The local_mknod() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) mknod() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
path elements
(3) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
elements but the rightmost one
(4) local_post_create_passthrough() which calls in turn lchown() and
chmod(), both functions also following symbolic links
This patch converts local_mknod() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
mknodat() to fix (1), as well as local_set_xattrat() and
local_set_mapped_file_attrat() to fix (2) and (3) respectively.
A new local_set_cred_passthrough() helper based on fchownat() and
fchmodat_nofollow() is introduced as a replacement to
local_post_create_passthrough() to fix (4).
The mapped and mapped-file security modes are supposed to be identical,
except for the place where credentials and file modes are stored. While
here, we also make that explicit by sharing the call to mknodat().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_symlink() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) symlink() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) open(O_NOFOLLOW) which follows symbolic links for all path elements but
the rightmost one
(3) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
path elements
(4) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
elements but the rightmost one
This patch converts local_symlink() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
symlinkat() to fix (1), openat(O_NOFOLLOW) to fix (2), as well as
local_set_xattrat() and local_set_mapped_file_attrat() to fix (3) and
(4) respectively.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_chown() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) lchown() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
path elements
(3) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
elements but the rightmost one
This patch converts local_chown() to rely on open_nofollow() and
fchownat() to fix (1), as well as local_set_xattrat() and
local_set_mapped_file_attrat() to fix (2) and (3) respectively.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_chmod() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) chmod() which follows symbolic links for all path elements
(2) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
path elements
(3) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
elements but the rightmost one
We would need fchmodat() to implement AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW to fix (1). This
isn't the case on linux unfortunately: the kernel doesn't even have a flags
argument to the syscall :-\ It is impossible to fix it in userspace in
a race-free manner. This patch hence converts local_chmod() to rely on
open_nofollow() and fchmod(). This fixes the vulnerability but introduces
a limitation: the target file must readable and/or writable for the call
to openat() to succeed.
It introduces a local_set_xattrat() replacement to local_set_xattr()
based on fsetxattrat() to fix (2), and a local_set_mapped_file_attrat()
replacement to local_set_mapped_file_attr() based on local_fopenat()
and mkdirat() to fix (3). No effort is made to factor out code because
both local_set_xattr() and local_set_mapped_file_attr() will be dropped
when all users have been converted to use the "at" versions.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_link() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it calls:
(1) link() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) local_create_mapped_attr_dir()->mkdir() which follows symbolic links
for all path elements but the rightmost one
This patch converts local_link() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and linkat()
to fix (1), mkdirat() to fix (2).
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
When using the mapped-file security model, we also have to create a link
for the metadata file if it exists. In case of failure, we should rollback.
That's what this patch does.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_rename() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
uses rename() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but the
rightmost one.
This patch simply transforms local_rename() into a wrapper around
local_renameat() which is symlink-attack safe.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_renameat() callback is currently a wrapper around local_rename()
which is vulnerable to symlink attacks.
This patch rewrites local_renameat() to have its own implementation, based
on local_opendir_nofollow() and renameat().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_lstat() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) lstat() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) getxattr() which follows symbolic links in all path elements
(3) local_mapped_file_attr()->local_fopen()->openat(O_NOFOLLOW) which
follows symbolic links in all path elements but the rightmost
one
This patch converts local_lstat() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
fstatat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) to fix (1), fgetxattrat_nofollow() to
fix (2).
A new local_fopenat() helper is introduced as a replacement to
local_fopen() to fix (3). No effort is made to factor out code
because local_fopen() will be dropped when all users have been
converted to call local_fopenat().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_readlink() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) open(O_NOFOLLOW) which follows symbolic links for all path elements but
the rightmost one
(2) readlink() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
rightmost one
This patch converts local_readlink() to rely on open_nofollow() to fix (1)
and opendir_nofollow(), readlinkat() to fix (2).
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_truncate() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because
it calls truncate() which follows symbolic links in all path elements.
This patch converts local_truncate() to rely on open_nofollow() and
ftruncate() instead.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_statfs() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls statfs() which follows symbolic links in all path elements.
This patch converts local_statfs() to rely on open_nofollow() and fstatfs()
instead.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_utimensat() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls qemu_utimens()->utimensat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) which follows symbolic
links in all path elements but the rightmost one or qemu_utimens()->utimes()
which follows symbolic links for all path elements.
This patch converts local_utimensat() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
utimensat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) directly instead of using qemu_utimens().
It is hence assumed that the OS supports utimensat(), i.e. has glibc 2.6
or higher and linux 2.6.22 or higher, which seems reasonable nowadays.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_remove() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:
(1) lstat() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but the
rightmost one
(2) remove() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but the
rightmost one
This patch converts local_remove() to rely on opendir_nofollow(),
fstatat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) to fix (1) and unlinkat() to fix (2).
