test(git-remote): clear the insecure-HTTP override in the fetch harness

fetch_with_helper passes the test process environment through to the helper, so an operator or CI exporting GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP decided the transport policy for every test that runs through it. Reported by CodeRabbit on the review of 12e68e54. Confirmed by execution: with the variable exported, real_git_fetch_refuses_a_remote_plaintext_node failed, because the helper permitted the URL and the refusal never appeared on stderr. With the env_remove in place the whole target passes with the variable still exported. Cleared in the shared harness rather than the one test, so a later test cannot inherit the same ambient policy. A test that wants the opt-in can pass it through the extra_env argument.
fix(git-remote): bypass the proxy for a loopback node
2026-11-08 07:38:18 -10:00 · 2026-09-08 00:01:42 -05:00 · 2026-09-07 22:53:22 -05:00 · 2026-09-07 22:24:58 -05:00
3 changed files with 332 additions and 11 deletions
@@ -188,7 +188,12 @@ export GITLAWB_NODE=http://localhost:7545
 git clone gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../my-repo
 ```

-For public-network use, make sure `GITLAWB_NODE` points to the node you want. The helper defaults to localhost for local development.
+For public-network use, make sure `GITLAWB_NODE` points to the node you want, over
+`https://`. The helper defaults to localhost for local development, and plaintext
+`http://` is allowed only to this machine: requests are signed but not encrypted, so
+a cleartext hop to a remote node exposes the pack contents and the `Signature`
+header. A remote `http://` node is refused, and `GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP=1`
+overrides that for a trusted private network.

 ### Full lifecycle against an iCaptcha-enforcing node

@@ -393,7 +398,7 @@ Important node settings:
 | `GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP` | Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs. |
 | `GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS` | Disable embedded seed peers for isolated dev/test networks. |
 | `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES` | Require signed peer announce/sync writes. Defaults to `false` during the staged rollout below. |
-| `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` | Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on `git-receive-pack`. **Defaults to `true`.** A `did:key` signature is authentication, not authorization — anyone can mint a key and sign — so with this off every signed caller may push to every repository, private ones included. Delegated and CI keys count as non-owners: a UCAN `git/push` capability is verified but not yet honored for authorization, so they cannot push while this is on. Set `false` only for a rolling upgrade; see [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md). |
+| `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` | Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on `git-receive-pack`. **Defaults to `true`.** A `did:key` signature is authentication, not authorization (anyone can mint a key and sign), so with this off every signed caller may push to every repository, private ones included. Delegated and CI keys count as non-owners: a UCAN `git/push` capability is verified but not yet honored for authorization, so they cannot push while this is on. Set `false` only for a rolling upgrade; see [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md). |
 | `GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC` | Enable automatic sync from known peers. |
 | `GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES` | Max git pack body size for smart-HTTP routes. |
 | `GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS` | Max seconds a served git upload-pack, receive-pack, or `info/refs` advertisement may run before it is aborted (504). Default 600. Also bounds the withheld-blob classification walk (on both the upload-pack serve and receive-pack replication paths) and the push-side pin-candidate discovery (`rev-list` / `cat-file`), each reaped via process-group teardown at the deadline. On the path-scoped upload-pack path the classification walk and the pack serve share ONE deadline, so this value bounds their combined duration rather than granting each stage a full budget: a walk that consumes it leaves the serve nothing and the clone gets a 504. Serving large path-scoped repos may therefore need a higher value than they did when each stage was budgeted separately. Accepted range is 1 to 3153600000 (100 years), since the node derives deadlines from this value and a larger one cannot be represented. |
@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
    // v0.1: default to localhost. Override with GITLAWB_NODE env var.
    let node_base =
        std::env::var("GITLAWB_NODE").unwrap_or_else(|_| "http://127.0.0.1:7545".to_string());
+    check_transport_security(
+        &node_base,
+        std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP").is_some(),
+    )?;
    let repo_base = format!("{}/{}/{}", node_base, short_owner, repo_name);
    tracing::debug!("repo_base: {repo_base}");

@@ -78,6 +82,76 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
    run_helper(&repo_base, keypair.as_ref())
 }

+/// Whether `url` is plaintext http, regardless of where it points.
