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Author SHA1 Message Date
Kevin Codex e9da517fde Merge pull request #240 from Gitlawb/release-please--branches--main--components--gitlawb-node
chore(main): release 0.7.0
2026-07-23 08:27:35 +08:00
Kevin Codex 9ca94c4d47 Merge pull request #241 from Gitlawb/ci/gitlawb-core-dep-purity
ci(core): add dependency-purity allowlist gate for gitlawb-core
2026-07-23 07:06:43 +08:00
beardthelion c0ad500b55 ci(core): allowlist curve25519-dalek-derive
Proc-macro helper for curve25519-dalek (already allowlisted). Newer cargo
versions list it under `cargo tree --edges normal` while older ones do not;
the allowlist is a superset so it passes on both. Caught by core-deps-purity
on the first CI run of this branch.
2026-07-22 12:36:25 -05:00
beardthelion e9d6aadd58 ci(core): add dependency-purity allowlist gate for gitlawb-core
gitlawb-core is embedded by gl, git-remote-gitlawb, and the node daemon,
so it must stay lean. Add a CI gate that fails if its normal (non-dev,
non-build) transitive dependency tree gains any crate not on an explicit
allowlist.

The allowlist is exhaustive-by-construction: a new heavy dependency reds
CI whether or not anyone thought to ban it, which a denylist cannot do.
The checker resolves like the build/test jobs (no --locked, since the
committed lockfile can lag the manifests) and snapshots/restores
Cargo.lock so a local run leaves no working-tree side effects.

- ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt: the 83 current normal deps, plus the
  regeneration command and rationale in the header
- scripts/check-gitlawb-core-deps.sh: recompute and diff; hard-fail on a
  non-allowlisted crate, note-only on a stale (removed) allowlist entry
- pr-checks.yml: new hard-fail core-deps-purity job, matching the pinned
  action SHAs and style of the sibling jobs
2026-07-22 12:04:34 -05:00
github-actions[bot] 32006b26a2 chore(main): release 0.7.0 2026-07-22 15:28:32 +00:00
30 changed files with 892 additions and 10624 deletions

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-30
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@@ -13,16 +13,9 @@ GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL=https://your-node.example.com
# ── Server ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
GITLAWB_HOST=0.0.0.0
GITLAWB_PORT=7545
# Optional address to bind a Prometheus /metrics exposition endpoint on (e.g.
# 127.0.0.1:9091). Leave empty (default) to disable. Bind to localhost or a
# private interface — the metrics endpoint is unauthenticated.
GITLAWB_METRICS_ADDR=
# ── Storage ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR=/data/repos
# Tigris (S3-compatible) bucket for repo storage. Leave empty (default) to
# disable Tigris and use local-only storage.
GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET=
# PostgreSQL connection URL. Required.
# When using the bundled docker-compose, this is wired automatically.
@@ -33,12 +26,6 @@ DATABASE_URL=postgresql://gitlawb:changeme@localhost:5432/gitlawb
# connections open lazily. Size against the DB server's max_connections,
# remembering admin tooling opens its own pool.
GITLAWB_DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS=20
# Maximum connections in the dedicated advisory-lock pool (separate from the
# pool above). Each in-flight repo write pins one connection here for its whole
# lifetime, so size it to peak concurrent distinct-repo writers — keeping it
# separate is what stops a push burst from starving request handlers. Keep
# (main pool + lock pool) within the DB server's max_connections.
GITLAWB_DB_LOCK_POOL_MAX_CONNECTIONS=32
# Seconds a request waits for a pool connection before failing with 503.
GITLAWB_DB_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS=5
# Upper bound on each startup connect+migrate attempt, in seconds. Keep it
@@ -52,9 +39,6 @@ GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_INITIAL_SECS=5
GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_MAX_SECS=60
# ── IPFS pinning (Pinata) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
# URL of a local IPFS/Kubo node HTTP API (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:5001). Leave
# empty (default) to disable local IPFS.
GITLAWB_IPFS_API=
# Get a JWT at https://app.pinata.cloud/developers/api-keys
GITLAWB_PINATA_JWT=
GITLAWB_PINATA_UPLOAD_URL=https://uploads.pinata.cloud/v3/files
@@ -143,20 +127,6 @@ GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT=600
# the client IP. 0 disables. Default 120.
GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT=120
# ── Write rate limiting (non-creation authenticated writes) ───────────────
# Max non-creation write requests per client IP per hour: issue/PR comments,
# labels, stars, merges, protect/unprotect, replicas, visibility, tasks,
# bounties, profile, and all GraphQL HTTP requests. The brake wraps the whole
# /graphql route, so queries and the playground GET consume this bucket too, not
# only mutations (GraphQL WebSocket subscriptions are excluded). Its own bucket,
# separate from the creation and push brakes. Uses GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY to
# resolve the client IP.
# NOTE: this is a per-IP aggregate across ALL those write actions, so behind a
# shared NAT/egress IP (or with GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY unset) many users collapse
# onto one bucket — raise this for automation-heavy or multi-user single-IP
# deployments. 0 disables. Default 600.
GITLAWB_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT=600
# ── Peer-sync rate limiting (per client IP, uses GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY below) ─
# /api/v1/peers/announce and /api/v1/sync/notify accept unsigned requests from
# known peers and run at higher frequency, so a generous bucket. Separate from
+29
View File
@@ -247,3 +247,32 @@ jobs:
- name: cargo test (shipped Windows crates)
run: cargo test -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
# gitlawb-core is embedded by every consumer (gl, git-remote-gitlawb, the node
# daemon), so it must stay lean. This gate fails if gitlawb-core's normal
# (non-dev, non-build) dependency tree gains any crate not on the allowlist in
# ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt. Exhaustive-by-construction: a new heavy
# dependency reds CI whether or not anyone thought to ban it, which a denylist
# cannot do. Regen instructions live in the allowlist header.
core-deps-purity:
name: gitlawb-core dependency purity
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- name: Check out repository
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Set up Rust toolchain
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
with:
toolchain: stable
- name: Cache cargo
uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
with:
key: core-deps-purity
- name: Check gitlawb-core dependency allowlist
run: bash scripts/check-gitlawb-core-deps.sh
+1 -1
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@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
{
".": "0.6.0"
".": "0.7.0"
}
+18
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,23 @@
# Changelog
## [0.7.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.6.0...v0.7.0) (2026-07-22)
### Features
* **gl:** actually verify certificate signatures in gl cert show ([b0a2ed8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b0a2ed830821b5a77b0dafdcf5ce4b1ad904ec25))
* **gl:** doctor warns when a shell alias shadows the gl binary ([0765c42](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/0765c42feff47b29054b9a277881a7cd5bfd9135))
### Bug Fixes
* **gl:** address review findings — non-fatal DID check, exact-host loopback, detached HEAD, multi-URL remotes, command-aware unalias ([3fa38dc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3fa38dce4e435ef017f607d355266c2892161f8d))
* **gl:** anchor cert --verify to a trusted issuer; pin canonical payload form ([c681af7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c681af70dba3a76b11795d324f2ca0fecf7e42fd))
* **gl:** detect gitlawb remotes beyond origin in gl status ([2d88937](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2d88937fbabf21013f28debb4d4f93270a4bb8cd))
* **gl:** doctor treats a reachable local node as configuration, not failure ([94c61f7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/94c61f79421fa26ecc1bdf7c255e0c48e66a2048))
* **gl:** make gl init's push guidance match the repo's actual state ([cb42a48](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/cb42a4830d0d070165e2212f316d009ec716dbee))
* warn about the oh-my-zsh gl alias at install time ([e3df51d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e3df51d76c0275fde33954ff0af0aab95fd0cb7d))
## [0.6.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.5.1...v0.6.0) (2026-07-22)
Generated
+5 -7
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@@ -3300,7 +3300,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
version = "0.6.0"
version = "0.5.1"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"gitlawb-core",
@@ -3312,7 +3312,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "gitlawb-attest"
version = "0.6.0"
version = "0.5.1"
dependencies = [
"base64",
"ed25519-dalek",
@@ -3329,7 +3329,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "gitlawb-core"
version = "0.6.0"
version = "0.5.1"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"base64",
@@ -3356,14 +3356,13 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "gitlawb-node"
version = "0.6.0"
version = "0.5.1"
dependencies = [
"alloy",
"anyhow",
"async-compression",
"async-graphql",
"async-graphql-axum",
"async-trait",
"aws-config",
"aws-sdk-s3",
"axum",
@@ -3413,11 +3412,10 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "gl"
version = "0.6.0"
version = "0.5.1"
dependencies = [
"alloy",
"anyhow",
"base64",
"chrono",
"clap",
"dirs",
+112
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@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
# Dependency allowlist for the `gitlawb-core` crate.
#
# gitlawb-core is the shared-primitives crate every consumer embeds (the `gl`
# CLI, git-remote-gitlawb, the node daemon). It must stay lean so those
# consumers do not inherit daemon-weight dependencies. This file is the source
# of truth for the crates gitlawb-core's NORMAL (non-dev, non-build) transitive
# dependency closure is allowed to contain. CI (`scripts/check-gitlawb-core-deps.sh`,
# wired into the `core-deps-purity` job in .github/workflows/pr-checks.yml)
# fails if gitlawb-core's tree contains any crate not listed here.
#
# The allowlist is exhaustive-by-construction: a NEW dependency reds CI whether
# or not anyone thought to ban it, which a denylist cannot do.
#
# Measured in-workspace, so feature unification across the workspace can, in
# rare cases, surface a crate here that gitlawb-core would not pull standalone.
# An unexpected new entry is a prompt to check what pulled it in, not noise to
# rubber-stamp.
#
# Regenerate (from repo root, after an INTENTIONAL dependency change):
# cargo tree -p gitlawb-core --edges normal --prefix none \
# | sed -E 's/ v[0-9].*$//' \
# | grep -v '^gitlawb-core$' \
# | sort -u
# then paste the result below this header block. (The checker snapshots and
# restores Cargo.lock; a manual regen may refresh it — `git checkout Cargo.lock`
# afterward if you did not intend that.)
#
# Lines starting with `#` and blank lines are ignored by the checker.
aead
anyhow
base-x
base256emoji
base64
base64ct
block-buffer
cfg-if
chacha20
chacha20poly1305
chrono
cid
cipher
const-oid
const-str
core2
cpufeatures
crypto-common
crypto_box
crypto_secretbox
curve25519-dalek
curve25519-dalek-derive
data-encoding
data-encoding-macro
data-encoding-macro-internal
der
digest
ed25519
ed25519-dalek
equivalent
generic-array
getrandom
hashbrown
hex
iana-time-zone
indexmap
inout
itoa
libc
match-lookup
memchr
multibase
multihash
multihash-codetable
multihash-derive
multihash-derive-impl
num-traits
opaque-debug
pem-rfc7468
pkcs8
poly1305
ppv-lite86
proc-macro-crate
proc-macro2
quote
rand
rand_chacha
rand_core
salsa20
serde
serde_core
serde_derive
serde_json
sha2
signature
spki
subtle
syn
synstructure
thiserror
thiserror-impl
toml_datetime
toml_edit
toml_parser
typenum
unicode-ident
universal-hash
unsigned-varint
uuid
winnow
zerocopy
zeroize
zeroize_derive
zmij
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
[package]
name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
description = "Git remote helper — enables 'git clone gitlawb://did:gitlawb:...'"
version = "0.6.0" # x-release-please-version
version = "0.7.0" # x-release-please-version
edition.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
[package]
name = "gitlawb-attest"
description = "External Attestation v1: pluggable provenance attachments for gitlawb ref-update certs"
version = "0.6.0" # x-release-please-version
version = "0.7.0" # x-release-please-version
edition.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
[package]
name = "gitlawb-core"
description = "Core cryptographic primitives for the gitlawb network: DIDs, CIDs, UCAN, HTTP Signatures, ref-update certificates"
version = "0.6.0" # x-release-please-version
version = "0.7.0" # x-release-please-version
edition.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
+1 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
[package]
name = "gitlawb-node"
description = "The gitlawb node daemon — git hosting over HTTP with DID auth"
version = "0.6.0" # x-release-please-version
version = "0.7.0" # x-release-please-version
edition.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
[dependencies]
gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
async-trait = "0.1"
ed25519-dalek = { workspace = true }
base64 = { workspace = true }
tokio = { workspace = true }
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+7 -490
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@@ -70,37 +70,11 @@ pub async fn create_issue(
let create_result = git_issues::create_issue(&disk_path, &issue_id, &json_str);
// Always release the advisory lock, even on error; upload to Tigris only on
// success. A false return means the durable upload failed/timed out: the
// issue ref applied to local disk but never reached object storage, so the
// next acquire_write would revert it from the stale archive. Report 5xx so
// the client retries rather than trusting an issue that never landed durably,
// and skip the trust bump below. (Same P1 data-loss guard as receive-pack.)
