fix(core): zeroize the derived X25519 secret (#65) (#66)

x25519_secret_from_seed derived the X25519 private scalar from the Ed25519
seed and returned it as a bare [u8; 32]. Because [u8; 32] is Copy with no
Drop (and sha2's digest output likewise has no zeroize), the scalar, the
SHA-512 digest, and the returned temporary were released without being
scrubbed, leaving secret-derived material in freed memory. This is the same
Copy-no-Drop class fixed for the raw seed in #41, on the derived secret.

Return Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>, build the scalar directly into a zeroizing
buffer so no bare secret local persists, and explicitly wipe the SHA-512
digest before it drops. Callers deref the result into crypto_box::SecretKey,
which already scrubs its own copy. No behavior change: the derived scalar and
all decryption output are byte-identical, covered by the existing
ed25519_to_x25519_keypair_agrees and seal_open_round_trip_for_recipients tests.

Stacked on #41 (#64).

.env.example

@@ -21,26 +21,6 @@ GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR=/data/repos
 # When using the bundled docker-compose, this is wired automatically.
 DATABASE_URL=postgresql://gitlawb:changeme@localhost:5432/gitlawb
 
-# ── Database pool & startup resilience ────────────────────────────────────
-# Maximum connections in the PostgreSQL pool. A cap, not a floor —
-# connections open lazily. Size against the DB server's max_connections,
-# remembering admin tooling opens its own pool. Each concurrent write pins one
-# connection for its whole duration (the connection-affine advisory lock), so the
-# node REJECTS at boot any value below GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_GIT_PUSHES + 8
-# headroom — keep this comfortably above that (default 48 for pushes 32).
-GITLAWB_DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS=48
-# Seconds a request waits for a pool connection before failing with 503.
-GITLAWB_DB_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS=5
-# Upper bound on each startup connect+migrate attempt, in seconds. Keep it
-# generous enough for a peer instance to finish migrating (the migration
-# advisory lock is held across a deploy); on expiry the attempt is retried.
-GITLAWB_DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS=60
-# Startup retry backoff while the database is unavailable: first delay and
-# ceiling, in seconds. The node stays up serving 503s (with a truthful
-# /ready) instead of crash-looping.
-GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_INITIAL_SECS=5
-GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_MAX_SECS=60
-
 # ── IPFS pinning (Pinata) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Get a JWT at https://app.pinata.cloud/developers/api-keys
 GITLAWB_PINATA_JWT=
@@ -92,17 +72,6 @@ GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS=false
 # rolling upgrades so existing live nodes can still communicate.
 GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false
 
-# Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on git-receive-pack.
-# A valid did:key signature is authentication, not authorization: anyone can
-# mint a key, derive its DID and sign, so with this off every signed caller may
-# push to every repository, private ones included. On by default.
-#
-# Set to false only for a rolling upgrade whose pushers are not yet the repo
-# owner. Note that delegated and CI keys count as non-owners: UCAN git/push is
-# verified but not yet honored for authorization, so they cannot push while this
-# is on. See docs/RUN-A-NODE.md.
-GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=true
-
 # Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs.
 # Example: /ip4/1.2.3.4/udp/7546/quic-v1/p2p/12D3KooW...
 GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP=
@@ -115,210 +84,6 @@ GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ=true
 # Maximum git smart-HTTP pack request size, in bytes.
 GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES=2147483648
 
-# Max seconds a served git upload-pack / receive-pack (clone / push) may run
-# before it is aborted with a 504. Bounds a hung git that would otherwise pin a
-# worker and, on push, the repo write lock. Also bounds both info/refs
-# advertisements, the withheld-blob pack build, and the push-side candidate
-# discovery (rev-list / cat-file), all reaped via process-group teardown (#174).
-# On the path-scoped upload-pack path the withheld-blob classification walk and
-# the pack serve share ONE deadline, so this value bounds their COMBINED duration
-# rather than giving each stage a full budget: a walk that consumes it leaves the
-# serve nothing and the clone gets a 504. Serving large path-scoped repos may
-# need a higher value here than when each stage was budgeted separately.
-# Must be 1..=3153600000 (100 years): the node derives deadlines from this value,
-# and a larger one cannot be represented. Default 600.
-GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS=600
-
-# Max seconds the storage-ACQUISITION phase of a served git op may run before the
-# request is shed with a 503, separate from the git-run timeout above. A
-# concurrency permit is taken before this phase and GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS
-# only starts once git spawns, so without this a stalled backend (a hung Tigris
-# HEAD/GET, or a hung pg advisory-lock iteration on push) pins the permit and drains
-# the pool until every later request 503s. On expiry the permit is released
-# (fail-closed). Kept separate because acquisition and git execution are distinct
-# cost centers. Must be positive; set very large to effectively disable. Default 30.
-GITLAWB_GIT_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS=30
-
-# Max concurrent git READ ops (upload-pack + the upload-pack info/refs
-# advertisement) served at once, a global pool separate from the push pool below.
-# The anon receive-pack info/refs advertisement has its OWN pool (see below), not
-# this one. Over-cap sheds a clean 503 + Retry-After. Anonymous reads draw from
-# here, so pair it with GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_READS_PER_CALLER (below) so one
-# caller cannot monopolize the pool. Default 128.
-GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_GIT_OPS=128
-
-# Max concurrent git-receive-pack (push) POST operations, in a pool separate from
-# the read pool (GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_GIT_OPS) so anonymous reads cannot shed an
-# authenticated push at admission. The anon receive-pack info/refs advertisement
-# runs in a SEPARATE pool of the same size (disjoint from this one), so an
-# advertisement flood cannot shed a push either. Over-cap sheds a 503 +
-# Retry-After. Default 32.
-GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_GIT_PUSHES=32
-
-# Max pushes PARKED at once waiting for the per-repo write lease of the SAME repo.
-# A parked push holds its already-buffered pack body in memory, so this bounds that
-# memory for a hot repo. Past the cap the newest push sheds a clean 503 +
-# Retry-After ("repo is busy with another push") instead of joining the queue; a
-# push to a DIFFERENT repo is never affected. The lease holder is not counted.
-# Raising GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_GIT_PUSHES does not raise this; set it explicitly.
-# Default 8.
-GITLAWB_REPO_LEASE_MAX_WAITERS=8
-
-# Max concurrent post-push pin loops (IPFS + Pinata pin_new_objects) across all
-# repos. The per-repo encrypt-task set caps the pin-task COUNT; this caps how many
-# of those loops RUN CONCURRENTLY, and so how much MB-scale object-id list memory is
-# held WHILE BEING PINNED. It does not bound retained memory in general: on the local
-# IPFS path the caller builds its list before this pool is entered, so a loop parked
-# waiting for a permit still holds its full list, and how many park is capped only
-# per repo. Do not size memory from this knob alone. A loop DEFERS (waits) when the
-# pool is full, never drops a pin. Default 8.
-GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_PIN_TASKS=8
-
-# Max concurrent read ops (upload-pack + the upload-pack info/refs advertisement)
-# a single caller may hold, so one caller cannot monopolize the read pool. Keyed
-# on the resolved SOURCE IP, never the DID: a signature does not move a caller off
-# this cap. The source-IP key is only as granular as GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY below:
-# left unset, a node behind an edge/NAT keys all callers on the edge IP and this
-# collapses to one global cap. Set GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY for per-client keying; a
-# high-fanout caller (CI behind one NAT) then needs the operator to raise this.
-# Default 16.
-GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_READS_PER_CALLER=16
-
-# Two further per-source concurrency caps exist on the PUSH side but have NO
-# environment variable of their own: both are DERIVED as
-# GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_GIT_PUSHES / 8, with a floor of 1. They are not settable
-# independently, so raising the push pool raises both proportionally, and the
-# default push pool of 32 gives each a cap of 4.
-#   * The anon receive-pack info/refs advertisement cap: one source IP may hold at
-#     most this many slots in the dedicated advert pool, so saturating that pool
-#     takes ~8 distinct source IPs.
-#   * The authenticated receive-pack POST cap: one source IP may hold at most this
-#     many WRITE-pool slots. This one is load-bearing for push availability, since
-#     it is acquired before the global write permit: without it, one host minting
-#     disposable did:key identities could open enough slow pushes to monopolize the
-#     write pool and 503 every other source (the push rate limiter caps arrival
-#     rate, not in-flight concurrency, and owner enforcement can be turned off for
-#     a rolling upgrade).
-# Keyed on the resolved source IP, never the DID, so a DID farm does not defeat
-# them; keying granularity follows GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY like the read cap above.
-
-# ── Push rate limiting (git-receive-pack flood brake) ─────────────────────
-# Max receive-pack requests (info/refs advertisement + push POST) per client
-# IP per hour. 0 disables. Default 600.
-GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT=600
-
-# ── /ipfs/{cid} visibility-walk admission (#174) ──────────────────────────
-# GET /ipfs/{cid} runs a per-repo full-history git walk in a blocking thread to
-# decide whether the caller may read a path-scoped blob. It is publicly reachable,
-# so it is bounded to keep a permissionless caller from fanning out unbounded
-# concurrent walks and exhausting blocking-pool threads + PIDs.
-# Max concurrent /ipfs walks across all callers (a pool of its own, disjoint from
-# the served-git pools). Over-cap sheds a 503. Default 32.
-GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_IPFS_WALKS=32
-# Max concurrent /ipfs walks a single SOURCE IP may hold (keyed like the git
-# per-caller caps via GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY; reject-before-insert bounded map).
-# Default 4.
-GITLAWB_IPFS_WALK_PER_SOURCE=4
-# Max legacy (NULL-provenance) repos probed per single /ipfs request, bounding the
-# scan-fallback fan-out (git cat-file per candidate repo) for an anonymous caller. A
-# truncated scan sheds a retryable 503, never a false 404. Default 256.
-GITLAWB_IPFS_MAX_LEGACY_PROBES=256
-# Max repo ROWS one /ipfs request's legacy scan may read from the database. The probe
-# ceiling above only counts once a probe runs, and quarantined or private repos are
-# denied before that, so without this an all-denying inventory paged the whole repo
-# table for one anonymous request. A truncated scan sheds a retryable 503 carrying a
-# sealed `continuation` token; echo it as ?scan= to resume, so a holder buried past the
-# ceiling is reachable in ceil(repos / ceiling) + 1 requests. Raising this also raises
-# the per-caller /ipfs work allowance, since each page is charged to it. Lowering it
-# sharpens a coarse oracle: laddering to the end reveals the node's total repo count to
-# within one ceiling. Default 2048.
-GITLAWB_IPFS_MAX_LEGACY_SCAN_ROWS=2048
-# Max EXPENSIVE path-scope visibility walks per single /ipfs request (only a
-# blob in a path-scoped repo costs a full-history walk). Over-cap repos are
-# skipped without a verdict and the scan continues; if the object is then found
-# nowhere the request sheds a retryable 503 instead of a false 404. The effective
-# cap is the tighter of this value and the node's internal per-request ceiling of
-# 17, so values above 17 have no effect; lower values do tighten it. Default 64.
-GITLAWB_IPFS_MAX_REPOS_WALKED=64
-# Ceiling on repos one /ipfs request may VISIT past the visibility gate. Each
-# visit costs a repo acquire — on a Tigris cache miss a full archive download,
-# so this is also the worst-case object-store fetch count per request — plus a
-# cat-file probe. On exhaustion the scan stops and sheds a retryable 503.
-# Default 1024.
-GITLAWB_IPFS_MAX_REPO_VISITS=1024
-# Absolute wall-clock budget for one admitted /ipfs request's acquire+walk
-# lifetime (all stages of the whole scan). Per-stage clamps bound the acquire
-# and walk stages to the remaining budget, and no stage starts once it is
-# exhausted (the scan then sheds a retryable 503). The object-type probe and
-# content-read cat-file subprocesses are budget-checked before starting AND each
-# run under their own deadline (the lesser of GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS and
-# the remaining budget), reaped via process-group teardown, so a hung cat-file
-# cannot hold the request's walk slot past it. One hang path is still unbounded:
-# the probe's object-store readability check is a plain filesystem sweep with
-# nothing to reap, so a wedged filesystem can hold the slot past the deadline.
-# Must be 1..=3153600000 (100 years): the node derives an Instant deadline from
-# this value, and a larger one cannot be represented. Default 600.
-GITLAWB_IPFS_REQUEST_BUDGET_SECS=600
-# Shorter budget (seconds) for the pre-walk CID resolve: the lookup that maps a
-# requested CID to its git oid(s), which runs while the scarce walk admission is
-# already held. A well-formed CID with no pin row does no probe and no walk work,
-# so without this a stalled lookup could hold a walk slot for the whole request
-# budget while nothing walked. The effective deadline is the lesser of this and
-# the remaining request budget; walk and probe work stay on the request budget,
-# so a slow but progressing scan is never shed by it.
-# Must be 1..=3153600000 (100 years). Default 10.
-GITLAWB_IPFS_RESOLVE_BUDGET_SECS=10
-# Max /ipfs/{cid} requests per client IP per hour (route flood brake, distinct
-# from the concurrency caps above). 0 disables. Default 600.
-GITLAWB_IPFS_RATE_LIMIT=600
-
-# ── Creation rate limiting (repo/agent/issue/PR flood brake) ──────────────
-# Max creation requests (POST /api/v1/repos, /api/register, fork, issues,
-# pulls) per client IP per hour, in addition to the per-DID limit. The per-DID
-# limit alone is bypassed by a did:key farm (one throwaway identity per repo),
-# which is how spam-repo floods slip past it and the iCaptcha gate; the per-IP
-# brake caps a single-source flood. Uses GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY below to resolve
-# the client IP. 0 disables. Default 120.
-GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT=120
-
-# ── Peer-sync rate limiting (per client IP, uses GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY below) ─
-# /api/v1/peers/announce and /api/v1/sync/notify accept unsigned requests from
-# known peers and run at higher frequency, so a generous bucket. Separate from
-# the trigger bucket so an unsigned notify flood can't drain trigger's quota.
-# 0 disables. Default 600.
-GITLAWB_PEER_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT=600
-# /api/v1/sync/trigger requires a signature and fans out to every peer per call,
-# so it gets a tight bucket. 0 disables. Default 60.
-GITLAWB_SYNC_TRIGGER_RATE_LIMIT=60
-
-# Which forwarded header the edge is trusted to set, used to resolve the real
-# client IP for the push limiter. One of:
-#   (unset) — no trusted proxy: key on the socket peer address, ignore headers.
-#   fly     — behind Fly's edge (trust Fly-Client-IP).
-#   x-forwarded-for — behind a single reverse proxy like Caddy/NGINX (trust the
-#             rightmost X-Forwarded-For hop).
-# Only set this when a proxy you control actually fronts the node; trusting a
-# forwarded header on a directly-exposed node lets clients spoof the key.
-GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY=
-
 # ── Sync ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Enable automatic background sync from known peers
 GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC=false
-
-# ── iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate ───────────────────────────────────
-# Optional gate on create_repo + register: require callers to present an
-# iCaptcha proof (X-ICaptcha-Proof header) earned at icaptcha.gitlawb.com.
-# Default off = fully inert (no behavior change).
-#   off     - gate disabled (default)
-#   shadow  - verify + log would-be rejections, but always allow
-#   enforce - reject requests without a valid, strong-enough proof
-ICAPTCHA_MODE=off
-# Optional base64url Ed25519 public key override; if unset it is fetched from
-# ICAPTCHA_URL/v1/pubkey at startup. Recommended in production: pinning the key
-# removes the startup dependency on the iCaptcha service being reachable and
-# avoids silently running inert if that one-time fetch fails.
-ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY=
-# Minimum proof difficulty level required to pass.
-ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL=3
-# Base URL of the iCaptcha service.
-ICAPTCHA_URL=https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com

.github/workflows/audit-schedule.yml

@@ -37,18 +37,7 @@ jobs:
         with:
           key: audit-schedule
 
-      - name: Install cargo-audit (floating; drift canary)
-        # Deliberately UNPINNED, unlike the blocking gate in pr-checks.yml. This
-        # job is cron-only (weekly); it is never pull_request- or push-triggered,
-        # so it NEVER gates a merge no matter what it does. Floating the scanner
-        # here is the drift canary: if a newer cargo-audit regresses, at worst
-        # this weekly run reds (the install step below is unguarded) or its
-        # visibility report changes, and that is exactly the signal that latest
-        # has moved and the pinned gate should not be bumped yet. The scan result
-        # itself never fails the run (the "Full audit report" step is `|| true`
-        # and the only other hard-fail is a Cargo.lock grep). The point is that
-        # drift surfaces here without ever blocking a PR. Do NOT pin to match
-        # pr-checks.yml.
+      - name: Install cargo-audit
         run: cargo install --locked cargo-audit
 
       # Full advisory report with NO suppressions. Run from a scratch dir that

.github/workflows/main-red-alert.yml

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-# Tracks main's CI state as a labeled issue: opens (or updates) a ci-main-red
-# issue when a push-to-main run of PR Checks ends red, and closes it when a
-# subsequent run on main's tip goes green.
-#
-# Why: two individually-green PRs can break main in combination when the
-# second merges on checks that ran against a stale base (semantic merge
-# race — #113 + #145 broke test compilation, found only via #229). A red main
-# is otherwise silent, and release-please PRs inherit the breakage.
-#
-# The alert reflects main's CURRENT STATE, not raw CI events: runs whose
-# commit is no longer main's tip are ignored (a re-run of an old red run
-# after a fix has landed must not cry wolf), and a green run on the tip
-# closes any open alert.
-name: Main red alert
-
-on:
-  workflow_run:
-    workflows: ["PR Checks"]
-    types: [completed]
-    branches: [main]
-
-permissions:
-  issues: write
-  contents: read # getBranch tip check
-
-# Serialize runs: concurrent completions would race the label/issue lookups
-# into duplicates (or 422 on createLabel). queue: max keeps every pending
-# completion instead of letting a later (possibly green-skipped) arrival
-# displace a pending red alert under burst merges; it is only incompatible
-# with cancel-in-progress: true, which we don't use.
-concurrency:
-  group: main-red-alert
-  cancel-in-progress: false
-  queue: max
-
-jobs:
-  track:
-    name: Track main CI state
-    # timed_out (the test job runs 45 min against Postgres) and
-    # startup_failure (malformed workflow) are red too — only cancelled is
-    # excluded as a deliberate human abort. success runs are needed to close
-    # the alert once main recovers.
-    if: >-
-      github.event.workflow_run.event == 'push' &&
-      contains(fromJSON('["failure", "timed_out", "startup_failure", "success"]'), github.event.workflow_run.conclusion)
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 5
-    steps:
-      - name: Reconcile the broken-main issue with main's current state
-        uses: actions/github-script@ed597411d8f924073f98dfc5c65a23a2325f34cd # v8.0.0
-        with:
-          script: |
-            const run = context.payload.workflow_run;
-            const label = 'ci-main-red';
-
-            // Freshness gate: only the run for main's current tip may open or
-            // close anything. Re-runs of superseded commits are events about
-            // the past, not statements about main's state.
-            const { data: branch } = await github.rest.repos.getBranch({
-              ...context.repo, branch: 'main',
-            });
-            if (branch.commit.sha !== run.head_sha) {
-              core.info(`run ${run.id} is for ${run.head_sha}, main is at ${branch.commit.sha} — ignoring stale run`);
-              return;
-            }
-
-            // listForRepo returns PRs carrying the label too — those must
-            // never be mistaken for the tracking issue.
-            const open = (await github.rest.issues.listForRepo({
-              ...context.repo, state: 'open', labels: label, per_page: 100,
-            })).data.filter(item => !item.pull_request);
-
-            if (run.conclusion === 'success') {
-              const body = `Recovered: [PR Checks](${run.html_url}) is green on main at \`${run.head_sha}\`.`;
-              for (const issue of open) {
-                await github.rest.issues.createComment({
-                  ...context.repo, issue_number: issue.number, body,
-                });
-                await github.rest.issues.update({
-                  ...context.repo, issue_number: issue.number, state: 'closed', state_reason: 'completed',
-                });
-              }
-              return;
-            }
-
-            const headline = run.head_commit?.message?.split('\n')[0] ?? '';
-            const body = [
-              `[PR Checks run](${run.html_url}) concluded \`${run.conclusion}\` on main at \`${run.head_sha}\`.`,
-              '',
-              `> ${headline}`,
-              '',
-              'Likely a semantic merge race: each merged PR was green on a stale base.',
-              'Fix main before merging anything else — release-please PRs inherit this breakage.',
-              '',
-              "This issue closes automatically when a run on main's tip goes green.",
-            ].join('\n');
-
-            try {
-              await github.rest.issues.getLabel({ ...context.repo, name: label });
-            } catch (e) {
-              if (e.status !== 404) throw e;
-              await github.rest.issues.createLabel({
-                ...context.repo,
-                name: label,
-                color: 'b60205',
-                description: 'CI is failing on main',
-              });
-            }
-
-            if (open.length > 0) {
-              await github.rest.issues.createComment({
-                ...context.repo, issue_number: open[0].number, body,
-              });
-            } else {
-              await github.rest.issues.create({
-                ...context.repo,
-                title: 'CI is red on main',
-                body,
-                labels: [label],
-              });
-            }

.github/workflows/pr-checks.yml

@@ -2,17 +2,6 @@ name: PR Checks
 
 on:
   pull_request:
-  # Run in the merge queue so a PR is re-validated against the true merged
-  # result before it lands. Guards against semantic merge races where two
-  # individually-green PRs break main in combination (#113 + #145 → #229).
-  merge_group:
-  # Release-branch heads are created and pushed by GITHUB_TOKEN (release-please
-  # and the lock-sync job), and GitHub's recursion guard means those pushes
-  # trigger no workflow runs. workflow_dispatch is the documented carve-out that
-  # GITHUB_TOKEN CAN trigger, so the release flow dispatches this workflow at
-  # the release branch to attach check runs to its head. Read-only workflow
-  # (contents: read), so the dispatch surface adds no privilege.
-  workflow_dispatch:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
@@ -53,20 +42,7 @@ jobs:
         run: cargo fmt --all -- --check
 
       - name: cargo clippy
-        run: cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
-
-  release-tag-validation:
-    name: release tag validation
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 5
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Test release tag resolver
-        run: scripts/test-resolve-release-tag.sh
+        run: cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
 
   test:
     name: test (${{ matrix.toolchain }})
@@ -78,23 +54,6 @@ jobs:
         toolchain: [stable, beta]
     # Beta is informational: an upstream beta regression should warn, not block merges.
     continue-on-error: ${{ matrix.toolchain == 'beta' }}
-    # Postgres for the DB-backed integration tests (#[sqlx::test] provisions an
-    # isolated database per test off this connection). The health-check gate keeps
-    # `cargo test` from racing a not-yet-ready server.
-    services:
-      postgres:
-        image: postgres:16
-        env:
-          POSTGRES_USER: postgres
-          POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres
-          POSTGRES_DB: gitlawb_test
-        ports:
-          - 5432:5432
-        options: >-
-          --health-cmd pg_isready
-          --health-interval 10s
-          --health-timeout 5s
-          --health-retries 5
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
@@ -112,9 +71,7 @@ jobs:
           key: ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
 
       - name: cargo test
-        env:
-          DATABASE_URL: postgres://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/gitlawb_test
-        run: cargo test --locked --workspace
+        run: cargo test --workspace
 
   build-release:
     name: build --release
@@ -137,7 +94,7 @@ jobs:
           key: release
 
       - name: cargo build --release
-        run: cargo build --locked --release --workspace
+        run: cargo build --release --workspace
 
   audit:
     name: cargo audit
@@ -157,30 +114,10 @@ jobs:
       - name: Cache cargo
         uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
         with:
-          key: audit-0.22.2
+          key: audit
 
-      - name: Install cargo-audit (pinned)
-        # Pin the scanner on this BLOCKING gate: an unpinned `cargo install`
-        # floats to the latest release, so a regressed cargo-audit could red CI
-        # repo-wide with no code change. Advisory-DB freshness is fetched at scan
-        # time, independent of the binary, so this does not weaken what the gate
-        # catches. The weekly Scheduled Audit (audit-schedule.yml) deliberately
-        # floats to latest as the drift canary; when it shows a newer cargo-audit
-        # behaving differently, bump this version (and the cache key above) as a
-        # deliberate maintainer action. If 0.22.2 is ever yanked from crates.io
-        # this step fails loud until the pin is bumped.
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          cargo install --locked --version 0.22.2 cargo-audit
-          # Assert the pin took effect so an accidental future unpin (or a drift
-          # off 0.22.2) fails loudly here instead of silently running a different
-          # scanner. `cargo audit --version` prints "cargo-audit-audit 0.22.2".
-          installed="$(cargo audit --version)"
-          echo "cargo-audit installed: $installed"
-          echo "$installed" | grep -qE '(^| )0\.22\.2($| )' || {
-            echo "::error::cargo-audit is not the pinned 0.22.2 (got: $installed)"
-            exit 1
-          }
+      - name: Install cargo-audit
+        run: cargo install --locked cargo-audit
 
       # Hard-fail gate. Suppressions live in .cargo/audit.toml (read automatically
       # from the repo root), each with no available upstream fix. A green check
@@ -219,7 +156,7 @@ jobs:
           key: msrv
 
       - name: cargo check on MSRV
-        run: cargo check --locked --workspace --all-targets
+        run: cargo check --workspace --all-targets
 
   docker-build:
     name: Docker build smoke test
@@ -236,95 +173,3 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Smoke test --version
         run: docker run --rm gitlawb-node:ci-test --version
-
-  test-windows:
-    name: test (windows, non-blocking)
-    runs-on: windows-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 45
-    # Non-blocking, mirroring the informational `beta` lane above. We ship `gl`
-    # and `git-remote-gitlawb` to Windows users (release.yml) with zero Windows
-    # test coverage, so run their suites here to make Windows-only regressions
-    # VISIBLE on the PR without gating merge (#228). These two are the client
-    # CLIs and depend on no database, so no Postgres service is needed (service
-    # containers do not run on windows-latest regardless). `git` is preinstalled
-    # on windows-latest, which the real_git_fetch harness relies on.
-    continue-on-error: true
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: stable
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: windows
-
-      - name: cargo test (shipped Windows crates)
-        run: cargo test --locked -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
-
-  # gitlawb-core is embedded by every consumer (gl, git-remote-gitlawb, the node
-  # daemon), so it must stay lean. This gate fails if gitlawb-core's normal
-  # (non-dev, non-build) dependency tree gains any crate not on the allowlist in
-  # ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt. Exhaustive-by-construction: a new heavy
-  # dependency reds CI whether or not anyone thought to ban it, which a denylist
-  # cannot do. Regen instructions live in the allowlist header.
-  core-deps-purity:
-    name: gitlawb-core dependency purity
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 15
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: stable
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: core-deps-purity
-
-      - name: Check gitlawb-core dependency allowlist
-        run: bash scripts/check-gitlawb-core-deps.sh
-
-  # release-please only rewrites a crate's version when the line carries the
-  # `# x-release-please-version` annotation AND the manifest is listed under
-  # extra-files in release-please-config.json. Miss either half and the crate
-  # is skipped silently at release time, freezing at its creation version:
-  # icaptcha-client was added as a workspace member after the config was last
-  # written and sat at 0.4.0 through four releases before anyone noticed.
-  # Exhaustive-by-construction, like the allowlist gate above: the required set
-  # is derived from `cargo metadata`, so a newly added crate reds CI whether or
-  # not its author knew this gate existed.
-  release-versioning:
-    name: release versioning coverage
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 15
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: stable
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: release-versioning
-
-      - name: Check every workspace crate is release-managed
-        run: bash scripts/check-release-versioning.sh

.github/workflows/pr-triage.yml

@@ -1,11 +1,7 @@
 name: PR Triage
 
-# Runs on pull_request_target, not pull_request: fork PRs get a read-only
-# GITHUB_TOKEN under pull_request regardless of the permissions below, so the
-# label/comment writes 403. This job never checks out or runs PR head code (it
-# only reads context.payload and the files API), so pull_request_target is safe.
 on:
-  pull_request_target:
+  pull_request:
     types: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened]
 
 permissions:
@@ -24,7 +20,7 @@ jobs:
     timeout-minutes: 10
     steps:
       - name: Label and guide
-        uses: actions/github-script@ed597411d8f924073f98dfc5c65a23a2325f34cd # v8.0.0
+        uses: actions/github-script@f28e40c7f34bde8b3046d885e986cb6290c5673b # v7
         with:
           script: |
             const pr = context.payload.pull_request;
@@ -68,17 +64,11 @@ jobs:
             if (isFork && touchesWorkflows) want.add("workflow-change");
 
             const changedRust = names.some(n => n.startsWith("crates/") && n.endsWith(".rs"));
-            // A test can live in a tests/ dir, a *_test.rs file, or (the common Rust
-            // pattern) an inline #[test] / #[cfg(test)] block added inside the source file.
-            // Async tests use a namespaced attribute (#[tokio::test], #[async_std::test],
-            // possibly with args like #[tokio::test(flavor = ...)]) rather than the bare
-            // #[test]. Match only on added lines, with the attribute at the start of the
-            // line after horizontal whitespace, covering bare, cfg(test), namespaced,
-            // optional leading ::, and raw-identifier (r#test) forms. No head-file fetch
-            // or lexer: needs-tests is advisory, not a merge gate.
+            // A test can live in a tests/ dir, a *_test.rs file, or — the common Rust
+            // pattern — an inline #[test] / #[cfg(test)] block added inside the source file.
             const addsInlineTest = files.some(f =>
               f.filename.endsWith(".rs") && f.patch &&
-              /^\+[ \t]*#\[[ \t]*(?:cfg[ \t]*\([ \t]*test[ \t]*\)|(?:::[ \t]*)?(?:[\w-]+[ \t]*::[ \t]*)*(?:r#)?test\b)/m.test(f.patch));
+              /^\+.*#\[(test\]|cfg\(test\))/m.test(f.patch));
             const touchedTests =
               names.some(n => n.includes("/tests/") || n.endsWith("_test.rs")) || addsInlineTest;
             if (changedRust && !touchedTests) want.add("needs-tests");
@@ -114,7 +104,7 @@ jobs:
 
             const reasons = {
               "needs-issue": "Link the issue this addresses (`Closes #123`). For protocol changes, open an issue first.",
-              "needs-description": "Add a short summary of what changes and why: the template's Summary and Motivation sections.",
+              "needs-description": "Add a short summary of what changes and why — the template's Summary and Motivation sections.",
               "needs-tests": "This changes Rust source but no tests changed. Tests are required for fixes and strongly encouraged for features.",
             };
             const lines = advisory.map(l => `- ${reasons[l]}`).join("\n");

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -4,34 +4,14 @@ on:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
-  # Manual backfill: republish an already-cut release to a channel that
-  # missed it. Fill in only the channel(s) you want — an empty input leaves
-  # that channel's jobs skipped. npm reuses the existing release's binary
-  # assets; docker rebuilds the image from the tag and re-tags the manifest.
-  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      npm_backfill_tag:
-        description: "Existing release tag to publish to npm (e.g. v0.6.0)"
-        required: false
-        type: string
-      docker_backfill_tag:
-        description: "Existing release tag to publish to ghcr (e.g. v0.6.0)"
-        required: false
-        type: string
 
 concurrency:
   group: release-${{ github.ref }}
   cancel-in-progress: false
 
-# Least privilege by default; every job opts in to exactly what it needs.
-permissions: {}
-
 jobs:
   release-please:
-    # Skipped on manual dispatch: a backfill must never create or advance a
-    # release PR as a side effect (npm-publish tolerates the skipped need via
-    # !cancelled(), and every other job gates on release_created == 'true').
-    if: ${{ github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' && github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' }}
+    if: ${{ github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' }}
     name: Release Please
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     permissions:
@@ -41,204 +21,29 @@ jobs:
       release_created: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
       tag_name: ${{ steps.release.outputs.tag_name }}
       version: ${{ steps.release.outputs.version }}
-      pr: ${{ steps.release.outputs.pr }}
     steps:
       - name: Run release-please
         id: release
-        uses: googleapis/release-please-action@45996ed1f6d02564a971a2fa1b5860e934307cf7 # v5.0.0
+        uses: googleapis/release-please-action@16a9c90856f42705d54a6fda1823352bdc62cf38 # v4.3.0
         with:
           token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
 
