fix(session): forward overwrite to SqliteSessionStore imported-session save

The merged import contract (#5547) now calls
_save_imported_session(session, overwrite=overwrite), but
SqliteSessionStore's override kept the old single-arg signature and raised
TypeError, breaking every indexed portable import. Forward the keyword to the
parent and update the concurrency test's save shim to mirror the signature.

Co-authored-by: Mervin Praison <[email protected]>

.github/workflows/praisonai-pr-review.yml

@@ -34,10 +34,24 @@ jobs:
         id: config
         env:
           HAS_APP_CREDENTIALS: ${{ secrets.PRAISONAI_APP_ID != '' && secrets.PRAISONAI_APP_PRIVATE_KEY != '' }}
-        run: echo "configured=$HAS_APP_CREDENTIALS" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          OPENAI_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}
+        run: |
+          echo "configured=$HAS_APP_CREDENTIALS" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          openai_ready=true
+          if [ -z "$OPENAI_API_KEY" ] || [ "$OPENAI_API_KEY" = "not-needed" ]; then
+            openai_ready=false
+            if [ "$HAS_APP_CREDENTIALS" = "true" ]; then
+              echo "::notice::Skipping PraisonAI PR review: OPENAI_API_KEY is missing or a placeholder."
+            fi
+          fi
+          if [ "$HAS_APP_CREDENTIALS" = "true" ] && [ "$openai_ready" = "true" ]; then
+            echo "ready=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          else
+            echo "ready=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          fi
 
       - name: Determine checkout ref
-        if: steps.config.outputs.configured == 'true'
+        if: steps.config.outputs.ready == 'true'
         id: dest
         env:
           ISSUE_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
@@ -53,7 +67,7 @@ jobs:
           fi
 
       - name: Checkout Repository
-        if: steps.config.outputs.configured == 'true'
+        if: steps.config.outputs.ready == 'true'
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           persist-credentials: false
@@ -61,7 +75,7 @@ jobs:
           fetch-depth: 0
           
       - name: Generate GitHub App Token
-        if: steps.config.outputs.configured == 'true'
+        if: steps.config.outputs.ready == 'true'
         id: generate_token
         uses: tibdex/github-app-token@v2
         with:
@@ -69,17 +83,17 @@ jobs:
           private_key: ${{ secrets.PRAISONAI_APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
           
       - name: Set up Python
-        if: steps.config.outputs.configured == 'true'
+        if: steps.config.outputs.ready == 'true'
         uses: actions/setup-python@v5
         with:
           python-version: '3.11'
           
       - name: Install PraisonAI
-        if: steps.config.outputs.configured == 'true'
+        if: steps.config.outputs.ready == 'true'
         run: pip install "praisonai[all]"
         
       - name: Run PraisonAI PR Review
-        if: steps.config.outputs.configured == 'true'
+        if: steps.config.outputs.ready == 'true'
         env:
           GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ steps.generate_token.outputs.token }}
           OPENAI_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}

.github/workflows/test-optimized.yml

@@ -773,7 +773,9 @@ jobs:
     env:
       # Bump deliberately: this is the version everything in this job was
       # verified against. Latest at time of writing is v0.33.3.
-      OLLAMA_VERSION: v0.33.2
+      # No leading "v": install.sh passes ?version=$OLLAMA_VERSION and ollama.com
+      # redirects to GitHub tag v$version (vv0.33.2 → 404 if set to v0.33.2).
+      OLLAMA_VERSION: "0.33.2"
       # 522 MB, capabilities: completion, tools, thinking.
       OLLAMA_TEST_MODEL: qwen3:0.6b
 

src/praisonai-agents/DOCS_PARITY.md

@@ -18,76 +18,76 @@ This report compares **Python SDK feature categories** against **Python document
 | Category | Features | Docs | Lines |
 |----------|----------|------|-------|
 | ✅ AGUI | 1 | 2 | 511 |
-| ✅ Agent | 22 | 59 | 18997 |
+| ✅ Agent | 22 | 59 | 19076 |
 | ✅ Agent-to-Agent (A2A) | 1 | 7 | 2996 |
 | ✅ Agent-to-User (A2U) | 1 | 3 | 701 |
-| ✅ Approval | 1 | 8 | 3941 |
+| ✅ Approval | 1 | 8 | 3969 |
 | ✅ Audio | 2 | 12 | 1000 |
-| ✅ Auto Generation | 5 | 12 | 3879 |
-| ✅ Autonomy | 3 | 7 | 2794 |
-| ✅ Bots | 7 | 38 | 15473 |
+| ✅ Auto Generation | 5 | 12 | 3941 |
+| ✅ Autonomy | 3 | 7 | 2805 |
+| ✅ Bots | 7 | 38 | 15809 |
 | ✅ Budget | 1 | 1 | 287 |
-| ✅ CLI | 5 | 124 | 38956 |
+| ✅ CLI | 5 | 124 | 39191 |
 | ✅ Chunking | 2 | 2 | 435 |
 | ✅ Citations | 2 | 1 | 202 |
 | ✅ Code Execution | 2 | 14 | 5022 |
 | ✅ Conditions | 1 | 3 | 1386 |
 | ✅ Configuration | 3 | 8 | 3341 |
-| ✅ Context Management | 16 | 36 | 14289 |
+| ✅ Context Management | 16 | 36 | 14384 |
 | ✅ Deep Research | 8 | 2 | 591 |
 | ✅ Display | 6 | 3 | 844 |
 | ✅ Embeddings | 6 | 23 | 2051 |
-| ✅ Evaluation | 1 | 9 | 3537 |
-| ✅ Events | 1 | 2 | 780 |
-| ✅ Execution | 3 | 4 | 1693 |
-| ✅ Failover | 2 | 1 | 480 |
+| ✅ Evaluation | 1 | 9 | 3637 |
+| ✅ Events | 1 | 2 | 782 |
+| ✅ Execution | 3 | 4 | 1694 |
+| ✅ Failover | 2 | 1 | 537 |
 | ✅ Files | 2 | 7 | 2376 |
 | ✅ Flow | 1 | 3 | 811 |
-| ✅ Gateway | 7 | 90 | 34764 |
-| ✅ Guardrails | 5 | 4 | 2529 |
+| ✅ Gateway | 7 | 97 | 37597 |
+| ✅ Guardrails | 5 | 4 | 2642 |
 | ✅ Handoffs | 11 | 6 | 2748 |
-| ✅ Hooks | 2 | 9 | 5011 |
+| ✅ Hooks | 2 | 9 | 5230 |
 | ✅ Image | 1 | 11 | 1295 |
-| ✅ Knowledge | 4 | 20 | 6188 |
-| ✅ LLM | 3 | 15 | 5946 |
-| ✅ Loops | 4 | 5 | 1475 |
-| ✅ MCP | 1 | 64 | 15068 |
-| ✅ Memory | 6 | 21 | 8188 |
+| ✅ Knowledge | 4 | 20 | 6260 |
+| ✅ LLM | 3 | 15 | 5958 |
+| ✅ Loops | 4 | 5 | 1478 |
+| ✅ MCP | 1 | 64 | 15116 |
+| ✅ Memory | 6 | 21 | 8198 |
 | ✅ OCR | 2 | 1 | 237 |
 | ✅ Observability | 2 | 23 | 2859 |
 | ✅ Optimizer | 1 | 2 | 792 |
 | ✅ Output | 3 | 5 | 1289 |
 | ✅ Parallel Execution | 3 | 2 | 528 |
-| ✅ Planning | 6 | 7 | 1825 |
-| ✅ Plugins | 8 | 5 | 3590 |
+| ✅ Planning | 6 | 7 | 1827 |
+| ✅ Plugins | 8 | 5 | 4108 |
 | ✅ Prompts | 2 | 9 | 2043 |
-| ✅ Providers | 1 | 58 | 8734 |
+| ✅ Providers | 1 | 58 | 8751 |
 | ✅ Query | 1 | 2 | 736 |
 | ✅ RAG | 5 | 15 | 3152 |
 | ✅ Realtime | 2 | 5 | 668 |
 | ✅ Reflection | 3 | 3 | 732 |
 | ✅ Retrieval | 2 | 5 | 1046 |
 | ✅ Routing | 1 | 2 | 430 |
-| ✅ Sandbox | 5 | 7 | 3712 |
-| ✅ Security | 1 | 3 | 3607 |
-| ✅ Sessions | 4 | 21 | 8382 |
-| ✅ Skills | 6 | 16 | 5988 |
+| ✅ Sandbox | 5 | 7 | 3720 |
+| ✅ Security | 1 | 3 | 3642 |
+| ✅ Sessions | 4 | 21 | 8388 |
+| ✅ Skills | 6 | 16 | 6045 |
 | ✅ Tasks | 2 | 8 | 3266 |
 | ✅ Telemetry | 1 | 2 | 660 |
 | ✅ Templates | 1 | 9 | 1859 |
-| ✅ Tools | 12 | 145 | 44758 |
+| ✅ Tools | 12 | 147 | 45378 |
 | ✅ Tracing | 3 | 2 | 139 |
 | ✅ Vector Store | 1 | 12 | 1219 |
 | ✅ Video | 2 | 10 | 1303 |
 | ✅ Vision | 2 | 1 | 329 |
-| ✅ Web | 3 | 10 | 2815 |
-| ✅ Workflows | 5 | 21 | 8862 |
+| ✅ Web | 3 | 10 | 2822 |
+| ✅ Workflows | 5 | 21 | 8880 |
 
 ## Documentation Without Features
 
 These docs exist but don't match any implemented feature category:
 
-- ℹ️ Database (43 docs, 7657 lines)
+- ℹ️ Database (44 docs, 8206 lines)
 - ℹ️ Documents (1 docs, 810 lines)
 - ℹ️ Teams (1 docs, 214 lines)
 

src/praisonai-agents/docs/local-model-layer/05-live-ci-job.md

@@ -183,7 +183,9 @@ banner. Key fragments:
     timeout-minutes: 15
     env:
       # Bump deliberately; the cache key and what we test both follow this.
-      OLLAMA_VERSION: v0.33.2
+      # No leading "v": install.sh passes ?version=$OLLAMA_VERSION and ollama.com
+      # redirects to GitHub tag v$version (vv0.33.2 → 404 if set to v0.33.2).
+      OLLAMA_VERSION: "0.33.2"
       OLLAMA_TEST_MODEL: qwen3:0.6b
     steps:
     - uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -204,9 +206,12 @@ banner. Key fragments:
       shell: bash
       run: |
         set -euo pipefail
-        curl -fsSL -o /tmp/ollama.tgz \
-          "https://github.com/ollama/ollama/releases/download/${OLLAMA_VERSION}/ollama-linux-amd64.tgz"
-        sudo tar -C /usr -xzf /tmp/ollama.tgz
+        # The official installer, VERSION-PINNED via OLLAMA_VERSION (which it
+        # honours). Since v0.33 the linux bundle ships as a .tar.zst with GPU
+        # runtimes bundled in, so a direct release-asset download is not a
+        # workable alternative; the installer handles the zst/tgz split.
+        sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq zstd
+        curl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | sh
         ollama --version
     - name: Start Ollama and pull model
       shell: bash

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/agent.py

@@ -7,10 +7,7 @@ from praisonaiagents._logging import get_logger
 import asyncio
 import contextlib
 import threading
-import concurrent.futures
-import random
-import re
-from typing import List, Optional, Any, Dict, Union, Literal, TYPE_CHECKING, Callable, Generator
+from typing import List, Optional, Any, Dict, Union, Literal, TYPE_CHECKING, Callable
 from collections import OrderedDict
 import inspect
 
@@ -7126,6 +7123,25 @@ Answer:"""
         """The most recent rejection message a guardrail sent back to the model."""
         return getattr(self, "_last_guardrail_error", None)
 
+    def _guardrail_blocked_message(self, error=None):
+        """Fixed, user-facing string returned when an output guardrail blocks a run.
+
+        A blocked response must never surface the rejected (potentially unsafe)
+        model text, but it must also never be ``None`` - callers expect a
+        ``str`` and would otherwise crash on ``.strip()`` (issue #5596, FR-001).
+
+        The returned string is intentionally **fixed** and carries no diagnostic
+        detail: a guardrail's own rejection reason (especially an LLM validator's
+        free-text) can echo the blocked output, so appending it would leak the
+        very content the guardrail rejected. The reason is logged instead, where
+        it stays auditable without reaching the caller. The rejection is also
+        exposed programmatically via :attr:`last_guardrail_error`.
+        """
+        reason = str(error) if error else getattr(self, "_last_guardrail_error", None)
+        if reason:
+            logging.info(f"Agent {self.name}: guardrail block reason: {reason}")
+        return "I'm sorry, but I can't share that response because it did not pass the safety guardrail."
+
     def _process_guardrail(self, task_output):
         """Process the guardrail validation for a task output.
         

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/async_safety.py

@@ -27,27 +27,21 @@ def run_async_in_sync_context(coro):
     tool loop, otherwise a bare un-awaited coroutine would be handed to the
     model as the tool result and the tool body would never run (silent data
     loss).
+
+    Delegates to the single canonical bridge
+    (:func:`utils.async_bridge.run_coroutine_from_any_context`) so all sync→async
+    call sites share one implementation: the caller's ``contextvars`` (trace /
+    session / approval context) are carried into the coroutine, and the running
+    loop is handled on a dedicated worker thread rather than raising.
+
+    ``timeout=None`` is passed deliberately: this helper backs the sync
+    tool-calling path, where a tool's own timeout policy (or lack of one) already
+    governs how long a tool may run. Imposing the bridge's default 5-minute
+    deadline here would silently cancel long-running tools that previously had no
+    limit — a backward-incompatible regression — so the bridge adds none.
     """
-    try:
-        asyncio.get_running_loop()
-    except RuntimeError:
-        # No event loop - safe to use asyncio.run()
-        return asyncio.run(coro)
-
-    # Event loop exists - avoid deadlock by running in dedicated thread
-    import concurrent.futures
-
-    def run_in_thread():
-        new_loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
-        asyncio.set_event_loop(new_loop)
-        try:
-            return new_loop.run_until_complete(coro)
-        finally:
-            new_loop.close()
-
-    with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor() as executor:
-        future = executor.submit(run_in_thread)
-        return future.result(timeout=300)  # 5 minute timeout
+    from ..utils.async_bridge import run_coroutine_from_any_context
+    return run_coroutine_from_any_context(coro, timeout=None)
 
 
 class DualLock:
@@ -306,13 +300,13 @@ class AsyncSafeState:
             
     def __enter__(self):
         """Support for synchronous context manager protocol (backward compatibility)."""
-        self._lock._thread_lock.acquire()
+        self._sync_guard = self._lock.sync()
+        self._sync_guard.__enter__()
         return self.value
         
     def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc_val, exc_tb):
         """Support for synchronous context manager protocol (backward compatibility)."""
-        self._lock._thread_lock.release()
-        return None
+        return self._sync_guard.__exit__(exc_type, exc_val, exc_tb)
         
     async def __aenter__(self):
         """Support for asynchronous context manager protocol."""

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/chat_mixin.py

@@ -751,6 +751,43 @@ Your Goal: {self.goal}"""
         
         return None
 
+    def _coerce_structured_output(self, response_text, schema_model):
+        """Parse a string response into the requested Pydantic model.
+
+        When ``output_pydantic``/``output_json`` is a Pydantic model, callers
+        expect a validated instance rather than a raw string. This tolerates
+        markdown code fences around the JSON payload.
+
+        Returns the parsed model instance on success, or the original
+        ``response_text`` unchanged if parsing is not possible (preserves
+        backward compatibility for non-Pydantic schemas or malformed output).
+        """
+        if not schema_model or not isinstance(response_text, str):
+            return response_text
+        if not hasattr(schema_model, 'model_validate_json'):
+            return response_text
+
+        candidate = response_text.strip()
+        try:
+            return schema_model.model_validate_json(candidate)
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+        # Strip a surrounding markdown code fence (```json ... ```) if present
+        fenced = re.search(r"```(?:json)?\s*(.*?)\s*```", candidate, re.DOTALL)
+        if fenced:
+            try:
+                return schema_model.model_validate_json(fenced.group(1).strip())
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+
+        logging.warning(
+            f"Agent {self.name}: output_pydantic={getattr(schema_model, '__name__', schema_model)} "
+            f"was requested but the response could not be parsed into the model; "
+            f"returning raw string."
+        )
+        return response_text
+
     def _supports_native_structured_output(self):
         """Check if current model supports native structured output via response_format.
         
@@ -3562,6 +3599,13 @@ Your Goal: {self.goal}"""
                     # Apply guardrail validation for custom LLM response
                     try:
                         validated_response = self._apply_guardrail_with_retry(response_text, prompt, temperature, tools, task_name, task_description, task_id, cancel_token=cancel_token, messages=processed_history)
+                        # Coerce into the requested Pydantic model so callers
+                        # get a validated instance, not a raw JSON string.
+                        # Only output_pydantic changes the return type; output_json
+                        # must stay a string for backward-compatible downstream
+                        # JSON parsing (task parsing, workflow results).
+                        if output_pydantic:
+                            validated_response = self._coerce_structured_output(validated_response, output_pydantic)
                         # Execute callback and display after validation
                         self._execute_callback_and_display(prompt, validated_response, time.time() - start_time, task_name, task_description, task_id)
                         return self._trigger_after_agent_hook(prompt, validated_response, start_time)
@@ -3569,7 +3613,7 @@ Your Goal: {self.goal}"""
                         logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed for custom LLM: {e}")
                         # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                         self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                        return None
+                        return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
                 except ToolExecutionError:
                     raise
                 except Exception as e:
@@ -3693,6 +3737,11 @@ Your Goal: {self.goal}"""
                             # Apply guardrail validation even for JSON output
                             try:
                                 validated_response = self._apply_guardrail_with_retry(response_text, original_prompt, temperature, tools, task_name, task_description, task_id, cancel_token=cancel_token, messages=messages)
+                                # Coerce into the requested Pydantic model so callers
+                                # get a validated instance, not a raw JSON string.
+                                # output_json intentionally stays a string (backward compat).
+                                if output_pydantic:
+                                    validated_response = self._coerce_structured_output(validated_response, output_pydantic)
                                 # Execute callback after validation
                                 self._execute_callback_and_display(original_prompt, validated_response, time.time() - start_time, task_name, task_description, task_id)
                                 return self._trigger_after_agent_hook(original_prompt, validated_response, start_time)
@@ -3700,7 +3749,7 @@ Your Goal: {self.goal}"""
                                 logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed for JSON output: {e}")
                                 # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                                 self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                                return None
+                                return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
 
                         if not self.self_reflect:
                             # User message already added before LLM call via _build_messages
@@ -3721,7 +3770,7 @@ Your Goal: {self.goal}"""
                                     logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed for reasoning content: {e}")
                                     # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                                     self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                                    return None
+                                    return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
                             # Apply guardrail to regular response
                             try:
                                 validated_response = self._apply_guardrail_with_retry(response_text, original_prompt, temperature, tools, task_name, task_description, task_id, cancel_token=cancel_token, messages=messages)
@@ -3732,7 +3781,7 @@ Your Goal: {self.goal}"""
                                 logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed: {e}")
                                 # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                                 self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                                return None
+                                return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
 
                         reflection_prompt = f"""
 Reflect on your previous response: '{response_text}'.
@@ -3800,7 +3849,7 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                                     # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                                     self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
                                     self._end_run(None, "error", {"error": str(e)})
-                                    return None
+                                    return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
 
                             # Check if we've hit max reflections
                             if reflection_count >= self.max_reflect - 1:
@@ -3818,7 +3867,7 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                                     logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed after max reflections: {e}")
                                     # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                                     self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                                    return None
+                                    return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
                             
                             # If not satisfactory and not at max reflections, continue with regeneration
                             logging.debug(f"{self.name} reflection count {reflection_count + 1}, continuing reflection process")
@@ -4228,6 +4277,11 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                     # Apply guardrail validation for custom LLM response
                     try:
                         validated_response = await self._aapply_guardrail_with_retry(response_text, prompt, temperature, tools, task_name, task_description, task_id, messages=effective_history)
+                        # Coerce into the requested Pydantic model so callers
+                        # get a validated instance, not a raw JSON string.
+                        # output_json intentionally stays a string (backward compat).
+                        if output_pydantic:
+                            validated_response = self._coerce_structured_output(validated_response, output_pydantic)
                         # Execute callback after validation
                         self._execute_callback_and_display(normalized_content, validated_response, time.time() - start_time, task_name, task_description, task_id)
                         return await self._atrigger_after_agent_hook(prompt, validated_response, start_time)
@@ -4235,7 +4289,7 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                         logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed for custom LLM: {e}")
                         # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                         self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                        return None
+                        return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
                 except ToolExecutionError:
                     raise
                 except Exception as e:
@@ -4373,6 +4427,11 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                             # Apply guardrail validation even for JSON output
                             try:
                                 validated_response = await self._aapply_guardrail_with_retry(response_text, original_prompt, temperature, tools, task_name, task_description, task_id, messages=messages)
+                                # Coerce into the requested Pydantic model so callers
+                                # get a validated instance, not a raw JSON string.
+                                # output_json intentionally stays a string (backward compat).
+                                if output_pydantic:
+                                    validated_response = self._coerce_structured_output(validated_response, output_pydantic)
                                 # Execute callback after validation
                                 self._execute_callback_and_display(original_prompt, validated_response, time.time() - start_time, task_name, task_description, task_id)
                                 return await self._atrigger_after_agent_hook(original_prompt, validated_response, start_time)
@@ -4380,7 +4439,7 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                                 logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed for JSON output: {e}")
                                 # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                                 self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                                return None
+                                return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
 
                         # For regular responses (no self-reflection)
                         if not self.self_reflect:
@@ -4403,7 +4462,7 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                                     logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed for reasoning content: {e}")
                                     # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                                     self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                                    return None
+                                    return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
                             else:
                                 # Apply guardrail to regular response content
                                 try:
@@ -4415,7 +4474,7 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                                     logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed: {e}")
                                     # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                                     self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                                    return None
+                                    return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
                         
                         # If self-reflection is enabled, implement reflection logic
                         if self.self_reflect:
@@ -4455,7 +4514,7 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                                             logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed: {e}")
                                             # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                                             self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                                            return None
+                                            return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
                                     
                                     _areflection_kwargs = {}
                                     if temperature is not None:
@@ -4489,7 +4548,7 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                                             logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed after reflection: {e}")
                                             # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                                             self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                                            return None
+                                            return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
                                     
                                     # Check if we've hit max reflections
                                     if reflection_count >= self.max_reflect - 1:
@@ -4508,7 +4567,7 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                                             logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed after max reflections: {e}")
                                             # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                                             self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                                            return None
+                                            return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
                                     
                                     # Regenerate response based on reflection
                                     regenerate_messages = reflection_messages + [
@@ -4558,7 +4617,7 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                                             logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed after reflection error: {guard_e}")
                                             # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                                             self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                                            return None
+                                            return self._guardrail_blocked_message(guard_e)
                                     continue
                         
                         # This should never be reached due to the returns above
@@ -4608,6 +4667,11 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                             if get_logger().getEffectiveLevel() == logging.DEBUG:
                                 total_time = time.time() - start_time
                                 logging.debug(f"Agent.achat completed in {total_time:.2f} seconds")
+                            # Coerce into the requested Pydantic model so callers
+                            # get a validated instance, not a raw JSON string.
+                            # output_json intentionally stays a string (backward compat).
+                            if output_pydantic:
+                                response_text = self._coerce_structured_output(response_text, output_pydantic)
                             # Execute callback after JSON/Pydantic completion
                             self._execute_callback_and_display(original_prompt, response_text, time.time() - start_time, task_name, task_description, task_id)
                             return await self._atrigger_after_agent_hook(original_prompt, response_text, start_time)
@@ -4722,7 +4786,7 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                             logging.error(f"Agent {self.name}: Guardrail validation failed for OpenAI client: {e}")
                             # Rollback chat history on guardrail failure
                             self._rollback_chat_history_to(chat_history_length)
-                            return None
+                            return self._guardrail_blocked_message(e)
                 except ToolExecutionError:
                     raise
                 except Exception as e:
@@ -5728,6 +5792,28 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
         
         return llm_summarize_async
 
+    def _resolve_compaction_max_tokens(self, execution_cfg):
+        """
+        Resolve the compaction trigger budget.
+
+        An explicit ``ExecutionConfig.max_context_tokens`` always wins. When it
+        is unset, size the trigger to the active model's context window (reusing
+        the model-aware ``budgeter`` the in-loop path already uses) instead of a
+        flat default, so large-context models are not compacted prematurely.
+        Falls back to a static default only for the offline / unknown-model case.
+        """
+        _explicit = getattr(execution_cfg, 'max_context_tokens', None)
+        if _explicit:
+            return _explicit
+        try:
+            from ..context.budgeter import get_model_limit, get_output_reserve
+            model_name = self.llm if isinstance(self.llm, str) else "gpt-4o-mini"
+            limit = get_model_limit(model_name)
+            reserve = get_output_reserve(model_name)
+            return max(1, int(limit * 0.8) - reserve)
+        except Exception:
+            return 8000
+
     def _apply_context_compaction(self, messages, hook_event_class):
         """
         Apply context compaction to messages if enabled (sync version).
@@ -5747,7 +5833,7 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
             from ..compaction import ContextCompactor
             from ..compaction.strategy import CompactionStrategy
             
-            _max_tok = getattr(_execution_cfg, 'max_context_tokens', None) or 8000
+            _max_tok = self._resolve_compaction_max_tokens(_execution_cfg)
             _strategy = getattr(_execution_cfg, 'compaction_strategy', None) or CompactionStrategy.TRUNCATE
             
             # Create LLM summarization function if strategy is LLM_SUMMARIZE
@@ -5779,17 +5865,20 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
             
             # Perform compaction
             if _strategy == CompactionStrategy.LLM_SUMMARIZE and _llm_fn:
-                import asyncio
-                try:
-                    # Run async compaction in event loop
-                    compacted_msgs, _cr = asyncio.run(_compactor.compact_async(messages))
-                except RuntimeError:
-                    # If already in async context, fall back to sync (naive) compaction
-                    logging.warning(
-                        f"[compaction] {self.name}: LLM_SUMMARIZE fell back to naive summarization "
-                        f"(asyncio.run not available in sync context)"
-                    )
-                    compacted_msgs, _cr = _compactor.compact(messages)
+                # Drive the async summariser through the shared bridge so it runs
+                # correctly whether or not a loop is already running (FastAPI /
+                # Jupyter / a bot handler). The previous code caught bare
+                # RuntimeError from ``asyncio.run`` ("event loop already
+                # running") and silently downgraded LLM summarisation to naive
+                # truncation whenever a loop was live; the bridge removes that
+                # spurious fallback so the real summariser always runs. Provider
+                # errors inside the summariser remain best-effort (see
+                # ``_llm_summarize_async``, which falls back to a naive summary on
+                # failure) — compaction never hard-fails the turn.
+                from ..utils.async_bridge import run_coroutine_from_any_context
+                compacted_msgs, _cr = run_coroutine_from_any_context(
+                    _compactor.compact_async(messages)
+                )
             else:
                 compacted_msgs, _cr = _compactor.compact(messages)
             
@@ -5834,7 +5923,7 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
             from ..compaction import ContextCompactor
             from ..compaction.strategy import CompactionStrategy
             
-            _max_tok = getattr(_execution_cfg, 'max_context_tokens', None) or 8000
+            _max_tok = self._resolve_compaction_max_tokens(_execution_cfg)
             _strategy = getattr(_execution_cfg, 'compaction_strategy', None) or CompactionStrategy.TRUNCATE
             
             # Create LLM summarization function if strategy is LLM_SUMMARIZE

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/memory_mixin.py

@@ -764,6 +764,50 @@ class MemoryMixin:
         except Exception as e:
             logging.debug(f"Auto-memory extraction failed: {e}")
 
+    def _persist_memory_turn(self, user_message: str, assistant_response: str):
+        """Persist a raw conversation turn to the memory store.
+
+        Called after each response when ``_memory_instance`` is set but
+        ``auto_memory`` extraction is off. Stores the turn to short-term memory
+        so a later Agent sharing the same store (e.g. ``memory={"user_id": uid}``)
+        recalls it via ``get_memory_context()``. Best-effort: never raises.
+
+        Async-safe: a memory store write is blocking file/DB I/O. When this runs
+        inside a live event loop (the async ``achat``/``astart`` after-agent path),
+        the write is offloaded to a worker thread so it never stalls the loop
+        (AGENTS.md §4.5). On the sync path (no running loop) it writes inline.
+        """
+        memory = getattr(self, "_memory_instance", None)
+        if memory is None or not assistant_response:
+            return
+        store = getattr(memory, "store_short_term", None) or getattr(memory, "add_short_term", None)
+        if store is None:
+            return
+        text = f"User: {user_message}\nAssistant: {assistant_response}"
+        metadata = {"agent_id": getattr(self, "agent_id", getattr(self, "name", None))}
+
+        def _do_store():
+            try:
+                store(text, metadata=metadata)
+            except Exception as e:
+                logging.debug(f"Memory turn persistence failed: {e}")
+
+        try:
+            import asyncio
+            asyncio.get_running_loop()
+        except RuntimeError:
+            # No running loop (sync chat/run/start path): write inline.
+            _do_store()
+            return
+        # Inside a live loop: offload the blocking write so it cannot stall the
+        # event loop. Fire-and-forget — persistence is best-effort.
+        try:
+            import asyncio
+            asyncio.get_running_loop().run_in_executor(None, _do_store)
+        except Exception as e:
+            logging.debug(f"Memory turn persistence scheduling failed: {e}")
+            _do_store()
+
     def _process_auto_learning(self):
         """Process auto-learning extraction after agent response.
         

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/tool_execution.py

@@ -1904,6 +1904,11 @@ class ToolExecutionMixin:
         ``_atrigger_after_agent_hook`` without any async-safety change.
         """
         from ..hooks import HookEvent, AfterAgentInput
+        # AfterAgentInput.response is typed/serialized as a string (its
+        # to_dict truncates via ``response[:500]``). Structured-output turns
+        # (output_pydantic) return a Pydantic instance, so coerce to str here
+        # to keep string-only hooks (e.g. command hooks) from crashing while
+        # the public chat() return value stays the model.
         return AfterAgentInput(
             session_id=getattr(self, '_session_id', 'default'),
             cwd=os.getcwd(),
@@ -1911,7 +1916,7 @@ class ToolExecutionMixin:
             timestamp=str(time.time()),
             agent_name=self.name,
             prompt=prompt if isinstance(prompt, str) else str(prompt),
-            response=response or "",
+            response=response if isinstance(response, str) else (str(response) if response else ""),
             tools_used=tools_used or [],
             total_tokens=0,
             execution_time_ms=(time.time() - start_time) * 1000
@@ -1928,7 +1933,16 @@ class ToolExecutionMixin:
         # Auto-memory extraction (opt-in via MemoryConfig(auto_memory=True))
         if response:
             prompt_str = prompt if isinstance(prompt, str) else str(prompt)
-            self._process_auto_memory(prompt_str, str(response))
+            if getattr(self, "_auto_memory", False):
+                self._process_auto_memory(prompt_str, str(response))
+            else:
+                # When memory is enabled but auto_memory extraction is off, still
+                # persist the raw turn so a later Agent sharing the same memory
+                # (e.g. memory={"user_id": uid}) can recall it. Without this the
+                # sync chat/run/start path wrote nothing and cross-session recall
+                # silently returned empty (issue #5595). Mirrors the write already
+                # done on the async unified path.
+                self._persist_memory_turn(prompt_str, str(response))
 
         # Auto-learning extraction (opt-in via LearnConfig(mode=LearnMode.AGENTIC))
         self._process_auto_learning()

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agents/agents.py

@@ -2382,6 +2382,20 @@ class AgentTeam(SpawnAnnounceProtocol):
 
     def run_all_tasks(self):
         """Synchronous version of run_all_tasks method"""
+        # The sync entry point (.start()/.run()) drives tasks one at a time and
+        # cannot batch async_execution=True tasks via asyncio.gather the way
+        # arun_all_tasks does. Warn once so the parallel fan-out feature the
+        # constructor docstring/ValueError advertise doesn't silently degrade to
+        # sequential execution -- point the caller at the async entry point.
+        if self.process in ("workflow", "sequential") and any(
+            getattr(t, 'async_execution', False) for t in self.tasks.values()
+        ):
+            logger.warning(
+                "One or more tasks have async_execution=True, but the synchronous "
+                "entry point (.start()/.run()) runs them sequentially -- use "
+                "`await team.astart()` for parallel fan-out."
+            )
+
         process = Process(
             tasks=self.tasks,
             agents=self.agents,

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/eval/evalport.py

@@ -7,9 +7,16 @@ another tool's harness, and results can be diffed/aggregated across tools.
 
 Mapping (1:1 with EvalPort's ``Suite`` / ``ResultSet`` concepts):
 
-    EvalPackage <-> EvalPort Suite      (name/description/version + cases + thresholds)
-    EvalCase    <-> EvalPort test case  (input / expected_output / grader refs)
-    EvalReport   -> EvalPort ResultSet  (aggregate + per-case pass/score/latency)
+    EvalPackage <-> EvalPort Suite      (id/name/description + test_cases + graders)
+    EvalCase    <-> EvalPort TestCase   (id / input / expected_output / grader refs)
+    EvalReport   -> EvalPort ResultSet  (summary + per-case grader_results)
+
+Per-criterion scores map to native EvalPort ``grader_results`` (one per criterion,
+matching the criterion graders referenced by the Suite). PraisonAI-only fields
+with no EvalPort slot (package version, thresholds, seed, trajectory records, a
+nonpositive ``timeout_seconds`` that the spec's ``timeout_ms`` cannot represent,
+...) are kept under the ``praisonai`` key of the relevant ``metadata`` object so
+round trips stay lossless.
 
 Design: this module is intentionally **dependency-free**. It emits and consumes
 plain spec-shaped dicts (JSON), so the core SDK does not take on ``evalport-sdk``
@@ -27,53 +34,90 @@ Example:
     >>> pkg2.name == pkg.name
     True
 """
-from typing import Any, Dict, List
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
 
 from .package import EvalCase, EvalPackage, EvalReport
 
-EVALPORT_SPEC_VERSION = "1.0"
+# EvalPort spec version the emitted documents conform to (semver, per spec).
+EVALPORT_SPEC_VERSION = "1.0.0-rc.5"
+
+# Grader that carries PraisonAI's own per-case verdict (EvalResult.passed/score).
+# EvalPort requires every test case to reference at least one grader.
+VERDICT_GRADER_ID = "praisonai_verdict"
+_HANDLER = "praisonaiagents.eval"
+_META_KEY = "praisonai"
+
+
+def _grader_def(grader_id: str, description: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "id": grader_id,
+        "type": "custom",
+        "params": {"handler": _HANDLER},
+        "description": description,
+    }
 
 
 def _case_to_evalport(case: EvalCase) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-    """Map an ``EvalCase`` to an EvalPort test-case dict.
+    """Map an ``EvalCase`` to an EvalPort TestCase dict.
 
-    The native ``timeout_seconds`` is emitted as a dedicated top-level field so
-    it never collides with a user-supplied ``metadata["timeout_seconds"]`` key,
-    keeping round trips lossless for both.
+    ``criteria`` become grader references (defined at suite level); a case
+    without criteria references the verdict grader. ``timeout_seconds`` maps to
+    the spec's ``timeout_ms``; user ``metadata`` is passed through untouched.
     """
+    # A case's own criteria are its graders; the verdict grader is always
+    # referenced too so PraisonAI's pass/score verdict has a home in the
+    # ResultSet (spec requires >= 1 grader per case).
+    graders = [VERDICT_GRADER_ID] + [c for c in case.criteria if c != VERDICT_GRADER_ID]
     item: Dict[str, Any] = {
         "id": case.name,
         "input": case.input,
+        "graders": list(dict.fromkeys(graders)),
     }
     if case.expected is not None:
         item["expected_output"] = case.expected
-    if case.criteria:
-        item["graders"] = list(case.criteria)
-    if case.timeout_seconds is not None:
-        item["timeout_seconds"] = case.timeout_seconds
-    metadata = dict(case.metadata or {})
-    if metadata:
-        item["metadata"] = metadata
+    if case.metadata:
+        item["metadata"] = dict(case.metadata)
+    if case.timeout_seconds is not None and case.timeout_seconds > 0:
+        item["timeout_ms"] = max(1, int(round(case.timeout_seconds * 1000)))
+    elif case.timeout_seconds is not None:
+        # Nonpositive timeout is not spec-representable (timeout_ms >= 1); keep
+        # the raw value under the reserved namespace so import restores it
+        # instead of silently applying the 30s default.
+        meta = item.setdefault("metadata", {})
+        native = dict(meta.get(_META_KEY) or {})
+        native["timeout_seconds"] = case.timeout_seconds
+        meta[_META_KEY] = native
     return item
 
 
 def _case_from_evalport(item: Dict[str, Any]) -> EvalCase:
-    """Map an EvalPort test-case dict to an ``EvalCase``.
+    """Map an EvalPort TestCase dict to an ``EvalCase``.
 
-    Prefers the dedicated top-level ``timeout_seconds`` field; falls back to a
-    ``metadata["timeout_seconds"]`` value for suites emitted by other tools,
-    without mutating the caller's metadata.
+    Reads ``timeout_ms`` (spec); falls back to a legacy top-level or
+    ``metadata["timeout_seconds"]`` value, without mutating caller metadata.
     """
     metadata = dict(item.get("metadata") or {})
-    if "timeout_seconds" in item:
+    native = metadata.get(_META_KEY) or {}
+    if "timeout_ms" in item:
+        timeout = item["timeout_ms"] / 1000.0
+    elif "timeout_seconds" in item:
         timeout = item["timeout_seconds"]
+    elif "timeout_seconds" in native:
+        timeout = native["timeout_seconds"]  # nonpositive timeout preserved on export
     else:
         timeout = metadata.get("timeout_seconds", 30.0)
+    criteria = []
+    for g in item.get("graders") or item.get("criteria") or []:
+        gid = g.get("id") if isinstance(g, dict) else g
+        if gid and gid != VERDICT_GRADER_ID:
+            criteria.append(gid)
     return EvalCase(
         name=item.get("id") or item.get("name") or "case",
         input=item.get("input", ""),
         expected=item.get("expected_output", item.get("expected")),
-        criteria=list(item.get("graders") or item.get("criteria") or []),
+        criteria=criteria,
         metadata=metadata,
         timeout_seconds=timeout,
     )
@@ -88,16 +132,28 @@ def to_evalport(package: EvalPackage) -> Dict[str, Any]:
     Returns:
         A spec-shaped dict suitable for ``openeval.validate.validate_suite()``.
     """
-    return {
-        "evalport_version": EVALPORT_SPEC_VERSION,
-        "kind": "suite",
+    criteria = dict.fromkeys(c for case in package.cases for c in case.criteria)
+    criteria.pop(VERDICT_GRADER_ID, None)
+    graders = [_grader_def(VERDICT_GRADER_ID, "PraisonAI per-case verdict (EvalResult.passed/score)")]
+    graders += [_grader_def(c, f"PraisonAI criterion: {c}") for c in criteria]
+
+    suite: Dict[str, Any] = {
+        "version": EVALPORT_SPEC_VERSION,
+        "id": package.name,
         "name": package.name,
-        "description": package.description,
-        "version": package.version,
-        "cases": [_case_to_evalport(c) for c in package.cases],
-        "thresholds": dict(package.thresholds or {}),
-        "seed": package.seed,
+        "graders": graders,
+        "test_cases": [_case_to_evalport(c) for c in package.cases],
+        "metadata": {
+            _META_KEY: {
+                "version": package.version,
+                "thresholds": dict(package.thresholds or {}),
+                "seed": package.seed,
+            }
+        },
     }
+    if package.description:
+        suite["description"] = package.description
+    return suite
 
 
 def from_evalport(suite: Dict[str, Any]) -> EvalPackage:
@@ -110,22 +166,68 @@ def from_evalport(suite: Dict[str, Any]) -> EvalPackage:
         An ``EvalPackage`` whose cases can be run via ``EvalSuite`` /
         ``HarnessEvaluator`` as native ``EvalCase`` objects.
     """
-    cases: List[EvalCase] = [_case_from_evalport(c) for c in suite.get("cases", [])]
+    items = suite.get("test_cases", suite.get("cases", []))
+    cases: List[EvalCase] = [_case_from_evalport(c) for c in items]
+    meta = (suite.get("metadata") or {}).get(_META_KEY) or {}
+    legacy = "evalport_version" in suite  # documents emitted before spec alignment
     return EvalPackage(
-        name=suite.get("name", "suite"),
+        name=suite.get("name") or suite.get("id") or "suite",
         description=suite.get("description", ""),
-        version=suite.get("version", "1.0.0"),
+        version=meta.get("version") or (suite.get("version") if legacy else None) or "1.0.0",
         cases=cases,
-        thresholds=dict(suite.get("thresholds") or {}),
-        seed=suite.get("seed"),
+        thresholds=dict(meta.get("thresholds") or suite.get("thresholds") or {}),
+        seed=meta.get("seed", suite.get("seed")),
     )
 
 
-def report_to_evalport(report: EvalReport) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+def _unit_score(value: Any) -> Optional[float]:
+    if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, (int, float)) or value != value:
+        return None
+    return min(1.0, max(0.0, float(value)))
+
+
+def _grader_result(grader_id: str, raw_score: Any, passed: bool) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build one spec-shaped ``grader_result`` entry.
+
+    Scores are clamped to the spec's [0, 1] range; the raw value is preserved
+    under ``metadata`` when clamping changes it. A null score means "not
+    verified", so ``passed`` is forced ``False`` in that case.
+    """
+    score = _unit_score(raw_score)
+    grader: Dict[str, Any] = {
+        "grader_id": grader_id,
+        "type": "custom",
+        "score": score,
+        "passed": bool(passed) if score is not None else False,
+    }
+    if score is not None and score != raw_score:
+        grader["metadata"] = {"openeval.raw_score": raw_score}
+    return grader
+
+
+def _runner_info() -> Dict[str, str]:
+    runner = {"name": "praisonaiagents"}
+    try:
+        from importlib.metadata import version
+
+        runner["version"] = version("praisonaiagents")
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    return runner
+
+
+def report_to_evalport(
+    report: EvalReport,
+    *,
+    run_id: Optional[str] = None,
+    started_at: Optional[str] = None,
+) -> Dict[str, Any]:
     """Convert an ``EvalReport`` to an EvalPort ``ResultSet`` dict.
 
     Args:
         report: The aggregated report from running an eval package.
+        run_id: Unique run identifier (defaults to a random UUID).
+        started_at: RFC 3339 run start time (defaults to now, UTC).
 
     Returns:
         A spec-shaped dict suitable for
@@ -133,33 +235,52 @@ def report_to_evalport(report: EvalReport) -> Dict[str, Any]:
     """
     results: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
     for r in report.results:
+        verdict = _grader_result(VERDICT_GRADER_ID, r.score, r.passed)
+        grader_results = [verdict]
+        # Surface each per-criterion score as its own grader_result so EvalPort
+        # consumers can diff criteria across tools (they match the criterion
+        # grader ids referenced by the exported Suite). ``passed`` is unknown at
+        # the criterion level, so mirror the case verdict.
+        for name, score in (r.criteria_scores or {}).items():
+            if name == VERDICT_GRADER_ID:
+                continue
+            grader_results.append(_grader_result(name, score, r.passed))
+
         item: Dict[str, Any] = {
-            "case_id": r.case_name,
-            "passed": r.passed,
-            "score": r.score,
-            "latency_ms": r.latency_ms,
+            "test_case_id": r.case_name,
+            "passed": verdict["passed"],
+            "grader_results": grader_results,
         }
         if r.actual_output is not None:
-            item["actual_output"] = r.actual_output
+            item["actual_output"] = str(r.actual_output)
+        if r.latency_ms is not None and r.latency_ms >= 0:
+            item["duration_ms"] = int(round(r.latency_ms))
         if r.error is not None:
-            item["error"] = r.error
-        if r.criteria_scores:
-            item["grader_scores"] = dict(r.criteria_scores)
+            item["error"] = {"type": "runner_error", "message": str(r.error)}
         if r.record is not None:
-            item["record"] = r.record
+            item["metadata"] = {_META_KEY: {"record": r.record}}
         results.append(item)
 
+    summary: Dict[str, Any] = {
+        "total": report.total_cases,
+        "passed": report.passed_cases,
+        "failed": report.failed_cases,
+        "pass_rate": report.pass_rate,
+    }
+    meta: Dict[str, Any] = {"thresholds_met": dict(report.thresholds_met or {})}
+    avg = _unit_score(report.average_score)
+    if avg is not None:
+        summary["avg_score"] = avg
+        if avg != report.average_score:
+            meta["average_score"] = report.average_score  # clamped
+
     return {
-        "evalport_version": EVALPORT_SPEC_VERSION,
-        "kind": "result_set",
-        "suite_name": report.package_name,
-        "summary": {
-            "total": report.total_cases,
-            "passed": report.passed_cases,
-            "failed": report.failed_cases,
-            "pass_rate": report.pass_rate,
-            "average_score": report.average_score,
-            "thresholds_met": dict(report.thresholds_met or {}),
-        },
+        "version": EVALPORT_SPEC_VERSION,
+        "suite_id": report.package_name,
+        "run_id": run_id or uuid.uuid4().hex,
+        "started_at": started_at or datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+        "runner": _runner_info(),
         "results": results,
+        "summary": summary,
+        "metadata": {_META_KEY: meta},
     }

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/gateway/__init__.py

@@ -35,6 +35,14 @@ _LAZY_IMPORTS = {
     "SessionProjection": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.session_projection", "SessionProjection"),
     "SessionProjectionState": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.session_projection", "SessionProjectionState"),
     "RunView": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.session_projection", "RunView"),
+    # Canonical session-address grammar (Issue #5383)
+    "SessionRef": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.addressing", "SessionRef"),
+    "build_session_path": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.addressing", "build_session_path"),
+    "parse_session_path": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.addressing", "parse_session_path"),
+    "derive_short_id": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.addressing", "derive_short_id"),
+    "slugify": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.addressing", "slugify"),
+    "RESERVED_NAMES": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.addressing", "RESERVED_NAMES"),
+    "SHORT_ID_LEN": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.addressing", "SHORT_ID_LEN"),
     "GatewayCloseCode": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols", "GatewayCloseCode"),
     # Declarative method -> required-scope registry (Issue #3206)
     "GatewayMethodDescriptor": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols", "GatewayMethodDescriptor"),
@@ -49,6 +57,11 @@ _LAZY_IMPORTS = {
     # Saturation / back-pressure observability (Issue #4265)
     "HealthPressure": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols", "HealthPressure"),
     "evaluate_pressure": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols", "evaluate_pressure"),
+    # Trusted-proxy ingress attribution (Issue #5312)
+    "IngressTrust": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols", "IngressTrust"),
+    "IngressAttribution": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols", "IngressAttribution"),
+    "resolve_ingress_attribution": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols", "resolve_ingress_attribution"),
+    "parse_forwarded_for": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols", "parse_forwarded_for"),
     # Push protocols and dataclasses
     "PushChannelProtocol": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols", "PushChannelProtocol"),
     "PresenceProtocol": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols", "PresenceProtocol"),
@@ -239,6 +252,8 @@ _LAZY_IMPORTS = {
     # liveness.py — Event-loop liveness watchdog (Issue #3385)
     "LoopWatchdogPolicy": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.liveness", "LoopWatchdogPolicy"),
     "LoopWatchdog": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.liveness", "LoopWatchdog"),
+    # liveness.py — Startup-phase watchdog (Issue #5265)
+    "StartupWatchdog": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.liveness", "StartupWatchdog"),
     # degraded_state.py — Unified degraded-capability registry (Issue #3518)
     "DegradedOwner": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.degraded_state", "DegradedOwner"),
     "DegradedCapabilityProtocol": ("praisonaiagents.gateway.degraded_state", "DegradedCapabilityProtocol"),
@@ -385,6 +400,14 @@ __all__ = [
     "SessionProjection",
     "SessionProjectionState",
     "RunView",
+    # Canonical session-address grammar (Issue #5383)
+    "SessionRef",
+    "build_session_path",
+    "parse_session_path",
+    "derive_short_id",
+    "slugify",
+    "RESERVED_NAMES",
+    "SHORT_ID_LEN",
     "GatewayCloseCode",
     # Declarative method -> required-scope registry (Issue #3206)
     "GatewayMethodDescriptor",
@@ -398,6 +421,11 @@ __all__ = [
     "compute_config_revision",
     "HealthPressure",
     "evaluate_pressure",
+    # Trusted-proxy ingress attribution (Issue #5312)
+    "IngressTrust",
+    "IngressAttribution",
+    "resolve_ingress_attribution",
+    "parse_forwarded_for",
     # Push protocols (always available)
     "PushChannelProtocol",
     "PresenceProtocol",
@@ -580,6 +608,8 @@ __all__ = [
     # Event-loop liveness watchdog (Issue #3385)
     "LoopWatchdogPolicy",
     "LoopWatchdog",
+    # Startup-phase watchdog (Issue #5265)
+    "StartupWatchdog",
     # Unified degraded-capability registry (Issue #3518)
     "DegradedOwner",
     "DegradedCapabilityProtocol",

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/gateway/addressing.py

@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+"""Canonical session-address grammar for the Gateway (Issue #5383).
+
+A pure, dependency-free grammar that maps between an opaque runtime
+``session_key`` (a UUID, or an ``agent:<id>:<uuid>``-style key) and a stable,
+human-readable, reconnect-survivable path — e.g. ``chat/<agentId>/<slug>-<shortId>``.
+It gives every surface (dashboard deep-links, bot channels, the CLI, the
+``praisonai-ts`` mirror, reconnecting clients) a single addressing contract to
+agree on, instead of each one carrying the raw UUID or re-inventing a resolver.
+
+This module lives in **core** because the grammar is a set of pure functions
+that define a protocol/contract every surface must share. It has **no**
+third-party dependencies and does no I/O — the concrete store-backed lookup
+(``session.resolve``) is implemented in the wrapper behind this contract.
+
+The grammar is deliberately lossy in one direction: ``build_session_path``
+derives a short id from the trailing UUID so the whole opaque instance id never
+appears in a URL, and an optional slug from the session label. ``parse_session_path``
+recovers a :class:`SessionRef` (agent id + short id + slug hint) that a resolver
+maps back to the concrete ``session_id``; it never assumes it can reconstruct the
+key byte-for-byte, except via the exact-key escape hatch (a ``!``-prefixed final
+segment) for sessions that must keep their literal key.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Optional
+from urllib.parse import quote, unquote
+
+__all__ = [
+    "SessionRef",
+    "SHORT_ID_LEN",
+    "RESERVED_NAMES",
+    "derive_short_id",
+    "slugify",
+    "build_session_path",
+    "parse_session_path",
+]
+
+# Length of the short id derived from the trailing hex of a session key. Eight
+# hex chars (32 bits) keeps URLs terse while staying collision-resistant enough
+# for a per-agent namespace, where a resolver disambiguates the rare clash.
+SHORT_ID_LEN = 8
+
+# Reserved final-segment names that denote a well-known / sentinel session
+# (e.g. the agent's ``main`` conversation) rather than a ``slug-shortId`` pair.
+# A resolver treats these as a friendly sentinel, not a short-id lookup.
+RESERVED_NAMES = frozenset({"main", "global", "default", "root"})
+
+# Trailing run of hex digits that terminates the key — the opaque UUID tail we
+# shorten from. Anchored at end-of-string so a *hex run followed by non-hex*
+# (e.g. ``report-deadbeef.js``) is NOT shortened and instead round-trips via the
+# literal-key escape hatch; only a genuine hex terminus (a UUID tail) is lossy.
+_HEX_TAIL_RE = re.compile(r"([0-9a-fA-F]{%d,})$" % SHORT_ID_LEN)
+
+# A ``slug-shortId`` final segment: optional slug, then a hex short id.
+_SLUG_SHORT_RE = re.compile(r"^(?:(?P<slug>.+)-)?(?P<short>[0-9a-fA-F]{%d})$" % SHORT_ID_LEN)
+
+# Characters allowed verbatim in a slug; everything else collapses to ``-``.
+_SLUG_STRIP_RE = re.compile(r"[^a-z0-9]+")
+
+# Exact-key escape hatch: a final segment prefixed with ``!`` carries the
+# percent-encoded literal key verbatim (for sessions that must not be shortened).
+_LITERAL_PREFIX = "!"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SessionRef:
+    """A parsed friendly reference to a session, for a resolver to map to an id.
+
+    Exactly one of the resolution hints is authoritative depending on how the
+    path was written:
+
+    - ``literal_key`` set  -> resolve by exact key (escape hatch).
+    - ``short_id`` set     -> resolve by short id (optionally aided by ``slug_hint``).
+    - ``slug_hint`` only, matching a reserved name -> resolve the sentinel session.
+
+    ``agent_id`` scopes the lookup so short ids only need to be unique per agent.
+    """
+
+    agent_id: str
+    short_id: Optional[str] = None
+    slug_hint: Optional[str] = None
+    literal_key: Optional[str] = None
+
+
+def derive_short_id(session_key: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Derive a stable short id from the terminating hex run of ``session_key``.
+
+    Returns the last :data:`SHORT_ID_LEN` hex chars of the key's *terminating*
+    hex run (e.g. a UUID tail), lower-cased. The run must end the key: a key
+    whose hex is followed by non-hex characters (e.g. ``report-deadbeef.js``)
+    is deliberately not shortened, so it round-trips via the literal-key escape
+    hatch instead of silently losing its suffix. Returns ``None`` when the key
+    has no terminating hex run long enough to shorten — the caller then falls
+    back to the literal key or reserved-name form.
+    """
+    if not session_key:
+        return None
+    match = _HEX_TAIL_RE.search(session_key)
+    if not match:
+        return None
+    hex_tail = match.group(1)
+    return hex_tail[-SHORT_ID_LEN:].lower()
+
+
+def slugify(display_name: Optional[str], max_len: int = 48) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Turn a human label into a lowercase, dash-separated URL slug.
+
+    Non-alphanumeric runs collapse to a single ``-``; leading/trailing dashes are
+    trimmed. Returns ``None`` for an empty/whitespace-only or unusable name so
+    the path omits the slug rather than emitting an empty segment.
+    """
+    if not display_name:
+        return None
+    slug = _SLUG_STRIP_RE.sub("-", display_name.strip().lower()).strip("-")
+    if not slug:
+        return None
+    if len(slug) > max_len:
+        slug = slug[:max_len].rstrip("-")
+    return slug or None
+
+
+def build_session_path(
+    agent_id: str,
+    session_key: str,
+    display_name: Optional[str] = None,
+    namespace: str = "chat",
+) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Build a stable, shareable path for a session.
+
+    Produces ``<namespace>/<agentId>/<slug>-<shortId>`` when a short id can be
+    derived (with the slug omitted when there is no usable ``display_name``), so
+    the whole opaque UUID never appears in the URL. When the key has no hex tail
+    to shorten, falls back to an exact-key segment (``!<percent-encoded-key>``)
+    so the address round-trips losslessly. Returns ``None`` if ``agent_id`` or
+    ``session_key`` is empty.
+
+    Path segments are percent-escaped, so a key that looks like a file
+    (e.g. ``report.js``) is never mistaken for a static asset.
+    """
+    if not agent_id or not session_key:
+        return None
+    ns = _seg(namespace) or "chat"
+    agent_seg = _seg(agent_id)
+    if not agent_seg:
+        return None
+
+    short_id = derive_short_id(session_key)
+    if short_id:
+        slug = slugify(display_name)
+        tail = f"{slug}-{short_id}" if slug else short_id
+    else:
+        # No hex tail to shorten: keep the literal key behind the escape hatch.
+        tail = _LITERAL_PREFIX + quote(session_key, safe="")
+    return f"{ns}/{agent_seg}/{tail}"
+
+
+def parse_session_path(path: str) -> Optional[SessionRef]:
+    """Parse a session path back into a :class:`SessionRef`.
+
+    Accepts the forms produced by :func:`build_session_path`, with or without a
+    leading namespace segment:
+
+    - ``chat/<agent>/<slug>-<shortId>`` / ``<agent>/<slug>-<shortId>``
+    - ``chat/<agent>/<shortId>`` / ``<agent>/<shortId>``
+    - ``chat/<agent>/main`` (reserved sentinel) / ``<agent>/main``
+    - ``chat/<agent>/!<percent-encoded-key>`` (exact-key escape hatch)
+
+    Returns ``None`` when the path has no agent segment or is otherwise
+    unparseable. A resolver combines the returned hints with its store to reach
+    the concrete ``session_id``.
+    """
+    if not path:
+        return None
+    parts = [p for p in path.strip().strip("/").split("/") if p]
+    # ``build_session_path`` percent-escapes the namespace and agent into single
+    # segments, so a canonical address is exactly ``<ns>/<agent>/<ref>`` (3) or
+    # ``<agent>/<ref>`` (2). Reject anything longer so a malformed link like
+    # ``chat/x/y/z`` never silently acquires a different meaning by using only
+    # its last two segments.
+    if len(parts) == 3:
+        # Drop the leading namespace segment; agent + final ref remain.
+        agent_id = unquote(parts[-2])
+        final = parts[-1]
+    elif len(parts) == 2:
+        agent_id = unquote(parts[0])
+        final = parts[1]
+    else:
+        return None
+
+    agent_id = agent_id.strip()
+    if not agent_id or not final:
+        return None
+
+    # Exact-key escape hatch.
+    if final.startswith(_LITERAL_PREFIX):
+        literal = unquote(final[len(_LITERAL_PREFIX):])
+        if not literal:
+            return None
+        return SessionRef(agent_id=agent_id, literal_key=literal)
+
+    final = unquote(final)
+
+    # Reserved sentinel (main/global/...): a friendly named session.
+    if final.lower() in RESERVED_NAMES:
+        return SessionRef(agent_id=agent_id, slug_hint=final.lower())
+
+    match = _SLUG_SHORT_RE.match(final)
+    if match:
+        return SessionRef(
+            agent_id=agent_id,
+            short_id=match.group("short").lower(),
+            slug_hint=match.group("slug") or None,
+        )
+
+    # No short id present: treat the whole segment as a slug hint the resolver
+    # can match against session labels.
+    return SessionRef(agent_id=agent_id, slug_hint=final)
+
+
+def _seg(value: Optional[str]) -> str:
+    """Percent-escape a single path segment (``/`` and dots are encoded)."""
+    if not value:
+        return ""
+    return quote(value.strip(), safe="")