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_unlinkat() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls remove() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but the
rightmost one.
This patch converts local_unlinkat() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
unlinkat() instead.
Most of the code is moved to a separate local_unlinkat_common() helper
which will be reused in a subsequent patch to fix the same issue in
local_remove().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_lremovexattr() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because
it calls lremovexattr() which follows symbolic links in all path elements
but the rightmost one.
This patch introduces a helper to emulate the non-existing fremovexattrat()
function: it is implemented with /proc/self/fd which provides a trusted
path that can be safely passed to lremovexattr().
local_lremovexattr() is converted to use this helper and opendir_nofollow().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_lsetxattr() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because
it calls lsetxattr() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but
the rightmost one.
This patch introduces a helper to emulate the non-existing fsetxattrat()
function: it is implemented with /proc/self/fd which provides a trusted
path that can be safely passed to lsetxattr().
local_lsetxattr() is converted to use this helper and opendir_nofollow().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_llistxattr() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because
it calls llistxattr() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but
the rightmost one.
This patch introduces a helper to emulate the non-existing flistxattrat()
function: it is implemented with /proc/self/fd which provides a trusted
path that can be safely passed to llistxattr().
local_llistxattr() is converted to use this helper and opendir_nofollow().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_lgetxattr() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because
it calls lgetxattr() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but
the rightmost one.
This patch introduces a helper to emulate the non-existing fgetxattrat()
function: it is implemented with /proc/self/fd which provides a trusted
path that can be safely passed to lgetxattr().
local_lgetxattr() is converted to use this helper and opendir_nofollow().
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
The local_open() and local_opendir() callbacks are vulnerable to symlink
attacks because they call:
(1) open(O_NOFOLLOW) which follows symbolic links in all path elements but
the rightmost one
(2) opendir() which follows symbolic links in all path elements
This patch converts both callbacks to use new helpers based on
openat_nofollow() to only open files and directories if they are
below the virtfs shared folder
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
This patch opens the shared folder and caches the file descriptor, so that
it can be used to do symlink-safe path walk.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
When using the passthrough security mode, symbolic links created by the
guest are actual symbolic links on the host file system.
Since the resolution of symbolic links during path walk is supposed to
occur on the client side. The server should hence never receive any path
pointing to an actual symbolic link. This isn't guaranteed by the protocol
though, and malicious code in the guest can trick the server to issue
various syscalls on paths whose one or more elements are symbolic links.
In the case of the "local" backend using the "passthrough" or "none"
security modes, the guest can directly create symbolic links to arbitrary
locations on the host (as per spec). The "mapped-xattr" and "mapped-file"
security modes are also affected to a lesser extent as they require some
help from an external entity to create actual symbolic links on the host,
i.e. another guest using "passthrough" mode for example.
The current code hence relies on O_NOFOLLOW and "l*()" variants of system
calls. Unfortunately, this only applies to the rightmost path component.
A guest could maliciously replace any component in a trusted path with a
symbolic link. This could allow any guest to escape a virtfs shared folder.
This patch introduces a variant of the openat() syscall that successively
opens each path element with O_NOFOLLOW. When passing a file descriptor
pointing to a trusted directory, one is guaranteed to be returned a
file descriptor pointing to a path which is beneath the trusted directory.
This will be used by subsequent patches to implement symlink-safe path walk
for any access to the backend.
Symbolic links aren't the only threats actually: a malicious guest could
change a path element to point to other types of file with undesirable
effects:
- a named pipe or any other thing that would cause openat() to block
- a terminal device which would become QEMU's controlling terminal
These issues can be addressed with O_NONBLOCK and O_NOCTTY.
Two helpers are introduced: one to open intermediate path elements and one
to open the rightmost path element.
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(renamed openat_nofollow() to relative_openat_nofollow(),
assert path is relative and doesn't contain '//',
fixed side-effect in assert, Greg Kurz)
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
If these functions fail, they should not change *fs. Let's use local
variables to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
These functions are always called indirectly. It really doesn't make sense
for them to sit in a header file.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
XkbGetKeyboard does not work in XWayland and even on non-Wayland
X11 servers its use is discouraged:
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89240
This resolves a problem whereby QEMU prints
"could not lookup keycode name"
on startup when running under XWayland. Keymap handling is
however still broken after this commit, since Xwayland is
reporting a keymap we can't handle
"unknown keycodes `(unnamed)', please report to qemu-devel@nongnu.org"
NB, native Wayland support (which is the default under GTK3) is
not affected - only XWayland (which can be requested with GDK_BACKEND
on GTK3, and is the only option for GTK2).
