fix: double counting purchased credit usage (#3359)

Previously the dashboard used a clean root URL for the 'apps' tab and hashes for other tabs. This change makes tab links and history entries consistently use a hash (e.g. #apps, #home) by always generating href as `#<id>` and pushing `#<section>` to history. Simplifies URL handling and ensures the Apps tab also reflects its hash in the address bar.

.github/workflows/backend-tests.yaml

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ name: Backend Tests
 on:
   pull_request:
     types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - 'src/docs/**'
 
 permissions:
   contents: read

.github/workflows/docs-build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: Docs Build
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - 'src/docs/**'
+
+jobs:
+  build-docs:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Set up Node.js
+        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: '24'
+          cache: 'npm'
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: npm ci
+
+      - name: Build docs
+        run: npm run build
+        working-directory: src/docs

.gitignore

@@ -70,3 +70,5 @@ coverage/
 undefined
 servers.json
 config.*.json
+
+volatile/

AGENTS.md

@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ Keep comments light. Prefer self-documenting code — clear names, small functio
 - The _why_ is non-obvious (a hidden constraint, a workaround, a subtle invariant).
 - A non-trivial usage detail would otherwise trip the next reader.
 
-Don't restate what the code already says. Don't write comments that reference the current task or PR — those rot.
+Don't restate what the code already says. Don't write comments that reference the current task or PR or version of something — those rot.
 
-**No ticket references in code or test comments.** Don't write `PUT-1234`, `AUTH-3`, `GUI-2`, `// fix for FOO-99`, `// per ROLLOUT-1`, or section headers like `// -- PUT-1020: ... --`. The ticket exists in git history and the issue tracker; the code should describe the *why* in domain terms ("logout cascade transparently invalidates...") not project-management terms ("the cascade from AUTH-3..."). Same rule for test-block names and section dividers — describe what's being tested, not which ticket asked for it.
+**No ticket references in code or test comments.** Don't write `PUT-1234`, `AUTH-3`, `GUI-2`, `// fix for FOO-99`, `// per ROLLOUT-1`, or section headers like `// -- PUT-1020: ... --`. The ticket exists in git history and the issue tracker; the code should describe the _why_ in domain terms ("logout cascade transparently invalidates...") not project-management terms ("the cascade from AUTH-3..."). Same rule for test-block names and section dividers — describe what's being tested, not which ticket asked for it.
 
 **Use plain ASCII `-` in comment section dividers, not box-drawing characters.** Write `// -- Section name --`, not `// ── Section name ──`. The `─` (U+2500) character renders inconsistently in some editors and diff tools and adds nothing over `-`.
 

BUG-BOUNTY.md

@@ -17,18 +17,51 @@ Out-of-scope:
 * Denial of Service (DoS), spam, or volumetric attacks.
 * Physical security issues.
 
+## Known Non-Issues (Please Check Before Submitting)
+
+The following have already been reviewed and determined **not to be vulnerabilities**. Reports that only re-describe one of these are **not eligible for a reward** and will be closed as non-issues — even if they include new code references. Please review this list before submitting:
+
+* **XSS / CORS / token issues scoped to `api.puter.com`.** The primary user session cookie lives on `puter.com`, not on the API origin, so reflected/stored XSS, CORS, or token handling on `api.puter.com` is generally out of scope. Two exceptions we *do* evaluate on their merits — please report these: (a) attacker-controlled content served **inline** (e.g. an HTML `Content-Type`) from API file/response endpoints, and (b) anything that abuses the app-scoped `puter_token_v2` companion cookie set on the API host.
+* **SSRF via `secureFetch`.** Production routes outbound requests through an isolated proxy that has no access to internal/SSRF-sensitive resources.
+* **Attacks that depend on guessing an `appInstanceID` or app UID.** These are random 128-bit secret values and are not considered guessable.
+* **Apps invoking drivers, creating workers, or using KV.** Applications are intended to do this; worker permissions are scoped to the owning app. This is by design.
+* **App metadata or app user-count "leaks".** This information is currently public by design.
+* **General "token in a URL" / token-lifetime designs** — signed directory URLs exposing children, a write signature implying read, or app tokens outliving a web session. These are current intended behaviors.
+* **Missing PKCE, unverified `id_token` signatures, or other OIDC hardening.** Provider tokens are obtained through a server-to-server authorization-code exchange with the provider's token endpoint over TLS, so the resulting `id_token` / userinfo claims are trusted from that channel rather than from local JWKS signature verification — the callback never accepts a caller-supplied `id_token`. Adding local signature / `aud` / `iss` / `exp` checks is welcome defense-in-depth (please open a GitHub issue/PR), but their absence is not an account-takeover vector on its own.
+* **JWT "algorithm confusion" / unpinned `algorithms` in `jwt.verify`.** Puter's session tokens are HMAC-signed (HS256) with a server-side secret, and there is no asymmetric public key anywhere in the verification path, so `alg`-substitution attacks do not apply. Explicitly pinning `algorithms` is a fine hardening PR, but it is not a vulnerability.
+* **Static-source "SQL injection" in internal pagination.** Findings such as `LIMIT ${limit}` in list/notification queries: the limit is numerically coerced and clamped before it reaches the query, so it is not reachable with attacker-controlled string input. Hardening PRs to the internal stores are welcome, but these are not exploitable as reported.
+* **Deprecated `saveTo*` GUI app messages.** The legacy `saveToDesktop` / `saveToDocuments` / etc. app-IPC handlers can create — never overwrite — new files in standard user folders. The behavior is non-destructive, path-traversal-safe, and deprecated (slated for removal); it is not treated as a sandbox escape.
+* **Best-practice suggestions** such as login/registration username enumeration (kept intentionally for UX) or unauthenticated unsubscribe links (industry norm).
+* **Rate-limiting suggestions for TURN credential issuance** (intentional; not billed per tunnel).
+
+If you believe you have a **genuinely new** exploit chain that defeats one of these rationales (for example, demonstrating a sensitive credential that really is reachable on `api.puter.com`), say so explicitly and show why the reasoning above does not apply.
+
 ## Rules of Engagement
 
 To participate, you must:
 
-1. **Report responsibly**: Provide detailed steps to reproduce the issue, including proof-of-concept code or screenshots where applicable.
+1. **Report responsibly**: Provide detailed steps to reproduce the issue, including proof-of-concept code, screenshots, or a screen recording (see *Proof of Reproduction* below).
 2. **Do no harm**: Do not exfiltrate, modify, or delete data. Only access your own account or test data.
 3. **Respect availability**: Do not perform denial-of-service attacks or automated scans that degrade service.
 4. **Follow disclosure policy**: Do not publicly disclose vulnerabilities until we have confirmed and patched the issue.
 5. **Act in good faith**: Make every effort to avoid privacy violations, destruction of data, and interruption or degradation of services.
+6. **Check the Known Non-Issues list**: Reports matching an item in the "Known Non-Issues" section above are not eligible and will be closed.
 
 Reports that do not meet these guidelines may not be eligible for a reward.
 
+## Proof of Reproduction
+
+Reports must demonstrate a **working, reproducible exploit with real impact** — not a theoretical or static-source-review finding. Please include:
+
+* Exact steps to reproduce, the relevant request/response or code path, and the commit or version you tested.
+* The **observed** result versus the **expected** result.
+* For client-side, UI, or authentication-flow bugs: a short screen recording (≤ 2 minutes) showing the exploit working end-to-end on a real Puter instance.
+* For server-side bugs: a runnable proof-of-concept.
+
+Reports based solely on reading the source ("source review only, not tested") or unverified AI/LLM-generated reports are the **lowest triage priority and are generally not eligible**. If you used an AI tool to help find an issue, you must personally verify that it actually reproduces before submitting.
+
+Please submit **one issue per report**. Bundled "audit packs" of many speculative findings will be declined; send each confirmed issue separately.
+
 ## Reporting Process
 
 To report a vulnerability, email us at: **[[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])**.

CLAUDE.md

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+FOLLOW ./AGENTS.md

config.default.json

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
     "default_user_group": "78b1b1dd-c959-44d2-b02c-8735671f9997",
     "default_temp_group": "b7220104-7905-4985-b996-649fdcdb3c8f",
     "storage_capacity": 104857600,
+    "disable_user_signup": false,
     "strict_email_verification_required": false,
     "gui_assets_root": "./src/gui",
     "puterjs_root": "./src/puter-js/dist",

config.template.jsonc

@@ -75,6 +75,9 @@
     "url_signature_secret": "change-me",
     "cookie_name": "puter_auth_token",
     "min_pass_length": 6,
+    // When true, anonymous users must log in instead of creating temp or
+    // permanent accounts.
+    "disable_user_signup": false,
     "allow_system_login": false,
     "strict_email_verification_required": false,
     "captcha": {
@@ -159,17 +162,30 @@
 
     // ── Database ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     "database": {
-        // `sqlite` for single-node / dev; `mysql` for self-host with MariaDB.
+        // `sqlite` for single-node/dev, `mysql` for MariaDB/MySQL,
+        // or `postgres` for PostgreSQL.
+        //
+        // NOTE: `postgres` support is a community contribution and is not
+        // exercised by Puter.com production. It boots, passes its own
+        // integration tests against pgmock, and runs the common user/app/
+        // fsentry/session/permission/OIDC flows — but less-traveled code
+        // paths may surface MySQL/SQLite-isms that haven't been ported yet.
+        // Expect rough edges and please file issues if you hit one. For
+        // production self-hosting today, `mysql` (MariaDB) and `sqlite` are
+        // the supported defaults.
         "engine": "sqlite",
         // sqlite — file path on disk
         "path": "volatile/runtime/puter-database.sqlite",
         "targetVersion": 0,
-        // mysql — connection details
+        // mysql/postgres — connection details. PostgreSQL defaults to port
+        // 5432 when `engine` is `postgres`; MySQL/MariaDB normally use 3306.
         "host": "",
         "port": 3306,
         "user": "",
         "password": "",
         "database": "",
+        // postgres may also use a URL instead of host/user/password fields:
+        // "connectionString": "postgres://puter:secret@localhost:5432/puter",
         // Optional read-replica pool. Reads route here when populated.
         "replica": {
             "host": "",
@@ -178,9 +194,10 @@
             "password": "",
             "database": ""
         }
-        // mysql self-host bootstrap: set `migrationPaths` to apply the bundled
-        // schema on first boot. Idempotent — safe to leave on.
+        // mysql/postgres self-host bootstrap: set `migrationPaths` to apply the
+        // bundled schema on first boot. Idempotent — safe to leave on.
         // "migrationPaths": ["./src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql"]
+        // "migrationPaths": ["./src/backend/clients/database/migrations/postgres"]
     },
 
     // ── DynamoDB (KV store) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -246,12 +263,20 @@
         // ─ Chat / completion ─
         "claude": { "apiKey": "" },
         "openai-completion": { "apiKey": "" },
+        "azure-openai": {
+            "apiKey": "",
+            "apiURL": ""
+        },
         "gemini": { "apiKey": "" },
         "groq": { "apiKey": "" },
         "deepseek": { "apiKey": "" },
         "mistral": { "apiKey": "" },
         "xai": { "apiKey": "" },
         "moonshot": { "apiKey": "" },
+        "minimax": {
+            "apiKey": "",
+            "apiBaseUrl": "https://api.minimax.io/v1"
+        },
         "openrouter": {
             "apiKey": "",
             "apiBaseUrl": "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1"

doc/i18n/README.jp.md

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ Puterは[**puter.com**](https://puter.com)でホストサービスとして利
 
 メンテナーやコミュニティと以下のチャンネルを通じてつながりましょう：
 
-- バグ報告や機能リクエストがありますか？ [issueを開く](https://github.com/HeyPuter/puter/issues/new/choose) してください。
+- バグ報告や機能リクエストは [新規Issue](https://github.com/HeyPuter/puter/issues/new/choose) まで
 - Discord: [discord.com/invite/PQcx7Teh8u](https://discord.com/invite/PQcx7Teh8u)
 - X (Twitter): [x.com/HeyPuter](https://x.com/HeyPuter)
 - Reddit: [reddit.com/r/puter/](https://www.reddit.com/r/puter/)

doc/self-hosting.md

@@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ Replace `puter.localhost`, `site.puter.localhost`, `host.puter.localhost`, `dev.
 Why these knobs:
 
 - `jwt_secret` + `jwt_secret_v2` — Puter signs new auth tokens with `jwt_secret_v2` (v2 token format, `kid: 'v2'` JWT header). `jwt_secret` is verify-only and lets tokens minted before this version (cookies still in users' browsers, stored API tokens) keep working. `allow_v1_tokens: true` keeps that fallback enabled. Fresh installs can leave it as-is; future versions will flip the flag to `false` and retire `jwt_secret` entirely once legacy tokens have drained.
-- `env: "prod"` — the bundled `config.default.json` ships with `env: "dev"` (matches the source-tree `npm run start=gui` workflow, which expects webpack-dev-server emitting a CSS manifest). Self-host runs against pre-built static bundles, so `env: "prod"` makes the homepage emit the `/dist/bundle.min.css` `<link>` tag instead of waiting on a manifest that doesn't exist.
-- `database.migrationPaths` — Puter applies the bundled MySQL schema on boot. `mysql_mig_1.sql` (tables) and `mysql_mig_2.sql` (default apps: editor, viewer, pdf, camera, player, recorder, git, dev-center, puter-linux). Idempotent — safe to re-run.
+- `env: "prod"` — the bundled `config.default.json` ships with `env: "dev"` (matches the source-tree `npm run start:gui` workflow, which expects webpack-dev-server emitting a CSS manifest). Self-host runs against pre-built static bundles, so `env: "prod"` makes the homepage emit the `/dist/bundle.min.css` `<link>` tag instead of waiting on a manifest that doesn't exist.
+- `database.migrationPaths` — Puter applies the bundled MySQL/MariaDB schema on boot. The migration files are idempotent, so it is safe to leave this configured across restarts.
 - `dynamo.bootstrapTables: true` — Puter creates its KV table on boot. **Only set against a local emulator**, never real AWS.
 - `dynamo.aws` keys are dummies; DynamoDB-local doesn't validate them but the AWS SDK requires _something_. **Note:** DynamoDB uses `access_key` / `secret_key` (snake_case); S3 below uses `accessKeyId` / `secretAccessKey` (camelCase). Not interchangeable.
 - `providers.ollama.enabled: false` — Puter auto-probes a local Ollama at `127.0.0.1:11434` by default; without one running you'd see `ECONNREFUSED` on every boot. To run a bundled Ollama, see [Optional: local LLM (Ollama)](#optional-local-llm-ollama) below.
@@ -199,6 +199,32 @@ Drop the resulting `fullchain.pem` and `privkey.pem` into `./puter/tls/`.
     "s3": { "s3Config": { "publicEndpoint": "https://s3.puter.local", ... } }
     ```
 
