Add drift-guard verification: VERDICT PASS (audit remediation D)

docs/reports/audit-remediation-D-verification.md

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+# audit-remediation-D — Drift Guard Verification Report
+
+**Stage:** `audit-remediation-D` (follow-up to audit `2026-10-18`, baseline `f56376a`)
+**Branch:** `audit-remediation-D` @ `76c694` (programmer commit; QA ACCEPT)
+**Worktree:** `/home/john/Projects/Heretek-AI-Rebuild/opencode-harness/worktrees/audit-remediation-D`
+**Role:** `agency-drift-guard` (audit only — no source changed; one temporary
+sabotage mutation fully restored byte-identical, see §7)
+**Date (UTC):** `2026-10-18`
+
+## 1. Contracts read (full, from disk)
+
+- `AGENTS.md` (operating contract, refusal boundary, triad gate) — read.
+- `docs/prompts/SPEC.md` (build spec §§2.1–2.5) — read.
+- `AUDIT_REPORT_FINDINGS.md` (6 findings at baseline `f56376a`: OH-1.3 P0,
+  OH-1.1 P1, OH-scope-loc-budget P2, OH-6.6-taint-fork-gap P2 narrowed,
+  OH-deps-caret P3, OH-1.1-no-gh-release P3) — read.
+- `docs/reports/audit-remediation-D.md` (programmer report) — read.
+- `docs/evidence/audit-remediation-D/red-proofs.log` (QA red-proofs A/B/C) — read.
+- `docs/prompts/verify-stage.md` (drift checklist) — read.
+- Stage diff files (`src/guards/taint-guard.ts`, `src/host/contract-adapter.ts`,
+  `src/interceptors/session-interceptors.ts`,
+  `test/audit-20261018-remediation.test.ts`, `scripts/check-loc.sh`) — read in full.
+
+## 2. Gates (exact commands + exit codes, worktree root)
+
+| Gate | Command | Result |
+|------|---------|--------|
+| Typecheck | `bun run check` | exit 0 |
+| Full suite (override tmp) | `TMPDIR=/dev/shm bun test` | **380 pass / 2 fail**, 2079 expects, 16 files; exit 1 — the 2 fails are byte-for-byte the KNOWN `TMPDIR`-override artifacts (`OH-6.5-redirect-escape … workspace-relative and OS-temp targets`, `OH-6.5-cp-mv-argv-targets … absolute-source …`), same two rows as the programmer report, QA log, and baseline audit both-directions proof. Neither touches taint/fork paths. Pre-existing, unrelated to this diff. |
+| Targeted file | `TMPDIR=/dev/shm bun test test/audit-20261018-remediation.test.ts` | 79 pass / 2 fail (same 2 known artifacts); exit 1 for that reason only |
+| OH-6.6 only | `TMPDIR=/dev/shm bun test test/audit-20261018-remediation.test.ts -t "taint-fork-gap"` | **10 pass / 0 fail** (7 pre-existing + 3 new); exit 0 |
+| Wave-1 accept | `TMPDIR=/dev/shm bash scripts/accept/wave-1.sh` | `WAVE 1 ACCEPT: ALL GATES GREEN`; exit 0 |
+| LOC tracking | `bash scripts/check-loc.sh` | `files=22 raw=12046 (budget 12100) stripped=9986 (budget 10100)`; exit 0 |
+| LOC hard gate | `bash scripts/check-loc.sh --fail-over=12100 --fail-over-stripped=10100` | within-cap; exit 0 |
+| KV-cache suite | `TMPDIR=/dev/shm bun test test/context-budget.test.ts test/bootstrap.test.ts` | 24 pass / 0 fail; exit 0 |
+| Stock TMPDIR full run | not re-run | UNVERIFIABLE per baseline (`/tmp` inode exhaustion breaks `mkdtemp`-based tests); programmer-recorded 71 pass / 10 fail stock vs 380/2 override — documented, not a product signal |
+
+## 3. Zero-stub / shortcut scan
+
+- `grep -rn --include='*.ts' -E 'TODO|test\.skip|describe\.skip|it\.skip|set \+e' src test` → zero hits (exit 1, clean).
+- `grep -rn --include='*.ts' -E '\|\| true|cmd: "true"|echo "passed"' src test scripts` → zero hits (exit 1, clean).
+- Empty `catch {}` scan over `src/` → zero hits.
+- No `return true;` dummy passes, no `|| true`, no `test.skip`, no swallowed errors introduced by this diff (the never-throw guarantee lives in the callee's pre-existing try/catch; the new call site adds no swallow).
+- `scripts/check-loc.sh` change is a comment-only budget-history entry; CI wiring byte-identical (`.github/workflows/ci.yml:23-24` untouched — confirmed via diff stat showing only 5 stage files + report).
