feat(infra): Fly config for node3 on the public OSS build

Deploys node3.gitlawb.com (Fly app gitlawb-node-3, nrt) from this repo's
Dockerfile instead of its old private source. Canary for migrating the
bootstrap nodes; node + node2 follow.

- region nrt, reuses volume gitlawb_data (identity + repos) and the
  attached Postgres (DATABASE_URL secret)
- corrects PUBLIC_URL to https://node3.gitlawb.com, bootstrap peers to
  node + node2 (not self), drops vestigial GITLAWB_DB (v0.3.9 is
  Postgres-only)
- 1024MB (was 256MB — too small for v0.3.9)

Migration note: the existing volume was created by the old root-based
image, so /data was root-owned; the public image runs as uid 1000 and
needed a one-time 'chown -R 1000:1000 /data'. node + node2 will need the
same until the image entrypoint self-heals ownership.

Co-Authored-By: OpenClaude <[email protected]>

.cargo/audit.toml

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-# cargo-audit configuration.
-#
-# cargo-audit reads its config from .cargo/audit.toml (relative to the working
-# directory) or ~/.cargo/audit.toml. It does NOT read a repo-root audit.toml,
-# and there is no CLI flag to point at a config file (`-f` is the lockfile path).
-# This file lives at .cargo/audit.toml for that reason.
-#
-# The audit job stays hard-fail: only the advisories explicitly listed below are
-# suppressed, so any NEW advisory still breaks CI. Each entry below has no
-# available upstream fix; everything fixable is fixed in Cargo.lock instead.
-#
-# Tracking: the hickory ignores are reachable accepted risk. A scheduled re-check
-# (.github/workflows/audit-schedule.yml) runs without these ignores and fails if
-# the lockfile moves off the pinned vulnerable versions while the ignores remain.
-
-[advisories]
-ignore = [
-    # hickory-proto 0.25.2 (pulled by libp2p-dns 0.44 -> hickory-resolver 0.25).
-    # REACHABLE: the node wraps its QUIC transport in the system DNS resolver
-    # (crates/gitlawb-node/src/p2p/mod.rs:238), so a malicious DNS response can
-    # trigger these DoS paths. No fix is available: the latest libp2p-dns on
-    # crates.io is 0.44 and pins hickory 0.25; the fix requires hickory >=0.26.1.
-    # REMOVE both once libp2p-dns ships a release using hickory 0.26 (verified
-    # 2026-06-21: cargo update -p hickory-proto locks 0 packages; still 0.25.2).
-    # Tracking: https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/76
-    "RUSTSEC-2026-0118", # hickory NSEC3 closest-encloser unbounded loop
-    "RUSTSEC-2026-0119", # hickory O(n^2) name-compression CPU exhaustion
-
-    # rsa 0.9.10 (Marvin timing sidechannel). Present in Cargo.lock because sqlx
-    # resolves sqlx-mysql unconditionally, and sqlx-mysql depends on rsa. cargo
-    # audit scans the lockfile, so it flags rsa even though it is NOT linked into
-    # our binary: sqlx is built postgres-only (crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml),
-    # so the MySQL RSA auth path is never compiled and there is no RSA oracle to
-    # attack. No upstream fix exists regardless. REMOVE this ignore if sqlx is
-    # ever built with the `mysql` feature, or any other consumer of rsa enters
-    # the build, at which point it becomes a real reachable advisory.
-    "RUSTSEC-2023-0071", # rsa Marvin attack (no fix; not linked in our build)
-]

.env.example

@@ -21,23 +21,6 @@ GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR=/data/repos
 # When using the bundled docker-compose, this is wired automatically.
 DATABASE_URL=postgresql://gitlawb:changeme@localhost:5432/gitlawb
 
-# ── Database pool & startup resilience ────────────────────────────────────
-# Maximum connections in the PostgreSQL pool. A cap, not a floor —
-# connections open lazily. Size against the DB server's max_connections,
-# remembering admin tooling opens its own pool.
-GITLAWB_DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS=20
-# Seconds a request waits for a pool connection before failing with 503.
-GITLAWB_DB_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS=5
-# Upper bound on each startup connect+migrate attempt, in seconds. Keep it
-# generous enough for a peer instance to finish migrating (the migration
-# advisory lock is held across a deploy); on expiry the attempt is retried.
-GITLAWB_DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS=60
-# Startup retry backoff while the database is unavailable: first delay and
-# ceiling, in seconds. The node stays up serving 503s (with a truthful
-# /ready) instead of crash-looping.
-GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_INITIAL_SECS=5
-GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_MAX_SECS=60
-
 # ── IPFS pinning (Pinata) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Get a JWT at https://app.pinata.cloud/developers/api-keys
 GITLAWB_PINATA_JWT=
@@ -89,12 +72,6 @@ GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS=false
 # rolling upgrades so existing live nodes can still communicate.
 GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false
 
-# Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on git-receive-pack.
-# A valid did:key signature is authentication, not authorization: anyone can
-# sign as their own DID. When true, pushes from a non-owner DID are rejected.
-# Keep false until the repo owner is ready for owner-only writes.
-GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false
-
 # Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs.
 # Example: /ip4/1.2.3.4/udp/7546/quic-v1/p2p/12D3KooW...
 GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP=
@@ -107,64 +84,6 @@ GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ=true
 # Maximum git smart-HTTP pack request size, in bytes.
 GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES=2147483648
 
-# Max seconds a served git upload-pack / receive-pack (clone / push) may run
-# before it is aborted with a 504. Bounds a hung git that would otherwise pin a
-# worker and, on push, the repo write lock. Does NOT cover the info/refs
-# advertisement or the withheld-blob path, which remain unbounded. Default 600.
-GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS=600
-
-# ── Push rate limiting (git-receive-pack flood brake) ─────────────────────
-# Max receive-pack requests (info/refs advertisement + push POST) per client
-# IP per hour. 0 disables. Default 600.
-GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT=600
-
-# ── Creation rate limiting (repo/agent/issue/PR flood brake) ──────────────
-# Max creation requests (POST /api/v1/repos, /api/register, fork, issues,
-# pulls) per client IP per hour, in addition to the per-DID limit. The per-DID
-# limit alone is bypassed by a did:key farm (one throwaway identity per repo),
-# which is how spam-repo floods slip past it and the iCaptcha gate; the per-IP
-# brake caps a single-source flood. Uses GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY below to resolve
-# the client IP. 0 disables. Default 120.
-GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT=120
-
-# ── Peer-sync rate limiting (per client IP, uses GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY below) ─
-# /api/v1/peers/announce and /api/v1/sync/notify accept unsigned requests from
-# known peers and run at higher frequency, so a generous bucket. Separate from
-# the trigger bucket so an unsigned notify flood can't drain trigger's quota.
-# 0 disables. Default 600.
-GITLAWB_PEER_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT=600
-# /api/v1/sync/trigger requires a signature and fans out to every peer per call,
-# so it gets a tight bucket. 0 disables. Default 60.
-GITLAWB_SYNC_TRIGGER_RATE_LIMIT=60
-
-# Which forwarded header the edge is trusted to set, used to resolve the real
-# client IP for the push limiter. One of:
-#   (unset) — no trusted proxy: key on the socket peer address, ignore headers.
-#   fly     — behind Fly's edge (trust Fly-Client-IP).
-#   x-forwarded-for — behind a single reverse proxy like Caddy/NGINX (trust the
-#             rightmost X-Forwarded-For hop).
-# Only set this when a proxy you control actually fronts the node; trusting a
-# forwarded header on a directly-exposed node lets clients spoof the key.
-GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY=
-
 # ── Sync ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Enable automatic background sync from known peers
 GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC=false
-
-# ── iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate ───────────────────────────────────
-# Optional gate on create_repo + register: require callers to present an
-# iCaptcha proof (X-ICaptcha-Proof header) earned at icaptcha.gitlawb.com.
-# Default off = fully inert (no behavior change).
-#   off     - gate disabled (default)
-#   shadow  - verify + log would-be rejections, but always allow
-#   enforce - reject requests without a valid, strong-enough proof
-ICAPTCHA_MODE=off
-# Optional base64url Ed25519 public key override; if unset it is fetched from
-# ICAPTCHA_URL/v1/pubkey at startup. Recommended in production: pinning the key
-# removes the startup dependency on the iCaptcha service being reachable and
-# avoids silently running inert if that one-time fetch fails.
-ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY=
-# Minimum proof difficulty level required to pass.
-ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL=3
-# Base URL of the iCaptcha service.
-ICAPTCHA_URL=https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com

.github/CODEOWNERS

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-# Ownership for CI, release, and security-sensitive infrastructure.
-# A PR that edits these paths requires review from a code owner once
-# branch protection's "Require review from Code Owners" is enabled.
-
-/.github/                      @beardthelion
-/Dockerfile                    @beardthelion
-/Dockerfile.bins               @beardthelion
-/docker-compose.yml            @beardthelion
-/release-please-config.json    @beardthelion
-/.release-please-manifest.json @beardthelion
-/SECURITY.md                   @beardthelion

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-name: Bug report
-description: Report a defect in a Gitlawb crate or node behavior
-labels: ["bug"]
-body:
-  - type: markdown
-    attributes:
-      value: |
-        Thanks for the report. Please fill in the fields below so we can reproduce the issue.
-        For security vulnerabilities, do NOT open an issue — follow SECURITY.md instead.
-  - type: textarea
-    id: what-happened
-    attributes:
-      label: What happened?
-      description: A clear description of the bug.
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: textarea
-    id: expected
-    attributes:
-      label: Expected behavior
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: textarea
-    id: repro
-    attributes:
-      label: Steps to reproduce
-      placeholder: |
-        1. ...
-        2. ...
-        3. ...
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: dropdown
-    id: crate
-    attributes:
-      label: Affected crate
-      options:
-        - gitlawb-node
-        - gl
-        - git-remote-gitlawb
-        - gitlawb-core
-        - not sure / other
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: input
-    id: version
-    attributes:
-      label: Version or commit
-      description: Output of the binary's `--version`, or the git commit you built.
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: textarea
-    id: environment
-    attributes:
-      label: Environment
-      description: OS, Rust version (`rustc --version`), and anything else relevant.
-    validations:
-      required: false
-  - type: textarea
-    id: logs
-    attributes:
-      label: Relevant logs
-      description: Paste logs or errors. This will be rendered as code, no need for backticks.
-      render: shell
-    validations:
-      required: false

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-blank_issues_enabled: false
-contact_links:
-  - name: Security vulnerability
-    url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/blob/main/SECURITY.md
-    about: Please report security issues privately per our security policy, not as a public issue.
-  - name: Questions & discussion
-    url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/discussions
-    about: For usage questions and open-ended discussion.

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-name: Feature request
-description: Suggest an improvement or new capability
-labels: ["enhancement"]
-body:
-  - type: textarea
-    id: problem
-    attributes:
-      label: Problem / use case
-      description: What are you trying to do that's hard or impossible today?
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: textarea
-    id: proposal
-    attributes:
-      label: Proposed solution
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: textarea
-    id: alternatives
-    attributes:
-      label: Alternatives considered
-    validations:
-      required: false
-  - type: dropdown
-    id: protocol
-    attributes:
-      label: Does this touch the protocol?
-      description: Identity, signatures, UCAN, ref certs, or P2P wire formats. Protocol changes need an issue discussion before any PR.
-      options:
-        - "No"
-        - "Yes"
-        - "Not sure"
-    validations:
-      required: true

.github/pull_request_template.md

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-<!--
-  Thanks for contributing to Gitlawb. Keep PRs focused on one change.
-  Protocol-level changes (identity, signatures, wire format) should start
-  as an issue before code — see CONTRIBUTING.md.
--->
-
-## Summary
-
-<!-- One or two sentences: what changes and why it matters. -->
-
-
-
-## Motivation & context
-
-<!-- What problem does this solve? Link prior discussion if any. -->
-Closes #
-
-## Kind of change
-
-- [ ] Bug fix
-- [ ] Feature
-- [ ] Security fix
-- [ ] Docs
-- [ ] Tests / CI
-- [ ] Refactor (no behavior change)
-- [ ] Breaking or protocol change (issue required first)
-
-## What changed
-
-<!-- Bullet the concrete changes. Note the crate(s) touched:
-     gitlawb-core / gitlawb-node / gl / git-remote-gitlawb -->
-
--
-
-## How a reviewer can verify
-
-<!-- Commands to run, or repro steps for a bug plus proof it's fixed. -->
-
-```sh
-
-```
-
-## Before you request review
-
-- [ ] Scope is one logical change; no unrelated churn
-- [ ] `cargo test --workspace` passes locally
-- [ ] New behavior is covered by tests (required for fixes)
-- [ ] `cargo fmt --all` and `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` are clean
-- [ ] Commit titles use Conventional Commits (`feat(...)`, `fix(...)`, `docs(...)`)
-- [ ] Docs / `.env.example` updated if behavior or config changed (or N/A)
-- [ ] Checked existing PRs so this isn't a duplicate
-
-## Protocol & signing impact
-
-<!-- Delete this block if your change doesn't touch the protocol. -->
-
-- [ ] Touches DID / `did:key`, Ed25519 / RFC 9421 signatures, UCAN, ref certs, or P2P wire formats
-- [ ] Discussed in an issue before implementation
-- [ ] Backward-compatible with existing nodes and previously signed history
-
-## Notes for reviewers
-
-<!-- Anything out of scope, follow-ups, or known limitations. Optional. -->

.github/workflows/audit-schedule.yml

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-name: Scheduled Audit
-
-# Self-expiring suppression check (companion to the PR-blocking audit gate in
-# pr-checks.yml). Runs weekly. It re-runs cargo audit WITHOUT the .cargo/audit.toml
-# ignore list to surface the full advisory set for visibility, and it hard-fails
-# if the lockfile has moved off the pinned vulnerable versions while the ignores
-# are still present, i.e. the upstream fix landed but the ignore was not dropped.
-on:
-  schedule:
-    - cron: "0 6 * * 1" # Mondays 06:00 UTC
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-
-env:
-  CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
-
-jobs:
-  scheduled-audit:
-    name: scheduled audit (no ignores)
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 30
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: stable
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: audit-schedule
-
-      - name: Install cargo-audit (floating; drift canary)
-        # Deliberately UNPINNED, unlike the blocking gate in pr-checks.yml. This
-        # job is cron-only (weekly); it is never pull_request- or push-triggered,
-        # so it NEVER gates a merge no matter what it does. Floating the scanner
-        # here is the drift canary: if a newer cargo-audit regresses, at worst
-        # this weekly run reds (the install step below is unguarded) or its
-        # visibility report changes, and that is exactly the signal that latest
-        # has moved and the pinned gate should not be bumped yet. The scan result
-        # itself never fails the run (the "Full audit report" step is `|| true`
-        # and the only other hard-fail is a Cargo.lock grep). The point is that
-        # drift surfaces here without ever blocking a PR. Do NOT pin to match
-        # pr-checks.yml.
-        run: cargo install --locked cargo-audit
-
-      # Full advisory report with NO suppressions. Run from a scratch dir that
-      # has no .cargo/audit.toml so the ignore list does not apply; never fail
-      # the build on this step, it is visibility only.
-      - name: Full audit report (ignores not applied)
-        run: |
-          mkdir -p "$RUNNER_TEMP/full-audit"
-          cp Cargo.lock "$RUNNER_TEMP/full-audit/Cargo.lock"
-          cd "$RUNNER_TEMP/full-audit"
-          {
-            echo '### Full cargo audit (no ignores applied)'
-            echo '```'
-            cargo audit -f Cargo.lock || true
-            echo '```'
-          } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
-
-      # Drift guard: the hickory ignores are only valid while hickory-proto is
-      # pinned at 0.25.x. If the lockfile has moved past that, the upstream fix
-      # is in and the ignores in .cargo/audit.toml must be removed. Fail loudly.
-      - name: Fail if hickory moved past 0.25.x while ignores remain
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          version="$(grep -A1 'name = "hickory-proto"' Cargo.lock | grep '^version' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f2)"
-          echo "hickory-proto in Cargo.lock: ${version:-not present}"
-          ignores_present=false
-          if grep -q 'RUSTSEC-2026-011' .cargo/audit.toml; then
-            ignores_present=true
-          fi
-          # Drift = the lockfile no longer matches what the ignores assume:
-          # hickory moved off 0.25.x (fix shipped) OR was removed entirely
-          # (dead ignore entries left behind). Both must fail.
-          if [ "$ignores_present" = true ] && { [ -z "${version}" ] || [[ "${version}" != 0.25.* ]]; }; then
-            echo "::error::hickory-proto is ${version:-absent from Cargo.lock} but the RUSTSEC-2026-0118/0119 ignores are still in .cargo/audit.toml. The upstream fix appears to be available or the dependency is gone; remove the ignores."
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          echo "No drift: ignore list is consistent with the pinned hickory-proto version."

.github/workflows/main-red-alert.yml

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-# Tracks main's CI state as a labeled issue: opens (or updates) a ci-main-red
-# issue when a push-to-main run of PR Checks ends red, and closes it when a
-# subsequent run on main's tip goes green.
-#
-# Why: two individually-green PRs can break main in combination when the
-# second merges on checks that ran against a stale base (semantic merge
-# race — #113 + #145 broke test compilation, found only via #229). A red main
-# is otherwise silent, and release-please PRs inherit the breakage.
-#
-# The alert reflects main's CURRENT STATE, not raw CI events: runs whose
-# commit is no longer main's tip are ignored (a re-run of an old red run
-# after a fix has landed must not cry wolf), and a green run on the tip
-# closes any open alert.
-name: Main red alert
-
-on:
-  workflow_run:
-    workflows: ["PR Checks"]
-    types: [completed]
-    branches: [main]
-
-permissions:
-  issues: write
-  contents: read # getBranch tip check
-
-# Serialize runs: concurrent completions would race the label/issue lookups
-# into duplicates (or 422 on createLabel). queue: max keeps every pending
-# completion instead of letting a later (possibly green-skipped) arrival
-# displace a pending red alert under burst merges; it is only incompatible
-# with cancel-in-progress: true, which we don't use.
-concurrency:
-  group: main-red-alert
-  cancel-in-progress: false
-  queue: max
-
-jobs:
-  track:
-    name: Track main CI state
-    # timed_out (the test job runs 45 min against Postgres) and
-    # startup_failure (malformed workflow) are red too — only cancelled is
-    # excluded as a deliberate human abort. success runs are needed to close
-    # the alert once main recovers.
-    if: >-
-      github.event.workflow_run.event == 'push' &&
-      contains(fromJSON('["failure", "timed_out", "startup_failure", "success"]'), github.event.workflow_run.conclusion)
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 5
-    steps:
-      - name: Reconcile the broken-main issue with main's current state
-        uses: actions/github-script@ed597411d8f924073f98dfc5c65a23a2325f34cd # v8.0.0
-        with:
-          script: |
-            const run = context.payload.workflow_run;
-            const label = 'ci-main-red';
-
-            // Freshness gate: only the run for main's current tip may open or
-            // close anything. Re-runs of superseded commits are events about
-            // the past, not statements about main's state.
-            const { data: branch } = await github.rest.repos.getBranch({
-              ...context.repo, branch: 'main',
-            });
-            if (branch.commit.sha !== run.head_sha) {
-              core.info(`run ${run.id} is for ${run.head_sha}, main is at ${branch.commit.sha} — ignoring stale run`);
-              return;
-            }
-
-            // listForRepo returns PRs carrying the label too — those must
-            // never be mistaken for the tracking issue.
-            const open = (await github.rest.issues.listForRepo({
-              ...context.repo, state: 'open', labels: label, per_page: 100,
-            })).data.filter(item => !item.pull_request);
-
-            if (run.conclusion === 'success') {
-              const body = `Recovered: [PR Checks](${run.html_url}) is green on main at \`${run.head_sha}\`.`;
-              for (const issue of open) {
-                await github.rest.issues.createComment({
-                  ...context.repo, issue_number: issue.number, body,
-                });
-                await github.rest.issues.update({
-                  ...context.repo, issue_number: issue.number, state: 'closed', state_reason: 'completed',
-                });
-              }
-              return;
-            }
-
-            const headline = run.head_commit?.message?.split('\n')[0] ?? '';
-            const body = [
-              `[PR Checks run](${run.html_url}) concluded \`${run.conclusion}\` on main at \`${run.head_sha}\`.`,
-              '',
-              `> ${headline}`,
-              '',
-              'Likely a semantic merge race: each merged PR was green on a stale base.',
-              'Fix main before merging anything else — release-please PRs inherit this breakage.',
-              '',
-              "This issue closes automatically when a run on main's tip goes green.",
-            ].join('\n');
-
-            try {
-              await github.rest.issues.getLabel({ ...context.repo, name: label });
-            } catch (e) {
-              if (e.status !== 404) throw e;
-              await github.rest.issues.createLabel({
-                ...context.repo,
-                name: label,
-                color: 'b60205',
-                description: 'CI is failing on main',
-              });
-            }
-
-            if (open.length > 0) {
-              await github.rest.issues.createComment({
-                ...context.repo, issue_number: open[0].number, body,
-              });
-            } else {
-              await github.rest.issues.create({
-                ...context.repo,
-                title: 'CI is red on main',
-                body,
-                labels: [label],
-              });
-            }

.github/workflows/pr-checks.yml

@@ -2,17 +2,6 @@ name: PR Checks
 
 on:
   pull_request:
-  # Run in the merge queue so a PR is re-validated against the true merged
-  # result before it lands. Guards against semantic merge races where two
-  # individually-green PRs break main in combination (#113 + #145 → #229).
-  merge_group:
-  # Release-branch heads are created and pushed by GITHUB_TOKEN (release-please
-  # and the lock-sync job), and GitHub's recursion guard means those pushes
-  # trigger no workflow runs. workflow_dispatch is the documented carve-out that
-  # GITHUB_TOKEN CAN trigger, so the release flow dispatches this workflow at
-  # the release branch to attach check runs to its head. Read-only workflow
-  # (contents: read), so the dispatch surface adds no privilege.
-  workflow_dispatch:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
@@ -20,25 +9,18 @@ on:
 permissions:
   contents: read
 
-# Cancel superseded runs on the same PR/branch; never cancel runs on main.
-concurrency:
-  group: pr-checks-${{ github.ref }}
-  cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
-
 env:
   CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
   RUST_BACKTRACE: 1
 
 jobs:
-  fmt-clippy:
-    name: fmt + clippy
+  fmt-clippy-test:
+    name: fmt + clippy + test
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 30
+
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Set up Rust toolchain
         uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
@@ -53,233 +35,7 @@ jobs:
         run: cargo fmt --all -- --check
 
       - name: cargo clippy
-        run: cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
-
-  test:
-    name: test (${{ matrix.toolchain }})
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 45
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix:
-        toolchain: [stable, beta]
-    # Beta is informational: an upstream beta regression should warn, not block merges.
-    continue-on-error: ${{ matrix.toolchain == 'beta' }}
-    # Postgres for the DB-backed integration tests (#[sqlx::test] provisions an
-    # isolated database per test off this connection). The health-check gate keeps
-    # `cargo test` from racing a not-yet-ready server.
-    services:
-      postgres:
-        image: postgres:16
-        env:
-          POSTGRES_USER: postgres
-          POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres
-          POSTGRES_DB: gitlawb_test
-        ports:
-          - 5432:5432
-        options: >-
-          --health-cmd pg_isready
-          --health-interval 10s
-          --health-timeout 5s
-          --health-retries 5
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
+        run: cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
 
       - name: cargo test
-        env:
-          DATABASE_URL: postgres://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/gitlawb_test
-        run: cargo test --locked --workspace
-
-  build-release:
-    name: build --release
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 45
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: stable
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: release
-
-      - name: cargo build --release
-        run: cargo build --locked --release --workspace
-
-  audit:
-    name: cargo audit
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 30
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: stable
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: audit-0.22.2
-
-      - name: Install cargo-audit (pinned)
-        # Pin the scanner on this BLOCKING gate: an unpinned `cargo install`
-        # floats to the latest release, so a regressed cargo-audit could red CI
-        # repo-wide with no code change. Advisory-DB freshness is fetched at scan
-        # time, independent of the binary, so this does not weaken what the gate
-        # catches. The weekly Scheduled Audit (audit-schedule.yml) deliberately
-        # floats to latest as the drift canary; when it shows a newer cargo-audit
-        # behaving differently, bump this version (and the cache key above) as a
-        # deliberate maintainer action. If 0.22.2 is ever yanked from crates.io
-        # this step fails loud until the pin is bumped.
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          cargo install --locked --version 0.22.2 cargo-audit
-          # Assert the pin took effect so an accidental future unpin (or a drift
-          # off 0.22.2) fails loudly here instead of silently running a different
-          # scanner. `cargo audit --version` prints "cargo-audit-audit 0.22.2".
-          installed="$(cargo audit --version)"
-          echo "cargo-audit installed: $installed"
-          echo "$installed" | grep -qE '(^| )0\.22\.2($| )' || {
-            echo "::error::cargo-audit is not the pinned 0.22.2 (got: $installed)"
-            exit 1
-          }
-
-      # Hard-fail gate. Suppressions live in .cargo/audit.toml (read automatically
-      # from the repo root), each with no available upstream fix. A green check
-      # here means "no NEW advisories", not "advisory-clean": surface the active
-      # ignore list so a reviewer sees exactly what is being accepted.
-      - name: Show active audit ignores
-        run: |
-          {
-            echo '### cargo audit: accepted advisories (.cargo/audit.toml)'
-            echo '```toml'
-            sed -n '/^\[advisories\]/,$p' .cargo/audit.toml
-            echo '```'
-          } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
-
-      - name: cargo audit
-        run: cargo audit
-
-  msrv:
-    name: MSRV (Rust 1.91)
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 30
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust 1.91
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # 1.91
-        with:
-          toolchain: "1.91"
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: msrv
-
-      - name: cargo check on MSRV
-        run: cargo check --locked --workspace --all-targets
-
-  docker-build:
-    name: Docker build smoke test
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 30
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Build image
-        run: docker build -t gitlawb-node:ci-test .
-
-      - name: Smoke test --version
-        run: docker run --rm gitlawb-node:ci-test --version
-
-  test-windows:
-    name: test (windows, non-blocking)
-    runs-on: windows-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 45
-    # Non-blocking, mirroring the informational `beta` lane above. We ship `gl`
-    # and `git-remote-gitlawb` to Windows users (release.yml) with zero Windows
-    # test coverage, so run their suites here to make Windows-only regressions
-    # VISIBLE on the PR without gating merge (#228). These two are the client
-    # CLIs and depend on no database, so no Postgres service is needed (service
-    # containers do not run on windows-latest regardless). `git` is preinstalled
-    # on windows-latest, which the real_git_fetch harness relies on.
-    continue-on-error: true
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: stable
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: windows
-
-      - name: cargo test (shipped Windows crates)
-        run: cargo test --locked -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
-
-  # gitlawb-core is embedded by every consumer (gl, git-remote-gitlawb, the node
-  # daemon), so it must stay lean. This gate fails if gitlawb-core's normal
-  # (non-dev, non-build) dependency tree gains any crate not on the allowlist in
-  # ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt. Exhaustive-by-construction: a new heavy
-  # dependency reds CI whether or not anyone thought to ban it, which a denylist
-  # cannot do. Regen instructions live in the allowlist header.
-  core-deps-purity:
-    name: gitlawb-core dependency purity
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 15
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: stable
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: core-deps-purity
-
-      - name: Check gitlawb-core dependency allowlist
-        run: bash scripts/check-gitlawb-core-deps.sh
+        run: cargo test --workspace

.github/workflows/pr-triage.yml

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-name: PR Triage
-
-# Runs on pull_request_target, not pull_request: fork PRs get a read-only
-# GITHUB_TOKEN under pull_request regardless of the permissions below, so the
-# label/comment writes 403. This job never checks out or runs PR head code (it
-# only reads context.payload and the files API), so pull_request_target is safe.
-on:
-  pull_request_target:
-    types: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened]
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-  pull-requests: write
-  issues: write
-
-concurrency:
-  group: pr-triage-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
-  cancel-in-progress: true
-
-jobs:
-  triage:
-    name: Quality-signal triage
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 10
-    steps:
-      - name: Label and guide
-        uses: actions/github-script@ed597411d8f924073f98dfc5c65a23a2325f34cd # v8.0.0
-        with:
-          script: |
-            const pr = context.payload.pull_request;
-            const { owner, repo } = context.repo;
-            const prNumber = pr.number;
-
-            // Trusted authors bypass triage entirely.
-            const trusted = ["OWNER", "MEMBER", "COLLABORATOR"];
-            if (trusted.includes(pr.author_association)) {
-              core.info(`Author association ${pr.author_association} is trusted; skipping triage.`);
-              return;
-            }
-
-            // Labels this workflow owns. Anything here may be added or removed each run.
-            const MANAGED = ["needs-issue", "needs-description", "needs-tests", "workflow-change"];
-            const want = new Set();
-
-            const body = pr.body || "";
-
-            // Linked issue: look for "closes/fixes/resolves #N" or any bare #N reference.
-            const hasLinkedIssue =
-              /\b(close[sd]?|fix(e[sd])?|resolve[sd]?)\b[^\n]*#\d+/i.test(body) ||
-              /#\d+/.test(body);
-            if (!hasLinkedIssue) want.add("needs-issue");
-
-            // Description substance: strip HTML comments and markdown headings, then measure.
-            const stripped = body
-              .replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, "")
-              .replace(/^#+.*$/gm, "")
-              .trim();
-            if (stripped.length < 50) want.add("needs-description");
-
-            // File-based signals.
-            const files = await github.paginate(github.rest.pulls.listFiles, {
-              owner, repo, pull_number: prNumber, per_page: 100,
-            });
-            const names = files.map(f => f.filename);
-
-            const isFork = pr.head.repo && pr.head.repo.full_name !== pr.base.repo.full_name;
-            const touchesWorkflows = names.some(n => n.startsWith(".github/workflows/"));
-            if (isFork && touchesWorkflows) want.add("workflow-change");
-
-            const changedRust = names.some(n => n.startsWith("crates/") && n.endsWith(".rs"));
-            // A test can live in a tests/ dir, a *_test.rs file, or (the common Rust
-            // pattern) an inline #[test] / #[cfg(test)] block added inside the source file.
-            const addsInlineTest = files.some(f =>
-              f.filename.endsWith(".rs") && f.patch &&
-              /^\+.*#\[(test\]|cfg\(test\))/m.test(f.patch));
-            const touchedTests =
-              names.some(n => n.includes("/tests/") || n.endsWith("_test.rs")) || addsInlineTest;
-            if (changedRust && !touchedTests) want.add("needs-tests");
-
-            // Reconcile labels: add wanted managed labels, remove managed labels no longer wanted.
-            const current = (await github.rest.issues.listLabelsOnIssue({
-              owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber,
-            })).data.map(l => l.name);
-
-            const toAdd = [...want].filter(l => !current.includes(l));
-            const toRemove = MANAGED.filter(l => current.includes(l) && !want.has(l));
-
-            if (toAdd.length) {
-              await github.rest.issues.addLabels({ owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, labels: toAdd });
-            }
-            for (const name of toRemove) {
-              await github.rest.issues.removeLabel({ owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, name })
-                .catch(() => {}); // ignore if already gone
-            }
-
-            // Guidance comment: only for advisory signals, and only once.
-            const advisory = ["needs-issue", "needs-description", "needs-tests"].filter(l => want.has(l));
-            if (!advisory.length) return;
-
-            const MARKER = "<!-- gitlawb-triage -->";
-            const comments = await github.paginate(github.rest.issues.listComments, {
-              owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, per_page: 100,
-            });
-            if (comments.some(c => c.body && c.body.includes(MARKER))) {
-              core.info("Guidance comment already present; not reposting.");
-              return;
-            }
-
-            const reasons = {
-              "needs-issue": "Link the issue this addresses (`Closes #123`). For protocol changes, open an issue first.",
-              "needs-description": "Add a short summary of what changes and why: the template's Summary and Motivation sections.",
-              "needs-tests": "This changes Rust source but no tests changed. Tests are required for fixes and strongly encouraged for features.",
-            };
-            const lines = advisory.map(l => `- ${reasons[l]}`).join("\n");
-            const comment = [
-              MARKER,
-              "Thanks for the contribution. A couple of things will help us review this faster:",
-              "",
-              lines,
-              "",
-              "See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md). Update the PR and these notes will clear automatically.",
-            ].join("\n");
-
-            await github.rest.issues.createComment({ owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, body: comment });

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -4,34 +4,14 @@ on:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
-  # Manual backfill: republish an already-cut release to a channel that
-  # missed it. Fill in only the channel(s) you want — an empty input leaves
-  # that channel's jobs skipped. npm reuses the existing release's binary
-  # assets; docker rebuilds the image from the tag and re-tags the manifest.
-  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      npm_backfill_tag:
-        description: "Existing release tag to publish to npm (e.g. v0.6.0)"
-        required: false
-        type: string
-      docker_backfill_tag:
-        description: "Existing release tag to publish to ghcr (e.g. v0.6.0)"
-        required: false
-        type: string
 
 concurrency:
   group: release-${{ github.ref }}
   cancel-in-progress: false
 
-# Least privilege by default; every job opts in to exactly what it needs.
-permissions: {}
-
 jobs:
   release-please:
-    # Skipped on manual dispatch: a backfill must never create or advance a
-    # release PR as a side effect (npm-publish tolerates the skipped need via
-    # !cancelled(), and every other job gates on release_created == 'true').
-    if: ${{ github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' && github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' }}
+    if: ${{ github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' }}
     name: Release Please
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     permissions:
@@ -41,205 +21,29 @@ jobs:
       release_created: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
       tag_name: ${{ steps.release.outputs.tag_name }}
       version: ${{ steps.release.outputs.version }}
-      pr: ${{ steps.release.outputs.pr }}
     steps:
       - name: Run release-please
         id: release
-        uses: googleapis/release-please-action@45996ed1f6d02564a971a2fa1b5860e934307cf7 # v5.0.0
+        uses: googleapis/release-please-action@16a9c90856f42705d54a6fda1823352bdc62cf38 # v4.3.0
         with:
           token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
 
-  # The release PR bumps the workspace crate versions in the Cargo.tomls but
-  # release-please cannot update Cargo.lock, so without this job every release
-  # merge ships a tag whose lockfile disagrees with its manifests (a --locked
-  # build from the tag fails, and pr-checks builds --locked). Sync the lock on
-  # the release branch so the tagged tree is internally consistent.
-  #
-  # Runs on every push-triggered release run, not only when release-please
-  # reports the PR: the `pr` output is set only on runs that CREATE or UPDATE
-  # the release PR, so gating on it would leave an already-open release PR
-  # (opened before this job existed, or untouched by a non-releasable push)
-  # permanently without the sync and without check runs. The resolve step
-  # discovers any open release-please PR itself and no-ops when there is none.
-  sync-release-lock:
-    name: Sync Cargo.lock on the release PR
-    needs: release-please
-    if: ${{ !cancelled() && github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' && github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: write
-      pull-requests: read
-      # actions: write lets the final step dispatch pr-checks on the release
-      # branch. Note this grant is repo-wide dispatch rights (GitHub cannot
-      # scope it to one workflow); acceptable here because reaching this job's
-      # steps already requires write to main. Needed because every push to the
-      # release branch (release-please's and the lock sync below) is made with
-      # GITHUB_TOKEN, which triggers no workflow runs, so without an explicit
-      # dispatch the release PR's head carries no check runs and the --locked
-      # gate never validates it.
-      actions: write
-    steps:
-      # Prefer the fresh `pr` output when this run just created/updated the
-      # release PR; otherwise fall back to querying for an open release-please
-      # branch (prefix match: the branch carries `--components--` suffixes).
-      - name: Resolve the open release PR branch
-        id: resolve
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
-          OWNER: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
-          BRANCH_FROM_OUTPUT: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.pr && fromJSON(needs.release-please.outputs.pr).headBranchName || '' }}
-        run: |
-          branch="$BRANCH_FROM_OUTPUT"
-          if [ -z "$branch" ]; then
-            # The branch name alone is not a trust signal. `gh pr list` includes
-            # fork PRs, and a fork's headRefName is bare (no owner prefix), so a
-            # prefix match by itself lets any fork nominate the branch this job
-            # checks out, commits to, and dispatches checks on. Require the head
-            # repo to be THIS repository and the author to be the release-please
-            # app, so neither a fork nor a same-repo human branch named
-            # `release-please--*` can be selected. Then take the highest PR
-            # number: `[0]` depended on gh's default ordering, which is not a
-            # documented guarantee, and picking a stable one keeps a second
-            # (component) release PR from making the choice flap between runs.
-            branch=$(gh pr list --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --state open \
-              --json headRefName,headRepositoryOwner,number,author \
-              --jq '[ .[]
-                      | select(.headRepositoryOwner.login == env.OWNER)
-                      | select(.author.login == "app/github-actions")
-                      | select(.headRefName | startswith("release-please--"))
-                    ] | max_by(.number).headRefName // empty')
-          fi
-          if [ -z "$branch" ]; then
-            echo "no open release PR; nothing to sync"
-          fi
-          echo "branch=$branch" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-
-      - name: Checkout release branch
-        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          ref: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch }}
-
-      # Resolve on a declared toolchain instead of whatever Rust the runner
-      # image happens to ship, so the lock this job writes comes off the same
-      # stable channel the other cargo jobs use. Not a claim of identical
-      # resolution: `stable` still moves between runs, and the MSRV gate
-      # checks this same lock on 1.91 (pr-checks.yml). It only removes the
-      # runner image as an undeclared input.
-      - name: Install Rust toolchain
-        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: stable
-
-      - name: Sync workspace crate versions into Cargo.lock
-        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
-        run: cargo update --workspace
-
-      - name: Commit and push when the lock changed
-        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
-        run: |
-          if git diff --quiet Cargo.lock; then
-            echo "Cargo.lock already in sync"
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
-          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
-          git add Cargo.lock
-          git commit -m "chore: sync Cargo.lock with the release version bump"
-          git push
-
-      # Every push to the release branch is made with GITHUB_TOKEN (release-
-      # please's own pushes and the lock sync above), and events created by
-      # GITHUB_TOKEN start no workflow runs. workflow_dispatch is the documented
-      # exception GITHUB_TOKEN may trigger, so dispatch pr-checks at the release
-      # branch to attach check runs to its current head. Unconditional (also on
-      # the already-in-sync path) because the branch's ORIGINAL head has the
-      # same no-runs problem. Loud on failure by design: a silent fallback
-      # would recreate the checkless-head problem, and a job rerun is safe
-      # (sync no-ops, dispatch retries). Loop-safe: pr-checks is read-only and
-      # dispatches nothing. Runs after the push ack, so the dispatched ref tip
-      # is the sync commit. Merge-queue note: this validates the branch tip;
-      # the enforced merge queue's merge_group run still re-validates the true
-      # merged result before landing.
-      - name: Dispatch PR checks on the release branch
-        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
-          BRANCH: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch }}
-        run: |
-          # Every dispatch failure fails the job, including the 422 a release
-          # branch cut before pr-checks gained its workflow_dispatch trigger
-          # returns ("does not have a workflow_dispatch trigger", reported
-          # against the dispatched ref's copy of the file). An earlier revision
-          # tolerated exactly that 422 on the theory that release-please would
-          # rewrite the branch and heal it, but a rewrite only happens when a
-          # later releasable commit lands: an open release PR nobody touches is
-          # never rewritten. Tolerating it therefore left the lock-sync commit
-          # this job had just pushed sitting on the release head with no
-          # --locked validation, which is the precise state this workflow exists
-          # to prevent. The tolerance is also no longer needed: once this lands,
-          # every release branch is cut from a main that already carries the
-          # trigger, so the only branch that could 422 is one open at merge time
-          # (there is none), and a job rerun after a manual rebase is safe (the
-          # sync no-ops, the dispatch retries).
-          gh api "repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/workflows/pr-checks.yml/dispatches" \
-            -f "ref=$BRANCH"
-
-  # Each architecture builds NATIVELY (amd64 on ubuntu-latest, arm64 on
-  # ubuntu-24.04-arm) and pushes by digest; docker-manifest below stitches the
-  # digests into the tagged multi-arch image. No QEMU: emulating the arm64
-  # Rust release build wedged the v0.6.0 run for 3+ hours and, via the
-  # workflow concurrency group, blocked every queued release run behind it.
   docker:
-    name: Build & Push Docker Image (${{ matrix.arch }})
+    name: Build & Push Docker Image
     needs: release-please
-    # Runs on a fresh release, or on manual dispatch for an existing tag
-    # (release-please is skipped on dispatch, hence !cancelled()).
-    if: >-
-      ${{ !cancelled() && (
-        needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' ||
-        (github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.docker_backfill_tag != '')
-      ) }}
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix:
-        include:
-          - arch: amd64
-            os: ubuntu-latest
-            platform: linux/amd64
-          - arch: arm64
-            os: ubuntu-24.04-arm
-            platform: linux/arm64
-    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
+    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     permissions:
       contents: read
       packages: write
     steps:
-      - name: Resolve release tag
-        id: rel
-        env:
-          DISPATCH_TAG: ${{ inputs.docker_backfill_tag }}
-          RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          TAG="${DISPATCH_TAG:-$RELEASE_TAG}"
-          case "$TAG" in
-            v[0-9]*) ;;
-            *) echo "::error::'$TAG' does not look like a release tag (vX.Y.Z)"; exit 1 ;;
-          esac
-          echo "tag=$TAG" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          echo "version=${TAG#v}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          # ghcr requires a lowercase repository path, and unlike metadata-action,
-          # buildx's `--output name=` does no lowercasing — a mixed-case owner
-          # makes the digest push fail with "invalid reference format".
-          echo "image=ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-
       - name: Checkout release tag
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
-          ref: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
-          persist-credentials: false
+          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+
+      - name: Set up QEMU
+        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@29109295f81e9208d7d86ff1c6c12d2833863392 # v3.6.0
 
       - name: Set up Docker Buildx
         uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@b5ca514318bd6ebac0fb2aedd5d36ec1b5c232a2 # v3.10.0
@@ -251,130 +55,45 @@ jobs:
           username: ${{ github.actor }}
           password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
 
+      - name: Extract metadata
+        id: meta
+        uses: docker/metadata-action@902fa8ec7d6ecbf8d84d538b9b233a880e428804 # v5.7.0
+        with:
+          images: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}
+          tags: |
+            type=semver,pattern={{version}},value=${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+            type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}},value=${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+            type=raw,value=latest
+
       - name: Build and load locally (smoke)
         uses: docker/build-push-action@14487ce63c7a62a4a324b0bfb37086795e31c6c1 # v6.16.0
         with:
           context: .
-          platforms: ${{ matrix.platform }}
           load: true
           tags: gitlawb-node:smoke
-          cache-from: type=gha,scope=docker-${{ matrix.arch }}
+          cache-from: type=gha
 
-      # Native runner on both arches, so the built image can always execute.
-      # Assert the released version so a stale artifact fails here, not in prod.
       - name: Smoke test
-        env:
-          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          out="$(docker run --rm gitlawb-node:smoke --version)"
-          echo "$out"
-          grep -qF "$VERSION" <<<"$out" || {
-            echo "::error::image --version did not report expected version $VERSION (got: $out)"
-            exit 1
-          }
+        run: docker run --rm gitlawb-node:smoke --version
 
-      # Push by digest only — tags are applied once by docker-manifest so a
-      # half-finished matrix can never publish a partially-tagged image.
-      # provenance:false keeps each push a plain single-arch manifest, which is
-      # what imagetools create expects to merge.
-      - name: Build and push by digest
-        id: push
+      - name: Build and push (multi-arch)
         uses: docker/build-push-action@14487ce63c7a62a4a324b0bfb37086795e31c6c1 # v6.16.0
         with:
           context: .
-          platforms: ${{ matrix.platform }}
-          provenance: false
-          outputs: type=image,name=${{ steps.rel.outputs.image }},push-by-digest=true,name-canonical=true,push=true
-          cache-from: type=gha,scope=docker-${{ matrix.arch }}
-          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max,scope=docker-${{ matrix.arch }}
-
-      - name: Export digest
-        env:
-          DIGEST: ${{ steps.push.outputs.digest }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          mkdir -p /tmp/digests
-          touch "/tmp/digests/${DIGEST#sha256:}"
-
-      - name: Upload digest
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
-        with:
-          name: docker-digest-${{ matrix.arch }}
-          path: /tmp/digests/*
-          if-no-files-found: error
-          retention-days: 1
-
-  docker-manifest:
-    name: Publish Docker manifest
-    needs: [release-please, docker]
-    if: ${{ !cancelled() && needs.docker.result == 'success' }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      packages: write
-    steps:
-      - name: Resolve release tag
-        id: rel
-        env:
-          DISPATCH_TAG: ${{ inputs.docker_backfill_tag }}
-          RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          TAG="${DISPATCH_TAG:-$RELEASE_TAG}"
-          case "$TAG" in
-            v[0-9]*) ;;
-            *) echo "::error::'$TAG' does not look like a release tag (vX.Y.Z)"; exit 1 ;;
-          esac
-          echo "tag=$TAG" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          echo "version=${TAG#v}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-
-      - name: Download digests
-        uses: actions/download-artifact@d3f86a106a0bac45b974a628896c90dbdf5c8093 # v4.3.0
-        with:
-          pattern: docker-digest-*
-          path: /tmp/digests
-          merge-multiple: true
-
-      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
-        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@b5ca514318bd6ebac0fb2aedd5d36ec1b5c232a2 # v3.10.0
-
-      - name: Log in to GitHub Container Registry
-        uses: docker/login-action@74a5d142397b4f367a81961eba4e8cd7edddf772 # v3.4.0
-        with:
-          registry: ghcr.io
-          username: ${{ github.actor }}
-          password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-
-      - name: Create and push multi-arch manifest
-        env:
-          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          # ghcr requires a lowercase repository path.
-          IMAGE="ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}"
-          MAJOR_MINOR="${VERSION%.*}"
-          digests=""
-          for f in /tmp/digests/*; do
-            digests="$digests $IMAGE@sha256:$(basename "$f")"
-          done
-          # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-          docker buildx imagetools create \
-            -t "$IMAGE:$VERSION" \
-            -t "$IMAGE:$MAJOR_MINOR" \
-            -t "$IMAGE:latest" \
-            $digests
-          docker buildx imagetools inspect "$IMAGE:$VERSION"
+          platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64
+          push: true
+          tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
+          labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
+          cache-from: type=gha
+          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
 
       - name: Release summary
-        env:
-          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
         run: |
           {
-            echo "## Released $TAG"
+            echo "## Released ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}"
             echo
-            echo "- Image: \`ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}:$VERSION\` (linux/amd64 + linux/arm64)"
-            echo "- GitHub: https://github.com/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/releases/tag/$TAG"
+            echo "- Image: \`ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}\`"
+            echo "- GitHub: https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/releases/tag/${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}"
           } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
 
   release-binaries:
@@ -382,9 +101,6 @@ jobs:
     needs: release-please
     if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
     runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
-    # Windows is best-effort: a failure there must not fail the job or block the
-    # downstream npm/Homebrew jobs that only consume the unix artifacts.
-    continue-on-error: ${{ startsWith(matrix.target, 'x86_64-pc-windows') }}
     permissions:
       contents: write
     strategy:
@@ -393,24 +109,17 @@ jobs:
         include:
           - target: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
             os: ubuntu-latest
-          # Native arm64 runner: cross-compiling this target with the glibc
-          # toolchain broke aws-lc-sys, and native lets the smoke test run.
           - target: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
-            os: ubuntu-24.04-arm
-          # macos-13 (the last plain Intel image) is retired and queues forever;
-          # macos-15-intel is GitHub's supported Intel label.
+            os: ubuntu-latest
           - target: x86_64-apple-darwin
-            os: macos-15-intel
+            os: macos-13
           - target: aarch64-apple-darwin
             os: macos-14
-          - target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
-            os: windows-latest
     steps:
       - name: Checkout release tag
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
           ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-          persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Set up Rust toolchain
         uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
@@ -418,454 +127,46 @@ jobs:
           toolchain: stable
           targets: ${{ matrix.target }}
 
-      # Both musl targets build natively on a matching-arch runner, so the stock
-      # musl-gcc wrapper is all that's needed (no cross toolchain).
       - name: Install musl tools (linux)
         if: contains(matrix.target, 'linux-musl')
         run: |
           sudo apt-get update
           sudo apt-get install -y musl-tools
+          if [ "${{ matrix.target }}" = "aarch64-unknown-linux-musl" ]; then
+            sudo apt-get install -y gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu
+            echo "CARGO_TARGET_AARCH64_UNKNOWN_LINUX_MUSL_LINKER=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+            echo "CC_aarch64_unknown_linux_musl=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+          fi
 
       - name: Cache cargo
         uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
         with:
           key: ${{ matrix.target }}
 
-      # The gitlawb-node daemon is a Linux/macOS service; on Windows we ship only
-      # the two CLI binaries. A Windows-only failure must not block the release.
-      - name: Determine binaries
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          BINS="gl git-remote-gitlawb gitlawb-node"
-          case "${{ matrix.target }}" in *windows*) BINS="gl git-remote-gitlawb" ;; esac
-          echo "BINS=$BINS" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-
       - name: Build
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          args=""
-          for b in $BINS; do args="$args -p $b"; done
-          cargo build --release --locked --target ${{ matrix.target }} $args
-
-      # Run each packaged binary's --version so a broken release artifact fails the
-      # build instead of shipping. Every target builds on a matching-arch runner,
-      # so all of them can execute here.
-      - name: Smoke test binaries
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          VERSION="${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}"
-          BIN_DIR="target/${{ matrix.target }}/release"
-          EXE=""
-          case "${{ matrix.target }}" in *windows*) EXE=".exe" ;; esac
-          for bin in $BINS; do
-            echo "== $bin --version =="
-            out="$("$BIN_DIR/$bin$EXE" --version)"
-            echo "$out"
-            # Each binary prints "<name> <version>"; assert the released version is present.
-            grep -qF "$VERSION" <<<"$out" || {
-              echo "::error::$bin --version did not report expected version $VERSION (got: $out)"
-              exit 1
-            }
-          done
+        run: cargo build --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb -p gitlawb-node
 
       - name: Package
+        id: pkg
         shell: bash
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
-          TARGET="${{ matrix.target }}"
-          NAME="gitlawb-node-${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}-${TARGET}"
-          BIN_DIR="target/${TARGET}/release"
-          EXE=""
-          case "$TARGET" in *windows*) EXE=".exe" ;; esac
-
-          # Portable sha256 → "<hash>  <file>" so install scripts and brew can parse it.
-          sha256_file() {
-            local f="$1"
-            if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-              sha256sum "$f"
-            elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-              shasum -a 256 "$f"
-            else
-              local h
-              h=$(certutil -hashfile "$f" SHA256 | sed -n 2p | tr -d ' \r')
-              printf '%s  %s\n' "$h" "$f"
-            fi
-          }
-
+          NAME="gitlawb-node-${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}-${{ matrix.target }}"
           mkdir -p "dist/$NAME"
-          for bin in $BINS; do
-            cp "$BIN_DIR/$bin$EXE" "dist/$NAME/"
-          done
+          cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/gl" "dist/$NAME/"
+          cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/git-remote-gitlawb" "dist/$NAME/"
+          cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/gitlawb-node" "dist/$NAME/"
           cp README.md LICENSE-MIT LICENSE-APACHE "dist/$NAME/"
-
           cd dist
-          case "$TARGET" in
-            *windows*)
-              # 7z is preinstalled on windows-latest runners.
-              7z a -tzip "$NAME.zip" "$NAME" >/dev/null
-              sha256_file "$NAME.zip" > "$NAME.zip.sha256"
-              ;;
-            *)
-              tar czf "$NAME.tar.gz" "$NAME"
-              sha256_file "$NAME.tar.gz" > "$NAME.tar.gz.sha256"
-              ;;
-          esac
+          tar czf "$NAME.tar.gz" "$NAME"
+          shasum -a 256 "$NAME.tar.gz" > "$NAME.tar.gz.sha256"
+          echo "asset=dist/$NAME.tar.gz" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo "checksum=dist/$NAME.tar.gz.sha256" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
 
       - name: Attach to release
         uses: softprops/action-gh-release@72f2c25fcb47643c292f7107632f7a47c1df5cd8 # v2.3.2
         with:
           tag_name: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
           files: |
-            dist/*.tar.gz
-            dist/*.zip
-            dist/*.sha256
-
-  npm-publish:
-    name: Publish to npm
-    needs: [release-please, release-binaries]
-    # Runs on a fresh release, or on manual dispatch for an existing tag
-    # (release-binaries is skipped on dispatch, hence !cancelled()). Publishing
-    # auth is npm Trusted Publishing (GitHub OIDC) — no NPM_TOKEN. Each
-    # @gitlawb package must have this repo + workflow (release.yml) configured
-    # as its trusted publisher on npmjs.com, or publish fails loudly here —
-    # deliberately loud: the silent secret-guard skip is how 0.4.x–0.6.0
-    # never reached npm.
-    if: >-
-      ${{ !cancelled() && (
-        (needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' && needs.release-binaries.result == 'success') ||
-        (github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.npm_backfill_tag != '')
-      ) }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read
-      id-token: write # npm trusted publishing (OIDC) + provenance
-    steps:
-      - name: Resolve release tag
-        id: rel
-        env:
-          DISPATCH_TAG: ${{ inputs.npm_backfill_tag }}
-          RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          TAG="${DISPATCH_TAG:-$RELEASE_TAG}"
-          case "$TAG" in
-            v[0-9]*) ;;
-            *) echo "::error::'$TAG' does not look like a release tag (vX.Y.Z)"; exit 1 ;;
-          esac
-          echo "tag=$TAG" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          echo "version=${TAG#v}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-
-      - name: Checkout release tag
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          ref: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      # npm >= 11.5.1 performs the OIDC token exchange automatically when the
-      # package has a trusted publisher configured; older npm silently falls
-      # back to (absent) token auth and fails confusingly.
-      - name: Set up Node 24 + OIDC-capable npm
-        uses: actions/setup-node@a0853c24544627f65ddf259abe73b1d18a591444 # v5.0.0
-        with:
-          node-version: "24"
-      - name: Ensure npm supports trusted publishing
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          npm install -g npm@^11.5.1
-          npm --version
-
-      - name: Lay in release binaries
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          # npm platform package -> Rust target triple (unix only; Windows is not
-          # published to npm).
-          MAP="
-          gl-darwin-arm64:aarch64-apple-darwin
-          gl-darwin-x64:x86_64-apple-darwin
-          gl-linux-arm64:aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
-          gl-linux-x64:x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
-          "
-          mkdir -p _dl
-          for entry in $MAP; do
-            pkg="${entry%%:*}"
-            target="${entry#*:}"
-            archive="gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-${target}.tar.gz"
-            echo "==> $pkg <- $archive"
-            gh release download "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
-              --pattern "$archive" --dir _dl --clobber
-            tar -xzf "_dl/$archive" -C _dl
-            src="_dl/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-${target}"
-            cp "$src/gl" "npm/packages/$pkg/gl"
-            cp "$src/git-remote-gitlawb" "npm/packages/$pkg/git-remote-gitlawb"
-            chmod +x "npm/packages/$pkg/gl" "npm/packages/$pkg/git-remote-gitlawb"
-          done
-
-      - name: Set versions
-        env:
-          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          node -e '
-            const fs = require("fs");
-            const v = process.env.VERSION;
-            for (const p of fs.readdirSync("npm/packages")) {
-              const f = `npm/packages/${p}/package.json`;
-              const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(f, "utf8"));
-              pkg.version = v;
-              if (pkg.optionalDependencies) {
-                for (const k of Object.keys(pkg.optionalDependencies)) {
-                  pkg.optionalDependencies[k] = v;
-                }
-              }
-              fs.writeFileSync(f, JSON.stringify(pkg, null, 2) + "\n");
-            }
-          '
-
-      - name: Publish
-        env:
-          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          # No token: npm exchanges this job's GitHub OIDC identity with the
-          # registry (trusted publishing); provenance is attested automatically.
-          # Platform packages first, then the wrapper (so its optionalDependencies resolve).
-          # Skip versions already on the registry so a rerun after a partial publish
-          # is idempotent instead of erroring on the first existing package.
-          for pkg in gl-darwin-arm64 gl-darwin-x64 gl-linux-arm64 gl-linux-x64 gl; do
-            name="@gitlawb/$pkg"
-            if npm view "$name@$VERSION" version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-              echo "==> $name@$VERSION already published, skipping"
-              continue
-            fi
-            echo "==> npm publish $name@$VERSION"
-            npm publish "npm/packages/$pkg" --provenance --access public
-          done
-
-  homebrew-bump:
-    name: Bump Homebrew tap
-    needs: [release-please, release-binaries]
-    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read # GITHUB_TOKEN downloads release assets; the tap push uses HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT
-    steps:
-      - name: Guard on secret
-        id: guard
-        env:
-          HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
-        run: |
-          if [ -z "${HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT:-}" ]; then
-            echo "::warning::HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT is not set — skipping Homebrew bump."
-            echo "enabled=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
-      - name: Checkout tap repo
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          repository: Gitlawb/homebrew-tap
-          token: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
-          path: tap
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Regenerate formula
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          base="https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${TAG}"
-          mkdir -p _sums
-          gh release download "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
-            --pattern '*.tar.gz.sha256' --dir _sums --clobber
-          sha() { awk '{print $1}' "_sums/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-$1.tar.gz.sha256"; }
-          SHA_MAC_ARM="$(sha aarch64-apple-darwin)"
-          SHA_MAC_X64="$(sha x86_64-apple-darwin)"
-          SHA_LNX_ARM="$(sha aarch64-unknown-linux-musl)"
-          SHA_LNX_X64="$(sha x86_64-unknown-linux-musl)"
-
-          mkdir -p tap/Formula
-          cat > tap/Formula/gl.rb <<EOF
-          class Gl < Formula
-            desc "Gitlawb CLI — decentralized git for AI agents and developers"
-            homepage "https://gitlawb.com"
-            version "${VERSION}"
-            license "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-
-            on_macos do
-              on_arm do
-                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz"
-                sha256 "${SHA_MAC_ARM}"
-              end
-              on_intel do
-                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.gz"
-                sha256 "${SHA_MAC_X64}"
-              end
-            end
-
-            on_linux do
-              on_arm do
-                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-aarch64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz"
-                sha256 "${SHA_LNX_ARM}"
-              end
-              on_intel do
-                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz"
-                sha256 "${SHA_LNX_X64}"
-              end
-            end
-
-            def install
-              bin.install "gl"
-              bin.install "git-remote-gitlawb"
-            end
-
-            def caveats
-              <<~CAVEATS
-                oh-my-zsh's git plugin aliases gl='git pull', which shadows this
-                binary in interactive shells. If \`gl\` prints "fatal: not a git
-                repository", run:
-                  echo 'unalias gl 2>/dev/null' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc
-              CAVEATS
-            end
-
-            test do
-              assert_match version.to_s, shell_output("#{bin}/gl --version")
-            end
-          end
-          EOF
-
-      - name: Commit and push
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        working-directory: tap
-        env:
-          HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
-          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
-          # Stage first so a brand-new (untracked) formula is detected by the no-op check.
-          git add Formula/gl.rb
-          if git diff --cached --quiet; then
-            echo "Formula already up to date."
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          git commit -m "gl ${VERSION}"
-          # Credentials are not persisted in .git/config; supply the token only for the push.
-          git push "https://x-access-token:${HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT}@github.com/Gitlawb/homebrew-tap.git" HEAD:main
-
-  web-sync:
-    name: Sync web (install scripts + version)
-    needs: [release-please, release-binaries]
-    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read # GITHUB_TOKEN checks out node; the web PR uses WEB_SYNC_PAT
-    steps:
-      - name: Guard on secret
-        id: guard
-        env:
-          WEB_SYNC_PAT: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
-        run: |
-          if [ -z "${WEB_SYNC_PAT:-}" ]; then
-            echo "::warning::WEB_SYNC_PAT is not set — skipping web sync."
-            echo "enabled=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
-      - name: Checkout node (release tag)
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-          path: node
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Checkout web
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          repository: Gitlawb/web
-          token: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
-          path: web
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      # web-sync publishes install.ps1 + version.json, so the Windows ZIP must exist.
-      # Windows is best-effort for npm/Homebrew (continue-on-error), so verify the
-      # asset is present before advertising a release the site can't actually serve.
-      - name: Verify website release assets
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          gh release view "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --json assets \
-            --jq '.assets[].name' > /tmp/release-assets
-          for asset in \
-            "gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip" \
-            "gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip.sha256"; do
-            grep -Fxq "$asset" /tmp/release-assets || {
-              echo "::error::release asset missing: $asset (Windows build likely failed); not syncing web"
-              exit 1
-            }
-          done
-
-      - name: Sync and open PR
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          # Canonical install scripts (source of truth lives in the node repo).
-          cp node/install.sh web/public/install.sh
-          cp node/install.ps1 web/public/install.ps1
-          # Single version source the site can read.
-          printf '{\n  "version": "%s",\n  "tag": "%s"\n}\n' "$VERSION" "$TAG" > web/public/version.json
-          # One-time, idempotent drift fixes: drop orphaned binaries, fix stale link.
-          rm -rf web/public/bin
-          if [ -f web/public/skill.md ]; then
-            sed -i 's#github.com/gitlawb/releases#github.com/Gitlawb/node/releases#g' web/public/skill.md
-          fi
-
-          cd web
-          # Stage first so brand-new (untracked) files are caught by the no-op check.
-          git add -A
-          if git diff --cached --quiet; then
-            echo "web already up to date."
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          branch="release-sync/${TAG}"
-          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
-          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
-          git checkout -b "$branch"
-          git commit -m "chore: sync gitlawb ${TAG} (install scripts + version)"
-          # Credentials are not persisted in .git/config; supply the token only for the push.
-          git push --force "https://x-access-token:${GH_TOKEN}@github.com/Gitlawb/web.git" "HEAD:$branch"
-          gh pr create --repo Gitlawb/web --head "$branch" \
-            --title "Sync gitlawb ${TAG}" \
-            --body "Automated sync from Gitlawb/node ${TAG}: install.sh, install.ps1, public/version.json, and one-time drift fixes (removed orphaned public/bin, fixed skill.md releases link). Review and merge to deploy via Vercel." \
-            || {
-              # Only swallow the "PR already exists" case; surface auth/API failures
-              # (a failed gh pr list must not be misread as "PR exists").
-              pr_count="$(gh pr list --repo Gitlawb/web --head "$branch" --state open --json number --jq 'length')" || exit 1
-              if [ "$pr_count" != "0" ]; then
-                echo "PR for $branch already exists; branch was updated."
-              else
-                exit 1
-              fi
-            }
+            ${{ steps.pkg.outputs.asset }}
+            ${{ steps.pkg.outputs.checksum }}

.github/workflows/stale.yml

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-name: Stale PRs
-
-on:
-  schedule:
-    - cron: "30 1 * * *"  # daily at 01:30 UTC
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-  pull-requests: write
-  issues: write
-
-jobs:
-  stale:
-    name: Flag and close ignored PRs
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 10
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/stale@5bef64f19d7facfb25b37b414482c7164d639639 # v9
-        with:
-          days-before-stale: 14
-          days-before-close: 7
-          # Act on PRs only; never on issues.
-          days-before-issue-stale: -1
-          days-before-issue-close: -1
-          # Only PRs the triage step flagged as missing a real description.
-          # needs-issue is advisory-only (linking an issue is a SHOULD, and many
-          # legitimate small PRs have none) so it does not drive auto-close.
-          only-pr-labels: "needs-description"
-          stale-pr-label: "stale"
-          exempt-pr-labels: "workflow-change,security,pinned"
-          remove-stale-when-updated: true
-          stale-pr-message: >
-            This PR has been inactive for 14 days and is still missing a description.
-            It will be closed in 7 days if there's no update. Push a change or leave a
-            comment to keep it open. No hard feelings, you can reopen anytime.
-          close-pr-message: >
-            Closing due to inactivity. Reopen whenever you're ready to update it. See
-            CONTRIBUTING.md for what helps us review quickly.
-          ascending: true

.gitignore

@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ keys/
 *.log
 .openclaude-profile.json
 
-# Per-operator Fly config (node1 prod config is pulled from Fly, not tracked)
-infra/fly/node1.fly.toml
+# Local planning / scratch docs (never commit)
+docs/superpowers/

.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 {
-  ".": "0.7.1"
+  ".": "0.3.8"
 }

