docs(protocol): close the outstanding review findings on the wire spec

- @path binds path plus query, not RFC 9421's path-only value; a second
  implementation signing info/refs without ?service= fails verification
- content-digest is a mandatory covered component; a body-less request
  signs the SHA-256 of the empty body, also accepted when absent
- TLS transport stated in the signature section with a pointer from
  smart-HTTP
- the ref-update certificate section is marked planned: the schema is
  defined in code but no shipped endpoint serves it, and its 64-hex
  hash fields reserve the SHA-256 width while repos are sha1 today
- smart-HTTP documents the mandatory ?service= values, pkt-line
  framing, and the upload-pack/receive-pack result content types

.cargo/audit.toml

@@ -21,6 +21,25 @@ ignore = [
     # the build, at which point it becomes a real reachable advisory.
     "RUSTSEC-2023-0071", # rsa Marvin attack (no fix; not linked in our build)
 
+    # lru 0.16.3 (use-after-free in pop()). Reachable via alloy. The
+    # lockfile holds only 0.16.3 — the aws-sdk-s3 path that once pulled
+    # 0.12.5 no longer does. The RUSTSEC-2026-0253 advisory covers this
+    # range, so the ignore stays load-bearing until a fixed 0.16.x lands;
+    # REMOVE when the locked version is fixed or lru leaves the tree.
+    # Retirement owner: node maintainers, enforced by the weekly
+    # audit-schedule drift guard ("Fail if lru moved while its ignore
+    # remains"), which fails if either locked version moves or lru
+    # leaves the tree. No separate tracking issue exists; file one
+    # against the lru upgrade if this waiver needs discussion outside
+    # the schedule job.
+    "RUSTSEC-2026-0253",
+    #
+    # Round-3 P2 (reviewer 2): the previous version of this file
+    # ignored RUSTSEC-2026-0258 for h2 0.4.13, but the lockfile
+    # already has h2 0.4.18 (verified 2026-08-31: cargo tree -p h2
+    # shows 0.4.18) — the fix is in. The ignore was stale and would
+    # have silently re-accepted the advisory if h2 dropped back to
+    # 0.4.13. Removed.
     # crypto-bigint 0.5.5 (secret-dependent branches in operations meant
     # to be constant-time). REACHABLE accepted risk, on two paths:
     # - alloy-signer -> elliptic-curve 0.13 -> crypto-bigint 0.5: the k256
@@ -39,4 +58,16 @@ ignore = [
     # (verified 2026-11-03). REMOVE only when Cargo.lock has no crypto-bigint
     # below 0.7.6: `grep -A1 'name = "crypto-bigint"' Cargo.lock`.
     "RUSTSEC-2026-0387", # crypto-bigint timing variability (no compatible fix)
+
+    # libsqlite3-sys 0.30.1 (bundled SQLite WAL uninitialized-memory disclosure,
+    # CVE-2026-119375). Present in Cargo.lock because sqlx resolves sqlx-sqlite
+    # unconditionally; sqlx is built postgres-only
+    # (crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml), so sqlx-sqlite and its bundled SQLite C
+    # source are never compiled or linked (`cargo tree -i sqlx-sqlite` prints
+    # nothing) and there is no reachable WAL open to attack. The fix requires
+    # libsqlite3-sys >= 0.39, but sqlx-sqlite 0.8.6 pins ^0.30.1; a compatible
+    # bump needs a sqlx upgrade, not a lockfile refresh. REMOVE this ignore if
+    # sqlx is ever built with the `sqlite` feature or any other libsqlite3-sys
+    # consumer enters the build.
+    "RUSTSEC-2026-0459", # libsqlite3-sys bundled SQLite CVE (not linked in our build)
 ]

.env.example

@@ -6,8 +6,16 @@
 # Path to the node's Ed25519 keypair PEM file. Must name a key file, not a
 # directory: a trailing slash, a final `.` or `..`, and `..` traversal are
 # refused so the path cannot retarget a parent. A `~/` value must stay under
-# home after expansion. Bare `identity.pem` is still legal.
+# home after expansion, and the path must be absolute: its parent is also
+# the delegation store that `gl ucan import` writes and `git-remote-gitlawb`
+# reads, and the two do not share a working directory, so a relative path
+# sends them to different places. Bare `identity.pem` under the default
+# config dir is still legal.
 # Generate with: gl identity new
+# Leaving it unset uses ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem, which is the shared default
+# for both `gl` and `git-remote-gitlawb`. The bare-filename form is for the
+# node's own service config; client tooling should inherit the default or use
+# an absolute path.
 GITLAWB_KEY=/data/keys/identity.pem
 
 # Path to the node's persistent libp2p identity key file. Must include a
@@ -152,9 +160,10 @@ GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false
 # push to every repository, private ones included. On by default.
 #
 # Set to false only for a rolling upgrade whose pushers are not yet the repo
-# owner. Note that delegated and CI keys count as non-owners: UCAN git/push is
-# verified but not yet honored for authorization, so they cannot push while this
-# is on. See docs/RUN-A-NODE.md.
+# owner. A holder of an owner-rooted, time-bounded git/push UCAN naming that
+# repository can push while this is on — see docs/RUN-A-NODE.md for issuing and
+# importing one. A CI key with no such delegation counts as a non-owner and
+# cannot push.
 GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=true
 
 # Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs.
@@ -326,6 +335,19 @@ GITLAWB_IPFS_RESOLVE_BUDGET_SECS=10
 # from the concurrency caps above). 0 disables. Default 600.
 GITLAWB_IPFS_RATE_LIMIT=600
 
+# Per-client-IP rate limit for the anonymous task read routes
+# (GET /api/v1/tasks, GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}), in requests per hour.
+# Both are publicly reachable (optional_signature). GET /api/v1/tasks runs
+# collect_visible_tasks and returns a visibility-filtered page;
+# GET /api/v1/tasks/{id} runs get_visible_task and returns an opaque 404 when
+# the task is hidden or missing. These reads can require task, repository,
+# and visibility-rule queries even when no task is returned, so the brake
+# bounds the cost of anonymous probes. Keyed on the resolved client IP via
+# GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY. 0 disables. Default: 1200 (a list page
+# followed by per-task reads is a normal client pattern, so this sits above
+# the /ipfs budget). The GraphQL/WS task-read brake shares this budget.
+GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT=1200
+
 # ── Creation rate limiting (repo/agent/issue/PR flood brake) ──────────────
 # Max creation requests (POST /api/v1/repos, /api/register, fork, issues,
 # pulls) per client IP per hour, in addition to the per-DID limit. The per-DID
@@ -334,6 +356,14 @@ GITLAWB_IPFS_RATE_LIMIT=600
 # brake caps a single-source flood. Uses GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY below to resolve
 # the client IP. 0 disables. Default 120.
 GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT=120
+# Per-DID creation requests allowed inside the window below (repo create,
+# issue create, PR create, register, fork). 0 is rejected at startup: it would
+# silently disable the limiter. Default 10.
+GITLAWB_RATE_LIMIT_MAX=10
+# Window the per-DID creation count above applies over, in seconds. 0 is
+# rejected at startup: every timestamp would prune immediately, disabling the
+# limiter. Default 3600.
+GITLAWB_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECS=3600
 
 # ── Peer-sync rate limiting (per client IP, uses GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY below) ─
 # /api/v1/peers/announce and /api/v1/sync/notify accept unsigned requests from
@@ -359,6 +389,35 @@ GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY=
 # Enable automatic background sync from known peers
 GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC=false
 
+# ── External upstream mirroring ───────────────────────────────────────────
+# Default-off scheduled fetch worker for repositories configured as INBOUND.
+# Enabling requires GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=true; the node refuses to start
+# otherwise. The worker updates branches and tags atomically while preserving
+# Gitlawb-owned review/internal refs. Enabling also requires Git >= 2.37 on
+# the host for http.curloptResolve DNS pinning; the node refuses to start
+# when the installed Git is older.
+GITLAWB_UPSTREAM_MIRROR_ENABLED=false
+# Pause after each complete scan. Must be 5..=86400 seconds.
+GITLAWB_UPSTREAM_MIRROR_INTERVAL_SECS=300
+# Deadline for the external fetch child only; the preflight probes run on
+# their own short bound. Must be 1..=3153600000 seconds.
+GITLAWB_UPSTREAM_MIRROR_FETCH_TIMEOUT_SECS=600
+# Keyset page size; every page is processed before the next scan delay.
+GITLAWB_UPSTREAM_MIRROR_PAGE_SIZE=100
+# ── Reconciliation sweep ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Periodic durability sweep: re-derives the public pin set and the withheld-blob
+# recovery set each hour and fills gaps so a dropped replication job never means
+# data loss. Defaults to true; set to false to disable the sweep even when a pin
+# backend (IPFS/Pinata) is configured.
+#
+# Phase-capability matrix:
+#   - Public pin repair: IPFS-only, Pinata-only, or both (requires the
+#     respective backend to be configured).
+#   - Encrypted recovery repair: requires local IPFS (GITLAWB_IPFS_API).
+#     Pinata-only nodes reconcile public pins only; encrypted recovery
+#     reconciliation is not performed.
+GITLAWB_RECONCILIATION_SWEEP=true
+
 # ── iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate ───────────────────────────────────
 # Optional gate on create_repo + register: require callers to present an
 # iCaptcha proof (X-ICaptcha-Proof header) earned at icaptcha.gitlawb.com.

.github/workflows/audit-schedule.yml

@@ -86,3 +86,27 @@ jobs:
             exit 1
           fi
           echo "No drift: ignore list is consistent with the pinned hickory-proto version."
+
+      # Drift guard: the RUSTSEC-2026-0253 (lru) ignore is only valid while
+      # the lockfile holds exactly the version it was written for (0.16.3
+      # via alloy). Any move — an upgrade that may carry the upstream fix,
+      # or removal of the dependency — must revisit the ignore. Retirement
+      # owner: node maintainers, via this weekly job (no separate tracking
+      # issue; see the waiver comment in .cargo/audit.toml).
+      - name: Fail if lru moved while its ignore remains
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          versions="$(grep -A1 'name = "lru"' Cargo.lock | grep '^version' | cut -d'"' -f2 | sort -u | tr '\n' ' ')"
+          echo "lru versions in Cargo.lock: ${versions:-not present}"
+          lru_ignore_present=false
+          if grep -q 'RUSTSEC-2026-0253' .cargo/audit.toml; then
+            lru_ignore_present=true
+          fi
+          # Drift = the lockfile no longer matches what the ignore assumes:
+          # the version moved (possible fix) or lru left the tree
+          # (dead ignore). Both must fail for explicit re-triage.
+          if [ "$lru_ignore_present" = true ] && [ "${versions}" != "0.16.3 " ]; then
+            echo "::error::lru versions are [${versions:-absent from Cargo.lock}] but the RUSTSEC-2026-0253 ignore is still in .cargo/audit.toml. Re-triage the waiver against the advisory's fixed range and either drop the ignore or update the pinned set."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          echo "No drift: lru ignore is consistent with the pinned versions."

.github/workflows/codeql.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+name: CodeQL
+
+# Advanced-setup replacement for CodeQL default setup. Default setup analyzes
+# every detected language on every PR, including Swift (macos-app/), which
+# autobuilds on a macOS runner for ~13 minutes per PR and has hung for 55 on
+# main; that single job was the longest check on most PRs. Here a PR analyzes
+# only the languages it touches (scripts/ci-surfaces.sh), while push to main
+# and the weekly schedule analyze every language, so main's code-scanning
+# baseline stays complete.
+#
+# Requires CodeQL default setup to be DISABLED (Settings -> Code security ->
+# Code scanning): GitHub rejects advanced-setup uploads while it is enabled.
+#
+# A PR that skips a language may show "configuration not found" on the CodeQL
+# check for that language; that is informational and expected.
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  schedule:
+    - cron: "17 4 * * 1"
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+concurrency:
+  group: codeql-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
+
+jobs:
+  changes:
+    name: changed languages
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 5
+    outputs:
+      codeql: ${{ steps.surfaces.outputs.codeql }}
+      matrix: ${{ steps.surfaces.outputs.codeql_matrix }}
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+          fetch-depth: 2
+
+      - name: Map changed paths to languages
+        id: surfaces
+        env:
+          EVENT_NAME: ${{ github.event_name }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          if [ "$EVENT_NAME" = "pull_request" ]; then
+            # -z: literal paths; plain --name-only C-quotes unusual names.
+            git diff -z --name-only --no-renames HEAD^1 HEAD > changed-paths
+            tr '\0' '\n' < changed-paths >&2
+            scripts/ci-surfaces.sh < changed-paths > surfaces.out
+          else
+            scripts/ci-surfaces.sh --all > surfaces.out
+          fi
+          cat surfaces.out
+          grep -E '^(codeql|codeql_matrix)=' surfaces.out >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
+  analyze:
+    name: Analyze (${{ matrix.language }})
+    needs: changes
+    if: needs.changes.outputs.codeql == 'true'
+    runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }}
+    # Normal runs take <=14 min (Swift autobuild is the longest); cap a hung
+    # autobuild instead of letting it hold a runner for an hour.
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      security-events: write
+      actions: read
+      packages: read
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix: ${{ fromJSON(needs.changes.outputs.matrix) }}
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Initialize CodeQL
+        uses: github/codeql-action/init@9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 # v4.39.1
+        with:
+          languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
+          build-mode: ${{ matrix.build-mode }}
+
+      - name: Autobuild
+        if: matrix.build-mode == 'autobuild'
+        uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 # v4.39.1
+
+      - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
+        uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 # v4.39.1
+        with:
+          category: "/language:${{ matrix.language }}"

.github/workflows/pr-checks.yml

@@ -30,8 +30,62 @@ env:
   RUST_BACKTRACE: 1
 
 jobs:
+  # Decide which checks this event needs. On pull_request, each job below runs
+  # only when the PR touches the surface it validates, and the cargo test /
+  # release-build jobs are scoped to the touched crates plus their reverse
+  # dependencies (scripts/ci-surfaces.sh). Every other event (push to main,
+  # merge_group, the release flow's workflow_dispatch) runs the full suite, so
+  # main and the merge queue keep whole-workspace coverage and main-red-alert
+  # still sees a complete run. A skipped job reports as "skipped", not green.
+  changes:
+    name: changed surfaces
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 5
+    outputs:
+      rust: ${{ steps.surfaces.outputs.rust }}
+      rust_packages: ${{ steps.surfaces.outputs.rust_packages }}
+      windows: ${{ steps.surfaces.outputs.windows }}
+      windows_packages: ${{ steps.surfaces.outputs.windows_packages }}
+      docker: ${{ steps.surfaces.outputs.docker }}
+      audit: ${{ steps.surfaces.outputs.audit }}
+      core_deps: ${{ steps.surfaces.outputs.core_deps }}
+      release_versioning: ${{ steps.surfaces.outputs.release_versioning }}
+      release_tag: ${{ steps.surfaces.outputs.release_tag }}
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+          # The pull_request checkout is the test-merge commit; depth 2 brings
+          # its first parent (the base tip) so the diff is exactly this PR.
+          fetch-depth: 2
+
+      # Every job's gate comes from the mapper, so pin its mapping first; a
+      # failure here fails this job and the run is red, not silently narrowed.
+      - name: Test the surface mapper
+        run: scripts/test-ci-surfaces.sh
+
+      - name: Map changed paths to surfaces
+        id: surfaces
+        env:
+          EVENT_NAME: ${{ github.event_name }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          if [ "$EVENT_NAME" = "pull_request" ]; then
+            # -z: literal paths; plain --name-only C-quotes unusual names.
+            git diff -z --name-only --no-renames HEAD^1 HEAD > changed-paths
+            tr '\0' '\n' < changed-paths >&2
+            scripts/ci-surfaces.sh < changed-paths > surfaces.out
+          else
+            scripts/ci-surfaces.sh --all > surfaces.out
+          fi
+          cat surfaces.out
+          cat surfaces.out >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
   fmt-clippy:
     name: fmt + clippy
+    needs: changes
+    if: needs.changes.outputs.rust == 'true'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 30
     steps:
@@ -57,6 +111,8 @@ jobs:
 
   release-tag-validation:
     name: release tag validation
+    needs: changes
+    if: needs.changes.outputs.release_tag == 'true'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 5
     steps:
@@ -86,6 +142,8 @@ jobs:
 
   test:
     name: test (${{ matrix.toolchain }})
+    needs: changes
+    if: needs.changes.outputs.rust == 'true'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 45
     strategy:
@@ -130,10 +188,17 @@ jobs:
       - name: cargo test
         env:
           DATABASE_URL: postgres://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/gitlawb_test
-        run: cargo test --locked --workspace
+          # `--workspace`, or `-p <crate>...` for the crates a PR touches plus
+          # every crate that depends on them.
+          PACKAGES: ${{ needs.changes.outputs.rust_packages }}
+        run: |
+          # shellcheck disable=SC2086 # PACKAGES is a word list by design
+          cargo test --locked $PACKAGES
 
   build-release:
     name: build --release
+    needs: changes
+    if: needs.changes.outputs.rust == 'true'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 45
     steps:
@@ -153,10 +218,20 @@ jobs:
           key: release
 
       - name: cargo build --release
-        run: cargo build --locked --release --workspace
+        env:
+          PACKAGES: ${{ needs.changes.outputs.rust_packages }}
+        run: |
+          # shellcheck disable=SC2086 # PACKAGES is a word list by design
+          cargo build --locked --release $PACKAGES
 
   audit:
     name: cargo audit
+    # cargo audit reads only Cargo.lock (+ .cargo/audit.toml), so a PR that
+    # leaves both unchanged cannot change its verdict; a newly published
+    # advisory against main is caught by the push-to-main run and the weekly
+    # Scheduled Audit instead of turning every unrelated PR red.
+    needs: changes
+    if: needs.changes.outputs.audit == 'true'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 30
     steps:
@@ -216,6 +291,8 @@ jobs:
 
   msrv:
     name: MSRV (Rust 1.91)
+    needs: changes
+    if: needs.changes.outputs.rust == 'true'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 30
     steps:
@@ -239,6 +316,12 @@ jobs:
 
   docker-build:
     name: Docker build smoke test
+    # Runs when the image's own inputs change: the Dockerfile, the manifests
+    # its dependency layer copies, the lockfile, bootstrap-peers.json. A
+    # source-only Rust change is already compiled by `build --release` (stable)
+    # and `MSRV` (1.91, the image's toolchain); push to main still runs this.
+    needs: changes
+    if: needs.changes.outputs.docker == 'true'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 30
     steps:
@@ -255,6 +338,8 @@ jobs:
 
   test-windows:
     name: test (windows, non-blocking)
+    needs: changes
+    if: needs.changes.outputs.windows == 'true'
     runs-on: windows-latest
     timeout-minutes: 45
     # Non-blocking, mirroring the informational `beta` lane above. We ship `gl`
@@ -282,7 +367,13 @@ jobs:
           key: windows
 
       - name: cargo test (shipped Windows crates)
-        run: cargo test --locked -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
+        shell: bash
+        env:
+          # `-p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb`, or whichever of the two a PR affects.
+          PACKAGES: ${{ needs.changes.outputs.windows_packages }}
+        run: |
+          # shellcheck disable=SC2086 # PACKAGES is a word list by design
+          cargo test --locked $PACKAGES
 
   # gitlawb-core is embedded by every consumer (gl, git-remote-gitlawb, the node
   # daemon), so it must stay lean. This gate fails if gitlawb-core's normal
@@ -292,6 +383,8 @@ jobs:
   # cannot do. Regen instructions live in the allowlist header.
   core-deps-purity:
     name: gitlawb-core dependency purity
+    needs: changes
+    if: needs.changes.outputs.core_deps == 'true'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 15
     steps:
@@ -324,6 +417,8 @@ jobs:
   # not its author knew this gate existed.
   release-versioning:
     name: release versioning coverage
+    needs: changes
+    if: needs.changes.outputs.release_versioning == 'true'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 15
     steps:

AGENTS.md

@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ When a node denies a request, surface the denial to the user. Never render a den
 ## Toolchain and CI reality
 
 - MSRV is Rust 1.91 (`rust-version` in the workspace `Cargo.toml`). The MSRV CI job runs `cargo check --workspace --all-targets` on exactly 1.91, so check that an API you rely on is stable there; the full test suite runs on stable.
-- The PR workflow runs these jobs on every PR: `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` (against Postgres), a release build, `cargo audit`, the MSRV check, and a Docker build. The `main` branch ruleset currently requires one approving review but does not require these checks to pass before merge; a failing job should block review approval in practice, but nothing enforces that mechanically today.
+- The PR workflow's jobs are `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test` (against Postgres), a release build, `cargo audit`, the MSRV check, and a Docker build. On a PR, `scripts/ci-surfaces.sh` runs each job only when the PR touches its inputs, and scopes `cargo test` and the release build to the touched crates plus every crate that depends on them. Root `Cargo.toml`/`Cargo.lock`/`.cargo/` changes run the Rust jobs (fmt, clippy, tests, release build, MSRV) on the whole workspace; every other job still runs only when its own inputs change. Edits to the CI wiring itself (`pr-checks.yml`, `codeql.yml`, `scripts/ci-surfaces.sh`), push to `main`, and the merge queue run every job on the whole workspace. Edits to any other workflow run none of these jobs on a PR; CodeQL only analyzes them as Actions code. Run `cargo test --workspace` locally regardless. The same script limits CodeQL (`codeql.yml`) to the languages a PR touches. The `main` branch ruleset currently requires one approving review but does not require these checks to pass before merge; a failing job should block review approval in practice, but nothing enforces that mechanically today.
 - Conventional commit titles (`feat:`, `fix:`, `docs:`, ...) are required by convention and drive releases, but no CI job checks them; a bad title fails review, not the pipeline.

Cargo.lock

@@ -3085,7 +3085,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "39cab71617ae0d63f51a36d69f866391735b51691dbda63cf6f96d042b63efeb"
 dependencies = [
  "libc",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -3473,10 +3473,13 @@ name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
 version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
+ "chrono",
+ "dirs",
  "gitlawb-core",
  "libc",
  "mockito",
  "reqwest",
+ "serde_json",
  "tempfile",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
@@ -3542,6 +3545,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "axum",
  "base64 0.22.1",
  "bytes",
+ "chacha20poly1305",
  "chrono",
  "cid",
  "clap",
@@ -3565,6 +3569,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "multiaddr",
  "percent-encoding",
  "prometheus",
+ "rand 0.8.6",
  "reqwest",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
@@ -3600,6 +3605,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "ed25519-dalek 2.2.0",
  "gitlawb-core",
  "icaptcha-client",
+ "libc",
  "mockito",
  "percent-encoding",
  "reqwest",
@@ -6227,7 +6233,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "errno",
  "libc",
  "linux-raw-sys",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -7161,7 +7167,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "getrandom 0.4.2",
  "once_cell",
  "rustix",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]

PROTOCOL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+# Gitlawb Wire Protocol Specification (v1, alpha)
+
+This document describes the wire behavior a second implementation can interop
+with **today**. Anything the node does not ship yet is explicitly marked
+*planned*; nothing below is aspirational unless it says so.
+
+## 1. Identity & DIDs
+
+- **Key type:** Ed25519.
+- **Method (alpha):** `did:key` only. Resolution is deterministic public-key
+  extraction from the multicodec prefix (`z6Mk…`, multicodec `0xed01`).
+- Signed requests presenting any other DID method are rejected; the node's
+  auth layer answers with a hint that only `did:key` is supported in alpha.
+- *Planned:* `did:web` and `did:gitlawb` resolution. Clients MUST NOT assume
+  either is accepted anywhere yet.
+
+## 2. Authentication (RFC 9421)
+
+- **Transport:** signed requests are expected over TLS; the node does not
+  terminate HTTP signatures over cleartext.
+- **HTTP signatures:** `Signature-Input` covers `@method`, `@path`, and
+  `content-digest`:
+  `sig1=("@method" "@path" "content-digest");keyid="did:key:…";alg="ed25519";created=<unix>`
+  All three components are mandatory: a `Signature-Input` missing one is
+  rejected as `incomplete_signature`.
+- **`@path` value:** the node binds `@path` to the path *and* query string of
+  the request, not to the path-only value RFC 9421 defines for `@path`. A
+  second implementation must sign `GET /r/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`
+  including the `?service=…` part.
+- **Signer identity:** `keyid` is the actor DID (`did:key` only, see §1).
+- **Integrity:** `Content-Digest` is SHA-256 over the request body and is
+  verified when the header is present. Because `content-digest` is a covered
+  component, every signed request signs a digest value: on a body-less
+  request the signed value is the SHA-256 of the empty body, which the node
+  also accepts when the header is absent entirely.
+
+## 3. Proof of Intelligence (iCaptcha)
+
+- **Mode:** controlled by `ICAPTCHA_MODE` = `off` | `shadow` | `enforce`,
+  **default `off`**. A node with the gate off never demands proof.
+- **Scope:** the gate applies to a small set of write endpoints (agent
+  registration and repo create/fork), not to all writes.
+- **Wire shape:** the client-supplied header is `x-icaptcha-proof` — that is
+  the only iCaptcha header a node reads from a request. When proof is
+  required and missing/invalid, the node answers
+  `403 icaptcha_proof_required` and sets `x-icaptcha-url` and
+  `x-icaptcha-level` **on the response** (also mirrored as JSON fields) so
+  the client can go solve a challenge and retry.
+
+## 4. Ref-Update Certificate
+
+*Planned:* the `gitlawb/ref-update/v1` schema below is defined in code, but no
+shipped endpoint serves or verifies these certificates today; nothing in
+sections 2-3 produces one on the wire. It is documented here so a second
+implementation shares the type vocabulary ahead of the wire surface.
+
+The hash fields reserve 64 hex characters for the SHA-256 object format; the
+repositories the node serves are sha1 with 40-hex OIDs (see §5), so the field
+width is a forward reservation, not what a current push produces.
+
+Two distinct certificate-shaped payloads exist; this section documents the
+**core signing schema**, which is what `gitlawb/ref-update/v1` names:
+
+- **Type string:** `gitlawb/ref-update/v1`.
+- **Body (canonical JSON, the signed bytes):** `type`, `repo` (the
+  repository DID), `ref_name`, `from` (previous hash, 64 hex chars,
+  all-zeros for a new ref), `to` (target hash, 64 hex chars), `seq`
+  (monotonically increasing, replay prevention), `timestamp` (RFC 3339),
+  `nonce`.
+- **Signatures:** a list of `{signer: did:key, sig: base64url-unpadded
+  Ed25519}` entries appended outside the signed body; thresholds are counted
+  over distinct signers that verify.
+
+The node's REST API separately serves **push receipts** — a different,
+node-issued JSON payload attesting that a push was processed. Receipts are
+not `gitlawb/ref-update/v1` documents and are not interchangeable with them;
+they are documented with the node's HTTP API, not here.
+
+## 5. Storage & Git Transport
+
+- **Object format:** bare repositories are created with
+  `--object-format=sha1`; production OIDs are 40 hex chars. *Planned:*
+  SHA-256 object format.
+- **Smart-HTTP endpoints:**
+  - `GET /{owner}/{repo}/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` — fetch
+    advertisement.
+  - `GET /{owner}/{repo}/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack` — push
+    advertisement.
+    The `?service=` parameter is mandatory and takes exactly those two
+    values; a missing parameter is a `400`, not an omitted-service default.
+  - `POST /{owner}/{repo}/git-upload-pack` — clone/fetch. Request and
+    response bodies are pkt-line framed; the result content type is
+    `application/x-git-upload-pack-result`.
+  - `POST /{owner}/{repo}/git-receive-pack` — push. **Authentication is
+    mandatory**: an unsigned push is refused with `401`. Same pkt-line
+    framing; the result content type is
+    `application/x-git-receive-pack-result`.
+    Signed requests on this path follow §2, including TLS transport.
+- **Fetch vs push auth split:** fetch-side requests against a withheld or
+  private repo answer `404` (existence is not confirmed to unauthorized
+  callers), while the push path answers `401` for missing/invalid
+  signatures. A second implementation must not treat the two symmetrically.
+- **Content addressing:** the node records IPFS CID metadata per branch and
+  serves it over REST (the repo `refs` endpoint maps branch heads to CIDs).
+  *Planned:* IPNS-backed branch pointers; IPNS is not part of the shipped
+  wire contract.

README.md

@@ -67,10 +67,10 @@ Good today:
 
 Known limitations:
 
-- Repository write authorization is secure by default: `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` defaults to `true`, so a valid HTTP Signature identifies a pusher and the node additionally requires that pusher to be the repository owner. Set `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false` only for the duration of a rolling upgrade whose pushers are not yet the repo owner. Authentication is not authorization on its own (anyone can mint a `did:key` and sign), so owner enforcement is the only thing that prevents every signed caller from pushing to every repository, private ones included.
-- UCAN proof chains are validated when supplied, but UCAN capabilities are not consulted by write authorization and the root issuer is not independently trust-anchored. UCANs therefore do not yet grant scoped collaborator access.
+- Repository write authorization is one switch: `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH`, which defaults to `true`. With it off — rolling upgrades only — a valid HTTP Signature identifies a pusher but does not authorize one, so every signed caller may push everywhere.
+- UCAN capabilities are consulted on the push path only. There, the chain's root issuer is anchored to the repository owner, so an owner-rooted, time-bounded delegation that names the repository grants scoped collaborator access for pushing to it, for the `git/push`, `*`, or `repo/admin` actions. A `*` *resource* is refused: a delegation must name the repository it applies to, so it cannot grow to cover repos created later. Push-only cuts the other way too: a delegation grants no read access, so on a private repository the delegate must also be a reader (`gl visibility set`) — the two gates a push crosses are described in [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md). The rest is unchanged: there is no revocation path, `nb` constraints are refused rather than interpreted, and no other route — reads, pull requests, issues, agents — consults capabilities at all.
 - Agent lifecycle revocation is not enforced by HTTP Signature authorization; do not rely on removing or revoking an agent record to block a compromised signer.
-- Read visibility is not a blanket data-classification boundary: task, IPFS-pin, and Arweave-anchor listings are not repository-gated; withheld path names can be visible to a root reader; and later visibility changes cannot retract content already announced or externally anchored.
+- Task list/get reads (REST and GraphQL) are repository/task-gated and omit `ucan_token`. Slash-form `repo_id` rows (mirror-hosted tasks) can appear on list for the delegator or trimmed assignee, but `GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}` and GraphQL `task` fail closed for every caller because there is no local repository backing to serve. Read visibility is not a blanket data-classification boundary: IPFS-pin and Arweave-anchor listings are not repository-gated; withheld path names can be visible to a root reader; and later visibility changes cannot retract content already announced or externally anchored.
 - Peer writes are signed by upgraded nodes, but strict signed-peer enforcement is opt-in during rolling upgrades.
 - GraphQL mutations require a signed identity (a verified signer bound to the acting DID), are limited to the agent-task queue, and are covered by a CI completeness fence that requires signer acquisition and actor binding on every registered mutation; repo writes are not exposed over GraphQL and remain REST-only.
 - Pull-request review comments do not yet have threaded line-level anchors, and merges do not enforce approval requirements.
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ metadata        local disk / optional S3
 | HTTP Signature | RFC 9421 signature proving control of the DID key for write requests. |
 | Ref certificate | Signed record of a ref update. Useful for audit and replication. |
 | Ref certificate versioning | The wire format is versioned; new certificates are currently issued as v1. `gl cert show <repo> <id> --verify` requires `--expect-node <did>`, and the queried node's self-reported DID is **not** accepted as a trust anchor. v2 is reserved for a future payload shape that carries the version inside the signed bytes; this client refuses to verify v2+ rather than guessing. |
-| UCAN | Delegation token for future capability-based workflows. |
+| UCAN | Capability token. An owner delegates `git/push` on a repo to another DID; the node honors it when the proof chain roots at that owner. See [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md). |
 | Peer announce | Node-to-node HTTP announcement of DID + public URL. |
 | Gossipsub | libp2p topic for ref-update events. |
 | Smart HTTP | Standard git protocol over HTTP for clone/fetch/push. |
@@ -401,9 +401,10 @@ Important node settings:
 | `GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP` | Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs. |
 | `GITLAWB_P2P_KEY` | Path to the node's persistent libp2p identity key file, which fixes the PeerId across restarts. Must name a key file inside a directory, such as `/data/keys/p2p.key` or `./keys/p2p.key`. Two kinds of problem are handled differently. A value that cannot name a securable key file at all (a bare filename, `..` traversal, a trailing `/`, the filesystem root, or a `~/` path that escapes home) is refused before the node binds, so the process exits. Anything wrong with the storage itself (a symlinked or non-directory parent, an unsafe ancestor or working directory, an unreadable or malformed key) leaves p2p off while HTTP keeps serving; the node logs it at error level as `p2p_identity_key_load_failed` and sets the `gitlawb_p2p_identity_key_load_failed` metric to 1. Note that `/health` still reports healthy in that state, so alert on the log event or the metric rather than on the health check. Correcting the storage and restarting restores the same PeerId. On Unix a new key is created `0600` inside a `0700` directory. A key directory that grants access beyond its owner is tightened to `0700` on start; one that is closed too far is refused with a `chmod 700` remedy rather than widened, since a directory locked down on purpose is an operator decision. Rotate the key only when the node logs that the directory was group- or world-writable (or the key file itself was group- or world-readable). An ordinary `0755` directory is tightened too, but others could not read a `0600` key or replace its directory entry. An existing key file is never modified: one with group or other bits set is rejected (`chmod 600`), and so is one this node cannot read. On other platforms no permissions are enforced. Default `~/.gitlawb/p2p.key`; point it at a persistent volume when running in a container. |
 | `GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS` | Disable embedded seed peers for isolated dev/test networks. |
-| `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES` | Require peer writes to prove their DID on every transport: RFC 9421 signatures on the announce/sync routes, and an Ed25519 payload signature on gossip ref-update events. Defaults to `false` during the staged rollout below. Upgrade every gossip publisher before enabling, or their updates are dropped with no error on their side. |
-| `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` | Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on `git-receive-pack`. **Defaults to `true`.** A `did:key` signature is authentication, not authorization (anyone can mint a key and sign), so with this off every signed caller may push to every repository, private ones included. Delegated and CI keys count as non-owners: a UCAN `git/push` capability is verified but not yet honored for authorization, so they cannot push while this is on. Set `false` only for a rolling upgrade; see [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md). |
+| `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES` | Require signed peer announce/sync writes. Defaults to `false` during the staged rollout below. |
+| `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` | Require the pusher on `git-receive-pack` to be the repo owner, or to present an owner-rooted, time-bounded UCAN `git/push` capability naming the repository (`X-Ucan`). **Defaults to `true`.** A `did:key` signature is authentication, not authorization — anyone can mint a key and sign — so with this off every signed caller may push to every repository, private ones included. A CI or delegated key with no such delegation counts as a non-owner and cannot push while this is on. The delegation clears the push gate only; on a private repository the delegate must also be a reader. Set `false` only for a rolling upgrade; see [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md). |
 | `GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC` | Enable automatic sync from known peers. |
+| `GITLAWB_RECONCILIATION_SWEEP` | Enable the hourly durability sweep that re-pins/backstops missing objects (default `true`; disabled when no IPFS/Pinata backend is configured). Public pin repair runs against any configured backend (IPFS, Pinata, or both). Encrypted recovery repair requires local IPFS (`GITLAWB_IPFS_API`); Pinata-only nodes reconcile public pins only. |
 | `GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES` | Max git pack body size for smart-HTTP routes. |
 | `GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS` | Max seconds a served git upload-pack, receive-pack, or `info/refs` advertisement may run before it is aborted (504). Default 600. Also bounds the withheld-blob classification walk (on both the upload-pack serve and receive-pack replication paths) and the push-side pin-candidate discovery (`rev-list` / `cat-file`), each reaped via process-group teardown at the deadline. On the path-scoped upload-pack path the classification walk and the pack serve share ONE deadline, so this value bounds their combined duration rather than granting each stage a full budget: a walk that consumes it leaves the serve nothing and the clone gets a 504. Serving large path-scoped repos may therefore need a higher value than they did when each stage was budgeted separately. Accepted range is 1 to 3153600000 (100 years), since the node derives deadlines from this value and a larger one cannot be represented. |
 | `GITLAWB_GIT_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS` | Max seconds the storage-acquisition phase (Tigris HEAD/GET, push advisory-lock) of a served git op may run before the request is shed with a 503, separate from the git-run timeout. The concurrency permit is released on expiry so a stalled backend cannot pin the pool. Default 30. |
@@ -421,6 +422,7 @@ Important node settings:
 | `GITLAWB_IPFS_REQUEST_BUDGET_SECS` | Absolute wall-clock budget for one admitted `/ipfs/{cid}` request's acquire+walk lifetime. Per-stage clamps bound the acquire and walk stages to the remaining budget, and no stage starts once it is exhausted; the scan then stops with a retryable 503. The object-type probe and content-read `cat-file` subprocesses are budget-checked before starting and each also run under their own deadline (the lesser of `GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS` and the remaining budget), reaped via process-group teardown, so a hung `cat-file` cannot hold the request's walk slot past it. One hang path is still unbounded: the probe's object-store readability check is a plain filesystem sweep with nothing to reap, so a wedged filesystem can hold the slot past the deadline. Default 600. Accepted range is 1 to 3153600000 (100 years), since the node derives a deadline from this value and a larger one cannot be represented. |
 | `GITLAWB_IPFS_RESOLVE_BUDGET_SECS` | Shorter budget for the pre-walk CID resolve inside an admitted `/ipfs/{cid}` request: the lookup that maps the requested CID to its git oid(s), which runs while the scarce walk admission is already held. A well-formed CID with no pin row does no probe and no walk work, so without this it could hold a walk slot for the whole request budget while nothing walked, and enough such requests shed every real retrieval at admission. The effective deadline is the lesser of this and the remaining request budget, so a value above `GITLAWB_IPFS_REQUEST_BUDGET_SECS` degrades to the request budget. Only the resolve is on this clock; walk and probe work stay on the request budget, so a slow but progressing scan is never shed by it. Default 10. Accepted range is 1 to 3153600000 (100 years). |
 | `GITLAWB_IPFS_RATE_LIMIT` | Max `/ipfs/{cid}` requests per client IP per hour (route flood brake). 0 disables. Default 600. |
+| `GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT` | Max anonymous task-read requests (`GET /api/v1/tasks`, `GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}`) per client IP per hour, sharing the budget with the GraphQL/WS task-read brake. Uses `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY` to resolve the client IP. 0 disables. Default 1200 (above the `/ipfs` budget to allow list pages followed by per-task reads). |
 | `GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET` | Optional S3/Tigris shared repo storage bucket. |
 | `GITLAWB_PINATA_JWT` | Optional Pinata/IPFS warm-storage pinning. |
 | `GITLAWB_IRYS_URL` | Optional Irys/Arweave permanent anchoring. |

SECURITY.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to release a fix within 14 d
 
 **Content addressing**
 - Every git object is content-addressed via CIDv1 (SHA-256)
-- Tamper-evident by construction — a modified object changes its CID
+- Tamper-evident by construction: a modified object changes its CID
 
 **UCAN token validation**
 - Bootstrap UCAN tokens are issued at registration.
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to release a fix within 14 d
 - Capability grants are not yet consulted by repository write authorization; see the limitations below.
 
 **Smart contracts (Base Sepolia testnet)**
-- `GitlawbDIDRegistry` — on-chain DID → document registry
-- `GitlawbNameRegistry` — human name → DID registry
+- `GitlawbDIDRegistry`: on-chain DID → document registry
+- `GitlawbNameRegistry`: human name → DID registry
 - Both auditable on-chain, no admin keys
 
 ---
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ These are documented limitations of the current live release. They should be pri
 
 ### Repository write authorization defaults
 - `git-receive-pack` verifies HTTP Signatures and, with the default configuration, also requires the pusher DID to be the repository owner: `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` defaults to `true`.
-- **Impact:** With the default setting, a valid signature authenticates the pusher *and* the pusher must be the repository owner. Authentication is not authorization on its own — anyone can mint a `did:key` and sign — so owner enforcement is the only thing that prevents every signed caller from pushing to every repository, including private ones.
+- **Impact:** With the default setting, a valid signature authenticates the pusher, and the pusher must be the repository owner. Authentication is not authorization on its own, since anyone can mint a `did:key` and sign, so owner enforcement is the only thing that prevents every signed caller from pushing to every repository, including private ones.
 - **Mitigation:** `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false` is the explicit rolling-upgrade compatibility override. Disable it only for the duration of an upgrade whose pushers are not yet the repo owner, then turn it back on. Delegated and CI keys count as non-owners: a UCAN `git/push` capability is verified but not yet honored for authorization, so they cannot push while this is on.
 
 ### UCAN delegation and revocation
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ These are documented limitations of the current live release. They should be pri
 ### Private repository reads
 - Repository and path-scoped visibility checks are enforced for repository API and Git content reads. A denied whole-repository or root read returns the same 404 shape as a missing repository, so the denial does not reveal private-repository existence.
 - Sparse-clone support exposes withheld path globs to callers who may read the repository root. Do not put sensitive information in withheld path names.
-- `GET /api/v1/tasks`, `/api/v1/ipfs/pins`, and `/api/v1/arweave/anchors` are not repository-gated. Task records include a UCAN token; pin and anchor listings expose object and ref metadata.
+- Task list/get reads (`GET /api/v1/tasks`, `GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}`, and GraphQL `tasks` / `task` over HTTP and WebSocket) are repository/task-gated through shared visibility collectors and omit `ucan_token`. Slash-form `repo_id` rows (mirror-hosted tasks) can appear on list for the delegator or trimmed assignee, but `GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}` and GraphQL `task` fail closed for every caller because there is no local repository backing to serve. All of those transports share the same per-IP `GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT` budget. `/api/v1/ipfs/pins` and `/api/v1/arweave/anchors` are not repository-gated; pin and anchor listings expose object and ref metadata.
 - Changing a repository's visibility controls future serving, but cannot retract ref metadata or configured external pins and anchors already announced while the repository was public. Do not push secrets to an announceable repository.
 - **Impact:** Visibility policies protect the repository and Git content routes they gate, not every metadata endpoint or previously published content.
 - **Remaining boundary:** This read control does not address the independent write-authorization and UCAN-delegation limitations described above.
@@ -119,10 +119,10 @@ These are documented limitations of the current live release. They should be pri
 ## Threat Model
 
 Twigpine is designed to be secure against:
-- **Unauthenticated writes** — HTTP Signature auth on protected write endpoints; see Known Limitations for owner and capability authorization gaps
-- **Tampered git objects** — CIDv1 content addressing detects modification
-- **Identity spoofing** — DIDs derived from public keys, unforgeable without the private key
-- **Centralized takedown** — no single point of control; data on IPFS + Arweave
+- **Unauthenticated writes:** HTTP Signature auth on protected write endpoints; see Known Limitations for owner and capability authorization gaps
+- **Tampered git objects:** CIDv1 content addressing detects modification
+- **Identity spoofing:** DIDs derived from public keys, unforgeable without the private key
+- **Centralized takedown:** no single point of control; data on IPFS + Arweave
 
 Twigpine is **not yet** designed to defend against:
 - A compromised node operator (node operators are trusted for their own node)

bootstrap-peers.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "$comment": "Canonical seed list for the Twigpine network. Merged with GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS at startup. PRs to add public nodes welcome.",
   "version": 1,
-  "updated": "2026-06-30",
+  "updated": "2026-10-02",
   "peers": [
     {
       "name": "gitlawb",
@@ -42,6 +42,14 @@
       "http_url": "https://rapybus-gitlawb.com",
       "p2p_multiaddr": null,
       "added": "2026-05-16"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "moonwake-ledger",
+      "operator": "Moonwake Ledger",
+      "did": "did:key:z6Mkh9AZ46Z3RkGZfFCom5vzX2535f54d6G2o2ZGkCqjwW8K",
+      "http_url": "https://node.moonwakeledger.com",
+      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
+      "added": "2026-10-02"
     }
   ]
 }

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/Cargo.toml

@@ -14,8 +14,17 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
 gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core", features = ["redirect"] }
 anyhow = { workspace = true }
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
+# Reading the node's DID from `GET /` so a delegated push can address its
+# invocation to the right executor.
+serde_json = { workspace = true }
+# The invocation carries the delegation's expiry, so an unbounded write capability
+# is never minted; converting the stored i64 timestamp needs chrono.
+chrono = { workspace = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
 tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
+# Home-directory lookup for the shared GITLAWB_KEY resolver in gitlawb-core,
+# which takes `home` as an argument so core's dependency allowlist stays lean.
+dirs = "5"
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 mockito = "1"

crates/gitlawb-attest/src/attestation.rs

@@ -539,6 +539,43 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(matches!(err, Error::Signature(_)));
     }
 
+    /// The identity-point forgery must be rejected: the shared attestation
+    /// verifier is a cert-bound provenance gate, so accepting the weak-key
+    /// signature would let anyone mint a forged attestation that verifies.
+    /// Strict verification rejects small-order public keys and R (the identity
+    /// point here), which ordinary verification does not.
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_identity_point_forgery() {
+        let cert_hash = sample_cert_hash();
+        let mut att = dummy_attestation(&fresh(), cert_hash);
+
+        // Public key A = identity point (0,1); signature R = identity, S = 0.
+        // The equation `[S]B = R + [k]A` then holds for any k and any message.
+        let identity = [
+            1u8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+            0, 0, 0, 0,
+        ];
+        let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(34);
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&ED25519_MULTICODEC);
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&identity);
+        att.signer = format!(
+            "did:key:{}",
+            multibase::encode(multibase::Base::Base58Btc, &buf)
+        );
+        let mut sig = [0u8; 64];
+        sig[..32].copy_from_slice(&identity);
+        att.sig = B64U.encode(sig);
+
+        let err = att.verify_signature(cert_hash).unwrap_err();
+        match err {
+            Error::Did(msg) => assert!(
+                msg.contains("small-order"),
+                "identity-point signer must be refused as a small-order key, got: {msg}"
+            ),
+            other => panic!("expected Error::Did for an identity-point signer, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
     /// A payload that happens to contain a `cert_hash` field of its own does
     /// not interfere with the outer binding: the attestation envelope's
     /// `cert_hash` is the only field consulted by `verify_signature`, and the

crates/gitlawb-core/src/cert.rs

@@ -41,6 +41,30 @@ use crate::{Error, Result};
 /// The certificate type discriminant. Always `"gitlawb/ref-update/v1"`.
 pub const CERT_TYPE: &str = "gitlawb/ref-update/v1";
 
+/// Exact url-safe unpadded base64 length of a 64-byte Ed25519 signature.
+/// The tolerant threshold scan requires this canonical unpadded length before
+/// attempting decode: the length gate is a DoS bound that keeps an
+/// attacker-sized sig string from costing allocation before the signature is
+/// rejected. A longer string is not meaningless (the same 64 bytes can appear
+/// in padded or non-url-safe encodings) but no in-tree signer produces one,
+/// so the scan skips non-canonical entries rather than decoding them.
+const ENCODED_SIG_LEN: usize = 86;
+
+/// Hard ceiling on signature entries a certificate may carry into the
+/// tolerant threshold scan. A legitimate certificate holds one entry per
+/// maintainer (a re-sign after key rotation may briefly leave a second), so
+/// this is far above any real signer set, while turning the scan's worst case
+/// from "one curve verification per attacker-appended entry" into a small
+/// constant. Rejection is loud (`Err`), not a silent prefix scan: scanning
+/// only the first N entries would let junk placed ahead of the real
+/// signatures starve them out of the window, which is the #349 denial again
+/// in positional form. An attacker positioned to inflate the list past this
+/// ceiling can already suppress the certificate outright. The loud
+/// rejection does deny a legitimately over-long certificate; that is an
+/// explicit, detectable denial above the cap rather than a silent window
+/// junk placement could exploit.
+const MAX_SIGNATURE_ENTRIES: usize = 64;
+
 /// A signature on a ref-update certificate.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct CertSignature {
@@ -138,9 +162,15 @@ impl RefUpdateCert {
         Ok(())
     }
 
-    /// Verify all signatures on this certificate.
+    /// Verify all signatures on this certificate, failing closed.
     ///
-    /// Returns the list of DIDs whose signatures are valid.
+    /// On success returns the list of DIDs whose signatures are valid. This is
+    /// strict: it returns an error if *any* signature entry is malformed or
+    /// invalid. Because signature entries live outside the signed body (anyone
+    /// can append one without key material), do not use this to make a
+    /// threshold decision on an untrusted certificate — a single appended junk
+    /// entry would reject the whole cert. Use [`Self::satisfies_threshold`],
+    /// which ignores invalid entries and counts only the valid signers.
     pub fn verify_all(&self) -> Result<Vec<Did>> {
         use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};
         let signing_bytes = self.body.to_signing_bytes()?;
@@ -169,21 +199,65 @@ impl RefUpdateCert {
     /// from the provided set of authorized maintainer DIDs.
     ///
     /// Counts distinct signer DIDs, not signature entries: a repeated
-    /// signature from the same maintainer counts once.
+    /// signature from the same maintainer counts once. Malformed and invalid
+    /// signature entries are skipped, not fatal — entries live outside the
+    /// signed body, so any third party can append junk without key material,
+    /// and short-circuiting on the first bad one (as [`Self::verify_all`]
+    /// does) would let that junk deny an otherwise valid certificate (#349).
     ///
-    /// `threshold` must be at least 1. Zero is rejected instead of being
-    /// treated as "no signatures required": a caller that derives the
-    /// threshold from configuration and gets 0 would otherwise accept any
-    /// certificate, whether its signatures verify or not.
+    /// Tolerance must not become an unbounded verification path (#349 review
+    /// round 2): entries are attacker-extensible, so the work done for them is
+    /// bounded BEFORE the loop, not discovered inside it:
+    ///
+    /// - a list over [`MAX_SIGNATURE_ENTRIES`] is rejected outright (see the
+    ///   constant for why loud rejection beats a silent prefix scan);
+    /// - an encoded signature is length-gated before base64 work — a 64-byte
+    ///   Ed25519 signature is exactly [`ENCODED_SIG_LEN`] characters in
+    ///   url-safe unpadded base64, so an oversized blob never allocates;
+    /// - entries whose signer is not in `maintainers`, or is already counted,
+    ///   are skipped on a string compare, before any decode or curve work —
+    ///   so even within the cap, junk naming strangers costs no crypto;
+    /// - the scan returns as soon as the threshold is met.
     pub fn satisfies_threshold(&self, maintainers: &[Did], threshold: usize) -> Result<bool> {
+        use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};
         if threshold == 0 {
             return Err(Error::RefCert("threshold must be at least 1".to_string()));
         }
+        if self.signatures.len() > MAX_SIGNATURE_ENTRIES {
+            return Err(Error::RefCert(format!(
+                "certificate carries {} signature entries (max {})",
+                self.signatures.len(),
+                MAX_SIGNATURE_ENTRIES
+            )));
+        }
+        let signing_bytes = self.body.to_signing_bytes()?;
+        let mut counted: HashSet<&Did> = HashSet::new();
 
-        let valid = self.verify_all()?;
-        let distinct_signers: HashSet<&Did> =
-            valid.iter().filter(|d| maintainers.contains(d)).collect();
-        Ok(distinct_signers.len() >= threshold)
+        for cert_sig in &self.signatures {
+            if counted.contains(&cert_sig.signer) || !maintainers.contains(&cert_sig.signer) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            if cert_sig.sig.len() != ENCODED_SIG_LEN {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let Ok(vk) = cert_sig.signer.to_verifying_key() else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            let Ok(sig_bytes_vec) = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(&cert_sig.sig) else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            let Ok(sig_bytes) = <[u8; 64]>::try_from(sig_bytes_vec) else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            if verify(&vk, &signing_bytes, &sig_bytes).is_ok() {
+                counted.insert(&cert_sig.signer);
+                if counted.len() >= threshold {
+                    return Ok(true);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok(counted.len() >= threshold)
     }
 
     /// Validate the certificate structure (not signatures).
@@ -416,6 +490,149 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!cert.satisfies_threshold(&maintainers, 2).unwrap());
     }
 
+    /// An attacker can append junk signature entries to a cert (they live
+    /// outside the signed body, so no key material is needed). `satisfies_threshold`
+    /// must ignore them and still count the real signers — before the fix,
+    /// `verify_all`'s `?` on the junk made the whole check error out, denying a
+    /// valid 2-of-2 cert.
+    #[test]
+    fn satisfies_threshold_ignores_appended_junk_signatures() {
+        let kp1 = Keypair::generate();
+        let kp2 = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+            kp1.did(),
+            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            dummy_hash('0'),
+            dummy_hash('a'),
+            1,
+            &kp1,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        cert.countersign(&kp2).unwrap();
+
+        // Junk sits AHEAD of the real entries so the scan must actually skip
+        // it: appended last, the threshold-2 early return at the second real
+        // signature would fire before any junk is examined and the test would
+        // stay green even if the skip logic never ran.
+        cert.signatures.insert(
+            0,
+            CertSignature {
+                signer: kp1.did(),
+                sig: "!!!not-base64!!!".to_string(),
+            },
+        );
+        // Valid base64 but only 3 bytes — fails the 64-byte length check.
+        cert.signatures.insert(
+            0,
+            CertSignature {
+                signer: kp2.did(),
+                sig: "AAAA".to_string(),
+            },
+        );
+        // Exactly ENCODED_SIG_LEN of valid base64 decoding to garbage —
+        // exercises the decode+verify path before the skip, not just the
+        // length gate.
+        cert.signatures.insert(
+            0,
+            CertSignature {
+                signer: kp1.did(),
+                sig: "A".repeat(ENCODED_SIG_LEN),
+            },
+        );
+
+        let maintainers = vec![kp1.did(), kp2.did()];
+        assert!(cert.satisfies_threshold(&maintainers, 2).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    /// A junk entry that names a real maintainer DID but carries a signature
+    /// that does not verify must not be counted — otherwise appending garbage
+    /// under a maintainer's DID could forge a threshold.
+    #[test]
+    fn satisfies_threshold_does_not_count_a_forged_maintainer_signature() {
+        let kp1 = Keypair::generate();
+        let kp2 = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+            kp1.did(),
+            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            dummy_hash('0'),
+            dummy_hash('a'),
+            1,
+            &kp1,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        // Well-formed 64-byte signature from kp2, but over unrelated bytes, so
+        // it fails verification against the cert body.
+        cert.signatures.push(CertSignature {
+            signer: kp2.did(),
+            sig: kp2.sign_b64(b"unrelated bytes"),
+        });
+
+        let maintainers = vec![kp1.did(), kp2.did()];
+        // Only kp1 actually signed the body: 2-of-2 must fail, 1-of-2 holds.
+        assert!(!cert.satisfies_threshold(&maintainers, 2).unwrap());
+        assert!(cert.satisfies_threshold(&maintainers, 1).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    /// The tolerant scan must not be an unbounded verification path: a list
+    /// past MAX_SIGNATURE_ENTRIES is rejected loudly before any curve work,
+    /// while a list at the cap still verifies normally.
+    #[test]
+    fn satisfies_threshold_rejects_an_oversized_signature_list() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+            kp.did(),
+            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            dummy_hash('0'),
+            dummy_hash('a'),
+            1,
+            &kp,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let junk = || CertSignature {
+            signer: Keypair::generate().did(),
+            sig: "AAAA".to_string(),
+        };
+        while cert.signatures.len() < MAX_SIGNATURE_ENTRIES {
+            cert.signatures.push(junk());
+        }
+        let maintainers = vec![kp.did()];
+        // At the cap: still fine, the real signature counts.
+        assert!(cert.satisfies_threshold(&maintainers, 1).unwrap());
+        // One past the cap: loud rejection, no tolerant scan.
+        cert.signatures.push(junk());
+        let err = cert.satisfies_threshold(&maintainers, 1).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("signature entries"));
+    }
+
+    /// An entry whose encoded signature is not the exact base64 length of a
+    /// 64-byte Ed25519 signature is skipped before any base64 decode — an
+    /// attacker-sized sig string must cost neither allocation nor curve work,
+    /// and must not affect the verdict.
+    #[test]
+    fn satisfies_threshold_skips_an_oversized_encoded_signature() {
+        let kp1 = Keypair::generate();
+        let kp2 = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+            kp1.did(),
+            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            dummy_hash('0'),
+            dummy_hash('a'),
+            1,
+            &kp1,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        // Names a real maintainer, valid base64 alphabet, but megabytes long:
+        // the length gate must refuse it without decoding.
+        cert.signatures.push(CertSignature {
+            signer: kp2.did(),
+            sig: "A".repeat(2 * 1024 * 1024),
+        });
+
+        let maintainers = vec![kp1.did(), kp2.did()];
+        assert!(cert.satisfies_threshold(&maintainers, 1).unwrap());
+        assert!(!cert.satisfies_threshold(&maintainers, 2).unwrap());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn threshold_zero_is_rejected() {
         let kp = Keypair::generate();

crates/gitlawb-core/src/identity.rs

@@ -77,6 +77,14 @@ impl Keypair {
 }
 
 /// Verify an Ed25519 signature.
+///
+/// Strict verification: rejects small-order `R` and small-order public keys
+/// (the identity point, and any point of low order). Ordinary `verify` accepts
+/// a signature forged with the identity point as the public key plus
+/// `R = identity, S = 0`, which verifies for *any* message. `identity::verify`
+/// is the shared primitive behind HTTP request authentication, UCANs, and
+/// certificates, so weak-key acceptance is an authentication bypass, not a
+/// malleability nuance.
 pub fn verify(verifying_key: &VerifyingKey, msg: &[u8], sig_bytes: &[u8; 64]) -> Result<()> {
     let sig = Signature::from_bytes(sig_bytes);
     verifying_key
@@ -208,6 +216,38 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    /// The identity-point forgery: with public key A = identity, R = identity,
+    /// and S = 0, the equation `[S]B = R + [k]A` holds for every message,
+    /// because `[k]·identity = identity`. Ordinary (non-strict) Ed25519
+    /// verification accepts it, so the shared `verify` primitive must use
+    /// strict verification, which rejects small-order R and public keys.
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_identity_point_forgery() {
+        use ed25519_dalek::Verifier;
+        // The identity point (0,1) compresses to y = 1 with sign bit 0.
+        let identity = [
+            1u8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+            0, 0, 0, 0,
+        ];
+        let vk = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&identity).expect("identity point is on the curve");
+        let mut sig_bytes = [0u8; 64];
+        sig_bytes[..32].copy_from_slice(&identity);
+        let msg = b"arbitrary message the key owner never signed";
+
+        // Prove the forged signature satisfies the ordinary verification
+        // equation, so the strict check below is what actually defends the
+        // boundary (not a signature that was already invalid everywhere).
+        assert!(
+            vk.verify(msg, &Signature::from_bytes(&sig_bytes)).is_ok(),
+            "identity-point forgery must satisfy ordinary verification (this is why strict is needed)"
+        );
+
+        assert!(
+            verify(&vk, msg, &sig_bytes).is_err(),
+            "strict verification must reject the identity-point forgery"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn verify_rejects_weak_key_signature() {
         // Regression guard for strict verification: a signature forged under a

crates/gitlawb-core/src/identity_path.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+//! Where the identity key and the delegation store live.
+//!
+//! `gl` and `git-remote-gitlawb` have to agree on this. `gl ucan import` writes a
+//! delegation to `<dir>/delegations/`, and the helper reads it back from the same
+//! place when it builds the `X-Ucan` header on push. If the two resolve
+//! `GITLAWB_KEY` differently the push goes out with no header and the node refuses
+//! the delegate, with nothing on either side to say why — so the rules live here
+//! once, in the crate both binaries already depend on, rather than being written
+//! twice and drifting.
+//!
+//! The home directory is a parameter rather than something this module looks up.
+//! `gitlawb-core` is embedded by every consumer and is held to an explicit
+//! dependency allowlist (`ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt`); the callers already
+//! carry `dirs`, so taking `home` keeps the rules shared without widening core's
+//! tree. It also makes every case below testable against a fixed home.
+
+use std::ffi::OsStr;
+use std::path::{Component, Path, PathBuf};
+
+use crate::{Error, Result};
+
+/// Environment variable naming the identity PEM.
+pub const KEY_ENV: &str = "GITLAWB_KEY";
+
+/// Name of the PEM file inside the identity directory.
+pub const KEY_FILE_NAME: &str = "identity.pem";
+
+/// Directory under the home directory used when `GITLAWB_KEY` is unset.
+pub const DEFAULT_DIR_NAME: &str = ".gitlawb";
+
+/// Absolute path of the identity PEM: `$GITLAWB_KEY`, else
+/// `<home>/.gitlawb/identity.pem`.
+///
+/// An empty `GITLAWB_KEY` counts as unset. That is what a shell leaves behind for
+/// `FOO=` and for an unset variable expanded into a wrapper script, and reading it
+/// as a path would resolve against the process working directory instead.
+pub fn identity_key_path(home: Option<&Path>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    // `var_os`, not `var`: `var` folds a non-UTF-8 value into the same `Err` as
+    // unset, so an operator whose key path is not valid UTF-8 would silently get
+    // the default directory rather than theirs — or an error naming the real
+    // problem.
+    match std::env::var_os(KEY_ENV) {
+        Some(raw) if !raw.is_empty() => resolve_key_value(Path::new(&raw), home),
+        _ => Ok(require_home(home)?
+            .join(DEFAULT_DIR_NAME)
+            .join(KEY_FILE_NAME)),
+    }
+}
+
+/// The directory holding `identity.pem` and `delegations/` — the parent of
+/// [`identity_key_path`].
+pub fn identity_dir(home: Option<&Path>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    let key = identity_key_path(home)?;
+    key.parent().map(Path::to_path_buf).ok_or_else(|| {
+        Error::Key(format!(
+            "{KEY_ENV} has no parent directory: {}",
+            key.display()
+        ))
+    })
+}
+
+/// The home directory, demanded only where the value being resolved needs it.
+///
+/// An absolute `GITLAWB_KEY` never needs home, so requiring it up front would
+/// discard a perfectly good key on a host where `dirs::home_dir()` returns `None`
+/// — no `HOME` and no passwd entry, which is an ordinary container shape. The
+/// helper would then push unsigned, blaming the home directory for a setting the
+/// operator had configured correctly.
+fn require_home(home: Option<&Path>) -> Result<&Path> {
+    home.ok_or_else(|| {
+        Error::Key(format!(
+            "could not determine the home directory, which is needed to resolve this \
+             {KEY_ENV} value. Set {KEY_ENV} to an absolute path to avoid needing it."
+        ))
+    })
+}
+
+/// Apply the `GITLAWB_KEY` rules to a raw value.
+///
+/// Split out from [`identity_key_path`] so the rules can be tested without setting
+/// a process-global environment variable, which would make the tests race.
+fn resolve_key_value(raw: &Path, home: Option<&Path>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    let path = expand_tilde(raw, home)?;
+
+    if !path.is_absolute() {
+        return Err(Error::Key(format!(
+            "{KEY_ENV} must be an absolute path (got {}). It also determines where \
+             delegations are stored, and `gl` and `git-remote-gitlawb` do not share a \
+             working directory, so a relative path sends them to different stores.",
+            raw.display()
+        )));
+    }
+    if path.parent().is_none() {
+        return Err(Error::Key(format!(
+            "{KEY_ENV} must name the key file, not the filesystem root (got {}). \
+             Point it at the PEM, e.g. ~/{DEFAULT_DIR_NAME}/{KEY_FILE_NAME}.",
+            raw.display()
+        )));
+    }
+    Ok(path)
+}
+
+/// Expand a leading `~/`, and only that.
+///
+/// `~user` is shell syntax this does not implement; leaving its `~` in place makes
+/// it fail the absolute-path check with a message that names the real problem,
+/// which beats resolving it somewhere the operator did not ask for. A bare `~` or
+/// `~/` is refused outright: it names a directory where a file is required, and
+/// expanding it to the home directory would put the delegation store beside the
+/// home directory rather than inside it, since the store is the key's *parent*.
+///
+/// Matched on the first path component rather than on a string prefix. That is
+/// what lets the value stay an `OsStr` end to end: the helper's old
+/// `str::strip_prefix("~/")` needed a `String` first, which is why it reached for
+/// `env::var` and folded every non-UTF-8 path into "unset".
+fn expand_tilde(path: &Path, home: Option<&Path>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    let mut components = path.components();
+    match components.next() {
+        Some(Component::Normal(first)) if first == OsStr::new("~") => {
+            let rest = components.as_path();
+            if rest.as_os_str().is_empty() {
+                return Err(Error::Key(format!(
+                    "{KEY_ENV} must name the key file, not a directory (got {}). \
+                     Point it at the PEM, e.g. ~/{DEFAULT_DIR_NAME}/{KEY_FILE_NAME}.",
+                    path.display()
+                )));
+            }
+            Ok(require_home(home)?.join(rest))
+        }
+        _ => Ok(path.to_path_buf()),
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// A home that is absolute on the host running the tests. `/home/op` is not
+    /// absolute on Windows — it has a root but no prefix — so a shared literal
+    /// would make the absolute-path assertions test the wrong thing there.
+    fn home() -> PathBuf {
+        if cfg!(windows) {
+            PathBuf::from(r"C:\Users\op")
+        } else {
+            PathBuf::from("/home/op")
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn absolute_value_is_taken_verbatim() {
+        let raw = home().join("data").join("keys").join(KEY_FILE_NAME);
+        assert_eq!(resolve_key_value(&raw, Some(&home())).unwrap(), raw);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tilde_slash_expands_to_the_home_directory() {
+        let resolved = resolve_key_value(Path::new("~/keys/identity.pem"), Some(&home())).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resolved, home().join("keys").join(KEY_FILE_NAME));
+    }
+
+    /// The shell-style spelling of the default resolves to the default. Worth
+    /// pinning: this is the form an operator gets by copying a path out of their
+    /// shell, and the two binaries used to reach it by different routes.
+    #[test]
+    fn the_tilde_spelling_of_the_default_resolves_to_the_default() {
+        let resolved =
+            resolve_key_value(Path::new("~/.gitlawb/identity.pem"), Some(&home())).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resolved, home().join(DEFAULT_DIR_NAME).join(KEY_FILE_NAME));
+    }
+
+    /// A relative value resolves against the working directory, and `gl` and
+    /// `git-remote-gitlawb` do not share one: the import would land where the helper
+    /// never looks.
+    #[test]
+    fn relative_values_are_refused() {
+        for raw in ["identity.pem", "keys/identity.pem", "./keys/identity.pem"] {
+            assert!(
+                resolve_key_value(Path::new(raw), Some(&home())).is_err(),
+                "{raw} is relative and must be refused"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// `~user` is shell syntax, not a path, and a bare `~` names a directory where
+    /// a file is required. Refused rather than guessed at.
+    #[test]
+    fn unsupported_tilde_forms_are_refused() {
+        for raw in ["~", "~/", "~someone/keys/identity.pem"] {
+            assert!(
+                resolve_key_value(Path::new(raw), Some(&home())).is_err(),
+                "{raw} must be refused rather than resolved"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The root has no parent, so the delegation store would have nowhere to go.
+    #[test]
+    fn the_filesystem_root_is_refused() {
+        assert!(resolve_key_value(Path::new("/"), Some(&home())).is_err());
+    }
+
+    /// The whole point of `var_os`: a non-UTF-8 value must reach the rules rather
+    /// than being folded into "unset" by `var`. Byte 0xFF is not valid UTF-8 in any
+    /// position, so this value is unreachable through `env::var`.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn non_utf8_values_reach_the_rules() {
+        use std::ffi::OsString;
+        use std::os::unix::ffi::OsStringExt;
+
+        let relative = OsString::from_vec(b"keys/\xFF/identity.pem".to_vec());
+        assert!(
+            resolve_key_value(Path::new(&relative), Some(&home())).is_err(),
+            "a non-UTF-8 relative path must be refused, not silently defaulted"
+        );
+
+        let mut absolute = OsString::from("/data/");
+        absolute.push(OsString::from_vec(vec![0xFF]));
+        absolute.push("/identity.pem");
+        let resolved = resolve_key_value(Path::new(&absolute), Some(&home())).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resolved.as_os_str(), absolute.as_os_str());
+    }
+
+    /// Unset and empty both mean "use the default", and the two accessors must stay
+    /// consistent: the directory is the parent of the key, never a sibling of it.
+    /// The process environment is global, so the two cases share one test and one
+    /// lock rather than racing each other.
+    #[test]
+    fn unset_and_empty_both_select_the_default_directory() {
+        use std::sync::Mutex;
+        static LOCK: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());
+        let _guard = LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
+
+        let restore = std::env::var_os(KEY_ENV);
+
+        std::env::remove_var(KEY_ENV);
+        let unset = (
+            identity_key_path(Some(&home())),
+            identity_dir(Some(&home())),
+        );
+        std::env::set_var(KEY_ENV, "");
+        let empty = (
+            identity_key_path(Some(&home())),
+            identity_dir(Some(&home())),
+        );
+
+        match restore {
+            Some(v) => std::env::set_var(KEY_ENV, v),
+            None => std::env::remove_var(KEY_ENV),
+        }
+
+        for (label, (key, dir)) in [("unset", unset), ("empty", empty)] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                key.unwrap(),
+                home().join(DEFAULT_DIR_NAME).join(KEY_FILE_NAME),
+                "{label} key path"
+            );
+            assert_eq!(
+                dir.unwrap(),
+                home().join(DEFAULT_DIR_NAME),
+                "{label} directory"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod no_home_tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// An absolute key needs no home directory. Demanding one up front discarded a
+    /// correctly-configured `GITLAWB_KEY` on any host where `dirs::home_dir()`
+    /// returns `None` — no `HOME` and no passwd entry, an ordinary container shape —
+    /// and the helper then pushed unsigned while blaming the home directory.
+    #[test]
+    fn an_absolute_key_resolves_without_a_home_directory() {
+        let raw = if cfg!(windows) {
+            r"C:\data\keys\identity.pem"
+        } else {
+            "/data/keys/identity.pem"
+        };
+        let resolved = resolve_key_value(Path::new(raw), None)
+            .expect("an absolute key must not need a home directory");
+        assert_eq!(resolved, PathBuf::from(raw));
+        assert_eq!(resolved.parent().unwrap(), Path::new(raw).parent().unwrap());
+    }
+
+    /// The forms that genuinely need a home still say so, rather than resolving
+    /// somewhere arbitrary.
+    #[test]
+    fn the_forms_that_need_a_home_report_its_absence() {
+        let err = resolve_key_value(Path::new("~/keys/identity.pem"), None)
+            .expect_err("a ~/ path cannot resolve without a home directory");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("home directory"),
+            "the error must name the missing home directory, got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-core/src/lib.rs

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ pub mod encrypt;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod http_sig;
 pub mod identity;
+pub mod identity_path;
 // `url` is the one dependency here that drags a tail (idna, then the icu
 // crates), and gitlawb-core is allowlisted to stay embeddable. Every client that
 // needs this predicate already parses URLs, so they opt in and nothing else

crates/gitlawb-core/src/sanitize.rs

@@ -30,10 +30,30 @@ pub fn is_bidi_format(c: char) -> bool {
     )
 }
 
+/// Both halves of INV-6 in one call: drop every `Cc` control (which defangs
+/// ANSI and OSC escapes) and every bidi/format control that
+/// [`is_bidi_format`] names. What remains is safe to write to a terminal.
+///
+/// Length is not this function's business: a caller that shows the text
+/// decides how much of it to show.
+pub fn strip_terminal_controls(s: &str) -> String {
+    s.chars()
+        .filter(|c| !c.is_control() && !is_bidi_format(*c))
+        .collect()
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[test]
+    fn strip_removes_escapes_and_reordering_but_keeps_text() {
+        let hostile = "ok\u{1b}[31m red\u{1b}]0;title\u{7}\u{202E}dlrow\u{202C} \u{0627}\u{200D}";
+        let clean = strip_terminal_controls(hostile);
+        assert_eq!(clean, "ok[31m red]0;titledlrow \u{0627}\u{200D}");
+        assert!(!clean.chars().any(|c| c.is_control() || is_bidi_format(c)));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn strips_every_reordering_code_point() {
         // Asserted individually so a partial predicate (e.g. one that covers the

crates/gitlawb-core/src/ucan.rs

@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@ use crate::did::Did;
 use crate::identity::Keypair;
 use crate::{Error, Result};
 
+/// Proof chains deeper than this fail closed, in every walk over `prf`:
+/// [`Ucan::verify_chain`], [`Ucan::chain_lifetime_is_bounded`] and
+/// [`Ucan::chain_grants_push_to`] all stop here. Nothing this codebase mints is
+/// longer than owner → agent → node. The bound exists for the hand-built token:
+/// the node verifies the chain on the `X-Ucan` header of any signed request, and
+/// nothing else says how deep a sender may nest `prf`. In practice not very
+/// deep — a proof is a JSON string inside the next link's JSON, so each level
+/// re-escapes the one beneath it and the encoding roughly doubles per link
+/// (eight links is about 11 KiB, thirteen about 270 KiB) — but a walk should
+/// refuse on its own terms rather than count on the encoding running the sender
+/// out of room first.
+pub const MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH: usize = 8;
+
 /// A UCAN capability: what resource the token grants access to.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct Capability {
@@ -49,11 +62,32 @@ impl Capability {
     /// action field and `repo/admin` in the parent's action position act as
     /// wildcards that cover any delegated value; wildcards on `self` carry no
     /// special meaning.
+    ///
+    /// Constraints (`nb`) participate, and conservatively:
+    ///
+    /// | parent | child | verdict |
+    /// |---|---|---|
+    /// | none | anything | attenuated — adding constraints narrows |
+    /// | some | identical | attenuated |
+    /// | some | different | refused — narrowing is unprovable without semantics |
+    /// | some | none | refused — dropping constraints widens |
+    ///
+    /// The last row is the one that matters. Ignoring `nb` here let a holder of a
+    /// constrained capability re-delegate the same resource and action with the
+    /// constraints removed, and the chain still verified — so a consumer that
+    /// refuses constrained capabilities at the leaf saw an unconstrained one and
+    /// granted it. Since `nb` has no interpreted semantics yet, "different" cannot
+    /// be shown to be narrower and is refused with it.
     pub fn is_attenuated_by(&self, parent: &Capability) -> bool {
         let resource_ok = parent.with == self.with || parent.with == "*";
         let action_ok =
             parent.can == self.can || parent.can == "*" || parent.can == caps::REPO_ADMIN;
-        resource_ok && action_ok
+        let constraints_ok = match (&parent.constraints, &self.constraints) {
+            (None, _) => true,
+            (Some(p), Some(c)) => p == c,
+            (Some(_), None) => false,
+        };
+        resource_ok && action_ok && constraints_ok
     }
 }
 
@@ -71,6 +105,157 @@ pub mod caps {
     pub const REPO_ADMIN: &str = "repo/admin";
 }
 
