feat: pass args to all events (#3248)

* feat: pass args to all events

* fix: alias app joining

* fix: actor in event

.github/workflows/backend-tests.yaml

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ name: Backend Tests
 on:
   pull_request:
     types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - 'src/docs/**'
 
 permissions:
   contents: read

.github/workflows/docs-build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: Docs Build
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - 'src/docs/**'
+
+jobs:
+  build-docs:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Set up Node.js
+        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: '24'
+          cache: 'npm'
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: npm ci
+
+      - name: Build docs
+        run: npm run build
+        working-directory: src/docs

.gitignore

@@ -70,3 +70,5 @@ coverage/
 undefined
 servers.json
 config.*.json
+
+volatile/

AGENTS.md

@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ Keep comments light. Prefer self-documenting code — clear names, small functio
 
 Don't restate what the code already says. Don't write comments that reference the current task or PR — those rot.
 
+**No ticket references in code or test comments.** Don't write `PUT-1234`, `AUTH-3`, `GUI-2`, `// fix for FOO-99`, `// per ROLLOUT-1`, or section headers like `// -- PUT-1020: ... --`. The ticket exists in git history and the issue tracker; the code should describe the *why* in domain terms ("logout cascade transparently invalidates...") not project-management terms ("the cascade from AUTH-3..."). Same rule for test-block names and section dividers — describe what's being tested, not which ticket asked for it.
+
+**Use plain ASCII `-` in comment section dividers, not box-drawing characters.** Write `// -- Section name --`, not `// ── Section name ──`. The `─` (U+2500) character renders inconsistently in some editors and diff tools and adds nothing over `-`.
+
 ### Tests
 
 When adding new behavior (function, endpoint, driver method, branch of logic), add a test for it.

BUG-BOUNTY.md

@@ -17,18 +17,51 @@ Out-of-scope:
 * Denial of Service (DoS), spam, or volumetric attacks.
 * Physical security issues.
 
+## Known Non-Issues (Please Check Before Submitting)
+
+The following have already been reviewed and determined **not to be vulnerabilities**. Reports that only re-describe one of these are **not eligible for a reward** and will be closed as non-issues — even if they include new code references. Please review this list before submitting:
+
+* **XSS / CORS / token issues scoped to `api.puter.com`.** The primary user session cookie lives on `puter.com`, not on the API origin, so reflected/stored XSS, CORS, or token handling on `api.puter.com` is generally out of scope. Two exceptions we *do* evaluate on their merits — please report these: (a) attacker-controlled content served **inline** (e.g. an HTML `Content-Type`) from API file/response endpoints, and (b) anything that abuses the app-scoped `puter_token_v2` companion cookie set on the API host.
+* **SSRF via `secureFetch`.** Production routes outbound requests through an isolated proxy that has no access to internal/SSRF-sensitive resources.
+* **Attacks that depend on guessing an `appInstanceID` or app UID.** These are random 128-bit secret values and are not considered guessable.
+* **Apps invoking drivers, creating workers, or using KV.** Applications are intended to do this; worker permissions are scoped to the owning app. This is by design.
+* **App metadata or app user-count "leaks".** This information is currently public by design.
+* **General "token in a URL" / token-lifetime designs** — signed directory URLs exposing children, a write signature implying read, or app tokens outliving a web session. These are current intended behaviors.
+* **Missing PKCE, unverified `id_token` signatures, or other OIDC hardening.** Provider tokens are obtained through a server-to-server authorization-code exchange with the provider's token endpoint over TLS, so the resulting `id_token` / userinfo claims are trusted from that channel rather than from local JWKS signature verification — the callback never accepts a caller-supplied `id_token`. Adding local signature / `aud` / `iss` / `exp` checks is welcome defense-in-depth (please open a GitHub issue/PR), but their absence is not an account-takeover vector on its own.
+* **JWT "algorithm confusion" / unpinned `algorithms` in `jwt.verify`.** Puter's session tokens are HMAC-signed (HS256) with a server-side secret, and there is no asymmetric public key anywhere in the verification path, so `alg`-substitution attacks do not apply. Explicitly pinning `algorithms` is a fine hardening PR, but it is not a vulnerability.
+* **Static-source "SQL injection" in internal pagination.** Findings such as `LIMIT ${limit}` in list/notification queries: the limit is numerically coerced and clamped before it reaches the query, so it is not reachable with attacker-controlled string input. Hardening PRs to the internal stores are welcome, but these are not exploitable as reported.
+* **Deprecated `saveTo*` GUI app messages.** The legacy `saveToDesktop` / `saveToDocuments` / etc. app-IPC handlers can create — never overwrite — new files in standard user folders. The behavior is non-destructive, path-traversal-safe, and deprecated (slated for removal); it is not treated as a sandbox escape.
+* **Best-practice suggestions** such as login/registration username enumeration (kept intentionally for UX) or unauthenticated unsubscribe links (industry norm).
+* **Rate-limiting suggestions for TURN credential issuance** (intentional; not billed per tunnel).
+
+If you believe you have a **genuinely new** exploit chain that defeats one of these rationales (for example, demonstrating a sensitive credential that really is reachable on `api.puter.com`), say so explicitly and show why the reasoning above does not apply.
+
 ## Rules of Engagement
 
 To participate, you must:
 
-1. **Report responsibly**: Provide detailed steps to reproduce the issue, including proof-of-concept code or screenshots where applicable.
+1. **Report responsibly**: Provide detailed steps to reproduce the issue, including proof-of-concept code, screenshots, or a screen recording (see *Proof of Reproduction* below).
 2. **Do no harm**: Do not exfiltrate, modify, or delete data. Only access your own account or test data.
 3. **Respect availability**: Do not perform denial-of-service attacks or automated scans that degrade service.
 4. **Follow disclosure policy**: Do not publicly disclose vulnerabilities until we have confirmed and patched the issue.
 5. **Act in good faith**: Make every effort to avoid privacy violations, destruction of data, and interruption or degradation of services.
+6. **Check the Known Non-Issues list**: Reports matching an item in the "Known Non-Issues" section above are not eligible and will be closed.
 
 Reports that do not meet these guidelines may not be eligible for a reward.
 
+## Proof of Reproduction
+
+Reports must demonstrate a **working, reproducible exploit with real impact** — not a theoretical or static-source-review finding. Please include:
+
+* Exact steps to reproduce, the relevant request/response or code path, and the commit or version you tested.
+* The **observed** result versus the **expected** result.
+* For client-side, UI, or authentication-flow bugs: a short screen recording (≤ 2 minutes) showing the exploit working end-to-end on a real Puter instance.
+* For server-side bugs: a runnable proof-of-concept.
+
+Reports based solely on reading the source ("source review only, not tested") or unverified AI/LLM-generated reports are the **lowest triage priority and are generally not eligible**. If you used an AI tool to help find an issue, you must personally verify that it actually reproduces before submitting.
+
+Please submit **one issue per report**. Bundled "audit packs" of many speculative findings will be declined; send each confirmed issue separately.
+
 ## Reporting Process
 
 To report a vulnerability, email us at: **[[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])**.

config.default.json

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
     "domain": "puter.localhost",
     "cookie_name": "puter_auth_token",
     "jwt_secret": "dev-jwt-secret-change-me",
+    "jwt_secret_v2": "dev-jwt-secret-v2-change-me",
+    "allow_v1_tokens": true,
     "url_signature_secret": "dev-url-signature-secret-change-me",
     "allow_all_host_values": true,
     "allow_no_host_header": true,

config.template.jsonc

@@ -67,7 +67,11 @@
 
     // ── Auth / session ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
     // ALWAYS replace these for any public install — `openssl rand -hex 64`.
+    // `jwt_secret` is legacy verify-only; new tokens sign with `jwt_secret_v2`.
     "jwt_secret": "change-me",
+    "jwt_secret_v2": "change-me",
+    // Set false to retire v1 tokens entirely (ROLLOUT-1).
+    "allow_v1_tokens": true,
     "url_signature_secret": "change-me",
     "cookie_name": "puter_auth_token",
     "min_pass_length": 6,
@@ -155,17 +159,30 @@
 
     // ── Database ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     "database": {
-        // `sqlite` for single-node / dev; `mysql` for self-host with MariaDB.
+        // `sqlite` for single-node/dev, `mysql` for MariaDB/MySQL,
+        // or `postgres` for PostgreSQL.
+        //
+        // NOTE: `postgres` support is a community contribution and is not
+        // exercised by Puter.com production. It boots, passes its own
+        // integration tests against pgmock, and runs the common user/app/
+        // fsentry/session/permission/OIDC flows — but less-traveled code
+        // paths may surface MySQL/SQLite-isms that haven't been ported yet.
+        // Expect rough edges and please file issues if you hit one. For
+        // production self-hosting today, `mysql` (MariaDB) and `sqlite` are
+        // the supported defaults.
         "engine": "sqlite",
         // sqlite — file path on disk
         "path": "volatile/runtime/puter-database.sqlite",
         "targetVersion": 0,
-        // mysql — connection details
+        // mysql/postgres — connection details. PostgreSQL defaults to port
+        // 5432 when `engine` is `postgres`; MySQL/MariaDB normally use 3306.
         "host": "",
         "port": 3306,
         "user": "",
         "password": "",
         "database": "",
+        // postgres may also use a URL instead of host/user/password fields:
+        // "connectionString": "postgres://puter:secret@localhost:5432/puter",
         // Optional read-replica pool. Reads route here when populated.
         "replica": {
             "host": "",
@@ -174,9 +191,10 @@
             "password": "",
             "database": ""
         }
-        // mysql self-host bootstrap: set `migrationPaths` to apply the bundled
-        // schema on first boot. Idempotent — safe to leave on.
+        // mysql/postgres self-host bootstrap: set `migrationPaths` to apply the
+        // bundled schema on first boot. Idempotent — safe to leave on.
         // "migrationPaths": ["./src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql"]
+        // "migrationPaths": ["./src/backend/clients/database/migrations/postgres"]
     },
 
     // ── DynamoDB (KV store) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -242,12 +260,20 @@
         // ─ Chat / completion ─
         "claude": { "apiKey": "" },
         "openai-completion": { "apiKey": "" },
+        "azure-openai": {
+            "apiKey": "",
+            "apiURL": ""
+        },
         "gemini": { "apiKey": "" },
         "groq": { "apiKey": "" },
         "deepseek": { "apiKey": "" },
         "mistral": { "apiKey": "" },
         "xai": { "apiKey": "" },
         "moonshot": { "apiKey": "" },
+        "minimax": {
+            "apiKey": "",
+            "apiBaseUrl": "https://api.minimax.io/v1"
+        },
         "openrouter": {
             "apiKey": "",
             "apiBaseUrl": "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1"

doc/i18n/README.id.md

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ Terhubung dengan maintainer dan komunitas melalui saluran-saluran berikut:
 - Reddit: [reddit.com/r/puter/](https://www.reddit.com/r/puter/)
 - Mastodon: [mastodon.social/@puter](https://mastodon.social/@puter)
 - Isu keamanan? [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
-- Email maintainers di [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
+- Email pengelola di [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
 
 Kami selalu senang membantu Anda dengan pertanyaan apa pun yang Anda miliki. Jangan ragu untuk bertanya!
 

doc/self-hosting.md

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ MARIADB_ROOT_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
 MARIADB_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
 S3_SECRET_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
 JWT_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 64)
+JWT_SECRET_V2=$(openssl rand -hex 64)
 URL_SIGNATURE_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 64)
 
 cat > .env <<EOF
@@ -78,6 +79,8 @@ cat > puter/config/config.json <<EOF
     "private_app_hosting_domain_alt": "dev.puter.localhost",
 
     "jwt_secret": "$JWT_SECRET",
+    "jwt_secret_v2": "$JWT_SECRET_V2",
+    "allow_v1_tokens": true,
     "url_signature_secret": "$URL_SIGNATURE_SECRET",
 
     "database": {
@@ -131,8 +134,9 @@ Replace `puter.localhost`, `site.puter.localhost`, `host.puter.localhost`, `dev.
 
 Why these knobs:
 
+- `jwt_secret` + `jwt_secret_v2` — Puter signs new auth tokens with `jwt_secret_v2` (v2 token format, `kid: 'v2'` JWT header). `jwt_secret` is verify-only and lets tokens minted before this version (cookies still in users' browsers, stored API tokens) keep working. `allow_v1_tokens: true` keeps that fallback enabled. Fresh installs can leave it as-is; future versions will flip the flag to `false` and retire `jwt_secret` entirely once legacy tokens have drained.
 - `env: "prod"` — the bundled `config.default.json` ships with `env: "dev"` (matches the source-tree `npm run start=gui` workflow, which expects webpack-dev-server emitting a CSS manifest). Self-host runs against pre-built static bundles, so `env: "prod"` makes the homepage emit the `/dist/bundle.min.css` `<link>` tag instead of waiting on a manifest that doesn't exist.
-- `database.migrationPaths` — Puter applies the bundled MySQL schema on boot. `mysql_mig_1.sql` (tables) and `mysql_mig_2.sql` (default apps: editor, viewer, pdf, camera, player, recorder, git, dev-center, puter-linux). Idempotent — safe to re-run.
+- `database.migrationPaths` — Puter applies the bundled MySQL/MariaDB schema on boot. The migration files are idempotent, so it is safe to leave this configured across restarts.
 - `dynamo.bootstrapTables: true` — Puter creates its KV table on boot. **Only set against a local emulator**, never real AWS.
 - `dynamo.aws` keys are dummies; DynamoDB-local doesn't validate them but the AWS SDK requires _something_. **Note:** DynamoDB uses `access_key` / `secret_key` (snake_case); S3 below uses `accessKeyId` / `secretAccessKey` (camelCase). Not interchangeable.
 - `providers.ollama.enabled: false` — Puter auto-probes a local Ollama at `127.0.0.1:11434` by default; without one running you'd see `ECONNREFUSED` on every boot. To run a bundled Ollama, see [Optional: local LLM (Ollama)](#optional-local-llm-ollama) below.
@@ -228,6 +232,26 @@ Change it in Settings after first login.
 
 All optional. Drop any of the blocks below into `puter/config/config.json` and `docker compose restart puter`. See [config.template.jsonc](../config.template.jsonc) for the full list. Per-key documentation lives in [src/backend/types.ts](../src/backend/types.ts).
 
+### PostgreSQL database
+
+> **Community contribution — expect rough edges.** PostgreSQL support was contributed by the community and is not run by Puter.com production. It boots, applies the bundled schema, and exercises the common user/app/fsentry/session/permission/OIDC flows in the integration tests, but less-traveled SQL call sites may still need porting. If you hit a query that doesn't work on Postgres, please open an issue. For production self-hosting today, MariaDB/MySQL and SQLite are the supported defaults.
+
+The bundled Docker Compose stack still defaults to MariaDB. To use PostgreSQL instead, run a PostgreSQL service yourself, point Puter at it, and use the PostgreSQL migration path:
+
+```json
+"database": {
+    "engine": "postgres",
+    "host": "postgres",
+    "port": 5432,
+    "user": "puter",
+    "password": "...",
+    "database": "puter",
+    "migrationPaths": ["/opt/puter/dist/src/backend/clients/database/migrations/postgres"]
+}
+```
+
+You may use `"connectionString": "postgres://puter:...@postgres:5432/puter"` instead of the host/user/password fields. Puter only needs normal PostgreSQL connection details and the migration path; CloudNativePG is one possible Kubernetes operator, but no operator-specific manifests are required by Puter.
+
 ### Email (SMTP)
 
 Used for password resets, email confirmation, and notifications. Without it those flows silently fail.

extensions/appTelemetry.ts

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ export const handleAppTelemetryUsers = async (
 
     const users = await clients.db.read(
         `SELECT u.username, u.uuid FROM user_to_app_permissions p
-         INNER JOIN user u ON p.user_id = u.id
+         INNER JOIN ${clients.db.quoteIdentifier('user')} u ON p.user_id = u.id
          WHERE p.permission = 'flag:app-is-authenticated' AND p.app_id = ?
          ORDER BY (p.dt IS NOT NULL), p.dt, p.user_id
          LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`,

extensions/installedApps.ts

@@ -71,6 +71,6 @@ export const handleInstalledApps = async (
 
 extension.get(
     '/installedApps',
-    { subdomain: 'api', requireUserActor: true },
+    { subdomain: 'api', requireUserActor: true, allowFullAccessToken: true },
     handleInstalledApps,
 );

extensions/thumbnails.ts

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ async function decodeAndValidateThumbnail(
     return { mimeType, data };
 }
 
-// ── thumbnail.created ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- thumbnail.created -----------------------------------------------
 // Intercept data-URL thumbnails before they hit the DB: upload to S3
 // and replace the URL with an s3:// pointer.
 
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ extension.on(
     },
 );
 
-// ── thumbnail.upload.prepare ────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- thumbnail.upload.prepare ----------------------------------------
 // Generate pre-signed upload URLs so the client can PUT directly to S3.
 
 extension.on(
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ extension.on(
     },
 );
 
-// ── thumbnail.read ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- thumbnail.read --------------------------------------------------
 // Convert s3:// or legacy https:// thumbnails to signed URLs.
 
 extension.on('thumbnail.read', async (_key, entry: Record<string, unknown>) => {
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ extension.on('thumbnail.read', async (_key, entry: Record<string, unknown>) => {
     });
 });
 
-// ── fs.remove.node ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- fs.remove.node --------------------------------------------------
 // Delete S3 thumbnail when the file is removed.
 
 extension.on(

install.ps1

@@ -113,7 +113,10 @@ if ($writeConfig) {
     $mariadbRootPw = New-HexSecret 32
     $mariadbPw     = New-HexSecret 32
     $s3SecretKey   = New-HexSecret 32
+    # Two JWT secrets: $jwtSecret is verify-only for legacy v1 tokens
+    # already in circulation; $jwtSecretV2 signs every new token.
     $jwtSecret     = New-HexSecret 64
+    $jwtSecretV2   = New-HexSecret 64
     $urlSigSecret  = New-HexSecret 64
 
     $envContent = @"
@@ -142,6 +145,8 @@ S3_BUCKET=puter-local
         private_app_hosting_domain     = "app.$PuterDomain"
         private_app_hosting_domain_alt = "dev.$PuterDomain"
         jwt_secret                     = $jwtSecret
+        jwt_secret_v2                  = $jwtSecretV2
+        allow_v1_tokens                = $true
         url_signature_secret           = $urlSigSecret
         database = [ordered]@{
             engine         = 'mysql'

install.sh

@@ -92,7 +92,11 @@ if [ "$write_config" = "1" ]; then
     MARIADB_ROOT_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
     MARIADB_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
     S3_SECRET_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
+    # Two JWT secrets: `jwt_secret` is verify-only for legacy v1 tokens
+    # already in circulation; `jwt_secret_v2` signs every new token.
+    # Both are required at boot (`jwt_secret` only when verifying v1).
     JWT_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 64)
+    JWT_SECRET_V2=$(openssl rand -hex 64)
     URL_SIGNATURE_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 64)
 
     cat > .env <<EOF
@@ -123,6 +127,8 @@ EOF
     "private_app_hosting_domain_alt": "dev.$PUTER_DOMAIN",
 
     "jwt_secret": "$JWT_SECRET",
+    "jwt_secret_v2": "$JWT_SECRET_V2",
+    "allow_v1_tokens": true,
     "url_signature_secret": "$URL_SIGNATURE_SECRET",
 
     "database": {

package.json

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
   },
   "scripts": {
     "test:backend": "vitest run --config src/backend/vitest.config.ts ",
+    "test:backend:postgres": "PUTER_TEST_DB_ENGINE=postgres vitest run --config src/backend/vitest.config.ts ",
     "start=gui": "nodemon --exec \"node dev-server.js\" ",
     "start": "node --enable-source-maps -r ./dist/src/backend/telemetry.js ./dist/src/backend/index.js",
     "prestart": "npm run build:ts",

src/backend/clients/alarm/AlarmClient.ts

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
 import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
 import { PuterClient } from '../types';
 
-// ── Types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Types ------------------------------------------------------------
 
 export interface AlarmFields {
     error?: Error;
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ interface Alarm {
     noAlert?: boolean;
 }
 
-type PagerSeverity = 'critical' | 'error' | 'warning' | 'info';
+export type PagerSeverity = 'critical' | 'error' | 'warning' | 'info';
 
 export interface AlertPayload {
     id: string;
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ interface KnownErrorRule {
     };
 }
 
-// ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Helpers ----------------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * Deterministic short identifier derived from an alarm ID.
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ function cleanFields(fields: AlarmFields): Record<string, string> {
     return out;
 }
 
-// ── AlarmClient ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- AlarmClient ------------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * Manages system alarms and dispatches alerts to external paging
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ export class AlarmClient extends PuterClient {
         super(config);
     }
 
-    // ── Lifecycle ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Lifecycle ----------------------------------------------------
 
     override async onServerStart(): Promise<void> {
         const pagerConf = this.config.pager;
@@ -228,13 +228,23 @@ export class AlarmClient extends PuterClient {
         console.log('[alarm] entering drain mode — suppressing new alarms');
     }
 
-    // ── Public API ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Public API ---------------------------------------------------
 
     /**
      * Create or update an alarm. If the alarm ID already exists, the
      * occurrence count is incremented and a repeat alert is dispatched.
+     *
+     * `severity` is the PagerDuty severity for this alarm; omit for the
+     * default 'critical'. Use 'info' / 'warning' for expected-but-worth-
+     * tracking signals (e.g. a user hitting a rate limit) so they record
+     * and de-dupe like any other alarm but don't page on-call.
      */
-    create(id: string, message: string, fields: AlarmFields = {}): void {
+    create(
+        id: string,
+        message: string,
+        fields: AlarmFields = {},
+        severity?: PagerSeverity,
+    ): void {
         if (this.draining) {
             if (!this.drainLogged) {
                 this.drainLogged = true;
@@ -256,6 +266,7 @@ export class AlarmClient extends PuterClient {
             shortId: shortId(id),
             message,
             fields,
+            severity,
             started: Date.now(),
             timestamps: [Date.now()],
             occurrences: [],
@@ -298,7 +309,7 @@ export class AlarmClient extends PuterClient {
         this.knownErrors = rules;
     }
 
-    // ── Internals ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Internals ----------------------------------------------------
 
     private recordOccurrence(
         alarm: Alarm,

src/backend/clients/clickhouse/ClickhouseClient.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Optional ClickHouse client.
+ *
+ * ClickHouse is NOT a hard dependency. Core Puter runs without it — the app
+ * stats read path (open / unique-user counts) falls back to the primary SQL
+ * database. `this.clients.clickhouse` is therefore typed as optional and is
+ * `undefined` in default and self-hosted setups; callers MUST branch on its
+ * presence and fall back to SQL.
+ *
+ * A production deployment can register a real ClickHouse client via an
+ * extension (`extension.registerClient('clickhouse', client)`) to offload the
+ * analytics queries off the primary database and keep the stats path fast at
+ * scale. When registered, the instance flows into `this.clients.clickhouse`
+ * everywhere it's typed.
+ *
+ * Only the surface the stats path actually consumes is declared here. Extend
+ * this interface (don't widen to `any`) when a new query shape is needed.
+ */
+export interface ClickhouseQueryResult {
+    json<T = Record<string, unknown>>(): Promise<T[]>;
+}
+
+export interface ClickhouseQueryParams {
+    query: string;
+    query_params?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    format?: string;
+}
+
+export interface ClickhouseClient {
+    query(params: ClickhouseQueryParams): Promise<ClickhouseQueryResult>;
+}

src/backend/clients/database/DatabaseClient.ts

@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ export interface BatchEntry {
     values: unknown[];
 }
 
+type SqlJsonPath = readonly [string, ...string[]];
+
 /**
  * Base database client. Subclasses must override every method that throws here.
  *
@@ -101,9 +103,10 @@ export class AbstractDatabaseClient extends PuterClient {
         const cols = Object.keys(data);
         const values = Object.values(data);
         const sql =
-            `INSERT INTO \`${tableName}\` ` +
-            `(${cols.map((c) => `\`${c}\``).join(', ')}) ` +
-            `VALUES (${cols.map(() => '?').join(', ')})`;
+            `INSERT INTO ${this.quoteIdentifier(tableName)} ` +
+            `(${cols.map((c) => this.quoteIdentifier(c)).join(', ')}) ` +
+            `VALUES (${cols.map(() => '?').join(', ')})` +
+            this.returningIdClause();
         return this.write(sql, values);
     }
 
@@ -161,4 +164,88 @@ export class AbstractDatabaseClient extends PuterClient {
         }
         return choices.otherwise as T;
     }
+
+    quoteIdentifier(identifier: string): string {
+        return identifier
+            .split('.')
+            .map((part) => {
+                if (part === '*') return part;
+                return `\`${part.replaceAll('`', '``')}\``;
+            })
+            .join('.');
+    }
+
+    booleanLiteral(value: boolean): string {
+        return value ? '1' : '0';
+    }
+
+    booleanValue(value: boolean): boolean | 0 | 1 {
+        return value ? 1 : 0;
+    }
+
+    insertIgnoreInto(tableName: string): string {
+        const table = this.quoteIdentifier(tableName);
+        return this.case({
+            sqlite: `INSERT OR IGNORE INTO ${table}`,
+            postgres: `INSERT INTO ${table}`,
+            otherwise: `INSERT IGNORE INTO ${table}`,
+        });
+    }
+
+    insertIgnoreSuffix(): string {
+        return this.case({
+            postgres: ' ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING',
+            otherwise: '',
+        });
+    }
+
+    upsertClause(
+        conflictColumns: readonly string[],
+        updateColumns: readonly string[],
+    ): string {
+        if (updateColumns.length === 0) {
+            throw new Error('upsertClause requires at least one update column');
+        }
+
+        const updateList = updateColumns
+            .map((column) => `${this.quoteIdentifier(column)} = ?`)
+            .join(', ');
+
+        return this.case({
+            mysql: `ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE ${updateList}`,
+            otherwise: `ON CONFLICT(${conflictColumns
+                .map((column) => this.quoteIdentifier(column))
+                .join(', ')}) DO UPDATE SET ${updateList}`,
+        });
+    }
+
+    jsonTextExtract(jsonExpression: string, path: SqlJsonPath): string {
+        const sqlitePath = `$${path.map((part) => `.${part}`).join('')}`;
+        return this.case({
+            sqlite: `json_extract(${jsonExpression}, ${this.sqlStringLiteral(sqlitePath)})`,
+            mysql: `JSON_UNQUOTE(JSON_EXTRACT(${jsonExpression}, ${this.sqlStringLiteral(sqlitePath)}))`,
+            postgres: `${jsonExpression} #>> ARRAY[${path
+                .map((part) => this.sqlStringLiteral(part))
+                .join(', ')}]`,
+            otherwise: `JSON_UNQUOTE(JSON_EXTRACT(${jsonExpression}, ${this.sqlStringLiteral(sqlitePath)}))`,
+        });
+    }
+
+    nullCoalesce(...expressions: readonly string[]): string {
+        if (expressions.length === 0) {
+            throw new Error('nullCoalesce requires at least one expression');
+        }
+        return `COALESCE(${expressions.join(', ')})`;
+    }
+
+    returningIdClause(): string {
+        return this.case({
+            postgres: ' RETURNING id',
+            otherwise: '',
+        });
+    }
+
+    protected sqlStringLiteral(value: string): string {
+        return `'${value.replaceAll("'", "''")}'`;
+    }
 }

src/backend/clients/database/MySQLDatabaseClient.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { compareMigrationFilenames } from './MySQLDatabaseClient.js';
+
+describe('compareMigrationFilenames', () => {
+    it('orders numbered migrations numerically, not lexically', () => {
+        const input = [
+            'mysql_mig_10.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_2.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_1.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_9.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_3.sql',
+        ];
+        const sorted = [...input].sort(compareMigrationFilenames);
+        expect(sorted).toEqual([
+            'mysql_mig_1.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_2.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_3.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_9.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_10.sql',
+        ]);
+    });
+
+    it('keeps mig_10 after mig_9 when the real prod set is shuffled', () => {
+        // Reflects the current migrations/mysql/ listing — guards against
+        // a future "let's just rename to padded" suggestion accidentally
+        // re-introducing the lex bug if the rename is incomplete.
+        const real = [
+            'mysql_mig_9.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_3.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_10.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_1.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_7.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_5.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_2.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_4.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_8.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_6.sql',
+        ];
+        const sorted = [...real].sort(compareMigrationFilenames);
+        for (let i = 1; i <= sorted.length; i += 1) {
+            expect(sorted[i - 1]).toBe(`mysql_mig_${i}.sql`);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it('sorts non-numeric filenames after numbered ones, lexically among themselves', () => {
+        // Numbered files always run first (they're the canonical history);
+        // unmatched names follow in localeCompare order. Mixing the two
+        // sets prevents a vendor dump from accidentally wedging itself
+        // between mig_4 and mig_5 if it happened to lex-sort there.
+        const mixed = [
+            'mysql_mig_2.sql',
+            'mysql_vendor_dump.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_10.sql',
+            'mysql_bootstrap.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_1.sql',
+        ];
+        const sorted = [...mixed].sort(compareMigrationFilenames);
+        expect(sorted).toEqual([
+            'mysql_mig_1.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_2.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_10.sql',
+            'mysql_bootstrap.sql',
+            'mysql_vendor_dump.sql',
+        ]);
+    });
+
+    it('is stable for already-sorted input', () => {
+        const sorted = [
+            'mysql_mig_1.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_2.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_10.sql',
+            'mysql_mig_11.sql',
+        ];
+        expect([...sorted].sort(compareMigrationFilenames)).toEqual(sorted);
+    });
+});

src/backend/clients/database/MySQLDatabaseClient.ts

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import { createPool, type Pool } from 'mysql2';
 import { AbstractDatabaseClient, type WriteResult } from './DatabaseClient';
 import { SQLBatcher } from './SQLBatcher.js';
 import { splitMysqlStatements } from './splitMysqlStatements.js';
+import { compareMigrationFilenames } from './migrationFilenames.js';
 import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
 
 const RETRIABLE_ERROR_CODES = new Set([
@@ -44,6 +45,8 @@ const RETRIABLE_ERROR_MESSAGES = [
     'ETIMEDOUT',
 ];
 
+export { compareMigrationFilenames };
+
 type PoolConfig = Parameters<typeof createPool>[0];
 
 enum Configuration {
@@ -247,7 +250,7 @@ export class MySQLDatabaseClient extends AbstractDatabaseClient {
                         .filter(
                             (f) => f.endsWith('.sql') && f.startsWith('mysql'),
                         )
-                        .sort();
+                        .sort(compareMigrationFilenames);
                 } catch (e) {
                     throw new Error(
                         `[mysql] migration path is unreadable: ${dir}`,

src/backend/clients/database/PostgresDatabaseClient.integration.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import { Pool } from 'pg';
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
+import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
+import type { PuterServer } from '../../server';
+import { generateDefaultFsentries } from '../../util/userProvisioning.js';
+import {
+    createPgMockPostgresDatabaseClient,
+    POSTGRES_TEST_MIGRATIONS_PATH,
+    setupTestServer,
+} from '../../testUtil.js';
+import { PostgresDatabaseClient } from './PostgresDatabaseClient.js';
+
+const postgresUrl = process.env.PUTER_TEST_POSTGRES_URL;
+const postgresMigrationsPath = POSTGRES_TEST_MIGRATIONS_PATH;
+const postgresTestSchemaPattern = /^puter_test_[a-f0-9]{32}$/u;
+const postgresIntegrationTimeoutMs = 180_000;
+
+let postgresTestSchema: string | undefined;
+let postgresTestUrl: string | undefined;
+
+const postgresConfig = (overrides: Partial<IConfig> = {}): IConfig => {
+    if (postgresUrl && !postgresTestUrl) {
+        throw new Error('Postgres test schema was not initialized');
+    }
+
+    const { database: databaseOverrides, ...rootOverrides } = overrides;
+    const database = postgresUrl
+        ? {
+              engine: 'postgres' as const,
+              inMemory: false,
+              connectionString: postgresTestUrl,
+              migrationPaths: [postgresMigrationsPath],
+          }
+        : {
+              engine: 'postgres' as const,
+              inMemory: true,
+              migrationPaths: [postgresMigrationsPath],
+          };
+
+    return {
+        port: 0,
+        extensions: [],
+        database: { ...database, ...(databaseOverrides ?? {}) },
+        ...rootOverrides,
+    };
+};
+
+const quoteTestSchemaIdentifier = (schema: string): string => {
+    if (!postgresTestSchemaPattern.test(schema)) {
+        throw new Error(`Unsafe Postgres test schema name: ${schema}`);
+    }
+    return `"${schema}"`;
+};
+
+const postgresConnectionStringForSchema = (
+    connectionString: string,
+    schema: string,
+): string => {
+    if (!postgresTestSchemaPattern.test(schema)) {
+        throw new Error(`Unsafe Postgres test schema name: ${schema}`);
+    }
+
+    const url = new URL(connectionString);
+    url.searchParams.set('options', `-c search_path=${schema}`);
+    return url.toString();
+};
+
+const createPostgresTestSchema = async (): Promise<void> => {
+    if (!postgresUrl) return;
+
+    const schema = `puter_test_${uuidv4().replaceAll('-', '')}`;
+    const pool = new Pool({ connectionString: postgresUrl });
+    try {
+        await pool.query(`CREATE SCHEMA ${quoteTestSchemaIdentifier(schema)}`);
+        postgresTestSchema = schema;
+        postgresTestUrl = postgresConnectionStringForSchema(
+            postgresUrl,
+            schema,
+        );
+    } finally {
+        await pool.end();
+    }
+};
+
+const dropPostgresTestSchema = async (): Promise<void> => {
+    if (!postgresUrl || !postgresTestSchema) return;
+
+    const schema = postgresTestSchema;
+    postgresTestSchema = undefined;
+    postgresTestUrl = undefined;
+
+    const pool = new Pool({ connectionString: postgresUrl });
+    try {
+        await pool.query(
+            `DROP SCHEMA IF EXISTS ${quoteTestSchemaIdentifier(schema)} CASCADE`,
+        );
+    } finally {
+        await pool.end();
+    }
+};
+
+describe('PostgresDatabaseClient integration', () => {
+    let server: PuterServer | undefined;
+
+    beforeEach(async () => {
+        await createPostgresTestSchema();
+    });
+
+    afterEach(async () => {
+        try {
+            await server?.shutdown();
+        } finally {
+            server = undefined;
+            await dropPostgresTestSchema();
+        }
+    });
+
+    it(
+        'applies the native migrations idempotently to an empty database',
+        async () => {
+            const config = postgresConfig();
+            const pgMockClient = postgresUrl
+                ? undefined
+                : await createPgMockPostgresDatabaseClient(config);
+            try {
+                const firstClient =
+                    pgMockClient?.client ?? new PostgresDatabaseClient(config);
+                try {
+                    await firstClient.onServerStart();
+                } finally {
+                    await firstClient.onServerShutdown();
+                }
+
+                const secondClient =
+                    pgMockClient?.createClient() ??
+                    new PostgresDatabaseClient(config);
+                try {
+                    await secondClient.onServerStart();
+                    const [systemUser] = await secondClient.read(
+                        'SELECT `id`, `username` FROM `user` WHERE `username` = ?',
+                        ['system'],
+                    );
+                    const [devCenter] = await secondClient.read(
+                        'SELECT `name`, `index_url` FROM `apps` WHERE `name` = ?',
+                        ['dev-center'],
+                    );
+
+                    expect(systemUser).toMatchObject({
+                        id: 1,
+                        username: 'system',
+                    });
+                    expect(devCenter).toMatchObject({
+                        name: 'dev-center',
+                        index_url:
+                            'https://builtins.namespaces.puter.com/dev-center',
+                    });
+                } finally {
+                    await secondClient.onServerShutdown();
+                }
+            } finally {
+                pgMockClient?.destroy();
+            }
+        },
+        postgresIntegrationTimeoutMs,
+    );
+
+    it('starts the server and exercises user, app, fsentry, permission, and session flows', async () => {
+        const userStorageAllowance = 123_456_789;
+        server = await setupTestServer(
+            postgresConfig({
+                no_default_user: false,
+                is_storage_limited: true,
+            }),
+        );
+
+        const admin = await server.stores.user.getByUsername('admin');
+        expect(admin?.username).toBe('admin');
+
+        const username = `pg-${uuidv4().slice(0, 8)}`;
+        const createdUser = await server.stores.user.create({
+            username,
+            uuid: uuidv4(),
+            password: null,
+            email: `${username}@test.local`,
+            free_storage: userStorageAllowance,
+            requires_email_confirmation: false,
+        });
+        await generateDefaultFsentries(
+            server.clients.db,
+            server.stores.user,
+            createdUser,
+        );
+        const user = await server.stores.user.getById(createdUser.id);
+        if (!user) throw new Error('created user was not readable');
+        expect(user.username).toBe(username);
+        await expect(
+            server.stores.fsEntry.getUserStorageAllowance(user.id),
+        ).resolves.toMatchObject({
+            max: userStorageAllowance,
+        });
+
+        const otherUsername = `pg-other-${uuidv4().slice(0, 8)}`;
+        const otherUser = await server.stores.user.create({
+            username: otherUsername,
+            uuid: uuidv4(),
+            password: null,
+            email: `${otherUsername}@test.local`,
+            free_storage: 100 * 1024 * 1024,
+            requires_email_confirmation: false,
+        });
+
+        const authResult = await server.services.auth.createSessionToken(
+            user,
+            {
+                ip: '127.0.0.1',
+                user_agent: 'postgres-integration-test',
+            },
+        );
+        const authenticated =
+            await server.services.auth.authenticateFromToken(authResult.token);
+        expect(authenticated?.user?.id).toBe(user?.id);
+
+        const devCenter = await server.stores.app.getByName('dev-center');
+        if (!devCenter) throw new Error('dev-center app was not seeded');
+        expect(devCenter.name).toBe('dev-center');
+
+        const documents = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+            `/${username}/Documents`,
+        );
+        if (!documents) throw new Error('Documents directory was not created');
+        expect(documents.isDir).toBe(true);
+        const folder = await server.stores.fsEntry.createNonFileEntry({
+            userId: user.id,
+            parent: documents,
+            name: 'postgres-folder',
+            kind: 'directory',
+        });
+        const renamedFolder = await server.stores.fsEntry.updateEntry(
+            folder.uuid,
+            {
+                name: 'postgres-folder-renamed',
+                path: `/${username}/Documents/postgres-folder-renamed`,
+            },
+        );
+        expect(renamedFolder.name).toBe('postgres-folder-renamed');
+
+        await server.stores.permission.upsertUserAppPerm(
+            user.id,
+            Number(devCenter.id),
+            'driver:postgres-integration',
+            { ok: true },
+        );
+        await expect(
+            server.stores.permission.hasUserAppPerm(
+                user.id,
+                Number(devCenter.id),
+                'driver:postgres-integration',
+            ),
+        ).resolves.toBe(true);
+
+        await server.stores.oidc.link(
+            user.id,
+            'postgres-integration-test',
+            'subject-1',
+            null,
+        );
+        await expect(
+            server.stores.oidc.link(
+                user.id,
+                'postgres-integration-test',
+                'subject-1',
+                null,
+            ),
+        ).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+        await expect(
+            server.stores.oidc.link(
+                otherUser.id,
+                'postgres-integration-test',
+                'subject-1',
+                null,
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            statusCode: 409,
+            legacyCode: 'conflict',
+        });
+
+        const session = await server.stores.session.create(user.id, {
+            meta: { source: 'postgres-integration-test' },
+        });
+        const activeSession = await server.stores.session.getByUuid(
+            session.uuid,
+        );
+        expect(activeSession?.uuid).toBe(session.uuid);
+
+        const workerName = `worker-${uuidv4().slice(0, 8)}`;
+        const workerSession = await server.stores.session.getOrCreateWorker(
+            user.id,
+            { workerName },
+        );
+        expect(workerSession?.kind).toBe('worker');
+        expect(workerSession?.meta?.worker_name).toBe(workerName);
+
+        await server.stores.session.removeByUuid(session.uuid);
+        await expect(
+            server.stores.session.getByUuid(session.uuid),
+        ).resolves.toBeNull();
+    }, postgresIntegrationTimeoutMs);
+});

src/backend/clients/database/PostgresDatabaseClient.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import type { FieldDef, QueryResult } from 'pg';
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
+import { DatabaseClientFactory } from './index.js';
+import {
+    mapPostgresWriteResult,
+    PostgresDatabaseClient,
+    type PostgresPool,
+    type PostgresPoolClient,
+} from './PostgresDatabaseClient.js';
+
+type QueryCall = {
+    text: string;
+    values?: unknown[];
+};
+
+const postgresConfig = (): IConfig => ({
+    port: 0,
+    extensions: [],
+    database: {
+        engine: 'postgres',
+        migrationPaths: [],
+    },
+});
+
+const postgresReplicaConfig = (): IConfig => ({
+    port: 0,
+    extensions: [],
+    database: {
+        engine: 'postgres',
+        migrationPaths: [],
+        replica: {},
+    },
+});
+
+const field = (name: string, dataTypeID: number): FieldDef => ({
+    name,
+    tableID: 0,
+    columnID: 0,
+    dataTypeID,
+    dataTypeSize: -1,
+    dataTypeModifier: -1,
+    format: 'text',
+});
+
+const int8Field = (name: string): FieldDef => field(name, 20);
+const textField = (name: string): FieldDef => field(name, 25);
+
+const queryResult = (
+    rows: Record<string, unknown>[] = [],
+    rowCount = rows.length,
+    fields: FieldDef[] = [],
+): QueryResult<Record<string, unknown>> => ({
+    command: '',
+    fields,
+    oid: 0,
+    rowCount,
+    rows,
+});
+
+class RecordingPoolClient implements PostgresPoolClient {
+    readonly calls: QueryCall[] = [];
+    released = false;
+
+    constructor(private readonly failOnText?: string) {}
+
+    async query(
+        text: string,
+        values?: unknown[],
+    ): Promise<QueryResult<Record<string, unknown>>> {
+        this.calls.push({ text, values });
+        if (this.failOnText && text.includes(this.failOnText)) {
+            throw new Error(`forced query failure: ${text}`);
+        }
+        return queryResult([], text === 'ROLLBACK' ? 0 : 1);
+    }
+
+    release(): void {
+        this.released = true;
+    }
+}
+
+class RecordingPool implements PostgresPool {
+    readonly calls: QueryCall[] = [];
+
+    constructor(
+        private readonly client: RecordingPoolClient =
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+        private readonly nextResult: QueryResult<Record<string, unknown>> =
+            queryResult(),
+    ) {}
+
+    async query(
+        text: string,
+        values?: unknown[],
+    ): Promise<QueryResult<Record<string, unknown>>> {
+        this.calls.push({ text, values });
+        if (text === 'SELECT 1') return queryResult([{ ok: 1 }], 1);
+        return this.nextResult;
+    }
+
+    async connect(): Promise<PostgresPoolClient> {
+        return this.client;
+    }
+
+    async end(): Promise<void> {}
+}
+
+describe('PostgresDatabaseClient', () => {
+    it('is selected by the database factory', () => {
+        const client = new DatabaseClientFactory(postgresConfig());
+        expect(client).toBeInstanceOf(PostgresDatabaseClient);
+    });
+
+    it('maps pg write results to the shared WriteResult shape', () => {
+        expect(
+            mapPostgresWriteResult(queryResult([{ id: '42' }], 1)),
+        ).toEqual({
+            insertId: 42,
+            affectedRows: 1,
+            anyRowsAffected: true,
+        });
+
+        expect(mapPostgresWriteResult(queryResult([], 0))).toEqual({
+            insertId: 0,
+            affectedRows: 0,
+            anyRowsAffected: false,
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('prepares write SQL at the pg boundary', async () => {
+        const pool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult([{ id: '7' }], 1),
+        );
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(postgresConfig(), () => pool);
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        const result = await client.write(
+            'INSERT INTO `apps` (`name`) VALUES (?) RETURNING id',
+            ['editor'],
+        );
+
+        expect(result.insertId).toBe(7);
+        expect(pool.calls.at(-1)).toEqual({
+            text: 'INSERT INTO "apps" ("name") VALUES ($1) RETURNING id',
+            values: ['editor'],
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('normalizes int8 fields on read and primary read rows', async () => {
+        const pool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult(
+                [
+                    {
+                        uuid: 'session-1',
+                        created_at: '1710000000',
+                        last_activity: '1710000001',
+                        expires_at: '1710000002',
+                        revoked_at: null,
+                    },
+                ],
+                1,
+                [
+                    textField('uuid'),
+                    int8Field('created_at'),
+                    int8Field('last_activity'),
+                    int8Field('expires_at'),
+                    int8Field('revoked_at'),
+                ],
+            ),
+        );
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(postgresConfig(), () => pool);
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        await expect(client.read('SELECT * FROM `sessions`')).resolves.toEqual(
+            [
+                {
+                    uuid: 'session-1',
+                    created_at: 1710000000,
+                    last_activity: 1710000001,
+                    expires_at: 1710000002,
+                    revoked_at: null,
+                },
+            ],
+        );
+        await expect(client.pread('SELECT * FROM `sessions`')).resolves.toEqual(
+            [
+                {
+                    uuid: 'session-1',
+                    created_at: 1710000000,
+                    last_activity: 1710000001,
+                    expires_at: 1710000002,
+                    revoked_at: null,
+                },
+            ],
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('rejects unsafe int8 values instead of losing precision', async () => {
+        const pool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult(
+                [{ id: '9007199254740992' }],
+                1,
+                [int8Field('id')],
+            ),
+        );
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(postgresConfig(), () => pool);
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        await expect(client.read('SELECT `id` FROM `sessions`')).rejects.toThrow(
+            'safe integer',
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('normalizes tryHardRead rows returned by a replica', async () => {
+        const primaryPool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult([{ created_at: '1' }], 1, [
+                int8Field('created_at'),
+            ]),
+        );
+        const replicaPool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult([{ created_at: '2' }], 1, [
+                int8Field('created_at'),
+            ]),
+        );
+        const pools = [primaryPool, replicaPool];
+        let nextPoolIndex = 0;
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(
+            postgresReplicaConfig(),
+            () => {
+                const pool = pools[nextPoolIndex];
+                nextPoolIndex += 1;
+                if (!pool) throw new Error('unexpected pool factory call');
+                return pool;
+            },
+        );
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        await expect(
+            client.tryHardRead('SELECT `created_at` FROM `sessions`'),
+        ).resolves.toEqual([{ created_at: 2 }]);
+    });
+
+    it('normalizes tryHardRead rows returned by primary fallback', async () => {
+        const primaryPool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult([{ created_at: '3' }], 1, [
+                int8Field('created_at'),
+            ]),
+        );
+        const replicaPool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult([], 0, [int8Field('created_at')]),
+        );
+        const pools = [primaryPool, replicaPool];
+        let nextPoolIndex = 0;
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(
+            postgresReplicaConfig(),
+            () => {
+                const pool = pools[nextPoolIndex];
+                nextPoolIndex += 1;
+                if (!pool) throw new Error('unexpected pool factory call');
+                return pool;
+            },
+        );
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        await expect(
+            client.tryHardRead('SELECT `created_at` FROM `sessions`'),
+        ).resolves.toEqual([{ created_at: 3 }]);
+    });
+
+    it('runs batch writes in order and commits', async () => {
+        const conn = new RecordingPoolClient();
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(
+            postgresConfig(),
+            () => new RecordingPool(conn),
+        );
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        await client.batchWrite([
+            {
+                statement:
+                    'UPDATE `user` SET `username` = ? WHERE `id` = ?',
+                values: ['ada', 1],
+            },
+            {
+                statement: 'DELETE FROM `sessions` WHERE `uuid` = ?',
+                values: ['session-1'],
+            },
+        ]);
+
+        expect(conn.calls).toEqual([
+            { text: 'BEGIN', values: undefined },
+            {
+                text: 'UPDATE "user" SET "username" = $1 WHERE "id" = $2',
+                values: ['ada', 1],
+            },
+            {
+                text: 'DELETE FROM "sessions" WHERE "uuid" = $1',
+                values: ['session-1'],
+            },
+            { text: 'COMMIT', values: undefined },
+        ]);
+        expect(conn.released).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('rolls back and releases the pg connection when a batch write fails', async () => {
+        const conn = new RecordingPoolClient('UPDATE "user"');
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(
+            postgresConfig(),
+            () => new RecordingPool(conn),
+        );
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        await expect(
+            client.batchWrite([
+                {
+                    statement:
+                        'UPDATE `user` SET `username` = ? WHERE `id` = ?',
+                    values: ['ada', 1],
+                },
+            ]),
+        ).rejects.toThrow('forced query failure');
+
+        expect(conn.calls).toEqual([
+            { text: 'BEGIN', values: undefined },
+            {
+                text: 'UPDATE "user" SET "username" = $1 WHERE "id" = $2',
+                values: ['ada', 1],
+            },
+            { text: 'ROLLBACK', values: undefined },
+        ]);
+        expect(conn.released).toBe(true);
+    });
+});