// On that failure, roll back the local ref BEFORE the lock releases — an
// orphan ref would make the retry a duplicate, and in an unlock-to-delete
// window a concurrent same-repo write could upload an archive still
// carrying it. Best-effort: a failed delete logs and the 5xx still returns.
let upload_ok = guard
.release_with_failure_cleanup(create_result.is_ok(), |path| {
if let Err(e) = git_issues::delete_issue_ref(path, &issue_id) {
tracing::warn!(issue = %issue_id, err = %e,
"failed to roll back local issue ref after failed durable upload; \
a retry may duplicate this issue");
}
})
.await;
// Always release the advisory lock — even on error; upload to Tigris only on success.
guard.release(create_result.is_ok()).await;
create_result.map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
if !upload_ok {
tracing::error!(repo = %record.name,
"durable upload failed after issue create; reporting failure so the client retries");
return Err(AppError::Git(format!(
"durable storage upload failed for {}",
record.name
)));
}
// Bump trust score for the issue author — increment current score by 0.05
// (avoids the push_count=0 stuck-at-0.05 bug for agents who only file issues)
if let Some(ref author_did) = issue.author {
@@ -270,14 +244,11 @@ pub async fn close_issue(
.ok()
.and_then(|i| i.author),
Ok(None) => {
// release(false): no upload attempted, so the bool is always true
// (nothing to fail on). Ignore it on this pre-write error path.
let _ = guard.release(false).await;
guard.release(false).await;
return Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("issue {issue_id} not found")));
}
Err(e) => {
// release(false): no upload attempted, nothing to fail on.
let _ = guard.release(false).await;
guard.release(false).await;
return Err(AppError::Git(e.to_string()));
}
};
@@ -286,57 +257,21 @@ pub async fn close_issue(
.as_deref()
.is_some_and(|a| crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, a));
if !is_owner && !is_author {
// release(false): no upload attempted, nothing to fail on.
let _ = guard.release(false).await;
guard.release(false).await;
return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
"only the repo owner or the issue author can close this issue".into(),
));
}
// Snapshot the issue ref's pre-close OID so a failed durable upload can roll
// the close back on local disk, mirroring create_issue. Best-effort: if the
// snapshot read fails we proceed without a rollback closure (the close still
// applies and a failed upload still surfaces as a 5xx below).
let prior_ref = git_issues::issue_ref_oid(&disk_path, &issue_id)
.ok()
.flatten();
let close_result = git_issues::close_issue(&disk_path, &issue_id);
// Always release the advisory lock, even on error; upload to Tigris only on
// success. A false return means the durable upload failed: the close applied
// to local disk but never reached object storage, so a later acquire_write
// reverts it. Report 5xx so the client retries. (P1 data-loss guard.)
// On that failure, roll the local close BACK to the captured open ref BEFORE
// the lock releases — otherwise the local fast path in RepoStore::acquire
// serves the "closed" state until a later write refreshes the archive, even
// though the client got a 5xx. The cleanup runs only when an upload was
// attempted and failed, while the advisory lock is still held.
let upload_ok = guard
.release_with_failure_cleanup(close_result.is_ok(), |path| {
if let Some((full_id, oid)) = &prior_ref {
if let Err(e) = git_issues::restore_issue_ref(path, full_id, oid) {
tracing::warn!(issue = %issue_id, err = %e,
"failed to roll back local issue close after failed durable upload; \
a local-fast-path read may serve a stale closed state");
}
}
})
.await;
// Always release the advisory lock — even on error; upload to Tigris only on success.
guard.release(close_result.is_ok()).await;
let updated = close_result
.map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("issue {issue_id} not found")))?;
if !upload_ok {
tracing::error!(repo = %repo,
"durable upload failed after issue close; reporting failure so the client retries");
return Err(AppError::Git(format!(
"durable storage upload failed for {}",
record.name
)));
}
let issue: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&updated)
.map_err(|e| AppError::BadRequest(format!("invalid issue data: {e}")))?;
@@ -344,421 +279,3 @@ pub async fn close_issue(
Ok(Json(issue))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use axum::extract::{Path as AxPath, State};
use axum::Extension;
use std::path::Path as StdPath;
use std::time::Duration;
// Object store whose upload() parks forever, so release()'s bounded timeout
// is the only thing that completes it, modeling a stalled durable PUT. exists()
// is false so acquire_write never downloads over the fresh local bare repo.
struct StallStore;
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl crate::git::tigris::ObjectStore for StallStore {
async fn exists(&self, _o: &str, _r: &str) -> anyhow::Result<bool> {
Ok(false)
}
async fn upload(&self, _o: &str, _r: &str, _p: &StdPath) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
std::future::pending::<()>().await;
Ok(())
}
async fn download(&self, _o: &str, _r: &str, _p: &StdPath) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
async fn delete(&self, _o: &str, _r: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
}
// Object store whose upload succeeds immediately. exists() is false so
// acquire_write never performs a reverting refresh over the local dir —
// the retry test below pins that contract explicitly.
struct OkStore;
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl crate::git::tigris::ObjectStore for OkStore {
async fn exists(&self, _o: &str, _r: &str) -> anyhow::Result<bool> {
Ok(false)
}
async fn upload(&self, _o: &str, _r: &str, _p: &StdPath) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
async fn download(&self, _o: &str, _r: &str, _p: &StdPath) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
async fn delete(&self, _o: &str, _r: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
}
// Shared setup for the failed-upload rollback tests: a state whose repo
// store stalls uploads (200ms release timeout), a public repo row for
// `owner/name`, and an initialized bare repo at the returned path.
async fn stall_state_with_repo(
pool: sqlx::PgPool,
repos_dir: &tempfile::TempDir,
owner: &str,
name: &str,
) -> (crate::state::AppState, std::path::PathBuf) {
let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(
repos_dir.path().to_path_buf(),
Some(std::sync::Arc::new(StallStore)),
pool.clone(),
)
.with_release_upload_timeout(Duration::from_millis(200));
let owner_slug = owner.replace([':', '/'], "_");
let bare = repos_dir
.path()
.join(&owner_slug)
.join(format!("{name}.git"));
state
.db
.upsert_mirror_repo(owner, name, &bare.to_string_lossy(), None, false)
.await
.unwrap();
std::fs::create_dir_all(&bare).unwrap();
let out = std::process::Command::new("git")
.args(["init", "--bare", "-q", &bare.to_string_lossy()])
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(out.status.success(), "git init --bare failed");
(state, bare)
}
async fn create_issue_status(
state: &crate::state::AppState,
owner: &str,
name: &str,
) -> axum::http::StatusCode {
use axum::response::IntoResponse;
let resp = super::create_issue(
State(state.clone()),
Extension(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid(owner.to_string())),
AxPath((owner.to_string(), name.to_string())),
axum::Json(CreateIssueRequest {
title: "t".into(),
body: None,
signed_payload: None,
}),
)
.await;
match resp {
Ok((code, _)) => code,
Err(e) => e.into_response().status(),
}
}
async fn close_issue_status(
state: &crate::state::AppState,
owner: &str,
name: &str,
issue_id: &str,
) -> axum::http::StatusCode {
use axum::response::IntoResponse;
let resp = super::close_issue(
State(state.clone()),
Extension(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid(owner.to_string())),
AxPath((owner.to_string(), name.to_string(), issue_id.to_string())),
)
.await;
match resp {
Ok(_) => axum::http::StatusCode::OK,
Err(e) => e.into_response().status(),
}
}
// Seed an OPEN issue directly on local disk, bypassing the (stalling) upload
// path so the close test starts from a durably-consistent open issue.
fn seed_open_issue(bare: &StdPath, owner: &str, issue_id: &str) {
let issue = IssueRecord {
id: issue_id.to_string(),
title: "t".into(),
body: None,
author: Some(owner.to_string()),
created_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
status: "open".to_string(),
signed_payload: None,
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&issue).unwrap();
git_issues::create_issue(bare, issue_id, &json).unwrap();
}
fn issue_status(bare: &StdPath, issue_id: &str) -> String {
let raw = git_issues::get_issue(bare, issue_id).unwrap().unwrap();
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&raw).unwrap();
v["status"].as_str().unwrap().to_string()
}
// U2 [F2, P1] — the failed-upload rollback on the close path. close_issue
// applies the "closed" ref to LOCAL disk, then release() uploads to durable
// storage. When that upload times out the local close is NOT persisted, so a
// later acquire_write reverts it from the stale archive — but until then, a
// local-fast-path read via RepoStore::acquire serves the stale "closed"
// state even though the client got a 5xx. The fix rolls the close back to the
// captured open ref while the advisory lock is held. RED with the cleanup
// closure reverted to `|_| {}`: the read sees "closed".
#[sqlx::test]
async fn issue_close_failed_upload_rolls_back_to_open(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
let repos_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let owner = "z6issuecloserollbackowner";
let name = "issuecloserollback";
let (state, bare) = stall_state_with_repo(pool, &repos_dir, owner, name).await;
let issue_id = "aaaa1111-0000-0000-0000-000000000000";
seed_open_issue(&bare, owner, issue_id);
assert_eq!(issue_status(&bare, issue_id), "open", "seed must be open");
// Close via the handler — the durable upload stalls and times out (5xx).
let status = close_issue_status(&state, owner, name, issue_id).await;
assert!(
status.is_server_error(),
"a stalled durable upload on issue-close must 500, got {status}"
);
// The local fast path must still see the issue OPEN: the failed upload
// rolled the close back while the lock was held.
assert_eq!(
issue_status(&bare, issue_id),
"open",
"a failed durable upload must roll the local close back to open; a \
local-fast-path read served the stale closed state"
);
}
// Success path: a working store closes the issue (2xx) and the read reflects
// the close. Confirms the rollback wiring does not fire on success.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn issue_close_success_persists_close(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
let repos_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let owner = "z6issueclosesuccessowner";
let name = "issueclosesuccess";
let (mut state, bare) = stall_state_with_repo(pool.clone(), &repos_dir, owner, name).await;
// Swap the stalling store for one whose upload succeeds immediately.
state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(
repos_dir.path().to_path_buf(),
Some(std::sync::Arc::new(OkStore)),
pool.clone(),
)
.with_release_upload_timeout(Duration::from_millis(200));
let issue_id = "bbbb2222-0000-0000-0000-000000000000";
seed_open_issue(&bare, owner, issue_id);
let status = close_issue_status(&state, owner, name, issue_id).await;
assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK, "working store must close (200)");
assert_eq!(
issue_status(&bare, issue_id),
"closed",
"a successful close must persist as closed"
);
}
// Pre-write error path: closing a nonexistent issue returns 404 and never
// attempts an upload (release(false)), so the stalling store cannot hang it.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn issue_close_not_found_releases_without_upload(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
let repos_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let owner = "z6issueclosemissingowner";
let name = "issueclosemissing";
let (state, _bare) = stall_state_with_repo(pool, &repos_dir, owner, name).await;
let status =
close_issue_status(&state, owner, name, "cccc3333-0000-0000-0000-000000000000").await;
assert_eq!(
status,
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
"closing a missing issue must 404 without attempting an upload"
);
}
fn issue_refs(bare: &StdPath) -> Vec<String> {
let out = std::process::Command::new("git")
.args([
"for-each-ref",
"--format=%(refname)",
"refs/gitlawb/issues/",
])
.current_dir(bare)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(out.status.success(), "git for-each-ref failed");
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout)
.lines()
.filter(|l| !l.trim().is_empty())
.map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
.collect()
}
// Rollback half of the #196 round-four issue-create fix. When the durable
// upload fails/times out, the handler 500s (covered below) — but the issue
// ref it wrote to LOCAL disk must also be rolled back, while the advisory
// lock is still held. An orphan ref makes the 500 dishonest: a retry
// re-creates the issue under a new uuid while the orphan is still listed,
// and a concurrent same-repo write can upload an archive carrying it.
// RED pre-fix: the orphan ref survives the failed create.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn issue_create_failed_upload_rolls_back_local_ref(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
let repos_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let owner = "z6issuerollbackowner";
let name = "issuerollback";
let (state, bare) = stall_state_with_repo(pool, &repos_dir, owner, name).await;
let status = create_issue_status(&state, owner, name).await;
assert!(
status.is_server_error(),
"stalled upload must 500, got {status}"
);
let refs = issue_refs(&bare);
assert!(
refs.is_empty(),
"a failed durable upload must roll back the local issue ref while \
the advisory lock is held; orphan ref(s) survived: {refs:?}"
);
}
// Retry half: after the failed-upload 500, a retry with a WORKING store
// must yield exactly one issue. Pre-fix the orphan ref from the failed
// attempt makes the retry a duplicate (two issues in list_issues).
