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The platform specific details of mechanisms for implementing confidential guest support may require setup at various points during initialization. Thus, it's not really feasible to have a single cgs initialization hook, but instead each mechanism needs its own initialization calls in arch or machine specific code. However, to make it harder to have a bug where a mechanism isn't properly initialized under some circumstances, we want to have a common place, late in boot, where we verify that cgs has been initialized if it was requested. This patch introduces a ready flag to the ConfidentialGuestSupport base type to accomplish this, which we verify in qemu_machine_creation_done(). Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
63 lines
2.2 KiB
C
63 lines
2.2 KiB
C
/*
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* QEMU Confidential Guest support
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* This interface describes the common pieces between various
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* schemes for protecting guest memory or other state against a
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* compromised hypervisor. This includes memory encryption (AMD's
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* SEV and Intel's MKTME) or special protection modes (PEF on POWER,
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* or PV on s390x).
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*
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* Copyright Red Hat.
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*
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* Authors:
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* David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
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*
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* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
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* later. See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
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*
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*/
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#ifndef QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H
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#define QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H
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#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
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#include "qom/object.h"
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#define TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT "confidential-guest-support"
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OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport, CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)
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struct ConfidentialGuestSupport {
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Object parent;
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/*
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* ready: flag set by CGS initialization code once it's ready to
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* start executing instructions in a potentially-secure
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* guest
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*
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* The definition here is a bit fuzzy, because this is essentially
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* part of a self-sanity-check, rather than a strict mechanism.
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*
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* It's not feasible to have a single point in the common machine
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* init path to configure confidential guest support, because
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* different mechanisms have different interdependencies requiring
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* initialization in different places, often in arch or machine
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* type specific code. It's also usually not possible to check
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* for invalid configurations until that initialization code.
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* That means it would be very easy to have a bug allowing CGS
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* init to be bypassed entirely in certain configurations.
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*
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* Silently ignoring a requested security feature would be bad, so
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* to avoid that we check late in init that this 'ready' flag is
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* set if CGS was requested. If the CGS init hasn't happened, and
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* so 'ready' is not set, we'll abort.
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*/
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bool ready;
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};
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typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
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ObjectClass parent;
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} ConfidentialGuestSupportClass;
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#endif /* !CONFIG_USER_ONLY */
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#endif /* QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H */
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