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xemu/hw/intc/armv7m_nvic.c
Peter Maydell be32116e32 target/arm: v8M: Check state of exception being returned from 
In v8M, an attempt to return from an exception which is not
active is an illegal exception return. For this purpose,
exceptions which can configurably target either Secure or
NonSecure are not considered to be active if they are
configured for the opposite security state for the one
we're trying to return from (eg attempt to return from
an NS NMI but NMI targets Secure). In the pseudocode this
is handled by IsActiveForState().

Detect this case rather than counting an active exception
possibly of the wrong security state as being sufficient.

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20190617175317.27557-4-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-07-04 17:25:30 +01:00

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/*
* ARM Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller
*
* Copyright (c) 2006-2007 CodeSourcery.
* Written by Paul Brook
*
* This code is licensed under the GPL.
*
* The ARMv7M System controller is fairly tightly tied in with the
* NVIC. Much of that is also implemented here.
*/
#include "qemu/osdep.h"
#include "qapi/error.h"
#include "cpu.h"
#include "hw/sysbus.h"
#include "qemu/timer.h"
#include "hw/intc/armv7m_nvic.h"
#include "target/arm/cpu.h"
#include "exec/exec-all.h"
#include "qemu/log.h"
#include "qemu/module.h"
#include "trace.h"
/* IRQ number counting:
*
* the num-irq property counts the number of external IRQ lines
*
* NVICState::num_irq counts the total number of exceptions
* (external IRQs, the 15 internal exceptions including reset,
* and one for the unused exception number 0).
*
* NVIC_MAX_IRQ is the highest permitted number of external IRQ lines.
*
* NVIC_MAX_VECTORS is the highest permitted number of exceptions.
*
* Iterating through all exceptions should typically be done with
* for (i = 1; i < s->num_irq; i++) to avoid the unused slot 0.
*
* The external qemu_irq lines are the NVIC's external IRQ lines,
* so line 0 is exception 16.
*
* In the terminology of the architecture manual, "interrupts" are
* a subcategory of exception referring to the external interrupts
* (which are exception numbers NVIC_FIRST_IRQ and upward).
* For historical reasons QEMU tends to use "interrupt" and
* "exception" more or less interchangeably.
*/
#define NVIC_FIRST_IRQ NVIC_INTERNAL_VECTORS
#define NVIC_MAX_IRQ (NVIC_MAX_VECTORS - NVIC_FIRST_IRQ)
/* Effective running priority of the CPU when no exception is active
* (higher than the highest possible priority value)
*/
#define NVIC_NOEXC_PRIO 0x100
/* Maximum priority of non-secure exceptions when AIRCR.PRIS is set */
#define NVIC_NS_PRIO_LIMIT 0x80
static const uint8_t nvic_id[] = {
0x00, 0xb0, 0x1b, 0x00, 0x0d, 0xe0, 0x05, 0xb1
};
static int nvic_pending_prio(NVICState *s)
{
/* return the group priority of the current pending interrupt,
* or NVIC_NOEXC_PRIO if no interrupt is pending
*/
return s->vectpending_prio;
}
/* Return the value of the ISCR RETTOBASE bit:
* 1 if there is exactly one active exception
* 0 if there is more than one active exception
* UNKNOWN if there are no active exceptions (we choose 1,
* which matches the choice Cortex-M3 is documented as making).
*
* NB: some versions of the documentation talk about this
* counting "active exceptions other than the one shown by IPSR";
* this is only different in the obscure corner case where guest
* code has manually deactivated an exception and is about
* to fail an exception-return integrity check. The definition
* above is the one from the v8M ARM ARM and is also in line
* with the behaviour documented for the Cortex-M3.
*/
static bool nvic_rettobase(NVICState *s)
{
int irq, nhand = 0;
bool check_sec = arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY);
for (irq = ARMV7M_EXCP_RESET; irq < s->num_irq; irq++) {
if (s->vectors[irq].active ||
(check_sec && irq < NVIC_INTERNAL_VECTORS &&
s->sec_vectors[irq].active)) {
nhand++;
if (nhand == 2) {
return 0;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
/* Return the value of the ISCR ISRPENDING bit:
* 1 if an external interrupt is pending
* 0 if no external interrupt is pending
*/
static bool nvic_isrpending(NVICState *s)
{
int irq;
/* We can shortcut if the highest priority pending interrupt
* happens to be external or if there is nothing pending.
*/
if (s->vectpending > NVIC_FIRST_IRQ) {
return true;
}
if (s->vectpending == 0) {
return false;
}
for (irq = NVIC_FIRST_IRQ; irq < s->num_irq; irq++) {
if (s->vectors[irq].pending) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
static bool exc_is_banked(int exc)
{
/* Return true if this is one of the limited set of exceptions which
* are banked (and thus have state in sec_vectors[])
*/
return exc == ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD ||
exc == ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM ||
exc == ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE ||
exc == ARMV7M_EXCP_SVC ||
exc == ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV ||
exc == ARMV7M_EXCP_SYSTICK;
}
/* Return a mask word which clears the subpriority bits from
* a priority value for an M-profile exception, leaving only
* the group priority.
*/
static inline uint32_t nvic_gprio_mask(NVICState *s, bool secure)
{
return ~0U << (s->prigroup[secure] + 1);
}
static bool exc_targets_secure(NVICState *s, int exc)
{
/* Return true if this non-banked exception targets Secure state. */
if (!arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
return false;
}
if (exc >= NVIC_FIRST_IRQ) {
return !s->itns[exc];
}
/* Function shouldn't be called for banked exceptions. */
assert(!exc_is_banked(exc));
switch (exc) {
case ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI:
case ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS:
return !(s->cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK);
case ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE:
return true;
case ARMV7M_EXCP_DEBUG:
/* TODO: controlled by DEMCR.SDME, which we don't yet implement */
return false;
default:
/* reset, and reserved (unused) low exception numbers.
* We'll get called by code that loops through all the exception
* numbers, but it doesn't matter what we return here as these
* non-existent exceptions will never be pended or active.
*/
return true;
}
}
static int exc_group_prio(NVICState *s, int rawprio, bool targets_secure)
{
/* Return the group priority for this exception, given its raw
* (group-and-subgroup) priority value and whether it is targeting
* secure state or not.
*/
if (rawprio < 0) {
return rawprio;
}
rawprio &= nvic_gprio_mask(s, targets_secure);
/* AIRCR.PRIS causes us to squash all NS priorities into the
* lower half of the total range
*/
if (!targets_secure &&
(s->cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_PRIS_MASK)) {
rawprio = (rawprio >> 1) + NVIC_NS_PRIO_LIMIT;
}
return rawprio;
}
/* Recompute vectpending and exception_prio for a CPU which implements
* the Security extension
*/
static void nvic_recompute_state_secure(NVICState *s)
{
int i, bank;
int pend_prio = NVIC_NOEXC_PRIO;
int active_prio = NVIC_NOEXC_PRIO;
int pend_irq = 0;
bool pending_is_s_banked = false;
int pend_subprio = 0;
/* R_CQRV: precedence is by:
* - lowest group priority; if both the same then
* - lowest subpriority; if both the same then
* - lowest exception number; if both the same (ie banked) then
* - secure exception takes precedence
* Compare pseudocode RawExecutionPriority.
* Annoyingly, now we have two prigroup values (for S and NS)
* we can't do the loop comparison on raw priority values.
*/
for (i = 1; i < s->num_irq; i++) {
for (bank = M_REG_S; bank >= M_REG_NS; bank--) {
VecInfo *vec;
int prio, subprio;
bool targets_secure;
if (bank == M_REG_S) {
if (!exc_is_banked(i)) {
continue;
}
vec = &s->sec_vectors[i];
targets_secure = true;
} else {
vec = &s->vectors[i];
targets_secure = !exc_is_banked(i) && exc_targets_secure(s, i);
}
prio = exc_group_prio(s, vec->prio, targets_secure);
subprio = vec->prio & ~nvic_gprio_mask(s, targets_secure);
if (vec->enabled && vec->pending &&
((prio < pend_prio) ||
(prio == pend_prio && prio >= 0 && subprio < pend_subprio))) {
pend_prio = prio;
pend_subprio = subprio;
pend_irq = i;
pending_is_s_banked = (bank == M_REG_S);
}
if (vec->active && prio < active_prio) {
active_prio = prio;
}
}
}
s->vectpending_is_s_banked = pending_is_s_banked;
s->vectpending = pend_irq;
s->vectpending_prio = pend_prio;
s->exception_prio = active_prio;
trace_nvic_recompute_state_secure(s->vectpending,
s->vectpending_is_s_banked,
s->vectpending_prio,
s->exception_prio);
}
/* Recompute vectpending and exception_prio */
static void nvic_recompute_state(NVICState *s)
{
int i;
int pend_prio = NVIC_NOEXC_PRIO;
int active_prio = NVIC_NOEXC_PRIO;
int pend_irq = 0;
/* In theory we could write one function that handled both
* the "security extension present" and "not present"; however
* the security related changes significantly complicate the
* recomputation just by themselves and mixing both cases together
* would be even worse, so we retain a separate non-secure-only
* version for CPUs which don't implement the security extension.
*/
if (arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
nvic_recompute_state_secure(s);
return;
}
for (i = 1; i < s->num_irq; i++) {
VecInfo *vec = &s->vectors[i];
if (vec->enabled && vec->pending && vec->prio < pend_prio) {
pend_prio = vec->prio;
pend_irq = i;
}
if (vec->active && vec->prio < active_prio) {
active_prio = vec->prio;
}
}
if (active_prio > 0) {
active_prio &= nvic_gprio_mask(s, false);
}
if (pend_prio > 0) {
pend_prio &= nvic_gprio_mask(s, false);
}
s->vectpending = pend_irq;
s->vectpending_prio = pend_prio;
s->exception_prio = active_prio;
trace_nvic_recompute_state(s->vectpending,
s->vectpending_prio,
s->exception_prio);
}
/* Return the current execution priority of the CPU
* (equivalent to the pseudocode ExecutionPriority function).
* This is a value between -2 (NMI priority) and NVIC_NOEXC_PRIO.