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/gateway/config.py

@@ -941,6 +941,73 @@ class AttachmentConfig:
         )
 
 
+def _parse_drain_timeout(value: Any) -> Optional[float]:
+    """Coerce a ``gateway.drain_timeout`` YAML value to a float (or None).
+
+    Tolerant of env-substituted strings (e.g. ``"20"``); an unparseable /
+    negative value falls back to None (no drain) rather than raising, matching
+    the wrapper's fail-open handling of a malformed drain window (#5362).
+    """
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    try:
+        parsed = float(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+    return parsed if parsed >= 0 else None
+
+
+def _parse_watchdog_enabled(value: Any) -> bool:
+    """Whether a ``gateway.watchdog`` YAML value enables the loop watchdog.
+
+    Accepts both a bare truthy scalar and the documented block form
+    (``watchdog: { enabled: true, ... }``), mirroring the wrapper's watchdog
+    wiring so the public config reflects the same on/off decision (#5362).
+    """
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        flag = value.get("enabled", False)
+    else:
+        flag = value
+    if isinstance(flag, str):
+        return flag.strip().lower() in ("1", "true", "yes", "on")
+    return bool(flag)
+
+
+def _parse_watchdog_timeout(value: Any) -> Optional[float]:
+    """Derive the loop-stall budget (seconds) from a ``gateway.watchdog`` block.
+
+    Reads ``liveness_interval * liveness_strikes`` from the block form when
+    present so the public config exposes the effective wedge budget the CLI
+    ``--watchdog-timeout`` flag sets; returns None when unset/unparseable.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        return None
+    try:
+        interval = float(value.get("liveness_interval", 5.0))
+        strikes = int(value.get("liveness_strikes", 3)) or 3
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+    budget = interval * strikes
+    return budget if budget > 0 else None
+
+
+def _parse_watchdog_timeout_scalar(value: Any) -> Optional[float]:
+    """Coerce an explicit ``gateway.watchdog_timeout`` scalar to a float.
+
+    Mirrors the ``watchdog_timeout > 0`` invariant (see ``GatewayConfig``):
+    tolerant of env-substituted strings (e.g. ``"15"``); an unparseable or
+    non-positive value falls back to None so a malformed timeout disables the
+    budget rather than raising (#5362).
+    """
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    try:
+        parsed = float(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+    return parsed if parsed > 0 else None
+
+
 @dataclass
 class GatewayConfig:
     """Configuration for the gateway server.
@@ -973,6 +1040,13 @@ class GatewayConfig:
     host: str = "127.0.0.1"
     port: int = 8765
     bind_host: Optional[str] = None
+    # Issue #5312: CIDRs/IPs of upstream proxies/tunnels the operator declares
+    # trusted. Empty (default) means the gateway is directly exposed: forwarded
+    # headers are never believed and per-IP policy keys on the socket peer.
+    # When set, the real client IP is resolved by walking the forwarded chain
+    # across trusted hops (see ``resolve_ingress_attribution``); anything
+    # proxy-shaped but unattributable fails closed to the socket peer.
+    trusted_proxies: List[str] = field(default_factory=list)
     cors_origins: List[str] = field(default_factory=lambda: [])
     allowed_origins: List[str] = field(default_factory=lambda: [])
     auth_token: Optional[str] = None
@@ -996,6 +1070,14 @@ class GatewayConfig:
     max_concurrent_runs: int = 0  # Aggregate concurrency ceiling (0 = unlimited)
     queue_depth: int = 0  # Bounded wait queue when at the ceiling
     overflow_policy: str = "reject"  # reject | queue | shed_oldest
+    # Issue #5362: complete the back-pressure/lifecycle posture on the public
+    # config so a Python embedder / gateway.yaml can pin it declaratively —
+    # parity with the CLI ``--drain-timeout`` / ``--watchdog`` /
+    # ``--watchdog-timeout`` flags. ``None``/False keep today's behaviour
+    # (no drain, watchdog off); a CLI flag still overrides these at start.
+    drain_timeout: Optional[float] = None  # graceful-drain window on shutdown (s)
+    watchdog: bool = False  # event-loop liveness watchdog (opt-in)
+    watchdog_timeout: Optional[float] = None  # loop-stall budget before restart (s)
     # Issue #5168: per-tenant/per-scope concurrency sub-limit within the global
     # ceiling so one tenant cannot occupy every run slot. 0 disables the
     # sub-limit (today's global-only behaviour).
@@ -1075,6 +1157,14 @@ class GatewayConfig:
             raise ValueError(
                 "overflow_policy must be one of 'reject', 'queue', 'shed_oldest'"
             )
+        if self.drain_timeout is not None and self.drain_timeout < 0:
+            raise ValueError(
+                "drain_timeout must be >= 0 (use 0/None to disable the drain window)"
+            )
+        if self.watchdog_timeout is not None and self.watchdog_timeout <= 0:
+            raise ValueError(
+                "watchdog_timeout must be > 0 (leave unset to use the default budget)"
+            )
         if self.max_concurrent_runs_per_scope < 0:
             raise ValueError(
                 "max_concurrent_runs_per_scope must be >= 0 "
@@ -1147,6 +1237,7 @@ class GatewayConfig:
         return {
             "host": self.host,
             "port": self.port,
+            "trusted_proxies": list(self.trusted_proxies),
             "cors_origins": self.cors_origins,
             "allowed_origins": self.allowed_origins,
             "auth_token": "***" if self.auth_token else None,
@@ -1162,6 +1253,9 @@ class GatewayConfig:
             "max_concurrent_runs": self.max_concurrent_runs,
             "queue_depth": self.queue_depth,
             "overflow_policy": self.overflow_policy,
+            "drain_timeout": self.drain_timeout,
+            "watchdog": self.watchdog,
+            "watchdog_timeout": self.watchdog_timeout,
             "max_concurrent_runs_per_scope": self.max_concurrent_runs_per_scope,
             "preauth_max_connections_per_ip": self.preauth_max_connections_per_ip,
             "max_unauthorized_frames": self.max_unauthorized_frames,
@@ -1341,9 +1435,17 @@ class MultiChannelGatewayConfig:
                 for tok, scopes in gw_data["auth_scopes"].items()
             }
 
+        raw_trusted = gw_data.get("trusted_proxies", [])
+        trusted_proxies = (
+            [str(p).strip() for p in raw_trusted if str(p).strip()]
+            if isinstance(raw_trusted, (list, tuple))
+            else []
+        )
+
         gateway_config = GatewayConfig(
             host=gw_data.get("host", "127.0.0.1"),
             port=gw_data.get("port", 8765),
+            trusted_proxies=trusted_proxies,
             cors_origins=gw_data.get("cors_origins", []),
             allowed_origins=gw_data.get("allowed_origins", []),
             auth_token=gw_data.get("auth_token"),
@@ -1360,6 +1462,17 @@ class MultiChannelGatewayConfig:
             max_concurrent_runs=int(gw_data.get("max_concurrent_runs", 0) or 0),
             queue_depth=int(gw_data.get("queue_depth", 0) or 0),
             overflow_policy=str(gw_data.get("overflow_policy", "reject") or "reject"),
+            drain_timeout=_parse_drain_timeout(gw_data.get("drain_timeout")),
+            watchdog=_parse_watchdog_enabled(gw_data.get("watchdog")),
+            # Prefer an explicit ``gateway.watchdog_timeout`` scalar (as emitted
+            # by ``to_dict`` and settable directly, matching the CLI
+            # ``--watchdog-timeout`` flag); otherwise derive the budget from the
+            # ``watchdog`` block so both round-trip and block forms work (#5362).
+            watchdog_timeout=(
+                _parse_watchdog_timeout_scalar(gw_data.get("watchdog_timeout"))
+                if gw_data.get("watchdog_timeout") is not None
+                else _parse_watchdog_timeout(gw_data.get("watchdog"))
+            ),
             max_concurrent_runs_per_scope=int(
                 gw_data.get("max_concurrent_runs_per_scope", 0) or 0
             ),

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/gateway/liveness.py

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ from .protocols import GATEWAY_RESTART_EXIT_CODE
 __all__ = [
     "LoopWatchdogPolicy",
     "LoopWatchdog",
+    "StartupWatchdog",
 ]
 
 
@@ -437,3 +438,271 @@ class LoopWatchdog:
                     faulthandler.dump_traceback(file=fh, all_threads=True)
             except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - fail open
                 pass
+
+
+class StartupWatchdog:
+    """Front-rung liveness guard for the pre-loop startup window (Issue #5265).
+
+    :class:`LoopWatchdog` only becomes meaningful once the asyncio event loop
+    is running — it probes the loop via ``loop.call_soon_threadsafe``, so it can
+    do nothing before a loop exists. That leaves the window between process
+    entry and "loop is live" (heavy imports, config/secret loading, the initial
+    adapter ``connect()``\\ s) uncovered. A wedge there — a hanging SDK import, a
+    blocking synchronous DNS/network call while minting credentials, a deadlock
+    inside ``connect()`` — leaves the process *alive but making no progress*: it
+    holds no serving loop, answers no probes, and never exits, so an external
+    supervisor never restarts it. It becomes a silent zombie with no diagnostics.
+
+    This primitive closes that gap. It arms a wall-clock **deadline** on a
+    dedicated daemon OS thread *before* the heavy work begins, so it keeps
+    working precisely when the main thread is wedged. If the deadline elapses
+    without :meth:`confirm_loop_live`, it dumps all-thread stacks via
+    :mod:`faulthandler` (so the hang is diagnosable) and hands the process back
+    to the supervisor via ``os._exit`` with a restart-intent code. A legitimately
+    slow-but-alive boot extends the deadline via :meth:`report_startup_progress`
+    (bounded, so a truly wedged phase still trips). :meth:`confirm_loop_live`
+    disarms it the instant the serving loop begins — at which point
+    :class:`LoopWatchdog` takes over.
+
+    Design mirrors :class:`LoopWatchdog`: **opt-in** (nothing arms it unless the
+    embedder calls :meth:`arm`), **fail-open** (any error inside the watchdog
+    must never kill a healthy startup), and **stdlib-only** (it must run when the
+    rest of the process cannot, so its correctness cannot depend on the code it
+    guards). Typical use at the gateway entry point::
+
+        sw = StartupWatchdog()
+        sw.arm(deadline_s=config.startup_watchdog_timeout)
+        load_config(config);   sw.report_startup_progress("config loaded")
+        connect_adapters();    sw.report_startup_progress("adapters connected")
+        loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+        LoopWatchdog().arm(loop)
+        sw.confirm_loop_live()  # disarm; loop watchdog now owns liveness
+        loop.run_forever()
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        on_expire: Literal["dump_and_exit", "dump_only"] = "dump_and_exit",
+        exit_code: int = GATEWAY_RESTART_EXIT_CODE,
+        dump_file: Optional[str] = None,
+        max_extensions: int = 10,
+    ) -> None:
+        if on_expire not in ("dump_and_exit", "dump_only"):
+            raise ValueError(
+                "on_expire must be 'dump_and_exit' or 'dump_only'"
+            )
+        if max_extensions < 0:
+            raise ValueError("max_extensions must be >= 0")
+        self.on_expire = on_expire
+        self.exit_code = exit_code
+        self.dump_file = dump_file
+        self.max_extensions = max_extensions
+        self._thread: Optional[threading.Thread] = None
+        # Each armed generation gets its own stop event handed straight to the
+        # thread, so a confirm/re-arm race can never let a stale generation
+        # observe a fresh generation's cleared flag and self-exit (mirrors the
+        # per-generation discipline of LoopWatchdog's deadline mode). The stop
+        # event, once set, stays set: a healthy confirm/disarm is monotonic.
+        self._stop = threading.Event()
+        # A separate wake event carries progress reports: it is briefly set to
+        # nudge the waiting thread to re-read the (extended) deadline, then
+        # cleared. Keeping it distinct from _stop means a progress nudge can
+        # never be mistaken for a disarm (and vice versa).
+        self._wake = threading.Event()
+        self._deadline_s = 0.0
+        self._extensions_used = 0
+        # Progress reports enqueue here; the watchdog thread drains this under
+        # the lock so budget is spent exactly once per report even when several
+        # reports batch between two wakes.
+        self._pending_progress = 0
+        self._expired = False
+        self._confirmed = False
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+
+    @property
+    def armed(self) -> bool:
+        return self._thread is not None and self._thread.is_alive()
+
+    @property
+    def expired(self) -> bool:
+        """True once the startup deadline expired (mainly for ``dump_only``)."""
+        return self._expired
+
+    @property
+    def confirmed(self) -> bool:
+        """True once :meth:`confirm_loop_live` has disarmed the watchdog."""
+        return self._confirmed
+
+    def arm(self, *, deadline_s: float, dump_stacks: bool = True) -> None:
+        """Arm a startup deadline on a dedicated daemon thread. Fail-open.
+
+        Idempotent: arming while already armed is a no-op. A non-finite or
+        non-positive ``deadline_s`` is ignored (nothing to guard). ``dump_stacks``
+        toggles the all-thread stack dump on expiry.
+        """
+        if not math.isfinite(deadline_s) or deadline_s <= 0:
+            return
+        with self._lock:
+            if self.armed:
+                return
+            stop = threading.Event()
+            wake = threading.Event()
+            self._stop = stop
+            self._wake = wake
+            self._deadline_s = deadline_s
+            self._extensions_used = 0
+            self._pending_progress = 0
+            self._expired = False
+            self._confirmed = False
+            self._dump_stacks_on_expire = dump_stacks
+            try:
+                thread = threading.Thread(
+                    target=self._run,
+                    args=(stop, wake),
+                    name="praisonai-startup-watchdog",
+                    daemon=True,
+                )
+                thread.start()
+            except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - fail open
+                self._thread = None
+                return
+            self._thread = thread
+
+    def report_startup_progress(self, phase: str) -> None:
+        """Signal forward progress, extending the deadline by one interval.
+
+        A legitimately slow boot (e.g. many adapters, cold DNS) calls this at
+        each phase so it is not killed. Extensions are bounded by
+        ``max_extensions`` so a phase that itself wedges still trips the
+        deadline. Fail-open and a no-op when not armed.
+
+        Budget accounting is done by the watchdog thread, not here: each report
+        merely enqueues a pending nudge. If several reports land before the
+        thread wakes, each still costs exactly one extension *and* each still
+        earns one fresh deadline window when the thread drains them — so a later
+        slow-but-progressing phase can never find the budget spent on resets it
+        never received (Issue #5265 review: "progress reports lose extensions").
+        """
+        if not self.armed:
+            return
+        with self._lock:
+            self._pending_progress += 1
+            wake = self._wake
+        # Wake the waiting thread so it drains the pending nudges, spends budget,
+        # and resets its window once per still-affordable report. The thread
+        # keeps waiting against its own (still-unset) stop event.
+        wake.set()
+
+    def confirm_loop_live(self) -> None:
+        """Disarm the startup watchdog; the event loop is now live.
+
+        Called immediately before :class:`LoopWatchdog` is armed. Safe to call
+        multiple times / when not armed. Sets the *current* generation's stop
+        event so that exact thread suppresses its self-exit even if it is
+        mid-dump, then drops the reference.
+        """
+        with self._lock:
+            self._confirmed = True
+            self._stop.set()
+            # Nudge the thread out of its wait immediately so the join is prompt.
+            self._wake.set()
+            thread = self._thread
+            self._thread = None
+        if thread is not None and thread is not threading.current_thread():
+            try:
+                thread.join(timeout=1.0)
+            except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - fail open
+                pass
+
+    def _run(self, stop: "threading.Event", wake: "threading.Event") -> None:
+        # Wait out the deadline against *this generation's* events. ``stop`` is
+        # set (and stays set) by a confirm/disarm — that must break us out and
+        # suppress the self-exit. ``wake`` is a transient progress nudge — on
+        # each wake we drain the queued progress reports, spending one extension
+        # of budget per report and resetting the window each time we can still
+        # afford it. A plain timeout with neither event set (and no affordable
+        # pending progress) means the startup genuinely wedged.
+        start = time.monotonic()
+        while not stop.is_set():
+            remaining = (start + self._deadline_s) - time.monotonic()
+            if remaining <= 0:
+                break
+            if wake.wait(remaining):
+                wake.clear()
+                if stop.is_set():
+                    return
+                # Drain queued progress reports. Each report costs one extension
+                # and, while budget remains, grants one fresh deadline window —
+                # so batched reports never lose the resets they paid for.
+                extended = False
+                with self._lock:
+                    pending = self._pending_progress
+                    self._pending_progress = 0
+                    for _ in range(pending):
+                        if self._extensions_used >= self.max_extensions:
+                            break
+                        self._extensions_used += 1
+                        extended = True
+                if extended:
+                    start = time.monotonic()
+                # Whether or not budget remained, loop back and re-check the
+                # (possibly unchanged) deadline against this generation's stop.
+                continue
+        self._on_expire(stop)
+
+    def _on_expire(self, stop: "threading.Event") -> None:
+        # Only fire if this generation was not disarmed. A confirm_loop_live()
+        # that raced in has set this exact event, so a stale generation stays
+        # inert and never self-exits a healthy startup.
+        if stop.is_set():
+            return
+        self._expired = True
+        if getattr(self, "_dump_stacks_on_expire", True):
+            try:
+                self._dump_stacks()
+            except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - fail open
+                pass
+        if self.on_expire == "dump_and_exit":
+            # If confirm_loop_live() raced in while we were dumping, honour it.
+            if stop.is_set():
+                return
+            try:
+                sys.stderr.flush()
+            except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - fail open
+                pass
+            # Final re-check the instant before the irreversible os._exit: the
+            # flush above can block (e.g. a full pipe) long enough for a
+            # concurrent confirm_loop_live() to land. A startup that has just
+            # confirmed a live loop must never be terminated (Issue #5265
+            # review: "confirmation cannot prevent late exit").
+            if stop.is_set():
+                return
+            os._exit(self.exit_code)
+
+    def _dump_stacks(self) -> None:
+        reason = (
+            f"gateway startup did not confirm a live event loop within "
+            f"~{self._deadline_s:.0f}s"
+        )
+        header = (
+            f"praisonai-startup-watchdog: {reason}; "
+            f"dumping all-thread stacks\n"
+        )
+        try:
+            sys.stderr.write(header)
+        except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - fail open
+            pass
+        try:
+            faulthandler.dump_traceback(file=sys.stderr, all_threads=True)
+        except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - fail open
+            pass
+        dump_file = self.dump_file
+        if dump_file:
+            try:
+                with open(dump_file, "a", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+                    fh.write(header)
+                    fh.flush()
+                    faulthandler.dump_traceback(file=fh, all_threads=True)
+            except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - fail open
+                pass

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/gateway/protocols.py

@@ -2555,6 +2555,225 @@ def resolve_auth_mode(bind_host: str, configured: Optional[AuthMode] = None) ->
     return "local" if is_loopback(bind_host) else "token"
 
 
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Ingress attribution / trusted-proxy real-client-IP resolution (Issue #5312)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# The gateway keys rate-limiting, the pre-auth connection budget, and the
+# operator identity on the *raw socket peer*. Behind a reverse proxy or tunnel
+# (nginx, Caddy, Traefik, a cloud LB, Cloudflare, Tailscale Serve/Funnel) that
+# peer is the *proxy* for every request, so every per-IP bucket collapses to
+# one and the operator id becomes identical for all callers. Trusting
+# ``X-Forwarded-For`` unconditionally is worse — a directly-reachable gateway
+# would accept a spoofed client IP any attacker can set.
+#
+# This pure, import-free contract resolves the real client address *only* by
+# walking the forwarded chain across hops the operator has explicitly declared
+# trusted, and **fails closed** for anything proxy-shaped but unattributable
+# (rate-limited as one bucket keyed on the socket peer; never trusts a header).
+# It lives in core so every seam consults one unit-testable decision, exactly
+# like the sibling ``resolve_route`` / ``evaluate_pressure`` contracts.
+
+IngressTrust = Literal[
+    "direct-local",
+    "direct-remote",
+    "trusted-proxy",
+    "tunnel",
+    "unattributable-proxy",
+]
+"""Classification of where an inbound request actually came from.
+
+- ``direct-local``: loopback peer, no proxy headers (local CLI / same host).
+- ``direct-remote``: a remote peer talking to us directly, no proxy headers.
+- ``trusted-proxy``: arrived via one or more hops all in ``trusted_proxies``;
+  the real client IP was resolved from the forwarded chain.
+- ``tunnel``: a trusted loopback/private tunnel hop (e.g. Tailscale/Cloudflare
+  sidecar on loopback) presented a forwarded client — resolved like a trusted
+  proxy.
+- ``unattributable-proxy``: proxy-shaped (forwarded headers present) but the
+  immediate hop is not declared trusted — fails closed, header not trusted.
+"""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class IngressAttribution:
+    """Resolved answer to "who/where is this request from", consulted before
+    any per-IP policy.
+
+    Attributes:
+        trust: The :data:`IngressTrust` classification.
+        client_ip: The subject to key per-IP policy on. The *real* client only
+            when it was resolved across trusted hops; otherwise the raw socket
+            peer (never a spoofable header value).
+        via_proxy: Whether forwarded headers were present at all.
+        fail_closed: True when the request was proxy-shaped but unattributable —
+            the caller must rate-limit it as a single bucket keyed on the socket
+            peer and must never trust a client IP from a header.
+    """
+
+    trust: IngressTrust
+    client_ip: str
+    via_proxy: bool
+    fail_closed: bool
+
+
+def parse_forwarded_for(header: Optional[str]) -> "List[str]":
+    """Parse an ``X-Forwarded-For`` header into an ordered list of hops.
+
+    The chain is left→right, client-first: ``client, proxy1, proxy2``. Empty
+    tokens and surrounding whitespace are dropped; ``None``/empty yields an
+    empty list. Pure string handling — no name resolution, no validation of
+    whether each token is a real IP (that is the caller's trust decision).
+    """
+    if not header:
+        return []
+    return [tok.strip() for tok in header.split(",") if tok.strip()]
+
+
+def _is_valid_ip(host: Optional[str]) -> bool:
+    """Return whether ``host`` parses as a literal IPv4/IPv6 address.
+
+    Forwarded-header tokens are attacker-influenced strings; a value such as
+    ``unknown`` or an arbitrary label must never become a per-IP policy subject
+    (it would group unrelated callers or split one caller across buckets). The
+    caller uses this to fail closed to the socket peer for a non-IP hop.
+    """
+    if not host:
+        return False
+    import ipaddress
+
+    try:
+        ipaddress.ip_address(str(host).strip())
+        return True
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+
+
+def _is_trusted_hop(host: str, trusted_proxies: "Sequence[str]") -> bool:
+    """Return whether ``host`` is a member of the declared trusted set.
+
+    A trusted entry may be a bare IP or a CIDR (``10.0.0.0/8``). Loopback is
+    *not* implicitly trusted here — the caller decides how to treat a loopback
+    tunnel — so this stays a pure membership test.
+    """
+    import ipaddress
+
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    for entry in trusted_proxies:
+        entry = str(entry).strip()
+        if not entry:
+            continue
+        try:
+            if "/" in entry:
+                if ip in ipaddress.ip_network(entry, strict=False):
+                    return True
+            elif ip == ipaddress.ip_address(entry):
+                return True
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+    return False
+
+
+def resolve_ingress_attribution(
+    *,
+    peer_ip: str,
+    forwarded_for: "Sequence[str]" = (),
+    real_ip: Optional[str] = None,
+    trusted_proxies: "Sequence[str]" = (),
+) -> IngressAttribution:
+    """Resolve the real client attribution for an inbound request.
+
+    Pure and side-effect-free so it is unit-testable in isolation and every
+    seam (rate limiters, connection budget, operator id) consults the same
+    decision.
+
+    Args:
+        peer_ip: Raw socket peer (``request.client.host``).
+        forwarded_for: Parsed ``X-Forwarded-For`` chain, left→right
+            (client-first). See :func:`parse_forwarded_for`.
+        real_ip: Optional ``X-Real-IP`` value (used only when there is no
+            forwarded chain and the immediate hop is trusted).
+        trusted_proxies: CIDRs/IPs the operator declares trusted.
+
+    Returns:
+        An :class:`IngressAttribution`. The real client IP is resolved *only*
+        across hops in ``trusted_proxies``; anything proxy-shaped but
+        unattributable fails closed to the socket peer.
+
+    Resolution rules:
+        * No proxy headers → ``direct-local`` (loopback peer) or
+          ``direct-remote``; ``client_ip`` is the peer, never fail-closed.
+        * Proxy headers present but the socket peer is not a trusted hop →
+          ``unattributable-proxy``, ``fail_closed=True``, ``client_ip`` = peer
+          (a spoofable header is never trusted on a directly-reachable
+          gateway).
+        * Socket peer is a trusted hop → walk the forwarded chain right→left,
+          peeling trusted hops, and stop at the first untrusted address: that
+          address is the real client. If the chain is empty, fall back to
+          ``real_ip`` then the peer. The resolved client must be a literal IP —
+          a malformed/non-IP hop fails closed to the peer. A loopback trusted
+          hop is classified ``tunnel``; otherwise ``trusted-proxy``.
+    """
+    has_headers = bool(forwarded_for) or bool(real_ip)
+
+    # No forwarded headers at all — attribute straight to the socket peer.
+    if not has_headers:
+        trust: IngressTrust = "direct-local" if is_loopback(peer_ip) else "direct-remote"
+        return IngressAttribution(
+            trust=trust,
+            client_ip=peer_ip,
+            via_proxy=False,
+            fail_closed=False,
+        )
+
+    # Proxy-shaped. The immediate hop (socket peer) must itself be trusted for
+    # any header to be believed; otherwise fail closed to the socket peer.
+    if not _is_trusted_hop(peer_ip, trusted_proxies):
+        return IngressAttribution(
+            trust="unattributable-proxy",
+            client_ip=peer_ip,
+            via_proxy=True,
+            fail_closed=True,
+        )
+
+    # Trusted immediate hop. Walk the forwarded chain right→left, peeling hops
+    # that are themselves trusted; the first untrusted address is the real
+    # client. Stop as soon as we hit it so a client-supplied spoofed prefix
+    # cannot be peeled past.
+    client_ip = None
+    for hop in reversed(list(forwarded_for)):
+        if _is_trusted_hop(hop, trusted_proxies):
+            continue
+        client_ip = hop
+        break
+    if client_ip is None:
+        # Entire chain was trusted (or empty). Prefer X-Real-IP, then peer.
+        client_ip = (real_ip.strip() if real_ip else None) or peer_ip
+
+    # The resolved client must be a literal IP before it keys per-IP policy. A
+    # malformed hop (e.g. ``unknown`` or an arbitrary label injected upstream)
+    # would otherwise group unrelated callers or split one caller across
+    # buckets — fail closed to the socket peer instead (Greptile P2).
+    if not _is_valid_ip(client_ip):
+        return IngressAttribution(
+            trust="unattributable-proxy",
+            client_ip=peer_ip,
+            via_proxy=True,
+            fail_closed=True,
+        )
+
+    trust = "tunnel" if is_loopback(peer_ip) else "trusted-proxy"
+    return IngressAttribution(
+        trust=trust,
+        client_ip=client_ip,
+        via_proxy=True,
+        fail_closed=False,
+    )
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Weak / placeholder secret guard (Issue #3259)
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -7582,6 +7801,10 @@ def _register_core_gateway_methods() -> None:
         "server_reply": OperatorScope.WRITE,
         "session.status": OperatorScope.READ,
         "session.transcript": OperatorScope.READ,
+        # Resolve a friendly reference (short id / slug / label / ``main``
+        # sentinel, optionally agent-scoped) to a concrete session id (Issue
+        # #5383). Read-only lookup: it reveals no more than session.status.
+        "session.resolve": OperatorScope.READ,
         "approvals.resolve": OperatorScope.APPROVALS,
         "pairing.approve": OperatorScope.PAIRING,
         "pairing.revoke": OperatorScope.PAIRING,

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/knowledge/adapters/factories.py

@@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ class ChromaKnowledgeAdapter:
                **kwargs: Any):
         """Search for relevant content in ChromaDB."""
         from ..models import SearchResult, SearchResultItem
+        from ..protocols import require_scope
+        require_scope(user_id, agent_id, run_id, "search", backend="chroma")
         
         # Get embedding for query
         embedding_model, embedding_kwargs = self._embedding_call()
@@ -236,9 +238,15 @@ class ChromaKnowledgeAdapter:
         if run_id is not None:
             where_filter["run_id"] = run_id
         
-        # Merge with additional filters
+        # Merge with additional filters, but never let a caller-supplied filter
+        # overwrite the tenant-scope constraint: filters={"user_id": "bob"} must
+        # not widen an already-scoped query back onto another tenant's data
+        # (issue #5319).
         if filters:
-            where_filter.update(filters)
+            for key, value in filters.items():
+                if key in where_filter:
+                    continue
+                where_filter[key] = value
         
         # Search ChromaDB
         try:
@@ -289,6 +297,8 @@ class ChromaKnowledgeAdapter:
             **kwargs: Any):
         """Add content to ChromaDB."""
         from ..models import AddResult
+        from ..protocols import require_scope
+        require_scope(user_id, agent_id, run_id, "add", backend="chroma")
         
         # Convert content to string
         content_str = str(content)
@@ -375,6 +385,8 @@ class ChromaKnowledgeAdapter:
                 run_id: Optional[str] = None, limit: int = 100, **kwargs: Any):
         """Get all items from ChromaDB."""
         from ..models import SearchResult, SearchResultItem
+        from ..protocols import require_scope
+        require_scope(user_id, agent_id, run_id, "get_all", backend="chroma")
         
         try:
             # ChromaDB doesn't support get_all with filters easily, so we'll use peek
@@ -510,8 +522,11 @@ class SQLiteKnowledgeAdapter:
                **kwargs: Any):
         """Search for relevant content in SQLite."""
         from ..models import SearchResult, SearchResultItem
+        from ..protocols import require_scope
         import json
         
+        require_scope(user_id, agent_id, run_id, "search", backend="sqlite")
+        
         conn = self._get_conn()
         
         # Build query with filters
@@ -528,6 +543,19 @@ class SQLiteKnowledgeAdapter:
             sql += " AND run_id = ?"
             params.append(run_id)
         
+        # Apply metadata filters against the stored JSON metadata column so a
+        # filtered search returns the same subset chroma/mem0 already return
+        # instead of silently discarding the filters (issue #5319).
+        if filters:
+            for key, value in filters.items():
+                # Quote the key in the JSON path so a top-level metadata key that
+                # itself contains dots (e.g. "source.type") is matched literally
+                # instead of being interpreted as a nested path (issue #5319).
+                escaped_key = key.replace('"', '""')
+                sql += " AND json_extract(metadata, ?) = ?"
+                params.append(f'$."{escaped_key}"')
+                params.append(value)
+        
         sql += " LIMIT ?"
         params.append(limit)
         
@@ -551,9 +579,12 @@ class SQLiteKnowledgeAdapter:
             **kwargs: Any):
         """Add content to SQLite."""
         from ..models import AddResult
+        from ..protocols import require_scope
         import json
         import time
         
+        require_scope(user_id, agent_id, run_id, "add", backend="sqlite")
+        
         content_str = str(content)
         doc_id = str(time.time_ns())
         metadata_json = json.dumps(metadata or {})
@@ -596,8 +627,11 @@ class SQLiteKnowledgeAdapter:
                 run_id: Optional[str] = None, limit: int = 100, **kwargs: Any):
         """Get all items from SQLite."""
         from ..models import SearchResult, SearchResultItem
+        from ..protocols import require_scope
         import json
         
+        require_scope(user_id, agent_id, run_id, "get_all", backend="sqlite")
+        
         conn = self._get_conn()
         
         # Build query with filters

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/knowledge/adapters/mongodb_adapter.py

@@ -169,7 +169,12 @@ class MongoDBKnowledgeAdapter:
             
         Returns:
             Document ID of inserted content
+
+        Raises:
+            ScopeRequiredError: If no scope identifier is provided
         """
+        from ..protocols import require_scope
+        require_scope(user_id, agent_id, run_id, "add", backend="mongodb")
         try:
             # Generate embedding if model is available
             embedding = None
@@ -210,6 +215,7 @@ class MongoDBKnowledgeAdapter:
         user_id: Optional[str] = None,
         agent_id: Optional[str] = None,
         run_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        filters: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
         **kwargs
     ) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
         """
@@ -221,11 +227,17 @@ class MongoDBKnowledgeAdapter:
             user_id: Optional user scope for tenant isolation
             agent_id: Optional agent scope for tenant isolation
             run_id: Optional run scope for tenant isolation
+            filters: Optional metadata filters applied to the query
             **kwargs: Additional search parameters
             
         Returns:
             List of matching documents
+
+        Raises:
+            ScopeRequiredError: If no scope identifier is provided
         """
+        from ..protocols import require_scope
+        require_scope(user_id, agent_id, run_id, "search", backend="mongodb")
         try:
             results = []
 
@@ -237,6 +249,13 @@ class MongoDBKnowledgeAdapter:
                     "run_id": run_id,
                 }.items() if v is not None
             }
+
+            # Fold metadata filters in alongside the scope so a filtered search
+            # returns the same subset chroma/mem0 already return instead of
+            # silently discarding the filters (issue #5319).
+            if filters:
+                for key, value in filters.items():
+                    scope_filter[f"metadata.{key}"] = value
             
             # Try vector search first if available
             if self.use_vector_search and self.embedding_model and self._is_atlas_connection():
@@ -332,6 +351,127 @@ class MongoDBKnowledgeAdapter:
             logger.error(f"Failed to delete document {document_id}: {e}")
             return False
     
+    def get(self, item_id: str, **kwargs):
+        """Get a specific document by ID from the knowledge store.
+
+        Returns a ``SearchResultItem`` (or ``None``) so the result shape matches
+        the shared KnowledgeStoreProtocol and the other adapters — a caller that
+        reads ``.text``/``.metadata`` or calls ``.to_dict()`` must not break when
+        it switches to the MongoDB backend (issue #5319).
+        """
+        from ..models import SearchResultItem
+        try:
+            from bson import ObjectId
+            doc = self.collection.find_one({"_id": ObjectId(item_id)})
+            if not doc:
+                return None
+            return SearchResultItem(
+                id=str(doc["_id"]),
+                text=doc.get("content", ""),
+                metadata=doc.get("metadata", {}) or {},
+                score=1.0,
+            )
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.error(f"Failed to get document {item_id}: {e}")
+            return None
+
+    def get_all(
+        self,
+        *,
+        user_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        agent_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        run_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        limit: int = 100,
+        **kwargs
+    ):
+        """Get all documents matching the given scope.
+
+        Returns a ``SearchResult`` to match the shared KnowledgeStoreProtocol
+        and the other adapters.
+
+        Raises:
+            ScopeRequiredError: If no scope identifier is provided
+        """
+        from ..models import SearchResult, SearchResultItem
+        from ..protocols import require_scope
+        require_scope(user_id, agent_id, run_id, "get_all", backend="mongodb")
+        try:
+            scope_filter = {
+                k: v for k, v in {
+                    "user_id": user_id,
+                    "agent_id": agent_id,
+                    "run_id": run_id,
+                }.items() if v is not None
+            }
+            items = []
+            for doc in self.collection.find(scope_filter).limit(limit):
+                items.append(SearchResultItem(
+                    id=str(doc["_id"]),
+                    text=doc.get("content", ""),
+                    metadata=doc.get("metadata", {}) or {},
+                    score=1.0,
+                ))
+            return SearchResult(results=items)
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.error(f"Failed to get_all from MongoDB: {e}")
+            return SearchResult(results=[])
+
+    def update(self, item_id: str, content: Any, **kwargs):
+        """Update an existing document's content/metadata by ID.
+
+        Returns an ``AddResult`` to match the shared KnowledgeStoreProtocol and
+        the other adapters (issue #5319).
+        """
+        from ..models import AddResult
+        try:
+            from bson import ObjectId
+            update_fields: Dict[str, Any] = {"content": str(content)}
+            if "metadata" in kwargs and kwargs["metadata"] is not None:
+                update_fields["metadata"] = kwargs["metadata"]
+            result = self.collection.update_one(
+                {"_id": ObjectId(item_id)},
+                {"$set": update_fields}
+            )
+            if result.matched_count > 0:
+                return AddResult(success=True, id=item_id)
+            return AddResult(success=False, message=f"No document matched id {item_id}")
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.error(f"Failed to update document {item_id}: {e}")
+            return AddResult(success=False, message=str(e))
+
+    def delete_all(
+        self,
+        *,
+        user_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        agent_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        run_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        **kwargs
+    ) -> bool:
+        """Delete all documents matching the given scope.
+
+        Enforces the same tenant-scope contract as the mem0 backend: an
+        unscoped call raises ``ScopeRequiredError`` instead of silently wiping
+        every tenant's documents from the (typically shared) collection.
+
+        Raises:
+            ScopeRequiredError: If no scope identifier is provided
+        """
+        from ..protocols import require_scope
+        require_scope(user_id, agent_id, run_id, "delete_all", backend="mongodb")
+        try:
+            scope_filter = {
+                k: v for k, v in {
+                    "user_id": user_id,
+                    "agent_id": agent_id,
+                    "run_id": run_id,
+                }.items() if v is not None
+            }
+            self.collection.delete_many(scope_filter)
+            return True
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.error(f"Failed to delete_all from MongoDB: {e}")
+            return False
+
     def close(self):
         """Close MongoDB connection."""
         if hasattr(self, 'client'):

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/llm/error_classifier.py

@@ -588,12 +588,48 @@ def get_retry_delay(category: ErrorCategory, attempt: int = 1, base_delay: float
     return 0
 
 
-def extract_retry_after(error: Exception) -> Optional[float]:
+def _retry_after_http_date_delay(value: str) -> Optional[float]:
+    """Return seconds until an HTTP-date ``Retry-After`` value, else ``None``.
+
+    RFC 7231 allows ``Retry-After`` to be either delta-seconds or an absolute
+    HTTP-date. Delta-seconds is handled by the caller; this parses the date
+    form using the stdlib (no new dependency) and returns the non-negative
+    delay from now. A value in the past or unparseable yields ``None`` so the
+    caller falls through to its other signals.
+    """
+    try:
+        from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime
+    except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - stdlib always present
+        return None
+    try:
+        when = parsedate_to_datetime(value.strip())
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+    if when is None:
+        return None
+    import time as _time
+    from datetime import timezone
+
+    # An HTTP-date is UTC; a naive parse result is treated as UTC per the RFC.
+    if when.tzinfo is None:
+        when = when.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    delay = when.timestamp() - _time.time()
+    return delay if delay > 0 else None
+
+
+def extract_retry_after(
+    error: Exception, cap_seconds: float = 300.0,
+) -> Optional[float]:
     """Extract Retry-After header value from rate limit errors.
-    
+
     Args:
         error: Exception potentially containing Retry-After info
-        
+        cap_seconds: Upper bound applied to the parsed value. Defaults to 300s
+            (5 minutes) for in-tick backoff callers. A scheduler *hold* passes a
+            larger cap so a job can be parked past a long provider reset window
+            (e.g. an hourly quota) instead of re-firing every tick — capping at
+            5 minutes there would defeat the park.
+
     Returns:
         Delay in seconds if found, None otherwise
     """
@@ -608,14 +644,21 @@ def extract_retry_after(error: Exception) -> Optional[float]:
             retry_after = None
         if retry_after is not None:
             try:
-                return min(float(retry_after), 300.0)  # Cap at 5 minutes
+                return min(float(retry_after), cap_seconds)
             except (ValueError, TypeError):
-                pass  # Not a plain number (could be an HTTP-date); fall through
+                # Not a plain delta-seconds value — RFC 7231 also permits an
+                # HTTP-date. Parse it so a provider that sends an absolute reset
+                # instant still yields a usable delay (else a long quota window
+                # would leave the job un-parked). A past/unparseable date yields
+                # no delay and falls through to the other signals.
+                delay = _retry_after_http_date_delay(str(retry_after))
+                if delay is not None:
+                    return min(delay, cap_seconds)
 
     # 2. Some SDKs expose a numeric ``retry_after`` attribute directly.
     retry_after_attr = getattr(error, "retry_after", None)
     if isinstance(retry_after_attr, (int, float)):
-        return min(float(retry_after_attr), 300.0)
+        return min(float(retry_after_attr), cap_seconds)
 
     error_str = str(error)
     
@@ -632,7 +675,7 @@ def extract_retry_after(error: Exception) -> Optional[float]:
         if match:
             try:
                 delay = float(match.group(1))
-                return min(delay, 300.0)  # Cap at 5 minutes
+                return min(delay, cap_seconds)
             except (ValueError, IndexError):
                 continue
     

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/llm/llm.py

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import re
 import inspect
 import asyncio
 import threading
-import contextvars
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Union, Literal, Callable, TYPE_CHECKING, Protocol
 
@@ -599,11 +598,11 @@ Respond with ONLY a valid JSON tool call in this format:
         # Token tracking
         self.last_token_metrics: Optional[TokenMetrics] = None
         self.session_token_metrics: Optional[TokenMetrics] = None
-        # Agent attribution is task-local: a single LLM instance is shared by
-        # concurrent agents (gateway channels, asyncio.gather), so a plain
-        # attribute would let one agent's set_current_agent() overwrite another's
-        # while it is still awaiting its own completion, misattributing tokens
-        # (issue #5052). A ContextVar isolates the value per async task/context.
+        # Agent attribution is task-local: a single LLM instance is often shared
+        # by several concurrently-running agents (gateway channels, asyncio.gather),
+        # so a plain attribute would let one agent's set_current_agent() clobber
+        # another's mid-await and misattribute token spend (issues #5052/#3933).
+        # A ContextVar keeps the value isolated per asyncio task / thread.
         self._current_agent_name_var: contextvars.ContextVar[Optional[str]] = (
             contextvars.ContextVar("current_agent_name", default=None)
         )
@@ -1003,14 +1002,6 @@ Respond with ONLY a valid JSON tool call in this format:
         ]):
             return "idle_timeout"
         
-        # Format errors
-        if any(indicator in error_str for indicator in [
-            "validation error", "invalid format", "parse error",
-            "parsing error", "decode error", "malformed",
-            "invalid json", "schema error"
-        ]):
-            return "format_error"
-        
         # Default fallback
         return "unknown"
     
@@ -2040,98 +2031,6 @@ Respond with ONLY a valid JSON tool call in this format:
                 schemas.append(f"- {name}({', '.join(param_strs)})")
         return '\n'.join(schemas) if schemas else "None"
 
-    def _param_accepts_string(self, function_name, param_name, tools) -> bool:
-        """True when a tool declares this parameter as accepting a string.
-
-        Used to decide whether an argument whose value matches a previous tool's
-        name is a legitimate string or a weak model's way of referring to that
-        tool's result. A declared string parameter is left alone.
-        """
-        try:
-            for tool in tools or []:
-                fn = tool.get("function") if isinstance(tool, dict) else None
-                if not fn or fn.get("name") != function_name:
-                    continue
-                spec = (fn.get("parameters") or {}).get("properties", {}).get(param_name)
-                if not isinstance(spec, dict):
-                    return False
-                return self._schema_accepts_string(spec)
-        except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 -- never break a tool call on a schema read
-            return False
-        return False
-
-    def _schema_accepts_string(self, spec) -> bool:
-        """True when a JSON-Schema fragment can accept a string value.
-
-        Handles the shapes this repo's own generator emits: a bare
-        ``{"type": "string"}``, a list type ``{"type": ["string", "null"]}``,
-        and the ``anyOf``/``oneOf``/``allOf`` unions produced for ``Optional[str]``
-        and ``Union`` parameters (``tools/schema.py``). Without the union case an
-        ``Optional[str]`` argument was still treated as a result reference and
-        silently overwritten.
-        """
-        if not isinstance(spec, dict):
-            return False
-        declared = spec.get("type")
-        if isinstance(declared, list):
-            if "string" in declared:
-                return True
-        elif declared == "string":
-            return True
-        # enum without an explicit type is string-typed in JSON Schema practice
-        if declared is None and isinstance(spec.get("enum"), list):
-            if any(isinstance(v, str) for v in spec["enum"]):
-                return True
-        for key in ("anyOf", "oneOf", "allOf"):
-            members = spec.get(key)
-            if isinstance(members, list) and any(
-                    self._schema_accepts_string(m) for m in members):
-                return True
-        return False
-
-    def _force_tool_usage_message(self, response_text, tool_calls, formatted_tools,
-                                  iteration_count):
-        """The nudge to send when a model ignored tools it should have used.
-
-        Returns the message content, or None when no nudge is warranted. Shared
-        so every response path applies the same policy -- this lived inline in
-        get_response only, so an agent that was awaited instead of called
-        silently lost a setting it had accepted.
-        """
-        if not self._should_force_tool_usage(
-                response_text, tool_calls, formatted_tools, iteration_count):
-            return None
-        tool_names = self._get_tool_names_for_prompt(formatted_tools)
-        logging.debug(
-            f"[OLLAMA_RELIABILITY] Force tool usage triggered. Adding prompt for tools: {tool_names}")
-        return self.FORCE_TOOL_USAGE_PROMPT.format(tool_names=tool_names)
-
-    def _tool_repair_message(self, tool_calls, formatted_tools):
-        """The correction to send when a model produced an invalid tool call.
-
-        Returns the message content and charges the repair budget, or None when
-        the calls are valid or the budget is spent. Shared for the same reason
-        as _force_tool_usage_message.
-        """
-        repair_attempt_count = getattr(self, '_current_repair_count', 0)
-        max_tool_repairs = getattr(self, 'max_tool_repairs', 0)
-        if not (tool_calls and max_tool_repairs > 0
-                and repair_attempt_count < max_tool_repairs):
-            return None
-        validation_errors = [e for e in
-                             (self._validate_tool_call(tc, formatted_tools) for tc in tool_calls)
-                             if e]
-        if not validation_errors:
-            return None
-        error_msg = "; ".join(validation_errors)
-        tool_schemas = self._get_tool_schemas_for_prompt(formatted_tools)
-        logging.debug(
-            f"[OLLAMA_RELIABILITY] Tool call repair attempt "
-            f"{repair_attempt_count + 1}/{max_tool_repairs}: {error_msg}")
-        self._current_repair_count = repair_attempt_count + 1
-        return self.TOOL_CALL_REPAIR_PROMPT.format(
-            error=error_msg, tool_schemas=tool_schemas)
-
     def _should_force_tool_usage(self, response_text: str, tool_calls: Optional[List], formatted_tools: Optional[List], iteration_count: int) -> bool:
         """
         Determine if we should force tool usage based on settings and context.
@@ -6623,11 +6522,11 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
     
     @property
     def current_agent_name(self) -> Optional[str]:
-        """The agent name attributed to the current async task/context.
+        """Task-local name of the agent currently driving this LLM.
 
-        Backed by a per-instance ContextVar (issue #5052) so concurrent agents
-        sharing one LLM instance keep independent, task-local attribution and do
-        not clobber each other's value while awaiting their own completions.
+        Backed by a per-instance ContextVar so concurrent agents sharing one
+        LLM instance each read/write their own value instead of racing on a
+        shared attribute (issues #5052/#3933).
         """
         var = getattr(self, "_current_agent_name_var", None)
         if var is None:
@@ -6673,32 +6572,35 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
         """Deep-copy the LLM while giving the clone fresh attribution ContextVars.
 
         ``contextvars.ContextVar`` has no ``__deepcopy__``/``__reduce__`` and is
-        not copyable, so ``Agent.__deepcopy__`` (which recursively copies
-        ``_llm_instance``) would raise ``TypeError: cannot pickle ContextVar``.
-        Thread locks on LLM subclasses get fresh locks (issue #1746 / #5052).
+        not copyable/pickleable, so ``Agent.__deepcopy__`` (which recursively
+        copies ``_llm_instance`` per gateway channel, issue #5052) would raise
+        ``TypeError: cannot pickle ContextVar``. Every other attribute is copied
+        normally, brand-new ContextVars start the clone's attribution clean, and
+        thread locks on LLM subclasses (RateLimiter/FailoverManager) get fresh
+        locks so configured LLMs clone cleanly (issues #1746 / #5052 / #3933).
         """
         cls = self.__class__
-        new = cls.__new__(cls)
-        memo[id(self)] = new
+        clone = cls.__new__(cls)
+        memo[id(self)] = clone
         for key, value in self.__dict__.items():
             if key == "_current_agent_name_var":
-                new.__dict__[key] = contextvars.ContextVar(
+                clone.__dict__[key] = contextvars.ContextVar(
                     "current_agent_name", default=None
                 )
                 continue
             if key == "_current_agent_id_var":
-                new.__dict__[key] = contextvars.ContextVar(
+                clone.__dict__[key] = contextvars.ContextVar(
                     "current_agent_id", default=None
                 )
                 continue
             if type(value) is type(threading.RLock()):
-                new.__dict__[key] = threading.RLock()
+                clone.__dict__[key] = threading.RLock()
                 continue
             if type(value) is type(threading.Lock()):
-                new.__dict__[key] = threading.Lock()
+                clone.__dict__[key] = threading.Lock()
                 continue
-            new.__dict__[key] = copy.deepcopy(value, memo)
-        return new
+            clone.__dict__[key] = copy.deepcopy(value, memo)
+        return clone
 
     def _resolve_openai_compatible_model(self) -> str:
         """Route a bare model name through the OpenAI-compatible client.
@@ -7126,7 +7028,9 @@ Output MUST be JSON with 'reflection' and 'satisfactory'.
                     # (input_text / input_image); local image paths become
                     # data URLs. Plain-string content is passed through.
                     from .openai_client import OpenAIClient
-                    item = dict(msg)
+                    # Do not forward persisted metadata/provider extensions as
+                    # Responses message properties.
+                    item = {"role": role}
                     item["content"] = OpenAIClient._build_responses_content(
                         msg.get("content", "")
                     )

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/llm/openai_client.py

@@ -781,7 +781,9 @@ class OpenAIClient:
                         "output": msg.get("content", ""),
                     })
                 else:
-                    item = dict(msg)
+                    # Persisted history may carry local metadata/provider fields.
+                    # Responses message items accept role/content, not that record.
+                    item = {"role": role}
                     item["content"] = self._build_responses_content(
                         msg.get("content", "")
                     )

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp.py

@@ -210,7 +210,27 @@ class MCPToolRunner(threading.Thread):
                 return f"Error: MCP tool call timed out after {self.timeout} seconds"
             if not success:
                 return f"Error: {result}"
-            
+
+            # A tool that fails at the application level returns a normal
+            # CallToolResult with isError=True per the MCP spec. Surface it as a
+            # structured error so retry/circuit-breaker/hook logic treats it as a
+            # failure instead of a successful string result (issue #5319).
+            if getattr(result, 'isError', False):
+                if hasattr(result, 'content') and result.content:
+                    if hasattr(result.content[0], 'text'):
+                        error_text = result.content[0].text
+                    else:
+                        error_text = str(result.content[0])
+                else:
+                    error_text = str(result)
+                # Guarantee a non-empty error string: an isError result with an
+                # empty text block would otherwise yield {"error": ""}, which
+                # retry/circuit-breaker/hook logic can misread as a success
+                # (issue #5319).
+                if not error_text:
+                    error_text = f"MCP tool '{tool_name}' reported an error (isError=True)"
+                return {"error": error_text, "mcp_error": True}
+
             # Process result
             if hasattr(result, 'content') and result.content:
                 if hasattr(result.content[0], 'text'):
@@ -401,8 +421,8 @@ class MCP:
         base = re.sub(r'\.(cmd|exe|bat|ps1)$', '', base, flags=re.IGNORECASE).lower()
         return base in cls._COLD_START_LAUNCHERS
 
-    def __init__(self, command_or_string=None, args=None, *, command=None, timeout=None, debug=False, 
-                 allowed_tools: Optional[List[str]] = None, disabled_tools: Optional[List[str]] = None, **kwargs):
+    def __init__(self, command_or_string=None, args=None, *, command=None, timeout=None, debug=False,
+                 allowed_tools: Optional[List[str]] = None, disabled_tools: Optional[List[str]] = None, max_response_bytes: Optional[int] = None, **kwargs):
         """
         Initialize the MCP connection and get tools.
         
@@ -422,6 +442,7 @@ class MCP:
             debug: Enable debug logging for MCP operations (default: False)
             allowed_tools: Include whitelist - only these tools will be available (default: None = all tools)
             disabled_tools: Exclude blacklist - these tools will be filtered out (default: None = no exclusions)
+            max_response_bytes: Maximum body size for each Streamable HTTP response.
             **kwargs: Additional parameters for StdioServerParameters
             
         Note:
@@ -439,6 +460,12 @@ class MCP:
         if command_or_string is None and command is not None:
             command_or_string = command
 
+        if max_response_bytes is not None:
+            if isinstance(max_response_bytes, bool) or not isinstance(max_response_bytes, int) or max_response_bytes <= 0:
+                raise ValueError("max_response_bytes must be a positive integer")
+            if not isinstance(command_or_string, str) or not re.match(r'^https?://', command_or_string):
+                raise ValueError("max_response_bytes is only supported for Streamable HTTP MCP servers")
+
         # Set up logging - default to WARNING level to hide INFO messages
         if debug:
             get_logger("mcp-wrapper").setLevel(logging.DEBUG)
@@ -510,6 +537,8 @@ class MCP:
             # single source of truth (see mcp_transport.get_transport_type).
             from .mcp_transport import get_transport_type
             if get_transport_type(command_or_string) == "sse" and 'transport_type' not in kwargs:
+                if max_response_bytes is not None:
+                    raise ValueError("max_response_bytes is only supported for Streamable HTTP MCP servers")
                 # Legacy SSE URL - use SSE transport for backward compatibility
                 from .mcp_sse import SSEMCPClient
                 self.sse_client = SSEMCPClient(command_or_string, debug=debug, timeout=timeout)
@@ -533,6 +562,8 @@ class MCP:
                     transport_options['session'] = kwargs.pop('session')
                 if 'resumability' in kwargs:
                     transport_options['resumability'] = kwargs.pop('resumability')
+                if max_response_bytes is not None:
+                    transport_options['max_response_bytes'] = max_response_bytes
                 
                 self.http_stream_client = HTTPStreamMCPClient(
                     command_or_string, 

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp_http_stream.py

@@ -71,6 +71,61 @@ def _register_cleanup():
         atexit.register(_cleanup_all_clients)
         _cleanup_registered = True
 
+def _bounded_httpx_client_factory(max_response_bytes):
+    import httpx
+
+    class BoundedStream(httpx.AsyncByteStream):
+        def __init__(self, stream):
+            self.stream = stream
+
+        async def __aiter__(self):
+            total_bytes = 0
+            async for chunk in self.stream:
+                total_bytes += len(chunk)
+                if total_bytes > max_response_bytes:
+                    raise ValueError(f"MCP response exceeded maximum of {max_response_bytes} bytes")
+                yield chunk
+
+        async def aclose(self):
+            await self.stream.aclose()
+
+    class BoundedClient(httpx.AsyncClient):
+        async def send(self, request, *, stream=False, **kwargs):
+            response = await super().send(request, stream=True, **kwargs)
+            encoding = response.headers.get("content-encoding", "identity").lower()
+            if encoding not in ("", "identity"):
+                await response.aclose()
+                raise ValueError("Compressed MCP responses are not supported with a response byte limit")
+            content_length = response.headers.get("content-length")
+            try:
+                content_length = int(content_length) if content_length is not None else None
+            except ValueError:
+                content_length = None
+            if content_length is not None and content_length > max_response_bytes:
+                await response.aclose()
+                raise ValueError(f"MCP response exceeded maximum of {max_response_bytes} bytes")
+            response.stream = BoundedStream(response.stream)
+            if not stream:
+                try:
+                    await response.aread()
+                except BaseException:
+                    await response.aclose()
+                    raise
+                await response.aclose()
+            return response
+
+    def create_client(headers=None, timeout=None, auth=None):
+        request_headers = dict(headers or {})
+        request_headers["Accept-Encoding"] = "identity"
+        return BoundedClient(
+            headers=request_headers,
+            timeout=timeout,
+            auth=auth,
+            trust_env=True,
+        )
+
+    return create_client
+
 class HTTPStreamMCPTool:
     """A wrapper for an MCP tool that can be used with praisonaiagents."""
     