-  # The release PR bumps the workspace crate versions in the Cargo.tomls but
-  # release-please cannot update Cargo.lock, so without this job every release
-  # merge ships a tag whose lockfile disagrees with its manifests (a --locked
-  # build from the tag fails, and pr-checks builds --locked). Sync the lock on
-  # the release branch so the tagged tree is internally consistent.
-  #
-  # Runs on every push-triggered release run, not only when release-please
-  # reports the PR: the `pr` output is set only on runs that CREATE or UPDATE
-  # the release PR, so gating on it would leave an already-open release PR
-  # (opened before this job existed, or untouched by a non-releasable push)
-  # permanently without the sync and without check runs. The resolve step
-  # discovers any open release-please PR itself and no-ops when there is none.
-  sync-release-lock:
-    name: Sync Cargo.lock on the release PR
-    needs: release-please
-    if: ${{ !cancelled() && github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' && github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: write
-      pull-requests: read
-      # actions: write lets the final step dispatch pr-checks on the release
-      # branch. Note this grant is repo-wide dispatch rights (GitHub cannot
-      # scope it to one workflow); acceptable here because reaching this job's
-      # steps already requires write to main. Needed because every push to the
-      # release branch (release-please's and the lock sync below) is made with
-      # GITHUB_TOKEN, which triggers no workflow runs, so without an explicit
-      # dispatch the release PR's head carries no check runs and the --locked
-      # gate never validates it.
-      actions: write
-    steps:
-      # Prefer the fresh `pr` output when this run just created/updated the
-      # release PR; otherwise fall back to querying for an open release-please
-      # branch (prefix match: the branch carries `--components--` suffixes).
-      - name: Resolve the open release PR branch
-        id: resolve
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
-          OWNER: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
-          BRANCH_FROM_OUTPUT: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.pr && fromJSON(needs.release-please.outputs.pr).headBranchName || '' }}
-        run: |
-          branch="$BRANCH_FROM_OUTPUT"
-          if [ -z "$branch" ]; then
-            # The branch name alone is not a trust signal. `gh pr list` includes
-            # fork PRs, and a fork's headRefName is bare (no owner prefix), so a
-            # prefix match by itself lets any fork nominate the branch this job
-            # checks out, commits to, and dispatches checks on. Require the head
-            # repo to be THIS repository and the author to be the release-please
-            # app, so neither a fork nor a same-repo human branch named
-            # `release-please--*` can be selected. Then take the highest PR
-            # number: `[0]` depended on gh's default ordering, which is not a
-            # documented guarantee, and picking a stable one keeps a second
-            # (component) release PR from making the choice flap between runs.
-            branch=$(gh pr list --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --state open \
-              --json headRefName,headRepositoryOwner,number,author \
-              --jq '[ .[]
-                      | select(.headRepositoryOwner.login == env.OWNER)
-                      | select(.author.login == "app/github-actions")
-                      | select(.headRefName | startswith("release-please--"))
-                    ] | max_by(.number).headRefName // empty')
-          fi
-          if [ -z "$branch" ]; then
-            echo "no open release PR; nothing to sync"
-          fi
-          echo "branch=$branch" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-
-      - name: Checkout release branch
-        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          ref: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch }}
-
-      # Resolve on a declared toolchain instead of whatever Rust the runner
-      # image happens to ship, so the lock this job writes comes off the same
-      # stable channel the other cargo jobs use. Not a claim of identical
-      # resolution: `stable` still moves between runs, and the MSRV gate
-      # checks this same lock on 1.91 (pr-checks.yml). It only removes the
-      # runner image as an undeclared input.
-      - name: Install Rust toolchain
-        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: stable
-
-      - name: Sync workspace crate versions into Cargo.lock
-        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
-        run: cargo update --workspace
-
-      - name: Commit and push when the lock changed
-        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
-        run: |
-          if git diff --quiet Cargo.lock; then
-            echo "Cargo.lock already in sync"
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
-          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
-          git add Cargo.lock
-          git commit -m "chore: sync Cargo.lock with the release version bump"
-          git push
-
-      # Every push to the release branch is made with GITHUB_TOKEN (release-
-      # please's own pushes and the lock sync above), and events created by
-      # GITHUB_TOKEN start no workflow runs. workflow_dispatch is the documented
-      # exception GITHUB_TOKEN may trigger, so dispatch pr-checks at the release
-      # branch to attach check runs to its current head. Unconditional (also on
-      # the already-in-sync path) because the branch's ORIGINAL head has the
-      # same no-runs problem. Loud on failure by design: a silent fallback
-      # would recreate the checkless-head problem, and a job rerun is safe
-      # (sync no-ops, dispatch retries). Loop-safe: pr-checks is read-only and
-      # dispatches nothing. Runs after the push ack, so the dispatched ref tip
-      # is the sync commit. Merge-queue note: this validates the branch tip;
-      # the enforced merge queue's merge_group run still re-validates the true
-      # merged result before landing.
-      - name: Dispatch PR checks on the release branch
-        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
-          BRANCH: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch }}
-        run: |
-          # Every dispatch failure fails the job, including the 422 a release
-          # branch cut before pr-checks gained its workflow_dispatch trigger
-          # returns ("does not have a workflow_dispatch trigger", reported
-          # against the dispatched ref's copy of the file). An earlier revision
-          # tolerated exactly that 422 on the theory that release-please would
-          # rewrite the branch and heal it, but a rewrite only happens when a
-          # later releasable commit lands: an open release PR nobody touches is
-          # never rewritten. Tolerating it therefore left the lock-sync commit
-          # this job had just pushed sitting on the release head with no
-          # --locked validation, which is the precise state this workflow exists
-          # to prevent. The tolerance is also no longer needed: once this lands,
-          # every release branch is cut from a main that already carries the
-          # trigger, so the only branch that could 422 is one open at merge time
-          # (there is none), and a job rerun after a manual rebase is safe (the
-          # sync no-ops, the dispatch retries).
-          gh api "repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/workflows/pr-checks.yml/dispatches" \
-            -f "ref=$BRANCH"
-
-  # Each architecture builds NATIVELY (amd64 on ubuntu-latest, arm64 on
-  # ubuntu-24.04-arm) and pushes by digest; docker-manifest below stitches the
-  # digests into the tagged multi-arch image. No QEMU: emulating the arm64
-  # Rust release build wedged the v0.6.0 run for 3+ hours and, via the
-  # workflow concurrency group, blocked every queued release run behind it.
   docker:
-    name: Build & Push Docker Image (${{ matrix.arch }})
+    name: Build & Push Docker Image
     needs: release-please
-    # Runs on a fresh release, or on manual dispatch for an existing tag
-    # (release-please is skipped on dispatch, hence !cancelled()).
-    if: >-
-      ${{ !cancelled() && (
-        needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' ||
-        (github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.docker_backfill_tag != '')
-      ) }}
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix:
-        include:
-          - arch: amd64
-            os: ubuntu-latest
-            platform: linux/amd64
-          - arch: arm64
-            os: ubuntu-24.04-arm
-            platform: linux/arm64
-    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
+    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     permissions:
       contents: read
       packages: write
     steps:
-      - name: Check out workflow scripts
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Resolve release tag
-        id: rel
-        env:
-          DISPATCH_TAG: ${{ inputs.docker_backfill_tag }}
-          RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          scripts/resolve-release-tag.sh "${DISPATCH_TAG:-$RELEASE_TAG}"
-          # ghcr requires a lowercase repository path, and unlike metadata-action,
-          # buildx's `--output name=` does no lowercasing — a mixed-case owner
-          # makes the digest push fail with "invalid reference format".
-          echo "image=ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-
       - name: Checkout release tag
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
-          ref: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
-          persist-credentials: false
+          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+
+      - name: Set up QEMU
+        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@29109295f81e9208d7d86ff1c6c12d2833863392 # v3.6.0
 
       - name: Set up Docker Buildx
         uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@b5ca514318bd6ebac0fb2aedd5d36ec1b5c232a2 # v3.10.0
@@ -250,130 +55,45 @@ jobs:
           username: ${{ github.actor }}
           password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
 
+      - name: Extract metadata
+        id: meta
+        uses: docker/metadata-action@902fa8ec7d6ecbf8d84d538b9b233a880e428804 # v5.7.0
+        with:
+          images: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}
+          tags: |
+            type=semver,pattern={{version}},value=${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+            type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}},value=${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+            type=raw,value=latest
+
       - name: Build and load locally (smoke)
         uses: docker/build-push-action@14487ce63c7a62a4a324b0bfb37086795e31c6c1 # v6.16.0
         with:
           context: .
-          platforms: ${{ matrix.platform }}
           load: true
           tags: gitlawb-node:smoke
-          cache-from: type=gha,scope=docker-${{ matrix.arch }}
+          cache-from: type=gha
 
-      # Native runner on both arches, so the built image can always execute.
-      # Assert the released version so a stale artifact fails here, not in prod.
       - name: Smoke test
-        env:
-          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          out="$(docker run --rm gitlawb-node:smoke --version)"
-          echo "$out"
-          grep -qF "$VERSION" <<<"$out" || {
-            echo "::error::image --version did not report expected version $VERSION (got: $out)"
-            exit 1
-          }
+        run: docker run --rm gitlawb-node:smoke --version
 
-      # Push by digest only — tags are applied once by docker-manifest so a
-      # half-finished matrix can never publish a partially-tagged image.
-      # provenance:false keeps each push a plain single-arch manifest, which is
-      # what imagetools create expects to merge.
-      - name: Build and push by digest
-        id: push
+      - name: Build and push (multi-arch)
         uses: docker/build-push-action@14487ce63c7a62a4a324b0bfb37086795e31c6c1 # v6.16.0
         with:
           context: .
-          platforms: ${{ matrix.platform }}
-          provenance: false
-          outputs: type=image,name=${{ steps.rel.outputs.image }},push-by-digest=true,name-canonical=true,push=true
-          cache-from: type=gha,scope=docker-${{ matrix.arch }}
-          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max,scope=docker-${{ matrix.arch }}
-
-      - name: Export digest
-        env:
-          DIGEST: ${{ steps.push.outputs.digest }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          mkdir -p /tmp/digests
-          touch "/tmp/digests/${DIGEST#sha256:}"
-
-      - name: Upload digest
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
-        with:
-          name: docker-digest-${{ matrix.arch }}
-          path: /tmp/digests/*
-          if-no-files-found: error
-          retention-days: 1
-
-  docker-manifest:
-    name: Publish Docker manifest
-    needs: [release-please, docker]
-    if: ${{ !cancelled() && needs.docker.result == 'success' }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read
-      packages: write
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out workflow scripts
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Resolve release tag
-        id: rel
-        env:
-          DISPATCH_TAG: ${{ inputs.docker_backfill_tag }}
-          RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          scripts/resolve-release-tag.sh "${DISPATCH_TAG:-$RELEASE_TAG}"
-
-      - name: Download digests
-        uses: actions/download-artifact@d3f86a106a0bac45b974a628896c90dbdf5c8093 # v4.3.0
-        with:
-          pattern: docker-digest-*
-          path: /tmp/digests
-          merge-multiple: true
-
-      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
-        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@b5ca514318bd6ebac0fb2aedd5d36ec1b5c232a2 # v3.10.0
-
-      - name: Log in to GitHub Container Registry
-        uses: docker/login-action@74a5d142397b4f367a81961eba4e8cd7edddf772 # v3.4.0
-        with:
-          registry: ghcr.io
-          username: ${{ github.actor }}
-          password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-
-      - name: Create and push multi-arch manifest
-        env:
-          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          # ghcr requires a lowercase repository path.
-          IMAGE="ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}"
-          MAJOR_MINOR="${VERSION%.*}"
-          digests=""
-          for f in /tmp/digests/*; do
-            digests="$digests $IMAGE@sha256:$(basename "$f")"
-          done
-          # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-          docker buildx imagetools create \
-            -t "$IMAGE:$VERSION" \
-            -t "$IMAGE:$MAJOR_MINOR" \
-            -t "$IMAGE:latest" \
-            $digests
-          docker buildx imagetools inspect "$IMAGE:$VERSION"
+          platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64
+          push: true
+          tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
+          labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
+          cache-from: type=gha
+          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
 
       - name: Release summary
-        env:
-          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
         run: |
           {
-            echo "## Released $TAG"
+            echo "## Released ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}"
             echo
-            echo "- Image: \`ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}:$VERSION\` (linux/amd64 + linux/arm64)"
-            echo "- GitHub: https://github.com/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/releases/tag/$TAG"
+            echo "- Image: \`ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}\`"
+            echo "- GitHub: https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/releases/tag/${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}"
           } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
 
   release-binaries:
@@ -381,9 +101,6 @@ jobs:
     needs: release-please
     if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
     runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
-    # Windows is best-effort: a failure there must not fail the job or block the
-    # downstream npm/Homebrew jobs that only consume the unix artifacts.
-    continue-on-error: ${{ startsWith(matrix.target, 'x86_64-pc-windows') }}
     permissions:
       contents: write
     strategy:
@@ -392,24 +109,17 @@ jobs:
         include:
           - target: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
             os: ubuntu-latest
-          # Native arm64 runner: cross-compiling this target with the glibc
-          # toolchain broke aws-lc-sys, and native lets the smoke test run.
           - target: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
-            os: ubuntu-24.04-arm
-          # macos-13 (the last plain Intel image) is retired and queues forever;
-          # macos-15-intel is GitHub's supported Intel label.
+            os: ubuntu-latest
           - target: x86_64-apple-darwin
-            os: macos-15-intel
+            os: macos-13
           - target: aarch64-apple-darwin
             os: macos-14
-          - target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
-            os: windows-latest
     steps:
       - name: Checkout release tag
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
           ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-          persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Set up Rust toolchain
         uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
@@ -417,50 +127,38 @@ jobs:
           toolchain: stable
           targets: ${{ matrix.target }}
 
-      # Both musl targets build natively on a matching-arch runner, so the stock
-      # musl-gcc wrapper is all that's needed (no cross toolchain).
       - name: Install musl tools (linux)
         if: contains(matrix.target, 'linux-musl')
         run: |
           sudo apt-get update
           sudo apt-get install -y musl-tools
+          if [ "${{ matrix.target }}" = "aarch64-unknown-linux-musl" ]; then
+            sudo apt-get install -y gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu
+            echo "CARGO_TARGET_AARCH64_UNKNOWN_LINUX_MUSL_LINKER=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+            echo "CC_aarch64_unknown_linux_musl=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+          fi
 
       - name: Cache cargo
         uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
         with:
           key: ${{ matrix.target }}
 
-      # The gitlawb-node daemon is a Linux/macOS service; on Windows we ship only
-      # the two CLI binaries. A Windows-only failure must not block the release.
-      - name: Determine binaries
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          BINS="gl git-remote-gitlawb gitlawb-node"
-          case "${{ matrix.target }}" in *windows*) BINS="gl git-remote-gitlawb" ;; esac
-          echo "BINS=$BINS" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-
       - name: Build
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          args=""
-          for b in $BINS; do args="$args -p $b"; done
-          cargo build --release --locked --target ${{ matrix.target }} $args
+        run: cargo build --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb -p gitlawb-node
 
       # Run each packaged binary's --version so a broken release artifact fails the
-      # build instead of shipping. Every target builds on a matching-arch runner,
-      # so all of them can execute here.
+      # build instead of shipping. Skipped for cross-compiled targets that can't run
+      # on the host runner (aarch64 linux on an x86_64 runner).
       - name: Smoke test binaries
+        if: ${{ matrix.target != 'aarch64-unknown-linux-musl' }}
         shell: bash
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           VERSION="${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}"
           BIN_DIR="target/${{ matrix.target }}/release"
-          EXE=""
-          case "${{ matrix.target }}" in *windows*) EXE=".exe" ;; esac
-          for bin in $BINS; do
+          for bin in gl git-remote-gitlawb gitlawb-node; do
             echo "== $bin --version =="
-            out="$("$BIN_DIR/$bin$EXE" --version)"
+            out="$("$BIN_DIR/$bin" --version)"
             echo "$out"
             # Each binary prints "<name> <version>"; assert the released version is present.
             grep -qF "$VERSION" <<<"$out" || {
@@ -470,400 +168,26 @@ jobs:
           done
 
       - name: Package
+        id: pkg
         shell: bash
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
-          TARGET="${{ matrix.target }}"
-          NAME="gitlawb-node-${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}-${TARGET}"
-          BIN_DIR="target/${TARGET}/release"
-          EXE=""
-          case "$TARGET" in *windows*) EXE=".exe" ;; esac
-
-          # Portable sha256 → "<hash>  <file>" so install scripts and brew can parse it.
-          sha256_file() {
-            local f="$1"
-            if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-              sha256sum "$f"
-            elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-              shasum -a 256 "$f"
-            else
-              local h
-              h=$(certutil -hashfile "$f" SHA256 | sed -n 2p | tr -d ' \r')
-              printf '%s  %s\n' "$h" "$f"
-            fi
-          }
-
+          NAME="gitlawb-node-${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}-${{ matrix.target }}"
           mkdir -p "dist/$NAME"
-          for bin in $BINS; do
-            cp "$BIN_DIR/$bin$EXE" "dist/$NAME/"
-          done
+          cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/gl" "dist/$NAME/"
+          cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/git-remote-gitlawb" "dist/$NAME/"
+          cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/gitlawb-node" "dist/$NAME/"
           cp README.md LICENSE-MIT LICENSE-APACHE "dist/$NAME/"
-
           cd dist
-          case "$TARGET" in
-            *windows*)
-              # 7z is preinstalled on windows-latest runners.
-              7z a -tzip "$NAME.zip" "$NAME" >/dev/null
-              sha256_file "$NAME.zip" > "$NAME.zip.sha256"
-              ;;
-            *)
-              tar czf "$NAME.tar.gz" "$NAME"
-              sha256_file "$NAME.tar.gz" > "$NAME.tar.gz.sha256"
-              ;;
-          esac
+          tar czf "$NAME.tar.gz" "$NAME"
+          shasum -a 256 "$NAME.tar.gz" > "$NAME.tar.gz.sha256"
+          echo "asset=dist/$NAME.tar.gz" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo "checksum=dist/$NAME.tar.gz.sha256" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
 
       - name: Attach to release
         uses: softprops/action-gh-release@72f2c25fcb47643c292f7107632f7a47c1df5cd8 # v2.3.2
         with:
           tag_name: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
           files: |
-            dist/*.tar.gz
-            dist/*.zip
-            dist/*.sha256
-
-  npm-publish:
-    name: Publish to npm
-    needs: [release-please, release-binaries]
-    # Runs on a fresh release, or on manual dispatch for an existing tag
-    # (release-binaries is skipped on dispatch, hence !cancelled()). Publishing
-    # auth is npm Trusted Publishing (GitHub OIDC) — no NPM_TOKEN. Each
-    # @gitlawb package must have this repo + workflow (release.yml) configured
-    # as its trusted publisher on npmjs.com, or publish fails loudly here —
-    # deliberately loud: the silent secret-guard skip is how 0.4.x–0.6.0
-    # never reached npm.
-    if: >-
-      ${{ !cancelled() && (
-        (needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' && needs.release-binaries.result == 'success') ||
-        (github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.npm_backfill_tag != '')
-      ) }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read
-      id-token: write # npm trusted publishing (OIDC) + provenance
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out workflow scripts
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Resolve release tag
-        id: rel
-        env:
-          DISPATCH_TAG: ${{ inputs.npm_backfill_tag }}
-          RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          scripts/resolve-release-tag.sh "${DISPATCH_TAG:-$RELEASE_TAG}"
-
-      - name: Checkout release tag
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          ref: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      # npm >= 11.5.1 performs the OIDC token exchange automatically when the
-      # package has a trusted publisher configured; older npm silently falls
-      # back to (absent) token auth and fails confusingly.
-      - name: Set up Node 24 + OIDC-capable npm
-        uses: actions/setup-node@a0853c24544627f65ddf259abe73b1d18a591444 # v5.0.0
-        with:
-          node-version: "24"
-      - name: Ensure npm supports trusted publishing
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          npm install -g npm@^11.5.1
-          npm --version
-
-      - name: Lay in release binaries
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          # npm platform package -> Rust target triple (unix only; Windows is not
-          # published to npm).
-          MAP="
-          gl-darwin-arm64:aarch64-apple-darwin
-          gl-darwin-x64:x86_64-apple-darwin
-          gl-linux-arm64:aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
-          gl-linux-x64:x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
-          "
-          mkdir -p _dl
-          for entry in $MAP; do
-            pkg="${entry%%:*}"
-            target="${entry#*:}"
-            archive="gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-${target}.tar.gz"
-            echo "==> $pkg <- $archive"
-            gh release download "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
-              --pattern "$archive" --dir _dl --clobber
-            tar -xzf "_dl/$archive" -C _dl
-            src="_dl/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-${target}"
-            cp "$src/gl" "npm/packages/$pkg/gl"
-            cp "$src/git-remote-gitlawb" "npm/packages/$pkg/git-remote-gitlawb"
-            chmod +x "npm/packages/$pkg/gl" "npm/packages/$pkg/git-remote-gitlawb"
-          done
-
-      - name: Set versions
-        env:
-          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          node -e '
-            const fs = require("fs");
-            const v = process.env.VERSION;
-            for (const p of fs.readdirSync("npm/packages")) {
-              const f = `npm/packages/${p}/package.json`;
-              const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(f, "utf8"));
-              pkg.version = v;
-              if (pkg.optionalDependencies) {
-                for (const k of Object.keys(pkg.optionalDependencies)) {
-                  pkg.optionalDependencies[k] = v;
-                }
-              }
-              fs.writeFileSync(f, JSON.stringify(pkg, null, 2) + "\n");
-            }
-          '
-
-      - name: Publish
-        env:
-          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          # No token: npm exchanges this job's GitHub OIDC identity with the
-          # registry (trusted publishing); provenance is attested automatically.
-          # Platform packages first, then the wrapper (so its optionalDependencies resolve).
-          # Skip versions already on the registry so a rerun after a partial publish
-          # is idempotent instead of erroring on the first existing package.
-          for pkg in gl-darwin-arm64 gl-darwin-x64 gl-linux-arm64 gl-linux-x64 gl; do
-            name="@gitlawb/$pkg"
-            if npm view "$name@$VERSION" version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-              echo "==> $name@$VERSION already published, skipping"
-              continue
-            fi
-            echo "==> npm publish $name@$VERSION"
-            npm publish "npm/packages/$pkg" --provenance --access public
-          done
-
-  homebrew-bump:
-    name: Bump Homebrew tap
-    needs: [release-please, release-binaries]
-    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read # GITHUB_TOKEN downloads release assets; the tap push uses HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT
-    steps:
-      - name: Guard on secret
-        id: guard
-        env:
-          HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
-        run: |
-          if [ -z "${HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT:-}" ]; then
-            echo "::warning::HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT is not set — skipping Homebrew bump."
-            echo "enabled=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
-      - name: Checkout tap repo
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          repository: Gitlawb/homebrew-tap
-          token: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
-          path: tap
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Regenerate formula
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          base="https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${TAG}"
-          mkdir -p _sums
-          gh release download "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
-            --pattern '*.tar.gz.sha256' --dir _sums --clobber
-          sha() { awk '{print $1}' "_sums/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-$1.tar.gz.sha256"; }
-          SHA_MAC_ARM="$(sha aarch64-apple-darwin)"
-          SHA_MAC_X64="$(sha x86_64-apple-darwin)"
-          SHA_LNX_ARM="$(sha aarch64-unknown-linux-musl)"
-          SHA_LNX_X64="$(sha x86_64-unknown-linux-musl)"
-
-          mkdir -p tap/Formula
-          cat > tap/Formula/gl.rb <<EOF
-          class Gl < Formula
-            desc "Gitlawb CLI — decentralized git for AI agents and developers"
-            homepage "https://gitlawb.com"
-            version "${VERSION}"
-            license "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-
-            on_macos do
-              on_arm do
-                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz"
-                sha256 "${SHA_MAC_ARM}"
-              end
-              on_intel do
-                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.gz"
-                sha256 "${SHA_MAC_X64}"
-              end
-            end
-
-            on_linux do
-              on_arm do
-                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-aarch64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz"
-                sha256 "${SHA_LNX_ARM}"
-              end
-              on_intel do
-                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz"
-                sha256 "${SHA_LNX_X64}"
-              end
-            end
-
-            def install
-              bin.install "gl"
-              bin.install "git-remote-gitlawb"
-            end
-
-            def caveats
-              <<~CAVEATS
-                oh-my-zsh's git plugin aliases gl='git pull', which shadows this
-                binary in interactive shells. If \`gl\` prints "fatal: not a git
-                repository", run:
-                  echo 'unalias gl 2>/dev/null' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc
-              CAVEATS
-            end
-
-            test do
-              assert_match version.to_s, shell_output("#{bin}/gl --version")
-            end
-          end
-          EOF
-
-      - name: Commit and push
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        working-directory: tap
-        env:
-          HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
-          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
-          # Stage first so a brand-new (untracked) formula is detected by the no-op check.
-          git add Formula/gl.rb
-          if git diff --cached --quiet; then
-            echo "Formula already up to date."
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          git commit -m "gl ${VERSION}"
-          # Credentials are not persisted in .git/config; supply the token only for the push.
-          git push "https://x-access-token:${HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT}@github.com/Gitlawb/homebrew-tap.git" HEAD:main
-
-  web-sync:
-    name: Sync web (install scripts + version)
-    needs: [release-please, release-binaries]
-    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read # GITHUB_TOKEN checks out node; the web PR uses WEB_SYNC_PAT
-    steps:
-      - name: Guard on secret
-        id: guard
-        env:
-          WEB_SYNC_PAT: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
-        run: |
-          if [ -z "${WEB_SYNC_PAT:-}" ]; then
-            echo "::warning::WEB_SYNC_PAT is not set — skipping web sync."
-            echo "enabled=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
-      - name: Checkout node (release tag)
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-          path: node
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Checkout web
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          repository: Gitlawb/web
-          token: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
-          path: web
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      # web-sync publishes install.ps1 + version.json, so the Windows ZIP must exist.
-      # Windows is best-effort for npm/Homebrew (continue-on-error), so verify the
-      # asset is present before advertising a release the site can't actually serve.
-      - name: Verify website release assets
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          gh release view "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --json assets \
-            --jq '.assets[].name' > /tmp/release-assets
-          for asset in \
-            "gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip" \
-            "gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip.sha256"; do
-            grep -Fxq "$asset" /tmp/release-assets || {
-              echo "::error::release asset missing: $asset (Windows build likely failed); not syncing web"
-              exit 1
-            }
-          done
-
-      - name: Sync and open PR
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          # Canonical install scripts (source of truth lives in the node repo).
-          cp node/install.sh web/public/install.sh
-          cp node/install.ps1 web/public/install.ps1
-          # Single version source the site can read.
-          printf '{\n  "version": "%s",\n  "tag": "%s"\n}\n' "$VERSION" "$TAG" > web/public/version.json
-          # One-time, idempotent drift fixes: drop orphaned binaries, fix stale link.
-          rm -rf web/public/bin
-          if [ -f web/public/skill.md ]; then
-            sed -i 's#github.com/gitlawb/releases#github.com/Gitlawb/node/releases#g' web/public/skill.md
-          fi
-
-          cd web
-          # Stage first so brand-new (untracked) files are caught by the no-op check.
-          git add -A
-          if git diff --cached --quiet; then
-            echo "web already up to date."
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          branch="release-sync/${TAG}"
-          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
-          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
-          git checkout -b "$branch"
-          git commit -m "chore: sync gitlawb ${TAG} (install scripts + version)"
-          # Credentials are not persisted in .git/config; supply the token only for the push.
-          git push --force "https://x-access-token:${GH_TOKEN}@github.com/Gitlawb/web.git" "HEAD:$branch"
-          gh pr create --repo Gitlawb/web --head "$branch" \
-            --title "Sync gitlawb ${TAG}" \
-            --body "Automated sync from Gitlawb/node ${TAG}: install.sh, install.ps1, public/version.json, and one-time drift fixes (removed orphaned public/bin, fixed skill.md releases link). Review and merge to deploy via Vercel." \
-            || {
-              # Only swallow the "PR already exists" case; surface auth/API failures
-              # (a failed gh pr list must not be misread as "PR exists").
-              pr_count="$(gh pr list --repo Gitlawb/web --head "$branch" --state open --json number --jq 'length')" || exit 1
-              if [ "$pr_count" != "0" ]; then
-                echo "PR for $branch already exists; branch was updated."
-              else
-                exit 1
-              fi
-            }
+            ${{ steps.pkg.outputs.asset }}
+            ${{ steps.pkg.outputs.checksum }}

.github/workflows/stale.yml

@@ -23,18 +23,17 @@ jobs:
           # Act on PRs only; never on issues.
           days-before-issue-stale: -1
           days-before-issue-close: -1
-          # Only PRs the triage step flagged as missing a real description.
-          # needs-issue is advisory-only (linking an issue is a SHOULD, and many
-          # legitimate small PRs have none) so it does not drive auto-close.
-          only-pr-labels: "needs-description"
+          # Only PRs the triage step flagged as needing an author response.
+          only-pr-labels: "needs-issue,needs-description"
           stale-pr-label: "stale"
           exempt-pr-labels: "workflow-change,security,pinned"
           remove-stale-when-updated: true
           stale-pr-message: >
-            This PR has been inactive for 14 days and is still missing a description.
-            It will be closed in 7 days if there's no update. Push a change or leave a
-            comment to keep it open. No hard feelings, you can reopen anytime.
+            This PR has been inactive for 14 days and is still missing a linked issue
+            or a description. It will be closed in 7 days if there's no update. Push a
+            change or leave a comment to keep it open — no hard feelings, you can reopen
+            anytime.
           close-pr-message: >
-            Closing due to inactivity. Reopen whenever you're ready to update it. See
+            Closing due to inactivity. Reopen whenever you're ready to update it — see
             CONTRIBUTING.md for what helps us review quickly.
           ascending: true

.gitignore

@@ -23,6 +23,3 @@ keys/
 # Logs
 *.log
 .openclaude-profile.json
-
-# Per-operator Fly config (node1 prod config is pulled from Fly, not tracked)
-infra/fly/node1.fly.toml

.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 {
-  ".": "0.7.1"
+  ".": "0.3.8"
 }