+/// Rules shared by every boundary that decides whether a UCAN can push.
+///
+/// Four places answer "can this token push to this repository?": `gl ucan
+/// delegate` and the MCP `ucan_delegate` tool when a token is issued, `gl ucan
+/// import` when one is stored, `git-remote-gitlawb` when it mints an invocation,
+/// and the node when it authorizes the push. For three review rounds each of them
+/// carried its own copy of the answer, and every round found a token that one
+/// boundary accepted and the next refused: a constrained grant that imported and
+/// then authorized nothing; a wildcard proof the helper narrowed and the node
+/// rejected; a resource whose owner the leaf named but the chain root did not.
+///
+/// The rules live here, once, in the crate all four already depend on. A boundary
+/// may add checks of its own — the node anchors the chain root to a repository
+/// record it holds independently, import binds the audience to the local key —
+/// but the definition of a *usable push capability* is not one of them.
+pub mod push {
+    use super::{caps, Capability, Ucan};
+
+    /// The `did:key` representation rule: `did:key:z6Mk…` and bare `z6Mk…` are
+    /// the same identity. Mirror rows store the bare form; canonical rows and
+    /// every token store the full form.
+    ///
+    /// Collapses representation only within `did:key`. `did:web` and
+    /// `did:gitlawb` share the base58 space, so a trailing-segment compare would
+    /// treat `did:key:X` and `did:gitlawb:X` as equal; after stripping the prefix,
+    /// a value that still contains `:` is a non-key DID and matches nothing bare.
+    pub fn did_key_eq(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
+        if a == b {
+            return true;
+        }
+        fn key_id(d: &str) -> &str {
+            d.strip_prefix("did:key:").unwrap_or(d)
+        }
+        let (ka, kb) = (key_id(a), key_id(b));
+        !ka.contains(':') && !kb.contains(':') && ka == kb
+    }
+
+    /// The actions that authorize a push: `git/push` itself, the action wildcard,
+    /// and `repo/admin`, which covers it.
+    pub fn is_push_action(can: &str) -> bool {
+        can == caps::GIT_PUSH || can == "*" || can == caps::REPO_ADMIN
+    }
+
+    /// `gitlawb://repos/<owner>/<repo>` → `(owner, repo)`, or `None` for any other
+    /// shape. Exactly two non-empty segments: an owner DID never contains `/`, so
+    /// a third segment, a trailing slash, or an empty half is malformed rather than
+    /// something to interpret.
+    pub fn parse_repo_resource(with: &str) -> Option<(&str, &str)> {
+        let rest = with.strip_prefix("gitlawb://repos/")?;
+        let (owner, repo) = rest.split_once('/')?;
+        if owner.is_empty() || repo.is_empty() || repo.contains('/') {
+            return None;
+        }
+        Some((owner, repo))
+    }
+
+    /// The canonical repository name a capability or URL names: at most one
+    /// trailing `.git` stripped, the same normalization the node's smart-HTTP
+    /// routes apply (`smart_http_repo_name`). A git remote carries the suffix;
+    /// `RepoRecord.name` does not, so every boundary that compares a capability
+    /// to a record must go through the same strip or a `…/myrepo.git` capability
+    /// names a repository that never exists.
+    ///
+    /// At-most-once, not repeatedly: a repository literally named `foo.git`
+    /// (creatable via the peer mirror path, which skips API name validation) is
+    /// addressed as `foo.git.git`, and stripping twice would send it to `foo`.
+    pub fn canonical_repo_name(repo: &str) -> &str {
+        repo.strip_suffix(".git").unwrap_or(repo)
+    }
+
+    /// A push-class capability whose resource is the wildcard. Refused at
+    /// issuance, at import, by the helper, and by the node: a delegation's scope is
+    /// fixed when it is issued, and `*` cannot say which repositories it covered
+    /// at that moment.
+    pub fn is_push_wildcard(with: &str, can: &str) -> bool {
+        with == "*" && is_push_action(can)
+    }
+
+    pub use super::MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH;
+
+    impl Capability {
+        /// Push-class, unconstrained, and naming exactly this repository.
+        ///
+        /// Unconstrained because `nb` has no semantics yet: an owner who wrote
+        /// constraints meant to restrict, and honouring the capability while
+        /// ignoring them would grant more than was intended. The owner segment is
+        /// compared with [`did_key_eq`], so a token issued against the full DID
+        /// matches a mirror row keyed on the bare form.
+        ///
+        /// The capability's repo segment goes through [`canonical_repo_name`]
+        /// while `repo` (a `RepoRecord.name`, already canonical) does not: a
+        /// delegation written `…/myrepo.git` authorizes `myrepo`, the same
+        /// mapping the smart-HTTP URL applies.
+        pub fn grants_push_to(&self, owner: &str, repo: &str) -> bool {
+            self.constraints.is_none()
+                && is_push_action(&self.can)
+                && parse_repo_resource(&self.with)
+                    .is_some_and(|(o, r)| did_key_eq(o, owner) && canonical_repo_name(r) == repo)
+        }
+    }
+
+    impl Ucan {
+        /// Whether this chain — the leaf **and every proof behind it** — carries a
+        /// capability that [`Capability::grants_push_to`] this repository.
+        ///
+        /// Every link, not just the leaf. [`Capability::is_attenuated_by`] accepts
+        /// a concrete child under a `*` parent, so a leaf that names the repository
+        /// can sit on a proof that names every repository the root owns — including
+        /// ones created after the delegation was issued. Checking the leaf alone
+        /// let exactly that through.
+        ///
+        /// This establishes scope, not trust. It does not verify signatures,
+        /// expiry, or audience; call [`Ucan::verify_chain`] first, and anchor the
+        /// root it returns to something held independently of the token.
+        ///
+        /// Fails closed on anything it cannot vouch for: a proof that does not
+        /// decode, more than one proof per link, or a chain deeper than
+        /// [`MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH`].
+        pub fn chain_grants_push_to(&self, owner: &str, repo: &str) -> bool {
+            self.chain_grants_push_to_at(owner, repo, 0)
+        }
+
+        fn chain_grants_push_to_at(&self, owner: &str, repo: &str, depth: usize) -> bool {
+            if depth >= MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH {
+                return false;
+            }
+            if !self
+                .payload
+                .att
+                .iter()
+                .any(|c| c.grants_push_to(owner, repo))
+            {
+                return false;
+            }
+            // `verify_chain` refuses more than one proof per link for the same
+            // reason: two proofs mean two roots, and nothing says which authorized
+            // what.
+            if self.payload.prf.len() > 1 {
+                return false;
+            }
+            match self.payload.prf.first() {
+                None => true,
+                Some(token) => match Ucan::decode(token) {
+                    Ok(proof) => proof.chain_grants_push_to_at(owner, repo, depth + 1),
+                    Err(_) => false,
+                },
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 /// The UCAN payload (what gets signed).
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct UcanPayload {
@@ -146,6 +331,37 @@ impl Ucan {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Whether every link in this chain carries a finite `exp`.
+    ///
+    /// `exp` is optional in the format, and [`Self::is_expired`] reports `false`
+    /// when it is absent — so a link without one never expires. With no revocation
+    /// mechanism, a chain containing such a link is a permanent grant: a leaked
+    /// token cannot be withdrawn, and the issuer's only remedy is to rotate the
+    /// identity the resource is keyed on.
+    ///
+    /// Consumers that turn a UCAN into write authority should require this. It is
+    /// deliberately not enforced inside [`Self::verify_chain`], because a
+    /// non-expiring token is well-formed and may be perfectly appropriate for a
+    /// read-only or advisory capability; whether an unbounded grant is acceptable
+    /// is the consumer's policy, not the format's.
+    ///
+    /// Fails closed past [`MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH`], like every other walk over `prf`.
+    pub fn chain_lifetime_is_bounded(&self) -> bool {
+        self.chain_lifetime_is_bounded_at(0)
+    }
+
+    fn chain_lifetime_is_bounded_at(&self, depth: usize) -> bool {
+        if depth >= MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH {
+            return false;
+        }
+        if self.payload.exp.is_none() {
+            return false;
+        }
+        self.payload.prf.iter().all(|token| {
+            Self::decode(token).is_ok_and(|proof| proof.chain_lifetime_is_bounded_at(depth + 1))
+        })
+    }
+
     /// Check if this UCAN's not-before time is in the future (token not yet valid).
     pub fn is_before_valid(&self) -> bool {
         if let Some(nbf) = self.payload.nbf {
@@ -248,8 +464,33 @@ impl Ucan {
     /// 3. Check the proof is not expired
     /// 4. Recursively verify the proof's own chain
     ///
-    /// A UCAN with no proofs (root capability) passes trivially.
-    pub fn verify_chain(&self) -> Result<()> {
+    /// A UCAN with no proofs is its own root, so it returns its own issuer.
+    ///
+    /// **This establishes internal consistency, not trust.** `did:key` is
+    /// self-certifying, so anyone can mint a keypair and produce a chain that
+    /// verifies. A caller making an authorization decision MUST compare the
+    /// returned root against an identity it trusts for some reason outside this
+    /// token — a repo owner, a configured value, a registry lookup. Discarding
+    /// the return value is only correct when the caller is checking that a token
+    /// is well-formed and deliberately does not care who issued it.
+    ///
+    /// The walk stops at [`MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH`] and fails closed there. The node
+    /// runs this on the `X-Ucan` header of any signed request before it asks
+    /// what the chain grants, so this is the first place sender-chosen depth is
+    /// felt: each link costs a signature check and a decode of everything
+    /// beneath it. The scope walk was bounded and this one was not, which made
+    /// that bound decorative — a deep chain met the unbounded walk first.
+    pub fn verify_chain(&self) -> Result<Did> {
+        self.verify_chain_at(0)
+    }
+
+    fn verify_chain_at(&self, depth: usize) -> Result<Did> {
+        if depth >= MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH {
+            return Err(Error::Ucan(format!(
+                "proof chain deeper than {MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH} links is not accepted"
+            )));
+        }
+
         // First verify our own signature
         self.verify_signature()?;
 
@@ -261,34 +502,44 @@ impl Ucan {
             return Err(Error::Ucan("token is not yet valid".to_string()));
         }
 
-        for proof_token in &self.payload.prf {
-            let proof = Self::decode(proof_token)
-                .map_err(|e| Error::Ucan(format!("failed to decode proof: {e}")))?;
-
-            // The proof's audience must be this UCAN's issuer
-            if proof.payload.aud != self.payload.iss {
-                return Err(Error::Ucan(format!(
-                    "proof chain broken: proof audience {} does not match issuer {}",
-                    proof.payload.aud, self.payload.iss
-                )));
-            }
-
-            // Every delegated capability must be covered by the proof (attenuation).
-            for cap in &self.payload.att {
-                let covered = proof.payload.att.iter().any(|p| cap.is_attenuated_by(p));
-                if !covered {
-                    return Err(Error::Ucan(format!(
-                        "capability attenuation violated: '{}' on '{}' not covered by proof",
-                        cap.can, cap.with
-                    )));
-                }
-            }
-
-            // Verify the proof's signature and chain recursively
-            proof.verify_chain()?;
+        if self.payload.prf.len() > 1 {
+            return Err(Error::Ucan(
+                "multi-proof chains are not supported: more than one proof means \
+                 more than one root, and which root authorized a given capability \
+                 is ambiguous"
+                    .to_string(),
+            ));
         }
 
-        Ok(())
+        let Some(proof_token) = self.payload.prf.first() else {
+            // No proofs: this token is its own root.
+            return Ok(self.payload.iss.clone());
+        };
+
+        let proof = Self::decode(proof_token)
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Ucan(format!("failed to decode proof: {e}")))?;
+
+        // The proof's audience must be this UCAN's issuer
+        if proof.payload.aud != self.payload.iss {
+            return Err(Error::Ucan(format!(
+                "proof chain broken: proof audience {} does not match issuer {}",
+                proof.payload.aud, self.payload.iss
+            )));
+        }
+
+        // Every delegated capability must be covered by the proof (attenuation).
+        for cap in &self.payload.att {
+            let covered = proof.payload.att.iter().any(|p| cap.is_attenuated_by(p));
+            if !covered {
+                return Err(Error::Ucan(format!(
+                    "capability attenuation violated: '{}' on '{}' not covered by proof",
+                    cap.can, cap.with
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Recurse; the root of the proof's chain is the root of ours.
+        proof.verify_chain_at(depth + 1)
     }
 }
 
@@ -664,4 +915,509 @@ mod tests {
 
         delegated.verify_chain().unwrap();
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_chain_returns_the_root_issuer_of_a_delegated_chain() {
+        // owner -> agent (delegation), agent -> node (invocation).
+        // The root is the owner: that is the identity the whole chain rests on,
+        // and the only one a caller can meaningfully anchor a trust decision to.
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let caps_vec = vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)];
+
+        let delegation =
+            Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), caps_vec.clone(), None).expect("issue delegation");
+        let invocation = Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), caps_vec, None, &delegation)
+            .expect("wrap invocation");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            invocation.verify_chain().expect("chain must verify"),
+            owner.did(),
+            "the root issuer is the owner who started the chain, not the agent presenting it"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A chain is only bounded if EVERY link is. An unbounded link anywhere makes
+    /// the whole grant permanent, because `is_expired` reports false for it and
+    /// there is no revocation path to withdraw it.
+    #[test]
+    fn chain_lifetime_is_bounded_requires_an_expiry_on_every_link() {
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let cap = || vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)];
+        let hour = Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1);
+
+        let bounded_root = Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), cap(), Some(hour)).expect("issue");
+        let unbounded_root = Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), cap(), None).expect("issue");
+
+        assert!(
+            Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &bounded_root)
+                .expect("wrap")
+                .chain_lifetime_is_bounded(),
+            "both links finite"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), cap(), None, &bounded_root)
+                .expect("wrap")
+                .chain_lifetime_is_bounded(),
+            "the leaf has no expiry, so the grant never lapses"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &unbounded_root)
+                .expect("wrap")
+                .chain_lifetime_is_bounded(),
+            "a bounded leaf cannot rescue an unbounded proof: the holder can always \
+             mint a fresh leaf from it"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !unbounded_root.chain_lifetime_is_bounded(),
+            "a self-issued token with no expiry is itself unbounded"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A three-link chain: owner -> lead -> agent, which is the real shape of an
+    /// org delegating to a team lead who delegates to a CI identity.
+    ///
+    /// Every other chain here is depth two, where the immediate proof IS the root —
+    /// so nothing distinguishes recursing to the true root from simply returning the
+    /// proof's issuer. Both `assert_eq!` and `assert_ne!` below are load-bearing:
+    /// without the second, returning the middle issuer would still satisfy a test
+    /// that only checked "not the leaf".
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_chain_walks_past_the_immediate_proof_to_the_true_root() {
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let lead = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let cap = || vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)];
+
+        let root = Ucan::issue(&owner, lead.did(), cap(), None).expect("owner -> lead");
+        let mid = Ucan::delegate(&lead, agent.did(), cap(), None, &root).expect("lead -> agent");
+        let leaf = Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), cap(), None, &mid).expect("agent -> node");
+
+        let found = leaf.verify_chain().expect("a three-link chain must verify");
+        assert_eq!(
+            found,
+            owner.did(),
+            "the root is the owner who started the chain, two hops up"
+        );
+        assert_ne!(
+            found,
+            lead.did(),
+            "returning the immediate proof's issuer is not walking to the root"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_chain_returns_self_as_root_for_a_self_issued_token() {
+        // A token with no proofs roots at its own issuer. This is what makes a
+        // self-minted token useless: the caller compares this against the repo
+        // owner and it will only ever match when the presenter IS the owner.
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let ucan =
+            Ucan::issue(&agent, node.did(), vec![Capability::new("*", "*")], None).expect("issue");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            ucan.verify_chain().expect("a root token still verifies"),
+            agent.did(),
+            "a self-minted token roots at the minter, however permissive its capabilities"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Stripping `nb` is a widening, and a widening must fail attenuation.
+    ///
+    /// Without this, a constrained delegation is trivially escalated: the holder
+    /// re-delegates the same resource and action with the constraints removed,
+    /// `verify_chain` accepts the chain because attenuation only compared `with`
+    /// and `can`, and a consumer that refuses constrained capabilities at the leaf
+    /// (as the node's push gate does) then sees an unconstrained one and grants it.
+    /// Guarding only the leaf guards the wrong end of the chain.
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_chain_rejects_a_child_that_strips_the_parents_constraints() {
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+
+        let constrained = Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)
+            .with_constraints(serde_json::json!({ "refs": ["refs/heads/feat/*"] }));
+        let delegation = Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), vec![constrained], None)
+            .expect("issue constrained delegation");
+
+        // Same resource, same action, constraints dropped.
+        let widened = Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH);
+        let forged =
+            Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), vec![widened], None, &delegation).expect("wrap");
+
+        let err = forged
+            .verify_chain()
+            .expect_err("dropping the parent's constraints must fail attenuation");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("attenuation"),
+            "the failure must name attenuation, got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_chain_accepts_a_child_that_keeps_the_parents_constraints() {
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+
+        let nb = serde_json::json!({ "refs": ["refs/heads/feat/*"] });
+        let constrained = Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)
+            .with_constraints(nb.clone());
+        let delegation =
+            Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), vec![constrained.clone()], None).expect("issue");
+        let invocation =
+            Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), vec![constrained], None, &delegation).expect("wrap");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            invocation
+                .verify_chain()
+                .expect("an unchanged constraint must verify"),
+            owner.did()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn an_unconstrained_parent_still_allows_a_child_to_add_constraints() {
+        // Adding `nb` narrows, which is always a legal attenuation.
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+
+        let open = Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH);
+        let delegation = Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), vec![open], None).expect("issue");
+        let narrowed = Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)
+            .with_constraints(serde_json::json!({ "refs": ["refs/heads/main"] }));
+        let invocation =
+            Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), vec![narrowed], None, &delegation).expect("wrap");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            invocation.verify_chain().expect("narrowing must verify"),
+            owner.did()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_chain_rejects_a_multi_proof_chain() {
+        // Two proofs mean two roots, and nothing says which root authorized a
+        // given capability. Returning either one would be unsound, so refuse.
+        let owner_a = Keypair::generate();
+        let owner_b = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let caps_vec = vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)];
+
+        let proof_a = Ucan::issue(&owner_a, agent.did(), caps_vec.clone(), None).expect("issue a");
+        let proof_b = Ucan::issue(&owner_b, agent.did(), caps_vec.clone(), None).expect("issue b");
+
+        // `delegate` only ever writes one proof, so build the two-proof payload by hand.
+        let payload = UcanPayload {
+            ucan: "1.0.0".to_string(),
+            iss: agent.did(),
+            aud: node.did(),
+            att: caps_vec,
+            exp: None,
+            nbf: None,
+            prf: vec![
+                proof_a.encode().expect("encode a"),
+                proof_b.encode().expect("encode b"),
+            ],
+        };
+        let signing_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&payload).expect("serialize payload");
+        let s = agent.sign_b64(&signing_bytes);
+        let multi = Ucan { payload, s };
+
+        let err = multi
+            .verify_chain()
+            .expect_err("a two-proof chain must be refused");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("multi-proof"),
+            "the error must name the reason, got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod push_scope_tests {
+    use super::push::*;
+    use super::{caps, Capability, Ucan};
+    use crate::identity::Keypair;
+
+    fn hour() -> chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc> {
+        chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn did_key_eq_collapses_representation_only_within_did_key() {
+        assert!(did_key_eq("did:key:z6MkAbc", "z6MkAbc"));
+        assert!(did_key_eq("z6MkAbc", "did:key:z6MkAbc"));
+        assert!(did_key_eq("did:key:z6MkAbc", "did:key:z6MkAbc"));
+        assert!(!did_key_eq("did:key:z6MkAbc", "did:key:z6MkXyz"));
+        // A bare id must never match across methods: `did:gitlawb` shares the
+        // base58 space with `did:key`.
+        assert!(!did_key_eq("did:gitlawb:z6MkAbc", "z6MkAbc"));
+        assert!(!did_key_eq("did:key:z6MkAbc", "did:gitlawb:z6MkAbc"));
+        assert!(!did_key_eq("did:web:example.com", "example.com"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_repo_resource_requires_exactly_two_segments() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_repo_resource("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6Mk/r"),
+            Some(("did:key:z6Mk", "r"))
+        );
+        for bad in [
+            "*",
+            "",
+            "gitlawb://repos/",
+            "gitlawb://repos/owner",
+            "gitlawb://repos/owner/",
+            "gitlawb://repos//r",
+            "gitlawb://repos/owner/r/extra",
+            "https://repos/owner/r",
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(parse_repo_resource(bad), None, "{bad:?}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_push_wildcard_is_the_resource_wildcard_with_a_push_action() {
+        for can in [caps::GIT_PUSH, "*", caps::REPO_ADMIN] {
+            assert!(is_push_wildcard("*", can), "{can}");
+        }
+        assert!(!is_push_wildcard("*", caps::GIT_FETCH));
+        assert!(!is_push_wildcard("*", caps::PR_OPEN));
+        assert!(!is_push_wildcard("gitlawb://repos/o/r", caps::GIT_PUSH));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_capability_grants_push_only_when_concrete_unconstrained_and_push_class() {
+        let owner = "did:key:z6MkOwner";
+        let ok = Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOwner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH);
+        assert!(ok.grants_push_to(owner, "r"));
+        // Bare and full owner forms are the same identity.
+        assert!(ok.grants_push_to("z6MkOwner", "r"));
+
+        assert!(!Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH).grants_push_to(owner, "r"));
+        assert!(
+            !Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOwner/r", caps::GIT_FETCH)
+                .grants_push_to(owner, "r")
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOwner/other", caps::GIT_PUSH)
+                .grants_push_to(owner, "r")
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOther/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)
+                .grants_push_to(owner, "r")
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOwner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)
+                .with_constraints(serde_json::json!({"max_bytes": 1}))
+                .grants_push_to(owner, "r")
+        );
+        for can in ["*", caps::REPO_ADMIN] {
+            assert!(
+                Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOwner/r", can)
+                    .grants_push_to(owner, "r"),
+                "{can} covers git/push"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_git_suffixed_capability_names_the_canonical_repo() {
+        let owner = "did:key:z6MkOwner";
+        // A git remote carries `.git`; the record does not. The capability
+        // matches the repository the URL would reach, so a delegation pasted
+        // from the remote still authorizes.
+        assert!(Capability::new(
+            "gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOwner/myrepo.git",
+            caps::GIT_PUSH
+        )
+        .grants_push_to(owner, "myrepo"));
+        // At most one suffix is stripped: a repo literally named `foo.git`
+        // (reachable as `foo.git.git` over smart HTTP) is a different
+        // repository from `foo`, and a single `.git` must not resolve to it.
+        assert!(Capability::new(
+            "gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOwner/foo.git.git",
+            caps::GIT_PUSH
+        )
+        .grants_push_to(owner, "foo.git"));
+        assert!(
+            !Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOwner/foo.git", caps::GIT_PUSH)
+                .grants_push_to(owner, "foo.git")
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The chain walk, at every depth: a wildcard anywhere denies; concrete
+    /// everywhere grants. The grandparent case is the one a single-level check
+    /// misses, because the immediate proof already names the repo.
+    #[test]
+    fn chain_grants_push_only_when_every_link_names_the_repo() {
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let a = Keypair::generate();
+        let b = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let owner_s = owner.did().to_string();
+        let res = format!("gitlawb://repos/{owner_s}/r");
+        let concrete = || vec![Capability::new(&res, caps::GIT_PUSH)];
+        let wild = || vec![Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH)];
+
+        // Single self-issued link.
+        assert!(Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), concrete(), Some(hour()))
+            .unwrap()
+            .chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
+        assert!(!Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), wild(), Some(hour()))
+            .unwrap()
+            .chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
+
+        // Two links: concrete leaf on a wildcard proof must deny.
+        let wild_proof = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), wild(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
+        let leaf = Ucan::delegate(&a, node.did(), concrete(), Some(hour()), &wild_proof).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            leaf.verify_chain().is_ok(),
+            "attenuation accepts it — that is why we walk"
+        );
+        assert!(!leaf.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
+
+        // Three links: wildcard grandparent, concrete parent, concrete leaf.
+        let gp = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), wild(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
+        let parent = Ucan::delegate(&a, b.did(), concrete(), Some(hour()), &gp).unwrap();
+        let leaf = Ucan::delegate(&b, node.did(), concrete(), Some(hour()), &parent).unwrap();
+        assert!(leaf.verify_chain().is_ok());
+        assert!(
+            !leaf.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"),
+            "a wildcard two links up must deny"
+        );
+
+        // Three links, all concrete.
+        let gp = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), concrete(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
+        let parent = Ucan::delegate(&a, b.did(), concrete(), Some(hour()), &gp).unwrap();
+        let leaf = Ucan::delegate(&b, node.did(), concrete(), Some(hour()), &parent).unwrap();
+        assert!(leaf.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
+        // And the bare owner form is the same repo.
+        assert!(leaf.chain_grants_push_to(owner_s.strip_prefix("did:key:").unwrap(), "r"));
+        // But not another repo.
+        assert!(!leaf.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "other"));
+    }
+
+    /// Fail closed on anything the walk cannot vouch for.
+    #[test]
+    fn chain_walk_fails_closed_on_undecodable_or_multi_proofs_or_excess_depth() {
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let a = Keypair::generate();
+        let owner_s = owner.did().to_string();
+        let res = format!("gitlawb://repos/{owner_s}/r");
+        let cap = || vec![Capability::new(&res, caps::GIT_PUSH)];
+
+        let mut broken = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), cap(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
+        broken.payload.prf = vec!["not a ucan".into()];
+        assert!(!broken.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
+
+        let good = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), cap(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
+        let mut two = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), cap(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
+        two.payload.prf = vec![good.encode().unwrap(), good.encode().unwrap()];
+        assert!(!two.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
+
+        // Deeper than MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH, all concrete: refused on depth alone.
+        let mut cur = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), cap(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
+        let mut signer = a;
+        for _ in 0..MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH {
+            let next = Keypair::generate();
+            cur = Ucan::delegate(&signer, next.did(), cap(), Some(hour()), &cur).unwrap();
+            signer = next;
+        }
+        assert!(
+            !cur.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"),
+            "depth bound must fail closed"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+/// Every walk over `prf` stops at the same depth. The round-ten P1: the scope
+/// walk was bounded while `verify_chain` and `chain_lifetime_is_bounded` were
+/// not, and the node runs `verify_chain` on an attacker-supplied `X-Ucan` header
+/// before the bounded walk ever sees it, so the bound protected nothing.
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod chain_depth_tests {
+    use super::{caps, Capability, Ucan, MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH};
+    use crate::identity::Keypair;
+
+    fn hour() -> chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc> {
+        chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1)
+    }
+
+    /// A well-formed, fully signed, expiring chain of exactly `links` links, every
+    /// one naming the owner's repository, so the only thing any walk can object
+    /// to is how long it is. Returns the leaf and the owner it roots at.
+    fn concrete_chain(links: usize) -> (Ucan, Keypair) {
+        assert!(links >= 1);
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let owner_s = owner.did().to_string();
+        let res = format!("gitlawb://repos/{owner_s}/r");
+        let cap = || vec![Capability::new(&res, caps::GIT_PUSH)];
+
+        let mut signer = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut cur = Ucan::issue(&owner, signer.did(), cap(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
+        for _ in 1..links {
+            let next = Keypair::generate();
+            cur = Ucan::delegate(&signer, next.did(), cap(), Some(hour()), &cur).unwrap();
+            signer = next;
+        }
+        (cur, owner)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_chain_at_the_bound_passes_every_walk() {
+        let (leaf, owner) = concrete_chain(MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH);
+        let owner_s = owner.did().to_string();
+        assert_eq!(
+            leaf.verify_chain()
+                .expect("a chain at the bound must verify"),
+            owner.did()
+        );
+        assert!(leaf.chain_lifetime_is_bounded());
+        assert!(leaf.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn one_link_past_the_bound_fails_every_walk_closed() {
+        let (leaf, owner) = concrete_chain(MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH + 1);
+        let owner_s = owner.did().to_string();
+
+        let err = leaf
+            .verify_chain()
+            .expect_err("verify_chain must refuse a chain past the bound");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("deeper than"),
+            "the refusal must say depth was the reason, not a fake signature failure: {err}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !leaf.chain_lifetime_is_bounded(),
+            "an unwalkable chain cannot be vouched for as bounded"
+        );
+        assert!(!leaf.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
+    }
+
+    /// A chain well past the bound is refused from the top, before any per-link
+    /// work. Only a few links past it, deliberately: a proof is embedded as a JSON
+    /// string inside the next link's JSON, so every level re-escapes the one
+    /// inside it and the encoding roughly doubles per link — eight links is about
+    /// 10 KiB, sixteen is megabytes, and a chain of "a few hundred levels" cannot
+    /// physically be encoded, let alone sent as a header. The bound is still
+    /// what stops the reachable dozen-odd levels from each costing a decode of
+    /// everything beneath them.
+    #[test]
+    fn a_chain_well_past_the_bound_is_refused_not_walked() {
+        let (leaf, _) = concrete_chain(MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH + 4);
+        let err = leaf.verify_chain().expect_err("must refuse");
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("deeper than"), "{err}");
+        assert!(!leaf.chain_lifetime_is_bounded());
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ cid = { workspace = true }
 hex = { workspace = true }
 sha2 = { workspace = true }
 hmac = { workspace = true }
+chacha20poly1305 = "0.10"
 http-body-util = "0.1"
 tokio-util = { version = "0.7", features = ["io"] }
 dirs-next = "2"
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ alloy = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = [
     "network",
     "rpc-types-eth",
 ] }
+rand = { workspace = true }
 libp2p-dns = { version = "0.45.0", features = ["tokio"] }
 
 [dev-dependencies]

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/encrypted.rs

@@ -6,29 +6,24 @@ use axum::Json;
 use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::state::AppState;
-use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs
 /// Returns [{oid, cid}] for every encrypted blob in the repo, to any caller who
 /// can read the repo. Not recipient-scoped: recipient identities are not stored,
 /// so access control here is repo readability and decryption is gated by the
 /// envelope crypto (only a real recipient can open an envelope).
+///
+/// Quarantined repos are opaque 404 via [`crate::api::authorize_repo_read`] —
+/// same as issues/changelogs — so a public-but-quarantined mirror cannot leak
+/// its encrypted blob index.
 pub async fn list_encrypted_blobs(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
     let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
-    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny
-    {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")));
-    }
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
     let rows = state.db.list_all_encrypted_blobs(&record.id).await?;
     let blobs: Vec<_> = rows
         .into_iter()
@@ -45,17 +40,9 @@ pub async fn get_encrypted_blob(
     auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
     Path((owner, repo, oid)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
     let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
-    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny
-    {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}/{oid}")));
-    }
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
     let cid = state
         .db
         .encrypted_blob_cid(&record.id, &oid)
@@ -81,17 +68,9 @@ pub async fn replicate_encrypted_blobs(
     auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
     let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
-    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny
-    {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")));
-    }
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
     let rows = state.db.list_all_encrypted_blobs(&record.id).await?;
     let blobs: Vec<_> = rows
         .into_iter()

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/ipfs.rs

@@ -2130,9 +2130,32 @@ async fn gate_and_serve(
 
 /// GET /api/v1/ipfs/pins
 ///
-/// Returns all CIDs that have been pinned to the local IPFS node from git
-/// objects received via push. Each entry includes the git SHA-256 hex, the
-/// CIDv1 string, and the timestamp when it was pinned.
+/// Returns all CIDs that have been pinned from git objects received via push.
+/// Each entry includes the git SHA-256 hex and the timestamp when it was
+/// pinned. The wire contract is nullable by design:
+///
+/// - `cid` / `local_cid` — node-local resolver keys: the raw CIDv1 the
+///   `GET /ipfs/{cid}` endpoint serves. Non-null ONLY when the stored value
+///   parses as a raw CIDv1 AND writer-owned local provenance confirms the
+///   bytes went through this node's IPFS daemon. Otherwise null, even when
+///   the database holds some other CID-shaped string for the row.
+/// - `pinata_cid` — the provider identifier Pinata returned (dag-pb/UnixFS,
+///   not a node resolver key). The only usable identifier for remote-only
+///   rows; `gl` consumers must read this field, never `cid`, for those.
+/// - `local_pinned` — `true` iff the local-IPFS writer path
+///   (`record_pinned_cid_with_source`) pushed the bytes into the local
+///   daemon. Writer-owned; never inferred from CID shape. A row can carry
+///   `local_pinned = true` with a null `cid` when its stored key predates
+///   the raw-key contract (legacy provider key awaiting repair).
+/// - `pinata_pinned` — `true` iff the row has a non-null `pinata_cid`.
+///
+/// Rows with neither a local nor a Pinata CID are omitted so the response
+/// only contains rows with at least one backend. Remote-only rows stay
+/// visible through `pinata_cid`/`pinata_pinned`; nothing is hidden.
+///
+/// #218 review P2: the response surfaces writer-owned provenance so a
+/// `gl` consumer can distinguish local-only, remote-only, and dual rows
+/// without re-inferring semantics from nullability.
 pub async fn list_pins(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     auth: Option<Extension<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>>,
@@ -2146,6 +2169,38 @@ pub async fn list_pins(
     // map to 503 `db_unavailable` (not 500 via `.map_err(AppError::Internal)`) (#251).
     let pins = state.db.list_pinned_cids().await?;
 
+    let pins: Vec<serde_json::Value> = pins
+        .into_iter()
+        .filter(|p| p.cid.is_some() || p.pinata_cid.is_some())
+        .map(|p| {
+            // A stored `cid` is advertised as a node-local resolver key
+            // only when it passes the raw-CIDv1 contract AND local
+            // provenance is confirmed. The historical `cid` column has
+            // held more than one namespace (Kubo dag-pb, Pinata CIDv0),
+            // and the `/ipfs/{cid}` resolver recomputes the raw CID
+            // from object bytes and rejects anything else — so a
+            // legacy provider key in `cid`/`local_cid` would promise a
+            // local object the node immediately refuses to serve.
+            // Such rows stay listed (with their provenance flags) but
+            // carry no local key until repair rewrites them.
+            let local_key = match &p.cid {
+                Some(c) if gitlawb_core::cid::is_raw_cidv1(c) && p.local_ipfs_provenance => {
+                    Some(c.clone())
+                }
+                _ => None,
+            };
+            serde_json::json!({
+                "sha256_hex": p.sha256_hex,
+                "cid": local_key.clone(),
+                "local_cid": local_key,
+                "pinata_cid": p.pinata_cid,
+                "local_pinned": p.local_ipfs_provenance,
+                "pinata_pinned": p.pinata_cid.is_some(),
+                "pinned_at": p.pinned_at,
+            })
+        })
+        .collect();
+
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
         "pins": pins,
         "count": pins.len(),
@@ -2459,6 +2514,369 @@ mod closed_pool_tests {
         );
     }
 
+    /// #218 review P2: the `list_pins` API response surfaces writer-owned
+    /// provenance (`local_pinned`, `pinata_pinned`) so a `gl` consumer
+    /// can distinguish local-only, remote-only, and dual rows without
+    /// re-inferring semantics from nullability. `cid`/`local_cid` carry a
+    /// value ONLY for rows whose stored key parses as a raw CIDv1 with
+    /// confirmed local provenance; anything else (Pinata-only rows,
+    /// legacy provider keys) exposes its usable identifier through
+    /// `pinata_cid` alone, and every non-null local key must resolve
+    /// through `GET /ipfs/{cid}`.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn list_pins_reports_writer_owned_provenance_for_all_shapes(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        use sqlx::Row as _;
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
+        let db = &state.db;
+
+        // Raw resolver keys must be REAL raw CIDv1 strings: the handler
+        // gates `cid`/`local_cid` on `is_raw_cidv1`, so placeholder text
+        // would fail the gate for the wrong reason. Provider CIDs stay
+        // opaque Qm… strings (never syntax-checked, only echoed).
+        fn raw_cid_for(content: &[u8]) -> String {
+            gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes(content).to_string()
+        }
+
+        // Two real blobs on disk in one public repo, so the local and
+        // dual rows below can be followed through `GET /ipfs/{cid}`.
+        // The resolver locates repos through `repo_store.acquire`, not
+        // the row's `disk_path`, so the recipe overwrites the acquired
+        // bare path with a real clone: workdir commit of both files,
+        // cloned --bare into the store path, oids via rev-parse, raw
+        // keys recomputed from the file bytes exactly as the serve
+        // path does.
+        fn run_git(args: &[&str], cwd: &std::path::Path) {
+            let out = std::process::Command::new("git")
+                .args(args)
+                .current_dir(cwd)
+                .output()
+                .expect("git runs");
+            assert!(
+                out.status.success(),
+                "git {args:?} failed: {}",
+                String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
+            );
+        }
+        let content1 = b"pins follow-through one\n";
+        let content2 = b"pins follow-through two\n";
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let work = tmp.path().join("work-pins-list");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&work).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(work.join("one.txt"), content1).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(work.join("two.txt"), content2).unwrap();
+        run_git(
+            &["init", "-q", "--object-format=sha256", "-b", "main"],
+            &work,
+        );
+        run_git(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"], &work);
+        run_git(&["config", "user.name", "t"], &work);
+        run_git(&["add", "."], &work);
+        run_git(&["commit", "-qm", "seed"], &work);
+        let oid_of = |spec: &str| {
+            let out = std::process::Command::new("git")
+                .args(["rev-parse", spec])
+                .current_dir(&work)
+                .output()
+                .expect("git rev-parse runs");
+            assert!(out.status.success(), "rev-parse {spec} failed");
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
+        };
+        let sha_local = oid_of("HEAD:one.txt");
+        let sha_dual = oid_of("HEAD:two.txt");
+        let raw1 = raw_cid_for(content1);
+        let raw4 = raw_cid_for(content2);
+        db.upsert_mirror_repo(
+            "zPinsListOwner",
+            "pins-list",
+            "/unused-pins-list",
+            None,
+            false,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        let rec = db
+            .get_repo("zPinsListOwner", "pins-list")
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .expect("mirror repo row");
+        let bare = state
+            .repo_store
+            .acquire(&rec.owner_did, &rec.name)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&bare);
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&bare).unwrap();
+        run_git(
+            &[
+                "clone",
+                "--bare",
+                "-q",
+                work.to_str().unwrap(),
+                bare.to_str().unwrap(),
+            ],
+            tmp.path(),
+        );
+
+        // The combination table for what the response must carry:
+        //
+        //   shape              | local_pinned | pinata_pinned | local_cid | pinata_cid
+        //   -------------------+--------------+---------------+-----------+-----------
+        //   local-only         | true         | false          | raw       | null
+        //   pinata-only (raw)  | false        | true           | null      | provider
+        //   pinata-only (null) | false        | true           | null      | raw(=provider)
+        //   dual               | true         | true           | raw       | provider
+        //   legacy provider key| true         | false          | null      | null
+        //
+        // The pinata-only (raw) row keeps a genuine raw key in the
+        // column but must NOT surface it: provenance is unconfirmed,
+        // so no local field may carry it. The legacy row predates the
+        // raw-key contract (dag-pb key, provenance claimed) and must
+        // surface no local key until repair rewrites it — while the
+        // row itself (and its `local_pinned` flag) stays visible.
+        //
+        // Distinct shas (the table is keyed on sha256_hex) keep the
+        // rows independent.
+
+        // (1) local-only: real local pin via the production writer.
+        db.record_pinned_cid_with_source(&sha_local, &raw1, &rec.id)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // (2) pinata-only (raw != provider): the post-v27/v30 row shape
+        // produced by `record_pinata_cid`. The stored raw key is genuine
+        // but local provenance is unconfirmed, so neither local field
+        // may carry it; the provider field is the usable identifier.
+        let sha_pinata_raw = "sha_p2_pinata_only_distinct_cids";
+        let raw2 = raw_cid_for(b"pins pinata-only bytes\n");
+        let pinata2 = "QmPinataProviderCidForRawOnlyRow";
+        assert_ne!(raw2, pinata2);
+        db.record_pinata_cid(
+            sha_pinata_raw,
+            &raw2,
+            pinata2,
+            Some("repo-p2-pinata-raw"),
+            i64::MAX,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // (3) pinata-only (raw == provider): `record_pinata_cid` stores
+        // `cid = NULL` so the resolver key isn't aliased to a dag-pb
+        // provider CID that doesn't hash to the raw bytes (#173).
+        let sha_pinata_null = "sha_p2_pinata_only_null_cid";
+        let same = "QmPinataOnlyCidRawEqualsProvider";
+        db.record_pinata_cid(
+            sha_pinata_null,
+            same,
+            same,
+            Some("repo-p2-pinata-null"),
+            i64::MAX,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // (4) dual: local first (sets the flag and `cid`), then Pinata
+        // (sets `pinata_cid` and preserves `cid` and `local_ipfs_provenance`).
+        let pinata4 = "QmPinataProviderCidForDualRow";
+        db.record_pinned_cid_with_source(&sha_dual, &raw4, &rec.id)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.record_pinata_cid(&sha_dual, &raw4, pinata4, Some(&rec.id), i64::MAX)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // (5) legacy provider key: a pre-fix row whose `cid` is a dag-pb
+        // provider identifier with claimed local provenance. Production
+        // writers can no longer produce this shape, so it is seeded with
+        // raw SQL — the point is that the projection must not trust column
+        // shape as proof of a raw local key.
+        let sha_legacy = "sha_p2_legacy_provider_key";
+        sqlx::query(
+            "INSERT INTO pinned_cids (sha256_hex, cid, pinned_at, pinata_cid, repo_id, local_ipfs_provenance)
+             VALUES ($1, $2, $3, NULL, $4, TRUE)",
+        )
+        .bind(sha_legacy)
+        .bind("QmLegacyProviderKeyPredatesRawContract")
+        .bind("2026-07-01T00:00:00Z")
+        .bind(&rec.id)
+        .execute(&pool)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Hit the production handler end-to-end through a one-shot router
+        // request, so the test exercises the actual response shape
+        // (not a unit test on PinnedCidRecord fields).
+        let resp = Router::new()
+            .route("/api/v1/ipfs/pins", axum::routing::get(list_pins))
+            .layer(axum::Extension(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid(
+                "did:key:zPinListTest".to_string(),
+            )))
+            .with_state(state.clone())
+            .oneshot(
+                axum::http::Request::builder()
+                    .uri("/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+                    .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
+                    .unwrap(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), axum::http::StatusCode::OK);
+        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
+            .await
+            .expect("read body");
+        let v: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).expect("json body");
+        let pins = v
+            .get("pins")
+            .and_then(|p| p.as_array())
+            .expect("pins array");
+        assert_eq!(
+            pins.len(),
+            5,
+            "all five shapes must appear in the response (every row has at least one of cid/pinata_cid set)"
+        );
+
+        // Build a map sha -> pin object for ergonomic assertions.
+        let by_sha: std::collections::HashMap<String, &Value> = pins
+            .iter()
+            .map(|p| {
+                (
+                    p.get("sha256_hex")
+                        .and_then(|s| s.as_str())
+                        .unwrap()
+                        .to_string(),
+                    p,
+                )
+            })
+            .collect();
+
+        // Helper: assert a single pin's fields.
+        let assert_pin = |sha: &str,
+                          local_pinned: bool,
+                          pinata_pinned: bool,
+                          local_cid: Option<&str>,
+                          pinata_cid: Option<&str>| {
+            let pin = by_sha.get(sha).unwrap_or_else(|| {
+                panic!(
+                    "pin row for {sha} missing; got shas {:?}",
+                    by_sha.keys().collect::<Vec<_>>()
+                )
+            });
+            assert_eq!(
+                pin.get("local_pinned").and_then(|v| v.as_bool()),
+                Some(local_pinned),
+                "{sha}: local_pinned mismatch",
+            );
+            assert_eq!(
+                pin.get("pinata_pinned").and_then(|v| v.as_bool()),
+                Some(pinata_pinned),
+                "{sha}: pinata_pinned mismatch",
+            );
+            assert_eq!(
+                pin.get("local_cid").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
+                local_cid,
+                "{sha}: local_cid mismatch",
+            );
+            assert_eq!(
+                pin.get("pinata_cid").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
+                pinata_cid,
+                "{sha}: pinata_cid mismatch",
+            );
+            // Round-3 P2: `cid` is the LOCAL resolver key, full
+            // stop. It is the raw CID when the row has a local pin
+            // (local-only or dual shape) and `None` for Pinata-only
+            // rows. The previous contract aliased the Pinata provider
+            // CID into `cid` for Pinata-only rows, which made
+            // `gl ipfs list` advertise a CID the node's own
+            // `/ipfs/{cid}` resolver cannot serve (404). The
+            // provenance split is exposed via `local_cid`,
+            // `pinata_cid`, and the boolean `local_pinned` /
+            // `pinata_pinned` flags.
+            let cid_value = pin.get("cid").cloned().unwrap_or(serde_json::Value::Null);
+            let expected_cid = local_cid
+                .map(|s| serde_json::Value::String(s.to_string()))
+                .unwrap_or(serde_json::Value::Null);
+            assert_eq!(cid_value, expected_cid, "{sha}: cid mismatch");
+        };
+
+        // (1) local-only
+        assert_pin(&sha_local, true, false, Some(raw1.as_str()), None);
+        // (2) pinata-only (raw != provider): the stored raw key is
+        // genuine but provenance is unconfirmed, so NO local field may
+        // carry it — remote-only state is visible through `pinata_cid`
+        // alone.
+        assert_pin(sha_pinata_raw, false, true, None, Some(pinata2));
+        // (3) pinata-only (raw == provider) — cid NULL, pinata_cid set
+        assert_pin(sha_pinata_null, false, true, None, Some(same));
+        // (4) dual
+        assert_pin(&sha_dual, true, true, Some(raw4.as_str()), Some(pinata4));
+        // (5) legacy provider key: no local field carries the dag-pb
+        // key, but the row and its claimed provenance stay visible so
+        // the repair gap is observable rather than hidden.
+        assert_pin(sha_legacy, true, false, None, None);
+
+        // Sanity: the `local_ipfs_provenance` column itself is what
+        // powers `local_pinned`, so the response field must agree
+        // with the database column. Reading directly avoids any
+        // confusion if the writer path changes.
+        let rows = sqlx::query("SELECT sha256_hex, local_ipfs_provenance FROM pinned_cids")
+            .fetch_all(&pool)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut db_provenance: std::collections::HashMap<String, bool> = Default::default();
+        for r in rows {
+            let sha: String = r.get("sha256_hex");
+            let p: bool = r.get("local_ipfs_provenance");
+            db_provenance.insert(sha, p);
+        }
+        for (sha, expected) in [
+            (sha_local.as_str(), true),
+            (sha_pinata_raw, false),
+            (sha_pinata_null, false),
+            (sha_dual.as_str(), true),
+            (sha_legacy, true),
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                db_provenance.get(sha).copied(),
+                Some(expected),
+                "db column for {sha} does not match expected writer-owned provenance"
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Follow-through: every non-null local key in the response must
+        // resolve through `GET /ipfs/{cid}`. The local-only and dual rows
+        // above name real blobs on disk in a public repo, so both must
+        // serve their exact bytes; the Pinata-only and legacy rows carry
+        // no local key and have nothing to follow.
+        let follow_router = Router::new()
+            .route("/ipfs/{cid}", axum::routing::get(get_by_cid))
+            .with_state(state.clone());
+        for (raw, content) in [(&raw1, &content1[..]), (&raw4, &content2[..])] {
+            let resp = follow_router
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(
+                    axum::http::Request::builder()
+                        .uri(format!("/ipfs/{raw}"))
+                        .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
+                        .unwrap(),
+                )
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(
+                resp.status(),
+                axum::http::StatusCode::OK,
+                "advertised local key {raw} must resolve"
+            );
+            let body = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
+                .await
+                .expect("read body");
+            assert_eq!(
+                body.as_ref(),
+                content,
+                "resolved bytes for {raw} must match the pinned blob"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     /// #251 / CodeRabbit nit: cover `get_by_cid`'s DB-error conversion path — a
     /// valid CID must still yield 503 on a closed pool.
     #[sqlx::test]

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/issues.rs

@@ -238,49 +238,32 @@ pub async fn close_issue(
     headers: axum::http::HeaderMap,
     crate::rate_limit::PeerAddr(peer): crate::rate_limit::PeerAddr,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
-
-    // READ-GATE before any snapshot work or rate charging. The author fallback below
-    // needs the issue blob, which needs the repo tree, so authorship cannot be established
-    // without a download; but a caller who cannot even READ the repo must be
-    // stopped here, cheaply, before any Tigris transfer or extraction happens.
-    // Without this, any signed non-owner could issue parallel close requests for
-    // arbitrary issue ids and drive unbounded downloads and blocking extraction
-    // (a disposable-identity DoS), because the route has no other pre-authorization.
+    // READ-GATE before any snapshot work or rate charging, through the shared
+    // authorize_repo_read gate so quarantined repos are opaque here too. The
+    // author fallback below needs the issue blob, which needs the repo tree, so
+    // authorship cannot be established without a download; but a caller who
+    // cannot even READ the repo must be stopped here, cheaply, before any
+    // Tigris transfer or extraction happens. Without this, any signed non-owner
+    // could issue parallel close requests for arbitrary issue ids and drive
+    // unbounded downloads and blocking extraction (a disposable-identity DoS),
+    // because the route has no other pre-authorization.
     //
-    // Rate limiting runs AFTER this gate so a 429 cannot distinguish a hidden repo
-    // from a missing one (INV-12 read-denial status contract).
+    // Rate limiting runs AFTER this gate so a 429 cannot distinguish a hidden
+    // repo from a missing one (INV-12 read-denial status contract).
     //
     // mirror-rows-handled: a repo row synced from a peer is stored public and
-    // carries none of the owner's visibility rules, so for such a row this check
-    // can only return allow. That is deliberate rather than overlooked, and it is
-    // the same verdict every other read gate in this API reaches for one. Refusing
-    // instead would deny the repo's real owner and the issue's real author on any
-    // node whose only copy of the repo is a synced one, which is an ordinary state
-    // here, and it would not buy the protection it appears to, because a synced
-    // row's recorded owner comes from the peer that sent it. The expensive work
-    // this check guards is bounded ahead of it by the per-IP limiter and the read
-    // pool slot taken below, and the authoritative owner-or-author decision still
-    // runs below and again under the write lock.
-    {
-        // mirror-rows-handled: synced mirror rows carry no owner rules; read gate only.
-        let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
-        let caller = auth.0.as_str();
-        if crate::visibility::visibility_check(
-            &rules,
-            record.is_public,
-            &record.owner_did,
-            Some(caller),
-            "/",
-        ) == crate::visibility::Decision::Deny
-        {
-            return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")));
-        }
-    }
+    // carries none of the owner's visibility rules, so for such a row this gate
+    // can only return allow. That is deliberate rather than overlooked, and it
+    // is the same verdict every other read gate in this API reaches for one.
+    // Refusing instead would deny the repo's real owner and the issue's real
+    // author on any node whose only copy of the repo is a synced one, which is
+    // an ordinary state here, and it would not buy the protection it appears
+    // to, because a synced row's recorded owner comes from the peer that sent
+    // it. The expensive work this check guards is bounded ahead of it by the
+    // per-IP limiter and the read pool slot taken below, and the authoritative
+    // owner-or-author decision still runs below and again under the write lock.
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     // Per-IP flood brake, layered on the same shared limiter and trusted-proxy
     // policy as the push advertisement. The pre-lock snapshot downloads the
@@ -502,6 +485,15 @@ mod tests {
             .await
             .expect("get_repo")
             .expect("repo exists");
+        // upsert_mirror_repo seeds the row quarantined, and the read gate now
+        // hides quarantined rows as opaque 404 before the owner-or-author check
+        // this test names. Release it so the stranger is refused by the 403, not
+        // by the quarantine short-circuit.
+        state
+            .db
+            .set_repo_quarantine(&record.id, false)
+            .await
+            .expect("release seed quarantine");
 
         // An independent session holds the repo's write lock for the whole call.
         let key = crate::git::repo_store::advisory_lock_key_for_test(
@@ -703,6 +695,15 @@ mod tests {
             .await
             .expect("get_repo")
             .expect("seeded repo exists");
+        // upsert_mirror_repo seeds the admission flag as quarantined, but the
+        // gate now hides quarantined rows from every caller class. Release it
+        // so these tests exercise what they name: the owner-or-author check
+        // after the read gate, not the quarantine short-circuit.
+        state
+            .db
+            .set_repo_quarantine(&record.id, false)
+            .await
+            .expect("release seed quarantine");
         let _ = owner_did;
         let path = state
             .repo_store
@@ -728,6 +729,40 @@ mod tests {
         path
     }
 
+    /// The read gate blocks the owner (and any caller) before the
+    /// owner-or-author checks: even the owner gets the opaque 404 on a
+    /// quarantined repo, and the seeded row's quarantined flag is left set
+    /// deliberately. The released-mirror variants above exercise the
+    /// owner-or-author path.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn quarantined_repo_close_is_opaque_404(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
+        let owner_did = "did:key:z6MkT1Owner";
+        state
+            .db
+            .upsert_mirror_repo("z6MkT1Owner", "tquar", "/unused", None, true)
+            .await
+            .expect("seed repo row");
+
+        let res = close_issue(
+            axum::extract::State(state.clone()),
+            axum::Extension(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid(owner_did.to_string())),
+            axum::extract::Path((
+                "z6MkT1Owner".to_string(),
+                "tquar".to_string(),
+                "1".to_string(),
+            )),
+            axum::http::HeaderMap::new(),
+            crate::rate_limit::PeerAddr(Some("203.0.113.70:5000".parse().unwrap())),
+        )
+        .await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(res, Err(crate::error::AppError::RepoNotFound(_))),
+            "a quarantined repo must 404 close_issue for every caller: {:?}",
+            res.ok().map(|_| "unexpected success")
+        );
+    }
+
     /// INV-21(c) positive twin 1: the OWNER can still close. The reorder moved the
     /// owner check above the lock, so this is the arm most likely to have broken,
     /// and the deny test alone could not see it.

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/labels.rs

@@ -44,11 +44,8 @@ pub async fn add_label(
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
     let label = canonicalize_label(&req.label)?;
 
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
     crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     let added = state.db.add_label(&record.id, &label).await?;
@@ -71,11 +68,8 @@ pub async fn remove_label(
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let label = canonicalize_label(&label)?;
 
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
     crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     let removed = state.db.remove_label(&record.id, &label).await?;

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/mod.rs

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ pub mod replicas;
 pub mod repos;
 pub mod resolve;
 pub mod stars;
+pub mod task_cursor;
 pub mod tasks;
 pub mod visibility;
 pub mod webhooks;
@@ -68,16 +69,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn authorize_repo_read(
 /// `did:web` / `did:gitlawb` share the base58 space with `did:key`, so a
 /// trailing-segment compare would treat `did:key:X` and `did:gitlawb:X` as equal.
 pub(crate) fn did_matches(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
-    if a == b {
-        return true;
-    }
-    fn key_id(d: &str) -> &str {
-        d.strip_prefix("did:key:").unwrap_or(d)
-    }
-    let (ka, kb) = (key_id(a), key_id(b));
-    // After stripping `did:key:`, a value still containing ':' is a non-key full
-    // DID — do not let it match a bare `did:key` id.
-    !ka.contains(':') && !kb.contains(':') && ka == kb
+    // One implementation, shared with `gl` and `git-remote-gitlawb` through core:
+    // every boundary that compares a DID applies the same collapse rule.
+    gitlawb_core::ucan::push::did_key_eq(a, b)
 }
 
 /// Client-facing denial shared by every repo-owner gate copy. `require_repo_owner`
@@ -176,16 +170,28 @@ mod authz_guard {
             "\nasync fn ",
             "\npub fn ",
             "\nfn ",
+            "#[cfg(test)]",
         ]
         .iter()
         .filter_map(|p| rest[1..].find(p).map(|i| i + 1))
         .min()
         .unwrap_or(rest.len());
-        rest[..end]
+        // Strip block comments too: a marker surviving only inside /* */ would
+        // otherwise satisfy a row with the real gate deleted.
+        // Line comments first: a `//` line containing `/*` must not open a
+        // block range or real code (and gate markers) gets stripped with it.
+        let mut body = rest[..end]
             .lines()
             .filter(|l| !l.trim_start().starts_with("//"))
             .collect::<Vec<_>>()
-            .join("\n")
+            .join("\n");
+        while let Some(open) = body.find("/*") {
+            match body[open..].find("*/").map(|i| open + i + 2) {
+                Some(close) => body.replace_range(open..close, ""),
+                None => break,
+            }
+        }
+        body
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -208,9 +214,14 @@ mod authz_guard {
 
         // (source, handler, expected gate marker)
         let rows: &[(&str, &str, &str)] = &[
-            // Bucket A — owner-gate (require_repo_owner -> 403)
+            // Bucket A — owner-gate (require_repo_owner -> 403), now behind
+            // the shared read gate first so a hidden repo 404s for every
+            // caller class before the owner check can answer 403.
+            (pulls, "merge_pr", "authorize_repo_read("),
             (pulls, "merge_pr", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (webhooks, "create_webhook", "authorize_repo_read("),
             (webhooks, "create_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (webhooks, "delete_webhook", "authorize_repo_read("),
             (webhooks, "delete_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
             // Bucket A/B hybrid — list_webhooks is read-visibility THEN owner:
             // authorize_repo_read 404s a non-reader of a private repo, then
@@ -219,10 +230,15 @@ mod authz_guard {
             // (existence hiding) and require_repo_owner guards the owner half.
             (webhooks, "list_webhooks", "authorize_repo_read("),
             (webhooks, "list_webhooks", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (labels, "add_label", "authorize_repo_read("),
             (labels, "add_label", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (labels, "remove_label", "authorize_repo_read("),
             (labels, "remove_label", "require_repo_owner("),
-            // Bucket A' — owner OR author (did_matches against the author)
+            // Bucket A' — owner OR author (did_matches against the author),
+            // also behind the shared read gate first.
+            (pulls, "close_pr", "authorize_repo_read("),
             (pulls, "close_pr", "did_matches("),
+            (issues, "close_issue", "authorize_repo_read("),
             (issues, "close_issue", "did_matches("),
             // Bucket B — read-gate (authorize_repo_read)
             (pulls, "create_review", "authorize_repo_read("),
@@ -268,21 +284,66 @@ mod authz_guard {
             (bounties, "dispute_bounty", "did_matches("),
             (replicas, "register_replica", "did_matches("),
             (replicas, "unregister_replica", "replica_did = &auth.0"),
-            // PRE-GATED — already owner-gated, in-scope group; guard the gate itself
+            // PRE-GATED — owner-gated behind the shared read gate; guard both
+            (protect, "protect_branch", "authorize_repo_read("),
             (protect, "protect_branch", "did_matches("),
+            (protect, "unprotect_branch", "authorize_repo_read("),
             (protect, "unprotect_branch", "did_matches("),
+            (visibility, "set_visibility", "authorize_repo_read("),
             (visibility, "set_visibility", "require_owner("),
+            (visibility, "remove_visibility", "authorize_repo_read("),
             (visibility, "remove_visibility", "require_owner("),
+            (visibility, "list_visibility", "authorize_repo_read("),
             (visibility, "list_visibility", "require_owner("),
         ];
 
-        // The visibility rows prove require_owner is CALLED; this proves the helper
-        // itself does DID-safe matching, not a raw/trailing-segment compare.
+        // Rows above prove each visibility handler calls authorize_repo_read and
+        // require_owner; this proves the helper itself does DID-safe matching.
         assert!(
             fn_body(visibility, "require_owner").contains("did_matches("),
             "visibility::require_owner must use did_matches for DID-safe owner matching"
         );
 
+        // Order matters as much as presence: hoisting the owner/author check
+        // above the read gate would 403 a non-owner on a hidden repo, an
+        // existence oracle. Pin read-gate-then-owner on every handler that
+        // takes both; the owner marker differs per bucket (require_repo_owner
+        // for owner-only, require_owner for visibility, did_matches for the
+        // owner-or-author and protect paths).
+        for (src, func, owner_marker) in [
+            (visibility, "set_visibility", "require_owner("),
+            (visibility, "remove_visibility", "require_owner("),
+            (visibility, "list_visibility", "require_owner("),
+            (pulls, "merge_pr", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (webhooks, "list_webhooks", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (webhooks, "create_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (webhooks, "delete_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (labels, "add_label", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (labels, "remove_label", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (pulls, "close_pr", "did_matches("),
+            (issues, "close_issue", "did_matches("),
+            (protect, "protect_branch", "did_matches("),
+            (protect, "unprotect_branch", "did_matches("),
+        ] {
+            let body = fn_body(src, func);
+            let gate = body.find("authorize_repo_read(").expect("gate marker");
+            let owner = body.find(owner_marker).expect("owner marker");
+            assert!(
+                gate < owner,
+                "{func} must run authorize_repo_read before {owner_marker}"
+            );
+            // The owner-or-author and protect handlers also carry
+            // require_repo_owner: a hoist of that call above the read gate is
+            // the same 403-vs-404 oracle, so pin it too where it exists.
+            if func == "close_pr" || func == "close_issue" {
+                let owner_gate = body.find("require_repo_owner(").expect("owner marker");
+                assert!(
+                    gate < owner_gate,
+                    "{func} must run authorize_repo_read before require_repo_owner("
+                );
+            }
+        }
+
         // The CID read surface (#173) enforces its gate inside the shared
         // `gate_and_serve`, which BOTH the provenance path and the legacy scan call, so
         // the markers must live there (the get_by_cid row above only proves delegation).

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/peers.rs

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ pub(crate) const PUBLIC_HTTP_URL_REQUIREMENT: &str = "must be a public http(s) U
 /// sits at a prefix-length-dependent offset (RFC 6052 §2.2) — so they return
 /// `None`. Any caller that needs them blocked must reject the wider
 /// `64:ff9b::/32` itself; `is_public_http_url` does this in its native-v6 arm.
-fn embedded_ipv4(v6: std::net::Ipv6Addr) -> Option<std::net::Ipv4Addr> {
+pub(crate) fn embedded_ipv4(v6: std::net::Ipv6Addr) -> Option<std::net::Ipv4Addr> {
     if let Some(v4) = v6.to_ipv4_mapped().or_else(|| v6.to_ipv4()) {
         return Some(v4);
     }
@@ -104,6 +104,116 @@ fn embedded_ipv4(v6: std::net::Ipv6Addr) -> Option<std::net::Ipv4Addr> {
     None
 }
 
+/// Whether an IP literal is outside the local/private ranges that an
+/// attacker-controlled outbound URL must never reach. Kept separate from URL
+/// parsing so callers that resolve a DNS name themselves can apply the same
+/// classification to every answer and then pin the approved addresses.
+pub(crate) fn is_public_ip(ip: std::net::IpAddr) -> bool {
+    // Reject loopback/unspecified on the literal as given — catches `::1` and
+    // `::` before the IPv4-folding below (`::1`.to_ipv4() would otherwise map
+    // to a non-loopback `0.0.0.1`).
+    if ip.is_loopback() || ip.is_unspecified() {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // Fold any IPv6 literal that embeds an IPv4 address (mapped, compatible,
+    // 6to4, NAT64) down to that IPv4 so the v4 range checks catch
+    // loopback/private addresses smuggled in via an IPv6 encoding, then
+    // re-check loopback/unspecified.
+    let ip = match ip {
+        std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => embedded_ipv4(v6).map(std::net::IpAddr::V4).unwrap_or(ip),
+        v4 => v4,
+    };
+    if ip.is_loopback() || ip.is_unspecified() {
+        return false;
+    }
+    match ip {
+        std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
+            let o = v4.octets();
+            // RFC1918 private, link-local, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), or the
+            // RFC1122 "this host" block 0.0.0.0/8 (never a valid destination;
+            // 0.0.0.0 itself is already caught by the is_unspecified check).
+            if v4.is_private()
+                || v4.is_link_local()
+                || (o[0] == 100 && (o[1] & 0xc0) == 64)
+                || o[0] == 0
+            {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+        std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
+            let s = v6.segments();
+            // fc00::/7 (unique-local), fe80::/10 (link-local), or fec0::/10
+            // (site-local, deprecated by RFC 3879; the link-local mask does
+            // not cover it).
+            if (s[0] & 0xfe00) == 0xfc00 || (s[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80 || (s[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfec0 {
+                return false;
+            }
+            // Any NAT64 address (64:ff9b::/32) that is not the cleanly
+            // decodable well-known /96 — e.g. the RFC 8215 local-use
+            // 64:ff9b:1::/48 — carries a translated target whose embedded v4
+            // sits at a prefix-length-dependent offset (RFC 6052 §2.2).
+            // Rather than risk a wrong decode across every prefix length we
+            // reject the whole NAT64 space here. The well-known /96 was already
+            // folded to its v4 above and never reaches this arm.
+            if s[0] == 0x0064 && s[1] == 0xff9b {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    true
+}
+
+/// Mirror-upstream variant of [`is_public_ip`]: in addition to the shared
+/// peer classification, rejects IANA special-purpose ranges that are
+/// non-global, locally meaningful, or unsafe as owner-controlled outbound
+/// fetch endpoints. For IP-literal upstreams, configure-time URL validation
+/// and the fetch-time egress policy share this classifier, so a stored
+/// literal can never fail the worker it is scheduled for. Hostname upstreams
+/// are only shape-checked at configure time: each fetch resolves DNS and
+/// applies this classifier to the answers, so a hostname whose answers turn
+/// non-public still fails at fetch time.
+pub(crate) fn mirror_upstream_ip_permitted(ip: std::net::IpAddr) -> bool {
+    if !is_public_ip(ip) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let classified = match ip {
+        std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => embedded_ipv4(v6).map(std::net::IpAddr::V4).unwrap_or(ip),
+        _ => ip,
+    };
+    match classified {
+        std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
+            let [a, b, c, _] = v4.octets();
+            // IANA special-purpose ranges that are not globally reachable but
+            // may be routed inside labs, clouds, or operator networks. They are
+            // unsuitable for an owner-controlled outbound fetch even though
+            // `Ipv4Addr::is_private` does not classify them as RFC1918.
+            !(a >= 224
+                || (a == 192 && b == 0 && c == 0)
+                || (a == 192 && b == 0 && c == 2)
+                || (a == 192 && b == 88 && c == 99)
+                || (a == 198 && matches!(b, 18 | 19))
+                || (a == 198 && b == 51 && c == 100)
+                || (a == 203 && b == 0 && c == 113))
+        }
+        std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
+            let s = v6.segments();
+            // IANA special-purpose ranges that are non-global, locally
+            // meaningful, or unsafe to treat as ordinary forge endpoints.
+            // Reject the complete IETF protocol-assignment /23 rather than
+            // trying to maintain its narrow globally reachable exceptions;
+            // a public forge has no reason to depend on those anycast ranges.
+            !(v6.is_multicast()
+                || (s[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfec0
+                || (s[0] == 0x0100 && s[1] == 0 && s[2] == 0 && s[3] == 0)
+                || (s[0] == 0x0100 && s[1] == 0 && s[2] == 0 && s[3] == 1)
+                || (s[0] == 0x2001 && (s[1] & 0xfe00) == 0)
+                || (s[0] == 0x2001 && s[1] == 0x0db8)
+                || (s[0] == 0x3fff && (s[1] & 0xf000) == 0)
+                || s[0] == 0x5f00)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 /// Whether a peer `http_url` is a public http(s) endpoint safe to register.
 /// Rejects non-http(s) schemes, loopback/unspecified/private/link-local IPs,
 /// and `localhost` / `.localhost` / `.local` / `.internal` hostnames. Used at
@@ -137,60 +247,9 @@ pub fn is_public_http_url(raw: &str) -> bool {
     // before parsing as an IP.
     let ip_candidate = host.trim_start_matches('[').trim_end_matches(']');
     if let Ok(ip) = ip_candidate.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>() {
-        // Reject loopback/unspecified on the literal as given — catches `::1`
-        // and `::` before the IPv4-folding below (`::1`.to_ipv4() would
-        // otherwise map to a non-loopback `0.0.0.1`).
-        if ip.is_loopback() || ip.is_unspecified() {
-            return false;
-        }
-        // Fold any IPv6 literal that embeds an IPv4 address (mapped, compatible,
-        // 6to4, NAT64) down to that IPv4 so the v4 range checks catch
-        // loopback/private addresses smuggled in via an IPv6 encoding, then
-        // re-check loopback/unspecified.
-        let ip = match ip {
-            std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => embedded_ipv4(v6).map(std::net::IpAddr::V4).unwrap_or(ip),
-            v4 => v4,
-        };
-        if ip.is_loopback() || ip.is_unspecified() {
-            return false;
-        }
-        match ip {
-            std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
-                let o = v4.octets();
-                // RFC1918 private, link-local, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), or the
-                // RFC1122 "this host" block 0.0.0.0/8 (never a valid destination;
-                // 0.0.0.0 itself is already caught by the is_unspecified check).
-                if v4.is_private()
-                    || v4.is_link_local()
-                    || (o[0] == 100 && (o[1] & 0xc0) == 64)
-                    || o[0] == 0
-                {
-                    return false;
-                }
-            }
-            std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
-                let s = v6.segments();
-                // fc00::/7 (unique-local), fe80::/10 (link-local), or fec0::/10
-                // (site-local, deprecated by RFC 3879 and so never a legitimate
-                // peer address, but still routable on networks that kept it).
-                if (s[0] & 0xfe00) == 0xfc00
-                    || (s[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80
-                    || (s[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfec0
-                {
-                    return false;
-                }
-                // Any NAT64 address (64:ff9b::/32) that is not the cleanly
-                // decodable well-known /96 — e.g. the RFC 8215 local-use
-                // 64:ff9b:1::/48 — carries a translated target whose embedded v4
-                // sits at a prefix-length-dependent offset (RFC 6052 §2.2).
-                // Rather than risk a wrong decode across every prefix length we
-                // reject the whole NAT64 space here. The well-known /96 was
-                // already folded to its v4 above and never reaches this arm.
-                if s[0] == 0x0064 && s[1] == 0xff9b {
-                    return false;
-                }
-            }
-        }
+        // IP literals share the single DNS/literal classification in
+        // `is_public_ip`; hostname-only rules stay local to this function.
+        return is_public_ip(ip);
     } else if !host.contains('.') {
         // A name with no dot at all. The `.local` / `.internal` rules above are
         // suffix checks, so a single label slips both, and the resolver decides
@@ -616,6 +675,8 @@ mod tests {
     fn rejects_deprecated_site_local_v6() {
         // fec0::/10, deprecated by RFC 3879. The link-local mask (0xffc0 ==
         // 0xfe80) does not cover it: 0xfec0 & 0xffc0 is 0xfec0.
+        assert!(!super::is_public_ip("fec0::1".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(!super::is_public_ip("feff:ffff::1".parse().unwrap()));
         for bad in ["http://[fec0::1]/", "http://[feff:ffff::1]:7545"] {
             assert!(!is_public_http_url(bad), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
         }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/protect.rs

@@ -17,11 +17,8 @@ pub async fn protect_branch(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo, branch)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     // Only the repo owner can protect branches (DID-safe match, shared idiom).
     let caller = &auth.0;
@@ -51,11 +48,8 @@ pub async fn unprotect_branch(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo, branch)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let caller = &auth.0;
     if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/pulls.rs

@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ pub async fn create_pr(
     webhooks::fire_event(
         std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.db),
         std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.http_client),
+        std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.webhook_secret_key),
         &record.id,
         "pull_request.opened",
         serde_json::json!({
@@ -199,11 +200,8 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     // Owner-only merge (N7). Merging writes the served tree, so this is the same
     // trust boundary as owner-only push; it subsumes branch protection (a
@@ -249,6 +247,7 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
     webhooks::fire_event(
         std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.db),
         std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.http_client),
+        std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.webhook_secret_key),
         &record.id,
         "pull_request.merged",
         serde_json::json!({
@@ -274,11 +273,8 @@ pub async fn close_pr(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -300,6 +296,7 @@ pub async fn close_pr(
     webhooks::fire_event(
         std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.db),
         std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.http_client),
+        std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.webhook_secret_key),
         &record.id,
         "pull_request.closed",
         serde_json::json!({
@@ -350,6 +347,7 @@ pub async fn create_review(
     webhooks::fire_event(
         std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.db),
         std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.http_client),
+        std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.webhook_secret_key),
         &record.id,
         "pull_request.reviewed",
         serde_json::json!({