src/backend/clients/database/PostgresDatabaseClient.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import { readdirSync, readFileSync } from 'fs';
+import { isAbsolute, resolve as resolvePath } from 'path';
+import { Pool, type PoolConfig, type QueryResult } from 'pg';
+import {
+    AbstractDatabaseClient,
+    type BatchEntry,
+    type WriteResult,
+} from './DatabaseClient';
+import { compareMigrationFilenames } from './migrationFilenames.js';
+import { preparePostgresSql } from './preparePostgresSql.js';
+import { splitPostgresStatements } from './splitPostgresStatements.js';
+import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
+
+type PostgresEndpointConfig = {
+    host?: string;
+    port?: number;
+    user?: string;
+    password?: string;
+    database?: string;
+    connectionString?: string;
+    url?: string;
+};
+
+export interface PostgresQueryable {
+    query(query: string, values?: unknown[]): Promise<QueryResult>;
+}
+
+export interface PostgresPoolClient extends PostgresQueryable {
+    release(): void;
+}
+
+export interface PostgresPool extends PostgresQueryable {
+    connect(): Promise<PostgresPoolClient>;
+    end(): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+type PostgresPoolFactory = (poolConfig: PoolConfig) => PostgresPool;
+
+enum Configuration {
+    SINGLE,
+    REPLICA,
+}
+
+const POSTGRES_INT8_OID = 20;
+const INTEGER_TEXT_PATTERN = /^-?\d+$/u;
+
+const normalizePostgresInt8 = (
+    value: unknown,
+    columnName: string,
+): number | null | undefined => {
+    if (value === null || value === undefined) return value;
+
+    const parsed =
+        typeof value === 'bigint'
+            ? Number(value)
+            : typeof value === 'number'
+              ? value
+              : typeof value === 'string' && INTEGER_TEXT_PATTERN.test(value)
+                ? Number(value)
+                : Number.NaN;
+
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(parsed)) {
+        throw new Error(
+            `[postgres] int8 column ${columnName} is outside JavaScript's safe integer range`,
+        );
+    }
+
+    return parsed;
+};
+
+const normalizePostgresRows = (
+    result: QueryResult,
+): Record<string, unknown>[] => {
+    const int8Fields = result.fields.filter(
+        (field) => field.dataTypeID === POSTGRES_INT8_OID,
+    );
+    if (int8Fields.length === 0) {
+        return result.rows as Record<string, unknown>[];
+    }
+
+    return result.rows.map((row) => {
+        const normalized: Record<string, unknown> = { ...row };
+        for (const field of int8Fields) {
+            normalized[field.name] = normalizePostgresInt8(
+                normalized[field.name],
+                field.name,
+            );
+        }
+        return normalized;
+    });
+};
+
+export const mapPostgresWriteResult = (result: QueryResult): WriteResult => {
+    const affectedRows = result.rowCount ?? 0;
+    const rowId = result.rows[0]?.id;
+    const insertId =
+        typeof rowId === 'bigint'
+            ? rowId
+            : typeof rowId === 'number'
+              ? rowId
+              : typeof rowId === 'string' && rowId !== ''
+                ? Number(rowId)
+                : 0;
+    const normalizedInsertId =
+        typeof insertId === 'number' && Number.isNaN(insertId) ? 0 : insertId;
+
+    return {
+        insertId: normalizedInsertId,
+        affectedRows,
+        anyRowsAffected: affectedRows > 0,
+    };
+};
+
+export class PostgresDatabaseClient extends AbstractDatabaseClient {
+    override readonly engineName = 'postgres';
+
+    private primaryPool!: PostgresPool;
+    private replicaPool!: PostgresPool;
+    private configuration = Configuration.SINGLE;
+    private shutdownStarted = false;
+    private shutdownTimer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;
+
+    constructor(
+        config: IConfig,
+        private readonly poolFactory: PostgresPoolFactory = (poolConfig) =>
+            new Pool(poolConfig) as unknown as PostgresPool,
+    ) {
+        super(config);
+    }
+
+    override async onServerStart(): Promise<void> {
+        const dbConf = this.config.database!;
+
+        this.primaryPool = this.createPool(dbConf);
+        await this.primaryPool.query('SELECT 1');
+        console.log('[postgres] connected to primary');
+
+        if (dbConf.replica) {
+            this.replicaPool = this.createPool(dbConf.replica);
+            await this.replicaPool.query('SELECT 1');
+            this.configuration = Configuration.REPLICA;
+            console.log('[postgres] connected to read-replica');
+        } else {
+            this.replicaPool = this.primaryPool;
+            this.configuration = Configuration.SINGLE;
+        }
+
+        await this.runMigrations();
+    }
+
+    override async onServerPrepareShutdown(): Promise<void> {
+        if (this.shutdownStarted) return;
+        this.shutdownStarted = true;
+
+        const drainMs = 60_000;
+        console.log(
+            `[postgres] draining in-flight queries (${drainMs}ms) before closing pools`,
+        );
+
+        this.shutdownTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+            this.shutdownTimer = null;
+            this.closeCurrentPools().catch((e) =>
+                console.error('[postgres] error closing pools after drain', e),
+            );
+        }, drainMs);
+
+        if (typeof this.shutdownTimer.unref === 'function') {
+            this.shutdownTimer.unref();
+        }
+    }
+
+    override async onServerShutdown(): Promise<void> {
+        if (this.shutdownTimer) {
+            clearTimeout(this.shutdownTimer);
+            this.shutdownTimer = null;
+        }
+        await this.closeCurrentPools();
+    }
+
+    override quoteIdentifier(identifier: string): string {
+        return identifier
+            .split('.')
+            .map((part) => {
+                if (part === '*') return part;
+                return `"${part.replaceAll('"', '""')}"`;
+            })
+            .join('.');
+    }
+
+    override booleanLiteral(value: boolean): string {
+        return value ? 'TRUE' : 'FALSE';
+    }
+
+    override booleanValue(value: boolean): boolean {
+        return value;
+    }
+
+    override async read(
+        query: string,
+        params: unknown[] = [],
+    ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>[]> {
+        const result = await this.query(this.replicaPool, query, params);
+        return normalizePostgresRows(result);
+    }
+
+    override async pread(
+        query: string,
+        params: unknown[] = [],
+    ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>[]> {
+        const result = await this.query(this.primaryPool, query, params);
+        return normalizePostgresRows(result);
+    }
+
+    override async write(
+        query: string,
+        params: unknown[] = [],
+    ): Promise<WriteResult> {
+        const result = await this.query(this.primaryPool, query, params);
+        return mapPostgresWriteResult(result);
+    }
+
+    override async batchWrite(entries: BatchEntry[]): Promise<void> {
+        if (entries.length === 0) return;
+
+        const conn = await this.primaryPool.connect();
+        try {
+            await conn.query('BEGIN');
+            try {
+                for (const { statement, values } of entries) {
+                    await this.query(conn, statement, values);
+                }
+                await conn.query('COMMIT');
+            } catch (err) {
+                await conn.query('ROLLBACK').catch(() => {});
+                throw err;
+            }
+        } finally {
+            conn.release();
+        }
+    }
+
+    override async tryHardRead(
+        query: string,
+        params: unknown[] = [],
+    ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>[]> {
+        if (this.configuration === Configuration.SINGLE) {
+            return this.read(query, params);
+        }
+
+        const primaryPromise = this.query(this.primaryPool, query, params);
+        try {
+            const replicaResult = await this.query(
+                this.replicaPool,
+                query,
+                params,
+            );
+            if (replicaResult.rows.length > 0) {
+                primaryPromise.catch(() => {});
+                return normalizePostgresRows(replicaResult);
+            }
+        } catch {
+            // fall through to primary
+        }
+
+        const primaryResult = await primaryPromise;
+        return normalizePostgresRows(primaryResult);
+    }
+
+    private async runMigrations(): Promise<void> {
+        const paths = this.config.database?.migrationPaths;
+        if (!paths || paths.length === 0) return;
+
+        const conn = await this.primaryPool.connect();
+        try {
+            for (const rawPath of paths) {
+                const dir = isAbsolute(rawPath)
+                    ? rawPath
+                    : resolvePath(process.cwd(), rawPath);
+
+                let files: string[];
+                try {
+                    files = readdirSync(dir)
+                        .filter(
+                            (f) =>
+                                f.endsWith('.sql') && f.startsWith('postgres'),
+                        )
+                        .sort(compareMigrationFilenames);
+                } catch (e) {
+                    throw new Error(
+                        `[postgres] migration path is unreadable: ${dir}`,
+                        { cause: e },
+                    );
+                }
+
+                if (files.length === 0) {
+                    console.log(`[postgres] no migrations in ${dir}`);
+                    continue;
+                }
+
+                console.log(
+                    `[postgres] running migrations from ${dir}: ${files.length} file(s)`,
+                );
+
+                for (const file of files) {
+                    const filePath = resolvePath(dir, file);
+                    const contents = readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');
+                    const statements = splitPostgresStatements(contents);
+                    await conn.query('BEGIN');
+                    try {
+                        for (let i = 0; i < statements.length; i++) {
+                            try {
+                                await conn.query(statements[i]);
+                            } catch (e) {
+                                throw new Error(
+                                    `[postgres] failed to apply ${file} at statement ${i}`,
+                                    { cause: e },
+                                );
+                            }
+                        }
+                        await conn.query('COMMIT');
+                    } catch (e) {
+                        await conn.query('ROLLBACK').catch(() => {});
+                        throw e;
+                    }
+                    console.log(
+                        `[postgres] applied ${file} (${statements.length} statements)`,
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+        } finally {
+            conn.release();
+        }
+    }
+
+    private createPool(dbConf: PostgresEndpointConfig): PostgresPool {
+        const connectionString = dbConf.connectionString ?? dbConf.url;
+        if (connectionString) {
+            return this.poolFactory({
+                connectionString,
+                max: 30,
+            });
+        }
+
+        return this.poolFactory({
+            host: dbConf.host ?? '127.0.0.1',
+            port: dbConf.port ?? 5432,
+            user: dbConf.user ?? 'postgres',
+            password: dbConf.password ?? '',
+            database: dbConf.database ?? 'puter',
+            max: 30,
+        });
+    }
+
+    private async query(
+        target: PostgresQueryable,
+        query: string,
+        params: unknown[] = [],
+    ): Promise<QueryResult> {
+        const prepared = preparePostgresSql(query);
+        return target.query(prepared.text, params);
+    }
+
+    private async closeCurrentPools(): Promise<void> {
+        const tasks: Promise<void>[] = [];
+        if (this.primaryPool) tasks.push(this.primaryPool.end());
+        if (this.replicaPool && this.replicaPool !== this.primaryPool) {
+            tasks.push(this.replicaPool.end());
+        }
+        await Promise.all(tasks);
+    }
+}

src/backend/clients/database/SqliteDatabaseClient.ts

@@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ const AVAILABLE_MIGRATIONS: [number, string[]][] = [
     [43, ['0047_app-url-updates.sql']],
     [44, ['0048_old-app-names-unique-tuple.sql']],
     [45, ['0049_music-player-pdf-player-updates.sql']],
+    [46, ['0050_add_preamble_version.sql']],
+    [47, ['0051_sessions_v2.sql']],
+    [48, ['0052_sessions_v2_lookups.sql']],
+    [49, ['0053_sessions_access_token_uid.sql']],
+    [50, ['0054_sessions_workers.sql']],
+    [50, ['0055_username_nocase_unique.sql']],
+    [51, ['0056_sessions_kind_worker.sql']],
+    [52, ['0057_add_user_reputation.sql']],
 ];
 
 export class SqliteDatabaseClient extends AbstractDatabaseClient {

src/backend/clients/database/index.ts

@@ -24,10 +24,12 @@ export {
 } from './DatabaseClient';
 export { SqliteDatabaseClient } from './SqliteDatabaseClient';
 export { MySQLDatabaseClient } from './MySQLDatabaseClient';
+export { PostgresDatabaseClient } from './PostgresDatabaseClient';
 
 import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
 import { AbstractDatabaseClient } from './DatabaseClient';
 import { MySQLDatabaseClient } from './MySQLDatabaseClient';
+import { PostgresDatabaseClient } from './PostgresDatabaseClient';
 import { SqliteDatabaseClient } from './SqliteDatabaseClient';
 
 /**
@@ -41,6 +43,8 @@ export const DatabaseClientFactory = class DatabaseClientFactory {
         switch (engine) {
             case 'mysql':
                 return new MySQLDatabaseClient(config);
+            case 'postgres':
+                return new PostgresDatabaseClient(config);
             case 'sqlite':
                 return new SqliteDatabaseClient(config);
             default:

src/backend/clients/database/migrationFilenames.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Comparator for migration filenames named `<engine>_mig_<N>.sql`.
+ *
+ * Existing MySQL files use unpadded integers, so lexical sorting places
+ * `*_mig_10.sql` before `*_mig_2.sql`. Pull the trailing integer out and sort
+ * numerically. Anything that does not match the `_<digits>.sql` shape falls
+ * back to lexical comparison and sorts after numbered files.
+ */
+export const compareMigrationFilenames = (a: string, b: string): number => {
+    const numericIndex = (name: string): number => {
+        const m = /_(\d+)\.sql$/.exec(name);
+        return m ? Number.parseInt(m[1], 10) : Number.NaN;
+    };
+    const na = numericIndex(a);
+    const nb = numericIndex(b);
+    if (Number.isFinite(na) && Number.isFinite(nb)) {
+        if (na !== nb) return na - nb;
+    } else if (Number.isFinite(na)) {
+        return -1;
+    } else if (Number.isFinite(nb)) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return a.localeCompare(b);
+};

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_10.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Mirrors SQLite migration 0053. Adds the
+-- `access_token_uid` reverse-lookup column on `sessions` so raw-uuid
+-- revoke can find the matching session row when only the v2 token_uid
+-- (no JWT) is presented.
+--
+-- Idempotent: each ADD COLUMN / ADD INDEX is guarded so the migration
+-- directory can be replayed safely.
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_sessions_access_token_uid;
+DELIMITER //
+CREATE PROCEDURE _puter_sessions_access_token_uid()
+BEGIN
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'access_token_uid'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD COLUMN `access_token_uid` VARCHAR(64) DEFAULT NULL;
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.STATISTICS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions'
+      AND INDEX_NAME = 'idx_sessions_access_token_uid'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD INDEX `idx_sessions_access_token_uid` (`access_token_uid`);
+  END IF;
+END//
+DELIMITER ;
+
+CALL _puter_sessions_access_token_uid();
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_sessions_access_token_uid;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_11.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Worker session uniqueness. Each Puter worker is a separately-deployed
+-- code unit (its own subdomain), so one user can have many workers under
+-- the same app — distinguished by `meta.worker_name`. The natural unique
+-- key for an active worker session is therefore
+-- (user_id, app_uid, worker_name), and app_uid is allowed NULL for
+-- user-scoped workers that aren't bound to any specific app.
+--
+-- Implemented the same way as `app_unique_key` from mig_9: a VIRTUAL
+-- generated column that's non-NULL only for the rows under the rule,
+-- then a UNIQUE INDEX on the column. NULLs don't conflict in MySQL
+-- UNIQUE indexes, so soft-revoked / non-worker rows fall out
+-- automatically. IFNULL normalises NULL `app_uid` so two user-scoped
+-- workers with the same name still dedupe. JSON_UNQUOTE strips the
+-- JSON value quoting from JSON_EXTRACT so the concatenated key is a
+-- plain string that matches the SELECT path's binding.
+--
+-- Idempotent: each ADD COLUMN / ADD INDEX is guarded so the migration
+-- directory can be replayed safely.
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_sessions_worker_unique;
+DELIMITER //
+CREATE PROCEDURE _puter_sessions_worker_unique()
+BEGIN
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'worker_unique_key'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD COLUMN `worker_unique_key` VARCHAR(550)
+        GENERATED ALWAYS AS (
+          IF(`kind` = 'worker' AND `revoked_at` IS NULL,
+             CONCAT(`user_id`, '|', IFNULL(`app_uid`, ''), '|',
+                    IFNULL(JSON_UNQUOTE(JSON_EXTRACT(`meta`, '$.worker_name')), '')),
+             NULL)
+        ) VIRTUAL;
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.STATISTICS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions'
+      AND INDEX_NAME = 'idx_sessions_user_worker_active'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD UNIQUE INDEX `idx_sessions_user_worker_active` (`worker_unique_key`);
+  END IF;
+END//
+DELIMITER ;
+
+CALL _puter_sessions_worker_unique();
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_sessions_worker_unique;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_12.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Add 'worker' to the `sessions.kind` ENUM. mig_11 already added the
+-- worker uniqueness index and the application code in SessionStore
+-- inserts rows with kind='worker', but the ENUM defined in mig_8 never
+-- listed 'worker' as a permitted value. Under STRICT_TRANS_TABLES the
+-- INSERT fails outright; under a relaxed sql_mode the value is coerced
+-- to '' (and the worker SELECT-by-kind path then misses the row).
+-- Mirrors SQLite migration 0056.
+--
+-- Idempotent: guarded against COLUMN_TYPE so re-running the directory is
+-- a no-op once 'worker' is in the ENUM.
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_sessions_kind_worker;
+DELIMITER //
+CREATE PROCEDURE _puter_sessions_kind_worker()
+BEGIN
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions'
+      AND COLUMN_NAME = 'kind'
+      AND FIND_IN_SET('worker', REPLACE(REPLACE(REPLACE(COLUMN_TYPE, 'enum(', ''), ')', ''), '''', '')) > 0
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      MODIFY COLUMN `kind`
+        ENUM('web', 'app', 'access_token', 'asset', 'worker')
+        NOT NULL DEFAULT 'web';
+  END IF;
+END//
+DELIMITER ;
+
+CALL _puter_sessions_kind_worker();
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_sessions_kind_worker;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_7.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+--
+-- Idempotent: the ADD COLUMN is guarded by an INFORMATION_SCHEMA check,
+-- so re-running the migration directory is safe (required — the runner
+-- has no per-file tracking).
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_add_subdomains_preamble_version;
+DELIMITER //
+CREATE PROCEDURE _puter_add_subdomains_preamble_version()
+BEGIN
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'subdomains' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'preamble_version'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `subdomains`
+      ADD COLUMN `preamble_version` varchar(64) DEFAULT NULL;
+  END IF;
+END//
+DELIMITER ;
+
+CALL _puter_add_subdomains_preamble_version();
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_add_subdomains_preamble_version;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_8.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+-- Extend `sessions` so a single row can represent any token kind
+-- (web/app/access_token/asset), carry display metadata for the
+-- manage-sessions UI, and be soft-revoked with row-level expiry.
+-- Mirrors SQLite migration 0050.
+--
+-- Idempotent: each ADD COLUMN / ADD INDEX is guarded by an
+-- INFORMATION_SCHEMA check, so re-running the migration directory
+-- is safe (required — the runner has no per-file tracking).
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_extend_sessions_v2;
+DELIMITER //
+CREATE PROCEDURE _puter_extend_sessions_v2()
+BEGIN
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'kind'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD COLUMN `kind` ENUM('web', 'app', 'access_token', 'asset')
+        NOT NULL DEFAULT 'web';
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'label'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `label` VARCHAR(255) DEFAULT NULL;
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'parent_session_id'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD COLUMN `parent_session_id` VARCHAR(64) DEFAULT NULL;
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'last_ip'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `last_ip` VARCHAR(64) DEFAULT NULL;
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'last_user_agent'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD COLUMN `last_user_agent` VARCHAR(512) DEFAULT NULL;
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'revoked_at'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `revoked_at` BIGINT DEFAULT NULL;
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'expires_at'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `expires_at` BIGINT DEFAULT NULL;
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.STATISTICS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions'
+      AND INDEX_NAME = 'idx_sessions_user_revoked'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD INDEX `idx_sessions_user_revoked` (`user_id`, `revoked_at`);
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.STATISTICS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions'
+      AND INDEX_NAME = 'idx_sessions_parent'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD INDEX `idx_sessions_parent` (`parent_session_id`);
+  END IF;
+END//
+DELIMITER ;
+
+CALL _puter_extend_sessions_v2();
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_extend_sessions_v2;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_9.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Composite-key lookups + audit columns. Mirrors
+-- SQLite migration 0052. MySQL has no partial unique indexes, so the
+-- "at most one active row per (user_id, app_uid)" / "one active row
+-- per legacy_token_uid" semantics are encoded via VIRTUAL generated
+-- columns that are NULL when the row isn't subject to the rule —
+-- MySQL allows multiple NULLs in a UNIQUE index, so non-applicable
+-- rows don't conflict.
+--
+-- Idempotent: each ADD COLUMN / ADD INDEX is guarded so the migration
+-- directory can be replayed safely.
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_sessions_v2_lookups;
+DELIMITER //
+CREATE PROCEDURE _puter_sessions_v2_lookups()
+BEGIN
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'app_uid'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `app_uid` VARCHAR(64) DEFAULT NULL;
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'legacy_token_uid'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD COLUMN `legacy_token_uid` VARCHAR(64) DEFAULT NULL;
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'created_via'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `created_via` VARCHAR(32) DEFAULT NULL;
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'auth_id'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `auth_id` VARCHAR(64) DEFAULT NULL;
+  END IF;
+
+  -- Generated discriminant: non-NULL only for active app-authorization rows,
+  -- so UNIQUE(app_unique_key) enforces "one active app session per
+  -- (user_id, app_uid)" while permitting any number of revoked rows.
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'app_unique_key'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD COLUMN `app_unique_key` VARCHAR(150)
+        GENERATED ALWAYS AS (
+          IF(`kind` = 'app' AND `revoked_at` IS NULL,
+             CONCAT(`user_id`, '|', `app_uid`),
+             NULL)
+        ) VIRTUAL;
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions' AND COLUMN_NAME = 'legacy_token_unique_key'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD COLUMN `legacy_token_unique_key` VARCHAR(64)
+        GENERATED ALWAYS AS (
+          IF(`revoked_at` IS NULL, `legacy_token_uid`, NULL)
+        ) VIRTUAL;
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.STATISTICS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions'
+      AND INDEX_NAME = 'idx_sessions_user_app_active'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD UNIQUE INDEX `idx_sessions_user_app_active` (`app_unique_key`);
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.STATISTICS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions'
+      AND INDEX_NAME = 'idx_sessions_legacy_token_active'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD UNIQUE INDEX `idx_sessions_legacy_token_active`
+        (`legacy_token_unique_key`);
+  END IF;
+
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.STATISTICS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'sessions'
+      AND INDEX_NAME = 'idx_sessions_kind_user'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `sessions`
+      ADD INDEX `idx_sessions_kind_user` (`kind`, `user_id`);
+  END IF;
+END//
+DELIMITER ;
+
+CALL _puter_sessions_v2_lookups();
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_sessions_v2_lookups;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/postgres/postgres_mig_1.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,724 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "user" (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uuid varchar(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  username varchar(50) UNIQUE,
+  email varchar(256),
+  password varchar(225),
+  free_storage bigint,
+  max_subdomains integer,
+  taskbar_items text,
+  desktop_uuid varchar(36),
+  appdata_uuid varchar(36),
+  documents_uuid varchar(36),
+  pictures_uuid varchar(36),
+  videos_uuid varchar(36),
+  trash_uuid varchar(36),
+  trash_id integer,
+  appdata_id integer,
+  desktop_id integer,
+  documents_id integer,
+  pictures_id integer,
+  videos_id integer,
+  referrer varchar(64),
+  desktop_bg_url text,
+  desktop_bg_color varchar(20),
+  desktop_bg_fit varchar(16),
+  pass_recovery_token varchar(36),
+  requires_email_confirmation boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+  email_confirm_code varchar(8),
+  email_confirm_token varchar(36),
+  email_confirmed boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+  dev_first_name varchar(100),
+  dev_last_name varchar(100),
+  dev_paypal varchar(100),
+  dev_approved_for_incentive_program boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  dev_joined_incentive_program boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  suspended boolean,
+  unsubscribed boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+  "timestamp" timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  last_activity_ts timestamp,
+  referral_code varchar(16) UNIQUE,
+  referred_by integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  unconfirmed_change_email varchar(256),
+  change_email_confirm_token varchar(256),
+  otp_secret text,
+  otp_enabled boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  otp_recovery_codes text,
+  stripe_customer_id varchar(40),
+  public_uuid varchar(36),
+  public_id integer,
+  clean_email varchar(256),
+  audit_metadata jsonb,
+  signup_ip varchar(45),
+  signup_ip_forwarded varchar(45),
+  signup_user_agent varchar(512),
+  signup_origin varchar(255),
+  signup_server varchar(255),
+  metadata jsonb DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb,
+  reputation smallint DEFAULT 100
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_email ON "user" (email);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_pass_recovery_token ON "user" (pass_recovery_token);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_referrer ON "user" (referrer);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_email_confirm_token ON "user" (email_confirm_token);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_last_activity_ts ON "user" (last_activity_ts);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_referred_by ON "user" (referred_by);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_stripe_customer_id ON "user" (stripe_customer_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_clean_email ON "user" (clean_email);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_signup_ip ON "user" (signup_ip);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_signup_ip_forwarded ON "user" (signup_ip_forwarded);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_signup_user_agent ON "user" (signup_user_agent);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_signup_origin ON "user" (signup_origin);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_signup_server ON "user" (signup_server);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS apps (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uid varchar(40) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  owner_user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  icon text,
+  name varchar(100) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  title varchar(100) NOT NULL,
+  description text,
+  godmode boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  maximize_on_start boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  index_url text NOT NULL,
+  approved_for_listing boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  approved_for_opening_items boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  approved_for_incentive_program boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  "timestamp" timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  last_review timestamp,
+  tags varchar(255),
+  app_owner integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  background boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  metadata jsonb,
+  protected boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  is_private boolean DEFAULT FALSE
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_apps_owner_user_id ON apps (owner_user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_apps_app_owner ON apps (app_owner);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_apps_owner_timestamp ON apps (owner_user_id, "timestamp" DESC);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_apps_listing_timestamp ON apps (approved_for_listing, "timestamp" DESC);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "group" (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uid varchar(40) UNIQUE,
+  owner_user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  extra jsonb,
+  metadata jsonb,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_group_owner_user_id ON "group" (owner_user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS app_filetype_association (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  app_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  type varchar(60) NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_filetype_association_app_id ON app_filetype_association (app_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_filetype_association_type ON app_filetype_association (type);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS app_opens (
+  _id bigint GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  app_uid varchar(40) NOT NULL REFERENCES apps (uid) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  ts integer NOT NULL,
+  human_ts timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_opens_user_id ON app_opens (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_opens_app_uid ON app_opens (app_uid);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_opens_uid_ts ON app_opens (app_uid, ts);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_opens_app_user ON app_opens (app_uid, user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fsentries (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uuid varchar(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  bucket varchar(50),
+  bucket_region varchar(30),
+  public_token varchar(36) UNIQUE,
+  file_request_token varchar(36) UNIQUE,
+  is_shortcut boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  shortcut_to integer REFERENCES fsentries (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  parent_id integer REFERENCES fsentries (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  associated_app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  is_dir boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  layout varchar(30),
+  sort_by varchar(20),
+  sort_order varchar(10),
+  is_public boolean,
+  thumbnail text,
+  immutable boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+  name varchar(767) NOT NULL,
+  metadata text,
+  modified integer NOT NULL,
+  created integer,
+  accessed integer,
+  size bigint,
+  symlink_path varchar(260),
+  is_symlink boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  parent_uid varchar(36),
+  path varchar(4096),
+  CONSTRAINT fsentries_parent_name_unique UNIQUE (parent_id, name)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_name ON fsentries (name);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_modified ON fsentries (modified);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_parent_id ON fsentries (parent_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_is_dir ON fsentries (is_dir);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_user_id ON fsentries (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_shortcut_to ON fsentries (shortcut_to);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_associated_app_id ON fsentries (associated_app_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_bucket ON fsentries (bucket);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_bucket_region ON fsentries (bucket_region);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_parent_uid ON fsentries (parent_uid);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_path ON fsentries (path);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_accessed ON fsentries (accessed);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_user_parent_name ON fsentries (user_id, parent_uid, name);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_parent_uid_name ON fsentries (parent_uid, name);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fsentry_versions (
+  id bigint GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  fsentry_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES fsentries (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  fsentry_uuid varchar(36) NOT NULL,
+  version_id varchar(60) NOT NULL,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  message text,
+  ts_epoch integer
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentry_versions_fsentry_id ON fsentry_versions (fsentry_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentry_versions_fsentry_uuid ON fsentry_versions (fsentry_uuid);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentry_versions_user_id ON fsentry_versions (user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS subdomains (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uuid varchar(40) UNIQUE,
+  subdomain varchar(64) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  root_dir_id integer REFERENCES fsentries (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  associated_app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  ts timestamp DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  app_owner integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  protected boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  domain varchar(265),
+  database_id varchar(40),
+  preamble_version varchar(64)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_user_id ON subdomains (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_root_dir_id ON subdomains (root_dir_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_associated_app_id ON subdomains (associated_app_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_app_owner ON subdomains (app_owner);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_domain ON subdomains (domain);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_root_user ON subdomains (root_dir_id, user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_app_user ON subdomains (associated_app_id, user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS kv (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  app varchar(40),
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  kkey_hash bigint NOT NULL,
+  kkey text NOT NULL,
+  value text,
+  migrated boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  "expireAt" timestamp,
+  CONSTRAINT kv_app_user_kkey_hash_unique UNIQUE (app, user_id, kkey_hash)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_kv_app ON kv (app);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_kv_user_id ON kv (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_kv_kkey_hash ON kv (kkey_hash);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS sessions (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  uuid varchar(40) NOT NULL,
+  meta jsonb,
+  created_at bigint DEFAULT 0,
+  last_activity bigint DEFAULT 0,
+  kind varchar(32) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'web'
+    CHECK (kind IN ('web', 'app', 'access_token', 'asset', 'worker')),
+  label varchar(255),
+  parent_session_id varchar(64),
+  last_ip varchar(64),
+  last_user_agent varchar(512),
+  revoked_at bigint,
+  expires_at bigint,
+  app_uid varchar(64),
+  legacy_token_uid varchar(64),
+  created_via varchar(32),
+  auth_id varchar(64),
+  access_token_uid varchar(64)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_user_id ON sessions (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_uuid ON sessions (uuid);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_user_revoked ON sessions (user_id, revoked_at);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_parent ON sessions (parent_session_id);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_user_app_active
+  ON sessions (user_id, app_uid)
+  WHERE kind = 'app' AND revoked_at IS NULL;
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_legacy_token_active
+  ON sessions (legacy_token_uid)
+  WHERE legacy_token_uid IS NOT NULL AND revoked_at IS NULL;
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_kind_user ON sessions (kind, user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_access_token_uid
+  ON sessions (access_token_uid)
+  WHERE access_token_uid IS NOT NULL;
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_user_worker_active
+  ON sessions (user_id, COALESCE(app_uid, ''), (meta #>> ARRAY['worker_name']))
+  WHERE kind = 'worker' AND revoked_at IS NULL;
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_to_app_permissions (
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  dt timestamp DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  PRIMARY KEY (user_id, app_id, permission)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_utap_user_permission ON user_to_app_permissions (user_id, permission);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_utap_app_permission ON user_to_app_permissions (app_id, permission);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_to_group_permissions (
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  group_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "group" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  PRIMARY KEY (user_id, group_id, permission)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_to_group_permissions_group_id ON user_to_group_permissions (group_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_to_user_permissions (
+  issuer_user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  holder_user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  PRIMARY KEY (issuer_user_id, holder_user_id, permission)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_to_user_permissions_holder_user_id ON user_to_user_permissions (holder_user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS dev_to_app_permissions (
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  PRIMARY KEY (user_id, app_id, permission)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_dev_to_app_permissions_app_id ON dev_to_app_permissions (app_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_dev_to_app_permissions_permission ON dev_to_app_permissions (permission);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS access_token_permissions (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  token_uid varchar(40) NOT NULL,
+  authorizer_user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  authorizer_app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_access_token_permissions_token_uid ON access_token_permissions (token_uid);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS old_app_names (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  app_uid varchar(40) NOT NULL REFERENCES apps (uid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+  name varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  "timestamp" timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  CONSTRAINT unique_old_app_names_app_uid_name UNIQUE (app_uid, name)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_old_app_names_app_uid ON old_app_names (app_uid);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_old_app_names_name ON old_app_names (name);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS jct_user_group (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  group_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "group" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  extra jsonb,
+  metadata jsonb,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_jct_user_group_user_id ON jct_user_group (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_jct_user_group_group_id ON jct_user_group (group_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS notification (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  uid varchar(40) UNIQUE,
+  value jsonb NOT NULL,
+  acknowledged bigint,
+  shown bigint,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_notification_user_id ON notification (user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS share (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uid varchar(40) UNIQUE,
+  issuer_user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  recipient_email varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  data jsonb,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_share_issuer_user_id ON share (issuer_user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_share_recipient_email ON share (recipient_email);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS feedback (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  message text,
+  ts timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_feedback_user_id ON feedback (user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS thread (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uid varchar(40) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  parent_uid varchar(40) REFERENCES thread (uid) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  owner_user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  "schema" text,
+  text text NOT NULL,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_thread_parent_uid ON thread (parent_uid);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_thread_owner_user_id ON thread (owner_user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_comments (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uid varchar(40) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  metadata jsonb,
+  text text NOT NULL,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_comments_user_id ON user_comments (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_comments_uid ON user_comments (uid);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_fsentry_comments (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_comment_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES user_comments (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  fsentry_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES fsentries (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_fsentry_comments_user_comment_id ON user_fsentry_comments (user_comment_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_fsentry_comments_fsentry_id ON user_fsentry_comments (fsentry_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_fsentry_version_comments (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_comment_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES user_comments (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  fsentry_version_id integer NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_fsentry_version_comments_user_comment_id ON user_fsentry_version_comments (user_comment_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_fsentry_version_comments_version_id ON user_fsentry_version_comments (fsentry_version_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_group_comments (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_comment_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES user_comments (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  group_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "group" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_group_comments_user_comment_id ON user_group_comments (user_comment_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_group_comments_group_id ON user_group_comments (group_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_user_comments (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_comment_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES user_comments (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  commented_user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_user_comments_user_comment_id ON user_user_comments (user_comment_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_user_comments_commented_user_id ON user_user_comments (commented_user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_oidc_providers (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  provider varchar(64) NOT NULL,
+  provider_sub varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  refresh_token text,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_oidc_providers_user_id ON user_oidc_providers (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_oidc_providers_provider ON user_oidc_providers (provider);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_oidc_providers_provider_sub_unique ON user_oidc_providers (provider, provider_sub);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS app_update_audit (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  old_name varchar(50),
+  new_name varchar(50),
+  reason varchar(255)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_update_audit_app_id ON app_update_audit (app_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_update_audit (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  old_email varchar(256),
+  new_email varchar(256),
+  old_username varchar(50),
+  new_username varchar(50),
+  reason varchar(255)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_update_audit_user_id ON user_update_audit (user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS storage_audit (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  is_subtract boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+  amount bigint NOT NULL,
+  field_a varchar(16),
+  field_b varchar(16),
+  reason varchar(255),
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_storage_audit_user_id ON storage_audit (user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_user_to_app_permissions (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  action varchar(16),
+  reason varchar(255),
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_user_to_app_permissions_user_id ON audit_user_to_app_permissions (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_user_to_app_permissions_app_id ON audit_user_to_app_permissions (app_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_dev_to_app_permissions (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  action varchar(16),
+  reason varchar(255),
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_dev_to_app_permissions_user_id ON audit_dev_to_app_permissions (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_dev_to_app_permissions_app_id ON audit_dev_to_app_permissions (app_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_user_to_group_permissions (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  group_id integer REFERENCES "group" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  group_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  action varchar(255),
+  reason varchar(255),
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_user_to_group_permissions_user_id ON audit_user_to_group_permissions (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_user_to_group_permissions_group_id ON audit_user_to_group_permissions (group_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_user_to_user_permissions (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  issuer_user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  issuer_user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  holder_user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  holder_user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  action varchar(16),
+  reason varchar(255),
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_user_to_user_permissions_issuer_user_id ON audit_user_to_user_permissions (issuer_user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_user_to_user_permissions_holder_user_id ON audit_user_to_user_permissions (holder_user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ai_usage (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  service_name varchar(64),
+  model_name varchar(128),
+  price_modifier varchar(40),
+  cost integer,
+  value_uint_1 integer,
+  value_uint_2 integer,
+  value_uint_3 integer,
+  value_uint_4 integer,
+  value_uint_5 integer,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ai_usage_app_id ON ai_usage (app_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ai_usage_service_name ON ai_usage (service_name);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ai_usage_model_name ON ai_usage (model_name);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ai_usage_price_modifier ON ai_usage (price_modifier);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ai_usage_created_at ON ai_usage (created_at);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ai_usage_user_timestamp ON ai_usage (user_id, created_at);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS general_analytics (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  uid varchar(40) NOT NULL,
+  trace_id varchar(40),
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id_keep integer,
+  app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id_keep integer,
+  server_id varchar(40),
+  actor_type varchar(40),
+  tags jsonb,
+  fields jsonb
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_general_analytics_user_id ON general_analytics (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_general_analytics_app_id ON general_analytics (app_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS monthly_usage_counts (
+  year integer NOT NULL,
+  month integer NOT NULL,
+  service_type varchar(40) NOT NULL,
+  service_name varchar(40) NOT NULL,
+  actor_key varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  pricing_category jsonb NOT NULL,
+  pricing_category_hash bytea NOT NULL,
+  "count" integer DEFAULT 0,
+  value_uint_1 integer,
+  value_uint_2 integer,
+  value_uint_3 integer,
+  PRIMARY KEY (year, month, service_type, service_name, actor_key, pricing_category_hash)
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS service_usage_monthly (
+  "key" varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  year integer NOT NULL,
+  month integer NOT NULL,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  "count" integer NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  PRIMARY KEY ("key", year, month)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_service_usage_monthly_user_id ON service_usage_monthly (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_service_usage_monthly_app_id ON service_usage_monthly (app_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS per_user_credit (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  amount bigint NOT NULL,
+  last_updated_at bigint NOT NULL
+);
+
+INSERT INTO "user" (id, uuid, username, metadata)
+VALUES (1, '5d4adce0-a381-4982-9c02-6e2540026238', 'system', '{}'::jsonb)
+ON CONFLICT (uuid) DO UPDATE SET username = EXCLUDED.username;
+
+SELECT setval(pg_get_serial_sequence('"user"', 'id'), COALESCE((SELECT MAX(id) FROM "user"), 1), true);
+
+INSERT INTO "group" (uid, owner_user_id, extra, metadata)
+VALUES
+  ('26bfb1fb-421f-45bc-9aa4-d81ea569e7a5', 1, '{"critical": true, "type": "default", "name": "system"}'::jsonb, '{"title": "System", "color": "#000000"}'::jsonb),
+  ('ca342a5e-b13d-4dee-9048-58b11a57cc55', 1, '{"critical": true, "type": "default", "name": "admin"}'::jsonb, '{"title": "Admin", "color": "#a83232"}'::jsonb),
+  ('78b1b1dd-c959-44d2-b02c-8735671f9997', 1, '{"critical": true, "type": "default", "name": "user"}'::jsonb, '{"title": "User", "color": "#3254a8"}'::jsonb),
+  ('b7220104-7905-4985-b996-649fdcdb3c8f', 1, '{"critical": true, "type": "default", "name": "temp"}'::jsonb, '{"title": "Temp", "color": "#888888"}'::jsonb),
+  ('3c2dfff7-d22a-41aa-a193-59a61dac4b64', 1, '{"type": "default", "name": "moderator"}'::jsonb, '{"title": "Moderator", "color": "#a432a8"}'::jsonb),
+  ('5e8f251d-3382-4b0d-932c-7bb82f48652f', 1, '{"type": "default", "name": "developer"}'::jsonb, '{"title": "Developer", "color": "#32a852"}'::jsonb)
+ON CONFLICT (uid) DO UPDATE SET
+  owner_user_id = EXCLUDED.owner_user_id,
+  extra = EXCLUDED.extra,
+  metadata = EXCLUDED.metadata;
+
+INSERT INTO apps (
+  uid, owner_user_id, icon, name, title, description, index_url,
+  godmode, maximize_on_start, background,
+  approved_for_listing, approved_for_opening_items,
+  approved_for_incentive_program, tags, "timestamp"
+)
+VALUES
+  ('app-3920851d-bda8-479b-9407-8517293c7d44', 1, NULL, 'pdf', 'PDF', '', 'https://pdf.puter.com', FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-5584fbf7-ed69-41fc-99cd-85da21b1ef51', 1, NULL, 'camera', 'Camera', 'Camera in the browser.', 'https://online-camera.com', FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-11edfba2-1ed3-4e22-8573-47e88fb87d70', 1, NULL, 'player', 'Player', 'A free video player app in the browser.', 'https://simple-player.puter.com', FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-7bdca1a4-6373-4c98-ad97-03ff2d608ca1', 1, NULL, 'recorder', 'Recorder', 'Online voice recorder in the browser with cloud storage.', 'https://voice-recorder.com', FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-d7e9471f-e441-4d72-a5ab-75e96573b76b', 1, NULL, 'music-player', 'Music Player', 'A free music player app in the browser.', 'https://player.puter.com', FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, NULL, '2026-05-10 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-e3ac5486-da8c-42ad-8377-8728086e0980', 1, NULL, 'git', 'Git', 'Puter Git client', 'https://builtins.namespaces.puter.com/git', FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-0b37f054-07d4-4627-8765-11bd23e889d4', 1, NULL, 'dev-center', 'Dev Center', 'This is the app that makes apps', 'https://builtins.namespaces.puter.com/dev-center', TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-fbbdb72b-ad08-4cb4-86a1-de0f27cf2e1e', 1, NULL, 'puter-linux', 'Puter Linux', 'Linux emulator for Puter', 'https://builtins.namespaces.puter.com/emulator', TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-838dfbc4-bf8b-48c2-b47b-c4adc77fab58', 1, NULL, 'editor', 'Editor', 'Text editor', 'https://online-notepad.com', TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-58282b08-990a-4906-95f7-fa37ff92452b', 1, NULL, 'draw', 'Draw', 'Image editor', 'https://draw.puter.com', TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, 'graphics', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-0bef044f-918f-4cbf-a0c0-b4a17ee81085', 1, NULL, 'about', 'About', 'About Puter', 'https://about.puter.com', TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-a2ae72a4-1ba3-4a29-b5c0-6de1be5cf178', 1, NULL, 'app-center', 'App Center', 'Discover apps for Puter', 'https://app-center.puter.com', TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-93005ce0-80d1-50d9-9b1e-9c453c375d56', 1, NULL, 'markus', 'Markus', 'Markdown editor', 'https://markus.puter.com', TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-6f79ef7b-52b7-4b31-91c6-fc07b62e9396', 1, NULL, 'code', 'Code', 'Code editor', 'https://code.puter.com', TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-862fc09e-c7b8-4c30-b5b4-47b3cc5f5232', 1, NULL, 'memos', 'Memos', 'Notes and memos', 'https://memos.puter.com', FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-aeb8c03e-1144-4c57-bff5-3a1a7c17f9f0', 1, NULL, 'word-processor', 'Word Processor', 'Write documents', 'https://word-processor.puter.com', FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-c10a1999-22f5-4644-9960-9aaac0d4934e', 1, NULL, 'spreadsheet', 'Spreadsheet', 'Work with spreadsheets', 'https://spreadsheet.puter.com', FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-e9c1d58d-3d8d-4f0a-a85c-e383ef63bc29', 1, NULL, 'presentation', 'Presentation', 'Create presentations', 'https://presentation.puter.com', FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-fb7d9e42-8207-4fa0-b680-f0239327097f', 1, NULL, 'pdf-editor', 'PDF Editor', 'Edit PDF documents', 'https://pdf-editor.puter.com', FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00')
+ON CONFLICT (uid) DO UPDATE SET
+  owner_user_id = EXCLUDED.owner_user_id,
+  name = EXCLUDED.name,
+  title = EXCLUDED.title,
+  description = EXCLUDED.description,
+  index_url = EXCLUDED.index_url,
+  godmode = EXCLUDED.godmode,
+  maximize_on_start = EXCLUDED.maximize_on_start,
+  background = EXCLUDED.background,
+  approved_for_listing = EXCLUDED.approved_for_listing,
+  approved_for_opening_items = EXCLUDED.approved_for_opening_items,
+  approved_for_incentive_program = EXCLUDED.approved_for_incentive_program,
+  tags = EXCLUDED.tags;
+
+INSERT INTO user_to_group_permissions (user_id, group_id, permission, extra)
+SELECT u.id, g.id, 'driver', '{}'::jsonb
+FROM "user" u, "group" g
+WHERE u.username = 'system'
+  AND g.uid = 'ca342a5e-b13d-4dee-9048-58b11a57cc55'
+ON CONFLICT (user_id, group_id, permission) DO UPDATE SET extra = EXCLUDED.extra;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0050_add_preamble_version.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+ALTER TABLE `subdomains` ADD COLUMN `preamble_version` varchar(64) DEFAULT NULL;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0051_sessions_v2.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Extend `sessions` so a single row can represent any token kind
+-- (web/app/access_token/asset), carry display metadata for the
+-- manage-sessions UI, and be soft-revoked.
+
+ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `kind` TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'web'
+    CHECK (`kind` IN ('web', 'app', 'access_token', 'asset'));
+ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `label` TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `parent_session_id` TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `last_ip` TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `last_user_agent` TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `revoked_at` INTEGER;
+ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `expires_at` INTEGER;
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_user_revoked`
+    ON `sessions` (`user_id`, `revoked_at`);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_parent`
+    ON `sessions` (`parent_session_id`);

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0052_sessions_v2_lookups.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Composite-key lookups + audit columns.
+--   - `app_uid`           : binds `kind='app'` rows to their app authorization
+--                           target. (user_id, app_uid) is the idempotency key.
+--   - `legacy_token_uid`  : keys lazy-backfilled rows to the v1 token_uid that
+--                           originally minted them.
+--   - `created_via`       : audit sentinel (e.g. 'legacy_backfill').
+--   - `auth_id`           : stable per-user identity that survives re-login;
+--                           lets manage-sessions group by identity.
+
+ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `app_uid` TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `legacy_token_uid` TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `created_via` TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `auth_id` TEXT;
+
+-- Partial unique indexes keep "at most one active row per key" without
+-- breaking the soft-revoke pattern (revoked rows stay for audit).
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_user_app_active`
+    ON `sessions` (`user_id`, `app_uid`)
+    WHERE `kind` = 'app' AND `revoked_at` IS NULL;
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_legacy_token_active`
+    ON `sessions` (`legacy_token_uid`)
+    WHERE `legacy_token_uid` IS NOT NULL AND `revoked_at` IS NULL;
+
+-- Supports manage-sessions list queries grouped by kind.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_kind_user`
+    ON `sessions` (`kind`, `user_id`);