+## Running behind your own reverse proxy
+
+The bundled `puter-nginx` mirrors production and is the supported default — it terminates TLS (Step 3) and forwards every Host to Puter. But plenty of self-hosters already run their own edge proxy (Caddy, Traefik, HAProxy, a cloud load balancer, another nginx). You can put Puter behind it instead; Puter doesn't terminate TLS itself in any setup, so "your proxy does TLS" is just a matter of pointing it at the Puter container and getting a handful of details right.
+
+You can keep the bundled nginx as the single hop your proxy talks to, or bypass it and forward straight to the Puter container on port `4100` (uncomment the `4100:4100` mapping under the `puter` service in [docker-compose.yml](../docker-compose.yml), or attach your proxy to the compose network). Either works — what matters is the rules below.
+
+**The rules that actually matter** (getting any of these wrong is what causes the redirect loops and "Invalid Host header" failures people hit):
+
+1. **Don't rewrite the `Host` header.** Puter routes entirely on Host — `api.<domain>`, `site.<domain>`, `app.<domain>` are all distinguished by the incoming host. Forward the original host through unchanged. Do **not** rewrite external hostnames to an internal name like `puter.local`; that forces you to remap every subdomain by hand and still breaks signed-URL and CORS checks. Most proxies preserve Host by default — just don't override it.
+
+2. **The external domain must equal `domain` in your `config.json`.** If users reach the box at `puter.example.com`, then `domain` must be `puter.example.com` and the hosting domains must be its real subdomains (`site.puter.example.com`, `app.puter.example.com`, …) — exactly as the installer/`config.json` lays them out. Puter rejects hosts it doesn't recognize with `Invalid Host header`.
+
+3. **Set `protocol` to match the public scheme.** When your proxy terminates TLS, set `"protocol": "https"` (installer: `PUTER_PROTOCOL=https`). Puter builds its origins, redirects, signed S3 URLs, and OIDC callback URLs from this — leave it `http` behind an HTTPS proxy and you get redirect loops, broken logins, and mixed-content errors.
+
+4. **Forward the standard proxy headers.** Puter needs:
+    - `Host` — the original request host (rule 1).
+    - `X-Forwarded-Proto` — the **external** scheme (`https`), so Puter knows TLS was terminated upstream.
+    - `X-Forwarded-For` — the real client IP (rate limiting + audit logs).
+    - `Upgrade` / `Connection` — passed through for WebSocket / socket.io upgrades, or the realtime connection silently fails.
+
+5. **Set `trust_proxy` to the number of hops in front of Puter.** One external proxy talking directly to Puter → `"trust_proxy": 1` (installer: `PUTER_TRUST_PROXY=1`). A second proxy in front (e.g. Cloudflare → your proxy → Puter) → `2`. This is the count of proxies between the client and Puter, **including** the bundled nginx if you keep it. Too low and `req.ip` becomes a proxy address (breaks rate limiting); never set `true` (it trusts every hop and makes `X-Forwarded-For` forgeable).
+
+6. **Route the wildcard to Puter.** Your proxy must forward `*.<domain>` (covering `api.*`, `app.*`, and `s3.<domain>`) and `*.site.<domain>` (and any other hosting domains) to Puter — same wildcard DNS as Step 2. Puter does the per-subdomain routing internally; the proxy just needs to hand it the traffic with the Host intact.
+
+With those in place the rest of the stack is unchanged — `docker compose up -d` as below.
+
 ## Step 4 — Bring it up
 
 ```bash
@@ -232,6 +258,26 @@ Change it in Settings after first login.
 
 All optional. Drop any of the blocks below into `puter/config/config.json` and `docker compose restart puter`. See [config.template.jsonc](../config.template.jsonc) for the full list. Per-key documentation lives in [src/backend/types.ts](../src/backend/types.ts).
 
+### PostgreSQL database
+
+> **Community contribution — expect rough edges.** PostgreSQL support was contributed by the community and is not run by Puter.com production. It boots, applies the bundled schema, and exercises the common user/app/fsentry/session/permission/OIDC flows in the integration tests, but less-traveled SQL call sites may still need porting. If you hit a query that doesn't work on Postgres, please open an issue. For production self-hosting today, MariaDB/MySQL and SQLite are the supported defaults.
+
+The bundled Docker Compose stack still defaults to MariaDB. To use PostgreSQL instead, run a PostgreSQL service yourself, point Puter at it, and use the PostgreSQL migration path:
+
+```json
+"database": {
+    "engine": "postgres",
+    "host": "postgres",
+    "port": 5432,
+    "user": "puter",
+    "password": "...",
+    "database": "puter",
+    "migrationPaths": ["/opt/puter/dist/src/backend/clients/database/migrations/postgres"]
+}
+```
+
+You may use `"connectionString": "postgres://puter:...@postgres:5432/puter"` instead of the host/user/password fields. Puter only needs normal PostgreSQL connection details and the migration path; CloudNativePG is one possible Kubernetes operator, but no operator-specific manifests are required by Puter.
+
 ### Email (SMTP)
 
 Used for password resets, email confirmation, and notifications. Without it those flows silently fail.
@@ -333,6 +379,15 @@ Built-in proof-of-work captcha — no external service needed.
 
 `difficulty` is one of `easy` / `medium` / `hard`.
 
+### Disable new signups
+
+Force visitors to log in with an existing account instead of creating a
+temporary or permanent one.
+
+```json
+"disable_user_signup": true
+```
+
 ### Block disposable email TLDs
 
 Only enforced when `env: "prod"`.

docker-compose.yml

@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ services:
       # Persistent runtime data (anything your config points at /var/puter).
       - ./puter/data/puter:/var/puter:z
     healthcheck:
-      test: wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider http://puter.localhost:4100/test || exit 1
+      test: wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider http://localhost:4100/ || exit 1
       interval: 30s
       timeout: 3s
       retries: 3

extensions/appTelemetry.test.ts

@@ -1,75 +1,66 @@
-import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
 import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
-import {
-    afterAll,
-    beforeAll,
-    describe,
-    expect,
-    it,
-    vi,
-} from 'vitest';
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
 import { runWithContext } from '../src/backend/core/context.ts';
 import { PuterServer } from '../src/backend/server.ts';
 import { setupTestServer } from '../src/backend/testUtil.ts';
-import {
-    handleAppTelemetryUserCount,
-    handleAppTelemetryUsers,
-} from './appTelemetry.ts';
-
-interface CapturedResponse {
-    body: unknown;
-}
-
-const makeReq = (query: Record<string, unknown> = {}): Request =>
-    ({ query }) as unknown as Request;
-
-const makeRes = () => {
-    const captured: CapturedResponse = { body: undefined };
-    const res = {
-        json: vi.fn((value: unknown) => {
-            captured.body = value;
-            return res;
-        }),
-        status: vi.fn(() => res),
-    };
-    return { res: res as unknown as Response, captured };
-};
-
-// `handleAppTelemetryUsers` calls `Context.get('actor')` for the permission
-// gate. Wrap test calls in `runWithContext` so the ALS lookup resolves.
-const callWithActor = async (
-    actor: { user: { uuid: string; id?: number }; app?: null } | undefined,
-    fn: () => Promise<void>,
-) => runWithContext({ actor }, fn);
+// Importing the module registers the `appTelemetry` driver into the shared
+// extensionStore, so `setupTestServer` instantiates it on `server.drivers`.
+import { AppTelemetryDriver } from './appTelemetry.ts';
 
 let server: PuterServer;
+let driver: AppTelemetryDriver;
+
+// `get_users` reads `Context.get('actor')` for the ownership gate. Wrap
+// actor-dependent calls in `runWithContext` so the ALS lookup resolves.
+const callWithActor = <T>(
+    actor: { user: { uuid: string; id?: number } } | undefined,
+    fn: () => Promise<T>,
+) => runWithContext({ actor }, fn);
 
 beforeAll(async () => {
     server = await setupTestServer();
+    driver = (server.drivers as unknown as Record<string, AppTelemetryDriver>)
+        .appTelemetry;
+    // Guard: the driver must have been wired onto the server. If this is
+    // undefined the extension didn't register, and every test below would
+    // fail with a confusing "cannot read property of undefined".
+    expect(driver).toBeInstanceOf(AppTelemetryDriver);
 });
 
 afterAll(async () => {
     await server.shutdown();
 });
 
-describe('appTelemetry extension — handleAppTelemetryUsers', () => {
+const seedOwnedApp = async (prefix: string) => {
+    const owner = await server.stores.user.create({
+        username: `${prefix}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
+        uuid: uuidv4(),
+        password: 'x',
+        email: null,
+    });
+    const slug = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8);
+    const app = await server.stores.app.create(
+        {
+            name: `${prefix}_${slug}`,
+            title: `${prefix} ${slug}`,
+            index_url: `https://example.com/${slug}`,
+        },
+        { ownerUserId: owner.id as number },
+    );
+    return { owner, app: app! };
+};
+
+describe('appTelemetry driver — get_users', () => {
     it('throws HttpError(400) when app_uuid is missing', async () => {
-        const { res } = makeRes();
-        await expect(
-            handleAppTelemetryUsers(makeReq({}), res),
-        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        await expect(driver.get_users({})).rejects.toMatchObject({
             statusCode: 400,
             message: expect.stringContaining('app_uuid'),
         });
     });
 
     it('throws HttpError(400) for a non-numeric limit', async () => {
-        const { res } = makeRes();
         await expect(
-            handleAppTelemetryUsers(
-                makeReq({ app_uuid: 'app-anything', limit: 'banana' }),
-                res,
-            ),
+            driver.get_users({ app_uuid: 'app-anything', limit: 'banana' }),
         ).rejects.toMatchObject({
             statusCode: 400,
             message: expect.stringContaining('limit'),
@@ -77,22 +68,14 @@ describe('appTelemetry extension — handleAppTelemetryUsers', () => {
     });
 
     it('throws HttpError(400) when offset exceeds the allowed maximum', async () => {
-        const { res } = makeRes();
         await expect(
-            handleAppTelemetryUsers(
-                makeReq({ app_uuid: 'app-anything', offset: 1_000_001 }),
-                res,
-            ),
+            driver.get_users({ app_uuid: 'app-anything', offset: 1_000_001 }),
         ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
     });
 
     it('throws HttpError(404) when the app cannot be found', async () => {
-        const { res } = makeRes();
         await expect(
-            handleAppTelemetryUsers(
-                makeReq({ app_uuid: 'app-does-not-exist' }),
-                res,
-            ),
+            driver.get_users({ app_uuid: 'app-does-not-exist' }),
         ).rejects.toMatchObject({
             statusCode: 404,
             message: 'App not found',
@@ -100,25 +83,10 @@ describe('appTelemetry extension — handleAppTelemetryUsers', () => {
     });
 
     it('throws HttpError(403) when the caller does not own the app', async () => {
-        // Seed an owner user + an app belonging to them, then call the
-        // handler as a *different* user. The real permission service should
-        // reject since the caller has no `apps-of-user:<owner>:write` perm.
-        const owner = await server.stores.user.create({
-            username: `owner_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
-            uuid: uuidv4(),
-            password: 'x',
-            email: null,
-        });
-        const slug = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8);
-        const app = await server.stores.app.create(
-            {
-                name: `app_${slug}`,
-                title: `App ${slug}`,
-                index_url: `https://example.com/${slug}`,
-            },
-            { ownerUserId: owner.id as number },
-        );
-
+        // Seed an owner + their app, then call as a *different* user. The
+        // real permission service should reject: the caller has no
+        // `apps-of-user:<owner>:write`.
+        const { app } = await seedOwnedApp('owner');
         const intruder = await server.stores.user.create({
             username: `intruder_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
             uuid: uuidv4(),
@@ -126,15 +94,11 @@ describe('appTelemetry extension — handleAppTelemetryUsers', () => {
             email: null,
         });
 
-        const { res } = makeRes();
         await callWithActor(
             { user: { uuid: intruder.uuid, id: intruder.id as number } },
             async () => {
                 await expect(
-                    handleAppTelemetryUsers(
-                        makeReq({ app_uuid: app!.uid }),
-                        res,
-                    ),
+                    driver.get_users({ app_uuid: app.uid }),
                 ).rejects.toMatchObject({
                     statusCode: 403,
                     message: 'Permission denied',
@@ -144,78 +108,32 @@ describe('appTelemetry extension — handleAppTelemetryUsers', () => {
     });
 
     it('returns an empty list for an owned app with no authenticated users', async () => {
-        const owner = await server.stores.user.create({
-            username: `owner2_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
-            uuid: uuidv4(),
-            password: 'x',
-            email: null,
-        });
-        const slug = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8);
-        const app = await server.stores.app.create(
-            {
-                name: `app2_${slug}`,
-                title: `App2 ${slug}`,
-                index_url: `https://example.com/${slug}`,
-            },
-            { ownerUserId: owner.id as number },
-        );
+        const { owner, app } = await seedOwnedApp('owner2');
 
-        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
-        await callWithActor(
+        const result = await callWithActor(
             { user: { uuid: owner.uuid, id: owner.id as number } },
-            async () => {
-                await handleAppTelemetryUsers(
-                    makeReq({ app_uuid: app!.uid }),
-                    res,
-                );
-            },
+            () => driver.get_users({ app_uuid: app.uid }),
         );
 
-        expect(captured.body).toEqual([]);
+        expect(result).toEqual([]);
     });
 });
 
-describe('appTelemetry extension — handleAppTelemetryUserCount', () => {
+describe('appTelemetry driver — user_count', () => {
     it('throws HttpError(400) when app_uuid is missing', async () => {
-        const { res } = makeRes();
-        await expect(
-            handleAppTelemetryUserCount(makeReq({}), res),
-        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+        await expect(driver.user_count({})).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            statusCode: 400,
+        });
     });
 
     it('throws HttpError(404) for an unknown app_uuid', async () => {
-        const { res } = makeRes();
         await expect(
-            handleAppTelemetryUserCount(
-                makeReq({ app_uuid: 'app-not-here' }),
-                res,
-            ),
+            driver.user_count({ app_uuid: 'app-not-here' }),
         ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
     });
 
-    it('returns { count: 0 } for an app with no authenticated users', async () => {
-        const owner = await server.stores.user.create({
-            username: `counto_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
-            uuid: uuidv4(),
-            password: 'x',
-            email: null,
-        });
-        const slug = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8);
-        const app = await server.stores.app.create(
-            {
-                name: `appcount_${slug}`,
-                title: `AppCount ${slug}`,
-                index_url: `https://example.com/${slug}`,
-            },
-            { ownerUserId: owner.id as number },
-        );
-
-        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
-        await handleAppTelemetryUserCount(
-            makeReq({ app_uuid: app!.uid }),
-            res,
-        );
-
-        expect(captured.body).toEqual({ count: 0 });
+    it('returns 0 for an app with no authenticated users', async () => {
+        const { app } = await seedOwnedApp('appcount');
+        await expect(driver.user_count({ app_uuid: app.uid })).resolves.toBe(0);
     });
 });

extensions/appTelemetry.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,16 @@
-import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
 import { Context } from '@heyputer/backend/src/core';
+import type { Actor } from '@heyputer/backend/src/core/actor';
 import { HttpError } from '@heyputer/backend/src/core/http';
+import { PuterDriver } from '@heyputer/backend/src/drivers/types';
 import { extension } from '@heyputer/backend/src/extensions';
 
-const clients = extension.import('client');
-const stores = extension.import('store');
-const services = extension.import('service');
+// App-telemetry lets an app owner enumerate the users who have
+// authenticated into their app. v1 shipped this as a driver on the
+// `app-telemetry` interface (methods `get_users` / `user_count`) and
+// puter-js's `puter.apps(...).getUsers()` still calls it that way
+// (`puter.drivers.call('app-telemetry', 'app-telemetry', 'get_users', …)`).
+// This is the v2 port of that driver — same interface/method/return shapes
+// so existing puter-js callers work unchanged.
 
 const DEFAULT_LIMIT = 100;
 const MAX_LIMIT = 1000;
@@ -41,91 +46,94 @@ const parseIntParam = (
     return parsed;
 };
 
-export const handleAppTelemetryUsers = async (
-    req: Request,
-    res: Response,
-): Promise<void> => {
-    const { app_uuid } = req.query as Record<string, string>;
-    if (!app_uuid) throw new HttpError(400, 'Missing `app_uuid`');
+/**
+ * Driver exposing the `app-telemetry` interface.
+ *
+ * The `/drivers/call` permission gate checks
+ * `service:app-telemetry:ii:app-telemetry`, which every actor already holds
+ * via the blanket `service` grant (hardcoded-permissions.js +
+ * `default_implicit_user_app_permissions`). The real authorization — "is the
+ * caller the app owner?" — is enforced inside `get_users` below, exactly as
+ * v1 did.
+ */
+export class AppTelemetryDriver extends PuterDriver {
+    readonly driverInterface = 'app-telemetry';
+    readonly driverName = 'app-telemetry';
+    readonly isDefault = true;
 
-    const safeLimit = parseIntParam(req.query.limit, {
-        key: 'limit',
-        min: 1,
-        max: MAX_LIMIT,
-        fallback: DEFAULT_LIMIT,
-    });
-    const safeOffset = parseIntParam(req.query.offset, {
-        key: 'offset',
-        min: 0,
-        max: MAX_OFFSET,
-        fallback: 0,
-    });
+    /** Users who have authenticated into the given app (owner-only). */
+    async get_users({
+        app_uuid,
+        limit,
+        offset,
+    }: {
+        app_uuid?: string;
+        limit?: unknown;
+        offset?: unknown;
+    } = {}): Promise<Array<{ user: string; user_uuid: string }>> {
+        if (!app_uuid) throw new HttpError(400, 'Missing `app_uuid`');
 
-    const app = await stores.app.getByUid(app_uuid);
-    if (!app) throw new HttpError(404, 'App not found');
+        const safeLimit = parseIntParam(limit, {
+            key: 'limit',
+            min: 1,
+            max: MAX_LIMIT,
+            fallback: DEFAULT_LIMIT,
+        });
+        const safeOffset = parseIntParam(offset, {
+            key: 'offset',
+            min: 0,
+            max: MAX_OFFSET,
+            fallback: 0,
+        });
 
-    // `apps-of-user:<uuid>:write` — the implicator keys on the owner's
-    // UUID, not the numeric id. Look up the owner explicitly. v1 got
-    // this for free because its entity-storage layer eager-joined the
-    // owner row; v2's AppStore.getByUid returns the raw row with only
-    // `owner_user_id` populated.
-    const ownerId = (app as { owner_user_id?: number }).owner_user_id;
-    if (!ownerId) throw new HttpError(404, 'App owner not found');
-    const owner = (await stores.user.getById(ownerId)) as {
-        uuid?: string;
-    } | null;
-    if (!owner?.uuid) throw new HttpError(404, 'App owner not found');
+        const app = await this.stores.app.getByUid(app_uuid);
+        if (!app) throw new HttpError(404, 'App not found');
 
-    const actor = Context.get('actor');
-    const ownsApp = await services.permission
-        .check(actor!, `apps-of-user:${owner.uuid}:write`)
-        .catch(() => false);
-    if (!ownsApp) throw new HttpError(403, 'Permission denied');
+        // The `apps-of-user:<uuid>:write` implicator keys on the owner's
+        // UUID, not the numeric id. Look up the owner explicitly — the raw
+        // app row only carries `owner_user_id`. (v1 got the owner for free
+        // because its entity-storage layer eager-joined the owner row.)
+        const ownerId = (app as { owner_user_id?: number }).owner_user_id;
+        if (!ownerId) throw new HttpError(404, 'App owner not found');
+        const owner = await this.stores.user.getById(ownerId);
+        if (!owner?.uuid) throw new HttpError(404, 'App owner not found');
 
-    const users = await clients.db.read(
-        `SELECT u.username, u.uuid FROM user_to_app_permissions p
-         INNER JOIN user u ON p.user_id = u.id
-         WHERE p.permission = 'flag:app-is-authenticated' AND p.app_id = ?
-         ORDER BY (p.dt IS NOT NULL), p.dt, p.user_id
-         LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`,
-        [(app as Record<string, unknown>).id, safeLimit, safeOffset],
-    );
+        const actor = Context.get('actor');
+        if (!actor) throw new HttpError(401, 'Authentication required');
+        const ownsApp = await this.services.permission
+            .check(actor as Actor, `apps-of-user:${owner.uuid}:write`)
+            .catch(() => false);
+        if (!ownsApp) throw new HttpError(403, 'Permission denied');
 
-    res.json(
-        (users as Array<{ username: string; uuid: string }>).map((e) => ({
-            user: e.username,
-            user_uuid: e.uuid,
-        })),
-    );
-};
+        const users = (await this.clients.db.read(
+            `SELECT u.username, u.uuid FROM user_to_app_permissions p
+             INNER JOIN ${this.clients.db.quoteIdentifier('user')} u ON p.user_id = u.id
+             WHERE p.permission = 'flag:app-is-authenticated' AND p.app_id = ?
+             ORDER BY (p.dt IS NOT NULL), p.dt, p.user_id
+             LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`,
+            [(app as { id: number }).id, safeLimit, safeOffset],
+        )) as Array<{ username: string; uuid: string }>;
 
-export const handleAppTelemetryUserCount = async (
-    req: Request,
-    res: Response,
-): Promise<void> => {
-    const { app_uuid } = req.query as Record<string, string>;
-    if (!app_uuid) throw new HttpError(400, 'Missing `app_uuid`');
+        return users.map((e) => ({ user: e.username, user_uuid: e.uuid }));
+    }
 
-    const app = await stores.app.getByUid(app_uuid);
-    if (!app) throw new HttpError(404, 'App not found');
+    /** Count of users who have authenticated into the given app. */
+    async user_count({
+        app_uuid,
+    }: { app_uuid?: string } = {}): Promise<number> {
+        if (!app_uuid) throw new HttpError(400, 'Missing `app_uuid`');
 
-    const [row] = (await clients.db.read(
-        `SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM user_to_app_permissions
-         WHERE permission = 'flag:app-is-authenticated' AND app_id = ?`,
-        [(app as Record<string, unknown>).id],
-    )) as Array<{ n: number }>;
+        const app = await this.stores.app.getByUid(app_uuid);
+        if (!app) throw new HttpError(404, 'App not found');
 
-    res.json({ count: row?.n ?? 0 });
-};
+        const [row] = (await this.clients.db.read(
+            `SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM user_to_app_permissions
+             WHERE permission = 'flag:app-is-authenticated' AND app_id = ?`,
+            [(app as { id: number }).id],
+        )) as Array<{ n: number }>;
 
-extension.get(
-    '/app-telemetry/users',
-    { subdomain: 'api', requireAuth: true },
-    handleAppTelemetryUsers,
-);
+        return row?.n ?? 0;
+    }
+}
 
-extension.get(
-    '/app-telemetry/user-count',
-    { subdomain: 'api', requireAuth: true },
-    handleAppTelemetryUserCount,
-);
+extension.registerDriver('appTelemetry', AppTelemetryDriver);

extensions/installedApps.test.ts

@@ -132,9 +132,41 @@ describe('installedApps extension — handleInstalledApps', () => {
         expect(list[0].uid).toBe(app!.uid);
         expect(list[0].name).toBe(app!.name);
         expect(list[0].title).toBe(app!.title);
+        // index_url is required so the dashboard can derive a hostname title
+        // for anonymous (app-…) apps.
+        expect(list[0].index_url).toBe(app!.index_url);
         expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(list[0], 'iconUrl')).toBe(
             true,
         );
+        // An owned app is not external, and the raw owner id must not leak.
+        expect(list[0].external).toBe(false);
+        expect(
+            Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(list[0], 'owner_user_id'),
+        ).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('flags apps with no owner_user_id as external', async () => {
+        const user = await seedUser();
+        const slug = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8);
+        // createFromOrigin bootstraps an app with owner_user_id = null.
+        const app = await server.stores.app.createFromOrigin(
+            `app-${slug}`,
+            `https://external-${slug}.example.com`,
+        );
+        await grantInstalled(app!.id as number, user.id as number);
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await runWithContext(
+            { actor: { user: { uuid: user.uuid, id: user.id as number } } },
+            () => handleInstalledApps(makeReq({}), res),
+        );
+
+        const list = captured.body as Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
+        expect(list).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(list[0].external).toBe(true);
+        expect(
+            Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(list[0], 'owner_user_id'),
+        ).toBe(false);
     });
 
     it('clamps page/limit to safe ranges (page>=1, 1<=limit<=100)', async () => {

extensions/installedApps.ts

@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ export const handleInstalledApps = async (
             apps.title,
             apps.description,
             apps.icon,
+            apps.index_url,
+            apps.owner_user_id,
             MIN(perm.dt) AS installed_at
         FROM apps
         LEFT JOIN user_to_app_permissions AS perm ON apps.id = perm.app_id
@@ -62,15 +64,23 @@ export const handleInstalledApps = async (
 
     const apiBaseUrl = extension.config.api_base_url as string | undefined;
     res.json(
-        installedApps.map((app) => ({
-            ...app,
-            iconUrl: getAppIconUrl(app, { apiBaseUrl }),
-        })),
+        installedApps.map((app) => {
+            // An app with no owner_user_id (null/empty) isn't owned by a Puter
+            // user — it's an "external" app. Derive a flag and don't leak the
+            // raw owner id to the client.
+            const { owner_user_id, ...rest } = app;
+            const external = owner_user_id == null || owner_user_id === '';
+            return {
+                ...rest,
+                iconUrl: getAppIconUrl(app, { apiBaseUrl }),
+                external,
+            };
+        }),
     );
 };
 
 extension.get(
     '/installedApps',
-    { subdomain: 'api', requireUserActor: true },
+    { subdomain: 'api', requireUserActor: true, allowFullAccessToken: true },
     handleInstalledApps,
 );

extensions/metering.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
 import { Context } from '@heyputer/backend/src/core';
 import { HttpError } from '@heyputer/backend/src/core/http';
 import {
@@ -6,6 +5,7 @@ import {
     driversContainers,
 } from '@heyputer/backend/src/exports';
 import { extension } from '@heyputer/backend/src/extensions';
+import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
 
 const services = extension.import('service');
 const clients = extension.import('client');

extensions/whoami.test.ts

@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ describe('whoami extension — handleWhoami', () => {
         expect(body.email).toBe(user.email);
         expect(body.is_temp).toBe(false);
         expect(body.oidc_only).toBe(false);
+        // is_user_token is present (true) for user actors.
+        expect(body.is_user_token).toBe(true);
         // `directories` is only sent to user actors — confirm it’s present.
         expect(body.directories).toBeDefined();
         // taskbar_items is only sent to user actors.
@@ -146,6 +148,8 @@ describe('whoami extension — handleWhoami', () => {
 
         const body = captured.body as Record<string, unknown>;
         expect(body.app_name).toBe('app-test-actor');
+        // is_user_token is stripped for app actors.
+        expect(body.is_user_token).toBeUndefined();
         expect(body.desktop_bg_url).toBeUndefined();
         expect(body.desktop_bg_color).toBeUndefined();
         expect(body.desktop_bg_fit).toBeUndefined();

extensions/whoami.ts

@@ -72,10 +72,14 @@ export const handleWhoami = async (
         unconfirmed_email: user.email,
         email_confirmed: user.email_confirmed || user.username === 'admin',
         requires_email_confirmation: user.requires_email_confirmation,
+        phone: user.phone,
+        requires_phone_verification: user.requires_phone_verification,
+        requires_card_verification: user.requires_card_verification,
         desktop_bg_url: user.desktop_bg_url,
         desktop_bg_color: user.desktop_bg_color,
         desktop_bg_fit: user.desktop_bg_fit,
         is_temp: user.password === null && user.email === null,
+        is_user_token: true,
         oidc_only: oidcOnly,
         taskbar_items: isUser
             ? await getTaskbarItems(
@@ -157,6 +161,7 @@ export const handleWhoami = async (
         delete details.desktop_bg_color;
         delete details.desktop_bg_fit;
         delete details.human_readable_age;
+        delete details.is_user_token;
     }
 
     if (actor.app) {

install.sh

@@ -16,11 +16,20 @@
 # the compose file + brings the stack up. Set PUTER_FORCE=1 to overwrite.
 #
 # Tunable env vars:
-#   PUTER_DIR     install directory                       (default: ./puter-selfhosted)
-#   PUTER_URL     base URL to fetch docker-compose.yml    (default: GitHub raw, main branch)
-#   PUTER_DOMAIN  domain Puter will serve on              (default: puter.localhost)
-#   PUTER_PORT    HTTP port for nginx                     (default: 80)
-#   PUTER_FORCE   set to 1 to overwrite existing .env / config.json
+#   PUTER_DIR         install directory                   (default: ./puter-selfhosted)
+#   PUTER_URL         base URL to fetch docker-compose.yml (default: GitHub raw, main branch)
+#   PUTER_DOMAIN      domain Puter will serve on           (default: puter.localhost)
+#   PUTER_PORT        HTTP port for nginx                  (default: 80)
+#   PUTER_PROTOCOL    public scheme: http | https          (default: http)
+#                     Set https when a TLS-terminating reverse proxy (Caddy,
+#                     Traefik, nginx, a cloud LB) sits in front — Puter then
+#                     builds https:// origins, S3 URLs, and redirects. See
+#                     "Running behind your own reverse proxy" in doc/self-hosting.md.
+#   PUTER_TRUST_PROXY number of reverse-proxy hops in front (default: 1)
+#                     1 = the bundled nginx (or a single external proxy);
+#                     2 = two hops (e.g. Cloudflare → your proxy → Puter).
+#   PUTER_ENV         prod | dev                            (default: prod)
+#   PUTER_FORCE       set to 1 to overwrite existing .env / config.json
 
 set -eu
 
@@ -28,6 +37,9 @@ PUTER_DIR="${PUTER_DIR:-puter-selfhosted}"
 PUTER_URL="${PUTER_URL:-https://raw.githubusercontent.com/HeyPuter/puter/main}"
 PUTER_DOMAIN="${PUTER_DOMAIN:-puter.localhost}"
 PUTER_PORT="${PUTER_PORT:-80}"
+PUTER_PROTOCOL="${PUTER_PROTOCOL:-http}"
+PUTER_TRUST_PROXY="${PUTER_TRUST_PROXY:-1}"
+PUTER_ENV="${PUTER_ENV:-prod}"
 PUTER_FORCE="${PUTER_FORCE:-0}"
 
 log()  { printf '\033[1;36m[puter-install]\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; }
@@ -117,9 +129,9 @@ EOF
     cat > puter/config/config.json <<EOF
 {
     "domain": "$PUTER_DOMAIN",
-    "protocol": "http",
+    "protocol": "$PUTER_PROTOCOL",
     "pub_port": $PUTER_PORT,
-    "env": "prod",
+    "env": "$PUTER_ENV",
 
     "static_hosting_domain": "site.$PUTER_DOMAIN",
     "static_hosting_domain_alt": "host.$PUTER_DOMAIN",
@@ -159,7 +171,7 @@ EOF
     "s3": {
         "s3Config": {
             "endpoint": "http://s3:9000",
-            "publicEndpoint": "http://s3.$PUTER_DOMAIN",
+            "publicEndpoint": "$PUTER_PROTOCOL://s3.$PUTER_DOMAIN",
             "accessKeyId": "puter",
             "secretAccessKey": "$S3_SECRET_KEY",
             "region": "us-east-1",
@@ -173,7 +185,7 @@ EOF
         "ollama": { "enabled": false }
     },
 
-    "trust_proxy": 1
+    "trust_proxy": $PUTER_TRUST_PROXY
 }
 EOF
 fi
@@ -187,6 +199,6 @@ log "stack starting. first boot takes ~30s while MariaDB initialises."
 log "follow puter logs:"
 log "    cd $PUTER_DIR && docker compose logs -f puter"
 log ""
-log "open http://$PUTER_DOMAIN:$PUTER_PORT once the puter container is healthy."
+log "open $PUTER_PROTOCOL://$PUTER_DOMAIN:$PUTER_PORT once the puter container is healthy."
 log "first-boot admin password is logged once — grab it with:"
 log "    cd $PUTER_DIR && docker compose logs puter | grep password"

package.json

@@ -44,17 +44,18 @@
     "yaml": "^2.8.1"
   },
   "scripts": {
-    "test:backend": "vitest run --config src/backend/vitest.config.ts ",
-    "start=gui": "nodemon --exec \"node dev-server.js\" ",
+    "test:backend": "npm run setupExtensions && vitest run --config src/backend/vitest.config.ts ",
+    "test:backend:postgres": "npm run setupExtensions && PUTER_TEST_DB_ENGINE=postgres vitest run --config src/backend/vitest.config.ts ",
+    "start:gui": "nodemon --exec \"node dev-server.js\" ",
     "start": "node --enable-source-maps -r ./dist/src/backend/telemetry.js ./dist/src/backend/index.js",
-    "prestart": "npm run build:ts",
+    "prestart": "npm run setupExtensions && npm run build:ts",
     "dev": "npm start",
-    "build": "npm run build:ts && cd src/gui && node ./build.js && cd ../puter-js && npm run build",
+    "build": "npm run setupExtensions && npm run build:ts && cd src/gui && node ./build.js && cd ../puter-js && npm run build",
     "build:workerLib": "cd src/puter-js && npm run build && cd ../worker && npm run build",
     "check-translations": "node tools/check-translations.js",
     "prepare": "husky",
     "build:ts": "tsc -p tsconfig.build.json && node ./tools/write-dist-package-json.mjs",
-    "postinstall": "node ./tools/extensionSetup.mjs"
+    "setupExtensions": "node ./tools/extensionSetup.mjs"
   },
   "workspaces": [
     "src/*",
@@ -76,9 +77,20 @@
     "ai": "^6.0.73",
     "dedent": "^1.5.3",
     "javascript-time-ago": "^2.5.11",
+    "libphonenumber-js": "1.13.6",
     "open": "^10.1.0"
   },
   "engines": {
     "node": ">=24.0.0"
+  },
+  "allowScripts": {
+    "@google/genai": false,
+    "[email protected]": true,
+    "[email protected]": true,
+    "[email protected]": true,
+    "[email protected]": true,
+    "[email protected]": true,
+    "[email protected]": true,
+    "[email protected]": true
   }
 }

src/backend/clients/clickhouse/ClickhouseClient.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Optional ClickHouse client.
+ *
+ * ClickHouse is NOT a hard dependency. Core Puter runs without it — the app
+ * stats read path (open / unique-user counts) falls back to the primary SQL
+ * database. `this.clients.clickhouse` is therefore typed as optional and is
+ * `undefined` in default and self-hosted setups; callers MUST branch on its
+ * presence and fall back to SQL.
+ *
+ * A production deployment can register a real ClickHouse client via an
+ * extension (`extension.registerClient('clickhouse', client)`) to offload the
+ * analytics queries off the primary database and keep the stats path fast at
+ * scale. When registered, the instance flows into `this.clients.clickhouse`
+ * everywhere it's typed.
+ *
+ * Only the surface the stats path actually consumes is declared here. Extend
+ * this interface (don't widen to `any`) when a new query shape is needed.
+ */
+export interface ClickhouseQueryResult {
+    json<T = Record<string, unknown>>(): Promise<T[]>;
+}
+
+export interface ClickhouseQueryParams {
+    query: string;
+    query_params?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    format?: string;
+}
+
+export interface ClickhouseClient {
+    query(params: ClickhouseQueryParams): Promise<ClickhouseQueryResult>;
+}

src/backend/clients/database/DatabaseClient.ts

@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ export interface BatchEntry {
     values: unknown[];
 }
 
+type SqlJsonPath = readonly [string, ...string[]];
+
 /**
  * Base database client. Subclasses must override every method that throws here.
  *
@@ -101,9 +103,10 @@ export class AbstractDatabaseClient extends PuterClient {
         const cols = Object.keys(data);
         const values = Object.values(data);
         const sql =
-            `INSERT INTO \`${tableName}\` ` +
-            `(${cols.map((c) => `\`${c}\``).join(', ')}) ` +
-            `VALUES (${cols.map(() => '?').join(', ')})`;
+            `INSERT INTO ${this.quoteIdentifier(tableName)} ` +
+            `(${cols.map((c) => this.quoteIdentifier(c)).join(', ')}) ` +
+            `VALUES (${cols.map(() => '?').join(', ')})` +
+            this.returningIdClause();
         return this.write(sql, values);
     }
 
@@ -161,4 +164,88 @@ export class AbstractDatabaseClient extends PuterClient {
         }
         return choices.otherwise as T;
     }
+
+    quoteIdentifier(identifier: string): string {
+        return identifier
+            .split('.')
+            .map((part) => {
+                if (part === '*') return part;
+                return `\`${part.replaceAll('`', '``')}\``;
+            })
+            .join('.');
+    }
+
+    booleanLiteral(value: boolean): string {
+        return value ? '1' : '0';
+    }
+
+    booleanValue(value: boolean): boolean | 0 | 1 {
+        return value ? 1 : 0;
+    }
+
+    insertIgnoreInto(tableName: string): string {
+        const table = this.quoteIdentifier(tableName);
+        return this.case({
+            sqlite: `INSERT OR IGNORE INTO ${table}`,
+            postgres: `INSERT INTO ${table}`,
+            otherwise: `INSERT IGNORE INTO ${table}`,
+        });
+    }
+
+    insertIgnoreSuffix(): string {
+        return this.case({
+            postgres: ' ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING',
+            otherwise: '',
+        });
+    }
+
+    upsertClause(
+        conflictColumns: readonly string[],
+        updateColumns: readonly string[],
+    ): string {
+        if (updateColumns.length === 0) {
+            throw new Error('upsertClause requires at least one update column');
+        }
+
+        const updateList = updateColumns
+            .map((column) => `${this.quoteIdentifier(column)} = ?`)
+            .join(', ');
+
+        return this.case({
+            mysql: `ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE ${updateList}`,
+            otherwise: `ON CONFLICT(${conflictColumns
+                .map((column) => this.quoteIdentifier(column))
+                .join(', ')}) DO UPDATE SET ${updateList}`,
+        });
+    }
+
+    jsonTextExtract(jsonExpression: string, path: SqlJsonPath): string {
+        const sqlitePath = `$${path.map((part) => `.${part}`).join('')}`;
+        return this.case({
+            sqlite: `json_extract(${jsonExpression}, ${this.sqlStringLiteral(sqlitePath)})`,
+            mysql: `JSON_UNQUOTE(JSON_EXTRACT(${jsonExpression}, ${this.sqlStringLiteral(sqlitePath)}))`,
+            postgres: `${jsonExpression} #>> ARRAY[${path
+                .map((part) => this.sqlStringLiteral(part))
+                .join(', ')}]`,
+            otherwise: `JSON_UNQUOTE(JSON_EXTRACT(${jsonExpression}, ${this.sqlStringLiteral(sqlitePath)}))`,
+        });
+    }
+
+    nullCoalesce(...expressions: readonly string[]): string {
+        if (expressions.length === 0) {
+            throw new Error('nullCoalesce requires at least one expression');
+        }
+        return `COALESCE(${expressions.join(', ')})`;
+    }
+
+    returningIdClause(): string {
+        return this.case({
+            postgres: ' RETURNING id',
+            otherwise: '',
+        });
+    }
+
+    protected sqlStringLiteral(value: string): string {
+        return `'${value.replaceAll("'", "''")}'`;
+    }
 }

src/backend/clients/database/MySQLDatabaseClient.ts

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import { createPool, type Pool } from 'mysql2';
 import { AbstractDatabaseClient, type WriteResult } from './DatabaseClient';
 import { SQLBatcher } from './SQLBatcher.js';
 import { splitMysqlStatements } from './splitMysqlStatements.js';
+import { compareMigrationFilenames } from './migrationFilenames.js';
 import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
 
 const RETRIABLE_ERROR_CODES = new Set([
@@ -44,36 +45,7 @@ const RETRIABLE_ERROR_MESSAGES = [
     'ETIMEDOUT',
 ];
 
-/**
- * Comparator for MySQL migration filenames.
- *
- * Existing files are named `mysql_mig_<N>.sql` with unpadded N, so a
- * plain lexical sort puts `mysql_mig_10.sql` BEFORE `mysql_mig_2.sql`.
- * Pull the trailing integer out and sort numerically. Anything that
- * doesn't match the `_<digits>.sql` shape (one-off, vendor dump) falls
- * back to lexical comparison so the order stays deterministic, and
- * unmatched names sort *after* numbered files so future numbered
- * migrations don't get interleaved into a one-off's namespace.
- *
- * Exported only for the unit test — the production caller is the
- * `runMigrations()` loop inside this file.
- */
-export const compareMigrationFilenames = (a: string, b: string): number => {
-    const numericIndex = (name: string): number => {
-        const m = /_(\d+)\.sql$/.exec(name);
-        return m ? Number.parseInt(m[1], 10) : Number.NaN;
-    };
-    const na = numericIndex(a);
-    const nb = numericIndex(b);
-    if (Number.isFinite(na) && Number.isFinite(nb)) {
-        if (na !== nb) return na - nb;
-    } else if (Number.isFinite(na)) {
-        return -1;
-    } else if (Number.isFinite(nb)) {
-        return 1;
-    }
-    return a.localeCompare(b);
-};
+export { compareMigrationFilenames };
 
 type PoolConfig = Parameters<typeof createPool>[0];
 

src/backend/clients/database/PostgresDatabaseClient.integration.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import { Pool } from 'pg';
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
+import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
+import type { PuterServer } from '../../server';
+import { generateDefaultFsentries } from '../../util/userProvisioning.js';
+import {
+    createPgMockPostgresDatabaseClient,
+    POSTGRES_TEST_MIGRATIONS_PATH,
+    setupTestServer,
+} from '../../testUtil.js';
+import { PostgresDatabaseClient } from './PostgresDatabaseClient.js';
+
+const postgresUrl = process.env.PUTER_TEST_POSTGRES_URL;
+const postgresMigrationsPath = POSTGRES_TEST_MIGRATIONS_PATH;
+const postgresTestSchemaPattern = /^puter_test_[a-f0-9]{32}$/u;
+const postgresIntegrationTimeoutMs = 180_000;
+
+let postgresTestSchema: string | undefined;
+let postgresTestUrl: string | undefined;
+
+const postgresConfig = (overrides: Partial<IConfig> = {}): IConfig => {
+    if (postgresUrl && !postgresTestUrl) {
+        throw new Error('Postgres test schema was not initialized');
+    }
+
+    const { database: databaseOverrides, ...rootOverrides } = overrides;
+    const database = postgresUrl
+        ? {
+              engine: 'postgres' as const,
+              inMemory: false,
+              connectionString: postgresTestUrl,
+              migrationPaths: [postgresMigrationsPath],
+          }
+        : {
+              engine: 'postgres' as const,
+              inMemory: true,
+              migrationPaths: [postgresMigrationsPath],
+          };
+
+    return {
+        port: 0,
+        extensions: [],
+        database: { ...database, ...(databaseOverrides ?? {}) },
+        ...rootOverrides,
+    };
+};
+
+const quoteTestSchemaIdentifier = (schema: string): string => {
+    if (!postgresTestSchemaPattern.test(schema)) {
+        throw new Error(`Unsafe Postgres test schema name: ${schema}`);
+    }
+    return `"${schema}"`;
+};
+
+const postgresConnectionStringForSchema = (
+    connectionString: string,
+    schema: string,
+): string => {
+    if (!postgresTestSchemaPattern.test(schema)) {
+        throw new Error(`Unsafe Postgres test schema name: ${schema}`);
+    }
+
+    const url = new URL(connectionString);
+    url.searchParams.set('options', `-c search_path=${schema}`);
+    return url.toString();
+};
+
+const createPostgresTestSchema = async (): Promise<void> => {
+    if (!postgresUrl) return;
+
+    const schema = `puter_test_${uuidv4().replaceAll('-', '')}`;
+    const pool = new Pool({ connectionString: postgresUrl });
+    try {
+        await pool.query(`CREATE SCHEMA ${quoteTestSchemaIdentifier(schema)}`);
+        postgresTestSchema = schema;
+        postgresTestUrl = postgresConnectionStringForSchema(
+            postgresUrl,
+            schema,
+        );
+    } finally {
+        await pool.end();
+    }
+};
+
+const dropPostgresTestSchema = async (): Promise<void> => {
+    if (!postgresUrl || !postgresTestSchema) return;
+
+    const schema = postgresTestSchema;
+    postgresTestSchema = undefined;
+    postgresTestUrl = undefined;
+
+    const pool = new Pool({ connectionString: postgresUrl });
+    try {
+        await pool.query(
+            `DROP SCHEMA IF EXISTS ${quoteTestSchemaIdentifier(schema)} CASCADE`,
+        );
+    } finally {
+        await pool.end();
+    }
+};
+
+describe('PostgresDatabaseClient integration', () => {
+    let server: PuterServer | undefined;
+
+    beforeEach(async () => {
+        await createPostgresTestSchema();
+    });
+
+    afterEach(async () => {
+        try {
+            await server?.shutdown();
+        } finally {
+            server = undefined;
+            await dropPostgresTestSchema();
+        }
+    });
+
+    it(
+        'applies the native migrations idempotently to an empty database',
+        async () => {
+            const config = postgresConfig();
+            const pgMockClient = postgresUrl
+                ? undefined
+                : await createPgMockPostgresDatabaseClient(config);
+            try {
+                const firstClient =
+                    pgMockClient?.client ?? new PostgresDatabaseClient(config);
+                try {
+                    await firstClient.onServerStart();
+                } finally {
+                    await firstClient.onServerShutdown();
+                }
+
+                const secondClient =
+                    pgMockClient?.createClient() ??
+                    new PostgresDatabaseClient(config);
+                try {
+                    await secondClient.onServerStart();
+                    const [systemUser] = await secondClient.read(
+                        'SELECT `id`, `username` FROM `user` WHERE `username` = ?',
+                        ['system'],
+                    );
+                    const [devCenter] = await secondClient.read(
+                        'SELECT `name`, `index_url` FROM `apps` WHERE `name` = ?',
+                        ['dev-center'],
+                    );
+
+                    expect(systemUser).toMatchObject({
+                        id: 1,
+                        username: 'system',
+                    });
+                    expect(devCenter).toMatchObject({
+                        name: 'dev-center',
+                        index_url:
+                            'https://builtins.namespaces.puter.com/dev-center',
+                    });
+                } finally {
+                    await secondClient.onServerShutdown();
+                }
+            } finally {
+                pgMockClient?.destroy();
+            }
+        },
+        postgresIntegrationTimeoutMs,
+    );
+
+    it('starts the server and exercises user, app, fsentry, permission, and session flows', async () => {
+        const userStorageAllowance = 123_456_789;
+        server = await setupTestServer(
+            postgresConfig({
+                no_default_user: false,
+                is_storage_limited: true,
+            }),
+        );
+
+        const admin = await server.stores.user.getByUsername('admin');
+        expect(admin?.username).toBe('admin');
+
+        const username = `pg-${uuidv4().slice(0, 8)}`;
+        const createdUser = await server.stores.user.create({
+            username,
+            uuid: uuidv4(),
+            password: null,
+            email: `${username}@test.local`,
+            free_storage: userStorageAllowance,
+            requires_email_confirmation: false,