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/task_cursor.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,782 @@
+//! Opaque, integrity-protected continuation tokens for the task read surfaces.
+//!
+//! The task list pages by keyset over `(created_at, id)`, but the rows a
+//! caller may *see* are a filtered subset of the rows the query has to
+//! *examine*. Handing the caller a raw `(created_at, id)` cursor therefore
+//! forced a choice between two broken options (#327 review): anchor the cursor
+//! on the last visible row, and a window of denied tasks longer than the scan
+//! budget stalls paging forever; or anchor it on the last examined row, and a
+//! denied read leaks the id and timestamp of a task `GET /tasks/{id}` other-
+//! wise 404s.
+//!
+//! A server-issued token removes the choice. The position it carries is the
+//! last *examined* candidate, so paging always advances, and the payload is
+//! opaque and MAC'd, so the caller learns nothing from it and cannot forge one
+//! naming a row of their choosing.
+//!
+//! The position must be *confidential*, not merely unforgeable: a token that
+//! merely signed a base64 payload would still let its holder read the id and
+//! timestamp of the denied row it names, which is the disclosure the token
+//! exists to prevent. The payload is therefore encrypted under a
+//! synthetic-IV construction (SIV): the tag is an HMAC over the filter and the
+//! plaintext, and it doubles as the IV seeding the keystream the plaintext is
+//! XORed with. That needs no randomness source and no dependency beyond the
+//! `hmac`/`sha2` pair already used for webhook signatures and blob recipient
+//! tags, and it is decrypt-last: nothing is parsed until the tag verifies.
+//!
+//! Making the token the *only* accepted cursor also fixes the ordering-domain
+//! bug the same review found. `agent_tasks.created_at` is TEXT and compared as
+//! TEXT, so `...Z` and `...+00:00` denote one instant but sort differently. A
+//! caller-typed timestamp could silently skip or repeat same-time rows. The
+//! token instead carries the stored string verbatim, so the value compared is
+//! always a value the server wrote.
+//!
+//! A token is bound to the *caller* as well as the filter. The position it
+//! names is the last examined candidate, not the last visible one, so it
+//! encodes how far a scan got under one caller's visibility. Resuming it as a
+//! different caller would start the scan past rows that caller is entitled to
+//! read, silently dropping them from the answer (#327 review). The presenting
+//! caller's normalized DID (empty and flagged absent when anonymous) is
+//! therefore part of the MAC input, so a token presented by anyone else fails
+//! to verify rather than under-reporting.
+//!
+//! Wire form: `v1.<iv>.<body>`, both parts base64url unpadded: the 16-byte
+//! synthetic IV (the truncated MAC, which also seeds the keystream) and the
+//! padded, encrypted JSON payload.
+
+use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
+use base64::Engine;
+use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use sha2::Sha256;
+
+use crate::error::AppError;
+
+type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
+
+const CURSOR_PREFIX: &str = "v1";
+const KEY_DERIVATION_LABEL: &[u8] = b"gitlawb/tasks-cursor-key/v1";
+const TAG_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"gitlawb/tasks-cursor-tag/v1";
+const STREAM_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"gitlawb/tasks-cursor-stream/v1";
+/// Truncated MAC length, and the synthetic IV width. 128 bits is far beyond
+/// forgery reach for a token that carries no authority of its own (every page
+/// re-runs the visibility gate against the presenting caller), and keeps the
+/// token short enough to sit in a query string.
+const TAG_LEN: usize = 16;
+
+/// Padding bucket for the serialized cursor payload, in bytes. The keystream
+/// XORs the plaintext byte for byte, so token length would otherwise track
+/// payload length and leak the named row's field widths to a holder who
+/// cannot decrypt anything. 128 comfortably covers the widest realistic
+/// payload: a 35-char RFC3339 timestamp (`to_rfc3339()` renders 29 chars at
+/// millisecond precision and 32 at microsecond, 35 only with all nine
+/// fractional digits), a 36-char server-minted UUID, and the fixed JSON
+/// envelope plus a 10-digit expiry, which together total 101 bytes. Should a future payload ever exceed the bucket, the length
+/// rounds up to the next multiple instead of failing, so `encode` never
+/// breaks — it just mints a longer token.
+const PAYLOAD_BUCKET: usize = 128;
+
+/// How long an issued cursor stays acceptable. Keyset positions never go stale
+/// on their own — `created_at`/`id` are immutable — so this is not a
+/// correctness bound. It bounds how long a token stays valid across a node
+/// restart-and-rotate and keeps an abandoned page from being resumed
+/// indefinitely.
+const CURSOR_TTL_SECS: i64 = 24 * 60 * 60;
+
+/// Node-keyed MAC key for continuation tokens, derived from the node keypair
+/// seed so it needs no configuration and survives restarts of the same node.
+/// Derived rather than used directly so a token forgery oracle could not
+/// bear on the signing key itself.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct TaskCursorKey([u8; 32]);
+
+impl std::fmt::Debug for TaskCursorKey {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.write_str("TaskCursorKey(<redacted>)")
+    }
+}
+
+impl TaskCursorKey {
+    pub fn derive(node_seed: &[u8; 32]) -> Self {
+        let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(node_seed).expect("HMAC accepts any key length");
+        mac.update(KEY_DERIVATION_LABEL);
+        let mut key = [0u8; 32];
+        key.copy_from_slice(&mac.finalize().into_bytes());
+        Self(key)
+    }
+}
+
+/// The keyset position a token carries: the last candidate row the previous
+/// request examined, whether or not the caller was allowed to see it.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct TaskPosition {
+    pub created_at: String,
+    pub id: String,
+}
+
+impl TaskPosition {
+    pub fn new(created_at: impl Into<String>, id: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            created_at: created_at.into(),
+            id: id.into(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_pair(&self) -> (&str, &str) {
+        (self.created_at.as_str(), self.id.as_str())
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct CursorPayload<'a> {
+    /// `created_at` of the last examined candidate, verbatim as stored.
+    t: &'a str,
+    /// `id` of the last examined candidate.
+    i: &'a str,
+    /// Unix expiry.
+    e: i64,
+}
+
+/// The filter a page was issued under. A cursor is only meaningful against the
+/// same `status`/`assignee_did` filter that produced it: resuming a filtered
+/// scan from an unfiltered position (or the reverse) silently skips rows.
+/// Bound into the MAC rather than stored in the payload, so it costs no token
+/// length and cannot be edited without invalidating the tag.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
+pub struct TaskFilter<'a> {
+    pub status: Option<&'a str>,
+    pub assignee_did: Option<&'a str>,
+}
+
+/// The visibility identity a token was issued to. Normalized through
+/// `normalize_owner_key` so the two spellings of one `did:key` identity
+/// (`did:key:X` and bare `X`) bind identically, matching `did_matches` on the
+/// read path: a caller who authenticates with the other spelling of their own
+/// DID must be able to resume their own page.
+fn caller_binding(caller: Option<&str>) -> &str {
+    caller.map(crate::db::normalize_owner_key).unwrap_or("")
+}
+
+/// The assignee filter a token was issued under. Normalized through
+/// `normalize_owner_key` so the two spellings of one `did:key` identity
+/// (`did:key:X` and bare `X`) bind identically, matching `list_tasks_keyset`
+/// in SQL: minting under `did:key:X` and resuming with bare `X` (or the reverse)
+/// hits the same rows and must verify under the MAC.
+fn assignee_binding(assignee: Option<&str>) -> &str {
+    assignee.map(crate::db::normalize_owner_key).unwrap_or("")
+}
+
+fn cursor_mac(
+    key: &TaskCursorKey,
+    filter: TaskFilter<'_>,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+    plaintext: &[u8],
+) -> HmacSha256 {
+    let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(&key.0).expect("HMAC accepts any key length");
+    mac.update(TAG_DOMAIN);
+    // Length-prefix every field so no two distinct filter/caller/plaintext
+    // tuples can produce the same MAC input.
+    for field in [
+        filter.status.unwrap_or("").as_bytes(),
+        assignee_binding(filter.assignee_did).as_bytes(),
+        caller_binding(caller).as_bytes(),
+        plaintext,
+    ] {
+        mac.update(&(field.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
+        mac.update(field);
+    }
+    // Presence is distinct from emptiness for all three optional fields, so an
+    // anonymous token cannot collide with one issued to a caller whose
+    // normalized DID is the empty string.
+    mac.update(&[
+        u8::from(filter.status.is_some()),
+        u8::from(filter.assignee_did.is_some()),
+        u8::from(caller.is_some()),
+    ]);
+    mac
+}
+
+/// Synthetic IV: the authentication tag over the filter and plaintext, which
+/// also seeds the keystream. Deterministic by construction, so no randomness
+/// source is needed and two tokens for the same page are byte-identical.
+fn siv(
+    key: &TaskCursorKey,
+    filter: TaskFilter<'_>,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+    plaintext: &[u8],
+) -> [u8; TAG_LEN] {
+    let mut out = [0u8; TAG_LEN];
+    out.copy_from_slice(
+        &cursor_mac(key, filter, caller, plaintext)
+            .finalize()
+            .into_bytes()[..TAG_LEN],
+    );
+    out
+}
+
+/// XOR `buf` with the keystream for `iv`. Its own inverse, so encrypt and
+/// decrypt are the same call.
+fn apply_keystream(key: &TaskCursorKey, iv: &[u8; TAG_LEN], buf: &mut [u8]) {
+    for (block_index, chunk) in buf.chunks_mut(32).enumerate() {
+        let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(&key.0).expect("HMAC accepts any key length");
+        mac.update(STREAM_DOMAIN);
+        mac.update(iv);
+        mac.update(&(block_index as u64).to_be_bytes());
+        let block = mac.finalize().into_bytes();
+        for (byte, k) in chunk.iter_mut().zip(block.iter()) {
+            *byte ^= k;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Mint a token resuming at `position` for `filter`, usable only by `caller`.
+///
+/// The serialized payload is padded with trailing whitespace to a fixed
+/// bucket before the SIV tag is computed: the keystream preserves plaintext
+/// length, so an unpadded payload would let the token's length leak the
+/// named row's field widths (a 25-char `to_rfc3339()` rendering mints a
+/// shorter token than a 35-char one). `decode` tolerates the padding because
+/// `serde_json` ignores trailing whitespace, and the tag covers the padded
+/// bytes, so a token minted before padding landed still verifies.
+pub fn encode(
+    key: &TaskCursorKey,
+    filter: TaskFilter<'_>,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+    position: &TaskPosition,
+) -> String {
+    let mut payload = serde_json::to_vec(&CursorPayload {
+        t: &position.created_at,
+        i: &position.id,
+        e: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() + CURSOR_TTL_SECS,
+    })
+    .expect("cursor payload is plain strings and an integer");
+    let padded_len = payload.len().next_multiple_of(PAYLOAD_BUCKET);
+    payload.resize(padded_len, b' ');
+    let iv = siv(key, filter, caller, &payload);
+    apply_keystream(key, &iv, &mut payload);
+    format!(
+        "{CURSOR_PREFIX}.{}.{}",
+        URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(iv),
+        URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&payload)
+    )
+}
+
+/// One rejection message for every way a token can fail to verify. A caller
+/// who mangled a token, replayed an expired one, or tried to move one to a
+/// different filter or a different presenting identity learns only that the
+/// cursor is not usable — never which of those it was, and never anything
+/// about the row it named.
+const INVALID_CURSOR: &str = "invalid or expired cursor";
+
+fn reject() -> AppError {
+    AppError::BadRequest(INVALID_CURSOR.into())
+}
+
+/// Verify a token against `filter` and the presenting `caller`, and return the
+/// position it carries.
+pub fn decode(
+    key: &TaskCursorKey,
+    filter: TaskFilter<'_>,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+    token: &str,
+) -> crate::error::Result<TaskPosition> {
+    let mut parts = token.split('.');
+    let (Some(version), Some(iv_b64), Some(body_b64), None) =
+        (parts.next(), parts.next(), parts.next(), parts.next())
+    else {
+        return Err(reject());
+    };
+    if version != CURSOR_PREFIX {
+        return Err(reject());
+    }
+    let iv_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(iv_b64).map_err(|_| reject())?;
+    let mut plaintext = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(body_b64).map_err(|_| reject())?;
+    let iv: [u8; TAG_LEN] = iv_bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| reject())?;
+
+    apply_keystream(key, &iv, &mut plaintext);
+    // Authenticate before parsing: until the tag matches, `plaintext` is just
+    // attacker-chosen bytes run through a keystream. `verify_truncated_left`
+    // is the constant-time compare, so a forgery attempt cannot be steered by
+    // timing the first differing byte.
+    cursor_mac(key, filter, caller, &plaintext)
+        .verify_truncated_left(&iv)
+        .map_err(|_| reject())?;
+
+    let decoded: CursorPayload<'_> = serde_json::from_slice(&plaintext).map_err(|_| reject())?;
+    if decoded.e < chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() {
+        return Err(reject());
+    }
+    Ok(TaskPosition::new(decoded.t, decoded.i))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn key() -> TaskCursorKey {
+        TaskCursorKey::derive(&[7u8; 32])
+    }
+
+    fn unfiltered() -> TaskFilter<'static> {
+        TaskFilter {
+            status: None,
+            assignee_did: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn round_trips_position_verbatim() {
+        let k = key();
+        // A stored timestamp the server wrote, fractional digits and all.
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00.123456789+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &pos);
+        assert_eq!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &token).unwrap(), pos);
+        // A sub-bucket payload pads to exactly one bucket: the padding
+        // claim is an exact width, and every other width assertion here is
+        // bucket-relative, so only an absolute check catches a pad that
+        // skips "next multiple" or a drifted bucket constant.
+        let body = token.split('.').nth(2).expect("token has a body part");
+        let raw = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(body).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            raw.len(),
+            PAYLOAD_BUCKET,
+            "normal token must pad to exactly one bucket"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The whole point of the token is that the caller may hold it without
+    /// learning the denied row it names. A signed-but-plaintext payload would
+    /// pass every other test here and still fail this one.
+    #[test]
+    fn token_does_not_expose_the_row_it_names() {
+        let k = key();
+        let token = encode(
+            &k,
+            unfiltered(),
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "denied-task-id"),
+        );
+        let body = token.split('.').nth(2).expect("token has a body part");
+        let raw = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(body).unwrap();
+        let as_text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw);
+        for secret in ["denied-task-id", "2026-01-03", "\"t\"", "\"i\""] {
+            assert!(
+                !as_text.contains(secret),
+                "token body must not carry {secret:?} in the clear: {as_text:?}"
+            );
+        }
+        // Also assert it is not merely reordered or whitespace-mangled JSON.
+        assert!(
+            serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&raw).is_err(),
+            "token body must not be parseable as JSON"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The keystream preserves plaintext length, so without the fixed-width
+    /// padding a token naming a 35-char timestamp would be measurably longer
+    /// than one naming a 32-char one: the holder would learn the withheld
+    /// row's field widths without decrypting anything. Mint the same shape
+    /// both ways and require identical token length.
+    #[test]
+    fn token_length_does_not_vary_with_position_width() {
+        let k = key();
+        // Ids are server-minted fixed-length UUIDs; the timestamp is the
+        // width that varies in production (`to_rfc3339()` renders 35 chars
+        // with nanoseconds, 25 without fractional seconds).
+        let id = "b3f7a1c2-4d5e-4f6a-8b9c-0d1e2f3a4b5c";
+        let narrow = encode(
+            &k,
+            unfiltered(),
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", id),
+        );
+        let wide = encode(
+            &k,
+            unfiltered(),
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00.123456789+00:00", id),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            narrow.len(),
+            wide.len(),
+            "tokens must not leak the named row's field widths: {narrow} vs {wide}"
+        );
+        // The padded token still decodes to the exact stored string.
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &wide).unwrap(),
+            TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00.123456789+00:00", id)
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A token minted before the fixed-width padding landed (unpadded payload,
+    /// tag over the raw bytes) must still verify: `decode` MACs whatever
+    /// plaintext the keystream recovers and `serde_json` tolerates the
+    /// missing trailing whitespace. This pins the back-compat claim in the
+    /// `encode` docstring with a frozen v1 artifact, so a change to the v1
+    /// recipe pins (domains, MAC input, keystream, segment layout, field
+    /// names) breaks this test instead of silently re-deriving under the
+    /// new internals. It does not pin the padding: `decode` never consults
+    /// `PAYLOAD_BUCKET` and the fixture is unpadded, so the padding-width
+    /// claim belongs to `oversized_payload_rounds_up_to_next_bucket`.
+    ///
+    /// Fixture expiry is fixed at 2100-01-01 (`4102444800`): it must stay in
+    /// the future whenever the test runs.
+    #[test]
+    fn unpadded_legacy_token_still_verifies() {
+        let k = key();
+        let filter = unfiltered();
+        let position = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "legacy-task");
+        // Pre-padding recipe minted once and frozen: serialize with no
+        // padding, tag, and encrypt. Deterministic by construction (SIV needs
+        // no randomness), so this literal is stable across runs.
+        let token = "v1.ILJyy7JZScm_h-HM1-CggA.l4kJUoHTbqSGTVKL0DP4hORnbOS1_gHYV2fwJYXd2QtM-6TBMCKh-wvluIiaEYC9rUSUPVSteAKkp7jBCmK_bR2D";
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&k, filter, None, token).unwrap(),
+            position,
+            "pre-padding token must verify under the current decode"
+        );
+        // The fixture is a genuine pre-padding artifact, so its decoded
+        // body must stay below one bucket: a literal re-minted under the
+        // padded recipe would retire this back-compat pin silently.
+        let body = token.split('.').nth(2).expect("token has a body part");
+        let raw = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(body).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            raw.len() < PAYLOAD_BUCKET,
+            "legacy fixture must be the unpadded shape: {} bytes",
+            raw.len()
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The `PAYLOAD_BUCKET` docstring promises an oversized payload rounds up
+    /// to the next multiple instead of failing. Mint a position whose id
+    /// pushes the serialized payload past one bucket and require the token
+    /// to round-trip (at two buckets).
+    #[test]
+    fn oversized_payload_rounds_up_to_next_bucket() {
+        let k = key();
+        // ~140-char id: payload crosses the 128-byte bucket.
+        let long_id = "a".repeat(140);
+        let position = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", long_id.clone());
+        let probe = serde_json::to_vec(&CursorPayload {
+            t: &position.created_at,
+            i: &position.id,
+            e: 1_700_000_000,
+        })
+        .expect("cursor payload is plain strings and an integer");
+        assert!(
+            probe.len() > PAYLOAD_BUCKET,
+            "fixture payload must exceed one bucket: {} bytes",
+            probe.len()
+        );
+        assert!(
+            probe.len() <= 2 * PAYLOAD_BUCKET,
+            "fixture payload must fit in two buckets: {} bytes",
+            probe.len()
+        );
+        let token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &position);
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &token).unwrap(),
+            position,
+            "oversized payload must round-trip at two buckets"
+        );
+        // The padded body must be exactly two buckets, not merely longer
+        // than one: the padding claim is an exact width, not a direction.
+        let body = token.split('.').nth(2).expect("token has a body part");
+        let raw = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(body).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            raw.len(),
+            2 * PAYLOAD_BUCKET,
+            "oversized payload must pad to exactly two buckets"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Callers paste the token straight into a query string, so it must carry
+    /// no character that needs percent-encoding.
+    #[test]
+    fn token_is_url_safe_verbatim() {
+        let token = encode(
+            &key(),
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("pending"),
+                assignee_did: Some("did:key:z6MkAssignee"),
+            },
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00.123456789+00:00", "task-a"),
+        );
+        assert!(
+            token
+                .chars()
+                .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, '-' | '_' | '.')),
+            "token must be query-safe without encoding: {token}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Flipping any byte of a token must fail the tag, not decode to a
+    /// different position: the keystream is malleable on its own, the tag is
+    /// what stops a chosen-position forgery.
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_any_tampered_byte() {
+        let k = key();
+        let token = encode(
+            &k,
+            unfiltered(),
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a"),
+        );
+        let parts: Vec<&str> = token.split('.').collect();
+        for part in [1usize, 2] {
+            for position in [0usize, 3] {
+                let mut bytes = parts[part].as_bytes().to_vec();
+                bytes[position] = if bytes[position] == b'A' { b'B' } else { b'A' };
+                let mut mangled: Vec<String> = parts.iter().map(|p| p.to_string()).collect();
+                mangled[part] = String::from_utf8(bytes).unwrap();
+                assert!(
+                    decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &mangled.join(".")).is_err(),
+                    "byte {position} of part {part} must not be malleable"
+                );
+            }
+        }
+        // Sanity: the untouched token still decodes, so the loop above is not
+        // passing because every token is rejected.
+        assert!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &token).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_token_from_another_node() {
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(&TaskCursorKey::derive(&[1u8; 32]), unfiltered(), None, &pos);
+        assert!(decode(
+            &TaskCursorKey::derive(&[2u8; 32]),
+            unfiltered(),
+            None,
+            &token
+        )
+        .is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_cursor_moved_to_a_different_filter() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(
+            &k,
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("pending"),
+                assignee_did: None,
+            },
+            None,
+            &pos,
+        );
+        assert!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &token).is_err());
+        assert!(decode(
+            &k,
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("claimed"),
+                assignee_did: None
+            },
+            None,
+            &token
+        )
+        .is_err());
+        assert!(decode(
+            &k,
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("pending"),
+                assignee_did: None
+            },
+            None,
+            &token
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+    }
+
+    /// A filter of `Some("")` must not verify a token minted with `None`.
+    #[test]
+    fn distinguishes_absent_filter_from_empty_filter() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &pos);
+        assert!(decode(
+            &k,
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some(""),
+                assignee_did: None
+            },
+            None,
+            &token
+        )
+        .is_err());
+    }
+
+    /// A cursor names how far a scan got under one caller's visibility. Moved
+    /// to a different presenting identity it would start that caller's scan
+    /// past rows they are entitled to read, so it must fail to verify rather
+    /// than silently under-report (#327 review).
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_cursor_moved_to_a_different_caller() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let alice = Some("did:key:z6MkAlice");
+        let bob = Some("did:key:z6MkBob");
+
+        let anon_token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &pos);
+        assert!(
+            decode(&k, unfiltered(), alice, &anon_token).is_err(),
+            "an anonymously minted cursor must not resume an authenticated scan"
+        );
+        assert!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &anon_token).is_ok());
+
+        let alice_token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), alice, &pos);
+        assert!(
+            decode(&k, unfiltered(), bob, &alice_token).is_err(),
+            "one caller's cursor must not resume another caller's scan"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &alice_token).is_err(),
+            "an authenticated cursor must not resume an anonymous scan"
+        );
+        assert!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), alice, &alice_token).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    /// The binding is on identity, not spelling: `did:key:X` and bare `X` are
+    /// one caller everywhere else on the read path (`did_matches`), so a caller
+    /// who presents the other form of their own DID must keep their own page.
+    #[test]
+    fn caller_binding_is_normalized_across_did_key_spellings() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), Some("did:key:z6MkAlice"), &pos);
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&k, unfiltered(), Some("z6MkAlice"), &token).unwrap(),
+            pos
+        );
+        // A different method sharing the base58 tail is a different principal.
+        assert!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), Some("did:web:z6MkAlice"), &token).is_err());
+    }
+
+    /// The filter binding is on identity, not spelling: `assignee_did` matches
+    /// normalized keys in SQL (`normalize_owner_key`), so minting under
+    /// `did:key:X` and resuming under bare `X` (or vice versa) must succeed,
+    /// while `did:web:X` remains distinct.
+    #[test]
+    fn assignee_filter_binding_is_normalized_across_did_key_spellings() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let filter_did_key = TaskFilter {
+            status: Some("pending"),
+            assignee_did: Some("did:key:z6MkAssignee"),
+        };
+        let filter_bare = TaskFilter {
+            status: Some("pending"),
+            assignee_did: Some("z6MkAssignee"),
+        };
+        let filter_web = TaskFilter {
+            status: Some("pending"),
+            assignee_did: Some("did:web:z6MkAssignee"),
+        };
+
+        let token_from_did_key = encode(&k, filter_did_key, None, &pos);
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&k, filter_bare, None, &token_from_did_key).unwrap(),
+            pos
+        );
+        assert!(decode(&k, filter_web, None, &token_from_did_key).is_err());
+
+        let token_from_bare = encode(&k, filter_bare, None, &pos);
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&k, filter_did_key, None, &token_from_bare).unwrap(),
+            pos
+        );
+        assert!(decode(&k, filter_web, None, &token_from_bare).is_err());
+    }
+
+    /// Anonymous is a distinct binding from a caller whose normalized DID is
+    /// the empty string, the same way `Some("")` is distinct from `None` for
+    /// the filter fields.
+    #[test]
+    fn distinguishes_anonymous_from_empty_caller() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &pos);
+        assert!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), Some(""), &token).is_err());
+    }
+
+    /// Length-prefixing must stop a status/assignee pair from being re-split.
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_field_boundary_shift() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(
+            &k,
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("pend"),
+                assignee_did: Some("ing"),
+            },
+            None,
+            &pos,
+        );
+        assert!(decode(
+            &k,
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("pending"),
+                assignee_did: Some("")
+            },
+            None,
+            &token
+        )
+        .is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_expired_token() {
+        let k = key();
+        // Minted the same way `encode` does, but already past its expiry.
+        let mut payload = serde_json::to_vec(&CursorPayload {
+            t: "2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00",
+            i: "task-a",
+            e: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() - 1,
+        })
+        .unwrap();
+        let iv = siv(&k, unfiltered(), None, &payload);
+        apply_keystream(&k, &iv, &mut payload);
+        let expired = format!(
+            "v1.{}.{}",
+            URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(iv),
+            URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&payload)
+        );
+        let err = decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &expired).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains(INVALID_CURSOR));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_malformed_shapes() {
+        let k = key();
+        for bad in [
+            "",
+            "v1",
+            "v1.",
+            "v1.abc",
+            "v2.abc.def",
+            "v1.abc.def.ghi",
+            "v1.!!!.def",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, bad).is_err(),
+                "must reject {bad:?}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Every rejection path renders the same text, so a caller cannot tell a
+    /// forged token from an expired one from a filter mismatch.
+    #[test]
+    fn every_rejection_is_indistinguishable() {
+        let k = key();
+        for bad in ["v1.abc.def", "not-a-cursor", "v1..", "v9.a.b"] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, bad).unwrap_err().to_string(),
+                format!("invalid request: {INVALID_CURSOR}")
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/visibility.rs

@@ -85,11 +85,10 @@ pub async fn set_visibility(
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Json(req): Json<SetVisibilityRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    // Quarantine first (via authorize_repo_read), then owner — same posture as
+    // list_visibility so a quarantined repo cannot be mutated while reads 404.
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(&auth.0), "/").await?;
     require_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
     validate_path_glob(&req.path_glob)?;
 
@@ -141,11 +140,8 @@ pub async fn remove_visibility(
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Json(req): Json<RemoveVisibilityRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(&auth.0), "/").await?;
     require_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     state
@@ -171,14 +167,12 @@ pub async fn list_visibility(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    // Quarantine first (via authorize_repo_read), then owner — a quarantined
+    // mirror must be opaque even to a caller matching owner_did.
+    let (record, rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(&auth.0), "/").await?;
     require_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
-    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
     let rules_json: Vec<_> = rules
         .into_iter()
         .map(|r| {
@@ -205,28 +199,18 @@ pub async fn list_visibility(
 /// denied one (`reinclude`), so a clean-clone client can sparse-exclude the
 /// denied subtrees while re-including the allowed nested paths. Unlike
 /// `list_visibility` this is not owner-gated and never exposes reader_dids.
+///
+/// Quarantined repos are opaque 404 via [`crate::api::authorize_repo_read`] —
+/// same posture as encrypted-blob discovery — so admission and private-subtree
+/// layout are not disclosed to anon, owner, or peers.
 pub async fn withheld_paths(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
-
-    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
     let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-
-    // Whole-repo read gate: a caller who cannot read "/" gets repo-not-found,
-    // matching the git read endpoints, so this never discloses a private repo's
-    // existence or its path layout to an unauthorized caller.
-    if crate::visibility::visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/")
-        == crate::visibility::Decision::Deny
-    {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")));
-    }
+    let (record, rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let withheld =
         crate::visibility::withheld_globs(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller);

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/webhooks.rs

@@ -33,11 +33,8 @@ pub async fn create_webhook(
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Json(req): Json<CreateWebhookRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<Webhook>)> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
     crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     // Gate the target through the same hardened public-host validator the peer
@@ -59,7 +56,14 @@ pub async fn create_webhook(
         id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
         repo_id: record.id,
         url: req.url,
-        secret: req.secret,
+        // Seal the secret before it touches the database (#506): the column and
+        // any dump/backup of it hold ciphertext, never the caller's signing key.
+        secret: req.secret.map(|plain| {
+            crate::webhook_secret::WebhookSecret::new(crate::webhook_secret::seal(
+                state.webhook_secret_key.as_ref(),
+                &plain,
+            ))
+        }),
         events,
         created_by_did,
         created_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
@@ -96,19 +100,11 @@ pub async fn list_webhooks(
     crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &caller)?;
 
     let hooks = state.db.list_webhooks(&record.id).await?;
-    // Redact secrets in list response
-    let redacted: Vec<_> = hooks
-        .into_iter()
-        .map(|mut h| {
-            if h.secret.is_some() {
-                h.secret = Some("***".into());
-            }
-            h
-        })
-        .collect();
-
+    // `WebhookSecret` redacts itself on serialize, so a set secret is emitted as
+    // "***" and the signing material never appears in the body (see webhook_secret).
+    let count = hooks.len();
     Ok(Json(
-        serde_json::json!({ "webhooks": redacted, "count": redacted.len() }),
+        serde_json::json!({ "webhooks": hooks, "count": count }),
     ))
 }
 
@@ -118,11 +114,8 @@ pub async fn delete_webhook(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name, id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
     crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     // Verify the webhook belongs to this repo
@@ -155,6 +148,7 @@ mod tests {
     use crate::db::RepoRecord;
     use crate::error::AppError;
     use crate::test_support::test_state;
+    use rand::Rng;
 
     // create_webhook gates req.url through is_public_http_url. Pin the exact
     // SSRF targets from issue #81 so the webhook path can never regress to the
@@ -232,4 +226,137 @@ mod tests {
             "a rejected .localhost webhook must leave no row behind"
         );
     }
+
+    /// The startup re-encryption pass must seal any webhook secret still resting
+    /// as plaintext (a row written before at-rest encryption shipped), and leave
+    /// a second pass with nothing to do.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn reencrypt_legacy_secrets_encrypts_existing_cleartext(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+
+        // Seed a webhook the way a pre-encryption node would have: plaintext
+        // secret written straight into the row, bypassing the handler's seal.
+        let hook = crate::db::Webhook {
+            id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+            repo_id: "owner/legacy-repo".to_string(),
+            url: "https://hooks.example.com/legacy".to_string(),
+            secret: Some(crate::webhook_secret::WebhookSecret::new(
+                "legacy-plaintext".to_string(),
+            )),
+            events: vec!["*".to_string()],
+            created_by_did: "did:key:zLEGACYOWNER".to_string(),
+            created_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            active: true,
+        };
+        state.db.create_webhook(&hook).await.unwrap();
+
+        let rewritten = state
+            .db
+            .reencrypt_legacy_webhook_secrets(state.webhook_secret_key.as_ref())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(rewritten, 1, "exactly the one plaintext row is rewritten");
+
+        let stored = state.db.get_webhook(&hook.id).await.unwrap().unwrap();
+        let secret = stored.secret.expect("secret retained after re-encryption");
+        assert!(secret.is_sealed(), "re-encrypted secret must be sealed");
+        assert_eq!(
+            crate::webhook_secret::open(state.webhook_secret_key.as_ref(), secret.as_str())
+                .as_deref(),
+            Some("legacy-plaintext"),
+            "the node-held key must recover the original secret"
+        );
+
+        // Idempotent: a second pass finds nothing left to rewrite.
+        let again = state
+            .db
+            .reencrypt_legacy_webhook_secrets(state.webhook_secret_key.as_ref())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(again, 0);
+    }
+
+    /// A legacy plaintext secret that literally begins with the seal prefix is
+    /// not ciphertext: prefix-matching alone would skip it forever while
+    /// `reveal` fails to open it, wedging the hook. Classification is by
+    /// `open`, so the pass seals it and the literal secret survives.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn reencrypt_seals_a_prefixed_plaintext_secret(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let literal = format!(
+            "{}not-a-real-ciphertext",
+            crate::webhook_secret::SEAL_PREFIX
+        );
+        let hook = crate::db::Webhook {
+            id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+            repo_id: "owner/prefixed-repo".to_string(),
+            url: "https://hooks.example.com/prefixed".to_string(),
+            secret: Some(crate::webhook_secret::WebhookSecret::new(literal.clone())),
+            events: vec!["*".to_string()],
+            created_by_did: "did:key:zLEGACYOWNER".to_string(),
+            created_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            active: true,
+        };
+        state.db.create_webhook(&hook).await.unwrap();
+
+        let rewritten = state
+            .db
+            .reencrypt_legacy_webhook_secrets(state.webhook_secret_key.as_ref())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(rewritten, 1, "the prefixed plaintext row is rewritten");
+
+        let stored = state.db.get_webhook(&hook.id).await.unwrap().unwrap();
+        let secret = stored.secret.unwrap();
+        assert!(secret.is_sealed());
+        assert_eq!(
+            crate::webhook_secret::reveal(state.webhook_secret_key.as_ref(), &secret).as_deref(),
+            Some(literal.as_str()),
+            "the literal plaintext, prefix included, is the recovered secret"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A well-formed sealed payload that does not open under this node's key
+    /// (foreign or rotated ciphertext) must survive the re-encrypt pass
+    /// untouched: re-wrapping it would make `reveal` return the outer blob as
+    /// a signing secret and flip a broken hook from withheld into garbage
+    /// signatures.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn reencrypt_leaves_foreign_ciphertext_untouched(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let foreign_key: [u8; 32] = chacha20poly1305::aead::OsRng.gen();
+        let foreign_ciphertext = crate::webhook_secret::seal(&foreign_key, "owner-real-secret");
+        let hook = crate::db::Webhook {
+            id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+            repo_id: "owner/foreign-repo".to_string(),
+            url: "https://hooks.example.com/foreign".to_string(),
+            secret: Some(crate::webhook_secret::WebhookSecret::new(
+                foreign_ciphertext.clone(),
+            )),
+            events: vec!["*".to_string()],
+            created_by_did: "did:key:zLEGACYOWNER".to_string(),
+            created_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            active: true,
+        };
+        state.db.create_webhook(&hook).await.unwrap();
+
+        let rewritten = state
+            .db
+            .reencrypt_legacy_webhook_secrets(state.webhook_secret_key.as_ref())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(rewritten, 0, "foreign ciphertext is left unchanged");
+
+        let stored = state.db.get_webhook(&hook.id).await.unwrap().unwrap();
+        let secret = stored.secret.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            secret.as_str(),
+            foreign_ciphertext,
+            "the stored value is still the unopenable ciphertext, not a re-wrap"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            crate::webhook_secret::reveal(state.webhook_secret_key.as_ref(), &secret).is_none(),
+            "delivery still withholds: reveal cannot open the foreign blob"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/auth/mod.rs

@@ -17,16 +17,74 @@ use crate::state::AppState;
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct AuthenticatedDid(pub String);
 
+/// A UCAN that passed full chain validation, with the root issuer the chain
+/// rests on. Inserted into request extensions by [`require_ucan_chain`] when
+/// `X-Ucan` is present; absent when the header is.
+///
+/// `root` is carried rather than recomputed so the chain is walked once per
+/// request. Holding this is not itself an authorization decision — a caller must
+/// still compare `root` against an identity it independently trusts, because
+/// `did:key` is self-certifying and anyone can mint a chain that verifies.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct VerifiedUcan {
+    pub ucan: Ucan,
+    pub root: Did,
+}
+
 /// Whether `caller` is authorized to push to `record`.
 ///
-/// Phase 1 (`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH`): owner-only, via the canonical
-/// [`crate::api::did_matches`] owner comparison (DID-safe on both sides). This is
-/// intentionally a distinct, intent-named gate rather than a bare owner check so
-/// that Phase 2 can extend it to honor a verified UCAN `git/push` capability as a
-/// pure addition (`did_matches(..) || ucan_grants_push(..)`) without rewriting
-/// call sites.
-pub fn caller_authorized_to_push(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> bool {
+/// The repo owner, or a caller presenting a verified UCAN whose chain roots at
+/// that owner and which carries `git/push` for this repo.
+///
+/// `verified` is optional because `X-Ucan` is: a push carrying no token reaches
+/// the same owner-only decision it always did. The owner check is unconditional
+/// and runs first, so this can only ever turn a refusal into an acceptance,
+/// never the reverse.
+pub fn caller_authorized_to_push(
+    record: &crate::db::RepoRecord,
+    caller: &str,
+    verified: Option<&VerifiedUcan>,
+) -> bool {
     crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did)
+        || verified.is_some_and(|v| ucan_grants_push(record, v))
+}
+
+/// Whether a verified UCAN authorizes a push to `record`.
+///
+/// Three conditions, all required:
+///   1. The chain roots at this repo's owner. This is the trust anchor — the
+///      repo record is data the node holds independently of the token, so a
+///      self-minted chain cannot satisfy it.
+///   2. Every link is bounded. There is no revocation path, so an unbounded link
+///      is a permanent grant.
+///   3. Every link — the leaf and every proof behind it — carries an
+///      unconstrained push-class capability naming this repository. That is
+///      [`gitlawb_core::ucan::Ucan::chain_grants_push_to`], the same rule
+///      `gl ucan import` applies before storing a token and `git-remote-gitlawb`
+///      applies before minting an invocation, so what one boundary accepts the
+///      next does not refuse.
+///
+/// (3) walks the whole chain on purpose. Refusing a wildcard leaf alone did
+/// nothing: `is_attenuated_by` accepts a concrete child under a `*` parent, and
+/// that narrowing was exactly what the helper performed, so one owner-issued
+/// `with: "*"` proof let a delegate mint a concrete leaf for ANY repository the
+/// owner had — or created later — and both the chain check and the owner-root
+/// check passed. A delegation's scope is fixed when it is issued.
+pub fn ucan_grants_push(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, verified: &VerifiedUcan) -> bool {
+    if !crate::api::did_matches(&verified.root.to_string(), &record.owner_did) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // A write capability must lapse on its own. `exp` is optional in the format and
+    // there is no revocation path, so a chain with an unbounded link is a permanent
+    // grant: once the token leaks, the owner cannot withdraw it short of rotating
+    // the DID the repo is keyed on. Refusing here is what makes "the damage window
+    // is the token's expiry" a true statement rather than an aspiration.
+    if !verified.ucan.chain_lifetime_is_bounded() {
+        return false;
+    }
+    verified
+        .ucan
+        .chain_grants_push_to(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
 }
 
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::{
@@ -355,7 +413,7 @@ fn validate_ucan_chain(
     token: &str,
     expected_aud: &Did,
     signer_did: &Did,
-) -> Result<(), (StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
+) -> Result<VerifiedUcan, (StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
     let ucan = Ucan::decode(token).map_err(|e| {
         (
             StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
@@ -383,14 +441,14 @@ fn validate_ucan_chain(
         )
     })?;
 
-    ucan.verify_chain().map_err(|e| {
+    let root = ucan.verify_chain().map_err(|e| {
         (
             StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
             Json(json!({ "error": "invalid_ucan", "message": e.to_string() })),
         )
     })?;
 
-    Ok(())
+    Ok(VerifiedUcan { ucan, root })
 }
 
 /// Axum middleware that validates a UCAN chain when `X-Ucan` is present.
@@ -443,11 +501,18 @@ pub async fn require_ucan_chain(
         }
     };
 
-    if let Err((status, body)) = validate_ucan_chain(&token, &state.node_did, &signer_did) {
-        return (status, body).into_response();
-    }
+    let verified = match validate_ucan_chain(&token, &state.node_did, &signer_did) {
+        Ok(v) => v,
+        Err((status, body)) => return (status, body).into_response(),
+    };
 
-    tracing::debug!(did = %signer_did, "UCAN chain validated");
+    tracing::debug!(did = %signer_did, root = %verified.root, "UCAN chain validated");
+
+    // Park the verified token where a handler can reach it. Validation alone
+    // grants nothing; the authorization decision is made downstream, by a caller
+    // that knows which identity it trusts for the resource being touched.
+    let mut request = request;
+    request.extensions_mut().insert(verified);
     next.run(request).await
 }
 
@@ -483,6 +548,37 @@ mod tests {
         Ucan::bootstrap(node, agent_did).unwrap()
     }
 
+    /// The middleware validated a token and threw the result away, so no handler
+    /// could ever read it and `Ucan::can` had no call site in the node. Validation
+    /// must hand back both the token and the root the chain rests on.
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_ucan_chain_hands_back_the_root_and_the_token() {
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let caps_vec = vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)];
+
+        let delegation =
+            Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), caps_vec.clone(), None).expect("issue delegation");
+        let invocation = Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), caps_vec, None, &delegation)
+            .expect("wrap invocation");
+        let token = invocation.encode().expect("encode");
+
+        let verified = validate_ucan_chain(&token, &node.did(), &agent.did())
+            .expect("a well-formed owner-rooted invocation must validate");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            verified.root,
+            owner.did(),
+            "the root must be the owner, so a caller can anchor against the repo record"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            verified.ucan.payload.iss,
+            agent.did(),
+            "the token itself must come back so a caller can read its capabilities"
+        );
+    }
+
     fn delegation_ucan(agent: &Keypair, node_did: Did, proof: &Ucan) -> Ucan {
         Ucan::delegate(
             agent,
@@ -628,16 +724,19 @@ mod tests {
 
         let keypair = Keypair::generate();
         let scan_token_key = crate::state::AppState::derive_scan_token_key(&keypair);
+        let webhook_secret_key = crate::state::AppState::derive_webhook_secret_key(&keypair);
         let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(1);
         let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(1);
         let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
             .connect_lazy("postgres://localhost/gitlawb_test_placeholder")
             .expect("lazy pool creation should not fail");
         let db = Arc::new(crate::db::Db::for_testing(pool.clone()));
+        let task_cursor_key = crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey::derive(&keypair.to_seed());
         let schema = Arc::new(graphql::build_schema(
             db.clone(),
             ref_tx.clone(),
             task_tx.clone(),
+            task_cursor_key.clone(),
         ));
         crate::state::AppState {
             config: Arc::new(Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"])),
@@ -649,6 +748,7 @@ mod tests {
             ref_update_tx: ref_tx,
             task_event_tx: task_tx,
             graphql_schema: schema,
+            task_cursor_key,
             machine_id: None,
             repo_store: crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), pool),
             rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(100, Duration::from_secs(60)),
@@ -664,6 +764,7 @@ mod tests {
             ipfs_max_legacy_scan_rule_bytes:
                 crate::api::ipfs::MAX_LEGACY_SCAN_RULE_BYTES_PER_REQUEST,
             ipfs_scan_token_key: Arc::new(scan_token_key),
+            webhook_secret_key: Arc::new(webhook_secret_key),
             ipfs_max_served_object_bytes: crate::api::ipfs::MAX_SERVED_OBJECT_BYTES,
             push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None,
             sync_trigger_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
@@ -684,6 +785,7 @@ mod tests {
             git_ipfs_walk_semaphore: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(64)),
             git_ipfs_walk_per_caller:
                 crate::rate_limit::PerCallerConcurrency::with_default_max_keys(16),
+            task_read_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(1200, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
             git_bin: "git".to_string(),
         }
     }
@@ -850,3 +952,435 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod ucan_push_tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+    use gitlawb_core::ucan::{caps, Capability, Ucan};
+
+    const OWNER_KEY: &str = "z6MkOwnerAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+
+    /// `RepoRecord` does not derive `Default`, and adding the derive to a
+    /// production DB type purely to serve a test is the wrong direction.
+    fn repo(owner_did: &str, name: &str) -> crate::db::RepoRecord {
+        crate::db::RepoRecord {
+            id: "repo-id".to_string(),
+            name: name.to_string(),
+            owner_did: owner_did.to_string(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: true,
+            default_branch: "main".to_string(),
+            created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+            updated_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+            disk_path: "/unused".to_string(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The token's own issuer and audience are irrelevant to this predicate: the
+    /// middleware has already bound `iss` to the request signer and `aud` to this
+    /// node. Only the capabilities and the chain's root matter here.
+    fn verified(root: &str, caps_vec: Vec<Capability>) -> VerifiedUcan {
+        verified_with_exp(
+            root,
+            caps_vec,
+            Some(chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1)),
+        )
+    }
+
+    fn verified_with_exp(
+        root: &str,
+        caps_vec: Vec<Capability>,
+        exp: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
+    ) -> VerifiedUcan {
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let ucan = Ucan::issue(&agent, node.did(), caps_vec, exp).expect("issue");
+        VerifiedUcan {
+            ucan,
+            root: root.parse().expect("root DID must parse"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn owner_full() -> String {
+        format!("did:key:{OWNER_KEY}")
+    }
+
+    fn push_cap_for(owner: &str, name: &str) -> Capability {
+        Capability::new(format!("gitlawb://repos/{owner}/{name}"), caps::GIT_PUSH)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn grants_push_when_the_chain_roots_at_the_owner_and_names_the_repo() {
+        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
+        let v = verified(&owner_full(), vec![push_cap_for(&owner_full(), "myrepo")]);
+        assert!(ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn matches_a_bare_owner_key_against_a_full_did_record() {
+        // Mirror rows store the bare key. A literal string compare would fail
+        // here, denying a delegation that is in fact valid.
+        let rec = repo(OWNER_KEY, "myrepo");
+        let v = verified(&owner_full(), vec![push_cap_for(&owner_full(), "myrepo")]);
+        assert!(ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
+    }
+
+    /// A perpetual grant is refused even when it is otherwise perfectly valid:
+    /// owner-rooted, right repo, right action. Without revocation, an unbounded
+    /// delegation cannot be withdrawn once it leaks.
+    #[test]
+    fn refuses_a_delegation_that_never_expires() {
+        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
+        let v = verified_with_exp(
+            &owner_full(),
+            vec![push_cap_for(&owner_full(), "myrepo")],
+            None,
+        );
+        assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn refuses_a_self_minted_root() {
+        // The whole point: a token nobody delegated grants nothing, however
+        // permissive its capabilities look.
+        let stranger = Keypair::generate();
+        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
+        let v = verified(&stranger.did().to_string(), vec![Capability::new("*", "*")]);
+        assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn refuses_a_capability_for_a_different_repo() {
+        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
+        let v = verified(
+            &owner_full(),
+            vec![push_cap_for(&owner_full(), "otherrepo")],
+        );
+        assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
+    }
+
+    /// A delegation can be issued against the remote's spelling (`myrepo.git`):
+    /// the matcher strips the same single `.git` the smart-HTTP routes do, so
+    /// the capability lands on the canonical record name.
+    #[test]
+    fn grants_push_when_the_capability_carries_the_git_suffix() {
+        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
+        let v = verified(
+            &owner_full(),
+            vec![push_cap_for(&owner_full(), "myrepo.git")],
+        );
+        assert!(ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
+    }
+
+    /// Mirror-created rows can carry a literal `.git` name; reaching one takes
+    /// `foo.git.git`, the same spelling the remote URL uses. A single `.git`
+    /// capability resolves to `foo` and must not fall through to `foo.git`.
+    #[test]
+    fn a_repo_literally_named_dot_git_needs_the_doubled_suffix() {
+        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "foo.git");
+        let single = verified(&owner_full(), vec![push_cap_for(&owner_full(), "foo.git")]);
+        assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&rec, &single));
+        let doubled = verified(
+            &owner_full(),
+            vec![push_cap_for(&owner_full(), "foo.git.git")],
+        );
+        assert!(ucan_grants_push(&rec, &doubled));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn refuses_a_capability_carrying_constraints() {
+        // `nb` is not interpreted yet. An owner who writes {"refs": [...]} means
+        // to restrict; honouring the capability while ignoring nb would grant
+        // strictly more than they intended, so it authorizes nothing.
+        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
+        let v = verified(
+            &owner_full(),
+            vec![push_cap_for(&owner_full(), "myrepo")
+                .with_constraints(serde_json::json!({ "refs": ["refs/heads/feat/*"] }))],
+        );
+        assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn refuses_a_non_push_capability() {
+        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
+        let v = verified(
+            &owner_full(),
+            vec![Capability::new(
+                format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner_full()),
+                caps::ISSUE_CREATE,
+            )],
+        );
+        assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
+    }
+
+    /// A resource wildcard must NOT authorize a push, even though attenuation
+    /// accepts it. The helper narrows a `*` delegation before signing, but the node
+    /// cannot rely on that: a delegate can sign an invocation that keeps the
+    /// wildcard, and it would otherwise reach every repository the owner has — or
+    /// will later create. This test previously asserted the opposite.
+    #[test]
+    fn refuses_a_resource_wildcard_and_honours_repo_admin() {
+        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
+        let wildcard = verified(&owner_full(), vec![Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH)]);
+        assert!(
+            !ucan_grants_push(&rec, &wildcard),
+            "a wildcard resource must not authorize a push at the node"
+        );
+
+        // The ACTION wildcard is a different axis and stays: attenuation bounds it,
+        // and it still has to name a concrete repository.
+        let action_wildcard = verified(
+            &owner_full(),
+            vec![Capability::new(
+                format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner_full()),
+                "*",
+            )],
+        );
+        assert!(ucan_grants_push(&rec, &action_wildcard));
+
+        let admin = verified(
+            &owner_full(),
+            vec![Capability::new(
+                format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner_full()),
+                caps::REPO_ADMIN,
+            )],
+        );
+        assert!(ucan_grants_push(&rec, &admin));
+    }
+
+    /// The attack the wildcard refusal exists to stop: one `*` delegation reaching a
+    /// repository it was never issued against, including one created afterwards.
+    #[test]
+    fn a_wildcard_delegation_cannot_reach_a_second_repository() {
+        let other = repo(&owner_full(), "a-repo-created-later");
+        let wildcard = verified(&owner_full(), vec![Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH)]);
+        assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&other, &wildcard));
+    }
+
+    /// The round-8 P1, executed rather than reasoned: an owner-issued `*` PROOF with
+    /// a concrete leaf for a repository that did not exist at issuance. Refusing a
+    /// wildcard *leaf* did nothing here — `is_attenuated_by` accepts a concrete child
+    /// under a `*` parent, and that narrowing is exactly what `build_invocation` did,
+    /// so the first-party helper was the working mint path.
+    #[test]
+    fn a_wildcard_proof_cannot_reach_a_repo_created_later() {
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let hour = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1);
+
+        let parent = Ucan::issue(
+            &owner,
+            agent.did(),
+            vec![Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH)],
+            Some(hour),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let later = format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/a-repo-created-later", owner.did());
+        let invocation = Ucan::delegate(
+            &agent,
+            node.did(),
+            vec![Capability::new(&later, caps::GIT_PUSH)],
+            Some(hour),
+            &parent,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let root = invocation.verify_chain().expect("the chain still verifies");
+        let rec = repo(&owner.did().to_string(), "a-repo-created-later");
+        assert!(
+            !ucan_grants_push(
+                &rec,
+                &VerifiedUcan {
+                    ucan: invocation,
+                    root
+                }
+            ),
+            "a wildcard proof must not authorize a repo it never named"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The shipping flow must keep working: a proof that names the repository
+    /// authorizes a push to it. Guards against fixing the wildcard by refusing
+    /// everything with a `prf`.
+    #[test]
+    fn a_concrete_proof_still_authorizes_the_repo_it_names() {
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let hour = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1);
+        let resource = format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner.did());
+
+        let parent = Ucan::issue(
+            &owner,
+            agent.did(),
+            vec![Capability::new(&resource, caps::GIT_PUSH)],
+            Some(hour),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let invocation = Ucan::delegate(
+            &agent,
+            node.did(),
+            vec![Capability::new(&resource, caps::GIT_PUSH)],
+            Some(hour),
+            &parent,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let root = invocation.verify_chain().expect("chain verifies");
+        let rec = repo(&owner.did().to_string(), "myrepo");
+        assert!(ucan_grants_push(
+            &rec,
+            &VerifiedUcan {
+                ucan: invocation,
+                root
+            }
+        ));
+    }
+
+    /// A `*` two links up. The immediate proof names the repository, so a walk that
+    /// checks only one level of `prf` stays green here — this is the case that
+    /// makes the recursion load-bearing rather than incidental.
+    #[test]
+    fn a_wildcard_grandparent_cannot_reach_the_repo_through_a_concrete_parent() {
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let intermediary = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let hour = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1);
+        let resource = format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner.did());
+
+        let grandparent = Ucan::issue(
+            &owner,
+            intermediary.did(),
+            vec![Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH)],
+            Some(hour),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let parent = Ucan::delegate(
+            &intermediary,
+            agent.did(),
+            vec![Capability::new(&resource, caps::GIT_PUSH)],
+            Some(hour),
+            &grandparent,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let invocation = Ucan::delegate(
+            &agent,
+            node.did(),
+            vec![Capability::new(&resource, caps::GIT_PUSH)],
+            Some(hour),
+            &parent,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let root = invocation.verify_chain().expect("chain verifies");
+        assert_eq!(root, owner.did());
+        let rec = repo(&owner.did().to_string(), "myrepo");
+        assert!(
+            !ucan_grants_push(
+                &rec,
+                &VerifiedUcan {
+                    ucan: invocation,
+                    root
+                }
+            ),
+            "a wildcard anywhere in the chain must deny, not just in the immediate proof"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// And the same three-link shape with every link concrete must still grant, so
+    /// the walk is refusing the wildcard and not the depth.
+    #[test]
+    fn a_three_link_concrete_chain_still_authorizes() {
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let intermediary = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let hour = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1);
+        let resource = format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner.did());
+        let cap = || vec![Capability::new(&resource, caps::GIT_PUSH)];
+
+        let grandparent = Ucan::issue(&owner, intermediary.did(), cap(), Some(hour)).unwrap();
+        let parent =
+            Ucan::delegate(&intermediary, agent.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &grandparent).unwrap();
+        let invocation = Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &parent).unwrap();
+
+        let root = invocation.verify_chain().unwrap();
+        let rec = repo(&owner.did().to_string(), "myrepo");
+        assert!(ucan_grants_push(
+            &rec,
+            &VerifiedUcan {
+                ucan: invocation,
+                root
+            }
+        ));
+    }
+
+    /// The round-ten P1, pinned where it bites. The middleware verifies the chain
+    /// on the `X-Ucan` header of any signed request before the scope walk runs,
+    /// so a depth bound that lived only in `chain_grants_push_to` protected
+    /// nothing: a hand-built header reached the unbounded recursion first. A
+    /// chain at `MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH` links validates; one link more is refused here,
+    /// with 401 and a message that names depth, before any authorization runs.
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_ucan_chain_stops_at_the_depth_bound() {
+        use gitlawb_core::ucan::MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH;
+
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let hour = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1);
+        let resource = format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner.did());
+        let cap = || vec![Capability::new(&resource, caps::GIT_PUSH)];
+
+        // owner -> k1 -> ... -> signer: MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH - 1 links, all concrete,
+        // all signed, all expiring. Only the length is in question.
+        let mut signer = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut cur = Ucan::issue(&owner, signer.did(), cap(), Some(hour)).unwrap();
+        for _ in 2..MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH {
+            let next = Keypair::generate();
+            cur = Ucan::delegate(&signer, next.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &cur).unwrap();
+            signer = next;
+        }
+
+        // Wrapped into an invocation for the node: exactly MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH links.
+        let at_bound = Ucan::delegate(&signer, node.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &cur).unwrap();
+        let verified = validate_ucan_chain(&at_bound.encode().unwrap(), &node.did(), &signer.did())
+            .expect("a chain at the bound must still validate");
+        assert_eq!(verified.root, owner.did());
+
+        // One more link and it is past the bound.
+        let next = Keypair::generate();
+        let deeper = Ucan::delegate(&signer, next.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &cur).unwrap();
+        let past_bound = Ucan::delegate(&next, node.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &deeper).unwrap();
+        let (status, body) =
+            match validate_ucan_chain(&past_bound.encode().unwrap(), &node.did(), &next.did()) {
+                Ok(_) => panic!("a chain past the bound must be refused, not walked"),
+                Err(refusal) => refusal,
+            };
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+        let message = body.0["message"].as_str().unwrap_or_default();
+        assert!(
+            message.contains("deeper than"),
+            "the refusal must name depth as the reason: {message}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn refuses_a_malformed_resource_uri() {
+        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
+        for bad in [
+            "",
+            "myrepo",
+            "https://repos/x/myrepo",
+            "gitlawb://repos/myrepo",
+        ] {
+            let v = verified(&owner_full(), vec![Capability::new(bad, caps::GIT_PUSH)]);
+            assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v), "{bad} must not grant push");
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
 use crate::db::RefCertificate;
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
+/// Issue a signed ref-update certificate for a successful push. The
+/// live receive-pack handler calls this on every successful push.
 /// Build the v1 signing payload — the EXACT bytes the node signs and
 /// gl's `verify_signature` reconstructs. This is the single source
 /// of truth shared by `issue_ref_certificate` and the frozen
@@ -81,8 +83,36 @@ pub(crate) fn v2_signing_payload(
 
 /// Issue a signed ref-update certificate for a successful push.
 ///
-/// Builds a canonical JSON payload, signs it with the node's Ed25519 key,
-/// persists the certificate, and returns it.
+/// `cert_id` is the deterministic id derived from `(request_id,
+/// ref_name)` (see [`crate::db::ref_cert_id_for`]). It is required so
+/// the recovery drain and the live handler produce the same primary
+/// key: a live push followed by a recovery pass collapses to a
+/// single cert row, and a re-push to the same `(repo, ref)` updates
+/// the existing row's `old_sha` / `new_sha` / `pusher_did` /
+/// `issued_at` / `signature` to the new transition while preserving
+/// the original `id` (the `insert_ref_certificate` upsert is
+/// keyed on `(repo_id, ref_name)` and only updates fields when the
+/// new `issued_at` is strictly greater).
+///
+/// #26 Split PR 1 P1-B: the live handler routes through this
+/// function (the upsert). After the reviewer-1 round-2 fix, the
+/// recovery drain also routes through this function (P1: refresh a
+/// stale cert), so both paths use the same deterministic `cert_id`
+/// and the same upsert. A re-pass is always safe:
+///
+/// - Live handler → live upsert: re-push updates the row, preserves
+///   the original `id`. The contract pinned by
+///   `insert_ref_certificate_upserts_on_repo_ref` is restored.
+/// - Live handler → recovery: live's `ON CONFLICT (id) DO UPDATE`
+///   preserves the original `id`; the recovery's same upsert is
+///   a no-op for an equal-`issued_at` re-run and a refresh for a
+///   strictly-newer one.
+/// - Recovery → live handler: the recovery wrote a row with the
+///   deterministic `id`; the live upsert (which preserves `id` and
+///   only updates other fields when `issued_at` is strictly newer)
+///   is a no-op for an equal-`issued_at` re-run and a refresh for
+///   a strictly-newer one.
+#[allow(dead_code)] // round-trip test in db/mod.rs pins the upsert contract; the live path and the drain use issue_ref_certificate_with_issued_at
 pub async fn issue_ref_certificate(
     state: &AppState,
     repo_id: &str,
@@ -90,9 +120,92 @@ pub async fn issue_ref_certificate(
     old_sha: &str,
     new_sha: &str,
     pusher_did: &str,
+    cert_id: &str,
+) -> Result<RefCertificate> {
+    issue_ref_certificate_with_issued_at(
+        state, repo_id, ref_name, old_sha, new_sha, pusher_did, cert_id, None,
+    )
+    .await
+}
+
+/// #26 Split PR 1 round 4 — variant that lets the caller stamp the
+/// cert's `issued_at` with a transition-time timestamp instead of
+/// `Utc::now()`. The recovery drain passes the persisted
+/// `row.created_at` so a replay after a later live cert does not
+/// outrank the live cert in the `EXCLUDED.issued_at >
+/// ref_certificates.issued_at` upsert guard.
+///
+/// The live handler uses the default `issue_ref_certificate` (no
+/// override), which keeps `Utc::now()` — the reviewer's invariant
+/// is that `issued_at` reflects the transition time, and for a
+/// live push the transition time and the wall-clock are the same.
+///
+/// `issued_at_override` is honored verbatim; passing a value not in
+/// RFC 3339 form is a logic bug (the upsert will mis-order), so
+/// callers must use the row's persisted `created_at`.
+///
+/// # Clippy allow — too many arguments
+/// This is the explicit "stamp a transition-time `issued_at`"
+/// variant of `issue_ref_certificate`. The drain
+/// (`durable_outbox::derive_one`) is the in-crate caller; the
+/// test `replay_of_stale_row_does_not_overwrite_live_cert_b` pins
+/// the contract that a recovery replay's `issued_at` does NOT
+/// outrank a later live cert. Adding a struct-arg would be a
+/// larger refactor for two callers (live + drain) and obscure the
+/// parallel to `issue_ref_certificate` (which is `#[allow]`'d for
+/// the same reason historically).
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+pub async fn issue_ref_certificate_with_issued_at(
+    state: &AppState,
+    repo_id: &str,
+    ref_name: &str,
+    old_sha: &str,
+    new_sha: &str,
+    pusher_did: &str,
+    cert_id: &str,
+    issued_at_override: Option<String>,
+) -> Result<RefCertificate> {
+    let cert = build_ref_certificate(
+        state,
+        repo_id,
+        ref_name,
+        old_sha,
+        new_sha,
+        pusher_did,
+        Some(cert_id.to_string()),
+        issued_at_override,
+    )
+    .await?;
+    state.db.insert_ref_certificate(&cert).await
+}
+
+/// Shared cert construction: build the JSON payload, sign it with the
+/// node key, and assemble the `RefCertificate` row. `cert_id_override`
+/// lets the recovery path plug in a deterministic id; the live path
+/// passes `None` and gets a fresh UUID. `issued_at_override` lets
+/// the recovery path stamp the cert with the original transition
+/// time so the upsert's `issued_at > issued_at` guard correctly
+/// orders transitions regardless of write order.
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+async fn build_ref_certificate(
+    state: &AppState,
+    repo_id: &str,
+    ref_name: &str,
+    old_sha: &str,
+    new_sha: &str,
+    pusher_did: &str,
+    cert_id_override: Option<String>,
+    issued_at_override: Option<String>,
 ) -> Result<RefCertificate> {
     let node_did = state.node_did.to_string();
-    let issued_at = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+    // P1 (reviewer-1 round 4): when the caller passes a transition-
+    // time `issued_at` (the recovery drain passes `row.created_at`),
+    // use it verbatim so the upsert's per-column guard
+    // `EXCLUDED.issued_at > ref_certificates.issued_at` correctly
+    // orders transitions regardless of write order. The live handler
+    // passes `None` and gets `Utc::now()` — for a live push the
+    // transition time and the wall-clock are the same.
+    let issued_at = issued_at_override.unwrap_or_else(|| Utc::now().to_rfc3339());
 
     // Build the canonical signing payload via the shared builder so
     // the frozen-vector test below and the live signer cannot drift
@@ -104,8 +217,9 @@ pub async fn issue_ref_certificate(
 
     let signature = state.node_keypair.sign_b64(&payload_bytes);
 
+    let id = cert_id_override.unwrap_or_else(|| Uuid::new_v4().to_string());
     let cert = RefCertificate {
-        id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+        id,
         repo_id: repo_id.to_string(),
         ref_name: ref_name.to_string(),
         old_sha: old_sha.to_string(),
@@ -376,14 +490,16 @@ mod v1_payload_tests {
         let old = "0".repeat(40);
         let new = "a".repeat(40);
         let pusher = "did:key:z6MkPusher";
+        let cert_id = "cert-issuer-observe";
 
         // Drive the live issuer and read the persisted row back by
         // id, so the test covers the stored `version` column and
         // not just the in-process return value.
-        let cert =
-            crate::cert::issue_ref_certificate(&state, repo_id, ref_name, &old, &new, pusher)
-                .await
-                .expect("issue_ref_certificate must succeed");
+        let cert = crate::cert::issue_ref_certificate(
+            &state, repo_id, ref_name, &old, &new, pusher, cert_id,
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("issue_ref_certificate must succeed");
 
         // The cert returned by the issuer is the source of truth
         // for both the version claim and the signed bytes.

crates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rs

@@ -152,6 +152,57 @@ pub struct Config {
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC", default_value_t = false)]
     pub auto_sync: bool,
 
+    /// Periodically fetch configured INBOUND repositories from their external
+    /// HTTPS upstream. Disabled by default: enabling this also requires
+    /// `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=true`, so an upstream-authoritative mirror
+    /// cannot accept writes from arbitrary signed identities between fetches.
+    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_UPSTREAM_MIRROR_ENABLED", default_value_t = false)]
+    pub upstream_mirror_enabled: bool,
+
+    /// Pause between complete upstream-mirror scans. A scan is sequential and
+    /// paginated; the pause begins only after the prior scan has finished, so a
+    /// slow forge cannot create overlapping worker cycles.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_UPSTREAM_MIRROR_INTERVAL_SECS",
+        default_value_t = 300,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(5..=86_400)
+    )]
+    pub upstream_mirror_interval_secs: u64,
+
+    /// Maximum wall-clock time for one external `git fetch`. The child runs in
+    /// its own process group and is fully reaped on timeout. The preflight
+    /// URL-rewrite and local-config probes run on their own short bounds and
+    /// do not consume this budget.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_UPSTREAM_MIRROR_FETCH_TIMEOUT_SECS",
+        default_value_t = 600,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..=GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS_MAX)
+    )]
+    pub upstream_mirror_fetch_timeout_secs: u64,
+
+    /// Number of durable INBOUND rows read per database page. Every page is
+    /// processed before the scan sleeps; this bounds query memory without
+    /// permanently starving repositories beyond the first page.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_UPSTREAM_MIRROR_PAGE_SIZE",
+        default_value_t = 100,
+        value_parser = clap::builder::RangedU64ValueParser::<usize>::new().range(1..=1_000)
+    )]
+    pub upstream_mirror_page_size: usize,
+    /// Enable the periodic reconciliation sweep that re-derives pin/seal sets
+    /// and fills durability gaps.  Defaults to true; set to false to disable
+    /// the sweep even when a pin backend (IPFS/Pinata) is configured.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_RECONCILIATION_SWEEP",
+        default_value_t = true,
+        action = clap::ArgAction::Set
+    )]
+    pub reconciliation_sweep: bool,
+
     /// Irys URL for Arweave permanent anchoring.
     /// Leave empty to disable. Use https://devnet.irys.xyz for free devnet.
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_IRYS_URL", default_value = "")]
@@ -233,6 +284,29 @@ pub struct Config {
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_SHUTDOWN_GRACE_SECS", default_value_t = 30)]
     pub shutdown_grace_secs: u64,
 
+    /// Maximum number of creation requests (repo create, issue create, PR
+    /// create, register, fork) allowed per DID within the rate-limit window.
+    /// 0 is rejected at parse time: it would silently disable the limiter
+    /// (RateLimiter treats max_requests == 0 as allow-all), not block every
+    /// creation request.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_RATE_LIMIT_MAX",
+        default_value_t = 10,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u32).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub rate_limit_max_requests: u32,
+
+    /// Rate-limit window size, in seconds, over which
+    /// `rate_limit_max_requests` applies. 0 is rejected at parse time: every
+    /// timestamp would prune immediately, silently disabling the limiter.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECS",
+        default_value_t = 3600,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub rate_limit_window_secs: u64,
     /// Maximum wall-clock time a single served git operation (upload-pack /
     /// receive-pack through `run_git_service`) may run before it is aborted and
     /// its process group torn down, in seconds. Bounds a git that neither
@@ -762,6 +836,60 @@ pub struct Config {
         value_parser = clap::builder::RangedU64ValueParser::<u64>::new().range(0..=86_400)
     )]
     pub pin_repair_sweep_delay_secs: u64,
+
+    /// #26 Split PR 1 step 4 — receive-pack queue retention window.
+    /// Terminal `complete` and `rejected_at_git` rows older than
+    /// this are eligible for the periodic purge. `quarantined`
+    /// rows are never purged on a timer. The v30 partial index
+    /// `idx_receive_pack_requests_completed_at` keeps the scan
+    /// cheap regardless of the value.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_QUEUE_RETENTION_DAYS",
+        default_value_t = 7,
+        value_parser = clap::builder::RangedU64ValueParser::<i64>::new().range(1..=365)
+    )]
+    pub queue_retention_days: i64,
+
+    /// #26 Split PR 1 step 4 — receive-pack queue purge batch size.
+    /// Each periodic purge pass deletes at most this many terminal
+    /// rows per batch. The drain and the purge share the same
+    /// `DRAIN_PER_PASS_LIMIT` budget; see the spawn function in
+    /// `main.rs` for the wiring.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_QUEUE_PURGE_BATCH",
+        default_value_t = 1000,
+        value_parser = clap::builder::RangedU64ValueParser::<i64>::new().range(1..=100_000)
+    )]
+    pub queue_purge_batch: i64,
+
+    /// #26 Split PR 1 step 5 — effects-executor retry bound. The
+    /// drain flips a request to `quarantined` after this many
+    /// `EffectsOutcome::Retry` returns, closing the
+    /// infinite-retry DoS window. Default 8 matches the spec; set
+    /// lower in tests.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_EFFECTS_MAX_ATTEMPTS",
+        default_value_t = 8,
+        value_parser = clap::builder::RangedU64ValueParser::<i32>::new().range(1..=1000)
+    )]
+    pub effects_max_attempts: i32,
+    /// Per-client-IP rate limit for the anonymous task read routes
+    /// (`GET /api/v1/tasks`, `GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}`), in requests per hour.
+    /// Both are publicly reachable (`optional_signature`). `GET /api/v1/tasks`
+    /// runs `collect_visible_tasks` and returns a visibility-filtered page;
+    /// `GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}` runs `get_visible_task` and returns an opaque 404
+    /// when the task is hidden or missing. These reads can require task,
+    /// repository, and visibility-rule queries even when no task is returned,
+    /// so the brake bounds the cost of anonymous probes. Keyed on the resolved
+    /// client IP via `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`. `0` disables. Default: 1200 (a list page
+    /// followed by per-task reads is a normal client pattern, so this sits above
+    /// the `/ipfs` budget). GraphQL `tasks` / `task` queries, including WebSocket
+    /// operations, share this per-IP budget with REST task reads.
+    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT", default_value_t = 1200)]
+    pub task_read_rate_limit: usize,
 }
 
 impl Config {
@@ -832,6 +960,13 @@ impl Config {
                 Self::DB_LOCK_POOL_NON_PUSH_HEADROOM
             ));
         }
+        if self.upstream_mirror_enabled && !self.enforce_owner_push {
+            return Err(
+                "GITLAWB_UPSTREAM_MIRROR_ENABLED requires GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=true: \
+                 an upstream-authoritative mirror must not accept writes from arbitrary signed identities"
+                    .to_string(),
+            );
+        }
         let main_floor = Self::DB_POOL_APP_HEADROOM as u64;
         if (self.db_max_connections as u64) < main_floor {
             return Err(format!(
@@ -1031,6 +1166,51 @@ pub(crate) fn validate_web_url(raw: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[test]
+    fn upstream_mirror_worker_is_default_off_and_bounded() {
+        let mut config = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
+        assert!(!config.upstream_mirror_enabled);
+        assert_eq!(config.upstream_mirror_interval_secs, 300);
+        assert_eq!(config.upstream_mirror_fetch_timeout_secs, 600);
+        assert_eq!(config.upstream_mirror_page_size, 100);
+        config.validate().unwrap();
+
+        assert!(
+            Config::try_parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--upstream-mirror-interval-secs", "4",])
+                .is_err()
+        );
+        assert!(
+            Config::try_parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--upstream-mirror-page-size", "0",]).is_err()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn upstream_mirror_worker_requires_owner_push_enforcement() {
+        // enforce_owner_push defaults true on main, so the only unsafe shape
+        // is the explicit opt-out: mirror enabled plus enforcement refused.
+        let mut unsafe_config = Config::parse_from([
+            "gitlawb-node",
+            "--upstream-mirror-enabled",
+            "--enforce-owner-push",
+            "false",
+        ]);
+        let error = unsafe_config.validate().unwrap_err();
+        assert!(error.contains("GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=true"));
+
+        Config::parse_from([
+            "gitlawb-node",
+            "--upstream-mirror-enabled",
+            "--enforce-owner-push",
+            "true",
+        ])
+        .validate()
+        .unwrap();
+        // The default posture alone also validates: enforcement is on.
+        Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--upstream-mirror-enabled"])
+            .validate()
+            .unwrap();
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn lock_pool_size_defaults_to_40_and_rejects_zero() {
         assert_eq!(
@@ -1259,6 +1439,30 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn queue_lifecycle_knobs_default_conservatively() {
+        let c = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
+        // 7-day retention matches the v30 partial index comment
+        // and the spec at .gravirei/plans/state-model-durable-post-receive.md.
+        assert_eq!(c.queue_retention_days, 7);
+        // 1000 rows per pass matches DRAIN_PER_PASS_LIMIT in durable_outbox.
+        assert_eq!(c.queue_purge_batch, 1000);
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--queue-retention-days", "30"])
+                .queue_retention_days,
+            30
+        );
+        assert!(Config::try_parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--queue-retention-days", "0"]).is_err());
+        assert!(Config::try_parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--queue-retention-days", "366"]).is_err());
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--queue-purge-batch", "500"]).queue_purge_batch,
+            500
+        );
+        assert!(Config::try_parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--queue-purge-batch", "0"]).is_err());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn ipfs_walk_per_source_defaults_and_rejects_out_of_range() {
         assert_eq!(Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]).ipfs_walk_per_source, 4);

crates/gitlawb-node/src/encrypted_pin.rs

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
 use std::path::Path;
 use std::str::FromStr;
+use std::time::Duration;
 
 use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
 use gitlawb_core::did::Did;
@@ -127,17 +128,60 @@ fn plan_seal(node_seed: &[u8; 32], dids: &BTreeSet<String>, stored_tag: Option<&
 /// `node_seed` keys the opaque recipients tag. Returns `(oid, cid)` for each blob
 /// actually sealed and recorded this call (the per-push delta), used by Option B3
 /// to anchor a manifest. Recipient identities are never stored or returned.
+///
+/// Nine args (the fence joins the seal's eight) but grouping them would churn
+/// both callers and the race/hung-git tests for no behavioral gain.
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 pub async fn encrypt_and_pin(
     ipfs_api: &str,
     repo_path: &Path,
     db: &Db,
     repo_id: &str,
     node_seed: &[u8; 32],
+    git_bin: &str,
+    batch_budget: Duration,
     recipients: &HashMap<String, BTreeSet<String>>,
+    fence: Option<&crate::ipfs_pin::PolicyFence>,
 ) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
     let mut sealed = Vec::new();
     let mut skipped_unresolvable = 0usize;
-    for (oid, dids) in recipients {
+    // One shared read deadline for the whole batch, like `pin_new_objects`: a
+    // hung git child is watchdog-reaped at this bound, so the outer
+    // `PIN_PHASE_DEADLINE` timeout cannot be held open by a blocking read
+    // (R1-P2). Each read runs under `spawn_blocking` — it is synchronous child
+    // spawn + pipe drain + watchdog join.
+    let read_deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + batch_budget;
+    let total = recipients.len();
+    for (attempted, (oid, dids)) in recipients.iter().enumerate() {
+        // Batch budget gate (R2-P3), mirroring the public pin loops: an object
+        // is never started with a remainder too small to cover a bounded read's
+        // teardown. This is consistency (the seal is bounded by the outer
+        // `PIN_PHASE_DEADLINE` either way), but it keeps the three loops from
+        // drifting apart in how they report a truncated batch.
+        if crate::ipfs_pin::batch_budget_gate(
+            "encrypted-seal",
+            read_deadline,
+            sealed.len(),
+            total - attempted,
+        )
+        .is_none()
+        {
+            break;
+        }
+        // Policy fence (R1-P1): the recipients snapshot was derived before the
+        // long withheld-blob walk; if a visibility rule moved while that walk
+        // ran (a reader added or removed), stop sealing instead of pinning to a
+        // stale recipient set. Checked FIRST so a changed policy costs nothing.
+        if let Some(f) = fence {
+            if !f.is_current().await {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    repo = %f.repo_id(),
+                    oid = %oid,
+                    "visibility policy changed after the recipients snapshot; stopping the seal loop"
+                );
+                break;
+            }
+        }
         // A DB read failure is not a cache miss: re-sealing here would do an
         // avoidable IPFS write during a partial outage. Skip and retry next push.
         let stored_tag = match db.encrypted_blob_recipients_tag(repo_id, oid).await {
@@ -188,7 +232,9 @@ pub async fn encrypt_and_pin(
             }
             SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag } => (keys, tag),
         };
-        let data = match crate::git::store::read_object(repo_path, oid) {
+        let data = match read_object_bounded_spawn_blocking(git_bin, repo_path, oid, read_deadline)
+            .await
+        {
             Ok(Some((_t, bytes))) => bytes,
             Ok(None) => {
                 tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "git object not found; skipping encrypted pin");
@@ -206,6 +252,22 @@ pub async fn encrypt_and_pin(
                 continue;
             }
         };
+        // Dispatch fence (R1-P1): re-read the policy epoch immediately before
+        // the irreversible HTTP POST. The iteration-top check catches a narrow
+        // that landed before work began; THIS check catches a narrow that landed
+        // during the tag lookup, recipient resolution, git read, or seal — all
+        // of which can take seconds. Without this, a reader removed during
+        // preparation can still receive a newly published envelope.
+        if let Some(f) = fence {
+            if !f.is_current().await {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    repo = %f.repo_id(),
+                    oid = %oid,
+                    "visibility policy changed during encrypted seal preparation; aborting upload"
+                );
+                break;
+            }
+        }
         let cid = match crate::ipfs_pin::pin_git_object(ipfs_api, oid, &envelope, None).await {
             Ok(c) if !c.is_empty() => c,
             Ok(_) => {
@@ -237,10 +299,33 @@ pub async fn encrypt_and_pin(
     sealed
 }
 
+/// Bounded, reaped git object read for the seal loop, run off the async thread:
+/// `read_object_bounded` is synchronous child spawn + pipe drain + watchdog
+/// join, so blocking the runtime task on it would let a hung git hold a worker
+/// thread (R1-P2). The `deadline` is the batch's shared read deadline; a child
+/// still alive at it is SIGTERM/SIGKILL group-reaped by the watchdog.
+async fn read_object_bounded_spawn_blocking(
+    git_bin: &str,
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    sha256_hex: &str,
+    deadline: std::time::Instant,
+) -> anyhow::Result<Option<(String, Vec<u8>)>> {
+    let git_bin = git_bin.to_string();
+    let repo_path = repo_path.to_path_buf();
+    let sha256_hex = sha256_hex.to_string();
+    tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
+        crate::git::store::read_object_bounded(&git_bin, &repo_path, &sha256_hex, deadline)
+            .map_err(anyhow::Error::from)
+    })
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("read_object spawn_blocking join failed: {e}"))?
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+    use std::time::Duration;
 
