xemu/crypto/secret.c

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crypto: add QCryptoSecret object class for password/key handling Introduce a new QCryptoSecret object class which will be used for providing passwords and keys to other objects which need sensitive credentials. The new object can provide secret values directly as properties, or indirectly via a file. The latter includes support for file descriptor passing syntax on UNIX platforms. Ordinarily passing secret values directly as properties is insecure, since they are visible in process listings, or in log files showing the CLI args / QMP commands. It is possible to use AES-256-CBC to encrypt the secret values though, in which case all that is visible is the ciphertext. For ad hoc developer testing though, it is fine to provide the secrets directly without encryption so this is not explicitly forbidden. The anticipated scenario is that libvirtd will create a random master key per QEMU instance (eg /var/run/libvirt/qemu/$VMNAME.key) and will use that key to encrypt all passwords it provides to QEMU via '-object secret,....'. This avoids the need for libvirt (or other mgmt apps) to worry about file descriptor passing. It also makes life easier for people who are scripting the management of QEMU, for whom FD passing is significantly more complex. Providing data inline (insecure, only for ad hoc dev testing) $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,data=letmein Providing data indirectly in raw format printf "letmein" > mypasswd.txt $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mypasswd.txt Providing data indirectly in base64 format $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 Providing data with encryption $QEMU -object secret,id=master0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 \ -object secret,id=sec0,data=[base64 ciphertext],\ keyid=master0,iv=[base64 IV],format=base64 Note that 'format' here refers to the format of the ciphertext data. The decrypted data must always be in raw byte format. More examples are shown in the updated docs. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-10-14 08:58:38 +00:00
/*
* QEMU crypto secret support
*
* Copyright (c) 2015 Red Hat, Inc.
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
crypto: add QCryptoSecret object class for password/key handling Introduce a new QCryptoSecret object class which will be used for providing passwords and keys to other objects which need sensitive credentials. The new object can provide secret values directly as properties, or indirectly via a file. The latter includes support for file descriptor passing syntax on UNIX platforms. Ordinarily passing secret values directly as properties is insecure, since they are visible in process listings, or in log files showing the CLI args / QMP commands. It is possible to use AES-256-CBC to encrypt the secret values though, in which case all that is visible is the ciphertext. For ad hoc developer testing though, it is fine to provide the secrets directly without encryption so this is not explicitly forbidden. The anticipated scenario is that libvirtd will create a random master key per QEMU instance (eg /var/run/libvirt/qemu/$VMNAME.key) and will use that key to encrypt all passwords it provides to QEMU via '-object secret,....'. This avoids the need for libvirt (or other mgmt apps) to worry about file descriptor passing. It also makes life easier for people who are scripting the management of QEMU, for whom FD passing is significantly more complex. Providing data inline (insecure, only for ad hoc dev testing) $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,data=letmein Providing data indirectly in raw format printf "letmein" > mypasswd.txt $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mypasswd.txt Providing data indirectly in base64 format $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 Providing data with encryption $QEMU -object secret,id=master0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 \ -object secret,id=sec0,data=[base64 ciphertext],\ keyid=master0,iv=[base64 IV],format=base64 Note that 'format' here refers to the format of the ciphertext data. The decrypted data must always be in raw byte format. More examples are shown in the updated docs. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-10-14 08:58:38 +00:00
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include "qemu/osdep.h"