+        });
+        await generateDefaultFsentries(
+            server.clients.db,
+            server.stores.user,
+            createdUser,
+        );
+        const user = await server.stores.user.getById(createdUser.id);
+        if (!user) throw new Error('created user was not readable');
+        expect(user.username).toBe(username);
+        await expect(
+            server.stores.fsEntry.getUserStorageAllowance(user.id),
+        ).resolves.toMatchObject({
+            max: userStorageAllowance,
+        });
+
+        const otherUsername = `pg-other-${uuidv4().slice(0, 8)}`;
+        const otherUser = await server.stores.user.create({
+            username: otherUsername,
+            uuid: uuidv4(),
+            password: null,
+            email: `${otherUsername}@test.local`,
+            free_storage: 100 * 1024 * 1024,
+            requires_email_confirmation: false,
+        });
+
+        const authResult = await server.services.auth.createSessionToken(
+            user,
+            {
+                ip: '127.0.0.1',
+                user_agent: 'postgres-integration-test',
+            },
+        );
+        const authenticated =
+            await server.services.auth.authenticateFromToken(authResult.token);
+        expect(authenticated?.user?.id).toBe(user?.id);
+
+        const devCenter = await server.stores.app.getByName('dev-center');
+        if (!devCenter) throw new Error('dev-center app was not seeded');
+        expect(devCenter.name).toBe('dev-center');
+
+        const documents = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+            `/${username}/Documents`,
+        );
+        if (!documents) throw new Error('Documents directory was not created');
+        expect(documents.isDir).toBe(true);
+        const folder = await server.stores.fsEntry.createNonFileEntry({
+            userId: user.id,
+            parent: documents,
+            name: 'postgres-folder',
+            kind: 'directory',
+        });
+        const renamedFolder = await server.stores.fsEntry.updateEntry(
+            folder.uuid,
+            {
+                name: 'postgres-folder-renamed',
+                path: `/${username}/Documents/postgres-folder-renamed`,
+            },
+        );
+        expect(renamedFolder.name).toBe('postgres-folder-renamed');
+
+        await server.stores.permission.upsertUserAppPerm(
+            user.id,
+            Number(devCenter.id),
+            'driver:postgres-integration',
+            { ok: true },
+        );
+        await expect(
+            server.stores.permission.hasUserAppPerm(
+                user.id,
+                Number(devCenter.id),
+                'driver:postgres-integration',
+            ),
+        ).resolves.toBe(true);
+
+        await server.stores.oidc.link(
+            user.id,
+            'postgres-integration-test',
+            'subject-1',
+            null,
+        );
+        await expect(
+            server.stores.oidc.link(
+                user.id,
+                'postgres-integration-test',
+                'subject-1',
+                null,
+            ),
+        ).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+        await expect(
+            server.stores.oidc.link(
+                otherUser.id,
+                'postgres-integration-test',
+                'subject-1',
+                null,
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            statusCode: 409,
+            legacyCode: 'conflict',
+        });
+
+        const session = await server.stores.session.create(user.id, {
+            meta: { source: 'postgres-integration-test' },
+        });
+        const activeSession = await server.stores.session.getByUuid(
+            session.uuid,
+        );
+        expect(activeSession?.uuid).toBe(session.uuid);
+
+        const workerName = `worker-${uuidv4().slice(0, 8)}`;
+        const workerSession = await server.stores.session.getOrCreateWorker(
+            user.id,
+            { workerName },
+        );
+        expect(workerSession?.kind).toBe('worker');
+        expect(workerSession?.meta?.worker_name).toBe(workerName);
+
+        await server.stores.session.removeByUuid(session.uuid);
+        await expect(
+            server.stores.session.getByUuid(session.uuid),
+        ).resolves.toBeNull();
+    }, postgresIntegrationTimeoutMs);
+});

src/backend/clients/database/PostgresDatabaseClient.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import type { FieldDef, QueryResult } from 'pg';
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
+import { DatabaseClientFactory } from './index.js';
+import {
+    mapPostgresWriteResult,
+    PostgresDatabaseClient,
+    type PostgresPool,
+    type PostgresPoolClient,
+} from './PostgresDatabaseClient.js';
+
+type QueryCall = {
+    text: string;
+    values?: unknown[];
+};
+
+const postgresConfig = (): IConfig => ({
+    port: 0,
+    extensions: [],
+    database: {
+        engine: 'postgres',
+        migrationPaths: [],
+    },
+});
+
+const postgresReplicaConfig = (): IConfig => ({
+    port: 0,
+    extensions: [],
+    database: {
+        engine: 'postgres',
+        migrationPaths: [],
+        replica: {},
+    },
+});
+
+const field = (name: string, dataTypeID: number): FieldDef => ({
+    name,
+    tableID: 0,
+    columnID: 0,
+    dataTypeID,
+    dataTypeSize: -1,
+    dataTypeModifier: -1,
+    format: 'text',
+});
+
+const int8Field = (name: string): FieldDef => field(name, 20);
+const textField = (name: string): FieldDef => field(name, 25);
+
+const queryResult = (
+    rows: Record<string, unknown>[] = [],
+    rowCount = rows.length,
+    fields: FieldDef[] = [],
+): QueryResult<Record<string, unknown>> => ({
+    command: '',
+    fields,
+    oid: 0,
+    rowCount,
+    rows,
+});
+
+class RecordingPoolClient implements PostgresPoolClient {
+    readonly calls: QueryCall[] = [];
+    released = false;
+
+    constructor(private readonly failOnText?: string) {}
+
+    async query(
+        text: string,
+        values?: unknown[],
+    ): Promise<QueryResult<Record<string, unknown>>> {
+        this.calls.push({ text, values });
+        if (this.failOnText && text.includes(this.failOnText)) {
+            throw new Error(`forced query failure: ${text}`);
+        }
+        return queryResult([], text === 'ROLLBACK' ? 0 : 1);
+    }
+
+    release(): void {
+        this.released = true;
+    }
+}
+
+class RecordingPool implements PostgresPool {
+    readonly calls: QueryCall[] = [];
+
+    constructor(
+        private readonly client: RecordingPoolClient =
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+        private readonly nextResult: QueryResult<Record<string, unknown>> =
+            queryResult(),
+    ) {}
+
+    async query(
+        text: string,
+        values?: unknown[],
+    ): Promise<QueryResult<Record<string, unknown>>> {
+        this.calls.push({ text, values });
+        if (text === 'SELECT 1') return queryResult([{ ok: 1 }], 1);
+        return this.nextResult;
+    }
+
+    async connect(): Promise<PostgresPoolClient> {
+        return this.client;
+    }
+
+    async end(): Promise<void> {}
+}
+
+describe('PostgresDatabaseClient', () => {
+    it('is selected by the database factory', () => {
+        const client = new DatabaseClientFactory(postgresConfig());
+        expect(client).toBeInstanceOf(PostgresDatabaseClient);
+    });
+
+    it('maps pg write results to the shared WriteResult shape', () => {
+        expect(
+            mapPostgresWriteResult(queryResult([{ id: '42' }], 1)),
+        ).toEqual({
+            insertId: 42,
+            affectedRows: 1,
+            anyRowsAffected: true,
+        });
+
+        expect(mapPostgresWriteResult(queryResult([], 0))).toEqual({
+            insertId: 0,
+            affectedRows: 0,
+            anyRowsAffected: false,
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('prepares write SQL at the pg boundary', async () => {
+        const pool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult([{ id: '7' }], 1),
+        );
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(postgresConfig(), () => pool);
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        const result = await client.write(
+            'INSERT INTO `apps` (`name`) VALUES (?) RETURNING id',
+            ['editor'],
+        );
+
+        expect(result.insertId).toBe(7);
+        expect(pool.calls.at(-1)).toEqual({
+            text: 'INSERT INTO "apps" ("name") VALUES ($1) RETURNING id',
+            values: ['editor'],
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('normalizes int8 fields on read and primary read rows', async () => {
+        const pool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult(
+                [
+                    {
+                        uuid: 'session-1',
+                        created_at: '1710000000',
+                        last_activity: '1710000001',
+                        expires_at: '1710000002',
+                        revoked_at: null,
+                    },
+                ],
+                1,
+                [
+                    textField('uuid'),
+                    int8Field('created_at'),
+                    int8Field('last_activity'),
+                    int8Field('expires_at'),
+                    int8Field('revoked_at'),
+                ],
+            ),
+        );
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(postgresConfig(), () => pool);
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        await expect(client.read('SELECT * FROM `sessions`')).resolves.toEqual(
+            [
+                {
+                    uuid: 'session-1',
+                    created_at: 1710000000,
+                    last_activity: 1710000001,
+                    expires_at: 1710000002,
+                    revoked_at: null,
+                },
+            ],
+        );
+        await expect(client.pread('SELECT * FROM `sessions`')).resolves.toEqual(
+            [
+                {
+                    uuid: 'session-1',
+                    created_at: 1710000000,
+                    last_activity: 1710000001,
+                    expires_at: 1710000002,
+                    revoked_at: null,
+                },
+            ],
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('rejects unsafe int8 values instead of losing precision', async () => {
+        const pool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult(
+                [{ id: '9007199254740992' }],
+                1,
+                [int8Field('id')],
+            ),
+        );
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(postgresConfig(), () => pool);
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        await expect(client.read('SELECT `id` FROM `sessions`')).rejects.toThrow(
+            'safe integer',
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('normalizes tryHardRead rows returned by a replica', async () => {
+        const primaryPool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult([{ created_at: '1' }], 1, [
+                int8Field('created_at'),
+            ]),
+        );
+        const replicaPool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult([{ created_at: '2' }], 1, [
+                int8Field('created_at'),
+            ]),
+        );
+        const pools = [primaryPool, replicaPool];
+        let nextPoolIndex = 0;
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(
+            postgresReplicaConfig(),
+            () => {
+                const pool = pools[nextPoolIndex];
+                nextPoolIndex += 1;
+                if (!pool) throw new Error('unexpected pool factory call');
+                return pool;
+            },
+        );
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        await expect(
+            client.tryHardRead('SELECT `created_at` FROM `sessions`'),
+        ).resolves.toEqual([{ created_at: 2 }]);
+    });
+
+    it('normalizes tryHardRead rows returned by primary fallback', async () => {
+        const primaryPool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult([{ created_at: '3' }], 1, [
+                int8Field('created_at'),
+            ]),
+        );
+        const replicaPool = new RecordingPool(
+            new RecordingPoolClient(),
+            queryResult([], 0, [int8Field('created_at')]),
+        );
+        const pools = [primaryPool, replicaPool];
+        let nextPoolIndex = 0;
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(
+            postgresReplicaConfig(),
+            () => {
+                const pool = pools[nextPoolIndex];
+                nextPoolIndex += 1;
+                if (!pool) throw new Error('unexpected pool factory call');
+                return pool;
+            },
+        );
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        await expect(
+            client.tryHardRead('SELECT `created_at` FROM `sessions`'),
+        ).resolves.toEqual([{ created_at: 3 }]);
+    });
+
+    it('runs batch writes in order and commits', async () => {
+        const conn = new RecordingPoolClient();
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(
+            postgresConfig(),
+            () => new RecordingPool(conn),
+        );
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        await client.batchWrite([
+            {
+                statement:
+                    'UPDATE `user` SET `username` = ? WHERE `id` = ?',
+                values: ['ada', 1],
+            },
+            {
+                statement: 'DELETE FROM `sessions` WHERE `uuid` = ?',
+                values: ['session-1'],
+            },
+        ]);
+
+        expect(conn.calls).toEqual([
+            { text: 'BEGIN', values: undefined },
+            {
+                text: 'UPDATE "user" SET "username" = $1 WHERE "id" = $2',
+                values: ['ada', 1],
+            },
+            {
+                text: 'DELETE FROM "sessions" WHERE "uuid" = $1',
+                values: ['session-1'],
+            },
+            { text: 'COMMIT', values: undefined },
+        ]);
+        expect(conn.released).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('rolls back and releases the pg connection when a batch write fails', async () => {
+        const conn = new RecordingPoolClient('UPDATE "user"');
+        const client = new PostgresDatabaseClient(
+            postgresConfig(),
+            () => new RecordingPool(conn),
+        );
+        await client.onServerStart();
+
+        await expect(
+            client.batchWrite([
+                {
+                    statement:
+                        'UPDATE `user` SET `username` = ? WHERE `id` = ?',
+                    values: ['ada', 1],
+                },
+            ]),
+        ).rejects.toThrow('forced query failure');
+
+        expect(conn.calls).toEqual([
+            { text: 'BEGIN', values: undefined },
+            {
+                text: 'UPDATE "user" SET "username" = $1 WHERE "id" = $2',
+                values: ['ada', 1],
+            },
+            { text: 'ROLLBACK', values: undefined },
+        ]);
+        expect(conn.released).toBe(true);
+    });
+});

src/backend/clients/database/PostgresDatabaseClient.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import { readdirSync, readFileSync } from 'fs';
+import { isAbsolute, resolve as resolvePath } from 'path';
+import { Pool, type PoolConfig, type QueryResult } from 'pg';
+import {
+    AbstractDatabaseClient,
+    type BatchEntry,
+    type WriteResult,
+} from './DatabaseClient';
+import { compareMigrationFilenames } from './migrationFilenames.js';
+import { preparePostgresSql } from './preparePostgresSql.js';
+import { splitPostgresStatements } from './splitPostgresStatements.js';
+import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
+
+type PostgresEndpointConfig = {
+    host?: string;
+    port?: number;
+    user?: string;
+    password?: string;
+    database?: string;
+    connectionString?: string;
+    url?: string;
+};
+
+export interface PostgresQueryable {
+    query(query: string, values?: unknown[]): Promise<QueryResult>;
+}
+
+export interface PostgresPoolClient extends PostgresQueryable {
+    release(): void;
+}
+
+export interface PostgresPool extends PostgresQueryable {
+    connect(): Promise<PostgresPoolClient>;
+    end(): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+type PostgresPoolFactory = (poolConfig: PoolConfig) => PostgresPool;
+
+enum Configuration {
+    SINGLE,
+    REPLICA,
+}
+
+const POSTGRES_INT8_OID = 20;
+const INTEGER_TEXT_PATTERN = /^-?\d+$/u;
+
+const normalizePostgresInt8 = (
+    value: unknown,
+    columnName: string,
+): number | null | undefined => {
+    if (value === null || value === undefined) return value;
+
+    const parsed =
+        typeof value === 'bigint'
+            ? Number(value)
+            : typeof value === 'number'
+              ? value
+              : typeof value === 'string' && INTEGER_TEXT_PATTERN.test(value)
+                ? Number(value)
+                : Number.NaN;
+
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(parsed)) {
+        throw new Error(
+            `[postgres] int8 column ${columnName} is outside JavaScript's safe integer range`,
+        );
+    }
+
+    return parsed;
+};
+
+const normalizePostgresRows = (
+    result: QueryResult,
+): Record<string, unknown>[] => {
+    const int8Fields = result.fields.filter(
+        (field) => field.dataTypeID === POSTGRES_INT8_OID,
+    );
+    if (int8Fields.length === 0) {
+        return result.rows as Record<string, unknown>[];
+    }
+
+    return result.rows.map((row) => {
+        const normalized: Record<string, unknown> = { ...row };
+        for (const field of int8Fields) {
+            normalized[field.name] = normalizePostgresInt8(
+                normalized[field.name],
+                field.name,
+            );
+        }
+        return normalized;
+    });
+};
+
+export const mapPostgresWriteResult = (result: QueryResult): WriteResult => {
+    const affectedRows = result.rowCount ?? 0;
+    const rowId = result.rows[0]?.id;
+    const insertId =
+        typeof rowId === 'bigint'
+            ? rowId
+            : typeof rowId === 'number'
+              ? rowId
+              : typeof rowId === 'string' && rowId !== ''
+                ? Number(rowId)
+                : 0;
+    const normalizedInsertId =
+        typeof insertId === 'number' && Number.isNaN(insertId) ? 0 : insertId;
+
+    return {
+        insertId: normalizedInsertId,
+        affectedRows,
+        anyRowsAffected: affectedRows > 0,
+    };
+};
+
+export class PostgresDatabaseClient extends AbstractDatabaseClient {
+    override readonly engineName = 'postgres';
+
+    private primaryPool!: PostgresPool;
+    private replicaPool!: PostgresPool;
+    private configuration = Configuration.SINGLE;
+    private shutdownStarted = false;
+    private shutdownTimer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;
+
+    constructor(
+        config: IConfig,
+        private readonly poolFactory: PostgresPoolFactory = (poolConfig) =>
+            new Pool(poolConfig) as unknown as PostgresPool,
+    ) {
+        super(config);
+    }
+
+    override async onServerStart(): Promise<void> {
+        const dbConf = this.config.database!;
+
+        this.primaryPool = this.createPool(dbConf);
+        await this.primaryPool.query('SELECT 1');
+        console.log('[postgres] connected to primary');
+
+        if (dbConf.replica) {
+            this.replicaPool = this.createPool(dbConf.replica);
+            await this.replicaPool.query('SELECT 1');
+            this.configuration = Configuration.REPLICA;
+            console.log('[postgres] connected to read-replica');
+        } else {
+            this.replicaPool = this.primaryPool;
+            this.configuration = Configuration.SINGLE;
+        }
+
+        await this.runMigrations();
+    }
+
+    override async onServerPrepareShutdown(): Promise<void> {
+        if (this.shutdownStarted) return;
+        this.shutdownStarted = true;
+
+        const drainMs = 60_000;
+        console.log(
+            `[postgres] draining in-flight queries (${drainMs}ms) before closing pools`,
+        );
+
+        this.shutdownTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+            this.shutdownTimer = null;
+            this.closeCurrentPools().catch((e) =>
+                console.error('[postgres] error closing pools after drain', e),
+            );
+        }, drainMs);
+
+        if (typeof this.shutdownTimer.unref === 'function') {
+            this.shutdownTimer.unref();
+        }
+    }
+
+    override async onServerShutdown(): Promise<void> {
+        if (this.shutdownTimer) {
+            clearTimeout(this.shutdownTimer);
+            this.shutdownTimer = null;
+        }
+        await this.closeCurrentPools();
+    }
+
+    override quoteIdentifier(identifier: string): string {
+        return identifier
+            .split('.')
+            .map((part) => {
+                if (part === '*') return part;
+                return `"${part.replaceAll('"', '""')}"`;
+            })
+            .join('.');
+    }
+
+    override booleanLiteral(value: boolean): string {
+        return value ? 'TRUE' : 'FALSE';
+    }
+
+    override booleanValue(value: boolean): boolean {
+        return value;
+    }
+
+    override async read(
+        query: string,
+        params: unknown[] = [],
+    ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>[]> {
+        const result = await this.query(this.replicaPool, query, params);
+        return normalizePostgresRows(result);
+    }
+
+    override async pread(
+        query: string,
+        params: unknown[] = [],
+    ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>[]> {
+        const result = await this.query(this.primaryPool, query, params);
+        return normalizePostgresRows(result);
+    }
+
+    override async write(
+        query: string,
+        params: unknown[] = [],
+    ): Promise<WriteResult> {
+        const result = await this.query(this.primaryPool, query, params);
+        return mapPostgresWriteResult(result);
+    }
+
+    override async batchWrite(entries: BatchEntry[]): Promise<void> {
+        if (entries.length === 0) return;
+
+        const conn = await this.primaryPool.connect();
+        try {
+            await conn.query('BEGIN');
+            try {
+                for (const { statement, values } of entries) {
+                    await this.query(conn, statement, values);
+                }
+                await conn.query('COMMIT');
+            } catch (err) {
+                await conn.query('ROLLBACK').catch(() => {});
+                throw err;
+            }
+        } finally {
+            conn.release();
+        }
+    }
+
+    override async tryHardRead(
+        query: string,
+        params: unknown[] = [],
+    ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>[]> {
+        if (this.configuration === Configuration.SINGLE) {
+            return this.read(query, params);
+        }
+
+        const primaryPromise = this.query(this.primaryPool, query, params);
+        try {
+            const replicaResult = await this.query(
+                this.replicaPool,
+                query,
+                params,
+            );
+            if (replicaResult.rows.length > 0) {
+                primaryPromise.catch(() => {});
+                return normalizePostgresRows(replicaResult);
+            }
+        } catch {
+            // fall through to primary
+        }
+
+        const primaryResult = await primaryPromise;
+        return normalizePostgresRows(primaryResult);
+    }
+
+    private async runMigrations(): Promise<void> {
+        const paths = this.config.database?.migrationPaths;
+        if (!paths || paths.length === 0) return;
+
+        const conn = await this.primaryPool.connect();
+        try {
+            for (const rawPath of paths) {
+                const dir = isAbsolute(rawPath)
+                    ? rawPath
+                    : resolvePath(process.cwd(), rawPath);
+
+                let files: string[];
+                try {
+                    files = readdirSync(dir)
+                        .filter(
+                            (f) =>
+                                f.endsWith('.sql') && f.startsWith('postgres'),
+                        )
+                        .sort(compareMigrationFilenames);
+                } catch (e) {
+                    throw new Error(
+                        `[postgres] migration path is unreadable: ${dir}`,
+                        { cause: e },
+                    );
+                }
+
+                if (files.length === 0) {
+                    console.log(`[postgres] no migrations in ${dir}`);
+                    continue;
+                }
+
+                console.log(
+                    `[postgres] running migrations from ${dir}: ${files.length} file(s)`,
+                );
+
+                for (const file of files) {
+                    const filePath = resolvePath(dir, file);
+                    const contents = readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');
+                    const statements = splitPostgresStatements(contents);
+                    await conn.query('BEGIN');
+                    try {
+                        for (let i = 0; i < statements.length; i++) {
+                            try {
+                                await conn.query(statements[i]);
+                            } catch (e) {
+                                throw new Error(
+                                    `[postgres] failed to apply ${file} at statement ${i}`,
+                                    { cause: e },
+                                );
+                            }
+                        }
+                        await conn.query('COMMIT');
+                    } catch (e) {
+                        await conn.query('ROLLBACK').catch(() => {});
+                        throw e;
+                    }
+                    console.log(
+                        `[postgres] applied ${file} (${statements.length} statements)`,
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+        } finally {
+            conn.release();
+        }
+    }
+
+    private createPool(dbConf: PostgresEndpointConfig): PostgresPool {
+        const connectionString = dbConf.connectionString ?? dbConf.url;
+        if (connectionString) {
+            return this.poolFactory({
+                connectionString,
+                max: 30,
+            });
+        }
+
+        return this.poolFactory({
+            host: dbConf.host ?? '127.0.0.1',
+            port: dbConf.port ?? 5432,
+            user: dbConf.user ?? 'postgres',
+            password: dbConf.password ?? '',
+            database: dbConf.database ?? 'puter',
+            max: 30,
+        });
+    }
+
+    private async query(
+        target: PostgresQueryable,
+        query: string,
+        params: unknown[] = [],
+    ): Promise<QueryResult> {
+        const prepared = preparePostgresSql(query);
+        return target.query(prepared.text, params);
+    }
+
+    private async closeCurrentPools(): Promise<void> {
+        const tasks: Promise<void>[] = [];
+        if (this.primaryPool) tasks.push(this.primaryPool.end());
+        if (this.replicaPool && this.replicaPool !== this.primaryPool) {
+            tasks.push(this.replicaPool.end());
+        }
+        await Promise.all(tasks);
+    }
+}

src/backend/clients/database/SqliteDatabaseClient.ts

@@ -85,6 +85,14 @@ const AVAILABLE_MIGRATIONS: [number, string[]][] = [
     [50, ['0054_sessions_workers.sql']],
     [50, ['0055_username_nocase_unique.sql']],
     [51, ['0056_sessions_kind_worker.sql']],
+    [52, ['0057_add_user_reputation.sql']],
+    [53, ['0058_add_phone_verification.sql']],
+    [54, ['0059_add_card_verification.sql']],
+    [55, ['0060_add_card_fingerprint.sql']],
+    [56, ['0061_add_suspended_at.sql']],
+    [57, ['0062_blocked-app-origins.sql']],
+    [58, ['0063_add_suspended_reason.sql']],
+    [59, ['0064_abuse-moderation-events.sql']],
 ];
 
 export class SqliteDatabaseClient extends AbstractDatabaseClient {

src/backend/clients/database/index.ts

@@ -24,10 +24,12 @@ export {
 } from './DatabaseClient';
 export { SqliteDatabaseClient } from './SqliteDatabaseClient';
 export { MySQLDatabaseClient } from './MySQLDatabaseClient';
+export { PostgresDatabaseClient } from './PostgresDatabaseClient';
 
 import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
 import { AbstractDatabaseClient } from './DatabaseClient';
 import { MySQLDatabaseClient } from './MySQLDatabaseClient';
+import { PostgresDatabaseClient } from './PostgresDatabaseClient';
 import { SqliteDatabaseClient } from './SqliteDatabaseClient';
 
 /**
@@ -41,6 +43,8 @@ export const DatabaseClientFactory = class DatabaseClientFactory {
         switch (engine) {
             case 'mysql':
                 return new MySQLDatabaseClient(config);
+            case 'postgres':
+                return new PostgresDatabaseClient(config);
             case 'sqlite':
                 return new SqliteDatabaseClient(config);
             default:

src/backend/clients/database/migrationFilenames.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Comparator for migration filenames named `<engine>_mig_<N>.sql`.
+ *
+ * Existing MySQL files use unpadded integers, so lexical sorting places
+ * `*_mig_10.sql` before `*_mig_2.sql`. Pull the trailing integer out and sort
+ * numerically. Anything that does not match the `_<digits>.sql` shape falls
+ * back to lexical comparison and sorts after numbered files.
+ */
+export const compareMigrationFilenames = (a: string, b: string): number => {
+    const numericIndex = (name: string): number => {
+        const m = /_(\d+)\.sql$/.exec(name);
+        return m ? Number.parseInt(m[1], 10) : Number.NaN;
+    };
+    const na = numericIndex(a);
+    const nb = numericIndex(b);
+    if (Number.isFinite(na) && Number.isFinite(nb)) {
+        if (na !== nb) return na - nb;
+    } else if (Number.isFinite(na)) {
+        return -1;
+    } else if (Number.isFinite(nb)) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return a.localeCompare(b);
+};

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_1.sql

@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@
 --
 
 --
--- Idempotent column-ensure helper (used by CALLs below; dropped at end of file)
+-- Idempotent column-ensure helper. Used by the CALLs below AND by later
+-- migration files, which CALL it as a one-line idempotent column add. Left
+-- resident (not dropped at end of file) so it outlives this migration.
 --
 
 DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_add_col;
@@ -1333,7 +1335,10 @@ CALL _puter_add_col('user_update_audit', 'new_username', '`new_username` varchar
 CALL _puter_add_col('user_update_audit', 'reason', '`reason` varchar(255) COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci DEFAULT NULL');
 
 
-DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_add_col;
+-- _puter_add_col is intentionally NOT dropped here: later migration files CALL
+-- it as a one-line idempotent column add, and migrations replay on every boot
+-- with no applied-state tracking, so the helper must outlive this file. The
+-- DROP-before-CREATE at the top keeps this migration itself replay-safe.
 /*!40103 SET TIME_ZONE=@OLD_TIME_ZONE */;
 
 /*!40101 SET SQL_MODE=@OLD_SQL_MODE */;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_13.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- SMS phone verification columns. Mirrors SQLite migration 0058. `phone` is the
+-- E.164 number collected during verification (indexed like `email`);
+-- `requires_phone_verification` gates account use for low-reputation signups
+-- (not indexed, mirroring `requires_email_confirmation`).
+--
+-- Idempotent: column adds use _puter_add_col (defined in mig_1, which leaves it
+-- resident for later migrations); the index add is guarded against
+-- INFORMATION_SCHEMA.STATISTICS so the directory replays safely.
+
+CALL _puter_add_col('user', 'phone', '`phone` varchar(20) DEFAULT NULL');
+CALL _puter_add_col('user', 'requires_phone_verification', '`requires_phone_verification` tinyint(1) NOT NULL DEFAULT ''0''');
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_add_user_phone_index;
+DELIMITER //
+CREATE PROCEDURE _puter_add_user_phone_index()
+BEGIN
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.STATISTICS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'user'
+      AND INDEX_NAME = 'idx_user_phone'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `user` ADD INDEX `idx_user_phone` (`phone`);
+  END IF;
+END//
+DELIMITER ;
+
+CALL _puter_add_user_phone_index();
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_add_user_phone_index;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_14.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Credit-card verification column. Mirrors SQLite migration 0059.
+-- `requires_card_verification` gates account use for low-reputation signups;
+-- the card itself never touches our DB, so this is the only column (not
+-- indexed, mirroring `requires_phone_verification`).
+--
+-- Idempotent: the column add uses _puter_add_col (from mig_1) so the
+-- directory replays safely.
+
+CALL _puter_add_col('user', 'requires_card_verification', '`requires_card_verification` tinyint(1) NOT NULL DEFAULT ''0''');

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_15.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Card fingerprint column. Mirrors SQLite migration 0060. `card_fingerprint`
+-- is the Stripe card fingerprint (stable per card number) recorded when a user
+-- clears card verification — the card sibling of `phone`, indexed like it so
+-- admin tooling can find the accounts that verified with a given card. The card
+-- itself never touches our DB, only Stripe's fingerprint for it.
+--
+-- Idempotent: the column add uses _puter_add_col (defined in mig_1, which
+-- leaves it resident for later migrations); the index add is guarded against
+-- INFORMATION_SCHEMA.STATISTICS so the directory replays safely.
+
+CALL _puter_add_col('user', 'card_fingerprint', '`card_fingerprint` varchar(128) DEFAULT NULL');
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_add_user_card_fingerprint_index;
+DELIMITER //
+CREATE PROCEDURE _puter_add_user_card_fingerprint_index()
+BEGIN
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.STATISTICS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'user'
+      AND INDEX_NAME = 'idx_user_card_fingerprint'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `user` ADD INDEX `idx_user_card_fingerprint` (`card_fingerprint`);
+  END IF;
+END//
+DELIMITER ;
+
+CALL _puter_add_user_card_fingerprint_index();
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_add_user_card_fingerprint_index;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_16.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Suspended-at column. Mirrors SQLite migration 0061. `suspended_at` is when
+-- the account was suspended, as unix seconds (NULL while not suspended) — the
+-- timestamp sibling of the boolean `suspended` flag, indexed so the
+-- signup-abuse harness can count an IP's recently-suspended accounts.
+--
+-- Idempotent: the column add uses _puter_add_col (defined in mig_1, which
+-- leaves it resident for later migrations); the index add is guarded against
+-- INFORMATION_SCHEMA.STATISTICS so the directory replays safely.
+
+CALL _puter_add_col('user', 'suspended_at', '`suspended_at` bigint DEFAULT NULL');
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_add_user_suspended_at_index;
+DELIMITER //
+CREATE PROCEDURE _puter_add_user_suspended_at_index()
+BEGIN
+  IF NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.STATISTICS
+    WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
+      AND TABLE_NAME = 'user'
+      AND INDEX_NAME = 'idx_user_suspended_at'
+  ) THEN
+    ALTER TABLE `user` ADD INDEX `idx_user_suspended_at` (`suspended_at`);
+  END IF;
+END//
+DELIMITER ;
+
+CALL _puter_add_user_suspended_at_index();
+
+DROP PROCEDURE IF EXISTS _puter_add_user_suspended_at_index;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_17.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Admin-managed blocklist of app origins. Mirrors SQLite migration 0062.
+-- An app whose `index_url` host (or a request origin) matches an entry is
+-- denied access to Puter resources: it cannot obtain an app token and
+-- already-issued app tokens are rejected on each request. `include_subdomains
+-- = 1` also blocks every subdomain of `domain`. Enforced in AuthService via
+-- AppOriginBlocklistService.
+--
+-- Idempotent: `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` lets the directory replay safely.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `blocked_app_origins` (
+    `id` INT NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `domain` VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
+    `include_subdomains` TINYINT(1) NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    `reason` TEXT DEFAULT NULL,
+    `created_by` VARCHAR(255) DEFAULT NULL,
+    `created_at` TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`),
+    UNIQUE KEY `idx_blocked_app_origins_domain` (`domain`)
+) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4 COLLATE=utf8mb4_unicode_ci;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_18.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Suspension reason column. Mirrors SQLite migration 0063. Why an account was
+-- suspended (NULL while not suspended) — companion to the boolean `suspended`
+-- flag and `suspended_at` timestamp. Constrained at the application layer to a
+-- fixed set of reasons (see extensions/admin suspension_reasons.js).
+--
+-- Idempotent: the column add uses _puter_add_col (defined in mig_1, which
+-- leaves it resident for later migrations).
+
+CALL _puter_add_col('user', 'suspended_reason', '`suspended_reason` VARCHAR(64) DEFAULT NULL');

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/mysql/mysql_mig_19.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Append-only log of admin moderation actions. Mirrors SQLite migration 0064.
+-- Used to measure the abuse system's false-positive rate: `unsuspend` (admin
+-- unblock) and `admin_create_user` are the false-positive signals; `suspend`
+-- gives the denominator. Preserves history the `user` suspension columns lose
+-- on unsuspend. `created_at` is unix seconds (matching `user.suspended_at`).
+--
+-- Idempotent: `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` lets the directory replay safely.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `abuse_moderation_events` (
+    `id` INT NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `action` VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL,
+    `target_user_id` BIGINT DEFAULT NULL,
+    `target_username` VARCHAR(255) DEFAULT NULL,
+    `admin_username` VARCHAR(255) DEFAULT NULL,
+    `reason` TEXT DEFAULT NULL,
+    `source` VARCHAR(64) DEFAULT NULL,
+    `created_at` BIGINT NOT NULL,
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`),
+    KEY `idx_abuse_moderation_events_created_at` (`created_at`),
+    KEY `idx_abuse_moderation_events_action` (`action`)
+) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4 COLLATE=utf8mb4_unicode_ci;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/postgres/postgres_mig_1.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,724 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "user" (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uuid varchar(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  username varchar(50) UNIQUE,
+  email varchar(256),
+  password varchar(225),
+  free_storage bigint,
+  max_subdomains integer,
+  taskbar_items text,
+  desktop_uuid varchar(36),
+  appdata_uuid varchar(36),
+  documents_uuid varchar(36),
+  pictures_uuid varchar(36),
+  videos_uuid varchar(36),
+  trash_uuid varchar(36),
+  trash_id integer,
+  appdata_id integer,
+  desktop_id integer,
+  documents_id integer,
+  pictures_id integer,
+  videos_id integer,
+  referrer varchar(64),
+  desktop_bg_url text,
+  desktop_bg_color varchar(20),
+  desktop_bg_fit varchar(16),
+  pass_recovery_token varchar(36),
+  requires_email_confirmation boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+  email_confirm_code varchar(8),
+  email_confirm_token varchar(36),
+  email_confirmed boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+  dev_first_name varchar(100),
+  dev_last_name varchar(100),
+  dev_paypal varchar(100),
+  dev_approved_for_incentive_program boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  dev_joined_incentive_program boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  suspended boolean,
+  unsubscribed boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+  "timestamp" timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  last_activity_ts timestamp,
+  referral_code varchar(16) UNIQUE,
+  referred_by integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  unconfirmed_change_email varchar(256),
+  change_email_confirm_token varchar(256),
+  otp_secret text,
+  otp_enabled boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  otp_recovery_codes text,
+  stripe_customer_id varchar(40),
+  public_uuid varchar(36),
+  public_id integer,
+  clean_email varchar(256),
+  audit_metadata jsonb,
+  signup_ip varchar(45),
+  signup_ip_forwarded varchar(45),
+  signup_user_agent varchar(512),
+  signup_origin varchar(255),
+  signup_server varchar(255),
+  metadata jsonb DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb,
+  reputation smallint DEFAULT 100
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_email ON "user" (email);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_pass_recovery_token ON "user" (pass_recovery_token);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_referrer ON "user" (referrer);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_email_confirm_token ON "user" (email_confirm_token);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_last_activity_ts ON "user" (last_activity_ts);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_referred_by ON "user" (referred_by);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_stripe_customer_id ON "user" (stripe_customer_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_clean_email ON "user" (clean_email);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_signup_ip ON "user" (signup_ip);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_signup_ip_forwarded ON "user" (signup_ip_forwarded);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_signup_user_agent ON "user" (signup_user_agent);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_signup_origin ON "user" (signup_origin);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_signup_server ON "user" (signup_server);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS apps (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uid varchar(40) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  owner_user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  icon text,
+  name varchar(100) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  title varchar(100) NOT NULL,
+  description text,
+  godmode boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  maximize_on_start boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  index_url text NOT NULL,
+  approved_for_listing boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  approved_for_opening_items boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  approved_for_incentive_program boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  "timestamp" timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  last_review timestamp,
+  tags varchar(255),
+  app_owner integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  background boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  metadata jsonb,
+  protected boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  is_private boolean DEFAULT FALSE
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_apps_owner_user_id ON apps (owner_user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_apps_app_owner ON apps (app_owner);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_apps_owner_timestamp ON apps (owner_user_id, "timestamp" DESC);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_apps_listing_timestamp ON apps (approved_for_listing, "timestamp" DESC);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "group" (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uid varchar(40) UNIQUE,
+  owner_user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  extra jsonb,
+  metadata jsonb,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_group_owner_user_id ON "group" (owner_user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS app_filetype_association (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  app_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  type varchar(60) NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_filetype_association_app_id ON app_filetype_association (app_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_filetype_association_type ON app_filetype_association (type);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS app_opens (
+  _id bigint GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  app_uid varchar(40) NOT NULL REFERENCES apps (uid) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  ts integer NOT NULL,
+  human_ts timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_opens_user_id ON app_opens (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_opens_app_uid ON app_opens (app_uid);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_opens_uid_ts ON app_opens (app_uid, ts);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_opens_app_user ON app_opens (app_uid, user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fsentries (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uuid varchar(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  bucket varchar(50),
+  bucket_region varchar(30),
+  public_token varchar(36) UNIQUE,
+  file_request_token varchar(36) UNIQUE,
+  is_shortcut boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  shortcut_to integer REFERENCES fsentries (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  parent_id integer REFERENCES fsentries (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  associated_app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  is_dir boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  layout varchar(30),
+  sort_by varchar(20),
+  sort_order varchar(10),
+  is_public boolean,
+  thumbnail text,
+  immutable boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+  name varchar(767) NOT NULL,
+  metadata text,
+  modified integer NOT NULL,
+  created integer,
+  accessed integer,
+  size bigint,
+  symlink_path varchar(260),
+  is_symlink boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  parent_uid varchar(36),
+  path varchar(4096),
+  CONSTRAINT fsentries_parent_name_unique UNIQUE (parent_id, name)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_name ON fsentries (name);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_modified ON fsentries (modified);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_parent_id ON fsentries (parent_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_is_dir ON fsentries (is_dir);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_user_id ON fsentries (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_shortcut_to ON fsentries (shortcut_to);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_associated_app_id ON fsentries (associated_app_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_bucket ON fsentries (bucket);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_bucket_region ON fsentries (bucket_region);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_parent_uid ON fsentries (parent_uid);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_path ON fsentries (path);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_accessed ON fsentries (accessed);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_user_parent_name ON fsentries (user_id, parent_uid, name);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentries_parent_uid_name ON fsentries (parent_uid, name);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fsentry_versions (
+  id bigint GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  fsentry_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES fsentries (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  fsentry_uuid varchar(36) NOT NULL,
+  version_id varchar(60) NOT NULL,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  message text,
+  ts_epoch integer
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentry_versions_fsentry_id ON fsentry_versions (fsentry_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentry_versions_fsentry_uuid ON fsentry_versions (fsentry_uuid);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fsentry_versions_user_id ON fsentry_versions (user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS subdomains (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uuid varchar(40) UNIQUE,
+  subdomain varchar(64) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  root_dir_id integer REFERENCES fsentries (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  associated_app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  ts timestamp DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  app_owner integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  protected boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  domain varchar(265),
+  database_id varchar(40),