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
-# Changelog
-
-## [0.7.1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.7.0...v0.7.1) (2026-08-03)
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **ci:** make the docker dependency cache work and unbreak Dockerfile.bins ([99b2b9a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/99b2b9a16662761a3959a2941798e6823621bda5))
-* **ci:** make the docker dependency cache work and unbreak Dockerfile.bins ([a49e04d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/a49e04ddcd23f3b666421486ae60c3c4329e2242)), closes [#265](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/265) [#266](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/266)
-* **db:** pin profile DID matching with lone non-key fixture and boundary matrix ([b4016dc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b4016dce9d1fe450603173f9d92bd880127620fa)), closes [#298](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/298)
-* **node:** add a shared owner/name slug validator ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([51d82de](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/51d82ded57a776d9c7e2fe65895efdbf9e227dc8))
-* **node:** bound the slug owner by NAME_MAX, not the DID limit ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([27b0495](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/27b0495a6f7edeecddbe62b0f075a7e3b1ef5053))
-* **node:** fail a sync row terminally when a non-directory holds the owner path ([2e664b7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2e664b7885036ee72ce175af95bb567b18222583))
-* **node:** make a stalled sync queue visible, and fix two test claims ([9aa4c17](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/9aa4c17aefd1885d134b1334b54551366cdd8ef0))
-* **node:** move the attempted_at migration to v17, clear of two open branches ([fbc5868](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/fbc5868bd16946ea184dad26abcdb0e89d68e99a))
-* **node:** prove the mirror path is inside repos_dir before running git ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([3ca9473](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3ca94739ed7b90e4c265a0947025dc3b50e7583b))
-* **node:** reject a malformed slug at the notify boundary ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([c587a40](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c587a40a508acea9f74c3468d42ff037397c75d0))
-* **node:** reset a peer's reachability gate when an announce changes its http_url ([#270](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/270)) ([1964f88](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/1964f88378fe6942ffca5836de3a092b5b8f67b4))
-* **node:** reset a peer's reachability gate when an announce changes its http_url ([#270](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/270)) ([e2560ee](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e2560ee46c28e4e966d87867a86dc4bad4ca7a3a))
-* **node:** stamp every dequeued sync row so a stuck one yields the batch ([6e64d0d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6e64d0d0a7fdd38ef3a56820c1808dd7c9bbd658))
-* **node:** stop a peer-supplied repo slug from escaping repos_dir ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([c70b1df](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c70b1df42d5c3f70ec4c272886c85fcc16ed92d1))
-* **node:** validate the queued slug before the worker derives a path ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([9f00e24](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/9f00e24aec217e4b8256dd437cff4741b1478b96))
-* **review:** correct two comment claims and guard two more wrong shapes ([#270](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/270)) ([811ad50](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/811ad504bc268c8e9cddac93822adcd00bfe9ff8))
-* **review:** stop the dequeue overclaiming, and pin the starvation premise ([457be11](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/457be11d728a2a34775cf96be2bc5af9a58cb250))
-* strict DID matching in get_profile ([acb4714](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/acb47145beec8ce7b20b7a2479f7a55ed68e2a89))
-* strict DID matching in get_profile ([13b565b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/13b565bcac09f075a7fd555a6e9acdd27de6c7bb))
-* target stored did on profile update aliases ([9836c3a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/9836c3a21bc96a2ce95cb1fd12bd84b22142787d))
-
-## [0.7.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.6.0...v0.7.0) (2026-07-22)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* **gl:** actually verify certificate signatures in gl cert show ([b0a2ed8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b0a2ed830821b5a77b0dafdcf5ce4b1ad904ec25))
-* **gl:** doctor warns when a shell alias shadows the gl binary ([0765c42](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/0765c42feff47b29054b9a277881a7cd5bfd9135))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **gl:** address review findings — non-fatal DID check, exact-host loopback, detached HEAD, multi-URL remotes, command-aware unalias ([3fa38dc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3fa38dce4e435ef017f607d355266c2892161f8d))
-* **gl:** anchor cert --verify to a trusted issuer; pin canonical payload form ([c681af7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c681af70dba3a76b11795d324f2ca0fecf7e42fd))
-* **gl:** detect gitlawb remotes beyond origin in gl status ([2d88937](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2d88937fbabf21013f28debb4d4f93270a4bb8cd))
-* **gl:** doctor treats a reachable local node as configuration, not failure ([94c61f7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/94c61f79421fa26ecc1bdf7c255e0c48e66a2048))
-* **gl:** make gl init's push guidance match the repo's actual state ([cb42a48](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/cb42a4830d0d070165e2212f316d009ec716dbee))
-* warn about the oh-my-zsh gl alias at install time ([e3df51d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e3df51d76c0275fde33954ff0af0aab95fd0cb7d))
-
-## [0.6.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.5.1...v0.6.0) (2026-07-22)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* **icaptcha-client:** solve the iCaptcha proof-of-work on answer ([#181](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/181)) ([c98b503](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c98b503f90cade54ce9c588bd2373a4e3486f2fc))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **core:** honor wildcard capabilities in Ucan::can, matching is_attenuated_by ([#200](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/200)) ([b6877a6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b6877a65981dbf41c4a7838971eb5c826c7fcaf2))
-* **gl:** point doctor's version check at Gitlawb/node, not the frozen Gitlawb/releases repo ([#198](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/198)) ([98d728c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/98d728c325f68f0ee4a62e473dc484b7dd627504))
-* **node:** carry full owner DID on ref-update wire event ([#144](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/144)) ([#145](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/145)) ([69a62e5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/69a62e51c2d2f090f9cae88f4d8ce3b9017b7149))
-* **node:** gate /hooks and sibling read surfaces leaking private repo metadata ([#94](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/94)) ([#113](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/113)) ([ee8d7c0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/ee8d7c03b26a0b678cc90b8801aa340fe81da700))
-* strip Cf bidi/format controls in terminal-bound error sanitizers ([#183](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/183)) ([#188](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/188)) ([b07d41e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b07d41ea97569d79d3f545ae5d43c373cd6f0f33))
-
-## [0.5.1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.5.0...v0.5.1) (2026-07-10)
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **bounties:** add tests for claim_bounty repo-read gate ([#160](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/160)) ([#169](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/169)) ([6bafaa6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6bafaa6dc5f05c0dcd61c708397afddbcf8c2e3f))
-* **deps:** bump crossbeam-epoch to 0.9.20 for RUSTSEC-2026-0204 ([#162](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/162)) ([#163](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/163)) ([67ad2b8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/67ad2b876c8d9a336219d1016968de7a88fc4e75))
-* **node,git:** bound a hung served git with a total-duration timeout ([#62](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/62)) ([#165](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/165)) ([cd67718](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/cd67718f49ec38726a40f6bcf36f539ccdb42969))
-* **node:** bound list_ref_certificates with LIMIT and add upsert to prevent unbounded growth ([#147](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/147)) ([#149](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/149)) ([6b5e5bc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6b5e5bc7aee00a2d03295d3620df1ee4d8c024a2))
-* **node:** gate POST /api/v1/sync/trigger and rate-limit the peer-sync routes ([#82](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/82)) ([#161](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/161)) ([d00d89a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/d00d89ae5be992d1f63e95b714ae1bd3735e8457))
-* **node:** rate-limit repo/agent creation per client IP to stop DID-farm spam floods ([#180](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/180)) ([dfcaa22](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/dfcaa22b23ec91be4c75926956aa994ca89de8d5))
-* **release:** build aarch64-musl natively on arm64 runners, replace retired macos-13 ([#155](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/155)) ([6cff528](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6cff5286b436fdee44ad881999e2a5f4bdba18f9))
-* **visibility:** gate repo-scoped read surfaces on visibility ([#120](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/120)) ([#157](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/157)) ([26bc3f6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/26bc3f69870aa77e43c0d92115a5aa59555b7d88))
-
-## [0.5.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0) (2026-07-05)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* **gl:** sanctioned iCaptcha client flow + secure git lifecycle ([#138](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/138)) ([06388ec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/06388ec26aa29d356ae311276fdb91be054e9ecc))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **gl:** sign the CLI's /ipfs/pins reads under the [#134](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/134) auth gate ([#146](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/146)) ([20d6848](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/20d6848846b3a988d604208833167a528b7d8820))
-* **node,git-remote:** gate receive-pack advertisement, sign client fetch/push ([#119](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/119)) ([6f36fc0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6f36fc07b8e10a650c5948b269feac1cb25cae2a))
-* **node,gossip:** route gossip HTTP through the no-redirect client ([#93](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/93)) ([#140](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/140)) ([563c456](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/563c456803bf3e958d63869db424b3940472bc3d))
-* **node:** close two spam-vector root causes (trust upsert + ungated push) ([#152](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/152)) ([2df6ff9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2df6ff9d30de62f754fa41473e85db316021718e))
-* **node:** gate GET /ipfs/{cid} on reachable allowed-set, not deny-set ([#126](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/126)) ([#133](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/133)) ([466a550](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/466a550915edd711856ef32035f9f474e2577c4f))
-* **node:** gate the ref-updates feeds on read visibility ([#112](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/112), [#114](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/114)) ([#143](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/143)) ([4891db3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/4891db38892663326ee0c1417a2db931988be4b5))
-* **node:** prefer canonical repo row over mirror row in get_repo ([#124](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/124)) ([#141](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/141)) ([6c95592](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6c95592d188222ac3446dc23ef8d9befbf82ad6f))
-* **remote:** include HTTP error response body ([#137](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/137)) ([09a0cb2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/09a0cb23b9f284ccbd69aca6958b70671f3bfb46))
-* **repos:** log the cause when repo create fails ([#103](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/103)) ([2620e97](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2620e973e3cd4835ed42ddd4adcd8183b5b3080e))
-
-## [0.4.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.3.9...v0.4.0) (2026-06-30)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* agent profiles (display name, bio, avatar, social links) ([#23](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/23)) ([09a3397](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/09a339745eca40a2567d911e947e3fc7426fc621))
-* **db:** versioned schema migrations with idempotent backfill ([#21](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/21)) ([927e4d0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/927e4d0cfb4ea11dca6930780939afaa067797ba))
-* encrypted replication for private subtrees (B1/B2/B3) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#36](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/36)) ([5ff7af8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/5ff7af84fa21fab53a12dfa04a0e7fb7e7d672e6))
-* **git-remote-gitlawb:** add --version and --help flags ([#30](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/30)) ([3a401eb](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3a401eb0792f9c5f5a10de6c16861655ab3836e0))
-* **gitlawb-attest:** External Attestation v1 for ref-update certs ([#20](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/20)) ([924bccd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/924bccd8e53e9be2dc9d6d4e4f1376952d6462bb))
-* **node:** blind recipient identities at rest and gate B1 by repo readability ([#40](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/40)) ([abdc775](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/abdc7757708d2bbb2bfda99bb65d50756142a42e))
-* **node:** enforce per-route authorization across the REST and GraphQL surface ([#87](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/87)) ([2202b00](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2202b0097fab6976ab366a2cdc385f1146a72f86))
-* **node:** graceful shutdown + Prometheus metrics endpoint ([#22](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/22)) ([2ce4da9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2ce4da9cc5a4791e8ae5a1cd90270b67f60d9ec3))
-* **node:** iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate on create_repo + register ([#108](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/108)) ([adc20f9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/adc20f9effad7b42fab55002875d209c4ed79518))
-* **node:** iCaptcha-aware repo propagation gate with quarantine ([#125](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/125)) ([8b9ceec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/8b9ceec25ef338965d1db72d39a7f2adb5300cc9))
-* **node:** owner-only push enforcement behind GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH ([#31](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/31)) ([#68](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/68)) ([0a15e76](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/0a15e763d2ab46737a3831715facbe51045b33ba))
-* **node:** peer partial-mirrors for repos with private subtrees ([#35](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/35)) ([e365a57](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e365a57b51c167abf06e87bfeb0565c80ed1b849))
-* **node:** pin the per-push object delta instead of re-enumerating the whole repo ([#90](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/90)) ([1af4fdf](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/1af4fdf485c7084cd160551b757b1ad1eed65cc6))
-* **node:** replication enforcement (Phase 2) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#34](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/34)) ([8680d0f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/8680d0f9d6600bba1a52d15624f8a2802a169511))
-* **node:** signature-gated agent self-deregister ([#29](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/29)) ([#63](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/63)) ([ff492b4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/ff492b452126f5568dac4286a7249f0cadb8b380))
-* **node:** subtree content withholding (Phase 3) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#28](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/28)) ([61b3830](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/61b383019fd895a1a6adfad934ad6c626e0f095e))
-* path-scoped repository visibility (Phase 1) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#25](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/25)) ([6abaf1d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6abaf1d7ed8fc55c6547568ae7247131311bde98))
-* per-DID rate limiting on creation endpoints (10/hour) ([#13](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/13)) ([b12c6bc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b12c6bc3283c2647224a62fb520a3cb7acf4a747))
-* **sync:** auto-register as replica with origin after successful mirror ([#56](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/56)) ([c03c9af](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c03c9af8fadafe262a2bf3cf25e19edf7160d376))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **api:** blob endpoint returns 400/404 instead of 500 on bad paths ([#37](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/37)) ([b61a1bd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b61a1bd46ffe78b39c0967e97b0ad349eba0b046))
-* **core:** route seed access through the zeroizing wrapper ([#41](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/41)) ([#64](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/64)) ([c9f43b0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c9f43b010576edb3c92a3be3d935cad232250344))
-* **core:** zeroize the derived X25519 secret ([#65](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/65)) ([#91](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/91)) ([2f6611a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2f6611a30fbb66cef9991cf4c6e507548acc5038))
-* **gl:** paginate gl-clone Arweave recovery and make /encrypted-blobs parsing schema-strict ([#49](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/49)) ([#70](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/70)) ([2153b0b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2153b0b7a67a48c29a33cd70b80cfbb69760805d))
-* **infra:** drop fly idle_timeout 600 -> 120 ([#38](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/38)) ([a2217bf](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/a2217bff27ff3d6cae02bd8a12f8a0af7ce2b0a1))
-* **node:** anchor the real old_sha and issue a per-ref certificate ([#72](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/72)) ([6809201](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6809201daa223d6f833be6e95876a7b4e1f2b0b5))
-* **node:** close under-withholding via full ref scope and full-history classification ([#42](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/42)) ([#84](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/84)) ([3e1e904](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3e1e9045e4e3aa5ea0aee69767ceb01637920d2a))
-* **node:** dedupe mirror and canonical repo rows on list surfaces ([#6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/6)) ([#73](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/73)) ([3e8e333](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3e8e333aa03d7a2fe455d5d83f23089d58feb8c9))
-* **node:** enforce path-scoped visibility on the REST read API ([#52](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/52)) ([e37ea7f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e37ea7fec6d5a3171b526c84f884670bbbd258fb))
-* **node:** fail closed when a recipient DID can't be resolved ([#47](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/47)) ([#67](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/67)) ([abc9ad0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/abc9ad03acb48e608234650a25049622673fa53a))
-* **node:** gate fork_repo on per-caller path-scoped visibility ([#98](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/98)) ([#109](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/109)) ([6ae316c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6ae316cc88521747cbacb2a612b9433897d2e490))
-* **node:** gate GET /ipfs/{cid} on per-caller path-scoped visibility ([#110](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/110)) ([#128](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/128)) ([174f25a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/174f25a206380b26796b8782e1bd860b0a409fc9))
-* **node:** gate repo-listing and stats surfaces on visibility ([#97](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/97), [#99](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/99), [#101](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/101), [#104](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/104)) ([#111](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/111)) ([828dd27](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/828dd279a286f58bbb3c73627b2a1e23778b25cf))
-* **node:** make Tigris repo hydration resilient to corrupt archives & failed writes ([#54](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/54)) ([7a99d0f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/7a99d0f27cfa869e9f8a803f16cff30191745a51))
-* **node:** preserve promisor mirror mode on unknown withheld-paths lookup ([#48](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/48)) ([#69](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/69)) ([96fcfdb](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/96fcfdb1ca6d4cd27226670068702c9f177e283a))
-* **node:** reap leaked git child processes ([#53](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/53)) ([#61](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/61)) ([803d83e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/803d83efdbcfa9d98affac1c5aaf8aacc511ae64))
-* **node:** reject malformed path globs with non-trailing or empty-segment wildcards ([#74](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/74)) ([#75](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/75)) ([3d880cd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3d880cd56fed10e4c5ae787b52ce411384950f5e))
-* **node:** skip withheld-walk when no path-scoped rule can withhold ([#60](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/60)) ([338ff83](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/338ff83584f2ab960be7e42ecec64191f5aaeb95))
-* **release:** give crates explicit versions for release-please ([#129](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/129)) ([788a868](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/788a8686c1deafe03573703d72eb927cde81f54d))
-* **release:** use simple release-type + generic Cargo.toml updaters ([#130](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/130)) ([12bfb1b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/12bfb1b3c86b38f0b22d488cd6e85dfd96e0c37f))
-* **security:** gate webhook creation through the public-host validator ([#81](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/81)) ([#92](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/92)) ([f28fa02](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/f28fa02236bd65c6a4fb690131ab14640cc53a12))
-* **security:** reject non-public peer URLs + prune poisoned peers ([#78](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/78)) ([a8cc33a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/a8cc33a185f2649d3fe100ec271ee5739a55eba7))

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -55,25 +55,6 @@ Smart contracts live in a separate repo: [github.com/Gitlawb/contracts](https://
 4. **Conventional commits.** Use `feat:`, `fix:`, `docs:`, `refactor:`, `test:`, `chore:`. Releases are automated by [release-please](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please) — your commit prefixes drive the next version bump.
 5. **Format and lint.** Run `cargo fmt --all` and `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` before submitting. CI will reject anything that fails these.
 
-## What gets merged, what gets closed
-
-We welcome contributions from humans and agents alike. To keep review sustainable, PRs are
-expected to clear a basic quality bar:
-
-- **Link an issue.** Bug fixes and features should reference an issue (`Closes #123`). For
-  protocol-level changes (identity, signatures, UCAN, ref certs, wire formats), open the
-  issue *before* writing code.
-- **One change per PR.** Unrelated churn slows review and gets sent back.
-- **Tests and a green pipeline.** New behavior needs tests; `cargo fmt`, `cargo clippy`,
-  and the full CI suite must pass.
-- **A real description.** Say what changes and why. "Update code" is not a description.
-
-A triage bot labels PRs that are missing these and leaves a short note. Nothing is closed
-automatically while you're engaging. A flagged PR still missing a description after 14 days of
-inactivity gets a stale warning, and is closed 7 days later if still untouched. A missing issue
-link alone never triggers closure; that label stays advisory. Closed PRs can be reopened at any
-time once updated.
-
 ## Development environment
 
 **Requirements:**

Cargo.lock

@@ -8,16 +8,6 @@ version = "0.11.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "fe438c63458706e03479442743baae6c88256498e6431708f6dfc520a26515d3"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "aead"
-version = "0.5.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d122413f284cf2d62fb1b7db97e02edb8cda96d769b16e443a4f6195e35662b0"
-dependencies = [
- "crypto-common",
- "generic-array",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "ahash"
 version = "0.8.12"
@@ -329,7 +319,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "keccak-asm",
  "paste",
  "proptest",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "rapidhash",
  "ruint",
  "rustc-hash",
@@ -770,23 +760,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "ark-ff"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f7a806ac6c8307b929df4645776290a50ee2aac754ad09d8bdf73391309e43af"
-dependencies = [
- "ark-ff-asm 0.6.0",
- "ark-ff-macros 0.6.0",
- "ark-serialize 0.6.0",
- "ark-std 0.6.0",
- "digest 0.10.7",
- "educe",
- "num-bigint",
- "num-traits",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-ff-asm"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -817,16 +790,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "ark-ff-asm"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "1479009684adc073dff49a1025d3a7065b317a9ead25aaaca38cdc70058ba8a2"
-dependencies = [
- "quote",
- "syn 2.0.117",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-ff-macros"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -865,19 +828,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "ark-ff-macros"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4a0691ed21ef00ef89c1e9bda832eba493dda3ec2f8d892fb25b705f73f06bb8"
-dependencies = [
- "num-bigint",
- "num-traits",
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn 2.0.117",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-serialize"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -911,30 +861,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "num-bigint",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "ark-serialize"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "a74dd304fd536fb95d0a328e72be759209cc496a9da094c5bc56e5fea4f9e86b"
-dependencies = [
- "ark-serialize-derive",
- "ark-std 0.6.0",
- "digest 0.10.7",
- "num-bigint",
- "serde_with",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "ark-serialize-derive"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4f153690697a2b91e5e1251ff98411ee5371500a111a0fd317a70e588eb300f9"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn 2.0.117",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-std"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -965,16 +891,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "rand 0.8.6",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "ark-std"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "367c9c827ed431bff6868b7aa926e05b16eb46603cc8b6e768e4a5553fa1d155"
-dependencies = [
- "num-traits",
- "rand 0.8.6",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "arrayref"
 version = "0.3.9"
@@ -2059,30 +1975,6 @@ version = "0.2.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "613afe47fcd5fac7ccf1db93babcb082c5994d996f20b8b159f2ad1658eb5724"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "chacha20"
-version = "0.9.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c3613f74bd2eac03dad61bd53dbe620703d4371614fe0bc3b9f04dd36fe4e818"
-dependencies = [
- "cfg-if",
- "cipher",
- "cpufeatures",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "chacha20poly1305"
-version = "0.10.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "10cd79432192d1c0f4e1a0fef9527696cc039165d729fb41b3f4f4f354c2dc35"
-dependencies = [
- "aead",
- "chacha20",
- "cipher",
- "poly1305",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "chrono"
 version = "0.4.44"
@@ -2109,17 +2001,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "unsigned-varint 0.8.0",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "cipher"
-version = "0.4.4"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "773f3b9af64447d2ce9850330c473515014aa235e6a783b02db81ff39e4a3dad"
-dependencies = [
- "crypto-common",
- "inout",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "clap"
 version = "4.5.60"
@@ -2181,7 +2062,7 @@ version = "3.1.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "faf9468729b8cbcea668e36183cb69d317348c2e08e994829fb56ebfdfbaac34"
 dependencies = [
- "windows-sys 0.48.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2336,7 +2217,7 @@ checksum = "6ddc2d09feefeee8bd78101665bd8645637828fa9317f9f292496dbbd8c65ff3"
 dependencies = [
  "crc",
  "digest 0.10.7",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "regex",
  "rustversion",
 ]
@@ -2367,9 +2248,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "crossbeam-epoch"
-version = "0.9.20"
+version = "0.9.18"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "2d6914041f254d6e9176c01941b21115dcfb7089e55135a35411081bd106ef3f"
+checksum = "5b82ac4a3c2ca9c3460964f020e1402edd5753411d7737aa39c3714ad1b5420e"
 dependencies = [
  "crossbeam-utils",
 ]
@@ -2426,41 +2307,9 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "78c8292055d1c1df0cce5d180393dc8cce0abec0a7102adb6c7b1eef6016d60a"
 dependencies = [
  "generic-array",
- "rand_core 0.6.4",
  "typenum",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "crypto_box"
-version = "0.9.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "16182b4f39a82ec8a6851155cc4c0cda3065bb1db33651726a29e1951de0f009"
-dependencies = [
- "aead",
- "chacha20",
- "crypto_secretbox",
- "curve25519-dalek",
- "salsa20",
- "subtle",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "crypto_secretbox"
-version = "0.1.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b9d6cf87adf719ddf43a805e92c6870a531aedda35ff640442cbaf8674e141e1"
-dependencies = [
- "aead",
- "chacha20",
- "cipher",
- "generic-array",
- "poly1305",
- "salsa20",
- "subtle",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "curve25519-dalek"
 version = "4.1.3"
@@ -3374,11 +3223,10 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "gitlawb-core",
- "mockito",
  "reqwest",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
@@ -3386,7 +3234,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
  "base64",
  "ed25519-dalek",
@@ -3403,15 +3251,12 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "base64",
- "chacha20poly1305",
  "chrono",
  "cid",
- "crypto_box",
- "curve25519-dalek",
  "ed25519-dalek",
  "hex",
  "multibase",
@@ -3430,7 +3275,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy",
  "anyhow",
@@ -3440,19 +3285,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "aws-config",
  "aws-sdk-s3",
  "axum",
- "base64",
  "bytes",
  "chrono",
  "cid",
  "clap",
  "dirs-next",
- "ed25519-dalek",
  "futures",
  "gitlawb-core",
  "hex",
  "hmac",
  "http-body-util",
- "libc",
  "libp2p-core",
  "libp2p-dns",
  "libp2p-gossipsub",
@@ -3479,23 +3321,20 @@ dependencies = [
  "tower-http",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
- "unicode-normalization",
  "uuid",
  "zstd",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gl"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy",
  "anyhow",
- "base64",
  "chrono",
  "clap",
  "dirs",
  "gitlawb-core",
- "icaptcha-client",
  "mockito",
  "reqwest",
  "serde",
@@ -3678,7 +3517,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "idna",
  "ipnet",
  "once_cell",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "ring",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
  "tinyvec",
@@ -3700,7 +3539,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "moka",
  "once_cell",
  "parking_lot",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "resolv-conf",
  "smallvec",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
@@ -3890,21 +3729,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "cc",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "icaptcha-client"
-version = "0.4.0"
-dependencies = [
- "anyhow",
- "gitlawb-core",
- "mockito",
- "reqwest",
- "serde",
- "serde_json",
- "sha2",
- "thiserror 2.0.18",
- "tracing",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "icu_collections"
 version = "2.1.1"
@@ -4095,15 +3919,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "serde_core",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "inout"
-version = "0.1.4"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "879f10e63c20629ecabbb64a8010319738c66a5cd0c29b02d63d272b03751d01"
-dependencies = [
- "generic-array",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "ipconfig"
 version = "0.3.4"
@@ -4630,7 +4445,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "hyper-util",
  "log",
  "pin-project-lite",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "regex",
  "serde_json",
  "serde_urlencoded",
@@ -4996,12 +4811,6 @@ version = "1.70.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "384b8ab6d37215f3c5301a95a4accb5d64aa607f1fcb26a11b5303878451b4fe"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "opaque-debug"
-version = "0.3.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c08d65885ee38876c4f86fa503fb49d7b507c2b62552df7c70b2fce627e06381"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "openssl-probe"
 version = "0.2.1"
@@ -5251,17 +5060,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "poly1305"
-version = "0.8.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8159bd90725d2df49889a078b54f4f79e87f1f8a8444194cdca81d38f5393abf"
-dependencies = [
- "cpufeatures",
- "opaque-debug",
- "universal-hash",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "portable-atomic"
 version = "1.13.1"
@@ -5377,7 +5175,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "bit-vec",
  "bitflags 2.11.0",
  "num-traits",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "rand_chacha 0.9.0",
  "rand_xorshift",
  "regex-syntax",
@@ -5437,14 +5235,14 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "quinn-proto"
-version = "0.11.15"
+version = "0.11.14"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4fcb935c5bec503c2f0e306bdd3e58bb9029dcb14fa8d9ac76e3a5256ac0763e"
+checksum = "434b42fec591c96ef50e21e886936e66d3cc3f737104fdb9b737c40ffb94c098"
 dependencies = [
  "bytes",
  "getrandom 0.3.4",
  "lru-slab",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "ring",
  "rustc-hash",
  "rustls",
@@ -5511,9 +5309,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "rand"
-version = "0.9.3"
+version = "0.9.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7ec095654a25171c2124e9e3393a930bddbffdc939556c914957a4c3e0a87166"
+checksum = "6db2770f06117d490610c7488547d543617b21bfa07796d7a12f6f1bd53850d1"
 dependencies = [
  "rand_chacha 0.9.0",
  "rand_core 0.9.5",
@@ -5815,15 +5613,14 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "ruint"
-version = "1.20.0"
+version = "1.17.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f5e99bff0393163bb25029a6af25d3d8d202ba5b5438a74d1bd8789f5c822970"
+checksum = "c141e807189ad38a07276942c6623032d3753c8859c146104ac2e4d68865945a"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy-rlp",
  "ark-ff 0.3.0",
  "ark-ff 0.4.2",
  "ark-ff 0.5.0",
- "ark-ff 0.6.0",
  "bytes",
  "fastrlp 0.3.1",
  "fastrlp 0.4.0",
@@ -5834,7 +5631,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "primitive-types",
  "proptest",
  "rand 0.8.6",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "rlp",
  "ruint-macro",
  "serde_core",
@@ -5939,9 +5736,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "rustls-webpki"
-version = "0.103.13"
+version = "0.103.10"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "61c429a8649f110dddef65e2a5ad240f747e85f7758a6bccc7e5777bd33f756e"
+checksum = "df33b2b81ac578cabaf06b89b0631153a3f416b0a886e8a7a1707fb51abbd1ef"
 dependencies = [
  "aws-lc-rs",
  "ring",
@@ -5990,15 +5787,6 @@ version = "0.2.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "6518fc26bced4d53678a22d6e423e9d8716377def84545fe328236e3af070e7f"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "salsa20"
-version = "0.10.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "97a22f5af31f73a954c10289c93e8a50cc23d971e80ee446f1f6f7137a088213"
-dependencies = [
- "cipher",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "schannel"
 version = "0.1.29"
@@ -6772,9 +6560,9 @@ checksum = "55937e1799185b12863d447f42597ed69d9928686b8d88a1df17376a097d8369"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "tar"
-version = "0.4.46"
+version = "0.4.45"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3f6221d9a6003c78398e3b239969f352578258df48c8eb051caadae0015bc840"
+checksum = "22692a6476a21fa75fdfc11d452fda482af402c008cdbaf3476414e122040973"
 dependencies = [
  "filetime",
  "libc",
@@ -7154,7 +6942,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "http 1.4.0",
  "httparse",
  "log",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "sha1",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
  "utf-8",
@@ -7247,16 +7035,6 @@ version = "0.2.6"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "ebc1c04c71510c7f702b52b7c350734c9ff1295c464a03335b00bb84fc54f853"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "universal-hash"
-version = "0.5.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "fc1de2c688dc15305988b563c3854064043356019f97a4b46276fe734c4f07ea"
-dependencies = [
- "crypto-common",
- "subtle",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "unsigned-varint"
 version = "0.7.2"

Cargo.toml

@@ -6,19 +6,11 @@ members = [
     "crates/gl",
     "crates/git-remote-gitlawb",
     "crates/gitlawb-attest",
-    "crates/icaptcha-client",
 ]
 
 [workspace.package]
-# Per-crate versions live in each crate's [package] so release-please can manage
-# them (it cannot rewrite an inherited `version.workspace = true`). They are kept
-# in lockstep by release-please's generic updater: each crate's `version` line
-# carries an `# x-release-please-version` annotation and is listed under
-# `extra-files` in release-please-config.json. The release type is `simple`
-# (not `rust`) because the rust strategy unconditionally tries to rewrite this
-# virtual workspace root as a package manifest and errors out.
+version = "0.3.9"
 edition = "2021"
-rust-version = "1.91"
 license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
 authors = ["gitlawb contributors"]
 repository = "https://github.com/gitlawb/node"
@@ -55,7 +47,3 @@ uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4"] }
 reqwest = { version = "0.12", features = ["blocking", "json", "multipart", "rustls-tls"], default-features = false }
 # HMAC
 hmac = "0.12"
-
-[profile.release]
-lto = "thin"
-strip = "symbols"

Dockerfile

@@ -8,33 +8,20 @@ FROM rust:1.91-bookworm AS builder
 
 WORKDIR /build
 
-# Cache dependencies first for faster rebuilds.
-# EVERY workspace member's manifest must be copied here, not just the ones this
-# image ships: cargo loads the whole workspace before it resolves anything, so a
-# missing member's Cargo.toml (or a path dependency pointing at one) aborts the
-# layer before a single crate is fetched.
+# Cache dependencies first for faster rebuilds
 COPY Cargo.toml Cargo.lock ./
 COPY crates/gitlawb-core/Cargo.toml crates/gitlawb-core/
 COPY crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml crates/gitlawb-node/
 COPY crates/gl/Cargo.toml crates/gl/
 COPY crates/git-remote-gitlawb/Cargo.toml crates/git-remote-gitlawb/
-COPY crates/gitlawb-attest/Cargo.toml crates/gitlawb-attest/
-COPY crates/icaptcha-client/Cargo.toml crates/icaptcha-client/
 
-# Fetch deps (this layer caches until Cargo.{toml,lock} change).
-# No `|| true`: this layer is expected to succeed, and swallowing its exit code
-# is what let it sit dead from the moment gl gained a path dependency on
-# icaptcha-client. A failure here should stop the build, not silently turn every
-# image build into a cold one.
-RUN mkdir -p crates/gitlawb-core/src crates/gitlawb-node/src crates/gl/src \
-        crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src crates/gitlawb-attest/src crates/icaptcha-client/src && \
+# Fetch deps (this layer caches until Cargo.{toml,lock} change)
+RUN mkdir -p crates/gitlawb-core/src crates/gitlawb-node/src crates/gl/src crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src && \
     echo 'fn main() {}' > crates/gitlawb-node/src/main.rs && \
     echo 'fn main() {}' > crates/gl/src/main.rs && \
     echo 'fn main() {}' > crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src/main.rs && \
     echo '' > crates/gitlawb-core/src/lib.rs && \
-    echo '' > crates/gitlawb-attest/src/lib.rs && \
-    echo '' > crates/icaptcha-client/src/lib.rs && \
-    cargo build --release --locked -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
+    cargo build --release -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb || true
 
 # Now copy real sources and build for real.
 # Force-bump mtimes so cargo's fingerprint check rebuilds — without this,
@@ -47,7 +34,7 @@ RUN find crates -name "*.rs" -exec touch {} + && \
     rm -rf target/release/.fingerprint/gitlawb-node-* \
            target/release/.fingerprint/gl-* \
            target/release/.fingerprint/git-remote-gitlawb-* && \
-    cargo build --release --locked -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb && \
+    cargo build --release -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb && \
     strip target/release/gitlawb-node target/release/gl target/release/git-remote-gitlawb
 
 # ── Runtime stage ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -57,7 +44,6 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
         git \
         ca-certificates \
         curl \
-        tini \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
 # Non-root user for runtime
@@ -86,11 +72,4 @@ VOLUME ["/data"]
 HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=15s --retries=3 \
     CMD curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:${GITLAWB_PORT}/health || exit 1
 
-# Run under tini so the node is never PID 1. As PID 1 a process must reap
-# reparented orphans itself; the node does not, so git's reparented grandchildren
-# (e.g. pack-objects orphaned when a served upload-pack dies on a client
-# disconnect) would accumulate as zombies until fork() fails with EAGAIN (#53).
-# tini reaps them and forwards SIGTERM/SIGINT to the node, which runs its own
-# graceful shutdown. (No `-g`: the node manages its own children, so group-wide
-# signalling would only disturb in-flight git helpers during shutdown.)
-ENTRYPOINT ["tini", "--", "gitlawb-node"]
+ENTRYPOINT ["gitlawb-node"]

Dockerfile.bins

@@ -3,10 +3,7 @@
 # Used by scripts/build-bins.sh — not used for node deployment.
 ARG TARGET=x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
 
-# Must stay at or above the workspace `rust-version` in Cargo.toml. An unmet
-# MSRV is a hard cargo error, and nothing in CI builds this file, so a stale
-# base image here fails only when someone runs scripts/build-bins.sh.
-FROM rust:1.91-bookworm AS builder
+FROM rust:1.85-bookworm AS builder
 ARG TARGET
 
 WORKDIR /build
@@ -26,7 +23,7 @@ COPY crates/ crates/
 # Configure cross-linker for aarch64
 ENV CARGO_TARGET_AARCH64_UNKNOWN_LINUX_MUSL_LINKER=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc
 
-RUN cargo build --release --locked --target "$TARGET" -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
+RUN cargo build --release --target "$TARGET" -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
 
 FROM debian:bookworm-slim
 ARG TARGET

README.md

@@ -119,18 +119,10 @@ docker compose down
 
 ## Install the CLI
 
+Use the installer once releases are available for your platform:
+
 ```bash
-# npm (macOS / Linux)
-npm install -g @gitlawb/gl
-
-# Homebrew (macOS / Linux)
-brew install gitlawb/tap/gl
-
-# curl (macOS / Linux)
 curl -fsSL https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh
-
-# PowerShell (Windows)
-irm https://gitlawb.com/install.ps1 | iex
 ```
 
 Or build from source:
@@ -185,45 +177,6 @@ git clone gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../my-repo
 
 For public-network use, make sure `GITLAWB_NODE` points to the node you want. The helper defaults to localhost for local development.
 
-### Full lifecycle against an iCaptcha-enforcing node
-
-Public nodes (e.g. `node.gitlawb.com`) require two things on writes:
-
-1. **RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures** — every write is signed by your identity key. `gl`
-   and the `git-remote-gitlawb` helper do this automatically. An old/unsigned CLI
-   fails with `401 not_an_agent`; `gl` will tell you to upgrade and register.
-2. **An iCaptcha proof** on the spam-gated writes (**repo create, fork, register**).
-   `gl` solves this for you: on the node's `403 icaptcha_proof_required` it reads the
-   `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` hints, requests a challenge, solves it
-   locally (arithmetic / algebra / sequence), and **retries the same signed request**
-   with the `x-icaptcha-proof` header — no manual steps, no env vars.
-
-```bash
-gl identity new                                   # create did:key identity
-gl register      --node https://node.gitlawb.com  # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
-gl repo create memlawb --node https://node.gitlawb.com   # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
-git push  origin2 main                            # origin2 = gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb (signed)
-git clone gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb            # public read, no proof needed
-gl doctor                                         # preflight: identity, node, version, iCaptcha
-```
-
-Notes:
-
-- **`requesterId` is always your DID.** The proof's `sub` claim must equal the
-  authenticated signer; `gl`/helper set this automatically and the node enforces
-  `sub == authenticated DID` (so a proof minted for another identity is rejected).
-- **Proofs are short-lived (~5 min TTL) and single-use.** If one expires between
-  solving and use, the client transparently solves a fresh one and retries.
-- **What needs what:** create / fork / register are signed **and** iCaptcha-gated;
-  `git push` is **signed-only** (owner signature is the gate — no per-push challenge);
-  reads (clone / fetch / `repo info`) need no proof. A non-existent repo returns a
-  clear `404`, never a placeholder.
-- **API-key iCaptcha deployments:** set `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL` to your iCaptcha
-  origin and `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY` to its key. The client only talks to an
-  `https` origin whose host is allowlisted (that URL or the public default), and
-  sends the bearer token **only** to your configured origin — never to a URL a
-  node advertises — so a hostile node can't capture the key or redirect the solve.
-
 ---
 
 ## Architecture
@@ -302,21 +255,20 @@ POST /api/v1/bounties/{id}/...
 POST /{owner}/{repo}/git-receive-pack
 ```
 
-These peer write routes support staged rollout:
+Peer write routes support staged rollout:
 
 ```txt
 POST /api/v1/peers/announce
 POST /api/v1/sync/notify
+POST /api/v1/sync/trigger
 ```
 
-When `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false`, unsigned legacy peers are accepted on those two routes, but signed requests are verified when signature headers are present. Once all live peers upgrade, operators can set:
+When `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false`, unsigned legacy peers are accepted, but signed requests are verified when signature headers are present. Once all live peers upgrade, operators can set:
 