@@ -137,6 +192,8 @@ class HTTPStreamMCPTool:
         logger.debug(f"Async calling tool {self.name} with args: {kwargs}")
         try:
             result = await self.session.call_tool(self.name, kwargs)
+            if getattr(result, 'isError', False):
+                raise RuntimeError(f"MCP tool {self.name} failed: {result.content}")
             
             # Extract text from result
             if hasattr(result, 'content') and result.content:
@@ -490,6 +547,13 @@ class HTTPStreamMCPClient:
         self.debug = debug
         self.timeout = timeout
         self.options = options or {}
+        self.max_response_bytes = self.options.get('max_response_bytes')
+        if self.max_response_bytes is not None and (
+            isinstance(self.max_response_bytes, bool)
+            or not isinstance(self.max_response_bytes, int)
+            or self.max_response_bytes <= 0
+        ):
+            raise ValueError("max_response_bytes must be a positive integer")
         self.session = None
         self.tools = []
         self.transport = None
@@ -510,17 +574,16 @@ class HTTPStreamMCPClient:
         
     def _initialize(self):
         """Initialize the connection and tools."""
-        # Use the global event loop
         loop = get_event_loop()
-        
-        # Start a background thread to run the event loop
-        def run_event_loop():
-            asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
-            loop.run_forever()
-        
-        self.loop_thread = threading.Thread(target=run_event_loop, daemon=True)
-        self.loop_thread.start()
-        
+        self.loop_thread = None
+        if not loop.is_running():
+            def run_event_loop():
+                asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
+                loop.run_forever()
+
+            self.loop_thread = threading.Thread(target=run_event_loop, daemon=True)
+            self.loop_thread.start()
+
         # Run the initialization in the event loop
         future = asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(self._async_initialize(), loop)
         self.tools = future.result(timeout=self.timeout)
@@ -542,11 +605,16 @@ class HTTPStreamMCPClient:
 
         headers = self.options.get('headers') or None
 
-        self._streams_context = streamablehttp_client(
-            url=self.base_url,
-            headers=headers,
-            timeout=self.timeout,
-        )
+        client_options = {
+            "url": self.base_url,
+            "headers": headers,
+            "timeout": self.timeout,
+        }
+        if self.max_response_bytes is not None:
+            client_options["httpx_client_factory"] = _bounded_httpx_client_factory(
+                self.max_response_bytes
+            )
+        self._streams_context = streamablehttp_client(**client_options)
 
         # If any step of the handshake fails after a context has been entered,
         # unwind the already-entered contexts so we don't leak the httpx/anyio
@@ -689,4 +757,4 @@ class HTTPStreamMCPClient:
                 self._force_cleanup()
         except Exception:
             # Never raise exceptions in __del__
-            pass
+            pass

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/adapters/sqlite_adapter.py

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ class SqliteMemoryAdapter:
 
     def _get_stm_conn(self):
         """Get thread-local short-term memory connection."""
-        if not hasattr(self._local, 'stm_conn'):
+        if getattr(self._local, 'stm_conn', None) is None:
             self._local.stm_conn = sqlite3.connect(
                 self.short_db,
                 check_same_thread=False,
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ class SqliteMemoryAdapter:
     
     def _get_ltm_conn(self):
         """Get thread-local long-term memory connection."""
-        if not hasattr(self._local, 'ltm_conn'):
+        if getattr(self._local, 'ltm_conn', None) is None:
             self._local.ltm_conn = sqlite3.connect(
                 self.long_db,
                 check_same_thread=False,
@@ -272,4 +272,30 @@ class SqliteMemoryAdapter:
                     conn.close()
                 except Exception:
                     pass
-            self._all_connections.clear()
+            self._all_connections.clear()
+
+    def close_thread_connections(self):
+        """Close only the calling thread's connections.
+
+        Leaves the shared adapter and other threads' connections intact so the
+        adapter can be reused; the calling thread lazily reopens its own
+        connections on next access.
+
+        A connection is only removed from the registry and cleared from
+        thread-local storage after it closes successfully. If ``close()`` raises,
+        the connection stays tracked so a later ``close_connections()`` /
+        ``close_thread_connections()`` can retry it, and the failure is logged
+        rather than silently swallowed.
+        """
+        for attr in ("stm_conn", "ltm_conn"):
+            conn = getattr(self._local, attr, None)
+            if conn is None:
+                continue
+            try:
+                conn.close()
+            except Exception as e:
+                logger.warning(f"Failed to close {attr}; keeping it tracked for retry: {e}")
+                continue
+            with self._connection_lock:
+                self._all_connections.discard(conn)
+            setattr(self._local, attr, None)

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py

@@ -266,11 +266,12 @@ class FileMemory:
             return True
         except (IOError, OSError) as e:
             self._log(f"Error writing {filepath}: {e}", logging.ERROR)
+            return False
+        finally:
             try:
                 tmp_path.unlink()
             except OSError:
                 pass
-            return False
 
     def commit_memory_batch(
         self,

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/memory.py

@@ -2532,16 +2532,31 @@ class Memory(SearchMixin, MemoryCoreMixin):
         # Other active threads should manage their own connections
         # Only clear full registry in __del__ or explicit shutdown
         
-        # Close memory adapter if it exists (protocol-driven path)
+        # Close memory adapter if it exists (protocol-driven path).
+        #
+        # SQLite is thread-scoped by contract (#1562/#1563): close only the
+        # calling thread's adapter connections and KEEP the shared adapter so
+        # other threads and subsequent same-thread searches keep using the
+        # adapter's tables. Tearing it down here would make searches fall back
+        # to legacy SQL against short_mem/long_mem (#5486).
         if hasattr(self, 'memory_adapter') and self.memory_adapter:
-            try:
-                if hasattr(self.memory_adapter, 'close') and callable(self.memory_adapter.close):
-                    self.memory_adapter.close()
-                    logger.debug("Memory adapter closed successfully")
-            except Exception as e:
-                logger.warning(f"Error closing memory adapter: {e}")
-            finally:
-                self.memory_adapter = None
+            if isinstance(self.memory_adapter, SqliteMemoryAdapter):
+                try:
+                    if hasattr(self.memory_adapter, 'close_thread_connections'):
+                        self.memory_adapter.close_thread_connections()
+                        logger.debug("SQLite adapter thread connections closed")
+                except Exception as e:
+                    logger.warning(f"Error closing SQLite adapter thread connections: {e}")
+                # Intentionally preserve self.memory_adapter for reuse.
+            else:
+                try:
+                    if hasattr(self.memory_adapter, 'close') and callable(self.memory_adapter.close):
+                        self.memory_adapter.close()
+                        logger.debug("Memory adapter closed successfully")
+                except Exception as e:
+                    logger.warning(f"Error closing memory adapter: {e}")
+                finally:
+                    self.memory_adapter = None
         
         # Close MongoDB client if it exists (legacy path)
         if hasattr(self, 'mongo_client') and self.mongo_client:

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/manager.py

@@ -1306,6 +1306,51 @@ def _adapt_plugin_hooks(plugin: Plugin) -> Iterator[Tuple["HookEvent", Callable]
             return HookResult.allow()
         yield HookEvent.CLI_BACKEND_EXECUTE, cli_backend_execute_hook
 
+    # Generic, declaration-driven tail. The explicit branches above give
+    # rewrite/deny semantics to the conversation/tool/channel events that need
+    # them. Everything else a plugin declares in ``PluginInfo.hooks`` — the
+    # gateway/schedule/kanban/compaction/subagent/model-fallback lifecycle — is
+    # observe-only, so a single loop bridges it by method name (``event.value``)
+    # without a hand-written branch per event. This keeps the coverage matrix
+    # from drifting: any future emitted event becomes first-class the moment a
+    # plugin declares it and defines the matching method.
+    yielded = {
+        HookEvent.BEFORE_AGENT, HookEvent.AFTER_AGENT,
+        HookEvent.BEFORE_LLM, HookEvent.AFTER_LLM,
+        HookEvent.BEFORE_TOOL, HookEvent.AFTER_TOOL,
+        HookEvent.BEFORE_TOOL_DEFINITIONS,
+        HookEvent.MESSAGE_RECEIVED, HookEvent.MESSAGE_SENDING,
+        HookEvent.MESSAGE_SENT, HookEvent.MESSAGE_UNDELIVERED,
+        HookEvent.ON_PERMISSION_ASK, HookEvent.ON_CONFIG, HookEvent.ON_AUTH,
+        HookEvent.SESSION_START, HookEvent.SESSION_END, HookEvent.ON_ERROR,
+        HookEvent.CLI_BACKEND_EXECUTE,
+    }
+
+    def _make_observe_hook(method):
+        def observe_hook(data, _m=method):
+            payload = data.to_dict() if hasattr(data, "to_dict") else {}
+            _m(payload)
+            return HookResult.allow()
+        return observe_hook
+
+    declared = getattr(plugin.info, "hooks", None) or []
+    seen: set = set()
+    for event in declared:
+        if not isinstance(event, HookEvent) or event in yielded or event in seen:
+            continue
+        seen.add(event)
+        method = getattr(plugin, event.value, None)
+        if not callable(method):
+            continue
+        parent = getattr(base, event.value, None)
+        own = getattr(type(plugin), event.value, None)
+        # A base no-op that the plugin did not override yields nothing (avoids
+        # registering dead hooks). Methods with no base counterpart (e.g.
+        # ``kanban_task_created``) are treated as genuine overrides.
+        if parent is not None and own is parent:
+            continue
+        yield event, _make_observe_hook(method)
+
 
 # Global plugin manager instance
 _default_manager: Optional[PluginManager] = None

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/plugin.py

@@ -248,6 +248,42 @@ class Plugin(ABC):
     def cli_backend_execute(self, context: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
         """Called after a CLI backend delegates a turn. Observe-only."""
         pass
+
+    def gateway_start(self, context: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        """Called when the gateway/BotOS starts. Observe-only (platforms, bot_count)."""
+        pass
+
+    def gateway_stop(self, context: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        """Called when the gateway/BotOS stops. Observe-only (platforms, reason)."""
+        pass
+
+    def schedule_add(self, context: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        """Called when a scheduled job is persisted. Observe-only."""
+        pass
+
+    def schedule_remove(self, context: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        """Called when a scheduled job is deleted. Observe-only."""
+        pass
+
+    def schedule_trigger(self, context: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        """Called when a scheduled job fires. Observe-only."""
+        pass
+
+    def before_compaction(self, context: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        """Called before conversation memory is compacted. Observe-only."""
+        pass
+
+    def after_compaction(self, context: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        """Called after conversation memory is compacted. Observe-only."""
+        pass
+
+    def subagent_stop(self, context: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        """Called when a spawned subagent reaches a terminal state. Observe-only."""
+        pass
+
+    def model_fallback(self, context: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        """Called when the runtime falls back to a secondary model. Observe-only."""
+        pass
     
     def on_permission_ask(self, target: str, reason: str) -> Optional[bool]:
         """Called when permission is requested. Return True/False to auto-approve/deny."""

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/process/process.py

@@ -844,6 +844,13 @@ Subtask: {st.name}
                                 break
                 else:
                     logging.debug(f"No subtasks created yet for {current_task.name}")
+                    # Mirror the sync workflow(): default a mid-workflow loop
+                    # task (reached via next_tasks/condition, not the start task)
+                    # with no explicit input_file to the tasks.csv convention so
+                    # its subtasks are still expanded instead of being silently
+                    # skipped (issue #5319).
+                    if current_task is not start_task and not current_task.input_file:
+                        current_task.input_file = "tasks.csv"
                     # Create subtasks if needed
                     if current_task.input_file:
                         self._create_loop_subtasks(current_task)

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/push/__init__.py

@@ -7,6 +7,14 @@ re-exports them lazily so user code can keep importing from
 import importlib
 
 from .models import ChannelMessage
+from .policy import (
+    DEFAULT_PREFERENCE,
+    DetailLevel,
+    NotificationCategory,
+    NotificationDecision,
+    NotificationPreference,
+    evaluate,
+)
 from .protocols import PushTransportProtocol
 
 _lazy_cache: dict = {}
@@ -33,6 +41,12 @@ def __getattr__(name: str):
 __all__ = [
     "ChannelMessage",
     "PushTransportProtocol",
+    "NotificationCategory",
+    "DetailLevel",
+    "NotificationPreference",
+    "NotificationDecision",
+    "evaluate",
+    "DEFAULT_PREFERENCE",
     "PushClient",
     "WebSocketTransport",
     "PollingTransport",

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/push/policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+"""Notification policy for gateway push — pure, dependency-free core.
+
+The push stack elsewhere is transport + delivery-guarantee only: it can get
+bytes to a device reliably, but it has no notion of *whether* or *what* to
+notify. This module supplies that missing policy layer as pure protocol code so
+every notifier (the gateway's delivery manager, scheduler completions,
+background-job alerts) can make the same decision identically:
+
+    decision = evaluate(category, prefs, now=..., is_urgent=..., content=...)
+    if decision.send:
+        deliver(recipient, decision.redacted_content)
+
+Three concerns compose into one :class:`NotificationDecision`:
+
+* **Categories** — a recipient opts in per event class (``approval_requested``,
+  ``agent_finished`` …); an un-opted category is suppressed.
+* **Quiet hours** — a per-recipient local window suppresses non-urgent
+  categories; urgent categories may override (``urgent_overrides_quiet``).
+* **Detail level** — ``private`` / ``identified`` / ``detailed`` redacts how
+  much message content leaves the gateway in a device notification.
+
+The heavy enforcement + durable preference store + CLI/YAML surface live in the
+``praisonai``/``praisonai-bot`` wrapper; this stays pure so it carries no heavy
+imports and is trivially testable.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, time
+from enum import Enum
+from typing import Optional, Set
+
+__all__ = [
+    "NotificationCategory",
+    "DetailLevel",
+    "NotificationPreference",
+    "NotificationDecision",
+    "evaluate",
+    "DEFAULT_PREFERENCE",
+]
+
+
+class NotificationCategory(str, Enum):
+    """Event classes a recipient can subscribe to independently."""
+
+    APPROVAL_REQUESTED = "approval_requested"
+    AGENT_FINISHED = "agent_finished"
+    AGENT_QUESTION = "agent_question"
+    HUMAN_MENTIONED = "human_mentioned"
+    SCHEDULED_TASK_FAILED = "scheduled_task_failed"
+    BACKGROUND_TASK_FAILED = "background_task_failed"
+
+
+class DetailLevel(str, Enum):
+    """How much content leaves the gateway in a notification.
+
+    * ``PRIVATE`` — a bare "you have activity"; no agent/session, no content.
+    * ``IDENTIFIED`` — which agent/session, but no message content.
+    * ``DETAILED`` — content included verbatim.
+    """
+
+    PRIVATE = "private"
+    IDENTIFIED = "identified"
+    DETAILED = "detailed"
+
+
+def _in_quiet_window(now: time, start: time, end: time) -> bool:
+    """Whether ``now`` falls inside the ``[start, end)`` local window.
+
+    Handles a window that wraps past midnight (e.g. ``22:00``–``07:30``) by
+    treating start > end as "outside the daytime gap".
+    """
+    if start == end:
+        return False
+    if start < end:
+        return start <= now < end
+    return now >= start or now < end
+
+
+@dataclass
+class NotificationPreference:
+    """A recipient's durable notification policy.
+
+    Attributes:
+        categories: Opted-in categories; a category not present is suppressed.
+        quiet_hours: Optional ``(start, end)`` local time window during which
+            non-urgent categories are suppressed. ``None`` means no quiet hours.
+        timezone: IANA name used to localise ``now`` for the quiet-hours test.
+        detail: Redaction level applied to the notification content.
+        urgent_overrides_quiet: When True, an urgent event is delivered even
+            inside quiet hours.
+    """
+
+    categories: Set[NotificationCategory] = field(default_factory=set)
+    quiet_hours: Optional[tuple] = None
+    timezone: str = "UTC"
+    detail: DetailLevel = DetailLevel.IDENTIFIED
+    urgent_overrides_quiet: bool = True
+
+    def allows(self, category: NotificationCategory) -> bool:
+        """Whether this recipient has opted into ``category``."""
+        return category in self.categories
+
+
+# A sensible default applied when a recipient has set nothing: the two
+# interaction-blocking categories are on, at the identified (no-content) detail
+# level, with no quiet hours.
+DEFAULT_PREFERENCE = NotificationPreference(
+    categories={
+        NotificationCategory.APPROVAL_REQUESTED,
+        NotificationCategory.AGENT_QUESTION,
+    },
+    detail=DetailLevel.IDENTIFIED,
+)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class NotificationDecision:
+    """Outcome of :func:`evaluate` for one (category, recipient, moment).
+
+    Attributes:
+        send: Whether the notification should be delivered at all.
+        reason: Machine/operator-readable reason (e.g. ``"quiet_hours"``,
+            ``"category_not_subscribed"``, ``"ok"``).
+        redacted_content: The content to actually push, redacted per the
+            recipient's detail level (``None`` when ``send`` is False).
+    """
+
+    send: bool
+    reason: str
+    redacted_content: Optional[str] = None
+
+
+def _redact(detail: DetailLevel, content: Optional[str], identity: Optional[str]) -> str:
+    """Apply the detail-level redaction to ``content``.
+
+    ``identity`` is an agent/session label used at the ``identified`` level so a
+    recipient learns *what* has activity without the transcript leaving the
+    gateway.
+    """
+    if detail == DetailLevel.DETAILED:
+        return content if content is not None else "You have new activity"
+    if detail == DetailLevel.IDENTIFIED:
+        return f"Activity in {identity}" if identity else "You have new activity"
+    return "You have new activity"
+
+
+def evaluate(
+    category: NotificationCategory,
+    prefs: Optional[NotificationPreference] = None,
+    *,
+    now: Optional[datetime] = None,
+    is_urgent: bool = False,
+    content: Optional[str] = None,
+    identity: Optional[str] = None,
+) -> NotificationDecision:
+    """Decide whether/what to notify for one event — pure, no side effects.
+
+    Args:
+        category: The event class being considered.
+        prefs: The recipient's preference; ``DEFAULT_PREFERENCE`` when ``None``.
+        now: The moment of evaluation (defaults to ``datetime.now`` localised to
+            the recipient's timezone). A naive ``now`` is treated as already in
+            the recipient's local zone.
+        is_urgent: Whether this specific event is urgent (may override quiet
+            hours when the recipient allows it).
+        content: The full message content, redacted per ``prefs.detail``.
+        identity: An agent/session label used at the ``identified`` detail level.
+
+    Returns:
+        A :class:`NotificationDecision`. ``send`` is False (with a ``reason``)
+        when the category is not subscribed or quiet hours suppress it.
+    """
+    if prefs is None:
+        prefs = DEFAULT_PREFERENCE
+
+    if not prefs.allows(category):
+        return NotificationDecision(send=False, reason="category_not_subscribed")
+
+    if prefs.quiet_hours is not None:
+        local_now = _localised_time(now, prefs.timezone)
+        start, end = prefs.quiet_hours
+        if _in_quiet_window(local_now, start, end):
+            if not (is_urgent and prefs.urgent_overrides_quiet):
+                return NotificationDecision(send=False, reason="quiet_hours")
+
+    return NotificationDecision(
+        send=True,
+        reason="urgent_override" if is_urgent and prefs.quiet_hours else "ok",
+        redacted_content=_redact(prefs.detail, content, identity),
+    )
+
+
+def _localised_time(now: Optional[datetime], tz_name: str) -> time:
+    """Return the wall-clock ``time`` at ``now`` in ``tz_name``.
+
+    A ``None`` ``now`` uses the current time. An aware ``now`` is converted to
+    ``tz_name``; a naive ``now`` is assumed to already be local. ``zoneinfo`` is
+    stdlib (3.9+) so this stays dependency-free; an unknown zone falls back to
+    the naive time rather than raising.
+    """
+    if now is None:
+        now = datetime.now()
+    if now.tzinfo is not None:
+        try:
+            from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo
+
+            now = now.astimezone(ZoneInfo(tz_name))
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+    return now.timetz().replace(tzinfo=None) if now.tzinfo else now.time()

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/scheduler/__init__.py

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
     from .store import FileScheduleStore
     from .config_store import ConfigYamlScheduleStore
     from .parser import parse_schedule
+    from .due import quota_hold_from_failure
     from .runner import ScheduleRunner
     from .loop import ScheduleLoop, InProcessScheduleProvider
     from .protocols import (
@@ -106,6 +107,11 @@ def __getattr__(name: str):
         _module_cache[name] = parse_schedule
         return parse_schedule
 
+    if name == "quota_hold_from_failure":
+        from .due import quota_hold_from_failure
+        _module_cache[name] = quota_hold_from_failure
+        return quota_hold_from_failure
+
     if name == "ScheduleRunner":
         from .runner import ScheduleRunner
         _module_cache[name] = ScheduleRunner
@@ -176,6 +182,7 @@ __all__ = [
     "FileScheduleStore",
     "ConfigYamlScheduleStore",
     "parse_schedule",
+    "quota_hold_from_failure",
     "ScheduleRunner",
     "ScheduleLoop",
     "InProcessScheduleProvider",

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/scheduler/config_store.py

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import time
 from typing import Dict, Iterator, List, Optional
 
 from .models import ScheduleJob, RunRecord
-from .due import is_due as _is_due, resolve_schedule_timezone
+from .due import is_due as _is_due, is_misfire as _is_misfire, resolve_schedule_timezone
 from .hook_emit import emit_schedule_add, emit_schedule_remove
 
 logger = get_logger(__name__)
@@ -202,6 +202,10 @@ class ConfigYamlScheduleStore:
         # a later ``remove(job.id)`` by the runner is then a no-op, so a spent
         # one-shot yields exactly one SCHEDULE_REMOVE.
         auto_removed: List[ScheduleJob] = []
+        # (job_id, job_name) for occurrences suppressed by the misfire policy.
+        # Logged as ``missed`` history after the lock so a dropped occurrence is
+        # observable instead of vanishing silently.
+        missed: List[tuple] = []
         with self._lock, self._file_lock():
             # Re-read from disk so we observe cross-process claims/leases.
             self._reload_locked()
@@ -224,6 +228,16 @@ class ConfigYamlScheduleStore:
                         self._job_state.pop(job.id, None)
                         changed = True
                     continue
+                # Misfire policy: an occurrence that landed while the process
+                # was down and is now older than ``misfire_grace_seconds`` is
+                # recorded as ``missed`` (observable) rather than fired stale or
+                # dropped silently. Advance past the slot so it is not seen due
+                # again on the next poll.
+                if _is_misfire(job, now, self._default_timezone):
+                    job.last_run_at = now
+                    missed.append((job.id, job.name))
+                    changed = True
+                    continue
                 # Win the claim: pre-advance + lease atomically.
                 job.last_run_at = now
                 # Count the fire here (needed so ``should_retire()`` can drop a
@@ -254,6 +268,14 @@ class ConfigYamlScheduleStore:
                     return []
         for job in auto_removed:
             emit_schedule_remove(job)
+        # Record suppressed occurrences so a missed run is visible in history
+        # rather than silently dropped (log_run takes only the thread lock).
+        for job_id, job_name in missed:
+            self.log_run(
+                job_id=job_id,
+                status="missed",
+                job_name=job_name,
+            )
         return claimed
 
     def complete(self, job_id: str, owner_id: str) -> None:

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/scheduler/due.py

@@ -76,6 +76,158 @@ def next_fire_time(
     return croniter(cron_expr, base_datetime).get_next(datetime).timestamp()
 
 
+def scheduled_instant(
+    job: Any,
+    now: float,
+    default_timezone: str | None = None,
+) -> float | None:
+    """Return the epoch of the occurrence this due job is firing *for*.
+
+    When a recurring job becomes due at ``now`` it is firing for a specific
+    scheduled slot that may lie in the past (the process was down when the
+    slot arrived). This returns that slot's canonical instant so a misfire
+    policy can decide whether recovery is still within an acceptable grace
+    window. ``None`` is returned when there is no meaningful past slot (a
+    never-run interval job, or a kind/expression that cannot be evaluated).
+
+    - ``every``: the *first* slot that came due after ``last_run_at``
+      (``last_run_at + every_seconds``). Its age measures how long the job has
+      been overdue — the meaningful lateness for a coalesced recovery.
+    - ``cron``: the last cron fire at or before ``now`` (the slot being
+      recovered for a daily/weekly schedule).
+    - ``at``: the target instant itself.
+    """
+    sched = job.schedule
+    if sched.kind == "every":
+        if sched.every_seconds is None or job.last_run_at is None:
+            return None
+        if now - job.last_run_at < sched.every_seconds:
+            return None
+        return job.last_run_at + sched.every_seconds
+    if sched.kind == "at":
+        if sched.at is None:
+            return None
+        try:
+            return localize_wall_clock(
+                datetime.fromisoformat(sched.at),
+                sched.tz or default_timezone,
+            ).timestamp()
+        except (ValueError, TypeError):
+            return None
+    if sched.kind == "cron":
+        if sched.cron_expr is None:
+            return None
+        try:
+            from croniter import croniter  # type: ignore[import-untyped]
+        except ImportError:
+            return None
+        try:
+            base_datetime = datetime.fromtimestamp(
+                now, resolve_schedule_timezone(sched.tz or default_timezone)
+            )
+            return croniter(sched.cron_expr, base_datetime).get_prev(datetime).timestamp()
+        except (ValueError, KeyError, TypeError):
+            return None
+    return None
+
+
+def is_misfire(
+    job: Any,
+    now: float,
+    default_timezone: str | None = None,
+) -> bool:
+    """Whether a *due* job's occurrence should be suppressed as a misfire.
+
+    Shared by every atomic-claim store so the misfire decision is defined once.
+    Returns ``True`` when the occurrence the job is firing for is older than
+    ``misfire_grace_seconds`` — a stale run whose slot passed while the process
+    was down. Such an occurrence is recorded as ``missed`` (observable) instead
+    of firing a late, no-longer-useful run. An occurrence still within the
+    grace window (or a first run) coalesces into a single normal fire on
+    recovery, the pre-existing behaviour.
+
+    With no grace set this is always ``False`` — existing jobs keep firing
+    exactly as before. A first run (``last_run_at is None``) is never a misfire
+    for any kind: there is no missed *recurrence* to suppress, only the initial
+    fire, which must always run (matching ``is_due``'s never-run branches).
+    """
+    grace = getattr(job, "misfire_grace_seconds", None)
+    if grace is None:
+        return False
+    # A first run is the initial fire, not a recovered recurrence — always let
+    # it run. ``every`` already encodes this (``scheduled_instant`` returns
+    # ``None`` with no ``last_run_at``); make it explicit for ``cron``/``at``
+    # too so a never-run job past a stale slot is not marked missed unfired.
+    if getattr(job, "last_run_at", None) is None:
+        return False
+    # Tolerate a mis-typed grace (e.g. a hand-edited quoted YAML value that
+    # slipped past coercion): a bad policy value must never raise and abort the
+    # whole claim pass — treat it as "no misfire" so other due jobs still fire.
+    try:
+        grace_val = float(grace)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return False
+    instant = scheduled_instant(job, now, default_timezone)
+    if instant is None:
+        return False
+    age = now - instant
+    if age <= 0:
+        return False
+    return age > grace_val
+
+
+# Upper bound on a single quota hold (24h) so a bogus/huge provider Retry-After
+# cannot park a recurring job indefinitely.
+_MAX_HOLD_SECONDS = 86_400.0
+
+
+def quota_hold_from_failure(
+    error: Any,
+    now: float,
+    slack_seconds: float = 60.0,
+) -> float | None:
+    """Return an epoch to park a job past a provider's rate-limit window.
+
+    Pure decision helper for the "provider-quota-aware hold": given a run's
+    failure it decides whether the job should stop re-firing until the
+    provider's own reset window elapses. Returns ``now + Retry-After + slack``
+    when the failure is a rate-limit / quota signal carrying a usable reset
+    hint, else ``None`` (no hold — a non-quota failure keeps today's behaviour).
+
+    Reuses the core error classifier so a 429/quota error is recognised by
+    exception type, HTTP status code, or message, and the reset window is read
+    from the provider's ``Retry-After`` header / ``retry_after`` attribute /
+    message text — no new parsing surface. The small ``slack_seconds`` avoids
+    re-firing the instant the window reopens (clock skew / provider rounding).
+
+    Args:
+        error: The failure — an ``Exception`` (preferred, so the classifier can
+            read the response headers) or an error string.
+        now: Epoch the failure was observed at.
+        slack_seconds: Extra seconds added past the provider's reset window.
+
+    Returns:
+        The epoch before which the job should be parked, or ``None`` when the
+        failure is not a quota signal or carries no usable reset window.
+    """
+    from praisonaiagents.llm.error_classifier import (
+        ErrorCategory,
+        classify_error,
+        extract_retry_after,
+    )
+
+    exc = error if isinstance(error, Exception) else Exception(str(error or ""))
+    if classify_error(exc) != ErrorCategory.RATE_LIMIT:
+        return None
+    # Honour the provider's full reset window (unlike in-tick backoff, which caps
+    # at 5 minutes) so a long quota window parks the job instead of re-firing —
+    # but bound it to 24h so a bogus/huge value can't park a job indefinitely.
+    retry_after = extract_retry_after(exc, cap_seconds=_MAX_HOLD_SECONDS)
+    if not retry_after or retry_after <= 0:
+        return None
+    return now + float(retry_after) + max(float(slack_seconds), 0.0)
+
+
 def is_due(
     job: Any,
     now: float,
@@ -101,6 +253,17 @@ def is_due(
     run_count = getattr(job, "run_count", 0)
     if max_runs is not None and run_count >= max_runs:
         return False
+    # Provider-quota hold short-circuits before the kind check: while a job is
+    # parked past a provider's known-closed window (a 429/quota ``Retry-After``
+    # captured on a prior failure) it is not due, so it stops re-firing and
+    # re-failing every tick against a benched provider. Any intervening fires
+    # coalesce — the job becomes due again at the first legal instant once the
+    # hold elapses. The executor clears ``hold_until`` on the first run that
+    # reaches the model (proof the window reopened).
+    hold_until = getattr(job, "hold_until", None)
+    if hold_until is not None and now < hold_until:
+        return False
+
     until = getattr(job, "until", None)
     if until is not None:
         try:

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/scheduler/models.py

@@ -10,6 +10,23 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from typing import Any, Dict, List, Literal, Optional
 
 
+def _coerce_optional_float(value: Any) -> Optional[float]:
+    """Coerce a persisted/hand-edited value to ``Optional[float]``.
+
+    A hand-written config.yaml may quote a numeric field (``'3600'``) so it
+    arrives as a string. Left as-is it would raise ``TypeError`` in a later
+    numeric comparison (e.g. the misfire age check), aborting the whole claim
+    pass and starving every other due job. Coerce leniently: ``None`` stays
+    ``None``; a non-numeric value is treated as unset rather than exploding.
+    """
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    try:
+        return float(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+
+
 @dataclass
 class Schedule:
     """When to run a scheduled job.
@@ -198,12 +215,16 @@ class RunRecord:
         job_id: ID of the job that was executed.
         job_name: Human-readable name of the job.
         status: Execution status. One of ``"succeeded"``, ``"failed"``,
-                ``"skipped"``, or ``"no_change"``. ``"no_change"`` is the
-                stateful "monitor mode" outcome — a watched source was
+                ``"skipped"``, ``"no_change"``, or ``"missed"``. ``"no_change"``
+                is the stateful "monitor mode" outcome — a watched source was
                 unchanged since the last tick, so the model turn was suppressed
                 silently (no tokens, no delivery). It is distinct from
                 ``"skipped"`` (a generic gate go/no-go) so an operator can tell
                 "nothing changed" apart from "the gate said don't run".
+                ``"missed"`` records a recurring occurrence that landed while
+                the process was down and fell outside the job's
+                ``misfire_grace_seconds`` — it was not run, but is recorded
+                (not silently dropped) so an operator can see the gap.
         result: Agent response text (truncated if very long).
         error: Error message if status is ``"failed"``.
         duration: Wall-clock seconds for execution.
@@ -213,7 +234,7 @@ class RunRecord:
 
     job_id: str
     job_name: str = ""
-    status: Literal["succeeded", "failed", "skipped", "no_change"] = "succeeded"
+    status: Literal["succeeded", "failed", "skipped", "no_change", "missed"] = "succeeded"
     result: Optional[str] = None
     error: Optional[str] = None
     duration: float = 0.0
@@ -374,6 +395,28 @@ class ScheduleJob:
                  ``skipped`` (no tokens, no delivery) so a downstream never runs
                  on empty inputs. Consistent with the existing ``skipped``
                  outcome.
+        misfire_grace_seconds: Misfire policy for a recurring occurrence missed
+                 while the process was down — the maximum age (seconds) of the
+                 occurrence being recovered for it to still run. When the slot
+                 the job is firing for is older than this on recovery, the
+                 occurrence is recorded as ``missed`` (an observable
+                 :class:`RunRecord`) rather than fired — so a daily brief whose
+                 gateway was down for hours does not surface a stale run long
+                 after it was useful, yet the gap is never silently dropped. An
+                 occurrence still within the window (or a first run) coalesces
+                 into a single normal fire on recovery. ``None`` (default)
+                 disables the check, so existing jobs are byte-for-byte
+                 unchanged and keep firing exactly as before.
+        hold_until: Optional epoch instant before which the job is parked and
+                 not due, even when its schedule would otherwise fire. Set when
+                 a run fails with a provider rate-limit / quota signal (the
+                 provider's own ``Retry-After`` / reset window plus a small
+                 slack): the recurring job stops re-firing and re-failing every
+                 tick against a benched provider. Intervening fires coalesce
+                 into the first legal instant after the hold; the executor
+                 clears it on the first run that reaches the model (proof the
+                 window reopened). ``None`` (default) keeps today's behaviour,
+                 so jobs that never hit a quota wall are unchanged.
     """
 
     name: str = ""
@@ -403,8 +446,10 @@ class ScheduleJob:
     context_from: Optional[List[str]] = None
     context_max_chars: int = 4000
     on_missing_context: Literal["run", "skip"] = "run"
+    misfire_grace_seconds: Optional[float] = None
     backend: Optional[str] = None
     backend_options: Dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    hold_until: Optional[float] = None
 
     # ── bounded-run retirement ───────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -519,6 +564,10 @@ class ScheduleJob:
                 d["context_max_chars"] = self.context_max_chars
             if self.on_missing_context != "run":
                 d["on_missing_context"] = self.on_missing_context
+        # Misfire policy. Only persist when configured so a job with no misfire
+        # grace stays byte-for-byte unchanged.
+        if self.misfire_grace_seconds is not None:
+            d["misfire_grace_seconds"] = self.misfire_grace_seconds
         # External CLI backend action. Only persist when configured so agent
         # and command jobs stay byte-for-byte unchanged; options are opaque to
         # the core (the executor validates them against the backend registry).
@@ -526,6 +575,11 @@ class ScheduleJob:
             d["backend"] = self.backend
             if self.backend_options:
                 d["backend_options"] = dict(self.backend_options)
+        # Provider-quota hold. Only persist when parked so a job that never hit
+        # a quota wall stays byte-for-byte unchanged; the parked instant must
+        # survive a restart so a benched job stays parked across processes.
+        if self.hold_until is not None:
+            d["hold_until"] = self.hold_until
         # Atomic-claim lease metadata (set dynamically by stores that support
         # ``claim_due``). Persisted so a lease is visible across processes and
         # survives a restart; omitted when no lease is held.
@@ -577,12 +631,16 @@ class ScheduleJob:
             context_from=context_from,
             context_max_chars=d.get("context_max_chars", 4000),
             on_missing_context=d.get("on_missing_context", "run"),
+            misfire_grace_seconds=_coerce_optional_float(
+                d.get("misfire_grace_seconds")
+            ),
             backend=d.get("backend"),
             backend_options=(
                 dict(d["backend_options"])
                 if isinstance(d.get("backend_options"), dict)
                 else {}
             ),
+            hold_until=d.get("hold_until"),
         )
         # Restore atomic-claim lease metadata if present (see ``to_dict``).
         job._lease_until = d.get("lease_until", 0.0) or 0.0

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/scheduler/store.py

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import time
 from typing import Dict, Iterator, List, Optional
 
 from .models import ScheduleJob, RunRecord
-from .due import is_due as _is_due
+from .due import is_due as _is_due, is_misfire as _is_misfire
 from .hook_emit import emit_schedule_add, emit_schedule_remove
 
 logger = get_logger(__name__)
@@ -187,6 +187,10 @@ class FileScheduleStore:
         # a later ``remove(job.id)`` by the runner is then a no-op, so a spent
         # one-shot yields exactly one SCHEDULE_REMOVE.
         auto_removed: List[ScheduleJob] = []
+        # (job_id, job_name) for occurrences suppressed by the misfire policy.
+        # Logged as ``missed`` history after the lock so a dropped occurrence is
+        # observable instead of vanishing silently.
+        missed: List[tuple] = []
         with self._lock, self._file_lock():
             # Re-read from disk so we observe cross-process claims/leases.
             self._reload_locked()
@@ -208,6 +212,18 @@ class FileScheduleStore:
                         auto_removed.append(self._jobs.pop(job.id))
                         changed = True
                     continue
+                # Misfire policy: the job is due, but the occurrence it is
+                # firing for may have landed while the process was down. Decide
+                # whether to run it now or record it as ``missed`` (observable)
+                # rather than firing a stale run or dropping it silently.
+                if _is_misfire(job, now):
+                    # Advance the schedule past the missed slot (so the next
+                    # poll does not see it as due again) and record the miss,
+                    # without claiming or firing.
+                    job.last_run_at = now
+                    missed.append((job.id, job.name))
+                    changed = True
+                    continue
                 # Win the claim: pre-advance + lease atomically.
                 job.last_run_at = now
                 # Count the fire here (needed so ``should_retire()`` can drop a
@@ -237,6 +253,15 @@ class FileScheduleStore:
                     return []
         for job in auto_removed:
             emit_schedule_remove(job)
+        # Record suppressed occurrences so a missed run is visible in history
+        # rather than silently dropped. Logged outside the file lock (log_run
+        # takes only the thread lock) to keep the critical section short.
+        for job_id, job_name in missed:
+            self.log_run(
+                job_id=job_id,
+                status="missed",
+                job_name=job_name,
+            )
         return claimed
 
     def complete(self, job_id: str, owner_id: str) -> None:

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/session/api.py

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import uuid
 import json
 import time
 import logging
+from copy import deepcopy
 from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, TYPE_CHECKING
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -502,6 +503,10 @@ class Session:
     ) -> bool:
         """Persist one sub-agent transcript onto this session's own record.
 
+        Built-in stores merge the entry under their session file lock. Older
+        custom stores retain the bounded read/write verification fallback below;
+        that fallback cannot guarantee atomic preservation of concurrent entries.
+
         The store replaces the whole ``AGENT_HISTORY_KEY`` map per write, so a
         naive read-then-replace would let a concurrent writer (another agent
         under the same parent) clobber this agent's entry, or vice versa. We
@@ -509,6 +514,14 @@ class Session:
         *other* key changed underneath us, retrying a bounded number of times.
         Legacy per-agent records are always merged in (they stay on disk).
         """
+        merge_map = getattr(session_store, "merge_session_metadata_map", None)
+        if callable(merge_map):
+            # Built-in stores merge inside their locked read/modify/write path.
+            # A post-write comparison cannot detect entries lost to a stale map.
+            return merge_map(
+                self.session_id, AGENT_HISTORY_KEY, {agent_key: messages},
+                defaults=self._legacy_agent_histories(session_store),
+            )
         update_meta = getattr(session_store, "update_session_metadata", None)
         if not callable(update_meta):
             return False
@@ -564,6 +577,7 @@ class Session:
                         {
                             "role": msg.get("role", "user"),
                             "content": msg.get("content", ""),
+                            **deepcopy(msg),
                         }
                         for msg in chat_history
                         if isinstance(msg, dict)

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/session/sqlite_store.py

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
 
 from praisonaiagents._logging import get_logger
 
-from .store import DefaultSessionStore, SessionData
+from .store import DefaultSessionStore, FileLock, SessionData
 
 logger = get_logger(__name__)
 
@@ -102,7 +102,10 @@ class SqliteSessionStore(DefaultSessionStore):
                 # DELETE fallback on NFS/SMB/FUSE/virtiofs (Issue #5264).
                 from ..storage.sqlite import connect as _sqlite_connect
 
-                conn = _sqlite_connect(self.db_path, isolation_level=None)
+                # guard=True: quick_check on open + forensic backup + bounded
+                # least-destructive repair so a malformed index file recovers
+                # instead of taking the durable path down (Issue #5387).
+                conn = _sqlite_connect(self.db_path, isolation_level=None, guard=True)
                 self._fts_available = self._init_schema(conn)
                 self._conn = conn
             except Exception as exc:
@@ -367,6 +370,27 @@ class SqliteSessionStore(DefaultSessionStore):
             self._index_session(session)
         return ok
 
+    def _save_imported_session(self, session: SessionData, *, overwrite: bool = True) -> bool:
+        """Refresh recall and routing after a verbatim portable restore."""
+        ok = super()._save_imported_session(session, overwrite=overwrite)
+        if ok:
+            try:
+                filepath = self._get_session_path(session.session_id)
+                with FileLock(filepath, self.lock_timeout):
+                    # Read-only cache fallback is unsafe after an overwrite:
+                    # it can restore routing fields removed by the import.
+                    fresh = self._load_session_from_disk(session.session_id, filepath)
+                    self._reingest_spill(session.session_id, fresh)
+                with self._lock:
+                    self._cache[session.session_id] = fresh
+                self._index_session(fresh)
+            except Exception as exc:
+                # The JSON write succeeded, but the old index is no longer a
+                # trustworthy view. Fail closed until a later refresh/rebuild.
+                self._deindex_session(session.session_id)
+                logger.debug("Post-import index refresh failed for %s: %s", session.session_id, exc)
+        return ok
+
     def _modify_session_locked(self, session_id, mutator, **kwargs) -> bool:
         """Refresh the index after any locked read-modify-write.
 

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/session/sqlite_transcript_store.py

@@ -101,10 +101,14 @@ class SqliteTranscriptStore(DefaultSessionStore):
             # readers proceed concurrently with a writer where available.
             from ..storage.sqlite import connect as _sqlite_connect
 
+            # guard=True: quick_check on open + forensic backup + bounded
+            # least-destructive repair so a malformed transcript DB recovers
+            # instead of taking the durable path down (Issue #5387).
             conn = _sqlite_connect(
                 self.db_path,
                 isolation_level=None,
                 busy_timeout_ms=int(self.lock_timeout * 1000),
+                guard=True,
             )
             conn.execute(
                 "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS sessions ("
@@ -154,7 +158,9 @@ class SqliteTranscriptStore(DefaultSessionStore):
         if not session_dir or not os.path.isdir(session_dir):
             return
         try:
-            filenames = [f for f in os.listdir(session_dir) if f.endswith(".json")]
+            filenames = sorted(
+                f for f in os.listdir(session_dir) if f.endswith(".json")
+            )
         except OSError:
             return
         if not filenames:
@@ -171,7 +177,7 @@ class SqliteTranscriptStore(DefaultSessionStore):
             try:
                 with open(filepath, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
                     data = json.load(f)
-            except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError):
+            except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError):
                 continue
             if not isinstance(data, dict):
                 continue
@@ -210,7 +216,7 @@ class SqliteTranscriptStore(DefaultSessionStore):
         except (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError):
             return None
 
-    def _write_row(self, session: SessionData, conn=None) -> bool:
+    def _write_row(self, session: SessionData, conn=None, *, overwrite: bool = True) -> bool:
         own_lock = conn is None
         if conn is None:
             conn = self._connect()
@@ -229,17 +235,21 @@ class SqliteTranscriptStore(DefaultSessionStore):
             getattr(session, "updated_at", None),
         )
         sql = (
-            "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO sessions "
+            ("INSERT OR REPLACE" if overwrite else "INSERT OR IGNORE") + " INTO sessions "
             "(session_id, data, agent_name, gateway_session_id, agent_id, updated_at) "
             "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)"
         )
         try:
             if own_lock:
                 with self._db_lock:
-                    conn.execute(sql, params)
+                    cursor = conn.execute(sql, params)
             else:
-                conn.execute(sql, params)
+                cursor = conn.execute(sql, params)
+            if not overwrite and cursor.rowcount == 0:
+                raise FileExistsError(session.session_id)
             return True
+        except FileExistsError:
+            raise
         except Exception as exc:
             logger.error("Failed to write session %s: %s", session.session_id, exc)
             return False
@@ -282,6 +292,52 @@ class SqliteTranscriptStore(DefaultSessionStore):
                 self._cache[session.session_id] = session
             return True
 
+    def _save_imported_session(self, session: SessionData, *, overwrite: bool = True) -> bool:
+        """Restore to the database without applying the destination's window."""
+        session.updated_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+        with self._db_lock:
+            # INSERT OR IGNORE makes no-clobber atomic across store instances;
+            # checking session_exists before a replace would still race.
+            if not self._write_row(session, overwrite=overwrite):
+                return False
+            with self._lock:
+                self._cache[session.session_id] = session
+            return True
+
+    def export_all(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        """Export durable database rows, not legacy JSON sidecar files."""
+        return {
+            "version": self.PORTABLE_VERSION,
+            "sessions": [data for data in self._all_rows() if isinstance(data, dict)],
+        }
+
+    def _collect_lineage(
+        self, session: SessionData, *, exclude: str
+    ) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
+        """Collect persisted database records from the same conversation chain."""
+        lineage = self._lineage_key(session.to_dict())
+        if not lineage:
+            return []
+
+        def record_lineage(raw):
+            # Preserve the writer's Python JSON semantics (including NaN)
+            # and the shared lineage precedence, without retaining other rows.
+            try:
+                data = json.loads(raw)
+                return self._lineage_key(data) if isinstance(data, dict) else None
+            except (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError, AttributeError):
+                return None
+
+        conn = self._connect()
+        with self._db_lock:
+            conn.create_function("portable_session_lineage", 1, record_lineage)
+            rows = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT data FROM sessions WHERE session_id != ? "
+                "AND portable_session_lineage(data) = ? ORDER BY updated_at DESC",
+                (exclude, lineage),
+            ).fetchall()
+        return [json.loads(row[0]) for row in rows]
+
     def _modify_session_locked(
         self,
         session_id: str,

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/session/store.py

@@ -1622,6 +1622,27 @@ class DefaultSessionStore:
             session_id, _apply, error_label="update session metadata"
         )
 
+    def merge_session_metadata_map(
+        self, session_id: str, key: str, updates: Dict[str, Any],
+        *, defaults: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
+    ) -> bool:
+        """Merge nested metadata entries using the freshest map under FileLock.
+
+        Defaults fill missing entries; persisted entries win over defaults,
+        and the supplied updates win over both.
+        """
+        def _apply(session: SessionData) -> None:
+            merged = dict(defaults or {})
+            current = session.metadata.get(key)
+            if isinstance(current, dict):
+                merged.update(current)
+            merged.update(updates)
+            session.metadata[key] = merged
+
+        return self._modify_session_locked(
+            session_id, _apply, error_label="merge session metadata map"
+        )
+
     def rename_session(self, session_id: str, title: str) -> bool:
         """Give a session a human-readable title (Issue #3737).
 
@@ -2306,7 +2327,7 @@ class DefaultSessionStore:
                 out.append(data)
         return out
 
-    def _save_imported_session(self, session: SessionData) -> bool:
+    def _save_imported_session(self, session: SessionData, *, overwrite: bool = True) -> bool:
         """Persist a restored session verbatim (no retention/window applied).
 
         Mirrors ``_save_session`` (timestamp + atomic, file-locked write) but
@@ -2317,6 +2338,10 @@ class DefaultSessionStore:
         filepath = self._get_session_path(session.session_id)
         session.updated_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
         with FileLock(filepath, self.lock_timeout):
+            # The initial import check can race with a peer creating this file.
+            # Check again inside the same lock that protects the replacement.
+            if not overwrite and os.path.exists(filepath):
+                raise FileExistsError(filepath)
             if not self._atomic_write_json(filepath, session.to_dict()):
                 logger.error(f"Failed to save imported session {session.session_id}")
                 return False
@@ -2416,7 +2441,7 @@ class DefaultSessionStore:
                 # Persist the imported record verbatim: an import is a restore,
                 # so the destination's retention/active_window must not truncate
                 # or compact a valid larger export before it lands on disk.
-                if not self._save_imported_session(session):
+                if not self._save_imported_session(session, overwrite=overwrite):
                     report.skipped.append(
                         {"session_id": session_id, "reason": "write failed"}
                     )
@@ -2424,6 +2449,10 @@ class DefaultSessionStore:
                 with self._lock:
                     self._cache[session_id] = session
                 report.imported += 1
+            except FileExistsError:
+                report.skipped.append(
+                    {"session_id": session_id, "reason": "already exists (use overwrite)"}
+                )
             except Exception as e:  # pragma: no cover - defensive; one bad record
                 report.skipped.append(
                     {"session_id": session_id, "reason": f"import error: {e}"}

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/session/title.py

@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ def generate_title(
         ... )
         >>> # Returns something like: "Python Code Debugging Help"
     """
+    if max_length <= 0:
+        return ""
+
     # Fallback title from user message if generation fails
     fallback_title = _create_fallback_title(user_msg, max_length)
     
@@ -119,6 +122,9 @@ async def generate_title_async(
     Returns:
         Generated title string, or fallback based on user message
     """
+    if max_length <= 0:
+        return ""
+
     fallback_title = _create_fallback_title(user_msg, max_length)
     
     try:
@@ -152,8 +158,7 @@ Return ONLY the title text, no quotes, no explanation."""
                 title = title.replace('\n', ' ').replace('\r', '')
                 
                 # Truncate if too long
-                if len(title) > max_length:
-                    title = title[:max_length-3] + "..."
+                title = _truncate_title(title, max_length)
                 
                 # Return if non-empty
                 if title and len(title.strip()) > 0:
@@ -176,6 +181,17 @@ Return ONLY the title text, no quotes, no explanation."""
     return fallback_title
 
 
+def _truncate_title(title: str, max_length: int) -> str:
+    """Apply the character cap without using negative ellipsis slices."""
+    if max_length <= 0:
+        return ""
+    if len(title) <= max_length:
+        return title
+    if max_length <= 3:
+        return title[:max_length]
+    return title[:max_length - 3] + "..."
+
+
 def _create_fallback_title(user_msg: str, max_length: int) -> str:
     """Create a fallback title from the user message.
     
@@ -187,7 +203,7 @@ def _create_fallback_title(user_msg: str, max_length: int) -> str:
         Simple title based on user message
     """
     if not user_msg or not user_msg.strip():
-        return "Chat Session"
+        return _truncate_title("Chat Session", max_length)
     
     # Clean up the message
     clean_msg = user_msg.strip()
@@ -200,8 +216,4 @@ def _create_fallback_title(user_msg: str, max_length: int) -> str:
     if '.' in clean_msg:
         clean_msg = clean_msg.split('.')[0]
     
-    # Truncate if too long
-    if len(clean_msg) > max_length:
-        clean_msg = clean_msg[:max_length-3] + "..."
-    
-    return clean_msg if clean_msg else "Chat Session"
+    return _truncate_title(clean_msg or "Chat Session", max_length)

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/storage/__init__.py

@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ __all__ = [
     "get_backend",
     # Hardened stdlib SQLite connection factory (WAL-with-safe-fallback)
     "sqlite_connect",
+    # Structural integrity probe for durable SQLite stores (Issue #5387)
+    "sqlite_quick_check",
 ]
 
 _LAZY_IMPORTS = {
@@ -49,6 +51,7 @@ _LAZY_IMPORTS = {
     "SQLiteBackend": ("backends", "SQLiteBackend"),
     "get_backend": ("backends", "get_backend"),
     "sqlite_connect": ("sqlite", "connect"),
+    "sqlite_quick_check": ("sqlite", "quick_check"),
 }
 
 

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/storage/backends.py

@@ -69,6 +69,17 @@ class FileBackend:
         # Sanitize key for filesystem
         safe_key = "".join(c if c.isalnum() or c in "-_" else "_" for c in key)
         return self.storage_dir / f"{safe_key}{self.suffix}"
+
+    def _path_to_key(self, file_path: Path) -> Optional[str]:
+        """Recognize records using the full configured suffix."""
+        if not file_path.is_file():
+            return None
+        if self.suffix:
+            if file_path.name.endswith(self.suffix):
+                return file_path.name[:-len(self.suffix)]
+            return None
+        # Preserve the existing no-extension selection for an empty suffix.
+        return file_path.name if not file_path.suffix else None
     
     def save(self, key: str, data: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
         """Save data with the given key."""
@@ -84,11 +95,11 @@ class FileBackend:
                     delete=False,
                     suffix=".tmp"
                 ) as f:
+                    temp_path = f.name
                     if self.pretty:
                         json.dump(data, f, indent=2, default=str, ensure_ascii=False)
                     else:
                         json.dump(data, f, default=str, ensure_ascii=False)
-                    temp_path = f.name
                 
                 os.replace(temp_path, file_path)
             except Exception as e:
@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ class FileBackend:
         try:
             with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
                 return json.load(f)
-        except (json.JSONDecodeError, IOError) as e:
+        except (json.JSONDecodeError, UnicodeDecodeError, IOError) as e:
             logger.warning(f"Failed to load {key}: {e}")
             return None
     
@@ -133,8 +144,8 @@ class FileBackend:
         keys = []
         
         for file_path in self.storage_dir.iterdir():
-            if file_path.is_file() and file_path.suffix == self.suffix:
-                key = file_path.stem
+            key = self._path_to_key(file_path)
+            if key is not None:
                 if not prefix or key.startswith(prefix):
                     keys.append(key)
         
@@ -149,7 +160,7 @@ class FileBackend:
         count = 0
         with self._lock:
             for file_path in self.storage_dir.iterdir():
-                if file_path.is_file() and file_path.suffix == self.suffix:
+                if self._path_to_key(file_path) is not None:
                     try:
                         file_path.unlink()
                         count += 1
@@ -191,13 +202,21 @@ class SQLiteBackend:
         if not isinstance(table_name, str) or not _re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$', table_name):
             raise ValueError("table_name must contain only alphanumeric characters and underscores")
         self.table_name = table_name
+        # Quote identifiers so validated names that are SQL keywords or start
+        # with a digit (e.g. "select", "9table") are valid in all statements.
+        self._quoted_table = f'"{table_name}"'
+        self._quoted_index = f'"idx_{table_name}_key"'
         self._local = threading.local()
         
         # Ensure directory exists
         Path(self.db_path).parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
         
         if auto_create:
-            self._create_table()
+            try:
+                self._create_table()
+            except Exception:
+                self.close()
+                raise
     
     def _get_conn(self):
         """Get thread-local connection."""
@@ -220,7 +239,7 @@ class SQLiteBackend:
         cur = conn.cursor()
         
         cur.execute(f"""
-            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS {self.table_name} (
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS {self._quoted_table} (
                 key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
                 data TEXT NOT NULL,
                 created_at REAL DEFAULT (strftime('%s', 'now')),
@@ -230,8 +249,8 @@ class SQLiteBackend:
         
         # Index for prefix queries
         cur.execute(f"""
-            CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_{self.table_name}_key 
-            ON {self.table_name}(key)
+            CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS {self._quoted_index} 
+            ON {self._quoted_table}(key)
         """)
         
         conn.commit()
@@ -244,7 +263,7 @@ class SQLiteBackend:
         json_data = json.dumps(data, default=str, ensure_ascii=False)
         
         cur.execute(f"""
-            INSERT INTO {self.table_name} (key, data, updated_at)
+            INSERT INTO {self._quoted_table} (key, data, updated_at)
             VALUES (?, ?, strftime('%s', 'now'))
             ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE SET
                 data = excluded.data,
@@ -259,7 +278,7 @@ class SQLiteBackend:
         cur = conn.cursor()
         
         cur.execute(f"""
-            SELECT data FROM {self.table_name} WHERE key = ?
+            SELECT data FROM {self._quoted_table} WHERE key = ?
         """, (key,))
         
         row = cur.fetchone()
@@ -276,7 +295,7 @@ class SQLiteBackend:
         cur = conn.cursor()
         
         cur.execute(f"""
-            DELETE FROM {self.table_name} WHERE key = ?
+            DELETE FROM {self._quoted_table} WHERE key = ?
         """, (key,))
         
         deleted = cur.rowcount > 0
@@ -290,13 +309,13 @@ class SQLiteBackend:
         
         if prefix:
             cur.execute(f"""
-                SELECT key FROM {self.table_name}
+                SELECT key FROM {self._quoted_table}
                 WHERE key LIKE ?
                 ORDER BY key
             """, (f"{prefix}%",))
         else:
             cur.execute(f"""
-                SELECT key FROM {self.table_name}
+                SELECT key FROM {self._quoted_table}
                 ORDER BY key
             """)
         
@@ -308,7 +327,7 @@ class SQLiteBackend:
         cur = conn.cursor()
         
         cur.execute(f"""
-            SELECT 1 FROM {self.table_name} WHERE key = ? LIMIT 1
+            SELECT 1 FROM {self._quoted_table} WHERE key = ? LIMIT 1
         """, (key,))
         
         return cur.fetchone() is not None
@@ -318,10 +337,10 @@ class SQLiteBackend:
         conn = self._get_conn()
         cur = conn.cursor()
         
-        cur.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM {self.table_name}")
+        cur.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM {self._quoted_table}")
         count = cur.fetchone()["count"]
         
-        cur.execute(f"DELETE FROM {self.table_name}")
+        cur.execute(f"DELETE FROM {self._quoted_table}")
         conn.commit()
         
         return count

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/storage/base.py

@@ -262,8 +262,8 @@ class BaseJSONStore:
                 delete=False,
                 suffix=".tmp"
             ) as f:
-                json.dump(self._data, f, indent=2, default=str, ensure_ascii=False)
                 temp_path = f.name
+                json.dump(self._data, f, indent=2, default=str, ensure_ascii=False)
             
             # Atomic rename
             if self.use_file_lock:
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ class BaseJSONStore:
 def list_json_sessions(
     storage_dir: Path,
     suffix: str = ".json",
-    limit: int = 50,
+    limit: Optional[int] = 50,
 ) -> List[BaseSessionInfo]:
     """
     List all sessions in a directory.
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ def list_json_sessions(
     Args:
         storage_dir: Directory to search
         suffix: File suffix to filter by
-        limit: Maximum number of sessions to return
+        limit: Maximum number of sessions to return, or None for all sessions
         
     Returns:
         List of BaseSessionInfo, sorted by modification time (newest first)
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ def list_json_sessions(
                 # Try to get item count from file
                 if suffix == ".json":
                     try:
-                        with open(file_path, "r") as f:
+                        with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
                             data = json.load(f)
                             # Common patterns for item count
                             if "iterations" in data:
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ def list_json_sessions(
                         pass
                 elif suffix == ".jsonl":
                     try:
-                        with open(file_path, "r") as f:
+                        with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
                             info.item_count = sum(1 for _ in f)
                     except Exception:
                         pass
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ def cleanup_old_sessions(
     now = datetime.now()
     
     # Get all sessions sorted by age (oldest first)
-    sessions = list_json_sessions(storage_dir, suffix, limit=10000)
+    sessions = list_json_sessions(storage_dir, suffix, limit=None)
     sessions.sort(key=lambda s: s.modified_at)
     