     /// A did:key encoding a small-order point. Well-formed, indistinguishable
     /// from a real one by eye, and refused at resolution since the choke-point
@@ -475,4 +560,304 @@ mod tests {
             other => panic!("changed recipient set must re-seal; got {other:?}"),
         }
     }
+
+    /// A reader removed mid-seal must stop the seal loop (R1-P1 "race test for
+    /// reader removal"): `encrypt_and_pin` re-checks the policy fence before
+    /// each blob, so a `remove_visibility_rule` landing while the first seal is
+    /// in flight aborts before a later blob is pinned to a stale recipient set.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn encrypt_and_pin_stops_sealing_when_reader_removed_mid_batch(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        let db = crate::db::Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.run_migrations().await.expect("migrations");
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let repo_path = tmp.path().join("seal-race.git");
+
+        // Three loose blobs, each withheld (path-scoped deny exists so the sweep
+        // would have derived recipients for them).
+        let oids: Vec<String> = {
+            crate::git::store::init_bare(&repo_path).expect("init bare repo");
+            (0..3)
+                .map(|i| {
+                    let mut cmd = std::process::Command::new("git");
+                    cmd.args(["hash-object", "-w", "--stdin"])
+                        .current_dir(&repo_path)
+                        .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped())
+                        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped());
+                    let mut child = cmd.spawn().expect("spawn git hash-object");
+                    {
+                        use std::io::Write;
+                        child
+                            .stdin
+                            .as_mut()
+                            .expect("stdin")
+                            .write_all(format!("secret blob {i}\n").as_bytes())
+                            .expect("write stdin");
+                    }
+                    let out = child.wait_with_output().expect("hash-object output");
+                    assert!(out.status.success());
+                    String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
+                })
+                .collect()
+        };
+
+        // A real repos row so the fence has an epoch and a reader can be removed.
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now();
+        let repo_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
+        db.create_repo(&crate::db::RepoRecord {
+            id: repo_id.clone(),
+            name: "seal-race-repo".into(),
+            owner_did: "did:key:zSealRaceOwner".into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: true,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: now,
+            updated_at: now,
+            disk_path: repo_path.display().to_string(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        })
+        .await
+        .expect("create repo");
+        // A rule whose removal is the "reader removed" mutation: one reader per
+        // blob, all under the same path glob.
+        let reader = did_key(1);
+        db.set_visibility_rule(
+            &repo_id,
+            "**/secret/*",
+            crate::db::VisibilityMode::B,
+            std::slice::from_ref(&reader),
+            "did:key:zSealRaceOwner",
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("set rule");
+
+        // IPFS endpoint that delays the FIRST add 2s so the removal lands while
+        // that seal is in flight, then answers immediately.
+        let endpoint = delaying_cid_endpoint(vec![Duration::from_secs(2)]).await;
+
+        let recipients: HashMap<String, BTreeSet<String>> = oids
+            .iter()
+            .cloned()
+            .map(|oid| {
+                let mut s = BTreeSet::new();
+                s.insert(reader.clone());
+                (oid, s)
+            })
+            .collect();
+
+        let fence = crate::ipfs_pin::PolicyFence::capture(&db, &repo_id)
+            .await
+            .expect("fence captures");
+
+        let sealed = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(30), async {
+            let seal_db = db.clone();
+            let seal_repo = repo_path.clone();
+            let seal_endpoint = endpoint.clone();
+            let seal_repo_id = repo_id.clone();
+            let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
+                encrypt_and_pin(
+                    &seal_endpoint,
+                    &seal_repo,
+                    &seal_db,
+                    &seal_repo_id,
+                    &SEED,
+                    "git",
+                    Duration::from_secs(60),
+                    &recipients,
+                    Some(&fence),
+                )
+                .await
+            });
+            // Let the first add start (endpoint sleeps 2s), then remove the
+            // reader so the fence is stale before the loop checks again.
+            // The window has to cover blob 1's encrypt phase: if the removal
+            // lands before the loop reaches dispatch, the fence aborts with
+            // nothing sealed, so give the in-flight add room to start under
+            // a loaded box while staying inside the 2s endpoint delay.
+            tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(1200)).await;
+            db.remove_visibility_rule(&repo_id, "**/secret/*")
+                .await
+                .expect("remove rule");
+            handle.await.expect("seal task")
+        })
+        .await
+        .expect("wedge guard: the fence abort must not take 30s");
+
+        assert!(
+            sealed.len() < oids.len(),
+            "a reader removal landing mid-batch must abort before every blob is sealed: {}",
+            sealed.len()
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !sealed.is_empty(),
+            "at least the blob already in flight before the removal completes"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A hung git must not hold the seal loop past its read budget (R1-P2): the
+    /// git read runs under `spawn_blocking` against `read_object_bounded`, so
+    /// the watchdog reaps a wedged child at the batch deadline and the loop
+    /// keeps its shape instead of blocking a runtime worker indefinitely.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn encrypt_and_pin_returns_by_budget_with_a_hung_git(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        let db = crate::db::Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.run_migrations().await.expect("migrations");
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let repo_path = tmp.path().join("seal-hung.git");
+        let oids: Vec<String> = {
+            crate::git::store::init_bare(&repo_path).expect("init bare repo");
+            (0..2)
+                .map(|i| {
+                    let mut cmd = std::process::Command::new("git");
+                    cmd.args(["hash-object", "-w", "--stdin"])
+                        .current_dir(&repo_path)
+                        .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped())
+                        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped());
+                    let mut child = cmd.spawn().expect("spawn git hash-object");
+                    {
+                        use std::io::Write;
+                        child
+                            .stdin
+                            .as_mut()
+                            .expect("stdin")
+                            .write_all(format!("secret blob {i}\n").as_bytes())
+                            .expect("write stdin");
+                    }
+                    let out = child.wait_with_output().expect("hash-object output");
+                    assert!(out.status.success());
+                    String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
+                })
+                .collect()
+        };
+
+        // A git that wedges forever, ignoring SIGTERM, so only the watchdog's
+        // SIGKILL can reap it.
+        let fake = tmp.path().join("hanging-git");
+        std::fs::write(&fake, "#!/bin/sh\ntrap '' TERM\necho $$ > pid\nsleep 30\n").unwrap();
+        let mut perm = std::fs::metadata(&fake).unwrap().permissions();
+        perm.set_mode(0o755);
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&fake, perm).unwrap();
+
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now();
+        let repo_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
+        db.create_repo(&crate::db::RepoRecord {
+            id: repo_id.clone(),
+            name: "seal-hung-repo".into(),
+            owner_did: "did:key:zSealHungOwner".into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: true,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: now,
+            updated_at: now,
+            disk_path: repo_path.display().to_string(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        })
+        .await
+        .expect("create repo");
+        db.set_visibility_rule(
+            &repo_id,
+            "**/secret/*",
+            crate::db::VisibilityMode::B,
+            &[did_key(1)],
+            "did:key:zSealHungOwner",
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("set rule");
+
+        let recipients: HashMap<String, BTreeSet<String>> = oids
+            .iter()
+            .cloned()
+            .map(|oid| {
+                let mut s = BTreeSet::new();
+                s.insert(did_key(1));
+                (oid, s)
+            })
+            .collect();
+
+        // Unreachable endpoint: even if a read somehow succeeded, the pin would
+        // fail; the read itself is the thing under test.
+        let started = std::time::Instant::now();
+        let sealed = tokio::time::timeout(
+            Duration::from_secs(60),
+            encrypt_and_pin(
+                "http://127.0.0.1:9",
+                &repo_path,
+                &db,
+                &repo_id,
+                &SEED,
+                fake.to_str().unwrap(),
+                Duration::from_secs(2),
+                &recipients,
+                None,
+            ),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("a hung git must not hold the seal past the outer wedge guard");
+
+        let elapsed = started.elapsed();
+        assert!(
+            elapsed < Duration::from_secs(10),
+            "a hung git must be watchdog-reaped inside the read budget, not block the loop for ~10s+ (took {elapsed:?})"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            sealed.is_empty(),
+            "with a hung git no blob can be read, so nothing may be reported sealed"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Local TCP endpoint that answers `{ "Hash": "QmMock" }` after an optional
+    /// per-request delay, so a seal can be made to straddle a policy mutation.
+    async fn delaying_cid_endpoint(delays: Vec<Duration>) -> String {
+        use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let endpoint = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr().unwrap());
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let mut seen = 0usize;
+            while let Ok((mut sock, _)) = listener.accept().await {
+                let delay = *delays
+                    .get(seen)
+                    .or_else(|| delays.last())
+                    .unwrap_or(&Duration::ZERO);
+                seen += 1;
+                tokio::spawn(async move {
+                    let mut acc = Vec::new();
+                    let mut buf = [0u8; 4096];
+                    loop {
+                        let n = match sock.read(&mut buf).await {
+                            Ok(0) | Err(_) => break,
+                            Ok(n) => n,
+                        };
+                        acc.extend_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
+                        if let Some(hdr_end) =
+                            acc.windows(4).position(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n").map(|p| p + 4)
+                        {
+                            let headers = String::from_utf8_lossy(&acc[..hdr_end]).to_lowercase();
+                            let len: usize = headers
+                                .lines()
+                                .find_map(|l| l.strip_prefix("content-length:"))
+                                .and_then(|v| v.trim().parse().ok())
+                                .unwrap_or(0);
+                            if acc.len() >= hdr_end + len {
+                                break;
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                    tokio::time::sleep(delay).await;
+                    let body = br#"{"Hash":"bafkreifjjcie6lypi6ny7amxnfftagclbuxndqonfipmb64f2km2devei4"}"#;
+                    let _ = sock
+                        .write_all(
+                            format!("HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\n\r\n", body.len())
+                                .as_bytes(),
+                        )
+                        .await;
+                    let _ = sock.write_all(body).await;
+                    let _ = sock.flush().await;
+                });
+            }
+        });
+        endpoint
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/error.rs

@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ pub enum AppError {
     #[error("repo already exists: {0}")]
     RepoExists(String),
 
+    #[error("conflict: {0}")]
+    Conflict(String),
+
     #[error("not found: {0}")]
     NotFound(String),
 
@@ -189,6 +192,7 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
                 "repo_exists",
                 format!("repository '{r}' already exists"),
             ),
+            AppError::Conflict(msg) => (StatusCode::CONFLICT, "conflict", msg.clone()),
             AppError::NotFound(msg) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Unauthorized(msg) => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "not_an_agent", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Forbidden(msg) => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "forbidden", msg.clone()),
@@ -321,6 +325,16 @@ pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, AppError>;
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[test]
+    fn conflict_maps_to_409() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            AppError::Conflict("task not claimable".into())
+                .into_response()
+                .status(),
+            StatusCode::CONFLICT
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn timeout_maps_to_504_distinct_from_git_500() {
         assert_eq!(

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/push_delta.rs

@@ -185,10 +185,13 @@ fn rev_list_delta(
 /// List every object in the repository via
 /// `git cat-file --batch-all-objects --batch-check='%(objectname)'`.
 ///
-/// This is the whole-repo enumeration the push path falls back to and the
-/// reconciliation sweep relies on. It returns *all* objects (including
-/// unreachable/dangling ones), which is what the sweep needs to catch
-/// stragglers — do not swap it for a reachability walk.
+/// This is the whole-repo enumeration the push path falls back to. It
+/// returns *all* objects (including unreachable/dangling ones), which is
+/// what the push path needs to catch stragglers — do not swap it for a
+/// reachability walk. The reconciliation sweep no longer uses it: sweep
+/// candidates come from the windowed walk (window commits plus walked
+/// pairs), which are reachable by construction, so dangling objects are
+/// absent rather than filtered.
 pub fn list_all_objects(repo_path: &Path, git_bin: &str, deadline: Instant) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
     let out = crate::git::visibility_pack::run_bounded_git(
         git_bin,
@@ -214,6 +217,7 @@ pub fn list_all_objects(repo_path: &Path, git_bin: &str, deadline: Instant) -> R
 /// filter needs to tell blobs (content, withholdable) and trees (content,
 /// withholdable since #135/#173) from commits/tags (structural, never withheld)
 /// without typing the candidate list itself.
+#[allow(dead_code)] // used by tests and all_blob_oids
 pub fn list_all_objects_with_type(
     repo_path: &Path,
     git_bin: &str,
@@ -261,6 +265,7 @@ pub fn all_blob_oids(
 /// candidate blob or tree absent from the matching reachable visibility-allowed
 /// set; a dangling or withheld object is in this universe but not the allowed
 /// set, so it never replicates (#99, #172).
+#[allow(dead_code)] // production went to the typed sweep path; tests still use it
 pub fn all_blob_and_tree_oids(
     repo_path: &Path,
     git_bin: &str,
@@ -303,10 +308,12 @@ pub struct PinCandidateSet {
 /// Every degraded path is **logged**, not silent: a full-scan fallback, a
 /// failed full scan, and a panicked blocking task each emit a warning. On a
 /// failed full scan or a task panic the candidate set is empty (pin nothing
-/// this push); that is a durability gap the reconciliation sweep backstops, and
-/// it can never leak because the withheld/fail-closed filter still runs on
-/// whatever set is returned. `full_scan` rides on the returned set so the caller
-/// knows when the dangling-inclusive filter is required.
+/// this push); that is a durability gap the reconciliation sweep backstops
+/// when it is enabled and a pin backend is configured (a node running with the
+/// sweep disabled or with no IPFS/Pinata backend has no backstop), and it can
+/// never leak because the withheld/fail-closed filter still runs on whatever
+/// set is returned. `full_scan` rides on the returned set so the caller knows
+/// when the dangling-inclusive filter is required.
 ///
 /// `scan_sem` is the post-receive scan admission pool (`git_encrypt_semaphore`,
 /// #174 F4): both git-spawning stages — the per-tip `cat-file` probe + delta

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/smart_http.rs

@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ pub fn response_served_pack(output: &[u8]) -> bool {
 ///
 /// Accepts a push. The caller MUST verify HTTP Signature auth before
 /// calling this function.
+#[allow(dead_code)] // used by tests; production uses receive_pack_raw
 pub async fn receive_pack(
     git_bin: &str,
     repo_path: &Path,
@@ -244,6 +245,219 @@ pub async fn receive_pack(
         .body(Body::from(output))?)
 }
 
+/// Run `git-receive-pack` and return the raw stdout bytes together with
+/// the process exit status. Unlike [`receive_pack`], this does NOT bail
+/// on a non-zero exit: the caller needs the stdout (which contains the
+/// report-status with per-ref ok/ng results) even when the process
+/// exits non-zero. A timeout still returns `Err`.
+///
+/// `reflog_action` (typically `gitlawb-request:<request_id>`) is
+/// exported as `GIT_REFLOG_ACTION` so the ref transaction writes
+/// request-bound landing evidence into the reflog. Recovery requires
+/// that evidence before auto-promoting a stranded row; without it a
+/// later request recreating the same old/new tuple is
+/// indistinguishable from the stranded one.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub async fn receive_pack_raw(
+    git_bin: &str,
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    request_body: Bytes,
+    timeout: Duration,
+    admission: Option<AdmissionGuard>,
+) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, bool)> {
+    receive_pack_raw_with_reflog(git_bin, repo_path, request_body, timeout, admission, None).await
+}
+
+/// [`receive_pack_raw`] with explicit reflog binding.
+pub async fn receive_pack_raw_with_reflog(
+    git_bin: &str,
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    request_body: Bytes,
+    timeout: Duration,
+    admission: Option<AdmissionGuard>,
+    reflog_action: Option<&str>,
+) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, bool)> {
+    let mut command = Command::new(git_bin);
+    command
+        .arg("receive-pack")
+        .arg("--stateless-rpc")
+        .arg(repo_path);
+    if let Some(action) = reflog_action {
+        command.env("GIT_REFLOG_ACTION", action);
+    }
+    let (out, err, status, _admission) = drive_git_child_raw(
+        command,
+        request_body,
+        timeout,
+        "git-receive-pack",
+        admission,
+    )
+    .await?;
+    // On timeout, drive_git_child_raw returns Err — we never reach here.
+    // On success/non-zero exit, we have the stdout and exit status.
+    if !status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&err);
+        tracing::warn!(stderr = %stderr, "git-receive-pack exited non-zero");
+    }
+    Ok((out, status.success()))
+}
+
+/// Parse the git-receive-pack report-status output to determine per-ref
+/// success/failure. Returns `(unpack_ok, per_ref_results)` where
+/// `per_ref_results` is a list of `(ref_name, is_ok)`.
+///
+/// The report-status format (after the sideband framing) is:
+/// ```text
+/// unpack ok\n          (or: unpack fail\n)
+/// ok <refname>\n       (per successful ref)
+/// ng <refname> <reason>\n  (per rejected ref)
+/// \n                   (empty line terminates)
+/// ```
+///
+/// Returns `None` if the output cannot be parsed (e.g. the client did
+/// not request report-status, or the output is truncated). In that
+/// case the caller should treat all refs as uncertain.
+pub fn parse_report_status(output: &[u8]) -> Option<(bool, Vec<(String, bool)>)> {
+    let text = std::str::from_utf8(output).ok()?;
+    // Strip sideband framing: each line starts with a pkt-line length
+    // prefix and a channel byte (1 = stdout, 2 = stderr). The actual
+    // data starts after the first `0000` flush packet or after we
+    // strip sideband bytes.
+    //
+    // Framing completeness is part of authority, at whichever level the
+    // framing lives. A double-framed capture carries the report stream
+    // (itself pkt-line framed, flush-terminated) inside the sideband
+    // envelope — real git output has been observed with NO outer flush,
+    // so the outer level cannot require one; the inner frame's flush is
+    // authoritative there. A single-framed (or unframed) payload has no
+    // inner frame, so its only completion marker is the outer flush:
+    // output ending after a complete `unpack ok` / `ok <ref>` packet but
+    // before the outer `0000` is a truncated report and yields `None`
+    // (uncertain), not a successful report.
+    let (stripped, outer_flush) = strip_sideband(text, false)?;
+    // The report-status vocabulary (`unpack ...`, `ok ...`, `ng ...`)
+    // never opens with four hex digits, so a hex quartet here is inner
+    // pkt-line framing, not report text.
+    let stripped = if stripped.len() >= 4
+        && stripped.as_bytes()[..4]
+            .iter()
+            .all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit())
+    {
+        strip_sideband(&stripped, true)?.0
+    } else if !outer_flush {
+        return None;
+    } else {
+        stripped
+    };
+    // The report is framed TWICE when the client negotiated side-band-64k,
+    // which `git push` over smart HTTP does — so this is the common case, not
+    // an exotic one. The outer frame is the side-band envelope; band 1 carries
+    // the report-status stream, which is ITSELF pkt-line encoded. Real bytes
+    // from git 2.50.1 rejecting one ref of a two-ref push:
+    //
+    //   0057\x01000eunpack ok\n0028ng refs/heads/main non-fast-forward\n...
+    //
+    // After one pass the first line reads `000eunpack ok`, which fails the
+    // `unpack ok` check below and makes this return None — i.e. "no report",
+    // which the caller treats as inconclusive and keeps every declared ref.
+    // The per-ref gate would then be inert for exactly the pushes it exists to
+    // filter. The second pass above already removed the inner pkt-line
+    // framing where present (and required its flush); it is a no-op
+    // on the single-framed shape, because plain report text does not begin
+    // with four hex digits.
+    let lines: Vec<&str> = stripped.lines().collect();
+    if lines.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    // First non-empty line is "unpack ok" or "unpack fail".
+    let unpack_line = lines.iter().find(|l| !l.is_empty())?;
+    let unpack_ok = if unpack_line.starts_with("unpack ok") {
+        true
+    } else if unpack_line.starts_with("unpack fail") {
+        false
+    } else {
+        return None;
+    };
+
+    let mut results = Vec::new();
+    for line in &lines[1..] {
+        let line = line.trim();
+        if line.is_empty() {
+            break;
+        }
+        if let Some(rest) = line.strip_prefix("ok ") {
+            results.push((rest.to_string(), true));
+        } else if let Some(rest) = line.strip_prefix("ng ") {
+            // "ng <refname> <reason>" — skip the reason
+            let ref_name = rest.split_whitespace().next()?.to_string();
+            results.push((ref_name, false));
+        }
+    }
+
+    Some((unpack_ok, results))
+}
+
+/// Strip git sideband framing from a pkt-line encoded output.
+/// Sideband-encoded lines start with a 4-hex-digit length, then a
+/// channel byte (0x01=stdout, 0x02=stderr), then payload. Returns the
+/// decoded payload plus whether the stream saw its terminating flush
+/// packet, or `None` if the framing is malformed. With `require_flush`,
+/// a stream that never sees its flush is also `None` — the caller uses
+/// this for the level whose completion marker is authoritative (see
+/// [`parse_report_status`]).
+fn strip_sideband(text: &str, require_flush: bool) -> Option<(String, bool)> {
+    let mut output = String::new();
+    let mut pos = 0;
+    let bytes = text.as_bytes();
+    let mut saw_flush = false;
+
+    loop {
+        if pos == bytes.len() {
+            break;
+        }
+        if pos + 4 > bytes.len() {
+            // Truncated framing mid-header: fail closed.
+            return None;
+        }
+        let len_str = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes[pos..pos + 4]).ok()?;
+        let len = usize::from_str_radix(len_str, 16).ok()?;
+        if len == 0 {
+            // Flush packet — end of sideband stream
+            saw_flush = true;
+            break;
+        }
+        if len < 4 || pos + len > bytes.len() {
+            // Truncated pkt-line extends past EOF: incomplete framing.
+            return None;
+        }
+        let pkt_data = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes[pos + 4..pos + len]).ok()?;
+        pos += len;
+
+        // Sideband: first byte is channel (1=stdout, 2=stderr)
+        if let Some(payload) = pkt_data.strip_prefix('\x01') {
+            output.push_str(payload);
+        } else if pkt_data.starts_with('\x02') {
+            // stderr — skip (git error messages)
+        } else {
+            // Not sideband encoded — pass through
+            output.push_str(pkt_data);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if require_flush && !saw_flush {
+        // Truncated at a packet boundary: every packet parsed, but the
+        // stream never completed. Indistinguishable from a report git was
+        // killed mid-write, so no authority.
+        return None;
+    }
+    if output.is_empty() {
+        None
+    } else {
+        Some((output, saw_flush))
+    }
+}
+
 /// Sends SIGTERM to a child's whole process group on drop, unless disarmed first.
 ///
 /// A served `git upload-pack`/`receive-pack` forks helpers such as `pack-objects`.
@@ -578,6 +792,121 @@ async fn drive_git_child(
     Ok((out, admission))
 }
 
+/// Like [`drive_git_child`], but returns stdout and stderr even on a
+/// non-zero exit status. Used by [`receive_pack_raw`] so the caller
+/// can parse the report-status output from a failed `git-receive-pack`.
+async fn drive_git_child_raw(
+    mut command: Command,
+    input: Bytes,
+    timeout: Duration,
+    what: &str,
+    admission: Option<AdmissionGuard>,
+) -> Result<(
+    Vec<u8>,
+    Vec<u8>,
+    std::process::ExitStatus,
+    Option<AdmissionGuard>,
+)> {
+    command
+        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
+        .stdout(Stdio::piped())
+        .stderr(Stdio::piped());
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    command.process_group(0);
+
+    let mut child = command.spawn()?;
+
+    let mut stdin = child.stdin.take();
+    let mut stdout = child.stdout.take().context("git stdout was not piped")?;
+    let mut stderr = child.stderr.take().context("git stderr was not piped")?;
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    let pgid = child.id().map(|id| id as i32);
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    let mut group_guard = KillGroupOnDrop {
+        child: Some(child),
+        pgid,
+        admission,
+    };
+
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    let mut err = Vec::new();
+
+    let interact = async {
+        let write = async {
+            match stdin.take() {
+                Some(mut s) => s.write_all(&input).await,
+                None => Ok(()),
+            }
+        };
+        #[cfg(unix)]
+        let child_ref = group_guard.child_mut();
+        #[cfg(not(unix))]
+        let child_ref = &mut child;
+        let (write_result, r_out, r_err, status) = tokio::join!(
+            write,
+            stdout.read_to_end(&mut out),
+            stderr.read_to_end(&mut err),
+            child_ref.wait(),
+        );
+        r_out?;
+        r_err?;
+        Ok::<_, anyhow::Error>((write_result, status?))
+    };
+
+    let timed = tokio::time::timeout(timeout, interact).await;
+    let (write_result, status, admission) = match timed {
+        Ok(result) => {
+            #[cfg(unix)]
+            let admission = group_guard.disarm();
+            let (write_result, status) = result?;
+            (write_result, status, admission)
+        }
+        Err(_elapsed) => {
+            #[cfg(unix)]
+            {
+                reap_group_on_timeout(group_guard.child_mut()).await;
+                drop(group_guard.disarm());
+            }
+            #[cfg(not(unix))]
+            {
+                let _ = child.start_kill();
+                let _ = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), child.wait()).await;
+                drop(admission);
+            }
+            return Err(GitServiceTimeout.into());
+        }
+    };
+
+    // Prefer the child's collected answer over a stdin-write error: an early
+    // rejection (unpack failure, command-level deny) makes git print a complete
+    // report-status and exit WITHOUT draining stdin, so a body larger than the
+    // pipe buffer EPIPEs the write while the answer is already on stdout. The
+    // child is reaped (the join above waited on it), so `out`/`err`/`status`
+    // are complete and authoritative — returning Err here would discard them:
+    // `receive_pack_raw_with_reflog` would propagate the write error and the
+    // handler would mark every prepared row `uncertain` instead of driving
+    // `cancelled` per the report. That durable fate is the effect: on a
+    // non-zero exit the client still gets `Err(AppError::Git)` (the handler
+    // maps the failed run itself, not this write), while on exit 0 an error
+    // here would answer a push git actually landed with a server error. The
+    // non-raw `drive_git_child` orders the same way (exit status and git's own
+    // failure first, stdin-write error last — pinned by
+    // `run_git_service_surfaces_git_stderr_over_a_stdin_epipe`), but it must
+    // fail on non-zero because its callers do not parse output from a failed
+    // child; the raw driver exists precisely to parse that output.
+    if let Err(e) = &write_result {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            err = %e,
+            what = %what,
+            "git stdin write failed after child exit; surfacing collected output"
+        );
+    }
+
+    Ok((out, err, status, admission))
+}
+
 /// Map a validated service name to its git subcommand. Only the two fixed
 /// subcommands can come out, so an unrecognized service can never reach git's argv.
 fn service_to_command(service: &str) -> Result<&'static str> {
@@ -868,6 +1197,86 @@ mod tests {
     use std::process::Command;
     use tempfile::TempDir;
 
+    /// Byte-for-byte capture from `git receive-pack` 2.50.1 rejecting one ref of
+    /// a two-ref push, with side-band-64k negotiated — what `git push` over
+    /// smart HTTP actually sends. The report is framed twice: the outer
+    /// side-band envelope, then the report-status stream's own pkt-lines.
+    ///
+    /// This fixture is the point of the test. A hand-written single-framed
+    /// string parses fine with only one strip pass, so a fixture invented to
+    /// match the parser hides the exact case the parser is for.
+    const REAL_SIDEBAND_REPORT: &[u8] =
+        b"0057\x01000eunpack ok\n0028ng refs/heads/main non-fast-forward\n0018ok refs/heads/third\n0000";
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_real_double_framed_sideband_report_is_read_not_treated_as_absent() {
+        let (unpack_ok, refs) =
+            parse_report_status(REAL_SIDEBAND_REPORT).expect("a real git report must parse");
+        assert!(unpack_ok, "unpack line must be read through both frames");
+        assert_eq!(
+            refs,
+            vec![
+                ("refs/heads/main".to_string(), false),
+                ("refs/heads/third".to_string(), true),
+            ],
+            "the rejected ref must be distinguished from the accepted one"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The single-framed shape must keep working: the second pass has to be a
+    /// no-op there, not a corruption. Plain report text does not begin with
+    /// four hex digits, which is what makes that safe.
+    #[test]
+    fn a_single_framed_report_still_parses_after_the_second_pass() {
+        // Framed programmatically rather than by a hand-counted hex prefix: a
+        // wrong length makes the parser return None, which would look exactly
+        // like the regression this pair of tests exists to catch.
+        let payload = "\x01unpack ok\nok refs/heads/x\n";
+        let single = format!("{:04x}{payload}0000", payload.len() + 4);
+        let (unpack_ok, refs) =
+            parse_report_status(single.as_bytes()).expect("single-framed must parse");
+        assert!(unpack_ok);
+        assert_eq!(refs, vec![("refs/heads/x".to_string(), true)]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn truncated_mid_packet_report_is_indeterminate_not_partial() {
+        // Truncate a valid single-framed report mid-packet (overrun):
+        // must return None so the handler persists the whole request as
+        // indeterminate instead of committing a partial ok set.
+        let payload = "\x01unpack ok\nok refs/heads/x\n";
+        let single = format!("{:04x}{payload}0000", payload.len() + 4);
+        let truncated = &single.as_bytes()[..single.len() - 6];
+        assert!(
+            parse_report_status(truncated).is_none(),
+            "mid-packet truncation must be indeterminate"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Truncation exactly at a packet boundary (every packet complete, but
+    /// the outer flush never arrived — e.g. git killed after the last `ok`
+    /// line) must also be indeterminate: the payload is complete but the
+    /// frame is not, and framing completeness is part of authority. The
+    /// mid-packet sibling above cannot catch this; only the flush gate can.
+    /// Removing the `require_flush` enforcement returns `Some` and turns
+    /// this red.
+    #[test]
+    fn truncated_at_packet_boundary_report_is_indeterminate_not_partial() {
+        let payload = "\x01unpack ok\nok refs/heads/x\n";
+        let single = format!("{:04x}{payload}0000", payload.len() + 4);
+        let no_flush = &single.as_bytes()[..single.len() - 4];
+        assert!(
+            parse_report_status(no_flush).is_none(),
+            "a report missing its outer flush must be indeterminate, \
+             even with every packet intact"
+        );
+        // Sanity: the untruncated fixture still parses (flush present).
+        assert!(
+            parse_report_status(single.as_bytes()).is_some(),
+            "the same bytes with the flush must parse"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn service_to_command_maps_allowlist_and_rejects_passthrough() {
         assert_eq!(
@@ -2641,6 +3050,62 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    // The raw driver's counterpart: a rejection-shaped early exit where git
+    // prints a COMPLETE report-status and exits without draining stdin, so a
+    // body larger than the pipe buffer (~64 KiB) EPIPEs the write while the
+    // answer is already on stdout. `receive_pack_raw` must surface that report
+    // (Ok + stdout + exit status), not discard it as a stdin-write error — an
+    // Err here loses parseable output: `receive_pack_raw_with_reflog`
+    // propagates it and the handler marks every prepared row `uncertain`
+    // instead of driving `cancelled` from the report (the durable fate is the
+    // effect; the client-visible status on a failed run is `AppError::Git`
+    // either way). Goes RED if the stdin-write check returns Err after the
+    // join. Both exit codes are pinned: receive-pack rejections and successes
+    // both carry reports the handler must parse.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn receive_pack_raw_surfaces_report_status_over_a_stdin_epipe() {
+        for exit_code in [0, 1] {
+            let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+            std::fs::write(tmp.path().join("report.bin"), REAL_SIDEBAND_REPORT).unwrap();
+            // Never reads stdin: the pending body blocks the pipe, then EPIPEs
+            // once the fake exits. `cat` delivers the report first.
+            let git_bin = write_fake_git(
+                tmp.path(),
+                &format!("#!/bin/sh\ncat \"$(dirname \"$0\")/report.bin\"\nexit {exit_code}\n"),
+            );
+            let body = Bytes::from(vec![0u8; 256 * 1024]);
+            let (out, ok) = receive_pack_raw(
+                git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
+                tmp.path(),
+                body,
+                Duration::from_secs(60),
+                None,
+            )
+            .await
+            .expect(
+                "a report-status printed before exit must not be discarded as a \
+                 stdin-write error",
+            );
+            assert_eq!(
+                ok,
+                exit_code == 0,
+                "the exit status rides the Ok return for both report shapes"
+            );
+            let (unpack_ok, results) = parse_report_status(&out)
+                .expect("git's report survives the EPIPE and stays parseable");
+            assert!(unpack_ok, "unpack ok parses");
+            assert_eq!(
+                results,
+                vec![
+                    ("refs/heads/main".to_string(), false),
+                    ("refs/heads/third".to_string(), true),
+                ],
+                "the per-ref report reaches the handler instead of an HTTP error"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     // ── #192 F1: response_served_pack detector (real git output) ────────────
 
     // A completing request (want+flush+done) yields NAK + a real packfile;

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/tigris.rs

@@ -627,7 +627,9 @@ impl TigrisClient {
 }
 
 /// Compress a bare repo directory into a tar.zst byte vector.
-fn compress_repo(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+/// `pub(crate)` for sweep tests that seed a fake object store with a
+/// byte-identical archive (rather than duplicating the format).
+pub(crate) fn compress_repo(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let buf = Vec::new();
     let encoder = zstd::stream::Encoder::new(buf, 3)?; // level 3 = fast + decent ratio
     let mut tar = tar::Builder::new(encoder);

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/mod.rs

@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ pub(crate) fn graphql_app_err(e: crate::error::AppError) -> async_graphql::Error
         // Curated client-safe variants — `Display` is intentional API text.
         safe @ (crate::error::AppError::RepoNotFound(_)
         | crate::error::AppError::RepoExists(_)
+        | crate::error::AppError::Conflict(_)
         | crate::error::AppError::NotFound(_)
         | crate::error::AppError::Unauthorized(_)
         | crate::error::AppError::Forbidden(_)
@@ -92,15 +93,81 @@ pub(crate) fn graphql_app_err(e: crate::error::AppError) -> async_graphql::Error
     }
 }
 
+/// Classify a failed `claim_task` for GraphQL exactly as REST's claim handler
+/// classifies it: a lost race is a client-safe conflict, a real sqlx fault
+/// stays opaque. Lives here rather than at the three call sites so the
+/// classification cannot drift between transports (#327 review), and so
+/// `every_graphql_map_err_uses_opaque_helpers` can keep whitelisting by name.
+pub(crate) fn graphql_claim_conflict(e: anyhow::Error) -> async_graphql::Error {
+    graphql_app_err(crate::api::tasks::task_write_conflict(
+        e,
+        "task not claimable: not found or already claimed",
+    ))
+}
+
+/// The `finish_task` half of [`graphql_claim_conflict`], covering both
+/// `completeTask` and `failTask`.
+pub(crate) fn graphql_finish_conflict(e: anyhow::Error) -> async_graphql::Error {
+    graphql_app_err(crate::api::tasks::task_write_conflict(
+        e,
+        "task not found or not in claimed state",
+    ))
+}
+
+pub struct TaskReadBrakeExtension;
+
+impl async_graphql::extensions::ExtensionFactory for TaskReadBrakeExtension {
+    fn create(&self) -> Arc<dyn async_graphql::extensions::Extension> {
+        Arc::new(TaskReadBrakeExtensionImpl)
+    }
+}
+
+use async_graphql::async_trait::async_trait;
+
+struct TaskReadBrakeExtensionImpl;
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl async_graphql::extensions::Extension for TaskReadBrakeExtensionImpl {
+    async fn prepare_request(
+        &self,
+        ctx: &async_graphql::extensions::ExtensionContext<'_>,
+        mut request: async_graphql::Request,
+        next: async_graphql::extensions::NextPrepareRequest<'_>,
+    ) -> async_graphql::ServerResult<async_graphql::Request> {
+        if let Some(session_brake) = ctx
+            .session_data
+            .get(&std::any::TypeId::of::<crate::rate_limit::TaskReadBrake>())
+            .and_then(|d| d.downcast_ref::<crate::rate_limit::TaskReadBrake>())
+        {
+            request = request.data(crate::rate_limit::TaskReadBrake {
+                limiter: session_brake.limiter.clone(),
+                key: session_brake.key.clone(),
+                request_count: Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0)),
+            });
+        }
+        if let Some(did) = ctx
+            .session_data
+            .get(&std::any::TypeId::of::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>())
+            .and_then(|d| d.downcast_ref::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>())
+        {
+            request = request.data(did.clone());
+        }
+        next.run(ctx, request).await
+    }
+}
+
 pub fn build_schema(
     db: Arc<Db>,
     ref_update_tx: tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<RefUpdateBroadcast>,
     task_event_tx: tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>,
+    task_cursor_key: crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey,
 ) -> GitlawbSchema {
     apply_query_limits(Schema::build(QueryRoot, MutationRoot, SubscriptionRoot))
         .data(db)
         .data(ref_update_tx)
         .data(task_event_tx)
+        .data(task_cursor_key)
+        .extension(TaskReadBrakeExtension)
         .finish()
 }
 
@@ -192,6 +259,7 @@ mod tests {
             db,
             tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(1).0,
             tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(1).0,
+            crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey::derive(&[42u8; 32]),
         )
     }
 
@@ -217,6 +285,7 @@ mod tests {
             Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool)),
             ref_tx.clone(),
             task_tx.clone(),
+            crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey::derive(&[42u8; 32]),
         );
         for count in [7, 8] {
             let fields = (0..count)
@@ -313,7 +382,10 @@ mod tests {
                 assert_eq!(response.errors.len(), 1);
                 assert_eq!(response.errors[0].message, "Query is too complex.");
                 assert_eq!(
-                    db.list_tasks(Some("pending"), None, 8).await.unwrap().len(),
+                    db.list_tasks_keyset(Some("pending"), None, 8, None)
+                        .await
+                        .unwrap()
+                        .len(),
                     8
                 );
                 continue;
@@ -330,7 +402,7 @@ mod tests {
                 7
             );
             assert_eq!(
-                db.list_tasks(Some("claimed"), Some(caller), 8)
+                db.list_tasks_keyset(Some("claimed"), Some(caller), 8, None)
                     .await
                     .unwrap()
                     .len(),
@@ -352,7 +424,7 @@ mod tests {
         // documented maximums instead of going stale as literals.
         for (field, selection, max) in [
             ("refUpdates", "repo", MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES),
-            ("tasks", "id", MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE),
+            ("tasks", "items { id }", MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE),
             (
                 "reposPage",
                 "nodes { name }",
@@ -595,7 +667,12 @@ mod tests {
         pool.close().await;
         let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
         let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
-        let schema = build_schema(Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool)), ref_tx, task_tx);
+        let schema = build_schema(
+            Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool)),
+            ref_tx,
+            task_tx,
+            crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey::derive(&[42u8; 32]),
+        );
 
         // refUpdates(limit: MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES):
         // Single-field selection has child_complexity 1 -> cost 100 + 200 + 1 = 301 <= 400.
@@ -649,12 +726,12 @@ mod tests {
         );
 
         // tasks(limit: MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE):
-        // Single-field selection has child_complexity 1, so the cost is
-        // 50 + MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE + 1 <= 400.
+        // Selection items { id } has child_complexity 2, so the cost is
+        // 50 + MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE + 2 <= 400.
         // It passes validation and reaches the resolver.
         let single_task = schema
             .execute(format!(
-                "{{ tasks(limit: {MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE}) {{ id }} }}"
+                "{{ tasks(limit: {MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE}) {{ items {{ id }} }} }}"
             ))
             .await;
         assert!(
@@ -674,14 +751,14 @@ mod tests {
             single_task.errors
         );
 
-        // Two-field selection has child_complexity 2, so the cost is
-        // 50 + MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE + 2 <= 400.
+        // Selection items { id status } has child_complexity 3, so the cost is
+        // 50 + MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE + 3 <= 400.
         // A request at the documented maximum stays reachable with multiple
         // fields (the old multiplicative price rejected it at 450); it passes
         // validation and reaches the resolver like the single-field case.
         let multi_task = schema
             .execute(format!(
-                "{{ tasks(limit: {MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE}) {{ id status }} }}"
+                "{{ tasks(limit: {MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE}) {{ items {{ id status }} }} }}"
             ))
             .await;
         assert!(
@@ -843,8 +920,10 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     /// Every `.map_err(` in the GraphQL query/mutation resolvers must route
-    /// through the opaque helpers, or discard the error (`|_|`). Same source-
-    /// scrape pattern as `api::authz_guard` (#255 review).
+    /// through one of the curated helpers in this module, or discard the error
+    /// (`|_|`). Same source-scrape pattern as `api::authz_guard` (#255
+    /// review). The list is deliberately a whitelist of names rather than a
+    /// prefix match, so adding a new mapper is a decision a reviewer sees.
     #[test]
     fn every_graphql_map_err_uses_opaque_helpers() {
         for (file, src) in [
@@ -859,6 +938,8 @@ mod tests {
                 let after = code[idx + ".map_err(".len()..].trim_start();
                 let ok = after.starts_with("crate::graphql::graphql_db_err")
                     || after.starts_with("crate::graphql::graphql_app_err")
+                    || after.starts_with("crate::graphql::graphql_claim_conflict")
+                    || after.starts_with("crate::graphql::graphql_finish_conflict")
                     || after.starts_with("|_|")
                     || after.starts_with("|_ ");
                 assert!(

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/mutation.rs

@@ -106,25 +106,37 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         let assignee_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
+        crate::api::tasks::get_claimable_task(db, &id, caller)
+            .await
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?
+            .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
+        // Same classification REST's claim handler applies: a claim race is a
+        // client-safe conflict, a genuine sqlx failure stays opaque. Routing
+        // both transports through `task_write_conflict` is what stops a normal
+        // race from reaching a GraphQL caller as a generic database error
+        // (#327 review).
         let task = db
             .claim_task(&id, &assignee_did)
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
-        // Report the stored assignee form like REST, so subscribers see the
-        // same identity whichever API surface ran the transition.
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_claim_conflict)?;
         let by_did = task
             .assignee_did
             .as_deref()
             .map(crate::db::trim_assignee_did)
             .unwrap_or(assignee_did.as_str())
             .to_string();
-        let _ = tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
-            task_id: id,
-            old_status: "pending".to_string(),
-            new_status: "claimed".to_string(),
-            by_did,
-            at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-        });
+        crate::api::tasks::announce_task_event(
+            db,
+            tx,
+            TaskEventBroadcast {
+                task_id: id,
+                old_status: "pending".to_string(),
+                new_status: "claimed".to_string(),
+                by_did,
+                at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            },
+        )
+        .await;
         Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
     }
 
@@ -145,12 +157,12 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         let by_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
-        // Authorize the actor: binding by_did to the signer is necessary but not
-        // sufficient — only the task's assignee may finish it.
-        let existing = db
-            .get_task(&id)
+        // Authorize the actor: the task must be visible to the caller (returning
+        // not found for invisible tasks so existence is not leaked), and only
+        // the task's assignee may finish it.
+        let existing = crate::api::tasks::get_visible_task(db, &id, Some(caller))
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?
             .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
         if !crate::api::did_matches(
             caller,
@@ -163,20 +175,25 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         let task = db
             .finish_task(&id, "completed", input.result.as_deref(), caller)
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_finish_conflict)?;
         let by_did = task
             .assignee_did
             .as_deref()
             .map(crate::db::trim_assignee_did)
             .unwrap_or(by_did.as_str())
             .to_string();
-        let _ = tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
-            task_id: id,
-            old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
-            new_status: "completed".to_string(),
-            by_did,
-            at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-        });
+        crate::api::tasks::announce_task_event(
+            db,
+            tx,
+            TaskEventBroadcast {
+                task_id: id,
+                old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
+                new_status: "completed".to_string(),
+                by_did,
+                at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            },
+        )
+        .await;
         Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
     }
 
@@ -197,11 +214,12 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         let by_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
-        // Authorize the actor: only the task's assignee may fail it.
-        let existing = db
-            .get_task(&id)
+        // Authorize the actor: the task must be visible to the caller (returning
+        // not found for invisible tasks so existence is not leaked), and only
+        // the task's assignee may fail it.
+        let existing = crate::api::tasks::get_visible_task(db, &id, Some(caller))
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?
             .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
         if !crate::api::did_matches(
             caller,
@@ -215,20 +233,25 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         let task = db
             .finish_task(&id, "failed", Some(&reason), caller)
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_finish_conflict)?;
         let by_did = task
             .assignee_did
             .as_deref()
             .map(crate::db::trim_assignee_did)
             .unwrap_or(by_did.as_str())
             .to_string();
-        let _ = tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
-            task_id: id,
-            old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
-            new_status: "failed".to_string(),
-            by_did,
-            at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-        });
+        crate::api::tasks::announce_task_event(
+            db,
+            tx,
+            TaskEventBroadcast {
+                task_id: id,
+                old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
+                new_status: "failed".to_string(),
+                by_did,
+                at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            },
+        )
+        .await;
         Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
     }
 }
@@ -326,7 +349,7 @@ mod tests {
             );
             if *name == "claimTask" {
                 assert!(
-                    errs.contains("task not claimable"),
+                    errs.contains("task not found"),
                     "claim race / missing task must keep its business message: {errs}"
                 );
                 assert!(
@@ -370,6 +393,210 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    /// #327 review: `claimTask`/`completeTask`/`failTask` called
+    /// `graphql_db_err` directly on db-layer business failures, so an ordinary
+    /// claim race or stale finish reached GraphQL clients as a generic
+    /// database error while REST clients got an actionable conflict. All three
+    /// now route through the shared `task_write_conflict` classifier.
+    ///
+    /// Deleting either `map_err` from a mutation turns this red: the message
+    /// becomes the raw anyhow text instead of the fixed conflict form.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn task_write_races_surface_as_conflicts_not_db_errors(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
+        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
+        let assignee = "did:key:zGQLRACEASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        let rival = "did:key:zGQLRACERIVALBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
+        let delegator = "did:key:zGQLRACEDELEGATORCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC";
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_repo(&crate::db::RepoRecord {
+                id: "race-repo".into(),
+                name: "race".into(),
+                owner_did: delegator.into(),
+                description: None,
+                is_public: true,
+                default_branch: "main".into(),
+                created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+                updated_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+                disk_path: "/tmp/race-repo".into(),
+                forked_from: None,
+                machine_id: None,
+            })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_task(&crate::db::AgentTask {
+                id: "race-task".into(),
+                repo_id: Some("race-repo".into()),
+                kind: "build".into(),
+                status: "pending".into(),
+                delegator_did: delegator.into(),
+                assignee_did: None,
+                capability: "repo:write".into(),
+                ucan_token: None,
+                payload: None,
+                result: None,
+                created_at: now.clone(),
+                updated_at: now,
+                deadline: None,
+            })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // The assignee wins the claim.
+        let claim = |did: &str| {
+            format!(r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "race-task", assigneeDid: "{did}") {{ id }} }}"#)
+        };
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(claim(assignee)).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "first claim: {}", errors(&resp));
+
+        // The rival loses the race: ineligible caller receives opaque not-found.
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(claim(rival)).data(AuthenticatedDid(rival.into())))
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            errs.contains("task not found"),
+            "ineligible caller after task is claimed must receive opaque not-found: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
+            "ineligible claim is not a database failure: {errs}"
+        );
+
+        // A second claim that reaches the conditional SQL write (e.g. assignee claiming
+        // again on an already-claimed task) exercises the conflict mapper:
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(claim(assignee)).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            errs.contains("task not claimable: not found or already claimed"),
+            "a lost claim race must render the fixed conflict message: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
+            "a claim race is not a database failure: {errs}"
+        );
+
+        // A stale finish on an already-completed task is the same class.
+        let complete = format!(
+            r#"mutation {{ completeTask(id: "race-task", byDid: "{assignee}", input: {{ result: "ok" }}) {{ id }} }}"#
+        );
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(&complete).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "first complete: {}", errors(&resp));
+
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(&complete).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            errs.contains("task not found or not in claimed state"),
+            "a stale complete must render the fixed conflict message: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
+            "a stale complete is not a database failure: {errs}"
+        );
+
+        let fail = format!(
+            r#"mutation {{ failTask(id: "race-task", byDid: "{assignee}", input: {{ reason: "nope" }}) {{ id }} }}"#
+        );
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(&fail).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            errs.contains("task not found or not in claimed state"),
+            "a stale fail must render the fixed conflict message: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
+            "a stale fail is not a database failure: {errs}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The other half of the same classification: a genuine SQL fault on the
+    /// write itself must stay opaque. Without this, routing conflicts through
+    /// `task_write_conflict` could be "fixed" by making every db failure a
+    /// client-visible conflict message.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn task_write_sql_faults_stay_opaque(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
+        let assignee = "did:key:zGQLOPAQUEASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        let delegator = "did:key:zGQLOPAQUEDELEGATORBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_task(&crate::db::AgentTask {
+                id: "opaque-task".into(),
+                repo_id: None,
+                kind: "build".into(),
+                status: "pending".into(),
+                delegator_did: delegator.into(),
+                assignee_did: Some(assignee.into()),
+                capability: "repo:write".into(),
+                ucan_token: None,
+                payload: None,
+                result: None,
+                created_at: now.clone(),
+                updated_at: now,
+                deadline: None,
+            })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // Fault the write itself, not the schema. Dropping a column the
+        // visibility pre-check also SELECTs would fail in `get_visible_task`
+        // and never reach `graphql_claim_conflict`, so this test would pass
+        // against a claim mapper that leaks (#327 review). A BEFORE UPDATE
+        // trigger keeps every read valid and faults only inside
+        // `Db::claim_task`.
+        sqlx::raw_sql(
+            "CREATE FUNCTION gl_test_fault_task_update() RETURNS trigger
+             LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $fn$
+             BEGIN RAISE EXCEPTION 'gl_test_forced_update_fault'; END;
+             $fn$;
+             CREATE TRIGGER gl_test_fault_task_update
+             BEFORE UPDATE ON agent_tasks
+             FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION gl_test_fault_task_update();",
+        )
+        .execute(&pool)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let resp = state
+            .graphql_schema
+            .execute(
+                Request::new(format!(
+                    r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "opaque-task", assigneeDid: "{assignee}") {{ id }} }}"#
+                ))
+                .data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())),
+            )
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
+            "a real sqlx fault on the write must stay opaque: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains("task not claimable"),
+            "a write-time sqlx fault must not be reclassified as a claim race: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains("gl_test_forced_update_fault") && !errs.contains("trigger"),
+            "database text leaked through the conflict mapper: {errs}"
+        );
+    }
+
     /// Adversarial-review GATE-1 (GraphQL): completing a task requires being its
     /// assignee, not merely signing as the by_did you pass. A signer who is not
     /// the assignee is rejected even though the by_did binding passes; the
@@ -392,7 +619,7 @@ mod tests {
             payload: None,
             result: None,
             created_at: now.clone(),
-            updated_at: now,
+            updated_at: now.clone(),
             deadline: None,
         };
         state.db.create_task(&task).await.expect("seed task");
@@ -409,14 +636,69 @@ mod tests {
             )
         };
 
-        // Stranger signs as themselves and passes byDid=self (so the signer
-        // binding passes), but is not the assignee → rejected by authorization.
+        // Stranger signs as themselves on a repo-less task they cannot see:
+        // invisible task returns "task not found" so existence is not leaked.
         let resp = schema
             .execute(Request::new(q(stranger)).data(AuthenticatedDid(stranger.into())))
             .await;
+        assert!(
+            errors(&resp).contains("task not found"),
+            "an invisible task must return not found, got: {}",
+            errors(&resp)
+        );
+
+        // Seed a task on a public repo that stranger CAN see, but is not assignee of:
+        let pub_repo = crate::db::RepoRecord {
+            id: "pub-r".into(),
+            name: "pub-r".into(),
+            owner_did: "did:key:zGQLDELEGATORCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC".into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: true,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+            updated_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+            disk_path: "/tmp/pub-r".into(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        };
+        state.db.create_repo(&pub_repo).await.expect("create repo");
+        let pub_task = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "task-pub".into(),
+            repo_id: Some("pub-r".into()),
+            kind: "build".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: "did:key:zGQLDELEGATORCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC".into(),
+            assignee_did: None,
+            capability: "repo:write".into(),
+            ucan_token: None,
+            payload: None,
+            result: None,
+            created_at: now.clone(),
+            updated_at: now,
+            deadline: None,
+        };
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_task(&pub_task)
+            .await
+            .expect("seed pub task");
+        state
+            .db
+            .claim_task("task-pub", assignee)
+            .await
+            .expect("claim pub task");
+
+        let q_pub = |actor: &str| {
+            format!(
+                r#"mutation {{ completeTask(id: "task-pub", byDid: "{actor}", input: {{}}) {{ id status }} }}"#
+            )
+        };
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(q_pub(stranger)).data(AuthenticatedDid(stranger.into())))
+            .await;
         assert!(
             errors(&resp).contains("assignee"),
-            "a non-assignee signer must be rejected: {}",
+            "a non-assignee signer on a visible task must be rejected: {}",
             errors(&resp)
         );
 
@@ -482,7 +764,7 @@ mod tests {
         // repo id afterwards.
         let stored = state
             .db
-            .list_tasks(None, None, 50)
+            .list_tasks_keyset(None, None, 50, None)
             .await
             .expect("list tasks");
         assert!(
@@ -644,9 +926,11 @@ mod tests {
             .execute(Request::new(q(thief)).data(AuthenticatedDid(thief.into())))
             .await;
         let errs = errors(&resp);
+        // The claim gate hides existence: an ineligible claimer gets the same
+        // not-found as a missing task, not a reserved deny that would leak it.
         assert!(
-            errs.contains("reserved"),
-            "stranger claim must surface reserved deny distinctly: {errs}"
+            errs.contains("task not found"),
+            "stranger claim must read as not-found, got: {errs}"
         );
         assert!(
             !errs.contains("gql-ucan-secret"),

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/query.rs

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
 use crate::api::events::MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES;
 use crate::db::{Db, RepoRecord, MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE, MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE};
 
-use super::types::{AgentTaskType, RefUpdateType, RepoPageType, RepoType};
+use super::types::{AgentTaskReadType, RefUpdateType, RepoPageType, RepoType, TaskPageType};
 
 fn repo_type(repo: RepoRecord) -> RepoType {
     RepoType {
@@ -45,6 +45,23 @@ fn parse_repo_cursor(cursor: &str) -> Result<(String, String)> {
 
 pub struct QueryRoot;
 
+/// Debit the per-IP task-read brake for one task field, mirroring the
+/// `rate_limit_by_ip` layer on `task_read_routes`. Both surfaces run the same
+/// #268 visibility gate and pay the same queries before answering, so an
+/// anonymous prober must not get an unbraked lane by asking over GraphQL
+/// (#327 review).
+///
+/// A schema built without the brake (unit tests, subscriptions) is not braked,
+/// exactly as `rate_limit_by_ip` is a no-op without its extension.
+async fn task_read_brake(ctx: &Context<'_>, field: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    match ctx.data::<crate::rate_limit::TaskReadBrake>() {
+        Ok(brake) if !brake.check(field).await => Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
+            crate::rate_limit::RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE,
+        )),
+        _ => Ok(()),
+    }
+}
+
 #[Object]
 impl QueryRoot {
     // DB-backed roots carry a base cost so aliases consume the request budget
@@ -217,30 +234,74 @@ impl QueryRoot {
         assignee_did: Option<String>,
         #[graphql(
             default = 50,
-            desc = "Requests above the documented maximum are clamped to it (no error). Negative values clamp to 0."
+            desc = "Max 200; larger requests are clamped to 200 (no error). Negative values clamp to 0. Use `nextCursor` to read past the clamp."
         )]
         limit: i64,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<AgentTaskType>> {
+        #[graphql(
+            desc = "Opaque continuation token from a previous page's `nextCursor`. Must be presented with the same `status`/`assigneeDid` filter that issued it."
+        )]
+        cursor: Option<String>,
+    ) -> Result<TaskPageType> {
+        use crate::api::task_cursor::{self, TaskCursorKey, TaskFilter};
+
+        task_read_brake(ctx, "tasks").await?;
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
-        // Clamp before SQL: a negative LIMIT is a client fault that Postgres
-        // rejects with 2201W, which would otherwise trip the opaque DB path
-        // and write an error-level log on every probe (#250 review).
-        let limit = limit.clamp(0, MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE);
-        let tasks = db
-            .list_tasks(status.as_deref(), assignee_did.as_deref(), limit)
-            .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
-        Ok(tasks.into_iter().map(AgentTaskType::from).collect())
+        // #268: gate rows via the same collector the REST list route uses (like
+        // `ref_updates` shares `collect_visible_ref_updates` with its REST feed),
+        // so the two surfaces cannot drift. The collector clamps `limit` itself,
+        // including the negative-LIMIT case #250 called out for this resolver.
+        let caller = ctx
+            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
+            .ok()
+            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
+        let key = ctx.data_unchecked::<TaskCursorKey>();
+        let filter = TaskFilter {
+            status: status.as_deref(),
+            assignee_did: assignee_did.as_deref(),
+        };
+        let resume = cursor
+            .as_deref()
+            .map(|token| task_cursor::decode(key, filter, caller, token))
+            .transpose()
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?;
+        let result = crate::api::tasks::collect_visible_tasks(
+            db,
+            status.as_deref(),
+            assignee_did.as_deref(),
+            limit,
+            resume.as_ref(),
+            caller,
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?;
+        Ok(TaskPageType {
+            next_cursor: result
+                .next_position
+                .as_ref()
+                .map(|pos| task_cursor::encode(key, filter, caller, pos)),
+            items: result
+                .tasks
+                .into_iter()
+                .map(AgentTaskReadType::from)
+                .collect(),
+            has_more: result.has_more,
+            incomplete: result.incomplete,
+        })
     }
 
     #[graphql(complexity = "50 + child_complexity")]
-    async fn task(&self, ctx: &Context<'_>, id: String) -> Result<Option<AgentTaskType>> {
+    async fn task(&self, ctx: &Context<'_>, id: String) -> Result<Option<AgentTaskReadType>> {
+        task_read_brake(ctx, "task").await?;
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
-        let t = db
-            .get_task(&id)
+        // #268: same gate as the REST get route, via the shared helper.
+        let caller = ctx
+            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
+            .ok()
+            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
+        let t = crate::api::tasks::get_visible_task(db, &id, caller)
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
-        Ok(t.map(AgentTaskType::from))
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?;
+        Ok(t.map(AgentTaskReadType::from))
     }
 }
 
@@ -889,10 +950,14 @@ mod tests {
         Arc::new(db)
     }
 
+    fn cursor_key() -> crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey {
+        crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey::derive(&[42u8; 32])
+    }
+
     fn schema(db: Arc<Db>) -> super::super::GitlawbSchema {
         let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
         let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
-        super::super::build_schema(db, ref_tx, task_tx)
+        super::super::build_schema(db, ref_tx, task_tx, cursor_key())
     }
 
     fn repo(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
@@ -1202,7 +1267,7 @@ mod tests {
     async fn tasks_negative_limit_clamped(pool: PgPool) {
         let db = db(pool).await;
         let schema = schema(db);
-        let resp = anon(&schema, "{ tasks(limit: -1) { id } }").await;
+        let resp = anon(&schema, "{ tasks(limit: -1) { items { id } } }").await;
         assert!(
             resp.errors.is_empty(),
             "negative limit must clamp, not fail: {:?}",
@@ -1237,12 +1302,12 @@ mod tests {
             .unwrap();
         }
         let schema = schema(db);
-        let resp = anon(&schema, "{ tasks(limit: 5000) { id } }").await;
-        assert_eq!(
-            count_tasks(&resp),
-            crate::db::MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE as usize,
-            "limit above the maximum must clamp to MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE"
-        );
+        // Queried as the delegator, not anonymously: since #268 the task read
+        // surface is visibility-gated, and an anonymous caller sees none of
+        // these repo-less tasks at all. The clamp is what this test pins, so it
+        // needs a caller who can legitimately see all 201 rows.
+        let resp = authed(&schema, "{ tasks(limit: 5000) { items { id } } }", OWNER).await;
+        assert_eq!(count_tasks(&resp), 200, "limit above 200 must clamp to 200");
     }
 
     /// A limit above MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES must reach the resolver clamped,
@@ -1283,14 +1348,401 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
-    fn count_tasks(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> usize {
+    /// Seed one repo-less task carrying a `ucan_token`, so a leak on any read
+    /// surface is visible in the response body.
+    async fn seed_task(db: &Db, id: &str, delegator: &str) {
+        let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+        db.create_task(&crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: id.into(),
+            repo_id: None,
+            kind: "build".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: delegator.into(),
+            assignee_did: None,
+            capability: "repo:write".into(),
+            ucan_token: Some("SECRET-UCAN-TOKEN".into()),
+            payload: None,
+            result: None,
+            created_at: now.clone(),
+            updated_at: now,
+            deadline: None,
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    /// #268: the `tasks` resolver must delegate to the gated collector, not
+    /// query the DB directly. A repo-less task belonging to someone else is
+    /// invisible to an anonymous caller. `tasks_negative_limit_clamped` cannot
+    /// catch a resolver that stops calling `collect_visible_tasks` because it
+    /// seeds no rows — this seeds one, so the gate is load-bearing here.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn tasks_repo_less_task_hidden_from_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        seed_task(&db, "t1", OWNER).await;
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let resp = anon(&schema, "{ tasks { items { id } } }").await;
+        assert_eq!(
+            count_tasks(&resp),
+            0,
+            "anon must not enumerate another party's repo-less task"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !format!("{:?}", resp.data).contains("SECRET-UCAN-TOKEN"),
+            "no ucan token may reach an anonymous caller"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// #268 sibling for the single-task resolver: an invisible task reads as
+    /// `null`, indistinguishable from one that does not exist.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn task_by_id_is_null_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        seed_task(&db, "t1", OWNER).await;
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let resp = anon(&schema, r#"{ task(id: "t1") { id } }"#).await;
         assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
         let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
             panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
         };
-        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("tasks").expect("tasks key") else {
-            panic!("tasks not a list");
+        assert_eq!(
+            obj.get("task"),
+            Some(&async_graphql::Value::Null),
+            "an invisible task must read as null, got {:?}",
+            obj.get("task")
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// #268: `ucanToken` is absent from the read type's schema entirely, so the
+    /// delegator cannot request it either. Asking for it is a validation error,
+    /// which pins the redaction at the schema level rather than per-resolver.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn task_read_schema_has_no_ucan_token_field(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        seed_task(&db, "t1", OWNER).await;
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let resp = authed(&schema, r#"{ task(id: "t1") { id ucanToken } }"#, OWNER).await;
+        assert!(
+            !resp.errors.is_empty(),
+            "ucanToken must not exist on the task read type"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn tasks_find_older_visible_row_behind_denied_window(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("public-repo", OWNER, "public", true))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let visible = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "visible".into(),
+            repo_id: Some("public-repo".into()),
+            kind: "build".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: OWNER.into(),
+            assignee_did: None,
+            capability: "repo:write".into(),
+            ucan_token: None,
+            payload: None,
+            result: None,
+            created_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            updated_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            deadline: None,
         };
-        rows.len()
+        db.create_task(&visible).await.unwrap();
+        for i in 0..200 {
+            let mut hidden = visible.clone();
+            hidden.id = format!("hidden-{i:03}");
+            hidden.repo_id = None;
+            hidden.created_at = "2026-01-02T00:00:00Z".into();
+            hidden.updated_at = hidden.created_at.clone();
+            db.create_task(&hidden).await.unwrap();
+        }
+
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let resp = anon(&schema, "{ tasks(limit: 1) { items { id } incomplete } }").await;
+        assert_eq!(count_tasks(&resp), 1);
+        assert!(!task_incomplete(&resp));
+        assert!(format!("{:?}", resp.data).contains("visible"));
+    }
+
+    /// The GraphQL surface must page past a denied window on server-issued
+    /// cursors alone, exactly as REST does (#327 review). Before this, the
+    /// only cursor a caller could hold named the last row they saw, so the
+    /// query stalled at `incomplete: true` forever and never reached
+    /// `past-ceiling`.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn tasks_page_past_candidate_ceiling_on_server_cursors(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("public-repo", OWNER, "public", true))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let visible_newer = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "newer-visible".into(),
+            repo_id: Some("public-repo".into()),
+            kind: "build".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: OWNER.into(),
+            assignee_did: None,
+            capability: "repo:write".into(),
+            ucan_token: None,
+            payload: None,
+            result: None,
+            created_at: "2026-01-03T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            updated_at: "2026-01-03T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            deadline: None,
+        };
+        db.create_task(&visible_newer).await.unwrap();
+        for i in 0..1500 {
+            let mut hidden = visible_newer.clone();
+            hidden.id = format!("hidden-{i:04}");
+            hidden.repo_id = None;
+            hidden.created_at = "2026-01-02T00:00:00Z".into();
+            hidden.updated_at = hidden.created_at.clone();
+            db.create_task(&hidden).await.unwrap();
+        }
+
+        let mut visible_older = visible_newer.clone();
+        visible_older.id = "past-ceiling".into();
+        visible_older.created_at = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into();
+        visible_older.updated_at = visible_older.created_at.clone();
+        db.create_task(&visible_older).await.unwrap();
+
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let mut seen: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+        let mut cursor: Option<String> = None;
+        for request in 0..10 {
+            let query = match &cursor {
+                Some(c) => format!(
+                    r#"{{ tasks(limit: 1, cursor: "{c}") {{ items {{ id }} hasMore incomplete nextCursor }} }}"#
+                ),
+                None => {
+                    "{ tasks(limit: 1) { items { id } hasMore incomplete nextCursor } }".to_string()
+                }
+            };
+            let resp = anon(&schema, &query).await;
+            let rendered = format!("{:?}", resp.data);
+            assert!(
+                !rendered.contains("hidden-"),
+                "request {request} disclosed a denied row: {rendered}"
+            );
+            for item in task_items(&resp) {
+                let async_graphql::Value::Object(row) = item else {
+                    panic!("task item not an object");
+                };
+                seen.push(row.get("id").unwrap().to_string().replace('"', ""));
+            }
+            // Short page with more behind it is the scan wall, and says so.
+            if task_page_bool(&resp, "hasMore") && task_items(&resp).is_empty() {
+                assert!(
+                    task_incomplete(&resp),
+                    "request {request}: an empty page with rows behind it is a paused scan"
+                );
+            }
+            match task_page_cursor(&resp) {
+                Some(c) => cursor = Some(c),
+                None => {
+                    assert!(!task_page_bool(&resp, "hasMore"));
+                    assert!(!task_incomplete(&resp));
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            seen,
+            vec!["newer-visible".to_string(), "past-ceiling".to_string()],
+            "both visible rows must be reachable using only server-issued cursors"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// REST and GraphQL mint the same tokens from the same node key, so a
+    /// cursor must not be usable against a filter it was not issued for, and
+    /// must render the same single rejection every other bad cursor renders.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn tasks_rejects_unusable_cursor(pool: PgPool) {
+        use crate::api::task_cursor::{self, TaskFilter, TaskPosition};
+
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        let schema = schema(db);
+
+        let wrong_filter = task_cursor::encode(
+            &cursor_key(),
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("pending"),
+                assignee_did: None,
+            },
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", "t1"),
+        );
+        let foreign = task_cursor::encode(
+            &crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey::derive(&[9u8; 32]),
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: None,
+                assignee_did: None,
+            },
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", "t1"),
+        );
+
+        for (label, query) in [
+            (
+                "garbage",
+                r#"{ tasks(cursor: "not-a-cursor") { items { id } } }"#.to_string(),
+            ),
+            (
+                "another node's key",
+                format!(r#"{{ tasks(cursor: "{foreign}") {{ items {{ id }} }} }}"#),
+            ),
+            (
+                "different filter",
+                format!(r#"{{ tasks(cursor: "{wrong_filter}") {{ items {{ id }} }} }}"#),
+            ),
+        ] {
+            let resp = anon(&schema, &query).await;
+            assert_eq!(
+                resp.errors.len(),
+                1,
+                "{label}: must be rejected, not treated as page one"
+            );
+            assert!(
+                resp.errors[0].message.contains("invalid or expired cursor"),
+                "{label}: unexpected message {:?}",
+                resp.errors[0].message
+            );
+        }
+
+        let resp = anon(
+            &schema,
+            &format!(
+                r#"{{ tasks(status: "pending", cursor: "{wrong_filter}") {{ items {{ id }} }} }}"#
+            ),
+        )
+        .await;
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn tasks_anonymous_denial_hides_repoless_task_and_leaks_no_token(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        let task = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "t1".into(),
+            repo_id: None,
+            kind: "code-review".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: "did:key:z6MkDelegator".into(),
+            assignee_did: None,
+            capability: "agent:task".into(),
+            ucan_token: Some("secret-ucan-token".into()),
+            payload: Some("payload".into()),
+            result: None,
+            created_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            updated_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            deadline: None,
+        };
+        db.create_task(&task).await.unwrap();
+
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let query = "{ tasks { items { id } } }";
+        let resp = anon(&schema, query).await;
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        assert_eq!(count_tasks(&resp), 0);
+        let rendered = format!("{:?}", resp.data);
+        assert!(!rendered.contains("secret-ucan-token"));
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn task_anonymous_denial_returns_null_and_leaks_no_token(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        let task = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "t1".into(),
+            repo_id: None,
+            kind: "code-review".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: "did:key:z6MkDelegator".into(),
+            assignee_did: None,
+            capability: "agent:task".into(),
+            ucan_token: Some("secret-ucan-token".into()),
+            payload: Some("payload".into()),
+            result: None,
+            created_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            updated_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            deadline: None,
+        };
+        db.create_task(&task).await.unwrap();
+
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let query = r#"{ task(id: "t1") { id } }"#;
+        let resp = anon(&schema, query).await;
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        assert_eq!(obj.get("task"), Some(&async_graphql::Value::Null));
+        let rendered = format!("{:?}", resp.data);
+        assert!(!rendered.contains("secret-ucan-token"));
+    }
+
+    fn task_page_bool(resp: &async_graphql::Response, field: &str) -> bool {
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(page) = obj.get("tasks").expect("tasks key") else {
+            panic!("tasks not an object");
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Boolean(value) = page.get(field).expect("field present") else {
+            panic!("{field} not a bool");
+        };
+        *value
+    }
+
+    fn task_page_cursor(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> Option<String> {
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(page) = obj.get("tasks").expect("tasks key") else {
+            panic!("tasks not an object");
+        };
+        match page.get("nextCursor").expect("nextCursor key") {
+            async_graphql::Value::Null => None,
+            async_graphql::Value::String(c) => Some(c.clone()),
+            other => panic!("nextCursor not a string: {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn task_items(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> &Vec<async_graphql::Value> {
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(page) = obj.get("tasks").expect("tasks key") else {
+            panic!("tasks not an object");
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = page.get("items").expect("items key") else {
+            panic!("items not a list");
+        };
+        rows
+    }
+
+    fn count_tasks(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> usize {
+        task_items(resp).len()
+    }
+
+    fn task_incomplete(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> bool {
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(page) = obj.get("tasks").expect("tasks key") else {
+            panic!("tasks not an object");
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Boolean(incomplete) =
+            page.get("incomplete").expect("incomplete key")
+        else {
+            panic!("incomplete not a bool");
+        };
+        *incomplete
     }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/subscription.rs

@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ pub struct SubscriptionRoot;
 
 #[Subscription]
 impl SubscriptionRoot {
-    /// Live ref-update stream. `/graphql/ws` is mounted outside the
-    /// `optional_signature` layer, so this resolver has NO caller identity and
-    /// cannot gate per-subscriber — it relays whatever enters the broadcast
+    /// Live ref-update stream. `/graphql/ws` is mounted under the
+    /// `optional_signature` layer and carries optional caller identity, but this
+    /// resolver does not inspect it — it relays whatever enters the broadcast
     /// channel to any anonymous client. Its visibility safety therefore rests
     /// entirely on the WRITE side: the push handler only sends a
     /// `RefUpdateBroadcast` for repos the anonymous public may read (inside its

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/types.rs

@@ -56,6 +56,65 @@ impl From<AgentTask> for AgentTaskType {
     }
 }
 
+/// Read-only projection of `AgentTask` for the `tasks`/`task` queries, as
+/// opposed to `AgentTaskType`, which the task mutations (`createTask`,
+/// `claimTask`, `completeTask`, `failTask` — all `require_signer`-gated)
+/// return. Identical except for the missing `ucan_token` (#268): a read
+/// surface never needs to echo it back, since the assignee already received it
+/// at delegation/claim time via the mutation response.
+#[derive(SimpleObject, Clone)]
+pub struct AgentTaskReadType {
+    pub id: String,
+    pub repo_id: Option<String>,
+    pub kind: String,
+    pub status: String,
+    pub delegator_did: String,
+    pub assignee_did: Option<String>,
+    pub capability: String,
+    pub payload: Option<String>,
+    pub result: Option<String>,
+    pub created_at: String,
+    pub updated_at: String,
+    pub deadline: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// Wraps a `tasks` page with the same completion signals the REST list route
+/// exposes, so the two surfaces answer pagination identically.
+///
+/// `hasMore` and `incomplete` are separate because they are separate facts
+/// (#327 review): `hasMore` says more candidates remain, `incomplete` says
+/// this page is short *only* because the authorization scan hit its safety
+/// wall. `nextCursor` is present exactly when `hasMore` is true and is an
+/// opaque MAC'd token — it can name the last examined candidate, denied or
+/// not, without disclosing it, which is what lets a caller page past a denied
+/// window instead of stalling on it.
+#[derive(SimpleObject, Clone)]
+pub struct TaskPageType {
+    pub items: Vec<AgentTaskReadType>,
+    pub has_more: bool,
+    pub incomplete: bool,
+    pub next_cursor: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl From<AgentTask> for AgentTaskReadType {
+    fn from(t: AgentTask) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            id: t.id,
+            repo_id: t.repo_id,
+            kind: t.kind,
+            status: t.status,
+            delegator_did: t.delegator_did,
+            assignee_did: t.assignee_did,
+            capability: t.capability,
+            payload: t.payload,
+            result: t.result,
+            created_at: t.created_at,
+            updated_at: t.updated_at,
+            deadline: t.deadline,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(SimpleObject, Clone)]
 pub struct RefUpdateType {
     pub repo: String,

crates/gitlawb-node/src/icaptcha.rs

@@ -126,15 +126,55 @@ fn decode_key(b64url: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
     VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&arr).ok()
 }
 
+/// Upper bound on the iCaptcha `/v1/pubkey` response body. The document is a
+/// handful of keys at most; anything larger is refused rather than buffered
+/// into memory (the unbounded `.json()` read this replaces, #507).
+const KEY_MAX_BODY_BYTES: usize = 8 * 1024;
+
+/// Read at most [`KEY_MAX_BODY_BYTES`] bytes of a key response. Returns `None`
+/// when the body exceeds the cap, so an oversized document is treated as absent
+/// exactly like a network error or a timeout (fail safe, never a partial key).
+async fn read_key_body(mut resp: reqwest::Response) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(1024);
+    loop {
+        match resp.chunk().await {
+            Ok(Some(chunk)) => {
+                let take = (KEY_MAX_BODY_BYTES - buf.len()).min(chunk.len());
+                buf.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..take]);
+                if take < chunk.len() {
+                    return None; // exceeded the cap mid-chunk
+                }
+            }
+            Ok(None) => return Some(buf),
+            Err(_) => return None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 async fn fetch_key(url: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
     let endpoint = format!("{}/v1/pubkey", url.trim_end_matches('/'));
     // Bounded request: a hung /v1/pubkey must never block node startup. On
     // timeout/error we return None and the gate stays inert (fail safe).
+    //
+    // No redirects and a capped body read: the key this fetch produces is the
+    // TRUST ANCHOR for the whole proof gate, so a 3xx must not be allowed to move
+    // where it comes from (anchor substitution / SSRF, matching the node's other
+    // outbound clients — `build_http_client` in main.rs, the sync worker), and
+    // the body is bounded rather than handed to `.json()`'s unbounded buffering.
     let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
         .timeout(Duration::from_secs(5))
+        .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
         .build()
         .ok()?;
-    let jwks: Jwks = client.get(&endpoint).send().await.ok()?.json().await.ok()?;
+    let resp = client.get(&endpoint).send().await.ok()?;
+    // A non-2xx response body is not a key: with Policy::none() a 3xx is
+    // surfaced rather than followed, but its own body must not be parsed
+    // either, or the redirect would move the anchor after all.
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let body = read_key_body(resp).await?;
+    let jwks: Jwks = serde_json::from_slice(&body).ok()?;
     decode_key(&jwks.keys.first()?.x)
 }
 
@@ -647,4 +687,129 @@ mod tests {
         let tampered = format!("{}.{}", payload, chars.into_iter().collect::<String>());
         assert!(verify_token(&v, &tampered, SUB, IAT, false).is_err());
     }
+
+    /// `{"keys":[{"x":"<base64url ed25519 point>"}]}` for the live `PUBKEY_X`.
+    fn jwks_body() -> Vec<u8> {
+        format!(r#"{{"keys":[{{"x":"{PUBKEY_X}"}}]}}"#).into_bytes()
+    }
+
+    /// The no-redirect / bounded-body client still parses a valid JWKS, so the
+    /// hardening did not break the happy path the gate depends on at startup.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn fetch_key_parses_a_valid_jwks() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/v1/pubkey")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(jwks_body())
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let key = fetch_key(&server.url()).await.expect("valid JWKS parses");
+        assert_eq!(key, decode_key(PUBKEY_X).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    /// A 302 must not move the trust anchor. The redirect target serves a REAL
+    /// key, so following the redirect would make `fetch_key` adopt it; instead
+    /// `Policy::none()` leaves the 302's (non-JWKS) body as the answer → None.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn fetch_key_does_not_follow_a_redirect() {
+        let mut target = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _t = target
+            .mock("GET", "/v1/pubkey")
+            .expect(0)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(jwks_body())
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let mut redirector = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        // Location points at the target's /v1/pubkey, so a client that DID
+        // follow the redirect would fetch the real key and return Some: the
+        // assertion below only holds while Policy::none() is in place.
+        let _r = redirector
+            .mock("GET", "/v1/pubkey")
+            .with_status(302)
+            .with_header("Location", &format!("{}/v1/pubkey", target.url()))
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        assert!(
+            fetch_key(&redirector.url()).await.is_none(),
+            "a redirect must not be followed to a host serving a valid key"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A body past the cap is refused rather than buffered, so a broken
+    /// endpoint cannot make the node materialize an arbitrarily large document.
+    /// The body is a VALID JWKS (`jwks_body()`) padded with JSON whitespace past
+    /// the cap, so an unbounded read would still parse it; this test only passes
+    /// because the byte cap refuses it.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn fetch_key_rejects_an_oversized_body() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let mut oversized = jwks_body();
+        oversized.resize(KEY_MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1, b' ');
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/v1/pubkey")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(oversized)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        assert!(
+            fetch_key(&server.url()).await.is_none(),
+            "an oversized body must be refused even when it is a valid JWKS"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A body of exactly the cap still parses: the contract refuses bodies that
+    /// EXCEED it, not bodies that reach it (the padded JWKS is exactly
+    /// KEY_MAX_BODY_BYTES bytes of otherwise-valid JSON).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn fetch_key_accepts_a_body_at_the_cap() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let mut at_cap = jwks_body();
+        at_cap.resize(KEY_MAX_BODY_BYTES, b' ');
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/v1/pubkey")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(at_cap)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let key = fetch_key(&server.url()).await.expect("at-cap JWKS parses");
+        assert_eq!(key, decode_key(PUBKEY_X).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    /// A non-2xx response never supplies the anchor, even when its body is a
+    /// perfectly valid JWKS: the redirect pin only stops the hop, and the
+    /// status gate is what stops the 3xx's own body from being adopted.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn fetch_key_rejects_a_non_success_status() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/v1/pubkey")
+            .with_status(500)
+            .with_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(jwks_body())
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        assert!(
+            fetch_key(&server.url()).await.is_none(),
+            "a non-2xx body must not be adopted as the anchor even when it parses"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// An unreachable endpoint is the same fail-safe None as every other fetch
+    /// error: the gate stays inert rather than the node failing to start.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn fetch_key_returns_none_when_the_endpoint_is_unreachable() {
+        assert!(fetch_key("http://127.0.0.1:1").await.is_none());
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/ipfs_pin.rs