+  preamble_version varchar(64)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_user_id ON subdomains (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_root_dir_id ON subdomains (root_dir_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_associated_app_id ON subdomains (associated_app_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_app_owner ON subdomains (app_owner);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_domain ON subdomains (domain);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_root_user ON subdomains (root_dir_id, user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_subdomains_app_user ON subdomains (associated_app_id, user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS kv (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  app varchar(40),
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  kkey_hash bigint NOT NULL,
+  kkey text NOT NULL,
+  value text,
+  migrated boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
+  "expireAt" timestamp,
+  CONSTRAINT kv_app_user_kkey_hash_unique UNIQUE (app, user_id, kkey_hash)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_kv_app ON kv (app);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_kv_user_id ON kv (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_kv_kkey_hash ON kv (kkey_hash);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS sessions (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  uuid varchar(40) NOT NULL,
+  meta jsonb,
+  created_at bigint DEFAULT 0,
+  last_activity bigint DEFAULT 0,
+  kind varchar(32) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'web'
+    CHECK (kind IN ('web', 'app', 'access_token', 'asset', 'worker')),
+  label varchar(255),
+  parent_session_id varchar(64),
+  last_ip varchar(64),
+  last_user_agent varchar(512),
+  revoked_at bigint,
+  expires_at bigint,
+  app_uid varchar(64),
+  legacy_token_uid varchar(64),
+  created_via varchar(32),
+  auth_id varchar(64),
+  access_token_uid varchar(64)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_user_id ON sessions (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_uuid ON sessions (uuid);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_user_revoked ON sessions (user_id, revoked_at);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_parent ON sessions (parent_session_id);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_user_app_active
+  ON sessions (user_id, app_uid)
+  WHERE kind = 'app' AND revoked_at IS NULL;
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_legacy_token_active
+  ON sessions (legacy_token_uid)
+  WHERE legacy_token_uid IS NOT NULL AND revoked_at IS NULL;
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_kind_user ON sessions (kind, user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_access_token_uid
+  ON sessions (access_token_uid)
+  WHERE access_token_uid IS NOT NULL;
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_user_worker_active
+  ON sessions (user_id, COALESCE(app_uid, ''), (meta #>> ARRAY['worker_name']))
+  WHERE kind = 'worker' AND revoked_at IS NULL;
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_to_app_permissions (
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  dt timestamp DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  PRIMARY KEY (user_id, app_id, permission)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_utap_user_permission ON user_to_app_permissions (user_id, permission);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_utap_app_permission ON user_to_app_permissions (app_id, permission);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_to_group_permissions (
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  group_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "group" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  PRIMARY KEY (user_id, group_id, permission)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_to_group_permissions_group_id ON user_to_group_permissions (group_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_to_user_permissions (
+  issuer_user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  holder_user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  PRIMARY KEY (issuer_user_id, holder_user_id, permission)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_to_user_permissions_holder_user_id ON user_to_user_permissions (holder_user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS dev_to_app_permissions (
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  PRIMARY KEY (user_id, app_id, permission)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_dev_to_app_permissions_app_id ON dev_to_app_permissions (app_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_dev_to_app_permissions_permission ON dev_to_app_permissions (permission);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS access_token_permissions (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  token_uid varchar(40) NOT NULL,
+  authorizer_user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  authorizer_app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_access_token_permissions_token_uid ON access_token_permissions (token_uid);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS old_app_names (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  app_uid varchar(40) NOT NULL REFERENCES apps (uid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+  name varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  "timestamp" timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  CONSTRAINT unique_old_app_names_app_uid_name UNIQUE (app_uid, name)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_old_app_names_app_uid ON old_app_names (app_uid);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_old_app_names_name ON old_app_names (name);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS jct_user_group (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  group_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "group" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  extra jsonb,
+  metadata jsonb,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_jct_user_group_user_id ON jct_user_group (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_jct_user_group_group_id ON jct_user_group (group_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS notification (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  uid varchar(40) UNIQUE,
+  value jsonb NOT NULL,
+  acknowledged bigint,
+  shown bigint,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_notification_user_id ON notification (user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS share (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uid varchar(40) UNIQUE,
+  issuer_user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  recipient_email varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  data jsonb,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_share_issuer_user_id ON share (issuer_user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_share_recipient_email ON share (recipient_email);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS feedback (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  message text,
+  ts timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_feedback_user_id ON feedback (user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS thread (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uid varchar(40) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  parent_uid varchar(40) REFERENCES thread (uid) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  owner_user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  "schema" text,
+  text text NOT NULL,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_thread_parent_uid ON thread (parent_uid);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_thread_owner_user_id ON thread (owner_user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_comments (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  uid varchar(40) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  metadata jsonb,
+  text text NOT NULL,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_comments_user_id ON user_comments (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_comments_uid ON user_comments (uid);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_fsentry_comments (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_comment_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES user_comments (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  fsentry_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES fsentries (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_fsentry_comments_user_comment_id ON user_fsentry_comments (user_comment_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_fsentry_comments_fsentry_id ON user_fsentry_comments (fsentry_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_fsentry_version_comments (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_comment_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES user_comments (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  fsentry_version_id integer NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_fsentry_version_comments_user_comment_id ON user_fsentry_version_comments (user_comment_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_fsentry_version_comments_version_id ON user_fsentry_version_comments (fsentry_version_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_group_comments (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_comment_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES user_comments (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  group_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "group" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_group_comments_user_comment_id ON user_group_comments (user_comment_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_group_comments_group_id ON user_group_comments (group_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_user_comments (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_comment_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES user_comments (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  commented_user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_user_comments_user_comment_id ON user_user_comments (user_comment_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_user_comments_commented_user_id ON user_user_comments (commented_user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_oidc_providers (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  provider varchar(64) NOT NULL,
+  provider_sub varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  refresh_token text,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_oidc_providers_user_id ON user_oidc_providers (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_oidc_providers_provider ON user_oidc_providers (provider);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_oidc_providers_provider_sub_unique ON user_oidc_providers (provider, provider_sub);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS app_update_audit (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  old_name varchar(50),
+  new_name varchar(50),
+  reason varchar(255)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_app_update_audit_app_id ON app_update_audit (app_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_update_audit (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  old_email varchar(256),
+  new_email varchar(256),
+  old_username varchar(50),
+  new_username varchar(50),
+  reason varchar(255)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_update_audit_user_id ON user_update_audit (user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS storage_audit (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  is_subtract boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+  amount bigint NOT NULL,
+  field_a varchar(16),
+  field_b varchar(16),
+  reason varchar(255),
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_storage_audit_user_id ON storage_audit (user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_user_to_app_permissions (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  action varchar(16),
+  reason varchar(255),
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_user_to_app_permissions_user_id ON audit_user_to_app_permissions (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_user_to_app_permissions_app_id ON audit_user_to_app_permissions (app_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_dev_to_app_permissions (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  action varchar(16),
+  reason varchar(255),
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_dev_to_app_permissions_user_id ON audit_dev_to_app_permissions (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_dev_to_app_permissions_app_id ON audit_dev_to_app_permissions (app_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_user_to_group_permissions (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  group_id integer REFERENCES "group" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  group_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  action varchar(255),
+  reason varchar(255),
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_user_to_group_permissions_user_id ON audit_user_to_group_permissions (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_user_to_group_permissions_group_id ON audit_user_to_group_permissions (group_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_user_to_user_permissions (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  issuer_user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  issuer_user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  holder_user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  holder_user_id_keep integer NOT NULL,
+  permission varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  action varchar(16),
+  reason varchar(255),
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_user_to_user_permissions_issuer_user_id ON audit_user_to_user_permissions (issuer_user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_user_to_user_permissions_holder_user_id ON audit_user_to_user_permissions (holder_user_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ai_usage (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  service_name varchar(64),
+  model_name varchar(128),
+  price_modifier varchar(40),
+  cost integer,
+  value_uint_1 integer,
+  value_uint_2 integer,
+  value_uint_3 integer,
+  value_uint_4 integer,
+  value_uint_5 integer,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ai_usage_app_id ON ai_usage (app_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ai_usage_service_name ON ai_usage (service_name);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ai_usage_model_name ON ai_usage (model_name);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ai_usage_price_modifier ON ai_usage (price_modifier);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ai_usage_created_at ON ai_usage (created_at);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ai_usage_user_timestamp ON ai_usage (user_id, created_at);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS general_analytics (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  created_at timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  uid varchar(40) NOT NULL,
+  trace_id varchar(40),
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  user_id_keep integer,
+  app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id_keep integer,
+  server_id varchar(40),
+  actor_type varchar(40),
+  tags jsonb,
+  fields jsonb
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_general_analytics_user_id ON general_analytics (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_general_analytics_app_id ON general_analytics (app_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS monthly_usage_counts (
+  year integer NOT NULL,
+  month integer NOT NULL,
+  service_type varchar(40) NOT NULL,
+  service_name varchar(40) NOT NULL,
+  actor_key varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  pricing_category jsonb NOT NULL,
+  pricing_category_hash bytea NOT NULL,
+  "count" integer DEFAULT 0,
+  value_uint_1 integer,
+  value_uint_2 integer,
+  value_uint_3 integer,
+  PRIMARY KEY (year, month, service_type, service_name, actor_key, pricing_category_hash)
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS service_usage_monthly (
+  "key" varchar(255) NOT NULL,
+  year integer NOT NULL,
+  month integer NOT NULL,
+  user_id integer REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  app_id integer REFERENCES apps (id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  "count" integer NOT NULL,
+  extra jsonb,
+  PRIMARY KEY ("key", year, month)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_service_usage_monthly_user_id ON service_usage_monthly (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_service_usage_monthly_app_id ON service_usage_monthly (app_id);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS per_user_credit (
+  id integer GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+  user_id integer NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES "user" (id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
+  amount bigint NOT NULL,
+  last_updated_at bigint NOT NULL
+);
+
+INSERT INTO "user" (id, uuid, username, metadata)
+VALUES (1, '5d4adce0-a381-4982-9c02-6e2540026238', 'system', '{}'::jsonb)
+ON CONFLICT (uuid) DO UPDATE SET username = EXCLUDED.username;
+
+SELECT setval(pg_get_serial_sequence('"user"', 'id'), COALESCE((SELECT MAX(id) FROM "user"), 1), true);
+
+INSERT INTO "group" (uid, owner_user_id, extra, metadata)
+VALUES
+  ('26bfb1fb-421f-45bc-9aa4-d81ea569e7a5', 1, '{"critical": true, "type": "default", "name": "system"}'::jsonb, '{"title": "System", "color": "#000000"}'::jsonb),
+  ('ca342a5e-b13d-4dee-9048-58b11a57cc55', 1, '{"critical": true, "type": "default", "name": "admin"}'::jsonb, '{"title": "Admin", "color": "#a83232"}'::jsonb),
+  ('78b1b1dd-c959-44d2-b02c-8735671f9997', 1, '{"critical": true, "type": "default", "name": "user"}'::jsonb, '{"title": "User", "color": "#3254a8"}'::jsonb),
+  ('b7220104-7905-4985-b996-649fdcdb3c8f', 1, '{"critical": true, "type": "default", "name": "temp"}'::jsonb, '{"title": "Temp", "color": "#888888"}'::jsonb),
+  ('3c2dfff7-d22a-41aa-a193-59a61dac4b64', 1, '{"type": "default", "name": "moderator"}'::jsonb, '{"title": "Moderator", "color": "#a432a8"}'::jsonb),
+  ('5e8f251d-3382-4b0d-932c-7bb82f48652f', 1, '{"type": "default", "name": "developer"}'::jsonb, '{"title": "Developer", "color": "#32a852"}'::jsonb)
+ON CONFLICT (uid) DO UPDATE SET
+  owner_user_id = EXCLUDED.owner_user_id,
+  extra = EXCLUDED.extra,
+  metadata = EXCLUDED.metadata;
+
+INSERT INTO apps (
+  uid, owner_user_id, icon, name, title, description, index_url,
+  godmode, maximize_on_start, background,
+  approved_for_listing, approved_for_opening_items,
+  approved_for_incentive_program, tags, "timestamp"
+)
+VALUES
+  ('app-3920851d-bda8-479b-9407-8517293c7d44', 1, NULL, 'pdf', 'PDF', '', 'https://pdf.puter.com', FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-5584fbf7-ed69-41fc-99cd-85da21b1ef51', 1, NULL, 'camera', 'Camera', 'Camera in the browser.', 'https://online-camera.com', FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-11edfba2-1ed3-4e22-8573-47e88fb87d70', 1, NULL, 'player', 'Player', 'A free video player app in the browser.', 'https://simple-player.puter.com', FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-7bdca1a4-6373-4c98-ad97-03ff2d608ca1', 1, NULL, 'recorder', 'Recorder', 'Online voice recorder in the browser with cloud storage.', 'https://voice-recorder.com', FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-d7e9471f-e441-4d72-a5ab-75e96573b76b', 1, NULL, 'music-player', 'Music Player', 'A free music player app in the browser.', 'https://player.puter.com', FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, NULL, '2026-05-10 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-e3ac5486-da8c-42ad-8377-8728086e0980', 1, NULL, 'git', 'Git', 'Puter Git client', 'https://builtins.namespaces.puter.com/git', FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-0b37f054-07d4-4627-8765-11bd23e889d4', 1, NULL, 'dev-center', 'Dev Center', 'This is the app that makes apps', 'https://builtins.namespaces.puter.com/dev-center', TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-fbbdb72b-ad08-4cb4-86a1-de0f27cf2e1e', 1, NULL, 'puter-linux', 'Puter Linux', 'Linux emulator for Puter', 'https://builtins.namespaces.puter.com/emulator', TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-838dfbc4-bf8b-48c2-b47b-c4adc77fab58', 1, NULL, 'editor', 'Editor', 'Text editor', 'https://online-notepad.com', TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-58282b08-990a-4906-95f7-fa37ff92452b', 1, NULL, 'draw', 'Draw', 'Image editor', 'https://draw.puter.com', TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, 'graphics', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-0bef044f-918f-4cbf-a0c0-b4a17ee81085', 1, NULL, 'about', 'About', 'About Puter', 'https://about.puter.com', TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-a2ae72a4-1ba3-4a29-b5c0-6de1be5cf178', 1, NULL, 'app-center', 'App Center', 'Discover apps for Puter', 'https://app-center.puter.com', TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, NULL, '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-93005ce0-80d1-50d9-9b1e-9c453c375d56', 1, NULL, 'markus', 'Markus', 'Markdown editor', 'https://markus.puter.com', TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-6f79ef7b-52b7-4b31-91c6-fc07b62e9396', 1, NULL, 'code', 'Code', 'Code editor', 'https://code.puter.com', TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-862fc09e-c7b8-4c30-b5b4-47b3cc5f5232', 1, NULL, 'memos', 'Memos', 'Notes and memos', 'https://memos.puter.com', FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-aeb8c03e-1144-4c57-bff5-3a1a7c17f9f0', 1, NULL, 'word-processor', 'Word Processor', 'Write documents', 'https://word-processor.puter.com', FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-c10a1999-22f5-4644-9960-9aaac0d4934e', 1, NULL, 'spreadsheet', 'Spreadsheet', 'Work with spreadsheets', 'https://spreadsheet.puter.com', FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-e9c1d58d-3d8d-4f0a-a85c-e383ef63bc29', 1, NULL, 'presentation', 'Presentation', 'Create presentations', 'https://presentation.puter.com', FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00'),
+  ('app-fb7d9e42-8207-4fa0-b680-f0239327097f', 1, NULL, 'pdf-editor', 'PDF Editor', 'Edit PDF documents', 'https://pdf-editor.puter.com', FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE, 'productivity', '2020-01-01 00:00:00')
+ON CONFLICT (uid) DO UPDATE SET
+  owner_user_id = EXCLUDED.owner_user_id,
+  name = EXCLUDED.name,
+  title = EXCLUDED.title,
+  description = EXCLUDED.description,
+  index_url = EXCLUDED.index_url,
+  godmode = EXCLUDED.godmode,
+  maximize_on_start = EXCLUDED.maximize_on_start,
+  background = EXCLUDED.background,
+  approved_for_listing = EXCLUDED.approved_for_listing,
+  approved_for_opening_items = EXCLUDED.approved_for_opening_items,
+  approved_for_incentive_program = EXCLUDED.approved_for_incentive_program,
+  tags = EXCLUDED.tags;
+
+INSERT INTO user_to_group_permissions (user_id, group_id, permission, extra)
+SELECT u.id, g.id, 'driver', '{}'::jsonb
+FROM "user" u, "group" g
+WHERE u.username = 'system'
+  AND g.uid = 'ca342a5e-b13d-4dee-9048-58b11a57cc55'
+ON CONFLICT (user_id, group_id, permission) DO UPDATE SET extra = EXCLUDED.extra;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/postgres/postgres_mig_2.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- SMS phone verification columns. Mirrors SQLite migration 0058. `phone` is the
+-- E.164 number collected during verification (indexed like `email`);
+-- `requires_phone_verification` gates account use for low-reputation signups
+-- (not indexed, mirroring `requires_email_confirmation`).
+-- Idempotent via IF NOT EXISTS.
+
+ALTER TABLE "user" ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS phone varchar(20);
+ALTER TABLE "user" ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS requires_phone_verification boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_phone ON "user" (phone);

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/postgres/postgres_mig_3.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Credit-card verification column. Mirrors SQLite migration 0059.
+-- `requires_card_verification` gates account use for low-reputation signups;
+-- the card itself never touches our DB, so this is the only column (not
+-- indexed, mirroring `requires_phone_verification`).
+-- Idempotent via IF NOT EXISTS.
+
+ALTER TABLE "user" ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS requires_card_verification boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/postgres/postgres_mig_4.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Card fingerprint column. Mirrors SQLite migration 0060. `card_fingerprint`
+-- is the Stripe card fingerprint (stable per card number) recorded when a user
+-- clears card verification — the card sibling of `phone`, indexed like it so
+-- admin tooling can find the accounts that verified with a given card. The card
+-- itself never touches our DB, only Stripe's fingerprint for it.
+-- Idempotent via IF NOT EXISTS.
+
+ALTER TABLE "user" ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS card_fingerprint varchar(128);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_card_fingerprint ON "user" (card_fingerprint);

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/postgres/postgres_mig_5.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Suspended-at column. Mirrors SQLite migration 0061. `suspended_at` is when
+-- the account was suspended, as unix seconds (NULL while not suspended) — the
+-- timestamp sibling of the boolean `suspended` flag, indexed so the
+-- signup-abuse harness can count an IP's recently-suspended accounts.
+-- Idempotent via IF NOT EXISTS.
+
+ALTER TABLE "user" ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS suspended_at bigint;
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_suspended_at ON "user" (suspended_at);

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/postgres/postgres_mig_6.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Admin-managed blocklist of app origins. Mirrors SQLite migration 0062 /
+-- MySQL mysql_mig_17 (which Postgres was originally missed for). An app whose
+-- `index_url` host (or a request origin) matches an entry is denied access to
+-- Puter resources. `include_subdomains = 1` also blocks every subdomain of
+-- `domain`. Enforced in AuthService via AppOriginBlocklistService.
+--
+-- Idempotent via IF NOT EXISTS.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS blocked_app_origins (
+    id SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
+    domain VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
+    include_subdomains SMALLINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    reason TEXT DEFAULT NULL,
+    created_by VARCHAR(255) DEFAULT NULL,
+    created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_blocked_app_origins_domain
+    ON blocked_app_origins (domain);

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/postgres/postgres_mig_7.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Suspension reason column. Mirrors SQLite migration 0063. Why an account was
+-- suspended (NULL while not suspended) — companion to the boolean `suspended`
+-- flag and `suspended_at` timestamp. Constrained at the application layer to a
+-- fixed set of reasons (see extensions/admin suspension_reasons.js).
+-- Idempotent via IF NOT EXISTS.
+
+ALTER TABLE "user" ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS suspended_reason text;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/postgres/postgres_mig_8.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Append-only log of admin moderation actions. Mirrors SQLite migration 0064 /
+-- MySQL mysql_mig_19. Used to measure the abuse system's false-positive rate:
+-- `unsuspend` (admin unblock) and `admin_create_user` are the false-positive
+-- signals; `suspend` gives the denominator. Preserves history the `user`
+-- suspension columns lose on unsuspend. `created_at` is unix seconds.
+--
+-- Idempotent via IF NOT EXISTS.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS abuse_moderation_events (
+    id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
+    action VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL,
+    target_user_id BIGINT DEFAULT NULL,
+    target_username VARCHAR(255) DEFAULT NULL,
+    admin_username VARCHAR(255) DEFAULT NULL,
+    reason TEXT DEFAULT NULL,
+    source VARCHAR(64) DEFAULT NULL,
+    created_at BIGINT NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_abuse_moderation_events_created_at
+    ON abuse_moderation_events (created_at);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_abuse_moderation_events_action
+    ON abuse_moderation_events (action);

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0057_add_user_reputation.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Abuse v2 reputation score (0–100+) recorded at signup. Mirrors the
+-- `reputation smallint DEFAULT 100` column already present in the mysql and
+-- postgres baseline migrations.
+ALTER TABLE `user` ADD COLUMN `reputation` SMALLINT DEFAULT 100;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0058_add_phone_verification.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- SMS phone verification. `phone` holds the E.164 number collected during
+-- verification (indexed like `email`). `requires_phone_verification` gates
+-- account use until verified — the abuse v2 harness sets it for low-reputation
+-- signups instead of blocking them. (Not indexed, mirroring
+-- `requires_email_confirmation`.)
+ALTER TABLE `user` ADD COLUMN `phone` varchar(20) DEFAULT NULL;
+ALTER TABLE `user` ADD COLUMN `requires_phone_verification` tinyint(1) NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_phone ON `user` (`phone`);

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0059_add_card_verification.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Credit-card verification ($0 authorization handled by a payments
+-- extension). `requires_card_verification` gates account use until verified —
+-- the abuse v2 harness sets it for low-reputation signups instead of blocking
+-- them. The card itself never touches our DB, so this is the only column.
+-- (Not indexed, mirroring `requires_phone_verification`.)
+ALTER TABLE `user` ADD COLUMN `requires_card_verification` tinyint(1) NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0060_add_card_fingerprint.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Card fingerprint column. `card_fingerprint` is the Stripe card fingerprint
+-- (stable per card number) recorded when a user clears card verification — the
+-- card sibling of `phone`. Indexed like `phone` so admin tooling can find the
+-- accounts that verified with a given card. The card itself never touches our
+-- DB, only Stripe's fingerprint for it. Server-only (not on the whoami
+-- allowlist), so it never reaches clients.
+ALTER TABLE `user` ADD COLUMN `card_fingerprint` varchar(128) DEFAULT NULL;
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_card_fingerprint ON `user` (`card_fingerprint`);

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0061_add_suspended_at.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- When the account was suspended, as unix seconds; NULL while not suspended.
+-- The timestamp sibling of the existing boolean `suspended` flag, stamped by
+-- every suspension site. Indexed so the signup-abuse harness can count an IP's
+-- recently-suspended accounts (see extensions/abuse/v2 suspendedAccountsByIp).
+ALTER TABLE `user` ADD COLUMN `suspended_at` INTEGER DEFAULT NULL;
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_suspended_at ON `user` (`suspended_at`);

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0062_blocked-app-origins.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Admin-managed blocklist of app origins. An app whose `index_url` host (or
+-- a request origin) matches an entry is denied access to Puter resources:
+-- it cannot obtain an app token and already-issued app tokens are rejected
+-- on each request. `include_subdomains = 1` also blocks every subdomain of
+-- `domain`. Enforced in AuthService via AppOriginBlocklistService.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `blocked_app_origins` (
+    "id" INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    "domain" TEXT NOT NULL,
+    "include_subdomains" INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    "reason" TEXT DEFAULT NULL,
+    "created_by" TEXT DEFAULT NULL,
+    "created_at" TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS `idx_blocked_app_origins_domain`
+    ON `blocked_app_origins` (`domain`);

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0063_add_suspended_reason.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Why an account was suspended, NULL while not suspended. Companion to the
+-- boolean `suspended` flag and `suspended_at` timestamp. Constrained at the
+-- application layer to a fixed set of reasons (see extensions/admin
+-- suspension_reasons.js) — kept as free TEXT here so adding a reason later
+-- needs no migration.
+ALTER TABLE `user` ADD COLUMN `suspended_reason` TEXT DEFAULT NULL;

src/backend/clients/database/migrations/sqlite/0064_abuse-moderation-events.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+-- Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+--
+-- This file is part of Puter.
+--
+-- Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+-- it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+-- by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+-- (at your option) any later version.
+--
+-- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+-- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+-- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+-- GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+--
+-- You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+-- along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+-- Append-only log of admin moderation actions, used to measure the abuse
+-- system's false-positive rate: `unsuspend` (admin unblock) and
+-- `admin_create_user` (an account minted by an admin, typically to recover a
+-- legitimately-blocked signup) are the false-positive signals; `suspend` gives
+-- the denominator. Unlike the `suspended`/`suspended_at`/`suspended_reason`
+-- columns on `user` — which are cleared on unsuspend and so keep no history —
+-- this table preserves every event. `created_at` is unix seconds (matching
+-- `user.suspended_at`), stamped by the recorder in
+-- extensions/admin/moderation_events.js. Written best-effort at the admin
+-- suspend/unsuspend/create-user sites; surfaced on the /admin/abuse dashboard.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `abuse_moderation_events` (
+    "id" INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    "action" TEXT NOT NULL,             -- 'suspend' | 'unsuspend' | 'admin_create_user'
+    "target_user_id" INTEGER DEFAULT NULL,
+    "target_username" TEXT DEFAULT NULL,
+    "admin_username" TEXT DEFAULT NULL, -- the acting admin (req.actor.user.username)
+    "reason" TEXT DEFAULT NULL,
+    "source" TEXT DEFAULT NULL,         -- 'user_page' | 'email_hostname_blacklist' | 'create_user'
+    "created_at" INTEGER NOT NULL       -- unix seconds
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_abuse_moderation_events_created_at
+    ON `abuse_moderation_events` (`created_at`);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_abuse_moderation_events_action
+    ON `abuse_moderation_events` (`action`);

src/backend/clients/database/preparePostgresSql.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { preparePostgresSql } from './preparePostgresSql.js';
+
+describe('preparePostgresSql', () => {
+    it('converts placeholders and backtick identifiers outside SQL literals', () => {
+        const prepared = preparePostgresSql(
+            'SELECT `user`.`id` FROM `user` WHERE `email` = ? AND `username` = ?',
+        );
+
+        expect(prepared).toEqual({
+            text: 'SELECT "user"."id" FROM "user" WHERE "email" = $1 AND "username" = $2',
+            parameterCount: 2,
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('leaves question marks inside strings and comments untouched', () => {
+        const prepared = preparePostgresSql(`
+            SELECT '?' AS literal, ?
+            -- ? in a comment
+            FROM \`apps\`
+            WHERE \`description\` = 'is this ok?'
+            /* and ? in a block comment */
+              AND \`name\` = ?
+        `);
+
+        expect(prepared.text).toContain("SELECT '?' AS literal, $1");
+        expect(prepared.text).toContain('-- ? in a comment');
+        expect(prepared.text).toContain('"description" = \'is this ok?\'');
+        expect(prepared.text).toContain('/* and ? in a block comment */');
+        expect(prepared.text).toContain('"name" = $2');
+        expect(prepared.parameterCount).toBe(2);
+    });
+
+    it('escapes double quotes inside converted identifiers', () => {
+        const prepared = preparePostgresSql(
+            'SELECT `odd"name` FROM `odd``table` WHERE `id` = ?',
+        );
+
+        expect(prepared).toEqual({
+            text: 'SELECT "odd""name" FROM "odd`table" WHERE "id" = $1',
+            parameterCount: 1,
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('does not scan placeholders inside dollar-quoted strings', () => {
+        const prepared = preparePostgresSql(
+            "SELECT $$?$$, $tag$`not_ident` ?$tag$, `id` FROM `user` WHERE `id` = ?",
+        );
+
+        expect(prepared).toEqual({
+            text: 'SELECT $$?$$, $tag$`not_ident` ?$tag$, "id" FROM "user" WHERE "id" = $1',
+            parameterCount: 1,
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('does not treat Postgres JSON operators as comments', () => {
+        const prepared = preparePostgresSql(
+            "SELECT * FROM `sessions` WHERE `user_id` = ? AND `meta` #>> ARRAY['worker_name'] = ? AND `expires_at` > ?",
+        );
+
+        expect(prepared).toEqual({
+            text: 'SELECT * FROM "sessions" WHERE "user_id" = $1 AND "meta" #>> ARRAY[\'worker_name\'] = $2 AND "expires_at" > $3',
+            parameterCount: 3,
+        });
+    });
+});

src/backend/clients/database/preparePostgresSql.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+export interface PreparedPostgresSql {
+    text: string;
+    parameterCount: number;
+}
+
+type ScannerState =
+    | { kind: 'normal' }
+    | { kind: 'singleQuote' }
+    | { kind: 'doubleQuote' }
+    | { kind: 'backtickIdentifier' }
+    | { kind: 'lineComment' }
+    | { kind: 'blockComment' }
+    | { kind: 'dollarQuote'; tag: string };
+
+const isLineCommentStart = (sql: string, index: number): boolean => {
+    if (sql[index] !== '-' || sql[index + 1] !== '-') return false;
+    const after = sql[index + 2];
+    return after === undefined || /\s/u.test(after);
+};
+
+const readDollarQuoteTag = (sql: string, index: number): string | null => {
+    const match = /^\$[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*\$|^\$\$/u.exec(sql.slice(index));
+    return match?.[0] ?? null;
+};
+
+export const preparePostgresSql = (sql: string): PreparedPostgresSql => {
+    let state: ScannerState = { kind: 'normal' };
+    let parameterCount = 0;
+    let out = '';
+
+    for (let i = 0; i < sql.length; i++) {
+        const char = sql[i]!;
+        const next = sql[i + 1];
+
+        switch (state.kind) {
+            case 'normal': {
+                const dollarTag =
+                    char === '$' ? readDollarQuoteTag(sql, i) : null;
+                if (dollarTag) {
+                    out += dollarTag;
+                    i += dollarTag.length - 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'dollarQuote', tag: dollarTag };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === "'") {
+                    out += char;
+                    state = { kind: 'singleQuote' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '"') {
+                    out += char;
+                    state = { kind: 'doubleQuote' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '`') {
+                    out += '"';
+                    state = { kind: 'backtickIdentifier' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (isLineCommentStart(sql, i)) {
+                    out += char;
+                    if (char === '-') {
+                        out += next ?? '';
+                        i += 1;
+                    }
+                    state = { kind: 'lineComment' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '/' && next === '*') {
+                    out += '/*';
+                    i += 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'blockComment' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '?') {
+                    parameterCount += 1;
+                    out += `$${parameterCount}`;
+                    break;
+                }
+                out += char;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            case 'singleQuote':
+                out += char;
+                if (char === "'" && next === "'") {
+                    out += next;
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === '\\' && next !== undefined) {
+                    out += next;
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === "'") {
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'doubleQuote':
+                out += char;
+                if (char === '"' && next === '"') {
+                    out += next;
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === '"') {
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'backtickIdentifier':
+                if (char === '`' && next === '`') {
+                    out += '`';
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === '`') {
+                    out += '"';
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                } else if (char === '"') {
+                    out += '""';
+                } else {
+                    out += char;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'lineComment':
+                out += char;
+                if (char === '\n') {
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'blockComment':
+                out += char;
+                if (char === '*' && next === '/') {
+                    out += '/';
+                    i += 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'dollarQuote':
+                if (sql.startsWith(state.tag, i)) {
+                    out += state.tag;
+                    i += state.tag.length - 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                } else {
+                    out += char;
+                }
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return { text: out, parameterCount };
+};

src/backend/clients/database/splitPostgresStatements.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+type ScannerState =
+    | { kind: 'normal' }
+    | { kind: 'singleQuote' }
+    | { kind: 'doubleQuote' }
+    | { kind: 'lineComment' }
+    | { kind: 'blockComment' }
+    | { kind: 'dollarQuote'; tag: string };
+
+const readDollarQuoteTag = (sql: string, index: number): string | null => {
+    const match = /^\$[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*\$|^\$\$/u.exec(sql.slice(index));
+    return match?.[0] ?? null;
+};
+
+export const splitPostgresStatements = (sql: string): string[] => {
+    const statements: string[] = [];
+    let state: ScannerState = { kind: 'normal' };
+    let start = 0;
+
+    for (let i = 0; i < sql.length; i++) {
+        const char = sql[i]!;
+        const next = sql[i + 1];
+
+        switch (state.kind) {
+            case 'normal': {
+                const dollarTag =
+                    char === '$' ? readDollarQuoteTag(sql, i) : null;
+                if (dollarTag) {
+                    i += dollarTag.length - 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'dollarQuote', tag: dollarTag };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === "'") {
+                    state = { kind: 'singleQuote' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '"') {
+                    state = { kind: 'doubleQuote' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '-' && next === '-') {
+                    i += 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'lineComment' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === '/' && next === '*') {
+                    i += 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'blockComment' };
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (char === ';') {
+                    const statement = sql.slice(start, i).trim();
+                    if (statement !== '') statements.push(statement);
+                    start = i + 1;
+                }
+                break;
+            }
+
+            case 'singleQuote':
+                if (char === "'" && next === "'") {
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === '\\' && next !== undefined) {
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === "'") {
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'doubleQuote':
+                if (char === '"' && next === '"') {
+                    i += 1;
+                } else if (char === '"') {
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'lineComment':
+                if (char === '\n') {
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'blockComment':
+                if (char === '*' && next === '/') {
+                    i += 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case 'dollarQuote':
+                if (sql.startsWith(state.tag, i)) {
+                    i += state.tag.length - 1;
+                    state = { kind: 'normal' };
+                }
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    const finalStatement = sql.slice(start).trim();
+    if (finalStatement !== '') statements.push(finalStatement);
+    return statements;
+};

src/backend/clients/event/types.ts

@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@
  *   the SocketService fans out to user-scoped channels.
  */
 
+import type {
+    Request as ExpressRequest,
+    Response as ExpressResponse,
+} from 'express';
 import { Actor } from '../../core';
 import { FSEntry } from '../../stores/fs/FSEntry';
 
@@ -116,6 +120,21 @@ export type EventMap = {
         actor: unknown;
         result: { allowed: boolean; reason?: string; error?: string };
     };
+    // Emitted after an app token is granted (get-user-app-token). The app-side
+    // analogue of `site.htmlServed` — the external-app abuse scanner
+    // (extensions/subdomainAbuse/appScan.ts) listens to screenshot + classify
+    // external `index_url`s that Puter never serves itself.
+    'puter.app.authenticated': {
+        app_uid?: string;
+        user_id?: number | null;
+        app?: {
+            id?: number;
+            uid?: string;
+            index_url?: string | null;
+            owner_user_id?: number | null;
+            name?: string | null;
+        };
+    };
 
     // ---- Auth / signup ----
     'puter.signup.validate': {
@@ -126,7 +145,19 @@ export type EventMap = {
         req?: unknown;
         data?: unknown;
         abuse?: unknown;
-        custom?: unknown;
+        trail?: Array<string>;
+        /**
+         * Set by the abuse harness for flagged signups — the id under which the
+         * decision trail is persisted to KV (`abuse:trail:<id>`), shared back on
+         * the request for log / support correlation.
+         */
+        trail_id?: string;
+        /** Device signal forwarded verbatim from the signup request body. */
+        fingerprint?: string | null;
+        /** Set by the abuse harness — require SMS phone verification post-signup. */
+        requires_phone_verification?: boolean;
+        /** Set by the abuse harness — require card verification post-signup. */
+        requires_card_verification?: boolean;
         [key: string]: unknown;
     };
     'puter.signup.success': {
@@ -135,6 +166,9 @@ export type EventMap = {
         email: string;
         username: string;
         ip?: string | null;
+        fingerprint?: string | null;
+        /** True when the created account is a temp user (no email/password). */
+        is_temp?: boolean;
         [key: string]: unknown;
     };
     'email.validate': {
@@ -154,12 +188,93 @@ export type EventMap = {
         user_uid: string;
         email: string;
     };
+    // Phone-reuse cap is pure mechanism here — the abuse extension answers
+    // (emitted via `emitAndWait`) by counting how many OTHER accounts have
+    // already verified this number and flipping `allowed` to false when the
+    // cross-account limit is hit. No extension listening → `allowed` stays
+    // true and the send proceeds.
+    'puter.phone-verification.check': {
+        user_id: number;
+        user_uid: string;
+        phone: string;
+        // Client-supplied device fingerprint for this request, or null. Lets
+        // the abuse extension cap sends per device (across accounts) so a
+        // device farm can't dodge the per-account cap with fresh signups.
+        device_fingerprint: string | null;
+        allowed: boolean;
+        reason: string | null;
+        [key: string]: unknown;
+    };
+    // Fire-and-forget signal that a code was actually sent — the abuse
+    // extension bumps its per-number / per-account / per-device send-velocity
+    // counters off this. No-op with no extension listening.
+    'puter.phone-verification.sent': {
+        user_id: number;
+        user_uid: string;
+        phone: string;