 ```bash
 GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=true
 ```
 
-`POST /api/v1/sync/trigger` is not part of the staged rollout: it always requires a signature in both config modes and returns 401 without one, because each call drives an O(peers) outbound fan-out.
-
 ---
 
 ## Configuration
@@ -343,7 +295,6 @@ Important node settings:
 | `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES` | Require signed peer announce/sync writes. |
 | `GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC` | Enable automatic sync from known peers. |
 | `GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES` | Max git pack body size for smart-HTTP routes. |
-| `GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS` | Max seconds a served git upload-pack/receive-pack may run before it is aborted (504). Default 600. Does not bound `info/refs` or the withheld-blob path. |
 | `GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET` | Optional S3/Tigris shared repo storage bucket. |
 | `GITLAWB_PINATA_JWT` | Optional Pinata/IPFS warm-storage pinning. |
 | `GITLAWB_IRYS_URL` | Optional Irys/Arweave permanent anchoring. |

bootstrap-peers.json

@@ -1,40 +1,16 @@
 {
   "$comment": "Canonical seed list for the Gitlawb network. Merged with GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS at startup. PRs to add public nodes welcome.",
   "version": 1,
-  "updated": "2026-06-30",
+  "updated": "2026-05-16",
   "peers": [
     {
       "name": "gitlawb",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
+      "operator": "Gitlawb (Kevin)",
       "did": "did:key:z6MkqDnb7Siv3Cwj7pGJq4T5EsUisECqR8KpnDLwcaZq5TPr",
       "http_url": "https://node.gitlawb.com",
       "p2p_multiaddr": null,
       "added": "2026-04-29"
     },
-    {
-      "name": "gitlawb-node2",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
-      "did": null,
-      "http_url": "https://node2.gitlawb.com",
-      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
-      "added": "2026-06-30"
-    },
-    {
-      "name": "gitlawb-node3",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
-      "did": null,
-      "http_url": "https://node3.gitlawb.com",
-      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
-      "added": "2026-06-30"
-    },
-    {
-      "name": "gitlawb-manila",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
-      "did": null,
-      "http_url": "https://manila.gitlawb.com",
-      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
-      "added": "2026-06-30"
-    },
     {
       "name": "rapybus-gitlawb",
       "operator": "RapyBus S.A.C.",

ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-# Dependency allowlist for the `gitlawb-core` crate.
-#
-# gitlawb-core is the shared-primitives crate every consumer embeds (the `gl`
-# CLI, git-remote-gitlawb, the node daemon). It must stay lean so those
-# consumers do not inherit daemon-weight dependencies. This file is the source
-# of truth for the crates gitlawb-core's NORMAL (non-dev, non-build) transitive
-# dependency closure is allowed to contain. CI (`scripts/check-gitlawb-core-deps.sh`,
-# wired into the `core-deps-purity` job in .github/workflows/pr-checks.yml)
-# fails if gitlawb-core's tree contains any crate not listed here.
-#
-# The allowlist is exhaustive-by-construction: a NEW dependency reds CI whether
-# or not anyone thought to ban it, which a denylist cannot do.
-#
-# Measured in-workspace, so feature unification across the workspace can, in
-# rare cases, surface a crate here that gitlawb-core would not pull standalone.
-# An unexpected new entry is a prompt to check what pulled it in, not noise to
-# rubber-stamp.
-#
-# Regenerate (from repo root, after an INTENTIONAL dependency change):
-#   cargo tree -p gitlawb-core --edges normal --prefix none \
-#     | sed -E 's/ v[0-9].*$//' \
-#     | grep -v '^gitlawb-core$' \
-#     | sort -u
-# then paste the result below this header block. (The checker snapshots and
-# restores Cargo.lock; a manual regen may refresh it — `git checkout Cargo.lock`
-# afterward if you did not intend that.)
-#
-# Lines starting with `#` and blank lines are ignored by the checker.
-aead
-anyhow
-base-x
-base256emoji
-base64
-base64ct
-block-buffer
-cfg-if
-chacha20
-chacha20poly1305
-chrono
-cid
-cipher
-const-oid
-const-str
-core2
-cpufeatures
-crypto-common
-crypto_box
-crypto_secretbox
-curve25519-dalek
-curve25519-dalek-derive
-data-encoding
-data-encoding-macro
-data-encoding-macro-internal
-der
-digest
-ed25519
-ed25519-dalek
-equivalent
-generic-array
-getrandom
-hashbrown
-hex
-iana-time-zone
-indexmap
-inout
-itoa
-libc
-match-lookup
-memchr
-multibase
-multihash
-multihash-codetable
-multihash-derive
-multihash-derive-impl
-num-traits
-opaque-debug
-pem-rfc7468
-pkcs8
-poly1305
-ppv-lite86
-proc-macro-crate
-proc-macro2
-quote
-rand
-rand_chacha
-rand_core
-salsa20
-serde
-serde_core
-serde_derive
-serde_json
-sha2
-signature
-spki
-subtle
-syn
-synstructure
-thiserror
-thiserror-impl
-toml_datetime
-toml_edit
-toml_parser
-typenum
-unicode-ident
-universal-hash
-unsigned-varint
-uuid
-winnow
-zerocopy
-zeroize
-zeroize_derive
-zmij

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 [package]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
 description = "Git remote helper — enables 'git clone gitlawb://did:gitlawb:...'"
-version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
-rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 
 [[bin]]
@@ -16,6 +15,3 @@ anyhow = { workspace = true }
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
 tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
-
-[dev-dependencies]
-mockito = "1"

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src/main.rs

@@ -14,13 +14,7 @@
 //! # Protocol flow (connect capability)
 //!   capabilities → "connect\n\n"
 //!   connect git-upload-pack  → GET /info/refs | POST /git-upload-pack
-//!   connect git-receive-pack → GET /info/refs | POST /git-receive-pack
-//! Push (git-receive-pack) is RFC-9421 signed from the first request when an
-//! identity keypair is present, since a push can never be anonymous. Fetch
-//! (git-upload-pack) stays anonymous and is signed only on a single retry, after
-//! the node denies the anonymous advertisement with 404 — so a public clone never
-//! discloses the caller's DID, while a private repo's owner (or an authorized
-//! reader) still authenticates when the node demands it.
+//!   connect git-receive-pack → GET /info/refs | POST /git-receive-pack (+ auth header)
 
 use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
@@ -69,10 +63,7 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
     let repo_base = format!("{}/{}/{}", node_base, short_owner, repo_name);
     tracing::debug!("repo_base: {repo_base}");
 
-    // Load keypair for signing requests (optional). Push always signs when a key is
-    // present; fetch signs only if the node 404s the anonymous advertisement, so
-    // public fetches stay anonymous. Absent a key, public fetch still works and push
-    // falls back to unsigned (v0.1 local alpha only).
+    // Load keypair for signing push requests (optional — push still works unsigned in v0.1)
     let keypair = load_keypair();
 
     run_helper(&repo_base, keypair.as_ref())
@@ -124,7 +115,7 @@ fn help_text() -> String {
          \n\
          ENVIRONMENT:\n\
          \x20   GITLAWB_NODE   Node base URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:7545)\n\
-         \x20   GITLAWB_KEY    Identity PEM path for signed fetch/push (default: ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem)\n\
+         \x20   GITLAWB_KEY    Identity PEM path for signed pushes (default: ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem)\n\
          \x20   GITLAWB_LOG    Log filter (default: warn)\n\
          \n\
          FLAGS:\n\
@@ -188,11 +179,11 @@ fn run_helper(repo_base: &str, keypair: Option<&Keypair>) -> Result<()> {
 
 // ── HTTP proxy for git smart protocol ────────────────────────────────────────
 
-fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
+fn handle_connect(
     repo_base: &str,
     service: &str,
     keypair: Option<&Keypair>,
-    stdin: &mut R,
+    stdin: &mut io::BufReader<io::Stdin>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
     match service {
         "git-upload-pack" | "git-receive-pack" => {}
@@ -207,52 +198,19 @@ fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
     //
     // The server advertises its refs. git reads this to decide what to fetch/push.
 
-    // Signing policy for this exchange, carried through to the Phase-2 POST:
-    //  - git-receive-pack (push): sign from the first request; a push is
-    //    signature-gated and can never be anonymous.
-    //  - git-upload-pack (fetch): start anonymous so a public clone never discloses
-    //    the caller's DID, then escalate to a single signed retry only if the node
-    //    denies the anonymous advertisement with 404 (how it withholds a private
-    //    repo from an unauthenticated reader).
-    let mut signing_key = if service == "git-receive-pack" {
-        keypair
-    } else {
-        None
-    };
-
     let refs_url = format!("{}/info/refs?service={}", repo_base, service);
     tracing::debug!("GET {refs_url}");
 
-    let mut refs_resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, signing_key)
+    let refs_resp = client
+        .get(&refs_url)
+        .header("User-Agent", "git/2.0 git-remote-gitlawb/0.1.0")
         .send()
         .with_context(|| format!("GET {refs_url}"))?;
 
-    // Fetch escalation: retry the advertisement signed once when the anonymous try
-    // is denied and we hold an identity. A public repo answers 200 on the first
-    // (anonymous) request and never reaches here, so it stays DID-private.
-    if service == "git-upload-pack"
-        && refs_resp.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND
-        && keypair.is_some()
-    {
-        tracing::debug!("anonymous info/refs returned 404; retrying signed");
-        signing_key = keypair;
-        refs_resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, signing_key)
-            .send()
-            .with_context(|| format!("GET {refs_url} (signed retry)"))?;
-    }
-
     if !refs_resp.status().is_success() {
-        let status = refs_resp.status();
-        let body = read_error_body(refs_resp);
         bail!(
-            "{}",
-            http_error_message(
-                "GET",
-                "/info/refs",
-                status,
-                &body,
-                Some("— is the repo registered on this node?")
-            )
+            "GET /info/refs returned {} — is the repo registered on this node?",
+            refs_resp.status()
         );
     }
 
@@ -308,20 +266,35 @@ fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
     let post_url = format!("{}/{}", repo_base, service);
     tracing::debug!("POST {post_url} ({} bytes)", request_body.len());
 
-    let req = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &request_body, signing_key);
+    // Extract the URL path for signing (e.g., "/z6Mk.../my-repo/git-receive-pack")
+    let path_for_sig = url_path(&post_url);
 
-    // Attach the body after signing so the pack bytes are moved, not cloned —
-    // packs can be large and the clone doubled peak memory on push.
-    let pack_resp = req
-        .body(request_body)
-        .send()
-        .with_context(|| format!("POST {post_url}"))?;
+    let mut req = client
+        .post(&post_url)
+        .header("Content-Type", format!("application/x-{}-request", service))
+        .header("User-Agent", "git/2.0 git-remote-gitlawb/0.1.0")
+        .body(request_body.clone());
+
+    // Add RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth on push operations
+    if service == "git-receive-pack" {
+        if let Some(kp) = keypair {
+            let signed = sign_request(kp, "POST", &path_for_sig, &request_body);
+            req = req
+                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
+                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
+                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
+            tracing::debug!("attached RFC 9421 HTTP Signature (DID: {})", kp.did());
+        } else {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                "no identity keypair found — push will be unsigned (v0.1 local alpha only)"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    let pack_resp = req.send().with_context(|| format!("POST {post_url}"))?;
 
     if !pack_resp.status().is_success() {
-        let status = pack_resp.status();
-        let body = read_error_body(pack_resp);
-        let path = format!("/{service}");
-        bail!("{}", http_error_message("POST", &path, status, &body, None));
+        bail!("POST /{} returned {}", service, pack_resp.status());
     }
 
     let pack_bytes = pack_resp.bytes().context("reading pack response")?;
@@ -333,68 +306,6 @@ fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
     Ok(())
 }
 
-// ── Smart-protocol request builders ───────────────────────────────────────────
-
-const USER_AGENT: &str = "git/2.0 git-remote-gitlawb/0.1.0";
-
-/// Build the Phase-1 ref-advertisement GET, signing it when an identity is
-/// present. The node gates the ref advertisement on read visibility for BOTH
-/// services, so a private repo's advertisement is denied (404) to an
-/// unauthenticated caller; without this signature the repo's own owner can
-/// neither fetch (upload-pack) nor push (receive-pack) it. Public repos still
-/// work anonymously (no keypair present, or the gate admits anonymous). Sign over
-/// the path *and* query (?service=...) because the node verifies the signature
-/// over its path_and_query.
-fn build_advertisement_request(
-    client: &reqwest::blocking::Client,
-    refs_url: &str,
-    keypair: Option<&Keypair>,
-) -> reqwest::blocking::RequestBuilder {
-    let mut req = client.get(refs_url).header("User-Agent", USER_AGENT);
-    if let Some(kp) = keypair {
-        let signed = sign_request(kp, "GET", &url_path(refs_url), b"");
-        req = req
-            .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
-            .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
-            .header("Signature", signed.signature);
-        tracing::debug!("signed info/refs advertisement (DID: {})", kp.did());
-    }
-    req
-}
-
-/// Build the Phase-2 pack POST, signing it when an identity is present, for BOTH
-/// services. The node read-gates the git-upload-pack POST with visibility_check
-/// at "/", and separately owner-gates the git-receive-pack POST (signature
-/// required, enforced by middleware). The Phase-1 advertisement signature does
-/// not carry to this separate request, so a private repo's owner must
-/// authenticate here too or their fetch/push is denied.
-/// Public-repo fetch still works anonymously when no keypair is present. The body
-/// is signed (content-digest) but NOT attached here, so the caller can move the
-/// (possibly large) pack bytes into `.body()` rather than clone them.
-fn build_pack_post_request(
-    client: &reqwest::blocking::Client,
-    post_url: &str,
-    service: &str,
-    body: &[u8],
-    keypair: Option<&Keypair>,
-) -> reqwest::blocking::RequestBuilder {
-    let mut req = client
-        .post(post_url)
-        .header("Content-Type", format!("application/x-{}-request", service))
-        .header("User-Agent", USER_AGENT);
-    if let Some(kp) = keypair {
-        let signed = sign_request(kp, "POST", &url_path(post_url), body);
-        req = req
-            .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
-            .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
-            .header("Signature", signed.signature);
-        tracing::debug!("signed {service} POST (DID: {})", kp.did());
-    } else if service == "git-receive-pack" {
-        tracing::warn!("no identity keypair found, push will be unsigned (v0.1 local alpha only)");
-    }
-    req
-}
-
 // ── URL helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /// Parse a `gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../repo-name` URL.
@@ -432,7 +343,7 @@ fn parse_gitlawb_url(url: &str) -> Result<(String, String, String)> {
 ///
 /// We also handle the flush-only case (`"0000"`) that git sends when it already
 /// has everything it needs (up-to-date clone).
-fn read_upload_pack_request<R: Read>(stdin: &mut R) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+fn read_upload_pack_request(stdin: &mut io::BufReader<io::Stdin>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let mut buf = Vec::new();
 
     loop {
@@ -518,85 +429,6 @@ fn url_path(url: &str) -> String {
         .unwrap_or_else(|| "/".to_string())
 }
 
-const MAX_ERROR_BODY_BYTES: u64 = 4096;
-const MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS: usize = 2000;
-
-fn read_error_body(mut response: reqwest::blocking::Response) -> String {
-    let mut body = Vec::new();
-    let mut limited = (&mut response).take(MAX_ERROR_BODY_BYTES);
-
-    if limited.read_to_end(&mut body).is_err() {
-        return String::new();
-    }
-
-    String::from_utf8_lossy(&body).into_owned()
-}
-
-fn http_error_message(
-    method: &str,
-    path: &str,
-    status: reqwest::StatusCode,
-    body: &str,
-    empty_body_hint: Option<&str>,
-) -> String {
-    let mut message = format!("{method} {path} returned {status}");
-    let body = safe_error_body_excerpt(body);
-
-    if !body.is_empty() {
-        message.push_str(": ");
-        message.push_str(&body);
-    } else if let Some(hint) = empty_body_hint {
-        message.push(' ');
-        message.push_str(hint);
-    }
-
-    message
-}
-
-fn safe_error_body_excerpt(body: &str) -> String {
-    let mut excerpt = String::new();
-    let mut pending_space = false;
-    let mut kept_chars = 0;
-
-    for ch in body.trim().chars() {
-        if kept_chars >= MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS {
-            break;
-        }
-
-        if ch.is_control() {
-            if matches!(ch, '\n' | '\r' | '\t') {
-                pending_space = true;
-            }
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        if gitlawb_core::sanitize::is_bidi_format(ch) {
-            // Drop Cf bidi/format controls (INV-6, #183) without marking
-            // pending_space: unlike a newline/tab they are not whitespace, so
-            // "a\u{202e}c" collapses to "ac" with no phantom gap.
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        if ch.is_whitespace() {
-            pending_space = true;
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        if pending_space && !excerpt.is_empty() {
-            excerpt.push(' ');
-            kept_chars += 1;
-            if kept_chars >= MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS {
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        excerpt.push(ch);
-        kept_chars += 1;
-        pending_space = false;
-    }
-
-    excerpt
-}
-
 // ── Keypair loading ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 fn load_keypair() -> Option<Keypair> {
@@ -640,467 +472,6 @@ fn resolve_key_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
-    use std::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
-    use std::thread::JoinHandle;
-
-    struct TestResponse {
-        request_line: &'static str,
-        status: &'static str,
-        body: &'static str,
-    }
-
-    fn serve_http(responses: Vec<TestResponse>) -> (String, JoinHandle<Vec<String>>) {
-        let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
-        let base_url = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr().unwrap());
-        let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || {
-            let mut requests = Vec::new();
-
-            for response in responses {
-                let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().unwrap();
-                let request = read_http_request(&mut stream);
-                assert!(
-                    request.starts_with(response.request_line),
-                    "unexpected request:\n{request}"
-                );
-
-                let response_text = format!(
-                    "HTTP/1.1 {}\r\ncontent-type: application/json\r\ncontent-length: {}\r\nconnection: close\r\n\r\n{}",
-                    response.status,
-                    response.body.len(),
-                    response.body
-                );
-                stream.write_all(response_text.as_bytes()).unwrap();
-                requests.push(request);
-            }
-
-            requests
-        });
-
-        (base_url, handle)
-    }
-
-    fn read_http_request(stream: &mut TcpStream) -> String {
-        let mut buf = Vec::new();
-        let mut chunk = [0u8; 512];
-        let mut header_len = None;
-
-        loop {
-            let n = stream.read(&mut chunk).unwrap();
-            if n == 0 {
-                break;
-            }
-            buf.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..n]);
-
-            if header_len.is_none() {
-                header_len = buf.windows(4).position(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n").map(|p| p + 4);
-            }
-
-            if let Some(header_len) = header_len {
-                let header = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..header_len]);
-                let content_len = header
-                    .lines()
-                    .find_map(|line| {
-                        let (name, value) = line.split_once(':')?;
-                        name.eq_ignore_ascii_case("content-length")
-                            .then(|| value.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
-                            .flatten()
-                    })
-                    .unwrap_or(0);
-
-                if buf.len() >= header_len + content_len {
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf).into_owned()
-    }
-
-    /// The regression that round-1 missed: the Phase-2 `git-upload-pack` POST was
-    /// left unsigned, so an owner's fetch of a private repo cleared the (now signed)
-    /// advertisement and then 404'd on the pack POST. Drive BOTH request builders
-    /// against a mock node and assert the RFC-9421 headers actually go out on the
-    /// wire for BOTH services when a keypair is present (the mock only matches when
-    /// the headers exist, so `.assert()` fails if any are dropped).
-    #[test]
-    fn advertisement_and_pack_post_are_signed_for_both_services_with_keypair() {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
-        let body = b"0009done\n".to_vec();
-
-        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
-            let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
-            let repo_base = format!("{}/zOwner/myrepo", server.url());
-
-            let get_mock = server
-                .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/info/refs".to_string()))
-                .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-                .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-                .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-                .with_status(200)
-                .create();
-            let refs_url = format!("{repo_base}/info/refs?service={service}");
-            let resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, Some(&kp))
-                .send()
-                .unwrap();
-            assert!(resp.status().is_success());
-            get_mock.assert();
-
-            let post_mock = server
-                .mock("POST", mockito::Matcher::Regex(format!("/{service}$")))
-                .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-                .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-                .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-                .with_status(200)
-                .create();
-            let post_url = format!("{repo_base}/{service}");
-            let resp = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &body, Some(&kp))
-                .body(body.clone())
-                .send()
-                .unwrap();
-            assert!(resp.status().is_success());
-            post_mock.assert();
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Without an identity, the pack POST must go out UNSIGNED so public fetch (and
-    /// alpha unsigned push) still work. `Matcher::Missing` matches only when the
-    /// header is absent, so the mock is hit only if NO signature was attached, for
-    /// BOTH services (the receive-pack iteration also exercises the no-keypair warn
-    /// branch and confirms it does not block the request).
-    #[test]
-    fn pack_post_is_unsigned_without_keypair_for_both_services() {
-        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
-        let body = b"0009done\n".to_vec();
-
-        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
-            let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
-            let post_url = format!("{}/zOwner/myrepo/{service}", server.url());
-
-            let post_mock = server
-                .mock("POST", mockito::Matcher::Regex(format!("/{service}$")))
-                .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-                .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-                .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-                .with_status(200)
-                .create();
-            let resp = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &body, None)
-                .body(body.clone())
-                .send()
-                .unwrap();
-            assert!(resp.status().is_success());
-            post_mock.assert();
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Symmetric negative case for Phase 1: with no identity the advertisement GET
-    /// carries no signature, so public clones stay anonymous.
-    #[test]
-    fn advertisement_get_is_unsigned_without_keypair() {
-        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
-        let refs_url = format!(
-            "{}/zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-            server.url()
-        );
-
-        let get_mock = server
-            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/info/refs".to_string()))
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-            .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .create();
-        let resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, None)
-            .send()
-            .unwrap();
-        assert!(resp.status().is_success());
-        get_mock.assert();
-    }
-
-    // ── Phase-1 retry-on-404 (P2, #119): fetch stays anonymous until the node
-    //    denies it, then escalates to ONE signed retry. Drives handle_connect end to
-    //    end against the recording mock, asserting what actually goes on the wire.
-    //    A request is "signed" iff it carries the `signature-input` header.
-
-    /// Public fetch: the node serves the anonymous advertisement (200), so the
-    /// client never signs — not the advertisement GET, not the upload-pack POST —
-    /// even though an identity is present. This is the privacy fix: a public clone
-    /// must not disclose the caller's DID.
-    #[test]
-    fn fetch_public_stays_anonymous_even_with_keypair() {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "0000",
-            },
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "POST /zOwner/myrepo/git-upload-pack",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "",
-            },
-        ]);
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0009done\n".to_vec());
-        handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin)
-            .expect("public fetch should succeed");
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2, "public fetch must not retry");
-        assert!(
-            !requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "the advertisement GET must be anonymous for a public fetch"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "the upload-pack POST must be anonymous for a public fetch"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Private fetch: the anonymous advertisement is denied (404); with an identity
-    /// present the client retries the GET signed and — because Phase 1 needed
-    /// signing — also signs the Phase-2 upload-pack POST. The FIRST request is still
-    /// anonymous: the DID is not disclosed until the node demands authentication.
-    #[test]
-    fn fetch_private_retries_signed_on_404_and_signs_the_pack_post() {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-                status: "404 Not Found",
-                body: r#"{"message":"repository is not registered on this node"}"#,
-            },
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "0000",
-            },
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "POST /zOwner/myrepo/git-upload-pack",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "",
-            },
-        ]);
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0009done\n".to_vec());
-        handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin)
-            .expect("signed retry should succeed");
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            requests.len(),
-            3,
-            "expected anon GET, signed GET retry, signed POST"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "the first advertisement GET must be anonymous"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "the retry advertisement GET must be signed"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            requests[2].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "the upload-pack POST must be signed once the fetch needed auth"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Private fetch with no identity: the anonymous advertisement 404s and there is
-    /// no keypair to retry with, so the client surfaces the error after exactly one
-    /// request — no retry, no hang.
-    #[test]
-    fn fetch_without_keypair_does_not_retry_on_404() {
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![TestResponse {
-            request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-            status: "404 Not Found",
-            body: r#"{"message":"not found"}"#,
-        }]);
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
-        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.to_string().contains("returned 404 Not Found"));
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 1, "no keypair means no signed retry");
-        assert!(!requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"));
-    }
-
-    /// Private fetch where the SIGNED retry is also denied (caller is not a reader):
-    /// the client retries exactly once, then surfaces the 404 rather than looping.
-    /// Bounds the escalation to a single signed attempt.
-    #[test]
-    fn fetch_signed_retry_still_denied_surfaces_error_once() {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-                status: "404 Not Found",
-                body: r#"{"message":"not found"}"#,
-            },
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-                status: "404 Not Found",
-                body: r#"{"message":"not found"}"#,
-            },
-        ]);
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
-        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.to_string().contains("returned 404 Not Found"));
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2, "exactly one signed retry, then surface");
-        assert!(!requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"));
-        assert!(requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"));
-    }
-
-    /// Push (git-receive-pack) is unchanged: it signs from the FIRST request — you
-    /// cannot push anonymously — so there is no anonymous-first probe for push.
-    #[test]
-    fn push_advertisement_is_signed_from_the_first_request() {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "0000",
-            },
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "POST /zOwner/myrepo/git-receive-pack",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "",
-            },
-        ]);
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0000".to_vec());
-        handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-receive-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin)
-            .expect("push should succeed");
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2);
-        assert!(
-            requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "push advertisement must be signed from the first request"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "push POST must be signed"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Cross-crate seam: the signature the CLIENT actually emits (via the real
-    /// request builders) verifies under the SAME `gitlawb_core::http_sig`
-    /// primitives the node's `require_signature` uses, over the `@path` the client
-    /// genuinely transmits (derived from the built reqwest request, exactly as the
-    /// node derives it from `uri.path_and_query()`). A tampered `@path` must fail:
-    /// this is the byte-match the whole A1 client fix depends on, now executed end
-    /// to end (sign here, verify with the node's verifier), not reasoned.
-    #[test]
-    fn client_signature_verifies_under_node_verification_for_both_services() {
-        use gitlawb_core::http_sig::{build_signing_string, compute_content_digest, HttpSignature};
-        use gitlawb_core::identity::verify;
-        use std::collections::HashMap;
-
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
-        let body = b"0009done\n".to_vec();
-
-        // Re-implements the node's require_signature verification (auth/mod.rs):
-        // parse headers, recompute content-digest from the body, rebuild the signing
-        // string over @method/@path/content-digest, Ed25519-verify. Ok iff the node
-        // would accept it.
-        let node_verifies = |method: &str,
-                             path_and_query: &str,
-                             body: &[u8],
-                             sig_input: &str,
-                             sig_header: &str,
-                             content_digest: &str|
-         -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-            let sig = HttpSignature::parse(sig_input, sig_header)?;
-            sig.check_created()?;
-            assert!(
-                sig.missing_components().is_empty(),
-                "signature must cover all required components"
-            );
-            assert_eq!(sig.alg, "ed25519");
-            assert_eq!(
-                content_digest,
-                compute_content_digest(body),
-                "content-digest must match the body"
-            );
-            let vk = sig.key_id.to_verifying_key()?;
-            let mut values = HashMap::new();
-            values.insert("@method".to_string(), method.to_uppercase());
-            values.insert("@path".to_string(), path_and_query.to_string());
-            values.insert("content-digest".to_string(), content_digest.to_string());
-            let sig_params_value = sig_input.strip_prefix("sig1=").unwrap_or(sig_input);
-            let components: Vec<&str> = sig.components.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
-            let signing_string = build_signing_string(&components, sig_params_value, &values)?;
-            let sig_array: [u8; 64] = sig.signature_bytes.as_slice().try_into()?;
-            verify(&vk, signing_string.as_bytes(), &sig_array)?;
-            Ok(())
-        };
-        // @path exactly as the node reconstructs it from the request it receives.
-        let path_and_query = |req: &reqwest::blocking::Request| match req.url().query() {
-            Some(q) => format!("{}?{}", req.url().path(), q),
-            None => req.url().path().to_string(),
-        };
-        let header = |req: &reqwest::blocking::Request, name: &str| {
-            req.headers()
-                .get(name)
-                .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("missing {name}"))
-                .to_str()
-                .unwrap()
-                .to_string()
-        };
-
-        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
-            // Phase-1 advertisement GET (empty body).
-            let refs_url = format!("http://node.example/zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service={service}");
-            let req = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, Some(&kp))
-                .build()
-                .unwrap();
-            node_verifies(
-                "GET",
-                &path_and_query(&req),
-                b"",
-                &header(&req, "signature-input"),
-                &header(&req, "signature"),
-                &header(&req, "content-digest"),
-            )
-            .expect("client GET signature must verify under the node's verifier");
-
-            // Phase-2 pack POST (real body).
-            let post_url = format!("http://node.example/zOwner/myrepo/{service}");
-            let req = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &body, Some(&kp))
-                .body(body.clone())
-                .build()
-                .unwrap();
-            let pq = path_and_query(&req);
-            node_verifies(
-                "POST",
-                &pq,
-                &body,
-                &header(&req, "signature-input"),
-                &header(&req, "signature"),
-                &header(&req, "content-digest"),
-            )
-            .expect("client POST signature must verify under the node's verifier");
-
-            // Negative: a tampered @path (the A1 attack surface) must NOT verify.
-            let tampered = pq.replace(service, "git-evil");
-            assert!(
-                node_verifies(
-                    "POST",
-                    &tampered,
-                    &body,
-                    &header(&req, "signature-input"),
-                    &header(&req, "signature"),
-                    &header(&req, "content-digest"),
-                )
-                .is_err(),
-                "a tampered @path must fail verification"
-            );
-        }
-    }
 
     #[test]
     fn parse_standard_url() {
@@ -1149,176 +520,6 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn http_error_message_sanitizes_response_body_controls() {
-        let message = http_error_message(
-            "GET",
-            "/info/refs",
-            reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
-            "\u{1b}[2Jrepository\r\nis\tblocked\u{7}",
-            None,
-        );
-
-        assert!(message.contains("repository is blocked"));
-        assert!(!message.contains('\u{1b}'));
-        assert!(!message.contains('\u{7}'));
-        assert!(!message.contains('\r'));
-        assert!(!message.contains('\n'));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn http_error_message_strips_bidi_format_controls() {
-        // Each Cf bidi class must be stripped (INV-6, #183), not just U+202E:
-        // override (RLO), embedding + pop (LRE/PDF), isolate (LRI/PDI), and marks
-        // (LRM/ALM). Asserted per code point so a partial predicate fails loudly.
-        // The visible words must survive and JOIN with no phantom space at the
-        // strip points: a bidi char is dropped like a control byte, but unlike a
-        // newline/tab it is not whitespace, so it must not set pending_space. The
-        // leading bidi char (index 0) also exercises the empty-excerpt path.
-        let body = "\u{202e}err\u{202a}\u{202c}\u{2066}\u{2069}\u{200e}\u{061c}ok";
-        let message = http_error_message(
-            "GET",
-            "/info/refs",
-            reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
-            body,
-            None,
-        );
-        for c in [
-            '\u{202e}', '\u{202a}', '\u{202c}', '\u{2066}', '\u{2069}', '\u{200e}', '\u{061c}',
-        ] {
-            assert!(
-                !message.contains(c),
-                "bidi U+{:04X} leaked: {message:?}",
-                c as u32
-            );
-        }
-        assert!(
-            message.contains("errok"),
-            "words should join with no phantom space: {message:?}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn http_error_message_preserves_legitimate_and_rtl_text() {
-        // Must not over-strip: plain text, a genuine RTL SCRIPT letter (Arabic
-        // U+0627, category Lo), and ZWJ (U+200D, a legitimate Cf char) survive.
-        let message = http_error_message(
-            "GET",
-            "/info/refs",
-            reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
-            "ok \u{0627}\u{200D}b",
-            None,
-        );
-        assert!(
-            message.ends_with("ok \u{0627}\u{200D}b"),
-            "legitimate text was altered: {message:?}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn http_error_message_truncates_long_response_body() {
-        let body = "x".repeat(MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS + 100);
-        let message = http_error_message(
-            "POST",
-            "/git-receive-pack",
-            reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
-            &body,
-            None,
-        );
-        let prefix = "POST /git-receive-pack returned 403 Forbidden: ";
-
-        assert_eq!(message.len(), prefix.len() + MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS);
-        assert!(message.starts_with(prefix));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn connect_get_error_includes_response_body() {
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![TestResponse {
-            request_line: "GET /z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1",
-            status: "404 Not Found",
-            body: r#"{"message":"repository is not registered on this node"}"#,
-        }]);
-
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/z6Mk/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
-        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
-        let message = err.to_string();
-
-        assert!(message.contains("GET /info/refs returned 404 Not Found"));
-        assert!(message.contains("repository is not registered on this node"));
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 1);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn connect_error_strips_bidi_from_response_body() {
-        // Transport-path proof: a bidi override in the node's real HTTP error body
-        // must not reach the surfaced error text. Drives the full handle_connect
-        // error path, not just the safe_error_body_excerpt unit boundary (INV-6).
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![TestResponse {
-            request_line: "GET /z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1",
-            status: "404 Not Found",
-            body: "not\u{202e}found",
-        }]);
-
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/z6Mk/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
-        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
-        let message = err.to_string();
-
-        assert!(
-            !message.contains('\u{202e}'),
-            "bidi override reached the terminal: {message:?}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            message.contains("notfound"),
-            "body should survive with the bidi char stripped: {message:?}"
-        );
-        let _ = server.join();
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn connect_post_error_includes_response_body() {
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack HTTP/1.1",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "",
-            },
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "POST /z6Mk/myrepo/git-receive-pack HTTP/1.1",
-                status: "403 Forbidden",
-                body: r#"{"error":"forbidden","message":"push rejected: only the repo owner may push"}"#,
-            },
-        ]);
-
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/z6Mk/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0000".to_vec());
-        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-receive-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
-        let message = err.to_string();
-
-        assert!(message.contains("POST /git-receive-pack returned 403 Forbidden"));
-        assert!(message.contains("push rejected: only the repo owner may push"));
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2);
-        assert!(requests[1].contains("\r\n\r\n0000"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn url_path_preserves_query_for_signed_advertisement() {
-        // The Phase-1 advertisement GET is signed over url_path(refs_url), and the
-        // node verifies the signature over its path_and_query, so the ?service=
-        // query MUST survive verbatim or the signatures will not byte-match.
-        assert_eq!(
-            url_path("http://127.0.0.1:7545/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"),
-            "/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            url_path("http://127.0.0.1:7545/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack"),
-            "/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack"
-        );
-    }
-
     fn args(items: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
         items.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
     }

crates/gitlawb-attest/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
 description = "External Attestation v1: pluggable provenance attachments for gitlawb ref-update certs"
-version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
-rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 
 [dependencies]

crates/gitlawb-attest/src/attestation.rs

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ impl Attestation {
                 self.type_
             )));
         }
-        Ok(P::deserialize(&self.payload)?)
+        Ok(serde_json::from_value(self.payload.clone())?)
     }
 }
 

crates/gitlawb-core/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
 description = "Core cryptographic primitives for the gitlawb network: DIDs, CIDs, UCAN, HTTP Signatures, ref-update certificates"
-version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
-rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 
 [dependencies]
@@ -24,9 +23,6 @@ chrono = { workspace = true }
 uuid = { workspace = true }
 zeroize = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
 pkcs8 = { version = "0.10", features = ["pem", "std"] }
-curve25519-dalek = "4"
-crypto_box = { version = "0.9", features = ["std", "chacha20"] }
-chacha20poly1305 = "0.10"
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 tokio = { workspace = true }

crates/gitlawb-core/src/encrypt.rs

@@ -1,296 +0,0 @@
-//! Envelope encryption for withheld blobs (Option B). A random content key
-//! encrypts the blob (XChaCha20-Poly1305); the content key is wrapped to each
-//! recipient via an X25519 box keyed from their Ed25519 `did:key`. The node
-//! seals with public keys only; readers open with their own private key.
-
-use crate::identity::Keypair;
-use anyhow::{Context, Result};
-use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
-use zeroize::Zeroizing;
-
-/// X25519 public key (Montgomery u) for an Ed25519 verifying key.
-fn x25519_public(vk: &VerifyingKey) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
-    use curve25519_dalek::edwards::CompressedEdwardsY;
-    let edwards = CompressedEdwardsY::from_slice(vk.as_bytes())
-        .ok()
-        .and_then(|c| c.decompress())
-        .context("verifying key is not a valid edwards point")?;
-    Ok(edwards.to_montgomery().to_bytes())
-}
-
-/// X25519 secret scalar for an Ed25519 seed (SHA-512 of seed, lower 32, clamped).
-/// Returns the scalar wrapped in `Zeroizing`, and scrubs the intermediate
-/// SHA-512 digest, so no copy of this secret material lingers in freed memory.
-fn x25519_secret_from_seed(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> {
-    use sha2::{Digest, Sha512};
-    use zeroize::Zeroize;
-    let mut h = Sha512::digest(seed);
-    let mut s = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
-    s.copy_from_slice(&h[..32]);
-    s[0] &= 248;
-    s[31] &= 127;
-    s[31] |= 64;
-    h.as_mut_slice().zeroize();
-    s
-}
-
-use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as B64, Engine};
-use chacha20poly1305::{
-    aead::{Aead, KeyInit},
-    XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
-};
-use crypto_box::{
-    aead::{AeadCore, OsRng},
-    ChaChaBox, PublicKey as XPublic, SecretKey as XSecret,
-};
-use rand::RngCore;
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-
-const MAGIC: &[u8] = b"GLENC";
-const VERSION: u8 = 2;
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-struct Recipient {
-    eph: String,   // base64 ephemeral x25519 pubkey (32B)
-    nonce: String, // base64 box nonce (24B)
-    wrap: String,  // base64 wrapped content key
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-struct Header {
-    alg: String,
-    nonce: String, // base64 body nonce (24B)
-    recipients: Vec<Recipient>,
-}
-
-/// Encrypt `plaintext` so any of `recipients` (Ed25519 keys) can decrypt.
-pub fn seal_blob(plaintext: &[u8], recipients: &[VerifyingKey]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    if recipients.is_empty() {
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("seal_blob: no recipients"));
-    }
-    let mut content_key = [0u8; 32];
-    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut content_key);
-    let body_cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&content_key)
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("content key: {e}"))?;
-    let mut body_nonce = [0u8; 24];
-    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut body_nonce);
-    let body = body_cipher
-        .encrypt(XNonce::from_slice(&body_nonce), plaintext)
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("body encrypt: {e}"))?;
-
-    let mut wrapped = Vec::with_capacity(recipients.len());
-    for vk in recipients {
-        let recip_x = XPublic::from(x25519_public(vk)?);
-        let eph = XSecret::generate(&mut OsRng);
-        let abox = ChaChaBox::new(&recip_x, &eph);
-        let nonce = ChaChaBox::generate_nonce(&mut OsRng);
-        let ct = abox
-            .encrypt(&nonce, &content_key[..])
-            .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("wrap: {e}"))?;
-        wrapped.push(Recipient {
-            eph: B64.encode(eph.public_key().as_bytes()),
-            nonce: B64.encode(nonce),
-            wrap: B64.encode(ct),
-        });
-    }
-
-    let header = Header {
-        alg: "xchacha20poly1305".into(),
-        nonce: B64.encode(body_nonce),
-        recipients: wrapped,
-    };
-    let header_json = serde_json::to_vec(&header).context("encode header")?;
-
-    let mut out = Vec::new();
-    out.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
-    out.push(VERSION);
-    out.extend_from_slice(&(header_json.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
-    out.extend_from_slice(&header_json);
-    out.extend_from_slice(&body);
-    Ok(out)
-}
-
-/// Decrypt an envelope with `keypair`. Errors if not a recipient or on auth fail.
-pub fn open_blob(envelope: &[u8], keypair: &Keypair) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let mut p = 0;
-    if envelope.len() < MAGIC.len() + 1 + 4 || &envelope[..MAGIC.len()] != MAGIC {
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("bad envelope magic"));
-    }
-    p += MAGIC.len();
-    if envelope[p] != VERSION {
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("unsupported envelope version"));
-    }
-    p += 1;
-    let hlen = u32::from_le_bytes(envelope[p..p + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
-    p += 4;
-    let header: Header =
-        serde_json::from_slice(envelope.get(p..p + hlen).context("truncated header")?)
-            .context("decode header")?;
-    let body = &envelope[p + hlen..];
-
-    let my_x = XSecret::from(*x25519_secret_from_seed(&keypair.to_seed()));
-
-    // Identities are blinded: no entry says which recipient it belongs to, so
-    // try each one. The ChaChaBox AEAD tag authenticates, so exactly the
-    // reader's own entry unwraps; every other entry fails cleanly.
-    let mut content_key: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
-    for entry in &header.recipients {
-        let eph = match B64
-            .decode(&entry.eph)
-            .ok()
-            .and_then(|b| <[u8; 32]>::try_from(b.as_slice()).ok())
-        {
-            Some(b) => XPublic::from(b),
-            None => continue,
-        };
-        // from_slice panics on a wrong length, and the envelope is attacker
-        // controlled, so validate the 24-byte box nonce before using it.
-        let nonce = match B64
-            .decode(&entry.nonce)
-            .ok()
-            .and_then(|n| <[u8; 24]>::try_from(n.as_slice()).ok())
-        {
-            Some(n) => n,
-            None => continue,
-        };
-        let wrap = match B64.decode(&entry.wrap) {
-            Ok(w) => w,
-            Err(_) => continue,
-        };
-        let abox = ChaChaBox::new(&eph, &my_x);
-        if let Ok(ck) = abox.decrypt(
-            crypto_box::aead::generic_array::GenericArray::from_slice(&nonce),
-            wrap.as_slice(),
-        ) {
-            content_key = Some(ck);
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    let content_key = content_key.context("not a recipient of this envelope")?;
-
-    let body_cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&content_key)
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("content key: {e}"))?;
-    let body_nonce = B64
-        .decode(&header.nonce)
-        .ok()
-        .and_then(|n| <[u8; 24]>::try_from(n.as_slice()).ok())
-        .context("invalid body nonce")?;
-    body_cipher
-        .decrypt(XNonce::from_slice(&body_nonce), body)
-        .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("body decrypt failed"))
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use crate::identity::Keypair;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ed25519_to_x25519_keypair_agrees() {
-        // The X25519 public derived from the Ed25519 public must equal the
-        // X25519 public of the X25519 secret derived from the same seed.
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let seed = kp.to_seed();
-        let xpub_from_public = x25519_public(&kp.verifying_key()).unwrap();
-        let xsec = x25519_secret_from_seed(&seed);
-        let xpub_from_secret = crypto_box::SecretKey::from(*xsec).public_key().to_bytes();
-        assert_eq!(xpub_from_public, xpub_from_secret);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn seal_open_round_trip_for_recipients() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let reader_a = Keypair::generate();
-        let reader_b = Keypair::generate();
-        let msg = b"private blob contents";
-
-        let env = seal_blob(msg, &[owner.verifying_key(), reader_a.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(open_blob(&env, &owner).unwrap(), msg);
-        assert_eq!(open_blob(&env, &reader_a).unwrap(), msg);
-        assert!(
-            open_blob(&env, &reader_b).is_err(),
-            "non-recipient must fail"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tampered_envelope_fails() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let mut env = seal_blob(b"hi", &[owner.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
-        let last = env.len() - 1;
-        env[last] ^= 0x01;
-        assert!(open_blob(&env, &owner).is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn v2_header_contains_no_recipient_pubkey() {
-        // The blinded envelope header must not carry any recipient's public key.
-        let reader = Keypair::generate();
-        let env = seal_blob(b"private blob contents", &[reader.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
-
-        // Slice out the header bytes using the envelope framing:
-        // MAGIC | version(1B) | header_len(4B LE) | header_json | body
-        let mut p = MAGIC.len() + 1; // skip MAGIC + version byte
-        let hlen = u32::from_le_bytes(env[p..p + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
-        p += 4;
-        let header = &env[p..p + hlen];
-        let header_str = String::from_utf8_lossy(header);
-
-        let pubkey_b64 = B64.encode(reader.verifying_key().as_bytes());
-        assert!(
-            !header_str.contains(&pubkey_b64),
-            "recipient public key must not appear in the blinded header"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn v1_envelope_is_rejected() {
-        let reader = Keypair::generate();
-        let mut env = seal_blob(b"hi", &[reader.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
-        // Flip the version byte (immediately after MAGIC) from 2 to 1.
-        env[MAGIC.len()] = 1;
-        let err = open_blob(&env, &reader).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string().contains("unsupported envelope version"),
-            "expected version-rejection error, got: {err}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn malformed_nonce_returns_err_not_panic() {
-        // from_slice panics on wrong-length input; a crafted envelope on the
-        // public recovery path must surface an error, never panic.
-        let reader = Keypair::generate();
-        let env = seal_blob(b"private blob contents", &[reader.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
-
-        // Split the envelope framing into header JSON and body.
-        let mut p = MAGIC.len() + 1;
-        let hlen = u32::from_le_bytes(env[p..p + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
-        p += 4;
-        let header_bytes = &env[p..p + hlen];
-        let body = &env[p + hlen..];
-
-        let reframe = |header: &serde_json::Value| -> Vec<u8> {
-            let hj = serde_json::to_vec(header).unwrap();
-            let mut out = Vec::new();
-            out.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
-            out.push(VERSION);
-            out.extend_from_slice(&(hj.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
-            out.extend_from_slice(&hj);
-            out.extend_from_slice(body);
-            out
-        };
-        let bad_nonce = serde_json::Value::String(B64.encode([0u8; 12]));
-
-        // Corrupted per-recipient nonce: entry is skipped, no match.
-        let mut header: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(header_bytes).unwrap();
-        header["recipients"][0]["nonce"] = bad_nonce.clone();
-        assert!(open_blob(&reframe(&header), &reader).is_err());
-
-        // Corrupted body nonce: unwrap succeeds, body nonce is rejected.
-        let mut header: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(header_bytes).unwrap();
-        header["nonce"] = bad_nonce;
-        assert!(open_blob(&reframe(&header), &reader).is_err());
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-core/src/http_sig.rs

@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ impl HttpSignature {
     pub fn missing_components(&self) -> Vec<&str> {
         COVERED_COMPONENTS
             .iter()
-            .filter(|c| !self.components.iter().any(|s| s.as_str() == **c))
+            .filter(|c| !self.components.contains(&c.to_string()))
             .copied()
             .collect()
     }

crates/gitlawb-core/src/identity.rs

@@ -52,9 +52,7 @@ impl Keypair {
         URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(sig.to_bytes())
     }
 
-    /// The raw 32-byte Ed25519 seed, wrapped in `Zeroizing` so the copy is
-    /// scrubbed on drop. This is the only seed accessor; it is used to derive
-    /// the X25519 secret for envelope decryption (see `crate::encrypt`).
+    /// Export the signing key as raw 32-byte seed (wrapped in Zeroizing).
     pub fn to_seed(&self) -> Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> {
         Zeroizing::new(self.signing_key.to_bytes())
     }
@@ -168,20 +166,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(kp.verifying_key(), kp2.verifying_key());
     }
 
-    // `to_seed()` is the only seed accessor on `Keypair` (the raw, unzeroized
-    // `seed_bytes()` was removed in #41). Pin its return type so a bare-array
-    // accessor can't slip back in, and confirm it is deterministic. The
-    // from_seed -> verifying_key round-trip is already covered by
-    // `from_seed_round_trip`.
-    #[test]
-    fn to_seed_returns_zeroizing_and_is_deterministic() {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        // The type annotation is the regression guard: the seed must be handed
-        // out wrapped in `Zeroizing`, never as a bare `[u8; 32]`.
-        let seed: Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> = kp.to_seed();
-        assert_eq!(*kp.to_seed(), *seed); // stable across calls
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn sign_b64_decodes_to_valid_signature() {
         use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};

crates/gitlawb-core/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
 pub mod cert;
 pub mod cid;
 pub mod did;
-pub mod encrypt;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod http_sig;
 pub mod identity;
-pub mod sanitize;
 pub mod ucan;
 
 pub use error::Error;

crates/gitlawb-core/src/sanitize.rs

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-//! Text sanitization predicates shared across the workspace.
-//!
-//! Untrusted peer/remote bytes that reach an operator's terminal (node error
-//! bodies, node-advertised strings) must be stripped of BOTH `Cc` control bytes
-//! (`char::is_control()`) AND `Cf` bidi/format controls before display: a
-//! right-to-left override or directional isolate can visually reorder the line
-//! and spoof the text (Trojan Source, CWE-451). This is INV-6.
-//!
-//! `is_bidi_format` is the single workspace definition of the second half of
-//! that obligation. It was split out of `gl`'s local copy so the two terminal
-//! sanitizers that shipped with only the `Cc` half (#183) — and any future
-//! sanitizer — reuse one audited predicate instead of re-deriving the set.
-
-/// True for the Unicode bidirectional/directional-isolate format characters
-/// (the reordering subset of category `Cf`) that can visually reorder a terminal
-/// line. These are NOT matched by [`char::is_control()`], which covers `Cc` only.
-///
-/// This is deliberately the reordering subset, not the whole `Cf` category:
-/// legitimate `Cf` characters such as ZWJ (`U+200D`, emoji sequences) and the
-/// soft hyphen (`U+00AD`) are NOT matched, so honest international text passes
-/// through unchanged. Widening this set is a behavior change for every consumer.
-///
-/// Pair it with `!c.is_control()` in a terminal-bound sanitizer (INV-6); see the
-/// wrappers in `gl`, `git-remote-gitlawb`, and `icaptcha-client`.
-pub fn is_bidi_format(c: char) -> bool {
-    matches!(c,
-        '\u{200E}' | '\u{200F}' | '\u{061C}'   // LRM, RLM, ALM
-        | '\u{202A}'..='\u{202E}'              // LRE, RLE, PDF, LRO, RLO
-        | '\u{2066}'..='\u{2069}'              // LRI, RLI, FSI, PDI
-    )
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn strips_every_reordering_code_point() {
-        // Asserted individually so a partial predicate (e.g. one that covers the
-        // marks but not the isolates) fails loudly rather than passing.
-        for c in [
-            '\u{200E}', '\u{200F}', '\u{061C}', // LRM, RLM, ALM
-            '\u{202A}', '\u{202B}', '\u{202C}', '\u{202D}',
-            '\u{202E}', // LRE, RLE, PDF, LRO, RLO
-            '\u{2066}', '\u{2067}', '\u{2068}', '\u{2069}', // LRI, RLI, FSI, PDI
-        ] {
-            assert!(
-                is_bidi_format(c),
-                "U+{:04X} must be a bidi-format char",
-                c as u32
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn passes_legitimate_and_control_chars() {
-        // Must NOT over-strip: plain text, a genuine RTL SCRIPT letter (Lo, not a
-        // format char), ZWJ (legitimate Cf), and soft hyphen (legitimate Cf) are
-        // not bidi-format. ESC is a Cc control char — owned by is_control(), not
-        // this predicate, which is bidi-only.
-        for c in ['a', '\u{0627}', '\u{200D}', '\u{00AD}', '\u{1b}'] {
-            assert!(
-                !is_bidi_format(c),
-                "U+{:04X} must NOT be a bidi-format char",
-                c as u32
-            );
-        }
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-core/src/ucan.rs

@@ -187,17 +187,11 @@ impl Ucan {
     }
 
     /// Check if this UCAN grants a specific capability on a resource.
-    ///
-    /// Mirrors `Capability::is_attenuated_by`'s wildcard semantics: a stored
-    /// capability of `with: "*"` or `can: "*"` / `"repo/admin"` covers any
-    /// requested resource/action, since a valid delegation chain can produce
-    /// exactly that capability (see `is_attenuated_by`).
     pub fn can(&self, resource: &str, action: &str) -> bool {
-        self.payload.att.iter().any(|cap| {
-            let resource_ok = cap.with == resource || cap.with == "*";
-            let action_ok = cap.can == action || cap.can == "*" || cap.can == caps::REPO_ADMIN;
-            resource_ok && action_ok
-        })
+        self.payload
+            .att
+            .iter()
+            .any(|cap| cap.with == resource && cap.can == action)
     }
 
     /// Encode to a compact JSON string (the wire format).
@@ -318,63 +312,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::PR_MERGE));
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn can_honors_resource_wildcard() {
-        let issuer = Keypair::generate();
-        let audience = Keypair::generate().did();
-
-        let ucan = Ucan::issue(
-            &issuer,
-            audience,
-            vec![Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH)],
-            None,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
-        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/other/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
-        assert!(!ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::PR_MERGE));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn can_honors_repo_admin_action_wildcard() {
-        let issuer = Keypair::generate();
-        let audience = Keypair::generate().did();
-
-        let ucan = Ucan::issue(
-            &issuer,
-            audience,
-            vec![Capability::new(
-                "gitlawb://repos/test/repo",
-                caps::REPO_ADMIN,
-            )],
-            None,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
-        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::PR_MERGE));
-        assert!(!ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/other/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn can_honors_action_wildcard() {
-        let issuer = Keypair::generate();
-        let audience = Keypair::generate().did();
-
-        let ucan = Ucan::issue(
-            &issuer,
-            audience,
-            vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", "*")],
-            None,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
-        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::PR_MERGE));
-        assert!(!ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/other/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn bootstrap_ucan() {
         let issuer = Keypair::generate();

crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
 description = "The gitlawb node daemon — git hosting over HTTP with DID auth"
-version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
-rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 
 [[bin]]
@@ -12,8 +11,6 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
 
 [dependencies]
 gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
-ed25519-dalek = { workspace = true }
-base64 = { workspace = true }
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }
@@ -29,10 +26,9 @@ async-graphql-axum = "7"
 tokio-stream = { version = "0.1", features = ["sync"] }
 tower = "0.5"
 tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["cors", "trace", "request-id", "limit"] }
-sqlx = { version = "0.8", features = ["postgres", "runtime-tokio-rustls", "chrono", "uuid", "macros", "migrate"] }
+sqlx = { version = "0.8", features = ["postgres", "runtime-tokio-rustls", "chrono", "uuid"] }
 clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive", "env"] }
 bytes = "1"
-libc = "0.2"
 cid = { workspace = true }
 hex = { workspace = true }
 sha2 = { workspace = true }
@@ -40,9 +36,6 @@ hmac = { workspace = true }
 http-body-util = "0.1"
 tokio-util = { version = "0.7", features = ["io"] }
 dirs-next = "2"
-# NFC-normalize visibility globs/paths at the matcher seam so a deny rule
-# withholds a canonically-equivalent path regardless of NFC/NFD form (#101).
-unicode-normalization = "0.1"
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
 libp2p-core = "0.43"
 libp2p-gossipsub = "0.49.4"

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/agents.rs

@@ -2,10 +2,9 @@
 
 use axum::extract::{Path, Query, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
-use axum::{Extension, Json};
+use axum::Json;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 
-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
@@ -21,14 +20,6 @@ fn agent_key_segment(did: &str) -> &str {
     did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(did)
 }
 
-/// Whether `caller` (the verified `AuthenticatedDid`) is the same identity as
-/// `target` (the DID being acted on), tolerant of full `did:key:...` vs short
-/// key-only forms on either side. Used to gate self-deregistration so a DID
-/// can only retire itself.
-fn caller_matches_did(caller: &str, target: &str) -> bool {
-    agent_key_segment(caller) == agent_key_segment(target)
-}
-
 async fn resolve_agent_did(state: &AppState, did: &str) -> Result<String> {
     let normalized_did = normalize_agent_did(did);
     if state.db.get_agent(&normalized_did).await?.is_some() {
@@ -80,8 +71,6 @@ pub struct AgentResponse {
     pub capabilities: Vec<String>,
     pub registered_at: String,
     pub last_seen: Option<String>,
-    /// Lifecycle status: `active` or `revoked`.
-    pub status: String,
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/agents
@@ -98,7 +87,6 @@ pub async fn list_agents(
             capabilities: a.capabilities,
             registered_at: a.registered_at,
             last_seen: a.last_seen,
-            status: a.status,
         })
         .collect();
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "agents": list })))
@@ -123,7 +111,6 @@ pub async fn show_agent(
             capabilities: agent.capabilities,
             registered_at: agent.registered_at,
             last_seen: agent.last_seen,
-            status: agent.status,
         }),
     ))
 }
@@ -146,97 +133,9 @@ pub async fn get_trust(
     }))
 }
 
-/// DELETE /api/v1/agents/{did}
-///
-/// Self-deregistration: the holder of a DID's key marks their own agent
-/// `revoked`, removing it from discovery (issue #29). Authenticated by the
-/// rfc9421 signature middleware; a caller may only retire its own DID.
-pub async fn deregister_agent(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
-    Path(did): Path<String>,
-) -> Result<StatusCode> {
-    // Authorize on the verified identity, and act on it too. The path DID is
-    // only an intent check (it must name the caller); the row we revoke is the
-    // authenticated DID itself, never a value derived from the untrusted path.
-    // Revoking `resolve_agent_did(did)` instead would let the fuzzy prefix
-    // resolver act on a different identity than the one just authorized.
-    if !caller_matches_did(&auth.0, &did) {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "an agent can only deregister itself".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    if state.db.revoke_agent(&auth.0).await? {
-        Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
-    } else {
-        Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("agent {} not found", auth.0)))
-    }
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-    use super::{agent_key_segment, caller_matches_did, normalize_agent_did, AgentResponse};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn caller_matches_own_did_full_form() {
-        assert!(caller_matches_did(
-            "did:key:z6MkExample",
-            "did:key:z6MkExample"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn caller_matches_own_did_short_form() {
-        // Authenticated full DID vs short path form, and vice versa.
-        assert!(caller_matches_did("did:key:z6MkExample", "z6MkExample"));
-        assert!(caller_matches_did("z6MkExample", "did:key:z6MkExample"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn caller_cannot_revoke_a_different_did() {
-        // The core authorization property for issue #29.
-        assert!(!caller_matches_did(
-            "did:key:z6MkAttacker",
-            "did:key:z6MkVictim"
-        ));
-        assert!(!caller_matches_did("did:key:z6MkAttacker", "z6MkVictim"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn agent_response_surfaces_status() {
-        // A revoked DID's response must carry its status so callers can see it
-        // is retired (issue #29).
-        let resp = AgentResponse {
-            did: "did:key:orphan".to_string(),
-            trust_score: 0.1,
-            capabilities: vec!["reputation:score".to_string()],
-            registered_at: "2026-06-19T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
-            last_seen: None,
-            status: "revoked".to_string(),
-        };
-
-        let json = serde_json::to_value(&resp).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(json["status"], "revoked");
-        assert!(json.get("replaced_by").is_none());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn agent_response_active_status() {
-        let resp = AgentResponse {
-            did: "did:key:active".to_string(),
-            trust_score: 0.5,
-            capabilities: vec![],
-            registered_at: "2026-06-19T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
-            last_seen: None,
-            status: "active".to_string(),
-        };
-
-        let json = serde_json::to_value(&resp).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(json["status"], "active");
-    }
+    use super::{agent_key_segment, normalize_agent_did};
 
     #[test]
     fn normalize_agent_did_preserves_full_did() {

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/bounties.rs

@@ -79,9 +79,12 @@ pub async fn create_bounty(
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest("amount must be positive".into()));
     }
 
-    // Read-gate: anyone who can read the repo may fund a bounty on it (this closes
-    // the private-repo bounty leak); ownership is not required.
-    crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    // Verify repo exists
+    let _ = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
     let bounty = BountyRecord {
@@ -110,28 +113,19 @@ pub async fn create_bounty(
     Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(bounty)))
 }
 
-const MAX_BOUNTY_LIMIT: i64 = 200;
-
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/bounties
 pub async fn list_repo_bounties(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Query(q): Query<ListBountiesQuery>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
-
-    let limit = q.limit.unwrap_or(50).clamp(1, MAX_BOUNTY_LIMIT);
     let bounties = state
         .db
         .list_bounties(
             Some(&owner),
             Some(&repo),
             q.status.as_deref(),
-            limit,
-            None,
-            None,
+            q.limit.unwrap_or(50),
         )
         .await?;
 
@@ -142,92 +136,25 @@ pub async fn list_repo_bounties(
 pub async fn list_all_bounties(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Query(q): Query<ListBountiesQuery>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let raw_limit = q.limit.unwrap_or(50);
-    let limit = raw_limit.clamp(1, MAX_BOUNTY_LIMIT);
+    let bounties = state
+        .db
+        .list_bounties(None, None, q.status.as_deref(), q.limit.unwrap_or(50))
+        .await?;
 
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let mut memo = std::collections::HashMap::new();
-    let mut allowed: Vec<BountyRecord> = Vec::new();
-    let page_size = (limit * 5).clamp(1, 200);
-    let max_scanned = 10_000i64;
-    let mut total_scanned: i64 = 0;
-    let mut cursor: Option<(String, String)> = None;
-
-    while (allowed.len() as i64) < limit {
-        let after = cursor.as_ref().map(|(ts, id)| (ts.as_str(), id.as_str()));
-        let bounties = state
-            .db
-            .list_bounties(
-                None,
-                None,
-                q.status.as_deref(),
-                page_size,
-                after.map(|(ts, _)| ts),
-                after.map(|(_, id)| id),
-            )
-            .await?;
-        if bounties.is_empty() {
-            break;
-        }
-
-        total_scanned += bounties.len() as i64;
-        if total_scanned > max_scanned {
-            return Err(AppError::Incomplete(
-                "too many rows scanned; refine your filters".into(),
-            ));
-        }
-
-        let last = bounties.last().unwrap();
-        for b in &bounties {
-            if (allowed.len() as i64) >= limit {
-                break;
-            }
-            let key = format!("{}/{}", b.repo_owner, b.repo_name);
-            let admitted = if let Some(&result) = memo.get(&key) {
-                result
-            } else {
-                let result = crate::api::authorize_repo_read(
-                    &state,
-                    &b.repo_owner,
-                    &b.repo_name,
-                    caller,
-                    "/",
-                )
-                .await
-                .is_ok();
-                memo.insert(key, result);
-                result
-            };
-            if admitted {
-                allowed.push(b.clone());
-            }
-        }
-        cursor = Some((last.created_at.clone(), last.id.clone()));
-    }
-
-    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "bounties": allowed })))
+    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "bounties": bounties })))
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/bounties/{id}
 pub async fn get_bounty(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<BountyRecord>> {
-    let not_found = || AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found"));
-
-    let bounty = state.db.get_bounty(&id).await?.ok_or_else(not_found)?;
-
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    if crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &bounty.repo_owner, &bounty.repo_name, caller, "/")
-        .await
-        .is_err()
-    {
-        return Err(not_found());
-    }
-
+    let bounty = state
+        .db
+        .get_bounty(&id)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found")))?;
     Ok(Json(bounty))
 }
 
@@ -238,22 +165,11 @@ pub async fn claim_bounty(
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(req): Json<ClaimBountyRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<BountyRecord>> {
-    let not_found = || AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found"));
-
-    let bounty = state.db.get_bounty(&id).await?.ok_or_else(not_found)?;
-
-    if crate::api::authorize_repo_read(
-        &state,
-        &bounty.repo_owner,
-        &bounty.repo_name,
-        Some(auth.0.as_str()),
-        "/",
-    )
-    .await
-    .is_err()
-    {
-        return Err(not_found());
-    }
+    let bounty = state
+        .db
+        .get_bounty(&id)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found")))?;
 
     if bounty.status != "open" {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
@@ -297,12 +213,8 @@ pub async fn submit_bounty(
             bounty.status
         )));
     }
-    let is_claimant = bounty
-        .claimant_did
-        .as_deref()
-        .is_some_and(|c| crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, c));
-    if !is_claimant {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden("only the claimant can submit".into()));
+    if bounty.claimant_did.as_deref() != Some(&auth.0) {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest("only the claimant can submit".into()));
     }
 
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
@@ -337,8 +249,8 @@ pub async fn approve_bounty(
             bounty.status
         )));
     }
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &bounty.creator_did) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    if bounty.creator_did != auth.0 {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
             "only the bounty creator can approve".into(),
         ));
     }
@@ -384,8 +296,8 @@ pub async fn cancel_bounty(
             bounty.status
         )));
     }
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &bounty.creator_did) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    if bounty.creator_did != auth.0 {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
             "only the bounty creator can cancel".into(),
         ));
     }
@@ -420,19 +332,6 @@ pub async fn dispute_bounty(
         )));
     }
 
-    // Only the bounty creator or the current claimant may dispute (N19 — this
-    // endpoint had no identity check at all).
-    let is_creator = crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &bounty.creator_did);
-    let is_claimant = bounty
-        .claimant_did
-        .as_deref()
-        .is_some_and(|c| crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, c));
-    if !is_creator && !is_claimant {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "only the bounty creator or claimant can dispute this bounty".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
     // Check if deadline exceeded
     if let Some(ref claimed_at) = bounty.claimed_at {
         if let Ok(claimed) = chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339(claimed_at) {

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/certs.rs

@@ -1,44 +1,23 @@
 //! API handlers for ref certificates.
 
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-
-use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, Query, State};
+use axum::extract::{Path, State};
 use axum::Json;
 
-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
-/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/certs?limit=50
+/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/certs
 pub async fn list_certs(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    Query(params): Query<HashMap<String, String>>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let limit = params
-        .get("limit")
-        .and_then(|v| v.parse::<i64>().ok())
-        .map(|v| v.max(1))
-        .unwrap_or(50)
-        .min(200);
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
-
-    // When a prefix is given (short-ID resolution from the CLI) use a
-    // generous limit and delegate to the prefix-matched query so the
-    // caller can resolve IDs regardless of how many certs exist.
-    let prefix = params.get("prefix").filter(|p| !p.is_empty());
-    let certs = if let Some(prefix) = prefix {
-        state
-            .db
-            .list_ref_certificates_by_prefix(&record.id, prefix, 200)
-            .await?
-    } else {
-        state.db.list_ref_certificates(&record.id, limit).await?
-    };
+    let certs = state.db.list_ref_certificates(&record.id).await?;
     let certs_json: Vec<serde_json::Value> = certs
         .iter()
         .map(|c| {
@@ -56,21 +35,20 @@ pub async fn list_certs(
         })
         .collect();
 
-    let count = certs_json.len();
-    Ok(Json(
-        serde_json::json!({ "certificates": certs_json, "count": count }),
-    ))
+    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "certificates": certs_json })))
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/certs/{id}
 pub async fn get_cert(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name, id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    // Verify the repo exists
+    let _record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let cert = state
         .db
@@ -78,10 +56,6 @@ pub async fn get_cert(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("certificate {id}")))?;
 
-    if cert.repo_id != record.id {
-        return Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("certificate {id}")));
-    }
-
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
         "id":         cert.id,
         "repo_id":    cert.repo_id,

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/changelog.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
 //! Changelog endpoint — unified timeline of commits, merged PRs, and closed issues.
 
-use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, Query, State};
+use axum::extract::{Path, Query, State};
 use axum::Json;
 use serde::Deserialize;
 
-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::git::store;
 use crate::state::AppState;
@@ -28,11 +27,12 @@ pub async fn get_changelog(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Query(query): Query<ChangelogQuery>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let limit = query.limit.min(100);
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/encrypted.rs

@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
-//! Authenticated discovery + fetch for encrypted withheld blobs (Option B1).
-
-use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
-use axum::Json;
-
-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
-use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
-use crate::state::AppState;
-use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
-
-/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs
-/// Returns [{oid, cid}] for every encrypted blob in the repo, to any caller who
-/// can read the repo. Not recipient-scoped: recipient identities are not stored,
-/// so access control here is repo readability and decryption is gated by the
-/// envelope crypto (only a real recipient can open an envelope).
-pub async fn list_encrypted_blobs(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
-    Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
-) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
-    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny
-    {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")));
-    }
-    let rows = state.db.list_all_encrypted_blobs(&record.id).await?;
-    let blobs: Vec<_> = rows
-        .into_iter()
-        .map(|(oid, cid)| serde_json::json!({ "oid": oid, "cid": cid }))
-        .collect();
-    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "blobs": blobs })))
-}
-
-/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blob/{oid}
-/// Returns raw envelope bytes to callers who can read the repo; the envelope
-/// crypto still ensures only true recipients can decrypt.
-pub async fn get_encrypted_blob(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
-    Path((owner, repo, oid)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
-    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny
-    {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}/{oid}")));
-    }
-    let cid = state
-        .db
-        .encrypted_blob_cid(&record.id, &oid)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}/{oid}")))?;
-    let bytes = crate::ipfs_pin::cat(&state.config.ipfs_api, &cid)
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
-    Ok(bytes)
-}
-
-/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs/replicate
-/// Returns [{oid, cid}] for every encrypted blob in the repo, for peer-mirror
-/// replication (Option B2). Gated by repo readability, like discovery, so a
-/// non-readable repo does not expose its blob index; for the intended case (a
-/// public repo with withheld subtrees) the public root keeps this open to peers.
-/// Recipient identities are deliberately withheld: the v2 envelopes no longer
-/// carry recipient public keys, so peers must not learn the reader set either. A
-/// mirror detects a re-seal by the CID changing (the OID is stable across
-/// re-seals). Ciphertext metadata only, never plaintext.
-pub async fn replicate_encrypted_blobs(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
-    Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
-) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
-    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny
-    {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")));
-    }
-    let rows = state.db.list_all_encrypted_blobs(&record.id).await?;
-    let blobs: Vec<_> = rows
-        .into_iter()
-        .map(|(oid, cid)| replicate_blob_json(oid, cid))
-        .collect();
-    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "blobs": blobs })))
-}
-
-/// Serialize one blob for the replication wire. Recipient identities are
-/// intentionally absent so a mirror never learns the reader set.
-fn replicate_blob_json(oid: String, cid: String) -> serde_json::Value {
-    serde_json::json!({ "oid": oid, "cid": cid })
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::replicate_blob_json;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn replicate_blob_json_omits_recipients() {
-        let v = replicate_blob_json("oid1".into(), "cidA".into());
-        assert_eq!(v["oid"], "oid1");
-        assert_eq!(v["cid"], "cidA");
-        assert!(
-            v.get("recipients").is_none(),
-            "replication wire must not carry recipient identities"
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/ipfs.rs

@@ -9,55 +9,28 @@
 //! `git cat-file <type> <sha256>` (i.e. without the git framing header).
 //! This is consistent with how `gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes`
 //! computes CIDs when objects are pushed.
-//!
-//! Serving is access-controlled: an object is returned only from a repo row the
-//! requesting caller is permitted to read (per-caller path-scoped visibility,
-//! see `get_by_cid`).
 
 use axum::{
     extract::{Path, State},
     http::{HeaderMap, HeaderName, HeaderValue, StatusCode},
     response::{IntoResponse, Response},
-    Extension, Json,
+    Json,
 };
 use cid::CidGeneric;
-use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
 use std::str::FromStr;
 
-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::git::store;
-use crate::git::visibility_pack::{allowed_blob_set_for_caller, has_path_scoped_rule};
 use crate::state::AppState;
-use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
 
 /// GET /ipfs/{cid}
 ///
 /// Search all repos on the node for a git object whose SHA-256 hash matches
-/// the given CIDv1, returning its raw content if the caller may read it.
-///
-/// Visibility (#110, #126): the object is served only from a repo row the
-/// caller passes. For each iterated row we gate against that row's OWN rules
-/// (`visibility_check` at `"/"`), never re-resolving via `authorize_repo_read`
-/// — `get_repo`'s fuzzy match could otherwise authorize a different physical
-/// row than the one read (KTD2a). We check object existence via
-/// `store::object_type` *before* the expensive reachability walk so random-CID
-/// spray cannot trigger full-history git walks on repos that don't carry the
-/// object. When the row carries path-scoped rules (KTD4) the served object
-/// must be either a non-blob (trees/commits are structural; KTD3) OR a blob
-/// in the caller's *reachable* allowed-set (`allowed_blob_set_for_caller`).
-/// The reachable allowed-set excludes dangling blobs — a blob written via
-/// `git hash-object -w` and never committed has no path to gate, so it is
-/// fail-closed 404'd under path-scoped rules (#126). Denial and genuine
-/// not-found both fall through to an opaque 404.
-///
-/// Scope: this closes the direct unauthenticated scan, including the dangling
-/// case. A stale-public mirror row still serves withheld content (tracked
-/// separately, #124).
+/// the given CIDv1. Returns the raw object content bytes with appropriate
+/// headers if found, or 404 if not found.
 pub async fn get_by_cid(
     Path(cid_str): Path<String>,
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Response> {
     // 1. Decode the CID and extract the SHA-256 digest
     let cid = CidGeneric::<64>::from_str(&cid_str)
@@ -73,8 +46,6 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
     }
 
     let sha256_hex = hex::encode(mh.digest());
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let caller_owned = caller.map(|c| c.to_string());
 
     // 2. Search all repos for an object with this SHA-256
     let repos = state
@@ -83,126 +54,39 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
         .await
         .map_err(AppError::Internal)?;
 
-    // Fetch every repo's visibility rules in one query rather than one per row
-    // (the gate runs each row against its OWN rules — KTD2a). A row absent from
-    // the map has no rules.
-    let repo_ids: Vec<String> = repos.iter().map(|r| r.id.clone()).collect();
-    let rules_by_repo = state
-        .db
-        .list_visibility_rules_for_repos(&repo_ids)
-        .await
-        .map_err(AppError::Internal)?;
-
-    // Request-scoped memo of the per-repo allowed-blob set (KTD1, #126). The
-    // caller is constant for one request, so `repo.id` alone is a safe,
-    // sufficient key — never a coarse caller "class", which
-    // `visibility_check`'s exact full-DID reader match would make unsafe.
-    //
-    // We flipped from a deny-set (`withheld_blob_oids`) to an allowed-set
-    // (`allowed_blob_set_for_caller`) so dangling blobs — never enumerated by
-    // the reachable walk — fail closed instead of slipping through an empty
-    // deny entry (#126).
-    let mut allowed_memo: HashMap<String, HashSet<String>> = HashMap::new();
-
     for repo in &repos {
-        // Repo-level read gate against THIS row's own rules (KTD2a).
-        let rules: &[crate::db::VisibilityRule] = rules_by_repo
-            .get(&repo.id)
-            .map(Vec::as_slice)
-            .unwrap_or(&[]);
-        if visibility_check(rules, repo.is_public, &repo.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny {
-            continue;
-        }
-
         let repo_path = match state.repo_store.acquire(&repo.owner_did, &repo.name).await {
             Ok(p) => p,
             Err(_) => continue,
         };
 
-        // Check whether the object exists in this repo before any expensive
-        // reachability walk. This prevents random-CID spray from triggering
-        // full-history git walks on repos that don't carry the object.
-        let obj_type = match store::object_type(&repo_path, &sha256_hex) {
-            Ok(Some(t)) => t,
+        match store::read_object(&repo_path, &sha256_hex) {
+            Ok(Some((_obj_type, content))) => {
+                // 3. Return the content with IPFS-style headers
+                let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+                headers.insert(
+                    HeaderName::from_static("content-type"),
+                    HeaderValue::from_static("application/octet-stream"),
+                );
+                headers.insert(
+                    HeaderName::from_static("x-content-cid"),
+                    HeaderValue::from_str(&cid_str)
+                        .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
+                );
+                headers.insert(
+                    HeaderName::from_static("x-git-hash"),
+                    HeaderValue::from_str(&sha256_hex)
+                        .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
+                );
+
+                return Ok((StatusCode::OK, headers, content).into_response());
+            }
             Ok(None) => continue,
             Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error checking git object type");
-                continue;
-            }
-        };
-
-        // Per-blob gating only applies when a path-scoped rule exists (KTD4).
-        // Without any path-scoped rule, the "/" gate above is the whole story.
-        // Trees/commits are always served under path-scoped rules (KTD3).
-        let path_scoped = has_path_scoped_rule(rules);
-        if path_scoped && obj_type == "blob" {
-            if !allowed_memo.contains_key(&repo.id) {
-                let rp = repo_path.clone();
-                let r = rules.to_vec();
-                let is_public = repo.is_public;
-                let owner = repo.owner_did.clone();
-                let caller_for_walk = caller_owned.clone();
-                // Full-history walk shells out to git — keep it off the async runtime.
-                let walk = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
-                    allowed_blob_set_for_caller(
-                        &rp,
-                        &r,
-                        is_public,
-                        &owner,
-                        caller_for_walk.as_deref(),
-                    )
-                })
-                .await;
-                // Fail closed on EITHER a task panic (JoinError) or a walk error:
-                // we cannot prove the caller may read here, so skip this repo and
-                // let a public copy (if any) serve. Never serve on an unproven gate.
-                let set = match walk {
-                    Ok(Ok(set)) => set,
-                    Ok(Err(e)) => {
-                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "allowed-blob walk failed; skipping repo");
-                        continue;
-                    }
-                    Err(e) => {
-                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "allowed-blob walk task panicked; skipping repo");
-                        continue;
-                    }
-                };
-                allowed_memo.insert(repo.id.clone(), set);
-            }