+fn is_http(url: &str) -> bool {
+    reqwest::Url::parse(url.trim())
+        .map(|u| u.scheme() == "http")
+        .unwrap_or(false)
+}
+
+/// Whether `url` would send git data off this machine in cleartext.
+///
+/// True only for `http://` to a non-loopback host. RFC 9421 signs the request
+/// but does not encrypt it, so on a plaintext hop the pack contents and the
+/// `Signature` header are both readable, and a captured signature is replayable
+/// for its freshness window against any host.
+///
+/// Loopback is decided from the parsed address rather than a string match, so
+/// `127.0.0.2`, `[::1]` and an IPv4-mapped `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]` are all
+/// recognised as this machine. A value that does not parse, or that is not
+/// http(s), is not this guard's business and returns false: it fails later with
+/// its own error, and naming it a TLS problem would misdirect the reader.
+fn is_insecure_remote(url: &str) -> bool {
+    let Ok(parsed) = reqwest::Url::parse(url.trim()) else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    if parsed.scheme() != "http" {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let Some(host) = parsed.host_str() else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    let host = host.trim_end_matches('.').to_ascii_lowercase();
+    if host == "localhost" {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // host_str() keeps the brackets on an IPv6 literal.
+    let bare = host.trim_start_matches('[').trim_end_matches(']');
+    if let Ok(ip) = bare.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>() {
+        if ip.is_loopback() {
+            return false;
+        }
+        // An IPv4-mapped IPv6 literal hides a v4 loopback from is_loopback().
+        if let std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) = ip {
+            if let Some(v4) = v6.to_ipv4_mapped() {
+                if v4.is_loopback() {
+                    return false;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    true
+}
+
+/// Refuse a cleartext hop off this machine unless the operator has opted in.
+///
+/// Fail closed: the alternative is signing a request and then handing it, and
+/// the pack it carries, to anyone on the path. `GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP`
+/// exists for a private LAN where the operator has decided that is acceptable.
+fn check_transport_security(node_base: &str, allow_insecure: bool) -> Result<()> {
+    if allow_insecure || !is_insecure_remote(node_base) {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    bail!(
+        "refusing to send git data to {node_base} over plaintext http.\n\
+         Requests are signed but not encrypted, so the pack contents and the \
+         Signature header are readable by anyone on the path, and a captured \
+         signature can be replayed.\n\
+         Use https://, or set GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP=1 to accept the risk \
+         (for a trusted private network only)."
+    )
+}
+
 // ── CLI argument handling ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 /// How the binary was invoked, derived from its CLI arguments.
@@ -125,6 +199,7 @@ fn help_text() -> String {
         ENVIRONMENT:\n\
         \x20   GITLAWB_NODE   Node base URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:7545)\n\
         \x20   GITLAWB_KEY    Identity PEM path for signed fetch/push (default: ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem)\n\
+         \x20   GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP  Permit plaintext http:// to a non-loopback node (unset by default)\n\
         \x20   GITLAWB_LOG    Log filter (default: warn)\n\
         \n\
         FLAGS:\n\
@@ -199,7 +274,8 @@ fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
        other => bail!("unsupported git service: {other}"),
    }

-    let client = build_http_client()?;
+    // A loopback node must never be proxied; see build_http_client.
+    let client = build_http_client(!is_insecure_remote(repo_base) && is_http(repo_base))?;

    // ── Phase 1: ref advertisement (GET /info/refs?service=<service>) ─────────
    //
@@ -335,8 +411,22 @@ const HTTP_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(300);
 /// node named, and on a 307/308 the pack body went with them. Scope the follow to the
 /// origin that issued the redirect AND to an identical request-target, which is the
 /// same predicate `gl` uses.