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0053_sessions_access_token_uid.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Let `kind='access_token'` rows be reverse-looked-up
+-- from the `token_uid` claim that lives only in `access_token_permissions`.
+-- Required so `POST /auth/revoke-access-token` with a raw token_uid input
+-- (no JWT) can find and soft-revoke the session row, matching the JWT
+-- input path's coverage. Without it, raw-uuid revoke would only drop the
+-- permissions row, leaving the session-row kill switch un-flipped.
+
+ALTER TABLE `sessions` ADD COLUMN `access_token_uid` TEXT;
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_access_token_uid`
+    ON `sessions` (`access_token_uid`)
+    WHERE `access_token_uid` IS NOT NULL;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0054_sessions_workers.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Worker session uniqueness. One active kind='worker' row per
+-- (user_id, app_uid, worker_name).
+--
+-- SQLite UNIQUE indexes treat NULLs as distinct (per the SQL standard),
+-- so user-scoped workers (where `app_uid` is NULL) would otherwise be
+-- allowed to duplicate. IFNULL collapses NULL `app_uid` to empty
+-- string in the index expression so two user-scoped workers with the
+-- same worker_name correctly conflict. MySQL handles the same case
+-- via the IFNULL in mig_11's generated column.
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_user_worker_active`
+    ON `sessions` (`user_id`, IFNULL(`app_uid`, ''), json_extract(`meta`, '$.worker_name'))
+    WHERE `kind` = 'worker' AND `revoked_at` IS NULL;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0055_username_nocase_unique.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Enforce case-insensitive uniqueness on user.username.
+--
+-- SQLite defaults varchar columns to BINARY collation, so without this
+-- index `Admin` and `admin` can coexist as separate rows even though the
+-- reserved-name check and adminOnly gate both treat usernames as
+-- case-insensitive. Prod MySQL already uses ascii_general_ci on this
+-- column; this brings self-hosted SQLite to the same invariant.
+--
+-- If this CREATE fails because the DB already contains case-collision
+-- duplicates, resolve them manually before re-running the migration —
+-- there is no safe automatic merge of two user accounts.
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_username_nocase
+    ON user(username COLLATE NOCASE)
+    WHERE username IS NOT NULL;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0056_sessions_kind_worker.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Add 'worker' to the `kind` CHECK constraint on `sessions`. Mirrors the
+-- MySQL ENUM extension in mysql_mig_12.
+--
+-- SQLite cannot ALTER a CHECK constraint in place, so we follow the
+-- standard 12-step rebuild: create `sessions_new` with the corrected
+-- constraint, copy rows, drop the old table, rename, then recreate every
+-- index that lived on the original (indexes are auto-dropped with their
+-- table).
+
+CREATE TABLE `sessions_new` (
+    "id" INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    "user_id" INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    "uuid" TEXT NOT NULL,
+    "meta" JSON DEFAULT NULL,
+    "created_at" INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
+    "last_activity" INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
+    "kind" TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'web'
+        CHECK (`kind` IN ('web', 'app', 'access_token', 'asset', 'worker')),
+    "label" TEXT,
+    "parent_session_id" TEXT,
+    "last_ip" TEXT,
+    "last_user_agent" TEXT,
+    "revoked_at" INTEGER,
+    "expires_at" INTEGER,
+    "app_uid" TEXT,
+    "legacy_token_uid" TEXT,
+    "created_via" TEXT,
+    "auth_id" TEXT,
+    "access_token_uid" TEXT,
+    FOREIGN KEY("user_id") REFERENCES "user" ("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE
+);
+
+INSERT INTO `sessions_new` (
+    `id`, `user_id`, `uuid`, `meta`, `created_at`, `last_activity`,
+    `kind`, `label`, `parent_session_id`, `last_ip`, `last_user_agent`,
+    `revoked_at`, `expires_at`, `app_uid`, `legacy_token_uid`,
+    `created_via`, `auth_id`, `access_token_uid`
+)
+SELECT
+    `id`, `user_id`, `uuid`, `meta`, `created_at`, `last_activity`,
+    `kind`, `label`, `parent_session_id`, `last_ip`, `last_user_agent`,
+    `revoked_at`, `expires_at`, `app_uid`, `legacy_token_uid`,
+    `created_via`, `auth_id`, `access_token_uid`
+FROM `sessions`;
+
+DROP TABLE `sessions`;
+
+ALTER TABLE `sessions_new` RENAME TO `sessions`;
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_user_revoked`
+    ON `sessions` (`user_id`, `revoked_at`);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_parent`
+    ON `sessions` (`parent_session_id`);
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_user_app_active`
+    ON `sessions` (`user_id`, `app_uid`)
+    WHERE `kind` = 'app' AND `revoked_at` IS NULL;
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_legacy_token_active`
+    ON `sessions` (`legacy_token_uid`)
+    WHERE `legacy_token_uid` IS NOT NULL AND `revoked_at` IS NULL;
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_kind_user`
+    ON `sessions` (`kind`, `user_id`);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_access_token_uid`
+    ON `sessions` (`access_token_uid`)
+    WHERE `access_token_uid` IS NOT NULL;
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_sessions_user_worker_active`
+    ON `sessions` (`user_id`, IFNULL(`app_uid`, ''), json_extract(`meta`, '$.worker_name'))
+    WHERE `kind` = 'worker' AND `revoked_at` IS NULL;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0057_add_user_reputation.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Abuse v2 reputation score (0–100+) recorded at signup. Mirrors the
+-- `reputation smallint DEFAULT 100` column already present in the mysql and
+-- postgres baseline migrations.
+ALTER TABLE `user` ADD COLUMN `reputation` SMALLINT DEFAULT 100;

src/backend/clients/database/preparePostgresSql.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { preparePostgresSql } from './preparePostgresSql.js';
+
+describe('preparePostgresSql', () => {
+    it('converts placeholders and backtick identifiers outside SQL literals', () => {
+        const prepared = preparePostgresSql(
+            'SELECT `user`.`id` FROM `user` WHERE `email` = ? AND `username` = ?',
+        );
+
+        expect(prepared).toEqual({
+            text: 'SELECT "user"."id" FROM "user" WHERE "email" = $1 AND "username" = $2',
+            parameterCount: 2,
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('leaves question marks inside strings and comments untouched', () => {
+        const prepared = preparePostgresSql(`
+            SELECT '?' AS literal, ?
+            -- ? in a comment
+            FROM \`apps\`
+            WHERE \`description\` = 'is this ok?'
+            /* and ? in a block comment */
+              AND \`name\` = ?
+        `);
+
+        expect(prepared.text).toContain("SELECT '?' AS literal, $1");
+        expect(prepared.text).toContain('-- ? in a comment');
+        expect(prepared.text).toContain('"description" = \'is this ok?\'');
+        expect(prepared.text).toContain('/* and ? in a block comment */');
+        expect(prepared.text).toContain('"name" = $2');
+        expect(prepared.parameterCount).toBe(2);
+    });
+
+    it('escapes double quotes inside converted identifiers', () => {
+        const prepared = preparePostgresSql(
+            'SELECT `odd"name` FROM `odd``table` WHERE `id` = ?',
+        );
+
+        expect(prepared).toEqual({
+            text: 'SELECT "odd""name" FROM "odd`table" WHERE "id" = $1',
+            parameterCount: 1,
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('does not scan placeholders inside dollar-quoted strings', () => {
+        const prepared = preparePostgresSql(
+            "SELECT $$?$$, $tag$`not_ident` ?$tag$, `id` FROM `user` WHERE `id` = ?",
+        );
+
+        expect(prepared).toEqual({
+            text: 'SELECT $$?$$, $tag$`not_ident` ?$tag$, "id" FROM "user" WHERE "id" = $1',
+            parameterCount: 1,
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('does not treat Postgres JSON operators as comments', () => {
+        const prepared = preparePostgresSql(
+            "SELECT * FROM `sessions` WHERE `user_id` = ? AND `meta` #>> ARRAY['worker_name'] = ? AND `expires_at` > ?",
+        );
+
+        expect(prepared).toEqual({
+            text: 'SELECT * FROM "sessions" WHERE "user_id" = $1 AND "meta" #>> ARRAY[\'worker_name\'] = $2 AND "expires_at" > $3',
+            parameterCount: 3,
+        });
+    });
+});

src/backend/clients/database/preparePostgresSql.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+export interface PreparedPostgresSql {
+    text: string;
+    parameterCount: number;
+}
+
+type ScannerState =
+    | { kind: 'normal' }
+    | { kind: 'singleQuote' }
+    | { kind: 'doubleQuote' }
+    | { kind: 'backtickIdentifier' }
+    | { kind: 'lineComment' }
+    | { kind: 'blockComment' }
+    | { kind: 'dollarQuote'; tag: string };
+
+const isLineCommentStart = (sql: string, index: number): boolean => {
+    if (sql[index] !== '-' || sql[index + 1] !== '-') return false;
+    const after = sql[index + 2];
+    return after === undefined || /\s/u.test(after);
+};
+
+const readDollarQuoteTag = (sql: string, index: number): string | null => {
+    const match = /^\$[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*\$|^\$\$/u.exec(sql.slice(index));
+    return match?.[0] ?? null;
+};
+
+export const preparePostgresSql = (sql: string): PreparedPostgresSql => {
+    let state: ScannerState = { kind: 'normal' };
+    let parameterCount = 0;
+    let out = '';
+
+    for (let i = 0; i < sql.length; i++) {
+        const char = sql[i]!;
+        const next = sql[i + 1];
+
+        switch (state.kind) {
+            case 'normal': {
+                const dollarTag =
+                    char === '$' ? readDollarQuoteTag(sql, i) : null;
+                if (dollarTag) {
+                    out += dollarTag;
+                    i += dollarTag.length - 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'dollarQuote', tag: dollarTag };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === "'") {
+                    out += char;
+                    state = { kind: 'singleQuote' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '"') {
+                    out += char;
+                    state = { kind: 'doubleQuote' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '`') {
+                    out += '"';
+                    state = { kind: 'backtickIdentifier' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (isLineCommentStart(sql, i)) {
+                    out += char;
+                    if (char === '-') {
+                        out += next ?? '';
+                        i += 1;
+                    }
+                    state = { kind: 'lineComment' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '/' && next === '*') {
+                    out += '/*';
+                    i += 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'blockComment' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '?') {
+                    parameterCount += 1;
+                    out += `$${parameterCount}`;
+                    break;
+                }
+                out += char;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            case 'singleQuote':
+                out += char;
+                if (char === "'" && next === "'") {
+                    out += next;
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === '\\' && next !== undefined) {
+                    out += next;
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === "'") {
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'doubleQuote':
+                out += char;
+                if (char === '"' && next === '"') {
+                    out += next;
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === '"') {
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'backtickIdentifier':
+                if (char === '`' && next === '`') {
+                    out += '`';
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === '`') {
+                    out += '"';
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                } else if (char === '"') {
+                    out += '""';
+                } else {
+                    out += char;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'lineComment':
+                out += char;
+                if (char === '\n') {
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'blockComment':
+                out += char;
+                if (char === '*' && next === '/') {
+                    out += '/';
+                    i += 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'dollarQuote':
+                if (sql.startsWith(state.tag, i)) {
+                    out += state.tag;
+                    i += state.tag.length - 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                } else {
+                    out += char;
+                }
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return { text: out, parameterCount };
+};

src/backend/clients/database/splitPostgresStatements.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+type ScannerState =
+    | { kind: 'normal' }
+    | { kind: 'singleQuote' }
+    | { kind: 'doubleQuote' }
+    | { kind: 'lineComment' }
+    | { kind: 'blockComment' }
+    | { kind: 'dollarQuote'; tag: string };
+
+const readDollarQuoteTag = (sql: string, index: number): string | null => {
+    const match = /^\$[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*\$|^\$\$/u.exec(sql.slice(index));
+    return match?.[0] ?? null;
+};
+
+export const splitPostgresStatements = (sql: string): string[] => {
+    const statements: string[] = [];
+    let state: ScannerState = { kind: 'normal' };
+    let start = 0;
+
+    for (let i = 0; i < sql.length; i++) {
+        const char = sql[i]!;
+        const next = sql[i + 1];
+
+        switch (state.kind) {
+            case 'normal': {
+                const dollarTag =
+                    char === '$' ? readDollarQuoteTag(sql, i) : null;
+                if (dollarTag) {
+                    i += dollarTag.length - 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'dollarQuote', tag: dollarTag };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === "'") {
+                    state = { kind: 'singleQuote' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '"') {
+                    state = { kind: 'doubleQuote' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '-' && next === '-') {
+                    i += 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'lineComment' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '/' && next === '*') {
+                    i += 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'blockComment' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === ';') {
+                    const statement = sql.slice(start, i).trim();
+                    if (statement !== '') statements.push(statement);
+                    start = i + 1;
+                }
+                break;
+            }
+
+            case 'singleQuote':
+                if (char === "'" && next === "'") {
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === '\\' && next !== undefined) {
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === "'") {
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'doubleQuote':
+                if (char === '"' && next === '"') {
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === '"') {
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'lineComment':
+                if (char === '\n') {
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'blockComment':
+                if (char === '*' && next === '/') {
+                    i += 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'dollarQuote':
+                if (sql.startsWith(state.tag, i)) {
+                    i += state.tag.length - 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    const finalStatement = sql.slice(start).trim();
+    if (finalStatement !== '') statements.push(finalStatement);
+    return statements;
+};

src/backend/clients/email/EmailClient.ts

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
 import { PuterClient } from '../types';
 import { EMAIL_TEMPLATES, type EmailTemplateName } from './templates';
 
-// ── Types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Types ------------------------------------------------------------
 
 // nodemailer doesn't ship TS types, so declare the subset we use.
 interface NodemailerTransport {
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ interface CompiledTemplate {
     html: ReturnType<typeof template>;
 }
 
-// ── Clean-email rules ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Clean-email rules ------------------------------------------------
 
 type CleanRule = (parts: { local: string; domain: string }) => {
     local: string;
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ const DOMAIN_ALIASES: Record<string, string> = {
     'googlemail.com': 'gmail.com',
 };
 
-// ── EmailClient ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- EmailClient ------------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * Unified email client. Handles:
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ export class EmailClient extends PuterClient {
         this.compileTemplates();
     }
 
-    // ── Lifecycle ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Lifecycle ----------------------------------------------------
 
     override onServerStart(): void {
         const emailConf = this.config.email;
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ export class EmailClient extends PuterClient {
         this.transport = null;
     }
 
-    // ── Public API: sending ──────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Public API: sending ------------------------------------------
 
     /**
      * Render a template and send it to `to`.
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ export class EmailClient extends PuterClient {
         });
     }
 
-    // ── Public API: clean / validate ─────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Public API: clean / validate ---------------------------------
 
     /**
      * Normalize an email to its canonical form for dedup comparisons.
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ export class EmailClient extends PuterClient {
         this.validators.push(fn);
     }
 
-    // ── Internals ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Internals ----------------------------------------------------
 
     private defaultFrom(): string {
         return this.config.email?.from ?? '"Puter" [email protected]';

src/backend/clients/event/EventClient.ts

@@ -19,7 +19,13 @@
 
 import { extensionStore } from '../../extensions';
 import { PuterClient } from '../types';
-import { EventListener, EventMap, ListenKey, MatchingEvents } from './types';
+import {
+    EventListener,
+    EventMap,
+    EventMetadata,
+    ListenKey,
+    MatchingEvents,
+} from './types';
 
 export class EventClient extends PuterClient {
     #eventListeners: Partial<Record<ListenKey, EventListener[]>> = {};
@@ -52,7 +58,11 @@ export class EventClient extends PuterClient {
      * scan of every listener.
      *
      */
-    emit<T extends keyof EventMap>(key: T, data: EventMap[T], meta: unknown) {
+    emit<T extends keyof EventMap>(
+        key: T,
+        data: EventMap[T],
+        meta: EventMetadata,
+    ) {
         const parts = key.split('.');
         for (let i = 0; i < parts.length; i++) {
             const matchKey = (
@@ -87,7 +97,7 @@ export class EventClient extends PuterClient {
     async emitAndWait<T extends keyof EventMap>(
         key: T,
         data: EventMap[T],
-        meta: unknown,
+        meta: EventMetadata,
     ) {
         const parts = key.split('.');
         for (let i = 0; i < parts.length; i++) {
@@ -129,7 +139,7 @@ export class EventClient extends PuterClient {
         callback: (
             key: MatchingEvents<P>,
             data: EventMap[MatchingEvents<P>],
-            meta: unknown,
+            meta: EventMetadata,
         ) => Promise<void> | void,
     ) {
         const listeners: EventListener[] =
@@ -140,7 +150,7 @@ export class EventClient extends PuterClient {
         listener: EventListener,
         key: T,
         data: EventMap[T],
-        meta: unknown,
+        meta: EventMetadata,
     ) {
         try {
             await listener(key, data, meta);

src/backend/clients/event/types.ts

@@ -14,6 +14,13 @@
  *   the SocketService fans out to user-scoped channels.
  */
 
+import type {
+    Request as ExpressRequest,
+    Response as ExpressResponse,
+} from 'express';
+import { Actor } from '../../core';
+import { FSEntry } from '../../stores/fs/FSEntry';
+
 // GUI write events spread an entry plus per-event metadata into `response`.
 // The exact field set varies by emit site (FSController / LegacyFSController /
 // WebDAVController each project a slightly different shape) so the envelope
@@ -96,8 +103,11 @@ export type EventMap = {
     };
     'app.from-origin': { origin: string };
     'app.privateAccess.check': {
-        app: unknown;
-        actor: unknown;
+        appUid: string;
+        userUid: string;
+        requestHost: string;
+        requestPath: string;
+        actor?: Actor;
         result: {
             allowed: boolean;
             reason?: string;
@@ -120,7 +130,7 @@ export type EventMap = {
         req?: unknown;
         data?: unknown;
         abuse?: unknown;
-        custom?: unknown;
+        trail?: Array<string>;
         [key: string]: unknown;
     };
     'puter.signup.success': {
@@ -154,6 +164,15 @@ export type EventMap = {
         new_username: string;
     };
     'user.email-changed': { user_id: number; new_email: string };
+    // Fired after an account is torn down (self-serve, admin, or temp-user
+    // logout cleanup). Listeners purge external state tied to the account —
+    // e.g. the marketplace extension cancels the user's Stripe subscriptions.
+    // The row is already gone by emit time, so identifiers ride the payload.
+    'user.delete': {
+        user_id: number;
+        user_uuid?: string;
+        stripe_customer_id?: string | null;
+    };
 
     // ---- Filesystem ----
     'fs.copy.node': {
@@ -162,8 +181,9 @@ export type EventMap = {
         sourceObjectKey: string;
         copyObjectKey: string;
     };
-    'fs.move.node': { node: unknown; fromPath: string; toPath: string };
-    'fs.remove.node': { node: unknown; entry: unknown; target: unknown };
+    'fs.move.node': { node: FSEntry; fromPath: string; toPath: string };
+    'fs.remove.node': { node: FSEntry; entry: FSEntry; target: FSEntry };
+    'fs.write.file': { node: FSEntry; entry: FSEntry; target: FSEntry };
     'fs.storage.upload-progress': {
         upload_tracker: unknown;
         context: unknown;
@@ -199,6 +219,15 @@ export type EventMap = {
     // ---- Subdomains ----
     'subdomain.delete': { subdomain: string };
     'subdomain.update': { subdomain: string };
+    'site.htmlServed': {
+        subdomain: string;
+        entry: unknown;
+        host: string;
+        requestPath: string;
+        requestUrl?: string;
+        requestHash?: string;
+        mime: string;
+    };
 
     // ---- Thumbnails ----
     'thumbnail.read': {
@@ -243,6 +272,94 @@ export type EventMap = {
     // SocketService re-emits each fanout-eligible event under
     // `sent-to-user.<wireName>` so per-user channels can subscribe by wire name.
     [K in `sent-to-user.${string}`]: { user_id: number; response: unknown };
+} & {
+    // Generic per-driver-method lifecycle, emitted by DriverController for
+    // EVERY driver call under a key scoped to the interface + method:
+    // `driver.<iface>.<method>.before|after|error|reject`. Wildcard
+    // subscribers can listen to `driver.*` for everything, `driver.<iface>.*`
+    // for one interface, or the exact key for one method. The `.before` phase
+    // is emitted via `emitAndWait`, so a listener may set `allow = false`
+    // (with an optional `rejectReason`) to veto the call before it runs — a
+    // vetoed call emits `.reject` instead of running.
+    [K in `driver.${string}`]: DriverMethodLifecycleEvent;
+} & {
+    // Generic per-route-endpoint lifecycle, emitted by the route materializer
+    // for EVERY non-middleware route under a key scoped to the HTTP method +
+    // normalized path: `route.<method>.<path>.before|after|error|reject`. Same
+    // wildcard + veto semantics as the driver lifecycle above.
+    [K in `route.${string}`]: RouteLifecycleEvent;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Phase of a request/method lifecycle. `reject` is emitted when a `before`
+ * listener vetoes the call (sets `allow = false`); the call never runs and no
+ * `after`/`error` follows.
+ */
+export type LifecyclePhase = 'before' | 'after' | 'error' | 'reject';
+
+/**
+ * Payload for `driver.<iface>.<method>.<phase>` events.
+ *
+ * One shape across all phases; read `phase` (or the key suffix) to
+ * branch. `allow`/`rejectReason` are only meaningful on the `before` phase
+ * (emitted via `emitAndWait`).
+ */
+export type DriverMethodLifecycleEvent = {
+    phase: LifecyclePhase;
+    iface: string;
+    method: string;
+    /** Resolved concrete driver name. */
+    driver: string;
+    /** Full actor object, if the request is authenticated. */
+    actor?: Actor;
+    /** Stable actor id (see `actorUid`), if the request is authenticated. */
+    actorUid?: string;
+    /** Call arguments. Present on every phase. */
+    args?: unknown;
+    /** Return value. Present on `after`. */
+    result?: unknown;
+    /** Thrown error. Present on `error`. */
+    error?: unknown;
+    /** Wall-clock duration of the invocation. Present on `after`/`error`. */
+    durationMs?: number;
+    /** Veto channel for `before`: set `false` to block the call. */
+    allow?: boolean;
+    /** Optional human-readable reason surfaced to the caller when vetoed. */
+    rejectReason?: string;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Payload for `route.<method>.<path>.<phase>` events. Mirrors
+ * {@link DriverMethodLifecycleEvent} for HTTP endpoints.
+ */
+export type RouteLifecycleEvent = {
+    phase: LifecyclePhase;
+    /** HTTP method, lowercased (`get`, `post`, ...). */
+    method: string;
+    /** Full route path including the controller prefix. */
+    path: string;
+    /**
+     * The live express request/response for this call. Present on every phase.
+     * On `before` a listener can read the parsed body/headers or write its own
+     * response; on terminal phases they're useful for logging. These are real
+     * in-process objects — never serialize or forward them across nodes.
+     */
+    req: ExpressRequest;
+    res: ExpressResponse;
+    /** Full actor object, if the request is authenticated. */
+    actor?: Actor;
+    /** Stable actor id (see `actorUid`), if the request is authenticated. */
+    actorUid?: string;
+    /** Response status code. Present on `after`/`error`. */
+    statusCode?: number;
+    /** Wall-clock duration from `before` to terminal phase. */
+    durationMs?: number;
+    /** Set when the request did not complete normally (abort / >=500). */
+    error?: unknown;
+    /** Veto channel for `before`: set `false` to block the request. */
+    allow?: boolean;
+    /** Optional human-readable reason surfaced to the caller when vetoed. */
+    rejectReason?: string;
 };
 
 export type EventKey = keyof EventMap & string;
@@ -264,8 +381,9 @@ export type MatchingEvents<P extends ListenKey> = P extends `${infer Prefix}.*`
     ? Extract<EventKey, `${Prefix}.${string}`>
     : P & EventKey;
 
+export type EventMetadata = { from_outside?: boolean };
 export type EventListener<K extends EventKey = EventKey> = (
     key: K,
     data: EventMap[K],
-    meta: unknown,
+    meta: EventMetadata,
 ) => Promise<void> | void;

src/backend/clients/types.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
  */
 
 import type { IConfig, WithLifecycle } from '../types';
+import type { ClickhouseClient } from './clickhouse/ClickhouseClient';
 
 /**
  * Extension-augmentable client registry. Extensions add their own client
@@ -40,6 +41,14 @@ export interface IExtensionClientInstances {
      * override this for that name.
      */
     [key: string]: unknown;
+
+    /**
+     * Optional ClickHouse analytics client. Absent by default — a production
+     * deployment registers it via an extension to speed up the app-stats path
+     * at scale (see {@link ClickhouseClient}). Always branch on its presence
+     * and fall back to SQL.
+     */
+    clickhouse?: ClickhouseClient;
 }
 
 export interface IPuterClient<T extends WithLifecycle = WithLifecycle> {

src/backend/controllers/apps/AppController.js

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
  * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
+import { isAccessTokenActor, isAppActor } from '../../core/actor.js';
 import { HttpError } from '../../core/http/HttpError.js';
 import { driversContainers } from '../../exports.js';
 import {
@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const apps = await this.appDriver.select({
@@ -70,6 +72,7 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const name = req.query?.name;
@@ -89,6 +92,16 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
         // actor calls this, the app id is already on the token — clients
         // don't re-send it in the body. Fall back to `actor.app.uid`
         // before 400-ing for a missing body field.
+        //
+        // Authorization: only two callers are trusted to report opens —
+        //   1. a root user actor (plain session, no `.app` and no access
+        //      token), e.g. the GUI launching apps on behalf of the user;
+        //   2. the app-under-user actor for the app being reported, i.e.
+        //      `actor.app.uid === app_uid`.
+        // Everything else — access tokens (regardless of issuer), asset
+        // tokens, app actors reporting for a *different* app — is denied,
+        // otherwise any authenticated party could inflate another app's
+        // open count.
         router.post(
             '/rao',
             {
@@ -96,8 +109,9 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
                 requireAuth: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
+                const actor = req.actor;
                 const bodyAppUid = req.body?.app_uid;
-                const actorAppUid = req.actor?.app?.uid;
+                const actorAppUid = actor?.app?.uid;
                 const app_uid =
                     typeof bodyAppUid === 'string' && bodyAppUid.length > 0
                         ? bodyAppUid
@@ -108,6 +122,26 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
                     });
                 }
 
+                // Access tokens (and any other non-user/non-app identity,
+                // e.g. asset tokens) are not allowed to report opens —
+                // they're shared / scoped credentials and shouldn't drive
+                // analytics counters.
+                if (isAccessTokenActor(actor)) {
+                    throw new HttpError(
+                        403,
+                        'Access tokens cannot report app opens',
+                        { legacyCode: 'forbidden' },
+                    );
+                }
+
+                if (isAppActor(actor) && app_uid !== actorAppUid) {
+                    throw new HttpError(
+                        403,
+                        'App actors can only report opens for their own app',
+                        { legacyCode: 'forbidden' },
+                    );
+                }
+
                 const app = await this.appStore.getByUid(app_uid);
                 if (!app)
                     throw new HttpError(404, 'App not found', {
@@ -153,6 +187,7 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const raw = req.params.name;
@@ -196,7 +231,7 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
             },
         );
 
-        // ── POST /query/app ────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- POST /query/app ----------------------------------------
         // Batch marketplace-style lookup by name or UID.
         //
         // Access rules: only apps the caller has a legitimate reason to
@@ -293,7 +328,7 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
             },
         );
 
-        // ── GET /app-icon/:app_uid(/:size) ─────────────────────────
+        // -- GET /app-icon/:app_uid(/:size) -------------------------
         // Serve app icon — data URL decoded inline, HTTP URL redirected.
         //
         // ⚠ FLAG: Missing sharp-based resize pipeline; serves the original.

src/backend/controllers/auth/AuthController.test.ts

@@ -30,13 +30,16 @@
  */
 
 import bcrypt from 'bcrypt';
+import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
 import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
 import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
 import type { EventClient } from '../../clients/event/EventClient.js';
 import type { Actor } from '../../core/actor.js';
 import { runWithContext } from '../../core/context.js';
 import { HttpError } from '../../core/http/HttpError.js';
+import { requireUserActorGate } from '../../core/http/middleware/gates.js';
 import { PuterServer } from '../../server.js';
+import { FULL_API_ACCESS } from '../../services/permission/consts.js';
 import { setupTestServer } from '../../testUtil.js';
 
 // ── Test harness ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -71,6 +74,7 @@ type SignupValidateOverride = (data: {
 
 let signupValidateOverride: SignupValidateOverride | null = null;
 const heardSignupSuccess: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
+const heardUserDelete: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
 
 const installSharedListeners = () => {
     eventClient.on('puter.signup.validate', (_k: unknown, data: unknown) => {
@@ -83,6 +87,9 @@ const installSharedListeners = () => {
     eventClient.on('puter.signup.success', (_k: unknown, data: unknown) => {
         heardSignupSuccess.push(data as Record<string, unknown>);
     });
+    eventClient.on('user.delete', (_k: unknown, data: unknown) => {
+        heardUserDelete.push(data as Record<string, unknown>);
+    });
 };
 
 const withSignupValidateOverride = async <T>(
@@ -793,6 +800,65 @@ describe('AuthController.handleLogout', () => {
     });
 });
 
+describe('AuthController account-lifecycle route gating', () => {
+    const routeOptions = (method: string, path: string) => {
+        const proto = Object.getPrototypeOf(controller) as {
+            __puterRoutes?: Array<{
+                method: string;
+                path: string;
+                options?: Record<string, unknown>;
+            }>;
+        };
+        const route = (proto.__puterRoutes ?? []).find(
+            (r) =>
+                r.method.toLowerCase() === method.toLowerCase() &&
+                r.path === path,
+        );
+        expect(route, `route ${method} ${path} not found`).toBeDefined();
+        return route!.options ?? {};
+    };
+
+    it('POST /logout requires a human user actor', () => {
+        const opts = routeOptions('post', '/logout');
+        expect(opts.requireUserActor).toBe(true);
+        expect(opts.antiCsrf).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('GET /get-anticsrf-token requires a human user actor', () => {
+        const opts = routeOptions('get', '/get-anticsrf-token');
+        expect(opts.requireUserActor).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('requireUserActorGate rejects app-under-user and access-token actors', () => {
+        const gate = requireUserActorGate();
+        const run = (actor: Partial<Actor>) =>
+            new Promise<unknown>((resolve) => {
+                gate(
+                    { actor } as never,
+                    {} as never,
+                    (err?: unknown) => resolve(err),
+                );
+            });
+
+        return (async () => {
+            const appActor = await run({
+                user: { uuid: 'u1' },
+                app: { uid: 'app-1' },
+            } as Partial<Actor>);
+            expect(appActor).toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
+
+            const tokenActor = await run({
+                user: { uuid: 'u1' },
+                accessToken: { uid: 'tok-1' },
+            } as Partial<Actor>);
+            expect(tokenActor).toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
+
+            const human = await run({ user: { uuid: 'u1' } } as Partial<Actor>);
+            expect(human).toBeUndefined();
+        })();
+    });
+});
+
 // ── Token grants: user → user / app / group ─────────────────────────
 
 describe('AuthController grant flows', () => {
@@ -1222,6 +1288,78 @@ describe('AuthController.handleCreateAccessToken + handleRevokeAccessToken', ()
         expect(decoded.user_uid).toBe(actor.user.uuid);
     });
 
+    // -- Full-API-access + labels --
+
+    it('mints a full-access token and stores a trimmed label on the session row', async () => {
+        const res = makeRes();
+        await controller.handleCreateAccessToken(
+            makeReq(
+                { permissions: [FULL_API_ACCESS], label: '  My CLI  ' },
+                { actor },
+            ),
+            res,
+        );
+        const decoded = server.services.token.verify(
+            'auth',
+            (res.body as { token: string }).token,
+        ) as {
+            type: string;
+            token_uid: string;
+            session_uid: string;
+            full_access?: boolean;
+        };
+        expect(decoded.type).toBe('access-token');
+
+        // Full access is a signed claim, not a stored permission row.
+        expect(decoded.full_access).toBe(true);
+        const permRows = (await server.clients.db.read(
+            'SELECT `permission` FROM `access_token_permissions` WHERE `token_uid` = ?',
+            [decoded.token_uid],
+        )) as Array<{ permission: string }>;
+        expect(permRows).toHaveLength(0);
+
+        const sessRows = (await server.clients.db.read(
+            'SELECT `label` FROM `sessions` WHERE `uuid` = ?',
+            [decoded.session_uid],
+        )) as Array<{ label: string }>;
+        expect(sessRows[0]?.label).toBe('My CLI');
+    });
+
+    it('caps an over-long label at 64 characters', async () => {
+        const res = makeRes();
+        await controller.handleCreateAccessToken(
+            makeReq(
+                { permissions: [FULL_API_ACCESS], label: 'x'.repeat(120) },
+                { actor },
+            ),
+            res,
+        );
+        const decoded = server.services.token.verify(
+            'auth',
+            (res.body as { token: string }).token,
+        ) as { session_uid: string };
+        const sessRows = (await server.clients.db.read(
+            'SELECT `label` FROM `sessions` WHERE `uuid` = ?',
+            [decoded.session_uid],
+        )) as Array<{ label: string }>;
+        expect(sessRows[0]?.label.length).toBe(64);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects a non-string label with 400', async () => {
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleCreateAccessToken(
+                makeReq(
+                    {
+                        permissions: [FULL_API_ACCESS],
+                        label: 123 as unknown as string,
+                    },
+                    { actor },
+                ),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+    });
+
     it('revoke-access-token: requires tokenOrUuid and returns ok:true on success', async () => {
         // Mint, then revoke.
         const created = makeRes();
@@ -1547,6 +1685,43 @@ describe('AuthController password recovery', () => {
             ),
         ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
     });
+
+    it('set-pass-using-token: revokes all of the user’s interactive sessions', async () => {
+        // A password reset is the "someone may have my account" flow, so
+        // existing sessions must not survive it.
+        const { user } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const recoveryToken = uuidv4();
+        await server.stores.user.update(user.id, {
+            pass_recovery_token: recoveryToken,
+        });
+        const jwt = server.services.token.sign(
+            'otp',
+            {
+                token: recoveryToken,
+                user_uid: user.uuid,
+                email: user.email,
+                purpose: 'pass-recovery',
+            },
+            { expiresIn: '1h' },
+        );
+
+        const s1 = await server.services.auth.createSessionToken(user, {});
+        const s2 = await server.services.auth.createSessionToken(user, {});
+        const uuid1 = (s1.session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
+        const uuid2 = (s2.session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
+        // Both are live before the reset.
+        expect(await server.stores.session.getByUuid(uuid1)).not.toBeNull();
+        expect(await server.stores.session.getByUuid(uuid2)).not.toBeNull();
+
+        await controller.handleSetPassUsingToken(
+            makeReq({ token: jwt, password: 'a-brand-new-password' }),
+            makeRes(),
+        );
+
+        // Every interactive session is revoked (getByUuid gates on revoked_at).
+        expect(await server.stores.session.getByUuid(uuid1)).toBeNull();
+        expect(await server.stores.session.getByUuid(uuid2)).toBeNull();
+    });
 });
 
 // ── User-protected change-* (skipping middleware-driven setup) ─────
@@ -1593,6 +1768,34 @@ describe('AuthController user-protected mutations (validation paths)', () => {
         ).toBe(true);
     });
 
+    it('change-password: revokes the user’s other web sessions but keeps the current one', async () => {
+        const { user, actor } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        // Two web sessions for this user; one is the session performing the
+        // change (the "current" one, identified via actor.session.uid).
+        const current = await server.services.auth.createSessionToken(user, {});
+        const other = await server.services.auth.createSessionToken(user, {});
+        const currentUuid = (current.session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
+        const otherUuid = (other.session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
+
+        const req = makeReq(
+            { new_pass: 'a-fresh-password-123' },
+            {
+                actor: {
+                    ...actor,
+                    session: { uid: currentUuid },
+                } as typeof actor,
+            },
+        );
+        (req as unknown as { userProtected: unknown }).userProtected = { user };
+        await controller.handleChangePassword(req, makeRes());
+
+        // The other session is revoked; the one that made the change survives.
+        expect(await server.stores.session.getByUuid(otherUuid)).toBeNull();
+        expect(
+            await server.stores.session.getByUuid(currentUuid),
+        ).not.toBeNull();
+    });
+
     it('change-username: 400 on missing/invalid/reserved/already-taken usernames', async () => {
         const { actor } = await makeUserAndActor();
         await expect(
@@ -2079,6 +2282,104 @@ describe('AuthController session endpoints', () => {
             ),
         ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
     });
+
+    it('rename-session: 400 when uuid param is missing', async () => {
+        const { actor } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleRenameSession(
+                makeReq({ label: 'x' }, { actor, params: {} }),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+    });
+
+    it('rename-session: 400 when label is the wrong type', async () => {
+        const { actor } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleRenameSession(
+                makeReq(
+                    { label: 123 as unknown as string },
+                    { actor, params: { uuid: 'whatever' } },
+                ),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+    });
+
+    it('rename-session: 400 when label field is missing entirely', async () => {
+        // Guards against accidental "PATCH with empty body silently clears
+        // the label". Type guard rejects `undefined` before reaching the
+        // service layer.
+        const { actor } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleRenameSession(
+                makeReq({}, { actor, params: { uuid: 'whatever' } }),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+    });
+
+    it('rename-session: 404 when the uuid belongs to another user', async () => {
+        const { user: u1 } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const { actor: a2 } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const sessionRes = await server.services.auth.createSessionToken(
+            u1,
+            {},
+        );
+        const uuid = (sessionRes.session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleRenameSession(
+                makeReq(
+                    { label: 'pwned' },
+                    { actor: a2, params: { uuid } },
+                ),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
+    });
+
+    it('rename-session: success updates the row label', async () => {
+        const { user, actor } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const sessionRes = await server.services.auth.createSessionToken(
+            user,
+            {},
+        );
+        const uuid = (sessionRes.session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
+        const res = makeRes();
+        await controller.handleRenameSession(
+            makeReq({ label: 'My Phone' }, { actor, params: { uuid } }),
+            res,
+        );
+        expect(res.body).toEqual({});
+        const rows = await server.clients.db.read(
+            'SELECT `label` FROM `sessions` WHERE `uuid` = ?',
+            [uuid],
+        );
+        expect((rows[0] as { label: string }).label).toBe('My Phone');
+    });
+
+    it('rename-session: accepts null to clear the label', async () => {
+        const { user, actor } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const sessionRes = await server.services.auth.createSessionToken(
+            user,
+            {},
+        );
+        const uuid = (sessionRes.session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
+        // Seed a non-null label so the clear-to-null transition is observable.
+        await server.clients.db.write(
+            'UPDATE `sessions` SET `label` = ? WHERE `uuid` = ?',
+            ['something', uuid],
+        );
+        await controller.handleRenameSession(
+            makeReq({ label: null }, { actor, params: { uuid } }),
+            makeRes(),
+        );
+        const rows = await server.clients.db.read(
+            'SELECT `label` FROM `sessions` WHERE `uuid` = ?',
+            [uuid],
+        );
+        expect((rows[0] as { label: string | null }).label).toBeNull();
+    });
 });
 
 // ── Dev-app grants/revokes ─────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -2457,6 +2758,35 @@ describe('AuthController.handleDeleteOwnUser', () => {
         });
         expect(after).toBeFalsy();
     });
+
+    it('emits user.delete with the uuid + stripe customer id for downstream teardown', async () => {
+        // `stripe_customer_id` ships in the MySQL/Postgres migrations but not
+        // the sqlite ones the test harness runs — add it so the delete path
+        // captures it (it's how the marketplace extension cancels the sub).
+        try {
+            await server.clients.db.write(
+                'ALTER TABLE user ADD COLUMN stripe_customer_id TEXT',
+                [],
+            );
+        } catch {
+            /* already exists */
+        }
+        const { user, actor } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        await server.clients.db.write(
+            'UPDATE user SET stripe_customer_id = ? WHERE id = ?',
+            ['cus_delete_test', user.id],
+        );
+
+        heardUserDelete.length = 0;
+        await controller.handleDeleteOwnUser(makeReq({}, { actor }), makeRes());
+
+        const evt = heardUserDelete.find((e) => e.user_id === user.id);
+        expect(evt).toMatchObject({
+            user_id: user.id,
+            user_uuid: user.uuid,
+            stripe_customer_id: 'cus_delete_test',
+        });
+    });
 });
 
