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d8dd15781d
Recently had a bug reported to me, in which the user was sending packets with a payload containing a sequence number. The packets were getting delivered in order according the chunk TSN values, but the sequence values in the payload were arriving out of order. At first I thought it must be an application error, but we eventually found it to be a problem on the transmit side in the sctp stack. The conditions for the error are that multihoming must be in use, and it helps if each transport has a different pmtu. The problem occurs in sctp_outq_flush. Basically we dequeue packets from the data queue, and attempt to append them to the orrered packet for a given transport. After we append a data chunk we add the trasport to the end of a list of transports to have their packets sent at the end of sctp_outq_flush. The problem occurs when a data chunks fills up a offered packet on a transport. The function that does the appending (sctp_packet_transmit_chunk), will try to call sctp_packet_transmit on the full packet, and then append the chunk to a new packet. This call to sctp_packet_transmit, sends that packet ahead of the others that may be queued in the transport_list in sctp_outq_flush. The result is that frames that were sent in one order from the user space sending application get re-ordered prior to tsn assignment in sctp_packet_transmit, resulting in mis-sequencing of data payloads, even though tsn ordering is correct. The fix is to change where we assign a tsn. By doing this earlier, we are then free to place chunks in packets, whatever way we see fit and the protocol will make sure to do all the appropriate re-ordering on receive as is needed. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reported-by: William Reich <reich@ulticom.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
768 lines
22 KiB
C
768 lines
22 KiB
C
/* SCTP kernel implementation
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* (C) Copyright IBM Corp. 2001, 2004
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* Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Cisco, Inc.
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* Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Motorola, Inc.
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*
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* This file is part of the SCTP kernel implementation
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*
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* These functions handle output processing.
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*
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* This SCTP implementation is free software;
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* you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of
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* the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
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* any later version.
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*
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* This SCTP implementation is distributed in the hope that it
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* will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
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* ************************
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* warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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* See the GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with GNU CC; see the file COPYING. If not, write to
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* the Free Software Foundation, 59 Temple Place - Suite 330,
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* Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
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*
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* Please send any bug reports or fixes you make to the
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* email address(es):
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* lksctp developers <lksctp-developers@lists.sourceforge.net>
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*
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* Or submit a bug report through the following website:
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* http://www.sf.net/projects/lksctp
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*
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* Written or modified by:
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* La Monte H.P. Yarroll <piggy@acm.org>
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* Karl Knutson <karl@athena.chicago.il.us>
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* Jon Grimm <jgrimm@austin.ibm.com>
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* Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* Any bugs reported given to us we will try to fix... any fixes shared will
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* be incorporated into the next SCTP release.
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*/
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/wait.h>
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#include <linux/time.h>
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#include <linux/ip.h>
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#include <linux/ipv6.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <net/inet_ecn.h>
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#include <net/ip.h>
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#include <net/icmp.h>
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#include <net/net_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/socket.h> /* for sa_family_t */
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#include <net/sock.h>
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#include <net/sctp/sctp.h>
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#include <net/sctp/sm.h>
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#include <net/sctp/checksum.h>
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/* Forward declarations for private helpers. */
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static sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_can_append_data(struct sctp_packet *packet,
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struct sctp_chunk *chunk);
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static void sctp_packet_append_data(struct sctp_packet *packet,
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struct sctp_chunk *chunk);
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static sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_will_fit(struct sctp_packet *packet,
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struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
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u16 chunk_len);
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static void sctp_packet_reset(struct sctp_packet *packet)
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{
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packet->size = packet->overhead;
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packet->has_cookie_echo = 0;
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packet->has_sack = 0;
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packet->has_data = 0;
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packet->has_auth = 0;
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packet->ipfragok = 0;
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packet->auth = NULL;
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}
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/* Config a packet.
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* This appears to be a followup set of initializations.
