chore: refresh PR head

parse_ref_updates accepted any 40-byte string as an object id, so a
peer-supplied pkt-line with non-hex content was forwarded into
RefUpdateEvents on gossip, branch_cid rows, and sync-notify JSON as a
canonical-looking identifier. Require [0-9a-fA-F] on both fields.

Closes #398

README.md

@@ -188,12 +188,7 @@ export GITLAWB_NODE=http://localhost:7545
 git clone gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../my-repo
 ```
 
-For public-network use, make sure `GITLAWB_NODE` points to the node you want, over
-`https://`. The helper defaults to localhost for local development, and plaintext
-`http://` is allowed only to this machine: requests are signed but not encrypted, so
-a cleartext hop to a remote node exposes the pack contents and the `Signature`
-header. A remote `http://` node is refused, and `GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP=1`
-overrides that for a trusted private network.
+For public-network use, make sure `GITLAWB_NODE` points to the node you want. The helper defaults to localhost for local development.
 
 ### Full lifecycle against an iCaptcha-enforcing node
 
@@ -398,7 +393,7 @@ Important node settings:
 | `GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP` | Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs. |
 | `GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS` | Disable embedded seed peers for isolated dev/test networks. |
 | `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES` | Require signed peer announce/sync writes. Defaults to `false` during the staged rollout below. |
-| `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` | Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on `git-receive-pack`. **Defaults to `true`.** A `did:key` signature is authentication, not authorization (anyone can mint a key and sign), so with this off every signed caller may push to every repository, private ones included. Delegated and CI keys count as non-owners: a UCAN `git/push` capability is verified but not yet honored for authorization, so they cannot push while this is on. Set `false` only for a rolling upgrade; see [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md). |
+| `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` | Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on `git-receive-pack`. **Defaults to `true`.** A `did:key` signature is authentication, not authorization — anyone can mint a key and sign — so with this off every signed caller may push to every repository, private ones included. Delegated and CI keys count as non-owners: a UCAN `git/push` capability is verified but not yet honored for authorization, so they cannot push while this is on. Set `false` only for a rolling upgrade; see [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md). |
 | `GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC` | Enable automatic sync from known peers. |
 | `GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES` | Max git pack body size for smart-HTTP routes. |
 | `GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS` | Max seconds a served git upload-pack, receive-pack, or `info/refs` advertisement may run before it is aborted (504). Default 600. Also bounds the withheld-blob classification walk (on both the upload-pack serve and receive-pack replication paths) and the push-side pin-candidate discovery (`rev-list` / `cat-file`), each reaped via process-group teardown at the deadline. On the path-scoped upload-pack path the classification walk and the pack serve share ONE deadline, so this value bounds their combined duration rather than granting each stage a full budget: a walk that consumes it leaves the serve nothing and the clone gets a 504. Serving large path-scoped repos may therefore need a higher value than they did when each stage was budgeted separately. Accepted range is 1 to 3153600000 (100 years), since the node derives deadlines from this value and a larger one cannot be represented. |

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src/main.rs

@@ -66,10 +66,6 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
     // v0.1: default to localhost. Override with GITLAWB_NODE env var.
     let node_base =
         std::env::var("GITLAWB_NODE").unwrap_or_else(|_| "http://127.0.0.1:7545".to_string());
-    check_transport_security(
-        &node_base,
-        std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP").is_some(),
-    )?;
     let repo_base = format!("{}/{}/{}", node_base, short_owner, repo_name);
     tracing::debug!("repo_base: {repo_base}");
 
@@ -82,76 +78,6 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
     run_helper(&repo_base, keypair.as_ref())
 }
 
-/// Whether `url` is plaintext http, regardless of where it points.
-fn is_http(url: &str) -> bool {
-    reqwest::Url::parse(url.trim())
-        .map(|u| u.scheme() == "http")
-        .unwrap_or(false)
-}
-
-/// Whether `url` would send git data off this machine in cleartext.
-///
-/// True only for `http://` to a non-loopback host. RFC 9421 signs the request
-/// but does not encrypt it, so on a plaintext hop the pack contents and the
-/// `Signature` header are both readable, and a captured signature is replayable
-/// for its freshness window against any host.
-///
-/// Loopback is decided from the parsed address rather than a string match, so
-/// `127.0.0.2`, `[::1]` and an IPv4-mapped `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]` are all
-/// recognised as this machine. A value that does not parse, or that is not
-/// http(s), is not this guard's business and returns false: it fails later with
-/// its own error, and naming it a TLS problem would misdirect the reader.
