This re-applies r336929 with a fix to accomodate for the Mips target
scheduling multiple SelectionDAG instances into the pass pipeline.
PrologEpilogInserter and StackColoring depend on the StackProtector analysis
being alive from the point it is run until PEI, which requires that they are all
scheduled in the same FunctionPassManager. Inserting a (machine) ModulePass
between StackProtector and PEI results in these passes being in separate
FunctionPassManagers and the StackProtector is not available for PEI.
PEI and StackColoring don't use much information from the StackProtector pass,
so transfering the required information to MachineFrameInfo is cleaner than
keeping the StackProtector pass around. This commit moves the SSP layout
information to MFI instead of keeping it in the pass.
This patch set (D37580, D37581, D37582, D37583, D37584, D37585, D37586, D37587)
is a first draft of the pagerando implementation described in
http://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2017-June/113794.html.
Patch by Stephen Crane <sjc@immunant.com>
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D49256
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@336964 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
PrologEpilogInserter and StackColoring depend on the StackProtector analysis
being alive from the point it is run until PEI, which requires that they are all
scheduled in the same FunctionPassManager. Inserting a (machine) ModulePass
between StackProtector and PEI results in these passes being in separate
FunctionPassManagers and the StackProtector is not available for PEI.
PEI and StackColoring don't use much information from the StackProtector pass,
so transfering the required information to MachineFrameInfo is cleaner than
keeping the StackProtector pass around. This commit moves the SSP layout
information to MFI instead of keeping it in the pass.
This patch set (D37580, D37581, D37582, D37583, D37584, D37585, D37586, D37587)
is a first draft of the pagerando implementation described in
http://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2017-June/113794.html.
Patch by Stephen Crane <sjc@immunant.com>
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D49256
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@336929 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
We've been running doxygen with the autobrief option for a couple of
years now. This makes the \brief markers into our comments
redundant. Since they are a visual distraction and we don't want to
encourage more \brief markers in new code either, this patch removes
them all.
Patch produced by
for i in $(git grep -l '\\brief'); do perl -pi -e 's/\\brief //g' $i & done
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D46290
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@331272 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Summary:
The 'strong' StackProtector heuristic takes into consideration call instructions.
Certain intrinsics, such as lifetime.start, can cause the
StackProtector to protect functions that do not need to be protected.
Specifically, a volatile variable, (not optimized away), but belonging to a stack
allocation will encourage a llvm.lifetime.start to be inserted during
compilation. Because that intrinsic is a 'call' the strong StackProtector
will see that the alloca'd variable is being passed to a call instruction, and
insert a stack protector. In this case the intrinsic isn't really lowered to a
call. This can cause unnecessary stack checking, at the cost of additional
(wasted) CPU cycles.
In the future we should rely on TargetTransformInfo::isLoweredToCall, but as of
now that routine considers all intrinsics as not being lowerable. That needs
to be corrected, and such a change is on my list of things to get moving on.
As a side note, the updated stack-protector-dbginfo.ll test always seems to
pass. I never see the dbg.declare/dbg.value reaching the
StackProtector::HasAddressTaken, but I don't see any code excluding dbg
intrinsic calls either, so I think it's the safest thing to do.
Reviewers: void, timshen
Reviewed By: timshen
Subscribers: llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D45331
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@329450 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
The patch originally broke Chromium (crbug.com/791714) due to its failing to
specify that the new pseudo instructions clobber EFLAGS. This commit fixes
that.
> Summary: This strengthens the guard and matches MSVC.
>
> Reviewers: hans, etienneb
>
> Subscribers: hiraditya, JDevlieghere, vlad.tsyrklevich, llvm-commits
>
> Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40622
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@319824 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
All these headers already depend on CodeGen headers so moving them into
CodeGen fixes the layering (since CodeGen depends on Target, not the
other way around).
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@318490 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
I did this a long time ago with a janky python script, but now
clang-format has built-in support for this. I fed clang-format every
line with a #include and let it re-sort things according to the precise
LLVM rules for include ordering baked into clang-format these days.
I've reverted a number of files where the results of sorting includes
isn't healthy. Either places where we have legacy code relying on
particular include ordering (where possible, I'll fix these separately)
or where we have particular formatting around #include lines that
I didn't want to disturb in this patch.
This patch is *entirely* mechanical. If you get merge conflicts or
anything, just ignore the changes in this patch and run clang-format
over your #include lines in the files.