*/
static inline int nvic_exec_prio(NVICState *s)
{
CPUARMState *env = &s->cpu->env;
int running = NVIC_NOEXC_PRIO;
if (env->v7m.basepri[M_REG_NS] > 0) {
running = exc_group_prio(s, env->v7m.basepri[M_REG_NS], M_REG_NS);
}
if (env->v7m.basepri[M_REG_S] > 0) {
int basepri = exc_group_prio(s, env->v7m.basepri[M_REG_S], M_REG_S);
if (running > basepri) {
running = basepri;
}
}
if (env->v7m.primask[M_REG_NS]) {
if (env->v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_PRIS_MASK) {
if (running > NVIC_NS_PRIO_LIMIT) {
running = NVIC_NS_PRIO_LIMIT;
}
} else {
running = 0;
}
}
if (env->v7m.primask[M_REG_S]) {
running = 0;
}
if (env->v7m.faultmask[M_REG_NS]) {
if (env->v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK) {
running = -1;
} else {
if (env->v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_PRIS_MASK) {
if (running > NVIC_NS_PRIO_LIMIT) {
running = NVIC_NS_PRIO_LIMIT;
}
} else {
running = 0;
}
}
}
if (env->v7m.faultmask[M_REG_S]) {
running = (env->v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK) ? -3 : -1;
}
/* consider priority of active handler */
return MIN(running, s->exception_prio);
}
bool armv7m_nvic_neg_prio_requested(void *opaque, bool secure)
{
/* Return true if the requested execution priority is negative
* for the specified security state, ie that security state
* has an active NMI or HardFault or has set its FAULTMASK.
* Note that this is not the same as whether the execution
* priority is actually negative (for instance AIRCR.PRIS may
* mean we don't allow FAULTMASK_NS to actually make the execution
* priority negative). Compare pseudocode IsReqExcPriNeg().
*/
NVICState *s = opaque;
if (s->cpu->env.v7m.faultmask[secure]) {
return true;
}
if (secure ? s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].active :
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].active) {
return true;
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI].active &&
exc_targets_secure(s, ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI) == secure) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
bool armv7m_nvic_can_take_pending_exception(void *opaque)
{
NVICState *s = opaque;
return nvic_exec_prio(s) > nvic_pending_prio(s);
}
int armv7m_nvic_raw_execution_priority(void *opaque)
{
NVICState *s = opaque;
return s->exception_prio;
}
/* caller must call nvic_irq_update() after this.
* secure indicates the bank to use for banked exceptions (we assert if
* we are passed secure=true for a non-banked exception).
*/
static void set_prio(NVICState *s, unsigned irq, bool secure, uint8_t prio)
{
assert(irq > ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI); /* only use for configurable prios */
assert(irq < s->num_irq);
prio &= MAKE_64BIT_MASK(8 - s->num_prio_bits, s->num_prio_bits);
if (secure) {
assert(exc_is_banked(irq));
s->sec_vectors[irq].prio = prio;
} else {
s->vectors[irq].prio = prio;
}
trace_nvic_set_prio(irq, secure, prio);
}
/* Return the current raw priority register value.
* secure indicates the bank to use for banked exceptions (we assert if
* we are passed secure=true for a non-banked exception).
*/
static int get_prio(NVICState *s, unsigned irq, bool secure)
{
assert(irq > ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI); /* only use for configurable prios */
assert(irq < s->num_irq);
if (secure) {
assert(exc_is_banked(irq));
return s->sec_vectors[irq].prio;
} else {
return s->vectors[irq].prio;
}
}
/* Recompute state and assert irq line accordingly.
* Must be called after changes to:
* vec->active, vec->enabled, vec->pending or vec->prio for any vector
* prigroup
*/
static void nvic_irq_update(NVICState *s)
{
int lvl;
int pend_prio;
nvic_recompute_state(s);
pend_prio = nvic_pending_prio(s);
/* Raise NVIC output if this IRQ would be taken, except that we
* ignore the effects of the BASEPRI, FAULTMASK and PRIMASK (which
* will be checked for in arm_v7m_cpu_exec_interrupt()); changes
* to those CPU registers don't cause us to recalculate the NVIC
* pending info.
*/
lvl = (pend_prio < s->exception_prio);
trace_nvic_irq_update(s->vectpending, pend_prio, s->exception_prio, lvl);
qemu_set_irq(s->excpout, lvl);
}
/**
* armv7m_nvic_clear_pending: mark the specified exception as not pending
* @opaque: the NVIC
* @irq: the exception number to mark as not pending
* @secure: false for non-banked exceptions or for the nonsecure
* version of a banked exception, true for the secure version of a banked
* exception.
*
* Marks the specified exception as not pending. Note that we will assert()
* if @secure is true and @irq does not specify one of the fixed set
* of architecturally banked exceptions.
*/
static void armv7m_nvic_clear_pending(void *opaque, int irq, bool secure)
{
NVICState *s = (NVICState *)opaque;
VecInfo *vec;
assert(irq > ARMV7M_EXCP_RESET && irq < s->num_irq);
if (secure) {
assert(exc_is_banked(irq));
vec = &s->sec_vectors[irq];
} else {
vec = &s->vectors[irq];
}
trace_nvic_clear_pending(irq, secure, vec->enabled, vec->prio);
if (vec->pending) {
vec->pending = 0;
nvic_irq_update(s);
}
}
static void do_armv7m_nvic_set_pending(void *opaque, int irq, bool secure,
bool derived)
{
/* Pend an exception, including possibly escalating it to HardFault.
*
* This function handles both "normal" pending of interrupts and
* exceptions, and also derived exceptions (ones which occur as
* a result of trying to take some other exception).
*
* If derived == true, the caller guarantees that we are part way through
* trying to take an exception (but have not yet called
* armv7m_nvic_acknowledge_irq() to make it active), and so:
* - s->vectpending is the "original exception" we were trying to take
* - irq is the "derived exception"
* - nvic_exec_prio(s) gives the priority before exception entry
* Here we handle the prioritization logic which the pseudocode puts
* in the DerivedLateArrival() function.
*/
NVICState *s = (NVICState *)opaque;
bool banked = exc_is_banked(irq);
VecInfo *vec;
bool targets_secure;
assert(irq > ARMV7M_EXCP_RESET && irq < s->num_irq);
assert(!secure || banked);
vec = (banked && secure) ? &s->sec_vectors[irq] : &s->vectors[irq];
targets_secure = banked ? secure : exc_targets_secure(s, irq);
trace_nvic_set_pending(irq, secure, targets_secure,
derived, vec->enabled, vec->prio);
if (derived) {
/* Derived exceptions are always synchronous. */
assert(irq >= ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD && irq < ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV);
if (irq == ARMV7M_EXCP_DEBUG &&
exc_group_prio(s, vec->prio, secure) >= nvic_exec_prio(s)) {
/* DebugMonitorFault, but its priority is lower than the
* preempted exception priority: just ignore it.
*/
return;
}
if (irq == ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD && vec->prio >= s->vectpending_prio) {
/* If this is a terminal exception (one which means we cannot
* take the original exception, like a failure to read its
* vector table entry), then we must take the derived exception.
* If the derived exception can't take priority over the
* original exception, then we go into Lockup.
*
* For QEMU, we rely on the fact that a derived exception is
* terminal if and only if it's reported to us as HardFault,
* which saves having to have an extra argument is_terminal
* that we'd only use in one place.
*/
cpu_abort(&s->cpu->parent_obj,
"Lockup: can't take terminal derived exception "
"(original exception priority %d)\n",
s->vectpending_prio);
}
/* We now continue with the same code as for a normal pending
* exception, which will cause us to pend the derived exception.
* We'll then take either the original or the derived exception
* based on which is higher priority by the usual mechanism
* for selecting the highest priority pending interrupt.
*/
}
if (irq >= ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD && irq < ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV) {
/* If a synchronous exception is pending then it may be
* escalated to HardFault if:
* * it is equal or lower priority to current execution
* * it is disabled
* (ie we need to take it immediately but we can't do so).
* Asynchronous exceptions (and interrupts) simply remain pending.
*
* For QEMU, we don't have any imprecise (asynchronous) faults,
* so we can assume that PREFETCH_ABORT and DATA_ABORT are always
* synchronous.
* Debug exceptions are awkward because only Debug exceptions
* resulting from the BKPT instruction should be escalated,
* but we don't currently implement any Debug exceptions other
* than those that result from BKPT, so we treat all debug exceptions
* as needing escalation.
*
* This all means we can identify whether to escalate based only on
* the exception number and don't (yet) need the caller to explicitly
* tell us whether this exception is synchronous or not.
*/
int running = nvic_exec_prio(s);
bool escalate = false;
if (exc_group_prio(s, vec->prio, secure) >= running) {
trace_nvic_escalate_prio(irq, vec->prio, running);
escalate = true;
} else if (!vec->enabled) {
trace_nvic_escalate_disabled(irq);
escalate = true;
}
if (escalate) {
/* We need to escalate this exception to a synchronous HardFault.
* If BFHFNMINS is set then we escalate to the banked HF for
* the target security state of the original exception; otherwise
* we take a Secure HardFault.
*/
irq = ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD;
if (arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) &&
(targets_secure ||
!(s->cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK))) {
vec = &s->sec_vectors[irq];
} else {
vec = &s->vectors[irq];
}
if (running <= vec->prio) {
/* We want to escalate to HardFault but we can't take the
* synchronous HardFault at this point either. This is a
* Lockup condition due to a guest bug. We don't model
* Lockup, so report via cpu_abort() instead.
*/
cpu_abort(&s->cpu->parent_obj,
"Lockup: can't escalate %d to HardFault "
"(current priority %d)\n", irq, running);
}
/* HF may be banked but there is only one shared HFSR */
s->cpu->env.v7m.hfsr |= R_V7M_HFSR_FORCED_MASK;
}
}
if (!vec->pending) {
vec->pending = 1;
nvic_irq_update(s);
}
}
void armv7m_nvic_set_pending(void *opaque, int irq, bool secure)
{
do_armv7m_nvic_set_pending(opaque, irq, secure, false);
}
void armv7m_nvic_set_pending_derived(void *opaque, int irq, bool secure)
{
do_armv7m_nvic_set_pending(opaque, irq, secure, true);
}
void armv7m_nvic_set_pending_lazyfp(void *opaque, int irq, bool secure)
{
/*
* Pend an exception during lazy FP stacking. This differs
* from the usual exception pending because the logic for
* whether we should escalate depends on the saved context
* in the FPCCR register, not on the current state of the CPU/NVIC.