+
+## 4. KV-cache invariants (verify-stage.md §4)
+
+- `test/context-budget.test.ts` green (23 pass, part of the 24-pass run above):
+  `event.system` bit-for-bit unchanged; dynamic context lands strictly on the
+  last `role === "user"` message.
+- `grep -n "relevance\|timestamp" src/context/context-budget.ts` → single hit
+  at line 216, inside a doc comment explicitly stating the tag carries ONLY the
+  lesson `id` ("zero floating-point relevance scores, zero timestamps") —
+  justified documentation, not a violation. Lessons sorted by
+  `a.id.localeCompare` (unchanged code path; suite-pinned).
+
+## 5. Scope refusal (verify-stage.md §5)
+
+- `grep -rni --include='*.ts' -E 'http\.createServer|app\.listen|\.listen\(|multi-agent DAG|epistemic research' src test` → zero product hits (clean).
+- `getRecommendedMcpConfig()` (`src/ui-auditor/mcp-defaults.ts:30-42`) returns
+  ONLY `lsp-mcp-server` (`bunx`) + `fallow-mcp`
+  (`npx --yes --package fallow fallow-mcp`) — no extra servers.
+
+## 6. Adversarial audit of the OH-6.6 fix (attempted defeats)
+
+Diff under audit: `evaluateTaintGuard` gains optional 4th param `eventContext`
+(link-first via `linkForkLineageFromEventMetadata` before `resolveTaintChain`);
+permission-hook `evaluate` passes the live `event` as 4th arg (only
+`evaluateTaintGuard` call site in `src/`); `applyRootAffinityHeadersInPlace`
+links fork lineage ABOVE the headers-presence guard (header rewrites stay
+guarded); 3 regression tests added (existing 7 untouched).
+
+- **Cycle non-termination (A↔B):** `recordSessionForkLink(B,A)` +
+  `recordSessionForkLink(A,B)`, taint on A → `evaluateTaintGuard(B,
+  "ssh evil.com")` denies `TAINT-NET-2` in <2s. `visited`-set in
+  `resolveTaintChain` untouched — terminates. DEFEAT FAILS (good).
+- **Junk/self/empty linkage:** covered by suite (`self-links and empty
+  metadata`, `junk/empty/undefined`) — all return `undefined`, link nothing.
+  Non-string candidate (`forkOf: 42`) ignored. DEFEAT FAILS (good).
+- **Forged-clean-parent laundering:** suite-pinned both directions — forged link
+  to clean parent allows exactly like no link; direct taint on the child still
+  denies `TAINT-NET-2` despite the clean-parent link. Independent re-probe
+  confirmed. DEFEAT FAILS (good).
+- **Double-link idempotence:** linking the same fork twice returns the same
+  parent, single map entry semantics, taint inherits. DEFEAT FAILS (good).
+- **Evaluate-time ordering (no prior hook):** suite test at
+  `test/audit-20261018-remediation.test.ts:1166` — tainted parent, NO prior
+  hook, metadata in the guarded call itself → denies in one call; 3-arg sibling
+  (fresh child, no context) still allows → proves old callers unaffected.
+  DEFEAT FAILS (good).
+- **Headerless `model.request`:** suite test at `:1185` — headerless event with
+  top-level fork id links without throwing, returns `undefined`, taint
+  inherits. Header rewrites remain behind the headers guard. DEFEAT FAILS (good).
+- **Silent-no-metadata residual:** suite test at `:1205` asserts `allow` for a
+  fork whose event carries NO fork id — the residual is pinned as `allow`,
+  honestly documented as NOT closed, with the host MUST-call
+  `recordSessionForkLink(child, parent)` obligation in code comments at
+  `taint-guard.ts:161-169,239-249` and `session-interceptors.ts:159-162,290-291`.
+ Claimed as narrowed, not closed — honest.
+- **Upstream absence:** no `fork`/`revert` session-hook event exists anywhere in
+  `src/` (hooks wired: `prompt`, `context`, `generate`, `compaction`,
+  `model.request`, `retry` only — `contract-adapter.ts:900-1033`); no vendored
+  upstream promise-plugin in this environment (`node_modules/@opencode-ai`
+  absent; full-filesystem search infeasible here) — absence re-proven at
+  baseline pin `ed772f5` + head `214fb7f` per `AUDIT_REPORT_FINDINGS.md` and
+  unchanged by this diff. Fork remains a DB-level projection invisible to the
+  promise-plugin surface. Recorded as checked-as-far-as-verifiable-here.