 // ── Additional branch coverage ─────────────────────────────────────
@@ -3405,4 +3735,601 @@ describe('AuthController.handleRevokeSession additional branches', () => {
         const body = res.body as { sessions: unknown[] };
         expect(Array.isArray(body.sessions)).toBe(true);
     });
+
+    it('refuses to revoke the caller’s OWN current session row (400)', async () => {
+        // Invariant: a self-revoke leaves the client in an ambiguous
+        // identity state because the response can't write fresh auth
+        // state. /logout is the only path that should end the session
+        // you're currently authenticated under.
+        const { user, actor } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const sessionRes = await server.services.auth.createSessionToken(
+            user,
+            {},
+        );
+        const sessionUid = (sessionRes.session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
+        const actorWithSession = {
+            ...actor,
+            session: { uid: sessionUid },
+        } as Actor;
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleRevokeSession(
+                makeReq({ uuid: sessionUid }, { actor: actorWithSession }),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            statusCode: 400,
+            legacyCode: 'bad_request',
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('still allows revoking a DIFFERENT session belonging to the same user', async () => {
+        // Sanity check that the self-revoke guard only blocks the
+        // caller's own uuid — sibling rows must still be revokable
+        // (that's the whole point of manage-sessions).
+        const { user, actor } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const callerSession = await server.services.auth.createSessionToken(
+            user,
+            {},
+        );
+        const targetSession = await server.services.auth.createSessionToken(
+            user,
+            {},
+        );
+        const actorWithSession = {
+            ...actor,
+            session: {
+                uid: (callerSession.session as { uuid: string }).uuid,
+            },
+        } as Actor;
+        const res = makeRes();
+        await controller.handleRevokeSession(
+            makeReq(
+                { uuid: (targetSession.session as { uuid: string }).uuid },
+                { actor: actorWithSession },
+            ),
+            res,
+        );
+        expect((res.body as { sessions: unknown[] }).sessions).toBeDefined();
+    });
+});
+
+// ── handleMigrateToken ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('AuthController.handleMigrateToken', () => {
+    const TEST_ORIGIN = 'https://migrate.test.local';
+
+    // PuterServer keeps config in a private field (#config), so we go
+    // through the controller — IController stores it as `protected
+    // config` which TS marks but JS doesn't enforce, and the controller
+    // is the actual consumer of #isMigrateTokenOriginAllowed anyway.
+    const controllerConfig = () =>
+        (controller as { config: Record<string, unknown> }).config;
+
+    // Mints a v1-shaped JWT signed under the test server's legacy
+    // secret. The body matches what migrateLegacyToken expects per
+    // `decoded.type`.
+    const mintV1Token = (payload: Record<string, unknown>): string => {
+        const legacy = controllerConfig().jwt_secret as string | undefined;
+        if (!legacy) throw new Error('test config missing jwt_secret');
+        return jwt.sign(payload, legacy);
+    };
+
+    beforeAll(() => {
+        // Make the origin allow-check pass for these tests. We mutate
+        // the live config because setupTestServer is shared across the
+        // file; the original value is undefined (default config has no
+        // `origin`) so we don't need to restore.
+        controllerConfig().origin = TEST_ORIGIN;
+    });
+
+    it('rejects when the Origin header is missing', async () => {
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleMigrateToken(makeReq({}), makeRes()),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
+    });
+
+    it('allows the exchange from an unlisted origin (apps live on arbitrary domains)', async () => {
+        // puter.js apps run on any third-party domain; the v1 bearer
+        // token is the credential, so the exchange itself is not
+        // origin-gated — only cookie issuance is (next test).
+        const { user } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const v1 = mintV1Token({
+            type: 'access-token',
+            token_uid: uuidv4(),
+            user_uid: user.uuid,
+        });
+        const res = makeRes();
+        await controller.handleMigrateToken(
+            makeReq(
+                {},
+                {
+                    headers: {
+                        origin: 'https://some-app.example',
+                        authorization: `Bearer ${v1}`,
+                    },
+                },
+            ),
+            res,
+        );
+        expect((res.body as { kind: string }).kind).toBe('access_token');
+        expect((res.body as { token: string }).token).toBeTruthy();
+    });
+
+    it('does NOT set the puter_token_v2 cookie for an app token from an untrusted origin', async () => {
+        // Cookie planting on the GUI origin is what the allowlist
+        // prevents: an attacker page may exchange a token it already
+        // holds, but must not be able to set a session cookie.
+        const { user } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const v1 = mintV1Token({
+            type: 'app-under-user',
+            user_uid: user.uuid,
+            app_uid: appUid,
+        });
+        const res = makeRes();
+        await controller.handleMigrateToken(
+            makeReq(
+                {},
+                {
+                    headers: {
+                        origin: 'https://some-app.example',
+                        authorization: `Bearer ${v1}`,
+                    },
+                },
+            ),
+            res,
+        );
+        expect((res.body as { kind: string }).kind).toBe('app');
+        expect((res.body as { token: string }).token).toBeTruthy();
+        expect(res.cookies.puter_token_v2).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('normalizes trailing slash on the request Origin (B4)', async () => {
+        // The Origin header per spec doesn't carry a trailing slash, but
+        // a misconfigured proxy or a deployment with config.origin
+        // ending in `/` would otherwise force every call to reject.
+        const { user } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const v1 = mintV1Token({
+            type: 'access-token',
+            token_uid: uuidv4(),
+            user_uid: user.uuid,
+        });
+        const res = makeRes();
+        await controller.handleMigrateToken(
+            makeReq(
+                {},
+                {
+                    headers: {
+                        origin: `${TEST_ORIGIN}/`, // trailing slash
+                        authorization: `Bearer ${v1}`,
+                    },
+                },
+            ),
+            res,
+        );
+        expect((res.body as { kind: string }).kind).toBe('access_token');
+    });
+
+    it('normalizes case on the request Origin (B4)', async () => {
+        const { user } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const v1 = mintV1Token({
+            type: 'access-token',
+            token_uid: uuidv4(),
+            user_uid: user.uuid,
+        });
+        const res = makeRes();
+        await controller.handleMigrateToken(
+            makeReq(
+                {},
+                {
+                    headers: {
+                        origin: TEST_ORIGIN.toUpperCase(),
+                        authorization: `Bearer ${v1}`,
+                    },
+                },
+            ),
+            res,
+        );
+        expect((res.body as { kind: string }).kind).toBe('access_token');
+    });
+
+    it('returns 409 reauth_required for v1 web/session tokens', async () => {
+        // Web tokens never migrate silently — they always go through
+        // the interactive reauth flow. The body code is what puter.js /
+        // GUI key on; the 409 status is what tells SDK code "this
+        // isn't a generic auth failure, route through reauth".
+        const { user } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const v1 = mintV1Token({
+            type: 'session',
+            user_uid: user.uuid,
+            uuid: uuidv4(),
+        });
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleMigrateToken(
+                makeReq(
+                    {},
+                    {
+                        headers: {
+                            origin: TEST_ORIGIN,
+                            authorization: `Bearer ${v1}`,
+                        },
+                    },
+                ),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            statusCode: 409,
+            code: 'reauth_required',
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('does NOT set the puter_token_v2 cookie when migrating an access token (B3)', async () => {
+        // Access tokens are programmatic — they ride in Authorization
+        // headers, not browser cookies. Setting a cookie here would
+        // confuse cookie-only middleware downstream.
+        const { user } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const v1 = mintV1Token({
+            type: 'access-token',
+            token_uid: uuidv4(),
+            user_uid: user.uuid,
+        });
+        const res = makeRes();
+        await controller.handleMigrateToken(
+            makeReq(
+                {},
+                {
+                    headers: {
+                        origin: TEST_ORIGIN,
+                        authorization: `Bearer ${v1}`,
+                    },
+                },
+            ),
+            res,
+        );
+        expect(res.cookies.puter_token_v2).toBeUndefined();
+        expect((res.body as { kind: string }).kind).toBe('access_token');
+        expect((res.body as { token: string }).token).toBeTruthy();
+    });
+
+    it('sets the puter_token_v2 cookie when migrating an app-under-user token (B3)', async () => {
+        // App tokens DO get a cookie companion — the app runs inside an
+        // iframe in the GUI, and the GUI's cookie-only middleware
+        // authenticates subsequent calls from the iframe via the cookie
+        // rather than the client having to plumb Authorization through
+        // every request.
+        const { user } = await makeUserAndActor();
+        const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const v1 = mintV1Token({
+            type: 'app-under-user',
+            user_uid: user.uuid,
+            app_uid: appUid,
+        });
+        const res = makeRes();
+        await controller.handleMigrateToken(
+            makeReq(
+                {},
+                {
+                    headers: {
+                        origin: TEST_ORIGIN,
+                        authorization: `Bearer ${v1}`,
+                    },
+                },
+            ),
+            res,
+        );
+        expect((res.body as { kind: string }).kind).toBe('app');
+        const cookie = res.cookies.puter_token_v2;
+        expect(cookie).toBeDefined();
+        expect(cookie.value).toBe((res.body as { token: string }).token);
+        expect(cookie.opts?.httpOnly).toBe(true);
+    });
+});
+
+// -- auth_id preservation on forced re-login --
+
+describe('AuthController auth_id preservation on reauth', () => {
+    const password = 'correct-horse-battery';
+    const mintReauth = (uuid: string): string =>
+        server.services.auth.signReauthToken(uuid);
+
+    it('handleLogin with matching reauth_token completes login as the same user', async () => {
+        const u = `aid_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
+        const ip = `127.0.${Math.floor(Math.random() * 200)}.1`;
+        await controller.handleSignup(
+            makeReq(
+                { username: u, email: `${u}@test.local`, password },
+                { ip },
+            ),
+            makeRes(),
+        );
+        const seeded = await server.stores.user.getByUsername(u);
+
+        const res = makeRes();
+        await controller.handleLogin(
+            makeReq(
+                {
+                    username: u,
+                    password,
+                    reauth_token: mintReauth(seeded!.uuid),
+                },
+                { ip },
+            ),
+            res,
+        );
+        expect(isCompleteLoginResponse(res.body)).toBe(true);
+        expect((res.body as { user: { uuid: string } }).user.uuid).toBe(
+            seeded!.uuid,
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('handleLogin with mismatched reauth_token is rejected 409', async () => {
+        const a = `aida_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
+        const b = `aidb_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
+        const ip = `127.0.${Math.floor(Math.random() * 200)}.2`;
+        await controller.handleSignup(
+            makeReq(
+                { username: a, email: `${a}@test.local`, password },
+                { ip },
+            ),
+            makeRes(),
+        );
+        await controller.handleSignup(
+            makeReq(
+                { username: b, email: `${b}@test.local`, password },
+                { ip },
+            ),
+            makeRes(),
+        );
+        const userB = await server.stores.user.getByUsername(b);
+
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleLogin(
+                makeReq(
+                    {
+                        username: a,
+                        password,
+                        reauth_token: mintReauth(userB!.uuid),
+                    },
+                    { ip },
+                ),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            statusCode: 409,
+            fields: { code: 'auth_id_mismatch' },
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('handleLogin with reauth_token for an unknown user returns 404', async () => {
+        const u = `aidu_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
+        const ip = `127.0.${Math.floor(Math.random() * 200)}.3`;
+        await controller.handleSignup(
+            makeReq(
+                { username: u, email: `${u}@test.local`, password },
+                { ip },
+            ),
+            makeRes(),
+        );
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleLogin(
+                makeReq(
+                    {
+                        username: u,
+                        password,
+                        reauth_token: mintReauth(uuidv4()),
+                    },
+                    { ip },
+                ),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
+    });
+
+    it('handleLogin with a non-string reauth_token returns 400', async () => {
+        const u = `aidb_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
+        const ip = `127.0.${Math.floor(Math.random() * 200)}.4`;
+        await controller.handleSignup(
+            makeReq(
+                { username: u, email: `${u}@test.local`, password },
+                { ip },
+            ),
+            makeRes(),
+        );
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleLogin(
+                makeReq({ username: u, password, reauth_token: 42 }, { ip }),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+    });
+
+    it('handleLogin with a forged/garbage reauth_token returns 401', async () => {
+        const u = `aidf_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
+        const ip = `127.0.${Math.floor(Math.random() * 200)}.9`;
+        await controller.handleSignup(
+            makeReq(
+                { username: u, email: `${u}@test.local`, password },
+                { ip },
+            ),
+            makeRes(),
+        );
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleLogin(
+                makeReq(
+                    { username: u, password, reauth_token: 'not-a-jwt' },
+                    { ip },
+                ),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 401 });
+    });
+
+    it('handleLogin OTP branch echoes auth_id into the OTP JWT', async () => {
+        const u = `aidotp_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
+        const ip = `127.0.${Math.floor(Math.random() * 200)}.5`;
+        await controller.handleSignup(
+            makeReq(
+                { username: u, email: `${u}@test.local`, password },
+                { ip },
+            ),
+            makeRes(),
+        );
+        const seeded = await server.stores.user.getByUsername(u);
+        await server.stores.user.update(seeded!.id, {
+            otp_enabled: 1,
+            otp_secret: 'TESTSECRETBASE32',
+        });
+
+        const res = makeRes();
+        await controller.handleLogin(
+            makeReq(
+                {
+                    username: u,
+                    password,
+                    reauth_token: mintReauth(seeded!.uuid),
+                },
+                { ip },
+            ),
+            res,
+        );
+        expect(res.statusCode).toBe(202);
+        const body = res.body as { otp_jwt_token: string };
+        const decoded = server.services.token.verify(
+            'otp',
+            body.otp_jwt_token,
+        ) as {
+            user_uid: string;
+            auth_id?: string;
+        };
+        expect(decoded.auth_id).toBe(seeded!.uuid);
+    });
+
+    it('handleSignup is_temp + matching reauth_token returns the SAME temp user', async () => {
+        const tempRes1 = makeRes();
+        const ip = `127.0.${Math.floor(Math.random() * 200)}.6`;
+        await controller.handleSignup(
+            makeReq({ is_temp: true }, { ip }),
+            tempRes1,
+        );
+        const body1 = tempRes1.body as { user: { uuid: string } };
+        const tempUuid = body1.user.uuid;
+        const tempUser1 = await server.stores.user.getByUuid(tempUuid);
+        expect(tempUser1).toBeTruthy();
+        const markerId = tempUser1!.id;
+
+        const tempRes2 = makeRes();
+        await controller.handleSignup(
+            makeReq(
+                { is_temp: true, reauth_token: mintReauth(tempUuid) },
+                { ip },
+            ),
+            tempRes2,
+        );
+        expect(isCompleteLoginResponse(tempRes2.body)).toBe(true);
+        const body2 = tempRes2.body as {
+            user: { uuid: string; is_temp: boolean };
+        };
+        expect(body2.user.uuid).toBe(tempUuid);
+        expect(body2.user.is_temp).toBe(true);
+
+        const tempUser2 = await server.stores.user.getByUuid(tempUuid);
+        expect(tempUser2!.id).toBe(markerId);
+    });
+
+    it('handleSignup is_temp + reauth_token pointing at a permanent user is rejected', async () => {
+        const u = `aidperm_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
+        const ip = `127.0.${Math.floor(Math.random() * 200)}.7`;
+        await controller.handleSignup(
+            makeReq(
+                { username: u, email: `${u}@test.local`, password },
+                { ip },
+            ),
+            makeRes(),
+        );
+        const seeded = await server.stores.user.getByUsername(u);
+
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleSignup(
+                makeReq(
+                    {
+                        is_temp: true,
+                        reauth_token: mintReauth(seeded!.uuid),
+                    },
+                    { ip },
+                ),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+    });
+
+    it('handleSignup is_temp + reauth_token for an unknown user returns 404', async () => {
+        const ip = `127.0.${Math.floor(Math.random() * 200)}.8`;
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleSignup(
+                makeReq(
+                    {
+                        is_temp: true,
+                        reauth_token: mintReauth(uuidv4()),
+                    },
+                    { ip },
+                ),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
+    });
+
+    it('handleSignup is_temp rejects a forged reauth_token (401)', async () => {
+        const ip = `127.0.${Math.floor(Math.random() * 200)}.10`;
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleSignup(
+                makeReq(
+                    { is_temp: true, reauth_token: 'not-a-jwt' },
+                    { ip },
+                ),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 401 });
+    });
+
+    it('rate-limits reauth_token login attempts per IP', async () => {
+        const ip = `10.99.${Math.floor(Math.random() * 200)}.${Math.floor(Math.random() * 200)}`;
+        const u = `aidrl_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
+        await controller.handleSignup(
+            makeReq(
+                { username: u, email: `${u}@test.local`, password },
+                { ip },
+            ),
+            makeRes(),
+        );
+        const seeded = await server.stores.user.getByUsername(u);
+
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+            const res = makeRes();
+            await controller.handleLogin(
+                makeReq(
+                    {
+                        username: u,
+                        password,
+                        reauth_token: mintReauth(seeded!.uuid),
+                    },
+                    { ip },
+                ),
+                res,
+            );
+            expect(isCompleteLoginResponse(res.body)).toBe(true);
+        }
+        await expect(
+            controller.handleLogin(
+                makeReq(
+                    {
+                        username: u,
+                        password,
+                        reauth_token: mintReauth(seeded!.uuid),
+                    },
+                    { ip },
+                ),
+                makeRes(),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 429 });
+    });
 });

src/backend/controllers/desktop/DesktopController.js

@@ -44,13 +44,14 @@ export class DesktopController extends PuterController {
     }
 
     registerRoutes(router) {
-        // ── Desktop background ──────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- Desktop background --------------------------------------
 
         router.post(
             '/set-desktop-bg',
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const { url, color, fit } = req.body ?? {};
@@ -98,13 +99,14 @@ export class DesktopController extends PuterController {
             },
         );
 
-        // ── Taskbar items ───────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- Taskbar items -------------------------------------------
 
         router.post(
             '/update-taskbar-items',
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const { items } = req.body ?? {};
@@ -123,13 +125,14 @@ export class DesktopController extends PuterController {
             },
         );
 
-        // ── Folder layout ───────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- Folder layout -------------------------------------------
 
         router.post(
             '/set_layout',
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const { item_uid, item_path, layout } = req.body ?? {};
@@ -149,13 +152,14 @@ export class DesktopController extends PuterController {
             },
         );
 
-        // ── Folder sort ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- Folder sort ---------------------------------------------
 
         router.post(
             '/set_sort_by',
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const { item_uid, item_path, sort_by, sort_order } =
@@ -188,7 +192,7 @@ export class DesktopController extends PuterController {
         );
     }
 
-    // ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Helpers ------------------------------------------------------
 
     /**
      * Update columns on an actor-owned fsentry. Accepts either `item_uid`

src/backend/controllers/drivers/DriverController.concurrent.test.ts

@@ -124,11 +124,13 @@ const makeSyntheticDriver = () => ({
 
 const buildController = (driver: ReturnType<typeof makeSyntheticDriver>) => {
     // The controller reads `this.services?.permission` only when an actor
-    // is on the request; otherwise the services bag is unused. Empty
-    // objects are sufficient for this path.
+    // is on the request; otherwise the services bag is unused. The
+    // alarm client is invoked on the rate-limit / concurrency rejection
+    // paths, so stub a no-op `create`.
+    const clients = { alarm: { create: () => {} } };
     return new DriverController(
         {} as any,
-        {} as any,
+        clients as any,
         {} as any,
         {} as any,
         { syntheticDriver: driver } as any,

src/backend/controllers/drivers/DriverController.test.ts

@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ import { Readable } from 'node:stream';
 import type { Request, RequestHandler, Response } from 'express';
 import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
 import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
-import type { Actor } from '../../core/actor.js';
+import { actorUid, type Actor } from '../../core/actor.js';
+import type { DriverMethodLifecycleEvent } from '../../clients/event/types.js';
 import { runWithContext } from '../../core/context.js';
 import { PuterServer } from '../../server.js';
 import { setupTestServer } from '../../testUtil.js';
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ import type { DriverController } from './DriverController.js';
 // The DriverController under test is the same instance the live request
 // pipeline uses, so its iface→driver registry is populated from real
 // drivers (puter-kvstore, puter-apps, puter-subdomains, …). The HTTP
-// handlers (`#handleCall`, `#handleListInterfaces`, `#handleXd`) are
+// handlers (`#handleCall`, `#handleListInterfaces`) are
 // private — we exercise the public lookup API (`resolve` / list / get
 // default) which the handlers themselves delegate to.
 
@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ describe('DriverController.resolve', () => {
     });
 });
 
-// ── Route handlers (#handleCall, #handleListInterfaces, #handleXd) ─
+// ── Route handlers (#handleCall, #handleListInterfaces) ─────────────
 
 // The handlers are private class fields. We capture references to them by
 // invoking `registerRoutes` with a fake router whose `post`/`get` save the
@@ -189,10 +190,7 @@ const makeRes = (): MockRes => {
     return res;
 };
 
-const makeReq = (
-    body: Record<string, unknown> = {},
-    actor?: Actor,
-): Request =>
+const makeReq = (body: Record<string, unknown> = {}, actor?: Actor): Request =>
     ({
         body,
         actor,
@@ -338,11 +336,7 @@ describe('DriverController.#handleCall (via captured router)', () => {
             actor,
         );
         await runWithContext({ actor }, () =>
-            routes['POST /call'](
-                req,
-                res as unknown as Response,
-                () => {},
-            ),
+            routes['POST /call'](req, res as unknown as Response, () => {}),
         );
         const body = res.body as {
             success: boolean;
@@ -374,11 +368,9 @@ describe('DriverController.#handleCall (via captured router)', () => {
         // Register it through the controller's private map by re-running
         // its #buildIfaceMap path: easier to just stash it into the
         // existing iface map directly via TypeScript-defeating cast.
-        const internalDrivers = (
-            controller as unknown as {
-                ['#drivers']: Map<string, Map<string, unknown>>;
-            }
-        );
+        const internalDrivers = controller as unknown as {
+            ['#drivers']: Map<string, Map<string, unknown>>;
+        };
         // Access the actual private slot via the well-known getter
         // pattern doesn't work for `#`-private fields; instead, re-run
         // registerRoutes after stashing on the bag — but that's already
@@ -413,13 +405,12 @@ describe('DriverController.#handleCall (via captured router)', () => {
         >;
         const original = kv.set;
         kv.set = async function (...args: unknown[]) {
-            const { Context } = await import(
-                '../../core/context.js'
-            );
+            const { Context } = await import('../../core/context.js');
             Context.set('driverMetadata', { providerUsed: 'kv-direct' });
-            return (
-                original as (...x: unknown[]) => Promise<unknown>
-            ).apply(this, args);
+            return (original as (...x: unknown[]) => Promise<unknown>).apply(
+                this,
+                args,
+            );
         };
         try {
             const res = makeRes();
@@ -432,11 +423,7 @@ describe('DriverController.#handleCall (via captured router)', () => {
                 actor,
             );
             await runWithContext({ actor }, () =>
-                routes['POST /call'](
-                    req,
-                    res as unknown as Response,
-                    () => {},
-                ),
+                routes['POST /call'](req, res as unknown as Response, () => {}),
             );
             const body = res.body as {
                 metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;
@@ -474,6 +461,129 @@ describe('DriverController.#handleCall (via captured router)', () => {
     });
 });
 
+describe('DriverController driver-method lifecycle events', () => {
+    let routes: Captured;
+    beforeAll(() => {
+        routes = captureRoutes(controller);
+    });
+
+    const grantKvPerm = async (actor: Actor) => {
+        await server.stores.permission.setFlatUserPerm(
+            actor.user!.id!,
+            'service:puter-kvstore:ii:puter-kvstore',
+            {
+                permission: 'service:puter-kvstore:ii:puter-kvstore',
+                deleted: false,
+                issuer_user_id: actor.user!.id!,
+            } as never,
+        );
+    };
+
+    it('emits before then after around a successful driver method', async () => {
+        const actor = await makeUserActor();
+        await grantKvPerm(actor);
+
+        // Correlate on the actor: each test creates a fresh user, so this
+        // isolates our call from any other traffic on the shared event bus.
+        const who = actorUid(actor);
+        const before: DriverMethodLifecycleEvent[] = [];
+        const after: DriverMethodLifecycleEvent[] = [];
+        server.clients.event.on(
+            'driver.puter-kvstore.set.before',
+            (_k, data) => {
+                if (data.actorUid === who) before.push(data);
+            },
+        );
+        server.clients.event.on(
+            'driver.puter-kvstore.set.after',
+            (_k, data) => {
+                if (data.actorUid === who) after.push(data);
+            },
+        );
+
+        const key = `lc-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const req = makeReq(
+            {
+                interface: 'puter-kvstore',
+                method: 'set',
+                args: { key, value: 'v' },
+            },
+            actor,
+        );
+        await runWithContext({ actor }, () =>
+            routes['POST /call'](
+                req,
+                makeRes() as unknown as Response,
+                () => {},
+            ),
+        );
+
+        expect(before).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(before[0]).toMatchObject({
+            phase: 'before',
+            iface: 'puter-kvstore',
+            method: 'set',
+            actor,
+            actorUid: who,
+        });
+        expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(after[0].phase).toBe('after');
+        expect(after[0].args).toMatchObject({ key, value: 'v' });
+        expect(typeof after[0].durationMs).toBe('number');
+    });
+
+    it('emits reject and answers 403 when a before listener vetoes', async () => {
+        const actor = await makeUserActor();
+        await grantKvPerm(actor);
+
+        // Scope the veto to a sentinel key so it doesn't affect other calls
+        // sharing this server's event bus.
+        const key = `veto-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const reject: DriverMethodLifecycleEvent[] = [];
+        server.clients.event.on(
+            'driver.puter-kvstore.set.before',
+            (_k, data) => {
+                if ((data.args as { key?: string })?.key === key) {
+                    data.allow = false;
+                    data.rejectReason = 'blocked in test';
+                }
+            },
+        );
+        server.clients.event.on(
+            'driver.puter-kvstore.set.reject',
+            (_k, data) => {
+                if (data.rejectReason === 'blocked in test') reject.push(data);
+            },
+        );
+
+        const req = makeReq(
+            {
+                interface: 'puter-kvstore',
+                method: 'set',
+                args: { key, value: 'v' },
+            },
+            actor,
+        );
+        await expect(
+            runWithContext({ actor }, () =>
+                routes['POST /call'](
+                    req,
+                    makeRes() as unknown as Response,
+                    () => {},
+                ),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
+
+        expect(reject).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(reject[0]).toMatchObject({
+            phase: 'reject',
+            method: 'set',
+            args: { key, value: 'v' },
+            rejectReason: 'blocked in test',
+        });
+    });
+});
+
 describe('DriverController.#handleListInterfaces', () => {
     let routes: Captured;
     beforeAll(() => {
@@ -497,31 +607,11 @@ describe('DriverController.#handleListInterfaces', () => {
     });
 });
 
-describe('DriverController.#handleXd', () => {
-    let routes: Captured;
-    beforeAll(() => {
-        routes = captureRoutes(controller);
-    });
-
-    it('serves the iframe-bridge HTML with text/html content-type', () => {
-        const res = makeRes();
-        routes['GET /xd'](
-            makeReq(),
-            res as unknown as Response,
-            () => {},
-        );
-        expect(res.contentType).toBe('text/html');
-        expect(res.sentBody).toMatch(/<!DOCTYPE html>/);
-        expect(res.sentBody).toMatch(/\/drivers\/call/);
-    });
-});
-
 describe('DriverController.registerRoutes', () => {
-    it('registers POST /call, GET /list-interfaces, and GET /xd', () => {
+    it('registers POST /call and GET /list-interfaces', () => {
         const routes = captureRoutes(controller);
         expect(routes['POST /call']).toBeInstanceOf(Function);
         expect(routes['GET /list-interfaces']).toBeInstanceOf(Function);
-        expect(routes['GET /xd']).toBeInstanceOf(Function);
     });
 });
 

src/backend/controllers/drivers/DriverController.ts

@@ -18,16 +18,15 @@
  */
 
 import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
+import { actorUid } from '../../core/actor.js';
 import { Context } from '../../core/context.js';
 import { Controller } from '../../core/http/decorators.js';
-import { HttpError } from '../../core/http/HttpError.js';
+import { HttpError, isHttpError } from '../../core/http/HttpError.js';
 import {
     acquireDriverConcurrent,
     checkDriverRateLimit,
 } from '../../core/http/middleware/rateLimit.js';
 import type { PuterRouter } from '../../core/http/PuterRouter.js';
-import type { PermissionService } from '../../services/permission/PermissionService.js';
-import type { WithLifecycle } from '../../types';
 import type { DriverMeta } from '../../drivers/meta.js';
 import {
     isDriverStreamResult,
@@ -35,100 +34,83 @@ import {
     resolveDriverMethodConcurrent,
     resolveDriverMethodRateLimit,
 } from '../../drivers/meta.js';
+import type { PermissionService } from '../../services/permission/PermissionService.js';
+import { PermissionUtil } from '../../services/permission/permissionUtil.js';
+import type { WithLifecycle } from '../../types';
 import { PuterController } from '../types.js';
 
 type DriverInstance = WithLifecycle & Record<string, unknown>;
 
-// ── /drivers/xd payload ─────────────────────────────────────────────
-//
-// Self-contained HTML/JS shipped to the iframe consumer. Listens for
-// postMessage events shaped as `{ id, interface, method, params }`,
-// forwards to `/drivers/call`, and posts `{ id, result }` back to the
-// originating window.
-//
-// Wire-shape note: the postMessage uses `params` (puter-js's historical
-// name) but `/drivers/call` expects `args`; this bridge translates.
+const extractUpstreamStatus = (e: {
+    status?: number;
+    statusCode?: number;
+    response?: { status?: number };
+    $metadata?: { httpStatusCode?: number };
+    message?: string;
+}): number | undefined => {
+    const direct = e.status ?? e.statusCode;
+    if (typeof direct === 'number') return direct;
+    const fromResponse = e.response?.status;
+    if (typeof fromResponse === 'number') return fromResponse;
+    const fromAws = e.$metadata?.httpStatusCode;
+    if (typeof fromAws === 'number') return fromAws;
+    // Message sniff (e.g. "... failed with status 422 ...").
+    // Only trust if it's adjacent to a status-indicating word to
+    // avoid matching random 4xx/5xx-looking numbers in payloads.
+    const msg = e.message;
+    if (typeof msg === 'string') {
+        const m = msg.match(/\bstatus(?:\s+code)?\s*[:=]?\s*(4\d\d|5\d\d)\b/i);
+        if (m) return Number(m[1]);
+    }
+    return undefined;
+};
 
-const XD_SCRIPT = /* js */ `
-(function () {
-    const call = async ({ interface_name, method_name, params }) => {
-        const response = await fetch('/drivers/call', {
-            method: 'POST',
-            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-            body: JSON.stringify({
-                interface: interface_name,
-                method: method_name,
-                args: params,
-            }),
-        });
-        return await response.json();
+const translateProviderError = (err: unknown): unknown => {
+    if (isHttpError(err)) return err;
+    if (!err || typeof err !== 'object') return err;
+    const e = err as {
+        status?: number;
+        statusCode?: number;
+        response?: { status?: number };
+        $metadata?: { httpStatusCode?: number };
+        message?: string;
+        error?: { code?: string; type?: string; message?: string };
+        code?: string;
     };
+    const status = extractUpstreamStatus(e);
+    if (typeof status !== 'number') return err;
 
-    const fcall = async ({ interface_name, method_name, params }) => {
-        const form = new FormData();
-        form.append('interface', interface_name);
-        form.append('method', method_name);
-        for (const k in params) {
-            form.append(k, params[k]);
-        }
-        const response = await fetch('/drivers/call', {
-            method: 'POST',
-            body: form,
+    const msg = e.error?.message ?? e.message ?? 'Upstream provider error';
+    const upstreamCode = e.error?.code ?? e.code;
+    const fields = { upstreamStatus: status, upstreamCode };
+
+    if (status === 429) {
+        return new HttpError(429, msg, {
+            legacyCode: 'upstream_rate_limited',
+            fields,
         });
-        return await response.json();
-    };
+    }
+    if (status === 401 || status === 403) {
+        return new HttpError(500, msg, {
+            legacyCode: 'upstream_auth_failed',
+            fields,
+        });
+    }
+    if (status >= 500) {
+        return new HttpError(400, 'AI provider unavailable', {
+            legacyCode: 'upstream_provider_unavailable',
+            fields,
+        });
+    }
+    if (status >= 400) {
+        return new HttpError(400, msg, {
+            legacyCode: 'upstream_bad_request',
+            fields,
+        });
+    }
+    return err;
+};
 
-    window.addEventListener('message', async (event) => {
-        const { id, interface: iface, method, params } = event.data || {};
-        let has_file = false;
-        for (const k in params) {
-            if (params[k] instanceof File) {
-                has_file = true;
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        const result = has_file
-            ? await fcall({ interface_name: iface, method_name: method, params })
-            : await call({ interface_name: iface, method_name: method, params });
-        if (event.source) {
-            event.source.postMessage({ id, result }, event.origin);
-        }
-    });
-})();
-`;
-
-const XD_HTML = `<!DOCTYPE html>
-<html>
-    <head>
-        <title>Puter Driver API</title>
-        <script>
-            document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function () {
-                ${XD_SCRIPT}
-            });
-        </script>
-    </head>
-    <body></body>
-</html>`;
-
-// ── Controller ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * Routes driver RPC calls through a unified HTTP surface.
- *
- * - `POST /drivers/call` — invoke `<iface>.<method>(args)` on the
- *   registered driver after a per-actor permission + rate-limit check.
- *   Stream-shaped results are piped directly; everything else is
- *   returned as JSON.
- * - `GET /drivers/list-interfaces` — enumerate registered driver
- *   interfaces with their default + alternate implementations.
- * - `GET /drivers/xd` — legacy iframe bridge; serves an HTML page that
- *   proxies `postMessage` RPCs to `/drivers/call` on the same origin.
- *
- * Holds an internal iface → driverName → instance map built at
- * construction time from `this.drivers`. Extensions that register
- * additional drivers end up in that bag before this controller is
- * instantiated, so they show up here automatically.
- */
 @Controller('/drivers')
 export class DriverController extends PuterController {
     /** iface → Map<driverName, driverInstance> */
@@ -146,7 +128,7 @@ export class DriverController extends PuterController {
         this.#buildIfaceMap();
     }
 
-    // ── Lookup API (used by tests / internals) ──────────────────────
+    // -- Lookup API (used by tests / internals) ----------------------
 
     /** Resolve a driver by interface + optional name (default when omitted). */
     resolve(interfaceName: string, driverName?: string): DriverInstance | null {
@@ -170,7 +152,7 @@ export class DriverController extends PuterController {
         return this.#defaults.get(interfaceName);
     }
 
-    // ── Route registration ──────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Route registration ------------------------------------------
 
     registerRoutes(router: PuterRouter): void {
         router.post(
@@ -183,14 +165,9 @@ export class DriverController extends PuterController {
             { subdomain: 'api', requireAuth: true },
             this.#handleListInterfaces,
         );
-        router.get(
-            '/xd',
-            { subdomain: 'api', requireAuth: true },
-            this.#handleXd,
-        );
     }
 
-    // ── Handlers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Handlers ----------------------------------------------------
 
     #handleCall = async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
         const {
@@ -246,7 +223,16 @@ export class DriverController extends PuterController {
                 | PermissionService
                 | undefined;
             if (permService) {
-                const permKey = `service:${resolvedDriverName}:ii:${ifaceName}`;
+                // Build via PermissionUtil.join so any `:` in a driver or
+                // interface name is escaped — raw interpolation would let a
+                // crafted name shift permission-segment boundaries and match
+                // a broader/narrower parent than intended in the scan logic.
+                const permKey = PermissionUtil.join(
+                    'service',
+                    String(resolvedDriverName),
+                    'ii',
+                    ifaceName,
+                );
                 const hasPermission = await permService.check(
                     req.actor,
                     permKey,
@@ -278,6 +264,19 @@ export class DriverController extends PuterController {
         if (
             !(await checkDriverRateLimit(req, ifaceName, method, rateLimitSpec))
         ) {
+            // De-dupe on (iface, method) so a hot loop across many users
+            // aggregates as occurrences on a single low-severity alarm
+            // instead of fanning out one per user.
+            this.clients.alarm.create(
+                `driver_rate_limit_hit:${ifaceName}:${method}`,
+                `Driver rate limit hit on ${ifaceName}:${method}`,
+                {
+                    iface: ifaceName,
+                    method,
+                    userUuid: req.actor?.user?.uuid,
+                },
+                'info',
+            );
             throw new HttpError(429, 'Too many requests.', {
                 legacyCode: 'too_many_requests',
             });
@@ -300,6 +299,16 @@ export class DriverController extends PuterController {
                 concurrentSpec,
             );
             if (!handle.ok) {
+                this.clients.alarm.create(
+                    `driver_concurrent_limit_hit:${ifaceName}:${method}`,
+                    `Driver concurrency limit hit on ${ifaceName}:${method}`,
+                    {
+                        iface: ifaceName,
+                        method,
+                        userUuid: req.actor?.user?.uuid,
+                    },
+                    'info',
+                );
                 throw new HttpError(429, 'Too many concurrent requests.', {
                     legacyCode: 'too_many_requests',
                 });
@@ -326,11 +335,90 @@ export class DriverController extends PuterController {
         // a stale value from a prior call.
         Context.set('driverName', requestedDriver);
 
-        // Drivers read actor/context via the Context API — no drilled args.
-        // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
-        const result = await (fn as (...x: unknown[]) => any).call(
-            driver,
+        // Per-method lifecycle events, scoped to `driver.<iface>.<method>`.
+        // Subscribers can listen on `driver.*`, `driver.<iface>.*`, or the
+        // exact key. `before` is emitted via `emitAndWait` so a listener may
+        // veto the call by setting `allow = false` (emits `reject`, throws
+        // 403); otherwise `after`/`error` carry the result/error + duration.
+        const actor = req.actor ? actorUid(req.actor) : undefined;
+        const resolved = String(resolvedDriverName);
+        const beforeEvent = {
+            phase: 'before' as const,
+            iface: ifaceName,
+            method,
+            driver: resolved,
+            actor: req.actor,
+            actorUid: actor,
             args,
+            allow: true as boolean,
+            rejectReason: undefined as string | undefined,
+        };
+        await this.clients.event?.emitAndWait(
+            `driver.${ifaceName}.${method}.before`,
+            beforeEvent,
+            {},
+        );
+        if (beforeEvent.allow === false) {
+            this.clients.event?.emit(
+                `driver.${ifaceName}.${method}.reject`,
+                {
+                    phase: 'reject',
+                    iface: ifaceName,
+                    method,
+                    driver: resolved,
+                    actor: req.actor,
+                    actorUid: actor,
+                    args,
+                    rejectReason: beforeEvent.rejectReason,
+                },
+                {},
+            );
+            throw new HttpError(
+                403,
+                beforeEvent.rejectReason ??
+                    `Blocked by policy: ${ifaceName}:${method}`,
+                { legacyCode: 'forbidden' },
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Drivers read actor/context via the Context API — no drilled args.
+        const startedAt = Date.now();
+        let result;
+        try {
+            // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
+            result = await (fn as (...x: unknown[]) => any).call(driver, args);
+        } catch (e) {
+            this.clients.event?.emit(
+                `driver.${ifaceName}.${method}.error`,
+                {
+                    phase: 'error',
+                    iface: ifaceName,
+                    method,
+                    driver: resolved,
+                    actor: req.actor,
+                    actorUid: actor,
+                    args,
+                    error: e,
+                    durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
+                },
+                {},
+            );
+            throw translateProviderError(e);
+        }
+        this.clients.event?.emit(
+            `driver.${ifaceName}.${method}.after`,
+            {
+                phase: 'after',
+                iface: ifaceName,
+                method,
+                driver: resolved,
+                actor: req.actor,
+                actorUid: actor,
+                args,
+                result,
+                durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
+            },
+            {},
         );
 
         if (isDriverStreamResult(result)) {
@@ -374,12 +462,7 @@ export class DriverController extends PuterController {
         res.json(out);
     };
 
-    #handleXd = (_req: Request, res: Response): void => {
-        res.type('text/html');
-        res.send(XD_HTML);
-    };
-
-    // ── Internals ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Internals ---------------------------------------------------
 
     #buildIfaceMap(): void {
         const bag = this.drivers as unknown as Record<string, DriverInstance>;

src/backend/controllers/fs/FSController.test.ts

@@ -434,6 +434,178 @@ describe('FSController.completeBatchWrites', () => {
         expect(finalized?.wasOverwrite).toBe(true);
     });
 
+    // Regression: a signed (direct-to-S3) upload could declare a tiny size
+    // and PUT far more — the presigned URL doesn't bound the body. The
+    // completion path must reconcile the recorded size against the object's
+    // true size, or storage accounting is permanently understated and the
+    // quota is bypassable.
+    it('reconciles the recorded size to the real uploaded bytes (ignores under-declared size)', async () => {
+        const { actor, userId } = await makeUser();
+        const username = actor.user!.username!;
+        const target = `/${username}/Documents/under-declared.bin`;
+
+        // Declare 1 byte.
+        const start = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.startBatchWrites(
+                makeReq<SignedWriteRequest[]>({
+                    body: [{ fileMetadata: { path: target, size: 1 } }],
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                start.res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const [started] = start.captured.body as SignedWriteResponse[];
+
+        // Actually upload 4096 bytes to the session's object key (simulating
+        // a client that PUTs more than it declared via the signed URL).
+        const realBytes = Buffer.alloc(4096, 0x41);
+        await server.stores.s3Object.uploadFromServer(
+            {
+                bucket: started!.bucket,
+                objectKey: started!.objectKey,
+                contentType: 'application/octet-stream',
+                body: realBytes,
+                contentLength: realBytes.byteLength,
+            },
+            started!.bucketRegion,
+        );
+
+        const complete = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.completeBatchWrites(
+                makeReq<CompleteWriteRequest[]>({
+                    body: [{ uploadId: started!.sessionId }],
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                complete.res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const entry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(target);
+        expect(entry).not.toBeNull();
+        // Recorded size is the true 4096 bytes, not the declared 1.
+        expect(entry?.size).toBe(4096);
+
+        // And the user's accounted usage reflects the real bytes.
+        const allowance =
+            await server.stores.fsEntry.getUserStorageAllowance(userId);
+        expect(allowance.curr).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(4096);
+    });
+
+    it('emits updated events with GUI metadata when overwriting via batch completion', async () => {
+        const { actor, userId } = await makeUser();
+        const username = actor.user!.username!;
+        const target = `/${username}/Documents/overwrite-event.js`;
+
+        const firstStart = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.startBatchWrites(
+                makeReq<SignedWriteRequest[]>({
+                    body: [{ fileMetadata: { path: target, size: 1 } }],
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                firstStart.res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const [firstResponse] = firstStart.captured
+            .body as SignedWriteResponse[];
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.completeBatchWrites(
+                makeReq<CompleteWriteRequest[]>({
+                    body: [{ uploadId: firstResponse!.sessionId }],
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const targetEntry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(target);
+        expect(targetEntry).not.toBeNull();
+        await server.stores.subdomain.create({
+            userId,
+            subdomain: `workers.puter.${username}-worker`,
+            rootDirId: targetEntry!.id,
+        });
+
+        const secondStart = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.startBatchWrites(
+                makeReq<SignedWriteRequest[]>({
+                    body: [
+                        {
+                            fileMetadata: {
+                                path: target,
+                                size: 2,
+                                overwrite: true,
+                            },
+                        },
+                    ],
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                secondStart.res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const [secondResponse] = secondStart.captured
+            .body as SignedWriteResponse[];
+
+        const emitSpy = vi.spyOn(server.clients.event, 'emit');
+        let updatedCall:
+            | (typeof emitSpy.mock.calls)[number]
+            | undefined;
+        try {
+            await withActor(actor, () =>
+                controller.completeBatchWrites(
+                    makeReq<CompleteWriteRequest[]>({
+                        body: [
+                            {
+                                uploadId: secondResponse!.sessionId,
+                                guiMetadata: {
+                                    operationId: 'op-123',
+                                    itemUploadId: 'item-456',
+                                    socketId: 'socket-789',
+                                    originalClientSocketId: 'socket-789',
+                                },
+                            },
+                        ],
+                        actor,
+                    }),
+                    makeRes().res,
+                ),
+            );
+            updatedCall = emitSpy.mock.calls.find(
+                ([eventName]) => eventName === 'outer.gui.item.updated',
+            );
+        } finally {
+            emitSpy.mockRestore();
+        }
+        expect(updatedCall).toBeTruthy();
+        const payload = updatedCall?.[1] as {
+            user_id_list?: number[];
+            response?: Record<string, unknown>;
+        };
+        expect(payload.user_id_list).toEqual([userId]);
+        expect(payload.response).toMatchObject({
+            uid: expect.any(String),
+            uuid: expect.any(String),
+            id: expect.any(String),
+            path: target,
+            name: 'overwrite-event.js',
+            is_dir: false,
+            type: expect.stringMatching(/^application\/javascript/),
+            workers: [
+                expect.objectContaining({
+                    subdomain: `workers.puter.${username}-worker`,
+                    address: expect.stringContaining(`${username}-worker`),
+                }),
+            ],
+            from_new_service: true,
+            operation_id: 'op-123',
+            item_upload_id: 'item-456',
+            socket_id: 'socket-789',
+            original_client_socket_id: 'socket-789',
+        });
+    });
+
     it("rejects another user's session ids with a 4xx", async () => {
         const a = await makeUser();
         const b = await makeUser();
@@ -678,6 +850,87 @@ describe('FSController.searchEntries', () => {
         expect(Array.isArray(results)).toBe(true);
         expect(results.some((r) => r.name === needle)).toBe(true);
     });
+
+    it('scopes app-under-user actors to their AppData root', async () => {
+        const { actor: userActor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = userActor.user!.username!;
+        const appUid = `app-search-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const appActor: Actor = { ...userActor, app: { uid: appUid } };
+        const needle = `appneedle-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
+
+        // User-owned entry outside AppData — must NOT appear for the app.
+        await withActor(userActor, () =>
+            controller.mkdirEntry(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { path: `/${username}/Documents/${needle}` },
+                    actor: userActor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+        // Entry under the app's own AppData — must appear.
+        await withActor(userActor, () =>
+            controller.mkdirEntry(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: {
+                        path: `/${username}/AppData/${appUid}/${needle}`,
+                        create_missing_parents: true,
+                    },
+                    actor: userActor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(appActor, () =>
+            controller.searchEntries(
+                makeReq({ body: { query: needle }, actor: appActor }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const results = captured.body as Array<{ name: string; path: string }>;
+        expect(results.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+        for (const r of results) {
+            expect(
+                r.path === `/${username}/AppData/${appUid}` ||
+                    r.path.startsWith(`/${username}/AppData/${appUid}/`),
+            ).toBe(true);
+        }
+        expect(
+            results.some(
+                (r) => r.path === `/${username}/Documents/${needle}`,
+            ),
+        ).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('returns nothing for an app actor when no AppData entries match', async () => {
+        const { actor: userActor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = userActor.user!.username!;
+        const appUid = `app-search-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const appActor: Actor = { ...userActor, app: { uid: appUid } };
+        const needle = `appneedle-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
+
+        // Only seed outside AppData — the app must not be able to find it.
+        await withActor(userActor, () =>
+            controller.mkdirEntry(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { path: `/${username}/Documents/${needle}` },
+                    actor: userActor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(appActor, () =>
+            controller.searchEntries(
+                makeReq({ body: { query: needle }, actor: appActor }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+        expect(captured.body).toEqual([]);
+    });
 });
 
 // ── /read (readEntry, validation paths) ─────────────────────────────
@@ -759,6 +1012,82 @@ describe('FSController.mkdirEntry', () => {
         expect(body.isDir).toBe(true);
     });
 
+    it('dedupes an existing directory when dedupe_name is true', async () => {
+        const { actor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = actor.user!.username!;
+        const target = `/${username}/Documents/hello`;
+
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.mkdirEntry(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { path: target },
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.mkdirEntry(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { path: target, dedupe_name: true },
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const body = captured.body as {
+            path: string;
+            name: string;
+            isDir: boolean;
+        };
+        expect(body.path).toBe(`/${username}/Documents/hello (1)`);
+        expect(body.name).toBe('hello (1)');
+        expect(body.isDir).toBe(true);
+        expect(
+            await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+                `/${username}/Documents/hello (1)`,
+            ),
+        ).toMatchObject({ isDir: true });
+    });
+
+    it('requires parent write when deduping an existing directory', async () => {
+        const { actor: userActor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = userActor.user!.username!;
+        const appUid = `app-mkdir-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const appActor: Actor = { ...userActor, app: { uid: appUid } };
+        const target = `/${username}/AppData/${appUid}`;
+
+        await withActor(userActor, () =>
+            controller.mkdirEntry(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { path: target },
+                    actor: userActor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        await expect(
+            withActor(appActor, () =>
+                controller.mkdirEntry(
+                    makeReq({
+                        body: { path: target, dedupe_name: true },
+                        actor: appActor,
+                    }),
+                    makeRes().res,
+                ),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
+        expect(
+            await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+                `/${username}/AppData/${appUid} (1)`,
+            ),
+        ).toBeNull();
+    });
+
     it('expands ~/ in the path to the user home', async () => {
         const { actor } = await makeUser();
         const username = actor.user!.username!;

src/backend/controllers/fs/FSController.ts

@@ -20,12 +20,13 @@
 import Busboy from 'busboy';
 import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
 import { posix as pathPosix } from 'node:path';
-import { assertNormalized } from '../../services/fs/resolveNode.js';
 import { pipeline } from 'node:stream/promises';
 import type { Actor } from '../../core/actor.js';
+import { effectiveActorApp } from '../../core/actor.js';
 import { Context } from '../../core/context.js';
 import { HttpError } from '../../core/http/HttpError.js';
 import { Controller, Get, Post } from '../../core/http/decorators.js';
+import { assertNormalized } from '../../services/fs/resolveNode.js';
 import type {
     PreparedBatchWrite,
     UploadedBatchWriteItem,
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ import {
     runWithConcurrencyLimit,
     runWithConcurrencyLimitSettled,
 } from '../../util/concurrency.js';
+import { applyInlineContentSecurity } from '../../util/inlineContentSecurity.js';
 import { PuterController } from '../types.js';
 import { FS_COSTS } from './costs.js';
 import type {
@@ -58,6 +60,7 @@ import type {
     ThumbnailUploadPrepareItem,
     ThumbnailUploadPreparePayload,
 } from './types.js';
+import { toLegacyEntry } from './legacyFsHelpers.js';
 class UploadProgressTracker implements UploadProgressTrackerLike {
     total = 0;
     progress = 0;
@@ -421,7 +424,12 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
             const busboy = Busboy({ headers: req.headers });
 
             busboy.on('field', (fieldName, value, info) => {
-                if (info.fieldnameTruncated || info.valueTruncated) {
+                if (
+                    (info as unknown as { filenameTruncated: string })
+                        .filenameTruncated ||
+                    info.nameTruncated ||
+                    info.valueTruncated
+                ) {
                     failParse(
                         new HttpError(
                             400,
@@ -810,7 +818,7 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
         res.json(updatedResponses);
     }
 
-    // ── Read-side routes ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Read-side routes ------------------------------------------------
 
     @Post('/stat', { subdomain: 'api', requireVerified: true })
     async statEntry(req: Request, res: Response) {
@@ -910,7 +918,7 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
 
     @Post('/search', { subdomain: 'api', requireVerified: true })
     async searchEntries(req: Request, res: Response) {
-        this.#requireActor(req);
+        const actor = this.#requireActor(req);
         const userId = this.#getActorUserId(req);
         const body = this.#toObjectRecord(req.body);
         const query =
@@ -929,6 +937,7 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
             userId,
             query,
             limit ?? 200,
+            this.#appDataScopeForActor(actor),
         );
         res.json(results);
     }
@@ -956,8 +965,13 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
             range,
         });
 
-        if (download.contentType)
+        if (download.contentType) {
             res.setHeader('Content-Type', download.contentType);
+            // Stored type is uploader-controlled and served inline on the
+            // api origin — sandbox active-document types (HTML/SVG/XML) so
+            // embedded scripts can't run here. Inert types are untouched.
+            applyInlineContentSecurity(res, download.contentType);
+        }
         if (download.contentLength !== null)
             res.setHeader('Content-Length', String(download.contentLength));
         if (download.contentRange)
@@ -1007,7 +1021,7 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
         }
     }
 
-    // ── Mutation routes ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Mutation routes ------------------------------------------------
 
     @Post('/mkdir', { subdomain: 'api', requireVerified: true })
     async mkdirEntry(req: Request, res: Response) {
@@ -1031,13 +1045,15 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
                 legacyCode: 'bad_request',
             });
 
+        const dedupeName =
+            this.#toBoolean(body.dedupe_name ?? body.dedupeName) ?? false;
         await this.#assertCanCreate(actor, path);
+        if (dedupeName) await this.#assertCanDedupeCreate(actor, path);
 
         const entry = await this.services.fs.mkdir(userId, {
             path,
             overwrite: this.#toBoolean(body.overwrite) ?? false,
-            dedupeName:
-                this.#toBoolean(body.dedupe_name ?? body.dedupeName) ?? false,
+            dedupeName,
             createMissingParents:
                 this.#toBoolean(
                     body.create_missing_parents ??
@@ -1205,7 +1221,7 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
         res.json(shortcut);
     }
 
-    // ── Read-side helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Read-side helpers -----------------------------------------------
 
     #requireActor(req: Request): Actor {
         const actor = req.actor;
@@ -1302,6 +1318,17 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
         await this.#assertAccess(actor, parentForCheck, 'write');
     }
 
+    async #assertCanDedupeCreate(actor: Actor, targetPath: string) {
+        const existing = await this.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(targetPath);
+        if (!existing) return;
+        const parent = pathPosix.dirname(targetPath);
+        await this.#assertAccess(
+            actor,
+            parent === '/' ? targetPath : parent,
+            'write',
+        );
+    }
+
     async #assertAccess(
         actor: Actor,
         path: string,
@@ -1649,24 +1676,6 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
             normalizedFileMetadata.multipartPartSize = multipartPartSize;
         }
 
-        const bucket = this.#firstDefined(
-            metadataRecord.bucket,
-            fallbackRecord.bucket,
-        );
-        if (typeof bucket === 'string' && bucket.length > 0) {
-            normalizedFileMetadata.bucket = bucket;
-        }
-
-        const bucketRegion = this.#firstDefined(
-            metadataRecord.bucketRegion,
-            metadataRecord.bucket_region,
-            fallbackRecord.bucketRegion,
-            fallbackRecord.bucket_region,
-        );
-        if (typeof bucketRegion === 'string' && bucketRegion.length > 0) {
-            normalizedFileMetadata.bucketRegion = bucketRegion;
-        }
-
         const associatedAppId = this.#toNumber(
             this.#firstDefined(
                 metadataRecord.associatedAppId,
@@ -2034,56 +2043,7 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
     }
 
     async #toGuiFsEntry(entry: FSEntry): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
-        const dirpath = pathPosix.dirname(entry.path);
-        const extension = pathPosix.extname(entry.name).slice(1).toLowerCase();
-        const response = {
-            id: entry.uuid,
-            uid: entry.uuid,
-            uuid: entry.uuid,
-            parent_id: entry.parentUid,
-            parent_uid: entry.parentUid,
-            path: entry.path,
-            dirname: dirpath,
-            dirpath,
-            name: entry.name,
-            is_dir: entry.isDir,
-            is_shortcut: entry.isShortcut ? 1 : 0,
-            shortcut_to: entry.shortcutTo,
-            type: entry.isDir ? 'folder' : extension,
-            writable: true,
-            is_public: entry.isPublic,
-            thumbnail: entry.thumbnail,
-            immutable: entry.immutable,
-            metadata: entry.metadata,
-            modified: entry.modified,
-            created: entry.created,
-            accessed: entry.accessed,
-            size: entry.size,
-        };
-
-        if (
-            typeof response.thumbnail === 'string' &&
-            response.thumbnail.length > 0
-        ) {
-            const thumbnailEntry = {
-                uuid: entry.uuid,
-                thumbnail: response.thumbnail,
-            };
-            // emitAndWait — listener rewrites s3:// / legacy URLs into
-            // time-limited signed URLs on the payload object.
-            await this.clients.event.emitAndWait(
-                'thumbnail.read',
-                thumbnailEntry,
-                {},
-            );
-            response.thumbnail =
-                typeof thumbnailEntry.thumbnail === 'string' &&
-                thumbnailEntry.thumbnail.length > 0
-                    ? thumbnailEntry.thumbnail
-                    : null;
-        }
-
-        return response;
+        return toLegacyEntry(this.clients.event, entry);
     }
 
     async #emitGuiWriteEvent(
@@ -2093,7 +2053,7 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
     ): Promise<void> {
         const response = {
             ...(await this.#toGuiFsEntry(fsEntry)),
-            ...this.#toEventGuiMetadata(guiMetadata, false),
+            ...this.#toEventGuiMetadata(guiMetadata),
             from_new_service: true,
         };
         await this.clients.event.emit(
@@ -2144,6 +2104,20 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
         return pathParts.length >= 2 && pathParts[1] === 'AppData';
     }
 