*/
NVICState *s = (NVICState *)opaque;
bool banked = exc_is_banked(irq);
VecInfo *vec;
bool targets_secure;
bool escalate = false;
/*
* We will only look at bits in fpccr if this is a banked exception
* (in which case 'secure' tells us whether it is the S or NS version).
* All the bits for the non-banked exceptions are in fpccr_s.
*/
uint32_t fpccr_s = s->cpu->env.v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S];
uint32_t fpccr = s->cpu->env.v7m.fpccr[secure];
assert(irq > ARMV7M_EXCP_RESET && irq < s->num_irq);
assert(!secure || banked);
vec = (banked && secure) ? &s->sec_vectors[irq] : &s->vectors[irq];
targets_secure = banked ? secure : exc_targets_secure(s, irq);
switch (irq) {
case ARMV7M_EXCP_DEBUG:
if (!(fpccr_s & R_V7M_FPCCR_MONRDY_MASK)) {
/* Ignore DebugMonitor exception */
return;
}
break;
case ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM:
escalate = !(fpccr & R_V7M_FPCCR_MMRDY_MASK);
break;
case ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE:
escalate = !(fpccr & R_V7M_FPCCR_UFRDY_MASK);
break;
case ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS:
escalate = !(fpccr_s & R_V7M_FPCCR_BFRDY_MASK);
break;
case ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE:
escalate = !(fpccr_s & R_V7M_FPCCR_SFRDY_MASK);
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
if (escalate) {
/*
* Escalate to HardFault: faults that initially targeted Secure
* continue to do so, even if HF normally targets NonSecure.
*/
irq = ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD;
if (arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) &&
(targets_secure ||
!(s->cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK))) {
vec = &s->sec_vectors[irq];
} else {
vec = &s->vectors[irq];
}
}
if (!vec->enabled ||
nvic_exec_prio(s) <= exc_group_prio(s, vec->prio, secure)) {
if (!(fpccr_s & R_V7M_FPCCR_HFRDY_MASK)) {
/*
* We want to escalate to HardFault but the context the
* FP state belongs to prevents the exception pre-empting.
*/
cpu_abort(&s->cpu->parent_obj,
"Lockup: can't escalate to HardFault during "
"lazy FP register stacking\n");
}
}
if (escalate) {
s->cpu->env.v7m.hfsr |= R_V7M_HFSR_FORCED_MASK;
}
if (!vec->pending) {
vec->pending = 1;
/*
* We do not call nvic_irq_update(), because we know our caller
* is going to handle causing us to take the exception by
* raising EXCP_LAZYFP, so raising the IRQ line would be
* pointless extra work. We just need to recompute the
* priorities so that armv7m_nvic_can_take_pending_exception()
* returns the right answer.
*/
nvic_recompute_state(s);
}
}
/* Make pending IRQ active. */
void armv7m_nvic_acknowledge_irq(void *opaque)
{
NVICState *s = (NVICState *)opaque;
CPUARMState *env = &s->cpu->env;
const int pending = s->vectpending;
const int running = nvic_exec_prio(s);
VecInfo *vec;
assert(pending > ARMV7M_EXCP_RESET && pending < s->num_irq);
if (s->vectpending_is_s_banked) {
vec = &s->sec_vectors[pending];
} else {
vec = &s->vectors[pending];
}
assert(vec->enabled);
assert(vec->pending);
assert(s->vectpending_prio < running);
trace_nvic_acknowledge_irq(pending, s->vectpending_prio);
vec->active = 1;
vec->pending = 0;
write_v7m_exception(env, s->vectpending);
nvic_irq_update(s);
}
void armv7m_nvic_get_pending_irq_info(void *opaque,
int *pirq, bool *ptargets_secure)
{
NVICState *s = (NVICState *)opaque;
const int pending = s->vectpending;
bool targets_secure;
assert(pending > ARMV7M_EXCP_RESET && pending < s->num_irq);
if (s->vectpending_is_s_banked) {
targets_secure = true;
} else {
targets_secure = !exc_is_banked(pending) &&
exc_targets_secure(s, pending);
}
trace_nvic_get_pending_irq_info(pending, targets_secure);
*ptargets_secure = targets_secure;
*pirq = pending;
}
int armv7m_nvic_complete_irq(void *opaque, int irq, bool secure)
{
NVICState *s = (NVICState *)opaque;
VecInfo *vec = NULL;
int ret;
assert(irq > ARMV7M_EXCP_RESET && irq < s->num_irq);
/*
* For negative priorities, v8M will forcibly deactivate the appropriate
* NMI or HardFault regardless of what interrupt we're being asked to
* deactivate (compare the DeActivate() pseudocode). This is a guard
* against software returning from NMI or HardFault with a corrupted
* IPSR and leaving the CPU in a negative-priority state.
* v7M does not do this, but simply deactivates the requested interrupt.
*/
if (arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
switch (armv7m_nvic_raw_execution_priority(s)) {
case -1:
if (s->cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK) {
vec = &s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD];
} else {
vec = &s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD];
}
break;
case -2:
vec = &s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI];
break;
case -3:
vec = &s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD];
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (!vec) {
if (secure && exc_is_banked(irq)) {
vec = &s->sec_vectors[irq];
} else {
vec = &s->vectors[irq];
}
}
trace_nvic_complete_irq(irq, secure);
if (!vec->active) {
/* Tell the caller this was an illegal exception return */
return -1;
}
/*
* If this is a configurable exception and it is currently
* targeting the opposite security state from the one we're trying
* to complete it for, this counts as an illegal exception return.
* We still need to deactivate whatever vector the logic above has
* selected, though, as it might not be the same as the one for the
* requested exception number.
*/
if (!exc_is_banked(irq) && exc_targets_secure(s, irq) != secure) {
ret = -1;
} else {
ret = nvic_rettobase(s);
}
vec->active = 0;
if (vec->level) {
/* Re-pend the exception if it's still held high; only
* happens for extenal IRQs
*/
assert(irq >= NVIC_FIRST_IRQ);
vec->pending = 1;
}
nvic_irq_update(s);
return ret;
}
bool armv7m_nvic_get_ready_status(void *opaque, int irq, bool secure)
{
/*
* Return whether an exception is "ready", i.e. it is enabled and is
* configured at a priority which would allow it to interrupt the
* current execution priority.
*
* irq and secure have the same semantics as for armv7m_nvic_set_pending():
* for non-banked exceptions secure is always false; for banked exceptions
* it indicates which of the exceptions is required.
*/
NVICState *s = (NVICState *)opaque;
bool banked = exc_is_banked(irq);
VecInfo *vec;
int running = nvic_exec_prio(s);
assert(irq > ARMV7M_EXCP_RESET && irq < s->num_irq);
assert(!secure || banked);
/*
* HardFault is an odd special case: we always check against -1,
* even if we're secure and HardFault has priority -3; we never
* need to check for enabled state.
*/
if (irq == ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD) {
return running > -1;
}
vec = (banked && secure) ? &s->sec_vectors[irq] : &s->vectors[irq];
return vec->enabled &&
exc_group_prio(s, vec->prio, secure) < running;
}
/* callback when external interrupt line is changed */
static void set_irq_level(void *opaque, int n, int level)
{
NVICState *s = opaque;
VecInfo *vec;
n += NVIC_FIRST_IRQ;
assert(n >= NVIC_FIRST_IRQ && n < s->num_irq);
trace_nvic_set_irq_level(n, level);
/* The pending status of an external interrupt is
* latched on rising edge and exception handler return.
*
* Pulsing the IRQ will always run the handler
* once, and the handler will re-run until the
* level is low when the handler completes.
*/
vec = &s->vectors[n];
if (level != vec->level) {
vec->level = level;
if (level) {
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(s, n, false);
}
}
}
/* callback when external NMI line is changed */
static void nvic_nmi_trigger(void *opaque, int n, int level)
{
NVICState *s = opaque;
trace_nvic_set_nmi_level(level);
/*
* The architecture doesn't specify whether NMI should share
* the normal-interrupt behaviour of being resampled on
* exception handler return. We choose not to, so just
* set NMI pending here and don't track the current level.
*/
if (level) {
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(s, ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI, false);
}
}
static uint32_t nvic_readl(NVICState *s, uint32_t offset, MemTxAttrs attrs)
{
ARMCPU *cpu = s->cpu;
uint32_t val;
switch (offset) {
case 4: /* Interrupt Control Type. */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V7)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
return ((s->num_irq - NVIC_FIRST_IRQ) / 32) - 1;
case 0xc: /* CPPWR */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
/* We make the IMPDEF choice that nothing can ever go into a
* non-retentive power state, which allows us to RAZ/WI this.
*/
return 0;
case 0x380 ... 0x3bf: /* NVIC_ITNS<n> */
{
int startvec = 8 * (offset - 0x380) + NVIC_FIRST_IRQ;
int i;
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return 0;
}
val = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 32 && startvec + i < s->num_irq; i++) {
if (s->itns[startvec + i]) {
val |= (1 << i);
}
}
return val;
}
case 0xd00: /* CPUID Base. */
return cpu->midr;
case 0xd04: /* Interrupt Control State (ICSR) */
/* VECTACTIVE */
val = cpu->env.v7m.exception;
/* VECTPENDING */
val |= (s->vectpending & 0xff) << 12;
/* ISRPENDING - set if any external IRQ is pending */
if (nvic_isrpending(s)) {
val |= (1 << 22);
}
/* RETTOBASE - set if only one handler is active */
if (nvic_rettobase(s)) {
val |= (1 << 11);
}
if (attrs.secure) {
/* PENDSTSET */
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SYSTICK].pending) {
val |= (1 << 26);
}
/* PENDSVSET */
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV].pending) {
val |= (1 << 28);
}
} else {
/* PENDSTSET */
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SYSTICK].pending) {
val |= (1 << 26);
}
/* PENDSVSET */
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV].pending) {
val |= (1 << 28);
}
}
/* NMIPENDSET */
if ((attrs.secure || (cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK))
&& s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI].pending) {
val |= (1 << 31);
}
/* ISRPREEMPT: RES0 when halting debug not implemented */
/* STTNS: RES0 for the Main Extension */
return val;
case 0xd08: /* Vector Table Offset. */
return cpu->env.v7m.vecbase[attrs.secure];
case 0xd0c: /* Application Interrupt/Reset Control (AIRCR) */
val = 0xfa050000 | (s->prigroup[attrs.secure] << 8);
if (attrs.secure) {
/* s->aircr stores PRIS, BFHFNMINS, SYSRESETREQS */
val |= cpu->env.v7m.aircr;
} else {
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
/* BFHFNMINS is R/O from NS; other bits are RAZ/WI. If
* security isn't supported then BFHFNMINS is RAO (and
* the bit in env.v7m.aircr is always set).
