fix(node): trim stored assignee on every task gate; align SECURITY.md task-read wording

# Conflicts:
#	crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/tasks.rs
#	crates/gitlawb-node/src/db/mod.rs
#	crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/mutation.rs
#	crates/gitlawb-node/src/server.rs
#	crates/gitlawb-node/src/state.rs

.cargo/audit.toml

@@ -8,24 +8,9 @@
 # The audit job stays hard-fail: only the advisories explicitly listed below are
 # suppressed, so any NEW advisory still breaks CI. Each entry below has no
 # available upstream fix; everything fixable is fixed in Cargo.lock instead.
-#
-# Tracking: the hickory ignores are reachable accepted risk. A scheduled re-check
-# (.github/workflows/audit-schedule.yml) runs without these ignores and fails if
-# the lockfile moves off the pinned vulnerable versions while the ignores remain.
 
 [advisories]
 ignore = [
-    # hickory-proto 0.25.2 (pulled by libp2p-dns 0.44 -> hickory-resolver 0.25).
-    # REACHABLE: the node wraps its QUIC transport in the system DNS resolver
-    # (crates/gitlawb-node/src/p2p/mod.rs:238), so a malicious DNS response can
-    # trigger these DoS paths. No fix is available: the latest libp2p-dns on
-    # crates.io is 0.44 and pins hickory 0.25; the fix requires hickory >=0.26.1.
-    # REMOVE both once libp2p-dns ships a release using hickory 0.26 (verified
-    # 2026-06-21: cargo update -p hickory-proto locks 0 packages; still 0.25.2).
-    # Tracking: https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/76
-    "RUSTSEC-2026-0118", # hickory NSEC3 closest-encloser unbounded loop
-    "RUSTSEC-2026-0119", # hickory O(n^2) name-compression CPU exhaustion
-
     # rsa 0.9.10 (Marvin timing sidechannel). Present in Cargo.lock because sqlx
     # resolves sqlx-mysql unconditionally, and sqlx-mysql depends on rsa. cargo
     # audit scans the lockfile, so it flags rsa even though it is NOT linked into
@@ -35,4 +20,23 @@ ignore = [
     # ever built with the `mysql` feature, or any other consumer of rsa enters
     # the build, at which point it becomes a real reachable advisory.
     "RUSTSEC-2023-0071", # rsa Marvin attack (no fix; not linked in our build)
+
+    # crypto-bigint 0.5.5 (secret-dependent branches in operations meant
+    # to be constant-time). REACHABLE accepted risk, on two paths:
+    # - alloy-signer -> elliptic-curve 0.13 -> crypto-bigint 0.5: the k256
+    #   PrivateKeySigner that signs transactions in `gl name`
+    #   (crates/gl/src/name.rs) and the node operator
+    #   (crates/gitlawb-node/src/operator.rs).
+    # - aws-sigv4 (`sigv4a` feature, crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml) ->
+    #   crypto-bigint 0.5 (directly and via p256 0.13): SigV4a key
+    #   derivation, used only for requests to endpoints that require SigV4a
+    #   (e.g. S3 Multi-Region Access Points).
+    # Exploiting it needs local timing observation of those signing operations.
+    # The fix is crypto-bigint >=0.7.6, and no compatible dependent uses it:
+    # every alloy-signer release (through 2.5.0) requires elliptic-curve ^0.13,
+    # and aws-sigv4 1.6.4 is the first release on crypto-bigint 0.7 (1.5.x -
+    # 1.6.3 still require ^0.5.4), but it needs Rust 1.94.1, above our 1.91 MSRV
+    # (verified 2026-11-03). REMOVE only when Cargo.lock has no crypto-bigint
+    # below 0.7.6: `grep -A1 'name = "crypto-bigint"' Cargo.lock`.
+    "RUSTSEC-2026-0387", # crypto-bigint timing variability (no compatible fix)
 ]

.env.example

@@ -1,18 +1,50 @@
-# gitlawb node — environment variables
+# Twigpine node — environment variables
 # Copy to .env and fill in your values.
 # All variables are optional unless marked REQUIRED.
 
 # ── Node identity ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Path to the node's Ed25519 keypair PEM file. Must be absolute: its parent is
-# also the delegation store that `gl ucan import` writes and `git-remote-gitlawb`
-# reads, and the two do not share a working directory, so a relative path sends
-# them to different places. `~/...` is expanded; a bare `~` is not accepted.
+# Path to the node's Ed25519 keypair PEM file. Must name a key file, not a
+# directory: a trailing slash, a final `.` or `..`, and `..` traversal are
+# refused so the path cannot retarget a parent. A `~/` value must stay under
+# home after expansion. Bare `identity.pem` is still legal.
 # Generate with: gl identity new
 GITLAWB_KEY=/data/keys/identity.pem
 
+# Path to the node's persistent libp2p identity key file. Must include a
+# directory, because the node will not keep its p2p identity key in the working
+# directory. A value that cannot name a securable key file (a bare filename,
+# `..` traversal, a trailing slash, the filesystem root, or a `~/` path that
+# escapes home) is refused before the node binds, so the process exits.
+# Anything wrong with the storage itself (a symlinked or non-directory parent,
+# an unsafe cwd or ancestor, an unreadable or malformed key) leaves p2p off
+# while HTTP keeps serving, logged at error as p2p_identity_key_load_failed and
+# counted by the gitlawb_p2p_identity_key_load_failed metric. /health still
+# reports healthy in that state, so alert on the event or the metric. Fixing
+# the storage and restarting restores the same PeerId.
+# On Unix it is created 0600 inside a 0700 directory. A key directory that
+# grants access beyond its owner is tightened to 0700 on start; one closed too
+# far is refused with a chmod 700 remedy rather than widened. On other
+# platforms no permissions are enforced.
+# If the node logs that it tightened a key directory that was GROUP OR WORLD
+# WRITABLE, treat the key that was sitting there as possibly exposed: delete
+# it so a fresh identity is generated on the next start. An ordinary 0755
+# directory is tightened too, but others could not read a 0600 key or replace
+# its directory entry, so do not rotate for that case. A directory that was
+# merely closed too far is refused, not tightened, and no key in it was ever
+# exposed.
+# Keep it on a persistent volume so the PeerId survives redeploys.
+# Default: ~/.gitlawb/p2p.key
+#GITLAWB_P2P_KEY=/data/keys/p2p.key
+
 # Publicly reachable URL of this node (used in peer announcements)
 GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL=https://your-node.example.com
 
+# Base URL for the web view of repos on this node (used by `gl` to print a
+# working View: link after repo creation). Omit for nodes with no web front-end.
+# Distinct from GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL: that is API reachability for peers;
+# this is browser reachability for humans.
+# GITLAWB_WEB_URL=https://gitlawb.com
+
 # ── Server ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 GITLAWB_HOST=0.0.0.0
 GITLAWB_PORT=7545
@@ -27,11 +59,26 @@ DATABASE_URL=postgresql://gitlawb:changeme@localhost:5432/gitlawb
 # ── Database pool & startup resilience ────────────────────────────────────
 # Maximum connections in the PostgreSQL pool. A cap, not a floor —
 # connections open lazily. Size against the DB server's max_connections,
-# remembering admin tooling opens its own pool. Each concurrent write pins one
-# connection for its whole duration (the connection-affine advisory lock), so the
-# node REJECTS at boot any value below GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_GIT_PUSHES + 8
-# headroom — keep this comfortably above that (default 48 for pushes 32).
+# remembering admin tooling opens its own pool.
 GITLAWB_DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS=48
+# Maximum connections in the DEDICATED advisory-lock pool, separate from the
+# pool above. Every in-flight repo write pins one connection here for its whole
+# duration, so this is a hard ceiling on simultaneous writes node-wide: size it
+# to expected peak concurrent writers, not small. Keeping it separate is what
+# stops a push burst from starving ordinary request handlers. Budget
+# (GITLAWB_DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS + this) per node against the server's
+# max_connections, times node count, plus admin tooling.
+GITLAWB_DB_LOCK_POOL_MAX_CONNECTIONS=40
+# Upper bound, in seconds, on any object-storage transfer that runs while a
+# per-repo write lock is HELD (the archive download inside acquire_write and the
+# upload inside release). These were free before the lock's connection was
+# pinned to the guard; now an unbounded stall holds a lock-pool slot, and enough
+# stalls deny every write on the node. The bound applies PER SPAN and there are
+# two (the acquire-side refresh, which covers the existence check and download
+# together, and the release-side upload), so worst-case slot occupancy is about
+# twice this value plus the git work between them. Read it together with the pool
+# size above and with GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS.
+GITLAWB_LOCK_HELD_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT_SECS=300
 # Seconds a request waits for a pool connection before failing with 503.
 GITLAWB_DB_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS=5
 # Upper bound on each startup connect+migrate attempt, in seconds. Keep it
@@ -91,8 +138,12 @@ GITLAWB_P2P_PORT=7546
 # GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS=true for isolated dev/test networks.
 GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS=
 GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS=false
-# Require signatures on peer announce/sync write routes. Keep false during
-# rolling upgrades so existing live nodes can still communicate.
+# Require a peer write to prove its DID on every transport: RFC 9421 signatures
+# on the announce/sync routes, and an Ed25519 payload signature on gossip
+# ref-update events. Keep false during rolling upgrades so existing live nodes
+# can still communicate. Upgrade every gossip-publishing peer to a build that
+# signs events before setting this true, or their updates are dropped on
+# arrival with no error visible on their side.
 GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false
 
 # Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on git-receive-pack.
@@ -101,10 +152,9 @@ GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false
 # push to every repository, private ones included. On by default.
 #
 # Set to false only for a rolling upgrade whose pushers are not yet the repo
-# owner. A holder of an owner-rooted, time-bounded git/push UCAN naming that
-# repository can push while this is on — see docs/RUN-A-NODE.md for issuing and
-# importing one. A CI key with no such delegation counts as a non-owner and
-# cannot push.
+# owner. Note that delegated and CI keys count as non-owners: UCAN git/push is
+# verified but not yet honored for authorization, so they cannot push while this
+# is on. See docs/RUN-A-NODE.md.
 GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=true
 
 # Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs.
@@ -112,8 +162,8 @@ GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=true
 GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP=
 
 # ── Access control ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Reserved for private-read mode. Public/private repo read enforcement is not
-# wired in the current live release; do not rely on this for private repositories.
+# Reserved and currently inert. Repo reads are gated per repository by
+# is_public and path-scoped visibility rules; this flag changes nothing.
 GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ=true
 
 # Maximum git smart-HTTP pack request size, in bytes.
@@ -276,6 +326,19 @@ GITLAWB_IPFS_RESOLVE_BUDGET_SECS=10
 # from the concurrency caps above). 0 disables. Default 600.
 GITLAWB_IPFS_RATE_LIMIT=600
 
+# Per-client-IP rate limit for the anonymous task read routes
+# (GET /api/v1/tasks, GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}), in requests per hour.
+# Both are publicly reachable (optional_signature). GET /api/v1/tasks runs
+# collect_visible_tasks and returns a visibility-filtered page;
+# GET /api/v1/tasks/{id} runs get_visible_task and returns an opaque 404 when
+# the task is hidden or missing. These reads can require task, repository,
+# and visibility-rule queries even when no task is returned, so the brake
+# bounds the cost of anonymous probes. Keyed on the resolved client IP via
+# GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY. 0 disables. Default: 1200 (a list page
+# followed by per-task reads is a normal client pattern, so this sits above
+# the /ipfs budget). The GraphQL/WS task-read brake shares this budget.
+GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT=1200
+
 # ── Creation rate limiting (repo/agent/issue/PR flood brake) ──────────────
 # Max creation requests (POST /api/v1/repos, /api/register, fork, issues,
 # pulls) per client IP per hour, in addition to the per-DID limit. The per-DID

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: Bug report
-description: Report a defect in a Gitlawb crate or node behavior
+description: Report a defect in a Twigpine crate or node behavior
 labels: ["bug"]
 body:
   - type: markdown

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 blank_issues_enabled: false
 contact_links:
   - name: Security vulnerability
-    url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/blob/main/SECURITY.md
+    url: https://github.com/Twigpine/node/blob/main/SECURITY.md
     about: Please report security issues privately per our security policy, not as a public issue.
   - name: Questions & discussion
-    url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/discussions
+    url: https://github.com/Twigpine/node/discussions
     about: For usage questions and open-ended discussion.

.github/pull_request_template.md

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 <!--
-  Thanks for contributing to Gitlawb. Keep PRs focused on one change.
+  Thanks for contributing to Twigpine. Keep PRs focused on one change.
   Protocol-level changes (identity, signatures, wire format) should start
   as an issue before code — see CONTRIBUTING.md.
 -->

.github/workflows/pr-checks.yml

@@ -68,6 +68,22 @@ jobs:
       - name: Test release tag resolver
         run: scripts/test-resolve-release-tag.sh
 
+  triage-detector:
+    name: triage detector matrix
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 5
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      # pr-triage.yml runs on pull_request_target and never checks out PR
+      # code, so its inline detector can only be exercised here, where the
+      # proposed workflow body IS the checked-out one.
+      - name: Test inline-test detector
+        run: node scripts/test-pr-triage-detect.mjs
+
   test:
     name: test (${{ matrix.toolchain }})
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest

.github/workflows/pr-triage.yml

@@ -76,9 +76,221 @@ jobs:
             // line after horizontal whitespace, covering bare, cfg(test), namespaced,
             // optional leading ::, and raw-identifier (r#test) forms. No head-file fetch
             // or lexer: needs-tests is advisory, not a merge gate.
-            const addsInlineTest = files.some(f =>
-              f.filename.endsWith(".rs") && f.patch &&
-              /^\+[ \t]*#\[[ \t]*(?:cfg[ \t]*\([ \t]*test[ \t]*\)|(?:::[ \t]*)?(?:[\w-]+[ \t]*::[ \t]*)*(?:r#)?test\b)/m.test(f.patch));
+            //
+            // The final path component may also carry `test` as an underscore-delimited
+            // segment, so third-party harnesses land without enumerating them one by one
+            // (#[test_case(1)], #[wasm_bindgen_test]). It is deliberately a segment and
+            // not a substring: a substring would also match #[contest] / #[latest], and a
+            // false positive here SUPPRESSES needs-tests rather than adding it. This
+            // heuristic has to fail loud, because a wrongly labeled PR gets corrected by
+            // the author while a wrongly cleared one is invisible. That trade costs the
+            // no-underscore harness names (#[rstest]), which stay unmatched on purpose.
+            //
+            // The segment classes are [A-Za-z0-9]+ rather than \w+ on purpose, so that `_`
+            // is only ever the literal delimiter. \w+ contains `_`, which makes the repeat
+            // ambiguous and backtracks exponentially: on this workflow's pull_request_target
+            // trigger f.patch is fork-controlled, so `#[test` followed by a long `_a` run is
+            // a permissionless stall of the triage job.
+            // Rust allows whitespace, line breaks, and comments between the
+            // attribute path and ] or (. A flat regex cannot decide that
+            // boundary: `//` runs to end of line, and block comments NEST, which
+            // is beyond regular languages — every enumeration of comment
+            // spellings so far has either dropped a legal separator (regressing
+            // real tests into needs-tests) or let unrelated patch records
+            // complete each other (clearing needs-tests from a testless PR, the
+            // invisible direction). So the closer is found by a token-aware
+            // scan instead: it consumes horizontal whitespace, `//`-to-newline,
+            // and depth-counted `/* */` runs, and accepts only when the first
+            // real token after the attribute path is `]` or `(`.
+            //
+            // Association is positional: the scan starts on the attribute's own
+            // added line and may continue ONLY through the immediately following
+            // added lines (a context line, hunk header, or removal breaks the
+            // chain). Unrelated `]`/`(` lines elsewhere in the patch can never
+            // complete a path they do not adjoin. The continuation is bounded;
+            // past the bound the scan gives up and reports NO inline test, which
+            // fails toward the loud label rather than the silent clearance.
+            //
+            // The detector body is fenced by the TRIAGE_DETECTOR markers so
+            // scripts/test-pr-triage-detect.mjs can extract and run it against
+            // the committed case matrix. Keep the fenced block self-contained.
+            // TRIAGE_DETECTOR_BEGIN
+            const TEST_ATTR_PATH =
+              "(?:cfg[ \\t]*\\([ \\t]*test[ \\t]*\\)|(?:::[ \\t]*)?(?:[\\w-]+[ \\t]*::[ \\t]*)*(?:r#)?(?:[A-Za-z0-9]+_)*test(?:_[A-Za-z0-9]+)*)";
+            // Anchored to the start of one added line; group 1 is whatever
+            // follows the path on that line, handed to the separator scan.
+            const TEST_ATTR_LINE = new RegExp(
+              "^[ \\t]*#\\[[ \\t]*" + TEST_ATTR_PATH + "([\\s\\S]*)$"
+            );
+            // An attribute split across more added lines than this is not a
+            // spelling anyone writes; refusing to scan further keeps the walk
+            // linear in the patch and fails toward the loud label.
+            const MAX_ATTR_CONTINUATION_LINES = 16;
+            // segs[0] is the remainder of the attribute's own line; each later
+            // entry is the text of one immediately following added line. True
+            // only when the first non-separator token across them is ] or (.
+            // Single forward pass, no backtracking: fork-controlled input.
+            function attrCloserFollows(segs) {
+              let depth = 0; // open block-comment nesting carried across lines
+              for (const seg of segs) {
+                let i = 0;
+                while (i < seg.length) {
+                  if (depth > 0) {
+                    if (seg.startsWith("/*", i)) { depth += 1; i += 2; }
+                    else if (seg.startsWith("*/", i)) { depth -= 1; i += 2; }
+                    else { i += 1; }
+                    continue;
+                  }
+                  const c = seg[i];
+                  if (c === " " || c === "\t") { i += 1; continue; }
+                  if (seg.startsWith("//", i)) break; // comment to end of line
+                  if (seg.startsWith("/*", i)) { depth = 1; i += 2; continue; }
+                  return c === "]" || c === "(";
+                }
+                // Line exhausted inside separators; the newline is itself a
+                // separator, so continue on the next added line.
+              }
+              return false; // out of adjoined lines (or bound hit): stay loud
+            }
+            // Before the candidate scan, a pre-pass walks added patch lines
+            // tracking Rust lexical state: raw strings (r#*", br#*", cr#*"),
+            // block comments (/* */ with nesting), regular strings ("...",
+            // which can span newlines), and line comments (//). An added line
+            // that starts inside any of these is skipped as a candidate,
+            // because a #[test_case] appearing there is lexical non-code, not
+            // a real test attribute. State is only tracked across consecutive
+            // added lines and reset at any break (context line, removal,
+            // hunk header): context lines carry a partial view of the file,
+            // so a " or r#" or /* there might be inside a string that opened
+            // before the hunk's visible window, and treating it as an opener
+            // would mark every later added line as non-code (a false negative
+            // on a real #[test]). The tradeoff is that a non-code region
+            // opened by a context line is invisible: an added #[test] inside
+            // an existing raw string or block comment is scanned as code and
+            // may match (a false positive, silent direction). This is accepted
+            // because (1) the old detector had the same behavior, (2) the
+            // pattern is rare, and (3) needs-tests is advisory, not a merge
+            // gate. Scanning context lines to close this gap would re-introduce
+            // the false negative, which affects the far more common case of a
+            // context line carrying a stray " from a string that opened before
+            // the visible window. Single forward pass, O(n) in patch length.
+            function patchAddsInlineTest(patch) {
+              const lines = patch.split("\n");
+              const nonCodeStart = new Set();
+              let rawHashes = -1; // -1 = not in raw string; >=0 = # count
+              let blockDepth = 0;
+              let inString = false;
+              for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+                const line = lines[i];
+                if (!line) continue;
+                const prefix = line[0];
+                // Only scan added lines. Context and removal lines carry
+                // a partial view of the file: a " or r#" or /* on a context
+                // line might be inside a string that opened before the
+                // hunk's visible window, and treating it as an opener would
+                // mark every later added line as non-code (a false negative
+                // on a real #[test]). So lexical state is only tracked across
+                // consecutive added lines and reset at any break. A non-code
+                // region opened by a context line is invisible; the candidate
+                // is still scanned, which fails toward the loud label.
+                if (prefix !== "+") {
+                  rawHashes = -1; blockDepth = 0; inString = false;
+                  continue;
+                }
+                const text = line.slice(1);
+                if (rawHashes >= 0 || blockDepth > 0 || inString)
+                  nonCodeStart.add(i);
+                let j = 0;
+                while (j < text.length) {
+                  if (rawHashes >= 0) {
+                    if (text[j] === '"') {
+                      let h = 1;
+                      while (h <= rawHashes && text[j + h] === "#") h++;
+                      if (h > rawHashes) { rawHashes = -1; j += h; continue; }
+                    }
+                    j += 1; continue;
+                  }
+                  if (blockDepth > 0) {
+                    if (text.startsWith("/*", j)) { blockDepth += 1; j += 2; }
+                    else if (text.startsWith("*/", j)) { blockDepth -= 1; j += 2; }
+                    else { j += 1; }
+                    continue;
+                  }
+                  if (inString) {
+                    if (text[j] === "\\") { j += 2; continue; }
+                    if (text[j] === '"') { inString = false; j += 1; continue; }
+                    j += 1; continue;
+                  }
+                  // Recognize Rust char and byte-char literals ('X', '\X',
+                  // '\u{...}', b'X') so their contents never open string or
+                  // comment state. A char literal has a closing ' within a
+                  // bounded distance; a lifetime or label ('a, 'static,
+                  // 'label:) does not, so it falls through as a regular char.
+                  // This is not a skip-to-next-' rule: the lookahead is 2-4
+                  // chars, or bounded to 20 for \u escapes (at most 6 hex
+                  // digits), never unbounded.
+                  if (text[j] === "'") {
+                    let k = j + 1;
+                    if (text[k] === "\\") {
+                      k += 1;
+                      if (text[k] === "u" && text[k + 1] === "{") {
+                        const uBound = k + 20;
+                        while (k < uBound && text[k] && text[k] !== "}") k++;
+                        if (text[k] === "}") k++;
+                      } else {
+                        k += 1;
+                      }
+                    } else {
+                      k += 1;
+                    }
+                    if (text[k] === "'") { j = k + 1; continue; }
+                    // lifetime or label: just skip the apostrophe
+                  }
+                  if (text[j] === '"') { inString = true; j += 1; continue; }
+                  if (text.startsWith("//", j)) break;
+                  if (text.startsWith("/*", j)) { blockDepth = 1; j += 2; continue; }
+                  const prev = j > 0 ? text[j - 1] : "";
+                  const isIdent = /[A-Za-z0-9_]/.test(prev);
+                  if (!isIdent && text[j] === "r") {
+                    let k = j + 1, h = 0;
+                    while (text[k + h] === "#") h++;
+                    if (text[k + h] === '"') {
+                      rawHashes = h; j = k + h + 1; continue;
+                    }
+                  }
+                  if (!isIdent && (text[j] === "b" || text[j] === "c") && text[j + 1] === "r") {
+                    let k = j + 2, h = 0;
+                    while (text[k + h] === "#") h++;
+                    if (text[k + h] === '"') {
+                      rawHashes = h; j = k + h + 1; continue;
+                    }
+                  }
+                  j += 1;
+                }
+              }
+              for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+                if (lines[i][0] !== "+") continue;
+                if (nonCodeStart.has(i)) continue;
+                const m = TEST_ATTR_LINE.exec(lines[i].slice(1));
+                if (m === null) continue;
+                const segs = [m[1]];
+                for (
+                  let j = i + 1;
+                  j < lines.length &&
+                  lines[j][0] === "+" &&
+                  segs.length <= MAX_ATTR_CONTINUATION_LINES;
+                  j++
+                ) {
+                  segs.push(lines[j].slice(1));
+                }
+                if (attrCloserFollows(segs)) return true;
+              }
+              return false;
+            }
+            // TRIAGE_DETECTOR_END
+            const addsInlineTest = files.some(
+              f => f.filename.endsWith(".rs") && !!f.patch && patchAddsInlineTest(f.patch)
+            );
             const touchedTests =
               names.some(n => n.includes("/tests/") || n.endsWith("_test.rs")) || addsInlineTest;
             if (changedRust && !touchedTests) want.add("needs-tests");
@@ -124,7 +336,7 @@ jobs:
               "",
               lines,
               "",
-              "See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md). Update the PR and these notes will clear automatically.",
+              "See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/Twigpine/node/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md). Update the PR and these notes will clear automatically.",
             ].join("\n");
 
             await github.rest.issues.createComment({ owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, body: comment });

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -20,7 +20,15 @@ on:
         type: string
 
 concurrency:
-  group: release-${{ github.ref }}
+  # Not keyed on the ref: two runs racing `imagetools create` on the same
+  # moving tags could interleave, so runs of this workflow serialize outright.
+  # GitHub keeps at most one running and one pending run per group; a newer
+  # queued run replaces the pending one, and cancel-in-progress: false
+  # protects only the run already executing. So a backfill dispatched while a
+  # release is running, followed by a push to main, is replaced silently: the
+  # remedy is to re-dispatch it once the running release completes, which the
+  # push-only gate on the moving-tag step makes safe in any ordering.
+  group: release
   cancel-in-progress: false
 
 # Least privilege by default; every job opts in to exactly what it needs.
@@ -31,12 +39,13 @@ jobs:
     # Skipped on manual dispatch: a backfill must never create or advance a
     # release PR as a side effect (npm-publish tolerates the skipped need via
     # !cancelled(), and every other job gates on release_created == 'true').
-    if: ${{ github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' && github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' }}
+    if: ${{ github.repository == 'Twigpine/node' && github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' }}
     name: Release Please
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     permissions:
       contents: write
       pull-requests: write
+    environment: release
     outputs:
       release_created: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
       tag_name: ${{ steps.release.outputs.tag_name }}
@@ -64,7 +73,7 @@ jobs:
   sync-release-lock:
     name: Sync Cargo.lock on the release PR
     needs: release-please
-    if: ${{ !cancelled() && github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' && github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' }}
+    if: ${{ !cancelled() && github.repository == 'Twigpine/node' && github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     permissions:
       contents: write
@@ -78,6 +87,7 @@ jobs:
       # dispatch the release PR's head carries no check runs and the --locked
       # gate never validates it.
       actions: write
+    environment: release
     steps:
       # Prefer the fresh `pr` output when this run just created/updated the
       # release PR; otherwise fall back to querying for an open release-please
@@ -215,6 +225,7 @@ jobs:
     permissions:
       contents: read
       packages: write
+    environment: release
     steps:
       - name: Check out workflow scripts
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
@@ -226,6 +237,7 @@ jobs:
         env:
           DISPATCH_TAG: ${{ inputs.docker_backfill_tag }}
           RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           scripts/resolve-release-tag.sh "${DISPATCH_TAG:-$RELEASE_TAG}"
@@ -237,7 +249,9 @@ jobs:
       - name: Checkout release tag
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
-          ref: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
+          # Pin the commit the resolver verified; a tag ref re-resolved here
+          # could have been moved between resolve and checkout.
+          ref: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag_commit || format('refs/tags/{0}', steps.rel.outputs.tag) }}
           persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Set up Docker Buildx
@@ -312,6 +326,7 @@ jobs:
     permissions:
       contents: read
       packages: write
+    environment: release
     steps:
       - name: Check out workflow scripts
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
@@ -323,9 +338,14 @@ jobs:
         env:
           DISPATCH_TAG: ${{ inputs.docker_backfill_tag }}
           RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           scripts/resolve-release-tag.sh "${DISPATCH_TAG:-$RELEASE_TAG}"
+          # ghcr requires a lowercase repository path, and unlike metadata-action,
+          # buildx's `--output name=` does no lowercasing, so a mixed-case owner
+          # makes the digest push fail with "invalid reference format".
+          echo "image=ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
 
       - name: Download digests
         uses: actions/download-artifact@d3f86a106a0bac45b974a628896c90dbdf5c8093 # v4.3.0
@@ -345,24 +365,80 @@ jobs:
           password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
 
       - name: Create and push multi-arch manifest
+        id: manifest
         env:
           VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
+          IMAGE: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.image }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
-          # ghcr requires a lowercase repository path.
-          IMAGE="ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}"
-          MAJOR_MINOR="${VERSION%.*}"
+          # The docker matrix pushes one digest per arch leg; anything else is
+          # a broken set, not a smaller multi-arch image.
+          count="$(find /tmp/digests -maxdepth 1 -type f | wc -l)"
+          if [ "$count" -ne 2 ]; then
+            echo "::error::expected 2 arch digests in /tmp/digests, found $count"
+            exit 1
+          fi
           digests=""
           for f in /tmp/digests/*; do
-            digests="$digests $IMAGE@sha256:$(basename "$f")"
+            d="$(basename "$f")"
+            case "$d" in
+              *[!0-9a-f]*)
+                echo "::error::digest filename is not lowercase sha256 hex: $d"
+                exit 1
+                ;;
+            esac
+            if [ "${#d}" -ne 64 ]; then
+              echo "::error::digest is not 64 hex chars: $d"
+              exit 1
+            fi
+            digests="$digests $IMAGE@sha256:$d"
           done
+          # The immutable tag always publishes. The moving tags are applied by
+          # the gated step below, which never runs on workflow_dispatch.
           # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-          docker buildx imagetools create \
-            -t "$IMAGE:$VERSION" \
-            -t "$IMAGE:$MAJOR_MINOR" \
-            -t "$IMAGE:latest" \
-            $digests
+          docker buildx imagetools create -t "$IMAGE:$VERSION" $digests
           docker buildx imagetools inspect "$IMAGE:$VERSION"
+          echo "digests=${digests# }" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
+      - name: Move floating tags
+        if: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
+        env:
+          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
+          IMAGE: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.image }}
+          DIGESTS: ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.digests }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          MAJOR_MINOR="${VERSION%.*}"
+          # :latest and :X.Y track the newest release. Only a push to main
+          # carries a release-please-cut version, and release-please versions
+          # are monotonic, so on this path the tags only ever advance. A
+          # workflow_dispatch backfill republishes an existing tag and must
+          # never move a pointer, so this step skips on dispatch. After a
+          # backfill that is genuinely newest in its minor line, advance :X.Y
+          # by hand: docker buildx imagetools create -t "$IMAGE:X.Y" <digests>.
+          # The event gate alone does not bound a stale run: re-running an
+          # older push run replays its stored needs outputs under the
+          # original event and ref, and would move the pointers backward to
+          # that run's version. Floor against live state instead: this run's
+          # release already exists by now, so VERSION must be the newest
+          # published release or the run is stale and the tags stay put. The
+          # releases list is ordered by creation, not semver, so read every
+          # page and take the semver maximum, not the first page's.
+          tags="$(gh api --paginate "repos/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/releases?per_page=100" \
+            -q '.[] | select(.draft == false) | .tag_name')" || {
+            echo "::error::could not list releases to bound the moving tags"
+            exit 1
+          }
+          floor="$(printf '%s\n' "$tags" \
+            | { grep -E '^v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' || true; } \
+            | sed 's/^v//' | sort -V | tail -n 1)"
+          if [ -n "$floor" ] && [ "$floor" != "$VERSION" ]; then
+            echo "::error::release v$floor is newer than this run's v$VERSION; refusing to move the moving tags backward (stale re-run?)"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+          docker buildx imagetools create -t "$IMAGE:latest" -t "$IMAGE:$MAJOR_MINOR" $DIGESTS
 
       - name: Release summary
         env:
@@ -386,6 +462,7 @@ jobs:
     continue-on-error: ${{ startsWith(matrix.target, 'x86_64-pc-windows') }}
     permissions:
       contents: write
+    environment: release
     strategy:
       fail-fast: false
       matrix:
@@ -405,10 +482,27 @@ jobs:
           - target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
             os: windows-latest
     steps:
+      - name: Check out workflow scripts
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Resolve release tag
+        id: rel
+        env:
+          RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        shell: bash # matrix includes windows-latest, where run: defaults to pwsh
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          scripts/resolve-release-tag.sh "$RELEASE_TAG"
+
       - name: Checkout release tag
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
-          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          # Pin the commit the resolver verified; a tag ref re-resolved here
+          # could have been moved between resolve and checkout.
+          ref: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag_commit || format('refs/tags/{0}', steps.rel.outputs.tag) }}
           persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Set up Rust toolchain
@@ -454,7 +548,7 @@ jobs:
         shell: bash
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
-          VERSION="${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}"
+          VERSION="${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}"
           BIN_DIR="target/${{ matrix.target }}/release"
           EXE=""
           case "${{ matrix.target }}" in *windows*) EXE=".exe" ;; esac
@@ -474,7 +568,7 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           TARGET="${{ matrix.target }}"
-          NAME="gitlawb-node-${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}-${TARGET}"
+          NAME="gitlawb-node-${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}-${TARGET}"
           BIN_DIR="target/${TARGET}/release"
           EXE=""
           case "$TARGET" in *windows*) EXE=".exe" ;; esac
@@ -515,7 +609,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Attach to release
         uses: softprops/action-gh-release@72f2c25fcb47643c292f7107632f7a47c1df5cd8 # v2.3.2
         with:
-          tag_name: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          tag_name: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
           files: |
             dist/*.tar.gz
             dist/*.zip
@@ -528,7 +622,9 @@ jobs:
     # (release-binaries is skipped on dispatch, hence !cancelled()). Publishing
     # auth is npm Trusted Publishing (GitHub OIDC) — no NPM_TOKEN. Each
     # @gitlawb package must have this repo + workflow (release.yml) configured
-    # as its trusted publisher on npmjs.com, or publish fails loudly here —
+    # as its trusted publisher on npmjs.com, scoped to the release environment
+    # so a dispatched copy of this file on another ref cannot mint a token, or
+    # publish fails loudly here —
     # deliberately loud: the silent secret-guard skip is how 0.4.x–0.6.0
     # never reached npm.
     if: >-
@@ -540,6 +636,7 @@ jobs:
     permissions:
       contents: read
       id-token: write # npm trusted publishing (OIDC) + provenance
+    environment: release
     steps:
       - name: Check out workflow scripts
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
@@ -551,6 +648,7 @@ jobs:
         env:
           DISPATCH_TAG: ${{ inputs.npm_backfill_tag }}
           RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           scripts/resolve-release-tag.sh "${DISPATCH_TAG:-$RELEASE_TAG}"
@@ -558,7 +656,9 @@ jobs:
       - name: Checkout release tag
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
-          ref: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
+          # Pin the commit the resolver verified; a tag ref re-resolved here
+          # could have been moved between resolve and checkout.
+          ref: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag_commit || format('refs/tags/{0}', steps.rel.outputs.tag) }}
           persist-credentials: false
 
       # npm >= 11.5.1 performs the OIDC token exchange automatically when the
@@ -571,14 +671,23 @@ jobs:
       - name: Ensure npm supports trusted publishing
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
-          npm install -g npm@^11.5.1
-          npm --version
+          npm install -g npm@11.19.1
+          # Assert the pin took, so an accidental unpin or a drift off 11.19.1
+          # fails loudly here instead of silently running a different npm on
+          # the OIDC path.
+          installed="$(npm --version)"
+          echo "npm installed: $installed"
+          if [ "$installed" != "11.19.1" ]; then
+            echo "::error::npm is not the pinned 11.19.1 (got: $installed)"
+            exit 1
+          fi
 
       - name: Lay in release binaries
         env:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
           VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
           TAG: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
+          ASSETS: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.assets }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           # npm platform package -> Rust target triple (unix only; Windows is not
@@ -595,8 +704,18 @@ jobs:
             target="${entry#*:}"
             archive="gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-${target}.tar.gz"
             echo "==> $pkg <- $archive"
-            gh release download "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
-              --pattern "$archive" --dir _dl --clobber
+            # Download by the asset id the resolver captured and uploader-
+            # checked, not by name: release assets are mutable, and an id can
+            # only ever point at the exact blob captured at resolve time.
+            # The map keys are base64-encoded asset names.
+            want="$(printf '%s' "$archive" | base64 -w0)"
+            asset_id="$(printf '%s\n' "$ASSETS" | awk -v n="$want" '$1 == n {print $2; exit}')"
+            if [ -z "$asset_id" ]; then
+              echo "::error::release $TAG has no asset $archive captured at resolve time"
+              exit 1
+            fi
+            gh api "repos/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/releases/assets/$asset_id" \
+              -H 'Accept: application/octet-stream' > "_dl/$archive"
             tar -xzf "_dl/$archive" -C _dl
             src="_dl/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-${target}"
             cp "$src/gl" "npm/packages/$pkg/gl"
@@ -635,14 +754,39 @@ jobs:
           # Platform packages first, then the wrapper (so its optionalDependencies resolve).
           # Skip versions already on the registry so a rerun after a partial publish
           # is idempotent instead of erroring on the first existing package.
+          # npm publish moves the latest dist-tag to whatever it publishes, so a
+          # backfilled older version would hand :latest to stale code. Decide
+          # the dist-tag per package from that package's own registry latest:
+          # a partial publish can leave the platform packages ahead of the
+          # wrapper. E404 means the package has never been published, so this
+          # release gets latest; any other lookup failure must fail closed
+          # rather than guess at the dist-tag and risk moving latest backward.
+          # stderr goes to a file so a warning on a successful lookup cannot
+          # leak into registry_latest; it is read only when the lookup fails.
+          npm_err="$(mktemp)"
+          trap 'rm -f -- "$npm_err"' EXIT
           for pkg in gl-darwin-arm64 gl-darwin-x64 gl-linux-arm64 gl-linux-x64 gl; do
             name="@gitlawb/$pkg"
             if npm view "$name@$VERSION" version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
               echo "==> $name@$VERSION already published, skipping"
               continue
             fi
-            echo "==> npm publish $name@$VERSION"
-            npm publish "npm/packages/$pkg" --provenance --access public
+            registry_latest="$(npm view "$name" dist-tags.latest 2>"$npm_err")" || {
+              if ! grep -q E404 "$npm_err"; then
+                cat "$npm_err" >&2
+                echo "::error::npm dist-tags lookup failed for $name; not guessing the dist-tag"
+                exit 1
+              fi
+              registry_latest=""
+            }
+            dist_tag="latest"
+            if [ -n "$registry_latest" ] && \
+               [ "$VERSION" != "$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$registry_latest" "$VERSION" | sort -V | tail -1)" ]; then
+              dist_tag="backfill"
+              echo "::notice::$VERSION is older than $name@$registry_latest; publishing under dist-tag backfill"
+            fi
+            echo "==> npm publish $name@$VERSION (dist-tag $dist_tag)"
+            npm publish "npm/packages/$pkg" --provenance --access public --tag "$dist_tag"
           done
 
   homebrew-bump:
@@ -652,6 +796,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     permissions:
       contents: read # GITHUB_TOKEN downloads release assets; the tap push uses HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT
+    environment: release
     steps:
       - name: Guard on secret
         id: guard
@@ -665,11 +810,27 @@ jobs:
             echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
           fi
 
+      - name: Check out workflow scripts
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Resolve release tag
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        id: rel
+        env:
+          RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          scripts/resolve-release-tag.sh "$RELEASE_TAG"
+
       - name: Checkout tap repo
         if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
-          repository: Gitlawb/homebrew-tap
+          repository: Twigpine/homebrew-tap
           token: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
           path: tap
           persist-credentials: false
@@ -678,15 +839,32 @@ jobs:
         if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
         env:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
+          TAG: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
+          ASSETS: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.assets }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           base="https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${TAG}"
           mkdir -p _sums
-          gh release download "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
-            --pattern '*.tar.gz.sha256' --dir _sums --clobber
-          sha() { awk '{print $1}' "_sums/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-$1.tar.gz.sha256"; }
+          # Hash the tarballs themselves, fetched by the asset id the resolver
+          # captured and uploader-checked. The *.sha256 sidecars are mutable
+          # release assets too; trusting them would trust the same surface.
+          sha() {
+            archive="gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-$1.tar.gz"
+            want="$(printf '%s' "$archive" | base64 -w0)"
+            asset_id="$(printf '%s\n' "$ASSETS" | awk -v n="$want" '$1 == n {print $2; exit}')"
+            if [ -z "$asset_id" ]; then
+              echo "::error::release $TAG has no asset $archive captured at resolve time" >&2
+              exit 1
+            fi
+            # errexit is off inside the $(...) this runs under, so a failed
+            # download must exit the function itself instead of hashing a
+            # truncated file.
+            gh api "repos/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/releases/assets/$asset_id" \
+              -H 'Accept: application/octet-stream' > "_sums/$archive" \
+              || exit 1
+            sha256sum "_sums/$archive" | awk '{print $1}'
+          }
           SHA_MAC_ARM="$(sha aarch64-apple-darwin)"
           SHA_MAC_X64="$(sha x86_64-apple-darwin)"
           SHA_LNX_ARM="$(sha aarch64-unknown-linux-musl)"
@@ -695,8 +873,8 @@ jobs:
           mkdir -p tap/Formula
           cat > tap/Formula/gl.rb <<EOF
           class Gl < Formula
-            desc "Gitlawb CLI — decentralized git for AI agents and developers"
-            homepage "https://gitlawb.com"
+            desc "Twigpine CLI — decentralized git for AI agents and developers"
+            homepage "https://twigpine.com"
             version "${VERSION}"
             license "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
 
@@ -747,7 +925,7 @@ jobs:
         working-directory: tap
         env:
           HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
@@ -760,7 +938,7 @@ jobs:
           fi
           git commit -m "gl ${VERSION}"
           # Credentials are not persisted in .git/config; supply the token only for the push.
-          git push "https://x-access-token:${HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT}@github.com/Gitlawb/homebrew-tap.git" HEAD:main
+          git push "https://x-access-token:${HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT}@github.com/Twigpine/homebrew-tap.git" HEAD:main
 
   web-sync:
     name: Sync web (install scripts + version)
@@ -769,6 +947,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     permissions:
       contents: read # GITHUB_TOKEN checks out node; the web PR uses WEB_SYNC_PAT
+    environment: release
     steps:
       - name: Guard on secret
         id: guard
@@ -782,11 +961,29 @@ jobs:
             echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
           fi
 
+      - name: Check out workflow scripts
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Resolve release tag
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        id: rel
+        env:
+          RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          scripts/resolve-release-tag.sh "$RELEASE_TAG"
+
       - name: Checkout node (release tag)
         if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
-          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          # Pin the commit the resolver verified; a tag ref re-resolved here
+          # could have been moved between resolve and checkout.
+          ref: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag_commit || format('refs/tags/{0}', steps.rel.outputs.tag) }}
           path: node
           persist-credentials: false
 
@@ -794,7 +991,7 @@ jobs:
         if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
-          repository: Gitlawb/web
+          repository: Twigpine/web
           token: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
           path: web
           persist-credentials: false
@@ -806,8 +1003,8 @@ jobs:
         if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
         env:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
+          TAG: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           gh release view "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --json assets \
@@ -825,8 +1022,8 @@ jobs:
         if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
         env:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
+          TAG: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           # Canonical install scripts (source of truth lives in the node repo).
@@ -837,7 +1034,7 @@ jobs:
           # One-time, idempotent drift fixes: drop orphaned binaries, fix stale link.
           rm -rf web/public/bin
           if [ -f web/public/skill.md ]; then
-            sed -i 's#github.com/gitlawb/releases#github.com/Gitlawb/node/releases#g' web/public/skill.md
+            sed -i 's#github.com/gitlawb/releases#github.com/Twigpine/node/releases#g' web/public/skill.md
           fi
 
           cd web
@@ -851,16 +1048,16 @@ jobs:
           git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
           git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
           git checkout -b "$branch"
-          git commit -m "chore: sync gitlawb ${TAG} (install scripts + version)"
+          git commit -m "chore: sync Twigpine ${TAG} (install scripts + version)"
           # Credentials are not persisted in .git/config; supply the token only for the push.
-          git push --force "https://x-access-token:${GH_TOKEN}@github.com/Gitlawb/web.git" "HEAD:$branch"
-          gh pr create --repo Gitlawb/web --head "$branch" \
-            --title "Sync gitlawb ${TAG}" \
-            --body "Automated sync from Gitlawb/node ${TAG}: install.sh, install.ps1, public/version.json, and one-time drift fixes (removed orphaned public/bin, fixed skill.md releases link). Review and merge to deploy via Vercel." \
+          git push --force "https://x-access-token:${GH_TOKEN}@github.com/Twigpine/web.git" "HEAD:$branch"
+          gh pr create --repo Twigpine/web --head "$branch" \
+            --title "Sync Twigpine ${TAG}" \
+            --body "Automated sync from Twigpine/node ${TAG}: install.sh, install.ps1, public/version.json, and one-time drift fixes (removed orphaned public/bin, fixed skill.md releases link). Review and merge to deploy via Vercel." \
             || {
               # Only swallow the "PR already exists" case; surface auth/API failures
               # (a failed gh pr list must not be misread as "PR exists").
-              pr_count="$(gh pr list --repo Gitlawb/web --head "$branch" --state open --json number --jq 'length')" || exit 1
+              pr_count="$(gh pr list --repo Twigpine/web --head "$branch" --state open --json number --jq 'length')" || exit 1
               if [ "$pr_count" != "0" ]; then
                 echo "PR for $branch already exists; branch was updated."
               else

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-# Contributing to gitlawb
+# Contributing to Twigpine
 
-Thanks for your interest in contributing. gitlawb is an open protocol — agents and humans welcome.
+Thanks for your interest in contributing. Twigpine is an open protocol — agents and humans welcome.
 
 ## Quick start for contributors
 
 ```sh
 # Clone and build
-git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/node
+git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/node
 cd node
 
 # Build everything
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ docs/                   Operator guides
 scripts/                Build helpers
 ```
 
-Smart contracts live in a separate repo: [github.com/Gitlawb/contracts](https://github.com/Gitlawb/contracts).
+Smart contracts live in a separate repo: [github.com/Twigpine/contracts](https://github.com/Twigpine/contracts).
 
 ## Ways to contribute
 

Cargo.toml

@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ members = [
 edition = "2021"
 rust-version = "1.91"
 license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-authors = ["gitlawb contributors"]
-repository = "https://github.com/gitlawb/node"
+authors = ["Twigpine contributors"]
+repository = "https://github.com/Twigpine/node"
 
 [workspace.dependencies]
 # async
@@ -54,8 +54,10 @@ uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4"] }
 # http client
 reqwest = { version = "0.12", features = ["blocking", "json", "multipart", "rustls-tls"], default-features = false }
 # URL parsing (what reqwest::Url re-exports, so the shared redirect predicate can
-# take a parsed URL without pulling reqwest into gitlawb-core)
+# take a parsed URL without pulling reqwest into gitlawb-core; also used for the
+# absolute-browser-url validation on GITLAWB_WEB_URL in the node and CLI)
 url = "2"
+percent-encoding = "2"
 # HMAC
 hmac = "0.12"
 

Dockerfile

@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ WORKDIR /data
 
 ENV GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR=/data/repos \
     GITLAWB_KEY=/data/keys/identity.pem \
+    GITLAWB_P2P_KEY=/data/keys/p2p.key \
     GITLAWB_HOST=0.0.0.0 \
     GITLAWB_PORT=7545 \
     GITLAWB_P2P_PORT=7546

LICENSE-APACHE

@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@
 
    END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
 
-   Copyright 2026 gitlawb contributors
+   Copyright 2026 Twigpine contributors
 
    Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
    you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.

LICENSE-MIT

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 MIT License
 
-Copyright (c) 2026 gitlawb contributors
+Copyright (c) 2026 Twigpine contributors
 
 Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
 of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal

README.md

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-# Gitlawb Node
+# Twigpine Node
 
 **Decentralized git infrastructure for developers, AI agents, and app delivery.**
 
-Gitlawb Node is the open-source node software behind the Gitlawb network. It lets anyone run a self-hosted node, publish repositories under a DID, sign writes with Ed25519 HTTP signatures, replicate git activity across peers, and move toward a resilient app-delivery network where code and build assets can be served closer to users.
+Twigpine Node is the open-source node software behind the Twigpine network. It lets anyone run a self-hosted node, publish repositories under a DID, sign writes with Ed25519 HTTP signatures, replicate git activity across peers, and move toward a resilient app-delivery network where code and build assets can be served closer to users.
 
-Gitlawb is not trying to be only "another git host." The long-term direction is:
+Twigpine is not trying to be only "another git host." The long-term direction is:
 
 ```txt
 Decentralized GitHub
@@ -24,17 +24,17 @@ This is a Rust workspace with six crates:
 | Crate | Purpose |
 |---|---|
 | `gitlawb-node` | The node daemon: Axum HTTP server, git smart-HTTP, Postgres metadata, libp2p gossip, optional S3/Tigris/IPFS/Arweave/Base PoS hooks. |
-| `gl` | The Gitlawb CLI for identity, repos, issues, PRs, bounties, tasks, peers, node status, MCP, and setup flows. |
-| `git-remote-gitlawb` | Git remote helper for `gitlawb://` URLs, so normal `git clone`, `git fetch`, and `git push` can talk to Gitlawb nodes. |
+| `gl` | The Twigpine CLI for identity, repos, issues, PRs, bounties, tasks, peers, node status, MCP, and setup flows. |
+| `git-remote-gitlawb` | Git remote helper for `gitlawb://` URLs, so normal `git clone`, `git fetch`, and `git push` can talk to Twigpine nodes. |
 | `gitlawb-core` | Shared primitives: Ed25519 identities, `did:key`, CIDs, RFC 9421 HTTP signatures, certificates, and UCAN tokens. |
 | `gitlawb-attest` | Pluggable external provenance attestations for ref-update certificates. |
 | `icaptcha-client` | Client for the iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence flow used to protect spam-prone writes. |
 
 ---
 
-## Why Gitlawb Nodes?
+## Why Twigpine Nodes?
 
-Most git hosting today depends on a small number of centralized platforms. Gitlawb Nodes are designed for a different model:
+Most git hosting today depends on a small number of centralized platforms. Twigpine Nodes are designed for a different model:
 
 - **Own your identity**: every user, agent, and node is an Ed25519 keypair represented as `did:key:z6Mk...`.
 - **Signed writes by default**: write requests use RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures instead of passwords.
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Most git hosting today depends on a small number of centralized platforms. Gitla
 
 ## Current status
 
-Gitlawb Node is live early infrastructure. It is useful today, but some security and reliability features are intentionally staged for compatibility with existing nodes.
+Twigpine Node is live early infrastructure. It is useful today, but some security and reliability features are intentionally staged for compatibility with existing nodes.
 
 Good today:
 
@@ -66,12 +66,12 @@ Good today:
 
 Known limitations:
 
-- Repository write authorization is one switch: `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH`, on by default since #330. With it off — rolling upgrades only — a valid HTTP Signature identifies a pusher but does not authorize one, so every signed caller may push everywhere.
-- UCAN capabilities are consulted on the push path only. There, the chain's root issuer is anchored to the repository owner, so an owner-rooted, time-bounded delegation that names the repository grants scoped collaborator access for pushing to it, for the `git/push`, `*`, or `repo/admin` actions. A `*` *resource* is refused: a delegation must name the repository it applies to, so it cannot grow to cover repos created later. Push-only cuts the other way too: a delegation grants no read access, so on a private repository the delegate must also be a reader (`gl visibility set`) — the two gates a push crosses are described in [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md). The rest is unchanged: there is no revocation path, `nb` constraints are refused rather than interpreted, and no other route — reads, pull requests, issues, agents — consults capabilities at all.
+- Repository write authorization is secure by default: `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` defaults to `true`, so a valid HTTP Signature identifies a pusher and the node additionally requires that pusher to be the repository owner. Set `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false` only for the duration of a rolling upgrade whose pushers are not yet the repo owner. Authentication is not authorization on its own (anyone can mint a `did:key` and sign), so owner enforcement is the only thing that prevents every signed caller from pushing to every repository, private ones included.
+- UCAN proof chains are validated when supplied, but UCAN capabilities are not consulted by write authorization and the root issuer is not independently trust-anchored. UCANs therefore do not yet grant scoped collaborator access.
 - Agent lifecycle revocation is not enforced by HTTP Signature authorization; do not rely on removing or revoking an agent record to block a compromised signer.
-- Read visibility is not a blanket data-classification boundary: task, IPFS-pin, and Arweave-anchor listings are not repository-gated; withheld path names can be visible to a root reader; and later visibility changes cannot retract content already announced or externally anchored.
+- Task list/get reads (REST and GraphQL) are repository/task-gated and omit `ucan_token`. Read visibility is not a blanket data-classification boundary: IPFS-pin and Arweave-anchor listings are not repository-gated; withheld path names can be visible to a root reader; and later visibility changes cannot retract content already announced or externally anchored.
 - Peer writes are signed by upgraded nodes, but strict signed-peer enforcement is opt-in during rolling upgrades.
-- Current GraphQL mutations require an authenticated signer, but there is no mutation-specific guardrail that prevents a future mutation from omitting that check.
+- GraphQL mutations require a signed identity (a verified signer bound to the acting DID), are limited to the agent-task queue, and are covered by a CI completeness fence that requires signer acquisition and actor binding on every registered mutation; repo writes are not exposed over GraphQL and remain REST-only.
 - Pull-request review comments do not yet have threaded line-level anchors, and merges do not enforce approval requirements.
 
 See:
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ See:
 The fastest path is Docker Compose. It starts a node and Postgres.
 
 ```bash
-git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/node.git
+git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/node.git
 cd node
 cp .env.example .env
 docker compose up -d
@@ -132,10 +132,10 @@ npm install -g @gitlawb/gl
 brew install gitlawb/tap/gl
 
 # curl (macOS / Linux)
-curl -fsSL https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh
+curl -fsSL https://twigpine.com/install.sh | sh
 
 # PowerShell (Windows)
-irm https://gitlawb.com/install.ps1 | iex
+irm https://twigpine.com/install.ps1 | iex
 ```
 
 Or build from source:
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ gl register --node http://localhost:7545
 Create a repo:
 
 ```bash
-gl repo create my-repo --description "My first Gitlawb repo" --node http://localhost:7545
+gl repo create my-repo --description "My first Twigpine repo" --node http://localhost:7545
 ```
 
 Use the git remote helper:
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ For public-network use, make sure `GITLAWB_NODE` points to the node you want. Th
 
 ### Full lifecycle against an iCaptcha-enforcing node
 
-Public nodes (e.g. `node.gitlawb.com`) require two things on writes:
+Public nodes (e.g. `node.twigpine.com`) require two things on writes:
 
 1. **RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures**: every write is signed by your identity key. `gl`
    and the `git-remote-gitlawb` helper do this automatically. An old/unsigned CLI
@@ -205,8 +205,8 @@ Public nodes (e.g. `node.gitlawb.com`) require two things on writes:
 
 ```bash
 gl identity new                                   # create did:key identity
-gl register      --node https://node.gitlawb.com  # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
-gl repo create memlawb --node https://node.gitlawb.com   # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
+gl register      --node https://node.twigpine.com  # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
+gl repo create memlawb --node https://node.twigpine.com   # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
 git push  origin2 main                            # origin2 = gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb (signed)
 git clone gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb            # public read, no proof needed
 gl doctor                                         # preflight: identity, node, version, iCaptcha
@@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ metadata        local disk / optional S3
 | DID | A user, agent, or node identity derived from an Ed25519 public key. |
 | HTTP Signature | RFC 9421 signature proving control of the DID key for write requests. |
 | Ref certificate | Signed record of a ref update. Useful for audit and replication. |
-| UCAN | Capability token. An owner delegates `git/push` on a repo to another DID; the node honors it when the proof chain roots at that owner. See [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md). |
+| Ref certificate versioning | The wire format is versioned; new certificates are currently issued as v1. `gl cert show <repo> <id> --verify` requires `--expect-node <did>`, and the queried node's self-reported DID is **not** accepted as a trust anchor. v2 is reserved for a future payload shape that carries the version inside the signed bytes; this client refuses to verify v2+ rather than guessing. |
+| UCAN | Delegation token for future capability-based workflows. |
 | Peer announce | Node-to-node HTTP announcement of DID + public URL. |
 | Gossipsub | libp2p topic for ref-update events. |
 | Smart HTTP | Standard git protocol over HTTP for clone/fetch/push. |
@@ -369,6 +370,12 @@ GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=true
 
 `POST /api/v1/sync/trigger` is not part of the staged rollout: it always requires a signature in both config modes and returns 401 without one, because each call drives an O(peers) outbound fan-out.
 
+The flag is not HTTP-only. It also gates inbound gossip ref-update events on the libp2p mesh, which carry an Ed25519 payload signature rather than RFC 9421 headers because there are no HTTP headers to sign. Set to `true`, an unsigned gossip event is dropped. Set to `false`, an unsigned event is accepted with a warning during the rolling-upgrade window, and the write budget it consumes is charged to the forwarding peer rather than to the DID it claims, since an unsigned event's claimed DID is asserted and not proven. A present-but-invalid signature is refused in both modes; that is forgery, not an un-upgraded peer.
+
+Because the flag now spans both transports, the rollout order matters in one direction: **upgrade every gossip-publishing peer to a build that signs events before you set this to `true`.** Enabling it while an old publisher is still live drops that publisher's ref-updates on arrival, and the publisher sees no error, because gossip has no response to carry one. Upgrading the HTTP peers alone is not sufficient.
+
+There is a second precondition on gossip ingest that the flag does not control. A publisher's `node_did` must already exist in the receiving node's peers table, or the event is dropped as an unknown peer DID. This holds in both modes, signed and unsigned alike: a valid signature proves key possession, not membership. Rows reach that table over HTTP, either from `GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS` when this node contacts a bootstrap peer and records the DID it reports, or from a prior `POST /api/v1/peers/announce`. So a peer that only ever joined the libp2p mesh, with no HTTP announce and no bootstrap contact in either direction, will have its ref-updates dropped even with a good signature and the flag off. If gossip is silently not landing from a peer you can see on the mesh, check that its DID is in `GET /api/v1/peers` on the receiving side first.
+
 ---
 
 ## Configuration
@@ -391,9 +398,10 @@ Important node settings:
 | `GITLAWB_P2P_PORT` | libp2p QUIC/UDP port. Use `0` to disable. |
 | `GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS` | Comma-separated HTTP peer URLs. |
 | `GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP` | Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs. |
+| `GITLAWB_P2P_KEY` | Path to the node's persistent libp2p identity key file, which fixes the PeerId across restarts. Must name a key file inside a directory, such as `/data/keys/p2p.key` or `./keys/p2p.key`. Two kinds of problem are handled differently. A value that cannot name a securable key file at all (a bare filename, `..` traversal, a trailing `/`, the filesystem root, or a `~/` path that escapes home) is refused before the node binds, so the process exits. Anything wrong with the storage itself (a symlinked or non-directory parent, an unsafe ancestor or working directory, an unreadable or malformed key) leaves p2p off while HTTP keeps serving; the node logs it at error level as `p2p_identity_key_load_failed` and sets the `gitlawb_p2p_identity_key_load_failed` metric to 1. Note that `/health` still reports healthy in that state, so alert on the log event or the metric rather than on the health check. Correcting the storage and restarting restores the same PeerId. On Unix a new key is created `0600` inside a `0700` directory. A key directory that grants access beyond its owner is tightened to `0700` on start; one that is closed too far is refused with a `chmod 700` remedy rather than widened, since a directory locked down on purpose is an operator decision. Rotate the key only when the node logs that the directory was group- or world-writable (or the key file itself was group- or world-readable). An ordinary `0755` directory is tightened too, but others could not read a `0600` key or replace its directory entry. An existing key file is never modified: one with group or other bits set is rejected (`chmod 600`), and so is one this node cannot read. On other platforms no permissions are enforced. Default `~/.gitlawb/p2p.key`; point it at a persistent volume when running in a container. |
 | `GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS` | Disable embedded seed peers for isolated dev/test networks. |
-| `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES` | Require signed peer announce/sync writes. Defaults to `false` during the staged rollout below. |
-| `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` | Require the pusher on `git-receive-pack` to be the repo owner, or to present an owner-rooted, time-bounded UCAN `git/push` capability naming the repository (`X-Ucan`). **Defaults to `true`.** A `did:key` signature is authentication, not authorization — anyone can mint a key and sign — so with this off every signed caller may push to every repository, private ones included. A CI or delegated key with no such delegation counts as a non-owner and cannot push while this is on. The delegation clears the push gate only; on a private repository the delegate must also be a reader. Set `false` only for a rolling upgrade; see [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md). |
+| `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES` | Require peer writes to prove their DID on every transport: RFC 9421 signatures on the announce/sync routes, and an Ed25519 payload signature on gossip ref-update events. Defaults to `false` during the staged rollout below. Upgrade every gossip publisher before enabling, or their updates are dropped with no error on their side. |
+| `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` | Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on `git-receive-pack`. **Defaults to `true`.** A `did:key` signature is authentication, not authorization (anyone can mint a key and sign), so with this off every signed caller may push to every repository, private ones included. Delegated and CI keys count as non-owners: a UCAN `git/push` capability is verified but not yet honored for authorization, so they cannot push while this is on. Set `false` only for a rolling upgrade; see [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md). |
 | `GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC` | Enable automatic sync from known peers. |
 | `GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES` | Max git pack body size for smart-HTTP routes. |
 | `GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS` | Max seconds a served git upload-pack, receive-pack, or `info/refs` advertisement may run before it is aborted (504). Default 600. Also bounds the withheld-blob classification walk (on both the upload-pack serve and receive-pack replication paths) and the push-side pin-candidate discovery (`rev-list` / `cat-file`), each reaped via process-group teardown at the deadline. On the path-scoped upload-pack path the classification walk and the pack serve share ONE deadline, so this value bounds their combined duration rather than granting each stage a full budget: a walk that consumes it leaves the serve nothing and the clone gets a 504. Serving large path-scoped repos may therefore need a higher value than they did when each stage was budgeted separately. Accepted range is 1 to 3153600000 (100 years), since the node derives deadlines from this value and a larger one cannot be represented. |
@@ -412,6 +420,7 @@ Important node settings:
 | `GITLAWB_IPFS_REQUEST_BUDGET_SECS` | Absolute wall-clock budget for one admitted `/ipfs/{cid}` request's acquire+walk lifetime. Per-stage clamps bound the acquire and walk stages to the remaining budget, and no stage starts once it is exhausted; the scan then stops with a retryable 503. The object-type probe and content-read `cat-file` subprocesses are budget-checked before starting and each also run under their own deadline (the lesser of `GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS` and the remaining budget), reaped via process-group teardown, so a hung `cat-file` cannot hold the request's walk slot past it. One hang path is still unbounded: the probe's object-store readability check is a plain filesystem sweep with nothing to reap, so a wedged filesystem can hold the slot past the deadline. Default 600. Accepted range is 1 to 3153600000 (100 years), since the node derives a deadline from this value and a larger one cannot be represented. |
 | `GITLAWB_IPFS_RESOLVE_BUDGET_SECS` | Shorter budget for the pre-walk CID resolve inside an admitted `/ipfs/{cid}` request: the lookup that maps the requested CID to its git oid(s), which runs while the scarce walk admission is already held. A well-formed CID with no pin row does no probe and no walk work, so without this it could hold a walk slot for the whole request budget while nothing walked, and enough such requests shed every real retrieval at admission. The effective deadline is the lesser of this and the remaining request budget, so a value above `GITLAWB_IPFS_REQUEST_BUDGET_SECS` degrades to the request budget. Only the resolve is on this clock; walk and probe work stay on the request budget, so a slow but progressing scan is never shed by it. Default 10. Accepted range is 1 to 3153600000 (100 years). |
 | `GITLAWB_IPFS_RATE_LIMIT` | Max `/ipfs/{cid}` requests per client IP per hour (route flood brake). 0 disables. Default 600. |
+| `GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT` | Max anonymous task-read requests (`GET /api/v1/tasks`, `GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}`) per client IP per hour, sharing the budget with the GraphQL/WS task-read brake. Uses `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY` to resolve the client IP. 0 disables. Default 1200 (above the `/ipfs` budget to allow list pages followed by per-task reads). |
 | `GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET` | Optional S3/Tigris shared repo storage bucket. |
 | `GITLAWB_PINATA_JWT` | Optional Pinata/IPFS warm-storage pinning. |
 | `GITLAWB_IRYS_URL` | Optional Irys/Arweave permanent anchoring. |
@@ -420,11 +429,33 @@ Production note: change the default Postgres password before exposing a node pub
 
 Legacy-pin window: releases before the CID-resolver work stored the provider CID (Kubo dag-pb / Pinata) as a pinned object's resolver key. The `/ipfs/{cid}` resolver now recomputes the raw-content CID from the object bytes and refuses to serve a key that does not match, so `GET /api/v1/ipfs/pins` can still advertise an unrepaired legacy CID that 404s. Such a row is repaired opportunistically the next time a push carries the object again (its key is rewritten to the raw CID, the old value kept in `legacy_provider_cid`), but git negotiation omits objects the node already has, so most legacy rows never re-enter a push delta. A deferred one-shot startup sweep, not this opportunistic path, is what fully retires the advertise-then-404 window. Rows whose object bytes are gone stay withheld.
 
+### Upgrading: the PeerId rotates once
+
+This node's libp2p identity is now a keypair generated on first start and kept
+at `GITLAWB_P2P_KEY`, rather than one derived from the node DID. Every node
+therefore gets a new PeerId once, on the first start after upgrading, and keeps
+it from then on as long as that key file survives (put it on a persistent volume
+in a container).
+
+Two things to check before upgrading:
+
+- Any `GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP` multiaddr that pins a peer's old PeerId with a
+  `/p2p/<PeerId>` suffix stops matching once that peer upgrades. Update the
+  suffix, or drop it and let identify supply the current one. Addresses without
+  the suffix keep working untouched.
+- `GITLAWB_P2P_KEY` must name a key file inside a directory, such as
+  `/data/keys/p2p.key` or `./keys/p2p.key`. A bare filename is refused at
+  startup, since the node will not keep its identity key in the working
+  directory.
+
+Peers found over `GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS` and the embedded seed list are
+unaffected, since those are HTTP URLs and carry no PeerId.
+
 ---
 
 ## Optional node staking
 
-Gitlawb Node includes optional Base L2 node-operator hooks. Operators can register a node DID, stake `$GITLAWB`, and post heartbeats.
+Twigpine Node includes optional Base L2 node-operator hooks. Operators can register a node DID, stake `$GITLAWB`, and post heartbeats.
 
 PoS is disabled unless these are configured:
 
@@ -494,8 +525,8 @@ Build:
 Output:
 
 ```txt
-dist/Gitlawb Node.app
-dist/Gitlawb Node.dmg
+dist/Twigpine Node.app
+dist/GitlawbNode-macOS.dmg
 ```
 