crypto: add QCryptoSecret object class for password/key handling Introduce a new QCryptoSecret object class which will be used for providing passwords and keys to other objects which need sensitive credentials. The new object can provide secret values directly as properties, or indirectly via a file. The latter includes support for file descriptor passing syntax on UNIX platforms. Ordinarily passing secret values directly as properties is insecure, since they are visible in process listings, or in log files showing the CLI args / QMP commands. It is possible to use AES-256-CBC to encrypt the secret values though, in which case all that is visible is the ciphertext. For ad hoc developer testing though, it is fine to provide the secrets directly without encryption so this is not explicitly forbidden. The anticipated scenario is that libvirtd will create a random master key per QEMU instance (eg /var/run/libvirt/qemu/$VMNAME.key) and will use that key to encrypt all passwords it provides to QEMU via '-object secret,....'. This avoids the need for libvirt (or other mgmt apps) to worry about file descriptor passing. It also makes life easier for people who are scripting the management of QEMU, for whom FD passing is significantly more complex. Providing data inline (insecure, only for ad hoc dev testing) $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,data=letmein Providing data indirectly in raw format printf "letmein" > mypasswd.txt $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mypasswd.txt Providing data indirectly in base64 format $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 Providing data with encryption $QEMU -object secret,id=master0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 \ -object secret,id=sec0,data=[base64 ciphertext],\ keyid=master0,iv=[base64 IV],format=base64 Note that 'format' here refers to the format of the ciphertext data. The decrypted data must always be in raw byte format. More examples are shown in the updated docs. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-10-14 08:58:38 +00:00
#include "crypto/secret.h"
2016-03-14 08:01:28 +00:00
#include "qapi/error.h"
crypto: add QCryptoSecret object class for password/key handling Introduce a new QCryptoSecret object class which will be used for providing passwords and keys to other objects which need sensitive credentials. The new object can provide secret values directly as properties, or indirectly via a file. The latter includes support for file descriptor passing syntax on UNIX platforms. Ordinarily passing secret values directly as properties is insecure, since they are visible in process listings, or in log files showing the CLI args / QMP commands. It is possible to use AES-256-CBC to encrypt the secret values though, in which case all that is visible is the ciphertext. For ad hoc developer testing though, it is fine to provide the secrets directly without encryption so this is not explicitly forbidden. The anticipated scenario is that libvirtd will create a random master key per QEMU instance (eg /var/run/libvirt/qemu/$VMNAME.key) and will use that key to encrypt all passwords it provides to QEMU via '-object secret,....'. This avoids the need for libvirt (or other mgmt apps) to worry about file descriptor passing. It also makes life easier for people who are scripting the management of QEMU, for whom FD passing is significantly more complex. Providing data inline (insecure, only for ad hoc dev testing) $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,data=letmein Providing data indirectly in raw format printf "letmein" > mypasswd.txt $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mypasswd.txt Providing data indirectly in base64 format $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 Providing data with encryption $QEMU -object secret,id=master0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 \ -object secret,id=sec0,data=[base64 ciphertext],\ keyid=master0,iv=[base64 IV],format=base64 Note that 'format' here refers to the format of the ciphertext data. The decrypted data must always be in raw byte format. More examples are shown in the updated docs. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-10-14 08:58:38 +00:00
#include "qom/object_interfaces.h"
#include "qemu/module.h"
crypto: add QCryptoSecret object class for password/key handling Introduce a new QCryptoSecret object class which will be used for providing passwords and keys to other objects which need sensitive credentials. The new object can provide secret values directly as properties, or indirectly via a file. The latter includes support for file descriptor passing syntax on UNIX platforms. Ordinarily passing secret values directly as properties is insecure, since they are visible in process listings, or in log files showing the CLI args / QMP commands. It is possible to use AES-256-CBC to encrypt the secret values though, in which case all that is visible is the ciphertext. For ad hoc developer testing though, it is fine to provide the secrets directly without encryption so this is not explicitly forbidden. The anticipated scenario is that libvirtd will create a random master key per QEMU instance (eg /var/run/libvirt/qemu/$VMNAME.key) and will use that key to encrypt all passwords it provides to QEMU via '-object secret,....'