*/
val |= cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK;
}
}
return val;
case 0xd10: /* System Control. */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V7)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
return cpu->env.v7m.scr[attrs.secure];
case 0xd14: /* Configuration Control. */
/* The BFHFNMIGN bit is the only non-banked bit; we
* keep it in the non-secure copy of the register.
*/
val = cpu->env.v7m.ccr[attrs.secure];
val |= cpu->env.v7m.ccr[M_REG_NS] & R_V7M_CCR_BFHFNMIGN_MASK;
return val;
case 0xd24: /* System Handler Control and State (SHCSR) */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V7)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
val = 0;
if (attrs.secure) {
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM].active) {
val |= (1 << 0);
}
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].active) {
val |= (1 << 2);
}
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE].active) {
val |= (1 << 3);
}
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SVC].active) {
val |= (1 << 7);
}
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV].active) {
val |= (1 << 10);
}
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SYSTICK].active) {
val |= (1 << 11);
}
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE].pending) {
val |= (1 << 12);
}
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM].pending) {
val |= (1 << 13);
}
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SVC].pending) {
val |= (1 << 15);
}
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM].enabled) {
val |= (1 << 16);
}
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE].enabled) {
val |= (1 << 18);
}
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].pending) {
val |= (1 << 21);
}
/* SecureFault is not banked but is always RAZ/WI to NS */
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE].active) {
val |= (1 << 4);
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE].enabled) {
val |= (1 << 19);
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE].pending) {
val |= (1 << 20);
}
} else {
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM].active) {
val |= (1 << 0);
}
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
/* HARDFAULTACT, HARDFAULTPENDED not present in v7M */
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].active) {
val |= (1 << 2);
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].pending) {
val |= (1 << 21);
}
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE].active) {
val |= (1 << 3);
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SVC].active) {
val |= (1 << 7);
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV].active) {
val |= (1 << 10);
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SYSTICK].active) {
val |= (1 << 11);
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE].pending) {
val |= (1 << 12);
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM].pending) {
val |= (1 << 13);
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SVC].pending) {
val |= (1 << 15);
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM].enabled) {
val |= (1 << 16);
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE].enabled) {
val |= (1 << 18);
}
}
if (attrs.secure || (cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK)) {
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS].active) {
val |= (1 << 1);
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS].pending) {
val |= (1 << 14);
}
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS].enabled) {
val |= (1 << 17);
}
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8) &&
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI].active) {
/* NMIACT is not present in v7M */
val |= (1 << 5);
}
}
/* TODO: this is RAZ/WI from NS if DEMCR.SDME is set */
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_DEBUG].active) {
val |= (1 << 8);
}
return val;
case 0xd2c: /* Hard Fault Status. */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
return cpu->env.v7m.hfsr;
case 0xd30: /* Debug Fault Status. */
return cpu->env.v7m.dfsr;
case 0xd34: /* MMFAR MemManage Fault Address */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
return cpu->env.v7m.mmfar[attrs.secure];
case 0xd38: /* Bus Fault Address. */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure &&
!(s->cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK)) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->env.v7m.bfar;
case 0xd3c: /* Aux Fault Status. */
/* TODO: Implement fault status registers. */
qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP,
"Aux Fault status registers unimplemented\n");
return 0;
case 0xd40: /* PFR0. */
return cpu->id_pfr0;
case 0xd44: /* PFR1. */
return cpu->id_pfr1;
case 0xd48: /* DFR0. */
return cpu->id_dfr0;
case 0xd4c: /* AFR0. */
return cpu->id_afr0;
case 0xd50: /* MMFR0. */
return cpu->id_mmfr0;
case 0xd54: /* MMFR1. */
return cpu->id_mmfr1;
case 0xd58: /* MMFR2. */
return cpu->id_mmfr2;
case 0xd5c: /* MMFR3. */
return cpu->id_mmfr3;
case 0xd60: /* ISAR0. */
return cpu->isar.id_isar0;
case 0xd64: /* ISAR1. */
return cpu->isar.id_isar1;
case 0xd68: /* ISAR2. */
return cpu->isar.id_isar2;
case 0xd6c: /* ISAR3. */
return cpu->isar.id_isar3;
case 0xd70: /* ISAR4. */
return cpu->isar.id_isar4;
case 0xd74: /* ISAR5. */
return cpu->isar.id_isar5;
case 0xd78: /* CLIDR */
return cpu->clidr;
case 0xd7c: /* CTR */
return cpu->ctr;
case 0xd80: /* CSSIDR */
{
int idx = cpu->env.v7m.csselr[attrs.secure] & R_V7M_CSSELR_INDEX_MASK;
return cpu->ccsidr[idx];
}
case 0xd84: /* CSSELR */
return cpu->env.v7m.csselr[attrs.secure];
case 0xd88: /* CPACR */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP)) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->env.v7m.cpacr[attrs.secure];
case 0xd8c: /* NSACR */
if (!attrs.secure || !arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP)) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->env.v7m.nsacr;
/* TODO: Implement debug registers. */
case 0xd90: /* MPU_TYPE */
/* Unified MPU; if the MPU is not present this value is zero */
return cpu->pmsav7_dregion << 8;
break;
case 0xd94: /* MPU_CTRL */
return cpu->env.v7m.mpu_ctrl[attrs.secure];
case 0xd98: /* MPU_RNR */
return cpu->env.pmsav7.rnr[attrs.secure];
case 0xd9c: /* MPU_RBAR */
case 0xda4: /* MPU_RBAR_A1 */
case 0xdac: /* MPU_RBAR_A2 */
case 0xdb4: /* MPU_RBAR_A3 */
{
int region = cpu->env.pmsav7.rnr[attrs.secure];
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
/* PMSAv8M handling of the aliases is different from v7M:
* aliases A1, A2, A3 override the low two bits of the region
* number in MPU_RNR, and there is no 'region' field in the
* RBAR register.
*/
int aliasno = (offset - 0xd9c) / 8; /* 0..3 */
if (aliasno) {
region = deposit32(region, 0, 2, aliasno);
}
if (region >= cpu->pmsav7_dregion) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->env.pmsav8.rbar[attrs.secure][region];
}
if (region >= cpu->pmsav7_dregion) {
return 0;
}
return (cpu->env.pmsav7.drbar[region] & ~0x1f) | (region & 0xf);
}
case 0xda0: /* MPU_RASR (v7M), MPU_RLAR (v8M) */
case 0xda8: /* MPU_RASR_A1 (v7M), MPU_RLAR_A1 (v8M) */
case 0xdb0: /* MPU_RASR_A2 (v7M), MPU_RLAR_A2 (v8M) */
case 0xdb8: /* MPU_RASR_A3 (v7M), MPU_RLAR_A3 (v8M) */
{
int region = cpu->env.pmsav7.rnr[attrs.secure];
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
/* PMSAv8M handling of the aliases is different from v7M:
* aliases A1, A2, A3 override the low two bits of the region
* number in MPU_RNR.
*/
int aliasno = (offset - 0xda0) / 8; /* 0..3 */
if (aliasno) {
region = deposit32(region, 0, 2, aliasno);
}
if (region >= cpu->pmsav7_dregion) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->env.pmsav8.rlar[attrs.secure][region];
}
if (region >= cpu->pmsav7_dregion) {
return 0;
}
return ((cpu->env.pmsav7.dracr[region] & 0xffff) << 16) |
(cpu->env.pmsav7.drsr[region] & 0xffff);
}
case 0xdc0: /* MPU_MAIR0 */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
return cpu->env.pmsav8.mair0[attrs.secure];
case 0xdc4: /* MPU_MAIR1 */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
return cpu->env.pmsav8.mair1[attrs.secure];
case 0xdd0: /* SAU_CTRL */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->env.sau.ctrl;
case 0xdd4: /* SAU_TYPE */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->sau_sregion;
case 0xdd8: /* SAU_RNR */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->env.sau.rnr;
case 0xddc: /* SAU_RBAR */
{
int region = cpu->env.sau.rnr;
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return 0;
}
if (region >= cpu->sau_sregion) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->env.sau.rbar[region];
}
case 0xde0: /* SAU_RLAR */
{
int region = cpu->env.sau.rnr;
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return 0;
}
if (region >= cpu->sau_sregion) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->env.sau.rlar[region];
}
case 0xde4: /* SFSR */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->env.v7m.sfsr;
case 0xde8: /* SFAR */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->env.v7m.sfar;
case 0xf34: /* FPCCR */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP)) {
return 0;
}
if (attrs.secure) {
return cpu->env.v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S];
} else {
/*
* NS can read LSPEN, CLRONRET and MONRDY. It can read
* BFRDY and HFRDY if AIRCR.BFHFNMINS != 0;
* other non-banked bits RAZ.
* TODO: MONRDY should RAZ/WI if DEMCR.SDME is set.