-fn is_insecure_remote(url: &str) -> bool {
-    let Ok(parsed) = reqwest::Url::parse(url.trim()) else {
-        return false;
-    };
-    if parsed.scheme() != "http" {
-        return false;
-    }
-    let Some(host) = parsed.host_str() else {
-        return false;
-    };
-    let host = host.trim_end_matches('.').to_ascii_lowercase();
-    if host == "localhost" {
-        return false;
-    }
-    // host_str() keeps the brackets on an IPv6 literal.
-    let bare = host.trim_start_matches('[').trim_end_matches(']');
-    if let Ok(ip) = bare.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>() {
-        if ip.is_loopback() {
-            return false;
-        }
-        // An IPv4-mapped IPv6 literal hides a v4 loopback from is_loopback().
-        if let std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) = ip {
-            if let Some(v4) = v6.to_ipv4_mapped() {
-                if v4.is_loopback() {
-                    return false;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    true
-}
-
-/// Refuse a cleartext hop off this machine unless the operator has opted in.
-///
-/// Fail closed: the alternative is signing a request and then handing it, and
-/// the pack it carries, to anyone on the path. `GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP`
-/// exists for a private LAN where the operator has decided that is acceptable.
-fn check_transport_security(node_base: &str, allow_insecure: bool) -> Result<()> {
-    if allow_insecure || !is_insecure_remote(node_base) {
-        return Ok(());
-    }
-    bail!(
-        "refusing to send git data to {node_base} over plaintext http.\n\
-         Requests are signed but not encrypted, so the pack contents and the \
-         Signature header are readable by anyone on the path, and a captured \
-         signature can be replayed.\n\
-         Use https://, or set GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP=1 to accept the risk \
-         (for a trusted private network only)."
-    )
-}
-
 // ── CLI argument handling ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /// How the binary was invoked, derived from its CLI arguments.
@@ -199,7 +125,6 @@ fn help_text() -> String {
          ENVIRONMENT:\n\
          \x20   GITLAWB_NODE   Node base URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:7545)\n\
          \x20   GITLAWB_KEY    Identity PEM path for signed fetch/push (default: ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem)\n\
-         \x20   GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP  Permit plaintext http:// to a non-loopback node (unset by default)\n\
          \x20   GITLAWB_LOG    Log filter (default: warn)\n\
          \n\
          FLAGS:\n\
@@ -274,8 +199,7 @@ fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
         other => bail!("unsupported git service: {other}"),
     }
 
-    // A loopback node must never be proxied; see build_http_client.
-    let client = build_http_client(!is_insecure_remote(repo_base) && is_http(repo_base))?;
+    let client = build_http_client()?;
 
     // ── Phase 1: ref advertisement (GET /info/refs?service=<service>) ─────────
     //
@@ -411,22 +335,8 @@ const HTTP_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(300);
 /// node named, and on a 307/308 the pack body went with them. Scope the follow to the
 /// origin that issued the redirect AND to an identical request-target, which is the
 /// same predicate `gl` uses.
-/// `bypass_proxy` must be true whenever the node is on this machine. reqwest's
-/// default client honours `HTTP_PROXY` / `ALL_PROXY` for a loopback URL too, so a
-/// proxy variable pointing off-machine turns an allowed local request into a
-/// cleartext hop carrying the `Signature` header, straight past
-/// `check_transport_security`. Verified: with `HTTP_PROXY` set, reqwest logged
-/// `proxy(...) intercepts 'http://127.0.0.1:7545/'` and dialled the proxy. A
-/// local node is never legitimately reached through a proxy, so this refuses one
-/// rather than trying to reimplement `NO_PROXY` parsing.
-fn build_http_client(bypass_proxy: bool) -> Result<reqwest::blocking::Client> {
-    let builder = reqwest::blocking::Client::builder();
-    let builder = if bypass_proxy {
-        builder.no_proxy()
-    } else {
-        builder
-    };
-    Ok(builder
+fn build_http_client() -> Result<reqwest::blocking::Client> {
+    Ok(reqwest::blocking::Client::builder()
         .timeout(HTTP_TIMEOUT)
         .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::custom(same_origin_redirect))
         .build()?)
@@ -919,148 +829,6 @@ fn resolve_key_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
 
 // ── Tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod insecure_transport_tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    /// Loopback in every form the transport can legitimately be pointed at.
-    /// Plaintext to this machine is the documented local-alpha default and must
-    /// keep working, so a false positive here breaks every stock install.