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*/
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struct sctp_packet *sctp_packet_config(struct sctp_packet *packet,
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__u32 vtag, int ecn_capable)
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{
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struct sctp_chunk *chunk = NULL;
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SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: packet:%p vtag:0x%x\n", __func__,
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packet, vtag);
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sctp_packet_reset(packet);
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packet->vtag = vtag;
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if (ecn_capable && sctp_packet_empty(packet)) {
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chunk = sctp_get_ecne_prepend(packet->transport->asoc);
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/* If there a is a prepend chunk stick it on the list before
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* any other chunks get appended.
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*/
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if (chunk)
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sctp_packet_append_chunk(packet, chunk);
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}
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return packet;
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}
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/* Initialize the packet structure. */
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struct sctp_packet *sctp_packet_init(struct sctp_packet *packet,
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struct sctp_transport *transport,
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__u16 sport, __u16 dport)
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{
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struct sctp_association *asoc = transport->asoc;
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size_t overhead;
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SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: packet:%p transport:%p\n", __func__,
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packet, transport);
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packet->transport = transport;
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packet->source_port = sport;
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packet->destination_port = dport;
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INIT_LIST_HEAD(&packet->chunk_list);
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if (asoc) {
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struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk);
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overhead = sp->pf->af->net_header_len;
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} else {
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overhead = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
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}
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overhead += sizeof(struct sctphdr);
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packet->overhead = overhead;
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sctp_packet_reset(packet);
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packet->vtag = 0;
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packet->malloced = 0;
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return packet;
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}
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/* Free a packet. */
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void sctp_packet_free(struct sctp_packet *packet)
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{
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struct sctp_chunk *chunk, *tmp;
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SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: packet:%p\n", __func__, packet);
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list_for_each_entry_safe(chunk, tmp, &packet->chunk_list, list) {
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list_del_init(&chunk->list);
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sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
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}
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if (packet->malloced)
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kfree(packet);
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}
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/* This routine tries to append the chunk to the offered packet. If adding
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* the chunk causes the packet to exceed the path MTU and COOKIE_ECHO chunk
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* is not present in the packet, it transmits the input packet.
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* Data can be bundled with a packet containing a COOKIE_ECHO chunk as long
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* as it can fit in the packet, but any more data that does not fit in this
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* packet can be sent only after receiving the COOKIE_ACK.
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*/
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sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_transmit_chunk(struct sctp_packet *packet,
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struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
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int one_packet)
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{
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sctp_xmit_t retval;
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int error = 0;
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SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: packet:%p chunk:%p\n", __func__,
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packet, chunk);
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switch ((retval = (sctp_packet_append_chunk(packet, chunk)))) {
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case SCTP_XMIT_PMTU_FULL:
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if (!packet->has_cookie_echo) {
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error = sctp_packet_transmit(packet);
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if (error < 0)
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chunk->skb->sk->sk_err = -error;
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/* If we have an empty packet, then we can NOT ever
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* return PMTU_FULL.
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*/
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if (!one_packet)
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retval = sctp_packet_append_chunk(packet,
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chunk);
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}
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break;
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case SCTP_XMIT_RWND_FULL:
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case SCTP_XMIT_OK:
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case SCTP_XMIT_NAGLE_DELAY:
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break;
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}
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return retval;
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}
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/* Try to bundle an auth chunk into the packet. */
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static sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_bundle_auth(struct sctp_packet *pkt,
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struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
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{
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struct sctp_association *asoc = pkt->transport->asoc;
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struct sctp_chunk *auth;
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sctp_xmit_t retval = SCTP_XMIT_OK;
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/* if we don't have an association, we can't do authentication */
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if (!asoc)
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return retval;
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/* See if this is an auth chunk we are bundling or if
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* auth is already bundled.
