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Author SHA1 Message Date
velzie 57fb5ec606 fix(peer): grant forgery bug and stale comment 2026-11-10 22:13:53 -05:00
4 changed files with 21 additions and 105 deletions

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+20 -13
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@@ -24,11 +24,7 @@ import { computeNetworkFingerprint } from '../../core/http/middleware/rateLimit.
import type { PuterRouter } from '../../core/http/PuterRouter.js';
import { PuterController } from '../types.js';
import { PEER_COSTS } from './costs.js';
import {
readClaimedGrantIdentifier,
signGuestGrant,
verifyGuestGrant,
} from './guestGrant.js';
import { signGuestGrant, verifyGuestGrant } from './guestGrant.js';
import {
DEFAULT_FREE_SUBSCRIPTION,
DEFAULT_TEMP_SUBSCRIPTION,
@@ -191,19 +187,30 @@ export class PeerController extends PuterController {
// guests share one bucket and no host can be relayed for by
// more guests per minute than this — the only ceiling on guest
// spend we can apply before the bytes are already spent.
// A grant that doesn't parse can't name a bucket, so those
// requests fall back to the caller's own network.
// The limiter counts a request when it admits it, so only a
// grant that would redeem names a host; otherwise anyone
// holding the host's identifier could drain the bucket and
// lock out every real guest. Anything else - forged, expired,
// malformed, or no secret configured - is charged to the
// caller's own network.
rateLimit: {
scope: 'peer-guest-turn',
limit: 60,
window: 60_000,
key: (req: Request) => {
const claimed = readClaimedGrantIdentifier(
(req.body as { grant?: unknown } | undefined)
?.grant,
);
return claimed
? `host:${claimed}`
const secret =
this.config.peers?.guest_turn?.grant_secret;
const verified = secret
? verifyGuestGrant({
grant: (
req.body as
{ grant?: unknown } | undefined
)?.grant,
secret,
})
: null;
return verified?.status === 'ok'
? `host:${verified.customIdentifier}`
: `net:${computeNetworkFingerprint(req)}`;
},
},
+1 -1
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
import { toMicroCents } from '../../services/metering/utils';
// Microcents per byte of TURN egress ($0.05/GB).
// Microcents per byte of TURN egress ($0.10/GB).
export const PEER_COSTS = {
'turn:egress-bytes': toMicroCents(0.1 / 1000 ** 3),
} as const;
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto';
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import {
readClaimedGrantIdentifier,
signGuestGrant,
verifyGuestGrant,
} from './guestGrant.js';
@@ -243,59 +242,3 @@ describe('signGuestGrant / verifyGuestGrant', () => {
});
});
});
describe('readClaimedGrantIdentifier', () => {
it('reads the identifier from a valid grant', () => {
const { grant } = signGuestGrant({
customIdentifier: USER_ID,
ttlSeconds: 60,
secret: SECRET,
});
expect(readClaimedGrantIdentifier(grant)).toBe(USER_ID);
});
it('reads the claimed identifier without checking the signature', () => {
// Bucketing runs before verification, so this is expected: a forged
// grant still names a bucket, and the handler still rejects it.
const grant = forgeGrant(
{ id: USER_ID, exp: 9_999_999_999, n: 'x' },
{ secret: 'wrong-secret' },
);
expect(readClaimedGrantIdentifier(grant)).toBe(USER_ID);
});
it('reads an expired grant, which the handler then rejects', () => {
const { grant } = signGuestGrant({
customIdentifier: USER_ID,
ttlSeconds: 60,
secret: SECRET,
now: 1_000_000_000_000,
});
expect(readClaimedGrantIdentifier(grant)).toBe(USER_ID);
expect(verifyGuestGrant({ grant, secret: SECRET })).toEqual({
status: 'expired',
});
});
it.each([
['a non-string', 42],
['undefined', undefined],
['a wrong-shaped string', 'not-a-grant'],
['an unknown version', 'pg2.abc.def'],
['an over-long string', `pg1.${'a'.repeat(600)}.sig`],
[
'a non-JSON payload',
`pg1.${Buffer.from('x').toString('base64url')}.sig`,
],
])('returns null for %s', (_label, grant) => {
expect(readClaimedGrantIdentifier(grant)).toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for an identifier of the wrong shape', () => {
const grant = forgeGrant({ id: 'nope', exp: 9_999_999_999 });
expect(readClaimedGrantIdentifier(grant)).toBeNull();
});
});
@@ -171,37 +171,3 @@ export const verifyGuestGrant = ({
expiresAt: payload.exp,
};
};
/**
* Read the claimed identifier out of a grant _without_ verifying it, for
* rate-limit bucketing only.
*
* Bucketing has to happen before the handler runs, and a forged grant is
* rejected there without reaching the upstream API — so an unverified read is
* enough to put a host's guests in one bucket, and the worst a forger achieves
* is choosing which bucket their own rejections land in. Never use this to
* decide attribution.
*
* @returns The claimed identifier, or null if the grant doesn't parse.
*/
export const readClaimedGrantIdentifier = (grant: unknown): string | null => {
if (typeof grant !== 'string' || grant.length > MAX_GRANT_LENGTH) {
return null;
}
const parts = grant.split('.');
if (parts.length !== 3 || parts[0] !== GRANT_VERSION) return null;
try {
const payload = JSON.parse(
Buffer.from(parts[1]!, 'base64url').toString('utf8'),
) as { id?: unknown };
if (
typeof payload?.id !== 'string' ||
!IDENTIFIER_RE.test(payload.id)
) {
return null;
}
return payload.id;
} catch {
return null;
}
};