     # Delete old sessions

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/storage/sqlite.py

@@ -151,6 +151,343 @@ def apply_wal_with_fallback(
     return mode
 
 
+# Maximum forensic backups of a malformed file kept before the oldest is
+# pruned, so a boot-loop on a permanently-bad file cannot fill the disk.
+_MAX_FORENSIC_BACKUPS = 3
+# A malformed file is repaired at most this many times before the guard gives
+# up (records the exhaustion in a sidecar ledger) and stops re-repairing on
+# every boot, so a permanently-bad file is not churned each start.
+_MAX_REPAIR_ATTEMPTS = 3
+
+
+def _is_transient_lock_error(exc: Exception) -> bool:
+    """True if an error is a transient lock/busy condition, not corruption.
+
+    A healthy database that a peer momentarily locks raises ``database is
+    locked`` / ``database is busy``. Treating that as corruption would trigger a
+    needless forensic copy and repair on a file that was never corrupt, so the
+    guard must distinguish it from a genuine "malformed image" error.
+    """
+    text = str(exc).lower()
+    return "locked" in text or "database is busy" in text
+
+
+def quick_check(conn) -> bool:
+    """Return True if ``PRAGMA quick_check`` reports the database is intact.
+
+    ``quick_check`` is the cheap structural probe (it skips the exhaustive
+    per-row index cross-check that ``integrity_check`` does), so it is safe to
+    run once on open without touching the hot path. Any SQLite-level error
+    (a malformed header, "database disk image is malformed", an I/O error) is
+    treated as *not intact* so the caller can route to backup/repair. A
+    transient lock/busy error is re-raised so callers can tell "locked" (leave
+    alone) apart from "corrupt" (back up + repair).
+    """
+    try:
+        row = conn.execute("PRAGMA quick_check(1)").fetchone()
+    except Exception as exc:  # DatabaseError / OperationalError on a bad file
+        if _is_transient_lock_error(exc):
+            raise
+        logger.warning("quick_check raised for database (%s); treating as corrupt.", exc)
+        return False
+    return bool(row) and str(row[0]).lower() == "ok"
+
+
+def _sidecar_paths(path: str):
+    """Return the WAL/SHM sidecar paths for a database file."""
+    return [path + "-wal", path + "-shm"]
+
+
+def _forensic_backup(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Copy a malformed database (+WAL/SHM sidecars) aside for forensics.
+
+    Mirrors the JSON store's ``_quarantine_corrupt`` behaviour: the raw,
+    possibly-recoverable bytes are preserved as ``<file>.corrupt-<epoch_ms>``
+    instead of being clobbered by a repair. Fails **closed** — returns ``None``
+    without copying — when free disk space is below the file size plus a margin,
+    so a corruption event never itself fills the disk. Retention-capped so a
+    boot-loop cannot accumulate unbounded copies.
+    """
+    import shutil
+    import time as _time
+
+    try:
+        size = os.path.getsize(path)
+    except OSError:
+        return None
+    try:
+        free = shutil.disk_usage(os.path.dirname(path) or ".").free
+    except OSError:
+        free = None
+    # Fail closed on low disk: need room for the file plus a small margin.
+    if free is not None and free < size * 2 + (1 << 20):
+        logger.error(
+            "Skipping forensic backup of %s: insufficient free disk space.", path
+        )
+        return None
+
+    base = f"{path}.corrupt-{int(_time.time() * 1000)}"
+    dest = base
+    attempt = 1
+    while os.path.exists(dest):
+        dest = f"{base}-{attempt}"
+        attempt += 1
+    try:
+        shutil.copy2(path, dest)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        logger.error("Forensic backup of %s failed: %s", path, exc)
+        return None
+    # Best-effort sidecar preservation; their absence is not fatal. Each sidecar
+    # is ``path + suffix`` (e.g. ``-wal``), copied next to the primary backup so
+    # a later analysis can replay the write-ahead log.
+    for sidecar in _sidecar_paths(path):
+        if os.path.exists(sidecar):
+            suffix = sidecar[len(path):]
+            try:
+                shutil.copy2(sidecar, dest + suffix)
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+    _prune_forensic_backups(path)
+    return dest
+
+
+def _prune_forensic_backups(path: str) -> None:
+    """Keep only the newest ``_MAX_FORENSIC_BACKUPS`` forensic copies."""
+    directory = os.path.dirname(path) or "."
+    prefix = os.path.basename(path) + ".corrupt-"
+    try:
+        entries = [
+            os.path.join(directory, name)
+            for name in os.listdir(directory)
+            if name.startswith(prefix)
+        ]
+    except OSError:
+        return
+    # Only prune the primary DB copies (no sidecar suffix like ``-wal``).
+    copies = [p for p in entries if not (p.endswith("-wal") or p.endswith("-shm"))]
+    if len(copies) <= _MAX_FORENSIC_BACKUPS:
+        return
+    copies.sort(key=lambda p: os.path.getmtime(p))
+    for stale in copies[: len(copies) - _MAX_FORENSIC_BACKUPS]:
+        # Remove the primary copy together with its own ``-wal``/``-shm``
+        # sidecars so a WAL database's forensic sidecars cannot accumulate past
+        # the retention cap.
+        for target in (stale, stale + "-wal", stale + "-shm"):
+            try:
+                os.remove(target)
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+
+
+def _repair_ledger_path(path: str) -> str:
+    return path + ".repair"
+
+
+def _repair_budget_ok(path: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True while the file still has repair attempts left in its budget.
+
+    A sidecar ledger (``<file>.repair``) records how many repairs have been
+    attempted so a permanently-malformed file is not re-repaired on every boot
+    (bounded persistent retry). Missing/unreadable ledger means a fresh budget.
+    """
+    try:
+        with open(_repair_ledger_path(path), "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            attempts = int(fh.read().strip() or "0")
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        attempts = 0
+    return attempts < _MAX_REPAIR_ATTEMPTS
+
+
+def _record_repair_attempt(path: str) -> None:
+    try:
+        with open(_repair_ledger_path(path), "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            attempts = int(fh.read().strip() or "0")
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        attempts = 0
+    try:
+        with open(_repair_ledger_path(path), "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            fh.write(str(attempts + 1))
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+
+
+def _clear_repair_ledger(path: str) -> None:
+    for p in (_repair_ledger_path(path),):
+        try:
+            os.remove(p)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+
+
+def _repair_via_online_backup(path: str) -> bool:
+    """Attempt a least-destructive repair of a malformed database in place.
+
+    Recovers what SQLite's online-backup API can read into a fresh snapshot and
+    promotes it back with an atomic ``os.replace`` so the canonical file is only
+    swapped for a *verified-intact* rebuild — a failed attempt never touches the
+    original bytes (which are already preserved by :func:`_forensic_backup`).
+    Returns True only when the rebuilt file itself passes ``quick_check``.
+    """
+    import sqlite3
+
+    _record_repair_attempt(path)
+    # A per-attempt-unique snapshot name so two concurrent repairs of the same
+    # file never delete or promote each other's in-flight rebuild.
+    snapshot = f"{path}.repair-tmp-{os.getpid()}-{id(path)}"
+    try:
+        os.remove(snapshot)
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+    src = dst = None
+    try:
+        src = sqlite3.connect(path)
+        dst = sqlite3.connect(snapshot)
+        src.backup(dst)  # copies all readable pages into the fresh file
+        dst.commit()
+    except Exception as exc:
+        logger.warning("Online-backup repair of %s failed to read pages: %s", path, exc)
+        for c in (src, dst):
+            try:
+                if c is not None:
+                    c.close()
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+        try:
+            os.remove(snapshot)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+        return False
+    finally:
+        for c in (src, dst):
+            try:
+                if c is not None:
+                    c.close()
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+
+    # Verify the rebuilt snapshot before promoting it over the canonical file.
+    verify = None
+    try:
+        verify = sqlite3.connect(snapshot)
+        intact = quick_check(verify)
+    except Exception:
+        intact = False
+    finally:
+        try:
+            if verify is not None:
+                verify.close()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+    if not intact:
+        try:
+            os.remove(snapshot)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+        return False
+
+    try:
+        # Drop stale sidecars of the malformed file so they cannot be replayed
+        # over the rebuilt database. The malformed original + its sidecars are
+        # already forensically backed up before we get here.
+        for sidecar in _sidecar_paths(path):
+            try:
+                os.remove(sidecar)
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+        os.replace(snapshot, path)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        logger.error("Could not promote repaired snapshot for %s: %s", path, exc)
+        return False
+    _clear_repair_ledger(path)
+    logger.warning("Repaired malformed SQLite database %s via online backup.", path)
+    return True
+
+
+def _quarantine_unrepairable(path: str) -> None:
+    """Move an unrepairable malformed file aside so a fresh DB can be created.
+
+    When the online-backup API cannot rebuild an intact snapshot (e.g. a
+    corrupt header that reads as "file is not a database"), the malformed bytes
+    are already preserved by :func:`_forensic_backup`; renaming the canonical
+    file out of the way lets the store open a fresh, empty database instead of
+    crashing on the first ``CREATE TABLE`` — mirroring the JSON store's
+    quarantine-and-continue behaviour (Issue #5387). Sidecars go too so a stale
+    ``-wal`` cannot be replayed over the new file.
+    """
+    for sidecar in _sidecar_paths(path):
+        try:
+            os.remove(sidecar)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+    try:
+        os.remove(path)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        logger.error("Could not clear unrepairable malformed file %s: %s", path, exc)
+
+
+def _guard_integrity(path: str, *, repair: bool, backup: bool) -> None:
+    """Detect and (optionally) repair a malformed database before first use.
+
+    Runs a cheap ``quick_check`` on open; on failure it forensically backs up
+    the malformed file (+sidecars) and attempts a bounded, least-destructive
+    online-backup repair. If the file cannot be repaired, its (already backed
+    up) bytes are quarantined so the store can open a fresh database rather than
+    crash on first use. A no-op for ``:memory:``/absent/empty files. A transient
+    lock/busy error is treated as "healthy but busy" and left untouched.
+    """
+    import sqlite3
+
+    if not path or path == ":memory:" or not os.path.exists(path):
+        return
+    try:
+        if os.path.getsize(path) == 0:
+            return
+    except OSError:
+        return
+
+    probe = None
+    try:
+        probe = sqlite3.connect(path)
+        if quick_check(probe):
+            return
+    except Exception as exc:
+        # A transient lock is not corruption — never back up or repair a file
+        # that a peer merely holds open. Leave it exactly as-is.
+        if _is_transient_lock_error(exc):
+            logger.info(
+                "SQLite database %s is locked/busy on probe; skipping guard.", path
+            )
+            return
+    finally:
+        try:
+            if probe is not None:
+                probe.close()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+    logger.error("SQLite database %s failed integrity check; corrupt.", path)
+
+    # Fail closed: if a forensic backup was requested but could not be taken
+    # (low disk, copy error), do NOT proceed to repair — repair's atomic
+    # promotion would otherwise destroy the only copy of the malformed bytes.
+    if backup:
+        if _forensic_backup(path) is None:
+            logger.error(
+                "Forensic backup of %s failed; skipping repair to preserve "
+                "the malformed file for recovery.",
+                path,
+            )
+            return
+
+    if repair and _repair_budget_ok(path):
+        if _repair_via_online_backup(path):
+            return
+        # Repair could not rebuild an intact snapshot. The malformed bytes are
+        # safely backed up, so quarantine the canonical file to let the durable
+        # store open a fresh database instead of crashing on first query.
+        _quarantine_unrepairable(path)
+
+
 def connect(
     path,
     *,
@@ -158,6 +495,9 @@ def connect(
     isolation_level: Optional[str] = "",
     busy_timeout_ms: int = 5000,
     synchronous: str = "FULL",
+    guard: bool = False,
+    repair: bool = True,
+    backup: bool = True,
     **kwargs,
 ):
     """Open a hardened SQLite connection used by core durable stores.
@@ -177,6 +517,14 @@ def connect(
         synchronous: ``PRAGMA synchronous`` level. Defaults to ``FULL`` so
             committed writes survive an OS/power crash (matches pre-hardening
             durability). Pass ``"NORMAL"`` for higher throughput under WAL.
+        guard: When True, run a one-time ``quick_check`` on open and, on a
+            malformed file, forensically back it up and attempt a bounded
+            least-destructive online-backup repair before connecting (Issue
+            #5387). Off by default so existing callers are unchanged.
+        repair: Attempt an online-backup repair on corruption (only when
+            ``guard`` is set). Bounded by a sidecar attempt-ledger.
+        backup: Take a retention-capped, disk-space-aware forensic backup of the
+            malformed file before repair (only when ``guard`` is set).
         **kwargs: Forwarded to ``sqlite3.connect``.
     """
     import sqlite3  # lazy import — stdlib, no heavy dependency
@@ -185,6 +533,12 @@ def connect(
     if isinstance(path, (str, os.PathLike)) and str(path) != ":memory:":
         db_path = str(path)
 
+    if guard:
+        try:
+            _guard_integrity(str(db_path), repair=repair, backup=backup)
+        except Exception as exc:  # detection/repair must never block open
+            logger.debug("Integrity guard skipped for %s: %s", db_path, exc)
+
     connect_kwargs = dict(kwargs)
     connect_kwargs["check_same_thread"] = check_same_thread
     if isolation_level != "":