 Features:
@@ -509,7 +540,7 @@ Features:
 Unsigned local build:
 
 ```bash
-xattr -cr "dist/Gitlawb Node.app"
+xattr -cr "dist/Twigpine Node.app"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -524,7 +555,7 @@ Short-term priorities:
 2. Add Docker and installer smoke tests.
 3. Improve operator docs and `gl doctor` checks.
 4. Harden peer writes and publish the signed-peer rollout plan.
-5. Close default-open write authorization and wire trusted UCAN delegation into repository permissions.
+5. Wire trusted UCAN delegation into repository write authorization.
 6. Add threaded, line-level pull-request discussions and enforce approval requirements on merges.
 7. Add metrics for pushes, fetches, pack sizes, peer sync, failed auth, and webhooks.
 

SECURITY.md

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 
 ## Reporting a Vulnerability
 
-If you discover a security vulnerability in gitlawb, please **do not open a public issue**.
+If you discover a security vulnerability in Twigpine, please **do not open a public issue**.
 
-Report it privately by emailing **security@gitlawb.com** with:
+Report it privately by emailing **security@twigpine.com** with:
 - A description of the vulnerability
 - Steps to reproduce
 - Potential impact assessment
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to release a fix within 14 d
 
 **Content addressing**
 - Every git object is content-addressed via CIDv1 (SHA-256)
-- Tamper-evident by construction — a modified object changes its CID
+- Tamper-evident by construction: a modified object changes its CID
 
 **UCAN token validation**
 - Bootstrap UCAN tokens are issued at registration.
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to release a fix within 14 d
 - Capability grants are not yet consulted by repository write authorization; see the limitations below.
 
 **Smart contracts (Base Sepolia testnet)**
-- `GitlawbDIDRegistry` — on-chain DID → document registry
-- `GitlawbNameRegistry` — human name → DID registry
+- `GitlawbDIDRegistry`: on-chain DID → document registry
+- `GitlawbNameRegistry`: human name → DID registry
 - Both auditable on-chain, no admin keys
 
 ---
@@ -54,9 +54,9 @@ We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to release a fix within 14 d
 These are documented limitations of the current live release. They should be prioritized without breaking existing nodes during rolling upgrades.
 
 ### Repository write authorization defaults
-- `git-receive-pack` verifies HTTP Signatures, but `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` defaults to `false` for compatibility during rollout.
-- **Impact:** With the default setting, a valid signature authenticates the pusher but does not require that DID to be the repository owner.
-- **Mitigation:** Set `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=true` on nodes where owner-only pushes are required. Confirm that every legitimate pusher uses the owner DID before enabling it.
+- `git-receive-pack` verifies HTTP Signatures and, with the default configuration, also requires the pusher DID to be the repository owner: `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` defaults to `true`.
+- **Impact:** With the default setting, a valid signature authenticates the pusher, and the pusher must be the repository owner. Authentication is not authorization on its own, since anyone can mint a `did:key` and sign, so owner enforcement is the only thing that prevents every signed caller from pushing to every repository, including private ones.
+- **Mitigation:** `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false` is the explicit rolling-upgrade compatibility override. Disable it only for the duration of an upgrade whose pushers are not yet the repo owner, then turn it back on. Delegated and CI keys count as non-owners: a UCAN `git/push` capability is verified but not yet honored for authorization, so they cannot push while this is on.
 
 ### UCAN delegation and revocation
 - The middleware validates a supplied UCAN's complete proof chain, but a root token is accepted without an independently trusted issuer anchor. `Ucan::can` is not yet used by write handlers, so a UCAN does not grant scoped repository access.
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ These are documented limitations of the current live release. They should be pri
 ### Private repository reads
 - Repository and path-scoped visibility checks are enforced for repository API and Git content reads. A denied whole-repository or root read returns the same 404 shape as a missing repository, so the denial does not reveal private-repository existence.
 - Sparse-clone support exposes withheld path globs to callers who may read the repository root. Do not put sensitive information in withheld path names.
-- `GET /api/v1/tasks`, `/api/v1/ipfs/pins`, and `/api/v1/arweave/anchors` are not repository-gated. Task records include a UCAN token; pin and anchor listings expose object and ref metadata.
+- Task list/get reads (`GET /api/v1/tasks`, `GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}`, and GraphQL `tasks` / `task` over HTTP and WebSocket) are repository/task-gated through shared visibility collectors and omit `ucan_token`. All of those transports share the same per-IP `GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT` budget. `/api/v1/ipfs/pins` and `/api/v1/arweave/anchors` are not repository-gated; pin and anchor listings expose object and ref metadata.
 - Changing a repository's visibility controls future serving, but cannot retract ref metadata or configured external pins and anchors already announced while the repository was public. Do not push secrets to an announceable repository.
 - **Impact:** Visibility policies protect the repository and Git content routes they gate, not every metadata endpoint or previously published content.
 - **Remaining boundary:** This read control does not address the independent write-authorization and UCAN-delegation limitations described above.
@@ -118,13 +118,13 @@ These are documented limitations of the current live release. They should be pri
 
 ## Threat Model
 
-gitlawb is designed to be secure against:
-- **Unauthenticated writes** — HTTP Signature auth on protected write endpoints; see Known Limitations for owner and capability authorization gaps
-- **Tampered git objects** — CIDv1 content addressing detects modification
-- **Identity spoofing** — DIDs derived from public keys, unforgeable without the private key
-- **Centralized takedown** — no single point of control; data on IPFS + Arweave
+Twigpine is designed to be secure against:
+- **Unauthenticated writes:** HTTP Signature auth on protected write endpoints; see Known Limitations for owner and capability authorization gaps
+- **Tampered git objects:** CIDv1 content addressing detects modification
+- **Identity spoofing:** DIDs derived from public keys, unforgeable without the private key
+- **Centralized takedown:** no single point of control; data on IPFS + Arweave
 
-gitlawb is **not yet** designed to defend against:
+Twigpine is **not yet** designed to defend against:
 - A compromised node operator (node operators are trusted for their own node)
 - Sybil attacks on the DHT (trust score system mitigates, not eliminates)
 - Timing attacks on signature verification (not constant-time compared in v0.1)

bootstrap-peers.json

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 {
-  "$comment": "Canonical seed list for the Gitlawb network. Merged with GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS at startup. PRs to add public nodes welcome.",
+  "$comment": "Canonical seed list for the Twigpine network. Merged with GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS at startup. PRs to add public nodes welcome.",
   "version": 1,
   "updated": "2026-06-30",
   "peers": [
     {
       "name": "gitlawb",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
+      "operator": "Twigpine",
       "did": "did:key:z6MkqDnb7Siv3Cwj7pGJq4T5EsUisECqR8KpnDLwcaZq5TPr",
       "http_url": "https://node.gitlawb.com",
       "p2p_multiaddr": null,
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "gitlawb-node2",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
+      "operator": "Twigpine",
       "did": null,
       "http_url": "https://node2.gitlawb.com",
       "p2p_multiaddr": null,
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "gitlawb-node3",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
+      "operator": "Twigpine",
       "did": null,
       "http_url": "https://node3.gitlawb.com",
       "p2p_multiaddr": null,
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "gitlawb-manila",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
+      "operator": "Twigpine",
       "did": null,
       "http_url": "https://manila.gitlawb.com",
       "p2p_multiaddr": null,

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/Cargo.toml

@@ -14,17 +14,8 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
 gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core", features = ["redirect"] }
 anyhow = { workspace = true }
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
-# Reading the node's DID from `GET /` so a delegated push can address its
-# invocation to the right executor.
-serde_json = { workspace = true }
-# The invocation carries the delegation's expiry, so an unbounded write capability
-# is never minted; converting the stored i64 timestamp needs chrono.
-chrono = { workspace = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
 tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
-# Home-directory lookup for the shared GITLAWB_KEY resolver in gitlawb-core,
-# which takes `home` as an argument so core's dependency allowlist stays lean.
-dirs = "5"
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 mockito = "1"

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/tests/real_git_fetch.rs

@@ -95,6 +95,36 @@ fn upload_pack(repo: &Path, advertise: bool, input: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
     out.stdout
 }
 
+/// Run `git receive-pack --stateless-rpc [--advertise-refs] <repo>`, optionally
+/// feeding `input` on stdin. Returns raw stdout (the wire bytes). The receive
+/// half of `upload_pack`, used so the shim can serve a real push.
+fn receive_pack(repo: &Path, advertise: bool, input: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut cmd = Command::new("git");
+    cmd.arg("receive-pack").arg("--stateless-rpc");
+    if advertise {
+        cmd.arg("--advertise-refs");
+    }
+    cmd.arg(repo)
+        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
+        .stdout(Stdio::piped())
+        .stderr(Stdio::piped());
+    let mut child = cmd.spawn().expect("spawn git receive-pack");
+    let mut stdin = child.stdin.take().unwrap();
+    let input = input.to_vec();
+    let writer = std::thread::spawn(move || {
+        let _ = stdin.write_all(&input);
+        // drop closes stdin
+    });
+    let out = child.wait_with_output().expect("wait receive-pack");
+    writer.join().ok();
+    assert!(
+        out.status.success(),
+        "git receive-pack failed: {}",
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
+    );
+    out.stdout
+}
+
 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
 enum ShimMode {
     /// Faithful v0 serving: pipe each POST to `git upload-pack --stateless-rpc`.
@@ -107,6 +137,11 @@ enum ShimMode {
 struct Shim {
     base_url: String,
     posts: Arc<AtomicUsize>,
+    /// Advertisement (GET /info/refs) count. One `git fetch` performs exactly
+    /// one advertisement, so tests assert this is EXACTLY one: any fetch-level
+    /// retry that comes back re-advertises and goes red on the spot, which the
+    /// lower-bound POST assertions alone cannot see (#275 round 6).
+    gets: Arc<AtomicUsize>,
     stop: Arc<AtomicBool>,
     handle: Option<std::thread::JoinHandle<()>>,
 }
@@ -136,15 +171,17 @@ fn start_shim(repo: PathBuf, mode: ShimMode) -> Shim {
     let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
     let base_url = format!("http://{addr}");
     let posts = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
+    let gets = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
     let stop = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
 
     let posts_t = posts.clone();
+    let gets_t = gets.clone();
     let stop_t = stop.clone();
     let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || {
         while !stop_t.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
             match listener.accept() {
                 Ok((stream, _)) => {
-                    handle_conn(stream, &repo, mode, &posts_t);
+                    handle_conn(stream, &repo, mode, &posts_t, &gets_t);
                 }
                 Err(ref e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock => {
                     std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(5));
@@ -157,6 +194,7 @@ fn start_shim(repo: PathBuf, mode: ShimMode) -> Shim {
     Shim {
         base_url,
         posts,
+        gets,
         stop,
         handle: Some(handle),
     }
@@ -182,7 +220,13 @@ fn normalize_accepted_stream(stream: &TcpStream) {
     stream.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(30))).ok();
 }
 
-fn handle_conn(stream: TcpStream, repo: &Path, mode: ShimMode, posts: &AtomicUsize) {
+fn handle_conn(
+    stream: TcpStream,
+    repo: &Path,
+    mode: ShimMode,
+    posts: &AtomicUsize,
+    gets: &AtomicUsize,
+) {
     normalize_accepted_stream(&stream);
     let mut reader = BufReader::new(stream);
 
@@ -218,7 +262,22 @@ fn handle_conn(stream: TcpStream, repo: &Path, mode: ShimMode, posts: &AtomicUsi
         reader.read_exact(&mut body).ok();
     }
 
-    let (content_type, payload) = if method == "GET" && target.contains("/info/refs") {
+    let (content_type, payload) = if method == "GET" && target.contains("service=git-receive-pack")
+    {
+        // Receive-pack advertisement, same wrapper shape as upload-pack.
+        let adv = receive_pack(repo, true, b"");
+        let mut wrapped = pkt(b"# service=git-receive-pack\n");
+        wrapped.extend_from_slice(b"0000");
+        wrapped.extend_from_slice(&adv);
+        ("application/x-git-receive-pack-advertisement", wrapped)
+    } else if method == "POST" && target.ends_with("/git-receive-pack") {
+        posts.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
+        (
+            "application/x-git-receive-pack-result",
+            receive_pack(repo, false, &body),
+        )
+    } else if method == "GET" && target.contains("/info/refs") {
+        gets.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
         // v0 advertisement, wrapped exactly as the node's info_refs does.
         let adv = upload_pack(repo, true, b"");
         let mut wrapped = pkt(b"# service=git-upload-pack\n");
@@ -293,6 +352,34 @@ fn fetch_with_helper(clone: &Path, node_url: &str) -> (bool, std::process::Outpu
     run_bounded(cmd, Duration::from_secs(30))
 }
 
+/// Run `git push` in `local` through the helper, same wiring and hard timeout as
+/// [`fetch_with_helper`]. `args` carries the push spec, e.g.
+/// `["--delete", "doomed"]`.
+fn push_with_helper(local: &Path, node_url: &str, args: &[&str]) -> (bool, std::process::Output) {
+    let helper_bin = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_git-remote-gitlawb"));
+    let helper_dir = helper_bin.parent().unwrap().to_path_buf();
+    let path_env = match std::env::var_os("PATH") {
+        Some(p) => {
+            let mut dirs = vec![helper_dir.clone()];
+            dirs.extend(std::env::split_paths(&p));
+            std::env::join_paths(dirs).unwrap()
+        }
+        None => helper_dir.clone().into_os_string(),
+    };
+
+    let mut cmd = Command::new("git");
+    cmd.arg("-C")
+        .arg(local)
+        .arg("push")
+        .arg("origin")
+        .args(args)
+        .env("PATH", path_env)
+        .env("LC_ALL", "C")
+        .env("GITLAWB_NODE", node_url)
+        .env("GITLAWB_KEY", "/nonexistent-key-for-anon-push");
+    run_bounded(cmd, Duration::from_secs(30))
+}
+
 /// A synthetic non-success `ExitStatus` used only on the unix timeout path, where
 /// `reap_group` has already consumed the child and the later `wait` returns ECHILD.
 /// The timeout branch already reports `completed == false`, so the exact status is
@@ -935,6 +1022,7 @@ fn shim_answers_a_connection_that_arrives_non_blocking() {
 
     let server = std::thread::spawn(move || {
         let posts = AtomicUsize::new(0);
+        let gets = AtomicUsize::new(0);
         let stream = loop {
             match listener.accept() {
                 Ok((s, _)) => break s,
@@ -949,7 +1037,7 @@ fn shim_answers_a_connection_that_arrives_non_blocking() {
         // the assertions below run on every platform.
         stream.set_nonblocking(true).unwrap();
         accepted_tx.send(()).unwrap();
-        handle_conn(stream, &repo, ShimMode::Normal, &posts);
+        handle_conn(stream, &repo, ShimMode::Normal, &posts, &gets);
     });
 
     let mut client = TcpStream::connect(addr).unwrap();
@@ -1013,6 +1101,17 @@ fn real_git_multi_round_fetch_completes() {
         posts >= 2,
         "fixture did not force multi-round negotiation (observed {posts} POST(s)); the bridging path was not exercised"
     );
+    // Exactly one advertisement: the POST bound above is a floor, so a
+    // reintroduced fetch-level retry could satisfy it by running a second full
+    // fetch instead of multi-round negotiation. Re-advertising is what a
+    // second fetch cannot avoid, so this is the committed guard on the
+    // retry's absence.
+    let gets = shim.gets.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
+    assert_eq!(
+        gets, 1,
+        "expected exactly one advertisement GET per fetch; {gets} means a \
+         fetch-level retry is back"
+    );
 
     // The fetched tip is present and the clone's object graph is intact.
     let server_head = String::from_utf8(git(&server, &["rev-parse", "HEAD"])).unwrap();
@@ -1105,6 +1204,17 @@ fn real_git_withheld_shaped_first_post() {
         "helper hung on a withheld-shaped response (should forward-and-terminate, not deadlock). stderr:\n{stderr}"
     );
 
+    // Exactly one advertisement, pass or fail: the POST assertions below are
+    // floors, so a reintroduced fetch-level retry could mask the withheld
+    // shape behind a second full fetch. A retry cannot avoid re-advertising,
+    // so this is the committed guard on its absence.
+    let gets = shim.gets.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
+    assert_eq!(
+        gets, 1,
+        "expected exactly one advertisement GET per fetch; {gets} means a \
+         fetch-level retry is back"
+    );
+
     if out.status.success() {
         // Real git accepted the mid-negotiation pack: the withheld multi-round
         // path works end to end with no extra handling.
@@ -1242,3 +1352,77 @@ fn run_bounded_bounds_join_when_leader_exits_leaving_a_pipe_holder() {
          held pipes do not stall the joins)"
     );
 }
+
+/// #369 end-to-end: a real `git push --delete` through the helper completes.
+/// The receive-pack request for a delete-only push is commands + flush with NO
+/// pack, and git holds its write pipe open for the report — so a helper that
+/// reads stdin to EOF deadlocks against it. The shim pipes the POST to a real
+/// `git receive-pack --stateless-rpc`, so the branch actually has to be deleted
+/// server-side for the assertions to pass.
+#[test]
+fn real_git_push_delete_completes() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let server = dir.path().join("server.git");
+    let local = dir.path().join("local");
+
+    // A bare repo holding the doomed branch, plus a live one.
+    git(
+        dir.path(),
+        &[
+            "init",
+            "--bare",
+            server.to_str().unwrap(),
+            "--initial-branch=main",
+        ],
+    );
+    let work = dir.path().join("work");
+    git(
+        dir.path(),
+        &["init", work.to_str().unwrap(), "--initial-branch=main"],
+    );
+    git(&work, &["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
+    git(&work, &["config", "user.name", "t"]);
+    std::fs::write(work.join("f"), "x").unwrap();
+    git(&work, &["add", "f"]);
+    git(&work, &["commit", "-m", "c"]);
+    git(&work, &["branch", "doomed"]);
+    git(&work, &["push", server.to_str().unwrap(), "main", "doomed"]);
+
+    // The pusher: a local repo whose origin is the gitlawb remote pointing at
+    // the shim. Nothing needs to be fetched first; git takes the old-oid from
+    // the receive-pack advertisement.
+    git(
+        dir.path(),
+        &["init", local.to_str().unwrap(), "--initial-branch=main"],
+    );
+    git(
+        &local,
+        &["remote", "add", "origin", "gitlawb://did:key:z6MkTest/repo"],
+    );
+
+    let shim = start_shim(server.clone(), ShimMode::Normal);
+    let (completed, out) = push_with_helper(&local, &shim.base_url, &["--delete", "doomed"]);
+    let posts = shim.posts.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
+
+    assert!(
+        completed,
+        "git push --delete did not complete within the timeout (deadlock signature). stderr:\n{}",
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
+    );
+    assert!(
+        out.status.success(),
+        "git push --delete failed. stderr:\n{}",
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
+    );
+    assert_eq!(posts, 1, "a delete-only push is exactly one POST");
+    let gone = Command::new("git")
+        .arg("-C")
+        .arg(&server)
+        .args(["rev-parse", "--verify", "--quiet", "refs/heads/doomed"])
+        .output()
+        .unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        !gone.status.success(),
+        "refs/heads/doomed must be deleted in the server repo"
+    );
+}

crates/gitlawb-attest/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
-description = "External Attestation v1: pluggable provenance attachments for gitlawb ref-update certs"
+description = "External Attestation v1: pluggable provenance attachments for Twigpine ref-update certs"
 version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true

crates/gitlawb-attest/src/attestation.rs

@@ -105,16 +105,30 @@ impl Attestation {
         let bytes = canonical_signing_bytes(&self.type_, &self.payload, &self.cert_hash)?;
 
         let vk = verifying_key_from_did_key(&self.signer)?;
+        self.verify_sig_with_key(&vk, &bytes)?;
+
+        Ok(vk)
+    }
+
+    /// The signature check itself, against a key the caller supplies.
+    ///
+    /// Split out so the STRICTNESS of the check stays provable on its own.
+    /// `verifying_key_from_did_key` now refuses a small-order key, so a weak
+    /// signer can no longer reach this line through `verify_signature`. Without
+    /// this seam there would be nothing left that fails when `verify_strict` is
+    /// downgraded to the non-strict `verify`, and that regression would land
+    /// silently. Check order in `verify_signature` is unchanged.
+    fn verify_sig_with_key(&self, vk: &VerifyingKey, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
         let sig_bytes: [u8; 64] = B64U
             .decode(&self.sig)
             .map_err(|e| Error::Signature(format!("base64url: {e}")))?
             .try_into()
             .map_err(|_| Error::Signature("signature must be 64 bytes".to_string()))?;
         let sig = Signature::from_bytes(&sig_bytes);
-        vk.verify_strict(&bytes, &sig)
+        vk.verify_strict(bytes, &sig)
             .map_err(|e| Error::Signature(format!("ed25519: {e}")))?;
 
-        Ok(vk)
+        Ok(())
     }
 
     /// Reparse `payload` as `P`. Errors if the type discriminator does not
@@ -181,7 +195,7 @@ fn canonical_signing_bytes(
     Ok(out)
 }
 
-fn did_key_from_verifying_key(key: &VerifyingKey) -> String {
+pub(crate) fn did_key_from_verifying_key(key: &VerifyingKey) -> String {
     let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(ED25519_MULTICODEC.len() + 32);
     buf.extend_from_slice(&ED25519_MULTICODEC);
     buf.extend_from_slice(&key.to_bytes());
@@ -202,6 +216,19 @@ fn verifying_key_from_did_key(did: &str) -> Result<VerifyingKey> {
             "did:key must use base58btc (z-prefix): {did}"
         )));
     }
+    // Refuse an oversized id before decoding. base58 decoding is quadratic in
+    // its input and `signer` comes off an attacker-supplied attestation, so a
+    // short request could otherwise buy a large decode. An ed25519 did:key
+    // method-id is a fixed 48 characters, so this bound is slack rather than a
+    // behavior change, and it only helps ahead of the decode. Mirrors the same
+    // cap in gitlawb-core's Did::to_verifying_key, which this crate cannot call
+    // (gitlawb-core is a dev-dependency here).
+    const MAX_METHOD_ID_LEN: usize = 64;
+    if method_id.len() > MAX_METHOD_ID_LEN {
+        return Err(Error::Did(
+            "did:key method-specific id too long".to_string(),
+        ));
+    }
     let (base, bytes) =
         multibase::decode(method_id).map_err(|e| Error::Did(format!("multibase: {e}")))?;
     if base != multibase::Base::Base58Btc {
@@ -217,8 +244,20 @@ fn verifying_key_from_did_key(did: &str) -> Result<VerifyingKey> {
     let key_bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes[ED25519_MULTICODEC.len()..]
         .try_into()
         .expect("length checked above");
-    VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&key_bytes)
-        .map_err(|e| Error::Did(format!("invalid ed25519 key: {e}")))
+    let key = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&key_bytes)
+        .map_err(|e| Error::Did(format!("invalid ed25519 key: {e}")))?;
+
+    // `from_bytes` only decompresses, so it accepts a small-order point. This
+    // crate parses did:key itself rather than going through gitlawb-core's
+    // `Did`, and it cannot go through it (gitlawb-core is a dev-dependency
+    // here), so the rejection is mirrored rather than inherited. Signature
+    // verification is already strict, so this is defense in depth against a
+    // future consumer of this parser that does not verify strictly.
+    if key.is_weak() {
+        return Err(Error::Did("small-order ed25519 key".to_string()));
+    }
+
+    Ok(key)
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
@@ -465,6 +504,23 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(matches!(err, Error::Did(_)));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_oversized_method_id_before_decoding() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let mut att = dummy_attestation(&sk, sample_cert_hash());
+        // A well-formed prefix on an absurdly long id must fail the length
+        // bound, not the decoder: base58 decode cost is quadratic in input
+        // length, so reaching it at all is the defect.
+        att.signer = format!("did:key:z{}", "1".repeat(256));
+        let err = att.verify_signature(sample_cert_hash()).unwrap_err();
+        // Match the bound's own message: any other Did error (a decode or
+        // length mismatch downstream) means the oversized input was decoded.
+        match err {
+            Error::Did(m) => assert!(m.contains("too long"), "unexpected: {m}"),
+            e => panic!("expected Error::Did, got {e:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn verify_rejects_bad_signature_base64() {
         let sk = fresh();
@@ -559,6 +615,111 @@ mod tests {
     /// weak (small-order) public key satisfies the verification equation
     /// but must be rejected. The identity point is such a key: with R the
     /// identity and S = 0, [S]B - [k]A is the identity for any message.
+    /// gitlawb-attest parses did:key itself and never routes through
+    /// gitlawb-core's `Did`, which it cannot: gitlawb-core is a dev-dependency
+    /// here. So the choke-point rejection has to be mirrored in this parser or
+    /// this crate keeps handing out keys the rest of the system rejects.
+    #[test]
+    fn verifying_key_from_did_key_rejects_a_small_order_key() {
+        let mut weak = [0u8; 32];
+        weak[0] = 1; // compressed identity point
+        let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(ED25519_MULTICODEC.len() + 32);
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&ED25519_MULTICODEC);
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&weak);
+        let did = format!(
+            "did:key:{}",
+            multibase::encode(multibase::Base::Base58Btc, &buf)
+        );
+
+        let err =
+            verifying_key_from_did_key(&did).expect_err("a small-order did:key must not resolve");
+        match err {
+            Error::Did(msg) => assert!(
+                msg.contains("small-order"),
+                "rejection must name the small-order key, got: {msg}"
+            ),
+            other => panic!("expected Error::Did, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// base58 decoding is quadratic in its input and `signer` is attacker
+    /// controlled, so an oversized method-id must be refused BEFORE the decode
+    /// or a hostile attestation buys a large decode for a short request. The
+    /// assertion is on the length error specifically: a multibase error here
+    /// would mean the cap ran too late to matter.
+    #[test]
+    fn verifying_key_from_did_key_refuses_an_oversized_method_id_before_decoding() {
+        let oversized = format!("did:key:z{}", "1".repeat(65_536));
+        let err = verifying_key_from_did_key(&oversized)
+            .expect_err("an oversized method-id must be refused");
+        match err {
+            Error::Did(msg) => assert!(
+                msg.contains("too long"),
+                "must fail on the length cap, not after decoding: {msg}"
+            ),
+            other => panic!("expected Error::Did, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Strictness regression guard. The parser now refuses a small-order key,
+    /// so `verify_signature` can no longer carry a weak signer down to the
+    /// signature check; this drives that check directly to prove it is still
+    /// STRICT. Downgrading `verify_strict` to `verify` makes this go red,
+    /// which nothing else in the suite would catch.
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_sig_with_key_is_strict_about_a_weak_key() {
+        let mut weak_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
+        weak_key_bytes[0] = 1; // compressed identity point
+        let weak_vk = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&weak_key_bytes).unwrap();
+        assert!(weak_vk.is_weak());
+
+        let cert_hash = sample_cert_hash();
+        let mut att = dummy_attestation(&SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng), cert_hash);
+        // R = identity, S = 0: satisfies the non-strict verification equation
+        // for any message under a small-order key.
+        let mut forged = [0u8; 64];
+        forged[0] = 1;
+        att.sig = B64U.encode(forged);
+
+        let bytes = canonical_signing_bytes(&att.type_, &att.payload, &att.cert_hash).expect("jcs");
+        let err = att
+            .verify_sig_with_key(&weak_vk, &bytes)
+            .expect_err("strict verification must reject a small-order key");
+        assert!(
+            matches!(err, Error::Signature(_)),
+            "expected a signature error, got {err:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Accept control for the seam: a genuine signature still verifies through
+    /// the same helper, so the guard above is not simply rejecting everything.
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_sig_with_key_accepts_a_genuine_signature() {
+        let cert_hash = sample_cert_hash();
+        let sk = SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng);
+        let att = dummy_attestation(&sk, cert_hash);
+        let bytes = canonical_signing_bytes(&att.type_, &att.payload, &att.cert_hash).expect("jcs");
+        att.verify_sig_with_key(&sk.verifying_key(), &bytes)
+            .expect("a real signature must verify");
+    }
+
+    /// Control for the guard above: a real did:key must still resolve.
+    #[test]
+    fn verifying_key_from_did_key_still_accepts_a_real_key() {
+        let sk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[3u8; 32]);
+        let vk = sk.verifying_key();
+        let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(ED25519_MULTICODEC.len() + 32);
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&ED25519_MULTICODEC);
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&vk.to_bytes());
+        let did = format!(
+            "did:key:{}",
+            multibase::encode(multibase::Base::Base58Btc, &buf)
+        );
+
+        let got = verifying_key_from_did_key(&did).expect("a real did:key must resolve");
+        assert_eq!(got.to_bytes(), vk.to_bytes());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn verify_rejects_weak_key_signature() {
         let mut weak_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
@@ -572,7 +733,13 @@ mod tests {
         let forged_sig = B64U.encode(forged);
 
         // Build an attestation with the weak key as signer and the forged
-        // signature. The weak-key check happens at verify time.
+        // signature. Rejection now happens at DID RESOLUTION rather than at
+        // verify time: `verifying_key_from_did_key` refuses a small-order key
+        // before `verify_strict` is reached, so the observed error is
+        // `Error::Did`, not `Error::Signature`. `verify_strict` remains the
+        // second layer for malleability cases that do not involve a weak
+        // public key (a small-order R under an honest key), which this fixture
+        // cannot construct and therefore no longer covers.
         let mut att = dummy_attestation(&SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng), cert_hash);
         let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(ED25519_MULTICODEC.len() + 32);
         buf.extend_from_slice(&ED25519_MULTICODEC);
@@ -584,9 +751,12 @@ mod tests {
         att.sig = forged_sig;
 
         let err = att.verify_signature(cert_hash).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(
-            matches!(err, Error::Signature(_)),
-            "signature under a weak (small-order) public key must be rejected"
-        );
+        match err {
+            Error::Did(msg) => assert!(
+                msg.contains("small-order"),
+                "weak signer must be refused as a small-order key, got: {msg}"
+            ),
+            other => panic!("expected Error::Did for a small-order signer, got {other:?}"),
+        }
     }
 }

crates/gitlawb-attest/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! Pluggable provenance attachments for gitlawb ref-update certs.
+//! Pluggable provenance attachments for Twigpine ref-update certs.
 //!
 //! A `gitlawb/ref-update/v1` cert proves who pushed and where a ref moved to.
 //! It does not say how the commit was produced. This crate adds an optional

crates/gitlawb-attest/src/verifier.rs

@@ -121,7 +121,12 @@ impl Registry {
         attestation: &Attestation,
         expected_cert_hash: [u8; 32],
     ) -> Result<VerifiedAttestation> {
-        attestation.verify_signature(expected_cert_hash)?;
+        // The key that actually verified is the trust anchor for the signer a
+        // consumer sees. `verify_signature` recovers it from the artifact's
+        // `signer` field and rejects a field that does not match the signing
+        // key, so this is the canonical DID of the key that signed — never a
+        // raw artifact string that could disagree with it.
+        let verified_key = attestation.verify_signature(expected_cert_hash)?;
 
         let fully = match self.by_type.get(attestation.type_.as_str()) {
             Some(v) => {
@@ -138,30 +143,55 @@ impl Registry {
 
         Ok(VerifiedAttestation {
             type_: attestation.type_.clone(),
-            signer: attestation.signer.clone(),
+            signer: crate::attestation::did_key_from_verifying_key(&verified_key),
             cert_hash: attestation.cert_hash.clone(),
             fully_verified: fully,
         })
     }
 
     /// Verify a batch, then enforce `RequireAll`.
+    ///
+    /// Under [`Policy::RequireAll`] this never short-circuits: an attestation
+    /// that fails to verify — bad signature, cert-hash mismatch, or malformed
+    /// payload, the actual `Err` paths of [`Registry::verify`] — is dropped
+    /// from the result rather than aborting the batch. A valid attestation of
+    /// a type with NO registered verifier is not one of those: under
+    /// `RequireAll` it verifies to `Ok` with `fully_verified: false` and stays
+    /// in the result, preserving the distinction between *untrusted* and
+    /// *invalid* (see `require_all_is_lenient_on_unknown_types_in_the_batch`).
+    /// Any third party can attach an attestation, so a hard error here would
+    /// let an unrelated `attacker/spam/v1` deny-of-service the whole cert (the
+    /// DoS vector the module docstring warns about). The `required_types`
+    /// check below is the real gate, and it only counts `fully_verified`
+    /// entries — so a required type represented solely by a malformed
+    /// attestation still fails with [`Error::RequiredMissing`].
+    ///
+    /// Under `AcceptKnown` and `RejectUnknown` the batch stays strict: the
+    /// first verification error is surfaced to the caller.
     pub fn verify_all(
         &self,
         attestations: &[Attestation],
         expected_cert_hash: [u8; 32],
     ) -> Result<Vec<VerifiedAttestation>> {
-        let mut verified = Vec::with_capacity(attestations.len());
-        for a in attestations {
-            verified.push(self.verify(a, expected_cert_hash)?);
+        if self.policy != Policy::RequireAll {
+            let mut verified = Vec::with_capacity(attestations.len());
+            for a in attestations {
+                verified.push(self.verify(a, expected_cert_hash)?);
+            }
+            return Ok(verified);
         }
-        if self.policy == Policy::RequireAll {
-            for required in &self.required_types {
-                let present = verified
-                    .iter()
-                    .any(|v| &v.type_ == required && v.fully_verified);
-                if !present {
-                    return Err(Error::RequiredMissing(required.clone()));
-                }
+
+        // RequireAll: drop entries that fail to verify instead of aborting.
+        let verified: Vec<VerifiedAttestation> = attestations
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|a| self.verify(a, expected_cert_hash).ok())
+            .collect();
+        for required in &self.required_types {
+            let present = verified
+                .iter()
+                .any(|v| &v.type_ == required && v.fully_verified);
+            if !present {
+                return Err(Error::RequiredMissing(required.clone()));
             }
         }
         Ok(verified)
@@ -171,7 +201,7 @@ impl Registry {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
-    use crate::attestation::{Attestation, AttestationPayload};
+    use crate::attestation::{did_key_from_verifying_key, Attestation, AttestationPayload};
     use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
     use rand::rngs::OsRng;
     use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
@@ -319,6 +349,38 @@ mod tests {
             .any(|v| v.type_ == "other/v1" && !v.fully_verified));
     }
 
+    /// The strict policies must surface a batch member's verification error
+    /// through `verify_all`, not launder it into a partial result. This binds
+    /// the POLICY BOUNDARY itself: only the `RequireAll` arm may drop failing
+    /// entries, and an apparently harmless cleanup that applies its
+    /// `filter_map(Result::ok)` shape to the strict arms would silently turn
+    /// the fail-closed contracts into fail-open — with every per-attestation
+    /// `verify` test still green, because none of them go through the batch
+    /// path. The failing entry is a wrong-cert-hash attestation (signed over a
+    /// different hash than the batch expects), a genuine `Err` under every
+    /// policy.
+    #[test]
+    fn strict_policies_propagate_a_batch_members_error() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_hash();
+        let mut wrong_hash = sample_hash();
+        wrong_hash[0] ^= 0xff;
+
+        for policy in [Policy::AcceptKnown, Policy::RejectUnknown] {
+            let mut reg = Registry::new().with_policy(policy);
+            reg.register(DemoVerifier);
+            let good = signed_demo(&sk, cert_hash, "ok");
+            let bad = signed_demo(&sk, wrong_hash, "ok");
+            let err = reg
+                .verify_all(&[good, bad], cert_hash)
+                .expect_err("a strict policy must fail the whole batch");
+            assert!(
+                matches!(err, Error::Signature(_) | Error::CertHashMismatch),
+                "expected the underlying verification error, got {err:?}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     /// A required type that is present but unverified (no verifier registered
     /// even though the type appears in `required_types`) must fail
     /// `verify_all` with `RequiredMissing`. Catches a misconfiguration where
@@ -336,6 +398,65 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(matches!(err, Error::RequiredMissing(t) if t == "demo/v1"));
     }
 
+    /// A cert-hash that does not match `sample_hash()`, so an attestation
+    /// signed against it fails `verify_signature` when the batch is checked
+    /// against `sample_hash()`.
+    fn other_hash() -> [u8; 32] {
+        let mut h = sample_hash();
+        h[0] ^= 0xff;
+        h
+    }
+
+    /// Under `RequireAll`, a malformed attestation (here: signed against the
+    /// wrong cert hash, so it fails signature verification) attached alongside a
+    /// valid required one must not abort the batch. The junk is dropped and the
+    /// cert still verifies. Before the fix, `verify_all` propagated the error
+    /// via `?` and the whole batch failed — the DoS vector the docstring warns
+    /// about.
+    #[test]
+    fn require_all_drops_a_malformed_extra_and_still_accepts() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_hash();
+        let mut reg = Registry::new()
+            .with_policy(Policy::RequireAll)
+            .require_types(["demo/v1"]);
+        reg.register(DemoVerifier);
+
+        // Signed against `other_hash()`, so it will not verify under `cert_hash`.
+        let malformed = signed_demo(&sk, other_hash(), "boom");
+        let real = signed_demo(&sk, cert_hash, "ok");
+
+        let verified = reg
+            .verify_all(&[malformed, real], cert_hash)
+            .expect("a malformed extra must not abort the batch under RequireAll");
+        assert_eq!(verified.len(), 1, "the malformed entry should be dropped");
+        assert!(verified
+            .iter()
+            .any(|v| v.type_ == "demo/v1" && v.fully_verified));
+    }
+
+    /// Leniency must not open a hole: if the *only* attestation of a required
+    /// type is malformed, dropping it leaves the required type absent and
+    /// `verify_all` must still fail with `RequiredMissing`. Guards against a fix
+    /// that skips errors so eagerly it lets an unverified required type pass.
+    #[test]
+    fn require_all_rejects_when_only_a_malformed_required_type_is_present() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_hash();
+        let mut reg = Registry::new()
+            .with_policy(Policy::RequireAll)
+            .require_types(["demo/v1"]);
+        reg.register(DemoVerifier);
+
+        // The sole demo/v1 is bound to the wrong cert hash → fails verification.
+        let malformed_required = signed_demo(&sk, other_hash(), "ok");
+
+        let err = reg
+            .verify_all(&[malformed_required], cert_hash)
+            .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::RequiredMissing(t) if t == "demo/v1"));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn payload_check_failure_rejects() {
         let sk = fresh();
@@ -374,4 +495,52 @@ mod tests {
         let err = reg.verify(&att, cert_hash).unwrap_err();
         assert!(matches!(err, Error::Payload(_)));
     }
+
+    /// The signer a consumer sees must be the canonical DID of the key that
+    /// actually verified, never a raw artifact string that could disagree.
+    /// `verify_signature` derives the key from the artifact's `signer` field
+    /// and the parser is canonical (base58btc, exact length, ed25519
+    /// multicodec), so a forged field fails verification outright: the
+    /// must-not here is that no `VerifiedAttestation` ever carries a signer
+    /// that did not verify.
+    #[test]
+    fn verified_signer_is_anchored_to_the_key_that_verified() {
+        let signer = fresh();
+        let other = fresh();
+        assert_ne!(
+            signer.verifying_key().to_bytes(),
+            other.verifying_key().to_bytes(),
+            "fixture precondition: distinct signing keys"
+        );
+
+        let cert_hash = sample_hash();
+        let reg = Registry::new();
+
+        // Control: an honest artifact reports the signer's canonical DID, and
+        // it agrees with the artifact field.
+        let att = signed_demo(&signer, cert_hash, "ok");
+        let v = reg.verify(&att, cert_hash).unwrap();
+        let expected = did_key_from_verifying_key(&signer.verifying_key());
+        assert_eq!(v.signer, expected, "signer must be the verified key's DID");
+        assert_eq!(v.signer, att.signer, "honest artifact: field and key agree");
+
+        // Must-not, both directions: a signer field naming a DIFFERENT key
+        // than the one that signed must fail verification, so the artifact
+        // string can never redirect the reported signer.
+        let mut forged = signed_demo(&signer, cert_hash, "ok");
+        forged.signer = did_key_from_verifying_key(&other.verifying_key());
+        let err = reg.verify(&forged, cert_hash).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            matches!(err, Error::Signature(_)),
+            "a signer field that does not match the signing key must fail, got {err:?}"
+        );
+
+        let mut forged_rev = signed_demo(&other, cert_hash, "ok");
+        forged_rev.signer = did_key_from_verifying_key(&signer.verifying_key());
+        let err_rev = reg.verify(&forged_rev, cert_hash).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            matches!(err_rev, Error::Signature(_)),
+            "mismatched signer field must fail verification, got {err_rev:?}"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-core/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
-description = "Core cryptographic primitives for the gitlawb network: DIDs, CIDs, UCAN, HTTP Signatures, ref-update certificates"
+description = "Core cryptographic primitives for the Twigpine network: DIDs, CIDs, UCAN, HTTP Signatures, ref-update certificates"
 version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true

crates/gitlawb-core/src/cert.rs

@@ -5,6 +5,28 @@
 //!
 //! The schema is frozen at v1. All fields are mandatory for forward compatibility.
 //! Nodes that receive a certificate with an unknown version MUST reject it.
+//!
+//! ## Replay
+//!
+//! A certificate proves *who* asserted a ref update and *what* they asserted.
+//! It does not prove the assertion is fresh. [`RefUpdateBody::seq`] and
+//! [`RefUpdateBody::nonce`] are inside the signed bytes (see
+//! [`RefUpdateBody::to_signing_bytes`]), so a verifier can trust the values,
+//! but deciding whether a nonce is being reused or a `seq` is going backwards
+//! needs state.
+//!
+//! This crate is deliberately stateless — it is embedded in both nodes and
+//! clients — so replay is **not** enforced here and cannot be. Ownership of
+//! the check sits with the verifier that accepts and persists certificates,
+//! which must:
+//!
+//! - reject a `nonce` it has already accepted for the same `(repo, ref_name)`;
+//! - reject a `seq` that does not advance past the last accepted `seq` for
+//!   that `(repo, ref_name)`.
+//!
+//! Until such a verifier exists, replay of ref-update certificates is not
+//! enforced anywhere in this workspace. This contract exists so the first one
+//! inherits the requirement instead of re-deriving it.
 
 use std::collections::HashSet;
 
@@ -41,11 +63,19 @@ pub struct RefUpdateBody {
     pub from: String,
     /// The new commit hash (SHA-256 hex).
     pub to: String,
-    /// Monotonically increasing sequence number. Prevents replay.
+    /// Monotonically increasing sequence number, scoped to `(repo, ref_name)`.
+    ///
+    /// Signed, but not enforced by this crate: core holds no state. The
+    /// verifier that persists certificates must reject a `seq` that does not
+    /// advance for the same repo and ref. See the module docs on replay.
     pub seq: u64,
     /// RFC 3339 timestamp of this update.
     pub timestamp: DateTime<Utc>,
-    /// Random nonce for deduplication.
+    /// Random nonce, unique per certificate.
+    ///
+    /// Signed, but not enforced by this crate: core holds no state. The
+    /// verifier that persists certificates must reject a nonce it has already
+    /// accepted for the same repo and ref. See the module docs on replay.
     pub nonce: String,
 }
 
@@ -140,7 +170,16 @@ impl RefUpdateCert {
     ///
     /// Counts distinct signer DIDs, not signature entries: a repeated
     /// signature from the same maintainer counts once.
+    ///
+    /// `threshold` must be at least 1. Zero is rejected instead of being
+    /// treated as "no signatures required": a caller that derives the
+    /// threshold from configuration and gets 0 would otherwise accept any
+    /// certificate, whether its signatures verify or not.
     pub fn satisfies_threshold(&self, maintainers: &[Did], threshold: usize) -> Result<bool> {
+        if threshold == 0 {
+            return Err(Error::RefCert("threshold must be at least 1".to_string()));
+        }
+
         let valid = self.verify_all()?;
         let distinct_signers: HashSet<&Did> =
             valid.iter().filter(|d| maintainers.contains(d)).collect();
@@ -378,7 +417,7 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn threshold_zero_is_always_satisfied() {
+    fn threshold_zero_is_rejected() {
         let kp = Keypair::generate();
         let cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
             kp.did(),
@@ -389,6 +428,120 @@ mod tests {
             &kp,
         )
         .unwrap();
-        assert!(cert.satisfies_threshold(&[], 0).unwrap());
+
+        // Zero must never read as "no signatures required", even with an empty
+        // maintainer set.
+        let err = cert.satisfies_threshold(&[], 0).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("threshold must be at least 1"),
+            "zero must be refused as an invalid threshold"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The threshold is checked before any signature work, so a zero is
+    /// reported as a threshold error even when the certificate's signatures
+    /// are also invalid. Otherwise a broken certificate would let a caller
+    /// mistake the failure for a legitimate verification result.
+    #[test]
+    fn threshold_zero_is_rejected_before_signature_verification() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let other = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+            kp.did(),
+            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            dummy_hash('0'),
+            dummy_hash('a'),
+            1,
+            &kp,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        cert.signatures[0].sig = other.sign_b64(b"unrelated bytes");
+
+        let err = cert.satisfies_threshold(&[kp.did()], 0).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("threshold must be at least 1"),
+            "the invalid threshold must win over the invalid signature"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// `seq` and `nonce` are the verifier's replay inputs, so they have to be
+    /// inside the signed body; tapping either one must invalidate the
+    /// certificate rather than leave it verifying with different values.
+    #[test]
+    fn replay_fields_are_covered_by_the_signature() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+            kp.did(),
+            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            dummy_hash('0'),
+            dummy_hash('a'),
+            7,
+            &kp,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        cert.verify_all().expect("baseline must verify");
+
+        let mut bumped = cert.clone();
+        bumped.body.seq = 8;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(bumped.verify_all(), Err(Error::SignatureInvalid)),
+            "changing seq must invalidate the signature"
+        );
+
+        let mut renamed = cert.clone();
+        renamed.body.nonce = "different-nonce".to_string();
+        assert!(
+            matches!(renamed.verify_all(), Err(Error::SignatureInvalid)),
+            "changing nonce must invalidate the signature"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A signature minted by a real key must not verify when the signer is
+    /// spelled in another multibase alphabet. Otherwise the same identity
+    /// would satisfy a maintainer allowlist under several DID strings.
+    ///
+    /// Base64url is deliberate: its 47-character method-id fits under the
+    /// pre-existing length bound, so this test reaches the canonical-prefix
+    /// rule and fails on the pre-fix code instead of being refused for length.
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_all_rejects_a_non_canonical_did_spelling() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+            kp.did(),
+            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            dummy_hash('0'),
+            dummy_hash('a'),
+            1,
+            &kp,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let mut prefixed = vec![0xed, 0x01];
+        prefixed.extend_from_slice(&kp.verifying_key().to_bytes());
+        cert.signatures[0].signer = format!(
+            "did:key:{}",
+            multibase::encode(multibase::Base::Base64Url, &prefixed)
+        )
+        .parse()
+        .expect("method is still `key`");
+
+        let err = cert
+            .verify_all()
+            .expect_err("a non-canonical did:key spelling must not resolve");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("base58btc"),
+            "rejection must come from the canonical-prefix rule, not the length guard"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !matches!(
+                cert.satisfies_threshold(&[cert.signatures[0].signer.clone()], 1),
+                Ok(true)
+            ),
+            "the alternate spelling must not satisfy a threshold"
+        );
+
+        // The canonical spelling of the same key is unaffected.
+        cert.signatures[0].signer = kp.did();
+        assert!(cert.satisfies_threshold(&[kp.did()], 1).unwrap());
     }
 }

crates/gitlawb-core/src/did.rs

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-//! Decentralized Identifier (DID) types for the gitlawb network.
+//! Decentralized Identifier (DID) types for the Twigpine network.
 //!
 //! Supported methods:
 //!   - `did:key`      — ephemeral, derived directly from an Ed25519 public key
 //!   - `did:web`      — anchored to a domain
 //!   - `did:gitlawb`  — native, anchored to the libp2p DHT
 //!
-//! The canonical DID for a gitlawb actor is `did:key` during bootstrap
+//! The canonical DID for a Twigpine actor is `did:key` during bootstrap
 //! and migrates to `did:gitlawb` once DHT anchoring is live.
 
 use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
@@ -20,6 +20,19 @@ use crate::{Error, Result};
 /// Value: 0xed01 encoded as a varint.
 const ED25519_MULTICODEC: &[u8] = &[0xed, 0x01];
 
+/// The only multibase prefix a `did:key` method-specific id may carry.
+///
+/// The DID:key spec encodes Ed25519 keys as base58btc, which is multibase
+/// `z`. `multibase::decode` happily accepts every other alphabet, and each
+/// spelling of the same key bytes would produce a distinct DID string while
+/// gates, allowlists, and database rows compare DIDs as strings — one
+/// identity would read as several. Rejecting the alternatives here keeps the
+/// mapping from `did:key` to key single-valued for every caller of
+/// [`Did::to_verifying_key`] (HTTP signatures, UCAN, ref certs, peer
+/// announces). `gitlawb-attest` enforces the same rule for attestation
+/// signers.
+const DID_KEY_MULTIBASE_PREFIX: char = 'z';
+
 /// A Decentralized Identifier.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(transparent)]
@@ -71,7 +84,14 @@ impl Did {
 
     /// Resolve the Ed25519 verifying key from a `did:key`.
     ///
-    /// Returns `Err` if the DID is not a `did:key` or the key bytes are invalid.
+    /// Only the canonical base58btc (`z`) spelling is accepted. Other
+    /// multibase encodings decode to the same key but spell a different DID
+    /// string, so accepting them would let one identity appear under several
+    /// identifiers to string-comparing gates and allowlists.
+    ///
+    /// Returns `Err` if the DID is not a `did:key`, uses a non-canonical
+    /// multibase prefix, the key bytes are invalid, or the key is a
+    /// small-order (weak) point.
     pub fn to_verifying_key(&self) -> Result<VerifyingKey> {
         if !self.is_did_key() {
             return Err(Error::InvalidDid(format!(
@@ -93,9 +113,27 @@ impl Did {
             ));
         }
 
-        let (_, bytes) =
+        // Cheap prefix gate before the decode, then the base check on what
+        // multibase actually parsed. The first keeps a clearly non-canonical id
+        // off the decoder. The second is belt-and-braces — multibase maps a
+        // leading `z` only to `Base58Btc` — but it states the requirement
+        // directly instead of relying on that mapping, and `gitlawb-attest`
+        // makes the same pair of checks.
+        if !self.method_id().starts_with(DID_KEY_MULTIBASE_PREFIX) {
+            return Err(Error::InvalidDid(
+                "did:key must use base58btc (z-prefix)".to_string(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        let (base, bytes) =
             multibase::decode(self.method_id()).map_err(|e| Error::InvalidDid(e.to_string()))?;
 
+        if base != Base::Base58Btc {
+            return Err(Error::InvalidDid(
+                "did:key must use base58btc (z-prefix)".to_string(),
+            ));
+        }
+
         if !bytes.starts_with(ED25519_MULTICODEC) {
             return Err(Error::InvalidDid(
                 "not an ed25519 multicodec key".to_string(),
@@ -106,7 +144,25 @@ impl Did {
             .try_into()
             .map_err(|_| Error::InvalidDid("ed25519 key must be 32 bytes".to_string()))?;
 
-        VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&key_bytes).map_err(|e| Error::InvalidDid(e.to_string()))
+        let key =
+            VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&key_bytes).map_err(|e| Error::InvalidDid(e.to_string()))?;
+
+        // `from_bytes` only decompresses, so it accepts a small-order point.
+        // Such a key satisfies the verification equation for any message, and
+        // every X25519 shared secret derived from it is the all-zero key: the
+        // order-1 and order-2 points convert to the all-zero Montgomery u
+        // directly, and the order-4 and order-8 points are annihilated by the
+        // scalar clamping instead. `is_weak` covers the whole torsion set.
+        // Mixed-order points are correctly NOT rejected, since clamping clears
+        // the cofactor component. Rejecting
+        // at resolution is what makes this the choke point: every consumer that
+        // resolves a DID through here inherits the rejection, and a recipient
+        // that cannot resolve already fails closed downstream.
+        if key.is_weak() {
+            return Err(Error::InvalidDid("small-order ed25519 key".to_string()));
+        }
+
+        Ok(key)
     }
 
     /// Return the full DID string as a `&str`.
@@ -152,7 +208,7 @@ impl From<Did> for String {
     }
 }
 
-/// A DID Document for a gitlawb actor.
+/// A DID Document for a Twigpine actor.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct DidDocument {
     #[serde(rename = "@context")]
@@ -369,4 +425,154 @@ mod tests {
         );
         did.to_verifying_key().expect("a real did:key must resolve");
     }
+
+    /// `multibase::decode` accepts every alphabet, so the same Ed25519 key can
+    /// be spelled as several `did:key` strings. Only base58btc is canonical;
+    /// the rest must be refused so one identity cannot appear as several to
+    /// gates and allowlists that compare DID strings.
+    #[test]
+    fn to_verifying_key_rejects_non_base58btc_multibase() {
+        use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+        let signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[9u8; 32]);
+        let mut prefixed = ED25519_MULTICODEC.to_vec();
+        prefixed.extend_from_slice(&signing.verifying_key().to_bytes());
+
+        let canonical = Did::from_verifying_key(&signing.verifying_key());
+        assert_eq!(
+            canonical.to_verifying_key().unwrap().to_bytes(),
+            signing.verifying_key().to_bytes(),
+            "base58btc is the accepted spelling"
+        );
+
+        // These spellings fit inside the method-id bound, so they reach the
+        // canonical-prefix check and must be refused there.
+        for base in [Base::Base64Url, Base::Base32Lower] {
+            let alternative = format!("did:key:{}", multibase::encode(base, &prefixed));
+            let did: Did = alternative.parse().expect("method is still `key`");
+            assert_ne!(
+                did.as_str(),
+                canonical.as_str(),
+                "the same key must not compare equal under another spelling"
+            );
+
+            let err = did
+                .to_verifying_key()
+                .expect_err("non-canonical multibase must be refused");
+            assert!(
+                matches!(err, Error::InvalidDid(_)),
+                "must be an InvalidDid, got {err:?}"
+            );
+            assert!(
+                err.to_string().contains("base58btc"),
+                "the error must name the canonical encoding: {err}"
+            );
+        }
+
+        // A base16 spelling of the same key is longer than the method-id
+        // bound, so it is refused by the length guard before the prefix check.
+        // Either way it must not resolve.
+        for base in [Base::Base16Lower, Base::Base16Upper] {
+            let alternative = format!("did:key:{}", multibase::encode(base, &prefixed));
+            let did: Did = alternative.parse().expect("method is still `key`");
+            assert!(
+                matches!(did.to_verifying_key(), Err(Error::InvalidDid(_))),
+                "a base16 spelling of a real key must not resolve"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// base58flickr (`Z`) is the non-bitcoin sibling alphabet. Its spelling of
+    /// a real key fits under the length bound, so it must be refused for the
+    /// prefix, not merely for its size.
+    #[test]
+    fn to_verifying_key_rejects_a_base58flickr_spelling() {
+        use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+        let signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[11u8; 32]);
+        let mut prefixed = ED25519_MULTICODEC.to_vec();
+        prefixed.extend_from_slice(&signing.verifying_key().to_bytes());
+
+        let did: Did = format!(
+            "did:key:{}",
+            multibase::encode(Base::Base58Flickr, &prefixed)
+        )
+        .parse()
+        .expect("method is still `key`");
+
+        let err = did
+            .to_verifying_key()
+            .expect_err("base58flickr must be refused");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("base58btc"),
+            "the error must name the canonical encoding: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// An empty method-specific id must be refused by the prefix rule without
+    /// panicking on a missing first character.
+    #[test]
+    fn to_verifying_key_rejects_an_empty_method_id() {
+        let did: Did = "did:key:".parse().expect("method is still `key`");
+        let err = did
+            .to_verifying_key()
+            .expect_err("an empty method id must be refused");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("base58btc"),
+            "the error must name the canonical encoding: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A canonical base58btc spelling is not enough on its own: the bytes must
+    /// also carry the ed25519-pub multicodec. This pins the check that stops a
+    /// key of another type from resolving as an Ed25519 key.
+    #[test]
+    fn to_verifying_key_rejects_base58btc_with_a_wrong_multicodec() {
+        use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+        let signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[12u8; 32]);
+        let mut buf = vec![0x12, 0x00]; // sha2-256, not ed25519-pub
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&signing.verifying_key().to_bytes());
+
+        let did: Did = format!("did:key:{}", multibase::encode(Base::Base58Btc, &buf))
+            .parse()
+            .expect("method is still `key`");
+
+        let err = did
+            .to_verifying_key()
+            .expect_err("a non-ed25519 multicodec must be refused");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("ed25519"),
+            "the error must name the expected multicodec: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A `did:key` can encode a small-order (weak) Ed25519 point. Such a key
+    /// satisfies the verification equation for any message and, converted to
+    /// Montgomery form for X25519, yields the all-zero shared secret, so an
+    /// envelope sealed to it is decryptable by anyone. Resolution is the choke
+    /// point every `Did`-based consumer shares, so it fails closed here.
+    #[test]
+    fn to_verifying_key_rejects_a_small_order_key() {
+        // The compressed identity point, the canonical small-order key.
+        let mut weak = [0u8; 32];
+        weak[0] = 1;
+        let mut prefixed = Vec::with_capacity(ED25519_MULTICODEC.len() + 32);
+        prefixed.extend_from_slice(ED25519_MULTICODEC);
+        prefixed.extend_from_slice(&weak);
+        let did: Did = format!(
+            "did:key:{}",
+            multibase::encode(multibase::Base::Base58Btc, &prefixed)
+        )
+        .parse()
+        .expect("a small-order did:key is still well-formed");
+
+        let err = did
+            .to_verifying_key()
+            .expect_err("a small-order did:key must not resolve");
+        match err {
+            Error::InvalidDid(msg) => assert!(
+                msg.contains("small-order"),
+                "rejection must name the small-order key, got: {msg}"
+            ),
+            other => panic!("expected Error::InvalidDid, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-core/src/encrypt.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,22 @@ use zeroize::Zeroizing;
 /// X25519 public key (Montgomery u) for an Ed25519 verifying key.
 fn x25519_public(vk: &VerifyingKey) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
     use curve25519_dalek::edwards::CompressedEdwardsY;
+
+    // Every X25519 shared secret derived from a small-order point is the
+    // all-zero key: order-1 and order-2 convert to the all-zero Montgomery u
+    // directly, order-4 and order-8 are annihilated by the scalar clamping in
+    // x25519_secret_from_seed. Either way the per-recipient wrap could be
+    // rebuilt by anyone. Resolution already refuses such a key (see
+    // Did::to_verifying_key); this guard covers the SEAL side on its own terms
+    // for a caller that obtained the key some other way. The open side
+    // (open_blob's attacker-supplied `eph`) skips any entry whose exchange with
+    // this reader yields the all-zero shared secret
+    // (`yields_all_zero_shared_secret`), regardless of whether the bytes decode
+    // to an Edwards point.
+    if vk.is_weak() {
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("verifying key is a small-order point"));
+    }
+
     let edwards = CompressedEdwardsY::from_slice(vk.as_bytes())
         .ok()
         .and_then(|c| c.decompress())
@@ -18,6 +34,26 @@ fn x25519_public(vk: &VerifyingKey) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
     Ok(edwards.to_montgomery().to_bytes())
 }
 
+/// True when the X25519 exchange between an attacker-supplied `u` and this
+/// reader's scalar yields the all-zero shared secret.
+///
+/// Asked of the RESULT, not of the encoding, and that distinction is the whole
+/// guard. The previous version decompressed `u` to an Edwards point and asked
+/// `is_small_order`, which reports "safe" for any low-order encoding that does
+/// not decompress at all. Measured across the seven standard low-order
+/// encodings, six were caught and `u = p - 1` was not: it fails to decompress,
+/// so the check returned false, and the exchange is still the all-zero secret.
+/// An entry built on it unwraps for every reader.
+///
+/// Enumerating encodings cannot be exhaustive, because the attack depends on the
+/// shared secret rather than on the bytes that produced it, and twist and
+/// non-canonical inputs keep arriving. Asking the result needs no list.
+fn yields_all_zero_shared_secret(u: &[u8; 32], scalar: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
+    use curve25519_dalek::montgomery::MontgomeryPoint;
+
+    MontgomeryPoint(*u).mul_clamped(*scalar).to_bytes() == [0u8; 32]
+}
+
 /// X25519 secret scalar for an Ed25519 seed (SHA-512 of seed, lower 32, clamped).
 /// Returns the scalar wrapped in `Zeroizing`, and scrubs the intermediate
 /// SHA-512 digest, so no copy of this secret material lingers in freed memory.
@@ -49,6 +85,13 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 const MAGIC: &[u8] = b"GLENC";
 const VERSION: u8 = 2;
 
+/// Upper bound on the blinded recipient list. The envelope author controls
+/// this count and `open_blob` pays one X25519 exchange per entry before it can
+/// answer "not a recipient", so the count has to be capped rather than
+/// optimized (#419). Legitimate envelopes carry a handful of authorized
+/// readers, so 256 is far above real use.
+const MAX_RECIPIENTS: usize = 256;
+
 #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
 struct Recipient {
     eph: String,   // base64 ephemeral x25519 pubkey (32B)
@@ -68,6 +111,14 @@ pub fn seal_blob(plaintext: &[u8], recipients: &[VerifyingKey]) -> Result<Vec<u8
     if recipients.is_empty() {
         return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("seal_blob: no recipients"));
     }
+    // Same bound open_blob enforces: an envelope over the cap could never be
+    // opened, so refuse to seal it (#419).
+    if recipients.len() > MAX_RECIPIENTS {
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
+            "seal_blob: {} recipients, over the {MAX_RECIPIENTS} cap",
+            recipients.len()
+        ));
+    }
     let mut content_key = [0u8; 32];
     OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut content_key);
     let body_cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&content_key)
@@ -126,9 +177,20 @@ pub fn open_blob(envelope: &[u8], keypair: &Keypair) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let header: Header =
         serde_json::from_slice(envelope.get(p..p + hlen).context("truncated header")?)
             .context("decode header")?;
+    // Reject before the recipient scan: every entry below is an X25519
+    // exchange, and a non-recipient would run the whole list (#419).
+    if header.recipients.len() > MAX_RECIPIENTS {
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
+            "envelope carries {} recipients, over the {MAX_RECIPIENTS} cap",
+            header.recipients.len()
+        ));
+    }
     let body = &envelope[p + hlen..];
 
-    let my_x = XSecret::from(*x25519_secret_from_seed(&keypair.to_seed()));
+    // The raw scalar is kept alongside the box secret so the exchange can be
+    // tested BEFORE a box is built from an attacker-supplied ephemeral.
+    let my_x_scalar = x25519_secret_from_seed(&keypair.to_seed());
+    let my_x = XSecret::from(*my_x_scalar);
 
     // Identities are blinded: no entry says which recipient it belongs to, so
     // try each one. The ChaChaBox AEAD tag authenticates, so exactly the
@@ -140,7 +202,12 @@ pub fn open_blob(envelope: &[u8], keypair: &Keypair) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
             .ok()
             .and_then(|b| <[u8; 32]>::try_from(b.as_slice()).ok())
         {
-            Some(b) => XPublic::from(b),
+            // An ephemeral whose exchange with this reader is the all-zero
+            // shared secret would unwrap for anyone, so the entry is skipped.
+            // Tested on the exchange itself: an encoding-shaped check misses
+            // every low-order input that does not decompress to Edwards.
+            Some(b) if !yields_all_zero_shared_secret(&b, &my_x_scalar) => XPublic::from(b),
+            Some(_) => continue,
             None => continue,
         };
         // from_slice panics on a wrong length, and the envelope is attacker
@@ -293,4 +360,436 @@ mod tests {
         header["nonce"] = bad_nonce;
         assert!(open_blob(&reframe(&header), &reader).is_err());
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn over_cap_recipient_list_is_rejected_before_the_scan() {
+        // #419: the envelope author controls the recipient count and each entry
+        // costs an X25519 exchange, so the list is capped. Reframe a valid
+        // envelope with MAX_RECIPIENTS + 1 junk entries.
+        let reader = Keypair::generate();
+        let env = seal_blob(b"private blob contents", &[reader.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
+
+        let mut p = MAGIC.len() + 1;
+        let hlen = u32::from_le_bytes(env[p..p + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
+        p += 4;
+        let header_bytes = &env[p..p + hlen];
+        let body = &env[p + hlen..];
+
+        let mut header: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(header_bytes).unwrap();
+        let junk = serde_json::json!({
+            "eph": B64.encode([0u8; 32]),
+            "nonce": B64.encode([0u8; 24]),
+            "wrap": B64.encode([0u8; 48]),
+        });
+        header["recipients"] = serde_json::Value::Array(vec![junk.clone(); MAX_RECIPIENTS + 1]);
+
+        let hj = serde_json::to_vec(&header).unwrap();
+        let mut fat = Vec::new();
+        fat.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
+        fat.push(VERSION);
+        fat.extend_from_slice(&(hj.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
+        fat.extend_from_slice(&hj);
+        fat.extend_from_slice(body);
+
+        let err = open_blob(&fat, &reader).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("recipients"),
+            "expected the recipient-cap error, got: {err}"
+        );
+
+        // Exactly at the cap the envelope is still processed end to end.
+        header["recipients"] = serde_json::Value::Array(vec![junk; MAX_RECIPIENTS]);
+        let hj = serde_json::to_vec(&header).unwrap();
+        let mut at_cap = Vec::new();
+        at_cap.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
+        at_cap.push(VERSION);
+        at_cap.extend_from_slice(&(hj.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
+        at_cap.extend_from_slice(&hj);
+        at_cap.extend_from_slice(body);
+        let err = open_blob(&at_cap, &reader).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            !err.to_string().contains("over the"),
+            "at-cap envelope must reach the scan, got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn seal_refuses_a_recipient_list_over_the_cap() {
+        // An envelope over the cap can never be opened, so seal must reject it
+        // instead of minting one.
+        let keys: Vec<VerifyingKey> = (0..MAX_RECIPIENTS + 1)
+            .map(|_| Keypair::generate().verifying_key())
+            .collect();
+        let err = seal_blob(b"blob", &keys).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("recipients"),
+            "expected the recipient-cap error, got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Every standard low-order X25519 encoding must be detected by
+    /// `yields_all_zero_shared_secret`, including encodings that do not
+    /// decompress to an Edwards point (notably `u = p - 1`). The open side
+    /// rejects on the exchange result, not on decode shape, because an
+    /// encoding-shaped check misses non-decompressing low-order inputs while
+    /// still yielding the all-zero shared secret.
+    #[test]
+    fn all_zero_shared_secret_is_detected_for_every_standard_low_order_encoding() {
+        // The seven standard X25519 low-order encodings, driven as a set rather
+        // than as the two that happen to decompress. The encoding-shaped check
+        // this replaced reported `p - 1` as safe, and its exchange is all-zero.
+        let mut one = [0u8; 32];
+        one[0] = 1;
+        let hex = |h: &str| -> [u8; 32] {
+            let mut out = [0u8; 32];
+            for i in 0..32 {
+                out[i] = u8::from_str_radix(&h[i * 2..i * 2 + 2], 16).unwrap();
+            }
+            out
+        };
+        let vectors = [
+            ("u=0", [0u8; 32]),
+            ("u=1", one),
+            (
+                "order8-a",
+                hex("e0eb7a7c3b41b8ae1656e3faf19fc46ada098deb9c32b1fd866205165f49b800"),
+            ),
+            (
+                "order8-b",
+                hex("5f9c95bca3508c24b1d0b1559c83ef5b04445cc4581c8e86d8224eddd09f1157"),
+            ),
+            (
+                "p-1",
+                hex("ecffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f"),
+            ),
+            (
+                "p",
+                hex("edffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f"),
+            ),
+            (
+                "p+1",
+                hex("eeffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f"),
+            ),
+        ];
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let scalar = x25519_secret_from_seed(&kp.to_seed());
+        for (name, u) in vectors {
+            assert!(
+                yields_all_zero_shared_secret(&u, &scalar),
+                "{name} is a low-order encoding and must be detected"
+            );
+        }
+
+        // And the other direction, or a guard that returned true always would
+        // pass everything above while making the envelope unopenable.
+        let real_u = x25519_public(&kp.verifying_key()).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            !yields_all_zero_shared_secret(&real_u, &scalar),
+            "a real key must not be treated as low-order"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The open side must skip an entry whose header-supplied `eph` is a
+    /// low-order point: such an entry forces the all-zero shared secret and
+    /// would unwrap for any reader. A poisoned entry among honest ones must
+    /// not DoS the envelope — the honest entry still opens.
+    #[test]
+    fn open_blob_skips_a_low_order_ephemeral_and_still_opens_honest_entry() {
+        use curve25519_dalek::montgomery::MontgomeryPoint;
+        let reader = Keypair::generate();
+        let env = seal_blob(b"private blob contents", &[reader.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
+
+        // Split the envelope framing into header JSON and body.
+        let mut p = MAGIC.len() + 1;
+        let hlen = u32::from_le_bytes(env[p..p + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
+        p += 4;
+        let header_bytes = &env[p..p + hlen];
+        let body = &env[p + hlen..];
+
+        // A low-order Montgomery u (u = 0) encoded as the entry's eph.
+        let low_order_u = MontgomeryPoint([0u8; 32]).to_bytes();
+        let poisoned = serde_json::json!({
+            "eph": B64.encode(low_order_u),
+            "nonce": B64.encode([0u8; 24]),
+            "wrap": B64.encode([0u8; 32]),
+        });
+
+        let reframe = |header: &serde_json::Value| -> Vec<u8> {
+            let hj = serde_json::to_vec(header).unwrap();
+            let mut out = Vec::new();
+            out.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
+            out.push(VERSION);
+            out.extend_from_slice(&(hj.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
+            out.extend_from_slice(&hj);
+            out.extend_from_slice(body);
+            out
+        };
+
+        let mut header: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(header_bytes).unwrap();
+        // Prepend the poisoned entry. The reader's honest entry must still
+        // unwrap, so the envelope opens despite the low-order entry.
+        let recipients = header["recipients"].as_array_mut().unwrap();
+        recipients.insert(0, poisoned);
+        assert_eq!(
+            open_blob(&reframe(&header), &reader).unwrap(),
+            b"private blob contents",
+            "the honest entry must still open despite a low-order eph entry"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Must-not for the open-side guard: an envelope whose ONLY entry is built
+    /// on a low-order ephemeral must not open for any reader. Without the
+    /// guard the all-zero shared secret unwraps for everyone, so the attacker
+    /// controls the plaintext and the envelope's confidentiality is void.
+    #[test]
+    fn open_blob_rejects_a_poisoned_only_envelope() {
+        use chacha20poly1305::{aead::Aead, KeyInit, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce};
+        use crypto_box::aead::AeadCore;
+        use curve25519_dalek::montgomery::MontgomeryPoint;
+
+        // Build a poisoned envelope from scratch: one recipient entry whose
+        // eph is the low-order u = 0. The wrap is the encryption of a content
+        // key under the all-zero shared secret, so without the guard any
+        // reader's ChaChaBox against u = 0 decrypts it.
+        let mut content_key: [u8; 32] = Default::default();
+        OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut content_key);
+        let attacker_x = XSecret::generate(&mut OsRng);
+        let zero_box = ChaChaBox::new(&XPublic::from(<[u8; 32]>::default()), &attacker_x);
+        let nonce = ChaChaBox::generate_nonce(&mut OsRng);
+        let wrap = zero_box.encrypt(&nonce, &content_key[..]).unwrap();
+
+        let mut body_nonce: [u8; 24] = Default::default();
+        OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut body_nonce);
+        let body_cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&content_key).unwrap();
+        let body = body_cipher
+            .encrypt(
+                XNonce::from_slice(&body_nonce),
+                b"attacker-chosen plaintext".as_slice(),
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let header = serde_json::json!({
+            "alg": "xchacha20poly1305",
+            "nonce": B64.encode(body_nonce),
+            "recipients": [{
+                "eph": B64.encode(MontgomeryPoint([0u8; 32]).to_bytes()),
+                "nonce": B64.encode(nonce),
+                "wrap": B64.encode(wrap),
+            }],
+        });
+        let header_json = serde_json::to_vec(&header).unwrap();
+        let mut env = Vec::new();
+        env.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
+        env.push(VERSION);
+        env.extend_from_slice(&(header_json.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
+        env.extend_from_slice(&header_json);
+        env.extend_from_slice(&body);
+
+        let reader = Keypair::generate();
+        let err = open_blob(&env, &reader).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("not a recipient"),
+            "a poisoned-only envelope must not open for anyone, got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The same must-not, driven with the low-order encoding that does NOT map
+    /// to an Edwards point.
+    ///
+    /// This is the case an encoding-shaped guard cannot see. `u = p - 1` is a
+    /// legal X25519 input whose exchange is the all-zero secret for any scalar,
+    /// and `MontgomeryPoint::to_edwards` returns None for it, so a check written
+    /// as "decompress, then ask is_small_order" reports it as safe. Measured
+    /// across the seven standard low-order encodings: six are caught that way
+    /// and this one is not.
+    ///
+    /// Found by a cross-family review of the head that first added the guard,
+    /// and the comment beside that guard asserted this case was already handled
+    /// by a decode path that does not exist. That is why the fix rejects on the
+    /// RESULT of the exchange rather than on a list of encodings: the result is
+    /// what the attack actually depends on, and it needs no enumeration to be
+    /// exhaustive.
+    #[test]
+    fn open_blob_rejects_a_non_edwards_low_order_ephemeral() {
+        // No blanket `use ...::Aead` here. Two aead versions are reachable, and a
+        // blanket import silently resolved the wrap through the one open_blob does
+        // NOT decrypt with, producing a ciphertext that could never open. The test
+        // then passed with the guard, without it, and with the original pre-fix
+        // guard alike, proving nothing. Every call below names its trait.
+        use chacha20poly1305::{KeyInit, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce};
+        use crypto_box::aead::AeadCore;
+
+        // u = p - 1 = 2^255 - 20, little endian.
+        let mut eph = [0xffu8; 32];
+        eph[0] = 0xec;
+        eph[31] = 0x7f;
+
+        let mut content_key: [u8; 32] = Default::default();
+        OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut content_key);
+        let attacker_x = XSecret::generate(&mut OsRng);
+        let zero_box = ChaChaBox::new(&XPublic::from(<[u8; 32]>::default()), &attacker_x);
+        let nonce = ChaChaBox::generate_nonce(&mut OsRng);
+        let wrap = crypto_box::aead::Aead::encrypt(&zero_box, &nonce, &content_key[..]).unwrap();
+
+        let mut body_nonce: [u8; 24] = Default::default();
+        OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut body_nonce);
+        let body_cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&content_key).unwrap();
+        let body = chacha20poly1305::aead::Aead::encrypt(
+            &body_cipher,
+            XNonce::from_slice(&body_nonce),
+            b"attacker-chosen plaintext".as_slice(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let header = serde_json::json!({
+            "alg": "xchacha20poly1305",
+            "nonce": B64.encode(body_nonce),
+            "recipients": [{
+                "eph": B64.encode(eph),
+                "nonce": B64.encode(nonce),
+                "wrap": B64.encode(wrap),
+            }],
+        });
+        let header_json = serde_json::to_vec(&header).unwrap();
+        let mut env = Vec::new();
+        env.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
+        env.push(VERSION);
+        env.extend_from_slice(&(header_json.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
+        env.extend_from_slice(&header_json);
+        env.extend_from_slice(&body);
+
+        let reader = Keypair::generate();
+        let err = open_blob(&env, &reader).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("not a recipient"),
+            "an envelope whose only entry uses a non-Edwards low-order eph must not \
+             open for anyone, got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The compressed identity point: a well-formed Ed25519 encoding that is
+    /// small-order, so every shared secret derived from it is all-zero.
+    fn weak_verifying_key() -> VerifyingKey {
+        let mut weak = [0u8; 32];
+        weak[0] = 1;
+        let vk = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&weak).expect("identity point decompresses");
+        assert!(vk.is_weak(), "fixture precondition: key is small-order");
+        vk
+    }
+
+    /// A small-order recipient key converts to Montgomery u = 0, and X25519
+    /// against u = 0 is the all-zero shared secret for ANY scalar, so the
+    /// wrapping box is reconstructable with no secret at all. Reject at the
+    /// primitive so the seal side is safe regardless of how the caller
+    /// obtained the key.
+    #[test]
+    fn x25519_public_rejects_a_small_order_key() {
+        let weak_vk = weak_verifying_key();
+
+        assert!(
+            x25519_public(&weak_vk).is_err(),
+            "a small-order key must not yield an x25519 public key"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Control: a legitimate key still converts, and to a non-zero u.
+    #[test]
+    fn x25519_public_still_accepts_a_real_key() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let u = x25519_public(&kp.verifying_key()).expect("a real key must convert");
+        assert_ne!(u, [0u8; 32], "a real key must not map to the zero point");
+    }
+
+    /// The guard has to propagate: no envelope may be produced for a weak
+    /// recipient even when the DID choke point is bypassed entirely.
+    #[test]
+    fn seal_blob_refuses_a_small_order_recipient() {
+        let weak_vk = weak_verifying_key();
+
+        assert!(
+            seal_blob(b"withheld", &[weak_vk]).is_err(),
+            "sealing to a weak recipient must fail"
+        );
+
+        // And a mixed set must fail too: one weak recipient exposes the shared
+        // content key, so a partial envelope is not an acceptable outcome.
+        let honest = Keypair::generate();
+        assert!(
+            seal_blob(b"withheld", &[honest.verifying_key(), weak_vk]).is_err(),
+            "a mixed honest+weak recipient set must fail closed, not seal partially"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Control for the two above: the ordinary seal/open round trip is intact.
+    #[test]
+    fn legit_seal_open_round_trip_still_works() {
+        let reader = Keypair::generate();
+        let env = seal_blob(b"withheld blob", &[reader.verifying_key()]).expect("seal");
+        assert_eq!(open_blob(&env, &reader).expect("open"), b"withheld blob");
+    }
+
+    /// The defect this fix exists to close, kept as an executable regression
+    /// rather than an assertion about absence. It runs the real attack: craft a
+    /// small-order did:key, get it into a recipient set alongside an honest
+    /// reader, then rebuild the wrapping box from the all-zero shared secret
+    /// that a small-order recipient forces. If any guard regresses, this does
+    /// not merely fail, it fails printing the plaintext it recovered.
+    #[test]
+    fn attacker_cannot_recover_plaintext_via_a_weak_recipient() {
+        use crate::did::Did;
+        use std::str::FromStr;
+
+        let weak_vk = weak_verifying_key();
+
+        // Layer 1: the attacker's did:key string must not resolve at all.
+        let weak_did = Did::from_verifying_key(&weak_vk).to_string();
+        assert!(
+            Did::from_str(&weak_did)
+                .expect("still a well-formed did:key")
+                .to_verifying_key()
+                .is_err(),
+            "a small-order did:key must not resolve"
+        );
+
+        // Layer 2: even handed the key directly, sealing must refuse. One weak
+        // recipient would expose the single shared content key, so the honest
+        // reader's blob would be readable by anyone.
+        let honest = Keypair::generate();
+        let secret_plaintext = b"WITHHELD BLOB CONTENTS";
+        let envelope = match seal_blob(secret_plaintext, &[honest.verifying_key(), weak_vk]) {
+            Err(_) => return, // no envelope exists, nothing to attack
+            Ok(env) => env,
+        };
+
+        // Only reachable if a guard regressed. Run the attack and report what
+        // it got, so the failure names the actual exposure.
+        let mut p = MAGIC.len() + 1;
+        let hlen = u32::from_le_bytes(envelope[p..p + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
+        p += 4;
+        let header: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&envelope[p..p + hlen]).unwrap();
+        let body = &envelope[p + hlen..];
+        let body_nonce = B64.decode(header["nonce"].as_str().unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+        // X25519 against u = 0 is the all-zero shared secret for any scalar, so
+        // the sealer's box is reconstructable with a key the attacker picks.
+        let zero_box = ChaChaBox::new(
+            &XPublic::from(<[u8; 32]>::default()),
+            &XSecret::generate(&mut OsRng),
+        );
+        for r in header["recipients"].as_array().unwrap() {
+            let n = B64.decode(r["nonce"].as_str().unwrap()).unwrap();
+            let w = B64.decode(r["wrap"].as_str().unwrap()).unwrap();
+            if let Ok(content_key) = zero_box.decrypt(n.as_slice().into(), w.as_slice()) {
+                let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&content_key).unwrap();
+                let recovered = cipher
+                    .decrypt(XNonce::from_slice(&body_nonce), body)
+                    .expect("body decrypts once the content key is out");
+                panic!(
+                    "REGRESSION: attacker recovered plaintext with no private key: {:?}",
+                    String::from_utf8_lossy(&recovered)
+                );
+            }
+        }
+        panic!("an envelope was sealed to a small-order recipient; the seal guard regressed");
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-core/src/http_sig.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //! HTTP Signatures (RFC 9421) for gitlawb.
 //!
-//! Every write request to a gitlawb node must be signed by the actor's
+//! Every write request to a Twigpine node must be signed by the actor's
 //! Ed25519 private key. The signature covers:
 //!   - `@method`         — HTTP method (uppercase)
 //!   - `@path`           — request path and query
@@ -14,13 +14,13 @@
 use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, Engine};
 use chrono::Utc;
 use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
 
 use crate::did::Did;
 use crate::identity::Keypair;
 use crate::{Error, Result};
 
-/// The component identifiers covered by every gitlawb signature.
+/// The component identifiers covered by every Twigpine signature.
 pub const COVERED_COMPONENTS: &[&str] = &["@method", "@path", "content-digest"];
 
 /// The three headers produced by RFC 9421 signing.
@@ -67,11 +67,20 @@ impl HttpSignature {
         let components_str = &rest[open + 1..close];
         let params_str = &rest[close + 1..]; // starts with ';'
 
-        // "\"@method\" \"@path\" \"content-digest\"" → ["@method", "@path", "content-digest"]
-        let components: Vec<String> = components_str
-            .split_whitespace()
-            .map(|s| s.trim_matches('"').to_string())
-            .collect();
+        // RFC 9421 §2.1: a component identifier appears at most once. Gitlawb
+        // only supports bare names; parameters are rejected so reordered
+        // equivalent forms cannot bypass duplicate detection as distinct strings.
+        let mut components = Vec::new();
+        let mut seen = HashSet::new();
+        for token in components_str.split_whitespace() {
+            let name = parse_covered_component(token)?;
+            if !seen.insert(name.clone()) {
+                return Err(Error::HttpSignature(format!(
+                    "duplicate covered component '{name}' in Signature-Input"
+                )));
+            }
+            components.push(name);
+        }
 
         let params = parse_params(params_str)?;
 
@@ -113,15 +122,48 @@ impl HttpSignature {
         })
     }
 
-    /// Reject if the `created` timestamp is more than 5 minutes from now.
+    /// Reject a `created` timestamp outside the acceptance window, which is
+    /// ASYMMETRIC: up to 5 minutes into the past, but only 60 seconds into the
+    /// future.
+    ///
+    /// The two directions are two comparisons rather than one distance, because
+    /// they are not the same event. A signature that arrives late is ordinary:
+    /// clocks run slow, requests queue, and networks are not instant, so the
+    /// past side keeps the full 300-second allowance. A signature stamped ahead
+    /// of this node's clock is not ordinary, and folding both sides into an
+    /// `abs()` let a signer extend its own validity: signed at T with
+    /// `created = T + 300`, it stayed acceptable until roughly T + 600, so the
+    /// effective window was double the one this function advertises. The
+    /// forward tolerance exists only to absorb honest drift between two hosts,
+    /// which is what 60 seconds buys; it is the same allowance the gossip
+    /// path's freshness check uses for the same reason.
     pub fn check_created(&self) -> Result<()> {
+        const MAX_AGE_SECS: i64 = 300;
+        const MAX_FUTURE_SECS: i64 = 60;
+
         let now = Utc::now().timestamp();
-        let skew = (now - self.created).abs();
-        if skew > 300 {
+
+        // Saturating, not plain subtraction. `created` is parsed as an
+        // unrestricted i64 straight from the Signature-Input header, so a
+        // sender picks it: at i64::MIN the past-side subtraction overflows,
+        // which panics a debug build and wraps a release one into an absurd
+        // value that can read as acceptable. Saturating gives the answer the
+        // check wants at both extremes, since a timestamp that far away is
+        // refused by whichever side it saturates toward.
+        let age = now.saturating_sub(self.created);
+        if age > MAX_AGE_SECS {
             return Err(Error::HttpSignature(format!(
-                "clock skew too large: {skew}s (max 300s)"
+                "clock skew too large: created {age}s in the past (max {MAX_AGE_SECS}s)"
             )));
         }
+
+        let ahead = self.created.saturating_sub(now);
+        if ahead > MAX_FUTURE_SECS {
+            return Err(Error::HttpSignature(format!(
+                "clock skew too large: created {ahead}s in the future (max {MAX_FUTURE_SECS}s)"
+            )));
+        }
+
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -203,6 +245,33 @@ pub fn compute_content_digest(body: &[u8]) -> String {
     format!("sha-256=:{}:", STANDARD.encode(hasher.finalize()))
 }
 
+/// Parse one covered-component token from Signature-Input's parenthesized list.
+///
+/// Gitlawb only supports bare component names (`"@method"`, `"@path"`,
+/// `"content-digest"`). RFC 9421 permits parameters on identifiers; they are
+/// rejected rather than accepted in a form `missing_components()` and
+/// `build_signing_string()` cannot handle consistently.
+fn parse_covered_component(token: &str) -> Result<String> {
+    let token = token.trim();
+    let open = token
+        .strip_prefix('"')
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::HttpSignature("component must be a quoted string".into()))?;
+    let close = open
+        .find('"')
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::HttpSignature("unterminated component string".into()))?;
+    let name = &open[..close];
+    if name.is_empty() {
+        return Err(Error::HttpSignature("empty component name".into()));
+    }
+    let trailing = open[close + 1..].trim();
+    if !trailing.is_empty() {
+        return Err(Error::HttpSignature(format!(
+            "component parameters are not supported on '{name}'"
+        )));
+    }
+    Ok(name.to_string())
+}
+
 /// Parse `;key="value";key2=value` parameter string into a map.
 fn parse_params(s: &str) -> Result<HashMap<String, String>> {
     let mut map = HashMap::new();