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*/
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if (chunk->chunk_hdr->type == SCTP_CID_AUTH || pkt->has_auth)
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return retval;
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/* if the peer did not request this chunk to be authenticated,
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* don't do it
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*/
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if (!chunk->auth)
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return retval;
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auth = sctp_make_auth(asoc);
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if (!auth)
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return retval;
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retval = sctp_packet_append_chunk(pkt, auth);
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return retval;
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}
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/* Try to bundle a SACK with the packet. */
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static sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_bundle_sack(struct sctp_packet *pkt,
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struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
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{
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sctp_xmit_t retval = SCTP_XMIT_OK;
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/* If sending DATA and haven't aleady bundled a SACK, try to
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* bundle one in to the packet.
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*/
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if (sctp_chunk_is_data(chunk) && !pkt->has_sack &&
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!pkt->has_cookie_echo) {
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struct sctp_association *asoc;
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struct timer_list *timer;
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asoc = pkt->transport->asoc;
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timer = &asoc->timers[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_SACK];
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/* If the SACK timer is running, we have a pending SACK */
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if (timer_pending(timer)) {
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struct sctp_chunk *sack;
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asoc->a_rwnd = asoc->rwnd;
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sack = sctp_make_sack(asoc);
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if (sack) {
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retval = sctp_packet_append_chunk(pkt, sack);
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asoc->peer.sack_needed = 0;
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if (del_timer(timer))
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sctp_association_put(asoc);
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}
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}
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}
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return retval;
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}
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/* Append a chunk to the offered packet reporting back any inability to do
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* so.
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*/
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sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_append_chunk(struct sctp_packet *packet,
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struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
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{
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sctp_xmit_t retval = SCTP_XMIT_OK;
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__u16 chunk_len = WORD_ROUND(ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length));
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SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: packet:%p chunk:%p\n", __func__, packet,
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chunk);
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/* Data chunks are special. Before seeing what else we can
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* bundle into this packet, check to see if we are allowed to
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* send this DATA.
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*/
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if (sctp_chunk_is_data(chunk)) {
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retval = sctp_packet_can_append_data(packet, chunk);
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if (retval != SCTP_XMIT_OK)
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goto finish;
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}
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/* Try to bundle AUTH chunk */
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retval = sctp_packet_bundle_auth(packet, chunk);
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if (retval != SCTP_XMIT_OK)
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goto finish;
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/* Try to bundle SACK chunk */
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retval = sctp_packet_bundle_sack(packet, chunk);
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if (retval != SCTP_XMIT_OK)
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goto finish;
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/* Check to see if this chunk will fit into the packet */
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retval = sctp_packet_will_fit(packet, chunk, chunk_len);
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if (retval != SCTP_XMIT_OK)
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goto finish;
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/* We believe that this chunk is OK to add to the packet */
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switch (chunk->chunk_hdr->type) {
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case SCTP_CID_DATA:
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/* Account for the data being in the packet */
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sctp_packet_append_data(packet, chunk);
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/* Disallow SACK bundling after DATA. */
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packet->has_sack = 1;
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/* Disallow AUTH bundling after DATA */
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packet->has_auth = 1;
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/* Let it be knows that packet has DATA in it */
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packet->has_data = 1;
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/* timestamp the chunk for rtx purposes */
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chunk->sent_at = jiffies;
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break;
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case SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO:
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packet->has_cookie_echo = 1;
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break;
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case SCTP_CID_SACK:
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packet->has_sack = 1;
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break;
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case SCTP_CID_AUTH:
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packet->has_auth = 1;
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packet->auth = chunk;
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break;
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}
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/* It is OK to send this chunk. */
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list_add_tail(&chunk->list, &packet->chunk_list);
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packet->size += chunk_len;
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chunk->transport = packet->transport;
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finish:
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return retval;
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}
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/* All packets are sent to the network through this function from
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* sctp_outq_tail().
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*
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* The return value is a normal kernel error return value.