#[sqlx::test]
async fn issue_create_failed_upload_retry_does_not_duplicate(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
use crate::git::tigris::ObjectStore as _;
let repos_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let owner = "z6issueretryowner";
let name = "issueretry";
let (state, bare) = stall_state_with_repo(pool.clone(), &repos_dir, owner, name).await;
let status = create_issue_status(&state, owner, name).await;
assert!(
status.is_server_error(),
"stalled upload must 500, got {status}"
);
// PIN the double's contract: exists() stays false after the failed
// upload, so the retry's acquire_write performs no reverting refresh
// from a stale archive. Without this pin, a download could revert the
// orphan ref and the assertion below would pass without the rollback
// fix — it must rest on the rollback, not a stale-archive revert.
let owner_slug = owner.replace([':', '/'], "_");
assert!(
!OkStore.exists(&owner_slug, name).await.unwrap(),
"test double contract broken: exists() must stay false"
);
// Retry with a store whose upload succeeds.
let mut retry_state = state.clone();
retry_state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(
repos_dir.path().to_path_buf(),
Some(std::sync::Arc::new(OkStore)),
pool.clone(),
)
.with_release_upload_timeout(Duration::from_millis(200));
let status = create_issue_status(&retry_state, owner, name).await;
assert_eq!(
status,
StatusCode::CREATED,
"retry with working store must 201"
);
let issues = crate::git::issues::list_issues(&bare).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
issues.len(),
1,
"retry after a failed-upload 500 must yield exactly ONE issue; the \
failed attempt's orphan ref duplicated it (got {} issues)",
issues.len()
);
}
// P1-class data-loss regression, issue-create path. create_issue writes the
// issue ref to local disk, then release(true) uploads the repo to durable
// storage. When that upload times out the local write is NOT persisted, so
// the next acquire_write reverts it from the stale archive. The pre-fix
// handler ignored release()'s bool and still returned 201 AND bumped the
// author's trust score, so the client trusted an issue that never landed
// durably. The fix surfaces a failed/timed-out upload as a 5xx and skips the
// success tail (the trust bump). Stall the upload past a tiny release timeout
// and assert (a) the handler returns 5xx and (b) the trust bump did not run.
// RED pre-fix: 201 + trust score bumped to 0.05.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn issue_create_durable_upload_timeout_fails_and_skips_side_effects(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
use axum::response::IntoResponse;
let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
let repos_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(
repos_dir.path().to_path_buf(),
Some(std::sync::Arc::new(StallStore)),
pool.clone(),
)
.with_release_upload_timeout(Duration::from_millis(200));
let owner = "z6issueownerdurablefail";
let name = "issuedurablefail";
let owner_slug = owner.replace([':', '/'], "_");
let bare = repos_dir
.path()
.join(&owner_slug)
.join(format!("{name}.git"));
// Public mirror repo so the owner clears authorize_repo_read, and a real
// agent row so the post-write trust bump is an observable durable side
// effect (register_agent seeds trust_score = 0.0).
state
.db
.upsert_mirror_repo(owner, name, &bare.to_string_lossy(), None, false)
.await
.unwrap();
state.db.register_agent(owner, &[]).await.unwrap();
std::fs::create_dir_all(&bare).unwrap();
let out = std::process::Command::new("git")
.args(["init", "--bare", "-q", &bare.to_string_lossy()])
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(out.status.success(), "git init --bare failed");
// acquire_write → git_issues::create_issue (writes the ref) → release
// (upload stalls, times out after 200ms). The client MUST see a failure.
let resp = super::create_issue(
State(state.clone()),
Extension(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid(owner.to_string())),
AxPath((owner.to_string(), name.to_string())),
axum::Json(CreateIssueRequest {
title: "t".into(),
body: None,
signed_payload: None,
}),
)
.await;
let status = match resp {
Ok((code, _)) => code,
Err(e) => e.into_response().status(),
};
assert!(
status.is_server_error(),
"a timed-out durable upload on issue-create must fail (5xx) so the \
client retries (got {status}), which the client trusts as a landed \
issue that a later acquire_write would silently revert"
);
// The success tail (trust bump) must NOT have run: the issue was never
// durably accepted. register_agent seeded 0.0; a bump would make it 0.05.
let score = state.db.get_trust_score(owner).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
score, 0.0,
"the trust bump must NOT run when the durable upload failed; the \
issue was not durably accepted (score bumped to {score})"
);
}
}
+2 -202
View File
@@ -216,14 +216,6 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
.map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
let disk_path = guard.path().to_path_buf();
let merger_did = auth.0;
// Snapshot the target branch's pre-merge tip so a failed durable upload can
// roll the merge commit back on local disk (mirrors create_issue). Without
// this the local fast path in RepoStore::acquire serves the merged tree until
// a later write refreshes the archive, even though the client got a 5xx.
let target_ref = format!("refs/heads/{}", pr.target_branch);
let prior_target = store::ref_oid(&disk_path, &target_ref).ok().flatten();
let merge_result = store::merge_branch(
&disk_path,
&pr.target_branch,
@@ -232,37 +224,11 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
&pr.title,
);
// Always release the advisory lock, even on error; upload to Tigris only on
// success. A false return means the durable upload failed/timed out: the merge
// commit applied to local disk but never reached object storage, so the next
// acquire_write reverts it from the stale archive. Report 5xx so the client
// retries rather than marking the PR merged in the DB while the merged tree
// was silently lost. Fail BEFORE merge_pr / touch_repo / webhooks. (P1
// data-loss guard, same as receive-pack.) On that failure, roll the local
// merge back to the captured tip BEFORE the lock releases.
let upload_ok = guard
.release_with_failure_cleanup(merge_result.is_ok(), |path| {
if let Some(oid) = &prior_target {
if let Err(e) = store::set_ref(path, &target_ref, oid) {
tracing::warn!(repo = %record.name, err = %e,
"failed to roll back local merge commit after failed durable upload; \
a local-fast-path read may serve the un-uploaded merged tree");
}
}
})
.await;
// Always release the advisory lock — even on error; upload to Tigris only on success.
guard.release(merge_result.is_ok()).await;
let merge_sha = merge_result.map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
if !upload_ok {
tracing::error!(repo = %record.name,
"durable upload failed after merge; reporting failure so the client retries");
return Err(AppError::Git(format!(
"durable storage upload failed for {}",
record.name
)));
}
state.db.merge_pr(&pr.id, &merger_did).await?;
let _ = state.db.touch_repo(&record.id).await;
@@ -458,169 +424,3 @@ pub async fn list_comments(
let comments = state.db.list_pr_comments(&pr.id).await?;
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "comments": comments })))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
// super::* brings in the handler plus the axum Extension/Path/State
// extractors and the Utc/Uuid/PullRequest types the seed uses.
use super::*;
use std::path::Path as StdPath;
use std::time::Duration;
// Object store whose upload() parks forever, so release()'s bounded timeout
// is the only thing that completes it, modeling a stalled durable PUT.
// exists() is false so acquire_write never downloads over the local bare repo.
struct StallStore;
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl crate::git::tigris::ObjectStore for StallStore {
async fn exists(&self, _o: &str, _r: &str) -> anyhow::Result<bool> {
Ok(false)
}
async fn upload(&self, _o: &str, _r: &str, _p: &StdPath) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
std::future::pending::<()>().await;
Ok(())
}
async fn download(&self, _o: &str, _r: &str, _p: &StdPath) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
async fn delete(&self, _o: &str, _r: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
}
// The failed-upload rollback on the merge path. merge_pr writes the merge
// commit to LOCAL disk, then release() uploads to durable storage. When
// that upload times out the handler must 5xx (before merge_pr/webhooks)
// AND roll the target branch back to its pre-merge tip while the advisory
// lock is held, so a local-fast-path read never serves the un-uploaded
// merged tree. RED with the cleanup closure at ~pulls.rs:244 reverted to
// `|_| {}`: main stays at the merge commit.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn merge_failed_upload_rolls_back_target_ref(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
use axum::response::IntoResponse;
use std::process::Command;
let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
let repos_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(
repos_dir.path().to_path_buf(),
Some(std::sync::Arc::new(StallStore)),
pool.clone(),
)
.with_release_upload_timeout(Duration::from_millis(200));
let owner = "z6mergerollbackowner";
let name = "mergerollback";
let owner_slug = owner.replace([':', '/'], "_");
let bare = repos_dir
.path()
.join(&owner_slug)
.join(format!("{name}.git"));
state
.db
.upsert_mirror_repo(owner, name, &bare.to_string_lossy(), None, false)
.await
.unwrap();
fn git(args: &[&str], dir: &StdPath) -> String {
let out = Command::new("git")
.args(args)
.current_dir(dir)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
out.status.success(),
"git {args:?} failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
}
// Scratch repo: c1 on main, c2 on feature; the bare clone carries both
// branches, so the merge of feature into main has real work to do.
let work = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
git(&["init", "-q", "-b", "main", "."], work.path());
git(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"], work.path());
git(&["config", "user.name", "t"], work.path());
std::fs::write(work.path().join("f.txt"), "one").unwrap();
git(&["add", "f.txt"], work.path());
git(&["commit", "-q", "-m", "c1"], work.path());
git(&["checkout", "-q", "-b", "feature"], work.path());
std::fs::write(work.path().join("g.txt"), "two").unwrap();
git(&["add", "g.txt"], work.path());
git(&["commit", "-q", "-m", "c2"], work.path());
std::fs::create_dir_all(bare.parent().unwrap()).unwrap();
let out = Command::new("git")
.args([
"clone",
"--bare",
"-q",
&work.path().to_string_lossy(),
&bare.to_string_lossy(),
])
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
out.status.success(),
"clone --bare failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
let pre_merge_tip = store::ref_oid(&bare, "refs/heads/main")
.unwrap()
.expect("main exists before the merge");
// Seed the open PR row the handler looks up.
let record = state.db.get_repo(owner, name).await.unwrap().unwrap();
let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
state
.db
.create_pr(&PullRequest {
id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
repo_id: record.id.clone(),
number: 1,
title: "t".into(),
body: None,
author_did: owner.to_string(),
source_branch: "feature".into(),
target_branch: "main".into(),
status: "open".to_string(),
merged_by_did: None,
merged_at: None,
created_at: now.clone(),
updated_at: now,
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Merge as the owner: the merge commit applies locally, the durable
// upload stalls and times out, and the handler must report 5xx.
let resp = super::merge_pr(
State(state.clone()),
Extension(AuthenticatedDid(owner.to_string())),
Path((owner.to_string(), name.to_string(), 1)),
)
.await;
let status = match resp {
Ok(_) => StatusCode::OK,
Err(e) => e.into_response().status(),
};
assert!(
status.is_server_error(),
"a stalled durable upload on merge must 5xx, got {status}"
);
// The target branch must still point at the pre-merge tip: the failed
// upload rolled the merge commit back while the lock was held.
let tip = store::ref_oid(&bare, "refs/heads/main")
.unwrap()
.expect("main still exists after the rollback");
assert_eq!(
tip, pre_merge_tip,
"a failed durable upload must roll the target branch back to its \
pre-merge tip; a local-fast-path read served the un-uploaded merge"
);
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
-1
View File
@@ -515,7 +515,6 @@ mod tests {
repo_store: crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), pool),
rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(100, Duration::from_secs(60)),
create_ip_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(1000, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
write_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(1000, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None,
sync_trigger_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+5 -48
View File
@@ -1,45 +1,18 @@
use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
use clap::Parser;
use std::path::PathBuf;
/// Optional admin subcommands. When none is given, the binary runs the node
/// daemon as before — the default (no-subcommand) startup path is unchanged.
#[derive(Subcommand, Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Command {
/// Dry-run (default) or, with --execute, delete empty spam-burst repos owned
/// by the known burst DID. Never touches the hard-excluded DIDs, and verifies
/// each repo is empty (zero git refs) per repo before selecting it.
PurgeSpam {
/// Actually delete the candidates. Omit for a dry-run that prints the
/// candidate list and deletes nothing.
#[arg(long, default_value_t = false)]
execute: bool,
},
}
#[derive(Parser, Debug, Clone)]
#[command(name = "gitlawb-node", about = "gitlawb node daemon", version)]
pub struct Config {
/// Admin subcommand to run instead of the node daemon. Absent = run the node.
#[command(subcommand)]
pub command: Option<Command>,
/// Directory where bare git repositories are stored. `global` so it can
/// follow a subcommand (e.g. `gitlawb-node purge-spam --repos-dir …`).
#[arg(
long,
env = "GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR",
default_value = "./data/repos",
global = true
)]
/// Directory where bare git repositories are stored
#[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR", default_value = "./data/repos")]
pub repos_dir: PathBuf,
/// PostgreSQL connection URL (Supabase or any Postgres instance). `global` so
/// admin subcommands accept it in either position.
/// PostgreSQL connection URL (Supabase or any Postgres instance)
#[arg(
long,
env = "DATABASE_URL",
default_value = "postgresql://localhost/gitlawb",
global = true
default_value = "postgresql://localhost/gitlawb"
)]
pub database_url: String,
@@ -221,22 +194,6 @@ pub struct Config {
)]
pub db_max_connections: u32,
/// Maximum connections in the dedicated advisory-lock pool, separate from
/// the main pool above. Every in-flight repo write (git-receive-pack, fork,
/// merge) pins one connection here for its whole lifetime — the write, its
/// metadata/fan-out tail, and the bounded post-write archive upload — so
/// size it to the expected peak number of concurrent distinct-repo writers,
/// NOT small. Keeping it separate from GITLAWB_DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS is what
/// stops a push burst from starving normal request handlers. Keep
/// (main pool + lock pool) within the database server's max_connections.