+        device_fingerprint: string | null;
+    };
+    'user.phone-verified': {
+        user_id: number;
+        user_uid: string;
+        phone: string;
+    };
+    // Card verification is pure mechanism here — a payments extension fills
+    // these in (emitted via `emitAndWait`). `enabled` stays null when no
+    // extension is installed; the extension always sets it (true/false) so
+    // the endpoints can distinguish "disabled" from "not installed".
+    'puter.card-verification.setup': {
+        user_id: number;
+        user_uid: string;
+        ip?: string | null;
+        // Client-supplied device fingerprint for this request, or null. Lets
+        // the abuse extension cap card-verification setups per device (across
+        // accounts) before any Stripe SetupIntent is created.
+        device_fingerprint: string | null;
+        enabled: boolean | null;
+        // Set false by the extension to refuse this setup (e.g. the per-device
+        // setup-velocity cap); `reason` carries the opaque code. Stays true
+        // when allowed or with no extension listening.
+        allowed: boolean;
+        reason: string | null;
+        client_secret: string | null;
+        publishable_key: string | null;
+        [key: string]: unknown;
+    };
+    'puter.card-verification.confirm': {
+        user_id: number;
+        user_uid: string;
+        setup_intent_id: string;
+        enabled: boolean | null;
+        verified: boolean;
+        reason: string | null;
+        fingerprint: string | null;
+        funding: string | null;
+        country: string | null;
+        [key: string]: unknown;
+    };
+    'user.card-verified': {
+        user_id: number;
+        user_uid: string;
+        fingerprint: string | null;
+        funding: string | null;
+        country: string | null;
+    };
     'user.username-changed': {
         user_id: number;
         old_username: string;
         new_username: string;
     };
     'user.email-changed': { user_id: number; new_email: string };
+    // Fired after an account is torn down (self-serve, admin, or temp-user
+    // logout cleanup). Listeners purge external state tied to the account —
+    // e.g. the marketplace extension cancels the user's Stripe subscriptions.
+    // The row is already gone by emit time, so identifiers ride the payload.
+    'user.delete': {
+        user_id: number;
+        user_uuid?: string;
+        stripe_customer_id?: string | null;
+    };
 
     // ---- Filesystem ----
     'fs.copy.node': {
@@ -211,6 +326,8 @@ export type EventMap = {
         entry: unknown;
         host: string;
         requestPath: string;
+        requestUrl?: string;
+        requestHash?: string;
         mime: string;
     };
 
@@ -257,6 +374,94 @@ export type EventMap = {
     // SocketService re-emits each fanout-eligible event under
     // `sent-to-user.<wireName>` so per-user channels can subscribe by wire name.
     [K in `sent-to-user.${string}`]: { user_id: number; response: unknown };
+} & {
+    // Generic per-driver-method lifecycle, emitted by DriverController for
+    // EVERY driver call under a key scoped to the interface + method:
+    // `driver.<iface>.<method>.before|after|error|reject`. Wildcard
+    // subscribers can listen to `driver.*` for everything, `driver.<iface>.*`
+    // for one interface, or the exact key for one method. The `.before` phase
+    // is emitted via `emitAndWait`, so a listener may set `allow = false`
+    // (with an optional `rejectReason`) to veto the call before it runs — a
+    // vetoed call emits `.reject` instead of running.
+    [K in `driver.${string}`]: DriverMethodLifecycleEvent;
+} & {
+    // Generic per-route-endpoint lifecycle, emitted by the route materializer
+    // for EVERY non-middleware route under a key scoped to the HTTP method +
+    // normalized path: `route.<method>.<path>.before|after|error|reject`. Same
+    // wildcard + veto semantics as the driver lifecycle above.
+    [K in `route.${string}`]: RouteLifecycleEvent;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Phase of a request/method lifecycle. `reject` is emitted when a `before`
+ * listener vetoes the call (sets `allow = false`); the call never runs and no
+ * `after`/`error` follows.
+ */
+export type LifecyclePhase = 'before' | 'after' | 'error' | 'reject';
+
+/**
+ * Payload for `driver.<iface>.<method>.<phase>` events.
+ *
+ * One shape across all phases; read `phase` (or the key suffix) to
+ * branch. `allow`/`rejectReason` are only meaningful on the `before` phase
+ * (emitted via `emitAndWait`).
+ */
+export type DriverMethodLifecycleEvent = {
+    phase: LifecyclePhase;
+    iface: string;
+    method: string;
+    /** Resolved concrete driver name. */
+    driver: string;
+    /** Full actor object, if the request is authenticated. */
+    actor?: Actor;
+    /** Stable actor id (see `actorUid`), if the request is authenticated. */
+    actorUid?: string;
+    /** Call arguments. Present on every phase. */
+    args?: unknown;
+    /** Return value. Present on `after`. */
+    result?: unknown;
+    /** Thrown error. Present on `error`. */
+    error?: unknown;
+    /** Wall-clock duration of the invocation. Present on `after`/`error`. */
+    durationMs?: number;
+    /** Veto channel for `before`: set `false` to block the call. */
+    allow?: boolean;
+    /** Optional human-readable reason surfaced to the caller when vetoed. */
+    rejectReason?: string;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Payload for `route.<method>.<path>.<phase>` events. Mirrors
+ * {@link DriverMethodLifecycleEvent} for HTTP endpoints.
+ */
+export type RouteLifecycleEvent = {
+    phase: LifecyclePhase;
+    /** HTTP method, lowercased (`get`, `post`, ...). */
+    method: string;
+    /** Full route path including the controller prefix. */
+    path: string;
+    /**
+     * The live express request/response for this call. Present on every phase.
+     * On `before` a listener can read the parsed body/headers or write its own
+     * response; on terminal phases they're useful for logging. These are real
+     * in-process objects — never serialize or forward them across nodes.
+     */
+    req: ExpressRequest;
+    res: ExpressResponse;
+    /** Full actor object, if the request is authenticated. */
+    actor?: Actor;
+    /** Stable actor id (see `actorUid`), if the request is authenticated. */
+    actorUid?: string;
+    /** Response status code. Present on `after`/`error`. */
+    statusCode?: number;
+    /** Wall-clock duration from `before` to terminal phase. */
+    durationMs?: number;
+    /** Set when the request did not complete normally (abort / >=500). */
+    error?: unknown;
+    /** Veto channel for `before`: set `false` to block the request. */
+    allow?: boolean;
+    /** Optional human-readable reason surfaced to the caller when vetoed. */
+    rejectReason?: string;
 };
 
 export type EventKey = keyof EventMap & string;

src/backend/clients/index.ts

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import { EventClient } from './event/EventClient';
 import { DDBClient } from './dynamodb/DDBClient';
 import { RedisClient } from './redis/RedisClient';
 import { S3Client } from './s3/S3Client';
+import { PreludeClient } from './prelude/PreludeClient';
 import type { IPuterClientRegistry } from './types';
 
 export const puterClients = {
@@ -34,4 +35,5 @@ export const puterClients = {
     dynamo: DDBClient,
     redis: RedisClient,
     s3: S3Client,
+    prelude: PreludeClient,
 } satisfies IPuterClientRegistry;

src/backend/clients/prelude/PreludeClient.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import { PreludeClient } from './PreludeClient';
+import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
+
+const makeClient = (apiKey?: string) =>
+    new PreludeClient({
+        prelude: apiKey ? { apiKey } : undefined,
+    } as unknown as IConfig);
+
+const okJson = (body: unknown) =>
+    ({
+        ok: true,
+        status: 200,
+        json: async () => body,
+    }) as unknown as Response;
+
+describe('PreludeClient', () => {
+    let fetchMock: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
+
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        fetchMock = vi.fn();
+        vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
+    });
+    afterEach(() => {
+        vi.unstubAllGlobals();
+    });
+
+    it('isConfigured reflects whether an apiKey is set', () => {
+        expect(makeClient('sk_test').isConfigured()).toBe(true);
+        expect(makeClient().isConfigured()).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    describe('isCountrySupported (€0.07 cap)', () => {
+        const client = makeClient('sk_test');
+
+        it('allows revenue markets up to the cap (incl. the priciest)', () => {
+            expect(client.isCountrySupported('US')).toBe(true); // €0.0043
+            expect(client.isCountrySupported('DE')).toBe(true); // €0.0598
+            expect(client.isCountrySupported('SA')).toBe(true); // €0.0638
+            expect(client.isCountrySupported('us')).toBe(true); // case-insensitive
+        });
+
+        it('rejects countries above the cap, with no SMS, or unknown', () => {
+            expect(client.isCountrySupported('PK')).toBe(false); // €0.3548
+            expect(client.isCountrySupported('ID')).toBe(false); // €0.2430
+            expect(client.isCountrySupported('LI')).toBe(false); // null (no SMS)
+            expect(client.isCountrySupported('ZZ')).toBe(false); // unknown
+            expect(client.isCountrySupported(undefined)).toBe(false);
+        });
+
+        it('honors a configured maxSmsCostEur override', () => {
+            const strict = new PreludeClient({
+                prelude: { apiKey: 'sk', maxSmsCostEur: 0.01 },
+            } as unknown as IConfig);
+            expect(strict.isCountrySupported('US')).toBe(true); // €0.0043
+            expect(strict.isCountrySupported('DE')).toBe(false); // €0.0598 > 0.01
+
+            const loose = new PreludeClient({
+                prelude: { apiKey: 'sk', maxSmsCostEur: 0.5 },
+            } as unknown as IConfig);
+            expect(loose.isCountrySupported('PK')).toBe(true); // €0.3548 <= 0.5
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('createVerification POSTs the phone target + ip signal with bearer auth', async () => {
+        fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
+            okJson({ id: 'vrf_1', status: 'success' }),
+        );
+        const client = makeClient('sk_test');
+
+        const res = await client.createVerification('+14155550123', {
+            ip: '203.0.113.7',
+        });
+
+        expect(res).toEqual({ id: 'vrf_1', status: 'success' });
+        const [url, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0];
+        expect(url).toBe('https://api.prelude.dev/v2/verification');
+        expect(init.method).toBe('POST');
+        expect(init.headers.Authorization).toBe('Bearer sk_test');
+        expect(JSON.parse(init.body)).toEqual({
+            target: { type: 'phone_number', value: '+14155550123' },
+            // Defaults to RCS (cheaper); Prelude falls back to SMS. locale is
+            // hardcoded to en-US so the message text is always English.
+            options: { code_size: 6, preferred_channel: 'rcs', locale: 'en-US' },
+            signals: { ip: '203.0.113.7' },
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('returns the delivery channel sequence Prelude reports', async () => {
+        fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
+            okJson({
+                id: 'vrf_1',
+                status: 'success',
+                channels: ['whatsapp', 'sms'],
+            }),
+        );
+        const client = makeClient('sk_test');
+
+        const res = await client.createVerification('+14155550123');
+
+        expect(res.channels).toEqual(['whatsapp', 'sms']);
+    });
+
+    it('forwards device_id and user_agent signals when supplied', async () => {
+        fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(okJson({ id: 'v', status: 'success' }));
+        const client = makeClient('sk_test');
+
+        await client.createVerification('+14155550123', {
+            ip: '203.0.113.7',
+            device_id: 'thumb_abc123',
+            user_agent: 'Mozilla/5.0',
+        });
+
+        const [, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0];
+        expect(JSON.parse(init.body).signals).toEqual({
+            ip: '203.0.113.7',
+            device_id: 'thumb_abc123',
+            user_agent: 'Mozilla/5.0',
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('omits the signals object entirely when none are supplied', async () => {
+        fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(okJson({ id: 'v', status: 'success' }));
+        const client = makeClient('sk_test');
+
+        await client.createVerification('+14155550123');
+
+        expect(JSON.parse(fetchMock.mock.calls[0][1].body)).not.toHaveProperty(
+            'signals',
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('forwards dispatch_id as a top-level field, not inside signals', async () => {
+        fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(okJson({ id: 'v', status: 'success' }));
+        const client = makeClient('sk_test');
+
+        await client.createVerification('+14155550123', {
+            ip: '203.0.113.7',
+            dispatch_id: 'd1f5e9a0-0000-4000-8000-000000000000',
+        });
+
+        const body = JSON.parse(fetchMock.mock.calls[0][1].body);
+        expect(body.dispatch_id).toBe('d1f5e9a0-0000-4000-8000-000000000000');
+        expect(body.signals).toEqual({ ip: '203.0.113.7' });
+        expect(body.signals).not.toHaveProperty('dispatch_id');
+    });
+
+    it('omits dispatch_id when not supplied', async () => {
+        fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(okJson({ id: 'v', status: 'success' }));
+        const client = makeClient('sk_test');
+
+        await client.createVerification('+14155550123', { ip: '203.0.113.7' });
+
+        expect(JSON.parse(fetchMock.mock.calls[0][1].body)).not.toHaveProperty(
+            'dispatch_id',
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('includes a configured template_id + sender_id + preferred channel', async () => {
+        fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(okJson({ id: 'v', status: 'success' }));
+        const client = new PreludeClient({
+            prelude: {
+                apiKey: 'sk_test',
+                templateId: 'tmpl_puter',
+                senderId: 'Puter',
+                preferredChannel: 'sms',
+            },
+        } as unknown as IConfig);
+
+        await client.createVerification('+14155550123');
+
+        const [, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0];
+        expect(JSON.parse(init.body).options).toEqual({
+            code_size: 6,
+            preferred_channel: 'sms', // config override beats the rcs default
+            locale: 'en-US',
+            template_id: 'tmpl_puter',
+            sender_id: 'Puter',
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('checkVerification POSTs target + code and returns the status', async () => {
+        fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(okJson({ status: 'success' }));
+        const client = makeClient('sk_test');
+
+        const res = await client.checkVerification('+14155550123', '123456');
+
+        expect(res).toEqual({ status: 'success' });
+        const [url, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0];
+        expect(url).toBe('https://api.prelude.dev/v2/verification/check');
+        expect(JSON.parse(init.body)).toEqual({
+            target: { type: 'phone_number', value: '+14155550123' },
+            code: '123456',
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('throws (does not call fetch) when not configured', async () => {
+        const client = makeClient();
+        await expect(
+            client.createVerification('+14155550123'),
+        ).rejects.toThrow(/not configured/i);
+        expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('throws on a non-2xx Prelude response', async () => {
+        fetchMock.mockResolvedValue({
+            ok: false,
+            status: 400,
+            json: async () => ({ message: 'bad target' }),
+        } as unknown as Response);
+
+        await expect(
+            makeClient('sk_test').checkVerification('+1', 'x'),
+        ).rejects.toThrow(/Prelude .* failed: 400/);
+    });
+});

src/backend/clients/prelude/PreludeClient.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import type { IConfig } from '../../types';
+import { PuterClient } from '../types';
+import { COUNTRY_SMS_PRICES } from './countries.js';
+
+const PRELUDE_API_BASE = 'https://api.prelude.dev/v2';
+const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 8000;
+/** OTP length — matches the 6-box code UI. Prelude allows 4–8. */
+const PRELUDE_CODE_SIZE = 6;
+/**
+ * Channel Prelude prioritizes for delivery. RCS is far cheaper than SMS, so we
+ * prefer it by default; Prelude routes to the next reachable channel (SMS) when
+ * RCS isn't available on the destination. (Requires an RCS agent provisioned in
+ * the Prelude account to actually use RCS — otherwise it just falls through to
+ * SMS.) Override with `config.prelude.preferredChannel`.
+ */
+const DEFAULT_PREFERRED_CHANNEL: PreludeChannel = 'rcs';
+
+/** Delivery channels Prelude can prioritize via `options.preferred_channel`. */
+export type PreludeChannel =
+    | 'sms'
+    | 'rcs'
+    | 'whatsapp'
+    | 'viber'
+    | 'zalo'
+    | 'telegram';
+/**
+ * Channels Prelude reports in a verification's `channels` array — the ordered
+ * delivery sequence, first entry first. Superset of `PreludeChannel`: 'silent'
+ * and 'voice' can appear as delivery methods but can't be preferred.
+ */
+export type PreludeDeliveryChannel = PreludeChannel | 'silent' | 'voice';
+/**
+ * Default per-SMS cost ceiling (EUR). Countries whose Prelude SMS rate exceeds
+ * this — or that have no SMS channel — are not offered phone verification. The
+ * cap covers every realistic revenue market (priciest are Germany €0.0598 and
+ * Saudi Arabia €0.0638) while excluding the expensive, high-fraud long tail.
+ * Override per-deployment with `config.prelude.maxSmsCostEur`.
+ */
+const DEFAULT_MAX_SMS_COST_EUR = 0.07;
+
+/** Status returned by Prelude when creating/retrying a verification. */
+export type PreludeCreateStatus =
+    | 'success'
+    | 'retry'
+    | 'challenged'
+    | 'blocked'
+    | 'shadow_blocked';
+
+/** Status returned by Prelude when checking a code. */
+export type PreludeCheckStatus =
+    | 'success'
+    | 'failure'
+    | 'expired_or_not_found'
+    | 'transaction_missing'
+    | 'transaction_mismatch';
+
+/**
+ * Prelude Verify v2 client (https://docs.prelude.so/verify/v2). Sends and checks
+ * SMS one-time codes — Prelude generates, delivers, and validates the code, so
+ * we never store one ourselves. No-ops with a warning when no API key is
+ * configured (so dev environments don't crash); `isConfigured()` lets callers
+ * surface a clean "phone verification unavailable" error instead.
+ */
+export class PreludeClient extends PuterClient {
+    private apiKey: string | null = null;
+
+    constructor(config: IConfig) {
+        super(config);
+        this.apiKey = config.prelude?.apiKey ?? null;
+    }
+
+    override onServerStart(): void {
+        if (!this.apiKey) {
+            console.warn(
+                '[prelude] no apiKey configured — SMS phone verification is disabled',
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /** True when an API key is configured and verification can be attempted. */
+    isConfigured(): boolean {
+        return !!this.apiKey;
+    }
+
+    /** ISO region used to parse local-format numbers (config-driven). */
+    get defaultCountry(): string | undefined {
+        return this.config.prelude?.defaultCountry;
+    }
+
+    /** Per-SMS cost ceiling in EUR (config override or the default cap). */
+    get maxSmsCostEur(): number {
+        return this.config.prelude?.maxSmsCostEur ?? DEFAULT_MAX_SMS_COST_EUR;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Whether SMS verification should be offered for a country. False when the
+     * country is unknown, has no SMS channel, or its rate exceeds the cost cap.
+     * @param iso ISO-3166 alpha-2 (e.g. 'US') — from the parsed phone number.
+     */
+    isCountrySupported(iso: string | undefined): boolean {
+        if (!iso) return false; // couldn't determine country → can't price it
+        const price = COUNTRY_SMS_PRICES[iso.toUpperCase()];
+        if (!price || price.sms == null) return false;
+        return price.sms <= this.maxSmsCostEur;
+    }
+
+    async createVerification(
+        target: string,
+        signals: {
+            ip?: string;
+            device_id?: string;
+            user_agent?: string;
+            dispatch_id?: string;
+        } = {},
+    ): Promise<{
+        id?: string;
+        status: PreludeCreateStatus;
+        channels?: PreludeDeliveryChannel[];
+    }> {
+        // Match the 6-box code UI (UIWindowPhoneVerificationRequired). Without
+        // code_size Prelude uses the dashboard default (4). preferred_channel
+        // prioritizes RCS (cheaper); Prelude falls back to SMS when unavailable.
+        const options: Record<string, unknown> = {
+            code_size: PRELUDE_CODE_SIZE,
+            preferred_channel:
+                this.config.prelude?.preferredChannel ??
+                DEFAULT_PREFERRED_CHANNEL,
+            locale: 'en-US',
+        };
+        // Branding lives in the Prelude dashboard (the message text is a
+        // template); these just select a Puter-branded template / sender when
+        // configured. See IPreludeConfig.
+        const { templateId, senderId } = this.config.prelude ?? {};
+        if (templateId) options.template_id = templateId;
+        if (senderId) options.sender_id = senderId;
+
+        const body: Record<string, unknown> = {
+            target: { type: 'phone_number', value: target },
+            options,
+        };
+        // Only attach signals we actually have — Prelude treats the object as
+        // optional and an empty one adds nothing.
+        const sig: Record<string, string> = {};
+        if (signals.ip) sig.ip = signals.ip;
+        if (signals.device_id) sig.device_id = signals.device_id;
+        if (signals.user_agent) sig.user_agent = signals.user_agent;
+        if (Object.keys(sig).length > 0) body.signals = sig;
+        // dispatch_id is a top-level field, not a member of `signals`.
+        if (signals.dispatch_id) body.dispatch_id = signals.dispatch_id;
+        return this.#post('/verification', body) as Promise<{
+            id?: string;
+            status: PreludeCreateStatus;
+            channels?: PreludeDeliveryChannel[];
+        }>;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Check a code the user entered against the active verification for `target`.
+     * @returns `{ status }` — `'success'` means verified.
+     */
+    async checkVerification(
+        target: string,
+        code: string,
+    ): Promise<{ status: PreludeCheckStatus }> {
+        return this.#post('/verification/check', {
+            target: { type: 'phone_number', value: target },
+            code,
+        }) as Promise<{ status: PreludeCheckStatus }>;
+    }
+
+    async #post(
+        path: string,
+        body: Record<string, unknown>,
+    ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
+        if (!this.apiKey) {
+            throw new Error('Prelude is not configured');
+        }
+        const controller = new AbortController();
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS);
+        try {
+            const res = await fetch(`${PRELUDE_API_BASE}${path}`, {
+                method: 'POST',
+                headers: {
+                    Authorization: `Bearer ${this.apiKey}`,
+                    'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+                    Accept: 'application/json',
+                },
+                body: JSON.stringify(body),
+                signal: controller.signal,
+            });
+            const json = (await res.json().catch(() => ({}))) as Record<
+                string,
+                unknown
+            >;
+            if (!res.ok) {
+                throw new Error(
+                    `Prelude ${path} failed: ${res.status} ${
+                        (json as { message?: string })?.message ?? ''
+                    }`.trim(),
+                );
+            }
+            return json;
+        } finally {
+            clearTimeout(timer);
+        }
+    }
+}

src/backend/clients/prelude/countries.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,952 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+/** Per-country Prelude SMS pricing, hardcoded from the Prelude global price
+ * sheet. `sms` is the average cost in EUR, or null when SMS is unavailable
+ * there. Used to cap phone verification to affordable countries (see
+ * PreludeClient.isCountrySupported). Regenerate from the price sheet when
+ * Prelude updates rates. */
+export interface CountryPrice {
+    name: string;
+    /** Prelude SMS average in EUR, or null when SMS is not available. */
+    sms: number | null;
+}
+
+export const COUNTRY_SMS_PRICES: Record<string, CountryPrice> = {
+    AD: {
+        name: 'Andorra',
+        sms: 0.0515,
+    },
+    AE: {
+        name: 'United Arab Emirates',
+        sms: 0.0145,
+    },
+    AF: {
+        name: 'Afghanistan',
+        sms: 0.2409,
+    },
+    AG: {
+        name: 'Antigua and Barbuda',
+        sms: 0.0755,
+    },
+    AI: {
+        name: 'Anguilla',
+        sms: 0.0765,
+    },
+    AL: {
+        name: 'Albania',
+        sms: 0.0345,
+    },
+    AM: {
+        name: 'Armenia',
+        sms: 0.118,
+    },
+    AN: {
+        name: 'Netherlands Antilles',
+        sms: null,
+    },
+    AO: {
+        name: 'Angola',
+        sms: 0.0347,
+    },
+    AR: {
+        name: 'Argentina',
+        sms: 0.0614,
+    },
+    AS: {
+        name: 'American Samoa',
+        sms: 0.077,
+    },
+    AT: {
+        name: 'Austria',
+        sms: 0.014,
+    },
+    AU: {
+        name: 'Australia',
+        sms: 0.0091,
+    },
+    AW: {
+        name: 'Aruba',
+        sms: 0.0617,
+    },
+    AZ: {
+        name: 'Azerbaijan',
+        sms: 0.0969,
+    },
+    BA: {
+        name: 'Bosnia and Herzegovina',
+        sms: 0.0801,
+    },
+    BB: {
+        name: 'Barbados',
+        sms: 0.2021,
+    },
+    BD: {
+        name: 'Bangladesh',
+        sms: 0.1844,
+    },
+    BE: {
+        name: 'Belgium',
+        sms: 0.0297,
+    },
+    BF: {
+        name: 'Burkina Faso',
+        sms: 0.063,
+    },
+    BG: {
+        name: 'Bulgaria',
+        sms: 0.0799,
+    },
+    BH: {
+        name: 'Bahrain',
+        sms: 0.014,
+    },
+    BI: {
+        name: 'Burundi',
+        sms: 0.217,
+    },
+    BJ: {
+        name: 'Benin',
+        sms: 0.13,
+    },
+    BM: {
+        name: 'Bermuda',
+        sms: 0.21,
+    },
+    BN: {
+        name: 'Brunei',
+        sms: 0.035,
+    },
+    BO: {
+        name: 'Bolivia',
+        sms: 0.0708,
+    },
+    BQ: {
+        name: 'Caribbean Netherlands',
+        sms: 0.0565,
+    },
+    BR: {
+        name: 'Brazil',
+        sms: 0.0086,
+    },
+    BS: {
+        name: 'Bahamas',
+        sms: 0.0672,
+    },
+    BT: {
+        name: 'Bhutan',
+        sms: null,
+    },
+    BW: {
+        name: 'Botswana',
+        sms: 0.0235,
+    },
+    BY: {
+        name: 'Belarus',
+        sms: 0.118,
+    },
+    BZ: {
+        name: 'Belize',
+        sms: 0.1529,
+    },
+    CA: {
+        name: 'Canada',
+        sms: 0.0052,
+    },
+    CD: {
+        name: 'Congo RDC',
+        sms: 0.1112,
+    },
+    CF: {
+        name: 'Central African Republic',
+        sms: 0.2,
+    },
+    CG: {
+        name: 'Congo',
+        sms: 0.2507,
+    },
+    CH: {
+        name: 'Switzerland',
+        sms: 0.0163,
+    },
+    CI: {
+        name: "Cote d'Ivoire",
+        sms: 0.19,
+    },
+    CK: {
+        name: 'Cook Islands',
+        sms: 0.1041,
+    },
+    CL: {
+        name: 'Chile',
+        sms: 0.0027,
+    },
+    CM: {
+        name: 'Cameroon',
+        sms: 0.1504,
+    },
+    CN: {
+        name: 'China',
+        sms: 0.0053,
+    },
+    CO: {
+        name: 'Colombia',
+        sms: 0.0008,
+    },
+    CR: {
+        name: 'Costa Rica',
+        sms: 0.0045,
+    },
+    CU: {
+        name: 'Cuba',
+        sms: 0.0512,
+    },
+    CV: {
+        name: 'Cabo Verde',
+        sms: 0.2031,
+    },
+    CW: {
+        name: 'Curacao',
+        sms: 0.0138,
+    },
+    CY: {
+        name: 'Northern Cyprus',
+        sms: 0.0065,
+    },
+    CZ: {
+        name: 'Czech Republic',
+        sms: 0.0299,
+    },
+    DE: {
+        name: 'Germany',
+        sms: 0.0598,
+    },
+    DJ: {
+        name: 'Djibouti',
+        sms: 0.0897,
+    },
+    DK: {
+        name: 'Denmark',
+        sms: 0.0301,
+    },
+    DM: {
+        name: 'Dominica',
+        sms: 0.0824,
+    },
+    DO: {
+        name: 'Dominican Republic',
+        sms: 0.0351,
+    },
+    DZ: {
+        name: 'Algeria',
+        sms: 0.196,
+    },
+    EC: {
+        name: 'Ecuador',
+        sms: 0.1041,
+    },
+    EE: {
+        name: 'Estonia',
+        sms: 0.0234,
+    },
+    EG: {
+        name: 'Egypt',
+        sms: 0.1561,
+    },
+    ER: {
+        name: 'Eritrea',
+        sms: 0.0659,
+    },
+    ES: {
+        name: 'Spain',
+        sms: 0.0193,
+    },
+    ET: {
+        name: 'Ethiopia',
+        sms: 0.2741,
+    },
+    FI: {
+        name: 'Finland',
+        sms: 0.043,
+    },
+    FJ: {
+        name: 'Fiji',
+        sms: 0.069,
+    },
+    FK: {
+        name: 'Falkland Islands',
+        sms: 0.0713,
+    },
+    FM: {
+        name: 'Micronesia',
+        sms: 0.0118,
+    },
+    FO: {
+        name: 'Faroe Islands',
+        sms: 0.0319,
+    },
+    FR: {
+        name: 'France',
+        sms: 0.03,
+    },
+    GA: {
+        name: 'Gabon',
+        sms: 0.15,
+    },
+    GB: {
+        name: 'United Kingdom',
+        sms: 0.026,
+    },
+    GD: {
+        name: 'Grenada',
+        sms: null,
+    },
+    GE: {
+        name: 'Georgia',
+        sms: 0.0788,
+    },
+    GF: {
+        name: 'French Guiana',
+        sms: 0.05,
+    },
+    GG: {
+        name: 'Guernsey',
+        sms: 0.025,
+    },
+    GH: {
+        name: 'Ghana',
+        sms: 0.15,
+    },
+    GI: {
+        name: 'Gibraltar',
+        sms: 0.0134,
+    },
+    GL: {
+        name: 'Greenland',
+        sms: 0.0048,
+    },
+    GM: {
+        name: 'Gambia',
+        sms: 0.1283,
+    },
+    GN: {
+        name: 'Guinea',
+        sms: 0.2,
+    },
+    GP: {
+        name: 'Guadeloupe',
+        sms: 0.0455,
+    },
+    GQ: {
+        name: 'Equatorial Guinea',
+        sms: 0.099,
+    },
+    GR: {
+        name: 'Greece',
+        sms: 0.0296,
+    },
+    GT: {
+        name: 'Guatemala',
+        sms: 0.1202,
+    },
+    GU: {
+        name: 'Guam',
+        sms: 0.02,
+    },
+    GW: {
+        name: 'Guinea-Bissau',
+        sms: 0.1566,
+    },
+    GY: {
+        name: 'Guyana',
+        sms: 0.2178,
+    },
+    HK: {
+        name: 'Hong Kong',
+        sms: 0.038,
+    },
+    HN: {
+        name: 'Honduras',
+        sms: 0.162,
+    },
+    HR: {
+        name: 'Croatia',
+        sms: 0.03,
+    },
+    HT: {
+        name: 'Haiti',
+        sms: 0.09,
+    },
+    HU: {
+        name: 'Hungary',
+        sms: 0.029,
+    },
+    ID: {
+        name: 'Indonesia',
+        sms: 0.243,
+    },
+    IE: {
+        name: 'Ireland',
+        sms: 0.0305,
+    },
+    IL: {
+        name: 'Israel',
+        sms: 0.01,
+    },
+    IM: {
+        name: 'Isle of Man',
+        sms: 0.0385,
+    },
+    IN: {
+        name: 'India',
+        sms: 0.0375,
+    },
+    IQ: {
+        name: 'Iraq',
+        sms: 0.151,
+    },
+    IR: {
+        name: 'Iran',
+        sms: 0.14,
+    },
+    IS: {
+        name: 'Iceland',
+        sms: 0.0493,
+    },
+    IT: {
+        name: 'Italy',
+        sms: 0.0245,
+    },
+    JE: {
+        name: 'Jersey',
+        sms: 0.025,
+    },
+    JM: {
+        name: 'Jamaica',
+        sms: 0.1525,
+    },
+    JO: {
+        name: 'Jordan',
+        sms: 0.2094,
+    },
+    JP: {
+        name: 'Japan',
+        sms: 0.017,
+    },
+    KE: {
+        name: 'Kenya',
+        sms: 0.125,
+    },
+    KG: {
+        name: 'Kyrgyzstan',
+        sms: 0.15,
+    },
+    KH: {
+        name: 'Cambodia',
+        sms: 0.1529,
+    },
+    KI: {
+        name: 'Kiribati',
+        sms: 0.025,
+    },
+    KM: {
+        name: 'Comoros',
+        sms: 0.15,
+    },
+    KN: {
+        name: 'Saint Kitts and Nevis',
+        sms: 0.1295,
+    },
+    KR: {
+        name: 'South Korea',
+        sms: 0.006,
+    },
+    KW: {
+        name: 'Kuwait',
+        sms: 0.145,
+    },
+    KY: {
+        name: 'Cayman Islands',
+        sms: 0.2172,
+    },
+    KZ: {
+        name: 'Kazakhstan',
+        sms: 0.202,
+    },
+    LA: {
+        name: 'Laos',
+        sms: 0.15,
+    },
+    LB: {
+        name: 'Lebanon',
+        sms: 0.153,
+    },
+    LC: {
+        name: 'Saint Lucia',
+        sms: 0.0892,
+    },
+    LI: {
+        name: 'Liechtenstein',
+        sms: null,
+    },
+    LK: {
+        name: 'Sri Lanka',
+        sms: 0.3593,
+    },
+    LR: {
+        name: 'Liberia',
+        sms: 0.1448,
+    },
+    LS: {
+        name: 'Lesotho',
+        sms: 0.0301,
+    },
+    LT: {
+        name: 'Lithuania',
+        sms: 0.0261,
+    },
+    LU: {
+        name: 'Luxembourg',
+        sms: 0.034,
+    },
+    LV: {
+        name: 'Latvia',
+        sms: 0.028,
+    },
+    LY: {
+        name: 'Libya',
+        sms: 0.1898,
+    },
+    MA: {
+        name: 'Morocco',
+        sms: 0.105,
+    },
+    MC: {
+        name: 'Monaco',
+        sms: 0.1219,
+    },
+    MD: {
+        name: 'Moldova',
+        sms: 0.065,
+    },
+    ME: {
+        name: 'Montenegro',
+        sms: 0.07,
+    },
+    MG: {
+        name: 'Madagascar',
+        sms: 0.24,
+    },
+    MH: {
+        name: '',
+        sms: 0.032,
+    },
+    MK: {
+        name: 'Macedonia',
+        sms: 0.0096,
+    },
+    ML: {
+        name: 'Mali',
+        sms: 0.136,
+    },
+    MM: {
+        name: 'Myanmar',
+        sms: 0.3037,
+    },
+    MN: {
+        name: 'Mongolia',
+        sms: 0.183,
+    },
+    MO: {
+        name: 'Macao',
+        sms: 0.005,
+    },
+    MP: {
+        name: 'Northern Mariana Islands',
+        sms: 0.0669,
+    },
+    MQ: {
+        name: 'Martinique',
+        sms: 0.0455,
+    },
+    MR: {
+        name: 'Mauritania',
+        sms: 0.161,
+    },
+    MS: {
+        name: 'Montserrat',
+        sms: 0.0725,
+    },
+    MT: {
+        name: 'Malta',
+        sms: 0.0343,
+    },
+    MU: {
+        name: 'Mauritius',
+        sms: 0.1431,
+    },
+    MV: {
+        name: 'Maldives',
+        sms: 0.145,
+    },
+    MW: {
+        name: 'Malawi',
+        sms: 0.19,
+    },
+    MX: {
+        name: 'Mexico',
+        sms: 0.0021,
+    },
+    MY: {
+        name: 'Malaysia',
+        sms: 0.08,
+    },
+    MZ: {
+        name: 'Mozambique',
+        sms: 0.2266,
+    },
+    NA: {
+        name: 'Namibia',
+        sms: 0.0173,
+    },
+    NC: {
+        name: 'New Caledonia',
+        sms: 0.052,
+    },
+    NE: {
+        name: 'Niger',
+        sms: 0.143,
+    },
+    NG: {
+        name: 'Nigeria',
+        sms: 0.198,
+    },
+    NI: {
+        name: 'Nicaragua',
+        sms: 0.1033,
+    },
+    NL: {
+        name: 'Netherlands',
+        sms: 0.046,
+    },
+    NO: {
+        name: 'Norway',
+        sms: 0.03,
+    },
+    NP: {
+        name: 'Nepal',
+        sms: 0.1645,
+    },
+    NR: {
+        name: 'Nauru',
+        sms: null,
+    },
+    NU: {
+        name: 'Niue',
+        sms: null,
+    },
+    NZ: {
+        name: 'New Zealand',
+        sms: 0.0372,
+    },
+    OM: {
+        name: 'Oman',
+        sms: 0.0713,
+    },
+    PA: {
+        name: 'Panama',
+        sms: 0.07,
+    },
+    PE: {
+        name: 'Peru',
+        sms: 0.13,
+    },
+    PF: {
+        name: 'French Polynesia',
+        sms: 0.0518,
+    },
+    PG: {
+        name: 'Papua New Guinea',
+        sms: 0.15,
+    },
+    PH: {
+        name: 'Philippines',
+        sms: 0.1237,
+    },
+    PK: {
+        name: 'Pakistan',
+        sms: 0.3548,
+    },
+    PL: {
+        name: 'Poland',
+        sms: 0.011,
+    },
+    PM: {
+        name: 'Saint Pierre and Miquelon',
+        sms: 0.0905,
+    },
+    PR: {
+        name: 'Puerto Rico',
+        sms: 0.02,
+    },
+    PS: {
+        name: 'Palestine',
+        sms: 0.2541,
+    },
+    PT: {
+        name: 'Portugal',
+        sms: 0.009,
+    },
+    PW: {
+        name: 'Palau',
+        sms: null,
+    },
+    PY: {
+        name: 'Paraguay',
+        sms: 0.0236,
+    },
+    QA: {
+        name: 'Qatar',
+        sms: 0.1393,
+    },
+    RE: {
+        name: 'Reunion',
+        sms: 0.034,
+    },
+    RO: {
+        name: 'Romania',
+        sms: 0.0255,
+    },
+    RS: {
+        name: 'Serbia',
+        sms: 0.1935,
+    },
+    RU: {
+        name: 'Russia',
+        sms: 0.2028,
+    },
+    RW: {
+        name: 'Rwanda',
+        sms: 0.1177,
+    },
+    SA: {
+        name: 'Saudi Arabia',
+        sms: 0.0638,
+    },
+    SB: {
+        name: 'Solomon Islands',
+        sms: 0.0357,
+    },
+    SC: {
+        name: 'Seychelles',
+        sms: 0.0404,
+    },
+    SD: {
+        name: 'Sudan',
+        sms: 0.224,
+    },
+    SE: {
+        name: 'Sweden',
+        sms: 0.026,
+    },
+    SG: {
+        name: 'Singapore',
+        sms: 0.0256,
+    },
+    SI: {
+        name: 'Slovenia',
+        sms: 0.1,
+    },
+    SK: {
+        name: 'Slovakia',
+        sms: 0.0245,
+    },
+    SL: {
+        name: 'Sierra Leone',
+        sms: 0.2322,
+    },
+    SM: {
+        name: 'San Marino',
+        sms: null,
+    },
+    SN: {
+        name: 'Senegal',
+        sms: 0.1151,
+    },
+    SO: {
+        name: 'Somalia',
+        sms: 0.06,
+    },
+    SR: {
+        name: 'Suriname',
+        sms: 0.119,
+    },
+    SS: {
+        name: 'South Sudan',
+        sms: 0.15,
+    },
+    ST: {
+        name: 'Sao Tome and Principe',
+        sms: 0.0133,
+    },
+    SV: {
+        name: 'El Salvador',
+        sms: 0.06,
+    },
+    SX: {
+        name: 'Sint Maarten',
+        sms: 0.0623,
+    },
+    SY: {
+        name: 'Syria',
+        sms: 0.221,
+    },
+    SZ: {
+        name: 'Eswatini',
+        sms: 0.12,
+    },
+    TC: {
+        name: 'Turks and Caicos Islands',
+        sms: null,
+    },
+    TD: {
+        name: 'Chad',
+        sms: 0.1711,
+    },
+    TG: {
+        name: 'Togo',
+        sms: 0.1806,
+    },
+    TH: {
+        name: 'Thailand',
+        sms: 0.003,
+    },
+    TJ: {
+        name: 'Tajikistan',
+        sms: 0.2626,
+    },
+    TL: {
+        name: 'Timor-Leste',
+        sms: 0.0675,
+    },
+    TM: {
+        name: 'Turkmenistan',
+        sms: 0.1677,
+    },
+    TN: {
+        name: 'Tunisia',
+        sms: 0.225,
+    },
+    TO: {
+        name: 'Tonga',
+        sms: 0.0902,
+    },
+    TR: {
+        name: 'Turkey',
+        sms: 0.0008,
+    },
+    TT: {
+        name: 'Trinidad and Tobago',
+        sms: 0.1556,
+    },
+    TW: {
+        name: 'Taiwan',
+        sms: 0.0165,
+    },
+    TZ: {
+        name: 'Tanzania',
+        sms: 0.2753,
+    },
+    UA: {
+        name: 'Ukraine',
+        sms: 0.094,
+    },
+    UG: {
+        name: 'Uganda',
+        sms: 0.1707,
+    },
+    US: {
+        name: 'United States',
+        sms: 0.0043,
+    },
+    UY: {
+        name: 'Uruguay',
+        sms: 0.0174,
+    },
+    UZ: {
+        name: 'Uzbekistan',
+        sms: 0.292,
+    },
+    VC: {
+        name: 'Saint Vincent and The Grenadines',
+        sms: 0.1216,
+    },
+    VE: {
+        name: 'Venezuela',
+        sms: 0.0427,
+    },
+    VG: {
+        name: 'British Virgin Islands',
+        sms: 0.083,
+    },
+    VI: {
+        name: 'Virgin Island',
+        sms: 0.0017,
+    },
+    VN: {
+        name: 'Vietnam',
+        sms: 0.0885,
+    },
+    VU: {
+        name: 'Vanuatu',
+        sms: 0.1347,
+    },
+    WF: {
+        name: 'Wallis and Futuna',
+        sms: 0.09,
+    },
+    WS: {
+        name: 'Samoa',
+        sms: 0.2,
+    },
+    XK: {
+        name: 'Kosovo',
+        sms: 0.1394,
+    },
+    YE: {
+        name: 'Yemen',
+        sms: 0.1486,
+    },
+    YT: {
+        name: 'Mayotte',
+        sms: 0.06,
+    },
+    ZA: {
+        name: 'South Africa',
+        sms: 0.039,
+    },
+    ZM: {
+        name: 'Zambia',
+        sms: 0.21,
+    },
+    ZW: {
+        name: 'Zimbabwe',
+        sms: 0.13,
+    },
+};

src/backend/clients/types.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
  */
 
 import type { IConfig, WithLifecycle } from '../types';
+import type { ClickhouseClient } from './clickhouse/ClickhouseClient';
 
 /**
  * Extension-augmentable client registry. Extensions add their own client
@@ -40,6 +41,14 @@ export interface IExtensionClientInstances {
      * override this for that name.
      */
     [key: string]: unknown;
+
+    /**
+     * Optional ClickHouse analytics client. Absent by default — a production
+     * deployment registers it via an extension to speed up the app-stats path
+     * at scale (see {@link ClickhouseClient}). Always branch on its presence
+     * and fall back to SQL.
+     */
+    clickhouse?: ClickhouseClient;
 }
 
 export interface IPuterClient<T extends WithLifecycle = WithLifecycle> {

src/backend/controllers/apps/AppController.js

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
  * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
+import { isAccessTokenActor, isAppActor } from '../../core/actor.js';
 import { HttpError } from '../../core/http/HttpError.js';
 import { driversContainers } from '../../exports.js';
 import {
@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const apps = await this.appDriver.select({
@@ -70,6 +72,7 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const name = req.query?.name;
@@ -89,6 +92,16 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
         // actor calls this, the app id is already on the token — clients
         // don't re-send it in the body. Fall back to `actor.app.uid`
         // before 400-ing for a missing body field.
+        //
+        // Authorization: only two callers are trusted to report opens —
+        //   1. a root user actor (plain session, no `.app` and no access
+        //      token), e.g. the GUI launching apps on behalf of the user;
+        //   2. the app-under-user actor for the app being reported, i.e.
+        //      `actor.app.uid === app_uid`.
+        // Everything else — access tokens (regardless of issuer), asset
+        // tokens, app actors reporting for a *different* app — is denied,
+        // otherwise any authenticated party could inflate another app's
+        // open count.
         router.post(
             '/rao',
             {
@@ -96,8 +109,9 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
                 requireAuth: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
+                const actor = req.actor;
                 const bodyAppUid = req.body?.app_uid;
-                const actorAppUid = req.actor?.app?.uid;
+                const actorAppUid = actor?.app?.uid;
                 const app_uid =
                     typeof bodyAppUid === 'string' && bodyAppUid.length > 0
                         ? bodyAppUid
@@ -108,6 +122,26 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
                     });
                 }
 
+                // Access tokens (and any other non-user/non-app identity,
+                // e.g. asset tokens) are not allowed to report opens —
+                // they're shared / scoped credentials and shouldn't drive
+                // analytics counters.
+                if (isAccessTokenActor(actor)) {
+                    throw new HttpError(
+                        403,
+                        'Access tokens cannot report app opens',
+                        { legacyCode: 'forbidden' },
+                    );
+                }
+
+                if (isAppActor(actor) && app_uid !== actorAppUid) {
+                    throw new HttpError(
+                        403,
+                        'App actors can only report opens for their own app',
+                        { legacyCode: 'forbidden' },
+                    );
+                }
+
                 const app = await this.appStore.getByUid(app_uid);
                 if (!app)
                     throw new HttpError(404, 'App not found', {
@@ -153,6 +187,7 @@ export class AppController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const raw = req.params.name;

src/backend/controllers/desktop/DesktopController.js

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ export class DesktopController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const { url, color, fit } = req.body ?? {};
@@ -105,6 +106,7 @@ export class DesktopController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const { items } = req.body ?? {};
@@ -130,6 +132,7 @@ export class DesktopController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const { item_uid, item_path, layout } = req.body ?? {};
@@ -156,6 +159,7 @@ export class DesktopController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {
                 const { item_uid, item_path, sort_by, sort_order } =

src/backend/controllers/drivers/DriverController.test.ts

@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ import { Readable } from 'node:stream';
 import type { Request, RequestHandler, Response } from 'express';
 import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
 import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
-import type { Actor } from '../../core/actor.js';
+import { actorUid, type Actor } from '../../core/actor.js';
+import type { DriverMethodLifecycleEvent } from '../../clients/event/types.js';
 import { runWithContext } from '../../core/context.js';
 import { PuterServer } from '../../server.js';
 import { setupTestServer } from '../../testUtil.js';
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ import type { DriverController } from './DriverController.js';
 // The DriverController under test is the same instance the live request
 // pipeline uses, so its iface→driver registry is populated from real
 // drivers (puter-kvstore, puter-apps, puter-subdomains, …). The HTTP
-// handlers (`#handleCall`, `#handleListInterfaces`, `#handleXd`) are
+// handlers (`#handleCall`, `#handleListInterfaces`) are
 // private — we exercise the public lookup API (`resolve` / list / get
 // default) which the handlers themselves delegate to.
 
@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ describe('DriverController.resolve', () => {
     });
 });
 
-// ── Route handlers (#handleCall, #handleListInterfaces, #handleXd) ─
+// ── Route handlers (#handleCall, #handleListInterfaces) ─────────────
 
 // The handlers are private class fields. We capture references to them by
 // invoking `registerRoutes` with a fake router whose `post`/`get` save the
@@ -189,10 +190,7 @@ const makeRes = (): MockRes => {
     return res;
 };
 
-const makeReq = (
-    body: Record<string, unknown> = {},
-    actor?: Actor,
-): Request =>
+const makeReq = (body: Record<string, unknown> = {}, actor?: Actor): Request =>
     ({
         body,
         actor,
@@ -338,11 +336,7 @@ describe('DriverController.#handleCall (via captured router)', () => {
             actor,
         );
         await runWithContext({ actor }, () =>
-            routes['POST /call'](
-                req,
-                res as unknown as Response,
-                () => {},
-            ),
+            routes['POST /call'](req, res as unknown as Response, () => {}),
         );
         const body = res.body as {
             success: boolean;
@@ -374,11 +368,9 @@ describe('DriverController.#handleCall (via captured router)', () => {
         // Register it through the controller's private map by re-running
         // its #buildIfaceMap path: easier to just stash it into the
         // existing iface map directly via TypeScript-defeating cast.
-        const internalDrivers = (
-            controller as unknown as {
-                ['#drivers']: Map<string, Map<string, unknown>>;
-            }
-        );
+        const internalDrivers = controller as unknown as {
+            ['#drivers']: Map<string, Map<string, unknown>>;
+        };
         // Access the actual private slot via the well-known getter
         // pattern doesn't work for `#`-private fields; instead, re-run
         // registerRoutes after stashing on the bag — but that's already
@@ -413,13 +405,12 @@ describe('DriverController.#handleCall (via captured router)', () => {
         >;
         const original = kv.set;
         kv.set = async function (...args: unknown[]) {
-            const { Context } = await import(
-                '../../core/context.js'
-            );
+            const { Context } = await import('../../core/context.js');
             Context.set('driverMetadata', { providerUsed: 'kv-direct' });
-            return (
-                original as (...x: unknown[]) => Promise<unknown>
-            ).apply(this, args);
+            return (original as (...x: unknown[]) => Promise<unknown>).apply(
+                this,
+                args,
+            );
         };
         try {
             const res = makeRes();
@@ -432,11 +423,7 @@ describe('DriverController.#handleCall (via captured router)', () => {
                 actor,
             );