-    #[test]
-    fn loopback_http_is_allowed() {
-        for url in [
-            "http://127.0.0.1:7545",
-            "http://localhost:7545",
-            "http://[::1]:7545",
-            "http://127.0.0.2:7545",
-            "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:7545",
-            "http://LocalHost:7545",
-        ] {
-            assert!(
-                !is_insecure_remote(url),
-                "{url} is this machine; plaintext to it must stay allowed"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The case the guard exists for: cleartext git data leaving the machine.
-    #[test]
-    fn remote_http_is_refused() {
-        for url in [
-            "http://node.example.com:7545",
-            "http://10.0.0.36:7777",
-            "http://192.168.1.10",
-            "http://[2001:db8::1]:7545",
-            "http://8.8.8.8",
-        ] {
-            assert!(
-                is_insecure_remote(url),
-                "{url} sends git data off-machine in cleartext and must be refused"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// TLS is always fine, loopback or not, so the guard keys on the scheme and
-    /// not merely on the host being remote.
-    #[test]
-    fn https_is_always_allowed() {
-        for url in [
-            "https://node.gitlawb.com",
-            "https://10.0.0.36:7777",
-            "https://127.0.0.1:7545",
-        ] {
-            assert!(!is_insecure_remote(url), "{url} is TLS and must be allowed");
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Spellings that defeat a naive loopback check. `Url` normalizes the scheme
-    /// and the host at parse time (lowercasing, and the WHATWG numeric forms), so
-    /// these must all still read as this machine.
-    #[test]
-    fn loopback_spellings_are_normalized_not_string_matched() {
-        for url in [
-            "HTTP://127.0.0.1:7545",
-            "Http://LOCALHOST:7545",
-            "http://localhost.:7545",
-            "http://user:[email protected]:7545",
-            "http://2130706433:7545",
-            "http://0x7f000001:7545",
-            "http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:7545",
-        ] {
-            assert!(
-                !is_insecure_remote(url),
-                "{url} resolves to this machine; plaintext to it must stay allowed"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The mirror of the above: an uppercase scheme must not become an escape
-    /// from the guard, and a remote host in any spelling is still remote.
-    #[test]
-    fn uppercase_scheme_does_not_escape_the_guard() {
-        for url in [
-            "HTTP://node.example.com:7545",
-            "Http://8.8.8.8",
-            "http://NODE.EXAMPLE.COM",
-            "http://user:[email protected]",
-        ] {
-            assert!(
-                is_insecure_remote(url),
-                "{url} is a remote cleartext hop and must be refused"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The gate itself, both directions, including the opt-in escape hatch.
-    #[test]
-    fn gate_refuses_remote_plaintext_unless_opted_in() {
-        let err = check_transport_security("http://node.example.com:7545", false)
-            .expect_err("remote plaintext must be refused by default");
-        let msg = err.to_string();
-        assert!(
-            msg.contains("plaintext http"),
-            "the refusal must say why: {msg}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            msg.contains("GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP"),
-            "the refusal must name the escape hatch: {msg}"
-        );
-
-        check_transport_security("http://node.example.com:7545", true)
-            .expect("the opt-in must permit the same URL");
-        check_transport_security("http://127.0.0.1:7545", false)
-            .expect("the local default must keep working with no opt-in");
-        check_transport_security("https://node.gitlawb.com", false)
-            .expect("TLS must need no opt-in");
-    }
-
-    /// The documented knob must appear in --help. A gate the operator cannot
-    /// discover reads as a broken transport rather than a deliberate refusal.
-    #[test]
-    fn help_documents_the_opt_in() {
-        assert!(help_text().contains("GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP"));
-    }
-
-    /// An unparseable or non-http value is not classified as insecure here: it
-    /// fails later with its own error, and reporting it as a TLS problem would
-    /// send the reader after the wrong thing.