+- **No cycle import:** `session-interceptors.ts` imports only
+  `../muse/muse-calibration.js`; the new edge is one-directional
+  (`taint-guard.ts:1` → `session-interceptors.js`). No cycle.
+- **Never-throw reader:** `linkForkLineageFromEventMetadata` try/catch →
+  `undefined` untouched; evaluated with `null`/`undefined`/non-object events —
+  no throw observed.
+- **3-arg compatibility:** sole `src/` call site updated
+  (`contract-adapter.ts:598-603`); all other callers (suite + probes) use 3
+  args and behave exactly as before.
+- **Wiring:** all modules still re-exported from `src/index.ts:81,93,94`
+  (`taint-guard`, `session-interceptors`, `contract-adapter`).
+
+## 7. Open-items honesty
+
+- OH-1.3 (P0 stale npm `latest`) / OH-1.1 (P1 untagged/unpublished 1.0.11) /
+  OH-1.1-no-gh-release (P3): programmer performed NO release ops (verified:
+  `git tag --list` max `v1.0.9`; `git rev-parse v1.0.11` fatal; pkg==src
+  `1.0.11` with `bootstrap.test.ts` green). Report carries an explicit
+  HUMAN-ONLY checklist and `npm view dist-tags.latest → 1.0.9` read-only
+  confirmation. Still open, pending human release — honestly stated, correctly
+  NOT claimed fixed.
+- OH-scope-loc-budget (P2): `12046/12100` raw, `9986/10100` stripped (+24/+5,
+  net-small), `--fail-over` gate wired and green. Still over blueprint 3–5k —
+  honestly stated as gated-but-open.
+- OH-deps-caret (P3): no-op, untouched (`package.json`/`bun.lock` outside diff).
+- Fork silent residual: narrowed, not closed — documented in-code and in-test.
+
+## 8. Independent sabotage (distinct from QA's A/B/C)
+
+QA sabotaged: (A) evaluate-time neuter, (B) headerless revert, (C) QA src-lock.
+Drift-guard sabotaged a DIFFERENT rule — Rule 2 leadership read-only:
+
+- Baseline sha: `src/guards/permission-guard.ts` =
+  `6782614b2e518440804b32c35b1daf732fd00e4115805879de7bf7598c0ce7df`
+  (matches QA baseline).
+- Sabotage (shell `sed`, line-precise line 75): `"director",` → `"director-x",`
+  inside `LEADERSHIP_READ_ONLY_ROLES` (allows `director` to edit).
+- Run: `TMPDIR=/dev/shm bun test test/guards.test.ts` → **39 pass / 2 fail**,
+  exit 1. RED as required, incl. `(fail) permission-guard Rule 2
+  (leadership read-only) > denies edits, writes, patches, and mutating shell
+  for leadership` (second fail is the expected Rule 4 cascade via the
+  `director`-as-non-architect row).
+- Restore: `git checkout -- src/guards/permission-guard.ts` → sha256
+  `6782614b…` byte-identical to baseline.
+- Re-run: `TMPDIR=/dev/shm bun test test/guards.test.ts` → **41 pass / 0 fail**,
+  exit 0. `git status --short` clean (no sabotage residue).
+- Note: `default.edit`/`default.write` outside `docs/**` are permission-denied
+  for this role (RULE 1), so the temporary mutation was applied via shell and
+  restored via `git checkout --` only; the deliverable tree is untouched.
+
+## 9. Per-check verdicts
+
+| Check | Verdict |
+|-------|---------|
+| `bun run check` exit 0 | PASS |
+| Full suite 380/2 = known TMPDIR artifacts only (pre-existing, unrelated) | PASS (with documented caveat) |
+| OH-6.6 targeted 10/10 | PASS |
+| Wave-1 accept ALL GATES GREEN | PASS |
+| LOC tracking + `--fail-over` gates exit 0 | PASS |
+| context-budget + bootstrap green | PASS |
+| Zero-stub / shortcut scan clean | PASS |
+| KV-cache invariants hold | PASS |
+| Scope refusal (no forbidden surfaces; 2 MCP blocks only) | PASS |
+| Fork-gap adversarial defeats (cycle, junk/self/empty, laundering, double-link, ordering, headerless, silent residual) | PASS (all defeats fail; residual honestly narrowed) |
+| No cycle import / never-throw / 3-arg compat / wiring intact | PASS |
+| Upstream fork-event absence (no hook surface in `src/`) | PASS (as far as verifiable here; baseline proof stands) |
+| Open items carried honestly (P0/P1/P3 pending human release; LOC gated-but-open; silent residual narrowed) | PASS |
+| Independent sabotage RED → byte-identical restore → green + clean status | PASS |
+
+No merge-blocking defect found. No release operations performed (none permitted).
+
+VERDICT: PASS