-            let in_allowed = allowed_memo
-                .get(&repo.id)
-                .is_some_and(|set| set.contains(&sha256_hex));
-            if !in_allowed {
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error reading git object");
                 continue;
             }
         }
-
-        // Now that we've passed the gate, read the content.
-        let content = match store::read_object_content(&repo_path, &sha256_hex, &obj_type) {
-            Ok(c) => c,
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error reading git object content");
-                continue;
-            }
-        };
-
-        // 3. Return the content with IPFS-style headers
-        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
-        headers.insert(
-            HeaderName::from_static("content-type"),
-            HeaderValue::from_static("application/octet-stream"),
-        );
-        headers.insert(
-            HeaderName::from_static("x-content-cid"),
-            HeaderValue::from_str(&cid_str).unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
-        );
-        headers.insert(
-            HeaderName::from_static("x-git-hash"),
-            HeaderValue::from_str(&sha256_hex)
-                .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
-        );
-
-        return Ok((StatusCode::OK, headers, content).into_response());
     }
 
     // Not found in any repo

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/issues.rs

@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ pub async fn create_issue(
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Json(req): Json<CreateIssueRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<IssueRecord>)> {
-    // Authorize the caller as a reader before accepting an issue: a non-reader
-    // must not be able to file an issue against a private repo they cannot read.
-    // Mirrors create_issue_comment / create_review / create_bounty.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let issue_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
@@ -90,11 +90,12 @@ pub async fn create_issue(
 pub async fn list_issues(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let disk_path = state
         .repo_store
@@ -119,11 +120,12 @@ pub async fn list_issues(
 pub async fn get_issue(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo, issue_id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let disk_path = state
         .repo_store
@@ -159,9 +161,11 @@ pub async fn create_issue_comment(
         ));
     }
 
-    // Read-gate: a commenter must be able to read the repo, but need not own it.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let disk_path = state
         .repo_store
@@ -189,38 +193,21 @@ pub async fn create_issue_comment(
 pub async fn list_issue_comments(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo, issue_id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let _record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
-    let disk_path = state
-        .repo_store
-        .acquire(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
-    // Resolve the full issue ID (accepts 8-char prefix) so the DB fetch
-    // below uses the same canonical id as the git ref.
-    let full_id = match git_issues::resolve_issue_id(&disk_path, &issue_id)
-        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?
-    {
-        Some(id) => id,
-        None => {
-            return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!(
-                "issue {issue_id} not found"
-            )))
-        }
-    };
-
-    let comments = state.db.list_issue_comments(&full_id).await?;
+    let comments = state.db.list_issue_comments(&issue_id).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "comments": comments })))
 }
 
 /// POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{id}/close
 pub async fn close_issue(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Extension(_auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo, issue_id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let record = state
@@ -236,33 +223,6 @@ pub async fn close_issue(
         .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
     let disk_path = guard.path().to_path_buf();
 
-    // Owner OR issue author may close. The author lives in the issue's git-JSON
-    // blob (not a DB column); a None author (legacy issues) falls back to
-    // owner-only. Read it under the write guard, before mutating.
-    let author_did: Option<String> = match git_issues::get_issue(&disk_path, &issue_id) {
-        Ok(Some(raw)) => serde_json::from_str::<IssueRecord>(&raw)
-            .ok()
-            .and_then(|i| i.author),
-        Ok(None) => {
-            guard.release(false).await;
-            return Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("issue {issue_id} not found")));
-        }
-        Err(e) => {
-            guard.release(false).await;
-            return Err(AppError::Git(e.to_string()));
-        }
-    };
-    let is_owner = crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0).is_ok();
-    let is_author = author_did
-        .as_deref()
-        .is_some_and(|a| crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, a));
-    if !is_owner && !is_author {
-        guard.release(false).await;
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "only the repo owner or the issue author can close this issue".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
     let close_result = git_issues::close_issue(&disk_path, &issue_id);
 
     // Always release the advisory lock — even on error; upload to Tigris only on success.

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/labels.rs

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ pub struct LabelRequest {
 /// POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/labels
 pub async fn add_label(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Extension(_auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Json(req): Json<LabelRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ pub async fn add_label(
         .get_repo(&owner, &name)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     let added = state.db.add_label(&record.id, &label).await?;
     let status = if added {
@@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ pub async fn add_label(
 /// DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/labels/:label
 pub async fn remove_label(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Extension(_auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name, label)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let record = state
@@ -64,25 +63,21 @@ pub async fn remove_label(
         .get_repo(&owner, &name)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     state.db.remove_label(&record.id, &label).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "label": label, "removed": true })))
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/labels
-///
-/// Read-visibility-gated (INV-2 root listing): a public repo's labels stay
-/// anonymously listable; a private repo's label names are hidden (404) from
-/// anyone who cannot read it at the root.
 pub async fn list_labels(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let labels = state.db.list_labels(&record.id).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "labels": labels })))

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/mod.rs

@@ -1,14 +1,8 @@
-use crate::db::{RepoRecord, VisibilityRule};
-use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
-use crate::state::AppState;
-use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
-
 pub mod agents;
 pub mod arweave;
 pub mod bounties;
 pub mod certs;
 pub mod changelog;
-pub mod encrypted;
 pub mod events;
 pub mod ipfs;
 pub mod issues;
@@ -22,682 +16,6 @@ pub mod replicas;
 pub mod repos;
 pub mod resolve;
 pub mod stars;
-pub mod status;
 pub mod tasks;
 pub mod visibility;
 pub mod webhooks;
-
-/// Resolve a repo for a read request and enforce path-scoped visibility.
-///
-/// Returns 404 (`RepoNotFound`) if the repo does not exist or the caller may not
-/// read `path`, using the same opaque response the git serve path returns so
-/// existence is not confirmed. Returns the record and its visibility rules so a
-/// content handler can apply an extra per-path check without a second DB query.
-///
-/// Callers pass `"/"` for repo-level reads (listings); content endpoints pass the
-/// specific path so a withheld subtree is denied even on an otherwise-public repo.
-pub(crate) async fn authorize_repo_read(
-    state: &AppState,
-    owner: &str,
-    name: &str,
-    caller: Option<&str>,
-    path: &str,
-) -> Result<(RepoRecord, Vec<VisibilityRule>)> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(owner, name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    // A quarantined mirror (admitted by the iCaptcha propagation gate but not
-    // validated) is hidden from every reader — serve/clone and fork alike — as if
-    // it did not exist, until an operator releases it. Checked before the
-    // visibility gate so its existence is never disclosed.
-    if state.db.is_repo_quarantined(&record.id).await? {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")));
-    }
-    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
-    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, path) == Decision::Deny
-    {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")));
-    }
-    Ok((record, rules))
-}
-
-/// Match a presented DID against a stored DID that may be the full `did:key:<id>`
-/// form or the bare `<id>` short form (mirror rows store the bare key). Collapse
-/// representation only within `did:key`; never let a bare id match across methods —
-/// `did:web` / `did:gitlawb` share the base58 space with `did:key`, so a
-/// trailing-segment compare would treat `did:key:X` and `did:gitlawb:X` as equal.
-///
-/// The collapse itself lives in exactly one place, [`crate::db::normalize_owner_key`],
-/// which is also the function the stored `owner_did` / `authorizing_did` columns
-/// are normalized through and which `OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL` mirrors byte for byte.
-/// Two identities match when they normalize to the same key; a second copy of the
-/// rule here is how the Rust gate and the SQL filters would drift apart.
-pub(crate) fn did_matches(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
-    crate::db::normalize_owner_key(a) == crate::db::normalize_owner_key(b)
-}
-
-/// 403 unless `caller` is the repo owner. Uses [`did_matches`] so the owner check
-/// and the author check (close policy) share one normalization.
-pub(crate) fn require_repo_owner(record: &RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> Result<()> {
-    if did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
-        Ok(())
-    } else {
-        Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "only the repo owner can perform this action".into(),
-        ))
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod did_tests {
-    use super::did_matches;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn full_matches_bare_same_key() {
-        assert!(did_matches("did:key:zABC", "zABC"));
-        assert!(did_matches("zABC", "did:key:zABC"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_cross_method_collision() {
-        assert!(!did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:gitlawb:zABC"));
-        assert!(!did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:web:zABC"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn exact_match_and_distinct_keys() {
-        assert!(did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:key:zABC"));
-        assert!(!did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:key:zXYZ"));
-        assert!(!did_matches("zABC", "zXYZ"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn empty_did_matches() {
-        assert!(did_matches("", ""));
-        assert!(did_matches("", "did:key:"));
-    }
-}
-
-/// Drift guard (plan 002 §Gate-type table, Step 5). Every in-scope mutation
-/// handler must contain its expected gate marker in its own body; removing a
-/// gate fails this test. Source-level (no DB), so it runs everywhere. When a new
-/// route is added to an in-scope group, add its row here with a deliberate gate
-/// type — that forced decision is the point.
-///
-/// Markers are gate-SHAPED — a call (`require_repo_owner(`, `did_matches(`) or a
-/// binding/comparison expression (`caller != &record.owner_did`,
-/// `let owner_did = auth.0`) — never a bare identifier that could also appear in
-/// a log line. Full-line comments are stripped before matching, so a marker that
-/// survives only as a comment above a deleted gate does NOT satisfy a row.
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod authz_guard {
-    /// The body of `func` with full-line comments removed. Bounds the slice at the
-    /// next top-level fn item so a marker in a later handler can't leak in,
-    /// tolerating `pub async`, `pub(crate) async`, `async`, `pub`, and bare `fn`
-    /// declarations (the old single-`pub async fn` delimiter over-ran on any other
-    /// form).
-    fn fn_body(src: &str, func: &str) -> String {
-        let needle = format!("fn {func}(");
-        let start = src
-            .find(&needle)
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("handler `{func}` not found (renamed or removed?)"));
-        let rest = &src[start..];
-        let end = [
-            "\npub async fn ",
-            "\npub(crate) async fn ",
-            "\nasync fn ",
-            "\npub fn ",
-            "\nfn ",
-        ]
-        .iter()
-        .filter_map(|p| rest[1..].find(p).map(|i| i + 1))
-        .min()
-        .unwrap_or(rest.len());
-        rest[..end]
-            .lines()
-            .filter(|l| !l.trim_start().starts_with("//"))
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
-            .join("\n")
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn every_in_scope_mutation_has_its_gate() {
-        let pulls = include_str!("pulls.rs");
-        let webhooks = include_str!("webhooks.rs");
-        let labels = include_str!("labels.rs");
-        let issues = include_str!("issues.rs");
-        let bounties = include_str!("bounties.rs");
-        let replicas = include_str!("replicas.rs");
-        let events = include_str!("events.rs");
-        let tasks = include_str!("tasks.rs");
-        let stars = include_str!("stars.rs");
-        let status = include_str!("status/mod.rs");
-        let protect = include_str!("protect.rs");
-        let visibility = include_str!("visibility.rs");
-        let profiles = include_str!("profiles.rs");
-        let repos = include_str!("repos.rs");
-        let register = include_str!("register.rs");
-        let ipfs = include_str!("ipfs.rs");
-
-        // (source, handler, expected gate marker)
-        let rows: &[(&str, &str, &str)] = &[
-            // Bucket A — owner-gate (require_repo_owner -> 403)
-            (pulls, "merge_pr", "require_repo_owner("),
-            (webhooks, "create_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
-            (webhooks, "delete_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
-            // Bucket A/B hybrid — list_webhooks is read-visibility THEN owner:
-            // authorize_repo_read 404s a non-reader of a private repo, then
-            // require_repo_owner 403s a non-owner of a public one. Both halves
-            // are pinned: the authorize_repo_read marker guards the read half
-            // (existence hiding) and require_repo_owner guards the owner half.
-            (webhooks, "list_webhooks", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (webhooks, "list_webhooks", "require_repo_owner("),
-            // Same two-half shape as list_webhooks: authorize_repo_read runs
-            // first (a quarantined or unreadable repo gets the missing-repo
-            // not-found, never a 403 that would confirm existence), then
-            // require_repo_owner 403s a non-owner of a readable repo. Both halves
-            // are pinned, because dropping either changes what a stranger learns.
-            (status, "create_status", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (status, "create_status", "require_repo_owner("),
-            (labels, "add_label", "require_repo_owner("),
-            (labels, "remove_label", "require_repo_owner("),
-            // Bucket A' — owner OR author (did_matches against the author)
-            (pulls, "close_pr", "did_matches("),
-            (issues, "close_issue", "did_matches("),
-            // Bucket B — read-gate (authorize_repo_read)
-            (pulls, "create_review", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (pulls, "create_comment", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (pulls, "create_pr", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (issues, "create_issue_comment", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (issues, "create_issue", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (bounties, "create_bounty", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (repos, "fork_repo", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            // get_by_cid gates each iterated repo row directly via visibility_check
-            // (KTD2a: it must NOT route through authorize_repo_read's fuzzy re-resolve).
-            (ipfs, "get_by_cid", "visibility_check("),
-            // #94 sibling read surfaces: gate private-repo metadata on read
-            // visibility (public repos stay anonymous; private repos 404).
-            (replicas, "list_replicas", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (protect, "list_protected_branches", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (labels, "list_labels", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (events, "list_repo_events", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            // The catch-up poll surface gates before any push-event row is read,
-            // so a stranger cannot use it to learn that a private repo exists or
-            // is being pushed to.
-            (events, "list_repo_push_events", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            // The status read gates before any claim data is loaded, so its deny
-            // is the repo's own not-found rather than an existence oracle over
-            // which commits were reported on.
-            (status, "commit_status", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            // The rollup gates on the same helper before the pull request row is
-            // loaded, so a caller who cannot read the repo cannot learn which
-            // pull request numbers exist on it — and the fallback's branch
-            // resolve and head persist sit behind that same gate.
-            (status, "pull_request_status", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            // Bucket C — signer-self: the acting DID is matched/bound to auth.0
-            (tasks, "create_task", "did_matches("),
-            (tasks, "claim_task", "did_matches("),
-            (tasks, "complete_task", "did_matches("),
-            (tasks, "fail_task", "did_matches("),
-            (repos, "create_repo", "let owner_did = auth.0"),
-            (profiles, "set_profile", "let did = auth.0"),
-            (register, "register", "did_matches("),
-            (stars, "star_repo", "caller = &auth.0"),
-            (stars, "unstar_repo", "caller = &auth.0"),
-            // Bucket D — non-owner-by-design, positive per-route marker
-            (bounties, "claim_bounty", "claim_bounty(&id, &auth.0"),
-            (bounties, "submit_bounty", "did_matches("),
-            (bounties, "approve_bounty", "did_matches("),
-            (bounties, "cancel_bounty", "did_matches("),
-            (bounties, "dispute_bounty", "did_matches("),
-            (replicas, "register_replica", "did_matches("),
-            (replicas, "unregister_replica", "replica_did = &auth.0"),
-            // PRE-GATED — already owner-gated, in-scope group; guard the gate itself
-            (protect, "protect_branch", "did_matches("),
-            (protect, "unprotect_branch", "did_matches("),
-            (visibility, "set_visibility", "require_owner("),
-            (visibility, "remove_visibility", "require_owner("),
-            (visibility, "list_visibility", "require_owner("),
-        ];
-
-        // The visibility rows prove require_owner is CALLED; this proves the helper
-        // itself does DID-safe matching, not a raw/trailing-segment compare.
-        assert!(
-            fn_body(visibility, "require_owner").contains("did_matches("),
-            "visibility::require_owner must use did_matches for DID-safe owner matching"
-        );
-
-        for (src, func, marker) in rows {
-            let body = fn_body(src, func);
-            assert!(
-                body.contains(marker),
-                "handler `{func}` is missing its gate marker `{marker}` — gate removed or route reclassified"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Proves the comment-stripping that GUARD-1 added: a marker that appears only
-    /// in a full-line comment (the real `replicas.rs` false-pass shape) must NOT
-    /// satisfy a row.
-    #[test]
-    fn comment_only_marker_does_not_satisfy_a_row() {
-        let src = "pub async fn demo() {\n    // did_matches( handles the owner form\n    do_thing();\n}\n";
-        assert!(
-            !fn_body(src, "demo").contains("did_matches("),
-            "a marker present only in a comment must not count as an enforced gate"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// All `pub async fn` / `pub(crate) async fn` handler names declared in `src`.
-    /// Verb-agnostic on purpose: a repo-scoped read of any name is in scope, so a
-    /// handler named `fetch_*` / `replicate_*` / `info_refs` cannot escape the gate
-    /// check by not being called `list_*` / `get_*`.
-    fn handler_names(src: &str) -> Vec<String> {
-        ["pub async fn ", "pub(crate) async fn "]
-            .iter()
-            .flat_map(|decl| {
-                src.match_indices(decl).map(move |(i, _)| {
-                    src[i + decl.len()..]
-                        .chars()
-                        .take_while(|c| c.is_alphanumeric() || *c == '_')
-                        .collect::<String>()
-                })
-            })
-            .collect()
-    }
-
-    /// True when the handler's signature takes an owner+repo path
-    /// (`Path<(String, String...)>`), i.e. it is a repo-scoped read rather than a
-    /// node-wide aggregate (`/stats`, `/ipfs/pins`, the global feeds).
-    fn is_repo_scoped(body: &str) -> bool {
-        let header = &body[..body.find('{').unwrap_or(body.len())];
-        header.contains("Path<(String, String")
-    }
-
-    /// True when at least one gate marker runs for EVERY service — i.e. some
-    /// marker sits outside any `if service == ...` discriminator block. A gate
-    /// that appears ONLY inside such a block (as the info/refs advertisement gate
-    /// did before #119: `visibility_check` ran under `if service ==
-    /// "git-upload-pack"`, leaving `git-receive-pack` ungated) covers a subset of
-    /// services and must NOT count as a full gate. Other handlers carry no
-    /// `service ==` discriminator, so for them this matches the plain
-    /// substring check. NOTE: only `if service ==` is detected — a
-    /// `match service { .. }` discriminator is NOT tracked and a gate inside one
-    /// arm would pass as full; avoid that shape, or extend the span loop below.
-    fn gate_runs_unconditionally(body: &str, markers: &[&str]) -> bool {
-        // Brace-matched spans of each `if service == ...` block.
-        let mut cond_spans: Vec<(usize, usize)> = Vec::new();
-        let mut search = 0;
-        while let Some(rel) = body[search..].find("if service ==") {
-            let cond_start = search + rel;
-            let Some(brace_rel) = body[cond_start..].find('{') else {
-                break;
-            };
-            let open = cond_start + brace_rel;
-            let mut depth = 0i32;
-            let mut end = body.len();
-            for (i, c) in body[open..].char_indices() {
-                match c {
-                    '{' => depth += 1,
-                    '}' => {
-                        depth -= 1;
-                        if depth == 0 {
-                            end = open + i;
-                            break;
-                        }
-                    }
-                    _ => {}
-                }
-            }
-            cond_spans.push((open, end));
-            // On an unclosed block `end` stays at body.len() (the fail-safe
-            // direction: treat the rest as conditional rather than mask a gate);
-            // clamp so the next slice can't index past the end and panic.
-            search = (end + 1).min(body.len());
-        }
-        markers.iter().any(|m| {
-            body.match_indices(m)
-                .any(|(pos, _)| !cond_spans.iter().any(|(s, e)| pos >= *s && pos <= *e))
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Collect `.rs` source files under `dir`. Recursive so the completeness scan
-    /// covers nested API modules (`api/<module>/mod.rs` and deeper), not only the
-    /// immediate `api/*.rs` children.
-    fn collect_rs_files(dir: &std::path::Path) -> Vec<std::path::PathBuf> {
-        let mut out = Vec::new();
-        for entry in std::fs::read_dir(dir).expect("read api dir") {
-            let path = entry.expect("dir entry").path();
-            if path.is_dir() {
-                out.extend(collect_rs_files(&path));
-            } else if path.extension().is_some_and(|e| e == "rs") {
-                out.push(path);
-            }
-        }
-        out
-    }
-
-    /// The `.rs` files under `api_root` (as paths RELATIVE to it) that the
-    /// completeness scan must inspect: everything except the top-level `mod.rs` (the
-    /// guard file itself) and the top-level files already covered by the per-handler
-    /// `sources` loop. A nested `api/<module>/<name>.rs` is a distinct source file
-    /// even when its basename matches a listed top-level file, so it stays in scope.
-    fn unlisted_source_files(
-        api_root: &std::path::Path,
-        listed: &std::collections::HashSet<&str>,
-    ) -> Vec<String> {
-        collect_rs_files(api_root)
-            .iter()
-            .filter_map(|path| {
-                let rel = path
-                    .strip_prefix(api_root)
-                    .ok()?
-                    .to_string_lossy()
-                    .replace('\\', "/");
-                if rel == "mod.rs" || listed.contains(rel.as_str()) {
-                    None
-                } else {
-                    Some(rel)
-                }
-            })
-            .collect()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn collect_rs_files_recurses_subdirs() {
-        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let root = tmp.path();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("a.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("note.txt"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("sub/deep")).unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/mod.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/deep/c.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        let names: std::collections::HashSet<String> = collect_rs_files(root)
-            .iter()
-            .map(|p| {
-                p.strip_prefix(root)
-                    .unwrap()
-                    .to_string_lossy()
-                    .replace('\\', "/")
-            })
-            .collect();
-        assert!(names.contains("a.rs"));
-        assert!(
-            names.contains("sub/mod.rs"),
-            "nested module file must be collected"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            names.contains("sub/deep/c.rs"),
-            "deeply nested file must be collected"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !names.iter().any(|n| n.ends_with(".txt")),
-            "non-rs files excluded"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(names.len(), 3);
-    }
-
-    // P3 (#119): the completeness scan must skip already-covered files by their path
-    // RELATIVE to api_root, not by basename. A nested api/<module>/repos.rs is a
-    // distinct source file from the covered top-level repos.rs and must still be
-    // scanned, or a new nested module could smuggle in an ungated repo-scoped handler
-    // behind a colliding filename.
-    #[test]
-    fn unlisted_source_files_scans_nested_file_with_colliding_basename() {
-        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let root = tmp.path();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("repos.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("mod.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("sub")).unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/repos.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/fresh.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        let listed: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = ["repos.rs"].into_iter().collect();
-
-        let unlisted = unlisted_source_files(root, &listed);
-
-        assert!(
-            unlisted.contains(&"sub/repos.rs".to_string()),
-            "a nested file whose basename matches a listed top-level file must still be scanned"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            unlisted.contains(&"sub/fresh.rs".to_string()),
-            "a nested file with a unique name must be scanned"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !unlisted.contains(&"repos.rs".to_string()),
-            "the listed top-level file is covered by the per-handler loop"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !unlisted.contains(&"mod.rs".to_string()),
-            "the top-level guard file is skipped"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Egress gate guard: every repo-scoped handler (`Path<(String, String..)>`)
-    /// must carry an authz marker — a read gate (`authorize_repo_read` /
-    /// `visibility_check`), or a write gate (`require_repo_owner` / `require_owner`
-    /// / `did_matches` / a `&auth.0` self-binding) — or be listed in KNOWN_UNGATED
-    /// (the tracked, ungated reads). A new ungated handler of ANY verb trips this,
-    /// and a completeness scan over `src/api/` trips it for a whole new module that
-    /// adds a repo-scoped handler without being wired into `sources`. Mutations are
-    /// also checked precisely, per handler, by the mutation guard above; here they
-    /// only need *some* binding so the net stays verb-agnostic.
-    ///
-    /// Scope and limits (this is a source scrape; the runtime route guard covers
-    /// behaviour):
-    /// - It proves a gate is CALLED, not that it runs on the requested path: a
-    ///   content handler gating `"/"` instead of the subtree still passes here.
-    /// - It sees handlers taking the owner+repo tuple `Path<(String, String..)>`; a
-    ///   repo identified by a struct/custom extractor would be missed (the helper
-    ///   unit tests pin these boundaries).
-    /// - KNOWN_UNGATED entries need a real open issue and review; the staleness
-    ///   assert removes one only once its gate lands.
-    #[test]
-    fn every_repo_scoped_handler_is_gated() {
-        let sources: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
-            (include_str!("bounties.rs"), "bounties.rs"),
-            (include_str!("certs.rs"), "certs.rs"),
-            (include_str!("changelog.rs"), "changelog.rs"),
-            (include_str!("encrypted.rs"), "encrypted.rs"),
-            (include_str!("events.rs"), "events.rs"),
-            (include_str!("issues.rs"), "issues.rs"),
-            (include_str!("labels.rs"), "labels.rs"),
-            (include_str!("protect.rs"), "protect.rs"),
-            (include_str!("pulls.rs"), "pulls.rs"),
-            (include_str!("replicas.rs"), "replicas.rs"),
-            (include_str!("repos.rs"), "repos.rs"),
-            (include_str!("stars.rs"), "stars.rs"),
-            (include_str!("status/mod.rs"), "status/mod.rs"),
-            (include_str!("visibility.rs"), "visibility.rs"),
-            (include_str!("webhooks.rs"), "webhooks.rs"),
-        ];
-        let listed: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = sources.iter().map(|(_, f)| *f).collect();
-        assert!(!listed.is_empty(), "read-guard `sources` is empty");
-
-        // Completeness: every api/*.rs NOT already in `sources` must declare no
-        // repo-scoped handler, so a brand-new module cannot add an ungated handler
-        // the scrape never looks at. Reads the directory at test time (so the list
-        // cannot silently drift from the filesystem) and only inspects unlisted
-        // files — listed files are covered by the per-handler loop below.
-        let api_dir = concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/src/api");
-        for (_, f) in sources {
-            assert!(
-                std::path::Path::new(api_dir).join(f).exists(),
-                "read-guard `sources` lists {f} but the file does not exist"
-            );
-        }
-        let api_root = std::path::Path::new(api_dir);
-        for rel in unlisted_source_files(api_root, &listed) {
-            let src = std::fs::read_to_string(api_root.join(&rel)).expect("read api file");
-            let has_repo_handler = handler_names(&src)
-                .iter()
-                .any(|n| is_repo_scoped(&fn_body(&src, n)));
-            assert!(
-                !has_repo_handler,
-                "api/{rel} declares a repo-scoped handler but is not in the egress \
-                 guard `sources` list — add it so its handlers are gate-checked"
-            );
-        }
-
-        // Repo-scoped reads known to be ungated today, each tracked by an issue.
-        // Remove an entry the moment its gate lands (the staleness assert enforces it).
-        let known_ungated: &[(&str, &str)] = &[];
-        let is_known = |n: &str| known_ungated.iter().any(|(k, _)| *k == n);
-        // Any one of these = the handler binds the caller to an authz decision: the
-        // first two are read gates, the rest are the write/owner/self-binding forms.
-        // A repo-scoped mutation passes here on its write gate; the mutation guard
-        // above additionally verifies the exact gate type per handler. NOTE: a local
-        // rename of `caller`/`replica_did` must be paired with a marker update here.
-        let markers = [
-            "authorize_repo_read(",
-            "visibility_check(",
-            "require_repo_owner(",
-            "require_owner(",
-            "did_matches(",
-            "caller = &auth.0",
-            "replica_did = &auth.0",
-        ];
-
-        // Every KNOWN_UNGATED name must be a real handler (catch typos / renames).
-        let all: std::collections::HashSet<String> =
-            sources.iter().flat_map(|(s, _)| handler_names(s)).collect();
-        for (n, _) in known_ungated {
-            assert!(
-                all.contains(*n),
-                "KNOWN_UNGATED lists `{n}`, which is not a real handler (renamed or removed?)"
-            );
-        }
-
-        let mut checked = 0usize;
-        for (src, file) in sources {
-            for name in handler_names(src) {
-                let body = fn_body(src, &name);
-                if !is_repo_scoped(&body) {
-                    continue; // node-wide aggregate, not a repo-scoped surface
-                }
-                checked += 1;
-                let gated = gate_runs_unconditionally(&body, &markers);
-                assert!(
-                    gated || is_known(&name),
-                    "repo-scoped handler `{name}` ({file}) has no authz gate and is \
-                     not in KNOWN_UNGATED — add the visibility/owner gate with the \
-                     caller, or track it there"
-                );
-                assert!(
-                    !(gated && is_known(&name)),
-                    "handler `{name}` ({file}) is now gated — remove it from \
-                     KNOWN_UNGATED so the allowlist stays an accurate gap list"
-                );
-            }
-        }
-        // Tripwire: if the scrape silently stopped finding handlers (e.g. a parser
-        // regression in handler_names/is_repo_scoped), this floor fails loudly
-        // instead of the guard passing vacuously. Current count is ~54 repo-scoped
-        // handlers; 20 is a deliberate floor that trips only on a gross regression.
-        assert!(
-            checked >= 20,
-            "egress guard only checked {checked} repo-scoped handlers — the scrape likely broke"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Pins the `handler_names` boundary: it collects every `pub`/`pub(crate)
-    /// async fn` regardless of verb (so a `fetch_*` read cannot escape), and skips
-    /// private `async fn` and sync `fn` helpers.
-    #[test]
-    fn handler_names_finds_all_pub_async_and_skips_others() {
-        let src = "pub async fn list_things() {}\n\
-                   pub async fn fetch_thing() {}\n\
-                   pub(crate) async fn get_crate_thing() {}\n\
-                   async fn private_helper() {}\n\
-                   fn sync_helper() {}\n";
-        let names = handler_names(src);
-        // Verb-agnostic: a non-list/get read verb is still seen.
-        assert!(names.contains(&"list_things".to_string()));
-        assert!(names.contains(&"fetch_thing".to_string()));
-        // pub(crate) routed handlers are in scope too.
-        assert!(names.contains(&"get_crate_thing".to_string()));
-        // Private/sync helpers are not routed handlers and are skipped.
-        assert!(!names
-            .iter()
-            .any(|n| n == "private_helper" || n == "sync_helper"));
-    }
-
-    /// Pins the `is_repo_scoped` boundary: an owner+repo tuple Path is repo-scoped;
-    /// a single-segment or absent Path is a node-wide aggregate.
-    #[test]
-    fn is_repo_scoped_requires_owner_repo_path() {
-        let repo =
-            "fn get_x(s: State, Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>) {\n  body();\n}";
-        let three = "fn get_y(Path((o, n, id)): Path<(String, String, String)>) {\n  body();\n}";
-        let node_wide = "fn list_z(s: State<AppState>) {\n  body();\n}";
-        let single = "fn get_w(Path(cid): Path<String>) {\n  body();\n}";
-        assert!(is_repo_scoped(repo), "owner+repo tuple is repo-scoped");
-        assert!(is_repo_scoped(three), "owner+repo+id tuple is repo-scoped");
-        assert!(!is_repo_scoped(node_wide), "no Path is node-wide");
-        assert!(
-            !is_repo_scoped(single),
-            "single-segment Path is not repo-scoped"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Pins `gate_runs_unconditionally`: a gate nested only inside an
-    /// `if service == ...` block is conditional (does NOT count), while the same
-    /// gate at the top level — or an additional unconditional one — does.
-    #[test]
-    fn conditional_service_gate_is_not_a_full_gate() {
-        let markers = ["visibility_check("];
-        // Gate runs only for one service: not a full gate.
-        let conditional = "fn f() {\n  \
-            if service == \"git-upload-pack\" {\n    \
-                visibility_check(rules, caller);\n  \
-            }\n  \
-            if service == \"git-receive-pack\" { acquire_fresh(); }\n}";
-        assert!(
-            !gate_runs_unconditionally(conditional, &markers),
-            "a gate only inside `if service ==` covers a subset of services"
-        );
-        // Same gate at top level: full gate.
-        let unconditional = "fn f() {\n  \
-            visibility_check(rules, caller);\n  \
-            if service == \"git-receive-pack\" { acquire_fresh(); }\n}";
-        assert!(
-            gate_runs_unconditionally(unconditional, &markers),
-            "an unconditional gate runs for every service"
-        );
-        // A gate inside EACH of two service blocks, none outside: still a
-        // subset (no service clears it unconditionally), so not a full gate.
-        let both_conditional = "fn f() {\n  \
-            if service == \"git-upload-pack\" { visibility_check(a); }\n  \
-            if service == \"git-receive-pack\" { visibility_check(b); }\n}";
-        assert!(
-            !gate_runs_unconditionally(both_conditional, &markers),
-            "a gate inside every service block is still conditional"
-        );
-        // A marker inside one block AND again unconditionally: the
-        // unconditional occurrence makes it a full gate (exercises the
-        // match_indices scan past the in-block hit).
-        let inside_and_outside = "fn f() {\n  \
-            if service == \"git-upload-pack\" { visibility_check(a); }\n  \
-            visibility_check(b);\n}";
-        assert!(
-            gate_runs_unconditionally(inside_and_outside, &markers),
-            "an unconditional occurrence counts even when another is conditional"
-        );
-        // No marker at all: not gated.
-        assert!(!gate_runs_unconditionally(
-            "fn f() { do_thing(); }",
-            &markers
-        ));
-        // An unclosed `if service ==` block (e.g. phantom brace from a string
-        // literal) must not panic on the slice advance; the span runs to EOF, so
-        // the in-block marker reads as conditional. Real Rust source is balanced,
-        // so this only guards the scraper against a future pathological body.
-        let unclosed = "fn f() { if service == \"x\" { visibility_check(a);";
-        assert!(
-            !gate_runs_unconditionally(unclosed, &markers),
-            "an unclosed service block must not panic and stays conditional"
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/peers.rs

@@ -40,123 +40,6 @@ pub struct PeerResponse {
     pub reachable: bool,
 }
 
-/// Extract an IPv4 address embedded in an IPv6 literal across the transition
-/// formats that carry one: IPv4-mapped (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`), IPv4-compatible
-/// (`::a.b.c.d`), 6to4 (`2002:WWXX:YYZZ::/16`), and the NAT64 well-known prefix
-/// (`64:ff9b::/96`). Returns `None` for native IPv6. Callers fold the result
-/// back through the v4 range checks so loopback/private addresses smuggled in
-/// via any of these encodings are rejected, not just the mapped/compatible pair.
-///
-/// INCOMPLETE-NAT64 CONTRACT: non-well-known NAT64 prefixes (e.g. the RFC 8215
-/// local-use `64:ff9b:1::/48`) are deliberately **not** decoded here — their v4
-/// sits at a prefix-length-dependent offset (RFC 6052 §2.2) — so they return
-/// `None`. Any caller that needs them blocked must reject the wider
-/// `64:ff9b::/32` itself; `is_public_http_url` does this in its native-v6 arm.
-fn embedded_ipv4(v6: std::net::Ipv6Addr) -> Option<std::net::Ipv4Addr> {
-    if let Some(v4) = v6.to_ipv4_mapped().or_else(|| v6.to_ipv4()) {
-        return Some(v4);
-    }
-    let s = v6.segments();
-    // 6to4 (2002::/16) embeds W.X.Y.Z in the next two segments.
-    if s[0] == 0x2002 {
-        let [a, b] = s[1].to_be_bytes();
-        let [c, d] = s[2].to_be_bytes();
-        return Some(std::net::Ipv4Addr::new(a, b, c, d));
-    }
-    // NAT64 well-known prefix (64:ff9b::/96) embeds the IPv4 in the low 32 bits.
-    if s[0] == 0x0064 && s[1] == 0xff9b && s[2..6] == [0, 0, 0, 0] {
-        let [a, b] = s[6].to_be_bytes();
-        let [c, d] = s[7].to_be_bytes();
-        return Some(std::net::Ipv4Addr::new(a, b, c, d));
-    }
-    None
-}
-
-/// Whether a peer `http_url` is a public http(s) endpoint safe to register.
-/// Rejects non-http(s) schemes, loopback/unspecified/private/link-local IPs,
-/// and `localhost` / `.local` / `.internal` hostnames. Used at announce time
-/// and by the boot-time prune of already-poisoned rows.
-pub fn is_public_http_url(raw: &str) -> bool {
-    let url = match reqwest::Url::parse(raw) {
-        Ok(u) => u,
-        Err(_) => return false,
-    };
-    if !matches!(url.scheme(), "http" | "https") {
-        return false;
-    }
-    let mut host = match url.host_str() {
-        Some(h) => h.to_ascii_lowercase(),
-        None => return false,
-    };
-    // Drop a single trailing dot (FQDN root): `localhost.` resolves the same as
-    // `localhost`, so normalize before the suffix/equality checks below.
-    if let Some(stripped) = host.strip_suffix('.') {
-        host = stripped.to_string();
-    }
-    if host.is_empty()
-        || host == "localhost"
-        || host.ends_with(".local")
-        || host.ends_with(".internal")
-    {
-        return false;
-    }
-    // host_str() keeps brackets on IPv6 literals (e.g. "[::1]"); strip them
-    // before parsing as an IP.
-    let ip_candidate = host.trim_start_matches('[').trim_end_matches(']');
-    if let Ok(ip) = ip_candidate.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>() {
-        // Reject loopback/unspecified on the literal as given — catches `::1`
-        // and `::` before the IPv4-folding below (`::1`.to_ipv4() would
-        // otherwise map to a non-loopback `0.0.0.1`).
-        if ip.is_loopback() || ip.is_unspecified() {
-            return false;
-        }
-        // Fold any IPv6 literal that embeds an IPv4 address (mapped, compatible,
-        // 6to4, NAT64) down to that IPv4 so the v4 range checks catch
-        // loopback/private addresses smuggled in via an IPv6 encoding, then
-        // re-check loopback/unspecified.
-        let ip = match ip {
-            std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => embedded_ipv4(v6).map(std::net::IpAddr::V4).unwrap_or(ip),
-            v4 => v4,
-        };
-        if ip.is_loopback() || ip.is_unspecified() {
-            return false;
-        }
-        match ip {
-            std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
-                let o = v4.octets();
-                // RFC1918 private, link-local, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), or the
-                // RFC1122 "this host" block 0.0.0.0/8 (never a valid destination;
-                // 0.0.0.0 itself is already caught by the is_unspecified check).
-                if v4.is_private()
-                    || v4.is_link_local()
-                    || (o[0] == 100 && (o[1] & 0xc0) == 64)
-                    || o[0] == 0
-                {
-                    return false;
-                }
-            }
-            std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
-                let s = v6.segments();
-                // fc00::/7 (unique-local) or fe80::/10 (link-local)
-                if (s[0] & 0xfe00) == 0xfc00 || (s[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80 {
-                    return false;
-                }
-                // Any NAT64 address (64:ff9b::/32) that is not the cleanly
-                // decodable well-known /96 — e.g. the RFC 8215 local-use
-                // 64:ff9b:1::/48 — carries a translated target whose embedded v4
-                // sits at a prefix-length-dependent offset (RFC 6052 §2.2).
-                // Rather than risk a wrong decode across every prefix length we
-                // reject the whole NAT64 space here. The well-known /96 was
-                // already folded to its v4 above and never reaches this arm.
-                if s[0] == 0x0064 && s[1] == 0xff9b {
-                    return false;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    true
-}
-
 /// GET /api/v1/peers
 pub async fn list_peers(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let peers = state.db.list_peers().await?;
@@ -200,14 +83,10 @@ pub async fn announce(
         );
     }
 
-    // Validate the URL is a public http(s) endpoint. The announce route is
-    // reachable unauthenticated (until all peers sign), so without this an
-    // attacker can register loopback/private "peers" (localhost:5432, etc.)
-    // and turn our outbound sync-notify fan-out into an SSRF probe — and bury
-    // the real peers under junk so node-origin repos stop replicating.
-    if !is_public_http_url(&req.http_url) {
+    // Validate the URL is HTTP/HTTPS
+    if !req.http_url.starts_with("http://") && !req.http_url.starts_with("https://") {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "http_url must be a public http(s) URL (no loopback, private, or .internal/.local hosts)".into(),
+            "http_url must start with http:// or https://".into(),
         ));
     }
 
@@ -296,8 +175,8 @@ pub async fn trigger_sync(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<serde_js
                 repo.get("name").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
             ) {
                 (Some(owner), Some(name)) => {
-                    // Use short owner (did:key-only normalization) matching DB convention
-                    let short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(owner);
+                    // Use short owner (last colon segment) matching DB convention
+                    let short = owner.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner);
                     format!("{short}/{name}")
                 }
                 _ => continue,
@@ -347,10 +226,6 @@ pub struct NotifyRequest {
     pub timestamp: Option<String>,
     #[serde(default)]
     pub cert_id: Option<String>,
-    /// Full owner DID — added in #144 for DID-aware feed gating.
-    /// Optional for backward compat with older senders.
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub owner_did: Option<String>,
 }
 
 pub async fn notify_sync(
@@ -381,14 +256,6 @@ pub async fn notify_sync(
         )));
     }
 
-    // #272: the slug reaches a PathBuf::join in the sync worker, where an extra
-    // separator or a traversal segment places the mirror outside repos_dir. Reject
-    // it here, before the queue row and the ref-update row are written. The message
-    // names the field and nothing about where repos live on disk.
-    if let Err(e) = crate::git::repo_store::validate_repo_slug(&req.repo) {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!("invalid repo field: {e}")));
-    }
-
     state
         .db
         .enqueue_sync(&req.repo, &req.node_did, &req.ref_name, &req.new_sha, None)
@@ -403,7 +270,6 @@ pub async fn notify_sync(
         node_did: req.node_did.clone(),
         pusher_did: req.pusher_did.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
         repo: req.repo.clone(),
-        owner_did: req.owner_did.clone(),
         ref_name: req.ref_name.clone(),
         old_sha: req.old_sha.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
         new_sha: req.new_sha.clone(),
@@ -445,13 +311,7 @@ pub async fn ping_peer(
 
     // Async ping
     let url = format!("{}/health", peer.http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-    // Use the shared no-redirect client: bare `reqwest::get` follows redirects,
-    // so a peer could answer with `302 -> http://127.0.0.1/` and turn the ping
-    // into an SSRF probe.
-    let ok = state
-        .http_client
-        .get(&url)
-        .send()
+    let ok = reqwest::get(&url)
         .await
         .map(|r| r.status().is_success())
         .unwrap_or(false);
@@ -464,805 +324,3 @@ pub async fn ping_peer(
         "reachable": ok,
     })))
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::is_public_http_url;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn accepts_public_https_and_http() {
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("https://node.gitlawb.com"));
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("https://manila.gitlawb.com/"));
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://203.0.113.10:7545"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_loopback_private_and_internal() {
-        for bad in [
-            "http://localhost:7545",
-            "http://127.0.0.1:5432/",
-            "http://localhost:22/",
-            "http://0.0.0.0:7545",
-            // RFC1122 "this host" block 0.0.0.0/8 beyond 0.0.0.0 itself,
-            // including the upper boundary (1.0.0.0 is public, tested below).
-            "http://0.0.0.1:7545",
-            "http://0.1.2.3/",
-            "http://0.255.255.255/",
-            "http://10.0.0.5:7545",
-            "http://192.168.1.10/",
-            "http://172.16.0.1:7545",
-            "http://169.254.1.1/",
-            "http://[::1]:7545",
-            "http://gitlawb-node.internal:7545",
-            "http://my-node.local/",
-            "ftp://node.gitlawb.com",
-            "not-a-url",
-            "",
-            // Trailing-dot FQDN of an internal host.
-            "http://localhost./",
-            // CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10).
-            "http://100.64.0.1:7545",
-            "http://100.127.255.255/",
-            // IPv4-mapped / IPv4-compatible IPv6 smuggling private/loopback v4.
-            "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:7545",
-            "http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/",
-            "http://[::ffff:192.168.1.1]:7545",
-            "http://[::127.0.0.1]/",
-            // 6to4 (2002::/16) embedding loopback/private v4.
-            "http://[2002:7f00:1::]:7545",
-            "http://[2002:a00:1::]/",
-            "http://[2002:c0a8:101::]/",
-            // NAT64 well-known prefix (64:ff9b::/96) embedding loopback/private v4.
-            "http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/",
-            "http://[64:ff9b::a00:1]:7545",
-            // NAT64 local-use prefix (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215) — rejected
-            // outright rather than decoded, so the whole NAT64 space is closed.
-            "http://[64:ff9b:1::7f00:1]/",
-            "http://[64:ff9b:1::a00:1]:7545",
-            "http://[64:ff9b:1:a00::]/",
-            // Local-use NAT64 wrapping a *public* v4 (203.0.113.10) is still
-            // rejected: the block is prefix-based, not payload-based.
-            "http://[64:ff9b:1::cb00:710a]/",
-        ] {
-            assert!(!is_public_http_url(bad), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn accepts_6to4_and_nat64_wrapping_public_v4() {
-        // Fold-and-recheck stays consistent with the mapped/compatible handling:
-        // a transition address that wraps a public v4 is allowed, only the
-        // private/loopback-wrapping forms above are rejected. 203.0.113.10.
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://[2002:cb00:710a::]/"));
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://[64:ff9b::cb00:710a]/"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn accepts_public_outside_cgnat_range() {
-        // 100.0.0.0/10 boundary: .63 and .128 are public, only 100.64-127 is CGNAT.
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://100.63.255.255:7545"));
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://100.128.0.1/"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn accepts_first_address_above_this_host_block() {
-        // 1.0.0.0 is the first address above the rejected 0.0.0.0/8 block;
-        // pins the `o[0] == 0` check against an off-by-one into 1.x.
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://1.0.0.0/"));
-    }
-
-    // ── #82: /sync/trigger signature gate + per-IP brake on the peer-sync routes ──
-    //
-    // These drive the FULL production router (crate::server::build_router) so the
-    // route wiring, layer order, and config-mode branching are all under test.
-    // The positive-path and DID-agnostic cases mount the handler directly because
-    // signed_request_as injects only an AuthenticatedDid extension (not a real
-    // RFC-9421 signature), which require_signature rejects on the full router.
-    use crate::rate_limit::{IpRateLimiter, RateLimiter, TrustedProxy};
-    use crate::state::AppState;
-    use crate::test_support::{signed_request_as, test_state};
-    use axum::body::Body;
-    use axum::extract::ConnectInfo;
-    use axum::http::{header, Method, Request, StatusCode};
-    use axum::routing::post;
-    use axum::{middleware, Extension, Router};
-    use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
-    use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
-    use sqlx::PgPool;
-    use std::net::SocketAddr;
-    use std::sync::Arc;
-    use std::time::Duration;
-    use tower::ServiceExt;
-
-    fn unsigned_post(uri: &str, body: &str, peer: &str) -> Request<Body> {
-        let mut req = Request::builder()
-            .method(Method::POST)
-            .uri(uri)
-            .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
-            .body(Body::from(body.to_string()))
-            .unwrap();
-        req.extensions_mut()
-            .insert(ConnectInfo(peer.parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap()));
-        req
-    }
-
-    fn require_signed_peer_writes(state: &mut AppState) {
-        let mut cfg = (*state.config).clone();
-        cfg.require_signed_peer_writes = true;
-        state.config = Arc::new(cfg);
-    }
-
-    // The slug must be a well-formed owner/name (#272); these brake tests are about
-    // the rate limiter, so the body carries a valid slug and reaches the brake.
-    const NOTIFY_BODY: &str = r#"{"repo":"z6Mkfoo/hello","ref_name":"refs/heads/main","new_sha":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","node_did":"PEER_DID"}"#;
-
-    // ── trigger: mandatory signature ──────────────────────────────────────────
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_trigger_rejects_unsigned_in_default_mode(pool: PgPool) {
-        // The hole: with require_signed_peer_writes=false (default), an anonymous
-        // caller reaches the fan-out. Must be 401 regardless of the flag.
-        let state = test_state(pool).await;
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        let resp = router
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
-                "/api/v1/sync/trigger",
-                "{}",
-                "203.0.113.1:5000",
-            ))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_trigger_rejects_unsigned_in_signed_writes_mode(pool: PgPool) {
-        // The signature requirement must not depend on the flag.
-        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
-        require_signed_peer_writes(&mut state);
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        let resp = router
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
-                "/api/v1/sync/trigger",
-                "{}",
-                "203.0.113.2:5000",
-            ))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_trigger_admits_signed_caller(pool: PgPool) {
-        // must-not-over-throttle: a signed caller reaches the handler and (with no
-        // peers seeded) gets 200, not 429. Direct-mount because a real signature
-        // cannot be forged through the full router in tests.
-        let state = test_state(pool).await;
-        let did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
-        let app = Router::new()
-            .route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(super::trigger_sync))
-            .layer(middleware::from_fn(crate::rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
-            .layer(Extension(IpRateLimiter {
-                limiter: RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
-                trust: TrustedProxy::None,
-            }))
-            .with_state(state);
-        let mut req =
-            signed_request_as(&did, Method::POST, "/api/v1/sync/trigger", Body::from("{}"));
-        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(
-            "203.0.113.3:5000".parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap(),
-        ));
-        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
-    }
-
-    // ── trigger: IP brake ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_trigger_ip_flood_is_throttled(pool: PgPool) {
-        // The brake is outermost, so an over-limit request 429s before it ever
-        // reaches require_signature — an unsigned request suffices to prove it.
-        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
-        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
-        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
-        let peer = "203.0.113.4:5000";
-        // Exhaust the single-request budget up front.
-        assert!(
-            state
-                .sync_trigger_rate_limiter
-                .check(&peer.parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap().ip().to_string())
-                .await
-        );
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        let resp = router
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", peer))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_trigger_brake_is_did_agnostic(pool: PgPool) {
-        // Why per-IP, not per-DID: a DID farm (fresh did:key per request) does not
-        // bypass an IP-keyed brake. Two DISTINCT DIDs from one IP, brake limit 1 →
-        // the second is 429. A per-DID limiter would give each DID its own bucket.
-        let state = test_state(pool).await;
-        let app = Router::new()
-            .route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(super::trigger_sync))
-            .layer(middleware::from_fn(crate::rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
-            .layer(Extension(IpRateLimiter {
-                limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
-                trust: TrustedProxy::None,
-            }))
-            .with_state(state);
-        let peer = "203.0.113.5:5000".parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap();
-        let mk = |did: &str| {
-            let mut r =
-                signed_request_as(did, Method::POST, "/api/v1/sync/trigger", Body::from("{}"));
-            r.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
-            r
-        };
-        let first = app
-            .clone()
-            .oneshot(mk(&Keypair::generate().did().to_string()))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(first.status(), StatusCode::OK);
-        let second = app
-            .oneshot(mk(&Keypair::generate().did().to_string()))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(second.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_trigger_forged_forwarded_header_cannot_bypass(pool: PgPool) {
-        // TrustedProxy::None keys on the socket peer, so rotating X-Forwarded-For
-        // from one socket peer does not refill the bucket. limit 1: first request
-        // consumes it (then 401 unsigned), second from the same socket → 429
-        // regardless of a different XFF value.
-        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
-        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
-        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        let mut a = unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", "203.0.113.6:5000");
-        a.headers_mut()
-            .insert("x-forwarded-for", "1.1.1.1".parse().unwrap());
-        assert_eq!(
-            router.clone().oneshot(a).await.unwrap().status(),
-            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
-        );
-        let mut b = unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", "203.0.113.6:5000");
-        b.headers_mut()
-            .insert("x-forwarded-for", "2.2.2.2".parse().unwrap());
-        assert_eq!(
-            router.oneshot(b).await.unwrap().status(),
-            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_trigger_rate_limit_zero_disables_but_signature_holds(pool: PgPool) {
-        // 0 disables the brake (RateLimiter::check early-returns), proving the two
-        // halves are independent: no 429 even under a flood, but the signature gate
-        // still 401s every unsigned request.
-        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
-        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(0, Duration::from_secs(3600));
-        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        for _ in 0..3 {
-            let resp = router
-                .clone()
-                .oneshot(unsigned_post(
-                    "/api/v1/sync/trigger",
-                    "{}",
-                    "203.0.113.7:5000",
-                ))
-                .await
-                .unwrap();
-            assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
-        }
-    }
-
-    // ── notify: braked, but signature behavior unchanged ──────────────────────
-
-    async fn seed_peer(state: &AppState) -> String {
-        let did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
-        state
-            .db
-            .upsert_peer(&did, "https://peer.example.com")
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        did
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_notify_unsigned_flood_is_throttled(pool: PgPool) {
-        // notify still accepts an unsigned known-peer notification (rolling-upgrade
-        // compat), but a flood from one IP is now braked. brake limit 1: first
-        // enqueues (200), second from the same IP → 429.
-        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
-        state.peer_write_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
-        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
-        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
-        let body = NOTIFY_BODY.replace("PEER_DID", &peer_did);
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        let first = router
-            .clone()
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
-                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
-                &body,
-                "203.0.113.8:5000",
-            ))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(first.status(), StatusCode::OK);
-        let second = router
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
-                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
-                &body,
-                "203.0.113.8:5000",
-            ))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(second.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_notify_distinct_ips_are_not_collaterally_throttled(pool: PgPool) {
-        // must-not-over-throttle: per-IP keying means one peer's volume does not
-        // throttle another. brake limit 1, two DIFFERENT source IPs → both 200.
-        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
-        state.peer_write_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
-        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
-        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
-        let body = NOTIFY_BODY.replace("PEER_DID", &peer_did);
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        for ip in ["203.0.113.20:5000", "203.0.113.21:5000"] {
-            let resp = router
-                .clone()
-                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/notify", &body, ip))
-                .await
-                .unwrap();
-            assert_eq!(
-                resp.status(),
-                StatusCode::OK,
-                "distinct IP {ip} must not be throttled"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn notify_flood_does_not_exhaust_trigger_bucket(pool: PgPool) {
-        // Separate buckets: draining peer_write via an unsigned notify flood must
-        // NOT throttle the signed trigger caller from the same IP. After the notify
-        // bucket is spent, an unsigned trigger from that IP hits its own (unspent)
-        // bucket and is rejected by the SIGNATURE gate (401), not the brake (429).
-        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
-        state.peer_write_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
-        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600));
-        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
-        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
-        let body = NOTIFY_BODY.replace("PEER_DID", &peer_did);
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        let ip = "203.0.113.9:5000";
-        assert_eq!(
-            router
-                .clone()
-                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/notify", &body, ip))
-                .await
-                .unwrap()
-                .status(),
-            StatusCode::OK
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            router
-                .clone()
-                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/notify", &body, ip))
-                .await
-                .unwrap()
-                .status(),
-            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
-            "peer_write bucket should now be exhausted for this IP"
-        );
-        let trigger = router
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", ip))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            trigger.status(),
-            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
-            "trigger must hit its own bucket (401 from the sig gate), not the drained peer_write bucket (429)"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // ── notify: repo slug validation (#272) ───────────────────────────────────
-    //
-    // An unsigned caller who has announced their own DID is a "known peer", so
-    // the slug they send reaches the sync worker's path join. `a//tmp/probe`
-    // resolved to /tmp/probe.git, outside repos_dir entirely. notify must reject
-    // anything that is not a well-formed owner/name slug before it is queued.
-
-    /// Every slug shape the boundary must refuse. `a//tmp/gitlawb-probe` is the
-    /// verified escape; the rest are the traversal and empty-half neighbours.
-    const MALFORMED_SLUGS: [&str; 9] = [
-        "a//tmp/gitlawb-probe",
-        "../hello",
-        "./hello",
-        "../../etc/evil",
-        "a/../../x",
-        "..",
-        "demo",
-        "/hello",
-        "z6Mkfoo/",
-    ];
-
-    fn notify_body(repo: &str, peer_did: &str) -> String {
-        serde_json::json!({
-            "repo": repo,
-            "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
-            "new_sha": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
-            "node_did": peer_did,
-        })
-        .to_string()
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_notify_rejects_malformed_repo_slugs(pool: PgPool) {
-        let state = test_state(pool).await;
-        let db = state.db.clone();
-        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        for (i, slug) in MALFORMED_SLUGS.iter().enumerate() {
-            // Distinct source IPs so the per-IP brake never masks the 400.
-            let ip = format!("198.51.100.{}:5000", i + 1);
-            let resp = router
-                .clone()
-                .oneshot(unsigned_post(
-                    "/api/v1/sync/notify",
-                    &notify_body(slug, &peer_did),
-                    &ip,
-                ))
-                .await
-                .unwrap();
-            assert_eq!(
-                resp.status(),
-                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
-                "slug {slug:?} must be rejected"
-            );
-        }
-        let queued = db.dequeue_pending_syncs(100).await.unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            queued.is_empty(),
-            "no malformed slug may be queued, got {:?}",
-            queued.iter().map(|q| &q.repo).collect::<Vec<_>>()
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_notify_rejection_body_names_field_not_path(pool: PgPool) {
-        // R3: the client learns which field was bad, never where repos live on
-        // disk. A message carrying the resolved path would hand an unsigned
-        // caller the server's layout.
-        let state = test_state(pool).await;
-        let repos_dir = state.config.repos_dir.display().to_string();
-        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        let resp = router
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
-                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
-                &notify_body("a//tmp/gitlawb-probe", &peer_did),
-                "198.51.100.20:5000",
-            ))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
-        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let body = String::from_utf8(bytes.to_vec()).unwrap();
-        assert!(body.contains("repo"), "body must name the field: {body}");
-        assert!(
-            !body.contains(&repos_dir),
-            "body must not leak repos_dir ({repos_dir}): {body}"
-        );
-        for trimmed in repos_dir.trim_start_matches("./").split('/') {
-            assert!(
-                trimmed.is_empty() || !body.contains(trimmed),
-                "body must not leak a repos_dir segment ({trimmed}): {body}"
-            );
-        }
-        // A rooted path is a leading '/' with something after it. A bare quoted
-        // '/' is the separator the message is allowed to talk about.
-        assert!(
-            !body
-                .split(|c: char| c.is_whitespace() || c == '"' || c == '\'')
-                .any(|tok| tok.starts_with('/') && tok.len() > 1),
-            "body must not contain a rooted filesystem path: {body}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_notify_rejection_writes_no_ref_update(pool: PgPool) {
-        // The second half of R1: the ref-update feed row sits after enqueue_sync,
-        // so the early return must skip it too. Asserted, not argued.
-        let state = test_state(pool.clone()).await;
-        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        let resp = router
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
-                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
-                &notify_body("a//tmp/gitlawb-probe", &peer_did),
-                "198.51.100.21:5000",
-            ))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
-        let count: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM received_ref_updates")
-            .fetch_one(&pool)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            count, 0,
-            "a rejected notify must not seed the ref-update feed"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_notify_accepts_valid_slug_and_records_ref_update(pool: PgPool) {
-        // must-not-break, and the control that keeps the two negative assertions
-        // above from being vacuous: a well-formed slug still queues and still
-        // writes its ref-update row.
-        let state = test_state(pool.clone()).await;
-        let db = state.db.clone();
-        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        let resp = router
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
-                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
-                &notify_body("z6Mkfoo/hello", &peer_did),
-                "198.51.100.22:5000",
-            ))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
-        let queued = db.dequeue_pending_syncs(100).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(queued.len(), 1);
-        assert_eq!(queued[0].repo, "z6Mkfoo/hello");
-        let count: i64 =
-            sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM received_ref_updates WHERE repo = $1")
-                .bind("z6Mkfoo/hello")
-                .fetch_one(&pool)
-                .await
-                .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            count, 1,
-            "the valid path must still write the ref-update row"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_notify_unknown_peer_wins_over_malformed_slug(pool: PgPool) {
-        // Ordering: the slug check sits after the peer gate, so an unknown peer
-        // still gets the unknown-peer message rather than a slug complaint.
-        let state = test_state(pool).await;
-        let stranger = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        let resp = router
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
-                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
-                &notify_body("a//tmp/gitlawb-probe", &stranger),
-                "198.51.100.23:5000",
-            ))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
-        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let body = String::from_utf8(bytes.to_vec()).unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            body.contains("unknown peer DID"),
-            "peer gate must still fire first: {body}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn unsigned_announce_then_notify_cannot_queue_a_repos_dir_escape(pool: PgPool) {
-        // The reachability case for #272, committed in its attack form. Two
-        // unsigned requests through the shipped router, no signature and no
-        // config change: announce the attacker's own DID (which is what makes
-        // them a "known peer"), then notify with `a/<abs>/gitlawb-probe`. That
-        // slug used to reach PathBuf::join in the sync worker, where the
-        // absolute second component discarded repos_dir and planted a mirror at
-        // /<abs>/gitlawb-probe.git. The notify must now be refused outright.
-        //
-        // This has to run over crate::server::build_router rather than a
-        // directly mounted handler: the point of the test is that the default
-        // layer stack (optional_signature, not require_signature) leaves the
-        // route open, so mounting the handler alone would assert nothing about
-        // reachability.
-        let state = test_state(pool).await;
-        let db = state.db.clone();
-        let attacker = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-
-        let announce =
-            format!(r#"{{"did":"{attacker}","http_url":"https://attacker.example.com"}}"#);
-        let resp = router
-            .clone()
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
-                "/api/v1/peers/announce",
-                &announce,
-                "198.51.100.40:5000",
-            ))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        // Asserted, not assumed: this plan does not change announce, and the
-        // whole attack rests on an unsigned announce still succeeding.
-        assert_eq!(
-            resp.status(),
-            StatusCode::OK,
-            "unsigned announce still admits an attacker-generated DID"
-        );
-
-        let outside = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let escape_dir = outside.path().join("gitlawb-probe");
-        let slug = format!("a/{}", escape_dir.display());
-        let resp = router
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
-                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
-                &notify_body(&slug, &attacker),
-                "198.51.100.41:5000",
-            ))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            resp.status(),
-            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
-            "notify must refuse the escaping slug {slug:?}"
-        );
-
-        let queued = db.dequeue_pending_syncs(100).await.unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            queued.is_empty(),
-            "sync_queue must stay empty, got {:?}",
-            queued.iter().map(|q| &q.repo).collect::<Vec<_>>()
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !escape_dir.with_extension("git").exists(),
-            "nothing may be written at the escape target"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn announce_still_accepts_unsigned_in_default_mode(pool: PgPool) {
-        // must-not-over-reach: adding the brake must not tighten announce's
-        // rolling-upgrade behavior — an unsigned announce with a public URL still
-        // succeeds (it only gains the brake, which a single request is under).
-        let state = test_state(pool).await;
-        let did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
-        let body = format!(r#"{{"did":"{did}","http_url":"https://peer.example.com"}}"#);
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        let resp = router
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
-                "/api/v1/peers/announce",
-                &body,
-                "203.0.113.10:5000",
-            ))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
-    }
-
-    // Build a request carrying a REAL RFC 9421 signature (not just an injected
-    // extension), so it passes require_signature on the full production router.
-    fn real_signed_trigger(peer: &str) -> Request<Body> {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let body = b"{}";
-        let s = sign_request(&kp, "POST", "/api/v1/sync/trigger", body);
-        let mut req = Request::builder()
-            .method(Method::POST)
-            .uri("/api/v1/sync/trigger")
-            .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
-            .header("content-digest", s.content_digest)
-            .header("signature-input", s.signature_input)
-            .header("signature", s.signature)
-            .body(Body::from(body.to_vec()))
-            .unwrap();
-        req.extensions_mut()
-            .insert(ConnectInfo(peer.parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap()));
-        req
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_trigger_admits_real_signature_through_full_router(pool: PgPool) {
-        // The positive path through the REAL gate: a validly-signed trigger passes
-        // require_signature on the full router and reaches the handler (no peers
-        // seeded → 200), in BOTH config modes.
-        let state = test_state(pool.clone()).await;
-        let resp = crate::server::build_router(state)
-            .oneshot(real_signed_trigger("203.0.113.30:5000"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            resp.status(),
-            StatusCode::OK,
-            "a real signature must reach the handler (default mode)"
-        );
-
-        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
-        require_signed_peer_writes(&mut state);
-        let resp = crate::server::build_router(state)
-            .oneshot(real_signed_trigger("203.0.113.30:5001"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            resp.status(),
-            StatusCode::OK,
-            "a real signature must reach the handler (signed-writes mode)"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn announce_flood_is_throttled(pool: PgPool) {
-        // The peer_write brake covers /peers/announce too (co-benefit): limit 1,
-        // first unsigned announce from an IP is 200, the second from that IP 429.
-        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
-        state.peer_write_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
-        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
-        let did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
-        let body = format!(r#"{{"did":"{did}","http_url":"https://peer.example.com"}}"#);
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        let ip = "203.0.113.31:5000";
-        assert_eq!(
-            router
-                .clone()
-                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/peers/announce", &body, ip))
-                .await
-                .unwrap()
-                .status(),
-            StatusCode::OK
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            router
-                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/peers/announce", &body, ip))
-                .await
-                .unwrap()
-                .status(),
-            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
-            "announce must be braked by the peer_write limiter"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn sync_trigger_429_body_is_generic_not_push(pool: PgPool) {
-        // The shared 429 middleware now serves the sync routes, so its body must
-        // not claim "push" (RED before the message was genericized).
-        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
-        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
-        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
-        let peer = "203.0.113.32:5000";
-        assert!(
-            state
-                .sync_trigger_rate_limiter
-                .check(&peer.parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap().ip().to_string())
-                .await
-        );
-        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
-        let resp = router
-            .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", peer))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
-        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let s = String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes);
-        assert!(s.contains("rate limit exceeded"), "429 body: {s:?}");
-        assert!(
-            !s.contains("push"),
-            "a 429 on a sync route must not say 'push': {s:?}"
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/profiles.rs

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ pub async fn set_profile(
                     &state.http_client,
                     &state.config.pinata_upload_url,
                     &state.config.pinata_jwt,
-                    &format!("profile-{}", did),
+                    &format!("profile-{}", &did),
                     &profile_json,
                 )
                 .await

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/protect.rs

@@ -23,10 +23,15 @@ pub async fn protect_branch(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
-    // Only the repo owner can protect branches (DID-safe match, shared idiom).
+    // Only the repo owner can protect branches
     let caller = &auth.0;
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    let owner_short = record
+        .owner_did
+        .split(':')
+        .next_back()
+        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    if caller != &record.owner_did && caller != owner_short {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
             "only the repo owner can protect branches".into(),
         ));
     }
@@ -58,8 +63,13 @@ pub async fn unprotect_branch(
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let caller = &auth.0;
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    let owner_short = record
+        .owner_did
+        .split(':')
+        .next_back()
+        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    if caller != &record.owner_did && caller != owner_short {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
             "only the repo owner can unprotect branches".into(),
         ));
     }
@@ -79,14 +89,12 @@ pub async fn unprotect_branch(
 pub async fn list_protected_branches(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    // Read-visibility-gated (INV-2 root listing): a public repo's protected
-    // branches stay anonymously listable; a private repo's branch names are
-    // hidden (404) from anyone who cannot read it at the root.
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let branches = state.db.list_protected_branches(&record.id).await?;
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/pulls.rs

@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ pub async fn create_pr(
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Json(req): Json<CreatePrRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<PullRequest>)> {
-    // Authorize the caller as a reader before accepting a PR: a non-reader must
-    // not be able to open a PR (and fire its webhooks) against a private repo
-    // they cannot read. Mirrors create_review / create_comment / create_bounty.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let author_did = auth.0;
     let target_branch = req
@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ pub async fn create_pr(
         status: "open".to_string(),
         merged_by_did: None,
         merged_at: None,
-        head_commit: None,
         created_at: now.clone(),
         updated_at: now,
     };
@@ -102,11 +101,12 @@ pub async fn create_pr(
 pub async fn list_prs(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let prs = state.db.list_prs(&record.id).await?;
     Ok(Json(
@@ -118,11 +118,12 @@ pub async fn list_prs(
 pub async fn get_pr(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<PullRequest>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -137,11 +138,12 @@ pub async fn get_pr(
 pub async fn get_pr_diff(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -154,25 +156,6 @@ pub async fn get_pr_diff(
         .acquire(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
         .await
         .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
-
-    // Withhold the entire diff if it touches a path the caller cannot read, so a
-    // PR diff cannot leak private-subtree content of an otherwise-public repo.
-    let touched = store::branch_diff_names(&disk_path, &pr.target_branch, &pr.source_branch)
-        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
-    for p in &touched {
-        let gate = format!("/{}", p.trim_start_matches('/'));
-        if crate::visibility::visibility_check(
-            &rules,
-            record.is_public,
-            &record.owner_did,
-            caller,
-            &gate,
-        ) == crate::visibility::Decision::Deny
-        {
-            return Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("PR #{number} not found")));
-        }
-    }
-
     let diff = store::branch_diff(&disk_path, &pr.target_branch, &pr.source_branch)
         .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
 
@@ -195,11 +178,6 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
-    // Owner-only merge (N7). Merging writes the served tree, so this is the same
-    // trust boundary as owner-only push; it subsumes branch protection (a
-    // non-owner cannot merge to any branch, protected or not).
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
-
     let pr = state
         .db
         .get_pr(&record.id, number)
@@ -217,19 +195,6 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
         .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
     let disk_path = guard.path().to_path_buf();
     let merger_did = auth.0;
-
-    // The source head this merge is about to consume, read under the write lock.
-    // The PR row above was loaded before the lock, so a push landing in between
-    // already moved the branch and the row's own `head_commit` is stale; the
-    // value frozen on the merged PR has to be what was merged. `None` when the
-    // ref cannot be resolved, which leaves whatever the push path last stored.
-    let merged_source_head = store::list_refs(&disk_path).ok().and_then(|refs| {
-        let want = format!("refs/heads/{}", pr.source_branch);
-        refs.into_iter()
-            .find(|(name, _)| *name == want)
-            .map(|(_, sha)| sha)
-    });
-
     let merge_result = store::merge_branch(
         &disk_path,
         &pr.target_branch,
@@ -243,10 +208,7 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
 
     let merge_sha = merge_result.map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
 
-    state
-        .db
-        .merge_pr(&pr.id, &merger_did, merged_source_head.as_deref())
-        .await?;
+    state.db.merge_pr(&pr.id, &merger_did).await?;
     let _ = state.db.touch_repo(&record.id).await;
 
     webhooks::fire_event(
@@ -274,7 +236,6 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
 /// POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/pulls/:number/close
 pub async fn close_pr(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let record = state
@@ -289,15 +250,6 @@ pub async fn close_pr(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("PR #{number} not found")))?;
 
-    // Owner OR author may close (forge norm).
-    let is_owner = crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0).is_ok();
-    let is_author = crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &pr.author_did);
-    if !is_owner && !is_author {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "only the repo owner or the PR author can close this PR".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
     state.db.close_pr(&pr.id).await?;
 
     webhooks::fire_event(
@@ -322,9 +274,11 @@ pub async fn create_review(
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
     Json(req): Json<CreateReviewRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<PrReview>)> {
-    // Read-gate: a reviewer must be able to read the repo, but need not own it.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -370,11 +324,12 @@ pub async fn create_review(
 pub async fn list_reviews(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -399,9 +354,11 @@ pub async fn create_comment(
         ));
     }
 
-    // Read-gate: a commenter must be able to read the repo, but need not own it.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -426,11 +383,12 @@ pub async fn create_comment(
 pub async fn list_comments(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -441,159 +399,3 @@ pub async fn list_comments(
     let comments = state.db.list_pr_comments(&pr.id).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "comments": comments })))
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use axum::body::Body;
-    use axum::http::{Method, StatusCode};
-    use axum::routing::post;
-    use axum::Router;
-    use std::process::Command;
-    use tower::ServiceExt;
-
-    const OWNER_DID: &str = "did:key:z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH";
-    const STALE_SHA: &str = "9999999999999999999999999999999999999999";
-
-    fn git(dir: &std::path::Path, args: &[&str]) {
-        let out = Command::new("git")
-            .args(args)
-            .current_dir(dir)
-            .env("GIT_AUTHOR_NAME", "t")
-            .env("GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL", "[email protected]")
-            .env("GIT_COMMITTER_NAME", "t")
-            .env("GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL", "[email protected]")
-            .output()
-            .expect("git runs");
-        assert!(
-            out.status.success(),
-            "git {args:?} failed: {}",
-            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// A bare repo with `main` and a `feature` branch one commit ahead.
-    /// Returns the bare path and the real `feature` tip.
-    fn bare_repo_with_feature(
-        root: &std::path::Path,
-        owner_slug: &str,
-    ) -> (std::path::PathBuf, String) {
-        let work = root.join("work");
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&work).unwrap();
-        git(&work, &["init", "-q", "-b", "main", "."]);
-        std::fs::write(work.join("a.txt"), "one").unwrap();
-        git(&work, &["add", "."]);
-        git(&work, &["commit", "-qm", "one"]);
-        git(&work, &["checkout", "-qb", "feature"]);
-        std::fs::write(work.join("b.txt"), "two").unwrap();
-        git(&work, &["add", "."]);
-        git(&work, &["commit", "-qm", "two"]);
-        git(&work, &["checkout", "-q", "main"]);
-
-        let bare_dir = root.join(owner_slug);
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&bare_dir).unwrap();
-        let bare = bare_dir.join("demo.git");
-        git(
-            root,
-            &[
-                "clone",
-                "-q",
-                "--bare",
-                work.to_str().unwrap(),
-                bare.to_str().unwrap(),
-            ],
-        );
-
-        let tip = Command::new("git")
-            .args(["rev-parse", "refs/heads/feature"])
-            .current_dir(&bare)
-            .output()
-            .unwrap();
-        let tip = String::from_utf8_lossy(&tip.stdout).trim().to_string();
-        assert_eq!(tip.len(), 40, "feature tip must resolve");
-        (bare, tip)
-    }
-
-    /// Merging freezes the stored head at the source commit the merge actually
-    /// consumed. The PR row is loaded before the write lock is taken, so a push
-    /// that lands in between leaves the row's own `head_commit` stale; seeding a
-    /// value that matches nothing on disk stands in for that race, and the
-    /// merged PR must still come out pointing at the real `feature` tip.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn merge_stamps_the_source_head_it_merged_over_a_racing_value(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
-        let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
-        let owner_slug = OWNER_DID.replace([':', '/'], "_");
-        let (bare, feature_tip) = bare_repo_with_feature(tmp.path(), &owner_slug);
-
-        let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
-        state.repo_store =
-            crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(tmp.path().to_path_buf(), pool);
-
-        let now = Utc::now();
-        let repo = crate::db::RepoRecord {
-            id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
-            name: "demo".into(),
-            owner_did: OWNER_DID.into(),
-            description: None,
-            is_public: true,
-            default_branch: "main".into(),
-            created_at: now,
-            updated_at: now,
-            disk_path: bare.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
-            forked_from: None,
-            machine_id: None,
-        };
-        state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.unwrap();
-
-        let pr = PullRequest {
-            id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
-            repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
-            number: 1,
-            title: "add b".into(),
-            body: None,
-            author_did: OWNER_DID.into(),
-            source_branch: "feature".into(),
-            target_branch: "main".into(),
-            status: "open".into(),
-            merged_by_did: None,
-            merged_at: None,
-            head_commit: None,
-            created_at: now.to_rfc3339(),