-    #[test]
-    fn unparseable_or_other_scheme_is_not_this_guards_problem() {
-        for url in [
-            "",
-            "   ",
-            "not a url",
-            "ftp://node.example.com",
-            "file:///tmp/x",
-        ] {
-            assert!(
-                !is_insecure_remote(url),
-                "{url:?} is not a cleartext-http-to-remote case"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -1161,7 +929,7 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn signed_requests_do_not_follow_a_redirect_off_the_node_origin() {
         let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let client = build_http_client(false).unwrap();
+        let client = build_http_client().unwrap();
 
         let mut elsewhere = mockito::Server::new();
         let never = elsewhere
@@ -1263,7 +1031,7 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn a_same_origin_path_changing_redirect_is_refused() {
         let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let client = build_http_client(false).unwrap();
+        let client = build_http_client().unwrap();
 
         let mut node = mockito::Server::new();
         let bounce = node
@@ -1314,7 +1082,7 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn an_identical_target_redirect_is_still_followed_up_to_the_chain_bound() {
         let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let client = build_http_client(false).unwrap();
+        let client = build_http_client().unwrap();
 
         let mut node = mockito::Server::new();
         let loop_route = node
@@ -1475,7 +1243,7 @@ mod tests {
     fn a_rewritten_target_never_receives_the_signature() {
         let kp = Keypair::generate();
         let expected_did = kp.did().to_string();
-        let client = build_http_client(false).unwrap();
+        let client = build_http_client().unwrap();
         let slot = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(None::<Verdict>));
 
         let mut node = mockito::Server::new();
@@ -1537,7 +1305,7 @@ mod tests {
     fn a_direct_signed_advertisement_verifies_under_the_node_verifier() {
         let kp = Keypair::generate();
         let expected_did = kp.did().to_string();
-        let client = build_http_client(false).unwrap();
+        let client = build_http_client().unwrap();
         let slot = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(None::<Verdict>));
 
         let mut node = mockito::Server::new();

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/tests/real_git_fetch.rs

@@ -267,15 +267,6 @@ fn write_response(mut stream: TcpStream, status: &str, content_type: &str, body:
 /// Run `git fetch` in `clone` through the helper, with a hard timeout so a
 /// regression to the deadlock fails fast instead of hanging the suite.
 fn fetch_with_helper(clone: &Path, node_url: &str) -> (bool, std::process::Output) {
-    fetch_with_helper_env(clone, node_url, &[])
-}
-
-/// [`fetch_with_helper`] with extra environment for the helper process.
-fn fetch_with_helper_env(
-    clone: &Path,
-    node_url: &str,
-    extra_env: &[(&str, &str)],
-) -> (bool, std::process::Output) {
     let helper_bin = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_git-remote-gitlawb"));
     let helper_dir = helper_bin.parent().unwrap().to_path_buf();
     let path_env = match std::env::var_os("PATH") {
@@ -298,14 +289,7 @@ fn fetch_with_helper_env(
         // machine/CI with git-l10n installed and LANG set to a translated locale.
         .env("LC_ALL", "C")
         .env("GITLAWB_NODE", node_url)
-        .env("GITLAWB_KEY", "/nonexistent-key-for-anon-fetch")
-        // The helper inherits this process's environment, so an operator or CI
-        // that exports the insecure-HTTP override would decide the transport
-        // policy for every test below. Clear it and let each test opt in.
-        .env_remove("GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP");
-    for (k, v) in extra_env {
-        cmd.env(k, v);
-    }
+        .env("GITLAWB_KEY", "/nonexistent-key-for-anon-fetch");
     run_bounded(cmd, Duration::from_secs(30))
 }
 
@@ -1258,71 +1242,3 @@ fn run_bounded_bounds_join_when_leader_exits_leaving_a_pipe_holder() {
          held pipes do not stall the joins)"
     );
 }
-
-/// The plaintext-transport gate, proven at its CALL SITE rather than in
-/// isolation. `main.rs`'s unit tests cover `is_insecure_remote` and
-/// `check_transport_security` as functions; neither notices if the call in
-/// `main()` is deleted, which is the regression that would silently restore the
-/// cleartext hop. Only driving the built binary binds the wiring.
-///
-/// `192.0.2.1` is TEST-NET-1 (RFC 5737): non-loopback, reserved for
-/// documentation, and never routable, so the gate is what stops this and no
-/// connection is attempted even if it regressed.
-#[test]
-fn real_git_fetch_refuses_a_remote_plaintext_node() {
-    // A shallow fixture is enough: the gate fires before any negotiation.
-    let repos = build_divergent_repos(1);
-    let (ok, out) = fetch_with_helper(&repos.clone, "http://192.0.2.1:7545");
-    let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr);
-
-    assert!(
-        !ok || !out.status.success(),
-        "the fetch must not succeed: {stderr}"
-    );
-    assert!(
-        stderr.contains("plaintext http"),
-        "the helper must refuse the cleartext hop and say so; stderr was: {stderr}"
-    );
-    assert!(
-        stderr.contains("GITLAWB_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP"),
-        "the refusal must name the escape hatch; stderr was: {stderr}"
-    );
-}
-
-/// A proxy variable must not divert a LOOPBACK node off this machine.
-///
-/// reqwest's default client honours `HTTP_PROXY` for a loopback URL, so before
-/// the fix a proxy pointing off-machine carried the signed plaintext request to
-/// it, past the transport guard, which only ever inspected the URL. Observed
-/// directly: `proxy(http://...:9999/) intercepts 'http://127.0.0.1:7545/'`.