             await runWithContext({ actor }, () =>
-                routes['POST /call'](
-                    req,
-                    res as unknown as Response,
-                    () => {},
-                ),
+                routes['POST /call'](req, res as unknown as Response, () => {}),
             );
             const body = res.body as {
                 metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;
@@ -474,6 +461,129 @@ describe('DriverController.#handleCall (via captured router)', () => {
     });
 });
 
+describe('DriverController driver-method lifecycle events', () => {
+    let routes: Captured;
+    beforeAll(() => {
+        routes = captureRoutes(controller);
+    });
+
+    const grantKvPerm = async (actor: Actor) => {
+        await server.stores.permission.setFlatUserPerm(
+            actor.user!.id!,
+            'service:puter-kvstore:ii:puter-kvstore',
+            {
+                permission: 'service:puter-kvstore:ii:puter-kvstore',
+                deleted: false,
+                issuer_user_id: actor.user!.id!,
+            } as never,
+        );
+    };
+
+    it('emits before then after around a successful driver method', async () => {
+        const actor = await makeUserActor();
+        await grantKvPerm(actor);
+
+        // Correlate on the actor: each test creates a fresh user, so this
+        // isolates our call from any other traffic on the shared event bus.
+        const who = actorUid(actor);
+        const before: DriverMethodLifecycleEvent[] = [];
+        const after: DriverMethodLifecycleEvent[] = [];
+        server.clients.event.on(
+            'driver.puter-kvstore.set.before',
+            (_k, data) => {
+                if (data.actorUid === who) before.push(data);
+            },
+        );
+        server.clients.event.on(
+            'driver.puter-kvstore.set.after',
+            (_k, data) => {
+                if (data.actorUid === who) after.push(data);
+            },
+        );
+
+        const key = `lc-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const req = makeReq(
+            {
+                interface: 'puter-kvstore',
+                method: 'set',
+                args: { key, value: 'v' },
+            },
+            actor,
+        );
+        await runWithContext({ actor }, () =>
+            routes['POST /call'](
+                req,
+                makeRes() as unknown as Response,
+                () => {},
+            ),
+        );
+
+        expect(before).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(before[0]).toMatchObject({
+            phase: 'before',
+            iface: 'puter-kvstore',
+            method: 'set',
+            actor,
+            actorUid: who,
+        });
+        expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(after[0].phase).toBe('after');
+        expect(after[0].args).toMatchObject({ key, value: 'v' });
+        expect(typeof after[0].durationMs).toBe('number');
+    });
+
+    it('emits reject and answers 403 when a before listener vetoes', async () => {
+        const actor = await makeUserActor();
+        await grantKvPerm(actor);
+
+        // Scope the veto to a sentinel key so it doesn't affect other calls
+        // sharing this server's event bus.
+        const key = `veto-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const reject: DriverMethodLifecycleEvent[] = [];
+        server.clients.event.on(
+            'driver.puter-kvstore.set.before',
+            (_k, data) => {
+                if ((data.args as { key?: string })?.key === key) {
+                    data.allow = false;
+                    data.rejectReason = 'blocked in test';
+                }
+            },
+        );
+        server.clients.event.on(
+            'driver.puter-kvstore.set.reject',
+            (_k, data) => {
+                if (data.rejectReason === 'blocked in test') reject.push(data);
+            },
+        );
+
+        const req = makeReq(
+            {
+                interface: 'puter-kvstore',
+                method: 'set',
+                args: { key, value: 'v' },
+            },
+            actor,
+        );
+        await expect(
+            runWithContext({ actor }, () =>
+                routes['POST /call'](
+                    req,
+                    makeRes() as unknown as Response,
+                    () => {},
+                ),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
+
+        expect(reject).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(reject[0]).toMatchObject({
+            phase: 'reject',
+            method: 'set',
+            args: { key, value: 'v' },
+            rejectReason: 'blocked in test',
+        });
+    });
+});
+
 describe('DriverController.#handleListInterfaces', () => {
     let routes: Captured;
     beforeAll(() => {
@@ -497,31 +607,11 @@ describe('DriverController.#handleListInterfaces', () => {
     });
 });
 
-describe('DriverController.#handleXd', () => {
-    let routes: Captured;
-    beforeAll(() => {
-        routes = captureRoutes(controller);
-    });
-
-    it('serves the iframe-bridge HTML with text/html content-type', () => {
-        const res = makeRes();
-        routes['GET /xd'](
-            makeReq(),
-            res as unknown as Response,
-            () => {},
-        );
-        expect(res.contentType).toBe('text/html');
-        expect(res.sentBody).toMatch(/<!DOCTYPE html>/);
-        expect(res.sentBody).toMatch(/\/drivers\/call/);
-    });
-});
-
 describe('DriverController.registerRoutes', () => {
-    it('registers POST /call, GET /list-interfaces, and GET /xd', () => {
+    it('registers POST /call and GET /list-interfaces', () => {
         const routes = captureRoutes(controller);
         expect(routes['POST /call']).toBeInstanceOf(Function);
         expect(routes['GET /list-interfaces']).toBeInstanceOf(Function);
-        expect(routes['GET /xd']).toBeInstanceOf(Function);
     });
 });
 

src/backend/controllers/drivers/DriverController.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
  */
 
 import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
+import { actorUid } from '../../core/actor.js';
 import { Context } from '../../core/context.js';
 import { Controller } from '../../core/http/decorators.js';
 import { HttpError, isHttpError } from '../../core/http/HttpError.js';
@@ -26,8 +27,6 @@ import {
     checkDriverRateLimit,
 } from '../../core/http/middleware/rateLimit.js';
 import type { PuterRouter } from '../../core/http/PuterRouter.js';
-import type { PermissionService } from '../../services/permission/PermissionService.js';
-import type { WithLifecycle } from '../../types';
 import type { DriverMeta } from '../../drivers/meta.js';
 import {
     isDriverStreamResult,
@@ -35,120 +34,13 @@ import {
     resolveDriverMethodConcurrent,
     resolveDriverMethodRateLimit,
 } from '../../drivers/meta.js';
+import type { PermissionService } from '../../services/permission/PermissionService.js';
+import { PermissionUtil } from '../../services/permission/permissionUtil.js';
+import type { WithLifecycle } from '../../types';
 import { PuterController } from '../types.js';
 
 type DriverInstance = WithLifecycle & Record<string, unknown>;
 
-// -- /drivers/xd payload ---------------------------------------------
-//
-// Self-contained HTML/JS shipped to the iframe consumer. Listens for
-// postMessage events shaped as `{ id, interface, method, params }`,
-// forwards to `/drivers/call`, and posts `{ id, result }` back to the
-// originating window.
-//
-// Wire-shape note: the postMessage uses `params` (puter-js's historical
-// name) but `/drivers/call` expects `args`; this bridge translates.
-
-const XD_SCRIPT = /* js */ `
-(function () {
-    const call = async ({ interface_name, method_name, params }) => {
-        const response = await fetch('/drivers/call', {
-            method: 'POST',
-            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-            body: JSON.stringify({
-                interface: interface_name,
-                method: method_name,
-                args: params,
-            }),
-        });
-        return await response.json();
-    };
-
-    const fcall = async ({ interface_name, method_name, params }) => {
-        const form = new FormData();
-        form.append('interface', interface_name);
-        form.append('method', method_name);
-        for (const k in params) {
-            form.append(k, params[k]);
-        }
-        const response = await fetch('/drivers/call', {
-            method: 'POST',
-            body: form,
-        });
-        return await response.json();
-    };
-
-    window.addEventListener('message', async (event) => {
-        const { id, interface: iface, method, params } = event.data || {};
-        let has_file = false;
-        for (const k in params) {
-            if (params[k] instanceof File) {
-                has_file = true;
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        const result = has_file
-            ? await fcall({ interface_name: iface, method_name: method, params })
-            : await call({ interface_name: iface, method_name: method, params });
-        if (event.source) {
-            event.source.postMessage({ id, result }, event.origin);
-        }
-    });
-})();
-`;
-
-const XD_HTML = `<!DOCTYPE html>
-<html>
-    <head>
-        <title>Puter Driver API</title>
-        <script>
-            document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function () {
-                ${XD_SCRIPT}
-            });
-        </script>
-    </head>
-    <body></body>
-</html>`;
-
-// -- Controller ------------------------------------------------------
-
-/**
- * Routes driver RPC calls through a unified HTTP surface.
- *
- * - `POST /drivers/call` — invoke `<iface>.<method>(args)` on the
- *   registered driver after a per-actor permission + rate-limit check.
- *   Stream-shaped results are piped directly; everything else is
- *   returned as JSON.
- * - `GET /drivers/list-interfaces` — enumerate registered driver
- *   interfaces with their default + alternate implementations.
- * - `GET /drivers/xd` — legacy iframe bridge; serves an HTML page that
- *   proxies `postMessage` RPCs to `/drivers/call` on the same origin.
- *
- * Holds an internal iface → driverName → instance map built at
- * construction time from `this.drivers`. Extensions that register
- * additional drivers end up in that bag before this controller is
- * instantiated, so they show up here automatically.
- */
-/**
- * Catch-all upstream-error translator for the driver boundary.
- *
- * Drivers that wrap a third-party SDK (OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.) often
- * let the SDK's own error class bubble — those carry an HTTP `.status`
- * but are plain `Error` subclasses, not `HttpError`s, so they would
- * otherwise hit the global error handler as unexpected 500s and page
- * PagerDuty. Repackage them with `upstream_*` legacy codes so the
- * alarm gate (server.ts) treats them as upstream failures and only
- * pages on the two we actually care about (rate-limit / auth).
- *
- * Status extraction covers the shapes we've seen in the wild:
- *  - `.status` / `.statusCode` (OpenAI / Anthropic / Together / Google GenAI)
- *  - `.response.status` (Replicate's `ApiError`)
- *  - `.$metadata.httpStatusCode` (AWS SDK v3, e.g. Polly)
- *  - status sniffed from the message string (last resort, for providers
- *    that re-wrap their SDK error in `new Error(msg)` and lose the field)
- *
- * `HttpError`s thrown by drivers pass through untouched.
- */
 const extractUpstreamStatus = (e: {
     status?: number;
     statusCode?: number;
@@ -273,11 +165,6 @@ export class DriverController extends PuterController {
             { subdomain: 'api', requireAuth: true },
             this.#handleListInterfaces,
         );
-        router.get(
-            '/xd',
-            { subdomain: 'api', requireAuth: true },
-            this.#handleXd,
-        );
     }
 
     // -- Handlers ----------------------------------------------------
@@ -336,7 +223,16 @@ export class DriverController extends PuterController {
                 | PermissionService
                 | undefined;
             if (permService) {
-                const permKey = `service:${resolvedDriverName}:ii:${ifaceName}`;
+                // Build via PermissionUtil.join so any `:` in a driver or
+                // interface name is escaped — raw interpolation would let a
+                // crafted name shift permission-segment boundaries and match
+                // a broader/narrower parent than intended in the scan logic.
+                const permKey = PermissionUtil.join(
+                    'service',
+                    String(resolvedDriverName),
+                    'ii',
+                    ifaceName,
+                );
                 const hasPermission = await permService.check(
                     req.actor,
                     permKey,
@@ -439,14 +335,91 @@ export class DriverController extends PuterController {
         // a stale value from a prior call.
         Context.set('driverName', requestedDriver);
 
+        // Per-method lifecycle events, scoped to `driver.<iface>.<method>`.
+        // Subscribers can listen on `driver.*`, `driver.<iface>.*`, or the
+        // exact key. `before` is emitted via `emitAndWait` so a listener may
+        // veto the call by setting `allow = false` (emits `reject`, throws
+        // 403); otherwise `after`/`error` carry the result/error + duration.
+        const actor = req.actor ? actorUid(req.actor) : undefined;
+        const resolved = String(resolvedDriverName);
+        const beforeEvent = {
+            phase: 'before' as const,
+            iface: ifaceName,
+            method,
+            driver: resolved,
+            actor: req.actor,
+            actorUid: actor,
+            args,
+            allow: true as boolean,
+            rejectReason: undefined as string | undefined,
+        };
+        await this.clients.event?.emitAndWait(
+            `driver.${ifaceName}.${method}.before`,
+            beforeEvent,
+            {},
+        );
+        if (beforeEvent.allow === false) {
+            this.clients.event?.emit(
+                `driver.${ifaceName}.${method}.reject`,
+                {
+                    phase: 'reject',
+                    iface: ifaceName,
+                    method,
+                    driver: resolved,
+                    actor: req.actor,
+                    actorUid: actor,
+                    args,
+                    rejectReason: beforeEvent.rejectReason,
+                },
+                {},
+            );
+            throw new HttpError(
+                403,
+                beforeEvent.rejectReason ??
+                    `Blocked by policy: ${ifaceName}:${method}`,
+                { legacyCode: 'forbidden' },
+            );
+        }
+
         // Drivers read actor/context via the Context API — no drilled args.
+        const startedAt = Date.now();
         let result;
         try {
             // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
             result = await (fn as (...x: unknown[]) => any).call(driver, args);
         } catch (e) {
+            this.clients.event?.emit(
+                `driver.${ifaceName}.${method}.error`,
+                {
+                    phase: 'error',
+                    iface: ifaceName,
+                    method,
+                    driver: resolved,
+                    actor: req.actor,
+                    actorUid: actor,
+                    args,
+                    error: e,
+                    durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
+                },
+                {},
+            );
             throw translateProviderError(e);
         }
+        this.clients.event?.emit(
+            `driver.${ifaceName}.${method}.after`,
+            {
+                phase: 'after',
+                iface: ifaceName,
+                method,
+                driver: resolved,
+                actor: req.actor,
+                actorUid: actor,
+                args,
+                result,
+                durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
+            },
+            {},
+        );
 
         if (isDriverStreamResult(result)) {
             res.setHeader('Content-Type', result.content_type);
@@ -489,11 +462,6 @@ export class DriverController extends PuterController {
         res.json(out);
     };
 
-    #handleXd = (_req: Request, res: Response): void => {
-        res.type('text/html');
-        res.send(XD_HTML);
-    };
-
     // -- Internals ---------------------------------------------------
 
     #buildIfaceMap(): void {

src/backend/controllers/fs/FSController.test.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
  */
 
 import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
+import type { Readable } from 'node:stream';
 import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
 import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
 import type { Actor } from '../../core/actor.js';
@@ -124,6 +125,14 @@ const makeRes = () => {
 const withActor = async <T>(actor: Actor, fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> =>
     runWithContext({ actor }, fn);
 
+const streamToString = async (stream: Readable): Promise<string> => {
+    const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
+    for await (const chunk of stream) {
+        chunks.push(Buffer.from(chunk as Buffer));
+    }
+    return Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8');
+};
+
 // ── /startBatchWrite ────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 describe('FSController.startBatchWrites', () => {
@@ -434,6 +443,65 @@ describe('FSController.completeBatchWrites', () => {
         expect(finalized?.wasOverwrite).toBe(true);
     });
 
+    // Regression: a signed (direct-to-S3) upload could declare a tiny size
+    // and PUT far more — the presigned URL doesn't bound the body. The
+    // completion path must reconcile the recorded size against the object's
+    // true size, or storage accounting is permanently understated and the
+    // quota is bypassable.
+    it('reconciles the recorded size to the real uploaded bytes (ignores under-declared size)', async () => {
+        const { actor, userId } = await makeUser();
+        const username = actor.user!.username!;
+        const target = `/${username}/Documents/under-declared.bin`;
+
+        // Declare 1 byte.
+        const start = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.startBatchWrites(
+                makeReq<SignedWriteRequest[]>({
+                    body: [{ fileMetadata: { path: target, size: 1 } }],
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                start.res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const [started] = start.captured.body as SignedWriteResponse[];
+
+        // Actually upload 4096 bytes to the session's object key (simulating
+        // a client that PUTs more than it declared via the signed URL).
+        const realBytes = Buffer.alloc(4096, 0x41);
+        await server.stores.s3Object.uploadFromServer(
+            {
+                bucket: started!.bucket,
+                objectKey: started!.objectKey,
+                contentType: 'application/octet-stream',
+                body: realBytes,
+                contentLength: realBytes.byteLength,
+            },
+            started!.bucketRegion,
+        );
+
+        const complete = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.completeBatchWrites(
+                makeReq<CompleteWriteRequest[]>({
+                    body: [{ uploadId: started!.sessionId }],
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                complete.res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const entry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(target);
+        expect(entry).not.toBeNull();
+        // Recorded size is the true 4096 bytes, not the declared 1.
+        expect(entry?.size).toBe(4096);
+
+        // And the user's accounted usage reflects the real bytes.
+        const allowance =
+            await server.stores.fsEntry.getUserStorageAllowance(userId);
+        expect(allowance.curr).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(4096);
+    });
+
     it('emits updated events with GUI metadata when overwriting via batch completion', async () => {
         const { actor, userId } = await makeUser();
         const username = actor.user!.username!;
@@ -490,9 +558,7 @@ describe('FSController.completeBatchWrites', () => {
             .body as SignedWriteResponse[];
 
         const emitSpy = vi.spyOn(server.clients.event, 'emit');
-        let updatedCall:
-            | (typeof emitSpy.mock.calls)[number]
-            | undefined;
+        let updatedCall: (typeof emitSpy.mock.calls)[number] | undefined;
         try {
             await withActor(actor, () =>
                 controller.completeBatchWrites(
@@ -667,9 +733,9 @@ describe('FSController.statEntry', () => {
             ...makeReq({ body: { path: '/x' }, actor }),
             actor: undefined,
         } as unknown as Request;
-        await expect(
-            controller.statEntry(req, res),
-        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 401 });
+        await expect(controller.statEntry(req, res)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            statusCode: 401,
+        });
     });
 });
 
@@ -839,9 +905,7 @@ describe('FSController.searchEntries', () => {
             ).toBe(true);
         }
         expect(
-            results.some(
-                (r) => r.path === `/${username}/Documents/${needle}`,
-            ),
+            results.some((r) => r.path === `/${username}/Documents/${needle}`),
         ).toBe(false);
     });
 
@@ -953,6 +1017,82 @@ describe('FSController.mkdirEntry', () => {
         expect(body.isDir).toBe(true);
     });
 
+    it('dedupes an existing directory when dedupe_name is true', async () => {
+        const { actor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = actor.user!.username!;
+        const target = `/${username}/Documents/hello`;
+
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.mkdirEntry(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { path: target },
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.mkdirEntry(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { path: target, dedupe_name: true },
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const body = captured.body as {
+            path: string;
+            name: string;
+            isDir: boolean;
+        };
+        expect(body.path).toBe(`/${username}/Documents/hello (1)`);
+        expect(body.name).toBe('hello (1)');
+        expect(body.isDir).toBe(true);
+        expect(
+            await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+                `/${username}/Documents/hello (1)`,
+            ),
+        ).toMatchObject({ isDir: true });
+    });
+
+    it('requires parent write when deduping an existing directory', async () => {
+        const { actor: userActor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = userActor.user!.username!;
+        const appUid = `app-mkdir-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const appActor: Actor = { ...userActor, app: { uid: appUid } };
+        const target = `/${username}/AppData/${appUid}`;
+
+        await withActor(userActor, () =>
+            controller.mkdirEntry(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { path: target },
+                    actor: userActor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        await expect(
+            withActor(appActor, () =>
+                controller.mkdirEntry(
+                    makeReq({
+                        body: { path: target, dedupe_name: true },
+                        actor: appActor,
+                    }),
+                    makeRes().res,
+                ),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
+        expect(
+            await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+                `/${username}/AppData/${appUid} (1)`,
+            ),
+        ).toBeNull();
+    });
+
     it('expands ~/ in the path to the user home', async () => {
         const { actor } = await makeUser();
         const username = actor.user!.username!;
@@ -1183,10 +1323,6 @@ describe('FSController.copyEntry', () => {
 // ── /read (readEntry, full read) ────────────────────────────────────
 
 describe('FSController.readEntry (file streaming)', () => {
-    // makeRes here adds a real Writable surface so that
-    // `pipeline(download.body, res)` inside the controller can pipe
-    // the in-memory S3 stream into the test's response and capture
-    // bytes for assertions.
     const makeStreamingRes = () => {
         const captured = {
             statusCode: 200,
@@ -1194,7 +1330,8 @@ describe('FSController.readEntry (file streaming)', () => {
             bodyChunks: [] as Buffer[],
         };
         // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-        const { Writable } = require('node:stream') as typeof import('node:stream');
+        const { Writable } =
+            require('node:stream') as typeof import('node:stream');
         const writable = new Writable({
             write(chunk: Buffer, _enc, cb) {
                 captured.bodyChunks.push(chunk);
@@ -1254,7 +1391,9 @@ describe('FSController.readEntry (file streaming)', () => {
         // Pipeline awaits the stream-end on success.
         expect(captured.statusCode).toBe(200);
         expect(captured.headers['Content-Type']).toMatch(/text\/plain/);
-        expect(captured.headers['Content-Length']).toBe(String(body.byteLength));
+        expect(captured.headers['Content-Length']).toBe(
+            String(body.byteLength),
+        );
         expect(captured.headers['Content-Disposition']).toMatch(
             /inline; filename=/,
         );
@@ -1698,3 +1837,266 @@ describe('FSController.mkshortcutEntry', () => {
         expect(body.isShortcut).toBe(true);
     });
 });
+
+describe('FSController metadata.objectKey injection', () => {
+    const writeFile = async (
+        actor: Actor,
+        path: string,
+        content: string,
+        metadata?: Record<string, unknown>,
+    ) => {
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.write(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: {
+                        fileMetadata: {
+                            path,
+                            size: Buffer.byteLength(content),
+                            contentType: 'text/plain',
+                            overwrite: true,
+                            ...(metadata ? { metadata } : {}),
+                        },
+                        fileContent: content,
+                        encoding: 'utf8',
+                    },
+                    actor,
+                }) as unknown as Request<
+                    Record<string, never>,
+                    null,
+                    import('./requestTypes.js').WriteRequest
+                >,
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const entry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(path, {
+            skipCache: true,
+        });
+        if (!entry) throw new Error(`entry not found after write: ${path}`);
+        return entry;
+    };
+
+    it("does not stream another user's file when a client injects metadata.objectKey on write", async () => {
+        const victim = await makeUser();
+        const attacker = await makeUser();
+        const victimSecret = 'VICTIM-TOP-SECRET-PAYLOAD';
+        const attackerDecoy = 'attacker-own-decoy-bytes';
+
+        const victimEntry = await writeFile(
+            victim.actor,
+            `/${victim.actor.user!.username}/Documents/secret.txt`,
+            victimSecret,
+        );
+
+        const victimRead = await server.services.fs.readContent(victimEntry);
+        expect(await streamToString(victimRead.body)).toBe(victimSecret);
+
+        const attackerEntry = await writeFile(
+            attacker.actor,
+            `/${attacker.actor.user!.username}/Documents/loot.txt`,
+            attackerDecoy,
+            { objectKey: victimEntry.uuid },
+        );
+
+        const persisted = attackerEntry.metadata
+            ? (JSON.parse(attackerEntry.metadata) as Record<string, unknown>)
+            : {};
+        expect(persisted.objectKey).toBeUndefined();
+
+        const attackerRead =
+            await server.services.fs.readContent(attackerEntry);
+        const got = await streamToString(attackerRead.body);
+        expect(got).toBe(attackerDecoy);
+        expect(got).not.toBe(victimSecret);
+    });
+
+    it('read path ignores a divergent metadata.objectKey on an already-poisoned row', async () => {
+        const victim = await makeUser();
+        const attacker = await makeUser();
+        const victimSecret = 'VICTIM-SECRET-FOR-POISON-TEST';
+        const attackerDecoy = 'attacker-decoy-for-poison-test';
+
+        const victimEntry = await writeFile(
+            victim.actor,
+            `/${victim.actor.user!.username}/Documents/secret2.txt`,
+            victimSecret,
+        );
+        const attackerEntry = await writeFile(
+            attacker.actor,
+            `/${attacker.actor.user!.username}/Documents/loot2.txt`,
+            attackerDecoy,
+        );
+
+        await server.stores.fsEntry.updateEntry(attackerEntry.uuid, {
+            metadata: JSON.stringify({ objectKey: victimEntry.uuid }),
+        });
+        const poisoned = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+            attackerEntry.path,
+            { skipCache: true },
+        );
+        if (!poisoned) throw new Error('poisoned entry not found');
+        expect(
+            (JSON.parse(poisoned.metadata!) as { objectKey: string }).objectKey,
+        ).toBe(victimEntry.uuid);
+
+        const read = await server.services.fs.readContent(poisoned);
+        expect(await streamToString(read.body)).toBe(attackerDecoy);
+    });
+
+    it('scrubs objectKey from move newMetadata while preserving legit trash metadata', async () => {
+        const victim = await makeUser();
+        const attacker = await makeUser();
+        const victimSecret = 'VICTIM-SECRET-FOR-MOVE-TEST';
+        const attackerDecoy = 'attacker-decoy-for-move-test';
+        const username = attacker.actor.user!.username!;
+
+        const victimEntry = await writeFile(
+            victim.actor,
+            `/${victim.actor.user!.username}/Documents/secret3.txt`,
+            victimSecret,
+        );
+        const attackerEntry = await writeFile(
+            attacker.actor,
+            `/${username}/Documents/loot3.txt`,
+            attackerDecoy,
+        );
+        const documents = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+            `/${username}/Documents`,
+            { skipCache: true },
+        );
+        if (!documents) throw new Error('Documents dir not found');
+
+        const moved = await withActor(attacker.actor, () =>
+            server.services.fs.move(attacker.userId, {
+                source: attackerEntry,
+                destinationParent: documents,
+                newName: 'loot3-moved.txt',
+                newMetadata: {
+                    original_path: `/${username}/Documents/loot3.txt`,
+                    trashed_ts: 1700000000,
+                    objectKey: victimEntry.uuid,
+                },
+            }),
+        );
+
+        const persisted = JSON.parse(moved.metadata!) as Record<
+            string,
+            unknown
+        >;
+        expect(persisted.objectKey).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(persisted.original_path).toBe(
+            `/${username}/Documents/loot3.txt`,
+        );
+        expect(persisted.trashed_ts).toBe(1700000000);
+
+        const read = await server.services.fs.readContent(moved);
+        expect(await streamToString(read.body)).toBe(attackerDecoy);
+    });
+});
+
+// ── associatedAppId entitlement gate ────────────────────────────────
+//
+// `associatedAppId` is client-supplied write metadata that's echoed back in
+// legacy FS responses. Binding a file to another tenant's private app would
+// turn `/stat` into an app-row enumeration oracle, so the write path drops
+// any association the actor isn't entitled to make.
+
+describe('FSController associatedAppId entitlement gate', () => {
+    // Seed an app row with a direct insert. `create` treats is_private as a
+    // read-only column, and going through the store would prime the cache —
+    // a raw insert leaves nothing cached so the gate's getById reads the DB.
+    const makeApp = async (
+        ownerUserId: number,
+        opts: { is_private?: boolean } = {},
+    ): Promise<{ id: number }> => {
+        const uid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
+        await server.clients.db.write(
+            `INSERT INTO \`apps\` (\`uid\`, \`name\`, \`title\`, \`index_url\`, \`owner_user_id\`, \`is_private\`)
+             VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+            [
+                uid,
+                uid,
+                'Gate App',
+                'https://gate-app.puter.site/',
+                ownerUserId,
+                opts.is_private ? 1 : 0,
+            ],
+        );
+        const row = (
+            await server.clients.db.read(
+                'SELECT id FROM apps WHERE uid = ?',
+                [uid],
+            )
+        )[0] as { id: number };
+        return { id: row.id };
+    };
+
+    // Write a file via the signed-write flow with the given associatedAppId
+    // and return the committed entry's stored associatedAppId.
+    const writeWithAssociation = async (
+        actor: Actor,
+        path: string,
+        associatedAppId: number,
+    ): Promise<number | null> => {
+        const startRes = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.startBatchWrites(
+                makeReq<SignedWriteRequest[]>({
+                    body: [{ fileMetadata: { path, size: 3, associatedAppId } }],
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                startRes.res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const [started] = startRes.captured.body as SignedWriteResponse[];
+        const completeRes = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.completeBatchWrites(
+                makeReq<CompleteWriteRequest[]>({
+                    body: [{ uploadId: started.sessionId }],
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                completeRes.res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const entry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(path);
+        return entry?.associatedAppId ?? null;
+    };
+
+    it("drops an association to another tenant's private app", async () => {
+        const victim = await makeUser();
+        const attacker = await makeUser();
+        const victimApp = await makeApp(victim.userId, { is_private: true });
+
+        const stored = await writeWithAssociation(
+            attacker.actor,
+            `/${attacker.actor.user!.username}/Documents/probe.txt`,
+            victimApp.id,
+        );
+        expect(stored).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('keeps an association to a public app the actor does not own', async () => {
+        const owner = await makeUser();
+        const other = await makeUser();
+        const publicApp = await makeApp(owner.userId, { is_private: false });
+
+        const stored = await writeWithAssociation(
+            other.actor,
+            `/${other.actor.user!.username}/Documents/public-assoc.txt`,
+            publicApp.id,
+        );
+        expect(stored).toBe(publicApp.id);
+    });
+
+    it('keeps an association to the actor’s own private app', async () => {
+        const owner = await makeUser();
+        const ownApp = await makeApp(owner.userId, { is_private: true });
+
+        const stored = await writeWithAssociation(
+            owner.actor,
+            `/${owner.actor.user!.username}/Documents/own-assoc.txt`,
+            ownApp.id,
+        );
+        expect(stored).toBe(ownApp.id);
+    });
+});

src/backend/controllers/fs/FSController.ts

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ import {
     runWithConcurrencyLimit,
     runWithConcurrencyLimitSettled,
 } from '../../util/concurrency.js';
+import { applyInlineContentSecurity } from '../../util/inlineContentSecurity.js';
 import { PuterController } from '../types.js';
 import { FS_COSTS } from './costs.js';
 import type {
@@ -118,6 +119,8 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
         requestBody.fileMetadata = await this.#resolveAssociatedAppMetadata(
             requestBody.fileMetadata,
             requestBody,
+            undefined,
+            userId,
         );
         await this.#assertWriteAccess(req, requestBody.fileMetadata, {
             pathAlreadyNormalized: true,
@@ -182,6 +185,7 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
                               normalizedRequestBody.fileMetadata,
                               normalizedRequestBody,
                               appUidLookupCache,
+                              userId,
                           );
                       return normalizedRequestBody;
                   }),
@@ -363,6 +367,8 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
         requestBody.fileMetadata = await this.#resolveAssociatedAppMetadata(
             requestBody.fileMetadata,
             requestBody,
+            undefined,
+            userId,
         );
         await this.#assertWriteAccess(req, requestBody.fileMetadata, {
             pathAlreadyNormalized: true,
@@ -496,6 +502,7 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
                                                 item.fileMetadata,
                                                 item,
                                                 appUidLookupCache,
+                                                userId,
                                             ),
                                     })),
                                 ),
@@ -717,6 +724,7 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
                               normalizedRequestBody.fileMetadata,
                               normalizedRequestBody,
                               appUidLookupCache,
+                              userId,
                           );
                       return normalizedRequestBody;
                   }),
@@ -964,8 +972,13 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
             range,
         });
 
-        if (download.contentType)
+        if (download.contentType) {
             res.setHeader('Content-Type', download.contentType);
+            // Stored type is uploader-controlled and served inline on the
+            // api origin — sandbox active-document types (HTML/SVG/XML) so
+            // embedded scripts can't run here. Inert types are untouched.
+            applyInlineContentSecurity(res, download.contentType);
+        }
         if (download.contentLength !== null)
             res.setHeader('Content-Length', String(download.contentLength));
         if (download.contentRange)
@@ -1039,13 +1052,15 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
                 legacyCode: 'bad_request',
             });
 
+        const dedupeName =
+            this.#toBoolean(body.dedupe_name ?? body.dedupeName) ?? false;
         await this.#assertCanCreate(actor, path);
+        if (dedupeName) await this.#assertCanDedupeCreate(actor, path);
 
         const entry = await this.services.fs.mkdir(userId, {
             path,
             overwrite: this.#toBoolean(body.overwrite) ?? false,
-            dedupeName:
-                this.#toBoolean(body.dedupe_name ?? body.dedupeName) ?? false,
+            dedupeName,
             createMissingParents:
                 this.#toBoolean(
                     body.create_missing_parents ??
@@ -1310,6 +1325,17 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
         await this.#assertAccess(actor, parentForCheck, 'write');
     }
 
+    async #assertCanDedupeCreate(actor: Actor, targetPath: string) {
+        const existing = await this.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(targetPath);
+        if (!existing) return;
+        const parent = pathPosix.dirname(targetPath);
+        await this.#assertAccess(
+            actor,
+            parent === '/' ? targetPath : parent,
+            'write',
+        );
+    }
+
     async #assertAccess(
         actor: Actor,
         path: string,
@@ -1676,6 +1702,7 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
         fileMetadata: FSEntryWriteInput,
         fallbackSource?: unknown,
         appUidLookupCache?: Map<string, Promise<number | null>>,
+        actorUserId?: number,
     ): Promise<FSEntryWriteInput> {
         const metadataRecord = this.#toObjectRecord(fileMetadata);
         const fallbackRecord = this.#toObjectRecord(fallbackSource);
@@ -1689,10 +1716,11 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
             ),
         );
         if (associatedAppId !== undefined) {
-            return {
-                ...fileMetadata,
+            return this.#withAssociatedAppId(
+                fileMetadata,
                 associatedAppId,
-            };
+                actorUserId,
+            );
         }
 
         const appUid = this.#firstDefined(
@@ -1726,9 +1754,46 @@ export class FSController extends PuterController {
         if (resolvedAppId === null) {
             return fileMetadata;
         }
+        return this.#withAssociatedAppId(
+            fileMetadata,
+            resolvedAppId,
+            actorUserId,
+        );
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Bind `associatedAppId` onto the write input only when the actor is
+     * entitled to reference that app. `associatedAppId` is client-supplied
+     * and never trusted for authz, but it's echoed back in legacy FS
+     * responses — so an attacker could plant another tenant's private app id
+     * to confirm the row exists (an enumeration oracle) and harvest its
+     * metadata. Allow binding to public apps (their existence isn't secret)
+     * or to apps the actor owns; drop the association otherwise so the file
+     * simply carries no associated app.
+     *
+     * `#resolveWriteFileMetadata` has already copied the raw client value onto
+     * `fileMetadata`, so a dropped association must be actively stripped — not
+     * merely left unset.
+     */
+    async #withAssociatedAppId(
+        fileMetadata: FSEntryWriteInput,
+        appId: number,
+        actorUserId?: number,
+    ): Promise<FSEntryWriteInput> {
+        const app = await this.stores.app.getById(appId);
+        const isPrivate =
+            !!app && (Boolean(app.is_private) || Boolean(app.protected));
+        const isOwner =
+            actorUserId !== undefined &&
+            this.#toNumber(app?.owner_user_id) === actorUserId;
+        if (!app || (isPrivate && !isOwner)) {
+            const { associatedAppId: _dropped, ...rest } =
+                fileMetadata as unknown as Record<string, unknown>;
+            return rest as unknown as FSEntryWriteInput;
+        }
         return {
             ...fileMetadata,
-            associatedAppId: resolvedAppId,
+            associatedAppId: appId,
         };
     }
 

src/backend/controllers/fs/LegacyFSController.test.ts

@@ -206,6 +206,78 @@ describe('LegacyFSController.mkdir', () => {
         expect(fetched?.isDir).toBe(true);
     });
 
+    it('dedupes an existing directory when dedupe_name is true', async () => {
+        const { actor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = actor.user!.username!;
+        const parent = `/${username}/Documents`;
+
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.mkdir(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { parent, path: 'hello' },
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.mkdir(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { parent, path: 'hello', dedupe_name: true },
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const body = captured.body as Record<string, unknown>;
+        expect(body).toMatchObject({
+            path: `${parent}/hello (1)`,
+            name: 'hello (1)',
+            is_dir: true,
+        });
+        expect(
+            await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(`${parent}/hello (1)`),
+        ).toMatchObject({ isDir: true });
+    });
+
+    it('requires parent write when deduping an existing directory', async () => {
+        const { actor: userActor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = userActor.user!.username!;
+        const appUid = `app-legacy-mkdir-${uuidv4()}`;
+        const appActor: Actor = { ...userActor, app: { uid: appUid } };
+        const parent = `/${username}/AppData`;
+
+        await withActor(userActor, () =>
+            controller.mkdir(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { parent, path: appUid },
+                    actor: userActor,
+                }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        await expect(
+            withActor(appActor, () =>
+                controller.mkdir(
+                    makeReq({
+                        body: { parent, path: appUid, dedupe_name: true },
+                        actor: appActor,
+                    }),
+                    makeRes().res,
+                ),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
+        expect(
+            await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+                `${parent}/${appUid} (1)`,
+            ),
+        ).toBeNull();
+    });
+
     it("rejects writing into another user's home with a 4xx", async () => {
         const a = await makeUser();
         const b = await makeUser();
@@ -693,6 +765,121 @@ describe('LegacyFSController.copy', () => {
             `/${username}/Pictures/renamed-copy`,
         );
     });
+
+    it('copies an empty file (no backing S3 object) without erroring', async () => {
+        // Empty files created via /touch have size 0 and no S3 object —
+        // bucket is null. Copy must clone them as empty-file entries rather
+        // than issuing a CopyObject, which would throw S3 NoSuchKey.
+        const { actor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = actor.user!.username!;
+        const src = `/${username}/Documents/empty.txt`;
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.touch(
+                makeReq({ body: { path: src }, actor }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.copy(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { source: src, destination: `/${username}/Pictures` },
+                    actor,
+                }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const body = captured.body as Array<{ copied: { path: string } }>;
+        expect(body[0].copied.path).toBe(`/${username}/Pictures/empty.txt`);
+        const copied = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+            `/${username}/Pictures/empty.txt`,
+        );
+        expect(copied).not.toBeNull();
+        expect(copied!.size).toBe(0);
+        // Original is untouched.
+        expect(await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(src)).not.toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('copying a ghost file (S3 object missing) 404s and cleans up the orphan', async () => {
+        // A real file whose backing S3 object has vanished keeps a non-null
+        // bucket, so it isn't an empty file. CopyObject would throw S3
+        // NoSuchKey; copy must surface a clean 404 and remove the orphan row
+        // rather than bubbling a 500. Mirrors readContent's ghost handling.
+        const { actor, userId } = await makeUser();
+        const username = actor.user!.username!;
+        const src = `/${username}/Documents/ghost.txt`;
+        const content = Buffer.from('i will be deleted from s3');
+        await server.services.fs.write(userId, {
+            fileMetadata: {
+                path: src,
+                size: content.byteLength,
+                contentType: 'text/plain',
+            },
+            fileContent: content,
+        });
+
+        // Delete the backing S3 object directly, leaving the DB row behind.
+        const entry = (await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(src))!;
+        await server.stores.s3Object.deleteObject(
+            server.stores.s3Object.resolveBucket(entry.bucket),
+            entry.uuid,
+            server.stores.s3Object.resolveRegion(entry.bucketRegion),
+        );
+
+        const { res } = makeRes();
+        await expect(
+            withActor(actor, () =>
+                controller.copy(
+                    makeReq({
+                        body: {
+                            source: src,
+                            destination: `/${username}/Pictures`,
+                        },
+                        actor,
+                    }),
+                    res,
+                ),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
+
+        // The ghost handler removed the orphaned source row.
+        expect(await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(src)).toBeNull();
+        // No partial copy was left behind.
+        expect(
+            await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
+                `/${username}/Pictures/ghost.txt`,
+            ),
+        ).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('reads an empty file as empty content without deleting it', async () => {
+        // Reading an empty file (no S3 object) must not throw NoSuchKey nor
+        // trip the ghost-file cleanup, which would delete the entry.
+        const { actor } = await makeUser();
+        const username = actor.user!.username!;