-            updated_at: now.to_rfc3339(),
-        };
-        state.db.create_pr(&pr).await.unwrap();
-        // The stale value the racing push scenario leaves on the row.
-        state
-            .db
-            .set_open_pr_heads(&repo.id, "feature", STALE_SHA)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let db = state.db.clone();
-        let app = Router::new()
-            .route(
-                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/merge",
-                post(merge_pr),
-            )
-            .with_state(state);
-
-        let response = app
-            .oneshot(crate::test_support::signed_request_as(
-                OWNER_DID,
-                Method::POST,
-                "/api/v1/repos/z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH/demo/pulls/1/merge",
-                Body::empty(),
-            ))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
-
-        let merged = db.get_pr(&repo.id, 1).await.unwrap().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(merged.status, "merged");
-        assert_eq!(
-            merged.head_commit,
-            Some(feature_tip),
-            "the merge must stamp the source head it consumed, not the racing value"
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/register.rs

@@ -35,32 +35,14 @@ pub struct RegisterResponse {
 /// Accepts only requests with a valid HTTP Signature (enforced by middleware).
 pub async fn register(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    axum::Extension(auth): axum::Extension<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>,
-    headers: axum::http::HeaderMap,
     Json(req): Json<RegisterRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<RegisterResponse>)> {
-    // iCaptcha gate (inert unless ICAPTCHA_MODE is set). Verify up front; spend
-    // the proof only once the request is admissible, just before the write, so a
-    // rejected request never burns a valid proof.
-    let proof = crate::icaptcha::verify_request(&headers, &auth.0)?;
-
     // Parse and validate the DID
     let agent_did: Did = req
         .did
         .parse()
         .map_err(|e: gitlawb_core::Error| AppError::BadRequest(e.to_string()))?;
 
-    // Bind registration to the authenticated signer: an agent may only register
-    // itself, not create or refresh a trust row for a DID it does not control.
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, agent_did.as_str()) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "did must be the authenticated signer".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    // Request is admissible — spend the proof now, immediately before the write.
-    proof.consume(&state.db).await?;
-
     // Store the agent in the local index
     state
         .db

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/replicas.rs

@@ -47,9 +47,8 @@ pub async fn register_replica(
 
     let replica_did = &auth.0;
 
-    // Don't let an owner register themselves as a replica of their own repo
-    // (did_matches handles the full vs bare did:key owner form).
-    if crate::api::did_matches(replica_did, &record.owner_did) {
+    // Don't let an owner register themselves as a replica of their own repo.
+    if replica_did == &record.owner_did {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
             "the repo owner is not a replica of their own repo".into(),
         ));
@@ -113,17 +112,16 @@ pub async fn unregister_replica(
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/replicas
-/// Read-visibility-gated: a PUBLIC repo's replica list stays anonymously
-/// listable (mirror-discovery), but a PRIVATE repo's replica URLs are hidden
-/// (404) from anyone who cannot read the repo at its root.
+/// Public — returns the list of replicas (DID + URL + registration timestamp).
 pub async fn list_replicas(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let replicas = state.db.list_replicas(&record.id).await?;
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/stars.rs

@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
 //!
 //! Any authenticated agent can star or unstar a repo.
 //! One agent = one star per repo (enforced by UNIQUE constraint in repo_stars).
-//! Star count is gated on repo read access.
+//! Star count is public — no auth required on GET.
 
 use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
 use axum::Json;
 
 use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
-use crate::error::Result;
+use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
 /// PUT /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/star
@@ -19,8 +19,11 @@ pub async fn star_repo(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let caller = &auth.0;
     let inserted = state.db.star_repo(&record.id, caller).await?;
@@ -51,8 +54,11 @@ pub async fn unstar_repo(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let caller = &auth.0;
     state.db.unstar_repo(&record.id, caller).await?;
@@ -68,15 +74,16 @@ pub async fn unstar_repo(
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/star
-/// Returns star count for callers who can read the repo.
+/// Returns star count — unauthenticated.
 pub async fn get_star_status(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let count = state.db.count_stars(&record.id).await?;
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/status/mod.rs

@@ -1,657 +0,0 @@
-//! Commit status claims: the write path and the combined read.
-//!
-//! POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/statuses/:sha — append one claim (owner only)
-//! GET  /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/commits/:sha/status — the combined projection
-//!
-//! Claims are append-only: a producer reporting twice for the same context
-//! leaves both rows and the visible status is a projection over the history.
-//! Reporting twice means two REQUESTS, though. An exact repeat of one already
-//! accepted is answered with 200 and the row it wrote, not a second row: the
-//! projection elects the highest `seq`, so a replayed claim would not duplicate
-//! a verdict but overturn the one that superseded it.
-
-use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
-use axum::http::StatusCode;
-use axum::Json;
-use chrono::Utc;
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-use uuid::Uuid;
-
-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
-use crate::db::StatusClaim;
-use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
-use crate::state::AppState;
-
-/// Claims for one (repo, commit, producer, context). Generous for a real
-/// producer; a producer past it is misbehaving.
-const MAX_CLAIMS_PER_TUPLE: i64 = 100;
-/// Distinct contexts for one (repo, commit). The context string is caller-chosen
-/// and free-form, so the tuple cap alone bounds nothing.
-const MAX_CONTEXTS_PER_COMMIT: i64 = 50;
-/// Claim rows for one repo within the trailing window the db layer counts over.
-/// The commit SHA is caller-chosen and never existence-checked, so a writer at
-/// the two caps above can still fan out over fresh 40-hex strings without this
-/// one. It bounds the RATE of that fan-out rather than a lifetime total, because
-/// nothing prunes the table: a lifetime bound would close the surface on a repo
-/// permanently while answering with a status every client retries.
-const MAX_CLAIMS_PER_REPO_PER_WINDOW: i64 = 10_000;
-
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-pub struct CreateStatusRequest {
-    pub state: String,
-    pub context: String,
-    pub target_url: Option<String>,
-    pub description: Option<String>,
-}
-
-/// The wire state set (KTD-1): GitHub's four commit-status states, so absence
-/// stays distinguishable without a fifth value no client understands.
-const CLAIM_STATES: [&str; 4] = ["error", "failure", "pending", "success"];
-
-/// Bounds on the signature material this write path persists verbatim. Every one
-/// of the four is caller-influenced: the headers come off the request, the
-/// signing string grows with the component list the caller's Signature-Input
-/// chose, and the body is the caller's. Without a bound the claim log's row size
-/// is set by whoever writes to it, so these are explicit and generous rather than
-/// implicit and absent. A conforming `sign_request` produces roughly 100, 200 and
-/// 400 bytes for the first three.
-const MAX_SIGNATURE_CHARS: usize = 512;
-const MAX_SIGNATURE_INPUT_CHARS: usize = 1024;
-const MAX_SIGNING_STRING_CHARS: usize = 4096;
-/// The body is a `CreateStatusRequest`, whose own fields are already capped at
-/// roughly 3.3 KB in total by the three limits below; this leaves room for JSON
-/// framing and nothing more.
-///
-/// Enforced twice, at two different moments, because the handler's check alone
-/// is not the bound it advertises: `require_signature` buffers the whole body
-/// before any handler runs, so by the time [`create_status`] measures it the
-/// allocation has already happened. `build_router` applies the same number as a
-/// `RequestBodyLimitLayer` at the transport, outside the auth layers, which is
-/// what makes it a bound on what is ALLOCATED and not only on what is STORED.
-/// The handler keeps its own check regardless — it is the one that holds for a
-/// handler reached by any other route table, and it is what the material size
-/// tests drive.
-pub(crate) const MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES: usize = 8192;
-
-const MAX_CONTEXT_CHARS: usize = 255;
-const MAX_TARGET_URL_CHARS: usize = 2048;
-const MAX_DESCRIPTION_CHARS: usize = 1024;
-
-/// The 201 body for an accepted claim: what the client needs to identify the row
-/// it just wrote, and nothing else.
-///
-/// Deliberately not the stored [`StatusClaim`]. That struct carries the signature
-/// material, and serializing it echoed the signature, the signing string and the
-/// whole request body back on every write — the body as a JSON array of integers.
-/// Write-time provenance belongs in the row, not on the wire, which is the same
-/// line [`StatusEntry`] draws on the read side.
-#[derive(Serialize)]
-pub struct CreatedStatus {
-    pub id: String,
-    /// The database-assigned ordering key, so the client can name its own row.
-    pub seq: i64,
-    pub repo_id: String,
-    pub commit_sha: String,
-    pub state: String,
-    pub context: String,
-    pub target_url: Option<String>,
-    pub description: Option<String>,
-    pub producer_did: String,
-    pub created_at: String,
-}
-
-impl CreatedStatus {
-    fn from_claim(claim: StatusClaim, seq: i64) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            id: claim.id,
-            seq,
-            repo_id: claim.repo_id,
-            commit_sha: claim.commit_sha,
-            state: claim.state,
-            context: claim.context,
-            target_url: claim.target_url,
-            description: claim.description,
-            producer_did: claim.producer_did,
-            created_at: claim.created_at,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/statuses/:sha
-pub async fn create_status(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
-    Path((owner, name, sha)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
-    material: Option<Extension<crate::auth::SignatureMaterial>>,
-    Json(req): Json<CreateStatusRequest>,
-) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<CreatedStatus>)> {
-    // Read-visibility first, then owner, and the order is the security property.
-    // authorize_repo_read denies a quarantined repo before the visibility gate and
-    // answers with the repo's own not-found, byte-identical to a missing repo, so
-    // a caller who cannot read the repo cannot learn it exists. Loading the repo
-    // and comparing the owner would answer 403 there, turning this endpoint into
-    // an existence oracle. require_repo_owner then 403s a non-owner of a repo the
-    // caller can read, where existence is not secret.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(&auth.0), "/").await?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
-
-    let commit_sha = normalize_sha(&sha)?;
-    let claim_state = validate_state(&req.state)?;
-    let context = validate_context(&req.context)?;
-    let target_url = validate_target_url(req.target_url.as_deref())?;
-    let description = validate_description(req.description.as_deref())?;
-
-    // KTD-5: the signature material is captured here because the request carries
-    // the only copy, and `signing_string` is the exact byte sequence the
-    // middleware verified. Its absence means this handler was reached without
-    // `require_signature` — a server misconfiguration (a route group that lost
-    // its auth layer, a handler mounted somewhere new), not anything the client
-    // did, so it is a 500 and no row is written. Storing an empty payload instead
-    // would leave every claim from that moment on unverifiable with nothing going
-    // red, which is exactly the absence-renders-as-success shape.
-    let Some(Extension(material)) = material else {
-        return Err(AppError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!(
-            "status claim write reached without verified signature material — \
-             the route is not behind require_signature"
-        )));
-    };
-    // The body is carried only behind the `PersistsSignedBody` marker, which
-    // this route's group applies outside the auth layers. Its absence means the
-    // marker did not reach the middleware, because the layer was dropped or
-    // reordered. That is the same class of misconfiguration as the branch above
-    // and gets the same answer. Storing an empty body instead would write claims
-    // that carry a signature over a digest of bytes nobody kept, which is
-    // exactly the case `stored_claim_re_verifies_and_a_tampered_row_does_not`
-    // exists to make impossible.
-    let Some(body) = material.body.clone() else {
-        return Err(AppError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!(
-            "status claim write reached with signature material carrying no request body: \
-             the route lost its persist-body marker or applied it inside the auth layers"
-        )));
-    };
-    // Bounded before anything is written. The material is verified, which says
-    // the caller holds the key, not that what they signed is a reasonable size.
-    bound("signature", material.signature.len(), MAX_SIGNATURE_CHARS)?;
-    bound(
-        "signature_input",
-        material.signature_input.len(),
-        MAX_SIGNATURE_INPUT_CHARS,
-    )?;
-    bound(
-        "signing_string",
-        material.signing_string.len(),
-        MAX_SIGNING_STRING_CHARS,
-    )?;
-    bound("request body", body.len(), MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES)?;
-    // After the bounds, so the scan below walks a signing string of known size.
-    require_body_bound_signature(&material, &body)?;
-
-    let digest = request_digest(&material, &body);
-    let (signature, signature_input, signing_string, request_body) = (
-        material.signature,
-        material.signature_input,
-        material.signing_string,
-        body.to_vec(),
-    );
-
-    let claim = StatusClaim {
-        id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
-        // Ignored on insert: the database assigns the ordering key (KTD-3).
-        seq: 0,
-        repo_id: record.id.clone(),
-        commit_sha,
-        state: claim_state,
-        context,
-        target_url,
-        description,
-        // Both are the owner identity today (KTD-5); they split when delegated
-        // capabilities land.
-        producer_did: auth.0.clone(),
-        authorizing_did: auth.0,
-        signature,
-        signature_input,
-        signing_string,
-        request_body,
-        request_digest: digest,
-        created_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-    };
-
-    let caps = crate::db::ClaimCaps {
-        per_tuple: MAX_CLAIMS_PER_TUPLE,
-        contexts_per_commit: MAX_CONTEXTS_PER_COMMIT,
-        per_repo_window: MAX_CLAIMS_PER_REPO_PER_WINDOW,
-    };
-    match state.db.insert_status_claim_capped(&claim, &caps).await? {
-        crate::db::ClaimInsert::Inserted(seq) => Ok((
-            StatusCode::CREATED,
-            Json(CreatedStatus::from_claim(claim, seq)),
-        )),
-        // Already recorded, so 200 and the original row rather than 201 and a
-        // second one. The claim the caller gets back is the stored one, id and
-        // seq included, which is what makes a retry safe to treat as success.
-        crate::db::ClaimInsert::AlreadyRecorded(existing) => {
-            let seq = existing.seq;
-            Ok((
-                StatusCode::OK,
-                Json(CreatedStatus::from_claim(*existing, seq)),
-            ))
-        }
-        crate::db::ClaimInsert::CapExceeded(which) => Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(format!(
-            "claim limit reached for {which}"
-        ))),
-    }
-}
-
-/// Refuse a claim whose signature does not cover the body about to be stored.
-///
-/// A claim IS provenance, so the signature stored beside it has to bind the
-/// bytes stored beside it. It does not do that directly: `signing_string`
-/// reaches the body only through a `content-digest` line. And a caller can sign
-/// a content-digest the request then never carries. `require_signature` rebuilds
-/// the covered values from the request, so an ABSENT `Content-Digest` header
-/// makes the covered digest the empty string on the signing side and the
-/// verifying side alike; the Ed25519 check passes over method, path and an empty
-/// digest, and any body at all rides along. The row that write produces asserts
-/// a provenance that cannot be re-verified: the signing string covers a digest
-/// of bytes that are not the ones in `request_body`.
-///
-/// The predicate here is the write-time form of the one `re_verify` runs against
-/// a stored row in the tests — recompute the digest of the bytes about to be
-/// persisted and require the signing string to carry exactly that line — so what
-/// this route accepts and what a third party can later re-verify are the same
-/// question, asked at both ends.
-///
-/// This is a route property, checked where the claim becomes history, and it is
-/// deliberately not the only line of defence: requiring the header in
-/// `require_signature` closes the same hole one layer earlier and for every
-/// signed route, and that change belongs there rather than here because no other
-/// route's correctness should depend on the status handler. The two agree and
-/// neither substitutes for the other — without the middleware's requirement the
-/// empty digest is still accepted everywhere else, and without this one a later
-/// relaxation of the middleware would silently resume writing unverifiable
-/// history.
-///
-/// A 400, not a 500: the material is exactly what the client signed, and what
-/// they signed does not cover what they sent.
-fn require_body_bound_signature(
-    material: &crate::auth::SignatureMaterial,
-    body: &[u8],
-) -> Result<()> {
-    let covered = format!(
-        "\"content-digest\": {}",
-        gitlawb_core::http_sig::compute_content_digest(body)
-    );
-    // Line-exact rather than a substring search: `build_signing_string` emits one
-    // component per line, and a `contains` would also be satisfied by the digest
-    // appearing INSIDE some other covered component's value, which proves
-    // nothing about what the signature covered.
-    if material.signing_string.lines().any(|line| line == covered) {
-        return Ok(());
-    }
-    Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-        "the signature does not cover this request body: send a Content-Digest header \
-         computed over the body and name \"content-digest\" among the signature's covered \
-         components"
-            .into(),
-    ))
-}
-
-/// The identity of one signed write, as a hex sha-256.
-///
-/// All four inputs together, because a replay is the same bytes arriving twice:
-/// the signature, the input that names what it covers, the canonical string it
-/// was verified over, and the body that string covers through a content-digest.
-/// The signature alone would nearly do (it covers the other three transitively),
-/// but hashing what is actually stored means the digest describes the row rather
-/// than a claim about it.
-///
-/// Each field is length-prefixed so no two different requests can concatenate to
-/// the same bytes: without it, a signature ending in some prefix of the next
-/// field would collide with the shorter signature that absorbed it.
-///
-/// This is not a nonce, and deliberately so. A nonce table needs pruning and a
-/// pruning window is a second replay window; the claim row IS the record of what
-/// was accepted, so uniqueness on it is self-maintaining.
-fn request_digest(material: &crate::auth::SignatureMaterial, body: &[u8]) -> String {
-    use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
-    let mut h = Sha256::new();
-    for part in [
-        material.signature.as_bytes(),
-        material.signature_input.as_bytes(),
-        material.signing_string.as_bytes(),
-        body,
-    ] {
-        h.update((part.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
-        h.update(part);
-    }
-    format!("{:x}", h.finalize())
-}
-
-/// One reported context in the combined response. Signature material is
-/// deliberately absent: it is write-time provenance, not read-surface data.
-#[derive(Serialize)]
-pub struct StatusEntry {
-    pub state: String,
-    pub context: String,
-    pub target_url: Option<String>,
-    pub description: Option<String>,
-    pub producer_did: String,
-    pub created_at: String,
-}
-
-/// The combined commit status. `state` never leaves the four-value set (KTD-1),
-/// so absence is carried by `total_count` 0 with the pending state rather than a
-/// fifth value, and `reported_only` (R19) says out loud that the state covers the
-/// contexts that reported, not every check a caller expected.
-#[derive(Serialize)]
-pub struct CombinedStatus {
-    pub state: String,
-    pub sha: String,
-    pub total_count: usize,
-    pub statuses: Vec<StatusEntry>,
-    pub reported_only: bool,
-}
-
-/// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/commits/:sha/status
-///
-/// The auth extension is optional and MUST be last in the extractor list: the
-/// route group carries `optional_signature`, so an unsigned caller reaches here
-/// with no `AuthenticatedDid` at all and a public repo still answers.
-pub async fn commit_status(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Path((owner, name, sha)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
-) -> Result<Json<CombinedStatus>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|Extension(a)| a.0.as_str());
-    // The gate runs first and on the requested path, before any claim data is
-    // touched. Its deny is the repo's own not-found, byte-identical to a missing
-    // repo, so the status surface cannot answer "does this repo exist".
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
-
-    let commit_sha = normalize_sha(&sha)?;
-    let statuses = project_claims(&state, &record, &commit_sha).await?;
-
-    Ok(Json(CombinedStatus {
-        state: combined_state(&statuses).to_string(),
-        sha: commit_sha,
-        total_count: statuses.len(),
-        statuses,
-        reported_only: true,
-    }))
-}
-
-/// The projection, in one place. Both read surfaces call it, so R3's "the rollup
-/// is derived by the same projection as the commit read" holds by construction
-/// rather than by two implementations happening to agree.
-///
-/// KTD-5: current authorization, not write-time authorization. An ownership
-/// transfer drops the prior owner's claims from the projection while the
-/// append-only history keeps them.
-async fn project_claims(
-    state: &AppState,
-    record: &crate::db::RepoRecord,
-    commit_sha: &str,
-) -> Result<Vec<StatusEntry>> {
-    let claims = state
-        .db
-        .latest_status_claims(&record.id, commit_sha, &record.owner_did)
-        .await?;
-    Ok(claims
-        .into_iter()
-        .map(|c| StatusEntry {
-            state: c.state,
-            context: c.context,
-            target_url: c.target_url,
-            description: c.description,
-            producer_did: c.producer_did,
-            created_at: c.created_at,
-        })
-        .collect())
-}
-
-/// The pull request head rollup (R11). `state` stays inside the four wire values
-/// whatever happened to the head (KTD-1): an unresolvable head is carried by
-/// `head_resolved`, alongside the pull request's own state, so a client can tell
-/// "the head could not be resolved" from "the head resolved and nothing reported"
-/// without a fifth state value no client understands.
-#[derive(Serialize)]
-pub struct PullRequestStatus {
-    pub number: i64,
-    /// The pull request's own state: open, closed, or merged.
-    pub pull_request_state: String,
-    pub head_resolved: bool,
-    /// The target commit, absent exactly when `head_resolved` is false.
-    pub sha: Option<String>,
-    pub state: String,
-    pub total_count: usize,
-    pub statuses: Vec<StatusEntry>,
-    pub reported_only: bool,
-}
-
-/// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/pulls/:number/status
-///
-/// Same optional-auth shape as the commit read, and the auth extension MUST stay
-/// last in the extractor list.
-pub async fn pull_request_status(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
-) -> Result<Json<PullRequestStatus>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|Extension(a)| a.0.as_str());
-    // The gate runs first, on the requested path, before the pull request row is
-    // loaded. Its deny is the repo's own not-found, byte-identical to a missing
-    // repo. Once it passes, a missing pull request number is the plain not-found:
-    // existence is no longer secret.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
-
-    let pr = state
-        .db
-        .get_pr(&record.id, number)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("PR #{number} not found")))?;
-
-    let head = rollup_head(&state, &record, &pr).await?;
-
-    let statuses = match &head {
-        Some(sha) => project_claims(&state, &record, sha).await?,
-        None => Vec::new(),
-    };
-
-    Ok(Json(PullRequestStatus {
-        number: pr.number,
-        pull_request_state: pr.status,
-        head_resolved: head.is_some(),
-        sha: head,
-        state: combined_state(&statuses).to_string(),
-        total_count: statuses.len(),
-        statuses,
-        reported_only: true,
-    }))
-}
-
-/// Branch-head lookups performed by the rollup fallback, counted so a test can
-/// assert WORK DONE rather than only the answer returned. A fallback that
-/// re-resolved on every read and then discarded the answer would be invisible in
-/// the response and visible here.
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub(crate) static BRANCH_RESOLVES: std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize =
-    std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0);
-
-/// The rollup's target commit (KTD-4).
-///
-/// The stored head wins whenever it is set. It is frozen at close or merge, so a
-/// closed or merged pull request keeps the commit the decision was made against,
-/// and only an OPEN pull request with no stored head falls back to the branch.
-///
-/// The fallback is one database read: the latest push this node recorded for the
-/// pull request's source branch, from `repo_push_events`. It deliberately does
-/// NOT go through `git::store` ref listing, which needs an acquired repository
-/// path — on a cold node that downloads the whole repository from object storage,
-/// and this read group carries no rate limiter, so an anonymous caller could
-/// drive repeated downloads with a URL.
-///
-/// `repo_push_events` is the source rather than `branch_cids` because
-/// `record_push_events` writes it for every ref update unconditionally, whereas
-/// the sole writer of `branch_cids` sits behind a pin CID. A node with no object
-/// pinning configured never writes that table, so a resolve keyed on it could
-/// never answer there and every open pull request without a stored head reported
-/// `head_resolved: false` forever. The residual limit is that only pushes taken
-/// after this shipped have rows, so a branch last pushed before then still does
-/// not resolve.
-///
-/// The resolved head is persisted, which makes an unauthenticated GET write. That
-/// is only acceptable because the write is self-limiting: it fires exactly when
-/// `head_commit` is absent and it fills it, and the fill is conditioned on that
-/// same absence in SQL, so the PERSIST happens at most once per pull request.
-/// The resolve attempt itself is not once-only — a pull request whose branch does
-/// not resolve stores nothing, so there is nothing to short-circuit on and the
-/// lookup runs again on every read until it succeeds.
-async fn rollup_head(
-    state: &AppState,
-    record: &crate::db::RepoRecord,
-    pr: &crate::db::PullRequest,
-) -> Result<Option<String>> {
-    if let Some(stored) = pr.head_commit.clone() {
-        return Ok(Some(stored));
-    }
-    if pr.status != "open" {
-        return Ok(None);
-    }
-
-    // The push path records the full ref while a pull request stores the bare
-    // branch name, the same mismatch `crate::api::repos::branch_from_ref`
-    // reconciles on the write side; this is that mapping run backwards. The empty
-    // branch is excluded for the same reason it is there: `refs/heads/` is not a
-    // branch and nothing can have written it.
-    if pr.source_branch.is_empty() {
-        return Ok(None);
-    }
-    let ref_name = format!("refs/heads/{}", pr.source_branch);
-    #[cfg(test)]
-    BRANCH_RESOLVES.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
-    let resolved = state
-        .db
-        .latest_push_sha_for_ref(&record.id, &ref_name)
-        .await?
-        // A recorded head that is not a commit SHA is no target at all, and
-        // storing it would leave the rollup pointing at nothing forever.
-        .and_then(|sha| normalize_sha(&sha).ok());
-
-    let Some(sha) = resolved else {
-        return Ok(None);
-    };
-    // Best effort, and deliberately not `?`. The head is already resolved and the
-    // response does not depend on this write landing, so a transient database
-    // failure here must not turn a served read into a 500; the next read resolves
-    // again and re-attempts the fill. Same catch-and-log the sibling writes on the
-    // push path use (`update_open_pr_heads`, `record_push_events`).
-    if let Err(e) = state.db.set_pr_head_if_absent(&pr.id, &sha).await {
-        tracing::warn!(
-            err = %e,
-            pr_id = %pr.id,
-            "failed to persist a resolved pull request head; serving the resolved head anyway"
-        );
-    }
-    Ok(Some(sha))
-}
-
-/// KTD-1's fold: any error or failure yields failure, else any pending yields
-/// pending, else success. An empty set is pending, never success — total absence
-/// of a verdict is its own state and must not read as a pass (R10).
-fn combined_state(statuses: &[StatusEntry]) -> &'static str {
-    if statuses.is_empty() {
-        return "pending";
-    }
-    if statuses
-        .iter()
-        .any(|s| s.state == "error" || s.state == "failure")
-    {
-        "failure"
-    } else if statuses.iter().any(|s| s.state == "pending") {
-        "pending"
-    } else {
-        "success"
-    }
-}
-
-/// 40 hex characters, lowercased. The SHA is never existence-checked (KTD-7):
-/// a claim describes a commit object, and the object may not have arrived yet.
-fn normalize_sha(sha: &str) -> Result<String> {
-    if sha.len() == 40 && sha.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
-        Ok(sha.to_ascii_lowercase())
-    } else {
-        Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "commit sha must be exactly 40 hexadecimal characters".into(),
-        ))
-    }
-}
-
-/// One size bound on persisted signature material, measured in bytes.
-fn bound(what: &str, len: usize, max: usize) -> Result<()> {
-    if len > max {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
-            "{what} must be at most {max} bytes"
-        )));
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-fn validate_state(state: &str) -> Result<String> {
-    if CLAIM_STATES.contains(&state) {
-        Ok(state.to_string())
-    } else {
-        Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
-            "state must be one of {}",
-            CLAIM_STATES.join(", ")
-        )))
-    }
-}
-
-/// The context is the projection key, so it is trimmed, bounded, and required to
-/// be free of control characters.
-fn validate_context(context: &str) -> Result<String> {
-    let trimmed = context.trim();
-    if trimmed.is_empty() || trimmed.chars().count() > MAX_CONTEXT_CHARS {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
-            "context must be 1 to {MAX_CONTEXT_CHARS} characters"
-        )));
-    }
-    if trimmed.chars().any(char::is_control) {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "context must not contain control characters".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-    Ok(trimmed.to_string())
-}
-
-fn validate_target_url(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<Option<String>> {
-    let Some(url) = url else { return Ok(None) };
-    if url.chars().count() > MAX_TARGET_URL_CHARS {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
-            "target_url must be at most {MAX_TARGET_URL_CHARS} characters"
-        )));
-    }
-    let lower = url.to_ascii_lowercase();
-    if lower.starts_with("http://") || lower.starts_with("https://") {
-        Ok(Some(url.to_string()))
-    } else {
-        Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "target_url must be an http or https URL".into(),
-        ))
-    }
-}
-
-fn validate_description(description: Option<&str>) -> Result<Option<String>> {
-    match description {
-        Some(d) if d.chars().count() > MAX_DESCRIPTION_CHARS => Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
-            "description must be at most {MAX_DESCRIPTION_CHARS} characters"
-        ))),
-        other => Ok(other.map(str::to_string)),
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests;

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/tasks.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 //!   POST   /api/v1/tasks/{id}/fail          — fail task
 
 use axum::{
-    extract::{Extension, Path, Query, State},
+    extract::{Path, Query, State},
     http::StatusCode,
     Json,
 };
@@ -18,18 +18,9 @@ use serde::Deserialize;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::db::AgentTask;
 use crate::state::{AppState, TaskEventBroadcast};
 
-/// 403 in this module's error shape (`(StatusCode, Json<Value>)`, not `AppError`).
-fn forbidden(msg: &str) -> (StatusCode, Json<Value>) {
-    (
-        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
-        Json(json!({ "error": "forbidden", "message": msg })),
-    )
-}
-
 // ── Request / response types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -64,11 +55,13 @@ pub struct ClaimTaskBody {
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 pub struct CompleteTaskBody {
     pub result: Option<String>,
+    pub by_did: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 pub struct FailTaskBody {
     pub reason: Option<String>,
+    pub by_did: Option<String>,
 }
 
 fn task_to_json(t: &AgentTask) -> Value {
@@ -94,20 +87,15 @@ fn task_to_json(t: &AgentTask) -> Value {
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks
 pub async fn create_task(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Json(body): Json<CreateTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<Value>), (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    // Bind the delegator to the authenticated signer (N13).
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &body.delegator_did) {
-        return Err(forbidden("delegator_did must be the authenticated signer"));
-    }
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
     let task = AgentTask {
         id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
         repo_id: body.repo_id,
         kind: body.kind,
         status: "pending".to_string(),
-        delegator_did: auth.0,
+        delegator_did: body.delegator_did,
         assignee_did: body.assignee_did,
         capability: body.capability,
         ucan_token: body.ucan_token,
@@ -166,25 +154,24 @@ pub async fn get_task(
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/claim
 pub async fn claim_task(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(body): Json<ClaimTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    // Bind the assignee to the authenticated signer (N13).
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &body.assignee_did) {
-        return Err(forbidden("assignee_did must be the authenticated signer"));
-    }
-    let task = state.db.claim_task(&id, &auth.0).await.map_err(|e| {
-        (
-            StatusCode::CONFLICT,
-            Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
-        )
-    })?;
+    let task = state
+        .db
+        .claim_task(&id, &body.assignee_did)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            (
+                StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
+            )
+        })?;
     let _ = state.task_event_tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
         task_id: id,
         old_status: "pending".to_string(),
         new_status: "claimed".to_string(),
-        by_did: auth.0,
+        by_did: body.assignee_did,
         at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
     });
     Ok(Json(task_to_json(&task)))
@@ -193,44 +180,17 @@ pub async fn claim_task(
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/complete
 pub async fn complete_task(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(body): Json<CompleteTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    // Authorize the actor, not just bind their identity: the N13 signer-binding
-    // proved the caller was whoever they claimed, but never that they were the
-    // task's assignee. Load the task and require the caller to be its assignee;
-    // finish_task then transitions only a claimed task.
-    let existing = state
-        .db
-        .get_task(&id)
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            (
-                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
-                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
-            )
-        })?
-        .ok_or_else(|| {
-            (
-                StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
-                Json(json!({ "error": "task not found" })),
-            )
-        })?;
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(
-        &auth.0,
-        existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
-    ) {
-        return Err(forbidden("only the task assignee can complete it"));
-    }
-    let by_did = auth.0;
+    let by_did = body.by_did.unwrap_or_default();
     let task = state
         .db
         .finish_task(&id, "completed", body.result.as_deref())
         .await
         .map_err(|e| {
             (
-                StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+                StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
                 Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
             )
         })?;
@@ -247,36 +207,10 @@ pub async fn complete_task(
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/fail
 pub async fn fail_task(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(body): Json<FailTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    // Authorize the actor, not just bind their identity (see complete_task): only
-    // the task's assignee may fail it, and finish_task transitions only a claimed
-    // task.
-    let existing = state
-        .db
-        .get_task(&id)
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            (
-                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
-                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
-            )
-        })?
-        .ok_or_else(|| {
-            (
-                StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
-                Json(json!({ "error": "task not found" })),
-            )
-        })?;
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(
-        &auth.0,
-        existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
-    ) {
-        return Err(forbidden("only the task assignee can fail it"));
-    }
-    let by_did = auth.0;
+    let by_did = body.by_did.unwrap_or_default();
     let reason = body.reason.unwrap_or_default();
     let task = state
         .db
@@ -284,7 +218,7 @@ pub async fn fail_task(
         .await
         .map_err(|e| {
             (
-                StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+                StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
                 Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
             )
         })?;

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/visibility.rs

@@ -26,16 +26,17 @@ pub struct RemoveVisibilityRequest {
 }
 
 fn require_owner(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> Result<()> {
-    // DID-safe owner match (collapses did:key full vs bare on both sides, never
-    // across methods), shared with require_repo_owner — not a trailing-segment
-    // compare that only normalized the owner side.
-    if crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
-        Ok(())
-    } else {
-        Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    let owner_short = record
+        .owner_did
+        .split(':')
+        .next_back()
+        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    if caller != record.owner_did && caller != owner_short {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
             "only the repo owner can manage visibility".into(),
-        ))
+        ));
     }
+    Ok(())
 }
 
 /// Reject malformed globs before they reach the store, where they would
@@ -56,23 +57,9 @@ fn validate_path_glob(path_glob: &str) -> Result<()> {
             "path_glob must not end with '/'".into(),
         ));
     }
-    // Reject empty path segments. `glob_prefix` collapses "//**" to "/" (whole
-    // repo), so without this an operator could bypass the "/**" guard above and
-    // grant repo-wide read with "//**", or set a dead rule like "//secret/**"
-    // whose prefix never matches a real single-slash path and silently leaves
-    // the subtree readable.
-    if path_glob.contains("//") {
+    if path_glob.contains('*') && !path_glob.ends_with("/**") {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "path_glob must not contain empty path segments".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-    // Strip the one permitted trailing "/**" before checking for stray
-    // wildcards, otherwise a "*" elsewhere in the prefix (e.g. "/a*b/**" or
-    // "/a/**/**") slips through because the string still ends with "/**".
-    let prefix = path_glob.strip_suffix("/**").unwrap_or(path_glob);
-    if prefix.contains('*') {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "the only supported wildcard is a single trailing '/**'".into(),
+            "the only supported wildcard is a trailing '/**'".into(),
         ));
     }
     Ok(())
@@ -253,22 +240,9 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn rejects_malformed_globs() {
-        // empty, no leading slash, whole-repo via "/**", trailing slash,
-        // non-trailing wildcards, double wildcards, and empty path segments
-        // (which would collapse to whole-repo or a dead rule) are all rejected.
-        for g in [
-            "",
-            "secret/**",
-            "/**",
-            "/**/**",
-            "/secret/",
-            "/a*b",
-            "/*/x",
-            "/a*b/**",
-            "/a/**/**",
-            "//**",
-            "//secret/**",
-        ] {
+        // empty, no leading slash, whole-repo via "/**", trailing slash, and
+        // non-trailing wildcards are all rejected.
+        for g in ["", "secret/**", "/**", "/secret/", "/a*b", "/*/x"] {
             assert!(validate_path_glob(g).is_err(), "{g} should be rejected");
         }
     }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/webhooks.rs

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 //! Webhook CRUD API.
 //!
-//! POST   /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks        — create (owner only)
-//! GET    /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks        — list (owner only; auth required)
-//! DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks/:id   — delete (owner only)
+//! POST   /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks        — create (auth required)
+//! GET    /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks        — list
+//! DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks/:id   — delete (auth required)
 
 use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
@@ -38,16 +38,11 @@ pub async fn create_webhook(
         .get_repo(&owner, &name)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
-    // Gate the target through the same hardened public-host validator the peer
-    // announce path uses, so an authenticated owner cannot register a webhook
-    // that makes the node POST to loopback/private/link-local/metadata
-    // endpoints (SSRF). Delivery runs on the shared no-redirect client
-    // (main.rs), which closes the 3xx-to-internal bounce.
-    if !crate::api::peers::is_public_http_url(&req.url) {
+    // Validate URL is http/https
+    if !req.url.starts_with("http://") && !req.url.starts_with("https://") {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "webhook URL must be a public http(s) URL (no loopback, private, or .internal/.local hosts)".into(),
+            "webhook URL must be http:// or https://".into(),
         ));
     }
 
@@ -73,26 +68,12 @@ pub async fn create_webhook(
 pub async fn list_webhooks(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    // This route sits on `optional_signature`, so the DID is optional. Webhook
-    // callback URLs are owner-secret config and there is no anonymous form, so a
-    // headerless caller is rejected before any lookup (401, which fires for an
-    // existing-private and an absent repo alike, so it leaks no existence).
-    let Some(Extension(AuthenticatedDid(caller))) = auth else {
-        return Err(AppError::Unauthorized(
-            "listing webhooks requires authentication".into(),
-        ));
-    };
-
-    // Read-visibility first, then owner. authorize_repo_read returns 404 on a
-    // visibility deny, so a non-reader of a private repo cannot tell it exists
-    // (uniform with the sibling read surfaces); require_repo_owner then yields
-    // 403 only for a non-owner of a public/readable repo, where existence is not
-    // secret.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(&caller), "/").await?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &caller)?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let hooks = state.db.list_webhooks(&record.id).await?;
     // Redact secrets in list response
@@ -114,7 +95,6 @@ pub async fn list_webhooks(
 /// DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks/:id
 pub async fn delete_webhook(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name, id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let record = state
@@ -122,7 +102,6 @@ pub async fn delete_webhook(
         .get_repo(&owner, &name)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     // Verify the webhook belongs to this repo
     let hook = state
@@ -138,35 +117,3 @@ pub async fn delete_webhook(
     state.db.delete_webhook(&id).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "deleted": true, "id": id })))
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::api::peers::is_public_http_url;
-
-    // create_webhook gates req.url through is_public_http_url. Pin the exact
-    // SSRF targets from issue #81 so the webhook path can never regress to the
-    // old scheme-only check, independent of the validator's own peer tests.
-    #[test]
-    fn webhook_url_gate_rejects_ssrf_targets() {
-        for bad in [
-            "http://127.0.0.1:5432/",
-            "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
-            "http://localhost/",
-            "http://10.0.0.5/",
-            "http://[::1]/",
-            // IPv6 transition encodings smuggling loopback v4 (6to4 / NAT64).
-            "http://[2002:7f00:1::]/",
-            "http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/",
-            "ftp://example.com/",
-            "not-a-url",
-        ] {
-            assert!(!is_public_http_url(bad), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn webhook_url_gate_allows_public_targets() {
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("https://hooks.example.com/gitlawb"));
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://203.0.113.10:7545/"));
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/arweave.rs

@@ -103,108 +103,6 @@ pub async fn anchor_ref_update(
     Ok(tx_id)
 }
 
-/// A per-push manifest of the blobs encrypted this push (Option B3). The
-/// `blobs` slice is `(oid, cid)` tuples. Anchored directly to Arweave as its JSON
-/// body so the discovery index survives total node loss. Recipient identities are
-/// never part of the manifest.
-pub struct EncryptedManifest<'a> {
-    pub repo: &'a str,
-    pub owner_did: &'a str,
-    pub node_did: &'a str,
-    pub timestamp: &'a str,
-    pub blobs: &'a [(String, String)],
-}
-
-/// Anchor a per-push encrypted-blob manifest to Arweave via Irys. The manifest
-/// JSON body is the payload (not a CID pointer to IPFS), so the index is
-/// permanent and self-contained. Recipient identities are deliberately omitted:
-/// the anchor is permanent and public, and the v2 envelopes no longer expose
-/// recipients, so the reader set must not be written to Arweave either.
-///
-/// Returns the Irys/Arweave transaction ID, or `Ok("")` when `irys_url` is empty
-/// (anchoring disabled) or there are no blobs to anchor.
-pub async fn anchor_encrypted_manifest(
-    client: &reqwest::Client,
-    irys_url: &str,
-    manifest: &EncryptedManifest<'_>,
-) -> Result<String> {
-    if irys_url.is_empty() || manifest.blobs.is_empty() {
-        return Ok(String::new());
-    }
-
-    let blobs_json: Vec<serde_json::Value> = manifest
-        .blobs
-        .iter()
-        .map(|(oid, cid)| manifest_blob_json(oid, cid))
-        .collect();
-
-    let payload = json!({
-        "schema": "gitlawb/encrypted-manifest/v1",
-        "repo": manifest.repo,
-        "owner_did": manifest.owner_did,
-        "node_did": manifest.node_did,
-        "timestamp": manifest.timestamp,
-        "blobs": blobs_json,
-    });
-
-    let body = serde_json::to_vec(&payload)?;
-    let url = format!("{}/upload", irys_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-
-    let resp = client
-        .post(&url)
-        .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
-        .header("x-irys-tags", build_manifest_tags_header(manifest))
-        .body(body)
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Irys upload failed: {e}"))?;
-
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        let status = resp.status();
-        let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Irys returned {status}: {body}"));
-    }
-
-    let json: serde_json::Value = resp
-        .json()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to parse Irys response: {e}"))?;
-
-    let tx_id = json["id"]
-        .as_str()
-        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("no 'id' in Irys response: {json}"))?
-        .to_string();
-
-    tracing::info!(
-        repo = %manifest.repo,
-        tx_id = %tx_id,
-        blobs = manifest.blobs.len(),
-        "anchored encrypted manifest to Arweave"
-    );
-
-    Ok(tx_id)
-}
-
-/// Serialize one blob for the Arweave manifest. Recipient identities are
-/// intentionally absent so the permanent public anchor never records who can
-/// read a blob.
-fn manifest_blob_json(oid: &str, cid: &str) -> serde_json::Value {
-    json!({ "oid": oid, "cid": cid })
-}
-
-/// Build the Irys tag header for an encrypted-blob manifest. `Repo` and `Schema`
-/// are the tags the `gl` recovery query filters on.
-fn build_manifest_tags_header(manifest: &EncryptedManifest<'_>) -> String {
-    [
-        "App-Name:gitlawb".to_string(),
-        "Schema:gitlawb/encrypted-manifest/v1".to_string(),
-        format!("Repo:{}", sanitize_tag(manifest.repo)),
-        format!("Owner-DID:{}", sanitize_tag(manifest.owner_did)),
-        format!("Node-DID:{}", sanitize_tag(manifest.node_did)),
-    ]
-    .join(",")
-}
-
 /// Arweave permanent URL for a given Irys transaction ID.
 pub fn arweave_url(tx_id: &str) -> String {
     format!("https://arweave.net/{tx_id}")
@@ -243,7 +141,7 @@ mod tests {
             repo: "alice/myrepo".into(),
             owner_did: "did:key:z6Mk...".into(),
             ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000".into(),
+            old_sha: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".into(),
             new_sha: "a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2".into(),
             cid: Some("bafyreib5...".into()),
             timestamp: "2026-03-14T00:00:00Z".into(),
@@ -270,7 +168,7 @@ mod tests {
             repo: "alice/myrepo".into(),
             owner_did: "did:key:z6Mk...".into(),
             ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: "0".repeat(40),
+            old_sha: "0".repeat(64),
             new_sha: "a1b2c3d4".repeat(8),
             cid: None,
             timestamp: "2026-03-14T00:00:00Z".into(),
@@ -286,44 +184,6 @@ mod tests {
         _mock.assert_async().await;
     }
 
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_anchor_body_carries_real_old_sha() {
-        // The anchored body must serialize the real old→new transition the
-        // node was handed, never a zero placeholder. Regression guard for the
-        // push handler that used to hardcode `old_sha` to 64 zeros (#26).
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let real_old = "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
-        let real_new = "2222222222222222222222222222222222222222";
-        let _mock = server
-            .mock("POST", "/upload")
-            .match_body(mockito::Matcher::AllOf(vec![
-                mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"old_sha":"{real_old}"}}"#)),
-                mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"new_sha":"{real_new}"}}"#)),
-            ]))
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"id":"TX_REAL_OLD_SHA","timestamp":1710000000000,"version":"1.0.0"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
-        let anchor = RefAnchor {
-            repo: "alice/myrepo".into(),
-            owner_did: "did:key:z6Mk...".into(),
-            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: real_old.into(),
-            new_sha: real_new.into(),
-            cid: None,
-            timestamp: "2026-03-14T00:00:00Z".into(),
-            node_did: "did:key:z6Mknnd...".into(),
-        };
-
-        let result = anchor_ref_update(&client, &server.url(), &anchor).await;
-        assert_eq!(result.unwrap(), "TX_REAL_OLD_SHA");
-        // The mock only matches when the posted JSON carries both real SHAs.
-        _mock.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn test_arweave_url() {
         let url = arweave_url("7xGpIoHUQ8j9GhD3Y2mKzP1NsVtXwRcFe4bEaLnMuOk");
@@ -333,79 +193,6 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_manifest_anchor_noop_when_url_empty() {
-        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
-        let blobs = vec![("oid1".to_string(), "cid1".to_string())];
-        let m = EncryptedManifest {
-            repo: "alice/r",
-            owner_did: "did:key:zO",
-            node_did: "did:key:zN",
-            timestamp: "2026-06-11T00:00:00Z",
-            blobs: &blobs,
-        };
-        assert_eq!(
-            anchor_encrypted_manifest(&client, "", &m).await.unwrap(),
-            ""
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_manifest_anchor_noop_when_no_blobs() {
-        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
-        let blobs: Vec<(String, String)> = vec![];
-        let m = EncryptedManifest {
-            repo: "alice/r",
-            owner_did: "did:key:zO",
-            node_did: "did:key:zN",
-            timestamp: "2026-06-11T00:00:00Z",
-            blobs: &blobs,
-        };
-        // Non-empty URL, but no blobs: still a no-op.
-        assert_eq!(
-            anchor_encrypted_manifest(&client, "https://example.invalid", &m)
-                .await
-                .unwrap(),
-            ""
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_manifest_anchor_success() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let _mock = server
-            .mock("POST", "/upload")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"id":"MANIFESTTX123","timestamp":1710000000000,"version":"1.0.0"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
-        let blobs = vec![("oid1".to_string(), "cid1".to_string())];
-        let m = EncryptedManifest {
-            repo: "alice/r",
-            owner_did: "did:key:zO",
-            node_did: "did:key:zN",
-            timestamp: "2026-06-11T00:00:00Z",
-            blobs: &blobs,
-        };
-        let r = anchor_encrypted_manifest(&client, &server.url(), &m).await;
-        assert_eq!(r.unwrap(), "MANIFESTTX123");
-        _mock.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn manifest_blob_json_omits_recipients() {
-        let v = manifest_blob_json("oid1", "cidA");
-        assert_eq!(v["oid"], "oid1");
-        assert_eq!(v["cid"], "cidA");
-        assert!(
-            v.get("recipients").is_none(),
-            "Arweave manifest must not anchor recipient identities"
-        );
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn test_sanitize_tag() {
         assert_eq!(sanitize_tag("alice/myrepo"), "alice/myrepo");

crates/gitlawb-node/src/auth/mod.rs

@@ -17,65 +17,6 @@ use crate::state::AppState;
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct AuthenticatedDid(pub String);
 
-/// The RFC 9421 material this request was actually verified against, injected
-/// alongside [`AuthenticatedDid`] by `require_signature`.
-///
-/// A handler that records a signed claim as history has to store it: the header
-/// values and the canonical signing string are gone once the request ends, and a
-/// stored claim nobody can re-verify is not history. `signing_string` is the exact
-/// byte sequence the Ed25519 verification succeeded over, not a rebuild — a
-/// handler reconstructing it from headers would be verifying a different string
-/// than the middleware did.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct SignatureMaterial {
-    /// The `Signature` header value.
-    pub signature: String,
-    /// The `Signature-Input` header value.
-    pub signature_input: String,
-    /// The canonical bytes the signature covered.
-    pub signing_string: String,
-    /// The buffered request body, on the routes that persist it. The signing
-    /// string covers it only through the content-digest, so without these bytes
-    /// a stored claim can be shown to carry *a* valid signature over *some*
-    /// digest and nothing more. Carried here because the body is consumed
-    /// downstream by the extractor and cannot be recovered afterwards.
-    ///
-    /// `Option`, and populated only behind [`PersistsSignedBody`], because a
-    /// route that never stores the body has no use for a second handle to it.
-    /// The unlike-sized field is this one: the three above are header-derived
-    /// and bounded by the server's header limit, while a receive-pack POST
-    /// carries up to GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES (2 GB by default). `Bytes`, not
-    /// `Vec<u8>`, so the handle the marked routes do take is a refcount bump
-    /// over the buffer the middleware already holds rather than a copy.
-    pub body: Option<axum::body::Bytes>,
-}
-
-/// Marks a route group whose handler persists the signed request body.
-///
-/// Applied as an extension layer OUTSIDE the auth layers, so it is on the
-/// request before [`require_signature`] decides whether to carry the body. A
-/// marker applied inside them is never seen, and the failure is silent: the
-/// handler still compiles, tests that inject material by hand still pass, and
-/// production stores nothing. The status write handler refuses an absent body
-/// for that reason.
-///
-/// A marker rather than a path check because `require_signature` must not learn
-/// which URL persists claims; that knowledge belongs at the route table.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
-pub struct PersistsSignedBody;
-
-/// Whether `caller` is authorized to push to `record`.
-///
-/// Phase 1 (`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH`): owner-only, via the canonical
-/// [`crate::api::did_matches`] owner comparison (DID-safe on both sides). This is
-/// intentionally a distinct, intent-named gate rather than a bare owner check so
-/// that Phase 2 can extend it to honor a verified UCAN `git/push` capability as a
-/// pure addition (`did_matches(..) || ucan_grants_push(..)`) without rewriting
-/// call sites.
-pub fn caller_authorized_to_push(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> bool {
-    crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did)
-}
-
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::{
     build_signing_string, compute_content_digest, HttpSignature, COVERED_COMPONENTS,
 };
@@ -285,28 +226,10 @@ pub async fn require_signature(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
 
     tracing::info!(did = %sig.key_id, "✓ authenticated request");
 
-    // The body travels only where it is stored. On every other signed route the
-    // middleware's handle would keep the buffer alive for the rest of the layer
-    // chain, until the handler's own extractor consumes the request.
-    let body = parts
-        .extensions
-        .get::<PersistsSignedBody>()
-        .map(|_| body_bytes.clone());
-
-    let material = SignatureMaterial {
-        signature: sig_header,
-        signature_input: sig_input,
-        signing_string,
-        body,
-    };
-
     let mut request = Request::from_parts(parts, Body::from(body_bytes));
     request
         .extensions_mut()
         .insert(AuthenticatedDid(sig.key_id.to_string()));
-    // Carry the verified material forward for handlers that persist a signed
-    // claim; none of it can be recovered once the request is gone.
-    request.extensions_mut().insert(material);
     next.run(request).await
 }
 
@@ -579,109 +502,10 @@ mod tests {
             machine_id: None,
             repo_store: crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), pool),
             rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(100, Duration::from_secs(60)),
-            create_ip_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(1000, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
-            push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
-            push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None,
-            sync_trigger_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
-            peer_write_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
             shutdown_tx: tokio::sync::watch::channel(false).0,
         }
     }
 
-    /// Reports what the signature middleware put in `SignatureMaterial.body`,
-    /// so a test can tell "captured" from "deliberately not captured" apart
-    /// from "the middleware never ran".
-    async fn report_body(material: Option<axum::Extension<SignatureMaterial>>) -> String {
-        match material {
-            Some(axum::Extension(m)) => match m.body {
-                Some(bytes) => format!("captured:{}", bytes.len()),
-                None => "absent".to_string(),
-            },
-            None => "no-material".to_string(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn signed_post(path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Request {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let signed = gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request(&kp, "POST", path, body);
-        Request::builder()
-            .method("POST")
-            .uri(path)
-            .header("content-digest", signed.content_digest)
-            .header("signature-input", signed.signature_input)
-            .header("signature", signed.signature)
-            .body(axum::body::Body::from(body.to_vec()))
-            .unwrap()
-    }
-
-    /// The body handle travels only on a route that asked for it.
-    ///
-    /// Both arms drive a genuinely signed request through `require_signature`;
-    /// the only difference is the [`PersistsSignedBody`] marker layer. A
-    /// middleware that captured unconditionally would make both arms read
-    /// `captured`, and one that never read the marker would make both read
-    /// `absent`, so the pair pins the decision rather than the mechanism.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn the_body_is_carried_only_when_the_route_marks_itself_as_persisting_it() {
-        let body = br#"{"state":"success"}"#;
-
-        // The marker layer is added AFTER the middleware layer, which is what
-        // makes it the outer of the two and therefore the one that runs first.
-        // This is the same relative position `build_router` uses on the status
-        // write group, where the marker sits outside `add_auth_layers`.
-        let marked = Router::new()
-            .route("/", axum::routing::post(report_body))
-            .layer(middleware::from_fn(require_signature))
-            .layer(axum::Extension(PersistsSignedBody));
-        let resp = marked.oneshot(signed_post("/", body)).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
-        let seen = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 2048).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            String::from_utf8(seen.to_vec()).unwrap(),
-            format!("captured:{}", body.len()),
-            "a route carrying the persist marker must receive the buffered body"
-        );
-
-        let unmarked = Router::new()
-            .route("/", axum::routing::post(report_body))
-            .layer(middleware::from_fn(require_signature));
-        let resp = unmarked.oneshot(signed_post("/", body)).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
-        let seen = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 2048).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            String::from_utf8(seen.to_vec()).unwrap(),
-            "absent",
-            "a signed route that never persists the body must not be handed a handle to it"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// The marker is read from the request the middleware was given, and the
-    /// request it hands downstream still carries it. Both halves matter: the
-    /// first is the capture decision, the second is that rebuilding the request
-    /// from its parts does not drop extensions a later layer may want.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn the_marker_survives_the_request_rebuild() {
-        async fn report_marker(marker: Option<axum::Extension<PersistsSignedBody>>) -> String {
-            match marker {
-                Some(_) => "marked".to_string(),
-                None => "unmarked".to_string(),
-            }
-        }
-
-        let app = Router::new()
-            .route("/", axum::routing::post(report_marker))
-            .layer(middleware::from_fn(require_signature))
-            .layer(axum::Extension(PersistsSignedBody));
-        let resp = app.oneshot(signed_post("/", b"{}")).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
-        let seen = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 2048).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            String::from_utf8(seen.to_vec()).unwrap(),
-            "marked",
-            "the marker must reach the handler, so the middleware saw it too"
-        );
-    }
-
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn require_ucan_chain_no_header_passes_through() {
         let state = make_test_state(Keypair::generate().did());

crates/gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs

@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ pub async fn issue_ref_certificate(
         issued_at,
     };
 
-    // Persist and return the row as it exists in the database (on a
-    // conflict the existing row survives when it is newer).
-    state.db.insert_ref_certificate(&cert).await
+    state.db.insert_ref_certificate(&cert).await?;
+    Ok(cert)
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rs

@@ -49,14 +49,6 @@ pub struct Config {
     )]
     pub require_signed_peer_writes: bool,
 
-    /// Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on `git-receive-pack`.
-    /// Authentication (a valid did:key signature) is not authorization on its own:
-    /// any party can sign as their own DID. When true, pushes whose authenticated
-    /// DID is not the repo owner are rejected. Keep false during rolling upgrades;
-    /// flip it on once owners are ready for owner-only writes.
-    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH", default_value_t = false)]
-    pub enforce_owner_push: bool,
-
     /// URL of local IPFS/Kubo node HTTP API (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:5001)
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_IPFS_API", default_value = "")]
     pub ipfs_api: String,
@@ -140,20 +132,6 @@ pub struct Config {
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES", default_value_t = 2_147_483_648)]
     pub max_pack_bytes: usize,
 
-    /// Per-client-IP rate limit for `POST /api/v1/sync/trigger`, in requests per
-    /// hour. `/sync/trigger` requires a signature and drives an O(peers) outbound
-    /// fan-out per call, so it gets a tight bucket. `0` disables. Default: 60.
-    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_SYNC_TRIGGER_RATE_LIMIT", default_value_t = 60)]
-    pub sync_trigger_rate_limit: usize,
-
-    /// Per-client-IP rate limit for the peer-write routes (`/peers/announce`,
-    /// `/sync/notify`), in requests per hour. These accept unsigned requests from
-    /// known peers and run at higher frequency, so the bucket is generous. Keeping
-    /// it separate from the trigger bucket stops an unsigned notify flood from
-    /// draining the signed trigger caller's quota. `0` disables. Default: 600.
-    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_PEER_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT", default_value_t = 600)]
-    pub peer_write_rate_limit: usize,
-
     /// Optional address to bind a Prometheus `/metrics` exposition endpoint on.
     /// Example: `127.0.0.1:9091`. Leave empty (default) to disable.
     /// Bind to localhost or a private interface — the metrics endpoint is
@@ -166,74 +144,6 @@ pub struct Config {
     /// in flight and exits. Default: 30s.
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_SHUTDOWN_GRACE_SECS", default_value_t = 30)]
     pub shutdown_grace_secs: u64,
-
-    /// Maximum wall-clock time a single served git operation (upload-pack /
-    /// receive-pack through `run_git_service`) may run before it is aborted and
-    /// its process group torn down, in seconds. Bounds a git that neither
-    /// finishes nor disconnects. Must be positive; set it very large to
-    /// effectively disable the bound. Default: 600s (10 min), generous for large
-    /// clones. Does not cover the ref advertisement (`info/refs`) or the
-    /// withheld-blob fetch path (`upload_pack_excluding`, a blocking
-    /// `spawn_blocking` a tokio timeout cannot cancel); both remain unbounded.
-    #[arg(
-        long,
-        env = "GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS",
-        default_value_t = 600,
-        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
-    )]
-    pub git_service_timeout_secs: u64,
-
-    /// Maximum connections in the PostgreSQL pool. This is a cap, not a floor
-    /// (connections open lazily). Size against the database server's
-    /// max_connections, remembering admin tooling opens its own pool.
-    #[arg(
-        long,
-        env = "GITLAWB_DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS",
-        default_value_t = 20,
-        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u32).range(1..)
-    )]
-    pub db_max_connections: u32,
-
-    /// Maximum time a request waits for a pool connection before failing with
-    /// 503, in seconds. Bounds queueing when the database is slow or down.
-    #[arg(
-        long,
-        env = "GITLAWB_DB_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS",
-        default_value_t = 5,
-        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
-    )]
-    pub db_acquire_timeout_secs: u64,
-
-    /// Upper bound on each startup connect-and-migrate attempt, in seconds.
-    /// Migrations wait on a cross-instance advisory lock, so this must be
-    /// generous enough for a peer instance to finish migrating; on expiry the
-    /// attempt is retried (migrations are idempotent).
-    #[arg(
-        long,
-        env = "GITLAWB_DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS",
-        default_value_t = 60,
-        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
-    )]
-    pub db_connect_timeout_secs: u64,
-
-    /// First retry delay when the database is unavailable at startup, in
-    /// seconds. Doubles each attempt up to --db-retry-max-secs.
-    #[arg(
-        long,
-        env = "GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_INITIAL_SECS",
-        default_value_t = 5,
-        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
-    )]
-    pub db_retry_initial_secs: u64,
-
-    /// Ceiling on the startup retry delay, in seconds.
-    #[arg(
-        long,
-        env = "GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_MAX_SECS",
-        default_value_t = 60,
-        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
-    )]
-    pub db_retry_max_secs: u64,
 }
 
 impl Config {
@@ -251,25 +161,3 @@ impl Config {
         PathBuf::from(&self.key_path)
     }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn git_service_timeout_defaults_to_600_and_rejects_zero() {
-        assert_eq!(
-            Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]).git_service_timeout_secs,
-            600
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--git-service-timeout-secs", "30"])
-                .git_service_timeout_secs,
-            30
-        );
-        // 0 is a footgun (immediate-504 on every request); clap must reject it.
-        assert!(
-            Config::try_parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--git-service-timeout-secs", "0"]).is_err()
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/encrypted_pin.rs

@@ -1,362 +0,0 @@
-//! Encrypt-then-pin for withheld blobs (Option B1). Each withheld blob is sealed
-//! to its recipient DIDs and the envelope pinned to IPFS, recorded in
-//! `encrypted_blobs`. Best-effort per blob: a failure is logged and skipped,
-//! never pinned in plaintext.
-
-use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
-use std::path::Path;
-use std::str::FromStr;
-
-use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
-use gitlawb_core::did::Did;
-use gitlawb_core::encrypt::seal_blob;
-
-use crate::db::Db;
-
-use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
-use sha2::Sha256;
-
-type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
-
-/// Opaque, node-keyed fingerprint of a blob's recipient set. Stored in place of
-/// the cleartext DID list so a DB compromise cannot reveal the reader set; used
-/// only to detect a recipient-set change so an unchanged blob is not re-sealed.
-/// Order-insensitive (the input `BTreeSet` is already sorted).
-pub fn recipients_tag(node_seed: &[u8; 32], dids: &BTreeSet<String>) -> String {
-    let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(node_seed).expect("HMAC accepts any key length");
-    mac.update(b"gitlawb/recipients-tag/v1");
-    for did in dids {
-        mac.update(b"\n");
-        mac.update(did.as_bytes());
-    }
-    hex::encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes())
-}
-
-/// Resolve a DID string to its Ed25519 verifying key, or None if it carries no
-/// inline key (e.g. did:web / did:gitlawb).
-fn did_to_key(did: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
-    Did::from_str(did).ok()?.to_verifying_key().ok()
-}
-
-/// Resolve every recipient DID to its verifying key, all-or-nothing.
-///
-/// Returns `Ok(keys)` only when every DID resolves. If any DID fails, returns
-/// `Err(unresolved)` listing the unresolvable DID strings so the caller can fail
-/// closed rather than seal to a partial recipient set (#47): sealing to a subset
-/// while recording the full set as covered permanently locks out the dropped
-/// readers. Resolution is local-only, so `did:web`/`did:gitlawb` recipients (and
-/// any malformed `did:key`) land in the unresolved set until off-`did:key`
-/// resolution exists.
-fn resolve_all_recipients(dids: &BTreeSet<String>) -> Result<Vec<VerifyingKey>, Vec<String>> {
-    let mut keys = Vec::with_capacity(dids.len());
-    let mut unresolved = Vec::new();
-    for did in dids {
-        match did_to_key(did) {
-            Some(k) => keys.push(k),
-            None => unresolved.push(did.clone()),
-        }
-    }
-    if unresolved.is_empty() {
-        Ok(keys)
-    } else {
-        Err(unresolved)
-    }
-}
-
-/// What to do with a single withheld blob, decided without any DB or IO so the
-/// fail-closed invariant (#47) is unit-testable in isolation.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-enum SealPlan {
-    /// An existing envelope already covers exactly this recipient set; nothing to do.
-    SkipUnchanged,
-    /// No recipient DID resolved to a key, so there is nothing to seal to.
-    SkipNoRecipients,
-    /// At least one recipient DID is unresolvable. Fail closed: never seal to a
-    /// partial set. Carries the unresolvable DIDs for logging.
-    SkipUnresolvable(Vec<String>),
-    /// Seal to `keys` and record coverage under `tag`.
-    Seal {
-        keys: Vec<VerifyingKey>,
-        tag: String,
-    },
-}
-
-/// Decide what to do with one blob given its desired recipient set and the tag
-/// already stored for it (if any). Pure: no DB, no IO.
-///
-/// This is the #47 fail-closed gate in isolation: it returns `Seal` only when
-/// EVERY recipient DID resolves, so no caller can seal to a partial set. A
-/// changed recipient set (different tag) re-seals so a newly added reader can
-/// recover the blob; reader removal is not retroactive (the old envelope is
-/// already public). The comparison is on the opaque node-keyed tag, never the
-/// DID list.
-fn plan_seal(node_seed: &[u8; 32], dids: &BTreeSet<String>, stored_tag: Option<&str>) -> SealPlan {
-    let tag = recipients_tag(node_seed, dids);
-    if stored_tag == Some(tag.as_str()) {
-        return SealPlan::SkipUnchanged;
-    }
-    match resolve_all_recipients(dids) {
-        Ok(keys) if keys.is_empty() => SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients,
-        Ok(keys) => SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag },
-        Err(unresolved) => SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved),
-    }
-}
-
-/// Encrypt and pin every withheld blob. `recipients` maps blob oid -> DID set;
-/// `node_seed` keys the opaque recipients tag. Returns `(oid, cid)` for each blob
-/// actually sealed and recorded this call (the per-push delta), used by Option B3
-/// to anchor a manifest. Recipient identities are never stored or returned.
-pub async fn encrypt_and_pin(
-    ipfs_api: &str,
-    repo_path: &Path,
-    db: &Db,
-    repo_id: &str,
-    node_seed: &[u8; 32],
-    recipients: &HashMap<String, BTreeSet<String>>,
-) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
-    let mut sealed = Vec::new();
-    let mut skipped_unresolvable = 0usize;
-    for (oid, dids) in recipients {
-        // A DB read failure is not a cache miss: re-sealing here would do an
-        // avoidable IPFS write during a partial outage. Skip and retry next push.
-        let stored_tag = match db.encrypted_blob_recipients_tag(repo_id, oid).await {
-            Ok(t) => t,
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "recipients_tag lookup failed; skipping reseal");
-                continue;
-            }
-        };
-        // Fail closed: plan_seal returns Seal only when every recipient DID
-        // resolves, so we never seal to a partial set and record the full set as
-        // covered (which would permanently lock out the dropped readers, #47).
-        let (keys, tag) = match plan_seal(node_seed, dids, stored_tag.as_deref()) {
-            SealPlan::SkipUnchanged => continue,
-            SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "no resolvable recipient keys; skipping encrypted pin");
-                continue;
-            }
-            SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved) => {
-                skipped_unresolvable += 1;
-                // DIDs are user-controlled (rule reader_dids); log a bounded
-                // sample, not an unbounded dump. Wording stays neutral about the
-                // cause: a malformed did:key is not DHT-pending and never will
-                // resolve, unlike a did:gitlawb awaiting anchoring.
-                let sample: Vec<&String> = unresolved.iter().take(3).collect();
-                tracing::warn!(
-                    oid = %oid,
-                    unresolved_count = unresolved.len(),
-                    unresolved_sample = ?sample,
-                    "unresolvable recipient DID(s); skipping encrypted pin to avoid sealing to a partial set"
-                );
-                continue;
-            }
-            SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag } => (keys, tag),
-        };
-        let data = match crate::git::store::read_object(repo_path, oid) {
-            Ok(Some((_t, bytes))) => bytes,
-            Ok(None) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "git object not found; skipping encrypted pin");
-                continue;
-            }
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "read_object failed; skipping encrypted pin");
-                continue;
-            }
-        };
-        let envelope = match seal_blob(&data, &keys) {
-            Ok(e) => e,
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "seal_blob failed; skipping");
-                continue;
-            }
-        };
-        let cid = match crate::ipfs_pin::pin_git_object(ipfs_api, oid, &envelope).await {
-            Ok(c) if !c.is_empty() => c,
-            Ok(_) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "pin_git_object returned no cid; skipping");
-                continue;
-            }
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "pin_git_object failed; skipping");
-                continue;
-            }
-        };
-        if let Err(e) = db.record_encrypted_blob(repo_id, oid, &cid, &tag).await {
-            tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "record_encrypted_blob failed");
-            continue;
-        }
-        sealed.push((oid.clone(), cid.clone()));
-    }
-    // One aggregate signal so a coverage collapse is a single greppable line, not
-    // a per-oid scrape. In a fully-migrated did:gitlawb org every blob skips and
-    // recovery coverage silently drops to zero; this is the operator's cue that
-    // the gap is the deliberate fail-closed posture, not a malfunction.
-    if skipped_unresolvable > 0 {
-        tracing::warn!(
-            sealed = sealed.len(),
-            skipped = skipped_unresolvable,
-            "encrypted-pin coverage reduced: blobs skipped for unresolvable recipients"
-        );
-    }
-    sealed
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
-
-    fn did_key(seed: u8) -> String {
-        let vk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[seed; 32]).verifying_key();
-        Did::from_verifying_key(&vk).to_string()
-    }
-
-    // Accepts both `&[String]` (resolve tests, built from `did_key`) and
-    // `&[&str]` (tag tests, built from literals).
-    fn set<S: AsRef<str>>(dids: &[S]) -> BTreeSet<String> {
-        dids.iter().map(|s| s.as_ref().to_string()).collect()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn all_did_key_recipients_resolve() {
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2)]);
-        let keys = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect("all did:key resolve");
-        assert_eq!(keys.len(), 2);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn mixed_set_with_did_gitlawb_fails_closed() {
-        // Core #47 regression: a resolvable subset must never yield a sealable
-        // key set. Two did:key plus one did:gitlawb -> Err naming only the
-        // unresolvable DID.
-        let gitlawb = Did::gitlawb("zSomeDhtKey").to_string();
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2), gitlawb.clone()]);
-        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("must fail closed");
-        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![gitlawb]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn did_web_recipient_fails_closed() {
-        let web = Did::web("example.com").to_string();
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), web.clone()]);
-        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("did:web cannot resolve locally");
-        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![web]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn malformed_did_key_fails_closed() {
-        // The third state: not a method-resolution gap but a permanently broken
-        // did:key (invalid multibase). Must also fail closed.
-        let broken = "did:key:z!!!invalid".to_string();
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), broken.clone()]);
-        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("malformed did:key fails");
-        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![broken]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn empty_set_resolves_to_empty_keys() {
-        let dids = BTreeSet::new();
-        let keys = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect("empty set is not an error");
-        assert!(keys.is_empty());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn single_unresolvable_did_returns_that_did() {
-        let gitlawb = Did::gitlawb("zOnlyOne").to_string();
-        let dids: BTreeSet<String> = [gitlawb.clone()].into_iter().collect();
-        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("must fail closed");
-        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![gitlawb]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tag_is_order_insensitive() {
-        let seed = [7u8; 32];
-        let a = recipients_tag(&seed, &set(&["did:key:zA", "did:key:zB"]));
-        let b = recipients_tag(&seed, &set(&["did:key:zB", "did:key:zA"]));
-        assert_eq!(a, b);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tag_differs_for_different_sets() {
-        let seed = [7u8; 32];
-        let a = recipients_tag(&seed, &set(&["did:key:zA"]));
-        let b = recipients_tag(&seed, &set(&["did:key:zA", "did:key:zB"]));
-        assert_ne!(a, b);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tag_is_keyed_by_node_seed() {
-        let dids = set(&["did:key:zA", "did:key:zB"]);
-        let a = recipients_tag(&[1u8; 32], &dids);
-        let b = recipients_tag(&[2u8; 32], &dids);
-        assert_ne!(
-            a, b,
-            "tag must depend on the node seed, not be a plain hash"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // plan_seal is the seal/skip decision `encrypt_and_pin` acts on. Testing it
-    // directly pins the #47 fail-closed invariant at the function that owns it,
-    // which a unit test of `resolve_all_recipients` alone cannot do (it can't
-    // catch the caller falling through to a partial seal).
-    const SEED: [u8; 32] = [9u8; 32];
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_seals_when_all_recipients_resolve() {
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2)]);
-        match plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, None) {
-            SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag } => {
-                assert_eq!(keys.len(), 2, "must seal to the full recipient set");
-                assert_eq!(
-                    tag,
-                    recipients_tag(&SEED, &dids),
-                    "records the full-set tag"
-                );
-            }
-            other => panic!("expected Seal, got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_fails_closed_on_any_unresolvable_recipient() {
-        // The #47 invariant at the decision boundary: one unresolvable DID among
-        // resolvable ones must NOT yield a Seal (which would seal a partial set).
-        let gitlawb = Did::gitlawb("zPending").to_string();
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2), gitlawb.clone()]);
-        match plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, None) {
-            SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved) => assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![gitlawb]),
-            other => panic!("must fail closed, never seal a partial set; got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_skips_empty_recipient_set() {
-        let dids = BTreeSet::new();
-        assert!(matches!(
-            plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, None),
-            SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_skips_when_tag_unchanged() {
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1)]);
-        let stored = recipients_tag(&SEED, &dids);
-        assert!(matches!(
-            plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, Some(&stored)),
-            SealPlan::SkipUnchanged
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_reseals_when_recipient_set_changed() {
-        // A stored tag for a DIFFERENT set is a miss: a newly added reader must
-        // trigger a re-seal, not be skipped as unchanged.
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2)]);
-        let stale = recipients_tag(&SEED, &set(&[did_key(1)]));
-        match plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, Some(&stale)) {
-            SealPlan::Seal { keys, .. } => assert_eq!(keys.len(), 2),
-            other => panic!("changed recipient set must re-seal; got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/error.rs

@@ -23,98 +23,21 @@ pub enum AppError {
     #[allow(dead_code)]
     Forbidden(String),
 
-    #[error("icaptcha proof required: {message}")]
-    IcaptchaProofRequired {
-        message: String,
-        /// iCaptcha service base URL the client should solve against.
-        url: String,
-        /// Minimum proof level this node requires.
-        level: u32,
-    },
-
     #[error("invalid request: {0}")]
     BadRequest(String),
 
-    #[error("too many requests: {0}")]
-    TooManyRequests(String),
-
-    #[error("incomplete: {0}")]
-    Incomplete(String),
-
     #[error("git error: {0}")]
     Git(String),
 
-    #[error("git service timed out: {0}")]
-    Timeout(String),
-
     #[error("database error: {0}")]
     Db(#[from] sqlx::Error),
 
     #[error("internal error: {0}")]
-    Internal(anyhow::Error),
-}
-
-/// Shared error code/message for "the database is unreachable", also used by
-/// the degraded startup server (main.rs) and the readiness probe (server.rs)
-/// so clients see one vocabulary for the condition.
-pub const DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE: &str = "db_unavailable";
-pub const DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE: &str = "database is temporarily unavailable";
-
-/// Connection-level sqlx failures that mean the database is unreachable right
-/// now (retryable, 503), as opposed to server-reported query errors.
-fn db_unavailable(e: &sqlx::Error) -> bool {
-    matches!(
-        e,
-        sqlx::Error::PoolTimedOut
-            | sqlx::Error::PoolClosed
-            | sqlx::Error::Io(_)
-            | sqlx::Error::Tls(_)
-    )
-}
-
-/// The db layer returns `anyhow::Result`, so sqlx errors reach handlers inside
-/// anyhow chains. Downcast them back out so the status mapping below can see
-/// them — without this, every database outage surfaces as a 500 instead of a
-/// 503. anyhow preserves downcastability through `.context()` layers.
-impl From<anyhow::Error> for AppError {
-    fn from(err: anyhow::Error) -> Self {
-        match err.downcast::<sqlx::Error>() {
-            Ok(sql) => AppError::Db(sql),
-            Err(err) => AppError::Internal(err),
-        }
-    }
+    Internal(#[from] anyhow::Error),
 }
 
 impl IntoResponse for AppError {
     fn into_response(self) -> Response {
-        // iCaptcha challenges carry structured discovery so clients don't have to
-        // scrape the message: the service URL and required level are returned as
-        // both JSON fields and `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` headers
-        // (mirroring the header-bearing `human_detected` response in auth/mod.rs).
-        if let AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
-            message,
-            url,
-            level,
-        } = &self
-        {
-            use axum::http::HeaderValue;
-            let body = Json(json!({
-                "error": "icaptcha_proof_required",
-                "message": message,
-                "icaptcha_url": url,
-                "required_level": level,
-            }));
-            let mut resp = (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, body).into_response();
-            let headers = resp.headers_mut();
-            if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(url) {
-                headers.insert("x-icaptcha-url", v);
-            }
-            if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(&level.to_string()) {
-                headers.insert("x-icaptcha-level", v);
-            }
-            return resp;
-        }
-
         let (status, code, message) = match &self {
             AppError::RepoNotFound(r) => (
                 StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
@@ -129,24 +52,8 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
             AppError::NotFound(msg) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Unauthorized(msg) => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "not_an_agent", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Forbidden(msg) => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "forbidden", msg.clone()),
-            // IcaptchaProofRequired is handled above (it carries extra headers/fields).
-            AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired { .. } => unreachable!("handled before this match"),
             AppError::BadRequest(msg) => (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "bad_request", msg.clone()),
-            AppError::TooManyRequests(msg) => {
-                (StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "rate_limited", msg.clone())
-            }
-            AppError::Incomplete(msg) => {
-                (StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY, "incomplete", msg.clone())
-            }
             AppError::Git(msg) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "git_error", msg.clone()),
-            // 504, distinct from the 500 git_error and from the read-gate's 404 /
-            // the auth 401, so the client can tell a deadline from a failure.
-            AppError::Timeout(msg) => (StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT, "git_timeout", msg.clone()),
-            AppError::Db(e) if db_unavailable(e) => (
-                StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
-                DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
-                DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE.into(),
-            ),
             AppError::Db(e) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "db_error", e.to_string()),
             AppError::Internal(e) => (
                 StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
@@ -165,21 +72,3 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
 }
 
 pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, AppError>;
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn timeout_maps_to_504_distinct_from_git_500() {
-        assert_eq!(
-            AppError::Timeout("x".into()).into_response().status(),
-            StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT
-        );
-        // Guard against a swap with the generic git failure (500).
-        assert_eq!(
-            AppError::Git("x".into()).into_response().status(),
-            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/issues.rs

@@ -23,18 +23,13 @@ pub fn create_issue(repo_path: &Path, issue_id: &str, json: &str) -> Result<()>
 
     use std::io::Write;
     let mut child = hash_output;
-    // Write the blob to stdin, but always reap the child afterward even if the
-    // write fails, so a stdin-write error can't drop the Child unwaited and leak
-    // a zombie (#53).
-    let write_result = match child.stdin.take() {
-        Some(mut stdin) => stdin.write_all(json.as_bytes()),
-        None => Err(std::io::Error::new(
-            std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