*/
uint32_t value = cpu->env.v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S];
uint32_t mask = R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPEN_MASK |
R_V7M_FPCCR_CLRONRET_MASK |
R_V7M_FPCCR_MONRDY_MASK;
if (s->cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK) {
mask |= R_V7M_FPCCR_BFRDY_MASK | R_V7M_FPCCR_HFRDY_MASK;
}
value &= mask;
value |= cpu->env.v7m.fpccr[M_REG_NS];
return value;
}
case 0xf38: /* FPCAR */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP)) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->env.v7m.fpcar[attrs.secure];
case 0xf3c: /* FPDSCR */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP)) {
return 0;
}
return cpu->env.v7m.fpdscr[attrs.secure];
case 0xf40: /* MVFR0 */
return cpu->isar.mvfr0;
case 0xf44: /* MVFR1 */
return cpu->isar.mvfr1;
case 0xf48: /* MVFR2 */
return cpu->isar.mvfr2;
default:
bad_offset:
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "NVIC: Bad read offset 0x%x\n", offset);
return 0;
}
}
static void nvic_writel(NVICState *s, uint32_t offset, uint32_t value,
MemTxAttrs attrs)
{
ARMCPU *cpu = s->cpu;
switch (offset) {
case 0xc: /* CPPWR */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
/* Make the IMPDEF choice to RAZ/WI this. */
break;
case 0x380 ... 0x3bf: /* NVIC_ITNS<n> */
{
int startvec = 8 * (offset - 0x380) + NVIC_FIRST_IRQ;
int i;
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < 32 && startvec + i < s->num_irq; i++) {
s->itns[startvec + i] = (value >> i) & 1;
}
nvic_irq_update(s);
break;
}
case 0xd04: /* Interrupt Control State (ICSR) */
if (attrs.secure || cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK) {
if (value & (1 << 31)) {
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(s, ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI, false);
} else if (value & (1 << 30) &&
arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
/* PENDNMICLR didn't exist in v7M */
armv7m_nvic_clear_pending(s, ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI, false);
}
}
if (value & (1 << 28)) {
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(s, ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV, attrs.secure);
} else if (value & (1 << 27)) {
armv7m_nvic_clear_pending(s, ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV, attrs.secure);
}
if (value & (1 << 26)) {
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(s, ARMV7M_EXCP_SYSTICK, attrs.secure);
} else if (value & (1 << 25)) {
armv7m_nvic_clear_pending(s, ARMV7M_EXCP_SYSTICK, attrs.secure);
}
break;
case 0xd08: /* Vector Table Offset. */
cpu->env.v7m.vecbase[attrs.secure] = value & 0xffffff80;
break;
case 0xd0c: /* Application Interrupt/Reset Control (AIRCR) */
if ((value >> R_V7M_AIRCR_VECTKEY_SHIFT) == 0x05fa) {
if (value & R_V7M_AIRCR_SYSRESETREQ_MASK) {
if (attrs.secure ||
!(cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_SYSRESETREQS_MASK)) {
qemu_irq_pulse(s->sysresetreq);
}
}
if (value & R_V7M_AIRCR_VECTCLRACTIVE_MASK) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"Setting VECTCLRACTIVE when not in DEBUG mode "
"is UNPREDICTABLE\n");
}
if (value & R_V7M_AIRCR_VECTRESET_MASK) {
/* NB: this bit is RES0 in v8M */
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"Setting VECTRESET when not in DEBUG mode "
"is UNPREDICTABLE\n");
}
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
s->prigroup[attrs.secure] =
extract32(value,
R_V7M_AIRCR_PRIGROUP_SHIFT,
R_V7M_AIRCR_PRIGROUP_LENGTH);
}
if (attrs.secure) {
/* These bits are only writable by secure */
cpu->env.v7m.aircr = value &
(R_V7M_AIRCR_SYSRESETREQS_MASK |
R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK |
R_V7M_AIRCR_PRIS_MASK);
/* BFHFNMINS changes the priority of Secure HardFault, and
* allows a pending Non-secure HardFault to preempt (which
* we implement by marking it enabled).
*/
if (cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK) {
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].prio = -3;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].enabled = 1;
} else {
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].prio = -1;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].enabled = 0;
}
}
nvic_irq_update(s);
}
break;
case 0xd10: /* System Control. */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V7)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
/* We don't implement deep-sleep so these bits are RAZ/WI.
* The other bits in the register are banked.
* QEMU's implementation ignores SEVONPEND and SLEEPONEXIT, which
* is architecturally permitted.
*/
value &= ~(R_V7M_SCR_SLEEPDEEP_MASK | R_V7M_SCR_SLEEPDEEPS_MASK);
cpu->env.v7m.scr[attrs.secure] = value;
break;
case 0xd14: /* Configuration Control. */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
/* Enforce RAZ/WI on reserved and must-RAZ/WI bits */
value &= (R_V7M_CCR_STKALIGN_MASK |
R_V7M_CCR_BFHFNMIGN_MASK |
R_V7M_CCR_DIV_0_TRP_MASK |
R_V7M_CCR_UNALIGN_TRP_MASK |
R_V7M_CCR_USERSETMPEND_MASK |
R_V7M_CCR_NONBASETHRDENA_MASK);
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
/* v8M makes NONBASETHRDENA and STKALIGN be RES1 */
value |= R_V7M_CCR_NONBASETHRDENA_MASK
| R_V7M_CCR_STKALIGN_MASK;
}
if (attrs.secure) {
/* the BFHFNMIGN bit is not banked; keep that in the NS copy */
cpu->env.v7m.ccr[M_REG_NS] =
(cpu->env.v7m.ccr[M_REG_NS] & ~R_V7M_CCR_BFHFNMIGN_MASK)
| (value & R_V7M_CCR_BFHFNMIGN_MASK);
value &= ~R_V7M_CCR_BFHFNMIGN_MASK;
}
cpu->env.v7m.ccr[attrs.secure] = value;
break;
case 0xd24: /* System Handler Control and State (SHCSR) */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V7)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (attrs.secure) {
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM].active = (value & (1 << 0)) != 0;
/* Secure HardFault active bit cannot be written */
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE].active = (value & (1 << 3)) != 0;
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SVC].active = (value & (1 << 7)) != 0;
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV].active =
(value & (1 << 10)) != 0;
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SYSTICK].active =
(value & (1 << 11)) != 0;
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE].pending =
(value & (1 << 12)) != 0;
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM].pending = (value & (1 << 13)) != 0;
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SVC].pending = (value & (1 << 15)) != 0;
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM].enabled = (value & (1 << 16)) != 0;
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS].enabled = (value & (1 << 17)) != 0;
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE].enabled =
(value & (1 << 18)) != 0;
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].pending = (value & (1 << 21)) != 0;
/* SecureFault not banked, but RAZ/WI to NS */
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE].active = (value & (1 << 4)) != 0;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE].enabled = (value & (1 << 19)) != 0;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE].pending = (value & (1 << 20)) != 0;
} else {
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM].active = (value & (1 << 0)) != 0;
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
/* HARDFAULTPENDED is not present in v7M */
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].pending = (value & (1 << 21)) != 0;
}
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE].active = (value & (1 << 3)) != 0;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SVC].active = (value & (1 << 7)) != 0;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV].active = (value & (1 << 10)) != 0;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SYSTICK].active = (value & (1 << 11)) != 0;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE].pending = (value & (1 << 12)) != 0;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM].pending = (value & (1 << 13)) != 0;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SVC].pending = (value & (1 << 15)) != 0;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM].enabled = (value & (1 << 16)) != 0;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE].enabled = (value & (1 << 18)) != 0;
}
if (attrs.secure || (cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK)) {
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS].active = (value & (1 << 1)) != 0;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS].pending = (value & (1 << 14)) != 0;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS].enabled = (value & (1 << 17)) != 0;
}
/* NMIACT can only be written if the write is of a zero, with
* BFHFNMINS 1, and by the CPU in secure state via the NS alias.
*/
if (!attrs.secure && cpu->env.v7m.secure &&
(cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK) &&
(value & (1 << 5)) == 0) {
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI].active = 0;
}
/* HARDFAULTACT can only be written if the write is of a zero
* to the non-secure HardFault state by the CPU in secure state.
* The only case where we can be targeting the non-secure HF state
* when in secure state is if this is a write via the NS alias
* and BFHFNMINS is 1.
*/
if (!attrs.secure && cpu->env.v7m.secure &&
(cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK) &&
(value & (1 << 2)) == 0) {
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].active = 0;
}
/* TODO: this is RAZ/WI from NS if DEMCR.SDME is set */
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_DEBUG].active = (value & (1 << 8)) != 0;
nvic_irq_update(s);
break;
case 0xd2c: /* Hard Fault Status. */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
cpu->env.v7m.hfsr &= ~value; /* W1C */
break;
case 0xd30: /* Debug Fault Status. */
cpu->env.v7m.dfsr &= ~value; /* W1C */
break;
case 0xd34: /* Mem Manage Address. */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
cpu->env.v7m.mmfar[attrs.secure] = value;
return;
case 0xd38: /* Bus Fault Address. */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure &&
!(s->cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK)) {
return;
}
cpu->env.v7m.bfar = value;
return;
case 0xd3c: /* Aux Fault Status. */
qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP,
"NVIC: Aux fault status registers unimplemented\n");
break;
case 0xd84: /* CSSELR */
if (!arm_v7m_csselr_razwi(cpu)) {
cpu->env.v7m.csselr[attrs.secure] = value & R_V7M_CSSELR_INDEX_MASK;
}
break;
case 0xd88: /* CPACR */
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP)) {
/* We implement only the Floating Point extension's CP10/CP11 */
cpu->env.v7m.cpacr[attrs.secure] = value & (0xf << 20);
}
break;
case 0xd8c: /* NSACR */
if (attrs.secure && arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP)) {
/* We implement only the Floating Point extension's CP10/CP11 */
cpu->env.v7m.nsacr = value & (3 << 10);
}
break;
case 0xd90: /* MPU_TYPE */
return; /* RO */
case 0xd94: /* MPU_CTRL */
if ((value &
(R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_HFNMIENA_MASK | R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_ENABLE_MASK))
== R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_HFNMIENA_MASK) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "MPU_CTRL: HFNMIENA and !ENABLE is "
"UNPREDICTABLE\n");
}
cpu->env.v7m.mpu_ctrl[attrs.secure]
= value & (R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_ENABLE_MASK |
R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_HFNMIENA_MASK |
R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_PRIVDEFENA_MASK);
tlb_flush(CPU(cpu));
break;
case 0xd98: /* MPU_RNR */
if (value >= cpu->pmsav7_dregion) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "MPU region out of range %"
PRIu32 "/%" PRIu32 "\n",
value, cpu->pmsav7_dregion);
} else {
cpu->env.pmsav7.rnr[attrs.secure] = value;
}
break;
case 0xd9c: /* MPU_RBAR */
case 0xda4: /* MPU_RBAR_A1 */
case 0xdac: /* MPU_RBAR_A2 */
case 0xdb4: /* MPU_RBAR_A3 */
{
int region;
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
/* PMSAv8M handling of the aliases is different from v7M:
* aliases A1, A2, A3 override the low two bits of the region
* number in MPU_RNR, and there is no 'region' field in the
* RBAR register.
*/
int aliasno = (offset - 0xd9c) / 8; /* 0..3 */
region = cpu->env.pmsav7.rnr[attrs.secure];
if (aliasno) {
region = deposit32(region, 0, 2, aliasno);
}
if (region >= cpu->pmsav7_dregion) {
return;
}
cpu->env.pmsav8.rbar[attrs.secure][region] = value;
tlb_flush(CPU(cpu));
return;
}
if (value & (1 << 4)) {
/* VALID bit means use the region number specified in this
* value and also update MPU_RNR.REGION with that value.