Sorry for any noise here, but it is important to keep these things
stable. I was seeing an increasing number of patches with irrelevant
re-ordering of #include lines because clang-format was used. This patch
at least isolates that churn, makes it easy to skip when resolving
conflicts, and gets us to a clean baseline (again).
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@304787 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Rename the DEBUG_TYPE to match the names of corresponding passes where
it makes sense. Also establish the pattern of simply referencing
DEBUG_TYPE instead of repeating the passname where possible.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@303921 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
This provides a new way to access the TargetMachine through
TargetPassConfig, as a dependency.
The patterns replaced here are:
* Passes handling a null TargetMachine call
`getAnalysisIfAvailable<TargetPassConfig>`.
* Passes not handling a null TargetMachine
`addRequired<TargetPassConfig>` and call
`getAnalysis<TargetPassConfig>`.
* MachineFunctionPasses now use MF.getTarget().
* Remove all the TargetMachine constructors.
* Remove INITIALIZE_TM_PASS.
This fixes a crash when running `llc -start-before prologepilog`.
PEI needs StackProtector, which gets constructed without a TargetMachine
by the pass manager. The StackProtector pass doesn't handle the case
where there is no TargetMachine, so it segfaults.
Related to PR30324.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D33222
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@303360 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
From a user prospective, it forces the use of an annoying nullptr to mark the end of the vararg, and there's not type checking on the arguments.
The variadic template is an obvious solution to both issues.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D31070
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@299949 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Module::getOrInsertFunction is using C-style vararg instead of
variadic templates.
From a user prospective, it forces the use of an annoying nullptr
to mark the end of the vararg, and there's not type checking on the
arguments. The variadic template is an obvious solution to both
issues.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@299925 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Module::getOrInsertFunction is using C-style vararg instead of
variadic templates.
From a user prospective, it forces the use of an annoying nullptr
to mark the end of the vararg, and there's not type checking on the
arguments. The variadic template is an obvious solution to both
issues.
Patch by: Serge Guelton <serge.guelton@telecom-bretagne.eu>
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D31070
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@299699 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
With this, it shows up as an attribute in YAML and non-printable characters
are properly removed by GlobalValue::getRealLinkageName.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@297362 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Stack Smash Protection is not completely free, so in hot code, the overhead it causes can cause performance issues. By adding diagnostic information for which functions have SSP and why, a user can quickly determine what they can do to stop SSP being applied to a specific hot function.
This change adds a remark that is reported by the stack protection code when an instruction or attribute is encountered that causes SSP to be applied.
Patch by: James Henderson
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D29023
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@296483 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Stack Smash Protection is not completely free, so in hot code, the overhead it causes can cause performance issues. By adding diagnostic information for which function have SSP and why, a user can quickly determine what they can do to stop SSP being applied to a specific hot function.
This change adds an SSP-specific DiagnosticInfo class and uses of it to the Stack Protection code. A subsequent change to clang will cause the remarks to be emitted when enabled.
Patch by: James Henderson
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D29023
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@294590 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
This check caused us to skip adding layout information for calls to
alloca in sspreq/sspstrong mode. We check properly for sspstrong later
on (and add the correct layout info when doing so), so removing this
shouldn't hurt.
No test is included, since testing this using lit seems to require
checking for exact offsets in asm, which is something that the lit tests
for this avoid. If someone cares deeply, I'm happy to write a unittest
or something to cover this, but that feels like overkill.
Patch by Daniel Micay.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D22714
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@282022 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
in order to make sure that its TargetMachine constructor is
registered.
This allows us to run the PEI machine pass with MIR input
(see PR30324).
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@281474 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Summary:
This patch is adding support for the MSVC buffer security check implementation
The buffer security check is turned on with the '/GS' compiler switch.
