Control Path Traversal Protections via Env Var (#5962)

* Fix isPathTraversal method to be less strict

* Fix isPathTraversal method to be less strict

* Control isPathTraversal via an Env Var

* Path traversal check env var

---------

Co-authored-by: christopherholland-workday <[email protected]>

docker/.env.example

@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY_IN_MINUTES=43200
 
 # HTTP_DENY_LIST=
 # HTTP_SECURITY_CHECK=true
+# PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY=true
 # CUSTOM_MCP_SECURITY_CHECK=true
 # CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL=sse #(stdio | sse)
 # TRUST_PROXY=true #(true | false | 1 | loopback| linklocal | uniquelocal | IP addresses | loopback, IP addresses)

docker/docker-compose-queue-prebuilt.yml

@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ services:
             - CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL=${CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL}
             - HTTP_DENY_LIST=${HTTP_DENY_LIST}
             - HTTP_SECURITY_CHECK=${HTTP_SECURITY_CHECK}
+            - PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY=${PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY}
             - TRUST_PROXY=${TRUST_PROXY}
         healthcheck:
             test: ['CMD', 'curl', '-f', 'http://localhost:${PORT:-3000}/api/v1/ping']
@@ -300,6 +301,7 @@ services:
             - CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL=${CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL}
             - HTTP_DENY_LIST=${HTTP_DENY_LIST}
             - HTTP_SECURITY_CHECK=${HTTP_SECURITY_CHECK}
+            - PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY=${PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY}
             - TRUST_PROXY=${TRUST_PROXY}
         healthcheck:
             test: ['CMD', 'curl', '-f', 'http://localhost:${WORKER_PORT:-5566}/healthz']

docker/docker-compose.yml

@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ services:
             - CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL=${CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL}
             - HTTP_DENY_LIST=${HTTP_DENY_LIST}
             - HTTP_SECURITY_CHECK=${HTTP_SECURITY_CHECK}
+            - PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY=${PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY}
             - TRUST_PROXY=${TRUST_PROXY}
         ports:
             - '${PORT}:${PORT}'

docker/worker/.env.example

@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY_IN_MINUTES=43200
 
 # HTTP_DENY_LIST=
 # HTTP_SECURITY_CHECK=true
+# PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY=true
 # CUSTOM_MCP_SECURITY_CHECK=true
 # CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL=sse #(stdio | sse)
 # TRUST_PROXY=true #(true | false | 1 | loopback| linklocal | uniquelocal | IP addresses | loopback, IP addresses)

docker/worker/docker-compose.yml

@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ services:
             - CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL=${CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL}
             - HTTP_DENY_LIST=${HTTP_DENY_LIST}
             - HTTP_SECURITY_CHECK=${HTTP_SECURITY_CHECK}
+            - PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY=${PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY}
             - TRUST_PROXY=${TRUST_PROXY}
         ports:
             - '${WORKER_PORT}:${WORKER_PORT}'

packages/components/src/validator.ts

@@ -33,17 +33,28 @@ export const isValidURL = (url: string): boolean => {
  * @returns {boolean} True if path traversal detected, false otherwise
  */
 export const isPathTraversal = (path: string): boolean => {
-    // Check for common path traversal patterns
+    // PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY defaults to true; must be explicitly set to 'false' to disable
+    if (process.env.PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY === 'false') {
+        return false
+    }
+
+    // Normalize %2e → . before checking for .. to catch mixed-encoding bypasses
+    // e.g. .%2e/, %2e./, %2e%2e all become ../
+    if (/\.\./.test(path.replace(/%2e/gi, '.'))) {
+        return true
+    }
+
     const dangerousPatterns = [
-        '..', // Directory traversal
-        '/', // Root directory
-        '\\', // Windows root directory
-        '%2e', // URL encoded .
-        '%2f', // URL encoded /
-        '%5c' // URL encoded \
+        /%2f/i, // URL encoded /
+        /%5c/i, // URL encoded \ (Windows path)
+        /\0/, // Null bytes
+        /%00/i, // URL encoded null byte
+        /^\s*[a-zA-Z]:[/\\]/, // Windows absolute paths (C:\, C:/) with optional leading whitespace
+        /^\\\\[^\\]/, // UNC paths (\\server\)
+        /^\// // Absolute Unix paths (/etc, /data, /root, etc.)
     ]
 
-    return dangerousPatterns.some((pattern) => path.toLowerCase().includes(pattern))
+    return dangerousPatterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(path))
 }
 
 /**
@@ -52,6 +63,10 @@ export const isPathTraversal = (path: string): boolean => {
  * @returns {boolean} True if path traversal detected, false otherwise
  */
 export const isUnsafeFilePath = (filePath: string): boolean => {
+    if (process.env.PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY === 'false') {
+        return false
+    }
+
     if (!filePath || typeof filePath !== 'string') {
         return true
     }
@@ -191,6 +206,14 @@ const getAllowedVectorStoreBaseDirs = (): string[] => {
  * @throws {Error} If path validation fails or path is outside allowed directories
  */
 export const validateVectorStorePath = (userProvidedPath: string | undefined): string => {
+    if (process.env.PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY === 'false') {
+        if (!userProvidedPath || userProvidedPath.trim() === '') {
+            return path.join(getUserHome(), '.flowise', 'vectorstore')
+        }
+        const bypassPath = userProvidedPath.trim()
+        return path.isAbsolute(bypassPath) ? bypassPath : path.resolve(path.join(getUserHome(), '.flowise', bypassPath))
+    }
+
     // If no path provided, use default secure location
     if (!userProvidedPath || userProvidedPath.trim() === '') {
         return path.join(getUserHome(), '.flowise', 'vectorstore')

packages/components/test/validator.test.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,86 @@
-import { validateMimeTypeAndExtensionMatch, validateVectorStorePath } from '../src/validator'
+import { isPathTraversal, isUnsafeFilePath, validateMimeTypeAndExtensionMatch, validateVectorStorePath } from '../src/validator'
 import path from 'path'
 import { getUserHome } from '../src/utils'
 