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*/
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int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet)
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{
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struct sctp_transport *tp = packet->transport;
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struct sctp_association *asoc = tp->asoc;
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struct sctphdr *sh;
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struct sk_buff *nskb;
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struct sctp_chunk *chunk, *tmp;
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struct sock *sk;
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int err = 0;
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int padding; /* How much padding do we need? */
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__u8 has_data = 0;
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struct dst_entry *dst = tp->dst;
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unsigned char *auth = NULL; /* pointer to auth in skb data */
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__u32 cksum_buf_len = sizeof(struct sctphdr);
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SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: packet:%p\n", __func__, packet);
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/* Do NOT generate a chunkless packet. */
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if (list_empty(&packet->chunk_list))
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return err;
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/* Set up convenience variables... */
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chunk = list_entry(packet->chunk_list.next, struct sctp_chunk, list);
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sk = chunk->skb->sk;
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/* Allocate the new skb. */
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nskb = alloc_skb(packet->size + LL_MAX_HEADER, GFP_ATOMIC);
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if (!nskb)
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goto nomem;
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/* Make sure the outbound skb has enough header room reserved. */
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skb_reserve(nskb, packet->overhead + LL_MAX_HEADER);
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/* Set the owning socket so that we know where to get the
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* destination IP address.
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*/
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skb_set_owner_w(nskb, sk);
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/* The 'obsolete' field of dst is set to 2 when a dst is freed. */
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if (!dst || (dst->obsolete > 1)) {
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dst_release(dst);
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sctp_transport_route(tp, NULL, sctp_sk(sk));
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if (asoc && (asoc->param_flags & SPP_PMTUD_ENABLE)) {
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sctp_assoc_sync_pmtu(asoc);
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}
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}
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dst = dst_clone(tp->dst);
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skb_dst_set(nskb, dst);
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if (!dst)
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goto no_route;
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/* Build the SCTP header. */
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sh = (struct sctphdr *)skb_push(nskb, sizeof(struct sctphdr));
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skb_reset_transport_header(nskb);
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sh->source = htons(packet->source_port);
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sh->dest = htons(packet->destination_port);
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/* From 6.8 Adler-32 Checksum Calculation:
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* After the packet is constructed (containing the SCTP common
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* header and one or more control or DATA chunks), the
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* transmitter shall:
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*
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* 1) Fill in the proper Verification Tag in the SCTP common
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* header and initialize the checksum field to 0's.
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*/
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sh->vtag = htonl(packet->vtag);
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sh->checksum = 0;
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/**
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* 6.10 Bundling
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*
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* An endpoint bundles chunks by simply including multiple
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* chunks in one outbound SCTP packet. ...
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*/
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/**
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* 3.2 Chunk Field Descriptions
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*
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* The total length of a chunk (including Type, Length and
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* Value fields) MUST be a multiple of 4 bytes. If the length
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* of the chunk is not a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender MUST
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* pad the chunk with all zero bytes and this padding is not
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* included in the chunk length field. The sender should
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* never pad with more than 3 bytes.
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*
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* [This whole comment explains WORD_ROUND() below.]
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*/
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SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("***sctp_transmit_packet***\n");
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list_for_each_entry_safe(chunk, tmp, &packet->chunk_list, list) {
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list_del_init(&chunk->list);
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if (sctp_chunk_is_data(chunk)) {
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if (!chunk->resent) {
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/* 6.3.1 C4) When data is in flight and when allowed
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* by rule C5, a new RTT measurement MUST be made each
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* round trip. Furthermore, new RTT measurements
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* SHOULD be made no more than once per round-trip
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* for a given destination transport address.
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*/
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if (!tp->rto_pending) {
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chunk->rtt_in_progress = 1;
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tp->rto_pending = 1;
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}
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}
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chunk->resent = 1;
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has_data = 1;
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}
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padding = WORD_ROUND(chunk->skb->len) - chunk->skb->len;
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if (padding)
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memset(skb_put(chunk->skb, padding), 0, padding);
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/* if this is the auth chunk that we are adding,
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* store pointer where it will be added and put
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* the auth into the packet.