-///
-/// The proxy here is a black hole on TEST-NET-1, so if the bypass regresses this
-/// fetch cannot succeed: it either hangs to the harness timeout or fails to
-/// connect. Success is only possible when the request went straight to the shim.
-#[test]
-fn real_git_fetch_ignores_a_proxy_for_a_loopback_node() {
-    let repos = build_divergent_repos(1);
-    let (server, clone) = (repos.server.clone(), repos.clone.clone());
-    let shim = start_shim(server.clone(), ShimMode::Normal);
-
-    let (completed, out) = fetch_with_helper_env(
-        &clone,
-        &shim.base_url,
-        &[
-            ("HTTP_PROXY", "http://192.0.2.1:9999"),
-            ("http_proxy", "http://192.0.2.1:9999"),
-            ("ALL_PROXY", "http://192.0.2.1:9999"),
-        ],
-    );
-
-    assert!(
-        completed,
-        "the fetch did not finish; a proxied loopback request would stall here. stderr:\n{}",
-        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
-    );
-    assert!(
-        out.status.success(),
-        "a loopback fetch must ignore the proxy variables. stderr:\n{}",
-        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
-    );
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rs

@@ -3153,6 +3153,12 @@ struct RefUpdate {
     ref_name: String,
 }
 
+/// A git object id is 40 hex chars; length alone is not enough, since a peer
+/// can send 40 arbitrary bytes (#398).
+fn is_hex_sha(s: &str) -> bool {
+    s.len() == 40 && s.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit())
+}
+
 /// Parse git receive-pack pkt-line ref updates from the request body.
 /// Format per line: `<40-hex-old> <40-hex-new> <refname>[NUL capabilities]\n`
 fn parse_ref_updates(body: &[u8]) -> Vec<RefUpdate> {
@@ -3194,7 +3200,7 @@ fn parse_ref_updates(body: &[u8]) -> Vec<RefUpdate> {
             .trim_end_matches('\n');
 
         let parts: Vec<&str> = line.splitn(3, ' ').collect();
-        if parts.len() == 3 && parts[0].len() == 40 && parts[1].len() == 40 {
+        if parts.len() == 3 && is_hex_sha(parts[0]) && is_hex_sha(parts[1]) {
             updates.push(RefUpdate {
                 old_sha: parts[0].to_string(),
                 new_sha: parts[1].to_string(),
@@ -3488,6 +3494,45 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    // #398: a peer-supplied pkt-line whose 40-byte "SHA" fields carry non-hex
+    // content must be dropped, not forwarded into RefUpdate events, branch_cid
+    // rows, and sync-notify JSON as a canonical-looking identifier.
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_ref_updates_requires_hex_shas() {
+        let sha_a = "a".repeat(40);
+        let sha_b = "b".repeat(40);
+        let pkt = |old: &str, new: &str, refname: &str| {
+            let line = format!("{old} {new} {refname}");
+            format!("{:04x}{}0000", line.len() + 4, line).into_bytes()
+        };
+
+        // Valid 40-hex old + new -> accepted.
+        let updates = parse_ref_updates(&pkt(&sha_a, &sha_b, "refs/heads/main"));
+        assert_eq!(updates.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(updates[0].old_sha, sha_a);
+        assert_eq!(updates[0].new_sha, sha_b);
+        assert_eq!(updates[0].ref_name, "refs/heads/main");
+
+        // 40-byte non-hex fields -> dropped.
+        let junk = "Z".repeat(40);
+        assert!(parse_ref_updates(&pkt(&junk, &sha_b, "refs/heads/main")).is_empty());
+        assert!(parse_ref_updates(&pkt(&sha_a, &junk, "refs/heads/main")).is_empty());
+
+        // Wrong lengths -> dropped.
+        assert!(parse_ref_updates(&pkt(&"a".repeat(39), &sha_b, "refs/heads/main")).is_empty());
+        assert!(parse_ref_updates(&pkt(&sha_a, &"b".repeat(41), "refs/heads/main")).is_empty());
+
+        // A bad line among good ones drops only the bad line.
+        let sha_c = "c".repeat(40);
+        let bad = pkt(&junk, &sha_b, "refs/heads/bad");
+        let good = pkt(&sha_a, &sha_c, "refs/heads/good");
+        let mut mixed = bad[..bad.len() - 4].to_vec(); // strip trailing flush
+        mixed.extend_from_slice(&good);
+        let updates = parse_ref_updates(&mixed);
+        assert_eq!(updates.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(updates[0].ref_name, "refs/heads/good");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn git_service_app_error_classifies_timeout_bad_request_and_git() {
         // GitServiceTimeout carried through anyhow -> 504 Timeout.