+    // If `actor` is effectively scoped to an app (directly or through an
+    // access-token issuer chain), return that app's AppData root under the
+    // actor's user. Returns undefined for pure user actors. The store anchors
+    // search results to this path so app actors can't see entries outside
+    // their AppData via `/fs/search`.
+    #appDataScopeForActor(actor: Actor): string | undefined {
+        const app = effectiveActorApp(actor);
+        if (!app) return undefined;
+        const username = actor.user?.username;
+        if (typeof username !== 'string' || username.length === 0)
+            return undefined;
+        return `/${username}/AppData/${app.uid}`;
+    }
+
     #estimateDataUrlSize(dataUrl: string): number {
         const commaIndex = dataUrl.indexOf(',');
         const base64 =
@@ -2237,7 +2211,7 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
             return null;
         }
 
-        return { index, contentType, size };
+        return { index, contentType, size } as ThumbnailUploadPrepareItem;
     }
 
     async #attachSignedThumbnailUploadTargets(
@@ -2257,11 +2231,12 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
 
         const payload: ThumbnailUploadPreparePayload = {
             items: prepareItems.map(
-                (item): ThumbnailUploadPrepareItem => ({
-                    index: item.index,
-                    contentType: item.contentType,
-                    ...(item.size !== undefined ? { size: item.size } : {}),
-                }),
+                (item): ThumbnailUploadPrepareItem =>
+                    ({
+                        index: item.index,
+                        contentType: item.contentType,
+                        ...(item.size !== undefined ? { size: item.size } : {}),
+                    }) as ThumbnailUploadPrepareItem,
             ),
         };
         // emitAndWait — listeners populate `uploadUrl` / `thumbnailUrl` on

src/backend/controllers/fs/LegacyFSController.test.ts

@@ -206,6 +206,78 @@ describe('LegacyFSController.mkdir', () => {
         expect(fetched?.isDir).toBe(true);
     });
 
+    it('dedupes an existing directory when dedupe_name is true', async () => {
+        const { actor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = actor.user!.username!;
+        const parent = `/${username}/Documents`;
+
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.mkdir(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { parent, path: 'hello' },
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.mkdir(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { parent, path: 'hello', dedupe_name: true },
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const body = captured.body as Record<string, unknown>;
+        expect(body).toMatchObject({
+            path: `${parent}/hello (1)`,
+            name: 'hello (1)',
+            is_dir: true,
+        });
+        expect(
+            await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(`${parent}/hello (1)`),
+        ).toMatchObject({ isDir: true });
+    });
+
+    it('requires parent write when deduping an existing directory', async () => {
+        const { actor: userActor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = userActor.user!.username!;
+        const appUid = `app-legacy-mkdir-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const appActor: Actor = { ...userActor, app: { uid: appUid } };
+        const parent = `/${username}/AppData`;
+
+        await withActor(userActor, () =>
+            controller.mkdir(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { parent, path: appUid },
+                    actor: userActor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        await expect(
+            withActor(appActor, () =>
+                controller.mkdir(
+                    makeReq({
+                        body: { parent, path: appUid, dedupe_name: true },
+                        actor: appActor,
+                    }),
+                    makeRes().res,
+                ),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
+        expect(
+            await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+                `${parent}/${appUid} (1)`,
+            ),
+        ).toBeNull();
+    });
+
     it("rejects writing into another user's home with a 4xx", async () => {
         const a = await makeUser();
         const b = await makeUser();
@@ -813,6 +885,57 @@ describe('LegacyFSController.search', () => {
         expect(Array.isArray(results)).toBe(true);
         expect(results.some((r) => r.name === needle)).toBe(true);
     });
+
+    it('scopes app-under-user actors to their AppData root', async () => {
+        const { actor: userActor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = userActor.user!.username!;
+        const appUid = `app-legacy-search-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const appActor: Actor = { ...userActor, app: { uid: appUid } };
+        const needle = `appneedle-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
+
+        await withActor(userActor, () =>
+            controller.mkdir(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { path: `/${username}/Documents/${needle}` },
+                    actor: userActor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+        await withActor(userActor, () =>
+            controller.mkdir(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: {
+                        path: `/${username}/AppData/${appUid}/${needle}`,
+                        create_missing_parents: true,
+                    },
+                    actor: userActor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(appActor, () =>
+            controller.search(
+                makeReq({ body: { query: needle }, actor: appActor }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const results = captured.body as Array<{ path: string }>;
+        expect(results.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+        for (const r of results) {
+            expect(
+                r.path === `/${username}/AppData/${appUid}` ||
+                    r.path.startsWith(`/${username}/AppData/${appUid}/`),
+            ).toBe(true);
+        }
+        expect(
+            results.some(
+                (r) => r.path === `/${username}/Documents/${needle}`,
+            ),
+        ).toBe(false);
+    });
 });
 
 // ── read (validation paths only) ────────────────────────────────────
@@ -959,6 +1082,76 @@ describe('LegacyFSController.sign', () => {
             ),
         ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
     });
+
+    it('refuses an app actor signing for a different app (403)', async () => {
+        // An app-under-user actor may only mint a token for its own app;
+        // requesting a different app's UID is rejected.
+        const { actor: userActor } = await makeUser();
+        const targetApp = await (
+            server.stores.app.create as unknown as (
+                fields: Record<string, unknown>,
+                opts: { ownerUserId: number },
+            ) => Promise<{ uid: string; id: number }>
+        )(
+            {
+                name: `victim-${uuidv4()}`,
+                title: 'Victim app',
+                index_url: 'https://example.test/victim.html',
+            },
+            { ownerUserId: userActor.user!.id! },
+        );
+        const attackerActor: Actor = {
+            ...userActor,
+            app: { uid: `attacker-${uuidv4()}` },
+        };
+
+        const { res } = makeRes();
+        await expect(
+            withActor(attackerActor, () =>
+                controller.sign(
+                    makeReq({
+                        body: {
+                            items: [{}],
+                            app_uid: targetApp.uid,
+                        },
+                        actor: attackerActor,
+                    }),
+                    res,
+                ),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403, legacyCode: 'forbidden' });
+    });
+
+    it('lets an app actor sign for its own app', async () => {
+        const { actor: userActor } = await makeUser();
+        const ownApp = await (
+            server.stores.app.create as unknown as (
+                fields: Record<string, unknown>,
+                opts: { ownerUserId: number },
+            ) => Promise<{ uid: string; id: number }>
+        )(
+            {
+                name: `self-${uuidv4()}`,
+                title: 'Self app',
+                index_url: 'https://example.test/self.html',
+            },
+            { ownerUserId: userActor.user!.id! },
+        );
+        const appActor: Actor = { ...userActor, app: { uid: ownApp.uid } };
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(appActor, () =>
+            controller.sign(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { items: [{}], app_uid: ownApp.uid },
+                    actor: appActor,
+                }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const body = captured.body as { token?: string };
+        expect(typeof body.token).toBe('string');
+    });
 });
 
 // ── writeFile (validation paths) ────────────────────────────────────
@@ -1038,6 +1231,85 @@ describe('LegacyFSController.openItem', () => {
     });
 });
 
+// ── openItem: write_url stripping for read-only callers ─────────────
+//
+// Mirrors `/sign` and `/readdir`, which already strip `write_url` when the
+// caller only proved read. Without these gates, /open_item handed out a
+// valid write signature to read-only sharees — `/writeFile`'s own ACL
+// re-check would still reject the write, but the leak shape (a signed
+// write URL escaping the access boundary) is the same one those other
+// endpoints already defend against.
+
+describe('LegacyFSController.openItem (write_url stripping)', () => {
+    beforeAll(() => {
+        (
+            controller as unknown as { config: { api_base_url?: string } }
+        ).config.api_base_url = 'http://api.test.local';
+    });
+
+    it('returns write_url for the owner (who has write)', async () => {
+        const { actor } = await makeUser();
+        const target = `/${actor.user!.username}/Documents/owned.txt`;
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.touch(
+                makeReq({ body: { path: target }, actor }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.openItem(
+                makeReq({ body: { path: target }, actor }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const body = captured.body as {
+            signature: { read_url?: string; write_url?: string };
+        };
+        expect(body.signature.read_url).toBeDefined();
+        expect(body.signature.write_url).toBeDefined();
+        expect(body.signature.write_url).toContain('writeFile');
+    });
+
+    it('strips write_url for a read-only sharee (the fix)', async () => {
+        const victim = await makeUser();
+        const attacker = await makeUser();
+        const target = `/${victim.actor.user!.username}/Documents/shared-ro.txt`;
+        await withActor(victim.actor, () =>
+            controller.touch(
+                makeReq({ body: { path: target }, actor: victim.actor }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const entry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(target);
+        await server.services.permission.grantUserUserPermission(
+            victim.actor,
+            attacker.actor.user!.username!,
+            `fs:${entry!.uuid}:read`,
+            {},
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(attacker.actor, () =>
+            controller.openItem(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { uid: entry!.uuid },
+                    actor: attacker.actor,
+                }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const body = captured.body as {
+            signature: { read_url?: string; write_url?: string };
+        };
+        // Sharee still gets read_url (they have read).
+        expect(body.signature.read_url).toBeDefined();
+        // …but write_url is stripped (they don't have write).
+        expect(body.signature.write_url).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+});
+
 // ── requestAppRootDir ───────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 describe('LegacyFSController.requestAppRootDir', () => {
@@ -2032,3 +2304,197 @@ describe('LegacyFSController.readdir extras', () => {
         ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
     });
 });
+
+// ── suggestApps (ACL-gated) ─────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('LegacyFSController.suggestApps', () => {
+    it('refuses to look up entries an app actor cannot see', async () => {
+        const { actor: userActor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = userActor.user!.username!;
+        const appActor: Actor = {
+            ...userActor,
+            app: { uid: `app-suggest-${uuidv4()}` },
+        };
+        const target = `/${username}/Documents/probe.txt`;
+        await withActor(userActor, () =>
+            controller.touch(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { path: target, set_modified_to_now: true },
+                    actor: userActor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const spy = vi.spyOn(
+            server.services.suggestedApps,
+            'getSuggestedApps',
+        );
+        try {
+            const { res } = makeRes();
+            await withActor(appActor, () =>
+                controller.suggestApps(
+                    makeReq({ body: { path: target }, actor: appActor }),
+                    res,
+                ),
+            );
+            expect(spy).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith({
+                name: undefined,
+                path: undefined,
+            });
+        } finally {
+            spy.mockRestore();
+        }
+    });
+
+    it('forwards entry name/path to the suggester for the owning user', async () => {
+        const { actor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = actor.user!.username!;
+        const target = `/${username}/Documents/probe2.txt`;
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.touch(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { path: target, set_modified_to_now: true },
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const spy = vi.spyOn(
+            server.services.suggestedApps,
+            'getSuggestedApps',
+        );
+        try {
+            const { res } = makeRes();
+            await withActor(actor, () =>
+                controller.suggestApps(
+                    makeReq({ body: { path: target }, actor }),
+                    res,
+                ),
+            );
+            expect(spy).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith({
+                name: 'probe2.txt',
+                path: target,
+            });
+        } finally {
+            spy.mockRestore();
+        }
+    });
+});
+
+// ── readdirSubdomains ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('LegacyFSController.readdirSubdomains', () => {
+    it('returns an empty array for app-under-user actors', async () => {
+        const { actor: userActor, userId } = await makeUser();
+        const appActor: Actor = {
+            ...userActor,
+            app: { uid: `app-subd-${uuidv4()}` },
+        };
+        await server.clients.db.write(
+            'INSERT INTO `subdomains` (`uuid`, `subdomain`, `user_id`) VALUES (?, ?, ?)',
+            [uuidv4(), `sd-${uuidv4().slice(0, 8)}`, userId],
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(appActor, () =>
+            controller.readdirSubdomains(
+                makeReq({ body: {}, actor: appActor }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+        expect(captured.body).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    it("returns the user actor's own subdomain rows", async () => {
+        const { actor, userId } = await makeUser();
+        const sd = `sd-${uuidv4().slice(0, 8)}`;
+        await server.clients.db.write(
+            'INSERT INTO `subdomains` (`uuid`, `subdomain`, `user_id`) VALUES (?, ?, ?)',
+            [uuidv4(), sd, userId],
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.readdirSubdomains(
+                makeReq({ body: {}, actor }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const rows = captured.body as Array<{ subdomain: string }>;
+        expect(rows.some((r) => r.subdomain === sd)).toBe(true);
+    });
+});
+
+// ── updateFsentryThumbnail ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('LegacyFSController.updateFsentryThumbnail', () => {
+    it('rejects an app actor probing entries outside AppData with 404', async () => {
+        const { actor: userActor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = userActor.user!.username!;
+        const appActor: Actor = {
+            ...userActor,
+            app: { uid: `app-thumb-${uuidv4()}` },
+        };
+        const target = `/${username}/Documents/thumbme.txt`;
+        await withActor(userActor, () =>
+            controller.touch(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { path: target, set_modified_to_now: true },
+                    actor: userActor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const entry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(target);
+
+        const { res } = makeRes();
+        await expect(
+            withActor(appActor, () =>
+                controller.updateFsentryThumbnail(
+                    makeReq({
+                        body: {
+                            uid: entry!.uuid,
+                            thumbnail: '',
+                        },
+                        actor: appActor,
+                    }),
+                    res,
+                ),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
+    });
+
+    it('updates the thumbnail for the owning user actor', async () => {
+        const { actor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = actor.user!.username!;
+        const target = `/${username}/Documents/thumbme2.txt`;
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.touch(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { path: target, set_modified_to_now: true },
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const entry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(target);
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.updateFsentryThumbnail(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: {
+                        uid: entry!.uuid,
+                        thumbnail: '',
+                    },
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const body = captured.body as { thumbnail: string };
+        expect(typeof body.thumbnail).toBe('string');
+    });
+});

src/backend/controllers/fs/LegacyFSController.ts

@@ -22,13 +22,14 @@ import type { Request, RequestHandler, Response } from 'express';
 import { contentType as contentTypeFromMime } from 'mime-types';
 import { posix as pathPosix } from 'node:path';
 import type { Actor } from '../../core/actor.js';
-import { isAccessTokenActor } from '../../core/actor.js';
+import { effectiveActorApp, isAccessTokenActor } from '../../core/actor.js';
 import { Context } from '../../core/context.js';
 import { HttpError } from '../../core/http/HttpError.js';
 import type { PuterRouter } from '../../core/http/PuterRouter.js';
 import type { ACLService } from '../../services/acl/ACLService.js';
 import type { SignedFile } from '../../util/fileSigning.js';
 import { verifySignature } from '../../util/fileSigning.js';
+import { applyInlineContentSecurity } from '../../util/inlineContentSecurity.js';
 import { PuterController } from '../types.js';
 import { FS_COSTS } from './costs.js';
 import {
@@ -57,6 +58,16 @@ type RouterCache = Map<string, RequestHandler | null>;
 
 const additionalRoutePaths: Record<string, string> = {};
 
+// Legacy `/batch` multipart upload caps. Each file is buffered fully into
+// memory before any quota / storage check runs, so without these limits an
+// authenticated caller could grow the process heap proportional to whatever
+// they sent. Streaming uploads go through `/writeFile`; this path is for
+// pre-v2 clients only.
+const BATCH_MAX_FILE_SIZE = 100 * 1024 * 1024; // 100 MiB per file
+const BATCH_MAX_FILES = 64;
+const BATCH_MAX_PARTS = 256;
+const BATCH_MAX_FIELD_SIZE = 1 * 1024 * 1024; // 1 MiB per operation/fileinfo JSON
+
 async function loadAdditionalRouter(
     key: string,
 ): Promise<RequestHandler | null> {
@@ -74,7 +85,7 @@ async function loadAdditionalRouter(
     }
 }
 
-// ── Controller ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Controller ------------------------------------------------------
 
 export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
     #additionalCache: RouterCache = new Map();
@@ -136,6 +147,11 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: ['api', ''],
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                // The user's own credential may download their files; apps and
+                // scoped tokens stay blocked. antiCsrf still protects the
+                // cookie-authed GUI path — a bearer-token PAT is exempt below
+                // (CSRF can't forge a header-credentialed request).
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
                 requireVerified: true,
                 antiCsrf: true,
             },
@@ -195,35 +211,7 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
             res.json({ recommended, recent });
         });
 
-        router.post('/suggest_apps', apiOptions, async (req, res) => {
-            const suggestSvc = this.services.suggestedApps;
-            if (!suggestSvc?.getSuggestedApps) {
-                res.json([]);
-                return;
-            }
-            const body = req.body ?? {};
-            // Client sends { uid } or { path } identifying a file entry.
-            // Resolve the entry to get its name/path for extension detection.
-            let entryName: string | undefined;
-            let entryPath: string | undefined;
-            if (body.uid || body.path) {
-                try {
-                    const entry = await resolveV1Selector(
-                        this.stores.fsEntry,
-                        body,
-                    );
-                    entryName = entry?.name;
-                    entryPath = entry?.path;
-                } catch {
-                    // If we can't resolve, fall back to empty
-                }
-            }
-            const suggestions = await suggestSvc.getSuggestedApps({
-                name: entryName,
-                path: entryPath,
-            });
-            res.json(suggestions);
-        });
+        router.post('/suggest_apps', apiOptions, this.suggestApps);
 
         // puter-js polls this to decide whether to purge its in-memory FS
         // cache. SocketService bumps a per-user Redis key on every
@@ -251,70 +239,11 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
             },
         );
 
-        // ── POST /readdir-subdomains ────────────────────────────────
-        router.post(
-            '/readdir-subdomains',
-            apiOptions,
-            async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
-                const userId = req.actor?.user?.id;
-                if (!userId)
-                    throw new HttpError(401, 'Authentication required', {
-                        legacyCode: 'unauthorized',
-                    });
-                const rows = await this.clients.db.read(
-                    'SELECT `subdomain`, `root_dir_id`, `uuid`, `ts` FROM `subdomains` WHERE `user_id` = ?',
-                    [userId],
-                );
-                res.json(rows);
-            },
-        );
-
-        // ── POST /update-fsentry-thumbnail ──────────────────────────
+        router.post('/readdir-subdomains', apiOptions, this.readdirSubdomains);
         router.post(
             '/update-fsentry-thumbnail',
             apiOptions,
-            async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
-                const userId = req.actor?.user?.id;
-                if (!userId)
-                    throw new HttpError(401, 'Authentication required', {
-                        legacyCode: 'unauthorized',
-                    });
-                const { uid, thumbnail } = (req.body ?? {}) as {
-                    uid?: string;
-                    thumbnail?: string;
-                };
-                if (!uid)
-                    throw new HttpError(400, 'Missing `uid`', {
-                        legacyCode: 'bad_request',
-                    });
-                if (!thumbnail)
-                    throw new HttpError(400, 'Missing `thumbnail`', {
-                        legacyCode: 'bad_request',
-                    });
-
-                const entry = await this.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByUuid(uid);
-                if (!entry || entry.userId !== userId)
-                    throw new HttpError(403, 'Access denied', {
-                        legacyCode: 'forbidden',
-                    });
-
-                // Emit thumbnail.created so the thumbnails extension can S3-upload.
-                // emitAndWait is required — the extension rewrites `event.url`
-                // from a data URL to an `s3://` pointer, and the DB write below
-                // needs to see that rewrite.
-                const event = { url: thumbnail };
-                await this.clients.event.emitAndWait(
-                    'thumbnail.created',
-                    event,
-                    {},
-                );
-
-                await this.clients.db.write(
-                    'UPDATE `fsentries` SET `thumbnail` = ? WHERE `uuid` = ?',
-                    [event.url, uid],
-                );
-                res.json({ thumbnail: event.url });
-            },
+            this.updateFsentryThumbnail,
         );
 
         for (const key of Object.keys(additionalRoutePaths)) {
@@ -328,7 +257,7 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         }
     }
 
-    // ── Route implementations ───────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Route implementations -------------------------------------------
     //
     // Handlers are public arrow class fields so they auto-bind `this` and can
     // be passed directly to `router.post(...)` without `.bind(this)`. Express
@@ -504,17 +433,33 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         const normalizedTarget = targetPath.startsWith('/')
             ? targetPath
             : `/${targetPath}`;
+        const dedupeName =
+            getBoolean(body, 'dedupe_name', 'change_name') ?? false;
         await assertCanCreate(
             this.services.acl,
             this.services.fs,
             actor,
             normalizedTarget,
         );
+        if (dedupeName) {
+            const existing =
+                await this.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(normalizedTarget);
+            if (existing) {
+                const parent = pathPosix.dirname(normalizedTarget);
+                await assertAccess(
+                    this.services.acl,
+                    this.services.fs,
+                    actor,
+                    parent === '/' ? normalizedTarget : parent,
+                    'write',
+                );
+            }
+        }
 
         const entry = await this.services.fs.mkdir(userId, {
             path: targetPath,
             overwrite: getBoolean(body, 'overwrite') ?? false,
-            dedupeName: getBoolean(body, 'dedupe_name', 'change_name') ?? false,
+            dedupeName,
             createMissingParents:
                 getBoolean(
                     body,
@@ -756,8 +701,108 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         res.send('');
     };
 
+    suggestApps = async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
+        const suggestSvc = this.services.suggestedApps;
+        if (!suggestSvc?.getSuggestedApps) {
+            res.json([]);
+            return;
+        }
+        const actor = this.#requireActor(req);
+        const body = asRecord(req.body);
+        let entryName: string | undefined;
+        let entryPath: string | undefined;
+        if (body.uid || body.path) {
+            try {
+                const entry = await resolveV1Selector(
+                    this.stores.fsEntry,
+                    body,
+                );
+                // Suggestions leak the entry's extension and existence;
+                // gate on `see` so app actors can't probe outside scope.
+                if (entry?.path) {
+                    await assertAccess(
+                        this.services.acl,
+                        this.services.fs,
+                        actor,
+                        entry.path,
+                        'see',
+                    );
+                }
+                entryName = entry?.name;
+                entryPath = entry?.path;
+            } catch {
+                // Unresolvable or ACL-denied → empty suggestions.
+            }
+        }
+        const suggestions = await suggestSvc.getSuggestedApps({
+            name: entryName,
+            path: entryPath,
+        });
+        res.json(suggestions);
+    };
+
+    readdirSubdomains = async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
+        const actor = this.#requireActor(req);
+        // Subdomain enumeration is a user-level concern; app actors would
+        // otherwise see root_dir uids pointing outside their AppData scope.
+        if (effectiveActorApp(actor)) {
+            res.json([]);
+            return;
+        }
+        const userId = this.#getActorUserId(req);
+        const rows = await this.clients.db.read(
+            'SELECT `subdomain`, `root_dir_id`, `uuid`, `ts` FROM `subdomains` WHERE `user_id` = ?',
+            [userId],
+        );
+        res.json(rows);
+    };
+
+    updateFsentryThumbnail = async (
+        req: Request,
+        res: Response,
+    ): Promise<void> => {
+        const actor = this.#requireActor(req);
+        const { uid, thumbnail } = asRecord(req.body) as {
+            uid?: string;
+            thumbnail?: string;
+        };
+        if (!uid)
+            throw new HttpError(400, 'Missing `uid`', {
+                legacyCode: 'bad_request',
+            });
+        if (!thumbnail)
+            throw new HttpError(400, 'Missing `thumbnail`', {
+                legacyCode: 'bad_request',
+            });
+
+        const entry = await this.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByUuid(uid);
+        if (!entry || !entry.path)
+            throw new HttpError(404, `Entry not found: uid=${uid}`, {
+                legacyCode: 'subject_does_not_exist',
+            });
+        await assertAccess(
+            this.services.acl,
+            this.services.fs,
+            actor,
+            entry.path,
+            'write',
+        );
+
+        // emitAndWait is required: the thumbnails extension rewrites
+        // `event.url` from a data URL to an `s3://` pointer, and the DB
+        // write below needs to see that rewrite.
+        const event = { url: thumbnail };
+        await this.clients.event.emitAndWait('thumbnail.created', event, {});
+
+        await this.clients.db.write(
+            'UPDATE `fsentries` SET `thumbnail` = ? WHERE `uuid` = ?',
+            [event.url, uid],
+        );
+        res.json({ thumbnail: event.url });
+    };
+
     search = async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
-        this.#requireActor(req);
+        const actor = this.#requireActor(req);
         const userId = this.#getActorUserId(req);
         const body = asRecord(req.body);
         const query = getString(body, 'query', 'text') ?? '';
@@ -766,7 +811,21 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
                 legacyCode: 'bad_request',
             });
 
-        const results = await this.services.fs.searchByName(userId, query, 200);
+        // App-under-user actors only see entries within their AppData root;
+        // user actors are unscoped. Mirrors the ACL short-circuit in
+        // ACLService.check.
+        const app = effectiveActorApp(actor);
+        const username = actor.user?.username;
+        const pathScope =
+            app && typeof username === 'string' && username.length > 0
+                ? `/${username}/AppData/${app.uid}`
+                : undefined;
+        const results = await this.services.fs.searchByName(
+            userId,
+            query,
+            200,
+            pathScope,
+        );
         const shaped = await Promise.all(
             results.map((r) => toLegacyEntry(this.clients.event, r)),
         );
@@ -888,7 +947,7 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         return this.read(req, res, { realMime: true });
     };
 
-    // ── Signed-URL + meta routes ────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Signed-URL + meta routes ----------------------------------------
 
     /**
      * POST /sign
@@ -937,7 +996,10 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
                     legacyCode: 'not_found',
                 });
             grantApp = { uid: app.uid };
-            result.token = this.services.auth.getUserAppToken(actor, app.uid);
+            result.token = await this.services.auth.getUserAppToken(
+                actor,
+                app.uid,
+            );
         }
 
         for (const rawItem of items) {
@@ -1001,7 +1063,12 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
                 }
 
                 const signed = signEntry(entry, signingCfg);
-                result.signatures.push({ ...signed, path: entry.path });
+                if (finalAction !== 'write') {
+                    const { write_url: _, ...rest } = signed;
+                    result.signatures.push({ ...rest, path: entry.path });
+                } else {
+                    result.signatures.push({ ...signed, path: entry.path });
+                }
             } catch {
                 // Silently skip unresolvable items.
                 result.signatures.push({});
@@ -1054,7 +1121,32 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         const operation =
             typeof query.operation === 'string' ? query.operation : 'write';
 
-        // `write` — multipart upload, streamed directly to the v2 write path.
+        // A valid write signature authorises overwriting the file's bytes,
+        // not structural changes. Restrict copy/move/mkdir/rename/delete/trash
+        // to a caller authenticated as the owner — otherwise a recipient of a
+        // write-share could relocate or destroy the source via this endpoint.
+        if (operation !== 'write' && req.actor?.user?.id !== userId) {
+            throw new HttpError(
+                403,
+                `'${operation}' via signed URL requires owner authentication`,
+                { legacyCode: 'forbidden' },
+            );
+        }
+
+        // ACL re-check: require an authenticated actor with write
+        // permission. A valid write signature alone is not sufficient —
+        // the caller must also pass ACL, preventing exploitation of
+        // leaked write URLs by read-only share recipients.
+        const callerActor = this.#requireActor(req);
+        if (operation === 'write') {
+            await assertAccess(
+                this.services.acl,
+                this.services.fs,
+                callerActor,
+                targetEntry.path,
+                'write',
+            );
+        }
         if (operation === 'write') {
             const body = asRecord(req.body);
             const parentEntry = targetEntry.isDir
@@ -1087,8 +1179,18 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         }
 
         // Non-write operations: route to existing service methods and sign the result.
+        // The signature alone authorises only byte writes to `targetEntry`. Structural
+        // ops (mkdir/rename/copy/move/delete) require a caller actor with explicit
+        // ACL on the affected paths — mirroring the unsigned counterparts above.
         const record = asRecord(req.body);
         if (operation === 'mkdir') {
+            await assertAccess(
+                this.services.acl,
+                this.services.fs,
+                callerActor,
+                targetEntry.path,
+                'write',
+            );
             const folderName =
                 typeof record.name === 'string'
                     ? record.name
@@ -1110,12 +1212,26 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
                 throw new HttpError(400, '`new_name` required', {
                     legacyCode: 'bad_request',
                 });
+            await assertAccess(
+                this.services.acl,
+                this.services.fs,
+                callerActor,
+                targetEntry.path,
+                'write',
+            );
             const renamed = await this.services.fs.rename(targetEntry, newName);
             await this.#emitGuiEvent('outer.gui.item.updated', renamed);
             res.json({ ...signEntry(renamed, signingCfg), path: renamed.path });
             return;
         }
         if (operation === 'delete' || operation === 'trash') {
+            await assertAccess(
+                this.services.acl,
+                this.services.fs,
+                callerActor,
+                targetEntry.path,
+                'write',
+            );
             // Treat trash == delete (recursive). Most clients just call delete
             // directly; if a trash folder becomes important we can revisit.
             await this.services.fs.remove(userId, {
@@ -1139,6 +1255,20 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
                 this.stores.fsEntry,
                 destRef,
             );
+            await assertAccess(
+                this.services.acl,
+                this.services.fs,
+                callerActor,
+                targetEntry.path,
+                operation === 'copy' ? 'read' : 'write',
+            );
+            await assertAccess(
+                this.services.acl,
+                this.services.fs,
+                callerActor,
+                destinationParent.path,
+                'write',
+            );
             const method = operation === 'copy' ? 'copy' : 'move';
             const result = await this.services.fs[method](userId, {
                 source: targetEntry,
@@ -1203,12 +1333,14 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         }
 
         // Directory: return a signed listing of direct children.
+        // The caller only proved read access, so strip write_url from
+        // each child to prevent privilege escalation via /writeFile.
         if (entry.isDir) {
             const children = await this.services.fs.listDirectory(entry.uuid);
-            const signedChildren = children.map((child) => ({
-                ...signEntry(child, signingCfg),
-                path: child.path,
-            }));
+            const signedChildren = children.map((child) => {
+                const { write_url: _, ...rest } = signEntry(child, signingCfg);
+                return { ...rest, path: child.path };
+            });
             res.json(signedChildren);
             return;
         }
@@ -1226,8 +1358,15 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
             query.download === '1' ||
             query.download === true;
 
-        if (download.contentType)
+        if (download.contentType) {
             res.setHeader('Content-Type', download.contentType);
+            // Uploader-controlled type served inline on the file origin —
+            // sandbox active-document types so an uploaded HTML/SVG can't
+            // execute scripts here. Mirrors FSController /fs/read.
+            if (!wantsAttachment) {
+                applyInlineContentSecurity(res, download.contentType);
+            }
+        }
         if (download.contentLength !== null)
             res.setHeader('Content-Length', String(download.contentLength));
         if (download.contentRange)
@@ -1281,6 +1420,20 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
             'read',
         );
 
+        // Downgrade the envelope when the caller only proved read.
+        // `/writeFile`'s ACL re-check would still block the write, but
+        // returning `write_url` to a read-only caller is the same
+        // privilege-leak shape that `/sign` and `/readdir` strip.
+        const writeOk = await this.services.acl.check(
+            actor,
+            {
+                path: entry.path,
+                resolveAncestors: () =>
+                    this.services.fs.getAncestorChain(entry.path),
+            },
+            'write',
+        );
+
         const suggested =
             (await this.services.suggestedApps?.getSuggestedApps({
                 name: entry.name,
@@ -1300,11 +1453,20 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
                 {},
                 { reason: 'open_item' },
             );
-            token = this.services.auth.getUserAppToken(actor, defaultAppUid);
+            token = await this.services.auth.getUserAppToken(
+                actor,
+                defaultAppUid,
+            );
         }
 
         const signingCfg = signingConfigFromAppConfig(this.config);
-        const signature = { ...signEntry(entry, signingCfg), path: entry.path };
+        const signed = signEntry(entry, signingCfg);
+        const signature = writeOk
+            ? { ...signed, path: entry.path }
+            : (() => {
+                  const { write_url: _, ...rest } = signed;
+                  return { ...rest, path: entry.path };
+              })();
         res.json({
             signature,
             token,
@@ -1470,7 +1632,7 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
     };
 
     // Helpers for writeFile
-    // ── GUI event emission ───────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- GUI event emission -------------------------------------------
     //
     // Fire-and-forget `outer.gui.item.*` events so SocketService,
     // BroadcastService, WorkerDriver (hot-reload), and cache-invalidation
@@ -1600,7 +1762,7 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         });
     }
 
-    // ── Batch route ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Batch route -----------------------------------------------------
     //
     // `/batch` interleaves multipart JSON operations with optional file
     // uploads. puter-js uses it for `write`, `shortcut`, `mkdir`, `move`,
@@ -1909,7 +2071,46 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
             }> = [];
             const fileinfos: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
             let parseError: Error | null = null;
-            const bb = Busboy({ headers: req.headers });
+            const bb = Busboy({
+                headers: req.headers,
+                limits: {
+                    fileSize: BATCH_MAX_FILE_SIZE,
+                    files: BATCH_MAX_FILES,
+                    parts: BATCH_MAX_PARTS,
+                    fieldSize: BATCH_MAX_FIELD_SIZE,
+                },
+            });
+
+            // Busboy emits these `*Limit` events when a configured cap is
+            // hit. Capture the first one as a 413 so callers get a clean
+            // signal instead of a silently-truncated upload.
+            bb.on('filesLimit', () => {
+                if (!parseError) {
+                    parseError = new HttpError(
+                        413,
+                        `Too many files in batch (max ${BATCH_MAX_FILES})`,
+                        { legacyCode: 'too_large' as never },
+                    );
+                }
+            });
+            bb.on('partsLimit', () => {
+                if (!parseError) {
+                    parseError = new HttpError(
+                        413,
+                        `Too many parts in batch (max ${BATCH_MAX_PARTS})`,
+                        { legacyCode: 'too_large' as never },
+                    );
+                }
+            });
+            bb.on('fieldsLimit', () => {
+                if (!parseError) {
+                    parseError = new HttpError(
+                        413,
+                        'Too many fields in batch',
+                        { legacyCode: 'too_large' as never },
+                    );
+                }
+            });
 
             bb.on('field', (fieldName, value) => {
                 try {
@@ -1936,8 +2137,24 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
             // For streaming uploads use the signed `/writeFile` endpoint.
             bb.on('file', (_fieldName, stream, info) => {
                 const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
+                let truncated = false;
                 stream.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => chunks.push(chunk));
+                // Busboy emits `limit` after writing the first byte past
+                // `fileSize`. The stream continues being drained so the
+                // multipart parser stays in sync, but we discard the (now
+                // truncated) buffer and mark the batch as failed.
+                stream.on('limit', () => {
+                    truncated = true;
+                    if (!parseError) {
+                        parseError = new HttpError(
+                            413,
+                            `File in batch exceeds ${BATCH_MAX_FILE_SIZE} bytes`,
+                            { legacyCode: 'too_large' as never },
+                        );
+                    }
+                });
                 stream.on('end', () => {
+                    if (truncated) return;
                     files.push({
                         content: Buffer.concat(chunks),
                         mimeType:
@@ -1997,7 +2214,7 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         return { error: true, status: 500, message: 'Unknown batch error' };
     }
 
-    // ── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Helpers ---------------------------------------------------------
 
     #parsePositiveIntegerQuery(
         query: Record<string, unknown>,

src/backend/controllers/fs/legacyFsHelpers.ts

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ import type { IConfig } from '../../types.js';
  * terse.
  */
 
-// ── Body parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Body parsing -----------------------------------------------------
 
 export function asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> {
     if (!value || typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value)) return {};
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ export async function resolveV1Selector(
     return entry;
 }
 
-// ── ACL ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- ACL --------------------------------------------------------------
 
 export async function assertAccess(
     aclService: ACLService,
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ export async function assertCanCreate(
     await assertAccess(aclService, fsService, actor, parentForCheck, 'write');
 }
 
-// ── Response shaping ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Response shaping ------------------------------------------------
 
 type AppRowLookup = {
     getByIds: (ids: number[]) => Promise<Map<number, Record<string, unknown>>>;
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ export async function toLegacyEntry(
 
 export { normalizeAbsolutePath };
 
-// ── Signing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Signing ---------------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * Pull the signing config off the app config. Throws if either value is

src/backend/controllers/fs/types.ts

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ export interface ThumbnailUploadPrepareItem {
     size?: number;
     uploadUrl?: string;
     thumbnailUrl?: string;
+    item_uid: string;
 }
 
 export interface ThumbnailUploadPreparePayload {

src/backend/controllers/homepage/HomepageController.ts

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ export class HomepageController extends PuterController {
             await homepage.send({ req, res, actor }, meta, launch);
         };
 
-        // ── Root + path-aliased shell routes ────────────────────────
+        // -- Root + path-aliased shell routes ------------------------
 
         router.get('/', {}, (req, res) => sendShell(req, res));
 
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ export class HomepageController extends PuterController {
 
         router.get('/@:username', {}, (req, res) => sendShell(req, res));
 
-        // ── /app/:name ─ app metadata baked into the shell ──────────
+        // -- /app/:name - app metadata baked into the shell ----------
 
         router.get('/app/:name', {}, async (req, res) => {
             const name = String(req.params.name ?? '');
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ export class HomepageController extends PuterController {
             });
         });
 
-        // ── /show/* ─ launch explorer with the requested file path ──
+        // -- /show/* - launch explorer with the requested file path --
 
         router.get('/show/*splat', {}, (req, res) => {
             const filePath = req.path.slice('/show'.length);
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ export class HomepageController extends PuterController {
             return sendShell(req, res, {}, launch);
         });
 
-        // ── Fallback static mount ───────────────────────────────────
+        // -- Fallback static mount -----------------------------------
         // Serves lingering GUI assets (images, fonts, lib files, etc.)
         // out of <gui_assets_root>/src. Falls through to the 404 handler
         // when the file doesn't exist.

src/backend/controllers/hosting/HostingController.js

@@ -37,13 +37,14 @@ export class HostingController extends PuterController {
     }
 
     registerRoutes(router) {
-        // ── Delete site ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- Delete site ---------------------------------------------
 
         router.post(
             '/delete-site',
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
                 requireVerified: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {

src/backend/controllers/notification/NotificationController.ts

@@ -38,7 +38,11 @@ export class NotificationController extends PuterController {
      * POST /notif/mark-ack — user dismissed a notification.
      * Sets `acknowledged` timestamp; pushes ack event to sockets.
      */
-    @Post('/mark-ack', { subdomain: 'api', requireUserActor: true })
+    @Post('/mark-ack', {
+        subdomain: 'api',
+        requireUserActor: true,
+        allowFullAccessToken: true,
+    })
     async markAck(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
         const uid = req.body?.uid;
         if (typeof uid !== 'string' || uid.length === 0) {
@@ -77,7 +81,11 @@ export class NotificationController extends PuterController {
      * POST /notif/mark-read — user saw a notification.
      * Sets `shown` timestamp; pushes ack event to sockets.
      */
-    @Post('/mark-read', { subdomain: 'api', requireUserActor: true })
+    @Post('/mark-read', {
+        subdomain: 'api',
+        requireUserActor: true,
+        allowFullAccessToken: true,
+    })
     async markRead(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
         const uid = req.body?.uid;
         if (typeof uid !== 'string' || uid.length === 0) {

src/backend/controllers/oidc/OIDCController.ts

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ function isSameOrigin(target: string, origin: string): boolean {
  */
 export class OIDCController extends PuterController {
     registerRoutes(router: PuterRouter): void {
-        // ── GET /auth/oidc/providers ────────────────────────────────
+        // -- GET /auth/oidc/providers --------------------------------
         // Public — list enabled provider IDs for the frontend.
 
         router.get(
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ export class OIDCController extends PuterController {
             },
         );
 
-        // ── GET /auth/oidc/:provider/start ──────────────────────────
+        // -- GET /auth/oidc/:provider/start --------------------------
         // Redirect user to IdP authorization endpoint.
 
         router.get(
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ export class OIDCController extends PuterController {
             },
         );
 
-        // ── /auth/oidc/callback/login (GET + POST) ────────────────
+        // -- /auth/oidc/callback/login (GET + POST) ----------------
 
         const cbOpts = {
             subdomain: '',
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ export class OIDCController extends PuterController {
         router.get('/auth/oidc/callback/login', cbOpts, loginCb);
         router.post('/auth/oidc/callback/login', cbOpts, loginCb);
 
-        // ── /auth/oidc/callback/signup (GET + POST) ────────────────
+        // -- /auth/oidc/callback/signup (GET + POST) ----------------
 
         const signupCb = async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
             const origin = this.config.origin ?? '';
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ export class OIDCController extends PuterController {
         router.get('/auth/oidc/callback/signup', cbOpts, signupCb);
         router.post('/auth/oidc/callback/signup', cbOpts, signupCb);
 
-        // ── /auth/oidc/callback/revalidate (GET + POST) ────────────
+        // -- /auth/oidc/callback/revalidate (GET + POST) ------------
 
         const revalidateCb = async (
             req: Request,
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ export class OIDCController extends PuterController {
         router.get('/auth/oidc/callback/revalidate', cbOpts, revalidateCb);
         router.post('/auth/oidc/callback/revalidate', cbOpts, revalidateCb);
 
-        // ── GET /auth/revalidate-done ───────────────────────────────
+        // -- GET /auth/revalidate-done -------------------------------
         // Landing page after revalidation; posts to opener for popup flow.
 
         router.get(
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ if (window.opener) {
         );
     }
 
-    // ── Shared helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Shared helpers ----------------------------------------------
 
     /**
      * Resolve an OIDC callback to a Puter user. In order:

src/backend/controllers/peer/PeerController.ts

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
  * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
+import { createHmac, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
 import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
 import type { Actor } from '../../core/actor.js';
 import { HttpError } from '../../core/http/HttpError.js';
@@ -24,6 +25,21 @@ import type { PuterRouter } from '../../core/http/PuterRouter.js';
 import { PuterController } from '../types.js';
 import { PEER_COSTS } from './costs.js';
 
+/**
+ * Constant-time secret comparison for the internal-auth header. HMAC both
+ * sides under a random per-process key to a fixed 32-byte digest first:
+ * this avoids leaking length via an early-return and sidesteps
+ * `timingSafeEqual`'s equal-length requirement for arbitrary-length
+ * inputs. The key need not persist — it only has to be unknown to the
+ * attacker for the duration of the comparison.
+ */
+const COMPARE_KEY = randomBytes(32);
+const secretsEqual = (a: string, b: string): boolean => {
+    const ha = createHmac('sha256', COMPARE_KEY).update(a).digest();
+    const hb = createHmac('sha256', COMPARE_KEY).update(b).digest();
+    return timingSafeEqual(ha, hb);
+};
+
 /**
  * Encode a UUID (or `app-<uuid>` UID) as base64url with no padding.
  * Strips an `app-` prefix and dashes, then reinterprets the hex bytes.
@@ -170,7 +186,11 @@ export class PeerController extends PuterController {
         }
         const expectedSecret = cfg.internal_auth_secret;
         const header = req.headers['x-puter-internal-auth'];
-        if (!expectedSecret || header !== expectedSecret) {
+        if (
+            !expectedSecret ||
+            typeof header !== 'string' ||
+            !secretsEqual(header, expectedSecret)
+        ) {
             throw new HttpError(403, 'Forbidden', { legacyCode: 'forbidden' });
         }
 

src/backend/controllers/puterai/PuterAIController.test.ts

@@ -188,10 +188,11 @@ describe('PuterAIController.registerRoutes', () => {
             ]),
         );
 
-        // The four upstream-proxy routes are user-only: app actors must
-        // call puter-chat-completion directly. The `requireUserActor`
-        // route option wires up the gate that enforces this, so each
-        // proxy route gets the assertion (not just chat/completions).
+        // The four upstream-proxy routes reject third-party apps (they must
+        // call puter-chat-completion directly), but admit the user's own
+        // full-access personal access token: `requireUserActor` keeps apps out
+        // and `allowFullAccessToken` opens the gate to a full-access PAT. Each
+        // proxy route carries both flags.
         const userOnlyPaths = [
             '/puterai/openai/v1/chat/completions',
             '/puterai/openai/v1/completions',
@@ -203,6 +204,7 @@ describe('PuterAIController.registerRoutes', () => {
             expect(route?.opts).toEqual({
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             });
         }
         const modelsRoute = calls.find(

src/backend/controllers/puterai/PuterAIController.ts

@@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
         const apiAuthOpts = {
             subdomain: 'api',
             requireUserActor: true,
+            // These are the user's own programmatic AI surface (OpenAI/Anthropic
+            // wire). `requireUserActor` here exists to keep third-party apps
+            // out, not to block the user's own credential — so admit full-access
+            // personal access tokens (CLI/MCP/scripts). Apps and scoped tokens
+            // stay blocked.
+            allowFullAccessToken: true,
         } as RouteOptions;
         const publicOpts = { subdomain: 'api', requireAuth: false } as const;
 
@@ -110,7 +116,7 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
             this.#modelDetails('aiVideo'),
         );
 
-        // ── Video URL proxy ─────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- Video URL proxy -----------------------------------------
         // Reverse-proxies AI-generated video URLs that can't be given
         // directly to the client (auth-gated provider downloads). The
         // URL itself is HMAC-signed, so no additional auth gate.
@@ -226,7 +232,7 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
         };
     }
 
-    // ── /openai/v1/chat/completions ─────────────────────────────────
+    // -- /openai/v1/chat/completions ---------------------------------
 
     openaiChatCompletions = async (
         req: Request,
@@ -394,7 +400,7 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
         });
     };
 
-    // ── /openai/v1/completions ──────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- /openai/v1/completions --------------------------------------
 
     openaiCompletions = async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
         const body = asRecord(req.body);
@@ -522,7 +528,7 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
         });
     };
 
-    // ── /openai/v1/responses ────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- /openai/v1/responses ----------------------------------------
 
     openaiResponses = async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
         const body = asRecord(req.body);
@@ -832,7 +838,7 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
         );
     };
 
-    // ── /anthropic/v1/messages ──────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- /anthropic/v1/messages --------------------------------------
 
     anthropicMessages = async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
         const body = asRecord(req.body);
@@ -1037,7 +1043,7 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
         });
     };
 
-    // ── Internals ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Internals ---------------------------------------------------
 
     #driver(): ChatCompletionDriver {
         const driver = this.drivers.aiChat;
@@ -1049,7 +1055,7 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
     }
 }
 
-// ── Shared helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Shared helpers --------------------------------------------------
 
 const DEFAULTS = {
     openaiChat: 'openai-completion',
@@ -1135,7 +1141,7 @@ const pipeNdjsonStream = (
     stream.on('error', opts.onError);
 };
 
-// ── OpenAI/Anthropic shape helpers ───────────────────────────────────
+// -- OpenAI/Anthropic shape helpers -----------------------------------
 
 const extractTextContent = (content: unknown): string => {
     if (content === undefined || content === null) return '';
@@ -1254,7 +1260,7 @@ const getPromptText = (prompt: unknown): string => {
     return prompt;
 };
 
-// ── OpenAI /responses input → message list ──────────────────────────
+// -- OpenAI /responses input → message list --------------------------
 
 const parseJsonMaybe = (value: unknown): unknown => {
     if (typeof value !== 'string') return value ?? {};
@@ -1363,7 +1369,7 @@ const responseInputToMessages = (input: unknown): unknown[] => {
     return messages;
 };
 
-// ── OpenAI /responses result → output items ─────────────────────────
+// -- OpenAI /responses result → output items -------------------------
 
 const responseOutputFromResult = (
     result: Extract<IChatCompleteResult, { message?: unknown }>,
@@ -1484,7 +1490,7 @@ const normalizeResponsesTool = (tool: unknown): unknown => {
     return { ...(t.function as Record<string, unknown>), type: 'function' };
 };
 
-// ── Anthropic → internal messages ───────────────────────────────────
+// -- Anthropic → internal messages -----------------------------------
 
 const normalizeAnthropicTools = (tools: unknown): unknown[] | undefined => {
     if (!Array.isArray(tools) || tools.length === 0) return undefined;

src/backend/controllers/share/ShareController.ts

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ export class ShareController extends PuterController {
         // router.post('/share', { ...api, requireAuth: true }, this.#share);
     }
 
-    // // ── POST /sharelink/check ───────────────────────────────────────
+    // // -- POST /sharelink/check ---------------------------------------
     // // Public — verify a share token from an email link.
 