#[arg(
long,
env = "GITLAWB_DB_LOCK_POOL_MAX_CONNECTIONS",
default_value_t = 32,
value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u32).range(1..)
)]
pub db_lock_pool_max_connections: u32,
/// Maximum time a request waits for a pool connection before failing with
/// 503, in seconds. Bounds queueing when the database is slow or down.
#[arg(
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+6 -27
View File
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ pub enum AppError {
#[error("invalid request: {0}")]
BadRequest(String),
#[error("too many requests: {0}")]
TooManyRequests(String),
#[error("incomplete: {0}")]
Incomplete(String),
@@ -44,9 +47,6 @@ pub enum AppError {
#[error("git service timed out: {0}")]
Timeout(String),
#[error("service unavailable: {0}")]
Unavailable(String),
#[error("database error: {0}")]
Db(#[from] sqlx::Error),
@@ -132,6 +132,9 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
// IcaptchaProofRequired is handled above (it carries extra headers/fields).
AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired { .. } => unreachable!("handled before this match"),
AppError::BadRequest(msg) => (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "bad_request", msg.clone()),
AppError::TooManyRequests(msg) => {
(StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "rate_limited", msg.clone())
}
AppError::Incomplete(msg) => {
(StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY, "incomplete", msg.clone())
}
@@ -139,14 +142,6 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
// 504, distinct from the 500 git_error and from the read-gate's 404 /
// the auth 401, so the client can tell a deadline from a failure.
AppError::Timeout(msg) => (StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT, "git_timeout", msg.clone()),
// 503, retryable: a transient resource contention (e.g. the repo lock
// pool is pinned by a write burst or a purge holds the key), distinct
// from the 500 git_error so the client knows to back off and retry.
AppError::Unavailable(msg) => (
StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
"service_unavailable",
msg.clone(),
),
AppError::Db(e) if db_unavailable(e) => (
StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
@@ -187,20 +182,4 @@ mod tests {
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
);
}
#[test]
fn unavailable_maps_to_503_distinct_from_git_500() {
// The create-repo lock-acquire failure returns Unavailable so a client sees
// a retryable 503, not a terminal 500 git_error.
assert_eq!(
AppError::Unavailable("lock pool pinned".into())
.into_response()
.status(),
StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
);
assert_eq!(
AppError::Git("x".into()).into_response().status(),
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
);
}
}
-45
View File
@@ -61,51 +61,6 @@ pub fn create_issue(repo_path: &Path, issue_id: &str, json: &str) -> Result<()>
Ok(())
}
/// Delete an issue ref. Used to roll back a locally written issue whose
/// durable upload failed, so a retry does not duplicate it. The dangling
/// blob object is harmless.
pub fn delete_issue_ref(repo_path: &Path, issue_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
let ref_name = format!("refs/gitlawb/issues/{issue_id}");
let output = Command::new("git")
.args(["update-ref", "-d", &ref_name])
.current_dir(repo_path)
.output()
.context("failed to run git update-ref -d")?;
if !output.status.success() {
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
anyhow::bail!("git update-ref -d failed: {stderr}");
}
Ok(())
}
/// Read the object id an issue ref currently points to (resolving an 8-char
/// prefix), returning `(full_id, oid)`. Returns None if no such issue exists.
/// Used to snapshot an issue ref's pre-mutation state so a failed durable
/// upload can restore it, mirroring `create_issue`'s rollback.
pub fn issue_ref_oid(repo_path: &Path, issue_id: &str) -> Result<Option<(String, String)>> {
let full_id = match resolve_issue_id(repo_path, issue_id)? {
Some(id) => id,
None => return Ok(None),
};
let ref_name = format!("refs/gitlawb/issues/{full_id}");
let oid = match crate::git::store::ref_oid(repo_path, &ref_name)? {
Some(oid) => oid,
None => return Ok(None),
};
Ok(Some((full_id, oid)))
}
/// Reset an issue ref back to a captured object id — rolls back a local
/// mutation (e.g. a close) whose durable upload failed, so a local-fast-path
/// read does not serve the un-uploaded state. `full_id` must be the resolved
/// UUID (from [`issue_ref_oid`]). The now-dangling object is harmless.
pub fn restore_issue_ref(repo_path: &Path, full_id: &str, oid: &str) -> Result<()> {
let ref_name = format!("refs/gitlawb/issues/{full_id}");
crate::git::store::set_ref(repo_path, &ref_name, oid)
}
/// List all issue refs and return their JSON content.
pub fn list_issues(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
// List all refs under refs/gitlawb/issues/
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -1,431 +0,0 @@
//! Read-path download coordination (KTD-3) for [`RepoStore`].
//!
//! The read path's cache-miss handling lives here: the per-repo async mutex
//! that serializes concurrent readers of the same repo, the holder's fetch +
//! extract + under-lock publish, and the RAII temp-dir cleanup. `acquire` and
//! `acquire_fresh` stay in the parent module and call into `download_published`.
//! These methods reach the parent's private fields (`download_locks`) and
//! private methods (`try_lock_repo`) directly, because a child module can see
//! its parent's private items.
use super::*;
/// Outcome of a coordinated read-path download (KTD-3).
pub(super) enum DownloadOutcome {
/// The local dir is present: this reader downloaded and published it under
/// the advisory lock, or a concurrent reader did and this one served it.
Published,
/// The download was discarded without publishing: the advisory lock was
/// contended (a live writer or purge holds it), the lock pool errored, or
/// the archive vanished under the lock (purged mid-download). The caller
/// degrades to its missing-path or serve-local-copy outcome.
Skipped,
}
/// RAII cleanup for a read-path download temp dir (finding 1). Its `Drop`
/// removes the dir (best effort), so a handler future cancelled mid-download
/// (axum drops it on client disconnect, the same hazard `RepoWriteGuard` /
/// `RepoLockGuard` Drop impls exist for) cannot leak a fully-populated repo
/// dir. `disarm` forgets the dir once the publish rename has consumed it.
struct TempDownloadDir {
path: PathBuf,
armed: bool,
}
impl TempDownloadDir {
fn new(path: PathBuf) -> Self {
Self { path, armed: true }
}
fn path(&self) -> &Path {
&self.path
}
/// Disarm: the temp has been consumed (renamed into place), so `Drop` must
/// not try to remove it.
fn disarm(mut self) {
self.armed = false;
}
}
impl Drop for TempDownloadDir {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if self.armed {
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&self.path);
}
}
}
/// RAII removal of a download-coordination map entry (finding 4). Its `Drop`
/// removes the entry from `download_locks` whenever the map still holds THIS
/// Arc (ptr_eq-guarded so a newer entry inserted after an earlier removal is
/// never clobbered). Removal is guaranteed on every path (a normal return or
/// `?` drops it in the holder; once a download is in flight it travels with
/// the spawned task and drops at settle, covering holder timeout and a
/// handler future cancelled mid cold-read, which axum triggers on client
/// disconnect), which is what keeps the map from growing per arbitrary
/// requested name: the pre-fix explicit removals ran only at the labelled
/// return points, which a cancelled future skipped, leaking the entry. The
/// outer map is a std::sync::Mutex so
/// this Drop can prune it synchronously (Drop cannot be async); it is only ever
/// held briefly for a get/insert/remove, never across an await.
struct DownloadEntryGuard {
locks: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<HashMap<String, Arc<Mutex<()>>>>>,
key: String,
entry: Arc<Mutex<()>>,
}
impl Drop for DownloadEntryGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
// A poisoned map is still safe to prune — recover the guard and remove.
let mut map = self.locks.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());
if map
.get(&self.key)
.is_some_and(|cur| Arc::ptr_eq(cur, &self.entry))
{
map.remove(&self.key);
}
}
}
impl RepoStore {
/// Coordinated read-path download (KTD-3). Serializes concurrent readers
/// of the same repo on a per-repo async mutex: the first one in becomes
/// the holder and runs [`download_and_publish`](Self::download_and_publish);
/// a contended reader awaits the holder, re-checks the local dir on wake,
/// and serves what the holder published instead of re-downloading. Only
/// callers that already confirmed the archive exists reach this, and the
/// map entry is removed on completion, so the map cannot grow per
/// arbitrary requested name.
pub(super) async fn download_published(
&self,
owner_did: &str,
repo_name: &str,
owner_slug: &str,
local_path: &Path,
store: &Arc<dyn ObjectStore>,
local_existed_at_entry: bool,
) -> Result<DownloadOutcome> {
let map_key = format!("{owner_slug}/{repo_name}");
let entry = {
let mut map = self.download_locks.lock().unwrap();
Arc::clone(
map.entry(map_key.clone())
.or_insert_with(|| Arc::new(Mutex::new(()))),
)
};
let held = match Arc::clone(&entry).try_lock_owned() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(_) => {
// Bounded coalescing wait: once a holder's download is in
// flight, the spawned task owns this lock (and the map entry)
// until it settles, whatever happens to the holder (timeout or
// cancellation), so an unbounded lock().await here would park
// this reader for as long as a stall lasts. On elapse, report
// the same timeout error the holder would. Do NOT touch the
// map entry on this path: pruning it while the download is in
// flight would let the next arrival start a duplicate download.
let waited = tokio::time::timeout(
self.release_upload_timeout,
Arc::clone(&entry).lock_owned(),
)
.await;
let g = match waited {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(_) => {
if local_path.exists() {
// A concurrent reader published while we waited.
return Ok(DownloadOutcome::Published);
}
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("read download timed out"));
}
};
if local_path.exists() {
// A concurrent reader published while we waited — serve it.
// The holder's own guard prunes the map entry on its exit.
return Ok(DownloadOutcome::Published);
}
// The holder degraded without publishing; this reader takes over.
// The prior holder removed the map entry on its way out, so
// re-register THIS entry before downloading, so readers arriving
// now coalesce onto it instead of starting a duplicate download
// (finding 3). Narrows the duplicate-download window; publishes
// stay serialized by the advisory lock regardless.
{
let mut map = self.download_locks.lock().unwrap();
map.entry(map_key.clone())
.or_insert_with(|| Arc::clone(&entry));
}
g
}
};
// RAII: remove the map entry when this holder's work is done (finding
// 4). Created only once THIS reader holds the per-repo lock, so a
// parked or timed-out waiter never prunes the entry out from under a
// live holder; its Drop is ptr_eq-guarded, so it never clobbers a
// newer entry. Ownership moves into download_and_publish and from
// there into the spawned download task itself, so on EVERY settle path
// (success, download error, holder timeout, holder cancellation) the
// entry stays registered and the lock stays held until the in-flight
// download settles: waiters queue on the ONE download instead of each
// timeout or cancel wave starting a fresh full download of the same
// object.
let entry_guard = DownloadEntryGuard {
locks: Arc::clone(&self.download_locks),
key: map_key,
entry: Arc::clone(&entry),
};
self.download_and_publish(
owner_did,
repo_name,
owner_slug,
local_path,
store,
local_existed_at_entry,
entry_guard,
held,
)
.await
}
/// The holder's half of the coordinated download: fetch and extract the
/// archive into a temp sibling with NO advisory lock held (the network
/// phase must never pin a lock-pool connection — a cold-read burst across
/// distinct repos must not drain the writer-sized pool), then take the
/// per-repo advisory lock only around the publish: re-check the archive
/// still exists under the lock (a purge deletes it under this same lock,
/// so a post-purge downloader discards rather than resurrecting), swap
/// the temp copy into place, release. Advisory contention or a lock-pool
/// error discards the temp copy and degrades — no blocking lock or pool
/// wait exists anywhere on the read path.
///
/// `local_existed_at_entry` selects the stale-swap guard (finding 2): a cold
/// `acquire` passes `false`, an `acquire_fresh` refresh passes `true`. Under
/// the lock, before the swap, we detect a writer that published a fresher
/// copy during our unlocked download window and serve theirs instead of
/// clobbering it with our now-stale temp.
///
/// `entry_guard` and `held` are this holder's per-repo coordination (the
/// download_locks map entry and the locked per-repo mutex). Both move into
/// the spawned download task, which returns them through its JoinHandle on
/// success; on any other settle path (download error, task panic, holder
/// timeout, holder cancellation) they drop when the task settles, so
/// waiters keep queueing on the SAME in-flight download until it settles
/// rather than each starting a duplicate one.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
async fn download_and_publish(
&self,
owner_did: &str,
repo_name: &str,
owner_slug: &str,
local_path: &Path,
store: &Arc<dyn ObjectStore>,
local_existed_at_entry: bool,
entry_guard: DownloadEntryGuard,
held: tokio::sync::OwnedMutexGuard<()>,
) -> Result<DownloadOutcome> {
let parent = local_path.parent().context("repo path has no parent")?;
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).context("creating repo parent dir")?;
let file_name = local_path
.file_name()
.context("repo path has no file name")?