+        const src = `/${username}/Documents/readme-empty.txt`;
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.touch(
+                makeReq({ body: { path: src }, actor }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const entry = (await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(src))!;
+
+        const download = await server.services.fs.readContent(entry);
+        const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
+        for await (const chunk of download.body) {
+            chunks.push(Buffer.from(chunk as Uint8Array));
+        }
+        expect(Buffer.concat(chunks).byteLength).toBe(0);
+        expect(download.contentLength).toBe(0);
+        // The entry must still exist — the ghost handler must NOT have run.
+        expect(
+            await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(src),
+        ).not.toBeNull();
+    });
 });
 
 // ── move ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -1010,6 +1197,76 @@ describe('LegacyFSController.sign', () => {
             ),
         ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
     });
+
+    it('refuses an app actor signing for a different app (403)', async () => {
+        // An app-under-user actor may only mint a token for its own app;
+        // requesting a different app's UID is rejected.
+        const { actor: userActor } = await makeUser();
+        const targetApp = await (
+            server.stores.app.create as unknown as (
+                fields: Record<string, unknown>,
+                opts: { ownerUserId: number },
+            ) => Promise<{ uid: string; id: number }>
+        )(
+            {
+                name: `victim-${uuidv4()}`,
+                title: 'Victim app',
+                index_url: 'https://example.test/victim.html',
+            },
+            { ownerUserId: userActor.user!.id! },
+        );
+        const attackerActor: Actor = {
+            ...userActor,
+            app: { uid: `attacker-${uuidv4()}` },
+        };
+
+        const { res } = makeRes();
+        await expect(
+            withActor(attackerActor, () =>
+                controller.sign(
+                    makeReq({
+                        body: {
+                            items: [{}],
+                            app_uid: targetApp.uid,
+                        },
+                        actor: attackerActor,
+                    }),
+                    res,
+                ),
+            ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403, legacyCode: 'forbidden' });
+    });
+
+    it('lets an app actor sign for its own app', async () => {
+        const { actor: userActor } = await makeUser();
+        const ownApp = await (
+            server.stores.app.create as unknown as (
+                fields: Record<string, unknown>,
+                opts: { ownerUserId: number },
+            ) => Promise<{ uid: string; id: number }>
+        )(
+            {
+                name: `self-${uuidv4()}`,
+                title: 'Self app',
+                index_url: 'https://example.test/self.html',
+            },
+            { ownerUserId: userActor.user!.id! },
+        );
+        const appActor: Actor = { ...userActor, app: { uid: ownApp.uid } };
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(appActor, () =>
+            controller.sign(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { items: [{}], app_uid: ownApp.uid },
+                    actor: appActor,
+                }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const body = captured.body as { token?: string };
+        expect(typeof body.token).toBe('string');
+    });
 });
 
 // ── writeFile (validation paths) ────────────────────────────────────
@@ -1089,6 +1346,85 @@ describe('LegacyFSController.openItem', () => {
     });
 });
 
+// ── openItem: write_url stripping for read-only callers ─────────────
+//
+// Mirrors `/sign` and `/readdir`, which already strip `write_url` when the
+// caller only proved read. Without these gates, /open_item handed out a
+// valid write signature to read-only sharees — `/writeFile`'s own ACL
+// re-check would still reject the write, but the leak shape (a signed
+// write URL escaping the access boundary) is the same one those other
+// endpoints already defend against.
+
+describe('LegacyFSController.openItem (write_url stripping)', () => {
+    beforeAll(() => {
+        (
+            controller as unknown as { config: { api_base_url?: string } }
+        ).config.api_base_url = 'http://api.test.local';
+    });
+
+    it('returns write_url for the owner (who has write)', async () => {
+        const { actor } = await makeUser();
+        const target = `/${actor.user!.username}/Documents/owned.txt`;
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.touch(
+                makeReq({ body: { path: target }, actor }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(actor, () =>
+            controller.openItem(
+                makeReq({ body: { path: target }, actor }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const body = captured.body as {
+            signature: { read_url?: string; write_url?: string };
+        };
+        expect(body.signature.read_url).toBeDefined();
+        expect(body.signature.write_url).toBeDefined();
+        expect(body.signature.write_url).toContain('writeFile');
+    });
+
+    it('strips write_url for a read-only sharee (the fix)', async () => {
+        const victim = await makeUser();
+        const attacker = await makeUser();
+        const target = `/${victim.actor.user!.username}/Documents/shared-ro.txt`;
+        await withActor(victim.actor, () =>
+            controller.touch(
+                makeReq({ body: { path: target }, actor: victim.actor }),
+                makeRes().res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const entry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(target);
+        await server.services.permission.grantUserUserPermission(
+            victim.actor,
+            attacker.actor.user!.username!,
+            `fs:${entry!.uuid}:read`,
+            {},
+        );
+
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await withActor(attacker.actor, () =>
+            controller.openItem(
+                makeReq({
+                    body: { uid: entry!.uuid },
+                    actor: attacker.actor,
+                }),
+                res,
+            ),
+        );
+        const body = captured.body as {
+            signature: { read_url?: string; write_url?: string };
+        };
+        // Sharee still gets read_url (they have read).
+        expect(body.signature.read_url).toBeDefined();
+        // …but write_url is stripped (they don't have write).
+        expect(body.signature.write_url).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+});
+
 // ── requestAppRootDir ───────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 describe('LegacyFSController.requestAppRootDir', () => {

src/backend/controllers/fs/LegacyFSController.ts

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import type { PuterRouter } from '../../core/http/PuterRouter.js';
 import type { ACLService } from '../../services/acl/ACLService.js';
 import type { SignedFile } from '../../util/fileSigning.js';
 import { verifySignature } from '../../util/fileSigning.js';
+import { applyInlineContentSecurity } from '../../util/inlineContentSecurity.js';
 import { PuterController } from '../types.js';
 import { FS_COSTS } from './costs.js';
 import {
@@ -45,14 +46,6 @@ import {
 } from './legacyFsHelpers.js';
 import { RouteOptions } from '../../core/http/index.js';
 
-/**
- * Legacy FS routes, implemented as thin shims over `FSService`.
- *
- * Each shim parses the request shape (FSNodeParam-style `{ path, uid, id }`
- * or `{ parent, name }`), invokes the service method, and returns the
- * snake_case response clients expect.
- */
-
 type RouterCache = Map<string, RequestHandler | null>;
 
 const additionalRoutePaths: Record<string, string> = {};
@@ -146,6 +139,11 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: ['api', ''],
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                // The user's own credential may download their files; apps and
+                // scoped tokens stay blocked. antiCsrf still protects the
+                // cookie-authed GUI path — a bearer-token PAT is exempt below
+                // (CSRF can't forge a header-credentialed request).
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
                 requireVerified: true,
                 antiCsrf: true,
             },
@@ -160,8 +158,7 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
 
         router.get('/get-launch-apps', apiOptions, async (req, res) => {
             const recommendedSvc = this.services.recommendedApps as unknown as
-                | { getRecommendedApps?: () => Promise<unknown[]> }
-                | undefined;
+                { getRecommendedApps?: () => Promise<unknown[]> } | undefined;
             const recommended = recommendedSvc?.getRecommendedApps
                 ? await recommendedSvc.getRecommendedApps()
                 : [];
@@ -196,6 +193,11 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
                             godmode: Boolean(app.godmode),
                             maximize_on_start: Boolean(app.maximize_on_start),
                             index_url: app.index_url,
+                            // An app with no owner isn't owned by a Puter user —
+                            // it's an "external" (origin-bootstrapped) app.
+                            external:
+                                app.owner_user_id == null ||
+                                app.owner_user_id === '',
                         });
                     }
                 }
@@ -427,17 +429,33 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         const normalizedTarget = targetPath.startsWith('/')
             ? targetPath
             : `/${targetPath}`;
+        const dedupeName =
+            getBoolean(body, 'dedupe_name', 'change_name') ?? false;
         await assertCanCreate(
             this.services.acl,
             this.services.fs,
             actor,
             normalizedTarget,
         );
+        if (dedupeName) {
+            const existing =
+                await this.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(normalizedTarget);
+            if (existing) {
+                const parent = pathPosix.dirname(normalizedTarget);
+                await assertAccess(
+                    this.services.acl,
+                    this.services.fs,
+                    actor,
+                    parent === '/' ? normalizedTarget : parent,
+                    'write',
+                );
+            }
+        }
 
         const entry = await this.services.fs.mkdir(userId, {
             path: targetPath,
             overwrite: getBoolean(body, 'overwrite') ?? false,
-            dedupeName: getBoolean(body, 'dedupe_name', 'change_name') ?? false,
+            dedupeName,
             createMissingParents:
                 getBoolean(
                     body,
@@ -541,9 +559,7 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
             // Trash, and `null`/`{}` when restoring. See
             // `src/gui/src/helpers.js` → `window.move_items`.
             newMetadata: (body.new_metadata ?? undefined) as
-                | Record<string, unknown>
-                | null
-                | undefined,
+                Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined,
         });
         const oldPath = source.path;
         await this.#emitGuiEvent('outer.gui.item.moved', moved, {
@@ -959,8 +975,7 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         }
 
         type SignedOrEmpty =
-            | (SignedFile & { path?: string })
-            | Record<string, never>;
+            (SignedFile & { path?: string }) | Record<string, never>;
         const result: { signatures: SignedOrEmpty[]; token?: string } = {
             signatures: [],
         };
@@ -1336,8 +1351,15 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
             query.download === '1' ||
             query.download === true;
 
-        if (download.contentType)
+        if (download.contentType) {
             res.setHeader('Content-Type', download.contentType);
+            // Uploader-controlled type served inline on the file origin —
+            // sandbox active-document types so an uploaded HTML/SVG can't
+            // execute scripts here. Mirrors FSController /fs/read.
+            if (!wantsAttachment) {
+                applyInlineContentSecurity(res, download.contentType);
+            }
+        }
         if (download.contentLength !== null)
             res.setHeader('Content-Length', String(download.contentLength));
         if (download.contentRange)
@@ -1391,6 +1413,20 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
             'read',
         );
 
+        // Downgrade the envelope when the caller only proved read.
+        // `/writeFile`'s ACL re-check would still block the write, but
+        // returning `write_url` to a read-only caller is the same
+        // privilege-leak shape that `/sign` and `/readdir` strip.
+        const writeOk = await this.services.acl.check(
+            actor,
+            {
+                path: entry.path,
+                resolveAncestors: () =>
+                    this.services.fs.getAncestorChain(entry.path),
+            },
+            'write',
+        );
+
         const suggested =
             (await this.services.suggestedApps?.getSuggestedApps({
                 name: entry.name,
@@ -1417,7 +1453,13 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         }
 
         const signingCfg = signingConfigFromAppConfig(this.config);
-        const signature = { ...signEntry(entry, signingCfg), path: entry.path };
+        const signed = signEntry(entry, signingCfg);
+        const signature = writeOk
+            ? { ...signed, path: entry.path }
+            : (() => {
+                  const { write_url: _, ...rest } = signed;
+                  return { ...rest, path: entry.path };
+              })();
         res.json({
             signature,
             token,
@@ -1474,10 +1516,7 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         const subjectRef = body.subject;
         const appRef = body.app;
         const mode = (getString(body, 'mode') ?? 'read') as
-            | 'see'
-            | 'list'
-            | 'read'
-            | 'write';
+            'see' | 'list' | 'read' | 'write';
         if (!subjectRef || !appRef)
             throw new HttpError(400, '`subject` and `app` are required', {
                 legacyCode: 'bad_request',
@@ -1582,17 +1621,6 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
         download.body.pipe(res);
     };
 
-    // Helpers for writeFile
-    // -- GUI event emission -------------------------------------------
-    //
-    // Fire-and-forget `outer.gui.item.*` events so SocketService,
-    // BroadcastService, WorkerDriver (hot-reload), and cache-invalidation
-    // listeners pick up mutations made through the legacy (bare-path) routes.
-    // FSController (v2-native /fs/* routes) emits these from its own handlers;
-    // LegacyFSController delegates to the same FSService but needs its
-    // own emissions because the service layer deliberately doesn't emit GUI
-    // events (that's a controller concern).
-
     async #emitGuiEvent(
         eventName:
             | 'outer.gui.item.added'
@@ -2166,120 +2194,6 @@ export class LegacyFSController extends PuterController {
     }
 
     // -- Helpers ---------------------------------------------------------
-
-    #parsePositiveIntegerQuery(
-        query: Record<string, unknown>,
-        key: string,
-        message: string,
-    ): number | undefined {
-        const value = query[key];
-        if (value === undefined || value === null || value === '') {
-            return undefined;
-        }
-        const parsed = Number.parseInt(String(value), 10);
-        if (!Number.isInteger(parsed) || parsed < 1) {
-            throw new HttpError(400, message, { legacyCode: 'bad_request' });
-        }
-        return parsed;
-    }
-
-    #parseNonNegativeIntegerQuery(
-        query: Record<string, unknown>,
-        key: string,
-        message: string,
-    ): number | undefined {
-        const value = query[key];
-        if (value === undefined || value === null || value === '') {
-            return undefined;
-        }
-        const parsed = Number.parseInt(String(value), 10);
-        if (!Number.isInteger(parsed) || parsed < 0) {
-            throw new HttpError(400, message, { legacyCode: 'bad_request' });
-        }
-        return parsed;
-    }
-
-    #normalizeRangeHeader(rangeHeader: string): string | undefined {
-        const firstRange = rangeHeader.includes(',')
-            ? rangeHeader.split(',')[0]?.trim()
-            : rangeHeader.trim();
-        if (!firstRange) return undefined;
-
-        const matches = firstRange.match(/^bytes=(\d+)-(\d*)$/);
-        if (!matches) return undefined;
-
-        const [, start, end] = matches;
-        return end ? `bytes=${start}-${end}` : `bytes=${start}-`;
-    }
-
-    #pipeLimitedLines(
-        source: NodeJS.ReadableStream,
-        res: Response,
-        lineCount: number,
-    ): void {
-        let remainingLines = lineCount;
-        let isClosed = false;
-
-        const closeSource = () => {
-            if (isClosed) return;
-            isClosed = true;
-            if ('destroy' in source && typeof source.destroy === 'function') {
-                source.destroy();
-            }
-        };
-
-        source.on('error', (err) => {
-            if (!isClosed) {
-                isClosed = true;
-                res.destroy(err);
-            }
-        });
-
-        res.on('close', () => {
-            closeSource();
-        });
-
-        source.on('data', (chunk: Buffer | string) => {
-            if (isClosed) return;
-
-            const buffer = Buffer.isBuffer(chunk) ? chunk : Buffer.from(chunk);
-            let endIndex = buffer.length;
-
-            for (let index = 0; index < buffer.length; index++) {
-                if (buffer[index] !== 0x0a) continue;
-                remainingLines -= 1;
-                if (remainingLines === 0) {
-                    endIndex = index + 1;
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-
-            if (endIndex > 0) {
-                const canContinue = res.write(buffer.subarray(0, endIndex));
-                if (!canContinue) {
-                    source.pause();
-                    res.once('drain', () => {
-                        if (!isClosed) {
-                            source.resume();
-                        }
-                    });
-                }
-            }
-
-            if (endIndex !== buffer.length) {
-                res.end();
-                closeSource();
-            }
-        });
-
-        source.on('end', () => {
-            if (!isClosed) {
-                isClosed = true;
-                res.end();
-            }
-        });
-    }
-
     #requireActor(req: Request) {
         const actor = req.actor;
         if (!actor) {

src/backend/controllers/fs/legacyFsHelpers.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { loadLegacyAssociatedApps } from './legacyFsHelpers.js';
+import type { FSEntry } from '../../stores/fs/FSEntry.js';
+
+const entryWithApp = (associatedAppId: number): FSEntry =>
+    ({ associatedAppId }) as unknown as FSEntry;
+
+const appRow = (overrides: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> => ({
+    id: 1,
+    uid: 'app-1',
+    owner_user_id: 99,
+    app_owner: 99,
+    icon: 'icon',
+    name: 'an-app',
+    title: 'An App',
+    description: 'desc',
+    godmode: 1,
+    maximize_on_start: 1,
+    index_url: 'https://an-app.puter.site/',
+    background: 1,
+    metadata: { secret: true },
+    is_private: 0,
+    protected: 0,
+    ...overrides,
+});
+
+const fakeStore = (row: Record<string, unknown>) => ({
+    getByIds: async (ids: number[]) =>
+        new Map(ids.map((id) => [id, { ...row, id }])),
+});
+
+describe('loadLegacyAssociatedApps associated_app redaction', () => {
+    it('never leaks owner identifiers, even for public apps', async () => {
+        const out = await loadLegacyAssociatedApps(
+            fakeStore(appRow({ is_private: 0, protected: 0 })),
+            [entryWithApp(1)],
+        );
+        const app = out.get(1)!;
+        expect(app).not.toHaveProperty('owner_user_id');
+        expect(app).not.toHaveProperty('app_owner');
+    });
+
+    it('passes through hosting + capability fields for public apps', async () => {
+        const out = await loadLegacyAssociatedApps(
+            fakeStore(appRow({ is_private: 0, protected: 0, godmode: 1 })),
+            [entryWithApp(1)],
+        );
+        const app = out.get(1)!;
+        expect(app.index_url).toBe('https://an-app.puter.site/');
+        expect(app.godmode).toBe(1);
+        expect(app.maximize_on_start).toBe(1);
+    });
+
+    it('redacts hosting + capability fields for private apps', async () => {
+        const out = await loadLegacyAssociatedApps(
+            fakeStore(appRow({ is_private: 1, godmode: 1 })),
+            [entryWithApp(1)],
+        );
+        const app = out.get(1)!;
+        // Existence + display fields still surface...
+        expect(app.uid).toBe('app-1');
+        expect(app.name).toBe('an-app');
+        expect(app.is_private).toBe(1);
+        // ...but the sensitive bits are stripped.
+        expect(app.index_url).toBeNull();
+        expect(app.godmode).toBe(0);
+        expect(app.maximize_on_start).toBe(0);
+        expect(app.background).toBe(0);
+        expect(app.metadata).toBeNull();
+        expect(app).not.toHaveProperty('owner_user_id');
+    });
+
+    it('redacts the same fields for protected apps', async () => {
+        const out = await loadLegacyAssociatedApps(
+            fakeStore(appRow({ is_private: 0, protected: 1, godmode: 1 })),
+            [entryWithApp(1)],
+        );
+        const app = out.get(1)!;
+        expect(app.protected).toBe(1);
+        expect(app.index_url).toBeNull();
+        expect(app.godmode).toBe(0);
+    });
+});

src/backend/controllers/fs/legacyFsHelpers.ts

@@ -274,21 +274,33 @@ const toIntBool = (v: unknown): number => (v ? 1 : 0);
  * embedded in legacy FS entries. Booleans round-trip back to integers (0/1)
  * because the v1 wire contract emits them that way and existing clients key
  * off it. Other columns pass through as-is — `metadata` is already parsed.
+ *
+ * Two redactions, because `associatedAppId` can name an app the actor does
+ * not own (the column is client-writable display metadata, never trusted for
+ * authz — see FSController) and may point cross-tenant:
+ *   - Owner identifiers (`owner_user_id`, `app_owner`) are never emitted —
+ *     they're internal user references with no client-side display use.
+ *   - For private or protected apps, the direct hosting URL and launch
+ *     capability flags (`index_url`, `godmode`, `maximize_on_start`,
+ *     `background`, `metadata`) are dropped. This mirrors AppDriver, which
+ *     withholds `index_url` from callers without read entitlement. Display
+ *     fields (name, icon, title) still pass through so the GUI can label the
+ *     file's associated app.
  */
 function mapAppForLegacyAssociatedApp(
     app: Record<string, unknown>,
 ): Record<string, unknown> {
+    const gated = Boolean(app.is_private) || Boolean(app.protected);
     return {
         id: app.id,
         uid: app.uid,
-        owner_user_id: app.owner_user_id,
         icon: app.icon,
         name: app.name,
         title: app.title,
         description: app.description,
-        godmode: toIntBool(app.godmode),
-        maximize_on_start: toIntBool(app.maximize_on_start),
-        index_url: app.index_url,
+        godmode: gated ? 0 : toIntBool(app.godmode),
+        maximize_on_start: gated ? 0 : toIntBool(app.maximize_on_start),
+        index_url: gated ? null : app.index_url,
         approved_for_listing: toIntBool(app.approved_for_listing),
         approved_for_opening_items: toIntBool(app.approved_for_opening_items),
         approved_for_incentive_program: toIntBool(
@@ -297,9 +309,8 @@ function mapAppForLegacyAssociatedApp(
         timestamp: app.timestamp ?? null,
         last_review: app.last_review ?? null,
         tags: app.tags ?? null,
-        app_owner: app.app_owner ?? null,
-        background: toIntBool(app.background),
-        metadata: app.metadata ?? null,
+        background: gated ? 0 : toIntBool(app.background),
+        metadata: gated ? null : (app.metadata ?? null),
         protected: toIntBool(app.protected),
         is_private: toIntBool(app.is_private),
     };

src/backend/controllers/homepage/HomepageController.test.ts

@@ -165,6 +165,43 @@ describe('HomepageController shell routes', () => {
         expect(html).toContain('Puter');
     });
 
+    it('exposes disable_temp_users to the GUI when signups are disabled', async () => {
+        const homepageConfig = server.controllers.homepage.config as {
+            disable_user_signup?: boolean;
+        };
+        const prev = homepageConfig.disable_user_signup;
+        homepageConfig.disable_user_signup = true;
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        try {
+            await callRoute('get', '/', makeReq({ path: '/' }), res);
+        } finally {
+            homepageConfig.disable_user_signup = prev;
+        }
+        expect(String(captured.body)).toContain('"disable_temp_users":true');
+    });
+
+    it('keeps an operator-set gui_params.disable_temp_users when the flag is off', async () => {
+        const homepageConfig = server.controllers.homepage.config as {
+            disable_user_signup?: boolean;
+            gui_params?: Record<string, unknown>;
+        };
+        const prevFlag = homepageConfig.disable_user_signup;
+        const prevGuiParams = homepageConfig.gui_params;
+        homepageConfig.disable_user_signup = false;
+        homepageConfig.gui_params = {
+            ...prevGuiParams,
+            disable_temp_users: true,
+        };
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        try {
+            await callRoute('get', '/', makeReq({ path: '/' }), res);
+        } finally {
+            homepageConfig.disable_user_signup = prevFlag;
+            homepageConfig.gui_params = prevGuiParams;
+        }
+        expect(String(captured.body)).toContain('"disable_temp_users":true');
+    });
+
     it('still serves the shell when an authenticated actor is present', async () => {
         const { actor } = await makeUser();
         const { res, captured } = makeRes();
@@ -173,12 +210,14 @@ describe('HomepageController shell routes', () => {
         expect(String(captured.body)).toMatch(/<!DOCTYPE html>/i);
     });
 
-    it('serves the shell on /settings, /dashboard, /action, /@:username', async () => {
+    it('serves the shell on /settings, /dashboard, /desktop, /action, /@:username', async () => {
         for (const path of [
             '/settings',
             '/settings/*splat',
             '/dashboard',
             '/dashboard/',
+            '/desktop',
+            '/desktop/',
             '/action/*splat',
             '/@:username',
         ]) {

src/backend/controllers/homepage/HomepageController.ts

@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ export class HomepageController extends PuterController {
         router.get('/dashboard', {}, (req, res) => sendShell(req, res));
         router.get('/dashboard/', {}, (req, res) => sendShell(req, res));
 
+        router.get('/desktop', {}, (req, res) => sendShell(req, res));
+        router.get('/desktop/', {}, (req, res) => sendShell(req, res));
+
         router.get('/action/*splat', {}, (req, res) => sendShell(req, res));
 
         router.get('/@:username', {}, (req, res) => sendShell(req, res));

src/backend/controllers/hosting/HostingController.js

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ export class HostingController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
                 requireVerified: true,
             },
             async (req, res) => {

src/backend/controllers/notification/NotificationController.ts

@@ -38,7 +38,11 @@ export class NotificationController extends PuterController {
      * POST /notif/mark-ack — user dismissed a notification.
      * Sets `acknowledged` timestamp; pushes ack event to sockets.
      */
-    @Post('/mark-ack', { subdomain: 'api', requireUserActor: true })
+    @Post('/mark-ack', {
+        subdomain: 'api',
+        requireUserActor: true,
+        allowFullAccessToken: true,
+    })
     async markAck(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
         const uid = req.body?.uid;
         if (typeof uid !== 'string' || uid.length === 0) {
@@ -77,7 +81,11 @@ export class NotificationController extends PuterController {
      * POST /notif/mark-read — user saw a notification.
      * Sets `shown` timestamp; pushes ack event to sockets.
      */
-    @Post('/mark-read', { subdomain: 'api', requireUserActor: true })
+    @Post('/mark-read', {
+        subdomain: 'api',
+        requireUserActor: true,
+        allowFullAccessToken: true,
+    })
     async markRead(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
         const uid = req.body?.uid;
         if (typeof uid !== 'string' || uid.length === 0) {

src/backend/controllers/oidc/OIDCController.ts

@@ -139,6 +139,19 @@ export class OIDCController extends PuterController {
 
                 let appRedirectUri = flowRedirects[flow] ?? (origin || '/');
 
+                // Optional GUI return path so login started from /desktop or
+                // /dashboard lands back there. Strict whitelist — never a
+                // client-supplied URL (no open redirect).
+                const rawReturnTo = Array.isArray(req.query.return_to)
+                    ? req.query.return_to[0]
+                    : req.query.return_to;
+                if (
+                    (flow === 'login' || flow === 'signup') &&
+                    (rawReturnTo === '/desktop' || rawReturnTo === '/dashboard')
+                ) {
+                    appRedirectUri = `${origin}${rawReturnTo}`;
+                }
+
                 // Popup support
                 const rawPopup = Array.isArray(req.query.embedded_in_popup)
                     ? req.query.embedded_in_popup[0]

src/backend/controllers/peer/PeerController.ts

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
  * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
+import { createHmac, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
 import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
 import type { Actor } from '../../core/actor.js';
 import { HttpError } from '../../core/http/HttpError.js';
@@ -24,6 +25,21 @@ import type { PuterRouter } from '../../core/http/PuterRouter.js';
 import { PuterController } from '../types.js';
 import { PEER_COSTS } from './costs.js';
 
+/**
+ * Constant-time secret comparison for the internal-auth header. HMAC both
+ * sides under a random per-process key to a fixed 32-byte digest first:
+ * this avoids leaking length via an early-return and sidesteps
+ * `timingSafeEqual`'s equal-length requirement for arbitrary-length
+ * inputs. The key need not persist — it only has to be unknown to the
+ * attacker for the duration of the comparison.
+ */
+const COMPARE_KEY = randomBytes(32);
+const secretsEqual = (a: string, b: string): boolean => {
+    const ha = createHmac('sha256', COMPARE_KEY).update(a).digest();
+    const hb = createHmac('sha256', COMPARE_KEY).update(b).digest();
+    return timingSafeEqual(ha, hb);
+};
+
 /**
  * Encode a UUID (or `app-<uuid>` UID) as base64url with no padding.
  * Strips an `app-` prefix and dashes, then reinterprets the hex bytes.
@@ -170,7 +186,11 @@ export class PeerController extends PuterController {
         }
         const expectedSecret = cfg.internal_auth_secret;
         const header = req.headers['x-puter-internal-auth'];
-        if (!expectedSecret || header !== expectedSecret) {
+        if (
+            !expectedSecret ||
+            typeof header !== 'string' ||
+            !secretsEqual(header, expectedSecret)
+        ) {
             throw new HttpError(403, 'Forbidden', { legacyCode: 'forbidden' });
         }
 

src/backend/controllers/puterai/PuterAIController.test.ts

@@ -188,10 +188,11 @@ describe('PuterAIController.registerRoutes', () => {
             ]),
         );
 
-        // The four upstream-proxy routes are user-only: app actors must
-        // call puter-chat-completion directly. The `requireUserActor`
-        // route option wires up the gate that enforces this, so each
-        // proxy route gets the assertion (not just chat/completions).
+        // The four upstream-proxy routes reject third-party apps (they must
+        // call puter-chat-completion directly), but admit the user's own
+        // full-access personal access token: `requireUserActor` keeps apps out
+        // and `allowFullAccessToken` opens the gate to a full-access PAT. Each
+        // proxy route carries both flags.
         const userOnlyPaths = [
             '/puterai/openai/v1/chat/completions',
             '/puterai/openai/v1/completions',
@@ -203,6 +204,7 @@ describe('PuterAIController.registerRoutes', () => {
             expect(route?.opts).toEqual({
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
             });
         }
         const modelsRoute = calls.find(
@@ -1504,6 +1506,212 @@ describe('PuterAIController.anthropicMessages streaming + helpers', () => {
     });
 });
 
+// ── Inline compaction ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('PuterAIController inline compaction', () => {
+    // Extract the single `event: compaction\ndata: {...}` SSE frame.
+    const compactionFrame = (out: string): string | null => {
+        const m = out.match(/event: compaction\ndata: [^\n]*\n\n/);
+        return m ? m[0] : null;
+    };
+
+    it('forwards the compaction opt-in to the driver (/responses)', async () => {
+        const spy = stubChatComplete({
+            message: { role: 'assistant', content: 'ok' },
+            finish_reason: 'stop',
+        });
+        await controller.openaiResponses(
+            makeReq({
+                body: { model: 'gpt-test', input: 'hi', compaction: true },
+                actor: makeUserActor(),
+            }),
+            makeRes().res,
+        );
+        expect(spy.mock.calls[0]![0].compaction).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('round-trips a compaction `input` item into a messages compaction item', async () => {
+        const spy = stubChatComplete({
+            message: { role: 'assistant', content: 'ack' },
+            finish_reason: 'stop',
+        });
+        await controller.openaiResponses(
+            makeReq({
+                body: {
+                    model: 'gpt-test',
+                    input: [
+                        {
+                            type: 'compaction',
+                            id: 'cmpct_1',
+                            encrypted_content: 'ENC',
+                        },
+                    ],
+                },
+                actor: makeUserActor(),
+            }),
+            makeRes().res,
+        );
+        expect(spy.mock.calls[0]![0].messages).toContainEqual({
+            type: 'compaction',
+            id: 'cmpct_1',
+            encrypted_content: 'ENC',
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('emits a canonical compaction SSE event and output item (/responses stream)', async () => {
+        stubChatComplete({
+            dataType: 'stream',
+            content_type: 'application/x-ndjson',
+            stream: ndjsonStreamFrom([
+                { type: 'text', text: 'hi' },
+                { type: 'compaction', id: 'cmpct_9', encrypted_content: 'ENC9' },
+                { type: 'usage', usage: { prompt_tokens: 1, completion_tokens: 1 } },
+            ]),
+        });
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await controller.openaiResponses(
+            makeReq({
+                body: {
+                    model: 'gpt-test',
+                    input: 'hi',
+                    stream: true,
+                    compaction: true,
+                },
+                actor: makeUserActor(),
+            }),
+            res,
+        );
+        await new Promise<void>((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+
+        const out = captured.written.join('');
+        expect(compactionFrame(out)).toBe(
+            'event: compaction\ndata: {"type":"compaction","id":"cmpct_9","encrypted_content":"ENC9"}\n\n',
+        );
+        // Native shape also lands in the final response.completed output[].
+        const completed = out
+            .split('event: response.completed\n')[1]
+            ?.split('\n\n')[0];
+        expect(completed).toContain('"type":"compaction"');
+        expect(completed).toContain('"encrypted_content":"ENC9"');
+    });
+
+    it('emits the compaction item in non-streaming /responses output', async () => {
+        stubChatComplete({
+            message: { role: 'assistant', content: 'done' },
+            finish_reason: 'stop',
+            compaction: { id: 'cmpct_n', encrypted_content: 'ENCN' },
+        });
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await controller.openaiResponses(
+            makeReq({
+                body: { model: 'gpt-test', input: 'hi', compaction: true },
+                actor: makeUserActor(),
+            }),
+            res,
+        );
+        const body = captured.body as { output: Array<Record<string, unknown>> };
+        expect(body.output).toContainEqual(
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                type: 'compaction',
+                encrypted_content: 'ENCN',
+            }),
+        );
+    });
+
+    it('emits an identical canonical compaction SSE event on the Anthropic surface', async () => {
+        // /responses frame
+        stubChatComplete({
+            dataType: 'stream',
+            content_type: 'application/x-ndjson',
+            stream: ndjsonStreamFrom([
+                { type: 'compaction', id: 'cmpct_x', encrypted_content: 'ENCX' },
+            ]),
+        });
+        const r1 = makeRes();
+        await controller.openaiResponses(
+            makeReq({
+                body: { model: 'gpt-test', input: 'hi', stream: true },
+                actor: makeUserActor(),
+            }),
+            r1.res,
+        );
+        await new Promise<void>((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+
+        // /anthropic/v1/messages frame
+        stubChatComplete({
+            dataType: 'stream',
+            content_type: 'application/x-ndjson',
+            stream: ndjsonStreamFrom([
+                { type: 'compaction', id: 'cmpct_x', encrypted_content: 'ENCX' },
+            ]),
+        });
+        const r2 = makeRes();
+        await controller.anthropicMessages(
+            makeReq({
+                body: {
+                    model: 'claude-test',
+                    messages: [{ role: 'user', content: 'hi' }],
+                    stream: true,
+                },
+                actor: makeUserActor(),
+            }),
+            r2.res,
+        );
+        await new Promise<void>((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+
+        const a = compactionFrame(r1.captured.written.join(''));
+        const b = compactionFrame(r2.captured.written.join(''));
+        expect(a).not.toBeNull();
+        expect(a).toBe(b); // byte-identical streaming shape across providers
+    });
+
+    it('renders a native compaction content block in non-streaming /messages', async () => {
+        stubChatComplete({
+            message: { role: 'assistant', content: 'done' },
+            finish_reason: 'stop',
+            compaction: { id: 'cmpct_m', encrypted_content: 'ENCM' },
+        });
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await controller.anthropicMessages(
+            makeReq({
+                body: {
+                    model: 'claude-test',
+                    messages: [{ role: 'user', content: 'hi' }],
+                },
+                actor: makeUserActor(),
+            }),
+            res,
+        );
+        const body = captured.body as { content: Array<Record<string, unknown>> };
+        expect(body.content).toContainEqual({
+            type: 'compaction',
+            id: 'cmpct_m',
+            encrypted_content: 'ENCM',
+        });
+    });
+
+    it('does not emit compaction frames for a normal stream (regression)', async () => {
+        stubChatComplete({
+            dataType: 'stream',
+            content_type: 'application/x-ndjson',
+            stream: ndjsonStreamFrom([
+                { type: 'text', text: 'hello' },
+                { type: 'usage', usage: { prompt_tokens: 1, completion_tokens: 1 } },
+            ]),
+        });
+        const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+        await controller.openaiResponses(
+            makeReq({
+                body: { model: 'gpt-test', input: 'hi', stream: true },
+                actor: makeUserActor(),
+            }),
+            res,
+        );
+        await new Promise<void>((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+        expect(captured.written.join('')).not.toContain('event: compaction');
+    });
+});
+
 // ── Model details listing ───────────────────────────────────────────
 
 describe('PuterAIController model details', () => {

src/backend/controllers/puterai/PuterAIController.ts

@@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
         const apiAuthOpts = {
             subdomain: 'api',
             requireUserActor: true,
+            // These are the user's own programmatic AI surface (OpenAI/Anthropic
+            // wire). `requireUserActor` here exists to keep third-party apps
+            // out, not to block the user's own credential — so admit full-access
+            // personal access tokens (CLI/MCP/scripts). Apps and scoped tokens
+            // stay blocked.
+            allowFullAccessToken: true,
         } as RouteOptions;
         const publicOpts = { subdomain: 'api', requireAuth: false } as const;
 
@@ -581,6 +587,15 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
                 ? { metadata: body.metadata as Record<string, string> }
                 : {}),
             ...(body.conversation ? { conversation: body.conversation } : {}),
+            ...(body.context_management !== undefined
+                ? { context_management: body.context_management }
+                : {}),
+            ...(body.compaction !== undefined
+                ? {
+                      compaction:
+                          body.compaction as ICompleteArguments['compaction'],
+                  }
+                : {}),
             ...(body.previous_response_id
                 ? { previous_response_id: String(body.previous_response_id) }
                 : {}),
@@ -744,6 +759,30 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
                             output_index: outputIndex,
                             item,
                         });
+                    } else if (ev.type === 'compaction') {
+                        // Native shape in the final `output[]`, plus the
+                        // canonical SSE event shared with the Anthropic surface.
+                        const item = {
+                            type: 'compaction',
+                            ...(ev.id !== undefined ? { id: ev.id } : {}),
+                            encrypted_content: ev.encrypted_content,
+                        };
+                        const outputIndex = output.length;
+                        output.push(item);
+                        sendEvent({
+                            type: 'response.output_item.added',
+                            output_index: outputIndex,
+                            item,
+                        });
+                        sendEvent({
+                            type: 'response.output_item.done',
+                            output_index: outputIndex,
+                            item,
+                        });
+                        writeCompactionEvent(res, {
+                            id: ev.id,
+                            encrypted_content: ev.encrypted_content,
+                        });
                     } else if (ev.type === 'usage') {
                         usage = buildResponsesUsage(
                             ev.usage as Record<string, unknown>,
@@ -863,6 +902,15 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
             ...(body.max_tokens !== undefined
                 ? { max_tokens: Number(body.max_tokens) }
                 : {}),
+            ...(body.context_management !== undefined
+                ? { context_management: body.context_management }
+                : {}),
+            ...(body.compaction !== undefined
+                ? {
+                      compaction:
+                          body.compaction as ICompleteArguments['compaction'],
+                  }
+                : {}),
             ...(body.provider
                 ? { provider: toStringOrEmpty(body.provider) }
                 : { provider: DEFAULTS.anthropic }),
@@ -962,6 +1010,14 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
                             },
                         });
                         closeBlock();
+                    } else if (ev.type === 'compaction') {
+                        // Close any open content block, then emit the canonical
+                        // compaction SSE event — byte-identical to /responses.
+                        closeBlock();
+                        writeCompactionEvent(res, {
+                            id: ev.id,
+                            encrypted_content: ev.encrypted_content,
+                        });
                     } else if (ev.type === 'usage') {
                         usage = ev.usage as Record<string, unknown>;
                     }
@@ -1020,6 +1076,18 @@ export class PuterAIController extends PuterController {
         if (textContent)
             contentBlocks.push({ type: 'text', text: textContent });
         contentBlocks.push(...toolUseBlocks);
+        // Native Anthropic-shaped compaction block (non-streaming bodies stay
+        // provider-native, unlike the unified streaming event).
+        const compaction = (
+            messageResult as { compaction?: Record<string, unknown> }
+        ).compaction;
+        if (compaction) {
+            contentBlocks.push({
+                type: 'compaction',
+                ...(compaction.id !== undefined ? { id: compaction.id } : {}),
+                encrypted_content: compaction.encrypted_content,
+            });
+        }
         if (contentBlocks.length === 0)
             contentBlocks.push({ type: 'text', text: '' });
 
@@ -1076,6 +1144,25 @@ const setSseHeaders = (res: Response): void => {
     res.setHeader('Connection', 'keep-alive');
 };
 
+/**
+ * Inline-compaction is emitted in a single canonical SSE shape that is
+ * byte-identical across the `/responses` and `/anthropic/v1/messages` streaming
+ * surfaces, so a streaming client parses compaction the same way regardless of
+ * which upstream served the request. (Non-streaming bodies stay provider-native.)
+ */
+const writeCompactionEvent = (
+    res: Response,
+    compaction: { id?: unknown; encrypted_content?: unknown },
+): void => {
+    const payload = {
+        type: 'compaction',
+        ...(compaction.id !== undefined ? { id: compaction.id } : {}),
+        encrypted_content: compaction.encrypted_content,
+    };
+    res.write(`event: compaction\n`);
+    res.write(`data: ${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n\n`);
+};
+
 /**
  * The chat driver returns either a stream-result envelope or a plain
  * message result. Proxy routes invoked with `stream: true` expect the
@@ -1319,6 +1406,17 @@ const responseInputToMessages = (input: unknown): unknown[] => {
         if (!item || typeof item !== 'object') continue;
         const it = item as Record<string, unknown>;
 
+        if (it.type === 'compaction') {
+            // Round-tripped compaction artifact: preserve it as a bare item so
+            // `normalize_single_message` wraps it into an internal compaction
+            // content block (providers map it back to their native input shape).
+            messages.push({
+                type: 'compaction',
+                ...(it.id !== undefined ? { id: it.id } : {}),
+                encrypted_content: it.encrypted_content,
+            });
+            continue;
+        }
         if (it.type === 'function_call_output') {
             messages.push({
                 role: 'tool',
@@ -1410,6 +1508,16 @@ const responseOutputFromResult = (
         });
     }
 
+    const compaction = (result as { compaction?: Record<string, unknown> })
+        .compaction;
+    if (compaction) {
+        output.push({
+            id: (compaction.id as string | undefined) || generateId('cmpct'),
+            type: 'compaction',
+            encrypted_content: compaction.encrypted_content,
+        });
+    }
+
     return output;
 };
 

src/backend/controllers/static/StaticPagesController.ts

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ export class StaticPagesController extends PuterController {
             const domain = this.config.domain ?? req.hostname;
             const origin = `${req.protocol}://${domain}`;
             const apps = (await this.clients.db.read(
-                'SELECT `name` FROM `apps` WHERE `approved_for_listing` = 1',
+                `SELECT \`name\` FROM \`apps\` WHERE \`approved_for_listing\` = ${this.clients.db.booleanLiteral(true)}`,