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/README.md

@@ -114,6 +114,27 @@ from praisonaiagents.tools import internet_search
 results = internet_search("AI news")
 ```
 
+### Parallel Search MCP
+
+Install `praisonaiagents[parallel-search]` to use Parallel's free Search MCP
+without an API key. Select it for one call with `providers="parallel"`, or set
+`WEB_SEARCH_PROVIDER=parallel` for the existing provider-selection path:
+
+```python
+from praisonaiagents.tools.web_search import search_web
+
+results = search_web("recent agent framework releases", providers="parallel")
+```
+
+Parallel is opt-in and does not change the automatic provider order. When you
+select it, your search query is sent to Parallel Search MCP for processing.
+Requests include a `praisonaiagents/<installed-version>` User-Agent so Parallel
+can measure aggregate project usage. This identifier is shared across
+installations and contains no user or installation ID. Anonymous access is
+intended for exploration and light use; see the
+[Search MCP documentation](https://docs.parallel.ai/integrations/mcp/search-mcp)
+for access limits.
+
 ### 2. Class-Based Approach (Complex Tools)
 
 Best for tools that do multiple related things or need to remember information. Like a smart calculator that remembers your previous calculations and can do many different math operations.

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_search.py

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 This module provides a single `search_web` function that automatically tries
 multiple search providers in order, falling back to the next if one fails.
 
-Search Provider Priority:
+Default Search Provider Priority:
 1. Tavily (requires TAVILY_API_KEY + tavily-python)
 2. Brave (requires BRAVE_API_KEY + requests)
 3. Exa (requires EXA_API_KEY + exa_py)
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ Search Provider Priority:
 5. DuckDuckGo (requires ddgs package, no API key)
 6. SearxNG (requires requests + running SearxNG instance)
 
+Parallel Search MCP is available when explicitly selected.
+
 Usage:
     from praisonaiagents.tools import search_web
     
@@ -24,10 +26,19 @@ Usage:
 from typing import List, Dict, Any, Optional
 from praisonaiagents._logging import get_logger
 import os
+import json
 from importlib import util
 
 logger = get_logger(__name__)
 
+PARALLEL_SEARCH_MCP_URL = "https://search.parallel.ai/mcp"
+PARALLEL_SEARCH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30
+PARALLEL_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 1_000_000
+PARALLEL_MAX_RESULTS = 10
+PARALLEL_MAX_TITLE_CHARS = 256
+PARALLEL_MAX_URL_CHARS = 2048
+PARALLEL_MAX_SNIPPET_CHARS = 1200
+
 def _check_tavily() -> tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
     """Check if Tavily is available."""
     if util.find_spec("tavily") is None:
@@ -72,6 +83,94 @@ def _check_searxng() -> tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
         return False, "requests package not installed"
     return True, None
 
+def _check_parallel() -> tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
+    """Check if compatible Streamable HTTP MCP support is installed."""
+    try:
+        from praisonaiagents.mcp.mcp_http_stream import streamablehttp_client
+    except ImportError:
+        streamablehttp_client = None
+    if streamablehttp_client is None:
+        return False, "install praisonaiagents[parallel-search] for Streamable HTTP MCP support"
+    from inspect import signature
+    if "httpx_client_factory" not in signature(streamablehttp_client).parameters:
+        return False, "install praisonaiagents[parallel-search] for bounded Streamable HTTP support"
+    return True, None
+
+def _truncate_parallel_text(value: Any, limit: int) -> str:
+    text = str(value or "").strip()
+    if len(text) > limit:
+        return text[:limit - 1] + "…"
+    return text
+
+def _search_parallel(query: str, max_results: int = 5) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Search with the keyless Parallel Search MCP endpoint."""
+    result_limit = max(0, min(int(max_results), PARALLEL_MAX_RESULTS))
+    if result_limit == 0:
+        return []
+
+    from importlib.metadata import PackageNotFoundError, version
+    from praisonaiagents.mcp import MCP
+
+    # Keep this project-level so attribution aggregates across installations.
+    # Fall back gracefully when dist metadata is unavailable (source checkouts,
+    # vendored/frozen installs) instead of crashing the whole search path.
+    try:
+        package_version = version("praisonaiagents")
+    except PackageNotFoundError:
+        package_version = "unknown"
+    headers = {"User-Agent": f"praisonaiagents/{package_version}"}
+    with MCP(
+        PARALLEL_SEARCH_MCP_URL,
+        timeout=PARALLEL_SEARCH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+        allowed_tools=["web_search"],
+        headers=headers,
+        max_response_bytes=PARALLEL_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES,
+    ) as client:
+        search_tool = next(
+            (tool for tool in client.get_tools() if getattr(tool, "__name__", None) == "web_search"),
+            None,
+        )
+        if search_tool is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("Parallel Search MCP did not expose web_search")
+        response = search_tool(objective=query, search_queries=[query])
+
+    if not isinstance(response, str):
+        raise ValueError("Parallel Search MCP returned a non-text response")
+    if response.startswith("Error:"):
+        raise RuntimeError(response)
+    payload = json.loads(response)
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict) or "results" not in payload:
+        raise ValueError("Parallel Search MCP returned an invalid response shape")
+    raw_results = payload["results"]
+    if not isinstance(raw_results, list):
+        raise ValueError("Parallel Search MCP returned an invalid results list")
+
+    results = []
+    for result in raw_results:
+        if not isinstance(result, dict):
+            continue
+        url = result.get("url")
+        if not isinstance(url, str) or not url or len(url) > PARALLEL_MAX_URL_CHARS:
+            continue
+        excerpts = result.get("excerpts", [])
+        if isinstance(excerpts, str):
+            excerpts = [excerpts]
+        if not isinstance(excerpts, list):
+            excerpts = []
+        snippet = " ".join(
+            excerpt.strip() for excerpt in excerpts
+            if isinstance(excerpt, str) and excerpt.strip()
+        )
+        results.append({
+            "title": _truncate_parallel_text(result.get("title", ""), PARALLEL_MAX_TITLE_CHARS),
+            "url": url,
+            "snippet": _truncate_parallel_text(snippet, PARALLEL_MAX_SNIPPET_CHARS),
+            "provider": "parallel",
+        })
+        if len(results) >= result_limit:
+            break
+    return results
+
 def _search_tavily(query: str, max_results: int = 5, search_depth: str = "basic", raw_content: bool = False) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
     """Search using Tavily."""
     from tavily import TavilyClient
@@ -272,6 +371,10 @@ SEARCH_PROVIDERS = [
     ("searxng", _check_searxng, _search_searxng),
 ]
 
+SELECTABLE_SEARCH_PROVIDERS = SEARCH_PROVIDERS + [
+    ("parallel", _check_parallel, _search_parallel),
+]
+
 def search_web(
     query: str,
     max_results: int = 5,
@@ -284,7 +387,8 @@ def search_web(
 ) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
     """Search the web using one or more providers with automatic fallback.
     
-    VALID PROVIDER NAMES: tavily, brave, exa, youdotcom, duckduckgo, searxng
+    VALID PROVIDER NAMES: tavily, brave, exa, youdotcom, duckduckgo, searxng, parallel
+    Parallel is opt-in and does not change the existing automatic provider order.
     
     Args:
         query: Search query string
@@ -293,7 +397,8 @@ def search_web(
                    - Single string: "tavily" (uses just that provider)
                    - Comma-separated: "tavily, brave" (tries in order, falls back on failure)
                    - List: ["tavily", "brave"] (same as comma-separated)
-                   If not specified, tries all providers in order until one succeeds.
+                   If not specified, tries the default providers in order until one succeeds.
+                   Select "parallel" to use the keyless Parallel Search MCP provider.
         
         Provider-specific options (only used by their respective provider):
         - searxng_url: [SearxNG] Custom instance URL
@@ -308,7 +413,7 @@ def search_web(
     errors = []
     
     # Valid provider names for reference
-    valid_provider_names = [p[0] for p in SEARCH_PROVIDERS]
+    valid_provider_names = [p[0] for p in SELECTABLE_SEARCH_PROVIDERS]
     
     # Check for WEB_SEARCH_PROVIDER env var (set by CLI --web-provider flag)
     if providers is None:
@@ -328,7 +433,7 @@ def search_web(
         for name in providers:
             name_lower = name.lower().strip()
             matched = False
-            for pname, check_fn, search_fn in SEARCH_PROVIDERS:
+            for pname, check_fn, search_fn in SELECTABLE_SEARCH_PROVIDERS:
                 if pname == name_lower:
                     provider_order.append((pname, check_fn, search_fn))
                     matched = True
@@ -398,7 +503,7 @@ def get_available_providers() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
             print(f"{p['name']}: {'✓' if p['available'] else '✗'} {p.get('reason', '')}")
     """
     result = []
-    for name, check_func, _ in SEARCH_PROVIDERS:
+    for name, check_func, _ in SELECTABLE_SEARCH_PROVIDERS:
         is_available, error = check_func()
         result.append({
             "name": name,

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/utils/async_bridge.py

@@ -7,48 +7,78 @@ ensuring no RuntimeError: "This event loop is already running" crashes.
 
 import asyncio
 import concurrent.futures
+import contextvars
 import logging
-from typing import Any, Awaitable, TypeVar
+from typing import Any, Awaitable, Optional, TypeVar
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 T = TypeVar('T')
 
-def run_coroutine_from_any_context(coro: Awaitable[T], timeout: float = 300) -> T:
+def run_coroutine_from_any_context(coro: Awaitable[T], timeout: Optional[float] = 300) -> T:
     """
-    Safely run a coroutine from sync context only.
-    
+    Safely run a coroutine to completion from any context (sync OR inside a
+    running event loop).
+
+    - No running loop: run it directly with ``asyncio.run`` (wrapped in
+      ``asyncio.wait_for`` when a timeout is set).
+    - Running loop (FastAPI, Jupyter, a bot handler calling ``agent.chat()``):
+      run it on a dedicated worker thread with its own loop so we never
+      deadlock on the caller's loop. The caller's ``contextvars`` are copied
+      into that thread so trace/session/approval context set by the caller is
+      visible inside the coroutine, and the timeout is enforced *inside* the
+      worker loop via ``asyncio.wait_for``. The caller also waits on the worker
+      with the same ``timeout`` as a hard backstop, so a coroutine that ignores
+      cancellation (e.g. a blocking C call that never yields) can still not pin
+      the caller past ``timeout``.
+
     Args:
         coro: The coroutine to execute
-        timeout: Maximum execution time in seconds (default: 5 minutes)
-        
+        timeout: Maximum execution time in seconds (default: 5 minutes).
+            ``None`` disables the timeout.
+
     Returns:
         The result of the coroutine
-        
+
     Raises:
-        RuntimeError: If called from async context (event loop is running)
-        TimeoutError: If the coroutine takes longer than timeout
-        
+        TimeoutError: If the coroutine takes longer than ``timeout``
+
     Examples:
         >>> async def my_async_function():
         ...     return "hello"
         >>> result = run_coroutine_from_any_context(my_async_function())
         >>> print(result)  # "hello"
     """
+    def _wrapped() -> Awaitable[T]:
+        return asyncio.wait_for(coro, timeout) if timeout is not None else coro
+
     try:
-        loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
-        # If we get here, event loop is running - this is not allowed
-        raise RuntimeError(
-            "run_coroutine_from_any_context() cannot be called from async context. "
-            "Use 'await' instead when calling from async functions."
-        )
-    except RuntimeError as e:
-        if "no running event loop" in str(e).lower():
-            # No event loop — safe to use asyncio.run()
-            return asyncio.run(coro)
-        else:
-            # Re-raise our own RuntimeError
-            raise
+        asyncio.get_running_loop()
+    except RuntimeError:
+        # No running event loop — safe to drive it directly on this thread.
+        return asyncio.run(_wrapped())
+
+    # A loop is already running on this thread. Offload to a worker thread with
+    # its own loop, carrying the caller's contextvars across so context set by
+    # the caller (trace/session/approval) is visible inside the coroutine.
+    ctx = contextvars.copy_context()
+    executor = concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1)
+    future = executor.submit(ctx.run, asyncio.run, _wrapped())
+    try:
+        # The timeout is normally enforced *inside* the worker loop by
+        # asyncio.wait_for. But a coroutine that ignores cancellation (a blocking
+        # C call, a shielded/uncancellable await) can keep the worker alive past
+        # the deadline, in which case that inner wait_for never fires. We
+        # therefore also bound the caller's wait here so a stuck worker can never
+        # pin the caller indefinitely.
+        return future.result(timeout=timeout)
+    except concurrent.futures.TimeoutError as exc:
+        raise TimeoutError(
+            f"Coroutine did not complete within {timeout}s"
+        ) from exc
+    finally:
+        # Never block on a stuck worker: don't wait for it to wind down.
+        executor.shutdown(wait=False)
 
 def is_async_context() -> bool:
     """

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/yaml_parser.py

@@ -617,6 +617,14 @@ class YAMLWorkflowParser:
             if _templates:
                 agent_kwargs['templates'] = _templates
             agent = Agent(**agent_kwargs)
+            # Preserve legacy YAML reflection fields for callers/tests that still
+            # read the pre-consolidation attribute names.
+            if reflect_llm is not None:
+                agent._yaml_reflect_llm = reflect_llm
+            if min_reflect is not None:
+                agent._yaml_min_reflect = min_reflect
+            if max_reflect is not None:
+                agent._yaml_max_reflect = max_reflect
         
         # Wire YAML max_rpm into a live RateLimiter when none is already set,
         # so `max_rpm` in YAML actually throttles requests. (Applies to

src/praisonai-agents/pyproject.toml

@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ mcp = [
     "uvicorn>=0.34.0",
     "websockets>=12.0"
 ]
+parallel-search = [
+    "mcp>=1.30.0,<2",
+]
+
 
 memory = [
     "chromadb>=1.0.0",

src/praisonai-agents/tests/test_file_memory.py

@@ -119,6 +119,54 @@ class TestShortTermMemory:
             assert items[0].content == "Persistent memory"
 
 
+class TestAtomicWriteCleanup:
+    """Tests for atomic write staging-file cleanup (regression for #5491)."""
+
+    def test_serialization_error_leaves_no_temp_file(self):
+        """A non-serializable value must not leave a .*.tmp staging file behind."""
+        from pathlib import Path
+        from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory
+
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
+            memory = FileMemory(base_path=tmpdir)
+            target = memory.short_term_file
+
+            with pytest.raises(TypeError):
+                memory._write_json(target, {"bad": object()})
+
+            leftovers = list(Path(target.parent).glob(f".{target.name}.*.tmp"))
+            assert leftovers == [], f"leftover temp files: {leftovers}"
+
+    def test_serialization_error_preserves_existing_file(self):
+        """A failed write must not clobber the previously persisted file."""
+        from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory
+
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
+            memory = FileMemory(base_path=tmpdir)
+            target = memory.short_term_file
+
+            assert memory._write_json(target, [{"content": "keep me"}]) is True
+            original = target.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+            with pytest.raises(TypeError):
+                memory._write_json(target, {"bad": object()})
+
+            assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == original
+
+    def test_successful_write_removes_temp_file(self):
+        """A successful atomic write must leave no staging file behind."""
+        from pathlib import Path
+        from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory
+
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
+            memory = FileMemory(base_path=tmpdir)
+            target = memory.short_term_file
+
+            assert memory._write_json(target, [{"content": "ok"}]) is True
+            leftovers = list(Path(target.parent).glob(f".{target.name}.*.tmp"))
+            assert leftovers == [], f"leftover temp files: {leftovers}"
+
+
 class TestLongTermMemory:
     """Tests for long-term memory functionality."""
     

src/praisonai-agents/tests/test_guardrail_blocked_message.py

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+"""Regression tests for issue #5596.
+
+A guardrail that blocks model output must never make Agent.chat/achat return
+``None`` (callers expect a ``str`` and crash on ``.strip()``). On a block the
+agent returns a safe, non-empty fallback string instead of leaking the rejected
+text.
+"""
+
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents import Agent, TaskOutput
+
+
+def _blocking_guardrail(task_output: TaskOutput):
+    """Reject every output, mimicking a forbidden-token guardrail."""
+    return False, "contains forbidden token"
+
+
+def test_guardrail_blocked_message_is_safe_non_empty_string():
+    agent = Agent(
+        name="GuardAgent",
+        instructions="You are a test agent",
+        llm="gpt-4o-mini",
+        guardrails=_blocking_guardrail,
+    )
+    message = agent._guardrail_blocked_message("contains forbidden token")
+    assert isinstance(message, str)
+    assert message.strip()
+    # Fixed safe string (FR-001): the guardrail reason must NOT leak to the
+    # caller, since an LLM validator's reason can echo the rejected output.
+    assert "contains forbidden token" not in message
+
+
+def test_guardrail_blocked_message_without_reason():
+    agent = Agent(
+        name="GuardAgent",
+        instructions="You are a test agent",
+        llm="gpt-4o-mini",
+        guardrails=_blocking_guardrail,
+    )
+    message = agent._guardrail_blocked_message()
+    assert isinstance(message, str)
+    assert message.strip()
+
+
+def test_chat_returns_safe_message_not_none_on_block():
+    agent = Agent(
+        name="GuardAgent",
+        instructions="You are a test agent",
+        llm="gpt-4o-mini",
+        guardrails=_blocking_guardrail,
+    )
+    # retries=0 so the retry loop raises immediately without a network call.
+    agent.max_guardrail_retries = 0
+    # Force the custom-LLM branch and feed it forbidden output offline.
+    agent._using_custom_llm = True
+    agent.llm_instance = MagicMock()
+    agent.llm_instance.get_response.return_value = "LEAKME secret"
+
+    result = agent.chat("say something")
+
+    assert result is not None
+    assert isinstance(result, str)
+    assert result.strip()
+    assert "LEAKME" not in result
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_achat_returns_safe_message_not_none_on_block():
+    agent = Agent(
+        name="GuardAgent",
+        instructions="You are a test agent",
+        llm="gpt-4o-mini",
+        guardrails=_blocking_guardrail,
+    )
+    agent.max_guardrail_retries = 0
+
+    async def _fake_get_response_async(**kwargs):
+        return "LEAKME secret"
+
+    agent._using_custom_llm = True
+    agent.llm_instance = MagicMock()
+    agent.llm_instance.get_response_async = _fake_get_response_async
+
+    result = await agent.achat("say something")
+
+    assert result is not None
+    assert isinstance(result, str)
+    assert result.strip()
+    assert "LEAKME" not in result
+
+
+def test_chat_does_not_leak_guardrail_reason():
+    """The fixed fallback must not echo the guardrail's rejection reason.
+
+    An LLM validator's reason can quote the blocked output, so the reason is
+    logged (and exposed via ``last_guardrail_error``) but never returned.
+    """
+    agent = Agent(
+        name="GuardAgent",
+        instructions="You are a test agent",
+        llm="gpt-4o-mini",
+        guardrails=_blocking_guardrail,
+    )
+    agent.max_guardrail_retries = 0
+    agent._using_custom_llm = True
+    agent.llm_instance = MagicMock()
+    agent.llm_instance.get_response.return_value = "LEAKME secret"
+
+    result = agent.chat("say something")
+
+    assert isinstance(result, str) and result.strip()
+    assert "LEAKME" not in result
+    assert "contains forbidden token" not in result
+
+
+def test_chat_returns_safe_message_with_reflection_enabled():
+    """A guardrail block with self-reflection on still yields a safe string."""
+    from praisonaiagents import ReflectionConfig
+
+    agent = Agent(
+        name="GuardAgent",
+        instructions="You are a test agent",
+        llm="gpt-4o-mini",
+        guardrails=_blocking_guardrail,
+        reflection=ReflectionConfig(min_iterations=1, max_iterations=1),
+    )
+    agent.max_guardrail_retries = 0
+    agent._using_custom_llm = True
+    agent.llm_instance = MagicMock()
+    agent.llm_instance.get_response.return_value = "LEAKME secret"
+
+    result = agent.chat("say something")
+
+    assert result is not None
+    assert isinstance(result, str)
+    assert result.strip()
+    assert "LEAKME" not in result

src/praisonai-agents/tests/test_memory_cross_session.py

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+"""
+Regression tests for cross-session memory recall (issue #5595).
+
+Two Agent instances sharing the same memory store (e.g. the same user_id)
+must be able to recall facts written during an earlier turn. Previously the
+synchronous chat/run/start path never wrote the interaction to the memory
+store, so the second agent recalled nothing.
+
+These tests drive the after-agent side-effect pipeline directly so they do
+not require an LLM or OPENAI_API_KEY.
+"""
+
+import asyncio
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent))
+
+from praisonaiagents import Agent
+from praisonaiagents.memory import FileMemory
+
+
+class TestCrossSessionMemoryRecall(unittest.TestCase):
+    """MEM-001/002/003 from issue #5595."""
+
+    def _agent(self, user_id, base_path):
+        memory = FileMemory(user_id=user_id, base_path=base_path)
+        return Agent(
+            name="Assistant",
+            instructions="You are a helpful assistant.",
+            memory=memory,
+        )
+
+    def test_turn_persisted_and_recalled_across_instances(self):
+        """MEM-001: a fact stored in session A is recalled by session B."""
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
+            base = f"{tmpdir}/memory"
+
+            # Session A: simulate a completed turn storing a codename.
+            agent_a = self._agent("e2e-memory-test", base)
+            agent_a._after_agent_side_effects(
+                "My codename is ORANGE-PANDA. ACK.",
+                "Acknowledged. Your codename is ORANGE-PANDA.",
+            )
+
+            # Session B: a fresh agent sharing the same user_id must recall it.
+            agent_b = self._agent("e2e-memory-test", base)
+            context = agent_b.get_memory_context(query="What is my codename?")
+            self.assertIn("ORANGE-PANDA", context)
+
+    def test_different_user_id_is_isolated(self):
+        """MEM-002: a different user_id must not see another user's memory."""
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
+            base = f"{tmpdir}/memory"
+
+            agent_a = self._agent("user-a", base)
+            agent_a._after_agent_side_effects(
+                "My codename is ORANGE-PANDA.",
+                "Acknowledged. Your codename is ORANGE-PANDA.",
+            )
+
+            agent_b = self._agent("user-b", base)
+            context = agent_b.get_memory_context(query="What is my codename?")
+            self.assertNotIn("ORANGE-PANDA", context)
+
+    def test_empty_response_is_not_persisted(self):
+        """A turn with no response must not write an empty entry."""
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
+            base = f"{tmpdir}/memory"
+            agent = self._agent("user-empty", base)
+            agent._after_agent_side_effects("hello", "")
+            self.assertEqual(
+                agent._memory_instance.get_stats()["short_term_count"], 0
+            )
+
+    def test_dict_memory_config_persists_and_recalls(self):
+        """MEM-004: the advertised ``memory={'user_id': uid}`` dict config —
+        resolved by the Agent itself, not a preconstructed FileMemory — persists
+        a turn that a second Agent with the same user_id recalls.
+
+        Guards the configuration-resolution + hook wiring that the direct-call
+        tests above cannot (Greptile #3). Runs in a temp cwd so the default
+        FileMemory base path is hermetic; no LLM/API key needed.
+        """
+        cwd = os.getcwd()
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
+            os.chdir(tmpdir)
+            try:
+                uid = "dict-config-user"
+                agent_a = Agent(name="A", instructions="x", memory={"user_id": uid})
+                self.assertIsInstance(agent_a._memory_instance, FileMemory)
+                agent_a._after_agent_side_effects(
+                    "My codename is BLUE-FOX.",
+                    "Acknowledged. Your codename is BLUE-FOX.",
+                )
+
+                agent_b = Agent(name="B", instructions="x", memory={"user_id": uid})
+                context = agent_b.get_memory_context(query="What is my codename?")
+                self.assertIn("BLUE-FOX", context)
+            finally:
+                os.chdir(cwd)
+
+    def test_async_path_persists_without_blocking_loop(self):
+        """MEM-005: on the async after-agent path the blocking store write is
+        offloaded to a thread (AGENTS.md §4.5), yet the turn is still persisted
+        and recalled by a later Agent. Exercises the running-loop branch of
+        ``_persist_memory_turn``.
+        """
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
+            base = f"{tmpdir}/memory"
+
+            async def write_turn():
+                agent_a = self._agent("async-user", base)
+                agent_a._after_agent_side_effects(
+                    "My codename is GREEN-HAWK.",
+                    "Acknowledged. Your codename is GREEN-HAWK.",
+                )
+                # The write is scheduled via run_in_executor; yield until the
+                # short-term store reflects it (bounded) rather than racing it.
+                for _ in range(500):
+                    if agent_a._memory_instance.get_stats()["short_term_count"] > 0:
+                        break
+                    await asyncio.sleep(0.01)
+
+            asyncio.run(write_turn())
+
+            agent_b = self._agent("async-user", base)
+            context = agent_b.get_memory_context(query="What is my codename?")
+            self.assertIn("GREEN-HAWK", context)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

src/praisonai-agents/tests/test_parallel_search.py

@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+import importlib
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from importlib.metadata import version
+import json
+from threading import Thread
+
+import pytest
+
+pytest.importorskip("mcp.client.streamable_http")
+
+web_search_module = importlib.import_module("praisonaiagents.tools.web_search")
+
+
+class MCPHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1"
+
+    def do_POST(self):
+        request_bytes = self.rfile.read(int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0")))
+        request = json.loads(request_bytes)
+        self.server.requests.append(request)
+        self.server.header_snapshots.append({
+            "user_agent": self.headers.get("User-Agent"),
+            "accept": self.headers.get("Accept"),
+            "content_type": self.headers.get("Content-Type"),
+            "accept_encoding": self.headers.get("Accept-Encoding"),
+            "authorization_present": self.headers.get("Authorization") is not None,
+        })
+        method = request.get("method")
+        request_id = request.get("id")
+
+        if method == "notifications/initialized":
+            self.send_response(202)
+            self.send_header("Content-Length", "0")
+            self.end_headers()
+            return
+        if method == "initialize":
+            self._send_json({
+                "jsonrpc": "2.0",
+                "id": request_id,
+                "result": {
+                    "protocolVersion": request["params"]["protocolVersion"],
+                    "capabilities": {"tools": {}},
+                    "serverInfo": {"name": "test-search", "version": "1.0"},
+                },
+            })
+            return
+        if method == "tools/list":
+            description = "x" * 2000 if self.server.oversized_tools_list else "Search the web"
+            self._send_json({
+                "jsonrpc": "2.0",
+                "id": request_id,
+                "result": {
+                    "tools": [
+                        {
+                            "name": "web_search",
+                            "description": description,
+                            "inputSchema": {
+                                "type": "object",
+                                "properties": {
+                                    "objective": {"type": "string"},
+                                    "search_queries": {
+                                        "type": "array",
+                                        "items": {"type": "string"},
+                                    },
+                                },
+                                "required": ["objective", "search_queries"],
+                            },
+                        },
+                        {
+                            "name": "web_fetch",
+                            "description": "Fetch a page",
+                            "inputSchema": {"type": "object", "properties": {}},
+                        },
+                    ],
+                },
+            })
+            return
+        if method == "tools/call":
+            self.server.tool_calls.append(request.get("params", {}))
+            text = json.dumps({
+                "results": [
+                    {
+                        "url": "https://example.com/one",
+                        "title": "First result",
+                        "excerpts": ["x" * 2000 if self.server.chunked_tool_call else "Useful evidence from the first result."],
+                    },
+                    {
+                        "url": "https://example.com/two",
+                        "title": "Second result",
+                        "excerpts": ["A second useful result."],
+                    },
+                ],
+            })
+            response = {
+                "jsonrpc": "2.0",
+                "id": request_id,
+                "result": {"content": [{"type": "text", "text": text}], "isError": self.server.tool_error},
+            }
+            if self.server.chunked_tool_call:
+                self._send_chunked_json(response)
+            else:
+                self._send_json(response)
+            return
+
+        self._send_json({
+            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
+            "id": request_id,
+            "error": {"code": -32601, "message": "Method not found"},
+        })
+
+    def do_GET(self):
+        self._send_chunked_json({"body": "x" * 2000})
+
+    def do_DELETE(self):
+        self.send_response(200)
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", "0")
+        self.end_headers()
+
+    def _send_json(self, body):
+        response = json.dumps(body).encode()
+        self.send_response(200)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(response)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(response)
+
+    def _send_chunked_json(self, body):
+        response = json.dumps(body).encode()
+        self.send_response(200)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Transfer-Encoding", "chunked")
+        self.end_headers()
+        try:
+            for offset in range(0, len(response), 64):
+                chunk = response[offset:offset + 64]
+                self.wfile.write(f"{len(chunk):x}\r\n".encode() + chunk + b"\r\n")
+                self.wfile.flush()
+            self.wfile.write(b"0\r\n\r\n")
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+
+    def log_message(self, format, *args):
+        return
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def mcp_server():
+    server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), MCPHandler)
+    server.daemon_threads = True
+    server.requests = []
+    server.tool_calls = []
+    server.header_snapshots = []
+    server.tool_error = False
+    server.chunked_tool_call = False
+    server.oversized_tools_list = False
+    thread = Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
+    thread.start()
+    try:
+        yield server
+    finally:
+        server.shutdown()
+        server.server_close()
+        thread.join(timeout=2)
+
+
+def _server_url(server):
+    return f"http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_address[1]}/mcp"
+
+
+def test_parallel_is_explicit_and_does_not_change_default_order(monkeypatch):
+    default_names = [name for name, _, _ in web_search_module.SEARCH_PROVIDERS]
+    selectable_names = [name for name, _, _ in web_search_module.SELECTABLE_SEARCH_PROVIDERS]
+    assert "parallel" not in default_names
+    assert "parallel" in selectable_names
+
+    calls = []
+
+    def check_incumbent():
+        return True, None
+
+    def search_incumbent(query, max_results):
+        calls.append(query)
+        return [{"title": "Existing", "url": "https://example.com", "snippet": "", "provider": "existing"}]
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(web_search_module, "SEARCH_PROVIDERS", [("existing", check_incumbent, search_incumbent)])
+    monkeypatch.delenv("WEB_SEARCH_PROVIDER", raising=False)
+    result = web_search_module.search_web("default route")
+
+    assert calls == ["default route"]
+    assert result[0]["provider"] == "existing"
+
+
+def test_parallel_provider_maps_results_and_never_adds_authorization(monkeypatch):
+    mcp_module = importlib.import_module("praisonaiagents.mcp")
+    observed = {}
+
+    class SearchTool:
+        __name__ = "web_search"
+
+        def __call__(self, **arguments):
+            observed["arguments"] = arguments
+            return json.dumps({
+                "results": [
+                    {"url": "https://example.com/one", "title": "T" * 300, "excerpts": ["S" * 1500]},
+                    {"url": "https://example.com/two", "title": "Second", "excerpts": ["Useful excerpt"]},
+                    {"url": "https://example.com/three", "title": "Third", "excerpts": []},
+                ],
+            })
+
+    class FakeMCP:
+        def __init__(self, url, **options):
+            observed["url"] = url
+            observed["options"] = options
+
+        def __enter__(self):
+            return self
+
+        def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc_value, traceback):
+            return False
+
+        def get_tools(self):
+            return [SearchTool()]
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_module, "MCP", FakeMCP)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("PARALLEL_API_KEY", raising=False)
+    query = "PraisonAI provider configuration"
+    result = web_search_module.search_web(query, max_results=2, providers="parallel")
+
+    assert observed["url"] == web_search_module.PARALLEL_SEARCH_MCP_URL
+    assert observed["options"]["allowed_tools"] == ["web_search"]
+    assert observed["options"]["timeout"] == web_search_module.PARALLEL_SEARCH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+    assert observed["options"]["max_response_bytes"] == web_search_module.PARALLEL_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES
+    assert observed["options"]["headers"] == {"User-Agent": f"praisonaiagents/{version('praisonaiagents')}"}
+    assert "Authorization" not in observed["options"]["headers"]
+    assert observed["arguments"] == {"objective": query, "search_queries": [query]}
+    assert len(result) == 2
+    assert result[0]["provider"] == "parallel"
+    assert len(result[0]["title"]) == web_search_module.PARALLEL_MAX_TITLE_CHARS
+    assert result[0]["title"].endswith("…")
+    assert len(result[0]["snippet"]) == web_search_module.PARALLEL_MAX_SNIPPET_CHARS
+    assert result[0]["snippet"].endswith("…")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("response", ["null", "[]", "{}", '{"other": []}', '{"results": {}}'])
+def test_parallel_rejects_malformed_result_shape(monkeypatch, response):
+    mcp_module = importlib.import_module("praisonaiagents.mcp")
+
+    class SearchTool:
+        __name__ = "web_search"
+
+        def __call__(self, **arguments):
+            return response
+
+    class FakeMCP:
+        def __init__(self, url, **options):
+            pass
+
+        def __enter__(self):
+            return self
+
+        def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc_value, traceback):
+            return False
+
+        def get_tools(self):
+            return [SearchTool()]
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_module, "MCP", FakeMCP)
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        web_search_module._search_parallel("search query")
+
+
+def test_parallel_accepts_valid_empty_results(monkeypatch):
+    mcp_module = importlib.import_module("praisonaiagents.mcp")
+
+    class SearchTool:
+        __name__ = "web_search"
+
+        def __call__(self, **arguments):
+            return '{"results": []}'
+
+    class FakeMCP:
+        def __init__(self, url, **options):
+            pass
+
+        def __enter__(self):
+            return self
+
+        def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc_value, traceback):
+            return False
+
+        def get_tools(self):
+            return [SearchTool()]
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_module, "MCP", FakeMCP)
+
+    assert web_search_module._search_parallel("search query") == []
+
+
+def test_parallel_uses_real_mcp_caller_and_preserves_request_headers(mcp_server, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(web_search_module, "PARALLEL_SEARCH_MCP_URL", _server_url(mcp_server))
+    monkeypatch.setenv("WEB_SEARCH_PROVIDER", "parallel")
+    monkeypatch.delenv("PARALLEL_API_KEY", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("NO_PROXY", "127.0.0.1,localhost")
+    query = "PraisonAI web search provider"
+
+    result = web_search_module.search_web(query, max_results=1)
+
+    assert result == [{
+        "title": "First result",
+        "url": "https://example.com/one",
+        "snippet": "Useful evidence from the first result.",
+        "provider": "parallel",
+    }]
+    assert len(mcp_server.tool_calls) == 1
+    assert mcp_server.tool_calls[0]["name"] == "web_search"
+    assert mcp_server.tool_calls[0]["arguments"] == {"objective": query, "search_queries": [query]}
+    assert mcp_server.header_snapshots
+    assert all(snapshot["user_agent"] == f"praisonaiagents/{version('praisonaiagents')}" for snapshot in mcp_server.header_snapshots)
+    assert all("application/json" in snapshot["accept"] and "text/event-stream" in snapshot["accept"] for snapshot in mcp_server.header_snapshots)
+    assert all(snapshot["content_type"] == "application/json" for snapshot in mcp_server.header_snapshots)
+    assert all(snapshot["accept_encoding"] == "identity" for snapshot in mcp_server.header_snapshots)
+    assert all(not snapshot["authorization_present"] for snapshot in mcp_server.header_snapshots)
+
+
+def test_parallel_bounded_mcp_client_routes_through_http_proxy(mcp_server, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(web_search_module, "PARALLEL_SEARCH_MCP_URL", "http://parallel.invalid/mcp")
+    proxy_url = f"http://{mcp_server.server_address[0]}:{mcp_server.server_address[1]}"
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HTTP_PROXY", proxy_url)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("NO_PROXY", "")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("no_proxy", "")
+    monkeypatch.delenv("http_proxy", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("PARALLEL_API_KEY", raising=False)
+
+    result = web_search_module.search_web("proxy-routed search", providers="parallel", max_results=1)
+
+    assert result == [{
+        "title": "First result",
+        "url": "https://example.com/one",
+        "snippet": "Useful evidence from the first result.",
+        "provider": "parallel",
+    }]
+    assert len(mcp_server.tool_calls) == 1
+    assert mcp_server.tool_calls[0]["name"] == "web_search"
+
+
+def test_bounded_mcp_client_routes_https_through_environment_proxy(monkeypatch):
+    import asyncio
+    import httpx
+    from praisonaiagents.mcp.mcp_http_stream import _bounded_httpx_client_factory
+
+    class ConnectProxyHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+        def do_CONNECT(self):
+            self.server.connect_requests.append(self.path)
+            self.send_response(200, "Connection Established")
+            self.end_headers()
+            self.close_connection = True
+
+        def log_message(self, format, *args):
+            return
+
+    proxy_server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), ConnectProxyHandler)
+    proxy_server.daemon_threads = True
+    proxy_server.connect_requests = []
+    proxy_thread = Thread(target=proxy_server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
+    proxy_thread.start()
+    proxy_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{proxy_server.server_address[1]}"
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HTTPS_PROXY", proxy_url)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("NO_PROXY", "")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("no_proxy", "")
+    monkeypatch.delenv("https_proxy", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("ALL_PROXY", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("all_proxy", raising=False)
+
+    async def request_through_proxy():
+        factory = _bounded_httpx_client_factory(512)
+        async with factory(timeout=httpx.Timeout(2)) as client:
+            with pytest.raises(httpx.TransportError):
+                await client.get("https://parallel.invalid/mcp")
+
+    try:
+        asyncio.run(request_through_proxy())
+    finally:
+        proxy_server.shutdown()
+        proxy_server.server_close()
+        proxy_thread.join(timeout=2)
+
+    assert proxy_server.connect_requests == ["parallel.invalid:443"]
+
+
+def test_parallel_uses_unknown_user_agent_when_distribution_metadata_is_missing(mcp_server, monkeypatch):
+    metadata = importlib.import_module("importlib.metadata")
+    installed_version = metadata.version
+
+    def missing_distribution(distribution):
+        if distribution == "praisonaiagents":
+            raise metadata.PackageNotFoundError(distribution)
+        return installed_version(distribution)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(metadata, "version", missing_distribution)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(web_search_module, "PARALLEL_SEARCH_MCP_URL", _server_url(mcp_server))
+    monkeypatch.setenv("WEB_SEARCH_PROVIDER", "parallel")
+    monkeypatch.delenv("PARALLEL_API_KEY", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("NO_PROXY", "127.0.0.1,localhost")
+
+    result = web_search_module.search_web("search without package metadata", max_results=1)
+
+    assert result[0]["provider"] == "parallel"
+    assert mcp_server.header_snapshots
+    assert all(snapshot["user_agent"] == "praisonaiagents/unknown" for snapshot in mcp_server.header_snapshots)
+
+
+def test_parallel_streaming_response_limit_is_enforced(mcp_server, monkeypatch):
+    import asyncio
+    from httpx import Timeout
+    from praisonaiagents.mcp.mcp_http_stream import _bounded_httpx_client_factory
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("NO_PROXY", "127.0.0.1,localhost")
+
+    async def read_oversized_response():
+        factory = _bounded_httpx_client_factory(512)
+        async with factory(timeout=Timeout(2)) as client:
+            async with client.stream("GET", _server_url(mcp_server)) as response:
+                async for _ in response.aiter_bytes():
+                    pass
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="maximum of 512 bytes"):
+        asyncio.run(read_oversized_response())
+
+
+def test_parallel_tool_error_is_not_reported_as_success(mcp_server, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(web_search_module, "PARALLEL_SEARCH_MCP_URL", _server_url(mcp_server))
+    monkeypatch.setenv("NO_PROXY", "127.0.0.1,localhost")
+    mcp_server.tool_error = True
+
+    result = web_search_module.search_web("failed search", providers="parallel")
+
+    assert len(mcp_server.tool_calls) == 1
+    assert len(result) == 1
+    assert "error" in result[0]
+    assert "MCP tool web_search failed" in result[0]["error"]

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/agent/test_guardrail_retry_feedback.py

@@ -270,9 +270,11 @@ class TestAlwaysFailingValidatorIsBounded:
         except _CallCap as exc:
             pytest.fail(str(exc))
 
-        # chat() reports guardrail exhaustion by returning None after rolling
-        # back history; the reason is on the agent for the caller to read.
-        assert result is None
+        # chat() reports guardrail exhaustion with a safe, non-empty fallback
+        # string after rolling back history - never None (issue #5596) and
+        # never the rejected answer. The reason is also on the agent to read.
+        assert isinstance(result, str) and result.strip()
+        assert "10001" not in result
         assert agent.guardrail_retry_count == 2, \
             f"must retry exactly max_guardrail_retries times, got {agent.guardrail_retry_count}"
         assert t.calls == 1 + 2, f"1 initial call + 2 retries, got {t.calls}"
@@ -300,7 +302,8 @@ class TestAlwaysFailingValidatorIsBounded:
     def test_max_retries_zero_never_retries(self):
         agent, t = _agent(["10001", "SW1A 1AA"], rejects_first_answer, max_retries=0)
         result = agent.chat("what is the postcode?", stream=False)
-        assert result is None
+        assert isinstance(result, str) and result.strip()
+        assert "10001" not in result
         assert t.calls == 1, f"max_guardrail_retries=0 must not call the model again (got {t.calls})"
         assert agent.guardrail_retry_count == 0
 

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/agents/test_chat_output_pydantic_coercion.py

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+"""Unit tests for Agent.chat structured-output coercion.
+
+Covers the fix for issue #5594: ``Agent.chat(output_pydantic=Model)`` must
+return a validated Pydantic instance (not a raw JSON string) on the live
+OpenAI/LiteLLM path. These tests exercise the ``_coerce_structured_output``
+helper directly so no live LLM is required.
+"""
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel
+
+from praisonaiagents.agent.chat_mixin import ChatMixin
+
+
+class Pair(BaseModel):
+    city: str
+    country: str
+
+
+def _fake_completion(content):
+    """Build a minimal OpenAI-style response object for mocking."""
+    message = SimpleNamespace(content=content, reasoning_content=None, tool_calls=None)
+    return SimpleNamespace(choices=[SimpleNamespace(message=message)])
+
+
+def _mixin():
+    m = ChatMixin()
+    m.name = "TestAgent"
+    return m
+
+
+def test_valid_json_string_returns_model():
+    out = _mixin()._coerce_structured_output(
+        '{"city": "Paris", "country": "France"}', Pair
+    )
+    assert isinstance(out, Pair)
+    assert out.city == "Paris"
+    assert out.country == "France"
+
+
+def test_markdown_fenced_json_returns_model():
+    fenced = '```json\n{"city": "Paris", "country": "France"}\n```'
+    out = _mixin()._coerce_structured_output(fenced, Pair)
+    assert isinstance(out, Pair)
+    assert out.city == "Paris"
+
+
+def test_prose_falls_back_to_raw_string():
+    out = _mixin()._coerce_structured_output(
+        "The capital of France is Paris.", Pair
+    )
+    assert isinstance(out, str)
+    assert out == "The capital of France is Paris."
+
+
+def test_no_schema_returns_input_unchanged():
+    out = _mixin()._coerce_structured_output("hello", None)
+    assert out == "hello"
+
+
+def test_non_string_input_returns_unchanged():
+    instance = Pair(city="Paris", country="France")
+    out = _mixin()._coerce_structured_output(instance, Pair)
+    assert out is instance
+
+
+def test_dict_schema_without_model_validate_json_returns_raw():
+    # dict schemas (inline JSON schema) have no model_validate_json; must not crash
+    out = _mixin()._coerce_structured_output('{"a": 1}', {"type": "object"})
+    assert out == '{"a": 1}'
+
+
+# --- Public-path tests: chat()/achat() wiring and backward-compat guards ---
+
+
+def _agent(monkeypatch, content):
+    """Build a real Agent whose LLM call is mocked to return ``content``.
+
+    A placeholder API key lets the lazy OpenAI client construct; the network is
+    never touched because ``_chat_completion`` is mocked.
+    """
+    monkeypatch.setenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "not-needed")
+    from praisonaiagents import Agent
+
+    agent = Agent(name="TestAgent", instructions="test")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(agent, "_chat_completion", lambda *a, **k: _fake_completion(content))
+    return agent
+
+
+def test_chat_output_pydantic_returns_model(monkeypatch):
+    # Public chat() path must return a validated Pydantic instance (issue #5594).
+    agent = _agent(monkeypatch, '{"city": "Paris", "country": "France"}')
+    out = agent.chat("capital of France?", output_pydantic=Pair)
+    assert isinstance(out, Pair)
+    assert out.city == "Paris"
+
+
+def test_chat_output_json_stays_string(monkeypatch):
+    # Backward compat: output_json must keep returning a raw JSON string so that
+    # downstream task/workflow JSON parsing (json.loads) keeps working.
+    agent = _agent(monkeypatch, '{"city": "Paris", "country": "France"}')
+    out = agent.chat("capital of France?", output_json=Pair)
+    assert isinstance(out, str)
+    assert '"Paris"' in out
+
+
+def test_after_agent_hook_receives_string_for_pydantic(monkeypatch):
+    # A Pydantic response must not crash command/string hooks: the after-agent
+    # hook payload truncates via response[:500], which requires a string.
+    agent = _agent(monkeypatch, '{"city": "Paris", "country": "France"}')
+    payload = agent._build_after_agent_input(
+        prompt="p", response=Pair(city="Paris", country="France"), start_time=0.0
+    )
+    assert isinstance(payload.response, str)
+    # to_dict() performs the [:500] slice that would otherwise raise on a model
+    assert isinstance(payload.to_dict()["response"], str)

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/eval/test_evalport.py

@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@ Covers the dependency-free round-trip between PraisonAI eval models and the
 EvalPort spec dicts. A real agentic test (gated by RUN_LIVE_TESTS=1) runs a live
 Agent and exports its EvalReport as an EvalPort ResultSet.
 """
+import json
 import os
+import re
+from datetime import datetime
 
 import pytest
 
@@ -17,6 +20,7 @@ from praisonaiagents.eval import (
     report_to_evalport,
     to_evalport,
 )
+from praisonaiagents.eval.evalport import EVALPORT_SPEC_VERSION, VERDICT_GRADER_ID
 
 
 class TestEvalPortImports:
@@ -52,21 +56,28 @@ class TestSuiteConversion:
 
     def test_to_evalport_shape(self):
         suite = to_evalport(self._pkg())
-        assert suite["kind"] == "suite"
+        assert suite["version"] == EVALPORT_SPEC_VERSION
+        assert suite["id"] == "support_agent_eval"
         assert suite["name"] == "support_agent_eval"
-        assert suite["version"] == "2.1.0"
-        assert suite["thresholds"] == {"accuracy": 0.9}
-        assert suite["seed"] == 7
-        assert "evalport_version" in suite
+        assert suite["description"] == "Support agent suite"
+        native = suite["metadata"]["praisonai"]
+        assert native == {"version": "2.1.0", "thresholds": {"accuracy": 0.9}, "seed": 7}
 
-        case = suite["cases"][0]
+        grader_ids = [g["id"] for g in suite["graders"]]
+        assert grader_ids == [VERDICT_GRADER_ID, "answer_correct"]
+        for g in suite["graders"]:
+            assert g["type"] == "custom" and g["params"]["handler"]
+
+        case = suite["test_cases"][0]
         assert case["id"] == "refund_policy"
         assert case["input"] == "What's your refund policy?"
         assert case["expected_output"] == "30 days, unused, receipt required"
-        assert case["graders"] == ["answer_correct"]
+        # Every case references the verdict grader (so the verdict result always
+        # has a matching reference) plus its own criteria.
+        assert case["graders"] == [VERDICT_GRADER_ID, "answer_correct"]
         assert case["metadata"]["tier"] == "gold"
-        assert case["timeout_seconds"] == 15.0
-        assert "timeout_seconds" not in case["metadata"]
+        assert case["timeout_ms"] == 15000
+        assert "praisonai" not in case["metadata"]
 
     def test_from_evalport_shape(self):
         suite = to_evalport(self._pkg())
@@ -106,9 +117,30 @@ class TestSuiteConversion:
 
     def test_case_without_expected_or_criteria(self):
         pkg = EvalPackage(name="p", cases=[EvalCase(name="c", input="x")])
-        case = to_evalport(pkg)["cases"][0]
+        case = to_evalport(pkg)["test_cases"][0]
         assert "expected_output" not in case
-        assert "graders" not in case
+        # EvalPort requires >= 1 grader per test case: a case without criteria
+        # still references the verdict grader.
+        assert case["graders"] == [VERDICT_GRADER_ID]
+        assert from_evalport(to_evalport(pkg)).cases[0].criteria == []
+
+    def test_empty_package_exports_valid_empty_suite(self):
+        """A valid package with no cases exports a spec-shaped empty suite."""
+        suite = to_evalport(EvalPackage(name="empty"))
+        assert suite["id"] == "empty"
+        assert suite["test_cases"] == []
+        assert _structural_suite_errors(suite) == []
+        assert from_evalport(suite).cases == []
+
+    def test_nonpositive_timeout_round_trips(self):
+        """A zero/negative timeout is not spec-representable but must round-trip."""
+        pkg = EvalPackage(
+            name="p", cases=[EvalCase(name="c", input="x", timeout_seconds=0.0)]
+        )
+        case = to_evalport(pkg)["test_cases"][0]
+        assert "timeout_ms" not in case  # spec requires timeout_ms >= 1
+        assert case["metadata"]["praisonai"]["timeout_seconds"] == 0.0
+        assert from_evalport(to_evalport(pkg)).cases[0].timeout_seconds == 0.0
 
     def test_metadata_timeout_key_does_not_corrupt_native_timeout(self):
         """A user ``metadata['timeout_seconds']`` must not clobber the native one."""
@@ -123,8 +155,8 @@ class TestSuiteConversion:
                 )
             ],
         )
-        case = to_evalport(pkg)["cases"][0]
-        assert case["timeout_seconds"] == 15.0
+        case = to_evalport(pkg)["test_cases"][0]
+        assert case["timeout_ms"] == 15000
         assert case["metadata"]["timeout_seconds"] == 999
 
         round_tripped = from_evalport(to_evalport(pkg)).cases[0]
@@ -141,6 +173,43 @@ class TestSuiteConversion:
         assert case.timeout_seconds == 45
         assert case.metadata["timeout_seconds"] == 45
 
+    def test_external_spec_suite_imports(self):
+        """A spec-shaped suite from another tool (test_cases, inline graders)."""
+        external = {
+            "version": "1.0.0",
+            "id": "hub_suite",
+            "test_cases": [
+                {
+                    "id": "c1",
+                    "input": "hi",
+                    "graders": [{"id": "has_hi", "type": "contains", "params": {"substring": "hi"}}],
+                    "timeout_ms": 2500,
+                }
+            ],
+        }
+        pkg = from_evalport(external)
+        assert pkg.name == "hub_suite"
+        assert pkg.version == "1.0.0"  # spec version is not the package version
+        assert pkg.cases[0].criteria == ["has_hi"]
+        assert pkg.cases[0].timeout_seconds == 2.5
+
+    def test_legacy_suite_still_imports(self):
+        """Suites emitted by the pre-spec-alignment adapter still import."""
+        legacy = {
+            "evalport_version": "1.0",
+            "kind": "suite",
+            "name": "old",
+            "version": "3.0.0",
+            "cases": [{"id": "c1", "input": "hi", "timeout_seconds": 5.0}],
+            "thresholds": {"accuracy": 0.8},
+            "seed": 1,
+        }
+        pkg = from_evalport(legacy)
+        assert pkg.version == "3.0.0"
+        assert pkg.thresholds == {"accuracy": 0.8}
+        assert pkg.seed == 1
+        assert pkg.cases[0].timeout_seconds == 5.0
+
 
 class TestResultSetConversion:
     """EvalReport -> EvalPort ResultSet."""
@@ -173,33 +242,155 @@ class TestResultSetConversion:
         )
 
     def test_result_set_shape(self):
-        rs = report_to_evalport(self._report())
-        assert rs["kind"] == "result_set"
-        assert rs["suite_name"] == "support_agent_eval"
+        rs = report_to_evalport(
+            self._report(), run_id="run-1", started_at="2026-09-29T00:00:00+00:00"
+        )
+        assert rs["version"] == EVALPORT_SPEC_VERSION
+        assert rs["suite_id"] == "support_agent_eval"
+        assert rs["run_id"] == "run-1"
+        assert rs["started_at"] == "2026-09-29T00:00:00+00:00"
+        assert rs["runner"]["name"] == "praisonaiagents"
         assert rs["summary"]["total"] == 2
         assert rs["summary"]["passed"] == 1
         assert rs["summary"]["failed"] == 1
         assert rs["summary"]["pass_rate"] == 0.5
-        assert rs["summary"]["average_score"] == 0.6
-        assert rs["summary"]["thresholds_met"] == {"accuracy": False}
+        assert rs["summary"]["avg_score"] == 0.6
+        assert rs["metadata"]["praisonai"]["thresholds_met"] == {"accuracy": False}
         assert len(rs["results"]) == 2
 
+    def test_run_id_and_started_at_defaults(self):
+        rs = report_to_evalport(self._report())
+        assert isinstance(rs["run_id"], str) and rs["run_id"]
+        assert datetime.fromisoformat(rs["started_at"]).tzinfo is not None
+        assert report_to_evalport(self._report())["run_id"] != rs["run_id"]
+
     def test_per_case_fields(self):
         rs = report_to_evalport(self._report())
         passed, failed = rs["results"]
-        assert passed["case_id"] == "refund_policy"
+        assert passed["test_case_id"] == "refund_policy"
         assert passed["passed"] is True
-        assert passed["score"] == 0.95
-        assert passed["latency_ms"] == 120.0
+        # The verdict grader result comes first, followed by a per-criterion
+        # grader result that matches the criterion grader referenced in the Suite.
+        assert passed["grader_results"] == [
+            {"grader_id": VERDICT_GRADER_ID, "type": "custom", "score": 0.95, "passed": True},
+            {"grader_id": "answer_correct", "type": "custom", "score": 0.95, "passed": True},
+        ]
+        assert passed["duration_ms"] == 120
         assert passed["actual_output"] == "30 days."
-        assert passed["grader_scores"] == {"answer_correct": 0.95}
+        assert "metadata" not in passed  # criteria are graders now, not metadata
         assert "error" not in passed
 
-        assert failed["case_id"] == "shipping"
+        assert failed["test_case_id"] == "shipping"
         assert failed["passed"] is False
-        assert failed["error"] == "timeout"
+        assert failed["grader_results"][0]["score"] == 0.25
+        assert failed["grader_results"][0]["passed"] is False
+        assert failed["error"] == {"type": "runner_error", "message": "timeout"}
         assert "actual_output" not in failed
-        assert "grader_scores" not in failed
+        assert "metadata" not in failed
+
+    def test_out_of_range_score_is_clamped_with_raw_kept(self):
+        report = EvalReport(
+            package_name="p", total_cases=1, passed_cases=1, failed_cases=0,
+            average_score=7.5,
+            results=[EvalResult(case_name="c", passed=True, score=7.5)],
+        )
+        rs = report_to_evalport(report)
+        gr = rs["results"][0]["grader_results"][0]
+        assert gr["score"] == 1.0
+        assert gr["metadata"] == {"openeval.raw_score": 7.5}
+        assert rs["summary"]["avg_score"] == 1.0
+        assert rs["metadata"]["praisonai"]["average_score"] == 7.5
+
+
+def _structural_suite_errors(suite):
+    """Minimal EvalPort Suite checks that need no third-party packages."""
+    errs = []
+    if not re.match(r"^\d+\.\d+\.\d+(?:[-+].+)?$", suite.get("version", "")):
+        errs.append("version")
+    if not suite.get("id"):
+        errs.append("id")
+    allowed = {"$schema", "version", "id", "name", "description", "graders",
+               "test_cases", "test_cases_file", "config", "metadata", "tags"}
+    errs += [f"extra:{k}" for k in set(suite) - allowed]
+    grader_ids = [g["id"] for g in suite.get("graders", [])]
+    if len(grader_ids) != len(set(grader_ids)):
+        errs.append("duplicate grader id")
+    if "test_cases" not in suite:  # spec allows an empty list, but the key is required
+        errs.append("test_cases")
+    for tc in suite.get("test_cases", []):
+        if not tc.get("id") or not tc.get("input") or not tc.get("graders"):
+            errs.append(f"test_case:{tc.get('id')}")
+        errs += [f"dangling:{g}" for g in tc.get("graders", [])
+                 if isinstance(g, str) and g not in grader_ids]
+    return errs
+
+
+def _structural_result_set_errors(rs):
+    """Minimal EvalPort ResultSet checks that need no third-party packages."""
+    errs = []
+    if not re.match(r"^\d+\.\d+\.\d+(?:[-+].+)?$", rs.get("version", "")):
+        errs.append("version")
+    errs += [k for k in ("suite_id", "run_id", "started_at") if not rs.get(k)]
+    allowed = {"$schema", "version", "suite_id", "suite_version", "run_id", "started_at",
+               "completed_at", "provider", "runner", "isolation", "group", "results",
+               "summary", "metadata"}
+    errs += [f"extra:{k}" for k in set(rs) - allowed]
+    item_keys = {"test_case_id", "actual_output", "attempt", "completed_at",
+                 "grader_results", "passed", "duration_ms", "error", "metadata"}
+    for r in rs.get("results", []):
+        errs += [f"result extra:{k}" for k in set(r) - item_keys]
+        if not r.get("test_case_id") or not isinstance(r.get("passed"), bool):
+            errs.append("result")
+        if not isinstance(r.get("duration_ms", 0), int):
+            errs.append("duration_ms")
+        for g in r.get("grader_results", None) or [None]:
+            if not g or not g.get("grader_id") or not isinstance(g.get("passed"), bool):
+                errs.append("grader_result")
+            elif g["score"] is not None and not 0 <= g["score"] <= 1:
+                errs.append("grader_result score")
+    return errs
+
+
+class TestEvalPortSpecConformance:
+    """Emitted documents must pass the EvalPort validators."""
+
+    def _docs(self):
+        pkg = TestSuiteConversion()._pkg()
+        pkg.add_case(EvalCase(name="no_criteria", input="hello"))
+        return to_evalport(pkg), report_to_evalport(TestResultSetConversion()._report())
+
+    def test_structurally_valid_without_sdk(self):
+        suite, rs = self._docs()
+        assert _structural_suite_errors(suite) == []
+        assert _structural_result_set_errors(rs) == []
+        json.dumps(suite)
+        json.dumps(rs)
+
+    def test_criterion_grader_results_reference_suite_graders(self):
+        """Per-criterion grader results must match graders declared in the Suite.
+
+        The Suite's ``answer_correct`` grader is now surfaced as a grader_result
+        in the ResultSet, so EvalPort consumers can diff that criterion across
+        tools instead of only seeing the verdict grader.
+        """
+        suite = to_evalport(TestSuiteConversion()._pkg())
+        rs = report_to_evalport(TestResultSetConversion()._report())
+        suite_grader_ids = {g["id"] for g in suite["graders"]}
+        emitted = {
+            g["grader_id"]
+            for r in rs["results"]
+            for g in r["grader_results"]
+        }
+        assert "answer_correct" in emitted
+        assert emitted <= suite_grader_ids
+
+    def test_valid_with_evalport_sdk(self):
+        validate = pytest.importorskip("openeval.validate")
+        suite, rs = self._docs()
+        suite_result = validate.validate_suite(suite)
+        assert suite_result.valid, suite_result.errors
+        rs_result = validate.validate_result_set(rs)
+        assert rs_result.valid, rs_result.errors
 
 
 @pytest.mark.skipif(
@@ -244,7 +435,7 @@ class TestEvalPortRealAgent:
         )
 
         result_set = report_to_evalport(report)
-        assert result_set["kind"] == "result_set"
-        assert result_set["suite_name"] == "math_eval"
-        assert result_set["results"][0]["case_id"] == "math_addition"
+        assert result_set["suite_id"] == "math_eval"
+        assert result_set["results"][0]["test_case_id"] == "math_addition"
         assert result_set["results"][0]["actual_output"] == str(answer)
+        assert _structural_result_set_errors(result_set) == []

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/knowledge/test_embedding_failure.py

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ def test_add_returns_failure_when_embedding_raises():
         raise RuntimeError("403 model_not_found")
 
     with patch("praisonaiagents.embedding.embedding", side_effect=boom):
-        result = adapter.add("Paris is the capital of France.")
+        result = adapter.add("Paris is the capital of France.", user_id="u1")
 
     assert isinstance(result, AddResult)
     assert result.success is False
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ def test_search_returns_empty_when_embedding_raises():
         raise RuntimeError("embedding down")
 
     with patch("praisonaiagents.embedding.embedding", side_effect=boom):
-        result = adapter.search("Paris")
+        result = adapter.search("Paris", user_id="u1")
 
     assert isinstance(result, SearchResult)
     assert result.results == []
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ def test_add_uses_configurable_embedding_model(monkeypatch):
         return MagicMock(embeddings=[[0.1, 0.2, 0.3]])
 
     with patch("praisonaiagents.embedding.embedding", side_effect=fake_embedding):
-        result = adapter.add("hello")
+        result = adapter.add("hello", user_id="u1")
 
     assert captured["model"] == "custom-embed-model"
     assert result.success is True

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/memory/test_memory_thread_cleanup.py

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+"""Thread-scoped SQLite cleanup must preserve the shared adapter (#5486).
+
+`Memory.close_connections()` is documented as thread-scoped: it closes only the
+calling thread's SQLite connections and leaves the shared `SqliteMemoryAdapter`
+(and other threads' connections) intact. A previous adapter-shutdown block
+cleared `self.memory_adapter` unconditionally, so subsequent searches fell back
+to legacy SQL against `short_mem` / `long_mem` and raised
+``sqlite3.OperationalError: no such table``.
+
+These tests pin the contract: after another thread (or the same thread) calls
+`close_connections()`, the shared adapter survives and searches keep working by
+lazily reopening the calling thread's connection.
+"""
+from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents.memory.memory import Memory
+from praisonaiagents.memory.adapters.sqlite_adapter import SqliteMemoryAdapter
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def store(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setenv("PRAISONAI_HOME", str(tmp_path / "home"))
+    monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
+    return Memory(config={"provider": "sqlite"})
+
+
+def _texts(results):
+    items = results if isinstance(results, list) else results.get("results", [])
+    return [r.get("text") or r.get("memory") or "" for r in items]
+
+
+def test_adapter_is_sqlite(store):
+    """Control: these tests only mean something for the SQLite adapter."""
+    assert isinstance(store.memory_adapter, SqliteMemoryAdapter)
+
+
+def test_search_before_cleanup(store):
+    """Control: searching works before any cleanup happens."""
+    store.store_short_term("shared record")
+    assert "shared record" in _texts(store.search_short_term("shared record"))
+
+
+def test_short_term_search_survives_idle_worker_cleanup(store):
+    """An idle worker that never opened a connection must not break searches."""
+    store.store_short_term("shared record")
+    with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1) as pool:
+        pool.submit(store.close_connections).result()
+
+    assert store.memory_adapter is not None
+    assert "shared record" in _texts(store.search_short_term("shared record"))
+
+
+def test_long_term_search_survives_idle_worker_cleanup(store):
+    store.store_long_term("shared long record")
+    with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1) as pool:
+        pool.submit(store.close_connections).result()
+
+    assert store.memory_adapter is not None
+    assert "shared long record" in _texts(store.search_long_term("shared long record"))
+
+
+def test_short_term_search_survives_initialized_worker_cleanup(store):
+    """A worker that has opened its own connection cleans up only its own."""
+    store.store_short_term("shared record")
+
+    def worker():
+        store.store_short_term("worker record")
+        store.close_connections()
+
+    with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1) as pool:
+        pool.submit(worker).result()
+
+    assert store.memory_adapter is not None
+    assert "shared record" in _texts(store.search_short_term("shared record"))
+    assert "worker record" in _texts(store.search_short_term("worker record"))
+
+
+def test_same_thread_repeated_cleanup_and_reopen(store):
+    """Repeated same-thread cleanup must keep the adapter usable (lazy reopen)."""
+    store.store_short_term("shared record")
+    store.close_connections()
+    store.close_connections()
+
+    assert store.memory_adapter is not None
+    assert "shared record" in _texts(store.search_short_term("shared record"))
+
+
+def test_same_thread_long_term_cleanup_and_reopen(store):
+    store.store_long_term("shared long record")
+    store.close_connections()
+
+    assert store.memory_adapter is not None
+    assert "shared long record" in _texts(store.search_long_term("shared long record"))
+
+
+def test_adapter_thread_close_is_idempotent(store):
+    """Adapter-level thread close tolerates being called with no open conns."""
+    store.memory_adapter.close_thread_connections()
+    store.memory_adapter.close_thread_connections()
+    store.store_short_term("shared record")
+    assert "shared record" in _texts(store.search_short_term("shared record"))
+
+
+def test_adapter_thread_close_closes_open_connection(store):
+    """Opening a connection then closing it directly must close the live conn
+    and drop it from the shared registry (not just the no-op path)."""
+    adapter = store.memory_adapter
+    adapter.store_short_term("shared record")
+    adapter.store_long_term("shared long record")
+
+    stm = adapter._local.stm_conn
+    ltm = adapter._local.ltm_conn
+    assert stm in adapter._all_connections
+    assert ltm in adapter._all_connections
+
+    adapter.close_thread_connections()
+
+    # Thread-local refs cleared and registry no longer tracks the closed conns.
+    assert getattr(adapter._local, "stm_conn", None) is None
+    assert getattr(adapter._local, "ltm_conn", None) is None
+    assert stm not in adapter._all_connections
+    assert ltm not in adapter._all_connections
+
+    # The physical connections are closed (operations raise ProgrammingError).
+    with pytest.raises(Exception):
+        stm.execute("SELECT 1")
+    with pytest.raises(Exception):
+        ltm.execute("SELECT 1")
+
+    # Adapter remains usable via lazy reopen.
+    assert "shared record" in _texts(adapter.search_short_term("shared record"))
+
+
+def test_adapter_thread_close_keeps_connection_tracked_on_failure(store):
+    """If a connection fails to close, it stays tracked for a later retry and
+    the thread-local ref is preserved (the open-conn failure path)."""
+    adapter = store.memory_adapter
+    adapter.store_short_term("shared record")
+    real = adapter._local.stm_conn
+
+    class _FlakyConn:
+        def __init__(self, inner):
+            self._inner = inner
+            self.close_calls = 0
+
+        def close(self):
+            self.close_calls += 1
+            raise RuntimeError("boom")
+
+    flaky = _FlakyConn(real)
+    # Swap the tracked real conn for a flaky wrapper in both registry and tls.
+    with adapter._connection_lock:
+        adapter._all_connections.discard(real)
+        adapter._all_connections.add(flaky)
+    adapter._local.stm_conn = flaky
+
+    adapter.close_thread_connections()
+
+    assert flaky.close_calls == 1
+    # Failed close: connection stays tracked and the ref is NOT cleared.
+    assert flaky in adapter._all_connections
+    assert adapter._local.stm_conn is flaky

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/plugins/test_hook_bridge.py

@@ -692,3 +692,156 @@ class TestCallerEnforcement:
         )
         results = runner.execute_sync(HookEvent.BEFORE_LLM, inp)
         assert runner.is_blocked(results) is True
+
+
+class GatewayForensicsLikePlugin(Plugin):
+    """Mirrors the bundled GatewayForensicsPlugin: declares gateway hooks and
+    defines matching observe-only methods that must actually fire."""
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.events = []
+
+    @property
+    def info(self):
+        return PluginInfo(
+            name="gwforensics",
+            hooks=[PluginHook.GATEWAY_START, PluginHook.GATEWAY_STOP],
+        )
+
+    def gateway_start(self, context):
+        self.events.append(("start", context.get("bot_count")))
+
+    def gateway_stop(self, context):
+        self.events.append(("stop", context.get("reason")))
+
+
+class AllRemainingLifecyclePlugin(Plugin):
+    """Declares every remaining lifecycle event the generic tail must bridge."""
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.fired = []
+
+    @property
+    def info(self):
+        return PluginInfo(
+            name="allremaining",
+            hooks=[
+                PluginHook.SCHEDULE_ADD,
+                PluginHook.SCHEDULE_REMOVE,
+                PluginHook.SCHEDULE_TRIGGER,
+                PluginHook.BEFORE_COMPACTION,
+                PluginHook.AFTER_COMPACTION,
+                PluginHook.SUBAGENT_STOP,
+                PluginHook.MODEL_FALLBACK,
+                PluginHook.KANBAN_TASK_CREATED,
+            ],
+        )
+
+    def schedule_add(self, context):
+        self.fired.append("schedule_add")
+
+    def schedule_remove(self, context):
+        self.fired.append("schedule_remove")
+
+    def schedule_trigger(self, context):
+        self.fired.append("schedule_trigger")
+
+    def before_compaction(self, context):
+        self.fired.append("before_compaction")
+
+    def after_compaction(self, context):
+        self.fired.append("after_compaction")
+
+    def subagent_stop(self, context):
+        self.fired.append("subagent_stop")
+
+    def model_fallback(self, context):
+        self.fired.append("model_fallback")
+
+    def kanban_task_created(self, context):
+        self.fired.append("kanban_task_created")
+
+
+class DeclaredButNotOverriddenPlugin(Plugin):
+    """Declares gateway hooks but does NOT override the base no-op methods."""
+
+    @property
+    def info(self):
+        return PluginInfo(
+            name="declared_noop",
+            hooks=[PluginHook.GATEWAY_START, PluginHook.GATEWAY_STOP],
+        )
+
+
+class TestGenericLifecycleBridge:
+    def test_gateway_hooks_wire_and_fire(self):
+        reg = HookRegistry()
+        mgr = PluginManager()
+        plugin = GatewayForensicsLikePlugin()
+        mgr.register(plugin)
+        assert mgr.wire_into_hook_registry(reg) == 2
+        assert reg.has_hooks(HookEvent.GATEWAY_START)
+        assert reg.has_hooks(HookEvent.GATEWAY_STOP)
+
+        from praisonaiagents.hooks.events import GatewayStartInput, GatewayStopInput
+
+        runner = HookRunner(registry=reg, cwd=os.getcwd())
+        runner.execute_sync(
+            HookEvent.GATEWAY_START,
+            GatewayStartInput(
+                session_id="s", cwd=os.getcwd(),
+                event_name=HookEvent.GATEWAY_START,
+                timestamp=str(time.time()), bot_count=3,