AGENTS.md

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-# Contributor guide for coding agents
-
-This file carries the rules a patch author cannot recover from the code alone, for humans and coding agents alike. For build, test, and PR basics, read `CONTRIBUTING.md` first.
-
-## Authorization invariants (the rules PRs most often break)
-
-Every repo-scoped endpoint must bind the caller to an authorization decision before serving or mutating anything. The `known_ungated` allowlist in `authz_guard::every_repo_scoped_handler_is_gated` is empty on main: `list_webhooks`, `list_replicas`, and `list_protected_branches` are gated (`list_webhooks` with read-visibility then owner; the other two with `authorize_repo_read`). Do not re-open those surfaces as exceptions.
-
-- Owner-only mutations (visibility, webhooks, protected branches, merges) are gated against the repo owner. Three gate forms are in use and all are recognized: webhooks and merges call `require_repo_owner` (`crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/mod.rs`), visibility uses its module-local `require_owner`, and protected branches compare inline with `did_matches`. Use the form the surrounding module already uses.
-- Not every write is owner-only, and that is by design: `star_repo`/`unstar_repo` bind to the signer (they still require repo read access), `register_replica`/`unregister_replica` bind to the replica's own DID, the bounty actions (claim, submit, approve, cancel, dispute) have their own multi-party rules, and closing a PR or issue is owner-or-author. Do not add owner gates to these.
-- Content-serving reads (blobs, trees, raw files) gate through `authorize_repo_read` with the specific path being served, so a withheld subtree is denied even on an otherwise-public repo; repo-level reads (listings) pass `"/"` by the helper's own contract. The source scans below cannot check this argument's value, so review will.
-- A route that reaches repo data through a global id, with no repo in its path, or through an extractor shape the scans do not recognize still needs the same gate; the scans cannot see those.
-- Read-surface denials must not reveal existence: a caller who may not read a repo (or a withheld subtree) gets the same 404 as a missing repo, never a 403. (Owner-gated mutations currently return 403 after the repo lookup; do not widen that shape to read paths.)
-- Two tests in module `authz_guard` (`crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/mod.rs`) scan handler sources and fail on a repo-scoped handler without a recognized gate: `every_in_scope_mutation_has_its_gate` and `every_repo_scoped_handler_is_gated`. If they fail on your handler, add the gate. The second test's `known_ungated` allowlist is empty; never add an entry to it without an open issue and review.
-
-## Adding or changing routes
-
-- A new gated handler needs tests proving its route-specific gate fires: exercise an unauthorized authenticated caller and an anonymous caller where applicable, assert the exact denial status each way, and assert the body leaks nothing. The non-owner tests in `crates/gitlawb-node/src/test_support.rs` show the shape for owner-gated routes.
-- A new mutation handler also gets a row in `every_in_scope_mutation_has_its_gate` naming its gate type; the per-handler row is the point of that test.
-- A table-driven deny suite covering every deny-bearing route is in review (#194, #195). If it is present in your checkout, add a probe row there for any new deny-bearing route.
-
-## Verifying signatures and certificates
-
-- Derive the verifying key from something outside the artifact you are checking: the node's own DID, a pinned or configured value, a peers lookup. A key read from a field of the object being verified (`Did::from_str(&cert.node_did)`) only proves the artifact is self-consistent, and identities here are permissionless, so anyone can mint a keypair, name it in the artifact, self-sign, and be told it is valid. A mismatch against that anchor has to fail the result, not log a warning.
-- A handler whose correct answer is "valid" needs a positive case driven by a trusted, independently anchored artifact, and a rejection case for a well-formed, fully populated forged artifact. Invalid-only suites miss an implementation that rejects everything; a forged artifact that still returns valid is the regression that matters.
-- The fields a signature covers are a versioned format. Adding one invalidates every artifact already signed, so give the payload a version, keep a path that verifies the older form, and add a test that verifies an artifact signed before your change.
-
-## Removing a serving path
-
-When a fix removes a path that used to serve content, the same PR must add a test asserting the removed path now denies. The deletion is what turns that test green; without it the path can quietly come back.
-
-## Database migrations
-
-Schema changes are code-defined in `MIGRATIONS` (`crates/gitlawb-node/src/db/mod.rs`). Always append a new versioned entry; never edit an entry that has merged (operators deploy from main). Test runs build the schema from scratch, so editing an applied version stays green in CI while breaking every existing deployment.
-
-## Client behavior (`gl`, `git-remote-gitlawb`)
-
-When a node denies a request, surface the denial to the user. Never render a denial as an empty list or a silent success; that turns an authorization boundary into invisible data loss.
-
-## Toolchain and CI reality
-
-- MSRV is Rust 1.91 (`rust-version` in the workspace `Cargo.toml`). The MSRV CI job runs `cargo check --workspace --all-targets` on exactly 1.91, so check that an API you rely on is stable there; the full test suite runs on stable.
-- The PR workflow runs these jobs on every PR: `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace` (against Postgres), a release build, `cargo audit`, the MSRV check, and a Docker build. The `main` branch ruleset currently requires one approving review but does not require these checks to pass before merge; a failing job should block review approval in practice, but nothing enforces that mechanically today.
-- Conventional commit titles (`feat:`, `fix:`, `docs:`, ...) are required by convention and drive releases, but no CI job checks them; a bad title fails review, not the pipeline.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
-# Changelog
-
-## [0.7.1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.7.0...v0.7.1) (2026-08-03)
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **ci:** make the docker dependency cache work and unbreak Dockerfile.bins ([99b2b9a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/99b2b9a16662761a3959a2941798e6823621bda5))
-* **ci:** make the docker dependency cache work and unbreak Dockerfile.bins ([a49e04d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/a49e04ddcd23f3b666421486ae60c3c4329e2242)), closes [#265](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/265) [#266](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/266)
-* **db:** pin profile DID matching with lone non-key fixture and boundary matrix ([b4016dc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b4016dce9d1fe450603173f9d92bd880127620fa)), closes [#298](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/298)
-* **node:** add a shared owner/name slug validator ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([51d82de](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/51d82ded57a776d9c7e2fe65895efdbf9e227dc8))
-* **node:** bound the slug owner by NAME_MAX, not the DID limit ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([27b0495](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/27b0495a6f7edeecddbe62b0f075a7e3b1ef5053))
-* **node:** fail a sync row terminally when a non-directory holds the owner path ([2e664b7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2e664b7885036ee72ce175af95bb567b18222583))
-* **node:** make a stalled sync queue visible, and fix two test claims ([9aa4c17](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/9aa4c17aefd1885d134b1334b54551366cdd8ef0))
-* **node:** move the attempted_at migration to v17, clear of two open branches ([fbc5868](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/fbc5868bd16946ea184dad26abcdb0e89d68e99a))
-* **node:** prove the mirror path is inside repos_dir before running git ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([3ca9473](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3ca94739ed7b90e4c265a0947025dc3b50e7583b))
-* **node:** reject a malformed slug at the notify boundary ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([c587a40](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c587a40a508acea9f74c3468d42ff037397c75d0))
-* **node:** reset a peer's reachability gate when an announce changes its http_url ([#270](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/270)) ([1964f88](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/1964f88378fe6942ffca5836de3a092b5b8f67b4))
-* **node:** reset a peer's reachability gate when an announce changes its http_url ([#270](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/270)) ([e2560ee](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e2560ee46c28e4e966d87867a86dc4bad4ca7a3a))
-* **node:** stamp every dequeued sync row so a stuck one yields the batch ([6e64d0d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6e64d0d0a7fdd38ef3a56820c1808dd7c9bbd658))
-* **node:** stop a peer-supplied repo slug from escaping repos_dir ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([c70b1df](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c70b1df42d5c3f70ec4c272886c85fcc16ed92d1))
-* **node:** validate the queued slug before the worker derives a path ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([9f00e24](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/9f00e24aec217e4b8256dd437cff4741b1478b96))
-* **review:** correct two comment claims and guard two more wrong shapes ([#270](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/270)) ([811ad50](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/811ad504bc268c8e9cddac93822adcd00bfe9ff8))
-* **review:** stop the dequeue overclaiming, and pin the starvation premise ([457be11](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/457be11d728a2a34775cf96be2bc5af9a58cb250))
-* strict DID matching in get_profile ([acb4714](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/acb47145beec8ce7b20b7a2479f7a55ed68e2a89))
-* strict DID matching in get_profile ([13b565b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/13b565bcac09f075a7fd555a6e9acdd27de6c7bb))
-* target stored did on profile update aliases ([9836c3a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/9836c3a21bc96a2ce95cb1fd12bd84b22142787d))
-
-## [0.7.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.6.0...v0.7.0) (2026-07-22)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* **gl:** actually verify certificate signatures in gl cert show ([b0a2ed8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b0a2ed830821b5a77b0dafdcf5ce4b1ad904ec25))
-* **gl:** doctor warns when a shell alias shadows the gl binary ([0765c42](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/0765c42feff47b29054b9a277881a7cd5bfd9135))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **gl:** address review findings — non-fatal DID check, exact-host loopback, detached HEAD, multi-URL remotes, command-aware unalias ([3fa38dc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3fa38dce4e435ef017f607d355266c2892161f8d))
-* **gl:** anchor cert --verify to a trusted issuer; pin canonical payload form ([c681af7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c681af70dba3a76b11795d324f2ca0fecf7e42fd))
-* **gl:** detect gitlawb remotes beyond origin in gl status ([2d88937](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2d88937fbabf21013f28debb4d4f93270a4bb8cd))
-* **gl:** doctor treats a reachable local node as configuration, not failure ([94c61f7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/94c61f79421fa26ecc1bdf7c255e0c48e66a2048))
-* **gl:** make gl init's push guidance match the repo's actual state ([cb42a48](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/cb42a4830d0d070165e2212f316d009ec716dbee))
-* warn about the oh-my-zsh gl alias at install time ([e3df51d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e3df51d76c0275fde33954ff0af0aab95fd0cb7d))
-
-## [0.6.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.5.1...v0.6.0) (2026-07-22)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* **icaptcha-client:** solve the iCaptcha proof-of-work on answer ([#181](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/181)) ([c98b503](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c98b503f90cade54ce9c588bd2373a4e3486f2fc))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **core:** honor wildcard capabilities in Ucan::can, matching is_attenuated_by ([#200](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/200)) ([b6877a6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b6877a65981dbf41c4a7838971eb5c826c7fcaf2))
-* **gl:** point doctor's version check at Gitlawb/node, not the frozen Gitlawb/releases repo ([#198](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/198)) ([98d728c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/98d728c325f68f0ee4a62e473dc484b7dd627504))
-* **node:** carry full owner DID on ref-update wire event ([#144](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/144)) ([#145](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/145)) ([69a62e5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/69a62e51c2d2f090f9cae88f4d8ce3b9017b7149))
-* **node:** gate /hooks and sibling read surfaces leaking private repo metadata ([#94](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/94)) ([#113](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/113)) ([ee8d7c0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/ee8d7c03b26a0b678cc90b8801aa340fe81da700))
-* strip Cf bidi/format controls in terminal-bound error sanitizers ([#183](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/183)) ([#188](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/188)) ([b07d41e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b07d41ea97569d79d3f545ae5d43c373cd6f0f33))
-
-## [0.5.1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.5.0...v0.5.1) (2026-07-10)
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **bounties:** add tests for claim_bounty repo-read gate ([#160](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/160)) ([#169](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/169)) ([6bafaa6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6bafaa6dc5f05c0dcd61c708397afddbcf8c2e3f))
-* **deps:** bump crossbeam-epoch to 0.9.20 for RUSTSEC-2026-0204 ([#162](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/162)) ([#163](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/163)) ([67ad2b8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/67ad2b876c8d9a336219d1016968de7a88fc4e75))
-* **node,git:** bound a hung served git with a total-duration timeout ([#62](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/62)) ([#165](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/165)) ([cd67718](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/cd67718f49ec38726a40f6bcf36f539ccdb42969))
-* **node:** bound list_ref_certificates with LIMIT and add upsert to prevent unbounded growth ([#147](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/147)) ([#149](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/149)) ([6b5e5bc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6b5e5bc7aee00a2d03295d3620df1ee4d8c024a2))
-* **node:** gate POST /api/v1/sync/trigger and rate-limit the peer-sync routes ([#82](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/82)) ([#161](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/161)) ([d00d89a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/d00d89ae5be992d1f63e95b714ae1bd3735e8457))
-* **node:** rate-limit repo/agent creation per client IP to stop DID-farm spam floods ([#180](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/180)) ([dfcaa22](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/dfcaa22b23ec91be4c75926956aa994ca89de8d5))
-* **release:** build aarch64-musl natively on arm64 runners, replace retired macos-13 ([#155](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/155)) ([6cff528](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6cff5286b436fdee44ad881999e2a5f4bdba18f9))
-* **visibility:** gate repo-scoped read surfaces on visibility ([#120](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/120)) ([#157](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/157)) ([26bc3f6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/26bc3f69870aa77e43c0d92115a5aa59555b7d88))
-
-## [0.5.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0) (2026-07-05)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* **gl:** sanctioned iCaptcha client flow + secure git lifecycle ([#138](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/138)) ([06388ec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/06388ec26aa29d356ae311276fdb91be054e9ecc))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **gl:** sign the CLI's /ipfs/pins reads under the [#134](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/134) auth gate ([#146](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/146)) ([20d6848](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/20d6848846b3a988d604208833167a528b7d8820))
-* **node,git-remote:** gate receive-pack advertisement, sign client fetch/push ([#119](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/119)) ([6f36fc0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6f36fc07b8e10a650c5948b269feac1cb25cae2a))
-* **node,gossip:** route gossip HTTP through the no-redirect client ([#93](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/93)) ([#140](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/140)) ([563c456](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/563c456803bf3e958d63869db424b3940472bc3d))
-* **node:** close two spam-vector root causes (trust upsert + ungated push) ([#152](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/152)) ([2df6ff9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2df6ff9d30de62f754fa41473e85db316021718e))
-* **node:** gate GET /ipfs/{cid} on reachable allowed-set, not deny-set ([#126](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/126)) ([#133](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/133)) ([466a550](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/466a550915edd711856ef32035f9f474e2577c4f))
-* **node:** gate the ref-updates feeds on read visibility ([#112](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/112), [#114](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/114)) ([#143](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/143)) ([4891db3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/4891db38892663326ee0c1417a2db931988be4b5))
-* **node:** prefer canonical repo row over mirror row in get_repo ([#124](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/124)) ([#141](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/141)) ([6c95592](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6c95592d188222ac3446dc23ef8d9befbf82ad6f))
-* **remote:** include HTTP error response body ([#137](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/137)) ([09a0cb2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/09a0cb23b9f284ccbd69aca6958b70671f3bfb46))
-* **repos:** log the cause when repo create fails ([#103](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/103)) ([2620e97](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2620e973e3cd4835ed42ddd4adcd8183b5b3080e))
-
-## [0.4.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.3.9...v0.4.0) (2026-06-30)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* agent profiles (display name, bio, avatar, social links) ([#23](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/23)) ([09a3397](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/09a339745eca40a2567d911e947e3fc7426fc621))
-* **db:** versioned schema migrations with idempotent backfill ([#21](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/21)) ([927e4d0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/927e4d0cfb4ea11dca6930780939afaa067797ba))
-* encrypted replication for private subtrees (B1/B2/B3) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#36](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/36)) ([5ff7af8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/5ff7af84fa21fab53a12dfa04a0e7fb7e7d672e6))
-* **git-remote-gitlawb:** add --version and --help flags ([#30](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/30)) ([3a401eb](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3a401eb0792f9c5f5a10de6c16861655ab3836e0))
-* **gitlawb-attest:** External Attestation v1 for ref-update certs ([#20](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/20)) ([924bccd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/924bccd8e53e9be2dc9d6d4e4f1376952d6462bb))
-* **node:** blind recipient identities at rest and gate B1 by repo readability ([#40](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/40)) ([abdc775](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/abdc7757708d2bbb2bfda99bb65d50756142a42e))
-* **node:** enforce per-route authorization across the REST and GraphQL surface ([#87](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/87)) ([2202b00](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2202b0097fab6976ab366a2cdc385f1146a72f86))
-* **node:** graceful shutdown + Prometheus metrics endpoint ([#22](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/22)) ([2ce4da9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2ce4da9cc5a4791e8ae5a1cd90270b67f60d9ec3))
-* **node:** iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate on create_repo + register ([#108](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/108)) ([adc20f9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/adc20f9effad7b42fab55002875d209c4ed79518))
-* **node:** iCaptcha-aware repo propagation gate with quarantine ([#125](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/125)) ([8b9ceec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/8b9ceec25ef338965d1db72d39a7f2adb5300cc9))
-* **node:** owner-only push enforcement behind GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH ([#31](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/31)) ([#68](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/68)) ([0a15e76](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/0a15e763d2ab46737a3831715facbe51045b33ba))
-* **node:** peer partial-mirrors for repos with private subtrees ([#35](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/35)) ([e365a57](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e365a57b51c167abf06e87bfeb0565c80ed1b849))
-* **node:** pin the per-push object delta instead of re-enumerating the whole repo ([#90](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/90)) ([1af4fdf](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/1af4fdf485c7084cd160551b757b1ad1eed65cc6))
-* **node:** replication enforcement (Phase 2) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#34](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/34)) ([8680d0f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/8680d0f9d6600bba1a52d15624f8a2802a169511))
-* **node:** signature-gated agent self-deregister ([#29](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/29)) ([#63](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/63)) ([ff492b4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/ff492b452126f5568dac4286a7249f0cadb8b380))
-* **node:** subtree content withholding (Phase 3) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#28](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/28)) ([61b3830](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/61b383019fd895a1a6adfad934ad6c626e0f095e))
-* path-scoped repository visibility (Phase 1) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#25](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/25)) ([6abaf1d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6abaf1d7ed8fc55c6547568ae7247131311bde98))
-* per-DID rate limiting on creation endpoints (10/hour) ([#13](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/13)) ([b12c6bc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b12c6bc3283c2647224a62fb520a3cb7acf4a747))
-* **sync:** auto-register as replica with origin after successful mirror ([#56](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/56)) ([c03c9af](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c03c9af8fadafe262a2bf3cf25e19edf7160d376))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **api:** blob endpoint returns 400/404 instead of 500 on bad paths ([#37](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/37)) ([b61a1bd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b61a1bd46ffe78b39c0967e97b0ad349eba0b046))
-* **core:** route seed access through the zeroizing wrapper ([#41](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/41)) ([#64](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/64)) ([c9f43b0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c9f43b010576edb3c92a3be3d935cad232250344))
-* **core:** zeroize the derived X25519 secret ([#65](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/65)) ([#91](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/91)) ([2f6611a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2f6611a30fbb66cef9991cf4c6e507548acc5038))
-* **gl:** paginate gl-clone Arweave recovery and make /encrypted-blobs parsing schema-strict ([#49](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/49)) ([#70](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/70)) ([2153b0b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2153b0b7a67a48c29a33cd70b80cfbb69760805d))
-* **infra:** drop fly idle_timeout 600 -> 120 ([#38](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/38)) ([a2217bf](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/a2217bff27ff3d6cae02bd8a12f8a0af7ce2b0a1))
-* **node:** anchor the real old_sha and issue a per-ref certificate ([#72](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/72)) ([6809201](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6809201daa223d6f833be6e95876a7b4e1f2b0b5))
-* **node:** close under-withholding via full ref scope and full-history classification ([#42](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/42)) ([#84](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/84)) ([3e1e904](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3e1e9045e4e3aa5ea0aee69767ceb01637920d2a))
-* **node:** dedupe mirror and canonical repo rows on list surfaces ([#6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/6)) ([#73](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/73)) ([3e8e333](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3e8e333aa03d7a2fe455d5d83f23089d58feb8c9))
-* **node:** enforce path-scoped visibility on the REST read API ([#52](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/52)) ([e37ea7f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e37ea7fec6d5a3171b526c84f884670bbbd258fb))
-* **node:** fail closed when a recipient DID can't be resolved ([#47](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/47)) ([#67](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/67)) ([abc9ad0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/abc9ad03acb48e608234650a25049622673fa53a))
-* **node:** gate fork_repo on per-caller path-scoped visibility ([#98](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/98)) ([#109](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/109)) ([6ae316c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6ae316cc88521747cbacb2a612b9433897d2e490))
-* **node:** gate GET /ipfs/{cid} on per-caller path-scoped visibility ([#110](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/110)) ([#128](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/128)) ([174f25a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/174f25a206380b26796b8782e1bd860b0a409fc9))
-* **node:** gate repo-listing and stats surfaces on visibility ([#97](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/97), [#99](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/99), [#101](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/101), [#104](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/104)) ([#111](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/111)) ([828dd27](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/828dd279a286f58bbb3c73627b2a1e23778b25cf))
-* **node:** make Tigris repo hydration resilient to corrupt archives & failed writes ([#54](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/54)) ([7a99d0f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/7a99d0f27cfa869e9f8a803f16cff30191745a51))
-* **node:** preserve promisor mirror mode on unknown withheld-paths lookup ([#48](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/48)) ([#69](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/69)) ([96fcfdb](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/96fcfdb1ca6d4cd27226670068702c9f177e283a))
-* **node:** reap leaked git child processes ([#53](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/53)) ([#61](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/61)) ([803d83e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/803d83efdbcfa9d98affac1c5aaf8aacc511ae64))
-* **node:** reject malformed path globs with non-trailing or empty-segment wildcards ([#74](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/74)) ([#75](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/75)) ([3d880cd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3d880cd56fed10e4c5ae787b52ce411384950f5e))
-* **node:** skip withheld-walk when no path-scoped rule can withhold ([#60](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/60)) ([338ff83](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/338ff83584f2ab960be7e42ecec64191f5aaeb95))
-* **release:** give crates explicit versions for release-please ([#129](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/129)) ([788a868](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/788a8686c1deafe03573703d72eb927cde81f54d))
-* **release:** use simple release-type + generic Cargo.toml updaters ([#130](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/130)) ([12bfb1b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/12bfb1b3c86b38f0b22d488cd6e85dfd96e0c37f))
-* **security:** gate webhook creation through the public-host validator ([#81](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/81)) ([#92](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/92)) ([f28fa02](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/f28fa02236bd65c6a4fb690131ab14640cc53a12))
-* **security:** reject non-public peer URLs + prune poisoned peers ([#78](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/78)) ([a8cc33a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/a8cc33a185f2649d3fe100ec271ee5739a55eba7))

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -31,9 +31,7 @@ crates/
 ├── gitlawb-core/       crypto primitives (DID, CID, HTTP sigs, UCAN, ref certs)
 ├── gitlawb-node/       axum HTTP server, git smart HTTP, P2P, GraphQL
 ├── gl/                 CLI — identity, repos, MCP server, Base L2 names
-├── git-remote-gitlawb/ git remote helper for gitlawb:// URLs
-├── gitlawb-attest/     provenance attestations for ref-update certificates
-└── icaptcha-client/    client for the iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence service
+└── git-remote-gitlawb/ git remote helper for gitlawb:// URLs
 docs/                   Operator guides
 scripts/                Build helpers
 ```
@@ -56,7 +54,6 @@ Smart contracts live in a separate repo: [github.com/Gitlawb/contracts](https://
 3. **No breaking changes without discussion.** Open an issue first for protocol-level changes.
 4. **Conventional commits.** Use `feat:`, `fix:`, `docs:`, `refactor:`, `test:`, `chore:`. Releases are automated by [release-please](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please) — your commit prefixes drive the next version bump.
 5. **Format and lint.** Run `cargo fmt --all` and `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` before submitting. CI will reject anything that fails these.
-6. **Security-surface rules.** [`AGENTS.md`](AGENTS.md) carries the authorization invariants PRs most often break; it is written for coding agents and humans alike, so read it before touching endpoints, visibility, or migrations.
 
 ## What gets merged, what gets closed
 
@@ -72,10 +69,9 @@ expected to clear a basic quality bar:
 - **A real description.** Say what changes and why. "Update code" is not a description.
 
 A triage bot labels PRs that are missing these and leaves a short note. Nothing is closed
-automatically while you're engaging. A flagged PR still missing a description after 14 days of
-inactivity gets a stale warning, and is closed 7 days later if still untouched. A missing issue
-link alone never triggers closure; that label stays advisory. Closed PRs can be reopened at any
-time once updated.
+automatically while you're engaging. A flagged PR that goes 14 days with no linked issue or
+description gets a stale warning, and is closed 7 days later if still untouched. Closed PRs can
+be reopened at any time once updated.
 
 ## Development environment
 
@@ -108,7 +104,7 @@ cargo test -p gitlawb-node
 
 - **TypeScript SDK** (`@gitlawb/sdk`) — client library for the HTTP API
 - **Python SDK** (`gitlawb`) — for ML/agent pipeline integration
-- **UCAN authorization** — add trusted issuer anchoring, capability checks, and authorization-aware revocation
+- **UCAN chain validation** — complete the auth middleware
 - **Filecoin storage tier** — wire up cold storage deals
 - **Documentation** — guides, tutorials, API examples
 - **Node operators** — run a public node and report issues

Cargo.lock

@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "keccak-asm",
  "paste",
  "proptest",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "rapidhash",
  "ruint",
  "rustc-hash",
@@ -770,23 +770,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "ark-ff"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f7a806ac6c8307b929df4645776290a50ee2aac754ad09d8bdf73391309e43af"
-dependencies = [
- "ark-ff-asm 0.6.0",
- "ark-ff-macros 0.6.0",
- "ark-serialize 0.6.0",
- "ark-std 0.6.0",
- "digest 0.10.7",
- "educe",
- "num-bigint",
- "num-traits",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-ff-asm"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -817,16 +800,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "ark-ff-asm"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "1479009684adc073dff49a1025d3a7065b317a9ead25aaaca38cdc70058ba8a2"
-dependencies = [
- "quote",
- "syn 2.0.117",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-ff-macros"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -865,19 +838,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "ark-ff-macros"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4a0691ed21ef00ef89c1e9bda832eba493dda3ec2f8d892fb25b705f73f06bb8"
-dependencies = [
- "num-bigint",
- "num-traits",
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn 2.0.117",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-serialize"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -911,30 +871,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "num-bigint",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "ark-serialize"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "a74dd304fd536fb95d0a328e72be759209cc496a9da094c5bc56e5fea4f9e86b"
-dependencies = [
- "ark-serialize-derive",
- "ark-std 0.6.0",
- "digest 0.10.7",
- "num-bigint",
- "serde_with",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "ark-serialize-derive"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4f153690697a2b91e5e1251ff98411ee5371500a111a0fd317a70e588eb300f9"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn 2.0.117",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-std"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -965,16 +901,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "rand 0.8.6",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "ark-std"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "367c9c827ed431bff6868b7aa926e05b16eb46603cc8b6e768e4a5553fa1d155"
-dependencies = [
- "num-traits",
- "rand 0.8.6",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "arrayref"
 version = "0.3.9"
@@ -2181,7 +2107,7 @@ version = "3.1.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "faf9468729b8cbcea668e36183cb69d317348c2e08e994829fb56ebfdfbaac34"
 dependencies = [
- "windows-sys 0.48.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2336,7 +2262,7 @@ checksum = "6ddc2d09feefeee8bd78101665bd8645637828fa9317f9f292496dbbd8c65ff3"
 dependencies = [
  "crc",
  "digest 0.10.7",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "regex",
  "rustversion",
 ]
@@ -2367,9 +2293,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "crossbeam-epoch"
-version = "0.9.20"
+version = "0.9.18"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "2d6914041f254d6e9176c01941b21115dcfb7089e55135a35411081bd106ef3f"
+checksum = "5b82ac4a3c2ca9c3460964f020e1402edd5753411d7737aa39c3714ad1b5420e"
 dependencies = [
  "crossbeam-utils",
 ]
@@ -3002,7 +2928,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "39cab71617ae0d63f51a36d69f866391735b51691dbda63cf6f96d042b63efeb"
 dependencies = [
  "libc",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -3374,22 +3300,18 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "gitlawb-core",
- "libc",
- "mockito",
  "reqwest",
- "tempfile",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
- "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
  "base64",
  "ed25519-dalek",
@@ -3406,7 +3328,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "base64",
@@ -3427,14 +3349,13 @@ dependencies = [
  "sha2",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
  "tokio",
- "url",
  "uuid",
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy",
  "anyhow",
@@ -3444,7 +3365,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "aws-config",
  "aws-sdk-s3",
  "axum",
- "base64",
  "bytes",
  "chrono",
  "cid",
@@ -3456,7 +3376,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "hex",
  "hmac",
  "http-body-util",
- "libc",
  "libp2p-core",
  "libp2p-dns",
  "libp2p-gossipsub",
@@ -3483,23 +3402,20 @@ dependencies = [
  "tower-http",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
- "unicode-normalization",
  "uuid",
  "zstd",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gl"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy",
  "anyhow",
- "base64",
  "chrono",
  "clap",
  "dirs",
  "gitlawb-core",
- "icaptcha-client",
  "mockito",
  "reqwest",
  "serde",
@@ -3543,9 +3459,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "h2"
-version = "0.4.18"
+version = "0.4.13"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "839c0e8a181239723652be9062bb56ca5bf5f64011f73b623f6f4fc59086a228"
+checksum = "2f44da3a8150a6703ed5d34e164b875fd14c2cdab9af1252a9a1020bde2bdc54"
 dependencies = [
  "atomic-waker",
  "bytes",
@@ -3682,7 +3598,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "idna",
  "ipnet",
  "once_cell",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "ring",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
  "tinyvec",
@@ -3704,7 +3620,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "moka",
  "once_cell",
  "parking_lot",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "resolv-conf",
  "smallvec",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
@@ -3864,7 +3780,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "libc",
  "percent-encoding",
  "pin-project-lite",
- "socket2 0.5.10",
+ "socket2 0.6.3",
  "tokio",
  "tower-service",
  "tracing",
@@ -3894,21 +3810,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "cc",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "icaptcha-client"
-version = "0.4.0"
-dependencies = [
- "anyhow",
- "gitlawb-core",
- "mockito",
- "reqwest",
- "serde",
- "serde_json",
- "sha2",
- "thiserror 2.0.18",
- "tracing",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "icu_collections"
 version = "2.1.1"
@@ -4634,7 +4535,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "hyper-util",
  "log",
  "pin-project-lite",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "regex",
  "serde_json",
  "serde_urlencoded",
@@ -5381,7 +5282,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "bit-vec",
  "bitflags 2.11.0",
  "num-traits",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "rand_chacha 0.9.0",
  "rand_xorshift",
  "regex-syntax",
@@ -5432,7 +5333,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "quinn-udp",
  "rustc-hash",
  "rustls",
- "socket2 0.5.10",
+ "socket2 0.6.3",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
  "tokio",
  "tracing",
@@ -5441,14 +5342,14 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "quinn-proto"
-version = "0.11.15"
+version = "0.11.14"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4fcb935c5bec503c2f0e306bdd3e58bb9029dcb14fa8d9ac76e3a5256ac0763e"
+checksum = "434b42fec591c96ef50e21e886936e66d3cc3f737104fdb9b737c40ffb94c098"
 dependencies = [
  "bytes",
  "getrandom 0.3.4",
  "lru-slab",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "ring",
  "rustc-hash",
  "rustls",
@@ -5469,7 +5370,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "cfg_aliases",
  "libc",
  "once_cell",
- "socket2 0.5.10",
+ "socket2 0.6.3",
  "tracing",
  "windows-sys 0.52.0",
 ]
@@ -5515,9 +5416,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "rand"
-version = "0.9.3"
+version = "0.9.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7ec095654a25171c2124e9e3393a930bddbffdc939556c914957a4c3e0a87166"
+checksum = "6db2770f06117d490610c7488547d543617b21bfa07796d7a12f6f1bd53850d1"
 dependencies = [
  "rand_chacha 0.9.0",
  "rand_core 0.9.5",
@@ -5819,15 +5720,14 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "ruint"
-version = "1.20.0"
+version = "1.17.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f5e99bff0393163bb25029a6af25d3d8d202ba5b5438a74d1bd8789f5c822970"
+checksum = "c141e807189ad38a07276942c6623032d3753c8859c146104ac2e4d68865945a"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy-rlp",
  "ark-ff 0.3.0",
  "ark-ff 0.4.2",
  "ark-ff 0.5.0",
- "ark-ff 0.6.0",
  "bytes",
  "fastrlp 0.3.1",
  "fastrlp 0.4.0",
@@ -5838,7 +5738,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "primitive-types",
  "proptest",
  "rand 0.8.6",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "rlp",
  "ruint-macro",
  "serde_core",
@@ -5901,7 +5801,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "errno",
  "libc",
  "linux-raw-sys",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -6776,9 +6676,9 @@ checksum = "55937e1799185b12863d447f42597ed69d9928686b8d88a1df17376a097d8369"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "tar"
-version = "0.4.46"
+version = "0.4.45"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3f6221d9a6003c78398e3b239969f352578258df48c8eb051caadae0015bc840"
+checksum = "22692a6476a21fa75fdfc11d452fda482af402c008cdbaf3476414e122040973"
 dependencies = [
  "filetime",
  "libc",
@@ -6795,7 +6695,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "getrandom 0.4.2",
  "once_cell",
  "rustix",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -7158,7 +7058,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "http 1.4.0",
  "httparse",
  "log",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
  "sha1",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
  "utf-8",

Cargo.toml

@@ -6,17 +6,10 @@ members = [
     "crates/gl",
     "crates/git-remote-gitlawb",
     "crates/gitlawb-attest",
-    "crates/icaptcha-client",
 ]
 
 [workspace.package]
-# Per-crate versions live in each crate's [package] so release-please can manage
-# them (it cannot rewrite an inherited `version.workspace = true`). They are kept
-# in lockstep by release-please's generic updater: each crate's `version` line
-# carries an `# x-release-please-version` annotation and is listed under
-# `extra-files` in release-please-config.json. The release type is `simple`
-# (not `rust`) because the rust strategy unconditionally tries to rewrite this
-# virtual workspace root as a package manifest and errors out.
+version = "0.3.9"
 edition = "2021"
 rust-version = "1.91"
 license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
@@ -53,12 +46,5 @@ chrono = { version = "0.4", features = ["serde"] }
 uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4"] }
 # http client
 reqwest = { version = "0.12", features = ["blocking", "json", "multipart", "rustls-tls"], default-features = false }
-# URL parsing (what reqwest::Url re-exports, so the shared redirect predicate can
-# take a parsed URL without pulling reqwest into gitlawb-core)
-url = "2"
 # HMAC
 hmac = "0.12"
-
-[profile.release]
-lto = "thin"
-strip = "symbols"

Dockerfile

@@ -8,33 +8,20 @@ FROM rust:1.91-bookworm AS builder
 
 WORKDIR /build
 
-# Cache dependencies first for faster rebuilds.
-# EVERY workspace member's manifest must be copied here, not just the ones this
-# image ships: cargo loads the whole workspace before it resolves anything, so a
-# missing member's Cargo.toml (or a path dependency pointing at one) aborts the
-# layer before a single crate is fetched.
+# Cache dependencies first for faster rebuilds
 COPY Cargo.toml Cargo.lock ./
 COPY crates/gitlawb-core/Cargo.toml crates/gitlawb-core/
 COPY crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml crates/gitlawb-node/
 COPY crates/gl/Cargo.toml crates/gl/
 COPY crates/git-remote-gitlawb/Cargo.toml crates/git-remote-gitlawb/
-COPY crates/gitlawb-attest/Cargo.toml crates/gitlawb-attest/
-COPY crates/icaptcha-client/Cargo.toml crates/icaptcha-client/
 
-# Fetch deps (this layer caches until Cargo.{toml,lock} change).
-# No `|| true`: this layer is expected to succeed, and swallowing its exit code
-# is what let it sit dead from the moment gl gained a path dependency on
-# icaptcha-client. A failure here should stop the build, not silently turn every
-# image build into a cold one.
-RUN mkdir -p crates/gitlawb-core/src crates/gitlawb-node/src crates/gl/src \
-        crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src crates/gitlawb-attest/src crates/icaptcha-client/src && \
+# Fetch deps (this layer caches until Cargo.{toml,lock} change)
+RUN mkdir -p crates/gitlawb-core/src crates/gitlawb-node/src crates/gl/src crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src && \
     echo 'fn main() {}' > crates/gitlawb-node/src/main.rs && \
     echo 'fn main() {}' > crates/gl/src/main.rs && \
     echo 'fn main() {}' > crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src/main.rs && \
     echo '' > crates/gitlawb-core/src/lib.rs && \
-    echo '' > crates/gitlawb-attest/src/lib.rs && \
-    echo '' > crates/icaptcha-client/src/lib.rs && \
-    cargo build --release --locked -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
+    cargo build --release -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb || true
 
 # Now copy real sources and build for real.
 # Force-bump mtimes so cargo's fingerprint check rebuilds — without this,
@@ -47,7 +34,7 @@ RUN find crates -name "*.rs" -exec touch {} + && \
     rm -rf target/release/.fingerprint/gitlawb-node-* \
            target/release/.fingerprint/gl-* \
            target/release/.fingerprint/git-remote-gitlawb-* && \
-    cargo build --release --locked -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb && \
+    cargo build --release -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb && \
     strip target/release/gitlawb-node target/release/gl target/release/git-remote-gitlawb
 
 # ── Runtime stage ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -57,7 +44,6 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
         git \
         ca-certificates \
         curl \
-        tini \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
 # Non-root user for runtime
@@ -86,11 +72,4 @@ VOLUME ["/data"]
 HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=15s --retries=3 \
     CMD curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:${GITLAWB_PORT}/health || exit 1
 
-# Run under tini so the node is never PID 1. As PID 1 a process must reap
-# reparented orphans itself; the node does not, so git's reparented grandchildren
-# (e.g. pack-objects orphaned when a served upload-pack dies on a client
-# disconnect) would accumulate as zombies until fork() fails with EAGAIN (#53).
-# tini reaps them and forwards SIGTERM/SIGINT to the node, which runs its own
-# graceful shutdown. (No `-g`: the node manages its own children, so group-wide
-# signalling would only disturb in-flight git helpers during shutdown.)
-ENTRYPOINT ["tini", "--", "gitlawb-node"]
+ENTRYPOINT ["gitlawb-node"]

Dockerfile.bins

@@ -3,10 +3,7 @@
 # Used by scripts/build-bins.sh — not used for node deployment.
 ARG TARGET=x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
 
-# Must stay at or above the workspace `rust-version` in Cargo.toml. An unmet
-# MSRV is a hard cargo error, and nothing in CI builds this file, so a stale
-# base image here fails only when someone runs scripts/build-bins.sh.
-FROM rust:1.91-bookworm AS builder
+FROM rust:1.85-bookworm AS builder
 ARG TARGET
 
 WORKDIR /build
@@ -26,7 +23,7 @@ COPY crates/ crates/
 # Configure cross-linker for aarch64
 ENV CARGO_TARGET_AARCH64_UNKNOWN_LINUX_MUSL_LINKER=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc
 
-RUN cargo build --release --locked --target "$TARGET" -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
+RUN cargo build --release --target "$TARGET" -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
 
 FROM debian:bookworm-slim
 ARG TARGET

README.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 Gitlawb Node is the open-source node software behind the Gitlawb network. It lets anyone run a self-hosted node, publish repositories under a DID, sign writes with Ed25519 HTTP signatures, replicate git activity across peers, and move toward a resilient app-delivery network where code and build assets can be served closer to users.
 
-Gitlawb is not trying to be only "another git host." The long-term direction is:
+Gitlawb is not trying to be only “another git host.” The long-term direction is:
 
 ```txt
 Decentralized GitHub
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ The mission is simple: once code is pushed to the network, it should not disappe
 
 ## What is in this repository?
 
-This is a Rust workspace with six crates:
+This is a Rust workspace with four crates:
 
 | Crate | Purpose |
 |---|---|
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ This is a Rust workspace with six crates:
 | `gl` | The Gitlawb CLI for identity, repos, issues, PRs, bounties, tasks, peers, node status, MCP, and setup flows. |
 | `git-remote-gitlawb` | Git remote helper for `gitlawb://` URLs, so normal `git clone`, `git fetch`, and `git push` can talk to Gitlawb nodes. |
 | `gitlawb-core` | Shared primitives: Ed25519 identities, `did:key`, CIDs, RFC 9421 HTTP signatures, certificates, and UCAN tokens. |
-| `gitlawb-attest` | Pluggable external provenance attestations for ref-update certificates. |
-| `icaptcha-client` | Client for the iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence flow used to protect spam-prone writes. |
 
 ---
 
@@ -36,12 +34,12 @@ This is a Rust workspace with six crates:
 
 Most git hosting today depends on a small number of centralized platforms. Gitlawb Nodes are designed for a different model:
 
-- **Own your identity**: every user, agent, and node is an Ed25519 keypair represented as `did:key:z6Mk...`.
-- **Signed writes by default**: write requests use RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures instead of passwords.
-- **Git-native transport**: repositories are still real git repositories served over smart HTTP.
-- **Agent-native workflows**: the `gl` CLI and MCP server expose repo, issue, task, PR, and UCAN flows to AI agents.
-- **Peer-aware delivery**: nodes can announce, discover, gossip, and sync with each other.
-- **App CDN direction**: the network can evolve from decentralized code storage into code + asset + app delivery.
+- **Own your identity** — every user, agent, and node is an Ed25519 keypair represented as `did:key:z6Mk...`.
+- **Signed writes by default** — write requests use RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures instead of passwords.
+- **Git-native transport** — repositories are still real git repositories served over smart HTTP.
+- **Agent-native workflows** — the `gl` CLI and MCP server expose repo, issue, task, PR, and UCAN flows to AI agents.
+- **Peer-aware delivery** — nodes can announce, discover, gossip, and sync with each other.
+- **App CDN direction** — the network can evolve from decentralized code storage into code + asset + app delivery.
 