     // #check = async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ export class ShareController extends PuterController {
     //     });
     // };
 
-    // // ── POST /sharelink/apply ───────────────────────────────────────
+    // // -- POST /sharelink/apply ---------------------------------------
     // // Auth required — apply a pending share's permissions to the caller.
 
     // #apply = async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ export class ShareController extends PuterController {
     //     res.json({ $: 'api:status-report', status: 'success' });
     // };
 
-    // // ── POST /sharelink/request ─────────────────────────────────────
+    // // -- POST /sharelink/request -------------------------------------
     // // Auth required — notify the issuer that someone is requesting access.
 
     // #request = async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ export class ShareController extends PuterController {
     //     res.json({ $: 'api:status-report', status: 'success' });
     // };
 
-    // // ── POST /share ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // // -- POST /share -------------------------------------------------
     // // Auth required — create shares for recipients (users or emails).
 
     // #share = async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ export class ShareController extends PuterController {
     //     });
     // };
 
-    // // ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // // -- Helpers ------------------------------------------------------
 
     // /**
     //  * Convert share declarations into a flat permission list.

src/backend/controllers/static/StaticPagesController.ts

@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ export class StaticPagesController extends PuterController {
             page('✕', 'Something went wrong', msg, '#e53e3e');
         const ok = (msg: string) => page('✓', 'Success', msg, '#38a169');
 
-        // ── /robots.txt ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- /robots.txt ---------------------------------------------
         router.get('/robots.txt', {}, (req, res) => {
             const domain = this.config.domain ?? req.hostname;
             const disallowed = [
@@ -160,12 +160,12 @@ export class StaticPagesController extends PuterController {
             res.type('text/plain').send(body);
         });
 
-        // ── /sitemap.xml ────────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- /sitemap.xml --------------------------------------------
         router.get('/sitemap.xml', {}, async (req, res) => {
             const domain = this.config.domain ?? req.hostname;
             const origin = `${req.protocol}://${domain}`;
             const apps = (await this.clients.db.read(
-                'SELECT `name` FROM `apps` WHERE `approved_for_listing` = 1',
+                `SELECT \`name\` FROM \`apps\` WHERE \`approved_for_listing\` = ${this.clients.db.booleanLiteral(true)}`,
             )) as Array<{ name: string }>;
             const urls = [
                 `<url><loc>${req.protocol}://docs.${domain}/</loc></url>`,
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ export class StaticPagesController extends PuterController {
             res.type('application/xml').send(body);
         });
 
-        // ── /unsubscribe ────────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- /unsubscribe --------------------------------------------
         router.get('/unsubscribe', {}, async (req, res) => {
             const userUuid =
                 typeof req.query.user_uuid === 'string'
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ export class StaticPagesController extends PuterController {
             res.send(ok('You have successfully unsubscribed from all emails.'));
         });
 
-        // ── /confirm-email-by-token ─────────────────────────────────
+        // -- /confirm-email-by-token ---------------------------------
         router.get('/confirm-email-by-token', {}, async (req, res) => {
             const userUuid =
                 typeof req.query.user_uuid === 'string'
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ export class StaticPagesController extends PuterController {
             const [dupe] = (await this.clients.db.read(
                 `SELECT EXISTS(
                     SELECT 1 FROM \`user\` WHERE (\`email\` = ? OR \`clean_email\` = ?)
-                    AND \`email_confirmed\` = 1
+                    AND \`email_confirmed\` = ${this.clients.db.booleanLiteral(true)}
                     AND \`password\` IS NOT NULL
                 ) AS email_exists`,
                 [user.email, cleanEmail],

src/backend/controllers/system/SystemController.js

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ export class SystemController extends PuterController {
         /** @type {import('../../core/http/PuterRouter.js').PuterRouter} */
         router,
     ) {
-        // ── Healthcheck ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- Healthcheck ---------------------------------------------
         // Delegates to ServerHealthService for the real check-based
         // status. Returns `{ ok: true }` when all registered checks pass,
         // or `{ ok: false, failed: [...] }` + 503 when any fail or the
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ export class SystemController extends PuterController {
             return res.json(status);
         });
 
-        // ── Version ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- Version -------------------------------------------------
 
         router.get('/version', { subdomain: '*' }, (_req, res) => {
             const version =
@@ -70,13 +70,14 @@ export class SystemController extends PuterController {
             });
         });
 
-        // ── Contact us ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- Contact us ----------------------------------------------
 
         router.post(
             '/contactUs',
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
                 rateLimit: {
                     scope: 'contact-us',
                     limit: 10,
@@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ export class SystemController extends PuterController {
             },
         );
 
-        // ── GET /whoarewe ───────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- GET /whoarewe -------------------------------------------
 
         router.get('/whoarewe', {}, (_req, res) => {
             res.json({
@@ -139,7 +140,7 @@ export class SystemController extends PuterController {
             });
         });
 
-        // ── GET /lsmod ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+        // -- GET /lsmod ----------------------------------------------
         // Enumerates driver interfaces and their implementors.
 
         router.get(

src/backend/controllers/webdav/WebDAVController.test.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
 // This suite tests basic features of puter webdav. it is not a comprehensive webdav test suite unlike litmus 
 // but rather it performs some common sense checks to ensure that WebDAV support isn't irrevocably broken in puter
 import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
+import { Readable } from 'node:stream';
 import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
 import { PuterRouter } from '../../core/http/PuterRouter.js';
 import { PuterServer } from '../../server.js';
 import { setupTestServer } from '../../testUtil.js';
+import { generateDefaultFsentries } from '../../util/userProvisioning.js';
 import type { WebDAVController } from './WebDAVController.js';
 
 let server: PuterServer;
@@ -101,6 +104,35 @@ const basicAuth = (user: string, pass: string) =>
 
 const noop = vi.fn();
 
+const makeUser = async () => {
+    const username = `webdav-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
+    const created = await server.stores.user.create({
+        username,
+        uuid: uuidv4(),
+        password: null,
+        email: `${username}@test.local`,
+        free_storage: 100 * 1024 * 1024,
+        requires_email_confirmation: false,
+    });
+    await generateDefaultFsentries(
+        server.clients.db,
+        server.stores.user,
+        created,
+    );
+    const refreshed = (await server.stores.user.getById(created.id))!;
+    return {
+        userId: refreshed.id,
+        username: refreshed.username,
+        actor: {
+            user: {
+                id: refreshed.id,
+                uuid: refreshed.uuid,
+                username: refreshed.username,
+            },
+        },
+    };
+};
+
 describe('WebDAVController', () => {
     describe('route registration', () => {
         it('registers a single catch-all use() route', () => {
@@ -396,6 +428,53 @@ describe('WebDAVController', () => {
             );
             expect(captured.statusCode).toBe(422);
         });
+
+        it('emits GUI-safe item events without leaking numeric fsentry ids', async () => {
+            const { actor, userId, username } = await makeUser();
+            const target = `/${username}/Documents/webdav-event.txt`;
+            const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+            const req = Object.assign(
+                Readable.from(['hello']),
+                makeReq({
+                    method: 'PUT',
+                    path: target,
+                    headers: { 'content-length': '5' },
+                    actor,
+                }),
+            ) as Request;
+
+            const emitSpy = vi.spyOn(server.clients.event, 'emit');
+            let addedCall:
+                | (typeof emitSpy.mock.calls)[number]
+                | undefined;
+            try {
+                await dispatchMiddleware(req, res, noop);
+                await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0));
+                addedCall = emitSpy.mock.calls.find(
+                    ([eventName]) => eventName === 'outer.gui.item.added',
+                );
+            } finally {
+                emitSpy.mockRestore();
+            }
+
+            expect(captured.statusCode).toBe(201);
+            expect(addedCall).toBeTruthy();
+            const payload = addedCall?.[1] as {
+                user_id_list?: number[];
+                response?: Record<string, unknown>;
+            };
+            expect(payload.user_id_list).toEqual([userId]);
+            expect(payload.response).toMatchObject({
+                id: expect.any(String),
+                uid: expect.any(String),
+                uuid: expect.any(String),
+                path: target,
+                from_new_service: true,
+            });
+            expect(typeof payload.response?.id).toBe('string');
+            expect(payload.response?.id).toBe(payload.response?.uuid);
+            expect(payload.response).not.toHaveProperty('userId');
+        });
     });
 
     describe('DELETE', () => {
@@ -516,7 +595,7 @@ describe('WebDAVController', () => {
             await dispatchMiddleware(
                 makeReq({
                     method: 'LOCK',
-                    path: '/lockable-file.txt',
+                    path: '/test/lockable-file.txt',
                     actor: {
                         user: {
                             id: 1,
@@ -539,8 +618,28 @@ describe('WebDAVController', () => {
             expect(captured.headers['lock-token']).toContain('urn:uuid:');
         });
 
+        it('rejects locking a path the user has no write access to (e.g. root)', async () => {
+            const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+            await dispatchMiddleware(
+                makeReq({
+                    method: 'LOCK',
+                    path: '/',
+                    actor: {
+                        user: {
+                            id: 1,
+                            uuid: 'test-uuid',
+                            username: 'test',
+                        },
+                    },
+                }),
+                res,
+                noop,
+            );
+            expect(captured.statusCode).toBe(403);
+        });
+
         it('rejects a second exclusive lock on the same path', async () => {
-            const uniquePath = `/double-lock-${Date.now()}.txt`;
+            const uniquePath = `/test/double-lock-${Date.now()}.txt`;
 
             // First lock
             const { res: res1, captured: cap1 } = makeRes();
@@ -582,7 +681,7 @@ describe('WebDAVController', () => {
         });
 
         it('refreshes an existing lock when If header provides the token', async () => {
-            const uniquePath = `/refresh-lock-${Date.now()}.txt`;
+            const uniquePath = `/test/refresh-lock-${Date.now()}.txt`;
             const { res: res1, captured: cap1 } = makeRes();
             await dispatchMiddleware(
                 makeReq({

src/backend/controllers/webdav/WebDAVController.ts

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import type { PuterRouter } from '../../core/http/PuterRouter.js';
 import { verify as verifyOtp } from '../../services/auth/OTPUtil.js';
 import { expandTildePath } from '../../services/fs/resolveNode.js';
 import type { FSEntry } from '../../stores/fs/FSEntry.js';
+import { toLegacyEntry } from '../fs/legacyFsHelpers.js';
 import { PuterController } from '../types.js';
 import {
     createLock,
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
             case 'MOVE':
                 return this.#move(req, res, actor, davPath, redis, lockToken);
             case 'LOCK':
-                return this.#lock(req, res, davPath, redis, lockToken);
+                return this.#lock(req, res, actor, davPath, redis, lockToken);
             case 'UNLOCK':
                 return this.#unlock(req, res, davPath, redis);
             default:
@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
         }
     }
 
-    // ── Auth ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Auth ---------------------------------------------------------
 
     async #resolveActor(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<Actor | null> {
         // If the global authProbe already resolved an actor, use it.
@@ -236,7 +237,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
         };
     }
 
-    // ── OPTIONS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- OPTIONS ------------------------------------------------------
 
     #options(res: Response): void {
         res.status(200)
@@ -250,7 +251,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
             .send('');
     }
 
-    // ── GET / HEAD ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- GET / HEAD --------------------------------------------------
 
     async #get(
         req: Request,
@@ -300,7 +301,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
         result.body.pipe(res);
     }
 
-    // ── PROPFIND ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- PROPFIND ----------------------------------------------------
 
     async #propfind(
         req: Request,
@@ -347,7 +348,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
             .send(wrapMultistatus(responses.join('\n')));
     }
 
-    // ── PROPPATCH (stub — acknowledges but doesn't persist props) ───
+    // -- PROPPATCH (stub — acknowledges but doesn't persist props) ---
 
     async #proppatch(
         res: Response,
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
             );
     }
 
-    // ── MKCOL ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- MKCOL -------------------------------------------------------
 
     async #mkcol(
         req: Request,
@@ -421,7 +422,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
             .end();
     }
 
-    // ── PUT ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- PUT ---------------------------------------------------------
 
     async #put(
         req: Request,
@@ -497,7 +498,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
             .end();
     }
 
-    // ── DELETE ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- DELETE -------------------------------------------------------
 
     async #delete(
         res: Response,
@@ -527,7 +528,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
         res.status(204).end();
     }
 
-    // ── COPY ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- COPY --------------------------------------------------------
 
     async #copy(
         req: Request,
@@ -585,7 +586,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
         res.status(destExists ? 204 : 201).end();
     }
 
-    // ── MOVE ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- MOVE --------------------------------------------------------
 
     async #move(
         req: Request,
@@ -641,17 +642,23 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
         res.status(destExists ? 204 : 201).end();
     }
 
-    // ── LOCK ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- LOCK --------------------------------------------------------
 
     async #lock(
         req: Request,
         res: Response,
+        actor: Actor,
         davPath: string,
         redis: unknown,
         headerToken: string | null,
     ): Promise<void> {
         const r = redis as import('ioredis').Cluster;
 
+        // ACL must succeed before any lock state is touched — otherwise
+        // an authenticated user could lock paths they don't own (e.g. `/`)
+        // and block writes for everyone else.
+        await this.#assertWrite(actor, davPath);
+
         // Refresh existing lock
         if (headerToken) {
             const existing = await getLockIfValid(r, headerToken);
@@ -702,7 +709,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
             .send(lockResponseXml(token, davPath, lockScope));
     }
 
-    // ── UNLOCK ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- UNLOCK ------------------------------------------------------
 
     async #unlock(
         req: Request,
@@ -733,7 +740,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
         res.status(204).end();
     }
 
-    // ── ACL helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- ACL helpers -------------------------------------------------
 
     async #assertRead(actor: Actor, path: string): Promise<void> {
         const descriptor = {
@@ -759,32 +766,36 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
             });
     }
 
-    // ── Event emission ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Event emission ----------------------------------------------
 
     #emitGuiEvent<T extends keyof EventMap>(
         eventName: T,
         entry: FSEntry,
         extra?: Record<string, unknown>,
     ): void {
-        const payload = {
-            user_id_list: [entry.userId],
-            response: { ...entry, ...extra, from_new_service: true },
-        };
         const meta = {};
         void Promise.resolve()
-            .then(() =>
+            .then(async () => {
+                const response = {
+                    ...(await toLegacyEntry(this.clients.event, entry)),
+                    ...extra,
+                    from_new_service: true,
+                };
                 this.clients.event.emit(
                     eventName,
-                    payload as unknown as EventMap[T],
+                    {
+                        user_id_list: [entry.userId],
+                        response,
+                    } as unknown as EventMap[T],
                     meta,
-                ),
-            )
+                );
+            })
             .catch(() => {
                 // non-critical
             });
     }
 
-    // ── Misc helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Misc helpers ------------------------------------------------
 
     #parseDestination(req: Request): string {
         const dest = req.headers.destination as string | undefined;
@@ -801,7 +812,7 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
     }
 }
 
-// ── XML helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- XML helpers ------------------------------------------------------
 
 function escapeXml(text: string): string {
     return text

src/backend/controllers/webdav/locks.ts

@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ export async function hasWritePermission(
     return true;
 }
 
-// ── Internals ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Internals -------------------------------------------------------
 
 async function getPathLockMap(
     redis: Cluster,

src/backend/core/actor.ts

@@ -33,6 +33,15 @@ export interface ActorAccessToken {
     uid: string;
     issuer: Actor;
     authorized?: Actor | null;
+    /**
+     * Full-API-access ("personal access token") flag, set from the signed
+     * `full_access` JWT claim. Such a token may exercise everything its issuing
+     * user can do via the API and is admitted past `requireNonAccessTokenGate`
+     * — but is still rejected by `requireUserActor` / web-session gates, so it
+     * can never manage the account. Normal (scoped) access tokens leave this
+     * false and remain blocked from non-`allowAccessToken` routes.
+     */
+    fullAccess?: boolean;
 }
 
 export interface Actor {
@@ -97,3 +106,13 @@ export const userRelatedActor = (actor: Actor): Actor => {
     if (!actor.app && !actor.accessToken) return actor;
     return { user: actor.user };
 };
+
+/**
+ * Walk the access-token issuer chain and return the first app identity found,
+ * or null if no app appears anywhere in the chain.
+ */
+export const effectiveActorApp = (actor: Actor): ActorApp | null => {
+    if (actor.app) return actor.app;
+    if (actor.accessToken) return effectiveActorApp(actor.accessToken.issuer);
+    return null;
+};