             )) as Array<{ name: string }>;
             const urls = [
                 `<url><loc>${req.protocol}://docs.${domain}/</loc></url>`,
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ export class StaticPagesController extends PuterController {
             const [dupe] = (await this.clients.db.read(
                 `SELECT EXISTS(
                     SELECT 1 FROM \`user\` WHERE (\`email\` = ? OR \`clean_email\` = ?)
-                    AND \`email_confirmed\` = 1
+                    AND \`email_confirmed\` = ${this.clients.db.booleanLiteral(true)}
                     AND \`password\` IS NOT NULL
                 ) AS email_exists`,
                 [user.email, cleanEmail],

src/backend/controllers/system/SystemController.js

@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ export class SystemController extends PuterController {
             {
                 subdomain: 'api',
                 requireUserActor: true,
+                allowFullAccessToken: true,
                 rateLimit: {
                     scope: 'contact-us',
                     limit: 10,
@@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ export class SystemController extends PuterController {
                 name: 'Puter',
                 version: this.config.version ?? null,
                 environment: this.config.env ?? 'prod',
+                disable_user_signup: Boolean(this.config.disable_user_signup),
             });
         });
 

src/backend/controllers/system/SystemController.test.ts

@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ describe('SystemController GET /whoarewe', () => {
         expect(captured.body).toMatchObject({
             name: 'Puter',
             environment: 'dev',
+            disable_user_signup: false,
         });
     });
 });

src/backend/controllers/webdav/WebDAVController.test.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
 import { Readable } from 'node:stream';
 import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
 import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
+import { hash as bcryptHash } from 'bcrypt';
 import { PuterRouter } from '../../core/http/PuterRouter.js';
 import { PuterServer } from '../../server.js';
 import { setupTestServer } from '../../testUtil.js';
@@ -228,6 +229,112 @@ describe('WebDAVController', () => {
         });
     });
 
+    describe('pending-verification gate', () => {
+        // WebDAV must enforce the same gate every other authenticated route
+        // gets from requireVerifiedAccount — it dispatches off a single use()
+        // with no route options, so the middleware is never wired in and it
+        // has to call assertVerifiedAccount itself. Without it, an account
+        // still pending email/phone/card verification could read/write its
+        // whole filesystem over the `dav` subdomain.
+        const gatedActor = (flags: Record<string, unknown>) => ({
+            user: {
+                id: 1,
+                uuid: 'gated-uuid',
+                username: 'gated',
+                ...flags,
+            },
+        });
+
+        it('rejects a session actor pending phone verification with 403', async () => {
+            const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+            await dispatchMiddleware(
+                makeReq({
+                    method: 'PROPFIND',
+                    actor: gatedActor({ requires_phone_verification: true }),
+                }),
+                res,
+                noop,
+            );
+            expect(captured.statusCode).toBe(403);
+        });
+
+        it('rejects a session actor pending card verification with 403', async () => {
+            const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+            await dispatchMiddleware(
+                makeReq({
+                    method: 'GET',
+                    actor: gatedActor({ requires_card_verification: true }),
+                }),
+                res,
+                noop,
+            );
+            expect(captured.statusCode).toBe(403);
+        });
+
+        it('rejects a session actor with an unconfirmed email with 403', async () => {
+            const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+            await dispatchMiddleware(
+                makeReq({
+                    method: 'PROPFIND',
+                    actor: gatedActor({
+                        requires_email_confirmation: true,
+                        email_confirmed: false,
+                    }),
+                }),
+                res,
+                noop,
+            );
+            expect(captured.statusCode).toBe(403);
+        });
+
+        it('enforces the gate on the Basic-auth path (flags carried onto the built actor)', async () => {
+            const username = `webdav-gated-${Math.random()
+                .toString(36)
+                .slice(2, 10)}`;
+            const created = await server.stores.user.create({
+                username,
+                uuid: uuidv4(),
+                password: await bcryptHash('correct-horse', 4),
+                email: `${username}@test.local`,
+                free_storage: 100 * 1024 * 1024,
+                requires_email_confirmation: false,
+            });
+            await server.stores.user.update(created.id, {
+                requires_phone_verification: 1,
+            });
+
+            const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+            await dispatchMiddleware(
+                makeReq({
+                    method: 'PROPFIND',
+                    headers: {
+                        authorization: basicAuth(username, 'correct-horse'),
+                    },
+                }),
+                res,
+                noop,
+            );
+            expect(captured.statusCode).toBe(403);
+        });
+
+        it('lets a fully-verified session actor through the gate', async () => {
+            const { res, captured } = makeRes();
+            await dispatchMiddleware(
+                makeReq({
+                    method: 'OPTIONS',
+                    actor: gatedActor({
+                        requires_phone_verification: false,
+                        requires_card_verification: false,
+                        requires_email_confirmation: false,
+                    }),
+                }),
+                res,
+                noop,
+            );
+            expect(captured.statusCode).toBe(200);
+        });
+    });
+
     describe('unsupported methods', () => {
         it('returns 405 for unknown HTTP methods', async () => {
             const { res, captured } = makeRes();

src/backend/controllers/webdav/WebDAVController.ts

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import { posix as pathPosix } from 'node:path';
 import { EventMap } from '../../clients/event/types.js';
 import type { Actor } from '../../core/actor.js';
 import { HttpError } from '../../core/http/HttpError.js';
+import { assertVerifiedAccount } from '../../core/http/middleware/gates.js';
 import type { PuterRouter } from '../../core/http/PuterRouter.js';
 import { verify as verifyOtp } from '../../services/auth/OTPUtil.js';
 import { expandTildePath } from '../../services/fs/resolveNode.js';
@@ -89,6 +90,16 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
         const actor = await this.#resolveActor(req, res);
         if (!actor) return; // 401 already sent
 
+        // Apply the same pending-verification gate every other authenticated
+        // route gets from `requireVerifiedAccount`. WebDAV dispatches every
+        // method off a single `router.use` with no route options, so that
+        // middleware is never inserted into its chain — without this call an
+        // account still pending email / phone / card verification could read,
+        // write, and delete its entire filesystem over the `dav` subdomain,
+        // bypassing the gate. Throws a 403 HttpError, surfaced by the catch in
+        // registerRoutes.
+        assertVerifiedAccount(actor.user);
+
         // Expand `~`/`~/...` against the authenticated actor's username.
         // WebDAV doesn't standardize `~`, but some clients do — and the
         // pre-existing behaviour silently expanded it via the FS store.
@@ -233,6 +244,15 @@ export class WebDAVController extends PuterController {
                 email_confirmed: user.email_confirmed ?? false,
                 requires_email_confirmation:
                     user.requires_email_confirmation ?? false,
+                // Carry the signup-time verification flags so the
+                // assertVerifiedAccount() gate in #dispatch can see them on
+                // the Basic-auth path too (the cookie / `-token` paths get
+                // them from AuthService#actorUserFromRow). Omitting these is
+                // what let phone/card-gated accounts through WebDAV.
+                requires_phone_verification:
+                    user.requires_phone_verification ?? false,
+                requires_card_verification:
+                    user.requires_card_verification ?? false,
             },
         };
     }

src/backend/core/actor.ts

@@ -33,6 +33,15 @@ export interface ActorAccessToken {
     uid: string;
     issuer: Actor;
     authorized?: Actor | null;
+    /**
+     * Full-API-access ("personal access token") flag, set from the signed
+     * `full_access` JWT claim. Such a token may exercise everything its issuing
+     * user can do via the API and is admitted past `requireNonAccessTokenGate`
+     * — but is still rejected by `requireUserActor` / web-session gates, so it
+     * can never manage the account. Normal (scoped) access tokens leave this
+     * false and remain blocked from non-`allowAccessToken` routes.
+     */
+    fullAccess?: boolean;
 }
 
 export interface Actor {

src/backend/core/http/expressAugmentation.ts

@@ -42,6 +42,13 @@ declare global {
 
             tokenAuthFailed?: boolean;
 
+            /**
+             * Set when a token authenticated but its app is on the origin
+             * blocklist. The auth probe leaves `actor` unset; gates translate
+             * this into a 403 `app_blocked`.
+             */
+            appBlocked?: { reason?: string };
+
             requiresReauth?: {
                 reason: 'token_v1' | 'session_revoked' | 'session_expired';
                 auth_id?: string;
@@ -66,6 +73,21 @@ declare global {
             /** True when the request's Host is a custom domain (not one of the configured Puter domains). */
             is_custom_domain?: boolean;
 
+            /**
+             * Coarse server-derived request fingerprint (IP + UA + accept
+             * headers), populated by the global fingerprint middleware. Always
+             * present; the same value the rate limiter keys on.
+             */
+            networkFingerprint?: string;
+
+            /**
+             * Client-supplied device fingerprint (ThumbmarkJS hash) from the
+             * body or `x-puter-device-fingerprint` header, populated by the
+             * global fingerprint middleware. Present only when the client sent a
+             * well-shaped value; spoofable but stable per device across IPs.
+             */
+            deviceFingerprint?: string;
+
             /** Parsed cookies, populated by the global `cookie-parser` middleware. */
             cookies?: Record<string, string>;
         }

src/backend/core/http/middleware/antiCsrf.js

@@ -73,6 +73,19 @@ export const antiCsrf = {
 export function requireAntiCsrf() {
     return async (req, _res, next) => {
         try {
+            // CSRF only applies to ambient credentials the browser attaches
+            // automatically (the session cookie). A full-access personal access
+            // token travels in the Authorization header — it can't be forged
+            // cross-origin — so it needs no anti-CSRF token, which is what makes
+            // routes like `/fs/down` reachable by a PAT. We deliberately scope
+            // this to full-access tokens (the only access tokens routed onto
+            // antiCsrf-protected endpoints): anything else — cookie-authed user
+            // actors, app actors, or a scoped token that somehow reaches here —
+            // still goes through the check below and fails closed.
+            if (req.actor?.accessToken?.fullAccess) {
+                return next();
+            }
+
             const sessionId = req.actor?.user?.uuid;
             if (!sessionId) {
                 return next(

src/backend/core/http/middleware/antiCsrf.test.js

@@ -118,6 +118,51 @@ describe('requireAntiCsrf middleware', () => {
         expect(arg).toBeUndefined();
     });
 
+    it('exempts a FULL-ACCESS access token (no anti_csrf token needed)', async () => {
+        // A full-access PAT is header-credentialed (bearer), so it can't be
+        // CSRF-forged — the middleware lets it through without a token. This is
+        // what makes antiCsrf routes like /fs/down reachable by a PAT.
+        const arg = await runMiddleware({
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'user-uuid-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'user-uuid-1' } },
+                    fullAccess: true,
+                },
+            },
+            body: {},
+        });
+        expect(arg).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('does NOT exempt a scoped (non-full-access) access token — fails closed', async () => {
+        // Scoped tokens are never deliberately routed onto antiCsrf endpoints;
+        // if one reaches here it must still present a token (which it can't get)
+        // rather than getting a free pass.
+        const arg = await runMiddleware({
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'user-uuid-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'user-uuid-1' } },
+                },
+            },
+            body: {},
+        });
+        expect(isHttpError(arg)).toBe(true);
+        expect(arg.statusCode).toBe(400);
+    });
+
+    it('still enforces the token for cookie-authed user actors (no accessToken)', async () => {
+        const arg = await runMiddleware({
+            actor: { user: { uuid: 'user-uuid-1' } },
+            body: {},
+        });
+        expect(isHttpError(arg)).toBe(true);
+        expect(arg.statusCode).toBe(400);
+    });
+
     it('returns 401 unauthorized when no actor is attached', async () => {
         const arg = await runMiddleware({ body: { anti_csrf: 'whatever' } });
         expect(isHttpError(arg)).toBe(true);

src/backend/core/http/middleware/authProbe.test.ts

@@ -545,30 +545,10 @@ describe('createAuthProbe — actor attachment + failure tracking', () => {
     });
 });
 
-// ── Reauth signal + KV counters ─────────────────────────────────────
+// ── Reauth signal ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 describe('createAuthProbe — reauth signal', () => {
-    /** Capture KV increments without a real store. */
-    const makeKvStub = () => {
-        const calls: Array<{
-            key: string;
-            pathAndAmountMap: Record<string, number>;
-        }> = [];
-        return {
-            calls,
-            store: {
-                incr: async (args: {
-                    key: string;
-                    pathAndAmountMap: Record<string, number>;
-                }) => {
-                    calls.push(args);
-                    return { res: {} as Record<string, number>, usage: 0 };
-                },
-            },
-        };
-    };
-
-    it('sets requiresReauth and counts v1 + reauth.token_v1 for a legacy v1 token', async () => {
+    it('sets requiresReauth with a signed token for a legacy v1 token', async () => {
         const stub = makeStubAuth();
         stub.setNextResult({
             reauth: { reason: 'token_v1', auth_id: 'u-legacy' },
@@ -576,11 +556,7 @@ describe('createAuthProbe — reauth signal', () => {
             // The probe must still set requiresReauth; gate emits 401.
             actor: { user: { uuid: 'u-legacy' } },
         } as never);
-        const kv = makeKvStub();
-        const probe = createAuthProbe({
-            authService: stub.service,
-            kvStore: kv.store,
-        });
+        const probe = createAuthProbe({ authService: stub.service });
         const { req } = await runProbe(
             probe,
             makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer v1-tok' } }),
@@ -590,109 +566,36 @@ describe('createAuthProbe — reauth signal', () => {
             auth_id: 'u-legacy',
             reauth_token: 'reauth-jwt:u-legacy',
         });
-        // Both increments fire under the same day-bucketed key.
-        expect(kv.calls).toHaveLength(1);
-        expect(kv.calls[0].key).toMatch(/^auth-v2:metrics:\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/);
-        expect(kv.calls[0].pathAndAmountMap).toEqual({
-            v1: 1,
-            'reauth.token_v1': 1,
-        });
     });
 
-    it('sets requiresReauth and counts reauth.session_revoked', async () => {
+    it('sets requiresReauth for a revoked session', async () => {
         const stub = makeStubAuth();
         stub.setNextResult({
             reauth: { reason: 'session_revoked', auth_id: 'u-1' },
         });
-        const kv = makeKvStub();
-        const probe = createAuthProbe({
-            authService: stub.service,
-            kvStore: kv.store,
-        });
+        const probe = createAuthProbe({ authService: stub.service });
         const { req } = await runProbe(
             probe,
             makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer tok' } }),
         );
         expect(req.requiresReauth?.reason).toBe('session_revoked');
-        expect(kv.calls[0].pathAndAmountMap).toEqual({
-            v1: 1,
-            'reauth.session_revoked': 1,
-        });
     });
 
-    it('sets requiresReauth and counts reauth.session_expired', async () => {
+    it('sets requiresReauth for an expired session', async () => {
         const stub = makeStubAuth();
         stub.setNextResult({
             reauth: { reason: 'session_expired', auth_id: 'u-1' },
         });
-        const kv = makeKvStub();
-        const probe = createAuthProbe({
-            authService: stub.service,
-            kvStore: kv.store,
-        });
+        const probe = createAuthProbe({ authService: stub.service });
         const { req } = await runProbe(
             probe,
             makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer tok' } }),
         );
         expect(req.requiresReauth?.reason).toBe('session_expired');
-        expect(kv.calls[0].pathAndAmountMap).toEqual({
-            v1: 1,
-            'reauth.session_expired': 1,
-        });
     });
 
-    it('counts v2 verify (no reauth) for a healthy token', async () => {
+    it('attaches an actor and no reauth for a healthy v2 token', async () => {
         const stub = makeStubAuth({ user: { uuid: 'u-1' } });
-        const kv = makeKvStub();
-        const probe = createAuthProbe({
-            authService: stub.service,
-            kvStore: kv.store,
-        });
-        const { req } = await runProbe(
-            probe,
-            makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer good-tok' } }),
-        );
-        expect(req.actor).toBeTruthy();
-        expect(req.requiresReauth).toBeUndefined();
-        expect(kv.calls[0].pathAndAmountMap).toEqual({ v2: 1 });
-    });
-
-    it('does not increment counters when no token is presented', async () => {
-        const stub = makeStubAuth();
-        const kv = makeKvStub();
-        const probe = createAuthProbe({
-            authService: stub.service,
-            kvStore: kv.store,
-        });
-        await runProbe(probe, makeReq({}));
-        // Anonymous-OK routes pay no metrics cost.
-        expect(kv.calls).toHaveLength(0);
-    });
-
-    it('absorbs KV failures — never rejects on the hot path', async () => {
-        const stub = makeStubAuth({ user: { uuid: 'u-1' } });
-        // Failing KV: increments throw. Probe must still succeed.
-        const failingKv = {
-            incr: async () => {
-                throw new Error('kv unavailable');
-            },
-        };
-        const probe = createAuthProbe({
-            authService: stub.service,
-            kvStore: failingKv,
-        });
-        const { req, next } = await runProbe(
-            probe,
-            makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer good-tok' } }),
-        );
-        expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledWith();
-        expect(req.actor).toBeTruthy();
-    });
-
-    it('works without a kvStore (counters become no-ops)', async () => {
-        const stub = makeStubAuth({ user: { uuid: 'u-1' } });
-        // Production may not always pass a KV — fresh installs without
-        // dynamo wired still need a functioning probe.
         const probe = createAuthProbe({ authService: stub.service });
         const { req } = await runProbe(
             probe,
@@ -702,6 +605,17 @@ describe('createAuthProbe — reauth signal', () => {
         expect(req.requiresReauth).toBeUndefined();
     });
 
+    it('never rejects on the hot path', async () => {
+        const stub = makeStubAuth({ user: { uuid: 'u-1' } });
+        const probe = createAuthProbe({ authService: stub.service });
+        const { req, next } = await runProbe(
+            probe,
+            makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer good-tok' } }),
+        );
+        expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledWith();
+        expect(req.actor).toBeTruthy();
+    });
+
     it('logs `[auth-v2] reauth reason=<r> auth_id=<id>` per event', async () => {
         // The log line is the human-facing forensic counterpart to the
         // KV counter. Asserting the exact shape so ops can `grep

src/backend/core/http/middleware/authProbe.ts

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ import type {
     AuthService,
     ReauthReason,
 } from '../../../services/auth/AuthService';
-import type { SystemKVStore } from '../../../stores/systemKv/SystemKVStore';
 
 // Ensure the `Request.actor` / `Request.token` augmentation is in scope
 // wherever this middleware is imported.
@@ -32,25 +31,8 @@ interface AuthProbeOptions {
     authService: AuthService;
     /** Name of the session cookie to inspect. Falls back to `config.cookie_name`. */
     cookieName?: string;
-    kvStore?: SystemKVStore;
 }
 
-const authV2MetricsKey = (): string => {
-    const now = new Date();
-    const yyyy = now.getUTCFullYear();
-    const mm = String(now.getUTCMonth() + 1).padStart(2, '0');
-    const dd = String(now.getUTCDate()).padStart(2, '0');
-    return `auth-v2:metrics:${yyyy}-${mm}-${dd}`;
-};
-
-const bumpCounter = (
-    kv: Pick<SystemKVStore, 'incr'> | undefined,
-    pathAndAmountMap: Record<string, number>,
-): void => {
-    if (!kv) return;
-    kv.incr({ key: authV2MetricsKey(), pathAndAmountMap }).catch(() => {});
-};
-
 /**
  * Non-enforcing auth probe. Runs globally (installed by `PuterServer`) on
  * every request, tries to locate a token in the usual places, and — if one
@@ -70,7 +52,7 @@ const bumpCounter = (
  *   6. Socket handshake query (for ws upgrades that pass through HTTP first)
  */
 export const createAuthProbe = (opts: AuthProbeOptions): RequestHandler => {
-    const { authService, cookieName, kvStore } = opts;
+    const { authService, cookieName } = opts;
     return async (req, _res, next): Promise<void> => {
         // If something upstream already attached an actor, respect it.
         if (req.actor) {
@@ -94,10 +76,6 @@ export const createAuthProbe = (opts: AuthProbeOptions): RequestHandler => {
             });
 
             if (result.reauth) {
-                bumpCounter(kvStore, {
-                    v1: 1,
-                    [`reauth.${result.reauth.reason}`]: 1,
-                });
                 // Bind a short-lived JWT proving the rejected session
                 // identified this auth_id. The GUI echoes this back on
                 // /login or /signup; the raw auth_id is informational
@@ -113,8 +91,13 @@ export const createAuthProbe = (opts: AuthProbeOptions): RequestHandler => {
                 console.info(
                     `[auth-v2] reauth reason=${result.reauth.reason} auth_id=${result.reauth.auth_id ?? '-'}`,
                 );
-            } else if (result.actor) {
-                bumpCounter(kvStore, { v2: 1 });
+            }
+
+            if (result.blocked) {
+                // App is on the origin blocklist: leave `actor` unset so gates
+                // reject. `appBlocked` lets the gate emit a clear 403 instead
+                // of the generic "token failed" 401.
+                req.appBlocked = { reason: result.blocked.reason };
             }
 
             if (result.actor) {

src/backend/core/http/middleware/fingerprint.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import { createFingerprintMiddleware } from './fingerprint';
+
+const VALID_FP = 'dev-fingerprint-abc123';
+
+const run = (reqPartial: Partial<Request> & Record<string, unknown>) => {
+    const middleware = createFingerprintMiddleware();
+    const req = {
+        headers: {},
+        ...reqPartial,
+    } as unknown as Request;
+    const next = vi.fn();
+    middleware(req, {} as Response, next);
+    return { req, next };
+};
+
+describe('createFingerprintMiddleware', () => {
+    it('always sets a well-formed networkFingerprint and calls next', () => {
+        const { req, next } = run({ ip: '203.0.113.1' });
+
+        expect(req.networkFingerprint).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16}$/);
+        expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
+    });
+
+    it('networkFingerprint is stable for identical inputs and varies by UA', () => {
+        const headers = { 'user-agent': 'UA/1.0' };
+        const a = run({ ip: '203.0.113.1', headers }).req.networkFingerprint;
+        const b = run({ ip: '203.0.113.1', headers }).req.networkFingerprint;
+        const c = run({
+            ip: '203.0.113.1',
+            headers: { 'user-agent': 'UA/2.0' },
+        }).req.networkFingerprint;
+
+        expect(a).toBe(b);
+        expect(a).not.toBe(c);
+    });
+
+    it('reads a well-shaped device fingerprint from the body', () => {
+        const { req } = run({ body: { fingerprint: VALID_FP } });
+        expect(req.deviceFingerprint).toBe(VALID_FP);
+    });
+
+    it('falls back to the x-puter-device-fingerprint header', () => {
+        const { req } = run({
+            headers: { 'x-puter-device-fingerprint': VALID_FP },
+        });
+        expect(req.deviceFingerprint).toBe(VALID_FP);
+    });
+
+    it('prefers the body fingerprint over the header', () => {
+        const { req } = run({
+            body: { fingerprint: VALID_FP },
+            headers: { 'x-puter-device-fingerprint': 'other-fingerprint-xyz' },
+        });
+        expect(req.deviceFingerprint).toBe(VALID_FP);
+    });
+
+    it('drops a malformed fingerprint to undefined', () => {
+        expect(run({ body: { fingerprint: 'bad fp!' } }).req.deviceFingerprint)
+            .toBeUndefined();
+        expect(run({ body: { fingerprint: 'short' } }).req.deviceFingerprint)
+            .toBeUndefined();
+        expect(
+            run({ body: { fingerprint: 123 as unknown as string } }).req
+                .deviceFingerprint,
+        ).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('leaves deviceFingerprint undefined when nothing was supplied', () => {
+        const { req } = run({ ip: '203.0.113.1' });
+        expect(req.deviceFingerprint).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+});

src/backend/core/http/middleware/fingerprint.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Puter.
+ *
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
+ * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+import type { RequestHandler } from 'express';
+import { computeNetworkFingerprint } from './rateLimit.js';
+import '../expressAugmentation';
+
+/**
+ * Conservative charset/length for the client-supplied device fingerprint. It
+ * becomes part of KV keys downstream (abuse extension), so anything outside
+ * this shape is dropped to `undefined` rather than trusted. Kept in sync with
+ * the abuse extension's `DEVICE_FINGERPRINT_SHAPE`; the core only enforces the
+ * shape, never any abuse policy built on the value.
+ */
+const DEVICE_FINGERPRINT_SHAPE = /^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,128}$/;
+
+/** Header the GUI may send the device fingerprint on for non-signup requests. */
+const DEVICE_FINGERPRINT_HEADER = 'x-puter-device-fingerprint';
+
+function readDeviceFingerprint(req: {
+    body?: unknown;
+    headers?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}): string | undefined {
+    // Body first (what /signup already sends), then a header fallback so
+    // authenticated, bodyless-or-different-shape requests can still carry it.
+    const body = req.body as { fingerprint?: unknown } | undefined;
+    const candidate =
+        (typeof body?.fingerprint === 'string'
+            ? body.fingerprint
+            : undefined) ??
+        (typeof req.headers?.[DEVICE_FINGERPRINT_HEADER] === 'string'
+            ? (req.headers[DEVICE_FINGERPRINT_HEADER] as string)
+            : undefined);
+    if (candidate && DEVICE_FINGERPRINT_SHAPE.test(candidate)) return candidate;
+    return undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Stamp request-scoped fingerprints onto `req` so any downstream gate, handler,
+ * or service (via the ALS `Context.get('req')`) can read them without recomputing:
+ *
+ *   - `req.networkFingerprint` — always set; a coarse IP+headers hash (the same
+ *     value the rate limiter keys on). Server-derived, so it can't be forged
+ *     away, but it's coarse (shared behind NAT/VPN, rotates with UA).
+ *   - `req.deviceFingerprint` — set only when the client supplied a well-shaped
+ *     device fingerprint (ThumbmarkJS hash) in the body or the
+ *     `x-puter-device-fingerprint` header; `undefined` otherwise. Client-supplied
+ *     and spoofable, but stable per real device across IP rotation.
+ *
+ * Install AFTER the body parsers (so the body fingerprint is readable) and
+ * before `requestContext` (so the snapshot into ALS already carries them).
+ * Never rejects — a missing/invalid device fingerprint is simply absent.
+ */
+export const createFingerprintMiddleware = (): RequestHandler => {
+    return (req, _res, next) => {
+        req.networkFingerprint = computeNetworkFingerprint(req);
+        req.deviceFingerprint = readDeviceFingerprint(req);
+        next();
+    };
+};

src/backend/core/http/middleware/gates.test.ts

@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ import {
     adminOnlyGate,
     allowedAppIdsGate,
     requireAuthGate,
-    requireEmailConfirmedGate,
+    requireVerifiedAccount,
+    requireNonAccessTokenGate,
     requireUserActorGate,
     requireVerifiedGate,
     subdomainGate,
@@ -224,6 +225,110 @@ describe('requireUserActorGate', () => {
         const got = runGate(requireUserActorGate(), {});
         expectHttpError(got, 401, 'token_missing');
     });
+
+    it('rejects a FULL-ACCESS access token too — account routes stay closed', () => {
+        // The account wall is actor-type based: even a full-access PAT (which
+        // the resource wall lets through) is rejected here, so it can never
+        // reach change-password/email/2FA/token-minting/etc.
+        const got = runGate(requireUserActorGate(), {
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'u-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' } },
+                    fullAccess: true,
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 403, 'forbidden');
+    });
+
+    // allowFullAccess opt-in: relaxes ONLY the access-token half, for
+    // user-resource/inference routes (e.g. the AI proxy).
+    it('admits a full-access PAT when allowFullAccess is set', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireUserActorGate({ allowFullAccess: true }), {
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'u-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' } },
+                    fullAccess: true,
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        expect(got).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('still rejects a SCOPED access token even when allowFullAccess is set', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireUserActorGate({ allowFullAccess: true }), {
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'u-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' } },
+                    // no fullAccess
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 403, 'forbidden');
+    });
+
+    it('still rejects a third-party app even when allowFullAccess is set', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireUserActorGate({ allowFullAccess: true }), {
+            actor: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' }, app: { uid: 'app-1' } },
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 403, 'forbidden');
+    });
+});
+
+// -- requireNonAccessTokenGate --
+
+describe('requireNonAccessTokenGate', () => {
+    it('passes through for plain user actors', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireNonAccessTokenGate(), {
+            actor: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' } },
+        });
+        expect(got).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('passes through for app-under-user actors (only access tokens are gated)', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireNonAccessTokenGate(), {
+            actor: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' }, app: { uid: 'app-1' } },
+        });
+        expect(got).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it('rejects a normal (scoped) access token with 403', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireNonAccessTokenGate(), {
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'u-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' } },
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 403, 'forbidden');
+    });
+
+    it('admits a FULL-ACCESS access token (the resource-wall carve-out)', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireNonAccessTokenGate(), {
+            actor: {
+                user: { uuid: 'u-1' },
+                accessToken: {
+                    uid: 'tok-1',
+                    issuer: { user: { uuid: 'u-1' } },
+                    fullAccess: true,
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        expect(got).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it("falls back to 401 if there's no actor at all (defensive)", () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireNonAccessTokenGate(), {});
+        expectHttpError(got, 401, 'token_missing');
+    });
 });
 
 // ── adminOnlyGate ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -335,11 +440,11 @@ describe('requireVerifiedGate', () => {
     });
 });
 
-// ── requireEmailConfirmedGate ───────────────────────────────────────
+// ── requireVerifiedAccount ──────────────────────────────────────────
 
-describe('requireEmailConfirmedGate', () => {
+describe('requireVerifiedAccount', () => {
     it('passes through users that do not require confirmation (e.g. legacy/temp)', () => {
-        const got = runGate(requireEmailConfirmedGate(), {
+        const got = runGate(requireVerifiedAccount(), {
             actor: {
                 user: {
                     uuid: 'u-1',
@@ -352,7 +457,7 @@ describe('requireEmailConfirmedGate', () => {
     });
 
     it('passes through confirmed users even when confirmation is required', () => {
-        const got = runGate(requireEmailConfirmedGate(), {
+        const got = runGate(requireVerifiedAccount(), {
             actor: {
                 user: {
                     uuid: 'u-1',
@@ -365,7 +470,7 @@ describe('requireEmailConfirmedGate', () => {
     });
 
     it('returns 403 email_confirmation_required for pending-confirmation users', () => {
-        const got = runGate(requireEmailConfirmedGate(), {
+        const got = runGate(requireVerifiedAccount(), {
             actor: {
                 user: {
                     uuid: 'u-1',
@@ -377,8 +482,51 @@ describe('requireEmailConfirmedGate', () => {
         expectHttpError(got, 403, 'email_confirmation_required');
     });
 
+    it('returns 403 phone_verification_required while the phone gate is set', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireVerifiedAccount(), {
+            actor: {
+                user: {
+                    uuid: 'u-1',
+                    requires_email_confirmation: false,
+                    email_confirmed: true,
+                    requires_phone_verification: true,
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 403, 'phone_verification_required');
+    });
+
+    it('returns 403 card_verification_required while the card gate is set', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireVerifiedAccount(), {
+            actor: {
+                user: {
+                    uuid: 'u-1',
+                    requires_email_confirmation: false,
+                    email_confirmed: true,
+                    requires_card_verification: true,
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        expectHttpError(got, 403, 'card_verification_required');
+    });
+
+    it('passes through once every gate is cleared', () => {
+        const got = runGate(requireVerifiedAccount(), {
+            actor: {
+                user: {
+                    uuid: 'u-1',
+                    requires_email_confirmation: true,
+                    email_confirmed: true,
+                    requires_phone_verification: false,
+                    requires_card_verification: false,
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        expect(got).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
     it("passes through when there's no actor (auth gate handled it)", () => {
-        const got = runGate(requireEmailConfirmedGate(), {});
+        const got = runGate(requireVerifiedAccount(), {});
         expect(got).toBeUndefined();
     });
 });

src/backend/core/http/middleware/gates.ts

@@ -79,6 +79,16 @@ export const subdomainGate = (allowed: string | string[]): RequestHandler => {
  */
 export const requireAuthGate = (): RequestHandler => {
     return (req, _res, next) => {
+        if (req.appBlocked) {
+            next(
+                new HttpError(
+                    403,
+                    'This app is not allowed to access Puter resources',
+                    { legacyCode: 'app_blocked' },
+                ),
+            );
+            return;
+        }
         if (!req.actor) {
             next(rejectAuth(req));
             return;
@@ -99,8 +109,18 @@ export const requireAuthGate = (): RequestHandler => {
  * Reject app-under-user and access-token actors with 403. Use on endpoints
  * that should only be exercised by a human session — settings changes,
  * admin-style actions on the user's own account.
+ *
+ * `allowFullAccess` (set per-route via the `allowFullAccessToken` route option)
+ * relaxes ONLY the access-token half: a full-access ("personal access token")
+ * actor is admitted, because it represents the user's own full API reach.
+ * Third-party apps are ALWAYS rejected, and scoped access tokens are always
+ * rejected. This opt-in is for user-resource / inference endpoints (AI proxy,
+ * etc.) that use this gate purely to keep apps out — NEVER for account or
+ * security management, which must stay closed to every access token.
  */
-export const requireUserActorGate = (): RequestHandler => {
+export const requireUserActorGate = (
+    opts: { allowFullAccess?: boolean } = {},
+): RequestHandler => {
     return (req, _res, next) => {
         const actor = req.actor;
         // requireAuth runs first; this gate just narrows the actor type.
@@ -108,7 +128,14 @@ export const requireUserActorGate = (): RequestHandler => {
             next(rejectAuth(req));
             return;
         }
-        if (actor.app || actor.accessToken) {
+        // Third-party apps are never allowed through this gate.
+        const appBlocked = !!actor.app;
+        // Access tokens are blocked unless the route opted in AND this is a
+        // full-access PAT (the user's own credential). Scoped tokens: blocked.
+        const tokenBlocked =
+            !!actor.accessToken &&
+            !(opts.allowFullAccess && actor.accessToken.fullAccess);
+        if (appBlocked || tokenBlocked) {
             next(
                 new HttpError(
                     403,
@@ -129,7 +156,13 @@ export const requireNonAccessTokenGate = (): RequestHandler => {
             next(rejectAuth(req));
             return;
         }
-        if (actor.accessToken) {
+        // Full-access ("personal access token") access tokens are admitted here:
+        // they carry the user's full API reach by design. They remain blocked
+        // from account management because those routes also use
+        // `requireUserActorGate`, which rejects ALL access tokens. Normal
+        // (scoped) access tokens stay blocked from non-`allowAccessToken`
+        // routes.
+        if (actor.accessToken && !actor.accessToken.fullAccess) {
             next(
                 new HttpError(
                     403,
@@ -201,29 +234,84 @@ export const requireVerifiedGate = (strictFlag: boolean): RequestHandler => {
 };
 
 /**
- * Reject authenticated users whose account is pending email confirmation
- * (`requires_email_confirmation && !email_confirmed`). Runs on every
- * authenticated route by default; routes that set `allowUnconfirmed: true`
- * skip this gate.
+ * Reject authenticated users whose account is still pending any signup-time
+ * verification — email confirmation, SMS phone verification, or credit-card
+ * verification. The abuse harness sets the phone/card flags on low-reputation
+ * signups (in place of a hard block), and this gate is what actually keeps
+ * those accounts out of the product until the flag clears: the flags live on
+ * `req.actor.user`, so every authenticated route enforces them, not just the
+ * GUI modal.
  *
- * Returns 403 with `email_confirmation_required` so clients can show the
- * confirmation prompt instead of a generic error.
+ * Runs on every authenticated route by default; routes that set
+ * `allowUnconfirmed: true` opt out (the verification endpoints themselves,
+ * plus essential flows like whoami / logout / save-account so a pending
+ * account can still reach the screens that clear the gate).
+ *
+ * Returns 403 with a per-gate legacy code (`email_confirmation_required` /
+ * `phone_verification_required` / `card_verification_required`) so clients can
+ * show the right prompt instead of a generic error. There is no state where a
+ * user should be allowed in with one verification pending, so any pending gate
+ * rejects.
  */
-export const requireEmailConfirmedGate = (): RequestHandler => {
+export const requireVerifiedAccount = (): RequestHandler => {
     return (req, _res, next) => {
-        const user = req.actor?.user;
-        if (user?.requires_email_confirmation && !user?.email_confirmed) {
-            next(
-                new HttpError(403, 'Please confirm your email to continue', {
-                    legacyCode: 'email_confirmation_required',
-                }),
-            );
+        try {
+            assertVerifiedAccount(req.actor?.user);
+        } catch (err) {
+            next(err);
             return;
         }
         next();
     };
 };
 
+/**
+ * The pending-verification check, factored out of {@link requireVerifiedAccount}
+ * so auth paths that build their own actor outside the route-option machinery
+ * can enforce the exact same gate. The WebDAV controller is the motivating
+ * case: it dispatches every method off a single `router.use`, so
+ * `requireVerifiedAccount` is never wired into its chain — it has to call this
+ * directly. Keeping one implementation is the point: a verification gate added
+ * here is picked up by every caller, so the paths can't drift (which is how
+ * WebDAV came to bypass the phone/card gate to begin with).
+ *
+ * Throws 403 with a per-gate legacy code (`email_confirmation_required` /
+ * `phone_verification_required` / `card_verification_required`) so clients can
+ * show the right prompt instead of a generic error. There is no state where a
+ * user should be let in with any verification pending, so the first pending
+ * gate rejects.
+ */
+export const assertVerifiedAccount = (
+    user:
+        | {
+              requires_email_confirmation?: unknown;
+              email_confirmed?: unknown;
+              requires_phone_verification?: unknown;
+              requires_card_verification?: unknown;
+          }
+        | undefined,
+): void => {
+    if (user?.requires_email_confirmation && !user?.email_confirmed) {
+        throw new HttpError(403, 'Please confirm your email to continue', {
+            legacyCode: 'email_confirmation_required',
+        });
+    }
+    if (user?.requires_phone_verification) {
+        throw new HttpError(
+            403,
+            'Please verify your phone number to continue',
+            {
+                legacyCode: 'phone_verification_required' as never,
+            },
+        );
+    }
+    if (user?.requires_card_verification) {
+        throw new HttpError(403, 'Please verify your card to continue', {
+            legacyCode: 'card_verification_required' as never,
+        });
+    }
+};
+
 /**
  * Reject unless the actor is acting through one of the named apps.
  * App-under-user actors are permitted iff `actor.app.uid` is in the allowList;

src/backend/core/http/middleware/hostRedirects.test.ts

@@ -264,6 +264,79 @@ describe('createUserSubdomainRedirect', () => {
         ]);
     });
 
+    const selfHosted = {
+        domain: 'puter.localhost',
+        static_hosting_domain: 'site.puter.localhost',
+        static_hosting_domain_alt: 'host.puter.localhost',
+        private_app_hosting_domain: 'app.puter.localhost',
+        private_app_hosting_domain_alt: 'dev.puter.localhost',
+    } as IConfig;
+
+    it('still redirects a bare subdomain on the main domain to the hosting domain (self-hosted)', () => {
+        const { out, next } = run(
+            createUserSubdomainRedirect(selfHosted),
+            makeReq({
+                subdomains: ['localhost', 'puter', 'foo'],
+                host: 'foo.puter.localhost',
+                originalUrl: '/bar?x=1',
+                protocol: 'http',
+            }),
+        );
+        expect(out.redirectArgs).toEqual([
+            302,
+            'http://foo.site.puter.localhost/bar?x=1',
+        ]);
+        expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('passes through hosts already on the static hosting domain (no redirect loop)', () => {
+        const { out, next } = run(
+            createUserSubdomainRedirect(selfHosted),
+            makeReq({
+                subdomains: ['localhost', 'puter', 'site', 'foo'],
+                host: 'foo.site.puter.localhost',
+                originalUrl: '/',
+            }),
+        );
+        expect(out.redirectArgs).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+
+    it('passes through hosts on the alt / private-app hosting domains too', () => {
+        for (const host of [
+            'foo.host.puter.localhost',
+            'foo.app.puter.localhost',
+            'foo.dev.puter.localhost',
+        ]) {
+            const { out, next } = run(
+                createUserSubdomainRedirect(selfHosted),
+                makeReq({
+                    subdomains: [
+                        'localhost',
+                        'puter',
+                        host.split('.')[1],
+                        'foo',
+                    ],
+                    host,
+                }),
+            );
+            expect(out.redirectArgs).toBeUndefined();
+            expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it('passes through the hosting-domain root itself (exact match, no loop)', () => {
+        const { out, next } = run(
+            createUserSubdomainRedirect(selfHosted),
+            makeReq({
+                subdomains: ['localhost', 'puter', 'site'],
+                host: 'site.puter.localhost',
+            }),
+        );
+        expect(out.redirectArgs).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+
     it("passes through when the request host has a port the configured domain doesn't", () => {
         // Edge case worth pinning: the suffix check is exact-`endsWith`,
         // so a port mismatch silently bypasses the redirect. Documenting

src/backend/core/http/middleware/hostRedirects.ts

@@ -88,6 +88,15 @@ export const createUserSubdomainRedirect = (
     if (!domain || !target) {
         return (_req, _res, next) => next();
     }
+
+    const hostingDomains = [
+        config.static_hosting_domain,
+        config.static_hosting_domain_alt,
+        config.private_app_hosting_domain,
+        config.private_app_hosting_domain_alt,
+    ]
+        .map((d) => (d ?? '').toLowerCase().split(':')[0])
+        .filter((d) => d.length > 0);
     return (req, res, next) => {
         const active = (
             req.subdomains?.[req.subdomains.length - 1] ?? ''
@@ -95,6 +104,14 @@ export const createUserSubdomainRedirect = (
         if (active === '' || RESERVED_SUBDOMAINS.has(active)) return next();
 
         const host = (req.headers.host ?? '').toLowerCase();
+        const hostName = host.split(':')[0];
+        if (
+            hostingDomains.some(
+                (d) => hostName === d || hostName.endsWith(`.${d}`),
+            )
+        ) {
+            return next();
+        }
         if (!host.endsWith(domain)) return next();
 
         // host ends in domain — swap the domain suffix for the hosting one,