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Author SHA1 Message Date
beardthelion 923d47d491 chore: refresh PR head 2026-11-05 10:53:18 -06:00
beardthelion f9942ee710 fix(node): validate ref-update SHAs are hex, not just length 40
parse_ref_updates accepted any 40-byte string as an object id, so a
peer-supplied pkt-line with non-hex content was forwarded into
RefUpdateEvents on gossip, branch_cid rows, and sync-notify JSON as a
canonical-looking identifier. Require [0-9a-fA-F] on both fields.

Closes #398
2026-09-10 17:17:49 -05:00
Kevin Codex bfc44f926d Merge pull request #381 from Gitlawb/fix/gl-whoami-capped-body-read
fix(gl): read whoami error bodies through CappedBody.text
2026-08-26 13:26:50 +08:00
beardthelion 65f5989a1d test(node): pin owner-push off in receive-pack lock tests
These lock-path proofs use non-owner proof DIDs. With enforce_owner_push
defaulting on, they fail before receive-pack runs.
2026-08-25 10:27:48 -05:00
beardthelion 4725146db2 fix(gl): read whoami error bodies through CappedBody.text
#173 changed read_body_capped to return CappedBody; peer.rs and sync.rs
were updated but whoami.rs was not, leaving main red after the #223 merge.
2026-08-25 10:04:20 -05:00
2 changed files with 56 additions and 2 deletions

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+55 -1
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@@ -3153,6 +3153,12 @@ struct RefUpdate {
ref_name: String,
}
/// A git object id is 40 hex chars; length alone is not enough, since a peer
/// can send 40 arbitrary bytes (#398).
fn is_hex_sha(s: &str) -> bool {
s.len() == 40 && s.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit())
}
/// Parse git receive-pack pkt-line ref updates from the request body.
/// Format per line: `<40-hex-old> <40-hex-new> <refname>[NUL capabilities]\n`
fn parse_ref_updates(body: &[u8]) -> Vec<RefUpdate> {
@@ -3194,7 +3200,7 @@ fn parse_ref_updates(body: &[u8]) -> Vec<RefUpdate> {
.trim_end_matches('\n');
let parts: Vec<&str> = line.splitn(3, ' ').collect();
if parts.len() == 3 && parts[0].len() == 40 && parts[1].len() == 40 {
if parts.len() == 3 && is_hex_sha(parts[0]) && is_hex_sha(parts[1]) {
updates.push(RefUpdate {
old_sha: parts[0].to_string(),
new_sha: parts[1].to_string(),
@@ -3488,6 +3494,45 @@ mod tests {
);
}
// #398: a peer-supplied pkt-line whose 40-byte "SHA" fields carry non-hex
// content must be dropped, not forwarded into RefUpdate events, branch_cid
// rows, and sync-notify JSON as a canonical-looking identifier.
#[test]
fn parse_ref_updates_requires_hex_shas() {
let sha_a = "a".repeat(40);
let sha_b = "b".repeat(40);
let pkt = |old: &str, new: &str, refname: &str| {
let line = format!("{old} {new} {refname}");
format!("{:04x}{}0000", line.len() + 4, line).into_bytes()
};
// Valid 40-hex old + new -> accepted.
let updates = parse_ref_updates(&pkt(&sha_a, &sha_b, "refs/heads/main"));
assert_eq!(updates.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(updates[0].old_sha, sha_a);
assert_eq!(updates[0].new_sha, sha_b);
assert_eq!(updates[0].ref_name, "refs/heads/main");
// 40-byte non-hex fields -> dropped.
let junk = "Z".repeat(40);
assert!(parse_ref_updates(&pkt(&junk, &sha_b, "refs/heads/main")).is_empty());
assert!(parse_ref_updates(&pkt(&sha_a, &junk, "refs/heads/main")).is_empty());
// Wrong lengths -> dropped.
assert!(parse_ref_updates(&pkt(&"a".repeat(39), &sha_b, "refs/heads/main")).is_empty());
assert!(parse_ref_updates(&pkt(&sha_a, &"b".repeat(41), "refs/heads/main")).is_empty());
// A bad line among good ones drops only the bad line.
let sha_c = "c".repeat(40);
let bad = pkt(&junk, &sha_b, "refs/heads/bad");
let good = pkt(&sha_a, &sha_c, "refs/heads/good");
let mut mixed = bad[..bad.len() - 4].to_vec(); // strip trailing flush
mixed.extend_from_slice(&good);
let updates = parse_ref_updates(&mixed);
assert_eq!(updates.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(updates[0].ref_name, "refs/heads/good");
}
#[test]
fn git_service_app_error_classifies_timeout_bad_request_and_git() {
// GitServiceTimeout carried through anyhow -> 504 Timeout.
@@ -6260,6 +6305,9 @@ mod tests {
// Long enough that the git-service timeout is never what ends this push; the
// disconnect is.
cfg.git_service_timeout_secs = 600;
// Lock-path test, not owner-push authorization: pin off so the default-on gate
// does not reject the proof DID before receive-pack runs.
cfg.enforce_owner_push = false;
state.config = std::sync::Arc::new(cfg);
state
.db
@@ -6430,6 +6478,9 @@ mod tests {
None,
crate::git::repo_store::build_lock_pool(&pool, 4, std::time::Duration::from_secs(5)),
);
let mut cfg = (*state.config).clone();
cfg.enforce_owner_push = false;
state.config = std::sync::Arc::new(cfg);
state
.db
.upsert_mirror_repo(owner, name, "/tmp/z6succ-sc1", None, false)
@@ -6516,6 +6567,9 @@ mod tests {
let owner = "z6lockpool";
let name = "lp1";
let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
let mut cfg = (*state.config).clone();
cfg.enforce_owner_push = false;
state.config = std::sync::Arc::new(cfg);
// One lock-pool connection, short checkout timeout so the exhaustion surfaces
// promptly rather than at the handler's own acquire deadline.
state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(
+1 -1
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@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn run_to_writer(args: WhoamiArgs, w: &mut impl std::io::Write)
}
Ok(resp) => {
let status = resp.status();
let raw = read_body_capped(resp, 8 * 1024).await;
let raw = read_body_capped(resp, 8 * 1024).await.text;
let msg = serde_json::from_str::<Value>(&raw)
.ok()
.and_then(|v| {