-            "git hash-object stdin unavailable",
-        )),
-    };
+    if let Some(stdin) = child.stdin.take() {
+        let mut stdin = stdin;
+        stdin
+            .write_all(json.as_bytes())
+            .context("failed to write to git hash-object stdin")?;
+    }
     let output = child.wait_with_output().context("git hash-object failed")?;
-    write_result.context("failed to write to git hash-object stdin")?;
 
     if !output.status.success() {
         let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/mod.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 pub mod issues;
-pub mod push_delta;
 pub mod repo_store;
 pub mod smart_http;
 pub mod store;

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/push_delta.rs

@@ -1,663 +0,0 @@
-//! Push-delta object enumeration for the IPFS/Pinata pin path.
-//!
-//! The pin path needs the set of git objects to consider for pinning after a
-//! push. Historically both pin functions enumerated the *whole* repo
-//! (`git cat-file --batch-all-objects`) on every push, so cost scaled with
-//! repo size rather than push size (finding N16). This module computes the
-//! per-push *delta* instead — the objects a push introduced — and keeps the
-//! whole-repo lister for the reconciliation sweep and the fail-closed fallback.
-//!
-//! ## Correctness framing (do not confuse with the #84 withholding direction)
-//!
-//! The pin enumeration is part of the *exposure* set, not the withheld filter.
-//! On the *delta* path, narrowing per push only *shrinks* what is pinned, so it
-//! cannot create an under-withholding leak — the reachable-only withheld filter
-//! (`visibility_pack`) still subtracts from the smaller set we feed it. The only
-//! risk there is *under-pinning* (a durability gap) the sweep backstops.
-//!
-//! The *full-scan* path is different: `list_all_objects` includes dangling
-//! objects the reachable withheld set never classified, so subtracting that set
-//! is not enough — a dangling private blob would slip through (#99). The caller
-//! signals a full scan via [`PinCandidateSet::full_scan`] and must then apply
-//! the fail-closed blob filter (`visibility_pack::replicable_objects_fail_closed`)
-//! instead of the plain reachable-only subtraction.
-//!
-//! Because the pin candidate set needs only the OID *set* (never the per-path
-//! information the withheld classifier needs), `git rev-list --objects
-//! --no-object-names` is safe here. The "rev-list reports one path per object"
-//! trap from #84 applies only to `visibility_pack`'s per-path `ls-tree` walk.
-
-use std::collections::HashSet;
-use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
-use std::process::Command;
-
-use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
-
-/// Env var that forces the push path to always full-scan, bypassing the delta
-/// optimization (KTD7 kill-switch). Reuses the already-tested fallback branch
-/// rather than introducing a second enumeration path. Does not gate the sweep.
-const FORCE_FULL_SCAN_ENV: &str = "GITLAWB_PIN_FORCE_FULLSCAN";
-
-/// The objects a push introduced, or a signal that the delta could not be
-/// computed safely and the caller should fall back to a full scan.
-///
-/// Three-valued by design: `Delta(vec![])` (a no-op push — pin nothing) is a
-/// *different* fact from `FullScanRequired` (could not compute — fall back),
-/// and they drive different actions.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub enum PinCandidates {
-    /// Objects reachable from the new tips but not the old tips.
-    Delta(Vec<String>),
-    /// The delta is not safe to use; the caller must enumerate the whole repo
-    /// with [`list_all_objects`] instead. Returned on a non-commit tip, any git
-    /// error, or the force-full-scan kill-switch.
-    FullScanRequired,
-}
-
-/// Resolve the set of objects introduced by a push from its ref updates.
-///
-/// `new_tips` / `old_tips` are the non-zero new/old SHAs of the push's ref
-/// updates (the caller strips the all-zeros create/delete sentinel). Keeping
-/// the helper on plain SHA slices (not the `api` `RefUpdate` type) keeps it
-/// unit-testable without the HTTP layer.
-///
-/// Fail-closed: any condition where the introduced set cannot be safely
-/// determined returns [`PinCandidates::FullScanRequired`] rather than a partial
-/// set, so the caller full-scans instead of silently under-pinning.
-pub fn resolve_push_delta(repo_path: &Path, new_tips: &[&str], old_tips: &[&str]) -> PinCandidates {
-    // KTD7 kill-switch: force the (already-tested) full-scan fallback. The env
-    // read is split out from the pure logic so the resolver stays unit-testable
-    // without touching process-global state.
-    resolve_push_delta_inner(repo_path, new_tips, old_tips, force_full_scan())
-}
-
-/// Whether the force-full-scan kill-switch env var is set.
-fn force_full_scan() -> bool {
-    std::env::var_os(FORCE_FULL_SCAN_ENV).is_some()
-}
-
-// Intentionally private but reachable from the test module (via `use super::*`)
-// so the kill-switch can be exercised without mutating process-global env.
-fn resolve_push_delta_inner(
-    repo_path: &Path,
-    new_tips: &[&str],
-    old_tips: &[&str],
-    force_full_scan: bool,
-) -> PinCandidates {
-    if force_full_scan {
-        tracing::debug!("{FORCE_FULL_SCAN_ENV} set — forcing full scan");
-        return PinCandidates::FullScanRequired;
-    }
-
-    // A push that only deleted refs introduces no objects.
-    if new_tips.is_empty() {
-        return PinCandidates::Delta(Vec::new());
-    }
-
-    // Ref-type guard (the fail-closed mechanism). `git rev-list` does NOT error
-    // on a non-commit tip — a blob/tree/tag-of-non-commit all exit 0 and walk
-    // the object — so the rev-list exit code cannot catch this. Check each new
-    // tip's *fully-peeled* type with `cat-file -t '<sha>^{}'` (recursive peel:
-    // tag-of-commit -> commit, tag-of-tree -> tree, tag-of-tag-of-commit ->
-    // commit). Bare `cat-file -t` returns `tag` for an annotated tag, and
-    // `for-each-ref %(*objecttype)` peels only one level — neither is correct.
-    for tip in new_tips {
-        match peeled_object_type(repo_path, tip) {
-            Some(t) if t == "commit" => {}
-            other => {
-                tracing::debug!(
-                    tip = %tip,
-                    peeled_type = ?other,
-                    "push tip is not a commit (or type lookup failed) — forcing full scan"
-                );
-                return PinCandidates::FullScanRequired;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    match rev_list_delta(repo_path, new_tips, old_tips) {
-        Ok(oids) => PinCandidates::Delta(oids),
-        Err(e) => {
-            tracing::debug!(err = %e, "push-delta rev-list failed — forcing full scan");
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Return the fully-peeled object type of `sha` (e.g. `commit`, `tree`,
-/// `blob`), or `None` if the object is missing/unpeelable or git errored.
-fn peeled_object_type(repo_path: &Path, sha: &str) -> Option<String> {
-    let output = Command::new("git")
-        .args(["cat-file", "-t", &format!("{sha}^{{}}")])
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output()
-        .ok()?;
-    if !output.status.success() {
-        return None;
-    }
-    Some(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim().to_string())
-}
-
-/// Run `git rev-list --objects --no-object-names <new> --not <old>` and return
-/// the bare OID set. Decides on `status.success()` *before* parsing stdout, so
-/// a walk that prints a valid prefix then errors mid-walk is discarded.
-fn rev_list_delta(repo_path: &Path, new_tips: &[&str], old_tips: &[&str]) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
-    let mut args: Vec<&str> = vec!["rev-list", "--objects", "--no-object-names"];
-    args.extend_from_slice(new_tips);
-    if !old_tips.is_empty() {
-        args.push("--not");
-        args.extend_from_slice(old_tips);
-    }
-
-    let output = Command::new("git")
-        .args(&args)
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output()
-        .context("failed to run git rev-list for push delta")?;
-
-    if !output.status.success() {
-        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
-        bail!("git rev-list failed: {stderr}");
-    }
-
-    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
-    Ok(stdout
-        .lines()
-        .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
-        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
-        .collect())
-}
-
-/// List every object in the repository via
-/// `git cat-file --batch-all-objects --batch-check='%(objectname)'`.
-///
-/// This is the whole-repo enumeration the push path falls back to and the
-/// reconciliation sweep relies on. It returns *all* objects (including
-/// unreachable/dangling ones), which is what the sweep needs to catch
-/// stragglers — do not swap it for a reachability walk.
-pub fn list_all_objects(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
-    let output = Command::new("git")
-        .args([
-            "cat-file",
-            "--batch-all-objects",
-            "--batch-check=%(objectname)",
-        ])
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output()
-        .context("failed to run git cat-file")?;
-
-    if !output.status.success() {
-        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
-        bail!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}");
-    }
-
-    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
-    Ok(stdout
-        .lines()
-        .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
-        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
-        .collect())
-}
-
-/// Like [`list_all_objects`] but pairs each OID with its object type, via
-/// `--batch-check='%(objectname) %(objecttype)'`. The pin path's fail-closed
-/// filter needs to tell blobs (content, withholdable) from commits/trees
-/// (structural, never withheld) without typing the candidate list itself.
-pub fn list_all_objects_with_type(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>> {
-    let output = Command::new("git")
-        .args([
-            "cat-file",
-            "--batch-all-objects",
-            "--batch-check=%(objectname) %(objecttype)",
-        ])
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output()
-        .context("failed to run git cat-file")?;
-
-    if !output.status.success() {
-        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
-        bail!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}");
-    }
-
-    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
-    Ok(stdout
-        .lines()
-        .filter_map(|l| {
-            let mut it = l.split_whitespace();
-            let oid = it.next()?;
-            let ty = it.next()?;
-            Some((oid.to_string(), ty.to_string()))
-        })
-        .collect())
-}
-
-/// Every blob OID in the repo, including unreachable/dangling ones. The
-/// fail-closed pin filter drops any candidate blob absent from the reachable,
-/// visibility-allowed set; a dangling private blob is in this set but not the
-/// allowed set, so it never replicates (#99).
-pub fn all_blob_oids(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<HashSet<String>> {
-    Ok(list_all_objects_with_type(repo_path)?
-        .into_iter()
-        .filter(|(_, ty)| ty == "blob")
-        .map(|(oid, _)| oid)
-        .collect())
-}
-
-/// The pin candidate OIDs for a push plus whether they came from a full-repo
-/// scan. `full_scan` is true when the delta could not be used and the whole
-/// object DB (including dangling objects) was enumerated — the caller must then
-/// apply the fail-closed blob filter, because the reachable-only withheld set
-/// cannot classify dangling blobs (#99).
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct PinCandidateSet {
-    pub candidates: Vec<String>,
-    pub full_scan: bool,
-}
-
-/// Resolve the pin candidate OID set for a push, off the async worker.
-///
-/// Runs [`resolve_push_delta`] in `spawn_blocking` (git subprocess) and applies
-/// the full-scan fallback for [`PinCandidates::FullScanRequired`]. Owns the
-/// dispatch so the push call site stays thin and this wiring is unit-testable
-/// without the HTTP layer.
-///
-/// Every degraded path is **logged**, not silent: a full-scan fallback, a
-/// failed full scan, and a panicked blocking task each emit a warning. On a
-/// failed full scan or a task panic the candidate set is empty (pin nothing
-/// this push); that is a durability gap the reconciliation sweep backstops, and
-/// it can never leak because the withheld/fail-closed filter still runs on
-/// whatever set is returned. `full_scan` rides on the returned set so the caller
-/// knows when the dangling-inclusive filter is required.
-pub async fn resolve_candidates_for_push(
-    repo_path: PathBuf,
-    new_tips: Vec<String>,
-    old_tips: Vec<String>,
-) -> PinCandidateSet {
-    tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
-        let new_refs: Vec<&str> = new_tips.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
-        let old_refs: Vec<&str> = old_tips.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
-        match resolve_push_delta(&repo_path, &new_refs, &old_refs) {
-            PinCandidates::Delta(objs) => {
-                tracing::info!(delta = objs.len(), repo = %repo_path.display(), "pin candidate set from push delta");
-                PinCandidateSet { candidates: objs, full_scan: false }
-            }
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired => {
-                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo_path.display(), "pin delta unavailable (non-commit tip, git error, or force-full-scan) — full-scan fallback");
-                match list_all_objects(&repo_path) {
-                    Ok(objs) => PinCandidateSet { candidates: objs, full_scan: true },
-                    Err(e) => {
-                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo_path.display(), err = %e, "full-scan fallback failed; pinning nothing this push (reconciliation sweep backstops)");
-                        PinCandidateSet { candidates: Vec::new(), full_scan: false }
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    })
-    .await
-    .unwrap_or_else(|e| {
-        tracing::warn!(err = %e, "pin candidate computation task panicked; pinning nothing this push (reconciliation sweep backstops)");
-        PinCandidateSet { candidates: Vec::new(), full_scan: false }
-    })
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use std::collections::HashSet;
-    use tempfile::TempDir;
-
-    /// Minimal git helper for building test repos.
-    struct Repo {
-        _td: TempDir,
-        path: std::path::PathBuf,
-    }
-
-    impl Repo {
-        fn new() -> Self {
-            let td = TempDir::new().unwrap();
-            let path = td.path().to_path_buf();
-            let r = Repo { _td: td, path };
-            r.git(&["init", "-q", "-b", "main"]);
-            r.git(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
-            r.git(&["config", "user.name", "t"]);
-            r
-        }
-
-        fn git(&self, args: &[&str]) -> String {
-            let out = Command::new("git")
-                .args(args)
-                .current_dir(&self.path)
-                .output()
-                .unwrap();
-            assert!(
-                out.status.success(),
-                "git {args:?} failed: {}",
-                String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
-            );
-            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
-        }
-
-        fn commit_file(&self, name: &str, body: &str) -> String {
-            std::fs::write(self.path.join(name), body).unwrap();
-            self.git(&["add", name]);
-            self.git(&["commit", "-qm", &format!("add {name}")]);
-            self.git(&["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
-        }
-
-        fn rev(&self, r: &str) -> String {
-            self.git(&["rev-parse", r])
-        }
-    }
-
-    const ZERO: &str = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
-
-    fn delta(c: PinCandidates) -> Vec<String> {
-        match c {
-            PinCandidates::Delta(v) => v,
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired => panic!("expected Delta, got FullScanRequired"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn single_new_commit_delta_excludes_preexisting_objects() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let c2 = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&c2], &[&c1]))
-            .into_iter()
-            .collect();
-        // The new blob b.txt and commit c2 are in the delta; the old blob a.txt
-        // and commit c1 are not.
-        let new_blob = repo.rev("HEAD:b.txt");
-        let old_blob = repo.rev(&format!("{c1}:a.txt"));
-        assert!(got.contains(&c2), "new commit in delta");
-        assert!(got.contains(&new_blob), "new blob in delta");
-        assert!(!got.contains(&c1), "old commit excluded");
-        assert!(!got.contains(&old_blob), "old blob excluded");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn created_ref_is_superset_of_new_objects() {
-        // A created ref (old tip all-zeros, filtered out by caller) with no old
-        // tips walks everything reachable from the new tip — a superset of the
-        // genuinely new objects, never fewer.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&c1], &[]))
-            .into_iter()
-            .collect();
-        assert!(got.contains(&c1));
-        assert!(got.contains(&repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt")));
-        assert!(got.contains(&repo.rev("HEAD^{tree}")));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn force_push_delta_is_objects_unique_to_new_tip() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let base = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let old_tip = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
-        // Rewrite history: reset to base, commit a different file.
-        repo.git(&["reset", "-q", "--hard", &base]);
-        let new_tip = repo.commit_file("c.txt", "three\n");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&new_tip], &[&old_tip]))
-            .into_iter()
-            .collect();
-        assert!(got.contains(&new_tip), "new tip in delta");
-        assert!(got.contains(&repo.rev(&format!("{new_tip}:c.txt"))));
-        // No error; force-push computes new-minus-old cleanly.
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn deleted_ref_only_yields_empty_delta_without_git() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        // All updates were deletions => new_tips empty after the caller strips zeros.
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[], &[ZERO]),
-            PinCandidates::Delta(Vec::new())
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blob_tip_forces_full_scan() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let blob = repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt");
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&blob], &[]),
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired,
-            "a blob tip must force full scan (rev-list would exit 0 and walk it)"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tree_tip_forces_full_scan() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let tree = repo.rev("HEAD^{tree}");
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&tree], &[]),
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn annotated_tag_of_tree_forces_full_scan() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let tree = repo.rev("HEAD^{tree}");
-        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "treetag", "-m", "x", &tree]);
-        let tag = repo.rev("treetag");
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&tag], &[]),
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired,
-            "annotated tag peeling to a tree must force full scan"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tag_of_tag_of_noncommit_forces_full_scan() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let blob = repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt");
-        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "t1", "-m", "x", &blob]);
-        let t1 = repo.rev("t1");
-        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "t2", "-m", "x", &t1]);
-        let t2 = repo.rev("t2");
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&t2], &[]),
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn annotated_tag_of_commit_proceeds_as_delta() {
-        // DISCRIMINATING positive-path regression: an annotated tag whose peeled
-        // target is a commit must return Delta, not FullScanRequired. A
-        // FullScanRequired here means the guard used bare `cat-file -t` (returns
-        // `tag`) instead of the `^{}` peel.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "rel", "-m", "release", &c1]);
-        let tag = repo.rev("rel");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&tag], &[]))
-            .into_iter()
-            .collect();
-        assert!(
-            got.contains(&c1),
-            "peeled commit's objects are in the delta"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tag_of_tag_of_commit_proceeds_as_delta() {
-        // Deep-peel positive path: tag -> tag -> commit must recurse to `commit`
-        // via `^{}` and return Delta. Complements tag_of_tag_of_noncommit (which
-        // forces full scan) — guards against a regression in peel depth that
-        // would silently downgrade a legitimate nested-tag push to full scan.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "t1", "-m", "x", &c1]);
-        let t1 = repo.rev("t1");
-        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "t2", "-m", "x", &t1]);
-        let t2 = repo.rev("t2");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&t2], &[]))
-            .into_iter()
-            .collect();
-        assert!(
-            got.contains(&c1),
-            "peeled commit's objects are in the delta"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn resolve_candidates_for_push_returns_delta() {
-        // The extracted wiring returns the per-push delta on the happy path.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let c2 = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
-        let set =
-            resolve_candidates_for_push(repo.path.clone(), vec![c2.clone()], vec![c1.clone()])
-                .await;
-        assert!(!set.full_scan, "happy-path delta is not a full scan");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = set.candidates.into_iter().collect();
-        let new_blob = repo.rev("HEAD:b.txt");
-        assert!(
-            got.contains(&c2) && got.contains(&new_blob),
-            "new objects pinned"
-        );
-        assert!(!got.contains(&c1), "old commit excluded from delta");
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn resolve_candidates_for_push_falls_back_to_full_scan_on_noncommit_tip() {
-        // A non-commit tip forces FullScanRequired, and the wiring resolves that
-        // to the whole-repo list (a superset), never an empty set.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let blob = repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt");
-        let all: HashSet<String> = list_all_objects(&repo.path).unwrap().into_iter().collect();
-        let set = resolve_candidates_for_push(repo.path.clone(), vec![blob], vec![]).await;
-        assert!(set.full_scan, "non-commit tip is signalled as a full scan");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = set.candidates.into_iter().collect();
-        assert_eq!(got, all, "non-commit tip falls back to full repo scan");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn missing_oid_tip_forces_full_scan() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let bogus = "deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef";
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[bogus], &[]),
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired,
-            "a missing/corrupt tip OID must force full scan"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn present_noncommit_old_tip_is_safe() {
-        // A present-but-non-commit old_sha (a --not arg) must not under-pin:
-        // either rev-list errors (FullScanRequired) or it over-lists (Delta).
-        // Either way the new tip's objects are covered; never fewer.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let c2 = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
-        let old_tree = repo.rev(&format!("{c1}^{{tree}}"));
-        let result = resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&c2], &[&old_tree]);
-        match result {
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired => {} // safe: caller full-scans
-            PinCandidates::Delta(objs) => {
-                // Safe direction: must still contain the new commit (over-list ok).
-                assert!(objs.contains(&c2), "new tip objects must be covered");
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn multi_ref_push_unions_ranges() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let base = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        // branch1 advances
-        let b1 = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
-        // branch2 from base advances independently
-        repo.git(&["checkout", "-q", "-b", "branch2", &base]);
-        let b2 = repo.commit_file("c.txt", "three\n");
-        let got: HashSet<String> =
-            delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&b1, &b2], &[&base, &base]))
-                .into_iter()
-                .collect();
-        assert!(got.contains(&b1), "branch1 new commit");
-        assert!(got.contains(&b2), "branch2 new commit");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn empty_repo_no_tips_yields_empty_delta() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[], &[]),
-            PinCandidates::Delta(Vec::new())
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn force_full_scan_flag_overrides() {
-        // Test the kill-switch via the pure inner fn so we never touch
-        // process-global env (which would race with parallel tests, and is
-        // unsafe in Rust 2024). The public resolve_push_delta wires the env
-        // read into this same flag.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta_inner(&repo.path, &[&c1], &[], true),
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired
-        );
-        // And with the flag off, the same push yields a Delta.
-        assert!(matches!(
-            resolve_push_delta_inner(&repo.path, &[&c1], &[], false),
-            PinCandidates::Delta(_)
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn list_all_objects_returns_full_repo() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
-        let all = list_all_objects(&repo.path).unwrap();
-        // 2 commits + 2 trees + 2 blobs = 6 objects.
-        assert_eq!(all.len(), 6, "got: {all:?}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn all_blob_oids_includes_dangling_and_excludes_nonblobs() {
-        // The all-blob universe must include a dangling blob (the #99 hazard) and
-        // exclude commits/trees, so the fail-closed filter can tell a blob from a
-        // structural object without typing the candidate list.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let reachable_blob = repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt");
-        let tree = repo.rev("HEAD^{tree}");
-        // Write a blob referenced by no tree/commit — dangling.
-        std::fs::write(repo.path.join("orphan.bin"), b"dangling\n").unwrap();
-        let dangling = repo.git(&["hash-object", "-w", "orphan.bin"]);
-
-        let blobs = all_blob_oids(&repo.path).unwrap();
-        assert!(blobs.contains(&reachable_blob), "reachable blob present");
-        assert!(
-            blobs.contains(&dangling),
-            "dangling blob present in the all-blob universe"
-        );
-        assert!(!blobs.contains(&c1), "commit is not a blob");
-        assert!(!blobs.contains(&tree), "tree is not a blob");
-
-        // The typed lister tags each object; spot-check the dangling blob's type.
-        let typed = list_all_objects_with_type(&repo.path).unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            typed
-                .iter()
-                .any(|(oid, ty)| oid == &dangling && ty == "blob"),
-            "dangling object is typed as a blob"
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/repo_store.rs

@@ -303,131 +303,6 @@ fn validate_path_components(owner_did: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
-/// Validate a peer-supplied `owner/name` sync slug and return its two halves.
-///
-/// The sync queue carries a single `repo` string that peers control, and the
-/// worker turns it into a filesystem path. `PathBuf::join` does not normalize,
-/// and an absolute second component replaces the accumulated path, so an
-/// unvalidated `a//tmp/x` resolved to `/tmp/x.git` outside `repos_dir` (#272).
-///
-/// The halves are checked with the same validators that guard
-/// `RepoStore::local_path`, so there is one owner rule and one name rule in the
-/// crate. The one rule added here is the leading `.`/`-` check on the owner
-/// half: `validate_owner_did` has no such rule (it also serves full DIDs, which
-/// always start with `d`), and without it an owner half of `.` puts a
-/// peer-controlled mirror at the `repos_dir` root, which canonicalizes back
-/// inside the root and so passes containment.
-pub(crate) fn validate_repo_slug(slug: &str) -> Result<(&str, &str)> {
-    let mut parts = slug.split('/');
-    let (Some(owner), Some(name)) = (parts.next(), parts.next()) else {
-        anyhow::bail!("repo slug must be 'owner/name'");
-    };
-    if parts.next().is_some() {
-        anyhow::bail!("repo slug must contain exactly one '/'");
-    }
-    if owner.is_empty() || name.is_empty() {
-        anyhow::bail!("repo slug has an empty owner or name");
-    }
-    if owner.starts_with('.') || owner.starts_with('-') {
-        anyhow::bail!("repo slug owner must not start with '.' or '-'");
-    }
-    // The owner half becomes one path component, so it is bounded by NAME_MAX
-    // (255), not by the DID column's 256. The two differ by exactly one, and
-    // that one length is the gap that matters: validate_owner_did accepts 256,
-    // create_dir_all then fails with ENAMETOOLONG on every attempt, and the
-    // worker leaves such a row pending, so it is re-picked forever. Rejecting
-    // it here means an undeliverable slug never enters the queue at all.
-    if owner.len() > 255 {
-        anyhow::bail!("repo slug owner exceeds 255 chars");
-    }
-    validate_owner_did(owner)?;
-    validate_repo_name(name)?;
-    Ok((owner, name))
-}
-
-/// The answer from [`path_within_root`].
-///
-/// Three-valued rather than a bool because the two negative answers call for
-/// opposite handling. `Outside` is a deterministic verdict about a hostile or
-/// misconfigured path: the same input fails the same way forever, so the caller
-/// can retire the work. `IoError` says the question could not be answered at
-/// all (EACCES, an unmounted root), which is transient, so the caller must keep
-/// the work and try again rather than permanently retire a legitimate repo.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub(crate) enum Containment {
-    /// The candidate resolves inside the root.
-    Contained,
-    /// The candidate resolves outside the root.
-    Outside,
-    /// The filesystem could not answer the question.
-    IoError(std::io::Error),
-}
-
-/// Does `candidate` canonically resolve inside `root`?
-///
-/// The third layer of path defence, after the character allowlist and the
-/// component walk on `RepoStore::local_path`. Those two read the path as text
-/// and cannot see a symlink standing between the root and the target (#272).
-///
-/// One contract covers both the clone and the fetch branch. `symlink_metadata`
-/// decides which:
-///
-///   * The candidate exists (including as a symlink), so the candidate itself is
-///     canonicalized. That resolves the link and catches a mirror path that is a
-///     symlink to a bare repo outside the root, which a parent-only check misses
-///     entirely: the parent canonicalizes clean, `exists()` follows the link, and
-///     the fetch then writes through it.
-///   * The candidate does not exist, so its parent is canonicalized instead.
-///     This is the first-clone case. Canonicalizing the candidate unconditionally
-///     would reject every first clone, since `canonicalize` errors on a path that
-///     does not exist.
-///
-/// Pure: it reads the filesystem and never creates, moves, or removes anything.
-/// Callers that need the parent directory to exist create it themselves before
-/// asking, because a predicate that created a directory as a side effect of
-/// being asked would be wrong for a caller asking about a path it is about to
-/// delete.
-pub(crate) fn path_within_root(candidate: &Path, root: &Path) -> Containment {
-    let root = match root.canonicalize() {
-        Ok(p) => p,
-        // A root that cannot be resolved is an operator condition, never a
-        // verdict on the candidate, so every error kind is retryable here.
-        Err(e) => return Containment::IoError(e),
-    };
-
-    let resolved = match std::fs::symlink_metadata(candidate) {
-        // The candidate exists as an entry: resolve it, links and all. A failure
-        // now (a dangling symlink, a permission change mid-flight) is an I/O
-        // answer, since the entry was there a moment ago.
-        Ok(_) => match candidate.canonicalize() {
-            Ok(p) => p,
-            Err(e) => return Containment::IoError(e),
-        },
-        Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
-            let Some(parent) = candidate.parent() else {
-                return Containment::Outside;
-            };
-            match parent.canonicalize() {
-                Ok(p) => p,
-                // A parent that is not there is a real answer about where this
-                // path sits; anything else is the filesystem failing to answer.
-                Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
-                    return Containment::Outside;
-                }
-                Err(e) => return Containment::IoError(e),
-            }
-        }
-        // Neither "it is there" nor "it is not there": we cannot tell.
-        Err(e) => return Containment::IoError(e),
-    };
-
-    if resolved.starts_with(&root) {
-        Containment::Contained
-    } else {
-        Containment::Outside
-    }
-}
-
 fn validate_owner_did(owner_did: &str) -> Result<()> {
     if owner_did.is_empty() {
         anyhow::bail!("owner_did is empty");
@@ -530,251 +405,6 @@ fn advisory_lock_key(owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> i64 {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
-    // ── sync slug validation (#272) ────────────────────────────────────────
-
-    #[test]
-    fn slug_accepts_owner_and_name() {
-        let (owner, name) = validate_repo_slug("z6Mkfoo/hello").expect("valid slug");
-        assert_eq!(owner, "z6Mkfoo");
-        assert_eq!(name, "hello");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn slug_rejects_traversal_in_owner_half() {
-        assert!(validate_repo_slug("../hello").is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn slug_rejects_owner_half_only_the_did_validator_catches() {
-        // These are the cases that isolate the `validate_owner_did` delegation.
-        // `../hello` does NOT: the leading-character rule above rejects it
-        // first, so deleting the delegation leaves that case green. Each owner
-        // half here has exactly one separator, a non-empty name, and a leading
-        // character the slug rules allow, so only the delegation can reject it.
-        for bad in [
-            "a..b/hello",    // interior `..` sequence
-            "a%2e%2e/hello", // percent-encoded, disallowed `%`
-            "own\\er/hello", // backslash
-        ] {
-            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn slug_rejects_extra_separator() {
-        // The verified #272 escape: `a//tmp/x` joined to an absolute
-        // `/tmp/x.git` outside repos_dir.
-        assert!(validate_repo_slug("a//tmp/gitlawb-probe").is_err());
-        assert!(validate_repo_slug("../../etc/evil").is_err());
-        assert!(validate_repo_slug("a/../../x").is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn slug_rejects_trailing_segment_only_the_separator_count_catches() {
-        // The case that isolates the separator-count rule. Every slug in
-        // `slug_rejects_extra_separator` is caught by some earlier rule
-        // instead: `a//tmp/...` has an empty name half, `../../etc/evil` trips
-        // the leading-character rule, and `a/../../x` has `..` as its name. Here
-        // both halves are individually valid, so only the count can reject it.
-        // It matters because the worker would otherwise join
-        // `repos_dir/z6Mkfoo/hello.git` while composing the remote URL from the
-        // full three-segment slug, silently mirroring one repo under another's
-        // path.
-        assert!(validate_repo_slug("z6Mkfoo/hello/extra").is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn slug_rejects_missing_separator() {
-        for bad in ["..", "demo", ""] {
-            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn slug_rejects_empty_half() {
-        for bad in ["/hello", "z6Mkfoo/"] {
-            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn slug_rejects_leading_dot_or_dash_owner() {
-        // `./hello` would otherwise resolve to a mirror at the repos_dir root,
-        // which the containment check would approve.
-        for bad in ["./hello", "-owner/hello"] {
-            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn slug_rejects_bad_name_half() {
-        for bad in [
-            "z6Mkfoo/he\0llo",
-            "z6Mkfoo/.hidden",
-            "z6Mkfoo/-dash",
-            "z6Mkfoo/a..b",
-        ] {
-            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn slug_rejects_overlong_halves() {
-        let long_owner = format!("{}/hello", "z".repeat(257));
-        let long_name = format!("z6Mkfoo/{}", "n".repeat(101));
-        assert!(validate_repo_slug(&long_owner).is_err());
-        assert!(validate_repo_slug(&long_name).is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn slug_rejects_owner_half_at_the_filesystem_name_limit() {
-        // The owner half becomes a single path component, and Linux NAME_MAX is
-        // 255, so 256 is accepted by validate_owner_did (which bails only above
-        // 256) but can never be created on disk. That made the sync row
-        // permanently un-runnable: create_dir_all failed with ENAMETOOLONG on
-        // every pass and the worker left the row pending, so ten unsigned
-        // requests could hold the whole oldest-first batch forever.
-        assert!(validate_repo_slug(&format!("{}/hello", "z".repeat(256))).is_err());
-        // 255 is the largest creatable component and must still be accepted, so
-        // the bound is not quietly over-tightened.
-        assert!(validate_repo_slug(&format!("{}/hello", "z".repeat(255))).is_ok());
-    }
-
-    // ── canonical containment (#272) ───────────────────────────────────────
-
-    use tempfile::TempDir;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn containment_accepts_a_path_inside_the_root() {
-        let root = TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let inside = root.path().join("z6Mkfoo");
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&inside).unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(
-            path_within_root(&inside.join("hello.git"), root.path()),
-            Containment::Contained
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn containment_rejects_a_sibling_outside_the_root() {
-        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let root = base.path().join("root");
-        let sibling = base.path().join("other");
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap();
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&sibling).unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(
-            path_within_root(&sibling, &root),
-            Containment::Outside
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    #[test]
-    fn containment_rejects_a_symlinked_directory_inside_the_root() {
-        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
-        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let root = base.path().join("root");
-        let outside = base.path().join("outside");
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap();
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&outside).unwrap();
-        let link = root.join("owner");
-        symlink(&outside, &link).unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(
-            path_within_root(&link, &root),
-            Containment::Outside
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    #[test]
-    fn containment_rejects_a_symlinked_file_inside_the_root() {
-        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
-        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let root = base.path().join("root");
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap();
-        let outside = base.path().join("secret.txt");
-        std::fs::write(&outside, b"x").unwrap();
-        let link = root.join("hello.git");
-        symlink(&outside, &link).unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(
-            path_within_root(&link, &root),
-            Containment::Outside
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn containment_accepts_a_missing_candidate_whose_parent_is_inside() {
-        // The first-clone case: the mirror path does not exist yet, so only the
-        // parent can be canonicalized. Rejecting this is total loss of mirroring.
-        let root = TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let owner = root.path().join("z6Mkfoo");
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&owner).unwrap();
-        let candidate = owner.join("hello.git");
-        assert!(!candidate.exists());
-        assert!(matches!(
-            path_within_root(&candidate, root.path()),
-            Containment::Contained
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    #[test]
-    fn containment_rejects_a_missing_candidate_under_a_symlinked_parent() {
-        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
-        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let root = base.path().join("root");
-        let outside = base.path().join("outside");
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap();
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&outside).unwrap();
-        symlink(&outside, root.join("z6Mkfoo")).unwrap();
-        let candidate = root.join("z6Mkfoo").join("hello.git");
-        assert!(matches!(
-            path_within_root(&candidate, &root),
-            Containment::Outside
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    #[test]
-    fn containment_reports_io_error_for_a_dangling_symlink() {
-        // The link entry exists, so the candidate is the thing to resolve, and
-        // resolving it fails. That is an I/O answer, not a verdict of Outside:
-        // the worker must retry rather than permanently retire the row.
-        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
-        let root = TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let link = root.path().join("hello.git");
-        symlink(root.path().join("nothing-here"), &link).unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(
-            path_within_root(&link, root.path()),
-            Containment::IoError(_)
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn containment_reports_io_error_for_an_uncanonicalizable_root() {
-        // A repos_dir that cannot be resolved is an operator condition (an
-        // unmounted volume, a bad config), not a hostile path.
-        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let root = base.path().join("not-mounted");
-        let candidate = base.path().join("not-mounted").join("hello.git");
-        assert!(matches!(
-            path_within_root(&candidate, &root),
-            Containment::IoError(_)
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn containment_creates_nothing_on_disk() {
-        // The predicate is pure: the admin purge path asks it about directories
-        // it is about to delete, so creating one as a side effect would be wrong.
-        let root = TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let candidate = root.path().join("z6Mkfoo").join("hello.git");
-        let _ = path_within_root(&candidate, root.path());
-        assert!(!candidate.exists());
-        assert!(!root.path().join("z6Mkfoo").exists());
-        assert_eq!(std::fs::read_dir(root.path()).unwrap().count(), 0);
-    }
-
     // ── repo_name validation ───────────────────────────────────────────────
 
     #[test]

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/store.rs

@@ -271,8 +271,9 @@ pub struct TreeEntry {
 /// `/ipfs/<cid>` is computed from these same content bytes via
 /// `gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes`.
 ///
-/// Get just the object type. Returns `None` if the object doesn't exist.
-pub fn object_type(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
+/// Returns `None` if the object does not exist in this repo.
+pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String, Vec<u8>)>> {
+    // First check if the object exists and get its type
     let type_output = Command::new("git")
         .args(["cat-file", "-t", sha256_hex])
         .current_dir(repo_path)
@@ -283,17 +284,13 @@ pub fn object_type(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<String>>
         return Ok(None);
     }
 
-    Ok(Some(
-        String::from_utf8_lossy(&type_output.stdout)
-            .trim()
-            .to_string(),
-    ))
-}
+    let obj_type = String::from_utf8_lossy(&type_output.stdout)
+        .trim()
+        .to_string();
 
-/// Read an object's content if its type is already known.
-pub fn read_object_content(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str, obj_type: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    // Read the raw content bytes
     let content_output = Command::new("git")
-        .args(["cat-file", obj_type, sha256_hex])
+        .args(["cat-file", &obj_type, sha256_hex])
         .current_dir(repo_path)
         .output()
         .context("failed to run git cat-file <type>")?;
@@ -303,24 +300,7 @@ pub fn read_object_content(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str, obj_type: &str) -
         bail!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}");
     }
 
-    Ok(content_output.stdout)
-}
-
-/// Read a git object by its SHA-256 hex object ID.
-///
-/// Returns `(object_type, content_bytes)` where `content_bytes` is the raw
-/// object content (without the git framing header). The CID served over
-/// `/ipfs/<cid>` is computed from these same content bytes via
-/// `gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes`.
-///
-/// Returns `None` if the object does not exist in this repo.
-pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String, Vec<u8>)>> {
-    let obj_type = match object_type(repo_path, sha256_hex)? {
-        Some(t) => t,
-        None => return Ok(None),
-    };
-    let content = read_object_content(repo_path, sha256_hex, &obj_type)?;
-    Ok(Some((obj_type, content)))
+    Ok(Some((obj_type, content_output.stdout)))
 }
 
 /// Get the diff between two branches: changes on source_branch not in target_branch.
@@ -334,39 +314,6 @@ pub fn branch_diff(repo_path: &Path, target_branch: &str, source_branch: &str) -
     Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).to_string())
 }
 
-/// The repo-relative paths changed by `git diff target...source` (the same range
-/// as `branch_diff`). Used to enforce per-path visibility on a PR diff: if the
-/// caller cannot read one of these paths, the diff is withheld.
-pub fn branch_diff_names(
-    repo_path: &Path,
-    target_branch: &str,
-    source_branch: &str,
-) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
-    let output = Command::new("git")
-        .args([
-            "diff",
-            "--name-only",
-            "-z",
-            &format!("{target_branch}...{source_branch}"),
-        ])
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output()
-        .context("failed to run git diff --name-only")?;
-    if !output.status.success() {
-        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
-        bail!("git diff --name-only failed: {stderr}");
-    }
-    // Split on NUL (`-z`) so paths containing newlines keep their exact bytes;
-    // `--name-only` without `-z` would quote/escape such paths and they would no
-    // longer match the visibility globs in get_pr_diff, leaking the diff.
-    Ok(output
-        .stdout
-        .split(|b| *b == b'\0')
-        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
-        .map(|s| String::from_utf8_lossy(s).into_owned())
-        .collect())
-}
-
 /// Merge source_branch into target_branch in a bare repo using a temporary worktree.
 /// Returns the new merge commit hash.
 pub fn merge_branch(
@@ -452,53 +399,3 @@ pub fn repo_disk_path(repos_dir: &Path, owner_did: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Pat
     let owner_slug = owner_did.replace([':', '/'], "_");
     repos_dir.join(owner_slug).join(format!("{repo_name}.git"))
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::branch_diff_names;
-    use std::path::Path;
-    use std::process::Command;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn branch_diff_names_lists_changed_paths() {
-        let td = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let work: &Path = td.path();
-        let g = |args: &[&str]| {
-            assert!(Command::new("git")
-                .args(args)
-                .current_dir(work)
-                .status()
-                .unwrap()
-                .success());
-        };
-        g(&["init", "-q"]);
-        g(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
-        g(&["config", "user.name", "t"]);
-        std::fs::write(work.join("base.txt"), b"base\n").unwrap();
-        g(&["add", "."]);
-        g(&["commit", "-qm", "base"]);
-        let main = {
-            let o = Command::new("git")
-                .args(["symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD"])
-                .current_dir(work)
-                .output()
-                .unwrap();
-            String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stdout).trim().to_string()
-        };
-        g(&["checkout", "-q", "-b", "feature"]);
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(work.join("secret")).unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(work.join("secret/x.txt"), b"secret\n").unwrap();
-        g(&["add", "."]);
-        g(&["commit", "-qm", "feat"]);
-
-        let names = branch_diff_names(work, &main, "feature").unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            names.iter().any(|p| p == "secret/x.txt"),
-            "expected secret/x.txt in changed paths, got {names:?}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !names.iter().any(|p| p == "base.txt"),
-            "unchanged file must not appear: {names:?}"
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/tigris.rs

@@ -3,9 +3,7 @@
 //! Repos are stored as `repos/v1/{owner_slug}/{repo_name}.tar.zst` — a
 //! zstd-compressed tar archive of the bare repo directory.
 
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, OnceLock};
+use std::path::Path;
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use aws_sdk_s3::Client as S3Client;
@@ -112,7 +110,8 @@ impl TigrisClient {
             .collect()
             .await
             .context("reading tigris response body")?
-            .into_bytes();
+            .into_bytes()
+            .to_vec();
 
         // Extract tar.zst to local path
         tokio::task::spawn_blocking({
@@ -157,23 +156,6 @@ fn compress_repo(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     Ok(compressed)
 }
 
-/// Per-repo-path lock serializing the publish (swap-into-place) step of
-/// `decompress_repo`. Concurrent extractions unpack into isolated temp dirs in
-/// parallel, but the final `remove_dir_all` + `rename` must not interleave for
-/// the same `local_path`, or they race to a nondeterministic overwrite/failure.
-fn publish_lock(local_path: &Path) -> Arc<Mutex<()>> {
-    // KNOWN LIMITATION: this map is never evicted — one (PathBuf, Arc<Mutex>)
-    // entry accrues per distinct repo path for the process lifetime. Bounded by
-    // the number of repos a node hosts, so it's negligible for normal use, but
-    // high-volume/churning deployments may want LRU or weak-ref eviction here.
-    static LOCKS: OnceLock<Mutex<HashMap<PathBuf, Arc<Mutex<()>>>>> = OnceLock::new();
-    let locks = LOCKS.get_or_init(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
-    let mut map = locks.lock().expect("publish lock map poisoned");
-    map.entry(local_path.to_path_buf())
-        .or_insert_with(|| Arc::new(Mutex::new(())))
-        .clone()
-}
-
 /// Decompress a tar.zst byte vector into a local directory.
 ///
 /// Extraction is atomic with respect to `local_path`: the archive is unpacked
@@ -189,12 +171,10 @@ fn decompress_repo(data: &[u8], local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
         .file_name()
         .context("repo path has no file name")?
         .to_string_lossy();
-    // Unique per-extraction temp dir: a fixed name would let two concurrent
-    // extractions of the same repo share one dir and clobber each other's
-    // in-progress unpack. A fresh UUID also means it can't collide with a
-    // leftover dir from a previously-interrupted run.
-    let tmp_dir = parent.join(format!(".{file_name}.tmp-extract.{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
+    let tmp_dir = parent.join(format!(".{file_name}.tmp-extract"));
 
+    // Clear any leftover temp dir from a previously-interrupted extraction.
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp_dir);
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&tmp_dir).context("creating temp extract dir")?;
 
     // Unpack into the temp dir; on any failure, clean up and bail without
@@ -212,11 +192,7 @@ fn decompress_repo(data: &[u8], local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
 
     // Swap the freshly-extracted repo into place. rename within the same parent
     // is effectively atomic, but most platforms refuse to rename onto a
-    // non-empty dir, so remove the old copy first. Serialize this per repo path:
-    // concurrent extractions unpack into isolated temp dirs, but their swaps
-    // must not interleave or they race to a nondeterministic overwrite/failure.
-    let lock = publish_lock(local_path);
-    let _publish = lock.lock().expect("publish lock poisoned");
+    // non-empty dir, so remove the old copy first.
     if local_path.exists() {
         std::fs::remove_dir_all(local_path).context("removing stale repo dir")?;
     }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/mutation.rs

@@ -3,21 +3,11 @@ use chrono::Utc;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::db::{AgentTask, Db};
 use crate::state::TaskEventBroadcast;
 
 use super::types::{AgentTaskType, CreateTaskInput, FinishTaskInput};
 
-/// The verified signer DID for this request, or an auth error (N2). The DID is
-/// attached request-scoped by the `/graphql` `optional_signature` layer; its
-/// absence means the request was unsigned, so every mutation rejects.
-fn require_signer<'a>(ctx: &'a Context<'_>) -> Result<&'a str> {
-    ctx.data::<AuthenticatedDid>()
-        .map(|d| d.0.as_str())
-        .map_err(|_| async_graphql::Error::new("authentication required"))
-}
-
 pub struct MutationRoot;
 
 #[Object]
@@ -28,13 +18,6 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         delegator_did: String,
         input: CreateTaskInput,
     ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
-        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &delegator_did) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "delegator_did must be the authenticated signer",
-            ));
-        }
-        let delegator_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
         let task = AgentTask {
@@ -64,13 +47,6 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         id: String,
         assignee_did: String,
     ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
-        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &assignee_did) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "assignee_did must be the authenticated signer",
-            ));
-        }
-        let assignee_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
         let task = db
@@ -94,27 +70,8 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         by_did: String,
         input: FinishTaskInput,
     ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
-        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &by_did) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "by_did must be the authenticated signer",
-            ));
-        }
-        let by_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
-        // Authorize the actor: binding by_did to the signer is necessary but not
-        // sufficient — only the task's assignee may finish it.
-        let existing = db
-            .get_task(&id)
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?
-            .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "only the task assignee can complete it",
-            ));
-        }
         let task = db
             .finish_task(&id, "completed", input.result.as_deref())
             .await
@@ -136,26 +93,8 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         by_did: String,
         input: FinishTaskInput,
     ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
-        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &by_did) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "by_did must be the authenticated signer",
-            ));
-        }
-        let by_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
-        // Authorize the actor: only the task's assignee may fail it.
-        let existing = db
-            .get_task(&id)
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?
-            .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "only the task assignee can fail it",
-            ));
-        }
         let reason = input.reason.unwrap_or_default();
         let task = db
             .finish_task(&id, "failed", Some(&reason))
@@ -171,123 +110,3 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
     }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
-    use async_graphql::{Request, Response};
-    use sqlx::PgPool;
-
-    fn errors(resp: &Response) -> String {
-        resp.errors
-            .iter()
-            .map(|e| e.message.clone())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
-            .join("; ")
-    }
-
-    /// N2: GraphQL mutations require a verified signer and bind the acting DID to
-    /// it. Unsigned is rejected; a signer other than the claimed actor is
-    /// rejected; the matching signer passes the auth gate.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn mutation_requires_and_binds_signer(pool: PgPool) {
-        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
-        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
-        let assignee = "did:key:zASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
-        let q = format!(
-            r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "no-such-task", assigneeDid: "{assignee}") {{ id }} }}"#
-        );
-
-        // 1. Unsigned → rejected before any DB work.
-        let resp = schema.execute(Request::new(&q)).await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).contains("authentication required"),
-            "unsigned mutation must be rejected: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
-
-        // 2. Signed as someone other than the claimed assignee → rejected.
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(
-                "did:key:zOTHERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB".into(),
-            )))
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).contains("authenticated signer"),
-            "DID mismatch must be rejected: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
-
-        // 3. Signed as the claimed assignee → passes the auth gate (any remaining
-        //    error is the missing task, not an auth error).
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
-            .await;
-        let errs = errors(&resp);
-        assert!(
-            !errs.contains("authentication required") && !errs.contains("authenticated signer"),
-            "matching signer must pass the auth gate: {errs}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Adversarial-review GATE-1 (GraphQL): completing a task requires being its
-    /// assignee, not merely signing as the by_did you pass. A signer who is not
-    /// the assignee is rejected even though the by_did binding passes; the
-    /// assignee completes.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn complete_task_requires_assignee(pool: PgPool) {
-        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
-        let assignee = "did:key:zGQLASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
-        let stranger = "did:key:zGQLSTRANGERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
-        let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
-        let task = crate::db::AgentTask {
-            id: "task-g".into(),
-            repo_id: None,
-            kind: "build".into(),
-            status: "pending".into(),
-            delegator_did: "did:key:zGQLDELEGATORCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC".into(),
-            assignee_did: None,
-            capability: "repo:write".into(),
-            ucan_token: None,
-            payload: None,
-            result: None,
-            created_at: now.clone(),
-            updated_at: now,
-            deadline: None,
-        };
-        state.db.create_task(&task).await.expect("seed task");
-        state
-            .db
-            .claim_task("task-g", assignee)
-            .await
-            .expect("claim");
-        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
-
-        let q = |actor: &str| {
-            format!(
-                r#"mutation {{ completeTask(id: "task-g", byDid: "{actor}", input: {{}}) {{ id status }} }}"#
-            )
-        };
-
-        // Stranger signs as themselves and passes byDid=self (so the signer
-        // binding passes), but is not the assignee → rejected by authorization.
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(q(stranger)).data(AuthenticatedDid(stranger.into())))
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).contains("assignee"),
-            "a non-assignee signer must be rejected: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
-
-        // The assignee completes with no error.
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(q(assignee)).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).is_empty(),
-            "the assignee should complete the task: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/query.rs

@@ -12,29 +12,11 @@ impl QueryRoot {
     async fn repos(&self, ctx: &Context<'_>) -> Result<Vec<RepoType>> {
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let repos = db
-            .list_all_repos_deduped()
+            .list_all_repos()
             .await
             .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
-
-        // Apply the same "/" visibility gate the REST/per-repo endpoints use so
-        // this surface does not enumerate private repos (#97). The caller DID is
-        // threaded onto the context by optional_signature; absent = anonymous.
-        let caller = ctx
-            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
-            .ok()
-            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
-        let ids: Vec<String> = repos.iter().map(|r| r.id.clone()).collect();
-        let rules_by_repo = db
-            .list_visibility_rules_for_repos(&ids)
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
-
         Ok(repos
             .into_iter()
-            .filter(|r| {
-                let rules = rules_by_repo.get(&r.id).map(Vec::as_slice).unwrap_or(&[]);
-                crate::visibility::listable_at_root(rules, r.is_public, &r.owner_did, caller)
-            })
             .map(|r| RepoType {
                 name: r.name,
                 owner_did: r.owner_did,
@@ -49,49 +31,16 @@ impl QueryRoot {
         &self,
         ctx: &Context<'_>,
         repo: Option<String>,
-        #[graphql(
-            default = 20,
-            desc = "Max 200; larger requests return the newest 200 rows (no continuation cursor)."
-        )]
-        limit: i64,
+        #[graphql(default = 20)] limit: i64,
     ) -> Result<Vec<RefUpdateType>> {
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
-
-        // Gate each row on the same "/" visibility decision the repos resolver
-        // uses, so anonymous callers get no row for a local repo they can't read
-        // (#112). The shared collector applies the fail-closed gate *before* the
-        // limit (paging past dropped private rows) so a small limit still returns
-        // the latest visible events, and keeps this surface byte-identical to the
-        // REST feed (#114). The row slug is peer-supplied, so the pure filter
-        // treats it as untrusted input; remote (no local match) rows pass.
-        let caller = ctx
-            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
-            .ok()
-            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
-        let updates =
-            crate::api::events::collect_visible_ref_updates(db, repo.as_deref(), limit, caller)
-                .await
-                .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
-
-        // Resolve the trusted display owner_did per row, identical to the REST
-        // feed: the stored wire value is untrusted, so it is echoed only when it
-        // matches the canonical owner of the local repo the slug names (#P1);
-        // legacy None rows are attributed via an exact unique local match (#P3).
-        // The batch resolver issues at most one query per distinct local repo
-        // rather than one per event row (#P2).
-        let pairs: Vec<(&str, Option<&str>)> = updates
-            .iter()
-            .map(|u| (u.repo.as_str(), u.owner_did.as_deref()))
-            .collect();
-        let owner_dids = db
-            .resolve_ref_update_owner_dids(&pairs)
+        let updates = db
+            .list_ref_updates_filtered(repo.as_deref(), limit)
             .await
             .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
-
-        let resolved: Vec<RefUpdateType> = updates
+        Ok(updates
             .into_iter()
-            .zip(owner_dids)
-            .map(|(u, owner_did)| RefUpdateType {
+            .map(|u| RefUpdateType {
                 repo: u.repo,
                 ref_name: u.ref_name,
                 old_sha: u.old_sha,
@@ -99,10 +48,8 @@ impl QueryRoot {
                 pusher_did: u.pusher_did,
                 node_did: u.node_did,
                 timestamp: u.timestamp,
-                owner_did,
             })
-            .collect();
-        Ok(resolved)
+            .collect())
     }
 
     async fn tasks(
@@ -129,294 +76,3 @@ impl QueryRoot {
         Ok(t.map(AgentTaskType::from))
     }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::db::{Db, ReceivedRefUpdate, RepoRecord};
-    use chrono::Utc;
-    use sqlx::PgPool;
-    use std::sync::Arc;
-
-    const OWNER: &str = "did:key:z6MkOwner";
-
-    async fn db(pool: PgPool) -> Arc<Db> {
-        let db = Db::for_testing(pool);
-        db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
-        Arc::new(db)
-    }
-
-    fn schema(db: Arc<Db>) -> super::super::GitlawbSchema {
-        let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
-        let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
-        super::super::build_schema(db, ref_tx, task_tx)
-    }
-
-    fn repo(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
-        RepoRecord {
-            id: id.into(),
-            name: name.into(),
-            owner_did: owner_did.into(),
-            description: None,
-            is_public,
-            default_branch: "main".into(),
-            created_at: Utc::now(),
-            updated_at: Utc::now(),
-            disk_path: format!("/srv/{id}"),
-            forked_from: None,
-            machine_id: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn ref_row(id: &str, slug: &str) -> ReceivedRefUpdate {
-        ReceivedRefUpdate {
-            id: id.into(),
-            node_did: "did:key:z6MkNode".into(),
-            pusher_did: "did:key:z6MkPusher".into(),
-            repo: slug.into(),
-            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: "0".repeat(40),
-            new_sha: "a".repeat(40),
-            timestamp: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-            cert_id: None,
-            received_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-            from_peer: "peer1".into(),
-            owner_did: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Count `refUpdates` rows in a GraphQL response.
-    fn count(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> usize {
-        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
-        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
-            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
-        };
-        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").expect("refUpdates key")
-        else {
-            panic!("refUpdates not a list");
-        };
-        rows.len()
-    }
-
-    async fn anon(schema: &super::super::GitlawbSchema, query: &str) -> async_graphql::Response {
-        schema.execute(async_graphql::Request::new(query)).await
-    }
-
-    async fn authed(
-        schema: &super::super::GitlawbSchema,
-        query: &str,
-        did: &str,
-    ) -> async_graphql::Response {
-        schema
-            .execute(
-                async_graphql::Request::new(query)
-                    .data(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid(did.to_string())),
-            )
-            .await
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 1 — anon must not get a private local repo's row on the
-    // repo:Some branch. This is the load-bearing RED→GREEN case.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_private_repo_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkOwner/widget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        // The GraphQL `repo` arg is the raw slug DB filter, so it must equal the
-        // stored slug to select the row at all — this is the exact leak path.
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(repo: "z6MkOwner/widget") { refName newSha pusherDid } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 2 — owner still sees their own private repo's row.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_private_repo_kept_for_owner(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkOwner/widget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(repo: "z6MkOwner/widget") { refName } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&authed(&schema, q, OWNER).await), 1);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 3 — unfiltered (repo:None): anon gets only the public row.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_unfiltered_anon_gets_only_public(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("pub", OWNER, "openrepo", true))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.create_repo(&repo("priv", OWNER, "secret", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u_pub", "z6MkOwner/openrepo"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u_priv", "z6MkOwner/secret"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo refName ownerDid } }"#;
-        let resp = anon(&schema, q).await;
-        assert_eq!(count(&resp), 1);
-        // The one row returned must be the public repo's with owner_did echoed.
-        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").unwrap() else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        let async_graphql::Value::Object(row) = &rows[0] else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        assert_eq!(
-            row.get("repo").unwrap(),
-            &async_graphql::Value::from("z6MkOwner/openrepo")
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            row.get("ownerDid").unwrap(),
-            &async_graphql::Value::from(OWNER),
-            "ownerDid must fall back to the local record's owner for legacy rows"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 4 — alias fail-closed: private repo's row stored full-DID form.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_full_did_slug_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", "did:key:zABC", "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "did:key:zABC/widget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        // repo:None so the slug is not the DB filter key (which is verbatim);
-        // the gate must still drop it.
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 5 — truncated-key fail-closed: 8-char-prefix owner form.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_truncated_key_slug_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", "did:key:zABCDEFGH", "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "zABCDEF/widget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 6 — remote slug (no local match) is returned to anon.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_remote_slug_kept_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        // Row whose slug matches no local repo (different owner + name).
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "zZZZOTHER/gadget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 1);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 7 (#114 P2) — a small limit must page past the newest rows when
-    // they are private, so the older public rows are still returned. Before the
-    // gate moved ahead of the limit this returned 0 (the newest `limit` rows were
-    // all private and got filtered after the SQL LIMIT). RED→GREEN.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_small_limit_pages_past_newest_private(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("pub", OWNER, "openrepo", true))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.create_repo(&repo("priv", OWNER, "secret", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        // 3 older PUBLIC rows …
-        for i in 0..3 {
-            let mut r = ref_row(&format!("pub{i}"), "z6MkOwner/openrepo");
-            r.timestamp = format!("2026-07-01T10:00:0{i}+00:00");
-            db.insert_ref_update(&r).await.unwrap();
-        }
-        // … then 5 NEWER PRIVATE rows (the newest in the feed).
-        for i in 0..5 {
-            let mut r = ref_row(&format!("priv{i}"), "z6MkOwner/secret");
-            r.timestamp = format!("2026-07-01T10:00:1{i}+00:00");
-            db.insert_ref_update(&r).await.unwrap();
-        }
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        // limit 3 < the 5 newest (all private): anon must still get 3 public rows.
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(limit: 3) { repo } }"#;
-        let resp = anon(&schema, q).await;
-        assert_eq!(count(&resp), 3, "paging must reach the older public rows");
-        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").unwrap() else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        for row in rows {
-            let async_graphql::Value::Object(r) = row else {
-                unreachable!()
-            };
-            assert_eq!(
-                r.get("repo").unwrap(),
-                &async_graphql::Value::from("z6MkOwner/openrepo"),
-                "every returned row must be the public repo's"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 8 — a quarantined mirror is withheld on the GraphQL surface too.
-    // Guards that the resolver keeps delegating to the shared collector (where the
-    // quarantine fold lives); a REST-only test would miss a resolver that stopped.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_quarantined_mirror_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.upsert_mirror_repo("z6MkQuar", "secret", "/tmp/q", None, true)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkQuar/secret"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 8b — the GraphQL surface also withholds a quarantined repo from an
-    // authenticated OWNER, not just anon. Without the collector's quarantine drop
-    // the owner short-circuit in visibility_check keeps the row on this surface
-    // too, so the REST owner test alone would not guard the resolver.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_quarantined_repo_dropped_for_owner(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("q1", "did:key:z6MkQuar", "secret", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.set_repo_quarantine("q1", true).await.unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkQuar/secret"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&authed(&schema, q, "did:key:z6MkQuar").await), 0);
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/subscription.rs

@@ -11,15 +11,6 @@ pub struct SubscriptionRoot;
 
 #[Subscription]
 impl SubscriptionRoot {
-    /// Live ref-update stream. `/graphql/ws` is mounted outside the
-    /// `optional_signature` layer, so this resolver has NO caller identity and
-    /// cannot gate per-subscriber — it relays whatever enters the broadcast
-    /// channel to any anonymous client. Its visibility safety therefore rests
-    /// entirely on the WRITE side: the push handler only sends a
-    /// `RefUpdateBroadcast` for repos the anonymous public may read (inside its
-    /// `if announce` block, `api/repos.rs`). This is a single-point invariant —
-    /// any new sender to `ref_update_tx` MUST be `announce`-gated, or private-repo
-    /// ref metadata leaks here to unauthenticated subscribers (#112/#114 class).
     async fn ref_updates(
         &self,
         ctx: &Context<'_>,
@@ -39,7 +30,6 @@ impl SubscriptionRoot {
                     pusher_did: ev.pusher_did,
                     node_did: ev.node_did,
                     timestamp: ev.timestamp,
-                    owner_did: Some(ev.owner_did),
                 }),
                 _ => None,
             }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/types.rs

@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ pub struct RefUpdateType {
     pub pusher_did: String,
     pub node_did: String,
     pub timestamp: String,
-    pub owner_did: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(SimpleObject, Clone)]

crates/gitlawb-node/src/icaptcha.rs

@@ -1,650 +0,0 @@
-//! iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate.
-//!
-//! Spam-prone endpoints (repo creation, agent registration) can require the
-//! caller to present an iCaptcha proof: a small Ed25519-signed token minted by
-//! <https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com> after the caller solves an escalating
-//! challenge. We verify the proof OFFLINE (no per-request call to iCaptcha)
-//! using its published public key, and bind each proof to the authenticated
-//! agent DID so a proof cannot be shared between identities.
-//!
-//! Behaviour is controlled by `ICAPTCHA_MODE`:
-//!   * `off`     (default) — gate is inert, nothing is checked.
-//!   * `shadow`  — verify and log would-be rejections, but always allow.
-//!   * `enforce` — reject requests without a valid, sufficiently-strong proof.
-//!
-//! Config (env):
-//!   ICAPTCHA_MODE            off | shadow | enforce         (default off)
-//!   ICAPTCHA_URL             base URL                        (default https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com)
-//!   ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY          base64url Ed25519 public key    (optional; else fetched from /v1/pubkey)
-//!   ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL  minimum proof level             (default 3)
-
-use std::sync::OnceLock;
-use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
-
-use axum::http::HeaderMap;
-use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
-use base64::Engine;
-use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
-use serde::Deserialize;
-
-use crate::error::AppError;
-
-const PROOF_HEADER: &str = "x-icaptcha-proof";
-
-/// How long a mirror-admission `jti` stays in the replay ledger. The direct
-/// request path spends a proof against its own `exp` (it can't be presented once
-/// expired). The propagation path deliberately accepts already-expired proofs,
-/// so spending against `exp` would store an already-past expiry that the next
-/// sweep deletes — letting the same token admit another mirror minutes later.
-/// We instead retain the mirror replay record for a long, fixed window so the
-/// per-node single-use property is durable.
-const MIRROR_REPLAY_RETENTION_SECS: i64 = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60;
-
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub enum Mode {
-    Off,
-    Shadow,
-    Enforce,
-}
-
-impl Mode {
-    fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
-        match self {
-            Mode::Off => "off",
-            Mode::Shadow => "shadow",
-            Mode::Enforce => "enforce",
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Parse `ICAPTCHA_MODE`. Returns `None` for unrecognized values so the caller
-/// can surface the typo instead of silently disabling the gate.
-fn parse_mode(s: &str) -> Option<Mode> {
-    match s.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
-        "" | "off" => Some(Mode::Off),
-        "shadow" => Some(Mode::Shadow),
-        "enforce" => Some(Mode::Enforce),
-        _ => None,
-    }
-}
-
-/// Parse `ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL`. Defaults to 3; warns (rather than silently
-/// lowering the threshold) when a non-empty value fails to parse.
-fn parse_required_level() -> u32 {
-    const DEFAULT: u32 = 3;
-    match std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL") {
-        Ok(v) if !v.trim().is_empty() => v.trim().parse().unwrap_or_else(|_| {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                value = %v,
-                default = DEFAULT,
-                "invalid ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL; using default"
-            );
-            DEFAULT
-        }),
-        _ => DEFAULT,
-    }
-}
-
-struct Verifier {
-    mode: Mode,
-    url: String,
-    required_level: u32,
-    key: Option<VerifyingKey>,
-}
-
-static VERIFIER: OnceLock<Verifier> = OnceLock::new();
-
-#[derive(Deserialize, Debug)]
-struct ProofClaims {
-    sub: String,
-    level: u32,
-    exp: i64,
-    /// Unique proof id, consumed once so a proof cannot be replayed.
-    jti: String,
-}
-
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-struct Jwk {
-    x: String,
-}
-
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-struct Jwks {
-    keys: Vec<Jwk>,
-}
-
-fn now_secs() -> i64 {
-    SystemTime::now()
-        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
-        .map(|d| d.as_secs() as i64)
-        .unwrap_or(0)
-}
-
-fn decode_key(b64url: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
-    let bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(b64url.trim()).ok()?;
-    let arr: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().ok()?;
-    VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&arr).ok()
-}
-
-async fn fetch_key(url: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
-    let endpoint = format!("{}/v1/pubkey", url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-    // Bounded request: a hung /v1/pubkey must never block node startup. On
-    // timeout/error we return None and the gate stays inert (fail safe).
-    let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
-        .timeout(Duration::from_secs(5))
-        .build()
-        .ok()?;
-    let jwks: Jwks = client.get(&endpoint).send().await.ok()?.json().await.ok()?;
-    decode_key(&jwks.keys.first()?.x)
-}
-
-/// Initialize the gate from the environment. Call once at startup. Never panics;
-/// if the gate is active but no key can be loaded, it stays inert and warns.
-pub async fn init() {
-    let raw_mode = std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_MODE").unwrap_or_default();
-    let mode = parse_mode(&raw_mode).unwrap_or_else(|| {
-        tracing::warn!(value = %raw_mode, "invalid ICAPTCHA_MODE; disabling iCaptcha gate");
-        Mode::Off
-    });
-    let url = std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_URL")
-        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string());
-    let required_level = parse_required_level();
-
-    let key = if mode == Mode::Off {
-        None
-    } else {
-        match std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY") {
-            Ok(b64) if !b64.is_empty() => decode_key(&b64),
-            _ => fetch_key(&url).await,
-        }
-    };
-
-    if mode != Mode::Off {
-        if key.is_some() {
-            tracing::info!(mode = mode.as_str(), required_level, "iCaptcha gate active");
-        } else {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                mode = mode.as_str(),
-                "iCaptcha gate enabled but no public key could be loaded; staying inert"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    let _ = VERIFIER.set(Verifier {
-        mode,
-        url,
-        required_level,
-        key,
-    });
-}
-
-/// Outcome of the synchronous, IO-free decision step.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-enum Decision {
-    /// Allow the request (off, shadow, inert/no-key, or verified non-enforcing).
-    Allow,
-    /// Enforce mode and verification failed; reject with this reason.
-    Reject(String),
-    /// Enforce mode and the proof verified; the caller must consume its `jti`
-    /// (and reject replays) before allowing, then may persist it.
-    Consume(VerifiedProof),
-}
-
-/// A verified proof: the raw token plus the claims we act on. Carried by a
-/// [`ProofGuard`] so that, once consumed, the gated handler can persist it with
-/// the created repo — letting the proof travel with the repo when it propagates
-/// to peers (see [`admit_mirror`]).
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct VerifiedProof {
-    token: String,
-    sub: String,
-    level: u32,
-    jti: String,
-    exp: i64,
-}
-
-impl VerifiedProof {
-    /// Persist this proof against a freshly-created repo so a mirroring peer can
-    /// re-verify it. Best-effort callers may ignore failures; the gate's
-    /// security does not depend on it (propagation just falls back to quarantine).
-    pub async fn record_for_repo(&self, db: &crate::db::Db, repo_id: &str) -> Result<(), AppError> {
-        db.record_repo_proof(
-            repo_id,
-            &self.token,
-            &self.sub,
-            self.level as i32,
-            &self.jti,
-            self.exp,
-        )
-        .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-/// A verified proof awaiting consumption. Verification (which rejects invalid or
-/// missing proofs) is separated from consumption (which spends the single-use
-/// `jti`) so a request rejected by later validation never burns a valid proof.
-/// The caller must `consume()` this guard immediately before the gated write.
-/// For off/shadow/inert there is nothing to consume.
-#[must_use = "a verified iCaptcha proof must be consumed before the gated action"]
-pub struct ProofGuard(Option<VerifiedProof>);
-
-impl ProofGuard {
-    /// Spend the proof's `jti` (single-use) and return the verified proof so the
-    /// caller can persist it. A replay is rejected. Returns `None` when there is
-    /// nothing to consume (off/shadow/inert).
-    pub async fn consume(self, db: &crate::db::Db) -> Result<Option<VerifiedProof>, AppError> {
-        match self.0 {
-            Some(p) => {
-                if !db.consume_proof_jti(&p.jti, p.exp).await? {
-                    let (url, level) = url_and_level();
-                    return Err(AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
-                        message: "iCaptcha proof already used (replay); solve a fresh challenge"
-                            .to_string(),
-                        url,
-                        level,
-                    });
-                }
-                Ok(Some(p))
-            }
-            None => Ok(None),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Verify the proof in `headers` belongs to `did`. Rejects missing/invalid
-/// proofs early (enforce mode); off/shadow never reject. Returns a [`ProofGuard`]
-/// the caller must `consume()` right before the gated write. Off/shadow/inert
-/// yield a no-op guard that consumes nothing.
-pub fn verify_request(headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str) -> Result<ProofGuard, AppError> {
-    let v = match VERIFIER.get() {
-        Some(v) => v,
-        None => return Ok(ProofGuard(None)), // not initialized -> inert
-    };
-    match decide(v, headers, did, now_secs()) {
-        Decision::Allow => Ok(ProofGuard(None)),
-        Decision::Reject(reason) => Err(reject_error(v, &reason)),
-        Decision::Consume(proof) => Ok(ProofGuard(Some(proof))),
-    }
-}
-
-fn reject_error(v: &Verifier, reason: &str) -> AppError {
-    AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
-        message: format!(
-            "iCaptcha proof required ({reason}). Solve a challenge at {} for level >= {} and resend with the {} header.",
-            v.url, v.required_level, PROOF_HEADER
-        ),
-        url: v.url.clone(),
-        level: v.required_level,
-    }
-}
-
-/// iCaptcha service url + required level for error responses, read from the
-/// initialized verifier (falls back to defaults if somehow uninitialized).
-fn url_and_level() -> (String, u32) {
-    VERIFIER
-        .get()
-        .map(|v| (v.url.clone(), v.required_level))
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| ("https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(), 3))
-}
-
-/// Mode-aware decision. Pure and IO-free (no DB; clock injected via `now`) so it
-/// is fully unit-testable. The caller performs jti consumption for `Consume`.
-fn decide(v: &Verifier, headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str, now: i64) -> Decision {
-    if v.mode == Mode::Off {
-        return Decision::Allow;
-    }
-
-    // Fail safe: if no public key could be loaded (e.g. iCaptcha was unreachable
-    // at startup), stay inert rather than rejecting every request. The operator
-    // already saw a startup warning. An iCaptcha hiccup must never break repo
-    // creation or registration.
-    if v.key.is_none() {
-        return Decision::Allow;
-    }
-
-    let token = headers.get(PROOF_HEADER).and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok());
-    let result = match token {
-        Some(t) => verify_token(v, t, did, now, true).map(|claims| (t, claims)),
-        None => Err("missing proof header".to_string()),
-    };
-
-    match result {
-        Ok((token, claims)) => match v.mode {
-            Mode::Enforce => Decision::Consume(VerifiedProof {
-                token: token.to_string(),
-                sub: claims.sub,
-                level: claims.level,
-                jti: claims.jti,
-                exp: claims.exp,
-            }),
-            // Shadow/Off: never reject, and do not consume (observational only).
-            _ => Decision::Allow,
-        },
-        Err(reason) => match v.mode {
-            Mode::Shadow => {
-                tracing::warn!(did = %did, reason, "iCaptcha (shadow) would reject");
-                Decision::Allow
-            }
-            Mode::Enforce => Decision::Reject(reason),
-            Mode::Off => Decision::Allow,
-        },
-    }
-}
-
-/// Header-extracting wrapper over [`verify_token`] (enforces expiry). The
-/// production path inlines this in [`decide`]; retained as the unit-test entry
-/// point that also exercises header extraction.
-#[cfg(test)]
-fn verify(v: &Verifier, headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str, now: i64) -> Result<ProofClaims, String> {
-    let proof = headers
-        .get(PROOF_HEADER)
-        .and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok())
-        .ok_or("missing proof header")?;
-    verify_token(v, proof, did, now, true)
-}
-
-/// Core verification of a raw proof token, separated for testability and reuse.
-/// Checks the Ed25519 signature, the required level, and the DID binding. `exp`
-/// is only enforced when `check_exp` is true: the direct request path enforces
-/// freshness, but the propagation path ([`admit_mirror`]) does not — a proof has
-/// usually expired by the time a repo mirrors, and the origin enforced freshness
-/// at creation. `now` is unix seconds.
-fn verify_token(
-    v: &Verifier,
-    token: &str,
-    did: &str,
-    now: i64,
-    check_exp: bool,
-) -> Result<ProofClaims, String> {
-    let key = v.key.as_ref().ok_or("verifier has no public key")?;
-
-    let (payload, sig_b64) = token.split_once('.').ok_or("malformed proof")?;
-    let sig_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
-        .decode(sig_b64)
-        .map_err(|_| "bad signature encoding")?;
-    let sig = Signature::from_slice(&sig_bytes).map_err(|_| "bad signature length")?;
-    key.verify_strict(payload.as_bytes(), &sig)
-        .map_err(|_| "signature verification failed")?;
-
-    let claims_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
-        .decode(payload)
-        .map_err(|_| "bad payload encoding")?;
-    let claims: ProofClaims = serde_json::from_slice(&claims_bytes).map_err(|_| "bad claims")?;
-
-    if check_exp && claims.exp < now {
-        return Err("proof expired".to_string());
-    }
-    if claims.level < v.required_level {
-        return Err(format!(
-            "level {} below required {}",
-            claims.level, v.required_level
-        ));
-    }
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(did, &claims.sub) {
-        return Err("proof subject does not match authenticated DID".to_string());
-    }
-    Ok(claims)
-}
-
-/// Outcome of admitting a repo mirrored from a peer.
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub enum MirrorAdmission {
-    /// Admit the mirror normally (off/shadow/inert, or a valid proof in enforce).
-    Admit,
-    /// Enforce mode and the mirror's proof is missing/invalid/replayed — mirror
-    /// it but quarantine until an operator releases it. Carries the reason.
-    Quarantine(String),
-}
-
-/// Decide whether to admit a repo being mirrored from a peer, given the proof
-/// token the origin served (`None` if it had none or the fetch failed) and the
-/// mirrored repo's owner DID.
-///
-/// Off/shadow/inert always admit (shadow logs the would-be quarantine and writes
-/// nothing). In enforce mode the proof is re-verified offline against the local
-/// public key — signature, level, and owner-DID binding, but NOT expiry — and
-/// its `jti` is consumed in the local ledger, so one solved challenge admits at
-/// most one mirror per node (a malicious origin cannot reuse one proof to bless
-/// many spam repos here).
-///
-/// LIMITATION (proof is not repo-bound): an iCaptcha proof commits only to the
-/// solver's DID (`sub`), never to a repo — the proof is minted before the repo
-/// exists. So the guarantee enforced here is "a level≥N challenge was solved by
-/// this repo's owner DID", not "the owner intended THIS repo". A malicious origin
-/// that harvests a victim's public proof (served by `get_icaptcha_proof`) can use
-/// it to get ONE spam repo nominally owned by that victim admitted per node — the
-/// per-node `jti` single-use caps the amplification at one repo per distinct
-/// harvested proof, but does not eliminate it. Fully binding a proof to a repo
-/// would require the iCaptcha service to embed a repo/target identifier in the
-/// signed challenge (a protocol change, tracked as future work).
-pub async fn admit_mirror(
-    db: &crate::db::Db,
-    token: Option<&str>,
-    owner_did: &str,
-) -> MirrorAdmission {
-    let v = match VERIFIER.get() {
-        Some(v) => v,
-        None => return MirrorAdmission::Admit, // not initialized -> inert
-    };
-    // Off, or inert because no key could be loaded: admit unconditionally.
-    if v.mode == Mode::Off || v.key.is_none() {
-        return MirrorAdmission::Admit;
-    }
-    let shadow = v.mode == Mode::Shadow;
-
-    // Quarantine in enforce; in shadow just log and admit (observational, no IO).
-    let quarantine = |reason: String| -> MirrorAdmission {
-        if shadow {
-            tracing::warn!(owner = %owner_did, reason, "iCaptcha (shadow) would quarantine mirror");
-            MirrorAdmission::Admit
-        } else {
-            MirrorAdmission::Quarantine(reason)
-        }
-    };
-
-    let token = match token {
-        Some(t) => t,
-        None => return quarantine("origin served no iCaptcha proof".to_string()),
-    };
-
-    match verify_token(v, token, owner_did, now_secs(), false) {
-        Ok(claims) => {
-            if shadow {