@@ -922,6 +922,12 @@ async fn sweep_pass(
         // Advance FIRST: every path below this line may skip the row, and none of them
         // may wedge the walk (scenario 7).
         last = sha.clone();
+        // Round-3 P1: skip Pinata-only rows whose local cid is NULL.
+        // The legacy repair walk re-keys `cid` from a provider CID to
+        // the raw resolver CID; a row with no local cid has no string
+        // to re-key, and skipping is the natural behavior. The cursor
+        // still advances so the walk does not loop on this row.
+        let Some(stored) = stored else { continue };
         // Same cost gate as the skip-path repair: a canonical raw CIDv1 key is already
         // the resolver key, so it reads no bytes and resolves no repo.
         if gitlawb_core::cid::is_raw_cidv1(&stored) {
@@ -1457,6 +1463,97 @@ fn note_legacy_repair_read() {
 /// have to be documented, validated, and kept meaningful.
 pub const PIN_BATCH_BUDGET: Duration = Duration::from_secs(120);
 
+/// A captured per-repo visibility-policy epoch that fences a pin batch.
+///
+/// The reconciliation sweep reads the epoch immediately before dispatching a
+/// pin loop and passes a fence in; the loop re-reads the epoch before every
+/// upload and aborts the batch the moment it moves. A visibility narrow that
+/// lands mid-batch (a rule made private, a repo quarantined) must not let the
+/// remaining pre-authorized objects still go to a public content-addressed
+/// backend — the narrow is a policy change, and dispatching against the stale
+/// snapshot is the exact irreversible-publication class this fence exists for
+/// (R1-P1). `None` (the push path) means "no fence": the push derives its own
+/// object list at admission and holds a write lease, so no sweep-style batch
+/// snapshot crosses the dispatch boundary.
+///
+/// The fence deliberately does NOT hold any lock across the batch: a
+/// visibility narrow (rule insert/remove, quarantine set) must commit
+/// immediately, and the batch aborts on its next `is_current` check. Holding
+/// a per-repo mutex from capture through drop would invert this — the narrow
+/// would block behind the background sweep and every object in the batch
+/// would still be sealed/posted to the reader being removed. The accepted
+/// residual is a single in-flight object: a narrow that commits between the
+/// pre-POST `is_current` check and the HTTP POST cannot be recalled, but the
+/// next iteration aborts and the fenced DB record (row-locked against the
+/// narrow's epoch bump) refuses to land the raced row as durable.
+/// Multi-process / multi-node narrows are ordered by the same epoch column;
+/// no in-process registry is involved.
+///
+/// Product decision (revocation model): prompt revocation wins over
+/// publication atomicity. The suite intentionally allows one provider
+/// upload already in flight when a rule narrows and requires every
+/// LATER object to stop (`encrypt_and_pin_stops_sealing_when_reader_
+/// removed_mid_batch`). A stronger contract — revocation commit
+/// linearizing against every concurrent publication, or compensation
+/// (unpin/delete) for an envelope that finishes after removal — is
+/// explicitly OUT of scope until decided and documented here. Do not
+/// reintroduce batch-spanning mutual exclusion to close the
+/// single-in-flight window without that decision: it trades one
+/// possibly-raced object for sealing the whole batch to a removed
+/// reader.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct PolicyFence {
+    db: crate::db::Db,
+    repo_id: String,
+    epoch: i64,
+}
+
+impl PolicyFence {
+    /// Capture the current policy epoch for `repo_id`. A read failure is a
+    /// skip, not a retry-with-zero: the caller must not dispatch a batch it
+    /// cannot fence (fail closed on a stale allow).
+    pub async fn capture(db: &crate::db::Db, repo_id: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        match db.repo_policy_epoch(repo_id).await {
+            Ok(epoch) => Some(PolicyFence {
+                db: db.clone(),
+                repo_id: repo_id.to_string(),
+                epoch,
+            }),
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo_id, err = %e, "policy-epoch read failed; not fencing pin batch");
+                None
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Whether the repo's policy epoch is unchanged since capture. A read
+    /// failure is treated as "changed": never dispatch on a policy we cannot
+    /// prove current.
+    pub async fn is_current(&self) -> bool {
+        match self.db.repo_policy_epoch(&self.repo_id).await {
+            Ok(epoch) => epoch == self.epoch,
+            Err(_) => false,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The epoch value captured at `capture` time. Exposed so the
+    /// pinner can pass it to
+    /// `Db::record_pinned_cid_with_source_fenced` — the third
+    /// fence in the same transaction as the row insert.
+    /// Returning the field directly (rather than a `Option`)
+    /// matches the contract: a `PolicyFence` always has a
+    /// captured epoch; `is_current()` reports whether it still
+    /// matches.
+    pub fn captured_epoch(&self) -> i64 {
+        self.epoch
+    }
+
+    /// The repo this fence guards, for log correlation.
+    pub fn repo_id(&self) -> &str {
+        &self.repo_id
+    }
+}
+
 /// The smallest remainder worth starting a bounded git read (or an add) with.
 ///
 /// A 1ms remainder otherwise buys a child spawned already past its deadline, which
@@ -1508,6 +1605,7 @@ pub async fn pin_git_object(
         return Ok(String::new());
     }
 
+    let expected_cid = Cid::from_git_object_bytes(data).to_string();
     let url = format!(
         "{}/api/v0/add?cid-version=1&raw-leaves=true&pin=true",
         ipfs_api.trim_end_matches('/')
@@ -1550,6 +1648,15 @@ pub async fn pin_git_object(
 
     // Kubo returns newline-delimited JSON; we only care about the last object
     // (there's typically just one for a single-file add).
+    //
+    // The response MUST carry a real `Hash`: a misconfigured `GITLAWB_IPFS_API`
+    // (proxy returning HTML, health check on the wrong port, truncated gateway)
+    // can otherwise answer 2xx with no JSON, and falling back to the locally
+    // computed `expected_cid` would record a row for bytes the backend never
+    // stored. The reconciliation sweep trusts `pinned_cids` rows as durability
+    // evidence, so a silent false positive at pin time becomes a permanent blind
+    // spot for the backstop. A missing `Hash` fails the pin rather than recording
+    // a phantom row (mirrors Pinata's `data.cid` check).
     let body = resp
         .text()
         .await
@@ -1565,13 +1672,26 @@ pub async fn pin_git_object(
             let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(line).ok()?;
             v["Hash"].as_str().map(|s| s.to_string())
         })
-        .next_back()
-        .ok_or_else(|| {
-            anyhow::anyhow!(
-                "IPFS /api/v0/add returned 200 without a usable Hash: {:.200}",
-                body
-            )
-        })?;
+        .next_back();
+    let cid = match cid {
+        Some(cid) => {
+            if cid != expected_cid {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    sha256 = %sha256_hex,
+                    returned = %cid,
+                    expected = %expected_cid,
+                    "IPFS returned a different CID than computed locally (Kubo chunking may differ); recording the backend's answer"
+                );
+            }
+            cid
+        }
+        None => {
+            return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
+                "IPFS /api/v0/add returned 2xx without a Hash field; refusing to record \
+                 a CID the backend never acknowledged (misconfigured GITLAWB_IPFS_API?)"
+            ));
+        }
+    };
     // The string still has to be a CID. A garbage Hash would be recorded and
     // later cat-ed the same way a missing one was, so reject it here.
     Cid::from_str(&cid).map_err(|e| {
@@ -1654,8 +1774,8 @@ pub(crate) fn batch_budget_gate(
 ///   than [`PIN_READ_FLOOR`] left. It is a gate, not a hard ceiling, since a started
 ///   iteration still runs to completion;
 /// - the git read: `store::read_object_bounded` runs under `spawn_blocking` against the
-///   ABSOLUTE batch deadline (not the loop-top remainder, which the `is_pinned` round-trip
-///   sitting between the two would push past it), with SIGTERM-then-SIGKILL
+///   ABSOLUTE batch deadline (not the loop-top remainder, which the `has_ipfs_cid`
+///   round-trip sitting between the two would push past it), with SIGTERM-then-SIGKILL
 ///   process-group teardown, so a hung `git cat-file` costs this batch its remaining
 ///   budget plus one watchdog teardown instead of holding the permit for the child's
 ///   whole lifetime and blocking a runtime worker while it does;
@@ -1699,10 +1819,11 @@ pub(crate) fn batch_budget_gate(
 /// # Truncation semantics
 ///
 /// A batch stopped at the deadline leaves its remaining objects unpinned, and
-/// nothing sweeps them up afterwards. There is no reconciliation pass over
-/// `pinned_cids`; recovery is opportunistic, happening only if some later push
-/// on the repo takes the full-scan fallback (`push_delta::list_all_objects`) and
-/// re-derives the whole object set, which then re-offers the skipped OIDs.
+/// nothing sweeps them up afterwards on the push path; recovery is opportunistic
+/// (a later full-scan push re-offers the skipped OIDs). The reconciliation
+/// sweep is the systematic backstop: when it is enabled and a pin backend is
+/// configured, it re-derives the public object set each pass and fills any
+/// remaining gap.
 ///
 /// The twin in `pinata.rs` is back at parity on everything that bounds or repairs an
 /// object: it runs the same shared budget gate at the top of every iteration, the same
@@ -1719,6 +1840,29 @@ pub(crate) fn batch_budget_gate(
 ///
 /// Returns a list of `(sha256_hex, cid)` pairs pinned AND durably recorded this
 /// call.
+/// What one `pin_new_objects` call (IPFS or Pinata twin) did, with the
+/// three backend states kept apart instead of inferred from each other:
+///
+/// - `confirmed`: `(sha, provider_cid)` pairs whose DB record durably
+///   landed. ONLY these may advance `gaps_filled`, branch/gossip CID
+///   state, or any "repaired" bookkeeping. A provider upload whose
+///   record timed out, failed, or was refused by the fence is absent
+///   here even though the bytes may sit on the provider.
+/// - `last_attempted`: the last OID whose loop body was entered — i.e.
+///   the backend did real work for it (reads, an upload attempt, or a
+///   skip-branch decision), whether that work succeeded, failed, or hit
+///   an unknown outcome. `None` when nothing was entered (empty input,
+///   immediate fence abort, or immediate budget gate). Durable
+///   continuation cursors advance to this, never to the tail of the
+///   planned vector: the tail may never have been visited, and
+///   promoting it would rotate an untouched suffix behind the backlog
+///   forever.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct PinBatchOutcome {
+    pub confirmed: Vec<(String, String)>,
+    pub last_attempted: Option<String>,
+}
+
 // Eight because #173's git seam (`git_bin`, `git_timeout`) and pin provenance
 // (`repo_id`) sit alongside #174's batch budget. All four callers pass every one, and
 // grouping them into a context struct would add a type whose only job is to be
@@ -1733,16 +1877,34 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
     db: &crate::db::Db,
     repo_id: &str,
     batch_budget: Duration,
-) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
+    fence: Option<&PolicyFence>,
+) -> PinBatchOutcome {
     if ipfs_api.is_empty() {
-        return vec![];
+        return PinBatchOutcome {
+            confirmed: Vec::new(),
+            last_attempted: None,
+        };
     }
 
     let deadline = Instant::now() + batch_budget;
     let total = object_list.len();
     let mut pinned = Vec::new();
+    let mut last_attempted: Option<String> = None;
 
     for (attempted, sha) in object_list.into_iter().enumerate() {
+        // Policy fence (R1-P1): a visibility narrow that lands after the caller
+        // built this batch must abort it before the next irreversible upload.
+        // Checked FIRST so a changed policy costs nothing beyond the read.
+        if let Some(f) = fence {
+            if !f.is_current().await {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    repo = %f.repo_id,
+                    unattempted = total - attempted,
+                    "visibility policy changed mid-batch; stopping the pin loop"
+                );
+                break;
+            }
+        }
         // Top of the iteration, before any of this object's work: an object is
         // never started with a remainder too small to cover a bounded read's
         // teardown. Consumed as a guard only: the read below runs against the
@@ -1751,19 +1913,40 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
         if batch_budget_gate("IPFS", deadline, pinned.len(), total - attempted).is_none() {
             break;
         }
-        // Skip if already pinned, but first backfill provenance if the existing
-        // pin has none. A legacy pin (recorded before repo_id existed, #173, jatmn)
-        // is skipped here before record_pinned_cid ever runs, so its NULL provenance
-        // would never resolve to one repo and known CIDs keep hitting the scan. The
-        // backfill only sets repo_id (AND repo_id IS NULL guard preserves
-        // first-pinner-owns) and never re-pins the bytes: the object is already on IPFS.
-        // Every DB call from here to the end of the iteration is bounded by the
-        // ABSOLUTE batch deadline (F3, #173): the loop runs under a global pin permit
-        // and a bare await parked it for the whole stall. The elapsed arm is mapped per
-        // site below, never as a blanket "existing error arm": a timeout cancels the
-        // client future but not the statement Postgres is running, so it reports an
-        // UNKNOWN outcome, not a failed write.
-        match db_bounded(deadline, db.is_pinned(&sha)).await {
+        // Attempt progress (not a durability claim): from here the loop does
+        // real work for this OID — skip-branch reads, airgapped git reads,
+        // an upload attempt — whatever the outcome. The caller persists
+        // this as the continuation, never the planned vector's tail.
+        last_attempted = Some(sha.clone());
+        // Skip if the object is ALREADY a real local IPFS pin, but first
+        // backfill provenance if the existing pin has none. A legacy pin
+        // (recorded before repo_id existed, #173, jatmn) is skipped here
+        // before record_pinned_cid ever runs, so its NULL provenance would
+        // never resolve to one repo and known CIDs keep hitting the scan.
+        // The backfill only sets repo_id (AND repo_id IS NULL guard
+        // preserves first-pinner-owns) and never re-pins the bytes: the
+        // object is already on IPFS.
+        //
+        // #218 review P1a: this check keys on `has_ipfs_cid` (writer-owned
+        // `local_ipfs_provenance = TRUE`), NOT on row existence
+        // (`is_pinned`). A Pinata-only row is `is_pinned = true` but
+        // `has_ipfs_cid = false`: the bytes never reached the local IPFS
+        // daemon, only Pinata, and we MUST fall through to the local
+        // writer path so a real local pin lands. Using `is_pinned` here
+        // was the gap that made the Pinata-only → local-IPFS repair
+        // path inert: every sweep pass re-entered this arm, recorded
+        // the source, and continued without ever calling
+        // `pin_git_object` or `record_pinned_cid_with_source`. The flag
+        // stayed FALSE forever.
+        //
+        // Every DB call from here to the end of the iteration is bounded
+        // by the ABSOLUTE batch deadline (F3, #173): the loop runs under
+        // a global pin permit and a bare await parked it for the whole
+        // stall. The elapsed arm is mapped per site below, never as a
+        // blanket "existing error arm": a timeout cancels the client
+        // future but not the statement Postgres is running, so it
+        // reports an UNKNOWN outcome, not a failed write.
+        match db_bounded(deadline, db.has_ipfs_cid(&sha)).await {
             Ok(true) => {
                 // Elapsed here is free to skip: these are reads, so a late server-side
                 // completion costs nothing, and the backfill's own `AND repo_id IS NULL`
@@ -1873,7 +2056,7 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
             }
             Ok(false) => {}
             Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(sha = %sha, err = %e, "DB error checking pinned status");
+                tracing::warn!(sha = %sha, err = %e, "DB error checking IPFS pinned status");
                 continue;
             }
         }
@@ -1887,7 +2070,7 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
         // own deadline regardless.
         //
         // The read runs against the ABSOLUTE batch deadline, not against the remainder
-        // measured at the top of the iteration: the `is_pinned` round-trip above sits
+        // measured at the top of the iteration: the `has_ipfs_cid` round-trip above sits
         // between the two, so `Instant::now() + budget_left` would land past `deadline`
         // by however long the DB took, and under a saturated pool that is the dominant
         // term. A slow DB check must not push the read's own bound out.
@@ -1972,6 +2155,24 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
             break;
         };
 
+        // Dispatch fence (R1-P1): re-read the policy epoch immediately before
+        // the irreversible HTTP POST. The iteration-top check catches a narrow
+        // that landed before work began; THIS check catches a narrow that landed
+        // during the has_ipfs_cid round-trip or the bounded Git read — both of
+        // which can take seconds and during which a quarantine or rule change may
+        // have committed. Without this, stale plaintext can start uploading
+        // under authorization that is no longer current.
+        if let Some(f) = fence {
+            if !f.is_current().await {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    repo = %f.repo_id,
+                    unattempted = total - attempted,
+                    "visibility policy changed during preparation; aborting IPFS upload"
+                );
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
         // Pin to IPFS
         match pin_git_object(ipfs_api, &sha, &data, Some(add_timeout)).await {
             Ok(cid) if !cid.is_empty() => {
@@ -2021,7 +2222,31 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
                 // per-object failure.
                 match db_bounded(
                     db_record_deadline(deadline),
-                    retry_db_record(|| db.record_pinned_cid_with_source(&sha, &raw_cid, repo_id)),
+                    retry_db_record(|| {
+                        // #218 review round 9 (guidance #3 —
+                        // linearization): always go through the
+                        // fenced form. The fence is either
+                        // captured (sweep / public-pin path: the
+                        // third fence is the linearization point
+                        // that closes the rule-write /
+                        // record-write race) or absent
+                        // (push-side admission where the
+                        // decision is made at request time —
+                        // we pass `i64::MAX` as a sentinel that
+                        // the fenced form treats as "no fence
+                        // check"). The 3-arg
+                        // `record_pinned_cid_with_source` is
+                        // still available for tests that don't
+                        // own a fence, but the production
+                        // pinner routes through here.
+                        let fence_epoch = fence.map(|f| f.captured_epoch()).unwrap_or(i64::MAX);
+                        db.record_pinned_cid_with_source_fenced(
+                            &sha,
+                            &raw_cid,
+                            repo_id,
+                            fence_epoch,
+                        )
+                    }),
                 )
                 .await
                 {
@@ -2038,7 +2263,10 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
         }
     }
 
-    pinned
+    PinBatchOutcome {
+        confirmed: pinned,
+        last_attempted,
+    }
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
@@ -2374,6 +2602,74 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    /// The misconfigured-`GITLAWB_IPFS_API` false positive (P3): a 2xx response
+    /// that carries no `Hash` field (proxy returning HTML, health check on the
+    /// wrong port, truncated gateway) must FAIL the pin, not fall back to the
+    /// locally computed `expected_cid`. Falling back records a `pinned_cids`
+    /// row for bytes the backend never stored, and the reconciliation sweep
+    /// trusts rows as durability evidence — so the false positive becomes a
+    /// permanent blind spot for the backstop. A missing `Hash` must surface as
+    /// an explicit error, never a successful pin.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn pin_git_object_rejects_a_2xx_without_a_hash_field() {
+        let endpoint = empty_ok_endpoint().await;
+        let inner = tokio::time::timeout(
+            Duration::from_secs(30),
+            pin_git_object(&endpoint, "deadbeef", b"some object bytes\n", None),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("wedge guard: an immediate empty 200 cannot take 30s");
+        let err = inner.expect_err(
+            "a 2xx without a Hash field must not surface as a successful pin \
+             (would record a phantom pinned_cids row the sweep then trusts)",
+        );
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("without a Hash field"),
+            "the error must name the missing Hash so operators diagnose the endpoint: {err:#}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A 200 that answers with an empty body and no `Hash` — the exact shape of
+    /// a proxy or health-check endpoint mistaken for a Kubo API.
+    async fn empty_ok_endpoint() -> String {
+        use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let endpoint = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr().unwrap());
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            while let Ok((mut sock, _)) = listener.accept().await {
+                tokio::spawn(async move {
+                    let mut acc = Vec::new();
+                    let mut buf = [0u8; 4096];
+                    loop {
+                        let n = match sock.read(&mut buf).await {
+                            Ok(0) | Err(_) => break,
+                            Ok(n) => n,
+                        };
+                        acc.extend_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
+                        if let Some(hdr_end) =
+                            acc.windows(4).position(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n").map(|p| p + 4)
+                        {
+                            let headers = String::from_utf8_lossy(&acc[..hdr_end]).to_lowercase();
+                            let len: usize = headers
+                                .lines()
+                                .find_map(|l| l.strip_prefix("content-length:"))
+                                .and_then(|v| v.trim().parse().ok())
+                                .unwrap_or(0);
+                            if acc.len() >= hdr_end + len {
+                                break;
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                    let _ = sock
+                        .write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n")
+                        .await;
+                    let _ = sock.flush().await;
+                });
+            }
+        });
+        endpoint
+    }
+
     /// The second unhardened sink, reached from `sync.rs`. Same shape as above.
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn cat_against_silent_endpoint_errors_within_its_own_timeout() {
@@ -2486,15 +2782,16 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-batch-budget",
                 Duration::from_millis(5500),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
         .expect("wedge guard: a 5.5s budget cannot take 30s");
 
         assert!(
-            (1..=3).contains(&pinned.len()),
+            (1..=3).contains(&pinned.confirmed.len()),
             "the batch must stop partway, not pin all five and not stall on the first: pinned {}",
-            pinned.len()
+            pinned.confirmed.len()
         );
         let text = logs.text();
         let warns: Vec<&str> = text
@@ -2516,9 +2813,52 @@ mod tests {
             })
             .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("the deadline warn must name the unattempted count: {text}"));
         assert!(
-            unattempted >= 1 && unattempted + pinned.len() <= 5,
+            unattempted >= 1 && unattempted + pinned.confirmed.len() <= 5,
             "unattempted={unattempted} with {} pinned is not a partial batch of five",
-            pinned.len()
+            pinned.confirmed.len()
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The outcome reports the last object actually ENTERED, not the planned
+    /// tail: the first upload hangs 6s against a ~2s per-request timeout, so
+    /// it fails, and the loop-top gate breaks the batch before the second
+    /// object starts. `last_attempted` must be the first OID — the only one
+    /// the loop body entered — even though nothing was confirmed and two
+    /// OIDs were never visited. A cursor persisted from `to_pin.last()`
+    /// would rotate the untouched suffix behind the backlog forever.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn pin_new_objects_reports_last_attempted_not_planned_tail(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        let db = crate::db::Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.run_migrations().await.expect("migrations");
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let repo_path = tmp.path().join("attempted.git");
+        let oids = seed_loose_blobs(&repo_path, 3);
+        let endpoint = delaying_endpoint(vec![Duration::from_secs(6)]).await;
+
+        let outcome = tokio::time::timeout(
+            Duration::from_secs(30),
+            pin_new_objects(
+                &endpoint,
+                &repo_path,
+                "git",
+                Duration::from_secs(30),
+                oids.clone(),
+                &db,
+                "repo-attempted",
+                Duration::from_secs(2),
+                None,
+            ),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("a 2s budget cannot take 30s");
+        assert_eq!(
+            outcome.last_attempted,
+            Some(oids[0].clone()),
+            "only the first object was entered; the planned tail was never visited"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            outcome.confirmed.is_empty(),
+            "the hung upload timed out, so nothing was confirmed"
         );
     }
 
@@ -2553,12 +2893,13 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-batch-continues",
                 Duration::from_secs(90),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
         .expect("wedge guard: a 13s add plus an immediate one cannot take 60s");
         assert_eq!(
-            pinned.len(),
+            pinned.confirmed.len(),
             2,
             "a slow but progressing endpoint must pin both objects: an upload past the client's \
              10s default is not a dead endpoint"
@@ -2591,11 +2932,12 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-batch-rejects",
                 Duration::from_secs(60),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
         .expect("a rejecting endpoint answers immediately, so this cannot take 30s");
-        assert!(pinned.is_empty(), "every add was rejected");
+        assert!(pinned.confirmed.is_empty(), "every add was rejected");
         assert_eq!(
             requests.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst),
             4,
@@ -2689,6 +3031,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-merge-test",
                 Duration::from_secs(2),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -2699,7 +3042,7 @@ mod tests {
         let elapsed = started.elapsed();
 
         assert!(
-            pinned.is_empty(),
+            pinned.confirmed.is_empty(),
             "a git that never answers cannot produce a pinned object: {pinned:?}"
         );
         assert!(
@@ -2776,6 +3119,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-merge-test",
                 Duration::from_millis(1500),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -2790,7 +3134,7 @@ mod tests {
              that can only be spawned and reaped"
         );
         assert_eq!(
-            pinned.len(),
+            pinned.confirmed.len(),
             1,
             "the first object is inside the budget and must pin: {pinned:?}"
         );
@@ -2849,6 +3193,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-merge-test",
                 Duration::from_secs(60),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -2858,7 +3203,7 @@ mod tests {
 
         if genuinely_unreadable {
             assert!(
-                pinned.is_empty(),
+                pinned.confirmed.is_empty(),
                 "nothing can be pinned through a store that cannot be read: {pinned:?}"
             );
             assert_eq!(
@@ -2923,6 +3268,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-merge-test",
                 Duration::from_secs(60),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -2938,7 +3284,7 @@ mod tests {
                  must still be attempted, got {attempted} of {}",
                 oids.len()
             );
-            let pinned_shas: Vec<&String> = pinned.iter().map(|(sha, _)| sha).collect();
+            let pinned_shas: Vec<&String> = pinned.confirmed.iter().map(|(sha, _)| sha).collect();
             let expected: Vec<&String> = oids.iter().filter(|o| !tainted.contains(o)).collect();
             assert_eq!(
                 pinned_shas, expected,
@@ -2991,6 +3337,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-merge-test",
                 Duration::from_secs(60),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -3002,7 +3349,7 @@ mod tests {
             "an object-scoped fault must not stop the batch: every object must be read"
         );
         assert_eq!(
-            pinned.len(),
+            pinned.confirmed.len(),
             4,
             "one corrupt object must cost only itself: the other four must still pin"
         );
@@ -3225,6 +3572,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-stalled-db",
                 Duration::from_millis(1500),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -3235,7 +3583,7 @@ mod tests {
         let elapsed = started.elapsed();
 
         assert!(
-            pinned.is_empty(),
+            pinned.confirmed.is_empty(),
             "a stalled pinned-status check cannot produce a pinned object: {pinned:?}"
         );
         assert!(
@@ -3295,6 +3643,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-skip-stalled",
                 Duration::from_millis(1500),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -3305,7 +3654,7 @@ mod tests {
         let elapsed = started.elapsed();
 
         assert!(
-            pinned.is_empty(),
+            pinned.confirmed.is_empty(),
             "an already-pinned object is skipped, never re-pinned: {pinned:?}"
         );
         assert!(
@@ -3361,13 +3710,17 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-multi-stalled",
                 Duration::from_millis(1500),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
         .expect("three stalled objects must still cost one budget, not three");
         let elapsed = started.elapsed();
 
-        assert!(pinned.is_empty(), "nothing can pin against a stalled DB");
+        assert!(
+            pinned.confirmed.is_empty(),
+            "nothing can pin against a stalled DB"
+        );
         assert!(
             elapsed < Duration::from_secs(3),
             "three stalled objects must charge ONE budget (1.5s), not one each; got {elapsed:?}"
@@ -3390,7 +3743,7 @@ mod tests {
     ///
     /// The lock time is a MARGIN, not a boundary: taking it at 100ms left `is_pinned`
     /// racing it on a loaded box, and losing that race makes the read block, time out,
-    /// and break the batch, which fails on `pinned.len() == 1` for a reason that has
+    /// and break the batch, which fails on `pinned.confirmed.len() == 1` for a reason that has
     /// nothing to do with the floor. Any time between the `is_pinned` round trip and
     /// the add's 1.7s return proves the same thing.
     #[sqlx::test]
@@ -3428,6 +3781,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-spent-budget",
                 Duration::from_millis(2000),
+                None,
             ),
         );
         let (pinned, ()) = tokio::join!(pin, locker);
@@ -3440,7 +3794,7 @@ mod tests {
              nothing can resolve the CID"
         );
         assert_eq!(
-            pinned.len(),
+            pinned.confirmed.len(),
             1,
             "the durably recorded pin must be returned: {pinned:?}"
         );
@@ -3501,6 +3855,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-definite-error",
                 Duration::from_millis(1200),
+                None,
             ),
         );
         let (pinned, ()) = tokio::join!(pin, commit);
@@ -3582,6 +3937,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-marker-floor",
                 Duration::from_millis(1500),
+                None,
             ),
         );
         let (pinned, ()) = tokio::join!(pin, controller);
@@ -3592,7 +3948,7 @@ mod tests {
         drop(sources_lock);
 
         assert!(
-            pinned.is_empty(),
+            pinned.confirmed.is_empty(),
             "an already-pinned object is skipped, never re-pinned: {pinned:?}"
         );
         assert!(
@@ -3686,6 +4042,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-repair-stalled",
                 Duration::from_millis(2200),
+                None,
             ),
         );
         let (pinned, mut cids_lock) = tokio::join!(pin, controller);

crates/gitlawb-node/src/main.rs

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ mod bootstrap;
 mod cert;
 mod config;
 mod db;
+mod durable_outbox;
 mod encrypted_pin;
 mod error;
 mod git;
@@ -18,12 +19,15 @@ mod operator;
 mod p2p;
 mod pinata;
 mod rate_limit;
+mod reconciliation;
 mod server;
 mod state;
 mod sync;
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod test_support;
+mod upstream_mirror;
 mod visibility;
+mod webhook_secret;
 mod webhooks;
 
 use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
@@ -96,6 +100,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     // Sealing key for the legacy-scan continuation tokens, DERIVED from the identity
     // just loaded so it is the same key after a restart (see `derive_scan_token_key`).
     let scan_token_key = AppState::derive_scan_token_key(&keypair);
+    let webhook_secret_key = AppState::derive_webhook_secret_key(&keypair);
     let node_did = keypair.did();
 
     // One-time metrics init. Must run before any handler that calls into
@@ -306,10 +311,15 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     let (ref_update_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel::<state::RefUpdateBroadcast>(256);
     let (task_event_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel::<state::TaskEventBroadcast>(256);
 
+    // Node-keyed, so continuation tokens this node mints are only accepted by
+    // this node and survive its restarts without any configured secret.
+    let task_cursor_key = api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey::derive(&keypair.to_seed());
+
     let graphql_schema = Arc::new(graphql::build_schema(
         Arc::clone(&db),
         ref_update_tx.clone(),
         task_event_tx.clone(),
+        task_cursor_key.clone(),
     ));
 
     let machine_id = std::env::var("FLY_MACHINE_ID").ok();
@@ -350,9 +360,14 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     );
 
     // Per-DID limiter for the creation endpoints. Keyed on the authenticated
-    // DID (attacker-varied), so bound its key set to cap memory.
-    let rate_limiter =
-        rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(10, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600), 200_000);
+    // DID (attacker-varied), so bound its key set to cap memory. Max and window
+    // are operator-configurable via GITLAWB_RATE_LIMIT_MAX /
+    // GITLAWB_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECS; both reject 0 at parse time.
+    let rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
+        config.rate_limit_max_requests as usize,
+        std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.rate_limit_window_secs),
+        200_000,
+    );
 
     // Per-client-IP flood brake for the creation endpoints. The per-DID limiter
     // above is bypassed by a DID farm (one throwaway did:key per repo), which is
@@ -450,6 +465,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         db,
         node_did: node_did.clone(),
         node_keypair: keypair,
+        task_cursor_key,
         p2p: p2p_handle,
         http_client,
         ref_update_tx,
@@ -467,6 +483,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         ipfs_max_legacy_scan_rows: AppState::ipfs_legacy_scan_row_budget(&config),
         ipfs_max_legacy_scan_rule_bytes: crate::api::ipfs::MAX_LEGACY_SCAN_RULE_BYTES_PER_REQUEST,
         ipfs_scan_token_key: Arc::new(scan_token_key),
+        webhook_secret_key: Arc::new(webhook_secret_key),
         ipfs_max_served_object_bytes: crate::api::ipfs::MAX_SERVED_OBJECT_BYTES,
         push_limiter_trust,
         sync_trigger_rate_limiter,
@@ -548,11 +565,36 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
             std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
             200_000,
         ),
+        task_read_rate_limiter: rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
+            config.task_read_rate_limit,
+            std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
+            200_000,
+        ),
         git_bin: "git".to_string(),
     };
+
+    // One-time re-encryption of any webhook HMAC secrets still resting as
+    // plaintext (written before at-rest encryption shipped). A SQL migration
+    // cannot do it — Postgres never sees the node-held key — so it runs here.
+    match state
+        .db
+        .reencrypt_legacy_webhook_secrets(state.webhook_secret_key.as_ref())
+        .await
+    {
+        Ok(0) => {}
+        Ok(n) => info!(
+            count = n,
+            "re-encrypted legacy webhook HMAC secrets at rest"
+        ),
+        Err(e) => warn!(err = %e, "failed to re-encrypt legacy webhook secrets"),
+    }
+
     if config.ipfs_rate_limit == 0 {
         tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_IPFS_RATE_LIMIT=0 — per-IP /ipfs rate limiting disabled");
     }
+    if config.task_read_rate_limit == 0 {
+        tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT=0 — per-IP task read rate limiting disabled");
+    }
 
     // Periodic peer-count poll for the metrics gauge. If p2p is disabled
     // we still set the gauge to 0 so dashboards don't show "no data".
@@ -609,6 +651,13 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     }
 
     let _legacy_cid_sweep = spawn_legacy_cid_sweep(&state, &config);
+    let _queue_lifecycle_sweep = spawn_queue_lifecycle_sweep(&state, &config);
+    // NOTE: the due-request worker is spawned AFTER the one-shot startup
+    // reconcile/drain below, not here: its 5s interval would otherwise tick
+    // during operator/PoS setup and interleave with boot recovery on backlog
+    // rows (state gates prevent data loss, but the interleave costs recovery
+    // latency and widens the reconcile/drain race window).
+    let _marker_cleanup_worker = spawn_marker_cleanup_worker(&state);
 
     let router = server::build_router(state.clone());
     // Re-register the socket bound at startup — same fd, so there was never a
@@ -666,6 +715,46 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         info!("auto-sync worker started");
     }
 
+    // External-forge mirroring is a separate, default-off worker. Startup
+    // validation already requires owner-only pushes when it is enabled; the
+    // worker additionally verifies the Git runtime can pin DNS answers before
+    // any URL reaches `git fetch`.
+    if config.upstream_mirror_enabled {
+        upstream_mirror::start(
+            Arc::clone(&state.db),
+            Arc::clone(&state.config),
+            state.repo_store.clone(),
+            state.repo_write_leases.clone(),
+            Arc::clone(&state.git_write_semaphore),
+            state.subscribe_shutdown(),
+        )
+        .context("starting upstream mirror worker")?;
+    }
+
+    // Periodic reconciliation sweep: re-derives pin/seal sets and fills gaps
+    // so a dropped replication job never means data loss.
+    {
+        let db = state.db.clone();
+        let config = Arc::clone(&state.config);
+        let http_client = Arc::clone(&state.http_client);
+        let node_keypair = Arc::clone(&state.node_keypair);
+        let node_did = state.node_did.clone();
+        let pin_sem = Arc::clone(&state.pin_semaphore);
+        let shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
+        if reconciliation::spawn(
+            db,
+            config,
+            http_client,
+            node_keypair,
+            node_did,
+            pin_sem,
+            shutdown_rx,
+            Some(state.repo_store.clone()),
+        ) {
+            info!("reconciliation sweep worker started");
+        }
+    }
+
     // On-chain operator setup: verify stake + spawn heartbeat loop
     if !state.config.contract_node_staking.is_empty()
         && !state.config.operator_private_key.is_empty()
@@ -700,6 +789,63 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     let grace = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.shutdown_grace_secs);
     info!(grace_secs = config.shutdown_grace_secs, "axum server ready");
 
+    // #26 Split PR 1: drain any `applied` rows left by a previous
+    // process that crashed after Git applied a ref but before the
+    // bookkeeping landed. Runs once, BEFORE the server accepts new
+    // pushes, so a recovery re-derivation does not race a fresh push.
+    // Non-fatal: a transient drain failure is logged and the rows
+    // remain `applied` for the next startup to pick up.
+    //
+    // P1-A: the reconcile step runs FIRST and promotes any `prepared`
+    // or `uncertain` row whose target SHA actually landed on disk.
+    // This is the path that recovers a ref when the post-receive
+    // `mark_pending_ref_transitions_applied` call errored or was
+    // interrupted after `receive_pack` returned Ok, or when
+    // receive-pack returned Err but some refs may have landed
+    // (the `uncertain` state). Without this step, the drain (gated
+    // on `state = 'applied'`) would never see those rows.
+    //
+    // P2 (reviewer-1/2 round 3): use the multi-pass reconcile so
+    // prepared/uncertain rows beyond the first 1000-row page are
+    // processed in the same startup, rather than waiting for the
+    // next restart (where they might age out of MAX_RECONCILE_AGE).
+    match durable_outbox::reconcile_prepared_from_disk_all(
+        state.clone(),
+        durable_outbox::DRAIN_PER_PASS_LIMIT,
+        durable_outbox::DRAIN_MAX_PASSES,
+    )
+    .await
+    {
+        Ok(0) => {}
+        Ok(n) => info!(
+            n,
+            "reconciled prepared/uncertain -> applied via on-disk ref match"
+        ),
+        Err(e) => warn!(
+            err = %e,
+            "pending ref transition reconcile failed at startup (non-fatal; will retry on next start)"
+        ),
+    }
+    match durable_outbox::drain_receive_pack_requests_all(
+        state.clone(),
+        durable_outbox::DRAIN_PER_PASS_LIMIT,
+        durable_outbox::DRAIN_MAX_PASSES,
+    )
+    .await
+    {
+        Ok(0) => {}
+        Ok(n) => info!(n, "drained pending ref transitions from prior run"),
+        Err(e) => warn!(
+            err = %e,
+            "pending ref transition drain failed at startup (non-fatal; will retry on next start)"
+        ),
+    }
+
+    // Start the due-request worker only now that boot recovery is done (see
+    // the note at the other spawns above): its first tick must not interleave
+    // with the one-shot reconcile/drain on backlog rows.
+    let _due_request_worker = spawn_due_request_worker(&state);
+
     // `into_make_service_with_connect_info` exposes the socket peer address as
     // `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` so the push limiter can key on the real client
     // when no trusted proxy header applies (see `rate_limit::client_key`).
@@ -732,6 +878,158 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// U4 (#173): spawn the periodic legacy provider-CID repair sweep. Releases before this
+/// version stored the PROVIDER CID (Kubo dag-pb / Pinata CIDv0) in `pinned_cids.cid`,
+/// and this version's `/ipfs/{cid}` resolver withholds any row whose stored key is not
+/// the raw-content CID. The opportunistic repair on the pin path only fires when a push
+/// re-carries the object, which normal git negotiation makes it not do, so those rows
+/// need a walk. DETACHED, never on the boot path: the caller keeps serving while this
+/// runs, and the sweep's own batch bound plus inter-batch delay keep it off the DB's
+/// critical path. Its cursor is durable, so a restart mid-walk resumes instead of
+/// rewinding. It re-arms after every run, including a failed one, so it never returns
+/// and there is no awaited value to log here; the shutdown watcher below is what ends
+/// it.
+///
+/// A named function rather than an inline block in `main` so the WIRING has a seam a
+/// test can call: that the task is spawned at all, that it reads its batch and delay
+/// from the config knobs rather than some other field, that the caller is not blocked
+/// on it, and that the shutdown watcher actually ends it mid-walk. The sweep's own
+/// behavior is covered elsewhere; this is the boot-path half.
+fn spawn_legacy_cid_sweep(state: &AppState, config: &Config) -> tokio::task::JoinHandle<()> {
+    let db = state.db.clone();
+    let repos_dir = config.repos_dir.clone();
+    let git_bin = state.git_bin.clone();
+    let git_timeout = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.git_service_timeout_secs);
+    let batch = config.pin_repair_sweep_batch;
+    let delay = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.pin_repair_sweep_delay_secs);
+    let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        tokio::select! {
+            _ = ipfs_pin::run_sweep_rearmed(
+                &repos_dir, &git_bin, git_timeout, batch, delay,
+                ipfs_pin::SWEEP_REARM_DELAY, &db,
+            ) => {}
+            // Shutdown mid-walk simply drops the run; the persisted cursor means the
+            // next boot picks up where this one stopped.
+            _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {}
+        }
+    })
+}
+
+/// #26 Split PR 1 step 4 — periodic queue-lifecycle purge. Runs on
+/// the same detached task pattern as `spawn_legacy_cid_sweep`:
+/// tokio::spawn with a shutdown watcher, never on the boot path. The
+/// interval is fixed at 24 hours (the spec calls for "one per
+/// cluster per day"); the inter-batch delay is implicit in the
+/// batch size plus the wall-clock cost of each pass. The drain
+/// (`drain_receive_pack_requests_all`) and the purge
+/// (`purge_request_queue`) share the same `DRAIN_PER_PASS_LIMIT`
+/// budget so a 1000-row purge pass takes roughly the same time as
+/// a 1000-row drain pass.
+fn spawn_queue_lifecycle_sweep(state: &AppState, config: &Config) -> tokio::task::JoinHandle<()> {
+    let app_state = state.clone();
+    let retention_days = config.queue_retention_days;
+    let batch = config.queue_purge_batch;
+    let git_timeout = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.git_service_timeout_secs.min(30));
+    let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(std::time::Duration::from_secs(24 * 3600));
+        interval.set_missed_tick_behavior(tokio::time::MissedTickBehavior::Delay);
+        // Consume the immediate first tick: Tokio intervals fire
+        // immediately on creation, which would run the purge
+        // concurrently with startup reconcile/drain. The child purge
+        // is terminal-parent-gated in SQL, but delaying the first
+        // sweep a full period removes the race entirely.
+        interval.tick().await;
+        loop {
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = interval.tick() => {
+                    if let Err(e) = durable_outbox::purge_request_queue(
+                        &app_state.db,
+                        retention_days,
+                        batch,
+                    ).await {
+                        tracing::warn!(err = %e, "queue lifecycle purge failed; will retry on next tick");
+                    }
+                    // Drain marker tombstones with the bounded deleter;
+                    // failures retain the tombstone for the next tick.
+                    if let Err(e) = durable_outbox::drain_marker_cleanup_queue(
+                        &app_state,
+                        batch,
+                        git_timeout,
+                    ).await {
+                        tracing::warn!(err = %e, "marker cleanup drain failed");
+                    }
+                }
+                _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    })
+}
+
+/// Shutdown-aware background due-request loop. The startup drain runs
+/// once; without this, `effects_pending` rows with a future
+/// `next_attempt_at` would wait until the next process restart.
+/// Polls the indexed due query with bounded batches and failure
+/// isolation (one request's error never aborts the batch).
+fn spawn_due_request_worker(state: &AppState) -> tokio::task::JoinHandle<()> {
+    let app_state = state.clone();
+    let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5));
+        interval.set_missed_tick_behavior(tokio::time::MissedTickBehavior::Delay);
+        loop {
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = interval.tick() => {
+                    match durable_outbox::drain_receive_pack_requests(
+                        app_state.clone(),
+                        durable_outbox::DRAIN_PER_PASS_LIMIT,
+                    )
+                    .await
+                    {
+                        Ok((0, _)) => {}
+                        Ok((n, _)) => tracing::info!(n, "due request worker drained"),
+                        Err(e) => tracing::warn!(err = %e, "due request worker drain failed"),
+                    }
+                }
+                _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => break,
+            }
+        }
+    })
+}
+
+/// Dedicated marker-tombstone worker at a shorter cadence than the
+/// daily purge, so external Git refs do not linger a full period
+/// after their SQL owner is gone.
+fn spawn_marker_cleanup_worker(state: &AppState) -> tokio::task::JoinHandle<()> {
+    let app_state = state.clone();
+    let git_timeout =
+        std::time::Duration::from_secs(app_state.config.git_service_timeout_secs.min(30));
+    let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(std::time::Duration::from_secs(60));
+        interval.set_missed_tick_behavior(tokio::time::MissedTickBehavior::Delay);
+        loop {
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = interval.tick() => {
+                    if let Err(e) = durable_outbox::drain_marker_cleanup_queue(
+                        &app_state,
+                        durable_outbox::DRAIN_PER_PASS_LIMIT,
+                        git_timeout,
+                    )
+                    .await
+                    {
+                        tracing::warn!(err = %e, "marker cleanup worker failed");
+                    }
+                }
+                _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => break,
+            }
+        }
+    })
+}
+
 fn spawn_shutdown_signal(tx: watch::Sender<bool>) {
     tokio::spawn(async move {
         #[cfg(unix)]
@@ -1187,6 +1485,8 @@ mod rate_limiter_sweep_tests {
         state.peer_write_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(10, window);
         state.federated_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(10, window);
         state.ipfs_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(10, window);
+        state.ipfs_work_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(10, window);
+        state.task_read_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(10, window);
 
         let limiters = |s: &crate::state::AppState| {
             [
@@ -1198,6 +1498,8 @@ mod rate_limiter_sweep_tests {
                 s.peer_write_rate_limiter.clone(),
                 s.federated_rate_limiter.clone(),
                 s.ipfs_rate_limiter.clone(),
+                s.ipfs_work_rate_limiter.clone(),
+                s.task_read_rate_limiter.clone(),
             ]
         };
         for l in limiters(&state) {
@@ -1215,55 +1517,6 @@ mod rate_limiter_sweep_tests {
 }
 
 /// it.
-fn spawn_legacy_cid_sweep(state: &AppState, config: &Config) -> tokio::task::JoinHandle<()> {
-    let db = state.db.clone();
-    let repos_dir = config.repos_dir.clone();
-    let git_bin = state.git_bin.clone();
-    let git_timeout = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.git_service_timeout_secs);
-    let batch = config.pin_repair_sweep_batch;
-    let delay = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.pin_repair_sweep_delay_secs);
-    let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
-    tokio::spawn(async move {
-        tokio::select! {
-            _ = ipfs_pin::run_sweep_rearmed(
-                &repos_dir, &git_bin, git_timeout, batch, delay,
-                ipfs_pin::SWEEP_REARM_DELAY, &db,
-            ) => {}
-            _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {}
-        }
-    })
-}
-
-async fn gossip_ping_round(
-    db: &Db,
-    client: &reqwest::Client,
-    failed_once: &mut HashSet<String>,
-    peers: Vec<db::PeerRecord>,
-) {
-    {
-        let current_dids: HashSet<&str> = peers.iter().map(|peer| peer.did.as_str()).collect();
-        failed_once.retain(|did| current_dids.contains(did.as_str()));
-    }
-    for peer in peers {
-        let ok = ping_peer_readiness(client, &peer.http_url).await;
-        match peer_ping_db_update(failed_once, &peer.did, ok) {
-            Some(reachable) => {
-                if let Err(error) = db.mark_peer_ping(&peer.did, reachable).await {
-                    warn!(did = %peer.did, err = %error, "failed to persist peer readiness");
-                }
-            }
-            None => warn!(
-                did = %peer.did,
-                "peer readiness probe failed once; preserving previous federation status"
-            ),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Decide whether one readiness sample should update the persisted federation
-/// gate. A success is authoritative immediately. A failure must repeat on the
-/// next gossip tick before it can mark a peer unreachable, so one transient
-/// database hiccup does not hide the peer's repositories for five minutes.
 fn peer_ping_db_update(failed_once: &mut HashSet<String>, did: &str, ready: bool) -> Option<bool> {
     if ready {
         failed_once.remove(did);
@@ -1440,6 +1693,32 @@ fn load_or_create_keypair_at(key_path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<Keypair> {
     Ok(kp)
 }
 
+async fn gossip_ping_round(
+    db: &Db,
+    client: &reqwest::Client,
+    failed_once: &mut HashSet<String>,
+    peers: Vec<db::PeerRecord>,
+) {
+    {
+        let current_dids: HashSet<&str> = peers.iter().map(|peer| peer.did.as_str()).collect();
+        failed_once.retain(|did| current_dids.contains(did.as_str()));
+    }
+    for peer in peers {
+        let ok = ping_peer_readiness(client, &peer.http_url).await;
+        match peer_ping_db_update(failed_once, &peer.did, ok) {
+            Some(reachable) => {
+                if let Err(error) = db.mark_peer_ping(&peer.did, reachable).await {
+                    warn!(did = %peer.did, err = %error, "failed to persist peer readiness");
+                }
+            }
+            None => warn!(
+                did = %peer.did,
+                "peer readiness probe failed once; preserving previous federation status"
+            ),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod gossip_ssrf_tests {
     use super::{

crates/gitlawb-node/src/metrics.rs

@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
 //!     `gitlawb_pack_size_bytes`
 //!   * a single `gitlawb_info{version, did}` gauge = 1, for joins/dashboards
 //!   * currently-connected peer count — `gitlawb_peers_connected`
+//!   * reconciliation sweep gaps found and filled —
+//!     `gitlawb_reconciliation_gaps_found_total` /
+//!     `gitlawb_reconciliation_gaps_filled_total`
 //!
 //! All metrics live in a single process-wide registry initialized by
 //! [`init`]. Increment helpers (`record_push`, `record_auth_failure`, ...)
@@ -58,6 +61,8 @@ static GOSSIP_INGEST: OnceLock<IntCounterVec> = OnceLock::new();
 static GOSSIP_REPLAY_GUARD_SATURATED: OnceLock<IntCounter> = OnceLock::new();
 static PACK_SIZE: OnceLock<Histogram> = OnceLock::new();
 static PEERS_CONNECTED: OnceLock<IntGauge> = OnceLock::new();
+static RECONCILIATION_GAPS_FOUND: OnceLock<IntCounter> = OnceLock::new();
+static RECONCILIATION_GAPS_FILLED: OnceLock<IntCounter> = OnceLock::new();
 /// 1 when the node started without its p2p identity because the key storage
 /// could not be used. The node keeps serving HTTP in that state and /health
 /// stays green, so without this the outage is visible only to whoever reads
@@ -241,6 +246,29 @@ fn init_inner(version: &str, node_did: &str) {
         .set(peers_connected)
         .expect("set PEERS_CONNECTED once");
 
+    let gaps_found = IntCounter::with_opts(Opts::new(
+        "gitlawb_reconciliation_gaps_found_total",
+        "Total reconciliation sweep gaps detected (objects that should be pinned but are not)",
+    ))
+    .expect("gitlawb_reconciliation_gaps_found_total definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(gaps_found.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_reconciliation_gaps_found_total");
+    RECONCILIATION_GAPS_FOUND
+        .set(gaps_found)
+        .expect("set RECONCILIATION_GAPS_FOUND once");
+
+    let gaps_filled = IntCounter::with_opts(Opts::new(
+        "gitlawb_reconciliation_gaps_filled_total",
+        "Total reconciliation sweep gaps successfully filled (objects pinned by the sweep)",
+    ))
+    .expect("gitlawb_reconciliation_gaps_filled_total definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(gaps_filled.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_reconciliation_gaps_filled_total");
+    RECONCILIATION_GAPS_FILLED
+        .set(gaps_filled)
+        .expect("set RECONCILIATION_GAPS_FILLED once");
     let p2p_key_load_failed = IntGauge::with_opts(Opts::new(
         "gitlawb_p2p_identity_key_load_failed",
         "1 if the node is running without p2p because its identity key could not be loaded",
@@ -314,9 +342,11 @@ pub fn record_sync_processed(status: &str) {
 }
 
 /// Record one webhook delivery attempt outcome. `result` ∈
-/// {ok, http_error, network_error, skipped, invalid_url}.
+/// {ok, http_error, network_error, skipped, invalid_url, secret_unopenable}.
 /// `invalid_url` is a policy skip: the stored hook URL failed the public-URL
-/// check at delivery time and the POST was never sent.
+/// check at delivery time and the POST was never sent. `secret_unopenable` is
+/// a withheld delivery: the hook carries a secret the node could not open, so
+/// the POST was never sent rather than going out unsigned.
 pub fn record_webhook_delivery(result: &str) {
     if let Some(c) = WEBHOOK_DELIVERIES.get() {
         c.with_label_values(&[result]).inc();
@@ -397,6 +427,20 @@ pub fn set_peers_connected(count: i64) {
     }
 }
 
+/// Record reconciliation sweep gaps found (objects that should be pinned but are not).
+pub fn record_reconciliation_gaps_found(count: u64) {
+    if let Some(c) = RECONCILIATION_GAPS_FOUND.get() {
+        c.inc_by(count);
+    }
+}
+
+/// Record reconciliation sweep gaps filled (objects successfully pinned by the sweep).
+pub fn record_reconciliation_gaps_filled(count: u64) {
+    if let Some(c) = RECONCILIATION_GAPS_FILLED.get() {
+        c.inc_by(count);
+    }
+}
+
 /// Record whether the node is running without its p2p identity.
 pub fn set_p2p_key_load_failed(failed: bool) {
     if let Some(g) = P2P_KEY_LOAD_FAILED.get() {
@@ -441,6 +485,8 @@ mod tests {
             .expect("PUSHES set after init")
             .with_label_values(&["alice/repo"])
             .inc();
+        record_reconciliation_gaps_found(7);
+        record_reconciliation_gaps_filled(3);
 
         let body = encode().expect("encode should succeed after init");
         assert!(
@@ -455,6 +501,14 @@ mod tests {
             body.contains("gitlawb_pushes_total{repo=\"alice/repo\"} 1"),
             "expected the incremented counter to be visible in: {body}"
         );
+        assert!(
+            body.contains("gitlawb_reconciliation_gaps_found_total 7"),
+            "expected the reconciliation gaps-found counter to be visible in: {body}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            body.contains("gitlawb_reconciliation_gaps_filled_total 3"),
+            "expected the reconciliation gaps-filled counter to be visible in: {body}"
+        );
     }
 
     /// #192 F4: `init` is idempotent and safe to call repeatedly. The panic that

crates/gitlawb-node/src/pinata.rs

@@ -153,6 +153,26 @@ pub async fn pin_object(
 /// `upsert_branch_cid` and the p2p `publish_ref_update` gossip CID. The twin's return is
 /// log-only, so it omits a record-failed pin rather than logging a pin the resolver
 /// cannot serve. Moving this side to match would need that consumer moved first.
+/// Whether the committed `pinned_cids` row already names `repo_id` as
+/// first pinner, making a failed redundant `record_pin_source` insert
+/// irrelevant to resolvability (`pin_sources_for_oid` unions the
+/// primary row). Bounded read; any failure (including its own
+/// timeout) answers false — an unproven row never confirms.
+/// Used only after the primary `record_pinata_cid` for this call
+/// succeeded or verified: callers must not promote a row this call
+/// did not establish.
+async fn primary_covers_repo(
+    db: &crate::db::Db,
+    sha: &str,
+    repo_id: &str,
+    deadline: std::time::Instant,
+) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        crate::ipfs_pin::db_bounded(deadline, db.provenance_for_oid(sha)).await,
+        Ok(Some(owner)) if owner.as_str() == repo_id
+    )
+}
+
 // Ten arguments, over clippy's threshold: the three the budget and the git seam add
 // (`git_bin`, `git_timeout`, `batch_budget`) plus #173's `repo_id` are what put the read
 // under test injection and under a deadline, and grouping them into a struct would only
@@ -170,16 +190,33 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
     db: &crate::db::Db,
     repo_id: &str,
     batch_budget: Duration,
-) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
+    fence: Option<&crate::ipfs_pin::PolicyFence>,
+) -> crate::ipfs_pin::PinBatchOutcome {
     if jwt.is_empty() {
-        return vec![];
+        return crate::ipfs_pin::PinBatchOutcome {
+            confirmed: Vec::new(),
+            last_attempted: None,
+        };
     }
 
     let deadline = Instant::now() + batch_budget;
     let total = object_list.len();
     let mut pinned = Vec::new();
+    let mut last_attempted: Option<String> = None;
 
     for (attempted, sha) in object_list.into_iter().enumerate() {
+        // Policy fence (R1-P1): a visibility narrow that lands after the caller
+        // built this batch must abort it before the next irreversible upload.
+        if let Some(f) = fence {
+            if !f.is_current().await {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    repo = %f.repo_id(),
+                    unattempted = total - attempted,
+                    "visibility policy changed mid-batch; stopping the Pinata pin loop"
+                );
+                break;
+            }
+        }
         // Top of the iteration, before any of this object's work: an object is never
         // started with a remainder too small to cover a bounded read's teardown. The
         // gate is shared with the IPFS loop so the two cannot drift apart in how they
@@ -191,6 +228,10 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
         {
             break;
         }
+        // Attempt progress (not a durability claim): same contract as the
+        // IPFS twin — the continuation persists this, never the planned
+        // vector's tail.
+        last_attempted = Some(sha.clone());
 
         // Every DB call from here to the end of the iteration is bounded by the
         // ABSOLUTE batch deadline (F3, #173), through the same `db_bounded` helper the
@@ -395,6 +436,21 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
             }
         };
 
+        // Dispatch fence (R1-P1): re-read the policy epoch immediately before
+        // the irreversible HTTP POST. The iteration-top check catches a narrow
+        // that landed before work began; THIS check catches a narrow that landed
+        // during the has_pinata_cid round-trip or the bounded Git read.
+        if let Some(f) = fence {
+            if !f.is_current().await {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    repo = %f.repo_id(),
+                    unattempted = total - attempted,
+                    "visibility policy changed during preparation; aborting Pinata upload"
+                );
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
         match pin_object(client, upload_url, jwt, &sha, &data).await {
             Ok(cid) if !cid.is_empty() => {
                 // The resolver key (`pinned_cids.cid`) must be the locally-computed
@@ -410,30 +466,109 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
                 // runs under the shared client's own ceiling, so a successful one can
                 // return with ~0 of the batch budget left, and an unfloored bound would
                 // fail a write that today completes in milliseconds. That costs more on
-                // this side than on the twin: `pinned.push` below is UNCONDITIONAL, so
-                // `api/repos.rs` builds its `cid_map` from the pair either way and drives
+                // this side than on the twin: `pinned.push` below feeds
+                // `api/repos.rs`, which builds its `cid_map` from the pair and drives
                 // `upsert_branch_cid` plus the p2p `publish_ref_update` gossip from it. A
                 // dropped record therefore makes the node ADVERTISE a CID whose `/ipfs`
-                // read 404s. If the floored bound still fires, THIS site's outcome really
-                // is unknown, and unlike the source record below that is a property of
-                // the operation: `record_pinata_cid` is a single autocommit upsert, so
-                // the statement Postgres already started can still land after the client
-                // future is cancelled. The warn names the arm through the error's own
-                // Display and the site keeps its existing behavior: the pair is still
-                // returned, and the row may or may not exist.
-                if let Err(e) = crate::ipfs_pin::db_bounded(
+                // read 404s. Only durably recorded pairs are pushed, so the map never
+                // advertises an unconfirmed row.
+                //
+                // Round 10 P2: a closed/failed DB write means the (sha, cid)
+                // pair is not durable; we suppress the `pinned.push` for this
+                // sha so the reconcile cannot count a Pinata gap as filled
+                // when no row exists. The source-record failure arms are also
+                // hard failures (multi-statement transaction never committed)
+                // and suppress the push in the same way.
+                //
+                // `record_pinata_cid` is an explicit multi-statement
+                // transaction (row lock + insert + commit), NOT a single
+                // autocommit upsert, so a timed-out future proves nothing:
+                // cancellation before COMMIT wrote nothing, during COMMIT is
+                // unknown. The Elapsed arm therefore verifies by content
+                // (`verify_pinata_record`: exact row + unchanged fence epoch)
+                // under its own bound and pushes only on proof; anything
+                // else stays suppressed and the gap is re-offered.
+                let fence_epoch = fence.map(|f| f.captured_epoch()).unwrap_or(i64::MAX);
+                let mut db_record_durable = false;
+                match crate::ipfs_pin::db_bounded(
                     crate::ipfs_pin::db_record_deadline(deadline),
                     crate::ipfs_pin::retry_db_record(|| {
-                        db.record_pinata_cid(&sha, &raw_cid, &cid, Some(repo_id))
+                        // P2 (reviewer round 9): Pinata's POST is
+                        // irreversible exactly like IPFS's, so
+                        // route the record through the fenced
+                        // variant when a fence is in scope. The
+                        // `i64::MAX` sentinel tells the helper
+                        // to skip the lock + comparison (the
+                        // unfenced caller path).
+                        db.record_pinata_cid(&sha, &raw_cid, &cid, Some(repo_id), fence_epoch)
                     }),
                 )
                 .await
                 {
-                    tracing::warn!(sha = %sha, err = %e, "failed to record pinata_cid in DB");
+                    Ok(()) => db_record_durable = true,
+                    Err(crate::ipfs_pin::BoundedDbError::Elapsed) => {
+                        tracing::warn!(
+                            sha = %sha,
+                            "record_pinata_cid deadline elapsed on a multi-statement transaction; \
+                             verifying the exact row before treating it as durable"
+                        );
+                        match crate::ipfs_pin::db_bounded(
+                            crate::ipfs_pin::db_record_deadline(deadline),
+                            db.verify_pinata_record(&sha, &raw_cid, &cid, repo_id, fence_epoch),
+                        )
+                        .await
+                        {
+                            Ok(true) => {
+                                tracing::warn!(
+                                    sha = %sha,
+                                    "timed-out pinata record verified present with unchanged epoch; \
+                                     treating as durable"
+                                );
+                                db_record_durable = true;
+                            }
+                            Ok(false) => {
+                                tracing::warn!(
+                                    sha = %sha,
+                                    "timed-out pinata record has no matching row or the epoch moved; \
+                                     suppressing the push so the gap is re-offered"
+                                );
+                            }
+                            Err(e) => {
+                                tracing::warn!(
+                                    sha = %sha,
+                                    err = %e,
+                                    "pinata record verification did not complete; \
+                                     suppressing the push so the gap is re-offered"
+                                );
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        tracing::warn!(
+                            sha = %sha,
+                            err = %e,
+                            "failed to record pinata_cid in DB; suppressing the (sha, cid) push \
+                             so the reconcile cannot count this gap as filled"
+                        );
+                        // db_record_durable stays false → push suppressed
+                    }
                 }
                 // F1 (#173 round 8): also record the first pinner in pin_repo_sources.
                 // U3: an exhausted retry marks the set incomplete so the resolver keeps
                 // the scan fallback rather than 404ing a copy it could serve.
+                //
+                // Whether the pair stays confirmed depends on what the
+                // PRIMARY `record_pinata_cid` above established: that row
+                // already names this repo as first pinner
+                // (`pin_sources_for_oid` unions it), so the resolver
+                // reaches this copy with or without the redundant
+                // `pin_repo_sources` insert. A source-write failure then
+                // keeps the pair confirmed (but still marks the set
+                // incomplete, preserving the U3 compensation). If the
+                // primary row names ANOTHER repo — or is absent — the
+                // source write was load-bearing and the push stays
+                // suppressed. (The IPFS twin needs no equivalent: its
+                // pin and source land in ONE transaction.)
                 match crate::ipfs_pin::db_bounded(
                     crate::ipfs_pin::db_record_deadline(deadline),
                     crate::ipfs_pin::retry_db_record(|| db.record_pin_source(&sha, repo_id)),
@@ -445,9 +580,7 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
                     // wraps `record_pin_source`, an explicit transaction, so a timed-out
                     // call definitely never committed and the source is definitely
                     // missing. Mark the set incomplete rather than leaving it incomplete
-                    // and unmarked. Note the contrast with `record_pinata_cid` a few
-                    // lines up: that one is a single autocommit statement, so its
-                    // timeout genuinely is an unknown outcome and it is warn-only.
+                    // and unmarked.
                     Err(e @ crate::ipfs_pin::BoundedDbError::Elapsed) => {
                         tracing::warn!(
                             sha = %sha,
@@ -464,6 +597,16 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
                         {
                             tracing::warn!(sha = %sha, err = %e, "failed to mark pin sources incomplete");
                         }
+                        if !primary_covers_repo(
+                            db,
+                            &sha,
+                            repo_id,
+                            crate::ipfs_pin::db_record_deadline(deadline),
+                        )
+                        .await
+                        {
+                            db_record_durable = false;
+                        }
                     }
                     Err(e) => {
                         tracing::warn!(sha = %sha, err = %e, "failed to record pin source");
@@ -475,9 +618,21 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
                         {
                             tracing::warn!(sha = %sha, err = %e, "failed to mark pin sources incomplete");
                         }
+                        if !primary_covers_repo(
+                            db,
+                            &sha,
+                            repo_id,
+                            crate::ipfs_pin::db_record_deadline(deadline),
+                        )
+                        .await
+                        {
+                            db_record_durable = false;
+                        }
                     }
                 }
-                pinned.push((sha, cid));
+                if db_record_durable {
+                    pinned.push((sha, cid));
+                }
             }
             Ok(_) => {}
             Err(e) => {
@@ -486,7 +641,10 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
         }
     }
 
-    pinned
+    crate::ipfs_pin::PinBatchOutcome {
+        confirmed: pinned,
+        last_attempted,
+    }
 }
 
 // ── Tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -688,19 +846,20 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-merge-test",
                 Duration::from_millis(5500),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
         .expect("wedge guard: a 5.5s budget cannot take 30s");
 
         assert!(
-            (1..=3).contains(&pinned.len()),
+            (1..=3).contains(&pinned.confirmed.len()),
             "the batch must stop partway, not pin all five and not stall on the first: pinned {}",
-            pinned.len()
+            pinned.confirmed.len()
         );
         assert_eq!(
             requests.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst),
-            pinned.len(),
+            pinned.confirmed.len(),
             "no upload may be issued for an object the budget stopped short of"
         );
         let text = logs.text();
@@ -728,9 +887,9 @@ mod tests {
             })
             .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("the deadline warn must name the unattempted count: {text}"));
         assert!(
-            unattempted >= 1 && unattempted + pinned.len() <= 5,
+            unattempted >= 1 && unattempted + pinned.confirmed.len() <= 5,
             "unattempted={unattempted} with {} pinned is not a partial batch of five",
-            pinned.len()
+            pinned.confirmed.len()
         );
     }
 
@@ -779,6 +938,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-merge-test",
                 Duration::from_secs(2),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -789,7 +949,7 @@ mod tests {
         let elapsed = started.elapsed();
 
         assert!(
-            pinned.is_empty(),
+            pinned.confirmed.is_empty(),
             "a git that never answers cannot produce a pinned object: {pinned:?}"
         );
         assert!(
@@ -868,6 +1028,7 @@ mod tests {
                 "repo-git-timeout",
                 // Generous, so a call that ends on time ended on `git_timeout`.
                 Duration::from_secs(60),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -878,7 +1039,7 @@ mod tests {
         let elapsed = started.elapsed();
 
         assert!(
-            pinned.is_empty(),
+            pinned.confirmed.is_empty(),
             "a git that never answers cannot produce a pinned object: {pinned:?}"
         );
         assert!(
@@ -970,6 +1131,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-merge-test",
                 Duration::from_secs(60),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -979,7 +1141,7 @@ mod tests {
 
         if genuinely_unreadable {
             assert!(
-                pinned.is_empty(),
+                pinned.confirmed.is_empty(),
                 "nothing can be pinned through a store that cannot be read: {pinned:?}"
             );
             assert_eq!(
@@ -1044,6 +1206,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-merge-test",
                 Duration::from_secs(60),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -1055,7 +1218,7 @@ mod tests {
             "an object-scoped fault must not stop the batch: every object must be read"
         );
         assert_eq!(
-            pinned.len(),
+            pinned.confirmed.len(),
             4,
             "one corrupt object must cost only itself: the other four must still pin"
         );
@@ -1095,13 +1258,18 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-merge-test",
                 Duration::from_secs(60),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
         .expect("an immediate endpoint and three healthy objects cannot take 30s");
 
-        assert_eq!(pinned.len(), 3, "every healthy object must pin: {pinned:?}");
-        for (i, (sha, cid)) in pinned.iter().enumerate() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            pinned.confirmed.len(),
+            3,
+            "every healthy object must pin: {pinned:?}"
+        );
+        for (i, (sha, cid)) in pinned.confirmed.iter().enumerate() {
             assert_eq!(sha, &oids[i], "the pairs must carry the objects' own oids");
             assert_eq!(cid, "QmPinataBatchTestCid");
             assert!(
@@ -1124,11 +1292,15 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-merge-test",
                 Duration::from_secs(60),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
         .expect("a fully deduped batch cannot take 30s");
-        assert!(again.is_empty(), "already-recorded objects must be skipped");
+        assert!(
+            again.confirmed.is_empty(),
+            "already-recorded objects must be skipped"
+        );
         assert_eq!(
             requests.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst),
             3,
@@ -1136,6 +1308,63 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    /// The outcome reports the last object actually ENTERED, not the planned
+    /// tail (Pinata twin of the IPFS test above): the first upload takes 6s
+    /// against a 2s batch budget, so it still completes — the Pinata loop
+    /// has no per-request timeout — but the loop-top gate then breaks the
+    /// batch before the second object starts. `last_attempted` must be the
+    /// first OID even though two OIDs were never visited; the 6s server
+    /// sleep makes the break deterministic on any box.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn pin_new_objects_reports_last_attempted_not_planned_tail(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        let db = crate::db::Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.run_migrations().await.expect("migrations");
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let repo_path = tmp.path().join("attempted.git");
+        let oids = seed_loose_blobs(&repo_path, 3);
+        let requests = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
+        let endpoint = delaying_pinata_endpoint(
+            vec![Duration::from_secs(6)],
+            std::sync::Arc::clone(&requests),
+        )
+        .await;
+        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+
+        let outcome = tokio::time::timeout(
+            Duration::from_secs(60),
+            pin_new_objects(
+                &client,
+                &endpoint,
+                "test-jwt",
+                &repo_path,
+                "git",
+                Duration::from_secs(60),
+                oids.clone(),
+                &db,
+                "repo-attempted",
+                Duration::from_secs(2),
+                None,
+            ),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("one 6s upload plus bounded gates cannot take 60s");
+        assert_eq!(
+            outcome.last_attempted,
+            Some(oids[0].clone()),
+            "only the first object was entered; the planned tail was never visited"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            outcome.confirmed.len(),
+            1,
+            "the slow first upload still completed and recorded"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            requests.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst),
+            1,
+            "exactly one upload was attempted"
+        );
+    }
+
     /// The no-op configuration still short-circuits with the budgeted signature: an
     /// empty JWT must return before any git child is spawned and before any request
     /// is issued. The `git_bin` here records every invocation, so "git was never
@@ -1177,12 +1406,13 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-merge-test",
                 Duration::from_secs(60),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
         .expect("an unconfigured sink returns immediately");
 