 ---
 
@@ -56,7 +54,6 @@ Good today:
 - Bare git repository storage.
 - Git smart-HTTP clone/fetch/push.
 - RFC 9421-signed writes.
-- Repository and path-scoped visibility enforcement for repository and Git content reads, with 404-shaped repository denials.
 - DID identities.
 - `gl` CLI workflows.
 - libp2p peer discovery/gossip foundation.
@@ -66,13 +63,11 @@ Good today:
 
 Known limitations:
 
-- Repository write authorization is not secure by default: `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` defaults to `false` for compatibility, so a valid HTTP Signature identifies a pusher but does not enforce owner-only pushes.
-- UCAN proof chains are validated when supplied, but UCAN capabilities are not consulted by write authorization and the root issuer is not independently trust-anchored. UCANs therefore do not yet grant scoped collaborator access.
-- Agent lifecycle revocation is not enforced by HTTP Signature authorization; do not rely on removing or revoking an agent record to block a compromised signer.
-- Read visibility is not a blanket data-classification boundary: task, IPFS-pin, and Arweave-anchor listings are not repository-gated; withheld path names can be visible to a root reader; and later visibility changes cannot retract content already announced or externally anchored.
+- Private repository read enforcement is not wired yet. Treat public nodes as public infrastructure unless you restrict access at your proxy/firewall.
+- UCAN chain validation and revocation are not complete.
+- Repository write authorization is not capability-complete yet; HTTP signatures prove identity, not full authorization policy.
 - Peer writes are signed by upgraded nodes, but strict signed-peer enforcement is opt-in during rolling upgrades.
-- Current GraphQL mutations require an authenticated signer, but there is no mutation-specific guardrail that prevents a future mutation from omitting that check.
-- Pull-request review comments do not yet have threaded line-level anchors, and merges do not enforce approval requirements.
+- GraphQL mutations need mutation-aware auth before becoming a public write surface.
 
 See:
 
@@ -124,18 +119,10 @@ docker compose down
 
 ## Install the CLI
 
+Use the installer once releases are available for your platform:
+
 ```bash
-# npm (macOS / Linux)
-npm install -g @gitlawb/gl
-
-# Homebrew (macOS / Linux)
-brew install gitlawb/tap/gl
-
-# curl (macOS / Linux)
 curl -fsSL https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh
-
-# PowerShell (Windows)
-irm https://gitlawb.com/install.ps1 | iex
 ```
 
 Or build from source:
@@ -190,92 +177,6 @@ git clone gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../my-repo
 
 For public-network use, make sure `GITLAWB_NODE` points to the node you want. The helper defaults to localhost for local development.
 
-### Full lifecycle against an iCaptcha-enforcing node
-
-Public nodes (e.g. `node.gitlawb.com`) require two things on writes:
-
-1. **RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures**: every write is signed by your identity key. `gl`
-   and the `git-remote-gitlawb` helper do this automatically. An old/unsigned CLI
-   fails with `401 not_an_agent`; `gl` will tell you to upgrade and register.
-2. **An iCaptcha proof** on the spam-gated writes (**repo create, fork, register**).
-   `gl` solves this for you: on the node's `403 icaptcha_proof_required` it reads the
-   `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` hints, requests a challenge, solves it
-   locally (arithmetic / algebra / sequence), and **retries the same signed request**
-   with the `x-icaptcha-proof` header. No manual steps, no env vars.
-
-```bash
-gl identity new                                   # create did:key identity
-gl register      --node https://node.gitlawb.com  # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
-gl repo create memlawb --node https://node.gitlawb.com   # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
-git push  origin2 main                            # origin2 = gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb (signed)
-git clone gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb            # public read, no proof needed
-gl doctor                                         # preflight: identity, node, version, iCaptcha
-```
-
-Notes:
-
-- **`requesterId` is always your DID.** The proof's `sub` claim must equal the
-  authenticated signer; `gl`/helper set this automatically and the node enforces
-  `sub == authenticated DID` (so a proof minted for another identity is rejected).
-- **Proofs are short-lived (~5 min TTL) and single-use.** If one expires between
-  solving and use, the client transparently solves a fresh one and retries.
-- **What needs what:** create / fork / register are signed **and** iCaptcha-gated;
-  `git push` is **signed-only** (owner signature is the gate, no per-push challenge);
-  reads (clone / fetch / `repo info`) need no proof. A non-existent repo returns a
-  clear `404`, never a placeholder.
-- **API-key iCaptcha deployments:** set `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL` to your iCaptcha
-  origin and `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY` to its key. The client only talks to an
-  `https` origin whose host is allowlisted (that URL or the public default), and
-  sends the bearer token **only** to your configured origin, never to a URL a
-  node advertises, so a hostile node can't capture the key or redirect the solve.
-
-### Fetching an object by CID
-
-```bash
-gl ipfs list                                  # CIDs this node has pinned
-gl ipfs get bafkrei... > object.bin           # object bytes on stdout
-```
-
-Objects that were pinned before the node started recording which repo they came
-from are found by scanning its repo inventory, and that scan stops at the
-per-request ceilings in the [Configuration](#configuration) table. A stopped scan
-answers 503 with a resume token instead of a false "not found", and `gl ipfs get`
-follows the token automatically: up to 8 resumes after the first request, so at
-most 9 calls to the node, waiting between attempts for as long as the node's
-`Retry-After` asks and never longer than 5 seconds.
-
-The whole ladder runs under a 60 second wall-clock deadline. The deadline bounds
-the search, not the download: each attempt gets the time left on it to produce
-response headers, and once an object is found its bytes stream outside that
-deadline. They are not unbounded, though. The client's own 30 second HTTP timeout
-is a total request timeout, running from the start of a request until its body
-has finished, so a transfer still going 30 seconds after its request began is cut
-off. Waits between attempts never run past the deadline either, so a single run
-spends at most around 90 seconds on the network: the deadline plus the 30 second
-timeout covering the last attempt. Writing the object out sits outside both
-bounds, so piping into a reader that stops reading can hold the command open
-longer than that.
-
-Two node-side brakes end a ladder early and are reported rather than retried
-around. A 429 is terminal, because the node's rate-limit window is an hour and
-that wait cannot be honored inside one invocation; a transient overload (a 503
-carrying no incomplete-scan code) is retried on the token already held, under the
-same cap, clamp and deadline. The per-IP fanout brake can also stop a ladder well
-short of the 9 calls, so automatic resumption is not a guarantee of reaching the
-object.
-
-When a bound stops the ladder with a usable token in hand, the command prints the
-token and the invocation that continues from it before exiting nonzero:
-
-```txt
-resume from where this stopped: gl ipfs get bafkrei... --scan <token>
-```
-
-Run that to carry on from where the scan stopped. Re-running without `--scan`
-restarts at the first row, reproduces the same truncation and spends the node's
-per-IP budget again, so the token is the only thing that makes progress. Tokens
-are valid for an hour.
-
 ---
 
 ## Architecture
@@ -354,21 +255,20 @@ POST /api/v1/bounties/{id}/...
 POST /{owner}/{repo}/git-receive-pack
 ```
 
-These peer write routes support staged rollout:
+Peer write routes support staged rollout:
 
 ```txt
 POST /api/v1/peers/announce
 POST /api/v1/sync/notify
+POST /api/v1/sync/trigger
 ```
 
-When `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false`, unsigned legacy peers are accepted on those two routes, but signed requests are verified when signature headers are present. Staged rollout relaxes who may announce, not who owns a peer row. An unsigned announce may register a previously unseen peer, and it may refresh an existing row whose `http_url` is unchanged, but changing an existing peer's `http_url` requires an RFC 9421 signature from that peer's own DID and is refused with 403 otherwise. An unsigned announce can only register a `did:key`, since that is the only method whose verifying key can be resolved and therefore the only kind of row anyone could ever correct through the signed path; any other DID is refused with 400. Once all live peers upgrade, operators can set:
+When `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false`, unsigned legacy peers are accepted, but signed requests are verified when signature headers are present. Once all live peers upgrade, operators can set:
 