. This avoids the need for libvirt (or other mgmt apps) to worry about file descriptor passing. It also makes life easier for people who are scripting the management of QEMU, for whom FD passing is significantly more complex. Providing data inline (insecure, only for ad hoc dev testing) $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,data=letmein Providing data indirectly in raw format printf "letmein" > mypasswd.txt $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mypasswd.txt Providing data indirectly in base64 format $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 Providing data with encryption $QEMU -object secret,id=master0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 \ -object secret,id=sec0,data=[base64 ciphertext],\ keyid=master0,iv=[base64 IV],format=base64 Note that 'format' here refers to the format of the ciphertext data. The decrypted data must always be in raw byte format. More examples are shown in the updated docs. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-10-14 08:58:38 +00:00
#include "trace.h"
static void
qcrypto_secret_load_data(QCryptoSecretCommon *sec_common,
crypto: add QCryptoSecret object class for password/key handling Introduce a new QCryptoSecret object class which will be used for providing passwords and keys to other objects which need sensitive credentials. The new object can provide secret values directly as properties, or indirectly via a file. The latter includes support for file descriptor passing syntax on UNIX platforms. Ordinarily passing secret values directly as properties is insecure, since they are visible in process listings, or in log files showing the CLI args / QMP commands. It is possible to use AES-256-CBC to encrypt the secret values though, in which case all that is visible is the ciphertext. For ad hoc developer testing though, it is fine to provide the secrets directly without encryption so this is not explicitly forbidden. The anticipated scenario is that libvirtd will create a random master key per QEMU instance (eg /var/run/libvirt/qemu/$VMNAME.key) and will use that key to encrypt all passwords it provides to QEMU via '-object secret,....'. This avoids the need for libvirt (or other mgmt apps) to worry about file descriptor passing. It also makes life easier for people who are scripting the management of QEMU, for whom FD passing is significantly more complex. Providing data inline (insecure, only for ad hoc dev testing) $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,data=letmein Providing data indirectly in raw format printf "letmein" > mypasswd.txt $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mypasswd.txt Providing data indirectly in base64 format $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 Providing data with encryption $QEMU -object secret,id=master0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 \ -object secret,id=sec0,data=[base64 ciphertext],\ keyid=master0,iv=[base64 IV],format=base64 Note that 'format' here refers to the format of the ciphertext data. The decrypted data must always be in raw byte format. More examples are shown in the updated docs. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-10-14 08:58:38 +00:00
uint8_t **output,
size_t *outputlen,
Error **errp)
{
char *data = NULL;
size_t length = 0;
GError *gerr = NULL;
QCryptoSecret *secret = QCRYPTO_SECRET(sec_common);
crypto: add QCryptoSecret object class for password/key handling Introduce a new QCryptoSecret object class which will be used for providing passwords and keys to other objects which need sensitive credentials. The new object can provide secret values directly as properties, or indirectly via a file. The latter includes support for file descriptor passing syntax on UNIX platforms. Ordinarily passing secret values directly as properties is insecure, since they are visible in process listings, or in log files showing the CLI args / QMP commands. It is possible to use AES-256-CBC to encrypt the secret values though, in which case all that is visible is the ciphertext. For ad hoc developer testing though, it is fine to provide the secrets directly without encryption so this is not explicitly forbidden. The anticipated scenario is that libvirtd will create a random master key per QEMU instance (eg /var/run/libvirt/qemu/$VMNAME.key) and will use that key to encrypt all passwords it provides to QEMU via '-object secret,....'