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*/
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if (chunk == packet->auth)
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auth = skb_tail_pointer(nskb);
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cksum_buf_len += chunk->skb->len;
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memcpy(skb_put(nskb, chunk->skb->len),
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chunk->skb->data, chunk->skb->len);
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SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s %p[%s] %s 0x%x, %s %d, %s %d, %s %d\n",
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"*** Chunk", chunk,
|
|
sctp_cname(SCTP_ST_CHUNK(
|
|
chunk->chunk_hdr->type)),
|
|
chunk->has_tsn ? "TSN" : "No TSN",
|
|
chunk->has_tsn ?
|
|
ntohl(chunk->subh.data_hdr->tsn) : 0,
|
|
"length", ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length),
|
|
"chunk->skb->len", chunk->skb->len,
|
|
"rtt_in_progress", chunk->rtt_in_progress);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this is a control chunk, this is our last
|
|
* reference. Free data chunks after they've been
|
|
* acknowledged or have failed.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!sctp_chunk_is_data(chunk))
|
|
sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.2
|
|
* The sender MUST calculate the MAC as described in RFC2104 [2]
|
|
* using the hash function H as described by the MAC Identifier and
|
|
* the shared association key K based on the endpoint pair shared key
|
|
* described by the shared key identifier. The 'data' used for the
|
|
* computation of the AUTH-chunk is given by the AUTH chunk with its
|
|
* HMAC field set to zero (as shown in Figure 6) followed by all
|
|
* chunks that are placed after the AUTH chunk in the SCTP packet.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (auth)
|
|
sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(asoc, nskb,
|
|
(struct sctp_auth_chunk *)auth,
|
|
GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
|
|
/* 2) Calculate the Adler-32 checksum of the whole packet,
|
|
* including the SCTP common header and all the
|
|
* chunks.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: Adler-32 is no longer applicable, as has been replaced
|
|
* by CRC32-C as described in <draft-ietf-tsvwg-sctpcsum-02.txt>.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!sctp_checksum_disable &&
|
|
!(dst->dev->features & (NETIF_F_NO_CSUM | NETIF_F_SCTP_CSUM))) {
|
|
__u32 crc32 = sctp_start_cksum((__u8 *)sh, cksum_buf_len);
|
|
|
|
/* 3) Put the resultant value into the checksum field in the
|
|
* common header, and leave the rest of the bits unchanged.
|
|
*/
|
|
sh->checksum = sctp_end_cksum(crc32);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (dst->dev->features & NETIF_F_SCTP_CSUM) {
|
|
/* no need to seed psuedo checksum for SCTP */
|
|
nskb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
|
|
nskb->csum_start = (skb_transport_header(nskb) -
|
|
nskb->head);
|
|
nskb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct sctphdr, checksum);
|
|
} else {
|
|
nskb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* IP layer ECN support
|
|
* From RFC 2481
|
|
* "The ECN-Capable Transport (ECT) bit would be set by the
|
|
* data sender to indicate that the end-points of the
|
|
* transport protocol are ECN-capable."
|
|
*
|
|
* Now setting the ECT bit all the time, as it should not cause
|
|
* any problems protocol-wise even if our peer ignores it.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: The works for IPv6 layer checks this bit too later
|
|
* in transmission. See IP6_ECN_flow_xmit().
|
|
*/
|
|
(*tp->af_specific->ecn_capable)(nskb->sk);
|
|
|
|
/* Set up the IP options. */
|
|
/* BUG: not implemented
|
|
* For v4 this all lives somewhere in sk->sk_opt...
