This adds the pref "security.pki.distrust_ca_policy" which, if set to 1,
enforces the graduated distrust from Bug 1409257, and if set to 0 (as it is in
this patch) disables that distrust.
This pref is intended to outlast the Symantec distrust, and instead be able to
extend to enable/disable future root policy actions. It would need its own
tests for that, in the future.
MozReview-Commit-ID: BAZfkapysfX
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 02b00aa486e9f8efb81b32d38d80db5cae86bc6e
Bug 1364159 introduced an optimization that attempted to avoid reading from the
user's cached certificate database as much as possible when building a verified
certificate chain. Unfortunately this had the side-effect of not preferring root
certificates in path building, which can result in unnecessarily long chains
(which rather defeats the purpose, since it means more signature verifications).
This patch reverts the functionality changes from that bug but keeps the test
that was added (the test didn't directly test the functionality changes - it's
more of a check that path building will query the cached certificate db when
necessary).
MozReview-Commit-ID: I56THTLUytH
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 7db9597e25b98942450840519d707046cc660781
GetHostNameRaw() returns a char* string, which is less safe and ergonomic
compared to the Mozilla string classes. GetHostName() can be used instead.
MozReview-Commit-ID: GYvTnISNN35
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : da257f5fba2c26cd92d932c3d1d363458b84a65b
CERT_CreateSubjectCertList is not an inexpensive function call, since it
enumerates the certificate database (i.e. reads from disk a lot). If we're
verifying for a TLS handshake, however, we should already have in memory a
certificate chain sent by the peer (there are some cases where we won't, such as
session resumption (see bug 731478)). If we can, we should use those
certificates before falling back to calling CERT_CreateSubjectCertList.
MozReview-Commit-ID: ASjVGsELb1O
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 1efc635d4a98079c87f77ef3794e4b2f20eec59f
The default OCSP timeout for soft-fail DV is still 2 seconds. This patch makes
it configurable on the interval (0, 5] seconds.
The default OCSP timeout for EV and hard-fail DV is still 10 seconds. This patch
makes it configurable on the interval (0, 20] seconds.
MozReview-Commit-ID: CPd8pwYrJhj
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 45bd7d06ea013f0a776ea18be9408dedb18271d8
Changed |print("enum ID : uint32_t {", file=output)| to |print("enum HistogramID : uint32_t {", file=output)| at line 53 of the file |toolkit/components/telemetry/gen-histogram-enum.py|, and then replaced all the textual occurrences of |Telemetry::ID| to |Telemetry::HistogramID| and |ID| to |HistogramID| in 43 other files.
The PR_SetError() + PR_GetError() pattern currently used is error prone and
unnecessary. The functions involved can instead return mozilla::pkix::Result,
which is equally expressive and more robust.
MozReview-Commit-ID: Hkd39eqTvds
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : f09e37c6a3a930c30cce003139df86bc84d771ee
ScopedCERTCertList is based on Scoped.h, which is deprecated in favour of the
standardised UniquePtr.
Also changes CERTCertList parameters of various functions to make ownership more
explicit.
MozReview-Commit-ID: EXqxTK6inqy
--HG--
extra : transplant_source : %9B%A9a%94%D1%7E%2BTa%9E%9Fu%9F%02%B3%1AT%1B%F1%F6
When a built-in root certificate has its trust changed from the default value,
the platform has to essentially create a copy of it in the read/write
certificate database with the new trust settings. At that point, the desired
behavior is that the platform still considers that certificate a built-in root.
Before this patch, this would indeed happen for the duration of that run of the
platform, but as soon as it restarted, the certificate in question would only
appear to be from the read/write database, and thus was not considered a
built-in root. This patch changes the test of built-in-ness to explicitly
search the built-in certificate slot for the certificate in question. If found,
it is considered a built-in root.
MozReview-Commit-ID: HCtZpPQVEGZ
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 759e9c5a7bb14f14a77e62eae2ba40c085f04ccd
Before this patch, we were measuring where SHA-1 was being used in TLS
certificates: nowhere, in end-entities, in intermediates, or in both. However,
the possible SHA-1 policies don't differentiate between end-entities and
intermediates and instead depended on whether or not each certificate has a
notBefore value after 2015 (i.e. >= 0:00:00 1 January 2016 UTC). We need to
gather telemetry on the possible policy configurations.
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 301c821c8de16ffb924cd198dd0a4d3139536019