. This avoids the need for libvirt (or other mgmt apps) to worry about file descriptor passing. It also makes life easier for people who are scripting the management of QEMU, for whom FD passing is significantly more complex. Providing data inline (insecure, only for ad hoc dev testing) $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,data=letmein Providing data indirectly in raw format printf "letmein" > mypasswd.txt $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mypasswd.txt Providing data indirectly in base64 format $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 Providing data with encryption $QEMU -object secret,id=master0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 \ -object secret,id=sec0,data=[base64 ciphertext],\ keyid=master0,iv=[base64 IV],format=base64 Note that 'format' here refers to the format of the ciphertext data. The decrypted data must always be in raw byte format. More examples are shown in the updated docs. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-10-14 08:58:38 +00:00
*output = NULL;
*outputlen = 0;
if (secret->file) {
if (secret->data) {
error_setg(errp,
"'file' and 'data' are mutually exclusive");
return;
}
if (!g_file_get_contents(secret->file, &data, &length, &gerr)) {
error_setg(errp,
"Unable to read %s: %s",
secret->file, gerr->message);
g_error_free(gerr);
return;
}
*output = (uint8_t *)data;
*outputlen = length;
} else if (secret->data) {
*outputlen = strlen(secret->data);
*output = (uint8_t *)g_strdup(secret->data);
} else {
error_setg(errp, "Either 'file' or 'data' must be provided");
}
}
static void
qcrypto_secret_prop_set_data(Object *obj,
const char *value,
Error **errp)
{
QCryptoSecret *secret = QCRYPTO_SECRET(obj);
g_free(secret->data);
secret->data = g_strdup(value);
}
static char *
qcrypto_secret_prop_get_data(Object *obj,
Error **errp)
{
QCryptoSecret *secret = QCRYPTO_SECRET(obj);
return g_strdup(secret->data);
}
static void
qcrypto_secret_prop_set_file(Object *obj,
const char *value,
Error **errp)
{
QCryptoSecret *secret = QCRYPTO_SECRET(obj);
g_free(secret->file);
secret->file = g_strdup(value);
}
static char *
qcrypto_secret_prop_get_file(Object *obj,
Error **errp)
{
QCryptoSecret *secret = QCRYPTO_SECRET(obj);
return g_strdup(secret->file);
}
static void
qcrypto_secret_complete(UserCreatable *uc, Error **errp)
{
qom: Put name parameter before value / visitor parameter The object_property_set_FOO() setters take property name and value in an unusual order: void object_property_set_FOO(Object *obj, FOO_TYPE value, const char *name, Error **errp) Having to pass value before name feels grating. Swap them. Same for object_property_set(), object_property_get(), and object_property_parse(). Convert callers with this Coccinelle script: @@ identifier fun = { object_property_get, object_property_parse, object_property_set_str, object_property_set_link, object_property_set_bool, object_property_set_int, object_property_set_uint, object_property_set, object_property_set_qobject }; expression obj, v, name, errp; @@ - fun(obj, v, name, errp) + fun(obj, name, v, errp) Chokes on hw/arm/musicpal.c's lcd_refresh() with the unhelpful error message "no position information". Convert that one manually. Fails to convert hw/arm/armsse.c, because Coccinelle gets confused by ARMSSE being used both as typedef and function-like macro there. Convert manually. Fails to convert hw/rx/rx-gdbsim.c, because Coccinelle gets confused by RXCPU being used both as typedef and function-like macro there. Convert manually. The other files using RXCPU that way don't need conversion. Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com> Message-Id: <20200707160613.848843-27-armbru@redhat.com> [Straightforwad conflict with commit 2336172d9b "audio: set default value for pcspk.iobase property" resolved]
2020-07-07 16:05:54 +00:00
object_property_set_bool(OBJECT(uc), "loaded", true, errp);
crypto: add QCryptoSecret object class for password/key handling Introduce a new QCryptoSecret object class which will be used for providing passwords and keys to other objects which need sensitive credentials. The new object can provide secret values directly as properties, or indirectly via a file. The latter includes support for file descriptor passing syntax on UNIX platforms. Ordinarily passing secret values directly as properties is insecure, since they are visible in process listings, or in log files showing the CLI args / QMP commands. It is possible to use AES-256-CBC to encrypt the secret values though, in which case all that is visible is the ciphertext. For ad hoc developer testing though, it is fine to provide the secrets directly without encryption so this is not explicitly forbidden. The anticipated scenario is that libvirtd will create a random master key per QEMU instance (eg /var/run/libvirt/qemu/$VMNAME.key) and will use that key to encrypt all passwords it provides to QEMU via '-object secret,....'