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20170227132343.30824-1-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Helper function (and DisplayChangeListenerOps ptr) to disable scanouts.
Replaces using dpy_gl_scanout_texture with 0x0 size and no texture
specified.
Allows cleanups to make the io and gfx emulation code more readable.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1487669841-13668-3-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
We'll add a variant which accepts dmabufs soon. Change
the name so we can easily disturgish the two variants.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1487669841-13668-2-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
Crypto routines 'qcrypto_cipher_get_block_len' and
'qcrypto_cipher_get_key_len' return non-zero cipher block and key
lengths from static arrays 'alg_block_len[]' and 'alg_key_len[]'
respectively. Returning 'zero(0)' value from either of them would
likely lead to an error condition.
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
On error path, the 'salt' doesn't been freed thus leading
a memory leak. This patch avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
nodes[id].next is written by other threads. If atomic_read is not used
(matching atomic_set in mcs_mutex_lock!) the compiler can optimize the
whole "if" away!
Reported-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Message-id: 20170227111726.9237-1-pbonzini@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/artyom/tags/pull-sun4v-20170226' into staging
Pull request for Niagara patches 2017 02 26
# gpg: Signature made Sun 26 Feb 2017 21:56:06 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key 0x3360C3F7411A125F
# gpg: Good signature from "Artyom Tarasenko <atar4qemu@gmail.com>"
# gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
# gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
# Primary key fingerprint: 2AD8 6149 17F4 B2D7 05C0 BB12 3360 C3F7 411A 125F
* remotes/artyom/tags/pull-sun4v-20170226:
niagara: check if a serial port is available
niagara: fail if a firmware file is missing
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
fail if a firmware file is missing and not qtest_enabled(),
the later is necessary to allow some basic tests if
firmware is not available
Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Artyom Tarasenko <atar4qemu@gmail.com>
Coverity points out (CID 1005725) that an error-exit path in tcp_listen()
will try to close(s) even if the reason it got there was that the
qemu_socket() failed and s was never opened. Not only that, this isn't even
the right function to use, because we need closesocket() to do the right
thing on Windows. Change to using the right function and only calling it if
needed.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
The mbuf code currently doesn't check the result of doing a malloc()
or realloc() of its data (spotted by Coverity, CID 1238946).
Since the m_inc() API assumes that extending an mbuf must succeed,
just convert to g_malloc() and g_free().
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Check the return value from qemu_socket() rather than trying to
pass it to bind() as an fd argument even if it's negative.
This wouldn't have caused any negative consequences, because
it won't be a valid fd number and the bind call will fail;
but Coverity complains (CID 1005723).
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/kevin/tags/for-upstream' into staging
Block layer patches
# gpg: Signature made Fri 24 Feb 2017 18:08:26 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key 0x7F09B272C88F2FD6
# gpg: Good signature from "Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>"
# Primary key fingerprint: DC3D EB15 9A9A F95D 3D74 56FE 7F09 B272 C88F 2FD6
* remotes/kevin/tags/for-upstream:
tests: Use opened block node for block job tests
vvfat: Use opened node as backing file
block: Add bdrv_new_open_driver()
block: Factor out bdrv_open_driver()
block: Use BlockBackend for image probing
block: Factor out bdrv_open_child_bs()
block: Attach bs->file only during .bdrv_open()
block: Pass BdrvChild to bdrv_truncate()
mirror: Resize active commit base in mirror_run()
qcow2: Use BB for resizing in qcow2_amend_options()
blockdev: Use BlockBackend to resize in qmp_block_resize()
iotests: Fix another race in 030
qemu-img: Improve documentation for PREALLOC_MODE_FALLOC
qemu-img: Truncate before full preallocation
qemu-img: Add tests for raw image preallocation
qemu-img: Do not truncate before preallocation
qemu-iotests: redirect nbd server stdout to /dev/null
qemu-iotests: add ability to exclude certain protocols from tests
qemu-iotests: Test 137 only supports 'file' protocol
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CHanges:
* Add the Boston board with fixing the make check issue on 32-bit hosts.
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/yongbok/tags/mips-20170224-2' into staging
MIPS patches 2017-02-24-2
CHanges:
* Add the Boston board with fixing the make check issue on 32-bit hosts.
# gpg: Signature made Fri 24 Feb 2017 11:43:45 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key 0x2238EB86D5F797C2
# gpg: Good signature from "Yongbok Kim <yongbok.kim@imgtec.com>"
# gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with sufficiently trusted signatures!
# gpg: It is not certain that the signature belongs to the owner.
# Primary key fingerprint: 8600 4CF5 3415 A5D9 4CFA 2B5C 2238 EB86 D5F7 97C2
* remotes/yongbok/tags/mips-20170224-2:
hw/mips: MIPS Boston board support
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