@@ -272,6 +341,91 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(missing.contains(&"content-digest"));
     }
 
+    /// RFC 9421 §2.1: a component identifier must not appear twice in the
+    /// covered list. Repeating one is not a way to say anything, but it does
+    /// repeat a line in the signing string, so the size of what a verifier
+    /// builds (and what a node persists alongside a claim) is set by how many
+    /// times the caller chose to write the same name.
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_rejects_component_parameters() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let did = kp.did();
+        let sig_input = format!(
+            r#"sig1=("@method" "@path" "content-digest";sf);keyid="{did}";alg="ed25519";created=1000"#
+        );
+        let err = HttpSignature::parse(
+            &sig_input,
+            "sig1=:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:",
+        )
+        .expect_err("parameterized components must be refused");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("component parameters"),
+            "got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_rejects_reordered_equivalent_component_parameters() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let did = kp.did();
+        let sig_input = format!(
+            r#"sig1=("content-digest";sf;tr "content-digest";tr;sf "@method" "@path");keyid="{did}";alg="ed25519";created=1000"#
+        );
+        let err = HttpSignature::parse(
+            &sig_input,
+            "sig1=:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:",
+        )
+        .expect_err("reordered equivalent parameters must not bypass as distinct components");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("component parameters"),
+            "got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_many_distinct_components_completes_quickly() {
+        use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let did = kp.did();
+        let names: Vec<String> = (0..20_000).map(|i| format!("\"c{i}\"")).collect();
+        let inner = names.join(" ");
+        let sig_input = format!(r#"sig1=({inner});keyid="{did}";alg="ed25519";created=1000"#);
+        let start = Instant::now();
+        let result = HttpSignature::parse(
+            &sig_input,
+            "sig1=:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:",
+        );
+        let elapsed = start.elapsed();
+        assert!(
+            elapsed < Duration::from_secs(2),
+            "duplicate tracking must stay linear, took {elapsed:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(result.is_ok(), "distinct names should parse: {:?}", result);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_rejects_duplicate_components() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let did = kp.did();
+        let sig_input = format!(
+            r#"sig1=("@method" "@path" "@path" "content-digest");keyid="{did}";alg="ed25519";created=1000"#
+        );
+        let err = HttpSignature::parse(&sig_input, "sig1=:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:")
+            .expect_err("a repeated component must be refused");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("duplicate"),
+            "the error must name the duplication, got: {err}"
+        );
+
+        // The control: the same list without the repeat still parses.
+        let ok = format!(
+            r#"sig1=("@method" "@path" "content-digest");keyid="{did}";alg="ed25519";created=1000"#
+        );
+        HttpSignature::parse(&ok, "sig1=:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:")
+            .expect("a distinct component list must still parse");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn verify_signature_end_to_end() {
         use crate::identity::verify;
@@ -335,6 +489,75 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(sig.check_created().is_err());
     }
 
+    /// Build a parseable signature whose `created` is `offset` seconds from now
+    /// (negative for the past), so a test can pin one side of the window.
+    fn sig_created_at_offset(offset: i64) -> HttpSignature {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let did = kp.did();
+        let created = Utc::now().timestamp() + offset;
+        let sig_input = format!(
+            r#"sig1=("@method" "@path" "content-digest");keyid="{did}";alg="ed25519";created={created}"#
+        );
+        HttpSignature::parse(&sig_input, "sig1=:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:").unwrap()
+    }
+
+    /// Build a signature at an ABSOLUTE `created`, so a test can drive the
+    /// extremes an offset from now cannot reach.
+    fn sig_created_absolute(created: i64) -> HttpSignature {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let did = kp.did();
+        let sig_input = format!(
+            r#"sig1=("@method" "@path" "content-digest");keyid="{did}";alg="ed25519";created={created}"#
+        );
+        HttpSignature::parse(&sig_input, "sig1=:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:").unwrap()
+    }
+
+    /// `created` is parsed as an unrestricted i64 from a header the sender
+    /// writes, so the window check has to survive both ends of the type. Before
+    /// the saturating form this panicked with "attempt to subtract with
+    /// overflow" on the past side, which is a debug-build crash any client
+    /// could trigger by sending one header value.
+    #[test]
+    fn extreme_created_values_are_refused_rather_than_overflowing() {
+        for created in [i64::MIN, i64::MIN + 1, i64::MAX - 1, i64::MAX] {
+            let err = sig_created_absolute(created)
+                .check_created()
+                .expect_err("an extreme created must be refused, not accepted");
+            let msg = err.to_string();
+            assert!(
+                msg.contains("past") || msg.contains("future"),
+                "created={created} must be refused by a named direction, got: {msg}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn created_301s_in_past_rejected() {
+        let err = sig_created_at_offset(-301).check_created().unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("past"), "{err}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn created_299s_in_past_accepted() {
+        assert!(sig_created_at_offset(-299).check_created().is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn created_61s_in_future_rejected() {
+        let err = sig_created_at_offset(61).check_created().unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("future"), "{err}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn created_30s_in_future_accepted() {
+        assert!(sig_created_at_offset(30).check_created().is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn created_exactly_now_accepted() {
+        assert!(sig_created_at_offset(0).check_created().is_ok());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn fresh_signature_passes_clock_skew() {
         let kp = Keypair::generate();
@@ -343,6 +566,26 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(sig.check_created().is_ok());
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn extreme_created_timestamps_reject_without_wrapping() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let did = kp.did();
+        let parse = |created: i64| {
+            let sig_input =
+                format!(r#"sig1=("@method");keyid="{did}";alg="ed25519";created={created}"#);
+            HttpSignature::parse(&sig_input, "sig1=:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:").unwrap()
+        };
+        // i64::MIN used to panic in debug (subtraction overflow) and wrap to a
+        // passing skew in release; now - 2^63 wrapped to i64::MIN, whose abs()
+        // wrapped back to itself and read as fresh. Both must reject.
+        for created in [i64::MIN, i64::MAX, Utc::now().timestamp() - i64::MAX] {
+            assert!(
+                parse(created).check_created().is_err(),
+                "created={created} must not pass the freshness gate"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn parse_error_missing_sig1_prefix() {
         let err = HttpSignature::parse(

crates/gitlawb-core/src/identity.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //! Keypair generation, storage, and signing.
 //!
-//! A gitlawb identity is an Ed25519 keypair. The public key encodes into a
+//! A Twigpine identity is an Ed25519 keypair. The public key encodes into a
 //! `did:key` DID. The private key is stored as PKCS#8 PEM on disk.
 
 use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, VerifyingKey};
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use zeroize::Zeroizing;
 use crate::did::Did;
 use crate::{Error, Result};
 
-/// An Ed25519 keypair that is the root identity for a gitlawb actor.
+/// An Ed25519 keypair that is the root identity for a Twigpine actor.
 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct Keypair {
     signing_key: SigningKey,

crates/gitlawb-core/src/identity_path.rs

@@ -1,299 +0,0 @@
-//! Where the identity key and the delegation store live.
-//!
-//! `gl` and `git-remote-gitlawb` have to agree on this. `gl ucan import` writes a
-//! delegation to `<dir>/delegations/`, and the helper reads it back from the same
-//! place when it builds the `X-Ucan` header on push. If the two resolve
-//! `GITLAWB_KEY` differently the push goes out with no header and the node refuses
-//! the delegate, with nothing on either side to say why — so the rules live here
-//! once, in the crate both binaries already depend on, rather than being written
-//! twice and drifting.
-//!
-//! The home directory is a parameter rather than something this module looks up.
-//! `gitlawb-core` is embedded by every consumer and is held to an explicit
-//! dependency allowlist (`ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt`); the callers already
-//! carry `dirs`, so taking `home` keeps the rules shared without widening core's
-//! tree. It also makes every case below testable against a fixed home.
-
-use std::ffi::OsStr;
-use std::path::{Component, Path, PathBuf};
-
-use crate::{Error, Result};
-
-/// Environment variable naming the identity PEM.
-pub const KEY_ENV: &str = "GITLAWB_KEY";
-
-/// Name of the PEM file inside the identity directory.
-pub const KEY_FILE_NAME: &str = "identity.pem";
-
-/// Directory under the home directory used when `GITLAWB_KEY` is unset.
-pub const DEFAULT_DIR_NAME: &str = ".gitlawb";
-
-/// Absolute path of the identity PEM: `$GITLAWB_KEY`, else
-/// `<home>/.gitlawb/identity.pem`.
-///
-/// An empty `GITLAWB_KEY` counts as unset. That is what a shell leaves behind for
-/// `FOO=` and for an unset variable expanded into a wrapper script, and reading it
-/// as a path would resolve against the process working directory instead.
-pub fn identity_key_path(home: Option<&Path>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
-    // `var_os`, not `var`: `var` folds a non-UTF-8 value into the same `Err` as
-    // unset, so an operator whose key path is not valid UTF-8 would silently get
-    // the default directory rather than theirs — or an error naming the real
-    // problem.
-    match std::env::var_os(KEY_ENV) {
-        Some(raw) if !raw.is_empty() => resolve_key_value(Path::new(&raw), home),
-        _ => Ok(require_home(home)?
-            .join(DEFAULT_DIR_NAME)
-            .join(KEY_FILE_NAME)),
-    }
-}
-
-/// The directory holding `identity.pem` and `delegations/` — the parent of
-/// [`identity_key_path`].
-pub fn identity_dir(home: Option<&Path>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
-    let key = identity_key_path(home)?;
-    key.parent().map(Path::to_path_buf).ok_or_else(|| {
-        Error::Key(format!(
-            "{KEY_ENV} has no parent directory: {}",
-            key.display()
-        ))
-    })
-}
-
-/// The home directory, demanded only where the value being resolved needs it.
-///
-/// An absolute `GITLAWB_KEY` never needs home, so requiring it up front would
-/// discard a perfectly good key on a host where `dirs::home_dir()` returns `None`
-/// — no `HOME` and no passwd entry, which is an ordinary container shape. The
-/// helper would then push unsigned, blaming the home directory for a setting the
-/// operator had configured correctly.
-fn require_home(home: Option<&Path>) -> Result<&Path> {
-    home.ok_or_else(|| {
-        Error::Key(format!(
-            "could not determine the home directory, which is needed to resolve this \
-             {KEY_ENV} value. Set {KEY_ENV} to an absolute path to avoid needing it."
-        ))
-    })
-}
-
-/// Apply the `GITLAWB_KEY` rules to a raw value.
-///
-/// Split out from [`identity_key_path`] so the rules can be tested without setting
-/// a process-global environment variable, which would make the tests race.
-fn resolve_key_value(raw: &Path, home: Option<&Path>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
-    let path = expand_tilde(raw, home)?;
-
-    if !path.is_absolute() {
-        return Err(Error::Key(format!(
-            "{KEY_ENV} must be an absolute path (got {}). It also determines where \
-             delegations are stored, and `gl` and `git-remote-gitlawb` do not share a \
-             working directory, so a relative path sends them to different stores.",
-            raw.display()
-        )));
-    }
-    if path.parent().is_none() {
-        return Err(Error::Key(format!(
-            "{KEY_ENV} must name the key file, not the filesystem root (got {}). \
-             Point it at the PEM, e.g. ~/{DEFAULT_DIR_NAME}/{KEY_FILE_NAME}.",
-            raw.display()
-        )));
-    }
-    Ok(path)
-}
-
-/// Expand a leading `~/`, and only that.
-///
-/// `~user` is shell syntax this does not implement; leaving its `~` in place makes
-/// it fail the absolute-path check with a message that names the real problem,
-/// which beats resolving it somewhere the operator did not ask for. A bare `~` or
-/// `~/` is refused outright: it names a directory where a file is required, and
-/// expanding it to the home directory would put the delegation store beside the
-/// home directory rather than inside it, since the store is the key's *parent*.
-///
-/// Matched on the first path component rather than on a string prefix. That is
-/// what lets the value stay an `OsStr` end to end: the helper's old
-/// `str::strip_prefix("~/")` needed a `String` first, which is why it reached for
-/// `env::var` and folded every non-UTF-8 path into "unset".
-fn expand_tilde(path: &Path, home: Option<&Path>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
-    let mut components = path.components();
-    match components.next() {
-        Some(Component::Normal(first)) if first == OsStr::new("~") => {
-            let rest = components.as_path();
-            if rest.as_os_str().is_empty() {
-                return Err(Error::Key(format!(
-                    "{KEY_ENV} must name the key file, not a directory (got {}). \
-                     Point it at the PEM, e.g. ~/{DEFAULT_DIR_NAME}/{KEY_FILE_NAME}.",
-                    path.display()
-                )));
-            }
-            Ok(require_home(home)?.join(rest))
-        }
-        _ => Ok(path.to_path_buf()),
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    /// A home that is absolute on the host running the tests. `/home/op` is not
-    /// absolute on Windows — it has a root but no prefix — so a shared literal
-    /// would make the absolute-path assertions test the wrong thing there.
-    fn home() -> PathBuf {
-        if cfg!(windows) {
-            PathBuf::from(r"C:\Users\op")
-        } else {
-            PathBuf::from("/home/op")
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn absolute_value_is_taken_verbatim() {
-        let raw = home().join("data").join("keys").join(KEY_FILE_NAME);
-        assert_eq!(resolve_key_value(&raw, Some(&home())).unwrap(), raw);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tilde_slash_expands_to_the_home_directory() {
-        let resolved = resolve_key_value(Path::new("~/keys/identity.pem"), Some(&home())).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resolved, home().join("keys").join(KEY_FILE_NAME));
-    }
-
-    /// The shell-style spelling of the default resolves to the default. Worth
-    /// pinning: this is the form an operator gets by copying a path out of their
-    /// shell, and the two binaries used to reach it by different routes.
-    #[test]
-    fn the_tilde_spelling_of_the_default_resolves_to_the_default() {
-        let resolved =
-            resolve_key_value(Path::new("~/.gitlawb/identity.pem"), Some(&home())).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resolved, home().join(DEFAULT_DIR_NAME).join(KEY_FILE_NAME));
-    }
-
-    /// A relative value resolves against the working directory, and `gl` and
-    /// `git-remote-gitlawb` do not share one: the import would land where the helper
-    /// never looks.
-    #[test]
-    fn relative_values_are_refused() {
-        for raw in ["identity.pem", "keys/identity.pem", "./keys/identity.pem"] {
-            assert!(
-                resolve_key_value(Path::new(raw), Some(&home())).is_err(),
-                "{raw} is relative and must be refused"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// `~user` is shell syntax, not a path, and a bare `~` names a directory where
-    /// a file is required. Refused rather than guessed at.
-    #[test]
-    fn unsupported_tilde_forms_are_refused() {
-        for raw in ["~", "~/", "~someone/keys/identity.pem"] {
-            assert!(
-                resolve_key_value(Path::new(raw), Some(&home())).is_err(),
-                "{raw} must be refused rather than resolved"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The root has no parent, so the delegation store would have nowhere to go.
-    #[test]
-    fn the_filesystem_root_is_refused() {
-        assert!(resolve_key_value(Path::new("/"), Some(&home())).is_err());
-    }
-
-    /// The whole point of `var_os`: a non-UTF-8 value must reach the rules rather
-    /// than being folded into "unset" by `var`. Byte 0xFF is not valid UTF-8 in any
-    /// position, so this value is unreachable through `env::var`.
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    #[test]
-    fn non_utf8_values_reach_the_rules() {
-        use std::ffi::OsString;
-        use std::os::unix::ffi::OsStringExt;
-
-        let relative = OsString::from_vec(b"keys/\xFF/identity.pem".to_vec());
-        assert!(
-            resolve_key_value(Path::new(&relative), Some(&home())).is_err(),
-            "a non-UTF-8 relative path must be refused, not silently defaulted"
-        );
-
-        let mut absolute = OsString::from("/data/");
-        absolute.push(OsString::from_vec(vec![0xFF]));
-        absolute.push("/identity.pem");
-        let resolved = resolve_key_value(Path::new(&absolute), Some(&home())).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(resolved.as_os_str(), absolute.as_os_str());
-    }
-
-    /// Unset and empty both mean "use the default", and the two accessors must stay
-    /// consistent: the directory is the parent of the key, never a sibling of it.
-    /// The process environment is global, so the two cases share one test and one
-    /// lock rather than racing each other.
-    #[test]
-    fn unset_and_empty_both_select_the_default_directory() {
-        use std::sync::Mutex;
-        static LOCK: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());
-        let _guard = LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
-
-        let restore = std::env::var_os(KEY_ENV);
-
-        std::env::remove_var(KEY_ENV);
-        let unset = (
-            identity_key_path(Some(&home())),
-            identity_dir(Some(&home())),
-        );
-        std::env::set_var(KEY_ENV, "");
-        let empty = (
-            identity_key_path(Some(&home())),
-            identity_dir(Some(&home())),
-        );
-
-        match restore {
-            Some(v) => std::env::set_var(KEY_ENV, v),
-            None => std::env::remove_var(KEY_ENV),
-        }
-
-        for (label, (key, dir)) in [("unset", unset), ("empty", empty)] {
-            assert_eq!(
-                key.unwrap(),
-                home().join(DEFAULT_DIR_NAME).join(KEY_FILE_NAME),
-                "{label} key path"
-            );
-            assert_eq!(
-                dir.unwrap(),
-                home().join(DEFAULT_DIR_NAME),
-                "{label} directory"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod no_home_tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    /// An absolute key needs no home directory. Demanding one up front discarded a
-    /// correctly-configured `GITLAWB_KEY` on any host where `dirs::home_dir()`
-    /// returns `None` — no `HOME` and no passwd entry, an ordinary container shape —
-    /// and the helper then pushed unsigned while blaming the home directory.
-    #[test]
-    fn an_absolute_key_resolves_without_a_home_directory() {
-        let raw = if cfg!(windows) {
-            r"C:\data\keys\identity.pem"
-        } else {
-            "/data/keys/identity.pem"
-        };
-        let resolved = resolve_key_value(Path::new(raw), None)
-            .expect("an absolute key must not need a home directory");
-        assert_eq!(resolved, PathBuf::from(raw));
-        assert_eq!(resolved.parent().unwrap(), Path::new(raw).parent().unwrap());
-    }
-
-    /// The forms that genuinely need a home still say so, rather than resolving
-    /// somewhere arbitrary.
-    #[test]
-    fn the_forms_that_need_a_home_report_its_absence() {
-        let err = resolve_key_value(Path::new("~/keys/identity.pem"), None)
-            .expect_err("a ~/ path cannot resolve without a home directory");
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string().contains("home directory"),
-            "the error must name the missing home directory, got: {err}"
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-core/src/lib.rs

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ pub mod encrypt;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod http_sig;
 pub mod identity;
-pub mod identity_path;
 // `url` is the one dependency here that drags a tail (idna, then the icu
 // crates), and gitlawb-core is allowlisted to stay embeddable. Every client that
 // needs this predicate already parses URLs, so they opt in and nothing else

crates/gitlawb-core/src/redirect.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! Redirect policy shared by every gitlawb HTTP client that signs its requests.
+//! Redirect policy shared by every Twigpine HTTP client that signs its requests.
 //!
 //! Both `gl` (async) and `git-remote-gitlawb` (blocking) attach RFC 9421
 //! `Signature` and `Signature-Input` headers, and reqwest strips only
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ pub const MAX_REDIRECTS: usize = 10;
 /// signed and unsigned callers alike, for the same reason the predicate is shared:
 /// two rules would drift.
 ///
-/// The clause pins `@path`, and only `@path`. A gitlawb signature also covers
+/// The clause pins `@path`, and only `@path`. A Twigpine signature also covers
 /// `@method` and `content-digest`, and both of those are still open on a followed
 /// hop: on a 301, 302 or 303, reqwest 0.12.28 delegates to tower-http's
 /// `FollowRedirect`, which rewrites a POST to a GET and empties the body
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ mod tests {
                 "the node's name pushed into the fragment: the host is the attacker's",
             ),
             // The request-target clause, both directions. `@path` is the only thing a
-            // gitlawb signature binds the request to, so a hop that rewrites it hands
+            // Twigpine signature binds the request to, so a hop that rewrites it hands
             // the node a signature over a target it never received.
             (
                 "https://node.example/a?x=1",

crates/gitlawb-core/src/sanitize.rs

@@ -30,30 +30,10 @@ pub fn is_bidi_format(c: char) -> bool {
     )
 }
 
-/// Both halves of INV-6 in one call: drop every `Cc` control (which defangs
-/// ANSI and OSC escapes) and every bidi/format control that
-/// [`is_bidi_format`] names. What remains is safe to write to a terminal.
-///
-/// Length is not this function's business: a caller that shows the text
-/// decides how much of it to show.
-pub fn strip_terminal_controls(s: &str) -> String {
-    s.chars()
-        .filter(|c| !c.is_control() && !is_bidi_format(*c))
-        .collect()
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
-    #[test]
-    fn strip_removes_escapes_and_reordering_but_keeps_text() {
-        let hostile = "ok\u{1b}[31m red\u{1b}]0;title\u{7}\u{202E}dlrow\u{202C} \u{0627}\u{200D}";
-        let clean = strip_terminal_controls(hostile);
-        assert_eq!(clean, "ok[31m red]0;titledlrow \u{0627}\u{200D}");
-        assert!(!clean.chars().any(|c| c.is_control() || is_bidi_format(c)));
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn strips_every_reordering_code_point() {
         // Asserted individually so a partial predicate (e.g. one that covers the

crates/gitlawb-core/src/ucan.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 //! UCAN (User Controlled Authorization Networks) — capability token types.
 //!
 //! UCANs let a DID delegate specific capabilities to another DID,
-//! with optional expiry and revocation. gitlawb uses UCANs for:
+//! with optional expiry and revocation. Twigpine uses UCANs for:
 //!   - Delegating push access to a branch to a CI agent
 //!   - Granting a reviewer the ability to approve PRs
 //!   - Bootstrap tokens issued at registration
@@ -16,19 +16,6 @@ use crate::did::Did;
 use crate::identity::Keypair;
 use crate::{Error, Result};
 
-/// Proof chains deeper than this fail closed, in every walk over `prf`:
-/// [`Ucan::verify_chain`], [`Ucan::chain_lifetime_is_bounded`] and
-/// [`Ucan::chain_grants_push_to`] all stop here. Nothing this codebase mints is
-/// longer than owner → agent → node. The bound exists for the hand-built token:
-/// the node verifies the chain on the `X-Ucan` header of any signed request, and
-/// nothing else says how deep a sender may nest `prf`. In practice not very
-/// deep — a proof is a JSON string inside the next link's JSON, so each level
-/// re-escapes the one beneath it and the encoding roughly doubles per link
-/// (eight links is about 11 KiB, thirteen about 270 KiB) — but a walk should
-/// refuse on its own terms rather than count on the encoding running the sender
-/// out of room first.
-pub const MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH: usize = 8;
-
 /// A UCAN capability: what resource the token grants access to.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct Capability {
@@ -62,36 +49,15 @@ impl Capability {
     /// action field and `repo/admin` in the parent's action position act as
     /// wildcards that cover any delegated value; wildcards on `self` carry no
     /// special meaning.
-    ///
-    /// Constraints (`nb`) participate, and conservatively:
-    ///
-    /// | parent | child | verdict |
-    /// |---|---|---|
-    /// | none | anything | attenuated — adding constraints narrows |
-    /// | some | identical | attenuated |
-    /// | some | different | refused — narrowing is unprovable without semantics |
-    /// | some | none | refused — dropping constraints widens |
-    ///
-    /// The last row is the one that matters. Ignoring `nb` here let a holder of a
-    /// constrained capability re-delegate the same resource and action with the
-    /// constraints removed, and the chain still verified — so a consumer that
-    /// refuses constrained capabilities at the leaf saw an unconstrained one and
-    /// granted it. Since `nb` has no interpreted semantics yet, "different" cannot
-    /// be shown to be narrower and is refused with it.
     pub fn is_attenuated_by(&self, parent: &Capability) -> bool {
         let resource_ok = parent.with == self.with || parent.with == "*";
         let action_ok =
             parent.can == self.can || parent.can == "*" || parent.can == caps::REPO_ADMIN;
-        let constraints_ok = match (&parent.constraints, &self.constraints) {
-            (None, _) => true,
-            (Some(p), Some(c)) => p == c,
-            (Some(_), None) => false,
-        };
-        resource_ok && action_ok && constraints_ok
+        resource_ok && action_ok
     }
 }
 
-/// Well-known gitlawb capability strings.
+/// Well-known Twigpine capability strings.
 pub mod caps {
     pub const GIT_PUSH: &str = "git/push";
     pub const GIT_FETCH: &str = "git/fetch";
@@ -105,138 +71,6 @@ pub mod caps {
     pub const REPO_ADMIN: &str = "repo/admin";
 }
 
-/// Rules shared by every boundary that decides whether a UCAN can push.
-///
-/// Four places answer "can this token push to this repository?": `gl ucan
-/// delegate` and the MCP `ucan_delegate` tool when a token is issued, `gl ucan
-/// import` when one is stored, `git-remote-gitlawb` when it mints an invocation,
-/// and the node when it authorizes the push. For three review rounds each of them
-/// carried its own copy of the answer, and every round found a token that one
-/// boundary accepted and the next refused: a constrained grant that imported and
-/// then authorized nothing; a wildcard proof the helper narrowed and the node
-/// rejected; a resource whose owner the leaf named but the chain root did not.
-///
-/// The rules live here, once, in the crate all four already depend on. A boundary
-/// may add checks of its own — the node anchors the chain root to a repository
-/// record it holds independently, import binds the audience to the local key —
-/// but the definition of a *usable push capability* is not one of them.
-pub mod push {
-    use super::{caps, Capability, Ucan};
-
-    /// The `did:key` representation rule: `did:key:z6Mk…` and bare `z6Mk…` are
-    /// the same identity. Mirror rows store the bare form; canonical rows and
-    /// every token store the full form.
-    ///
-    /// Collapses representation only within `did:key`. `did:web` and
-    /// `did:gitlawb` share the base58 space, so a trailing-segment compare would
-    /// treat `did:key:X` and `did:gitlawb:X` as equal; after stripping the prefix,
-    /// a value that still contains `:` is a non-key DID and matches nothing bare.
-    pub fn did_key_eq(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
-        if a == b {
-            return true;
-        }
-        fn key_id(d: &str) -> &str {
-            d.strip_prefix("did:key:").unwrap_or(d)
-        }
-        let (ka, kb) = (key_id(a), key_id(b));
-        !ka.contains(':') && !kb.contains(':') && ka == kb
-    }
-
-    /// The actions that authorize a push: `git/push` itself, the action wildcard,
-    /// and `repo/admin`, which covers it.
-    pub fn is_push_action(can: &str) -> bool {
-        can == caps::GIT_PUSH || can == "*" || can == caps::REPO_ADMIN
-    }
-
-    /// `gitlawb://repos/<owner>/<repo>` → `(owner, repo)`, or `None` for any other
-    /// shape. Exactly two non-empty segments: an owner DID never contains `/`, so
-    /// a third segment, a trailing slash, or an empty half is malformed rather than
-    /// something to interpret.
-    pub fn parse_repo_resource(with: &str) -> Option<(&str, &str)> {
-        let rest = with.strip_prefix("gitlawb://repos/")?;
-        let (owner, repo) = rest.split_once('/')?;
-        if owner.is_empty() || repo.is_empty() || repo.contains('/') {
-            return None;
-        }
-        Some((owner, repo))
-    }
-
-    /// A push-class capability whose resource is the wildcard. Refused at
-    /// issuance, at import, by the helper, and by the node: a delegation's scope is
-    /// fixed when it is issued, and `*` cannot say which repositories it covered
-    /// at that moment.
-    pub fn is_push_wildcard(with: &str, can: &str) -> bool {
-        with == "*" && is_push_action(can)
-    }
-
-    pub use super::MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH;
-
-    impl Capability {
-        /// Push-class, unconstrained, and naming exactly this repository.
-        ///
-        /// Unconstrained because `nb` has no semantics yet: an owner who wrote
-        /// constraints meant to restrict, and honouring the capability while
-        /// ignoring them would grant more than was intended. The owner segment is
-        /// compared with [`did_key_eq`], so a token issued against the full DID
-        /// matches a mirror row keyed on the bare form.
-        pub fn grants_push_to(&self, owner: &str, repo: &str) -> bool {
-            self.constraints.is_none()
-                && is_push_action(&self.can)
-                && parse_repo_resource(&self.with)
-                    .is_some_and(|(o, r)| did_key_eq(o, owner) && r == repo)
-        }
-    }
-
-    impl Ucan {
-        /// Whether this chain — the leaf **and every proof behind it** — carries a
-        /// capability that [`Capability::grants_push_to`] this repository.
-        ///
-        /// Every link, not just the leaf. [`Capability::is_attenuated_by`] accepts
-        /// a concrete child under a `*` parent, so a leaf that names the repository
-        /// can sit on a proof that names every repository the root owns — including
-        /// ones created after the delegation was issued. Checking the leaf alone
-        /// let exactly that through.
-        ///
-        /// This establishes scope, not trust. It does not verify signatures,
-        /// expiry, or audience; call [`Ucan::verify_chain`] first, and anchor the
-        /// root it returns to something held independently of the token.
-        ///
-        /// Fails closed on anything it cannot vouch for: a proof that does not
-        /// decode, more than one proof per link, or a chain deeper than
-        /// [`MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH`].
-        pub fn chain_grants_push_to(&self, owner: &str, repo: &str) -> bool {
-            self.chain_grants_push_to_at(owner, repo, 0)
-        }
-
-        fn chain_grants_push_to_at(&self, owner: &str, repo: &str, depth: usize) -> bool {
-            if depth >= MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH {
-                return false;
-            }
-            if !self
-                .payload
-                .att
-                .iter()
-                .any(|c| c.grants_push_to(owner, repo))
-            {
-                return false;
-            }
-            // `verify_chain` refuses more than one proof per link for the same
-            // reason: two proofs mean two roots, and nothing says which authorized
-            // what.
-            if self.payload.prf.len() > 1 {
-                return false;
-            }
-            match self.payload.prf.first() {
-                None => true,
-                Some(token) => match Ucan::decode(token) {
-                    Ok(proof) => proof.chain_grants_push_to_at(owner, repo, depth + 1),
-                    Err(_) => false,
-                },
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 /// The UCAN payload (what gets signed).
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct UcanPayload {
@@ -312,37 +146,6 @@ impl Ucan {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Whether every link in this chain carries a finite `exp`.
-    ///
-    /// `exp` is optional in the format, and [`Self::is_expired`] reports `false`
-    /// when it is absent — so a link without one never expires. With no revocation
-    /// mechanism, a chain containing such a link is a permanent grant: a leaked
-    /// token cannot be withdrawn, and the issuer's only remedy is to rotate the
-    /// identity the resource is keyed on.
-    ///
-    /// Consumers that turn a UCAN into write authority should require this. It is
-    /// deliberately not enforced inside [`Self::verify_chain`], because a
-    /// non-expiring token is well-formed and may be perfectly appropriate for a
-    /// read-only or advisory capability; whether an unbounded grant is acceptable
-    /// is the consumer's policy, not the format's.
-    ///
-    /// Fails closed past [`MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH`], like every other walk over `prf`.
-    pub fn chain_lifetime_is_bounded(&self) -> bool {
-        self.chain_lifetime_is_bounded_at(0)
-    }
-
-    fn chain_lifetime_is_bounded_at(&self, depth: usize) -> bool {
-        if depth >= MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH {
-            return false;
-        }
-        if self.payload.exp.is_none() {
-            return false;
-        }
-        self.payload.prf.iter().all(|token| {
-            Self::decode(token).is_ok_and(|proof| proof.chain_lifetime_is_bounded_at(depth + 1))
-        })
-    }
-
     /// Check if this UCAN's not-before time is in the future (token not yet valid).
     pub fn is_before_valid(&self) -> bool {
         if let Some(nbf) = self.payload.nbf {
@@ -445,33 +248,8 @@ impl Ucan {
     /// 3. Check the proof is not expired
     /// 4. Recursively verify the proof's own chain
     ///
-    /// A UCAN with no proofs is its own root, so it returns its own issuer.
-    ///
-    /// **This establishes internal consistency, not trust.** `did:key` is
-    /// self-certifying, so anyone can mint a keypair and produce a chain that
-    /// verifies. A caller making an authorization decision MUST compare the
-    /// returned root against an identity it trusts for some reason outside this
-    /// token — a repo owner, a configured value, a registry lookup. Discarding
-    /// the return value is only correct when the caller is checking that a token
-    /// is well-formed and deliberately does not care who issued it.
-    ///
-    /// The walk stops at [`MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH`] and fails closed there. The node
-    /// runs this on the `X-Ucan` header of any signed request before it asks
-    /// what the chain grants, so this is the first place sender-chosen depth is
-    /// felt: each link costs a signature check and a decode of everything
-    /// beneath it. The scope walk was bounded and this one was not, which made
-    /// that bound decorative — a deep chain met the unbounded walk first.
-    pub fn verify_chain(&self) -> Result<Did> {
-        self.verify_chain_at(0)
-    }
-
-    fn verify_chain_at(&self, depth: usize) -> Result<Did> {
-        if depth >= MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH {
-            return Err(Error::Ucan(format!(
-                "proof chain deeper than {MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH} links is not accepted"
-            )));
-        }
-
+    /// A UCAN with no proofs (root capability) passes trivially.
+    pub fn verify_chain(&self) -> Result<()> {
         // First verify our own signature
         self.verify_signature()?;
 
@@ -483,44 +261,34 @@ impl Ucan {
             return Err(Error::Ucan("token is not yet valid".to_string()));
         }
 
-        if self.payload.prf.len() > 1 {
-            return Err(Error::Ucan(
-                "multi-proof chains are not supported: more than one proof means \
-                 more than one root, and which root authorized a given capability \
-                 is ambiguous"
-                    .to_string(),
-            ));
-        }
+        for proof_token in &self.payload.prf {
+            let proof = Self::decode(proof_token)
+                .map_err(|e| Error::Ucan(format!("failed to decode proof: {e}")))?;
 
-        let Some(proof_token) = self.payload.prf.first() else {
-            // No proofs: this token is its own root.
-            return Ok(self.payload.iss.clone());
-        };
-
-        let proof = Self::decode(proof_token)
-            .map_err(|e| Error::Ucan(format!("failed to decode proof: {e}")))?;
-
-        // The proof's audience must be this UCAN's issuer
-        if proof.payload.aud != self.payload.iss {
-            return Err(Error::Ucan(format!(
-                "proof chain broken: proof audience {} does not match issuer {}",
-                proof.payload.aud, self.payload.iss
-            )));
-        }
-
-        // Every delegated capability must be covered by the proof (attenuation).
-        for cap in &self.payload.att {
-            let covered = proof.payload.att.iter().any(|p| cap.is_attenuated_by(p));
-            if !covered {
+            // The proof's audience must be this UCAN's issuer
+            if proof.payload.aud != self.payload.iss {
                 return Err(Error::Ucan(format!(
-                    "capability attenuation violated: '{}' on '{}' not covered by proof",
-                    cap.can, cap.with
+                    "proof chain broken: proof audience {} does not match issuer {}",
+                    proof.payload.aud, self.payload.iss
                 )));
             }
+
+            // Every delegated capability must be covered by the proof (attenuation).
+            for cap in &self.payload.att {
+                let covered = proof.payload.att.iter().any(|p| cap.is_attenuated_by(p));
+                if !covered {
+                    return Err(Error::Ucan(format!(
+                        "capability attenuation violated: '{}' on '{}' not covered by proof",
+                        cap.can, cap.with
+                    )));
+                }
+            }
+
+            // Verify the proof's signature and chain recursively
+            proof.verify_chain()?;
         }
 
-        // Recurse; the root of the proof's chain is the root of ours.
-        proof.verify_chain_at(depth + 1)
+        Ok(())
     }
 }
 
@@ -896,484 +664,4 @@ mod tests {
 
         delegated.verify_chain().unwrap();
     }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_chain_returns_the_root_issuer_of_a_delegated_chain() {
-        // owner -> agent (delegation), agent -> node (invocation).
-        // The root is the owner: that is the identity the whole chain rests on,
-        // and the only one a caller can meaningfully anchor a trust decision to.
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-        let caps_vec = vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)];
-
-        let delegation =
-            Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), caps_vec.clone(), None).expect("issue delegation");
-        let invocation = Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), caps_vec, None, &delegation)
-            .expect("wrap invocation");
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            invocation.verify_chain().expect("chain must verify"),
-            owner.did(),
-            "the root issuer is the owner who started the chain, not the agent presenting it"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// A chain is only bounded if EVERY link is. An unbounded link anywhere makes
-    /// the whole grant permanent, because `is_expired` reports false for it and
-    /// there is no revocation path to withdraw it.
-    #[test]
-    fn chain_lifetime_is_bounded_requires_an_expiry_on_every_link() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-        let cap = || vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)];
-        let hour = Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1);
-
-        let bounded_root = Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), cap(), Some(hour)).expect("issue");
-        let unbounded_root = Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), cap(), None).expect("issue");
-
-        assert!(
-            Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &bounded_root)
-                .expect("wrap")
-                .chain_lifetime_is_bounded(),
-            "both links finite"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), cap(), None, &bounded_root)
-                .expect("wrap")
-                .chain_lifetime_is_bounded(),
-            "the leaf has no expiry, so the grant never lapses"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &unbounded_root)
-                .expect("wrap")
-                .chain_lifetime_is_bounded(),
-            "a bounded leaf cannot rescue an unbounded proof: the holder can always \
-             mint a fresh leaf from it"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !unbounded_root.chain_lifetime_is_bounded(),
-            "a self-issued token with no expiry is itself unbounded"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// A three-link chain: owner -> lead -> agent, which is the real shape of an
-    /// org delegating to a team lead who delegates to a CI identity.
-    ///
-    /// Every other chain here is depth two, where the immediate proof IS the root —
-    /// so nothing distinguishes recursing to the true root from simply returning the
-    /// proof's issuer. Both `assert_eq!` and `assert_ne!` below are load-bearing:
-    /// without the second, returning the middle issuer would still satisfy a test
-    /// that only checked "not the leaf".
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_chain_walks_past_the_immediate_proof_to_the_true_root() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let lead = Keypair::generate();
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-        let cap = || vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)];
-
-        let root = Ucan::issue(&owner, lead.did(), cap(), None).expect("owner -> lead");
-        let mid = Ucan::delegate(&lead, agent.did(), cap(), None, &root).expect("lead -> agent");
-        let leaf = Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), cap(), None, &mid).expect("agent -> node");
-
-        let found = leaf.verify_chain().expect("a three-link chain must verify");
-        assert_eq!(
-            found,
-            owner.did(),
-            "the root is the owner who started the chain, two hops up"
-        );
-        assert_ne!(
-            found,
-            lead.did(),
-            "returning the immediate proof's issuer is not walking to the root"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_chain_returns_self_as_root_for_a_self_issued_token() {
-        // A token with no proofs roots at its own issuer. This is what makes a
-        // self-minted token useless: the caller compares this against the repo
-        // owner and it will only ever match when the presenter IS the owner.
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-        let ucan =
-            Ucan::issue(&agent, node.did(), vec![Capability::new("*", "*")], None).expect("issue");
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            ucan.verify_chain().expect("a root token still verifies"),
-            agent.did(),
-            "a self-minted token roots at the minter, however permissive its capabilities"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Stripping `nb` is a widening, and a widening must fail attenuation.
-    ///
-    /// Without this, a constrained delegation is trivially escalated: the holder
-    /// re-delegates the same resource and action with the constraints removed,
-    /// `verify_chain` accepts the chain because attenuation only compared `with`
-    /// and `can`, and a consumer that refuses constrained capabilities at the leaf
-    /// (as the node's push gate does) then sees an unconstrained one and grants it.
-    /// Guarding only the leaf guards the wrong end of the chain.
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_chain_rejects_a_child_that_strips_the_parents_constraints() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-
-        let constrained = Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)
-            .with_constraints(serde_json::json!({ "refs": ["refs/heads/feat/*"] }));
-        let delegation = Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), vec![constrained], None)
-            .expect("issue constrained delegation");
-
-        // Same resource, same action, constraints dropped.
-        let widened = Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH);
-        let forged =
-            Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), vec![widened], None, &delegation).expect("wrap");
-
-        let err = forged
-            .verify_chain()
-            .expect_err("dropping the parent's constraints must fail attenuation");
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string().contains("attenuation"),
-            "the failure must name attenuation, got: {err}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_chain_accepts_a_child_that_keeps_the_parents_constraints() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-
-        let nb = serde_json::json!({ "refs": ["refs/heads/feat/*"] });
-        let constrained = Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)
-            .with_constraints(nb.clone());
-        let delegation =
-            Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), vec![constrained.clone()], None).expect("issue");
-        let invocation =
-            Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), vec![constrained], None, &delegation).expect("wrap");
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            invocation
-                .verify_chain()
-                .expect("an unchanged constraint must verify"),
-            owner.did()
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn an_unconstrained_parent_still_allows_a_child_to_add_constraints() {
-        // Adding `nb` narrows, which is always a legal attenuation.
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-
-        let open = Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH);
-        let delegation = Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), vec![open], None).expect("issue");
-        let narrowed = Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)
-            .with_constraints(serde_json::json!({ "refs": ["refs/heads/main"] }));
-        let invocation =
-            Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), vec![narrowed], None, &delegation).expect("wrap");
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            invocation.verify_chain().expect("narrowing must verify"),
-            owner.did()
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_chain_rejects_a_multi_proof_chain() {
-        // Two proofs mean two roots, and nothing says which root authorized a
-        // given capability. Returning either one would be unsound, so refuse.
-        let owner_a = Keypair::generate();
-        let owner_b = Keypair::generate();
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-        let caps_vec = vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)];
-
-        let proof_a = Ucan::issue(&owner_a, agent.did(), caps_vec.clone(), None).expect("issue a");
-        let proof_b = Ucan::issue(&owner_b, agent.did(), caps_vec.clone(), None).expect("issue b");
-
-        // `delegate` only ever writes one proof, so build the two-proof payload by hand.
-        let payload = UcanPayload {
-            ucan: "1.0.0".to_string(),
-            iss: agent.did(),
-            aud: node.did(),
-            att: caps_vec,
-            exp: None,
-            nbf: None,
-            prf: vec![
-                proof_a.encode().expect("encode a"),
-                proof_b.encode().expect("encode b"),
-            ],
-        };
-        let signing_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&payload).expect("serialize payload");
-        let s = agent.sign_b64(&signing_bytes);
-        let multi = Ucan { payload, s };
-
-        let err = multi
-            .verify_chain()
-            .expect_err("a two-proof chain must be refused");
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string().contains("multi-proof"),
-            "the error must name the reason, got: {err}"
-        );
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod push_scope_tests {
-    use super::push::*;
-    use super::{caps, Capability, Ucan};
-    use crate::identity::Keypair;
-
-    fn hour() -> chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc> {
-        chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1)
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn did_key_eq_collapses_representation_only_within_did_key() {
-        assert!(did_key_eq("did:key:z6MkAbc", "z6MkAbc"));
-        assert!(did_key_eq("z6MkAbc", "did:key:z6MkAbc"));
-        assert!(did_key_eq("did:key:z6MkAbc", "did:key:z6MkAbc"));
-        assert!(!did_key_eq("did:key:z6MkAbc", "did:key:z6MkXyz"));
-        // A bare id must never match across methods: `did:gitlawb` shares the
-        // base58 space with `did:key`.
-        assert!(!did_key_eq("did:gitlawb:z6MkAbc", "z6MkAbc"));
-        assert!(!did_key_eq("did:key:z6MkAbc", "did:gitlawb:z6MkAbc"));
-        assert!(!did_key_eq("did:web:example.com", "example.com"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn parse_repo_resource_requires_exactly_two_segments() {
-        assert_eq!(
-            parse_repo_resource("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6Mk/r"),
-            Some(("did:key:z6Mk", "r"))
-        );
-        for bad in [
-            "*",
-            "",
-            "gitlawb://repos/",
-            "gitlawb://repos/owner",
-            "gitlawb://repos/owner/",
-            "gitlawb://repos//r",
-            "gitlawb://repos/owner/r/extra",
-            "https://repos/owner/r",
-        ] {
-            assert_eq!(parse_repo_resource(bad), None, "{bad:?}");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn is_push_wildcard_is_the_resource_wildcard_with_a_push_action() {
-        for can in [caps::GIT_PUSH, "*", caps::REPO_ADMIN] {
-            assert!(is_push_wildcard("*", can), "{can}");
-        }
-        assert!(!is_push_wildcard("*", caps::GIT_FETCH));
-        assert!(!is_push_wildcard("*", caps::PR_OPEN));
-        assert!(!is_push_wildcard("gitlawb://repos/o/r", caps::GIT_PUSH));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn a_capability_grants_push_only_when_concrete_unconstrained_and_push_class() {
-        let owner = "did:key:z6MkOwner";
-        let ok = Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOwner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH);
-        assert!(ok.grants_push_to(owner, "r"));
-        // Bare and full owner forms are the same identity.
-        assert!(ok.grants_push_to("z6MkOwner", "r"));
-
-        assert!(!Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH).grants_push_to(owner, "r"));
-        assert!(
-            !Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOwner/r", caps::GIT_FETCH)
-                .grants_push_to(owner, "r")
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOwner/other", caps::GIT_PUSH)
-                .grants_push_to(owner, "r")
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOther/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)
-                .grants_push_to(owner, "r")
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOwner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)
-                .with_constraints(serde_json::json!({"max_bytes": 1}))
-                .grants_push_to(owner, "r")
-        );
-        for can in ["*", caps::REPO_ADMIN] {
-            assert!(
-                Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/did:key:z6MkOwner/r", can)
-                    .grants_push_to(owner, "r"),
-                "{can} covers git/push"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The chain walk, at every depth: a wildcard anywhere denies; concrete
-    /// everywhere grants. The grandparent case is the one a single-level check
-    /// misses, because the immediate proof already names the repo.
-    #[test]
-    fn chain_grants_push_only_when_every_link_names_the_repo() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let a = Keypair::generate();
-        let b = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-        let owner_s = owner.did().to_string();
-        let res = format!("gitlawb://repos/{owner_s}/r");
-        let concrete = || vec![Capability::new(&res, caps::GIT_PUSH)];
-        let wild = || vec![Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH)];
-
-        // Single self-issued link.
-        assert!(Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), concrete(), Some(hour()))
-            .unwrap()
-            .chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
-        assert!(!Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), wild(), Some(hour()))
-            .unwrap()
-            .chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
-
-        // Two links: concrete leaf on a wildcard proof must deny.
-        let wild_proof = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), wild(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
-        let leaf = Ucan::delegate(&a, node.did(), concrete(), Some(hour()), &wild_proof).unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            leaf.verify_chain().is_ok(),
-            "attenuation accepts it — that is why we walk"
-        );
-        assert!(!leaf.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
-
-        // Three links: wildcard grandparent, concrete parent, concrete leaf.
-        let gp = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), wild(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
-        let parent = Ucan::delegate(&a, b.did(), concrete(), Some(hour()), &gp).unwrap();
-        let leaf = Ucan::delegate(&b, node.did(), concrete(), Some(hour()), &parent).unwrap();
-        assert!(leaf.verify_chain().is_ok());
-        assert!(
-            !leaf.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"),
-            "a wildcard two links up must deny"
-        );
-
-        // Three links, all concrete.
-        let gp = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), concrete(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
-        let parent = Ucan::delegate(&a, b.did(), concrete(), Some(hour()), &gp).unwrap();
-        let leaf = Ucan::delegate(&b, node.did(), concrete(), Some(hour()), &parent).unwrap();
-        assert!(leaf.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
-        // And the bare owner form is the same repo.
-        assert!(leaf.chain_grants_push_to(owner_s.strip_prefix("did:key:").unwrap(), "r"));
-        // But not another repo.
-        assert!(!leaf.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "other"));
-    }
-
-    /// Fail closed on anything the walk cannot vouch for.
-    #[test]
-    fn chain_walk_fails_closed_on_undecodable_or_multi_proofs_or_excess_depth() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let a = Keypair::generate();
-        let owner_s = owner.did().to_string();
-        let res = format!("gitlawb://repos/{owner_s}/r");
-        let cap = || vec![Capability::new(&res, caps::GIT_PUSH)];
-
-        let mut broken = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), cap(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
-        broken.payload.prf = vec!["not a ucan".into()];
-        assert!(!broken.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
-
-        let good = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), cap(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
-        let mut two = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), cap(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
-        two.payload.prf = vec![good.encode().unwrap(), good.encode().unwrap()];
-        assert!(!two.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
-
-        // Deeper than MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH, all concrete: refused on depth alone.
-        let mut cur = Ucan::issue(&owner, a.did(), cap(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
-        let mut signer = a;
-        for _ in 0..MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH {
-            let next = Keypair::generate();
-            cur = Ucan::delegate(&signer, next.did(), cap(), Some(hour()), &cur).unwrap();
-            signer = next;
-        }
-        assert!(
-            !cur.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"),
-            "depth bound must fail closed"
-        );
-    }
-}
-
-/// Every walk over `prf` stops at the same depth. The round-ten P1: the scope
-/// walk was bounded while `verify_chain` and `chain_lifetime_is_bounded` were
-/// not, and the node runs `verify_chain` on an attacker-supplied `X-Ucan` header
-/// before the bounded walk ever sees it, so the bound protected nothing.
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod chain_depth_tests {
-    use super::{caps, Capability, Ucan, MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH};
-    use crate::identity::Keypair;
-
-    fn hour() -> chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc> {
-        chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1)
-    }
-
-    /// A well-formed, fully signed, expiring chain of exactly `links` links, every
-    /// one naming the owner's repository, so the only thing any walk can object
-    /// to is how long it is. Returns the leaf and the owner it roots at.
-    fn concrete_chain(links: usize) -> (Ucan, Keypair) {
-        assert!(links >= 1);
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let owner_s = owner.did().to_string();
-        let res = format!("gitlawb://repos/{owner_s}/r");
-        let cap = || vec![Capability::new(&res, caps::GIT_PUSH)];
-
-        let mut signer = Keypair::generate();
-        let mut cur = Ucan::issue(&owner, signer.did(), cap(), Some(hour())).unwrap();
-        for _ in 1..links {
-            let next = Keypair::generate();
-            cur = Ucan::delegate(&signer, next.did(), cap(), Some(hour()), &cur).unwrap();
-            signer = next;
-        }
-        (cur, owner)
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn a_chain_at_the_bound_passes_every_walk() {
-        let (leaf, owner) = concrete_chain(MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH);
-        let owner_s = owner.did().to_string();
-        assert_eq!(
-            leaf.verify_chain()
-                .expect("a chain at the bound must verify"),
-            owner.did()
-        );
-        assert!(leaf.chain_lifetime_is_bounded());
-        assert!(leaf.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn one_link_past_the_bound_fails_every_walk_closed() {
-        let (leaf, owner) = concrete_chain(MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH + 1);
-        let owner_s = owner.did().to_string();
-
-        let err = leaf
-            .verify_chain()
-            .expect_err("verify_chain must refuse a chain past the bound");
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string().contains("deeper than"),
-            "the refusal must say depth was the reason, not a fake signature failure: {err}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !leaf.chain_lifetime_is_bounded(),
-            "an unwalkable chain cannot be vouched for as bounded"
-        );
-        assert!(!leaf.chain_grants_push_to(&owner_s, "r"));
-    }
-
-    /// A chain well past the bound is refused from the top, before any per-link
-    /// work. Only a few links past it, deliberately: a proof is embedded as a JSON
-    /// string inside the next link's JSON, so every level re-escapes the one
-    /// inside it and the encoding roughly doubles per link — eight links is about
-    /// 10 KiB, sixteen is megabytes, and a chain of "a few hundred levels" cannot
-    /// physically be encoded, let alone sent as a header. The bound is still
-    /// what stops the reachable dozen-odd levels from each costing a decode of
-    /// everything beneath them.
-    #[test]
-    fn a_chain_well_past_the_bound_is_refused_not_walked() {
-        let (leaf, _) = concrete_chain(MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH + 4);
-        let err = leaf.verify_chain().expect_err("must refuse");
-        assert!(err.to_string().contains("deeper than"), "{err}");
-        assert!(!leaf.chain_lifetime_is_bounded());
-    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
-description = "The gitlawb node daemon — git hosting over HTTP with DID auth"
+description = "The Twigpine node daemon — git hosting over HTTP with DID auth"
 version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ tracing = { workspace = true }
 tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
 chrono = { workspace = true }
 uuid = { workspace = true }
+url = { workspace = true }
+percent-encoding = { workspace = true }
 axum = { version = "0.8", features = ["http1", "http2", "json", "ws"] }
 async-graphql = { version = "7", features = ["chrono", "uuid", "tracing"] }
 async-graphql-axum = "7"
@@ -33,6 +35,7 @@ sqlx = { version = "0.8", features = ["postgres", "runtime-tokio-rustls", "chron
 clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive", "env"] }
 bytes = "1"
 libc = "0.2"
+zeroize = "1"
 cid = { workspace = true }
 hex = { workspace = true }
 sha2 = { workspace = true }
@@ -44,14 +47,14 @@ dirs-next = "2"
 # withholds a canonically-equivalent path regardless of NFC/NFD form (#101).
 unicode-normalization = "0.1"
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
-libp2p-core = "0.43"
-libp2p-gossipsub = "0.49.4"
-libp2p-identify = "0.47"
-libp2p-identity = { version = "0.2", features = ["ed25519", "peerid", "rand"] }
-libp2p-kad = "0.48"
-libp2p-quic = { version = "0.13", features = ["tokio"] }
-libp2p-swarm = { version = "0.47", features = ["macros", "tokio"] }
-multiaddr = "0.18"
+libp2p-core = "0.44"
+libp2p-gossipsub = "0.50.1"
+libp2p-identify = "0.48"
+libp2p-identity = { version = "0.3", features = ["ed25519", "peerid", "rand"] }
+libp2p-kad = "0.49"
+libp2p-quic = { version = "0.14", features = ["tokio"] }
+libp2p-swarm = { version = "0.48", features = ["macros", "tokio"] }
+multiaddr = "0.19"
 futures = "0.3"
 aws-sdk-s3 = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = ["sigv4a", "default-https-client", "rt-tokio"] }
 aws-config = { version = "1", features = ["behavior-version-latest"] }
@@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ alloy = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = [
     "network",
     "rpc-types-eth",
 ] }
-libp2p-dns = { version = "0.44.0", features = ["tokio"] }
+libp2p-dns = { version = "0.45.0", features = ["tokio"] }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 mockito = "1"

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/arweave.rs

@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
 //! GET /api/v1/arweave/anchors — list Arweave ref-update anchors.
 
 use axum::{
-    extract::{Query, State},
+    extract::{Extension, Query, State},
     Json,
 };
 use serde::Deserialize;
 
-use crate::error::Result;
+use crate::db::normalize_owner_key;
+use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@@ -21,17 +22,62 @@ fn default_limit() -> i64 {
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/arweave/anchors
+///
+/// `?repo=<owner>/<name>` returns anchors for one repository and binds the
+/// request to the canonical read-authorization path used by every other
+/// repo-scoped read: the same `authorize_repo_read` helper, with the caller
+/// identity attached. Missing repositories, quarantined mirrors, and signed
+/// non-readers all collapse to the standard `404` (no existence oracle). The
+/// unscoped listing is auth-only — the #121 contract — and does not admit
+/// visibility filtering, which is the #136 stale-index class and explicitly
+/// out of scope for this auth slice.
 pub async fn list_anchors(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Query(q): Query<ListAnchorsQuery>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let limit = q.limit.min(200);
-    // Bare `?` so connection-class sqlx failures downcast to `AppError::Db` and
-    // map to 503 `db_unavailable` (not 500 via `.map_err(AppError::Internal)`) (#251).
-    let anchors = state
-        .db
-        .list_arweave_anchors(q.repo.as_deref(), limit)
-        .await?;
+    // The route's `optional_signature` layer is permissive (it admits unsigned
+    // legacy callers) so this in-handler check is the actual gate. A signed
+    // non-reader still passes this check and proceeds to the authz step below.
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    if caller.is_none() {
+        return Err(AppError::Unauthorized(
+            "authentication required for anchor listing".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    // Clamp before the SQL query. A negative or non-numeric limit must not
+    // reach Postgres as `LIMIT -1` (which it rejects as a db error / 500) — the
+    // contract is the same default ceiling as the listing page itself.
+    let limit = q.limit.clamp(0, 200);
+
+    let anchors = if let Some(repo_slug) = q.repo.as_deref() {
+        // Parse the user-supplied "owner/name" through the same slug validator
+        // the sync path uses, so a malformed query is a 400, not a 500.
+        let (owner, name) = match crate::git::repo_store::validate_repo_slug(repo_slug) {
+            Ok(parts) => parts,
+            Err(e) => return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!("invalid ?repo: {e}"))),
+        };
+        // Read gate. Returns `RepoNotFound` (→ 404) indistinguishably for
+        // missing repos, quarantined mirrors, and signed non-readers.
+        let (record, _rules) =
+            crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, owner, name, caller, "/").await?;
+        // Build the SQL filter from the canonical stored slug, NOT from the
+        // user-supplied `?repo=` string. Anchor rows are written as
+        // `{normalize_owner_key(owner_did)}/{name}` (the short form), so a
+        // request that passes authz with the full `did:key:…/name` form would
+        // match zero rows and return a false empty page. The gate already
+        // verified the repo is readable; `record.owner_did` is the canonical
+        // identity and `record.name` is the stored name.
+        let stored_slug = format!("{}/{}", normalize_owner_key(&record.owner_did), record.name);
+        state
+            .db
+            .list_arweave_anchors(Some(&stored_slug), limit)
+            .await?
+    } else {
+        // No scope → no repo-read decision. Auth-only.
+        state.db.list_arweave_anchors(None, limit).await?
+    };
 
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
         "anchors": anchors,
@@ -60,6 +106,7 @@ mod closed_pool_tests {
             .oneshot(
                 Request::builder()
                     .uri("/api/v1/arweave/anchors")
+                    .extension(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid("did:key:test".into()))
                     .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
                     .unwrap(),
             )

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/bounties.rs

@@ -285,11 +285,22 @@ pub async fn submit_bounty(
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(req): Json<SubmitBountyRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<BountyRecord>> {
-    let bounty = state
-        .db
-        .get_bounty(&id)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found")))?;
+    let not_found = || AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found"));
+
+    let bounty = state.db.get_bounty(&id).await?.ok_or_else(not_found)?;
+
+    if crate::api::authorize_repo_read(
+        &state,
+        &bounty.repo_owner,
+        &bounty.repo_name,
+        Some(auth.0.as_str()),
+        "/",
+    )
+    .await
+    .is_err()
+    {
+        return Err(not_found());
+    }
 
     if bounty.status != "claimed" {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
@@ -325,11 +336,22 @@ pub async fn approve_bounty(
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(req): Json<ApproveBountyRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<BountyRecord>> {
-    let bounty = state
-        .db
-        .get_bounty(&id)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found")))?;
+    let not_found = || AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found"));
+
+    let bounty = state.db.get_bounty(&id).await?.ok_or_else(not_found)?;
+
+    if crate::api::authorize_repo_read(
+        &state,
+        &bounty.repo_owner,
+        &bounty.repo_name,
+        Some(auth.0.as_str()),
+        "/",
+    )
+    .await
+    .is_err()
+    {
+        return Err(not_found());
+    }
 
     if bounty.status != "submitted" {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
@@ -372,11 +394,22 @@ pub async fn cancel_bounty(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
 ) -> Result<Json<BountyRecord>> {
-    let bounty = state
-        .db
-        .get_bounty(&id)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found")))?;
+    let not_found = || AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found"));
+
+    let bounty = state.db.get_bounty(&id).await?.ok_or_else(not_found)?;
+
+    if crate::api::authorize_repo_read(
+        &state,
+        &bounty.repo_owner,
+        &bounty.repo_name,
+        Some(auth.0.as_str()),
+        "/",
+    )
+    .await
+    .is_err()
+    {
+        return Err(not_found());
+    }
 
     if bounty.status != "open" {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
@@ -407,11 +440,22 @@ pub async fn dispute_bounty(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
 ) -> Result<Json<BountyRecord>> {
-    let bounty = state
-        .db
-        .get_bounty(&id)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found")))?;
+    let not_found = || AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found"));
+
+    let bounty = state.db.get_bounty(&id).await?.ok_or_else(not_found)?;
+
+    if crate::api::authorize_repo_read(
+        &state,
+        &bounty.repo_owner,
+        &bounty.repo_name,
+        Some(auth.0.as_str()),
+        "/",
+    )
+    .await
+    .is_err()
+    {
+        return Err(not_found());
+    }
 
     if bounty.status != "claimed" && bounty.status != "submitted" {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
@@ -456,21 +500,68 @@ pub async fn dispute_bounty(
     Ok(Json(updated))
 }
 
+/// Resolve the set of `(owner_did, name)` pairs for repos an anonymous caller
+/// can list.  Mirrors the `stats()` pattern in `server.rs` (#104): batch-load
+/// all deduped repos, batch-load their visibility rules, keep only those that
+/// pass `listable_at_root`.  Pure I/O after the two DB round-trips — no
+/// per-repo authorization queries.
+///
+/// Both bounty stats handlers mount behind `optional_signature` (see
+/// `bounty_read_routes` in server.rs), so the caller is always `None` for
+/// anonymous access.  Every caller, signed or not, currently receives the
+/// anonymous-scoped aggregates (matching the #104 pattern); per-caller
+/// visibility can be threaded through here when that work lands.
+///
+/// A database error is returned to the caller, never collapsed to an empty
+/// set: an empty set would render as HTTP 200 with zero counts, which a client
+/// reads as confirmed absence of activity.
+async fn visible_repo_pairs(state: &AppState) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>> {
+    let rows = state.db.list_all_repos_deduped().await?;
+    let ids: Vec<String> = rows.iter().map(|r| r.id.clone()).collect();
+    let rules_by_repo = state.db.list_visibility_rules_for_repos(&ids).await?;
+    let pairs = rows
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|r| {
+            let rules = rules_by_repo.get(&r.id).map(Vec::as_slice).unwrap_or(&[]);
+            // mirror-rows-handled: a mirror with a canonical twin is deduped to the
+            // canonical row and its rules; a mirror-only repo counts as public, the
+            // same answer authorize_repo_read and /stats give. Pinned by
+            // bounty_stats_mirror_rows_follow_canonical_twin_or_count_when_alone.
+            crate::visibility::listable_at_root(rules, r.is_public, &r.owner_did, None)
+        })
+        .map(|r| {
+            (
+                crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&r.owner_did).to_string(),
+                r.name.clone(),
+            )
+        })
+        .collect();
+    Ok(pairs)
+}
+
 /// GET /api/v1/bounties/stats
+///
+/// Aggregates are restricted to anonymously-listable repos so private-repo
+/// bounty activity is not exposed (#477).  The visible-repo set is resolved
+/// once per request via `visible_repo_pairs` (two SQL round-trips), then
+/// passed into the filtered aggregate queries.
 pub async fn bounty_stats(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<BountyStatsResponse>> {
-    let open = state.db.count_bounties_by_status("open").await.unwrap_or(0);
+    let visible = visible_repo_pairs(&state).await?;
+
+    let open = state
+        .db
+        .count_bounties_by_status_visible("open", &visible)
+        .await?;
     let claimed = state
         .db
-        .count_bounties_by_status("claimed")
-        .await
-        .unwrap_or(0);
+        .count_bounties_by_status_visible("claimed", &visible)
+        .await?;
     let completed = state
         .db
-        .count_bounties_by_status("completed")
-        .await
-        .unwrap_or(0);
+        .count_bounties_by_status_visible("completed", &visible)
+        .await?;
 
-    let leaders = state.db.bounty_leaderboard(10).await.unwrap_or_default();
+    let leaders = state.db.bounty_leaderboard_visible(10, &visible).await?;
     let leaderboard = leaders
         .into_iter()
         .map(|(did, cnt, total)| AgentBountyEntry {
@@ -489,11 +580,14 @@ pub async fn bounty_stats(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<BountySt
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/agents/{did}/bounties
+///
+/// Per-agent earnings restricted to anonymously-listable repos (#477).
 pub async fn agent_bounty_stats(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path(did): Path<String>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let (count, total) = state.db.agent_bounty_stats(&did).await.unwrap_or((0, 0));
+    let visible = visible_repo_pairs(&state).await?;
+    let (count, total) = state.db.agent_bounty_stats_visible(&did, &visible).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
         "did": did,
         "completed_bounties": count,

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/certs.rs

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ pub async fn list_certs(
                 "node_did":   c.node_did,
                 "signature":  c.signature,
                 "issued_at":  c.issued_at,
+                "version":    c.version,
             })
         })
         .collect();
@@ -92,5 +93,6 @@ pub async fn get_cert(
         "node_did":   cert.node_did,
         "signature":  cert.signature,
         "issued_at":  cert.issued_at,
+        "version":    cert.version,
     })))
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/events.rs

@@ -437,6 +437,7 @@ mod ref_updates_feed_tests {
             node_did: "did:key:z6MkNode".into(),
             signature: "sig".into(),
             issued_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            version: 1,
         }
     }
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/ipfs.rs

@@ -2133,7 +2133,15 @@ async fn gate_and_serve(
 /// Returns all CIDs that have been pinned to the local IPFS node from git
 /// objects received via push. Each entry includes the git SHA-256 hex, the
 /// CIDv1 string, and the timestamp when it was pinned.
-pub async fn list_pins(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
+pub async fn list_pins(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>>,
+) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
+    if auth.is_none() {
+        return Err(crate::error::AppError::Unauthorized(
+            "authentication required for pin listing".into(),
+        ));
+    }
     // Bare `?` so connection-class sqlx failures downcast to `AppError::Db` and
     // map to 503 `db_unavailable` (not 500 via `.map_err(AppError::Internal)`) (#251).
     let pins = state.db.list_pinned_cids().await?;
@@ -2426,6 +2434,7 @@ mod closed_pool_tests {
             .oneshot(
                 Request::builder()
                     .uri("/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+                    .extension(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid("did:key:test".into()))
                     .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
                     .unwrap(),
             )
@@ -2520,7 +2529,10 @@ mod tests {
                 "/ipfs/{cid}",
                 axum::routing::get(crate::api::ipfs::get_by_cid),
             )
-            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(crate::auth::optional_signature))
+            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
+                crate::auth::SignatureBodyLimit(crate::server::SIGNED_BODY_LIMIT),
+                crate::auth::optional_signature,
+            ))
             .with_state(state)
     }
 
@@ -3758,9 +3770,13 @@ mod tests {
         // deterministically.
         let endpoint = crate::test_support::silent_http_endpoint().await;
         let tigris =
-            crate::git::tigris::TigrisClient::for_testing_with_endpoint("test-bucket", &endpoint)
-                .await;
-        state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(repos_dir, Some(tigris), pool);
+            crate::git::tigris::TigrisClient::for_testing_with_endpoint("test-bucket", &endpoint);
+        state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(
+            repos_dir,
+            Some(tigris),
+            pool,
+            std::time::Duration::from_secs(300),
+        );
         state.push_limiter_trust = crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None;
         let mut cfg = (*state.config).clone();
         cfg.git_acquire_timeout_secs = 1;
@@ -3831,9 +3847,13 @@ mod tests {
         // (endpoint-pinned test client, no AWS_* env reads).
         let endpoint = crate::test_support::silent_http_endpoint().await;
         let tigris =
-            crate::git::tigris::TigrisClient::for_testing_with_endpoint("test-bucket", &endpoint)
-                .await;
-        state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(repos_dir, Some(tigris), pool);
+            crate::git::tigris::TigrisClient::for_testing_with_endpoint("test-bucket", &endpoint);
+        state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(
+            repos_dir,
+            Some(tigris),
+            pool,
+            std::time::Duration::from_secs(300),
+        );
         let mut cfg = (*state.config).clone();
         cfg.git_acquire_timeout_secs = 1;
         state.config = Arc::new(cfg);
@@ -7956,9 +7976,18 @@ mod tests {
         // (endpoint-pinned test client, no AWS_* env reads).
         let endpoint = crate::test_support::silent_http_endpoint().await;
         let tigris =
-            crate::git::tigris::TigrisClient::for_testing_with_endpoint("test-bucket", &endpoint)
-                .await;
-        state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(repos_dir, Some(tigris), pool);
+            crate::git::tigris::TigrisClient::for_testing_with_endpoint("test-bucket", &endpoint);
+        state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(
+            repos_dir,
+            Some(tigris),
+            pool,
+            std::time::Duration::from_secs(300),
+        );
+        state
+            .db
+            .upsert_mirror_repo("z6f3budget", "ghost", "/unused-ghost", None, false)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
         let mut cfg = (*state.config).clone();
         cfg.ipfs_request_budget_secs = 1;
         cfg.git_acquire_timeout_secs = 2;

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/labels.rs

@@ -14,14 +14,13 @@ pub struct LabelRequest {
     pub label: String,
 }
 
-/// POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/labels
-pub async fn add_label(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
-    Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    Json(req): Json<LabelRequest>,
-) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
-    let label = req.label.trim().to_lowercase();
+/// Canonicalize and validate a label string. `add_label` and `remove_label`
+/// must agree on the form stored in the DB: `add_label` already trims and
+/// lowercases before storing, so `remove_label` has to do the same to find
+/// the row. Validation is shared so neither handler can drift on charset or
+/// length (#344).
+fn canonicalize_label(raw: &str) -> std::result::Result<String, AppError> {
+    let label = raw.trim().to_lowercase();
     if label.is_empty() || label.len() > 50 {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest("label must be 1–50 characters".into()));
     }
@@ -33,6 +32,17 @@ pub async fn add_label(
             "label must contain only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, and colons".into(),
         ));
     }
+    Ok(label)
+}
+
+/// POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/labels
+pub async fn add_label(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    Json(req): Json<LabelRequest>,
+) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
+    let label = canonicalize_label(&req.label)?;
 
     let record = state
         .db
@@ -59,6 +69,8 @@ pub async fn remove_label(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name, label)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
+    let label = canonicalize_label(&label)?;
+
     let record = state
         .db
         .get_repo(&owner, &name)
@@ -66,7 +78,10 @@ pub async fn remove_label(
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
     crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
-    state.db.remove_label(&record.id, &label).await?;
+    let removed = state.db.remove_label(&record.id, &label).await?;
+    if !removed {
+        return Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("label '{label}'")));
+    }
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "label": label, "removed": true })))
 }
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/mod.rs

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ pub mod replicas;
 pub mod repos;
 pub mod resolve;
 pub mod stars;
+pub mod task_cursor;
 pub mod tasks;
 pub mod visibility;
 pub mod webhooks;
@@ -68,20 +69,51 @@ pub(crate) async fn authorize_repo_read(
 /// `did:web` / `did:gitlawb` share the base58 space with `did:key`, so a
 /// trailing-segment compare would treat `did:key:X` and `did:gitlawb:X` as equal.
 pub(crate) fn did_matches(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
-    // One implementation, shared with `gl` and `git-remote-gitlawb` through core:
-    // every boundary that compares a DID applies the same collapse rule.
-    gitlawb_core::ucan::push::did_key_eq(a, b)
+    if a == b {
+        return true;
+    }
+    fn key_id(d: &str) -> &str {
+        d.strip_prefix("did:key:").unwrap_or(d)
+    }
+    let (ka, kb) = (key_id(a), key_id(b));
+    // After stripping `did:key:`, a value still containing ':' is a non-key full
+    // DID — do not let it match a bare `did:key` id.
+    !ka.contains(':') && !kb.contains(':') && ka == kb
 }
 
+/// Client-facing denial shared by every repo-owner gate copy. `require_repo_owner`
+/// renders it as `AppError::Forbidden`; a handler that emits its own
+/// `(StatusCode, Json)` envelope instead of `AppError` (e.g.
+/// `api::tasks::create_task`) must use this constant too, so two copies of one
+/// gate cannot drift in observable output.
+pub(crate) const REPO_OWNER_ONLY_MESSAGE: &str = "only the repo owner can perform this action";
+
 /// 403 unless `caller` is the repo owner. Uses [`did_matches`] so the owner check
 /// and the author check (close policy) share one normalization.
 pub(crate) fn require_repo_owner(record: &RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> Result<()> {
     if did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
         Ok(())
     } else {
-        Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "only the repo owner can perform this action".into(),
-        ))
+        Err(AppError::Forbidden(REPO_OWNER_ONLY_MESSAGE.into()))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Validate a branch name using the configured git binary (storage boundaries).
+pub(crate) fn validate_git_ref_with_git(
+    git_bin: &str,
+    name: &str,
+) -> std::result::Result<(), crate::git::store::GitRefValidationError> {
+    crate::git::store::validate_git_ref_with_git(git_bin, name)
+}
+
+/// Map ref-validation failures to the correct HTTP surface: malformed caller
+/// input stays 400; an inability to run git stays on the git/server-error path.
+pub(crate) fn map_git_ref_validation_error(
+    err: crate::git::store::GitRefValidationError,
+) -> AppError {
+    match err {
+        crate::git::store::GitRefValidationError::Invalid(msg) => AppError::BadRequest(msg),
+        crate::git::store::GitRefValidationError::GitUnavailable(msg) => AppError::Git(msg),
     }
 }
 
@@ -216,6 +248,11 @@ mod authz_guard {
             (events, "list_repo_events", "authorize_repo_read("),
             // Bucket C — signer-self: the acting DID is matched/bound to auth.0
             (tasks, "create_task", "did_matches("),
+            // #496: create_task is signer-self AND owner-when-repo-scoped — a
+            // repo_id naming a hosted repo admits tasks only from its owner.
+            // Both halves are pinned: the did_matches row guards the signer
+            // binding, this one the repo-ownership gate.
+            (tasks, "create_task", "require_repo_owner("),
             (tasks, "claim_task", "did_matches("),
             (tasks, "complete_task", "did_matches("),
             (tasks, "fail_task", "did_matches("),
@@ -272,6 +309,577 @@ mod authz_guard {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Completeness fence over the GraphQL mutation surface: the mirror of
+    /// `every_in_scope_mutation_has_its_gate` for `graphql/mutation.rs`. Kept a
+    /// SEPARATE guard with its own table (never folded into the REST rows above):
+    /// a guard over a heterogeneous set must classify per member, and these
+    /// same-named task rows belong to the GraphQL surface, not `api/tasks.rs`.
+    ///
+    /// COMPLETENESS comes from the engine's own SDL (`schema.sdl()`), parsed as a
+    /// structured AST (#219), NOT introspection and NOT a text parse of source.
+    /// This matters: async-graphql OMITS `#[graphql(visible = false)]` fields from
+    /// introspection while leaving them executable, so an introspection-sourced fence
+    /// could be defeated by a hidden mutation. SDL includes those fields, so no
+    /// visibility flag (and, via the AST parse, no brace-in-description quirk) can hide
+    /// a live mutation. The SDL field set must equal the registered set: a new field with
+    /// no row fails (a repo-write cannot slip in unlisted); a registered name absent from
+    /// the schema fails (renamed or removed). The set is also cross-checked against
+    /// introspection, so any field present in SDL but hidden from introspection fails
+    /// named as a forbidden hidden mutation.
+    ///
+    /// The MARKER check is the only source-scraped part, and it is not the
+    /// completeness guarantee. Three honest limits, so a green check is not misread
+    /// as full authorization coverage:
+    ///   1. A present marker is not load-bearingness (the gate may not redden on a
+    ///      hostile probe: the #203 present-but-vacuous case). The adversarial tests
+    ///      in `graphql/mutation.rs` are the load-bearing layer.
+    ///   2. A present marker is not gate-correctness (it may be the wrong bucket for
+    ///      the operation's resource: a repo-write registered as signer-self would
+    ///      pass, so INV-1 review remains the defense).
+    ///   3. The marker check scrapes the comment-masked, brace-bounded resolver body;
+    ///      a `{`/`}` or a `did_matches(` inside a STRING literal is not masked, so it
+    ///      could mis-slice that body or satisfy the marker vacuously (the same
+    ///      vacuous-marker class as limit 1). Completeness is unaffected: it comes
+    ///      from the SDL AST, not from this scrape.
+    #[test]
+    fn every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate() {
+        // (Rust snake name, schema field in camelCase, expected gate markers). The
+        // four are Bucket C signer-self: `/graphql` uses optional_signature, so each
+        // resolver must call `require_signer(ctx)?` and bind the acting DID with
+        // `did_matches(`. A repo-write would be Bucket A (`require_repo_owner(`).
+        // Same-named REST rows live in the guard above against `api/tasks.rs`.
+        let registered: &[(&str, &str, &[&str])] = &[
+            (
+                "create_task",
+                "createTask",
+                &[
+                    "require_signer(ctx)?",
+                    "did_matches(",
+                    "require_repo_owner(",
+                ],
+            ),
+            (
+                "claim_task",
+                "claimTask",
+                &["require_signer(ctx)?", "did_matches("],
+            ),
+            (
+                "complete_task",
+                "completeTask",
+                &["require_signer(ctx)?", "did_matches("],
+            ),
+            (
+                "fail_task",
+                "failTask",
+                &["require_signer(ctx)?", "did_matches("],
+            ),
+        ];
+
+        // Completeness + hidden-mutation cross-check against the REAL schema (#219),
+        // delegated to the generic `assert_mutation_fence` so the SDL sourcing and the
+        // cross-check are ALSO exercised by a synthetic hidden schema in
+        // `fence_rejects_a_hidden_mutation` (INV-21). Because the real MutationRoot has no
+        // hidden field today, that synthetic test — not a hypothetical production canary —
+        // is what turns reverting the SDL source or deleting the cross-check RED.
+        {
+            use crate::graphql::mutation::MutationRoot;
+            use crate::graphql::query::QueryRoot;
+            use crate::graphql::subscription::SubscriptionRoot;
+            let schema =
+                async_graphql::Schema::build(QueryRoot, MutationRoot, SubscriptionRoot).finish();
+            let registered_camel: Vec<&str> = registered.iter().map(|(_, c, _)| *c).collect();
+            assert_mutation_fence(&schema, &registered_camel);
+        }
+
+        // Marker present (source scrape; the vacuity limit, backstopped by the
+        // adversarial tests): each resolver body carries every required gate marker.
+        let masked = mask_comments(include_str!("../graphql/mutation.rs"));
+        for (snake, _, markers) in registered {
+            let body = resolver_body(&masked, snake);
+            for marker in *markers {
+                assert!(
+                    body.contains(marker),
+                    "GraphQL mutation `{snake}` is missing its gate marker `{marker}`: gate removed"
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Version-safety self-check (#219, INV-21): the fence's completeness guarantee rests
+    /// on `schema.sdl()` INCLUDING `visible = false` fields while introspection omits
+    /// them. That is observed async-graphql behavior, not a documented contract, so pin
+    /// it here: a synthetic schema with a hidden mutation must have that field in its
+    /// SDL-derived set and NOT in its introspection-derived set. If a future
+    /// async-graphql upgrade ever filters SDL by visibility, the first assertion flips
+    /// RED — the assumption is load-bearing, not trusted.
+    #[test]
+    fn sdl_source_sees_hidden_mutations_that_introspection_omits() {
+        use async_graphql::{EmptySubscription, Object, Schema};
+        struct Q;
+        #[Object]
+        impl Q {
+            async fn ping(&self) -> i32 {
+                0
+            }
+        }
+        struct M;
+        #[Object]
+        impl M {
+            async fn visible_mut(&self) -> i32 {
+                1
+            }
+            #[graphql(visible = false)]
+            async fn hidden_mut(&self) -> i32 {
+                2
+            }
+        }
+        let schema = Schema::build(Q, M, EmptySubscription).finish();
+
+        // SDL source (the fix): includes the hidden field.
+        let sdl_fields = mutation_field_names_from_sdl(&schema.sdl());
+        assert!(
+            sdl_fields.iter().any(|f| f == "hiddenMut"),
+            "SDL-sourced set MUST include the visible=false mutation; if this is RED, \
+             async-graphql started filtering SDL by visibility and the fence's \
+             completeness guarantee is broken: {sdl_fields:?}"
+        );
+
+        // Introspection (the fence's own helper): OMITS the hidden field. This is the
+        // exact gap the fix closes — an introspection-sourced fence never sees `hiddenMut`.
+        let introspected = introspection_mutation_fields(&schema);
+        assert!(
+            !introspected.iter().any(|f| f == "hiddenMut"),
+            "introspection is expected to OMIT the visible=false mutation (that is the \
+             gap the SDL source closes); got {introspected:?}"
+        );
+
+        // The exact diff the fence computes: hidden ∈ (sdl \ introspection).
+        let hidden: Vec<&String> = sdl_fields
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|f| !introspected.iter().any(|i| i == *f))
+            .collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            hidden,
+            vec!["hiddenMut"],
+            "the SDL-vs-introspection diff must surface exactly the hidden mutation"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// INV-21 wiring guard (#219): drives the generic `assert_mutation_fence` — the SAME
+    /// helper the real fence calls — against a synthetic schema whose mutation is
+    /// `visible = false` and IS registered, so completeness passes and ONLY the
+    /// hidden-from-introspection cross-check can fail. This is what makes the fence's SDL
+    /// sourcing load-bearing without a production canary: reverting the source to
+    /// introspection (the hidden field then absent from the SDL set) or deleting the
+    /// cross-check removes this panic (or changes its message), turning the
+    /// `should_panic` test RED. The real MutationRoot has no hidden field, so nothing on
+    /// the real schema could catch that regression.
+    #[test]
+    #[should_panic(expected = "hidden from introspection")]
+    fn fence_rejects_a_hidden_mutation() {
+        use async_graphql::{EmptySubscription, Object, Schema};
+        struct Q;
+        #[Object]
+        impl Q {
+            async fn ping(&self) -> i32 {
+                0
+            }
+        }
+        struct M;
+        #[Object]
+        impl M {
+            async fn visible_mut(&self) -> i32 {
+                1
+            }
+            #[graphql(visible = false)]
+            async fn hidden_mut(&self) -> i32 {
+                2
+            }
+        }
+        let schema = Schema::build(Q, M, EmptySubscription).finish();
+        // Both fields registered, so completeness passes and only the cross-check fires.
+        assert_mutation_fence(&schema, &["visibleMut", "hiddenMut"]);
+    }
+
+    /// Deprecated-mutation guard (#219): a `#[graphql(deprecation = "...")]` mutation is
+    /// executable and present in SDL, but GraphQL introspection omits it by default. The
+    /// fence's introspection helper uses `includeDeprecated: true`, so a deprecated (but
+    /// visible) mutation is NOT mistaken for a hidden one. With it registered, the fence
+    /// must NOT panic. Remove `includeDeprecated: true` and this goes RED — the deprecated
+    /// field would look hidden and false-red as a forbidden visible=false mutation.
+    #[test]
+    fn fence_admits_a_deprecated_mutation() {
+        use async_graphql::{EmptySubscription, Object, Schema};
+        struct Q;
+        #[Object]
+        impl Q {
+            async fn ping(&self) -> i32 {
+                0
+            }
+        }