.to_string_lossy();
// Best-effort sweep of leftover temp siblings from a prior download whose
// cleanup never ran (a process crash or kill mid-download, where no Drop
// and no owning task survive to remove the temp). Serialized per
// repo by the download mutex, so no concurrent same-repo download owns a
// live temp here; scoped to THIS repo's prefix, so other repos are
// untouched.
let tmp_prefix = format!(".{file_name}.tmp-download.");
if let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(parent) {
for entry in entries.flatten() {
if entry.file_name().to_string_lossy().starts_with(&tmp_prefix) {
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(entry.path());
}
}
}
// Stale-swap signal (finding 2): capture the local dir's mtime BEFORE the
// unlocked download. Under the lock, a changed mtime (acquire_fresh,
// refreshing over an existing copy) or the dir's mere appearance (cold
// acquire) means a writer published a fresher copy during our download
// window, so we serve theirs rather than swap our stale temp over it.
let entry_mtime = std::fs::metadata(local_path)
.and_then(|m| m.modified())
.ok();
// Unique per-download temp target (same parent as local_path so the
// publish rename stays on one filesystem); mirrors the extract temp
// naming in tigris.rs. Wrapped in an RAII guard so a handler future
// cancelled mid-download (axum drops it on client disconnect) cannot
// leak the populated temp dir (the same hazard the guard Drop impls
// below exist for, finding 1).
let temp = TempDownloadDir::new(parent.join(format!(
".{file_name}.tmp-download.{}",
uuid::Uuid::new_v4()
)));
// Ownership of the download AND the temp-dir guard moves into a spawned
// task, so timeout and handler cancellation share ONE cleanup path
// (finding F3 and its cancellation twin). `store.download` runs its tar
// extraction in `spawn_blocking`, and neither a tokio timeout nor a
// dropped handler future cancels a spawn_blocking task: pre-fix,
// dropping the download future (a timed-out await, or axum dropping the
// whole handler on client disconnect) detached the extraction, whose
// later rename resurrected `temp.path()` AFTER the guard's Drop had
// removed it, leaving an orphan only a later same-repo download sweeps.
// The spawned task is never dropped mid-flight, so the download future
// always runs to settle. On success it returns the still-armed guard
// through the JoinHandle: the caller consumes it and publishes below.
// If the caller timed out or was cancelled, the JoinHandle is gone, so
// the runtime drops the returned guard when the task settles and its
// Drop removes the temp dir; cleanup is tied to the extraction's
// completion, never racing it (this subsumes the previous detached
// janitor). A download error drops the guard inside the task with the
// same at-settle timing.
let store_dl = Arc::clone(store);
let (dl_owner, dl_repo, dl_target) = (
owner_slug.to_string(),
repo_name.to_string(),
temp.path().to_path_buf(),
);
// The per-repo coordination (`held`, `entry_guard`) moves into the task
// alongside the temp guard: whatever happens to THIS caller (timeout
// below, or a handler future cancelled by axum on client disconnect),
// the lock stays held and the map entry stays registered until the
// in-flight download settles, so waiters and new arrivals queue on the
// ONE download instead of starting duplicates. On success the tuple
// returns through the JoinHandle: the caller publishes under `held` as
// before. If the caller timed out or was cancelled, the runtime drops
// the returned tuple when the task settles, in field order: `temp`
// (dir removed), then `held` (lock released), then `entry_guard` (map
// entry pruned), the same unlock-before-prune order as a normal
// return.
let dl_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
// The guards travel as one `(held, entry_guard)` tuple so that
// wherever it drops (here on error, in the runtime at settle after
// a caller timeout or cancellation, or in the caller after a
// normal publish), its field order gives unlock-before-prune.
match store_dl.download(&dl_owner, &dl_repo, &dl_target).await {
Ok(()) => Ok((temp, (held, entry_guard))),
// The download settled, so cleanup is safe. Explicit drops pin
// the order (async-block captures have no guaranteed one):
// temp removed, lock released, map entry pruned last.
Err(e) => {
drop(temp);
drop(held);
drop(entry_guard);
Err(e)
}
}
});
// Bound the wait, not the work: a stalled GET would park this reader
// indefinitely. On timeout the caller gets the same error as before,
// but the coordination does NOT unwind: it lives in the task (see
// above) and is released only at settle. Waiters therefore stay queued
// on the SAME in-flight download (each bounded by its own timeout in
// download_published) instead of each timeout wave starting a fresh
// full download of the same object; the task keeps running and cleans
// up its temp when the download settles.
// `_coordination` is `(held, entry_guard)`, kept alive to the end of
// this function exactly as the separate guards were before: the
// publish below still runs with the per-repo lock held, and the map
// entry is pruned only on exit (unlock first, prune second, per the
// tuple's field order).
let (temp, _coordination) =
match tokio::time::timeout(self.release_upload_timeout, dl_task).await {
Ok(Ok(Ok(returned))) => returned,
Ok(Ok(Err(e))) => return Err(e),
// The task panicked; its unwind dropped the guards, removing
// the dir, releasing the lock, and pruning the map entry.
Ok(Err(join_err)) => {
return Err(anyhow::Error::from(join_err).context("read download task failed"))
}
Err(_) => {
warn!(repo = %repo_name, timeout_secs = self.release_upload_timeout.as_secs(),
"read download timed out — discarding");
// Dropping the JoinHandle detaches the task; the runtime
// frees temp dir, lock, and map entry at settle (see the
// spawn comment above).
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("read download timed out"));
}
};
let guard = match self.try_lock_repo(owner_did, repo_name).await {
Ok(Some(g)) => g,
Ok(None) => {
debug!(repo = %repo_name,
"read download discarded — repo lock held by a live writer or purge");
return Ok(DownloadOutcome::Skipped);
}
Err(e) => {
warn!(repo = %repo_name, err = %e,
"read download discarded — could not acquire repo lock");
return Ok(DownloadOutcome::Skipped);
}
};
// Re-check under the lock: the archive gone here means a purge won the
// key mid-download — discard, never publish (the read-side twin of the
// upload paths' under-lock dir re-check). Bounded so a stalled HEAD
// cannot pin the advisory lock + its lock-pool connection. Both a
// timeout and an exists() error collapse to "not present" and take the
// discard arm: fail closed rather than publish unconfirmed state.
let archive_present = matches!(
tokio::time::timeout(
self.release_upload_timeout,
store.exists(owner_slug, repo_name),
)
.await,
Ok(Ok(true))
);
if !archive_present {
warn!(repo = %repo_name,
"read download discarded — archive gone under lock (purged?)");
guard.release().await;
return Ok(DownloadOutcome::Skipped);
}
// Stale-swap guard (finding 2): a writer that locked, published a fresher
// copy, and released during our unlocked download window must not have
// its work clobbered by our now-stale temp. The only concurrent mutator
// of local_path is a writer or a purge (readers of the same repo
// serialize on the download mutex), so the signals below unambiguously
// mean "a writer published here."
let writer_published = match (local_existed_at_entry, entry_mtime) {
// acquire_fresh over an existing copy: presence is always true, so it
// cannot signal a writer; a CHANGED mtime can (the writer replaced
// the dir via rename, minting a fresh mtime).
(true, Some(entry_m)) => std::fs::metadata(local_path)
.and_then(|m| m.modified())
.map(|now| now != entry_m)
.unwrap_or(false),
// Cold acquire, or acquire_fresh whose dir was absent at entry: the
// dir being present now means a writer published it during the window.
_ => local_path.exists(),
};
if writer_published {
warn!(repo = %repo_name,
"read download discarded: a writer published a fresher copy during the download window");
guard.release().await;
// temp guard's Drop removes the stale temp; serve the fresher local copy.
return Ok(DownloadOutcome::Published);
}
let swapped = (|| -> std::io::Result<()> {
if local_path.exists() {
std::fs::remove_dir_all(local_path)?;
}
std::fs::rename(temp.path(), local_path)
})();
guard.release().await;
match swapped {
Ok(()) => {
temp.disarm(); // the rename consumed the temp; nothing to clean up
Ok(DownloadOutcome::Published)
}
// temp guard's Drop removes the temp if the rename left it behind.
Err(e) => Err(e).context("publishing downloaded repo into place"),
}
}
}
+1 -266
View File
@@ -63,105 +63,6 @@ pub fn list_refs(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>> {
Ok(refs)
}
/// Read the object id a single ref currently points to. Returns None if the
/// ref does not exist. Used to snapshot a ref's pre-write state so a failed
/// durable upload can roll the local write back.
pub fn ref_oid(repo_path: &Path, ref_name: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
let output = Command::new("git")
.args(["rev-parse", "--verify", ref_name])
.current_dir(repo_path)
.output()
.context("failed to run git rev-parse")?;
if !output.status.success() {
return Ok(None);
}
let oid = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim().to_string();
if oid.is_empty() {
return Ok(None);
}
Ok(Some(oid))
}
/// Force a single ref back to a captured object id — rolls back a local write
/// (e.g. a merge commit) whose durable upload failed, so a local-fast-path
/// read does not serve the un-uploaded state. The now-dangling objects are
/// harmless.
pub fn set_ref(repo_path: &Path, ref_name: &str, oid: &str) -> Result<()> {
let output = Command::new("git")
.args(["update-ref", ref_name, oid])
.current_dir(repo_path)
.output()
.context("failed to run git update-ref")?;
if !output.status.success() {
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
bail!("git update-ref failed: {stderr}");
}
Ok(())
}
/// Restore a repo's refs to a previously captured snapshot: reset every
/// snapshot ref to its captured object id, and delete any ref that exists now
/// but was absent from the snapshot (created by the intervening write). Used
/// to roll back a receive-pack whose durable upload failed, so the next
/// local-fast-path read does not serve refs that never reached object storage.
/// Best-effort per ref: an individual failure is collected and reported, but
/// the remaining refs are still attempted.
pub fn restore_refs(repo_path: &Path, snapshot: &[(String, String)]) -> Result<()> {
use std::collections::HashSet;
let mut errors: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
// Reset every snapshot ref to its captured oid (recreates refs the write
// deleted, and rewinds refs the write advanced).
for (ref_name, oid) in snapshot {
if let Err(e) = set_ref(repo_path, ref_name, oid) {
errors.push(format!("{ref_name}: {e}"));
}
}
// Delete refs that exist now but were not in the snapshot (created by the
// write being rolled back). A failure to LIST the current refs is collected
// like any per-ref failure, never returned early: the snapshot-reset half
// above already ran, and bailing here would discard its collected errors.
let snapshot_names: HashSet<&str> = snapshot.iter().map(|(r, _)| r.as_str()).collect();
match list_refs(repo_path) {
Ok(current) => {
for (ref_name, _) in &current {
if !snapshot_names.contains(ref_name.as_str()) {
match Command::new("git")
.args(["update-ref", "-d", ref_name])
.current_dir(repo_path)
.output()
{
Ok(output) if output.status.success() => {}
Ok(output) => {
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
errors.push(format!("{ref_name} (delete): {stderr}"));
}
Err(e) => {
errors.push(format!(
"{ref_name} (delete): failed to run git update-ref -d: {e}"
));
}
}
}
}
}
Err(e) => {
errors.push(format!("(extra-ref sweep) listing current refs: {e}"));
}
}
if !errors.is_empty() {
bail!(
"failed to restore {} ref(s): {}",
errors.len(),
errors.join("; ")
);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Read the current HEAD commit hash of a repository.
/// Returns None if the repo is empty (no commits yet).
pub fn head_commit(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Option<String>> {
@@ -554,176 +455,10 @@ pub fn repo_disk_path(repos_dir: &Path, owner_did: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Pat
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{branch_diff_names, list_refs, restore_refs};
use super::branch_diff_names;
use std::path::Path;
use std::process::Command;
fn run_git(dir: &Path, args: &[&str]) -> String {
let out = Command::new("git")
.args(args)
.current_dir(dir)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
out.status.success(),
"git {args:?} failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
}
/// Bare repo with main at c2 and keeper at c2, whose "pre-push" state was
/// main and keeper both at c1. Returns (workdir, baredir, bare_path, c1, c2).
fn advanced_bare_repo() -> (
tempfile::TempDir,
tempfile::TempDir,
std::path::PathBuf,
String,
String,
) {
let work = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
run_git(work.path(), &["init", "-q", "-b", "main", "."]);
run_git(work.path(), &["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
run_git(work.path(), &["config", "user.name", "t"]);
std::fs::write(work.path().join("f.txt"), "one").unwrap();
run_git(work.path(), &["add", "f.txt"]);
run_git(work.path(), &["commit", "-qm", "c1"]);
let c1 = run_git(work.path(), &["rev-parse", "HEAD"]);
std::fs::write(work.path().join("f.txt"), "two").unwrap();
run_git(work.path(), &["add", "f.txt"]);
run_git(work.path(), &["commit", "-qm", "c2"]);
let c2 = run_git(work.path(), &["rev-parse", "HEAD"]);
let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let bare = dir.path().join("repo.git");
let out = Command::new("git")
.args([
"clone",
"--bare",
"-q",
&work.path().to_string_lossy(),
&bare.to_string_lossy(),
])
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(out.status.success(), "clone --bare failed");
// "The push" advanced main to c2 (already there from the clone), moved
// keeper c1 -> c2, and created feature at c2.
run_git(&bare, &["update-ref", "refs/heads/keeper", &c2]);
run_git(&bare, &["update-ref", "refs/heads/feature", &c2]);
(work, dir, bare, c1, c2)
}
fn sorted_refs(bare: &Path) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
let mut refs = list_refs(bare).unwrap();
refs.sort();
refs
}
/// A single unrestorable snapshot entry (invalid oid, `set_ref` fails) must
/// not abort the restore: every OTHER snapshot ref is still reset and the
/// push-created extra ref is still deleted, and the fn returns Err carrying
/// the failure. RED with the reset loop reverted to `set_ref(..)?`: the
/// broken entry is first in the snapshot, so an early return leaves keeper
/// at c2 and feature alive.