*/
region = extract32(value, 0, 4);
if (region >= cpu->pmsav7_dregion) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"MPU region out of range %u/%" PRIu32 "\n",
region, cpu->pmsav7_dregion);
return;
}
cpu->env.pmsav7.rnr[attrs.secure] = region;
} else {
region = cpu->env.pmsav7.rnr[attrs.secure];
}
if (region >= cpu->pmsav7_dregion) {
return;
}
cpu->env.pmsav7.drbar[region] = value & ~0x1f;
tlb_flush(CPU(cpu));
break;
}
case 0xda0: /* MPU_RASR (v7M), MPU_RLAR (v8M) */
case 0xda8: /* MPU_RASR_A1 (v7M), MPU_RLAR_A1 (v8M) */
case 0xdb0: /* MPU_RASR_A2 (v7M), MPU_RLAR_A2 (v8M) */
case 0xdb8: /* MPU_RASR_A3 (v7M), MPU_RLAR_A3 (v8M) */
{
int region = cpu->env.pmsav7.rnr[attrs.secure];
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
/* PMSAv8M handling of the aliases is different from v7M:
* aliases A1, A2, A3 override the low two bits of the region
* number in MPU_RNR.
*/
int aliasno = (offset - 0xd9c) / 8; /* 0..3 */
region = cpu->env.pmsav7.rnr[attrs.secure];
if (aliasno) {
region = deposit32(region, 0, 2, aliasno);
}
if (region >= cpu->pmsav7_dregion) {
return;
}
cpu->env.pmsav8.rlar[attrs.secure][region] = value;
tlb_flush(CPU(cpu));
return;
}
if (region >= cpu->pmsav7_dregion) {
return;
}
cpu->env.pmsav7.drsr[region] = value & 0xff3f;
cpu->env.pmsav7.dracr[region] = (value >> 16) & 0x173f;
tlb_flush(CPU(cpu));
break;
}
case 0xdc0: /* MPU_MAIR0 */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (cpu->pmsav7_dregion) {
/* Register is RES0 if no MPU regions are implemented */
cpu->env.pmsav8.mair0[attrs.secure] = value;
}
/* We don't need to do anything else because memory attributes
* only affect cacheability, and we don't implement caching.
*/
break;
case 0xdc4: /* MPU_MAIR1 */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (cpu->pmsav7_dregion) {
/* Register is RES0 if no MPU regions are implemented */
cpu->env.pmsav8.mair1[attrs.secure] = value;
}
/* We don't need to do anything else because memory attributes
* only affect cacheability, and we don't implement caching.
*/
break;
case 0xdd0: /* SAU_CTRL */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return;
}
cpu->env.sau.ctrl = value & 3;
break;
case 0xdd4: /* SAU_TYPE */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
break;
case 0xdd8: /* SAU_RNR */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return;
}
if (value >= cpu->sau_sregion) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "SAU region out of range %"
PRIu32 "/%" PRIu32 "\n",
value, cpu->sau_sregion);
} else {
cpu->env.sau.rnr = value;
}
break;
case 0xddc: /* SAU_RBAR */
{
int region = cpu->env.sau.rnr;
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return;
}
if (region >= cpu->sau_sregion) {
return;
}
cpu->env.sau.rbar[region] = value & ~0x1f;
tlb_flush(CPU(cpu));
break;
}
case 0xde0: /* SAU_RLAR */
{
int region = cpu->env.sau.rnr;
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return;
}
if (region >= cpu->sau_sregion) {
return;
}
cpu->env.sau.rlar[region] = value & ~0x1c;
tlb_flush(CPU(cpu));
break;
}
case 0xde4: /* SFSR */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return;
}
cpu->env.v7m.sfsr &= ~value; /* W1C */
break;
case 0xde8: /* SFAR */
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (!attrs.secure) {
return;
}
cpu->env.v7m.sfsr = value;
break;
case 0xf00: /* Software Triggered Interrupt Register */
{
int excnum = (value & 0x1ff) + NVIC_FIRST_IRQ;
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
goto bad_offset;
}
if (excnum < s->num_irq) {
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(s, excnum, false);
}
break;
}
case 0xf34: /* FPCCR */
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP)) {
/* Not all bits here are banked. */
uint32_t fpccr_s;
if (!arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
/* Don't allow setting of bits not present in v7M */
value &= (R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPACT_MASK |
R_V7M_FPCCR_USER_MASK |
R_V7M_FPCCR_THREAD_MASK |
R_V7M_FPCCR_HFRDY_MASK |
R_V7M_FPCCR_MMRDY_MASK |
R_V7M_FPCCR_BFRDY_MASK |
R_V7M_FPCCR_MONRDY_MASK |
R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPEN_MASK |
R_V7M_FPCCR_ASPEN_MASK);
}
value &= ~R_V7M_FPCCR_RES0_MASK;
if (!attrs.secure) {
/* Some non-banked bits are configurably writable by NS */
fpccr_s = cpu->env.v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S];
if (!(fpccr_s & R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPENS_MASK)) {
uint32_t lspen = FIELD_EX32(value, V7M_FPCCR, LSPEN);
fpccr_s = FIELD_DP32(fpccr_s, V7M_FPCCR, LSPEN, lspen);
}
if (!(fpccr_s & R_V7M_FPCCR_CLRONRETS_MASK)) {
uint32_t cor = FIELD_EX32(value, V7M_FPCCR, CLRONRET);
fpccr_s = FIELD_DP32(fpccr_s, V7M_FPCCR, CLRONRET, cor);
}
if ((s->cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK)) {
uint32_t hfrdy = FIELD_EX32(value, V7M_FPCCR, HFRDY);
uint32_t bfrdy = FIELD_EX32(value, V7M_FPCCR, BFRDY);
fpccr_s = FIELD_DP32(fpccr_s, V7M_FPCCR, HFRDY, hfrdy);
fpccr_s = FIELD_DP32(fpccr_s, V7M_FPCCR, BFRDY, bfrdy);
}
/* TODO MONRDY should RAZ/WI if DEMCR.SDME is set */
{
uint32_t monrdy = FIELD_EX32(value, V7M_FPCCR, MONRDY);
fpccr_s = FIELD_DP32(fpccr_s, V7M_FPCCR, MONRDY, monrdy);
}
/*
* All other non-banked bits are RAZ/WI from NS; write
* just the banked bits to fpccr[M_REG_NS].
*/
value &= R_V7M_FPCCR_BANKED_MASK;
cpu->env.v7m.fpccr[M_REG_NS] = value;
} else {
fpccr_s = value;
}
cpu->env.v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] = fpccr_s;
}
break;
case 0xf38: /* FPCAR */
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP)) {
value &= ~7;
cpu->env.v7m.fpcar[attrs.secure] = value;
}
break;
case 0xf3c: /* FPDSCR */
if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP)) {
value &= 0x07c00000;
cpu->env.v7m.fpdscr[attrs.secure] = value;
}
break;
case 0xf50: /* ICIALLU */
case 0xf58: /* ICIMVAU */
case 0xf5c: /* DCIMVAC */
case 0xf60: /* DCISW */
case 0xf64: /* DCCMVAU */
case 0xf68: /* DCCMVAC */
case 0xf6c: /* DCCSW */
case 0xf70: /* DCCIMVAC */
case 0xf74: /* DCCISW */
case 0xf78: /* BPIALL */
/* Cache and branch predictor maintenance: for QEMU these always NOP */
break;
default:
bad_offset:
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"NVIC: Bad write offset 0x%x\n", offset);
}
}
static bool nvic_user_access_ok(NVICState *s, hwaddr offset, MemTxAttrs attrs)
{
/* Return true if unprivileged access to this register is permitted. */
switch (offset) {
case 0xf00: /* STIR: accessible only if CCR.USERSETMPEND permits */
/* For access via STIR_NS it is the NS CCR.USERSETMPEND that
* controls access even though the CPU is in Secure state (I_QDKX).
*/
return s->cpu->env.v7m.ccr[attrs.secure] & R_V7M_CCR_USERSETMPEND_MASK;
default:
/* All other user accesses cause a BusFault unconditionally */
return false;
}
}
static int shpr_bank(NVICState *s, int exc, MemTxAttrs attrs)
{
/* Behaviour for the SHPR register field for this exception:
* return M_REG_NS to use the nonsecure vector (including for
* non-banked exceptions), M_REG_S for the secure version of
* a banked exception, and -1 if this field should RAZ/WI.