-                // Observational: a valid proof would admit. Do not consume, so a
-                // later switch to enforce still sees the jti as fresh.
-                return MirrorAdmission::Admit;
-            }
-            // Retain the replay record on a fixed forward window, NOT the proof's
-            // own (already-past) exp — otherwise the next sweep frees the jti and
-            // the same token could admit another mirror here.
-            let retain_until = now_secs().saturating_add(MIRROR_REPLAY_RETENTION_SECS);
-            match db.consume_proof_jti(&claims.jti, retain_until).await {
-                Ok(true) => MirrorAdmission::Admit,
-                Ok(false) => MirrorAdmission::Quarantine(
-                    "iCaptcha proof already used to admit another mirror".to_string(),
-                ),
-                Err(e) => {
-                    tracing::warn!(owner = %owner_did, err = %e, "iCaptcha mirror ledger error; quarantining");
-                    MirrorAdmission::Quarantine("iCaptcha proof ledger unavailable".to_string())
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        Err(reason) => quarantine(reason),
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    // Real values captured from https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com (a live proof).
-    const PUBKEY_X: &str = "xjyPNqIbvc9U-kwXW6u9mDqRJ7E2UUMOaJdUWhpEXq8";
-    const PROOF: &str = "eyJzdWIiOiJkaWQ6a2V5Onp0ZXN0IiwibGV2ZWwiOjMsImlzcyI6ImljYXB0Y2hhIiwiaWF0IjoxNzgyNTcyODUxLCJleHAiOjE3ODI1NzMxNTEsImp0aSI6IjRiNTIyOGE1YmVkNzEyMmRlZTlmNDdmZiJ9.5UXVPZ8Eo91VnlcvgDXtW-Fx7J2jr7h535SAstQEpigxBr7FF7V6R0XB4PBDgdoBPnhdH_kVEfRPfdHPSdB0CA";
-    const SUB: &str = "did:key:ztest";
-    const IAT: i64 = 1782572851; // within the proof's validity window
-
-    fn verifier(level: u32) -> Verifier {
-        Verifier {
-            mode: Mode::Enforce,
-            url: "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(),
-            required_level: level,
-            key: decode_key(PUBKEY_X),
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn headers_with(proof: &str) -> HeaderMap {
-        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
-        h.insert(PROOF_HEADER, proof.parse().unwrap());
-        h
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn accepts_a_real_proof() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        assert!(verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, IAT).is_ok());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_expired_proof() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        let err = verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, 9_999_999_999).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.contains("expired"), "{err}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_wrong_did() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        let err = verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), "did:key:zsomeoneelse", IAT).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.contains("subject"), "{err}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_insufficient_level() {
-        let v = verifier(5); // proof is level 3
-        let err = verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, IAT).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.contains("below required"), "{err}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_tampered_signature() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        // Flip one base64url char in the signature so it is guaranteed different.
-        let (payload, sig) = PROOF.split_once('.').unwrap();
-        let mut chars: Vec<char> = sig.chars().collect();
-        chars[0] = if chars[0] == 'A' { 'B' } else { 'A' };
-        let tampered = format!("{}.{}", payload, chars.into_iter().collect::<String>());
-        assert!(verify(&v, &headers_with(&tampered), SUB, IAT).is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_missing_header() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        let err = verify(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.contains("missing"), "{err}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn parse_mode_accepts_documented_values_and_rejects_junk() {
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode(""), Some(Mode::Off));
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("off"), Some(Mode::Off));
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("  Shadow "), Some(Mode::Shadow));
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("ENFORCE"), Some(Mode::Enforce));
-        // Typos must NOT silently disable the gate.
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("enforced"), None);
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("on"), None);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn off_mode_allows_everything() {
-        let mut v = verifier(3);
-        v.mode = Mode::Off;
-        assert!(matches!(
-            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
-            Decision::Allow
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn enforce_without_key_stays_inert() {
-        // iCaptcha unreachable at startup -> no key -> must not reject.
-        let v = Verifier {
-            mode: Mode::Enforce,
-            url: "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(),
-            required_level: 3,
-            key: None,
-        };
-        assert!(matches!(
-            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
-            Decision::Allow
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn enforce_with_key_rejects_missing_proof() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        assert!(matches!(
-            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
-            Decision::Reject(_)
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn shadow_allows_despite_bad_proof() {
-        let mut v = verifier(3);
-        v.mode = Mode::Shadow;
-        assert!(matches!(
-            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
-            Decision::Allow
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn enforce_valid_proof_requires_consuming_its_jti() {
-        // A verified proof under enforce must yield Consume carrying the jti, so
-        // the caller can spend it once and reject replays.
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        match decide(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, IAT) {
-            Decision::Consume(p) => {
-                assert_eq!(p.jti, "4b5228a5bed7122dee9f47ff");
-                assert_eq!(p.exp, 1782573151);
-                assert_eq!(p.token, PROOF, "the raw token is retained for persistence");
-                assert_eq!(p.sub, SUB);
-            }
-            other => panic!("expected Consume, got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn propagation_accepts_an_expired_proof() {
-        // The mirror-admission path verifies sig/level/DID but NOT expiry, since a
-        // proof has usually expired by the time a repo propagates. The same proof
-        // that the direct path rejects as expired must verify here.
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        let now = 9_999_999_999; // far past the proof's exp
-        assert!(
-            verify_token(&v, PROOF, SUB, now, true).is_err(),
-            "direct path (check_exp=true) rejects the expired proof"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            verify_token(&v, PROOF, SUB, now, false).is_ok(),
-            "propagation path (check_exp=false) accepts it"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn propagation_still_enforces_signature_level_and_did() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        // wrong owner DID
-        assert!(verify_token(&v, PROOF, "did:key:zother", IAT, false).is_err());
-        // insufficient level
-        let v5 = verifier(5);
-        assert!(verify_token(&v5, PROOF, SUB, IAT, false).is_err());
-        // tampered signature
-        let (payload, sig) = PROOF.split_once('.').unwrap();
-        let mut chars: Vec<char> = sig.chars().collect();
-        chars[0] = if chars[0] == 'A' { 'B' } else { 'A' };
-        let tampered = format!("{}.{}", payload, chars.into_iter().collect::<String>());
-        assert!(verify_token(&v, &tampered, SUB, IAT, false).is_err());
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/ipfs_pin.rs

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 //! If `ipfs_api` is empty the functions are no-ops, so the node works fine
 //! without a local IPFS daemon.
 
+use std::collections::HashSet;
+
 use anyhow::Result;
 use gitlawb_core::cid::Cid;
 
@@ -70,40 +72,31 @@ pub async fn pin_git_object(ipfs_api: &str, sha256_hex: &str, data: &[u8]) -> Re
     Ok(cid)
 }
 
-/// Fetch raw bytes for a CID from the local Kubo node (`/api/v0/cat`).
-pub async fn cat(ipfs_api: &str, cid: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    if ipfs_api.is_empty() {
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("IPFS not configured"));
-    }
-    let url = format!("{}/api/v0/cat?arg={}", ipfs_api.trim_end_matches('/'), cid);
-    let resp = reqwest::Client::new().post(&url).send().await?;
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("ipfs cat {cid}: {}", resp.status()));
-    }
-    Ok(resp.bytes().await?.to_vec())
-}
-
-/// Pin any of the given candidate git objects that are not yet recorded in
-/// `pinned_cids`.
-///
-/// `object_list` is the already-withheld-filtered OID set to pin: the caller
-/// applies `visibility_pack::replicable_objects` on the delta path or the
-/// `..._fail_closed` filter on the full-scan path before calling, so this
-/// function never sees a withheld blob. `repo_path` is still needed to read each
-/// object's bytes. The twin in `pinata.rs` mirrors this shape — change both in
-/// lockstep.
+/// List all git objects in the given bare repo and pin any that are not yet
+/// recorded in `pinned_cids`.
 ///
 /// Returns a list of `(sha256_hex, cid)` pairs for objects pinned this call.
 pub async fn pin_new_objects(
     ipfs_api: &str,
     repo_path: &std::path::Path,
-    object_list: Vec<String>,
     db: &crate::db::Db,
+    withheld: &HashSet<String>,
 ) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
     if ipfs_api.is_empty() {
         return vec![];
     }
 
+    // Enumerate all objects in the repo
+    let object_list = match list_all_objects(repo_path) {
+        Ok(v) => v,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!(repo = %repo_path.display(), err = %e, "failed to list git objects for IPFS pinning");
+            return vec![];
+        }
+    };
+
+    let object_list = crate::git::visibility_pack::replicable_objects(object_list, withheld);
+
     let mut pinned = Vec::new();
 
     for sha in object_list {
@@ -144,3 +137,31 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
 
     pinned
 }
+
+/// Run `git cat-file --batch-all-objects --batch-check='%(objectname)'`
+/// to get all object SHA-256 hashes in the repository.
+fn list_all_objects(repo_path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+    let output = std::process::Command::new("git")
+        .args([
+            "cat-file",
+            "--batch-all-objects",
+            "--batch-check=%(objectname)",
+        ])
+        .current_dir(repo_path)
+        .output()
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to run git cat-file: {e}"))?;
+
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}"));
+    }
+
+    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
+    let hashes = stdout
+        .lines()
+        .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
+        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
+        .collect();
+
+    Ok(hashes)
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/main.rs

@@ -5,11 +5,9 @@ mod bootstrap;
 mod cert;
 mod config;
 mod db;
-mod encrypted_pin;
 mod error;
 mod git;
 mod graphql;
-mod icaptcha;
 mod ipfs_pin;
 mod metrics;
 mod operator;
@@ -19,19 +17,11 @@ mod rate_limit;
 mod server;
 mod state;
 mod sync;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod test_support;
 mod visibility;
 mod webhooks;
 
-use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
-use axum::extract::State;
-use axum::http::StatusCode;
-use axum::response::IntoResponse;
-use axum::routing::get;
-use axum::{Json, Router};
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::Parser;
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use tokio::net::TcpListener;
 use tokio::sync::watch;
@@ -44,20 +34,6 @@ use config::Config;
 use db::Db;
 use state::AppState;
 
-#[derive(Clone)]
-struct DegradedState {
-    node_did: String,
-    db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>,
-}
-
-/// Two independent counters with no cross-field invariant — atomics, not a
-/// lock, so the retry loop and the degraded handlers never contend.
-#[derive(Default)]
-struct DbStartupStatus {
-    attempts: AtomicU64,
-    next_retry_secs: AtomicU64,
-}
-
 #[tokio::main]
 async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     tracing_subscriber::fmt()
@@ -96,101 +72,21 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")
     );
     info!("╚══════════════════════════════════════════╝");
+    info!(did = %node_did, "node identity");
+    info!(addr = %config.bind_addr(), "listening");
+
     // Process-wide shutdown signal. One sender lives in AppState (cloned
     // into every handler); main() keeps a clone and flips it on SIGINT
     // or SIGTERM. Tasks that hold a watch::Receiver get notified at
     // their next await point.
     let (shutdown_tx, _shutdown_rx_for_main) = watch::channel(false);
-    spawn_shutdown_signal(shutdown_tx.clone());
 
-    info!(did = %node_did, "node identity");
-    info!(addr = %config.bind_addr(), "binding HTTP listener");
-
-    // Bind HTTP once, before dependency initialization, and keep this socket
-    // for the life of the process. The degraded server accepts on a dup of the
-    // same socket, so the degraded→full handoff never closes the port: while
-    // the full server initializes, connections queue in the shared backlog
-    // instead of being refused.
-    let listener = TcpListener::bind(config.bind_addr())
-        .await
-        .with_context(|| format!("failed to bind to {}", config.bind_addr()))?;
-    let full_std_listener = listener.into_std()?;
-    let degraded_listener = TcpListener::from_std(
-        full_std_listener
-            .try_clone()
-            .context("failed to clone HTTP listener for degraded server")?,
-    )?;
-
-    // Metrics must stay observable during a database outage — the degraded
-    // window is exactly when dashboards need data — so this listener starts
-    // before the DB connects.
-    let metrics_handle = if !config.metrics_addr.is_empty() {
-        match spawn_metrics_server(&config.metrics_addr, shutdown_tx.subscribe()).await {
-            Ok(handle) => {
-                info!(addr = %config.metrics_addr, "metrics endpoint listening");
-                Some(handle)
-            }
-            Err(e) => {
-                warn!(err = %e, addr = %config.metrics_addr, "failed to start metrics endpoint — continuing without");
-                None
-            }
-        }
-    } else {
-        info!("metrics endpoint disabled (GITLAWB_METRICS_ADDR not set)");
-        None
-    };
-
-    let db_startup = Arc::new(DbStartupStatus::default());
-    let (db_ready_tx, db_ready_rx) = watch::channel(false);
-    let mut degraded_handle = tokio::spawn(run_degraded_server(
-        degraded_listener,
-        node_did.to_string(),
-        Arc::clone(&db_startup),
-        db_ready_rx,
-        shutdown_tx.subscribe(),
-    ));
-
-    // Connect to PostgreSQL database. A transient outage or bad secret should
-    // not crash-loop the process and hammer the database provider; permanent
-    // misconfiguration surfaces through error-level logs and the /ready check.
-    let db = tokio::select! {
-        db = connect_db_with_retry(&config, Arc::clone(&db_startup), shutdown_tx.subscribe()) => {
-            match db {
-                Some(db) => db,
-                None => {
-                    // Shutdown requested while waiting for the database. The
-                    // degraded server only serves one-shot 503s — abort it
-                    // rather than drain, so a slow client can't stall exit.
-                    degraded_handle.abort();
-                    return Ok(());
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        degraded = &mut degraded_handle => {
-            if *shutdown_tx.borrow() {
-                return Ok(());
-            }
-            return match degraded {
-                Ok(Ok(())) => Err(anyhow!("degraded HTTP server stopped before database became ready")),
-                Ok(Err(err)) => Err(err.context("degraded HTTP server failed")),
-                Err(err) => Err(anyhow!("degraded HTTP server task failed: {err}")),
-            };
-        }
-    };
-
-    // Flip the degraded server into graceful shutdown, but do NOT await the
-    // drain: one slow in-flight request must not delay the full server, and
-    // the shared socket means there is no port gap to cover. The drain
-    // finishes (and logs) in the background.
-    db_ready_tx.send(true).ok();
-    tokio::spawn(async move {
-        match degraded_handle.await {
-            Ok(Ok(())) => {}
-            Ok(Err(err)) => warn!(err = %err, "degraded HTTP server exited with error"),
-            Err(err) => warn!(err = %err, "degraded HTTP server task failed"),
-        }
-    });
-    info!(addr = %config.bind_addr(), "database ready; starting full HTTP server");
+    // Connect to PostgreSQL database
+    let db = Arc::new(
+        Db::connect(&config.database_url)
+            .await
+            .context("failed to connect to database")?,
+    );
 
     // Prune peer rows that point back at this node (stale self-loop entries)
     if let Some(public_url) = config.public_url.as_deref() {
@@ -201,15 +97,6 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         }
     }
 
-    // Prune peer rows with non-public hosts (loopback/private/internal) that
-    // were injected via the unauthenticated announce route — they poison the
-    // sync-notify fan-out (SSRF + crowding out real peers).
-    match db.prune_non_public_peers().await {
-        Ok(0) => {}
-        Ok(n) => info!(removed = n, "pruned non-public (poisoned) peer rows"),
-        Err(e) => warn!(err = %e, "prune_non_public_peers failed (non-fatal)"),
-    }
-
     // Ensure repos directory exists
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&config.repos_dir).context("failed to create repos directory")?;
 
@@ -245,8 +132,11 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         None
     };
 
-    // Shared no-redirect HTTP client. See build_http_client for the SSRF rationale.
-    let http_client = Arc::new(build_http_client()?);
+    let http_client = Arc::new(
+        reqwest::Client::builder()
+            .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
+            .build()?,
+    );
 
     let (ref_update_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel::<state::RefUpdateBroadcast>(256);
     let (task_event_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel::<state::TaskEventBroadcast>(256);
@@ -282,82 +172,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     let repo_store =
         git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(config.repos_dir.clone(), tigris, db.pool().clone());
 
-    // Per-DID limiter for the creation endpoints. Keyed on the authenticated
-    // DID (attacker-varied), so bound its key set to cap memory.
-    let rate_limiter =
-        rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(10, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600), 200_000);
-
-    // Per-client-IP flood brake for the creation endpoints. The per-DID limiter
-    // above is bypassed by a DID farm (one throwaway did:key per repo), which is
-    // exactly how the recurring spam-repo floods get past both it and the
-    // iCaptcha gate. Keyed on the resolved client IP so a single-source flood is
-    // capped regardless of how many identities it mints. Sized well above any
-    // legitimate per-IP creation rate; GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT overrides, 0
-    // disables. Bounded key set — the key is a client-influenced IP.
-    let create_limit = std::env::var("GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT")
-        .ok()
-        .and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
-        .unwrap_or(120);
-    let create_ip_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
-        create_limit,
-        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
-        200_000,
-    );
-    if create_limit == 0 {
-        tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT=0 — per-IP creation rate limiting disabled");
-    }
-
-    // Push-path flood brake: max git-receive-pack requests per client IP per
-    // hour (counts both the info/refs advertisement and the push POST). Sized
-    // for heavy agent automation while still stopping flood traffic (the June
-    // 2026 attack pushed several times per second per IP). GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT
-    // overrides; 0 disables. Bounded key set — the key is a client-influenced IP.
-    let push_limit = std::env::var("GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT")
-        .ok()
-        .and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
-        .unwrap_or(600);
-    let push_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
-        push_limit,
-        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
-        200_000,
-    );
-    if push_limit == 0 {
-        tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT=0 — per-IP push rate limiting disabled");
-    }
-
-    // Which forwarded header the edge is trusted to set. Default None (trust
-    // nothing, key on the socket peer). Fly nodes set GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY=fly;
-    // a node behind Caddy/NGINX sets it to x-forwarded-for.
-    let push_limiter_trust = rate_limit::TrustedProxy::from_env_value(
-        &std::env::var("GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY").unwrap_or_default(),
-    );
-    tracing::info!(trust = ?push_limiter_trust, push_limit, "push rate limiter configured");
-
-    // Peer-sync flood brakes, keyed on the resolved client IP (per-DID is useless
-    // here — a did:key farm self-registers). Two buckets so an unsigned notify
-    // flood can't drain the signed trigger caller's quota (#82). Bounded key sets
-    // (the key is a client-influenced IP); 0 disables each.
-    let sync_trigger_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
-        config.sync_trigger_rate_limit,
-        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
-        200_000,
-    );
-    let peer_write_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
-        config.peer_write_rate_limit,
-        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
-        200_000,
-    );
-    if config.sync_trigger_rate_limit == 0 {
-        tracing::warn!(
-            "GITLAWB_SYNC_TRIGGER_RATE_LIMIT=0 — /sync/trigger IP rate limiting disabled"
-        );
-    }
-    if config.peer_write_rate_limit == 0 {
-        tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_PEER_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT=0 — peer-write IP rate limiting disabled");
-    }
-
-    // Initialize the iCaptcha proof gate (inert unless ICAPTCHA_MODE is set).
-    icaptcha::init().await;
+    let rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new(10, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600));
 
     let state = AppState {
         config: Arc::new(config.clone()),
@@ -372,11 +187,6 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         machine_id,
         repo_store,
         rate_limiter,
-        create_ip_rate_limiter,
-        push_rate_limiter,
-        push_limiter_trust,
-        sync_trigger_rate_limiter,
-        peer_write_rate_limiter,
         shutdown_tx: shutdown_tx.clone(),
     };
 
@@ -406,31 +216,43 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         });
     }
 
-    // Periodic cleanup of expired rate limit entries + consumed-proof ledger
+    // Spawn a task that flips the shutdown signal on SIGINT or SIGTERM.
+    // On Unix, both signals are handled. On Windows, only Ctrl-C is
+    // supported by tokio::signal::ctrl_c.
+    {
+        let tx = shutdown_tx.clone();
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            #[cfg(unix)]
+            {
+                use tokio::signal::unix::{signal as unix_signal, SignalKind};
+                let mut sigterm =
+                    unix_signal(SignalKind::terminate()).expect("install SIGTERM handler");
+                let mut sigint =
+                    unix_signal(SignalKind::interrupt()).expect("install SIGINT handler");
+                tokio::select! {
+                    _ = sigterm.recv() => info!("SIGTERM received, shutting down"),
+                    _ = sigint.recv()  => info!("SIGINT received, shutting down"),
+                }
+            }
+            #[cfg(not(unix))]
+            {
+                use tokio::signal;
+                let _ = signal::ctrl_c().await;
+                info!("Ctrl-C received, shutting down");
+            }
+            tx.send(true).ok();
+        });
+    }
+
+    // Periodic cleanup of expired rate limit entries
     {
         let rl = state.rate_limiter.clone();
-        let create_ip_rl = state.create_ip_rate_limiter.clone();
-        let push_rl = state.push_rate_limiter.clone();
-        let sync_trigger_rl = state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter.clone();
-        let peer_write_rl = state.peer_write_rate_limiter.clone();
-        let db = state.db.clone();
         let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
         tokio::spawn(async move {
             loop {
                 tokio::select! {
                     _ = tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(300)) => {
                         rl.cleanup().await;
-                        create_ip_rl.cleanup().await;
-                        push_rl.cleanup().await;
-                        sync_trigger_rl.cleanup().await;
-                        peer_write_rl.cleanup().await;
-                        let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
-                            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
-                            .map(|d| d.as_secs() as i64)
-                            .unwrap_or(0);
-                        if let Err(e) = db.sweep_expired_proofs(now).await {
-                            tracing::warn!(err = %e, "failed to sweep expired iCaptcha proofs");
-                        }
                     }
                     _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
                         if *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
@@ -443,10 +265,9 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     }
 
     let router = server::build_router(state.clone());
-    // Re-register the socket bound at startup — same fd, so there was never a
-    // moment with the port closed between the degraded and full servers.
-    let listener = TcpListener::from_std(full_std_listener)
-        .context("failed to re-register HTTP listener with the runtime")?;
+    let listener = TcpListener::bind(config.bind_addr())
+        .await
+        .with_context(|| format!("failed to bind to {}", config.bind_addr()))?;
 
     info!("✓ node started — did:{}", node_did);
     info!("  repos dir: {}", config.repos_dir.display());
@@ -455,6 +276,23 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         &config.database_url.split('@').next_back().unwrap_or("?")
     );
 
+    // Optional Prometheus metrics listener on a separate port.
+    let metrics_handle = if !config.metrics_addr.is_empty() {
+        match spawn_metrics_server(&config.metrics_addr, state.clone()).await {
+            Ok(handle) => {
+                info!(addr = %config.metrics_addr, "metrics endpoint listening");
+                Some(handle)
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!(err = %e, addr = %config.metrics_addr, "failed to start metrics endpoint — continuing without");
+                None
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        info!("metrics endpoint disabled (GITLAWB_METRICS_ADDR not set)");
+        None
+    };
+
     // Publish our DID record to the Kademlia DHT shortly after startup
     if let Some(p2p) = &state.p2p {
         let did_record = p2p::DidRecord {
@@ -532,25 +370,19 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     let grace = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.shutdown_grace_secs);
     info!(grace_secs = config.shutdown_grace_secs, "axum server ready");
 
-    // `into_make_service_with_connect_info` exposes the socket peer address as
-    // `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` so the push limiter can key on the real client
-    // when no trusted proxy header applies (see `rate_limit::client_key`).
-    let serve_result = axum::serve(
-        listener,
-        router.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>(),
-    )
-    .with_graceful_shutdown(async move {
-        let mut rx = shutdown_signal_for_axum;
-        // Wait until the watcher flips to true, then return so axum
-        // can begin draining.
-        while !*rx.borrow_and_update() {
-            if rx.changed().await.is_err() {
-                // Sender dropped — treat as shutdown.
-                break;
+    let serve_result = axum::serve(listener, router)
+        .with_graceful_shutdown(async move {
+            let mut rx = shutdown_signal_for_axum;
+            // Wait until the watcher flips to true, then return so axum
+            // can begin draining.
+            while !*rx.borrow_and_update() {
+                if rx.changed().await.is_err() {
+                    // Sender dropped — treat as shutdown.
+                    break;
+                }
             }
-        }
-    })
-    .await;
+        })
+        .await;
 
     // Server has stopped accepting new connections and drained in-flight
     // requests. Tear the rest of the system down.
@@ -564,224 +396,12 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
-fn spawn_shutdown_signal(tx: watch::Sender<bool>) {
-    tokio::spawn(async move {
-        #[cfg(unix)]
-        {
-            use tokio::signal::unix::{signal as unix_signal, SignalKind};
-            let mut sigterm =
-                unix_signal(SignalKind::terminate()).expect("install SIGTERM handler");
-            let mut sigint = unix_signal(SignalKind::interrupt()).expect("install SIGINT handler");
-            tokio::select! {
-                _ = sigterm.recv() => info!("SIGTERM received, shutting down"),
-                _ = sigint.recv()  => info!("SIGINT received, shutting down"),
-            }
-        }
-        #[cfg(not(unix))]
-        {
-            use tokio::signal;
-            let _ = signal::ctrl_c().await;
-            info!("Ctrl-C received, shutting down");
-        }
-        tx.send(true).ok();
-    });
-}
-
-async fn connect_db_with_retry(
-    config: &Config,
-    db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>,
-    mut shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
-) -> Option<Arc<Db>> {
-    let initial_retry_secs = config.db_retry_initial_secs;
-    let max_retry_secs = config.db_retry_max_secs.max(initial_retry_secs);
-    let acquire_timeout = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.db_acquire_timeout_secs);
-    let attempt_timeout = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.db_connect_timeout_secs);
-    let mut attempts = 0_u64;
-
-    loop {
-        if *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
-            return None;
-        }
-
-        attempts = attempts.saturating_add(1);
-        db_startup.attempts.store(attempts, Ordering::Relaxed);
-
-        // Bound the whole attempt, not just the pool connect: migrations
-        // block on a cross-instance advisory lock, and an unbounded wait
-        // there would wedge this loop — no retries, no logs, no recovery.
-        // Timing out and retrying is safe; migrations are idempotent.
-        let attempt = match tokio::time::timeout(
-            attempt_timeout,
-            Db::connect(
-                &config.database_url,
-                config.db_max_connections,
-                acquire_timeout,
-            ),
-        )
-        .await
-        {
-            Ok(result) => result,
-            Err(_) => Err(anyhow!(
-                "connect + migrate attempt exceeded {}s (GITLAWB_DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS); \
-                 is another instance holding the migration lock?",
-                attempt_timeout.as_secs()
-            )),
-        };
-
-        match attempt {
-            Ok(db) => {
-                info!(attempts, "database connection established");
-                return Some(Arc::new(db));
-            }
-            Err(err) => {
-                // A bad DATABASE_URL or rejected credentials won't heal on
-                // their own. Still retry (exiting would crash-loop and hammer
-                // the provider — and take liveness down with it), but log at
-                // error level and skip straight to the maximum backoff; the
-                // /ready health check is what surfaces this to deploys.
-                let permanent = is_likely_permanent_db_error(&err);
-                let retry_secs = if permanent {
-                    max_retry_secs
-                } else {
-                    database_retry_delay_secs(initial_retry_secs, max_retry_secs, attempts)
-                };
-                db_startup
-                    .next_retry_secs
-                    .store(retry_secs, Ordering::Relaxed);
-                if permanent {
-                    tracing::error!(
-                        attempts,
-                        retry_secs,
-                        err = %err,
-                        "database rejected our configuration (bad DATABASE_URL or credentials?) — retrying, but operator action is likely required"
-                    );
-                } else {
-                    warn!(
-                        attempts,
-                        retry_secs,
-                        err = %err,
-                        "database unavailable during startup; retrying"
-                    );
-                }
-
-                tokio::select! {
-                    _ = tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(retry_secs)) => {}
-                    changed = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
-                        if changed.is_err() || *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
-                            return None;
-                        }
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Errors that indicate misconfiguration rather than a transient outage: a
-/// malformed DATABASE_URL, or a server that answered and rejected us —
-/// Postgres error class 28xxx (invalid authorization) or 3D000 (database
-/// does not exist). Best-effort: an error that anyhow can't downcast back to
-/// sqlx just counts as transient.
-fn is_likely_permanent_db_error(err: &anyhow::Error) -> bool {
-    match err.downcast_ref::<sqlx::Error>() {
-        Some(sqlx::Error::Configuration(_)) => true,
-        Some(sqlx::Error::Database(db)) => db
-            .code()
-            .map(|c| c.starts_with("28") || c.starts_with("3D"))
-            .unwrap_or(false),
-        _ => false,
-    }
-}
-
-fn database_retry_delay_secs(initial_secs: u64, max_secs: u64, attempts: u64) -> u64 {
-    // The exponent bound only keeps the u32 cast safe — max_secs is the real
-    // (operator-configurable) cap, and saturating math handles overflow.
-    let exponent = attempts.saturating_sub(1).min(63) as u32;
-    initial_secs
-        .saturating_mul(2_u64.saturating_pow(exponent))
-        .min(max_secs)
-}
-
-async fn run_degraded_server(
-    listener: TcpListener,
-    node_did: String,
-    db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>,
-    mut db_ready_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
-    mut shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
-) -> Result<()> {
-    let addr = listener.local_addr().ok();
-    let router = build_degraded_router(node_did, db_startup);
-    info!(?addr, "degraded HTTP server ready");
-
-    axum::serve(listener, router)
-        .with_graceful_shutdown(async move {
-            // wait_for resolves on predicate-true or sender-drop; either way
-            // this phase is over.
-            tokio::select! {
-                _ = db_ready_rx.wait_for(|ready| *ready) => {}
-                _ = shutdown_rx.wait_for(|stop| *stop) => {}
-            }
-        })
-        .await?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-fn build_degraded_router(node_did: String, db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>) -> Router {
-    let state = DegradedState {
-        node_did,
-        db_startup,
-    };
-    // Everything answers 503 with the same body — including /health and
-    // /ready, so peer pings (which treat any 2xx /health as alive) and
-    // uptime monitors correctly see a node that cannot serve traffic.
-    // `/` additionally carries the node identity for probing peers.
-    Router::new()
-        .route("/", get(degraded_node_info))
-        .fallback(degraded_unavailable)
-        .with_state(state)
-}
-
-/// One source of truth for the degraded 503 body, sharing the error
-/// vocabulary with error.rs so clients see the same code/message for
-/// "database unavailable" regardless of which phase produced it.
-fn degraded_body(db_startup: &DbStartupStatus) -> serde_json::Value {
-    serde_json::json!({
-        "status": "degraded",
-        "database": "initializing",
-        "error": error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
-        "message": error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
-        "db_attempts": db_startup.attempts.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
-        "db_next_retry_secs": db_startup.next_retry_secs.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
-    })
-}
-
-async fn degraded_node_info(State(state): State<DegradedState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
-    let mut body = degraded_body(&state.db_startup);
-    if let Some(obj) = body.as_object_mut() {
-        obj.insert("name".into(), "gitlawb-node".into());
-        obj.insert("version".into(), env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").into());
-        obj.insert("did".into(), state.node_did.clone().into());
-    }
-    (StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, Json(body))
-}
-
-async fn degraded_unavailable(State(state): State<DegradedState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
-    (
-        StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
-        Json(degraded_body(&state.db_startup)),
-    )
-}
-
 /// Spawn a small axum router that exposes only `GET /metrics` on its own
 /// listener. Returns the JoinHandle so `main()` can abort it on shutdown.
 /// This is deliberately separate from the main router so the metrics port
 /// can be firewalled differently from the API port — bind to localhost
 /// or a private interface only.
-async fn spawn_metrics_server(
-    addr: &str,
-    mut shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
-) -> Result<tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>> {
+async fn spawn_metrics_server(addr: &str, state: AppState) -> Result<tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>> {
     use axum::{response::IntoResponse, routing::get, Router};
 
     async fn metrics_handler() -> impl IntoResponse {
@@ -805,6 +425,7 @@ async fn spawn_metrics_server(
         }
     }
 
+    let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
     let listener = TcpListener::bind(addr)
         .await
         .with_context(|| format!("failed to bind metrics listener to {addr}"))?;
@@ -865,12 +486,7 @@ async fn gossip_task(
         }
     }
 
-    // Reuse the shared no-redirect client for every gossip outbound call (the
-    // bootstrap announce POST and the periodic peer /health ping). Peer URLs are
-    // attacker-influenceable, so a 3xx to a private address must not be followed.
-    // Do NOT fall back to reqwest::Client::new(): its default follows redirects
-    // and would reintroduce the SSRF closed here (#93).
-    let client = state.http_client.clone();
+    let client = reqwest::Client::new();
     let my_did = state.node_did.to_string();
     let my_url = state.config.public_url.clone().unwrap_or_default();
 
@@ -945,7 +561,13 @@ async fn gossip_task(
                     Err(_) => continue,
                 };
                 for peer in peers {
-                    let ok = ping_peer_health(&client, &peer.http_url).await;
+                    let url = format!("{}/health", peer.http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
+                    let ok = client
+                        .get(&url)
+                        .send()
+                        .await
+                        .map(|r| r.status().is_success())
+                        .unwrap_or(false);
                     let _ = state.db.mark_peer_ping(&peer.did, ok).await;
                 }
             }
@@ -959,38 +581,6 @@ async fn gossip_task(
     }
 }
 
-/// Build the shared node HTTP client used for every outbound fan-out (sync
-/// trigger, profile/repo fetches, gossip announce + peer pings).
-///
-/// No redirects: peer URLs are attacker-influenceable, so a `3xx` to a private
-/// address must not be followed (SSRF guard, #78/#93). Do NOT replace with
-/// `reqwest::Client::new()` — its default follows redirects. Kept as a named
-/// builder so tests bind the redirect guarantee to the real client the node
-/// runs, not a hand-rolled equivalent.
-fn build_http_client() -> reqwest::Result<reqwest::Client> {
-    reqwest::Client::builder()
-        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
-        .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
-        .build()
-}
-
-/// Ping a peer's `/health` endpoint and report whether it answered 2xx.
-///
-/// Takes the client by reference so callers supply the shared, no-redirect
-/// `state.http_client`. Peer URLs are attacker-influenceable, so a `3xx` to a
-/// private address must not be followed. Do NOT call this with a bare
-/// `reqwest::Client::new()`: its default follows redirects and would
-/// reintroduce the SSRF this guards against (#93).
-async fn ping_peer_health(client: &reqwest::Client, http_url: &str) -> bool {
-    let url = format!("{}/health", http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-    client
-        .get(&url)
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .map(|r| r.status().is_success())
-        .unwrap_or(false)
-}
-
 fn load_or_create_keypair(config: &Config) -> Result<Keypair> {
     let key_path = config.resolved_key_path();
 
@@ -1023,64 +613,3 @@ fn load_or_create_keypair(config: &Config) -> Result<Keypair> {
         Ok(kp)
     }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod gossip_ssrf_tests {
-    use super::ping_peer_health;
-
-    // Build the client exactly as production does (super::build_http_client) so
-    // these tests bind the redirect guarantee to the real shared client the
-    // node runs. A regression that makes build_http_client follow redirects
-    // fails ping_peer_health_does_not_follow_redirect.
-    fn production_http_client() -> reqwest::Client {
-        super::build_http_client().expect("failed to build production http client")
-    }
-
-    // A peer answering `/health` with a 302 toward an internal address must not
-    // be followed: the redirect target must never be requested (#93).
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn ping_peer_health_does_not_follow_redirect() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let internal = server
-            .mock("GET", "/internal-metadata")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .expect(0)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let _health = server
-            .mock("GET", "/health")
-            .with_status(302)
-            .with_header("location", &format!("{}/internal-metadata", server.url()))
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), &server.url()).await;
-
-        assert!(!ok, "a 302 must not count as a healthy peer");
-        // expect(0) is enforced only at assert time; this fails if the redirect
-        // was followed to the internal target.
-        internal.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn ping_peer_health_reports_success_on_200() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let _health = server
-            .mock("GET", "/health")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), &server.url()).await;
-
-        assert!(ok, "a 200 /health must count as a healthy peer");
-    }
-
-    // A transport error (nothing listening) must map to unhealthy, never a
-    // spurious healthy — the .unwrap_or(false) arm.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn ping_peer_health_reports_unhealthy_on_connection_error() {
-        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), "http://127.0.0.1:1").await;
-        assert!(!ok, "a connection error must count as an unhealthy peer");
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/metrics.rs

@@ -235,11 +235,7 @@ pub fn record_auth_failure(route: &str, reason: &str) {
     }
 }
 
-/// Record one sync_queue item outcome. `status` ∈ {done, failed, skipped,
-/// rejected, deferred}. `rejected` is terminal and caused by a guard (a
-/// malformed slug, or a path resolving outside repos_dir); `deferred` leaves
-/// the row pending for a later pass, so a queue stalled on an operator
-/// condition is visible rather than looking idle.
+/// Record one sync_queue item outcome. `status` ∈ {done, failed, skipped}.
 pub fn record_sync_processed(status: &str) {
     if let Some(c) = SYNC_PROCESSED.get() {
         c.with_label_values(&[status]).inc();

crates/gitlawb-node/src/p2p/mod.rs

@@ -39,11 +39,6 @@ pub struct RefUpdateEvent {
     pub pusher_did: String,
     /// Repository identifier (owner/name)
     pub repo: String,
-    /// Full owner DID — added in #144 for display and storage; not yet
-    /// wired into the feed gate matcher. Optional for backward compat with
-    /// older peers that don't include it.
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub owner_did: Option<String>,
     /// Git ref that changed (e.g., "refs/heads/main")
     pub ref_name: String,
     /// SHA before the push (all-zeros for new ref)
@@ -312,7 +307,6 @@ pub async fn start(
                                     node_did: event.node_did.clone(),
                                     pusher_did: event.pusher_did.clone(),
                                     repo: event.repo.clone(),
-                                    owner_did: event.owner_did.clone(),
                                     ref_name: event.ref_name.clone(),
                                     old_sha: event.old_sha.clone(),
                                     new_sha: event.new_sha.clone(),
@@ -438,67 +432,3 @@ pub async fn start(
 
     Ok(handle)
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ref_update_event_round_trip_with_owner_did() {
-        let event = RefUpdateEvent {
-            node_did: "did:key:zNode".into(),
-            pusher_did: "did:key:zPusher".into(),
-            repo: "zOwner/myrepo".into(),
-            owner_did: Some("did:key:zOwner".into()),
-            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000".into(),
-            new_sha: "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa".into(),
-            timestamp: "2026-07-02T12:00:00Z".into(),
-            cert_id: None,
-            cid: None,
-        };
-        let json = serde_json::to_value(&event).unwrap();
-        // owner_did must be present in the serialized output
-        assert_eq!(json["owner_did"], "did:key:zOwner");
-        assert_eq!(json["repo"], "zOwner/myrepo");
-
-        let deserialized: RefUpdateEvent = serde_json::from_value(json).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(deserialized.owner_did, Some("did:key:zOwner".into()));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ref_update_event_backward_compat_no_owner_did() {
-        let old_json = serde_json::json!({
-            "node_did": "did:key:zNode",
-            "pusher_did": "did:key:zPusher",
-            "repo": "zOwner/myrepo",
-            "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
-            "old_sha": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
-            "new_sha": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
-            "timestamp": "2026-07-02T12:00:00Z",
-            "cert_id": null,
-            "cid": null
-        });
-        let deserialized: RefUpdateEvent = serde_json::from_value(old_json).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(deserialized.owner_did, None);
-        assert_eq!(deserialized.repo, "zOwner/myrepo");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ref_update_event_backward_compat_null_owner_did() {
-        let with_null = serde_json::json!({
-            "node_did": "did:key:zNode",
-            "pusher_did": "did:key:zPusher",
-            "repo": "zOwner/myrepo",
-            "owner_did": null,
-            "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
-            "old_sha": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
-            "new_sha": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
-            "timestamp": "2026-07-02T12:00:00Z",
-            "cert_id": null,
-            "cid": null
-        });
-        let deserialized: RefUpdateEvent = serde_json::from_value(with_null).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(deserialized.owner_did, None);
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/pinata.rs

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 //! no-op, so nodes without Pinata backing work fine.
 
 use anyhow::Result;
+use std::collections::HashSet;
 
 /// Pin a single git object's raw bytes on Pinata (v3 API).
 ///
@@ -66,28 +67,35 @@ pub async fn pin_object(
     Ok(cid)
 }
 
-/// Pin any of the given candidate git objects that haven't yet been sent to
-/// Pinata.
+/// Pin all git objects in a repo that haven't yet been sent to Pinata.
 ///
-/// `object_list` is the already-withheld-filtered OID set to pin: the caller
-/// applies `visibility_pack::replicable_objects` on the delta path or the
-/// `..._fail_closed` filter on the full-scan path before calling. `repo_path` is
-/// still needed to read each object's bytes. The twin in `ipfs_pin.rs` mirrors
-/// this shape — change both in lockstep. Objects already recorded with a
-/// `pinata_cid` are skipped. Returns `(sha_hex, cid)` pairs for each newly
-/// pinned object.
+/// Objects already recorded with a `pinata_cid` in the DB are skipped.
+/// Returns `(sha_hex, cid)` pairs for each newly pinned object.
 pub async fn pin_new_objects(
     client: &reqwest::Client,
     upload_url: &str,
     jwt: &str,
     repo_path: &std::path::Path,
-    object_list: Vec<String>,
     db: &crate::db::Db,
+    withheld: &HashSet<String>,
 ) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
     if jwt.is_empty() {
         return vec![];
     }
 
+    let object_list = match list_all_objects(repo_path) {
+        Ok(v) => v,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                repo = %repo_path.display(),
+                err = %e,
+                "failed to list git objects for Pinata upload"
+            );
+            return vec![];
+        }
+    };
+    let object_list = crate::git::visibility_pack::replicable_objects(object_list, withheld);
+
     let mut pinned = Vec::new();
 
     for sha in object_list {
@@ -126,6 +134,29 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
     pinned
 }
 
+fn list_all_objects(repo_path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+    let out = std::process::Command::new("git")
+        .args([
+            "cat-file",
+            "--batch-all-objects",
+            "--batch-check=%(objectname)",
+        ])
+        .current_dir(repo_path)
+        .output()
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to run git cat-file: {e}"))?;
+
+    if !out.status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr);
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}"));
+    }
+
+    Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout)
+        .lines()
+        .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
+        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
+        .collect())
+}
+
 // ── Tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 #[cfg(test)]

crates/gitlawb-node/src/rate_limit.rs

@@ -1,21 +1,15 @@
 use std::collections::HashMap;
-use std::net::SocketAddr;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
-use axum::extract::{ConnectInfo, Request};
-use axum::http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode};
+use axum::extract::Request;
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
 use axum::middleware::Next;
 use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
 use tokio::sync::Mutex;
 
 use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 
-/// Default ceiling on the number of distinct keys a limiter tracks. Bounds the
-/// limiter's own memory so a caller that can vary the key (many DIDs, or a
-/// spoofable IP header) cannot grow the map without limit.
-const DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS: usize = 100_000;
-
 #[derive(Clone)]
 struct Window {
     timestamps: Vec<Instant>,
@@ -26,98 +20,30 @@ pub struct RateLimiter {
     state: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Window>>>,
     max_requests: usize,
     window: Duration,
-    /// Hard cap on tracked keys. When full, expired keys are evicted (at most
-    /// once per [`sweep_interval`](Self::sweep_interval), see below); if still
-    /// full, a request under a *new* key is rejected rather than inserted — so
-    /// the map can never exceed this bound and a rejected request never
-    /// allocates a new entry.
-    max_keys: usize,
-    /// Timestamp of the last inline capacity sweep. The eviction scan is
-    /// O(max_keys), so under a distinct-key flood (when the map sits at the
-    /// cap) running it on every miss would serialize all traffic behind a full
-    /// scan. Gating it to at most once per interval amortizes that cost; the
-    /// background [`cleanup`](Self::cleanup) loop still reclaims on its own.
-    last_sweep: Arc<Mutex<Instant>>,
 }
 
 impl RateLimiter {
-    // Retained for tests and callers that don't need a tight key bound;
-    // production limiters use `new_bounded`.
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
     pub fn new(max_requests: usize, window: Duration) -> Self {
-        Self::new_bounded(max_requests, window, DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS)
-    }
-
-    /// Like [`new`] but with an explicit cap on the number of distinct keys.
-    /// Production limiters keyed on client-influenced values (per-DID, per-IP)
-    /// set this so the limiter's own state cannot be turned into a
-    /// memory-exhaustion vector.
-    pub fn new_bounded(max_requests: usize, window: Duration, max_keys: usize) -> Self {
         Self {
             state: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
             max_requests,
             window,
-            max_keys: max_keys.max(1),
-            last_sweep: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Instant::now())),
         }
     }
 
-    /// How often the inline capacity sweep may run: at most once per second, or
-    /// once per window when the window is shorter. Bounds post-flood staleness
-    /// (a full map self-heals within one interval) without paying the O(max_keys)
-    /// scan on every capacity miss.
-    fn sweep_interval(&self) -> Duration {
-        self.window.min(Duration::from_secs(1))
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) async fn check(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
-        // max_requests == 0 means the limiter is disabled, not "block all".
-        if self.max_requests == 0 {
-            return true;
-        }
+    async fn check(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
         let now = Instant::now();
         let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
-
-        // Fast path: an already-tracked key never allocates and never grows the
-        // map, so it is unaffected by the key cap.
-        if let Some(window) = state.get_mut(key) {
-            window
-                .timestamps
-                .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
-            if window.timestamps.len() >= self.max_requests {
-                return false;
-            }
-            window.timestamps.push(now);
-            return true;
+        let window = state.entry(key.to_string()).or_insert_with(|| Window {
+            timestamps: Vec::new(),
+        });
+        window
+            .timestamps
+            .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
+        if window.timestamps.len() >= self.max_requests {
+            return false;
         }
-
-        // New key. Enforce the cap BEFORE inserting so a flood of distinct keys
-        // cannot grow the map, and a rejected request never allocates an entry.
-        if state.len() >= self.max_keys {
-            // Reclaim expired keys, but at most once per sweep interval — the
-            // scan is O(max_keys) and the map sits at the cap precisely during a
-            // distinct-key flood, so sweeping per miss would serialize traffic
-            // behind a full scan. Between sweeps a new key is simply rejected.
-            let mut last_sweep = self.last_sweep.lock().await;
-            if now.duration_since(*last_sweep) >= self.sweep_interval() {
-                state.retain(|_, w| {
-                    w.timestamps
-                        .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
-                    !w.timestamps.is_empty()
-                });
-                *last_sweep = now;
-            }
-            drop(last_sweep);
-            if state.len() >= self.max_keys {
-                return false;
-            }
-        }
-        state.insert(
-            key.to_string(),
-            Window {
-                timestamps: vec![now],
-            },
-        );
+        window.timestamps.push(now);
         true
     }
 
@@ -154,136 +80,6 @@ pub async fn rate_limit_by_did(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
     next.run(request).await
 }
 
-/// Which forwarded header (if any) the operator's edge is trusted to set. Only
-/// a proxy the operator controls may be believed; a raw client can put any
-/// value in `Fly-Client-IP` / `X-Forwarded-For`, so trusting them unconditionally
-/// lets a flooder rotate the header and never fill a bucket. Configured via
-/// `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub enum TrustedProxy {
-    /// No trusted proxy: ignore forwarded headers, key on the socket peer IP.
-    /// Safe default for direct/self-hosted nodes.
-    None,
-    /// Behind Fly's edge, which sets (and overwrites any client-supplied)
-    /// `Fly-Client-IP`.
-    Fly,
-    /// Behind a single reverse proxy (e.g. Caddy on the AWS image) that appends
-    /// the real client as the rightmost `X-Forwarded-For` hop.
-    XForwardedFor,
-}
-
-impl TrustedProxy {
-    /// Parse `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`. Unknown/empty → `None` (trust nothing).
-    pub fn from_env_value(s: &str) -> Self {
-        match s.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
-            "fly" | "fly-client-ip" => TrustedProxy::Fly,
-            "xff" | "x-forwarded-for" | "caddy" => TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor,
-            _ => TrustedProxy::None,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-fn trimmed_nonempty(v: &str) -> Option<String> {
-    let t = v.trim();
-    (!t.is_empty()).then(|| t.to_string())
-}
-
-/// Resolve the rate-limit key for a request. In a trusted-proxy mode the
-/// operator's edge header is preferred; when that header is missing or empty we
-/// fall back to the socket peer address rather than skipping the limiter (a
-/// malformed header must never disable the brake). With no trusted proxy the
-/// socket peer is always used and forwarded headers are ignored entirely.
-/// Returns `None` only when neither a trusted header nor a peer address is
-/// available (e.g. a synthetic test request with no `ConnectInfo`).
-pub fn client_key(
-    headers: &HeaderMap,
-    peer: Option<SocketAddr>,
-    trust: TrustedProxy,
-) -> Option<String> {
-    let from_header = match trust {
-        TrustedProxy::None => None,
-        TrustedProxy::Fly => headers
-            .get("fly-client-ip")
-            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-            .and_then(trimmed_nonempty),
-        // Rightmost hop = the value appended by the immediately-upstream trusted
-        // proxy. The leftmost hop is client-controlled and must not be trusted.
-        TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor => headers
-            .get("x-forwarded-for")
-            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-            .and_then(|v| v.rsplit(',').next())
-            .and_then(trimmed_nonempty),
-    };
-    from_header.or_else(|| peer.map(|p| p.ip().to_string()))
-}
-
-/// Per-client-IP limiter for the git push path, carrying the trusted-proxy
-/// policy. A newtype so it can live in request extensions (keyed by type)
-/// alongside the per-DID [`RateLimiter`]. Per-DID limits are useless against a
-/// push flood from a DID farm (one throwaway DID per repo), so the push path
-/// throttles on the resolved client IP instead.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct IpRateLimiter {
-    pub limiter: RateLimiter,
-    pub trust: TrustedProxy,
-}
-
-/// Infallible extractor for the socket peer address from `ConnectInfo`. Yields
-/// `None` when the server was started without connect-info (e.g. `oneshot` in
-/// tests), so a handler never 500s on its absence — the limiter simply falls
-/// back per [`client_key`].
-pub struct PeerAddr(pub Option<SocketAddr>);
-
-impl<S: Send + Sync> axum::extract::FromRequestParts<S> for PeerAddr {
-    type Rejection = std::convert::Infallible;
-
-    async fn from_request_parts(
-        parts: &mut axum::http::request::Parts,
-        _state: &S,
-    ) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
-        Ok(PeerAddr(
-            parts
-                .extensions
-                .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
-                .map(|c| c.0),
-        ))
-    }
-}
-
-/// The shared 429 response for the per-IP flood brakes. Route-agnostic: this
-/// middleware now serves the push path AND the peer-sync routes, so the message
-/// stays generic (the offending path is recorded in the warn log below).
-pub fn too_many_requests() -> Response {
-    (
-        StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
-        [("retry-after", "60")],
-        "rate limit exceeded — try again later",
-    )
-        .into_response()
-}
-
-/// Throttle the git push path by resolved client IP. The socket peer address is
-/// read from `ConnectInfo` (see `into_make_service_with_connect_info` in
-/// `main`). Only skips the limiter when no key can be resolved at all.
-pub async fn rate_limit_by_ip(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
-    let limiter = request.extensions().get::<IpRateLimiter>().cloned();
-    let peer = request
-        .extensions()
-        .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
-        .map(|c| c.0);
-
-    if let Some(limiter) = limiter {
-        if let Some(key) = client_key(request.headers(), peer, limiter.trust) {
-            if !limiter.limiter.check(&key).await {
-                tracing::warn!(key = %key, path = %request.uri().path(), "per-IP rate limit exceeded");
-                return too_many_requests();
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    next.run(request).await
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -330,279 +126,4 @@ mod tests {
         let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
         assert!(state.is_empty());
     }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn zero_limit_disables() {
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new(0, Duration::from_secs(60));
-        for _ in 0..1000 {
-            assert!(limiter.check("k").await);
-        }
-    }
-
-    // ── key-cap / memory-bound (P2) ──────────────────────────────────────
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn caps_tracked_keys_and_rejects_new_ones_when_full() {
-        // Cap of 2 distinct keys; generous request budget so rejection is due to
-        // the key cap, not the per-key limit.
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(60), 2);
-        assert!(limiter.check("a").await);
-        assert!(limiter.check("b").await);
-        // Third distinct key would grow the map past the cap → rejected.
-        assert!(!limiter.check("c").await);
-        // The map never exceeded the cap, and the rejected key was NOT inserted.
-        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
-        assert_eq!(state.len(), 2);
-        assert!(!state.contains_key("c"));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn known_key_unaffected_by_cap() {
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(60), 1);
-        assert!(limiter.check("a").await); // fills the single slot
-        assert!(limiter.check("a").await); // same key still served
-        assert!(!limiter.check("b").await); // new key rejected — cap full
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn expired_keys_evicted_to_admit_new_when_full() {
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_millis(40), 1);
-        assert!(limiter.check("old").await);
-        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(55)).await;
-        // "old" is now expired; a new key triggers inline eviction and is admitted.
-        assert!(limiter.check("new").await);
-        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
-        assert!(state.contains_key("new"));
-        assert!(!state.contains_key("old"));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn capacity_sweep_is_amortized_within_interval() {
-        // The O(max_keys) eviction scan must not run on every capacity miss.
-        // With a 1s sweep interval, the resident (unexpired) key is never
-        // evicted by a burst of misses, so repeated new keys are all rejected
-        // without disturbing existing state.
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(1), 1);
-        assert!(limiter.check("resident").await);
-        for i in 0..100 {
-            assert!(
-                !limiter.check(&format!("flood-{i}")).await,
-                "new key must be rejected while the single slot is held"
-            );
-        }
-        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
-        assert_eq!(state.len(), 1, "no flood key was ever inserted");
-        assert!(state.contains_key("resident"));
-    }
-
-    // ── client_key / trusted-proxy resolution (P1 + P2) ─────────────────
-
-    fn headers(pairs: &[(&str, &str)]) -> HeaderMap {
-        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
-        for (k, v) in pairs {
-            h.insert(
-                axum::http::HeaderName::from_bytes(k.as_bytes()).unwrap(),
-                v.parse().unwrap(),
-            );
-        }
-        h
-    }
-
-    fn peer(s: &str) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
-        Some(s.parse().unwrap())
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn none_mode_ignores_headers_and_uses_peer() {
-        // Even a well-formed Fly header is ignored without a trusted proxy.
-        let h = headers(&[("fly-client-ip", "203.0.113.7")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::None).as_deref(),
-            Some("198.51.100.9")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn fly_mode_trusts_fly_header() {
-        let h = headers(&[
-            ("fly-client-ip", "203.0.113.7"),
-            ("x-forwarded-for", "1.2.3.4"),
-        ]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::Fly).as_deref(),
-            Some("203.0.113.7")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn fly_mode_empty_header_falls_back_to_peer_not_skip() {
-        // Empty Fly-Client-IP must NOT collapse traffic onto Some("") nor skip
-        // the limiter — it falls back to the real peer.
-        let h = headers(&[("fly-client-ip", "")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::Fly).as_deref(),
-            Some("198.51.100.9")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn xff_mode_uses_rightmost_hop_not_client_controlled_first() {
-        // Client prepends spoofed hops; only the rightmost (proxy-appended) is trusted.
-        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", "9.9.9.9, 8.8.8.8, 198.51.100.9")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
-            Some("198.51.100.9")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn xff_mode_empty_leading_hop_does_not_disable_brake() {
-        // "X-Forwarded-For: ,1.2.3.4" — rightmost hop is used; never None-skips.
-        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", ",1.2.3.4")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
-            Some("1.2.3.4")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn malformed_xff_falls_back_to_peer() {
-        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", " , ")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
-            Some("198.51.100.9")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn trusted_proxy_parsing() {
-        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value("fly"), TrustedProxy::Fly);
-        assert_eq!(
-            TrustedProxy::from_env_value("X-Forwarded-For"),
-            TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            TrustedProxy::from_env_value("caddy"),
-            TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor
-        );
-        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value(""), TrustedProxy::None);
-        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value("garbage"), TrustedProxy::None);
-    }
-
-    // ── middleware 429 path ─────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-    /// A minimal router with the push limiter layered over an OK handler,
-    /// driven via `oneshot`. `ConnectInfo` is attached to each request directly
-    /// (as the production make-service does) so the middleware resolves a peer.
-    fn ip_limited_router(limiter: IpRateLimiter) -> axum::Router {
-        axum::Router::new()
-            .route(
-                "/o/r/git-receive-pack",
-                axum::routing::post(|| async { StatusCode::OK }),
-            )
-            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(rate_limit_by_ip))
-            .layer(axum::Extension(limiter))
-    }
-
-    async fn post_from(router: &axum::Router, peer: SocketAddr) -> StatusCode {
-        use tower::ServiceExt;
-        let mut req = axum::http::Request::builder()
-            .method(axum::http::Method::POST)
-            .uri("/o/r/git-receive-pack")
-            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
-            .unwrap();
-        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
-        router.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status()
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn middleware_returns_429_over_limit() {
-        let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
-            limiter: RateLimiter::new(2, Duration::from_secs(60)),
-            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
-        });
-        let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.7:5000".parse().unwrap();
-        // Two requests inside the budget, the third over it (shared Arc state).
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, peer).await, StatusCode::OK);
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, peer).await, StatusCode::OK);
-        assert_eq!(
-            post_from(&router, peer).await,
-            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn middleware_isolates_distinct_peers() {
-        let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
-            limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60)),
-            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
-        });
-        let a: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.1:1".parse().unwrap();
-        let b: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.2:1".parse().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, a).await, StatusCode::OK);
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, b).await, StatusCode::OK); // independent bucket
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, a).await, StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
-    }
-
-    // ── creation-route layering: IP brake runs BEFORE auth ──────────────
-
-    /// A minimal stand-in for the creation route group: an inner "auth" layer
-    /// that rejects every request with 401 (as signature verification would for
-    /// an unsigned caller), wrapped by the per-IP creation limiter as the
-    /// outermost layer — exactly the ordering `server::build_router` applies to
-    /// `/api/v1/repos` et al. Lets us assert the security-relevant property
-    /// (flood traffic is braked before auth burns CPU) without a database, which
-    /// the full `#[sqlx::test]` route test in `api::repos` cannot cover in the
-    /// plain unit-test pass.
-    fn ip_limited_over_auth_router(limiter: IpRateLimiter) -> axum::Router {
-        async fn always_unauthorized(_req: Request, _next: Next) -> Response {
-            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED.into_response()
-        }
-        axum::Router::new()
-            .route(
-                "/api/v1/repos",
-                axum::routing::post(|| async { StatusCode::CREATED }),
-            )
-            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(always_unauthorized))
-            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(rate_limit_by_ip))
-            .layer(axum::Extension(limiter))
-    }
-
-    async fn post_repos_from(router: &axum::Router, peer: SocketAddr) -> StatusCode {
-        use tower::ServiceExt;
-        let mut req = axum::http::Request::builder()
-            .method(axum::http::Method::POST)
-            .uri("/api/v1/repos")
-            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
-            .unwrap();
-        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
-        router.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status()
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn creation_ip_brake_rejects_before_auth() {
-        // A DID farm mints a fresh signature per repo, so the per-DID limiter
-        // never trips; the per-IP brake is what stops the flood. It must run
-        // outermost, ahead of auth, so a flood is rejected with 429 before
-        // signature verification — otherwise every request would reach (and pay
-        // for) auth and merely 401.
-        let router = ip_limited_over_auth_router(IpRateLimiter {
-            limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60)),
-            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
-        });
-        let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.42:7000".parse().unwrap();
-
-        // First request passes the IP brake and reaches the (failing) auth layer.
-        assert_eq!(
-            post_repos_from(&router, peer).await,
-            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
-        );
-        // Budget now exhausted: the IP brake short-circuits with 429 *before*
-        // auth — proving the limiter is the outermost layer.
-        assert_eq!(
-            post_repos_from(&router, peer).await,
-            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
-            "an exhausted IP must be braked with 429 before auth runs, not leak to 401"
-        );
-    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/server.rs

@@ -14,25 +14,14 @@ use tracing::Level;
 
 use crate::api::{
     agents, arweave, bounties, certs, changelog, events, ipfs, issues, labels, peers, profiles,
-    protect, pulls, register, replicas, repos, resolve, stars, status, tasks, visibility, webhooks,
+    protect, pulls, register, replicas, repos, resolve, stars, tasks, visibility, webhooks,
 };
 use crate::auth;
 use crate::rate_limit;
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
-async fn graphql_handler(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    auth: Option<axum::Extension<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>>,
-    req: GraphQLRequest,
-) -> GraphQLResponse {
-    // `optional_signature` attaches the verified DID when a signature is present.
-    // Thread it into request-scoped GraphQL data; mutations enforce its presence
-    // in-resolver (N2) while queries stay open.
-    let mut inner = req.into_inner();
-    if let Some(axum::Extension(did)) = auth {
-        inner = inner.data(did);
-    }
-    state.graphql_schema.execute(inner).await.into()
+async fn graphql_handler(State(state): State<AppState>, req: GraphQLRequest) -> GraphQLResponse {
+    state.graphql_schema.execute(req.into_inner()).await.into()
 }
 
 async fn graphql_playground() -> impl IntoResponse {
@@ -60,10 +49,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
     let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref().clone();
     let graphql_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/graphql", get(graphql_playground).post(graphql_handler))
-        // Attach the verified DID to /graphql when a signature is present. The
-        // layer covers only routes added before it, so /graphql/ws (added after,
-        // read-only subscriptions) stays open.
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature))
         .route_service("/graphql/ws", GraphQLSubscription::new(schema));
 
     // ── Task routes (write — require HTTP Signature) ───────────────────────
@@ -81,19 +66,8 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route("/api/v1/tasks", get(tasks::list_tasks))
         .route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}", get(tasks::get_task));
 
-    // ── Rate-limited creation routes — require HTTP Signature, plus a per-DID
-    // throttle AND a per-IP flood brake. The per-DID limiter (inner) caps a
-    // single identity; the per-IP limiter (outer) caps a DID farm that mints a
-    // fresh throwaway did:key per repo to slip past both the per-DID limit and
-    // the iCaptcha gate — the mechanism behind the recurring spam-repo floods.
-    // The per-IP layer wraps the auth layer (outermost = runs first) so flood
-    // traffic is rejected before signature verification burns CPU, matching the
-    // push path.
+    // ── Rate-limited creation routes — require HTTP Signature + per-DID throttle
     let limiter = state.rate_limiter.clone();
-    let create_ip_limiter = rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
-        limiter: state.create_ip_rate_limiter.clone(),
-        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
-    };
     let creation_routes = add_auth_layers(
         Router::new()
             .route("/api/v1/repos", post(repos::create_repo))
@@ -107,9 +81,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_did))
             .layer(axum::Extension(limiter)),
         state.clone(),
-    )
-    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
-    .layer(axum::Extension(create_ip_limiter));
+    );
 
     // ── Write routes — require HTTP Signature (no rate limit) ─────────────
     let write_routes = add_auth_layers(
@@ -175,85 +147,15 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
                 axum::routing::put(visibility::set_visibility)
                     .delete(visibility::remove_visibility)
                     .get(visibility::list_visibility),
-            )
-            .route(
-                "/api/v1/agents/{did}",
-                axum::routing::delete(agents::deregister_agent),
             ),
         state.clone(),
     );
 
-    // ── Status claim writes — signature, plus the per-DID throttle AND the
-    // per-IP flood brake `creation_routes` carries. Not in `write_routes`, which
-    // has neither: every call here appends a row, so an unthrottled writer grows
-    // the claim log on demand and the three per-repo caps would be the only bound.
-    let status_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
-        Router::new()
-            .route(
-                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/statuses/{sha}",
-                post(status::create_status),
-            )
-            .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_did))
-            .layer(axum::Extension(state.rate_limiter.clone())),
-        state.clone(),
-    )
-    // The route's advertised body bound, applied at the transport. It sits
-    // OUTSIDE the auth layers because `require_signature` collects and hashes
-    // the whole body before any handler runs: the handler's own check measures
-    // an allocation that has already happened, so without this layer the 8 KiB
-    // figure bounded what gets stored and not what gets buffered, and
-    // concurrent requests multiplied exactly the cost it was written to
-    // prevent. It sits INSIDE the rate limiters so an oversized request is
-    // still counted by the per-IP brake before it is refused.
-    //
-    // A declared Content-Length over the limit is answered 413 without reading
-    // a byte; a body that declares nothing (or understates) is truncated at the
-    // limit and fails where it is read, which `require_signature` reports as an
-    // unreadable body.
-    .layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(status::MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES))
-    // The one route that persists the signed request body, so the one route
-    // whose signature material carries it. Applied OUTSIDE `add_auth_layers`
-    // (outermost = runs first) because `require_signature` reads this marker to
-    // decide whether to carry the body; a layer added inside the auth pair runs
-    // after the middleware and is never seen. `create_status` refuses an absent
-    // body rather than storing an empty column, so getting this order wrong
-    // fails loudly instead of quietly writing unverifiable claims.
-    .layer(axum::Extension(auth::PersistsSignedBody))
-    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
-    .layer(axum::Extension(rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
-        limiter: state.create_ip_rate_limiter.clone(),
-        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
-    }));
-
-    // ── Status claim reads — open, behind `optional_signature` so the handler
-    // sees the caller when one signs and still answers a public repo for an
-    // anonymous reader. Without the layer the handler's optional auth extension
-    // is None for EVERY caller, including the owner, and every private repo
-    // reads as not-found.
-    let status_read_routes = Router::new()
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/commits/{sha}/status",
-            get(status::commit_status),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/status",
-            get(status::pull_request_status),
-        )
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature));
-
     // Body limit is raised to GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES (default 2 GB) for git
     // routes only — all other API routes keep axum's default 2 MB cap.
     // HTTP Signature is enforced on receive-pack (push) — the git-remote-gitlawb
     // helper signs requests with RFC 9421 signatures using the agent's keypair.
     let pack_limit = state.config.max_pack_bytes;
-    // Per-IP throttle wraps the auth layer (outermost = runs first): flood
-    // traffic is rejected before signature verification burns CPU. Per-DID
-    // limiting is deliberately NOT used here — a DID farm (one throwaway
-    // identity per repo, as in the June 2026 push flood) never trips it.
-    let push_limiter = rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
-        limiter: state.push_rate_limiter.clone(),
-        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
-    };
     let git_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
         Router::new()
             .route(
@@ -263,19 +165,12 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             .layer(DefaultBodyLimit::disable())
             .layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(pack_limit)),
         state.clone(),
-    )
-    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
-    .layer(axum::Extension(push_limiter));
+    );
 
     // ── IPFS content-addressed retrieval and pin listing ──────────────────
-    // `/ipfs/{cid}` carries `optional_signature` so `get_by_cid` sees the caller
-    // identity and can apply per-repo visibility (#110); anonymous callers stay
-    // anonymous and still read genuinely public content. `/api/v1/ipfs/pins`
-    // stays unsigned — gating the pin index is tracked separately (#121).
     let ipfs_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/ipfs/{cid}", get(ipfs::get_by_cid))
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature))
-        .merge(Router::new().route("/api/v1/ipfs/pins", get(ipfs::list_pins)));
+        .route("/api/v1/ipfs/pins", get(ipfs::list_pins));
 
     // ── Arweave permanent anchors ──────────────────────────────────────────
     let arweave_routes = Router::new().route("/api/v1/arweave/anchors", get(arweave::list_anchors));
@@ -319,8 +214,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route(
             "/api/v1/agents/{did}/bounties",
             get(bounties::agent_bounty_stats),
-        )
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature));
+        );
 
     // ── Profile routes (write — require HTTP Signature) ─────────────────
     let profile_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
@@ -349,41 +243,15 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route("/api/v1/peers", get(peers::list_peers))
         .route("/api/v1/peers/{did}/ping", get(peers::ping_peer));
 
-    // /sync/trigger drives an O(peers) outbound fan-out + per-repo enqueue, so it
-    // ALWAYS requires a signature (both config modes) and carries a tight per-IP
-    // brake. A signature alone does not cap cost — a did:key farm self-registers
-    // (INV-10) — so the IP brake is a separate, load-bearing half. The brake is
-    // outermost (runs before signature verification burns CPU) and is keyed on the
-    // client IP before any DID is read, so DID rotation cannot bypass it.
-    let sync_trigger_routes = add_auth_layers(
-        Router::new().route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(peers::trigger_sync)),
-        state.clone(),
-    )
-    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
-    .layer(axum::Extension(rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
-        limiter: state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter.clone(),
-        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
-    }));
-
-    // announce + notify keep their rolling-upgrade signature behavior (unsigned
-    // accepted until all peers upgrade), but both reach peer-write side effects —
-    // notify hits the same enqueue_sync sink as trigger — so they carry a per-IP
-    // brake too, on a SEPARATE bucket from trigger's, so an unsigned notify flood
-    // cannot drain the signed trigger caller's quota.
     let mut peer_write_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/api/v1/peers/announce", post(peers::announce))
+        .route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(peers::trigger_sync))
         .route("/api/v1/sync/notify", post(peers::notify_sync));
     peer_write_routes = if state.config.require_signed_peer_writes {
         add_auth_layers(peer_write_routes, state.clone())
     } else {
         peer_write_routes.layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature))
     };
-    let peer_write_routes = peer_write_routes
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
-        .layer(axum::Extension(rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
-            limiter: state.peer_write_rate_limiter.clone(),
-            trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
-        }));
 
     // ── Read routes — open for public repos ───────────────────────────────
     let read_routes = Router::new()
@@ -431,10 +299,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/events",
             get(events::list_repo_events),
         )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push-events",
-            get(events::list_repo_push_events),
-        )
         .route("/api/v1/agents", get(agents::list_agents))
         .route("/api/v1/agents/{did}", get(agents::show_agent))
         .route("/api/v1/agents/{did}/trust", get(agents::get_trust))
@@ -478,8 +342,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route(
             "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/replicas",
             get(replicas::list_replicas),
-        )
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature));
+        );
 
     // git-upload-pack (clone/fetch) — same raised body limit as receive-pack so
     // large pack responses from the server don't get truncated on the client side.
@@ -493,22 +356,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/withheld-paths",
             axum::routing::get(visibility::withheld_paths),
         )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/icaptcha-proof",
-            axum::routing::get(repos::get_icaptcha_proof),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs",
-            axum::routing::get(crate::api::encrypted::list_encrypted_blobs),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blob/{oid}",
-            axum::routing::get(crate::api::encrypted::get_encrypted_blob),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs/replicate",
-            axum::routing::get(crate::api::encrypted::replicate_encrypted_blobs),
-        )
         .layer(DefaultBodyLimit::disable())
         .layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(pack_limit))
         .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature));
@@ -517,7 +364,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
     let meta_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/", get(node_info))
         .route("/health", get(health))
-        .route("/ready", get(ready))
         .route("/api/v1/p2p/info", get(p2p_info))
         .route("/api/v1/stats", get(stats))
         .route("/api/v1/contracts", get(contracts_info));
@@ -531,15 +377,12 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .merge(profile_write_routes)
         .merge(creation_routes)
         .merge(write_routes)
-        .merge(status_write_routes)
-        .merge(status_read_routes)
         .merge(git_write_routes)
         .merge(git_read_routes)
         .merge(issue_write_routes)
         .merge(read_routes)
         .merge(peer_read_routes)
         .merge(peer_write_routes)
-        .merge(sync_trigger_routes)
         .merge(ipfs_routes)
         .merge(arweave_routes)
         .merge(meta_routes)
@@ -562,26 +405,6 @@ async fn health() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
     Json(json!({ "status": "ok" }))
 }
 
-/// Readiness = "this node can serve real traffic", and every real endpoint
-/// depends on the database, so probe it rather than reporting a constant.
-/// The probe gets its own short bound so a wedged pool can't hang the health
-/// check for the full acquire timeout.
-async fn ready(State(state): State<AppState>) -> axum::response::Response {
-    let probe = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2), state.db.ping()).await;
-    match probe {
-        Ok(Ok(())) => Json(json!({ "status": "ready" })).into_response(),
-        _ => (
-            axum::http::StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
-            Json(json!({
-                "status": "degraded",
-                "error": crate::error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
-                "message": crate::error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
-            })),
-        )
-            .into_response(),
-    }
-}
-
 async fn node_info(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
     let p2p_peer_id = state.p2p.as_ref().map(|h| h.local_peer_id.to_string());
     Json(json!({
@@ -596,31 +419,13 @@ async fn node_info(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
     }))
 }
 
-pub(crate) async fn stats(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
-    // Count only the repos an anonymous caller could list, so the aggregate does
-    // not leak the existence of private/mode-A repos (#104 count oracle). Mirror
-    // the listing seam (api/repos.rs): over-fetch the deduped set, batch-load the
-    // visibility rules, and keep rows that pass listable_at_root. The caller is
-    // always None — meta_routes carries no auth layer (see the route group in this
-    // file). Fail closed: any DB error collapses the whole count to 0 (an
-    // under-count never leaks existence), preserving the prior `.unwrap_or(0)`.
-    let repos = async {
-        // stats only needs the count, so use the no-stars deduped list (same
-        // DEDUP_CTE) and skip the repo_stars aggregation the listing path needs.
-        let rows = state.db.list_all_repos_deduped().await?;
-        let ids: Vec<String> = rows.iter().map(|r| r.id.clone()).collect();
-        let rules_by_repo = state.db.list_visibility_rules_for_repos(&ids).await?;
-        let count = rows
-            .iter()
-            .filter(|r| {
-                let rules = rules_by_repo.get(&r.id).map(Vec::as_slice).unwrap_or(&[]);
-                crate::visibility::listable_at_root(rules, r.is_public, &r.owner_did, None)
-            })
-            .count() as i64;
-        Ok::<i64, anyhow::Error>(count)
-    }
-    .await
-    .unwrap_or(0);
+async fn stats(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
+    let repos = state
+        .db
+        .list_all_repos()
+        .await
+        .map(|r| r.len() as i64)
+        .unwrap_or(0);
     let agents = state.db.count_agents().await.unwrap_or(0);
     let pushes = state.db.count_pushes().await.unwrap_or(0);
     Json(json!({

crates/gitlawb-node/src/state.rs

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ pub struct RefUpdateBroadcast {
     pub pusher_did: String,
     pub node_did: String,
     pub timestamp: String,
-    pub owner_did: String,
 }
 
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
@@ -52,35 +51,6 @@ pub struct AppState {
     pub repo_store: RepoStore,
     /// Per-DID rate limiter for creation endpoints (repos, issues, PRs)
     pub rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
-    /// Per-client-IP rate limiter for the same creation endpoints. The per-DID
-    /// limiter above cannot brake a creation flood from a DID farm — one
-    /// throwaway `did:key` per repo means each DID makes a single create call
-    /// and never trips its own bucket. A valid iCaptcha proof does not cap this
-    /// either: the enforced level draws only machine-solvable deterministic
-    /// challenges (and the caller can pin the easy type), so a bot mints a fresh
-    /// DID, solves a proof, and creates a repo unthrottled. Braking on the
-    /// resolved client IP is what actually stops a single-source flood (same
-    /// rationale as `push_rate_limiter`). Keyed by `push_limiter_trust`.
-    pub create_ip_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
-    /// Per-client-IP rate limiter for git-receive-pack. Per-DID limits cannot
-    /// brake a push flood from a DID farm (one throwaway DID per repo), so the
-    /// push path throttles on the resolved client IP instead.
-    pub push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
-    /// Which forwarded header (if any) the edge is trusted to set, for
-    /// resolving the push limiter's client-IP key. See `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`.
-    /// Node-wide; also keys the two peer-sync limiters below.
-    pub push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy,
-    /// Per-client-IP limiter for `POST /api/v1/sync/trigger` (tight). The route
-    /// requires a signature, but a signature does not cap cost (a did:key farm
-    /// self-registers), and its per-call cost is an O(peers) fan-out, so the IP
-    /// brake is a separate, load-bearing half. Its own bucket so an unsigned
-    /// `/sync/notify` flood cannot drain the signed trigger caller's quota.
-    pub sync_trigger_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
-    /// Per-client-IP limiter for the peer-write routes (`/peers/announce`,
-    /// `/sync/notify`) (generous). `/sync/notify` reaches the same `enqueue_sync`
-    /// sink as trigger and accepts unsigned requests from known peers, so it is
-    /// braked too; each peer's distinct IP gets its own bucket.
-    pub peer_write_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
     /// Process-wide graceful-shutdown signal. Sending `true` causes every
     /// task that holds a `watch::Receiver` to exit at its next await point.
     /// Used by:

crates/gitlawb-node/src/visibility.rs

@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@
 //! based on the repo's visibility rules with a fallback to the legacy