#[test]
fn restore_refs_partial_failure_still_resets_rest_and_deletes_extras() {
let (_work, _dir, bare, c1, c2) = advanced_bare_repo();
let snapshot = vec![
(
"refs/heads/broken".to_string(),
"not-a-valid-oid".to_string(),
),
("refs/heads/main".to_string(), c1.clone()),
("refs/heads/keeper".to_string(), c1.clone()),
];
let err = restore_refs(&bare, &snapshot).unwrap_err();
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
assert!(
msg.contains("refs/heads/broken"),
"the aggregated error names the failed ref: {msg}"
);
let refs = sorted_refs(&bare);
assert_eq!(
refs,
vec![
("refs/heads/keeper".to_string(), c1.clone()),
("refs/heads/main".to_string(), c1.clone()),
],
"keeper and main are reset to c1 and feature is deleted despite the \
broken entry (c2 was {c2})"
);
}
/// Happy path unchanged by the hardening: a fully valid snapshot restores
/// exactly (refs rewound, created ref deleted) and returns Ok.
#[test]
fn restore_refs_happy_path_restores_snapshot_exactly() {
let (_work, _dir, bare, c1, _c2) = advanced_bare_repo();
let snapshot = vec![
("refs/heads/main".to_string(), c1.clone()),
("refs/heads/keeper".to_string(), c1.clone()),
];
restore_refs(&bare, &snapshot).unwrap();
let refs = sorted_refs(&bare);
assert_eq!(
refs,
vec![
("refs/heads/keeper".to_string(), c1.clone()),
("refs/heads/main".to_string(), c1),
],
"restore must reproduce the snapshot exactly"
);
}
/// When the internal `list_refs` (extra-ref sweep) fails, the snapshot-reset
/// half must still have run and its collected failures must surface in the
/// aggregated error, not be discarded by an early `?` return. The repo is a
/// real bare repo declaring repositoryformatversion=999, so both `set_ref`
/// and `list_refs` fail deterministically. RED with the sweep reverted to
/// `let current = list_refs(repo_path)?;`: the raw for-each-ref error
/// propagates without the "failed to restore" aggregate or the ref name.
#[test]
fn restore_refs_aggregates_when_internal_list_refs_fails() {
let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let bare = dir.path().join("repo.git");
let out = Command::new("git")
.args(["init", "--bare", "-q", &bare.to_string_lossy()])
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(out.status.success(), "git init --bare failed");
std::fs::write(
bare.join("config"),
"[core]\n\trepositoryformatversion = 999\n\tbare = true\n",
)
.unwrap();
assert!(
list_refs(&bare).is_err(),
"precondition: list_refs must fail on the corrupted repo"
);
let snapshot = vec![("refs/heads/main".to_string(), "a".repeat(40))];
let err = restore_refs(&bare, &snapshot).unwrap_err();
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
assert!(
msg.contains("failed to restore"),
"must return the aggregated error, not the raw list_refs error: {msg}"
);
assert!(
msg.contains("refs/heads/main"),
"the set_ref failure from the reset half must survive the sweep \
failure: {msg}"
);
assert!(
msg.contains("listing current refs"),
"the sweep failure itself is also collected: {msg}"
);
}
#[test]
fn branch_diff_names_lists_changed_paths() {
let td = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+10 -22
View File
@@ -11,21 +11,6 @@ use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use aws_sdk_s3::Client as S3Client;
use tracing::{debug, info};
/// Object storage for git bare-repo archives. The seam that lets `RepoStore`
/// (and tests) depend on storage behavior without a live bucket. `TigrisClient`
/// is the production implementation.
#[async_trait::async_trait]
pub trait ObjectStore: Send + Sync {
/// Whether an archive exists for this repo.
async fn exists(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Result<bool>;
/// Upload a local bare repo directory as an archive.
async fn upload(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str, local_path: &Path) -> Result<()>;
/// Download and extract a repo archive to local disk.
async fn download(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str, local_path: &Path) -> Result<()>;
/// Delete a repo archive.
async fn delete(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Result<()>;
}
/// Wrapper around the S3 client with the configured bucket.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct TigrisClient {
@@ -50,12 +35,9 @@ impl TigrisClient {
fn repo_key(owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> String {
format!("repos/v1/{owner_slug}/{repo_name}.tar.zst")
}
}
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl ObjectStore for TigrisClient {
/// Check if a repo archive exists in Tigris.
async fn exists(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Result<bool> {
pub async fn exists(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Result<bool> {
let key = Self::repo_key(owner_slug, repo_name);
match self
.s3
@@ -77,7 +59,7 @@ impl ObjectStore for TigrisClient {
}
/// Upload a local bare repo directory to Tigris as a tar.zst archive.
async fn upload(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str, local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
pub async fn upload(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str, local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
let key = Self::repo_key(owner_slug, repo_name);
debug!(key = %key, path = %local_path.display(), "uploading repo to tigris");
@@ -107,7 +89,12 @@ impl ObjectStore for TigrisClient {
}
/// Download a repo archive from Tigris and extract to local disk.
async fn download(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str, local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
pub async fn download(
&self,
owner_slug: &str,
repo_name: &str,
local_path: &Path,
) -> Result<()> {
let key = Self::repo_key(owner_slug, repo_name);
debug!(key = %key, path = %local_path.display(), "downloading repo from tigris");
@@ -141,7 +128,8 @@ impl ObjectStore for TigrisClient {
}
/// Delete a repo archive from Tigris.
async fn delete(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Result<()> {
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn delete(&self, owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Result<()> {
let key = Self::repo_key(owner_slug, repo_name);
self.s3
.delete_object()
+36 -179
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
mod admin;
mod api;
mod arweave;
mod auth;
@@ -71,12 +70,6 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
let mut config = Config::parse();
// Admin subcommands run out-of-band and exit, never starting the node. The
// no-subcommand path below is the unchanged daemon startup.
if let Some(command) = config.command.clone() {
return run_admin_command(command, &config).await;
}
// Merge the embedded seed list of public network nodes into the runtime
// bootstrap peers. Operators can opt out via GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS.
bootstrap::merge_seeds(&mut config);
@@ -286,22 +279,8 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
None
};
let object_store =
tigris.map(|t| std::sync::Arc::new(t) as std::sync::Arc<dyn git::tigris::ObjectStore>);
// Advisory-lock guards get their own pool, separate from the app pool
// (db.pool()) that serves normal handlers, so a concurrent-push burst pins
// lock connections here instead of starving request handlers. Sized to peak
// writers via GITLAWB_DB_LOCK_POOL_MAX_CONNECTIONS.
let lock_pool_acquire_timeout = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.db_acquire_timeout_secs);
let lock_pool = Db::connect_lock_pool(
&config.database_url,
config.db_lock_pool_max_connections,
lock_pool_acquire_timeout,
)
.await
.context("connecting advisory-lock pool")?;
let repo_store =
git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(config.repos_dir.clone(), object_store, lock_pool);
git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(config.repos_dir.clone(), tigris, db.pool().clone());
// Per-DID limiter for the creation endpoints. Keyed on the authenticated
// DID (attacker-varied), so bound its key set to cap memory.
@@ -315,24 +294,36 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
// capped regardless of how many identities it mints. Sized well above any
// legitimate per-IP creation rate; GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT overrides, 0
// disables. Bounded key set — the key is a client-influenced IP.
let create_ip_rate_limiter = build_ip_limiter("GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT", 120, "creation");
// Per-IP brake for the authenticated non-creation write surface (issue/PR
// comments, labels, stars, merges, protect, replicas, visibility, tasks,
// bounties, profile, GraphQL mutations). Its own bucket, separate from the
// creation brake, so a write flood cannot drain the creation budget and vice
// versa (same rationale as the sync_trigger / peer_write split). Sized above
// any legitimate per-IP write rate — real agent automation makes many small
// writes per hour. GITLAWB_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT overrides; 0 disables. Bounded
// key set — the key is a client-influenced IP.
let write_rate_limiter = build_ip_limiter("GITLAWB_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT", 600, "write");
let create_limit = std::env::var("GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT")
.ok()
.and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
.unwrap_or(120);
let create_ip_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
create_limit,
std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
200_000,
);
if create_limit == 0 {
tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT=0 — per-IP creation rate limiting disabled");
}
// Push-path flood brake: max git-receive-pack requests per client IP per
// hour (counts both the info/refs advertisement and the push POST). Sized
// for heavy agent automation while still stopping flood traffic (the June
// 2026 attack pushed several times per second per IP). GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT
// overrides; 0 disables. Bounded key set — the key is a client-influenced IP.
let push_rate_limiter = build_ip_limiter("GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT", 600, "push");
let push_limit = std::env::var("GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT")
.ok()
.and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
.unwrap_or(600);
let push_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
push_limit,
std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
200_000,
);
if push_limit == 0 {
tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT=0 — per-IP push rate limiting disabled");
}
// Which forwarded header the edge is trusted to set. Default None (trust
// nothing, key on the socket peer). Fly nodes set GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY=fly;
@@ -340,7 +331,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
let push_limiter_trust = rate_limit::TrustedProxy::from_env_value(
&std::env::var("GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY").unwrap_or_default(),
);
tracing::info!(trust = ?push_limiter_trust, "push rate limiter trust configured");
tracing::info!(trust = ?push_limiter_trust, push_limit, "push rate limiter configured");
// Peer-sync flood brakes, keyed on the resolved client IP (per-DID is useless
// here — a did:key farm self-registers). Two buckets so an unsigned notify
@@ -382,7 +373,6 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
repo_store,
rate_limiter,
create_ip_rate_limiter,
write_rate_limiter,
push_rate_limiter,
push_limiter_trust,
sync_trigger_rate_limiter,
@@ -418,17 +408,22 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
// Periodic cleanup of expired rate limit entries + consumed-proof ledger
{
// Clone the whole state so the sweep uses AppState::cleanup_rate_limiters
// (the single source of truth that reaps EVERY limiter, including
// write_rate_limiter) rather than a hand-maintained list that can omit one.
let state = state.clone();
let rl = state.rate_limiter.clone();
let create_ip_rl = state.create_ip_rate_limiter.clone();
let push_rl = state.push_rate_limiter.clone();
let sync_trigger_rl = state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter.clone();
let peer_write_rl = state.peer_write_rate_limiter.clone();
let db = state.db.clone();
let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
tokio::select! {
_ = tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(300)) => {
state.cleanup_rate_limiters().await;
rl.cleanup().await;
create_ip_rl.cleanup().await;
push_rl.cleanup().await;
sync_trigger_rl.cleanup().await;
peer_write_rl.cleanup().await;
let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.map(|d| d.as_secs() as i64)
@@ -569,110 +564,6 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
/// Pure resolver for a usize rate-limit env value. Returns `(resolved, invalid)`:
/// an absent or empty value resolves to `default` and is NOT invalid; a non-empty
/// value that fails to parse resolves to `default` and IS invalid (so the caller
/// warns rather than silently disabling the intended, usually stricter, brake).
fn resolve_rate_limit(raw: Option<&str>, default: usize) -> (usize, bool) {
match raw.map(str::trim) {
None | Some("") => (default, false),
Some(t) => match t.parse::<usize>() {
Ok(n) => (n, false),
Err(_) => (default, true),
},
}
}
/// Read a rate-limit env var, warning on a present-but-unparseable value. A typo
/// like `GITLAWB_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT=5O` must not silently revert to the default and
/// leave the operator believing a stricter cap is in force.
fn rate_limit_from_env(var: &str, default: usize) -> usize {
let raw = std::env::var(var).ok();
let (value, invalid) = resolve_rate_limit(raw.as_deref(), default);
if invalid {
tracing::warn!(
var,
value = raw.as_deref().unwrap_or(""),
default,
"invalid rate-limit value — using default; the intended brake is NOT applied"
);
}
value
}
/// Build a bounded per-client-IP rate limiter from an env var: resolve the limit
/// (honoring the present-but-unparseable warning in `rate_limit_from_env`), build
/// the limiter with the shared 1-hour window and 200k-key cap, and warn when the
/// limit is 0 (disabled). Collapses the identical create/write/push setup.