 ```bash
 GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=true
 ```
 
-`POST /api/v1/sync/trigger` is not part of the staged rollout: it always requires a signature in both config modes and returns 401 without one, because each call drives an O(peers) outbound fan-out.
-
 ---
 
 ## Configuration
@@ -392,34 +292,15 @@ Important node settings:
 | `GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS` | Comma-separated HTTP peer URLs. |
 | `GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP` | Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs. |
 | `GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS` | Disable embedded seed peers for isolated dev/test networks. |
-| `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES` | Require signed peer announce/sync writes. Defaults to `false` during the staged rollout below. |
-| `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` | Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on `git-receive-pack`. **Defaults to `true`.** A `did:key` signature is authentication, not authorization — anyone can mint a key and sign — so with this off every signed caller may push to every repository, private ones included. Delegated and CI keys count as non-owners: a UCAN `git/push` capability is verified but not yet honored for authorization, so they cannot push while this is on. Set `false` only for a rolling upgrade; see [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md). |
+| `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES` | Require signed peer announce/sync writes. |
 | `GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC` | Enable automatic sync from known peers. |
 | `GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES` | Max git pack body size for smart-HTTP routes. |
-| `GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS` | Max seconds a served git upload-pack, receive-pack, or `info/refs` advertisement may run before it is aborted (504). Default 600. Also bounds the withheld-blob classification walk (on both the upload-pack serve and receive-pack replication paths) and the push-side pin-candidate discovery (`rev-list` / `cat-file`), each reaped via process-group teardown at the deadline. On the path-scoped upload-pack path the classification walk and the pack serve share ONE deadline, so this value bounds their combined duration rather than granting each stage a full budget: a walk that consumes it leaves the serve nothing and the clone gets a 504. Serving large path-scoped repos may therefore need a higher value than they did when each stage was budgeted separately. Accepted range is 1 to 3153600000 (100 years), since the node derives deadlines from this value and a larger one cannot be represented. |
-| `GITLAWB_GIT_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS` | Max seconds the storage-acquisition phase (Tigris HEAD/GET, push advisory-lock) of a served git op may run before the request is shed with a 503, separate from the git-run timeout. The concurrency permit is released on expiry so a stalled backend cannot pin the pool. Default 30. |
-| `GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_GIT_OPS` | Max concurrent served git READ ops (upload-pack and its `info/refs` advertisement) across all callers; over-cap sheds a 503 + Retry-After. Anonymous reads draw from this pool, so pair it with `GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_READS_PER_CALLER`. Pushes and the receive-pack advertisement have their own pools, so a read flood cannot shed an authenticated push. Default 128. |
-| `GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_GIT_PUSHES` | Max concurrent `git-receive-pack` POST operations, in a pool separate from the read pool. The anon receive-pack `info/refs` advertisement runs in a third pool of the same size, disjoint from both, so an advertisement flood cannot shed a push either. Two per-source push caps are derived from this value (`/8`, floor 1) and have no env var of their own. Over-cap sheds a 503 + Retry-After. Default 32. |
-| `GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_READS_PER_CALLER` | Max concurrent read ops a single caller may hold, so one caller cannot monopolize the read pool. Keyed on the resolved source IP, never the DID, and only as granular as `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`: left unset, a node behind an edge or NAT keys every caller on the edge IP and this collapses to one global cap. Default 16. |
-| `GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_PIN_TASKS` | Max post-push pin loops (IPFS + Pinata) running concurrently across all repos. This caps how many loops RUN at once, not how much object-id list memory the node retains: on the local IPFS path a loop parked waiting for a permit still holds its full list. Do not size memory from this knob alone. A loop over cap waits, never drops a pin. Default 8. |
-| `GITLAWB_REPO_LEASE_MAX_WAITERS` | Max pushes parked at once waiting for the same repo's write lease. Each waiter pins its buffered pack body, so this bounds that memory for a hot repo; past the cap the newest push sheds a 503 + Retry-After instead of queueing. Pushes to other repos are unaffected, and the lease holder is not counted. Default 8. |
-| `GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_IPFS_WALKS` | Max concurrent `GET /ipfs/{cid}` visibility walks across all callers (own pool, disjoint from the served-git pools); over-cap sheds 503. Default 32. |
-| `GITLAWB_IPFS_WALK_PER_SOURCE` | Max concurrent `/ipfs` walks a single source IP may hold. Default 4. |
-| `GITLAWB_IPFS_MAX_LEGACY_PROBES` | Max legacy (NULL-provenance) repos probed per `/ipfs/{cid}` request, bounding the scan-fallback fan-out. A truncated scan returns a retryable 503, not a false 404. Default 256. |
-| `GITLAWB_IPFS_MAX_LEGACY_SCAN_ROWS` | Max repo rows one `/ipfs/{cid}` request's legacy scan may read from the database. The probe ceiling above only starts counting once a probe runs, and quarantined or private repos are denied before that, so this is what bounds a scan over an inventory that denies the caller everywhere. A truncated scan sheds a retryable 503 carrying an opaque `continuation` token; echoing it as `?scan=` resumes the scan where it stopped. Every per-request ceiling on this path (rows, probes, visits, retained rule bytes) mints one, so each request advances the ladder by at least the rows it read and a holder buried past a ceiling is reached in a bounded number of requests, `ceil(repos / ceiling) + 1` when this row ceiling is the one that binds. No ceiling ever produces a 404. Every page is charged to the caller's `/ipfs` work allowance, so raising this raises that allowance too. Lowering it sharpens an oracle: because a truncation emits a token and a completed wrap does not, laddering to the end reveals the node's total repo count (private and quarantined included) to within one ceiling. Default 2048. |
-| `GITLAWB_IPFS_MAX_REPOS_WALKED` | Max expensive path-scope visibility walks a `/ipfs/{cid}` request may run per phase; over-cap repos are skipped and the scan continues, shedding a retryable 503 (not a false 404) if the object is then found nowhere. The effective cap is the tighter of this knob and the node's internal history-walk ceiling of 17 (`MAX_PIN_SOURCES + 1`), so a value above 17 has no effect while a value below it does tighten the cap. It is charged per phase: the provenance lookup and the legacy-scan fallback get separate equal budgets, so one request can run up to twice the cap in total. Default 64. |
-| `GITLAWB_IPFS_MAX_REPO_VISITS` | Ceiling on repos one `/ipfs/{cid}` request may visit (acquire + probe) past the visibility gate. Also the worst-case per-request Tigris fetch count. On exhaustion the scan stops with a retryable 503. Default 1024. |
-| `GITLAWB_IPFS_REQUEST_BUDGET_SECS` | Absolute wall-clock budget for one admitted `/ipfs/{cid}` request's acquire+walk lifetime. Per-stage clamps bound the acquire and walk stages to the remaining budget, and no stage starts once it is exhausted; the scan then stops with a retryable 503. The object-type probe and content-read `cat-file` subprocesses are budget-checked before starting and each also run under their own deadline (the lesser of `GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS` and the remaining budget), reaped via process-group teardown, so a hung `cat-file` cannot hold the request's walk slot past it. One hang path is still unbounded: the probe's object-store readability check is a plain filesystem sweep with nothing to reap, so a wedged filesystem can hold the slot past the deadline. Default 600. Accepted range is 1 to 3153600000 (100 years), since the node derives a deadline from this value and a larger one cannot be represented. |
-| `GITLAWB_IPFS_RESOLVE_BUDGET_SECS` | Shorter budget for the pre-walk CID resolve inside an admitted `/ipfs/{cid}` request: the lookup that maps the requested CID to its git oid(s), which runs while the scarce walk admission is already held. A well-formed CID with no pin row does no probe and no walk work, so without this it could hold a walk slot for the whole request budget while nothing walked, and enough such requests shed every real retrieval at admission. The effective deadline is the lesser of this and the remaining request budget, so a value above `GITLAWB_IPFS_REQUEST_BUDGET_SECS` degrades to the request budget. Only the resolve is on this clock; walk and probe work stay on the request budget, so a slow but progressing scan is never shed by it. Default 10. Accepted range is 1 to 3153600000 (100 years). |
-| `GITLAWB_IPFS_RATE_LIMIT` | Max `/ipfs/{cid}` requests per client IP per hour (route flood brake). 0 disables. Default 600. |
 | `GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET` | Optional S3/Tigris shared repo storage bucket. |
 | `GITLAWB_PINATA_JWT` | Optional Pinata/IPFS warm-storage pinning. |
 | `GITLAWB_IRYS_URL` | Optional Irys/Arweave permanent anchoring. |
 
 Production note: change the default Postgres password before exposing a node publicly.
 
-Legacy-pin window: releases before the CID-resolver work stored the provider CID (Kubo dag-pb / Pinata) as a pinned object's resolver key. The `/ipfs/{cid}` resolver now recomputes the raw-content CID from the object bytes and refuses to serve a key that does not match, so `GET /api/v1/ipfs/pins` can still advertise an unrepaired legacy CID that 404s. Such a row is repaired opportunistically the next time a push carries the object again (its key is rewritten to the raw CID, the old value kept in `legacy_provider_cid`), but git negotiation omits objects the node already has, so most legacy rows never re-enter a push delta. A deferred one-shot startup sweep, not this opportunistic path, is what fully retires the advertise-then-404 window. Rows whose object bytes are gone stay withheld.
-
 ---
 
 ## Optional node staking
@@ -524,8 +405,8 @@ Short-term priorities:
 2. Add Docker and installer smoke tests.
 3. Improve operator docs and `gl doctor` checks.
 4. Harden peer writes and publish the signed-peer rollout plan.
-5. Close default-open write authorization and wire trusted UCAN delegation into repository permissions.
-6. Add threaded, line-level pull-request discussions and enforce approval requirements on merges.
+5. Implement repo write authorization: owner checks, protected branches, and UCAN capability checks.
+6. Implement private-read enforcement or remove private repo affordances until it exists.
 7. Add metrics for pushes, fetches, pack sizes, peer sync, failed auth, and webhooks.
 
 Product direction:

SECURITY.md

@@ -28,11 +28,10 @@ We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to release a fix within 14 d
 - Every git object is content-addressed via CIDv1 (SHA-256)
 - Tamper-evident by construction — a modified object changes its CID
 
-**UCAN token validation**
-- Bootstrap UCAN tokens are issued at registration.
-- A supplied token's signature, audience, expiry, and proof-chain attenuation are validated.
-- Tokens use a signed JSON wire format with expiry.
-- Capability grants are not yet consulted by repository write authorization; see the limitations below.
+**UCAN capability tokens**
+- Bootstrap UCAN tokens issued at registration
+- Capability-scoped: `git:push`, `git:fetch`, `issue:create`, `pr:open`
+- JWT-format tokens with expiry
 
 **Smart contracts (Base Sepolia testnet)**
 - `GitlawbDIDRegistry` — on-chain DID → document registry
@@ -49,20 +48,21 @@ We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to release a fix within 14 d
 
 ---
 
-## Known Limitations
+## Known Limitations (Planned for v0.2)
 
-These are documented limitations of the current live release. They should be prioritized without breaking existing nodes during rolling upgrades.
+These are **documented, accepted limitations** for the current live release and should be prioritized without breaking existing nodes during rolling upgrades.
 
-### Repository write authorization defaults
-- `git-receive-pack` verifies HTTP Signatures, but `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH` defaults to `false` for compatibility during rollout.
-- **Impact:** With the default setting, a valid signature authenticates the pusher but does not require that DID to be the repository owner.
-- **Mitigation:** Set `GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=true` on nodes where owner-only pushes are required. Confirm that every legitimate pusher uses the owner DID before enabling it.
+### UCAN chain validation
+- The auth middleware verifies HTTP Signatures and token structure, but does not yet walk the full UCAN delegation chain.
+- **Impact:** A node cannot yet enforce fine-grained capability delegation. Currently, any registered agent with a valid HTTP Signature can push.
+- **Mitigation:** Keep write endpoints signed, treat public nodes as public infrastructure, and treat trust scores as soft rate-limiting signals rather than authorization.
+- **Fix target:** v0.2
 
-### UCAN delegation and revocation
-- The middleware validates a supplied UCAN's complete proof chain, but a root token is accepted without an independently trusted issuer anchor. `Ucan::can` is not yet used by write handlers, so a UCAN does not grant scoped repository access.
-- Agent lifecycle revocation is not checked by HTTP Signature authorization. Removing or revoking an agent record does not itself block a compromised DID from authenticating.
-- **Impact:** Do not use UCANs for collaborator permissions or rely on agent-record revocation as a key-compromise response.
-- **Mitigation:** Keep sensitive deployments behind operational network controls and enable owner-only push enforcement where it fits the deployment until trusted delegation and authorization-aware revocation are implemented.
+### UCAN revocation
+- Issued UCAN tokens cannot be revoked before expiry.
+- **Impact:** If a keypair is compromised, the attacker retains access until the UCAN expires (default: 30 days).
+- **Mitigation:** Regenerate your identity (`gl identity new --force`) and re-register to issue a new UCAN. Until revocation/blocklisting is implemented, operators should remove compromised DIDs directly from their local database.
+- **Fix target:** v0.2
 
 ### git-receive-pack authentication
 - The `git-receive-pack` endpoint enforces HTTP Signature auth. Plain Git smart-HTTP clients do not generate those headers, so the `git-remote-gitlawb` helper is required for pushes.
@@ -71,20 +71,10 @@ These are documented limitations of the current live release. They should be pri
 - **Fix target:** v0.2
 
 ### Private repository reads
-- Repository and path-scoped visibility checks are enforced for repository API and Git content reads. A denied whole-repository or root read returns the same 404 shape as a missing repository, so the denial does not reveal private-repository existence.
-- Sparse-clone support exposes withheld path globs to callers who may read the repository root. Do not put sensitive information in withheld path names.
-- `GET /api/v1/tasks`, `/api/v1/ipfs/pins`, and `/api/v1/arweave/anchors` are not repository-gated. Task records include a UCAN token; pin and anchor listings expose object and ref metadata.
-- Changing a repository's visibility controls future serving, but cannot retract ref metadata or configured external pins and anchors already announced while the repository was public. Do not push secrets to an announceable repository.
-- **Impact:** Visibility policies protect the repository and Git content routes they gate, not every metadata endpoint or previously published content.
-- **Remaining boundary:** This read control does not address the independent write-authorization and UCAN-delegation limitations described above.
-
-### Pull-request review enforcement
-- Pull-request review comments are not yet threaded or line-anchored, and merges do not enforce required approvals.
-- **Impact:** Teams must use their own review policy or external controls for merge approval requirements.
-
-### GraphQL mutation coverage
-- Existing GraphQL mutations require an authenticated signer, but a mutation-specific source-level guardrail has not yet been added for future mutations.
-- **Impact:** A new mutation could accidentally omit its signer check without an explicit test fence.
+- Repository records have an `is_public` field and the node exposes `GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ`, but per-repository private-read enforcement is not wired in the current live release.
+- **Impact:** Do not store private repositories or secrets on public nodes.
+- **Mitigation:** Run isolated nodes for non-public data and restrict network access at the reverse proxy or firewall layer.
+- **Fix target:** v0.2
 
 ### Peer route hardening rollout
 - Peer announce and sync notification routes accept signed requests and verify DID matches when a signature is present.
@@ -111,7 +101,7 @@ These are documented limitations of the current live release. They should be pri
 | Key storage | PKCS#8 PEM, 0600 permissions |
 | Content hashing | SHA-256 via CIDv1 |
 | HTTP Signatures | RFC 9421 (Ed25519 + SHA-256 Content-Digest) |
-| UCAN tokens | Signed JSON object (Ed25519 signature) |
+| UCAN tokens | JWT (Ed25519 signatures) |
 | On-chain | ECDSA secp256k1 (Base L2 / Ethereum) |
 
 ---
@@ -119,7 +109,7 @@ These are documented limitations of the current live release. They should be pri
 ## Threat Model
 
 gitlawb is designed to be secure against:
-- **Unauthenticated writes** — HTTP Signature auth on protected write endpoints; see Known Limitations for owner and capability authorization gaps
+- **Unauthorized writes** — HTTP Signature auth on all write endpoints
 - **Tampered git objects** — CIDv1 content addressing detects modification
 - **Identity spoofing** — DIDs derived from public keys, unforgeable without the private key
 - **Centralized takedown** — no single point of control; data on IPFS + Arweave

bootstrap-peers.json

@@ -1,40 +1,16 @@
 {
   "$comment": "Canonical seed list for the Gitlawb network. Merged with GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS at startup. PRs to add public nodes welcome.",
   "version": 1,
-  "updated": "2026-06-30",
+  "updated": "2026-05-16",
   "peers": [
     {
       "name": "gitlawb",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
+      "operator": "Gitlawb (Kevin)",
       "did": "did:key:z6MkqDnb7Siv3Cwj7pGJq4T5EsUisECqR8KpnDLwcaZq5TPr",
       "http_url": "https://node.gitlawb.com",
       "p2p_multiaddr": null,
       "added": "2026-04-29"
     },
-    {
-      "name": "gitlawb-node2",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
-      "did": null,
-      "http_url": "https://node2.gitlawb.com",
-      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
-      "added": "2026-06-30"
-    },
-    {
-      "name": "gitlawb-node3",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
-      "did": null,
-      "http_url": "https://node3.gitlawb.com",
-      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
-      "added": "2026-06-30"
-    },
-    {
-      "name": "gitlawb-manila",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
-      "did": null,
-      "http_url": "https://manila.gitlawb.com",
-      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
-      "added": "2026-06-30"
-    },
     {
       "name": "rapybus-gitlawb",
       "operator": "RapyBus S.A.C.",

ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-# Dependency allowlist for the `gitlawb-core` crate.
-#
-# gitlawb-core is the shared-primitives crate every consumer embeds (the `gl`
-# CLI, git-remote-gitlawb, the node daemon). It must stay lean so those
-# consumers do not inherit daemon-weight dependencies. This file is the source
-# of truth for the crates gitlawb-core's NORMAL (non-dev, non-build) transitive
-# dependency closure is allowed to contain. CI (`scripts/check-gitlawb-core-deps.sh`,
-# wired into the `core-deps-purity` job in .github/workflows/pr-checks.yml)
-# fails if gitlawb-core's tree contains any crate not listed here.
-#
-# The allowlist is exhaustive-by-construction: a NEW dependency reds CI whether
-# or not anyone thought to ban it, which a denylist cannot do.
-#
-# Measured in-workspace, so feature unification across the workspace can, in
-# rare cases, surface a crate here that gitlawb-core would not pull standalone.
-# An unexpected new entry is a prompt to check what pulled it in, not noise to
-# rubber-stamp.
-#
-# Regenerate (from repo root, after an INTENTIONAL dependency change):
-#   cargo tree -p gitlawb-core --edges normal --prefix none \
-#     | sed -E 's/ v[0-9].*$//' \
-#     | grep -v '^gitlawb-core$' \
-#     | sort -u
-# then paste the result below this header block. (The checker snapshots and
-# restores Cargo.lock; a manual regen may refresh it — `git checkout Cargo.lock`
-# afterward if you did not intend that.)
-#
-# Lines starting with `#` and blank lines are ignored by the checker.
-aead
-anyhow
-base-x
-base256emoji
-base64
-base64ct
-block-buffer
-cfg-if
-chacha20
-chacha20poly1305
-chrono
-cid
-cipher
-const-oid
-const-str
-core2
-cpufeatures
-crypto-common
-crypto_box
-crypto_secretbox
-curve25519-dalek
-curve25519-dalek-derive
-data-encoding
-data-encoding-macro
-data-encoding-macro-internal
-der
-digest
-ed25519
-ed25519-dalek
-equivalent
-generic-array
-getrandom
-hashbrown
-hex
-iana-time-zone
-indexmap
-inout
-itoa
-libc
-match-lookup
-memchr
-multibase
-multihash
-multihash-codetable
-multihash-derive
-multihash-derive-impl
-num-traits
-opaque-debug
-pem-rfc7468
-pkcs8
-poly1305
-ppv-lite86
-proc-macro-crate
-proc-macro2
-quote
-rand
-rand_chacha
-rand_core
-salsa20
-serde
-serde_core
-serde_derive
-serde_json
-sha2
-signature
-spki
-subtle
-syn
-synstructure
-thiserror
-thiserror-impl
-toml_datetime
-toml_edit
-toml_parser
-typenum
-unicode-ident
-universal-hash
-unsigned-varint
-uuid
-winnow
-zerocopy
-zeroize
-zeroize_derive
-zmij

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
 description = "Git remote helper — enables 'git clone gitlawb://did:gitlawb:...'"
-version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
@@ -11,28 +11,8 @@ name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
 path = "src/main.rs"
 
 [dependencies]
-gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core", features = ["redirect"] }
+gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
 anyhow = { workspace = true }
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
 tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
-
-[dev-dependencies]
-mockito = "1"
-tempfile = "3"
-
-[target.'cfg(unix)'.dev-dependencies]
-libc = "0.2"
-
-[target.'cfg(windows)'.dev-dependencies]
-# Job Object bindings for the real_git_fetch harness: the Windows analog of the
-# unix process-group teardown, so the whole `git fetch` tree can be killed
-# together on both the timeout and clean-exit paths (INV-22). Win32_Security is
-# required by CreateJobObjectW, and Win32_System_Threading by
-# JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION (it embeds IO_COUNTERS).
-windows-sys = { version = "0.61", features = [
-    "Win32_Foundation",
-    "Win32_Security",
-    "Win32_System_JobObjects",
-    "Win32_System_Threading",
-] }

crates/gitlawb-attest/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
 description = "External Attestation v1: pluggable provenance attachments for gitlawb ref-update certs"
-version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

crates/gitlawb-attest/src/attestation.rs

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 //! by exact match.
 
 use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD as B64U, Engine};
-use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, VerifyingKey};
+use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, Verifier, VerifyingKey};
 use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, Deserialize, Serialize};
 
 use crate::error::{Error, Result};
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ impl Attestation {
             .try_into()
             .map_err(|_| Error::Signature("signature must be 64 bytes".to_string()))?;
         let sig = Signature::from_bytes(&sig_bytes);
-        vk.verify_strict(&bytes, &sig)
+        vk.verify(&bytes, &sig)
             .map_err(|e| Error::Signature(format!("ed25519: {e}")))?;
 
         Ok(vk)
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ impl Attestation {
                 self.type_
             )));
         }
-        Ok(P::deserialize(&self.payload)?)
+        Ok(serde_json::from_value(self.payload.clone())?)
     }
 }
 
@@ -554,39 +554,4 @@ mod tests {
         let err = tampered.verify_signature(cert_hash).unwrap_err();
         assert!(matches!(err, Error::Signature(_)));
     }
-
-    /// Regression guard for strict verification: a signature forged under a
-    /// weak (small-order) public key satisfies the verification equation
-    /// but must be rejected. The identity point is such a key: with R the
-    /// identity and S = 0, [S]B - [k]A is the identity for any message.
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_rejects_weak_key_signature() {
-        let mut weak_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
-        weak_key_bytes[0] = 1; // compressed identity point (y = 1, x = 0)
-        let weak_vk = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&weak_key_bytes).unwrap();
-        assert!(weak_vk.is_weak(), "identity point must be a weak key");
-
-        let cert_hash = sample_cert_hash();
-        let mut forged = [0u8; 64];
-        forged[0] = 1; // R = identity point, S = 0
-        let forged_sig = B64U.encode(forged);
-
-        // Build an attestation with the weak key as signer and the forged
-        // signature. The weak-key check happens at verify time.
-        let mut att = dummy_attestation(&SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng), cert_hash);
-        let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(ED25519_MULTICODEC.len() + 32);
-        buf.extend_from_slice(&ED25519_MULTICODEC);
-        buf.extend_from_slice(&weak_key_bytes);
-        att.signer = format!(
-            "did:key:{}",
-            multibase::encode(multibase::Base::Base58Btc, &buf)
-        );
-        att.sig = forged_sig;
-
-        let err = att.verify_signature(cert_hash).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(
-            matches!(err, Error::Signature(_)),
-            "signature under a weak (small-order) public key must be rejected"
-        );
-    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-core/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
 description = "Core cryptographic primitives for the gitlawb network: DIDs, CIDs, UCAN, HTTP Signatures, ref-update certificates"
-version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ multihash-codetable = { workspace = true }
 cid = { workspace = true }
 chrono = { workspace = true }
 uuid = { workspace = true }
-url = { workspace = true, optional = true }
 zeroize = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
 pkcs8 = { version = "0.10", features = ["pem", "std"] }
 curve25519-dalek = "4"
@@ -31,9 +30,3 @@ chacha20poly1305 = "0.10"
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 tokio = { workspace = true }
-# Not optional here: the redirect matrix must run under a bare
-# `cargo test -p gitlawb-core`, with no feature selected.
-url = { workspace = true }
-
-[features]
-redirect = ["dep:url"]

crates/gitlawb-core/src/cert.rs

@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@
 //! The schema is frozen at v1. All fields are mandatory for forward compatibility.
 //! Nodes that receive a certificate with an unknown version MUST reject it.
 
-use std::collections::HashSet;
-
 use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use uuid::Uuid;
@@ -137,14 +135,10 @@ impl RefUpdateCert {
 
     /// Check if this certificate satisfies a threshold of valid signatures
     /// from the provided set of authorized maintainer DIDs.
-    ///
-    /// Counts distinct signer DIDs, not signature entries: a repeated
-    /// signature from the same maintainer counts once.
     pub fn satisfies_threshold(&self, maintainers: &[Did], threshold: usize) -> Result<bool> {
         let valid = self.verify_all()?;
-        let distinct_signers: HashSet<&Did> =
-            valid.iter().filter(|d| maintainers.contains(d)).collect();
-        Ok(distinct_signers.len() >= threshold)
+        let count = valid.iter().filter(|d| maintainers.contains(d)).count();
+        Ok(count >= threshold)
     }
 
     /// Validate the certificate structure (not signatures).
@@ -350,33 +344,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!cert.satisfies_threshold(&maintainers, 1).unwrap());
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn satisfies_threshold_rejects_duplicated_signature() {
-        let kp1 = Keypair::generate();
-        let kp2 = Keypair::generate();
-        let kp3 = Keypair::generate();
-        let repo_did = kp1.did();
-
-        let mut cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
-            repo_did,
-            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
-            dummy_hash('0'),
-            dummy_hash('a'),
-            1,
-            &kp1,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        // Copy-paste the only real signature onto the certificate a second
-        // time. Same signer, same valid signature, still one real signer.
-        let dup = cert.signatures[0].clone();
-        cert.signatures.push(dup);
-
-        let maintainers = vec![kp1.did(), kp2.did(), kp3.did()];
-        // Two signature entries but a single distinct signer must not
-        // satisfy a 2-of-3 threshold.
-        assert!(!cert.satisfies_threshold(&maintainers, 2).unwrap());
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn threshold_zero_is_always_satisfied() {
         let kp = Keypair::generate();

crates/gitlawb-core/src/cid.rs

@@ -64,19 +64,6 @@ impl Cid {
     }
 }
 
-/// True when `s` parses as a CIDv1 with the raw codec — the exact shape
-/// [`Cid::from_git_object_bytes`] produces and the `/ipfs` resolver looks up.
-/// A legacy provider CID (Kubo dag-pb, Pinata CIDv0) parses to a different
-/// version or codec and returns `false`, marking it an opportunistic-repair
-/// candidate. Decidable from the string alone (no object bytes), so the pin path
-/// can gate the byte-read/recompute cost on it and leave non-legacy rows at the
-/// existing DB-only skip cost. An unparseable string is non-canonical (`false`).
-pub fn is_raw_cidv1(s: &str) -> bool {
-    s.parse::<CidGeneric<64>>()
-        .map(|c| c.version() == cid::Version::V1 && c.codec() == RAW)
-        .unwrap_or(false)
-}
-
 impl fmt::Display for Cid {
     fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
         write!(f, "{}", self.0)
@@ -190,38 +177,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(result.is_err());
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn is_raw_cidv1_classifies_codec_from_string() {
-        // The canonical resolver key: CIDv1 + raw codec → not a repair candidate.
-        let raw = Cid::from_git_object_bytes(b"blob 5\0hello");
-        assert!(
-            is_raw_cidv1(raw.as_str()),
-            "from_git_object_bytes output is CIDv1/raw"
-        );
-
-        // A CIDv0 (Pinata dag-pb legacy shape) → repair candidate.
-        assert!(
-            !is_raw_cidv1("QmYwAPJzv5CZsnA625s3Xf2nemtYgPpHdWEz79ojWnPbdG"),
-            "a CIDv0 dag-pb value is a legacy-repair candidate"
-        );
-
-        // A CIDv1 with the dag-pb codec (the Kubo above-block-size root) over the
-        // same multihash → still a repair candidate (codec, not just version).
-        let parsed = raw.as_str().parse::<CidGeneric<64>>().unwrap();
-        const DAG_PB: u64 = 0x70;
-        let dagpb = CidGeneric::<64>::new_v1(DAG_PB, *parsed.hash()).to_string();
-        assert!(
-            !is_raw_cidv1(&dagpb),
-            "a CIDv1 dag-pb value is a legacy-repair candidate"
-        );
-
-        // Garbage is non-canonical.
-        assert!(
-            !is_raw_cidv1("not-a-cid"),
-            "an unparseable string is non-canonical"
-        );
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn sha256_hex_of_empty_input_is_well_known() {
         // SHA-256("") is a fixed constant; verifies the hasher is wired correctly.

crates/gitlawb-core/src/did.rs

@@ -80,19 +80,6 @@ impl Did {
             )));
         }
 
-        // Refuse an oversized id before decoding. base58 decoding is quadratic
-        // in its input, and both callers of this function take the string from
-        // an untrusted request: the unauthenticated peer-announce gate, and the
-        // HTTP-signature keyid. An ed25519 did:key method-id is a fixed 48
-        // characters, so this bound is slack rather than a behavior change, and
-        // it has to sit ahead of the decode to be worth anything.
-        const MAX_METHOD_ID_LEN: usize = 64;
-        if self.method_id().len() > MAX_METHOD_ID_LEN {
-            return Err(Error::InvalidDid(
-                "did:key method-specific id too long".to_string(),
-            ));
-        }
-
         let (_, bytes) =
             multibase::decode(self.method_id()).map_err(|e| Error::InvalidDid(e.to_string()))?;
 
@@ -321,52 +308,4 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(Did::web("example.com").method_id(), "example.com");
         assert_eq!(Did::gitlawb("z6MkSomeKey").method_id(), "z6MkSomeKey");
     }
-
-    /// An oversized method-specific id is refused on its length, before the
-    /// base58 decode runs.
-    ///
-    /// base58 decoding is quadratic in the input, and `to_verifying_key` is
-    /// reached from two places that take an attacker-supplied string: the
-    /// unauthenticated peer-announce gate, and the HTTP-signature keyid. A
-    /// 64k-character DID measured 8s through the router without this guard
-    /// against 4.6ms with it, on a tokio worker with no spawn_blocking, so a
-    /// single caller could buy CPU-seconds by the thousand.
-    ///
-    /// Asserting the MESSAGE is what makes this load-bearing: an oversized id
-    /// errors either way, so a test that only checked `is_err()` would pass
-    /// with the guard removed, having merely paid the cost it exists to avoid.
-    #[test]
-    fn to_verifying_key_rejects_an_oversized_method_id_before_decoding() {
-        let oversized = format!("did:key:z{}", "z".repeat(64_000));
-        let did: Did = oversized.parse().expect("method is still `key`");
-
-        let start = std::time::Instant::now();
-        let err = did.to_verifying_key().expect_err("must be refused");
-        let elapsed = start.elapsed();
-
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string().contains("too long"),
-            "must be refused on length, not after the decode: {err}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            elapsed < std::time::Duration::from_secs(1),
-            "refusal must not pay the quadratic decode: took {elapsed:?}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// The bound must not reject a real key. Every `did:key` this project
-    /// mints is a fixed 48 characters, so the limit is slack, not a behavior
-    /// change.
-    #[test]
-    fn to_verifying_key_still_accepts_a_real_did_key() {
-        use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
-        let signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32]);
-        let did = Did::from_verifying_key(&signing.verifying_key());
-        assert_eq!(
-            did.method_id().len(),
-            48,
-            "did:key method-id is fixed-width"
-        );
-        did.to_verifying_key().expect("a real did:key must resolve");
-    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-core/src/http_sig.rs

@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ impl HttpSignature {
     pub fn missing_components(&self) -> Vec<&str> {
         COVERED_COMPONENTS
             .iter()
-            .filter(|c| !self.components.iter().any(|s| s.as_str() == **c))
+            .filter(|c| !self.components.contains(&c.to_string()))
             .copied()
             .collect()
     }

crates/gitlawb-core/src/identity.rs

@@ -78,9 +78,10 @@ impl Keypair {
 
 /// Verify an Ed25519 signature.
 pub fn verify(verifying_key: &VerifyingKey, msg: &[u8], sig_bytes: &[u8; 64]) -> Result<()> {
+    use ed25519_dalek::Verifier;
     let sig = Signature::from_bytes(sig_bytes);
     verifying_key
-        .verify_strict(msg, &sig)
+        .verify(msg, &sig)
         .map_err(|_| Error::SignatureInvalid)
 }
 
@@ -208,28 +209,6 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_rejects_weak_key_signature() {
-        // Regression guard for strict verification: a signature forged under a
-        // weak (small-order) public key satisfies the verification equation
-        // but must be rejected. The identity point is such a key: with R the
-        // identity and S = 0, [S]B - [k]A is the identity for any message.
-        let mut weak_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
-        weak_key_bytes[0] = 1; // compressed identity point (y = 1, x = 0)
-        let weak_vk = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&weak_key_bytes).unwrap();
-        assert!(weak_vk.is_weak(), "identity point must be a weak key");
-
-        let msg = b"forged message";
-        let mut forged = [0u8; 64];
-        forged[0] = 1; // R = identity point, S = 0
-
-        let result = verify(&weak_vk, msg, &forged);
-        assert!(
-            result.is_err(),
-            "signature under a weak (small-order) public key must be rejected"
-        );
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn signed_payload_round_trip() {
         let kp = Keypair::generate();

crates/gitlawb-core/src/lib.rs

@@ -5,16 +5,6 @@ pub mod encrypt;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod http_sig;
 pub mod identity;
-// `url` is the one dependency here that drags a tail (idna, then the icu
-// crates), and gitlawb-core is allowlisted to stay embeddable. Every client that
-// needs this predicate already parses URLs, so they opt in and nothing else
-// pays. `test` is in the cfg so `cargo test -p gitlawb-core` still compiles and
-// runs the matrix below with no feature selected; without it the tests would
-// silently not run, which is the failure this module exists to prevent.
-#[cfg(any(feature = "redirect", test))]
-pub mod redirect;
-pub mod sanitize;
-pub mod scan_token;
 pub mod ucan;
 
 pub use error::Error;

crates/gitlawb-core/src/redirect.rs

@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
-//! Redirect policy shared by every gitlawb HTTP client that signs its requests.
-//!
-//! Both `gl` (async) and `git-remote-gitlawb` (blocking) attach RFC 9421
-//! `Signature` and `Signature-Input` headers, and reqwest strips only
-//! `Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Proxy-Authorization` and `WWW-Authenticate` when a
-//! redirect crosses hosts. A signature would survive that hop, and it binds
-//! `@method`, `@path` and `content-digest` with no authority component, so a node
-//! answering 302 could hand a working credential to a host of its choosing and read
-//! as the caller anywhere until the clock-skew window closes. On a 307/308 the
-//! request body goes along with it, which for the remote helper is the pack.
-//!
-//! That same missing authority component is why the predicate also pins the
-//! request-target: `@path` is signed as the client sent it and verified as the node
-//! received it, so a same-origin hop that rewrites the path or the query (a
-//! trailing-slash or query normalization) makes the signature cover a target the
-//! node never saw and the read 401s. Only a hop that re-issues the identical target,
-//! an http-to-https upgrade being the one that matters in practice, is followed.
-//!
-//! The decision lives here rather than in either client because the two used to
-//! disagree: `gl` was scoped to the origin while the remote helper, the binary that
-//! actually runs `git clone gitlawb://`, still ran reqwest's default and followed
-//! anywhere. One predicate is what keeps a future third client from repeating that.
-//!
-//! The type is `url::Url`, which is what `reqwest::Url` re-exports, so both clients
-//! pass their attempt URLs straight in.
-
-/// Longest redirect chain followed. `reqwest::redirect::Policy::custom` replaces
-/// reqwest's built-in limit, so the bound has to be restated by every client that
-/// installs a custom policy; the value is reqwest's own default.
-///
-/// This counts FOLLOWS, matching `Policy::limited`: reqwest pushes the redirecting
-/// URL onto `previous` before consulting the policy, and `Limit(max)` refuses once
-/// `previous.len() > max`, so a caller comparing against this constant must use `>`
-/// too or it permits one hop fewer than it says.
-pub const MAX_REDIRECTS: usize = 10;
-
-/// Follow a redirect only when it stays on the origin that issued it AND re-issues
-/// the identical request-target.
-///
-/// `Policy::none()` would have been the simpler answer, but one same-origin redirect
-/// shape is legitimate here: a node fronted by a proxy that upgrades http to https,
-/// or otherwise re-issues the same path and query, so the policy is scoped rather
-/// than switched off.
-///
-/// Path and query must match exactly, and that is the request-target clause rather
-/// than an origin one. `@path` is signed as the client sent it and verified as the
-/// node received it, so a hop that rewrites either half leaves a signature covering
-/// a target nobody asked for and the node answers 401. Refusing the hop turns a
-/// confusing 401 into the 3xx that names what actually happened. One policy covers
-/// signed and unsigned callers alike, for the same reason the predicate is shared:
-/// two rules would drift.
-///
-/// The clause pins `@path`, and only `@path`. A gitlawb signature also covers
-/// `@method` and `content-digest`, and both of those are still open on a followed
-/// hop: on a 301, 302 or 303, reqwest 0.12.28 delegates to tower-http's
-/// `FollowRedirect`, which rewrites a POST to a GET and empties the body
-/// (tower-http-0.6.8 `src/follow_redirect/mod.rs:273-285`), while its
-/// `drop_payload_headers` removes only `Content-Type`, `Content-Length`,
-/// `Content-Encoding` and `Transfer-Encoding`. So `Signature`, `Signature-Input` and
-/// `Content-Digest` ride along on a request that no longer has the method or the body
-/// they were computed over. Only 307 and 308 preserve both. This predicate returning
-/// true therefore makes a GET-shaped hop safe to replay against the node's verifier
-/// and says nothing about a bodied one: a signed write must not rely on it alone.
-///
-/// `Url::query` is `None` for `/a` and `Some("")` for `/a?`, and those are two
-/// different request-targets on the node side too, so the comparison is strict and
-/// needs no special case.
-///
-/// Host and port must match exactly. Port is compared as `Url::port`, which is
-/// `None` for a scheme's default port, so http -> https on the same host compares
-/// equal while http -> http on a different port does not. A downgrade from https to
-/// http is refused as well: the target is the same host, but the signature would go
-/// out in cleartext, which is the same credential leak by a slower route.
-///
-/// Host comparison rides on `url`'s parse-time normalization (lowercasing and IDN
-/// -> punycode), so the spellings an attacker reaches for do not open a gap. That
-/// is a property of the parsed `Url`, not of this function, which is why the test
-/// matrix pins it: a move to raw string comparison would silently lose it.
-pub fn may_follow(previous: &url::Url, next: &url::Url) -> bool {
-    let same_origin = next.host_str() == previous.host_str() && next.port() == previous.port();
-    let same_target = next.path() == previous.path() && next.query() == previous.query();
-    let downgraded = previous.scheme() == "https" && next.scheme() != "https";
-    same_origin && same_target && !downgraded
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    /// Every branch of the decision, both ways, plus the spellings that would slip
-    /// past a comparison less careful than `Url`'s own normalization.
-    #[test]
-    fn may_follow_covers_each_origin_branch() {
-        let url = |s: &str| url::Url::parse(s).unwrap();
-        let cases: &[(&str, &str, bool, &str)] = &[
-            (
-                "http://node.example/a",
-                "http://node.example/b",
-                false,
-                "same origin but the path changed: @path is signed as sent and verified as received",
-            ),
-            (
-                "http://node.example/a",
-                "https://node.example/a",
-                true,
-                "http to https on one host with an identical request-target: both ports are \
-                 the scheme default, so the proxy upgrade is still followed",
-            ),
-            (
-                "https://node.example/a",
-                "https://node.example/a/",
-                false,
-                "trailing-slash normalization changes the request-target, so it is refused",
-            ),
-            (
-                "https://node.example:8443/a",
-                "https://node.example:8443/a",
-                true,
-                "same explicit port",
-            ),
-            (
-                "http://node.example/a",
-                "http://attacker.example/a",
-                false,
-                "different host",
-            ),
-            (
-                "http://node.example/a",
-                "http://node.example:8080/a",
-                false,
-                "same host, different port",
-            ),
-            (
-                "https://node.example/a",
-                "http://node.example/a",
-                false,
-                "https downgraded to cleartext on the same host",
-            ),
-            (
-                "https://node.example/a",
-                "http://node.example:443/a",
-                false,
-                "a downgrade dressed up as the https port",
-            ),
-            // The rows below pass today because `Url::parse` normalizes the host, not
-            // because anything here compares case-insensitively or decodes IDN. They
-            // are the variants an attacker reaches for, so they are pinned: swapping
-            // this predicate for a raw string comparison must break the suite.
-            // Each of these pairs an IDENTICAL path on both sides, deliberately. The
-            // request-target clause below would make every one of them false on the
-            // path alone, and a row that is false for two reasons has stopped pinning