+describe('isPathTraversal', () => {
+    describe('returns true for dangerous patterns', () => {
+        it.each([
+            ['directory traversal (..)', '../etc/passwd'],
+            ['multiple levels of traversal', '../../sensitive'],
+            ['bare double-dot', '..'],
+            ['Windows absolute path', 'C:\\windows'],
+            ['Windows absolute path with forward slash', 'C:/windows'],
+            ['Windows absolute path with leading whitespace', ' C:\\windows'],
+            ['UNC path', '\\\\server\\share'],
+            ['URL encoded dot (%2e)', '%2e%2e/etc'],
+            ['URL encoded dot uppercase (%2E)', '%2E%2E'],
+            ['mixed encoding (.%2e)', '.%2e/etc'],
+            ['mixed encoding (%2e.)', '%2e./etc'],
+            ['URL encoded forward slash (%2f)', '%2f'],
+            ['URL encoded forward slash uppercase (%2F)', '%2F'],
+            ['URL encoded backslash (%5c)', '%5c'],
+            ['URL encoded backslash uppercase (%5C)', '%5C'],
+            ['null byte', 'path\0name'],
+            ['URL encoded null byte (%00)', 'path%00name'],
+            ['absolute Unix path', '/etc/passwd'],
+            ['absolute Unix root', '/']
+        ])('should detect %s: %s', (_description, input) => {
+            expect(isPathTraversal(input)).toBe(true)
+        })
+    })
+
+    describe('returns false for safe inputs', () => {
+        it.each([
+            ['simple filename with extension', 'filename.txt'],
+            ['plain name without extension', 'myfile'],
+            ['empty string', ''],
+            ['name with underscores', 'hello_world'],
+            ['relative path with slash', 'uploads/file.txt']
+        ])('should not flag %s: %s', (_description, input) => {
+            expect(isPathTraversal(input)).toBe(false)
+        })
+    })
+
+    describe('PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY=false bypasses all checks', () => {
+        beforeEach(() => {
+            process.env.PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY = 'false'
+        })
+        afterEach(() => {
+            delete process.env.PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY
+        })
+
+        it.each([
+            ['absolute Unix path', '/data/uploads'],
+            ['mixed encoding', '.%2e/etc'],
+            ['directory traversal', '../etc/passwd'],
+            ['Windows absolute path', 'C:\\windows']
+        ])('should return false for %s when safety disabled', (_desc, input) => {
+            expect(isPathTraversal(input)).toBe(false)
+        })
+    })
+})
+
+describe('isUnsafeFilePath', () => {
+    describe('PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY=false bypasses all checks', () => {
+        beforeEach(() => {
+            process.env.PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY = 'false'
+        })
+        afterEach(() => {
+            delete process.env.PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY
+        })
+
+        it.each([
+            ['absolute Unix path', '/data/uploads'],
+            ['directory traversal', '../etc/passwd'],
+            ['Windows absolute path', 'C:\\windows'],
+            ['null byte', 'path\0name'],
+            ['control character', 'path\x01name']
+        ])('should return false for %s when safety disabled', (_desc, input) => {
+            expect(isUnsafeFilePath(input)).toBe(false)
+        })
+    })
+})
+
 describe('validateMimeTypeAndExtensionMatch', () => {
     describe('valid cases', () => {
         it.each([
@@ -359,4 +438,31 @@ describe('validateVectorStorePath', () => {
             expect(result).toBe(path.normalize(mixedPath))
         })
     })
+
+    describe('PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY=false bypasses all checks', () => {
+        beforeEach(() => {
+            process.env.PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY = 'false'
+        })
+        afterEach(() => {
+            delete process.env.PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY
+        })
+
+        it('should allow arbitrary absolute Unix path', () => {
+            expect(validateVectorStorePath('/data/faiss-store')).toBe('/data/faiss-store')
+        })
+
+        it('should allow path outside allowed directories (/tmp)', () => {
+            expect(validateVectorStorePath('/tmp/mystore')).toBe('/tmp/mystore')
+        })
+
+        it('should allow path containing .. without throwing', () => {
+            const result = validateVectorStorePath('../mystore')
+            expect(typeof result).toBe('string')
+        })
+
+        it('should return default path when undefined', () => {
+            const userHome = getUserHome()
+            expect(validateVectorStorePath(undefined)).toBe(path.join(userHome, '.flowise', 'vectorstore'))
+        })
+    })
 })

packages/server/.env.example

@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY_IN_MINUTES=43200
 
 # HTTP_DENY_LIST=
 # HTTP_SECURITY_CHECK=true
+# PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY=true
 # CUSTOM_MCP_SECURITY_CHECK=true
 # CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL=sse #(stdio | sse)
 # TRUST_PROXY=true #(true | false | 1 | loopback| linklocal | uniquelocal | IP addresses | loopback, IP addresses)

packages/server/src/commands/base.ts

@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ export abstract class BaseCommand extends Command {
         CUSTOM_MCP_PROTOCOL: Flags.string(),
         HTTP_DENY_LIST: Flags.string(),
         HTTP_SECURITY_CHECK: Flags.string(),
+        PATH_TRAVERSAL_SAFETY: Flags.string(),
         TRUST_PROXY: Flags.string(),
 
         // Auth