fn build_ip_limiter(var: &str, default: usize, label: &str) -> rate_limit::RateLimiter {
let limit = rate_limit_from_env(var, default);
let limiter =
rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(limit, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600), 200_000);
if limit == 0 {
tracing::warn!("{var}=0 — per-IP {label} rate limiting disabled");
} else {
tracing::info!(%var, limit, "per-IP {label} rate limiter configured");
}
limiter
}
/// Dispatch an admin subcommand. Connects the database directly (no server, no
/// p2p, no metrics) and runs the requested tool to completion, then exits.
async fn run_admin_command(command: config::Command, config: &Config) -> Result<()> {
match command {
config::Command::PurgeSpam { execute } => {
let acquire_timeout = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.db_acquire_timeout_secs);
let db = Db::connect(
&config.database_url,
config.db_max_connections,
acquire_timeout,
)
.await
.context("connecting to database for purge-spam")?;
// Build the object store so purge is authoritative against remote
// state: the emptiness recheck consults the archive (not just
// possibly-stale local disk) and a successful purge deletes the
// archive too. When no bucket is configured this stays None and purge
// is local-only, exactly as before.
let object_store: Option<std::sync::Arc<dyn git::tigris::ObjectStore>> = if config
.tigris_bucket
.is_empty()
{
None
} else {
match git::tigris::TigrisClient::new(&config.tigris_bucket).await {
Ok(client) => Some(std::sync::Arc::new(client)),
Err(e) => {
// Fail closed: without the configured store we cannot
// do the authoritative recheck, and a local-only purge
// on a Tigris deployment is the stale-view delete this
// guards against. Refuse to run rather than fall back.
anyhow::bail!(
"purge-spam: GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET is set but the object-store client failed to initialize ({e}); refusing to run a local-only purge on a Tigris deployment"
);
}
}
};
// Give the purge-spam store a dedicated advisory-lock pool, separate
// from `db`'s app pool. The guard then holds a lock-pool connection
// while `delete_repo_by_id` runs on the app pool, so a purge at
// GITLAWB_DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS=1 does not self-deadlock (KTD3).
let lock_pool = Db::connect_lock_pool(
&config.database_url,
config.db_lock_pool_max_connections,
acquire_timeout,
)
.await
.context("connecting advisory-lock pool for purge-spam")?;
let repo_store =
git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(config.repos_dir.clone(), object_store, lock_pool);
admin::run_purge_spam(&db, &repo_store, &config.repos_dir, execute)
.await
.map(|_| ())
}
}
}
fn spawn_shutdown_signal(tx: watch::Sender<bool>) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
#[cfg(unix)]
@@ -1133,40 +1024,6 @@ fn load_or_create_keypair(config: &Config) -> Result<Keypair> {
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod rate_limit_env_tests {
use super::resolve_rate_limit;
#[test]
fn absent_uses_default_without_warning() {
assert_eq!(resolve_rate_limit(None, 600), (600, false));
}
#[test]
fn empty_or_whitespace_uses_default_without_warning() {
assert_eq!(resolve_rate_limit(Some(""), 600), (600, false));
assert_eq!(resolve_rate_limit(Some(" "), 600), (600, false));
}
#[test]
fn valid_value_parses() {
assert_eq!(resolve_rate_limit(Some("50"), 600), (50, false));
assert_eq!(resolve_rate_limit(Some(" 50 "), 600), (50, false));
// 0 is a VALID value (disables the brake); the ==0 warning is handled
// separately at the call site. It must NOT be flagged invalid here.
assert_eq!(resolve_rate_limit(Some("0"), 600), (0, false));
}
#[test]
fn present_but_unparseable_defaults_and_flags_invalid() {
// The L8 case: a fat-fingered stricter cap ("5O", letter O) must default
// AND be flagged so the caller warns, not silently disable the brake.
assert_eq!(resolve_rate_limit(Some("5O"), 600), (600, true));
assert_eq!(resolve_rate_limit(Some("abc"), 600), (600, true));
assert_eq!(resolve_rate_limit(Some("-1"), 600), (600, true));
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod gossip_ssrf_tests {
use super::ping_peer_health;
+19 -273
View File
@@ -70,23 +70,10 @@ impl RateLimiter {
self.window.min(Duration::from_secs(1))
}
/// Returns `true` if the request is allowed. Thin wrapper over
/// [`check_retry`](Self::check_retry) for callers that only need the
/// allow/deny decision, not the rejection's Retry-After delay. Test-only now:
/// production 429 sites use `check_retry` so they can advertise Retry-After.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) async fn check(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
self.check_retry(key).await.is_none()
}
/// Record a request against `key`. Returns `None` when it is allowed, or
/// `Some(retry_after)` when it is rejected — the delay a client should wait
/// before retrying, so a 429 can advertise a value consistent with the
/// actual window instead of a constant.
pub(crate) async fn check_retry(&self, key: &str) -> Option<Duration> {
// max_requests == 0 means the limiter is disabled, not "block all".
if self.max_requests == 0 {
return None;
return true;
}
let now = Instant::now();
let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
@@ -98,25 +85,10 @@ impl RateLimiter {
.timestamps
.retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
if window.timestamps.len() >= self.max_requests {
// Insertion order is preserved, so after the retain the first
// element is the oldest live request. It ages out (freeing a
// slot) one window after it landed, so that remaining time is
// the delay to advertise. Clamp to >= 1 so a 429 never tells a
// client to retry immediately.
let retry = window
.timestamps
.first()
.map(|oldest| {
self.window
.as_secs()
.saturating_sub(now.duration_since(*oldest).as_secs())
})
.unwrap_or(0)
.max(1);
return Some(Duration::from_secs(retry));
return false;
}
window.timestamps.push(now);
return None;
return true;
}
// New key. Enforce the cap BEFORE inserting so a flood of distinct keys
@@ -137,11 +109,7 @@ impl RateLimiter {
}
drop(last_sweep);
if state.len() >= self.max_keys {
// The key is untracked (never inserted), so there is no oldest
// entry to derive a delay from. Advertise the full window as a
// conservative bound: capacity frees as other keys expire, at
// the latest one window from now.
return Some(self.window.max(Duration::from_secs(1)));
return false;
}
}
state.insert(
@@ -150,7 +118,7 @@ impl RateLimiter {
timestamps: vec![now],
},
);
None
true
}
pub async fn cleanup(&self) {
@@ -162,41 +130,6 @@ impl RateLimiter {
!w.timestamps.is_empty()
});
}
/// Test-only: insert a fully-expired entry (no live timestamps) that the next
/// `cleanup()` must reclaim. Models a key whose window has aged out, without
/// depending on wall-clock sleeps or a short window. Used cross-module by the
/// AppState cleanup guard test (H2).
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) async fn insert_reclaimable_for_test(&self, key: &str) {
self.state
.lock()
.await
.insert(key.to_string(), Window { timestamps: vec![] });
}
/// Test-only: number of distinct keys currently tracked.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) async fn tracked_keys(&self) -> usize {
self.state.lock().await.len()
}
/// Test-only: seed a key's bucket with entries of the given ages (how long
/// ago each request landed), so a test can drive the Retry-After computation
/// off a controlled oldest-entry age without wall-clock sleeps. Ages that
/// would underflow the monotonic clock collapse to `now`.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) async fn seed_aged_entry_for_test(&self, key: &str, ages: &[Duration]) {
let now = Instant::now();
let timestamps = ages
.iter()
.map(|a| now.checked_sub(*a).unwrap_or(now))
.collect();
self.state
.lock()
.await
.insert(key.to_string(), Window { timestamps });
}
}
pub async fn rate_limit_by_did(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
@@ -208,8 +141,13 @@ pub async fn rate_limit_by_did(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
.map(|a| a.0.clone());
if let (Some(limiter), Some(did)) = (limiter, did) {
if let Some(retry_after) = limiter.check_retry(&did).await {
return too_many_requests(retry_after);
if !limiter.check(&did).await {
return (
StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
[("retry-after", "60")],
"rate limit exceeded — try again later",
)
.into_response();
}
}
@@ -312,13 +250,13 @@ impl<S: Send + Sync> axum::extract::FromRequestParts<S> for PeerAddr {
}
}
/// The shared 429 response for the rate-limit middlewares (per-DID and per-IP
/// alike). Route-agnostic: the message stays generic (the offending path, when
/// logged, is recorded at the call site).
pub fn too_many_requests(retry_after: Duration) -> Response {
/// The shared 429 response for the per-IP flood brakes. Route-agnostic: this
/// middleware now serves the push path AND the peer-sync routes, so the message
/// stays generic (the offending path is recorded in the warn log below).
pub fn too_many_requests() -> Response {
(
StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
[("retry-after", retry_after.as_secs().to_string())],
[("retry-after", "60")],
"rate limit exceeded — try again later",
)
.into_response()
@@ -336,9 +274,9 @@ pub async fn rate_limit_by_ip(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
if let Some(limiter) = limiter {
if let Some(key) = client_key(request.headers(), peer, limiter.trust) {
if let Some(retry_after) = limiter.limiter.check_retry(&key).await {
if !limiter.limiter.check(&key).await {
tracing::warn!(key = %key, path = %request.uri().path(), "per-IP rate limit exceeded");
return too_many_requests(retry_after);
return too_many_requests();
}
}
}
@@ -667,196 +605,4 @@ mod tests {
"an exhausted IP must be braked with 429 before auth runs, not leak to 401"
);
}
// ── Adversarial TrustedProxy verification through the middleware (U5) ──
// These complement the client_key unit tests above by driving hostile
// headers through rate_limit_by_ip on a real router: the property under test
// is that the *bucket key* cannot be rotated by a spoofer.
async fn post_with(
router: &axum::Router,
peer: SocketAddr,
hdrs: &[(&str, &str)],
) -> StatusCode {
use tower::ServiceExt;
let mut b = axum::http::Request::builder()
.method(axum::http::Method::POST)
.uri("/api/v1/repos");
for (k, v) in hdrs {
b = b.header(*k, *v);
}
let mut req = b.body(axum::body::Body::empty()).unwrap();
req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
router.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status()
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn xff_spoofed_leftmost_hop_cannot_rotate_bucket() {
// XForwardedFor mode, budget 1. A spoofer varies the client-controlled
// leftmost hop every request but the trusted proxy always appends the
// same rightmost hop. All requests must key to the rightmost hop, so the
// second is braked despite a fresh leftmost value.
let router = ip_limited_over_auth_router(IpRateLimiter {
limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60)),
trust: TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor,
});
let p1: SocketAddr = "10.0.0.1:1".parse().unwrap();
let p2: SocketAddr = "10.0.0.2:1".parse().unwrap();
// First request passes the brake, reaches (failing) auth.
assert_eq!(
post_with(&router, p1, &[("x-forwarded-for", "9.9.9.1, 203.0.113.5")]).await,
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
);
// Different leftmost + different socket peer, SAME rightmost trusted hop:
// braked, because the key is the rightmost hop, not the spoofed value.
assert_eq!(
post_with(&router, p2, &[("x-forwarded-for", "9.9.9.2, 203.0.113.5")]).await,
StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
"a spoofer varying the leftmost XFF hop must not rotate its bucket key"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn xff_distinct_real_clients_get_distinct_buckets() {
// Distinct trusted (rightmost) hops are distinct clients: neither throttles
// the other, so a busy legitimate client cannot starve a different one.
let router = ip_limited_over_auth_router(IpRateLimiter {
limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60)),
trust: TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor,
});
let peer: SocketAddr = "10.0.0.9:1".parse().unwrap();
assert_eq!(
post_with(
&router,
peer,
&[("x-forwarded-for", "1.1.1.1, 203.0.113.5")]
)
.await,
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
);
assert_eq!(
post_with(
&router,
peer,
&[("x-forwarded-for", "1.1.1.1, 203.0.113.6")]
)
.await,
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
"a different trusted client hop must get its own bucket"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn absent_trusted_header_collapses_to_socket_peer() {
// The documented fallback: in a trusted-proxy mode, a request with no
// forwarded header keys on the socket peer. Behind a real edge every
// request shares the proxy's socket, so they collapse onto one bucket —
// asserted here by name so any change to this behavior is deliberate.
let router = ip_limited_over_auth_router(IpRateLimiter {
limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60)),
trust: TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor,
});
let proxy: SocketAddr = "172.16.0.1:1".parse().unwrap();
assert_eq!(
post_with(&router, proxy, &[]).await,
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
);
assert_eq!(
post_with(&router, proxy, &[]).await,
StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
"with no trusted header, requests fall back to the socket peer key (collapse)"
);
}
// ── Retry-After derived from the window, not a constant 60 (U5) ───────
// A 429 must advertise the delay until the oldest live request ages out of
// the limiter's window, so the value tracks the real window instead of the
// hardcoded 60 that contradicted every limiter's 3600s window.