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Dump that on IP! */
|
|
if (asoc && asoc->peer.last_sent_to != tp) {
|
|
/* Considering the multiple CPU scenario, this is a
|
|
* "correcter" place for last_sent_to. --xguo
|
|
*/
|
|
asoc->peer.last_sent_to = tp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (has_data) {
|
|
struct timer_list *timer;
|
|
unsigned long timeout;
|
|
|
|
/* Restart the AUTOCLOSE timer when sending data. */
|
|
if (sctp_state(asoc, ESTABLISHED) && asoc->autoclose) {
|
|
timer = &asoc->timers[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_AUTOCLOSE];
|
|
timeout = asoc->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_AUTOCLOSE];
|
|
|
|
if (!mod_timer(timer, jiffies + timeout))
|
|
sctp_association_hold(asoc);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("***sctp_transmit_packet*** skb len %d\n",
|
|
nskb->len);
|
|
|
|
nskb->local_df = packet->ipfragok;
|
|
(*tp->af_specific->sctp_xmit)(nskb, tp);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
sctp_packet_reset(packet);
|
|
return err;
|
|
no_route:
|
|
kfree_skb(nskb);
|
|
IP_INC_STATS_BH(&init_net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: Returning the 'err' will effect all the associations
|
|
* associated with a socket, although only one of the paths of the
|
|
* association is unreachable.
|
|
* The real failure of a transport or association can be passed on
|
|
* to the user via notifications. So setting this error may not be
|
|
* required.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* err = -EHOSTUNREACH; */
|
|
err:
|
|
/* Control chunks are unreliable so just drop them. DATA chunks
|
|
* will get resent or dropped later.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(chunk, tmp, &packet->chunk_list, list) {
|
|
list_del_init(&chunk->list);
|
|
if (!sctp_chunk_is_data(chunk))
|
|
sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
|
|
}
|
|
goto out;
|
|
nomem:
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/********************************************************************
|
|
* 2nd Level Abstractions
|
|
********************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/* This private function check to see if a chunk can be added */
|
|
static sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_can_append_data(struct sctp_packet *packet,
|
|
struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
|
|
{
|
|
sctp_xmit_t retval = SCTP_XMIT_OK;
|
|
size_t datasize, rwnd, inflight, flight_size;
|
|
struct sctp_transport *transport = packet->transport;
|
|
struct sctp_association *asoc = transport->asoc;
|
|
struct sctp_outq *q = &asoc->outqueue;
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 2960 6.1 Transmission of DATA Chunks
|
|
*
|
|
* A) At any given time, the data sender MUST NOT transmit new data to
|
|
* any destination transport address if its peer's rwnd indicates
|
|
* that the peer has no buffer space (i.e. rwnd is 0, see Section
|
|
* 6.2.1). However, regardless of the value of rwnd (including if it
|
|
* is 0), the data sender can always have one DATA chunk in flight to
|
|
* the receiver if allowed by cwnd (see rule B below). This rule
|
|
* allows the sender to probe for a change in rwnd that the sender
|
|
* missed due to the SACK having been lost in transit from the data
|
|
* receiver to the data sender.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rwnd = asoc->peer.rwnd;
|
|
inflight = q->outstanding_bytes;
|
|
flight_size = transport->flight_size;
|
|
|
|
datasize = sctp_data_size(chunk);
|
|
|
|
if (datasize > rwnd) {
|
|
if (inflight > 0) {
|
|
/* We have (at least) one data chunk in flight,
|
|
* so we can't fall back to rule 6.1 B).
|
|
*/
|
|
retval = SCTP_XMIT_RWND_FULL;
|
|
goto finish;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 2960 6.1 Transmission of DATA Chunks
|
|
*
|
|
* B) At any given time, the sender MUST NOT transmit new data
|
|
* to a given transport address if it has cwnd or more bytes
|
|
* of data outstanding to that transport address.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* RFC 7.2.4 & the Implementers Guide 2.8.
|
|
*
|
|
* 3) ...