src/backend/core/context.ts

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ import type { Actor } from './actor';
  * ```
  */
 
-// ── Well-known typed keys ───────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Well-known typed keys -------------------------------------------
 
 export interface KnownContextFields {
     /** The authenticated actor, if one was resolved by the auth probe. */
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ export interface KnownContextFields {
     requestId: string;
 }
 
-// ── Context store ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Context store ---------------------------------------------------
 
 interface ContextStore {
     known: Partial<KnownContextFields>;
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ interface ContextStore {
 
 const als = new AsyncLocalStorage<ContextStore>();
 
-// ── Public API ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Public API ------------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * Static-style context accessor.
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ export class Context {
     }
 }
 
-// ── Internal: used by the request-context middleware ─────────────────
+// -- Internal: used by the request-context middleware -----------------
 
 /**
  * Run `fn` inside a new context scope. Used by the request-context

src/backend/core/http/PuterRouter.ts

@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ export class PuterRouter {
         this.prefix = prefix;
     }
 
-    // ── use ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- use ---------------------------------------------------------
     //
     // `use` is the only method whose path is optional (global-ish
     // middleware) and whose options can appear with or without a path.
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ export class PuterRouter {
         return this;
     }
 
-    // ── HTTP verbs + WebDAV ─────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- HTTP verbs + WebDAV -----------------------------------------
     //
     // All take `(path, handler)` or `(path, options, handler)`.
 
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ export class PuterRouter {
         return this.#push('move', args);
     }
 
-    // ── Internals ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // -- Internals ---------------------------------------------------
 
     #push(method: RouteMethod, args: unknown[]): this {
         const normalized = this.#parsePathArgs(args);

src/backend/core/http/decorators.ts

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ import {
  * directly work equally well.
  */
 
-// ── Prototype shape helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Prototype shape helpers -----------------------------------------
 
 interface DecoratedPrototype {
     [ROUTES_METADATA_KEY]?: CollectedRoute[];
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ const getOrInitRoutes = (proto: DecoratedPrototype): CollectedRoute[] => {
     return proto[ROUTES_METADATA_KEY]!;
 };
 
-// ── @Controller ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- @Controller -----------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * Class decorator.
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ export function Controller(prefix: string = '') {
     };
 }
 
-// ── Method decorators (@Get, @Post, ...) ───────────────────────────
+// -- Method decorators (@Get, @Post, ...) ---------------------------
 
 // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-function-type
 type AnyMethod = Function;

src/backend/core/http/expressAugmentation.ts

@@ -35,40 +35,25 @@ declare global {
     // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-namespace
     namespace Express {
         interface Request {
-            /**
-             * Populated by the global auth probe when a valid token is
-             * attached to the request (Bearer header, auth_token body/query,
-             * session cookie, or socket handshake). Absent for anonymous
-             * requests — route-level gates decide whether to reject.
-             */
             actor?: Actor;
 
             /** The raw token string, if one was presented and parsed. */
             token?: string;
 
-            /**
-             * Set by the global auth probe when a token was extracted from
-             * the request but failed to resolve to an actor (bad signature,
-             * expired, references a deleted session/user/app, or has a
-             * legacy shape v2 can't authenticate). Lets `requireAuthGate`
-             * distinguish "no token" from "token present but invalid" and
-             * emit the legacy `token_auth_failed` error so old clients
-             * trigger their re-login flow.
-             */
             tokenAuthFailed?: boolean;
 
-            /**
-             * Raw request body bytes, captured by the global JSON parser's
-             * `verify` callback. Available for any JSON request — needed by
-             * webhook handlers that verify an HMAC over the exact bytes the
-             * sender signed (e.g., AppStore prod webhooks, BroadcastService
-             * inter-instance hooks).
-             *
-             * Set only when the global JSON parser actually ran (request had
-             * `Content-Type: application/json` or one of the recognized
-             * JSON-as-text variants). For non-JSON requests it stays
-             * `undefined`.
-             */
+            requiresReauth?: {
+                reason: 'token_v1' | 'session_revoked' | 'session_expired';
+                auth_id?: string;
+                /**
+                 * Short-lived server-signed JWT that proves the bearer was
+                 * identified as `auth_id` by the rejected session. The GUI
+                 * must echo this back (not the raw `auth_id`) on the next
+                 * login/signup so the controller can rebind to the same user.
+                 */
+                reauth_token?: string;
+            };
+
             rawBody?: Buffer;
 
             /** Parsed user-agent, populated by the global UA-parsing middleware. */

src/backend/core/http/middleware/antiCsrf.js

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ export const antiCsrf = {
     },
 };
 
-// ── Route middleware ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Route middleware ------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * Middleware that requires a valid anti-CSRF token in `req.body.anti_csrf`.
@@ -73,6 +73,19 @@ export const antiCsrf = {
 export function requireAntiCsrf() {
     return async (req, _res, next) => {
         try {
+            // CSRF only applies to ambient credentials the browser attaches
+            // automatically (the session cookie). A full-access personal access
+            // token travels in the Authorization header — it can't be forged
+            // cross-origin — so it needs no anti-CSRF token, which is what makes
+            // routes like `/fs/down` reachable by a PAT. We deliberately scope
+            // this to full-access tokens (the only access tokens routed onto
+            // antiCsrf-protected endpoints): anything else — cookie-authed user
+            // actors, app actors, or a scoped token that somehow reaches here —
+            // still goes through the check below and fails closed.
+            if (req.actor?.accessToken?.fullAccess) {
+                return next();
+            }
+
             const sessionId = req.actor?.user?.uuid;
             if (!sessionId) {
                 return next(

src/backend/core/http/middleware/antiCsrf.test.js

@@ -118,6 +118,51 @@ describe('requireAntiCsrf middleware', () => {
         expect(arg).toBeUndefined();
     });
 
+    it('exempts a FULL-ACCESS access token (no anti_csrf token needed)', async () => {
+        // A full-access PAT is header-credentialed (bearer), so it can't be
+        // CSRF-forged — the middleware lets it through without a token. This is
+        // what makes antiCsrf routes like /fs/down reachable by a PAT.
+        const arg = await runMiddleware({
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'user-uuid-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'user-uuid-1' } },
+                    fullAccess: true,
+                },
+            },
+            body: {},
+        });
+        expect(arg).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('does NOT exempt a scoped (non-full-access) access token — fails closed', async () => {
+        // Scoped tokens are never deliberately routed onto antiCsrf endpoints;
+        // if one reaches here it must still present a token (which it can't get)
+        // rather than getting a free pass.
+        const arg = await runMiddleware({
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'user-uuid-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'user-uuid-1' } },
+                },
+            },
+            body: {},
+        });
+        expect(isHttpError(arg)).toBe(true);
+        expect(arg.statusCode).toBe(400);
+    });
+
+    it('still enforces the token for cookie-authed user actors (no accessToken)', async () => {
+        const arg = await runMiddleware({
+            actor: { user: { uuid: 'user-uuid-1' } },
+            body: {},
+        });
+        expect(isHttpError(arg)).toBe(true);
+        expect(arg.statusCode).toBe(400);
+    });
+
     it('returns 401 unauthorized when no actor is attached', async () => {
         const arg = await runMiddleware({ body: { anti_csrf: 'whatever' } });
         expect(isHttpError(arg)).toBe(true);

src/backend/core/http/middleware/authProbe.test.ts

@@ -34,27 +34,50 @@ import { createAuthProbe } from './authProbe';
 // test wants. This is mocking at a real boundary (a service), which the
 // AGENTS.md guidance explicitly allows.
 
+type AuthResultLike =
+    | { actor: Actor }
+    | { reauth: { reason: string; auth_id?: string } }
+    | { invalid: true };
+
 interface StubAuth {
     service: AuthService;
     seenTokens: string[];
-    /** What the next call to authenticateFromToken should return. */
+    /** Legacy setter — accepts the old Actor|null|'throw' shape. */
     setNext: (next: Actor | null | 'throw') => void;
+    /** Set the full AuthResult to be returned by `authenticate()`. */
+    setNextResult: (next: AuthResultLike | 'throw') => void;
 }
 
 const makeStubAuth = (defaultActor: Actor | null = null): StubAuth => {
     const seenTokens: string[] = [];
-    let nextResult: Actor | null | 'throw' = defaultActor;
+    let nextResult: AuthResultLike | 'throw' = defaultActor
+        ? { actor: defaultActor }
+        : { invalid: true };
     const service = {
-        authenticateFromToken: async (token: string) => {
+        // Entry point used by the probe.
+        authenticate: async (token: string) => {
             seenTokens.push(token);
             if (nextResult === 'throw') throw new Error('verify failed');
             return nextResult;
         },
+        // Back-compat wrapper for callers that still want Actor | null.
+        authenticateFromToken: async (token: string) => {
+            seenTokens.push(token);
+            if (nextResult === 'throw') throw new Error('verify failed');
+            return 'actor' in nextResult ? nextResult.actor : null;
+        },
+        // Deterministic stub — production mints a real JWT here.
+        signReauthToken: (authId: string) => `reauth-jwt:${authId}`,
     } as unknown as AuthService;
     return {
         service,
         seenTokens,
         setNext: (n) => {
+            if (n === 'throw') nextResult = 'throw';
+            else if (n === null) nextResult = { invalid: true };
+            else nextResult = { actor: n };
+        },
+        setNextResult: (n) => {
             nextResult = n;
         },
     };
@@ -522,6 +545,225 @@ describe('createAuthProbe — actor attachment + failure tracking', () => {
     });
 });
 
+// ── Reauth signal + KV counters ─────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('createAuthProbe — reauth signal', () => {
+    /** Capture KV increments without a real store. */
+    const makeKvStub = () => {
+        const calls: Array<{
+            key: string;
+            pathAndAmountMap: Record<string, number>;
+        }> = [];
+        return {
+            calls,
+            store: {
+                incr: async (args: {
+                    key: string;
+                    pathAndAmountMap: Record<string, number>;
+                }) => {
+                    calls.push(args);
+                    return { res: {} as Record<string, number>, usage: 0 };
+                },
+            },
+        };
+    };
+
+    it('sets requiresReauth and counts v1 + reauth.token_v1 for a legacy v1 token', async () => {
+        const stub = makeStubAuth();
+        stub.setNextResult({
+            reauth: { reason: 'token_v1', auth_id: 'u-legacy' },
+            // Some legacy paths resolve an actor anyway (lazy-backfill).
+            // The probe must still set requiresReauth; gate emits 401.
+            actor: { user: { uuid: 'u-legacy' } },
+        } as never);
+        const kv = makeKvStub();
+        const probe = createAuthProbe({
+            authService: stub.service,
+            kvStore: kv.store,
+        });
+        const { req } = await runProbe(
+            probe,
+            makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer v1-tok' } }),
+        );
+        expect(req.requiresReauth).toEqual({
+            reason: 'token_v1',
+            auth_id: 'u-legacy',
+            reauth_token: 'reauth-jwt:u-legacy',
+        });
+        // Both increments fire under the same day-bucketed key.
+        expect(kv.calls).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(kv.calls[0].key).toMatch(/^auth-v2:metrics:\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/);
+        expect(kv.calls[0].pathAndAmountMap).toEqual({
+            v1: 1,
+            'reauth.token_v1': 1,
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('sets requiresReauth and counts reauth.session_revoked', async () => {
+        const stub = makeStubAuth();
+        stub.setNextResult({
+            reauth: { reason: 'session_revoked', auth_id: 'u-1' },
+        });
+        const kv = makeKvStub();
+        const probe = createAuthProbe({
+            authService: stub.service,
+            kvStore: kv.store,
+        });
+        const { req } = await runProbe(
+            probe,
+            makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer tok' } }),
+        );
+        expect(req.requiresReauth?.reason).toBe('session_revoked');
+        expect(kv.calls[0].pathAndAmountMap).toEqual({
+            v1: 1,
+            'reauth.session_revoked': 1,
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('sets requiresReauth and counts reauth.session_expired', async () => {
+        const stub = makeStubAuth();
+        stub.setNextResult({
+            reauth: { reason: 'session_expired', auth_id: 'u-1' },
+        });
+        const kv = makeKvStub();
+        const probe = createAuthProbe({
+            authService: stub.service,
+            kvStore: kv.store,
+        });
+        const { req } = await runProbe(
+            probe,
+            makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer tok' } }),
+        );
+        expect(req.requiresReauth?.reason).toBe('session_expired');
+        expect(kv.calls[0].pathAndAmountMap).toEqual({
+            v1: 1,
+            'reauth.session_expired': 1,
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('counts v2 verify (no reauth) for a healthy token', async () => {
+        const stub = makeStubAuth({ user: { uuid: 'u-1' } });
+        const kv = makeKvStub();
+        const probe = createAuthProbe({
+            authService: stub.service,
+            kvStore: kv.store,
+        });
+        const { req } = await runProbe(
+            probe,
+            makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer good-tok' } }),
+        );
+        expect(req.actor).toBeTruthy();
+        expect(req.requiresReauth).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(kv.calls[0].pathAndAmountMap).toEqual({ v2: 1 });
+    });
+
+    it('does not increment counters when no token is presented', async () => {
+        const stub = makeStubAuth();
+        const kv = makeKvStub();
+        const probe = createAuthProbe({
+            authService: stub.service,
+            kvStore: kv.store,
+        });
+        await runProbe(probe, makeReq({}));
+        // Anonymous-OK routes pay no metrics cost.
+        expect(kv.calls).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('absorbs KV failures — never rejects on the hot path', async () => {
+        const stub = makeStubAuth({ user: { uuid: 'u-1' } });
+        // Failing KV: increments throw. Probe must still succeed.
+        const failingKv = {
+            incr: async () => {
+                throw new Error('kv unavailable');
+            },
+        };
+        const probe = createAuthProbe({
+            authService: stub.service,
+            kvStore: failingKv,
+        });
+        const { req, next } = await runProbe(
+            probe,
+            makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer good-tok' } }),
+        );
+        expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledWith();
+        expect(req.actor).toBeTruthy();
+    });
+
+    it('works without a kvStore (counters become no-ops)', async () => {
+        const stub = makeStubAuth({ user: { uuid: 'u-1' } });
+        // Production may not always pass a KV — fresh installs without
+        // dynamo wired still need a functioning probe.
+        const probe = createAuthProbe({ authService: stub.service });
+        const { req } = await runProbe(
+            probe,
+            makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer good-tok' } }),
+        );
+        expect(req.actor).toBeTruthy();
+        expect(req.requiresReauth).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('logs `[auth-v2] reauth reason=<r> auth_id=<id>` per event', async () => {
+        // The log line is the human-facing forensic counterpart to the
+        // KV counter. Asserting the exact shape so ops can `grep
+        // '\[auth-v2\] reauth'` and trust the format won't drift.
+        const stub = makeStubAuth();
+        stub.setNextResult({
+            reauth: { reason: 'session_revoked', auth_id: 'u-grep' },
+        });
+        const infoSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'info').mockImplementation(() => {});
+        try {
+            const probe = createAuthProbe({ authService: stub.service });
+            await runProbe(
+                probe,
+                makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer tok' } }),
+            );
+            expect(infoSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+                '[auth-v2] reauth reason=session_revoked auth_id=u-grep',
+            );
+        } finally {
+            infoSpy.mockRestore();
+        }
+    });
+
+    it('logs `auth_id=-` when the reauth result has no auth_id', async () => {
+        const stub = makeStubAuth();
+        stub.setNextResult({
+            reauth: { reason: 'session_expired' },
+        });
+        const infoSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'info').mockImplementation(() => {});
+        try {
+            const probe = createAuthProbe({ authService: stub.service });
+            await runProbe(
+                probe,
+                makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer tok' } }),
+            );
+            expect(infoSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+                '[auth-v2] reauth reason=session_expired auth_id=-',
+            );
+        } finally {
+            infoSpy.mockRestore();
+        }
+    });
+
+    it('does not emit a reauth log line on a healthy v2 verify', async () => {
+        const stub = makeStubAuth({ user: { uuid: 'u-1' } });
+        const infoSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'info').mockImplementation(() => {});
+        try {
+            const probe = createAuthProbe({ authService: stub.service });
+            await runProbe(
+                probe,
+                makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer good-tok' } }),
+            );
+            const reauthCalls = infoSpy.mock.calls.filter((args) =>
+                String(args[0]).startsWith('[auth-v2] reauth'),
+            );
+            expect(reauthCalls).toHaveLength(0);
+        } finally {
+            infoSpy.mockRestore();
+        }
+    });
+});
+
 // ── Server-backed end-to-end (real AuthService + DB) ────────────────
 //
 // The unit tests above cover the extraction logic in isolation. This

src/backend/core/http/middleware/authProbe.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,11 @@
  */
 
 import type { Request, RequestHandler } from 'express';
-import type { AuthService } from '../../../services/auth/AuthService';
+import type {
+    AuthService,
+    ReauthReason,
+} from '../../../services/auth/AuthService';
+import type { SystemKVStore } from '../../../stores/systemKv/SystemKVStore';
 
 // Ensure the `Request.actor` / `Request.token` augmentation is in scope
 // wherever this middleware is imported.
@@ -28,8 +32,25 @@ interface AuthProbeOptions {
     authService: AuthService;
     /** Name of the session cookie to inspect. Falls back to `config.cookie_name`. */
     cookieName?: string;
+    kvStore?: SystemKVStore;
 }
 
+const authV2MetricsKey = (): string => {
+    const now = new Date();
+    const yyyy = now.getUTCFullYear();
+    const mm = String(now.getUTCMonth() + 1).padStart(2, '0');
+    const dd = String(now.getUTCDate()).padStart(2, '0');
+    return `auth-v2:metrics:${yyyy}-${mm}-${dd}`;
+};
+
+const bumpCounter = (
+    kv: Pick<SystemKVStore, 'incr'> | undefined,
+    pathAndAmountMap: Record<string, number>,
+): void => {
+    if (!kv) return;
+    kv.incr({ key: authV2MetricsKey(), pathAndAmountMap }).catch(() => {});
+};
+
 /**
  * Non-enforcing auth probe. Runs globally (installed by `PuterServer`) on
  * every request, tries to locate a token in the usual places, and — if one
@@ -49,7 +70,7 @@ interface AuthProbeOptions {
  *   6. Socket handshake query (for ws upgrades that pass through HTTP first)
  */
 export const createAuthProbe = (opts: AuthProbeOptions): RequestHandler => {
-    const { authService, cookieName } = opts;
+    const { authService, cookieName, kvStore } = opts;
     return async (req, _res, next): Promise<void> => {
         // If something upstream already attached an actor, respect it.
         if (req.actor) {
@@ -64,24 +85,45 @@ export const createAuthProbe = (opts: AuthProbeOptions): RequestHandler => {
         }
 
         try {
-            const actor = await authService.authenticateFromToken(token);
-            if (actor) {
-                req.actor = actor;
+            // Thread the request IP and User-Agent into authenticate so
+            // SessionStore.touch can refresh `last_ip` / `last_user_agent`
+            // when a session roams to a new network / browser.
+            const result = await authService.authenticate(token, {
+                ip: req.ip,
+                userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'] ?? undefined,
+            });
+
+            if (result.reauth) {
+                bumpCounter(kvStore, {
+                    v1: 1,
+                    [`reauth.${result.reauth.reason}`]: 1,
+                });
+                // Bind a short-lived JWT proving the rejected session
+                // identified this auth_id. The GUI echoes this back on
+                // /login or /signup; the raw auth_id is informational
+                // only and is not accepted as authoritative on its own.
+                const reauth_token = result.reauth.auth_id
+                    ? authService.signReauthToken(result.reauth.auth_id)
+                    : undefined;
+                req.requiresReauth = {
+                    reason: result.reauth.reason as ReauthReason,
+                    auth_id: result.reauth.auth_id,
+                    ...(reauth_token ? { reauth_token } : {}),
+                };
+                console.info(
+                    `[auth-v2] reauth reason=${result.reauth.reason} auth_id=${result.reauth.auth_id ?? '-'}`,
+                );
+            } else if (result.actor) {
+                bumpCounter(kvStore, { v2: 1 });
+            }
+
+            if (result.actor) {
+                req.actor = result.actor;
                 req.token = token;
-            } else {
-                // Token was present but didn't resolve — covers v1-shape
-                // tokens v2 can't authenticate (e.g. FPE-encrypted session
-                // UUIDs), as well as tokens whose session/user/app rows
-                // have been deleted. `requireAuthGate` reads this flag
-                // to emit `token_auth_failed` (matching v1) so clients
-                // trigger their re-login flow instead of retrying.
+            } else if (result.invalid) {
                 req.tokenAuthFailed = true;
             }
         } catch {
-            // Probe never rejects — invalid tokens just leave `req.actor`
-            // undefined. Same flag as above so the gate's response shape
-            // is identical regardless of whether the failure came from
-            // jwt.verify or a downstream lookup.
             req.tokenAuthFailed = true;
         }
         next();
@@ -130,10 +172,22 @@ const extractToken = (req: Request, cookieName?: string): string | null => {
     // arbitrary browser Origin spend an ambient session cookie against the
     // credentialed API CORS surface; bearer/body/x-api-key tokens remain
     // available for cross-origin SDK requests.
-    if (cookieName && !isCrossOriginBrowserRequest(req)) {
-        const cookieToken = req.cookies?.[cookieName];
-        if (typeof cookieToken === 'string' && cookieToken.length > 0) {
-            return stripBearer(cookieToken);
+    //
+    // `puter_token_v2` is the cookie companion to v2 app-under-user
+    // tokens set by `POST /auth/migrate-token`. We accept it under the
+    // same same-origin gate as the primary session cookie so a private
+    // app iframe can authenticate subsequent calls without re-attaching
+    // an `Authorization` header on every request.
+    if (!isCrossOriginBrowserRequest(req)) {
+        if (cookieName) {
+            const cookieToken = req.cookies?.[cookieName];
+            if (typeof cookieToken === 'string' && cookieToken.length > 0) {
+                return stripBearer(cookieToken);
+            }
+        }
+        const v2Token = req.cookies?.puter_token_v2;
+        if (typeof v2Token === 'string' && v2Token.length > 0) {
+            return stripBearer(v2Token);
         }
     }
 

src/backend/core/http/middleware/captcha.js

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ function readTransactionValue(result) {
     return result[1];
 }
 
-// ── Public API ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Public API ------------------------------------------------------
 
 /** Generate a captcha image + token pair. */
 export async function generateCaptcha(difficulty = 'medium') {
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ export async function verifyCaptcha(token, answer) {
     return text === answer.toLowerCase().trim();
 }
 
-// ── Route middleware ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Route middleware ------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * Captcha gate middleware factory.

src/backend/core/http/middleware/errorHandler.ts

@@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ export const createErrorHandler = (
             return;
         }
 
+        const translated = translateKnownClientError(err);
+        if (translated) {
+            err = translated;
+        }
+
         if (isHttpError(err)) {
             opts.onError?.(err, req);
             if (err.statusCode === 402 || err.statusCode === 413) {
@@ -102,6 +107,70 @@ export const createErrorHandler = (
     };
 };
 
+/**
+ * Recognise framework-level errors that are caused by the client and
+ * re-shape them as `HttpError`s with `client_*` legacy codes so the
+ * alarm gate (server.ts) treats them as user-caused 4xx and does not
+ * page on them.
+ *
+ * Sources covered:
+ *  - `URIError` from `decodeURIComponent` in the express router (raised
+ *    by path-traversal scanners hitting `%c0%ae` etc.)
+ *  - body-parser `entity.parse.failed` (malformed JSON in request body)
+ *  - body-parser `request.aborted` / `ECONNABORTED` (client closed
+ *    socket mid-upload)
+ *  - Anything else that already opted into `expose: true` with a
+ *    numeric `statusCode` is mapped to `client_bad_request` so it
+ *    surfaces with the declared status instead of becoming a 500.
+ */
+const translateKnownClientError = (err: unknown): HttpError | null => {
+    if (err instanceof URIError) {
+        return new HttpError(400, 'Bad request URL', {
+            legacyCode: 'client_bad_url',
+        });
+    }
+
+    if (!err || typeof err !== 'object') return null;
+    const e = err as {
+        type?: string;
+        code?: string;
+        statusCode?: number;
+        status?: number;
+        expose?: boolean;
+        message?: string;
+    };
+
+    if (e.type === 'request.aborted' || e.code === 'ECONNABORTED') {
+        return new HttpError(400, 'Request aborted', {
+            legacyCode: 'client_aborted',
+        });
+    }
+
+    if (e.type === 'entity.parse.failed') {
+        return new HttpError(400, 'Malformed JSON in request body', {
+            legacyCode: 'client_bad_json',
+        });
+    }
+
+    // Generic body-parser / http-errors convention: anything tagged
+    // `expose: true` with a real 4xx statusCode is by definition meant
+    // to be returned to the client, not paged on. Honour the declared
+    // status; tag with a known code so the alarm gate skips it.
+    const declaredStatus = e.statusCode ?? e.status;
+    if (
+        e.expose === true &&
+        typeof declaredStatus === 'number' &&
+        declaredStatus >= 400 &&
+        declaredStatus < 500
+    ) {
+        return new HttpError(declaredStatus, e.message ?? 'Bad request', {
+            legacyCode: 'client_bad_request',
+        });
+    }
+
+    return null;
+};
+
 const serializeHttpError = (err: HttpError): Record<string, unknown> => {
     const payload: Record<string, unknown> = {
         error: err.message,

src/backend/core/http/middleware/gates.test.ts

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import {
     allowedAppIdsGate,
     requireAuthGate,
     requireEmailConfirmedGate,
+    requireNonAccessTokenGate,
     requireUserActorGate,
     requireVerifiedGate,
     subdomainGate,
@@ -136,6 +137,53 @@ describe('requireAuthGate', () => {
         });
         expectHttpError(got, 403, 'forbidden');
     });
+
+    // ── Reauth signal ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    it('returns 401 reauth_required for a legacy v1 token', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireAuthGate(), {
+            requiresReauth: { reason: 'token_v1', auth_id: 'u-1' },
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 401, 'reauth_required');
+        expect((got as HttpError).fields).toMatchObject({
+            code: 'reauth_required',
+            reason: 'token_v1',
+            auth_id: 'u-1',
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('returns 401 reauth_required with reason=session_revoked', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireAuthGate(), {
+            requiresReauth: { reason: 'session_revoked', auth_id: 'u-2' },
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 401, 'reauth_required');
+        expect((got as HttpError).fields).toMatchObject({
+            reason: 'session_revoked',
+            auth_id: 'u-2',
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('returns 401 reauth_required with reason=session_expired', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireAuthGate(), {
+            requiresReauth: { reason: 'session_expired' },
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 401, 'reauth_required');
+        expect((got as HttpError).fields).toMatchObject({
+            reason: 'session_expired',
+        });
+        // No auth_id field at all when none was supplied (vs. set-to-undefined).
+        expect((got as HttpError).fields?.auth_id).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('reauth_required takes priority over tokenAuthFailed', () => {
+        // Both flags set: the structured reauth signal wins. v2 clients
+        // key on `code === 'reauth_required'`; v1 clients still see a 401.
+        const got = runGate(requireAuthGate(), {
+            requiresReauth: { reason: 'token_v1', auth_id: 'u-1' },
+            tokenAuthFailed: true,
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 401, 'reauth_required');
+    });
 });
 
 // ── requireUserActorGate ────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -177,6 +225,110 @@ describe('requireUserActorGate', () => {
         const got = runGate(requireUserActorGate(), {});
         expectHttpError(got, 401, 'token_missing');
     });
+
+    it('rejects a FULL-ACCESS access token too — account routes stay closed', () => {
+        // The account wall is actor-type based: even a full-access PAT (which
+        // the resource wall lets through) is rejected here, so it can never
+        // reach change-password/email/2FA/token-minting/etc.
+        const got = runGate(requireUserActorGate(), {
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'u-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' } },
+                    fullAccess: true,
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 403, 'forbidden');
+    });
+
+    // allowFullAccess opt-in: relaxes ONLY the access-token half, for
+    // user-resource/inference routes (e.g. the AI proxy).
+    it('admits a full-access PAT when allowFullAccess is set', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireUserActorGate({ allowFullAccess: true }), {
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'u-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' } },
+                    fullAccess: true,
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        expect(got).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('still rejects a SCOPED access token even when allowFullAccess is set', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireUserActorGate({ allowFullAccess: true }), {
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'u-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' } },
+                    // no fullAccess
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 403, 'forbidden');
+    });
+
+    it('still rejects a third-party app even when allowFullAccess is set', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireUserActorGate({ allowFullAccess: true }), {
+            actor: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' }, app: { uid: 'app-1' } },
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 403, 'forbidden');
+    });
+});
+
+// -- requireNonAccessTokenGate --
+
+describe('requireNonAccessTokenGate', () => {
+    it('passes through for plain user actors', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireNonAccessTokenGate(), {
+            actor: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' } },
+        });
+        expect(got).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('passes through for app-under-user actors (only access tokens are gated)', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireNonAccessTokenGate(), {
+            actor: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' }, app: { uid: 'app-1' } },
+        });
+        expect(got).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('rejects a normal (scoped) access token with 403', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireNonAccessTokenGate(), {
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'u-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' } },
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 403, 'forbidden');
+    });
+
+    it('admits a FULL-ACCESS access token (the resource-wall carve-out)', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireNonAccessTokenGate(), {
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'u-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' } },
+                    fullAccess: true,
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        expect(got).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it("falls back to 401 if there's no actor at all (defensive)", () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireNonAccessTokenGate(), {});
+        expectHttpError(got, 401, 'token_missing');
+    });
 });
 
 // ── adminOnlyGate ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -226,6 +378,35 @@ describe('adminOnlyGate', () => {
             'forbidden',
         );
     });
+
+    it('admits the built-ins regardless of case', () => {
+        // On a SQLite self-host with case-sensitive (BINARY) collation, a
+        // user row could exist with `Admin`/`SYSTEM` capitalization. The
+        // gate must still admit those — case is normalized on both sides.
+        for (const username of ['Admin', 'ADMIN', 'sYsTeM']) {
+            const got = runGate(adminOnlyGate(), {
+                actor: { user: { uuid: 'u-1', username } },
+            });
+            expect(got).toBeUndefined();
+        }
+    });
+
+    it('admits case-mismatched extras (allowlist lowercased on construction)', () => {
+        // Pass an extra in mixed case; the gate must accept the same name
+        // in any case — the on-disk username row may be either, depending
+        // on the DB's column collation.
+        const gate = adminOnlyGate(['Daniel']);
+        expect(
+            runGate(gate, {
+                actor: { user: { uuid: 'u-1', username: 'daniel' } },
+            }),
+        ).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(
+            runGate(gate, {
+                actor: { user: { uuid: 'u-1', username: 'DANIEL' } },
+            }),
+        ).toBeUndefined();
+    });
 });
 
 // ── requireVerifiedGate ─────────────────────────────────────────────

src/backend/core/http/middleware/gates.ts

@@ -24,14 +24,22 @@ import { assertVerifiedEmail } from '../verifiedEmail';
 // Make sure the `Express.Request.actor` augmentation is in scope.
 import '../expressAugmentation';
 
-/**
- * Build the 401 a route gate emits when `req.actor` is absent. Splits the
- * legacy code so old clients can tell the two cases apart: `token_missing`
- * means "send a token", `token_auth_failed` means "your token didn't work,
- * re-login". Matches the v1 backend's auth-failure shape so the existing
- * client retry-vs-reauth logic doesn't need to change.
- */
 const rejectAuth = (req: Request): HttpError => {
+    if (req.requiresReauth) {
+        return new HttpError(401, 'Re-authentication required', {
+            legacyCode: 'reauth_required',
+            fields: {
+                code: 'reauth_required',
+                reason: req.requiresReauth.reason,
+                ...(req.requiresReauth.auth_id
+                    ? { auth_id: req.requiresReauth.auth_id }
+                    : {}),
+                ...(req.requiresReauth.reauth_token
+                    ? { reauth_token: req.requiresReauth.reauth_token }
+                    : {}),
+            },
+        });
+    }
     if (req.tokenAuthFailed) {
         return new HttpError(401, 'Authentication failed', {
             legacyCode: 'token_auth_failed',
@@ -91,8 +99,18 @@ export const requireAuthGate = (): RequestHandler => {
  * Reject app-under-user and access-token actors with 403. Use on endpoints
  * that should only be exercised by a human session — settings changes,
  * admin-style actions on the user's own account.
+ *
+ * `allowFullAccess` (set per-route via the `allowFullAccessToken` route option)
+ * relaxes ONLY the access-token half: a full-access ("personal access token")
+ * actor is admitted, because it represents the user's own full API reach.
+ * Third-party apps are ALWAYS rejected, and scoped access tokens are always
+ * rejected. This opt-in is for user-resource / inference endpoints (AI proxy,
+ * etc.) that use this gate purely to keep apps out — NEVER for account or
+ * security management, which must stay closed to every access token.
  */
-export const requireUserActorGate = (): RequestHandler => {
+export const requireUserActorGate = (
+    opts: { allowFullAccess?: boolean } = {},
+): RequestHandler => {
     return (req, _res, next) => {
         const actor = req.actor;
         // requireAuth runs first; this gate just narrows the actor type.
@@ -100,7 +118,14 @@ export const requireUserActorGate = (): RequestHandler => {
             next(rejectAuth(req));
             return;
         }
-        if (actor.app || actor.accessToken) {
+        // Third-party apps are never allowed through this gate.
+        const appBlocked = !!actor.app;
+        // Access tokens are blocked unless the route opted in AND this is a
+        // full-access PAT (the user's own credential). Scoped tokens: blocked.
+        const tokenBlocked =
+            !!actor.accessToken &&
+            !(opts.allowFullAccess && actor.accessToken.fullAccess);
+        if (appBlocked || tokenBlocked) {
             next(
                 new HttpError(
                     403,
@@ -121,7 +146,13 @@ export const requireNonAccessTokenGate = (): RequestHandler => {
             next(rejectAuth(req));
             return;
         }
-        if (actor.accessToken) {
+        // Full-access ("personal access token") access tokens are admitted here:
+        // they carry the user's full API reach by design. They remain blocked
+        // from account management because those routes also use
+        // `requireUserActorGate`, which rejects ALL access tokens. Normal
+        // (scoped) access tokens stay blocked from non-`allowAccessToken`
+        // routes.
+        if (actor.accessToken && !actor.accessToken.fullAccess) {
             next(
                 new HttpError(
                     403,
@@ -151,10 +182,16 @@ export const DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAMES = ['admin', 'system'] as const;
 export const adminOnlyGate = (
     extras: readonly string[] = [],
 ): RequestHandler => {
-    const allowList = new Set<string>([...DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAMES, ...extras]);
+    // Match the case-insensitivity guarantee of the username column
+    // (MySQL: ascii_general_ci; SQLite: idx_user_username_nocase). Comparing
+    // raw-case here would let a stored `Admin` bypass the lowercase allowlist
+    // on any backend that lets case-collision rows exist.
+    const allowList = new Set<string>(
+        [...DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAMES, ...extras].map((u) => u.toLowerCase()),
+    );
     return (req, _res, next) => {
         const username = req.actor?.user.username;
-        if (!username || !allowList.has(username)) {
+        if (!username || !allowList.has(username.toLowerCase())) {
             next(
                 new HttpError(403, 'Only admins may request this resource', {
                     legacyCode: 'forbidden',

src/backend/core/http/middleware/privateAppGate.test.ts

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ import {
     normalizeHost,
     normalizeHostRaw,
     renderLoginBootstrapHtml,
-    resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite,
+    resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite,
     resolvePrivateIdentity,
     resolvePublicHostedIdentity,
     subdomainFromHost,
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ describe('renderLoginBootstrapHtml', () => {
 
 // ── Server-backed helpers (AuthService + DB) ─────────────────────────
 //
-// `resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite` queries the apps table directly;
+// `resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite` queries the apps table directly;
 // `resolvePrivateIdentity` / `resolvePublicHostedIdentity` rely on the
 // real AuthService for token verification + cookie naming.
 
@@ -524,7 +524,33 @@ const baseConfig = () =>
         protocol: 'http',
     } as unknown as IConfig);
 
-describe('resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite', () => {
+const createApp = async (
+    ownerId: number,
+    indexUrl: string,
+    opts: { isPrivate?: boolean } = {},
+): Promise<{ id: number; uid: string }> => {
+    const uid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
+    await server.clients.db.write(
+        `INSERT INTO \`apps\` (\`uid\`, \`name\`, \`title\`, \`index_url\`, \`owner_user_id\`, \`is_private\`)
+         VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+        [
+            uid,
+            `app-${uid}`,
+            `app-${uid}`,
+            indexUrl,
+            ownerId,
+            opts.isPrivate ? 1 : 0,
+        ],
+    );
+    const row = (
+        await server.clients.db.read('SELECT id, uid FROM apps WHERE uid = ?', [
+            uid,
+        ])
+    )[0] as { id: number; uid: string };
+    return row;
+};
+
+describe('resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite', () => {
     const reqOf = (host: string): Request =>
         ({
             hostname: host,
@@ -532,84 +558,101 @@ describe('resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite', () => {
             headers: { host },
         }) as unknown as Request;
 
-    it('returns the associated app immediately when it is already private', async () => {
+    it("matches the subdomain owner's app by index_url on the same hosting domain", async () => {
         const owner = await makeUser();
-        const associatedApp = {
-            id: 1,
-            uid: 'app-direct',
-            is_private: 1,
-            owner_user_id: owner.id,
-        };
-        const out = await resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite({
-            req: reqOf('beans.site.puter.localhost'),
-            site: { user_id: owner.id, associated_app_id: 1 },
-            associatedApp,
-            db: server.clients.db,
-            config: baseConfig(),
-            matchedHostingDomain: 'site.puter.localhost',
-        });
-        expect(out?.uid).toBe('app-direct');
-    });
-
-    it('falls back to an index_url lookup when associated_app_id is unset', async () => {
-        const owner = await makeUser();
-        // Private app registered with a URL on the static hosting domain.
-        // The visitor lands on the equivalent private host — the helper
-        // should still find it.
         const app = await createPrivateApp(
             owner.id,
             'http://beans.site.puter.localhost/',
         );
-        const out = await resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite({
-            req: reqOf('beans.app.puter.localhost'),
-            site: { user_id: owner.id, associated_app_id: null },
-            associatedApp: null,
+        const out = await resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite({
+            req: reqOf('beans.site.puter.localhost'),
+            site: { user_id: owner.id },
             db: server.clients.db,
             config: baseConfig(),
-            matchedHostingDomain: 'app.puter.localhost',
         });
         expect(out?.uid).toBe(app.uid);
     });
 
-    it('returns the original associated app when no index_url matches', async () => {
+    it('matches across hosting variants (static URL, private host request)', async () => {
         const owner = await makeUser();
-        const associatedApp = {
-            id: 99,
-            uid: 'app-public',
-            is_private: 0,
-            owner_user_id: owner.id,
-        };
-        const out = await resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite({
-            req: reqOf('orphan.site.puter.localhost'),
-            site: { user_id: owner.id, associated_app_id: 99 },
-            associatedApp,
+        const app = await createPrivateApp(
+            owner.id,
+            'http://beans.site.puter.localhost/',
+        );
+        const out = await resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite({
+            req: reqOf('beans.app.puter.localhost'),
+            site: { user_id: owner.id },
             db: server.clients.db,
             config: baseConfig(),
-            matchedHostingDomain: 'site.puter.localhost',
         });
-        expect(out?.uid).toBe('app-public');
+        expect(out?.uid).toBe(app.uid);
+    });
+
+    it("ignores apps owned by a different user even when index_url matches the host", async () => {
+        // Regression test for the `associated_app_uid` IDOR: an app owned
+        // by user B must never resolve as "associated" with a subdomain
+        // owned by user A, even when the index_url notionally matches.
+        const a = await makeUser();
+        const b = await makeUser();
+        await createPrivateApp(b.id, 'http://beans.site.puter.localhost/');
+        const out = await resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite({
+            req: reqOf('beans.site.puter.localhost'),
+            site: { user_id: a.id },
+            db: server.clients.db,
+            config: baseConfig(),
+        });
+        expect(out).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('returns a public app when requirePrivate is not set', async () => {
+        const owner = await makeUser();
+        const app = await createApp(
+            owner.id,
+            'http://beans.site.puter.localhost/',
+            { isPrivate: false },
+        );
+        const out = await resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite({
+            req: reqOf('beans.site.puter.localhost'),
+            site: { user_id: owner.id },
+            db: server.clients.db,
+            config: baseConfig(),
+        });
+        expect(out?.uid).toBe(app.uid);
+    });
+
+    it('filters out non-private apps when requirePrivate is set', async () => {
+        const owner = await makeUser();
+        await createApp(
+            owner.id,
+            'http://beans.site.puter.localhost/',
+            { isPrivate: false },
+        );
+        const out = await resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite({
+            req: reqOf('beans.site.puter.localhost'),
+            site: { user_id: owner.id },
+            db: server.clients.db,
+            config: baseConfig(),
+            requirePrivate: true,
+        });
+        expect(out).toBeNull();
     });
 
     it('returns null when the site has no owner', async () => {
-        const out = await resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite({
+        const out = await resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite({
             req: reqOf('beans.site.puter.localhost'),
-            site: { user_id: null, associated_app_id: null },
-            associatedApp: null,
+            site: { user_id: null },
             db: server.clients.db,
             config: baseConfig(),
-            matchedHostingDomain: 'site.puter.localhost',
         });
         expect(out).toBeNull();
     });
 
     it("returns null on a request whose host can't be parsed", async () => {
-        const out = await resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite({
+        const out = await resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite({
             req: reqOf(''),
-            site: { user_id: 1, associated_app_id: null },
-            associatedApp: null,
+            site: { user_id: 1 },
             db: server.clients.db,
             config: baseConfig(),
-            matchedHostingDomain: 'site.puter.localhost',
         });
         expect(out).toBeNull();
     });
@@ -632,7 +675,7 @@ describe('resolvePrivateIdentity', () => {
     it('returns the sticky private-cookie identity when the token matches the expected app/subdomain/host', async () => {
         const user = await makeUser();
         const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
-        const token = authService.createPrivateAssetToken({
+        const token = await authService.createPrivateAssetToken({
             appUid,
             userUid: user.uuid,
             subdomain: 'beans',
@@ -657,7 +700,7 @@ describe('resolvePrivateIdentity', () => {
 
     it('falls through to req.actor when the private cookie is for a different app', async () => {
         const user = await makeUser();
-        const wrongToken = authService.createPrivateAssetToken({
+        const wrongToken = await authService.createPrivateAssetToken({
             appUid: `app-${uuidv4()}`,
             userUid: user.uuid,
             subdomain: 'beans',
@@ -695,6 +738,124 @@ describe('resolvePrivateIdentity', () => {
         expect(out.source).toBe('none');
         expect(out.userUid).toBeUndefined();
     });
+
+    it("ignores req.actor whose actor.app.uid doesn't match the target app", async () => {
+        // Cross-app token confusion guard: an app-under-user actor whose
+        // issuing app is NOT the private host's app must not establish
+        // identity here — even though the underlying user may have legit
+        // entitlement to the target app, accepting the actor would let
+        // attacker-app JS replay a victim's app-under-user token against
+        // an unrelated private host.
+        const user = await makeUser();
+        const out = await resolvePrivateIdentity({
+            req: reqOf({
+                cookies: {},
+                actor: {
+                    user: { uuid: user.uuid },
+                    app: { uid: `app-attacker-${uuidv4()}` },
+                    session: { uid: 'sess-1' },
+                },
+            }),
+            authService,
+            sessionCookieName: 'puter_auth_token',
+            expectedAppUid: `app-target-${uuidv4()}`,
+        });
+        expect(out.source).toBe('none');
+        expect(out.userUid).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it("ignores a bootstrap query-token whose actor.app.uid doesn't match the target app", async () => {
+        // Same guard for the `?puter.auth.token=` bootstrap path. A token
+        // minted via getUserAppToken for the attacker's app carries
+        // app_uid=attacker; using it as a bootstrap on the target host
+        // must fall through to source='none' (login bootstrap), not
+        // promote it to a victim identity on the target app. Both app
+        // rows are seeded so authenticateFromToken returns a real actor
+        // — proving the guard (not a missing row) is what blocks it.
+        const user = await makeUser();
+        // App uids must be `app-<hex-uuid>` — TokenService compresses the
+        // `app_uid` field by stripping the `app-` prefix and decoding the
+        // rest as a hex-encoded UUID (see TokenService AUTH_COMPRESSION).
+        // Custom non-uuid suffixes round-trip incorrectly and break
+        // authenticateFromToken's app lookup.
+        const attackerUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const targetUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
+        // index_url is NOT NULL in the schema, so supply placeholders.
+        await server.clients.db.write(
+            `INSERT INTO \`apps\` (\`uid\`, \`name\`, \`title\`, \`index_url\`, \`owner_user_id\`, \`is_private\`)
+             VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?), (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+            [
+                attackerUid,
+                `attacker-${attackerUid}`,
+                `attacker-${attackerUid}`,
+                `http://${attackerUid}.example/`,
+                user.id,
+                0,
+                targetUid,
+                `target-${targetUid}`,
+                `target-${targetUid}`,
+                `http://${targetUid}.example/`,
+                user.id,
+                1,
+            ],
+        );
+        const wrongAppToken = await authService.getUserAppToken(
+            { user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid } } as unknown as Parameters<
+                typeof authService.getUserAppToken
+            >[0],
+            attackerUid,
+        );
+        const out = await resolvePrivateIdentity({
+            req: reqOf({
+                cookies: {},
+                query: { 'puter.auth.token': wrongAppToken },
+            }),
+            authService,
+            sessionCookieName: 'puter_auth_token',
+            expectedAppUid: targetUid,
+        });
+        expect(out.source).toBe('none');
+        expect(out.userUid).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('accepts a bootstrap query-token whose actor.app.uid matches the target app', async () => {
+        // Positive case: a token correctly bound to the target app
+        // resolves the user identity. Confirms the guard isn't blocking
+        // legitimate same-app traffic.
+        const user = await makeUser();
+        // App uids must be `app-<hex-uuid>` for token round-trip — see the
+        // negative-case comment above.
+        const targetUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
+        await server.clients.db.write(
+            `INSERT INTO \`apps\` (\`uid\`, \`name\`, \`title\`, \`index_url\`, \`owner_user_id\`, \`is_private\`)
+             VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+            [
+                targetUid,
+                `target-${targetUid}`,
+                `target-${targetUid}`,
+                `http://${targetUid}.example/`,
+                user.id,
+                1,
+            ],
+        );
+        const matchedToken = await authService.getUserAppToken(
+            { user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid } } as unknown as Parameters<
+                typeof authService.getUserAppToken
+            >[0],
+            targetUid,
+        );
+        const out = await resolvePrivateIdentity({
+            req: reqOf({
+                cookies: {},
+                query: { 'puter.auth.token': matchedToken },
+            }),
+            authService,
+            sessionCookieName: 'puter_auth_token',
+            expectedAppUid: targetUid,
+        });
+        expect(out.source).toBe('query');
+        expect(out.userUid).toBe(user.uuid);
+    });
 });
 
 describe('resolvePublicHostedIdentity', () => {
@@ -712,7 +873,7 @@ describe('resolvePublicHostedIdentity', () => {
     it('returns the cookie identity when present and valid', async () => {
         const user = await makeUser();
         const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
-        const token = authService.createPublicHostedActorToken({
+        const token = await authService.createPublicHostedActorToken({
             appUid,
             userUid: user.uuid,
             subdomain: 'beans',
@@ -730,7 +891,7 @@ describe('resolvePublicHostedIdentity', () => {
             expectedSubdomain: 'beans',
             expectedHost: 'beans.site.puter.localhost',
         });
-        expect(out.source).toBe('private-cookie');
+        expect(out.source).toBe('public-cookie');
         expect(out.userUid).toBe(user.uuid);
         expect(
             (out as { hasValidPublicCookie?: boolean }).hasValidPublicCookie,

src/backend/core/http/middleware/privateAppGate.ts

@@ -17,9 +17,11 @@
  * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
+import type { AbstractDatabaseClient } from '@heyputer/backend/src/clients/database/DatabaseClient';
 import type { Request } from 'express';
 import type { AuthService } from '../../../services/auth/AuthService';
 import type { IConfig } from '../../../types';
+import type { Actor } from '../../actor';
 
 /**
  * Support helpers for the private-app access gate — ported from v1's
@@ -29,9 +31,10 @@ import type { IConfig } from '../../../types';
  *
  * Covers:
  *   - Host/subdomain parsing against `private_app_hosting_domain(_alt)`.
- *   - Broader private-app detection for hosted sites whose subdomain row
- *     has no `associated_app_id` — falls back to an `index_url` lookup
- *     against the subdomain owner's private apps.
+ *   - Owned-app detection for hosted sites: matches the subdomain owner's
+ *     apps by `index_url` against the request host. Replaces the older
+ *     `associated_app_id`-trusting path, which was user-writable without
+ *     an ownership check.
  *   - Bootstrap-token identity resolution (`Authorization: Bearer`,
  *     `?puter.auth.token=`, `X-Puter-Auth-Token`, referrer query) so
  *     private-app visitors with a valid session token (but no cookie on
@@ -66,6 +69,7 @@ export interface PrivateHostingConfig {
 export interface PrivateIdentity {
     source:
         | 'private-cookie'
+        | 'public-cookie'
         | 'session-cookie'
         | 'bootstrap-token'
         | 'authorization'
@@ -74,32 +78,25 @@ export interface PrivateIdentity {
         | 'none';
     userUid?: string;
     sessionUuid?: string;
-    /** True when resolved from the sticky `puter.private.asset.token` cookie. */
+    /** True when resolved from the sticky private-asset cookie. */
     hasValidPrivateCookie?: boolean;
 }
 
 interface SubdomainLike {
     user_id?: number | null;
-    associated_app_id?: number | null;
 }
 
 interface AppLike {
     id?: number;
     uid?: string;
     name?: string;
+    title?: string;
     owner_user_id?: number;
     is_private?: boolean | number | null;
     index_url?: string | null;
 }
 
-interface DBClient {
-    read: (
-        sql: string,
-        params: unknown[],
-    ) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>[]>;
-}
-
-// ── Host helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Host helpers ----------------------------------------------------
 
 export function normalizeHost(value: string | undefined | null): string | null {
     if (typeof value !== 'string') return null;
@@ -153,7 +150,7 @@ export function hostMatchesPrivateDomain(
     return privateDomains.some((pd) => host === pd || host.endsWith(`.${pd}`));
 }
 
-// ── Subdomain extraction from a hosted request ─────────────────────
+// -- Subdomain extraction from a hosted request ---------------------
 
 export function subdomainFromHost(
     host: string,
@@ -173,43 +170,39 @@ export function subdomainFromHost(
     return host.split('.')[0] || '';
 }
 
-// ── Private-app detection fallback (v1 `resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite`)
+// -- Hosted-site → owned-app resolution -----------------------------
 
 /**
- * When the subdomain row has no `associated_app_id`, v1 looked up the
- * owner's private apps and matched `index_url` against the request host
- * variants (this-subdomain × every hosting domain). Ports that logic.
+ * Resolve "what app does the subdomain owner run on this host?" by matching
+ * apps owned by `site.user_id` against the request's host variants. Used by
+ * the puter-site middleware to decide whether the request hits a private
+ * app (gate) or a public app (sticky cookie), and by the subdomain driver
+ * to populate the `associated_app` field in API responses.
  *
- * Returns the matched private app (if any) so the caller can run the
- * normal access check — closes a gap where a private app's files could
- * be served via a subdomain whose row wasn't explicitly linked.
+ * Ownership-anchored on `apps.owner_user_id = site.user_id` so a subdomain
+ * can never "claim" an app belonging to a different user. The `subdomains`
+ * row's own `associated_app_id` column is intentionally ignored — it was
+ * previously user-writable without an ownership check, so any value there
+ * is either legacy or planted; deriving from `index_url` makes the answer
+ * fall out of facts the system already verifies at app-create time.
  */
-export async function resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite(opts: {
+export async function resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite(opts: {
     req: Request;
     site: SubdomainLike;
-    associatedApp: AppLike | null;
-    db: DBClient;
+    db: AbstractDatabaseClient;
     config: PrivateHostingConfig;
-    matchedHostingDomain: string;
+    requirePrivate?: boolean;
 }): Promise<AppLike | null> {
-    // When the subdomain row's own `associated_app_id` points at a private
-    // app, that wins outright. Otherwise fall through to index_url matching
-    // so a private app whose canonical URL lives on one hosting variant
-    // (`beans.puter.site`) still resolves when the visitor hits another
-    // (`beans.puter.app`).
-    if (opts.associatedApp && Number(opts.associatedApp.is_private ?? 0) > 0) {
-        return opts.associatedApp;
-    }
-    if (!opts.site?.user_id) return opts.associatedApp ?? null;
+    if (!opts.site?.user_id) return null;
 
     const host = normalizeHost(opts.req.hostname);
-    if (!host) return opts.associatedApp ?? null;
+    if (!host) return null;
 
     const hostedSubdomain = subdomainFromHost(host, [
         ...opts.config.staticDomains,
         ...opts.config.privateDomains,
     ]);
-    if (!hostedSubdomain) return opts.associatedApp ?? null;
+    if (!hostedSubdomain) return null;
 
     // Build host variants with AND without port, then cross each with both
     // protocols. Apps store whatever URL the user typed at create time, so
@@ -248,16 +241,19 @@ export async function resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite(opts: {
         }
     }
     const uniqueCandidates = [...new Set(urlCandidates)];
-    if (uniqueCandidates.length === 0) return opts.associatedApp ?? null;
+    if (uniqueCandidates.length === 0) return null;
 
+    const privateFilter = opts.requirePrivate
+        ? `AND \`is_private\` = ${opts.db.booleanLiteral(true)} `
+        : '';
     const placeholders = uniqueCandidates.map(() => '?').join(', ');
     const rows = await opts.db.read(
-        `SELECT * FROM apps WHERE owner_user_id = ? AND is_private = 1 AND index_url IN (${placeholders}) LIMIT 2`,
+        `SELECT * FROM apps WHERE owner_user_id = ? ${privateFilter}AND index_url IN (${placeholders}) LIMIT 2`,
         [opts.site.user_id, ...uniqueCandidates],
     );
-    if (rows.length === 0) return opts.associatedApp ?? null;
+    if (rows.length === 0) return null;
     if (rows.length > 1) {
-        console.warn('[puter-site] private_access.host_match_ambiguous', {
+        console.warn('[puter-site] hosted_site_app_match_ambiguous', {
             requestHost: host,
             matchCount: rows.length,
         });
@@ -265,7 +261,7 @@ export async function resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite(opts: {
     return rows[0] as unknown as AppLike;
 }
 
-// ── Bootstrap token resolution ──────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Bootstrap token resolution --------------------------------------
 
 function getAuthorizationToken(req: Request): string | null {
     const header = req.headers?.authorization;
@@ -352,12 +348,20 @@ export async function resolvePrivateIdentity(opts: {
     const cookies = (req as Request & { cookies?: Record<string, string> })
         .cookies;
 
-    // 1. Sticky private-asset cookie.
-    const privateCookieName = authService.getPrivateAssetCookieName();
+    // 1. Sticky private-asset cookie. Prefer the v2 cookie name; fall
+    // back to the legacy dot-style name while the deprecation window
+    // is open. A v1 (legacy-secret) token verifies but is intentionally
+    // NOT treated as a valid sticky cookie — we fall through so the
+    // chain re-mints under the v2 secret on this response.
+    const v2CookieName = authService.getPrivateAssetCookieNameV2();
+    const legacyCookieName = authService.getPrivateAssetCookieName();
     const privateCookieToken =
-        typeof cookies?.[privateCookieName] === 'string'
-            ? cookies[privateCookieName]
-            : null;
+        (typeof cookies?.[v2CookieName] === 'string'
+            ? cookies[v2CookieName]
+            : null) ??
+        (typeof cookies?.[legacyCookieName] === 'string'
+            ? cookies[legacyCookieName]
+            : null);
     if (privateCookieToken) {
         try {
             const claims = await authService.verifyPrivateAssetToken(
@@ -368,12 +372,15 @@ export async function resolvePrivateIdentity(opts: {
                     expectedPrivateHost,
                 },
             );
-            return {
-                source: 'private-cookie',
-                userUid: claims.userUid,
-                sessionUuid: claims.sessionUuid,
-                hasValidPrivateCookie: true,
-            };
+            if (!claims.legacy) {
+                return {
+                    source: 'private-cookie',
+                    userUid: claims.userUid,
+                    sessionUuid: claims.sessionUuid,
+                    hasValidPrivateCookie: true,
+                };
+            }
+            /* legacy cookie: fall through so the caller re-mints v2 */
         } catch {
             /* fall through — stale / mismatched / logged-out cookie */
         }
@@ -381,7 +388,10 @@ export async function resolvePrivateIdentity(opts: {
 
     // 2. Auth probe actor.
     const existingActor = req.actor;
-    if (existingActor?.user?.uuid) {
+    if (
+        existingActor?.user?.uuid &&
+        actorMatchesExpectedApp(existingActor, expectedAppUid)
+    ) {
         return {
             source: 'session-cookie',
             userUid: existingActor.user.uuid,
@@ -397,7 +407,10 @@ export async function resolvePrivateIdentity(opts: {
     if (sessionToken) {
         try {
             const actor = await authService.authenticateFromToken(sessionToken);
-            if (actor?.user?.uuid) {
+            if (
+                actor?.user?.uuid &&
+                actorMatchesExpectedApp(actor, expectedAppUid)
+            ) {
                 return {
                     source: 'session-cookie',
                     userUid: actor.user.uuid,
@@ -416,7 +429,10 @@ export async function resolvePrivateIdentity(opts: {
             const actor = await authService.authenticateFromToken(
                 bootstrap.token,
             );
-            if (actor?.user?.uuid) {
+            if (
+                actor?.user?.uuid &&
+                actorMatchesExpectedApp(actor, expectedAppUid)
+            ) {
                 return {
                     source: bootstrap.source,
                     userUid: actor.user.uuid,
@@ -431,6 +447,25 @@ export async function resolvePrivateIdentity(opts: {
     return { source: 'none' };
 }
 
+/**
+ * Guard against token confusion across private-app boundaries: an actor
+ * derived from an app-under-user token carries the *issuing* app's uid,
+ * which must match the host the request is being made against. A token
+ * minted for app A — e.g. when the visitor authorized a third-party app —
+ * must not be honored as identity on app B's private host, even when the
+ * underlying user happens to have entitlement to B. User-only actors
+ * (no `actor.app`) are unaffected: a plain session token is portable by
+ * design.
+ */
+function actorMatchesExpectedApp(
+    actor: Actor,
+    expectedAppUid: string | undefined,
+): boolean {
+    if (!expectedAppUid) return true;
+    if (!actor.app?.uid) return true;
+    return actor.app.uid === expectedAppUid;
+}
+
 /**
  * Mirror of `resolvePrivateIdentity` for public hosted apps. Reads the
  * sticky `puter.public.hosted.actor.token` cookie first, then the same
@@ -456,14 +491,18 @@ export async function resolvePublicHostedIdentity(opts: {
     const cookies = (req as Request & { cookies?: Record<string, string> })
         .cookies;
 
-    const publicCookieName = authService.getPublicHostedActorCookieName();
+    const publicCookieNameV2 = authService.getPublicHostedActorCookieNameV2();
+    const publicCookieNameLegacy = authService.getPublicHostedActorCookieName();
     const publicCookieToken =
-        typeof cookies?.[publicCookieName] === 'string'
-            ? cookies[publicCookieName]
-            : null;
+        (typeof cookies?.[publicCookieNameV2] === 'string'
+            ? cookies[publicCookieNameV2]
+            : null) ??
+        (typeof cookies?.[publicCookieNameLegacy] === 'string'
+            ? cookies[publicCookieNameLegacy]
+            : null);
     if (publicCookieToken) {
         try {
-            const claims = authService.verifyPublicHostedActorToken(
+            const claims = await authService.verifyPublicHostedActorToken(
                 publicCookieToken,
                 {
                     expectedAppUid,
@@ -471,19 +510,25 @@ export async function resolvePublicHostedIdentity(opts: {
                     expectedHost,
                 },
             );
-            return {
-                source: 'private-cookie',
-                userUid: claims.userUid,
-                sessionUuid: claims.sessionUuid,
-                hasValidPublicCookie: true,
-            };
+            if (!claims.legacy) {
+                return {
+                    source: 'public-cookie',
+                    userUid: claims.userUid,
+                    sessionUuid: claims.sessionUuid,
+                    hasValidPublicCookie: true,
+                };
+            }
+            /* legacy cookie: fall through so the caller re-mints v2 */
         } catch {
             /* fall through */
         }
     }
 
     const existingActor = req.actor;
-    if (existingActor?.user?.uuid) {
+    if (
+        existingActor?.user?.uuid &&
+        actorMatchesExpectedApp(existingActor, expectedAppUid)
+    ) {
         return {
             source: 'session-cookie',
             userUid: existingActor.user.uuid,
@@ -498,7 +543,10 @@ export async function resolvePublicHostedIdentity(opts: {
     if (sessionToken) {
         try {
             const actor = await authService.authenticateFromToken(sessionToken);
-            if (actor?.user?.uuid) {
+            if (
+                actor?.user?.uuid &&
+                actorMatchesExpectedApp(actor, expectedAppUid)
+            ) {
                 return {
                     source: 'session-cookie',
                     userUid: actor.user.uuid,
@@ -516,7 +564,10 @@ export async function resolvePublicHostedIdentity(opts: {
             const actor = await authService.authenticateFromToken(
                 bootstrap.token,
             );
-            if (actor?.user?.uuid) {
+            if (
+                actor?.user?.uuid &&
+                actorMatchesExpectedApp(actor, expectedAppUid)
+            ) {
                 return {
                     source: bootstrap.source,
                     userUid: actor.user.uuid,
@@ -531,7 +582,7 @@ export async function resolvePublicHostedIdentity(opts: {
     return { source: 'none' };
 }
 
-// ── Redirect helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Redirect helpers ------------------------------------------------
 
 /** Build the URL to redirect a private-app request to its private host. */
 export function buildPrivateHostRedirect(
@@ -612,7 +663,7 @@ export function buildAppCenterFallback(
     return `https://${config.domain}/app/app-center/?item=${encodeURIComponent(appName)}`;
 }
 