-            // either. With the paths equal, the host or port comparison is the only
-            // thing left that can decide them.
-            (
-                "https://node.example/a",
-                "https://NODE.EXAMPLE/a",
-                true,
-                "same host in a different case: parse lowercases it",
-            ),
-            (
-                "https://node.example/a",
-                "https://node.example./a",
-                false,
-                "a trailing dot is a different host to url, so the redirect is refused",
-            ),
-            (
-                "https://exämple.test/a",
-                "https://xn--exmple-cua.test/a",
-                true,
-                "unicode host and its punycode spelling are one host after parse",
-            ),
-            (
-                "https://node.example/a",
-                "https://user:[email protected]/a",
-                true,
-                "userinfo is not part of the origin: same host, still followed",
-            ),
-            (
-                "https://node.example/a",
-                "https://[email protected]/a",
-                false,
-                "the node's name smuggled into userinfo: the host is the attacker's",
-            ),
-            (
-                "https://node.example/a",
-                "https://attacker.example/a#node.example",
-                false,
-                "the node's name pushed into the fragment: the host is the attacker's",
-            ),
-            // The request-target clause, both directions. `@path` is the only thing a
-            // gitlawb signature binds the request to, so a hop that rewrites it hands
-            // the node a signature over a target it never received.
-            (
-                "https://node.example/a?x=1",
-                "https://node.example/a?x=1",
-                true,
-                "identical request-target: the same-origin hop that is still followed",
-            ),
-            (
-                "https://node.example/a?x=1",
-                "https://node.example/a?x=2",
-                false,
-                "same path but a different query: the request-target covers the query too",
-            ),
-            (
-                "https://node.example/a",
-                "https://node.example/a?x=1",
-                false,
-                "a query added where there was none",
-            ),
-            (
-                "http://node.example/a",
-                "http://node.example/a?",
-                false,
-                "an empty query added where there was none: a missing query and an empty \
-                 one are different request-targets",
-            ),
-            (
-                "https://node.example/a?x=1",
-                "https://node.example/a",
-                false,
-                "the query dropped where there was one: the comparison is symmetric, and \
-                 nothing else in the matrix pins that direction",
-            ),
-            (
-                "https://node.example/a#x",
-                "https://node.example/a#y",
-                true,
-                "a fragment-only difference is still followed: a fragment never reaches \
-                 the wire, so it is no part of the request-target the node verifies",
-            ),
-        ];
-        for (previous, next, expected, why) in cases {
-            assert_eq!(
-                may_follow(&url(previous), &url(next)),
-                *expected,
-                "{previous} -> {next} ({why})"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-core/src/sanitize.rs

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-//! Text sanitization predicates shared across the workspace.
-//!
-//! Untrusted peer/remote bytes that reach an operator's terminal (node error
-//! bodies, node-advertised strings) must be stripped of BOTH `Cc` control bytes
-//! (`char::is_control()`) AND `Cf` bidi/format controls before display: a
-//! right-to-left override or directional isolate can visually reorder the line
-//! and spoof the text (Trojan Source, CWE-451). This is INV-6.
-//!
-//! `is_bidi_format` is the single workspace definition of the second half of
-//! that obligation. It was split out of `gl`'s local copy so the two terminal
-//! sanitizers that shipped with only the `Cc` half (#183) — and any future
-//! sanitizer — reuse one audited predicate instead of re-deriving the set.
-
-/// True for the Unicode bidirectional/directional-isolate format characters
-/// (the reordering subset of category `Cf`) that can visually reorder a terminal
-/// line. These are NOT matched by [`char::is_control()`], which covers `Cc` only.
-///
-/// This is deliberately the reordering subset, not the whole `Cf` category:
-/// legitimate `Cf` characters such as ZWJ (`U+200D`, emoji sequences) and the
-/// soft hyphen (`U+00AD`) are NOT matched, so honest international text passes
-/// through unchanged. Widening this set is a behavior change for every consumer.
-///
-/// Pair it with `!c.is_control()` in a terminal-bound sanitizer (INV-6); see the
-/// wrappers in `gl`, `git-remote-gitlawb`, and `icaptcha-client`.
-pub fn is_bidi_format(c: char) -> bool {
-    matches!(c,
-        '\u{200E}' | '\u{200F}' | '\u{061C}'   // LRM, RLM, ALM
-        | '\u{202A}'..='\u{202E}'              // LRE, RLE, PDF, LRO, RLO
-        | '\u{2066}'..='\u{2069}'              // LRI, RLI, FSI, PDI
-    )
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn strips_every_reordering_code_point() {
-        // Asserted individually so a partial predicate (e.g. one that covers the
-        // marks but not the isolates) fails loudly rather than passing.
-        for c in [
-            '\u{200E}', '\u{200F}', '\u{061C}', // LRM, RLM, ALM
-            '\u{202A}', '\u{202B}', '\u{202C}', '\u{202D}',
-            '\u{202E}', // LRE, RLE, PDF, LRO, RLO
-            '\u{2066}', '\u{2067}', '\u{2068}', '\u{2069}', // LRI, RLI, FSI, PDI
-        ] {
-            assert!(
-                is_bidi_format(c),
-                "U+{:04X} must be a bidi-format char",
-                c as u32
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn passes_legitimate_and_control_chars() {
-        // Must NOT over-strip: plain text, a genuine RTL SCRIPT letter (Lo, not a
-        // format char), ZWJ (legitimate Cf), and soft hyphen (legitimate Cf) are
-        // not bidi-format. ESC is a Cc control char — owned by is_control(), not
-        // this predicate, which is bidi-only.
-        for c in ['a', '\u{0627}', '\u{200D}', '\u{00AD}', '\u{1b}'] {
-            assert!(
-                !is_bidi_format(c),
-                "U+{:04X} must NOT be a bidi-format char",
-                c as u32
-            );
-        }
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-core/src/scan_token.rs

@@ -1,499 +0,0 @@
-//! Sealed continuation token for the node's bounded legacy CID scan (INV-13).
-//!
-//! The `/ipfs/{cid}` resolver's legacy scan stops at a row ceiling and sheds a
-//! retryable 503. To let a holder buried past that ceiling still be reached, the
-//! shed carries the scan position so the caller can echo it back and resume. The
-//! whole point of the design is that the node keeps NO server-side scan state: the
-//! position rides in the caller's token.
-//!
-//! That makes the token an EMITTED continuation derived from a FETCHED row, and on
-//! a scan that served nothing every fetched row is by construction a private or
-//! quarantined repo the caller may not read. The row's `created_at` leaks its
-//! creation time and its `id` carries the owner's DID, so both halves are withheld
-//! fields and the token must be CONFIDENTIAL, not merely tamper-evident:
-//!
-//!   * AEAD-sealed (XChaCha20-Poly1305), never base64-of-plaintext and never
-//!     signed plaintext. Integrity is not confidentiality.
-//!   * A fresh `OsRng` nonce on EVERY seal. Under a stream cipher a repeated nonce
-//!     means repeated keystream, and an attacker who can force the node to seal a
-//!     position whose plaintext they know XORs two tokens and recovers a withheld
-//!     row's fields in full, strictly worse than emitting plaintext.
-//!   * FIXED-WIDTH plaintext. AEAD ciphertext is plaintext-length plus the tag, and
-//!     every field of a scan position varies in length, so a variable encoding would
-//!     make token LENGTH a side channel for the sealed row (a short name under a
-//!     short owner vs a long one) and for the candidate oid's width (40 hex on a
-//!     sha1 repo, 64 on a sha256 one). Every token this module mints is byte-identical
-//!     in length. Each field is padded to its own separate width, which is a per-field
-//!     constant and so still leaks nothing about a given row or candidate.
-//!   * The canonical CID as associated data, so a token minted while scanning for
-//!     one CID does not authenticate when replayed against another.
-//!
-//! Every failure to open (wrong key, tampered bytes, wrong CID, expired, malformed)
-//! returns the same `None`. The caller treats that as "no token" and starts at the
-//! front, so no failure class is distinguishable and the token is no oracle.
-
-use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD as B64URL, Engine};
-use chacha20poly1305::{
-    aead::{Aead, KeyInit, OsRng, Payload},
-    XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
-};
-use rand::RngCore;
-
-/// Keyset position of the last row a truncated scan fetched.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct ScanPosition {
-    /// The row's raw stored `created_at` text, the first half of the keyset cursor.
-    pub created_at_key: String,
-    /// The row's `id`, the tiebreaking half of the keyset cursor.
-    pub id: String,
-    /// The oid hex of the CANDIDATE this position resumes. One CID can map to several
-    /// git oids, so a bare row cursor names a row without naming whose walk it belongs
-    /// to. The candidate is named by IDENTITY rather than by position in the candidate
-    /// list: that list is ordered by hex and mutates between rungs, so an index would
-    /// name a different candidate the moment anything is pinned or unpinned.
-    pub sha256_hex: String,
-}
-
-/// Plaintext version byte, so a future layout change is a clean open-failure
-/// (treated as absent) rather than a misparse.
-///
-/// Bumped to 2 when the two halves stopped sharing one width (see [`ID_WIDTH`]), and
-/// to 3 when the position gained the candidate oid it resumes (see [`OID_WIDTH`]).
-/// A token minted under an earlier layout is a different length and a different
-/// framing, so it opens to `None` and the caller restarts at the front, which is the
-/// safe direction: a misparse would resume at a fabricated row and skip coverage.
-const VERSION: u8 = 3;
-
-/// Byte width the `created_at` half is padded to. Every value stored here is a
-/// serialized timestamp, about 30 bytes, so 64 is roomy for the field's whole domain.
-/// It is deliberately NOT widened to match [`ID_WIDTH`]: padding both halves to the id
-/// width would nearly double every token for a field that can never use the space.
-const CREATED_WIDTH: usize = 64;
-
-/// Byte width the `id` half is padded to.
-///
-/// The bound is set by the WRITERS, not by what a typical id happens to look like.
-/// `upsert_mirror_repo` builds `repos.id` as `{owner}/{name}`, and the slug validators
-/// in the node's `repo_store` admit an owner of up to 255 bytes and a name of up to
-/// 100, so 356 bytes is reachable through the ordinary write path and repo names are
-/// peer-controllable. 384 clears that with margin.
-///
-/// Under-sizing this is not a cosmetic bug. A row at a truncation boundary whose id
-/// exceeds the width fails the seal, the handler sheds a 503 with no continuation, and
-/// a tokenless shed is byte-identical to the wrapped-scan response whose contract is
-/// "the absence of a token means the ladder is over". The boundary row is deterministic
-/// for a stable inventory, so every retry reproduces it and every row past it becomes
-/// permanently unreachable. Anything past the width still fails loudly rather than
-/// silently truncating a cursor into one that resumes at the wrong row.
-const ID_WIDTH: usize = 384;
-
-/// Byte width the candidate oid half is padded to.
-///
-/// Git mints exactly two oid widths and this field carries BOTH. A production repo is
-/// created by `store::init_bare` with `git init --bare --object-format=sha1`, so its
-/// oids are 40 hex; only the sha256 test fixtures mint 64. The field is therefore
-/// length-prefixed like the two row halves rather than a bare fixed 64: a 64-only
-/// field would fail every seal on a real deployment, and a failed seal sheds a
-/// tokenless 503 that is byte-identical to "your ladder is over".
-///
-/// The padding to 64 is what keeps the WIDTH off the wire. Without it a 40-hex token
-/// is 24 bytes shorter than a 64-hex one, and token length would say which object
-/// format the holder's repo uses.
-const OID_WIDTH: usize = 64;
-
-/// `version | created_len:u16 | created[CREATED_WIDTH] | id_len:u16 | id[ID_WIDTH] | oid_len:u16 | oid[OID_WIDTH] | expires:i64`
-const PLAINTEXT_LEN: usize = 1 + 2 + CREATED_WIDTH + 2 + ID_WIDTH + 2 + OID_WIDTH + 8;
-
-/// Nonce width for XChaCha20-Poly1305.
-const NONCE_LEN: usize = 24;
-
-/// A fresh random 32-byte sealing key from the OS CSPRNG.
-pub fn new_key() -> [u8; 32] {
-    let mut key = [0u8; 32];
-    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut key);
-    key
-}
-
-// The two halves below are deliberately separate and adjacent. The framing pair owns
-// "every token is the same length"; the AEAD pair owns "the contents are confidential
-// and CID-bound". Keeping them apart is what lets each property be exercised (and
-// broken) without disturbing the other.
-
-/// Encode a position into the FIXED-WIDTH plaintext:
-/// `version | created_len:u16 | created[CREATED_WIDTH] | id_len:u16 | id[ID_WIDTH] | oid_len:u16 | oid[OID_WIDTH] | expires:i64`
-///
-/// The padding is the point. AEAD ciphertext is plaintext-length plus the tag, and every
-/// field of a scan position varies in length, so a length-prefixed encoding with no
-/// padding would make token LENGTH a side channel for the sealed row and for the
-/// candidate's object format. Each field is padded to its OWN fixed width, which keeps
-/// every minted token the same length while letting the id half carry the range the
-/// write path actually admits.
-fn encode_position(pos: &ScanPosition, expires_at_unix: i64) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let mut out = vec![0u8; PLAINTEXT_LEN];
-    out[0] = VERSION;
-    let mut at = 1;
-    for (field, width) in [
-        (pos.created_at_key.as_bytes(), CREATED_WIDTH),
-        (pos.id.as_bytes(), ID_WIDTH),
-        (pos.sha256_hex.as_bytes(), OID_WIDTH),
-    ] {
-        if field.len() > width {
-            // Loud rather than truncating: a clipped cursor resumes at the wrong row and
-            // silently skips coverage, which is the availability half of the bug this
-            // token exists to fix.
-            anyhow::bail!(
-                "scan token field is {} bytes, over the {width}-byte fixed width",
-                field.len()
-            );
-        }
-        out[at..at + 2].copy_from_slice(&(field.len() as u16).to_le_bytes());
-        at += 2;
-        out[at..at + field.len()].copy_from_slice(field);
-        at += width;
-    }
-    out[at..at + 8].copy_from_slice(&expires_at_unix.to_le_bytes());
-    Ok(out)
-}
-
-/// Decode what [`encode_position`] wrote. `None` on any structural mismatch.
-fn decode_position(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<(ScanPosition, i64)> {
-    if bytes.len() != PLAINTEXT_LEN || bytes[0] != VERSION {
-        return None;
-    }
-    let mut at = 1;
-    let mut fields = [const { String::new() }; 3];
-    for (slot, width) in fields.iter_mut().zip([CREATED_WIDTH, ID_WIDTH, OID_WIDTH]) {
-        let len = u16::from_le_bytes([bytes[at], bytes[at + 1]]) as usize;
-        at += 2;
-        if len > width {
-            return None;
-        }
-        *slot = String::from_utf8(bytes[at..at + len].to_vec()).ok()?;
-        at += width;
-    }
-    let expires_at = i64::from_le_bytes(bytes[at..at + 8].try_into().ok()?);
-    let [created_at_key, id, sha256_hex] = fields;
-    // A zero-length candidate is a third state the encoder never mints. The front-of-table
-    // sentinel is empty ROW halves with a real oid, so an empty oid would hand the resume
-    // path a candidate that names nothing; refuse it like every other malformed frame.
-    if sha256_hex.is_empty() {
-        return None;
-    }
-    Some((
-        ScanPosition {
-            created_at_key,
-            id,
-            sha256_hex,
-        },
-        expires_at,
-    ))
-}
-
-/// AEAD-seal `plaintext` under `key`, bound to `cid`, framed as `nonce || ciphertext`.
-fn seal_bytes(key: &[u8; 32], cid: &str, plaintext: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(key)
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("scan token key: {e}"))?;
-    // A FRESH nonce per seal, from the OS CSPRNG. Under a stream cipher a repeated nonce
-    // repeats the keystream, and two tokens sealed under one nonce XOR to the difference
-    // of their plaintexts, which recovers a withheld row in full when the attacker can
-    // force one of the two positions. This draw is the property the whole confidentiality
-    // claim rests on.
-    let mut nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
-    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
-    let sealed = cipher
-        .encrypt(
-            XNonce::from_slice(&nonce),
-            Payload {
-                msg: plaintext,
-                // The canonical CID as associated data: a token minted while scanning for
-                // one CID does not authenticate against another, so it cannot be replayed
-                // to seed a different scan.
-                aad: cid.as_bytes(),
-            },
-        )
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("scan token seal: {e}"))?;
-    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(NONCE_LEN + sealed.len());
-    out.extend_from_slice(&nonce);
-    out.extend_from_slice(&sealed);
-    Ok(out)
-}
-
-/// Open what [`seal_bytes`] framed. `None` on any failure, including a wrong `cid`.
-fn open_bytes(key: &[u8; 32], cid: &str, raw: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
-    if raw.len() <= NONCE_LEN + 16 {
-        return None;
-    }
-    let (nonce, sealed) = raw.split_at(NONCE_LEN);
-    let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(key).ok()?;
-    cipher
-        .decrypt(
-            XNonce::from_slice(nonce),
-            Payload {
-                msg: sealed,
-                aad: cid.as_bytes(),
-            },
-        )
-        .ok()
-}
-
-/// Seal `pos` under `key`, bound to `cid`, expiring at `expires_at_unix`.
-///
-/// Returns the base64url (no pad) token. Errors only when a field exceeds
-/// its own fixed width ([`CREATED_WIDTH`], [`ID_WIDTH`], [`OID_WIDTH`]) or the AEAD
-/// itself fails, never silently truncates.
-pub fn seal_scan_token(
-    key: &[u8; 32],
-    cid: &str,
-    pos: &ScanPosition,
-    expires_at_unix: i64,
-) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
-    let plaintext = encode_position(pos, expires_at_unix)?;
-    Ok(B64URL.encode(seal_bytes(key, cid, &plaintext)?))
-}
-
-/// Open a token minted by [`seal_scan_token`] under the same key and CID.
-///
-/// `None` for every failure class alike (wrong key, tampered, foreign CID, expired,
-/// malformed, wrong version), so the caller can treat all of them as "absent" without
-/// leaking which one occurred.
-pub fn open_scan_token(
-    key: &[u8; 32],
-    cid: &str,
-    token: &str,
-    now_unix: i64,
-) -> Option<ScanPosition> {
-    let raw = B64URL.decode(token).ok()?;
-    let plaintext = open_bytes(key, cid, &raw)?;
-    let (pos, expires_at) = decode_position(&plaintext)?;
-    if now_unix >= expires_at {
-        return None;
-    }
-    Some(pos)
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    /// A production-shaped candidate: `git init --bare --object-format=sha1`, so 40 hex.
-    const OID_40: &str = "a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f9012345678";
-    /// A test-fixture-shaped candidate: the sha256 repos the suite creates mint 64 hex.
-    const OID_64: &str = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
-
-    fn pos(created: &str, id: &str) -> ScanPosition {
-        pos_for(created, id, OID_40)
-    }
-
-    fn pos_for(created: &str, id: &str, sha256_hex: &str) -> ScanPosition {
-        ScanPosition {
-            created_at_key: created.to_string(),
-            id: id.to_string(),
-            sha256_hex: sha256_hex.to_string(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Seal a hand-built plaintext through the AEAD half, so a test can frame bytes the
-    /// encoder would never mint (an old version byte, a zero-length oid) and still exercise
-    /// the real open path.
-    fn seal_raw(key: &[u8; 32], cid: &str, plaintext: &[u8]) -> String {
-        B64URL.encode(seal_bytes(key, cid, plaintext).unwrap())
-    }
-
-    /// Byte offset of the oid length prefix inside the plaintext, derived from the widths
-    /// rather than hardcoded so a width change moves it with the layout.
-    const OID_LEN_AT: usize = 1 + 2 + CREATED_WIDTH + 2 + ID_WIDTH;
-
-    /// Scenario 1: both of git's oid widths round trip. The 40-hex case is the PRODUCTION
-    /// shape (`git init --bare --object-format=sha1`), and an all-64 fixture suite would
-    /// never exercise it, which is exactly how a fixed-64 field would ship broken.
-    #[test]
-    fn round_trips_at_both_oid_widths() {
-        let key = new_key();
-        for hex in [OID_40, OID_64] {
-            let p = pos_for("2020-01-01T00:00:03+00:00", "z6MkOwner/private-repo", hex);
-            let t =
-                seal_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &p, 1 << 40).expect("both oid widths must seal");
-            assert_eq!(
-                open_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &t, 0),
-                Some(p),
-                "a {}-hex candidate must open to the identical position",
-                hex.len()
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Scenario 2: a token framed under the OLD version opens to `None`, never a misparse.
-    /// Both legs matter: the version-2 plaintext was a different LENGTH, and a future
-    /// same-length layout would only be caught by the version byte itself.
-    #[test]
-    fn a_prior_layout_version_opens_to_none() {
-        let key = new_key();
-
-        // The version-2 layout verbatim: no oid field, so 461 bytes.
-        let mut old = vec![0u8; 1 + 2 + CREATED_WIDTH + 2 + ID_WIDTH + 8];
-        old[0] = 2;
-        assert_eq!(old.len(), 461, "the version-2 plaintext was 461 bytes");
-        assert_eq!(
-            open_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &seal_raw(&key, "bafkcid", &old), 0),
-            None,
-            "a version-2 token must open to None so the caller restarts at the front"
-        );
-
-        // Same length, stale version byte: only the version check can refuse this one.
-        let mut stamped = encode_position(
-            &pos("2020-01-01T00:00:03+00:00", "z6MkOwner/private-repo"),
-            1 << 40,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        stamped[0] = VERSION - 1;
-        assert_eq!(
-            open_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &seal_raw(&key, "bafkcid", &stamped), 0),
-            None,
-            "a stale version byte must open to None even at the current width"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Scenario 3: token length is invariant across candidate VALUE and candidate WIDTH.
-    /// The padding is what keeps the oid width off the wire: without it a 40-hex token is
-    /// 24 bytes shorter than a 64-hex one and the length says which repo format the
-    /// holder uses.
-    #[test]
-    fn token_length_is_invariant_across_oid_widths() {
-        let key = new_key();
-        let created = "2020-01-01T00:00:00+00:00";
-        let id = "z6MkOwner/private-repo";
-        let short =
-            seal_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &pos_for(created, id, OID_40), 1 << 40).unwrap();
-        let long =
-            seal_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &pos_for(created, id, OID_64), 1 << 40).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            short.len(),
-            long.len(),
-            "a 40-hex and a 64-hex candidate must mint tokens of identical length, or the \
-             oid width is a side channel"
-        );
-
-        // The absolute width, pinned by execution rather than by arithmetic on paper. The
-        // gl client's mock fixtures hardcode this number (`TOKEN_LEN` in
-        // crates/gl/src/ipfs_cmd.rs), and nothing in that crate seals a real token, so this
-        // assertion is the only executable check that the two agree.
-        assert_eq!(
-            short.len(),
-            756,
-            "24 nonce + {PLAINTEXT_LEN} plaintext + 16 tag, base64url no pad"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Scenario 4: the front-of-table sentinel. Empty row halves with a REAL candidate
-    /// round trip, which is what lets a seal say "this candidate, no row cursor yet".
-    #[test]
-    fn empty_row_fields_round_trip_with_a_real_candidate() {
-        let key = new_key();
-        let p = pos_for("", "", OID_40);
-        let t =
-            seal_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &p, 1 << 40).expect("the front sentinel must seal");
-        assert_eq!(open_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &t, 0), Some(p));
-    }
-
-    /// Scenario 6, third leg: a zero-length oid is a distinguishable third state that the
-    /// encoder never mints, and accepting it would hand the sentinel machinery a candidate
-    /// naming nothing. The decode path refuses it.
-    #[test]
-    fn a_zero_length_candidate_opens_to_none() {
-        let key = new_key();
-        let mut plaintext = encode_position(
-            &pos("2020-01-01T00:00:03+00:00", "z6MkOwner/private-repo"),
-            1 << 40,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        plaintext[OID_LEN_AT..OID_LEN_AT + 2].copy_from_slice(&0u16.to_le_bytes());
-        assert_eq!(
-            open_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &seal_raw(&key, "bafkcid", &plaintext), 0),
-            None,
-            "a zero-length candidate must open to None, not to a position naming nothing"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Scenario 6, second leg: an oid past the 64-byte width fails the seal loudly rather
-    /// than being clipped into a hex that names a different candidate.
-    #[test]
-    fn an_oid_over_the_fixed_width_fails_loudly() {
-        let key = new_key();
-        let p = pos_for(
-            "2020-01-01T00:00:03+00:00",
-            "z6MkOwner/private-repo",
-            &"a".repeat(OID_WIDTH + 1),
-        );
-        assert!(
-            seal_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &p, 1 << 40).is_err(),
-            "an over-wide candidate must fail the seal, never be truncated into a hex that \
-             resumes the wrong candidate"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn round_trips_under_the_same_key_and_cid() {
-        let key = new_key();
-        let p = pos("2020-01-01T00:00:03+00:00", "z6MkOwner/private-repo");
-        let t = seal_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &p, 1 << 40).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(open_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &t, 0), Some(p));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn every_failure_class_opens_to_none() {
-        let key = new_key();
-        let other = new_key();
-        let p = pos("2020-01-01T00:00:03+00:00", "z6MkOwner/private-repo");
-        let t = seal_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &p, 1 << 40).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(open_scan_token(&other, "bafkcid", &t, 0), None, "wrong key");
-        assert_eq!(
-            open_scan_token(&key, "bafkOTHER", &t, 0),
-            None,
-            "foreign CID"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            open_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &t, 1 << 41),
-            None,
-            "expired"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(open_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", "!!not b64", 0), None);
-        assert_eq!(open_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", "", 0), None);
-        let mut flipped: Vec<u8> = t.bytes().collect();
-        let last = flipped.len() - 1;
-        flipped[last] = if flipped[last] == b'A' { b'B' } else { b'A' };
-        assert_eq!(
-            open_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &String::from_utf8(flipped).unwrap(), 0),
-            None,
-            "tampered"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// The id half must clear the LARGEST repo id the node's own write path admits,
-    /// not merely a typical one. `upsert_mirror_repo` builds `repos.id` as
-    /// `{owner}/{name}`, and the slug validators in `repo_store` admit 255 bytes of
-    /// owner and 100 of name, so 356 is reachable. A width under that turns the
-    /// boundary row into a seal failure, which sheds a tokenless 503 that is
-    /// byte-identical to "your ladder is over" and strands every row past it forever.
-    #[test]
-    fn round_trips_a_repo_id_at_the_write_paths_maximum() {
-        let key = new_key();
-        let id = format!("{}/{}", "o".repeat(255), "n".repeat(100));
-        assert_eq!(id.len(), 356, "255 owner + '/' + 100 name");
-        let p = pos("2020-01-01T00:00:03+00:00", &id);
-        let t = seal_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &p, 1 << 40)
-            .expect("a repo id the write path admits must seal, never fail the width");
-        assert_eq!(open_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &t, 0), Some(p));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn a_field_over_the_fixed_width_fails_loudly() {
-        let key = new_key();
-        let p = pos("2020-01-01T00:00:03+00:00", &"x".repeat(ID_WIDTH + 1));
-        assert!(
-            seal_scan_token(&key, "bafkcid", &p, 1 << 40).is_err(),
-            "an over-wide field must fail the seal, never be truncated into a cursor \
-             that resumes at the wrong row"
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-core/src/ucan.rs

@@ -187,17 +187,11 @@ impl Ucan {
     }
 
     /// Check if this UCAN grants a specific capability on a resource.
-    ///
-    /// Mirrors `Capability::is_attenuated_by`'s wildcard semantics: a stored
-    /// capability of `with: "*"` or `can: "*"` / `"repo/admin"` covers any
-    /// requested resource/action, since a valid delegation chain can produce
-    /// exactly that capability (see `is_attenuated_by`).
     pub fn can(&self, resource: &str, action: &str) -> bool {
-        self.payload.att.iter().any(|cap| {
-            let resource_ok = cap.with == resource || cap.with == "*";
-            let action_ok = cap.can == action || cap.can == "*" || cap.can == caps::REPO_ADMIN;
-            resource_ok && action_ok
-        })
+        self.payload
+            .att
+            .iter()
+            .any(|cap| cap.with == resource && cap.can == action)
     }
 
     /// Encode to a compact JSON string (the wire format).
@@ -318,63 +312,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::PR_MERGE));
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn can_honors_resource_wildcard() {
-        let issuer = Keypair::generate();
-        let audience = Keypair::generate().did();
-
-        let ucan = Ucan::issue(
-            &issuer,
-            audience,
-            vec![Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH)],
-            None,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
-        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/other/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
-        assert!(!ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::PR_MERGE));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn can_honors_repo_admin_action_wildcard() {
-        let issuer = Keypair::generate();
-        let audience = Keypair::generate().did();
-
-        let ucan = Ucan::issue(
-            &issuer,
-            audience,
-            vec![Capability::new(
-                "gitlawb://repos/test/repo",
-                caps::REPO_ADMIN,
-            )],
-            None,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
-        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::PR_MERGE));
-        assert!(!ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/other/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn can_honors_action_wildcard() {
-        let issuer = Keypair::generate();
-        let audience = Keypair::generate().did();
-
-        let ucan = Ucan::issue(
-            &issuer,
-            audience,
-            vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", "*")],
-            None,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
-        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::PR_MERGE));
-        assert!(!ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/other/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn bootstrap_ucan() {
         let issuer = Keypair::generate();

crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
 description = "The gitlawb node daemon — git hosting over HTTP with DID auth"
-version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
 [dependencies]
 gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
 ed25519-dalek = { workspace = true }
-base64 = { workspace = true }
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }
@@ -29,10 +28,9 @@ async-graphql-axum = "7"
 tokio-stream = { version = "0.1", features = ["sync"] }
 tower = "0.5"
 tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["cors", "trace", "request-id", "limit"] }
-sqlx = { version = "0.8", features = ["postgres", "runtime-tokio-rustls", "chrono", "uuid", "macros", "migrate"] }
+sqlx = { version = "0.8", features = ["postgres", "runtime-tokio-rustls", "chrono", "uuid"] }
 clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive", "env"] }
 bytes = "1"
-libc = "0.2"
 cid = { workspace = true }
 hex = { workspace = true }
 sha2 = { workspace = true }
@@ -40,9 +38,6 @@ hmac = { workspace = true }
 http-body-util = "0.1"
 tokio-util = { version = "0.7", features = ["io"] }
 dirs-next = "2"
-# NFC-normalize visibility globs/paths at the matcher seam so a deny rule
-# withholds a canonically-equivalent path regardless of NFC/NFD form (#101).
-unicode-normalization = "0.1"
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
 libp2p-core = "0.43"
 libp2p-gossipsub = "0.49.4"
@@ -77,6 +72,3 @@ libp2p-dns = { version = "0.44.0", features = ["tokio"] }
 [dev-dependencies]
 mockito = "1"
 tempfile = "3"
-# `test-util` for `#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]`: lets the deadline tests assert
-# on which timer fired instead of on wall clock.
-tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["test-util"] }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/agents.rs

@@ -2,10 +2,9 @@
 
 use axum::extract::{Path, Query, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
-use axum::{Extension, Json};
+use axum::Json;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 
-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
@@ -21,14 +20,6 @@ fn agent_key_segment(did: &str) -> &str {
     did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(did)
 }
 
-/// Whether `caller` (the verified `AuthenticatedDid`) is the same identity as
-/// `target` (the DID being acted on), tolerant of full `did:key:...` vs short
-/// key-only forms on either side. Used to gate self-deregistration so a DID
-/// can only retire itself.
-fn caller_matches_did(caller: &str, target: &str) -> bool {
-    agent_key_segment(caller) == agent_key_segment(target)
-}
-
 async fn resolve_agent_did(state: &AppState, did: &str) -> Result<String> {
     let normalized_did = normalize_agent_did(did);
     if state.db.get_agent(&normalized_did).await?.is_some() {
@@ -80,8 +71,6 @@ pub struct AgentResponse {
     pub capabilities: Vec<String>,
     pub registered_at: String,
     pub last_seen: Option<String>,
-    /// Lifecycle status: `active` or `revoked`.
-    pub status: String,
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/agents
@@ -98,7 +87,6 @@ pub async fn list_agents(
             capabilities: a.capabilities,
             registered_at: a.registered_at,
             last_seen: a.last_seen,
-            status: a.status,
         })
         .collect();
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "agents": list })))
@@ -123,7 +111,6 @@ pub async fn show_agent(
             capabilities: agent.capabilities,
             registered_at: agent.registered_at,
             last_seen: agent.last_seen,
-            status: agent.status,
         }),
     ))
 }
@@ -146,97 +133,9 @@ pub async fn get_trust(
     }))
 }
 
-/// DELETE /api/v1/agents/{did}
-///
-/// Self-deregistration: the holder of a DID's key marks their own agent
-/// `revoked`, removing it from discovery (issue #29). Authenticated by the
-/// rfc9421 signature middleware; a caller may only retire its own DID.
-pub async fn deregister_agent(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
-    Path(did): Path<String>,
-) -> Result<StatusCode> {
-    // Authorize on the verified identity, and act on it too. The path DID is
-    // only an intent check (it must name the caller); the row we revoke is the
-    // authenticated DID itself, never a value derived from the untrusted path.
-    // Revoking `resolve_agent_did(did)` instead would let the fuzzy prefix
-    // resolver act on a different identity than the one just authorized.
-    if !caller_matches_did(&auth.0, &did) {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "an agent can only deregister itself".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    if state.db.revoke_agent(&auth.0).await? {
-        Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
-    } else {
-        Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("agent {} not found", auth.0)))
-    }
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-    use super::{agent_key_segment, caller_matches_did, normalize_agent_did, AgentResponse};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn caller_matches_own_did_full_form() {
-        assert!(caller_matches_did(
-            "did:key:z6MkExample",
-            "did:key:z6MkExample"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn caller_matches_own_did_short_form() {
-        // Authenticated full DID vs short path form, and vice versa.
-        assert!(caller_matches_did("did:key:z6MkExample", "z6MkExample"));
-        assert!(caller_matches_did("z6MkExample", "did:key:z6MkExample"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn caller_cannot_revoke_a_different_did() {
-        // The core authorization property for issue #29.
-        assert!(!caller_matches_did(
-            "did:key:z6MkAttacker",
-            "did:key:z6MkVictim"
-        ));
-        assert!(!caller_matches_did("did:key:z6MkAttacker", "z6MkVictim"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn agent_response_surfaces_status() {
-        // A revoked DID's response must carry its status so callers can see it
-        // is retired (issue #29).
-        let resp = AgentResponse {
-            did: "did:key:orphan".to_string(),
-            trust_score: 0.1,
-            capabilities: vec!["reputation:score".to_string()],
-            registered_at: "2026-06-19T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
-            last_seen: None,
-            status: "revoked".to_string(),
-        };
-
-        let json = serde_json::to_value(&resp).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(json["status"], "revoked");
-        assert!(json.get("replaced_by").is_none());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn agent_response_active_status() {
-        let resp = AgentResponse {
-            did: "did:key:active".to_string(),
-            trust_score: 0.5,
-            capabilities: vec![],
-            registered_at: "2026-06-19T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
-            last_seen: None,
-            status: "active".to_string(),
-        };
-
-        let json = serde_json::to_value(&resp).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(json["status"], "active");
-    }
+    use super::{agent_key_segment, normalize_agent_did};
 
     #[test]
     fn normalize_agent_did_preserves_full_did() {

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/arweave.rs

@@ -26,61 +26,14 @@ pub async fn list_anchors(
     Query(q): Query<ListAnchorsQuery>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let limit = q.limit.min(200);
-    // Bare `?` so connection-class sqlx failures downcast to `AppError::Db` and
-    // map to 503 `db_unavailable` (not 500 via `.map_err(AppError::Internal)`) (#251).
     let anchors = state
         .db
         .list_arweave_anchors(q.repo.as_deref(), limit)
-        .await?;
+        .await
+        .map_err(crate::error::AppError::Internal)?;
 
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
         "anchors": anchors,
         "count": anchors.len(),
     })))
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod closed_pool_tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use axum::http::{Request, StatusCode};
-    use axum::Router;
-    use serde_json::Value;
-    use sqlx::PgPool;
-    use tower::ServiceExt;
-
-    /// #251: a closed pool on /api/v1/arweave/anchors must be 503 db_unavailable.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn list_anchors_closed_pool_returns_503_db_unavailable(pool: PgPool) {
-        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
-        pool.close().await;
-
-        let resp = Router::new()
-            .route("/api/v1/arweave/anchors", axum::routing::get(list_anchors))
-            .with_state(state)
-            .oneshot(
-                Request::builder()
-                    .uri("/api/v1/arweave/anchors")
-                    .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
-                    .unwrap(),
-            )
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            resp.status(),
-            StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
-            "closed-pool outage must be retryable 503, not 500"
-        );
-        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
-            .await
-            .expect("read body");
-        let v: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).expect("json body");
-        assert_eq!(
-            v,
-            serde_json::json!({
-                "error": crate::error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
-                "message": crate::error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
-            })
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/bounties.rs

@@ -79,9 +79,12 @@ pub async fn create_bounty(
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest("amount must be positive".into()));
     }
 
-    // Read-gate: anyone who can read the repo may fund a bounty on it (this closes
-    // the private-repo bounty leak); ownership is not required.
-    crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    // Verify repo exists
+    let _ = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
     let bounty = BountyRecord {
@@ -110,28 +113,19 @@ pub async fn create_bounty(
     Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(bounty)))
 }
 
-const MAX_BOUNTY_LIMIT: i64 = 200;
-
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/bounties
 pub async fn list_repo_bounties(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Query(q): Query<ListBountiesQuery>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
-
-    let limit = q.limit.unwrap_or(50).clamp(1, MAX_BOUNTY_LIMIT);
     let bounties = state
         .db
         .list_bounties(
             Some(&owner),
             Some(&repo),
             q.status.as_deref(),
-            limit,
-            None,
-            None,
+            q.limit.unwrap_or(50),
         )
         .await?;
 
@@ -142,92 +136,25 @@ pub async fn list_repo_bounties(
 pub async fn list_all_bounties(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Query(q): Query<ListBountiesQuery>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let raw_limit = q.limit.unwrap_or(50);
-    let limit = raw_limit.clamp(1, MAX_BOUNTY_LIMIT);
+    let bounties = state
+        .db
+        .list_bounties(None, None, q.status.as_deref(), q.limit.unwrap_or(50))
+        .await?;
 
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let mut memo = std::collections::HashMap::new();
-    let mut allowed: Vec<BountyRecord> = Vec::new();
-    let page_size = (limit * 5).clamp(1, 200);
-    let max_scanned = 10_000i64;
-    let mut total_scanned: i64 = 0;
-    let mut cursor: Option<(String, String)> = None;
-
-    while (allowed.len() as i64) < limit {
-        let after = cursor.as_ref().map(|(ts, id)| (ts.as_str(), id.as_str()));
-        let bounties = state
-            .db
-            .list_bounties(
-                None,
-                None,
-                q.status.as_deref(),
-                page_size,
-                after.map(|(ts, _)| ts),
-                after.map(|(_, id)| id),
-            )
-            .await?;
-        if bounties.is_empty() {
-            break;
-        }
-
-        total_scanned += bounties.len() as i64;
-        if total_scanned > max_scanned {
-            return Err(AppError::Incomplete(
-                "too many rows scanned; refine your filters".into(),
-            ));
-        }
-
-        let last = bounties.last().unwrap();
-        for b in &bounties {
-            if (allowed.len() as i64) >= limit {
-                break;
-            }
-            let key = format!("{}/{}", b.repo_owner, b.repo_name);
-            let admitted = if let Some(&result) = memo.get(&key) {
-                result
-            } else {
-                let result = crate::api::authorize_repo_read(
-                    &state,
-                    &b.repo_owner,
-                    &b.repo_name,
-                    caller,
-                    "/",
-                )
-                .await
-                .is_ok();
-                memo.insert(key, result);
-                result
-            };
-            if admitted {
-                allowed.push(b.clone());
-            }
-        }
-        cursor = Some((last.created_at.clone(), last.id.clone()));
-    }
-
-    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "bounties": allowed })))
+    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "bounties": bounties })))
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/bounties/{id}
 pub async fn get_bounty(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<BountyRecord>> {
-    let not_found = || AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found"));
-
-    let bounty = state.db.get_bounty(&id).await?.ok_or_else(not_found)?;
-
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    if crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &bounty.repo_owner, &bounty.repo_name, caller, "/")
-        .await
-        .is_err()
-    {