+        struct M;
+        #[Object]
+        impl M {
+            async fn visible_mut(&self) -> i32 {
+                1
+            }
+            #[graphql(deprecation = "use visibleMut")]
+            async fn deprecated_mut(&self) -> i32 {
+                2
+            }
+        }
+        let schema = Schema::build(Q, M, EmptySubscription).finish();
+        // Must not panic: the deprecated field is visible (present in introspection with
+        // includeDeprecated) and registered, so it is neither hidden nor unclassified.
+        assert_mutation_fence(&schema, &["visibleMut", "deprecatedMut"]);
+    }
+
+    /// Completeness + hidden-mutation cross-check for a BUILT schema (#219). Generic over
+    /// the schema type so the real fence AND the synthetic `fence_rejects_a_hidden_mutation`
+    /// / `fence_admits_a_deprecated_mutation` tests drive the SAME sourcing and cross-check.
+    /// Completeness is sourced from SDL (which includes `visible = false` fields); the
+    /// cross-check fails any SDL field hidden from introspection. This genericity is the
+    /// INV-21 fix: because the real MutationRoot has no hidden field, only a synthetic
+    /// hidden schema through THIS helper makes reverting the SDL source or removing the
+    /// cross-check RED, rather than leaving the class latent behind a production canary.
+    fn assert_mutation_fence<Q, M, S>(
+        schema: &async_graphql::Schema<Q, M, S>,
+        registered_camel: &[&str],
+    ) where
+        Q: async_graphql::ObjectType + 'static,
+        M: async_graphql::ObjectType + 'static,
+        S: async_graphql::SubscriptionType + 'static,
+    {
+        let sdl_fields = mutation_field_names_from_sdl(&schema.sdl());
+        let introspected = introspection_mutation_fields(schema);
+        // No SDL field may be hidden from introspection (a visible=false mutation).
+        for f in &sdl_fields {
+            assert!(
+                introspected.iter().any(|i| i == f),
+                "GraphQL mutation `{f}` is in the schema but hidden from introspection \
+                 (a `#[graphql(visible = false)]` field): hidden mutations are forbidden \
+                 by this fence — make it visible so its classification is enforceable, or \
+                 remove it"
+            );
+        }
+        // Completeness both directions against the registered (camelCase) set.
+        for f in &sdl_fields {
+            assert!(
+                registered_camel.contains(&f.as_str()),
+                "unclassified GraphQL mutation `{f}`: add it to \
+                 every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate with a deliberate gate \
+                 (`require_repo_owner(` for a repo-write, `did_matches(` for a task op)"
+            );
+        }
+        for c in registered_camel {
+            assert!(
+                sdl_fields.iter().any(|f| f == c),
+                "registered GraphQL mutation `{c}` is not in the schema \
+                 (renamed or removed); update the table"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The mutation field names via the engine's introspection, run against a passed
+    /// schema. STRUCTURED (names arrive as data). Uses `fields(includeDeprecated: true)`:
+    /// GraphQL's default omits `@deprecated` fields, but a `#[graphql(deprecation = "...")]`
+    /// mutation is still executable and present in SDL, so without this the cross-check
+    /// above would false-red a deprecated mutation as a hidden (visible=false) one. Only a
+    /// real visibility filter should trip that arm; deprecation is a lifecycle marker.
+    fn introspection_mutation_fields<Q, M, S>(
+        schema: &async_graphql::Schema<Q, M, S>,
+    ) -> Vec<String>
+    where
+        Q: async_graphql::ObjectType + 'static,
+        M: async_graphql::ObjectType + 'static,
+        S: async_graphql::SubscriptionType + 'static,
+    {
+        use async_graphql::Value;
+        let resp = tokio::runtime::Runtime::new()
+            .expect("tokio runtime")
+            .block_on(schema.execute(
+                "{ __schema { mutationType { fields(includeDeprecated: true) { name } } } }",
+            ));
+        assert!(
+            resp.errors.is_empty(),
+            "schema introspection failed: {:?}",
+            resp.errors
+        );
+        let mut names = Vec::new();
+        if let Value::Object(root) = &resp.data {
+            if let Some(Value::Object(sc)) = root.get("__schema") {
+                if let Some(Value::Object(mt)) = sc.get("mutationType") {
+                    if let Some(Value::List(field_list)) = mt.get("fields") {
+                        for field in field_list {
+                            if let Value::Object(fo) = field {
+                                if let Some(Value::String(n)) = fo.get("name") {
+                                    names.push(n.clone());
+                                }
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        names
+    }
+
+    /// The mutation field names sourced from the built schema's SDL — the completeness
+    /// source (#219). Builds the same DB-free schema as the introspection helper and runs
+    /// its `.sdl()` (sync, no runtime needed) through [`mutation_field_names_from_sdl`].
+    /// SDL includes `#[graphql(visible = false)]` fields, so this source cannot be
+    /// defeated by hiding a mutation from introspection.
+    fn graphql_mutation_fields_from_sdl() -> Vec<String> {
+        use crate::graphql::mutation::MutationRoot;
+        use crate::graphql::query::QueryRoot;
+        use crate::graphql::subscription::SubscriptionRoot;
+        let schema =
+            async_graphql::Schema::build(QueryRoot, MutationRoot, SubscriptionRoot).finish();
+        mutation_field_names_from_sdl(&schema.sdl())
+    }
+
+    /// The mutation type's field names extracted from an async-graphql SDL string via
+    /// the engine's OWN parser AST (`async_graphql::parser::parse_schema`), NOT
+    /// introspection. This is the completeness source (#219): unlike introspection,
+    /// which async-graphql filters by `visible` (a `#[graphql(visible = false)]`
+    /// mutation is executable but ABSENT from introspection), `schema.sdl()` includes
+    /// every registered field, so a hidden mutation still appears here and must carry a
+    /// classified row. Parsing the AST (not a brace/line text scan) means a `}` inside a
+    /// field description cannot mis-slice the type block. camelCase, as async-graphql
+    /// emits. An empty result on a navigation miss is safe: the set-equality in
+    /// `every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate` turns "no fields" into a loud failure for
+    /// every registered name, never a vacuous pass.
+    fn mutation_field_names_from_sdl(sdl: &str) -> Vec<String> {
+        use async_graphql::parser::parse_schema;
+        use async_graphql::parser::types::{TypeKind, TypeSystemDefinition};
+
+        let doc = parse_schema(sdl).expect("async-graphql SDL must parse");
+        // The mutation root type name: from the `schema { mutation: X }` block if
+        // present, else the GraphQL default "Mutation".
+        let mutation_type = doc
+            .definitions
+            .iter()
+            .find_map(|def| match def {
+                TypeSystemDefinition::Schema(s) => s
+                    .node
+                    .mutation
+                    .as_ref()
+                    .map(|m| m.node.as_str().to_string()),
+                _ => None,
+            })
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| "Mutation".to_string());
+        // The fields of that object type.
+        doc.definitions
+            .iter()
+            .find_map(|def| match def {
+                TypeSystemDefinition::Type(t) if t.node.name.node.as_str() == mutation_type => {
+                    match &t.node.kind {
+                        TypeKind::Object(obj) => Some(
+                            obj.fields
+                                .iter()
+                                .map(|f| f.node.name.node.as_str().to_string())
+                                .collect::<Vec<_>>(),
+                        ),
+                        _ => None,
+                    }
+                }
+                _ => None,
+            })
+            .unwrap_or_default()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sdl_extractor_includes_a_hidden_visible_false_field() {
+        // A field that would be hidden from introspection must still be listed from SDL.
+        let sdl = "schema { query: QueryRoot mutation: MutationRoot }\n\
+                   type QueryRoot { ping: Int! }\n\
+                   type MutationRoot { createTask: Int! hiddenMut: Int! }\n";
+        let fields = mutation_field_names_from_sdl(sdl);
+        assert!(
+            fields.iter().any(|f| f == "createTask"),
+            "visible field must be listed: {fields:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            fields.iter().any(|f| f == "hiddenMut"),
+            "a visible=false field (present in SDL, hidden from introspection) MUST be \
+             listed by the completeness source: {fields:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sdl_extractor_is_not_fooled_by_a_brace_in_a_field_description() {
+        // A `}` inside a field description must not truncate the type block (the AST
+        // parse is immune to the text-parse quirk the old design feared).
+        let sdl = "schema { query: QueryRoot mutation: MutationRoot }\n\
+                   type QueryRoot { ping: Int! }\n\
+                   type MutationRoot {\n\
+                     \"\"\"a description with a } brace and { another\"\"\"\n\
+                     createTask: Int!\n\
+                     claimTask: Int!\n\
+                   }\n";
+        let fields = mutation_field_names_from_sdl(sdl);
+        assert!(
+            fields.iter().any(|f| f == "createTask") && fields.iter().any(|f| f == "claimTask"),
+            "both fields must be extracted despite a brace in a description: {fields:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sdl_extractor_returns_empty_for_a_query_only_schema() {
+        let sdl = "schema { query: QueryRoot }\ntype QueryRoot { ping: Int! }\n";
+        assert!(
+            mutation_field_names_from_sdl(sdl).is_empty(),
+            "a schema with no mutation root yields no mutation fields (no panic)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The comment-masked body of `async fn <snake>` in `graphql/mutation.rs`, bounded
+    /// to the resolver's OWN braces (its `{ .. }`), for the marker check. Brace-matching
+    /// on the comment-masked source means a `}` in a trailing helper cannot extend the
+    /// body and a comment marker does not count. A `{`/`}` inside a STRING literal is
+    /// not masked, a documented marker-check-only residual (limit 3); completeness does
+    /// not use this.
+    fn resolver_body(masked_src: &str, snake: &str) -> String {
+        let needle = format!("async fn {snake}(");
+        let start = masked_src.find(&needle).unwrap_or_else(|| {
+            panic!("resolver `async fn {snake}(` not found in graphql/mutation.rs")
+        });
+        let open = start
+            + masked_src[start..]
+                .find('{')
+                .expect("resolver body opening brace");
+        let mut depth = 0i32;
+        let mut end = masked_src.len();
+        for (i, c) in masked_src[open..].char_indices() {
+            match c {
+                '{' => depth += 1,
+                '}' => {
+                    depth -= 1;
+                    if depth == 0 {
+                        end = open + i + 1;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+                _ => {}
+            }
+        }
+        masked_src[open..end].to_string()
+    }
+
+    /// `src` with `//` line comments and `/* */` block comments (nested) blanked to
+    /// spaces, WITHOUT opening a comment inside a `"..."` string (so a `"https://"` does
+    /// not erase the rest of its line). String CONTENTS are left intact, so a brace or
+    /// a gate marker inside a string is not masked; for the marker check that is a
+    /// documented vacuity residual (limit 3), and completeness does not use this at
+    /// all. Char literals and raw/byte strings are not tracked (absent in resolver
+    /// bodies); a `'"'` char or a raw string is the remaining narrow residual.
+    fn mask_comments(src: &str) -> String {
+        let chars: Vec<char> = src.chars().collect();
+        let mut out = String::with_capacity(src.len());
+        let mut i = 0;
+        let mut block_depth = 0usize;
+        let mut in_string = false;
+        while i < chars.len() {
+            let c = chars[i];
+            let next = chars.get(i + 1).copied();
+            if block_depth > 0 {
+                if c == '/' && next == Some('*') {
+                    block_depth += 1;
+                    out.push_str("  ");
+                    i += 2;
+                } else if c == '*' && next == Some('/') {
+                    block_depth -= 1;
+                    out.push_str("  ");
+                    i += 2;
+                } else {
+                    out.push(if c == '\n' { '\n' } else { ' ' });
+                    i += 1;
+                }
+            } else if in_string {
+                out.push(c);
+                if c == '\\' {
+                    if let Some(n) = next {
+                        out.push(n);
+                        i += 2;
+                    } else {
+                        i += 1;
+                    }
+                } else {
+                    if c == '"' {
+                        in_string = false;
+                    }
+                    i += 1;
+                }
+            } else if c == '"' {
+                in_string = true;
+                out.push('"');
+                i += 1;
+            } else if c == '/' && next == Some('/') {
+                while i < chars.len() && chars[i] != '\n' {
+                    out.push(' ');
+                    i += 1;
+                }
+            } else if c == '/' && next == Some('*') {
+                block_depth = 1;
+                out.push_str("  ");
+                i += 2;
+            } else {
+                out.push(c);
+                i += 1;
+            }
+        }
+        out
+    }
+
+    /// The SDL field set (the completeness source of truth, #219) is exactly the
+    /// registered mutations. If async-graphql adds or renames a field, this reddens
+    /// and forces the `every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate` table to be updated. Uses
+    /// SDL, not introspection: introspection omits `visible = false` fields, so an
+    /// introspection-based pin here would go green while a hidden mutation existed.
+    #[test]
+    fn schema_lists_exactly_the_registered_mutations() {
+        let mut fields = graphql_mutation_fields_from_sdl();
+        fields.sort();
+        assert_eq!(
+            fields,
+            vec!["claimTask", "completeTask", "createTask", "failTask"],
+            "the SDL mutation field set is the authoritative discovered set"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The marker check is bounded to a resolver's OWN body and is comment- and
+    /// string-aware: a `//` inside a `"https://"` string does not erase a real gate on
+    /// that line (no false-red), and a trailing module helper's `did_matches(` does not
+    /// rescue a resolver whose own gate was removed (no false-green).
+    #[test]
+    fn resolver_body_is_bounded_and_comment_and_string_aware() {
+        let src = "\
+impl MutationRoot {
+    async fn ok(&self) -> Result<u32> {
+        let _ = (\"see https://x/y\", did_matches(a, b)); // URL string then gate, one line
+        Ok(0)
+    }
+    async fn last(&self) -> Result<u32> {
+        // did_matches( only in a comment
+        Ok(0)
+    }
+}
+fn helper() { let _ = did_matches(z, z); }
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests { async fn t() { let _ = did_matches(x, y); } }
+";
+        let masked = mask_comments(src);
+        assert!(
+            resolver_body(&masked, "ok").contains("did_matches("),
+            "a `//` inside a string must not erase the real gate on that line"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !resolver_body(&masked, "last").contains("did_matches("),
+            "the marker check must be bounded to the resolver's own body (a trailing \
+             helper's marker must not rescue a resolver whose gate was removed)"
+        );
+    }
+
     /// Proves the comment-stripping that GUARD-1 added: a marker that appears only
     /// in a full-line comment (the real `replicas.rs` false-pass shape) must NOT
     /// satisfy a row.

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/peers.rs

@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ pub struct PeerResponse {
     pub reachable: bool,
 }
 
+pub(crate) const PUBLIC_HTTP_URL_REQUIREMENT: &str = "must be a public http(s) URL (no loopback, private, localhost, .localhost, .internal, or .local hosts)";
+
 /// Extract an IPv4 address embedded in an IPv6 literal across the transition
 /// formats that carry one: IPv4-mapped (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`), IPv4-compatible
 /// (`::a.b.c.d`), 6to4 (`2002:WWXX:YYZZ::/16`), and the NAT64 well-known prefix
@@ -104,8 +106,8 @@ fn embedded_ipv4(v6: std::net::Ipv6Addr) -> Option<std::net::Ipv4Addr> {
 
 /// Whether a peer `http_url` is a public http(s) endpoint safe to register.
 /// Rejects non-http(s) schemes, loopback/unspecified/private/link-local IPs,
-/// and `localhost` / `.local` / `.internal` hostnames. Used at announce time
-/// and by the boot-time prune of already-poisoned rows.
+/// and `localhost` / `.localhost` / `.local` / `.internal` hostnames. Used at
+/// announce time and by the boot-time prune of already-poisoned rows.
 pub fn is_public_http_url(raw: &str) -> bool {
     let url = match reqwest::Url::parse(raw) {
         Ok(u) => u,
@@ -118,13 +120,14 @@ pub fn is_public_http_url(raw: &str) -> bool {
         Some(h) => h.to_ascii_lowercase(),
         None => return false,
     };
-    // Drop a single trailing dot (FQDN root): `localhost.` resolves the same as
+    // Drop trailing dots (FQDN root): `localhost.` resolves the same as
     // `localhost`, so normalize before the suffix/equality checks below.
-    if let Some(stripped) = host.strip_suffix('.') {
-        host = stripped.to_string();
-    }
+    // Strip to fixation rather than once, or `localhost..` reduces to
+    // `localhost.` and matches neither the equality nor the suffix check.
+    host.truncate(host.trim_end_matches('.').len());
     if host.is_empty()
         || host == "localhost"
+        || host.ends_with(".localhost")
         || host.ends_with(".local")
         || host.ends_with(".internal")
     {
@@ -167,8 +170,13 @@ pub fn is_public_http_url(raw: &str) -> bool {
             }
             std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
                 let s = v6.segments();
-                // fc00::/7 (unique-local) or fe80::/10 (link-local)
-                if (s[0] & 0xfe00) == 0xfc00 || (s[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80 {
+                // fc00::/7 (unique-local), fe80::/10 (link-local), or fec0::/10
+                // (site-local, deprecated by RFC 3879 and so never a legitimate
+                // peer address, but still routable on networks that kept it).
+                if (s[0] & 0xfe00) == 0xfc00
+                    || (s[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80
+                    || (s[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfec0
+                {
                     return false;
                 }
                 // Any NAT64 address (64:ff9b::/32) that is not the cleanly
@@ -183,6 +191,13 @@ pub fn is_public_http_url(raw: &str) -> bool {
                 }
             }
         }
+    } else if !host.contains('.') {
+        // A name with no dot at all. The `.local` / `.internal` rules above are
+        // suffix checks, so a single label slips both, and the resolver decides
+        // what it means by appending a search domain we cannot see from here.
+        // Only reachable when the host did not parse as an IP literal, which is
+        // what keeps bracketed IPv6 (also dotless) on the accepting path.
+        return false;
     }
     true
 }
@@ -248,9 +263,9 @@ pub async fn announce(
     // and turn our outbound sync-notify fan-out into an SSRF probe — and bury
     // the real peers under junk so node-origin repos stop replicating.
     if !is_public_http_url(&req.http_url) {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "http_url must be a public http(s) URL (no loopback, private, or .internal/.local hosts)".into(),
-        ));
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
+            "http_url {PUBLIC_HTTP_URL_REQUIREMENT}"
+        )));
     }
 
     // Reject self-announcements: a peer row whose http_url is our own public
@@ -520,7 +535,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn accepts_public_https_and_http() {
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("https://node.gitlawb.com"));
+        assert!(is_public_http_url("https://node.twigpine.com"));
         assert!(is_public_http_url("https://manila.gitlawb.com/"));
         assert!(is_public_http_url("http://203.0.113.10:7545"));
     }
@@ -529,6 +544,7 @@ mod tests {
     fn rejects_loopback_private_and_internal() {
         for bad in [
             "http://localhost:7545",
+            "http://node.localhost:7545",
             "http://127.0.0.1:5432/",
             "http://localhost:22/",
             "http://0.0.0.0:7545",
@@ -544,7 +560,7 @@ mod tests {
             "http://[::1]:7545",
             "http://gitlawb-node.internal:7545",
             "http://my-node.local/",
-            "ftp://node.gitlawb.com",
+            "ftp://node.twigpine.com",
             "not-a-url",
             "",
             // Trailing-dot FQDN of an internal host.
@@ -577,6 +593,49 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_dotless_single_label_hosts() {
+        // `.local` and `.internal` are suffix checks, so a name with no dot at
+        // all never matches one. A single-label name is completed by whatever
+        // search domain the resolver is configured with, which is not a
+        // destination we can reason about from the URL.
+        for bad in [
+            "http://local/",
+            "http://internal/",
+            "http://intranet/",
+            "http://wpad/",
+            "http://metadata/",
+            "http://local./",
+            "http://internal.:7545",
+        ] {
+            assert!(!is_public_http_url(bad), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_deprecated_site_local_v6() {
+        // fec0::/10, deprecated by RFC 3879. The link-local mask (0xffc0 ==
+        // 0xfe80) does not cover it: 0xfec0 & 0xffc0 is 0xfec0.
+        for bad in ["http://[fec0::1]/", "http://[feff:ffff::1]:7545"] {
+            assert!(!is_public_http_url(bad), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_repeated_trailing_root_dots() {
+        // Stripping a single root dot leaves `localhost.`, which matches
+        // neither the equality nor the suffix check. The subdomain form now
+        // exercises the `.localhost` suffix rejection together with the extra
+        // trailing dot.
+        for bad in [
+            "http://localhost../",
+            "http://localhost...:7545",
+            "http://node.localhost../",
+        ] {
+            assert!(!is_public_http_url(bad), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn accepts_6to4_and_nat64_wrapping_public_v4() {
         // Fold-and-recheck stays consistent with the mapped/compatible handling:
@@ -1530,6 +1589,31 @@ mod tests {
         )
     }
 
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn announce_rejects_localhost_subdomains_with_an_accurate_error(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        let resp = announce_only(state.clone())
+            .oneshot(announce_as(
+                &did,
+                &announce_body(&did, "https://node.localhost:7545"),
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let (status, error, message) = status_and_error(resp).await;
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+        assert_eq!(error, "bad_request");
+        assert_eq!(
+            message,
+            "http_url must be a public http(s) URL (no loopback, private, localhost, .localhost, .internal, or .local hosts)"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            snapshot(&state.db, &did).await.is_none(),
+            "a rejected .localhost announce must leave no row behind"
+        );
+    }
+
     /// U4 scenario 1, and the first test the keyid branch has ever had: a caller
     /// who proved control of one DID must not announce another's. Kills
     /// neutralizing the handler's keyid comparison, and kills demoting this

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/pulls.rs

@@ -50,6 +50,17 @@ pub async fn create_pr(
     let target_branch = req
         .target_branch
         .unwrap_or_else(|| record.default_branch.clone());
+
+    // Validate both refs before they are stored, since both are later
+    // interpolated into git argv (git diff / worktree add / merge). Validate the
+    // RESOLVED target, not just a caller-supplied one: create_repo also gates
+    // default_branch, but validating here as well means a PR can never feed the
+    // git sink an unchecked ref even if a default was poisoned by an older row
+    // or a future path that skips create_repo's gate.
+    crate::api::validate_git_ref_with_git(&state.git_bin, &req.source_branch)
+        .map_err(crate::api::map_git_ref_validation_error)?;
+    crate::api::validate_git_ref_with_git(&state.git_bin, &target_branch)
+        .map_err(crate::api::map_git_ref_validation_error)?;
     let number = state.db.next_pr_number(&record.id).await?;
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
 
@@ -209,9 +220,6 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!("PR is already {}", pr.status)));
     }
 
-    // Shed 503 + Retry-After on an exhausted write-lock POOL instead of a generic
-    // git 500 (#173 F1). Merging holds no admission permit, so it reaches the pool
-    // unthrottled; reuse the push handler's mapping so the two cannot drift.
     let guard = state
         .repo_store
         .acquire_write(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
@@ -228,7 +236,10 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
     );
 
     // Always release the advisory lock — even on error; upload to Tigris only on success.
-    guard.release(merge_result.is_ok()).await;
+    // Short-circuit on a refused publish before the PR is marked merged and
+    // before the webhook fires. Both are irreversible announcements of a merge
+    // commit that only exists on this node's disk.
+    guard.release(merge_result.is_ok()).await.into_result()?;
 
     let merge_sha = merge_result.map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
 
@@ -428,12 +439,8 @@ pub async fn list_comments(
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "comments": comments })))
 }
 
-/// #173 F1 follow-up: `merge_pr` reaches `acquire_write` holding NO admission permit
-/// (unlike the push handler, which is capped by the git-push semaphore), so it is one
-/// of the callers most likely to meet an exhausted write-lock POOL under load. An
-/// exhausted pool is a capacity signal, so the merge must shed 503 + Retry-After
-/// (`AppError::Overloaded`) the way the push handler does, not report the generic
-/// 500 git error that says nothing about retrying.
+/// #173 F1 follow-up: merge holds no admission permit, so an exhausted write-lock
+/// pool must shed 503 + Retry-After.
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod lock_pool_shed_tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -457,20 +464,15 @@ mod lock_pool_shed_tests {
         }
     }
 
-    /// RED-before/GREEN-after for `merge_pr`. Both directions: the shed while the only
-    /// lock-pool connection is held by a guard on a DIFFERENT repo (so this is pool
-    /// capacity, not advisory-lock contention on this repo), and the must-not case
-    /// once that connection is back.
     #[sqlx::test]
     async fn merge_pr_lock_pool_exhaustion_sheds_503_not_500(pool: PgPool) {
         let owner = "did:key:zMERGELOCKPOOLOWNERAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
         let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
-        // One lock-pool connection with a short checkout timeout, so a single held
-        // guard exhausts it promptly rather than at the pool default.
         state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(
             std::path::PathBuf::from("/tmp/gitlawb-pulls-lockpool"),
             None,
             crate::git::repo_store::build_lock_pool(&pool, 1, std::time::Duration::from_secs(1)),
+            std::time::Duration::from_secs(300),
         );
 
         let repo = seed_repo(owner, "lp-merge");
@@ -524,9 +526,7 @@ mod lock_pool_shed_tests {
             "merge_pr: a capacity shed must tell the client when to retry"
         );
 
-        // MUST-NOT: with the pool free again the merge is not shed as capacity (it
-        // fails later on the nonexistent on-disk repo, which is a git 500).
-        held.release(false).await;
+        let _ = held.release(false).await;
         let admitted = merge_pr(
             State(state.clone()),
             Extension(AuthenticatedDid(owner.to_string())),

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/replicas.rs

@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ pub async fn register_replica(
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
     validate_replica_url(&req.url)?;
 
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    // The mutation response carries repo metadata (name, replica count), so
+    // registration applies the same read-visibility decision as the listing:
+    // a caller who may not read the repo gets the same 404 as a missing one.
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let replica_did = &auth.0;
 
@@ -93,11 +93,10 @@ pub async fn unregister_replica(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    // Same gate as register_replica: removal mutates repo-scoped metadata and
+    // its response discloses the replica count.
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let replica_did = &auth.0;
     state.db.unregister_replica(&record.id, replica_did).await?;

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/resolve.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! DID resolution — look up a node by its gitlawb DID.
+//! DID resolution — look up a node by its Twigpine DID.
 //!
 //! First checks the local peers table (HTTP-layer peer discovery),
 //! then queries the Kademlia DHT via the libp2p swarm.
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ use crate::state::AppState;
 
 /// GET /api/v1/resolve/{did}
 ///
-/// Resolves a gitlawb DID to an HTTP URL and p2p multiaddr.
+/// Resolves a Twigpine DID to an HTTP URL and p2p multiaddr.
 /// Checks local peer cache first, then falls back to Kademlia DHT lookup.
 pub async fn resolve_did(
     State(state): State<AppState>,

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/task_cursor.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,782 @@
+//! Opaque, integrity-protected continuation tokens for the task read surfaces.
+//!
+//! The task list pages by keyset over `(created_at, id)`, but the rows a
+//! caller may *see* are a filtered subset of the rows the query has to
+//! *examine*. Handing the caller a raw `(created_at, id)` cursor therefore
+//! forced a choice between two broken options (#327 review): anchor the cursor
+//! on the last visible row, and a window of denied tasks longer than the scan
+//! budget stalls paging forever; or anchor it on the last examined row, and a
+//! denied read leaks the id and timestamp of a task `GET /tasks/{id}` other-
+//! wise 404s.
+//!
+//! A server-issued token removes the choice. The position it carries is the
+//! last *examined* candidate, so paging always advances, and the payload is
+//! opaque and MAC'd, so the caller learns nothing from it and cannot forge one
+//! naming a row of their choosing.
+//!
+//! The position must be *confidential*, not merely unforgeable: a token that
+//! merely signed a base64 payload would still let its holder read the id and
+//! timestamp of the denied row it names, which is the disclosure the token
+//! exists to prevent. The payload is therefore encrypted under a
+//! synthetic-IV construction (SIV): the tag is an HMAC over the filter and the
+//! plaintext, and it doubles as the IV seeding the keystream the plaintext is
+//! XORed with. That needs no randomness source and no dependency beyond the
+//! `hmac`/`sha2` pair already used for webhook signatures and blob recipient
+//! tags, and it is decrypt-last: nothing is parsed until the tag verifies.
+//!
+//! Making the token the *only* accepted cursor also fixes the ordering-domain
+//! bug the same review found. `agent_tasks.created_at` is TEXT and compared as
+//! TEXT, so `...Z` and `...+00:00` denote one instant but sort differently. A
+//! caller-typed timestamp could silently skip or repeat same-time rows. The
+//! token instead carries the stored string verbatim, so the value compared is
+//! always a value the server wrote.
+//!
+//! A token is bound to the *caller* as well as the filter. The position it
+//! names is the last examined candidate, not the last visible one, so it
+//! encodes how far a scan got under one caller's visibility. Resuming it as a
+//! different caller would start the scan past rows that caller is entitled to
+//! read, silently dropping them from the answer (#327 review). The presenting
+//! caller's normalized DID (empty and flagged absent when anonymous) is
+//! therefore part of the MAC input, so a token presented by anyone else fails
+//! to verify rather than under-reporting.
+//!
+//! Wire form: `v1.<iv>.<body>`, both parts base64url unpadded: the 16-byte
+//! synthetic IV (the truncated MAC, which also seeds the keystream) and the
+//! padded, encrypted JSON payload.
+
+use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
+use base64::Engine;
+use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use sha2::Sha256;
+
+use crate::error::AppError;
+
+type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
+
+const CURSOR_PREFIX: &str = "v1";
+const KEY_DERIVATION_LABEL: &[u8] = b"gitlawb/tasks-cursor-key/v1";
+const TAG_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"gitlawb/tasks-cursor-tag/v1";
+const STREAM_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"gitlawb/tasks-cursor-stream/v1";
+/// Truncated MAC length, and the synthetic IV width. 128 bits is far beyond
+/// forgery reach for a token that carries no authority of its own (every page
+/// re-runs the visibility gate against the presenting caller), and keeps the
+/// token short enough to sit in a query string.
+const TAG_LEN: usize = 16;
+
+/// Padding bucket for the serialized cursor payload, in bytes. The keystream
+/// XORs the plaintext byte for byte, so token length would otherwise track
+/// payload length and leak the named row's field widths to a holder who
+/// cannot decrypt anything. 128 comfortably covers the widest realistic
+/// payload: a 35-char RFC3339 timestamp (`to_rfc3339()` renders 29 chars at
+/// millisecond precision and 32 at microsecond, 35 only with all nine
+/// fractional digits), a 36-char server-minted UUID, and the fixed JSON
+/// envelope plus a 10-digit expiry, which together total 101 bytes. Should a future payload ever exceed the bucket, the length
+/// rounds up to the next multiple instead of failing, so `encode` never
+/// breaks — it just mints a longer token.
+const PAYLOAD_BUCKET: usize = 128;
+
+/// How long an issued cursor stays acceptable. Keyset positions never go stale
+/// on their own — `created_at`/`id` are immutable — so this is not a
+/// correctness bound. It bounds how long a token stays valid across a node
+/// restart-and-rotate and keeps an abandoned page from being resumed
+/// indefinitely.
+const CURSOR_TTL_SECS: i64 = 24 * 60 * 60;
+
+/// Node-keyed MAC key for continuation tokens, derived from the node keypair
+/// seed so it needs no configuration and survives restarts of the same node.
+/// Derived rather than used directly so a token forgery oracle could not
+/// bear on the signing key itself.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct TaskCursorKey([u8; 32]);
+
+impl std::fmt::Debug for TaskCursorKey {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.write_str("TaskCursorKey(<redacted>)")
+    }
+}
+
+impl TaskCursorKey {
+    pub fn derive(node_seed: &[u8; 32]) -> Self {
+        let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(node_seed).expect("HMAC accepts any key length");
+        mac.update(KEY_DERIVATION_LABEL);
+        let mut key = [0u8; 32];
+        key.copy_from_slice(&mac.finalize().into_bytes());
+        Self(key)
+    }
+}
+
+/// The keyset position a token carries: the last candidate row the previous
+/// request examined, whether or not the caller was allowed to see it.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct TaskPosition {
+    pub created_at: String,
+    pub id: String,
+}
+
+impl TaskPosition {
+    pub fn new(created_at: impl Into<String>, id: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            created_at: created_at.into(),
+            id: id.into(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_pair(&self) -> (&str, &str) {
+        (self.created_at.as_str(), self.id.as_str())
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct CursorPayload<'a> {
+    /// `created_at` of the last examined candidate, verbatim as stored.
+    t: &'a str,
+    /// `id` of the last examined candidate.
+    i: &'a str,
+    /// Unix expiry.
+    e: i64,
+}
+
+/// The filter a page was issued under. A cursor is only meaningful against the
+/// same `status`/`assignee_did` filter that produced it: resuming a filtered
+/// scan from an unfiltered position (or the reverse) silently skips rows.
+/// Bound into the MAC rather than stored in the payload, so it costs no token
+/// length and cannot be edited without invalidating the tag.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
+pub struct TaskFilter<'a> {
+    pub status: Option<&'a str>,
+    pub assignee_did: Option<&'a str>,
+}
+
+/// The visibility identity a token was issued to. Normalized through
+/// `normalize_owner_key` so the two spellings of one `did:key` identity
+/// (`did:key:X` and bare `X`) bind identically, matching `did_matches` on the
+/// read path: a caller who authenticates with the other spelling of their own
+/// DID must be able to resume their own page.
+fn caller_binding(caller: Option<&str>) -> &str {
+    caller.map(crate::db::normalize_owner_key).unwrap_or("")
+}
+
+/// The assignee filter a token was issued under. Normalized through
+/// `normalize_owner_key` so the two spellings of one `did:key` identity
+/// (`did:key:X` and bare `X`) bind identically, matching `list_tasks_keyset`
+/// in SQL: minting under `did:key:X` and resuming with bare `X` (or the reverse)
+/// hits the same rows and must verify under the MAC.
+fn assignee_binding(assignee: Option<&str>) -> &str {
+    assignee.map(crate::db::normalize_owner_key).unwrap_or("")
+}
+
+fn cursor_mac(
+    key: &TaskCursorKey,
+    filter: TaskFilter<'_>,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+    plaintext: &[u8],
+) -> HmacSha256 {
+    let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(&key.0).expect("HMAC accepts any key length");
+    mac.update(TAG_DOMAIN);
+    // Length-prefix every field so no two distinct filter/caller/plaintext
+    // tuples can produce the same MAC input.
+    for field in [
+        filter.status.unwrap_or("").as_bytes(),
+        assignee_binding(filter.assignee_did).as_bytes(),
+        caller_binding(caller).as_bytes(),
+        plaintext,
+    ] {
+        mac.update(&(field.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
+        mac.update(field);
+    }
+    // Presence is distinct from emptiness for all three optional fields, so an
+    // anonymous token cannot collide with one issued to a caller whose
+    // normalized DID is the empty string.
+    mac.update(&[
+        u8::from(filter.status.is_some()),
+        u8::from(filter.assignee_did.is_some()),
+        u8::from(caller.is_some()),
+    ]);
+    mac
+}
+
+/// Synthetic IV: the authentication tag over the filter and plaintext, which
+/// also seeds the keystream. Deterministic by construction, so no randomness
+/// source is needed and two tokens for the same page are byte-identical.
+fn siv(
+    key: &TaskCursorKey,
+    filter: TaskFilter<'_>,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+    plaintext: &[u8],
+) -> [u8; TAG_LEN] {
+    let mut out = [0u8; TAG_LEN];
+    out.copy_from_slice(
+        &cursor_mac(key, filter, caller, plaintext)
+            .finalize()
+            .into_bytes()[..TAG_LEN],
+    );
+    out
+}
+
+/// XOR `buf` with the keystream for `iv`. Its own inverse, so encrypt and
+/// decrypt are the same call.
+fn apply_keystream(key: &TaskCursorKey, iv: &[u8; TAG_LEN], buf: &mut [u8]) {
+    for (block_index, chunk) in buf.chunks_mut(32).enumerate() {
+        let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(&key.0).expect("HMAC accepts any key length");
+        mac.update(STREAM_DOMAIN);
+        mac.update(iv);
+        mac.update(&(block_index as u64).to_be_bytes());
+        let block = mac.finalize().into_bytes();
+        for (byte, k) in chunk.iter_mut().zip(block.iter()) {
+            *byte ^= k;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Mint a token resuming at `position` for `filter`, usable only by `caller`.
+///
+/// The serialized payload is padded with trailing whitespace to a fixed
+/// bucket before the SIV tag is computed: the keystream preserves plaintext
+/// length, so an unpadded payload would let the token's length leak the
+/// named row's field widths (a 25-char `to_rfc3339()` rendering mints a
+/// shorter token than a 35-char one). `decode` tolerates the padding because
+/// `serde_json` ignores trailing whitespace, and the tag covers the padded
+/// bytes, so a token minted before padding landed still verifies.
+pub fn encode(
+    key: &TaskCursorKey,
+    filter: TaskFilter<'_>,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+    position: &TaskPosition,
+) -> String {
+    let mut payload = serde_json::to_vec(&CursorPayload {
+        t: &position.created_at,
+        i: &position.id,
+        e: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() + CURSOR_TTL_SECS,
+    })
+    .expect("cursor payload is plain strings and an integer");
+    let padded_len = payload.len().next_multiple_of(PAYLOAD_BUCKET);
+    payload.resize(padded_len, b' ');
+    let iv = siv(key, filter, caller, &payload);
+    apply_keystream(key, &iv, &mut payload);
+    format!(
+        "{CURSOR_PREFIX}.{}.{}",
+        URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(iv),
+        URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&payload)
+    )
+}
+
+/// One rejection message for every way a token can fail to verify. A caller
+/// who mangled a token, replayed an expired one, or tried to move one to a
+/// different filter or a different presenting identity learns only that the
+/// cursor is not usable — never which of those it was, and never anything
+/// about the row it named.
+const INVALID_CURSOR: &str = "invalid or expired cursor";
+
+fn reject() -> AppError {
+    AppError::BadRequest(INVALID_CURSOR.into())
+}
+
+/// Verify a token against `filter` and the presenting `caller`, and return the
+/// position it carries.
+pub fn decode(
+    key: &TaskCursorKey,
+    filter: TaskFilter<'_>,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+    token: &str,
+) -> crate::error::Result<TaskPosition> {
+    let mut parts = token.split('.');
+    let (Some(version), Some(iv_b64), Some(body_b64), None) =
+        (parts.next(), parts.next(), parts.next(), parts.next())
+    else {
+        return Err(reject());
+    };
+    if version != CURSOR_PREFIX {
+        return Err(reject());
+    }
+    let iv_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(iv_b64).map_err(|_| reject())?;
+    let mut plaintext = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(body_b64).map_err(|_| reject())?;
+    let iv: [u8; TAG_LEN] = iv_bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| reject())?;
+
+    apply_keystream(key, &iv, &mut plaintext);
+    // Authenticate before parsing: until the tag matches, `plaintext` is just
+    // attacker-chosen bytes run through a keystream. `verify_truncated_left`
+    // is the constant-time compare, so a forgery attempt cannot be steered by
+    // timing the first differing byte.
+    cursor_mac(key, filter, caller, &plaintext)
+        .verify_truncated_left(&iv)
+        .map_err(|_| reject())?;
+
+    let decoded: CursorPayload<'_> = serde_json::from_slice(&plaintext).map_err(|_| reject())?;
+    if decoded.e < chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() {
+        return Err(reject());
+    }
+    Ok(TaskPosition::new(decoded.t, decoded.i))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn key() -> TaskCursorKey {
+        TaskCursorKey::derive(&[7u8; 32])
+    }
+
+    fn unfiltered() -> TaskFilter<'static> {
+        TaskFilter {
+            status: None,
+            assignee_did: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn round_trips_position_verbatim() {
+        let k = key();
+        // A stored timestamp the server wrote, fractional digits and all.
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00.123456789+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &pos);
+        assert_eq!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &token).unwrap(), pos);
+        // A sub-bucket payload pads to exactly one bucket: the padding
+        // claim is an exact width, and every other width assertion here is
+        // bucket-relative, so only an absolute check catches a pad that
+        // skips "next multiple" or a drifted bucket constant.
+        let body = token.split('.').nth(2).expect("token has a body part");
+        let raw = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(body).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            raw.len(),
+            PAYLOAD_BUCKET,
+            "normal token must pad to exactly one bucket"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The whole point of the token is that the caller may hold it without
+    /// learning the denied row it names. A signed-but-plaintext payload would
+    /// pass every other test here and still fail this one.
+    #[test]
+    fn token_does_not_expose_the_row_it_names() {
+        let k = key();
+        let token = encode(
+            &k,
+            unfiltered(),
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "denied-task-id"),
+        );
+        let body = token.split('.').nth(2).expect("token has a body part");
+        let raw = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(body).unwrap();
+        let as_text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw);
+        for secret in ["denied-task-id", "2026-01-03", "\"t\"", "\"i\""] {
+            assert!(
+                !as_text.contains(secret),
+                "token body must not carry {secret:?} in the clear: {as_text:?}"
+            );
+        }
+        // Also assert it is not merely reordered or whitespace-mangled JSON.
+        assert!(
+            serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&raw).is_err(),
+            "token body must not be parseable as JSON"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The keystream preserves plaintext length, so without the fixed-width
+    /// padding a token naming a 35-char timestamp would be measurably longer
+    /// than one naming a 32-char one: the holder would learn the withheld
+    /// row's field widths without decrypting anything. Mint the same shape
+    /// both ways and require identical token length.
+    #[test]
+    fn token_length_does_not_vary_with_position_width() {
+        let k = key();
+        // Ids are server-minted fixed-length UUIDs; the timestamp is the
+        // width that varies in production (`to_rfc3339()` renders 35 chars
+        // with nanoseconds, 25 without fractional seconds).
+        let id = "b3f7a1c2-4d5e-4f6a-8b9c-0d1e2f3a4b5c";
+        let narrow = encode(
+            &k,
+            unfiltered(),
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", id),
+        );
+        let wide = encode(
+            &k,
+            unfiltered(),
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00.123456789+00:00", id),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            narrow.len(),
+            wide.len(),
+            "tokens must not leak the named row's field widths: {narrow} vs {wide}"
+        );
+        // The padded token still decodes to the exact stored string.
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &wide).unwrap(),
+            TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00.123456789+00:00", id)
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A token minted before the fixed-width padding landed (unpadded payload,
+    /// tag over the raw bytes) must still verify: `decode` MACs whatever
+    /// plaintext the keystream recovers and `serde_json` tolerates the
+    /// missing trailing whitespace. This pins the back-compat claim in the
+    /// `encode` docstring with a frozen v1 artifact, so a change to the v1
+    /// recipe pins (domains, MAC input, keystream, segment layout, field
+    /// names) breaks this test instead of silently re-deriving under the
+    /// new internals. It does not pin the padding: `decode` never consults
+    /// `PAYLOAD_BUCKET` and the fixture is unpadded, so the padding-width
+    /// claim belongs to `oversized_payload_rounds_up_to_next_bucket`.
+    ///
+    /// Fixture expiry is fixed at 2100-01-01 (`4102444800`): it must stay in
+    /// the future whenever the test runs.
+    #[test]
+    fn unpadded_legacy_token_still_verifies() {
+        let k = key();
+        let filter = unfiltered();
+        let position = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "legacy-task");
+        // Pre-padding recipe minted once and frozen: serialize with no
+        // padding, tag, and encrypt. Deterministic by construction (SIV needs
+        // no randomness), so this literal is stable across runs.
+        let token = "v1.ILJyy7JZScm_h-HM1-CggA.l4kJUoHTbqSGTVKL0DP4hORnbOS1_gHYV2fwJYXd2QtM-6TBMCKh-wvluIiaEYC9rUSUPVSteAKkp7jBCmK_bR2D";
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&k, filter, None, token).unwrap(),
+            position,
+            "pre-padding token must verify under the current decode"
+        );
+        // The fixture is a genuine pre-padding artifact, so its decoded
+        // body must stay below one bucket: a literal re-minted under the
+        // padded recipe would retire this back-compat pin silently.
+        let body = token.split('.').nth(2).expect("token has a body part");
+        let raw = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(body).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            raw.len() < PAYLOAD_BUCKET,
+            "legacy fixture must be the unpadded shape: {} bytes",
+            raw.len()
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The `PAYLOAD_BUCKET` docstring promises an oversized payload rounds up
+    /// to the next multiple instead of failing. Mint a position whose id
+    /// pushes the serialized payload past one bucket and require the token
+    /// to round-trip (at two buckets).
+    #[test]
+    fn oversized_payload_rounds_up_to_next_bucket() {
+        let k = key();
+        // ~140-char id: payload crosses the 128-byte bucket.
+        let long_id = "a".repeat(140);
+        let position = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", long_id.clone());
+        let probe = serde_json::to_vec(&CursorPayload {
+            t: &position.created_at,
+            i: &position.id,
+            e: 1_700_000_000,
+        })
+        .expect("cursor payload is plain strings and an integer");
+        assert!(
+            probe.len() > PAYLOAD_BUCKET,
+            "fixture payload must exceed one bucket: {} bytes",
+            probe.len()
+        );
+        assert!(
+            probe.len() <= 2 * PAYLOAD_BUCKET,
+            "fixture payload must fit in two buckets: {} bytes",
+            probe.len()
+        );
+        let token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &position);
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &token).unwrap(),
+            position,
+            "oversized payload must round-trip at two buckets"
+        );
+        // The padded body must be exactly two buckets, not merely longer
+        // than one: the padding claim is an exact width, not a direction.
+        let body = token.split('.').nth(2).expect("token has a body part");
+        let raw = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(body).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            raw.len(),
+            2 * PAYLOAD_BUCKET,
+            "oversized payload must pad to exactly two buckets"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Callers paste the token straight into a query string, so it must carry
+    /// no character that needs percent-encoding.
+    #[test]
+    fn token_is_url_safe_verbatim() {
+        let token = encode(
+            &key(),
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("pending"),
+                assignee_did: Some("did:key:z6MkAssignee"),
+            },
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00.123456789+00:00", "task-a"),
+        );
+        assert!(
+            token
+                .chars()
+                .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, '-' | '_' | '.')),
+            "token must be query-safe without encoding: {token}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Flipping any byte of a token must fail the tag, not decode to a
+    /// different position: the keystream is malleable on its own, the tag is
+    /// what stops a chosen-position forgery.
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_any_tampered_byte() {
+        let k = key();
+        let token = encode(
+            &k,
+            unfiltered(),
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a"),
+        );
+        let parts: Vec<&str> = token.split('.').collect();
+        for part in [1usize, 2] {
+            for position in [0usize, 3] {
+                let mut bytes = parts[part].as_bytes().to_vec();
+                bytes[position] = if bytes[position] == b'A' { b'B' } else { b'A' };
+                let mut mangled: Vec<String> = parts.iter().map(|p| p.to_string()).collect();
+                mangled[part] = String::from_utf8(bytes).unwrap();
+                assert!(
+                    decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &mangled.join(".")).is_err(),
+                    "byte {position} of part {part} must not be malleable"
+                );
+            }
+        }
+        // Sanity: the untouched token still decodes, so the loop above is not
+        // passing because every token is rejected.
+        assert!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &token).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_token_from_another_node() {
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(&TaskCursorKey::derive(&[1u8; 32]), unfiltered(), None, &pos);
+        assert!(decode(
+            &TaskCursorKey::derive(&[2u8; 32]),
+            unfiltered(),
+            None,
+            &token
+        )
+        .is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_cursor_moved_to_a_different_filter() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(
+            &k,
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("pending"),
+                assignee_did: None,
+            },
+            None,
+            &pos,
+        );
+        assert!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &token).is_err());
+        assert!(decode(
+            &k,
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("claimed"),
+                assignee_did: None
+            },
+            None,
+            &token
+        )
+        .is_err());
+        assert!(decode(
+            &k,
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("pending"),
+                assignee_did: None
+            },
+            None,
+            &token
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+    }
+
+    /// A filter of `Some("")` must not verify a token minted with `None`.
+    #[test]
+    fn distinguishes_absent_filter_from_empty_filter() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &pos);
+        assert!(decode(
+            &k,
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some(""),
+                assignee_did: None
+            },
+            None,
+            &token
+        )
+        .is_err());
+    }
+
+    /// A cursor names how far a scan got under one caller's visibility. Moved
+    /// to a different presenting identity it would start that caller's scan
+    /// past rows they are entitled to read, so it must fail to verify rather
+    /// than silently under-report (#327 review).
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_cursor_moved_to_a_different_caller() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let alice = Some("did:key:z6MkAlice");
+        let bob = Some("did:key:z6MkBob");
+
+        let anon_token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &pos);
+        assert!(
+            decode(&k, unfiltered(), alice, &anon_token).is_err(),
+            "an anonymously minted cursor must not resume an authenticated scan"
+        );
+        assert!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &anon_token).is_ok());
+
+        let alice_token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), alice, &pos);
+        assert!(
+            decode(&k, unfiltered(), bob, &alice_token).is_err(),
+            "one caller's cursor must not resume another caller's scan"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &alice_token).is_err(),
+            "an authenticated cursor must not resume an anonymous scan"
+        );
+        assert!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), alice, &alice_token).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    /// The binding is on identity, not spelling: `did:key:X` and bare `X` are
+    /// one caller everywhere else on the read path (`did_matches`), so a caller
+    /// who presents the other form of their own DID must keep their own page.
+    #[test]
+    fn caller_binding_is_normalized_across_did_key_spellings() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), Some("did:key:z6MkAlice"), &pos);
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&k, unfiltered(), Some("z6MkAlice"), &token).unwrap(),
+            pos
+        );
+        // A different method sharing the base58 tail is a different principal.
+        assert!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), Some("did:web:z6MkAlice"), &token).is_err());
+    }
+
+    /// The filter binding is on identity, not spelling: `assignee_did` matches
+    /// normalized keys in SQL (`normalize_owner_key`), so minting under
+    /// `did:key:X` and resuming under bare `X` (or vice versa) must succeed,
+    /// while `did:web:X` remains distinct.
+    #[test]
+    fn assignee_filter_binding_is_normalized_across_did_key_spellings() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let filter_did_key = TaskFilter {
+            status: Some("pending"),
+            assignee_did: Some("did:key:z6MkAssignee"),
+        };
+        let filter_bare = TaskFilter {
+            status: Some("pending"),
+            assignee_did: Some("z6MkAssignee"),
+        };
+        let filter_web = TaskFilter {
+            status: Some("pending"),
+            assignee_did: Some("did:web:z6MkAssignee"),
+        };
+
+        let token_from_did_key = encode(&k, filter_did_key, None, &pos);
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&k, filter_bare, None, &token_from_did_key).unwrap(),
+            pos
+        );
+        assert!(decode(&k, filter_web, None, &token_from_did_key).is_err());
+
+        let token_from_bare = encode(&k, filter_bare, None, &pos);
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&k, filter_did_key, None, &token_from_bare).unwrap(),
+            pos
+        );
+        assert!(decode(&k, filter_web, None, &token_from_bare).is_err());
+    }
+
+    /// Anonymous is a distinct binding from a caller whose normalized DID is
+    /// the empty string, the same way `Some("")` is distinct from `None` for
+    /// the filter fields.
+    #[test]
+    fn distinguishes_anonymous_from_empty_caller() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &pos);
+        assert!(decode(&k, unfiltered(), Some(""), &token).is_err());
+    }
+
+    /// Length-prefixing must stop a status/assignee pair from being re-split.
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_field_boundary_shift() {
+        let k = key();
+        let pos = TaskPosition::new("2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00", "task-a");
+        let token = encode(
+            &k,
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("pend"),
+                assignee_did: Some("ing"),
+            },
+            None,
+            &pos,
+        );
+        assert!(decode(
+            &k,
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("pending"),
+                assignee_did: Some("")
+            },
+            None,
+            &token
+        )
+        .is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_expired_token() {
+        let k = key();
+        // Minted the same way `encode` does, but already past its expiry.
+        let mut payload = serde_json::to_vec(&CursorPayload {
+            t: "2026-01-03T00:00:00+00:00",
+            i: "task-a",
+            e: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() - 1,
+        })
+        .unwrap();
+        let iv = siv(&k, unfiltered(), None, &payload);
+        apply_keystream(&k, &iv, &mut payload);
+        let expired = format!(
+            "v1.{}.{}",
+            URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(iv),
+            URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&payload)
+        );
+        let err = decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, &expired).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains(INVALID_CURSOR));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_malformed_shapes() {
+        let k = key();
+        for bad in [
+            "",
+            "v1",
+            "v1.",
+            "v1.abc",
+            "v2.abc.def",
+            "v1.abc.def.ghi",
+            "v1.!!!.def",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, bad).is_err(),
+                "must reject {bad:?}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Every rejection path renders the same text, so a caller cannot tell a
+    /// forged token from an expired one from a filter mismatch.
+    #[test]
+    fn every_rejection_is_indistinguishable() {
+        let k = key();
+        for bad in ["v1.abc.def", "not-a-cursor", "v1..", "v9.a.b"] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                decode(&k, unfiltered(), None, bad).unwrap_err().to_string(),
+                format!("invalid request: {INVALID_CURSOR}")
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/webhooks.rs

@@ -46,9 +46,10 @@ pub async fn create_webhook(
     // endpoints (SSRF). Delivery runs on the shared no-redirect client
     // (main.rs), which closes the 3xx-to-internal bounce.
     if !crate::api::peers::is_public_http_url(&req.url) {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "webhook URL must be a public http(s) URL (no loopback, private, or .internal/.local hosts)".into(),
-        ));
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
+            "webhook URL {}",
+            crate::api::peers::PUBLIC_HTTP_URL_REQUIREMENT
+        )));
     }
 
     let events = req.events.unwrap_or_else(|| vec!["*".into()]);
@@ -141,7 +142,19 @@ pub async fn delete_webhook(
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-    use crate::api::peers::is_public_http_url;
+    use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
+    use axum::Json;
+    use chrono::Utc;
+    use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+    use sqlx::PgPool;
+    use uuid::Uuid;
+
+    use super::{create_webhook, CreateWebhookRequest};
+    use crate::api::peers::{is_public_http_url, PUBLIC_HTTP_URL_REQUIREMENT};
+    use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
+    use crate::db::RepoRecord;
+    use crate::error::AppError;
+    use crate::test_support::test_state;
 
     // create_webhook gates req.url through is_public_http_url. Pin the exact
     // SSRF targets from issue #81 so the webhook path can never regress to the
@@ -152,6 +165,7 @@ mod tests {
             "http://127.0.0.1:5432/",
             "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
             "http://localhost/",
+            "http://node.localhost/",
             "http://10.0.0.5/",
             "http://[::1]/",
             // IPv6 transition encodings smuggling loopback v4 (6to4 / NAT64).
@@ -169,4 +183,53 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(is_public_http_url("https://hooks.example.com/gitlawb"));
         assert!(is_public_http_url("http://203.0.113.10:7545/"));
     }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn webhook_localhost_rejection_uses_shared_public_url_contract(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let owner = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        let repo_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_repo(&RepoRecord {
+                id: repo_id.clone(),
+                name: "webhook-contract".to_string(),
+                owner_did: owner.clone(),
+                description: None,
+                is_public: true,
+                default_branch: "main".to_string(),
+                created_at: Utc::now(),
+                updated_at: Utc::now(),
+                disk_path: "/tmp/webhook-contract.git".to_string(),
+                forked_from: None,
+                machine_id: None,
+            })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let result = create_webhook(
+            State(state.clone()),
+            Extension(AuthenticatedDid(owner.clone())),
+            Path((owner, "webhook-contract".to_string())),
+            Json(CreateWebhookRequest {
+                url: "https://node.localhost/hook".to_string(),
+                secret: None,
+                events: None,
+            }),
+        )
+        .await;
+
+        match result {
+            Err(AppError::BadRequest(message)) => assert_eq!(
+                message,
+                format!("webhook URL {PUBLIC_HTTP_URL_REQUIREMENT}")
+            ),
+            Err(error) => panic!("unexpected webhook rejection: {error}"),
+            Ok(_) => panic!("a .localhost webhook must be rejected"),
+        }
+        assert!(
+            state.db.list_webhooks(&repo_id).await.unwrap().is_empty(),
+            "a rejected .localhost webhook must leave no row behind"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/arweave_v2.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+//! #26 Split PR 2 — three-outcome recovery policy types.
+//!
+//! This module owns the recovery classification policy the reviewer
+//! demanded: only a trustworthy, protocol-defined absence authorizes
+//! a paid re-upload. Everything else stays non-terminal.
+//!
+//! Deliberately narrow: the ANS-104 codec lives in `ans104`, and the
+//! gateway probe, the `verify_anchor` path, and the public verify
+//! endpoint are deferred until the uploader, retrieval proof, and
+//! recovery consumer can be proven as one vertical slice (reviewer 2,
+//! round 5). A probe against a real provider contract — same-network
+//! upload/read pair, redirect-safe client, envelope-supplying read
+//! API, provider-documented absence evidence — belongs in that slice,
+//! not here. What ships here is the policy type plus the rule that
+//! only `DefinitivelyAbsent` permits spending another upload.
+
+/// Outcome of a gateway probe for a persisted `item_id`.
+// Policy surface for the recovery slice: no construction on this
+// head (the probe arrives with the provider contract); the unit
+// test pins the rule meanwhile.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ProbeOutcome {
+    /// The persisted item was served back with a verifiable envelope
+    /// bound to the requested id. No re-upload allowed.
+    Present,
+    /// Trustworthy, protocol-defined proof the item was never
+    /// accepted. Authorizes re-upload. The exact evidence that
+    /// establishes this is defined by the provider contract in the
+    /// vertical slice that introduces the probe — never by a
+    /// mock-only body shape.
+    DefinitivelyAbsent,
+    /// Anything else: transport failure, oversized body, bad
+    /// signature, id mismatch, ambiguous gateway response. The
+    /// outbox stays non-terminal.
+    Indeterminate,
+}
+
+impl ProbeOutcome {
+    /// True iff the recovery code is allowed to spend another paid
+    /// upload request. Only `DefinitivelyAbsent` qualifies.
+    #[allow(dead_code)] // the recovery consumer lives in a later slice
+    pub fn permits_reupload(self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self, ProbeOutcome::DefinitivelyAbsent)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// Only `DefinitivelyAbsent` authorizes a paid re-upload. This is
+    /// the policy the reviewer named: collapsing any ambiguous outcome
+    /// to absent spends a second immutable upload for the same
+    /// transition.
+    #[test]
+    fn only_definitively_absent_authorizes_reupload() {
+        assert!(!ProbeOutcome::Present.permits_reupload());
+        assert!(ProbeOutcome::DefinitivelyAbsent.permits_reupload());
+        assert!(!ProbeOutcome::Indeterminate.permits_reupload());
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/auth/mod.rs

@@ -17,74 +17,16 @@ use crate::state::AppState;
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct AuthenticatedDid(pub String);
 
-/// A UCAN that passed full chain validation, with the root issuer the chain
-/// rests on. Inserted into request extensions by [`require_ucan_chain`] when
-/// `X-Ucan` is present; absent when the header is.
-///
-/// `root` is carried rather than recomputed so the chain is walked once per
-/// request. Holding this is not itself an authorization decision — a caller must
-/// still compare `root` against an identity it independently trusts, because
-/// `did:key` is self-certifying and anyone can mint a chain that verifies.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct VerifiedUcan {
-    pub ucan: Ucan,
-    pub root: Did,
-}
-
 /// Whether `caller` is authorized to push to `record`.
 ///
-/// The repo owner, or a caller presenting a verified UCAN whose chain roots at
-/// that owner and which carries `git/push` for this repo.
-///
-/// `verified` is optional because `X-Ucan` is: a push carrying no token reaches
-/// the same owner-only decision it always did. The owner check is unconditional
-/// and runs first, so this can only ever turn a refusal into an acceptance,
-/// never the reverse.
-pub fn caller_authorized_to_push(
-    record: &crate::db::RepoRecord,
-    caller: &str,
-    verified: Option<&VerifiedUcan>,
-) -> bool {
+/// Phase 1 (`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH`): owner-only, via the canonical
+/// [`crate::api::did_matches`] owner comparison (DID-safe on both sides). This is
+/// intentionally a distinct, intent-named gate rather than a bare owner check so
+/// that Phase 2 can extend it to honor a verified UCAN `git/push` capability as a
+/// pure addition (`did_matches(..) || ucan_grants_push(..)`) without rewriting
+/// call sites.
+pub fn caller_authorized_to_push(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> bool {
     crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did)
-        || verified.is_some_and(|v| ucan_grants_push(record, v))
-}
-
-/// Whether a verified UCAN authorizes a push to `record`.
-///
-/// Three conditions, all required:
-///   1. The chain roots at this repo's owner. This is the trust anchor — the
-///      repo record is data the node holds independently of the token, so a
-///      self-minted chain cannot satisfy it.
-///   2. Every link is bounded. There is no revocation path, so an unbounded link
-///      is a permanent grant.
-///   3. Every link — the leaf and every proof behind it — carries an
-///      unconstrained push-class capability naming this repository. That is
-///      [`gitlawb_core::ucan::Ucan::chain_grants_push_to`], the same rule
-///      `gl ucan import` applies before storing a token and `git-remote-gitlawb`
-///      applies before minting an invocation, so what one boundary accepts the
-///      next does not refuse.
-///
-/// (3) walks the whole chain on purpose. Refusing a wildcard leaf alone did
-/// nothing: `is_attenuated_by` accepts a concrete child under a `*` parent, and
-/// that narrowing was exactly what the helper performed, so one owner-issued
-/// `with: "*"` proof let a delegate mint a concrete leaf for ANY repository the
-/// owner had — or created later — and both the chain check and the owner-root
-/// check passed. A delegation's scope is fixed when it is issued.
-pub fn ucan_grants_push(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, verified: &VerifiedUcan) -> bool {
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&verified.root.to_string(), &record.owner_did) {
-        return false;
-    }
-    // A write capability must lapse on its own. `exp` is optional in the format and
-    // there is no revocation path, so a chain with an unbounded link is a permanent
-    // grant: once the token leaks, the owner cannot withdraw it short of rotating
-    // the DID the repo is keyed on. Refusing here is what makes "the damage window
-    // is the token's expiry" a true statement rather than an aspiration.
-    if !verified.ucan.chain_lifetime_is_bounded() {
-        return false;
-    }
-    verified
-        .ucan
-        .chain_grants_push_to(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
 }
 
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::{
@@ -92,6 +34,38 @@ use gitlawb_core::http_sig::{
 };
 use gitlawb_core::identity::verify;
 
+/// Per-route-group ceiling on how much request body [`require_signature`] will
+/// buffer BEFORE it has authenticated anything.
+///
+/// This is middleware state rather than a constant because a single number cannot
+/// serve both a 2 GB git push and a 2 MB profile update: the git write group
+/// passes `GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES`, every other signed group passes
+/// [`crate::server::SIGNED_BODY_LIMIT`]. Making it a required piece of state means
+/// a new signed route group cannot be wired up without choosing a limit.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
+pub struct SignatureBodyLimit(pub usize);
+
+/// The hint for an unresolvable DID, chosen by method. The hint is only true
+/// for a method we have no resolver for: a did:key that parsed and then failed
+/// on its key material (a small-order key, wrong multicodec, wrong length)
+/// would be sent looking for the wrong problem by the alpha-support wording.
+fn unresolvable_did_hint(key_id: &Did) -> &'static str {
+    if key_id.is_did_key() {
+        "the DID is a did:key whose key material did not resolve"
+    } else {
+        "only did:key is supported in alpha"
+    }
+}
+
+/// Bound the echoed keyid in the unresolvable-DID message. `key_id` is
+/// unauthenticated request input, so reflecting it back at whatever length the
+/// caller chose would amplify attacker input into the response body. The bound
+/// is slack (a did:key method-id is a fixed 48 characters) and only defends
+/// the echo, not the resolution.
+fn bounded_did_echo(key_id: &str) -> String {
+    key_id.chars().take(96).collect()
+}
+
 /// Axum middleware that enforces HTTP Signature authentication (RFC 9421).
 ///
 /// Every write request must carry:
@@ -106,20 +80,52 @@ use gitlawb_core::identity::verify;
 ///   4. Resolves the did:key to an Ed25519 VerifyingKey
 ///   5. Rebuilds the signing string and verifies the Ed25519 signature
 ///   6. Verifies Content-Digest matches the request body
-pub async fn require_signature(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
-    // Buffer the body so we can verify content-digest and pass it downstream
+pub async fn require_signature(
+    State(SignatureBodyLimit(limit)): State<SignatureBodyLimit>,
+    request: Request,
+    next: Next,
+) -> Response {
+    verify_signature(limit, request, next).await
+}
+
+/// The signature check itself, shared by [`require_signature`] and the optional
+/// variant. `limit` bounds the pre-auth buffer; see [`SignatureBodyLimit`].
+async fn verify_signature(limit: usize, request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
+    // Buffer the body so we can verify content-digest and pass it downstream.
+    //
+    // The buffer is bounded, because this runs BEFORE any identity check: an
+    // unauthenticated caller with no DID, no signature and no repo reaches this
+    // line. Nothing upstream supplies the bound. On the git write routes
+    // `RequestBodyLimitLayer` sits on the inner router, and a later `.layer()` is
+    // the OUTER service, so this middleware runs first and sees the raw body. On
+    // every other signed group axum's 2 MB `DefaultBodyLimit` is enforced by the
+    // `Bytes`/`Json` extractors through a request extension, which collecting the
+    // body here bypasses. `Limited` stops reading at the limit rather than reading
+    // everything and then measuring it, which is the property that matters.
     let (parts, body) = request.into_parts();
-    let body_bytes =
-        match body.collect().await {
-            Ok(collected) => collected.to_bytes(),
-            Err(_) => return (
+    let body_bytes = match http_body_util::Limited::new(body, limit).collect().await {
+        Ok(collected) => collected.to_bytes(),
+        // Over the limit: a distinct status from the 401 an unsigned request gets
+        // and the 400 below, so a client can tell "too big" from "not authenticated"
+        // and from "your body did not arrive".
+        Err(e) if e.is::<http_body_util::LengthLimitError>() => return (
+            StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
+            Json(json!({
+                "error": "body_too_large",
+                "message": format!("request body exceeds the {limit}-byte limit for this route"),
+            })),
+        )
+            .into_response(),
+        Err(_) => {
+            return (
                 StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
                 Json(
                     json!({ "error": "unreadable_body", "message": "could not read request body" }),
                 ),
             )
-                .into_response(),
-        };
+                .into_response()
+        }
+    };
 
     let sig_input = parts
         .headers
@@ -178,7 +184,7 @@ pub async fn require_signature(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
                     COVERED_COMPONENTS.join(", "),
                     missing.join(", ")
                 ),
-                "hint": "See https://gitlawb.com/agents#authentication",
+                "hint": "See https://twigpine.com/agents#authentication",
             })),
         )
             .into_response();
@@ -203,11 +209,14 @@ pub async fn require_signature(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
                 StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
                 Json(json!({
                     "error": "unresolvable_did",
-                    "message": format!("cannot resolve DID '{}': {e}", sig.key_id),
-                    "hint": "only did:key is supported in alpha",
+                    "message": format!(
+                        "cannot resolve DID '{}': {e}",
+                        bounded_did_echo(&sig.key_id.to_string())
+                    ),
+                    "hint": unresolvable_did_hint(&sig.key_id),
                 })),
             )
-                .into_response()
+                .into_response();
         }
     };
 
@@ -220,17 +229,34 @@ pub async fn require_signature(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
         .unwrap_or("/")
         .to_string();
 
-    let content_digest = parts
+    // Required, never defaulted. The signing string is rebuilt from the request,
+    // so an absent header would make the covered `content-digest` empty on both
+    // sides: verification would pass and the digest-versus-body comparison below
+    // would have nothing to compare, leaving a signed request free to carry a
+    // body its signature never covered. `sign_request` always emits the header,
+    // so refusing here costs no conforming client anything.
+    let content_digest = match parts
         .headers
         .get("content-digest")
         .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-        .unwrap_or("")
-        .to_string();
+    {
+        Some(v) => v.to_string(),
+        None => {
+            return (
+                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+                Json(json!({
+                    "error": "missing_content_digest",
+                    "message": "Content-Digest header is required on a signed request",
+                })),
+            )
+                .into_response()
+        }
+    };
 
     let mut request_values: HashMap<String, String> = HashMap::new();
     request_values.insert("@method".to_string(), method);
     request_values.insert("@path".to_string(), path_and_query);
-    request_values.insert("content-digest".to_string(), content_digest);
+    request_values.insert("content-digest".to_string(), content_digest.clone());
 
     // The @signature-params value is the part of Signature-Input after "sig1="
     let sig_params_value = sig_input.strip_prefix("sig1=").unwrap_or(&sig_input);
@@ -275,23 +301,18 @@ pub async fn require_signature(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
             .into_response();
     }
 
-    // Verify Content-Digest matches the actual request body
-    if let Some(claimed) = parts
-        .headers
-        .get("content-digest")
-        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-    {
-        let actual = compute_content_digest(&body_bytes);
-        if claimed != actual {
-            return (
-                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
-                Json(json!({
-                    "error": "content_digest_mismatch",
-                    "message": "Content-Digest does not match request body",
-                })),
-            )
-                .into_response();
-        }
+    // Verify Content-Digest matches the actual request body. Unconditional: the
+    // header's presence was established above, so there is no branch here that
+    // skips the comparison.
+    if content_digest != compute_content_digest(&body_bytes) {
+        return (
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            Json(json!({
+                "error": "content_digest_mismatch",
+                "message": "Content-Digest does not match request body",
+            })),
+        )
+            .into_response();
     }
 
     tracing::info!(did = %sig.key_id, "✓ authenticated request");
@@ -306,11 +327,17 @@ pub async fn require_signature(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
 /// Optional variant for rolling upgrades: verify and inject `AuthenticatedDid` when
 /// RFC 9421 signature headers are present, but allow legacy unsigned requests to
 /// continue when no signature attempt was made.
-pub async fn optional_signature(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
+pub async fn optional_signature(
+    State(SignatureBodyLimit(limit)): State<SignatureBodyLimit>,
+    request: Request,
+    next: Next,
+) -> Response {
     let has_signature_headers = request.headers().contains_key("signature-input")
         || request.headers().contains_key("signature");
     if has_signature_headers {
-        return require_signature(request, next).await;
+        // Same pre-auth buffer, same bound: presenting signature headers is not
+        // authentication, so this path is as reachable as the required one.
+        return verify_signature(limit, request, next).await;
     }
     next.run(request).await
 }
@@ -328,7 +355,7 @@ fn validate_ucan_chain(
     token: &str,
     expected_aud: &Did,
     signer_did: &Did,
-) -> Result<VerifiedUcan, (StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
+) -> Result<(), (StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
     let ucan = Ucan::decode(token).map_err(|e| {
         (
             StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
@@ -356,14 +383,14 @@ fn validate_ucan_chain(
         )
     })?;
 
-    let root = ucan.verify_chain().map_err(|e| {
+    ucan.verify_chain().map_err(|e| {
         (
             StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
             Json(json!({ "error": "invalid_ucan", "message": e.to_string() })),
         )
     })?;
 
-    Ok(VerifiedUcan { ucan, root })
+    Ok(())
 }
 
 /// Axum middleware that validates a UCAN chain when `X-Ucan` is present.
@@ -416,18 +443,11 @@ pub async fn require_ucan_chain(
         }
     };
 
-    let verified = match validate_ucan_chain(&token, &state.node_did, &signer_did) {
-        Ok(v) => v,
-        Err((status, body)) => return (status, body).into_response(),
-    };
+    if let Err((status, body)) = validate_ucan_chain(&token, &state.node_did, &signer_did) {
+        return (status, body).into_response();
+    }
 
-    tracing::debug!(did = %signer_did, root = %verified.root, "UCAN chain validated");
-
-    // Park the verified token where a handler can reach it. Validation alone
-    // grants nothing; the authorization decision is made downstream, by a caller
-    // that knows which identity it trusts for the resource being touched.
-    let mut request = request;
-    request.extensions_mut().insert(verified);
+    tracing::debug!(did = %signer_did, "UCAN chain validated");
     next.run(request).await
 }
 
@@ -445,7 +465,7 @@ fn human_detected(message: &str) -> impl IntoResponse {
             "error": "not_an_agent",
             "message": message,
             "hint": "gl identity new && gl register",
-            "docs": "https://gitlawb.com/agents",
+            "docs": "https://twigpine.com/agents",
         })),
     )
 }
@@ -463,37 +483,6 @@ mod tests {
         Ucan::bootstrap(node, agent_did).unwrap()
     }
 
-    /// The middleware validated a token and threw the result away, so no handler
-    /// could ever read it and `Ucan::can` had no call site in the node. Validation
-    /// must hand back both the token and the root the chain rests on.
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_ucan_chain_hands_back_the_root_and_the_token() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-        let caps_vec = vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/zowner/r", caps::GIT_PUSH)];
-
-        let delegation =
-            Ucan::issue(&owner, agent.did(), caps_vec.clone(), None).expect("issue delegation");
-        let invocation = Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), caps_vec, None, &delegation)
-            .expect("wrap invocation");
-        let token = invocation.encode().expect("encode");
-
-        let verified = validate_ucan_chain(&token, &node.did(), &agent.did())
-            .expect("a well-formed owner-rooted invocation must validate");
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            verified.root,
-            owner.did(),
-            "the root must be the owner, so a caller can anchor against the repo record"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            verified.ucan.payload.iss,
-            agent.did(),
-            "the token itself must come back so a caller can read its capabilities"
-        );
-    }
-
     fn delegation_ucan(agent: &Keypair, node_did: Did, proof: &Ucan) -> Ucan {
         Ucan::delegate(
             agent,
@@ -519,6 +508,58 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(validate_ucan_chain(&token, &node_did, &agent_did).is_ok());
     }
 
+    /// The two-branch hint selection is the point of the unresolvable-DID
+    /// change: a did:key that failed on its key material must be told the key
+    /// material did not resolve, and any other method must be told only did:key
+    /// is supported. A regression that drops the is_did_key() check would send
+    /// a did:key caller after the wrong problem, so both branches are pinned.
+    #[test]
+    fn unresolvable_did_hint_distinguishes_key_material_from_method() {
+        // A real did:key whose key material fails to resolve (small-order):
+        // key-material hint.
+        let mut weak = [0u8; 32];
+        weak[0] = 1; // compressed identity point
+        let weak_vk = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&weak).unwrap();
+        let weak_did = Did::from_verifying_key(&weak_vk);
+        assert!(
+            weak_did.to_verifying_key().is_err(),
+            "fixture precondition: small-order did:key must not resolve"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            unresolvable_did_hint(&weak_did),
+            "the DID is a did:key whose key material did not resolve"
+        );
+
+        // A method with no resolver: alpha-support hint.
+        let web = Did::web("example.com");
+        assert!(
+            web.to_verifying_key().is_err(),
+            "fixture precondition: did:web must not resolve locally"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            unresolvable_did_hint(&web),
+            "only did:key is supported in alpha"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The unresolvable-DID message echoes the keyid, which is unauthenticated
+    /// request input. The echoed value must be bounded so a hostile caller
+    /// cannot amplify arbitrary-length input into the response body.
+    #[test]
+    fn unresolvable_did_message_bounds_the_echoed_keyid() {
+        let long_keyid = format!("did:key:z{}", "A".repeat(2000));
+        let shown = bounded_did_echo(&long_keyid);
+        assert!(
+            shown.len() <= 96,
+            "echoed keyid must be bounded, got {} chars",
+            shown.len()
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !shown.contains(&"A".repeat(1000)),
+            "the full keyid must not survive into the message"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn validate_ucan_chain_wrong_issuer() {
         let node = Keypair::generate();
@@ -593,10 +634,12 @@ mod tests {
             .connect_lazy("postgres://localhost/gitlawb_test_placeholder")
             .expect("lazy pool creation should not fail");
         let db = Arc::new(crate::db::Db::for_testing(pool.clone()));
+        let task_cursor_key = crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey::derive(&keypair.to_seed());
         let schema = Arc::new(graphql::build_schema(
             db.clone(),
             ref_tx.clone(),
             task_tx.clone(),
+            task_cursor_key.clone(),
         ));
         crate::state::AppState {
             config: Arc::new(Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"])),
@@ -608,11 +651,13 @@ mod tests {
             ref_update_tx: ref_tx,
             task_event_tx: task_tx,
             graphql_schema: schema,
+            task_cursor_key,
             machine_id: None,
             repo_store: crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), pool),
             rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(100, Duration::from_secs(60)),
             create_ip_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(1000, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
             push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+            close_issue_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(120, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
             ipfs_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
             ipfs_work_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
             ipfs_max_history_walks: crate::api::ipfs::MAX_HISTORY_WALKS_PER_REQUEST,
@@ -626,6 +671,7 @@ mod tests {
             push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None,
             sync_trigger_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
             peer_write_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+            federated_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new_bounded(12, Duration::from_secs(60), 10_000),
             shutdown_tx: tokio::sync::watch::channel(false).0,
             git_read_semaphore: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(64)),
             git_write_semaphore: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(64)),
@@ -641,6 +687,7 @@ mod tests {
             git_ipfs_walk_semaphore: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(64)),
             git_ipfs_walk_per_caller:
                 crate::rate_limit::PerCallerConcurrency::with_default_max_keys(16),
+            task_read_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(1200, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
             git_bin: "git".to_string(),
         }
     }
@@ -732,408 +779,78 @@ mod tests {
         let body_json: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes).unwrap();
         assert_eq!(body_json["error"], "invalid_ucan");
     }
-}
 
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod ucan_push_tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
-    use gitlawb_core::ucan::{caps, Capability, Ucan};
+    /// A request that signs `content-digest` as the EMPTY string and then sends
+    /// no Content-Digest header at all must be refused before any handler runs.
+    ///
+    /// This is the whole point of requiring the header rather than defaulting it:
+    /// the middleware rebuilds the signing string from the request, so an absent
+    /// header makes the covered digest empty on both sides. The Ed25519 check
+    /// passes, the body-versus-digest comparison is skipped for want of a header,
+    /// and a signed request carries a body the signature never covered.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn signed_request_without_content_digest_is_rejected() {
+        use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, Engine};
+        use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
 
-    const OWNER_KEY: &str = "z6MkOwnerAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        static REACHED: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
 
-    /// `RepoRecord` does not derive `Default`, and adding the derive to a
-    /// production DB type purely to serve a test is the wrong direction.
-    fn repo(owner_did: &str, name: &str) -> crate::db::RepoRecord {
-        crate::db::RepoRecord {
-            id: "repo-id".to_string(),
-            name: name.to_string(),
-            owner_did: owner_did.to_string(),
-            description: None,
-            is_public: true,
-            default_branch: "main".to_string(),
-            created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
-            updated_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
-            disk_path: "/unused".to_string(),
-            forked_from: None,
-            machine_id: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The token's own issuer and audience are irrelevant to this predicate: the
-    /// middleware has already bound `iss` to the request signer and `aud` to this
-    /// node. Only the capabilities and the chain's root matter here.
-    fn verified(root: &str, caps_vec: Vec<Capability>) -> VerifiedUcan {
-        verified_with_exp(
-            root,
-            caps_vec,
-            Some(chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1)),
-        )
-    }
-
-    fn verified_with_exp(
-        root: &str,
-        caps_vec: Vec<Capability>,
-        exp: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
-    ) -> VerifiedUcan {
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-        let ucan = Ucan::issue(&agent, node.did(), caps_vec, exp).expect("issue");
-        VerifiedUcan {
-            ucan,
-            root: root.parse().expect("root DID must parse"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn owner_full() -> String {
-        format!("did:key:{OWNER_KEY}")
-    }
-
-    fn push_cap_for(owner: &str, name: &str) -> Capability {
-        Capability::new(format!("gitlawb://repos/{owner}/{name}"), caps::GIT_PUSH)
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn grants_push_when_the_chain_roots_at_the_owner_and_names_the_repo() {
-        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
-        let v = verified(&owner_full(), vec![push_cap_for(&owner_full(), "myrepo")]);
-        assert!(ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn matches_a_bare_owner_key_against_a_full_did_record() {
-        // Mirror rows store the bare key. A literal string compare would fail
-        // here, denying a delegation that is in fact valid.
-        let rec = repo(OWNER_KEY, "myrepo");
-        let v = verified(&owner_full(), vec![push_cap_for(&owner_full(), "myrepo")]);
-        assert!(ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
-    }
-
-    /// A perpetual grant is refused even when it is otherwise perfectly valid:
-    /// owner-rooted, right repo, right action. Without revocation, an unbounded
-    /// delegation cannot be withdrawn once it leaks.
-    #[test]
-    fn refuses_a_delegation_that_never_expires() {
-        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
-        let v = verified_with_exp(
-            &owner_full(),
-            vec![push_cap_for(&owner_full(), "myrepo")],
-            None,
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let did = kp.did();
+        let created = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
+        let signature_input = format!(
+            r#"sig1=("@method" "@path" "content-digest");keyid="{did}";alg="ed25519";created={created}"#
         );
-        assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
-    }
+        let sig_params_value = &signature_input["sig1=".len()..];
 
-    #[test]
-    fn refuses_a_self_minted_root() {
-        // The whole point: a token nobody delegated grants nothing, however
-        // permissive its capabilities look.
-        let stranger = Keypair::generate();
-        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
-        let v = verified(&stranger.did().to_string(), vec![Capability::new("*", "*")]);
-        assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn refuses_a_capability_for_a_different_repo() {
-        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
-        let v = verified(
-            &owner_full(),
-            vec![push_cap_for(&owner_full(), "otherrepo")],
+        let mut values: HashMap<String, String> = HashMap::new();
+        values.insert("@method".to_string(), "POST".to_string());
+        values.insert("@path".to_string(), "/x".to_string());