-// ── Login bootstrap HTML ────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Login bootstrap HTML --------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * Minimal HTML page that prompts the visitor to sign in with Puter.

src/backend/core/http/middleware/puterSite.test.ts

@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ describe('createPuterSiteMiddleware — file serving', () => {
         expect(String(out.body)).toContain('Not Found');
     });
 
-    it('returns 404 when the resolved URL points at a directory rather than a file', async () => {
+    it('returns 404 when the resolved URL points at a directory with no index.html', async () => {
         const owner = await makeUserWithHome();
         const homePath = `/${owner.username}`;
         const homeEntry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(homePath);
@@ -645,8 +645,8 @@ describe('createPuterSiteMiddleware — file serving', () => {
         await mw(
             makeReq({
                 hostname: `${sub}.site.puter.localhost`,
-                // Documents/ exists from generateDefaultFsentries — a
-                // directory entry, which the file branch must refuse.
+                // Documents/ exists from generateDefaultFsentries but has
+                // no index.html — directory fallback must still 404.
                 path: '/Documents',
             }),
             res,
@@ -657,6 +657,45 @@ describe('createPuterSiteMiddleware — file serving', () => {
         expect(out.contentType).toBe('text/html; charset=UTF-8');
     });
 
+    it('serves <folder>/index.html when the URL resolves to a folder containing one', async () => {
+        const owner = await makeUserWithHome();
+        const homePath = `/${owner.username}`;
+        const homeEntry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(homePath);
+        const sub = `folderidx-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
+        await server.stores.subdomain.create({
+            userId: owner.id,
+            subdomain: sub,
+            rootDirId: homeEntry!.id,
+        });
+        const body = Buffer.from('nested doc');
+        await writeFile(
+            owner.id,
+            `${homePath}/Documents/index.html`,
+            body,
+            'text/html',
+        );
+
+        const mw = buildMiddleware();
+        const { res, out } = makeRes();
+        await mw(
+            makeReq({
+                hostname: `${sub}.site.puter.localhost`,
+                // No trailing slash; folder exists and contains index.html.
+                path: '/Documents',
+            }),
+            res,
+            vi.fn(),
+        );
+        // Allow the piped stream to flush.
+        await new Promise<void>((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+
+        expect(out.statusCode).toBe(200);
+        expect(out.headers['Content-Type']).toMatch(/text\/html/);
+        const piped = out.body as Buffer | undefined;
+        expect(Buffer.isBuffer(piped)).toBe(true);
+        expect(piped!.equals(body)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
     it("serves the HTML SUBDOMAIN_404 when the subdomain's root_dir_id points to a missing entry", async () => {
         // Subdomain row references a fsentry id that doesn't exist —
         // earlier path resolution must catch this with the HTML 404 page.
@@ -781,3 +820,344 @@ describe('createPuterSiteMiddleware — file serving', () => {
         expect(out.statusCode).toBe(404);
     });
 });
+
+// ── .puter_site_config (custom error pages) ─────────────────────────
+//
+// Sites can drop a `.puter_site_config` JSON file at the root of their
+// hosting directory to map error codes onto custom pages — the
+// canonical use case is SPA fallback (404 → /index.html with status
+// 200). These tests pin the contract end-to-end through the real
+// FSService so we exercise parsing, path resolution, and the loop-
+// prevention guard together.
+
+describe('createPuterSiteMiddleware — .puter_site_config', () => {
+    const setupSiteWithConfig = async (config: unknown) => {
+        const owner = await makeUserWithHome();
+        const homePath = `/${owner.username}`;
+        const homeEntry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(homePath);
+        const sub = `cfg-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
+        await server.stores.subdomain.create({
+            userId: owner.id,
+            subdomain: sub,
+            rootDirId: homeEntry!.id,
+        });
+        await writeFile(
+            owner.id,
+            `${homePath}/.puter_site_config`,
+            Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(config)),
+            'application/json',
+        );
+        return { owner, homePath, sub };
+    };
+
+    it('serves /index.html with status 200 on 404 when configured (SPA fallback)', async () => {
+        // The user's headline use case: route any unknown path through
+        // the SPA entrypoint so client-side routing can take over,
+        // while still serving HTTP 200 so search engines don't cache
+        // the page as a hard 404.
+        const { owner, homePath, sub } = await setupSiteWithConfig({
+            errors: {
+                '404': { file: '/index.html', status: 200 },
+            },
+        });
+        const body = Buffer.from('<html>spa-shell</html>');
+        await writeFile(owner.id, `${homePath}/index.html`, body, 'text/html');
+
+        const mw = buildMiddleware();
+        const { res, out } = makeRes();
+        await mw(
+            makeReq({
+                hostname: `${sub}.site.puter.localhost`,
+                path: '/some/client-route',
+            }),
+            res,
+            vi.fn(),
+        );
+        await new Promise<void>((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+
+        expect(out.statusCode).toBe(200);
+        expect(out.headers['Content-Type']).toMatch(/text\/html/);
+        const piped = out.body as Buffer | undefined;
+        expect(Buffer.isBuffer(piped)).toBe(true);
+        expect(piped!.equals(body)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('serves the configured file with the matched code when `status` is omitted', async () => {
+        // No explicit `status` → default to the matched error code
+        // (404 here). Bare `{ file: '/404.html' }` should Just Work
+        // for the classic "pretty 404 page" use case.
+        const { owner, homePath, sub } = await setupSiteWithConfig({
+            errors: { '404': { file: '/404.html' } },
+        });
+        const body = Buffer.from('<html>custom 404</html>');
+        await writeFile(owner.id, `${homePath}/404.html`, body, 'text/html');
+
+        const mw = buildMiddleware();
+        const { res, out } = makeRes();
+        await mw(
+            makeReq({
+                hostname: `${sub}.site.puter.localhost`,
+                path: '/no-such-page',
+            }),
+            res,
+            vi.fn(),
+        );
+        await new Promise<void>((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+
+        expect(out.statusCode).toBe(404);
+        const piped = out.body as Buffer | undefined;
+        expect(piped!.equals(body)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('falls back to the default 404 page when the configured error file does not exist (no infinite loop)', async () => {
+        // Critical loop guard: if the error page itself is missing,
+        // we must NOT recurse through the error config again. The
+        // request must terminate with the built-in 404 page rather
+        // than spinning errors.404 → errors.404 → … .
+        const { sub } = await setupSiteWithConfig({
+            errors: { '404': { file: '/missing.html', status: 200 } },
+        });
+        // Deliberately do not write missing.html.
+
+        const mw = buildMiddleware();
+        const { res, out } = makeRes();
+        await mw(
+            makeReq({
+                hostname: `${sub}.site.puter.localhost`,
+                path: '/anything',
+            }),
+            res,
+            vi.fn(),
+        );
+
+        expect(out.statusCode).toBe(404);
+        expect(out.contentType).toBe('text/html; charset=UTF-8');
+        expect(String(out.body)).toContain('Not Found');
+    });
+
+    it('returns 404 when a visitor requests `.puter_site_config` directly (no config leak)', async () => {
+        // The config file is implementation detail — hide it the same
+        // way any other missing path would 404, so visitors can't
+        // enumerate deployment shape by guessing well-known names.
+        const { sub } = await setupSiteWithConfig({
+            errors: { '404': { file: '/index.html', status: 200 } },
+        });
+
+        const mw = buildMiddleware();
+        const { res, out } = makeRes();
+        await mw(
+            makeReq({
+                hostname: `${sub}.site.puter.localhost`,
+                path: '/.puter_site_config',
+            }),
+            res,
+            vi.fn(),
+        );
+
+        // No error-page fallback because we didn't write /index.html.
+        expect(out.statusCode).toBe(404);
+        // Body shape is the default 404, not the JSON config.
+        expect(String(out.body)).not.toContain('errors');
+    });
+
+    it('rejects `errors.404.file` paths that try to climb out of the site root', async () => {
+        // The normalizer collapses `..` segments, so an attacker who
+        // can edit the config can't pivot it into reading files
+        // outside their own subdomain root.
+        const otherOwner = await makeUserWithHome();
+        const secretPath = `/${otherOwner.username}/secret.html`;
+        await writeFile(
+            otherOwner.id,
+            secretPath,
+            Buffer.from('SECRET'),
+            'text/html',
+        );
+
+        const { sub } = await setupSiteWithConfig({
+            errors: {
+                '404': {
+                    // Tries to walk up to the other user's home dir.
+                    file: `/../${otherOwner.username}/secret.html`,
+                    status: 200,
+                },
+            },
+        });
+
+        const mw = buildMiddleware();
+        const { res, out } = makeRes();
+        await mw(
+            makeReq({
+                hostname: `${sub}.site.puter.localhost`,
+                path: '/anything',
+            }),
+            res,
+            vi.fn(),
+        );
+
+        // The collapsed path resolves under the requesting site's
+        // root, which doesn't have a `<username>/secret.html` file —
+        // so the fallback fails and we get the default 404, NOT the
+        // SECRET body.
+        expect(out.statusCode).toBe(404);
+        expect(String(out.body)).not.toContain('SECRET');
+    });
+
+    it('ignores malformed JSON configs and behaves like there is no config', async () => {
+        // A typo in the config file must not 5xx the request — the
+        // visitor still gets the default 404 on a missing path.
+        const owner = await makeUserWithHome();
+        const homePath = `/${owner.username}`;
+        const homeEntry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(homePath);
+        const sub = `bad-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
+        await server.stores.subdomain.create({
+            userId: owner.id,
+            subdomain: sub,
+            rootDirId: homeEntry!.id,
+        });
+        await writeFile(
+            owner.id,
+            `${homePath}/.puter_site_config`,
+            Buffer.from('this is not json {{{'),
+            'application/json',
+        );
+        await writeFile(
+            owner.id,
+            `${homePath}/index.html`,
+            Buffer.from('would-be-fallback'),
+            'text/html',
+        );
+
+        const mw = buildMiddleware();
+        const { res, out } = makeRes();
+        await mw(
+            makeReq({
+                hostname: `${sub}.site.puter.localhost`,
+                path: '/unknown',
+            }),
+            res,
+            vi.fn(),
+        );
+
+        expect(out.statusCode).toBe(404);
+        expect(String(out.body)).toContain('Not Found');
+        // Did NOT silently fall back to /index.html as if the config
+        // were valid — malformed config must be ignored, not partially
+        // applied.
+        expect(String(out.body)).not.toContain('would-be-fallback');
+    });
+
+    it('still serves real files normally — config only applies on 404', async () => {
+        // Sanity check: when the requested path exists, the config's
+        // error rules are not consulted, so the response is the live
+        // file at status 200 (not the error-page status override).
+        const { owner, homePath, sub } = await setupSiteWithConfig({
+            errors: { '404': { file: '/index.html', status: 200 } },
+        });
+        const body = Buffer.from('real-page');
+        await writeFile(
+            owner.id,
+            `${homePath}/page.html`,
+            body,
+            'text/html',
+        );
+
+        const mw = buildMiddleware();
+        const { res, out } = makeRes();
+        await mw(
+            makeReq({
+                hostname: `${sub}.site.puter.localhost`,
+                path: '/page.html',
+            }),
+            res,
+            vi.fn(),
+        );
+        await new Promise<void>((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+
+        expect(out.statusCode).toBe(200);
+        const piped = out.body as Buffer | undefined;
+        expect(piped!.equals(body)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('serves the cached config on a second request, even when the on-disk file is removed (Redis cache holds within TTL)', async () => {
+        // First request seeds the cache with the parsed config. We
+        // then delete the underlying file and fire a second request:
+        // if the cache is wired correctly, the SPA fallback still
+        // applies because we never re-read from S3. Within-TTL
+        // staleness is the explicit contract (60s default).
+        const { owner, homePath, sub } = await setupSiteWithConfig({
+            errors: { '404': { file: '/index.html', status: 200 } },
+        });
+        const body = Buffer.from('<html>spa-shell</html>');
+        await writeFile(owner.id, `${homePath}/index.html`, body, 'text/html');
+
+        const mw = buildMiddleware();
+
+        // First request → primes the cache.
+        const first = makeRes();
+        await mw(
+            makeReq({
+                hostname: `${sub}.site.puter.localhost`,
+                path: '/route-a',
+            }),
+            first.res,
+            vi.fn(),
+        );
+        await new Promise<void>((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+        expect(first.out.statusCode).toBe(200);
+
+        // Now wipe the on-disk config. If the loader hits S3 on every
+        // request, the second call below would see no config and fall
+        // through to a default 404. The cache contract is that it
+        // does NOT — within the TTL, the prior parse stands.
+        const configEntry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+            `${homePath}/.puter_site_config`,
+        );
+        if (configEntry) {
+            await server.services.fs.remove(owner.id, { entry: configEntry });
+        }
+
+        const second = makeRes();
+        await mw(
+            makeReq({
+                hostname: `${sub}.site.puter.localhost`,
+                path: '/route-b',
+            }),
+            second.res,
+            vi.fn(),
+        );
+        await new Promise<void>((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+
+        // SPA fallback still fires → cache served the deleted config.
+        expect(second.out.statusCode).toBe(200);
+        expect(
+            (second.out.body as Buffer | undefined)?.equals(body),
+        ).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('ignores `errors` entries with status codes outside 4xx/5xx', async () => {
+        // A `200` key in errors is meaningless and a footgun (it
+        // could be used to silently override the happy path). The
+        // parser must drop these on the floor.
+        const { sub } = await setupSiteWithConfig({
+            errors: {
+                '200': { file: '/oops.html', status: 200 },
+                '999': { file: '/oops.html', status: 200 },
+            },
+        });
+
+        const mw = buildMiddleware();
+        const { res, out } = makeRes();
+        await mw(
+            makeReq({
+                hostname: `${sub}.site.puter.localhost`,
+                path: '/missing',
+            }),
+            res,
+            vi.fn(),
+        );
+
+        // No valid 404 rule survives the filter → default 404.
+        expect(out.statusCode).toBe(404);
+        expect(String(out.body)).toContain('Not Found');
+    });
+});

src/backend/core/http/middleware/puterSite.ts

@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ import type { RequestHandler } from 'express';
 import { contentType as contentTypeFromMime } from 'mime-types';
 import { posix as pathPosix } from 'node:path';
 import type { puterClients } from '../../../clients';
+import { FS_COSTS } from '../../../controllers/fs/costs';
 import type { puterServices } from '../../../services';
 import type { puterStores } from '../../../stores';
-import { FS_COSTS } from '../../../controllers/fs/costs';
 import type { IConfig, LayerInstances } from '../../../types';
 import {
     buildAppCenterFallback,
@@ -32,10 +32,16 @@ import {
     buildPublicHostRedirect,
     hostMatchesPrivateDomain,
     renderLoginBootstrapHtml,
-    resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite,
+    resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite,
     resolvePrivateIdentity,
     resolvePublicHostedIdentity,
 } from './privateAppGate';
+import {
+    isSiteConfigPath,
+    loadSiteConfig,
+    resolveErrorTarget,
+    type SiteConfig,
+} from './puterSiteConfig';
 
 /**
  * Serves user-hosted static sites on the hosting domains (`*.puter.site`,
@@ -52,9 +58,15 @@ import {
  *
  * Deferred (not yet implemented):
  *   - `.at` username-based sites (UUIDv5-keyed `/user/Public`).
- *   - `.puter_site_config` error rules (custom status-code → file mapping).
  *   - Custom domains (subdomains table `domain` column) — requires host
  *     validation to allow arbitrary hostnames first.
+ *
+ * Site config:
+ *   - `.puter_site_config` at the site root (see `puterSiteConfig.ts`)
+ *     supplies custom error pages. On a file 404, the matching rule's
+ *     `file` is served with the rule's `status` — supports the SPA
+ *     fallback pattern of `404 → /index.html with status 200`. The
+ *     config file itself is hidden from public serving.
  */
 
 const SUBDOMAIN_404 = `<div style="font-size: 20px;
@@ -192,29 +204,21 @@ export const createPuterSiteMiddleware = (
 
         const hostingCfg = buildHostingConfig(config);
 
-        let associatedApp: AppRow | null = null;
-        if (
-            site.associated_app_id !== null &&
-            site.associated_app_id !== undefined
-        ) {
-            associatedApp = (await layers.stores.app.getById(
-                site.associated_app_id,
-            )) as unknown as AppRow | null;
-        }
-
-        const privateApp = (await resolvePrivateAppForHostedSite({
+        // The subdomain row's `associated_app_id` column is intentionally
+        // not consulted — it was previously user-writable without an
+        // ownership check (so any value there is either legacy or planted).
+        // Resolve "what app does this subdomain host?" directly from
+        // `apps.owner_user_id = site.user_id` + `index_url` match against
+        // the request host.
+        const associatedApp = (await resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite({
             req,
-            site: {
-                user_id: site.user_id,
-                associated_app_id: site.associated_app_id,
-            },
-            associatedApp,
+            site: { user_id: site.user_id },
             db: layers.clients.db,
             config: hostingCfg,
-            matchedHostingDomain: matched,
         })) as AppRow | null;
 
-        const isPrivateApp = Boolean(privateApp?.is_private);
+        const isPrivateApp = Boolean(associatedApp?.is_private);
+        const privateApp = isPrivateApp ? associatedApp : null;
 
         if (isPrivateApp) {
             // Private apps must run on the private hosting domain. If a
@@ -319,15 +323,16 @@ export const createPuterSiteMiddleware = (
             // visitors but still refreshes after rotation/expiry.
             if (!identity.hasValidPrivateCookie) {
                 try {
-                    const token = layers.services.auth.createPrivateAssetToken({
-                        appUid: privateApp!.uid,
-                        userUid: identity.userUid,
-                        sessionUuid: identity.sessionUuid,
-                        subdomain,
-                        privateHost: host,
-                    });
+                    const token =
+                        await layers.services.auth.createPrivateAssetToken({
+                            appUid: privateApp!.uid,
+                            userUid: identity.userUid,
+                            sessionUuid: identity.sessionUuid,
+                            subdomain,
+                            privateHost: host,
+                        });
                     res.cookie(
-                        layers.services.auth.getPrivateAssetCookieName(),
+                        layers.services.auth.getPrivateAssetCookieNameV2(),
                         token,
                         layers.services.auth.getPrivateAssetCookieOptions({
                             requestHostname: host,
@@ -386,15 +391,17 @@ export const createPuterSiteMiddleware = (
                     associatedApp?.uid
                 ) {
                     const token =
-                        layers.services.auth.createPublicHostedActorToken({
-                            appUid: associatedApp.uid,
-                            userUid: identity.userUid,
-                            sessionUuid: identity.sessionUuid,
-                            subdomain,
-                            host,
-                        });
+                        await layers.services.auth.createPublicHostedActorToken(
+                            {
+                                appUid: associatedApp.uid,
+                                userUid: identity.userUid,
+                                sessionUuid: identity.sessionUuid,
+                                subdomain,
+                                host,
+                            },
+                        );
                     res.cookie(
-                        layers.services.auth.getPublicHostedActorCookieName(),
+                        layers.services.auth.getPublicHostedActorCookieNameV2(),
                         token,
                         layers.services.auth.getPublicHostedActorCookieOptions({
                             requestHostname: host,
@@ -436,7 +443,16 @@ export const createPuterSiteMiddleware = (
         // Resolve URL path → absolute FS path under the site root.
         let urlPath = req.path || '/';
         if (urlPath.endsWith('/')) urlPath += 'index.html';
-        const decoded = decodeURIComponent(urlPath);
+        let decoded: string;
+        try {
+            decoded = decodeURIComponent(urlPath);
+        } catch {
+            // Malformed `%xx` escape — treat as a missing path, not a 500.
+            res.status(404)
+                .type('text/html; charset=UTF-8')
+                .send('<h1>404</h1><p>Not Found</p>');
+            return;
+        }
         // pathPosix.normalize strips `..` segments; the join with '/' anchors
         // it so traversal can't escape the site root.
         const resolvedUrlPath = pathPosix.normalize(
@@ -449,10 +465,63 @@ export const createPuterSiteMiddleware = (
         }
         const filePath = rootPath + resolvedUrlPath;
 
+        // Best-effort site config load. A missing / malformed config
+        // never blocks the request — `loadSiteConfig` swallows all
+        // errors and returns null on any failure. The Redis cache
+        // keyed on `rootDirId` keeps the hot path off S3 for the
+        // common case where the same subdomain gets repeat visits.
+        let siteConfig: SiteConfig | null = null;
+        try {
+            siteConfig = await loadSiteConfig({
+                rootPath,
+                rootDirId: rootEntry.id,
+                fsEntryStore: layers.stores.fsEntry,
+                fsService: layers.services.fs,
+                cache: layers.clients.redis,
+            });
+        } catch (e) {
+            console.warn('[puter-site] loadSiteConfig threw', e);
+        }
+
+        // Hide the config file from public serving — visitors should
+        // see the same 404 as for any other missing path so the
+        // deployment shape isn't leaked.
+        const isConfigRequest = isSiteConfigPath(resolvedUrlPath);
+
         // Subdomain hosting bypasses ACL by design: anything the owner placed
         // under the registered root_dir is treated as public. Path traversal
         // is blocked above by `pathPosix.normalize` anchoring at `/`.
-        const entry = await layers.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(filePath);
+        let entry = isConfigRequest
+            ? null
+            : await layers.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(filePath);
+        if (entry?.isDir) {
+            // Folder request → fall back to <folder>/index.html, the same
+            // way `/` is rewritten to `/index.html` at the site root above.
+            entry = await layers.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+                pathPosix.join(filePath, 'index.html'),
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Custom error page fallback. On a 404 we consult the site config
+        // for a rule and, if one resolves to an existing file, serve that
+        // instead. Critical: we do this exactly once — the error page
+        // itself never re-enters error handling, so a misconfigured
+        // `errors.404.file` that doesn't exist falls through to the
+        // default 404 page rather than looping.
+        let statusOverride: number | undefined;
+        if (!entry || entry.isDir) {
+            const errorTarget = resolveErrorTarget(siteConfig, 404, rootPath);
+            if (errorTarget) {
+                const candidate = await layers.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+                    errorTarget.absPath,
+                );
+                if (candidate && !candidate.isDir) {
+                    entry = candidate;
+                    statusOverride = errorTarget.status;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
         if (!entry || entry.isDir) {
             res.status(404)
                 .type('text/html; charset=UTF-8')
@@ -461,8 +530,13 @@ export const createPuterSiteMiddleware = (
         }
 
         // Stream the file. `fsEntry.readContent` honours Range + emits
-        // ETag/Last-Modified when the S3 layer returns them.
+        // ETag/Last-Modified when the S3 layer returns them. Range
+        // requests are suppressed when serving a custom error page so
+        // the visitor always receives the full document with the
+        // configured status code (no 206 with a stale `bytes=...`
+        // header from the original request).
         const range =
+            statusOverride === undefined &&
             typeof req.headers.range === 'string'
                 ? req.headers.range
                 : undefined;
@@ -479,6 +553,25 @@ export const createPuterSiteMiddleware = (
         const mime =
             contentTypeFromMime(entry.name) || 'application/octet-stream';
         res.setHeader('Content-Type', mime);
+
+        // Fire-and-forget signal for downstream extensions
+        if (mime === 'text/html' || mime === 'application/xhtml+xml') {
+            try {
+                layers.clients.event.emit(
+                    'site.htmlServed',
+                    {
+                        subdomain,
+                        entry,
+                        host,
+                        requestPath: req.path,
+                        mime,
+                    },
+                    {},
+                );
+            } catch (e) {
+                console.warn('[puter-site] site.htmlServed emit failed', e);
+            }
+        }
         if (download.contentLength !== null) {
             res.setHeader('Content-Length', String(download.contentLength));
         }
@@ -489,7 +582,7 @@ export const createPuterSiteMiddleware = (
             res.setHeader('Last-Modified', download.lastModified.toUTCString());
         res.setHeader('Accept-Ranges', 'bytes');
         res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');
-        res.status(range ? 206 : 200);
+        res.status(statusOverride ?? (range ? 206 : 200));
 
         // Best-effort egress metering against the site owner. The request
         // itself is unauthenticated (public site visitor), so we can't use

src/backend/core/http/middleware/puterSiteConfig.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import { posix as pathPosix } from 'node:path';
+import type { FSEntry } from '../../../stores/fs/FSEntry';
+
+/**
+ * Minimal Redis surface we need — `get` / `set` with EX TTL. Typed as a
+ * subset of ioredis so callers can pass either the real cluster client
+ * or a mock without needing the full Cluster type here.
+ */
+export interface SiteConfigCache {
+    get(key: string): Promise<string | null>;
+    set(
+        key: string,
+        value: string,
+        mode: 'EX',
+        ttlSeconds: number,
+    ): Promise<unknown>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Site-level configuration loaded from `.puter_site_config` at the site
+ * root. Lets a hosted site customize how the server responds for it —
+ * currently limited to error-page mapping (e.g. SPA fallback that serves
+ * `/index.html` for any 404 with a 200 status).
+ *
+ * The on-disk JSON shape:
+ *
+ *   {
+ *     "errors": {
+ *       "404": { "file": "/index.html", "status": 200 }
+ *     }
+ *   }
+ *
+ * Other static-hosting platforms (Vercel `vercel.json`, Netlify/Amplify
+ * `_redirects`, nginx `error_page`) express the same idea with different
+ * syntax. The internal `SiteConfig` is intentionally narrow so additional
+ * parsers can normalize to it without churning the consumer in
+ * `puterSite.ts` — see `SITE_CONFIG_FILENAMES` for the lookup list.
+ *
+ * Security posture (every input here originates from a user-uploaded file
+ * served on the open internet):
+ *   - the on-disk file is size-capped before parse (`MAX_CONFIG_BYTES`),
+ *   - JSON parsing is wrapped in try/catch — a malformed file silently
+ *     falls back to default behavior, never 5xx,
+ *   - every `file` value is normalized as if it were a URL path: it must
+ *     start with `/`, gets `pathPosix.normalize`d so `..` is collapsed,
+ *     and is re-anchored under the site root before any FS lookup,
+ *   - status codes are clamped to a strict allow-list (the request side
+ *     only honours 4xx/5xx error keys; the response side validates the
+ *     `status` is a legitimate HTTP integer),
+ *   - the config file itself is hidden from public serving by the caller
+ *     (`isSiteConfigPath`) — same status/body as any other missing path,
+ *     no separate 403 that would leak its existence.
+ *
+ * Loop safety is the consumer's responsibility: when serving an error
+ * page, do NOT re-consult `errors` if the error page itself is missing,
+ * otherwise a misconfigured site could spin a 404→404→404 cycle.
+ */
+export interface SiteErrorRule {
+    /** Absolute path under the site root (e.g. `/index.html`). */
+    file: string;
+    /** HTTP status to return when serving this error page (200–599). */
+    status: number;
+}
+
+export interface SiteConfig {
+    /** Map of HTTP status code → custom error rule. Keys are 4xx/5xx. */
+    errors: Record<number, SiteErrorRule>;
+}
+
+const MAX_CONFIG_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
+
+// Cache key prefix is distinct from `subdomains:` (SubdomainStore) and
+// other Redis users — keep this in sync if you rename, otherwise stale
+// entries from prior deploys could be read back as configs.
+const CACHE_KEY_PREFIX = 'puter-site-config:';
+const CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 60;
+// Sentinel for "we looked, the site has no config" so repeated visits
+// to a config-less site don't keep round-tripping S3 to confirm.
+const NEGATIVE_CACHE_MARKER = '__none__';
+
+/**
+ * Filenames consulted at the site root, in priority order. First file
+ * that parses to a non-empty config wins. Extending this list to add
+ * Vercel / Netlify / nginx adapters is the entrypoint for multi-format
+ * support — each parser receives the raw text and returns a normalized
+ * `SiteConfig` (or null if the file isn't valid in that format).
+ */
+const SITE_CONFIG_FILENAMES: ReadonlyArray<{
+    name: string;
+    parse: (text: string) => SiteConfig | null;
+}> = [{ name: '.puter_site_config', parse: parsePuterSiteConfig }];
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if `urlPath` (already normalized to start with `/`) names
+ * the site config file. Used by `puterSite.ts` to suppress direct
+ * serving so the deployment shape isn't leaked to visitors.
+ */
+export function isSiteConfigPath(urlPath: string): boolean {
+    const base = pathPosix.basename(urlPath);
+    return SITE_CONFIG_FILENAMES.some((f) => f.name === base);
+}
+
+interface LoadSiteConfigArgs {
+    /** Absolute site root path (e.g. `/<username>/Public`). */
+    rootPath: string;
+    /**
+     * Stable identifier for the site root, used as the cache key. We
+     * key on `rootDirId` (not the subdomain) so that renaming a
+     * subdomain — or pointing multiple subdomains at the same
+     * directory — neither orphans nor duplicates the cached entry.
+     */
+    rootDirId: number;
+    fsEntryStore: {
+        getEntryByPath: (path: string) => Promise<FSEntry | null>;
+    };
+    fsService: {
+        readContent: (
+            entry: FSEntry,
+            options?: { range?: string },
+        ) => Promise<{
+            body: NodeJS.ReadableStream;
+            contentLength: number | null;
+        }>;
+    };
+    /**
+     * Optional Redis cache. When omitted, every request re-reads the
+     * config from S3 — fine for tests, slow for prod. Cache failures
+     * are swallowed (best-effort): a transient Redis blip just falls
+     * through to the live read, never errors the request.
+     */
+    cache?: SiteConfigCache;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Locate and parse the site config. Returns null when no config file
+ * exists, the file is unreadable, oversized, or fails validation —
+ * callers must treat null as "behave like there is no config" and never
+ * raise the error to the visitor. Errors are logged for the operator
+ * but never surfaced to the request.
+ */
+export async function loadSiteConfig(
+    args: LoadSiteConfigArgs,
+): Promise<SiteConfig | null> {
+    const { rootPath, rootDirId, fsEntryStore, fsService, cache } = args;
+    if (!rootPath || rootPath === '/') return null;
+    // Reject non-positive-integer ids defensively — they'd produce a
+    // weird cache key and we'd cache something nonsensical against it.
+    // The store contract is positive integers, but this is a hot path
+    // for untrusted-origin traffic so we belt-and-brace it.
+    const cacheable =
+        Number.isInteger(rootDirId) && rootDirId > 0 && cache !== undefined;
+    const cacheKey = cacheable ? `${CACHE_KEY_PREFIX}${rootDirId}` : null;
+
+    if (cacheable && cacheKey) {
+        try {
+            const raw = await cache!.get(cacheKey);
+            if (raw === NEGATIVE_CACHE_MARKER) return null;
+            if (typeof raw === 'string' && raw.length > 0) {
+                // Trust the cached shape — it was produced by this
+                // same parser, validated, and the TTL is short. Still
+                // wrap in try/catch in case a different deploy wrote a
+                // legacy/unparseable value to the same key.
+                try {
+                    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as SiteConfig;
+                    if (parsed && parsed.errors) return parsed;
+                } catch {
+                    /* fall through to a fresh load */
+                }
+            }
+        } catch {
+            // Cache transport failure — fall through to live load.
+            // Don't poison the next request with a half-applied state.
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (const { name, parse } of SITE_CONFIG_FILENAMES) {
+        const filePath = pathPosix.join(rootPath, name);
+        let entry: FSEntry | null;
+        try {
+            entry = await fsEntryStore.getEntryByPath(filePath);
+        } catch (e) {
+            console.warn('[puter-site] config lookup failed', {
+                path: filePath,
+                error: (e as Error)?.message,
+            });
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!entry || entry.isDir) continue;
+        // Reject oversized configs before paying the S3 read. `size` can
+        // be null for legacy entries — accept and rely on the streaming
+        // byte counter below.
+        if (entry.size !== null && entry.size > MAX_CONFIG_BYTES) {
+            console.warn('[puter-site] config too large, ignoring', {
+                path: filePath,
+                size: entry.size,
+            });
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        let text: string | null;
+        try {
+            text = await readBoundedText(entry, fsService, MAX_CONFIG_BYTES);
+        } catch (e) {
+            console.warn('[puter-site] config read failed', {
+                path: filePath,
+                error: (e as Error)?.message,
+            });
+            continue;
+        }
+        // Null means the stream exceeded the byte cap mid-read.
+        if (text === null) continue;
+
+        let parsed: SiteConfig | null;
+        try {
+            parsed = parse(text);
+        } catch (e) {
+            console.warn('[puter-site] config parse threw', {
+                path: filePath,
+                error: (e as Error)?.message,
+            });
+            parsed = null;
+        }
+        if (parsed && Object.keys(parsed.errors).length > 0) {
+            if (cacheable && cacheKey) {
+                writeCache(
+                    cache!,
+                    cacheKey,
+                    JSON.stringify(parsed),
+                    CACHE_TTL_SECONDS,
+                );
+            }
+            return parsed;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // No file matched (or all matched files parsed to empty). Cache
+    // the negative result so config-less sites — which are the common
+    // case — don't keep paying the FS lookup on every visit.
+    if (cacheable && cacheKey) {
+        writeCache(cache!, cacheKey, NEGATIVE_CACHE_MARKER, CACHE_TTL_SECONDS);
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+// Fire-and-forget cache write. We never await it on the request path
+// because failure is non-fatal and we don't want a slow Redis to add
+// latency to the response — the next request just re-loads from FS.
+function writeCache(
+    cache: SiteConfigCache,
+    key: string,
+    value: string,
+    ttlSeconds: number,
+): void {
+    cache.set(key, value, 'EX', ttlSeconds).catch(() => {
+        /* swallow — cache writes are best-effort */
+    });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve a custom error rule for `statusCode` into an absolute FS path
+ * under `rootPath`. Returns null if no rule applies or the rule's `file`
+ * would escape the site root after normalization. Caller is responsible
+ * for loop prevention (don't recurse into error handling when serving
+ * the error page itself).
+ */
+export function resolveErrorTarget(
+    config: SiteConfig | null,
+    statusCode: number,
+    rootPath: string,
+): { absPath: string; status: number } | null {
+    if (!config) return null;
+    const rule = config.errors[statusCode];
+    if (!rule) return null;
+    // Defence-in-depth: re-normalize at use time. `parsePuterSiteConfig`
+    // already does this, but keeping the contract here means future
+    // parsers (Vercel, Netlify) only need to return raw paths and can
+    // rely on this final guard.
+    const normalized = pathPosix.normalize(pathPosix.join('/', rule.file));
+    if (!normalized.startsWith('/') || normalized === '/') return null;
+    const absPath = rootPath.replace(/\/+$/, '') + normalized;
+    return { absPath, status: rule.status };
+}
+
+// -- Parsers ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+function parsePuterSiteConfig(text: string): SiteConfig | null {
+    let raw: unknown;
+    try {
+        raw = JSON.parse(text);
+    } catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+    if (!raw || typeof raw !== 'object') return null;
+    const errorsField = (raw as { errors?: unknown }).errors;
+    const errors: Record<number, SiteErrorRule> = {};
+    if (errorsField && typeof errorsField === 'object') {
+        for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(
+            errorsField as Record<string, unknown>,
+        )) {
+            const code = Number(k);
+            // Only 4xx/5xx are meaningful as "error pages" — accepting
+            // 2xx/3xx keys would let a config silently override the
+            // happy path, which is out of scope and a footgun.
+            if (!Number.isInteger(code) || code < 400 || code > 599) continue;
+            if (!v || typeof v !== 'object') continue;
+            const rule = v as { file?: unknown; status?: unknown };
+            if (typeof rule.file !== 'string' || !rule.file.startsWith('/')) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            // Default the response status to the matched error code so a
+            // bare `{ file: '/404.html' }` Just Works. Allow overriding
+            // for the SPA-fallback case where 404 should turn into 200.
+            let status: number;
+            if (rule.status === undefined) {
+                status = code;
+            } else if (
+                typeof rule.status === 'number' &&
+                Number.isInteger(rule.status) &&
+                rule.status >= 200 &&
+                rule.status <= 599
+            ) {
+                status = rule.status;
+            } else {
+                continue;
+            }
+            const normalized = pathPosix.normalize(
+                pathPosix.join('/', rule.file),
+            );
+            // Empty/root after normalize is meaningless as an error page
+            // (it would resolve to the site root itself).
+            if (normalized === '/') continue;
+            errors[code] = { file: normalized, status };
+        }
+    }
+    return { errors };
+}
+
+// Returns null when the stream exceeds `maxBytes` (caller treats as
+// "config too large, ignore"). The stream is always destroyed before
+// return so the S3 connection doesn't leak on early break.
+async function readBoundedText(
+    entry: FSEntry,
+    fsService: LoadSiteConfigArgs['fsService'],
+    maxBytes: number,
+): Promise<string | null> {
+    const download = await fsService.readContent(entry);
+    const stream = download.body as NodeJS.ReadableStream & {
+        destroy?: () => void;
+    };
+    const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
+    let total = 0;
+    let exceeded = false;
+    try {
+        for await (const chunk of stream as AsyncIterable<Buffer>) {
+            total += chunk.length;
+            if (total > maxBytes) {
+                exceeded = true;
+                break;
+            }
+            chunks.push(chunk);
+        }
+    } finally {
+        stream.destroy?.();
+    }
+    if (exceeded) return null;
+    return Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8');
+}

src/backend/core/http/middleware/rateLimit.js

@@ -42,11 +42,11 @@ import { HttpError } from '../HttpError.js';
  * one via the `backend` option; omitting it uses the configured default.
  */
 
-// ── Backend names ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Backend names ----------------------------------------------------
 
 export const RATE_LIMIT_BACKENDS = ['memory', 'redis', 'kv'];
 
-// ── Memory backend ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Memory backend --------------------------------------------------
 
 // Hard cap and retention bound memory in the worst case. Without them,
 // one-shot keys (visited once, never again) leak forever: their single
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ async function checkMemory(key, limit, windowMs) {
     return true;
 }
 
-// ── Redis backend ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Redis backend ---------------------------------------------------
 
 async function checkRedis(
     /** @type {import('ioredis').Cluster} */
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ async function checkRedis(
     return true;
 }
 
-// ── KV backend ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- KV backend ------------------------------------------------------
 
 async function checkKv(kv, key, limit, windowMs) {
     const prefix = `rate:${key}:`;
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ async function checkKv(kv, key, limit, windowMs) {
     return true;
 }
 
-// ── Concurrent in-flight backends ───────────────────────────────────
+// -- Concurrent in-flight backends -----------------------------------
 //
 // Concurrent limiting is the *other* shape: rather than "no more than X
 // hits in Y window", it's "no more than X requests in flight at once".
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ async function acquireKvConcurrent(kv, key, limit) {
     };
 }
 
-// ── Backend registry ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Backend registry ------------------------------------------------
 //
 // All registered backends stay live simultaneously; selection happens
 // per call via the `backend` option. The `default` slot is what callers
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ function resolveBackend(name) {
     return backends[defaultBackendName];
 }
 
-// ── Key strategies ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Key strategies --------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * Build a rate-limit key from the request.
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ function fingerprint(req) {
         .slice(0, 16);
 }
 
-// ── Route middleware ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Route middleware ------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * Express middleware factory. Reads from the materialised route option:
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ export function rateLimitGate(opts) {
     };
 }
 
-// ── Driver-call helper ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Driver-call helper ----------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * Check rate limit for a driver call. Called from DriverController's
@@ -492,7 +492,30 @@ export async function checkDriverRateLimit(req, ifaceName, method, opts = {}) {
     }
 }
 
-// ── Subscription-aware limit resolution ─────────────────────────────
+// -- Imperative helper -----------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Imperative rate-limit check (no middleware shape). For handlers that
+ * need a second-axis limit after their route-level limit fires —
+ * e.g. `/auth/migrate-token` limits per IP at the route, then per
+ * `auth_id` once the v1 token is decoded. Returns true if allowed,
+ * false if rate-limited. Fails open on backend error, matching the
+ * rest of this module's policy.
+ */
+export async function checkRateLimit(key, limit, windowMs, backend) {
+    const bk = resolveBackend(backend);
+    try {
+        return await bk.rate(key, limit, windowMs);
+    } catch (err) {
+        console.error(
+            '[rate-limit] imperative check failed, failing open:',
+            err,
+        );
+        return true;
+    }
+}
+
+// -- Subscription-aware limit resolution -----------------------------
 
 /**
  * Per-request limit resolution shared by `rateLimitGate` and
@@ -517,7 +540,7 @@ async function resolveSubscriptionLimit(req, opts) {
     }
 }
 
-// ── Concurrency gate + driver helper ────────────────────────────────
+// -- Concurrency gate + driver helper --------------------------------
 
 /**
  * Express middleware factory for concurrent in-flight limiting:

src/backend/core/http/middleware/rateLimit.test.js

@@ -140,6 +140,67 @@ describe('rateLimitGate — memory backend (default)', () => {
         expect(isHttpError(re)).toBe(true);
     });
 
+    // Stacked gates, mirroring the materializer's handling of a
+    // `rateLimit: [...]` array (each entry is its own gate; a rejection
+    // short-circuits the chain). This is the credential-endpoint pattern:
+    // per-fingerprint budget for fairness on shared IPs, per-IP backstop
+    // against header rotation.
+    const runStack = async (stack, req) => {
+        for (const opts of stack) {
+            const err = await runGate(opts, req);
+            if (err) return err;
+        }
+        return undefined;
+    };
+
+    it('stacked gates: per-IP backstop catches header rotation that escapes the fingerprint key', async () => {
+        const stack = [
+            { limit: 3, window: 60_000, scope: 'stack-fp' },
+            { limit: 6, window: 60_000, key: 'ip', scope: 'stack-ip' },
+        ];
+        // Rotating the User-Agent mints a fresh fingerprint bucket every
+        // request, so the fingerprint gate admits all of these — the IP
+        // backstop must cap the total anyway.
+        for (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+            const arg = await runStack(
+                stack,
+                makeReq({ headers: { 'user-agent': `rotated-ua-${i}` } }),
+            );
+            expect(arg).toBeUndefined();
+        }
+        const rejected = await runStack(
+            stack,
+            makeReq({ headers: { 'user-agent': 'rotated-ua-final' } }),
+        );
+        expect(isHttpError(rejected)).toBe(true);
+        expect(rejected.statusCode).toBe(429);
+    });
+
+    it('stacked gates: clients sharing an IP each get their own fingerprint budget under the IP cap', async () => {
+        const stack = [
+            { limit: 2, window: 60_000, scope: 'stack2-fp' },
+            { limit: 10, window: 60_000, key: 'ip', scope: 'stack2-ip' },
+        ];
+        // Two clients (distinct UAs) behind one NAT IP: each gets the
+        // full per-fingerprint budget, and each is cut off by its own
+        // fingerprint bucket — not starved by the other's traffic.
+        for (const ua of ['alice-browser', 'bob-browser']) {
+            for (let i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+                expect(
+                    await runStack(
+                        stack,
+                        makeReq({ headers: { 'user-agent': ua } }),
+                    ),
+                ).toBeUndefined();
+            }
+            const rejected = await runStack(
+                stack,
+                makeReq({ headers: { 'user-agent': ua } }),
+            );
+            expect(isHttpError(rejected)).toBe(true);
+        }
+    });
+
     it("falls back to fingerprint when 'user' strategy is selected but no actor present", async () => {
         // The fallback prevents anonymous traffic from sharing a single
         // bucket (which would invite trivial DoS via global rate-limit).

src/backend/core/http/middleware/userProtected.ts

@@ -63,6 +63,57 @@ export interface UserProtectedGateDeps {
     tokenService: TokenService;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Cookie-only credential check. Rejects API tokens, GUI tokens,
+ * `x-api-key` headers, and query-string tokens — only a request whose
+ * resolved `req.token` matches the session cookie passes. Used both by
+ * `createUserProtectedGate` (as its first stage) and standalone by
+ * routes that need session-cookie-only credentials without the full
+ * password-revalidation gate (e.g. `/auth/revoke-*`, where an access
+ * token shouldn't be able to revoke its own issuing web session).
+ */
+export const createSessionCookieGate = (config: IConfig): RequestHandler => {
+    const cookieName = config.cookie_name ?? 'puter_token';
+    return (req, _res, next) => {
+        const cookieValue = req.cookies?.[cookieName];
+        if (!cookieValue || (req.token && req.token !== cookieValue)) {
+            return next(
+                new HttpError(401, 'Session cookie required', {
+                    legacyCode: 'session_required',
+                }),
+            );
+        }
+        next();
+    };
+};
+
+/**
+ * Same intent as `createSessionCookieGate` ("an access token can't revoke
+ * its issuing web session") but identity-shape based instead of cookie-
+ * value based, so it works for the cross-subdomain GUI -> api.puter.com
+ * call path where the session cookie isn't sent. Accepts a plain user
+ * actor (web/session/gui-token); rejects app-under-user actors and
+ * access-token actors. Pair with `antiCsrf: true` on the route.
+ */
+export const createWebSessionActorGate = (): RequestHandler => {
+    return (req, _res, next) => {
+        const actor = req.actor;
+        if (
+            !actor?.user ||
+            !actor.session ||
+            (actor as { app?: unknown }).app ||
+            (actor as { accessToken?: unknown }).accessToken
+        ) {
+            return next(
+                new HttpError(401, 'Web session required', {
+                    legacyCode: 'session_required',
+                }),
+            );
+        }
+        next();
+    };
+};
+
 export interface UserProtectedGateOptions {
     /** Allow temp accounts (no password + no email) through. Default: false. */
     allowTempUsers?: boolean;
@@ -95,19 +146,10 @@ export const createUserProtectedGate = (
     options: UserProtectedGateOptions = {},
 ): RequestHandler[] => {
     const { config, userStore, oidcService, tokenService } = deps;
-    const cookieName = config.cookie_name ?? 'puter_token';
     const allowTemp = !!options.allowTempUsers;
 
-    // 1. Session cookie only.
-    const requireSessionCookie: RequestHandler = (req, _res, next) => {
-        const cookieValue = req.cookies?.[cookieName];
-        if (!cookieValue || (req.token && req.token !== cookieValue)) {
-            throw new HttpError(401, 'Session cookie required', {
-                legacyCode: 'session_required',
-            });
-        }
-        next();
-    };
+    // 1. Session cookie only. Shared with the standalone cookie-only gate.
+    const requireSessionCookie = createSessionCookieGate(config);
 
     // 2. Fresh user row (bypass cache to catch just-suspended accounts).
     // `getById` doesn't take options; go through `getByProperty` with

src/backend/core/http/routeLifecycle.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import { EventEmitter } from 'node:events';
+import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { EventClient } from '../../clients/event/EventClient';
+import type {
+    EventMap,
+    RouteLifecycleEvent,
+} from '../../clients/event/types';
+import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
+import {
+    createRouteLifecycleMiddleware,
+    pathKeySegment,
+    routeEventKeyBase,
+} from './routeLifecycle';
+
+// -- Fakes --
+//
+// EventClient is a pure in-memory bus (no external deps), so we use the real
+// one and register real listeners. The request/response are the boundary we
+// fake: a minimal `res` that is an EventEmitter (for `finish`/`close`) and
+// records status/body.
+
+const makeEvents = () => new EventClient({} as IConfig);
+
+class FakeRes extends EventEmitter {
+    statusCode = 200;
+    writableFinished = false;
+    headersSent = false;
+    body: unknown;
+    status(code: number) {
+        this.statusCode = code;
+        return this;
+    }
+    json(b: unknown) {
+        this.body = b;
+        return this;
+    }
+}
+
+const makeReq = (actorUuid?: string): Request =>
+    ({
+        actor: actorUuid ? { user: { uuid: actorUuid } } : undefined,
+    }) as unknown as Request;
+
+// Collect every emit on a given key into an array for assertions.
+const record = (events: EventClient, key: keyof EventMap) => {
+    const seen: RouteLifecycleEvent[] = [];
+    events.on(key as never, (_k, data) =>
+        seen.push(data as RouteLifecycleEvent),
+    );
+    return seen;
+};
+
+const POST = 'post' as const;
+const PATH = '/fs/completeBatchWrite';
+const BASE = 'route.post.fs.completeBatchWrite';
+
+describe('pathKeySegment', () => {
+    it('joins path parts with dots and drops slashes', () => {
+        expect(pathKeySegment('/fs/completeBatchWrite')).toBe(
+            'fs.completeBatchWrite',
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('strips the leading colon from path params', () => {
+        expect(pathKeySegment('/foo/:id')).toBe('foo.id');
+    });
+
+    it('maps the root path and non-string paths to placeholders', () => {
+        expect(pathKeySegment('/')).toBe('root');
+        expect(pathKeySegment(/^\/x/)).toBe('_');
+    });
+});
+
+describe('routeEventKeyBase', () => {
+    it('scopes the key to method + normalized path', () => {
+        expect(routeEventKeyBase(POST, PATH)).toBe(BASE);
+    });
+});
+
+describe('createRouteLifecycleMiddleware', () => {
+    it('emits before, then after on a clean finish', async () => {
+        const events = makeEvents();
+        const before = record(events, `${BASE}.before` as keyof EventMap);
+        const after = record(events, `${BASE}.after` as keyof EventMap);
+        const error = record(events, `${BASE}.error` as keyof EventMap);
+
+        const mw = createRouteLifecycleMiddleware(events, POST, PATH);
+        const req = makeReq('u-1');
+        const res = new FakeRes();
+        let nextCalled = false;
+
+        await mw(req, res as unknown as Response, () => {
+            nextCalled = true;
+        });
+
+        expect(nextCalled).toBe(true);
+        expect(before).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(before[0]).toMatchObject({
+            phase: 'before',
+            method: 'post',
+            path: PATH,
+            actor: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' } },
+            actorUid: 'user:u-1',
+        });
+        // The live req/res are exposed so listeners can read the body or
+        // respond themselves.
+        expect(before[0].req).toBe(req);
+        expect(before[0].res).toBe(res);
+
+        res.statusCode = 200;
+        res.writableFinished = true;
+        res.emit('finish');
+
+        expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(after[0]).toMatchObject({ phase: 'after', statusCode: 200 });
+        expect(typeof after[0].durationMs).toBe('number');
+        expect(error).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('emits error (not after) when the response is a 5xx', async () => {
+        const events = makeEvents();
+        const after = record(events, `${BASE}.after` as keyof EventMap);
+        const error = record(events, `${BASE}.error` as keyof EventMap);
+
+        const mw = createRouteLifecycleMiddleware(events, POST, PATH);
+        const res = new FakeRes();
+        await mw(makeReq(), res as unknown as Response, () => {});
+
+        res.statusCode = 500;
+        res.writableFinished = true;
+        res.emit('finish');
+
+        expect(after).toHaveLength(0);
+        expect(error).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(error[0]).toMatchObject({ phase: 'error', statusCode: 500 });
+    });
+
+    it('emits error when the connection closes without finishing (abort)', async () => {
+        const events = makeEvents();
+        const error = record(events, `${BASE}.error` as keyof EventMap);
+
+        const mw = createRouteLifecycleMiddleware(events, POST, PATH);
+        const res = new FakeRes();
+        await mw(makeReq(), res as unknown as Response, () => {});
+
+        res.writableFinished = false;
+        res.emit('close');
+
+        expect(error).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(error[0].phase).toBe('error');
+        expect(error[0].error).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
+    });
+
+    it('emits a terminal event only once across finish + close', async () => {
+        const events = makeEvents();
+        const after = record(events, `${BASE}.after` as keyof EventMap);
+        const error = record(events, `${BASE}.error` as keyof EventMap);
+
+        const mw = createRouteLifecycleMiddleware(events, POST, PATH);
+        const res = new FakeRes();
+        await mw(makeReq(), res as unknown as Response, () => {});
+
+        res.statusCode = 200;
+        res.writableFinished = true;
+        res.emit('finish');
+        res.emit('close');
+
+        expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(error).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('vetoes the request when a before listener sets allow=false', async () => {
+        const events = makeEvents();
+        events.on(`${BASE}.before` as never, (_k, data) => {
+            (data as RouteLifecycleEvent).allow = false;
+            (data as RouteLifecycleEvent).rejectReason = 'quota exceeded';
+        });
+        const reject = record(events, `${BASE}.reject` as keyof EventMap);
+        const after = record(events, `${BASE}.after` as keyof EventMap);
+
+        const mw = createRouteLifecycleMiddleware(events, POST, PATH);
+        const res = new FakeRes();
+        let nextCalled = false;
+        await mw(makeReq('u-9'), res as unknown as Response, () => {
+            nextCalled = true;
+        });
+
+        expect(nextCalled).toBe(false);
+        expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+        expect(res.body).toMatchObject({
+            error: { code: 'forbidden', message: 'quota exceeded' },
+        });
+        expect(reject).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(reject[0]).toMatchObject({
+            phase: 'reject',
+            statusCode: 403,
+            rejectReason: 'quota exceeded',
+        });
+        // A vetoed request never runs, so no terminal after fires.
+        res.emit('finish');
+        expect(after).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('treats a listener-sent response as a terminal after (not a reject) with the real status', async () => {
+        const events = makeEvents();
+        events.on(`${BASE}.before` as never, (_k, data) => {
+            // Listener answers the request itself without vetoing.
+            const e = data as RouteLifecycleEvent;
+            (e.res as unknown as FakeRes).headersSent = true;
+            e.res.status(418).json({ teapot: true });
+        });
+        const reject = record(events, `${BASE}.reject` as keyof EventMap);
+        const after = record(events, `${BASE}.after` as keyof EventMap);
+
+        const mw = createRouteLifecycleMiddleware(events, POST, PATH);
+        const res = new FakeRes();
+        let nextCalled = false;
+        await mw(makeReq(), res as unknown as Response, () => {
+            nextCalled = true;
+        });
+
+        expect(nextCalled).toBe(false);
+        // Listener's own 418 stands; the middleware doesn't clobber it with 403.
+        expect(res.statusCode).toBe(418);
+        expect(res.body).toEqual({ teapot: true });
+        // Not a veto, so no reject — a terminal `after` keyed off the real 418.
+        expect(reject).toHaveLength(0);
+        expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(after[0]).toMatchObject({ phase: 'after', statusCode: 418 });
+    });
+});

src/backend/core/http/routeLifecycle.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import type { Request, RequestHandler } from 'express';
+import { actorUid } from '../actor';
+import type { EventClient } from '../../clients/event/EventClient';
+import type { RouteMethod } from './types';
+
+type RoutePathValue = string | RegExp | Array<string | RegExp> | undefined;
+
+/**
+ * Normalize a route path into a dot-separated key segment so lifecycle events
+ * can be scoped per endpoint. Strips slashes and param markers so the key is
+ * stable (`/drivers/call` -> `drivers.call`, `/foo/:id` -> `foo.id`).
+ * Non-string paths (RegExp / arrays) collapse to a single `_` placeholder.
+ */
+export const pathKeySegment = (fullPath: RoutePathValue): string => {
+    if (typeof fullPath !== 'string') return '_';
+    const seg = fullPath
+        .split('/')
+        .filter(Boolean)
+        .map((p) => p.replace(/^:/, '').replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9_-]/g, '_'))
+        .join('.');
+    return seg || 'root';
+};
+
+/**
+ * Scoped event-key base for a route: `route.<method>.<normalized-path>`.
+ * Callers append `.before` / `.after` / `.error` / `.reject`.
+ */
+export const routeEventKeyBase = (
+    method: RouteMethod,
+    fullPath: RoutePathValue,
+): `route.${string}` => `route.${method}.${pathKeySegment(fullPath)}`;
+
+/**
+ * Build the per-endpoint lifecycle middleware for one route.
+ *
+ * On each request it: emits `before` (awaited, so a listener may veto by
+ * setting `allow = false`), times the handler, and emits a single terminal
+ * event when the response finishes or the connection closes — `after` on a
+ * clean response, `error` on an abort or a >=500, `reject` only when a
+ * listener vetoes (it then answers 403 and the handler never runs). A listener
+ * that writes its own response without vetoing terminates as `after`/`error`
+ * keyed off the real status, not `reject`.
+ *
+ * Subscribers can listen on `route.*`, `route.<method>.*`, or the exact key.
+ */
+export const createRouteLifecycleMiddleware = (
+    events: EventClient,
+    method: RouteMethod,
+    fullPath: RoutePathValue,
+): RequestHandler => {
+    const pathLabel =
+        typeof fullPath === 'string' ? fullPath : String(fullPath);
+    const keyBase = routeEventKeyBase(method, fullPath);
+
+    return async (req: Request, res, next) => {
+        const actor = req.actor ? actorUid(req.actor) : undefined;
+        const startedAt = Date.now();
+        const base = {
+            method,
+            path: pathLabel,
+            req,
+            res,
+            actor: req.actor,
+            actorUid: actor,
+        };
+
+        const beforeEvent = {
+            phase: 'before' as const,
+            ...base,
+            allow: true as boolean,
+            rejectReason: undefined as string | undefined,
+        };
+        await events.emitAndWait(`${keyBase}.before`, beforeEvent, {});
+
+        // Explicit veto: a listener set `allow = false`. Emit `reject` and
+        // answer 403 — unless the listener already wrote its own response, in
+        // which case we report that status rather than a misleading 403.
+        if (beforeEvent.allow === false) {
+            events.emit(
+                `${keyBase}.reject`,
+                {
+                    phase: 'reject',
+                    ...base,
+                    statusCode: res.headersSent ? res.statusCode : 403,
+                    durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
+                    rejectReason: beforeEvent.rejectReason,
+                },
+                {},
+            );
+            if (!res.headersSent) {
+                res.status(403).json({
+                    error: {
+                        code: 'forbidden',
+                        message:
+                            beforeEvent.rejectReason ?? 'Blocked by policy',
+                    },
+                });
+            }
+            return;
+        }
+
+        // A listener answered the request itself without vetoing (it wrote a
+        // response in the `before` hook). That's a normal terminal outcome,
+        // not a reject — emit `after`/`error` keyed off the real status.
+        if (res.headersSent) {
+            const statusCode = res.statusCode;
+            const isError = statusCode >= 500;
+            events.emit(
+                `${keyBase}.${isError ? 'error' : 'after'}`,
+                {
+                    phase: isError ? 'error' : 'after',
+                    ...base,
+                    statusCode,
+                    durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
+                },
+                {},
+            );
+            return;
+        }
+
+        let settled = false;
+        const settle = (aborted: boolean) => {
+            if (settled) return;
+            settled = true;
+            const statusCode = res.statusCode;
+            const isError = aborted || statusCode >= 500;
+            events.emit(
+                `${keyBase}.${isError ? 'error' : 'after'}`,
+                {
+                    phase: isError ? 'error' : 'after',
+                    ...base,
+                    statusCode,
+                    durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
+                    ...(aborted ? { error: new Error('request aborted') } : {}),
+                },
+                {},
+            );
+        };
+        res.once('finish', () => settle(false));
+        res.once('close', () => settle(!res.writableFinished));
+        next();
+    };
+};

src/backend/core/http/types.ts

@@ -66,6 +66,22 @@ export type RoutePath = string | RegExp | Array<string | RegExp>;
  * in the chain. Commented-out slots are reserved for the next chunks
  * (body parsing, post-auth gates, timing).
  */
+/** One rate-limit window. See `RouteOptions.rateLimit` for semantics. */
+export interface RouteRateLimit {
+    limit: number;
+    window: number;
+    /**
+     * Per-subscription overrides for `limit` (`SubscriptionPolicy.id`
+     * → cap). Same mechanic as `concurrent.bySubscription`: resolved
+     * via the metering service per request; falls back to the base
+     * `limit` when there's no actor / no metering / no match.
+     */
+    bySubscription?: Record<string, number>;
+    key?: 'fingerprint' | 'ip' | 'user' | ((req: Request) => string);
+    scope?: string;
+    backend?: 'memory' | 'redis' | 'kv';
+}
+
 export interface RouteOptions {
     /** Extra per-route middleware. Applied after built-in gates, before the handler. */
     middleware?: RequestHandler[];
@@ -86,6 +102,17 @@ export interface RouteOptions {
     /** Reject app/access-token actors. Implies `requireAuth`. */
     requireUserActor?: boolean;
 
+    /**
+     * Only meaningful alongside `requireUserActor`. Relaxes the access-token
+     * half of that gate so a FULL-ACCESS personal access token (the user's own
+     * credential) is admitted — third-party apps and scoped tokens stay
+     * blocked. Use ONLY on user-resource / inference endpoints that gate with
+     * `requireUserActor` purely to keep apps out (e.g. the AI proxy). NEVER set
+     * on account/security/credential routes — those must stay closed to every
+     * access token. Default-deny: omitting this keeps PATs blocked.
+     */
+    allowFullAccessToken?: boolean;
+
     /** Allows access-tokens */
     allowAccessToken?: boolean;
 
@@ -198,21 +225,15 @@ export interface RouteOptions {
      * All registered backends stay co-resident at runtime, so different
      * routes can pick whichever fits their access pattern. Omitting
      * `backend` uses the server-wide default (`config.rate_limit.backend`).
+     *
+     * An array applies every limit independently (a request must pass all
+     * of them). Use this to pair a per-client budget with a coarser
+     * backstop on a different key — e.g. per-fingerprint for fairness on
+     * shared IPs, plus per-IP so rotating headers can't mint fresh
+     * fingerprint buckets indefinitely. Give each entry its own `scope`
+     * so the counters don't collide.
      */
-    rateLimit?: {
-        limit: number;
-        window: number;
-        /**
-         * Per-subscription overrides for `limit` (`SubscriptionPolicy.id`
-         * → cap). Same mechanic as `concurrent.bySubscription`: resolved
-         * via the metering service per request; falls back to the base
-         * `limit` when there's no actor / no metering / no match.
-         */
-        bySubscription?: Record<string, number>;
-        key?: 'fingerprint' | 'ip' | 'user' | ((req: Request) => string);
-        scope?: string;
-        backend?: 'memory' | 'redis' | 'kv';
-    };
+    rateLimit?: RouteRateLimit | RouteRateLimit[];
 
     /**
      * Concurrent in-flight limiting. Caps how many requests for this
@@ -274,7 +295,7 @@ export const ROUTES_METADATA_KEY = '__puterRoutes' as const;
 /** Internal: the property name used to stash a controller's path prefix. */
 export const PREFIX_METADATA_KEY = '__puterControllerPrefix' as const;
 
-// ── Type narrowing helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────
+// -- Type narrowing helpers ------------------------------------------
 //
 // When a route declares a gate option (requireAuth, requireUserActor,
 // adminOnly, allowedAppIds), the materializer guarantees the corresponding

src/backend/drivers/ai-chat/ChatCompletionDriver.test.ts

@@ -547,6 +547,46 @@ describe('ChatCompletionDriver.complete credit gate and max_tokens cap', () => {
         expect(passed.max_tokens!).toBeGreaterThan(0);
     });
 
+    it('throws 402 instead of leaving `max_tokens` unset when credits cannot afford one output token', async () => {
+        // Regression: previously a sub-1 cap set max_tokens to `undefined`,
+        // which let the provider run to the model's full output limit and
+        // overdraw the account. It must reject instead.
+        vi.spyOn(FakeChatProvider.prototype, 'models').mockResolvedValueOnce([
+            {
+                id: 'capme',
+                aliases: [],
+                costs_currency: 'usd-cents',
+                costs: { input_tokens: 1000, output_tokens: 2000 },
+                max_tokens: 8192,
+            },
+        ]);
+        const d = await makeDriver();
+
+        // Pass the cheap pre-flight gate but leave a balance too small to
+        // afford a single 2000-microcent output token.
+        vi.spyOn(server.services.metering, 'hasEnoughCredits').mockResolvedValue(
+            true,
+        );
+        vi.spyOn(server.services.metering, 'getRemainingUsage').mockResolvedValue(
+            100,
+        );
+
+        const completeSpy = vi.spyOn(FakeChatProvider.prototype, 'complete');
+
+        await expect(
+            withTestActor(() =>
+                d.complete({
+                    model: 'capme',
+                    messages: [{ role: 'user', content: 'hi' }],
+                }),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            statusCode: 402,
+            legacyCode: 'insufficient_funds',
+        });
+        expect(completeSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
     it('rejects subscriber-only models for the default free subscription', async () => {
         vi.spyOn(FakeChatProvider.prototype, 'models').mockResolvedValueOnce([
             {