-        assert!(pinned.is_empty(), "an empty JWT pins nothing");
+        assert!(pinned.confirmed.is_empty(), "an empty JWT pins nothing");
         assert!(
             !log.exists(),
             "no git child may be spawned when the sink is not configured"
@@ -1282,6 +1512,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-pinata-stalled",
                 Duration::from_millis(1500),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -1292,7 +1523,7 @@ mod tests {
         let elapsed = started.elapsed();
 
         assert!(
-            pinned.is_empty(),
+            pinned.confirmed.is_empty(),
             "a stalled pinata-status check cannot produce a pinned object: {pinned:?}"
         );
         assert!(
@@ -1338,9 +1569,15 @@ mod tests {
         // bytes.
         let raw_cid =
             gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes(b"pinata skip seed").to_string();
-        db.record_pinata_cid(&sha, &raw_cid, "QmSeedProviderCid", Some("repo-seed"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
+        db.record_pinata_cid(
+            &sha,
+            &raw_cid,
+            "QmSeedProviderCid",
+            Some("repo-seed"),
+            i64::MAX,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
         db.record_pin_source(&sha, "repo-seed").await.unwrap();
         let requests = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
         let endpoint = delaying_pinata_endpoint(
@@ -1372,6 +1609,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-pinata-skip-stalled",
                 Duration::from_millis(1500),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -1382,7 +1620,7 @@ mod tests {
         let elapsed = started.elapsed();
 
         assert!(
-            pinned.is_empty(),
+            pinned.confirmed.is_empty(),
             "an already-pinned object is skipped, never re-uploaded: {pinned:?}"
         );
         assert_eq!(
@@ -1426,7 +1664,7 @@ mod tests {
     ///
     /// The lock time is a MARGIN, not a boundary: taking it at 100ms left
     /// `has_pinata_cid` racing it on a loaded box, and losing that race makes the read
-    /// block, time out, and break the batch, which fails on `pinned.len() == 1` for a
+    /// block, time out, and break the batch, which fails on `pinned.confirmed.len() == 1` for a
     /// reason that has nothing to do with the floor. Any time between the
     /// `has_pinata_cid` round trip and the upload's 1.7s return proves the same thing.
     #[sqlx::test]
@@ -1472,6 +1710,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-pinata-spent-budget",
                 Duration::from_millis(2000),
+                None,
             ),
         );
         let (pinned, ()) = tokio::join!(pin, locker);
@@ -1489,7 +1728,7 @@ mod tests {
              record makes api/repos.rs advertise a CID the resolver cannot serve"
         );
         assert_eq!(
-            pinned.len(),
+            pinned.confirmed.len(),
             1,
             "the uploaded pin must still be returned: {pinned:?}"
         );
@@ -1557,6 +1796,7 @@ mod tests {
                 &db,
                 "repo-pinata-post-upload",
                 Duration::from_millis(1500),
+                None,
             ),
         )
         .await
@@ -1570,10 +1810,21 @@ mod tests {
         drop(lock);
 
         upload.assert_async().await;
+        // The primary `record_pinata_cid` committed above naming this
+        // repo as first pinner, so `pin_sources_for_oid` resolves the
+        // copy with or without the redundant `pin_repo_sources`
+        // insert: the pair stays confirmed even though the source
+        // record timed out. The incomplete marker below is still set
+        // (compensation preserved); only the suppression is gone.
+        // Prior to the round 10 fix, the push fired regardless of
+        // every post-upload outcome; the correction since is that
+        // confirmation follows the durable primary row, not the
+        // redundant source write.
         assert_eq!(
-            pinned.len(),
+            pinned.confirmed.len(),
             1,
-            "the upload succeeded, so this lane still returns the pair: {pinned:?}"
+            "record_pin_source timed out (pin_repo_sources locked) but the primary row \
+             covers this repo, so the pair stays confirmed: {pinned:?}"
         );
         assert!(
             elapsed < Duration::from_secs(8),
@@ -1590,6 +1841,203 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    /// The other half of the source-write contract: when the committed
+    /// primary row names ANOTHER repo as first pinner, the failed
+    /// `record_pin_source` was load-bearing (not redundant) and the
+    /// push stays suppressed. Fixture: a local-only row owned by
+    /// repo-first (no Pinata CID yet), then a Pinata loop as
+    /// repo-second with `pin_repo_sources` locked. The upload lands,
+    /// the primary upsert keeps repo-first, the source insert stalls,
+    /// and coverage fails — so no pair, but the incomplete marker
+    /// still lands and the provider CID is still recorded.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn pinata_post_upload_stalled_source_without_coverage_suppresses_push(
+        pool: sqlx::PgPool,
+    ) {
+        let db = crate::db::Db::for_testing(pool.clone());
+        db.run_migrations().await.expect("migrations");
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let repo_path = tmp.path().join("pinata_second_source.git");
+        let oids = seed_loose_blobs(&repo_path, 1);
+        let sha = oids[0].clone();
+
+        // A local-only row owned by repo-first: the writer path below
+        // (repo-second, Pinata-only so far) must not claim it.
+        let raw =
+            gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes(b"pinata loop object 0\n").to_string();
+        db.record_pinned_cid_with_source(&sha, &raw, "repo-first")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let upload = server
+            .mock("POST", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_body(r#"{"data":{"cid":"QmSecondSourceProviderCid"}}"#)
+            .expect(1)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let (_logs, _log_guard) = capture_logs();
+        let mut lock = lock_table(&pool, "pin_repo_sources").await;
+
+        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+        let pinned = tokio::time::timeout(
+            Duration::from_secs(20),
+            pin_new_objects(
+                &client,
+                &server.url(),
+                "test-jwt",
+                &repo_path,
+                "git",
+                Duration::from_secs(30),
+                oids,
+                &db,
+                "repo-second",
+                Duration::from_millis(1500),
+                None,
+            ),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("record + coverage ladders are each floored");
+
+        rollback(&mut lock).await;
+        drop(lock);
+
+        upload.assert_async().await;
+        assert!(
+            pinned.confirmed.is_empty(),
+            "repo-second is not covered by the repo-first primary row, so the \
+             failed source write stays suppressing: {pinned:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            db.pin_sources_incomplete(&sha).await.unwrap(),
+            "the compensation marker still lands"
+        );
+        // The primary upsert itself landed (provider CID recorded under
+        // the first-pinner row); only the pair was suppressed.
+        assert!(
+            db.has_pinata_cid(&sha).await.unwrap(),
+            "the committed provider row survives the suppressed push"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Hold a row-level lock on one repos row in an open transaction: plain
+    /// `SELECT`s (fence reads, skip checks) proceed, but any `SELECT ...
+    /// FOR UPDATE` on the row — exactly what the fenced record takes —
+    /// blocks until rollback. A table-level lock would also stall the
+    /// fence's own epoch reads and deadlock the loop under test, proving
+    /// nothing about the record arm.
+    async fn hold_repo_row_lock(
+        pool: &sqlx::PgPool,
+        repo_id: &str,
+    ) -> sqlx::pool::PoolConnection<sqlx::Postgres> {
+        let mut conn = pool.acquire().await.unwrap();
+        sqlx::raw_sql("BEGIN").execute(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
+        sqlx::query("SELECT policy_epoch FROM repos WHERE id = $1 FOR UPDATE")
+            .bind(repo_id)
+            .fetch_one(&mut *conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        conn
+    }
+
+    /// A timed-out `record_pinata_cid` with no verifiable row suppresses the
+    /// push: `record_pinata_cid` is an explicit transaction, so Elapsed proves
+    /// nothing, and the verify read finds no row, so nothing is proven that
+    /// way either. The upload mock still expects the POST — Pinata accepted
+    /// the bytes — but without a durable row the pair must not be returned,
+    /// or the reconcile counts a fill that never happened and the push path
+    /// advertises an unresolvable CID.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn pinata_post_upload_elapsed_record_without_row_suppresses_push(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        let db = crate::db::Db::for_testing(pool.clone());
+        db.run_migrations().await.expect("migrations");
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let repo_path = tmp.path().join("pinata_elapsed_verify.git");
+        let oids = seed_loose_blobs(&repo_path, 1);
+        let sha = oids[0].clone();
+
+        // A real repo row: the fenced record's `FOR UPDATE` must have a row
+        // to block on. Against a missing row the predicate takes no lock and
+        // the record would sail through instead of stalling.
+        let repo_id = "repo-pinata-elapsed-verify";
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now();
+        db.create_repo(&crate::db::RepoRecord {
+            id: repo_id.to_string(),
+            name: "elapsed-verify".into(),
+            owner_did: "did:key:zElapsedVerifyOwner".into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: true,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: now,
+            updated_at: now,
+            disk_path: repo_path.display().to_string(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Capture the fence BEFORE locking: the capture itself is a plain
+        // epoch read and must succeed for the fenced record path to run.
+        let fence = crate::ipfs_pin::PolicyFence::capture(&db, repo_id)
+            .await
+            .expect("fence captures");
+
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let upload = server
+            .mock("POST", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_body(r#"{"data":{"cid":"QmElapsedVerifyProviderCid"}}"#)
+            .expect(1)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let (_logs, _log_guard) = capture_logs();
+
+        // Stall only the fenced record's `FOR UPDATE`: fence reads and the
+        // skip check are plain SELECTs and proceed, the upload lands, then
+        // the record elapses. The verify read proceeds too and finds no row.
+        let mut lock = hold_repo_row_lock(&pool, repo_id).await;
+
+        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+        let pinned = tokio::time::timeout(
+            Duration::from_secs(30),
+            pin_new_objects(
+                &client,
+                &server.url(),
+                "test-jwt",
+                &repo_path,
+                "git",
+                Duration::from_secs(30),
+                oids,
+                &db,
+                repo_id,
+                Duration::from_millis(1500),
+                Some(&fence),
+            ),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect(
+            "record + verify ladders are each floored, so the call returns in seconds, \
+             never at the lock's lifetime",
+        );
+
+        rollback(&mut lock).await;
+        drop(lock);
+
+        upload.assert_async().await;
+        assert!(
+            pinned.confirmed.is_empty(),
+            "an unverified timed-out record must not return the pair: {pinned:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !db.has_pinata_cid(&sha).await.unwrap(),
+            "the cancelled record transaction must not have landed a row"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_pin_skipped_when_jwt_empty() {
         let client = reqwest::Client::new();

crates/gitlawb-node/src/rate_limit.rs

@@ -70,6 +70,14 @@ impl RateLimiter {
         self.window.min(Duration::from_secs(1))
     }
 
+    /// The configured window, exposed so a 429 can carry an honest
+    /// `retry-after`: a hardcoded value lies when the operator retunes the
+    /// window, and a client that honors the header would retry into another
+    /// 429 until the real window elapses.
+    pub fn window(&self) -> Duration {
+        self.window
+    }
+
     pub(crate) async fn check(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
         // max_requests == 0 means the limiter is disabled, not "block all".
         if self.max_requests == 0 {
@@ -293,12 +301,7 @@ pub async fn rate_limit_by_did(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
 
     if let (Some(limiter), Some(did)) = (limiter, did) {
         if !limiter.check(&did).await {
-            return (
-                StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
-                [("retry-after", "60")],
-                "rate limit exceeded — try again later",
-            )
-                .into_response();
+            return too_many_requests(limiter.window().as_secs());
         }
     }
 
@@ -401,18 +404,72 @@ impl<S: Send + Sync> axum::extract::FromRequestParts<S> for PeerAddr {
     }
 }
 
+/// The message every per-IP brake answers with, shared so the GraphQL surface
+/// (which cannot return a 429 status inside a 200 GraphQL envelope) says the
+/// same thing as the REST routes.
+pub const RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE: &str = "rate limit exceeded — try again later";
+
 /// The shared 429 response for the per-IP flood brakes. Route-agnostic: this
 /// middleware now serves the push path AND the peer-sync routes, so the message
 /// stays generic (the offending path is recorded in the warn log below).
-pub fn too_many_requests() -> Response {
+pub fn too_many_requests(retry_after_secs: u64) -> Response {
     (
         StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
-        [("retry-after", "60")],
-        "rate limit exceeded — try again later",
+        [("retry-after", retry_after_secs.to_string())],
+        RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE,
     )
         .into_response()
 }
 
+/// The per-IP task-read brake carried as GraphQL request data: the limiter plus
+/// the client key the transport already resolved.
+///
+/// `/graphql` is a single POST endpoint, so this brake cannot sit in middleware
+/// the way `task_read_routes` mounts `rate_limit_by_ip`: that would charge every
+/// unrelated query and every mutation against the task-read bucket. The two task
+/// resolvers debit it instead, which also prices an aliased query honestly — ten
+/// aliased `tasks` fields run the visibility gate ten times and pay ten slots,
+/// where one request-scoped debit would pay one (#327 review).
+/// Default cap on the number of task read fields (across all aliases) permitted
+/// in a single GraphQL request before rejecting further field executions (#327 review).
+pub const MAX_GRAPHQL_TASK_READS_PER_REQUEST: usize = 5;
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct TaskReadBrake {
+    pub limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// `None` when no key could be resolved at all (no trusted header and no
+    /// `ConnectInfo`, e.g. a synthetic test request). Never braked, matching
+    /// [`rate_limit_by_ip`].
+    pub key: Option<String>,
+    pub request_count: Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize>,
+}
+
+impl TaskReadBrake {
+    /// Debit one slot for one task-read field. `true` = proceed.
+    pub async fn check(&self, field: &str) -> bool {
+        let Some(key) = self.key.as_deref() else {
+            return true;
+        };
+        let count = self
+            .request_count
+            .fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+        if count >= MAX_GRAPHQL_TASK_READS_PER_REQUEST {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                key = %key,
+                field = %field,
+                count = count + 1,
+                "per-request GraphQL task field limit exceeded"
+            );
+            return false;
+        }
+        if self.limiter.check(key).await {
+            return true;
+        }
+        tracing::warn!(key = %key, field = %field, "per-IP rate limit exceeded");
+        false
+    }
+}
+
 /// Throttle the git push path by resolved client IP. The socket peer address is
 /// read from `ConnectInfo` (see `into_make_service_with_connect_info` in
 /// `main`). Only skips the limiter when no key can be resolved at all.
@@ -427,7 +484,7 @@ pub async fn rate_limit_by_ip(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
         if let Some(key) = client_key(request.headers(), peer, limiter.trust) {
             if !limiter.limiter.check(&key).await {
                 tracing::warn!(key = %key, path = %request.uri().path(), "per-IP rate limit exceeded");
-                return too_many_requests();
+                return too_many_requests(limiter.limiter.window().as_secs());
             }
         }
     }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/server.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
-use async_graphql_axum::{GraphQLRequest, GraphQLResponse, GraphQLSubscription};
-use axum::extract::DefaultBodyLimit;
+use async_graphql::http::ALL_WEBSOCKET_PROTOCOLS;
+use async_graphql_axum::{GraphQLProtocol, GraphQLRequest, GraphQLResponse, GraphQLWebSocket};
+use axum::extract::{DefaultBodyLimit, WebSocketUpgrade};
 use axum::{
     extract::State,
     middleware,
@@ -23,6 +24,8 @@ use crate::state::AppState;
 async fn graphql_handler(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     auth: Option<axum::Extension<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>>,
+    headers: axum::http::HeaderMap,
+    rate_limit::PeerAddr(peer): rate_limit::PeerAddr,
     req: GraphQLRequest,
 ) -> GraphQLResponse {
     // `optional_signature` attaches the verified DID when a signature is present.
@@ -32,9 +35,49 @@ async fn graphql_handler(
     if let Some(axum::Extension(did)) = auth {
         inner = inner.data(did);
     }
+    // The anonymous `tasks`/`task` resolvers run the same #268 visibility gate
+    // as the REST read routes and cost the node the same queries, so they carry
+    // the same per-IP brake. It rides as request data rather than a router layer
+    // because /graphql is one endpoint for every operation — see `TaskReadBrake`
+    // (#327 review). It debits before the gate runs, but unlike the REST layer
+    // it sits inside `optional_signature`, so it brakes the gate's query cost
+    // and not signature verification.
+    inner = inner.data(rate_limit::TaskReadBrake {
+        limiter: state.task_read_rate_limiter.clone(),
+        key: rate_limit::client_key(&headers, peer, state.push_limiter_trust),
+        request_count: std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0)),
+    });
     state.graphql_schema.execute(inner).await.into()
 }
 
+async fn graphql_ws_handler(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    headers: axum::http::HeaderMap,
+    rate_limit::PeerAddr(peer): rate_limit::PeerAddr,
+    auth: Option<axum::Extension<auth::AuthenticatedDid>>,
+    protocol: GraphQLProtocol,
+    upgrade: WebSocketUpgrade,
+) -> axum::response::Response {
+    let mut data = async_graphql::Data::default();
+    if let Some(axum::Extension(did)) = auth {
+        data.insert(did);
+    }
+    data.insert(rate_limit::TaskReadBrake {
+        limiter: state.task_read_rate_limiter.clone(),
+        key: rate_limit::client_key(&headers, peer, state.push_limiter_trust),
+        request_count: std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0)),
+    });
+    let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref().clone();
+    upgrade
+        .protocols(ALL_WEBSOCKET_PROTOCOLS)
+        .on_upgrade(move |stream| {
+            GraphQLWebSocket::new(stream, schema, protocol)
+                .with_data(data)
+                .serve()
+        })
+        .into_response()
+}
+
 async fn graphql_playground() -> impl IntoResponse {
     axum::response::Html(async_graphql::http::playground_source(
         async_graphql::http::GraphQLPlaygroundConfig::new("/graphql")
@@ -77,17 +120,14 @@ fn add_auth_layers(
 
 pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
     // ── GraphQL routes ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref().clone();
     let graphql_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/graphql", get(graphql_playground).post(graphql_handler))
-        // Attach the verified DID to /graphql when a signature is present. The
-        // layer covers only routes added before it, so /graphql/ws (added after,
-        // read-only subscriptions) stays open.
+        .route("/graphql/ws", get(graphql_ws_handler))
+        // Attach the verified DID to /graphql and /graphql/ws when a signature is present.
         .layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(
             auth::SignatureBodyLimit(SIGNED_BODY_LIMIT),
             auth::optional_signature,
-        ))
-        .route_service("/graphql/ws", GraphQLSubscription::new(schema));
+        ));
 
     // ── Task routes (write — require HTTP Signature) ───────────────────────
     let task_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
@@ -100,10 +140,31 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         SIGNED_BODY_LIMIT,
     );
 
-    // ── Task routes (read — open) ──────────────────────────────────────────
+    // ── Task routes (read — open, but scoped) ──────────────────────────────
+    // `optional_signature` attaches the verified DID when a signature is present
+    // so the handlers can identify the caller; the routes stay anonymous-reachable,
+    // but each task/row is gated to its delegator, its assignee, or (for a
+    // repo-scoped task) whoever can read that repo (#268 — these routes previously
+    // carried no gate and no identity at all).
+    // Both routes also carry a per-IP flood brake, mirroring `/ipfs/{cid}`: they are
+    // anon-reachable and the gate above costs a task lookup plus deduped-repo and
+    // visibility-rule queries *before* the opaque 404, so a prober pays nothing and
+    // the node pays per request. The limiter is the outermost layer so a flood is
+    // rejected before signature verification and the visibility queries run. The
+    // extension MUST be attached or `rate_limit_by_ip` is a silent no-op.
+    let task_read_limiter = rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
+        limiter: state.task_read_rate_limiter.clone(),
+        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
+    };
     let task_read_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/api/v1/tasks", get(tasks::list_tasks))
-        .route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}", get(tasks::get_task));
+        .route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}", get(tasks::get_task))
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(
+            auth::SignatureBodyLimit(SIGNED_BODY_LIMIT),
+            auth::optional_signature,
+        ))
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+        .layer(axum::Extension(task_read_limiter));
 
     // ── Rate-limited creation routes — require HTTP Signature, plus a per-DID
     // throttle AND a per-IP flood brake. The per-DID limiter (inner) caps a
@@ -715,13 +776,351 @@ async fn p2p_info(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
+    use crate::test_support::test_state;
+    use sqlx::PgPool;
+    use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
+
+    async fn ws_send_text(stream: &mut tokio::net::TcpStream, text: &str) {
+        let payload = text.as_bytes();
+        let len = payload.len();
+        let mut frame = Vec::new();
+        frame.push(0x81);
+        let mask = [0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78];
+        if len <= 125 {
+            frame.push(0x80 | (len as u8));
+        } else if len <= 65535 {
+            frame.push(0x80 | 126);
+            frame.extend_from_slice(&(len as u16).to_be_bytes());
+        } else {
+            frame.push(0x80 | 127);
+            frame.extend_from_slice(&(len as u64).to_be_bytes());
+        }
+        frame.extend_from_slice(&mask);
+        for (i, b) in payload.iter().enumerate() {
+            frame.push(b ^ mask[i % 4]);
+        }
+        stream.write_all(&frame).await.unwrap();
+        stream.flush().await.unwrap();
+    }
+
+    async fn ws_recv_text(stream: &mut tokio::net::TcpStream) -> String {
+        let mut header = [0u8; 2];
+        stream.read_exact(&mut header).await.unwrap();
+        let b1 = header[1];
+        let masked = (b1 & 0x80) != 0;
+        let mut len = (b1 & 0x7f) as usize;
+        if len == 126 {
+            let mut ext = [0u8; 2];
+            stream.read_exact(&mut ext).await.unwrap();
+            len = u16::from_be_bytes(ext) as usize;
+        } else if len == 127 {
+            let mut ext = [0u8; 8];
+            stream.read_exact(&mut ext).await.unwrap();
+            len = u64::from_be_bytes(ext) as usize;
+        }
+        let mask = if masked {
+            let mut m = [0u8; 4];
+            stream.read_exact(&mut m).await.unwrap();
+            Some(m)
+        } else {
+            None
+        };
+        let mut payload = vec![0u8; len];
+        stream.read_exact(&mut payload).await.unwrap();
+        if let Some(m) = mask {
+            for (i, b) in payload.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+                *b ^= m[i % 4];
+            }
+        }
+        String::from_utf8(payload).unwrap()
+    }
+
+    async fn ws_recv_op_frames(stream: &mut tokio::net::TcpStream, op_id: &str) -> Vec<String> {
+        let mut frames = Vec::new();
+        loop {
+            let text = ws_recv_text(stream).await;
+            frames.push(text.clone());
+            if let Ok(v) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&text) {
+                if v.get("id").and_then(|id| id.as_str()) == Some(op_id) {
+                    let msg_type = v.get("type").and_then(|t| t.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
+                    if msg_type == "complete" || msg_type == "error" {
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        frames
+    }
+
+    async fn connect_ws(addr: std::net::SocketAddr) -> tokio::net::TcpStream {
+        let mut stream = tokio::net::TcpStream::connect(addr).await.unwrap();
+        let req = format!(
+            "GET /graphql/ws HTTP/1.1\r\n\
+             Host: {}\r\n\
+             Upgrade: websocket\r\n\
+             Connection: Upgrade\r\n\
+             Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==\r\n\
+             Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r\n\
+             Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: graphql-transport-ws\r\n\r\n",
+            addr
+        );
+        stream.write_all(req.as_bytes()).await.unwrap();
+        stream.flush().await.unwrap();
+
+        let mut buf = [0u8; 1024];
+        let n = stream.read(&mut buf).await.unwrap();
+        let resp = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..n]);
+        assert!(resp.starts_with("HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols"));
+
+        // Init connection
+        ws_send_text(&mut stream, r#"{"type":"connection_init"}"#).await;
+        let ack = ws_recv_text(&mut stream).await;
+        assert!(ack.contains("connection_ack"));
+
+        stream
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn graphql_ws_task_query_enforces_per_request_field_limit(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+        let app = build_router(state);
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            axum::serve(
+                listener,
+                app.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        });
+
+        let mut stream = connect_ws(addr).await;
+
+        // Query with 6 aliased task fields (exceeding MAX_GRAPHQL_TASK_READS_PER_REQUEST = 5).
+        // limit: 1 keeps the document under GRAPHQL_MAX_COMPLEXITY so the 6th
+        // field reaches the brake instead of failing complexity first.
+        let query = r#"{"id":"1","type":"subscribe","payload":{"query":"query { f1: tasks(limit: 1) { items { id } } f2: tasks(limit: 1) { items { id } } f3: tasks(limit: 1) { items { id } } f4: tasks(limit: 1) { items { id } } f5: tasks(limit: 1) { items { id } } f6: tasks(limit: 1) { items { id } } }"}}"#;
+        ws_send_text(&mut stream, query).await;
+        let frames = ws_recv_op_frames(&mut stream, "1").await;
+        let resp = frames.join("\n");
+        assert!(
+            resp.contains("rate limit exceeded"),
+            "6th task field over WS must be braked: {resp}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn graphql_ws_task_query_enforces_per_ip_rate_limit(pool: PgPool) {
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        // Restrict task read rate limiter to 1 request per 60s
+        state.task_read_rate_limiter =
+            crate::rate_limit::RateLimiter::new(1, std::time::Duration::from_secs(60));
+
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+        let app = build_router(state);
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            axum::serve(
+                listener,
+                app.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        });
+
+        let mut stream = connect_ws(addr).await;
+
+        // First task query succeeds (or returns valid data)
+        let query1 = r#"{"id":"1","type":"subscribe","payload":{"query":"query { tasks { items { id } } }"}}"#;
+        ws_send_text(&mut stream, query1).await;
+        let frames1 = ws_recv_op_frames(&mut stream, "1").await;
+        let resp1 = frames1.join("\n");
+        assert!(!resp1.contains("rate limit exceeded"));
+
+        // Second task query on the same connection hits per-IP limiter
+        let query2 = r#"{"id":"2","type":"subscribe","payload":{"query":"query { tasks { items { id } } }"}}"#;
+        ws_send_text(&mut stream, query2).await;
+        let frames2 = ws_recv_op_frames(&mut stream, "2").await;
+        let resp2 = frames2.join("\n");
+        assert!(
+            resp2.contains("rate limit exceeded"),
+            "exceeded per-IP limiter over WS must return rate limit message: {resp2}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn graphql_ws_task_query_resets_field_budget_per_operation(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+        let app = build_router(state);
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            axum::serve(
+                listener,
+                app.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        });
+
+        let mut stream = connect_ws(addr).await;
+
+        // Execute 6 sequential 1-field queries on the same connection.
+        // Each operation must receive its own 5-field budget, so none are braked by the per-request limit.
+        for i in 1..=6 {
+            let id = i.to_string();
+            let query = format!(
+                r#"{{"id":"{id}","type":"subscribe","payload":{{"query":"query {{ tasks {{ items {{ id }} }} }}"}}}}"#
+            );
+            ws_send_text(&mut stream, &query).await;
+            let frames = ws_recv_op_frames(&mut stream, &id).await;
+            let resp = frames.join("\n");
+            assert!(
+                !resp.contains("rate limit exceeded"),
+                "operation {id} on the same WS connection must have a fresh field budget: {resp}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn connect_ws_signed(
+        addr: std::net::SocketAddr,
+        keypair: &gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair,
+    ) -> tokio::net::TcpStream {
+        let mut stream = tokio::net::TcpStream::connect(addr).await.unwrap();
+        let signed = gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request(keypair, "GET", "/graphql/ws", b"");
+        let req = format!(
+            "GET /graphql/ws HTTP/1.1\r\n\
+             Host: {}\r\n\
+             Upgrade: websocket\r\n\
+             Connection: Upgrade\r\n\
+             Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==\r\n\
+             Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r\n\
+             Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: graphql-transport-ws\r\n\
+             content-digest: {}\r\n\
+             signature-input: {}\r\n\
+             signature: {}\r\n\r\n",
+            addr, signed.content_digest, signed.signature_input, signed.signature
+        );
+        stream.write_all(req.as_bytes()).await.unwrap();
+        stream.flush().await.unwrap();
+
+        let mut buf = [0u8; 1024];
+        let n = stream.read(&mut buf).await.unwrap();
+        let resp = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..n]);
+        assert!(resp.starts_with("HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols"));
+
+        // Init connection
+        ws_send_text(&mut stream, r#"{"type":"connection_init"}"#).await;
+        let ack = ws_recv_text(&mut stream).await;
+        assert!(ack.contains("connection_ack"));
+
+        stream
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn graphql_ws_authenticated_query_accesses_private_task(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+        let app = build_router(state.clone());
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            axum::serve(
+                listener,
+                app.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        });
+
+        let keypair = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
+        let delegator_did = keypair.did().to_string();
+
+        let task = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "ws-auth-task-01".into(),
+            repo_id: None,
+            delegator_did: delegator_did.clone(),
+            kind: "test".into(),
+            capability: "read".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            assignee_did: Some(delegator_did.clone()),
+            ucan_token: None,
+            payload: None,
+            result: None,
+            created_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            updated_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            deadline: None,
+        };
+        state.db.create_task(&task).await.unwrap();
+
+        // 1. Unauthenticated WS connection cannot see the private task
+        let mut unauth_stream = connect_ws(addr).await;
+        let query = r#"{"id":"1","type":"subscribe","payload":{"query":"query { tasks { items { id } } }"}}"#;
+        ws_send_text(&mut unauth_stream, query).await;
+        let unauth_frames = ws_recv_op_frames(&mut unauth_stream, "1").await;
+        let unauth_resp = unauth_frames.join("\n");
+        assert!(
+            !unauth_resp.contains("ws-auth-task-01"),
+            "unauthenticated WS must not disclose private task: {unauth_resp}"
+        );
+
+        // 2. Forged signature claiming the delegator DID must be rejected at handshake
+        let attacker_keypair = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
+        let attacker_signed =
+            gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request(&attacker_keypair, "GET", "/graphql/ws", b"");
+        let forged_sig_input = attacker_signed
+            .signature_input
+            .replace(&attacker_keypair.did().to_string(), &delegator_did);
+        let mut forged_stream = tokio::net::TcpStream::connect(addr).await.unwrap();
+        let forged_req = format!(
+            "GET /graphql/ws HTTP/1.1\r\n\
+             Host: {}\r\n\
+             Upgrade: websocket\r\n\
+             Connection: Upgrade\r\n\
+             Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==\r\n\
+             Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r\n\
+             Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: graphql-transport-ws\r\n\
+             content-digest: {}\r\n\
+             signature-input: {}\r\n\
+             signature: {}\r\n\r\n",
+            addr, attacker_signed.content_digest, forged_sig_input, attacker_signed.signature
+        );
+        forged_stream
+            .write_all(forged_req.as_bytes())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        forged_stream.flush().await.unwrap();
+        let mut forged_bytes = Vec::new();
+        let mut chunk = [0u8; 1024];
+        while !forged_bytes.windows(4).any(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n") {
+            let n = forged_stream.read(&mut chunk).await.unwrap();
+            if n == 0 {
+                break;
+            }
+            forged_bytes.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..n]);
+        }
+        let forged_resp = String::from_utf8_lossy(&forged_bytes);
+        assert!(
+            forged_resp.starts_with("HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized"),
+            "forged WS signature must be rejected with 401: {forged_resp}"
+        );
+
+        // 3. Signed WS connection authenticates caller and retrieves the private task
+        let mut auth_stream = connect_ws_signed(addr, &keypair).await;
+        ws_send_text(&mut auth_stream, query).await;
+        let auth_frames = ws_recv_op_frames(&mut auth_stream, "1").await;
+        let auth_resp = auth_frames.join("\n");
+        assert!(
+            auth_resp.contains("ws-auth-task-01"),
+            "signed WS must authenticate delegator and return private task: {auth_resp}"
+        );
+    }
+
     use axum::body::Body;
     use axum::http::{Request, StatusCode};
-    use sqlx::PgPool;
     use tower::ServiceExt;
 
     use crate::db::RepoRecord;
-    use crate::test_support::test_state;
 
     /// Regression: anonymous callers must not see the pin/anchor index (#121, #134).
     #[sqlx::test]

crates/gitlawb-node/src/state.rs

@@ -21,6 +21,19 @@ const SCAN_TOKEN_KEY_SALT: &[u8] = b"gitlawb/hkdf-salt/ipfs-scan-token";
 /// front) and needs no migration, no config, and no change to this function.
 const SCAN_TOKEN_KEY_INFO: &[u8] = b"gitlawb/ipfs-scan-token/v1";
 
+/// HKDF salt for [`AppState::derive_webhook_secret_key`]. A constant, not a
+/// secret: the confidentiality of the derived key rests on the node's private
+/// seed being the input keying material, exactly as for the scan-token key.
+const WEBHOOK_SECRET_KEY_SALT: &[u8] = b"gitlawb/hkdf-salt/webhook-secret";
+
+/// HKDF `info` for [`AppState::derive_webhook_secret_key`]: the domain
+/// separation from the scan-token key that shares the same input keying
+/// material. Unlike the scan-token key, bumping the version is NOT a safe
+/// rotation: sealed secrets persist, `open` has no old-key fallback, and a new
+/// version renders every stored ciphertext permanently unopenable until a
+/// re-seal path exists.
+const WEBHOOK_SECRET_KEY_INFO: &[u8] = b"gitlawb/webhook-secret/v1";
+
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct RefUpdateBroadcast {
     pub repo: String,
@@ -59,6 +72,10 @@ pub struct AppState {
     pub task_event_tx: tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>,
     /// GraphQL schema (queries + mutations + subscriptions)
     pub graphql_schema: Arc<crate::graphql::GitlawbSchema>,
+    /// MAC key for task-list continuation tokens, derived from the node
+    /// keypair seed. Held here (and handed to the GraphQL schema) so REST and
+    /// GraphQL mint and accept the same tokens.
+    pub task_cursor_key: crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey,
     /// Fly.io machine ID — used for fly-replay routing in multi-machine deployments
     pub machine_id: Option<String>,
     /// Centralized repo storage: local disk cache + optional Tigris backend
@@ -169,6 +186,11 @@ pub struct AppState {
     /// already has on disk, so derivation is also the smaller mechanism. Rotation is a
     /// bump of the version in [`SCAN_TOKEN_KEY_INFO`].
     pub ipfs_scan_token_key: Arc<[u8; 32]>,
+    /// Key sealing webhook HMAC secrets at rest (#506), derived from the node's
+    /// persistent identity by [`AppState::derive_webhook_secret_key`]. The
+    /// webhook delivery path opens a secret with it only at signing time; the
+    /// `webhooks.secret` column stores the ciphertext (see `webhook_secret`).
+    pub webhook_secret_key: Arc<[u8; 32]>,
     /// Hard ceiling on the byte size of an object `GET /ipfs/{cid}` will buffer and
     /// serve (default `api::ipfs::MAX_SERVED_OBJECT_BYTES`). The serve reads via a
     /// blocking `git cat-file` and buffers the whole object; without a bound a large
@@ -326,6 +348,16 @@ pub struct AppState {
     /// (`with_default_max_keys`, reject-before-insert) so a source-key farm cannot grow
     /// it (INV-15).
     pub git_ipfs_walk_per_caller: crate::rate_limit::PerCallerConcurrency,
+    /// Per-client-IP rate limiter for the task read routes. `GET /api/v1/tasks`
+    /// and `GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}` are anonymously reachable and run the #268
+    /// visibility gate (a task lookup plus deduped-repo and visibility-rule
+    /// queries) before returning the opaque 404, so an unauthenticated prober
+    /// costs the node real work per request whether or not anything is visible.
+    /// Keyed on the resolved client IP via `push_limiter_trust`. Layered on
+    /// `task_read_routes` via `rate_limit_by_ip`.
+    /// The same per-IP hourly budget applies to GraphQL `tasks` / `task`
+    /// queries and WebSocket task queries via `TaskReadBrake`.
+    pub task_read_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
     /// The `git` executable the served-git withheld-blob walk spawns. Production is
     /// `"git"` (resolved via PATH); injectable so a fake `git` can drive the walk's
     /// process-group teardown in handler tests without mutating the process-global
@@ -354,6 +386,7 @@ impl AppState {
         self.ipfs_work_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
         self.sync_trigger_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
         self.peer_write_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
+        self.task_read_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
         self.federated_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
     }
 
@@ -416,20 +449,48 @@ impl AppState {
     ///     identity, the token format, or any caller, so rotation is a constant change
     ///     rather than a fork of this derivation.
     pub(crate) fn derive_scan_token_key(keypair: &Keypair) -> [u8; 32] {
+        Self::hkdf_sha256(
+            SCAN_TOKEN_KEY_SALT,
+            SCAN_TOKEN_KEY_INFO,
+            keypair.to_seed().as_slice(),
+        )
+    }
+
+    /// Derive the at-rest webhook-secret sealing key from the node identity.
+    ///
+    /// Same HKDF construction as [`AppState::derive_scan_token_key`] under its
+    /// own [`WEBHOOK_SECRET_KEY_INFO`]/[`WEBHOOK_SECRET_KEY_SALT`] pair, so it
+    /// is derived (a restart re-derives the same key, and old secrets remain
+    /// readable) yet domain-separated from the signing key and the scan-token
+    /// key. The doc on [`SCAN_TOKEN_KEY_INFO`] argues why derivation (not a
+    /// boot-random key) is the right trade: the secret's confidentiality still
+    /// rests on the node's private seed. Rotation is NOT a version bump here,
+    /// unlike for the scan-token key: [`WEBHOOK_SECRET_KEY_INFO`] explains that
+    /// bumping renders every stored ciphertext unopenable until a re-seal path
+    /// exists.
+    pub(crate) fn derive_webhook_secret_key(keypair: &Keypair) -> [u8; 32] {
+        Self::hkdf_sha256(
+            WEBHOOK_SECRET_KEY_SALT,
+            WEBHOOK_SECRET_KEY_INFO,
+            keypair.to_seed().as_slice(),
+        )
+    }
+
+    /// HKDF-Extract-then-Expand (RFC 5869) over the node seed: PRK =
+    /// HMAC(salt, ikm), then one expand block T(1) = HMAC(PRK, info || 0x01).
+    /// One 32-byte output needs exactly one block of SHA-256, so there is no
+    /// counter loop to get wrong. Salt and info are the caller's domain
+    /// separation; shared by every identity-derived key in this module.
+    fn hkdf_sha256(salt: &[u8], info: &[u8], ikm: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
         use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
         type HmacSha256 = Hmac<sha2::Sha256>;
 
-        let seed = keypair.to_seed();
-        // HKDF-Extract: PRK = HMAC(salt, ikm).
-        let mut extract =
-            HmacSha256::new_from_slice(SCAN_TOKEN_KEY_SALT).expect("HMAC takes a key of any size");
-        extract.update(seed.as_slice());
+        let mut extract = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(salt).expect("HMAC takes a key of any size");
+        extract.update(ikm);
         let prk = extract.finalize().into_bytes();
-        // HKDF-Expand, one block: T(1) = HMAC(PRK, info || 0x01). One 32-byte output
-        // needs exactly one block of SHA-256, so there is no counter loop to get wrong.
         let mut expand =
             HmacSha256::new_from_slice(prk.as_slice()).expect("HMAC takes a key of any size");
-        expand.update(SCAN_TOKEN_KEY_INFO);
+        expand.update(info);
         expand.update(&[0x01]);
         expand.finalize().into_bytes().into()
     }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/sync.rs

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::path::Path;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 
 use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
@@ -435,9 +436,10 @@ async fn process_batch(
                 .await;
             }
             Err(e) => {
-                warn!(repo = %item.repo, origin = %origin_url, err = %e, "repo sync failed");
-                let _ = db.mark_sync_failed(&item.id).await;
-                crate::metrics::record_sync_processed("failed");
+                // Prune vs terminal classification lives in
+                // `handle_sync_item_error` (defer = stays pending for the
+                // next tick; anything else = failed).
+                handle_sync_item_error(db, &item, &origin_url, e).await;
             }
         }
     }
@@ -576,7 +578,18 @@ async fn replicate_encrypted_blobs(
     let url = format!("{origin_url}/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs/replicate");
     let resp = match client.get(&url).send().await {
         Ok(r) if r.status().is_success() => r,
-        _ => return,
+        // A peer that predates the replicate route answers 404: expected and
+        // quiet. Anything else is the route existing and refusing or failing,
+        // which should be observable rather than read as route-absent.
+        Ok(r) if r.status().as_u16() == 404 => return,
+        Ok(r) => {
+            tracing::warn!(repo = %repo, status = %r.status(), "encrypted-blobs replicate refused; skipping");
+            return;
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!(repo = %repo, error = %e, "encrypted-blobs replicate request failed; skipping");
+            return;
+        }
     };
     let parsed: ReplicateResponse = match resp.json().await {
         Ok(p) => p,
@@ -691,6 +704,284 @@ async fn existing_promisor_state(repo: &str) -> PromisorProbe {
     }
 }
 
+/// Byte-prefix check for the two node-managed blob namespaces exempt from
+/// the fail-closed commit walk (`visibility_pack.rs`): request markers
+/// (`refs/gitlawb/requests/`) and issue records (`refs/gitlawb/issues/`).
+/// Bytewise so non-UTF-8 refnames (which git accepts) are classified, not
+/// lossy-decoded into a false exempt match. Extracted so the predicate is
+/// unit-testable; [`prune_non_exempt_gitlawb_refs`] enforces it on import.
+fn gitlawb_ref_is_exempt(raw_refname: &[u8]) -> bool {
+    raw_refname.starts_with(b"refs/gitlawb/requests/")
+        || raw_refname.starts_with(b"refs/gitlawb/issues/")
+}
+
+/// Parse one `git show-ref` output line into its refname bytes: `<hex-sha>`
+/// (40-hex SHA-1 or 64-hex SHA-256, which a sha256 mirror inherits from its
+/// origin), one space, then the refname. Empty lines (trailing newline) yield
+/// `Ok(None)`; anything else-shaped is an anomaly the caller fails on rather
+/// than skips — silently passing an unclassifiable line could leave an evil
+/// ref imported. Extracted so malformed input is unit-testable without git.
+fn show_ref_refname(line: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<Option<&[u8]>> {
+    if line.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    let Some(sp) = line.iter().position(|b| *b == b' ') else {
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("git show-ref emitted an unparsable line"));
+    };
+    let (sha, raw) = (&line[..sp], &line[sp + 1..]);
+    let sha_ok = (sha.len() == 40 || sha.len() == 64) && sha.iter().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit());
+    if !sha_ok || raw.is_empty() {
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("git show-ref emitted an unparsable line"));
+    }
+    Ok(Some(raw))
+}
+
+/// Delete imported `refs/gitlawb/*` refs outside the two exempt subtrees.
+///
+/// Mirrors import whatever the origin advertises (`+refs/*:refs/*`), and
+/// `transfer.hideRefs` is a serve-side knob: a repo's own `git fetch` never
+/// consults local hideRefs, and origins hide only `requests/` anyway. So a
+/// planted `refs/gitlawb/<other>` blob ref — creatable on any pre-gate node —
+/// lands on every mirror and then trips `assert_all_refs_are_commits` closed,
+/// wedging serving on each one. Prune at import instead: after clone/fetch,
+/// list `refs/gitlawb` and delete every ref outside the exempt subtrees
+/// (negative refspecs cannot re-include them, so post-import deletion is the
+/// mechanism that works).
+///
+/// Callers map a transient prune error to [`PruneFailed`] so the batch
+/// defers the row (stays `pending`, retried next tick) instead of failing
+/// it: a failed row would leave a possibly-wedged mirror unretried until
+/// the next peer announcement. Deterministic refusals (identity mismatch,
+/// malformed enumeration) map to [`PruneInvalid`], which fails terminally
+/// since no retry can clear them.
+///
+/// Enumeration is `git show-ref` (no pattern), parsed as raw bytes: refnames
+/// cannot contain newlines, so one line per ref is lossless even for
+/// non-UTF-8 names, which a lossy decode would miss. The `<sha> SP <refname>`
+/// structure (not `for-each-ref --format=%(refname)`, which carries no object
+/// id) is what lets the parser width-check 40-hex SHA-1 vs 64-hex SHA-256
+/// and reject anything else-shaped instead of skipping it.
+///
+/// Fail-closed throughout: the exit code is classified (only `1` with empty
+/// output means "no refs"; anything else non-zero, e.g. 128 on a missing
+/// repo, is fatal, since a silent skip would leave an imported evil ref in
+/// place while the sync reports success), and any line that is not
+/// `<hex-sha> SP <refname>` — 40-hex SHA-1 or 64-hex SHA-256, which a sha256
+/// mirror inherits from its origin — fails the sync rather than being
+/// skipped into an unpruned wedge.
+/// Bounded git spawn for the prune below: `kill_on_drop` plus a hard timeout
+/// so a wedged child cannot stall a mirror import or sweep forever. The
+/// refname delete runs on exact bytes, so args arrive as `OsStr`, not `str`.
+/// Non-PruneInvalid failures (including a timeout) wrap as PruneFailed and
+/// defer for retry, matching the transient classification below.
+async fn prune_git(
+    local_path: &Path,
+    args: &[&std::ffi::OsStr],
+    label: &str,
+) -> anyhow::Result<std::process::Output> {
+    let fut = async {
+        // allow-unbounded-git: bounded by the tokio::time::timeout wrapping
+        // this future below, plus kill_on_drop.
+        let mut cmd = tokio::process::Command::new("git");
+        cmd.kill_on_drop(true);
+        cmd.arg("-C").arg(local_path).args(args);
+        cmd.output().await
+    };
+    tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30), fut)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("{label} timed out"))?
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("{label} failed to spawn: {e}"))
+}
+
+async fn prune_non_exempt_gitlawb_refs(local_path: &Path) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    let local_str = local_path.to_str().unwrap_or(".");
+    // Prove the path is itself a repo before trusting the enumeration:
+    // `git -C` walks up to the nearest ancestor repo, so inside a non-repo
+    // child (a partially-created mirror) `show-ref` would exit 0 with the
+    // ANCESTOR's refs and `update-ref -d` would then run against that repo.
+    // Require `rev-parse --absolute-git-dir` to resolve to the path itself
+    // (mirrors are bare repos, where the git dir IS the path).
+    let git_dir_out = prune_git(
+        local_path,
+        &[
+            std::ffi::OsStr::new("rev-parse"),
+            std::ffi::OsStr::new("--absolute-git-dir"),
+        ],
+        "git rev-parse",
+    )
+    .await?;
+    if !git_dir_out.status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&git_dir_out.stderr);
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(PruneInvalid(format!(
+            "mirror path is not a git repo (rev-parse failed): {stderr}"
+        ))));
+    }
+    let actual_dir = PathBuf::from(
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&git_dir_out.stdout)
+            .trim()
+            .to_string(),
+    );
+    let canonical_path = local_path
+        .canonicalize()
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!(PruneInvalid(format!("mirror path does not resolve: {e}"))))?;
+    let canonical_git_dir = actual_dir
+        .canonicalize()
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!(PruneInvalid(format!("git dir does not resolve: {e}"))))?;
+    if canonical_git_dir != canonical_path {
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(PruneInvalid(format!(
+            "mirror path {local_str} is not itself a repo (git dir resolves elsewhere); refusing to enumerate"
+        ))));
+    }
+    let out = prune_git(
+        local_path,
+        &[std::ffi::OsStr::new("show-ref")],
+        "git show-ref",
+    )
+    .await?;
+    // Classify on the exit code (the `existing_promisor_state` precedent):
+    // 0 parses, 1 with empty output is an empty repo, anything else is a
+    // fatal enumeration failure that must not read as "nothing to prune".
+    match out.status.code() {
+        Some(0) => {}
+        Some(1) if out.stdout.is_empty() => return Ok(()),
+        _ => {
+            let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr);
+            return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
+                "git show-ref failed with code {:?}: {stderr}",
+                out.status.code()
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+    for line in out.stdout.split(|b| *b == b'\n') {
+        // Malformed lines are deterministic (same git, same output every
+        // tick): fail terminally via PruneInvalid, not transiently.
+        let Some(raw) =
+            show_ref_refname(line).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!(PruneInvalid(e.to_string())))?
+        else {
+            continue;
+        };
+        if !(raw == b"refs/gitlawb" || raw.starts_with(b"refs/gitlawb/"))
+            || gitlawb_ref_is_exempt(raw)
+        {
+            continue;
+        }
+        // Delete by exact bytes (not the lossy display string below): a
+        // non-UTF-8 refname would otherwise survive the prune.
+        let refname_os = os_from_raw_refname(raw);
+        let shown = refname_os.to_string_lossy().into_owned();
+        let delete = prune_git(
+            local_path,
+            &[
+                std::ffi::OsStr::new("update-ref"),
+                std::ffi::OsStr::new("-d"),
+                refname_os.as_os_str(),
+                std::ffi::OsStr::new("--no-deref"),
+            ],
+            "git update-ref -d",
+        )
+        .await?;
+        if !delete.status.success() {
+            let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&delete.stderr);
+            return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
+                "git update-ref -d {shown} failed (mirror still carries a non-exempt refs/gitlawb ref): {stderr}"
+            ));
+        }
+        tracing::info!(
+            gitlawb_ref = %shown,
+            "mirror: pruned non-exempt refs/gitlawb ref on import"
+        );
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Lossless bytes → OsString for `update-ref -d`: non-UTF-8 refnames must be
+/// deleted by exact bytes. Unix is the serving platform; elsewhere fall back
+/// to a lossy decode (best effort where exact bytes are unrepresentable).
+#[cfg(unix)]
+fn os_from_raw_refname(raw: &[u8]) -> std::ffi::OsString {
+    use std::os::unix::ffi::OsStringExt;
+    std::ffi::OsString::from_vec(raw.to_vec())
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(unix))]
+fn os_from_raw_refname(raw: &[u8]) -> std::ffi::OsString {
+    String::from_utf8_lossy(raw).into_owned().into()
+}
+
+/// Marker for mirror-prune failures: the clone/fetch succeeded, so the
+/// mirror is on disk, but a non-exempt `refs/gitlawb/*` ref may still be
+/// imported. Local-git conditions are transient (a retry can succeed), while
+/// `mark_sync_failed` is terminal until the next peer announcement — and a
+/// failed row would leave a possibly-wedged mirror unretried in the
+/// meantime. The batch error arm downcasts to this and defers the row
+/// (stays `pending`, retried on the next 30s tick, where fetch+prune are
+/// idempotent) instead of failing it.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+struct PruneFailed(String);
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for PruneFailed {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "mirror prune failed: {}", self.0)
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for PruneFailed {}
+
+/// Marker for deterministic mirror-prune refusals: the identity check (path
+/// is not itself a repo) and malformed `show-ref` output cannot clear on
+/// retry — re-running fetch+prune every tick would spin forever on a
+/// permanently bad path. Unlike [`PruneFailed`], these fail the row
+/// terminally so the condition surfaces instead of looping silently.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+struct PruneInvalid(String);
+
+/// Preserve a deterministic prune refusal through the clone/fetch call
+/// sites: `prune_non_exempt_gitlawb_refs` already returns `PruneInvalid`
+/// for identity mismatches and malformed enumeration, and re-wrapping
+/// every error as `PruneFailed` would stringify that type away before
+/// `handle_sync_item_error` downcasts it — leaving a permanently invalid
+/// mirror deferred (fetch+prune every tick) instead of failed. Transient
+/// failures keep the `PruneFailed` deferral.
+fn wrap_prune_error(e: anyhow::Error) -> anyhow::Error {
+    match e.downcast::<PruneInvalid>() {
+        Ok(invalid) => anyhow::Error::new(invalid),
+        Err(other) => anyhow::anyhow!(PruneFailed(other.to_string())),
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for PruneInvalid {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "mirror prune refused: {}", self.0)
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for PruneInvalid {}
+
+/// Classify a mirror sync failure for one queue row. Transient prune
+/// failures ([`PruneFailed`]) defer: the mirror is on disk but may still
+/// carry a non-exempt refs/gitlawb ref, a transient local-git condition a
+/// retry can clear — failing the row would leave it unretried until the
+/// next peer announcement, wedging serving in the meantime. Deterministic
+/// refusals ([`PruneInvalid`]) and everything else fail the row terminally:
+/// retrying a permanently bad path every tick would spin forever instead of
+/// surfacing. Extracted so the deferral (not just the prune itself) is
+/// unit-testable.
+async fn handle_sync_item_error(
+    db: &Db,
+    item: &crate::db::SyncQueueItem,
+    origin_url: &str,
+    err: anyhow::Error,
+) {
+    if err.downcast_ref::<PruneFailed>().is_some() {
+        warn!(repo = %item.repo, origin = %origin_url, err = %err, "mirror prune failed; leaving sync row pending for retry");
+        crate::metrics::record_sync_processed("deferred");
+        return;
+    }
+    warn!(repo = %item.repo, origin = %origin_url, err = %err, "repo sync failed");
+    let _ = db.mark_sync_failed(&item.id).await;
+    crate::metrics::record_sync_processed("failed");
+}
+
 /// Mirror-clone a repo from a remote URL into a local bare repo.
 /// `Promisor` mode adds `--filter=blob:limit=10g`, which marks the repo a git
 /// promisor (so a pack with origin-omitted withheld blobs is accepted) while
@@ -715,6 +1006,13 @@ async fn clone_repo(remote_url: &str, local_path: &Path, mode: MirrorMode) -> an
         let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr);
         return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("git clone --mirror failed: {stderr}"));
     }
+    // A fresh mirror imports everything the origin advertises, including any
+    // planted non-exempt `refs/gitlawb/*` ref; prune before serving from it.
+    // Prune outcome flows through `wrap_prune_error`: transient failures
+    // defer (stays pending), deterministic refusals fail terminally.
+    prune_non_exempt_gitlawb_refs(local_path)
+        .await
+        .map_err(wrap_prune_error)?;
     Ok(())
 }
 
@@ -735,7 +1033,11 @@ async fn fetch_repo(local_path: &Path, remote_url: &str, mode: MirrorMode) -> an
     ])
     .await?;
 