|
|
* When a Fast Retransmit is being performed the sender SHOULD
|
|
* ignore the value of cwnd and SHOULD NOT delay retransmission.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (chunk->fast_retransmit != SCTP_NEED_FRTX)
|
|
if (flight_size >= transport->cwnd) {
|
|
retval = SCTP_XMIT_RWND_FULL;
|
|
goto finish;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Nagle's algorithm to solve small-packet problem:
|
|
* Inhibit the sending of new chunks when new outgoing data arrives
|
|
* if any previously transmitted data on the connection remains
|
|
* unacknowledged.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk)->nodelay && sctp_packet_empty(packet) &&
|
|
inflight && sctp_state(asoc, ESTABLISHED)) {
|
|
unsigned max = transport->pathmtu - packet->overhead;
|
|
unsigned len = chunk->skb->len + q->out_qlen;
|
|
|
|
/* Check whether this chunk and all the rest of pending
|
|
* data will fit or delay in hopes of bundling a full
|
|
* sized packet.
|
|
* Don't delay large message writes that may have been
|
|
* fragmeneted into small peices.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((len < max) && (chunk->msg->msg_size < max)) {
|
|
retval = SCTP_XMIT_NAGLE_DELAY;
|
|
goto finish;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finish:
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This private function does management things when adding DATA chunk */
|
|
static void sctp_packet_append_data(struct sctp_packet *packet,
|
|
struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sctp_transport *transport = packet->transport;
|
|
size_t datasize = sctp_data_size(chunk);
|
|
struct sctp_association *asoc = transport->asoc;
|
|
u32 rwnd = asoc->peer.rwnd;
|
|
|
|
/* Keep track of how many bytes are in flight over this transport. */
|
|
transport->flight_size += datasize;
|
|
|
|
/* Keep track of how many bytes are in flight to the receiver. */
|
|
asoc->outqueue.outstanding_bytes += datasize;
|
|
|
|
/* Update our view of the receiver's rwnd. Include sk_buff overhead
|
|
* while updating peer.rwnd so that it reduces the chances of a
|
|
* receiver running out of receive buffer space even when receive
|
|
* window is still open. This can happen when a sender is sending
|
|
* sending small messages.
|
|
*/
|
|
datasize += sizeof(struct sk_buff);
|
|
if (datasize < rwnd)
|
|
rwnd -= datasize;
|
|
else
|
|
rwnd = 0;
|
|
|
|
asoc->peer.rwnd = rwnd;
|
|
/* Has been accepted for transmission. */
|
|
if (!asoc->peer.prsctp_capable)
|
|
chunk->msg->can_abandon = 0;
|
|
sctp_chunk_assign_tsn(chunk);
|
|
sctp_chunk_assign_ssn(chunk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_will_fit(struct sctp_packet *packet,
|
|
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
|
|
u16 chunk_len)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t psize;
|
|
size_t pmtu;
|
|
int too_big;
|
|
sctp_xmit_t retval = SCTP_XMIT_OK;
|
|
|
|
psize = packet->size;
|
|
pmtu = ((packet->transport->asoc) ?
|
|
(packet->transport->asoc->pathmtu) :
|
|
(packet->transport->pathmtu));
|
|
|
|
too_big = (psize + chunk_len > pmtu);
|
|
|
|
/* Decide if we need to fragment or resubmit later. */
|
|
if (too_big) {
|
|
/* It's OK to fragmet at IP level if any one of the following
|
|
* is true:
|
|
* 1. The packet is empty (meaning this chunk is greater
|
|
* the MTU)
|
|
* 2. The chunk we are adding is a control chunk
|
|
* 3. The packet doesn't have any data in it yet and data
|
|
* requires authentication.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sctp_packet_empty(packet) || !sctp_chunk_is_data(chunk) ||
|
|
(!packet->has_data && chunk->auth)) {
|
|
/* We no longer do re-fragmentation.
|
|
* Just fragment at the IP layer, if we
|
|
* actually hit this condition
|
|
*/
|
|
packet->ipfragok = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
retval = SCTP_XMIT_PMTU_FULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|