+            ),
+        )
+        runner.execute_sync(
+            HookEvent.GATEWAY_STOP,
+            GatewayStopInput(
+                session_id="s", cwd=os.getcwd(),
+                event_name=HookEvent.GATEWAY_STOP,
+                timestamp=str(time.time()), reason="sigterm",
+            ),
+        )
+        assert ("start", 3) in plugin.events
+        assert ("stop", "sigterm") in plugin.events
+
+    def test_all_remaining_lifecycle_events_bridge(self):
+        events = dict(_adapt_plugin_hooks(AllRemainingLifecyclePlugin()))
+        for event in (
+            HookEvent.SCHEDULE_ADD, HookEvent.SCHEDULE_REMOVE,
+            HookEvent.SCHEDULE_TRIGGER, HookEvent.BEFORE_COMPACTION,
+            HookEvent.AFTER_COMPACTION, HookEvent.SUBAGENT_STOP,
+            HookEvent.MODEL_FALLBACK, HookEvent.KANBAN_TASK_CREATED,
+        ):
+            assert event in events
+
+    def test_generic_hook_delivers_payload(self):
+        plugin = AllRemainingLifecyclePlugin()
+        events = dict(_adapt_plugin_hooks(plugin))
+
+        from praisonaiagents.hooks.events import SubagentStopInput
+
+        data = SubagentStopInput(
+            session_id="s", cwd=os.getcwd(),
+            event_name=HookEvent.SUBAGENT_STOP,
+            timestamp=str(time.time()), task="t", success=True,
+        )
+        events[HookEvent.SUBAGENT_STOP](data)
+        assert "subagent_stop" in plugin.fired
+
+    def test_declared_but_not_overridden_registers_nothing(self):
+        # Base no-op methods must NOT be wired as dead hooks.
+        assert list(_adapt_plugin_hooks(DeclaredButNotOverriddenPlugin())) == []
+
+    def test_undeclared_overridden_method_not_registered(self):
+        # A plugin that defines gateway_start but never declares it in
+        # PluginInfo.hooks must not be bridged (declaration-driven only).
+        class _Undeclared(Plugin):
+            @property
+            def info(self):
+                return PluginInfo(name="undeclared")
+
+            def gateway_start(self, context):
+                pass
+
+        assert list(_adapt_plugin_hooks(_Undeclared())) == []

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/session/test_session_agent_history_fields.py

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+"""Closing and reopening a Session must preserve complete agent messages."""
+
+from copy import deepcopy
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents.session.api import AGENT_HISTORY_KEY, Session
+from praisonaiagents.session.store import DefaultSessionStore
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("history", [
+    [{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}],
+    [
+        {"role": "assistant", "content": None, "tool_calls": [
+            {"id": "call_1", "type": "function", "function": {
+                "name": "lookup", "arguments": '{"query":"hello"}'}}
+        ]},
+        {"role": "tool", "content": "found", "tool_call_id": "call_1",
+         "name": "lookup"},
+        {"role": "assistant", "content": "answer"},
+    ],
+    [{"role": "assistant", "content": "answer", "reasoning_content": "why",
+      "metadata": {"citations": [{"source": "local"}]}, "custom": False}],
+    [{"role": "user", "content": [
+        {"type": "text", "text": "describe"},
+        {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": ""}},
+    ], "name": "reader"}],
+], ids=["plain-control", "tool-turn", "reasoning-and-metadata", "multimodal"])
+def test_close_reopen_preserves_message_fields(tmp_path, monkeypatch, history):
+    import praisonaiagents.agent as agent_module
+    import praisonaiagents.session.store as store_module
+
+    class LocalAgent:
+        def __init__(self, **kwargs):
+            self.chat_history = []
+
+    monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("PRAISONAI_HOME", str(tmp_path / "home"))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(agent_module, "Agent", LocalAgent)
+    session_dir = str(tmp_path / "sessions")
+    store = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=session_dir)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(store_module, "_default_store", store)
+    session = Session(session_id="parent")
+    session._memory = SimpleNamespace(search_short_term=lambda **kwargs: [])
+    agent = session.Agent(name="helper", memory=False)
+    agent.chat_history = deepcopy(history)
+    session.close()
+
+    fresh = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=session_dir)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(store_module, "_default_store", fresh)
+    assert fresh.get_session("parent").metadata[AGENT_HISTORY_KEY][
+        "helper:Assistant"
+    ] == history
+    resumed = Session(session_id="parent").Agent(name="helper", memory=False)
+    assert resumed.chat_history == history
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("builder", ["openai", "litellm"])
+def test_restored_extensions_do_not_reach_responses_input(tmp_path, monkeypatch, builder):
+    import praisonaiagents.session.store as store_module
+    from praisonaiagents.llm.openai_client import OpenAIClient
+    from praisonaiagents.llm.llm import LLM
+
+    monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("PRAISONAI_HOME", str(tmp_path / "home"))
+    store = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=str(tmp_path / "sessions"))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(store_module, "_default_store", store)
+    history = [
+        {"role": "user", "content": "question", "name": "reader",
+         "metadata": {"origin": "disk"}},
+        {"role": "assistant", "content": "answer", "reasoning_content": "why",
+         "metadata": {"citation": "local"}, "extension": False},
+        {"role": "assistant", "content": None, "tool_calls": [{
+            "id": "call_1", "type": "function",
+            "function": {"name": "lookup", "arguments": "{}"},
+        }]},
+        {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_1", "content": "found"},
+    ]
+    session = Session(session_id="parent")
+    session._agents["helper:Assistant"] = {"agent": None, "chat_history": history}
+    session.close()
+    resumed = Session(session_id="parent")._restore_agent_chat_history("helper:Assistant")
+    if builder == "openai":
+        client = object.__new__(OpenAIClient)
+        params = client._build_responses_input(resumed, model="gpt-4o")
+    else:
+        llm = object.__new__(LLM)
+        llm.max_tokens = None
+        llm.top_p = None
+        llm.base_url = None
+        llm.api_key = None
+        llm.timeout = None
+        llm._resolve_subscription_creds = lambda: None
+        llm._resolve_openai_compatible_model = lambda: "gpt-4o"
+        params = llm._build_responses_params(resumed)
+    assert params["input"] == [
+        {"role": "user", "content": "question"},
+        {"role": "assistant", "content": "answer"},
+        {"type": "function_call", "call_id": "call_1", "name": "lookup",
+         "arguments": "{}"},
+        {"type": "function_call_output", "call_id": "call_1", "output": "found"},
+    ]
+    assert store.get_session("parent").metadata[AGENT_HISTORY_KEY][
+        "helper:Assistant"
+    ] == history
+
+
+def test_legacy_defaults_and_non_message_filter(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    import praisonaiagents.session.store as store_module
+
+    monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("PRAISONAI_HOME", str(tmp_path / "home"))
+    store = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=str(tmp_path / "sessions"))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(store_module, "_default_store", store)
+    session = Session(session_id="parent")
+    session._agents["helper:Assistant"] = {
+        "agent": None, "chat_history": [None, {"name": "helper"}],
+    }
+    session.close()
+    assert store.get_session("parent").metadata[AGENT_HISTORY_KEY][
+        "helper:Assistant"
+    ] == [{"role": "user", "content": "", "name": "helper"}]

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/session/test_session_atomic_agent_history.py

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+"""Concurrent Session closes must merge different agent histories under lock."""
+
+from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
+from threading import Event
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents.session.api import AGENT_HISTORY_KEY, Session
+from praisonaiagents.session.store import DefaultSessionStore
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("existing", [{}, {"peer:Assistant": [
+    {"role": "user", "content": "peer"},
+]}])
+def test_two_closes_preserve_both_agent_histories(tmp_path, monkeypatch, existing):
+    monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("PRAISONAI_HOME", str(tmp_path / "home"))
+    directory = str(tmp_path / "sessions")
+    first = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=directory)
+    second = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=directory)
+    first.update_session_metadata("parent", **{AGENT_HISTORY_KEY: existing})
+    a, b = Session(session_id="parent"), Session(session_id="parent")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(a, "_get_session_store", lambda: first)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(b, "_get_session_store", lambda: second)
+    ah = [{"role": "user", "content": "a"}]
+    bh = [{"role": "user", "content": "b"}]
+    a._agents["a:Assistant"] = {"agent": None, "chat_history": ah}
+    b._agents["b:Assistant"] = {"agent": None, "chat_history": bh}
+    ready, completed = Event(), Event()
+    original = first._modify_session_locked
+
+    def pause_before_lock(*args, **kwargs):
+        ready.set()
+        assert completed.wait(10), "second writer did not complete"
+        return original(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(first, "_modify_session_locked", pause_before_lock)
+
+    def close_second():
+        assert ready.wait(10), "first writer did not reach write boundary"
+        try:
+            b.close()
+        finally:
+            completed.set()
+
+    with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as pool:
+        fa, fb = pool.submit(a.close), pool.submit(close_second)
+        fa.result(timeout=15)
+        fb.result(timeout=15)
+    fresh = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=directory)
+    assert fresh.get_session("parent").metadata[AGENT_HISTORY_KEY] == {
+        **existing, "a:Assistant": ah, "b:Assistant": bh,
+    }
+
+
+def test_metadata_map_defaults_do_not_overwrite_current_entries(tmp_path):
+    store = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=str(tmp_path))
+    store.update_session_metadata("parent", marker="keep", **{AGENT_HISTORY_KEY: {
+        "current": [], "peer": ["present"],
+    }})
+    assert store.merge_session_metadata_map(
+        "parent", AGENT_HISTORY_KEY, {"new": ["new"]},
+        defaults={"current": ["legacy"], "legacy-only": ["old"]},
+    )
+    data = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=str(tmp_path)).get_session("parent")
+    assert data.metadata[AGENT_HISTORY_KEY] == {
+        "current": [], "peer": ["present"], "new": ["new"],
+        "legacy-only": ["old"],
+    }
+    assert data.metadata["marker"] == "keep"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("failure", ["read", "write"])
+def test_metadata_map_failure_preserves_disk(tmp_path, monkeypatch, failure):
+    import praisonaiagents.session.store as store_module
+
+    store = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=str(tmp_path))
+    store.update_session_metadata("parent", **{AGENT_HISTORY_KEY: {"peer": ["old"]}})
+    path = Path(store._get_session_path("parent"))
+    before = path.read_bytes()
+
+    def fail(*args, **kwargs):
+        raise OSError("injected I/O failure")
+
+    if failure == "read":
+        monkeypatch.setattr(store, "_load_session_from_disk", fail)
+    else:
+        monkeypatch.setattr(store_module.os, "replace", fail)
+    assert not store.merge_session_metadata_map("parent", AGENT_HISTORY_KEY, {"new": []})
+    assert path.read_bytes() == before

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/session/test_session_import_no_clobber.py

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+"""Default imports must not overwrite a session created after the first check."""
+
+from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
+from threading import Event
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents.session.store import DefaultSessionStore
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("overwrite", [False, True])
+def test_import_rechecks_new_peer_session_under_write_lock(tmp_path, monkeypatch, overwrite):
+    directory = str(tmp_path / "sessions")
+    importer = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=directory)
+    peer = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=directory)
+    ready, completed = Event(), Event()
+    original = importer._save_imported_session
+
+    def pause_before_write(*args, **kwargs):
+        ready.set()
+        assert completed.wait(10), "peer did not finish creating its session"
+        return original(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(importer, "_save_imported_session", pause_before_write)
+    payload = {"version": 1, "sessions": [{
+        "session_id": "shared", "messages": [{
+            "role": "user", "content": "imported", "timestamp": 1,
+        }],
+    }]}
+
+    def create_peer():
+        assert ready.wait(10), "import did not reach write boundary"
+        try:
+            assert peer.add_message("shared", "user", "peer-created")
+        finally:
+            completed.set()
+
+    with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as pool:
+        future = pool.submit(create_peer)
+        report = importer.import_sessions(payload, overwrite=overwrite)
+        future.result(timeout=15)
+    fresh = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=directory)
+    if overwrite:
+        assert report.imported == 1
+        assert not report.skipped
+        assert fresh.get_chat_history("shared") == [{"role": "user", "content": "imported"}]
+    else:
+        assert report.imported == 0
+        assert report.skipped == [{
+            "session_id": "shared", "reason": "already exists (use overwrite)",
+        }]
+        assert fresh.get_chat_history("shared") == [{"role": "user", "content": "peer-created"}]

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/session/test_sqlite_import_index.py

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+"""Portable imports refresh the indexed store's content and routing views."""
+
+import pytest
+import threading
+from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
+
+from praisonaiagents.session.sqlite_store import SqliteSessionStore
+from praisonaiagents.session.store import DefaultSessionStore
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def make_store(tmp_path):
+    stores = []
+
+    def create(kind, **kwargs):
+        store = kind(session_dir=str(tmp_path / str(len(stores))), **kwargs)
+        stores.append(store)
+        return store
+
+    yield create
+    for store in stores:
+        conn = getattr(store, "_conn", None)
+        if conn is not None:
+            conn.close()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("kind", [DefaultSessionStore, SqliteSessionStore])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("warm", [False, True])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("overwrite", [False, True])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("reset_live_fields", [False, True])
+def test_import_refreshes_content_and_routes(make_store, kind, warm, overwrite, reset_live_fields):
+    source = make_store(DefaultSessionStore)
+    messages = [{"role": "user", "content": f"narwhal imported turn {index}"} for index in range(5)]
+    assert source.set_chat_history("session", messages)
+    assert source.set_gateway_info("session", gateway_session_id="new-gateway", agent_id="new-agent")
+    payload = source.export_all()
+
+    destination = make_store(kind, active_window=2)
+    if overwrite:
+        assert destination.add_message("session", "user", "pelican old turn")
+        assert destination.set_gateway_info("session", gateway_session_id="old-gateway", agent_id="old-agent")
+    if warm:
+        destination.search("pelican")
+        destination.get_by_gateway_session("old-gateway")
+
+    report = destination.import_sessions(payload, overwrite=overwrite, reset_live_fields=reset_live_fields)
+    assert report.imported == 1
+    assert report.skipped == []
+    session = destination.get_session("session")
+    assert [message.content for message in session.messages] == [message["content"] for message in messages]
+    assert destination.get_by_gateway_session("old-gateway") is None
+    assert destination.list_sessions_by_gateway_agent("old-agent") == []
+    found = destination.get_by_gateway_session("new-gateway")
+    if reset_live_fields:
+        assert found is None
+        assert destination.list_sessions_by_gateway_agent("new-agent") == []
+    else:
+        assert found is not None and found.session_id == "session"
+        assert destination.list_sessions_by_gateway_agent("new-agent") == ["session"]
+    assert destination.search("pelican") == []
+    assert [hit.session_id for hit in destination.search("narwhal")] == ["session"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("write_failure", [False, True])
+def test_unsaved_import_keeps_previous_index(make_store, monkeypatch, write_failure):
+    source = make_store(DefaultSessionStore)
+    assert source.add_message("session", "user", "narwhal replacement")
+    destination = make_store(SqliteSessionStore)
+    assert destination.add_message("session", "user", "pelican original")
+    assert destination.set_gateway_info("session", gateway_session_id="gateway", agent_id="agent")
+    assert destination.search("pelican")
+    if write_failure:
+        monkeypatch.setattr(destination, "_atomic_write_json", lambda *args: False)
+
+    report = destination.import_sessions(source.export_all(), overwrite=write_failure)
+    assert report.imported == 0
+    assert len(report.skipped) == 1
+    assert report.skipped[0]["reason"] == ("write failed" if write_failure else "already exists (use overwrite)")
+    assert [hit.session_id for hit in destination.search("pelican")] == ["session"]
+    assert destination.search("narwhal") == []
+    assert destination.get_by_gateway_session("gateway").session_id == "session"
+    assert destination.list_sessions_by_gateway_agent("agent") == ["session"]
+
+
+def test_warm_import_indexes_archived_turns(make_store):
+    source = make_store(DefaultSessionStore, active_window=3)
+    assert source.add_message("session", "user", "pelican archived marker")
+    for index in range(8):
+        assert source.add_message("session", "user", f"later turn {index}")
+    assert any("pelican" in message.content for message in source.get_session("session").archived_messages)
+    destination = make_store(SqliteSessionStore, active_window=2)
+    assert destination.search("pelican") == []
+    assert destination.import_sessions(source.export_all()).imported == 1
+    hits = destination.search("pelican")
+    assert [hit.session_id for hit in hits] == ["session"]
+    assert any(message["archived"] for message in hits[0].messages)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("separate_store", [False, True])
+def test_write_between_import_save_and_index_keeps_newer_content(make_store, monkeypatch, separate_store):
+    source = make_store(DefaultSessionStore)
+    assert source.add_message("session", "user", "pelican imported turn")
+    destination = make_store(SqliteSessionStore)
+    destination.search("pelican")
+    writer = destination
+    if separate_store:
+        writer = SqliteSessionStore(session_dir=destination.session_dir, db_path=destination.db_path)
+        writer.search("pelican")
+
+    saved = threading.Event()
+    resume = threading.Event()
+    original = DefaultSessionStore._save_imported_session
+
+    def delayed_save(store, session, **kwargs):
+        result = original(store, session, **kwargs)
+        saved.set()
+        assert resume.wait(5), "concurrent writer did not finish"
+        return result
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(DefaultSessionStore, "_save_imported_session", delayed_save)
+    try:
+        with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1) as executor:
+            importing = executor.submit(destination.import_sessions, source.export_all())
+            try:
+                assert saved.wait(5), "import did not persist the JSON"
+                assert writer.set_chat_history("session", [{"role": "user", "content": "narwhal newer turn"}])
+                assert writer.set_gateway_info("session", gateway_session_id="new-gateway", agent_id="new-agent")
+                assert writer.search("narwhal")
+            finally:
+                resume.set()
+            assert importing.result(timeout=5).imported == 1
+        destination.invalidate_cache()
+        assert destination.get_session("session").messages[0].content == "narwhal newer turn"
+        assert [hit.session_id for hit in destination.search("narwhal")] == ["session"]
+        assert destination.search("pelican") == []
+        assert destination.get_by_gateway_session("new-gateway").session_id == "session"
+        assert destination.list_sessions_by_gateway_agent("new-agent") == ["session"]
+    finally:
+        if separate_store and writer._conn is not None:
+            writer._conn.close()
+
+
+def test_post_import_refresh_failure_does_not_report_durable_write_failure(make_store, monkeypatch):
+    source = make_store(DefaultSessionStore)
+    assert source.add_message("session", "user", "durable imported note")
+    destination = make_store(SqliteSessionStore)
+
+    def unavailable(*args):
+        raise OSError("injected index refresh read failure")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(destination, "_load_session_from_disk", unavailable)
+    report = destination.import_sessions(source.export_all())
+    assert report.imported == 1
+    assert report.skipped == []
+    reader = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=destination.session_dir)
+    assert reader.get_session("session").messages[0].content == "durable imported note"
+
+
+def test_post_import_read_failure_does_not_restore_old_routes(make_store, monkeypatch):
+    source = make_store(DefaultSessionStore)
+    assert source.add_message("session", "user", "narwhal replacement")
+    destination = make_store(SqliteSessionStore)
+    assert destination.add_message("session", "user", "pelican original")
+    assert destination.set_gateway_info("session", gateway_session_id="old-gateway", agent_id="old-agent")
+    assert destination.get_by_gateway_session("old-gateway").session_id == "session"
+    assert destination.search("pelican")
+    original = destination._load_session_from_disk
+
+    def unavailable(*args):
+        raise OSError("injected post-save read failure")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(destination, "_load_session_from_disk", unavailable)
+    report = destination.import_sessions(source.export_all(), overwrite=True)
+    assert report.imported == 1
+    assert report.skipped == []
+    assert destination.get_by_gateway_session("old-gateway") is None
+    assert destination.list_sessions_by_gateway_agent("old-agent") == []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(destination, "_load_session_from_disk", original)
+    destination.invalidate_cache()
+    saved = destination.get_session("session")
+    assert saved.gateway_session_id is None
+    assert saved.agent_id is None
+    assert saved.messages[0].content == "narwhal replacement"
+    assert destination.search("narwhal") == []
+    assert destination.add_message("session", "user", "later update")
+    assert [hit.session_id for hit in destination.search("narwhal")] == ["session"]
+    assert destination.get_by_gateway_session("old-gateway") is None

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/session/test_sqlite_transcript_portability.py

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+"""Portable session operations use the SQLite transcript persistence backend."""
+
+import json
+import tracemalloc
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents.session.store import DefaultSessionStore
+from praisonaiagents.session.sqlite_transcript_store import SqliteTranscriptStore
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def stores(tmp_path):
+    opened = []
+
+    def make(name, backend=SqliteTranscriptStore, **kwargs):
+        store = backend(session_dir=str(tmp_path / name), **kwargs)
+        opened.append(store)
+        return store
+
+    yield make
+    for store in opened:
+        conn = getattr(store, "_conn", None)
+        if conn is not None:
+            conn.close()
+
+
+def test_export_all_reads_database_not_json_sidecars(stores):
+    store = stores("source")
+    assert store.add_message("one", "user", "First")
+    assert store.add_message("two", "assistant", "Second")
+    from pathlib import Path
+    (Path(store.session_dir) / "unrelated.json").write_text(
+        json.dumps({"session_id": "sidecar", "messages": []}), encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+    payload = store.export_all()
+    assert payload["version"] == store.PORTABLE_VERSION
+    assert {record["session_id"] for record in payload["sessions"]} == {"one", "two"}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("key", ["lineage_id", "root_session_id", "thread_id"])
+def test_single_export_includes_database_lineage(stores, key):
+    store = stores("source")
+    for session_id in ("first", "continuation", "unrelated"):
+        assert store.add_message(session_id, "user", session_id)
+        assert store.update_session_metadata(session_id, **{key: "shared" if session_id != "unrelated" else "other"})
+    payload = store.export_session("continuation")
+    assert {record["session_id"] for record in payload["sessions"]} == {"first", "continuation"}
+    assert [record["session_id"] for record in store.export_session("continuation", include_lineage=False)["sessions"]] == ["continuation"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("source_backend", [DefaultSessionStore, SqliteTranscriptStore])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("target_backend", [DefaultSessionStore, SqliteTranscriptStore])
+def test_cross_backend_restore_survives_reopen_without_window_truncation(stores, source_backend, target_backend):
+    source = stores("source", source_backend)
+    for index in range(6):
+        assert source.add_message("reference", "user", f"message-{index}")
+    assert source.set_gateway_info("reference", gateway_session_id="live", agent_id="agent")
+    payload = source.export_all()
+    assert len(payload["sessions"]) == 1
+    target = stores("target", target_backend, active_window=2, retention="truncate")
+    # An existing SQLite row prevents legacy JSON migration from masking a
+    # restore incorrectly written to a sidecar file instead of the database.
+    assert target.add_message("existing", "user", "Existing history")
+    assert target.import_sessions(payload).imported == 1
+    assert target.session_exists("reference")
+    target.invalidate_cache()
+    reopened = stores("target", target_backend, active_window=2, retention="truncate")
+    for current in (target, reopened):
+        assert [message["content"] for message in current.get_chat_history("reference")] == [f"message-{index}" for index in range(6)]
+        session = current.get_session("reference")
+        assert session.gateway_session_id is None
+        assert session.agent_id is None
+    if target_backend is SqliteTranscriptStore:
+        from pathlib import Path
+        assert list(Path(target.session_dir).glob("*.json")) == []
+
+
+def test_import_sqlite_write_failure_is_reported_and_preserves_existing_row(stores):
+    source = stores("source", DefaultSessionStore)
+    assert source.add_message("reference", "user", "New history")
+    target = stores("target")
+    assert target.add_message("reference", "user", "Original history")
+    target._connect().execute("PRAGMA query_only=ON")
+    report = target.import_sessions(source.export_all(), overwrite=True)
+    assert report.imported == 0
+    assert report.skipped_count == 1
+    assert "write failed" in report.skipped[0]["reason"]
+    target.invalidate_cache()
+    assert target.get_chat_history("reference")[0]["content"] == "Original history"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("reset_live_fields", [True, False])
+def test_restore_preserves_archived_history_and_tool_calls(stores, reset_live_fields):
+    tool_calls = [{"id": "call-1", "type": "function", "function": {"name": "lookup", "arguments": "{}"}}]
+    payload = {"sessions": [{
+        "session_id": "reference",
+        "gateway_session_id": "live",
+        "agent_id": "agent",
+        "metadata": {"gateway_session_id": "live", "agent_id": "agent", "lineage_id": "shared"},
+        "archived_messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Archived", "timestamp": 1}],
+        "messages": [{"role": "assistant", "content": "Tool call", "tool_calls": tool_calls}],
+    }]}
+    target = stores("target", active_window=1, retention="truncate")
+    assert target.add_message("existing", "user", "Existing")
+    assert target.import_sessions(payload, reset_live_fields=reset_live_fields).imported == 1
+    record = stores("target").export_session("reference")["sessions"][0]
+    assert record["messages"][0]["tool_calls"] == tool_calls
+    assert record["archived_messages"][0]["content"] == "Archived"
+    assert record["metadata"]["lineage_id"] == "shared"
+    if reset_live_fields:
+        assert record.get("gateway_session_id") is None
+        assert record.get("agent_id") is None
+        assert "gateway_session_id" not in record["metadata"]
+        assert "agent_id" not in record["metadata"]
+    else:
+        assert record["gateway_session_id"] == "live"
+        assert record["agent_id"] == "agent"
+        assert record["metadata"]["gateway_session_id"] == "live"
+        assert record["metadata"]["agent_id"] == "agent"
+
+
+def test_sqlite_restore_keeps_import_guards(stores):
+    source = stores("source", DefaultSessionStore)
+    assert source.add_message("reference", "user", "Original")
+    payload = source.export_all()
+    payload["sessions"].append(dict(payload["sessions"][0]))
+    target = stores("target")
+    report = target.import_sessions(payload)
+    assert report.imported == 1
+    assert "duplicate" in report.skipped[0]["reason"]
+    assert target.import_sessions(payload).imported == 0
+    assert target.import_sessions(payload, overwrite=True).imported == 1
+    assert target.export_session("missing")["sessions"] == []
+    payload["version"] = target.PORTABLE_VERSION + 1
+    assert target.import_sessions(payload, overwrite=True).imported == 0
+    assert target.get_chat_history("reference")[0]["content"] == "Original"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("overwrite", [False, True])
+def test_import_does_not_clobber_peer_created_after_initial_check(stores, monkeypatch, overwrite):
+    target = stores("target")
+    peer = stores("target")
+    original = target._save_imported_session
+
+    def create_peer_before_write(*args, **kwargs):
+        assert peer.add_message("reference", "user", "peer-created")
+        return original(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(target, "_save_imported_session", create_peer_before_write)
+    payload = {"sessions": [{"session_id": "reference", "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "imported"}]}]}
+    report = target.import_sessions(payload, overwrite=overwrite)
+    assert report.imported == int(overwrite)
+    assert target.get_chat_history("reference")[0]["content"] == ("imported" if overwrite else "peer-created")
+    if overwrite:
+        assert target._cache["reference"].messages[0].content == "imported"
+    else:
+        assert report.skipped[0]["reason"] == "already exists (use overwrite)"
+
+
+def test_lineage_export_does_not_materialize_unrelated_transcripts(stores):
+    store = stores("source")
+    for sid in ("root", "continuation"):
+        assert store.add_message(sid, "user", sid)
+        assert store.update_session_metadata(sid, lineage_id="shared")
+    for index in range(24):
+        sid = f"unrelated-{index}"
+        assert store.add_message(sid, "user", "x" * 256_000)
+        assert store.update_session_metadata(sid, lineage_id="other", value=float("nan"))
+    tracemalloc.start()
+    try:
+        payload = store.export_session("continuation")
+        _, peak = tracemalloc.get_traced_memory()
+    finally:
+        tracemalloc.stop()
+    assert {record["session_id"] for record in payload["sessions"]} == {"root", "continuation"}
+    # The unrelated transcripts total over 6 MB. A single-record parse can
+    # allocate its input and decoded content, but must not retain all rows.
+    assert peak < 2_000_000

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/session/test_sqlite_transcript_store.py

@@ -61,6 +61,35 @@ class TestSqliteTranscriptStore:
         history = s2.get_chat_history("s1")
         assert history == [{"role": "user", "content": "persist me"}]
 
+    def test_boots_on_malformed_db(self, tmp_dir):
+        """A malformed transcript DB recovers instead of taking the store down.
+
+        Before Issue #5387's guard, opening a corrupt ``sessions.db`` raised an
+        uncaught ``sqlite3.DatabaseError`` on the first ``CREATE TABLE``. The
+        guard forensically backs up the bad bytes and lets a fresh, usable store
+        open so durable session handling keeps working.
+        """
+        db = os.path.join(tmp_dir, "sessions.db")
+        s1 = SqliteTranscriptStore(session_dir=tmp_dir, db_path=db)
+        s1.add_message("s1", "user", "before corruption")
+        s1._conn.close()  # release the file/WAL before corrupting on disk
+
+        # Corrupt the on-disk database so quick_check fails and it is unreadable.
+        for sidecar in (db + "-wal", db + "-shm"):
+            if os.path.exists(sidecar):
+                os.remove(sidecar)
+        with open(db, "r+b") as fh:
+            fh.write(b"not a sqlite database" + b"\x00" * 300)
+
+        # A new store must open without raising and be usable.
+        s2 = SqliteTranscriptStore(session_dir=tmp_dir, db_path=db)
+        assert s2.add_message("s2", "user", "after recovery")
+        assert s2.get_chat_history("s2") == [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "after recovery"}
+        ]
+        # The malformed bytes were preserved for forensics.
+        assert any(f.startswith("sessions.db.corrupt-") for f in os.listdir(tmp_dir))
+
     def test_session_exists_and_delete(self, tmp_dir):
         store = SqliteTranscriptStore(session_dir=tmp_dir)
         assert not store.session_exists("s1")
@@ -175,6 +204,57 @@ class TestSqliteTranscriptStore:
             {"role": "user", "content": "legacy transcript"}
         ]
 
+    def test_migration_skips_invalid_utf8_legacy_file(self, tmp_dir):
+        """A legacy file with invalid UTF-8 bytes is skipped (not fatal), and
+        valid transcripts still migrate; the bad bytes are preserved."""
+        legacy = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=tmp_dir)
+        legacy.add_message("old", "user", "legacy transcript")
+
+        bad_path = os.path.join(tmp_dir, "invalid.json")
+        with open(bad_path, "wb") as handle:
+            handle.write(b"\xff\xfe")
+
+        store = SqliteTranscriptStore(session_dir=tmp_dir)
+        assert store.session_exists("old")
+        assert store.get_chat_history("old") == [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "legacy transcript"}
+        ]
+
+        with open(bad_path, "rb") as handle:
+            assert handle.read() == b"\xff\xfe"
+
+    def test_migration_continues_after_invalid_utf8_ordered_first(self, tmp_dir):
+        """A bad file processed before valid ones must not abort later migrations.
+
+        Migration sorts filenames, so ``aaa_invalid.json`` is deterministically
+        processed before the ``zeta`` session's JSON file — guaranteeing the
+        bad-first scenario is actually exercised.
+        """
+        legacy = DefaultSessionStore(session_dir=tmp_dir)
+        legacy.add_message("zeta", "user", "valid transcript")
+
+        bad_path = os.path.join(tmp_dir, "aaa_invalid.json")
+        with open(bad_path, "wb") as handle:
+            handle.write(b"\xff\xfe")
+
+        import json as _json
+
+        json_files = sorted(f for f in os.listdir(tmp_dir) if f.endswith(".json"))
+        assert json_files[0] == "aaa_invalid.json"
+        valid_file = next(
+            f for f in json_files
+            if f != "aaa_invalid.json" and "zeta" in _json.dumps(
+                _json.load(open(os.path.join(tmp_dir, f)))
+            )
+        )
+        assert "aaa_invalid.json" < valid_file
+
+        store = SqliteTranscriptStore(session_dir=tmp_dir)
+        assert store.session_exists("zeta")
+        assert store.get_chat_history("zeta") == [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "valid transcript"}
+        ]
+
 
 class TestTranscriptArchivedRecall:
     """Issue #5031: transcript store must recall compacted (archived) turns."""

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/session/test_title_length_boundaries.py

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+"""The public title length cap applies to generated and fallback titles."""
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents.session.title import generate_title, generate_title_async
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("max_length", [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 60])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("user_msg", ["", "?!.", "A long user request about debugging code"])
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_sync_fallback_in_running_loop_respects_length(user_msg, max_length):
+    title = generate_title(user_msg, "Response", max_length=max_length)
+    assert len(title) <= max_length
+    if max_length == 60:
+        assert title
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("max_length", [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 60])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("response", ["A long generated title about Python", None])
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_async_generated_and_fallback_titles_respect_length(monkeypatch, max_length, response):
+    import praisonaiagents.llm as llm_module
+
+    class LocalLLM:
+        def __init__(self, **kwargs):
+            pass
+
+        async def get_response_async(self, **kwargs):
+            return response
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(llm_module, "LLM", LocalLLM)
+    title = await generate_title_async("", "Response", llm_model="test", max_length=max_length)
+    assert len(title) <= max_length
+    if max_length == 60:
+        assert title == (response or "Chat Session")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("max_length", [0, -1])
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_nonpositive_cap_skips_model_initialization(monkeypatch, max_length):
+    import praisonaiagents.llm as llm_module
+
+    calls = []
+
+    class UnexpectedLLM:
+        def __init__(self, **kwargs):
+            calls.append(kwargs)
+
+        async def get_response_async(self, **kwargs):
+            return "Unneeded title"
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(llm_module, "LLM", UnexpectedLLM)
+    assert await generate_title_async("Question", "Response", max_length=max_length) == ""
+    assert generate_title("Question", "Response", max_length=max_length) == ""
+    assert calls == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("user_msg", ["", "?!."])
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_three_character_fallback_keeps_readable_prefix(user_msg):
+    assert generate_title(user_msg, "Response", max_length=3) == "Cha"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_three_character_generated_title_keeps_readable_prefix(monkeypatch):
+    import praisonaiagents.llm as llm_module
+
+    class LocalLLM:
+        def __init__(self, **kwargs):
+            pass
+
+        async def get_response_async(self, **kwargs):
+            return "Python debugging"
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(llm_module, "LLM", LocalLLM)
+    assert await generate_title_async("Question", "Response", max_length=3) == "Pyt"

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/skills/test_self_improve.py

@@ -270,22 +270,28 @@ def test_dispatch_skill_review_inline_runs_synchronously():
 
 
 def test_dispatch_skill_review_background_runs_off_path():
+    import threading
     import time
 
     agent = Agent(instructions="x", self_improve="background")
     done = []
+    # Gate the review body so the assertion is on ordering, not wall-clock:
+    # the caller must return *before* the review is released, proving the turn
+    # ran off-path. This is deterministic — it never depends on how fast the
+    # runner schedules the background thread (AGENTS.md §4.6: no timing-based
+    # tests), unlike an absolute ``elapsed < 0.1`` bound that flaked on slow CI.
+    release = threading.Event()
 
-    def slow_review(p, r, t):
-        time.sleep(0.15)
+    def gated_review(p, r, t):
+        release.wait(5.0)
         done.append((p, r, t))
 
-    start = time.time()
-    agent._dispatch_skill_review(slow_review, "p", "r", ["shell"])
-    elapsed = time.time() - start
-    # Caller is not blocked by the review turn.
-    assert elapsed < 0.1
-    # But the review still runs on the background runner.
-    for _ in range(50):
+    agent._dispatch_skill_review(gated_review, "p", "r", ["shell"])
+    # Caller returned while the review is still blocked → it did not run inline.
+    assert done == []
+    # Release it and confirm the review still runs on the background runner.
+    release.set()
+    for _ in range(250):
         if done:
             break
         time.sleep(0.02)

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/storage/test_backends.py

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ Tests cover:
 import threading
 from pathlib import Path
 
+import pytest
+
 from praisonaiagents.storage.backends import FileBackend, SQLiteBackend, get_backend
 from praisonaiagents.storage.protocols import StorageBackendProtocol
 
@@ -33,7 +35,33 @@ class TestFileBackend:
         
         loaded = backend.load("test_key")
         assert loaded == data
-    
+
+    def test_file_backend_load_invalid_utf8_returns_none(self, tmp_path, caplog):
+        """Undecodable bytes should warn and return None, not raise (Issue #5566)."""
+        import logging
+
+        backend = FileBackend(storage_dir=str(tmp_path))
+
+        for raw in (b"\xff", b"\xe4\xb8", b"\xed\xa0\x80"):
+            backend.save("bad", {"message": "original"})
+            file_path = Path(tmp_path) / "bad.json"
+            file_path.write_bytes(raw)
+
+            with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="praisonaiagents.storage.backends"):
+                caplog.clear()
+                assert backend.load("bad") is None
+                # A warning is emitted identifying the failed key
+                assert any(
+                    rec.levelno == logging.WARNING and "Failed to load bad" in rec.getMessage()
+                    for rec in caplog.records
+                )
+            # Original bytes are preserved (load is non-destructive)
+            assert file_path.read_bytes() == raw
+
+        # Valid neighboring keys still load
+        backend.save("good", {"key": "value"})
+        assert backend.load("good") == {"key": "value"}
+
     def test_file_backend_exists(self, tmp_path):
         """Test exists check."""
         backend = FileBackend(storage_dir=str(tmp_path))
@@ -115,6 +143,29 @@ class TestFileBackend:
         backend = FileBackend(storage_dir=str(tmp_path))
         assert isinstance(backend, StorageBackendProtocol)
 
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("pretty", [True, False])
+    def test_file_backend_save_cleans_tmp_on_serialization_error(self, tmp_path, pretty):
+        """Serialization failures must not leave partial .tmp staging files."""
+        backend = FileBackend(storage_dir=str(tmp_path), pretty=pretty)
+        backend.save("good", {"value": 1})
+
+        circular = {}
+        circular["self"] = circular
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            backend.save("circular", circular)
+
+        with pytest.raises(TypeError):
+            backend.save("tuple_key", {("a", "b"): 1})
+
+        with pytest.raises((ValueError, TypeError)):
+            backend.save("good", circular)
+
+        tmp_files = list(tmp_path.glob("*.tmp"))
+        assert tmp_files == []
+        assert backend.load("good") == {"value": 1}
+        assert not backend.exists("circular")
+        assert not backend.exists("tuple_key")
+
 
 class TestSQLiteBackend:
     """Tests for SQLiteBackend."""
@@ -248,6 +299,68 @@ class TestSQLiteBackend:
         loaded = backend2.load("key1")
         assert loaded["data"] == 1
 
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("table_name", ["select", "123", "9table", "praison_storage"])
+    def test_sqlite_backend_keyword_and_digit_table_names(self, tmp_path, table_name):
+        """Validator-accepted names that are SQL keywords or start with a digit
+        must work across schema creation and all CRUD operations (Issue #5569)."""
+        db_path = tmp_path / "test.db"
+        backend = SQLiteBackend(db_path=str(db_path), table_name=table_name)
+
+        # save / upsert
+        backend.save("key1", {"version": 1})
+        backend.save("key1", {"version": 2})
+        assert backend.load("key1")["version"] == 2
+
+        # exists
+        assert backend.exists("key1")
+        assert not backend.exists("missing")
+
+        # list_keys (full + prefix)
+        backend.save("key2", {"data": 2})
+        backend.save("other", {"data": 3})
+        assert backend.list_keys() == ["key1", "key2", "other"]
+        assert backend.list_keys(prefix="key") == ["key1", "key2"]
+
+        # delete
+        assert backend.delete("other") is True
+        assert not backend.exists("other")
+
+        # clear
+        assert backend.clear() == 2
+        assert backend.list_keys() == []
+
+    def test_sqlite_backend_reopen_with_auto_create_false(self, tmp_path):
+        """A keyword table name persists and reopens with auto_create=False."""
+        db_path = tmp_path / "test.db"
+        backend = SQLiteBackend(db_path=str(db_path), table_name="select")
+        backend.save("key1", {"data": 1})
+        backend.close()
+
+        backend2 = SQLiteBackend(
+            db_path=str(db_path), table_name="select", auto_create=False
+        )
+        assert backend2.load("key1")["data"] == 1
+
+    def test_sqlite_backend_separate_tables_same_db(self, tmp_path):
+        """Quoted identifiers keep distinct tables isolated in one DB file."""
+        db_path = tmp_path / "test.db"
+        t1 = SQLiteBackend(db_path=str(db_path), table_name="select")
+        t2 = SQLiteBackend(db_path=str(db_path), table_name="praison_storage")
+
+        t1.save("shared", {"from": "select"})
+        t2.save("shared", {"from": "praison_storage"})
+
+        assert t1.load("shared")["from"] == "select"
+        assert t2.load("shared")["from"] == "praison_storage"
+
+    def test_sqlite_backend_invalid_table_name_rejected(self, tmp_path):
+        """Names with disallowed characters are still rejected by the validator."""
+        db_path = tmp_path / "test.db"
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            SQLiteBackend(db_path=str(db_path), table_name="bad name")
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            SQLiteBackend(db_path=str(db_path), table_name='drop";')
+
 
 class TestGetBackend:
     """Tests for get_backend factory function."""

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/storage/test_file_backend_compound_suffix.py

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+"""Enumeration and clearing honor the complete configured filename suffix."""
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents.storage.backends import FileBackend
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("suffix", [".data.json", "record", ".json", ""])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("operation", ["list", "clear"])
+def test_configured_suffix_selects_saved_records(tmp_path, suffix, operation):
+    store = FileBackend(storage_dir=str(tmp_path), suffix=suffix)
+    for key in ("session_one", "session_two", "other"):
+        store.save(key, {"key": key})
+    unrelated = tmp_path / "unrelated.txt"
+    unrelated.write_text("keep", encoding="utf-8")
+    directory = tmp_path / ("directory" + suffix)
+    directory.mkdir()
+    assert store.exists("session_one")
+    assert store.load("session_one") == {"key": "session_one"}
+    if operation == "list":
+        assert store.list_keys() == ["other", "session_one", "session_two"]
+        assert store.list_keys("session_") == ["session_one", "session_two"]
+        for key in store.list_keys():
+            assert store.load(key) == {"key": key}
+    else:
+        assert store.clear() == 3
+        assert not store.exists("session_one")
+        assert store.list_keys() == []
+    assert unrelated.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "keep"
+    assert directory.is_dir()

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/storage/test_session_cleanup_full_enumeration.py

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+"""Retention must include sessions beyond the listing display limit."""
+
+import os
+import time
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents.storage.base import cleanup_old_sessions, list_json_sessions
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("boundary", ["age", "size"])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("suffix", [".json", ".jsonl"])
+def test_cleanup_includes_oldest_session_after_ten_thousand_newer_files(tmp_path, boundary, suffix):
+    oldest = tmp_path / ("oldest" + suffix)
+    oldest.write_bytes(b"x")
+    now = time.time()
+    old_time = now - 90 * 24 * 60 * 60
+    os.utime(oldest, (old_time, old_time))
+    for index in range(10000):
+        (tmp_path / f"new-{index:05d}{suffix}").write_bytes(b"")
+    neighbor = tmp_path / "unrelated.txt"
+    neighbor.write_bytes(b"keep")
+
+    if boundary == "age":
+        deleted = cleanup_old_sessions(tmp_path, suffix=suffix, max_age_days=30, max_size_mb=100)
+    else:
+        # Only the oldest file contributes bytes to the quota; none exceed age.
+        deleted = cleanup_old_sessions(tmp_path, suffix=suffix, max_age_days=365, max_size_mb=0)
+
+    assert deleted == 1
+    assert not oldest.exists()
+    assert len(list(tmp_path.glob("new-*" + suffix))) == 10000
+    assert neighbor.read_bytes() == b"keep"
+
+
+def test_listing_keeps_default_limit_and_supports_unbounded_listing(tmp_path):
+    for index in range(51):
+        (tmp_path / f"session-{index:02d}.json").write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8")
+    assert len(list_json_sessions(tmp_path)) == 50
+    assert len(list_json_sessions(tmp_path, limit=3)) == 3
+    assert len(list_json_sessions(tmp_path, limit=None)) == 51

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/storage/test_session_list_utf8_counts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+"""Session counts use the UTF-8 writer format, independent of host locale."""
+
+import builtins
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents.storage.base import BaseJSONStore, list_json_sessions
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def legacy_text_locale(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    original_open = builtins.open
+
+    def locale_open(file, mode="r", *args, **kwargs):
+        if Path(file).parent == tmp_path and mode == "r" and not kwargs.get("encoding"):
+            kwargs["encoding"] = "cp1252"
+        return original_open(file, mode, *args, **kwargs)
+
+    # Exercise real decoding with a deterministic Windows-style default locale.
+    monkeypatch.setattr(builtins, "open", locale_open)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["iterations", "messages", "items", "jsonl"])
+def test_utf8_session_counts_survive_legacy_locale(tmp_path, legacy_text_locale, field):
+    values = ["丁 café 😀", "second"]
+    suffix = ".jsonl" if field == "jsonl" else ".json"
+    path = tmp_path / ("session" + suffix)
+    if field == "jsonl":
+        path.write_text("".join(json.dumps({"value": value}, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n" for value in values), encoding="utf-8")
+    else:
+        BaseJSONStore(path).save({field: values})
+    before = path.read_bytes()
+
+    sessions = list_json_sessions(tmp_path, suffix=suffix)
+
+    assert len(sessions) == 1
+    assert sessions[0].item_count == 2
+    assert sessions[0].size_bytes == len(before)
+    assert path.read_bytes() == before
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("suffix", [".json", ".jsonl"])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("valid", [True, False])
+def test_ascii_and_unreadable_files_keep_existing_behavior(tmp_path, legacy_text_locale, suffix, valid):
+    path = tmp_path / ("session" + suffix)
+    content = b'{"items":[1,2]}' if suffix == ".json" else b'{"value":1}\n{"value":2}\n'
+    path.write_bytes(content if valid else b"\x81")
+    before = path.read_bytes()
+    sessions = list_json_sessions(tmp_path, suffix=suffix)
+    assert len(sessions) == 1
+    assert sessions[0].item_count == (2 if valid else 0)
+    assert path.read_bytes() == before

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/storage/test_sqlite_backend_init_cleanup.py

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+"""A failed backend constructor releases its real SQLite connection."""
+
+import sqlite3
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents.storage import sqlite as connector
+from praisonaiagents.storage.backends import SQLiteBackend
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("failure", ["reserved_name", "incompatible_schema"])
+def test_constructor_closes_connection_after_schema_failure(tmp_path, monkeypatch, failure):
+    path = str(tmp_path / "store.db")
+    with sqlite3.connect(path) as seed:
+        seed.execute("CREATE TABLE preserved (value TEXT)")
+        seed.execute("INSERT INTO preserved VALUES ('original')")
+        if failure == "incompatible_schema":
+            seed.execute("CREATE TABLE praison_storage (wrong_column TEXT)")
+    seed.close()
+    opened = []
+    original = connector.connect
+
+    def connect(*args, **kwargs):
+        conn = original(*args, **kwargs)
+        opened.append(conn)
+        return conn
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(connector, "connect", connect)
+    try:
+        name = "sqlite_private" if failure == "reserved_name" else "praison_storage"
+        with pytest.raises(sqlite3.OperationalError) as error:
+            SQLiteBackend(db_path=path, table_name=name)
+        expected = "reserved" if failure == "reserved_name" else "no such column"
+        assert expected in str(error.value)
+        assert len(opened) == 1
+        with pytest.raises(sqlite3.ProgrammingError, match="closed database"):
+            opened[0].execute("SELECT 1")
+        with sqlite3.connect(path) as check:
+            assert check.execute("SELECT value FROM preserved").fetchall() == [("original",)]
+        check.close()
+    finally:
+        for conn in opened:
+            conn.close()
+
+
+def test_successful_constructor_keeps_connection_usable(tmp_path):
+    backend = SQLiteBackend(db_path=str(tmp_path / "store.db"))
+    try:
+        backend.save("key", {"value": 1})
+        assert backend.load("key") == {"value": 1}
+    finally:
+        backend.close()

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/storage/test_sqlite_connector.py

@@ -173,3 +173,255 @@ def test_lazy_export_from_storage_package():
     from praisonaiagents.storage import sqlite_connect
 
     assert sqlite_connect is connect
+
+
+# ── corruption detection / repair / backup (Issue #5387) ──────────────
+
+
+def _corrupt_file(path: str) -> None:
+    """Overwrite a database's header/pages with garbage so it is malformed."""
+    with open(path, "r+b") as fh:
+        fh.write(b"this is not a valid sqlite header" + b"\x00" * 200)
+
+
+def _make_db(path: str, rows: int = 5) -> None:
+    import sqlite3
+
+    conn = sqlite3.connect(path)
+    conn.execute("CREATE TABLE t (x INTEGER)")
+    conn.executemany("INSERT INTO t VALUES (?)", [(i,) for i in range(rows)])
+    conn.commit()
+    conn.close()
+
+
+def test_quick_check_reports_ok_for_healthy_db(tmp_path):
+    from praisonaiagents.storage.sqlite import quick_check
+    import sqlite3
+
+    db = str(tmp_path / "ok.db")
+    _make_db(db)
+    conn = sqlite3.connect(db)
+    try:
+        assert quick_check(conn) is True
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+
+def test_quick_check_false_on_malformed_db(tmp_path):
+    from praisonaiagents.storage.sqlite import quick_check
+    import sqlite3
+
+    db = str(tmp_path / "bad.db")
+    _make_db(db)
+    _corrupt_file(db)
+    conn = sqlite3.connect(db)
+    try:
+        assert quick_check(conn) is False
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+
+def test_guard_noop_for_healthy_db(tmp_path):
+    """A healthy database is not backed up or altered when guarded."""
+    db = str(tmp_path / "healthy.db")
+    _make_db(db, rows=3)
+    conn = connect(db, guard=True)
+    try:
+        assert conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM t").fetchone()[0] == 3
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+    # No forensic copy created for a healthy file.
+    assert not any(p.name.startswith("healthy.db.corrupt-") for p in tmp_path.iterdir())
+
+
+def test_guard_backs_up_malformed_db(tmp_path):
+    """A malformed file is forensically backed up before repair."""
+    db = str(tmp_path / "state.db")
+    _make_db(db)
+    _corrupt_file(db)
+    conn = connect(db, guard=True, repair=False)
+    conn.close()
+    backups = [p for p in tmp_path.iterdir() if p.name.startswith("state.db.corrupt-")]
+    assert backups, "expected a forensic backup of the malformed file"
+
+
+def test_guard_never_raises_on_malformed_open(tmp_path):
+    """A malformed file must not surface an uncaught DatabaseError on open.
+
+    This is the core of Issue #5387: today a malformed file crashes the durable
+    path. With the guard, ``connect`` returns a usable connection object (the
+    malformed original is backed up first), never propagating the error.
+    """
+    db = str(tmp_path / "state.db")
+    _make_db(db)
+    _corrupt_file(db)
+    conn = connect(db, guard=True)  # must not raise
+    try:
+        assert conn is not None
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+    backups = [p for p in tmp_path.iterdir() if p.name.startswith("state.db.corrupt-")]
+    assert backups, "malformed file should have been forensically backed up"
+
+
+def test_repair_promotes_only_verified_snapshot(tmp_path):
+    """A repair that cannot rebuild an intact file never touches the original.
+
+    An unreadable ("file is not a database") original cannot be recovered by the
+    online-backup API, so the canonical file must be left exactly as-is (only the
+    forensic copy is added) rather than replaced by a half-written snapshot.
+    """
+    from praisonaiagents.storage.sqlite import _repair_via_online_backup
+
+    db = str(tmp_path / "state.db")
+    _make_db(db)
+    _corrupt_file(db)
+    with open(db, "rb") as fh:
+        before = fh.read()
+    assert _repair_via_online_backup(db) is False
+    with open(db, "rb") as fh:
+        after = fh.read()
+    assert before == after  # canonical bytes untouched by a failed repair
+    assert not os.path.exists(db + ".repair-tmp")  # snapshot cleaned up
+
+
+def test_repair_budget_is_bounded(tmp_path):
+    """A permanently-bad file exhausts its repair budget and stops retrying."""
+    from praisonaiagents.storage.sqlite import (
+        _repair_budget_ok,
+        _record_repair_attempt,
+        _MAX_REPAIR_ATTEMPTS,
+    )
+
+    db = str(tmp_path / "state.db")
+    _make_db(db)
+    assert _repair_budget_ok(db) is True
+    for _ in range(_MAX_REPAIR_ATTEMPTS):
+        _record_repair_attempt(db)
+    assert _repair_budget_ok(db) is False
+
+
+def test_forensic_backup_retention_capped(tmp_path):
+    from praisonaiagents.storage.sqlite import _forensic_backup, _MAX_FORENSIC_BACKUPS
+    import os
+    import time
+
+    db = str(tmp_path / "state.db")
+    for _ in range(_MAX_FORENSIC_BACKUPS + 3):
+        _make_db(db)
+        _corrupt_file(db)
+        assert _forensic_backup(db) is not None
+        os.remove(db)  # start clean for the next iteration's fresh DB
+        time.sleep(0.002)
+    copies = [
+        p
+        for p in tmp_path.iterdir()
+        if p.name.startswith("state.db.corrupt-")
+        and not (p.name.endswith("-wal") or p.name.endswith("-shm"))
+    ]
+    assert len(copies) <= _MAX_FORENSIC_BACKUPS
+
+
+def test_guard_off_by_default_leaves_malformed_untouched(tmp_path):
+    """Without guard, connect() does not back up or repair (unchanged behaviour)."""
+    db = str(tmp_path / "state.db")
+    _make_db(db)
+    _corrupt_file(db)
+    conn = connect(db)  # guard defaults to False
+    conn.close()
+    assert not any(p.name.startswith("state.db.corrupt-") for p in tmp_path.iterdir())
+
+
+def test_guard_quarantines_unrepairable_so_store_can_boot(tmp_path):
+    """An unrepairable malformed file is cleared so a fresh DB opens usable.
+
+    This is the durable-path fix for Issue #5387: after the guard runs, the
+    connection must be usable for schema creation (``CREATE TABLE``) instead of
+    raising ``file is not a database`` on first query. The malformed bytes are
+    preserved in a forensic copy.
+    """
+    db = str(tmp_path / "state.db")
+    _make_db(db)
+    _corrupt_file(db)
+    conn = connect(db, guard=True)
+    try:
+        # A fresh, empty database must be usable — this raised before the fix.
+        conn.execute("CREATE TABLE s (session_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY)")
+        conn.execute("INSERT INTO s VALUES ('a')")
+        conn.commit()
+        assert conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM s").fetchone()[0] == 1
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+    backups = [p for p in tmp_path.iterdir() if p.name.startswith("state.db.corrupt-")]
+    assert backups, "malformed bytes must be preserved before quarantine"
+
+
+def test_guard_leaves_locked_healthy_db_untouched(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """A transient lock on a healthy DB is not mistaken for corruption."""
+    from praisonaiagents.storage import sqlite as sqlite_mod
+
+    db = str(tmp_path / "state.db")
+    _make_db(db, rows=4)
+
+    import sqlite3
+
+    real_connect = sqlite3.connect
+
+    class _LockingConn:
+        def __init__(self, conn):
+            self._conn = conn
+
+        def execute(self, sql, *a, **k):
+            if isinstance(sql, str) and "quick_check" in sql:
+                raise sqlite3.OperationalError("database is locked")
+            return self._conn.execute(sql, *a, **k)
+
+        def __getattr__(self, name):
+            return getattr(self._conn, name)
+
+    def _locking_connect(target, *args, **kwargs):
+        conn = real_connect(target, *args, **kwargs)
+        if str(target) == db:
+            return _LockingConn(conn)
+        return conn
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sqlite3, "connect", _locking_connect)
+    # Guard must NOT back up or quarantine a merely-locked healthy file.
+    sqlite_mod._guard_integrity(db, repair=True, backup=True)
+    monkeypatch.undo()
+
+    assert not any(p.name.startswith("state.db.corrupt-") for p in tmp_path.iterdir())
+    # The original healthy data is intact.
+    conn = connect(db)
+    try:
+        assert conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM t").fetchone()[0] == 4
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+
+def test_guard_skips_repair_when_backup_fails(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """If the forensic backup cannot be taken, repair must not run.
+
+    Repair's atomic promotion would otherwise destroy the only copy of the
+    malformed bytes, so a failed backup must leave the canonical file untouched.
+    """
+    from praisonaiagents.storage import sqlite as sqlite_mod
+
+    db = str(tmp_path / "state.db")
+    _make_db(db)
+    _corrupt_file(db)
+    with open(db, "rb") as fh:
+        before = fh.read()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sqlite_mod, "_forensic_backup", lambda path: None)
+    repaired = {"called": False}
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        sqlite_mod,
+        "_repair_via_online_backup",
+        lambda path: repaired.__setitem__("called", True) or True,
+    )
+    sqlite_mod._guard_integrity(db, repair=True, backup=True)
+
+    assert repaired["called"] is False, "repair must not run when backup failed"
+    with open(db, "rb") as fh:
+        assert fh.read() == before  # canonical malformed bytes preserved

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_compaction_wiring.py

@@ -59,6 +59,109 @@ class TestContextCompactorExists:
         assert result.compacted_tokens < result.original_tokens
 
 
+class TestCompactionMaxTokensResolution:
+    """When max_context_tokens is unset, trigger must size to the model window."""
+
+    def _make_agent(self, model):
+        from praisonaiagents.agent.agent import Agent
+        return Agent(name="t", instructions="t", llm=model)
+
+    def test_explicit_max_context_tokens_wins(self):
+        from praisonaiagents.config.feature_configs import ExecutionConfig
+        agent = self._make_agent("gpt-4o")
+        cfg = ExecutionConfig(context_compaction=True, max_context_tokens=8000)
+        assert agent._resolve_compaction_max_tokens(cfg) == 8000
+
+    def test_unset_derives_from_large_model_window(self):
+        from praisonaiagents.config.feature_configs import ExecutionConfig
+        agent = self._make_agent("gpt-4o")  # 128k window
+        cfg = ExecutionConfig(context_compaction=True)  # max_context_tokens unset
+        resolved = agent._resolve_compaction_max_tokens(cfg)
+        # Must be far above the old flat 8000 for a large-context model.
+        assert resolved > 8000
+
+    def test_unset_does_not_trigger_within_window(self):
+        from praisonaiagents.config.feature_configs import ExecutionConfig
+        from praisonaiagents.compaction import ContextCompactor
+        agent = self._make_agent("gpt-4o")  # 128k window
+        cfg = ExecutionConfig(context_compaction=True)
+        resolved = agent._resolve_compaction_max_tokens(cfg)
+        # ~30k tokens of conversation should fit comfortably in a 128k model.
+        msgs = [{"role": "user", "content": "A" * 4 * 30000}]
+        compactor = ContextCompactor(max_tokens=resolved)
+        assert compactor.needs_compaction(msgs) is False
+
+    def test_unset_triggers_when_budget_approached(self):
+        from praisonaiagents.config.feature_configs import ExecutionConfig
+        from praisonaiagents.compaction import ContextCompactor
+        agent = self._make_agent("gpt-4o")
+        cfg = ExecutionConfig(context_compaction=True)
+        resolved = agent._resolve_compaction_max_tokens(cfg)
+        # Well beyond the working budget must trigger compaction. Repeated
+        # characters compress heavily under tiktoken (~8 chars/token), so use
+        # 8× not the heuristic 4× when sizing synthetic overflow content.
+        msgs = [{"role": "user", "content": "A" * 8 * (resolved + 50000)}]
+        compactor = ContextCompactor(max_tokens=resolved)
+        assert compactor.needs_compaction(msgs) is True
+
+
+class TestCompactionEntryPointWiring:
+    """Both sync and async entry points must pass the resolved model-aware
+    budget to ContextCompactor when max_context_tokens is unset.
+
+    These guard against a regression where an entry point stops forwarding the
+    resolved budget (e.g. reverting to a flat default), which the resolver-only
+    tests above would not catch.
+    """
+
+    def _make_agent(self, model):
+        from praisonaiagents.agent.agent import Agent
+        return Agent(name="t", instructions="t", llm=model)
+
+    def _capture_max_tokens(self):
+        captured = {}
+
+        class _FakeCompactor:
+            def __init__(self, max_tokens=None, strategy=None, llm_summarize_fn=None):
+                captured["max_tokens"] = max_tokens
+
+            def needs_compaction(self, messages):
+                return False  # short-circuit; we only assert the wired budget
+
+        return captured, _FakeCompactor
+
+    def test_sync_entry_point_wires_resolved_budget(self):
+        from praisonaiagents.config.feature_configs import ExecutionConfig
+        from praisonaiagents.hooks.types import HookEvent
+
+        agent = self._make_agent("gpt-4o")  # 128k window
+        agent.execution = ExecutionConfig(context_compaction=True)  # unset limit
+        expected = agent._resolve_compaction_max_tokens(agent.execution)
+        assert expected > 8000  # model-aware, not the old flat default
+
+        captured, fake = self._capture_max_tokens()
+        with patch("praisonaiagents.compaction.ContextCompactor", fake):
+            agent._apply_context_compaction([{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}], HookEvent)
+        assert captured["max_tokens"] == expected
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_async_entry_point_wires_resolved_budget(self):
+        from praisonaiagents.config.feature_configs import ExecutionConfig
+        from praisonaiagents.hooks.types import HookEvent
+
+        agent = self._make_agent("gpt-4o")  # 128k window
+        agent.execution = ExecutionConfig(context_compaction=True)  # unset limit
+        expected = agent._resolve_compaction_max_tokens(agent.execution)
+        assert expected > 8000
+
+        captured, fake = self._capture_max_tokens()
+        with patch("praisonaiagents.compaction.ContextCompactor", fake):
+            await agent._apply_context_compaction_async(
+                [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}], HookEvent
+            )
+        assert captured["max_tokens"] == expected
+
+
 class TestCompactionHookEvents:
     """BEFORE_COMPACTION and AFTER_COMPACTION must be defined in HookEvent."""
 

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_gateway_addressing.py

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+"""Tests for the canonical session-address grammar (Issue #5383)."""
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents.gateway import (
+    GATEWAY_METHODS,
+    RESERVED_NAMES,
+    SHORT_ID_LEN,
+    OperatorScope,
+    SessionRef,
+    build_session_path,
+    derive_short_id,
+    parse_session_path,
+    resolve_required_scope,
+    slugify,
+)
+
+
+def test_derive_short_id_from_uuid_tail():
+    key = "agent:assistant:a3f9c2e1-7b04-4c8e-9f21-1234abcd5678"
+    short = derive_short_id(key)
+    assert short == "1234abcd5678"[-SHORT_ID_LEN:]
+    assert len(short) == SHORT_ID_LEN
+
+
+def test_derive_short_id_none_without_hex_tail():
+    assert derive_short_id("report.js") is None
+    assert derive_short_id("") is None
+    assert derive_short_id("main") is None
+
+
+def test_derive_short_id_none_when_hex_not_at_end():
+    # A hex run followed by non-hex chars (a file-like key) must NOT be
+    # shortened, so it can round-trip losslessly via the literal escape hatch.
+    assert derive_short_id("report-deadbeef.js") is None
+    assert derive_short_id("deadbeef.txt") is None
+
+
+def test_file_like_key_with_hex_run_roundtrips():
+    # Regression: ``report-deadbeef.js`` must not collapse to ``deadbeef``.
+    key = "report-deadbeef.js"
+    path = build_session_path("bot", key)
+    assert path == "chat/bot/!report-deadbeef.js"
+    ref = parse_session_path(path)
+    assert ref == SessionRef(agent_id="bot", literal_key=key)
+
+
+def test_slugify():
+    assert slugify("Quarterly Report") == "quarterly-report"
+    assert slugify("  Hello,  World!! ") == "hello-world"
+    assert slugify("") is None
+    assert slugify("   ") is None
+    assert slugify("---") is None
+
+
+def test_slugify_truncates():
+    long = "a" * 100
+    out = slugify(long, max_len=10)
+    assert out is not None and len(out) <= 10
+
+
+def test_build_path_hides_whole_uuid():
+    key = "agent:assistant:a3f9c2e1-7b04-4c8e-9f21-000000000000"
+    path = build_session_path("assistant", key, "Quarterly report")
+    assert path is not None
+    assert path.startswith("chat/assistant/quarterly-report-")
+    # The whole UUID never appears whole in the URL.
+    assert "a3f9c2e1-7b04-4c8e-9f21-000000000000" not in path
+
+
+def test_build_path_without_display_name():
+    key = "agent:bot:aaaabbbbcccc"
+    path = build_session_path("bot", key)
+    assert path == "chat/bot/aaaabbbb"[: len("chat/bot/")] + derive_short_id(key)
+
+
+def test_build_path_custom_namespace():
+    path = build_session_path("bot", "x-11112222", namespace="thread")
+    assert path is not None and path.startswith("thread/bot/")
+
+
+def test_build_path_empty_inputs():
+    assert build_session_path("", "key") is None
+    assert build_session_path("agent", "") is None
+
+
+def test_roundtrip_slug_short():
+    key = "agent:assistant:a3f9c2e1-7b04-4c8e-9f21-1234abcd5678"
+    path = build_session_path("assistant", key, "Quarterly report")
+    ref = parse_session_path(path)
+    assert ref == SessionRef(
+        agent_id="assistant",
+        short_id=derive_short_id(key),
+        slug_hint="quarterly-report",
+    )
+
+
+def test_parse_no_namespace():
+    ref = parse_session_path("assistant/quarterly-report-1234abcd")
+    assert ref.agent_id == "assistant"
+    assert ref.short_id == "1234abcd"
+    assert ref.slug_hint == "quarterly-report"
+
+
+def test_parse_reserved_sentinel():
+    for name in RESERVED_NAMES:
+        ref = parse_session_path(f"chat/assistant/{name}")
+        assert ref == SessionRef(agent_id="assistant", slug_hint=name)
+
+
+def test_parse_short_id_only():
+    ref = parse_session_path("chat/assistant/deadbeef")
+    assert ref.short_id == "deadbeef"
+    assert ref.slug_hint is None
+
+
+def test_literal_key_escape_hatch_roundtrips():
+    path = build_session_path("bot", "report.js")
+    assert path == "chat/bot/!report.js"
+    ref = parse_session_path(path)
+    assert ref == SessionRef(agent_id="bot", literal_key="report.js")
+
+
+def test_file_like_key_not_a_static_asset():
+    # A key that looks like an asset is escaped behind the ``!`` hatch, so a
+    # router never mistakes the final segment for ``report.js`` on disk.
+    path = build_session_path("bot", "weird/key.js")
+    ref = parse_session_path(path)
+    assert ref.literal_key == "weird/key.js"
+
+
+def test_slug_hint_only_when_no_short_id():
+    ref = parse_session_path("chat/assistant/my-label")
+    # "my-label" has no 8-hex short id, so it becomes a slug hint the resolver
+    # matches against session labels.
+    assert ref.short_id is None
+    assert ref.slug_hint == "my-label"
+
+
+def test_parse_invalid():
+    assert parse_session_path("") is None
+    assert parse_session_path("just-one-segment") is None
+    assert parse_session_path("/") is None
+
+
+def test_parse_rejects_surplus_segments():
+    # A canonical address is at most ``<ns>/<agent>/<ref>``; a longer path is
+    # malformed and must be rejected rather than silently using its last two
+    # segments (which would resolve to the wrong agent).
+    assert parse_session_path("chat/other/assistant/deadbeef") is None
+    assert parse_session_path("a/b/c/d/e") is None
+
+
+def test_agent_id_with_special_chars_roundtrips():
+    path = build_session_path("team/assistant", "x-11112222")
+    ref = parse_session_path(path)
+    assert ref.agent_id == "team/assistant"
+
+
+def test_session_resolve_registered_read():
+    assert "session.resolve" in GATEWAY_METHODS
+    assert resolve_required_scope("session.resolve") == OperatorScope.READ

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_gateway_config.py

@@ -636,3 +636,83 @@ class TestAttachmentConfig:
         assert m.gateway.attachments.max_attachments == 3
         assert m.gateway.attachments.max_attachment_bytes == 2048
         assert m.gateway.attachments.allowed_types == ["image/"]
+
+
+class TestDrainWatchdogParity:
+    """Drain/watchdog GatewayConfig ↔ YAML parity and round-trip (#5362)."""
+
+    def test_python_fields_default_off(self):
+        from praisonaiagents.gateway import GatewayConfig
+
+        gc = GatewayConfig()
+        assert gc.drain_timeout is None
+        assert gc.watchdog is False
+        assert gc.watchdog_timeout is None
+
+    def test_watchdog_timeout_survives_round_trip(self):
+        """to_dict → from_dict must not silently drop watchdog_timeout."""
+        from praisonaiagents.gateway.config import (
+            GatewayConfig,
+            MultiChannelGatewayConfig,
+        )
+
+        gc = GatewayConfig(watchdog=True, watchdog_timeout=60.0)
+        round_tripped = MultiChannelGatewayConfig.from_dict(
+            {"gateway": gc.to_dict()}
+        ).gateway
+        assert round_tripped.watchdog is True
+        assert round_tripped.watchdog_timeout == 60.0
+
+    def test_watchdog_timeout_scalar_key_parsed(self):
+        from praisonaiagents.gateway.config import MultiChannelGatewayConfig