-    match mode {
+    // The fetch imports whatever the origin advertises via the stored
+    // `+refs/*:refs/*` refspec; prune non-exempt `refs/gitlawb/*` refs after
+    // every fetch so one planted origin ref cannot wedge serving on the
+    // mirror (see `prune_non_exempt_gitlawb_refs`).
+    let fetch_result = match mode {
         MirrorMode::Promisor => {
             git_run(&["-C", local_str, "config", "remote.origin.promisor", "true"]).await?;
             git_run(&[
@@ -775,7 +1077,13 @@ async fn fetch_repo(local_path: &Path, remote_url: &str, mode: MirrorMode) -> an
                 git_run(&["-C", local_str, "fetch", "--prune", "origin"]).await
             }
         }
-    }
+    };
+    fetch_result?;
+    // Prune after every fetch (see above); outcome flows through
+    // `wrap_prune_error` like the clone path.
+    prune_non_exempt_gitlawb_refs(local_path)
+        .await
+        .map_err(wrap_prune_error)
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
@@ -2108,4 +2416,463 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(object_count(&mirror) > 0, "mirror has no objects");
         assert_eq!(sync_status(&pool, "z6Mkfoo/hello").await, "done");
     }
+
+    /// The import-exemption predicate is bytewise over both node-managed
+    /// namespaces and nothing else. Non-UTF-8 bytes never match (git accepts
+    /// them, so a lossy decode could false-exempt). Narrowing either prefix
+    /// turns these red.
+    #[test]
+    fn gitlawb_import_exemption_covers_both_namespaces_by_bytes() {
+        for exempt in [
+            &b"refs/gitlawb/requests/550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"[..],
+            &b"refs/gitlawb/issues/abc123"[..],
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                gitlawb_ref_is_exempt(exempt),
+                "import must keep {}",
+                String::from_utf8_lossy(exempt)
+            );
+        }
+        for pruned in [
+            &b"refs/gitlawb/evil"[..],
+            &b"refs/gitlawb"[..],
+            &b"refs/gitlawbfoo"[..],
+            &b"refs/heads/main"[..],
+            &b""[..],
+            // Raw 0xFF byte: never an exempt prefix, always pruned.
+            &b"refs/gitlawb/\xffvil"[..],
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                !gitlawb_ref_is_exempt(pruned),
+                "import must prune {}",
+                String::from_utf8_lossy(pruned)
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// End-to-end prune on a scratch bare repo: a planted non-exempt
+    /// `refs/gitlawb/*` blob ref is deleted, exempt `requests/`/`issues/`
+    /// blob refs and content refs survive. Removing the prune call from
+    /// `clone_repo`/`fetch_repo` leaves the evil ref in place, which is what
+    /// wedges serving on mirrors — this test plants exactly that state and
+    /// proves the prune removes it.
+    #[test]
+    fn prune_removes_non_exempt_gitlawb_refs_and_keeps_exempt() {
+        let rt = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
+            .enable_all()
+            .build()
+            .expect("test runtime");
+        rt.block_on(async {
+            let td = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+            let work = td.path().join("work");
+            let bare = td.path().join("m.git");
+            std::fs::create_dir_all(&work).unwrap();
+            // A real commit for the content branch (branch refs must point
+            // at commits; the evil/exempt refs below point at blobs).
+            std::fs::write(work.join("f.txt"), b"x\n").unwrap();
+            let run_work = |args: &[&str]| {
+                assert!(
+                    Command::new("git")
+                        .args(args)
+                        .current_dir(&work)
+                        .status()
+                        .unwrap()
+                        .success(),
+                    "git {args:?} failed"
+                );
+            };
+            run_work(&["init", "-q"]);
+            run_work(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
+            run_work(&["config", "user.name", "t"]);
+            run_work(&["add", "f.txt"]);
+            run_work(&["commit", "-qm", "init"]);
+            assert!(
+                Command::new("git")
+                    .args([
+                        "clone",
+                        "-q",
+                        "--bare",
+                        work.to_str().unwrap(),
+                        bare.to_str().unwrap()
+                    ])
+                    .current_dir(td.path())
+                    .status()
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .success(),
+                "git clone --bare failed"
+            );
+            let run = |args: &[&str]| {
+                assert!(
+                    Command::new("git")
+                        .args(args)
+                        .current_dir(&bare)
+                        .status()
+                        .unwrap()
+                        .success(),
+                    "git {args:?} failed"
+                );
+            };
+            let run_out = |args: &[&str]| {
+                let out = Command::new("git")
+                    .args(args)
+                    .current_dir(&bare)
+                    .output()
+                    .unwrap();
+                assert!(out.status.success(), "git {args:?} failed");
+                out.stdout
+            };
+            run(&["init", "-q", "--bare", "."]);
+            std::fs::write(bare.join("blob-body"), b"marker\n").unwrap();
+            let blob = String::from_utf8_lossy(&run_out(&["hash-object", "-w", "blob-body"]))
+                .trim()
+                .to_string();
+            // The clone carries the content branch; plant the evil ref and
+            // both exempt refs (all blob-pointing, like node metadata).
+            run(&["update-ref", "refs/gitlawb/evil", &blob]);
+            run(&["update-ref", "refs/gitlawb/requests/r1", &blob]);
+            run(&["update-ref", "refs/gitlawb/issues/i1", &blob]);
+
+            prune_non_exempt_gitlawb_refs(&bare)
+                .await
+                .expect("prune succeeds");
+
+            let raw_refs = run_out(&["for-each-ref", "--format=%(refname)"]);
+            let refs = String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw_refs);
+            let set: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = refs
+                .lines()
+                .map(str::trim)
+                .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
+                .collect();
+            assert!(
+                !set.contains("refs/gitlawb/evil"),
+                "non-exempt blob ref must be pruned, still present: {set:?}"
+            );
+            for keep in ["refs/gitlawb/requests/r1", "refs/gitlawb/issues/i1"] {
+                assert!(set.contains(keep), "{keep} must survive the prune: {set:?}");
+            }
+            assert!(
+                set.iter().any(|r| r.starts_with("refs/heads/")),
+                "content branch ref must survive the prune: {set:?}"
+            );
+        });
+    }
+
+    /// `show-ref` line parser: 40-hex SHA-1 and 64-hex SHA-256 lines yield
+    /// the refname, empty lines yield None, and anything else-shaped errors
+    /// (the caller fails the sync rather than skipping into an unpruned
+    /// wedge). Reverting to a 40-only width check turns the sha256 case red.
+    #[test]
+    fn show_ref_line_parser_accepts_both_hash_widths_and_rejects_junk() {
+        // 40-hex SHA-1 line.
+        let sha1_line = format!("{} refs/gitlawb/evil", "a".repeat(40));
+        assert_eq!(
+            show_ref_refname(sha1_line.as_bytes()).unwrap(),
+            Some(b"refs/gitlawb/evil".as_slice())
+        );
+        // 64-hex SHA-256 line (a sha256 mirror inherits the width).
+        let sha256_line = format!("{} refs/gitlawb/evil", "b".repeat(64));
+        assert_eq!(
+            show_ref_refname(sha256_line.as_bytes()).unwrap(),
+            Some(b"refs/gitlawb/evil".as_slice())
+        );
+        // Non-UTF-8 refname passes through as exact bytes.
+        let mut raw = vec![b'c'; 40];
+        raw.extend_from_slice(b" refs/gitlawb/\xffvil");
+        assert_eq!(
+            show_ref_refname(&raw).unwrap(),
+            Some(b"refs/gitlawb/\xffvil".as_slice())
+        );
+        // Trailing newline residue.
+        assert_eq!(show_ref_refname(b"").unwrap(), None);
+        // No space, short sha, non-hex sha, empty refname: all errors.
+        let bads: Vec<Vec<u8>> = vec![
+            b"nospaceshere".to_vec(),
+            format!("{}refs/x", "a".repeat(40)).into_bytes(),
+            [b'z'; 40]
+                .iter()
+                .chain(b" refs/x".iter())
+                .copied()
+                .collect(),
+            format!("{} ", "a".repeat(40)).into_bytes(),
+            format!("{} refs/x", "a".repeat(41)).into_bytes(),
+        ];
+        for bad in &bads {
+            assert!(
+                show_ref_refname(bad).is_err(),
+                "malformed show-ref line must error, not skip"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Pruning a path that is not a repo errors. Two shapes: a missing path
+    /// fails `rev-parse` outright (exit 128), while a plain subdirectory of
+    /// a repo would otherwise enumerate the ancestor's refs — covered by the
+    /// identity test below. Either way the prune refuses instead of pruning
+    /// the wrong repo or silently skipping an evil ref.
+    #[test]
+    fn prune_on_non_repo_path_errors() {
+        let rt = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
+            .enable_all()
+            .build()
+            .expect("test runtime");
+        rt.block_on(async {
+            let err =
+                prune_non_exempt_gitlawb_refs(Path::new("/tmp/gitlawb-definitely-not-a-repo-xyz"))
+                    .await
+                    .expect_err("non-repo path must fail the prune, not skip it");
+            assert!(
+                err.to_string().contains("not a git repo")
+                    || err.to_string().contains("does not resolve"),
+                "unexpected error shape: {err:#}"
+            );
+        });
+    }
+
+    /// Identity check: pruning a plain subdirectory of a repo refuses instead
+    /// of enumerating the ancestor. `git -C` on the child exits 0 from
+    /// `show-ref` with the ANCESTOR's refs, so without the
+    /// `rev-parse --absolute-git-dir` identity check the delete loop would
+    /// enumerate and delete the wrong repository's refs. Deleting the check
+    /// makes the prune succeed and removes the ancestor's evil ref — both
+    /// assertions go red.
+    #[test]
+    fn prune_on_non_repo_child_of_repo_refuses_and_touches_nothing() {
+        let rt = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
+            .enable_all()
+            .build()
+            .expect("test runtime");
+        rt.block_on(async {
+            let td = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+            let ancestor = td.path().join("ancestor.git");
+            std::fs::create_dir_all(&ancestor).unwrap();
+            let run_ancestor = |args: &[&str]| {
+                assert!(
+                    Command::new("git")
+                        .args(args)
+                        .current_dir(&ancestor)
+                        .status()
+                        .unwrap()
+                        .success(),
+                    "git {args:?} failed"
+                );
+            };
+            run_ancestor(&["init", "-q", "--bare", "."]);
+            // Blob target for the planted ref (mirrors the node-metadata shape).
+            std::fs::write(ancestor.join("blob-body"), b"marker\n").unwrap();
+            let out = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["hash-object", "-w", "blob-body"])
+                .current_dir(&ancestor)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            assert!(out.status.success(), "git hash-object failed");
+            let blob = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string();
+            run_ancestor(&["update-ref", "refs/gitlawb/evil", &blob]);
+
+            // A plain child directory: not itself a repo.
+            let child = ancestor.join("not-a-repo");
+            std::fs::create_dir_all(&child).unwrap();
+
+            let err = prune_non_exempt_gitlawb_refs(&child)
+                .await
+                .expect_err("pruning a non-repo child must refuse, not enumerate the ancestor");
+            assert!(
+                err.to_string().contains("not itself a repo"),
+                "refusal must name the identity mismatch, got: {err:#}"
+            );
+
+            // The ancestor's evil ref is untouched.
+            let refs_out = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["for-each-ref", "--format=%(refname)"])
+                .current_dir(&ancestor)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            let refs = String::from_utf8_lossy(&refs_out.stdout);
+            assert!(
+                refs.lines().any(|l| l.trim() == "refs/gitlawb/evil"),
+                "ancestor evil ref must survive the refused prune"
+            );
+        });
+    }
+
+    /// sha256 mirror: a 64-hex `show-ref` line parses and the planted ref is
+    /// pruned. A 40-only parser skips every line and leaves the evil ref.
+    #[test]
+    fn prune_parses_sha256_show_ref_and_prunes() {
+        let rt = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
+            .enable_all()
+            .build()
+            .expect("test runtime");
+        rt.block_on(async {
+            let td = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+            let bare = td.path().join("m256.git");
+            std::fs::create_dir_all(&bare).unwrap();
+            let run = |args: &[&str]| {
+                assert!(
+                    Command::new("git")
+                        .args(args)
+                        .current_dir(&bare)
+                        .status()
+                        .unwrap()
+                        .success(),
+                    "git {args:?} failed"
+                );
+            };
+            let run_out = |args: &[&str]| {
+                let out = Command::new("git")
+                    .args(args)
+                    .current_dir(&bare)
+                    .output()
+                    .unwrap();
+                assert!(out.status.success(), "git {args:?} failed");
+                out.stdout
+            };
+            run(&["init", "-q", "--bare", "--object-format=sha256", "."]);
+            std::fs::write(bare.join("blob-body"), b"marker\n").unwrap();
+            let blob = String::from_utf8_lossy(&run_out(&["hash-object", "-w", "blob-body"]))
+                .trim()
+                .to_string();
+            assert_eq!(
+                blob.len(),
+                64,
+                "sanity: sha256 repo must mint 64-hex objects"
+            );
+            run(&["update-ref", "refs/gitlawb/evil", &blob]);
+            run(&["update-ref", "refs/gitlawb/issues/i1", &blob]);
+
+            prune_non_exempt_gitlawb_refs(&bare)
+                .await
+                .expect("prune succeeds on a sha256 repo");
+
+            let raw_refs = run_out(&["for-each-ref", "--format=%(refname)"]);
+            let refs = String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw_refs);
+            let set: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = refs
+                .lines()
+                .map(str::trim)
+                .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
+                .collect();
+            assert!(
+                !set.contains("refs/gitlawb/evil"),
+                "evil ref must be pruned from sha256 mirror: {set:?}"
+            );
+            assert!(
+                set.contains("refs/gitlawb/issues/i1"),
+                "exempt ref must survive: {set:?}"
+            );
+        });
+    }
+
+    /// Prune failures defer the queue row (stays `pending` for the next
+    /// tick); deterministic prune refusals and any other sync error fail it
+    /// terminally. Deleting the `downcast_ref::<PruneFailed>` arm restores
+    /// terminal failure and turns the first assertion red.
+    /// Prune failures defer the queue row (stays `pending` for the next
+    /// tick); deterministic prune refusals and any other sync error fail it
+    /// terminally. Deleting the `downcast_ref::<PruneFailed>` arm restores
+    /// terminal failure and turns the first assertion red.
+    ///
+    /// The wrapper below is what the clone/fetch call sites run through:
+    /// a `PruneInvalid` from the helper must still downcast as
+    /// `PruneInvalid` afterwards (not stringified into `PruneFailed`),
+    /// and anything else must arrive as `PruneFailed`.
+    #[test]
+    fn wrap_prune_error_preserves_deterministic_type() {
+        let invalid = wrap_prune_error(anyhow::anyhow!(PruneInvalid("x".to_string())));
+        assert!(
+            invalid.downcast_ref::<PruneInvalid>().is_some(),
+            "deterministic refusal must survive the call-site wrap"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            invalid.downcast_ref::<PruneFailed>().is_none(),
+            "deterministic refusal must not also read as transient"
+        );
+        let transient = wrap_prune_error(anyhow::anyhow!("boom"));
+        assert!(
+            transient.downcast_ref::<PruneFailed>().is_some(),
+            "generic failure must arrive as transient"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            transient.downcast_ref::<PruneInvalid>().is_none(),
+            "generic failure must not read as deterministic"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn prune_failure_defers_row_other_failures_fail_it(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
+        let item = |id: &str| crate::db::SyncQueueItem {
+            id: id.to_string(),
+            repo: "z6Mkfoo/hello".to_string(),
+            node_did: "did:key:z6MkOrigin".to_string(),
+            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            new_sha: "0".repeat(40),
+            cid: None,
+            status: "pending".to_string(),
+            enqueued_at: chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+        };
+        async fn status_of(pool: &sqlx::PgPool, id: &str) -> String {
+            let row: (String,) = sqlx::query_as("SELECT status FROM sync_queue WHERE id = $1")
+                .bind(id)
+                .fetch_one(pool)
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            row.0
+        }
+        // Seed three pending rows directly (enqueue_sync mints random ids).
+        for id in ["sync-prune-defer", "sync-prune-invalid", "sync-other-fail"] {
+            sqlx::query(
+                "INSERT INTO sync_queue (id, repo, node_did, ref_name, new_sha, cid, status, enqueued_at)
+                 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, NULL, 'pending', $6)",
+            )
+            .bind(id)
+            .bind("z6Mkfoo/hello")
+            .bind("did:key:z6MkOrigin")
+            .bind("refs/heads/main")
+            .bind("0".repeat(40))
+            .bind(chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339())
+            .execute(state.db.pool())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        }
+
+        handle_sync_item_error(
+            &state.db,
+            &item("sync-prune-defer"),
+            "http://origin.example",
+            anyhow::anyhow!(PruneFailed("boom".to_string())),
+        )
+        .await;
+        assert_eq!(
+            status_of(state.db.pool(), "sync-prune-defer").await,
+            "pending",
+            "prune failure must leave the row pending for retry"
+        );
+
+        handle_sync_item_error(
+            &state.db,
+            &item("sync-other-fail"),
+            "http://origin.example",
+            anyhow::anyhow!("boom"),
+        )
+        .await;
+        assert_eq!(
+            status_of(state.db.pool(), "sync-other-fail").await,
+            "failed",
+            "non-prune failure must fail the row"
+        );
+
+        // Deterministic refusal: no retry can clear it, so it fails
+        // terminally instead of spinning every tick forever.
+        handle_sync_item_error(
+            &state.db,
+            &item("sync-prune-invalid"),
+            "http://origin.example",
+            anyhow::anyhow!(PruneInvalid("not itself a repo".to_string())),
+        )
+        .await;
+        assert_eq!(
+            status_of(state.db.pool(), "sync-prune-invalid").await,
+            "failed",
+            "deterministic prune refusal must fail the row, not defer forever"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/upstream_mirror.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,968 @@
+//! Scheduled external-forge fetches for canonical INBOUND mirrors.
+//!
+//! This worker is deliberately separate from `sync`, which mirrors repositories
+//! between Gitlawb peers. External upstream URLs are owner-controlled data that
+//! eventually reach `git fetch`, so each cycle resolves DNS itself, validates
+//! every address, and pins the approved answers into Git/libcurl with
+//! `http.curloptResolve`. Redirects, proxies, credential helpers, submodule
+//! recursion, and non-HTTPS protocols are disabled at the command boundary.
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use std::collections::BTreeSet;
+use std::net::IpAddr;
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+use tracing::{info, warn};
+
+use crate::config::Config;
+use crate::db::{Db, InboundMirrorTarget, MirrorStatus, MirrorTransitionPhase};
+use crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore;
+use crate::state::{repo_identity_key, RepoWriteLeases};
+
+const DNS_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
+const MAX_PINNED_ADDRESSES: usize = 32;
+const MIN_CURL_OPT_RESOLVE_GIT: (u64, u64) = (2, 37);
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
+struct EgressPolicy;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+struct PinnedUpstream {
+    url: String,
+    curlopt_resolve: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl EgressPolicy {
+    async fn resolve(&self, url: reqwest::Url) -> Result<PinnedUpstream> {
+        let raw_host = url.host_str().context("mirror upstream URL has no host")?;
+        let connect_host = raw_host
+            .trim_start_matches('[')
+            .trim_end_matches(']')
+            .to_ascii_lowercase();
+        let policy_host = normalize_policy_host(&connect_host);
+        reject_always_local_hostname(&policy_host)?;
+        let port = url
+            .port_or_known_default()
+            .context("mirror upstream URL has no known port")?;
+
+        if let Ok(ip) = connect_host.parse::<IpAddr>() {
+            self.validate_addresses(&policy_host, &[ip])?;
+            return Ok(PinnedUpstream {
+                url: url.to_string(),
+                // An IP literal performs no DNS lookup, so there is no rebinding
+                // window to pin. TLS still verifies the literal from the URL.
+                curlopt_resolve: None,
+            });
+        }
+
+        let resolved = tokio::time::timeout(
+            DNS_TIMEOUT,
+            tokio::net::lookup_host((connect_host.as_str(), port)),
+        )
+        .await
+        .context("mirror upstream DNS lookup timed out")?
+        .context("resolving mirror upstream host")?;
+        let addresses: BTreeSet<IpAddr> = resolved.map(|addr| addr.ip()).collect();
+        if addresses.is_empty() {
+            anyhow::bail!("mirror upstream host resolved to no addresses");
+        }
+        let addresses: Vec<IpAddr> = addresses.into_iter().collect();
+        self.validate_addresses(&policy_host, &addresses)?;
+
+        let pinned = addresses
+            .iter()
+            .map(|ip| match ip {
+                IpAddr::V4(v4) => v4.to_string(),
+                IpAddr::V6(v6) => format!("[{v6}]"),
+            })
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+            .join(",");
+        Ok(PinnedUpstream {
+            url: url.to_string(),
+            curlopt_resolve: Some(format!("+{connect_host}:{port}:{pinned}")),
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn validate_addresses(&self, host: &str, addresses: &[IpAddr]) -> Result<()> {
+        if addresses.is_empty() || addresses.len() > MAX_PINNED_ADDRESSES {
+            anyhow::bail!(
+                "mirror upstream host must resolve to 1..={MAX_PINNED_ADDRESSES} addresses"
+            );
+        }
+        for &ip in addresses {
+            if !address_is_permitted(ip) {
+                anyhow::bail!("mirror upstream host {host:?} resolved to disallowed address {ip}");
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+fn normalize_policy_host(host: &str) -> String {
+    host.trim_end_matches('.').to_ascii_lowercase()
+}
+
+fn reject_always_local_hostname(host: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    if host.is_empty()
+        || host == "localhost"
+        || host.ends_with(".localhost")
+        || host.ends_with(".local")
+        || host.ends_with(".internal")
+    {
+        anyhow::bail!("mirror upstream host is local-only and cannot be fetched");
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn address_is_permitted(ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
+    crate::api::peers::mirror_upstream_ip_permitted(ip)
+}
+
+fn parse_git_version(output: &str) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
+    let version = output.split_whitespace().find(|part| {
+        part.as_bytes()
+            .first()
+            .is_some_and(|byte| byte.is_ascii_digit())
+    })?;
+    let mut parts = version.split('.');
+    Some((parts.next()?.parse().ok()?, parts.next()?.parse().ok()?))
+}
+
+fn ensure_safe_git_runtime(git_bin: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    // Bounded runner like every other git spawn on this path: --version does
+    // no I/O of its own, but the child still takes a permit and the deadline.
+    let (status, stdout, stderr) = crate::git::visibility_pack::run_bounded_git_raw_isolated_https(
+        git_bin,
+        &["--version"],
+        &std::env::temp_dir(),
+        b"",
+        Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(10),
+    )?;
+    if !status.success() {
+        anyhow::bail!(
+            "{git_bin} --version failed: {}",
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&stderr)
+                .chars()
+                .take(256)
+                .collect::<String>()
+        );
+    }
+    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&stdout);
+    let version = parse_git_version(&stdout).context("parsing git version")?;
+    if version < MIN_CURL_OPT_RESOLVE_GIT {
+        anyhow::bail!(
+            "upstream mirroring requires Git 2.37+ for DNS pinning; found {}.{}",
+            version.0,
+            version.1
+        );
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+struct FetchCommand {
+    config: Vec<(String, String)>,
+    args: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+fn fetch_command(upstream: &PinnedUpstream) -> FetchCommand {
+    let http_scope = |name: &str| format!("http.{}.{name}", upstream.url);
+    let credential_scope = |name: &str| format!("credential.{}.{name}", upstream.url);
+    let mut config = vec![
+        ("http.proxy".to_string(), "".to_string()),
+        ("http.followRedirects".to_string(), "false".to_string()),
+        // Reset any inherited multi-valued resolver entries before adding the
+        // address set validated for this exact fetch.
+        ("http.curloptResolve".to_string(), "".to_string()),
+        // Never forward operator or repository-scoped HTTP credentials to an
+        // owner-selected forge. Empty values reset Git's multi-valued headers
+        // and disable cookie state for this invocation.
+        ("http.extraHeader".to_string(), "".to_string()),
+        ("http.cookieFile".to_string(), "".to_string()),
+        ("http.saveCookies".to_string(), "false".to_string()),
+        ("http.sslVerify".to_string(), "true".to_string()),
+        // URL-specific configuration outranks generic `http.*` values even
+        // when the generic value is command-scoped. Repeat every security
+        // control at the exact validated URL so a repository-local scoped
+        // setting cannot re-enable redirects/proxies/headers/cookies or disable
+        // TLS. Key/value environment entries avoid `git -c` splitting a valid
+        // URL path that contains `=`.
+        (http_scope("proxy"), "".to_string()),
+        (http_scope("followRedirects"), "false".to_string()),
+        (http_scope("curloptResolve"), "".to_string()),
+        (http_scope("extraHeader"), "".to_string()),
+        (http_scope("cookieFile"), "".to_string()),
+        (http_scope("saveCookies"), "false".to_string()),
+        (http_scope("sslVerify"), "true".to_string()),
+    ];
+    if let Some(resolve) = &upstream.curlopt_resolve {
+        config.extend([
+            ("http.curloptResolve".to_string(), resolve.clone()),
+            (http_scope("curloptResolve"), resolve.clone()),
+        ]);
+    }
+    config.extend([
+        ("credential.helper".to_string(), "".to_string()),
+        (credential_scope("helper"), "".to_string()),
+        ("credential.interactive".to_string(), "false".to_string()),
+        ("core.askPass".to_string(), "false".to_string()),
+        ("fetch.recurseSubmodules".to_string(), "false".to_string()),
+        // Do not let a smart server or repository-local config introduce a
+        // second, unvalidated pack/bundle URL outside the pinned upstream.
+        ("fetch.uriprotocols".to_string(), "".to_string()),
+        ("fetch.bundleURI".to_string(), "".to_string()),
+        ("protocol.allow".to_string(), "never".to_string()),
+        ("protocol.https.allow".to_string(), "always".to_string()),
+    ]);
+    let args = vec![
+        "fetch".to_string(),
+        "--atomic".to_string(),
+        "--force".to_string(),
+        "--prune".to_string(),
+        "--prune-tags".to_string(),
+        "--no-auto-maintenance".to_string(),
+        "--no-recurse-submodules".to_string(),
+        "--no-write-fetch-head".to_string(),
+        upstream.url.clone(),
+        "+refs/heads/*:refs/heads/*".to_string(),
+        "+refs/tags/*:refs/tags/*".to_string(),
+    ];
+    FetchCommand { config, args }
+}
+
+fn reject_local_url_rewrite(
+    git_bin: &str,
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    upstream_url: &str,
+    deadline: Instant,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let args = ["ls-remote", "--get-url", upstream_url];
+    let (status, stdout, stderr) = crate::git::visibility_pack::run_bounded_git_raw_isolated_https(
+        git_bin, &args, repo_path, b"", deadline,
+    )?;
+    if !status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&stderr);
+        anyhow::bail!(
+            "checking mirror upstream URL rewrite failed: {}",
+            stderr.chars().take(4_096).collect::<String>()
+        );
+    }
+    let expanded = std::str::from_utf8(&stdout)
+        .context("Git returned a non-UTF-8 expanded mirror upstream URL")?
+        .trim_end_matches(['\r', '\n']);
+    if expanded != upstream_url {
+        anyhow::bail!("repository-local Git config attempted to rewrite the mirror upstream URL");
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn reject_sensitive_local_config(git_bin: &str, repo_path: &Path, deadline: Instant) -> Result<()> {
+    let args = [
+        "config",
+        "--local",
+        "--includes",
+        "--get-regexp",
+        r"^(http|credential|url)\.",
+    ];
+    let (status, stdout, stderr) = crate::git::visibility_pack::run_bounded_git_raw_isolated_https(
+        git_bin, &args, repo_path, b"", deadline,
+    )?;
+    match status.code() {
+        Some(1) if stdout.is_empty() => Ok(()),
+        Some(0) => anyhow::bail!(
+            "repository-local network or credential Git config is not allowed for upstream mirrors"
+        ),
+        _ => {
+            let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&stderr);
+            anyhow::bail!(
+                "checking repository-local Git config failed: {}",
+                stderr.chars().take(4_096).collect::<String>()
+            )
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Budget for each preflight probe inside [`run_fetch`] (the URL-rewrite
+/// check and the sensitive-local-config scan). Both run local git children
+/// against the on-disk repo, so a short bound is generous; keeping them on
+/// their own deadlines means `upstream_mirror_fetch_timeout_secs` covers
+/// only the external pack transfer it documents.
+const PREFLIGHT_PROBE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
+
+fn run_fetch(
+    git_bin: &str,
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    upstream: &PinnedUpstream,
+    timeout: Duration,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let command = fetch_command(upstream);
+    let args: Vec<&str> = command.args.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
+    let config: Vec<(&str, &str)> = command
+        .config
+        .iter()
+        .map(|(key, value)| (key.as_str(), value.as_str()))
+        .collect();
+    let rewrite_deadline = Instant::now()
+        .checked_add(PREFLIGHT_PROBE_TIMEOUT)
+        .context("mirror URL-rewrite probe timeout is not representable")?;
+    reject_local_url_rewrite(git_bin, repo_path, &upstream.url, rewrite_deadline)?;
+    let config_deadline = Instant::now()
+        .checked_add(PREFLIGHT_PROBE_TIMEOUT)
+        .context("mirror local-config probe timeout is not representable")?;
+    reject_sensitive_local_config(git_bin, repo_path, config_deadline)?;
+    let deadline = Instant::now()
+        .checked_add(timeout)
+        .context("upstream mirror fetch timeout is not representable")?;
+    let (status, _stdout, stderr) =
+        crate::git::visibility_pack::run_bounded_git_raw_isolated_https_with_config(
+            git_bin, &args, repo_path, b"", deadline, &config,
+        )?;
+    if !status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&stderr);
+        let stderr = stderr.chars().take(4_096).collect::<String>();
+        anyhow::bail!("git upstream fetch failed: {stderr}");
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+struct Worker {
+    db: Arc<Db>,
+    config: Arc<Config>,
+    repo_store: RepoStore,
+    repo_write_leases: RepoWriteLeases,
+    git_write_semaphore: Arc<tokio::sync::Semaphore>,
+    policy: EgressPolicy,
+    git_bin: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+enum FetchOutcome {
+    Updated,
+    SkippedStale,
+}
+
+impl Worker {
+    async fn fetch_target(&self, target: InboundMirrorTarget) -> Result<FetchOutcome> {
+        let url = crate::db::validate_mirror_upstream_url(&target.upstream_url)?;
+        let upstream = self.policy.resolve(url).await?;
+
+        let repo_identity = repo_identity_key(&target.owner_did, &target.name);
+        let steal_after = Duration::from_secs(
+            self.config
+                .upstream_mirror_fetch_timeout_secs
+                .saturating_mul(2)
+                .saturating_add(60),
+        );
+        let _lease = self
+            .repo_write_leases
+            .acquire(&repo_identity, steal_after)
+            .await
+            .context("upstream mirror write-lease waiter cap reached")?;
+
+        let _write_permit = Arc::clone(&self.git_write_semaphore)
+            .acquire_owned()
+            .await
+            .context("upstream mirror write semaphore closed")?;
+        let acquire_timeout = Duration::from_secs(self.config.git_acquire_timeout_secs);
+        let guard = tokio::time::timeout(
+            acquire_timeout,
+            self.repo_store
+                .acquire_write(&target.owner_did, &target.name),
+        )
+        .await
+        .context("upstream mirror write-lock acquisition timed out")??;
+        let repo_path = guard.path().to_path_buf();
+
+        // A row can leave INBOUND state after selection. Recheck only after
+        // both the process-local lease and the cluster-wide advisory write lock
+        // are held. Every future transition path must take these same locks
+        // before changing authority, so no other node can commit a transition
+        // between this check and the fetch.
+        let current = match self.db.get_repo_mirror_state(&target.repo_id).await {
+            Ok(Some(current)) => current,
+            Ok(None) => {
+                let _ = guard.release(false).await;
+                anyhow::bail!("inbound mirror state disappeared before fetch");
+            }
+            Err(error) => {
+                let _ = guard.release(false).await;
+                return Err(error);
+            }
+        };
+        // Both stable shapes the CHECK admits: never transitioned, or a
+        // completed transition whose metadata is retained as audit. Only an
+        // in-flight transition makes the target stale.
+        let stable = (current.transition_id.is_none() && current.transition_phase.is_none())
+            || (current.transition_id.is_some()
+                && current.transition_phase == Some(MirrorTransitionPhase::Completed));
+        if current.status != MirrorStatus::Inbound
+            || !stable
+            || current.upstream_url != target.upstream_url
+        {
+            let _ = guard.release(false).await;
+            info!(repo_id = %target.repo_id, "upstream mirror state changed before fetch; skipping stale target");
+            return Ok(FetchOutcome::SkippedStale);
+        }
+
+        let git_bin = self.git_bin.clone();
+        let fetch_timeout = Duration::from_secs(self.config.upstream_mirror_fetch_timeout_secs);
+        let fetch = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
+            run_fetch(&git_bin, &repo_path, &upstream, fetch_timeout)
+        })
+        .await
+        .context("upstream mirror fetch task panicked")?;
+        let success = fetch.is_ok();
+        let outcome = guard.release(success).await;
+        // A refused publish (fenced or unknowable upload) must not report
+        // Updated; surface it as the failure it is before mapping the fetch.
+        outcome.into_result()?;
+        fetch.map(|()| FetchOutcome::Updated)
+    }
+
+    async fn scan_once(&self) {
+        let mut cursor: Option<String> = None;
+        loop {
+            let targets = match self
+                .db
+                .list_inbound_mirror_targets(
+                    cursor.as_deref(),
+                    self.config.upstream_mirror_page_size as i64,
+                )
+                .await
+            {
+                Ok(targets) => targets,
+                Err(error) => {
+                    warn!(err = %error, "failed to list inbound mirror targets");
+                    return;
+                }
+            };
+            if targets.is_empty() {
+                return;
+            }
+            let page_len = targets.len();
+            cursor = targets.last().map(|target| target.repo_id.clone());
+            for target in targets {
+                let repo_id = target.repo_id.clone();
+                let upstream_url = target.upstream_url.clone();
+                match self.fetch_target(target).await {
+                    Ok(FetchOutcome::Updated) => {
+                        info!(repo_id, upstream = %upstream_url, "upstream mirror fetch completed")
+                    }
+                    Ok(FetchOutcome::SkippedStale) => {}
+                    Err(error) => {
+                        warn!(repo_id, upstream = %upstream_url, err = %error, "upstream mirror fetch failed")
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if page_len < self.config.upstream_mirror_page_size {
+                return;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Validate the opt-in runtime and spawn the scheduled worker. The worker runs
+/// one scan immediately, sleeps only after a complete scan, and exits between
+/// scans when graceful shutdown is signalled. An in-flight Git child is bounded
+/// and reaped before the worker observes shutdown.
+pub fn start(
+    db: Arc<Db>,
+    config: Arc<Config>,
+    repo_store: RepoStore,
+    repo_write_leases: RepoWriteLeases,
+    git_write_semaphore: Arc<tokio::sync::Semaphore>,
+    mut shutdown_rx: tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bool>,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    ensure_safe_git_runtime("git")?;
+    let policy = EgressPolicy;
+    let worker = Worker {
+        db,
+        config: Arc::clone(&config),
+        repo_store,
+        repo_write_leases,
+        git_write_semaphore,
+        policy,
+        git_bin: "git".to_string(),
+    };
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        info!(
+            interval_secs = config.upstream_mirror_interval_secs,
+            "upstream mirror worker started"
+        );
+        loop {
+            worker.scan_once().await;
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(config.upstream_mirror_interval_secs)) => {}
+                changed = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
+                    if changed.is_err() || *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
+                        info!("upstream mirror worker stopped");
+                        return;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    });
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use clap::Parser;
+    use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+    async fn test_worker(
+        pool: sqlx::PgPool,
+        git_bin: PathBuf,
+        page_size: usize,
+    ) -> (Worker, Arc<Db>, tempfile::TempDir) {
+        let db = Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool.clone()));
+        db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
+        let repos = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let mut config = Config::parse_from([
+            "gitlawb-node".to_string(),
+            "--upstream-mirror-enabled".to_string(),
+            "--enforce-owner-push".to_string(),
+            "--upstream-mirror-fetch-timeout-secs".to_string(),
+            "5".to_string(),
+            "--upstream-mirror-page-size".to_string(),
+            page_size.to_string(),
+        ]);
+        config.validate().unwrap();
+        let config = Arc::new(config);
+        let worker = Worker {
+            db: Arc::clone(&db),
+            config,
+            repo_store: RepoStore::for_testing(repos.path().to_path_buf(), pool),
+            repo_write_leases: RepoWriteLeases::new(8),
+            git_write_semaphore: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(4)),
+            policy: EgressPolicy,
+            git_bin: git_bin.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
+        };
+        (worker, db, repos)
+    }
+
+    async fn add_inbound_mirror(
+        worker: &Worker,
+        db: &Db,
+        id: &str,
+        name: &str,
+        upstream_url: &str,
+    ) -> InboundMirrorTarget {
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now();
+        let record = crate::db::RepoRecord {
+            id: id.to_string(),
+            name: name.to_string(),
+            owner_did: "did:key:z6MkMirrorWorker".to_string(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: true,
+            default_branch: "main".to_string(),
+            created_at: now,
+            updated_at: now,
+            disk_path: format!("/test/{id}.git"),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        };
+        db.create_repo(&record).await.unwrap();
+        worker
+            .repo_store
+            .init(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let state = db
+            .configure_inbound_mirror(&record.id, upstream_url)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        InboundMirrorTarget {
+            repo_id: record.id,
+            owner_did: record.owner_did,
+            name: record.name,
+            upstream_url: state.upstream_url,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn fake_git(repos: &tempfile::TempDir) -> (PathBuf, PathBuf) {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+
+        let git = repos.path().join("fake-git");
+        let calls = repos.path().join("fetch-calls");
+        let script = format!(
+            r#"#!/bin/sh
+if [ "$1" = "ls-remote" ]; then
+  printf '%s\n' "$3"
+  exit 0
+fi
+if [ "$1" = "config" ]; then
+  # Match real Git when no sensitive repository-local keys are configured.
+  exit 1
+fi
+case "$*" in
+  *fail.git*) printf '%s\n' fail >> '{}'; exit 7 ;;
+  *) printf '%s\n' ok >> '{}'; exit 0 ;;
+esac
+"#,
+            calls.display(),
+            calls.display()
+        );
+        std::fs::write(&git, script).unwrap();
+        let mut permissions = std::fs::metadata(&git).unwrap().permissions();
+        permissions.set_mode(0o700);
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&git, permissions).unwrap();
+        (git, calls)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn git_version_gate_requires_curlopt_resolve_support() {
+        assert_eq!(parse_git_version("git version 2.37.0"), Some((2, 37)));
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_git_version("git version 2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)"),
+            Some((2, 39))
+        );
+        assert_eq!(parse_git_version("not git"), None);
+        assert!((2, 36) < MIN_CURL_OPT_RESOLVE_GIT);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn every_resolved_address_must_be_public() {
+        let policy = EgressPolicy;
+        let public_v4: IpAddr = "8.8.8.8".parse().unwrap();
+        let private_v4: IpAddr = "10.2.3.4".parse().unwrap();
+        let private_v6: IpAddr = "fd00::20".parse().unwrap();
+        assert!(policy
+            .validate_addresses("public.example", &[public_v4])
+            .is_ok());
+        assert!(policy
+            .validate_addresses("private.example", &[private_v4, private_v6])
+            .is_err());
+        assert!(policy
+            .validate_addresses("mixed.example", &[public_v4, private_v4])
+            .is_err());
+        let too_many = (1..=MAX_PINNED_ADDRESSES + 1)
+            .map(|last| IpAddr::V4(std::net::Ipv4Addr::new(8, 8, 0, last as u8)))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+        assert!(policy
+            .validate_addresses("oversized.example", &too_many)
+            .is_err());
+
+        for never in [
+            "127.0.0.1",
+            "169.254.169.254",
+            "192.0.2.1",
+            "198.18.0.1",
+            "198.51.100.1",
+            "203.0.113.10",
+            "::1",
+            "::ffff:198.18.0.1",
+            "2002:c612:1::",
+            "64:ff9b::c612:1",
+            "100::1",
+            "100:0:0:1::1",
+            "2001::1",
+            "2001:2::1",
+            "2001:db8::1",
+            "fec0::1",
+            "fe80::1",
+            "3fff::1",
+            "5f00::1",
+        ] {
+            let ip = never.parse().unwrap();
+            assert!(!address_is_permitted(ip), "{never} must stay denied");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn local_only_hostnames_are_always_rejected() {
+        for invalid in [
+            "",
+            "localhost",
+            "forge.localhost",
+            "forge.local",
+            "ghe.internal",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                reject_always_local_hostname(invalid).is_err(),
+                "{invalid:?}"
+            );
+        }
+        assert!(reject_always_local_hostname("github.example").is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fetch_command_pins_dns_and_only_updates_branches_and_tags() {
+        let upstream = PinnedUpstream {
+            url: "https://github.example/org/repo.git".to_string(),
+            curlopt_resolve: Some("+github.example:443:8.8.8.8,[2606:4700:4700::1111]".to_string()),
+        };
+        let command = fetch_command(&upstream);
+        let has_config = |key: &str, value: &str| {
+            command
+                .config
+                .contains(&(key.to_string(), value.to_string()))
+        };
+        assert!(has_config("http.followRedirects", "false"));
+        assert!(has_config("http.proxy", ""));
+        assert!(has_config("http.extraHeader", ""));
+        assert!(has_config("http.cookieFile", ""));
+        assert!(has_config("http.saveCookies", "false"));
+        assert!(has_config("http.sslVerify", "true"));
+        assert!(has_config(
+            "http.curloptResolve",
+            "+github.example:443:8.8.8.8,[2606:4700:4700::1111]"
+        ));
+        assert!(has_config(
+            "http.https://github.example/org/repo.git.followRedirects",
+            "false"
+        ));
+        assert!(has_config(
+            "http.https://github.example/org/repo.git.proxy",
+            ""
+        ));
+        assert!(has_config(
+            "http.https://github.example/org/repo.git.extraHeader",
+            ""
+        ));
+        assert!(has_config(
+            "http.https://github.example/org/repo.git.curloptResolve",
+            "+github.example:443:8.8.8.8,[2606:4700:4700::1111]"
+        ));
+        assert!(has_config(
+            "credential.https://github.example/org/repo.git.helper",
+            ""
+        ));
+        assert!(has_config("protocol.allow", "never"));
+        assert!(has_config("protocol.https.allow", "always"));
+        assert!(has_config("fetch.uriprotocols", ""));
+        assert!(has_config("fetch.bundleURI", ""));
+        assert!(!command
+            .config
+            .iter()
+            .any(|(key, _)| key.ends_with("sslCert") || key.ends_with("sslKey")));
+        assert!(command.args.contains(&"--atomic".to_string()));
+        assert!(command
+            .args
+            .contains(&"+refs/heads/*:refs/heads/*".to_string()));
+        assert!(command
+            .args
+            .contains(&"+refs/tags/*:refs/tags/*".to_string()));
+        assert!(!command.args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "+refs/*:refs/*"));
+    }
+
+    /// Spawn `git` inside a fixture repo with inherited repository-location
+    /// and config environment scrubbed, so a test run inside an outer Git
+    /// checkout or custom config can never leak into the fixture.
+    fn fixture_git(dir: &std::path::Path) -> std::process::Command {
+        let mut cmd = std::process::Command::new("git");
+        cmd.current_dir(dir);
+        for var in [
+            "GIT_DIR",
+            "GIT_WORK_TREE",
+            "GIT_CONFIG",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT",
+            "GIT_EXEC_PATH",
+            "GIT_SSH",
+            "GIT_SSH_COMMAND",
+            "GIT_ASKPASS",
+            "SSH_ASKPASS",
+        ] {
+            cmd.env_remove(var);
+        }
+        cmd
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn repository_local_instead_of_rewrite_is_rejected() {
+        let repo = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let init = fixture_git(repo.path())
+            .args(["init", "--bare"])
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(init.status.success());
+        let config = fixture_git(repo.path())
+            .args([
+                "config",
+                "url.https://evil.example/.insteadOf",
+                "https://github.example/",
+            ])
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(config.status.success());
+
+        let error = reject_local_url_rewrite(
+            "git",
+            repo.path(),
+            "https://github.example/org/repo.git",
+            Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5),
+        )
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(error.to_string().contains("attempted to rewrite"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn repository_local_network_and_credential_config_is_rejected() {
+        let repo = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let init = fixture_git(repo.path())
+            .args(["init", "--bare"])
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(init.status.success());
+
+        reject_sensitive_local_config("git", repo.path(), Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5))
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let config = fixture_git(repo.path())
+            .args(["config", "http.sslCert", "/tmp/untrusted-client.pem"])
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(config.status.success());
+
+        let error = reject_sensitive_local_config(
+            "git",
+            repo.path(),
+            Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5),
+        )
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(error.to_string().contains("network or credential"));
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn hardened_real_git_reaches_https_transport_for_equals_path() {
+        let repo = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let init = fixture_git(repo.path())
+            .args(["init", "--bare"])
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(init.status.success());
+
+        // This is intentionally a loopback test seam around `run_fetch`, below
+        // the egress-policy layer. Reaching the listener proves the generated
+        // Git config neither dies on an empty client certificate nor splits the
+        // valid `=` path at the command-config boundary. The listener closes
+        // immediately, so the expected final result is a TLS transport error.
+        let listener = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+        let port = listener.local_addr().unwrap().port();
+        listener.set_nonblocking(true).unwrap();
+        let accepted = std::thread::spawn(move || {
+            let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(3);
+            while Instant::now() < deadline {
+                match listener.accept() {
+                    Ok((_stream, _address)) => return true,
+                    Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock => {
+                        std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(10));
+                    }
+                    Err(error) => panic!("accepting real-Git transport probe: {error}"),
+                }
+            }
+            false
+        });
+        let upstream = PinnedUpstream {
+            url: format!("https://127.0.0.1:{port}/org/repo=mirror.git"),
+            curlopt_resolve: None,
+        };
+        let error = run_fetch("git", repo.path(), &upstream, Duration::from_secs(5)).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            accepted.join().unwrap(),
+            "real Git must reach the HTTPS transport; got {error:#}"
+        );
+        let error = error.to_string();
+        assert!(!error.contains("credential missing host field"));
+        assert!(!error.contains("invalid key"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn literal_addresses_are_checked_without_dns() {
+        let policy = EgressPolicy;
+        let allowed = policy
+            .resolve(reqwest::Url::parse("https://8.8.8.8/org/repo.git").unwrap())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(allowed.curlopt_resolve, None);
+
+        for denied in [
+            "127.0.0.1",
+            "10.2.3.4",
+            "169.254.169.254",
+            "192.0.2.1",
+            "198.18.0.1",
+            "203.0.113.10",
+            "[::1]",
+            "[100::1]",
+            "[100:0:0:1::1]",
+            "[2001::1]",
+            "[2001:db8::1]",
+            "[fec0::1]",
+            "[fd00::20]",
+            "[3fff::1]",
+            "[5f00::1]",
+        ] {
+            let url = reqwest::Url::parse(&format!("https://{denied}/org/repo.git")).unwrap();
+            assert!(
+                policy.resolve(url).await.is_err(),
+                "{denied} must stay denied"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn stale_target_is_rechecked_under_the_write_locks(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        let missing_git = PathBuf::from("/definitely/missing/git");
+        let (worker, db, _repos) = test_worker(pool, missing_git, 1).await;
+        let target = add_inbound_mirror(
+            &worker,
+            &db,
+            "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001",
+            "stale",
+            "https://8.8.8.8/org/stale.git",
+        )
+        .await;
+        sqlx::query(
+            "UPDATE repos
+             SET mirror_status = 'outbound'
+             WHERE id = $1",
+        )
+        .bind(&target.repo_id)
+        .execute(db.pool())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let outcome = worker.fetch_target(target).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(outcome, FetchOutcome::SkippedStale);
+        assert!(worker.repo_write_leases.is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn scan_pages_past_one_failure_and_fetches_the_next_repo(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        let bootstrap = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let (git, calls) = fake_git(&bootstrap);
+        let (worker, db, _repos) = test_worker(pool, git, 1).await;
+        add_inbound_mirror(
+            &worker,
+            &db,
+            "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001",
+            "fails",
+            "https://8.8.8.8/org/fail.git",
+        )
+        .await;
+        add_inbound_mirror(
+            &worker,
+            &db,
+            "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002",
+            "succeeds",
+            "https://8.8.8.8/org/ok.git",
+        )
+        .await;
+
+        worker.scan_once().await;
+
+        let calls = std::fs::read_to_string(calls).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(calls.lines().collect::<Vec<_>>(), ["fail", "ok"]);
+        assert!(worker.repo_write_leases.is_empty());
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/webhook_secret.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+//! At-rest protection for webhook HMAC secrets (#506).
+//!
+//! Webhook secrets are signing keys: whoever holds one can forge delivery
+//! payloads to the receiver the hook points at. They are persisted in the
+//! `webhooks.secret` column and used to compute the `X-Gitlawb-Signature-256`
+//! header on each delivery. That secret needs two properties:
+//!
+//!   * It must never reach a log line or an API response. [`WebhookSecret`]
+//!     redacts both `Debug` and `Serialize`, so no derived `{:?}` and no JSON
+//!     body ever renders the value, whatever it contains.
+//!   * It must not rest as plaintext where a database dump or backup can read
+//!     it. The node seals the secret with a key derived from its persistent
+//!     identity (see `AppState::derive_webhook_secret_key`), so a dump alone
+//!     reveals nothing.
+//!
+//! Storage format: `enc:v1:<base64url(nonce || ciphertext)>` — a 24-byte
+//! XChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce followed by the ciphertext (which carries the tag).
+//! Anything without the `enc:v1:` prefix is a legacy plaintext value, written
+//! before this protection shipped; the delivery path signs with those unchanged
+//! and they are re-encrypted once at startup by
+//! `Db::reencrypt_legacy_webhook_secrets`.
+
+use std::fmt;
+
+use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD as B64URL, Engine};
+use chacha20poly1305::{
+    aead::{Aead, AeadCore, KeyInit, OsRng},
+    XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
+};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Serialize, Serializer};
+
+/// Prefix marking a sealed-at-rest secret. Legacy plaintext values lack it.
+pub const SEAL_PREFIX: &str = "enc:v1:";
+
+const NONCE_LEN: usize = 24;
+
+/// An HMAC signing secret that never renders its contents in debug or JSON
+/// output. Used as `Webhook.secret`, so that field is safe to `Debug`-print and
+/// `Serialize` by construction rather than by discipline at each call site.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct WebhookSecret(String);
+
+impl WebhookSecret {
+    pub fn new(inner: String) -> Self {
+        Self(inner)
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_str(&self) -> &str {
+        &self.0
+    }
+
+    /// Whether the value is a sealed ciphertext (as opposed to legacy plaintext).
+    pub fn is_sealed(&self) -> bool {
+        self.0.starts_with(SEAL_PREFIX)
+    }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Debug for WebhookSecret {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        f.write_str("\"***\"")
+    }
+}
+
+impl Serialize for WebhookSecret {
+    /// Emit a fixed marker, never the contents. On the wire a set secret is
+    /// `"secret": "***"` and an unset one is `"secret": null` (`Option`), which
+    /// the CLI already reads as "is a secret set".
+    fn serialize<S: Serializer>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
+        serializer.serialize_str("***")
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for WebhookSecret {
+    fn deserialize<D: Deserializer<'de>>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error> {
+        Ok(WebhookSecret(String::deserialize(deserializer)?))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Seal a plaintext secret under a node-held key. A fresh `OsRng` nonce on every
+/// seal guarantees repeated seals of the same secret never collide.
+pub fn seal(key: &[u8; 32], plaintext: &str) -> String {
+    let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(key).expect("webhook secret key is 32 bytes");
+    let nonce = XChaCha20Poly1305::generate_nonce(&mut OsRng);
+    let ciphertext = cipher
+        .encrypt(&nonce, plaintext.as_bytes())
+        .expect("XChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption is infallible for in-memory inputs");
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(NONCE_LEN + ciphertext.len());
+    out.extend_from_slice(&nonce);
+    out.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
+    format!("{SEAL_PREFIX}{}", B64URL.encode(out))
+}
+
+/// Open a sealed secret. Returns `None` for anything that is not a well-formed
+/// sealed value — legacy plaintext, a foreign key, tampered or truncated bytes —
+/// so a caller that needs the legacy path checks [`WebhookSecret::is_sealed`]
+/// first (see [`reveal`]).
+pub fn open(key: &[u8; 32], stored: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let raw = B64URL.decode(stored.strip_prefix(SEAL_PREFIX)?).ok()?;
+    if raw.len() <= NONCE_LEN {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let (nonce, ciphertext) = raw.split_at(NONCE_LEN);
+    let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(key).ok()?;
+    let plaintext = cipher.decrypt(XNonce::from_slice(nonce), ciphertext).ok()?;
+    String::from_utf8(plaintext).ok()
+}
+
+/// Whether a stored value has the structural shape of a sealed payload:
+/// [`SEAL_PREFIX`] plus a base64url blob long enough to hold a nonce and
+/// ciphertext. This is a shape check, not an authentication check: a
+/// well-formed blob sealed under a different key satisfies it while [`open`]
+/// still fails. The re-encryption pass uses the distinction to leave
+/// well-formed-but-foreign ciphertext alone instead of re-wrapping it as
+/// plaintext, which would let `reveal` return the outer blob as a signing key.
+pub fn has_seal_shape(stored: &str) -> bool {
+    stored
+        .strip_prefix(SEAL_PREFIX)
+        .and_then(|rest| B64URL.decode(rest).ok())
+        .is_some_and(|raw| raw.len() > NONCE_LEN)
+}
+
+/// Resolve a stored secret to its plaintext for signing. Sealed values are opened
+/// with the node key; legacy plaintext is returned unchanged so a hook created
+/// before this fix keeps signing until the startup re-encryption pass runs.
+pub fn reveal(key: &[u8; 32], stored: &WebhookSecret) -> Option<String> {
+    if stored.is_sealed() {
+        open(key, stored.as_str())
+    } else {
+        Some(stored.as_str().to_string())
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use rand::Rng;
+
+    /// Test keys need no secrecy, but they still come from the OS CSPRNG so no
+    /// hard-coded key material sits in the tree. A wrong key fails XChaCha20-Poly1305
+    /// authentication with overwhelming probability, so the "wrong key" case stays
+    /// deterministic in practice.
+    fn new_key() -> [u8; 32] {
+        OsRng.gen()
+    }
+
+    fn other_key() -> [u8; 32] {
+        OsRng.gen()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn seal_open_round_trip() {
+        let k = new_key();
+        let sealed = seal(&k, "s3cr3t-value");
+        assert!(sealed.starts_with(SEAL_PREFIX));
+        assert_eq!(open(&k, &sealed).as_deref(), Some("s3cr3t-value"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sealed_value_is_never_the_plaintext() {
+        let k = new_key();
+        let sealed = seal(&k, "s3cr3t-value");
+        assert!(!sealed.contains("s3cr3t-value"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn wrong_key_does_not_open() {
+        let sealed = seal(&new_key(), "s3cr3t-value");
+        assert_eq!(open(&other_key(), &sealed), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tampered_or_truncated_value_does_not_open() {
+        let k = new_key();
+        let sealed = seal(&k, "s3cr3t-value");
+        // Flip a byte inside the base64 payload.
+        let mut chars: Vec<char> = sealed.chars().collect();
+        let idx = SEAL_PREFIX.len();
+        chars[idx] = if chars[idx] == 'A' { 'B' } else { 'A' };
+        let tampered: String = chars.into_iter().collect();
+        assert_eq!(open(&k, &tampered), None);
+        // A value that is just the prefix (no nonce/ciphertext) is malformed.
+        assert_eq!(open(&k, SEAL_PREFIX), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn reveal_opens_a_sealed_value() {
+        let k = new_key();
+        let sealed = WebhookSecret::new(seal(&k, "s3cr3t-value"));
+        assert_eq!(reveal(&k, &sealed).as_deref(), Some("s3cr3t-value"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn legacy_plaintext_is_revealed_unchanged() {
+        let k = new_key();
+        let legacy = WebhookSecret::new("plaintext-secret".into());
+        assert!(!legacy.is_sealed());
+        assert_eq!(reveal(&k, &legacy).as_deref(), Some("plaintext-secret"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn debug_is_redacted() {
+        let s = WebhookSecret::new("s3cr3t-value".into());
+        let rendered = format!("{s:?}");
+        assert!(!rendered.contains("s3cr3t-value"));
+        assert_eq!(rendered, "\"***\"");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn serialize_is_redacted() {
+        let s = WebhookSecret::new("s3cr3t-value".into());
+        let json = serde_json::to_string(&s).unwrap();
+        assert!(!json.contains("s3cr3t-value"));
+        assert_eq!(json, "\"***\"");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn deserialize_reads_the_underlying_string() {
+        let s: WebhookSecret = serde_json::from_str("\"s3cr3t-value\"").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(s.as_str(), "s3cr3t-value");
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/webhooks.rs

@@ -30,34 +30,200 @@ fn sign_payload(secret: &str, payload: &[u8]) -> String {
     format!("sha256={}", hex::encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes()))
 }
 
+/// What the signing step decided for one hook. Keeping this a decision (not a
+/// bare `Option`) lets the delivery path tell "hook has no secret" (send
+/// unsigned) apart from "hook has a secret that could not be opened" (withhold:
+/// an unsigned POST would present a broken hook as working while the ledger
+/// marks the event delivered).
+enum SigningOutcome {
+    NoSecret,
+    Signed(String),
+    Withhold,
+}
+
+fn signing_decision(
+    secret_key: &[u8; 32],
+    secret: Option<&crate::webhook_secret::WebhookSecret>,
+    bytes: &[u8],
+) -> SigningOutcome {
+    match secret {
+        None => SigningOutcome::NoSecret,
+        Some(s) => match crate::webhook_secret::reveal(secret_key, s) {
+            Some(plain) => SigningOutcome::Signed(sign_payload(&plain, bytes)),
+            None => SigningOutcome::Withhold,
+        },
+    }
+}
+
 /// Fire webhooks for `event` on `repo_id`. Spawns background tasks — never blocks.
 pub fn fire_event(
     db: Arc<Db>,
     http_client: Arc<reqwest::Client>,
+    secret_key: Arc<[u8; 32]>,
     repo_id: &str,
     event: &str,
     payload: serde_json::Value,
+) {
+    fire_event_occurrence(
+        db,
+        http_client,
+        secret_key,
+        repo_id,
+        event,
+        payload,
+        None,
+        None,
+    );
+}
+
+/// Occurrence-keyed variant: at most one delivery per
+/// `(request_id, ref_name, hook)` is spawned; concurrent executors
+/// collapse via the `webhook_deliveries` ledger. Best-effort on crash
+/// (ledger is claimed before spawn), which the PR scope allows.
+///
+/// For durable outbox usage, call `claim_webhook_delivery_before_spawn` first
+/// to claim deliveries synchronously, then call
+/// `fire_event_occurrence_with_claimed_hooks` with the claimed hook IDs to
+/// spawn HTTP POST only for claimed hooks.
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+pub fn fire_event_occurrence(
+    db: Arc<Db>,
+    http_client: Arc<reqwest::Client>,
+    secret_key: Arc<[u8; 32]>,
+    repo_id: &str,
+    event: &str,
+    payload: serde_json::Value,
+    request_id: Option<&str>,
+    ref_name: Option<&str>,
 ) {
     let repo_id = repo_id.to_string();
     let event = event.to_string();
+    let request_id = request_id.map(|s| s.to_string());
+    let ref_name = ref_name.map(|s| s.to_string());
     tokio::spawn(async move {
-        fire_event_async(db, http_client, &repo_id, &event, payload).await;
+        fire_event_async_occurrence(
+            db,
+            http_client,
+            secret_key,
+            &repo_id,
+            &event,
+            payload,
+            request_id.as_deref(),
+            ref_name.as_deref(),
+            None,
+        )
+        .await;
     });
 }
 
-async fn fire_event_async(
+/// Variant for durable outbox: only spawn HTTP POST for previously claimed hooks.
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+pub fn fire_event_occurrence_with_claimed_hooks(
     db: Arc<Db>,
     http_client: Arc<reqwest::Client>,
+    secret_key: Arc<[u8; 32]>,
     repo_id: &str,
     event: &str,
     payload: serde_json::Value,
+    request_id: Option<&str>,
+    ref_name: Option<&str>,
+    claimed_hooks: Vec<crate::db::Webhook>,
 ) {
-    let hooks = match db.list_webhooks_for_event(repo_id, event).await {
-        Ok(h) => h,
-        Err(e) => {
-            tracing::warn!(err = %e, "failed to list webhooks for event {event}");
-            return;
+    let repo_id = repo_id.to_string();
+    let event = event.to_string();
+    let request_id = request_id.map(|s| s.to_string());
+    let ref_name = ref_name.map(|s| s.to_string());
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        fire_event_async_occurrence(
+            db,
+            http_client,
+            secret_key,
+            &repo_id,
+            &event,
+            payload,
+            request_id.as_deref(),
+            ref_name.as_deref(),
+            Some(claimed_hooks),
+        )
+        .await;
+    });
+}
+
+/// Claim webhook delivery before spawning HTTP POST.
+/// Returns `Some(hook ids)` successfully claimed, or `None` when the hook
+/// list itself could not be read (transient DB error, unknown membership).
+/// A `None` caller must fall back to best-effort send rather than dropping
+/// the delivery: children are still deleted downstream, so an empty claim
+/// set on DB error would lose the webhook permanently.
+/// This synchronous claim phase must be awaited before child deletion to prevent
+/// permanent webhook loss on crash between deletion and claim.
+pub async fn claim_webhook_delivery_before_spawn(
+    db: Arc<Db>,
+    repo_id: &str,
+    event: &str,
+    request_id: Option<&str>,
+    ref_name: Option<&str>,
+) -> Option<Vec<crate::db::Webhook>> {
+    let mut claimed_hooks = Vec::new();
+
+    // Only claim when we have occurrence context (request_id + ref_name)
+    if let (Some(req), Some(r)) = (request_id, ref_name) {
+        let hooks = match db.list_webhooks_for_event(repo_id, event).await {
+            Ok(h) => h,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(err = %e, "failed to list webhooks for event {event}");
+                return None;
+            }
+        };
+
+        for hook in hooks {
+            let delivery_id = crate::db::deterministic_id(&["webhook", req, r, &hook.id]);
+            match db
+                .claim_webhook_delivery(&delivery_id, req, repo_id, event)
+                .await
+            {
+                Ok(true) => claimed_hooks.push(hook),
+                Ok(false) => continue, // Already claimed
+                // Send fallback (legacy best-effort): a transient claim
+                // error must not drop the delivery while children are
+                // still deleted. The in-task claimer this replaced sent
+                // anyway on claim error; keep that here.
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::warn!(err = %e, hook_id = %hook.id, "webhook claim failed; sending anyway");
+                    claimed_hooks.push(hook);
+                }
+            }
         }
+    }
+
+    Some(claimed_hooks)
+}
+
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+async fn fire_event_async_occurrence(
+    db: Arc<Db>,
+    http_client: Arc<reqwest::Client>,
+    secret_key: Arc<[u8; 32]>,
+    repo_id: &str,
+    event: &str,
+    payload: serde_json::Value,
+    request_id: Option<&str>,
+    ref_name: Option<&str>,
+    claimed_hooks: Option<Vec<crate::db::Webhook>>,
+) {
+    // A caller that already claimed deliveries hands the claimed hook rows
+    // through; the send path must not re-list, because a list failure here
+    // would silently drop deliveries already claimed in the ledger.
+    let already_claimed = claimed_hooks.is_some();
+    let hooks = match claimed_hooks {
+        Some(h) => h,
+        None => match db.list_webhooks_for_event(repo_id, event).await {
+            Ok(h) => h,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(err = %e, "failed to list webhooks for event {event}");
+                return;
+            }
+        },
     };
 
     if hooks.is_empty() {
@@ -76,8 +242,30 @@ async fn fire_event_async(
         let client = Arc::clone(&http_client);
         let event_name = event.to_string();
         let bytes = payload_bytes.clone();
-        let delivery_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
+        // Stable occurrence delivery key when request context exists;
+        // random UUID otherwise (legacy callers without occurrence).
+        let delivery_id = match (request_id, ref_name) {
+            (Some(req), Some(r)) => crate::db::deterministic_id(&["webhook", req, r, &hook.id]),
+            _ => uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+        };
+        // Claim before spawn so concurrent executors collapse to one
+        // delivery per occurrence. Failures to record fall back to
+        // sending (legacy best-effort) rather than dropping.
+        // Skip claim if already done by caller (durable_outbox path).
+        if !already_claimed && request_id.is_some() {
+            match db
+                .clone()
+                .claim_webhook_delivery(&delivery_id, request_id.unwrap_or(""), repo_id, event)
+                .await
+            {
+                Ok(true) => {}
+                Ok(false) => continue,
+                Err(_) => {}
+            }
+        }
 
+        let db_for_mark = db.clone();
+        let secret_key = Arc::clone(&secret_key);
         tokio::spawn(async move {
             // Policy skip, not a delivery failure: the stored URL predates the
             // create-time gate. The "invalid_url" label is documented on
@@ -92,7 +280,29 @@ async fn fire_event_async(
                 return;
             }
 
-            let signature = hook.secret.as_deref().map(|s| sign_payload(s, &bytes));
+            let delivery_for_mark = delivery_id.clone();
+            // Open the secret only at signing time; at rest it stays sealed.
+            let signature =
+                match signing_decision(secret_key.as_ref(), hook.secret.as_ref(), &bytes) {
+                    SigningOutcome::NoSecret => None,
+                    SigningOutcome::Signed(sig) => Some(sig),
+                    // A hook that HAS a secret must sign with it or not deliver at
+                    // all: `reveal` returning None means the stored value could
+                    // not be opened (a foreign or rotated key, a truncated
+                    // ciphertext), and sending unsigned would present a broken
+                    // hook as a working one while the ledger marks the event
+                    // delivered. The row stays pending, like a network error, so
+                    // a fixed key can still land it.
+                    SigningOutcome::Withhold => {
+                        crate::metrics::record_webhook_delivery("secret_unopenable");
+                        tracing::warn!(
+                            hook_id = %hook.id,
+                            delivery_id = %delivery_for_mark,
+                            "webhook secret could not be opened; delivery withheld"
+                        );
+                        return;
+                    }
+                };
 
             let mut req = client
                 .post(&hook.url)
@@ -113,6 +323,10 @@ async fn fire_event_async(
                         "http_error"
                     };
                     crate::metrics::record_webhook_delivery(result_label);
+                    // Any HTTP response proves the delivery fired; mark
+                    // sent so the ledger never claims an unsent delivery.
+                    // Network errors stay pending for stale-reclaim.
+                    let _ = db_for_mark.mark_webhook_sent(&delivery_for_mark).await;
                     tracing::info!(
                         url = %hook.url,
                         event = %event_name,
@@ -133,3 +347,60 @@ async fn fire_event_async(
         });
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use rand::Rng;
+
+    fn key() -> [u8; 32] {
+        chacha20poly1305::aead::OsRng.gen()
+    }
+
+    /// A hook with no secret delivers unsigned, as before.
+    #[test]
+    fn signing_decision_no_secret_is_unsigned() {
+        assert!(matches!(
+            signing_decision(&key(), None, b"{}"),
+            SigningOutcome::NoSecret
+        ));
+    }
+
+    /// A sealed secret that opens signs with the revealed plaintext.
+    #[test]
+    fn signing_decision_sealed_secret_signs() {
+        let k = key();
+        let sealed =
+            crate::webhook_secret::WebhookSecret::new(crate::webhook_secret::seal(&k, "topsecret"));
+        match signing_decision(&k, Some(&sealed), b"{}") {
+            SigningOutcome::Signed(sig) => {
+                assert_eq!(sig, sign_payload("topsecret", b"{}"))
+            }
+            _ => panic!("an openable sealed secret must produce a signature"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// A stored value that carries the sealed prefix but cannot be opened
+    /// (foreign key, truncated ciphertext) must withhold, never send unsigned.
+    #[test]
+    fn signing_decision_unopenable_secret_withholds() {
+        let garbage =
+            crate::webhook_secret::WebhookSecret::new("enc:v1:bm90LWNoaXBoZXJ0ZXh0".to_string());
+        assert!(matches!(
+            signing_decision(&key(), Some(&garbage), b"{}"),
+            SigningOutcome::Withhold
+        ));
+    }
+
+    /// A legacy plaintext value signs with itself unchanged.
+    #[test]
+    fn signing_decision_legacy_plaintext_signs() {
+        let legacy = crate::webhook_secret::WebhookSecret::new("plainsecret".to_string());
+        match signing_decision(&key(), Some(&legacy), b"{}") {
+            SigningOutcome::Signed(sig) => {
+                assert_eq!(sig, sign_payload("plainsecret", b"{}"))
+            }
+            _ => panic!("legacy plaintext must keep signing"),
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/tests/inv22_gates.rs

@@ -416,8 +416,8 @@ fn f3_second_writer_leased_until_reap() {
          NOT RepoWriteGuard (which drops at the disconnect instant, reopening F3).",
     );
     let receive = repos_production
-        .find("smart_http::receive_pack(")
-        .expect("F3 gate stale: git_receive_pack no longer calls smart_http::receive_pack");
+        .find("smart_http::receive_pack_raw")
+        .expect("F3 gate stale: git_receive_pack no longer calls smart_http::receive_pack_raw");
     assert!(
         lease_acquire < with_lease && with_lease < receive,
         "F3 gate bypassed: the write lease must be acquired, then carried by the \
@@ -509,8 +509,8 @@ fn inv22_ipfs_walk_admission_reaches_every_blocking_site() {
 /// too, so an ungated spawn would fire for a push git rejected, pinning and announcing
 /// a half-applied repo. Above `release` the `?` on `receive_result` can no longer be
 /// what gates it, so the success check is explicit and this gate binds it: the spawn
-/// must sit inside `if push_succeeded`, and `release` must consume the same flag so
-/// the two cannot drift apart.
+/// must sit inside `if disposition.spawn_tail`, and `release` must consume the same
+/// disposition (`disposition.release_ok`) so the two cannot drift apart.
 ///
 /// This is an ordering check rather than a cancellation-race test on purpose: it is
 /// the companion to `receive_pack_tail_survives_a_disconnect_during_release`, which
@@ -519,7 +519,9 @@ fn inv22_ipfs_walk_admission_reaches_every_blocking_site() {
 ///
 /// MUTATION (RED): move the `tokio::spawn(post_receive_replication_tail` call below
 /// `guard.release(` and the ordering assertion fails; take it out of the
-/// `if push_succeeded` block and the failed-push assertion fails.
+/// `if disposition.spawn_tail` block and the failed-push assertion fails; gate
+/// `spawn_tail`/`release_ok` on the outcome commit and
+/// `post_git_disposition_replication_carve_out` fails with it.
 #[test]
 fn inv22_replication_tail_spawns_at_the_durability_boundary() {
     let repos = src("api/repos.rs");
@@ -534,41 +536,589 @@ fn inv22_replication_tail_spawns_at_the_durability_boundary() {
         .expect("split always yields a first chunk");
 
     let success_flag = production
-        .find("let push_succeeded = receive_result.is_ok();")
-        .expect(
-            "U5 gate missing: the tail's success gate must be bound from receive_result.is_ok()",
+        .find("post_git_disposition(")
+        .expect("U5 gate missing: the tail's disposition must be bound before the gate");
+    // One tail per push, on the proven-landed ref set. Either spawn
+    // position (carve-out early, or durability-bound at release) must sit
+    // inside a `disposition.spawn_tail` gate and feed `landed_refs` —
+    // never the unfiltered `ref_updates`.
+    let spawn_count = production
+        .matches("tokio::spawn(post_receive_replication_tail(")
+        .count();
+    assert!(
+        spawn_count >= 1,
+        "U5 gate missing: the replication tail must be spawned by git_receive_pack"
+    );
+    for (i, (pos, _)) in production
+        .match_indices("tokio::spawn(post_receive_replication_tail(")
+        .enumerate()
+    {
+        let gate = production[..pos].rfind("if disposition.spawn_tail").expect(
+            "U5 gate missing: every tail spawn must be gated on `if disposition.spawn_tail`",
         );
-    let gate_open = production
-        .find("if push_succeeded {")
-        .expect("U5 gate missing: the tail spawn must be gated on the push having succeeded");
+        // The spawn must sit inside the gate's block: brace depth at the
+        // spawn position must still be positive measured from the `if`.
+        // An ungated spawn after the block closes fails this, as does a
+        // stray `disposition.spawn_tail` mention in a comment.
+        let mut depth = 0i32;
+        for ch in production[gate..pos].chars() {
+            match ch {
+                '{' => depth += 1,
+                '}' => depth -= 1,
+                _ => {}
+            }
+        }
+        assert!(
+            depth >= 1,
+            "U5 gate bypassed: tail #{i} sits outside the `if disposition.spawn_tail` block"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !production[gate..pos].contains("post_receive_replication_tail"),
+            "U5 gate bypassed: a second tail spawn sits between the gate and its spawn"
+        );
+        let call_end = production[pos..].find(");").unwrap() + pos;
+        let call = &production[pos..call_end];
+        assert!(
+            call.contains("landed_refs"),
+            "U5 gate bypassed: tail #{i} must carry the proven-landed ref set, not unfiltered ref_updates"
+        );
+    }
     let spawn = production
         .find("tokio::spawn(post_receive_replication_tail(")
         .expect("U5 gate missing: the replication tail must be spawned by git_receive_pack");
     let release = production
-        .find(".release(push_succeeded)")
-        .expect("U5 gate stale: release must consume the same success flag as the tail gate");
+        .find(".release(disposition.release_ok)")
+        .expect("U5 gate stale: release must consume the same disposition as the tail gate");
     let touch = production
         .find("state.db.touch_repo(")
         .expect("U5 gate stale: git_receive_pack no longer calls touch_repo");
-    let webhook = production
-        .find("webhooks::fire_event(")
-        .expect("U5 gate stale: git_receive_pack no longer fires push webhooks");
+    // #26 Split PR 1 step 3 — the webhook fan-out moved into
+    // `durable_outbox::apply_request_effects`, which the live
+    // handler calls inline (the recovery drain calls the same
+    // function on the next startup). The gate now pins that the
+    // handler is wired to the executor, not to a per-ref inline
+    // webhook call.
+    let effects_executor = production
+        .find("apply_request_effects(&state, &request_id)")
+        .expect("U5 gate stale: git_receive_pack no longer calls apply_request_effects inline");
 
     assert!(
-        success_flag < gate_open && gate_open < spawn,
-        "U5 gate bypassed: the tail must be spawned inside `if push_succeeded`, or a \
-         rejected push spawns a tail that pins and announces a half-applied repo"
-    );
-    // Still inside that block: no `}` may close it between the gate and the spawn.
-    assert!(
-        !production[gate_open + "if push_succeeded {".len()..spawn].contains('}'),
-        "U5 gate bypassed: the tail spawn left the `if push_succeeded` block, so a \
-         rejected push now spawns a tail"
+        success_flag < spawn,
+        "U5 gate bypassed: the disposition must be bound before any tail spawn"
     );
     assert!(
-        spawn < release && spawn < touch && spawn < webhook,
+        spawn < release && spawn < touch && spawn < effects_executor,
         "U5 gate bypassed: the tail must be spawned BEFORE guard.release, touch_repo \
-         and the webhook fan-out, so a disconnect in any of those windows cannot drop \
+         and the effect executor, so a disconnect in any of those windows cannot drop \
          this push's pins, recovery copy, and announcements"
     );
 }
+
+/// #26 Split PR 1 step 3 — drain + handler share a single effect
+/// executor. The live handler (api/repos.rs) and the recovery
+/// drain (`durable_outbox::drain_receive_pack_requests_with`) both
+/// call `apply_request_effects`, so the per-ref effects fan-out
+/// lives in exactly one place. The v29 per-ref walk
+/// (`derive_one`, `drain_pending_ref_transitions_all`,
+/// `lookup_accepted_ordinal`) is dead code: any caller reintroduced
+/// would be the per-ref walk the step-3 PR removed. This gate
+/// fails if a call site slips back in or the new seam is bypassed.
+#[test]
+fn inv26_step3_live_and_drain_share_apply_request_effects() {
+    let repos = src("api/repos.rs");
+    let outbox = src("durable_outbox.rs");
+
+    // The live handler calls `apply_request_effects`. Split the
+    // file at the test attribute so test code can't satisfy the
+    // gate by itself.
+    let production_repos = repos
+        .split("\nmod tests {")
+        .next()
+        .expect("split always yields a first chunk");
+
+    assert!(
+        production_repos.contains("apply_request_effects(&state, &request_id)"),
+        "live handler must call `apply_request_effects(&state, &request_id)`; \
+         reverting to a per-ref inline fan-out splits live and recovery"
+    );
+
+    // The durable intent insert closes the pre-outbox crash window this
+    // PR exists to fix. Wrapping it in `if false` must turn this gate
+    // red; drain-only tests cannot prove the handler creates the rows.
+    assert!(
+        production_repos.contains("insert_receive_pack_request_with_children("),
+        "live handler must persist durable intent via \
+         `insert_receive_pack_request_with_children`; disabling it must fail this gate"
+    );
+
+    // The drain's per-request seam calls the same executor. Test
+    // code lives below `mod drain_tests`, so split there too.
+    let production_outbox = outbox
+        .split("\nmod drain_tests {")
+        .next()
+        .expect("split always yields a first chunk");
+
+    assert!(
+        production_outbox.contains("drain_receive_pack_requests_with"),
+        "drain seam `drain_receive_pack_requests_with` must exist; \
+         removing it forces a per-ref walk back into the drain"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        production_outbox.contains("apply_request_effects"),
+        "durable_outbox production code must define `apply_request_effects`; \
+         removing it splits the executor between live and recovery"
+    );
+
+    // The drain's per-request walker is wired to the executor.
+    // The closure body of `drain_receive_pack_requests_with` is the
+    // only call site — if a future change calls `derive_one`
+    // instead, this assertion fires.
+    let drain_seam_open = production_outbox
+        .find("pub async fn drain_receive_pack_requests_with<F, Fut>")
+        .expect("drain seam must be defined in the production half");
+    let drain_seam_close = production_outbox[drain_seam_open..]
+        .find("\n}\n")
+        .expect("drain seam body must close");
+    let drain_seam_body = &production_outbox[drain_seam_open..drain_seam_open + drain_seam_close];
+    assert!(
+        drain_seam_body.contains("apply_request_effects"),
+        "drain_receive_pack_requests_with must call apply_request_effects; \
+         wiring it to a per-ref helper reintroduces the v29 walk"
+    );
+
+    // The deleted per-ref drain must have zero call sites in the
+    // production half. A regression that re-adds a caller would
+    // bring back the per-ref fan-out.
+    assert!(
+        !production_outbox.contains("drain_pending_ref_transitions_all("),
+        "deleted `drain_pending_ref_transitions_all` must have zero production call sites; \
+         a per-ref walk is reintroduced"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !production_outbox.contains("derive_one("),
+        "deleted `derive_one` must have zero production call sites; \
+         the per-ref fan-out is reintroduced"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !production_outbox.contains("lookup_accepted_ordinal("),
+        "deleted `lookup_accepted_ordinal` must have zero production call sites; \
+         the per-ref ordinal lookup is reintroduced"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !production_repos.contains("derive_one("),
+        "deleted `derive_one` must have zero live-handler call sites"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !production_repos.contains("drain_pending_ref_transitions"),
+        "deleted per-ref drain functions must have zero live-handler call sites"
+    );
+}
+
+/// #26 Split PR 1 step 4 — the periodic queue-lifecycle purge is
+/// wired in `main.rs` and the contract is enforced by the `idx_receive_pack_requests_completed_at`
+/// partial index from v41.
+///
+/// Assertions:
+/// 1. `main.rs` calls `purge_request_queue` once at boot (well, on
+///    the spawn-task interval) and the spawn function exists.
+/// 2. The DB helpers `purge_completed_receive_pack_requests` and
+///    `purge_completed_pending_ref_transitions` exist in `db/mod.rs`.
+/// 3. The config knobs `queue_retention_days` and `queue_purge_batch` exist
+///    on `Config`.
+/// 4. `quarantined` is NOT in the purge WHERE clause (step 4 does not
+///    introduce the state, but the invariant holds for the future).
+#[test]
+fn inv26_step4_queue_lifecycle_purge_is_wired() {
+    let main_src = src("main.rs");
+    assert!(
+        main_src.contains("spawn_queue_lifecycle_sweep"),
+        "main.rs must spawn the periodic queue-lifecycle purge"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        main_src.contains("purge_request_queue"),
+        "main.rs must call purge_request_queue on the periodic sweep"
+    );
+
+    let db_src = src("db/mod.rs");
+    assert!(
+        db_src.contains("purge_completed_receive_pack_requests"),
+        "db/mod.rs must expose purge_completed_receive_pack_requests"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        db_src.contains("purge_completed_pending_ref_transitions"),
+        "db/mod.rs must expose purge_completed_pending_ref_transitions"
+    );
+
+    let config_src = src("config.rs");
+    assert!(
+        config_src.contains("queue_retention_days"),
+        "Config must expose queue_retention_days"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        config_src.contains("queue_purge_batch"),
+        "Config must expose queue_purge_batch"
+    );
+}
+
+/// #26 Split PR 1 step 5 — the marker gate and the retry-bound
+/// quarantine are wired end-to-end. A missing or hash-mismatched
+/// marker on disk quarantines the request; a Retry over the bound
+/// does too. This gate pins every load-bearing seam, against the
+/// production half of each file (the test modules name the same
+/// identifiers in their own harnesses).
+///
+/// Assertions:
+/// 1. `reconcile_prepared_page` calls `mark_request_quarantined`
+///    and `mark_children_rejected_for_quarantined_parent` on
+///    marker-gate failure.
+/// 2. The drain's `EffectsOutcome::Retry` arm checks
+///    `effects_max_attempts`.
+/// 3. `git::store::read_ref` exists in `git/store.rs`.
+/// 4. `db::mark_request_quarantined`,
+///    `db::mark_children_rejected_for_quarantined_parent`,
+///    `db::get_receive_pack_requests_by_ids`, and
+///    `db::request_state::QUARANTINED` all exist.
+/// 5. The handler writes the marker ref BEFORE calling
+///    `smart_http::receive_pack_raw` (the durability window).
+#[test]
+fn inv26_step5_marker_quarantine_and_bound_are_wired() {
+    let outbox = src("durable_outbox.rs");
+    let store = src("git/store.rs");
+    let db = src("db/mod.rs");
+    let repos = src("api/repos.rs");
+
+    // Split at the TEST MODULE for the production-only assertions.
+    let production_outbox = outbox
+        .split("\nmod drain_tests {")
+        .next()
+        .expect("split always yields a first chunk");
+    let production_repos = repos
+        .split("\nmod tests {")
+        .next()
+        .expect("split always yields a first chunk");
+
+    // (1) The reconcile's marker gate quarantines via the DB helpers.
+    assert!(
+        production_outbox.contains("mark_request_quarantined"),
+        "reconcile_prepared_page must call mark_request_quarantined on marker-gate failure"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        production_outbox.contains("mark_children_rejected_for_quarantined_parent"),
+        "reconcile_prepared_page must call mark_children_rejected_for_quarantined_parent \
+         so quarantined parents cancel their children"
+    );
+
+    // The gate reads the marker ref and compares against the parent's
+    // `request_bytes_hash` via `git::store::read_ref` /
+    // `git::store::marker_value_for`. Reverting either reintroduces
+    // the DoS window the marker gate exists to close.
+    assert!(
+        production_outbox.contains("git::store::read_ref"),
+        "reconcile_prepared_page must read the marker ref via git::store::read_ref"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        production_outbox.contains("marker_value_for"),
+        "reconcile_prepared_page must compute the expected marker value via \
+         git::store::marker_value_for"
+    );
+
+    // (2) The drain's `EffectsOutcome::Retry` arm checks the bound.
+    assert!(
+        production_outbox.contains("effects_max_attempts"),
+        "drain_receive_pack_requests_with must consult effects_max_attempts on Retry"
+    );
+
+    // (3) `git::store::read_ref` is the read seam the gate depends on.
+    assert!(
+        store.contains("pub fn read_ref("),
+        "git::store::read_ref must exist; the marker gate reads through it"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        store.contains("pub fn marker_value_for("),
+        "git::store::marker_value_for must exist; the marker gate computes the expected \
+         value with it (and the live handler writes the value via the same helper)"
+    );
+
+    // (4) DB-side seams the gate depends on.
+    assert!(
+        db.contains("pub async fn mark_request_quarantined"),
+        "Db::mark_request_quarantined must exist"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        db.contains("pub async fn mark_children_rejected_for_quarantined_parent"),
+        "Db::mark_children_rejected_for_quarantined_parent must exist"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        db.contains("pub async fn get_receive_pack_requests_by_ids"),
+        "Db::get_receive_pack_requests_by_ids must exist (avoids N+1 in the marker gate)"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        db.contains("pub const QUARANTINED: &str = \"quarantined\""),
+        "request_state::QUARANTINED must be defined"
+    );
+
+    // (5) The handler writes the marker ref BEFORE the durability
+    // boundary (smart_http::receive_pack_raw). Severing the
+    // ordering re-opens the marker-gate DoS window for live pushes.
+    let marker_write = production_repos
+        .find("git::store::marker_value_for")
+        .expect("U5 gate stale: the live handler no longer computes the marker value");
+    let receive_raw = production_repos
+        .find("smart_http::receive_pack_raw")
+        .expect("U5 gate stale: git_receive_pack no longer calls smart_http::receive_pack_raw");
+    assert!(
+        marker_write < receive_raw,
+        "U5 gate bypassed: the marker ref must be written BEFORE receive_pack_raw so the \
+         reconcile's gate has evidence of the live push"
+    );
+}
+
+/// Issue #26 split 1 — namespace gate and pre-git refusal lifecycle.
+///
+/// The push gate (repos.rs) must deny:
+/// 1. Any ref-update line that fails UTF-8 decode (the raw body is passed verbatim
+///    to git receive-pack, and git accepts refnames with bytes >= 0x80; the gate
+///    never sees these refs, no durable child row exists, and under requests/issues/
+///    the lossy for-each-ref decode still matches the narrowed exemption).
+/// 2. The bare `refs/gitlawb` name (the `starts_with("refs/gitlawb/")` check misses it).
+///
+/// Every explicit pre-git refusal must call `refuse_receive_pack_before_git` to
+/// terminalize the intent aggregate in one transaction, or a dropped future between
+/// the intent insert and `receive_pack` strands a `received` + `prepared` aggregate
+/// that is never purged, never promotable, and poisons its tuple.
+///
+/// The visibility exemption (visibility_pack.rs) was narrowed to `requests/` and
+/// `issues/` only. The push gate is the premise that narrowing relies on (the comment
+/// at visibility_pack.rs:340), so tests must prove:
+/// - A `refs/gitlawb/<other>` ref pointing at a blob is denied on push.
+/// - A stray `refs/gitlawb/<other>` blob ref planted in the pack path fails closed.
+///
+/// Source gates below pin the wiring; behavioral proofs live next to the code:
+/// `parse_ref_updates_refuses_non_utf8_command_line` and
+/// `internal_namespace_gate_covers_bare_name_and_subtree` (api/repos.rs),
+/// `planted_non_exempt_gitlawb_blob_ref_fails_closed` (git/visibility_pack.rs),
+/// and the mirror import prune
+/// `prune_removes_non_exempt_gitlawb_refs_and_keeps_exempt` (sync.rs).
+#[test]
+fn issue_26_namespace_gate_and_refusal_wiring() {
+    let repos = src("api/repos.rs");
+    let vis = src("git/visibility_pack.rs");
+
+    // P1: fail the push on ref-update lines the handler cannot decode.
+    // The gate at parse_ref_updates must refuse when any command line in the
+    // ref-update section is undecodable UTF-8. The check is an Err arm on
+    // `from_utf8(data)` that returns BadRequest, so removing it allows non-UTF-8
+    // refs to bypass the namespace gate.
+    assert!(
+        repos.contains("ref-update line is not valid UTF-8; push refused"),
+        "P1 gate missing: parse_ref_updates must refuse when any ref-update line is \
+         non-UTF-8 (git accepts bytes >= 0x80; the gate never sees them, no durable \
+         child exists, and the lossy for-each-ref decode still matches the exemption)"
+    );
+
+    // P1 (cont): the bare `refs/gitlawb` name must also be caught. The
+    // predicate is extracted as `ref_is_internal_namespace` so it is
+    // unit-testable; pin the bare-name arm inside it and its use at the
+    // push gate (a `starts_with("refs/gitlawb/")`-only check misses the
+    // bare name, and it lands on repos with no internal refs yet).
+    assert!(
+        repos.contains("ref_name == \"refs/gitlawb\"")
+            && repos.contains(".find(|r| ref_is_internal_namespace(r))"),
+        "P1 gate missing: ref_is_internal_namespace must match the bare \
+         'refs/gitlawb' name and the push gate must consult it \
+         (starts_with('refs/gitlawb/') misses it, and it lands on repos with \
+         no internal refs yet)"
+    );
+
+    // P1 (cont): every explicit pre-git refusal must call refuse_receive_pack_before_git
+    // to terminalize the intent. Exactly 6 occurrences: the five inline call
+    // sites (lease cap, per-source cap, write pool, acquire timeout, acquire
+    // error) plus the drop-guard's own pre-git spawn. The post-git guard phase
+    // calls mark_receive_pack_interrupted (a different name), so deleting any
+    // one inline site drops the count to 5 and turns this red. The parse and
+    // namespace refusals correctly carry no call: they return before the
+    // intent insert, so there is no aggregate to terminalize.
+    assert_eq!(
+        repos.matches("refuse_receive_pack_before_git(").count(),
+        6,
+        "P1 wiring: exactly 6 refuse_receive_pack_before_git calls expected (5 \
+         inline refusal sites + guard pre-git spawn); deleting any inline site \
+         must turn this red"
+    );
+    // Pin the five inline sites by their reason literals, so a site that stops
+    // terminalizing (or is renumbered away) fails by name, not just by count.
+    for reason in [
+        "repo write-lease waiter cap reached",
+        "admission per-source cap reached",
+        "git write pool saturated",
+        "acquire_write timed out",
+        "acquire_write failed",
+        "handler dropped before git started",
+    ] {
+        assert!(
+            repos.contains(reason),
+            "P1 wiring: refusal reason literal missing: {reason}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // P1 (cont): the intent drop-guard must be phase-aware. It is armed before
+    // the insert resolves (covering the cancellation window), flipped to
+    // git-started immediately before the receive_pack await (a drop from there
+    // is a mid-git disconnect, terminalized via mark_receive_pack_interrupted
+    // because the Err arm never runs on a drop), and disarmed once the outcome
+    // commit resolves. Assert the ordering, not just presence: the phase flip
+    // must precede the receive_pack call.
+    assert!(
+        repos.contains("IntentDropGuard::new") && repos.contains("notify_git_started()"),
+        "P1 gate missing: IntentDropGuard must exist and flip to git-started phase \
+         before receive_pack (a dropped future between intent insert and git start \
+         strands a received+prepared aggregate)"
+    );
+    let flip_pos = repos
+        .find("notify_git_started()")
+        .expect("notify_git_started call must exist");
+    let git_pos = repos
+        .find("receive_pack_raw_with_reflog(")
+        .expect("receive_pack call must exist");
+    assert!(
+        flip_pos < git_pos,
+        "P1 ordering: notify_git_started() must precede the receive_pack call, \
+         or a mid-git drop is misclassified as a pre-git shed"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        repos.contains("_intent_guard.disarm()"),
+        "P1 gate missing: the guard must disarm once the outcome commit resolves, \
+         or every push spawns a wasteful cleanup txn at scope end"
+    );
+    // A sync Drop cannot await: cleanup is spawned via the current runtime
+    // handle with an off-runtime fallback. A bare tokio::spawn panics
+    // mid-unwind with no runtime (off-runtime drop, process teardown).
+    assert!(
+        repos.contains("Handle::try_current()"),
+        "P1 gate missing: guard Drop must spawn via Handle::try_current with an \
+         off-runtime arm, not a bare tokio::spawn"
+    );
+
+    // P2: the post-git drop arm must exist and be wired. The guard's
+    // GIT_STARTED phase spawns `mark_receive_pack_interrupted` (parent to
+    // `rejected_at_git`, children to `uncertain` — the Err arm never runs on
+    // a drop). Deleting that spawn keeps every count above green, so pin the
+    // method name; its behavior is proved by
+    // `post_git_interruption_marks_uncertain_and_terminalizes_parent`.
+    assert!(
+        repos.contains("mark_receive_pack_interrupted("),
+        "P2 wiring: the guard's post-git phase must spawn \
+         mark_receive_pack_interrupted (a mid-git drop otherwise strands \
+         received+prepared with no Err arm to mark them uncertain)"
+    );
+    // The guard must commit computed fates rather than a blanket uncertain
+    // once the report is parsed, and only disarm on a resolved commit: pin
+    // both the stash call and the `outcome_commit_ok` gate. Making disarm()
+    // unconditional strands the commit-failure path and misfiles proven
+    // rejections as uncertain.
+    assert!(
+        repos.contains("set_fates(ComputedFates"),
+        "P2 wiring: computed fates must be stashed on the guard once parsed, \
+         or a post-commit drop can only apply a context-free uncertain"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        repos.contains("if outcome_commit_ok"),
+        "P2 wiring: disarm must be gated on outcome_commit_ok; unconditional \
+         disarm strands the persistent-commit-failure path"
+    );
+    // The live-handler `AwaitingSiblings` arm is unreachable through the
+    // current outcome builder (documented at the arm itself) and therefore
+    // has no behavioral test; pin its presence so removing it is conscious.
+    // The drain consumer IS behaviorally driven (sibling-wait tests).
+    assert_eq!(
+        repos.matches("EffectsOutcome::AwaitingSiblings").count(),
+        1,
+        "live AwaitingSiblings arm must exist (defensive symmetry with the \
+         drain consumer); deleting it must turn this red"
+    );
+
+    // P2: pin the mirror prune call sites. The prune helper is called from
+    // both `clone_repo` and `fetch_repo` (plus its own definition) — deleting
+    // either call leaves the direct-helper test green while mirrors import
+    // evil refs again. Count occurrences of the call with its argument.
+    let sync_src = src("sync.rs");
+    assert_eq!(
+        sync_src
+            .matches("prune_non_exempt_gitlawb_refs(local_path)")
+            .count(),
+        2,
+        "P2 wiring: prune must be called from both clone_repo and fetch_repo; \
+         deleting either call must turn this red"
+    );
+    // Both call sites must route through `wrap_prune_error`, which preserves
+    // deterministic `PruneInvalid` refusals instead of stringifying every
+    // error into transient `PruneFailed` (an every-tick deferral spin for
+    // permanently invalid mirrors). Pin the exact call shape at both sites.
+    assert_eq!(
+        sync_src.matches(".map_err(wrap_prune_error)").count(),
+        2,
+        "P2 wiring: both prune call sites must use wrap_prune_error; inline \
+         rewrap must turn this red"
+    );
+
+    // P2: the visibility exemption narrowing removed a serving path. The exemption
+    // is now scoped to `requests/` and `issues/` only (visibility_pack.rs:371), and
+    // the comment at :340 states the push gate is the premise. Tests must prove the
+    // gate works, which the P1 findings above covered (non-UTF-8 line, bare name,
+    // refusal wiring). This check verifies the exemption narrowing landed.
+    assert!(
+        vis.contains(
+            r#"!r.starts_with("refs/gitlawb/requests/") && !r.starts_with("refs/gitlawb/issues/")"#
+        ),
+        "P2 gate missing: the visibility exemption must be narrowed to requests/ and \
+         issues/ only (the push gate is the premise; any other refs/gitlawb/* ref is \
+         denied on push and must fail closed in the pack path)"
+    );
+}
+
+/// Claimed-webhook delivery must not re-list hooks: the durable path claims
+/// synchronously, hands the claimed hook rows to the sender, and a list
+/// failure in the send task would silently drop already-claimed deliveries.
+#[test]
+fn inv26_claimed_hook_delivery_never_relists() {
+    let webhooks = src("webhooks.rs");
+    let production = webhooks
+        .split("\nmod tests {")
+        .next()
+        .expect("split always yields a first chunk");
+
+    // The claimed entry point exists and passes hook ROWS (not ids) so the
+    // sender never needs the hook table again.
+    let entry = production
+        .find("fire_event_occurrence_with_claimed_hooks(")
+        .expect("claimed-hooks sender missing");
+    let claimed_rows = production
+        .find("claimed_hooks: Vec<crate::db::Webhook>")
+        .expect("claimed path must carry Webhook rows, not ids");
+    let list_call = production
+        .find("db.list_webhooks_for_event(repo_id, event)")
+        .expect("unclaimed path still lists hooks");
+    assert!(
+        entry < claimed_rows && claimed_rows < list_call,
+        "claimed sender must hand rows through before any list fallback"
+    );
+
+    // Inside the async worker, the claimed branch must bypass the list.
+    // Inside the async worker (which starts after the claim helper), the
+    // claimed branch must be selected before the list fallback can run.
+    let worker = production
+        .find("async fn fire_event_async_occurrence(")
+        .expect("occurrence worker missing");
+    let already_claimed = production[worker..]
+        .find("let already_claimed = claimed_hooks.is_some();")
+        .map(|i| worker + i)
+        .expect("claimed path must short-circuit before re-listing");
+    let worker_list = production[worker..]
+        .find("db.list_webhooks_for_event(repo_id, event)")
+        .map(|i| worker + i)
+        .expect("unclaimed path still lists hooks");
+    assert!(
+        already_claimed < worker_list,
+        "the claimed branch must be selected before list_webhooks_for_event can run"
+    );
+}

crates/gl/Cargo.toml

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ uuid = { workspace = true }
 url = { workspace = true }
 percent-encoding = { workspace = true }
 urlencoding = "2"
+libc = "0.2"
 alloy = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = [
     "contract",
     "provider-http",

crates/gl/src/clone.rs

@@ -267,7 +267,31 @@ async fn fetch_withheld(node: &str, owner: &str, name: &str) -> Result<(Vec<Stri
     };
     let resp = match resp {
         Ok(r) if r.status().is_success() => r,
-        Ok(r) if matches!(r.status().as_u16(), 404 | 501) => return Ok((Vec::new(), Vec::new())),
+        Ok(r) if matches!(r.status().as_u16(), 404 | 501) => {
+            // Two 404s share this status and must be told apart before the
+            // legacy empty-glob fallback is taken: a route miss on a node that
+            // predates withheld-paths has an empty body, while a current node
+            // returns the JSON AppError body for absent/denied/quarantined
+            // repos. The JSON body proves the route exists, so the repo is
+            // unavailable to this caller and cloning cannot proceed.
+            if r.status().as_u16() == 404 {
+                let status = r.status();
+                let body = crate::http::read_body_capped(r, 4096).await;
+                if body.read_failed {
+                    // The read died part-way: we cannot classify the denial,
+                    // and a failed read must not collapse into the legacy
+                    // route-miss arm and start a clone.
+                    bail!("withheld-paths 404 body from this node could not be read");
+                }
+                if !body.text.trim().is_empty() {
+                    bail!(
+                        "repository {owner}/{name} is not available on this node ({status}): {}",
+                        sanitize_node_msg(&body.text)
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+            return Ok((Vec::new(), Vec::new()));
+        }
         Ok(r) => bail!("withheld-paths lookup failed: {}", r.status()),
         Err(err) => return Err(err).context("fetching withheld paths"),
     };
@@ -327,7 +351,12 @@ async fn recover_encrypted_blobs(
         .await
     {
         Ok(r) if r.status().is_success() => r,
-        _ => return Ok(vec![]),
+        // Discovery failure is not an empty inventory: a denied, quarantined,
+        // erroring, or unreachable node must surface so the caller can warn
+        // and still run the Arweave fallback rather than report a clean clone
+        // with authorized blobs silently missing.
+        Ok(r) => bail!("encrypted-blobs inventory unavailable: {}", r.status()),
+        Err(err) => return Err(err).context("fetching encrypted-blobs inventory"),
     };
     let body: EncryptedBlobsResponse = resp.json().await.context("parsing encrypted-blobs")?;
     if body.blobs.is_empty() {

crates/gl/src/doctor.rs

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ pub struct DoctorArgs {
     #[arg(long, default_value = PUBLIC_NODE, env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
     pub node: String,
 
-    /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
+    /// Identity directory (default: the parent of $GITLAWB_KEY, else ~/.gitlawb)
     #[arg(long)]
     pub dir: Option<PathBuf>,
 }
@@ -69,22 +69,63 @@ impl Check {
     }
 }
 
+/// Resolve the config dir and key path without aborting on a refused resolver.
+/// The whole point of doctor is to explain a broken setup, so a `GITLAWB_KEY`
+/// or `--dir` the resolvers reject becomes `Check::fail` rows for the checks
+/// that depend on them, while node/git checks still run.
+fn resolve_config_paths(
+    args_dir: Option<PathBuf>,
+) -> (Option<PathBuf>, Option<PathBuf>, Vec<Check>) {
+    let dir = crate::identity::gitlawb_dir(args_dir.clone());
+    let mut checks = Vec::new();
+    let dir = match dir {
+        Ok(d) => Some(d),
+        Err(e) => {
+            checks.push(Check::fail(
+                "identity",
+                format!("could not resolve config dir: {e}"),
+                "fix GITLAWB_KEY or --dir",
+            ));
+            checks.push(Check::fail(
+                "registration",
+                "skipped: config dir unresolved",
+                "fix GITLAWB_KEY or --dir",
+            ));
+            None
+        }
+    };
+    let pem_path = match crate::identity::key_path_for(args_dir.as_deref()) {
+        Ok(p) => Some(p),
+        Err(e) => {
+            if dir.is_some() {
+                checks.push(Check::fail(
+                    "identity",
+                    format!("could not resolve key path: {e}"),
+                    "fix GITLAWB_KEY or --dir",
+                ));
+            }
+            None
+        }
+    };
+    (dir, pem_path, checks)
+}
+
 pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
     println!("gl doctor — checking your Twigpine setup");
     println!();
 
-    let dir = args.dir.unwrap_or_else(|| {
-        dirs::home_dir()
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."))
-            .join(".gitlawb")
-    });
-
-    let mut checks = Vec::new();
+    // The same resolver every other command uses. `doctor` reporting on
+    // `~/.gitlawb` while `gl register` writes to the parent of `GITLAWB_KEY` would
+    // make the one command whose job is to explain a broken setup the one that
+    // misreports it.
+    let args_dir = args.dir.clone();
+    let (dir, pem_path, resolver_rows) = resolve_config_paths(args_dir.clone());
+    let mut checks = resolver_rows;
 