. This avoids the need for libvirt (or other mgmt apps) to worry about file descriptor passing. It also makes life easier for people who are scripting the management of QEMU, for whom FD passing is significantly more complex. Providing data inline (insecure, only for ad hoc dev testing) $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,data=letmein Providing data indirectly in raw format printf "letmein" > mypasswd.txt $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mypasswd.txt Providing data indirectly in base64 format $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 Providing data with encryption $QEMU -object secret,id=master0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 \ -object secret,id=sec0,data=[base64 ciphertext],\ keyid=master0,iv=[base64 IV],format=base64 Note that 'format' here refers to the format of the ciphertext data. The decrypted data must always be in raw byte format. More examples are shown in the updated docs. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-10-14 08:58:38 +00:00
}
static void
qcrypto_secret_finalize(Object *obj)
{
QCryptoSecret *secret = QCRYPTO_SECRET(obj);
g_free(secret->file);
g_free(secret->data);
}
static void
qcrypto_secret_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
{
QCryptoSecretCommonClass *sic = QCRYPTO_SECRET_COMMON_CLASS(oc);
sic->load_data = qcrypto_secret_load_data;
crypto: add QCryptoSecret object class for password/key handling Introduce a new QCryptoSecret object class which will be used for providing passwords and keys to other objects which need sensitive credentials. The new object can provide secret values directly as properties, or indirectly via a file. The latter includes support for file descriptor passing syntax on UNIX platforms. Ordinarily passing secret values directly as properties is insecure, since they are visible in process listings, or in log files showing the CLI args / QMP commands. It is possible to use AES-256-CBC to encrypt the secret values though, in which case all that is visible is the ciphertext. For ad hoc developer testing though, it is fine to provide the secrets directly without encryption so this is not explicitly forbidden. The anticipated scenario is that libvirtd will create a random master key per QEMU instance (eg /var/run/libvirt/qemu/$VMNAME.key) and will use that key to encrypt all passwords it provides to QEMU via '-object secret,....'. This avoids the need for libvirt (or other mgmt apps) to worry about file descriptor passing. It also makes life easier for people who are scripting the management of QEMU, for whom FD passing is significantly more complex. Providing data inline (insecure, only for ad hoc dev testing) $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,data=letmein Providing data indirectly in raw format printf "letmein" > mypasswd.txt $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mypasswd.txt Providing data indirectly in base64 format $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 Providing data with encryption $QEMU -object secret,id=master0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 \ -object secret,id=sec0,data=[base64 ciphertext],\ keyid=master0,iv=[base64 IV],format=base64 Note that 'format' here refers to the format of the ciphertext data. The decrypted data must always be in raw byte format. More examples are shown in the updated docs. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-10-14 08:58:38 +00:00
UserCreatableClass *ucc = USER_CREATABLE_CLASS(oc);
crypto: add QCryptoSecret object class for password/key handling Introduce a new QCryptoSecret object class which will be used for providing passwords and keys to other objects which need sensitive credentials. The new object can provide secret values directly as properties, or indirectly via a file. The latter includes support for file descriptor passing syntax on UNIX platforms. Ordinarily passing secret values directly as properties is insecure, since they are visible in process listings, or in log files showing the CLI args / QMP commands. It is possible to use AES-256-CBC to encrypt the secret values though, in which case all that is visible is the ciphertext. For ad hoc developer testing though, it is fine to provide the secrets directly without encryption so this is not explicitly forbidden. The anticipated scenario is that libvirtd will create a random master key per QEMU instance (eg /var/run/libvirt/qemu/$VMNAME.key) and will use that key to encrypt all passwords it provides to QEMU via '-object secret,....'