+
+        m = MultiChannelGatewayConfig.from_dict(
+            {"gateway": {"watchdog": True, "watchdog_timeout": "15"}}
+        )
+        assert m.gateway.watchdog is True
+        assert m.gateway.watchdog_timeout == 15.0
+
+    def test_watchdog_block_still_derives_budget(self):
+        from praisonaiagents.gateway.config import MultiChannelGatewayConfig
+
+        m = MultiChannelGatewayConfig.from_dict(
+            {
+                "gateway": {
+                    "watchdog": {
+                        "enabled": True,
+                        "liveness_interval": 5.0,
+                        "liveness_strikes": 4,
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        )
+        assert m.gateway.watchdog is True
+        assert m.gateway.watchdog_timeout == 20.0
+
+    def test_scalar_watchdog_timeout_non_positive_is_none(self):
+        from praisonaiagents.gateway.config import MultiChannelGatewayConfig
+
+        m = MultiChannelGatewayConfig.from_dict(
+            {"gateway": {"watchdog": True, "watchdog_timeout": 0}}
+        )
+        assert m.gateway.watchdog_timeout is None
+
+    def test_drain_timeout_round_trip(self):
+        from praisonaiagents.gateway.config import (
+            GatewayConfig,
+            MultiChannelGatewayConfig,
+        )
+
+        gc = GatewayConfig(drain_timeout=20.0)
+        round_tripped = MultiChannelGatewayConfig.from_dict(
+            {"gateway": gc.to_dict()}
+        ).gateway
+        assert round_tripped.drain_timeout == 20.0
+
+    def test_scalar_watchdog_false_parsed(self):
+        from praisonaiagents.gateway.config import MultiChannelGatewayConfig
+
+        m = MultiChannelGatewayConfig.from_dict(
+            {"gateway": {"watchdog": False}}
+        )
+        assert m.gateway.watchdog is False

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_gateway_ingress_attribution.py

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+"""Unit tests for trusted-proxy ingress attribution (Issue #5312).
+
+Covers the pure, core-side contract: :func:`parse_forwarded_for`,
+:func:`resolve_ingress_attribution`, and the :class:`IngressAttribution`
+dataclass. No I/O — the trust decision must fail closed for anything
+proxy-shaped but unattributable, and resolve the real client only across
+operator-declared trusted hops.
+"""
+
+from praisonaiagents.gateway import (
+    IngressAttribution,
+    parse_forwarded_for,
+    resolve_ingress_attribution,
+)
+
+
+def test_parse_forwarded_for_splits_and_trims():
+    assert parse_forwarded_for("1.2.3.4, 10.0.0.1 , 10.0.0.2") == [
+        "1.2.3.4",
+        "10.0.0.1",
+        "10.0.0.2",
+    ]
+
+
+def test_parse_forwarded_for_empty():
+    assert parse_forwarded_for(None) == []
+    assert parse_forwarded_for("") == []
+    assert parse_forwarded_for(" , ") == []
+
+
+def test_direct_local_no_headers():
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(peer_ip="127.0.0.1")
+    assert attr == IngressAttribution(
+        trust="direct-local", client_ip="127.0.0.1", via_proxy=False, fail_closed=False
+    )
+
+
+def test_direct_remote_no_headers():
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(peer_ip="203.0.113.9")
+    assert attr.trust == "direct-remote"
+    assert attr.client_ip == "203.0.113.9"
+    assert attr.via_proxy is False
+    assert attr.fail_closed is False
+
+
+def test_unattributable_proxy_fails_closed():
+    # Directly-reachable gateway: an attacker sets X-Forwarded-For but the peer
+    # is not a declared trusted proxy -> never trust the header, key on peer.
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+        peer_ip="203.0.113.9",
+        forwarded_for=["1.1.1.1"],
+        trusted_proxies=[],
+    )
+    assert attr.trust == "unattributable-proxy"
+    assert attr.client_ip == "203.0.113.9"
+    assert attr.via_proxy is True
+    assert attr.fail_closed is True
+
+
+def test_untrusted_peer_with_trusted_set_still_fails_closed():
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+        peer_ip="203.0.113.9",
+        forwarded_for=["1.1.1.1"],
+        trusted_proxies=["10.0.0.0/8"],
+    )
+    assert attr.trust == "unattributable-proxy"
+    assert attr.fail_closed is True
+    assert attr.client_ip == "203.0.113.9"
+
+
+def test_trusted_proxy_resolves_real_client():
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+        peer_ip="10.0.0.5",
+        forwarded_for=["203.0.113.9", "10.0.0.5"],
+        trusted_proxies=["10.0.0.0/8"],
+    )
+    assert attr.trust == "trusted-proxy"
+    assert attr.client_ip == "203.0.113.9"
+    assert attr.via_proxy is True
+    assert attr.fail_closed is False
+
+
+def test_trusted_proxy_peels_chain_to_first_untrusted():
+    # Two trusted hops appended; the real client is the first untrusted address
+    # walking right->left.
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+        peer_ip="10.0.0.1",
+        forwarded_for=["198.51.100.7", "10.0.0.2", "10.0.0.1"],
+        trusted_proxies=["10.0.0.0/8"],
+    )
+    assert attr.client_ip == "198.51.100.7"
+    assert attr.trust == "trusted-proxy"
+
+
+def test_spoofed_prefix_not_peeled_past_untrusted_hop():
+    # An attacker prepends a spoofed trusted-looking address; because the first
+    # untrusted hop stops the walk, the spoof cannot masquerade as the client.
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+        peer_ip="10.0.0.1",
+        forwarded_for=["10.0.0.9", "198.51.100.7", "10.0.0.1"],
+        trusted_proxies=["10.0.0.0/8"],
+    )
+    assert attr.client_ip == "198.51.100.7"
+
+
+def test_bare_ip_trusted_entry():
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+        peer_ip="192.168.1.10",
+        forwarded_for=["203.0.113.9", "192.168.1.10"],
+        trusted_proxies=["192.168.1.10"],
+    )
+    assert attr.trust == "trusted-proxy"
+    assert attr.client_ip == "203.0.113.9"
+
+
+def test_tunnel_classification_for_loopback_trusted_hop():
+    # A loopback sidecar tunnel (Tailscale/Cloudflare) declared trusted.
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+        peer_ip="127.0.0.1",
+        forwarded_for=["203.0.113.9"],
+        trusted_proxies=["127.0.0.1"],
+        real_ip=None,
+    )
+    assert attr.trust == "tunnel"
+    assert attr.client_ip == "203.0.113.9"
+    assert attr.fail_closed is False
+
+
+def test_real_ip_used_when_chain_all_trusted():
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+        peer_ip="10.0.0.5",
+        forwarded_for=["10.0.0.6", "10.0.0.5"],
+        real_ip="203.0.113.9",
+        trusted_proxies=["10.0.0.0/8"],
+    )
+    assert attr.client_ip == "203.0.113.9"
+
+
+def test_real_ip_only_with_trusted_peer():
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+        peer_ip="10.0.0.5",
+        forwarded_for=[],
+        real_ip="203.0.113.9",
+        trusted_proxies=["10.0.0.0/8"],
+    )
+    assert attr.trust == "trusted-proxy"
+    assert attr.client_ip == "203.0.113.9"
+
+
+def test_real_ip_only_untrusted_peer_fails_closed():
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+        peer_ip="203.0.113.9",
+        forwarded_for=[],
+        real_ip="1.1.1.1",
+        trusted_proxies=["10.0.0.0/8"],
+    )
+    assert attr.fail_closed is True
+    assert attr.client_ip == "203.0.113.9"
+
+
+def test_malformed_client_hop_fails_closed():
+    # A trusted proxy forwards a non-IP token (e.g. "unknown" or an injected
+    # label). It must NOT become the per-IP subject — fail closed to the peer.
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+        peer_ip="10.0.0.5",
+        forwarded_for=["unknown", "10.0.0.5"],
+        trusted_proxies=["10.0.0.0/8"],
+    )
+    assert attr.trust == "unattributable-proxy"
+    assert attr.fail_closed is True
+    assert attr.client_ip == "10.0.0.5"
+
+
+def test_malformed_real_ip_fallback_fails_closed():
+    # Chain entirely trusted; a garbage X-Real-IP must not key policy.
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+        peer_ip="10.0.0.5",
+        forwarded_for=["10.0.0.6", "10.0.0.5"],
+        real_ip="not-an-ip",
+        trusted_proxies=["10.0.0.0/8"],
+    )
+    assert attr.fail_closed is True
+    assert attr.client_ip == "10.0.0.5"
+
+
+def test_ipv6_client_hop_is_valid():
+    attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+        peer_ip="10.0.0.5",
+        forwarded_for=["2001:db8::1", "10.0.0.5"],
+        trusted_proxies=["10.0.0.0/8"],
+    )
+    assert attr.trust == "trusted-proxy"
+    assert attr.client_ip == "2001:db8::1"
+    assert attr.fail_closed is False

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_gateway_loop_watchdog.py

@@ -8,12 +8,17 @@ do not kill the interpreter.
 
 import asyncio
 import os
+import sys
 import threading
 import time
 
 import pytest
 
-from praisonaiagents.gateway import LoopWatchdog, LoopWatchdogPolicy
+from praisonaiagents.gateway import (
+    LoopWatchdog,
+    LoopWatchdogPolicy,
+    StartupWatchdog,
+)
 from praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols import GATEWAY_RESTART_EXIT_CODE
 
 
@@ -381,3 +386,218 @@ def test_non_positive_deadline_is_noop():
     assert wd.deadline_armed is False
     wd.arm_deadline(-5)
     assert wd.deadline_armed is False
+
+
+# ── Startup-phase watchdog (Issue #5265) ──
+
+
+def test_startup_validation():
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        StartupWatchdog(on_expire="boom")
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        StartupWatchdog(max_extensions=-1)
+
+
+def test_startup_defaults_and_initial_state():
+    sw = StartupWatchdog()
+    assert sw.on_expire == "dump_and_exit"
+    assert sw.exit_code == GATEWAY_RESTART_EXIT_CODE
+    assert sw.armed is False
+    assert sw.expired is False
+    assert sw.confirmed is False
+
+
+def test_startup_non_positive_deadline_is_noop():
+    sw = StartupWatchdog()
+    sw.arm(deadline_s=0)
+    assert sw.armed is False
+    sw.arm(deadline_s=-1)
+    assert sw.armed is False
+    sw.arm(deadline_s=float("nan"))
+    assert sw.armed is False
+
+
+def test_startup_confirm_when_not_armed_is_safe():
+    sw = StartupWatchdog()
+    sw.confirm_loop_live()  # must not raise
+    assert sw.confirmed is True
+    assert sw.expired is False
+
+
+def test_startup_progress_when_not_armed_is_safe():
+    sw = StartupWatchdog()
+    sw.report_startup_progress("noop")  # must not raise
+    assert sw.armed is False
+
+
+def test_startup_confirm_before_deadline_no_exit():
+    """A startup that confirms the loop live before the deadline never exits."""
+    sw = StartupWatchdog(on_expire="dump_and_exit")
+    sw.arm(deadline_s=5.0)
+    assert sw.armed is True
+    sw.confirm_loop_live()  # loop came up promptly
+    assert sw.armed is False
+    assert sw.confirmed is True
+    assert sw.expired is False
+
+
+def test_startup_arm_is_idempotent():
+    sw = StartupWatchdog(on_expire="dump_only")
+    sw.arm(deadline_s=5.0)
+    first = sw._thread
+    sw.arm(deadline_s=5.0)  # no-op while armed
+    assert sw._thread is first
+    sw.confirm_loop_live()
+
+
+def test_startup_deadline_expires_and_dumps(tmp_path):
+    """A wedged startup expires, dumps stacks, records expiry (dump_only)."""
+    dump = tmp_path / "startup.txt"
+    sw = StartupWatchdog(on_expire="dump_only", dump_file=str(dump))
+    sw.arm(deadline_s=0.05)
+    thread = sw._thread
+    assert thread is not None
+    thread.join(timeout=5.0)
+    assert thread.is_alive() is False
+    assert sw.expired is True
+    assert dump.exists()
+    assert "startup did not confirm" in dump.read_text()
+
+
+def test_startup_progress_extends_deadline():
+    """Progress reports keep a slow-but-alive startup from being tripped."""
+    sw = StartupWatchdog(on_expire="dump_only", max_extensions=10)
+    sw.arm(deadline_s=0.1)
+    # Nudge the deadline several times across a span longer than the base
+    # deadline; a live startup reporting progress must not expire.
+    for _ in range(4):
+        time.sleep(0.05)
+        sw.report_startup_progress("phase")
+    assert sw.expired is False
+    assert sw.armed is True
+    sw.confirm_loop_live()
+    assert sw.expired is False
+
+
+def test_startup_extensions_are_bounded():
+    """Once extensions are exhausted, a still-wedged phase trips the deadline."""
+    sw = StartupWatchdog(on_expire="dump_only", max_extensions=2)
+    sw.arm(deadline_s=0.05)
+    sw.report_startup_progress("a")
+    sw.report_startup_progress("b")
+    # Third report is refused (bound reached); the phase then wedges.
+    sw.report_startup_progress("c")
+    thread = sw._thread
+    assert thread is not None
+    thread.join(timeout=5.0)
+    assert sw.expired is True
+    # Budget accounting is done by the watchdog thread (so batched reports never
+    # lose the resets they paid for); it is exact once the thread has drained.
+    assert sw._extensions_used == 2
+
+
+def test_startup_batched_progress_does_not_waste_budget():
+    """Reports batched before a wake each still buy a real deadline reset.
+
+    Regression for the review finding "progress reports lose extensions": with
+    per-call accounting, several reports landing between two wakes would each
+    spend budget but only reset the window once, letting a later legitimate
+    phase exhaust the budget early. With thread-side draining, a single slow
+    boot that stays under the extension bound must survive well past its base
+    deadline.
+    """
+    sw = StartupWatchdog(on_expire="dump_only", max_extensions=6)
+    sw.arm(deadline_s=0.08)
+    # Fire a burst of reports (likely batched) then keep reporting across a
+    # span far longer than the base deadline; must not expire while affordable.
+    sw.report_startup_progress("burst-1")
+    sw.report_startup_progress("burst-2")
+    for _ in range(4):
+        time.sleep(0.05)
+        sw.report_startup_progress("phase")
+    assert sw.expired is False
+    assert sw.armed is True
+    sw.confirm_loop_live()
+    assert sw.expired is False
+
+
+def test_startup_confirm_suppresses_in_flight_exit():
+    """A confirm racing an in-flight expiry must not call os._exit."""
+    sw = StartupWatchdog(on_expire="dump_and_exit")
+    stop = threading.Event()
+    stop.set()  # simulate confirm_loop_live() having raced in
+    exited = []
+    original_exit = os._exit
+    os._exit = lambda code: exited.append(code)
+    try:
+        sw._on_expire(stop)  # must observe its own stop flag and stay inert
+    finally:
+        os._exit = original_exit
+    assert exited == []
+    assert sw.expired is False
+
+
+def test_startup_expiry_takes_active_exit_path():
+    """The active exit path (stop NOT set) must dump and call os._exit.
+
+    The in-flight-suppression test only exercises the first stop check; this one
+    covers the real wedge path so a regression that silently stopped exiting
+    would be caught (review: "exit race remains untested").
+    """
+    sw = StartupWatchdog(on_expire="dump_and_exit", exit_code=42)
+    sw._dump_stacks_on_expire = True
+    stop = threading.Event()  # deliberately NOT set: a genuine wedge
+    dumped = []
+    exited = []
+    sw._dump_stacks = lambda: dumped.append(True)
+    original_exit = os._exit
+    os._exit = lambda code: exited.append(code)
+    try:
+        sw._on_expire(stop)
+    finally:
+        os._exit = original_exit
+    assert dumped == [True]
+    assert exited == [42]
+    assert sw.expired is True
+
+
+def test_startup_confirm_during_flush_suppresses_exit():
+    """A confirm landing while the pre-exit flush blocks must cancel the exit.
+
+    Simulates a full-pipe stderr.flush() that blocks long enough for
+    confirm_loop_live() to set the stop event; the final re-check before
+    os._exit must then honour it (review: "confirmation cannot prevent late
+    exit").
+    """
+    sw = StartupWatchdog(on_expire="dump_and_exit")
+    sw._dump_stacks_on_expire = False
+    stop = threading.Event()  # NOT set initially: wedge path is taken
+
+    exited = []
+    original_exit = os._exit
+    original_flush = sys.stderr.flush
+
+    def blocking_flush():
+        # The confirm races in "while" the flush is in progress.
+        stop.set()
+
+    os._exit = lambda code: exited.append(code)
+    sys.stderr.flush = blocking_flush
+    try:
+        sw._on_expire(stop)
+    finally:
+        os._exit = original_exit
+        sys.stderr.flush = original_flush
+    assert exited == []  # final re-check honoured the racing confirm
+    assert sw.expired is True
+
+
+def test_startup_dump_stacks_can_be_disabled(tmp_path):
+    dump = tmp_path / "nodump.txt"
+    sw = StartupWatchdog(on_expire="dump_only", dump_file=str(dump))
+    sw.arm(deadline_s=0.05, dump_stacks=False)
+    thread = sw._thread
+    assert thread is not None
+    thread.join(timeout=5.0)
+    assert sw.expired is True
+    assert dump.exists() is False

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_push_policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+"""Tests for the pure notification policy in praisonaiagents.push.policy."""
+
+from datetime import datetime, time, timezone, timedelta
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents.push import (
+    DEFAULT_PREFERENCE,
+    DetailLevel,
+    NotificationCategory,
+    NotificationDecision,
+    NotificationPreference,
+    evaluate,
+)
+
+
+class TestExports:
+    def test_symbols_importable_from_push(self):
+        assert NotificationCategory.APPROVAL_REQUESTED.value == "approval_requested"
+        assert DetailLevel.PRIVATE.value == "private"
+        assert isinstance(DEFAULT_PREFERENCE, NotificationPreference)
+
+
+class TestCategoryFilter:
+    def test_unsubscribed_category_suppressed(self):
+        prefs = NotificationPreference(categories={NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED})
+        decision = evaluate(NotificationCategory.AGENT_QUESTION, prefs)
+        assert decision.send is False
+        assert decision.reason == "category_not_subscribed"
+        assert decision.redacted_content is None
+
+    def test_subscribed_category_sent(self):
+        prefs = NotificationPreference(categories={NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED})
+        decision = evaluate(
+            NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED, prefs, content="transcript"
+        )
+        assert decision.send is True
+        assert decision.reason == "ok"
+
+    def test_default_preference_used_when_none(self):
+        # DEFAULT_PREFERENCE opts into approval + question, not agent_finished.
+        assert evaluate(NotificationCategory.APPROVAL_REQUESTED).send is True
+        assert evaluate(NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED).send is False
+
+
+class TestDetailLevelRedaction:
+    def _prefs(self, detail):
+        return NotificationPreference(
+            categories={NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED}, detail=detail
+        )
+
+    def test_private_hides_everything(self):
+        d = evaluate(
+            NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED,
+            self._prefs(DetailLevel.PRIVATE),
+            content="secret transcript",
+            identity="session-42",
+        )
+        assert d.redacted_content == "You have new activity"
+
+    def test_identified_shows_identity_not_content(self):
+        d = evaluate(
+            NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED,
+            self._prefs(DetailLevel.IDENTIFIED),
+            content="secret transcript",
+            identity="session-42",
+        )
+        assert d.redacted_content == "Activity in session-42"
+        assert "secret" not in d.redacted_content
+
+    def test_detailed_includes_content(self):
+        d = evaluate(
+            NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED,
+            self._prefs(DetailLevel.DETAILED),
+            content="full transcript tail",
+            identity="session-42",
+        )
+        assert d.redacted_content == "full transcript tail"
+
+    def test_identified_without_identity_falls_back(self):
+        d = evaluate(
+            NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED,
+            self._prefs(DetailLevel.IDENTIFIED),
+            content="x",
+        )
+        assert d.redacted_content == "You have new activity"
+
+
+class TestQuietHours:
+    def _prefs(self, **kw):
+        base = dict(
+            categories={NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED,
+                        NotificationCategory.APPROVAL_REQUESTED},
+            quiet_hours=(time(22, 0), time(7, 30)),
+            timezone="UTC",
+        )
+        base.update(kw)
+        return NotificationPreference(**base)
+
+    def test_suppressed_inside_wrapping_window(self):
+        now = datetime(2026, 1, 1, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        d = evaluate(NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED, self._prefs(), now=now)
+        assert d.send is False
+        assert d.reason == "quiet_hours"
+
+    def test_suppressed_after_midnight_before_end(self):
+        now = datetime(2026, 1, 1, 6, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        d = evaluate(NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED, self._prefs(), now=now)
+        assert d.send is False
+
+    def test_sent_outside_window(self):
+        now = datetime(2026, 1, 1, 12, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        d = evaluate(NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED, self._prefs(), now=now)
+        assert d.send is True
+
+    def test_urgent_overrides_quiet_hours(self):
+        now = datetime(2026, 1, 1, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        d = evaluate(
+            NotificationCategory.APPROVAL_REQUESTED,
+            self._prefs(),
+            now=now,
+            is_urgent=True,
+        )
+        assert d.send is True
+        assert d.reason == "urgent_override"
+
+    def test_urgent_does_not_override_when_disabled(self):
+        now = datetime(2026, 1, 1, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        d = evaluate(
+            NotificationCategory.APPROVAL_REQUESTED,
+            self._prefs(urgent_overrides_quiet=False),
+            now=now,
+            is_urgent=True,
+        )
+        assert d.send is False
+        assert d.reason == "quiet_hours"
+
+    def test_timezone_applied(self):
+        # 23:00 UTC is 08:00 in Asia/Tokyo (+09:00) — outside the quiet window.
+        now = datetime(2026, 1, 1, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        d = evaluate(
+            NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED,
+            self._prefs(timezone="Asia/Tokyo"),
+            now=now,
+        )
+        assert d.send is True
+
+    def test_no_quiet_hours_always_considered(self):
+        prefs = NotificationPreference(
+            categories={NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED}
+        )
+        now = datetime(2026, 1, 1, 3, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        assert evaluate(NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED, prefs, now=now).send
+
+
+class TestPreferenceHelpers:
+    def test_allows(self):
+        prefs = NotificationPreference(categories={NotificationCategory.AGENT_QUESTION})
+        assert prefs.allows(NotificationCategory.AGENT_QUESTION)
+        assert not prefs.allows(NotificationCategory.AGENT_FINISHED)

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_run_on_docker.py

@@ -308,6 +308,7 @@ def test_a_hosted_backend_reclaims_its_instance_when_collected():
     instance kept billing until the provider's own idle timer noticed, which
     docker and flyio do not have."""
     import gc
+    import time
 
     from praisonai.integrations.compute_managed_agent import ComputeManagedAgent
 
@@ -338,6 +339,12 @@ def test_a_hosted_backend_reclaims_its_instance_when_collected():
 
     del backend
     gc.collect()
+    # During live GC the finalizer reclaims fire-and-forget on the shared
+    # AsyncBridge's background loop, so the shutdown lands a beat after
+    # gc.collect() returns. Wait (bounded) for it rather than racing it.
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + 5.0
+    while not released and time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        time.sleep(0.01)
     assert released == ["inst-1"], "the instance outlived the backend that owned it"
 
 
@@ -361,6 +368,7 @@ def test_release_reclaims_even_on_an_event_loop_thread():
     ever runs, silently leaking the instance -- so _release must bridge the loop
     the way SharedCompute does, not call asyncio.run() directly."""
     import asyncio
+    import time
 
     from praisonai.integrations.compute_managed_agent import _release
 
@@ -374,4 +382,11 @@ def test_release_reclaims_even_on_an_event_loop_thread():
         _release(Fake(), "inst-loop", "docker")
 
     asyncio.run(collect_on_the_loop())
+    # _release routes through the shared AsyncBridge's background loop
+    # fire-and-forget, so the shutdown lands a beat after asyncio.run()
+    # returns. Wait (bounded) for it rather than racing it — the assertion
+    # still fails if _release ever leaks (never schedules the shutdown).
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + 5.0
+    while not released and time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        time.sleep(0.01)
     assert released == ["inst-loop"], "an instance leaked when GC ran on a live loop"

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_schedule_misfire.py

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+"""
+Unit tests for the scheduler misfire / missed-run policy.
+
+Tests:
+- scheduled_instant() returns the occurrence a due job is firing for
+- is_misfire() is False without a grace window (backward-compatible)
+- A recurring occurrence older than misfire_grace_seconds is recorded as
+  ``missed`` and not claimed/fired (interval + cron)
+- A recovery within the grace window still fires once (coalesce)
+- A first run (never fired) always fires, never recorded missed
+- misfire_grace_seconds round-trips through to_dict / from_dict and is omitted
+  when unset
+- The default store (ConfigYamlScheduleStore) applies the same policy
+"""
+
+import os
+import tempfile
+import time
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonaiagents.scheduler.models import Schedule, ScheduleJob
+from praisonaiagents.scheduler.store import FileScheduleStore
+from praisonaiagents.scheduler.config_store import ConfigYamlScheduleStore
+from praisonaiagents.scheduler.due import scheduled_instant, is_misfire
+
+
+def _interval_job(name="job", every=60, grace=None, last_run_at=None):
+    job = ScheduleJob(
+        name=name,
+        schedule=Schedule(kind="every", every_seconds=every),
+        message="hi",
+        misfire_grace_seconds=grace,
+    )
+    if last_run_at is not None:
+        job.last_run_at = last_run_at
+    return job
+
+
+class TestScheduledInstant:
+    def test_interval_missed_slot(self):
+        # last run at t0; the first overdue slot is t0 + one interval — its age
+        # measures how long the job has been overdue.
+        t0 = 1000.0
+        job = _interval_job(every=60, last_run_at=t0)
+        instant = scheduled_instant(job, t0 + 60 * 5 + 3)
+        assert instant == t0 + 60
+
+    def test_interval_first_run_has_no_instant(self):
+        job = _interval_job(every=60)  # never run
+        assert scheduled_instant(job, time.time()) is None
+
+    def test_interval_not_yet_elapsed(self):
+        t0 = 1000.0
+        job = _interval_job(every=60, last_run_at=t0)
+        assert scheduled_instant(job, t0 + 30) is None
+
+
+class TestIsMisfire:
+    def test_no_grace_is_never_misfire(self):
+        t0 = 1000.0
+        job = _interval_job(every=60, last_run_at=t0, grace=None)
+        # Even a very old slot is not a misfire without a grace window.
+        assert is_misfire(job, t0 + 60 * 100) is False
+
+    def test_stale_slot_is_misfire(self):
+        t0 = 1000.0
+        job = _interval_job(every=60, last_run_at=t0, grace=90)
+        # Slot at t0+60, now is t0+300 → age 240 > 90 grace.
+        assert is_misfire(job, t0 + 300) is True
+
+    def test_fresh_slot_within_grace_is_not_misfire(self):
+        t0 = 1000.0
+        job = _interval_job(every=60, last_run_at=t0, grace=90)
+        # Slot at t0+60, now is t0+70 → age 10 < 90 grace.
+        assert is_misfire(job, t0 + 70) is False
+
+    def test_first_run_never_misfire(self):
+        job = _interval_job(every=60, grace=1)  # never run
+        assert is_misfire(job, time.time()) is False
+
+    def test_string_grace_does_not_raise(self):
+        # A hand-edited quoted YAML value (``'90'``) reaching is_misfire as a
+        # string must not raise TypeError and abort the claim pass — it is
+        # coerced, so a genuinely stale slot is still detected.
+        t0 = 1000.0
+        job = _interval_job(every=60, last_run_at=t0, grace=90)
+        job.misfire_grace_seconds = "90"  # simulate un-coerced legacy value
+        assert is_misfire(job, t0 + 300) is True
+
+    def test_non_numeric_grace_is_not_misfire(self):
+        # A non-numeric junk value must fail safe to "not a misfire" rather
+        # than raising and starving other due jobs in the same pass.
+        t0 = 1000.0
+        job = _interval_job(every=60, last_run_at=t0, grace=90)
+        job.misfire_grace_seconds = "notanumber"
+        assert is_misfire(job, t0 + 300) is False
+
+
+class TestGraceCoercion:
+    def test_quoted_grace_coerced_to_float(self):
+        # from_dict must coerce a quoted YAML numeric to float so the later
+        # age comparison never raises.
+        d = _interval_job(every=60, grace=None).to_dict()
+        d["misfire_grace_seconds"] = "3600"
+        restored = ScheduleJob.from_dict(d)
+        assert restored.misfire_grace_seconds == 3600.0
+        assert isinstance(restored.misfire_grace_seconds, float)
+
+    def test_junk_grace_coerced_to_none(self):
+        d = _interval_job(every=60, grace=None).to_dict()
+        d["misfire_grace_seconds"] = "not-a-number"
+        restored = ScheduleJob.from_dict(d)
+        assert restored.misfire_grace_seconds is None
+
+
+class TestClaimMisfire:
+    def test_stale_occurrence_recorded_missed_not_claimed(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            store = FileScheduleStore(store_dir=d)
+            t0 = time.time() - 10000
+            job = _interval_job(every=60, grace=90)
+            job.last_run_at = t0
+            store.add(job)
+            claimed = store.claim_due(time.time(), owner_id="A")
+            # Not fired.
+            assert claimed == []
+            # Recorded as observable missed, not silently dropped.
+            history = store.get_history(job_id=job.id)
+            assert len(history) == 1
+            assert history[0].status == "missed"
+            # Schedule advanced so it is not re-seen as due immediately.
+            reloaded = store.get(job.id)
+            assert reloaded.last_run_at is not None
+            assert reloaded.last_run_at > t0
+
+    def test_within_grace_still_fires_once(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            store = FileScheduleStore(store_dir=d)
+            now = time.time()
+            job = _interval_job(every=60, grace=300)
+            job.last_run_at = now - 65  # one slot ago, age ~5s < grace
+            store.add(job)
+            claimed = store.claim_due(now, owner_id="A")
+            assert len(claimed) == 1
+
+    def test_first_run_fires_despite_grace(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            store = FileScheduleStore(store_dir=d)
+            job = _interval_job(every=60, grace=1)  # never run
+            store.add(job)
+            claimed = store.claim_due(time.time(), owner_id="A")
+            assert len(claimed) == 1
+
+    def test_no_grace_backward_compatible_fires(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            store = FileScheduleStore(store_dir=d)
+            job = _interval_job(every=60, grace=None)
+            job.last_run_at = time.time() - 100000  # long downtime
+            store.add(job)
+            claimed = store.claim_due(time.time(), owner_id="A")
+            # Unchanged behaviour: still fires once on recovery.
+            assert len(claimed) == 1
+            assert store.get_history(job_id=job.id) == []
+
+    @pytest.mark.skipif(
+        __import__("importlib").util.find_spec("croniter") is None,
+        reason="croniter not installed",
+    )
+    def test_cron_stale_occurrence_recorded_missed(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            store = FileScheduleStore(store_dir=d)
+            # Daily 07:00 UTC; last run long ago, now well past a 07:00 slot.
+            job = ScheduleJob(
+                name="brief",
+                schedule=Schedule(kind="cron", cron_expr="0 7 * * *", tz="UTC"),
+                message="brief",
+                misfire_grace_seconds=600,  # 10 min grace
+            )
+            job.last_run_at = time.time() - 3 * 86400
+            store.add(job)
+            claimed = store.claim_due(time.time(), owner_id="A")
+            assert claimed == []
+            history = store.get_history(job_id=job.id)
+            assert len(history) == 1
+            assert history[0].status == "missed"
+
+    @pytest.mark.skipif(
+        __import__("importlib").util.find_spec("croniter") is None,
+        reason="croniter not installed",
+    )
+    def test_cron_first_run_fires_despite_stale_slot(self):
+        # A never-run cron job first polled after its slot has aged past grace
+        # must still fire its initial run — the first fire is not a recovered
+        # recurrence to suppress.
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            store = FileScheduleStore(store_dir=d)
+            job = ScheduleJob(
+                name="brief",
+                schedule=Schedule(kind="cron", cron_expr="0 7 * * *", tz="UTC"),
+                message="brief",
+                misfire_grace_seconds=600,
+                # created far in the past so the first 07:00 slot is already
+                # due; last_run_at left None → never run.
+                created_at=time.time() - 3 * 86400,
+            )
+            store.add(job)
+            claimed = store.claim_due(time.time(), owner_id="A")
+            assert len(claimed) == 1
+            # No missed record for a first run.
+            assert store.get_history(job_id=job.id) == []
+
+
+class TestSerialisation:
+    def test_grace_round_trips(self):
+        job = _interval_job(grace=120)
+        restored = ScheduleJob.from_dict(job.to_dict())
+        assert restored.misfire_grace_seconds == 120
+
+    def test_grace_omitted_when_unset(self):
+        job = _interval_job(grace=None)
+        assert "misfire_grace_seconds" not in job.to_dict()
+
+
+class TestConfigYamlMisfire:
+    def test_stale_occurrence_recorded_missed(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            store = ConfigYamlScheduleStore(
+                config_path=os.path.join(d, "config.yaml")
+            )
+            job = _interval_job(every=60, grace=90)
+            job.last_run_at = time.time() - 10000
+            store.add(job)
+            claimed = store.claim_due(time.time(), owner_id="A")
+            assert claimed == []
+            history = store.get_history(job_id=job.id)
+            assert len(history) == 1
+            assert history[0].status == "missed"
+
+    def test_yaml_grace_round_trips_through_store(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            path = os.path.join(d, "config.yaml")
+            store = ConfigYamlScheduleStore(config_path=path)
+            job = _interval_job(every=60, grace=120)
+            store.add(job)
+            # Reopen from disk and confirm the field survives serialisation.
+            reopened = ConfigYamlScheduleStore(config_path=path)
+            reloaded = reopened.get(job.id)
+            assert reloaded is not None
+            assert reloaded.misfire_grace_seconds == 120

src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_schedule_quota_hold.py

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+"""Core tests for the provider-quota-aware schedule hold (Issue #5386).
+
+A recurring job whose model provider is rate-limited must stop re-firing and
+re-failing every tick: the first 429 parks ``next`` due instant past the
+provider's own reset window (``Retry-After``), intervening fires coalesce, and
+the job becomes due again once the window elapses. Covers the pure decision
+helper ``quota_hold_from_failure`` and the ``is_due`` hold guard, plus the
+serialisation round-trip of the new ``hold_until`` field.
+"""
+
+from praisonaiagents.scheduler import quota_hold_from_failure
+from praisonaiagents.scheduler.due import is_due
+from praisonaiagents.scheduler.models import Schedule, ScheduleJob
+
+
+class _RateLimited(Exception):
+    """A 429-shaped provider error carrying a Retry-After header."""
+
+    def __init__(self, retry_after):
+        super().__init__("Rate limit exceeded")
+        self.status_code = 429
+
+        class _Resp:
+            headers = {"retry-after": str(retry_after)}
+
+        self.response = _Resp()
+
+
+# ── quota_hold_from_failure (pure decision helper) ────────────────────
+
+
+def test_rate_limit_with_retry_after_parks_past_window():
+    now = 1000.0
+    hold = quota_hold_from_failure(_RateLimited(3600), now, slack_seconds=60.0)
+    assert hold == now + 3600 + 60
+
+
+def test_retry_after_parsed_from_message_string():
+    now = 500.0
+    hold = quota_hold_from_failure(
+        "429 Too Many Requests, retry after 30 seconds", now, slack_seconds=10.0
+    )
+    assert hold == now + 30 + 10
+
+
+def test_retry_after_http_date_parks_past_window():
+    # RFC 7231 allows Retry-After as an absolute HTTP-date, not just
+    # delta-seconds. A provider that sends the reset instant as a date must
+    # still park the job (greptile #2) — else a long quota window is ignored.
+    import time
+    from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+    from email.utils import format_datetime
+
+    now = time.time()
+    reset = format_datetime(
+        datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=1800)
+    )
+    hold = quota_hold_from_failure(_RateLimited(reset), now, slack_seconds=60.0)
+    assert hold is not None
+    # ~1800s window + 60s slack, allowing a little scheduling drift.
+    assert now + 1800 + 60 - 5 <= hold <= now + 1800 + 60 + 5
+
+
+def test_retry_after_past_http_date_does_not_hold():
+    # An HTTP-date already in the past yields no usable window → no park.
+    from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+    from email.utils import format_datetime
+
+    past = format_datetime(datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(seconds=120))
+    assert quota_hold_from_failure(_RateLimited(past), 0.0) is None
+
+
+def test_non_quota_failure_never_holds():
+    assert quota_hold_from_failure(Exception("boom: invalid request"), 0.0) is None
+    assert quota_hold_from_failure(Exception("connection reset"), 0.0) is None
+
+
+def test_rate_limit_without_reset_hint_does_not_hold():
+    # A 429 with no Retry-After / reset window carries no usable park instant.
+    class _Bare(Exception):
+        status_code = 429
+
+    assert quota_hold_from_failure(_Bare("rate limited"), 0.0) is None
+
+
+def test_slack_is_clamped_non_negative():
+    now = 0.0
+    assert quota_hold_from_failure(_RateLimited(100), now, slack_seconds=-5.0) == 100.0
+
+
+# ── is_due hold guard ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _every_job(**kw):
+    return ScheduleJob(
+        name="j", schedule=Schedule(kind="every", every_seconds=1), message="hi", **kw
+    )
+
+
+def test_held_job_not_due_within_window():
+    job = _every_job(hold_until=2000.0)
+    # Would otherwise be due (every-1s, never run) but is parked.
+    assert is_due(job, now=1999.0) is False
+
+
+def test_held_job_due_again_after_window():
+    job = _every_job(hold_until=2000.0)
+    assert is_due(job, now=2000.0) is True
+    assert is_due(job, now=2500.0) is True
+
+
+def test_unparked_job_unchanged():
+    # No hold → today's behaviour exactly.
+    assert is_due(_every_job(), now=123.0) is True
+
+
+def test_intervening_fires_coalesce():
+    # A parked every-1s job stays not-due across every intervening tick and
+    # fires exactly once at the first legal instant after the window.
+    job = _every_job(hold_until=100.0)
+    assert [is_due(job, now=t) for t in (10, 50, 99)] == [False, False, False]
+    assert is_due(job, now=100.0) is True
+
+
+# ── serialisation round-trip ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_hold_until_round_trips():
+    job = _every_job(hold_until=4242.0)
+    restored = ScheduleJob.from_dict(job.to_dict())
+    assert restored.hold_until == 4242.0
+
+
+def test_unparked_job_omits_hold_until_key():
+    # A job that never hit a quota wall stays byte-for-byte unchanged.
+    assert "hold_until" not in _every_job().to_dict()

src/praisonai-bot/praisonai_bot/bots/_config_schema.py

@@ -189,6 +189,12 @@ class StreamingConfigSchema(BaseModel):
     flood_backoff_factor: float = 2.0  # Multiply interval on each flood/429
     max_interval: float = 30.0  # Cap for the adaptively-widened interval
     strip_reasoning_tags: bool = True  # Strip <think>/<reasoning> from output
+    # Opt-in privacy-safe activity surface (PROGRESS mode). Retained here so the
+    # documented ``activity_status: {enabled, phrases}`` block (and the inline
+    # ``activity_phrases`` catalogue) reach ``StreamingConfig.from_dict`` instead
+    # of being silently dropped by the schema. Off by default.
+    activity_status: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None
+    activity_phrases: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None
     
     @field_validator("mode")
     @classmethod

src/praisonai-bot/praisonai_bot/bots/_http_approval.py

@@ -23,11 +23,18 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import asyncio
 import logging
+import os
+import secrets
 import time
 import uuid
-from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
+from typing import Any, Dict, Iterable, Optional
 
-from ._approval_base import DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT, DurableApprovalMixin
+from ._approval_base import (
+    DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT,
+    DurableApprovalMixin,
+    is_authorized_actor,
+    normalize_approvers,
+)
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -45,6 +52,14 @@ class HTTPApproval(DurableApprovalMixin):
         host: Bind address (default ``127.0.0.1``).
         port: Port to listen on (default ``8899``).
         timeout: Max seconds to wait for a response (default 300).
+        allowed_approvers: Optional allowlist of approver IDs permitted to
+            resolve an approval. When provided, each pending approval mints a
+            single-use token that is carried only in the per-approval URL; the
+            resolver must present that token (and, when the request supplies an
+            ``approver``, be in the allowlist) or the decision is rejected. When
+            ``None`` (default) any visitor may decide (legacy behaviour,
+            backward compatible). Falls back to a comma-separated
+            ``HTTP_APPROVERS`` env var when not passed.
 
     Example::
 
@@ -57,11 +72,17 @@ class HTTPApproval(DurableApprovalMixin):
         host: str = "127.0.0.1",
         port: int = 8899,
         timeout: float = DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT,
+        allowed_approvers: Optional[Iterable[str]] = None,
         store: Optional[Any] = None,
     ):
         self._host = host
         self._port = port
         self._timeout = timeout
+        if allowed_approvers is None:
+            _env = os.environ.get("HTTP_APPROVERS", "").strip()
+            if _env:
+                allowed_approvers = [a.strip() for a in _env.split(",") if a.strip()]
+        self._allowed_approvers = normalize_approvers(allowed_approvers)
         self._pending: Dict[str, Optional[Dict[str, Any]]] = {}
         self._server_started = False
         self._runner: Optional[Any] = None
@@ -91,6 +112,20 @@ class HTTPApproval(DurableApprovalMixin):
         self._server_started = True
         logger.info(f"HTTPApproval server started on http://{self._host}:{self._port}")
 
+    def _token_ok(self, pending: Dict[str, Any], request) -> bool:
+        """Return whether *request* carries the per-approval token.
+
+        The token is minted per pending approval and embedded only in the URL
+        handed to the authorised approver. A constant-time comparison is used so
+        the endpoint does not leak the token via timing. When no allowlist is
+        configured there is no token, so this is a no-op (legacy behaviour).
+        """
+        expected = pending.get("token")
+        if not expected:
+            return True
+        supplied = request.query.get("token") or request.headers.get("X-Approval-Token", "")
+        return secrets.compare_digest(str(supplied), str(expected))
+
     async def _handle_page(self, request) -> Any:
         """Serve the approval page HTML."""
         from aiohttp import web
@@ -101,11 +136,18 @@ class HTTPApproval(DurableApprovalMixin):
         if pending is None:
             return web.Response(text="Approval request not found or already decided.", status=404)
 
+        if not self._token_ok(pending, request):
+            logger.warning(
+                "Unauthorised HTTP approval page access for %s", request_id,
+            )
+            return web.Response(text="Not authorized to view this approval.", status=403)
+
         if pending.get("decided"):
             return web.Response(text="This approval has already been decided.", status=200)
 
         info = pending.get("info", {})
-        html = self._build_html(request_id, info)
+        token = pending.get("token")
+        html = self._build_html(request_id, info, token=token)
         return web.Response(text=html, content_type="text/html")
 
     async def _handle_decide(self, request) -> Any:
@@ -117,6 +159,13 @@ class HTTPApproval(DurableApprovalMixin):
 
         if pending is None:
             return web.Response(text="Not found", status=404)
+
+        if not self._token_ok(pending, request):
+            logger.warning(
+                "Unauthorised HTTP approval decision attempt for %s", request_id,
+            )
+            return web.json_response({"ok": False, "error": "unauthorized"}, status=403)
+
         if pending.get("decided"):
             return web.Response(text="Already decided", status=200)
 
@@ -125,18 +174,32 @@ class HTTPApproval(DurableApprovalMixin):
         except Exception:
             body = {}
 
+        approver = body.get("approver", "http_user")
+
+        # Authorisation boundary: when an allowlist is configured a free-text
+        # ``approver`` must be one of the authorised approvers. The per-approval
+        # token already proves the resolver received the private URL; the
+        # allowlist additionally pins the recorded approver identity.
+        if not is_authorized_actor(approver, self._allowed_approvers):
+            logger.warning(
+                "Unauthorised HTTP approver %r for %s", approver, request_id,
+            )
+            return web.json_response({"ok": False, "error": "unauthorized"}, status=403)
+
         decision = body.get("decision", "deny")
         pending["decided"] = True
         pending["approved"] = decision == "approve"
         pending["reason"] = body.get("reason", f"{'Approved' if pending['approved'] else 'Denied'} via HTTP dashboard")
-        pending["approver"] = body.get("approver", "http_user")
+        pending["approver"] = approver
 
         return web.json_response({"ok": True, "decision": decision})
 
-    def _build_html(self, request_id: str, info: Dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    def _build_html(self, request_id: str, info: Dict[str, Any], token: Optional[str] = None) -> str:
         """Build a minimal approval page."""
         import html as html_module
 
+        token_qs = f"?token={html_module.escape(str(token))}" if token else ""
+
         tool_name = html_module.escape(str(info.get("tool_name", "unknown")))
         risk_level = html_module.escape(str(info.get("risk_level", "unknown")))
         agent_name = html_module.escape(str(info.get("agent_name", "")))
@@ -181,7 +244,7 @@ td {{ padding: 8px; border-bottom: 1px solid #333; }} code {{ background: #2a2a4
 <div class="done" id="result" style="display:none"></div>
 <script>
 async function decide(d) {{
-  const res = await fetch('/approve/{request_id}/decide', {{
+  const res = await fetch('/approve/{request_id}/decide{token_qs}', {{
     method: 'POST', headers: {{'Content-Type': 'application/json'}},
     body: JSON.stringify({{decision: d}})
   }});
@@ -202,9 +265,13 @@ async function decide(d) {{
         await self._ensure_server()
 
         request_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
+        # Mint a single-use token bound to this approval when an allowlist is
+        # configured, so only the holder of the private URL can resolve it.
+        token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32) if self._allowed_approvers is not None else None
         self._pending[request_id] = {
             "decided": False,
             "approved": False,
+            "token": token,
             "info": {
                 "tool_name": request.tool_name,
                 "arguments": request.arguments,
@@ -214,6 +281,8 @@ async function decide(d) {{
         }
 
         url = f"http://{self._host}:{self._port}/approve/{request_id}"
+        if token:
+            url = f"{url}?token={token}"
         logger.info(f"HTTPApproval: Waiting for decision at {url}")
         print(f"\n🔗 Open this URL to approve/deny:\n   {url}\n")
 

src/praisonai-bot/praisonai_bot/bots/_outbox.py

@@ -172,7 +172,16 @@ class OutboundQueue:
         ordering: Literal["strict", "best_effort"] = "best_effort",
         dead_letter_min_age: float = _DEFAULT_DEAD_LETTER_MIN_AGE_SECONDS,
         dead_letter_policy: Optional[Any] = None,
+        read_only: bool = False,
     ) -> None:
+        # Operator inspection (``list``/``stats``) must NEVER run crash recovery
+        # on a live database: flipping in-flight ``sending`` rows to
+        # ``recovered`` while the owning gateway is mid-send lets a later drain
+        # re-claim and duplicate a message. ``read_only=True`` opens the store
+        # for reads without the ``sending``→``recovered`` migration; targeted
+        # ops (``retry``/``purge_entry``) still work but leave in-flight rows
+        # untouched.
+        self.read_only = bool(read_only)
         self.path = Path(path).expanduser()
         self.max_size = int(max_size)
         self.ttl_seconds = int(ttl_seconds)
@@ -255,11 +264,17 @@ class OutboundQueue:
             # reconciled before re-dispatch to avoid duplicate delivery. Drain
             # treats 'recovered' like a retryable entry but offers it to a
             # reconciler first.
-            conn.execute("""
-                UPDATE outbound_queue
-                SET status = 'recovered'
-                WHERE status = 'sending'
-            """)
+            #
+            # NEVER run this under read_only inspection: the gateway may be live
+            # and a 'sending' row genuinely in flight. Flipping it to 'recovered'
+            # here would let the running drain re-claim and duplicate it, so
+            # operator ``list``/``stats`` open the store without touching claims.
+            if not self.read_only:
+                conn.execute("""
+                    UPDATE outbound_queue
+                    SET status = 'recovered'
+                    WHERE status = 'sending'
+                """)
             conn.commit()
     
     # ── Core API ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -743,6 +758,31 @@ class OutboundQueue:
             return int(key.split(":")[-1])
         except (ValueError, IndexError):
             raise ValueError(f"Invalid entry key format: {key}")
+
+    def _row_status_if_key_matches(
+        self, conn: sqlite3.Connection, key: str
+    ) -> Optional[str]:
+        """Return the row's status only if ``key`` fully matches a stored entry.
+
+        :meth:`enqueue` builds the key as ``f"{target}:{idempotency_key}:{id}"``.
+        Targeted ops (:meth:`retry`, :meth:`purge_entry`) previously acted on the
+        trailing id alone, so a stale key from another outbox — or a mistyped
+        target/idempotency that kept an existing id — would silently mutate the
+        WRONG message. This verifies the whole reconstructed key against the row
+        before any state change. Returns ``None`` when no row matches the full
+        key (unknown id, or id matches but target/idempotency differ).
+        """
+        entry_id = self._extract_id_from_key(key)
+        row = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT target, idempotency_key, status FROM outbound_queue WHERE id = ?",
+            (entry_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            return None
+        target, idempotency, status = row
+        if f"{target}:{idempotency}:{entry_id}" != key:
+            return None
+        return str(status)
     
     # ── Maintenance ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
     def _evict_expired_locked(self, conn: sqlite3.Connection) -> int:
@@ -883,6 +923,118 @@ class OutboundQueue:
             conn.execute("DELETE FROM outbound_queue")
             conn.commit()
             return int(n)
+
+    # ── Operator introspection & targeted ops (parity with InboundDLQ) ──
+    def list(
+        self,
+        *,
+        status: Optional[str] = None,
+        target: Optional[str] = None,
+        limit: int = 100,
+    ) -> List[OutboundEntry]:
+        """Enumerate outbound entries for operator inspection (newest first).
+
+        Optionally filter by ``status`` (e.g. ``"failed"``,
+        ``"permanent_failure"``, ``"pending"``) and/or ``target`` (exact match,
+        e.g. ``"telegram:12345"``). Purely read-only; it never mutates state.
+        """
+        clauses: List[str] = []
+        params: List[Any] = []
+        if status is not None:
+            clauses.append("status = ?")
+            params.append(status)
+        if target is not None:
+            clauses.append("target = ?")
+            params.append(target)
+        where = (" WHERE " + " AND ".join(clauses)) if clauses else ""
+        params.append(int(limit))
+        with self._lock, closing(self._connect()) as conn:
+            rows = conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT id, ts, idempotency_key, target, payload, metadata,
+                       status, attempts, last_attempt, error, sent_at
+                FROM outbound_queue
+                """
+                + where
+                + " ORDER BY ts DESC LIMIT ?",
+                params,
+            ).fetchall()
+        return [OutboundEntry(*row) for row in rows]
+
+    def stats(self) -> Dict[str, int]:
+        """Return a per-status count map (e.g. ``{"pending": 3, "failed": 1}``).
+
+        Only statuses with at least one entry are present. Gives operators an
+        at-a-glance breakdown of the outbox instead of a single bulk counter.
+        """
+        with self._lock, closing(self._connect()) as conn:
+            rows = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT status, COUNT(*) FROM outbound_queue GROUP BY status"
+            ).fetchall()
+        return {str(status): int(count) for status, count in rows}
+
+    async def retry(self, key: str) -> bool:
+        """Requeue a single entry for the next drain.
+
+        Resets a ``failed``/``permanent_failure`` entry back to ``pending`` and
+        clears its ``attempts`` so the next :meth:`drain` re-dispatches it —
+        e.g. after a channel outage recovers. Returns True if an entry was
+        requeued, False if the key is unknown, already terminal (``sent``),
+        in-flight (``sending``), or crash-``recovered``.
+
+        A ``recovered`` entry is DELIBERATELY not manually retriable: it was
+        in-flight when the process last crashed, so its delivery outcome is
+        unknown and the next :meth:`drain` already handles it safely (reconcile
+        first, else re-send with the "possible duplicate" annotator). Flipping it
+        to ``pending`` here would strip that safeguard and risk an unlabelled
+        duplicate. ``key`` is the tracking key form ``target:idempotency:id`` and
+        is matched in full against the stored row.
+        """
+        loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
+        return await loop.run_in_executor(None, self._sync_retry, key)
+
+    def _sync_retry(self, key: str) -> bool:
+        """Synchronous version of retry for thread pool execution."""
+        with self._lock, closing(self._connect()) as conn:
+            if self._row_status_if_key_matches(conn, key) is None:
+                return False  # unknown id or full key mismatch — never guess
+            entry_id = self._extract_id_from_key(key)
+            cur = conn.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE outbound_queue
+                SET status = 'pending', attempts = 0, error = NULL,
+                    last_attempt = NULL
+                WHERE id = ? AND status IN ('failed', 'permanent_failure')
+                """,
+                (entry_id,),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            self._active_claims.pop(key, None)
+            return cur.rowcount > 0
+
+    def purge_entry(self, key: str) -> bool:
+        """Delete a single entry by its full tracking key. Returns True if removed.
+
+        Refuses to delete an in-flight ``sending`` entry: the gateway may have
+        already handed it to the channel API and be awaiting the terminal
+        ``mark_sent``/``mark_failed`` write. Deleting the row out from under that
+        send makes ``mark_sent`` a no-op and the caller report a spurious
+        failure despite delivery. The key is matched in full against the stored
+        row so a stale/mistyped key cannot delete the wrong message.
+        """
+        with self._lock, closing(self._connect()) as conn:
+            status = self._row_status_if_key_matches(conn, key)
+            if status is None:
+                return False  # unknown id or full key mismatch
+            if status == "sending":
+                return False  # in-flight — never delete under an active send
+            entry_id = self._extract_id_from_key(key)
+            cur = conn.execute(
+                "DELETE FROM outbound_queue WHERE id = ?", (entry_id,)
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            self._active_claims.pop(key, None)
+            return cur.rowcount > 0
     
     def __repr__(self) -> str:
         return (

src/praisonai-bot/praisonai_bot/bots/_session.py

@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ class BotSessionManager:
         admission_gate: Optional[Any] = None,
         turn_lock_map: Optional["LockMap"] = None,
         surface_completion_reason: bool = False,
+        defer_journal_completion: bool = False,
     ) -> None:
         self._histories: Dict[str, List[Dict[str, Any]]] = {}
         # Issue #3232: the per-turn lock map is keyed on the *resolved* storage
@@ -270,6 +271,21 @@ class BotSessionManager:
         # behaviour (the tool returns its "no gateway available" message).
         self._delivery_router = delivery_router
         self._last_journal_key = None  # Store key for delayed completion
+        # Issue #5152: set of inbound journal keys deferred for delayed
+        # completion. Unlike the single ``_last_journal_key`` slot, this holds
+        # *every* in-flight deferred key so two concurrent turns (different
+        # users run under different per-storage-key locks, so ``chat()`` is not
+        # globally serialised) can never clobber one another — settling one
+        # turn must never settle another turn's still-undelivered inbound.
+        self._deferred_journal_keys: set[str] = set()
+        # Issue #5152: when True, chat() does NOT mark the inbound journal
+        # complete on clean exit; instead it stashes the journal key so the
+        # adapter can call complete_last_journal_entry() *after* the reply is
+        # durably delivered. This closes the window where a crash between
+        # "agent finished" and "reply sent" would settle the inbound (no
+        # replay) yet lose the user's reply. Default False keeps the legacy
+        # settle-on-agent-completion behaviour byte-for-byte unchanged.
+        self._defer_journal_completion = defer_journal_completion
         # Run control for in-flight message handling
         self._run_control = run_control
         # Issue #3296: opt-in surfacing of *why* a turn ended. When True, a turn
@@ -1641,13 +1657,26 @@ class BotSessionManager:
                     await claim_ctx.__aexit__(type(e), e, e.__traceback__)
                 raise
             else:
-                # Clean exit - mark journal complete before releasing claim
+                # Clean exit - settle the inbound journal.
                 if journal_key is not None and self._ingress_journal is not None:
-                    try:
-                        self._ingress_journal.complete(journal_key)
-                        self._last_journal_key = None
-                    except Exception as e:
-                        logger.warning("Failed to complete journal entry: %s", e)
+                    if self._defer_journal_completion:
+                        # Issue #5152: defer completion until the adapter has
+                        # durably delivered the reply. Record the key so the
+                        # adapter calls complete_last_journal_entry(journal_key)
+                        # *after* send; on a crash before delivery the entry
+                        # stays pending and is redeliverable rather than lost.
+                        # The key is added to the per-turn set (race-safe under
+                        # concurrent turns) and also mirrored into the single
+                        # slot for the convenience no-arg completion path.
+                        self._deferred_journal_keys.add(journal_key)
+                        self._last_journal_key = journal_key
+                    else:
+                        # Legacy behaviour: mark complete on agent completion.
+                        try:
+                            self._ingress_journal.complete(journal_key)
+                            self._last_journal_key = None
+                        except Exception as e:
+                            logger.warning("Failed to complete journal entry: %s", e)
                 if claim_ctx is not None:
                     await claim_ctx.__aexit__(None, None, None)
                 return result or ""
@@ -2006,22 +2035,44 @@ class BotSessionManager:
             )
         return evicted
 
-    def complete_last_journal_entry(self) -> bool:
-        """Complete the last journal entry if one exists.
-        
-        Call this after successfully delivering a message to the platform
-        to ensure the journal entry is marked as completed.
-        
-        Returns True if an entry was completed, False if no entry was pending.
+    def complete_last_journal_entry(
+        self, journal_key: Optional[str] = None
+    ) -> bool:
+        """Complete a deferred inbound journal entry after delivery.
+
+        Call this *after* the reply has been durably delivered to the platform
+        so the inbound entry is settled only once the user has actually been
+        answered (Issue #5152).
+
+        Args:
+            journal_key: The exact deferred key to settle. **Prefer passing
+                this** — under concurrent turns (different users run under
+                different per-storage-key locks) the manager-wide "last" slot
+                is ambiguous, so settling a specific key guarantees turn A's
+                acknowledgement never settles turn B's still-undelivered
+                inbound. When ``None`` (single-turn convenience), the most
+                recently deferred key is used.
+
+        Returns True if an entry was completed, False if no matching entry was
+        pending.
         """
-        if self._last_journal_key is not None and self._ingress_journal is not None:
-            try:
-                self._ingress_journal.complete(self._last_journal_key)
-                self._last_journal_key = None
-                return True
-            except Exception as e:
-                logger.warning("Failed to complete journal entry: %s", e)
-        return False
+        if self._ingress_journal is None:
+            return False
+        key = journal_key if journal_key is not None else self._last_journal_key
+        if key is None:
+            return False
+        try:
+            self._ingress_journal.complete(key)
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.warning("Failed to complete journal entry: %s", e)
+            return False
+        # Settle bookkeeping: drop the key from the deferred set and clear the
+        # convenience slot only when it referred to this key (so a concurrent
+        # turn's slot is never silently cleared out from under it).
+        self._deferred_journal_keys.discard(key)
+        if self._last_journal_key == key:
+            self._last_journal_key = None
+        return True
 
     def _should_reset_session(self, storage_key: str) -> bool:
         """Check if a session should be reset based on the policy.

src/praisonai-bot/praisonai_bot/bots/_streaming.py

@@ -68,6 +68,43 @@ def redact_outbound_text(text: str, adapter: Any = None) -> str:
         return text
 
 
+# Privacy-safe activity surface: stable mapping from tool-name substrings to a
+# coarse activity *category*. Categories key the operator-configured phrase
+# catalogue so a curated line ("Searching the web…") can be shown during an
+# output-silent tool run WITHOUT ever interpolating tool args, command strings,
+# URLs, file paths or model reasoning. Matching is substring-based on the
+# lowercased tool name only; unknown tools fall back to the ``default`` phrase.
+_ACTIVITY_CATEGORY_HINTS: tuple = (
+    ("web", ("web", "browser", "fetch", "url", "http", "crawl", "scrape")),
+    ("search", ("search", "google", "duckduckgo", "tavily", "serper", "wiki")),
+    ("shell", ("shell", "bash", "command", "terminal", "exec", "subprocess")),
+    ("code", ("code", "python", "interpreter", "repl", "compile", "script")),
+    ("file", ("file", "read", "write", "open", "save", "load", "csv", "pdf", "doc")),
+    ("mcp", ("mcp",)),
+)
+
+# Neutral line used when a curated catalogue is enabled but has no phrase for the
+# current category and no ``default``. Guarantees opting in can never fall back to
+# surfacing the raw tool name.
+_SAFE_ACTIVITY_FALLBACK = "Working on it…"
+
+
+def resolve_activity_category(tool_name: Optional[str]) -> str:
+    """Map a tool name to a stable activity *category* for the phrase catalogue.
+
+    Uses substring hints on the lowercased tool name only — never the tool's
+    arguments — so the resulting category (and the phrase it selects) can never
+    leak sensitive input. Returns ``"default"`` when nothing matches.
+    """
+    if not tool_name:
+        return "default"
+    lowered = str(tool_name).lower()
+    for category, hints in _ACTIVITY_CATEGORY_HINTS:
+        if any(hint in lowered for hint in hints):
+            return category
+    return "default"
+
+
 def strip_reasoning_tags(text: str) -> str:
     """Remove ``<think>``/``<reasoning>`` spans from streamed content.
 
@@ -116,6 +153,12 @@ class StreamingConfig:
     flood_backoff_factor: float = 2.0         # Multiply interval on each flood/429
     max_interval: float = 30.0                # Cap for the adaptively-widened interval
     strip_reasoning_tags: bool = True         # Strip <think>/<reasoning> from output
+    # Opt-in privacy-safe activity surface (PROGRESS mode). When set, a curated
+    # phrase keyed by tool *category* (see ``resolve_activity_category``) is
+    # shown during an output-silent tool run instead of the raw tool name.
+    # Empty/None => today's behaviour (renders "Running <tool>..."). Phrases are
+    # the ONLY text surfaced; tool args/commands/URLs are never interpolated.
+    activity_phrases: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None
     
     @classmethod
     def from_dict(cls, data: Dict[str, Any]) -> "StreamingConfig":
@@ -127,6 +170,20 @@ class StreamingConfig:
             logger.warning("Invalid streaming mode '%s', using 'off'", mode_str)
             mode = StreamingMode.OFF
         
+        # Accept the curated phrase catalogue either inline as ``activity_phrases``
+        # or under an ``activity_status`` block ({enabled, phrases}) matching the
+        # documented bot-config shape. ``enabled: false`` disables the surface.
+        activity_phrases: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None
+        raw_phrases = data.get("activity_phrases")
+        activity_block = data.get("activity_status")
+        if isinstance(activity_block, dict):
+            if activity_block.get("enabled", True):
+                raw_phrases = activity_block.get("phrases", raw_phrases)
+            else:
+                raw_phrases = None
+        if isinstance(raw_phrases, dict) and raw_phrases:
+            activity_phrases = {str(k): str(v) for k, v in raw_phrases.items()}
+        
         return cls(
             mode=mode,
             min_interval=data.get("min_interval", 1.5),
@@ -140,6 +197,7 @@ class StreamingConfig:
             flood_backoff_factor=data.get("flood_backoff_factor", 2.0),
             max_interval=data.get("max_interval", 30.0),
             strip_reasoning_tags=data.get("strip_reasoning_tags", True),
+            activity_phrases=activity_phrases,
         )
 
 
@@ -412,6 +470,26 @@ class DraftStreamer:
         # Schedule new update task
         self._update_task = asyncio.create_task(_delayed_update())
     
+    def _activity_line(self, tool_name: str) -> str:
+        """Render the progress line for a running tool.
+
+        When a curated ``activity_phrases`` catalogue is configured, the line is
+        drawn EXCLUSIVELY from that catalogue keyed by the tool's activity
+        *category* (falling back to the ``default`` phrase). The raw tool name is
+        never surfaced in that mode, closing the privacy footgun where tool
+        identity/args could leak to chat. With no catalogue configured, behaviour
+        is unchanged ("Running <tool>...").
+        """
+        phrases = self._config.activity_phrases
+        if phrases:
+            category = resolve_activity_category(tool_name)
+            phrase = phrases.get(category) or phrases.get("default")
+            # Opting in must NEVER silently restore the raw tool name: when a
+            # partial catalogue lacks both the matched category and a ``default``
+            # phrase, fall back to a safe generic line rather than the tool name.
+            return f"{self._config.progress_prefix}{phrase or _SAFE_ACTIVITY_FALLBACK}"
+        return f"{self._config.progress_prefix}Running {tool_name}..."
+
     def _render_content(self) -> Optional[str]:
         """Render the buffer for the current mode, applying reasoning stripping."""
         buffer = self._content_buffer
@@ -422,7 +500,11 @@ class DraftStreamer:
         if self._config.mode == StreamingMode.DRAFT:
             content = buffer or self._config.placeholder_text
         elif self._config.mode == StreamingMode.PROGRESS:
-            if self._feed_style and self._progress_lines:
+            # When a curated catalogue is opted in, the raw feed (which folds tool
+            # names/summaries/output into its lines) must not be rendered — that
+            # would bypass the privacy-safe surface. Fall through to the curated
+            # single-line ``_activity_line`` instead so only phrases are shown.
+            if self._feed_style and self._progress_lines and not self._config.activity_phrases:
                 from praisonaiagents.streaming.progress import render_progress
 
                 content = render_progress(
@@ -433,7 +515,7 @@ class DraftStreamer:
                 if not content:
                     content = self._config.placeholder_text
             elif self._current_tool:
-                content = f"{self._config.progress_prefix}Running {self._current_tool}..."
+                content = self._activity_line(self._current_tool)
             elif buffer:
                 content = buffer
             else:

src/praisonai-bot/praisonai_bot/bots/_webhook_approval.py

@@ -27,9 +27,14 @@ import logging
 import os
 import time
 import uuid
-from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
+from typing import Any, Dict, Iterable, Optional
 
-from ._approval_base import DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT, DurableApprovalMixin
+from ._approval_base import (
+    DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT,
+    DurableApprovalMixin,
+    is_authorized_actor,
+    normalize_approvers,
+)
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -51,6 +56,13 @@ class WebhookApproval(DurableApprovalMixin):
         headers: Extra HTTP headers (e.g. auth tokens).
         timeout: Max seconds to wait for a response (default 300).
         poll_interval: Seconds between status polls (default 5.0).
+        allowed_approvers: Optional allowlist of approver IDs permitted to
+            resolve an approval. When provided, a decision whose ``approver``
+            is not in the allowlist is dropped (polling continues) so an
+            unauthorised responder to the status endpoint cannot resolve a
+            gated tool. When ``None`` (default) any responder may decide
+            (legacy behaviour, backward compatible). Falls back to a
+            comma-separated ``WEBHOOK_APPROVERS`` env var when not passed.
 
     Example::
 
@@ -71,6 +83,7 @@ class WebhookApproval(DurableApprovalMixin):
         headers: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None,
         timeout: float = DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT,
         poll_interval: float = 5.0,
+        allowed_approvers: Optional[Iterable[str]] = None,
         store: Optional[Any] = None,
     ):
         self._webhook_url = webhook_url or os.environ.get("APPROVAL_WEBHOOK_URL", "")
@@ -82,11 +95,29 @@ class WebhookApproval(DurableApprovalMixin):
         self._headers = headers or {}
         self._timeout = timeout
         self._poll_interval = poll_interval
+        if allowed_approvers is None:
+            _env = os.environ.get("WEBHOOK_APPROVERS", "").strip()
+            if _env:
+                allowed_approvers = [a.strip() for a in _env.split(",") if a.strip()]
+        self._allowed_approvers = normalize_approvers(allowed_approvers)
         self._init_store(store)
 
     def __repr__(self) -> str:
         return f"WebhookApproval(webhook_url={self._webhook_url!r})"
 
+    def _approver_authorized(self, approver: Any) -> bool:
+        """Return whether *approver* may resolve an approval.
+
+        No-op (always ``True``) when no allowlist is configured (legacy
+        behaviour). Otherwise the responder's ``approver`` must be in the
+        allowlist, so an unauthorised party that can reach the status endpoint
+        cannot resolve a gated tool.
+        """
+        return is_authorized_actor(
+            None if approver is None else str(approver),
+            self._allowed_approvers,
+        )
+
     # ── Internal HTTP helper ───────────────────────────────────────────
 
     async def _http_request(
@@ -158,7 +189,9 @@ class WebhookApproval(DurableApprovalMixin):
 
                 # Check for immediate decision
                 if isinstance(post_data, dict):
-                    if "approved" in post_data:
+                    if "approved" in post_data and self._approver_authorized(
+                        post_data.get("approver")
+                    ):
                         decision = ApprovalDecision(
                             approved=bool(post_data["approved"]),
                             reason=post_data.get("reason", "Webhook immediate response"),
@@ -167,6 +200,11 @@ class WebhookApproval(DurableApprovalMixin):
                         )
                         await self._resolve_pending(request, decision)
                         return decision
+                    if "approved" in post_data:
+                        logger.warning(
+                            "Dropping webhook immediate decision from unauthorised "
+                            "approver %r", post_data.get("approver"),
+                        )
 
                 # 2. Poll for decision
                 status_url = self._status_url or f"{self._webhook_url}/{request_id}"
@@ -227,6 +265,17 @@ class WebhookApproval(DurableApprovalMixin):
                 if status == "pending":
                     continue
 
+                has_decision = (
+                    "approved" in data
+                    or status in ("approved", "approve", "yes", "denied", "deny", "rejected", "no")
+                )
+                if has_decision and not self._approver_authorized(data.get("approver")):
+                    logger.warning(
+                        "Dropping webhook decision from unauthorised approver %r "
+                        "for %s", data.get("approver"), request_id,
+                    )
+                    continue
+
                 if "approved" in data:
                     return ApprovalDecision(
                         approved=bool(data["approved"]),

src/praisonai-bot/praisonai_bot/bots/botos.py

@@ -706,12 +706,14 @@ class BotOS:
                     _status = "succeeded"
                     _result = None
                     _error = None
+                    _exc: Optional[Exception] = None