-fn build_http_client() -> Result<reqwest::blocking::Client> {
-    Ok(reqwest::blocking::Client::builder()
+/// `bypass_proxy` must be true whenever the node is on this machine. reqwest's
+/// default client honours `HTTP_PROXY` / `ALL_PROXY` for a loopback URL too, so a
+/// proxy variable pointing off-machine turns an allowed local request into a
+/// cleartext hop carrying the `Signature` header, straight past
+/// `check_transport_security`. Verified: with `HTTP_PROXY` set, reqwest logged
+/// `proxy(...) intercepts 'http://127.0.0.1:7545/'` and dialled the proxy. A
+/// local node is never legitimately reached through a proxy, so this refuses one
+/// rather than trying to reimplement `NO_PROXY` parsing.
+fn build_http_client(bypass_proxy: bool) -> Result<reqwest::blocking::Client> {
+    let builder = reqwest::blocking::Client::builder();
+    let builder = if bypass_proxy {
+        builder.no_proxy()
+    } else {
+        builder
+    };
+    Ok(builder
        .timeout(HTTP_TIMEOUT)
        .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::custom(same_origin_redirect))
        .build()?)
@@ -829,6 +919,148 @@ fn resolve_key_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {

 // ── Tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

+#[cfg(test)]
+mod insecure_transport_tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// Loopback in every form the transport can legitimately be pointed at.
+    /// Plaintext to this machine is the documented local-alpha default and must
+    /// keep working, so a false positive here breaks every stock install.
+    #[test]
+    fn loopback_http_is_allowed() {
+        for url in [
+            "http://127.0.0.1:7545",
+            "http://localhost:7545",
+            "http://[::1]:7545",
+            "http://127.0.0.2:7545",
+            "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:7545",
+            "http://LocalHost:7545",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                !is_insecure_remote(url),
+                "{url} is this machine; plaintext to it must stay allowed"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The case the guard exists for: cleartext git data leaving the machine.
+    #[test]
+    fn remote_http_is_refused() {
+        for url in [
+            "http://node.example.com:7545",
+            "http://10.0.0.36:7777",
+            "http://192.168.1.10",
+            "http://[2001:db8::1]:7545",
+            "http://8.8.8.8",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                is_insecure_remote(url),
+                "{url} sends git data off-machine in cleartext and must be refused"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// TLS is always fine, loopback or not, so the guard keys on the scheme and
+    /// not merely on the host being remote.
+    #[test]
+    fn https_is_always_allowed() {
+        for url in [
+            "https://node.gitlawb.com",
+            "https://10.0.0.36:7777",
+            "https://127.0.0.1:7545",
+        ] {
+            assert!(!is_insecure_remote(url), "{url} is TLS and must be allowed");
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Spellings that defeat a naive loopback check. `Url` normalizes the scheme
+    /// and the host at parse time (lowercasing, and the WHATWG numeric forms), so
+    /// these must all still read as this machine.
+    #[test]
+    fn loopback_spellings_are_normalized_not_string_matched() {
+        for url in [
+            "HTTP://127.0.0.1:7545",
+            "Http://LOCALHOST:7545",
+            "http://localhost.:7545",
+            "http://user:[email protected]:7545",
+            "http://2130706433:7545",
+            "http://0x7f000001:7545",
+            "http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:7545",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                !is_insecure_remote(url),
+                "{url} resolves to this machine; plaintext to it must stay allowed"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The mirror of the above: an uppercase scheme must not become an escape
+    /// from the guard, and a remote host in any spelling is still remote.
+    #[test]
+    fn uppercase_scheme_does_not_escape_the_guard() {
+        for url in [
+            "HTTP://node.example.com:7545",
+            "Http://8.8.8.8",
+            "http://NODE.EXAMPLE.COM",
+            "http://user:[email protected]",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                is_insecure_remote(url),
+                "{url} is a remote cleartext hop and must be refused"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The gate itself, both directions, including the opt-in escape hatch.