*/
switch (exc) {
case ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM:
case ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE:
case ARMV7M_EXCP_SVC:
case ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV:
case ARMV7M_EXCP_SYSTICK:
/* Banked exceptions */
return attrs.secure;
case ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS:
/* Not banked, RAZ/WI from nonsecure if BFHFNMINS is zero */
if (!attrs.secure &&
!(s->cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK)) {
return -1;
}
return M_REG_NS;
case ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE:
/* Not banked, RAZ/WI from nonsecure */
if (!attrs.secure) {
return -1;
}
return M_REG_NS;
case ARMV7M_EXCP_DEBUG:
/* Not banked. TODO should RAZ/WI if DEMCR.SDME is set */
return M_REG_NS;
case 8 ... 10:
case 13:
/* RES0 */
return -1;
default:
/* Not reachable due to decode of SHPR register addresses */
g_assert_not_reached();
}
}
static MemTxResult nvic_sysreg_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t *data, unsigned size,
MemTxAttrs attrs)
{
NVICState *s = (NVICState *)opaque;
uint32_t offset = addr;
unsigned i, startvec, end;
uint32_t val;
if (attrs.user && !nvic_user_access_ok(s, addr, attrs)) {
/* Generate BusFault for unprivileged accesses */
return MEMTX_ERROR;
}
switch (offset) {
/* reads of set and clear both return the status */
case 0x100 ... 0x13f: /* NVIC Set enable */
offset += 0x80;
/* fall through */
case 0x180 ... 0x1bf: /* NVIC Clear enable */
val = 0;
startvec = 8 * (offset - 0x180) + NVIC_FIRST_IRQ; /* vector # */
for (i = 0, end = size * 8; i < end && startvec + i < s->num_irq; i++) {
if (s->vectors[startvec + i].enabled &&
(attrs.secure || s->itns[startvec + i])) {
val |= (1 << i);
}
}
break;
case 0x200 ... 0x23f: /* NVIC Set pend */
offset += 0x80;
/* fall through */
case 0x280 ... 0x2bf: /* NVIC Clear pend */
val = 0;
startvec = 8 * (offset - 0x280) + NVIC_FIRST_IRQ; /* vector # */
for (i = 0, end = size * 8; i < end && startvec + i < s->num_irq; i++) {
if (s->vectors[startvec + i].pending &&
(attrs.secure || s->itns[startvec + i])) {
val |= (1 << i);
}
}
break;
case 0x300 ... 0x33f: /* NVIC Active */
val = 0;
if (!arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V7)) {
break;
}
startvec = 8 * (offset - 0x300) + NVIC_FIRST_IRQ; /* vector # */
for (i = 0, end = size * 8; i < end && startvec + i < s->num_irq; i++) {
if (s->vectors[startvec + i].active &&
(attrs.secure || s->itns[startvec + i])) {
val |= (1 << i);
}
}
break;
case 0x400 ... 0x5ef: /* NVIC Priority */
val = 0;
startvec = offset - 0x400 + NVIC_FIRST_IRQ; /* vector # */
for (i = 0; i < size && startvec + i < s->num_irq; i++) {
if (attrs.secure || s->itns[startvec + i]) {
val |= s->vectors[startvec + i].prio << (8 * i);
}
}
break;
case 0xd18 ... 0xd1b: /* System Handler Priority (SHPR1) */
if (!arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
val = 0;
break;
}
/* fall through */
case 0xd1c ... 0xd23: /* System Handler Priority (SHPR2, SHPR3) */
val = 0;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
unsigned hdlidx = (offset - 0xd14) + i;
int sbank = shpr_bank(s, hdlidx, attrs);
if (sbank < 0) {
continue;
}
val = deposit32(val, i * 8, 8, get_prio(s, hdlidx, sbank));
}
break;
case 0xd28 ... 0xd2b: /* Configurable Fault Status (CFSR) */
if (!arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
val = 0;
break;
};
/*
* The BFSR bits [15:8] are shared between security states
* and we store them in the NS copy. They are RAZ/WI for
* NS code if AIRCR.BFHFNMINS is 0.
*/
val = s->cpu->env.v7m.cfsr[attrs.secure];
if (!attrs.secure &&
!(s->cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK)) {
val &= ~R_V7M_CFSR_BFSR_MASK;
} else {
val |= s->cpu->env.v7m.cfsr[M_REG_NS] & R_V7M_CFSR_BFSR_MASK;
}
val = extract32(val, (offset - 0xd28) * 8, size * 8);
break;
case 0xfe0 ... 0xfff: /* ID. */
if (offset & 3) {
val = 0;
} else {
val = nvic_id[(offset - 0xfe0) >> 2];
}
break;
default:
if (size == 4) {
val = nvic_readl(s, offset, attrs);
} else {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"NVIC: Bad read of size %d at offset 0x%x\n",
size, offset);
val = 0;
}
}
trace_nvic_sysreg_read(addr, val, size);
*data = val;
return MEMTX_OK;
}
static MemTxResult nvic_sysreg_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t value, unsigned size,
MemTxAttrs attrs)
{
NVICState *s = (NVICState *)opaque;
uint32_t offset = addr;
unsigned i, startvec, end;
unsigned setval = 0;
trace_nvic_sysreg_write(addr, value, size);
if (attrs.user && !nvic_user_access_ok(s, addr, attrs)) {
/* Generate BusFault for unprivileged accesses */
return MEMTX_ERROR;
}
switch (offset) {
case 0x100 ... 0x13f: /* NVIC Set enable */
offset += 0x80;
setval = 1;
/* fall through */
case 0x180 ... 0x1bf: /* NVIC Clear enable */
startvec = 8 * (offset - 0x180) + NVIC_FIRST_IRQ;
for (i = 0, end = size * 8; i < end && startvec + i < s->num_irq; i++) {
if (value & (1 << i) &&
(attrs.secure || s->itns[startvec + i])) {
s->vectors[startvec + i].enabled = setval;
}
}
nvic_irq_update(s);
return MEMTX_OK;
case 0x200 ... 0x23f: /* NVIC Set pend */
/* the special logic in armv7m_nvic_set_pending()
* is not needed since IRQs are never escalated
*/
offset += 0x80;
setval = 1;
/* fall through */
case 0x280 ... 0x2bf: /* NVIC Clear pend */
startvec = 8 * (offset - 0x280) + NVIC_FIRST_IRQ; /* vector # */
for (i = 0, end = size * 8; i < end && startvec + i < s->num_irq; i++) {
if (value & (1 << i) &&
(attrs.secure || s->itns[startvec + i])) {
s->vectors[startvec + i].pending = setval;
}
}
nvic_irq_update(s);
return MEMTX_OK;
case 0x300 ... 0x33f: /* NVIC Active */
return MEMTX_OK; /* R/O */
case 0x400 ... 0x5ef: /* NVIC Priority */
startvec = (offset - 0x400) + NVIC_FIRST_IRQ; /* vector # */
for (i = 0; i < size && startvec + i < s->num_irq; i++) {
if (attrs.secure || s->itns[startvec + i]) {
set_prio(s, startvec + i, false, (value >> (i * 8)) & 0xff);
}
}
nvic_irq_update(s);
return MEMTX_OK;
case 0xd18 ... 0xd1b: /* System Handler Priority (SHPR1) */
if (!arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
return MEMTX_OK;
}
/* fall through */
case 0xd1c ... 0xd23: /* System Handler Priority (SHPR2, SHPR3) */
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
unsigned hdlidx = (offset - 0xd14) + i;
int newprio = extract32(value, i * 8, 8);
int sbank = shpr_bank(s, hdlidx, attrs);
if (sbank < 0) {
continue;
}
set_prio(s, hdlidx, sbank, newprio);
}
nvic_irq_update(s);
return MEMTX_OK;
case 0xd28 ... 0xd2b: /* Configurable Fault Status (CFSR) */
if (!arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
return MEMTX_OK;
}
/* All bits are W1C, so construct 32 bit value with 0s in
* the parts not written by the access size
*/
value <<= ((offset - 0xd28) * 8);
if (!attrs.secure &&
!(s->cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK)) {
/* BFSR bits are RAZ/WI for NS if BFHFNMINS is set */
value &= ~R_V7M_CFSR_BFSR_MASK;
}
s->cpu->env.v7m.cfsr[attrs.secure] &= ~value;
if (attrs.secure) {
/* The BFSR bits [15:8] are shared between security states
* and we store them in the NS copy.
*/
s->cpu->env.v7m.cfsr[M_REG_NS] &= ~(value & R_V7M_CFSR_BFSR_MASK);
}
return MEMTX_OK;
}
if (size == 4) {
nvic_writel(s, offset, value, attrs);
return MEMTX_OK;
}
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"NVIC: Bad write of size %d at offset 0x%x\n", size, offset);
/* This is UNPREDICTABLE; treat as RAZ/WI */
return MEMTX_OK;
}
static const MemoryRegionOps nvic_sysreg_ops = {
.read_with_attrs = nvic_sysreg_read,
.write_with_attrs = nvic_sysreg_write,
.endianness = DEVICE_NATIVE_ENDIAN,
};
static MemTxResult nvic_sysreg_ns_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t value, unsigned size,
MemTxAttrs attrs)
{
MemoryRegion *mr = opaque;
if (attrs.secure) {
/* S accesses to the alias act like NS accesses to the real region */
attrs.secure = 0;
return memory_region_dispatch_write(mr, addr, value, size, attrs);
} else {
/* NS attrs are RAZ/WI for privileged, and BusFault for user */
if (attrs.user) {
return MEMTX_ERROR;
}
return MEMTX_OK;
}
}
static MemTxResult nvic_sysreg_ns_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t *data, unsigned size,
MemTxAttrs attrs)
{
MemoryRegion *mr = opaque;
if (attrs.secure) {
/* S accesses to the alias act like NS accesses to the real region */
attrs.secure = 0;
return memory_region_dispatch_read(mr, addr, data, size, attrs);
} else {
/* NS attrs are RAZ/WI for privileged, and BusFault for user */
if (attrs.user) {
return MEMTX_ERROR;
}
*data = 0;
return MEMTX_OK;
}
}
static const MemoryRegionOps nvic_sysreg_ns_ops = {
.read_with_attrs = nvic_sysreg_ns_read,
.write_with_attrs = nvic_sysreg_ns_write,
.endianness = DEVICE_NATIVE_ENDIAN,
};
static MemTxResult nvic_systick_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t value, unsigned size,
MemTxAttrs attrs)
{
NVICState *s = opaque;
MemoryRegion *mr;
/* Direct the access to the correct systick */
mr = sysbus_mmio_get_region(SYS_BUS_DEVICE(&s->systick[attrs.secure]), 0);
return memory_region_dispatch_write(mr, addr, value, size, attrs);
}
static MemTxResult nvic_systick_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t *data, unsigned size,
MemTxAttrs attrs)
{
NVICState *s = opaque;
MemoryRegion *mr;
/* Direct the access to the correct systick */
mr = sysbus_mmio_get_region(SYS_BUS_DEVICE(&s->systick[attrs.secure]), 0);
return memory_region_dispatch_read(mr, addr, data, size, attrs);
}
static const MemoryRegionOps nvic_systick_ops = {
.read_with_attrs = nvic_systick_read,
.write_with_attrs = nvic_systick_write,
.endianness = DEVICE_NATIVE_ENDIAN,
};
static int nvic_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
{
NVICState *s = opaque;
unsigned i;
int resetprio;
/* Check for out of range priority settings */
resetprio = arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8) ? -4 : -3;
if (s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_RESET].prio != resetprio ||
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI].prio != -2 ||
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].prio != -1) {
return 1;
}
for (i = ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM; i < s->num_irq; i++) {
if (s->vectors[i].prio & ~0xff) {
return 1;
}
}
nvic_recompute_state(s);
return 0;
}
static const VMStateDescription vmstate_VecInfo = {
.name = "armv7m_nvic_info",
.version_id = 1,
.minimum_version_id = 1,
.fields = (VMStateField[]) {
VMSTATE_INT16(prio, VecInfo),
VMSTATE_UINT8(enabled, VecInfo),
VMSTATE_UINT8(pending, VecInfo),
VMSTATE_UINT8(active, VecInfo),
VMSTATE_UINT8(level, VecInfo),
VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST()
}
};
static bool nvic_security_needed(void *opaque)
{
NVICState *s = opaque;
return arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY);
}
static int nvic_security_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
{
NVICState *s = opaque;
int i;
/* Check for out of range priority settings */
if (s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].prio != -1
&& s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].prio != -3) {
/* We can't cross-check against AIRCR.BFHFNMINS as we don't know
* if the CPU state has been migrated yet; a mismatch won't
* cause the emulation to blow up, though.