+        // Exactly what the middleware derives when the header is absent.
+        values.insert("content-digest".to_string(), String::new());
+        let signing_string =
+            build_signing_string(COVERED_COMPONENTS, sig_params_value, &values).unwrap();
+        let signature = format!(
+            "sig1=:{}:",
+            STANDARD.encode(kp.sign(signing_string.as_bytes()).to_bytes())
         );
-        assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
-    }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn refuses_a_capability_carrying_constraints() {
-        // `nb` is not interpreted yet. An owner who writes {"refs": [...]} means
-        // to restrict; honouring the capability while ignoring nb would grant
-        // strictly more than they intended, so it authorizes nothing.
-        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
-        let v = verified(
-            &owner_full(),
-            vec![push_cap_for(&owner_full(), "myrepo")
-                .with_constraints(serde_json::json!({ "refs": ["refs/heads/feat/*"] }))],
+        let app = Router::new()
+            .route(
+                "/x",
+                axum::routing::post(|| async {
+                    REACHED.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
+                    StatusCode::OK
+                }),
+            )
+            .layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(
+                SignatureBodyLimit(crate::server::SIGNED_BODY_LIMIT),
+                require_signature,
+            ));
+
+        let req = Request::builder()
+            .method("POST")
+            .uri("/x")
+            .header("signature-input", signature_input)
+            .header("signature", signature)
+            .body(Body::from("a body no signature covers"))
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            "a signed request with no Content-Digest header must be refused"
         );
-        assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn refuses_a_non_push_capability() {
-        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
-        let v = verified(
-            &owner_full(),
-            vec![Capability::new(
-                format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner_full()),
-                caps::ISSUE_CREATE,
-            )],
+        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 2048).await.unwrap();
+        let body: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            body["error"], "missing_content_digest",
+            "the refusal must name the absent Content-Digest header"
         );
-        assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v));
-    }
-
-    /// A resource wildcard must NOT authorize a push, even though attenuation
-    /// accepts it. The helper narrows a `*` delegation before signing, but the node
-    /// cannot rely on that: a delegate can sign an invocation that keeps the
-    /// wildcard, and it would otherwise reach every repository the owner has — or
-    /// will later create. This test previously asserted the opposite.
-    #[test]
-    fn refuses_a_resource_wildcard_and_honours_repo_admin() {
-        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
-        let wildcard = verified(&owner_full(), vec![Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH)]);
         assert!(
-            !ucan_grants_push(&rec, &wildcard),
-            "a wildcard resource must not authorize a push at the node"
+            !REACHED.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
+            "the handler must never see a request whose body no signature covers"
         );
-
-        // The ACTION wildcard is a different axis and stays: attenuation bounds it,
-        // and it still has to name a concrete repository.
-        let action_wildcard = verified(
-            &owner_full(),
-            vec![Capability::new(
-                format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner_full()),
-                "*",
-            )],
-        );
-        assert!(ucan_grants_push(&rec, &action_wildcard));
-
-        let admin = verified(
-            &owner_full(),
-            vec![Capability::new(
-                format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner_full()),
-                caps::REPO_ADMIN,
-            )],
-        );
-        assert!(ucan_grants_push(&rec, &admin));
-    }
-
-    /// The attack the wildcard refusal exists to stop: one `*` delegation reaching a
-    /// repository it was never issued against, including one created afterwards.
-    #[test]
-    fn a_wildcard_delegation_cannot_reach_a_second_repository() {
-        let other = repo(&owner_full(), "a-repo-created-later");
-        let wildcard = verified(&owner_full(), vec![Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH)]);
-        assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&other, &wildcard));
-    }
-
-    /// The round-8 P1, executed rather than reasoned: an owner-issued `*` PROOF with
-    /// a concrete leaf for a repository that did not exist at issuance. Refusing a
-    /// wildcard *leaf* did nothing here — `is_attenuated_by` accepts a concrete child
-    /// under a `*` parent, and that narrowing is exactly what `build_invocation` did,
-    /// so the first-party helper was the working mint path.
-    #[test]
-    fn a_wildcard_proof_cannot_reach_a_repo_created_later() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-        let hour = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1);
-
-        let parent = Ucan::issue(
-            &owner,
-            agent.did(),
-            vec![Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH)],
-            Some(hour),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        let later = format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/a-repo-created-later", owner.did());
-        let invocation = Ucan::delegate(
-            &agent,
-            node.did(),
-            vec![Capability::new(&later, caps::GIT_PUSH)],
-            Some(hour),
-            &parent,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let root = invocation.verify_chain().expect("the chain still verifies");
-        let rec = repo(&owner.did().to_string(), "a-repo-created-later");
-        assert!(
-            !ucan_grants_push(
-                &rec,
-                &VerifiedUcan {
-                    ucan: invocation,
-                    root
-                }
-            ),
-            "a wildcard proof must not authorize a repo it never named"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// The shipping flow must keep working: a proof that names the repository
-    /// authorizes a push to it. Guards against fixing the wildcard by refusing
-    /// everything with a `prf`.
-    #[test]
-    fn a_concrete_proof_still_authorizes_the_repo_it_names() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-        let hour = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1);
-        let resource = format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner.did());
-
-        let parent = Ucan::issue(
-            &owner,
-            agent.did(),
-            vec![Capability::new(&resource, caps::GIT_PUSH)],
-            Some(hour),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        let invocation = Ucan::delegate(
-            &agent,
-            node.did(),
-            vec![Capability::new(&resource, caps::GIT_PUSH)],
-            Some(hour),
-            &parent,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let root = invocation.verify_chain().expect("chain verifies");
-        let rec = repo(&owner.did().to_string(), "myrepo");
-        assert!(ucan_grants_push(
-            &rec,
-            &VerifiedUcan {
-                ucan: invocation,
-                root
-            }
-        ));
-    }
-
-    /// A `*` two links up. The immediate proof names the repository, so a walk that
-    /// checks only one level of `prf` stays green here — this is the case that
-    /// makes the recursion load-bearing rather than incidental.
-    #[test]
-    fn a_wildcard_grandparent_cannot_reach_the_repo_through_a_concrete_parent() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let intermediary = Keypair::generate();
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-        let hour = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1);
-        let resource = format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner.did());
-
-        let grandparent = Ucan::issue(
-            &owner,
-            intermediary.did(),
-            vec![Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH)],
-            Some(hour),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        let parent = Ucan::delegate(
-            &intermediary,
-            agent.did(),
-            vec![Capability::new(&resource, caps::GIT_PUSH)],
-            Some(hour),
-            &grandparent,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        let invocation = Ucan::delegate(
-            &agent,
-            node.did(),
-            vec![Capability::new(&resource, caps::GIT_PUSH)],
-            Some(hour),
-            &parent,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let root = invocation.verify_chain().expect("chain verifies");
-        assert_eq!(root, owner.did());
-        let rec = repo(&owner.did().to_string(), "myrepo");
-        assert!(
-            !ucan_grants_push(
-                &rec,
-                &VerifiedUcan {
-                    ucan: invocation,
-                    root
-                }
-            ),
-            "a wildcard anywhere in the chain must deny, not just in the immediate proof"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// And the same three-link shape with every link concrete must still grant, so
-    /// the walk is refusing the wildcard and not the depth.
-    #[test]
-    fn a_three_link_concrete_chain_still_authorizes() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let intermediary = Keypair::generate();
-        let agent = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-        let hour = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1);
-        let resource = format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner.did());
-        let cap = || vec![Capability::new(&resource, caps::GIT_PUSH)];
-
-        let grandparent = Ucan::issue(&owner, intermediary.did(), cap(), Some(hour)).unwrap();
-        let parent =
-            Ucan::delegate(&intermediary, agent.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &grandparent).unwrap();
-        let invocation = Ucan::delegate(&agent, node.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &parent).unwrap();
-
-        let root = invocation.verify_chain().unwrap();
-        let rec = repo(&owner.did().to_string(), "myrepo");
-        assert!(ucan_grants_push(
-            &rec,
-            &VerifiedUcan {
-                ucan: invocation,
-                root
-            }
-        ));
-    }
-
-    /// The round-ten P1, pinned where it bites. The middleware verifies the chain
-    /// on the `X-Ucan` header of any signed request before the scope walk runs,
-    /// so a depth bound that lived only in `chain_grants_push_to` protected
-    /// nothing: a hand-built header reached the unbounded recursion first. A
-    /// chain at `MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH` links validates; one link more is refused here,
-    /// with 401 and a message that names depth, before any authorization runs.
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_ucan_chain_stops_at_the_depth_bound() {
-        use gitlawb_core::ucan::MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH;
-
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let node = Keypair::generate();
-        let hour = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1);
-        let resource = format!("gitlawb://repos/{}/myrepo", owner.did());
-        let cap = || vec![Capability::new(&resource, caps::GIT_PUSH)];
-
-        // owner -> k1 -> ... -> signer: MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH - 1 links, all concrete,
-        // all signed, all expiring. Only the length is in question.
-        let mut signer = Keypair::generate();
-        let mut cur = Ucan::issue(&owner, signer.did(), cap(), Some(hour)).unwrap();
-        for _ in 2..MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH {
-            let next = Keypair::generate();
-            cur = Ucan::delegate(&signer, next.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &cur).unwrap();
-            signer = next;
-        }
-
-        // Wrapped into an invocation for the node: exactly MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH links.
-        let at_bound = Ucan::delegate(&signer, node.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &cur).unwrap();
-        let verified = validate_ucan_chain(&at_bound.encode().unwrap(), &node.did(), &signer.did())
-            .expect("a chain at the bound must still validate");
-        assert_eq!(verified.root, owner.did());
-
-        // One more link and it is past the bound.
-        let next = Keypair::generate();
-        let deeper = Ucan::delegate(&signer, next.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &cur).unwrap();
-        let past_bound = Ucan::delegate(&next, node.did(), cap(), Some(hour), &deeper).unwrap();
-        let (status, body) =
-            match validate_ucan_chain(&past_bound.encode().unwrap(), &node.did(), &next.did()) {
-                Ok(_) => panic!("a chain past the bound must be refused, not walked"),
-                Err(refusal) => refusal,
-            };
-        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
-        let message = body.0["message"].as_str().unwrap_or_default();
-        assert!(
-            message.contains("deeper than"),
-            "the refusal must name depth as the reason: {message}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn refuses_a_malformed_resource_uri() {
-        let rec = repo(&owner_full(), "myrepo");
-        for bad in [
-            "",
-            "myrepo",
-            "https://repos/x/myrepo",
-            "gitlawb://repos/myrepo",
-        ] {
-            let v = verified(&owner_full(), vec![Capability::new(bad, caps::GIT_PUSH)]);
-            assert!(!ucan_grants_push(&rec, &v), "{bad} must not grant push");
-        }
     }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/bootstrap.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! Embedded seed list of public Gitlawb network nodes.
+//! Embedded seed list of public Twigpine network nodes.
 //!
 //! This module parses `bootstrap-peers.json` (embedded at compile time) and
 //! merges its contents into the runtime config so a fresh `docker compose up`

crates/gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,74 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
 use crate::db::RefCertificate;
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
+/// Build the v1 signing payload — the EXACT bytes the node signs and
+/// gl's `verify_signature` reconstructs. This is the single source
+/// of truth shared by `issue_ref_certificate` and the frozen
+/// canonical-form tests below; drift here is what would break every
+/// existing cert.
+///
+/// Field order and key set are fixed: a default `serde_json::Value`
+/// serializes `Map<String, Value>` with sorted keys, so any change to
+/// the literal is observable as a different byte sequence on the
+/// wire.
+///
+/// v1 is the unversioned legacy shape: no `version` key in the signed
+/// JSON. From v2 onward the version belongs INSIDE the signed bytes
+/// (see `v2_signing_payload`): leaving it as an unsigned sibling
+/// would let a future v2 cert be downgraded to v1 and still verify
+/// cleanly, since the bytes would be identical.
+pub(crate) fn v1_signing_payload(
+    repo_id: &str,
+    ref_name: &str,
+    old_sha: &str,
+    new_sha: &str,
+    pusher_did: &str,
+    node_did: &str,
+    issued_at: &str,
+) -> serde_json::Value {
+    serde_json::json!({
+        "repo_id": repo_id,
+        "ref":     ref_name,
+        "old":     old_sha,
+        "new":     new_sha,
+        "pusher":  pusher_did,
+        "node":    node_did,
+        "ts":      issued_at,
+    })
+}
+
+/// Build the v2 signing payload — the future shape for versioned
+/// certs. Identical to v1 except the wire `version` is part of the
+/// signed bytes, so stripping or flipping the `version` column
+/// invalidates the signature instead of verifying cleanly under the
+/// other version's path.
+///
+/// NOT yet issued: `issue_ref_certificate` still stamps v1 because
+/// the shipped `gl` verifier only supports v1. This builder exists
+/// to pin the downgrade-resistant shape now, before any v2 cert is
+/// ever signed.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub(crate) fn v2_signing_payload(
+    repo_id: &str,
+    ref_name: &str,
+    old_sha: &str,
+    new_sha: &str,
+    pusher_did: &str,
+    node_did: &str,
+    issued_at: &str,
+) -> serde_json::Value {
+    serde_json::json!({
+        "repo_id": repo_id,
+        "ref":     ref_name,
+        "old":     old_sha,
+        "new":     new_sha,
+        "pusher":  pusher_did,
+        "node":    node_did,
+        "ts":      issued_at,
+        "version": 2,
+    })
+}
+
 /// Issue a signed ref-update certificate for a successful push.
 ///
 /// Builds a canonical JSON payload, signs it with the node's Ed25519 key,
@@ -26,16 +94,12 @@ pub async fn issue_ref_certificate(
     let node_did = state.node_did.to_string();
     let issued_at = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
 
-    // Build the canonical signing payload.
-    let payload = serde_json::json!({
-        "repo_id": repo_id,
-        "ref":     ref_name,
-        "old":     old_sha,
-        "new":     new_sha,
-        "pusher":  pusher_did,
-        "node":    node_did,
-        "ts":      issued_at,
-    });
+    // Build the canonical signing payload via the shared builder so
+    // the frozen-vector test below and the live signer cannot drift
+    // apart — a regression in either side fails both.
+    let payload = v1_signing_payload(
+        repo_id, ref_name, old_sha, new_sha, pusher_did, &node_did, &issued_at,
+    );
     let payload_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&payload)?;
 
     let signature = state.node_keypair.sign_b64(&payload_bytes);
@@ -50,9 +114,351 @@ pub async fn issue_ref_certificate(
         node_did,
         signature,
         issued_at,
+        // #26 Split PR 3: the wire-format version. New certs stamp
+        // v1 — the pre-versioning 7-field payload with no `version`
+        // key in the signed JSON — because the shipped `gl`
+        // verifier only supports v1. Stamping v2 here would issue
+        // certificates the shipped client refuses (round-3
+        // finding: node pinned `version == 2` while gl pinned
+        // "2 is refused", with nothing exercising the
+        // composition). v2 is reserved for the future shape
+        // defined by `v2_signing_payload`, which carries the
+        // version INSIDE the signed bytes; land the v2 verify
+        // path before stamping v2.
+        version: 1,
     };
 
     // Persist and return the row as it exists in the database (on a
     // conflict the existing row survives when it is newer).
     state.db.insert_ref_certificate(&cert).await
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod v1_payload_tests {
+    //! #26 Split PR 3 — cert payload version compat.
+    //!
+    //! The v1 cert payload is the frozen canonical byte form the
+    //! node signs. gl's `verify_signature` reconstructs the same
+    //! payload and verifies. Any drift in field order, key set, or
+    //! whitespace breaks every existing cert. The tests here pin
+    //! the v1 payload shape, the round-trip, the cert id
+    //! determinism per the v1 version, and the v2 read forward
+    //! compat (an unknown version refuses to verify rather than
+    //! guessing).
+    //!
+    //! Reviewer 1 finding: the live signer (`issue_ref_certificate`)
+    //! and the frozen-vector test (`v1_payload_matches_frozen_canonical_form`)
+    //! previously held two separate `serde_json::json!` literals,
+    //! so a regression in the signer could not fail this test.
+    //! Both now go through the shared `v1_signing_payload` builder.
+    use super::{v1_signing_payload, v2_signing_payload};
+    use crate::db::RefCertificate;
+    use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+
+    /// v1 payload is the same shape the legacy code signed, byte
+    /// for byte. Reverting this assertion to the v2 shape (which
+    /// includes a `version` key) is what the versioned format
+    /// forbids: an old client reading a v1 cert must not see a
+    /// `version` key in the signed JSON.
+    ///
+    /// The literal is built via the shared `v1_signing_payload`
+    /// helper that `issue_ref_certificate` also uses, so the live
+    /// signer and the frozen vector share one source of truth.
+    #[test]
+    fn v1_payload_matches_frozen_canonical_form() {
+        let payload = v1_signing_payload(
+            "repo-1",
+            "refs/heads/main",
+            &"0".repeat(40),
+            &"a".repeat(40),
+            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
+            "did:key:z6MkNode",
+            "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
+        );
+        let frozen = format!(
+            r#"{{"new":"{}","node":"did:key:z6MkNode","old":"{}","pusher":"did:key:z6MkPusher","ref":"refs/heads/main","repo_id":"repo-1","ts":"2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00"}}"#,
+            "a".repeat(40),
+            "0".repeat(40),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&payload).unwrap(), frozen);
+    }
+
+    /// Round-trip: sign the v1 payload with a keypair, build a
+    /// RefCertificate with version: 1, and verify the structure.
+    /// This is the construction the live code does on every push.
+    ///
+    /// Uses the shared builder for both halves so a regression in
+    /// the live signer (adding/removing/renaming a field) cannot
+    /// pass this test by accident.
+    #[test]
+    fn v1_ref_certificate_structure_is_well_formed() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let node_did = kp.did().as_str().to_string();
+        let payload = v1_signing_payload(
+            "repo-1",
+            "refs/heads/main",
+            &"0".repeat(40),
+            &"a".repeat(40),
+            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
+            &node_did,
+            "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
+        );
+        let payload_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&payload).unwrap();
+        let sig = kp.sign_b64(&payload_bytes);
+        let cert = RefCertificate {
+            id: "cert-id".into(),
+            repo_id: "repo-1".into(),
+            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
+            old_sha: "0".repeat(40),
+            new_sha: "a".repeat(40),
+            pusher_did: "did:key:z6MkPusher".into(),
+            node_did: node_did.clone(),
+            signature: sig.clone(),
+            issued_at: "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00".into(),
+            version: 1,
+        };
+        assert_eq!(cert.version, 1, "new certs carry version: 1");
+        // The signed payload reconstructs identically: gl's
+        // verify_signature would build the same JSON, hash the
+        // same bytes, and verify the same signature.
+        let reconstructed = v1_signing_payload(
+            &cert.repo_id,
+            &cert.ref_name,
+            &cert.old_sha,
+            &cert.new_sha,
+            &cert.pusher_did,
+            &cert.node_did,
+            &cert.issued_at,
+        );
+        let reconstructed_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&reconstructed).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            reconstructed_bytes, payload_bytes,
+            "the round-trip serialization must be byte-identical; \
+             this is what makes gl's verify_signature succeed"
+        );
+        // Round 3 (P3 reviewer): byte-equality alone never calls
+        // `identity::verify`, so a bad signature helper would pass.
+        // Verify the computed signature against the reconstructed
+        // bytes — the same check gl performs.
+        let vk = node_did
+            .parse::<gitlawb_core::did::Did>()
+            .unwrap()
+            .to_verifying_key()
+            .unwrap();
+        use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};
+        let sig_bytes: [u8; 64] = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
+            .decode(&cert.signature)
+            .unwrap()
+            .try_into()
+            .unwrap();
+        gitlawb_core::identity::verify(&vk, &reconstructed_bytes, &sig_bytes)
+            .expect("well-formed v1 cert signature must verify");
+    }
+
+    /// Reviewer 1 finding: the live signer must share the
+    /// canonical-form literal so a regression in either side
+    /// fails both. This test pins the shared builder's output
+    /// against the literal a future v2 byte stream would have
+    /// to break — if someone adds a `version` key to
+    /// `v1_signing_payload`, every existing cert breaks verify,
+    /// and this test is one of the canaries that fires.
+    #[test]
+    fn v1_signing_payload_has_no_version_key() {
+        let payload = v1_signing_payload(
+            "repo-1",
+            "refs/heads/main",
+            "oldsha",
+            "newsha",
+            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
+            "did:key:z6MkNode",
+            "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
+        );
+        let obj = payload.as_object().expect("payload is a JSON object");
+        assert!(
+            !obj.contains_key("version"),
+            "v1 signing payload must not carry a `version` key — adding \
+             one changes the bytes and breaks every existing cert's \
+             signature. v2 certs build a different payload, not this one"
+        );
+        // Pin the exact set so a future field addition is caught.
+        let expected: std::collections::BTreeSet<&str> =
+            ["new", "node", "old", "pusher", "ref", "repo_id", "ts"]
+                .into_iter()
+                .collect();
+        let actual: std::collections::BTreeSet<&str> = obj.keys().map(String::as_str).collect();
+        assert_eq!(actual, expected, "v1 payload key set is frozen");
+    }
+
+    /// Round 3 (P2 reviewer): from v2 onward the version belongs
+    /// INSIDE the signed bytes. v1 stays the unversioned legacy
+    /// shape; v2 carries `"version": 2` in the payload so a
+    /// version flip without re-signing invalidates the signature
+    /// instead of verifying cleanly under the other path.
+    #[test]
+    fn v2_signing_payload_binds_version_and_resists_downgrade() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let node_did = kp.did().as_str().to_string();
+        let ts = "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00";
+        let v1 = v1_signing_payload(
+            "repo-1",
+            "refs/heads/main",
+            "oldsha",
+            "newsha",
+            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
+            &node_did,
+            ts,
+        );
+        let v2 = v2_signing_payload(
+            "repo-1",
+            "refs/heads/main",
+            "oldsha",
+            "newsha",
+            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
+            &node_did,
+            ts,
+        );
+        let v2_obj = v2.as_object().expect("v2 payload is a JSON object");
+        assert_eq!(
+            v2_obj.get("version"),
+            Some(&serde_json::json!(2)),
+            "v2 payload must carry the version inside the signed bytes"
+        );
+        let v1_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&v1).unwrap();
+        let v2_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&v2).unwrap();
+        assert_ne!(
+            v1_bytes, v2_bytes,
+            "v1 and v2 payloads must differ, otherwise a version flip is cryptographically invisible"
+        );
+
+        // A signature over v1 must NOT verify as v2 and vice versa.
+        let vk = node_did
+            .parse::<gitlawb_core::did::Did>()
+            .unwrap()
+            .to_verifying_key()
+            .unwrap();
+        use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};
+        let sig_v1 = kp.sign_b64(&v1_bytes);
+        let sig_v1_bytes: [u8; 64] = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(&sig_v1).unwrap().try_into().unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            gitlawb_core::identity::verify(&vk, &v1_bytes, &sig_v1_bytes).is_ok(),
+            "v1 signature must verify under v1 bytes"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            gitlawb_core::identity::verify(&vk, &v2_bytes, &sig_v1_bytes).is_err(),
+            "a v1 signature presented as v2 (downgrade/upgrade flip) must not verify"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The live issuer stamps the version the shipped client can
+    /// verify. The gl client refuses to verify v2 certs explicitly;
+    /// this test pins that the version the ISSUING PATH claims
+    /// agrees with the payload shape it actually signs.
+    ///
+    /// Round 2: the prior form built a `RefCertificate` literal with
+    /// `version: 1` and asserted `version == 1` — true no matter what the
+    /// signer does, so flipping the issuer's version (or its payload shape)
+    /// left it green. This one drives the actual
+    /// `issue_ref_certificate` so a regression in the issuer flips the test.
+    /// The DB row is created against `test_support::test_state`, which
+    /// gives us a real `AppState` with a real node keypair.
+    ///
+    /// Round 3: the issuer stamps v1 because the shipped `gl`
+    /// verifier only supports v1 (stamping v2 shipped certs the
+    /// client refuses). The binding to the live issuer is kept —
+    /// flipping the stamp still turns this test red — without
+    /// changing what production issues.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    #[allow(clippy::async_yields_async)]
+    async fn issuer_stamps_v1_over_v1_payload(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
+        let repo_id = "repo-issuer-observe";
+        let ref_name = "refs/heads/main";
+        let old = "0".repeat(40);
+        let new = "a".repeat(40);
+        let pusher = "did:key:z6MkPusher";
+
+        // Drive the live issuer and read the persisted row back by
+        // id, so the test covers the stored `version` column and
+        // not just the in-process return value.
+        let cert =
+            crate::cert::issue_ref_certificate(&state, repo_id, ref_name, &old, &new, pusher)
+                .await
+                .expect("issue_ref_certificate must succeed");
+
+        // The cert returned by the issuer is the source of truth
+        // for both the version claim and the signed bytes.
+        assert_eq!(cert.repo_id, repo_id);
+        assert_eq!(cert.ref_name, ref_name);
+
+        // Cross-check 1: the issuer's claimed version must match
+        // what the live function stamps. This assertion is bound
+        // to the live function, not a hand-built literal:
+        // flipping the stamp in `issue_ref_certificate` breaks it
+        // through the actual call path.
+        assert_eq!(
+            cert.version, 1,
+            "the live issuer must stamp v1 until a v2 verifier ships; \
+             flipping the stamp breaks this assertion through the actual call path"
+        );
+
+        // Cross-check 1b: the persisted row carries the same stamp.
+        let stored = state
+            .db
+            .get_ref_certificate(&cert.id)
+            .await
+            .expect("persisted cert must be readable")
+            .expect("persisted cert must exist");
+        assert_eq!(
+            stored.version, cert.version,
+            "the stored version column must match the issued claim"
+        );
+
+        // Cross-check 2: the signature on the cert must verify
+        // against the v1 payload builder's bytes, not against some
+        // other shape the issuer might have introduced. This is
+        // what gl's `verify_signature` does for a v1 cert: rebuild
+        // the payload from the cert's own fields and verify the
+        // signature. If the issuer ever signs a different shape
+        // while still claiming v1, every shipped client breaks —
+        // and so does this.
+        let rebuilt = v1_signing_payload(
+            &cert.repo_id,
+            &cert.ref_name,
+            &cert.old_sha,
+            &cert.new_sha,
+            &cert.pusher_did,
+            &cert.node_did,
+            &cert.issued_at,
+        );
+        let vk = cert
+            .node_did
+            .parse::<gitlawb_core::did::Did>()
+            .unwrap()
+            .to_verifying_key()
+            .unwrap();
+        use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};
+        let sig_bytes: [u8; 64] = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
+            .decode(&cert.signature)
+            .unwrap()
+            .try_into()
+            .unwrap();
+        gitlawb_core::identity::verify(&vk, &serde_json::to_vec(&rebuilt).unwrap(), &sig_bytes)
+            .expect("a v1 cert's signature must verify against the v1 payload shape");
+
+        // Cross-check 3: the v1 signed payload must NOT contain a
+        // version key — v2 is the future shape that adds one inside
+        // the signed bytes (see `v2_signing_payload`). The v1
+        // payload (which the cert is signed over) is frozen at 7
+        // fields. A change that adds `version` to the v1 payload
+        // breaks every existing cert and this test.
+        let obj = rebuilt
+            .as_object()
+            .expect("rebuilt v1 payload is a JSON object");
+        assert!(
+            !obj.contains_key("version"),
+            "the v1 signing payload must not carry a version key — \
+             adding one changes the bytes and breaks every existing \
+             cert's signature"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/encrypted_pin.rs

@@ -69,6 +69,12 @@ fn resolve_all_recipients(dids: &BTreeSet<String>) -> Result<Vec<VerifyingKey>,
 enum SealPlan {
     /// An existing envelope already covers exactly this recipient set; nothing to do.
     SkipUnchanged,
+    /// The stored tag matches, but the stored reader set contains a DID that
+    /// must not resolve (e.g. a small-order did:key sealed before the choke
+    /// point landed). The old envelope is already public and cannot be
+    /// withdrawn, but it must be surfaced for operator action rather than
+    /// silently skipped as unchanged.
+    SkipUnresolvableStored(Vec<String>),
     /// No recipient DID resolved to a key, so there is nothing to seal to.
     SkipNoRecipients,
     /// At least one recipient DID is unresolvable. Fail closed: never seal to a
@@ -90,15 +96,30 @@ enum SealPlan {
 /// recover the blob; reader removal is not retroactive (the old envelope is
 /// already public). The comparison is on the opaque node-keyed tag, never the
 /// DID list.
+///
+/// A matching stored tag is normally a skip, but the set is still resolved
+/// before skipping: a reader that used to resolve and now must not (a
+/// small-order did:key sealed before the choke point landed) is surfaced as
+/// [`SealPlan::SkipUnresolvableStored`] instead of being silently treated as
+/// unchanged. The old envelope is already public and cannot be withdrawn, but
+/// the operator must be able to see that a persisted envelope was sealed to a
+/// weak recipient.
 fn plan_seal(node_seed: &[u8; 32], dids: &BTreeSet<String>, stored_tag: Option<&str>) -> SealPlan {
     let tag = recipients_tag(node_seed, dids);
     if stored_tag == Some(tag.as_str()) {
-        return SealPlan::SkipUnchanged;
-    }
-    match resolve_all_recipients(dids) {
-        Ok(keys) if keys.is_empty() => SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients,
-        Ok(keys) => SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag },
-        Err(unresolved) => SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved),
+        // The stored envelope already covers exactly this set, so there is
+        // nothing to re-seal. Resolve anyway so a now-unresolvable reader in an
+        // unchanged set is surfaced rather than hidden by the tag match.
+        match resolve_all_recipients(dids) {
+            Ok(_) => SealPlan::SkipUnchanged,
+            Err(unresolved) => SealPlan::SkipUnresolvableStored(unresolved),
+        }
+    } else {
+        match resolve_all_recipients(dids) {
+            Ok(keys) if keys.is_empty() => SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients,
+            Ok(keys) => SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag },
+            Err(unresolved) => SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved),
+        }
     }
 }
 
@@ -131,6 +152,21 @@ pub async fn encrypt_and_pin(
         // covered (which would permanently lock out the dropped readers, #47).
         let (keys, tag) = match plan_seal(node_seed, dids, stored_tag.as_deref()) {
             SealPlan::SkipUnchanged => continue,
+            SealPlan::SkipUnresolvableStored(unresolved) => {
+                // A stored envelope already covers this exact reader set, and
+                // the set now contains a DID that must not resolve (a
+                // small-order did:key sealed before the choke point landed).
+                // The old envelope is already public and cannot be withdrawn
+                // or re-sealed; surface it so the operator can act.
+                let sample: Vec<&String> = unresolved.iter().take(3).collect();
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    oid = %oid,
+                    unresolved_count = unresolved.len(),
+                    unresolved_sample = ?sample,
+                    "stored envelope was sealed to a recipient that must not resolve; operator action may be required"
+                );
+                continue;
+            }
             SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients => {
                 tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "no resolvable recipient keys; skipping encrypted pin");
                 continue;
@@ -206,6 +242,49 @@ mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
 
+    /// A did:key encoding a small-order point. Well-formed, indistinguishable
+    /// from a real one by eye, and refused at resolution since the choke-point
+    /// guard landed.
+    fn weak_did_key() -> String {
+        let mut weak = [0u8; 32];
+        weak[0] = 1; // compressed identity point
+        let vk = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&weak).expect("decompresses");
+        Did::from_verifying_key(&vk).to_string()
+    }
+
+    /// The #47 fail-closed arm already refuses to seal to a partial recipient
+    /// set. Because a small-order did:key no longer RESOLVES, it lands in the
+    /// unresolved set and that existing arm catches it: nothing is sealed, and
+    /// no new code path was added to make that happen.
+    #[test]
+    fn weak_recipient_falls_into_the_existing_fail_closed_arm() {
+        let weak = weak_did_key();
+        let mut dids = BTreeSet::new();
+        dids.insert(did_key(9));
+        dids.insert(weak.clone());
+
+        match plan_seal(&[0u8; 32], &dids, None) {
+            SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved) => assert!(
+                unresolved.contains(&weak),
+                "the weak DID must be named in the unresolved set, got {unresolved:?}"
+            ),
+            other => panic!("expected SkipUnresolvable, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Must-not-over-reject control: an all-legitimate recipient set still seals.
+    #[test]
+    fn legitimate_recipient_set_still_seals() {
+        let mut dids = BTreeSet::new();
+        dids.insert(did_key(9));
+        dids.insert(did_key(11));
+
+        match plan_seal(&[0u8; 32], &dids, None) {
+            SealPlan::Seal { keys, .. } => assert_eq!(keys.len(), 2, "both recipients resolve"),
+            other => panic!("expected Seal, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
     fn did_key(seed: u8) -> String {
         let vk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[seed; 32]).verifying_key();
         Did::from_verifying_key(&vk).to_string()
@@ -348,6 +427,43 @@ mod tests {
         ));
     }
 
+    /// P1 remediation (review): an unchanged reader set is normally a skip, but
+    /// the skip must not hide a recipient that now fails to resolve. A blob
+    /// sealed to a small-order did:key before the choke-point guard landed keeps
+    /// its old CID and stays decryptable-without-a-private-key unless the
+    /// matching-tag path surfaces it. This pins that the stored-tag match still
+    /// resolves the set instead of short-circuiting.
+    #[test]
+    fn plan_seal_surfaces_unresolvable_recipient_in_unchanged_reader_set() {
+        let weak = weak_did_key();
+        let mut dids = BTreeSet::new();
+        dids.insert(did_key(9));
+        dids.insert(weak.clone());
+        let stored = recipients_tag(&SEED, &dids);
+
+        match plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, Some(&stored)) {
+            SealPlan::SkipUnresolvableStored(unresolved) => assert!(
+                unresolved.contains(&weak),
+                "the weak DID must be named in the unresolved set, got {unresolved:?}"
+            ),
+            other => panic!("expected SkipUnresolvableStored, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Degenerate control: an empty set with a matching stored tag stays a
+    /// silent skip. The state is unreachable in practice (a seal is never
+    /// recorded for an empty reader set), so this pins only that the
+    /// resolve-on-match path must not turn it into a re-seal or a warning.
+    #[test]
+    fn plan_seal_unchanged_empty_set_still_skips() {
+        let empty = BTreeSet::new();
+        let empty_tag = recipients_tag(&SEED, &empty);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            plan_seal(&SEED, &empty, Some(&empty_tag)),
+            SealPlan::SkipUnchanged
+        ));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn plan_seal_reseals_when_recipient_set_changed() {
         // A stored tag for a DIFFERENT set is a miss: a newly added reader must

crates/gitlawb-node/src/error.rs

@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ pub enum AppError {
     #[error("repo already exists: {0}")]
     RepoExists(String),
 
+    #[error("conflict: {0}")]
+    Conflict(String),
+
     #[error("not found: {0}")]
     NotFound(String),
 
@@ -69,6 +72,15 @@ pub enum AppError {
     #[error("server overloaded: {0}")]
     Overloaded(String),
 
+    #[error("repository is busy")]
+    RepoBusy,
+
+    #[error("repository is temporarily unavailable")]
+    RepoUnavailable,
+
+    #[error("repository write was fenced by a concurrent publish")]
+    RepoWriteFenced,
+
     #[error("database error: {0}")]
     Db(#[from] sqlx::Error),
 
@@ -92,7 +104,7 @@ pub const DB_ERROR_MESSAGE: &str = "a database error occurred";
 
 /// Connection-level sqlx failures that mean the database is unreachable right
 /// now (retryable, 503), as opposed to server-reported query errors.
-fn db_unavailable(e: &sqlx::Error) -> bool {
+pub(crate) fn db_unavailable(e: &sqlx::Error) -> bool {
     matches!(
         e,
         sqlx::Error::PoolTimedOut
@@ -110,7 +122,31 @@ impl From<anyhow::Error> for AppError {
     fn from(err: anyhow::Error) -> Self {
         match err.downcast::<sqlx::Error>() {
             Ok(sql) => AppError::Db(sql),
-            Err(err) => AppError::Internal(err),
+            // Lock contention is transient and ordinary, so it must not land as a
+            // 500. The internal message names the owner slug and repo, so the
+            // variant carries nothing: the detail stays in the log at the raise
+            // site and the client gets a fixed retryable body.
+            Err(err) => match err.downcast::<crate::git::repo_store::LockPoolBusy>() {
+                Ok(_) => AppError::Overloaded("git write locks at capacity, retry shortly".into()),
+                Err(err) => match err.downcast::<crate::git::repo_store::RepoBusy>() {
+                    Ok(_) => AppError::RepoBusy,
+                    // Same reasoning one rung down: a refused under-lock refresh is a
+                    // transient storage condition, and its internal message names the
+                    // owner slug and repo, so the variant carries nothing.
+                    Err(err) => match err.downcast::<crate::git::repo_store::RepoUnavailable>() {
+                        Ok(_) => AppError::RepoUnavailable,
+                        // And one more rung: a publish the store refused twice is
+                        // transient in the same way, and the retry is the client's
+                        // to make. The variant carries nothing for the same reason
+                        // as the two above.
+                        Err(err) => match err.downcast::<crate::git::repo_store::RepoWriteFenced>()
+                        {
+                            Ok(_) => AppError::RepoWriteFenced,
+                            Err(err) => AppError::Internal(err),
+                        },
+                    },
+                },
+            },
         }
     }
 }
@@ -156,6 +192,7 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
                 "repo_exists",
                 format!("repository '{r}' already exists"),
             ),
+            AppError::Conflict(msg) => (StatusCode::CONFLICT, "conflict", msg.clone()),
             AppError::NotFound(msg) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Unauthorized(msg) => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "not_an_agent", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Forbidden(msg) => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "forbidden", msg.clone()),
@@ -184,6 +221,29 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
             // 504, distinct from the 500 git_error and from the read-gate's 404 /
             // the auth 401, so the client can tell a deadline from a failure.
             AppError::Timeout(msg) => (StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT, "git_timeout", msg.clone()),
+            // 503 with a FIXED body: the caller should retry, and must not be told
+            // which repo is contended or for how long.
+            AppError::RepoBusy => (
+                StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+                "repo_busy",
+                "repository is busy — retry".into(),
+            ),
+            // 503 with a FIXED body for the same reason: the caller should retry, and
+            // must not be told which repo could not be refreshed or why.
+            AppError::RepoUnavailable => (
+                StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+                "repo_unavailable",
+                "repository is temporarily unavailable, retry".into(),
+            ),
+            // 503 with a FIXED body again, and its own code: the caller should
+            // retry, but the condition is not contention, so a client that
+            // distinguishes them should be able to. The body must not say which
+            // repo lost its publish or to whom.
+            AppError::RepoWriteFenced => (
+                StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+                "repo_write_fenced",
+                "repository changed underneath this write, retry".into(),
+            ),
             AppError::Db(e) if db_unavailable(e) => (
                 StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
                 DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
@@ -244,7 +304,11 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
         // here rather than in bespoke early returns, keeping each variant handled once.
         if matches!(
             self,
-            AppError::Overloaded(_) | AppError::SearchIncomplete { .. }
+            AppError::Overloaded(_)
+                | AppError::SearchIncomplete { .. }
+                | AppError::RepoBusy
+                | AppError::RepoUnavailable
+                | AppError::RepoWriteFenced
         ) {
             resp.headers_mut().insert(
                 axum::http::header::RETRY_AFTER,
@@ -261,6 +325,16 @@ pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, AppError>;
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[test]
+    fn conflict_maps_to_409() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            AppError::Conflict("task not claimable".into())
+                .into_response()
+                .status(),
+            StatusCode::CONFLICT
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn timeout_maps_to_504_distinct_from_git_500() {
         assert_eq!(
@@ -362,4 +436,31 @@ mod tests {
         let resp = err.into_response();
         assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn lock_pool_busy_via_anyhow_from_is_503_overloaded() {
+        let err: AppError = anyhow::Error::new(crate::git::repo_store::LockPoolBusy).into();
+        let resp = err.into_response();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.headers().get("retry-after").unwrap().to_str().unwrap(),
+            "1"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn repo_busy_unavailable_and_fenced_advertise_retry_after() {
+        for err in [
+            AppError::RepoBusy,
+            AppError::RepoUnavailable,
+            AppError::RepoWriteFenced,
+        ] {
+            let resp = err.into_response();
+            assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
+            assert_eq!(
+                resp.headers().get("retry-after").unwrap().to_str().unwrap(),
+                "1"
+            );
+        }
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/issues.rs

@@ -61,6 +61,27 @@ pub fn create_issue(repo_path: &Path, issue_id: &str, json: &str) -> Result<()>
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Remove a single issue ref while the write guard still holds the advisory lock,
+/// after a definite publish refusal. Best-effort: a failed delete leaves a
+/// local-only orphan, which is still better than telling the client to retry into a
+/// duplicate id. Not used on `UploadUnknowable`, where the PUT may still land.
+pub fn delete_issue_ref(
+    git_bin: &str,
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    issue_id: &str,
+    deadline: std::time::Instant,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let ref_name = format!("refs/gitlawb/issues/{issue_id}");
+    crate::git::visibility_pack::run_bounded_git(
+        git_bin,
+        &["update-ref", "-d", &ref_name],
+        repo_path,
+        b"",
+        deadline,
+    )?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 /// List all issue refs and return their JSON content.
 pub fn list_issues(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
     // List all refs under refs/gitlawb/issues/
@@ -108,19 +129,22 @@ pub fn list_issues(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
 /// Returns Ok(Some(full_id)) on unique match, Ok(None) if not found,
 /// Err if the prefix is ambiguous (matches more than one issue).
 pub fn resolve_issue_id(repo_path: &Path, id_or_prefix: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
-    // Try exact match first — fast path for callers passing the full UUID.
-    let exact_ref = format!("refs/gitlawb/issues/{id_or_prefix}");
-    let check = Command::new("git")
-        .args(["cat-file", "-e", &exact_ref])
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output()
-        .context("failed to run git cat-file -e")?;
-    if check.status.success() {
-        return Ok(Some(id_or_prefix.to_string()));
+    // The id comes from the request path and is spliced into a git revision and a
+    // for-each-ref pattern below. Issue ids are UUIDs, so accept only ASCII
+    // alphanumerics and '-': anything else (`^{blob}`, `@{0}`, `*`, `/`, `..`) is
+    // revision or glob syntax, never an issue id, and is reported as not found.
+    if id_or_prefix.is_empty()
+        || !id_or_prefix
+            .bytes()
+            .all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b == b'-')
+    {
+        return Ok(None);
     }
 
-    // Prefix search: list all refs that start with the given string.
-    let prefix_glob = format!("refs/gitlawb/issues/{id_or_prefix}*");
+    // List all refs that start with the given string; the glob also matches the exact
+    // ref. The id handed back is always git's own refname, never the request input.
+    let exact_ref = format!("refs/gitlawb/issues/{id_or_prefix}");
+    let prefix_glob = format!("{exact_ref}*");
     let list = Command::new("git")
         .args(["for-each-ref", "--format=%(refname)", &prefix_glob])
         .current_dir(repo_path)
@@ -132,25 +156,44 @@ pub fn resolve_issue_id(repo_path: &Path, id_or_prefix: &str) -> Result<Option<S
     }
 
     let output = String::from_utf8_lossy(&list.stdout);
-    let matches: Vec<&str> = output.lines().filter(|l| !l.trim().is_empty()).collect();
+    let matches: Vec<&str> = output
+        .lines()
+        .map(str::trim)
+        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
+        .collect();
 
-    match matches.len() {
-        0 => Ok(None),
-        1 => {
-            // Strip the "refs/gitlawb/issues/" prefix to get the bare ID.
-            let full_id = matches[0]
-                .trim()
-                .strip_prefix("refs/gitlawb/issues/")
-                .unwrap_or(matches[0].trim())
-                .to_string();
-            Ok(Some(full_id))
+    // An exact id wins over longer ids that share it as a prefix, but only if its
+    // object exists: for-each-ref also lists a ref whose blob is missing, so a
+    // dangling exact ref falls through to the prefix rules below.
+    let exact = match matches.iter().find(|m| **m == exact_ref) {
+        Some(m) => {
+            let check = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["cat-file", "-e", m])
+                .current_dir(repo_path)
+                .output()
+                .context("failed to run git cat-file -e")?;
+            check.status.success().then_some(*m)
         }
-        _ => anyhow::bail!(
-            "ambiguous issue prefix '{}': matches {} issues",
-            id_or_prefix,
-            matches.len()
-        ),
-    }
+        None => None,
+    };
+    let found = match exact {
+        Some(m) => m,
+        None => match matches.as_slice() {
+            [] => return Ok(None),
+            [m] => *m,
+            _ => anyhow::bail!(
+                "ambiguous issue prefix '{}': matches {} issues",
+                id_or_prefix,
+                matches.len()
+            ),
+        },
+    };
+    // Strip the "refs/gitlawb/issues/" prefix to get the bare ID.
+    let full_id = found
+        .strip_prefix("refs/gitlawb/issues/")
+        .unwrap_or(found)
+        .to_string();
+    Ok(Some(full_id))
 }
 
 /// Close an issue by updating its status to "closed" in the git ref.
@@ -234,6 +277,43 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(resolved, Some(full_id.to_string()));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn test_resolve_exact_id_wins_over_longer_id() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        init_repo(&dir);
+        create_issue(dir.path(), "abc12345", r#"{"status":"open"}"#).unwrap();
+        create_issue(dir.path(), "abc12345-0000", r#"{"status":"open"}"#).unwrap();
+        let resolved = resolve_issue_id(dir.path(), "abc12345").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resolved, Some("abc12345".to_string()));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_resolve_dangling_exact_id_does_not_win_over_longer_id() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        init_repo(&dir);
+        create_issue(dir.path(), "abc12345", r#"{"status":"open","n":1}"#).unwrap();
+        create_issue(dir.path(), "abc12345-0000", r#"{"status":"open","n":2}"#).unwrap();
+        // Dangle the exact ref: the ref stays listed by for-each-ref, but its blob is gone.
+        let out = Command::new("git")
+            .args(["rev-parse", "refs/gitlawb/issues/abc12345"])
+            .current_dir(dir.path())
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        let hash = String::from_utf8(out.stdout).unwrap();
+        let hash = hash.trim();
+        std::fs::remove_file(
+            dir.path()
+                .join(".git/objects")
+                .join(&hash[..2])
+                .join(&hash[2..]),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let result = resolve_issue_id(dir.path(), "abc12345");
+        assert!(result.unwrap_err().to_string().contains("ambiguous"));
+        assert!(close_issue(dir.path(), "abc12345").is_err());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_resolve_prefix_matches_unique() {
         let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
@@ -249,6 +329,35 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(resolved, Some(full_id.to_string()));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn test_resolve_rejects_revision_syntax() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        init_repo(&dir);
+        let full_id = "abc12345-0000-0000-0000-000000000000";
+        create_issue(
+            dir.path(),
+            full_id,
+            r#"{"id":"abc12345-0000-0000-0000-000000000000","status":"open"}"#,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        // Each of these resolves to (or globs over) the issue blob in git, but none
+        // is an issue id, so the lookup must not accept it.
+        for crafted in [
+            "abc12345-0000-0000-0000-000000000000^{blob}",
+            "abc12345-0000-0000-0000-000000000000^{}",
+            "abc12345-0000-0000-0000-000000000000~0",
+            "*",
+            "",
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                resolve_issue_id(dir.path(), crafted).unwrap(),
+                None,
+                "{crafted:?}"
+            );
+            assert_eq!(get_issue(dir.path(), crafted).unwrap(), None, "{crafted:?}");
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_resolve_prefix_not_found() {
         let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
@@ -278,6 +387,27 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(result.unwrap_err().to_string().contains("ambiguous"));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn delete_issue_ref_removes_a_created_ref() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        init_repo(&dir);
+        let full_id = "eee88888-0000-0000-0000-000000000000";
+        create_issue(
+            dir.path(),
+            full_id,
+            r#"{"id":"eee88888-0000-0000-0000-000000000000","status":"open"}"#,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        delete_issue_ref(
+            "git",
+            dir.path(),
+            full_id,
+            std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(30),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resolve_issue_id(dir.path(), full_id).unwrap(), None);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_close_issue_via_prefix() {
         let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/mod.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 pub mod issues;
+pub mod publish;
 pub mod push_delta;
 pub mod repo_store;
 pub mod smart_http;

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/publish.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+//! The publication boundary: WHO wrote, and HOW FAR that write got.
+//!
+//! Four lifecycle defects on this branch shared one root cause. A resource was
+//! tracked by a coarse state — "release started", "the path exists", "a row with
+//! this name exists" — when the safety question was about the IDENTITY and the
+//! PUBLICATION STAGE of one specific write attempt. A tail replicated refs from
+//! an attempt that had not dispatched a PUT; a read served a tree whose
+//! generation nobody had confirmed; a fork claimed a concurrent attempt's row and
+//! deleted a successor's object; a response-loss failure was compensated as if it
+//! proved non-publication.
+//!
+//! This module is the vocabulary that makes those questions answerable, and it is
+//! deliberately free of any object-storage type:
+//!
+//! - [`PublishAttemptId`] — minted before the request is built, carried with the
+//!   bytes as user metadata, read back off the store to decide whether what is
+//!   published is THIS attempt's work.
+//! - [`PublishStage`] / [`PublishStageCell`] — how far one attempt got, observable
+//!   from outside the future that is performing it, so a CANCELLED attempt can
+//!   still be classified.
+//! - [`UploadError`] — what the client KNOWS about dispatch and commit, not just
+//!   which HTTP status came back. Destructive compensation is licensed only by
+//!   [`UploadError::proves_not_published`].
+//!
+//! # Porting note (#79)
+//!
+//! PR #79 (`feat/storage-abstraction`) deletes `git/tigris.rs` and replaces it
+//! with a `BlobStore`/`RepoArchive` layer. Everything in this file is
+//! backend-agnostic on purpose and is meant to survive that swap unchanged: a new
+//! backend supplies its own error classifier (the one in `tigris.rs` is a single
+//! private function) and keeps these types as the contract its callers read.
+
+use std::sync::Mutex;
+
+/// A durable identity for ONE publish attempt.
+///
+/// The point is reconciliation. A conditional PUT whose response was lost leaves
+/// the client unable to say whether its bytes committed; an attempt id stored
+/// alongside those bytes turns that into a question the store can answer, because
+/// "is the published object mine?" is decidable where "did my request succeed?"
+/// is not.
+///
+/// Fork creation passes the DB row id it is about to insert, so the object, the
+/// on-disk clone and the database row are all stamped with the same attempt
+/// identity and every cleanup can be made conditional on still owning all three.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct PublishAttemptId(String);
+
+impl PublishAttemptId {
+    /// A fresh identity for an attempt that has nothing else to be named after.
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        Self(uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string())
+    }
+
+    /// Name the attempt after a caller-owned identity — fork creation uses the
+    /// `record.id` it is about to insert, which is what ties the object back to
+    /// the exact row rather than to the logical owner/name.
+    pub fn from_owned(id: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        Self(id.into())
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_str(&self) -> &str {
+        &self.0
+    }
+}
+
+impl Default for PublishAttemptId {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self::new()
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for PublishAttemptId {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.write_str(&self.0)
+    }
+}
+
+/// The object user-metadata key an attempt id travels in.
+///
+/// S3 lowercases user-metadata keys, so this must already be lowercase or the
+/// read back would never match what was written.
+pub const ATTEMPT_METADATA_KEY: &str = "gitlawb-attempt";
+
+/// The precondition an upload is fenced on.
+///
+/// Object storage is the only place a fence can hold. Dropping the future of an
+/// in-flight PUT does not cancel the request the server is already processing,
+/// so no amount of local locking stops an abandoned writer's bytes from landing
+/// after a successor has published. A conditional PUT the store itself refuses
+/// is what actually stops it.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub enum UploadPrecondition {
+    /// Publish only if the stored object is still the generation we observed.
+    IfMatch(String),
+    /// Publish only if nothing is stored under the key yet.
+    IfAbsent,
+    /// No fence. Last writer wins.
+    Unconditional,
+}
+
+/// What the store holds under a key right now.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct StoredGeneration {
+    /// The generation a later conditional upload can fence itself on.
+    pub etag: Option<String>,
+    /// The attempt that published it, when the object carries our metadata.
+    /// `None` for anything written by something that does not stamp attempts
+    /// (an operator upload, a pre-attempt-id archive).
+    pub attempt: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl StoredGeneration {
+    /// Is what the store holds the work of `attempt`?
+    ///
+    /// This is the whole reconciliation primitive. It is deliberately a
+    /// three-way question collapsed to a boolean only at the point of use: an
+    /// object with no attempt metadata answers `false`, because "somebody else's
+    /// bytes" and "bytes nobody stamped" license exactly the same caution.
+    pub fn belongs_to(&self, attempt: &PublishAttemptId) -> bool {
+        self.attempt.as_deref() == Some(attempt.as_str())
+    }
+}
+
+/// The receipt of a publish the store ACKNOWLEDGED.
+///
+/// Only produced on a response the client actually read, so holding one is proof
+/// of publication in a way that "the upload future returned" is not.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct UploadReceipt {
+    pub attempt: PublishAttemptId,
+    pub etag: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// How far ONE publish attempt got.
+///
+/// Observable through [`PublishStageCell`] from outside the future doing the
+/// work, which is the property the whole design turns on: a handler future that
+/// is DROPPED never returns an outcome, so the only way to classify a cancelled
+/// attempt is to read the stage it had reached when it was abandoned.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum PublishStage {
+    /// Nothing has been attempted.
+    Idle,
+    /// No object-storage backend is configured, so there is no publication to
+    /// confirm and the local write IS the durable copy. Distinct from `Idle`,
+    /// which means an attempt was possible and had not started: a cancellation
+    /// under `NoBackend` loses nothing, while a cancellation under `Idle` means
+    /// a publish that could have happened never did.
+    NoBackend,
+    /// The archive is being built. The request has not been constructed, let
+    /// alone sent. A cancellation here is a DEFINITE "no publication was
+    /// attempted" — not an ambiguous in-flight PUT.
+    PreparingArchive,
+    /// The request is on the wire. Its fate is unknown until the store answers,
+    /// and a cancellation here does NOT stop the server processing it.
+    PutDispatched { attempt: PublishAttemptId },
+    /// The store acknowledged the write. This is the ONLY stage that licenses
+    /// replication, a 2xx, or treating the local tree as durable.
+    Published {
+        attempt: PublishAttemptId,
+        etag: Option<String>,
+    },
+    /// The store definitively did not publish this attempt (a refused
+    /// precondition, or a failure that proves the bytes never committed).
+    Refused,
+    /// The attempt may or may not have committed and has not been reconciled.
+    /// Destructive compensation is NEVER licensed from here.
+    Ambiguous { attempt: PublishAttemptId },
+}
+
+impl PublishStage {
+    /// Did this attempt reach a state where the store may hold its bytes?
+    ///
+    /// True from dispatch onward. `false` is what makes deleting the attempt's
+    /// object or local tree safe.
+    pub fn may_have_published(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(
+            self,
+            PublishStage::PutDispatched { .. }
+                | PublishStage::Published { .. }
+                | PublishStage::Ambiguous { .. }
+        )
+    }
+
+    /// The attempt whose fate is unresolved, when there is one. This is what a
+    /// reconciliation HEAD is compared against.
+    pub fn unresolved_attempt(&self) -> Option<&PublishAttemptId> {
+        match self {
+            PublishStage::PutDispatched { attempt } | PublishStage::Ambiguous { attempt } => {
+                Some(attempt)
+            }
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// A [`PublishStage`] an in-flight upload writes and an outside observer reads.
+///
+/// `std::sync::Mutex` rather than an async lock on purpose: every write is a
+/// field assignment with no await inside, and the reader that matters most runs
+/// inside a `Drop` impl, where an async lock cannot be awaited at all.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct PublishStageCell(Mutex<PublishStage>);
+
+impl PublishStageCell {
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        Self::seeded(PublishStage::Idle)
+    }
+
+    pub fn seeded(stage: PublishStage) -> Self {
+        Self(Mutex::new(stage))
+    }
+
+    pub fn set(&self, stage: PublishStage) {
+        *self.0.lock().expect("publish stage mutex poisoned") = stage;
+    }
+
+    pub fn get(&self) -> PublishStage {
+        self.0.lock().expect("publish stage mutex poisoned").clone()
+    }
+}
+
+impl Default for PublishStageCell {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self::new()
+    }
+}
+
+/// What the client knows about whether a request it could not complete ever
+/// reached the wire.
+///
+/// The classifier that produces this is the ONLY backend-aware code in the
+/// publish path; a pluggable store (#79) supplies its own and every caller below
+/// keeps working off [`UploadError`].
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum DispatchKnowledge {
+    /// The request could not be built or sent. The store cannot hold these bytes.
+    NeverSent,
+    /// The request may have been sent, and may have committed.
+    MaybeSent,
+}
+
+/// Why an upload did not publish, split by what it leaves the caller ENTITLED TO
+/// DO — not by which HTTP status came back.
+///
+/// The split exists because the previous shape ("precondition lost" vs "some
+/// other error") made every caller treat a lost response as proof of failure.
+/// Smithy timeout, dispatch and response errors all allow that the request was
+/// sent and committed: a server can accept a complete conditional PUT and lose
+/// or corrupt the response before the client observes success. Compensating that
+/// as a definite failure deletes state that IS published.
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum UploadError {
+    /// The store explicitly refused the fence (412, or 409 under create-only).
+    /// DEFINITE: this attempt did not publish, and a successor did.
+    #[error("upload precondition lost (HTTP {status})")]
+    PreconditionLost { status: u16 },
+    /// The attempt provably never committed: it failed before the request could
+    /// be dispatched, or the store answered a definite client-side refusal.
+    /// Destructive compensation is safe here and ONLY here.
+    #[error("upload did not reach the store: {0:#}")]
+    NotPublished(#[source] anyhow::Error),
+    /// The request may have been dispatched and may have committed; the client
+    /// never learned which. The attempt id is carried so the caller can ask the
+    /// store rather than guess.
+    #[error("upload outcome is unknowable (attempt {attempt}): {source:#}")]
+    Ambiguous {
+        attempt: PublishAttemptId,
+        #[source]
+        source: anyhow::Error,
+    },
+}
+
+impl UploadError {
+    /// May this caller destroy state that would be needed if the write HAD
+    /// landed — delete the object, drop the only local clone, invalidate the
+    /// cache?
+    ///
+    /// Only a proven non-publication says yes. Every new variant must default to
+    /// `false`, which is why this is a match on the safe arms rather than a
+    /// negation of the unsafe one.
+    pub fn proves_not_published(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(
+            self,
+            UploadError::PreconditionLost { .. } | UploadError::NotPublished(_)
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn only_definite_outcomes_license_destructive_compensation() {
+        assert!(UploadError::PreconditionLost { status: 412 }.proves_not_published());
+        assert!(
+            UploadError::NotPublished(anyhow::anyhow!("no route to host")).proves_not_published()
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !UploadError::Ambiguous {
+                attempt: PublishAttemptId::new(),
+                source: anyhow::anyhow!("response body truncated"),
+            }
+            .proves_not_published(),
+            "a response-loss failure must never license deleting state the write may own"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_stage_may_have_published_only_from_dispatch_onward() {
+        let attempt = PublishAttemptId::new();
+        assert!(!PublishStage::Idle.may_have_published());
+        assert!(!PublishStage::NoBackend.may_have_published());
+        assert!(
+            !PublishStage::PreparingArchive.may_have_published(),
+            "compression has not constructed a request, let alone sent one"
+        );
+        assert!(!PublishStage::Refused.may_have_published());
+        assert!(PublishStage::PutDispatched {
+            attempt: attempt.clone()
+        }
+        .may_have_published());
+        assert!(PublishStage::Ambiguous {
+            attempt: attempt.clone()
+        }
+        .may_have_published());
+        assert!(PublishStage::Published {
+            attempt,
+            etag: None
+        }
+        .may_have_published());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn an_unstamped_object_never_belongs_to_an_attempt() {
+        let attempt = PublishAttemptId::new();
+        assert!(StoredGeneration {
+            etag: Some("\"e\"".into()),
+            attempt: Some(attempt.as_str().to_string()),
+        }
+        .belongs_to(&attempt));
+        assert!(
+            !StoredGeneration {
+                etag: Some("\"e\"".into()),
+                attempt: None,
+            }
+            .belongs_to(&attempt),
+            "bytes nobody stamped must not be claimed by this attempt"
+        );
+        assert!(!StoredGeneration {
+            etag: Some("\"e\"".into()),
+            attempt: Some("someone-else".into()),
+        }
+        .belongs_to(&attempt));
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/push_delta.rs

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 //! objects the reachable withheld set never classified, so subtracting that set
 //! is not enough — a dangling private blob would slip through (#99). The caller
 //! signals a full scan via [`PinCandidateSet::full_scan`] and must then apply
-//! the fail-closed blob filter (`visibility_pack::replicable_objects_fail_closed`)
+//! the fail-closed blob-and-tree filter (`visibility_pack::replicable_objects_fail_closed`)
 //! instead of the plain reachable-only subtraction.
 //!
 //! Because the pin candidate set needs only the OID *set* (never the per-path
@@ -211,8 +211,9 @@ pub fn list_all_objects(repo_path: &Path, git_bin: &str, deadline: Instant) -> R
 
 /// Like [`list_all_objects`] but pairs each OID with its object type, via
 /// `--batch-check='%(objectname) %(objecttype)'`. The pin path's fail-closed
-/// filter needs to tell blobs (content, withholdable) from commits/trees
-/// (structural, never withheld) without typing the candidate list itself.
+/// filter needs to tell blobs (content, withholdable) and trees (content,
+/// withholdable since #135/#173) from commits/tags (structural, never withheld)
+/// without typing the candidate list itself.
 pub fn list_all_objects_with_type(
     repo_path: &Path,
     git_bin: &str,
@@ -244,24 +245,48 @@ pub fn list_all_objects_with_type(
 /// Every blob OID in the repo, including unreachable/dangling ones. The
 /// fail-closed pin filter drops any candidate blob absent from the reachable,
 /// visibility-allowed set; a dangling private blob is in this set but not the
-/// allowed set, so it never replicates (#99).
+/// allowed set, so it never replicates (#99). Production uses
+/// [`all_blob_and_tree_oids`] (one typed pass); this wrapper stays for tests.
+#[cfg(test)]
 pub fn all_blob_oids(
     repo_path: &Path,
     git_bin: &str,
     deadline: Instant,
 ) -> Result<HashSet<String>> {
-    Ok(list_all_objects_with_type(repo_path, git_bin, deadline)?
-        .into_iter()
-        .filter(|(_, ty)| ty == "blob")
-        .map(|(oid, _)| oid)
-        .collect())
+    Ok(all_blob_and_tree_oids(repo_path, git_bin, deadline)?.0)
+}
+
+/// Every blob OID and every tree OID in the repo, including unreachable/dangling
+/// ones, from one typed enumeration. The fail-closed pin filter drops any
+/// candidate blob or tree absent from the matching reachable visibility-allowed
+/// set; a dangling or withheld object is in this universe but not the allowed
+/// set, so it never replicates (#99, #172).
+pub fn all_blob_and_tree_oids(
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    git_bin: &str,
+    deadline: Instant,
+) -> Result<(HashSet<String>, HashSet<String>)> {
+    let mut blobs = HashSet::new();
+    let mut trees = HashSet::new();
+    for (oid, ty) in list_all_objects_with_type(repo_path, git_bin, deadline)? {
+        match ty.as_str() {
+            "blob" => {
+                blobs.insert(oid);
+            }
+            "tree" => {
+                trees.insert(oid);
+            }
+            _ => {}
+        }
+    }
+    Ok((blobs, trees))
 }
 
 /// The pin candidate OIDs for a push plus whether they came from a full-repo
 /// scan. `full_scan` is true when the delta could not be used and the whole
 /// object DB (including dangling objects) was enumerated — the caller must then
-/// apply the fail-closed blob filter, because the reachable-only withheld set
-/// cannot classify dangling blobs (#99).
+/// apply the fail-closed blob-and-tree filter, because the reachable-only withheld set
+/// cannot classify dangling blobs or trees (#99, #172).
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct PinCandidateSet {
     pub candidates: Vec<String>,

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/smart_http.rs

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ pub async fn info_refs(
 
     let mut command = Command::new(git_bin);
     command
-        .arg(service_to_command(service))
+        .arg(service_to_command(service)?)
         .arg("--stateless-rpc")
         .arg("--advertise-refs")
         .arg(repo_path);
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ async fn run_git_service(
 ) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let mut command = Command::new(git_bin);
     command
-        .arg(service_to_command(service))
+        .arg(service_to_command(service)?)
         .arg("--stateless-rpc")
         .arg(repo_path);
     let (out, admission) = drive_git_child(command, input, timeout, service, admission).await?;
@@ -578,11 +578,13 @@ async fn drive_git_child(
     Ok((out, admission))
 }
 
-fn service_to_command(service: &str) -> &str {
+/// Map a validated service name to its git subcommand. Only the two fixed
+/// subcommands can come out, so an unrecognized service can never reach git's argv.
+fn service_to_command(service: &str) -> Result<&'static str> {
     match service {
-        "git-upload-pack" => "upload-pack",
-        "git-receive-pack" => "receive-pack",
-        _ => service,
+        "git-upload-pack" => Ok("upload-pack"),
+        "git-receive-pack" => Ok("receive-pack"),
+        other => bail!("unknown git service: {other}"),
     }
 }
 
@@ -866,6 +868,24 @@ mod tests {
     use std::process::Command;
     use tempfile::TempDir;
 
+    #[test]
+    fn service_to_command_maps_allowlist_and_rejects_passthrough() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            service_to_command("git-upload-pack").unwrap(),
+            "upload-pack"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            service_to_command("git-receive-pack").unwrap(),
+            "receive-pack"
+        );
+        for bad in ["git-fetch-pack", "--version", "upload-pack", ""] {
+            assert!(
+                service_to_command(bad).is_err(),
+                "must reject passthrough for {bad:?}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     /// List OIDs in a pack by writing it to a temp dir and running verify-pack.
     pub(super) fn pack_object_ids(pack: &[u8]) -> std::collections::HashSet<String> {
         let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/store.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
-use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::path::Path;
 use std::process::Command;
 
 /// Initialize a new bare git repository with SHA-1 object format (default).
@@ -746,13 +746,149 @@ pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String,
     Ok(Some((obj_type, content)))
 }
 
+/// Outcome of validating a stored branch-field value.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum GitRefValidationError {
+    /// Caller supplied a name that is not a valid local branch name.
+    Invalid(String),
+    /// Git could not be executed to validate the name.
+    GitUnavailable(String),
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for GitRefValidationError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            Self::Invalid(msg) | Self::GitUnavailable(msg) => f.write_str(msg),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Reject revision shorthands and pseudoref names that `git check-ref-format
+/// --branch` accepts but that git later interprets as symbolic revisions rather
+/// than literal local branch names.
+fn reject_revision_shorthand(name: &str) -> Option<&'static str> {
+    if name == "@" {
+        return Some("branch ref must not be a revision shorthand");
+    }
+    if name.starts_with("@{") {
+        return Some("branch ref must not be a reflog revision expression");
+    }
+    const PSEUDOREFS: &[&str] = &[
+        "FETCH_HEAD",
+        "ORIG_HEAD",
+        "MERGE_HEAD",
+        "CHERRY_PICK_HEAD",
+        "RERERE_MERGE_HEAD",
+        "REBASE_HEAD",
+        "REVERT_HEAD",
+        "BISECT_HEAD",
+        "AUTO_MERGE",
+    ];
+    if PSEUDOREFS.contains(&name) {
+        return Some("branch ref must not be a git pseudoref name");
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Validate a git *branch name* before it is stored or passed to git subprocesses.
+/// Delegates to `git check-ref-format --branch`, then rejects fully qualified
+/// ref paths, revision-namespace shorthands (`heads/`, `tags/`, `remotes/`), and
+/// symbolic names that git would reinterpret at the sink.
+///
+/// At diff/merge sinks, validated short names are passed as `refs/heads/{name}` so
+/// grammar-valid revision shorthands cannot retarget another ref namespace. The
+/// merge worktree checks out the local branch name instead, so merge commits
+/// advance refs/heads/{target}. Symbolic revision names (`HEAD`), option-shaped
+/// trailing dots, and other invalid forms are rejected by check-ref-format itself.
+/// Revision shorthands that pass the grammar check (`@`, `@{-1}`, pseudorefs) are
+/// rejected explicitly because git treats them as symbolic revisions when bare.
+///
+/// Storage boundaries call this via [`validate_git_ref_with_git`] with the configured
+/// git binary. Sink functions call [`validate_git_ref`] (system `git`) then prefix
+/// before building argv, so the property holds for every caller and every row,
+/// including legacy rows and any writer that skipped the boundary check.
+pub fn validate_git_ref(name: &str) -> std::result::Result<(), GitRefValidationError> {
+    validate_git_ref_with_git("git", name)
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn validate_git_ref_with_git(
+    git_bin: &str,
+    name: &str,
+) -> std::result::Result<(), GitRefValidationError> {
+    if name.is_empty() {
+        return Err(GitRefValidationError::Invalid(
+            "branch ref must not be empty".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+    if name.starts_with("refs/") {
+        return Err(GitRefValidationError::Invalid(
+            "branch ref must be a local branch name, not a fully qualified ref".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+    if name.starts_with("heads/") || name.starts_with("tags/") || name.starts_with("remotes/") {
+        return Err(GitRefValidationError::Invalid(
+            "branch ref must be a local branch name, not a revision shorthand".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+    if let Some(reason) = reject_revision_shorthand(name) {
+        return Err(GitRefValidationError::Invalid(reason.into()));
+    }
+    // allow-unbounded-git: stateless check-ref-format on a user-supplied name; no repo acquire or concurrency permit
+    let output = Command::new(git_bin)
+        .args(["check-ref-format", "--branch", name])
+        .output()
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            // allow-unbounded-git: stateless check-ref-format on user-supplied name; no repo acquire
+            GitRefValidationError::GitUnavailable(format!(
+                "failed to run git check-ref-format: {e}"
+            ))
+        })?;
+
+    if output.status.success() {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
+        Err(GitRefValidationError::Invalid(stderr.trim().to_string()))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Reject both refs at the sink, so an option-shaped ref can never reach a git
+/// argv element regardless of how it was stored.
+fn map_ref_validation_to_anyhow(which: &str, err: GitRefValidationError) -> anyhow::Error {
+    match err {
+        GitRefValidationError::Invalid(msg) => {
+            anyhow::anyhow!("invalid {which} branch ref: {msg}")
+        }
+        GitRefValidationError::GitUnavailable(msg) => anyhow::anyhow!("{msg}"),
+    }
+}
+
+fn guard_refs(target_branch: &str, source_branch: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    validate_git_ref(target_branch).map_err(|e| map_ref_validation_to_anyhow("target", e))?;
+    validate_git_ref(source_branch).map_err(|e| map_ref_validation_to_anyhow("source", e))?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Stored short branch names are passed to git as explicit local-branch refs so a
+/// syntax-valid name cannot be reinterpreted as a revision shorthand at the sink.
+fn local_branch_ref(short_name: &str) -> String {
+    format!("refs/heads/{short_name}")
+}
+
 /// Get the diff between two branches: changes on source_branch not in target_branch.
 pub fn branch_diff(repo_path: &Path, target_branch: &str, source_branch: &str) -> Result<String> {
+    guard_refs(target_branch, source_branch)?;
+    let target = local_branch_ref(target_branch);
+    let source = local_branch_ref(source_branch);
     let output = Command::new("git")
-        .args(["diff", &format!("{target_branch}...{source_branch}")])
+        .args(["diff", &format!("{target}...{source}")])
         .current_dir(repo_path)
         .output()
         .context("failed to run git diff")?;
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
+        bail!("git diff failed: {stderr}");
+    }
 
     Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).to_string())
 }
@@ -765,13 +901,11 @@ pub fn branch_diff_names(
     target_branch: &str,
     source_branch: &str,
 ) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+    guard_refs(target_branch, source_branch)?;
+    let target = local_branch_ref(target_branch);
+    let source = local_branch_ref(source_branch);
     let output = Command::new("git")
-        .args([
-            "diff",
-            "--name-only",
-            "-z",
-            &format!("{target_branch}...{source_branch}"),
-        ])
+        .args(["diff", "--name-only", "-z", &format!("{target}...{source}")])
         .current_dir(repo_path)
         .output()
         .context("failed to run git diff --name-only")?;
@@ -799,18 +933,78 @@ pub fn merge_branch(
     author_did: &str,
     pr_title: &str,
 ) -> Result<String> {
+    guard_refs(target_branch, source_branch)?;
+    let source_ref = local_branch_ref(source_branch);
+    let target_ref = local_branch_ref(target_branch);
     let worktree_path = repo_path.join("_merge_worktree");
 
-    // Clean up any leftover worktree
-    if worktree_path.exists() {
+    let remove_worktree = || {
+        // Two --force flags, not one. A single --force refuses a LOCKED worktree
+        // ("cannot remove a locked working tree") and `git worktree prune` skips
+        // locked registrations too, so with one flag a locked leftover survives
+        // the whole cleanup and wedges this endpoint for good. With both flags a
+        // separate prune adds nothing: over every leftover state that can reach
+        // here (registered/unregistered x directory present/gone/locked/corrupt)
+        // `remove -f -f` plus the removal below already clears the registration.
         let _ = Command::new("git")
-            .args(["worktree", "remove", "--force", "_merge_worktree"])
+            .args([
+                "worktree",
+                "remove",
+                "--force",
+                "--force",
+                "_merge_worktree",
+            ])
             .current_dir(repo_path)
             .output();
         let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&worktree_path);
+    };
+
+    // Clean up any leftover worktree. This cannot be gated on the directory
+    // existing: a registration whose directory is gone is the one state
+    // `worktree add` refuses outright ("missing but already registered"), and
+    // it is reachable from the cleanup above, so gating on .exists() would let
+    // one failed removal wedge every later merge on this repo.
+    remove_worktree();
+
+    // The merge must land on the LOCAL target branch, so the worktree has to end
+    // up attached to exactly refs/heads/{target}. validate_git_ref proves
+    // branch-name grammar only: it does not prove refs/heads/{target} exists,
+    // and it cannot stop git's revision DWIM rules from resolving the same
+    // short name in another namespace (refs/tags/{name}, refs/remotes/...). If
+    // DWIM won, `worktree add` would check out a detached HEAD at the foreign
+    // ref, the merge would succeed on that disposable HEAD, and cleanup would
+    // discard the commit without ever advancing refs/heads/{target}.
+    //
+    // (1) Require the exact local ref before creating the worktree. show-ref
+    // --verify matches the full refname literally — no DWIM, no abbreviation —
+    // so a same-named tag with no local branch fails here instead of being
+    // silently resolved.
+    //
+    // allow-unbounded-git: read-only `show-ref --verify` on one literal refname,
+    // no network and no object walk. It also sits alongside the pre-existing bare
+    // `git diff`, `git merge` and `git rev-parse` spawns in this same function,
+    // all under the same acquire_write lock, so bounding only this one would not
+    // change the function's exposure. Bounding merge_branch as a whole is a
+    // separate change against already-reviewed code, tracked as follow-up.
+    let target_exists = Command::new("git")
+        .args(["show-ref", "--verify", "--quiet", &target_ref])
+        .current_dir(repo_path)
+        .output()
+        .context("failed to run git show-ref")?;
+    if !target_exists.status.success() {
+        bail!("target branch {target_ref} does not exist as a local branch");
     }
 
-    // Create worktree on target branch
+    // (2) Check out the local target branch in the worktree. The bare short
+    // name is what makes git attach HEAD to the branch (passing
+    // refs/heads/{name} would detach, so a successful merge would not advance
+    // refs/heads/{target}); step (1) guarantees the branch exists, so an
+    // attached checkout is the only acceptable outcome — verified right below.
+    //
+    // allow-unbounded-git: local `worktree add`, no network. Same reasoning as the
+    // show-ref spawn above: the surrounding function's other git children are
+    // already bare under this lock, so this one is not the thing that would need
+    // bounding first.
     let wt = Command::new("git")
         .args(["worktree", "add", "_merge_worktree", target_branch])
         .current_dir(repo_path)
@@ -823,12 +1017,31 @@ pub fn merge_branch(
         );
     }
 
+    // The worktree's HEAD must be a symbolic ref to exactly refs/heads/{target}.
+    // A detached or differently-attached HEAD means git resolved the name as
+    // something other than the local target branch; a merge committed on it
+    // would be thrown away by cleanup, so refuse before merging rather than
+    // relying on any denylist of symbolic shapes.
+    //
+    // allow-unbounded-git: read-only `symbolic-ref` resolving one local HEAD, no
+    // network. Same reasoning as the two spawns above.
+    let head_ref = Command::new("git")
+        .args(["symbolic-ref", "--quiet", "HEAD"])
+        .current_dir(&worktree_path)
+        .output()
+        .context("failed to run git symbolic-ref")?;
+    let head_ref_name = String::from_utf8_lossy(&head_ref.stdout).trim().to_string();
+    if !head_ref.status.success() || head_ref_name != target_ref {
+        remove_worktree();
+        bail!("merge worktree is not attached to {target_ref} (HEAD is {head_ref_name:?})");
+    }
+
     // Run merge in worktree
     let merge = Command::new("git")
         .args([
             "merge",
             "--no-ff",
-            source_branch,
+            &source_ref,
             "-m",
             &format!(
                 "Merge branch '{}' into {} ({})",
@@ -846,11 +1059,7 @@ pub fn merge_branch(
     let success = merge.status.success();
 
     // Always remove worktree
-    let _ = Command::new("git")
-        .args(["worktree", "remove", "--force", "_merge_worktree"])
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output();
-    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&worktree_path);
+    remove_worktree();
 
     if !success {
         bail!(
@@ -859,18 +1068,42 @@ pub fn merge_branch(
         );
     }
 
-    // Get new HEAD of target branch
+    // (3) The merge only counts if the exact target ref now points at a commit.
+    // Plain `rev-parse` echoes an unresolvable token back on stdout with a
+    // nonzero exit status, so an unchecked call here would hand the literal
+    // string "refs/heads/{target}" upward as an apparently valid merge SHA and
+    // the caller would mark the PR merged and fire the webhook. --verify plus
+    // ^{commit} plus an explicit status check turn "target ref missing or not a
+    // commit" into a hard failure before any of that happens.
     let head = Command::new("git")
-        .args(["rev-parse", &format!("refs/heads/{target_branch}")])
+        .args(["rev-parse", "--verify", &format!("{target_ref}^{{commit}}")])
         .current_dir(repo_path)
         .output()
         .context("failed to get merge commit")?;
+    if !head.status.success() {
+        bail!(
+            "merge completed but {target_ref} does not resolve to a commit: {}",
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&head.stderr)
+        );
+    }
 
     Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&head.stdout).trim().to_string())
 }
 
 /// Resolve a repo disk path: {repos_dir}/{owner_slug}/{repo_name}.git
-pub fn repo_disk_path(repos_dir: &Path, owner_did: &str, repo_name: &str) -> PathBuf {
+///
+/// UNVALIDATED, and test-only for that reason. It performs the bare join with no
+/// allowlist, no containment check and no component walk, so it accepts an empty
+/// or traversal-bearing name. Production code must use
+/// `git::repo_store::validated_repo_disk_path`; the last production caller was
+/// `fork_repo`, which used this and turned a `{"name":""}` request into a repo
+/// row at `<repos_dir>/<owner_slug>/.git`. The `cfg(test)` is the guard: a new
+/// production caller fails to compile rather than silently skipping the barrier.
+///
+/// Tests keep it because a fixture that must escape `repos_dir` cannot be built
+/// with the validated form.
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn repo_disk_path(repos_dir: &Path, owner_did: &str, repo_name: &str) -> std::path::PathBuf {
     // Sanitize the DID for use as a directory name
     let owner_slug = owner_did.replace([':', '/'], "_");
     repos_dir.join(owner_slug).join(format!("{repo_name}.git"))
@@ -878,7 +1111,73 @@ pub fn repo_disk_path(repos_dir: &Path, owner_did: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Pat
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-    use super::branch_diff_names;
+    use super::{validate_git_ref, validate_git_ref_with_git, GitRefValidationError};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_git_ref_accepts_normal_branch_names() {
+        for good in [
+            "main",
+            "feature/foo",
+            "release-1.2",
+            "v1.0.0",
+            "user/fix-bug",
+            "feature@",
+            "user@host",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                validate_git_ref(good).is_ok(),
+                "{good:?} should be accepted"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_git_ref_rejects_option_injection_and_malformed_refs() {
+        for bad in [
+            "",
+            "HEAD",
+            "@",
+            "@{-1}",
+            "FETCH_HEAD",
+            "MERGE_HEAD",
+            "feature.",
+            "feature/x.",
+            "refs/heads/main",
+            "refs/tags/v1",
+            "refs/heads/--output=/tmp/x",
+            "heads/main",
+            "tags/v1",
+            "remotes/origin/main",
+            "--output=/tmp/x",
+            "-rf",
+            "a b",
+            "a..b",
+            "a~b",
+            "refs/heads/@{x}",
+            "foo.lock",
+            "/leading",
+            "trailing/",
+            "a//b",
+        ] {
+            let err = validate_git_ref(bad).expect_err("{bad:?} should be rejected");
+            assert!(
+                matches!(err, GitRefValidationError::Invalid(_)),
+                "{bad:?} should be an invalid-name rejection, got {err:?}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_git_ref_spawn_failure_is_git_unavailable_not_invalid() {
+        let err = validate_git_ref_with_git("/nonexistent/gitlawb-git", "main")
+            .expect_err("missing git binary should fail");
+        assert!(
+            matches!(err, GitRefValidationError::GitUnavailable(_)),
+            "spawn failure must not be classified as invalid input, got {err:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    use super::{branch_diff_names, merge_branch};
     use std::path::Path;
     use std::process::Command;
 
@@ -2025,4 +2324,259 @@ mod tests {
             "a clean `missing` twice on a readable store is a genuine absence; got {res:?}"
         );
     }
+
+    /// CodeRabbit #379: `merge_branch`'s leftover-worktree cleanup ran only when the
+    /// `_merge_worktree` DIRECTORY still existed. A directory that is gone while
+    /// `$GIT_DIR/worktrees/_merge_worktree` still holds its registration is precisely
+    /// the state `git worktree add` refuses ("is a missing but already registered
+    /// worktree", exit 128), and it is self-inflicted: `remove_worktree` deletes the
+    /// directory even when the `git worktree remove` before it failed. Once a repo is
+    /// in that state every later merge on it fails permanently. REVERT PROOF (RED):