+    #[test]
+    fn gate_refuses_remote_plaintext_unless_opted_in() {
+        let err = check_transport_security("http://node.example.com:7545", false)
+            .expect_err("remote plaintext must be refused by default");
+        let msg = err.to_string();
+        assert!(
+            msg.contains("plaintext http"),
+            "the refusal must say why: {msg}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            msg.contains("GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP"),
+            "the refusal must name the escape hatch: {msg}"
+        );
+
+        check_transport_security("http://node.example.com:7545", true)
+            .expect("the opt-in must permit the same URL");
+        check_transport_security("http://127.0.0.1:7545", false)
+            .expect("the local default must keep working with no opt-in");
+        check_transport_security("https://node.gitlawb.com", false)
+            .expect("TLS must need no opt-in");
+    }
+
+    /// The documented knob must appear in --help. A gate the operator cannot
+    /// discover reads as a broken transport rather than a deliberate refusal.
+    #[test]
+    fn help_documents_the_opt_in() {
+        assert!(help_text().contains("GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP"));
+    }
+
+    /// An unparseable or non-http value is not classified as insecure here: it
+    /// fails later with its own error, and reporting it as a TLS problem would
+    /// send the reader after the wrong thing.
+    #[test]
+    fn unparseable_or_other_scheme_is_not_this_guards_problem() {
+        for url in [
+            "",
+            "   ",
+            "not a url",
+            "ftp://node.example.com",
+            "file:///tmp/x",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                !is_insecure_remote(url),
+                "{url:?} is not a cleartext-http-to-remote case"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
@@ -929,7 +1161,7 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn signed_requests_do_not_follow_a_redirect_off_the_node_origin() {
        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let client = build_http_client().unwrap();
+        let client = build_http_client(false).unwrap();

        let mut elsewhere = mockito::Server::new();
        let never = elsewhere
@@ -1031,7 +1263,7 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn a_same_origin_path_changing_redirect_is_refused() {
        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let client = build_http_client().unwrap();
+        let client = build_http_client(false).unwrap();

        let mut node = mockito::Server::new();
        let bounce = node
@@ -1082,7 +1314,7 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn an_identical_target_redirect_is_still_followed_up_to_the_chain_bound() {
        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let client = build_http_client().unwrap();
+        let client = build_http_client(false).unwrap();

        let mut node = mockito::Server::new();
        let loop_route = node
@@ -1243,7 +1475,7 @@ mod tests {
    fn a_rewritten_target_never_receives_the_signature() {
        let kp = Keypair::generate();
        let expected_did = kp.did().to_string();
-        let client = build_http_client().unwrap();
+        let client = build_http_client(false).unwrap();
        let slot = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(None::<Verdict>));

        let mut node = mockito::Server::new();
@@ -1305,7 +1537,7 @@ mod tests {
    fn a_direct_signed_advertisement_verifies_under_the_node_verifier() {
        let kp = Keypair::generate();
        let expected_did = kp.did().to_string();
-        let client = build_http_client().unwrap();
+        let client = build_http_client(false).unwrap();
        let slot = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(None::<Verdict>));

        let mut node = mockito::Server::new();
@@ -267,6 +267,15 @@ fn write_response(mut stream: TcpStream, status: &str, content_type: &str, body:
 /// Run `git fetch` in `clone` through the helper, with a hard timeout so a
 /// regression to the deadlock fails fast instead of hanging the suite.
 fn fetch_with_helper(clone: &Path, node_url: &str) -> (bool, std::process::Output) {
+    fetch_with_helper_env(clone, node_url, &[])
+}
+
+/// [`fetch_with_helper`] with extra environment for the helper process.