-        return Err(not_found());
-    }
-
+    let bounty = state
+        .db
+        .get_bounty(&id)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found")))?;
     Ok(Json(bounty))
 }
 
@@ -238,22 +165,11 @@ pub async fn claim_bounty(
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(req): Json<ClaimBountyRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<BountyRecord>> {
-    let not_found = || AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found"));
-
-    let bounty = state.db.get_bounty(&id).await?.ok_or_else(not_found)?;
-
-    if crate::api::authorize_repo_read(
-        &state,
-        &bounty.repo_owner,
-        &bounty.repo_name,
-        Some(auth.0.as_str()),
-        "/",
-    )
-    .await
-    .is_err()
-    {
-        return Err(not_found());
-    }
+    let bounty = state
+        .db
+        .get_bounty(&id)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found")))?;
 
     if bounty.status != "open" {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
@@ -297,12 +213,8 @@ pub async fn submit_bounty(
             bounty.status
         )));
     }
-    let is_claimant = bounty
-        .claimant_did
-        .as_deref()
-        .is_some_and(|c| crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, c));
-    if !is_claimant {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden("only the claimant can submit".into()));
+    if bounty.claimant_did.as_deref() != Some(&auth.0) {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest("only the claimant can submit".into()));
     }
 
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
@@ -337,8 +249,8 @@ pub async fn approve_bounty(
             bounty.status
         )));
     }
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &bounty.creator_did) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    if bounty.creator_did != auth.0 {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
             "only the bounty creator can approve".into(),
         ));
     }
@@ -384,8 +296,8 @@ pub async fn cancel_bounty(
             bounty.status
         )));
     }
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &bounty.creator_did) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    if bounty.creator_did != auth.0 {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
             "only the bounty creator can cancel".into(),
         ));
     }
@@ -420,19 +332,6 @@ pub async fn dispute_bounty(
         )));
     }
 
-    // Only the bounty creator or the current claimant may dispute (N19 — this
-    // endpoint had no identity check at all).
-    let is_creator = crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &bounty.creator_did);
-    let is_claimant = bounty
-        .claimant_did
-        .as_deref()
-        .is_some_and(|c| crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, c));
-    if !is_creator && !is_claimant {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "only the bounty creator or claimant can dispute this bounty".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
     // Check if deadline exceeded
     if let Some(ref claimed_at) = bounty.claimed_at {
         if let Ok(claimed) = chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339(claimed_at) {

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/certs.rs

@@ -1,44 +1,23 @@
 //! API handlers for ref certificates.
 
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-
-use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, Query, State};
+use axum::extract::{Path, State};
 use axum::Json;
 
-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
-/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/certs?limit=50
+/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/certs
 pub async fn list_certs(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    Query(params): Query<HashMap<String, String>>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let limit = params
-        .get("limit")
-        .and_then(|v| v.parse::<i64>().ok())
-        .map(|v| v.max(1))
-        .unwrap_or(50)
-        .min(200);
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
-
-    // When a prefix is given (short-ID resolution from the CLI) use a
-    // generous limit and delegate to the prefix-matched query so the
-    // caller can resolve IDs regardless of how many certs exist.
-    let prefix = params.get("prefix").filter(|p| !p.is_empty());
-    let certs = if let Some(prefix) = prefix {
-        state
-            .db
-            .list_ref_certificates_by_prefix(&record.id, prefix, 200)
-            .await?
-    } else {
-        state.db.list_ref_certificates(&record.id, limit).await?
-    };
+    let certs = state.db.list_ref_certificates(&record.id).await?;
     let certs_json: Vec<serde_json::Value> = certs
         .iter()
         .map(|c| {
@@ -56,21 +35,20 @@ pub async fn list_certs(
         })
         .collect();
 
-    let count = certs_json.len();
-    Ok(Json(
-        serde_json::json!({ "certificates": certs_json, "count": count }),
-    ))
+    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "certificates": certs_json })))
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/certs/{id}
 pub async fn get_cert(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name, id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    // Verify the repo exists
+    let _record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let cert = state
         .db
@@ -78,10 +56,6 @@ pub async fn get_cert(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("certificate {id}")))?;
 
-    if cert.repo_id != record.id {
-        return Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("certificate {id}")));
-    }
-
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
         "id":         cert.id,
         "repo_id":    cert.repo_id,

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/issues.rs

@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ pub async fn create_issue(
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Json(req): Json<CreateIssueRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<IssueRecord>)> {
-    // Authorize the caller as a reader before accepting an issue: a non-reader
-    // must not be able to file an issue against a private repo they cannot read.
-    // Mirrors create_issue_comment / create_review / create_bounty.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let issue_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
@@ -61,14 +61,11 @@ pub async fn create_issue(
     let json_str = serde_json::to_string(&issue)
         .map_err(|e| AppError::BadRequest(format!("serialization error: {e}")))?;
 
-    // Shed 503 + Retry-After on an exhausted write-lock POOL instead of a generic
-    // git 500 (#173 F1). This path holds no admission permit, so it reaches the pool
-    // unthrottled; reuse the push handler's mapping so the two cannot drift.
     let guard = state
         .repo_store
         .acquire_write(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
         .await
-        .map_err(|e| crate::api::repos::acquire_write_app_error(&e, &repo))?;
+        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
     let disk_path = guard.path().to_path_buf();
 
     let create_result = git_issues::create_issue(&disk_path, &issue_id, &json_str);
@@ -93,11 +90,12 @@ pub async fn create_issue(
 pub async fn list_issues(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let disk_path = state
         .repo_store
@@ -122,11 +120,12 @@ pub async fn list_issues(
 pub async fn get_issue(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo, issue_id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let disk_path = state
         .repo_store
@@ -162,9 +161,11 @@ pub async fn create_issue_comment(
         ));
     }
 
-    // Read-gate: a commenter must be able to read the repo, but need not own it.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let disk_path = state
         .repo_store
@@ -192,38 +193,21 @@ pub async fn create_issue_comment(
 pub async fn list_issue_comments(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo, issue_id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let _record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
-    let disk_path = state
-        .repo_store
-        .acquire(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
-    // Resolve the full issue ID (accepts 8-char prefix) so the DB fetch
-    // below uses the same canonical id as the git ref.
-    let full_id = match git_issues::resolve_issue_id(&disk_path, &issue_id)
-        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?
-    {
-        Some(id) => id,
-        None => {
-            return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!(
-                "issue {issue_id} not found"
-            )))
-        }
-    };
-
-    let comments = state.db.list_issue_comments(&full_id).await?;
+    let comments = state.db.list_issue_comments(&issue_id).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "comments": comments })))
 }
 
 /// POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{id}/close
 pub async fn close_issue(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Extension(_auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo, issue_id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let record = state
@@ -232,42 +216,13 @@ pub async fn close_issue(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
-    // Same capacity shed as create_issue above (#173 F1): an exhausted write-lock
-    // pool is a 503 + Retry-After, not a 500 git error.
     let guard = state
         .repo_store
         .acquire_write(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
         .await
-        .map_err(|e| crate::api::repos::acquire_write_app_error(&e, &repo))?;
+        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
     let disk_path = guard.path().to_path_buf();
 
-    // Owner OR issue author may close. The author lives in the issue's git-JSON
-    // blob (not a DB column); a None author (legacy issues) falls back to
-    // owner-only. Read it under the write guard, before mutating.
-    let author_did: Option<String> = match git_issues::get_issue(&disk_path, &issue_id) {
-        Ok(Some(raw)) => serde_json::from_str::<IssueRecord>(&raw)
-            .ok()
-            .and_then(|i| i.author),
-        Ok(None) => {
-            guard.release(false).await;
-            return Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("issue {issue_id} not found")));
-        }
-        Err(e) => {
-            guard.release(false).await;
-            return Err(AppError::Git(e.to_string()));
-        }
-    };
-    let is_owner = crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0).is_ok();
-    let is_author = author_did
-        .as_deref()
-        .is_some_and(|a| crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, a));
-    if !is_owner && !is_author {
-        guard.release(false).await;
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "only the repo owner or the issue author can close this issue".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
     let close_result = git_issues::close_issue(&disk_path, &issue_id);
 
     // Always release the advisory lock — even on error; upload to Tigris only on success.
@@ -284,168 +239,3 @@ pub async fn close_issue(
 
     Ok(Json(issue))
 }
-
-/// #173 F1 follow-up: the two issue write paths reach `acquire_write` holding NO
-/// admission permit (unlike the push handler, which is capped by the git-push
-/// semaphore), so they are the callers most likely to meet an exhausted write-lock
-/// POOL under load. An exhausted pool is a capacity signal, so both must shed
-/// 503 + Retry-After (`AppError::Overloaded`) the way the push handler does, not
-/// report the generic 500 git error that says nothing about retrying.
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod lock_pool_shed_tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use axum::response::IntoResponse;
-    use sqlx::PgPool;
-
-    fn seed_repo(owner_did: &str, name: &str) -> crate::db::RepoRecord {
-        let now = Utc::now();
-        crate::db::RepoRecord {
-            id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
-            name: name.to_string(),
-            owner_did: owner_did.to_string(),
-            description: None,
-            is_public: true,
-            default_branch: "main".to_string(),
-            created_at: now,
-            updated_at: now,
-            disk_path: format!("/tmp/{name}"),
-            forked_from: None,
-            machine_id: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// State whose repo store draws write locks from a ONE-connection pool with a
-    /// short checkout timeout, so a single held guard exhausts it promptly rather
-    /// than at the pool default.
-    async fn one_connection_lock_pool_state(pool: &PgPool) -> AppState {
-        let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
-        state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(
-            std::path::PathBuf::from("/tmp/gitlawb-issues-lockpool"),
-            None,
-            crate::git::repo_store::build_lock_pool(pool, 1, std::time::Duration::from_secs(1)),
-        );
-        state
-    }
-
-    /// The shed must be a real 503 carrying Retry-After, not just an internal enum
-    /// variant: assert on the rendered response so a remapping of `Overloaded` is
-    /// caught here too.
-    fn assert_sheds_503_with_retry_after(err: AppError, what: &str) {
-        let resp = err.into_response();
-        assert_eq!(
-            resp.status(),
-            StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
-            "{what}: an exhausted write-lock pool must shed 503, not a 500 git error"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            resp.headers()
-                .get("retry-after")
-                .map(|v| v.to_str().unwrap()),
-            Some("1"),
-            "{what}: a capacity shed must tell the client when to retry"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// RED-before/GREEN-after for `create_issue`. Both directions: the shed while the
-    /// only lock-pool connection is held by a guard on a DIFFERENT repo (so this is
-    /// pool capacity, not advisory-lock contention on this repo), and the must-not
-    /// case once that connection is back.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn create_issue_lock_pool_exhaustion_sheds_503_not_500(pool: PgPool) {
-        let owner = "did:key:zISSUECREATELOCKPOOLAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
-        let state = one_connection_lock_pool_state(&pool).await;
-        state
-            .db
-            .create_repo(&seed_repo(owner, "lp-create"))
-            .await
-            .expect("seed repo");
-
-        let held = state
-            .repo_store
-            .acquire_write(owner, "other-repo")
-            .await
-            .expect("the first write takes the only lock-pool connection");
-
-        let shed = create_issue(
-            State(state.clone()),
-            Extension(AuthenticatedDid(owner.to_string())),
-            Path((owner.to_string(), "lp-create".to_string())),
-            Json(CreateIssueRequest {
-                title: "t".to_string(),
-                body: None,
-                signed_payload: None,
-            }),
-        )
-        .await;
-        let err = shed.expect_err("an exhausted lock pool must fail the call");
-        assert_sheds_503_with_retry_after(err, "create_issue");
-
-        // MUST-NOT: with the pool free again the call is not shed as capacity (it
-        // fails later on the nonexistent on-disk repo, which is a git 500).
-        held.release(false).await;
-        let admitted = create_issue(
-            State(state.clone()),
-            Extension(AuthenticatedDid(owner.to_string())),
-            Path((owner.to_string(), "lp-create".to_string())),
-            Json(CreateIssueRequest {
-                title: "t".to_string(),
-                body: None,
-                signed_payload: None,
-            }),
-        )
-        .await;
-        assert!(
-            !matches!(admitted, Err(AppError::Overloaded(_))),
-            "with the lock pool free, create_issue must not be shed as capacity; got {:?}",
-            admitted.err()
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// RED-before/GREEN-after for `close_issue`, same two directions.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn close_issue_lock_pool_exhaustion_sheds_503_not_500(pool: PgPool) {
-        let owner = "did:key:zISSUECLOSELOCKPOOLBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
-        let state = one_connection_lock_pool_state(&pool).await;
-        state
-            .db
-            .create_repo(&seed_repo(owner, "lp-close"))
-            .await
-            .expect("seed repo");
-
-        let held = state
-            .repo_store
-            .acquire_write(owner, "other-repo")
-            .await
-            .expect("the first write takes the only lock-pool connection");
-
-        let shed = close_issue(
-            State(state.clone()),
-            Extension(AuthenticatedDid(owner.to_string())),
-            Path((
-                owner.to_string(),
-                "lp-close".to_string(),
-                "deadbeef".to_string(),
-            )),
-        )
-        .await;
-        let err = shed.expect_err("an exhausted lock pool must fail the call");
-        assert_sheds_503_with_retry_after(err, "close_issue");
-
-        held.release(false).await;
-        let admitted = close_issue(
-            State(state.clone()),
-            Extension(AuthenticatedDid(owner.to_string())),
-            Path((
-                owner.to_string(),
-                "lp-close".to_string(),
-                "deadbeef".to_string(),
-            )),
-        )
-        .await;
-        assert!(
-            !matches!(admitted, Err(AppError::Overloaded(_))),
-            "with the lock pool free, close_issue must not be shed as capacity; got {:?}",
-            admitted.err()
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/labels.rs

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ pub struct LabelRequest {
 /// POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/labels
 pub async fn add_label(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Extension(_auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Json(req): Json<LabelRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ pub async fn add_label(
         .get_repo(&owner, &name)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     let added = state.db.add_label(&record.id, &label).await?;
     let status = if added {
@@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ pub async fn add_label(
 /// DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/labels/:label
 pub async fn remove_label(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Extension(_auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name, label)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let record = state
@@ -64,25 +63,21 @@ pub async fn remove_label(
         .get_repo(&owner, &name)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     state.db.remove_label(&record.id, &label).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "label": label, "removed": true })))
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/labels
-///
-/// Read-visibility-gated (INV-2 root listing): a public repo's labels stay
-/// anonymously listable; a private repo's label names are hidden (404) from
-/// anyone who cannot read it at the root.
 pub async fn list_labels(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let labels = state.db.list_labels(&record.id).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "labels": labels })))

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/mod.rs

@@ -47,13 +47,6 @@ pub(crate) async fn authorize_repo_read(
         .get_repo(owner, name)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    // A quarantined mirror (admitted by the iCaptcha propagation gate but not
-    // validated) is hidden from every reader — serve/clone and fork alike — as if
-    // it did not exist, until an operator releases it. Checked before the
-    // visibility gate so its existence is never disclosed.
-    if state.db.is_repo_quarantined(&record.id).await? {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")));
-    }
     let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
     if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, path) == Decision::Deny
     {
@@ -61,643 +54,3 @@ pub(crate) async fn authorize_repo_read(
     }
     Ok((record, rules))
 }
-
-/// Match a presented DID against a stored DID that may be the full `did:key:<id>`
-/// form or the bare `<id>` short form (mirror rows store the bare key). Collapse
-/// representation only within `did:key`; never let a bare id match across methods —
-/// `did:web` / `did:gitlawb` share the base58 space with `did:key`, so a
-/// trailing-segment compare would treat `did:key:X` and `did:gitlawb:X` as equal.
-pub(crate) fn did_matches(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
-    if a == b {
-        return true;
-    }
-    fn key_id(d: &str) -> &str {
-        d.strip_prefix("did:key:").unwrap_or(d)
-    }
-    let (ka, kb) = (key_id(a), key_id(b));
-    // After stripping `did:key:`, a value still containing ':' is a non-key full
-    // DID — do not let it match a bare `did:key` id.
-    !ka.contains(':') && !kb.contains(':') && ka == kb
-}
-
-/// 403 unless `caller` is the repo owner. Uses [`did_matches`] so the owner check
-/// and the author check (close policy) share one normalization.
-pub(crate) fn require_repo_owner(record: &RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> Result<()> {
-    if did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
-        Ok(())
-    } else {
-        Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "only the repo owner can perform this action".into(),
-        ))
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod did_tests {
-    use super::did_matches;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn full_matches_bare_same_key() {
-        assert!(did_matches("did:key:zABC", "zABC"));
-        assert!(did_matches("zABC", "did:key:zABC"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_cross_method_collision() {
-        assert!(!did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:gitlawb:zABC"));
-        assert!(!did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:web:zABC"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn exact_match_and_distinct_keys() {
-        assert!(did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:key:zABC"));
-        assert!(!did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:key:zXYZ"));
-        assert!(!did_matches("zABC", "zXYZ"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn empty_did_matches() {
-        assert!(did_matches("", ""));
-        assert!(did_matches("", "did:key:"));
-    }
-}
-
-/// Drift guard (plan 002 §Gate-type table, Step 5). Every in-scope mutation
-/// handler must contain its expected gate marker in its own body; removing a
-/// gate fails this test. Source-level (no DB), so it runs everywhere. When a new
-/// route is added to an in-scope group, add its row here with a deliberate gate
-/// type — that forced decision is the point.
-///
-/// Markers are gate-SHAPED — a call (`require_repo_owner(`, `did_matches(`) or a
-/// binding/comparison expression (`caller != &record.owner_did`,
-/// `let owner_did = auth.0`) — never a bare identifier that could also appear in
-/// a log line. Full-line comments are stripped before matching, so a marker that
-/// survives only as a comment above a deleted gate does NOT satisfy a row.
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod authz_guard {
-    /// The body of `func` with full-line comments removed. Bounds the slice at the
-    /// next top-level fn item so a marker in a later handler can't leak in,
-    /// tolerating `pub async`, `pub(crate) async`, `async`, `pub`, and bare `fn`
-    /// declarations (the old single-`pub async fn` delimiter over-ran on any other
-    /// form).
-    fn fn_body(src: &str, func: &str) -> String {
-        let needle = format!("fn {func}(");
-        let start = src
-            .find(&needle)
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("handler `{func}` not found (renamed or removed?)"));
-        let rest = &src[start..];
-        let end = [
-            "\npub async fn ",
-            "\npub(crate) async fn ",
-            "\nasync fn ",
-            "\npub fn ",
-            "\nfn ",
-        ]
-        .iter()
-        .filter_map(|p| rest[1..].find(p).map(|i| i + 1))
-        .min()
-        .unwrap_or(rest.len());
-        rest[..end]
-            .lines()
-            .filter(|l| !l.trim_start().starts_with("//"))
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
-            .join("\n")
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn every_in_scope_mutation_has_its_gate() {
-        let pulls = include_str!("pulls.rs");
-        let webhooks = include_str!("webhooks.rs");
-        let labels = include_str!("labels.rs");
-        let issues = include_str!("issues.rs");
-        let bounties = include_str!("bounties.rs");
-        let replicas = include_str!("replicas.rs");
-        let events = include_str!("events.rs");
-        let tasks = include_str!("tasks.rs");
-        let stars = include_str!("stars.rs");
-        let protect = include_str!("protect.rs");
-        let visibility = include_str!("visibility.rs");
-        let profiles = include_str!("profiles.rs");
-        let repos = include_str!("repos.rs");
-        let register = include_str!("register.rs");
-        let ipfs = include_str!("ipfs.rs");
-
-        // (source, handler, expected gate marker)
-        let rows: &[(&str, &str, &str)] = &[
-            // Bucket A — owner-gate (require_repo_owner -> 403)
-            (pulls, "merge_pr", "require_repo_owner("),
-            (webhooks, "create_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
-            (webhooks, "delete_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
-            // Bucket A/B hybrid — list_webhooks is read-visibility THEN owner:
-            // authorize_repo_read 404s a non-reader of a private repo, then
-            // require_repo_owner 403s a non-owner of a public one. Both halves
-            // are pinned: the authorize_repo_read marker guards the read half
-            // (existence hiding) and require_repo_owner guards the owner half.
-            (webhooks, "list_webhooks", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (webhooks, "list_webhooks", "require_repo_owner("),
-            (labels, "add_label", "require_repo_owner("),
-            (labels, "remove_label", "require_repo_owner("),
-            // Bucket A' — owner OR author (did_matches against the author)
-            (pulls, "close_pr", "did_matches("),
-            (issues, "close_issue", "did_matches("),
-            // Bucket B — read-gate (authorize_repo_read)
-            (pulls, "create_review", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (pulls, "create_comment", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (pulls, "create_pr", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (issues, "create_issue_comment", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (issues, "create_issue", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (bounties, "create_bounty", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (repos, "fork_repo", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            // get_by_cid resolves each candidate (provenance path + legacy scan) through
-            // the shared `gate_and_serve`; the gate markers themselves are asserted
-            // below. This row proves the delegation is real, so the gate is actually
-            // reached rather than dead code. The delegated gate still calls
-            // `visibility_check` directly and never `authorize_repo_read`, so it keeps
-            // the property the pre-merge marker enforced: no fuzzy re-resolve.
-            (ipfs, "get_by_cid", "gate_and_serve("),
-            // Sibling read surfaces: gate private-repo metadata on read visibility
-            // (public repos stay anonymous; private repos 404).
-            (replicas, "list_replicas", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (protect, "list_protected_branches", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (labels, "list_labels", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (events, "list_repo_events", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            // Bucket C — signer-self: the acting DID is matched/bound to auth.0
-            (tasks, "create_task", "did_matches("),
-            (tasks, "claim_task", "did_matches("),
-            (tasks, "complete_task", "did_matches("),
-            (tasks, "fail_task", "did_matches("),
-            (repos, "create_repo", "let owner_did = auth.0"),
-            (profiles, "set_profile", "let did = auth.0"),
-            (register, "register", "did_matches("),
-            (stars, "star_repo", "caller = &auth.0"),
-            (stars, "unstar_repo", "caller = &auth.0"),
-            // Bucket D — non-owner-by-design, positive per-route marker
-            (bounties, "claim_bounty", "claim_bounty(&id, &auth.0"),
-            (bounties, "submit_bounty", "did_matches("),
-            (bounties, "approve_bounty", "did_matches("),
-            (bounties, "cancel_bounty", "did_matches("),
-            (bounties, "dispute_bounty", "did_matches("),
-            (replicas, "register_replica", "did_matches("),
-            (replicas, "unregister_replica", "replica_did = &auth.0"),
-            // PRE-GATED — already owner-gated, in-scope group; guard the gate itself
-            (protect, "protect_branch", "did_matches("),
-            (protect, "unprotect_branch", "did_matches("),
-            (visibility, "set_visibility", "require_owner("),
-            (visibility, "remove_visibility", "require_owner("),
-            (visibility, "list_visibility", "require_owner("),
-        ];
-
-        // The visibility rows prove require_owner is CALLED; this proves the helper
-        // itself does DID-safe matching, not a raw/trailing-segment compare.
-        assert!(
-            fn_body(visibility, "require_owner").contains("did_matches("),
-            "visibility::require_owner must use did_matches for DID-safe owner matching"
-        );
-
-        // The CID read surface (#173) enforces its gate inside the shared
-        // `gate_and_serve`, which BOTH the provenance path and the legacy scan call, so
-        // the markers must live there (the get_by_cid row above only proves delegation).
-        // The repo's own "/" visibility check (KTD2a — never authorize_repo_read's fuzzy
-        // re-resolve) and the quarantine hard-drop BEFORE visibility (INV-11) are both
-        // load-bearing: removing either re-opens a leak on the provenance path.
-        let gate_body = fn_body(ipfs, "gate_and_serve");
-        assert!(
-            gate_body.contains("visibility_check("),
-            "gate_and_serve must gate the CID read surface via visibility_check (KTD2a)"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            gate_body.contains("if quarantined"),
-            "gate_and_serve must hard-drop a quarantined repo before the visibility gate (INV-11)"
-        );
-
-        for (src, func, marker) in rows {
-            let body = fn_body(src, func);
-            assert!(
-                body.contains(marker),
-                "handler `{func}` is missing its gate marker `{marker}` — gate removed or route reclassified"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Proves the comment-stripping that GUARD-1 added: a marker that appears only
-    /// in a full-line comment (the real `replicas.rs` false-pass shape) must NOT
-    /// satisfy a row.
-    #[test]
-    fn comment_only_marker_does_not_satisfy_a_row() {
-        let src = "pub async fn demo() {\n    // did_matches( handles the owner form\n    do_thing();\n}\n";
-        assert!(
-            !fn_body(src, "demo").contains("did_matches("),
-            "a marker present only in a comment must not count as an enforced gate"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// All `pub async fn` / `pub(crate) async fn` handler names declared in `src`.
-    /// Verb-agnostic on purpose: a repo-scoped read of any name is in scope, so a
-    /// handler named `fetch_*` / `replicate_*` / `info_refs` cannot escape the gate
-    /// check by not being called `list_*` / `get_*`.
-    fn handler_names(src: &str) -> Vec<String> {
-        ["pub async fn ", "pub(crate) async fn "]
-            .iter()
-            .flat_map(|decl| {
-                src.match_indices(decl).map(move |(i, _)| {
-                    src[i + decl.len()..]
-                        .chars()
-                        .take_while(|c| c.is_alphanumeric() || *c == '_')
-                        .collect::<String>()
-                })
-            })
-            .collect()
-    }
-
-    /// True when the handler's signature takes an owner+repo path
-    /// (`Path<(String, String...)>`), i.e. it is a repo-scoped read rather than a
-    /// node-wide aggregate (`/stats`, `/ipfs/pins`, the global feeds).
-    fn is_repo_scoped(body: &str) -> bool {
-        let header = &body[..body.find('{').unwrap_or(body.len())];
-        header.contains("Path<(String, String")
-    }
-
-    /// True when at least one gate marker runs for EVERY service — i.e. some
-    /// marker sits outside any `if service == ...` discriminator block. A gate
-    /// that appears ONLY inside such a block (as the info/refs advertisement gate
-    /// did before #119: `visibility_check` ran under `if service ==
-    /// "git-upload-pack"`, leaving `git-receive-pack` ungated) covers a subset of
-    /// services and must NOT count as a full gate. Other handlers carry no
-    /// `service ==` discriminator, so for them this matches the plain
-    /// substring check. NOTE: only `if service ==` is detected — a
-    /// `match service { .. }` discriminator is NOT tracked and a gate inside one
-    /// arm would pass as full; avoid that shape, or extend the span loop below.
-    fn gate_runs_unconditionally(body: &str, markers: &[&str]) -> bool {
-        // Brace-matched spans of each `if service == ...` block.
-        let mut cond_spans: Vec<(usize, usize)> = Vec::new();
-        let mut search = 0;
-        while let Some(rel) = body[search..].find("if service ==") {
-            let cond_start = search + rel;
-            let Some(brace_rel) = body[cond_start..].find('{') else {
-                break;
-            };
-            let open = cond_start + brace_rel;
-            let mut depth = 0i32;
-            let mut end = body.len();
-            for (i, c) in body[open..].char_indices() {
-                match c {
-                    '{' => depth += 1,
-                    '}' => {
-                        depth -= 1;
-                        if depth == 0 {
-                            end = open + i;
-                            break;
-                        }
-                    }
-                    _ => {}
-                }
-            }
-            cond_spans.push((open, end));
-            // On an unclosed block `end` stays at body.len() (the fail-safe
-            // direction: treat the rest as conditional rather than mask a gate);
-            // clamp so the next slice can't index past the end and panic.
-            search = (end + 1).min(body.len());
-        }
-        markers.iter().any(|m| {
-            body.match_indices(m)
-                .any(|(pos, _)| !cond_spans.iter().any(|(s, e)| pos >= *s && pos <= *e))
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Collect `.rs` source files under `dir`. Recursive so the completeness scan
-    /// covers nested API modules (`api/<module>/mod.rs` and deeper), not only the
-    /// immediate `api/*.rs` children.
-    fn collect_rs_files(dir: &std::path::Path) -> Vec<std::path::PathBuf> {
-        let mut out = Vec::new();
-        for entry in std::fs::read_dir(dir).expect("read api dir") {
-            let path = entry.expect("dir entry").path();
-            if path.is_dir() {
-                out.extend(collect_rs_files(&path));
-            } else if path.extension().is_some_and(|e| e == "rs") {
-                out.push(path);
-            }
-        }
-        out
-    }
-
-    /// The `.rs` files under `api_root` (as paths RELATIVE to it) that the
-    /// completeness scan must inspect: everything except the top-level `mod.rs` (the
-    /// guard file itself) and the top-level files already covered by the per-handler
-    /// `sources` loop. A nested `api/<module>/<name>.rs` is a distinct source file
-    /// even when its basename matches a listed top-level file, so it stays in scope.
-    fn unlisted_source_files(
-        api_root: &std::path::Path,
-        listed: &std::collections::HashSet<&str>,
-    ) -> Vec<String> {
-        collect_rs_files(api_root)
-            .iter()
-            .filter_map(|path| {
-                let rel = path
-                    .strip_prefix(api_root)
-                    .ok()?
-                    .to_string_lossy()
-                    .replace('\\', "/");
-                if rel == "mod.rs" || listed.contains(rel.as_str()) {
-                    None
-                } else {
-                    Some(rel)
-                }
-            })
-            .collect()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn collect_rs_files_recurses_subdirs() {
-        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let root = tmp.path();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("a.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("note.txt"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("sub/deep")).unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/mod.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/deep/c.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        let names: std::collections::HashSet<String> = collect_rs_files(root)
-            .iter()
-            .map(|p| {
-                p.strip_prefix(root)
-                    .unwrap()
-                    .to_string_lossy()
-                    .replace('\\', "/")
-            })
-            .collect();
-        assert!(names.contains("a.rs"));
-        assert!(
-            names.contains("sub/mod.rs"),
-            "nested module file must be collected"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            names.contains("sub/deep/c.rs"),
-            "deeply nested file must be collected"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !names.iter().any(|n| n.ends_with(".txt")),
-            "non-rs files excluded"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(names.len(), 3);
-    }
-
-    // P3 (#119): the completeness scan must skip already-covered files by their path
-    // RELATIVE to api_root, not by basename. A nested api/<module>/repos.rs is a
-    // distinct source file from the covered top-level repos.rs and must still be
-    // scanned, or a new nested module could smuggle in an ungated repo-scoped handler
-    // behind a colliding filename.
-    #[test]
-    fn unlisted_source_files_scans_nested_file_with_colliding_basename() {
-        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let root = tmp.path();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("repos.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("mod.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("sub")).unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/repos.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/fresh.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        let listed: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = ["repos.rs"].into_iter().collect();
-
-        let unlisted = unlisted_source_files(root, &listed);
-
-        assert!(
-            unlisted.contains(&"sub/repos.rs".to_string()),
-            "a nested file whose basename matches a listed top-level file must still be scanned"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            unlisted.contains(&"sub/fresh.rs".to_string()),
-            "a nested file with a unique name must be scanned"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !unlisted.contains(&"repos.rs".to_string()),
-            "the listed top-level file is covered by the per-handler loop"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !unlisted.contains(&"mod.rs".to_string()),
-            "the top-level guard file is skipped"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Egress gate guard: every repo-scoped handler (`Path<(String, String..)>`)
-    /// must carry an authz marker — a read gate (`authorize_repo_read` /
-    /// `visibility_check`), or a write gate (`require_repo_owner` / `require_owner`
-    /// / `did_matches` / a `&auth.0` self-binding) — or be listed in KNOWN_UNGATED
-    /// (the tracked, ungated reads). A new ungated handler of ANY verb trips this,
-    /// and a completeness scan over `src/api/` trips it for a whole new module that
-    /// adds a repo-scoped handler without being wired into `sources`. Mutations are
-    /// also checked precisely, per handler, by the mutation guard above; here they
-    /// only need *some* binding so the net stays verb-agnostic.
-    ///
-    /// Scope and limits (this is a source scrape; the runtime route guard covers
-    /// behaviour):
-    /// - It proves a gate is CALLED, not that it runs on the requested path: a
-    ///   content handler gating `"/"` instead of the subtree still passes here.
-    /// - It sees handlers taking the owner+repo tuple `Path<(String, String..)>`; a
-    ///   repo identified by a struct/custom extractor would be missed (the helper
-    ///   unit tests pin these boundaries).
-    /// - KNOWN_UNGATED entries need a real open issue and review; the staleness
-    ///   assert removes one only once its gate lands.
-    #[test]
-    fn every_repo_scoped_handler_is_gated() {
-        let sources: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
-            (include_str!("bounties.rs"), "bounties.rs"),
-            (include_str!("certs.rs"), "certs.rs"),
-            (include_str!("changelog.rs"), "changelog.rs"),
-            (include_str!("encrypted.rs"), "encrypted.rs"),
-            (include_str!("events.rs"), "events.rs"),
-            (include_str!("issues.rs"), "issues.rs"),
-            (include_str!("labels.rs"), "labels.rs"),
-            (include_str!("protect.rs"), "protect.rs"),
-            (include_str!("pulls.rs"), "pulls.rs"),
-            (include_str!("replicas.rs"), "replicas.rs"),
-            (include_str!("repos.rs"), "repos.rs"),
-            (include_str!("stars.rs"), "stars.rs"),
-            (include_str!("visibility.rs"), "visibility.rs"),
-            (include_str!("webhooks.rs"), "webhooks.rs"),
-        ];
-        let listed: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = sources.iter().map(|(_, f)| *f).collect();
-        assert!(!listed.is_empty(), "read-guard `sources` is empty");
-
-        // Completeness: every api/*.rs NOT already in `sources` must declare no
-        // repo-scoped handler, so a brand-new module cannot add an ungated handler
-        // the scrape never looks at. Reads the directory at test time (so the list
-        // cannot silently drift from the filesystem) and only inspects unlisted
-        // files — listed files are covered by the per-handler loop below.
-        let api_dir = concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/src/api");
-        for (_, f) in sources {
-            assert!(
-                std::path::Path::new(api_dir).join(f).exists(),
-                "read-guard `sources` lists {f} but the file does not exist"
-            );
-        }
-        let api_root = std::path::Path::new(api_dir);
-        for rel in unlisted_source_files(api_root, &listed) {
-            let src = std::fs::read_to_string(api_root.join(&rel)).expect("read api file");
-            let has_repo_handler = handler_names(&src)
-                .iter()
-                .any(|n| is_repo_scoped(&fn_body(&src, n)));
-            assert!(
-                !has_repo_handler,
-                "api/{rel} declares a repo-scoped handler but is not in the egress \
-                 guard `sources` list — add it so its handlers are gate-checked"
-            );
-        }
-
-        // Repo-scoped reads known to be ungated today, each tracked by an issue.
-        // Remove an entry the moment its gate lands (the staleness assert enforces it).
-        let known_ungated: &[(&str, &str)] = &[];
-        let is_known = |n: &str| known_ungated.iter().any(|(k, _)| *k == n);
-        // Any one of these = the handler binds the caller to an authz decision: the
-        // first two are read gates, the rest are the write/owner/self-binding forms.
-        // A repo-scoped mutation passes here on its write gate; the mutation guard
-        // above additionally verifies the exact gate type per handler. NOTE: a local
-        // rename of `caller`/`replica_did` must be paired with a marker update here.
-        let markers = [
-            "authorize_repo_read(",
-            "visibility_check(",
-            "require_repo_owner(",
-            "require_owner(",
-            "did_matches(",
-            "caller = &auth.0",
-            "replica_did = &auth.0",
-        ];
-
-        // Every KNOWN_UNGATED name must be a real handler (catch typos / renames).
-        let all: std::collections::HashSet<String> =
-            sources.iter().flat_map(|(s, _)| handler_names(s)).collect();
-        for (n, _) in known_ungated {
-            assert!(
-                all.contains(*n),
-                "KNOWN_UNGATED lists `{n}`, which is not a real handler (renamed or removed?)"
-            );
-        }
-
-        let mut checked = 0usize;
-        for (src, file) in sources {
-            for name in handler_names(src) {
-                let body = fn_body(src, &name);
-                if !is_repo_scoped(&body) {
-                    continue; // node-wide aggregate, not a repo-scoped surface
-                }
-                checked += 1;
-                let gated = gate_runs_unconditionally(&body, &markers);
-                assert!(
-                    gated || is_known(&name),
-                    "repo-scoped handler `{name}` ({file}) has no authz gate and is \
-                     not in KNOWN_UNGATED — add the visibility/owner gate with the \
-                     caller, or track it there"
-                );
-                assert!(
-                    !(gated && is_known(&name)),
-                    "handler `{name}` ({file}) is now gated — remove it from \
-                     KNOWN_UNGATED so the allowlist stays an accurate gap list"
-                );
-            }
-        }
-        // Tripwire: if the scrape silently stopped finding handlers (e.g. a parser
-        // regression in handler_names/is_repo_scoped), this floor fails loudly
-        // instead of the guard passing vacuously. Current count is ~54 repo-scoped
-        // handlers; 20 is a deliberate floor that trips only on a gross regression.
-        assert!(
-            checked >= 20,
-            "egress guard only checked {checked} repo-scoped handlers — the scrape likely broke"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Pins the `handler_names` boundary: it collects every `pub`/`pub(crate)
-    /// async fn` regardless of verb (so a `fetch_*` read cannot escape), and skips
-    /// private `async fn` and sync `fn` helpers.