+    /// put the cleanup call back behind `if worktree_path.exists()` and this test
+    /// fails at the merge below with "missing but already registered".
+    #[test]
+    fn merge_branch_recovers_from_a_stale_worktree_registration() {
+        let td = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let work = td.path().join("work");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&work).unwrap();
+        let g = |args: &[&str], dir: &Path| {
+            assert!(
+                Command::new("git")
+                    .args(args)
+                    .current_dir(dir)
+                    .status()
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .success(),
+                "git {args:?} failed"
+            );
+        };
+        g(&["init", "-q"], &work);
+        g(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"], &work);
+        g(&["config", "user.name", "t"], &work);
+        std::fs::write(work.join("base.txt"), b"base\n").unwrap();
+        g(&["add", "."], &work);
+        g(&["commit", "-qm", "base"], &work);
+        let main = {
+            let o = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD"])
+                .current_dir(&work)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stdout).trim().to_string()
+        };
+        g(&["checkout", "-q", "-b", "feature"], &work);
+        std::fs::write(work.join("feat.txt"), b"feat\n").unwrap();
+        g(&["add", "."], &work);
+        g(&["commit", "-qm", "feat"], &work);
+        g(&["checkout", "-q", &main], &work);
+
+        let bare = td.path().join("bare.git");
+        g(
+            &[
+                "clone",
+                "--bare",
+                "-q",
+                work.to_str().unwrap(),
+                bare.to_str().unwrap(),
+            ],
+            td.path(),
+        );
+
+        // Reproduce the stuck state exactly: register the worktree, then delete its
+        // directory without unregistering it. This is what a failed `worktree remove`
+        // followed by the unconditional `remove_dir_all` leaves behind.
+        //
+        // `gc.worktreePruneExpire=never` is set on purpose. Recovery must not depend on
+        // git's prune expiry policy: a registration this fresh would sit inside any
+        // sane expiry window, so a cleanup that only pruned on expiry would leave the
+        // repo wedged. Both `worktree remove --force` and `worktree prune` unregister a
+        // worktree whose gitdir target is gone regardless of this setting, and pinning
+        // it here keeps that true if either call is ever changed.
+        g(&["config", "gc.worktreePruneExpire", "never"], &bare);
+        g(&["worktree", "add", "_merge_worktree", &main], &bare);
+        std::fs::remove_dir_all(bare.join("_merge_worktree")).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            bare.join("worktrees/_merge_worktree").exists(),
+            "fixture must leave the registration behind"
+        );
+
+        let before = Command::new("git")
+            .args(["rev-parse", &format!("refs/heads/{main}")])
+            .current_dir(&bare)
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        let before = String::from_utf8_lossy(&before.stdout).trim().to_string();
+
+        let merged = merge_branch(&bare, &main, "feature", "did:key:zTest", "t")
+            .expect("a stale worktree registration must not wedge the merge endpoint");
+
+        let after = Command::new("git")
+            .args(["rev-parse", &format!("refs/heads/{main}")])
+            .current_dir(&bare)
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        let after = String::from_utf8_lossy(&after.stdout).trim().to_string();
+        assert_ne!(before, after, "the merge must advance refs/heads/{main}");
+        assert_eq!(after, merged, "the returned sha must be the new branch tip");
+    }
+
+    /// Companion to the stale-registration case: the leftover worktree is also LOCKED.
+    /// `git worktree remove --force` (ONE flag) refuses a locked worktree outright, and
+    /// `git worktree prune` skips locked registrations too, so with a single --force the
+    /// cleanup makes no progress and `worktree add` keeps failing. REVERT PROOF (RED):
+    /// drop either --force from remove_worktree and this test fails.
+    #[test]
+    fn merge_branch_recovers_from_a_locked_stale_worktree() {
+        let td = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let work = td.path().join("work");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&work).unwrap();
+        let g = |args: &[&str], dir: &Path| {
+            assert!(
+                Command::new("git")
+                    .args(args)
+                    .current_dir(dir)
+                    .status()
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .success(),
+                "git {args:?} failed"
+            );
+        };
+        g(&["init", "-q"], &work);
+        g(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"], &work);
+        g(&["config", "user.name", "t"], &work);
+        std::fs::write(work.join("base.txt"), b"base\n").unwrap();
+        g(&["add", "."], &work);
+        g(&["commit", "-qm", "base"], &work);
+        let main = {
+            let o = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD"])
+                .current_dir(&work)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stdout).trim().to_string()
+        };
+        g(&["checkout", "-q", "-b", "feature"], &work);
+        std::fs::write(work.join("feat.txt"), b"feat\n").unwrap();
+        g(&["add", "."], &work);
+        g(&["commit", "-qm", "feat"], &work);
+        g(&["checkout", "-q", &main], &work);
+
+        let bare = td.path().join("bare.git");
+        g(
+            &[
+                "clone",
+                "--bare",
+                "-q",
+                work.to_str().unwrap(),
+                bare.to_str().unwrap(),
+            ],
+            td.path(),
+        );
+
+        g(&["worktree", "add", "_merge_worktree", &main], &bare);
+        g(&["worktree", "lock", "_merge_worktree"], &bare);
+        std::fs::remove_dir_all(bare.join("_merge_worktree")).unwrap();
+
+        let before = Command::new("git")
+            .args(["rev-parse", &format!("refs/heads/{main}")])
+            .current_dir(&bare)
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        let before = String::from_utf8_lossy(&before.stdout).trim().to_string();
+
+        let merged = merge_branch(&bare, &main, "feature", "did:key:zTest", "t")
+            .expect("a locked leftover worktree must not wedge the merge endpoint");
+
+        let after = Command::new("git")
+            .args(["rev-parse", &format!("refs/heads/{main}")])
+            .current_dir(&bare)
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        let after = String::from_utf8_lossy(&after.stdout).trim().to_string();
+        assert_ne!(before, after, "the merge must advance refs/heads/{main}");
+        assert_eq!(after, merged, "the returned sha must be the new branch tip");
+    }
+
+    /// The third leftover shape: a `_merge_worktree` DIRECTORY with no registration
+    /// behind it, which is what a crash between `worktree add` creating the directory
+    /// and git recording it leaves. `git worktree remove` refuses this one outright
+    /// ("is not a working tree"), so the `remove_dir_all` in remove_worktree is the
+    /// only thing that clears it and `worktree add` otherwise fails on the existing
+    /// path. REVERT PROOF (RED): drop the remove_dir_all from remove_worktree and this
+    /// test fails.
+    #[test]
+    fn merge_branch_recovers_from_an_unregistered_leftover_directory() {
+        let td = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let work = td.path().join("work");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&work).unwrap();
+        let g = |args: &[&str], dir: &Path| {
+            assert!(
+                Command::new("git")
+                    .args(args)
+                    .current_dir(dir)
+                    .status()
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .success(),
+                "git {args:?} failed"
+            );
+        };
+        g(&["init", "-q"], &work);
+        g(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"], &work);
+        g(&["config", "user.name", "t"], &work);
+        std::fs::write(work.join("base.txt"), b"base\n").unwrap();
+        g(&["add", "."], &work);
+        g(&["commit", "-qm", "base"], &work);
+        let main = {
+            let o = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD"])
+                .current_dir(&work)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stdout).trim().to_string()
+        };
+        g(&["checkout", "-q", "-b", "feature"], &work);
+        std::fs::write(work.join("feat.txt"), b"feat\n").unwrap();
+        g(&["add", "."], &work);
+        g(&["commit", "-qm", "feat"], &work);
+        g(&["checkout", "-q", &main], &work);
+
+        let bare = td.path().join("bare.git");
+        g(
+            &[
+                "clone",
+                "--bare",
+                "-q",
+                work.to_str().unwrap(),
+                bare.to_str().unwrap(),
+            ],
+            td.path(),
+        );
+
+        // A directory in the way, with nothing registered behind it.
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(bare.join("_merge_worktree")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(bare.join("_merge_worktree/leftover.txt"), b"junk\n").unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            !bare.join("worktrees/_merge_worktree").exists(),
+            "fixture must leave no registration, only the directory"
+        );
+
+        let before = Command::new("git")
+            .args(["rev-parse", &format!("refs/heads/{main}")])
+            .current_dir(&bare)
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        let before = String::from_utf8_lossy(&before.stdout).trim().to_string();
+
+        let merged = merge_branch(&bare, &main, "feature", "did:key:zTest", "t")
+            .expect("an unregistered leftover directory must not wedge the merge endpoint");
+
+        let after = Command::new("git")
+            .args(["rev-parse", &format!("refs/heads/{main}")])
+            .current_dir(&bare)
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        let after = String::from_utf8_lossy(&after.stdout).trim().to_string();
+        assert_ne!(before, after, "the merge must advance refs/heads/{main}");
+        assert_eq!(after, merged, "the returned sha must be the new branch tip");
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/tigris.rs

@@ -5,17 +5,121 @@
 
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, OnceLock};
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use aws_sdk_s3::Client as S3Client;
-use tracing::{debug, info};
+use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
+
+// The publication vocabulary lives in `git::publish`, which carries no
+// object-storage types, and is re-exported here so existing `git::tigris::…`
+// imports keep resolving. #79 deletes this file; `git::publish` is what survives
+// the swap, and the only backend-aware code below is `classify_dispatch`.
+pub use super::publish::{
+    DispatchKnowledge, PublishAttemptId, PublishStage, PublishStageCell, StoredGeneration,
+    UploadError, UploadPrecondition, UploadReceipt, ATTEMPT_METADATA_KEY,
+};
+
+/// What happened to a conditional, attempt-guarded delete.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum AttemptDelete {
+    /// The object was this attempt's and is gone.
+    Deleted,
+    /// Nothing is stored under the key.
+    Absent,
+    /// Something is stored, and it is NOT this attempt's work. Left alone.
+    NotOurs,
+}
+
+/// THE ONLY BACKEND-AWARE CLASSIFIER in the publish path.
+///
+/// It answers one question: does this failure PROVE the request never committed?
+/// Anything short of proof is [`DispatchKnowledge::MaybeSent`], because the
+/// caller's next move on a definite failure is destructive (delete the object,
+/// drop the only local clone, invalidate the cache) and being wrong there
+/// destroys published state.
+///
+/// - An HTTP status means the server answered. A 4xx is a refusal it took
+///   BEFORE storing anything, so it proves non-publication. A 5xx does not: the
+///   store can commit and then fail to report it.
+/// - No status at all means no response was read. Only a construction failure
+///   proves the request never left; Smithy's timeout, dispatch and response
+///   errors all allow that the bytes arrived and committed while the answer was
+///   lost, corrupted, or never parsed.
+/// - `SdkError` is `#[non_exhaustive]`, so the fallback arm must be the CAUTIOUS
+///   one. A future variant defaulting to "definitely failed" would silently
+///   re-open exactly the class this closes.
+///
+/// #79 replaces `tigris.rs` with a `BlobStore` layer; this function is the piece
+/// each backend reimplements, and nothing above it changes.
+fn classify_put_failure<E, R>(
+    err: &aws_sdk_s3::error::SdkError<E, R>,
+    status: Option<u16>,
+) -> DispatchKnowledge {
+    if let Some(status) = status {
+        return if (400..500).contains(&status) {
+            DispatchKnowledge::NeverSent
+        } else {
+            DispatchKnowledge::MaybeSent
+        };
+    }
+    match err {
+        aws_sdk_s3::error::SdkError::ConstructionFailure(_) => DispatchKnowledge::NeverSent,
+        _ => DispatchKnowledge::MaybeSent,
+    }
+}
 
 /// Wrapper around the S3 client with the configured bucket.
 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct TigrisClient {
     s3: S3Client,
     bucket: String,
+    /// Test-only seam: when set, the blocking compression inside `upload_tracked`
+    /// parks on this barrier. That is the ONLY window in which a publish attempt
+    /// can be cancelled with `PublishStage::PreparingArchive` still holding, and
+    /// it is unreachable from outside without a seam because compression of a
+    /// test-sized repo finishes in microseconds.
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    compress_gate: Option<Arc<BlockingGate>>,
+}
+
+/// A gate a BLOCKING thread parks on until a test opens it.
+///
+/// A condvar rather than a held `MutexGuard`: the test's assertions run while the
+/// gate is shut, and holding a `std::sync::MutexGuard` across those awaits is
+/// both a lint violation and a real hazard. Here the test owns no guard at all —
+/// it flips a flag and notifies.
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct BlockingGate {
+    open: Mutex<bool>,
+    opened: std::sync::Condvar,
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+impl BlockingGate {
+    /// A gate that starts SHUT.
+    pub fn shut() -> Self {
+        Self::default()
+    }
+
+    fn wait(&self) {
+        let mut open = self.open.lock().expect("compression gate poisoned");
+        while !*open {
+            open = self
+                .opened
+                .wait(open)
+                .expect("compression gate poisoned while waiting");
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Let every parked compression through. Call this at teardown so the
+    /// blocking thread is not stranded for the life of the process.
+    pub fn open(&self) {
+        *self.open.lock().expect("compression gate poisoned") = true;
+        self.opened.notify_all();
+    }
 }
 
 impl TigrisClient {
@@ -28,28 +132,48 @@ impl TigrisClient {
         Ok(Self {
             s3,
             bucket: bucket.to_string(),
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            compress_gate: None,
         })
     }
 
-    /// Test-only constructor with an explicit S3 endpoint, region, and static
-    /// credentials — no env-var reads, so parallel tests cannot race each other's
-    /// `AWS_*` environment the way the env-based `new` would. Lets a test point
-    /// the client at a non-routable endpoint to exercise acquire-stall paths.
+    /// Build a client pointed at an arbitrary endpoint, for tests.
+    ///
+    /// The production constructor reads the endpoint and credentials from the
+    /// environment, which a test cannot steer without mutating process-global
+    /// state. This takes both explicitly so a test can aim the client at a
+    /// closed port and get a prompt transport error out of `exists()`.
+    ///
+    /// `RetryConfig::disabled()` is load-bearing, not tidiness: the SDK's default
+    /// policy retries a connection refusal with backoff, which turns each failing
+    /// call into seconds of waiting.
     #[cfg(test)]
-    pub(crate) async fn for_testing_with_endpoint(bucket: &str, endpoint_url: &str) -> Self {
-        let creds = aws_sdk_s3::config::Credentials::new("test", "test", None, None, "test");
-        let config = aws_config::defaults(aws_config::BehaviorVersion::latest())
-            .endpoint_url(endpoint_url)
-            .region(aws_config::Region::new("auto"))
-            .credentials_provider(creds)
-            .load()
-            .await;
+    pub fn for_testing_with_endpoint(bucket: &str, endpoint: &str) -> Self {
+        use aws_sdk_s3::config::{retry::RetryConfig, Credentials, Region};
+
+        let config = aws_sdk_s3::config::Config::builder()
+            .endpoint_url(endpoint)
+            .credentials_provider(Credentials::new("test", "test", None, None, "test"))
+            .region(Region::new("auto"))
+            .retry_config(RetryConfig::disabled())
+            .behavior_version_latest()
+            .build();
         Self {
-            s3: S3Client::new(&config),
+            s3: S3Client::from_conf(config),
             bucket: bucket.to_string(),
+            compress_gate: None,
         }
     }
 
+    /// Test-only: park this client's blocking compression on `gate` until the
+    /// holder releases it, so a cancellation can be aimed at
+    /// [`PublishStage::PreparingArchive`] rather than at the PUT.
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub fn with_compress_gate(mut self, gate: Arc<BlockingGate>) -> Self {
+        self.compress_gate = Some(gate);
+        self
+    }
+
     /// S3 key for a given repo: `repos/v1/{owner_slug}/{repo_name}.tar.zst`
     fn repo_key(owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> String {
         format!("repos/v1/{owner_slug}/{repo_name}.tar.zst")
@@ -77,34 +201,325 @@ impl TigrisClient {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Upload a local bare repo directory to Tigris as a tar.zst archive.
-    pub async fn upload(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str, local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
-        let key = Self::repo_key(owner_slug, repo_name);
-        debug!(key = %key, path = %local_path.display(), "uploading repo to tigris");
+    /// Read the ETag of a repo archive, or `None` when nothing is stored under
+    /// the key. The ETag identifies the generation a later conditional upload
+    /// can fence itself on.
+    ///
+    /// Separate from `exists` rather than folded into it: `exists` has callers
+    /// that only want the boolean, and widening its return type would churn
+    /// every one of them for no benefit.
+    pub async fn head_etag(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
+        Ok(self
+            .head_generation(owner_slug, repo_name)
+            .await?
+            .map(|g| g.etag)
+            .unwrap_or(None))
+    }
 
-        // Create tar.zst in memory
-        let archive_bytes = tokio::task::spawn_blocking({
-            let local_path = local_path.to_path_buf();
-            move || compress_repo(&local_path)
-        })
+    /// The full stored generation: the ETag AND the attempt that published it.
+    ///
+    /// The attempt half is what makes a lost response recoverable. An ETag alone
+    /// answers "has the generation moved", which every writer sees the same way;
+    /// the attempt id answers "are the published bytes MINE", which is the
+    /// question a client whose PUT response vanished actually needs answered.
+    pub async fn head_generation(
+        &self,
+        owner_slug: &str,
+        repo_name: &str,
+    ) -> Result<Option<StoredGeneration>> {
+        let key = Self::repo_key(owner_slug, repo_name);
+        match self
+            .s3
+            .head_object()
+            .bucket(&self.bucket)
+            .key(&key)
+            .send()
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(out) => {
+                let etag = out
+                    .e_tag()
+                    .context(format!("tigris HEAD {key}: hit carried no ETag"))?
+                    .to_string();
+                let attempt = out
+                    .metadata()
+                    .and_then(|m| m.get(ATTEMPT_METADATA_KEY))
+                    .cloned();
+                Ok(Some(StoredGeneration {
+                    etag: Some(etag),
+                    attempt,
+                }))
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                if e.as_service_error().is_some_and(|e| e.is_not_found()) {
+                    Ok(None)
+                } else {
+                    Err(anyhow::anyhow!("tigris HEAD {key}: {e}"))
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Did `attempt`'s bytes land? The reconciliation an ambiguous dispatch owes
+    /// before anything downstream may treat it as confirmation.
+    ///
+    /// `Ok(false)` is deliberately NOT "the PUT failed": an abandoned request may
+    /// still be in flight, so a negative answer licenses refusing and retrying,
+    /// never deleting. Only `Ok(true)` upgrades an unresolved attempt to
+    /// published.
+    pub async fn attempt_landed(
+        &self,
+        owner_slug: &str,
+        repo_name: &str,
+        attempt: &PublishAttemptId,
+    ) -> Result<bool> {
+        Ok(self
+            .head_generation(owner_slug, repo_name)
+            .await?
+            .is_some_and(|g| g.belongs_to(attempt)))
+    }
+
+    /// Upload a local bare repo directory to Tigris as a tar.zst archive,
+    /// fenced by `precondition`, under a freshly minted attempt identity.
+    pub async fn upload(
+        &self,
+        owner_slug: &str,
+        repo_name: &str,
+        local_path: &Path,
+        precondition: UploadPrecondition,
+    ) -> std::result::Result<UploadReceipt, UploadError> {
+        self.upload_tracked(
+            owner_slug,
+            repo_name,
+            local_path,
+            precondition,
+            PublishAttemptId::new(),
+            None,
+        )
         .await
-        .context("tar task panicked")?
-        .context("compressing repo")?;
+    }
+
+    /// The full form: a caller-chosen attempt identity, and a stage cell the
+    /// upload reports its progress into.
+    ///
+    /// The stage cell is the answer to "a dropped future never returns an
+    /// outcome". Compression runs inside `spawn_blocking` and the conditional PUT
+    /// is not even constructed until it finishes, so a handler cancelled during
+    /// compression definitely never attempted publication — but nothing could
+    /// observe that, because the only report was the return value of a future
+    /// that no longer exists. Marking [`PublishStage::PreparingArchive`] before
+    /// the blocking call and [`PublishStage::PutDispatched`] immediately before
+    /// `send()` makes that boundary readable from outside.
+    pub async fn upload_tracked(
+        &self,
+        owner_slug: &str,
+        repo_name: &str,
+        local_path: &Path,
+        precondition: UploadPrecondition,
+        attempt: PublishAttemptId,
+        stage: Option<&PublishStageCell>,
+    ) -> std::result::Result<UploadReceipt, UploadError> {
+        let key = Self::repo_key(owner_slug, repo_name);
+        debug!(key = %key, path = %local_path.display(), attempt = %attempt, "uploading repo to tigris");
+
+        if let Some(stage) = stage {
+            stage.set(PublishStage::PreparingArchive);
+        }
+
+        // Create tar.zst in memory. Nothing has been sent at this point and
+        // nothing can be: the request below is not constructed until this
+        // returns. A failure or a cancellation here is a definite
+        // non-publication.
+        let compressed = {
+            let local_path = local_path.to_path_buf();
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            let gate = self.compress_gate.clone();
+            tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
+                // Test-only seam: park INSIDE the blocking compression, which is
+                // the window a handler can be cancelled in while
+                // `PublishStage::PreparingArchive` still holds.
+                #[cfg(test)]
+                if let Some(gate) = gate {
+                    // Blocks until the test opens the gate.
+                    gate.wait();
+                }
+                compress_repo(&local_path)
+            })
+            .await
+        };
+        let archive_bytes = match compressed {
+            Ok(Ok(bytes)) => bytes,
+            Ok(Err(e)) => {
+                if let Some(stage) = stage {
+                    stage.set(PublishStage::Refused);
+                }
+                return Err(UploadError::NotPublished(e.context("compressing repo")));
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                if let Some(stage) = stage {
+                    stage.set(PublishStage::Refused);
+                }
+                return Err(UploadError::NotPublished(
+                    anyhow::Error::new(e).context("tar task panicked"),
+                ));
+            }
+        };
 
         let body = aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream::from(archive_bytes);
 
-        self.s3
+        let mut req = self
+            .s3
             .put_object()
             .bucket(&self.bucket)
             .key(&key)
+            // The attempt identity travels WITH the bytes. That is what makes a
+            // lost response recoverable: the client can HEAD the key afterwards
+            // and ask whether the published object is its own work, which is
+            // decidable, instead of asking whether its request succeeded, which
+            // is not.
+            .metadata(ATTEMPT_METADATA_KEY, attempt.as_str())
             .body(body)
-            .content_type("application/zstd")
-            .send()
-            .await
-            .context(format!("tigris PUT {key}"))?;
+            .content_type("application/zstd");
+        match &precondition {
+            UploadPrecondition::IfMatch(etag) => req = req.if_match(etag),
+            UploadPrecondition::IfAbsent => req = req.if_none_match("*"),
+            UploadPrecondition::Unconditional => {}
+        }
 
-        info!(key = %key, "uploaded repo to tigris");
-        Ok(())
+        // From HERE the bytes may reach the store. Everything downstream that
+        // could destroy state has to treat this stage as "maybe published".
+        if let Some(stage) = stage {
+            stage.set(PublishStage::PutDispatched {
+                attempt: attempt.clone(),
+            });
+        }
+
+        let sent = req.send().await;
+        let out = match sent {
+            Ok(out) => out,
+            Err(e) => {
+                // `PutObjectError` models no PreconditionFailed variant (its arms are
+                // EncryptionTypeMismatch, InvalidRequest, InvalidWriteOffset,
+                // TooManyParts, Unhandled), so a refused precondition arrives as
+                // `Unhandled` and matching the enum would classify it as a generic
+                // failure. The raw HTTP status off the response is the only place the
+                // answer actually lives.
+                //
+                // Read it via `raw_response()`, not a `ServiceError`-only match: the
+                // SDK exposes the raw response for BOTH `ServiceError` and
+                // `ResponseError`, and a refused conditional PUT whose error body the
+                // SDK cannot parse (malformed XML, premature close) surfaces as
+                // `ResponseError`. Matching only `ServiceError` would classify that
+                // unparsable 409/412 as a generic failure, and `RepoWriteGuard::release`
+                // would log-and-succeed instead of taking the supersede retry,
+                // acknowledging a write that was definitively not published.
+                let status = e.raw_response().map(|raw| raw.status().as_u16());
+                // 412 is always a lost precondition. 409 is one only when we asked
+                // for create-only, which is how S3-compatible stores report "the key
+                // already exists". Everything else, 404 included, is a real failure:
+                // archive keys are never deleted by the write path, so a 404 here
+                // means something permanent like a missing bucket or a misrouted
+                // endpoint, and reporting that as a lost precondition would tell a
+                // caller to expect a successor that does not exist.
+                let lost = match status {
+                    Some(412) => true,
+                    Some(409) => matches!(precondition, UploadPrecondition::IfAbsent),
+                    _ => false,
+                };
+                if lost {
+                    if let Some(stage) = stage {
+                        stage.set(PublishStage::Refused);
+                    }
+                    return Err(UploadError::PreconditionLost {
+                        status: status.expect("a lost precondition came from a status"),
+                    });
+                }
+                let knowledge = classify_put_failure(&e, status);
+                let ctx = anyhow::Error::new(e).context(format!("tigris PUT {key}"));
+                return Err(match knowledge {
+                    DispatchKnowledge::NeverSent => {
+                        if let Some(stage) = stage {
+                            stage.set(PublishStage::Refused);
+                        }
+                        UploadError::NotPublished(ctx)
+                    }
+                    DispatchKnowledge::MaybeSent => {
+                        warn!(
+                            key = %key,
+                            attempt = %attempt,
+                            status = ?status,
+                            "tigris PUT failed WITHOUT proving it did not commit — the outcome \
+                             is ambiguous and must be reconciled, not compensated"
+                        );
+                        if let Some(stage) = stage {
+                            stage.set(PublishStage::Ambiguous {
+                                attempt: attempt.clone(),
+                            });
+                        }
+                        UploadError::Ambiguous {
+                            attempt: attempt.clone(),
+                            source: ctx,
+                        }
+                    }
+                });
+            }
+        };
+
+        let etag = out.e_tag().map(str::to_string);
+        if let Some(stage) = stage {
+            stage.set(PublishStage::Published {
+                attempt: attempt.clone(),
+                etag: etag.clone(),
+            });
+        }
+        info!(key = %key, attempt = %attempt, "uploaded repo to tigris");
+        Ok(UploadReceipt { attempt, etag })
+    }
+
+    /// Delete a repo archive ONLY while it is still `attempt`'s work.
+    ///
+    /// The unconditional delete this replaces used the logical owner/name as its
+    /// cleanup authority, so a failed attempt compensating late could erase the
+    /// object a SUCCESSOR had already published under the same name and already
+    /// returned 201 for. A second name lookup before the delete only narrows that
+    /// window; reading the attempt id off the object and fencing the delete on
+    /// the generation it came from closes it.
+    pub async fn delete_if_attempt_matches(
+        &self,
+        owner_slug: &str,
+        repo_name: &str,
+        attempt: &PublishAttemptId,
+    ) -> Result<AttemptDelete> {
+        let Some(generation) = self.head_generation(owner_slug, repo_name).await? else {
+            return Ok(AttemptDelete::Absent);
+        };
+        if !generation.belongs_to(attempt) {
+            return Ok(AttemptDelete::NotOurs);
+        }
+        let key = Self::repo_key(owner_slug, repo_name);
+        let mut req = self.s3.delete_object().bucket(&self.bucket).key(&key);
+        // The If-Match guard is what makes this atomic rather than merely
+        // narrowed: between the HEAD above and this call a successor can publish,
+        // and the store refusing on the moved generation is the only thing that
+        // stops the delete landing on their object.
+        if let Some(etag) = generation.etag.as_deref() {
+            req = req.if_match(etag);
+        }
+        match req.send().await {
+            Ok(_) => Ok(AttemptDelete::Deleted),
+            Err(e) => {
+                // A refused conditional delete means the generation moved: the
+                // object is no longer ours, which is a successful outcome for a
+                // guard whose whole job is not to touch somebody else's bytes.
+                if e.raw_response()
+                    .map(|raw| raw.status().as_u16())
+                    .is_some_and(|s| s == 412 || s == 409)
+                {
+                    return Ok(AttemptDelete::NotOurs);
+                }
+                Err(anyhow::anyhow!("tigris conditional DELETE {key}: {e}"))
+            }
+        }
     }
 
     /// Download a repo archive from Tigris and extract to local disk.
@@ -112,10 +527,32 @@ impl TigrisClient {
         &self,
         owner_slug: &str,
         repo_name: &str,
-        local_path: &Path,
+        local_path: &super::repo_store::ValidatedRepoDiskPath,
+        swap_authority: Option<Arc<AtomicBool>>,
     ) -> Result<()> {
+        self.download_to(owner_slug, repo_name, local_path, true, swap_authority)
+            .await
+            .map(|_| ())
+    }
+
+    /// Download a repo archive from Tigris and extract it, returning the
+    /// directory that was populated.
+    ///
+    /// `publish` controls whether the extract is swapped into `target` in place
+    /// (the live-path mutation used by writes; returns `target`) or unpacked
+    /// into a fresh temp directory under `target`'s parent (a non-mutating
+    /// snapshot read; returns the temp dir, which the caller owns and cleans
+    /// up). The snapshot form never touches the live repo path.
+    pub async fn download_to(
+        &self,
+        owner_slug: &str,
+        repo_name: &str,
+        target: &super::repo_store::ValidatedRepoDiskPath,
+        publish: bool,
+        swap_authority: Option<Arc<AtomicBool>>,
+    ) -> Result<DownloadExtract> {
         let key = Self::repo_key(owner_slug, repo_name);
-        debug!(key = %key, path = %local_path.display(), "downloading repo from tigris");
+        debug!(key = %key, path = %target.as_path().display(), "downloading repo from tigris");
 
         let resp = self
             .s3
@@ -133,31 +570,59 @@ impl TigrisClient {
             .context("reading tigris response body")?
             .into_bytes();
 
-        // Extract tar.zst to local path
-        tokio::task::spawn_blocking({
-            let local_path = local_path.to_path_buf();
-            move || decompress_repo(&data, &local_path)
+        // The snapshot temp dir is decided HERE, in the async layer, before the
+        // extraction runs. Cleanup ownership moves into the blocking task so a
+        // cancelled async future cannot drop it while extraction is still running.
+        let snapshot_tmp = if publish {
+            None
+        } else {
+            let parent = target.parent().context("snapshot path has no parent")?;
+            std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).context("creating parent dir")?;
+            let file_name = target
+                .file_name()
+                .context("snapshot path has no file name")?
+                .to_string_lossy();
+            Some(parent.join(format!(
+                ".{file_name}.tmp-snapshot.{}",
+                uuid::Uuid::new_v4()
+            )))
+        };
+
+        // Extract tar.zst to a directory.
+        let extracted = tokio::task::spawn_blocking({
+            let target = target.clone();
+            let snapshot_tmp = snapshot_tmp.clone();
+            move || -> Result<DownloadExtract> {
+                let result = (|| -> Result<DownloadExtract> {
+                    if publish {
+                        decompress_repo(&data, &target, swap_authority.as_ref())?;
+                        return Ok(DownloadExtract::Published(()));
+                    }
+                    // Non-mutating snapshot: unpack into the temp dir decided above.
+                    // The live repo path is never touched.
+                    let tmp_dir = snapshot_tmp.expect("snapshot path was decided above");
+                    std::fs::create_dir_all(&tmp_dir).context("creating temp extract dir")?;
+                    let unpack = (|| -> Result<()> {
+                        let decoder = zstd::stream::Decoder::new(&data[..])?;
+                        let mut archive = tar::Archive::new(decoder);
+                        archive.unpack(&tmp_dir).context("unpacking tar.zst")?;
+                        Ok(())
+                    })();
+                    if let Err(e) = unpack {
+                        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp_dir);
+                        return Err(e);
+                    }
+                    Ok(DownloadExtract::Snapshot(TempSnapshotDir { path: tmp_dir }))
+                })();
+                result
+            }
         })
         .await
         .context("extract task panicked")?
         .context("extracting repo")?;
 
-        info!(key = %key, path = %local_path.display(), "downloaded repo from tigris");
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Delete a repo archive from Tigris.
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
-    pub async fn delete(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Result<()> {
-        let key = Self::repo_key(owner_slug, repo_name);
-        self.s3
-            .delete_object()
-            .bucket(&self.bucket)
-            .key(&key)
-            .send()
-            .await
-            .context(format!("tigris DELETE {key}"))?;
-        Ok(())
+        info!(key = %key, path = %target.as_path().display(), "downloaded repo from tigris");
+        Ok(extracted)
     }
 }
 
@@ -180,7 +645,7 @@ fn compress_repo(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
 /// `decompress_repo`. Concurrent extractions unpack into isolated temp dirs in
 /// parallel, but the final `remove_dir_all` + `rename` must not interleave for
 /// the same `local_path`, or they race to a nondeterministic overwrite/failure.
-fn publish_lock(local_path: &Path) -> Arc<Mutex<()>> {
+pub(crate) fn publish_lock(local_path: &Path) -> Arc<Mutex<()>> {
     // KNOWN LIMITATION: this map is never evicted — one (PathBuf, Arc<Mutex>)
     // entry accrues per distinct repo path for the process lifetime. Bounded by
     // the number of repos a node hosts, so it's negligible for normal use, but
@@ -193,6 +658,35 @@ fn publish_lock(local_path: &Path) -> Arc<Mutex<()>> {
         .clone()
 }
 
+/// Owns a snapshot temp dir from extraction through handoff to [`RepoSnapshot`].
+/// Dropped when the `spawn_blocking` join result is abandoned, so cancellation
+/// before the outer future resumes still removes the directory.
+pub(crate) struct TempSnapshotDir {
+    path: PathBuf,
+}
+
+impl TempSnapshotDir {
+    pub(crate) fn into_repo_snapshot(self) -> super::repo_store::RepoSnapshot {
+        let path = self.path.clone();
+        std::mem::forget(self);
+        super::repo_store::RepoSnapshot::from_owned_path(path)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Drop for TempSnapshotDir {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&self.path);
+    }
+}
+
+/// What [`TigrisClient::download_to`] produced.
+pub enum DownloadExtract {
+    /// Published into the validated live repo path.
+    Published(()),
+    /// Unpacked into a throwaway temp dir that cleans up on drop until adopted.
+    Snapshot(TempSnapshotDir),
+}
+
 /// Decompress a tar.zst byte vector into a local directory.
 ///
 /// Extraction is atomic with respect to `local_path`: the archive is unpacked
@@ -200,11 +694,16 @@ fn publish_lock(local_path: &Path) -> Arc<Mutex<()>> {
 /// fully succeeds. A corrupt or truncated archive therefore can never clobber a
 /// good existing copy at `local_path` — on failure we discard the temp dir and
 /// leave `local_path` exactly as it was.
-fn decompress_repo(data: &[u8], local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
-    let parent = local_path.parent().context("repo path has no parent")?;
+fn decompress_repo(
+    data: &[u8],
+    local_path: &super::repo_store::ValidatedRepoDiskPath,
+    swap_authority: Option<&Arc<AtomicBool>>,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let live = local_path.as_path();
+    let parent = live.parent().context("repo path has no parent")?;
     std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).context("creating parent dir")?;
 
-    let file_name = local_path
+    let file_name = live
         .file_name()
         .context("repo path has no file name")?
         .to_string_lossy();
@@ -229,17 +728,218 @@ fn decompress_repo(data: &[u8], local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
         return Err(e);
     }
 
-    // Swap the freshly-extracted repo into place. rename within the same parent
-    // is effectively atomic, but most platforms refuse to rename onto a
-    // non-empty dir, so remove the old copy first. Serialize this per repo path:
-    // concurrent extractions unpack into isolated temp dirs, but their swaps
-    // must not interleave or they race to a nondeterministic overwrite/failure.
-    let lock = publish_lock(local_path);
-    let _publish = lock.lock().expect("publish lock poisoned");
-    if local_path.exists() {
-        std::fs::remove_dir_all(local_path).context("removing stale repo dir")?;
-    }
-    std::fs::rename(&tmp_dir, local_path).context("swapping extracted repo into place")?;
+    // Swap through the validated-path helper so CodeQL sees the barrier before the
+    // remove/rename sink (`rust/path-injection`).
+    super::repo_store::swap_extracted_into_validated_repo(local_path, &tmp_dir, swap_authority)?;
 
     Ok(())
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
+    use futures::FutureExt;
+
+    /// The envs the probe needs, all of them, or it does not run.
+    ///
+    /// `AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_S3` is included on purpose: without it the SDK resolves
+    /// to real AWS S3, and a probe that passed there would say nothing about
+    /// Tigris.
+    fn probe_env() -> Option<String> {
+        if std::env::var("GITLAWB_TIGRIS_PROBE").ok().as_deref() != Some("1") {
+            return None;
+        }
+        for name in [
+            "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID",
+            "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY",
+            "AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_S3",
+        ] {
+            if std::env::var(name).is_err() {
+                eprintln!("tigris conditional-write probe: {name} is unset, skipping");
+                return None;
+            }
+        }
+        match std::env::var("GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET") {
+            Ok(b) if !b.is_empty() => Some(b),
+            _ => {
+                eprintln!(
+                    "tigris conditional-write probe: GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET is unset, skipping"
+                );
+                None
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// One conditional PUT, reported as the status that REFUSED it, or `None`
+    /// when the store accepted the write.
+    ///
+    /// Accepted is the interesting answer here, not an error: it means the
+    /// endpoint ignored the header we fenced on.
+    async fn conditional_put(
+        s3: &S3Client,
+        bucket: &str,
+        key: &str,
+        body: &'static [u8],
+        if_match: Option<&str>,
+        if_none_match: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> Result<Option<u16>, String> {
+        let mut req = s3
+            .put_object()
+            .bucket(bucket)
+            .key(key)
+            .body(ByteStream::from_static(body));
+        if let Some(v) = if_match {
+            req = req.if_match(v);
+        }
+        if let Some(v) = if_none_match {
+            req = req.if_none_match(v);
+        }
+        match req.send().await {
+            Ok(_) => Ok(None),
+            Err(e) => match e.raw_response() {
+                // Same raw-response rule as `upload`: a refused conditional PUT
+                // whose body the SDK cannot parse surfaces as `ResponseError`, and
+                // the status has to come off the raw response for both variants.
+                // Without it, an unparsable 409/412 would report "no HTTP
+                // response" here and skip the supersede retry.
+                Some(raw) => Ok(Some(raw.status().as_u16())),
+                None => Err(format!("conditional PUT {key}: no HTTP response: {e}")),
+            },
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The probe body, written to RETURN its failures rather than panic on
+    /// them, so the caller's cleanup is reached on every arm.
+    async fn conditional_write_probe(s3: &S3Client, bucket: &str, key: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+        // 1. A plain PUT under a throwaway key.
+        let seeded = s3
+            .put_object()
+            .bucket(bucket)
+            .key(key)
+            .body(ByteStream::from_static(b"probe-one"))
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| format!("seeding PUT {key}: {e}"))?;
+
+        // 2. Its ETag, which is the generation the next arm fences against.
+        let etag = seeded
+            .e_tag()
+            .ok_or_else(|| format!("seeding PUT {key} returned no ETag"))?
+            .to_string();
+
+        // 3. A deliberately wrong If-Match. A store honoring it answers 412.
+        let wrong = format!("\"{}\"", "0".repeat(32));
+        if etag.trim_matches('"') == wrong.trim_matches('"') {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "the seeded ETag {etag} collides with the deliberately wrong one, \
+                 so this arm would prove nothing"
+            ));
+        }
+        match conditional_put(s3, bucket, key, b"probe-two", Some(&wrong), None).await? {
+            Some(412) => {}
+            Some(status) => {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "a stale If-Match must be refused with 412, the endpoint answered {status}"
+                ))
+            }
+            None => {
+                return Err(
+                    "a stale If-Match was ACCEPTED: this endpoint does not honor If-Match, so \
+                     the release fence cannot hold here"
+                        .to_string(),
+                )
+            }
+        }
+
+        // 4. If-None-Match `*` over the object that now exists. This arm matters
+        // MORE than the one above. An ignored If-Match eventually surfaces as
+        // odd behavior, because a stale writer overwrites and someone notices
+        // the lost tree. An ignored If-None-Match just returns 200, so a publish
+        // that should have been fenced lands with no error anywhere: the silent
+        // no-op the bucket-type caveat on this test describes.
+        match conditional_put(s3, bucket, key, b"probe-three", None, Some("*")).await? {
+            // Either status is a pass, and the asymmetry with the If-Match arm
+            // above mirrors `upload`'s classifier exactly: 412 is always a lost
+            // precondition, and 409 is one too when we asked for create-only.
+            // AWS documents 409 for a create-only conflict racing a delete, so a
+            // store answering it is enforcing the precondition and we already
+            // handle it. Pinning 412 alone here would fail the probe against a
+            // backend that is behaving correctly, which sends whoever runs it
+            // chasing a fault that is not there.
+            Some(412) | Some(409) => {}
+            Some(status) => {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "create-only over an existing object must be refused with 412 or 409, \
+                     the endpoint answered {status}"
+                ))
+            }
+            None => {
+                return Err(
+                    "If-None-Match * was ACCEPTED over an existing object: this endpoint does \
+                     not honor create-only, so a fenced publish lands silently"
+                        .to_string(),
+                )
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Probe the REAL Tigris endpoint for the conditional-write semantics the
+    /// release fence depends on.
+    ///
+    /// UNTIL THIS IS RUN AGAINST REAL CREDENTIALS, the fence is verified against
+    /// vendor documentation and an in-process mock, not against the backend it
+    /// runs on. The mock implements the semantics we believe Tigris has; it
+    /// cannot tell us whether Tigris actually has them.
+    ///
+    /// The bucket matters, not just the endpoint. Tigris documents conditional
+    /// operations as supported on Single-region and Multi-region buckets only.
+    /// Global and Dual-region buckets are eventually consistent, and a
+    /// conditional PUT evaluated against a stale replica would make the fence a
+    /// silent no-op rather than an error. So point `GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET` at a
+    /// throwaway bucket of the SAME type production uses.
+    ///
+    /// Ignored by default and additionally gated on `GITLAWB_TIGRIS_PROBE=1`,
+    /// because it writes to a real bucket and costs real requests. Run with:
+    /// `GITLAWB_TIGRIS_PROBE=1 cargo test -p gitlawb-node --bin gitlawb-node
+    /// tigris_honors_conditional_writes -- --ignored --nocapture`
+    #[tokio::test]
+    #[ignore = "writes to a real Tigris bucket; needs GITLAWB_TIGRIS_PROBE=1 plus credentials"]
+    async fn tigris_honors_conditional_writes() {
+        let Some(bucket) = probe_env() else {
+            eprintln!(
+                "tigris conditional-write probe: skipped. Set GITLAWB_TIGRIS_PROBE=1, \
+                 GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY and \
+                 AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_S3 to run it."
+            );
+            return;
+        };
+
+        let config = aws_config::load_defaults(aws_config::BehaviorVersion::latest()).await;
+        let s3 = S3Client::new(&config);
+        // A fresh key per run, so a probe that somehow orphaned an object on an
+        // earlier run cannot change what this one observes.
+        let key = format!("probe/conditional-write-{}.bin", uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
+
+        // CLEANUP MUST RUN ON EVERY ARM, and a failing assertion is precisely
+        // the case this probe exists to catch, so the delete cannot sit after
+        // the checks. The body returns its failures rather than panicking, and
+        // `catch_unwind` covers the panic an SDK call could still raise; either
+        // way the delete below is reached before the verdict is re-raised.
+        let outcome = std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(conditional_write_probe(&s3, &bucket, &key))
+            .catch_unwind()
+            .await;
+
+        if let Err(e) = s3.delete_object().bucket(&bucket).key(&key).send().await {
+            eprintln!("tigris conditional-write probe: cleanup of {key} failed: {e}");
+        }
+
+        match outcome {
+            Ok(Ok(())) => {}
+            Ok(Err(msg)) => panic!("tigris conditional-write probe: {msg}"),
+            Err(payload) => std::panic::resume_unwind(payload),
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/visibility_pack.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
-//! Resolve which blob OIDs must be withheld from a caller because every path
-//! at which the blob appears is denied by the repo's visibility rules. Trees
-//! and commits are never withheld (mode B keeps SHAs intact); only blob
-//! content is held back.
+//! Resolve which object OIDs must be withheld from a caller because every path
+//! at which the object appears is denied by the repo's visibility rules. Blobs
+//! and subtree trees are withholdable (mode B; trees since #135/#173). Commits
+//! and tags are never withheld: they are root-level metadata a "/" reader already
+//! clears. The replication pin path uses [`withheld_object_oids_bounded`] so a
+//! withheld-subtree tree is not exported to public IPFS (#172).
 
 use crate::db::VisibilityRule;
 use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
@@ -540,6 +542,79 @@ pub fn withheld_blob_oids_bounded(
     ))
 }
 
+/// Reachable blob AND withheld-subtree tree OIDs the anonymous (or `caller`)
+/// replication audience must not receive. The single source for
+/// `replication_withheld_set`: a blob-only set handed to [`replicable_objects`]
+/// reintroduces #172 (withheld trees pin to public IPFS).
+///
+/// Strict where [`tree_paths`] is lenient. This feeds a withheld filter, so
+/// absence means replicate; a missed reachable tree would leak. The walk
+/// therefore matches [`blob_paths`]: [`assert_all_refs_are_commits`] first, then
+/// a failing `rev-list --all [HEAD]` is an error, then [`object_paths`] (already
+/// fail-closed on ls-tree / non-UTF-8) plus [`root_tree_pairs`]. [`tree_paths`]
+/// stays the lenient allow-list walk for GET /ipfs/{cid} and the full-scan
+/// allowed-tree set, where absence withholds.
+pub fn withheld_object_oids_bounded(
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    git_bin: &str,
+    timeout: Duration,
+    rules: &[VisibilityRule],
+    is_public: bool,
+    owner_did: &str,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+) -> Result<HashSet<String>> {
+    let deadline = Instant::now() + timeout;
+    assert_all_refs_are_commits(repo_path, git_bin, deadline)?;
+    let head_resolves = run_bounded_git(
+        git_bin,
+        &["rev-parse", "--verify", "HEAD"],
+        repo_path,
+        b"",
+        deadline,
+    )
+    .is_ok();
+    let mut rev_args = vec!["rev-list", "--all"];
+    if head_resolves {
+        rev_args.push("HEAD");
+    }
+    let commits_out = run_bounded_git(git_bin, &rev_args, repo_path, b"", deadline)?;
+    let commits: Vec<String> = String::from_utf8_lossy(&commits_out)
+        .lines()
+        .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
+        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
+        .collect();
+    let triples = object_paths(repo_path, git_bin, &commits, deadline)?;
+    let mut pairs: Vec<(String, String)> = triples
+        .into_iter()
+        .filter(|(_, _, kind)| kind == "blob" || kind == "tree")
+        .map(|(oid, path, _)| (oid, path))
+        .collect();
+    pairs.extend(root_tree_pairs(repo_path, git_bin, &commits, deadline)?);
+    Ok(withheld_from_pairs(
+        &pairs, rules, is_public, owner_did, caller,
+    ))
+}
+
+/// [`withheld_object_oids_bounded`] with the test walk budget.
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn withheld_object_oids(
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    rules: &[VisibilityRule],
+    is_public: bool,
+    owner_did: &str,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+) -> Result<HashSet<String>> {
+    withheld_object_oids_bounded(
+        repo_path,
+        "git",
+        WALK_TIMEOUT,
+        rules,
+        is_public,
+        owner_did,
+        caller,
+    )
+}
+
 /// Withheld set from an already-computed (oid, "/path") listing: a blob is
 /// withheld only when visibility denies the caller at *every* path it appears
 /// at. Split out so a caller that already walked `blob_paths` (e.g.
@@ -588,8 +663,9 @@ pub fn has_path_scoped_rule(rules: &[VisibilityRule]) -> bool {
 
 /// Objects that may replicate to the public: everything not in `withheld`.
 /// Order-preserving. The single seam every replication site (IPFS, Pinata)
-/// passes its object list through; option B would later reroute the withheld
-/// ones through encrypt-then-pin instead of dropping them.
+/// passes its object list through on the delta path. `withheld` MUST be the
+/// combined blob-and-tree set from [`withheld_object_oids_bounded`] (via
+/// `replication_withheld_set`); a blob-only set reintroduces #172.
 pub fn replicable_objects(all: Vec<String>, withheld: &HashSet<String>) -> Vec<String> {
     all.into_iter()
         .filter(|oid| !withheld.contains(oid))
@@ -627,6 +703,23 @@ pub fn replicable_blob_set_bounded(
     )
 }
 
+/// Reachable tree OIDs that visibility ALLOWS the anonymous replication
+/// audience at some path. The tree analog of [`replicable_blob_set_bounded`],
+/// used on the fail-closed full-scan pin path so a withheld or dangling tree
+/// is absent and dropped (#172).
+pub fn replicable_tree_set_bounded(
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    git_bin: &str,
+    timeout: Duration,
+    rules: &[VisibilityRule],
+    is_public: bool,
+    owner_did: &str,
+) -> Result<HashSet<String>> {
+    allowed_tree_set_for_caller_bounded(
+        repo_path, git_bin, timeout, rules, is_public, owner_did, None,
+    )
+}
+
 /// Reachable blob OIDs that visibility ALLOWS `caller` at some path. The
 /// caller-aware generalization of `replicable_blob_set` (which is the anonymous
 /// `caller = None` case). Used by `GET /ipfs/{cid}` to gate fail-closed against
@@ -827,11 +920,12 @@ fn root_tree_pairs(
 /// Every `(tree_oid, "/path")` pair reachable in `repo_path`: the `kind == "tree"`
 /// slice of [`object_paths`] (subtree trees at their directory paths) PLUS every
 /// reachable commit's root tree at "/" (see [`root_tree_pairs`]). Computes the
-/// reachable-commit set ONCE (leniently — see [`reachable_commit_oids`]; the tree
-/// allowed-set feeds ONLY the `/ipfs/{cid}` tree gate, where absence = fail-closed
-/// 404) and drives both the ls-tree walk and the root-tree pass from it, so the two
-/// cannot diverge and neither re-enumerates. The tree analog of [`blob_paths`],
-/// bounded by the same shared `deadline`.
+/// reachable-commit set ONCE (leniently, see [`reachable_commit_oids`]; the tree
+/// allowed-set feeds the `/ipfs/{cid}` tree gate AND the full-scan pin allow-list,
+/// where absence = fail-closed) and drives both the ls-tree walk and the root-tree
+/// pass from it, so the two cannot diverge and neither re-enumerates. The tree analog
+/// of [`blob_paths`], bounded by the same shared `deadline`. Not for a withheld
+/// filter: that path is [`withheld_object_oids_bounded`].
 fn tree_paths(
     repo_path: &Path,
     git_bin: &str,
@@ -1150,22 +1244,29 @@ pub fn reachable_commit_tag_oids_bounded(
     Ok(set)
 }
 
-/// Objects safe to replicate, failing closed on blobs (#99). A candidate
-/// replicates iff it is NOT a blob (`all_blob_oids` — commits and trees are
-/// structural, never content-withheld) OR it is in `allowed_blobs` (reachable
-/// and visibility-allowed). This drops both withheld reachable blobs and
-/// dangling/unreachable blobs the reachable walk never classified, without
-/// tagging the candidate list with per-object types. Used on the full-scan pin
-/// path, where the candidate set can contain dangling objects the reachable-only
-/// withheld set cannot cover; the delta path keeps `replicable_objects`.
+/// Objects safe to replicate, failing closed on blobs AND trees (#99, #172).
+/// A candidate replicates iff it is neither a known blob nor a known tree
+/// (commits and tags: structural, a "/" reader already clears) OR it is in
+/// `allowed_blobs` OR it is in `allowed_trees`. Trees have been content-withholdable
+/// since #135/#173; the old premise that they always pass is falsified. A dangling
+/// or withheld tree is in `all_tree_oids` and absent from `allowed_trees`, so it
+/// drops. Used on the full-scan pin path, where the candidate set can contain
+/// dangling objects the reachable-only withheld set cannot cover; the delta path
+/// keeps [`replicable_objects`].
 pub fn replicable_objects_fail_closed(
     candidates: Vec<String>,
     allowed_blobs: &HashSet<String>,
     all_blob_oids: &HashSet<String>,
+    allowed_trees: &HashSet<String>,
+    all_tree_oids: &HashSet<String>,
 ) -> Vec<String> {
     candidates
         .into_iter()
-        .filter(|oid| !all_blob_oids.contains(oid) || allowed_blobs.contains(oid))
+        .filter(|oid| {
+            let is_blob = all_blob_oids.contains(oid);
+            let is_tree = all_tree_oids.contains(oid);
+            (!is_blob && !is_tree) || allowed_blobs.contains(oid) || allowed_trees.contains(oid)
+        })
         .collect()
 }
 
@@ -2384,28 +2485,49 @@ esac\n";
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn fail_closed_keeps_nonblobs_and_allowed_blobs_only() {
-        // Non-blob objects (commit/tree) always pass; a blob passes only if it
-        // is in the allowed set. A withheld blob and a dangling blob (both in
-        // all_blob_oids, neither in allowed) are dropped.
-        let allowed: HashSet<String> = ["b_pub".to_string()].into_iter().collect();
+    fn fail_closed_keeps_commits_allowed_blobs_and_allowed_trees_only() {
+        // Deliberate invariant flip of fail_closed_keeps_nonblobs_and_allowed_blobs_only
+        // (#172). That test's premise ("commits and trees are structural, never
+        // content-withheld") was falsified by #135/#173: a withheld-subtree tree is
+        // content, same as a withheld blob. Commits and tags still pass; a blob or
+        // tree passes only if it is in its allowed set. Withheld and dangling blobs
+        // and trees (in the all-set, absent from allowed) drop.
+        let allowed_blobs: HashSet<String> = ["b_pub".to_string()].into_iter().collect();
         let all_blobs: HashSet<String> = ["b_pub", "b_secret", "b_dangling"]
             .into_iter()
             .map(String::from)
             .collect();
+        let allowed_trees: HashSet<String> =
+            ["t_root", "t_pub"].into_iter().map(String::from).collect();
+        let all_trees: HashSet<String> = ["t_root", "t_pub", "t_secret", "t_dangling"]
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(String::from)
+            .collect();
         let candidates = vec![
             "commit1".to_string(),
-            "tree1".to_string(),
+            "tag1".to_string(),
+            "t_root".to_string(),
+            "t_pub".to_string(),
+            "t_secret".to_string(),
+            "t_dangling".to_string(),
             "b_pub".to_string(),
             "b_secret".to_string(),
             "b_dangling".to_string(),
         ];
-        let got = replicable_objects_fail_closed(candidates, &allowed, &all_blobs);
+        let got = replicable_objects_fail_closed(
+            candidates,
+            &allowed_blobs,
+            &all_blobs,
+            &allowed_trees,
+            &all_trees,
+        );
         assert_eq!(
             got,
             vec![
                 "commit1".to_string(),
-                "tree1".to_string(),
+                "tag1".to_string(),
+                "t_root".to_string(),
+                "t_pub".to_string(),
                 "b_pub".to_string()
             ]
         );
@@ -2482,8 +2604,12 @@ esac\n";
         );
 
         // Full-scan candidate set includes the dangling blob; fail-closed drops it.
+        // Empty tree sets keep today's keep-all-trees behavior for this blob-only
+        // case (U1 signature adapt; U3 wires the real tree walks).
+        let no_trees: HashSet<String> = HashSet::new();
         let candidates = vec![dangling_oid.clone(), public_oid.clone()];
-        let replicable = replicable_objects_fail_closed(candidates, &allowed, &all_blobs);
+        let replicable =
+            replicable_objects_fail_closed(candidates, &allowed, &all_blobs, &no_trees, &no_trees);
         assert!(
             !replicable.contains(&dangling_oid),
             "#99: a dangling private blob must not replicate"
@@ -2494,6 +2620,210 @@ esac\n";
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn withheld_object_set_contains_withheld_subtree_tree() {
+        // #172 repro as a test: the withheld /secret tree must enter the combined
+        // withheld set (today's blob-only walk omits it because trees are never in
+        // all_blob_oids). Nested secret/nested is the same leak class.
+        let td = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let work = td.path().join("work");
+        let bare = td.path().join("bare.git");
+        let run = |args: &[&str], dir: &Path| {
+            assert!(
+                Command::new("git")
+                    .args(args)
+                    .current_dir(dir)
+                    .status()
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .success(),
+                "git {args:?} failed"
+            );
+        };
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(work.join("public")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(work.join("secret/nested")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(work.join("public/a.txt"), b"public bytes\n").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(work.join("secret/b.txt"), b"TOP SECRET\n").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(work.join("secret/nested/c.txt"), b"NESTED SECRET\n").unwrap();
+        run(&["init", "-q"], &work);
+        run(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"], &work);
+        run(&["config", "user.name", "t"], &work);
+        run(&["add", "."], &work);
+        run(&["commit", "-qm", "init"], &work);
+        run(
+            &[
+                "clone",
+                "-q",
+                "--bare",
+                work.to_str().unwrap(),
+                bare.to_str().unwrap(),
+            ],
+            td.path(),
+        );
+        let oid = |rev: &str| {
+            let out = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["rev-parse", rev])
+                .current_dir(&bare)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            assert!(out.status.success(), "rev-parse {rev}");
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
+        };
+        let secret_tree = oid("HEAD:secret");
+        let nested_tree = oid("HEAD:secret/nested");
+        let secret_blob = oid("HEAD:secret/b.txt");
+        let public_tree = oid("HEAD:public");
+        let public_blob = oid("HEAD:public/a.txt");
+        let root_tree = oid("HEAD^{tree}");
+        let head = oid("HEAD");
+        let rules = [rule("/secret/**", &[])];
+        let withheld = withheld_object_oids(&bare, &rules, true, OWNER, None).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            withheld.contains(&secret_tree),
+            "withheld /secret tree must be in the combined withheld set (#172)"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            withheld.contains(&nested_tree),
+            "nested withheld tree secret/nested must also be withheld"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            withheld.contains(&secret_blob),
+            "withheld blob remains withheld"
+        );
+        assert!(!withheld.contains(&root_tree), "root tree is allowed at /");
+        assert!(
+            !withheld.contains(&public_tree),
+            "public subtree tree is not withheld"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !withheld.contains(&public_blob),
+            "public blob is not withheld"
+        );
+        assert!(!withheld.contains(&head), "commits are never withheld");
+
+        let candidates_out = Command::new("git")
+            .args(["rev-list", "--objects", "--no-object-names", "HEAD"])
+            .current_dir(&bare)
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(candidates_out.status.success());
+        let candidates: Vec<String> = String::from_utf8_lossy(&candidates_out.stdout)
+            .lines()
+            .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
+            .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
+            .collect();
+        let replicable = replicable_objects(candidates, &withheld);
+        assert!(
+            replicable.contains(&head) && replicable.contains(&root_tree),
+            "commit and root tree still replicate"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            replicable.contains(&public_tree) && replicable.contains(&public_blob),
+            "public tree and blob still replicate"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !replicable.contains(&secret_tree) && !replicable.contains(&secret_blob),
+            "secret tree and blob must drop from the replicable set (#172)"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !replicable.contains(&nested_tree),
+            "nested withheld tree must drop too"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn withheld_object_set_blob_slice_matches_withheld_blob_oids() {
+        let (_td, bare, _s, _p) = fixture();
+        let rules = [rule("/secret/**", &[])];
+        let combined = withheld_object_oids(&bare, &rules, true, OWNER, None).unwrap();
+        let blobs = withheld_blob_oids(&bare, &rules, true, OWNER, None).unwrap();
+        let all_blobs =
+            crate::git::push_delta::all_blob_oids(&bare, "git", Instant::now() + WALK_TIMEOUT)
+                .unwrap();
+        let blob_slice: HashSet<String> = combined.intersection(&all_blobs).cloned().collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            blob_slice, blobs,
+            "combined withheld set's blob slice must equal withheld_blob_oids (R4)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn withheld_object_set_keeps_tree_shared_across_allowed_and_denied_paths() {
+        let td = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let work = td.path().join("work");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(work.join("pub/sub")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(work.join("sec/sub")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(work.join("pub/sub/f.txt"), b"same bytes\n").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(work.join("sec/sub/f.txt"), b"same bytes\n").unwrap();
+        let run = |args: &[&str]| {
+            assert!(
+                Command::new("git")
+                    .args(args)
+                    .current_dir(&work)
+                    .status()
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .success(),
+                "git {args:?}"
+            );
+        };
+        run(&["init", "-q"]);
+        run(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
+        run(&["config", "user.name", "t"]);
+        run(&["add", "."]);
+        run(&["commit", "-qm", "seed"]);
+        let oid = |rev: &str| {
+            let out = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["rev-parse", rev])
+                .current_dir(&work)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
+        };
+        let pub_sub = oid("HEAD:pub/sub");
+        let sec_sub = oid("HEAD:sec/sub");
+        assert_eq!(pub_sub, sec_sub, "identical content dedups to one tree oid");
+        let rules = [rule("/sec/**", &[])];
+        let withheld = withheld_object_oids(&work, &rules, true, OWNER, None).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            !withheld.contains(&pub_sub),
+            "a tree reachable at an allowed path is not withheld even when also at a denied path"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn withheld_object_set_empty_with_root_only_rules() {
+        let (_td, bare, _s, _p) = fixture();
+        // A caller who has already passed the "/" gate: the listed reader of a
+        // root-only rule. Path-scoped withholding cannot apply, so the set is empty
+        // (R7, the has_path_scoped_rule short-circuit premise).
+        let rules = [rule("/", &["did:key:zFriend"])];
+        let withheld =
+            withheld_object_oids(&bare, &rules, true, OWNER, Some("did:key:zFriend")).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            withheld.is_empty(),
+            "root-only rules cannot withhold a blob or tree from a caller who passed the / gate (R7)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn withheld_object_walk_fails_closed_on_non_commit_ref() {
+        let (_td, bare, _s, _p) = fixture();
+        let secret_tree = {
+            let out = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["rev-parse", "HEAD:secret"])
+                .current_dir(&bare)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
+        };
+        std::fs::write(bare.join("refs/heads/treeref"), format!("{secret_tree}\n")).unwrap();
+        let rules = [rule("/secret/**", &[])];
+        let result = withheld_object_oids(&bare, &rules, true, OWNER, None);
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "a ref that peels to a tree must fail the withheld walk closed (Err), not a partial set"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn allowed_set_excludes_dangling_blob_for_every_caller() {
         // #126: a blob written via `git hash-object -w` but never referenced has

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/mod.rs

@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ pub(crate) fn graphql_app_err(e: crate::error::AppError) -> async_graphql::Error
         // Curated client-safe variants — `Display` is intentional API text.
         safe @ (crate::error::AppError::RepoNotFound(_)
         | crate::error::AppError::RepoExists(_)
+        | crate::error::AppError::Conflict(_)
         | crate::error::AppError::NotFound(_)
         | crate::error::AppError::Unauthorized(_)
         | crate::error::AppError::Forbidden(_)
@@ -76,15 +77,81 @@ pub(crate) fn graphql_app_err(e: crate::error::AppError) -> async_graphql::Error
     }
 }
 
+/// Classify a failed `claim_task` for GraphQL exactly as REST's claim handler
+/// classifies it: a lost race is a client-safe conflict, a real sqlx fault
+/// stays opaque. Lives here rather than at the three call sites so the
+/// classification cannot drift between transports (#327 review), and so
+/// `every_graphql_map_err_uses_opaque_helpers` can keep whitelisting by name.
+pub(crate) fn graphql_claim_conflict(e: anyhow::Error) -> async_graphql::Error {
+    graphql_app_err(crate::api::tasks::task_write_conflict(
+        e,
+        "task not claimable: not found or already claimed",
+    ))
+}
+
+/// The `finish_task` half of [`graphql_claim_conflict`], covering both
+/// `completeTask` and `failTask`.
+pub(crate) fn graphql_finish_conflict(e: anyhow::Error) -> async_graphql::Error {
+    graphql_app_err(crate::api::tasks::task_write_conflict(
+        e,
+        "task not found or not in claimed state",
+    ))
+}
+
+pub struct TaskReadBrakeExtension;
+
+impl async_graphql::extensions::ExtensionFactory for TaskReadBrakeExtension {
+    fn create(&self) -> Arc<dyn async_graphql::extensions::Extension> {
+        Arc::new(TaskReadBrakeExtensionImpl)
+    }
+}
+
+use async_graphql::async_trait::async_trait;
+
+struct TaskReadBrakeExtensionImpl;
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl async_graphql::extensions::Extension for TaskReadBrakeExtensionImpl {
+    async fn prepare_request(
+        &self,
+        ctx: &async_graphql::extensions::ExtensionContext<'_>,
+        mut request: async_graphql::Request,
+        next: async_graphql::extensions::NextPrepareRequest<'_>,
+    ) -> async_graphql::ServerResult<async_graphql::Request> {
+        if let Some(session_brake) = ctx
+            .session_data
+            .get(&std::any::TypeId::of::<crate::rate_limit::TaskReadBrake>())
+            .and_then(|d| d.downcast_ref::<crate::rate_limit::TaskReadBrake>())
+        {
+            request = request.data(crate::rate_limit::TaskReadBrake {
+                limiter: session_brake.limiter.clone(),
+                key: session_brake.key.clone(),
+                request_count: Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0)),
+            });
+        }
+        if let Some(did) = ctx
+            .session_data
+            .get(&std::any::TypeId::of::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>())
+            .and_then(|d| d.downcast_ref::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>())
+        {
+            request = request.data(did.clone());
+        }
+        next.run(ctx, request).await
+    }
+}
+
 pub fn build_schema(
     db: Arc<Db>,
     ref_update_tx: tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<RefUpdateBroadcast>,
     task_event_tx: tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>,
+    task_cursor_key: crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey,
 ) -> GitlawbSchema {
     Schema::build(QueryRoot, MutationRoot, SubscriptionRoot)
         .data(db)
         .data(ref_update_tx)
         .data(task_event_tx)
+        .data(task_cursor_key)
+        .extension(TaskReadBrakeExtension)
         .finish()
 }
 
@@ -161,8 +228,10 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     /// Every `.map_err(` in the GraphQL query/mutation resolvers must route
-    /// through the opaque helpers, or discard the error (`|_|`). Same source-
-    /// scrape pattern as `api::authz_guard` (#255 review).
+    /// through one of the curated helpers in this module, or discard the error
+    /// (`|_|`). Same source-scrape pattern as `api::authz_guard` (#255
+    /// review). The list is deliberately a whitelist of names rather than a
+    /// prefix match, so adding a new mapper is a decision a reviewer sees.
     #[test]
     fn every_graphql_map_err_uses_opaque_helpers() {
         for (file, src) in [
@@ -177,6 +246,8 @@ mod tests {
                 let after = code[idx + ".map_err(".len()..].trim_start();
                 let ok = after.starts_with("crate::graphql::graphql_db_err")
                     || after.starts_with("crate::graphql::graphql_app_err")
+                    || after.starts_with("crate::graphql::graphql_claim_conflict")
+                    || after.starts_with("crate::graphql::graphql_finish_conflict")
                     || after.starts_with("|_|")
                     || after.starts_with("|_ ");
                 assert!(

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/mutation.rs

@@ -36,6 +36,33 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         }
         let delegator_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
+        // #496: same write gate as the REST handler — a repo_id naming a
+        // hosted, non-quarantined repo admits tasks only from its owner, so a
+        // stranger cannot file under a foreign repo id. An id naming no hosted
+        // repo (unknown, or quarantined — hidden as if it did not exist) is
+        // stored verbatim as an opaque label; the gate does not bind an
+        // unresolved id to a repo. Task reads are caller-independent on this
+        // base (the tasks resolver is not repo-scoped), before and after this
+        // change. As in tasks.rs, the success-vs-denial split between a hosted
+        // repo id and an unknown one is itself a one-bit oracle — a stranger
+        // holding a private repo's id learns it is hosted here — but denying
+        // foreign repos requires drawing exactly that line.
+        if let Some(repo_id) = input.repo_id.as_deref() {
+            let record = db
+                .get_repo_by_id(repo_id)
+                .await
+                .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
+            if let Some(record) = record {
+                let quarantined = db
+                    .is_repo_quarantined(&record.id)
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
+                if !quarantined {
+                    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, caller)
+                        .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?;
+                }
+            }
+        }
         let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
         let task = AgentTask {
             id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
@@ -52,10 +79,14 @@ impl MutationRoot {
             updated_at: now,
             deadline: input.deadline,
         };
-        db.create_task(&task)
+        // Return the stored row, not the pre-insert input: create_task
+        // normalizes the assignee (whitespace-only becomes NULL/open), and a
+        // response that shows the raw input lies about the reservation.
+        let stored = db
+            .create_task(&task)
             .await
             .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
-        Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
+        Ok(AgentTaskType::from(stored))
     }
 
     async fn claim_task(
@@ -73,20 +104,39 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         let assignee_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
+        crate::api::tasks::get_claimable_task(db, &id, caller)
+            .await
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?
+            .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
+        // Same classification REST's claim handler applies: a claim race is a
+        // client-safe conflict, a genuine sqlx failure stays opaque. Routing
+        // both transports through `task_write_conflict` is what stops a normal
+        // race from reaching a GraphQL caller as a generic database error
+        // (#327 review).
         let task = db
             .claim_task(&id, &assignee_did)
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
-        let _ = tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
-            task_id: id,
-            old_status: "pending".to_string(),
-            new_status: "claimed".to_string(),
-            by_did: assignee_did,
-            at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-        });
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_claim_conflict)?;
+        let by_did = task
+            .assignee_did
+            .as_deref()
+            .map(crate::db::trim_assignee_did)
+            .unwrap_or(assignee_did.as_str())
+            .to_string();
+        crate::api::tasks::announce_task_event(
+            db,
+            tx,
+            TaskEventBroadcast {
+                task_id: id,
+                old_status: "pending".to_string(),
+                new_status: "claimed".to_string(),
+                by_did,
+                at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            },
+        )
+        .await;
         Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
     }
-
     async fn complete_task(
         &self,
         ctx: &Context<'_>,
@@ -103,29 +153,43 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         let by_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
-        // Authorize the actor: binding by_did to the signer is necessary but not
-        // sufficient — only the task's assignee may finish it.
-        let existing = db
-            .get_task(&id)
+        // Authorize the actor: the task must be visible to the caller (returning
+        // not found for invisible tasks so existence is not leaked), and only
+        // the task's assignee may finish it.
+        let existing = crate::api::tasks::get_visible_task(db, &id, Some(caller))
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?
             .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()) {
+        if !crate::api::did_matches(
+            caller,
+            crate::db::trim_assignee_did(existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()),
+        ) {
             return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
                 "only the task assignee can complete it",
             ));
         }
         let task = db
-            .finish_task(&id, "completed", input.result.as_deref())
+            .finish_task(&id, "completed", input.result.as_deref(), caller)
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
-        let _ = tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
-            task_id: id,
-            old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
-            new_status: "completed".to_string(),
-            by_did,
-            at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-        });
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_finish_conflict)?;
+        let by_did = task
+            .assignee_did
+            .as_deref()
+            .map(crate::db::trim_assignee_did)
+            .unwrap_or(by_did.as_str())
+            .to_string();
+        crate::api::tasks::announce_task_event(
+            db,
+            tx,
+            TaskEventBroadcast {
+                task_id: id,
+                old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
+                new_status: "completed".to_string(),
+                by_did,
+                at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            },
+        )
+        .await;
         Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
     }
 
@@ -145,29 +209,44 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         let by_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
-        // Authorize the actor: only the task's assignee may fail it.
-        let existing = db
-            .get_task(&id)
+        // Authorize the actor: the task must be visible to the caller (returning
+        // not found for invisible tasks so existence is not leaked), and only
+        // the task's assignee may fail it.
+        let existing = crate::api::tasks::get_visible_task(db, &id, Some(caller))
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?
             .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()) {
+        if !crate::api::did_matches(
+            caller,
+            crate::db::trim_assignee_did(existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()),
+        ) {
             return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
                 "only the task assignee can fail it",
             ));
         }
         let reason = input.reason.unwrap_or_default();
         let task = db
-            .finish_task(&id, "failed", Some(&reason))
+            .finish_task(&id, "failed", Some(&reason), caller)
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
-        let _ = tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
-            task_id: id,
-            old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
-            new_status: "failed".to_string(),
-            by_did,
-            at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-        });
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_finish_conflict)?;
+        let by_did = task
+            .assignee_did
+            .as_deref()
+            .map(crate::db::trim_assignee_did)
+            .unwrap_or(by_did.as_str())
+            .to_string();
+        crate::api::tasks::announce_task_event(
+            db,
+            tx,
+            TaskEventBroadcast {
+                task_id: id,
+                old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
+                new_status: "failed".to_string(),
+                by_did,
+                at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            },
+        )
+        .await;
         Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
     }
 }
@@ -186,57 +265,94 @@ mod tests {
             .join("; ")
     }
 
-    /// N2: GraphQL mutations require a verified signer and bind the acting DID to
-    /// it. Unsigned is rejected; a signer other than the claimed actor is
+    /// The `id` scalar returned by a successful `createTask` mutation.
+    fn created_id(resp: &Response) -> String {
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(task) = obj.get("createTask").expect("createTask key")
+        else {
+            panic!("createTask not an object");
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::String(id) = task.get("id").expect("id key") else {
+            panic!("id not a string");
+        };
+        id.clone()
+    }
+
+    /// N2: every GraphQL mutation requires a verified signer and binds the acting
+    /// DID to it. Unsigned is rejected; a signer other than the claimed actor is
     /// rejected; the matching signer passes the auth gate.
     #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn mutation_requires_and_binds_signer(pool: PgPool) {
+    async fn each_mutation_requires_and_binds_signer(pool: PgPool) {
         let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
         let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
-        let assignee = "did:key:zASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
-        let q = format!(
-            r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "no-such-task", assigneeDid: "{assignee}") {{ id }} }}"#
-        );
+        let actor = "did:key:zGQLACTORAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        let other = "did:key:zGQLOTHERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
+        let cases: Vec<(&str, String)> = vec![
+            (
+                "createTask",
+                format!(
+                    r#"mutation {{ createTask(delegatorDid: "{actor}", input: {{ kind: "build", capability: "repo:write" }}) {{ id }} }}"#
+                ),
+            ),
+            (
+                "claimTask",
+                format!(
+                    r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "no-such-task", assigneeDid: "{actor}") {{ id }} }}"#
+                ),
+            ),
+            (
+                "completeTask",
+                format!(
+                    r#"mutation {{ completeTask(id: "no-such-task", byDid: "{actor}", input: {{}}) {{ id }} }}"#
+                ),
+            ),
+            (
+                "failTask",
+                format!(
+                    r#"mutation {{ failTask(id: "no-such-task", byDid: "{actor}", input: {{}}) {{ id }} }}"#
+                ),
+            ),
+        ];
 
-        // 1. Unsigned → rejected before any DB work.
-        let resp = schema.execute(Request::new(&q)).await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).contains("authentication required"),
-            "unsigned mutation must be rejected: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
+        for (name, q) in &cases {
+            let resp = schema.execute(Request::new(q.as_str())).await;
+            assert!(
+                errors(&resp).contains("authentication required"),
+                "{name}: unsigned mutation must be rejected: {}",
+                errors(&resp)
+            );
 
-        // 2. Signed as someone other than the claimed assignee → rejected.
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(
-                "did:key:zOTHERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB".into(),
-            )))
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).contains("authenticated signer"),
-            "DID mismatch must be rejected: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
+            let resp = schema
+                .execute(Request::new(q.as_str()).data(AuthenticatedDid(other.into())))
+                .await;
+            assert!(
+                errors(&resp).contains("authenticated signer"),
+                "{name}: DID mismatch must be rejected: {}",
+                errors(&resp)
+            );
 
-        // 3. Signed as the claimed assignee → passes the auth gate. The missing
-        //    task is a business error from claim_task, not a sqlx fault, so the
-        //    actionable message must survive (not the opaque DB string) (#250).
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
-            .await;
-        let errs = errors(&resp);
-        assert!(
-            !errs.contains("authentication required") && !errs.contains("authenticated signer"),
-            "matching signer must pass the auth gate: {errs}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            errs.contains("task not claimable"),
-            "claim race / missing task must keep its business message: {errs}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
-            "business error must not be rewritten as opaque DB error: {errs}"
-        );
+            let resp = schema
+                .execute(Request::new(q.as_str()).data(AuthenticatedDid(actor.into())))
+                .await;
+            let errs = errors(&resp);
+            assert!(
+                !errs.contains("authentication required") && !errs.contains("authenticated signer"),
+                "{name}: matching signer must pass the auth gate: {errs}"
+            );
+            if *name == "claimTask" {
+                assert!(
+                    errs.contains("task not found"),
+                    "claim race / missing task must keep its business message: {errs}"
+                );
+                assert!(
+                    !errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
+                    "business error must not be rewritten as opaque DB error: {errs}"
+                );
+            }
+        }
     }
 
     /// #250: mutation DB faults must be opaque; create_task hits agent_tasks.
@@ -272,6 +388,210 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    /// #327 review: `claimTask`/`completeTask`/`failTask` called
+    /// `graphql_db_err` directly on db-layer business failures, so an ordinary
+    /// claim race or stale finish reached GraphQL clients as a generic
+    /// database error while REST clients got an actionable conflict. All three
+    /// now route through the shared `task_write_conflict` classifier.
+    ///
+    /// Deleting either `map_err` from a mutation turns this red: the message
+    /// becomes the raw anyhow text instead of the fixed conflict form.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn task_write_races_surface_as_conflicts_not_db_errors(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
+        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
+        let assignee = "did:key:zGQLRACEASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        let rival = "did:key:zGQLRACERIVALBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
+        let delegator = "did:key:zGQLRACEDELEGATORCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC";
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_repo(&crate::db::RepoRecord {
+                id: "race-repo".into(),
+                name: "race".into(),
+                owner_did: delegator.into(),
+                description: None,
+                is_public: true,
+                default_branch: "main".into(),
+                created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+                updated_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+                disk_path: "/tmp/race-repo".into(),
+                forked_from: None,
+                machine_id: None,
+            })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_task(&crate::db::AgentTask {
+                id: "race-task".into(),
+                repo_id: Some("race-repo".into()),
+                kind: "build".into(),
+                status: "pending".into(),
+                delegator_did: delegator.into(),
+                assignee_did: None,
+                capability: "repo:write".into(),
+                ucan_token: None,
+                payload: None,
+                result: None,
+                created_at: now.clone(),
+                updated_at: now,
+                deadline: None,
+            })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // The assignee wins the claim.
+        let claim = |did: &str| {
+            format!(r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "race-task", assigneeDid: "{did}") {{ id }} }}"#)
+        };
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(claim(assignee)).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "first claim: {}", errors(&resp));
+
+        // The rival loses the race: ineligible caller receives opaque not-found.
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(claim(rival)).data(AuthenticatedDid(rival.into())))
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            errs.contains("task not found"),
+            "ineligible caller after task is claimed must receive opaque not-found: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
+            "ineligible claim is not a database failure: {errs}"
+        );
+
+        // A second claim that reaches the conditional SQL write (e.g. assignee claiming
+        // again on an already-claimed task) exercises the conflict mapper:
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(claim(assignee)).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            errs.contains("task not claimable: not found or already claimed"),
+            "a lost claim race must render the fixed conflict message: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
+            "a claim race is not a database failure: {errs}"
+        );
+
+        // A stale finish on an already-completed task is the same class.
+        let complete = format!(
+            r#"mutation {{ completeTask(id: "race-task", byDid: "{assignee}", input: {{ result: "ok" }}) {{ id }} }}"#
+        );
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(&complete).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "first complete: {}", errors(&resp));
+
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(&complete).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            errs.contains("task not found or not in claimed state"),
+            "a stale complete must render the fixed conflict message: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
+            "a stale complete is not a database failure: {errs}"
+        );
+
+        let fail = format!(
+            r#"mutation {{ failTask(id: "race-task", byDid: "{assignee}", input: {{ reason: "nope" }}) {{ id }} }}"#
+        );
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(&fail).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            errs.contains("task not found or not in claimed state"),
+            "a stale fail must render the fixed conflict message: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
+            "a stale fail is not a database failure: {errs}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The other half of the same classification: a genuine SQL fault on the
+    /// write itself must stay opaque. Without this, routing conflicts through
+    /// `task_write_conflict` could be "fixed" by making every db failure a
+    /// client-visible conflict message.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn task_write_sql_faults_stay_opaque(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
+        let assignee = "did:key:zGQLOPAQUEASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        let delegator = "did:key:zGQLOPAQUEDELEGATORBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_task(&crate::db::AgentTask {
+                id: "opaque-task".into(),
+                repo_id: None,
+                kind: "build".into(),
+                status: "pending".into(),
+                delegator_did: delegator.into(),
+                assignee_did: Some(assignee.into()),
+                capability: "repo:write".into(),
+                ucan_token: None,
+                payload: None,
+                result: None,
+                created_at: now.clone(),
+                updated_at: now,
+                deadline: None,
+            })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // Fault the write itself, not the schema. Dropping a column the