                     _delivered = False
                     try:
                         _result, _delivered = await self._execute_schedule_job(job)
                     except Exception as e:
                         _status = "failed"
                         _error = str(e)
+                        _exc = e
                         logger.warning(f"BotOS: schedule job {job.name} failed: {e}")
                     finally:
                         # Release the lease so it does not linger until expiry.
@@ -731,6 +733,15 @@ class BotOS:
                                     f"{job.name}: {e}"
                                 )
                     _duration = _time.time() - _start
+                    # Provider-quota hold: park a job past a 429/quota reset
+                    # window so this loop stops re-firing and re-failing every
+                    # tick against a benched provider — the same core decision
+                    # the gateway executor applies (issue #5386). A success
+                    # clears any prior park (the window reopened); the hold is
+                    # written by the mark_run below.
+                    self._apply_schedule_quota_hold(
+                        job, succeeded=_status == "succeeded", error=_exc,
+                    )
                     runner.mark_run(
                         job,
                         status=_status,
@@ -826,6 +837,52 @@ class BotOS:
         logger.info(f"BotOS: executed schedule job '{job.name}'")
         return (result_str, delivered)
 
+    @staticmethod
+    def _apply_schedule_quota_hold(
+        job: Any, *, succeeded: bool, error: Optional[Exception],
+    ) -> None:
+        """Park a due-loop job past a provider rate-limit window (issue #5386).
+
+        The BotOS schedule loop runs ``agent.chat`` directly rather than through
+        :class:`ScheduledAgentExecutor`, so it needs the same provider-quota
+        hold or a benched provider is hammered every tick. Uses the *core* pure
+        decision ``quota_hold_from_failure`` (no new surface): a 429/quota
+        failure carrying a reset hint sets ``job.hold_until`` (never shortening
+        an existing later park), which the subsequent ``mark_run`` persists so
+        ``is_due`` coalesces intervening fires. A success clears any prior park
+        (proof the window reopened). A no-op when core is unavailable or the
+        failure is not a quota signal, so today's behaviour is unchanged.
+        """
+        if succeeded:
+            if getattr(job, "hold_until", None) is not None:
+                try:
+                    job.hold_until = None
+                except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+                    pass
+            return
+        if error is None:
+            return
+        try:
+            from praisonaiagents.scheduler import quota_hold_from_failure
+        except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - core primitive always present
+            return
+        import time as _time
+        hold_until = quota_hold_from_failure(error, _time.time())
+        if hold_until is None:
+            return
+        prior = getattr(job, "hold_until", None)
+        if isinstance(prior, (int, float)) and prior > hold_until:
+            hold_until = prior
+        try:
+            job.hold_until = hold_until
+        except Exception as e:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+            logger.warning(f"BotOS: could not set quota hold for {job.name}: {e}")
+            return
+        logger.info(
+            "BotOS: job '%s' held until %.0f after provider rate-limit",
+            job.name, hold_until,
+        )
+
     @staticmethod
     def _enforce_pinned_model(job: Any, agent: Any) -> Optional[Any]:
         """Fail closed when a pinned job has drifted from its model snapshot.

src/praisonai-bot/praisonai_bot/cli/commands/gateway.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Provides commands for managing the WebSocket gateway with multi-bot support.
 """
 
 import sys
-from typing import Optional
+from typing import List, Optional
 
 import typer
 
@@ -221,6 +221,13 @@ def gateway_start(
         help="Seconds the event loop may stall before the watchdog trips a "
         "restart (default ~15s = 5s x 3 strikes; #3410)",
     ),
+    trusted_proxy: Optional[List[str]] = typer.Option(
+        None, "--trusted-proxy",
+        help="CIDR/IP of an upstream proxy or tunnel to trust for real-client-IP "
+        "resolution (repeatable, e.g. --trusted-proxy 10.0.0.0/8). Behind a "
+        "reverse proxy this keeps per-IP rate-limits and the operator id keyed "
+        "on the real client; unattributable proxies fail closed (#5312)",
+    ),
 ):
     """Start the gateway server.
 
@@ -409,6 +416,11 @@ def gateway_start(
         drain_marker=drain_marker,
         watchdog=True if watchdog else None,
         watchdog_timeout=watchdog_timeout,
+        trusted_proxies=(
+            list(trusted_proxy)
+            if isinstance(trusted_proxy, (list, tuple))
+            else None
+        ),
     )
     raise typer.Exit(code if isinstance(code, int) else 0)
 
@@ -627,6 +639,10 @@ def gateway_status(
                     output.print_info(
                         f"DLQ ({name}): praisonai bot dlq list --path {dlq_path}"
                     )
+                output.print_info(
+                    "Outbox: praisonai gateway outbox list "
+                    "[--status failed] [--target <chan>]"
+                )
             if probe and config and os.path.exists(config):
                 import asyncio
 
@@ -1866,6 +1882,154 @@ diagnostics_app = typer.Typer(
 app.add_typer(diagnostics_app, name="diagnostics")
 
 
+# ── Outbound queue operator surface (parity with `praisonai bot dlq`) ──
+outbox_app = typer.Typer(
+    help="Inspect / retry / purge the durable outbound delivery queue.",
+    no_args_is_help=True,
+)
+app.add_typer(outbox_app, name="outbox")
+
+
+def _resolve_outbox_path(path: Optional[str]) -> str:
+    """Resolve the durable outbox sqlite path.
+
+    Precedence: explicit ``--path`` → ``PRAISONAI_OUTBOX_PATH`` env →
+    the canonical gateway outbox (``~/.praisonai/state/gateway_outbox.sqlite``)
+    that ``GatewayServer.scheduled_outbox`` writes.
+    """
+    import os
+
+    if path:
+        return os.path.expanduser(path)
+    return os.path.expanduser(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "PRAISONAI_OUTBOX_PATH",
+            "~/.praisonai/state/gateway_outbox.sqlite",
+        )
+    )
+
+
+@outbox_app.command("list")
+def outbox_list(
+    path: Optional[str] = typer.Option(
+        None, "--path", "-p", help="Path to outbox sqlite file."
+    ),
+    status: Optional[str] = typer.Option(
+        None, "--status", "-s",
+        help="Filter by status (pending/failed/permanent_failure/recovered/sent).",
+    ),
+    target: Optional[str] = typer.Option(
+        None, "--target", "-t", help="Filter by exact target (e.g. telegram:12345)."
+    ),
+    limit: int = typer.Option(20, "--limit", "-n", help="Max entries to show."),
+):
+    """List outbound entries (newest first) with target/status/attempts/error."""
+    import time
+
+    from praisonai_bot.bots import OutboundQueue
+
+    outbox = OutboundQueue(path=_resolve_outbox_path(path), read_only=True)
+    entries = outbox.list(status=status, target=target, limit=limit)
+    if not entries:
+        typer.echo(f"Outbox empty (path={outbox.path})")
+        raise typer.Exit(0)
+
+    typer.echo(
+        f"Outbox {outbox.path} — {outbox.size()} entries "
+        f"(showing {len(entries)}):"
+    )
+    # Print the FULL tracking key: operators copy it verbatim into `outbox
+    # retry`/`outbox purge`, so truncating it (with an ellipsis over the id)
+    # would make listed entries unactionable. Metadata follows on the next line.
+    now = time.time()
+    for e in entries:
+        key = f"{e.target}:{e.idempotency_key}:{e.id}"
+        err = (e.error or "")[:80]
+        age = f"{int(now - e.ts)}s"
+        typer.echo(f"  key={key}")
+        typer.echo(
+            f"      target={e.target} status={e.status} "
+            f"attempts={e.attempts} age={age}"
+            + (f" error={err}" if err else "")
+        )
+
+
+@outbox_app.command("stats")
+def outbox_stats(
+    path: Optional[str] = typer.Option(None, "--path", "-p"),
+):
+    """Show a per-status breakdown of the outbound queue."""
+    from praisonai_bot.bots import OutboundQueue
+
+    outbox = OutboundQueue(path=_resolve_outbox_path(path), read_only=True)
+    counts = outbox.stats()
+    if not counts:
+        typer.echo(f"Outbox empty (path={outbox.path})")
+        raise typer.Exit(0)
+
+    typer.echo(f"Outbox {outbox.path}:")
+    for status in sorted(counts):
+        typer.echo(f"  {status:<18} {counts[status]}")
+
+
+@outbox_app.command("retry")
+def outbox_retry(
+    key: str = typer.Argument(..., help="Entry key (target:idempotency:id)."),
+    path: Optional[str] = typer.Option(None, "--path", "-p"),
+):
+    """Requeue a specific entry for the next drain (e.g. after channel recovery)."""
+    import asyncio
+
+    from praisonai_bot.bots import OutboundQueue
+
+    outbox = OutboundQueue(path=_resolve_outbox_path(path))
+    ok = asyncio.run(outbox.retry(key))
+    if ok:
+        typer.echo("requeued 1 entry")
+    else:
+        typer.echo("no matching entry to requeue (unknown key or already sent)")
+        raise typer.Exit(1)
+
+
+@outbox_app.command("purge")
+def outbox_purge(
+    key: Optional[str] = typer.Argument(
+        None, help="Entry key to delete. Omit with --all to clear everything."
+    ),
+    path: Optional[str] = typer.Option(None, "--path", "-p"),
+    all_entries: bool = typer.Option(
+        False, "--all", help="Delete ALL entries instead of a single key."
+    ),
+    yes: bool = typer.Option(False, "--yes", "-y", help="Skip confirmation."),
+):
+    """Delete a single outbound entry by key, or all entries with --all."""
+    from praisonai_bot.bots import OutboundQueue
+
+    outbox = OutboundQueue(path=_resolve_outbox_path(path))
+
+    if all_entries:
+        n = outbox.size()
+        if n == 0:
+            typer.echo("Outbox already empty.")
+            raise typer.Exit(0)
+        if not yes and not typer.confirm(
+            f"Delete all {n} entries from {outbox.path}?"
+        ):
+            raise typer.Exit(0)
+        typer.echo(f"purged {outbox.purge()} entries")
+        return
+
+    if not key:
+        typer.echo("Provide an entry key or pass --all to clear the outbox.")
+        raise typer.Exit(1)
+
+    if outbox.purge_entry(key):
+        typer.echo("purged 1 entry")
+    else:
+        typer.echo("no matching entry to purge (unknown key)")
+        raise typer.Exit(1)
+
+
 @diagnostics_app.command("export")
 def gateway_diagnostics_export(
     config: str = typer.Option(

src/praisonai-bot/praisonai_bot/cli/features/gateway.py

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ _START_FLAG_KEYS = (
     "agent_file", "config_file", "drain_timeout", "max_concurrent_runs",
     "queue_depth", "overflow_policy", "reliability", "openai_api", "mcp",
     "identity_store", "scale_to_zero", "idle_minutes", "drain_marker",
-    "watchdog", "watchdog_timeout",
+    "watchdog", "watchdog_timeout", "trusted_proxies",
 )
 
 
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ class GatewayHandler:
         drain_marker: Optional[str] = None,
         watchdog: Optional[bool] = None,
         watchdog_timeout: Optional[float] = None,
+        trusted_proxies: Optional[list] = None,
     ) -> int:
         """Start the gateway server.
 
@@ -269,6 +270,7 @@ class GatewayHandler:
             "drain_marker": drain_marker,
             "watchdog": watchdog,
             "watchdog_timeout": watchdog_timeout,
+            "trusted_proxies": trusted_proxies,
         }
 
         def _commit_start_flags() -> None:
@@ -303,6 +305,9 @@ class GatewayHandler:
                 self._gateway._queue_depth_override = queue_depth
             if overflow_policy is not None:
                 self._gateway._overflow_policy_override = overflow_policy
+            # CLI --trusted-proxy overrides gateway.trusted_proxies in YAML (#5312)
+            if trusted_proxies:
+                self._gateway._trusted_proxies_override = list(trusted_proxies)
             # CLI --reliability preset overrides gateway.reliability in YAML (#2531)
             if reliability is not None:
                 self._gateway._reliability_override = reliability
@@ -378,6 +383,12 @@ class GatewayHandler:
 
         # Standard WebSocket-only mode
         config = GatewayConfig(host=host, port=port)
+        # CLI --trusted-proxy applies in no-config mode too (#5312): stamp it on
+        # the config directly since start_with_config's YAML wiring is skipped.
+        if trusted_proxies:
+            config.trusted_proxies = [
+                str(p).strip() for p in trusted_proxies if str(p).strip()
+            ]
         self._gateway = WebSocketGateway(
             config=config, openai_api=openai_api, mcp=mcp
         )

src/praisonai-bot/praisonai_bot/gateway/server.py

@@ -49,6 +49,15 @@ from praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols import (
     evaluate_pressure,
 )
 
+try:  # Trusted-proxy ingress attribution (Issue #5312); optional at import time.
+    from praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols import (
+        resolve_ingress_attribution,
+        parse_forwarded_for,
+    )
+except ImportError:  # pragma: no cover - core predates ingress attribution
+    resolve_ingress_attribution = None  # type: ignore[assignment]
+    parse_forwarded_for = None  # type: ignore[assignment]
+
 try:  # Server→client interactive request/reply over the transport (Issue #5351).
     from praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols import (
         GatewayServerRequest,
@@ -1331,6 +1340,15 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
         self._ledger_heartbeat_task: Optional[asyncio.Task] = None
         self._ledger_heartbeat_interval: float = 15.0
 
+        # Issue #5153: shed the coldest *already-persisted* live sessions before
+        # the cgroup memory ceiling OOM-kills the process. Reuses the core
+        # planner (``plan_pressure_evictions``) + the concrete stdlib cgroup
+        # reader that the bot warm-agent cache already uses; folded into the
+        # existing liveness-heartbeat tick, so there is no new task and it is a
+        # no-op on hosts without a cgroup limit or without a session store.
+        self._memory_pressure: Optional[Any] = None
+        self._pressure_headroom: float = 0.9
+
     @property
     def is_running(self) -> bool:
         return self._is_running
@@ -1589,6 +1607,56 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
                 status_code=403,
             )
 
+        def _client_subject(peer_ip, headers) -> str:
+            """Resolve the per-IP policy subject for an inbound request.
+
+            Consults the pure core ``resolve_ingress_attribution`` contract
+            (Issue #5312) so rate-limiting, the pre-auth budget, and the
+            operator id all key on the *real* client behind a declared trusted
+            proxy — and fail closed (one bucket keyed on the socket peer, never
+            a spoofable header) for anything proxy-shaped but unattributable.
+
+            When core predates the contract, or no ``trusted_proxies`` are
+            configured, this returns the raw socket peer — today's behaviour.
+            """
+            peer = peer_ip or "unknown"
+            # Precedence (highest first) so a live config reload is honoured
+            # and a removed proxy stops being trusted without a restart (#5312):
+            #   1. CLI ``--trusted-proxy`` override — operator-pinned, wins always.
+            #   2. Live YAML ``gateway.trusted_proxies`` from ``_loaded_config`` —
+            #      re-read every request so reload adds/removals take effect.
+            #   3. ``self.config.trusted_proxies`` — the Python/no-config value.
+            override = getattr(self, "_trusted_proxies_override", None)
+            trusted: list = []
+            if override:
+                trusted = [str(p).strip() for p in override if str(p).strip()]
+            else:
+                loaded = getattr(self, "_loaded_config", None) or {}
+                gw = loaded.get("gateway", {}) if isinstance(loaded, dict) else {}
+                if isinstance(gw, dict) and "trusted_proxies" in gw:
+                    raw = gw.get("trusted_proxies")
+                    if isinstance(raw, (list, tuple)):
+                        trusted = [str(p).strip() for p in raw if str(p).strip()]
+                else:
+                    trusted = [
+                        str(p).strip()
+                        for p in (getattr(self.config, "trusted_proxies", None) or [])
+                        if str(p).strip()
+                    ]
+            if resolve_ingress_attribution is None or not trusted:
+                return peer
+            attr = resolve_ingress_attribution(
+                peer_ip=peer,
+                forwarded_for=parse_forwarded_for(
+                    headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
+                ),
+                real_ip=headers.get("x-real-ip"),
+                trusted_proxies=trusted,
+            )
+            if attr.fail_closed:
+                return f"proxy:{peer}"
+            return attr.client_ip
+
         def _resolve_operator_identity(request) -> str:
             """Derive a stable, non-secret operator identity for the audit trail.
 
@@ -1616,7 +1684,10 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
                 digest = hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:12]
                 return f"operator:{digest}"
             client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else None
-            return f"operator:{client_ip}" if client_ip else "gateway"
+            if not client_ip:
+                return "gateway"
+            subject = _client_subject(client_ip, request.headers)
+            return f"operator:{subject}"
 
         async def info(request):
             auth_err = _check_auth(request)
@@ -1660,11 +1731,16 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
                 )
 
         async def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket):
-            # Get client IP for rate limiting
-            client_ip = websocket.client.host if websocket.client else "unknown"
+            # Raw socket peer: used for the loopback exemption decision (a
+            # trusted proxy hop is not loopback) and as the fail-closed bucket.
+            peer_ip = websocket.client.host if websocket.client else "unknown"
+            # Resolve the real client behind a declared trusted proxy so per-IP
+            # rate-limit/budget buckets are not collapsed onto the proxy peer
+            # (Issue #5312). Falls back to the peer when no proxy is trusted.
+            client_ip = _client_subject(peer_ip, websocket.headers)
 
             # Rate limiting for WebSocket upgrades (exempt loopback per acceptance criteria)
-            if not is_loopback(client_ip) and not is_loopback(self._host):
+            if not is_loopback(peer_ip) and not is_loopback(self._host):
                 if not _ws_upgrade_rate.allow("ws_upgrade", client_ip):
                     retry = _ws_upgrade_rate.time_until_allowed("ws_upgrade", client_ip)
                     await _reject_connection(
@@ -1685,7 +1761,7 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
             # once so a hostile client cannot park many half-open connections up
             # to max_connections. Loopback is exempt so local CLIs are never
             # locked out. The slot is released on auth-success or on close.
-            _ip_is_loopback = is_loopback(client_ip) or is_loopback(self._host)
+            _ip_is_loopback = is_loopback(peer_ip) or is_loopback(self._host)
             _released = {"done": False}
 
             def _release_budget():
@@ -1896,7 +1972,8 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
             if auth_err:
                 return auth_err
 
-            client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
+            peer_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
+            client_ip = _client_subject(peer_ip, request.headers)
             if not _approval_rate.allow("approval_pending", client_ip):
                 retry = _approval_rate.time_until_allowed("approval_pending", client_ip)
                 return JSONResponse(
@@ -1922,7 +1999,8 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
             if scope_err:
                 return scope_err
 
-            client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
+            peer_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
+            client_ip = _client_subject(peer_ip, request.headers)
             if not _approval_rate.allow("approval_resolve", client_ip):
                 retry = _approval_rate.time_until_allowed("approval_resolve", client_ip)
                 return JSONResponse(
@@ -1999,7 +2077,8 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
             if scope_err:
                 return scope_err
 
-            client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
+            peer_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
+            client_ip = _client_subject(peer_ip, request.headers)
             if not _approval_rate.allow("approval_allowlist", client_ip):
                 retry = _approval_rate.time_until_allowed("approval_allowlist", client_ip)
                 return JSONResponse(
@@ -2988,7 +3067,10 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
         return merged
 
     def _merge_watchdog_overrides(
-        self, watchdog_cfg: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]
+        self,
+        watchdog_cfg: Optional[Dict[str, Any]],
+        *,
+        yaml_present: bool = False,
     ) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
         """Fold CLI watchdog overrides into the YAML ``watchdog`` block (#3410).
 
@@ -3001,6 +3083,21 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
         """
         enable = getattr(self, "_watchdog_override", None)
         timeout = getattr(self, "_watchdog_timeout_override", None)
+        # Issue #5362: fall back to the public ``GatewayConfig`` fields so a
+        # Python embedder building ``GatewayConfig(watchdog=True, …)`` enables
+        # the backstop without a YAML block or CLI flag. Precedence: CLI flag >
+        # explicit YAML (block *or* scalar, incl. ``watchdog: false``) > Python
+        # config field. ``yaml_present`` distinguishes an explicit scalar/block
+        # from an absent key so an explicit ``watchdog: false`` is honoured and
+        # not silently re-enabled by ``GatewayConfig(watchdog=True)``.
+        if enable is None and not yaml_present:
+            cfg_enable = getattr(self.config, "watchdog", None)
+            if cfg_enable:
+                enable = True
+        if timeout is None:
+            cfg_timeout = getattr(self.config, "watchdog_timeout", None)
+            if cfg_timeout is not None:
+                timeout = cfg_timeout
         if enable is None and timeout is None:
             return watchdog_cfg
 
@@ -5057,39 +5154,211 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
         ``LIVENESS_TIMEOUT`` and its state released. A connection with no bound
         session yet (stalled pre-``hello``/``join`` handshake) is evaluated
         against its per-connection ``_client_last_seen`` clock so it too ages
-        out. No-op when the policy is disabled (``interval_ms == 0``).
+        out. Heartbeat/reap is a no-op when the policy is disabled
+        (``interval_ms == 0``), but the loop still runs so the memory-pressure
+        sweep (issue #5153) keeps shedding cold sessions — that OOM guard must
+        not depend on liveness being enabled.
         """
         policy = self._liveness_policy()
-        if not policy.enabled:
-            return
+        # When liveness is disabled we still need a housekeeping cadence for the
+        # pressure sweep; fall back to the config's interval (or the policy
+        # default) rather than exiting, so shedding is never silently disabled.
         interval = policy.interval_seconds
+        if not policy.enabled:
+            from praisonaiagents.gateway.protocols import LivenessPolicy
+
+            interval = LivenessPolicy().interval_seconds
         while self._is_running:
             try:
                 await asyncio.sleep(interval)
                 if self._draining:
                     continue
                 now = time.time()
-                for client_id in list(self._clients.keys()):
-                    session_id = self._client_sessions.get(client_id)
-                    session = self._sessions.get(session_id) if session_id else None
-                    if session is not None:
-                        last_activity = session.last_activity
-                    else:
-                        # No bound session yet (pre-``hello``/``join``): fall
-                        # back to the per-connection last-seen clock so a
-                        # stalled handshake ages out instead of living forever.
-                        last_activity = self._client_last_seen.get(client_id, now)
-                    if policy.evaluate(last_activity, now) is LivenessDecision.REAP:
-                        await self._reap_session(client_id)
-                    else:
-                        await self._send_to_client(
-                            client_id, {"type": EventType.PING.value}
+                if policy.enabled:
+                    for client_id in list(self._clients.keys()):
+                        session_id = self._client_sessions.get(client_id)
+                        session = (
+                            self._sessions.get(session_id) if session_id else None
                         )
+                        if session is not None:
+                            last_activity = session.last_activity
+                        else:
+                            # No bound session yet (pre-``hello``/``join``): fall
+                            # back to the per-connection last-seen clock so a
+                            # stalled handshake ages out instead of living forever.
+                            last_activity = self._client_last_seen.get(client_id, now)
+                        if policy.evaluate(last_activity, now) is LivenessDecision.REAP:
+                            await self._reap_session(client_id)
+                        else:
+                            await self._send_to_client(
+                                client_id, {"type": EventType.PING.value}
+                            )
+                # Issue #5153: on the same housekeeping tick, shed the coldest
+                # already-persisted sessions if the resident set is approaching
+                # the cgroup budget — before the kernel OOM-kills the process.
+                # Runs regardless of whether liveness ping/reap is enabled.
+                self._sweep_sessions_under_pressure()
             except asyncio.CancelledError:
                 raise
             except Exception:
                 logger.exception("Liveness heartbeat/reaper iteration failed")
 
+    def _sweep_sessions_under_pressure(self) -> int:
+        """Soft-evict the coldest already-persisted live sessions under RSS pressure.
+
+        Issue #5153: the gateway's own runtime enactor for the core planner,
+        mirroring ``BotSessionManager.sweep_under_pressure`` (the warm-agent
+        cache). It reads the real container budget/anonymous RSS from a
+        :class:`praisonaiagents.gateway.MemoryPressureProtocol` (the stdlib
+        ``CgroupMemoryPressure`` reader), asks
+        :func:`praisonaiagents.gateway.plan_pressure_evictions` which sessions to
+        shed, and evicts them LRU-first via ``close_session(persist=True)`` — the
+        transcript is left durable so the next ``join`` transparently rehydrates
+        it. It re-samples RSS as it goes and stops as soon as RSS is back within
+        ``headroom`` of the budget, so it sheds the minimum.
+
+        Persistence-gated: a session is only evictable when a session store is
+        configured (its transcript is durable and rebuildable), it is not
+        currently executing a turn (never abort live work), and **no live
+        WebSocket is bound to it** — a connected client's next ordinary
+        ``message`` looks the session up in ``_sessions`` directly and would be
+        silently dropped (only ``hello``/``join`` rehydrate), so evicting a
+        bound session would strand that client. A no-op (returns ``0``) when no
+        store is configured or the platform reports no cgroup budget, preserving
+        today's behaviour exactly.
+        """
+        # No durable store ⇒ nothing is rebuildable ⇒ evicting would lose data.
+        if self._session_store is None or not self._sessions:
+            return 0
+        try:
+            from praisonaiagents.gateway import (
+                WarmSession,
+                plan_pressure_evictions,
+            )
+        except Exception:  # pragma: no cover — old/absent core
+            return 0
+        if self._memory_pressure is None:
+            try:
+                from .memory_pressure import CgroupMemoryPressure
+
+                self._memory_pressure = CgroupMemoryPressure()
+            except Exception:  # pragma: no cover — defensive
+                return 0
+        mp = self._memory_pressure
+        try:
+            budget = mp.cgroup_limit_mb()
+            rss = mp.anon_rss_mb()
+        except Exception:  # pragma: no cover — defensive
+            return 0
+        headroom = self._pressure_headroom
+        # Sessions with a live WebSocket bound to them are excluded from the
+        # eviction candidate set: evicting them would strand the connection
+        # (Finding: ordinary ``message`` frames do not rehydrate). Only cold,
+        # disconnected-but-resumable sessions are candidates.
+        bound_session_ids = set(self._client_sessions.values())
+        warm = [
+            WarmSession(
+                session_id=sid,
+                last_activity=session.last_activity,
+                in_flight=bool(getattr(session, "_is_executing", False)),
+                flushed=True,
+            )
+            for sid, session in self._sessions.items()
+            if sid not in bound_session_ids
+        ]
+        if not warm:
+            return 0
+        plan = plan_pressure_evictions(budget, rss, warm, headroom_ratio=headroom)
+        if not plan:
+            return 0
+        try:
+            target = float(budget) * float(headroom)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            target = 0.0
+        evicted = 0
+        for sid in plan:
+            session = self._sessions.get(sid)
+            # Re-check at enact time: a turn may have started, the session may
+            # already be gone, or a client may have (re)bound to it since the
+            # plan was computed. Never abort live work (an executing turn) and
+            # never strand a now-bound connection.
+            if session is None or getattr(session, "_is_executing", False):
+                continue
+            if sid in set(self._client_sessions.values()):
+                continue
+            if self._evict_persisted_session(sid):
+                evicted += 1
+                try:
+                    if mp.anon_rss_mb() <= target:
+                        break
+                except Exception:  # pragma: no cover — defensive
+                    break
+        if evicted:
+            logger.info(
+                "WebSocketGateway: soft-evicted %d cold session(s) under "
+                "memory pressure (durable, rehydrate on next join)",
+                evicted,
+            )
+        return evicted
+
+    def _evict_persisted_session(self, session_id: str) -> bool:
+        """Remove ``session_id`` from memory **only after** its transcript is durable.
+
+        Unlike ``close_session(persist=True)`` — which best-effort persists but
+        still drops the in-memory session even when the store write fails — this
+        enactor refuses to evict a session whose final snapshot could not be
+        persisted. Under memory pressure the live session may hold the only copy
+        of recent messages/events, so a failed persist must leave it in memory
+        (no data loss) rather than count it as safely shed. ``add_message``
+        signals failure two ways — a raised exception *or* a falsy return
+        (``SessionStoreProtocol.add_message`` returns ``bool`` and both built-in
+        stores return ``False`` on a failed write); both must retain the session.
+        """
+        session = self._sessions.get(session_id)
+        if session is None:
+            return False
+        store = self._session_store
+        if store is None:  # pragma: no cover — guarded by caller
+            return False
+        try:
+            persisted = store.add_message(
+                session_id=session_id,
+                role="system",
+                content="Session closed",
+                metadata={"session_data": session.to_dict()},
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:  # persist raised ⇒ keep session in memory
+            logger.warning(
+                "WebSocketGateway: skipped pressure eviction of %s — "
+                "persistence failed (%s); session retained in memory",
+                session_id,
+                exc,
+            )
+            return False
+        # A store may report a failed write via a falsy return instead of
+        # raising; treat that identically so we never drop the only live copy.
+        # ``None`` (legacy stores with no return) is treated as success to
+        # preserve today's behaviour for stores that persist without reporting.
+        if persisted is False:
+            logger.warning(
+                "WebSocketGateway: skipped pressure eviction of %s — "
+                "store reported a failed write; session retained in memory",
+                session_id,
+            )
+            return False
+        # Durable now: mark resumable, close, and drop from the live set.
+        try:
+            session.close()
+        except Exception:  # pragma: no cover — defensive
+            pass
+        resume_window = self.config.session_config.resume_window
+        self._session_ttls[session_id] = time.time() + resume_window
+        self._sessions.pop(session_id, None)
+        logger.info(
+            "Session %s persisted, resumable for %ss", session_id, resume_window
+        )
+        return True
+
     async def _send_to_client(self, client_id: str, data: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
         """Send data to a specific client through its bounded outbound queue."""
         ws = self._clients.get(client_id)
@@ -10791,6 +11060,29 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
             self._host = gw_cfg["host"]
         if gw_cfg.get("port"):
             self._port = int(gw_cfg["port"])
+        # Issue #5312: resolve the operator-declared trusted-proxy set. CLI
+        # ``--trusted-proxy`` (``_trusted_proxies_override``) wins over the YAML
+        # ``gateway.trusted_proxies``. Stamp the resolved set onto ``self.config``
+        # so the ingress-attribution seam reads it uniformly. Only overwrite when
+        # a source actually supplies one — YAML that *omits* ``trusted_proxies``
+        # must not wipe a value a Python caller set on ``GatewayConfig`` before
+        # ``start_with_config`` (Greptile P1).
+        _tp_override = getattr(self, "_trusted_proxies_override", None)
+        _trusted = None
+        if _tp_override:
+            _trusted = [str(p).strip() for p in _tp_override if str(p).strip()]
+        elif "trusted_proxies" in gw_cfg:
+            _raw_tp = gw_cfg.get("trusted_proxies")
+            _trusted = (
+                [str(p).strip() for p in _raw_tp if str(p).strip()]
+                if isinstance(_raw_tp, (list, tuple))
+                else []
+            )
+        if _trusted is not None:
+            try:
+                self.config.trusted_proxies = _trusted
+            except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - config is always a GatewayConfig
+                pass
         # Issue #3593: the multi-bot CLI builds this gateway with a *default*
         # session config, so ``__init__`` already picked a store before this
         # YAML loaded. Re-read the ``session:`` block here and re-select the
@@ -10879,6 +11171,13 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
         drain_timeout_cfg = getattr(self, "_drain_timeout_override", None)
         if drain_timeout_cfg is None:
             drain_timeout_cfg = gw_cfg.get("drain_timeout")
+        # Issue #5362: a Python embedder building ``GatewayConfig(drain_timeout=…)``
+        # directly (no YAML key, no CLI flag) must still take effect, closing the
+        # CLI/YAML/Python parity gap for the drain window. Only fall back when
+        # the YAML key is *absent* — an explicit ``drain_timeout: null`` is an
+        # operator choice to disable the drain and must win over the field.
+        if drain_timeout_cfg is None and "drain_timeout" not in gw_cfg:
+            drain_timeout_cfg = getattr(self.config, "drain_timeout", None)
         # YAML/env-substituted values may arrive as strings (e.g. "30");
         # coerce once so later ``> 0`` comparisons never raise TypeError.
         if drain_timeout_cfg is not None:
@@ -11043,8 +11342,26 @@ class WebSocketGateway:
         # ``watchdog:`` block nested under ``gateway:``; a CLI ``--watchdog``
         # override (stamped on the instance) wins over / synthesises the YAML.
         # No-op unless enabled, so always-on gateways are unchanged.
+        # Issue #5362: distinguish an explicit YAML key (block *or* scalar,
+        # including ``watchdog: false``) from an absent one so an explicit
+        # scalar disable is honoured over the Python ``GatewayConfig`` field.
+        watchdog_yaml_present = "watchdog" in gw_cfg
         watchdog_cfg = gw_cfg.get("watchdog")
-        watchdog_cfg = self._merge_watchdog_overrides(watchdog_cfg)
+        # Normalise a scalar (``watchdog: true`` / ``false``) into the block
+        # form ``_configure_watchdog`` expects, so an explicit scalar carries
+        # its enabled decision rather than being ignored as a non-dict.
+        if watchdog_yaml_present and not isinstance(watchdog_cfg, dict):
+            _wd_scalar = watchdog_cfg
+            if isinstance(_wd_scalar, str):
+                _wd_enabled = _wd_scalar.strip().lower() in (
+                    "1", "true", "yes", "on"
+                )
+            else:
+                _wd_enabled = bool(_wd_scalar)
+            watchdog_cfg = {"enabled": _wd_enabled}
+        watchdog_cfg = self._merge_watchdog_overrides(
+            watchdog_cfg, yaml_present=watchdog_yaml_present
+        )
         self._configure_watchdog(watchdog_cfg)
 
         # Start channels + WebSocket server concurrently

src/praisonai-bot/praisonai_bot/scheduler/executor.py

@@ -567,6 +567,11 @@ class ScheduledAgentExecutor:
             logger.warning("Job '%s' execution failed: %s", job.id, e)
             err = str(e)
             duration = time.time() - started
+            # Provider-quota hold: a 429 / quota failure parks the job past the
+            # provider's own reset window so it stops re-firing and re-failing
+            # every tick against a benched provider. ``e`` (not ``err``) is
+            # passed so the classifier can read the response headers.
+            held_until = self._maybe_hold_on_rate_limit(job, e)
             self._runner.mark_run(job, status="failed", error=err, duration=duration)
             if self._on_failure:
                 self._on_failure(job, err)
@@ -574,12 +579,20 @@ class ScheduledAgentExecutor:
                 job=job, status="failed", error=err, duration=duration,
             )
             await asyncio.to_thread(self._audit_output, job, failed)
-            await self._maybe_deliver_failure(job, failed)
+            if held_until is not None:
+                await self._maybe_deliver_hold(job, failed, held_until)
+            else:
+                await self._maybe_deliver_failure(job, failed)
             return failed
         finally:
             if _restore_tools is not None:
                 _restore_tools()
 
+        # The turn reached the model and returned — clear any prior quota hold
+        # (proof the provider's window reopened), fingerprinted so a stale error
+        # can't keep the job parked.
+        self._clear_quota_hold(job)
+
         # Success - calculate duration before delivery
         duration = time.time() - started
 
@@ -871,6 +884,15 @@ class ScheduledAgentExecutor:
         if succeeded and pending_state_updates:
             self._persist_job_state(job, prior_state, pending_state_updates)
 
+        # Provider-quota hold: a backend turn that reached the model reopens the
+        # window (clear any prior hold); a 429/quota error parks the job past
+        # the provider's reset window like the native-agent path.
+        held_until: Optional[float] = None
+        if succeeded:
+            self._clear_quota_hold(job)
+        else:
+            held_until = self._maybe_hold_on_rate_limit(job, Exception(str(error)))
+
         status = "succeeded" if succeeded else "failed"
         self._runner.mark_run(
             job,
@@ -896,7 +918,10 @@ class ScheduledAgentExecutor:
         )
         await asyncio.to_thread(self._audit_output, job, result)
         if not succeeded:
-            await self._maybe_deliver_failure(job, result)
+            if held_until is not None:
+                await self._maybe_deliver_hold(job, result, held_until)
+            else:
+                await self._maybe_deliver_failure(job, result)
         return result
 
     async def _execute_command(
@@ -1365,6 +1390,118 @@ class ScheduledAgentExecutor:
 
         return None, _restore
 
+    # ── provider-quota hold helpers ──────────────────────────────────
+
+    def _maybe_hold_on_rate_limit(
+        self, job: "ScheduleJob", error: Exception,
+    ) -> Optional[float]:
+        """Park ``job`` past a provider's rate-limit window on a 429/quota fail.
+
+        Returns the epoch the job is parked until when a hold was applied, else
+        ``None`` (non-quota failure, no usable reset window, or policy disabled).
+        The decision is the core pure helper ``quota_hold_from_failure`` — the
+        reschedule contract lives next to ``is_due``; here we only apply it to
+        the in-memory job so the subsequent ``mark_run`` persists it. The parked
+        instant coalesces intervening fires: ``is_due`` returns ``False`` until
+        it elapses, so the job stops re-firing and re-failing every tick.
+        """
+        policy = self._run_policy
+        if policy is None or not getattr(policy, "hold_on_rate_limit", False):
+            return None
+        try:
+            from praisonaiagents.scheduler import quota_hold_from_failure
+        except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - core primitive always present
+            return None
+        slack = getattr(policy, "hold_slack_seconds", 60.0)
+        hold_until = quota_hold_from_failure(error, time.time(), slack)
+        if hold_until is None:
+            return None
+        # Coalesce: never shorten an existing (later) hold. A fingerprint of the
+        # schedule ties the hold to the job's current cadence so a stale error
+        # cannot keep re-parking a job whose schedule changed underneath it.
+        prior = getattr(job, "hold_until", None)
+        if isinstance(prior, (int, float)) and prior > hold_until:
+            hold_until = prior
+        try:
+            job.hold_until = hold_until
+        except Exception as e:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+            logger.warning("Could not set quota hold for job '%s': %s", job.id, e)
+            return None
+        logger.info(
+            "Job '%s' held until %.0f after provider rate-limit", job.id, hold_until,
+        )
+        return hold_until
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _clear_quota_hold(job: "ScheduleJob") -> None:
+        """Clear a prior quota hold once a run reaches the model.
+
+        A completed model turn is proof the provider's window reopened, so the
+        park is lifted; the subsequent ``mark_run`` persists the cleared field.
+        No-op when the job was never parked.
+        """
+        if getattr(job, "hold_until", None) is not None:
+            try:
+                job.hold_until = None
+            except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+                pass
+
+    async def _maybe_deliver_hold(
+        self, job: "ScheduleJob", result: JobResult, held_until: float,
+    ) -> None:
+        """Emit one "held until N" notice for a parked job via the incident path.
+
+        Reuses the same de-duplicating incident/alert plumbing as
+        :meth:`_maybe_deliver_failure` so a benched provider produces a single
+        notice, not one alert per skipped tick. Falls back to nothing extra when
+        failure delivery is disabled — the hold itself still applies.
+        """
+        if self._run_policy is None or not self._run_policy.deliver_on_failure:
+            return
+        delivery = getattr(job, "delivery", None)
+        if not delivery or not self._can_deliver(delivery):
+            return
+        # A hold is a distinct operational state (the job is now silenced for a
+        # whole provider-reset window) and is emitted at most once per window:
+        # ``is_due`` coalesces intervening fires, so this method only runs on the
+        # tick that *newly* parks the job. It must therefore NOT be gated on the
+        # failure ``alert_after_failures`` threshold — otherwise a job configured
+        # to alert only after N failures would park silently and the operator
+        # would never learn it was held (greptile #3). We still fold the failure
+        # through the incident tracker so failure/recovery accounting stays
+        # consistent, but deliver the hold notice regardless of its alert state.
+        pending: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None
+        observed = self._observe_incident(job, result)
+        if observed is not None:
+            _incident, pending = observed
+        try:
+            when = time.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", time.localtime(held_until))
+        except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+            when = str(held_until)
+        summary = (
+            f"⏸️ Scheduled job '{getattr(job, 'name', job.id)}' held until "
+            f"{when} (provider rate-limited): {result.error or 'quota exceeded'}"
+        )
+        try:
+            if await self._dispatch_delivery(delivery, summary):
+                result.delivered = True
+                self._commit_incident(job, pending)
+                logger.info("Delivered hold notice for job '%s'", job.id)
+            else:
+                result.delivery_error = (
+                    f"hold-notice delivery to {delivery.channel}:"
+                    f"{delivery.channel_id} did not complete"
+                )
+                logger.warning(
+                    "Hold-notice delivery did not complete for job '%s'; "
+                    "leaving incident un-alerted to retry", job.id,
+                )
+        except Exception as e:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+            result.delivery_error = str(e)
+            logger.warning(
+                "Hold-notice delivery failed for job '%s': %s", job.id, e,
+            )
+
     # ── run-policy helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────
 
     def _assemble_scan_target(self, agent: Any, message: str) -> str:

src/praisonai-bot/tests/unit/bots/test_outbox_operator.py

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Tests for the operator inspect/retry/purge surface on the durable outbound
+queue (Issue #5366), giving parity with the inbound DLQ CLI.
+
+Covers ``OutboundQueue.list`` (with status/target filters), ``stats``,
+``retry`` (requeue a failed/permanent entry for the next drain), and
+``purge_entry`` (targeted single-entry delete).
+"""
+
+import asyncio
+
+from praisonai_bot.bots._outbox import OutboundQueue
+
+
+def test_list_returns_enqueued_entries(tmp_path):
+    async def run():
+        q = OutboundQueue(path=str(tmp_path / "o.sqlite"))
+        await q.enqueue("m1", "telegram:1", {"text": "a"})
+        await q.enqueue("m2", "slack:C0", {"text": "b"})
+        entries = q.list()
+        assert {e.idempotency_key for e in entries} == {"m1", "m2"}
+        assert all(e.status == "pending" for e in entries)
+
+    asyncio.run(run())
+
+
+def test_list_filters_by_status_and_target(tmp_path):
+    async def run():
+        q = OutboundQueue(path=str(tmp_path / "o.sqlite"))
+        k1 = await q.enqueue("m1", "telegram:1", {"text": "a"})
+        await q.enqueue("m2", "slack:C0", {"text": "b"})
+        await q.mark_failed(k1, "boom", permanent=True)
+
+        failed = q.list(status="permanent_failure")
+        assert [e.idempotency_key for e in failed] == ["m1"]
+
+        by_target = q.list(target="slack:C0")
+        assert [e.idempotency_key for e in by_target] == ["m2"]
+
+        assert q.list(status="pending", target="slack:C0")[0].idempotency_key == "m2"
+
+    asyncio.run(run())
+
+
+def test_stats_counts_per_status(tmp_path):
+    async def run():
+        q = OutboundQueue(path=str(tmp_path / "o.sqlite"))
+        k1 = await q.enqueue("m1", "telegram:1", {"text": "a"})
+        await q.enqueue("m2", "telegram:2", {"text": "b"})
+        await q.mark_failed(k1, "boom", permanent=True)
+
+        stats = q.stats()
+        assert stats.get("pending") == 1
+        assert stats.get("permanent_failure") == 1
+
+    asyncio.run(run())
+
+
+def test_retry_requeues_permanent_failure(tmp_path):
+    async def run():
+        q = OutboundQueue(path=str(tmp_path / "o.sqlite"))
+        key = await q.enqueue("m1", "telegram:1", {"text": "a"})
+        await q.mark_failed(key, "boom", permanent=True)
+        assert q.stats().get("permanent_failure") == 1
+
+        assert await q.retry(key) is True
+        entry = q.list()[0]
+        assert entry.status == "pending"
+        assert entry.attempts == 0
+        assert entry.error is None
+
+        # Second retry is a no-op (already pending, not terminal-failed).
+        assert await q.retry(key) is False
+
+    asyncio.run(run())
+
+
+def test_retry_unknown_key_returns_false(tmp_path):
+    async def run():
+        q = OutboundQueue(path=str(tmp_path / "o.sqlite"))
+        assert await q.retry("telegram:1:999") is False
+
+    asyncio.run(run())
+
+
+def test_purge_entry_removes_single_entry(tmp_path):
+    async def run():
+        q = OutboundQueue(path=str(tmp_path / "o.sqlite"))
+        key = await q.enqueue("m1", "telegram:1", {"text": "a"})
+        await q.enqueue("m2", "telegram:2", {"text": "b"})
+
+        assert q.purge_entry(key) is True
+        remaining = q.list()
+        assert [e.idempotency_key for e in remaining] == ["m2"]
+
+        assert q.purge_entry(key) is False
+
+    asyncio.run(run())
+
+
+def test_retried_entry_drains_successfully(tmp_path):
+    async def run():
+        q = OutboundQueue(path=str(tmp_path / "o.sqlite"))
+        key = await q.enqueue("m1", "telegram:1", {"text": "a"})
+        await q.mark_failed(key, "chat unavailable", permanent=True)
+
+        await q.retry(key)
+
+        sent = []
+
+        async def sender(target, payload):
+            sent.append((target, payload))
+            return True
+
+        succeeded, failed = await q.drain(sender)
+        assert succeeded == 1 and failed == 0
+        assert sent == [("telegram:1", {"text": "a"})]
+        assert q.list(status="sent")[0].idempotency_key == "m1"
+
+    asyncio.run(run())
+
+
+def test_retry_does_not_touch_recovered_entry(tmp_path):
+    """A crash-recovered entry must keep its 'recovered' safeguard; manual retry
+    is a no-op so the next drain still reconciles/annotates it (no unlabelled
+    duplicate)."""
+
+    async def run():
+        path = tmp_path / "o.sqlite"
+        q1 = OutboundQueue(path=str(path))
+        key = await q1.enqueue("m1", "telegram:1", {"text": "a"})
+        # Simulate an in-flight send interrupted by a crash: leave it 'sending'.
+        with q1._lock, __import__("contextlib").closing(q1._connect()) as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE outbound_queue SET status = 'sending' WHERE id = ?",
+                (q1._extract_id_from_key(key),),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        # Reopen: crash recovery flips 'sending' -> 'recovered'.
+        q2 = OutboundQueue(path=str(path))
+        assert q2.list()[0].status == "recovered"
+
+        assert await q2.retry(key) is False
+        assert q2.list()[0].status == "recovered"
+
+    asyncio.run(run())
+
+
+def test_purge_refuses_in_flight_sending_entry(tmp_path):
+    """purge_entry must not delete a row an active send is awaiting a terminal
+    write on."""
+
+    async def run():
+        path = tmp_path / "o.sqlite"
+        q = OutboundQueue(path=str(path))
+        key = await q.enqueue("m1", "telegram:1", {"text": "a"})
+        with q._lock, __import__("contextlib").closing(q._connect()) as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE outbound_queue SET status = 'sending' WHERE id = ?",
+                (q._extract_id_from_key(key),),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+
+        assert q.purge_entry(key) is False
+        assert q.list()[0].status == "sending"
+
+    asyncio.run(run())
+
+
+def test_targeted_ops_reject_mismatched_key(tmp_path):
+    """A key whose id exists but whose target/idempotency differ must not mutate
+    the real entry (stale/mistyped key protection)."""
+
+    async def run():
+        q = OutboundQueue(path=str(tmp_path / "o.sqlite"))
+        key = await q.enqueue("m1", "telegram:1", {"text": "a"})
+        await q.mark_failed(key, "boom", permanent=True)
+        entry_id = q._extract_id_from_key(key)
+
+        wrong_key = f"telegram:999:wrong:{entry_id}"
+        assert await q.retry(wrong_key) is False
+        assert q.purge_entry(wrong_key) is False
+        # Real entry untouched and still actionable via its true key.
+        assert q.list()[0].status == "permanent_failure"
+        assert await q.retry(key) is True
+
+    asyncio.run(run())
+
+
+def test_read_only_does_not_recover_sending_rows(tmp_path):
+    """Opening the outbox read_only (operator inspection) must NOT flip live
+    'sending' rows to 'recovered' — doing so would let a running drain re-claim
+    and duplicate an in-flight message."""
+
+    async def run():
+        path = tmp_path / "o.sqlite"
+        q = OutboundQueue(path=str(path))
+        key = await q.enqueue("m1", "telegram:1", {"text": "a"})
+        with q._lock, __import__("contextlib").closing(q._connect()) as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE outbound_queue SET status = 'sending' WHERE id = ?",
+                (q._extract_id_from_key(key),),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+
+        ro = OutboundQueue(path=str(path), read_only=True)
+        assert ro.list()[0].status == "sending"
+        assert ro.stats().get("sending") == 1
+
+    asyncio.run(run())

src/praisonai-bot/tests/unit/bots/test_session_defer_journal.py

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+"""Issue #5152 — Defer inbound journal completion until the reply is delivered.
+
+By default ``BotSessionManager.chat()`` marks the durable inbound journal entry
+complete on the agent's clean exit — *before* the adapter delivers the reply —
+so a crash in the send window loses the reply with no replay. When
+``defer_journal_completion=True`` the entry is left pending and the key is
+stashed so the adapter can call ``complete_last_journal_entry()`` only *after*
+the reply is durably delivered. Off by default → behaviour unchanged.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from praisonai_bot.bots import InboundJournal
+from praisonai_bot.bots._session import BotSessionManager
+
+
+class _Agent:
+    def __init__(self, reply: str = "answer"):
+        self.chat_history = []
+        self._reply = reply
+
+    def chat(self, prompt):
+        self.chat_history.append({"role": "user", "content": prompt})
+        self.chat_history.append({"role": "assistant", "content": self._reply})
+        return self._reply
+
+
+class TestDeferredJournalCompletion:
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_default_completes_on_agent_exit(self, tmp_path):
+        journal = InboundJournal(path=tmp_path / "ingress.sqlite")
+        mgr = BotSessionManager(platform="telegram", ingress_journal=journal)
+
+        out = await mgr.chat(
+            _Agent(), "u1", "hi", message_id="m1", account="acct"
+        )
+
+        assert out == "answer"
+        # Legacy path: settled on agent completion, so a redelivery is deduped.
+        assert journal.receive("telegram", "acct", "u1", "m1", {}) is None
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_deferred_leaves_entry_pending_until_delivered(self, tmp_path):
+        journal = InboundJournal(path=tmp_path / "ingress.sqlite")
+        mgr = BotSessionManager(
+            platform="telegram",
+            ingress_journal=journal,
+            defer_journal_completion=True,
+        )
+
+        out = await mgr.chat(
+            _Agent(), "u1", "hi", message_id="m1", account="acct"
+        )
+
+        assert out == "answer"
+        # Not yet delivered → entry stays pending (a crash here would replay).
+        assert journal.pending_count() == 1
+
+        # Adapter delivers the reply, then settles the inbound.
+        assert mgr.complete_last_journal_entry() is True
+        assert journal.pending_count() == 0
+        # Now a redelivery is deduped.
+        assert journal.receive("telegram", "acct", "u1", "m1", {}) is None
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_deferred_entry_replayable_before_delivery(self, tmp_path):
+        journal = InboundJournal(path=tmp_path / "ingress.sqlite")
+        mgr = BotSessionManager(
+            platform="telegram",
+            ingress_journal=journal,
+            defer_journal_completion=True,
+        )
+
+        await mgr.chat(_Agent(), "u1", "hi", message_id="m1", account="acct")
+
+        # Simulate a crash before delivery: the entry is left pending (not
+        # completed), so a redelivery of the same inbound is not deduped away
+        # and returns the pending key for reprocessing rather than silently
+        # losing the reply.
+        assert journal.pending_count() == 1
+        assert journal.receive("telegram", "acct", "u1", "m1", {}) is not None
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_explicit_key_settles_only_that_turn(self, tmp_path):
+        """Regression (Issue #5152): concurrent turns run under different
+        per-storage-key locks, so one turn's delivery acknowledgement must
+        settle *only* that turn's inbound. Passing the explicit journal key to
+        ``complete_last_journal_entry`` guarantees it never settles another
+        still-undelivered turn's entry.
+        """
+        journal = InboundJournal(path=tmp_path / "ingress.sqlite")
+        mgr = BotSessionManager(
+            platform="telegram",
+            ingress_journal=journal,
+            defer_journal_completion=True,
+        )
+
+        # Two different users → two deferred entries, both pending.
+        await mgr.chat(_Agent(), "uA", "hi", message_id="mA", account="acct")
+        key_a = mgr._last_journal_key
+        await mgr.chat(_Agent(), "uB", "hi", message_id="mB", account="acct")
+        key_b = mgr._last_journal_key
+
+        assert key_a is not None and key_b is not None and key_a != key_b
+        assert journal.pending_count() == 2
+
+        # Turn A's reply is delivered first (out of order): settle ONLY A.
+        assert mgr.complete_last_journal_entry(key_a) is True
+        assert journal.pending_count() == 1
+        # B is still pending/redeliverable — not clobbered by A's ack.
+        assert mgr._last_journal_key == key_b
+        assert journal.receive("telegram", "acct", "uB", "mB", {}) is not None
+
+        # Now settle B.
+        assert mgr.complete_last_journal_entry(key_b) is True
+        assert journal.pending_count() == 0

src/praisonai-bot/tests/unit/bots/test_streaming_activity_surface.py

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Tests for the opt-in, privacy-safe activity surface (issue #5314).
+
+During an output-silent tool run in PROGRESS mode, an operator-configured
+phrase keyed by tool *category* may be shown instead of the raw tool name.
+Tool names/args/URLs are never surfaced when a catalogue is configured, and
+behaviour is unchanged when it is not.
+"""
+
+from praisonai_bot.bots._streaming import (
+    _SAFE_ACTIVITY_FALLBACK,
+    DraftStreamer,
+    StreamingConfig,
+    StreamingMode,
+    resolve_activity_category,
+)
+
+
+def _streamer(config: StreamingConfig) -> DraftStreamer:
+    class _Adapter:
+        capabilities = {"live_edit": True}
+
+    s = DraftStreamer(_Adapter(), "chan", config, platform="telegram")
+    s._message_id = "m1"
+    return s
+
+
+def test_resolve_activity_category_mappings():
+    assert resolve_activity_category("web_search") == "web"
+    assert resolve_activity_category("duckduckgo_search") == "search"
+    assert resolve_activity_category("run_shell_command") == "shell"
+    assert resolve_activity_category("python_interpreter") == "code"
+    assert resolve_activity_category("read_file") == "file"
+    assert resolve_activity_category("mcp_tool") == "mcp"
+
+
+def test_resolve_activity_category_falls_back_to_default():
+    assert resolve_activity_category("some_unmapped_tool") == "default"
+    assert resolve_activity_category("") == "default"
+    assert resolve_activity_category(None) == "default"
+
+
+def test_activity_line_uses_curated_phrase_not_tool_name():
+    cfg = StreamingConfig(
+        mode=StreamingMode.PROGRESS,
+        progress_prefix="",
+        activity_phrases={
+            "web": "Searching the web…",
+            "shell": "Running a command…",
+            "default": "Working on it…",
+        },
+    )
+    s = _streamer(cfg)
+    s._current_tool = "web_fetch_secret_url"
+    content = s._render_content()
+    assert content == "Searching the web…"
+    # The raw tool name must never leak.
+    assert "web_fetch_secret_url" not in content
+
+
+def test_activity_line_default_phrase_for_unmapped_category():
+    cfg = StreamingConfig(
+        mode=StreamingMode.PROGRESS,
+        progress_prefix="",
+        activity_phrases={"default": "Working on it…"},
+    )
+    s = _streamer(cfg)
+    s._current_tool = "totally_custom_tool"
+    assert s._render_content() == "Working on it…"
+
+
+def test_no_catalogue_preserves_legacy_behaviour():
+    cfg = StreamingConfig(mode=StreamingMode.PROGRESS, progress_prefix="")
+    s = _streamer(cfg)
+    s._current_tool = "web_search"
+    assert s._render_content() == "Running web_search..."
+
+
+def test_from_dict_inline_activity_phrases():
+    cfg = StreamingConfig.from_dict(
+        {"mode": "progress", "activity_phrases": {"web": "Searching…"}}
+    )
+    assert cfg.activity_phrases == {"web": "Searching…"}
+
+
+def test_from_dict_activity_status_block_enabled():
+    cfg = StreamingConfig.from_dict(
+        {
+            "mode": "progress",
+            "activity_status": {
+                "enabled": True,
+                "phrases": {"web": "Searching the web…", "default": "Working…"},
+            },
+        }
+    )
+    assert cfg.activity_phrases == {
+        "web": "Searching the web…",
+        "default": "Working…",
+    }
+
+
+def test_from_dict_activity_status_disabled_yields_none():
+    cfg = StreamingConfig.from_dict(
+        {
+            "mode": "progress",
+            "activity_status": {"enabled": False, "phrases": {"web": "x"}},
+        }
+    )
+    assert cfg.activity_phrases is None
+
+
+def test_from_dict_defaults_to_none():
+    cfg = StreamingConfig.from_dict({"mode": "progress"})
+    assert cfg.activity_phrases is None
+
+
+def test_partial_catalogue_never_leaks_tool_name():
+    # Catalogue enabled but missing both the matched category AND a default:
+    # opting in must fall back to a safe generic line, NOT the raw tool name.
+    cfg = StreamingConfig(
+        mode=StreamingMode.PROGRESS,
+        progress_prefix="",
+        activity_phrases={"web": "Searching the web…"},
+    )
+    s = _streamer(cfg)
+    s._current_tool = "run_shell_command"
+    content = s._render_content()
+    assert content == _SAFE_ACTIVITY_FALLBACK
+    assert "run_shell_command" not in content
+
+
+def test_schema_retains_activity_status_and_forwards_to_config():
+    # The bot/gateway streaming schema must not silently drop the documented
+    # activity_status block; it must survive validation and reach from_dict.
+    from praisonai_bot.bots._config_schema import StreamingConfigSchema
+
+    schema = StreamingConfigSchema(
+        mode="progress",
+        activity_status={
+            "enabled": True,
+            "phrases": {"web": "Searching the web…", "default": "Working…"},
+        },
+    )
+    assert schema.activity_status is not None
+    cfg = StreamingConfig.from_dict(schema.model_dump())
+    assert cfg.activity_phrases == {
+        "web": "Searching the web…",
+        "default": "Working…",
+    }
+
+
+def test_feed_style_does_not_bypass_curated_phrases():
+    # In feed style with a catalogue enabled, the raw feed (which folds tool
+    # names/summaries) must NOT be rendered; the curated line is shown instead.
+    cfg = StreamingConfig(
+        mode=StreamingMode.PROGRESS,
+        progress_prefix="",
+        progress_style="feed",
+        activity_phrases={"web": "Searching the web…", "default": "Working…"},
+    )
+    s = _streamer(cfg)
+    s._current_tool = "web_fetch"
+    # Simulate a populated feed carrying a raw tool name.
+    s._progress_lines = ["run_shell_command: rm -rf /secret"]
+    content = s._render_content()
+    assert content == "Searching the web…"
+    assert "run_shell_command" not in content
+    assert "secret" not in content

src/praisonai-bot/tests/unit/gateway/test_gateway_watchdog_wiring.py

@@ -108,6 +108,26 @@ def test_merge_watchdog_overrides_cli_wins_over_yaml():
     assert merged["enabled"] is True
 
 
+def test_merge_watchdog_config_field_enables_when_yaml_absent():
+    # Issue #5362: GatewayConfig(watchdog=True) enables the backstop when no
+    # CLI flag and no YAML key are set (yaml_present=False).
+    gw = _make_gateway()
+    gw.config.watchdog = True
+    merged = gw._merge_watchdog_overrides(None, yaml_present=False)
+    assert merged["enabled"] is True
+
+
+def test_explicit_yaml_scalar_false_beats_config_field():
+    # Issue #5362: an explicit ``watchdog: false`` (yaml_present=True) must not
+    # be re-enabled by GatewayConfig(watchdog=True).
+    gw = _make_gateway()
+    gw.config.watchdog = True
+    merged = gw._merge_watchdog_overrides(
+        {"enabled": False}, yaml_present=True
+    )
+    assert merged["enabled"] is False
+
+
 def test_arm_and_disarm_are_safe_without_watchdog():
     gw = _make_gateway()
     # No watchdog configured: both are no-ops and must not raise.

src/praisonai-bot/tests/unit/scheduler/test_botos_quota_hold.py

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+"""BotOS schedule-loop provider-quota hold (Issue #5386, greptile #1).
+
+The BotOS ``_run_schedule_loop`` runs ``agent.chat`` directly rather than
+through :class:`ScheduledAgentExecutor`, so it needs the same provider-quota
+hold or a 429/quota failure re-fires every tick against a benched provider.
+These tests cover the pure ``_apply_schedule_quota_hold`` decision the loop
+applies before ``mark_run``: a 429 with a reset hint parks the job, a
+non-quota failure never parks, a later hold is never shortened, and a success
+clears a prior park.
+"""
+
+import time
+
+import pytest
+
+try:
+    from praisonai_bot.bots.botos import BotOS
+except ImportError:  # pragma: no cover - optional deps not installed
+    BotOS = None
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(BotOS is None, reason="praisonai bots not importable")
+
+
+class _Job:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.name = "j"
+        self.hold_until = None
+
+
+class _RateLimited(Exception):
+    """A 429-shaped provider error carrying a Retry-After header."""
+
+    def __init__(self, retry_after):
+        super().__init__("Rate limit exceeded")
+        self.status_code = 429
+
+        class _Resp:
+            headers = {"retry-after": str(retry_after)}
+
+        self.response = _Resp()
+
+
+def test_rate_limit_failure_parks_botos_job():
+    job = _Job()
+    now = time.time()
+    BotOS._apply_schedule_quota_hold(
+        job, succeeded=False, error=_RateLimited(3600),
+    )
+    assert job.hold_until is not None
+    # Parked past the ~3600s window (+ default 60s slack), allowing drift.
+    assert now + 3600 <= job.hold_until <= now + 3600 + 120
+
+
+def test_non_quota_failure_does_not_park():
+    job = _Job()
+    BotOS._apply_schedule_quota_hold(
+        job, succeeded=False, error=Exception("boom: invalid request"),
+    )
+    assert job.hold_until is None
+
+
+def test_never_shortens_an_existing_later_hold():
+    job = _Job()
+    job.hold_until = time.time() + 10_000
+    prior = job.hold_until
+    BotOS._apply_schedule_quota_hold(
+        job, succeeded=False, error=_RateLimited(60),
+    )
+    # A shorter new window must not shorten a job already parked further out.
+    assert job.hold_until == prior
+
+
+def test_success_clears_prior_hold():
+    job = _Job()
+    job.hold_until = time.time() + 3600
+    BotOS._apply_schedule_quota_hold(job, succeeded=True, error=None)
+    assert job.hold_until is None
+
+
+def test_failure_without_exception_is_inert():
+    job = _Job()
+    BotOS._apply_schedule_quota_hold(job, succeeded=False, error=None)
+    assert job.hold_until is None

src/praisonai-bot/tests/unit/test_gateway_memory_pressure.py

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import pytest
 
 from praisonai_bot.bots._session import BotSessionManager
 from praisonai_bot.gateway.memory_pressure import CgroupMemoryPressure
+from praisonai_bot.gateway.server import GatewaySession, WebSocketGateway
 
 
 class _Store:
@@ -230,3 +231,183 @@ def test_sweep_skips_cache_when_last_store_write_failed():
     mp = _Pressure(100.0, [1000.0])
     assert mgr.sweep_under_pressure(mp) == 0
     assert "a" in mgr._histories
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# WebSocketGateway live-session pressure shedding (Issue #5153)
+#
+# The gateway server is the primary layer that owns ``WebSocketGateway._sessions``
+# and must call the core planner on its housekeeping tick. These tests exercise
+# ``_sweep_sessions_under_pressure`` directly on a bare gateway wired with only
+# the attributes the method (and ``close_session``) touch.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class _SessionStore:
+    """Minimal SessionStore: records that a session's state was persisted."""
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.persisted = {}
+
+    def add_message(self, session_id, role, content, metadata=None):
+        self.persisted[session_id] = metadata
+
+
+def _bare_gateway(store, budget, rss_samples, headroom=0.9):
+    """A ``WebSocketGateway`` with just enough state to run the pressure sweep."""
+    gw = WebSocketGateway.__new__(WebSocketGateway)
+    gw._session_store = store
+    gw._sessions = {}
+    gw._clients = {}
+    gw._client_sessions = {}
+    gw._session_ttls = {}
+    gw._memory_pressure = _Pressure(budget, rss_samples)
+    gw._pressure_headroom = headroom
+
+    class _SC:
+        resume_window = 3600
+    class _Cfg:
+        session_config = _SC()
+    gw.config = _Cfg()
+    return gw
+
+
+def _add_session(gw, sid, last_activity, executing=False):
+    session = GatewaySession(_session_id=sid, _agent_id="agent")
+    session._last_activity = last_activity
+    session._is_executing = executing
+    gw._sessions[sid] = session
+    return session
+
+
+def test_gateway_sheds_coldest_session_first_until_within_budget():
+    store = _SessionStore()
+    # Budget 1000 MiB, target 900; start over at 1000, drop to 850 after the
+    # first (coldest) eviction so exactly one session is shed.
+    gw = _bare_gateway(store, 1000.0, [1000.0, 850.0])
+    _add_session(gw, "cold", 1.0)
+    _add_session(gw, "warm", 100.0)
+    evicted = gw._sweep_sessions_under_pressure()
+    assert evicted == 1
+    assert "cold" not in gw._sessions   # coldest dropped from memory
+    assert "warm" in gw._sessions       # warmest kept live
+    assert "cold" in store.persisted    # transcript left durable
+
+
+def test_gateway_never_evicts_executing_session():
+    store = _SessionStore()
+    gw = _bare_gateway(store, 100.0, [1000.0])
+    _add_session(gw, "busy", 1.0, executing=True)
+    assert gw._sweep_sessions_under_pressure() == 0
+    assert "busy" in gw._sessions
+
+
+def test_gateway_noop_without_session_store():
+    # No durable store ⇒ nothing rebuildable ⇒ never shed (would lose data).
+    gw = _bare_gateway(None, 100.0, [1000.0])
+    _add_session(gw, "a", 1.0)
+    assert gw._sweep_sessions_under_pressure() == 0
+    assert "a" in gw._sessions
+
+
+def test_gateway_noop_when_no_cgroup_budget():
+    store = _SessionStore()
+    gw = _bare_gateway(store, None, [1000.0])  # host without a cgroup limit
+    _add_session(gw, "a", 1.0)
+    assert gw._sweep_sessions_under_pressure() == 0
+    assert "a" in gw._sessions
+
+
+def test_gateway_noop_when_within_budget():
+    store = _SessionStore()
+    gw = _bare_gateway(store, 1000.0, [500.0])  # RSS well under the 900 target
+    _add_session(gw, "a", 1.0)
+    assert gw._sweep_sessions_under_pressure() == 0
+    assert "a" in gw._sessions
+
+
+def test_gateway_noop_when_no_sessions():
+    store = _SessionStore()
+    gw = _bare_gateway(store, 1000.0, [1000.0])
+    assert gw._sweep_sessions_under_pressure() == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Review fixes (PR #5237): never strand a bound client, never lose a session on
+# a failed persist, and shed even when liveness ping/reap is disabled.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_gateway_never_evicts_session_with_live_client():
+    """A session a live WebSocket is bound to is never shed (would strand it).
+
+    Ordinary ``message`` frames look the session up in ``_sessions`` directly and
+    are silently dropped if it is gone (only ``hello``/``join`` rehydrate), so a
+    connected client must keep its session in memory.
+    """
+    store = _SessionStore()
+    gw = _bare_gateway(store, 100.0, [1000.0])
+    _add_session(gw, "bound", 1.0)
+    gw._client_sessions["client-1"] = "bound"  # a live connection holds it
+    assert gw._sweep_sessions_under_pressure() == 0
+    assert "bound" in gw._sessions
+    assert "bound" not in store.persisted
+
+
+def test_gateway_sheds_disconnected_but_keeps_bound_session():
+    """Under pressure, only the disconnected cold session is shed."""
+    store = _SessionStore()
+    gw = _bare_gateway(store, 1000.0, [1000.0, 850.0])
+    _add_session(gw, "cold", 1.0)     # coldest, no client → evictable
+    _add_session(gw, "bound", 2.0)    # colder than warm but has a client
+    gw._client_sessions["client-1"] = "bound"
+    evicted = gw._sweep_sessions_under_pressure()
+    assert evicted == 1
+    assert "cold" not in gw._sessions
+    assert "bound" in gw._sessions    # protected despite being cold
+
+
+def test_gateway_keeps_session_when_persist_fails():
+    """A failed final-persist must leave the session in memory (no data loss)."""
+
+    class _FlakyStore(_SessionStore):
+        def add_message(self, session_id, role, content, metadata=None):
+            raise RuntimeError("store backend down")
+
+    store = _FlakyStore()
+    gw = _bare_gateway(store, 1000.0, [1000.0, 1000.0])
+    _add_session(gw, "cold", 1.0)
+    assert gw._sweep_sessions_under_pressure() == 0
+    assert "cold" in gw._sessions        # retained — its only copy is in memory
+    assert "cold" not in store.persisted
+
+
+def test_gateway_keeps_session_when_store_returns_false():
+    """A falsy ``add_message`` result (failed write, no exception) retains it.
+
+    ``SessionStoreProtocol.add_message`` returns ``bool`` and both built-in
+    stores return ``False`` when a write fails; treating that as success would
+    drop the session's only current copy under pressure (Greptile P1).
+    """
+
+    class _FalsyStore(_SessionStore):
+        def add_message(self, session_id, role, content, metadata=None):
+            return False  # write failed but did not raise
+
+    store = _FalsyStore()
+    gw = _bare_gateway(store, 1000.0, [1000.0, 1000.0])
+    _add_session(gw, "cold", 1.0)
+    assert gw._sweep_sessions_under_pressure() == 0
+    assert "cold" in gw._sessions        # retained — the write did not persist
+    assert "cold" not in gw._session_ttls
+    assert gw._evict_persisted_session("cold") is False
+
+
+def test_gateway_evict_persisted_session_sets_resume_ttl():
+    store = _SessionStore()
+    gw = _bare_gateway(store, 1000.0, [1000.0])
+    _add_session(gw, "cold", 1.0)
+    assert gw._evict_persisted_session("cold") is True
+    assert "cold" not in gw._sessions
+    assert "cold" in store.persisted
+    assert "cold" in gw._session_ttls    # resumable window stamped