. This avoids the need for libvirt (or other mgmt apps) to worry about file descriptor passing. It also makes life easier for people who are scripting the management of QEMU, for whom FD passing is significantly more complex. Providing data inline (insecure, only for ad hoc dev testing) $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,data=letmein Providing data indirectly in raw format printf "letmein" > mypasswd.txt $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mypasswd.txt Providing data indirectly in base64 format $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 Providing data with encryption $QEMU -object secret,id=master0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 \ -object secret,id=sec0,data=[base64 ciphertext],\ keyid=master0,iv=[base64 IV],format=base64 Note that 'format' here refers to the format of the ciphertext data. The decrypted data must always be in raw byte format. More examples are shown in the updated docs. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-10-14 08:58:38 +00:00
ucc->complete = qcrypto_secret_complete;
object_class_property_add_str(oc, "data",
qcrypto_secret_prop_get_data,
qom: Drop parameter @errp of object_property_add() & friends The only way object_property_add() can fail is when a property with the same name already exists. Since our property names are all hardcoded, failure is a programming error, and the appropriate way to handle it is passing &error_abort. Same for its variants, except for object_property_add_child(), which additionally fails when the child already has a parent. Parentage is also under program control, so this is a programming error, too. We have a bit over 500 callers. Almost half of them pass &error_abort, slightly fewer ignore errors, one test case handles errors, and the remaining few callers pass them to their own callers. The previous few commits demonstrated once again that ignoring programming errors is a bad idea. Of the few ones that pass on errors, several violate the Error API. The Error ** argument must be NULL, &error_abort, &error_fatal, or a pointer to a variable containing NULL. Passing an argument of the latter kind twice without clearing it in between is wrong: if the first call sets an error, it no longer points to NULL for the second call. ich9_pm_add_properties(), sparc32_ledma_realize(), sparc32_dma_realize(), xilinx_axidma_realize(), xilinx_enet_realize() are wrong that way. When the one appropriate choice of argument is &error_abort, letting users pick the argument is a bad idea. Drop parameter @errp and assert the preconditions instead. There's one exception to "duplicate property name is a programming error": the way object_property_add() implements the magic (and undocumented) "automatic arrayification". Don't drop @errp there. Instead, rename object_property_add() to object_property_try_add(), and add the obvious wrapper object_property_add(). Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200505152926.18877-15-armbru@redhat.com> [Two semantic rebase conflicts resolved]
2020-05-05 15:29:22 +00:00
qcrypto_secret_prop_set_data);
object_class_property_add_str(oc, "file",
qcrypto_secret_prop_get_file,
qom: Drop parameter @errp of object_property_add() & friends The only way object_property_add() can fail is when a property with the same name already exists. Since our property names are all hardcoded, failure is a programming error, and the appropriate way to handle it is passing &error_abort. Same for its variants, except for object_property_add_child(), which additionally fails when the child already has a parent. Parentage is also under program control, so this is a programming error, too. We have a bit over 500 callers. Almost half of them pass &error_abort, slightly fewer ignore errors, one test case handles errors, and the remaining few callers pass them to their own callers. The previous few commits demonstrated once again that ignoring programming errors is a bad idea. Of the few ones that pass on errors, several violate the Error API. The Error ** argument must be NULL, &error_abort, &error_fatal, or a pointer to a variable containing NULL. Passing an argument of the latter kind twice without clearing it in between is wrong: if the first call sets an error, it no longer points to NULL for the second call. ich9_pm_add_properties(), sparc32_ledma_realize(), sparc32_dma_realize(), xilinx_axidma_realize(), xilinx_enet_realize() are wrong that way. When the one appropriate choice of argument is &error_abort, letting users pick the argument is a bad idea. Drop parameter @errp and assert the preconditions instead. There's one exception to "duplicate property name is a programming error": the way object_property_add() implements the magic (and undocumented) "automatic arrayification". Don't drop @errp there. Instead, rename object_property_add() to object_property_try_add(), and add the obvious wrapper object_property_add(). Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200505152926.18877-15-armbru@redhat.com> [Two semantic rebase conflicts resolved]