+        // visibility pre-check also SELECTs would fail in `get_visible_task`
+        // and never reach `graphql_claim_conflict`, so this test would pass
+        // against a claim mapper that leaks (#327 review). A BEFORE UPDATE
+        // trigger keeps every read valid and faults only inside
+        // `Db::claim_task`.
+        sqlx::raw_sql(
+            "CREATE FUNCTION gl_test_fault_task_update() RETURNS trigger
+             LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $fn$
+             BEGIN RAISE EXCEPTION 'gl_test_forced_update_fault'; END;
+             $fn$;
+             CREATE TRIGGER gl_test_fault_task_update
+             BEFORE UPDATE ON agent_tasks
+             FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION gl_test_fault_task_update();",
+        )
+        .execute(&pool)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let resp = state
+            .graphql_schema
+            .execute(
+                Request::new(format!(
+                    r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "opaque-task", assigneeDid: "{assignee}") {{ id }} }}"#
+                ))
+                .data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())),
+            )
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
+            "a real sqlx fault on the write must stay opaque: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains("task not claimable"),
+            "a write-time sqlx fault must not be reclassified as a claim race: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains("gl_test_forced_update_fault") && !errs.contains("trigger"),
+            "database text leaked through the conflict mapper: {errs}"
+        );
+    }
+
     /// Adversarial-review GATE-1 (GraphQL): completing a task requires being its
     /// assignee, not merely signing as the by_did you pass. A signer who is not
     /// the assignee is rejected even though the by_did binding passes; the
@@ -294,7 +614,7 @@ mod tests {
             payload: None,
             result: None,
             created_at: now.clone(),
-            updated_at: now,
+            updated_at: now.clone(),
             deadline: None,
         };
         state.db.create_task(&task).await.expect("seed task");
@@ -311,14 +631,69 @@ mod tests {
             )
         };
 
-        // Stranger signs as themselves and passes byDid=self (so the signer
-        // binding passes), but is not the assignee → rejected by authorization.
+        // Stranger signs as themselves on a repo-less task they cannot see:
+        // invisible task returns "task not found" so existence is not leaked.
         let resp = schema
             .execute(Request::new(q(stranger)).data(AuthenticatedDid(stranger.into())))
             .await;
+        assert!(
+            errors(&resp).contains("task not found"),
+            "an invisible task must return not found, got: {}",
+            errors(&resp)
+        );
+
+        // Seed a task on a public repo that stranger CAN see, but is not assignee of:
+        let pub_repo = crate::db::RepoRecord {
+            id: "pub-r".into(),
+            name: "pub-r".into(),
+            owner_did: "did:key:zGQLDELEGATORCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC".into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: true,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+            updated_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+            disk_path: "/tmp/pub-r".into(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        };
+        state.db.create_repo(&pub_repo).await.expect("create repo");
+        let pub_task = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "task-pub".into(),
+            repo_id: Some("pub-r".into()),
+            kind: "build".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: "did:key:zGQLDELEGATORCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC".into(),
+            assignee_did: None,
+            capability: "repo:write".into(),
+            ucan_token: None,
+            payload: None,
+            result: None,
+            created_at: now.clone(),
+            updated_at: now,
+            deadline: None,
+        };
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_task(&pub_task)
+            .await
+            .expect("seed pub task");
+        state
+            .db
+            .claim_task("task-pub", assignee)
+            .await
+            .expect("claim pub task");
+
+        let q_pub = |actor: &str| {
+            format!(
+                r#"mutation {{ completeTask(id: "task-pub", byDid: "{actor}", input: {{}}) {{ id status }} }}"#
+            )
+        };
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(q_pub(stranger)).data(AuthenticatedDid(stranger.into())))
+            .await;
         assert!(
             errors(&resp).contains("assignee"),
-            "a non-assignee signer must be rejected: {}",
+            "a non-assignee signer on a visible task must be rejected: {}",
             errors(&resp)
         );
 
@@ -332,4 +707,341 @@ mod tests {
             errors(&resp)
         );
     }
+
+    /// #496 (GraphQL): createTask applies the same repo-ownership gate as the
+    /// REST handler — a stranger naming a hosted repo is rejected without
+    /// persisting anything, while the owner files. The quarantined and
+    /// unknown-id arms are pinned too, including that each accepted write
+    /// stores the supplied id verbatim, so this copy of the gate cannot regress
+    /// silently.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn create_task_rejects_foreign_repo_id(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
+        let owner = "did:key:zGQLTASKOWNERAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        let stranger = "did:key:zGQLTASKSTRANGERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now();
+        let repo = crate::db::RepoRecord {
+            id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+            name: "gql-task-gate-repo".to_string(),
+            owner_did: owner.to_string(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: true,
+            default_branch: "main".to_string(),
+            created_at: now,
+            updated_at: now,
+            disk_path: "/tmp/gql-task-gate-repo".to_string(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        };
+        state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.expect("seed repo");
+        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
+
+        let q = |actor: &str| {
+            format!(
+                r#"mutation {{ createTask(delegatorDid: "{actor}", input: {{ kind: "build", capability: "repo:write", repoId: "{}" }}) {{ id }} }}"#,
+                repo.id
+            )
+        };
+
+        // Stranger signs as themselves (so the signer binding passes) but
+        // names the victim's repo → rejected by the ownership gate, leaking
+        // nothing about the repo.
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(q(stranger)).data(AuthenticatedDid(stranger.into())))
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            errs.contains(crate::api::REPO_OWNER_ONLY_MESSAGE),
+            "a non-owner must not file under a foreign repo id (shared denial text): {errs}"
+        );
+
+        // The denial must not persist: no task row may carry the victim's
+        // repo id afterwards.
+        let stored = state
+            .db
+            .list_tasks_keyset(None, None, 50, None)
+            .await
+            .expect("list tasks");
+        assert!(
+            stored
+                .iter()
+                .all(|t| t.repo_id.as_deref() != Some(repo.id.as_str())),
+            "a denied write must not leave a task under the foreign repo id"
+        );
+
+        // The owner files under their own repo id.
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(q(owner)).data(AuthenticatedDid(owner.into())))
+            .await;
+        assert!(
+            errors(&resp).is_empty(),
+            "the owner should file against their repo: {}",
+            errors(&resp)
+        );
+
+        // Unknown repo ids stay accepted as opaque labels.
+        let q_unknown = format!(
+            r#"mutation {{ createTask(delegatorDid: "{stranger}", input: {{ kind: "build", capability: "repo:write", repoId: "no-such-repo-id" }}) {{ id }} }}"#
+        );
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(q_unknown).data(AuthenticatedDid(stranger.into())))
+            .await;
+        assert!(
+            errors(&resp).is_empty(),
+            "an id naming no hosted repo stays an opaque label: {}",
+            errors(&resp)
+        );
+        // Read back the row: the unresolved id must be stored verbatim, not
+        // dropped or rewritten to a repo it never named.
+        let stored = state
+            .db
+            .get_task(&created_id(&resp))
+            .await
+            .expect("get task")
+            .expect("task must be stored");
+        assert_eq!(
+            stored.repo_id.as_deref(),
+            Some("no-such-repo-id"),
+            "an unresolved id must be stored verbatim as a label"
+        );
+
+        // A quarantined repo id is treated as unknown (accepted, never a 403
+        // that would confirm the id names a real repo). This pins the
+        // `!quarantined` arm on this copy of the gate.
+        state
+            .db
+            .set_repo_quarantine(&repo.id, true)
+            .await
+            .expect("quarantine");
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(q(stranger)).data(AuthenticatedDid(stranger.into())))
+            .await;
+        assert!(
+            errors(&resp).is_empty(),
+            "a quarantined repo id must not 403 (existence oracle): {}",
+            errors(&resp)
+        );
+        // Read back the row: the quarantined id is stored verbatim as a label
+        // too, so the accepted write is not silently dropped.
+        let stored = state
+            .db
+            .get_task(&created_id(&resp))
+            .await
+            .expect("get task")
+            .expect("task must be stored");
+        assert_eq!(
+            stored.repo_id.as_deref(),
+            Some(repo.id.as_str()),
+            "a quarantined id must be stored verbatim as a label"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// #496 (GraphQL): a repo-lookup fault in createTask's gate must stay
+    /// opaque. Dropping a column `get_repo_by_id` selects faults that lookup;
+    /// the resolver must return the fixed DB message and leak no schema text
+    /// (#250), as `create_task_db_error_message_is_opaque` pins for the
+    /// agent_tasks fault.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn create_task_gate_repo_lookup_fault_is_opaque(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
+        let owner = "did:key:zGQLTASKFAULTOWNERAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now();
+        let repo = crate::db::RepoRecord {
+            id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+            name: "gql-task-gate-fault-repo".to_string(),
+            owner_did: owner.to_string(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: true,
+            default_branch: "main".to_string(),
+            created_at: now,
+            updated_at: now,
+            disk_path: "/tmp/gql-task-gate-fault-repo".to_string(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        };
+        state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.expect("seed repo");
+
+        sqlx::query("ALTER TABLE repos DROP COLUMN machine_id")
+            .execute(&pool)
+            .await
+            .expect("drop machine_id");
+
+        let q = format!(
+            r#"mutation {{ createTask(delegatorDid: "{owner}", input: {{ kind: "build", capability: "repo:write", repoId: "{}" }}) {{ id }} }}"#,
+            repo.id
+        );
+        let resp = state
+            .graphql_schema
+            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(owner.into())))
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
+            "gate sqlx fault must be opaque: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains("machine_id") && !errs.contains("column"),
+            "schema text leaked through the gate: {errs}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Pre-assigned GraphQL claimTask must reject a stranger (no UCAN leak)
+    /// and admit the reserved assignee.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn claim_task_honors_preassigned_assignee(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
+        let reserved = "did:key:zGQLRESERVEDAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        let thief = "did:key:zGQLTHIEFBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+        let task = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "task-gql-reserved".into(),
+            repo_id: None,
+            kind: "build".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: "did:key:zGQLDELEGATORCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC".into(),
+            assignee_did: Some(reserved.into()),
+            capability: "repo:write".into(),
+            ucan_token: Some("gql-ucan-secret".into()),
+            payload: None,
+            result: None,
+            created_at: now.clone(),
+            updated_at: now,
+            deadline: None,
+        };
+        state.db.create_task(&task).await.expect("seed");
+        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
+
+        let q = |actor: &str| {
+            format!(
+                r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "task-gql-reserved", assigneeDid: "{actor}") {{ id status ucanToken }} }}"#
+            )
+        };
+
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(q(thief)).data(AuthenticatedDid(thief.into())))
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        // The claim gate hides existence: an ineligible claimer gets the same
+        // not-found as a missing task, not a reserved deny that would leak it.
+        assert!(
+            errs.contains("task not found"),
+            "stranger claim must read as not-found, got: {errs}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains("gql-ucan-secret"),
+            "UCAN must not leak in GraphQL errors: {errs}"
+        );
+        if let Ok(data) = resp.data.into_json() {
+            let s = data.to_string();
+            assert!(
+                !s.contains("gql-ucan-secret"),
+                "UCAN must not leak in GraphQL data on failed claim: {s}"
+            );
+        }
+        // Parity with REST: failed steal must leave the row untouched.
+        let still = state
+            .db
+            .get_task("task-gql-reserved")
+            .await
+            .expect("get")
+            .expect("task exists");
+        assert_eq!(
+            still.status, "pending",
+            "status must stay pending after steal"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            still.assignee_did.as_deref(),
+            Some(reserved),
+            "assignee_did must stay reserved after steal"
+        );
+
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(q(reserved)).data(AuthenticatedDid(reserved.into())))
+            .await;
+        assert!(
+            errors(&resp).is_empty(),
+            "reserved assignee must claim: {}",
+            errors(&resp)
+        );
+        let data = resp.data.into_json().expect("json data");
+        assert_eq!(data["claimTask"]["status"], "claimed");
+        assert_eq!(data["claimTask"]["ucanToken"], "gql-ucan-secret");
+    }
+
+    /// create_task normalizes a whitespace-only assignee to NULL (open task),
+    /// so the create response must show the stored row, not echo the input: a
+    /// client trusting the echoed "reservation" would believe a claimable task
+    /// is reserved. Before the fix the response was built from the pre-insert
+    /// struct and returned the padded input verbatim.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn create_task_reports_stored_assignee_not_input(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
+        let caller = "did:key:zGQLCREATORAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
+        let q = format!(
+            r#"mutation {{ createTask(delegatorDid: "{caller}", input: {{ kind: "build", capability: "repo:write", assigneeDid: "   " }}) {{ id assigneeDid }} }}"#
+        );
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(q).data(AuthenticatedDid(caller.into())))
+            .await;
+        let data = resp.data.into_json().expect("json data");
+        assert!(
+            data["createTask"]["assigneeDid"].is_null(),
+            "whitespace-only assigneeDid must come back null (stored shape): {data}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A task seeded with a whitespace-padded assignee must still be
+    /// completable by that assignee over GraphQL: REST and Db::finish_task
+    /// trim the stored value before comparing, and the GraphQL gate must do
+    /// the same or padded reservations finish only through REST.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn graphql_finish_accepts_padded_stored_assignee(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
+        let assignee = "did:key:zGQLPADDEDAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+        let task = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "task-gql-padded".into(),
+            repo_id: None,
+            kind: "build".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: "did:key:zGQLDELEGATORDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD".into(),
+            assignee_did: Some(format!("\t{assignee}\n")),
+            capability: "repo:write".into(),
+            ucan_token: None,
+            payload: None,
+            result: None,
+            created_at: now.clone(),
+            updated_at: now,
+            deadline: None,
+        };
+        state.db.create_task(&task).await.expect("seed");
+        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
+
+        let claim = format!(
+            r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "task-gql-padded", assigneeDid: "{assignee}") {{ id status }} }}"#
+        );
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(claim).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        assert!(
+            errors(&resp).is_empty(),
+            "reserved assignee must claim a padded reservation: {}",
+            errors(&resp)
+        );
+
+        let finish = format!(
+            r#"mutation {{ completeTask(id: "task-gql-padded", byDid: "{assignee}", input: {{}}) {{ id status }} }}"#
+        );
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(finish).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            errs.is_empty(),
+            "assignee must complete a padded reservation: {errs}"
+        );
+        let data = resp.data.into_json().expect("json data");
+        assert_eq!(data["completeTask"]["status"], "completed");
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/query.rs

@@ -3,10 +3,27 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
 
 use crate::db::Db;
 
-use super::types::{AgentTaskType, RefUpdateType, RepoType};
+use super::types::{AgentTaskReadType, RefUpdateType, RepoType, TaskPageType};
 
 pub struct QueryRoot;
 
+/// Debit the per-IP task-read brake for one task field, mirroring the
+/// `rate_limit_by_ip` layer on `task_read_routes`. Both surfaces run the same
+/// #268 visibility gate and pay the same queries before answering, so an
+/// anonymous prober must not get an unbraked lane by asking over GraphQL
+/// (#327 review).
+///
+/// A schema built without the brake (unit tests, subscriptions) is not braked,
+/// exactly as `rate_limit_by_ip` is a no-op without its extension.
+async fn task_read_brake(ctx: &Context<'_>, field: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    match ctx.data::<crate::rate_limit::TaskReadBrake>() {
+        Ok(brake) if !brake.check(field).await => Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
+            crate::rate_limit::RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE,
+        )),
+        _ => Ok(()),
+    }
+}
+
 #[Object]
 impl QueryRoot {
     async fn repos(&self, ctx: &Context<'_>) -> Result<Vec<RepoType>> {
@@ -112,29 +129,73 @@ impl QueryRoot {
         assignee_did: Option<String>,
         #[graphql(
             default = 50,
-            desc = "Max 200; larger requests are clamped to 200 (no error). Negative values clamp to 0."
+            desc = "Max 200; larger requests are clamped to 200 (no error). Negative values clamp to 0. Use `nextCursor` to read past the clamp."
         )]
         limit: i64,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<AgentTaskType>> {
+        #[graphql(
+            desc = "Opaque continuation token from a previous page's `nextCursor`. Must be presented with the same `status`/`assigneeDid` filter that issued it."
+        )]
+        cursor: Option<String>,
+    ) -> Result<TaskPageType> {
+        use crate::api::task_cursor::{self, TaskCursorKey, TaskFilter};
+
+        task_read_brake(ctx, "tasks").await?;
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
-        // Clamp before SQL: a negative LIMIT is a client fault that Postgres
-        // rejects with 2201W, which would otherwise trip the opaque DB path
-        // and write an error-level log on every probe (#250 review).
-        let limit = limit.clamp(0, 200);
-        let tasks = db
-            .list_tasks(status.as_deref(), assignee_did.as_deref(), limit)
-            .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
-        Ok(tasks.into_iter().map(AgentTaskType::from).collect())
+        // #268: gate rows via the same collector the REST list route uses (like
+        // `ref_updates` shares `collect_visible_ref_updates` with its REST feed),
+        // so the two surfaces cannot drift. The collector clamps `limit` itself,
+        // including the negative-LIMIT case #250 called out for this resolver.
+        let caller = ctx
+            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
+            .ok()
+            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
+        let key = ctx.data_unchecked::<TaskCursorKey>();
+        let filter = TaskFilter {
+            status: status.as_deref(),
+            assignee_did: assignee_did.as_deref(),
+        };
+        let resume = cursor
+            .as_deref()
+            .map(|token| task_cursor::decode(key, filter, caller, token))
+            .transpose()
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?;
+        let result = crate::api::tasks::collect_visible_tasks(
+            db,
+            status.as_deref(),
+            assignee_did.as_deref(),
+            limit,
+            resume.as_ref(),
+            caller,
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?;
+        Ok(TaskPageType {
+            next_cursor: result
+                .next_position
+                .as_ref()
+                .map(|pos| task_cursor::encode(key, filter, caller, pos)),
+            items: result
+                .tasks
+                .into_iter()
+                .map(AgentTaskReadType::from)
+                .collect(),
+            has_more: result.has_more,
+            incomplete: result.incomplete,
+        })
     }
 
-    async fn task(&self, ctx: &Context<'_>, id: String) -> Result<Option<AgentTaskType>> {
+    async fn task(&self, ctx: &Context<'_>, id: String) -> Result<Option<AgentTaskReadType>> {
+        task_read_brake(ctx, "task").await?;
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
-        let t = db
-            .get_task(&id)
+        // #268: same gate as the REST get route, via the shared helper.
+        let caller = ctx
+            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
+            .ok()
+            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
+        let t = crate::api::tasks::get_visible_task(db, &id, caller)
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
-        Ok(t.map(AgentTaskType::from))
+            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?;
+        Ok(t.map(AgentTaskReadType::from))
     }
 }
 
@@ -153,10 +214,14 @@ mod tests {
         Arc::new(db)
     }
 
+    fn cursor_key() -> crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey {
+        crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey::derive(&[42u8; 32])
+    }
+
     fn schema(db: Arc<Db>) -> super::super::GitlawbSchema {
         let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
         let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
-        super::super::build_schema(db, ref_tx, task_tx)
+        super::super::build_schema(db, ref_tx, task_tx, cursor_key())
     }
 
     fn repo(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
@@ -466,7 +531,7 @@ mod tests {
     async fn tasks_negative_limit_clamped(pool: PgPool) {
         let db = db(pool).await;
         let schema = schema(db);
-        let resp = anon(&schema, "{ tasks(limit: -1) { id } }").await;
+        let resp = anon(&schema, "{ tasks(limit: -1) { items { id } } }").await;
         assert!(
             resp.errors.is_empty(),
             "negative limit must clamp, not fail: {:?}",
@@ -500,18 +565,409 @@ mod tests {
             .unwrap();
         }
         let schema = schema(db);
-        let resp = anon(&schema, "{ tasks(limit: 5000) { id } }").await;
+        // Queried as the delegator, not anonymously: since #268 the task read
+        // surface is visibility-gated, and an anonymous caller sees none of
+        // these repo-less tasks at all. The clamp is what this test pins, so it
+        // needs a caller who can legitimately see all 201 rows.
+        let resp = authed(&schema, "{ tasks(limit: 5000) { items { id } } }", OWNER).await;
         assert_eq!(count_tasks(&resp), 200, "limit above 200 must clamp to 200");
     }
 
-    fn count_tasks(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> usize {
+    /// Seed one repo-less task carrying a `ucan_token`, so a leak on any read
+    /// surface is visible in the response body.
+    async fn seed_task(db: &Db, id: &str, delegator: &str) {
+        let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+        db.create_task(&crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: id.into(),
+            repo_id: None,
+            kind: "build".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: delegator.into(),
+            assignee_did: None,
+            capability: "repo:write".into(),
+            ucan_token: Some("SECRET-UCAN-TOKEN".into()),
+            payload: None,
+            result: None,
+            created_at: now.clone(),
+            updated_at: now,
+            deadline: None,
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    /// #268: the `tasks` resolver must delegate to the gated collector, not
+    /// query the DB directly. A repo-less task belonging to someone else is
+    /// invisible to an anonymous caller. `tasks_negative_limit_clamped` cannot
+    /// catch a resolver that stops calling `collect_visible_tasks` because it
+    /// seeds no rows — this seeds one, so the gate is load-bearing here.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn tasks_repo_less_task_hidden_from_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        seed_task(&db, "t1", OWNER).await;
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let resp = anon(&schema, "{ tasks { items { id } } }").await;
+        assert_eq!(
+            count_tasks(&resp),
+            0,
+            "anon must not enumerate another party's repo-less task"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !format!("{:?}", resp.data).contains("SECRET-UCAN-TOKEN"),
+            "no ucan token may reach an anonymous caller"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// #268 sibling for the single-task resolver: an invisible task reads as
+    /// `null`, indistinguishable from one that does not exist.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn task_by_id_is_null_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        seed_task(&db, "t1", OWNER).await;
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let resp = anon(&schema, r#"{ task(id: "t1") { id } }"#).await;
         assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
         let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
             panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
         };
-        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("tasks").expect("tasks key") else {
-            panic!("tasks not a list");
+        assert_eq!(
+            obj.get("task"),
+            Some(&async_graphql::Value::Null),
+            "an invisible task must read as null, got {:?}",
+            obj.get("task")
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// #268: `ucanToken` is absent from the read type's schema entirely, so the
+    /// delegator cannot request it either. Asking for it is a validation error,
+    /// which pins the redaction at the schema level rather than per-resolver.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn task_read_schema_has_no_ucan_token_field(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        seed_task(&db, "t1", OWNER).await;
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let resp = authed(&schema, r#"{ task(id: "t1") { id ucanToken } }"#, OWNER).await;
+        assert!(
+            !resp.errors.is_empty(),
+            "ucanToken must not exist on the task read type"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn tasks_find_older_visible_row_behind_denied_window(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("public-repo", OWNER, "public", true))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let visible = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "visible".into(),
+            repo_id: Some("public-repo".into()),
+            kind: "build".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: OWNER.into(),
+            assignee_did: None,
+            capability: "repo:write".into(),
+            ucan_token: None,
+            payload: None,
+            result: None,
+            created_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            updated_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            deadline: None,
         };
-        rows.len()
+        db.create_task(&visible).await.unwrap();
+        for i in 0..200 {
+            let mut hidden = visible.clone();
+            hidden.id = format!("hidden-{i:03}");
+            hidden.repo_id = None;
+            hidden.created_at = "2026-01-02T00:00:00Z".into();
+            hidden.updated_at = hidden.created_at.clone();
+            db.create_task(&hidden).await.unwrap();
+        }
+
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let resp = anon(&schema, "{ tasks(limit: 1) { items { id } incomplete } }").await;
+        assert_eq!(count_tasks(&resp), 1);
+        assert!(!task_incomplete(&resp));
+        assert!(format!("{:?}", resp.data).contains("visible"));
+    }
+
+    /// The GraphQL surface must page past a denied window on server-issued
+    /// cursors alone, exactly as REST does (#327 review). Before this, the
+    /// only cursor a caller could hold named the last row they saw, so the
+    /// query stalled at `incomplete: true` forever and never reached
+    /// `past-ceiling`.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn tasks_page_past_candidate_ceiling_on_server_cursors(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("public-repo", OWNER, "public", true))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let visible_newer = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "newer-visible".into(),
+            repo_id: Some("public-repo".into()),
+            kind: "build".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: OWNER.into(),
+            assignee_did: None,
+            capability: "repo:write".into(),
+            ucan_token: None,
+            payload: None,
+            result: None,
+            created_at: "2026-01-03T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            updated_at: "2026-01-03T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            deadline: None,
+        };
+        db.create_task(&visible_newer).await.unwrap();
+        for i in 0..1500 {
+            let mut hidden = visible_newer.clone();
+            hidden.id = format!("hidden-{i:04}");
+            hidden.repo_id = None;
+            hidden.created_at = "2026-01-02T00:00:00Z".into();
+            hidden.updated_at = hidden.created_at.clone();
+            db.create_task(&hidden).await.unwrap();
+        }
+
+        let mut visible_older = visible_newer.clone();
+        visible_older.id = "past-ceiling".into();
+        visible_older.created_at = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into();
+        visible_older.updated_at = visible_older.created_at.clone();
+        db.create_task(&visible_older).await.unwrap();
+
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let mut seen: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+        let mut cursor: Option<String> = None;
+        for request in 0..10 {
+            let query = match &cursor {
+                Some(c) => format!(
+                    r#"{{ tasks(limit: 1, cursor: "{c}") {{ items {{ id }} hasMore incomplete nextCursor }} }}"#
+                ),
+                None => {
+                    "{ tasks(limit: 1) { items { id } hasMore incomplete nextCursor } }".to_string()
+                }
+            };
+            let resp = anon(&schema, &query).await;
+            let rendered = format!("{:?}", resp.data);
+            assert!(
+                !rendered.contains("hidden-"),
+                "request {request} disclosed a denied row: {rendered}"
+            );
+            for item in task_items(&resp) {
+                let async_graphql::Value::Object(row) = item else {
+                    panic!("task item not an object");
+                };
+                seen.push(row.get("id").unwrap().to_string().replace('"', ""));
+            }
+            // Short page with more behind it is the scan wall, and says so.
+            if task_page_bool(&resp, "hasMore") && task_items(&resp).is_empty() {
+                assert!(
+                    task_incomplete(&resp),
+                    "request {request}: an empty page with rows behind it is a paused scan"
+                );
+            }
+            match task_page_cursor(&resp) {
+                Some(c) => cursor = Some(c),
+                None => {
+                    assert!(!task_page_bool(&resp, "hasMore"));
+                    assert!(!task_incomplete(&resp));
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            seen,
+            vec!["newer-visible".to_string(), "past-ceiling".to_string()],
+            "both visible rows must be reachable using only server-issued cursors"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// REST and GraphQL mint the same tokens from the same node key, so a
+    /// cursor must not be usable against a filter it was not issued for, and
+    /// must render the same single rejection every other bad cursor renders.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn tasks_rejects_unusable_cursor(pool: PgPool) {
+        use crate::api::task_cursor::{self, TaskFilter, TaskPosition};
+
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        let schema = schema(db);
+
+        let wrong_filter = task_cursor::encode(
+            &cursor_key(),
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: Some("pending"),
+                assignee_did: None,
+            },
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", "t1"),
+        );
+        let foreign = task_cursor::encode(
+            &crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey::derive(&[9u8; 32]),
+            TaskFilter {
+                status: None,
+                assignee_did: None,
+            },
+            None,
+            &TaskPosition::new("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", "t1"),
+        );
+
+        for (label, query) in [
+            (
+                "garbage",
+                r#"{ tasks(cursor: "not-a-cursor") { items { id } } }"#.to_string(),
+            ),
+            (
+                "another node's key",
+                format!(r#"{{ tasks(cursor: "{foreign}") {{ items {{ id }} }} }}"#),
+            ),
+            (
+                "different filter",
+                format!(r#"{{ tasks(cursor: "{wrong_filter}") {{ items {{ id }} }} }}"#),
+            ),
+        ] {
+            let resp = anon(&schema, &query).await;
+            assert_eq!(
+                resp.errors.len(),
+                1,
+                "{label}: must be rejected, not treated as page one"
+            );
+            assert!(
+                resp.errors[0].message.contains("invalid or expired cursor"),
+                "{label}: unexpected message {:?}",
+                resp.errors[0].message
+            );
+        }
+
+        let resp = anon(
+            &schema,
+            &format!(
+                r#"{{ tasks(status: "pending", cursor: "{wrong_filter}") {{ items {{ id }} }} }}"#
+            ),
+        )
+        .await;
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn tasks_anonymous_denial_hides_repoless_task_and_leaks_no_token(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        let task = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "t1".into(),
+            repo_id: None,
+            kind: "code-review".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: "did:key:z6MkDelegator".into(),
+            assignee_did: None,
+            capability: "agent:task".into(),
+            ucan_token: Some("secret-ucan-token".into()),
+            payload: Some("payload".into()),
+            result: None,
+            created_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            updated_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            deadline: None,
+        };
+        db.create_task(&task).await.unwrap();
+
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let query = "{ tasks { items { id } } }";
+        let resp = anon(&schema, query).await;
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        assert_eq!(count_tasks(&resp), 0);
+        let rendered = format!("{:?}", resp.data);
+        assert!(!rendered.contains("secret-ucan-token"));
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn task_anonymous_denial_returns_null_and_leaks_no_token(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        let task = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "t1".into(),
+            repo_id: None,
+            kind: "code-review".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: "did:key:z6MkDelegator".into(),
+            assignee_did: None,
+            capability: "agent:task".into(),
+            ucan_token: Some("secret-ucan-token".into()),
+            payload: Some("payload".into()),
+            result: None,
+            created_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            updated_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            deadline: None,
+        };
+        db.create_task(&task).await.unwrap();
+
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let query = r#"{ task(id: "t1") { id } }"#;
+        let resp = anon(&schema, query).await;
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        assert_eq!(obj.get("task"), Some(&async_graphql::Value::Null));
+        let rendered = format!("{:?}", resp.data);
+        assert!(!rendered.contains("secret-ucan-token"));
+    }
+
+    fn task_page_bool(resp: &async_graphql::Response, field: &str) -> bool {
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(page) = obj.get("tasks").expect("tasks key") else {
+            panic!("tasks not an object");
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Boolean(value) = page.get(field).expect("field present") else {
+            panic!("{field} not a bool");
+        };
+        *value
+    }
+
+    fn task_page_cursor(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> Option<String> {
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(page) = obj.get("tasks").expect("tasks key") else {
+            panic!("tasks not an object");
+        };
+        match page.get("nextCursor").expect("nextCursor key") {
+            async_graphql::Value::Null => None,
+            async_graphql::Value::String(c) => Some(c.clone()),
+            other => panic!("nextCursor not a string: {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn task_items(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> &Vec<async_graphql::Value> {
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(page) = obj.get("tasks").expect("tasks key") else {
+            panic!("tasks not an object");
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = page.get("items").expect("items key") else {
+            panic!("items not a list");
+        };
+        rows
+    }
+
+    fn count_tasks(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> usize {
+        task_items(resp).len()
+    }
+
+    fn task_incomplete(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> bool {
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(page) = obj.get("tasks").expect("tasks key") else {
+            panic!("tasks not an object");
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Boolean(incomplete) =
+            page.get("incomplete").expect("incomplete key")
+        else {
+            panic!("incomplete not a bool");
+        };
+        *incomplete
     }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/subscription.rs

@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ pub struct SubscriptionRoot;
 
 #[Subscription]
 impl SubscriptionRoot {
-    /// Live ref-update stream. `/graphql/ws` is mounted outside the
-    /// `optional_signature` layer, so this resolver has NO caller identity and
-    /// cannot gate per-subscriber — it relays whatever enters the broadcast
+    /// Live ref-update stream. `/graphql/ws` is mounted under the
+    /// `optional_signature` layer and carries optional caller identity, but this
+    /// resolver does not inspect it — it relays whatever enters the broadcast
     /// channel to any anonymous client. Its visibility safety therefore rests
     /// entirely on the WRITE side: the push handler only sends a
     /// `RefUpdateBroadcast` for repos the anonymous public may read (inside its

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/types.rs

@@ -48,6 +48,65 @@ impl From<AgentTask> for AgentTaskType {
     }
 }
 
+/// Read-only projection of `AgentTask` for the `tasks`/`task` queries, as
+/// opposed to `AgentTaskType`, which the task mutations (`createTask`,
+/// `claimTask`, `completeTask`, `failTask` — all `require_signer`-gated)
+/// return. Identical except for the missing `ucan_token` (#268): a read
+/// surface never needs to echo it back, since the assignee already received it
+/// at delegation/claim time via the mutation response.
+#[derive(SimpleObject, Clone)]
+pub struct AgentTaskReadType {
+    pub id: String,
+    pub repo_id: Option<String>,
+    pub kind: String,
+    pub status: String,
+    pub delegator_did: String,
+    pub assignee_did: Option<String>,
+    pub capability: String,
+    pub payload: Option<String>,
+    pub result: Option<String>,
+    pub created_at: String,
+    pub updated_at: String,
+    pub deadline: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// Wraps a `tasks` page with the same completion signals the REST list route
+/// exposes, so the two surfaces answer pagination identically.
+///
+/// `hasMore` and `incomplete` are separate because they are separate facts
+/// (#327 review): `hasMore` says more candidates remain, `incomplete` says
+/// this page is short *only* because the authorization scan hit its safety
+/// wall. `nextCursor` is present exactly when `hasMore` is true and is an
+/// opaque MAC'd token — it can name the last examined candidate, denied or
+/// not, without disclosing it, which is what lets a caller page past a denied
+/// window instead of stalling on it.
+#[derive(SimpleObject, Clone)]
+pub struct TaskPageType {
+    pub items: Vec<AgentTaskReadType>,
+    pub has_more: bool,
+    pub incomplete: bool,
+    pub next_cursor: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl From<AgentTask> for AgentTaskReadType {
+    fn from(t: AgentTask) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            id: t.id,
+            repo_id: t.repo_id,
+            kind: t.kind,
+            status: t.status,
+            delegator_did: t.delegator_did,
+            assignee_did: t.assignee_did,
+            capability: t.capability,
+            payload: t.payload,
+            result: t.result,
+            created_at: t.created_at,
+            updated_at: t.updated_at,
+            deadline: t.deadline,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(SimpleObject, Clone)]
 pub struct RefUpdateType {
     pub repo: String,

crates/gitlawb-node/src/ipfs_pin.rs

@@ -676,7 +676,20 @@ async fn warm_candidates(
                 &repo.owner_did,
                 &repo.name,
             ) {
-                Ok(p) if p.is_dir() => out.push((repo, created_at_key, p)),
+                // A tree whose publish is unresolved is filtered HERE, before the
+                // candidate is ever probed: discovery records the repo as a source
+                // for a CID, and refs that may never become durable must not become
+                // durable provenance. This is a different filter from the `quarantined`
+                // status flag dropped at candidate-load time; that one is an operator
+                // decision about a mirror, this one is "the store cannot confirm what
+                // is on disk right now". An unresolved candidate falls into the arm
+                // below and is accounted exactly as a cold one: absent, not evidence.
+                Ok(p)
+                    if p.is_dir()
+                        && !crate::git::repo_store::live_tree_publish_unresolved(p.as_path()) =>
+                {
+                    out.push((repo, created_at_key, p.into_path_buf()))
+                }
                 Ok(_) => {}
                 Err(e) => {
                     tracing::warn!(repo_id = %repo.id, err = %e, "sweep discovery: rejected unsafe repo path");
@@ -1015,6 +1028,16 @@ async fn sweep_pass(
                 row_retryable = true;
                 continue;
             }
+            // The repo is on disk but its last publish is unresolved, so the refs it
+            // holds may never become durable. The sweep does not merely read here: it
+            // rewrites the legacy provider CID from whatever these objects say, which
+            // is state the resolver then serves. Skip, and count it retryable rather
+            // than settled: an unresolved publish resolves one way or the other, so
+            // the row is worth walking again, unlike a repo that is simply gone.
+            if crate::git::repo_store::live_tree_publish_unresolved(repo_path.as_path()) {
+                row_retryable = true;
+                continue;
+            }
             // The sweep holds no pin permit and has no batch to overrun, so the plain
             // `git_timeout` is the right budget here.
             row_read_attempted = true;
@@ -1485,9 +1508,6 @@ pub async fn pin_git_object(
         return Ok(String::new());
     }
 
-    // Compute the expected CIDv1 from the content bytes
-    let expected_cid = Cid::from_git_object_bytes(data).to_string();
-
     let url = format!(
         "{}/api/v0/add?cid-version=1&raw-leaves=true&pin=true",
         ipfs_api.trim_end_matches('/')
@@ -1534,6 +1554,10 @@ pub async fn pin_git_object(
         .text()
         .await
         .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("IPFS add response body read failed: {e}"))?;
+    // A 200 without a parseable Hash is not a successful pin. Fabricating the
+    // caller-computed CID would record an address the backend never confirmed;
+    // above its chunk threshold that raw CID is not even a stored block, so
+    // every later cat fails permanently.
     let cid = body
         .lines()
         .filter(|l| !l.trim().is_empty())
@@ -1542,7 +1566,17 @@ pub async fn pin_git_object(
             v["Hash"].as_str().map(|s| s.to_string())
         })
         .next_back()
-        .unwrap_or(expected_cid.clone());
+        .ok_or_else(|| {
+            anyhow::anyhow!(
+                "IPFS /api/v0/add returned 200 without a usable Hash: {:.200}",
+                body
+            )
+        })?;
+    // The string still has to be a CID. A garbage Hash would be recorded and
+    // later cat-ed the same way a missing one was, so reject it here.
+    Cid::from_str(&cid).map_err(|e| {
+        anyhow::anyhow!("IPFS /api/v0/add returned a Hash that is not a CID ({cid:.200}): {e}")
+    })?;
 
     tracing::debug!(sha256 = %sha256_hex, %cid, "pinned git object to IPFS");
     Ok(cid)
@@ -1602,7 +1636,7 @@ pub(crate) fn batch_budget_gate(
 /// `object_list` is the already-withheld-filtered OID set to pin: the caller
 /// applies `visibility_pack::replicable_objects` on the delta path or the
 /// `..._fail_closed` filter on the full-scan path before calling, so this
-/// function never sees a withheld blob. `repo_path` is still needed to read each
+/// function never sees a withheld blob or withheld-subtree tree. `repo_path` is still needed to read each
 /// object's bytes, and `git_bin` names the binary those reads run: the production
 /// callers pass the literal `"git"`, and a test passes a fake so the loop's own bound
 /// can be driven with a git that never answers. `repo_id` records the pin's provenance
@@ -2200,16 +2234,16 @@ mod tests {
         endpoint
     }
 
-    /// A sleeping-but-live endpoint. Answers `200` with an empty body after
-    /// `delays[i]` for the i-th request it accepts (the last entry repeats), so
-    /// a test can make one add slow and the next fast. Drains the full request,
-    /// headers plus the declared `Content-Length` body, before sleeping: exactly
-    /// as in `rejecting_endpoint`, answering early and closing would surface as
-    /// a write failure on the client and turn a slow-but-healthy add into a
-    /// different failure shape.
+    /// A sleeping-but-live endpoint. Answers `200` with a conformant NDJSON add
+    /// response after `delays[i]` for the i-th request it accepts (the last
+    /// entry repeats), so a test can make one add slow and the next fast.
+    /// Drains the full request, headers plus the declared `Content-Length`
+    /// body, before sleeping: exactly as in `rejecting_endpoint`, answering
+    /// early and closing would surface as a write failure on the client and
+    /// turn a slow-but-healthy add into a different failure shape.
     ///
-    /// An empty body is a successful pin: `pin_git_object` falls back to the CID
-    /// it computed from the bytes when the response carries no `Hash`.
+    /// The Hash is a fixed, real CID: the timing tests assert on pin counts,
+    /// not on the recorded address.
     async fn delaying_endpoint(delays: Vec<Duration>) -> String {
         use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
         let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
@@ -2246,9 +2280,14 @@ mod tests {
                         }
                     }
                     tokio::time::sleep(delay).await;
-                    let _ = sock
-                        .write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n")
-                        .await;
+                    let body = br#"{"Hash":"bafkreifjjcie6lypi6ny7amxnfftagclbuxndqonfipmb64f2km2devei4","Size":"12"}
+"#;
+                    let resp = format!(
+                        "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: application/x-ndjson\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\n\r\n",
+                        body.len()
+                    );
+                    let _ = sock.write_all(resp.as_bytes()).await;
+                    let _ = sock.write_all(body).await;
                     let _ = sock.flush().await;
                 });
             }
@@ -2350,6 +2389,71 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    /// A 200 add response with no parseable Hash must surface as an add
+    /// failure. Falling back to the caller-computed CID records an
+    /// unverifiable address: above the backend's chunk threshold that raw
+    /// CID is not a stored block, so every later cat 500s.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn pin_git_object_rejects_a_200_without_a_hash() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("POST", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"^/api/v0/add".to_string()))
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_body(r#"{"Name":"object","Size":"19"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let result = pin_git_object(&server.url(), "deadbeef", b"some object bytes\n", None).await;
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "a 200 without a Hash must be an add failure, not a fabricated CID: {result:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A Hash that is a string but not a CID must also fail. It would be
+    /// recorded into `encrypted_blobs.cid` and every later cat would miss.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn pin_git_object_rejects_a_malformed_hash() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("POST", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"^/api/v0/add".to_string()))
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_body(r#"{"Hash":"not-a-cid","Size":"19"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let result = pin_git_object(&server.url(), "deadbeef", b"some object bytes\n", None).await;
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "a Hash that is not a CID must be an add failure: {result:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The Hash text goes into the error and `encrypted_pin` logs that error,
+    /// so a backend answering with a huge invalid Hash must not produce an
+    /// unbounded log entry.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn pin_git_object_bounds_an_oversized_invalid_hash_in_the_error() {
+        let long = "x".repeat(5000);
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("POST", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"^/api/v0/add".to_string()))
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_body(format!(r#"{{"Hash":"{long}","Size":"19"}}"#))
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let result = pin_git_object(&server.url(), "deadbeef", b"some object bytes\n", None).await;
+        let err = result.expect_err("an invalid Hash must be an add failure");
+        let msg = err.to_string();
+        assert!(
+            msg.len() < 1000,
+            "the error must bound the echoed Hash, got {} bytes",
+            msg.len()
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !msg.contains(&long),
+            "the error must not carry the full invalid Hash"
+        );
+    }
+
     /// The permit-hold bound. `pin_new_objects` runs under a deferring
     /// `pin_semaphore`, so without a batch deadline the hold is O(N) with N
     /// chosen by the pusher. Five objects against an endpoint that takes 2s

crates/gitlawb-node/src/metrics.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! Prometheus metrics for the gitlawb node.
+//! Prometheus metrics for the Twigpine node.
 //!
 //! Exposes a small, deliberately conservative set of counters and histograms
 //! that cover the questions an operator actually asks of a live node:
@@ -11,6 +11,11 @@
 //!     `gitlawb_sync_queue_processed_total{status}`
 //!   * are webhooks reaching their endpoints? —
 //!     `gitlawb_webhook_deliveries_total{result}`
+//!   * is inbound gossip being admitted or shed, and for which reason?
+//!     `gitlawb_gossip_ingest_events_total{outcome}`
+//!   * is the gossip replay seen-set full, and therefore admitting events it
+//!     cannot deduplicate?
+//!     `gitlawb_gossip_replay_guard_saturated_total`
 //!   * how big are the packs we're sending and receiving? —
 //!     `gitlawb_pack_size_bytes`
 //!   * a single `gitlawb_info{version, did}` gauge = 1, for joins/dashboards
@@ -33,8 +38,8 @@
 use std::sync::OnceLock;
 
 use prometheus::{
-    Encoder, Histogram, HistogramOpts, IntCounterVec, IntGauge, IntGaugeVec, Opts, Registry,
-    TextEncoder,
+    Encoder, Histogram, HistogramOpts, IntCounter, IntCounterVec, IntGauge, IntGaugeVec, Opts,
+    Registry, TextEncoder,
 };
 
 /// The single, process-wide metrics registry. Initialized by [`init`].
@@ -49,8 +54,15 @@ static AUTH_SUCCESSES: OnceLock<IntCounterVec> = OnceLock::new();
 static AUTH_FAILURES: OnceLock<IntCounterVec> = OnceLock::new();
 static SYNC_PROCESSED: OnceLock<IntCounterVec> = OnceLock::new();
 static WEBHOOK_DELIVERIES: OnceLock<IntCounterVec> = OnceLock::new();
+static GOSSIP_INGEST: OnceLock<IntCounterVec> = OnceLock::new();
+static GOSSIP_REPLAY_GUARD_SATURATED: OnceLock<IntCounter> = OnceLock::new();
 static PACK_SIZE: OnceLock<Histogram> = OnceLock::new();
 static PEERS_CONNECTED: OnceLock<IntGauge> = OnceLock::new();
+/// 1 when the node started without its p2p identity because the key storage
+/// could not be used. The node keeps serving HTTP in that state and /health
+/// stays green, so without this the outage is visible only to whoever reads
+/// the startup log.
+static P2P_KEY_LOAD_FAILED: OnceLock<IntGauge> = OnceLock::new();
 
 /// One-time initializer. Builds the registry, registers every metric,
 /// and sets the constant `gitlawb_info` gauge. Idempotent — calling
@@ -168,6 +180,33 @@ fn init_inner(version: &str, node_did: &str) {
         .set(webhook_deliveries)
         .expect("set WEBHOOK_DELIVERIES once");
 
+    let gossip_ingest = IntCounterVec::new(
+        Opts::new(
+            "gitlawb_gossip_ingest_events_total",
+            "Total inbound gossip ref-update events and what the ingest path decided about each",
+        ),
+        &["outcome"],
+    )
+    .expect("gitlawb_gossip_ingest_events_total definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(gossip_ingest.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_gossip_ingest_events_total");
+    GOSSIP_INGEST
+        .set(gossip_ingest)
+        .expect("set GOSSIP_INGEST once");
+
+    let gossip_replay_guard_saturated = IntCounter::with_opts(Opts::new(
+        "gitlawb_gossip_replay_guard_saturated_total",
+        "Inbound gossip ref-updates admitted without being recorded because the replay seen-set was at capacity",
+    ))
+    .expect("gitlawb_gossip_replay_guard_saturated_total definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(gossip_replay_guard_saturated.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_gossip_replay_guard_saturated_total");
+    GOSSIP_REPLAY_GUARD_SATURATED
+        .set(gossip_replay_guard_saturated)
+        .expect("set GOSSIP_REPLAY_GUARD_SATURATED once");
+
     let pack_size = Histogram::with_opts(
         HistogramOpts::new(
             "gitlawb_pack_size_bytes",
@@ -202,6 +241,18 @@ fn init_inner(version: &str, node_did: &str) {
         .set(peers_connected)
         .expect("set PEERS_CONNECTED once");
 
+    let p2p_key_load_failed = IntGauge::with_opts(Opts::new(
+        "gitlawb_p2p_identity_key_load_failed",
+        "1 if the node is running without p2p because its identity key could not be loaded",
+    ))
+    .expect("gitlawb_p2p_identity_key_load_failed definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(p2p_key_load_failed.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_p2p_identity_key_load_failed");
+    P2P_KEY_LOAD_FAILED
+        .set(p2p_key_load_failed)
+        .expect("set P2P_KEY_LOAD_FAILED once");
+
     REGISTRY
         .set(registry)
         .expect("set REGISTRY once (init must be called exactly once)");
@@ -263,13 +314,75 @@ pub fn record_sync_processed(status: &str) {
 }
 
 /// Record one webhook delivery attempt outcome. `result` ∈
-/// {ok, http_error, network_error, skipped}.
+/// {ok, http_error, network_error, skipped, invalid_url}.
+/// `invalid_url` is a policy skip: the stored hook URL failed the public-URL
+/// check at delivery time and the POST was never sent.
 pub fn record_webhook_delivery(result: &str) {
     if let Some(c) = WEBHOOK_DELIVERIES.get() {
         c.with_label_values(&[result]).inc();
     }
 }
 
+/// Record what the gossip ingest path decided about one inbound ref-update.
+/// `outcome` ∈ {accepted, unsigned_admitted, write_failed, rejected,
+/// source_rate_limited, author_rate_limited, unsigned_source_rate_limited,
+/// replayed, stale_timestamp}.
+///
+/// `accepted` is reserved for signature-verified events. An unsigned event that
+/// survives the rolling-upgrade window is `unsigned_admitted`, so the
+/// authenticated-admission rate is not silently padded by legacy compatibility
+/// traffic; an operator can tell whether the fleet still relies on the
+/// compatibility allowance.
+///
+/// The three shed reasons stay separate labels rather than one `rate_limited`
+/// because they answer different operator questions: `source_rate_limited` is a
+/// forwarding peer over the pre-parse brake, `unsigned_source_rate_limited` is
+/// that same forwarder relaying unproven traffic, and `author_rate_limited`
+/// names a principal a signature actually proved. Collapsing them would make a
+/// flood of unauthenticated garbage indistinguishable from one registered peer
+/// pushing too hard, which is exactly the distinction an alert needs.
+///
+/// The label is the variant, never the free-form reason string that
+/// `Rejected`/`WriteFailed` carry: those are attacker-influenced and would blow
+/// up the label cardinality of a process-wide registry.
+pub fn record_gossip_ingest(outcome: &str) {
+    if let Some(c) = GOSSIP_INGEST.get() {
+        c.with_label_values(&[outcome]).inc();
+    }
+}
+
+/// Record one inbound gossip ref-update that the replay seen-set could not
+/// record because it was at capacity.
+///
+/// Label-less on purpose: there is one degradation mode and nothing about it
+/// varies per event, so a label would only add cardinality.
+///
+/// This is an alert-worthy signal, not a debug counter, and it is the ONLY way
+/// the degraded state is visible. At capacity the guard fails open, which means
+/// the event is admitted and `gitlawb_gossip_ingest_events_total{outcome=
+/// "accepted"}` counts it exactly as it counts a healthy admission. Fail-open is
+/// the right policy (a saturated set that dropped all fresh gossip would convert
+/// a loud resource attack into quiet mesh-wide censorship), but it is not a free
+/// one: while this counter is moving, a captured signature can again be replayed
+/// against the freshness window's full 10 minutes, spending a `peer_exists`
+/// round trip and a debit from the victim author's budget on every replay.
+pub fn record_gossip_replay_guard_saturated() {
+    if let Some(c) = GOSSIP_REPLAY_GUARD_SATURATED.get() {
+        c.inc();
+    }
+}
+
+/// Test-only: current `gitlawb_gossip_replay_guard_saturated_total` value (0 if
+/// the registry is not initialized). Lets the seen-set tests assert the
+/// saturation signal fires without scraping the encoded text.
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn replay_guard_saturated_count_for_test() -> u64 {
+    GOSSIP_REPLAY_GUARD_SATURATED
+        .get()
+        .map(|c| c.get())
+        .unwrap_or(0)
+}
+
 /// Record a pack body size observation (bytes).
 pub fn observe_pack_size(bytes: f64) {
     if let Some(h) = PACK_SIZE.get() {
@@ -284,6 +397,13 @@ pub fn set_peers_connected(count: i64) {
     }
 }
 
+/// Record whether the node is running without its p2p identity.
+pub fn set_p2p_key_load_failed(failed: bool) {
+    if let Some(g) = P2P_KEY_LOAD_FAILED.get() {
+        g.set(i64::from(failed));
+    }
+}
+
 /// Encode the registry as the standard Prometheus text exposition format.
 /// Returns an error if `init` was never called.
 pub fn encode() -> Result<String, prometheus::Error> {
@@ -365,6 +485,12 @@ mod tests {
         record_auth_failure("test/route", "test_reason");
         record_sync_processed("done");
         record_webhook_delivery("ok");
+        // `record_gossip_replay_guard_saturated` is deliberately NOT called
+        // here. It is a label-less process-wide counter and the seen-set test
+        // that asserts it asserts a before/after delta, so an increment from a
+        // second test running concurrently in this binary would be a flake with
+        // no diagnostic value.
+        record_gossip_ingest("accepted");
         observe_pack_size(1024.0);
         set_peers_connected(0);
     }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/pinata.rs

@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ pub async fn pin_object(
 /// Pin any of the given candidate git objects that haven't yet been sent to
 /// Pinata.
 ///
-/// `object_list` is the already-withheld-filtered OID set to pin: the caller
+/// `object_list` is the already-withheld-filtered OID set to pin (blobs and
+/// withheld-subtree trees already dropped): the caller
 /// applies `visibility_pack::replicable_objects` on the delta path or the
 /// `..._fail_closed` filter on the full-scan path before calling. `repo_path` is
 /// still needed to read each object's bytes, and `git_bin` names the binary those

crates/gitlawb-node/src/rate_limit.rs

@@ -143,6 +143,23 @@ impl RateLimiter {
         false
     }
 
+    /// The configured key ceiling. Tests use it to assert that a limiter a
+    /// production factory builds is actually bounded, which flooding the real
+    /// ceiling in distinct keys would be far too slow to show.
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub fn max_keys(&self) -> usize {
+        self.max_keys
+    }
+
+    /// The configured per-key request cap. Tests use it to assert that a
+    /// limiter a production factory builds carries the cap it is documented
+    /// with; re-asserting the constant on its own cannot tell whether the
+    /// factory passed that constant or a different one.
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub fn max_requests(&self) -> usize {
+        self.max_requests
+    }
+
     pub async fn cleanup(&self) {
         let now = Instant::now();
         let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
@@ -279,7 +296,7 @@ pub async fn rate_limit_by_did(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
             return (
                 StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
                 [("retry-after", "60")],
-                "rate limit exceeded — try again later",
+                RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE,
             )
                 .into_response();
         }
@@ -384,6 +401,11 @@ impl<S: Send + Sync> axum::extract::FromRequestParts<S> for PeerAddr {
     }
 }
 
+/// The message every per-IP brake answers with, shared so the GraphQL surface
+/// (which cannot return a 429 status inside a 200 GraphQL envelope) says the
+/// same thing as the REST routes.
+pub const RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE: &str = "rate limit exceeded — try again later";
+
 /// The shared 429 response for the per-IP flood brakes. Route-agnostic: this
 /// middleware now serves the push path AND the peer-sync routes, so the message
 /// stays generic (the offending path is recorded in the warn log below).
@@ -391,11 +413,60 @@ pub fn too_many_requests() -> Response {
     (
         StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
         [("retry-after", "60")],
-        "rate limit exceeded — try again later",
+        RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE,
     )
         .into_response()
 }
 
+/// The per-IP task-read brake carried as GraphQL request data: the limiter plus
+/// the client key the transport already resolved.
+///
+/// `/graphql` is a single POST endpoint, so this brake cannot sit in middleware
+/// the way `task_read_routes` mounts `rate_limit_by_ip`: that would charge every
+/// unrelated query and every mutation against the task-read bucket. The two task
+/// resolvers debit it instead, which also prices an aliased query honestly — ten
+/// aliased `tasks` fields run the visibility gate ten times and pay ten slots,
+/// where one request-scoped debit would pay one (#327 review).
+/// Default cap on the number of task read fields (across all aliases) permitted
+/// in a single GraphQL request before rejecting further field executions (#327 review).
+pub const MAX_GRAPHQL_TASK_READS_PER_REQUEST: usize = 5;
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct TaskReadBrake {
+    pub limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// `None` when no key could be resolved at all (no trusted header and no
+    /// `ConnectInfo`, e.g. a synthetic test request). Never braked, matching
+    /// [`rate_limit_by_ip`].
+    pub key: Option<String>,
+    pub request_count: Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize>,
+}
+
+impl TaskReadBrake {
+    /// Debit one slot for one task-read field. `true` = proceed.
+    pub async fn check(&self, field: &str) -> bool {
+        let Some(key) = self.key.as_deref() else {
+            return true;
+        };
+        let count = self
+            .request_count
+            .fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+        if count >= MAX_GRAPHQL_TASK_READS_PER_REQUEST {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                key = %key,
+                field = %field,
+                count = count + 1,
+                "per-request GraphQL task field limit exceeded"
+            );
+            return false;
+        }
+        if self.limiter.check(key).await {
+            return true;
+        }
+        tracing::warn!(key = %key, field = %field, "per-IP rate limit exceeded");
+        false
+    }
+}
+
 /// Throttle the git push path by resolved client IP. The socket peer address is
 /// read from `ConnectInfo` (see `into_make_service_with_connect_info` in
 /// `main`). Only skips the limiter when no key can be resolved at all.

crates/gitlawb-node/src/state.rs

@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ pub struct AppState {
     pub task_event_tx: tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>,
     /// GraphQL schema (queries + mutations + subscriptions)
     pub graphql_schema: Arc<crate::graphql::GitlawbSchema>,
+    /// MAC key for task-list continuation tokens, derived from the node
+    /// keypair seed. Held here (and handed to the GraphQL schema) so REST and
+    /// GraphQL mint and accept the same tokens.
+    pub task_cursor_key: crate::api::task_cursor::TaskCursorKey,
     /// Fly.io machine ID — used for fly-replay routing in multi-machine deployments
     pub machine_id: Option<String>,
     /// Centralized repo storage: local disk cache + optional Tigris backend
@@ -79,6 +83,10 @@ pub struct AppState {
     /// brake a push flood from a DID farm (one throwaway DID per repo), so the
     /// push path throttles on the resolved client IP instead.
     pub push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// Per-client-IP rate limiter for `close_issue`'s pre-lock snapshot path.
+    /// Distinct from `push_rate_limiter` so a flood of close attempts cannot
+    /// drain the receive-pack budget for the same source IP.
+    pub close_issue_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
     /// Per-client-IP ROUTE brake for `GET /ipfs/{cid}`: charged ONCE per request by the
     /// `rate_limit_by_ip` middleware (server.rs), never inside the handler. It bounds
     /// request RATE (the "requests per hour" contract of `GITLAWB_IPFS_RATE_LIMIT`) on
@@ -186,6 +194,9 @@ pub struct AppState {
     /// sink as trigger and accepts unsigned requests from known peers, so it is
     /// braked too; each peer's distinct IP gets its own bucket.
     pub peer_write_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// Per-client-IP federation budget: 12 requests per minute, with at most
+    /// 10,000 tracked source keys. Shared by router instances and swept below.
+    pub federated_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
     /// Process-wide graceful-shutdown signal. Sending `true` causes every
     /// task that holds a `watch::Receiver` to exit at its next await point.
     /// Used by:
@@ -319,6 +330,16 @@ pub struct AppState {
     /// (`with_default_max_keys`, reject-before-insert) so a source-key farm cannot grow
     /// it (INV-15).
     pub git_ipfs_walk_per_caller: crate::rate_limit::PerCallerConcurrency,
+    /// Per-client-IP rate limiter for the task read routes. `GET /api/v1/tasks`
+    /// and `GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}` are anonymously reachable and run the #268
+    /// visibility gate (a task lookup plus deduped-repo and visibility-rule
+    /// queries) before returning the opaque 404, so an unauthenticated prober
+    /// costs the node real work per request whether or not anything is visible.
+    /// Keyed on the resolved client IP via `push_limiter_trust`. Layered on
+    /// `task_read_routes` via `rate_limit_by_ip`.
+    /// The same per-IP hourly budget applies to GraphQL `tasks` / `task`
+    /// queries and WebSocket task queries via `TaskReadBrake`.
+    pub task_read_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
     /// The `git` executable the served-git withheld-blob walk spawns. Production is
     /// `"git"` (resolved via PATH); injectable so a fake `git` can drive the walk's
     /// process-group teardown in handler tests without mutating the process-global
@@ -342,10 +363,13 @@ impl AppState {
         self.rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
         self.create_ip_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
         self.push_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
+        self.close_issue_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
         self.ipfs_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
         self.ipfs_work_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
         self.sync_trigger_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
         self.peer_write_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
+        self.task_read_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
+        self.federated_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
     }
 
     /// Trigger graceful shutdown. Idempotent — calling more than once

crates/gitlawb-node/src/sync.rs

@@ -701,6 +701,7 @@ async fn clone_repo(remote_url: &str, local_path: &Path, mode: MirrorMode) -> an
     if mode == MirrorMode::Promisor {
         args.push("--filter=blob:limit=10g");
     }
+    args.push("--");
     args.push(remote_url);
     args.push(local_str);
 
@@ -729,7 +730,10 @@ async fn clone_repo(remote_url: &str, local_path: &Path, mode: MirrorMode) -> an
 async fn fetch_repo(local_path: &Path, remote_url: &str, mode: MirrorMode) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     let local_str = local_path.to_str().unwrap_or(".");
 
-    git_run(&["-C", local_str, "remote", "set-url", "origin", remote_url]).await?;
+    git_run(&[
+        "-C", local_str, "remote", "set-url", "origin", "--", remote_url,
+    ])
+    .await?;
 
     match mode {
         MirrorMode::Promisor => {
@@ -1006,6 +1010,82 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(probe, PromisorProbe::NotPromisor);
     }
 
+    /// #374: `clone_repo` interpolates the peer's origin URL into a `git
+    /// clone --mirror` argument list. Without a `--` delimiter git parses a
+    /// remote beginning with `-` as an option instead of a repository.
+    ///
+    /// The delimiter is what forces the same string to be a repository, and
+    /// git says so in its own words: it reports the whole argument as a
+    /// repository it cannot find. Undelimited, git consumes it as an option
+    /// and fails against the *destination* instead (`fatal: repository '<dest>' does not exist`),
+    /// never naming the injected string — which is why this assertion is RED
+    /// before the fix and GREEN after.
+    ///
+    /// The payload is deliberately free of `:` and spaces: a colon would make
+    /// git read the argument as an ssh-style `host:path` URL and report a
+    /// hostname rather than a repository, which is a different code path.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn clone_never_parses_a_remote_as_a_git_option() {
+        let td = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let dest = td.path().join("mirror.git");
+        let injected = "--upload-pack=false";
+
+        let err = clone_repo(injected, &dest, MirrorMode::Plain)
+            .await
+            .expect_err("a remote that is not a repository must fail the clone")
+            .to_string();
+
+        assert!(
+            err.contains(injected),
+            "git must report the argument as a repository, not consume it as an option: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// #374: `fetch_repo` interpolates the peer's origin URL into
+    /// `git remote set-url`, a second argv construction with the same contract as
+    /// the clone. It needs its own proof: the clone test cannot reach this path.
+    ///
+    /// The assertion is on stored state rather than on the error string, and that
+    /// is deliberate. `git_run` formats its failure as `git {args:?} failed:
+    /// {stderr}`, so the injected value is in the message via the debug-printed
+    /// argv whether or not the delimiter is present — asserting on containment
+    /// would pass with `--` deleted. Delimited, `set-url` succeeds and stores the
+    /// value verbatim; undelimited, git exits 129 with `unknown option` and leaves
+    /// the previous URL in place, so this goes red without the fix.
+    ///
+    /// The fetch that follows the rewrite fails, because the stored URL is not a
+    /// repository. That is expected and ignored: the property under test is what
+    /// `set-url` wrote, not whether the subsequent fetch could succeed.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn fetch_never_parses_a_remote_as_a_git_option() {
+        let td = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let local = td.path().join("mirror.git");
+        let local_str = local.to_str().unwrap();
+        let placeholder = "http://example.invalid/x.git";
+
+        assert!(Command::new("git")
+            .args(["init", "-q", "--bare", local_str])
+            .status()
+            .unwrap()
+            .success());
+        assert!(Command::new("git")
+            .args(["-C", local_str, "remote", "add", "origin", placeholder])
+            .status()
+            .unwrap()
+            .success());
+
+        let injected = "--upload-pack=false";
+        let _ = fetch_repo(&local, injected, MirrorMode::Plain).await;
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            git_config_get(local_str, "remote.origin.url")
+                .await
+                .as_deref(),
+            Some(injected),
+            "set-url must store an option-shaped remote verbatim, not reject it as an option"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn probe_reports_unknown_on_git_error() {
         // A path git cannot resolve as a repo at all (exit 128) is an indeterminate

crates/gitlawb-node/src/webhooks.rs

@@ -79,6 +79,19 @@ async fn fire_event_async(
         let delivery_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
 
         tokio::spawn(async move {
+            // Policy skip, not a delivery failure: the stored URL predates the
+            // create-time gate. The "invalid_url" label is documented on
+            // record_webhook_delivery in metrics.rs.
+            if !crate::api::peers::is_public_http_url(&hook.url) {
+                crate::metrics::record_webhook_delivery("invalid_url");
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    url = %hook.url,
+                    event = %event_name,
+                    "webhook delivery skipped: stored URL is not a public http(s) target"
+                );
+                return;
+            }
+
             let signature = hook.secret.as_deref().map(|s| sign_payload(s, &bytes));
 
             let mut req = client

crates/gitlawb-node/tests/inv22_gates.rs

@@ -225,7 +225,8 @@ fn f4_release_keeps_conn_owned_until_unlock_resolves() {
     let repo_store = src("git/repo_store.rs");
 
     let rel_start = repo_store
-        .find("pub async fn release(mut self")
+        .find("pub async fn release(self")
+        .or_else(|| repo_store.find("pub async fn release(mut self"))
         .expect("F4 gate: repo_store.rs no longer defines RepoWriteGuard::release");
     let rel_end = repo_store[rel_start..]
         .find("impl Drop for RepoWriteGuard")

crates/gitlawb-node/tests/owner_push_default_docs.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+//! #26 Split PR 4 — `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` default is consistent across surfaces.
+//!
+//! Reviewer 2 (2026-08-28) closed PR #224 with a P2 finding: SECURITY.md and
+//! README.md both stated the default was `false`, while `Config::enforce_owner_push`
+//! declared `default_value_t = true` and the runtime, .env.example, and the env
+//! var table on the README all agreed with the code. Two operator-facing
+//! surfaces lied about the authorization policy. PR #330 flipped the code
+//! default and updated .env.example / README env table / docs/RUN-A-NODE.md,
+//! but missed these two prose mentions.
+//!
+//! This guard pins the documentation and example surfaces together. Each one
+//! is read off the working tree at test time, not a copy in the binary, so a
+//! revert of the doc edit turns it red:
+//!
+//! 1. `SECURITY.md` says the default is `true`.
+//! 2. `README.md` says the default is `true` in the known-limitations prose.
+//! 3. `README.md` says the default is `true` in the env-var table row.
+//! 4. `.env.example` sets `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=true`.
+//!
+//! The runtime declared default (`Config::enforce_owner_push`'s
+//! `default_value_t = true`) is protected by the
+//! `enforce_owner_push_is_declared_true_independent_of_the_environment`
+//! unit test in `config.rs`, which reads the parser directly and is
+//! env-independent. The two checks together cover the surfaces that
+//! produced the original doc-vs-code drift; this guard cannot reach into
+//! the binary crate's `Config` type (it is private to the bin target,
+//! which has no `lib.rs`) without a larger refactor, so the contract is
+//! stated as the four documentation/example surfaces above.
+//!
+//! The four are checked independently. A check that just verified "at least
+//! one surface says true" would pass while a stale SECURITY.md lied; a check
+//! that only verified the binary would not catch the doc drift that
+//! produced this finding in the first place.
+
+use std::path::Path;
+
+fn read(rel: &str) -> String {
+    let p = Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"))
+        .join("..")
+        .join("..")
+        .join(rel);
+    std::fs::read_to_string(&p).unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("read {}: {e}", p.display()))
+}
+
+/// Pin the prose mentions of `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` so a future doc
+/// edit cannot reintroduce the "defaults to false" wording the reviewer
+/// flagged. The wording in the test is what the docs MUST say about the
+/// default; absence of any prose mention is also a fail because operators
+/// rely on the docs to learn the default.
+#[test]
+fn security_md_states_owner_push_default_is_true() {
+    let security = read("SECURITY.md");
+    let section = section_after(&security, "### Repository write authorization defaults")
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("SECURITY.md is missing the owner-push section"));
+
+    assert!(
+        section.contains("defaults to `true`"),
+        "SECURITY.md owner-push section must state the default is true. \
+         Found:\n{section}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !section_claims_default_is_false(&section),
+        "SECURITY.md owner-push section must not claim the default is false. \
+         Found:\n{section}"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn readme_known_limitations_states_owner_push_default_is_true() {
+    let readme = read("README.md");
+    let limitations = section_after(&readme, "Known limitations:")
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("README.md is missing the Known limitations: section"));
+
+    // The owner-push line is one bullet in the limitations list. Pull the
+    // single line that mentions the env var so the assertion is local to
+    // the claim, not a substring of unrelated text.
+    let line = limitations
+        .lines()
+        .find(|l| l.contains("GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH"))
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| {
+            panic!(
+                "README.md Known limitations must mention GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH.\n\
+                 Got:\n{limitations}"
+            )
+        });
+
+    assert!(
+        line.contains("defaults to `true`") || line.contains("defaults to true"),
+        "README Known-limitations owner-push bullet must state the default is true. \
+         Found:\n{line}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !section_claims_default_is_false(line),
+        "README Known-limitations owner-push bullet must not claim the default is false. \
+         Found:\n{line}"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn readme_env_var_table_states_owner_push_default_is_true() {
+    let readme = read("README.md");
+    let line = readme
+        .lines()
+        .find(|l| l.contains("GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH") && l.contains("|"))
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| {
+            panic!("README.md is missing the env-var-table row for GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH")
+        });
+
+    assert!(
+        line.contains("Defaults to `true`") || line.contains("defaults to `true`"),
+        "README env-var-table row for GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH must state the default is true. \
+         Found:\n{line}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !section_claims_default_is_false(line),
+        "README env-var-table row for GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH must not claim the default is false. \
+         Found:\n{line}"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn env_example_sets_owner_push_true() {
+    let env = read(".env.example");
+    let line = env
+        .lines()
+        .find(|l| l.trim_start().starts_with("GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH"))
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!(".env.example is missing GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH"));
+
+    assert!(
+        line.contains("=true"),
+        ".env.example GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH must be set to true. Found:\n{line}"
+    );
+}
+
+/// A claim that the default is false can hide in many phrasings. Match the
+/// forms that have appeared in the wild on this branch: "defaults to `false`",
+/// "defaults to false", "default is false", "is `false` for compatibility",
+/// "is false for compatibility". The match is intentionally narrow — false
+/// positives would suppress a real doc edit.
+fn section_claims_default_is_false(section: &str) -> bool {
+    let lower = section.to_ascii_lowercase();
+    lower.contains("defaults to `false`")
+        || lower.contains("defaults to false")
+        || lower.contains("default is `false`")
+        || lower.contains("default is false")
+        || (lower.contains("`false`") && lower.contains("for compatibility"))
+}
+
+/// Return the prose after a marker up to the next heading boundary. The
+/// marker is normally a markdown heading (e.g. `### Section`); if it has
+/// no `#` prefix it is treated as a plain-text marker and the slice is
+/// bounded by the next heading of any level. This matters because a
+/// plain-text marker would otherwise produce `header_level = 0`, making
+/// the same-or-higher-level stop condition unsatisfiable and letting the
+/// slice run to EOF.
+fn section_after(doc: &str, heading: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let start = doc.find(heading)?;
+    let after = &doc[start..];
+    let header_level = heading.chars().take_while(|c| *c == '#').count();
+
+    // Skip past the heading line itself.
+    let body_start = after.find('\n')? + 1;
+    let body = &after[body_start..];
+
+    // Stop at the next heading of the same or higher level, or at the next
+    // heading of any level when the marker had no `#` prefix.
+    let mut end = body.len();
+    for line in body.lines() {
+        let level = line.chars().take_while(|c| *c == '#').count();
+        if level > 0 && (header_level == 0 || level <= header_level) {
+            end = line.as_ptr() as usize - body.as_ptr() as usize;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    Some(body[..end].to_string())
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/tests/p2p_key_startup_policy.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,637 @@
+//! Which p2p key-storage failures stop the node, and which leave HTTP up.
+//!
+//! The two domains are decided by different code at different phases, so the
+//! only honest proof is at the process boundary: spawn the real binary and
+//! watch what it does. A helper's returned error says nothing about whether
+//! `main` treated it as fatal.
+//!
+//! Every row also asserts the key tree is byte-identical afterwards. A refusal
+//! that mutates storage on its way out is its own defect, and a returned error
+//! cannot show that.
+//!
+//! No database: `DATABASE_URL` points at a closed port on purpose, so a row
+//! that reaches the degraded server proves the outcome is observable without
+//! Postgres. That is what makes the port-zero no-I/O guarantee testable at all.
+
+#![cfg(unix)]
+
+use std::io::{BufRead, BufReader, Read, Write};
+use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::process::{Child, Command, Stdio};
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+/// Wall clock, never an iteration count: a fixed loop count starves on a slow
+/// or loaded machine and turns a real pass into a flake.
+const DEADLINE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);
+
+/// Kills the child on every exit path, including a panicking assertion.
+///
+/// Without this a failing row leaves a node behind that retries its database
+/// connection forever, holding the row's tempdir open. The first run of this
+/// file did exactly that, and the leak is invisible until something else in
+/// the suite gets slow.
+struct ChildGuard(Child);
+
+impl ChildGuard {
+    /// The tracing subscriber writes to STDOUT; only anyhow's final error
+    /// print goes to stderr. A row that watches one stream sees half the
+    /// story, so both are read.
+    fn take_stdout(&mut self) -> std::process::ChildStdout {
+        self.0.stdout.take().expect("stdout piped")
+    }
+
+    fn take_stderr(&mut self) -> std::process::ChildStderr {
+        self.0.stderr.take().expect("stderr piped")
+    }
+}
+
+impl Drop for ChildGuard {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        let _ = self.0.kill();
+        let _ = self.0.wait();
+    }
+}
+
+/// `(path, is_dir, is_symlink, mode, len)` for everything under `root`, sorted.
+/// Taken before and after each row so a refusal that creates, chmods, or
+/// deletes anything fails the row.
+fn snapshot(root: &Path) -> Vec<String> {
+    fn walk(dir: &Path, out: &mut Vec<String>) {
+        let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(dir) else {
+            return;
+        };
+        for e in entries.flatten() {
+            let p = e.path();
+            let Ok(md) = std::fs::symlink_metadata(&p) else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            out.push(format!(
+                "{} dir={} link={} mode={:04o} len={}",
+                p.display(),
+                md.is_dir(),
+                md.is_symlink(),
+                md.permissions().mode() & 0o7777,
+                if md.is_file() { md.len() } else { 0 }
+            ));
+            if md.is_dir() && !md.is_symlink() {
+                walk(&p, out);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    walk(root, &mut out);
+    out.sort();
+    out
+}
+
+struct Row {
+    /// Sandbox the row owns: HOME, repos, cwd and the key tree all live here.
+    home: tempfile::TempDir,
+}
+
+impl Row {
+    /// The only directory the no-mutation assertions watch.
+    fn tree(&self) -> PathBuf {
+        self.home.path().join("keytree")
+    }
+}
+
+impl Row {
+    fn new() -> Row {
+        let home = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
+        std::fs::set_permissions(home.path(), std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700))
+            .expect("chmod home");
+        // Created here, before any row takes its `before` snapshot, so the
+        // no-mutation assertions measure what the NODE did and not what this
+        // harness set up.
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(home.path().join("repos")).expect("repos dir");
+        // The p2p key tree lives in its own subdirectory so the no-mutation
+        // assertions can watch exactly it. HOME also holds `.gitlawb`, which
+        // the node creates for its NODE identity on every start; measuring the
+        // whole home would read that legitimate write as a p2p storage
+        // mutation.
+        let tree = home.path().join("keytree");
+        std::fs::create_dir(&tree).expect("key tree");
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&tree, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700))
+            .expect("chmod key tree");
+        Row { home }
+    }
+
+    fn spawn(&self, p2p_key: &str, p2p_port: &str, cwd: &Path) -> ChildGuard {
+        self.spawn_env(p2p_key, p2p_port, cwd, &[])
+    }
+
+    fn spawn_env(
+        &self,
+        p2p_key: &str,
+        p2p_port: &str,
+        cwd: &Path,
+        extra: &[(&str, &str)],
+    ) -> ChildGuard {
+        let repos = self.home.path().join("repos");
+        let mut cmd = Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_gitlawb-node"));
+        cmd.env_clear()
+            .env("PATH", std::env::var("PATH").unwrap_or_default())
+            // The subscriber is built from the default env filter, so with a
+            // cleared environment the node logs nothing at all and every
+            // assertion here reads as a timeout with empty output. The rows
+            // are about which log lines appear, so the filter is part of the
+            // fixture, not incidental setup.
+            .env("RUST_LOG", "info")
+            .env("HOME", self.home.path())
+            .env("GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR", &repos)
+            .env("GITLAWB_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+            // Ephemeral: the real port is read back from the ready log.
+            .env("GITLAWB_PORT", "0")
+            // A closed port, so the node stays on the degraded path for the
+            // whole row instead of ever reaching a database.
+            .env("DATABASE_URL", "postgres://127.0.0.1:1/nonexistent")
+            .env("GITLAWB_P2P_PORT", p2p_port)
+            .env("GITLAWB_P2P_KEY", p2p_key)
+            .env("GITLAWB_METRICS_ADDR", "")
+            .current_dir(cwd)
+            .stdout(Stdio::piped())
+            .stderr(Stdio::piped());
+        for (k, v) in extra {
+            cmd.env(k, v);
+        }
+        cmd.spawn().map(ChildGuard).expect("spawn gitlawb-node")
+    }
+}
+
+/// Read the child's stderr until `needle` appears, the stream ends, or the
+/// deadline passes. Returns everything read.
+///
+/// The read runs on its own thread feeding a channel, and the deadline is
+/// enforced with `recv_timeout`. Checking elapsed time between blocking
+/// `read_line` calls does NOT work: a child that goes quiet blocks the read
+/// forever and the check never runs, so the deadline looks present and cannot
+/// fire. The first version of this file did that and hung for minutes on a row
+/// that was supposed to fail in fifteen seconds.
+fn read_until(child: &mut ChildGuard, needle: &str) -> (bool, String) {
+    read_until_all(child, &[needle])
+}
+
+/// Read until EVERY needle has appeared, the stream ends, or the deadline
+/// passes.
+///
+/// Waiting on a single line is a race here: the degraded server logs "ready"
+/// from a spawned task while the p2p gate logs its verdict from the main task,
+/// so whichever the reader stops at first can leave the other uncaptured. That
+/// made this file pass or fail depending on scheduling.
+fn read_until_all(child: &mut ChildGuard, needles: &[&str]) -> (bool, String) {
+    let stdout = child.take_stdout();
+    let (tx, rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::<String>();
+    std::thread::spawn(move || {
+        let mut reader = BufReader::new(stdout);
+        loop {
+            let mut line = String::new();
+            match reader.read_line(&mut line) {
+                Ok(0) | Err(_) => break,
+                Ok(_) => {
+                    if tx.send(line).is_err() {
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    });
+
+    let mut acc = String::new();
+    let start = Instant::now();
+    loop {
+        if needles.iter().all(|n| acc.contains(n)) {
+            return (true, acc);
+        }
+        let left = match DEADLINE.checked_sub(start.elapsed()) {
+            Some(d) if !d.is_zero() => d,
+            _ => return (false, acc),
+        };
+        match rx.recv_timeout(left) {
+            Ok(line) => acc.push_str(&line),
+            // Sender gone: the stream ended. One last check, then give up.
+            Err(std::sync::mpsc::RecvTimeoutError::Disconnected) => {
+                return (needles.iter().all(|n| acc.contains(n)), acc)
+            }
+            Err(std::sync::mpsc::RecvTimeoutError::Timeout) => return (false, acc),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn wait_for_exit(child: &mut ChildGuard) -> (std::process::ExitStatus, String) {
+    // Both streams: the refusal reason is anyhow's stderr print, while
+    // "binding HTTP listener" is a tracing line on stdout, and the fatal rows
+    // assert on one of each.
+    let mut out = String::new();
+    let mut o = child.take_stdout();
+    let mut e = child.take_stderr();
+    let reader = std::thread::spawn(move || {
+        let mut buf = String::new();
+        let _ = o.read_to_string(&mut buf);
+        buf
+    });
+    let _ = e.read_to_string(&mut out);
+    let status = child.0.wait().expect("wait");
+    out.push_str(&reader.join().unwrap_or_default());
+    (status, out)
+}
+
+/// Strip ANSI escapes: the subscriber colourises even when piped, which would
+/// otherwise sit between `addr=` and the value.
+fn strip_ansi(s: &str) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
+    let mut chars = s.chars();
+    while let Some(c) = chars.next() {
+        if c == '\u{1b}' {
+            for c2 in chars.by_ref() {
+                if c2.is_ascii_alphabetic() {
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        } else {
+            out.push(c);
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+/// A lexically invalid value must stop the process before the listener binds.
+fn assert_fatal_before_bind(row: &Row, key: &str, cwd: &Path) {
+    let before = snapshot(&row.tree());