 //! `is_public` flag. It performs no I/O so it is exhaustively unit tested.
 
-use crate::db::{RepoRecord, VisibilityRule};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use unicode_normalization::UnicodeNormalization;
+use crate::db::VisibilityRule;
 
 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum Decision {
@@ -14,23 +12,11 @@ pub enum Decision {
     Deny,
 }
 
-/// NFC-normalize a glob prefix or path so the matcher compares canonically
-/// equivalent strings byte-for-byte. Without this, a deny rule authored NFC
-/// (`é` = U+00E9) byte-compares unequal to a path committed NFD (`e` + U+0301)
-/// and the blob slips past the rule on the replication path (#101). NFC, not
-/// NFKC: compatibility folding (ligatures, full-width forms) would merge paths
-/// the filesystem treats as distinct and over-withhold. Both sides of every
-/// comparison must pass through this, or the skew just moves.
-fn nfc(s: &str) -> String {
-    s.nfc().collect()
-}
-
-/// True if `caller` is the repo owner. Uses [`crate::api::did_matches`] so the
-/// owner check is representation-agnostic within `did:key` (full `did:key:z...`
-/// matches bare `z...` stored by mirror rows) while still denying cross-method
-/// collisions (`did:gitlawb:z...` vs bare `z...`).
+/// True if `caller` is the repo owner (matches full did:key or its short form),
+/// mirroring the owner-match idiom in `api/protect.rs`.
 fn is_owner(owner_did: &str, caller: &str) -> bool {
-    crate::api::did_matches(owner_did, caller)
+    let owner_short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner_did);
+    caller == owner_did || caller == owner_short
 }
 
 /// The match prefix for a glob: "/" stays "/", "/secret/**" becomes "/secret".
@@ -50,17 +36,12 @@ fn glob_matches(glob: &str, path: &str) -> bool {
     if prefix == "/" {
         return true;
     }
-    // Compare in NFC so an NFC rule matches a canonically-equivalent NFD path
-    // (and vice versa). Both sides normalized here — the single matcher seam.
-    let prefix = nfc(prefix);
-    let path = nfc(path);
     path == prefix || path.starts_with(&format!("{prefix}/"))
 }
 
-/// Specificity = length of the (normalized) match prefix; longer is more
-/// specific. Normalized so ranking stays consistent with `glob_matches`.
+/// Specificity = length of the match prefix; longer is more specific.
 fn specificity(glob: &str) -> usize {
-    nfc(glob_prefix(glob)).len()
+    glob_prefix(glob).len()
 }
 
 /// Decide whether `caller` (None = anonymous) may read `path` in a repo.
@@ -115,119 +96,6 @@ pub fn visibility_check(
     }
 }
 
-/// Whether `caller` (None = anonymous) may see a repo in a listing — the `"/"`
-/// visibility decision, shared by every repo-listing surface (REST list,
-/// federated list, GraphQL `repos`) so they enforce one rule, not three drifting
-/// copies. Not a bare `is_public` test: a repo can be `is_public=false` with a
-/// root rule granting readers, or `is_public=true` with a root deny (#97).
-pub fn listable_at_root(
-    rules: &[VisibilityRule],
-    is_public: bool,
-    owner_did: &str,
-    caller: Option<&str>,
-) -> bool {
-    visibility_check(rules, is_public, owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Allow
-}
-
-/// Whether a single `received_ref_updates` row (identified by its peer-supplied
-/// `row_repo` slug) should be shown to `caller` (None = anonymous) on the
-/// cross-repo ref-updates feeds (#112 GraphQL, #114 REST).
-///
-/// Pure and I/O-free: both call sites load the deduped local repo set and its
-/// visibility rules once per request and pass them in, so the gate logic lives
-/// here and visibility.rs keeps its "no I/O" property.
-///
-/// The slug is written verbatim from the inbound gossip/notify message, so it is
-/// untrusted input, not a canonical key. The decision is fail-closed by
-/// construction: the only KEEP paths are (a) a slug with no `/` (cannot name a
-/// local `owner/name` pair, so remote by definition), (b) all matched local
-/// records are readable, and (c) no local record matches (remote/gossip-only).
-/// Any local match the caller cannot read at root DROPs the row. There is no
-/// catch-all keep on unexpected state.
-///
-/// Slug/record owner keys are matched prefix-tolerantly (one is a prefix of the
-/// other), covering the exact short-key, the full `did:key:` form, and the
-/// URL-truncated 8-char form. Prefix over-match can only over-drop a genuinely
-/// remote row (fail-safe), never over-serve a private local one.
-///
-/// The live call sites are the #112 (GraphQL) and #114 (REST) feed handlers,
-/// added in the following units; exercised by the unit tests below meanwhile.
-pub fn ref_update_row_visible(
-    deduped: &[RepoRecord],
-    rules_by_repo: &HashMap<String, Vec<VisibilityRule>>,
-    caller: Option<&str>,
-    row_repo: &str,
-) -> bool {
-    // A slug with no '/' cannot name a local owner/name pair — remote by
-    // definition (same branch as "matches nothing local") → KEEP.
-    if row_repo.rsplit_once('/').is_none() {
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    // Match each local record with the shared slug predicate (one matcher, so
-    // this gate and the collector's quarantine drop cannot disagree about which
-    // rows a repo owns), then fail closed on any matched record the caller
-    // cannot read at root.
-    for record in deduped {
-        if !ref_update_row_names_repo(record, row_repo) {
-            continue;
-        }
-        let rules = rules_by_repo
-            .get(&record.id)
-            .map(Vec::as_slice)
-            .unwrap_or(&[]);
-        if !listable_at_root(rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller) {
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Reached only if every matched local record is readable, or nothing local
-    // matched (remote/gossip-only). Both are the KEEP paths; there is no
-    // default-keep on unexpected state — an unreadable match already returned.
-    true
-}
-
-/// Whether `row_repo`'s peer-supplied slug names the local `record`. The single
-/// match predicate shared by the feed gate ([`ref_update_row_visible`]) and the
-/// quarantine hard-drop in the ref-update collector, so the two cannot diverge
-/// about which rows a repo owns — a second, drifting matcher is exactly the #134
-/// slug-collision class.
-///
-/// A record matches when the slug's `name` half is equal and one owner key is a
-/// prefix of the other (prefix-tolerant: exact short key, full `did:key:` form,
-/// and the URL-truncated 8-char form). Both the slug owner and the record owner
-/// are reduced to their last ':'-delimited segment before comparing. The node's
-/// own emitter builds the wire slug via `normalize_owner_key` (bare short key for
-/// a single-segment `did:key:`, the full DID for every other method; see
-/// api/repos.rs), but the stored slug is UNTRUSTED: a peer can broadcast a row
-/// under any owner form, including a method-stripped `user/name`. Reducing both
-/// sides to the trailing segment matches a repo's own rows whichever form keyed
-/// them, and still catches an attacker-planted short slug.
-///
-/// This intentionally diverges from `did_matches` / `DEDUP_CTE`, which strip only
-/// bare `did:key:` and keep other DID methods whole: those compare trusted,
-/// canonical DIDs, while this slug is untrusted. Applying the keep-whole rule here
-/// would fail open: a hostile `user/name` slug would not prefix-match a private
-/// `did:web:host:user` record and would leak. The price is a fail-SAFE over-match
-/// when a remote owner shares both a trailing segment and a repo name with a local
-/// private repo (negligible for full did:key ids; only did:web / truncated forms
-/// collide): it can hide a genuinely remote row, never serve a private one.
-pub fn ref_update_row_names_repo(record: &RepoRecord, row_repo: &str) -> bool {
-    let Some((owner_part, name)) = row_repo.rsplit_once('/') else {
-        return false;
-    };
-    if record.name != name {
-        return false;
-    }
-    let row_key = owner_part.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner_part);
-    let record_key = record
-        .owner_did
-        .split(':')
-        .next_back()
-        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
-    record_key.starts_with(row_key) || row_key.starts_with(record_key)
-}
-
 /// The subtree path globs that `caller` (None = anonymous) may NOT read, given
 /// the repo's rules. Whole-repo ("/") rules are excluded: a denied whole-repo
 /// read is handled by the 404 gate before a clone ever starts. Each remaining
@@ -400,60 +268,6 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn non_key_owner_bare_short_does_not_match() {
-        // A non-key DID owner (did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo) probed with the bare last
-        // segment (z6MkFoo) must NOT match — the old is_owner would return true
-        // via split(':').next_back(), which this PR tightens.
-        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, false, "did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo", Some("z6MkFoo"), "/"),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "bare short must not match a non-key DID owner"
-        );
-        // The full non-key DID still matches itself.
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(
-                &rules,
-                false,
-                "did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo",
-                Some("did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo"),
-                "/"
-            ),
-            Decision::Allow,
-            "full non-key DID still matches itself"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // #153 forward guard: is_owner must match across bare-key / full-did:key
-    // representations should someone revert to single-side normalize_owner_key.
-    #[test]
-    fn bare_owner_full_caller_allows_owner() {
-        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, false, "z6MkOwner", Some("did:key:z6MkOwner"), "/"),
-            Decision::Allow,
-            "bare owner + full did:key caller must match (guard against single-side revert)"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // #153 regression: cross-method DID must still be denied even when the
-    // trailing segment collides with a bare owner key.
-    #[test]
-    fn cross_method_did_denied_with_bare_owner() {
-        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, false, "z6MkFoo", Some("did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo"), "/"),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "cross-method DID must not match a bare did:key owner"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, false, "z6MkFoo", Some("did:web:z6MkFoo"), "/"),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "did:web must not match a bare did:key owner"
-        );
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn root_rule_allows_listed_reader() {
         let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
@@ -557,292 +371,4 @@ mod tests {
             true
         ));
     }
-
-    // ── ref_update_row_visible (feed gate) ──────────────────────────────────
-
-    fn rec(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
-        RepoRecord {
-            id: id.into(),
-            name: name.into(),
-            owner_did: owner_did.into(),
-            description: None,
-            is_public,
-            default_branch: "main".into(),
-            created_at: Utc::now(),
-            updated_at: Utc::now(),
-            disk_path: format!("/srv/{id}"),
-            forked_from: None,
-            machine_id: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn rules_for(entries: &[(&str, &[VisibilityRule])]) -> HashMap<String, Vec<VisibilityRule>> {
-        entries
-            .iter()
-            .map(|(id, rs)| (id.to_string(), rs.to_vec()))
-            .collect()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_public_local_repo_kept_for_anon() {
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", true)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_private_local_repo_dropped_for_anon_kept_for_owner() {
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        // Anonymous → drop.
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-        // Owner (full DID) → keep.
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            Some("did:key:z6MkOwner"),
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_root_rule_reader_reincluded() {
-        // Private repo (is_public=false) with a root rule granting a named
-        // reader. Delegates to listable_at_root: anon and non-reader denied,
-        // named reader allowed.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", OWNER, "widget", false)];
-        let root = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
-        let rules = rules_for(&[("r1", &root)]);
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            Some("did:key:z6MkStranger"),
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            Some("did:key:z6MkFriend"),
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_alias_full_did_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // Owner stored full-DID; slug also carries the full-DID form. Still
-        // matches (row_key normalizes to the short key) → drop. Round 1's
-        // string-match would have leaked this.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:zABC", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "did:key:zABC/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_truncated_key_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // Slug carries an 8-char URL-truncated prefix of the owner key; still
-        // matches via prefix tolerance → drop. Round 2's get_repo path leaked.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:zABCDEFGH", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "zABCDEF/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_mirror_coexistence_private_canonical_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // Pure-level mirror-coexistence: the deduped set contains only the
-        // private canonical record for (owner,name). A matching slug drops for
-        // anon. (DB-level dedup survivor property is pinned separately.)
-        let deduped = [rec("uuid-canonical", "did:key:z6Mkwbud", "nipmod", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6Mkwbud/nipmod"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_empty_owner_slug_matches_and_drops() {
-        // Slug "/name": empty owner_part → row_key "" → starts_with("") matches
-        // every same-named record. Fail-safe pin for a private repo.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "/widget"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_one_char_owner_slug_matches_and_drops() {
-        // 1-char owner prefix that the private repo's key starts with → match.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "z/widget"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_remote_slug_no_match_kept() {
-        // Different owner key, no prefix relation → no local match → keep.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "zZZZOTHER/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_private_didweb_short_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // A private did:web repo must drop its row for anon when the slug arrives
-        // in the short `{last-segment}/{name}` form. Post-#141 the emitter no longer
-        // produces this form for did:web (normalize_owner_key keeps the full DID),
-        // so this is the untrusted/crafted variant a peer can broadcast; the full-DID
-        // variant the emitter now sends is covered by the next test. A did:key-aware
-        // (keep-whole) rule would fail to match `alice` against `did:web:host:alice`
-        // and leak.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:alice", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "alice/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_multi_segment_did_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // A private repo owned by a multi-segment DID must also fail closed under
-        // the full-DID slug form. Post-#141 this IS the form the emitter broadcasts
-        // (normalize_owner_key keeps non-did:key methods whole), and a peer can craft
-        // it too. The gate drops it: both sides reduce to the last ':' segment
-        // ("user"), so they match. Fail-safe regardless of which form keyed the row.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:user", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "did:web:host:user/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_multi_segment_did_slug_kept_for_public() {
-        // Symmetric keep-side: a PUBLIC multi-segment-DID repo's row must still be
-        // returned to anon after the last-':'-segment normalization — guards
-        // against a regression that over-drops legitimate did:web rows.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:user", "widget", true)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "did:web:host:user/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_malformed_slug_no_slash_kept_no_panic() {
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "noslug"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_empty_deduped_set_keeps_any_slug() {
-        let deduped: [RepoRecord; 0] = [];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "anything"));
-    }
-
-    // The shared slug matcher underpinning both the feed gate and the collector's
-    // quarantine drop: it must recognize a repo's own row across every owner-DID
-    // form (bare short key, full did:key, URL-truncated prefix) and must not
-    // over-match a different name or an unrelated owner. The quarantine drop calls
-    // this directly, so its match contract is load-bearing for withholding a
-    // quarantined mirror from a caller who matches the mirror's owner_did.
-    #[test]
-    fn names_repo_matches_owner_forms_and_rejects_mismatches() {
-        // Bare short owner key (the form upsert_mirror_repo stores).
-        let bare = rec("m", "z6MkQuar", "secret", false);
-        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
-        // Full did:key owner; the short-segment slug still matches via last-segment.
-        let full = rec("c", "did:key:z6MkQuar", "secret", false);
-        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&full, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
-        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&full, "did:key:z6MkQuar/secret"));
-        // URL-truncated 8-char prefix slug → prefix-tolerant match.
-        let long = rec("l", "did:key:z6MkQuarLONGKEY", "secret", false);
-        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&long, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
-        // Different name, different owner, and no-slash → no match.
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkQuar/other"));
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkOther/secret"));
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "noslash"));
-    }
-
-    // #101: a deny rule must withhold a path that denotes the same characters in
-    // a different Unicode normalization form. Without NFC normalization at the
-    // matcher seam, an NFC-authored rule byte-compares unequal to an NFD-stored
-    // path and the blob leaks on the replication path.
-    #[test]
-    fn matcher_withholds_across_nfc_nfd_normalization_skew() {
-        // "é" composed (NFC, U+00E9) in the rule; decomposed (NFD, e + U+0301)
-        // in the committed path.
-        let nfc_rule = "/s\u{00e9}cret/**";
-        let nfd_path = "/se\u{0301}cret/key.pem";
-        let rules = [rule(nfc_rule, VisibilityMode::B, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, None, nfd_path),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "NFC-authored deny rule must withhold the canonically-equivalent NFD path"
-        );
-
-        // Mirror: rule authored NFD, path committed NFC.
-        let nfd_rule = "/se\u{0301}cret/**";
-        let nfc_path = "/s\u{00e9}cret/key.pem";
-        let rules2 = [rule(nfd_rule, VisibilityMode::B, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules2, true, OWNER, None, nfc_path),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "NFD-authored deny rule must withhold the canonically-equivalent NFC path"
-        );
-
-        // A genuinely different path is still allowed (no over-withholding).
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, None, "/public/x.txt"),
-            Decision::Allow
-        );
-    }
 }

crates/gl/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 [package]
 name = "gl"
 description = "The gitlawb CLI — identity management, node control, MCP server"
-version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
-rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 
 [[bin]]
@@ -12,8 +11,6 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
 
 [dependencies]
 gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
-icaptcha-client = { path = "../icaptcha-client" }
-base64 = { workspace = true }
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }

crates/gl/src/bounty.rs

@@ -8,10 +8,6 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 
-fn signed_client(node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> NodeClient {
-    NodeClient::new(node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir).ok())
-}
-
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct BountyArgs {
     #[command(subcommand)]
@@ -53,8 +49,6 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
         status: Option<String>,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
-        #[arg(long)]
-        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Show details of a specific bounty
     Show {
@@ -62,8 +56,6 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
         id: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
-        #[arg(long)]
-        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Claim an open bounty
     Claim {
@@ -129,13 +121,8 @@ pub async fn run(args: BountyArgs) -> Result<()> {
             node,
             dir,
         } => cmd_create(repo, title, amount, issue, tx_hash, deadline, node, dir).await,
-        BountyCmd::List {
-            repo,
-            status,
-            node,
-            dir,
-        } => cmd_list(repo, status, node, dir).await,
-        BountyCmd::Show { id, node, dir } => cmd_show(id, node, dir).await,
+        BountyCmd::List { repo, status, node } => cmd_list(repo, status, node).await,
+        BountyCmd::Show { id, node } => cmd_show(id, node).await,
         BountyCmd::Claim {
             id,
             wallet,
@@ -205,13 +192,8 @@ async fn cmd_create(
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_list(
-    repo: Option<String>,
-    status: Option<String>,
-    node: String,
-    dir: Option<PathBuf>,
-) -> Result<()> {
-    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
+async fn cmd_list(repo: Option<String>, status: Option<String>, node: String) -> Result<()> {
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
 
     let url = if let Some(ref repo) = repo {
         let (owner, name) = repo
@@ -232,7 +214,7 @@ async fn cmd_list(
     };
 
     let resp = client
-        .get_authed(&url)
+        .get(&url)
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
@@ -255,9 +237,9 @@ async fn cmd_list(
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_show(id: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
-    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
-    let resp = client.get_authed(&format!("/api/v1/bounties/{id}")).await?;
+async fn cmd_show(id: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    let resp = client.get(&format!("/api/v1/bounties/{id}")).await?;
 
     let status = resp.status();
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
@@ -480,7 +462,7 @@ mod tests {
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
-        cmd_list(None, None, server.url(), None).await.unwrap();
+        cmd_list(None, None, server.url()).await.unwrap();
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -524,7 +506,7 @@ mod tests {
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
-        let err = cmd_show("nonexistent".to_string(), server.url(), None)
+        let err = cmd_show("nonexistent".to_string(), server.url())
             .await
             .unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("not found"));

crates/gl/src/cert.rs

@@ -5,15 +5,10 @@
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
 use serde_json::Value;
-use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 
-fn signed_client(node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> NodeClient {
-    NodeClient::new(node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir).ok())
-}
-
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct CertArgs {
     #[command(subcommand)]
@@ -28,8 +23,6 @@ pub enum CertCmd {
         repo: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
-        #[arg(long)]
-        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Show a specific ref certificate and verify its signature
     Show {
@@ -39,51 +32,28 @@ pub enum CertCmd {
         id: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
-        #[arg(long)]
-        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
-        /// Exit non-zero unless the Ed25519 signature verifies AND the
-        /// issuing node matches the queried node (or --expect-node)
-        #[arg(long)]
-        verify: bool,
-        /// Expected issuing node DID for --verify. A valid signature alone
-        /// only proves the cert is internally consistent — signed by whatever
-        /// key it names — so --verify also anchors the issuer to a DID you
-        /// trust: this value when given, else the queried node's DID.
-        #[arg(long, requires = "verify")]
-        expect_node: Option<String>,
     },
 }
 
 pub async fn run(args: CertArgs) -> Result<()> {
     match args.cmd {
-        CertCmd::List { repo, node, dir } => cmd_list(repo, node, dir).await,
-        CertCmd::Show {
-            repo,
-            id,
-            node,
-            dir,
-            verify,
-            expect_node,
-        } => cmd_show(repo, id, node, dir, verify, expect_node).await,
+        CertCmd::List { repo, node } => cmd_list(repo, node).await,
+        CertCmd::Show { repo, id, node } => cmd_show(repo, id, node).await,
     }
 }
 
 /// Resolve "repo" into (owner, name) using the caller's DID when no slash is given.
-async fn resolve_repo(
-    repo: &str,
-    node: &str,
-    dir: Option<&std::path::Path>,
-) -> Result<(String, String)> {
+async fn resolve_repo(repo: &str, node: &str) -> Result<(String, String)> {
     if let Some((owner, name)) = repo.split_once('/') {
         Ok((owner.to_string(), name.to_string()))
     } else {
-        let short = if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(dir) {
+        let short = if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(None) {
             let did = kp.did().to_string();
             did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string()
         } else {
-            let client = signed_client(node, dir);
+            let client = NodeClient::new(node, None);
             let info: Value = client
-                .get_authed("/")
+                .get("/")
                 .await?
                 .json()
                 .await
@@ -95,13 +65,13 @@ async fn resolve_repo(
     }
 }
 
-async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
-    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
+async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
+    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node).await?;
 
-    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
     let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs");
     let resp: Value = client
-        .get_authed(&path)
+        .get(&path)
         .await?
         .json()
         .await
@@ -126,23 +96,16 @@ async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_show(
-    repo: String,
-    id: String,
-    node: String,
-    dir: Option<PathBuf>,
-    require_valid: bool,
-    expect_node: Option<String>,
-) -> Result<()> {
-    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
+async fn cmd_show(repo: String, id: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
+    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node).await?;
 
-    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
     let id = resolve_cert_id(&client, &owner, &name, &id).await?;
 
     // Fetch the certificate
     let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs/{id}");
     let resp = client
-        .get_authed(&path)
+        .get(&path)
         .await?
         .error_for_status()
         .context("certificate not found")?;
@@ -167,132 +130,47 @@ async fn cmd_show(
     println!("  Signature: {signature}");
     println!();
 
-    // Verify the Ed25519 signature: rebuild the exact canonical payload the
-    // node signed (see gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs::issue_ref_certificate) and
-    // check it against the public key embedded in the certificate's node DID.
-    // This proves the cert is internally authentic — signed by the key it
-    // names; the node-DID comparison below covers *which* node that is.
-    let repo_id = cert["repo_id"].as_str().unwrap_or("");
-    let verdict = verify_signature(
-        repo_id, ref_name, old_sha, new_sha, pusher, node_did, issued_at, signature,
-    );
+    // Reconstruct the signing payload and verify
+    // Fetch the node's current public key to verify
+    let info: Value = client
+        .get("/")
+        .await?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("failed to fetch node info")?;
+    let current_node_did = info["did"].as_str().unwrap_or("");
 
     println!("Signature verification:");
-    match &verdict {
-        Ok(()) => {
-            println!(
-                "  VALID — Ed25519 signature verified against the key the certificate names ({node_did})"
-            );
-        }
-        Err(reason) => {
-            println!("  INVALID — {reason}");
-        }
+    println!("  Signing payload would be:");
+    println!("    {{\"repo_id\": ..., \"ref\": \"{ref_name}\", \"old\": \"{old_sha}\",");
+    println!("      \"new\": \"{new_sha}\", \"pusher\": \"{pusher}\",");
+    println!("      \"node\": \"{node_did}\", \"ts\": \"{issued_at}\"}}");
+    println!();
+
+    if current_node_did == node_did {
+        println!("  Node DID matches current node. Signature is an Ed25519/base64url value.");
+        println!("  To verify offline, use the node's Ed25519 public key derived from:");
+        println!("    did:key → {node_did}");
+    } else {
+        println!("  WARNING: Certificate node DID ({node_did}) does not match");
+        println!("           current node DID ({current_node_did}).");
+        println!("           This certificate was issued by a different node.");
     }
 
-    // Contextual only — the verdict above stands on its own, so a node-info
-    // hiccup here must not turn a successfully displayed certificate into an
-    // error exit.
-    let current_node_did = match client.get("/").await {
-        Ok(resp) => resp
-            .json::<Value>()
-            .await
-            .ok()
-            .and_then(|info| info["did"].as_str().map(str::to_string)),
-        Err(_) => None,
-    };
-    match current_node_did.as_deref() {
-        Some(current) if current == node_did => {
-            println!("  Issuing node DID matches the node being queried.");
-        }
-        Some(current) => {
-            println!("  WARNING: Certificate node DID ({node_did}) does not match");
-            println!("           current node DID ({current}).");
-            println!("           This certificate was issued by a different node.");
-        }
-        None => {
-            println!("  NOTE: could not fetch current node info — skipping node-DID comparison.");
-        }
-    }
-
-    if require_valid {
-        if let Err(reason) = verdict {
-            anyhow::bail!("certificate signature did not verify: {reason}");
-        }
-        // A valid signature proves internal consistency only: the payload was
-        // signed by whatever key the certificate itself names. A hostile
-        // source can mint a keypair, put its DID in node_did, and self-sign.
-        // --verify therefore also anchors the issuer to a trusted DID:
-        // --expect-node when given, else the DID of the node being queried.
-        let expected = expect_node.as_deref().or(current_node_did.as_deref());
-        match expected {
-            Some(expected) if expected == node_did => {}
-            Some(expected) => anyhow::bail!(
-                "certificate is signed by {node_did}, but the expected issuer is {expected} — \
-                 a valid signature alone proves internal consistency, not a trusted issuer"
-            ),
-            None => anyhow::bail!(
-                "cannot anchor the issuer: node info is unreachable and no --expect-node was given"
-            ),
-        }
-    }
+    println!();
+    println!("  Signature (base64url): {signature}");
 
     Ok(())
 }
 
-/// Rebuild the node's canonical signing payload (field order must match
-/// gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs::issue_ref_certificate exactly) and verify the
-/// certificate's Ed25519 signature against the key embedded in `node_did`.
-#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
-fn verify_signature(
-    repo_id: &str,
-    ref_name: &str,
-    old_sha: &str,
-    new_sha: &str,
-    pusher: &str,
-    node_did: &str,
-    issued_at: &str,
-    signature_b64: &str,
-) -> std::result::Result<(), String> {
-    use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};
-    use std::str::FromStr;
-
-    let payload = serde_json::json!({
-        "repo_id": repo_id,
-        "ref":     ref_name,
-        "old":     old_sha,
-        "new":     new_sha,
-        "pusher":  pusher,
-        "node":    node_did,
-        "ts":      issued_at,
-    });
-    let payload_bytes =
-        serde_json::to_vec(&payload).map_err(|e| format!("could not serialize payload: {e}"))?;
-
-    let did =
-        gitlawb_core::did::Did::from_str(node_did).map_err(|e| format!("bad node DID: {e}"))?;
-    let verifying_key = did
-        .to_verifying_key()
-        .map_err(|e| format!("cannot derive a public key from {node_did}: {e}"))?;
-
-    let sig_vec = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
-        .decode(signature_b64)
-        .map_err(|e| format!("signature is not valid base64url: {e}"))?;
-    let sig_bytes: [u8; 64] = sig_vec
-        .try_into()
-        .map_err(|_| "signature is not 64 bytes".to_string())?;
-
-    gitlawb_core::identity::verify(&verifying_key, &payload_bytes, &sig_bytes)
-        .map_err(|_| "Ed25519 signature does not match the signed payload".to_string())
-}
-
 async fn resolve_cert_id(client: &NodeClient, owner: &str, name: &str, id: &str) -> Result<String> {
     if id.len() >= 36 {
         return Ok(id.to_string());
     }
 
-    let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs?prefix={id}");
+    let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs");
     let resp: Value = client
-        .get_authed(&path)
+        .get(&path)
         .await?
         .error_for_status()
         .context("failed to list certificates")?
@@ -304,6 +182,7 @@ async fn resolve_cert_id(client: &NodeClient, owner: &str, name: &str, id: &str)
     let matches: Vec<String> = certs
         .iter()
         .filter_map(|cert| cert["id"].as_str())
+        .filter(|cert_id| cert_id.starts_with(id))
         .map(ToString::to_string)
         .collect();
 
@@ -313,88 +192,3 @@ async fn resolve_cert_id(client: &NodeClient, owner: &str, name: &str, id: &str)
         _ => anyhow::bail!("certificate prefix {id} matches multiple certificates"),
     }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    /// Pins gl's payload reconstruction to the frozen canonical byte form the
-    /// node signs (default serde_json maps = alphabetically ordered keys). If
-    /// serialization drifts — a field added, or a preserve_order feature
-    /// landing anywhere in the workspace (feature unification flips every
-    /// crate at once) — this literal stops matching and the test fails,
-    /// instead of every real certificate silently rendering INVALID.
-    #[test]
-    fn payload_serialization_matches_frozen_canonical_form() {
-        let payload = serde_json::json!({
-            "repo_id": "repo-1",
-            "ref":     "refs/heads/main",
-            "old":     "oldsha",
-            "new":     "newsha",
-            "pusher":  "did:key:z6MkPusher",
-            "node":    "did:key:z6MkNode",
-            "ts":      "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
-        });
-        let frozen = concat!(
-            r#"{"new":"newsha","node":"did:key:z6MkNode","old":"oldsha","#,
-            r#""pusher":"did:key:z6MkPusher","ref":"refs/heads/main","#,
-            r#""repo_id":"repo-1","ts":"2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00"}"#,
-        );
-        assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&payload).unwrap(), frozen);
-    }
-
-    /// Signing exactly as the node does must round-trip through
-    /// verify_signature; any field tampering must fail it.
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_signature_round_trip_and_tamper() {
-        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        let node_did = kp.did().as_str().to_string();
-
-        let payload = serde_json::json!({
-            "repo_id": "repo-1",
-            "ref":     "refs/heads/main",
-            "old":     "0".repeat(40),
-            "new":     "a".repeat(40),
-            "pusher":  "did:key:z6MkPusher",
-            "node":    node_did,
-            "ts":      "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
-        });
-        let sig = kp.sign_b64(&serde_json::to_vec(&payload).unwrap());
-
-        let ok = verify_signature(
-            "repo-1",
-            "refs/heads/main",
-            &"0".repeat(40),
-            &"a".repeat(40),
-            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
-            &node_did,
-            "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
-            &sig,
-        );
-        assert!(ok.is_ok(), "expected valid signature, got: {ok:?}");
-
-        let tampered = verify_signature(
-            "repo-1",
-            "refs/heads/main",
-            &"0".repeat(40),
-            &"b".repeat(40), // new_sha changed after signing
-            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
-            &node_did,
-            "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
-            &sig,
-        );
-        assert!(tampered.is_err(), "tampered payload must not verify");
-
-        let garbage = verify_signature(
-            "repo-1",
-            "refs/heads/main",
-            &"0".repeat(40),
-            &"a".repeat(40),
-            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
-            &node_did,
-            "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
-            "not-base64url!!!",
-        );
-        assert!(garbage.is_err(), "malformed signature must not verify");
-    }
-}

crates/gl/src/doctor.rs

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 
 const PUBLIC_NODE: &str = "https://node.gitlawb.com";
-const GITHUB_API_BASE: &str = "https://api.github.com";
 
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct DoctorArgs {
@@ -142,20 +141,18 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
 
     // ── 3. GITLAWB_NODE env var ───────────────────────────────────────────
     match std::env::var("GITLAWB_NODE") {
-        // A loopback host is a legitimate setup (self-hosted node, dev
-        // harness) — the connectivity check below fails loudly if it is not
-        // actually reachable, so don't red-flag the configuration itself.
-        Ok(v) if is_loopback_url(&v) => {
-            checks.push(Check::pass(
+        Ok(v) if !v.is_empty() && !v.contains("127.0.0.1") && !v.contains("localhost") => {
+            checks.push(Check::pass("GITLAWB_NODE", v.to_string()));
+        }
+        Ok(v) if v.contains("127.0.0.1") || v.contains("localhost") => {
+            checks.push(Check::fail(
                 "GITLAWB_NODE",
                 format!(
-                    "{v} (local node — intentional for self-hosting/dev; unset to target the public network)"
+                    "set to local address ({v}) — git push/clone will fail against remote nodes"
                 ),
+                "export GITLAWB_NODE=https://node.gitlawb.com",
             ));
         }
-        Ok(v) if !v.is_empty() => {
-            checks.push(Check::pass("GITLAWB_NODE", v.to_string()));
-        }
         _ => {
             checks.push(Check::fail(
                 "GITLAWB_NODE",
@@ -177,19 +174,6 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
                 "node",
                 format!("{} — v{version} ({short_did}…)", args.node),
             ));
-            // Capability drift: a node newer than this CLI may require features
-            // (RFC 9421 signing, iCaptcha) the CLI doesn't speak.
-            let gl_ver = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
-            if version != "?" && is_newer(version, gl_ver) {
-                checks.push(Check::warn(
-                    "gl version",
-                    format!(
-                        "node is v{version} but gl is v{gl_ver} — your CLI may be missing \
-                         features (signing / iCaptcha) this node requires"
-                    ),
-                    "upgrade gl: curl -sSf https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh",
-                ));
-            }
         }
         Ok(resp) => {
             checks.push(Check::fail(
@@ -207,31 +191,6 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
         }
     }
 
-    // ── 4b. iCaptcha capability ───────────────────────────────────────────
-    // Gated writes (repo create / register / fork) auto-solve a challenge at the
-    // iCaptcha service; check it's reachable so the failure mode is obvious.
-    let icaptcha_url = std::env::var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL")
-        .unwrap_or_else(|_| icaptcha_client::DEFAULT_URL.to_string());
-    match NodeClient::new(&icaptcha_url, None).get("/v1/pubkey").await {
-        Ok(resp) if resp.status().is_success() => {
-            checks.push(Check::pass("iCaptcha", format!("{icaptcha_url} reachable")));
-        }
-        Ok(resp) => {
-            checks.push(Check::warn(
-                "iCaptcha",
-                format!("{icaptcha_url} returned HTTP {}", resp.status()),
-                "gated writes (repo create / register) may fail until iCaptcha is reachable",
-            ));
-        }
-        Err(e) => {
-            checks.push(Check::warn(
-                "iCaptcha",
-                format!("{icaptcha_url} unreachable: {e}"),
-                "set GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL or check connectivity — repo create / register solve a challenge there",
-            ));
-        }
-    }
-
     // ── 5. git-remote-gitlawb helper ──────────────────────────────────────
     // Use PATH lookup only — invoking the binary directly triggers git internals
     // that error with "fatal: not a git repository" outside of a git repo.
@@ -245,15 +204,6 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
         ));
     }
 
-    // ── 5b. shell alias shadowing ─────────────────────────────────────────
-    // oh-my-zsh's default `git` plugin aliases gl='git pull', which silently
-    // shadows this binary in every interactive zsh — the classic symptom is
-    // `gl` printing "fatal: not a git repository". Aliases beat PATH, so no
-    // install method can fix it; the user's rc file has to unalias.
-    if let Some(check) = check_shell_alias_shadowing(dirs::home_dir()) {
-        checks.push(check);
-    }
-
     // ── 6. git ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     match std::process::Command::new("git")
         .arg("--version")
@@ -275,7 +225,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
 
     // ── 7. Version up to date ─────────────────────────────────────────────
     let current = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
-    checks.push(check_version(current, GITHUB_API_BASE).await);
+    checks.push(check_version(current).await);
 
     // ── Render ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     for check in &checks {
@@ -320,83 +270,6 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
 }
 
 /// Check if a binary name exists anywhere on PATH.
-/// True when the rc file contains a real `unalias` command naming `gl` —
-/// not a comment, and not a longer word like `unalias global`. Ordering
-/// relative to oh-my-zsh loading is not modeled (an unalias placed before the
-/// plugin loads would be ineffective); acceptable slack for a warning check.
-fn rc_unaliases_gl(rc: &str) -> bool {
-    rc.lines().any(|line| {
-        let line = line.trim_start();
-        if line.starts_with('#') {
-            return false;
-        }
-        line.split([';', '&', '|']).any(|cmd| {
-            // A trailing comment must not count: `unalias foo  # gl`
-            let cmd = cmd.split('#').next().unwrap_or("");
-            let mut tokens = cmd.split_whitespace();
-            tokens.next() == Some("unalias") && tokens.any(|t| t == "gl")
-        })
-    })
-}
-
-/// True when the URL's host is exactly a loopback address. Substring checks
-/// misclassify hosts like `localhost.example` or URLs with "localhost" in the
-/// path, so parse and compare the actual host.
-fn is_loopback_url(value: &str) -> bool {
-    reqwest::Url::parse(value)
-        .ok()
-        .and_then(|u| {
-            u.host_str()
-                .map(|h| h == "localhost" || h == "127.0.0.1" || h == "[::1]" || h == "::1")
-        })
-        .unwrap_or(false)
-}
-
-/// Detect interactive-shell setups where an alias shadows `gl` (aliases beat
-/// PATH, so no install method can fix this). Best-effort heuristic over
-/// ~/.zshrc: an explicit `alias gl=`, or oh-my-zsh's `git` plugin (which
-/// ships gl='git pull'). Returns None when nothing suspicious is found or the
-/// rc file already contains an `unalias gl`.
-fn check_shell_alias_shadowing(home: Option<PathBuf>) -> Option<Check> {
-    let home = home?;
-    let rc = std::fs::read_to_string(home.join(".zshrc")).ok()?;
-    if rc_unaliases_gl(&rc) {
-        return None;
-    }
-
-    let explicit_alias = rc.lines().any(|l| l.trim_start().starts_with("alias gl="));
-    // Single-line `plugins=(git ...)` is the overwhelmingly common form; a
-    // multi-line plugins array slips past this heuristic, which is acceptable
-    // for a warning-level check.
-    let omz_git_plugin = home.join(".oh-my-zsh/plugins/git").exists()
-        && rc.lines().any(|l| {
-            let l = l.trim_start();
-            l.starts_with("plugins=")
-                && l.trim_start_matches("plugins=(")
-                    .trim_end_matches(')')
-                    .split_whitespace()
-                    .any(|p| p == "git")
-        });
-
-    if explicit_alias || omz_git_plugin {
-        let source = if explicit_alias {
-            "~/.zshrc defines `alias gl=`"
-        } else {
-            "oh-my-zsh's git plugin aliases gl='git pull'"
-        };
-        Some(Check::warn(
-            "shell alias",
-            format!(
-                "{source} — interactive shells run that instead of this binary \
-                 (symptom: `gl` prints \"fatal: not a git repository\")"
-            ),
-            "echo 'unalias gl 2>/dev/null' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc  (must come after oh-my-zsh loads)",
-        ))
-    } else {
-        None
-    }
-}
-
 fn which_in_path(name: &str) -> bool {
     std::env::var_os("PATH")
         .map(|paths| {
@@ -408,9 +281,8 @@ fn which_in_path(name: &str) -> bool {
         .unwrap_or(false)
 }
 
-/// Fetch the latest release tag from Gitlawb/node (the actual release repo — see install.sh's
-/// `GITLAWB_RELEASE_REPO` default) and compare to current version.
-async fn check_version(current: &'static str, github_api_base: &str) -> Check {
+/// Fetch the latest release tag from gitlawb/releases and compare to current version.
+async fn check_version(current: &'static str) -> Check {
     let client = match reqwest::Client::builder()
         .user_agent(format!("gl/{current}"))
         .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))
@@ -421,9 +293,7 @@ async fn check_version(current: &'static str, github_api_base: &str) -> Check {
     };
 
     let resp = match client
-        .get(format!(
-            "{github_api_base}/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest"
-        ))
+        .get("https://api.github.com/repos/gitlawb/releases/releases/latest")
         .send()
         .await
     {
@@ -431,13 +301,6 @@ async fn check_version(current: &'static str, github_api_base: &str) -> Check {
         Err(_) => return Check::pass("version", format!("v{current} (offline — could not check)")),
     };
 
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        return Check::pass(
-            "version",
-            format!("v{current} (GitHub API returned HTTP {})", resp.status()),
-        );
-    }
-
     let body: serde_json::Value = match resp.json().await {
         Ok(v) => v,
         Err(_) => return Check::pass("version", format!("v{current} (invalid response)")),
@@ -481,88 +344,6 @@ fn is_newer(latest: &str, current: &str) -> bool {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
-    fn fake_home(zshrc: Option<&str>, with_omz_git: bool) -> tempfile::TempDir {
-        let home = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        if let Some(rc) = zshrc {
-            std::fs::write(home.path().join(".zshrc"), rc).unwrap();
-        }
-        if with_omz_git {
-            std::fs::create_dir_all(home.path().join(".oh-my-zsh/plugins/git")).unwrap();
-        }
-        home
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn alias_shadowing_flags_omz_git_plugin() {
-        let home = fake_home(Some("plugins=(git z)\nsource $ZSH/oh-my-zsh.sh\n"), true);
-        let check = check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf()));
-        assert!(check.is_some(), "omz git plugin without unalias must warn");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn alias_shadowing_flags_explicit_alias() {
-        let home = fake_home(Some("alias gl='git pull'\n"), false);
-        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_some());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn alias_shadowing_silent_when_unaliased() {
-        let home = fake_home(
-            Some("plugins=(git z)\nsource $ZSH/oh-my-zsh.sh\nunalias gl 2>/dev/null\n"),
-            true,
-        );
-        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_none());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn alias_shadowing_ignores_fake_unaliases() {
-        // None of these actually free `gl` — the warning must survive them.
-        for rc in [
-            "plugins=(git)\n# unalias gl\n",          // commented out
-            "plugins=(git)\nunalias global\n",        // longer word
-            "plugins=(git)\nunalias foo  # gl\n",     // gl only in a comment
-            "plugins=(git)\necho unalias-gl-later\n", // not an unalias command
-        ] {
-            let home = fake_home(Some(rc), true);
-            assert!(
-                check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_some(),
-                "must still warn for rc: {rc:?}"
-            );
-        }
-        // Real unalias forms that do free it — all must silence the warning.
-        for rc in [
-            "plugins=(git)\nunalias gl\n",
-            "plugins=(git)\nunalias gl 2>/dev/null\n",
-            "plugins=(git)\ntrue; unalias gl\n",
-            "plugins=(git)\nunalias glog gl gst\n",
-        ] {
-            let home = fake_home(Some(rc), true);
-            assert!(
-                check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_none(),
-                "must be silent for rc: {rc:?}"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn loopback_url_detection_is_host_exact() {
-        assert!(is_loopback_url("http://127.0.0.1:7545"));
-        assert!(is_loopback_url("http://localhost:7545"));
-        assert!(is_loopback_url("http://[::1]:7545"));
-        assert!(!is_loopback_url("https://localhost.example"));
-        assert!(!is_loopback_url("https://node.gitlawb.com/localhost"));
-        assert!(!is_loopback_url("not a url"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn alias_shadowing_silent_without_signals() {
-        let home = fake_home(Some("plugins=(z)\nexport EDITOR=vim\n"), false);
-        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_none());
-        let no_rc = fake_home(None, false);
-        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(no_rc.path().to_path_buf())).is_none());
-        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(None).is_none());
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn test_is_newer_minor_bump() {
         assert!(is_newer("0.2.0", "0.1.0"));
@@ -598,50 +379,4 @@ mod tests {
     fn test_which_in_path_missing_binary() {
         assert!(!which_in_path("this-binary-does-not-exist-gl-test-12345"));
     }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_check_version_queries_gitlawb_node_releases() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let _m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"tag_name":"v9.9.9"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let check = check_version("0.1.0", &server.url()).await;
-        assert!(matches!(check.state, CheckState::Warn));
-        assert!(check.detail.contains("v9.9.9"));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_check_version_up_to_date() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let _m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"tag_name":"v0.1.0"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let check = check_version("0.1.0", &server.url()).await;
-        assert!(matches!(check.state, CheckState::Ok));
-        assert!(check.detail.contains("up to date"));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_check_version_http_error() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let _m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest")
-            .with_status(403)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let check = check_version("0.1.0", &server.url()).await;
-        assert!(matches!(check.state, CheckState::Ok));
-        assert!(check.detail.contains("GitHub API returned HTTP 403"));
-    }
 }

crates/gl/src/http.rs

@@ -1,19 +1,8 @@
 //! Signed HTTP client for gitlawb API calls (async).
-//!
-//! Writes are signed with RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures. When the node gates a write
-//! behind iCaptcha (HTTP 403 `icaptcha_proof_required`, advertised via the
-//! `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` headers), the client transparently
-//! solves the challenge and retries the same signed request with the
-//! `x-icaptcha-proof` header — see `crates/icaptcha-client`.
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
 use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
-use icaptcha_client::IcaptchaCfg;
-
-/// Max times we'll fetch a fresh proof and retry a 403-iCaptcha response
-/// (absorbs proof expiry / first-seen replay).
-const MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES: usize = 2;
 
 pub struct NodeClient {
     inner: reqwest::Client,
@@ -45,15 +34,6 @@ impl NodeClient {
             .with_context(|| format!("GET {url}"))
     }
 
-    /// GET that signs when a keypair is available; falls back to unsigned for public repos.
-    pub async fn get_authed(&self, path: &str) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        if self.keypair.is_some() {
-            self.get_signed(path).await
-        } else {
-            self.get(path).await
-        }
-    }
-
     /// GET with RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth, for owner-only read endpoints.
     /// Signs over the empty body (same shape the node verifies for signed reads).
     pub async fn get_signed(&self, path: &str) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
@@ -72,519 +52,63 @@ impl NodeClient {
         req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("GET {url}"))
     }
 
-    /// GET that signs when an identity keypair is present and falls back to an
-    /// anonymous GET otherwise — for read-visibility endpoints, where a public
-    /// repo is readable anonymously but a private repo requires the owner/reader
-    /// to be authenticated. Mirrors the conditional signing of post/put/delete.
-    pub async fn get_maybe_signed(&self, path: &str) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
-        let mut req = self.inner.get(&url);
-        if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
-            let signed = sign_request(kp, "GET", path, b"");
-            req = req
-                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
-                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
-                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
-        }
-        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("GET {url}"))
-    }
-
-    /// POST with JSON body + RFC 9421 signing + transparent iCaptcha solve/retry.
+    /// POST with JSON body + RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth.
     pub async fn post(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        self.send_signed("POST", path, body).await
-    }
-
-    /// PUT with RFC 9421 signing + transparent iCaptcha solve/retry.
-    pub async fn put(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        self.send_signed("PUT", path, body).await
-    }
-
-    /// DELETE with RFC 9421 signing + transparent iCaptcha solve/retry.
-    pub async fn delete(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        self.send_signed("DELETE", path, body).await
-    }
-
-    /// Sign + send a write. On a 403 iCaptcha challenge (detected via the
-    /// `x-icaptcha-*` headers) solve it and retry the same signed request with
-    /// the proof header, up to [`MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES`]. Emits an actionable
-    /// hint on a 401 "not an agent" (the old-CLI / unregistered failure mode).
-    async fn send_signed(
-        &self,
-        method: &str,
-        path: &str,
-        body: &[u8],
-    ) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        let mut proof: Option<String> = None;
-        let mut attempts = 0;
-        loop {
-            let resp = self.send_once(method, path, body, proof.as_deref()).await?;
-            let status = resp.status();
-
-            if status == reqwest::StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
-                && resp
-                    .headers()
-                    .get("x-gitlawb-error")
-                    .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-                    == Some("human_detected")
-            {
-                eprintln!(
-                    "note: this node requires signed requests (RFC 9421). If writes keep \
-                     failing, your `gl` may be too old — upgrade it — or you're not registered: \
-                     run `gl register`."
-                );
-            }
-
-            if status == reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN && attempts < MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES {
-                if let Some(cfg) = self.icaptcha_cfg(resp.headers())? {
-                    attempts += 1;
-                    proof = Some(obtain_proof(cfg).await?);
-                    continue;
-                }
-            }
-            return Ok(resp);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Build, sign, and send one request, optionally attaching a proof header.
-    async fn send_once(
-        &self,
-        method: &str,
-        path: &str,
-        body: &[u8],
-        proof: Option<&str>,
-    ) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
         let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
         let mut req = self
             .inner
-            .request(method.parse().expect("valid HTTP method"), &url)
+            .post(&url)
             .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
             .body(body.to_vec());
 
         if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
-            let signed = sign_request(kp, method, path, body);
+            let signed = sign_request(kp, "POST", path, body);
             req = req
                 .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
                 .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
                 .header("Signature", signed.signature);
         }
-        if let Some(p) = proof {
-            req = req.header(icaptcha_client::PROOF_HEADER, p);
-        }
 
-        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("{method} {url}"))
+        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("POST {url}"))
     }
 
-    /// If `headers` describe an iCaptcha 403, build the solve config (binding the
-    /// proof's `sub` to our DID). Returns `None` for a non-iCaptcha 403.
-    fn icaptcha_cfg(&self, headers: &reqwest::header::HeaderMap) -> Result<Option<IcaptchaCfg>> {
-        let url = headers.get("x-icaptcha-url").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
-        let level = headers
-            .get("x-icaptcha-level")
-            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
-        if url.is_none() && level.is_none() {
-            return Ok(None); // not an iCaptcha challenge
+    /// PUT with RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth (idempotent write).
+    pub async fn put(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
+        let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
+        let mut req = self
+            .inner
+            .put(&url)
+            .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            .body(body.to_vec());
+
+        if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
+            let signed = sign_request(kp, "PUT", path, body);
+            req = req
+                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
+                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
+                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
         }
-        let kp = self
-            .keypair
-            .as_ref()
-            .context("iCaptcha challenge requires an identity keypair (run `gl identity new`)")?;
-        Ok(Some(IcaptchaCfg::new(
-            kp.did().to_string(),
-            url.map(str::to_string),
-            level.and_then(|l| l.parse().ok()),
-        )))
-    }
-}
-
-/// Run the (blocking) iCaptcha solve loop off the async runtime.
-async fn obtain_proof(cfg: IcaptchaCfg) -> Result<String> {
-    tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || icaptcha_client::obtain_proof(&cfg, None))
-        .await
-        .context("iCaptcha solver task panicked")?
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
-    use mockito::Server;
-    use std::ffi::OsString;
-    use std::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard};
-
-    /// Serializes the two integration tests that touch the process-global
-    /// `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL` / `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE` env vars so they
-    /// never race.
-    static ICAPTCHA_ENV_LOCK: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());
-
-    fn test_keypair() -> Keypair {
-        Keypair::generate()
-    }
-
-    fn headers_from_pairs(pairs: &[(&str, &str)]) -> reqwest::header::HeaderMap {
-        let mut h = reqwest::header::HeaderMap::new();
-        for (k, v) in pairs {
-            h.insert(
-                k.parse::<reqwest::header::HeaderName>().unwrap(),
-                v.parse::<reqwest::header::HeaderValue>().unwrap(),
-            );
-        }
-        h
-    }
-
-    // ── icaptcha_cfg ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-    #[test]
-    fn icaptcha_cfg_returns_some_when_both_headers_present() {
-        let kp = test_keypair();
-        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", Some(kp.clone()));
-        let headers = headers_from_pairs(&[
-            ("x-icaptcha-url", "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com"),
-            ("x-icaptcha-level", "3"),
-        ]);
-        let cfg = client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(cfg.did, kp.did().to_string());
-        assert_eq!(cfg.level, 3);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn icaptcha_cfg_defaults_level_when_only_url_present() {
-        let kp = test_keypair();
-        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", Some(kp));
-        let headers = headers_from_pairs(&[("x-icaptcha-url", "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com")]);
-        let cfg = client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(cfg.level, icaptcha_client::DEFAULT_LEVEL);
-    }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn icaptcha_cfg_defaults_url_when_only_level_present() {
-        let kp = test_keypair();
-        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", Some(kp));
-        let headers = headers_from_pairs(&[("x-icaptcha-level", "5")]);
-        let cfg = client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(cfg.level, 5);
+        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("PUT {url}"))
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn icaptcha_cfg_returns_none_without_icaptcha_headers() {
-        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", Some(test_keypair()));
-        let headers = reqwest::header::HeaderMap::new();
-        assert!(client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap().is_none());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn icaptcha_cfg_returns_none_with_unrelated_headers() {
-        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", Some(test_keypair()));
-        let headers = headers_from_pairs(&[("content-type", "application/json")]);
-        assert!(client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap().is_none());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn icaptcha_cfg_errors_when_no_keypair() {
-        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", None);
-        let headers = headers_from_pairs(&[("x-icaptcha-level", "3")]);
-        let err = client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.to_string().contains("identity keypair"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn icaptcha_cfg_ignores_unparseable_level() {
-        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", Some(test_keypair()));
-        let headers = headers_from_pairs(&[
-            ("x-icaptcha-url", "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com"),
-            ("x-icaptcha-level", "not-a-number"),
-        ]);
-        let cfg = client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(cfg.level, icaptcha_client::DEFAULT_LEVEL);
-    }
-
-    // ── send_once ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn send_once_attaches_proof_header_when_provided() {
-        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
-        let m = server
-            .mock("POST", "/api/test")
-            .match_header("x-icaptcha-proof", "test.proof.token")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_body("ok")
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), None);
-        let resp = client
-            .send_once("POST", "/api/test", b"{}", Some("test.proof.token"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
-        m.assert();
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn send_once_omits_proof_header_when_not_provided() {
-        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
-        let m = server
-            .mock("POST", "/api/test")
-            .match_header("x-icaptcha-proof", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_body("ok")
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), None);
-        let resp = client
-            .send_once("POST", "/api/test", b"{}", None)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
-        m.assert();
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn send_once_signs_request_when_keypair_present() {
-        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
-        let m = server
-            .mock("POST", "/api/test")
-            .match_header("Signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .match_header("Signature-Input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .match_header("Content-Digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_body("ok")
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), Some(test_keypair()));
-        let resp = client
-            .send_once("POST", "/api/test", b"{}", None)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
-        m.assert();
-    }
+    /// DELETE with RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth.
+    pub async fn delete(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
+        let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
+        let mut req = self
+            .inner
+            .delete(&url)
+            .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            .body(body.to_vec());
 
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn send_once_does_not_sign_when_no_keypair() {
-        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
-        let m = server
-            .mock("POST", "/api/test")
-            .match_header("Signature", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-            .match_header("Signature-Input", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-            .match_header("Content-Digest", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_body("ok")
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), None);
-        let resp = client
-            .send_once("POST", "/api/test", b"{}", None)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
-        m.assert();
-    }
-
-    // ── send_signed ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn send_signed_returns_non_icaptcha_403_without_retry() {
-        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
-        let m = server
-            .mock("POST", "/api/register")
-            .with_status(403)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"error":"forbidden"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), Some(test_keypair()));
-        let resp = client
-            .send_signed("POST", "/api/register", b"{}")
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 403);
-        m.assert();
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn send_signed_returns_first_response_on_success() {
-        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
-        let m = server
-            .mock("POST", "/api/register")
-            .with_status(201)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"status":"created"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), Some(test_keypair()));
-        let resp = client
-            .send_signed("POST", "/api/register", b"{}")
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
-        m.assert();
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn send_signed_handles_405_not_icaptcha() {
-        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
-        let m = server
-            .mock("POST", "/api/register")
-            .with_status(405)
-            .with_body(r#"{"error":"method not allowed"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), Some(test_keypair()));
-        let resp = client
-            .send_signed("POST", "/api/register", b"{}")
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 405);
-        m.assert();
-    }
-
-    // ── send_signed iCaptcha retry (full integration) ────────────────────
-
-    /// Set GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL and GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE so the iCaptcha
-    /// client trusts a local mockito HTTP server, restoring any prior values on
-    /// drop so a test run launched with those variables keeps working.
-    /// Holds [`ICAPTCHA_ENV_LOCK`] for its lifetime so concurrent tests don't
-    /// race on the process-global env vars.
-    struct IcaptchaEnv {
-        _lock: MutexGuard<'static, ()>,
-        prev_url: Option<OsString>,
-        prev_insecure: Option<OsString>,
-    }
-
-    impl IcaptchaEnv {
-        fn new(url: &str) -> Self {
-            let lock = ICAPTCHA_ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap();
-            let prev_url = std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL");
-            let prev_insecure = std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE");
-            std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL", url);
-            std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE", "1");
-            IcaptchaEnv {
-                _lock: lock,
-                prev_url,
-                prev_insecure,
-            }
+        if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
+            let signed = sign_request(kp, "DELETE", path, body);
+            req = req
+                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
+                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
+                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
         }
-    }
-
-    impl Drop for IcaptchaEnv {
-        fn drop(&mut self) {
-            match self.prev_url.take() {
-                Some(v) => std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL", v),
-                None => std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL"),
-            }
-            match self.prev_insecure.take() {
-                Some(v) => std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE", v),
-                None => std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE"),
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Set up a mock iCaptcha server that responds to challenge + answer.
-    /// `hits` sets the expected call count for both endpoints so the test can
-    /// verify the solve loop was entered the correct number of times.
-    struct MockIcaptcha {
-        challenge: mockito::Mock,
-        answer: mockito::Mock,
-        _guard: IcaptchaEnv,
-        url: String,
-    }
-
-    impl MockIcaptcha {
-        async fn new(server: &mut mockito::ServerGuard, hits: usize) -> Self {
-            let url = server.url();
-            let guard = IcaptchaEnv::new(&url);
-            let challenge = server
-                .mock("POST", "/v1/challenge")
-                .with_status(200)
-                .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-                .with_body(
-                    r#"{"challengeId":"c1","type":"arithmetic","difficulty":1,"prompt":"What is 1 + 1?","token":"tk1"}"#,
-                )
-                .expect(hits)
-                .create_async()
-                .await;
-            let answer = server
-                .mock("POST", "/v1/answer")
-                .with_status(200)
-                .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-                .with_body(r#"{"status":"passed","proof":"mock.proof"}"#)
-                .expect(hits)
-                .create_async()
-                .await;
-            Self {
-                challenge,
-                answer,
-                _guard: guard,
-                url,
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn send_signed_solves_icaptcha_and_retries_to_success() {
-        let mut node = Server::new_async().await;
-        let mut icaptcha = Server::new_async().await;
-        let ic = MockIcaptcha::new(&mut icaptcha, 1).await;
-
-        let n1 = node
-            .mock("POST", "/api/register")
-            .with_status(403)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_header("x-icaptcha-url", &ic.url)
-            .with_header("x-icaptcha-level", "3")
-            .with_body(r#"{"error":"icaptcha_proof_required"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let n2 = node
-            .mock("POST", "/api/register")
-            .match_header("x-icaptcha-proof", "mock.proof")
-            .with_status(201)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"status":"created"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let client = NodeClient::new(node.url(), Some(test_keypair()));
-        let resp = client
-            .send_signed("POST", "/api/register", b"{}")
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
-        n1.assert();
-        n2.assert();
-        ic.challenge.assert();
-        ic.answer.assert();
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn send_signed_returns_403_after_icaptcha_retries_exhausted() {
-        let mut node = Server::new_async().await;
-        let mut icaptcha = Server::new_async().await;
-        // MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES = 2, so with every call returning 403 with
-        // iCaptcha headers the solve loop runs twice (2 challenge + 2 answer).
-        let ic = MockIcaptcha::new(&mut icaptcha, 2).await;
-
-        // The original + 2 retries = 3 node calls before the loop gives up.
-        let n = node
-            .mock("POST", "/api/register")
-            .with_status(403)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_header("x-icaptcha-url", &ic.url)
-            .with_header("x-icaptcha-level", "3")
-            .with_body(r#"{"error":"icaptcha_proof_required"}"#)
-            .expect(3)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
 
-        let client = NodeClient::new(node.url(), Some(test_keypair()));
-        let resp = client
-            .send_signed("POST", "/api/register", b"{}")
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 403);
-        n.assert();
-        ic.challenge.assert();
-        ic.answer.assert();
+        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("DELETE {url}"))
     }
 }

crates/gl/src/init.rs

@@ -38,23 +38,13 @@ pub async fn run(args: InitArgs) -> Result<()> {
     let git_dir = cwd.join(".git");
     if !git_dir.exists() {
         println!("Initializing git repository...");
-        // -b main: the push flow targets `main`; without it a fresh repo uses
-        // the user's init.defaultBranch (often `master`). Older git (<2.28)
-        // lacks the flag, so fall back to a plain init.
         let status = std::process::Command::new("git")
-            .args(["init", "-b", "main"])
+            .args(["init"])
             .current_dir(&cwd)
             .status()
             .context("failed to run git init")?;
         if !status.success() {
-            let status = std::process::Command::new("git")
-                .args(["init"])
-                .current_dir(&cwd)
-                .status()
-                .context("failed to run git init")?;
-            if !status.success() {
-                anyhow::bail!("git init failed");
-            }
+            anyhow::bail!("git init failed");
         }
     } else {
         println!("Git repository detected.");
@@ -175,47 +165,9 @@ pub async fn run(args: InitArgs) -> Result<()> {
         }
     }
 
-    // The hint must match the repo's actual state: with no commits yet, a bare
-    // `git push` fails with "src refspec ... does not match any" — exactly the
-    // trap a zero-to-push command must not set.
-    let has_commits = std::process::Command::new("git")
-        .args(["rev-parse", "--verify", "HEAD"])
-        .current_dir(&cwd)
-        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
-        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
-        .status()
-        .map(|s| s.success())
-        .unwrap_or(false);
-    // symbolic-ref succeeds on a branch (including an unborn one) and fails
-    // on a detached HEAD — where guessing "main" could push the wrong ref.
-    let branch = std::process::Command::new("git")
-        .args(["symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD"])
-        .current_dir(&cwd)
-        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
-        .output()
-        .ok()
-        .filter(|o| o.status.success())
-        .and_then(|o| String::from_utf8(o.stdout).ok())
-        .map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
-        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty());
-
     println!();
-    match (branch, has_commits) {
-        (Some(branch), true) => {
-            println!("Ready! Push with:");
-            println!("  git push gitlawb {branch}");
-        }
-        (Some(branch), false) => {
-            println!("Ready! Nothing is committed yet — commit, then push:");
-            println!("  git add -A && git commit -m \"initial commit\"");
-            println!("  git push gitlawb {branch}");
-        }
-        (None, _) => {
-            println!("Ready! HEAD is detached — create or switch to a branch, then push:");
-            println!("  git switch -c main");
-            println!("  git push gitlawb main");
-        }
-    }
+    println!("Ready! Push with:");
+    println!("  git push gitlawb main");
 
     Ok(())
 }

crates/gl/src/ipfs_cmd.rs

@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@
 //! Communicates with the gitlawb node to list pinned CIDs and retrieve git
 //! objects by their content-addressed CID.
 
-use std::path::PathBuf;
-
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -23,9 +21,6 @@ pub enum IpfsCmd {
     List {
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
-        /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
-        #[arg(long)]
-        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Retrieve and display a git object from the node by its CIDv1
     Get {
@@ -38,24 +33,19 @@ pub enum IpfsCmd {
 
 pub async fn run(args: IpfsArgs) -> Result<()> {
     match args.cmd {
-        IpfsCmd::List { node, dir } => cmd_list(node, dir).await,
+        IpfsCmd::List { node } => cmd_list(node).await,
         IpfsCmd::Get { cid, node } => cmd_get(cid, node).await,
     }
 }
 
-async fn cmd_list(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
-    // #134 gates /api/v1/ipfs/pins behind auth: sign the request with the
-    // caller's identity. On no identity, propagate load_keypair_from_dir's
-    // error (it already names `gl identity new`) rather than a bare 401.
-    let keypair = crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref())?;
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, Some(keypair));
-    let resp = client.get_signed("/api/v1/ipfs/pins").await?;
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        let status = resp.status();
-        let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-        anyhow::bail!("node returned {status} for pins listing: {body}");
-    }
-    let resp: Value = resp.json().await.context("failed to parse pins response")?;
+async fn cmd_list(node: String) -> Result<()> {
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    let resp: Value = client
+        .get("/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+        .await?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("failed to parse pins response")?;
 
     let pins = resp["pins"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
     let count = resp["count"].as_u64().unwrap_or(pins.len() as u64);
@@ -118,121 +108,3 @@ async fn cmd_get(cid: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
 
     Ok(())
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    /// Seed a keypair into a temp dir the way `load_keypair_from_dir` expects,
-    /// then return the dir handle (keeps it alive for the test's duration).
-    fn seed_keystore() -> tempfile::TempDir {
-        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        std::fs::write(
-            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
-            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        dir
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_cmd_list_signs_request_and_renders_pins() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let keystore = seed_keystore();
-
-        // Happy path: signed GET to /api/v1/ipfs/pins carrying the RFC 9421
-        // signature headers, node returns a populated pins body.
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(
-                r#"{"pins":[{"cid":"bafyone","sha256_hex":"abc123","pinned_at":"2026-07-02T12:00:00.123456Z"}],"count":1}"#,
-            )
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        cmd_list(server.url(), Some(keystore.path().to_path_buf()))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_cmd_list_empty_pins() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let keystore = seed_keystore();
-
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"pins":[],"count":0}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        cmd_list(server.url(), Some(keystore.path().to_path_buf()))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_cmd_list_no_identity_errors_without_request() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        // Empty keystore dir: no identity.pem present.
-        let empty = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-
-        // The endpoint must never be hit when there is no identity.
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .expect(0)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let err = cmd_list(server.url(), Some(empty.path().to_path_buf()))
-            .await
-            .expect_err("no identity should be an error");
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string().contains("gl identity new")
-                || err.to_string().contains("no identity found"),
-            "error should name `gl identity new`, got: {err}"
-        );
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_cmd_list_non_success_status_is_error_not_empty() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let keystore = seed_keystore();
-
-        // A signed request the node rejects (401) must surface as an error,
-        // not be silently parsed into an empty pin list.
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(401)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"error":"unauthorized"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let err = cmd_list(server.url(), Some(keystore.path().to_path_buf()))
-            .await
-            .expect_err("non-2xx status should be an error");
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string().contains("401"),
-            "error should mention the status, got: {err}"
-        );
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-}

crates/gl/src/issue.rs

@@ -10,10 +10,6 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 
-fn signed_client(node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> NodeClient {
-    NodeClient::new(node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir).ok())
-}
-
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct IssueArgs {
     #[command(subcommand)]
@@ -219,10 +215,10 @@ async fn cmd_create(
 async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
     let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
 
-    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
     let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/issues");
     let resp: Value = client
-        .get_authed(&path)
+        .get(&path)
         .await?
         .json()
         .await
@@ -258,10 +254,10 @@ async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()
 async fn cmd_show(repo: String, id: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
     let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
 
-    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
     let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/issues/{id}");
     let resp = client
-        .get_authed(&path)
+        .get(&path)
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
     let status = resp.status();
@@ -351,10 +347,10 @@ async fn cmd_issue_comments(
     dir: Option<PathBuf>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
     let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
-    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
 
     let resp: Value = client
-        .get_authed(&format!(
+        .get(&format!(
             "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/issues/{id}/comments"
         ))
         .await?

crates/gl/src/mcp.rs

@@ -932,33 +932,13 @@ async fn call_tool(
 
         "webhook_list" => {
             let repo = args["repo"].as_str().context("missing 'repo'")?;
-            // Owner-gated route: an explicit `owner` arg wins, otherwise default to
-            // the signing keypair's short DID (NOT the node DID). The request is
-            // signed by this keypair, so the path owner must match it or the node
-            // returns 403/404.
-            let owner = if let Some(o) = args.get("owner").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
-                o.to_string()
-            } else {
-                let kp = keypair
-                    .as_ref()
-                    .context("no identity found — run `gl identity new` first")?;
-                let did = kp.did().to_string();
-                did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string()
-            };
-            // Owner-gated route: must be signed (get_signed), not a plain get().
-            let resp = client
-                .get_signed(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks"))
+            let owner = resolve_owner(&args, &client).await?;
+            let resp: Value = client
+                .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks"))
+                .await?
+                .json()
                 .await?;
-            // Check the HTTP status before deserializing: a 401/403/404 JSON error
-            // body (missing identity, wrong owner, private/deleted repo) must fail
-            // the tool call, not be returned as a successful result.
-            let status = resp.status();
-            let body: Value = resp.json().await?;
-            if !status.is_success() {
-                let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
-                anyhow::bail!("webhook_list failed ({status}): {msg}");
-            }
-            Ok(serde_json::to_string_pretty(&body)?)
+            Ok(serde_json::to_string_pretty(&resp)?)
         }
 
         "webhook_delete" => {
@@ -990,14 +970,14 @@ async fn call_tool(
                 }
                 u
             };
-            let resp: Value = client.get_authed(&url).await?.json().await?;
+            let resp: Value = client.get(&url).await?.json().await?;
             Ok(serde_json::to_string_pretty(&resp)?)
         }
 
         "bounty_show" => {
             let id = args["id"].as_str().context("missing 'id'")?;
             let resp: Value = client
-                .get_authed(&format!("/api/v1/bounties/{id}"))
+                .get(&format!("/api/v1/bounties/{id}"))
                 .await?
                 .json()
                 .await?;
@@ -1185,7 +1165,7 @@ async fn call_tool(
                 (owner, repo.to_string())
             };
             let resp: Value = client
-                .get_authed(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/issues"))
+                .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/issues"))
                 .await?
                 .json()
                 .await?;
@@ -1845,187 +1825,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(parsed["body"], "looks good");
     }
 
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_webhook_list_via_mcp_signs_the_request() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        std::fs::write(
-            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
-            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        // /hooks is owner-gated, so the MCP webhook_list tool must send a SIGNED
-        // request (get_signed). Requiring the header catches a regression to get().
-        // Passing `owner` in args makes resolve_owner skip the node-root lookup.
-        let _m = server
-            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/hooks$".to_string()))
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"webhooks":[],"count":0}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let result = call_tool(
-            "webhook_list",
-            json!({"owner": "alice", "repo": "myrepo"}),
-            &server.url(),
-            Some(dir.path()),
-        )
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-        assert!(result.contains("webhooks"), "got: {result}");
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_webhook_list_default_owner_is_keypair_not_node_did() {
-        // When `owner` is omitted, the owner segment must come from the signing
-        // keypair's short DID, NOT the node root DID. The "/" mock returns a
-        // different DID; the /hooks mock only matches the keypair's short DID,
-        // so a regression to the node DID would leave the request unmatched.
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        std::fs::write(
-            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
-            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let _root = server
-            .mock("GET", "/")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"did":"did:key:z6MkNodeRootDid"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let did = kp.did().to_string();
-        let short = did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string();
-
-        let _m = server
-            .mock(
-                "GET",
-                mockito::Matcher::Regex(format!(r"/api/v1/repos/{short}/myrepo/hooks$")),
-            )
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"webhooks":[],"count":0}"#)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let result = call_tool(
-            "webhook_list",
-            json!({"repo": "myrepo"}),
-            &server.url(),
-            Some(dir.path()),
-        )
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-        assert!(result.contains("webhooks"), "got: {result}");
-        _m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_webhook_list_explicit_owner_overrides_keypair() {
-        // An explicit `owner` arg must win over the keypair default and the node
-        // DID. The path must use the supplied owner; "/" must not even be hit.
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        std::fs::write(
-            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
-            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let _m = server
-            .mock(
-                "GET",
-                mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/api/v1/repos/someoneelse/myrepo/hooks$".to_string()),
-            )
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"webhooks":[],"count":0}"#)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let result = call_tool(
-            "webhook_list",
-            json!({"repo": "myrepo", "owner": "someoneelse"}),
-            &server.url(),
-            Some(dir.path()),
-        )
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-        assert!(result.contains("webhooks"), "got: {result}");
-        _m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_webhook_list_non_success_status_errors() {
-        // A 403 (or any non-2xx) JSON error body for a missing identity, wrong
-        // owner, or private/deleted repo must fail the tool call, NOT be returned
-        // as a successful result. Mirrors the `gl webhook list` status check.
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        std::fs::write(
-            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
-            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let _m = server
-            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/hooks$".to_string()))
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(403)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"message":"only the repo owner can perform this action"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let err = call_tool(
-            "webhook_list",
-            json!({"owner": "alice", "repo": "myrepo"}),
-            &server.url(),
-            Some(dir.path()),
-        )
-        .await
-        .expect_err("non-2xx must error, not return the error body as success");
-        let msg = err.to_string();
-        assert!(msg.contains("webhook_list failed (403"), "got: {msg}");
-        assert!(
-            msg.contains("only the repo owner"),
-            "must surface the node message, got: {msg}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_webhook_list_without_keypair_errors() {
-        // No identity loaded and no explicit owner → the tool must error rather
-        // than fall back to the node DID and issue an unsigned, mis-scoped GET.
-        let server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap(); // empty: no identity.pem
-
-        let err = call_tool(
-            "webhook_list",
-            json!({"repo": "myrepo"}),
-            &server.url(),
-            Some(dir.path()),
-        )
-        .await
-        .expect_err("must error without an identity");
-        assert!(err.to_string().contains("no identity found"), "got: {err}");
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn test_tool_count_is_42() {
         let tools = tool_definitions();