* https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/8dbf701c.aspx
* To be added to clang here: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20347
Some overview of buffer security check feature and implementation:
* https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa290051(VS.71).aspx
* http://www.ksyash.com/2011/01/buffer-overflow-protection-3/
* http://blog.osom.info/2012/02/understanding-vs-c-compilers-buffer.html
For the following example:
```
int example(int offset, int index) {
char buffer[10];
memset(buffer, 0xCC, index);
return buffer[index];
}
```
The MSVC compiler is adding these instructions to perform stack integrity check:
```
push ebp
mov ebp,esp
sub esp,50h
[1] mov eax,dword ptr [__security_cookie (01068024h)]
[2] xor eax,ebp
[3] mov dword ptr [ebp-4],eax
push ebx
push esi
push edi
mov eax,dword ptr [index]
push eax
push 0CCh
lea ecx,[buffer]
push ecx
call _memset (010610B9h)
add esp,0Ch
mov eax,dword ptr [index]
movsx eax,byte ptr buffer[eax]
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
[4] mov ecx,dword ptr [ebp-4]
[5] xor ecx,ebp
[6] call @__security_check_cookie@4 (01061276h)
mov esp,ebp
pop ebp
ret
```
The instrumentation above is:
* [1] is loading the global security canary,
* [3] is storing the local computed ([2]) canary to the guard slot,
* [4] is loading the guard slot and ([5]) re-compute the global canary,
* [6] is validating the resulting canary with the '__security_check_cookie' and performs error handling.
Overview of the current stack-protection implementation:
* lib/CodeGen/StackProtector.cpp
* There is a default stack-protection implementation applied on intermediate representation.
* The target can overload 'getIRStackGuard' method if it has a standard location for the stack protector cookie.
* An intrinsic 'Intrinsic::stackprotector' is added to the prologue. It will be expanded by the instruction selection pass (DAG or Fast).
* Basic Blocks are added to every instrumented function to receive the code for handling stack guard validation and errors handling.
* Guard manipulation and comparison are added directly to the intermediate representation.
* lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp
* lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp
* There is an implementation that adds instrumentation during instruction selection (for better handling of sibbling calls).
* see long comment above 'class StackProtectorDescriptor' declaration.
* The target needs to override 'getSDagStackGuard' to activate SDAG stack protection generation. (note: getIRStackGuard MUST be nullptr).
* 'getSDagStackGuard' returns the appropriate stack guard (security cookie)
* The code is generated by 'SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp' and 'SelectionDAGISel.cpp'.
* include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h
* Contains function to retrieve the default Guard 'Value'; should be overriden by each target to select which implementation is used and provide Guard 'Value'.
* lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp
* Contains the x86 specialisation; Guard 'Value' used by the SelectionDAG algorithm.
Function-based Instrumentation:
* The MSVC doesn't inline the stack guard comparison in every function. Instead, a call to '__security_check_cookie' is added to the epilogue before every return instructions.
* To support function-based instrumentation, this patch is
* adding a function to get the function-based check (llvm 'Value', see include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h),
* If provided, the stack protection instrumentation won't be inlined and a call to that function will be added to the prologue.
* modifying (SelectionDAGISel.cpp) do avoid producing basic blocks used for inline instrumentation,
* generating the function-based instrumentation during the ISEL pass (SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp),
* if FastISEL (not SelectionDAG), using the fallback which rely on the same function-based implemented over intermediate representation (StackProtector.cpp).
Modifications
* adding support for MSVC (lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp)
* adding support function-based instrumentation (lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp, .h)
Results
* IR generated instrumentation:
```
clang-cl /GS test.cc /Od /c -mllvm -print-isel-input
```
```
*** Final LLVM Code input to ISel ***
; Function Attrs: nounwind sspstrong
define i32 @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"(i32 %offset, i32 %index) #0 {
entry:
%StackGuardSlot = alloca i8* <<<-- Allocated guard slot
%0 = call i8* @llvm.stackguard() <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value
call void @llvm.stackprotector(i8* %0, i8** %StackGuardSlot) <<<-- Prologue intrinsic call (store to Guard slot)
%index.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%offset.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%buffer = alloca [10 x i8], align 1
store i32 %index, i32* %index.addr, align 4
store i32 %offset, i32* %offset.addr, align 4
%arraydecay = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 0
%1 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4
call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %arraydecay, i8 -52, i32 %1, i32 1, i1 false)
%2 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4
%arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 %2
%3 = load i8, i8* %arrayidx, align 1
%conv = sext i8 %3 to i32
%4 = load volatile i8*, i8** %StackGuardSlot <<<-- Loading Guard slot
call void @__security_check_cookie(i8* %4) <<<-- Epilogue function-based check
ret i32 %conv
}
```
* SelectionDAG generated instrumentation:
```
clang-cl /GS test.cc /O1 /c /FA
```
```
"?example@@YAHHH@Z": # @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"
# BB#0: # %entry
pushl %esi
subl $16, %esp
movl ___security_cookie, %eax <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value
movl 28(%esp), %esi
movl %eax, 12(%esp) <<<-- Store to Guard slot
leal 2(%esp), %eax
pushl %esi
pushl $204
pushl %eax
calll _memset
addl $12, %esp
movsbl 2(%esp,%esi), %esi
movl 12(%esp), %ecx <<<-- Loading Guard slot
calll @__security_check_cookie@4 <<<-- Epilogue function-based check
movl %esi, %eax
addl $16, %esp
popl %esi
retl
```
Reviewers: kcc, pcc, eugenis, rnk
Subscribers: majnemer, llvm-commits, hans, thakis, rnk
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20346
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@272053 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
With this change, ideally IR pass can always generate llvm.stackguard
call to get the stack guard; but for now there are still IR form stack
guard customizations around (see getIRStackGuard()). Future SSP
customization should go through LOAD_STACK_GUARD.