async fn resp_from(router: &axum::Router, peer: SocketAddr) -> Response {
use tower::ServiceExt;
let mut req = axum::http::Request::builder()
.method(axum::http::Method::POST)
.uri("/o/r/git-receive-pack")
.body(axum::body::Body::empty())
.unwrap();
req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
router.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap()
}
fn retry_after_secs(resp: &Response) -> u64 {
resp.headers()
.get("retry-after")
.expect("429 must carry a retry-after header")
.to_str()
.unwrap()
.parse()
.expect("retry-after must be an integer number of seconds")
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn retry_after_reflects_full_window_for_freshly_filled_bucket() {
// A just-filled bucket's oldest entry is ~now, so the advertised delay
// must be close to the whole window (100s), NOT the old constant 60.
let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(100)),
trust: TrustedProxy::None,
});
let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.50:6000".parse().unwrap();
assert_eq!(resp_from(&router, peer).await.status(), StatusCode::OK);
let resp = resp_from(&router, peer).await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
let retry = retry_after_secs(&resp);
assert!(
(95..=100).contains(&retry),
"freshly-filled bucket must advertise ~window (95..=100s), got {retry} (constant-60 bug if 60)"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn retry_after_shrinks_as_oldest_entry_ages() {
// Seed the sole slot with an entry already 95s into a 100s window: the
// next request is rejected and must advertise only the ~5s remaining,
// not 60.
let limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(100));
let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.51:6000".parse().unwrap();
limiter
.seed_aged_entry_for_test(&peer.ip().to_string(), &[Duration::from_secs(95)])
.await;
let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
limiter,
trust: TrustedProxy::None,
});
let resp = resp_from(&router, peer).await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
let retry = retry_after_secs(&resp);
assert!(
(1..=10).contains(&retry),
"an aged bucket must advertise the small remaining delay (1..=10s), got {retry}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn retry_after_clamps_to_at_least_one_second() {
// Oldest entry is 99s into a 100s window: the raw remainder rounds toward
// 1s and must never be advertised as 0 (a 0/blank retry lets a rejected
// client hammer immediately).
let limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(100));
let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.52:6000".parse().unwrap();
limiter
.seed_aged_entry_for_test(&peer.ip().to_string(), &[Duration::from_secs(99)])
.await;
let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
limiter,
trust: TrustedProxy::None,
});
let resp = resp_from(&router, peer).await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
let retry = retry_after_secs(&resp);
assert!(retry >= 1, "retry-after must clamp to >= 1, got {retry}");
assert!(
retry <= 2,
"with 99s of a 100s window elapsed, the remaining delay is ~1s, got {retry}"
);
}
}
+9 -52
View File
@@ -55,50 +55,18 @@ fn add_auth_layers(router: Router<AppState>, state: AppState) -> Router<AppState
.layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::require_signature))
}
/// Attach the shared per-IP write brake to an authenticated write-route group,
/// outermost so a flood is rejected before signature verification. Every
/// authenticated non-creation write group MUST call this or it silently ships
/// unbraked with no compile error. Deliberately a separate call, NOT folded into
/// `add_auth_layers`: the creation routes use a different bucket
/// (`create_ip_rate_limiter`) and the graphql group is not built through
/// `add_auth_layers`, so a helper keyed on auth would attach the wrong limiter.
trait WriteBraked {
fn write_braked(self, limiter: &rate_limit::IpRateLimiter) -> Self;
}
impl WriteBraked for Router<AppState> {
fn write_braked(self, limiter: &rate_limit::IpRateLimiter) -> Self {
self.layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
.layer(axum::Extension(limiter.clone()))
}
}
pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
// ── GraphQL routes ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref().clone();
// Per-IP write brake, shared across every authenticated non-creation write
// group (see `AppState::write_rate_limiter`). Built once here so each group
// clones the same bucket; attached outermost on each group so a flood is
// rejected before auth runs. Separate bucket from the creation brake.
let write_ip_limiter = rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
limiter: state.write_rate_limiter.clone(),
trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
};
let graphql_routes = Router::new()
.route("/graphql", get(graphql_playground).post(graphql_handler))
// Attach the verified DID to /graphql when a signature is present. The
// layer covers only routes added before it, so /graphql/ws (added after,
// read-only subscriptions) stays open. The per-IP write brake covers the
// same /graphql (KTD-5: an HTTP-layer brake cannot tell a query POST from
// a mutation POST, so it counts every /graphql request — acceptable, both
// cost work); /graphql/ws subscriptions stay unbraked.
// read-only subscriptions) stays open.
.layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature))
.write_braked(&write_ip_limiter)
.route_service("/graphql/ws", GraphQLSubscription::new(schema));
// ── Task routes (write — require HTTP Signature + per-IP write brake) ──
// ── Task routes (write — require HTTP Signature) ───────────────────────
let task_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
Router::new()
.route("/api/v1/tasks", post(tasks::create_task))
@@ -106,8 +74,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
.route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}/complete", post(tasks::complete_task))
.route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}/fail", post(tasks::fail_task)),
state.clone(),
)
.write_braked(&write_ip_limiter);
);
// ── Task routes (read — open) ──────────────────────────────────────────
let task_read_routes = Router::new()
@@ -144,13 +111,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
.layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
.layer(axum::Extension(create_ip_limiter));
// ── Write routes — require HTTP Signature + per-IP write brake ────────
// Same per-IP flood defense as the creation routes, on its own `write`
// bucket (see `AppState::write_rate_limiter`). Per-DID is deliberately not
// paired (a DID farm never trips it; busy legitimate agents would false-
// positive). The bundled visibility GET is a read that also draws from the
// write bucket — harmless, since the bucket is sized far above any legit
// per-IP read rate.
// ── Write routes — require HTTP Signature (no rate limit) ─────────────
let write_routes = add_auth_layers(
Router::new()
.route(
@@ -220,8 +181,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
axum::routing::delete(agents::deregister_agent),
),
state.clone(),
)
.write_braked(&write_ip_limiter);
);
// Body limit is raised to GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES (default 2 GB) for git
// routes only — all other API routes keep axum's default 2 MB cap.
@@ -287,8 +247,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
post(bounties::dispute_bounty),
),
state.clone(),
)
.write_braked(&write_ip_limiter);
);
// ── Bounty routes (read — open) ──────────────────────────────────────
let bounty_read_routes = Router::new()
@@ -309,10 +268,9 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
let profile_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
Router::new().route("/api/v1/profile", axum::routing::put(profiles::set_profile)),
state.clone(),
)
.write_braked(&write_ip_limiter);
);
// ── Issue routes (write — require HTTP Signature + per-IP write brake) ─
// ── Issue routes (write — require HTTP Signature, no rate limit) ─────
let issue_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
Router::new()
.route(
@@ -324,8 +282,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
post(issues::create_issue_comment),
),
state.clone(),
)
.write_braked(&write_ip_limiter);
);
// ── Peer discovery routes ─────────────────────────────────────────────
// Peer writes accept signatures when present and can require them after a
-54
View File
@@ -62,16 +62,6 @@ pub struct AppState {
/// resolved client IP is what actually stops a single-source flood (same
/// rationale as `push_rate_limiter`). Keyed by `push_limiter_trust`.
pub create_ip_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
/// Per-client-IP rate limiter for the authenticated write surface that is
/// not repo/agent creation: issue/PR comments, labels, stars, merges,
/// protect/unprotect, replicas, visibility, tasks, bounties, profile, and
/// the GraphQL `MutationRoot`. Separate bucket from `create_ip_rate_limiter`
/// (its own budget, per the `sync_trigger`/`peer_write` precedent) so a
/// write flood cannot drain the creation budget and vice versa. Per-DID is
/// deliberately NOT paired here: a DID farm never trips it, and busy
/// legitimate agents would false-positive. `GITLAWB_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT`
/// overrides the default, 0 disables. Keyed by `push_limiter_trust`.
pub write_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
/// Per-client-IP rate limiter for git-receive-pack. Per-DID limits cannot
/// brake a push flood from a DID farm (one throwaway DID per repo), so the
/// push path throttles on the resolved client IP instead.
@@ -128,48 +118,4 @@ impl AppState {
pub fn is_shutting_down(&self) -> bool {
*self.shutdown_tx.borrow()
}
/// Reclaim expired entries from EVERY rate limiter. Single source of truth for
/// the periodic cleanup loop (main.rs), co-located with the limiter fields so a
/// newly-added limiter is cleaned here rather than silently omitted from a
/// hand-maintained list in main() (H2: `write_rate_limiter` was the omitted
/// one). Every limiter field above MUST be swept here; the guard test
/// `cleanup_rate_limiters_reaps_the_write_limiter` fails if it is not.
pub(crate) async fn cleanup_rate_limiters(&self) {
self.rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
self.create_ip_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
self.write_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
self.push_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
self.sync_trigger_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
self.peer_write_rate_limiter.cleanup().await;
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
/// H2 guard: the write-surface limiter must be reaped by the shared cleanup
/// routine. Seeds a reclaimable entry into `write_rate_limiter` and asserts
/// `cleanup_rate_limiters` removes it. Goes RED if `write_rate_limiter` is
/// dropped from `cleanup_rate_limiters` — the exact H2 omission, now guarded.
#[tokio::test]
async fn cleanup_rate_limiters_reaps_the_write_limiter() {
let state = crate::test_support::test_state_lazy();
state
.write_rate_limiter
.insert_reclaimable_for_test("some-ip")
.await;
assert_eq!(
state.write_rate_limiter.tracked_keys().await,
1,
"precondition: the reclaimable entry is tracked"
);
state.cleanup_rate_limiters().await;
assert_eq!(
state.write_rate_limiter.tracked_keys().await,
0,
"write_rate_limiter must be reaped by cleanup_rate_limiters (H2)"
);
}
}
-1
View File
@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ fn build_state(db: Arc<crate::db::Db>, pool: PgPool) -> AppState {
repo_store: crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), pool),
rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(100, Duration::from_secs(60)),
create_ip_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(1000, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
write_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(1000, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None,
sync_trigger_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
[package]
name = "gl"
description = "The gitlawb CLI — identity management, node control, MCP server"
version = "0.6.0" # x-release-please-version
version = "0.7.0" # x-release-please-version
edition.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
+71
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# Dependency-purity gate for the `gitlawb-core` crate.
#
# gitlawb-core is embedded by every consumer (the gl CLI, git-remote-gitlawb,
# the node daemon), so it must stay lean. This script recomputes gitlawb-core's
# NORMAL (non-dev, non-build) transitive dependency set and fails if it contains
# any crate not present in ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt.
#
# Hard-fail direction: a crate present now but NOT allowlisted. That is the case
# the gate exists to catch (core silently gaining a heavy dependency).
# Informational only: an allowlisted crate no longer present (stale entry) — a
# legitimate dependency removal should not red CI, so it is reported, not failed.
#
# Runnable from anywhere in the repo.
set -euo pipefail
ROOT="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
ALLOW="$ROOT/ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt"
if [ ! -f "$ALLOW" ]; then
echo "ERROR: allowlist not found at $ALLOW" >&2
exit 1
fi
# `cargo tree` resolves like the build/test jobs (no --locked): the committed
# Cargo.lock can lag the manifests, and --locked would red this gate for
# lock-staleness reasons unrelated to gitlawb-core's dependencies. Resolving can
# refresh Cargo.lock as a side effect, so snapshot and restore it — this check
# must never leave the working tree dirty when run locally.
lock_backup="$(mktemp)"
cp "$ROOT/Cargo.lock" "$lock_backup"
restore_lock() { cp "$lock_backup" "$ROOT/Cargo.lock"; rm -f "$lock_backup"; }
trap restore_lock EXIT
# Current normal-dependency closure of gitlawb-core, one crate name per line.
# Must match the regen command documented in the allowlist header exactly.
current="$(
cargo tree -p gitlawb-core --edges normal --prefix none --manifest-path "$ROOT/Cargo.toml" \
| sed -E 's/ v[0-9].*$//' \
| grep -v '^gitlawb-core$' \
| sort -u
)"
# Allowlist with comments and blank lines stripped.
allowed="$(grep -vE '^[[:space:]]*(#|$)' "$ALLOW" | sort -u)"
# comm needs sorted input; both sides are sorted above.
offenders="$(comm -23 <(printf '%s\n' "$current") <(printf '%s\n' "$allowed"))"
stale="$(comm -13 <(printf '%s\n' "$current") <(printf '%s\n' "$allowed"))"
if [ -n "$stale" ]; then
echo "NOTE: allowlisted crates no longer in gitlawb-core's dependency tree"
echo " (safe to prune from ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt):"
printf ' %s\n' $stale
echo
fi
if [ -n "$offenders" ]; then
{
echo "ERROR: gitlawb-core gained dependencies not on the allowlist:"
printf ' %s\n' $offenders
echo
echo "gitlawb-core must stay embeddable and lean. If a new dependency is"
echo "intentional, add it to ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt (regen command"
echo "is in that file's header). Otherwise, drop the dependency."
} >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "gitlawb-core dependency purity: OK ($(printf '%s\n' "$current" | wc -l | tr -d ' ') normal deps, all allowlisted)."