     // ── 1. Identity ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    let pem_path = dir.join("identity.pem");
-    if pem_path.exists() {
-        match std::fs::read_to_string(&pem_path)
+    if pem_path.as_ref().is_some_and(|p| p.exists()) {
+        let pem_path = pem_path.as_ref().unwrap();
+        match std::fs::read_to_string(pem_path)
             .ok()
             .and_then(|pem| gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::from_pem(&pem).ok())
         {
@@ -101,7 +142,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
                 ));
             }
         }
-    } else {
+    } else if let Some(pem_path) = &pem_path {
         checks.push(Check::fail(
             "identity",
             format!("not found at {}", pem_path.display()),
@@ -110,33 +151,35 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
     }
 
     // ── 2. Registration ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    let ucan_path = dir.join("ucan.json");
-    if ucan_path.exists() {
-        match std::fs::read_to_string(&ucan_path)
-            .ok()
-            .and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&s).ok())
-        {
-            Some(v) => {
-                let node = v["node"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown");
-                checks.push(Check::pass(
-                    "registration",
-                    format!("registered with {node}"),
-                ));
-            }
-            None => {
-                checks.push(Check::fail(
-                    "registration",
-                    "ucan.json exists but is malformed",
-                    "gl register",
-                ));
+    if let Some(dir) = &dir {
+        let ucan_path = dir.join("ucan.json");
+        if ucan_path.exists() {
+            match std::fs::read_to_string(&ucan_path)
+                .ok()
+                .and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&s).ok())
+            {
+                Some(v) => {
+                    let node = v["node"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown");
+                    checks.push(Check::pass(
+                        "registration",
+                        format!("registered with {node}"),
+                    ));
+                }
+                None => {
+                    checks.push(Check::fail(
+                        "registration",
+                        "ucan.json exists but is malformed",
+                        "gl register",
+                    ));
+                }
             }
+        } else {
+            checks.push(Check::fail(
+                "registration",
+                "not registered with any node",
+                "gl register",
+            ));
         }
-    } else {
-        checks.push(Check::fail(
-            "registration",
-            "not registered with any node",
-            "gl register",
-        ));
     }
 
     // ── 3. GITLAWB_NODE env var ───────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -605,6 +648,24 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(None).is_none());
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn refused_resolver_becomes_check_rows_not_abort() {
+        // A relative GITLAWB_KEY makes both resolvers Err; doctor must turn
+        // that into fail rows for the dependent checks and keep going, not
+        // exit before the node/git checks ever run.
+        crate::identity::test_env::with_key(Some("relative/path"), || {
+            let (dir, pem_path, rows) = resolve_config_paths(None);
+            assert!(dir.is_none() && pem_path.is_none());
+            let fails: Vec<_> = rows
+                .iter()
+                .filter(|c| matches!(c.state, CheckState::Fail))
+                .map(|c| c.label)
+                .collect();
+            assert!(fails.contains(&"identity"), "rows: {fails:?}");
+            assert!(fails.contains(&"registration"), "rows: {fails:?}");
+        });
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_is_newer_minor_bump() {
         assert!(is_newer("0.2.0", "0.1.0"));

crates/gl/src/http.rs

@@ -324,8 +324,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn read_body_capped(mut resp: reqwest::Response, cap: usize) ->
 /// defangs ANSI/OSC escapes) AND the Unicode bidi/format controls (which
 /// `char::is_control` does not cover — they can reorder the displayed line).
 pub(crate) fn sanitize_node_msg(s: &str) -> String {
-    s.chars()
-        .filter(|c| !c.is_control() && !gitlawb_core::sanitize::is_bidi_format(*c))
+    gitlawb_core::sanitize::strip_terminal_controls(s)
+        .chars()
         .take(200)
         .collect()
 }

crates/gl/src/identity.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 pub enum IdentityCmd {
     /// Generate a new Ed25519 keypair and DID
     New {
-        /// Output directory for key files (default: ~/.gitlawb)
+        /// Output directory for key files
+        /// (default: the parent of $GITLAWB_KEY, else ~/.gitlawb)
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
         /// Overwrite existing keys if present
@@ -63,16 +64,51 @@ pub async fn run(cmd: IdentityCmd) -> Result<()> {
     }
 }
 
-fn gitlawb_dir(override_dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+/// Resolve the identity directory, honouring an explicit override.
+/// Public so sibling commands (`gl ucan import`, `gl doctor`) look in the same
+/// place the identity itself lives.
+///
+/// Without an override this is [`gitlawb_core::identity_path::identity_dir`] — the
+/// parent of `GITLAWB_KEY`, else `~/.gitlawb`. The rules live in `gitlawb-core`
+/// because `git-remote-gitlawb` needs the identical answer: an operator who moved
+/// their key (`GITLAWB_KEY=/data/keys/identity.pem`, the shape `.env.example`
+/// documents) would otherwise have `gl ucan import` write the delegation to
+/// `~/.gitlawb/delegations` while the helper reads `/data/keys/delegations` and
+/// finds it empty. The push then goes out with no `X-Ucan` and the delegate is
+/// refused, with nothing on either side to indicate why.
+pub fn gitlawb_dir(override_dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
     if let Some(d) = override_dir {
         return Ok(d);
     }
-    let home = dirs::home_dir().context("could not determine home directory")?;
-    Ok(home.join(".gitlawb"))
+    // `home_dir()` is passed as an Option rather than demanded here: an absolute
+    // GITLAWB_KEY resolves without a home directory, and a host that has none is a
+    // normal container shape, not a reason to refuse a correctly-configured key.
+    let home = dirs::home_dir();
+    gitlawb_core::identity_path::identity_dir(home.as_deref()).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("{e}"))
 }
 
-fn key_path(dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
-    dir.join("identity.pem")
+/// The identity PEM to read or write.
+///
+/// With an explicit `--dir` this is `<dir>/identity.pem`, the conventional layout.
+/// Without one it is [`gitlawb_core::identity_path::identity_key_path`] — the whole
+/// of `GITLAWB_KEY`, basename included.
+///
+/// Taking only the parent and re-appending `identity.pem` was a real divergence,
+/// not a tidy-up: `GITLAWB_KEY` is documented as a path to a PEM, and
+/// `git-remote-gitlawb` opens exactly that path. With
+/// `GITLAWB_KEY=/data/keys/ci-agent.pem`, `gl identity new` wrote
+/// `/data/keys/identity.pem` while every push loaded `/data/keys/ci-agent.pem`, so
+/// the two either disagreed on identity or the helper found no key at all — and
+/// owner enforcement and the delegation proof both key off that identity.
+pub(crate) fn key_path_for(dir: Option<&Path>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    match dir {
+        Some(d) => Ok(d.join(gitlawb_core::identity_path::KEY_FILE_NAME)),
+        None => {
+            let home = dirs::home_dir();
+            gitlawb_core::identity_path::identity_key_path(home.as_deref())
+                .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("{e}"))
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 fn load_keypair(dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<Keypair> {
@@ -81,15 +117,14 @@ fn load_keypair(dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<Keypair> {
 
 /// Load keypair from an optional directory override.
 /// Used by other modules (register, repo, mcp).
+///
+/// Routed through [`gitlawb_dir`] rather than reaching for `~/.gitlawb` directly:
+/// `gl identity new` writes the key wherever `GITLAWB_KEY` points, so a second
+/// resolver here would have every other command read a different file than the one
+/// just created — `gl ucan delegate` would either fail to find an identity or sign
+/// with a stale DID that is not the repo owner.
 pub fn load_keypair_from_dir(dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<Keypair> {
-    let base = if let Some(d) = dir {
-        d.to_path_buf()
-    } else {
-        dirs::home_dir()
-            .context("could not determine home directory")?
-            .join(".gitlawb")
-    };
-    let path = key_path(&base);
+    let path = key_path_for(dir)?;
     let pem = fs::read_to_string(&path).with_context(|| {
         format!(
             "no identity found at {}\nRun `gl identity new` to create one",
@@ -99,6 +134,36 @@ pub fn load_keypair_from_dir(dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<Keypair> {
     Keypair::from_pem(&pem).context("failed to load keypair from PEM")
 }
 
+/// Load keypair from an optional directory override, distinguishing missing default
+/// identity (clean anonymous) from an explicit directory error or corrupt PEM.
+pub fn load_optional_keypair(dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<Option<Keypair>> {
+    if let Some(d) = dir {
+        return load_keypair_from_dir(Some(d)).map(Some);
+    }
+    // Route the default lookup through key_path_for(None), not a hand-built
+    // ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem: that path pinned the conventional basename and
+    // ignored GITLAWB_KEY, so callers on this helper (task list/view, the MCP
+    // identity fallback) signed as a stale DID or went anonymous while every
+    // sibling command read the configured key. A host with no home and no
+    // GITLAWB_KEY still resolves to anonymous rather than refusing.
+    // An empty GITLAWB_KEY counts as unconfigured, matching identity_key_path:
+    // set-but-empty should not force an anonymous resolution through a path
+    // that cannot resolve.
+    let key_configured = std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_KEY").is_some_and(|v| !v.is_empty());
+    if !key_configured && dirs::home_dir().is_none() {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    let path = key_path_for(None)?;
+    match fs::read_to_string(&path) {
+        Ok(pem) => Keypair::from_pem(&pem)
+            .context("failed to load keypair from PEM")
+            .map(Some),
+        Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(None),
+        Err(e) => Err(anyhow::Error::from(e)
+            .context(format!("failed to read identity from {}", path.display()))),
+    }
+}
+
 async fn cmd_new(dir: Option<PathBuf>, force: bool) -> Result<()> {
     cmd_new_with_reader(dir, force, &mut std::io::stdin().lock()).await
 }
@@ -108,8 +173,11 @@ async fn cmd_new_with_reader(
     force: bool,
     reader: &mut impl std::io::BufRead,
 ) -> Result<()> {
-    let dir = gitlawb_dir(dir)?;
-    let path = key_path(&dir);
+    let path = key_path_for(dir.as_deref())?;
+    let dir = path
+        .parent()
+        .map(Path::to_path_buf)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."));
 
     if path.exists() {
         if force {
@@ -131,23 +199,13 @@ async fn cmd_new_with_reader(
         }
     }
 
-    fs::create_dir_all(&dir)
+    crate::secret_file::create_dir(&dir)
         .with_context(|| format!("failed to create directory {}", dir.display()))?;
 
     let keypair = Keypair::generate();
     let pem = keypair.to_pem()?;
 
-    // Write with restricted permissions
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    {
-        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
-        fs::write(&path, pem.as_bytes())?;
-        fs::set_permissions(&path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;
-    }
-    #[cfg(not(unix))]
-    {
-        fs::write(&path, pem.as_bytes())?;
-    }
+    crate::secret_file::write(&path, pem.as_bytes())?;
 
     let did = keypair.did();
     println!("✓ Generated new identity");
@@ -183,8 +241,7 @@ async fn cmd_sign(message: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
 }
 
 async fn cmd_backup(out: Option<PathBuf>, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
-    let base = gitlawb_dir(dir)?;
-    let src = key_path(&base);
+    let src = key_path_for(dir.as_deref())?;
 
     let pem = fs::read_to_string(&src).with_context(|| {
         format!(
@@ -202,16 +259,7 @@ async fn cmd_backup(out: Option<PathBuf>, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
             .join("identity.pem.bak")
     });
 
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    {
-        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
-        fs::write(&dest, pem.as_bytes())?;
-        fs::set_permissions(&dest, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;
-    }
-    #[cfg(not(unix))]
-    {
-        fs::write(&dest, pem.as_bytes())?;
-    }
+    crate::secret_file::write(&dest, pem.as_bytes())?;
 
     println!("✓ Identity backed up");
     println!("  DID:  {}", keypair.did());
@@ -239,8 +287,11 @@ async fn cmd_restore_with_reader(
     // Verify it's a valid keypair before writing anything
     let keypair = Keypair::from_pem(&pem).context("backup file is not a valid identity PEM")?;
 
-    let base = gitlawb_dir(dir)?;
-    let dest = key_path(&base);
+    let dest = key_path_for(dir.as_deref())?;
+    let base = dest
+        .parent()
+        .map(Path::to_path_buf)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."));
 
     if dest.exists() {
         if force {
@@ -262,19 +313,10 @@ async fn cmd_restore_with_reader(
         }
     }
 
-    fs::create_dir_all(&base)
+    crate::secret_file::create_dir(&base)
         .with_context(|| format!("failed to create directory {}", base.display()))?;
 
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    {
-        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
-        fs::write(&dest, pem.as_bytes())?;
-        fs::set_permissions(&dest, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;
-    }
-    #[cfg(not(unix))]
-    {
-        fs::write(&dest, pem.as_bytes())?;
-    }
+    crate::secret_file::write(&dest, pem.as_bytes())?;
 
     println!("✓ Identity restored");
     println!("  DID:  {}", keypair.did());
@@ -288,6 +330,36 @@ mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use tempfile::TempDir;
 
+    #[test]
+    fn load_optional_keypair_honors_gitlawb_key_basename() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let custom = dir.path().join("ci-agent.pem");
+        std::fs::write(&custom, kp.to_pem().unwrap()).unwrap();
+        crate::identity::test_env::with_key(Some(custom.as_os_str()), || {
+            let loaded = load_optional_keypair(None).unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(
+                loaded.map(|k| k.did().to_string()),
+                Some(kp.did().to_string()),
+                "the configured basename must be read, not ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem"
+            );
+        });
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn load_optional_keypair_none_when_unset_and_missing() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        crate::identity::test_env::with_key(
+            Some(dir.path().join("absent.pem").as_os_str()),
+            || {
+                assert!(
+                    load_optional_keypair(None).unwrap().is_none(),
+                    "a configured-but-absent key resolves anonymous, not an error"
+                );
+            },
+        );
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_cmd_new_creates_pem() {
         let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
@@ -509,3 +581,186 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(original_did, dst_kp.did());
     }
 }
+
+/// Scoped `GITLAWB_KEY` for tests, shared crate-wide.
+///
+/// The process environment is global and more than one suite in this crate
+/// depends on it — the resolver's own cases here, and `gl register`'s check that
+/// the bootstrap token lands beside the key. They take one lock rather than each
+/// declaring its own, which would not serialise them against each other.
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub(crate) mod test_env {
+    use std::ffi::{OsStr, OsString};
+    use std::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard};
+
+    static ENV_LOCK: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());
+
+    /// Restores the previous value and releases the lock on drop.
+    pub(crate) struct KeyEnv {
+        _guard: MutexGuard<'static, ()>,
+        restore: Option<OsString>,
+    }
+
+    impl Drop for KeyEnv {
+        fn drop(&mut self) {
+            match self.restore.take() {
+                Some(v) => std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_KEY", v),
+                None => std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_KEY"),
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Run `f` with `GITLAWB_KEY` set, restoring it afterwards.
+    pub(crate) fn with_key<T, V: AsRef<OsStr>>(value: Option<V>, f: impl FnOnce() -> T) -> T {
+        let _guard = set_key(value);
+        f()
+    }
+
+    /// Set `GITLAWB_KEY` (or remove it, for `None`) until the guard drops.
+    pub(crate) fn set_key<V: AsRef<OsStr>>(value: Option<V>) -> KeyEnv {
+        let guard = ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
+        let restore = std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_KEY");
+        match value {
+            Some(v) => std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_KEY", v),
+            None => std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_KEY"),
+        }
+        KeyEnv {
+            _guard: guard,
+            restore,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod gitlawb_dir_tests {
+    use super::{gitlawb_dir, load_keypair_from_dir};
+    use std::ffi::OsString;
+    use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+    /// Run `f` with `GITLAWB_KEY` set to `value` (or removed for `None`), restoring
+    /// whatever was there before.
+    fn with_key_env<T>(value: Option<OsString>, f: impl FnOnce() -> T) -> T {
+        let _env = crate::identity::test_env::set_key(value);
+        f()
+    }
+
+    /// An explicit --dir always wins and is never validated against GITLAWB_KEY.
+    #[test]
+    fn explicit_override_wins() {
+        let d = PathBuf::from("/tmp/explicit");
+        assert_eq!(gitlawb_dir(Some(d.clone())).unwrap(), d);
+    }
+
+    /// A relative GITLAWB_KEY must fail loudly. `gl` and `git-remote-gitlawb` run
+    /// from different working directories, so resolving one relatively sends the
+    /// import and the lookup to different stores; a one-component value yields an
+    /// empty parent and puts the store in `./delegations`.
+    #[test]
+    fn relative_key_paths_are_refused() {
+        for raw in ["identity.pem", "keys/identity.pem"] {
+            let result = with_key_env(Some(OsString::from(raw)), || gitlawb_dir(None));
+            assert!(result.is_err(), "{raw} is relative and must be refused");
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// An empty value is what a shell leaves behind for `FOO=` and for an unset
+    /// variable expanded into a wrapper script. Treated as unset, not as an error.
+    #[test]
+    fn an_empty_key_path_is_treated_as_unset() {
+        // A host without a home dir is a legitimate CI shape; the empty-is-unset
+        // rule resolves to anonymous there, so this assertion has nothing to
+        // compare against and is a pass, not a panic.
+        let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir() else { return };
+        let result = with_key_env(Some(OsString::new()), || gitlawb_dir(None));
+        assert_eq!(
+            result.unwrap(),
+            home.join(".gitlawb"),
+            "an empty value selects the default directory"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The reason `gitlawb_dir` reads through `var_os`: `env::var` folds a non-UTF-8
+    /// value into the same `Err` as unset, so a bad path would silently resolve to
+    /// `~/.gitlawb` instead of being reported. Byte 0xFF is not valid UTF-8 in any
+    /// position, so this value is unreachable through `env::var`.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn a_non_utf8_key_path_is_not_mistaken_for_unset() {
+        use std::os::unix::ffi::OsStringExt;
+
+        let raw = OsString::from_vec(b"keys/\xFF/identity.pem".to_vec());
+        let result = with_key_env(Some(raw), || gitlawb_dir(None));
+
+        let err = result.expect_err("a non-UTF-8 relative path must be refused");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("absolute"),
+            "the error must name the real problem, not fall back to the default: {err}"
+        );
+
+        let mut absolute = OsString::from("/data/");
+        absolute.push(OsString::from_vec(vec![0xFF]));
+        absolute.push("/identity.pem");
+        let resolved = with_key_env(Some(absolute.clone()), || gitlawb_dir(None)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            resolved,
+            PathBuf::from(&absolute).parent().unwrap(),
+            "an absolute non-UTF-8 path resolves to its own parent, not to ~/.gitlawb"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// `gl identity new` writes the key wherever `GITLAWB_KEY` points, so every
+    /// other command has to read it back from there. `load_keypair_from_dir(None)`
+    /// used to hardcode `~/.gitlawb`, which made `gl ucan delegate` sign with a
+    /// stale DID — or fail outright — for exactly the operators who moved the key.
+    #[test]
+    fn load_keypair_from_dir_honours_the_key_env() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let key = dir.path().join("identity.pem");
+        let expected = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
+        std::fs::write(&key, expected.to_pem().unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+        let loaded = with_key_env(Some(key.into_os_string()), || load_keypair_from_dir(None))
+            .expect("the identity beside GITLAWB_KEY must be found");
+
+        assert_eq!(loaded.did(), expected.did());
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod key_basename_tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// `GITLAWB_KEY` names a FILE. `gl` used to keep only its parent and re-append
+    /// `identity.pem`, while `git-remote-gitlawb` opened the configured path — so
+    /// with `GITLAWB_KEY=/data/keys/ci-agent.pem` the CLI and the push path loaded
+    /// different files, and owner enforcement and the delegation proof both key off
+    /// whichever identity that was.
+    #[test]
+    fn a_non_default_key_basename_is_honoured() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let key = dir.path().join("ci-agent.pem");
+        let expected = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
+        std::fs::write(&key, expected.to_pem().unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+        let (resolved, loaded) = crate::identity::test_env::with_key(Some(key.clone()), || {
+            (key_path_for(None).unwrap(), load_keypair_from_dir(None))
+        });
+
+        assert_eq!(resolved, key, "the configured basename must survive");
+        assert_eq!(
+            loaded.expect("the key at GITLAWB_KEY must load").did(),
+            expected.did(),
+            "gl must load the same file the helper opens"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// An explicit --dir keeps the conventional layout.
+    #[test]
+    fn an_explicit_dir_still_uses_identity_pem() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            key_path_for(Some(dir.path())).unwrap(),
+            dir.path().join("identity.pem")
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gl/src/init.rs

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ pub struct InitArgs {
     )]
     pub node: String,
 
-    /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
+    /// Identity directory (default: the parent of $GITLAWB_KEY, else ~/.gitlawb)
     #[arg(long)]
     pub dir: Option<PathBuf>,
 
@@ -105,20 +105,17 @@ pub async fn run(args: InitArgs) -> Result<()> {
     // Save UCAN if returned
     if let Some(ucan) = payload.get("ucan").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
         if !ucan.is_empty() {
-            let ucan_dir = args
-                .dir
-                .clone()
-                .unwrap_or_else(|| dirs::home_dir().unwrap_or_default().join(".gitlawb"));
-            std::fs::create_dir_all(&ucan_dir)?;
+            let ucan_dir = crate::identity::gitlawb_dir(args.dir.clone())?;
+            crate::secret_file::create_dir(&ucan_dir)?;
             let record = json!({
                 "ucan": ucan,
                 "node": args.node,
                 "did": did.to_string(),
                 "saved_at": chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
             });
-            std::fs::write(
-                ucan_dir.join("ucan.json"),
-                serde_json::to_string_pretty(&record)?,
+            crate::secret_file::write(
+                &ucan_dir.join("ucan.json"),
+                serde_json::to_string_pretty(&record)?.as_bytes(),
             )?;
         }
     }
@@ -225,29 +222,26 @@ pub async fn run(args: InitArgs) -> Result<()> {
 }
 
 fn generate_identity(dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair> {
-    let base = if let Some(d) = dir {
-        d.to_path_buf()
-    } else {
-        dirs::home_dir()
-            .context("could not determine home directory")?
-            .join(".gitlawb")
-    };
-    std::fs::create_dir_all(&base)?;
+    let path = crate::identity::key_path_for(dir)?;
+    let base = path
+        .parent()
+        .map(std::path::Path::to_path_buf)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| std::path::PathBuf::from("."));
+    crate::secret_file::create_dir(&base)?;
 
     let keypair = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
     let pem = keypair.to_pem()?;
-    let path = base.join("identity.pem");
 
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    {
-        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
-        std::fs::write(&path, pem.as_bytes())?;
-        std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;
-    }
-    #[cfg(not(unix))]
-    {
-        std::fs::write(&path, pem.as_bytes())?;
-    }
+    crate::secret_file::write_new(&path, pem.as_bytes()).map_err(|e| {
+        if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists {
+            anyhow::anyhow!(
+                "identity key already exists at {} — refusing to overwrite; pass --dir for a fresh location or move the key",
+                path.display()
+            )
+        } else {
+            anyhow::anyhow!(e)
+        }
+    })?;
 
     Ok(keypair)
 }

crates/gl/src/ipfs_cmd.rs

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ pub enum IpfsCmd {
             env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
         )]
         node: String,
-        /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
+        /// Identity directory (default: the parent of $GITLAWB_KEY, else ~/.gitlawb)
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ pub enum IpfsCmd {
             env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
         )]
         node: String,
-        /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
+        /// Identity directory (default: the parent of $GITLAWB_KEY, else ~/.gitlawb)
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
         /// Resume token from a scan that stopped at a bound, as printed by a
@@ -127,19 +127,93 @@ async fn cmd_list(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
     println!("IPFS pins ({count}) on {node}");
     println!();
     for pin in &pins {
-        let cid = pin["cid"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
-        let sha = pin["sha256_hex"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
-        let pinned_at = pin["pinned_at"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
-        // Trim pinned_at to date+time without subseconds
-        let ts = crate::text::truncate(pinned_at, 19);
-        println!("  {cid}");
-        println!("    sha256: {sha}");
-        println!("    pinned: {ts}");
+        for line in render_pin(pin) {
+            println!("{line}");
+        }
         println!();
     }
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// The rendered lines for one pins-listing entry.
+///
+/// #218 review round 8 P2 — why this is not just `pin["cid"]`: the wire format
+/// gained a provenance split, and `cid` is now NULLABLE. The node stopped
+/// aliasing a Pinata provider CID into `cid` (round 3) because `cid` is the
+/// key `GET /ipfs/{cid}` resolves against, and a Pinata provider CID is not
+/// resolvable there — advertising one would send clients to a guaranteed 404.
+/// The truthful representation of a Pinata-only row is therefore `cid: null`
+/// plus a `pinata_cid`. This function was reading only `cid`, so such a row
+/// printed as a bare `?` — the CLI showed nothing usable for an object that is
+/// in fact durably stored, and nothing in the client read `pinata_cid` at all.
+///
+/// So: the heading is the node-resolvable CID when there is one, and otherwise
+/// the Pinata provider CID, labelled as such so nobody feeds it back to this
+/// node's resolver. A `backends:` line names where the bytes actually are,
+/// taken from the writer-owned `local_pinned` / `pinata_pinned` booleans rather
+/// than re-inferred from CID shape (which is what the node's own comment warns
+/// against). Older nodes send neither flag; their `cid`-only rows fall back to
+/// CID presence and render exactly as they did before.
+fn render_pin(pin: &Value) -> Vec<String> {
+    let sha = pin["sha256_hex"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
+    let pinned_at = pin["pinned_at"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
+    // Trim pinned_at to date+time without subseconds; truncate() is
+    // boundary-safe (a raw &s[..19] panics on a split code point).
+    let ts = if pinned_at.len() >= 19 {
+        crate::text::truncate(pinned_at, 19)
+    } else {
+        pinned_at
+    };
+
+    // `cid` and `local_cid` carry the same raw CID; read both so a node that
+    // ships only one of them still renders.
+    let local_cid = pin["cid"]
+        .as_str()
+        .or_else(|| pin["local_cid"].as_str())
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty());
+    let pinata_cid = pin["pinata_cid"].as_str().filter(|s| !s.is_empty());
+
+    // Writer-owned flags when present; CID presence is the pre-split fallback.
+    let local_pinned = pin["local_pinned"]
+        .as_bool()
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| local_cid.is_some());
+    let pinata_pinned = pin["pinata_pinned"]
+        .as_bool()
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| pinata_cid.is_some());
+
+    let mut lines = Vec::new();
+    match (local_cid, pinata_cid) {
+        // Node-resolvable CID present: it leads, as it always has.
+        (Some(cid), _) => lines.push(format!("  {cid}")),
+        // Pinata-only: show the provider CID rather than "?", and say plainly
+        // that this node's resolver will not serve it.
+        (None, Some(p)) => lines.push(format!("  {p}  (pinata provider CID)")),
+        (None, None) => lines.push("  ?".to_string()),
+    }
+    lines.push(format!("    sha256: {sha}"));
+    lines.push(format!("    pinned: {ts}"));
+
+    // A dual row keeps the provider CID visible too; it differs from the local
+    // CID and is the only key that resolves on Pinata's gateway.
+    if local_cid.is_some() {
+        if let Some(p) = pinata_cid {
+            lines.push(format!("    pinata: {p}"));
+        }
+    }
+
+    let backends = match (local_pinned, pinata_pinned) {
+        (true, true) => "local ipfs, pinata",
+        (true, false) => "local ipfs",
+        (false, true) => "pinata",
+        // Neither flag set: the node filters such rows out, so this is only
+        // reachable from a hand-rolled response. Say so rather than imply
+        // durability the row does not claim.
+        (false, false) => "none recorded",
+    };
+    lines.push(format!("    backends: {backends}"));
+    lines
+}
+
 /// Automatic resumes attempted after the initial request when the node reports a
 /// truncated legacy scan, so at most `MAX_SCAN_RESUMES + 1` node calls per invocation.
 const MAX_SCAN_RESUMES: usize = 8;
@@ -633,6 +707,102 @@ mod tests {
         dir
     }
 
+    /// #218 review round 8 P2: a Pinata-only row must render its provider CID,
+    /// not a bare `?`. The node stopped aliasing that CID into `cid` because
+    /// `cid` is the key `GET /ipfs/{cid}` resolves on and a provider CID 404s
+    /// there — so `cid` is now legitimately null for such a row, and a client
+    /// that reads only `cid` shows the user nothing for an object that IS
+    /// durably stored. The heading must carry the provider CID and label it,
+    /// and the row must not claim a local pin.
+    #[test]
+    fn render_pin_shows_provider_cid_for_a_pinata_only_row() {
+        let pin: Value = serde_json::from_str(
+            r#"{"sha256_hex":"abc123","cid":null,"local_cid":null,
+                "pinata_cid":"QmProviderOnly","local_pinned":false,
+                "pinata_pinned":true,"pinned_at":"2026-07-02T12:00:00.123456Z"}"#,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let out = render_pin(&pin).join("\n");
+        assert!(
+            out.contains("QmProviderOnly"),
+            "the provider CID must be shown; got:\n{out}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !out.contains("  ?"),
+            "a Pinata-only row must not render as a bare `?`; got:\n{out}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            out.contains("backends: pinata"),
+            "the row must say where the bytes are; got:\n{out}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            out.contains("pinata provider CID"),
+            "the heading must be labelled so it is not fed back to this node's \
+             resolver, which cannot serve it; got:\n{out}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A dual row leads with the node-resolvable CID (unchanged behavior) and
+    /// additionally surfaces the provider CID, which is a different key and the
+    /// only one Pinata's gateway answers for.
+    #[test]
+    fn render_pin_shows_both_cids_for_a_dual_row() {
+        let pin: Value = serde_json::from_str(
+            r#"{"sha256_hex":"abc123","cid":"bafyLocal","local_cid":"bafyLocal",
+                "pinata_cid":"QmProvider","local_pinned":true,
+                "pinata_pinned":true,"pinned_at":"2026-07-02T12:00:00.123456Z"}"#,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let out = render_pin(&pin).join("\n");
+        assert!(
+            out.starts_with("  bafyLocal"),
+            "the resolver key leads; got:\n{out}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            out.contains("pinata: QmProvider"),
+            "the provider CID must still be reachable from the listing; got:\n{out}"
+        );
+        assert!(out.contains("backends: local ipfs, pinata"), "got:\n{out}");
+    }
+
+    /// Backward compatibility: a pre-provenance node sends `cid` alone, with no
+    /// `local_pinned` / `pinata_pinned` flags. That row must render as it always
+    /// did, with the backends line inferred from CID presence.
+    #[test]
+    fn render_pin_handles_a_legacy_cid_only_row() {
+        let pin: Value = serde_json::from_str(
+            r#"{"sha256_hex":"abc123","cid":"bafyone",
+                "pinned_at":"2026-07-02T12:00:00.123456Z"}"#,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let out = render_pin(&pin).join("\n");
+        assert!(out.starts_with("  bafyone"), "got:\n{out}");
+        assert!(out.contains("sha256: abc123"), "got:\n{out}");
+        assert!(
+            out.contains("pinned: 2026-07-02T12:00:00"),
+            "the timestamp is still trimmed to seconds; got:\n{out}"
+        );
+        assert!(out.contains("backends: local ipfs"), "got:\n{out}");
+    }
+
+    /// A node-supplied timestamp whose 19th byte splits a multi-byte code
+    /// point must not panic the CLI — `&s[..19]` panics there; `truncate`
+    /// returns the boundary-safe prefix.
+    #[test]
+    fn render_pin_does_not_panic_on_a_non_boundary_timestamp() {
+        let mut ts = "2026-07-02T12:00:0".to_string();
+        ts.push('é'); // 2-byte char starting at byte 18: byte 19 is its tail
+        assert_eq!(ts.len(), 20);
+        assert!(std::panic::catch_unwind(|| &ts[..19]).is_err());
+        let pin: Value = serde_json::json!({
+            "sha256_hex":"abc123","cid":"bafkreifjjcie6lypi6ny7amxnfftagclbuxndqonfipmb64f2km2devei4",
+            "local_cid":null,"pinata_cid":null,"local_pinned":true,
+            "pinata_pinned":false,"pinned_at":ts,
+        });
+        let out = render_pin(&pin).join("\n");
+        assert!(out.contains("pinned: 2026-07-02T12:00:0"), "got:\n{out}");
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_cmd_list_signs_request_and_renders_pins() {
         let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;

crates/gl/src/main.rs

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ mod protect;
 mod quickstart;
 mod register;
 mod repo;
+mod secret_file;
 mod star;
 mod status;
 mod sync;

crates/gl/src/name.rs

@@ -168,16 +168,8 @@ pub async fn run(args: NameArgs) -> Result<()> {
 
 // ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
-fn identity_dir(dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> PathBuf {
-    dir.unwrap_or_else(|| {
-        dirs::home_dir()
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."))
-            .join(".gitlawb")
-    })
-}
-
 fn load_did(dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<String> {
-    let path = identity_dir(dir).join("identity.pem");
+    let path = crate::identity::key_path_for(dir.as_deref())?;
     let pem = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).with_context(|| {
         format!(
             "No identity at {} — run `gl identity new` first",
@@ -190,7 +182,7 @@ fn load_did(dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<String> {
 }
 
 fn load_did_and_document(dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<(String, String)> {
-    let path = identity_dir(dir).join("identity.pem");
+    let path = crate::identity::key_path_for(dir.as_deref())?;
     let pem = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).with_context(|| {
         format!(
             "No identity at {} — run `gl identity new` first",

crates/gl/src/node.rs

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ pub enum NodeCmd {
             env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
         )]
         node: String,
-        /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
+        /// Identity directory (default: the parent of $GITLAWB_KEY, else ~/.gitlawb)
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },

crates/gl/src/node_stake.rs

@@ -328,12 +328,10 @@ pub async fn cmd_unstake(
 // ── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 fn load_did(dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<String> {
-    let base = dir.unwrap_or_else(|| {
-        dirs::home_dir()
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."))
-            .join(".gitlawb")
-    });
-    let path = base.join("identity.pem");
+    // The shared resolver, not a local `~/.gitlawb`: `gl identity new` writes the
+    // key wherever `GITLAWB_KEY` points, and the old fallback to `.` on a missing
+    // home made the answer depend on the working directory.
+    let path = crate::identity::key_path_for(dir.as_deref())?;
     let pem = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).with_context(|| {
         format!(
             "No identity at {} — run `gl identity new` first",

crates/gl/src/quickstart.rs

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use std::io::{self, Write};
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
-use crate::http::NodeClient;
+use crate::http::{sanitize_node_msg, NodeClient};
 use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 
 const PUBLIC_NODE: &str = "https://node.twigpine.com";
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ pub struct QuickstartArgs {
     #[arg(long, default_value = PUBLIC_NODE, env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
     pub node: String,
 
-    /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
+    /// Identity directory (default: the parent of $GITLAWB_KEY, else ~/.gitlawb)
     #[arg(long)]
     pub dir: Option<PathBuf>,
 
@@ -39,19 +39,25 @@ pub async fn run(args: QuickstartArgs) -> Result<()> {
     println!("and create your first repository.");
     println!();
 
-    let dir = args.dir.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| {
-        dirs::home_dir()
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."))
-            .join(".gitlawb")
-    });
+    // The wizard generates the identity AND stores the bootstrap UCAN, so it has to
+    // land where every later command reads from — the parent of `GITLAWB_KEY`, not
+    // an unconditional `~/.gitlawb`.
+    let dir = crate::identity::gitlawb_dir(args.dir.clone())?;
 
     // ── Step 1: Identity ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
     println!("── Step 1: Identity ─────────────────────────────────────────────────");
     println!();
 
-    let pem_path = dir.join("identity.pem");
+    let pem_path = crate::identity::key_path_for(args.dir.as_deref())?;
     let keypair = if pem_path.exists() {
-        match load_keypair_from_dir(Some(&dir)) {
+        // `args.dir.as_deref()`, not `Some(&dir)`. Passing the DIRECTORY made the
+        // loader re-derive the basename as `identity.pem`, so with
+        // `GITLAWB_KEY=/data/keys/ci-agent.pem` the check above found `ci-agent.pem`
+        // while the load looked for a sibling that need not exist. The load must
+        // target the file that was actually selected, and a file that exists but
+        // fails to load is refused below, never regenerated over: `pem_path` can
+        // name any file, and repository ownership and delegations are tied to its DID.
+        match load_keypair_from_dir(args.dir.as_deref()) {
             Ok(kp) => {
                 let did = kp.did();
                 println!("  ✓  Identity already exists");
@@ -59,14 +65,17 @@ pub async fn run(args: QuickstartArgs) -> Result<()> {
                 println!();
                 kp
             }
-            Err(_) => {
-                println!("  Identity file exists but is unreadable. Regenerating...");
-                generate_identity(&dir)?
+            Err(e) => {
+                anyhow::bail!(
+                    "identity at {} could not be loaded: {e}. Fix or move the file, \
+                     or run `gl identity new --force` to replace it deliberately.",
+                    pem_path.display()
+                );
             }
         }
     } else {
         println!("  No identity found. Generating a new Ed25519 keypair...");
-        generate_identity(&dir)?
+        generate_identity(&dir, &pem_path)?
     };
 
     let did = keypair.did().to_string();
@@ -99,27 +108,51 @@ pub async fn run(args: QuickstartArgs) -> Result<()> {
             Ok(resp) if resp.status().is_success() => {
                 let payload: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
                 let ucan = payload["ucan"].as_str().unwrap_or("");
-                if !ucan.is_empty() {
-                    std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir)?;
+                // The messaging below derives from what was actually persisted, not
+                // from the 2xx: a success response carrying no `ucan` skips the write,
+                // and saying "UCAN saved" anyway sends the operator looking for a file
+                // that was never created - then resurfaces later as a push rejection
+                // with nothing pointing back here.
+                let saved = if ucan.is_empty() {
+                    false
+                } else {
+                    crate::secret_file::create_dir(&dir)?;
                     let record = json!({
                         "ucan": ucan,
                         "node": args.node,
                         "did": did,
                         "saved_at": chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
                     });
-                    std::fs::write(&ucan_path, serde_json::to_string_pretty(&record)?)?;
+                    crate::secret_file::write(
+                        &ucan_path,
+                        serde_json::to_string_pretty(&record)?.as_bytes(),
+                    )?;
+                    true
+                };
+                if saved {
+                    // Success belongs to the saved branch: a 2xx without a
+                    // usable ucan is not a registration — the response may not
+                    // even be JSON, and saying success would also leave a
+                    // stale ucan.json from another node in place.
+                    let trust = payload["trust_score"].as_f64().unwrap_or(0.0);
+                    println!("  ✓  Registered successfully");
+                    println!("     Trust score: {trust:.2}");
+                    println!("     UCAN saved to {}", ucan_path.display());
+                } else {
+                    println!(
+                        "  \u{00d7}  Registration returned no UCAN (unexpected response body)"
+                    );
                 }
-                let trust = payload["trust_score"].as_f64().unwrap_or(0.0);
-                println!("  ✓  Registered successfully");
-                println!("     Trust score: {trust:.2}");
-                println!("     UCAN saved to {}", ucan_path.display());
                 println!();
             }
             Ok(resp) => {
                 let status = resp.status();
                 let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
                 let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown");
-                println!("  ✗  Registration failed ({status}): {msg}");
+                println!(
+                    "  ✗  Registration failed ({status}): {}",
+                    sanitize_node_msg(msg)
+                );
                 println!("     You can retry with: gl register --node {}", args.node);
                 println!();
                 // Non-fatal — continue to repo creation
@@ -205,7 +238,10 @@ pub async fn run(args: QuickstartArgs) -> Result<()> {
             let status = resp.status();
             let payload: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
             let msg = payload["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown");
-            println!("  ✗  Repo creation failed ({status}): {msg}");
+            println!(
+                "  ✗  Repo creation failed ({status}): {}",
+                sanitize_node_msg(msg)
+            );
             println!(
                 "     Try manually: gl repo create {repo_name} --node {}",
                 args.node
@@ -226,23 +262,27 @@ pub async fn run(args: QuickstartArgs) -> Result<()> {
 
 // ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
-fn generate_identity(dir: &PathBuf) -> Result<gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair> {
-    std::fs::create_dir_all(dir).with_context(|| format!("failed to create {}", dir.display()))?;
+fn generate_identity(
+    dir: &std::path::Path,
+    path: &std::path::Path,
+) -> Result<gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair> {
+    crate::secret_file::create_dir(dir)
+        .with_context(|| format!("failed to create {}", dir.display()))?;
 
     let keypair = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
     let pem = keypair.to_pem()?;
-    let path = dir.join("identity.pem");
 
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    {
-        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
-        std::fs::write(&path, pem.as_bytes())?;
-        std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;
-    }
-    #[cfg(not(unix))]
-    {
-        std::fs::write(&path, pem.as_bytes())?;
-    }
+    crate::secret_file::write_new(path, pem.as_bytes()).map_err(|e| {
+        if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists {
+            anyhow::anyhow!(
+                "identity key already exists at {}: refusing to overwrite; \
+                 pass --dir for a fresh location or move the existing key",
+                path.display()
+            )
+        } else {
+            anyhow::anyhow!(e)
+        }
+    })?;
 
     let did = keypair.did();
     println!("  ✓  Generated new identity");

crates/gl/src/register.rs

@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
 //! `gl register` — register this agent identity with a Twigpine node.
 //!
 //! Sends a signed POST /api/register request and saves the returned bootstrap
-//! UCAN token to `~/.gitlawb/ucan.json` for use by other commands.
+//! UCAN token as `ucan.json` beside the identity key, where the other commands
+//! look for it.
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::Args;
 use serde_json::json;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
-use crate::http::NodeClient;
+use crate::http::{sanitize_node_msg, NodeClient};
 use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 
 #[derive(Args)]
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ pub struct RegisterArgs {
     #[arg(long)]
     pub model: Option<String>,
 
-    /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
+    /// Identity directory (default: the parent of $GITLAWB_KEY, else ~/.gitlawb)
     #[arg(long)]
     pub dir: Option<PathBuf>,
 }
@@ -64,17 +65,20 @@ pub async fn run(args: RegisterArgs) -> Result<()> {
     // Save bootstrap UCAN
     let ucan = payload.get("ucan").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
 
-    if !ucan.is_empty() {
-        let ucan_path = ucan_path(args.dir.as_deref())?;
+    let saved_to = if ucan.is_empty() {
+        None
+    } else {
+        let path = ucan_path(args.dir.as_deref())?;
         let record = json!({
             "ucan": ucan,
             "node": args.node,
             "did": did.to_string(),
             "saved_at": chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
         });
-        std::fs::write(&ucan_path, serde_json::to_string_pretty(&record)?)?;
-        tracing::debug!("saved UCAN to {}", ucan_path.display());
-    }
+        crate::secret_file::write(&path, serde_json::to_string_pretty(&record)?.as_bytes())?;
+        tracing::debug!("saved UCAN to {}", path.display());
+        Some(path)
+    };
 
     let trust = payload
         .get("trust_score")
@@ -90,25 +94,39 @@ pub async fn run(args: RegisterArgs) -> Result<()> {
         .unwrap_or("");
 
     println!();
-    println!("  {message}");
+    println!("  {}", sanitize_node_msg(message));
     println!("  Trust score:  {trust:.2}");
-    println!("  UCAN expires: {expires}");
+    println!("  UCAN expires: {}", sanitize_node_msg(expires));
     println!();
-    println!("  Bootstrap UCAN saved to ~/.gitlawb/ucan.json");
-    println!("  You are now a verified agent on the Twigpine network.");
+    // The real path, not the default one: `GITLAWB_KEY` moves it, and an operator
+    // told to look in `~/.gitlawb` would find nothing there.
+    // Registration without a stored token means the registration-gated
+    // capabilities never arrived, so the closing line must not claim they did.
+    match &saved_to {
+        Some(path) => {
+            println!("  Bootstrap UCAN saved to {}", path.display());
+            println!("  You are now a verified agent on the gitlawb network.");
+        }
+        None => {
+            println!("  The node returned no bootstrap UCAN, so this identity is not");
+            println!("  a verified agent yet. Re-run `gl register` once the node issues one.");
+        }
+    }
 
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Where the bootstrap UCAN is stored: beside the identity key, always.
+///
+/// Routed through `gitlawb_dir` rather than resolving `~/.gitlawb` locally. The
+/// key is READ from the parent of `GITLAWB_KEY`, so writing the token anywhere
+/// else splits the two: registration succeeds, and `gl doctor`, `gl ucan show`,
+/// `gl init`, and `gl mcp ucan_show` all read `ucan.json` from the key's
+/// directory and report an unregistered identity.
 fn ucan_path(dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
-    let base = if let Some(d) = dir {
-        d.to_path_buf()
-    } else {
-        dirs::home_dir()
-            .context("could not determine home directory")?
-            .join(".gitlawb")
-    };
-    std::fs::create_dir_all(&base)?;
+    let base = crate::identity::gitlawb_dir(dir.map(std::path::Path::to_path_buf))?;
+    crate::secret_file::create_dir(&base)
+        .with_context(|| format!("failed to create {}", base.display()))?;
     Ok(base.join("ucan.json"))
 }
 
@@ -155,6 +173,48 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(content["node"].as_str().unwrap(), server.url());
     }
 
+    /// `gl register` READS the identity from the parent of `GITLAWB_KEY`, so it has
+    /// to WRITE the bootstrap token there too. Sending it to `~/.gitlawb` instead is
+    /// silent split-brain: registration prints success, and every command that later
+    /// reads `ucan.json` — `gl doctor`, `gl ucan show`, `gl init`, `gl mcp` — looks
+    /// beside the key, finds nothing, and reports an unregistered identity.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn register_saves_the_bootstrap_ucan_beside_the_key() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        write_identity(&dir);
+        // No --dir: the destination has to come from GITLAWB_KEY alone.
+        let _env = crate::identity::test_env::set_key(Some(dir.path().join("identity.pem")));
+
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("POST", "/api/register")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(
+                r#"{"message":"Welcome","ucan":"eyJhbGci.test.token","trust_score":0.5,"expires":"2026-12-31"}"#,
+            )
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        run(RegisterArgs {
+            node: server.url(),
+            capabilities: vec!["git:push".to_string()],
+            model: None,
+            dir: None,
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let beside_the_key = dir.path().join("ucan.json");
+        assert!(
+            beside_the_key.exists(),
+            "the bootstrap UCAN must land beside GITLAWB_KEY, not in ~/.gitlawb"
+        );
+        let content: serde_json::Value =
+            serde_json::from_str(&std::fs::read_to_string(beside_the_key).unwrap()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(content["ucan"].as_str().unwrap(), "eyJhbGci.test.token");
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_register_server_error() {
         let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();

crates/gl/src/secret_file.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+//! Writes and directories that hold key material or bearer tokens.
+
+use std::io::Write;
+use std::path::Path;
+
+/// Write `contents` to `path` with owner-only permissions.
+///
+/// On unix the mode is pinned at creation, so the file never exists with a
+/// permissive mode between open and chmod. `O_NOFOLLOW` refuses to write
+/// through a pre-planted symlink. `mode()` applies only when the file is
+/// created, so the mode is pinned on the descriptor before the file is
+/// truncated: a pre-existing loose file is tightened before, not after, the
+/// new contents land in it.
+pub(crate) fn write(path: &Path, contents: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::{OpenOptionsExt, PermissionsExt};
+        let mut f = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+            .write(true)
+            .create(true)
+            .mode(0o600)
+            .custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
+            .open(path)?;
+        f.set_permissions(std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;
+        f.set_len(0)?;
+        f.write_all(contents)?;
+    }
+    #[cfg(not(unix))]
+    std::fs::write(path, contents)?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Write `contents` to a `path` that must not already exist.
+///
+/// `create_new` makes the existence check and the create one atomic open, so
+/// there is no check-then-write window where an attacker or a second `gl init`
+/// could slip a file in between. Same owner-only mode and `O_NOFOLLOW` as
+/// [`write`]. `AlreadyExists` means the key was present, never that it was
+/// touched.
+pub(crate) fn write_new(path: &Path, contents: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
+        let mut f = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+            .write(true)
+            .create_new(true)
+            .mode(0o600)
+            .custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
+            .open(path)?;
+        f.write_all(contents)?;
+    }
+    #[cfg(not(unix))]
+    {
+        if path.exists() {
+            return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+                std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists,
+                "refusing to overwrite existing file",
+            ));
+        }
+        std::fs::write(path, contents)?;
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Create `path` (and missing parents) as an owner-only directory.
+///
+/// An existing directory is also re-pinned: a `~/.gitlawb` created before
+/// this helper stays group- and world-listable otherwise. A symlinked
+/// `path` is left alone rather than chmodded through, which would strip
+/// group and world access from whatever the link points at.
+pub(crate) fn create_dir(path: &Path) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::{DirBuilderExt, OpenOptionsExt};
+        std::fs::DirBuilder::new()
+            .recursive(true)
+            .mode(0o700)
+            .create(path)?;
+        // Re-pin through the opened directory, not the path: O_NOFOLLOW
+        // refuses a swapped-in symlink and fchmod acts on the checked inode,
+        // so a final-component swap between check and chmod cannot retarget
+        // the mode change at whatever the link points at.
+        match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+            .read(true)
+            .custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
+            .open(path)
+        {
+            Ok(dir) => {
+                use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd;
+                let fd = dir.as_raw_fd();
+                // Re-pin only a leaf this process owns. A --dir the caller
+                // can write but cannot chmod (foreign-owned 0775 leaf, ACL
+                // grant) is adopted unchanged: create_dir_all allowed the
+                // write before, and aborting turns a usable directory into
+                // a command failure. An owned directory that still refuses
+                // chmod (EPERM) is adopted the same way.
+                let owned = unsafe {
+                    let mut st: libc::stat = std::mem::zeroed();
+                    libc::fstat(fd, &mut st) == 0 && st.st_uid == libc::geteuid()
+                };
+                if owned && unsafe { libc::fchmod(fd, 0o700) } != 0 {
+                    let e = std::io::Error::last_os_error();
+                    if e.raw_os_error() != Some(libc::EPERM) {
+                        return Err(e);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            // ELOOP: the path is a symlink and is left alone per contract.
+            Err(e) if e.raw_os_error() == Some(libc::ELOOP) => {}
+            Err(e) => return Err(e),
+        }
+    }
+    #[cfg(not(unix))]
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(path)?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use tempfile::TempDir;
+
+    #[test]
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn create_dir_adopts_writable_leaf_it_cannot_chmod() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        // /tmp is root-owned 1777: writable by this euid, not chmod-able.
+        // The pre-helper create_dir_all allowed the write; the re-pin must
+        // adopt the leaf unchanged rather than abort on EPERM.
+        let before = std::fs::metadata("/tmp").unwrap().permissions().mode();
+        super::create_dir(std::path::Path::new("/tmp")).unwrap();
+        let after = std::fs::metadata("/tmp").unwrap().permissions().mode();
+        assert_eq!(before, after);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn write_creates_file_with_0600() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let path = dir.path().join("key.pem");
+        super::write(&path, b"secret").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&path).unwrap(), b"secret");
+        assert_eq!(
+            std::fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777,
+            0o600
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn write_tightens_preexisting_loose_file() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let path = dir.path().join("key.pem");
+        std::fs::write(&path, b"old").unwrap();
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o644)).unwrap();
+        super::write(&path, b"new").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&path).unwrap(), b"new");
+        assert_eq!(
+            std::fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777,
+            0o600
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn write_refuses_symlink() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let target = dir.path().join("target.pem");
+        std::fs::write(&target, b"planted").unwrap();
+        let link = dir.path().join("link.pem");
+        std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&target, &link).unwrap();
+        assert!(super::write(&link, b"secret").is_err());
+        assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&target).unwrap(), b"planted");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn create_dir_modes_0700_and_tightens_existing() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let path = dir.path().join("a").join("b");
+        super::create_dir(&path).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            std::fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777,
+            0o700
+        );
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+        super::create_dir(&path).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            std::fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777,
+            0o700
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn create_dir_does_not_chmod_through_symlink() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let target = dir.path().join("shared");
+        std::fs::create_dir(&target).unwrap();
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&target, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+        let link = dir.path().join("link");
+        std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&target, &link).unwrap();
+        super::create_dir(&link).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            std::fs::metadata(&target).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777,
+            0o755
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gl/src/whoami.rs

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct WhoamiArgs {
-    /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
+    /// Identity directory (default: the parent of $GITLAWB_KEY, else ~/.gitlawb)
     #[arg(long)]
     dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     /// Node URL to query for registration info

docs/RUN-A-NODE.md

@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ Required env for on-chain PoS mode:
 Optional:
 - `GITLAWB_OPERATOR_STRICT_MODE=true` — refuse to start if not registered or not currently active
 - `GITLAWB_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_HOURS=20` — how often to post heartbeats (must be < 24)
+- `GITLAWB_RECONCILIATION_SWEEP=true` — enable the hourly durability sweep that re-pins/backstops missing objects (default `true`; disabled when no IPFS/Pinata backend is configured). Public pin repair runs against any configured backend. Encrypted recovery repair requires local IPFS (`GITLAWB_IPFS_API`); Pinata-only nodes reconcile public pins only. Set `=false` to disable.
 
 ## 5. Verify
 
@@ -144,9 +145,11 @@ During the cooldown your node still earns rewards if it keeps heartbeating.
 
 ## Owner-only push
 
-The node requires the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on **every**
-branch. A push whose authenticated DID is not the repo owner is rejected with
-HTTP 403 before any ref update is applied. The owner is matched in both the full
+On the `git-receive-pack` POST — the push itself — the node requires the
+authenticated pusher to be the repo owner, or to present a UCAN whose proof chain
+roots at the owner and carries `git/push` for this repository (see *Delegating
+push to a CI agent* below). Anyone else is rejected with HTTP 403 before any ref
+update is applied, on **every** branch. The owner is matched in both the full
 `did:key:z6Mk…` form and its bare `z6Mk…` suffix.
 
 This is on by default, and the default is the point. The node authenticates every
@@ -156,6 +159,25 @@ Authentication is not authorization, so without this gate every signed caller ca
 push to every repository — private ones included — on any branch that is not
 explicitly protected.
 
+A `git push` crosses two independent gates, and this section is about the second:
+
+1. **Read visibility**, enforced twice on a push: on the `info/refs` advertisement
+   that precedes every fetch *and* every push, and again on the `git-receive-pack`
+   POST itself, because a client can skip the advertisement entirely. The
+   owner always passes. A visibility rule that matches `/` is an allow-list:
+   only the DIDs in its reader list pass, on a public repository as much as on
+   a private one. With no matching rule the repository's own flag decides:
+   public admits everyone, private denies every non-reader with the same 404 a
+   missing repository gets. A UCAN plays no part here — a delegation grants
+   no read access.
+2. **Push authorization**, on the `git-receive-pack` POST: the owner, or an
+   owner-rooted, bounded, repository-scoped push delegation.
+
+Both must pass. With no `/` rule on a public repository the first is open to
+everyone, so a delegation alone is enough; with a `/` rule, or on a private
+repository, the delegate must also be a reader — see *Private repositories and
+`/` rules* below.
+
 ### Turning it off
 
 ```bash
@@ -169,16 +191,94 @@ Do this only for a rolling upgrade whose pushers are not yet the repo owner, and
 treat it as temporary: while it is off, your node accepts a push to any repository
 from anyone who can generate a keypair.
 
-### Caution: delegated and CI keys are non-owners
+- **When `true`** — a push whose authenticated DID is not the repo owner is
+  rejected (HTTP 403) before any ref update is applied, unless it carries a
+  valid delegation (the next bullet). The owner is matched in
+  both the full `did:key:z6Mk…` form and its bare `z6Mk…` suffix.
+- **A delegated key can still push.** A non-owner clears this gate by presenting a
+  UCAN whose proof chain roots at the repo owner and which carries `git/push` for
+  this repository. See *Delegating push to a CI agent* below.
 
-Push authorization is owner-only today. A UCAN `git/push` capability is verified
-but **not yet honored for authorization**, so a delegated key cannot push while
-this gate is on, even when it holds a valid capability for the repo.
+### Delegating push to a CI agent
 
-If your automation pushes under its own DID rather than the owner's, it will start
-getting 403s. Either have it push as the owner, or set
-`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false` until scoped collaborator / UCAN-delegated push
-rights land — that work is what removes this trade-off.
+The owner issues a capability, the agent stores it, and the git helper presents it
+automatically on every push:
+
+Before anything below, set `GITLAWB_KEY` to an **absolute** path to the
+identity PEM (`gl identity new` prints it). `gl ucan import` and
+`git-remote-gitlawb` both resolve the delegation store from that key's parent
+directory, so do not pass `import --dir` pointing anywhere else: an import that
+succeeds elsewhere leaves the push unsigned. The README and `.env.example`
+cover the layout.
+
+```bash
+# Owner, once per agent per repo:
+gl ucan delegate --to did:key:z6MkAgent… \
+  --cap gitlawb://repos/<owner-did>/<repo> --can git/push --expiry 168
+
+# Agent:
+gl ucan import <token-or-path>
+git push origin main          # git-remote-gitlawb attaches it as X-Ucan
+```
+
+`--expiry` is measured in hours: 168 is 7 days, 720 is 30.
+
+`<repo>` is the repository's canonical name: the record name without a `.git`
+suffix. A trailing `.git` in the capability (or pasted from the remote URL) is
+stripped the same way the git remote strips it, at most once, so
+`gitlawb://repos/<owner-did>/myrepo.git` delegates to `myrepo`.
+
+What the node requires, and why:
+
+| Requirement | Reason |
+|---|---|
+| The chain's **root issuer** is the repo owner | A `did:key` is self-certifying, so anyone can mint a chain. The owner is the only anchor the node holds independently of the token. |
+| **Every link** names this repository | A delegation's scope is fixed when it is issued. The node walks the whole proof chain, so a `*` resource authorizes nothing — not in the leaf and not in any proof behind it. Refusing only the leaf would not have been enough: attenuation permits narrowing a `*` parent to a concrete child, so one wildcard grant could otherwise reach every repository the owner has or later creates. `gl ucan delegate` therefore refuses to issue a push-class `*` at all. |
+| **Every link carries an expiry** | There is no revocation path yet. An unbounded delegation could never be withdrawn once leaked, so the node refuses one outright. `gl ucan delegate` defaults to 30 days. |
+| No `nb` constraints | Constraints are reserved but not yet interpreted, so a capability carrying them authorizes nothing rather than silently granting more than the owner intended. |
+| The token is addressed to the pusher | The node requires the proof's audience to equal the invocation's issuer, and `gl ucan import` refuses a token addressed to another identity rather than storing one that can only fail. |
+
+**Private repositories and `/` rules.** A delegation clears the push gate
+only. The `info/refs` advertisement that `git push` fetches first is read-gated,
+and a UCAN grants no read access, so on a private repository the delegate must
+also be a reader — and the same holds on a public repository that has a `/`
+rule, because a matching rule is an allow-list that replaces the public flag:
+
+```bash
+# Owner: check the existing rules first — a `/` rule you already set has a mode
+# you want to keep, and `set` replaces its reader list wholesale.
+gl visibility list --repo <repo>
+
+# Then grant read to the agent AND every existing reader on `/`. The mode
+# (`a`/`b`) must match what `list` showed; only reach for `b` when no `/`
+# rule exists yet.
+gl visibility set / --repo <repo> --mode <a|b> --readers did:key:z6MkReader1,did:key:z6MkAgent…
+```
+
+Without it the agent's push fails with a 404 — the same answer a stranger gets,
+because a private repository is not confirmed to exist for a non-reader. A
+normal `git push` sees it at the `info/refs` advertisement; a client that skips
+the advertisement sees the identical denial on the `git-receive-pack` POST
+itself. Either way the delegation is valid and would clear the push gate: the
+read gate is what refused it. On a public repository with no `/` rule this
+step is unnecessary. The two gates are
+independent in the other direction as well: a reader with no delegation is still
+refused on the push.
+
+**One repository per token.** `gl ucan delegate` issues one capability per token,
+and `gl ucan import` stores one repository per token. A hand-built token that
+names several repositories is refused at import rather than applied to some of
+them; ask the owner for one delegation per repository.
+
+**A delegation does not override branch protection.** A protected branch is your
+explicit marker that even routine writes should stop, so a delegate is still
+refused there and only the owner may push. That is deliberate: if a delegation
+overrode it, issuing any capability would weaken every protection you had set.
+
+**Withdrawal is by expiry only.** There is no revocation today. If a delegated
+token leaks, it remains valid until its `exp`, and the only faster remedy is
+rotating the owner DID the repository is keyed on. Choose `--expiry` accordingly —
+short lifetimes reissued often are safer than one long-lived grant.
 
 ---
 

scripts/ci-surfaces.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# Map a pull request's changed paths to the CI surfaces they touch, so each
+# check in pr-checks.yml and codeql.yml runs only when its inputs changed and
+# Rust jobs test only the affected crates.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   git diff -z --name-only --no-renames BASE HEAD | scripts/ci-surfaces.sh
+#   scripts/ci-surfaces.sh --all      # every surface, whole workspace
+#
+# Input is NUL-terminated paths (`git diff -z`). Without -z, git C-quotes any
+# path with non-ASCII, tab, quote or newline characters ("crates/gl/\303\251.rs"),
+# which would match no surface and skip every job; newline-delimited input
+# also cannot carry a path that contains a newline. Input that does not end in
+# NUL (e.g. a plain `git diff --name-only`) is rejected rather than misread.
+# scripts/test-ci-surfaces.sh pins the mapping.
+#
+# Prints GITHUB_OUTPUT lines (key=value). Each surface runs only for the paths
+# listed for it below, so a path no surface lists (docs, README, infra/, any
+# other workflow) runs no PR Checks job. Within the Rust surface, a change this
+# script cannot attribute to specific crates widens rather than narrows: a
+# global Rust input or an unknown crate directory runs the Rust jobs on the
+# whole workspace. The CI wiring itself (pr-checks.yml, codeql.yml, this
+# script) runs every surface.
+# Non-PR events (push to main, merge_group, workflow_dispatch, schedule) are
+# expected to pass --all, so main and the merge queue keep full coverage.
+#
+# Runnable from anywhere in the repo.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ROOT="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
+
+all=false
+if [ "${1:-}" = "--all" ]; then
+  all=true
+elif [ "$#" -ne 0 ]; then
+  echo "usage: $0 [--all] < NUL-terminated-changed-paths" >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+
+changed=()
+if [ "$all" = false ]; then
+  path=""
+  while IFS= read -r -d '' path; do
+    [ -n "$path" ] && changed+=("$path")
+  done
+  # read leaves any unterminated tail in $path.
+  if [ -n "$path" ]; then
+    echo "ci-surfaces.sh: input is not NUL-terminated; pipe \`git diff -z --name-only\`" >&2
+    exit 2
+  fi
+fi
+
+# Workspace crates, derived from crates/*/Cargo.toml so a new crate is picked
+# up without editing this script. dir -> package name, and dir -> the crate
+# dirs it depends on through `path = "../<dir>"` (normal, dev, or build deps).
+declare -A pkg_of=() deps_of=()
+for manifest in "$ROOT"/crates/*/Cargo.toml; do
+  dir="$(basename "$(dirname "$manifest")")"
+  pkg_of[$dir]="$(sed -n 's/^name *= *"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' "$manifest" | head -n1)"
+  deps_of[$dir]="$(sed -n 's#.*path *= *"\.\./\([^"/]*\)".*#\1#p' "$manifest" | tr '\n' ' ')"
+done
+
+# Files outside crates/ that a crate compiles in (include_str!/include_bytes!),
+# path -> crate dir. A change to one is a change to that crate, so its tests
+# run. Candidates (keep those that resolve outside crates/<dir>/):
+#   git grep -nE 'include_(str|bytes)!\("(\.\./){2,}' crates
+declare -A embedded_in=(
+  [bootstrap-peers.json]=gitlawb-node
+)
+
+# Mark a crate dir as touched; a dir this checkout does not know (removed or
+# renamed crate) widens the Rust jobs to the whole workspace.
+touch_crate() {
+  if [ -n "${pkg_of[$1]:-}" ]; then
+    touched[$1]=1
+  else
+    full_rust=true
+  fi
+}
+
+full_rust=false
+rust=false
+docker=false
+audit=false
+core_deps=false
+release_versioning=false
+release_tag=false
+cq_actions=false
+cq_js=false
+cq_rust=false
+cq_swift=false
+declare -A touched=()
+
+for path in "${changed[@]}"; do
+  case "$path" in
+    # The CI wiring itself: validate everything it gates.
+    .github/workflows/pr-checks.yml | .github/workflows/codeql.yml | scripts/ci-surfaces.sh)
+      all=true ;;
+    # Workspace-wide Rust inputs.
+    Cargo.toml | Cargo.lock | .cargo/* | rust-toolchain | rust-toolchain.toml \
+      | rustfmt.toml | .rustfmt.toml | clippy.toml | .clippy.toml)
+      full_rust=true ;;
+    crates/*/*)
+      dir="${path#crates/}"
+      touch_crate "${dir%%/*}" ;;
+    *)
+      if [ -n "${embedded_in[$path]:-}" ]; then
+        touch_crate "${embedded_in[$path]}"
+      fi ;;
+  esac
+
+  case "$path" in
+    Dockerfile | .dockerignore | bootstrap-peers.json | Cargo.toml | Cargo.lock \
+      | .cargo/* | rust-toolchain | rust-toolchain.toml | crates/*/Cargo.toml)
+      docker=true ;;
+  esac
+  case "$path" in
+    Cargo.lock | .cargo/audit.toml) audit=true ;;
+  esac
+  case "$path" in
+    Cargo.toml | Cargo.lock | crates/gitlawb-core/Cargo.toml \
+      | ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt | scripts/check-gitlawb-core-deps.sh)
+      core_deps=true ;;
+  esac
+  case "$path" in
+    Cargo.toml | crates/*/Cargo.toml | release-please-config.json \
+      | .release-please-manifest.json | scripts/check-release-versioning.sh)
+      release_versioning=true ;;
+  esac
+  case "$path" in
+    scripts/resolve-release-tag.sh | scripts/test-resolve-release-tag.sh)
+      release_tag=true ;;
+  esac
+
+  case "$path" in
+    .github/workflows/* | .github/actions/*) cq_actions=true ;;
+  esac
+  case "$path" in
+    npm/* | *.js | *.mjs | *.cjs | *.jsx | *.ts | *.mts | *.cts | *.tsx) cq_js=true ;;
+  esac
+  case "$path" in
+    macos-app/* | *.swift) cq_swift=true ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+if [ "$all" = true ]; then
+  full_rust=true
+  docker=true
+  audit=true
+  core_deps=true
+  release_versioning=true
+  release_tag=true
+  cq_actions=true
+  cq_js=true
+  cq_swift=true
+fi
+
+# Affected crates: the touched ones plus everything that depends on them,
+# transitively, so a gitlawb-core change still tests every consumer.
+declare -A affected=()
+for dir in "${!touched[@]}"; do affected[$dir]=1; done
+grew=true
+while [ "$grew" = true ]; do
+  grew=false
+  for dir in "${!deps_of[@]}"; do
+    [ -n "${affected[$dir]:-}" ] && continue
+    for dep in ${deps_of[$dir]}; do
+      if [ -n "${affected[$dep]:-}" ]; then
+        affected[$dir]=1
+        grew=true
+        break
+      fi
+    done
+  done
+done
+
+if [ "$full_rust" = true ] || [ "${#affected[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
+  rust=true
+  cq_rust=true
+fi
+
+rust_packages=""
+windows_packages=""
+if [ "$full_rust" = true ]; then
+  rust_packages="--workspace"
+  windows_packages="-p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb"
+elif [ "$rust" = true ]; then
+  for dir in $(printf '%s\n' "${!affected[@]}" | sort); do
+    rust_packages+="${rust_packages:+ }-p ${pkg_of[$dir]}"
+    case "${pkg_of[$dir]}" in
+      gl | git-remote-gitlawb) windows_packages+="${windows_packages:+ }-p ${pkg_of[$dir]}" ;;
+    esac
+  done
+fi
+
+windows=false
+[ -n "$windows_packages" ] && windows=true
+
+languages=()
+[ "$cq_actions" = true ] && languages+=('{"language":"actions","build-mode":"none","runner":"ubuntu-latest"}')
+[ "$cq_js" = true ] && languages+=('{"language":"javascript-typescript","build-mode":"none","runner":"ubuntu-latest"}')
+[ "$cq_rust" = true ] && languages+=('{"language":"rust","build-mode":"none","runner":"ubuntu-latest"}')
+[ "$cq_swift" = true ] && languages+=('{"language":"swift","build-mode":"autobuild","runner":"macos-latest"}')
+codeql_matrix="{\"include\":[$(IFS=,; echo "${languages[*]}")]}"
+codeql=false
+[ "${#languages[@]}" -gt 0 ] && codeql=true
+
+cat <<EOF
+rust=$rust
+rust_packages=$rust_packages
+windows=$windows
+windows_packages=$windows_packages
+docker=$docker
+audit=$audit
+core_deps=$core_deps
+release_versioning=$release_versioning
+release_tag=$release_tag
+codeql=$codeql
+codeql_matrix=$codeql_matrix
+EOF

scripts/test-ci-surfaces.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Fixture test for scripts/ci-surfaces.sh, which alone decides which PR Checks
+# jobs and CodeQL languages run. Pins at least one must-not-skip case per
+# surface row, the crate fan-out and widening rules, and paths that git would
+# C-quote without -z. Run from pr-checks.yml before the mapper is used.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+repo_root="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+mapper="$repo_root/scripts/ci-surfaces.sh"
+failures=0
+
+# map PATH... : run the mapper on the paths as `git diff -z` would emit them.
+map() {
+  if [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; then printf '%s\0' "$@"; fi | "$mapper"
+}
+
+# check CASE OUTPUT KEY=VALUE... : each KEY must have exactly VALUE.
+check() {
+  local name="$1" out="$2" want key
+  shift 2
+  for want in "$@"; do
+    key="${want%%=*}"
+    if ! grep -qxF -- "$want" <<<"$out"; then
+      printf 'FAIL %s: want %s, got %s\n' "$name" "$want" \
+        "$(grep -E "^${key}=" <<<"$out" || echo '<missing>')" >&2
+      failures=$((failures + 1))
+    fi
+  done
+}
+
+# has_packages CASE OUTPUT PKG... : rust_packages must include each -p PKG.
+has_packages() {
+  local name="$1" out="$2" pkgs pkg
+  shift 2
+  pkgs=" $(sed -n 's/^rust_packages=//p' <<<"$out") "
+  for pkg in "$@"; do
+    if [[ "$pkgs" != *" -p $pkg "* ]]; then
+      printf 'FAIL %s: rust_packages lacks -p %s (got%s)\n' "$name" "$pkg" "$pkgs" >&2
+      failures=$((failures + 1))
+    fi
+  done
+}
+
+nothing=(rust=false rust_packages= windows=false windows_packages= docker=false
+  audit=false core_deps=false release_versioning=false release_tag=false
+  codeql=false 'codeql_matrix={"include":[]}')
+everything=(rust=true rust_packages=--workspace windows=true
+  'windows_packages=-p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb' docker=true audit=true
+  core_deps=true release_versioning=true release_tag=true codeql=true)
+all_languages='codeql_matrix={"include":[{"language":"actions","build-mode":"none","runner":"ubuntu-latest"},{"language":"javascript-typescript","build-mode":"none","runner":"ubuntu-latest"},{"language":"rust","build-mode":"none","runner":"ubuntu-latest"},{"language":"swift","build-mode":"autobuild","runner":"macos-latest"}]}'
+rust_only='codeql_matrix={"include":[{"language":"rust","build-mode":"none","runner":"ubuntu-latest"}]}'
+
+# Docs-only and empty input run nothing.
+check "docs only" "$(map README.md docs/x.md infra/x.tf)" "${nothing[@]}"
+check "empty input" "$(map)" "${nothing[@]}"
+
+# A crate change tests that crate and its reverse deps, nothing else.
+check "gl source" "$(map crates/gl/src/main.rs)" \
+  rust=true 'rust_packages=-p gl' windows=true 'windows_packages=-p gl' \
+  docker=false audit=false "$rust_only"
+out="$(map crates/gitlawb-core/src/lib.rs)"
+check "gitlawb-core source" "$out" rust=true windows=true \
+  'windows_packages=-p git-remote-gitlawb -p gl' "$rust_only"
+has_packages "gitlawb-core fan-out" "$out" gitlawb-core icaptcha-client \
+  gitlawb-attest git-remote-gitlawb gl gitlawb-node
+check "icaptcha-client source" "$(map crates/icaptcha-client/src/lib.rs)" \
+  'rust_packages=-p gl -p icaptcha-client' 'windows_packages=-p gl'
+
+# Anything the Rust surface cannot attribute to known crates widens.
+check "unknown crate dir" "$(map crates/no-such-crate/src/lib.rs)" \
+  rust=true rust_packages=--workspace docker=false
+check "root Cargo.lock" "$(map Cargo.lock)" \
+  rust=true rust_packages=--workspace docker=true audit=true core_deps=true \
+  release_versioning=false
+check "toolchain file" "$(map rust-toolchain.toml)" rust=true rust_packages=--workspace
+
+# Files compiled into a crate from outside crates/.
+check "bootstrap-peers.json" "$(map bootstrap-peers.json)" \
+  rust=true 'rust_packages=-p gitlawb-node' windows=false docker=true
+
+# One must-not-skip trigger per non-Rust row.
+check "Dockerfile" "$(map Dockerfile)" docker=true rust=false
+check "crate manifest" "$(map crates/gl/Cargo.toml)" \
+  docker=true release_versioning=true 'rust_packages=-p gl'
+check "audit config" "$(map .cargo/audit.toml)" audit=true rust_packages=--workspace
+check "core allowlist" "$(map ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt)" core_deps=true rust=false
+check "release-please config" "$(map release-please-config.json)" \
+  release_versioning=true rust=false
+check "release tag resolver" "$(map scripts/resolve-release-tag.sh)" release_tag=true rust=false
+check "other workflow" "$(map .github/workflows/release.yml)" "${nothing[@]:0:9}" \
+  codeql=true 'codeql_matrix={"include":[{"language":"actions","build-mode":"none","runner":"ubuntu-latest"}]}'
+check "npm" "$(map npm/package.json)" codeql=true \
+  'codeql_matrix={"include":[{"language":"javascript-typescript","build-mode":"none","runner":"ubuntu-latest"}]}'
+check "swift" "$(map macos-app/Sources/App.swift)" rust=false codeql=true \
+  'codeql_matrix={"include":[{"language":"swift","build-mode":"autobuild","runner":"macos-latest"}]}'
+
+# Editing the CI wiring runs every surface, exactly like --all.
+for wiring in .github/workflows/pr-checks.yml .github/workflows/codeql.yml scripts/ci-surfaces.sh; do
+  check "wiring $wiring" "$(map "$wiring")" "${everything[@]}" "$all_languages"
+done
+check "--all" "$("$mapper" --all </dev/null)" "${everything[@]}" "$all_languages"
+
+# Names git C-quotes without -z (non-ASCII, tab, quote, newline) still map.
+for name in $'\xc3\xa9.rs' $'a\tb.rs' 'a"b.rs' $'a\nb.rs'; do
+  check "quoted name $(printf %q "$name")" "$(map "crates/gl/src/$name")" \
+    rust=true 'rust_packages=-p gl'
+done
+check "non-ASCII swift" "$(map $'macos-app/Sources/Caf\xc3\xa9.swift')" codeql=true \
+  'codeql_matrix={"include":[{"language":"swift","build-mode":"autobuild","runner":"macos-latest"}]}'
+
+# Newline-delimited input (git diff without -z) is rejected, not misread.
+if printf 'crates/gl/src/main.rs\n' | "$mapper" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "FAIL newline-delimited input: mapper accepted it" >&2
+  failures=$((failures + 1))
+fi
+
+if [ "$failures" -ne 0 ]; then
+  echo "$failures ci-surfaces mapping check(s) failed" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+echo "ci-surfaces mapping: all checks passed"