There is a behavior change: stack guard values are not CSEed anymore,
since we should never reuse the value in case that it has been spilled (and
corrupted). See ssp-guard-spill.ll. This also cause the change of stack
size and codegen in X86 and AArch64 test cases.
Ideally we'd like to know if the guard created in llvm.stackprotector() gets
spilled or not. If the value is spilled, discard the value and reload
stack guard; otherwise reuse the value. This can be done by teaching
register allocator to know how to rematerialize LOAD_STACK_GUARD and
force a rematerialization (which seems hard), or check for spilling in
expandPostRAPseudo. It only makes sense when the stack guard is a global
variable, which requires more instructions to load. Anyway, this seems to go out
of the scope of the current patch.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@266806 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Add StackProtector to SafeStack. This adds limited protection against
data corruption in the caller frame. Current implementation treats
all stack protector levels as -fstack-protector-all.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@266004 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
This is a cleanup patch for SSP support in LLVM. There is no functional change.
llvm.stackprotectorcheck is not needed, because SelectionDAG isn't
actually lowering it in SelectBasicBlock; rather, it adds check code in
FinishBasicBlock, ignoring the position where the intrinsic is inserted
(See FindSplitPointForStackProtector()).
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@265851 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Bionic has a defined thread-local location for the stack protector
cookie. Emit a direct load instead of going through __stack_chk_guard.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@265481 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
This patch removes all weight-related interfaces from BPI and replace
them by probability versions. With this patch, we won't use edge weight
anymore in either IR or MC passes. Edge probabilitiy is a better
representation in terms of CFG update and validation.
Differential revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D15519
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@256263 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Finish removing implicit ilist iterator conversions from LLVMCodeGen.
I'm sure there are lots more of these in lib/CodeGen/*/.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@249915 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Summary:
This change is part of a series of commits dedicated to have a single
DataLayout during compilation by using always the one owned by the
module.
Reviewers: echristo
Subscribers: llvm-commits, rafael, yaron.keren
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D11010
From: Mehdi Amini <mehdi.amini@apple.com>
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@241646 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Canonicalize access to function attributes to use the simpler API.
getAttributes().getAttribute(AttributeSet::FunctionIndex, Kind)
=> getFnAttribute(Kind)
getAttributes().hasAttribute(AttributeSet::FunctionIndex, Kind)
=> hasFnAttribute(Kind)
Also, add `Function::getFnStackAlignment()`, and canonicalize:
getAttributes().getStackAlignment(AttributeSet::FunctionIndex)
=> getFnStackAlignment()
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@229208 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
This is to be consistent with StringSet and ultimately with the standard
library's associative container insert function.
This lead to updating SmallSet::insert to return pair<iterator, bool>,
and then to update SmallPtrSet::insert to return pair<iterator, bool>,
and then to update all the existing users of those functions...
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@222334 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Windows defines NULL to 0, which when used as an argument to a variadic
function, is not a null pointer constant. As a result, Clang's
-Wsentinel fires on this code. Using '0' would be wrong on most 64-bit
platforms, but both MSVC and Clang make it work on Windows. Sidestep the
issue with nullptr.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@221940 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
define below all header includes in the lib/CodeGen/... tree. While the
current modules implementation doesn't check for this kind of ODR
violation yet, it is likely to grow support for it in the future. It
also removes one layer of macro pollution across all the included
headers.
Other sub-trees will follow.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@206837 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