+    let mut child = row.spawn(key, "7546", cwd);
+    let (status, err) = wait_for_exit(&mut child);
+
+    assert!(
+        !status.success(),
+        "key={key:?} must exit non-zero\n--- stderr ---\n{err}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        err.contains("invalid configuration"),
+        "key={key:?} must fail as invalid configuration\n--- stderr ---\n{err}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !err.contains("binding HTTP listener"),
+        "key={key:?} must be refused BEFORE the listener binds\n--- stderr ---\n{err}"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        snapshot(&row.tree()),
+        before,
+        "key={key:?}: a configuration refusal must not touch the key tree"
+    );
+}
+
+/// A live storage fault must leave HTTP serving with p2p off, and must not
+/// mutate the tree on its way to that verdict.
+fn assert_degrades_with_http_up(row: &Row, key: &str, cwd: &Path, label: &str) {
+    let before = snapshot(&row.tree());
+    let mut child = row.spawn(key, "7546", cwd);
+    let (found, log) = read_until_all(
+        &mut child,
+        &[
+            "degraded HTTP server ready",
+            "failed to load p2p identity key",
+        ],
+    );
+    assert!(
+        found,
+        "{label}: the node must bind and serve while p2p is off\n--- stderr ---\n{log}"
+    );
+    // The operator docs promise a specific signal, so pin it here: the level,
+    // the stable event name, and the message. A degrade that logs at warn or
+    // renames the event silently breaks the alert those docs tell operators to
+    // build, and asserting only the prose would not notice.
+    let clean_log = strip_ansi(&log);
+    let signal = clean_log
+        .lines()
+        .find(|l| l.contains("failed to load p2p identity key"))
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{label}: the p2p failure must be logged\n{clean_log}"));
+    assert!(
+        signal.contains("ERROR"),
+        "{label}: the p2p failure must be logged at error level, got: {signal}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        signal.contains("p2p_identity_key_load_failed"),
+        "{label}: the p2p failure must carry the documented event name, got: {signal}"
+    );
+
+    let clean = strip_ansi(&log);
+    let addr = clean
+        .lines()
+        .find(|l| l.contains("degraded HTTP server ready"))
+        .and_then(|l| l.rsplit("addr=").next())
+        .map(|a| {
+            a.trim()
+                .trim_start_matches("Some(")
+                .trim_matches(|c| c == '"' || c == ')')
+        })
+        .and_then(|a| a.parse::<std::net::SocketAddr>().ok())
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{label}: could not parse the bound address from {clean}"));
+
+    // A served response, any status: the degraded server answers 503, which is
+    // still proof the port is up and answering.
+    let mut sock = std::net::TcpStream::connect(addr).expect("connect to the degraded server");
+    sock.set_read_timeout(Some(DEADLINE)).unwrap();
+    sock.write_all(b"GET /health HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n")
+        .expect("send request");
+    let mut resp = String::new();
+    let _ = sock.read_to_string(&mut resp);
+    assert!(
+        resp.starts_with("HTTP/1.1 "),
+        "{label}: the degraded server must answer, got {resp:?}"
+    );
+
+    drop(child);
+    assert_eq!(
+        snapshot(&row.tree()),
+        before,
+        "{label}: a storage refusal must not mutate the key tree"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn lexically_invalid_key_paths_stop_the_node_before_it_binds() {
+    for key in [
+        "p2p.key",
+        "./p2p.key",
+        "a/../p2p.key",
+        "../p2p.key",
+        "/p2p.key",
+        "keys/",
+        "~/",
+        "~//etc/p2p.key",
+        "~/../x/p2p.key",
+    ] {
+        let row = Row::new();
+        let cwd = row.home.path().to_path_buf();
+        assert_fatal_before_bind(&row, key, &cwd);
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn live_storage_faults_leave_http_up_with_p2p_off() {
+    // Symlinked final parent.
+    {
+        let row = Row::new();
+        let real = row.tree().join("real");
+        std::fs::create_dir(&real).unwrap();
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&real, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
+        let link = row.tree().join("keys");
+        std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&real, &link).unwrap();
+        let key = link.join("p2p.key");
+        let cwd = row.home.path().to_path_buf();
+        assert_degrades_with_http_up(&row, key.to_str().unwrap(), &cwd, "symlinked parent");
+    }
+
+    // Regular file where the key directory should be.
+    {
+        let row = Row::new();
+        let file = row.tree().join("keys");
+        std::fs::write(&file, b"not a directory").unwrap();
+        let key = file.join("p2p.key");
+        let cwd = row.home.path().to_path_buf();
+        assert_degrades_with_http_up(&row, key.to_str().unwrap(), &cwd, "regular-file parent");
+    }
+
+    // Unreadable parent: an inspection error, the purest instance of a live
+    // fault that used to be reported as invalid configuration.
+    {
+        let row = Row::new();
+        let parent = row.tree().join("locked");
+        std::fs::create_dir(&parent).unwrap();
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&parent, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o000)).unwrap();
+        let key = parent.join("keys").join("p2p.key");
+        let cwd = row.home.path().to_path_buf();
+        assert_degrades_with_http_up(&row, key.to_str().unwrap(), &cwd, "unreadable parent");
+        // Restore so the tempdir can be cleaned up.
+        let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(&parent, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700));
+    }
+
+    // World-writable non-sticky ancestor: already the degrade class today, kept
+    // so the row set covers both sides of the policy.
+    {
+        let row = Row::new();
+        let anc = row.tree().join("open");
+        std::fs::create_dir(&anc).unwrap();
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&anc, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o777)).unwrap();
+        let key = anc.join("keys").join("p2p.key");
+        let cwd = row.home.path().to_path_buf();
+        assert_degrades_with_http_up(&row, key.to_str().unwrap(), &cwd, "world-writable ancestor");
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn port_zero_does_no_key_storage_io_at_all() {
+    // A lexically invalid path that would be fatal with p2p enabled.
+    {
+        let row = Row::new();
+        let before = snapshot(&row.tree());
+        let cwd = row.home.path().to_path_buf();
+        let mut child = row.spawn("p2p.key", "0", &cwd);
+        let (found, log) = read_until(&mut child, "p2p disabled");
+        assert!(
+            found,
+            "port zero must bypass key handling entirely\n--- stderr ---\n{log}"
+        );
+        drop(child);
+        assert_eq!(
+            snapshot(&row.tree()),
+            before,
+            "port zero must not touch the key tree"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // A hostile tree that would degrade with p2p enabled.
+    {
+        let row = Row::new();
+        let real = row.tree().join("real");
+        std::fs::create_dir(&real).unwrap();
+        let link = row.tree().join("keys");
+        std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&real, &link).unwrap();
+        let before = snapshot(&row.tree());
+        let cwd = row.home.path().to_path_buf();
+        let key: PathBuf = link.join("p2p.key");
+        let mut child = row.spawn(key.to_str().unwrap(), "0", &cwd);
+        let (found, log) = read_until(&mut child, "p2p disabled");
+        assert!(
+            found,
+            "port zero must bypass a hostile tree too\n--- stderr ---\n{log}"
+        );
+        drop(child);
+        assert_eq!(
+            snapshot(&row.tree()),
+            before,
+            "port zero must not touch a hostile key tree"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+/// A terminal `.` is a directory-valued spelling. Path drops it, so the load
+/// path would otherwise chmod the parent and publish a file named `keys`.
+#[test]
+fn terminal_dot_key_path_is_fatal_and_does_not_mutate() {
+    // Absent leaf: `/data/keys/.` must not create `keys` as a file or chmod `/data`.
+    {
+        let row = Row::new();
+        let data = row.tree().join("data");
+        std::fs::create_dir(&data).unwrap();
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&data, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+        let key = format!("{}/keys/.", data.display());
+        let cwd = row.home.path().to_path_buf();
+        assert_fatal_before_bind(&row, &key, &cwd);
+        let mode = std::fs::metadata(&data).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o7777;
+        assert_eq!(mode, 0o755, "rejection must not chmod the parent");
+        assert!(
+            !data.join("keys").exists(),
+            "rejection must not create a file named keys"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // Existing directory at the would-be leaf: still boot-fatal, directory untouched.
+    {
+        let row = Row::new();
+        let data = row.tree().join("data");
+        let keys = data.join("keys");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&keys).unwrap();
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&data, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&keys, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
+        let key = format!("{}/.", keys.display());
+        let cwd = row.home.path().to_path_buf();
+        assert_fatal_before_bind(&row, &key, &cwd);
+        assert!(
+            keys.is_dir(),
+            "the existing keys directory must remain a directory"
+        );
+        let data_mode = std::fs::metadata(&data).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o7777;
+        let keys_mode = std::fs::metadata(&keys).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o7777;
+        assert_eq!(data_mode, 0o755, "rejection must not chmod the parent");
+        assert_eq!(
+            keys_mode, 0o700,
+            "rejection must not chmod the existing keys dir"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+/// GITLAWB_KEY has the same Path-retarget hole as GITLAWB_P2P_KEY: a terminal
+/// `.` would publish a file named `keys` under `data`. Fatal before bind, and
+/// the parent tree is unchanged. p2p is off so it cannot chmod a shared dir.
+#[test]
+fn identity_terminal_dot_is_fatal_and_does_not_mutate() {
+    let row = Row::new();
+    let data = row.home.path().join("data");
+    std::fs::create_dir(&data).unwrap();
+    std::fs::set_permissions(&data, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+    let key = format!("{}/keys/.", data.display());
+    let cwd = row.home.path().to_path_buf();
+    let mut child = row.spawn_env("p2p.key", "0", &cwd, &[("GITLAWB_KEY", key.as_str())]);
+    let (status, err) = wait_for_exit(&mut child);
+    assert!(
+        !status.success(),
+        "GITLAWB_KEY={key:?} must exit non-zero\n--- stderr ---\n{err}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        err.contains("invalid configuration"),
+        "GITLAWB_KEY={key:?} must fail as invalid configuration\n--- stderr ---\n{err}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !err.contains("binding HTTP listener"),
+        "GITLAWB_KEY={key:?} must be refused BEFORE the listener binds\n--- stderr ---\n{err}"
+    );
+    let mode = std::fs::metadata(&data).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o7777;
+    assert_eq!(mode, 0o755, "rejection must not chmod the parent");
+    assert!(
+        !data.join("keys").exists(),
+        "rejection must not create a file named keys"
+    );
+}
+
+/// An existing 0755 identity parent is usable and must not be chmodded. p2p is
+/// off so a default `~/.gitlawb/p2p.key` cannot tighten the same directory.
+#[test]
+fn identity_existing_0755_parent_is_not_chmodded_on_boot() {
+    let row = Row::new();
+    let iddir = row.home.path().join("idparent");
+    std::fs::create_dir(&iddir).unwrap();
+    std::fs::set_permissions(&iddir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+    let key = iddir.join("identity.pem");
+    let cwd = row.home.path().to_path_buf();
+    let mut child = row.spawn_env(
+        "p2p.key",
+        "0",
+        &cwd,
+        &[("GITLAWB_KEY", key.to_str().unwrap())],
+    );
+    let (found, log) = read_until(&mut child, "degraded HTTP server ready");
+    assert!(
+        found,
+        "a 0755 identity parent must still boot\n--- stderr ---\n{log}"
+    );
+    drop(child);
+    let mode = std::fs::metadata(&iddir).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o7777;
+    assert_eq!(
+        mode, 0o755,
+        "boot must not chmod the existing identity parent"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        std::fs::metadata(&key).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o7777,
+        0o600,
+        "the identity key must be owner-only"
+    );
+}
+
+/// Creating into a world-writable identity parent is refused before bind, and
+/// the directory is left untouched.
+#[test]
+fn identity_writable_parent_is_fatal_and_unchanged() {
+    let row = Row::new();
+    let iddir = row.home.path().join("idparent");
+    std::fs::create_dir(&iddir).unwrap();
+    std::fs::set_permissions(&iddir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o777)).unwrap();
+    let key = iddir.join("identity.pem");
+    let cwd = row.home.path().to_path_buf();
+    let mut child = row.spawn_env(
+        "p2p.key",
+        "0",
+        &cwd,
+        &[("GITLAWB_KEY", key.to_str().unwrap())],
+    );
+    let (status, err) = wait_for_exit(&mut child);
+    assert!(
+        !status.success(),
+        "a writable identity parent must exit non-zero\n--- stderr ---\n{err}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !err.contains("binding HTTP listener"),
+        "a writable identity parent must be refused BEFORE the listener binds\n--- stderr ---\n{err}"
+    );
+    let mode = std::fs::metadata(&iddir).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o7777;
+    assert_eq!(mode, 0o777, "refusal must not chmod the parent");
+    assert!(!key.exists(), "refusal must not publish the identity key");
+}
+
+/// A 2700 (setgid, owner rwx) p2p key directory is repairable: boot, tighten
+/// to 0700, HTTP still comes up.
+#[test]
+fn p2p_setgid_key_directory_is_tightened_and_http_comes_up() {
+    let row = Row::new();
+    let keys = row.tree().join("keys");
+    std::fs::create_dir(&keys).unwrap();
+    std::fs::set_permissions(&keys, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o2700)).unwrap();
+    let key = keys.join("p2p.key");
+    let cwd = row.home.path().to_path_buf();
+    let mut child = row.spawn(key.to_str().unwrap(), "7546", &cwd);
+    let (found, log) = read_until_all(
+        &mut child,
+        &["degraded HTTP server ready", "generated new p2p identity"],
+    );
+    assert!(
+        found,
+        "a 2700 key directory must boot and generate a key\n--- stderr ---\n{log}"
+    );
+    drop(child);
+    let mode = std::fs::metadata(&keys).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o7777;
+    assert_eq!(
+        mode, 0o700,
+        "2700 must be normalized to 0700, found {mode:04o}"
+    );
+}

crates/gl/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "gl"
-description = "The gitlawb CLI — identity management, node control, MCP server"
+description = "The Twigpine CLI — identity management, node control, MCP server"
 version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive", "env"] }
 dirs = "5"
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
 uuid = { workspace = true }
+url = { workspace = true }
+percent-encoding = { workspace = true }
 urlencoding = "2"
 alloy = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = [
     "contract",
@@ -42,3 +44,4 @@ alloy = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = [
 mockito = "1"
 tempfile = "3"
 tokio = { workspace = true }
+ed25519-dalek = { workspace = true }

crates/gl/src/agent.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
-use serde_json::Value;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
@@ -17,7 +16,11 @@ pub struct AgentArgs {
 pub enum AgentCmd {
     /// List agents registered on a node
     List {
-        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+        #[arg(
+            long,
+            default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+            env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+        )]
         node: String,
         /// Filter by capability (e.g. git:push)
         #[arg(long)]
@@ -29,7 +32,11 @@ pub enum AgentCmd {
     Show {
         /// Agent DID or short key segment
         did: String,
-        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+        #[arg(
+            long,
+            default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+            env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+        )]
         node: String,
     },
 }
@@ -57,24 +64,16 @@ async fn cmd_list(node: String, capability: Option<String>) -> Result<()> {
         .get(&path)
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
-    let status = resp.status();
-
-    if status == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
+    // Keep the bespoke 404 hint (older node without the agents API) ahead of
+    // read_json; every other status routes through it (capped + sanitized error).
+    if resp.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
         anyhow::bail!(
             "this node does not yet support the agents API (v0.3+)\n\
              upgrade the node or check GITLAWB_NODE is pointing to the right server"
         );
     }
 
-    let body: Value = resp
-        .json()
-        .await
-        .context("invalid JSON from node — is GITLAWB_NODE correct?")?;
-
-    if !status.is_success() {
-        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
-        anyhow::bail!("list agents failed ({status}): {msg}");
-    }
+    let body = crate::http::read_json(resp, "list agents").await?;
 
     let agents = body["agents"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
 
@@ -89,7 +88,7 @@ async fn cmd_list(node: String, capability: Option<String>) -> Result<()> {
         let short = did
             .split(':')
             .next_back()
-            .map(|s| &s[..s.len().min(16)])
+            .map(|s| crate::text::truncate(s, 16))
             .unwrap_or("?");
         let trust = agent["trust_score"].as_f64().unwrap_or(0.0);
         let caps = agent["capabilities"]
@@ -117,24 +116,15 @@ async fn cmd_show(did: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
         .get(&format!("/api/v1/agents/{did}"))
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
-    let status = resp.status();
-
-    if status == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
+    // Keep the bespoke 404 hint ahead of read_json; other statuses route through it.
+    if resp.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
         anyhow::bail!(
             "agent not found, or this node does not yet support the agents API (v0.3+)\n\
              upgrade the node or check GITLAWB_NODE is pointing to the right server"
         );
     }
 
-    let agent: Value = resp
-        .json()
-        .await
-        .context("invalid JSON from node — is GITLAWB_NODE correct?")?;
-
-    if !status.is_success() {
-        let msg = agent["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
-        anyhow::bail!("agent not found ({status}): {msg}");
-    }
+    let agent = crate::http::read_json(resp, "agent").await?;
 
     let full_did = agent["did"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
     let trust = agent["trust_score"].as_f64().unwrap_or(0.0);
@@ -215,11 +205,14 @@ mod tests {
             .with_status(404)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"message":"not found"}"#)
+            .expect(1)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
         let err = cmd_list(server.url(), None).await.unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("agents API"));
+        // Prove the mocked route was actually requested; a non-matching request (mockito's 501, also non-2xx) would otherwise satisfy the error assertion vacuously.
+        _m.assert_async().await;
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -230,11 +223,14 @@ mod tests {
             .with_status(500)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"message":"internal error"}"#)
+            .expect(1)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
         let err = cmd_list(server.url(), None).await.unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("list agents failed"));
+        // Prove the mocked route was actually requested; a non-matching request (mockito's 501, also non-2xx) would otherwise satisfy the error assertion vacuously.
+        _m.assert_async().await;
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -261,6 +257,7 @@ mod tests {
             .with_status(404)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"message":"agent not found"}"#)
+            .expect(1)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
@@ -268,6 +265,8 @@ mod tests {
             .await
             .unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("agents API") || err.to_string().contains("not found"));
+        // Prove the mocked route was actually requested; a non-matching request (mockito's 501, also non-2xx) would otherwise satisfy the error assertion vacuously.
+        _m.assert_async().await;
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]

crates/gl/src/bounty.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
-use serde_json::Value;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
@@ -39,7 +38,11 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
         /// Deadline in seconds (default 7 days)
         #[arg(long)]
         deadline: Option<i64>,
-        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+        #[arg(
+            long,
+            default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+            env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+        )]
         node: String,
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
@@ -51,7 +54,11 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
         /// Filter by status: open, claimed, submitted, completed
         #[arg(long)]
         status: Option<String>,
-        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+        #[arg(
+            long,
+            default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+            env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+        )]
         node: String,
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
@@ -60,7 +67,11 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
     Show {
         /// Bounty ID
         id: String,
-        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+        #[arg(
+            long,
+            default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+            env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+        )]
         node: String,
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
@@ -72,7 +83,11 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
         /// Your wallet address for payout
         #[arg(long)]
         wallet: Option<String>,
-        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+        #[arg(
+            long,
+            default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+            env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+        )]
         node: String,
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
@@ -84,7 +99,11 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
         /// Pull request ID
         #[arg(long)]
         pr: String,
-        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+        #[arg(
+            long,
+            default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+            env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+        )]
         node: String,
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
@@ -96,7 +115,11 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
         /// On-chain payout tx hash
         #[arg(long)]
         tx_hash: Option<String>,
-        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+        #[arg(
+            long,
+            default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+            env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+        )]
         node: String,
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
@@ -105,14 +128,22 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
     Cancel {
         /// Bounty ID
         id: String,
-        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+        #[arg(
+            long,
+            default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+            env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+        )]
         node: String,
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Show bounty stats and leaderboard
     Stats {
-        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+        #[arg(
+            long,
+            default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+            env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+        )]
         node: String,
     },
 }
@@ -189,13 +220,7 @@ async fn cmd_create(
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
 
-    let status = resp.status();
-    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
-
-    if !status.is_success() {
-        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
-        anyhow::bail!("create bounty failed ({status}): {msg}");
-    }
+    let body = crate::http::read_json(resp, "create bounty").await?;
 
     let id = body["id"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
     println!("Bounty created: {id}");
@@ -231,11 +256,14 @@ async fn cmd_list(
         u
     };
 
-    let resp = client
-        .get_authed(&url)
-        .await
-        .context("failed to connect to node")?;
-    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
+    let body = crate::http::read_json(
+        client
+            .get_authed(&url)
+            .await
+            .context("failed to connect to node")?,
+        "bounties",
+    )
+    .await?;
 
     let bounties = body["bounties"].as_array();
     if let Some(arr) = bounties {
@@ -247,7 +275,7 @@ async fn cmd_list(
                 let title = b["title"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
                 let amount = b["amount"].as_i64().unwrap_or(0);
                 let st = b["status"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
-                let short_id = &id[..8.min(id.len())];
+                let short_id = crate::text::truncate(id, 8);
                 println!("{short_id}  {st:<10}  {amount:>12} $GITLAWB  {title}");
             }
         }
@@ -259,13 +287,7 @@ async fn cmd_show(id: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()>
     let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
     let resp = client.get_authed(&format!("/api/v1/bounties/{id}")).await?;
 
-    let status = resp.status();
-    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
-
-    if !status.is_success() {
-        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("not found");
-        anyhow::bail!("bounty not found: {msg}");
-    }
+    let body = crate::http::read_json(resp, "show bounty").await?;
 
     println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&body)?);
     Ok(())
@@ -289,13 +311,7 @@ async fn cmd_claim(
         )
         .await?;
 
-    let status = resp.status();
-    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
-
-    if !status.is_success() {
-        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
-        anyhow::bail!("claim failed ({status}): {msg}");
-    }
+    let _ = crate::http::read_json(resp, "claim").await?;
 
     println!("Bounty {id} claimed. Deadline starts now.");
     Ok(())
@@ -314,13 +330,7 @@ async fn cmd_submit(id: String, pr: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>)
         )
         .await?;
 
-    let status = resp.status();
-    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
-
-    if !status.is_success() {
-        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
-        anyhow::bail!("submit failed ({status}): {msg}");
-    }
+    let _ = crate::http::read_json(resp, "submit").await?;
 
     println!("Bounty {id} submitted with PR {pr}. Awaiting creator approval.");
     Ok(())
@@ -344,13 +354,7 @@ async fn cmd_approve(
         )
         .await?;
 
-    let status = resp.status();
-    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
-
-    if !status.is_success() {
-        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
-        anyhow::bail!("approve failed ({status}): {msg}");
-    }
+    let _ = crate::http::read_json(resp, "approve").await?;
 
     println!("Bounty {id} approved! Payout released to agent.");
     Ok(())
@@ -369,13 +373,7 @@ async fn cmd_cancel(id: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()
         )
         .await?;
 
-    let status = resp.status();
-    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
-
-    if !status.is_success() {
-        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
-        anyhow::bail!("cancel failed ({status}): {msg}");
-    }
+    let _ = crate::http::read_json(resp, "cancel").await?;
 
     println!("Bounty {id} cancelled. Tokens refunded.");
     Ok(())
@@ -383,8 +381,11 @@ async fn cmd_cancel(id: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()
 
 async fn cmd_stats(node: String) -> Result<()> {
     let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
-    let resp = client.get("/api/v1/bounties/stats").await?;
-    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
+    // Route through read_json so a node denial (403/404/5xx, incl. a non-JSON
+    // body) surfaces as an error instead of a fake `Bounty Stats` with every
+    // counter zeroed (#186, the denial-as-success class #123 fixes elsewhere).
+    let body =
+        crate::http::read_json(client.get("/api/v1/bounties/stats").await?, "bounty stats").await?;
 
     let open = body["open"].as_i64().unwrap_or(0);
     let claimed = body["claimed"].as_i64().unwrap_or(0);
@@ -402,7 +403,7 @@ async fn cmd_stats(node: String) -> Result<()> {
                 let did = entry["did"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
                 let count = entry["completed"].as_i64().unwrap_or(0);
                 let earned = entry["total_earned"].as_i64().unwrap_or(0);
-                let short = &did[did.len().saturating_sub(8)..];
+                let short = crate::text::truncate_suffix(did, 8);
                 println!(
                     "  {}. ...{short}  {count} bounties  {earned} $GITLAWB",
                     i + 1
@@ -521,6 +522,7 @@ mod tests {
             .with_status(404)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"message":"not found"}"#)
+            .expect(1)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
@@ -528,6 +530,8 @@ mod tests {
             .await
             .unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("not found"));
+        // Prove the mocked route was actually requested; a non-matching request (mockito's 501, also non-2xx) would otherwise satisfy the error assertion vacuously.
+        _m.assert_async().await;
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -544,4 +548,86 @@ mod tests {
 
         cmd_stats(server.url()).await.unwrap();
     }
+
+    /// #186 (F1): a node denial on the stats endpoint must surface as an error,
+    /// not print a fake `Bounty Stats` with every counter zeroed. RED before the
+    /// fix (unwrap_or_default + no status check -> Ok with zeros), GREEN after
+    /// (read_json bails on the non-2xx).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cmd_stats_surfaces_denial_not_fake_result() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/stats$".to_string()))
+            .with_status(403)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"message":"forbidden"}"#)
+            .expect(1)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let err = cmd_stats(server.url())
+            .await
+            .expect_err("a 403 must be an error, not a zeroed fake result");
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("403"), "err={err}");
+        // Pin the mock hit explicitly. The status assertion above already fails
+        // when the route does not match (mockito answers an unmatched route with
+        // 501, so "403" is absent), but that proof is incidental to mockito's
+        // fallback status; assert the hit directly so it survives a reworded
+        // assertion.
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    /// #186 (F1): the same denial-as-error behavior across the non-2xx response
+    /// classes, not just 403 — a 404 and a 500 (incl. a non-JSON body) must each
+    /// surface as an error with the status, never a zeroed fake result.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cmd_stats_surfaces_denial_across_status_classes() {
+        for (status, body, json) in [
+            (404, r#"{"message":"not found"}"#, true),
+            (500, "internal boom", false),
+        ] {
+            let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+            let mut m = server
+                .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/stats$".to_string()))
+                .with_status(status)
+                .with_body(body);
+            if json {
+                m = m.with_header("content-type", "application/json");
+            }
+            let m = m.expect(1).create_async().await;
+
+            let err = cmd_stats(server.url()).await.unwrap_err().to_string();
+            assert!(
+                err.contains(&status.to_string()),
+                "status {status} must surface as an error, got: {err}"
+            );
+            m.assert_async().await;
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cmd_list_repo_scoped_surfaces_denial_not_empty() {
+        // `gl bounty list --repo owner/name` hits the gated /repos/{o}/{n}/bounties;
+        // a 404 must Err, not silently print nothing.
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock(
+                "GET",
+                mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/repos/alice/secret/bounties".to_string()),
+            )
+            .with_status(404)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"message":"repository 'alice/secret' not found"}"#)
+            .expect(1)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let result = cmd_list(Some("alice/secret".to_string()), None, server.url(), None).await;
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "bounty list --repo must Err on a gated 404"
+        );
+        // Prove the gated repo-scoped path was actually requested: without this,
+        // an unmatched route (mockito's 501, also non-2xx) would satisfy is_err().
+        _m.assert_async().await;
+    }
 }

crates/gl/src/changelog.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::Args;
-use serde_json::Value;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
@@ -15,7 +14,11 @@ pub struct ChangelogArgs {
     /// Maximum number of events to show
     #[arg(long, default_value = "20")]
     pub limit: usize,
-    #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+        env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+    )]
     pub node: String,
     #[arg(long)]
     pub dir: Option<PathBuf>,
@@ -31,7 +34,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: ChangelogArgs) -> Result<()> {
     };
 
     if repo.is_empty() {
-        anyhow::bail!("no repo specified — pass <repo> or run from inside a gitlawb repo");
+        anyhow::bail!("no repo specified — pass <repo> or run from inside a Twigpine repo");
     }
 
     let (owner, name) = if let Some((o, n)) = repo.split_once('/') {
@@ -42,12 +45,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: ChangelogArgs) -> Result<()> {
             did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string()
         } else {
             let client = NodeClient::new(&args.node, None);
-            let info: Value = client
-                .get("/")
-                .await?
-                .json()
-                .await
-                .context("failed to fetch node info")?;
+            let info = crate::http::read_json(client.get("/").await?, "node info").await?;
             let did = info["did"].as_str().context("node missing DID")?;
             did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(did).to_string()
         };
@@ -64,13 +62,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: ChangelogArgs) -> Result<()> {
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
 
-    let status = resp.status();
-    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
-
-    if !status.is_success() {
-        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
-        anyhow::bail!("changelog failed ({status}): {msg}");
-    }
+    let body = crate::http::read_json(resp, "changelog").await?;
 
     let events = body["events"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
 
@@ -83,14 +75,14 @@ pub async fn run(args: ChangelogArgs) -> Result<()> {
 
     for event in &events {
         let ts = event["timestamp"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
-        let date = &ts[..ts.len().min(10)];
+        let date = crate::text::truncate(ts, 10);
 
         match event["type"].as_str().unwrap_or("") {
             "commit" => {
                 let sha = event["sha"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
                 let msg = event["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
                 let first_line = msg.lines().next().unwrap_or(msg);
-                let short_sha = &sha[..sha.len().min(8)];
+                let short_sha = crate::text::truncate(sha, 8);
                 println!("  {date}  commit      {short_sha}  {first_line}");
             }
             "pr_merged" => {
@@ -212,6 +204,7 @@ mod tests {
             .with_status(404)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"message":"repo not found"}"#)
+            .expect(1)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
@@ -223,6 +216,8 @@ mod tests {
         };
         let err = run(args).await.unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("changelog failed"));
+        // Prove the mocked route was actually requested; a non-matching request (mockito's 501, also non-2xx) would otherwise satisfy the error assertion vacuously.
+        _m.assert_async().await;
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -270,4 +265,31 @@ mod tests {
         let err = rt.block_on(run(args)).unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("no repo specified"));
     }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn resolve_via_run_surfaces_denial() {
+        // A slash-free repo with an empty identity dir forces the inline GET /
+        // node-info fetch during resolution. A gated 404 there must Err (surfacing
+        // the status), proving the read_json conversion is load-bearing.
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap(); // empty, no identity.pem, forces the GET / branch
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/")
+            .with_status(404)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"message":"denied"}"#)
+            .expect(1)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let err = run(ChangelogArgs {
+            repo: Some("noslash".to_string()),
+            limit: 20,
+            node: server.url(),
+            dir: Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("404"), "got: {err}");
+        _m.assert_async().await;
+    }
 }

crates/gl/src/clone.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! `gl clone`: clean partial clone of a gitlawb repo with private subtrees.
+//! `gl clone`: clean partial clone of a Twigpine repo with private subtrees.
 //!
 //! A repo may withhold blob content under some path globs from the caller
 //! (Phase 3). The resulting pack is not closed under reachability, so a stock
@@ -76,7 +76,11 @@ pub struct CloneArgs {
     #[arg(long)]
     pub branch: Option<String>,
 
-    #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+        env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+    )]
     pub node: String,
 
     /// Arweave gateway for B3 manifest discovery/fetch when a node cannot supply
@@ -159,8 +163,8 @@ pub fn setup_partial_clone(
 
     if withheld_globs.is_empty() {
         match branch {
-            Some(b) => git_global(&["clone", "-q", "--branch", b, remote_url, dest_str])?,
-            None => git_global(&["clone", "-q", remote_url, dest_str])?,
+            Some(b) => git_global(&["clone", "-q", "--branch", b, "--", remote_url, dest_str])?,
+            None => git_global(&["clone", "-q", "--", remote_url, dest_str])?,
         }
         return Ok(());
     }
@@ -170,6 +174,7 @@ pub fn setup_partial_clone(
         "-q",
         "--filter=blob:none",
         "--no-checkout",
+        "--",
         remote_url,
         dest_str,
     ])?;
@@ -384,7 +389,7 @@ async fn recover_encrypted_blobs(
         let plaintext = match open_blob(&envelope, keypair) {
             Ok(p) => p,
             Err(e) => {
-                eprintln!("warning: could not decrypt {oid}: {e}");
+                emit_warning(&format!("warning: could not decrypt {oid}: {e}"));
                 continue;
             }
         };
@@ -402,7 +407,9 @@ async fn recover_encrypted_blobs(
                 recovered.push(p.clone());
             }
         } else {
-            eprintln!("warning: recovered blob {oid} hashed to {written}; discarding");
+            emit_warning(&format!(
+                "warning: recovered blob {oid} hashed to {written}; discarding"
+            ));
         }
     }
     Ok(recovered)
@@ -574,7 +581,7 @@ fn merge_manifests(
         .collect()
 }
 
-/// Option B3 fallback recovery, with no dependency on a gitlawb node API. Query
+/// Option B3 fallback recovery, with no dependency on a Twigpine node API. Query
 /// the Arweave gateway for this repo's encrypted manifests, merge them, and for
 /// each blob still missing locally that the caller can decrypt, pull the envelope
 /// from a public IPFS gateway, decrypt, and install it as a loose object. Returns
@@ -800,7 +807,9 @@ async fn recover_from_arweave(
                 recovered.push(p.clone());
             }
         } else {
-            eprintln!("warning: recovered blob {oid} hashed to {written}; discarding");
+            emit_warning(&format!(
+                "warning: recovered blob {oid} hashed to {written}; discarding"
+            ));
         }
     }
     Ok(recovered)
@@ -1086,6 +1095,85 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn setup_partial_clone_plain_without_withheld_paths() {
+        let (td, url) = bare_remote(&[("file.txt", b"hello\n")]);
+        let dest = td.path().join("dest");
+        setup_partial_clone(&dest, &url, &[], &[], None).unwrap();
+        assert!(dest.join("file.txt").exists());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn setup_partial_clone_with_branch_without_withheld_paths() {
+        let (td, url) = bare_remote(&[("file.txt", b"hello\n")]);
+        let branch_out = Command::new("git")
+            .args([
+                "-C",
+                td.path().join("origin").to_str().unwrap(),
+                "branch",
+                "--show-current",
+            ])
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        let branch = String::from_utf8(branch_out.stdout)
+            .unwrap()
+            .trim()
+            .to_string();
+        let dest = td.path().join("dest");
+        setup_partial_clone(&dest, &url, &[], &[], Some(&branch)).unwrap();
+        assert!(dest.join("file.txt").exists());
+    }
+
+    /// #374: every `setup_partial_clone` shape interpolates `remote_url` into a
+    /// `git clone` argv. The `--` delimiter is what forces an option-shaped
+    /// remote to be read as a repository rather than parsed as an option.
+    ///
+    /// The assertion is on git's own words — `repository '<value>'`, single-quoted
+    /// — and not merely on the value appearing somewhere in the error. `git_global`
+    /// formats its failure as `git {args:?} failed: {stderr}`, so the injected
+    /// string is already present in the debug-printed argv whether or not the
+    /// delimiter is there; asserting on containment alone would pass with `--`
+    /// deleted. Undelimited, git consumes the value as an option, leaving the
+    /// destination as the only positional, and names *that* instead
+    /// (`repository '<dest>' does not exist`) — so this goes red without the fix.
+    ///
+    /// The payload carries no `:` or space: a colon would make git read the
+    /// argument as an ssh-style `host:path` URL and report a hostname, which is a
+    /// different parse.
+    fn assert_option_shaped_remote_is_a_repository(withheld: &[String], branch: Option<&str>) {
+        let td = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let dest = td.path().join("dest");
+        let injected = "--upload-pack=false";
+
+        let err = setup_partial_clone(&dest, injected, withheld, &[], branch)
+            .expect_err("an option-shaped remote is not a repository and must fail")
+            .to_string();
+
+        assert!(
+            err.contains(&format!("repository '{injected}'")),
+            "git must name the argument as the repository, not consume it as an option: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn plain_clone_never_parses_a_remote_as_a_git_option() {
+        assert_option_shaped_remote_is_a_repository(&[], None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn branch_clone_never_parses_a_remote_as_a_git_option() {
+        // Pins that `--branch <b>` stays ahead of the delimiter: if `--` were moved
+        // before `--branch`, git would read the branch name as a positional instead.
+        assert_option_shaped_remote_is_a_repository(&[], Some("main"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sparse_clone_never_parses_a_remote_as_a_git_option() {
+        // The withheld-globs arm is a separate argv construction
+        // (`--filter=blob:none --no-checkout`) and needs its own proof.
+        assert_option_shaped_remote_is_a_repository(&["/secret/**".to_string()], None);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn sparse_patterns_subtree_and_exact() {
         assert_eq!(sparse_patterns("/secret/**"), vec!["/secret/".to_string()]);

crates/gl/src/doctor.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-//! `gl doctor` — check your gitlawb installation and connectivity.
+//! `gl doctor` — check your Twigpine installation and connectivity.
 //!
 //! Checks:
 //!   1. Identity        — ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem exists, DID parseable
 //!   2. Registration    — ~/.gitlawb/ucan.json exists (registered with a node)
-//!   3. GITLAWB_NODE    — env var is set to a non-localhost URL
-//!   4. Node            — GITLAWB_NODE is reachable (default: https://node.gitlawb.com)
+//!   3. GITLAWB_NODE    — env var points at a public node (unset is advisory)
+//!   4. Node            — GITLAWB_NODE is reachable (default: https://node.twigpine.com)
 //!   5. git helper      — git-remote-gitlawb is in PATH
 //!   6. git             — git is installed
 //!   7. version         — gl is up to date with latest GitHub release
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 
-const PUBLIC_NODE: &str = "https://node.gitlawb.com";
+const PUBLIC_NODE: &str = "https://node.twigpine.com";
 const GITHUB_API_BASE: &str = "https://api.github.com";
 
 #[derive(Args)]
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ pub struct DoctorArgs {
     #[arg(long, default_value = PUBLIC_NODE, env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
     pub node: String,
 
-    /// Identity directory (default: the parent of $GITLAWB_KEY, else ~/.gitlawb)
+    /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
     #[arg(long)]
     pub dir: Option<PathBuf>,
 }
@@ -70,21 +70,19 @@ impl Check {
 }
 
 pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
-    println!("gl doctor — checking your gitlawb setup");
+    println!("gl doctor — checking your Twigpine setup");
     println!();
 
-    // The same resolver every other command uses. `doctor` reporting on
-    // `~/.gitlawb` while `gl register` writes to the parent of `GITLAWB_KEY` would
-    // make the one command whose job is to explain a broken setup the one that
-    // misreports it.
-    let args_dir = args.dir.clone();
-    let dir = crate::identity::gitlawb_dir(args.dir)?;
+    let dir = args.dir.unwrap_or_else(|| {
+        dirs::home_dir()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."))
+            .join(".gitlawb")
+    });
 
     let mut checks = Vec::new();
-    let mut all_ok = true;
 
     // ── 1. Identity ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    let pem_path = crate::identity::key_path_for(args_dir.as_deref())?;
+    let pem_path = dir.join("identity.pem");
     if pem_path.exists() {
         match std::fs::read_to_string(&pem_path)
             .ok()
@@ -142,32 +140,16 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
     }
 
     // ── 3. GITLAWB_NODE env var ───────────────────────────────────────────
-    match std::env::var("GITLAWB_NODE") {
-        // A loopback host is a legitimate setup (self-hosted node, dev
-        // harness) — the connectivity check below fails loudly if it is not
-        // actually reachable, so don't red-flag the configuration itself.
-        Ok(v) if is_loopback_url(&v) => {
-            checks.push(Check::pass(
-                "GITLAWB_NODE",
-                format!(
-                    "{v} (local node — intentional for self-hosting/dev; unset to target the public network)"
-                ),
-            ));
-        }
-        Ok(v) if !v.is_empty() => {
-            checks.push(Check::pass("GITLAWB_NODE", v.to_string()));
-        }
-        _ => {
-            checks.push(Check::fail(
-                "GITLAWB_NODE",
-                "not set — git-remote-gitlawb will fall back to http://127.0.0.1:7545",
-                "export GITLAWB_NODE=https://node.gitlawb.com",
-            ));
-        }
-    }
+    checks.push(gitlawb_node_env_check(
+        std::env::var("GITLAWB_NODE").ok().as_deref(),
+    ));
 
     // ── 4. Node connectivity ──────────────────────────────────────────────
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&args.node, None);
+    // GITLAWB_NODE="" binds args.node to "" through clap, and check 3 groups
+    // empty with unset. The probe must apply the same normalization or it
+    // would dial "" and Fail while the env row only Warns.
+    let node_url = effective_node_url(&args.node);
+    let client = NodeClient::new(node_url, None);
     match client.get("/").await {
         Ok(resp) if resp.status().is_success() => {
             let info = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await.unwrap_or_default();
@@ -176,7 +158,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
             let short_did = did.chars().take(30).collect::<String>();
             checks.push(Check::pass(
                 "node",
-                format!("{} — v{version} ({short_did}…)", args.node),
+                format!("{} — v{version} ({short_did}…)", node_url),
             ));
             // Capability drift: a node newer than this CLI may require features
             // (RFC 9421 signing, iCaptcha) the CLI doesn't speak.
@@ -188,21 +170,21 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
                         "node is v{version} but gl is v{gl_ver} — your CLI may be missing \
                          features (signing / iCaptcha) this node requires"
                     ),
-                    "upgrade gl: curl -sSf https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh",
+                    "upgrade gl: curl -sSf https://twigpine.com/install.sh | sh",
                 ));
             }
         }
         Ok(resp) => {
             checks.push(Check::fail(
                 "node",
-                format!("{} returned HTTP {}", args.node, resp.status()),
+                format!("{} returned HTTP {}", node_url, resp.status()),
                 "check GITLAWB_NODE env var or try gl register --node <url>",
             ));
         }
         Err(e) => {
             checks.push(Check::fail(
                 "node",
-                format!("{} unreachable: {e}", args.node),
+                format!("{} unreachable: {e}", node_url),
                 "check your internet connection or set GITLAWB_NODE",
             ));
         }
@@ -242,7 +224,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
         checks.push(Check::fail(
             "git-remote-gitlawb",
             "not found in PATH — gitlawb:// clone/push will not work",
-            "curl -sSf https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh",
+            "curl -sSf https://twigpine.com/install.sh | sh",
         ));
     }
 
@@ -286,23 +268,21 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
             CheckState::Fail => "✗",
         };
         println!("  {icon}  {:<24}  {}", check.label, check.detail);
-        if matches!(check.state, CheckState::Fail) {
-            all_ok = false;
-        }
     }
 
     println!();
 
+    let has_failures_now = has_failures(&checks);
     let has_issues = checks
         .iter()
         .any(|c| matches!(c.state, CheckState::Fail | CheckState::Warn));
     if !has_issues {
         println!("Everything looks good. Run `gl quickstart` to create your first repo.");
     } else {
-        if all_ok {
-            println!("Setup looks good with some warnings:");
-        } else {
+        if has_failures_now {
             println!("Some checks failed. Suggested fixes:");
+        } else {
+            println!("Setup looks good with some warnings:");
         }
         for check in &checks {
             if matches!(check.state, CheckState::Fail | CheckState::Warn) {
@@ -312,14 +292,75 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
             }
         }
         println!();
-        if !all_ok {
+        if has_failures_now {
             println!("Run `gl quickstart` for a guided setup.");
         }
     }
 
+    // #357: a non-zero exit is the only signal scripting and CI have. Warn-only
+    // rows stay exit 0 (iCaptcha offline, version drift, shell-alias shadowing
+    // are all non-fatal); Fail-class rows (identity, registration, node
+    // reachable, git-remote-gitlawb present, git present) flip to exit 1.
+    // Direct `process::exit` rather than returning Err: the prose above is the
+    // user-facing summary, and an anyhow Error frame would just duplicate it.
+    if has_failures(&checks) {
+        std::process::exit(1);
+    }
+
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Classify the `GITLAWB_NODE` env var for `gl doctor`. Extracted so unit
+/// tests can pin the Warn tier directly (#357): an unset env is advisory, not
+/// a failure, because `--node` defaults to `https://node.twigpine.com` and the
+/// CLI works without it. Flipping this back to `Check::fail` must break a
+/// test, not just change prose.
+fn gitlawb_node_env_check(env_val: Option<&str>) -> Check {
+    match env_val {
+        // A loopback host is a legitimate setup (self-hosted node, dev
+        // harness) — the connectivity check below fails loudly if it is not
+        // actually reachable, so don't red-flag the configuration itself.
+        Some(v) if is_loopback_url(v) => Check::pass(
+            "GITLAWB_NODE",
+            format!(
+                "{v} (local node — intentional for self-hosting/dev; unset to target the public network)"
+            ),
+        ),
+        Some(v) if !v.is_empty() => Check::pass("GITLAWB_NODE", v.to_string()),
+        // `--node` defaults to `https://node.twigpine.com` and the CLI works
+        // fine without the variable, so an unset env is advisory, not a
+        // failure. Warn-class keeps the exit code 0 for a stock working
+        // install; this used to be Fail, which the obvious "return non-zero
+        // on any failure" change would have flipped to exit 1 on every
+        // default-config install (#357).
+        _ => Check::warn(
+            "GITLAWB_NODE",
+            "not set — git-remote-gitlawb will fall back to http://127.0.0.1:7545",
+            format!("export GITLAWB_NODE={PUBLIC_NODE}"),
+        ),
+    }
+}
+
+/// The URL the connectivity probe should dial. `GITLAWB_NODE` set but empty
+/// (or whitespace-only) binds `args.node` to `""` through clap rather than
+/// to the `default_value`, and check 3 already groups empty with unset, so
+/// the probe applies the same normalization: an empty effective URL means
+/// the public node, same as unset.
+fn effective_node_url(node: &str) -> &str {
+    if node.trim().is_empty() {
+        PUBLIC_NODE
+    } else {
+        node
+    }
+}
+
+/// True when at least one check is Fail-class. Warn-only runs (iCaptcha offline,
+/// version drift, shell-alias shadowing, GITLAWB_NODE unset) keep exit 0;
+/// this is the gating predicate for #357's exit-status fix.
+fn has_failures(checks: &[Check]) -> bool {
+    checks.iter().any(|c| matches!(c.state, CheckState::Fail))
+}
+
 /// Check if a binary name exists anywhere on PATH.
 /// True when the rc file contains a real `unalias` command naming `gl` —
 /// not a comment, and not a longer word like `unalias global`. Ordering
@@ -409,7 +450,7 @@ fn which_in_path(name: &str) -> bool {
         .unwrap_or(false)
 }
 
-/// Fetch the latest release tag from Gitlawb/node (the actual release repo — see install.sh's
+/// Fetch the latest release tag from Twigpine/node (the actual release repo — see install.sh's
 /// `GITLAWB_RELEASE_REPO` default) and compare to current version.
 async fn check_version(current: &'static str, github_api_base: &str) -> Check {
     let client = match reqwest::Client::builder()
@@ -423,7 +464,7 @@ async fn check_version(current: &'static str, github_api_base: &str) -> Check {
 
     let resp = match client
         .get(format!(
-            "{github_api_base}/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest"
+            "{github_api_base}/repos/Twigpine/node/releases/latest"
         ))
         .send()
         .await
@@ -458,7 +499,7 @@ async fn check_version(current: &'static str, github_api_base: &str) -> Check {
         Check::warn(
             "version",
             format!("v{current} → v{tag} available"),
-            "curl -sSf https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh",
+            "curl -sSf https://twigpine.com/install.sh | sh",
         )
     } else {
         Check::pass("version", format!("v{current} (up to date)"))
@@ -551,7 +592,7 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(is_loopback_url("http://localhost:7545"));
         assert!(is_loopback_url("http://[::1]:7545"));
         assert!(!is_loopback_url("https://localhost.example"));
-        assert!(!is_loopback_url("https://node.gitlawb.com/localhost"));
+        assert!(!is_loopback_url("https://node.twigpine.com/localhost"));
         assert!(!is_loopback_url("not a url"));
     }
 
@@ -604,7 +645,7 @@ mod tests {
     async fn test_check_version_queries_gitlawb_node_releases() {
         let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
         let _m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest")
+            .mock("GET", "/repos/Twigpine/node/releases/latest")
             .with_status(200)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"tag_name":"v9.9.9"}"#)
@@ -620,7 +661,7 @@ mod tests {
     async fn test_check_version_up_to_date() {
         let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
         let _m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest")
+            .mock("GET", "/repos/Twigpine/node/releases/latest")
             .with_status(200)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"tag_name":"v0.1.0"}"#)
@@ -636,7 +677,7 @@ mod tests {
     async fn test_check_version_http_error() {
         let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
         let _m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest")
+            .mock("GET", "/repos/Twigpine/node/releases/latest")
             .with_status(403)
             .create_async()
             .await;
@@ -645,4 +686,103 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(matches!(check.state, CheckState::Ok));
         assert!(check.detail.contains("GitHub API returned HTTP 403"));
     }
+
+    /// #357: an all-Ok run does not flip the exit code to non-zero — a healthy
+    /// install must keep returning 0 so scripts like `gl doctor && gl push`
+    /// keep working.
+    #[test]
+    fn exit_predicate_is_false_for_all_ok() {
+        let checks = vec![
+            Check::pass("identity", "ok"),
+            Check::pass("registration", "ok"),
+            Check::pass("git", "ok"),
+        ];
+        assert!(!has_failures(&checks));
+    }
+
+    /// #357: Warn-class rows (iCaptcha offline, version drift, shell-alias
+    /// shadowing, GITLAWB_NODE unset on a default-config install) are NOT
+    /// exit-status failures — they are still printed to the user but the
+    /// process exits 0. This is the rule that the previous "any
+    /// Fail-or-Warn row → exit 1" change would have broken for stock
+    /// installs that simply have not set the env var.
+    #[test]
+    fn exit_predicate_is_false_for_warn_only() {
+        let checks = vec![
+            Check::pass("identity", "ok"),
+            Check::warn("GITLAWB_NODE", "unset", "export GITLAWB_NODE=..."),
+            Check::warn("iCaptcha", "offline", "check connectivity"),
+            Check::warn("version", "drift", "upgrade"),
+            Check::warn("shell alias", "omz git plugin", "unalias gl"),
+        ];
+        assert!(!has_failures(&checks));
+    }
+
+    /// #357: a single Fail-class row trips the exit code. The set of Fail
+    /// rows is whatever `run` writes through `Check::fail`: identity missing
+    /// or unparseable, registration missing/malformed, node unreachable,
+    /// git-remote-gitlawb absent, git absent.
+    #[test]
+    fn exit_predicate_is_true_when_a_fail_row_is_present() {
+        let checks = vec![
+            Check::pass("registration", "ok"),
+            Check::fail("identity", "missing", "gl identity new"),
+            Check::pass("git", "ok"),
+        ];
+        assert!(has_failures(&checks));
+
+        let mixed_warns = vec![
+            Check::pass("identity", "ok"),
+            Check::warn("GITLAWB_NODE", "unset", "export"),
+            Check::fail("node", "unreachable", "check network"),
+            Check::warn("iCaptcha", "offline", "check"),
+        ];
+        assert!(has_failures(&mixed_warns));
+    }
+
+    /// #357: `GITLAWB_NODE` unset must be Warn, not Fail. This pins the
+    /// re-tier so flipping it back to `Check::fail` breaks the suite — the
+    /// previous `has_failures`-only tests built their own `Check::warn` rows
+    /// and could not see the re-tier at all.
+    #[test]
+    fn gitlawb_node_env_unset_is_warn() {
+        let check = gitlawb_node_env_check(None);
+        assert!(matches!(check.state, CheckState::Warn));
+        assert!(check.detail.contains("not set"));
+        let empty = gitlawb_node_env_check(Some(""));
+        assert!(matches!(empty.state, CheckState::Warn));
+    }
+
+    /// `GITLAWB_NODE=""` binds `args.node` to `""` through clap, and check 3
+    /// groups empty with unset. The probe must dial the same URL unset
+    /// would — removing the normalization makes check 4 probe `""` and Fail
+    /// while the env row only Warns, so an empty env install exits 1.
+    #[test]
+    fn effective_node_url_treats_empty_and_blank_as_unset() {
+        assert_eq!(effective_node_url(""), PUBLIC_NODE);
+        assert_eq!(effective_node_url("   "), PUBLIC_NODE);
+        assert_eq!(effective_node_url("\t\n"), PUBLIC_NODE);
+        assert_eq!(
+            effective_node_url("http://127.0.0.1:7545"),
+            "http://127.0.0.1:7545"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn gitlawb_node_env_set_is_pass() {
+        let check = gitlawb_node_env_check(Some("https://node.twigpine.com"));
+        assert!(matches!(check.state, CheckState::Ok));
+        assert!(check.detail.contains("https://node.twigpine.com"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn gitlawb_node_env_loopback_is_pass() {
+        for url in ["http://127.0.0.1:7545", "http://localhost:7545"] {
+            let check = gitlawb_node_env_check(Some(url));
+            assert!(
+                matches!(check.state, CheckState::Ok),
+                "loopback {url} must be Ok, not Warn/Fail"
+            );
+        }
+    }
 }

crates/gl/src/http.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//! Signed HTTP client for gitlawb API calls (async).
+//! Signed HTTP client for Twigpine API calls (async).
 //!
 //! Writes are signed with RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures. When the node gates a write
 //! behind iCaptcha (HTTP 403 `icaptcha_proof_required`, advertised via the
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
 use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
 use icaptcha_client::IcaptchaCfg;
+use serde_json::Value;
 
 /// Max times we'll fetch a fresh proof and retry a 403-iCaptcha response
 /// (absorbs proof expiry / first-seen replay).
@@ -319,16 +320,70 @@ pub(crate) async fn read_body_capped(mut resp: reqwest::Response, cap: usize) ->
 /// Strip terminal-dangerous characters from (and cap the length of) a
 /// node-supplied error string before surfacing it. The node a caller talks to
 /// could be hostile and embed escape sequences in its error body; those must not
-/// reach the terminal verbatim (INV-6). We drop the C0/C1 control bytes (which
+/// reach the terminal verbatim. We drop the C0/C1 control bytes (which
 /// defangs ANSI/OSC escapes) AND the Unicode bidi/format controls (which
 /// `char::is_control` does not cover — they can reorder the displayed line).
 pub(crate) fn sanitize_node_msg(s: &str) -> String {
-    gitlawb_core::sanitize::strip_terminal_controls(s)
-        .chars()
+    s.chars()
+        .filter(|c| !c.is_control() && !gitlawb_core::sanitize::is_bidi_format(*c))
         .take(200)
         .collect()
 }
 
+/// Read a JSON response, surfacing a node denial/error instead of parsing it as
+/// the requested resource. On a non-2xx status it returns an `Err` carrying the
+/// node's sanitized `message` plus the status; on success it parses the
+/// body and propagates a parse error, so a truncated/garbage 2xx body is an error
+/// rather than a silently-empty success (the denial-as-success bug #123 fixes).
+/// `what` names the resource for the error text (e.g. "repo", "commits").
+///
+/// Callers must route gated reads through this rather than `resp.json().await?`:
+/// the bare parse renders a gated 404/5xx body back as the resource.
+/// Cap on the error body `read_json` reads before parsing a node's `message`.
+/// Matches the capped-read bound used on the sync error path; large enough for any
+/// legitimate error, small enough that a hostile node cannot exhaust memory.
+const ERROR_BODY_CAP: usize = 8 * 1024;
+
+pub(crate) async fn read_json(resp: reqwest::Response, what: &str) -> Result<Value> {
+    let status = resp.status();
+    if !status.is_success() {
+        // Bound the error read: `resp.json()` would buffer and parse the WHOLE
+        // body, so a hostile node could stream an arbitrarily large valid JSON
+        // error and exhaust this process's memory (#186). Read a small capped body
+        // first, then best-effort extract `message`. The error body may also be
+        // non-JSON (503 degraded, 413 body-limit from middleware), so a parse miss
+        // falls back to the capped raw text; an empty body to the status alone.
+        let raw = read_body_capped(resp, ERROR_BODY_CAP).await.text;
+        // Preserve the prior contract: surface the JSON `message` when present in
+        // the capped body, else the status alone ("request failed") — a non-JSON
+        // or message-less body (503 degraded, 413 body-limit) never surfaces raw
+        // node bytes. A body whose `message` sits past the cap parses as truncated
+        // garbage here and correctly falls back rather than being buffered whole.
+        //
+        // Fall back to `error` before giving up: the node's shared AppError
+        // envelope carries both keys, but the task API answers with `error` alone
+        // (`{"error":"task not found"}` in gitlawb-node/src/api/tasks.rs), so
+        // reading only `message` blanked every `gl task` denial to the generic
+        // "request failed". `sync.rs`'s hand-rolled reader already reads both; this
+        // matches it.
+        let msg = serde_json::from_str::<Value>(&raw)
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|b| {
+                b.get("message")
+                    .or_else(|| b.get("error"))
+                    .and_then(|m| m.as_str())
+                    .map(str::to_owned)
+            })
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| "request failed".to_owned());
+        anyhow::bail!("{what} failed ({status}): {}", sanitize_node_msg(&msg));
+    }
+    // Success: a truncated/garbage 2xx body must be an `Err`, not `Ok(Null)` that
+    // a caller then renders as an empty success.
+    resp.json()
+        .await
+        .with_context(|| format!("invalid JSON in {what} response"))
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -1268,4 +1323,217 @@ mod tests {
         let out = sanitize_node_msg("ok \u{0627}\u{200D}b");
         assert_eq!(out, "ok \u{0627}\u{200D}b");
     }
+
+    // ── read_json (status-checked, bounded, sanitized read; #123) ────────
+
+    /// Drive a real `reqwest::Response` off a mockito mock so `read_json` sees an
+    /// actual HTTP status + body, the same shape the gated read arms produce.
+    async fn response_for(
+        server: &mut Server,
+        status: usize,
+        body: &str,
+        json: bool,
+    ) -> reqwest::Response {
+        let mut m = server.mock("GET", "/x").with_status(status).with_body(body);
+        if json {
+            m = m.with_header("content-type", "application/json");
+        }
+        let _m = m.create_async().await;
+        NodeClient::new(server.url(), None).get("/x").await.unwrap()
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_json_returns_body_on_2xx() {
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let resp = response_for(
+            &mut server,
+            200,
+            r#"{"name":"r","owner_did":"did:gitlawb:z"}"#,
+            true,
+        )
+        .await;
+        let v = read_json(resp, "repo").await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v["name"], "r");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_json_errs_on_404_surfacing_message_and_status() {
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let resp = response_for(
+            &mut server,
+            404,
+            r#"{"message":"repository 'o/r' not found"}"#,
+            true,
+        )
+        .await;
+        let err = read_json(resp, "repo").await.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("404"), "err={err}");
+        assert!(err.contains("not found"), "err={err}");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_json_errs_on_500_surfacing_message() {
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let resp = response_for(&mut server, 500, r#"{"message":"internal boom"}"#, true).await;
+        let err = read_json(resp, "commits").await.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("500"), "err={err}");
+        assert!(err.contains("internal boom"), "err={err}");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_json_errs_on_non_json_error_body_with_fallback() {
+        // 503 with a plain-text (middleware) body: no `message` field to surface.
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let resp = response_for(&mut server, 503, "service unavailable", false).await;
+        let err = read_json(resp, "repo").await.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("503"), "err={err}");
+        assert!(err.contains("request failed"), "err={err}");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_json_sanitizes_control_and_bidi_in_message() {
+        // A hostile node embeds ESC, BEL, and a right-to-left override in
+        // the error message; none may reach the terminal verbatim.
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let resp = response_for(
+            &mut server,
+            404,
+            r#"{"message":"a\u001b[31mb\u0007c\u202ed"}"#,
+            true,
+        )
+        .await;
+        let err = read_json(resp, "repo").await.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(!err.contains('\u{1b}'), "ESC leaked: {err:?}");
+        assert!(!err.contains('\u{7}'), "BEL leaked: {err:?}");
+        assert!(!err.contains('\u{202e}'), "bidi override leaked: {err:?}");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_json_errs_on_garbage_2xx_body() {
+        // The #123 correctness point: a 200 with a non-JSON/truncated body must be
+        // an `Err`, NOT `Ok(Null)` that a caller renders as an empty success.
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let resp = response_for(&mut server, 200, "this is not json", false).await;
+        assert!(read_json(resp, "repo").await.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_json_errs_on_empty_2xx_body() {
+        // A zero-byte 200 body must be an `Err`, not a silent `Ok(Null)`.
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let resp = response_for(&mut server, 200, "", false).await;
+        assert!(read_json(resp, "repo").await.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_json_errs_on_non_2xx_json_without_message_or_error() {
+        // A non-2xx JSON body carrying NEITHER key is the real fallback case.
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let resp = response_for(&mut server, 403, r#"{"detail":"forbidden"}"#, true).await;
+        let err = read_json(resp, "repo").await.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("403"), "err={err}");
+        assert!(err.contains("request failed"), "err={err}");
+        // The body's own text must not leak when no recognised key carries it.
+        assert!(!err.contains("forbidden"), "raw body leaked: {err}");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_json_surfaces_error_key_when_message_absent() {
+        // The task API answers with `error` alone — see
+        // gitlawb-node/src/api/tasks.rs `{"error":"task not found"}`. Reading only
+        // `message` blanked those denials to the generic "request failed", so the
+        // user was told nothing about why the call failed.
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let resp = response_for(&mut server, 404, r#"{"error":"task not found"}"#, true).await;
+        let err = read_json(resp, "task show").await.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("404"), "err={err}");
+        assert!(err.contains("task not found"), "reason not surfaced: {err}");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_json_prefers_message_over_error_key() {
+        // The shared AppError envelope carries both; `message` is the human text
+        // and must win over the machine code in `error`.
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let resp = response_for(
+            &mut server,
+            500,
+            r#"{"error":"db_error","message":"database unavailable"}"#,
+            true,
+        )
+        .await;
+        let err = read_json(resp, "repo").await.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("database unavailable"), "err={err}");
+        assert!(
+            !err.contains("db_error"),
+            "machine code won over message: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_json_sanitizes_error_key_text() {
+        // The `error` fallback goes through the same sanitizer as `message`; a
+        // hostile node must not reach the terminal through the new path. The
+        // controls are JSON \u escapes so the body stays VALID JSON — embedding
+        // them raw would fail the parse and pass this test vacuously.
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let resp = response_for(
+            &mut server,
+            404,
+            r#"{"error":"a\u001b[31mb\u0007c\u202ed"}"#,
+            true,
+        )
+        .await;
+        let err = read_json(resp, "task show").await.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        // Proves the parse succeeded and the `error` key was read, not the
+        // "request failed" fallback (which would make the asserts below vacuous).
+        assert!(err.contains("task show failed (404"), "err={err}");
+        assert!(
+            !err.contains("request failed"),
+            "fell back, sanitizer untested: {err}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            err.contains('a') && err.contains('d'),
+            "text dropped: {err}"
+        );
+        assert!(!err.contains('\u{1b}'), "ESC leaked: {err:?}");
+        assert!(!err.contains('\u{7}'), "BEL leaked: {err:?}");
+        assert!(!err.contains('\u{202e}'), "bidi override leaked: {err:?}");
+    }
+
+    /// #186 (F2): the non-2xx error path must read a CAPPED body, not buffer and
+    /// parse the whole thing — a hostile node can stream an arbitrarily large valid
+    /// JSON error. Place the `message` field AFTER more than the cap of padding: the
+    /// bounded read stops before it, so it must be ABSENT from the surfaced error.
+    /// RED before the fix (`resp.json()` parses the full body → the far message
+    /// appears), GREEN after (capped read truncates → fallback → far message gone).
+    /// The status is still surfaced, so a legitimate small error is unaffected.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_json_bounds_the_error_body_read() {
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        // >8 KiB of padding, then the marker message at the very end of the body.
+        let big = format!(
+            r#"{{"padding":"{}","message":"FARMARKER_BEYOND_CAP"}}"#,
+            "A".repeat(16 * 1024)
+        );
+        let resp = response_for(&mut server, 500, &big, true).await;
+        let err = read_json(resp, "repo").await.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("500"), "bounded read still errors: {err}");
+        assert!(
+            !err.contains("FARMARKER_BEYOND_CAP"),
+            "the error body read must be capped: a message beyond the cap must not be surfaced, err={err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// #186 (F2): an EMPTY non-2xx body is its own input class — the capped read
+    /// yields "", the JSON parse fails, and it falls back to the status alone
+    /// ("request failed"), never a panic or a spurious success.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_json_errs_on_empty_non_2xx_body() {
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let resp = response_for(&mut server, 502, "", false).await;
+        let err = read_json(resp, "repo").await.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("502"), "err={err}");
+        assert!(err.contains("request failed"), "err={err}");
+    }
 }

crates/gl/src/identity.rs

@@ -9,8 +9,7 @@ use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 pub enum IdentityCmd {
     /// Generate a new Ed25519 keypair and DID
     New {
-        /// Output directory for key files
-        /// (default: the parent of $GITLAWB_KEY, else ~/.gitlawb)
+        /// Output directory for key files (default: ~/.gitlawb)
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
         /// Overwrite existing keys if present
@@ -64,51 +63,16 @@ pub async fn run(cmd: IdentityCmd) -> Result<()> {
     }
 }
 
-/// Resolve the identity directory, honouring an explicit override.
-/// Public so sibling commands (`gl ucan import`, `gl doctor`) look in the same
-/// place the identity itself lives.
-///
-/// Without an override this is [`gitlawb_core::identity_path::identity_dir`] — the
-/// parent of `GITLAWB_KEY`, else `~/.gitlawb`. The rules live in `gitlawb-core`
-/// because `git-remote-gitlawb` needs the identical answer: an operator who moved
-/// their key (`GITLAWB_KEY=/data/keys/identity.pem`, the shape `.env.example`
-/// documents) would otherwise have `gl ucan import` write the delegation to
-/// `~/.gitlawb/delegations` while the helper reads `/data/keys/delegations` and
-/// finds it empty. The push then goes out with no `X-Ucan` and the delegate is
-/// refused, with nothing on either side to indicate why.
-pub fn gitlawb_dir(override_dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+fn gitlawb_dir(override_dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
     if let Some(d) = override_dir {
         return Ok(d);
     }
-    // `home_dir()` is passed as an Option rather than demanded here: an absolute
-    // GITLAWB_KEY resolves without a home directory, and a host that has none is a
-    // normal container shape, not a reason to refuse a correctly-configured key.
-    let home = dirs::home_dir();
-    gitlawb_core::identity_path::identity_dir(home.as_deref()).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("{e}"))
+    let home = dirs::home_dir().context("could not determine home directory")?;
+    Ok(home.join(".gitlawb"))
 }
 
-/// The identity PEM to read or write.
-///
-/// With an explicit `--dir` this is `<dir>/identity.pem`, the conventional layout.
-/// Without one it is [`gitlawb_core::identity_path::identity_key_path`] — the whole
-/// of `GITLAWB_KEY`, basename included.
-///
-/// Taking only the parent and re-appending `identity.pem` was a real divergence,
-/// not a tidy-up: `GITLAWB_KEY` is documented as a path to a PEM, and
-/// `git-remote-gitlawb` opens exactly that path. With
-/// `GITLAWB_KEY=/data/keys/ci-agent.pem`, `gl identity new` wrote
-/// `/data/keys/identity.pem` while every push loaded `/data/keys/ci-agent.pem`, so
-/// the two either disagreed on identity or the helper found no key at all — and
-/// owner enforcement and the delegation proof both key off that identity.
-pub(crate) fn key_path_for(dir: Option<&Path>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
-    match dir {
-        Some(d) => Ok(d.join(gitlawb_core::identity_path::KEY_FILE_NAME)),
-        None => {
-            let home = dirs::home_dir();
-            gitlawb_core::identity_path::identity_key_path(home.as_deref())
-                .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("{e}"))
-        }
-    }
+fn key_path(dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
+    dir.join("identity.pem")
 }
 
 fn load_keypair(dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<Keypair> {
@@ -117,14 +81,15 @@ fn load_keypair(dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<Keypair> {
 
 /// Load keypair from an optional directory override.
 /// Used by other modules (register, repo, mcp).
-///
-/// Routed through [`gitlawb_dir`] rather than reaching for `~/.gitlawb` directly:
-/// `gl identity new` writes the key wherever `GITLAWB_KEY` points, so a second
-/// resolver here would have every other command read a different file than the one
-/// just created — `gl ucan delegate` would either fail to find an identity or sign
-/// with a stale DID that is not the repo owner.
 pub fn load_keypair_from_dir(dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<Keypair> {
-    let path = key_path_for(dir)?;
+    let base = if let Some(d) = dir {
+        d.to_path_buf()
+    } else {
+        dirs::home_dir()
+            .context("could not determine home directory")?
+            .join(".gitlawb")
+    };
+    let path = key_path(&base);
     let pem = fs::read_to_string(&path).with_context(|| {
         format!(
             "no identity found at {}\nRun `gl identity new` to create one",
@@ -134,6 +99,27 @@ pub fn load_keypair_from_dir(dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<Keypair> {
     Keypair::from_pem(&pem).context("failed to load keypair from PEM")
 }
 
+/// Load keypair from an optional directory override, distinguishing missing default
+/// identity (clean anonymous) from an explicit directory error or corrupt PEM.
+pub fn load_optional_keypair(dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<Option<Keypair>> {
+    if let Some(d) = dir {
+        return load_keypair_from_dir(Some(d)).map(Some);
+    }
+    let base = match dirs::home_dir() {
+        Some(h) => h.join(".gitlawb"),
+        None => return Ok(None),
+    };
+    let path = key_path(&base);
+    match fs::read_to_string(&path) {
+        Ok(pem) => Keypair::from_pem(&pem)
+            .context("failed to load keypair from PEM")
+            .map(Some),
+        Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(None),
+        Err(e) => Err(anyhow::Error::from(e)
+            .context(format!("failed to read identity from {}", path.display()))),
+    }
+}
+
 async fn cmd_new(dir: Option<PathBuf>, force: bool) -> Result<()> {
     cmd_new_with_reader(dir, force, &mut std::io::stdin().lock()).await
 }
@@ -143,11 +129,8 @@ async fn cmd_new_with_reader(
     force: bool,
     reader: &mut impl std::io::BufRead,
 ) -> Result<()> {
-    let path = key_path_for(dir.as_deref())?;
-    let dir = path
-        .parent()
-        .map(Path::to_path_buf)
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."));
+    let dir = gitlawb_dir(dir)?;
+    let path = key_path(&dir);
 
     if path.exists() {
         if force {
@@ -192,7 +175,7 @@ async fn cmd_new_with_reader(
     println!("  DID:  {did}");
     println!("  Key:  {}", path.display());
     println!();
-    println!("  Your DID is your identity on the gitlawb network.");
+    println!("  Your DID is your identity on the Twigpine network.");
     println!("  Keep your key file safe — it cannot be recovered if lost.");
 
     Ok(())
@@ -221,7 +204,8 @@ async fn cmd_sign(message: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
 }
 
 async fn cmd_backup(out: Option<PathBuf>, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
-    let src = key_path_for(dir.as_deref())?;
+    let base = gitlawb_dir(dir)?;
+    let src = key_path(&base);
 
     let pem = fs::read_to_string(&src).with_context(|| {
         format!(
@@ -276,11 +260,8 @@ async fn cmd_restore_with_reader(
     // Verify it's a valid keypair before writing anything
     let keypair = Keypair::from_pem(&pem).context("backup file is not a valid identity PEM")?;
 
-    let dest = key_path_for(dir.as_deref())?;
-    let base = dest
-        .parent()
-        .map(Path::to_path_buf)
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."));
+    let base = gitlawb_dir(dir)?;
+    let dest = key_path(&base);
 
     if dest.exists() {
         if force {
@@ -549,182 +530,3 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(original_did, dst_kp.did());
     }
 }
-
-/// Scoped `GITLAWB_KEY` for tests, shared crate-wide.
-///
-/// The process environment is global and more than one suite in this crate
-/// depends on it — the resolver's own cases here, and `gl register`'s check that
-/// the bootstrap token lands beside the key. They take one lock rather than each
-/// declaring its own, which would not serialise them against each other.
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub(crate) mod test_env {
-    use std::ffi::{OsStr, OsString};
-    use std::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard};
-
-    static ENV_LOCK: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());
-
-    /// Restores the previous value and releases the lock on drop.
-    pub(crate) struct KeyEnv {
-        _guard: MutexGuard<'static, ()>,
-        restore: Option<OsString>,
-    }
-
-    impl Drop for KeyEnv {
-        fn drop(&mut self) {
-            match self.restore.take() {
-                Some(v) => std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_KEY", v),
-                None => std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_KEY"),
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Run `f` with `GITLAWB_KEY` set, restoring it afterwards.
-    pub(crate) fn with_key<T, V: AsRef<OsStr>>(value: Option<V>, f: impl FnOnce() -> T) -> T {
-        let _guard = set_key(value);
-        f()
-    }
-
-    /// Set `GITLAWB_KEY` (or remove it, for `None`) until the guard drops.
-    pub(crate) fn set_key<V: AsRef<OsStr>>(value: Option<V>) -> KeyEnv {
-        let guard = ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
-        let restore = std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_KEY");
-        match value {
-            Some(v) => std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_KEY", v),
-            None => std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_KEY"),
-        }
-        KeyEnv {
-            _guard: guard,
-            restore,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod gitlawb_dir_tests {
-    use super::{gitlawb_dir, load_keypair_from_dir};
-    use std::ffi::OsString;
-    use std::path::PathBuf;
-
-    /// Run `f` with `GITLAWB_KEY` set to `value` (or removed for `None`), restoring
-    /// whatever was there before.
-    fn with_key_env<T>(value: Option<OsString>, f: impl FnOnce() -> T) -> T {
-        let _env = crate::identity::test_env::set_key(value);
-        f()
-    }
-
-    /// An explicit --dir always wins and is never validated against GITLAWB_KEY.
-    #[test]
-    fn explicit_override_wins() {
-        let d = PathBuf::from("/tmp/explicit");
-        assert_eq!(gitlawb_dir(Some(d.clone())).unwrap(), d);
-    }
-
-    /// A relative GITLAWB_KEY must fail loudly. `gl` and `git-remote-gitlawb` run
-    /// from different working directories, so resolving one relatively sends the
-    /// import and the lookup to different stores; a one-component value yields an
-    /// empty parent and puts the store in `./delegations`.
-    #[test]
-    fn relative_key_paths_are_refused() {
-        for raw in ["identity.pem", "keys/identity.pem"] {
-            let result = with_key_env(Some(OsString::from(raw)), || gitlawb_dir(None));
-            assert!(result.is_err(), "{raw} is relative and must be refused");
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// An empty value is what a shell leaves behind for `FOO=` and for an unset
-    /// variable expanded into a wrapper script. Treated as unset, not as an error.
-    #[test]
-    fn an_empty_key_path_is_treated_as_unset() {
-        let result = with_key_env(Some(OsString::new()), || gitlawb_dir(None));
-        assert_eq!(
-            result.unwrap(),
-            dirs::home_dir().unwrap().join(".gitlawb"),
-            "an empty value selects the default directory"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// The reason `gitlawb_dir` reads through `var_os`: `env::var` folds a non-UTF-8
-    /// value into the same `Err` as unset, so a bad path would silently resolve to
-    /// `~/.gitlawb` instead of being reported. Byte 0xFF is not valid UTF-8 in any
-    /// position, so this value is unreachable through `env::var`.
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    #[test]
-    fn a_non_utf8_key_path_is_not_mistaken_for_unset() {
-        use std::os::unix::ffi::OsStringExt;
-
-        let raw = OsString::from_vec(b"keys/\xFF/identity.pem".to_vec());
-        let result = with_key_env(Some(raw), || gitlawb_dir(None));
-
-        let err = result.expect_err("a non-UTF-8 relative path must be refused");
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string().contains("absolute"),
-            "the error must name the real problem, not fall back to the default: {err}"
-        );
-
-        let mut absolute = OsString::from("/data/");
-        absolute.push(OsString::from_vec(vec![0xFF]));
-        absolute.push("/identity.pem");
-        let resolved = with_key_env(Some(absolute.clone()), || gitlawb_dir(None)).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolved,
-            PathBuf::from(&absolute).parent().unwrap(),
-            "an absolute non-UTF-8 path resolves to its own parent, not to ~/.gitlawb"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// `gl identity new` writes the key wherever `GITLAWB_KEY` points, so every
-    /// other command has to read it back from there. `load_keypair_from_dir(None)`
-    /// used to hardcode `~/.gitlawb`, which made `gl ucan delegate` sign with a
-    /// stale DID — or fail outright — for exactly the operators who moved the key.
-    #[test]
-    fn load_keypair_from_dir_honours_the_key_env() {
-        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
-        let key = dir.path().join("identity.pem");
-        let expected = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        std::fs::write(&key, expected.to_pem().unwrap()).unwrap();
-
-        let loaded = with_key_env(Some(key.into_os_string()), || load_keypair_from_dir(None))
-            .expect("the identity beside GITLAWB_KEY must be found");
-
-        assert_eq!(loaded.did(), expected.did());
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod key_basename_tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    /// `GITLAWB_KEY` names a FILE. `gl` used to keep only its parent and re-append
-    /// `identity.pem`, while `git-remote-gitlawb` opened the configured path — so
-    /// with `GITLAWB_KEY=/data/keys/ci-agent.pem` the CLI and the push path loaded
-    /// different files, and owner enforcement and the delegation proof both key off
-    /// whichever identity that was.
-    #[test]
-    fn a_non_default_key_basename_is_honoured() {
-        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
-        let key = dir.path().join("ci-agent.pem");
-        let expected = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        std::fs::write(&key, expected.to_pem().unwrap()).unwrap();
-
-        let (resolved, loaded) = crate::identity::test_env::with_key(Some(key.clone()), || {
-            (key_path_for(None).unwrap(), load_keypair_from_dir(None))
-        });
-
-        assert_eq!(resolved, key, "the configured basename must survive");
-        assert_eq!(
-            loaded.expect("the key at GITLAWB_KEY must load").did(),
-            expected.did(),
-            "gl must load the same file the helper opens"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// An explicit --dir keeps the conventional layout.
-    #[test]
-    fn an_explicit_dir_still_uses_identity_pem() {
-        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            key_path_for(Some(dir.path())).unwrap(),
-            dir.path().join("identity.pem")
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gl/src/init.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 //! `gl init` — zero-to-push in one command.
 //!
 //! Detects or initializes a git repo, ensures an identity exists,
-//! registers with the node, creates a remote repo, adds the gitlawb
+//! registers with the node, creates a remote repo, adds the Twigpine
 //! remote, and pushes.
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
@@ -19,10 +19,14 @@ pub struct InitArgs {
     pub name: Option<String>,
 
     /// Node URL to register with
-    #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+        env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+    )]
     pub node: String,
 
-    /// Identity directory (default: the parent of $GITLAWB_KEY, else ~/.gitlawb)
+    /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
     #[arg(long)]
     pub dir: Option<PathBuf>,
 
@@ -101,7 +105,10 @@ pub async fn run(args: InitArgs) -> Result<()> {
     // Save UCAN if returned
     if let Some(ucan) = payload.get("ucan").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
         if !ucan.is_empty() {
-            let ucan_dir = crate::identity::gitlawb_dir(args.dir.clone())?;
+            let ucan_dir = args
+                .dir
+                .clone()
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| dirs::home_dir().unwrap_or_default().join(".gitlawb"));
             std::fs::create_dir_all(&ucan_dir)?;
             let record = json!({
                 "ucan": ucan,
@@ -148,7 +155,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: InitArgs) -> Result<()> {
         println!("  Repository created.");
     }
 
-    // 5. Add gitlawb remote
+    // 5. Add Twigpine remote
     let did_short = did.to_string();
     let did_short = did_short.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did_short);
     let remote_url = format!("gitlawb://{did_short}/{repo_name}");
@@ -218,15 +225,18 @@ pub async fn run(args: InitArgs) -> Result<()> {
 }
 
 fn generate_identity(dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair> {
-    let path = crate::identity::key_path_for(dir)?;
-    let base = path
-        .parent()
-        .map(std::path::Path::to_path_buf)
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| std::path::PathBuf::from("."));
+    let base = if let Some(d) = dir {
+        d.to_path_buf()
+    } else {
+        dirs::home_dir()
+            .context("could not determine home directory")?
+            .join(".gitlawb")
+    };
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&base)?;
 
     let keypair = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
     let pem = keypair.to_pem()?;
+    let path = base.join("identity.pem");
 
     #[cfg(unix)]
     {

crates/gl/src/ipfs_cmd.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //! `gl ipfs` — IPFS pin management commands.
 //!
-//! Communicates with the gitlawb node to list pinned CIDs and retrieve git
+//! Communicates with the Twigpine node to list pinned CIDs and retrieve git
 //! objects by their content-addressed CID.
 
 use std::path::PathBuf;
@@ -22,9 +22,13 @@ pub struct IpfsArgs {
 pub enum IpfsCmd {
     /// List all CIDs pinned to the node's local IPFS daemon
     List {
-        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+        #[arg(
+            long,
+            default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+            env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+        )]
         node: String,
-        /// Identity directory (default: the parent of $GITLAWB_KEY, else ~/.gitlawb)
+        /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
@@ -69,7 +73,11 @@ pub enum IpfsCmd {
     Get {
         /// The CIDv1 string (e.g. bafkrei...)
         cid: String,
-        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
+        #[arg(
+            long,
+            default_value = "https://node.twigpine.com",
+            env = "GITLAWB_NODE"
+        )]
         node: String,
         /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
         #[arg(long)]
@@ -123,11 +131,7 @@ async fn cmd_list(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
         let sha = pin["sha256_hex"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
         let pinned_at = pin["pinned_at"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
         // Trim pinned_at to date+time without subseconds
-        let ts = if pinned_at.len() >= 19 {
-            &pinned_at[..19]
-        } else {
-            pinned_at
-        };
+        let ts = crate::text::truncate(pinned_at, 19);
         println!("  {cid}");
         println!("    sha256: {sha}");
         println!("    pinned: {ts}");