2020-05-05 15:29:22 +00:00
qcrypto_secret_prop_set_file);
crypto: add QCryptoSecret object class for password/key handling Introduce a new QCryptoSecret object class which will be used for providing passwords and keys to other objects which need sensitive credentials. The new object can provide secret values directly as properties, or indirectly via a file. The latter includes support for file descriptor passing syntax on UNIX platforms. Ordinarily passing secret values directly as properties is insecure, since they are visible in process listings, or in log files showing the CLI args / QMP commands. It is possible to use AES-256-CBC to encrypt the secret values though, in which case all that is visible is the ciphertext. For ad hoc developer testing though, it is fine to provide the secrets directly without encryption so this is not explicitly forbidden. The anticipated scenario is that libvirtd will create a random master key per QEMU instance (eg /var/run/libvirt/qemu/$VMNAME.key) and will use that key to encrypt all passwords it provides to QEMU via '-object secret,....'. This avoids the need for libvirt (or other mgmt apps) to worry about file descriptor passing. It also makes life easier for people who are scripting the management of QEMU, for whom FD passing is significantly more complex. Providing data inline (insecure, only for ad hoc dev testing) $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,data=letmein Providing data indirectly in raw format printf "letmein" > mypasswd.txt $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mypasswd.txt Providing data indirectly in base64 format $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 Providing data with encryption $QEMU -object secret,id=master0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 \ -object secret,id=sec0,data=[base64 ciphertext],\ keyid=master0,iv=[base64 IV],format=base64 Note that 'format' here refers to the format of the ciphertext data. The decrypted data must always be in raw byte format. More examples are shown in the updated docs. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-10-14 08:58:38 +00:00
}
static const TypeInfo qcrypto_secret_info = {
.parent = TYPE_QCRYPTO_SECRET_COMMON,
crypto: add QCryptoSecret object class for password/key handling Introduce a new QCryptoSecret object class which will be used for providing passwords and keys to other objects which need sensitive credentials. The new object can provide secret values directly as properties, or indirectly via a file. The latter includes support for file descriptor passing syntax on UNIX platforms. Ordinarily passing secret values directly as properties is insecure, since they are visible in process listings, or in log files showing the CLI args / QMP commands. It is possible to use AES-256-CBC to encrypt the secret values though, in which case all that is visible is the ciphertext. For ad hoc developer testing though, it is fine to provide the secrets directly without encryption so this is not explicitly forbidden. The anticipated scenario is that libvirtd will create a random master key per QEMU instance (eg /var/run/libvirt/qemu/$VMNAME.key) and will use that key to encrypt all passwords it provides to QEMU via '-object secret,....'. This avoids the need for libvirt (or other mgmt apps) to worry about file descriptor passing. It also makes life easier for people who are scripting the management of QEMU, for whom FD passing is significantly more complex. Providing data inline (insecure, only for ad hoc dev testing) $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,data=letmein Providing data indirectly in raw format printf "letmein" > mypasswd.txt $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mypasswd.txt Providing data indirectly in base64 format $QEMU -object secret,id=sec0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 Providing data with encryption $QEMU -object secret,id=master0,file=mykey.b64,format=base64 \ -object secret,id=sec0,data=[base64 ciphertext],\ keyid=master0,iv=[base64 IV],format=base64 Note that 'format' here refers to the format of the ciphertext data. The decrypted data must always be in raw byte format. More examples are shown in the updated docs. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-10-14 08:58:38 +00:00
.name = TYPE_QCRYPTO_SECRET,
.instance_size = sizeof(QCryptoSecret),
.instance_finalize = qcrypto_secret_finalize,
.class_size = sizeof(QCryptoSecretClass),
.class_init = qcrypto_secret_class_init,
.interfaces = (InterfaceInfo[]) {
{ TYPE_USER_CREATABLE },
{ }
}
};
static void
qcrypto_secret_register_types(void)
{
type_register_static(&qcrypto_secret_info);
}
type_init(qcrypto_secret_register_types);