Cryptographic identity: Ed25519 keypair, self-certifying instance ID, and Ed25519-signed GET /descriptor records (docs/identity.md).
Cross-instance social: persisted friend requests with a pending -> accepted | rejected lifecycle (POST /friends/request, POST /friends/accept, POST /friends/reject, GET /friends).
Presence: presence records over the federation:presence WebSocket channel and persisted, freshness-filtered peer heartbeats (GET /peers).
Open Depot Protocol: signed catalog syndication (GET /odp/catalog, POST /odp/subscribe) with signature verification, cross-instance discovery search (GET /odp/search), subscription provenance (GET /odp/subscriptions), and revocation (DELETE /odp/subscriptions/:instanceId).
Moderation & abuse controls: peer block list (POST /friends/block, /unblock, GET /friends/blocked), immediate revocation (POST /friends/remove), and per-instance friend-request rate limiting.
Peer transport (direct + relay): descriptors advertise endpoints (DROP_FEDERATION_ENDPOINTS); POST /peers/dial fetches and cryptographically verifies a peer's signed descriptor before recording it. When direct dialing fails and DROP_FEDERATION_RELAY_URL is set, a relay retransmits the descriptor (GET <relay>/relay/descriptor?target=...) — the relay can only censor, never forge, because the descriptor is verified end to end.
Key rotation: POST /identity/rotate (operator-only via DROP_FEDERATION_ADMIN_TOKEN) mints a new keypair and publishes a signed rotation certificate; GET /identity/rotations exposes the verifiable old→new chain so pinned peers can follow the transition.
Opt-in library sharing: POST /sharing (operator-only) sets a sharing scope (none/library/games); GET /shared/library returns the currently-shared games and is empty by default or immediately after revocation.
WebRTC signaling relay: POST/GET/DELETE /signaling/:instanceId provide a bounded, per-target mailbox for SDP offers/answers and ICE candidates (the relay never inspects the payload; peers connect via their own WebRTC stack).

Status

Implemented: the routes above, signed and tamper-checked descriptors (v2, with advertised endpoints), friend persistence, presence/peer tracking, optional encrypted-at-rest key storage, ODP catalog subscription + provenance-aware discovery search, moderation/rate limiting, direct peer dialing with descriptor verification, operator-driven key rotation with a verifiable chain, and opt-in library sharing scopes with immediate revocation. The threat model is documented in docs/security.md.

Not implemented yet: NAT traversal (the direct and relay transport paths exist, but hole-punching does not) (#4), direct or group messaging (#5), and remote save sharing / streaming a shared game (the sharing scopes and shared-library endpoint exist, but content transfer is not wired). There is no peer-to-peer messaging today.

Security

Set DROP_FEDERATION_KEY_PASSPHRASE to encrypt the instance private key at rest (AES-256-GCM keyed by scrypt). Without it the key is stored in plaintext and a warning is logged on every boot. See docs/security.md.
Descriptors use Ed25519 rather than the P-384 roadmap spec; rationale and migration path are in docs/identity.md.

Built on the @droposs/plugin-sdk.

Development

npm ci
npm run build
npm test
npm run typecheck