+fn fetch_with_helper_env(
+    clone: &Path,
+    node_url: &str,
+    extra_env: &[(&str, &str)],
+) -> (bool, std::process::Output) {
    let helper_bin = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_git-remote-gitlawb"));
    let helper_dir = helper_bin.parent().unwrap().to_path_buf();
    let path_env = match std::env::var_os("PATH") {
@@ -289,7 +298,14 @@ fn fetch_with_helper(clone: &Path, node_url: &str) -> (bool, std::process::Outpu
        // machine/CI with git-l10n installed and LANG set to a translated locale.
        .env("LC_ALL", "C")
        .env("GITLAWB_NODE", node_url)
-        .env("GITLAWB_KEY", "/nonexistent-key-for-anon-fetch");
+        .env("GITLAWB_KEY", "/nonexistent-key-for-anon-fetch")
+        // The helper inherits this process's environment, so an operator or CI
+        // that exports the insecure-HTTP override would decide the transport
+        // policy for every test below. Clear it and let each test opt in.
+        .env_remove("GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP");
+    for (k, v) in extra_env {
+        cmd.env(k, v);
+    }
    run_bounded(cmd, Duration::from_secs(30))
 }

@@ -1242,3 +1258,71 @@ fn run_bounded_bounds_join_when_leader_exits_leaving_a_pipe_holder() {
         held pipes do not stall the joins)"
    );
 }
+
+/// The plaintext-transport gate, proven at its CALL SITE rather than in
+/// isolation. `main.rs`'s unit tests cover `is_insecure_remote` and
+/// `check_transport_security` as functions; neither notices if the call in
+/// `main()` is deleted, which is the regression that would silently restore the
+/// cleartext hop. Only driving the built binary binds the wiring.
+///
+/// `192.0.2.1` is TEST-NET-1 (RFC 5737): non-loopback, reserved for
+/// documentation, and never routable, so the gate is what stops this and no
+/// connection is attempted even if it regressed.
+#[test]
+fn real_git_fetch_refuses_a_remote_plaintext_node() {
+    // A shallow fixture is enough: the gate fires before any negotiation.
+    let repos = build_divergent_repos(1);
+    let (ok, out) = fetch_with_helper(&repos.clone, "http://192.0.2.1:7545");
+    let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr);
+
+    assert!(
+        !ok || !out.status.success(),
+        "the fetch must not succeed: {stderr}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        stderr.contains("plaintext http"),
+        "the helper must refuse the cleartext hop and say so; stderr was: {stderr}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        stderr.contains("GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP"),
+        "the refusal must name the escape hatch; stderr was: {stderr}"
+    );
+}
+
+/// A proxy variable must not divert a LOOPBACK node off this machine.
+///
+/// reqwest's default client honours `HTTP_PROXY` for a loopback URL, so before
+/// the fix a proxy pointing off-machine carried the signed plaintext request to
+/// it, past the transport guard, which only ever inspected the URL. Observed
+/// directly: `proxy(http://...:9999/) intercepts 'http://127.0.0.1:7545/'`.
+///
+/// The proxy here is a black hole on TEST-NET-1, so if the bypass regresses this
+/// fetch cannot succeed: it either hangs to the harness timeout or fails to
+/// connect. Success is only possible when the request went straight to the shim.
+#[test]
+fn real_git_fetch_ignores_a_proxy_for_a_loopback_node() {
+    let repos = build_divergent_repos(1);
+    let (server, clone) = (repos.server.clone(), repos.clone.clone());
+    let shim = start_shim(server.clone(), ShimMode::Normal);
+
+    let (completed, out) = fetch_with_helper_env(
+        &clone,
+        &shim.base_url,
+        &[
+            ("HTTP_PROXY", "http://192.0.2.1:9999"),
+            ("http_proxy", "http://192.0.2.1:9999"),
+            ("ALL_PROXY", "http://192.0.2.1:9999"),
+        ],
+    );
+
+    assert!(
+        completed,
+        "the fetch did not finish; a proxied loopback request would stall here. stderr:\n{}",
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
+    );
+    assert!(
+        out.status.success(),
+        "a loopback fetch must ignore the proxy variables. stderr:\n{}",
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
+    );
+}