*/
return 1;
}
for (i = ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s->sec_vectors); i++) {
if (s->sec_vectors[i].prio & ~0xff) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static const VMStateDescription vmstate_nvic_security = {
.name = "armv7m_nvic/m-security",
.version_id = 1,
.minimum_version_id = 1,
.needed = nvic_security_needed,
.post_load = &nvic_security_post_load,
.fields = (VMStateField[]) {
VMSTATE_STRUCT_ARRAY(sec_vectors, NVICState, NVIC_INTERNAL_VECTORS, 1,
vmstate_VecInfo, VecInfo),
VMSTATE_UINT32(prigroup[M_REG_S], NVICState),
VMSTATE_BOOL_ARRAY(itns, NVICState, NVIC_MAX_VECTORS),
VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST()
}
};
static const VMStateDescription vmstate_nvic = {
.name = "armv7m_nvic",
.version_id = 4,
.minimum_version_id = 4,
.post_load = &nvic_post_load,
.fields = (VMStateField[]) {
VMSTATE_STRUCT_ARRAY(vectors, NVICState, NVIC_MAX_VECTORS, 1,
vmstate_VecInfo, VecInfo),
VMSTATE_UINT32(prigroup[M_REG_NS], NVICState),
VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST()
},
.subsections = (const VMStateDescription*[]) {
&vmstate_nvic_security,
NULL
}
};
static Property props_nvic[] = {
/* Number of external IRQ lines (so excluding the 16 internal exceptions) */
DEFINE_PROP_UINT32("num-irq", NVICState, num_irq, 64),
DEFINE_PROP_END_OF_LIST()
};
static void armv7m_nvic_reset(DeviceState *dev)
{
int resetprio;
NVICState *s = NVIC(dev);
memset(s->vectors, 0, sizeof(s->vectors));
memset(s->sec_vectors, 0, sizeof(s->sec_vectors));
s->prigroup[M_REG_NS] = 0;
s->prigroup[M_REG_S] = 0;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI].enabled = 1;
/* MEM, BUS, and USAGE are enabled through
* the System Handler Control register
*/
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SVC].enabled = 1;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV].enabled = 1;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SYSTICK].enabled = 1;
/* DebugMonitor is enabled via DEMCR.MON_EN */
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_DEBUG].enabled = 0;
resetprio = arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8) ? -4 : -3;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_RESET].prio = resetprio;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI].prio = -2;
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].prio = -1;
if (arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].enabled = 1;
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SVC].enabled = 1;
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_PENDSV].enabled = 1;
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_SYSTICK].enabled = 1;
/* AIRCR.BFHFNMINS resets to 0 so Secure HF is priority -1 (R_CMTC) */
s->sec_vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].prio = -1;
/* If AIRCR.BFHFNMINS is 0 then NS HF is (effectively) disabled */
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].enabled = 0;
} else {
s->vectors[ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD].enabled = 1;
}
/* Strictly speaking the reset handler should be enabled.
* However, we don't simulate soft resets through the NVIC,
* and the reset vector should never be pended.
* So we leave it disabled to catch logic errors.
*/
s->exception_prio = NVIC_NOEXC_PRIO;
s->vectpending = 0;
s->vectpending_is_s_banked = false;
s->vectpending_prio = NVIC_NOEXC_PRIO;
if (arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
memset(s->itns, 0, sizeof(s->itns));
} else {
/* This state is constant and not guest accessible in a non-security
* NVIC; we set the bits to true to avoid having to do a feature
* bit check in the NVIC enable/pend/etc register accessors.
*/
int i;
for (i = NVIC_FIRST_IRQ; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s->itns); i++) {
s->itns[i] = true;
}
}
}
static void nvic_systick_trigger(void *opaque, int n, int level)
{
NVICState *s = opaque;
if (level) {
/* SysTick just asked us to pend its exception.
* (This is different from an external interrupt line's
* behaviour.)
* n == 0 : NonSecure systick
* n == 1 : Secure systick
*/
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(s, ARMV7M_EXCP_SYSTICK, n);
}
}
static void armv7m_nvic_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
{
NVICState *s = NVIC(dev);
Error *err = NULL;
int regionlen;
/* The armv7m container object will have set our CPU pointer */
if (!s->cpu || !arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
error_setg(errp, "The NVIC can only be used with a Cortex-M CPU");
return;
}
if (s->num_irq > NVIC_MAX_IRQ) {
error_setg(errp, "num-irq %d exceeds NVIC maximum", s->num_irq);
return;
}
qdev_init_gpio_in(dev, set_irq_level, s->num_irq);
/* include space for internal exception vectors */
s->num_irq += NVIC_FIRST_IRQ;
s->num_prio_bits = arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V7) ? 8 : 2;
object_property_set_bool(OBJECT(&s->systick[M_REG_NS]), true,
"realized", &err);
if (err != NULL) {
error_propagate(errp, err);
return;
}
sysbus_connect_irq(SYS_BUS_DEVICE(&s->systick[M_REG_NS]), 0,
qdev_get_gpio_in_named(dev, "systick-trigger",
M_REG_NS));
if (arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
/* We couldn't init the secure systick device in instance_init
* as we didn't know then if the CPU had the security extensions;
* so we have to do it here.
*/
sysbus_init_child_obj(OBJECT(dev), "systick-reg-s",
&s->systick[M_REG_S],
sizeof(s->systick[M_REG_S]), TYPE_SYSTICK);
object_property_set_bool(OBJECT(&s->systick[M_REG_S]), true,
"realized", &err);
if (err != NULL) {
error_propagate(errp, err);
return;
}
sysbus_connect_irq(SYS_BUS_DEVICE(&s->systick[M_REG_S]), 0,
qdev_get_gpio_in_named(dev, "systick-trigger",
M_REG_S));
}
/* The NVIC and System Control Space (SCS) starts at 0xe000e000
* and looks like this:
* 0x004 - ICTR
* 0x010 - 0xff - systick
* 0x100..0x7ec - NVIC
* 0x7f0..0xcff - Reserved
* 0xd00..0xd3c - SCS registers
* 0xd40..0xeff - Reserved or Not implemented
* 0xf00 - STIR
*
* Some registers within this space are banked between security states.
* In v8M there is a second range 0xe002e000..0xe002efff which is the
* NonSecure alias SCS; secure accesses to this behave like NS accesses
* to the main SCS range, and non-secure accesses (including when
* the security extension is not implemented) are RAZ/WI.
* Note that both the main SCS range and the alias range are defined
* to be exempt from memory attribution (R_BLJT) and so the memory
* transaction attribute always matches the current CPU security
* state (attrs.secure == env->v7m.secure). In the nvic_sysreg_ns_ops
* wrappers we change attrs.secure to indicate the NS access; so
* generally code determining which banked register to use should
* use attrs.secure; code determining actual behaviour of the system
* should use env->v7m.secure.
*/
regionlen = arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8) ? 0x21000 : 0x1000;
memory_region_init(&s->container, OBJECT(s), "nvic", regionlen);
/* The system register region goes at the bottom of the priority
* stack as it covers the whole page.
*/
memory_region_init_io(&s->sysregmem, OBJECT(s), &nvic_sysreg_ops, s,
"nvic_sysregs", 0x1000);
memory_region_add_subregion(&s->container, 0, &s->sysregmem);
memory_region_init_io(&s->systickmem, OBJECT(s),
&nvic_systick_ops, s,
"nvic_systick", 0xe0);
memory_region_add_subregion_overlap(&s->container, 0x10,
&s->systickmem, 1);
if (arm_feature(&s->cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
memory_region_init_io(&s->sysreg_ns_mem, OBJECT(s),
&nvic_sysreg_ns_ops, &s->sysregmem,
"nvic_sysregs_ns", 0x1000);
memory_region_add_subregion(&s->container, 0x20000, &s->sysreg_ns_mem);
memory_region_init_io(&s->systick_ns_mem, OBJECT(s),
&nvic_sysreg_ns_ops, &s->systickmem,
"nvic_systick_ns", 0xe0);
memory_region_add_subregion_overlap(&s->container, 0x20010,
&s->systick_ns_mem, 1);
}
sysbus_init_mmio(SYS_BUS_DEVICE(dev), &s->container);
}
static void armv7m_nvic_instance_init(Object *obj)
{
/* We have a different default value for the num-irq property
* than our superclass. This function runs after qdev init
* has set the defaults from the Property array and before
* any user-specified property setting, so just modify the
* value in the GICState struct.
*/
DeviceState *dev = DEVICE(obj);
NVICState *nvic = NVIC(obj);
SysBusDevice *sbd = SYS_BUS_DEVICE(obj);
sysbus_init_child_obj(obj, "systick-reg-ns", &nvic->systick[M_REG_NS],
sizeof(nvic->systick[M_REG_NS]), TYPE_SYSTICK);
/* We can't initialize the secure systick here, as we don't know
* yet if we need it.
*/
sysbus_init_irq(sbd, &nvic->excpout);
qdev_init_gpio_out_named(dev, &nvic->sysresetreq, "SYSRESETREQ", 1);
qdev_init_gpio_in_named(dev, nvic_systick_trigger, "systick-trigger",
M_REG_NUM_BANKS);
qdev_init_gpio_in_named(dev, nvic_nmi_trigger, "NMI", 1);
}
static void armv7m_nvic_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
{
DeviceClass *dc = DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
dc->vmsd = &vmstate_nvic;
dc->props = props_nvic;
dc->reset = armv7m_nvic_reset;
dc->realize = armv7m_nvic_realize;
}
static const TypeInfo armv7m_nvic_info = {
.name = TYPE_NVIC,
.parent = TYPE_SYS_BUS_DEVICE,
.instance_init = armv7m_nvic_instance_init,
.instance_size = sizeof(NVICState),
.class_init = armv7m_nvic_class_init,
.class_size = sizeof(SysBusDeviceClass),
};
static void armv7m_nvic_register_types(void)
{
type_register_static(&armv7m_nvic_info);
}
type_init(armv7m_nvic_register_types)
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