-    #[test]
-    fn handler_names_finds_all_pub_async_and_skips_others() {
-        let src = "pub async fn list_things() {}\n\
-                   pub async fn fetch_thing() {}\n\
-                   pub(crate) async fn get_crate_thing() {}\n\
-                   async fn private_helper() {}\n\
-                   fn sync_helper() {}\n";
-        let names = handler_names(src);
-        // Verb-agnostic: a non-list/get read verb is still seen.
-        assert!(names.contains(&"list_things".to_string()));
-        assert!(names.contains(&"fetch_thing".to_string()));
-        // pub(crate) routed handlers are in scope too.
-        assert!(names.contains(&"get_crate_thing".to_string()));
-        // Private/sync helpers are not routed handlers and are skipped.
-        assert!(!names
-            .iter()
-            .any(|n| n == "private_helper" || n == "sync_helper"));
-    }
-
-    /// Pins the `is_repo_scoped` boundary: an owner+repo tuple Path is repo-scoped;
-    /// a single-segment or absent Path is a node-wide aggregate.
-    #[test]
-    fn is_repo_scoped_requires_owner_repo_path() {
-        let repo =
-            "fn get_x(s: State, Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>) {\n  body();\n}";
-        let three = "fn get_y(Path((o, n, id)): Path<(String, String, String)>) {\n  body();\n}";
-        let node_wide = "fn list_z(s: State<AppState>) {\n  body();\n}";
-        let single = "fn get_w(Path(cid): Path<String>) {\n  body();\n}";
-        assert!(is_repo_scoped(repo), "owner+repo tuple is repo-scoped");
-        assert!(is_repo_scoped(three), "owner+repo+id tuple is repo-scoped");
-        assert!(!is_repo_scoped(node_wide), "no Path is node-wide");
-        assert!(
-            !is_repo_scoped(single),
-            "single-segment Path is not repo-scoped"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Pins `gate_runs_unconditionally`: a gate nested only inside an
-    /// `if service == ...` block is conditional (does NOT count), while the same
-    /// gate at the top level — or an additional unconditional one — does.
-    #[test]
-    fn conditional_service_gate_is_not_a_full_gate() {
-        let markers = ["visibility_check("];
-        // Gate runs only for one service: not a full gate.
-        let conditional = "fn f() {\n  \
-            if service == \"git-upload-pack\" {\n    \
-                visibility_check(rules, caller);\n  \
-            }\n  \
-            if service == \"git-receive-pack\" { acquire_fresh(); }\n}";
-        assert!(
-            !gate_runs_unconditionally(conditional, &markers),
-            "a gate only inside `if service ==` covers a subset of services"
-        );
-        // Same gate at top level: full gate.
-        let unconditional = "fn f() {\n  \
-            visibility_check(rules, caller);\n  \
-            if service == \"git-receive-pack\" { acquire_fresh(); }\n}";
-        assert!(
-            gate_runs_unconditionally(unconditional, &markers),
-            "an unconditional gate runs for every service"
-        );
-        // A gate inside EACH of two service blocks, none outside: still a
-        // subset (no service clears it unconditionally), so not a full gate.
-        let both_conditional = "fn f() {\n  \
-            if service == \"git-upload-pack\" { visibility_check(a); }\n  \
-            if service == \"git-receive-pack\" { visibility_check(b); }\n}";
-        assert!(
-            !gate_runs_unconditionally(both_conditional, &markers),
-            "a gate inside every service block is still conditional"
-        );
-        // A marker inside one block AND again unconditionally: the
-        // unconditional occurrence makes it a full gate (exercises the
-        // match_indices scan past the in-block hit).
-        let inside_and_outside = "fn f() {\n  \
-            if service == \"git-upload-pack\" { visibility_check(a); }\n  \
-            visibility_check(b);\n}";
-        assert!(
-            gate_runs_unconditionally(inside_and_outside, &markers),
-            "an unconditional occurrence counts even when another is conditional"
-        );
-        // No marker at all: not gated.
-        assert!(!gate_runs_unconditionally(
-            "fn f() { do_thing(); }",
-            &markers
-        ));
-        // An unclosed `if service ==` block (e.g. phantom brace from a string
-        // literal) must not panic on the slice advance; the span runs to EOF, so
-        // the in-block marker reads as conditional. Real Rust source is balanced,
-        // so this only guards the scraper against a future pathological body.
-        let unclosed = "fn f() { if service == \"x\" { visibility_check(a);";
-        assert!(
-            !gate_runs_unconditionally(unclosed, &markers),
-            "an unclosed service block must not panic and stays conditional"
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/profiles.rs

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ pub async fn set_profile(
                     &state.http_client,
                     &state.config.pinata_upload_url,
                     &state.config.pinata_jwt,
-                    &format!("profile-{}", did),
+                    &format!("profile-{}", &did),
                     &profile_json,
                 )
                 .await

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/protect.rs

@@ -23,10 +23,15 @@ pub async fn protect_branch(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
-    // Only the repo owner can protect branches (DID-safe match, shared idiom).
+    // Only the repo owner can protect branches
     let caller = &auth.0;
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    let owner_short = record
+        .owner_did
+        .split(':')
+        .next_back()
+        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    if caller != &record.owner_did && caller != owner_short {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
             "only the repo owner can protect branches".into(),
         ));
     }
@@ -58,8 +63,13 @@ pub async fn unprotect_branch(
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let caller = &auth.0;
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    let owner_short = record
+        .owner_did
+        .split(':')
+        .next_back()
+        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    if caller != &record.owner_did && caller != owner_short {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
             "only the repo owner can unprotect branches".into(),
         ));
     }
@@ -79,14 +89,12 @@ pub async fn unprotect_branch(
 pub async fn list_protected_branches(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    // Read-visibility-gated (INV-2 root listing): a public repo's protected
-    // branches stay anonymously listable; a private repo's branch names are
-    // hidden (404) from anyone who cannot read it at the root.
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let branches = state.db.list_protected_branches(&record.id).await?;
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/pulls.rs

@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ pub async fn create_pr(
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Json(req): Json<CreatePrRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<PullRequest>)> {
-    // Authorize the caller as a reader before accepting a PR: a non-reader must
-    // not be able to open a PR (and fire its webhooks) against a private repo
-    // they cannot read. Mirrors create_review / create_comment / create_bounty.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let author_did = auth.0;
     let target_branch = req
@@ -194,11 +194,6 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
-    // Owner-only merge (N7). Merging writes the served tree, so this is the same
-    // trust boundary as owner-only push; it subsumes branch protection (a
-    // non-owner cannot merge to any branch, protected or not).
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
-
     let pr = state
         .db
         .get_pr(&record.id, number)
@@ -209,14 +204,11 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!("PR is already {}", pr.status)));
     }
 
-    // Shed 503 + Retry-After on an exhausted write-lock POOL instead of a generic
-    // git 500 (#173 F1). Merging holds no admission permit, so it reaches the pool
-    // unthrottled; reuse the push handler's mapping so the two cannot drift.
     let guard = state
         .repo_store
         .acquire_write(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
         .await
-        .map_err(|e| crate::api::repos::acquire_write_app_error(&e, &name))?;
+        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
     let disk_path = guard.path().to_path_buf();
     let merger_did = auth.0;
     let merge_result = store::merge_branch(
@@ -260,7 +252,6 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
 /// POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/pulls/:number/close
 pub async fn close_pr(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let record = state
@@ -275,15 +266,6 @@ pub async fn close_pr(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("PR #{number} not found")))?;
 
-    // Owner OR author may close (forge norm).
-    let is_owner = crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0).is_ok();
-    let is_author = crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &pr.author_did);
-    if !is_owner && !is_author {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "only the repo owner or the PR author can close this PR".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
     state.db.close_pr(&pr.id).await?;
 
     webhooks::fire_event(
@@ -308,9 +290,11 @@ pub async fn create_review(
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
     Json(req): Json<CreateReviewRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<PrReview>)> {
-    // Read-gate: a reviewer must be able to read the repo, but need not own it.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -385,9 +369,11 @@ pub async fn create_comment(
         ));
     }
 
-    // Read-gate: a commenter must be able to read the repo, but need not own it.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -427,116 +413,3 @@ pub async fn list_comments(
     let comments = state.db.list_pr_comments(&pr.id).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "comments": comments })))
 }
-
-/// #173 F1 follow-up: `merge_pr` reaches `acquire_write` holding NO admission permit
-/// (unlike the push handler, which is capped by the git-push semaphore), so it is one
-/// of the callers most likely to meet an exhausted write-lock POOL under load. An
-/// exhausted pool is a capacity signal, so the merge must shed 503 + Retry-After
-/// (`AppError::Overloaded`) the way the push handler does, not report the generic
-/// 500 git error that says nothing about retrying.
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod lock_pool_shed_tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use axum::response::IntoResponse;
-    use sqlx::PgPool;
-
-    fn seed_repo(owner_did: &str, name: &str) -> crate::db::RepoRecord {
-        let now = Utc::now();
-        crate::db::RepoRecord {
-            id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
-            name: name.to_string(),
-            owner_did: owner_did.to_string(),
-            description: None,
-            is_public: true,
-            default_branch: "main".to_string(),
-            created_at: now,
-            updated_at: now,
-            disk_path: format!("/tmp/{name}"),
-            forked_from: None,
-            machine_id: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// RED-before/GREEN-after for `merge_pr`. Both directions: the shed while the only
-    /// lock-pool connection is held by a guard on a DIFFERENT repo (so this is pool
-    /// capacity, not advisory-lock contention on this repo), and the must-not case
-    /// once that connection is back.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn merge_pr_lock_pool_exhaustion_sheds_503_not_500(pool: PgPool) {
-        let owner = "did:key:zMERGELOCKPOOLOWNERAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
-        let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
-        // One lock-pool connection with a short checkout timeout, so a single held
-        // guard exhausts it promptly rather than at the pool default.
-        state.repo_store = crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(
-            std::path::PathBuf::from("/tmp/gitlawb-pulls-lockpool"),
-            None,
-            crate::git::repo_store::build_lock_pool(&pool, 1, std::time::Duration::from_secs(1)),
-        );
-
-        let repo = seed_repo(owner, "lp-merge");
-        let repo_id = repo.id.clone();
-        state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.expect("seed repo");
-        let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
-        state
-            .db
-            .create_pr(&PullRequest {
-                id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
-                repo_id: repo_id.clone(),
-                number: 1,
-                title: "lp".to_string(),
-                body: None,
-                author_did: owner.to_string(),
-                source_branch: "feature".to_string(),
-                target_branch: "main".to_string(),
-                status: "open".to_string(),
-                merged_by_did: None,
-                merged_at: None,
-                created_at: now.clone(),
-                updated_at: now,
-            })
-            .await
-            .expect("seed open PR");
-
-        let held = state
-            .repo_store
-            .acquire_write(owner, "other-repo")
-            .await
-            .expect("the first write takes the only lock-pool connection");
-
-        let shed = merge_pr(
-            State(state.clone()),
-            Extension(AuthenticatedDid(owner.to_string())),
-            Path((owner.to_string(), "lp-merge".to_string(), 1)),
-        )
-        .await;
-        let err = shed.expect_err("an exhausted lock pool must fail the call");
-        let resp = err.into_response();
-        assert_eq!(
-            resp.status(),
-            StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
-            "merge_pr: an exhausted write-lock pool must shed 503, not a 500 git error"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            resp.headers()
-                .get("retry-after")
-                .map(|v| v.to_str().unwrap()),
-            Some("1"),
-            "merge_pr: a capacity shed must tell the client when to retry"
-        );
-
-        // MUST-NOT: with the pool free again the merge is not shed as capacity (it
-        // fails later on the nonexistent on-disk repo, which is a git 500).
-        held.release(false).await;
-        let admitted = merge_pr(
-            State(state.clone()),
-            Extension(AuthenticatedDid(owner.to_string())),
-            Path((owner.to_string(), "lp-merge".to_string(), 1)),
-        )
-        .await;
-        assert!(
-            !matches!(admitted, Err(AppError::Overloaded(_))),
-            "with the lock pool free, merge_pr must not be shed as capacity; got {:?}",
-            admitted.err()
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/register.rs

@@ -35,32 +35,14 @@ pub struct RegisterResponse {
 /// Accepts only requests with a valid HTTP Signature (enforced by middleware).
 pub async fn register(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    axum::Extension(auth): axum::Extension<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>,
-    headers: axum::http::HeaderMap,
     Json(req): Json<RegisterRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<RegisterResponse>)> {
-    // iCaptcha gate (inert unless ICAPTCHA_MODE is set). Verify up front; spend
-    // the proof only once the request is admissible, just before the write, so a
-    // rejected request never burns a valid proof.
-    let proof = crate::icaptcha::verify_request(&headers, &auth.0)?;
-
     // Parse and validate the DID
     let agent_did: Did = req
         .did
         .parse()
         .map_err(|e: gitlawb_core::Error| AppError::BadRequest(e.to_string()))?;
 
-    // Bind registration to the authenticated signer: an agent may only register
-    // itself, not create or refresh a trust row for a DID it does not control.
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, agent_did.as_str()) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "did must be the authenticated signer".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    // Request is admissible — spend the proof now, immediately before the write.
-    proof.consume(&state.db).await?;
-
     // Store the agent in the local index
     state
         .db

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/replicas.rs

@@ -47,9 +47,8 @@ pub async fn register_replica(
 
     let replica_did = &auth.0;
 
-    // Don't let an owner register themselves as a replica of their own repo
-    // (did_matches handles the full vs bare did:key owner form).
-    if crate::api::did_matches(replica_did, &record.owner_did) {
+    // Don't let an owner register themselves as a replica of their own repo.
+    if replica_did == &record.owner_did {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
             "the repo owner is not a replica of their own repo".into(),
         ));
@@ -113,17 +112,16 @@ pub async fn unregister_replica(
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/replicas
-/// Read-visibility-gated: a PUBLIC repo's replica list stays anonymously
-/// listable (mirror-discovery), but a PRIVATE repo's replica URLs are hidden
-/// (404) from anyone who cannot read the repo at its root.
+/// Public — returns the list of replicas (DID + URL + registration timestamp).
 pub async fn list_replicas(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let replicas = state.db.list_replicas(&record.id).await?;
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/stars.rs

@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
 //!
 //! Any authenticated agent can star or unstar a repo.
 //! One agent = one star per repo (enforced by UNIQUE constraint in repo_stars).
-//! Star count is gated on repo read access.
+//! Star count is public — no auth required on GET.
 
 use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
 use axum::Json;
 
 use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
-use crate::error::Result;
+use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
 /// PUT /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/star
@@ -19,8 +19,11 @@ pub async fn star_repo(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let caller = &auth.0;
     let inserted = state.db.star_repo(&record.id, caller).await?;
@@ -51,8 +54,11 @@ pub async fn unstar_repo(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let caller = &auth.0;
     state.db.unstar_repo(&record.id, caller).await?;
@@ -68,15 +74,16 @@ pub async fn unstar_repo(
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/star
-/// Returns star count for callers who can read the repo.
+/// Returns star count — unauthenticated.
 pub async fn get_star_status(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let count = state.db.count_stars(&record.id).await?;
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/tasks.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 //!   POST   /api/v1/tasks/{id}/fail          — fail task
 
 use axum::{
-    extract::{Extension, Path, Query, State},
+    extract::{Path, Query, State},
     http::StatusCode,
     Json,
 };
@@ -18,18 +18,9 @@ use serde::Deserialize;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::db::AgentTask;
 use crate::state::{AppState, TaskEventBroadcast};
 
-/// 403 in this module's error shape (`(StatusCode, Json<Value>)`, not `AppError`).
-fn forbidden(msg: &str) -> (StatusCode, Json<Value>) {
-    (
-        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
-        Json(json!({ "error": "forbidden", "message": msg })),
-    )
-}
-
 // ── Request / response types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -64,11 +55,13 @@ pub struct ClaimTaskBody {
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 pub struct CompleteTaskBody {
     pub result: Option<String>,
+    pub by_did: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 pub struct FailTaskBody {
     pub reason: Option<String>,
+    pub by_did: Option<String>,
 }
 
 fn task_to_json(t: &AgentTask) -> Value {
@@ -94,20 +87,15 @@ fn task_to_json(t: &AgentTask) -> Value {
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks
 pub async fn create_task(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Json(body): Json<CreateTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<Value>), (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    // Bind the delegator to the authenticated signer (N13).
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &body.delegator_did) {
-        return Err(forbidden("delegator_did must be the authenticated signer"));
-    }
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
     let task = AgentTask {
         id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
         repo_id: body.repo_id,
         kind: body.kind,
         status: "pending".to_string(),
-        delegator_did: auth.0,
+        delegator_did: body.delegator_did,
         assignee_did: body.assignee_did,
         capability: body.capability,
         ucan_token: body.ucan_token,
@@ -166,25 +154,24 @@ pub async fn get_task(
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/claim
 pub async fn claim_task(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(body): Json<ClaimTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    // Bind the assignee to the authenticated signer (N13).
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &body.assignee_did) {
-        return Err(forbidden("assignee_did must be the authenticated signer"));
-    }
-    let task = state.db.claim_task(&id, &auth.0).await.map_err(|e| {
-        (
-            StatusCode::CONFLICT,
-            Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
-        )
-    })?;
+    let task = state
+        .db
+        .claim_task(&id, &body.assignee_did)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            (
+                StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
+            )
+        })?;
     let _ = state.task_event_tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
         task_id: id,
         old_status: "pending".to_string(),
         new_status: "claimed".to_string(),
-        by_did: auth.0,
+        by_did: body.assignee_did,
         at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
     });
     Ok(Json(task_to_json(&task)))
@@ -193,44 +180,17 @@ pub async fn claim_task(
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/complete
 pub async fn complete_task(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(body): Json<CompleteTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    // Authorize the actor, not just bind their identity: the N13 signer-binding
-    // proved the caller was whoever they claimed, but never that they were the
-    // task's assignee. Load the task and require the caller to be its assignee;
-    // finish_task then transitions only a claimed task.
-    let existing = state
-        .db
-        .get_task(&id)
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            (
-                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
-                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
-            )
-        })?
-        .ok_or_else(|| {
-            (
-                StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
-                Json(json!({ "error": "task not found" })),
-            )
-        })?;
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(
-        &auth.0,
-        existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
-    ) {
-        return Err(forbidden("only the task assignee can complete it"));
-    }
-    let by_did = auth.0;
+    let by_did = body.by_did.unwrap_or_default();
     let task = state
         .db
         .finish_task(&id, "completed", body.result.as_deref())
         .await
         .map_err(|e| {
             (
-                StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+                StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
                 Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
             )
         })?;
@@ -247,36 +207,10 @@ pub async fn complete_task(
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/fail
 pub async fn fail_task(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(body): Json<FailTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    // Authorize the actor, not just bind their identity (see complete_task): only
-    // the task's assignee may fail it, and finish_task transitions only a claimed
-    // task.
-    let existing = state
-        .db
-        .get_task(&id)
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            (
-                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
-                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
-            )
-        })?
-        .ok_or_else(|| {
-            (
-                StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
-                Json(json!({ "error": "task not found" })),
-            )
-        })?;
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(
-        &auth.0,
-        existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
-    ) {
-        return Err(forbidden("only the task assignee can fail it"));
-    }
-    let by_did = auth.0;
+    let by_did = body.by_did.unwrap_or_default();
     let reason = body.reason.unwrap_or_default();
     let task = state
         .db
@@ -284,7 +218,7 @@ pub async fn fail_task(
         .await
         .map_err(|e| {
             (
-                StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+                StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
                 Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
             )
         })?;

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/visibility.rs

@@ -26,16 +26,17 @@ pub struct RemoveVisibilityRequest {
 }
 
 fn require_owner(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> Result<()> {
-    // DID-safe owner match (collapses did:key full vs bare on both sides, never
-    // across methods), shared with require_repo_owner — not a trailing-segment
-    // compare that only normalized the owner side.
-    if crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
-        Ok(())
-    } else {
-        Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    let owner_short = record
+        .owner_did
+        .split(':')
+        .next_back()
+        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    if caller != record.owner_did && caller != owner_short {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
             "only the repo owner can manage visibility".into(),
-        ))
+        ));
     }
+    Ok(())
 }
 
 /// Reject malformed globs before they reach the store, where they would
@@ -56,23 +57,9 @@ fn validate_path_glob(path_glob: &str) -> Result<()> {
             "path_glob must not end with '/'".into(),
         ));
     }
-    // Reject empty path segments. `glob_prefix` collapses "//**" to "/" (whole
-    // repo), so without this an operator could bypass the "/**" guard above and
-    // grant repo-wide read with "//**", or set a dead rule like "//secret/**"
-    // whose prefix never matches a real single-slash path and silently leaves
-    // the subtree readable.
-    if path_glob.contains("//") {
+    if path_glob.contains('*') && !path_glob.ends_with("/**") {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "path_glob must not contain empty path segments".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-    // Strip the one permitted trailing "/**" before checking for stray
-    // wildcards, otherwise a "*" elsewhere in the prefix (e.g. "/a*b/**" or
-    // "/a/**/**") slips through because the string still ends with "/**".
-    let prefix = path_glob.strip_suffix("/**").unwrap_or(path_glob);
-    if prefix.contains('*') {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "the only supported wildcard is a single trailing '/**'".into(),
+            "the only supported wildcard is a trailing '/**'".into(),
         ));
     }
     Ok(())
@@ -253,22 +240,9 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn rejects_malformed_globs() {
-        // empty, no leading slash, whole-repo via "/**", trailing slash,
-        // non-trailing wildcards, double wildcards, and empty path segments
-        // (which would collapse to whole-repo or a dead rule) are all rejected.
-        for g in [
-            "",
-            "secret/**",
-            "/**",
-            "/**/**",
-            "/secret/",
-            "/a*b",
-            "/*/x",
-            "/a*b/**",
-            "/a/**/**",
-            "//**",
-            "//secret/**",
-        ] {
+        // empty, no leading slash, whole-repo via "/**", trailing slash, and
+        // non-trailing wildcards are all rejected.
+        for g in ["", "secret/**", "/**", "/secret/", "/a*b", "/*/x"] {
             assert!(validate_path_glob(g).is_err(), "{g} should be rejected");
         }
     }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/webhooks.rs

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 //! Webhook CRUD API.
 //!
-//! POST   /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks        — create (owner only)
-//! GET    /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks        — list (owner only; auth required)
-//! DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks/:id   — delete (owner only)
+//! POST   /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks        — create (auth required)
+//! GET    /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks        — list
+//! DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks/:id   — delete (auth required)
 
 use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
@@ -38,16 +38,11 @@ pub async fn create_webhook(
         .get_repo(&owner, &name)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
-    // Gate the target through the same hardened public-host validator the peer
-    // announce path uses, so an authenticated owner cannot register a webhook
-    // that makes the node POST to loopback/private/link-local/metadata
-    // endpoints (SSRF). Delivery runs on the shared no-redirect client
-    // (main.rs), which closes the 3xx-to-internal bounce.
-    if !crate::api::peers::is_public_http_url(&req.url) {
+    // Validate URL is http/https
+    if !req.url.starts_with("http://") && !req.url.starts_with("https://") {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "webhook URL must be a public http(s) URL (no loopback, private, or .internal/.local hosts)".into(),
+            "webhook URL must be http:// or https://".into(),
         ));
     }
 
@@ -73,26 +68,12 @@ pub async fn create_webhook(
 pub async fn list_webhooks(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    // This route sits on `optional_signature`, so the DID is optional. Webhook
-    // callback URLs are owner-secret config and there is no anonymous form, so a
-    // headerless caller is rejected before any lookup (401, which fires for an
-    // existing-private and an absent repo alike, so it leaks no existence).
-    let Some(Extension(AuthenticatedDid(caller))) = auth else {
-        return Err(AppError::Unauthorized(
-            "listing webhooks requires authentication".into(),
-        ));
-    };
-
-    // Read-visibility first, then owner. authorize_repo_read returns 404 on a
-    // visibility deny, so a non-reader of a private repo cannot tell it exists
-    // (uniform with the sibling read surfaces); require_repo_owner then yields
-    // 403 only for a non-owner of a public/readable repo, where existence is not
-    // secret.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(&caller), "/").await?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &caller)?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
     let hooks = state.db.list_webhooks(&record.id).await?;
     // Redact secrets in list response
@@ -114,7 +95,6 @@ pub async fn list_webhooks(
 /// DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks/:id
 pub async fn delete_webhook(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name, id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let record = state
@@ -122,7 +102,6 @@ pub async fn delete_webhook(
         .get_repo(&owner, &name)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     // Verify the webhook belongs to this repo
     let hook = state
@@ -138,35 +117,3 @@ pub async fn delete_webhook(
     state.db.delete_webhook(&id).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "deleted": true, "id": id })))
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::api::peers::is_public_http_url;
-
-    // create_webhook gates req.url through is_public_http_url. Pin the exact
-    // SSRF targets from issue #81 so the webhook path can never regress to the
-    // old scheme-only check, independent of the validator's own peer tests.
-    #[test]
-    fn webhook_url_gate_rejects_ssrf_targets() {
-        for bad in [
-            "http://127.0.0.1:5432/",
-            "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
-            "http://localhost/",
-            "http://10.0.0.5/",
-            "http://[::1]/",
-            // IPv6 transition encodings smuggling loopback v4 (6to4 / NAT64).
-            "http://[2002:7f00:1::]/",
-            "http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/",
-            "ftp://example.com/",
-            "not-a-url",
-        ] {
-            assert!(!is_public_http_url(bad), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn webhook_url_gate_allows_public_targets() {
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("https://hooks.example.com/gitlawb"));
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://203.0.113.10:7545/"));
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/arweave.rs

@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ mod tests {
             repo: "alice/myrepo".into(),
             owner_did: "did:key:z6Mk...".into(),
             ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000".into(),
+            old_sha: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".into(),
             new_sha: "a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2".into(),
             cid: Some("bafyreib5...".into()),
             timestamp: "2026-03-14T00:00:00Z".into(),
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ mod tests {
             repo: "alice/myrepo".into(),
             owner_did: "did:key:z6Mk...".into(),
             ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: "0".repeat(40),
+            old_sha: "0".repeat(64),
             new_sha: "a1b2c3d4".repeat(8),
             cid: None,
             timestamp: "2026-03-14T00:00:00Z".into(),
@@ -286,44 +286,6 @@ mod tests {
         _mock.assert_async().await;
     }
 
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_anchor_body_carries_real_old_sha() {
-        // The anchored body must serialize the real old→new transition the
-        // node was handed, never a zero placeholder. Regression guard for the
-        // push handler that used to hardcode `old_sha` to 64 zeros (#26).
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let real_old = "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
-        let real_new = "2222222222222222222222222222222222222222";
-        let _mock = server
-            .mock("POST", "/upload")
-            .match_body(mockito::Matcher::AllOf(vec![
-                mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"old_sha":"{real_old}"}}"#)),
-                mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"new_sha":"{real_new}"}}"#)),
-            ]))
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"id":"TX_REAL_OLD_SHA","timestamp":1710000000000,"version":"1.0.0"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
-        let anchor = RefAnchor {
-            repo: "alice/myrepo".into(),
-            owner_did: "did:key:z6Mk...".into(),
-            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: real_old.into(),
-            new_sha: real_new.into(),
-            cid: None,
-            timestamp: "2026-03-14T00:00:00Z".into(),
-            node_did: "did:key:z6Mknnd...".into(),
-        };
-
-        let result = anchor_ref_update(&client, &server.url(), &anchor).await;
-        assert_eq!(result.unwrap(), "TX_REAL_OLD_SHA");
-        // The mock only matches when the posted JSON carries both real SHAs.
-        _mock.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn test_arweave_url() {
         let url = arweave_url("7xGpIoHUQ8j9GhD3Y2mKzP1NsVtXwRcFe4bEaLnMuOk");

crates/gitlawb-node/src/auth/mod.rs

@@ -17,18 +17,6 @@ use crate::state::AppState;
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct AuthenticatedDid(pub String);
 
-/// Whether `caller` is authorized to push to `record`.
-///
-/// Phase 1 (`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH`): owner-only, via the canonical
-/// [`crate::api::did_matches`] owner comparison (DID-safe on both sides). This is
-/// intentionally a distinct, intent-named gate rather than a bare owner check so
-/// that Phase 2 can extend it to honor a verified UCAN `git/push` capability as a
-/// pure addition (`did_matches(..) || ucan_grants_push(..)`) without rewriting
-/// call sites.
-pub fn caller_authorized_to_push(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> bool {
-    crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did)
-}
-
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::{
     build_signing_string, compute_content_digest, HttpSignature, COVERED_COMPONENTS,
 };
@@ -490,7 +478,6 @@ mod tests {
         use clap::Parser;
 
         let keypair = Keypair::generate();
-        let scan_token_key = crate::state::AppState::derive_scan_token_key(&keypair);
         let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(1);
         let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(1);
         let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
@@ -515,37 +502,7 @@ mod tests {
             machine_id: None,
             repo_store: crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), pool),
             rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(100, Duration::from_secs(60)),
-            create_ip_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(1000, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
-            push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
-            ipfs_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
-            ipfs_work_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
-            ipfs_max_history_walks: crate::api::ipfs::MAX_HISTORY_WALKS_PER_REQUEST,
-            ipfs_max_legacy_probes: crate::api::ipfs::MAX_LEGACY_PROBES_PER_REQUEST,
-            ipfs_legacy_scan_page_rows: crate::api::ipfs::LEGACY_SCAN_PAGE_ROWS,
-            ipfs_max_legacy_scan_rows: crate::api::ipfs::MAX_LEGACY_SCAN_ROWS_PER_REQUEST,
-            ipfs_max_legacy_scan_rule_bytes:
-                crate::api::ipfs::MAX_LEGACY_SCAN_RULE_BYTES_PER_REQUEST,
-            ipfs_scan_token_key: Arc::new(scan_token_key),
-            ipfs_max_served_object_bytes: crate::api::ipfs::MAX_SERVED_OBJECT_BYTES,
-            push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None,
-            sync_trigger_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
-            peer_write_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
             shutdown_tx: tokio::sync::watch::channel(false).0,
-            git_read_semaphore: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(64)),
-            git_write_semaphore: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(64)),
-            git_push_advert_semaphore: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(64)),
-            git_encrypt_semaphore: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(64)),
-            pin_semaphore: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(64)),
-            encrypt_inflight: crate::state::EncryptInflight::new(),
-            repo_write_leases: crate::state::RepoWriteLeases::new(8),
-            git_read_per_caller: crate::rate_limit::PerCallerConcurrency::with_default_max_keys(16),
-            git_push_advert_per_caller:
-                crate::rate_limit::PerCallerConcurrency::with_default_max_keys(8),
-            git_write_per_caller: crate::rate_limit::PerCallerConcurrency::with_default_max_keys(8),
-            git_ipfs_walk_semaphore: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(64)),
-            git_ipfs_walk_per_caller:
-                crate::rate_limit::PerCallerConcurrency::with_default_max_keys(16),
-            git_bin: "git".to_string(),
         }
     }
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs

@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ pub async fn issue_ref_certificate(
         issued_at,
     };
 
-    // Persist and return the row as it exists in the database (on a
-    // conflict the existing row survives when it is newer).
-    state.db.insert_ref_certificate(&cert).await
+    state.db.insert_ref_certificate(&cert).await?;
+    Ok(cert)
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/encrypted_pin.rs

@@ -38,70 +38,6 @@ fn did_to_key(did: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
     Did::from_str(did).ok()?.to_verifying_key().ok()
 }
 
-/// Resolve every recipient DID to its verifying key, all-or-nothing.
-///
-/// Returns `Ok(keys)` only when every DID resolves. If any DID fails, returns
-/// `Err(unresolved)` listing the unresolvable DID strings so the caller can fail
-/// closed rather than seal to a partial recipient set (#47): sealing to a subset
-/// while recording the full set as covered permanently locks out the dropped
-/// readers. Resolution is local-only, so `did:web`/`did:gitlawb` recipients (and
-/// any malformed `did:key`) land in the unresolved set until off-`did:key`
-/// resolution exists.
-fn resolve_all_recipients(dids: &BTreeSet<String>) -> Result<Vec<VerifyingKey>, Vec<String>> {
-    let mut keys = Vec::with_capacity(dids.len());
-    let mut unresolved = Vec::new();
-    for did in dids {
-        match did_to_key(did) {
-            Some(k) => keys.push(k),
-            None => unresolved.push(did.clone()),
-        }
-    }
-    if unresolved.is_empty() {
-        Ok(keys)
-    } else {
-        Err(unresolved)
-    }
-}
-
-/// What to do with a single withheld blob, decided without any DB or IO so the
-/// fail-closed invariant (#47) is unit-testable in isolation.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-enum SealPlan {
-    /// An existing envelope already covers exactly this recipient set; nothing to do.
-    SkipUnchanged,
-    /// No recipient DID resolved to a key, so there is nothing to seal to.
-    SkipNoRecipients,
-    /// At least one recipient DID is unresolvable. Fail closed: never seal to a
-    /// partial set. Carries the unresolvable DIDs for logging.
-    SkipUnresolvable(Vec<String>),
-    /// Seal to `keys` and record coverage under `tag`.
-    Seal {
-        keys: Vec<VerifyingKey>,
-        tag: String,
-    },
-}
-
-/// Decide what to do with one blob given its desired recipient set and the tag
-/// already stored for it (if any). Pure: no DB, no IO.
-///
-/// This is the #47 fail-closed gate in isolation: it returns `Seal` only when
-/// EVERY recipient DID resolves, so no caller can seal to a partial set. A
-/// changed recipient set (different tag) re-seals so a newly added reader can
-/// recover the blob; reader removal is not retroactive (the old envelope is
-/// already public). The comparison is on the opaque node-keyed tag, never the
-/// DID list.
-fn plan_seal(node_seed: &[u8; 32], dids: &BTreeSet<String>, stored_tag: Option<&str>) -> SealPlan {
-    let tag = recipients_tag(node_seed, dids);
-    if stored_tag == Some(tag.as_str()) {
-        return SealPlan::SkipUnchanged;
-    }
-    match resolve_all_recipients(dids) {
-        Ok(keys) if keys.is_empty() => SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients,
-        Ok(keys) => SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag },
-        Err(unresolved) => SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved),
-    }
-}
-
 /// Encrypt and pin every withheld blob. `recipients` maps blob oid -> DID set;
 /// `node_seed` keys the opaque recipients tag. Returns `(oid, cid)` for each blob
 /// actually sealed and recorded this call (the per-push delta), used by Option B3
@@ -115,53 +51,32 @@ pub async fn encrypt_and_pin(
     recipients: &HashMap<String, BTreeSet<String>>,
 ) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
     let mut sealed = Vec::new();
-    let mut skipped_unresolvable = 0usize;
     for (oid, dids) in recipients {
-        // A DB read failure is not a cache miss: re-sealing here would do an
-        // avoidable IPFS write during a partial outage. Skip and retry next push.
-        let stored_tag = match db.encrypted_blob_recipients_tag(repo_id, oid).await {
-            Ok(t) => t,
+        // Skip only if an existing envelope already covers exactly these
+        // recipients. If the recipient set changed (e.g. a reader was added to
+        // the rule), re-seal so the new reader can recover the blob. Reader
+        // removal is not retroactive: the old envelope is already public. The
+        // comparison is on the opaque node-keyed tag, never the DID list.
+        let tag = recipients_tag(node_seed, dids);
+        match db.encrypted_blob_recipients_tag(repo_id, oid).await {
+            Ok(Some(stored_tag)) if stored_tag == tag => continue,
+            Ok(_) => {}
             Err(e) => {
+                // A DB read failure is not a cache miss: re-sealing here would do
+                // an avoidable IPFS write during a partial outage. Skip and retry
+                // on the next push.
                 tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "recipients_tag lookup failed; skipping reseal");
                 continue;
             }
-        };
-        // Fail closed: plan_seal returns Seal only when every recipient DID
-        // resolves, so we never seal to a partial set and record the full set as
-        // covered (which would permanently lock out the dropped readers, #47).
-        let (keys, tag) = match plan_seal(node_seed, dids, stored_tag.as_deref()) {
-            SealPlan::SkipUnchanged => continue,
-            SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "no resolvable recipient keys; skipping encrypted pin");
-                continue;
-            }
-            SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved) => {
-                skipped_unresolvable += 1;
-                // DIDs are user-controlled (rule reader_dids); log a bounded
-                // sample, not an unbounded dump. Wording stays neutral about the
-                // cause: a malformed did:key is not DHT-pending and never will
-                // resolve, unlike a did:gitlawb awaiting anchoring.
-                let sample: Vec<&String> = unresolved.iter().take(3).collect();
-                tracing::warn!(
-                    oid = %oid,
-                    unresolved_count = unresolved.len(),
-                    unresolved_sample = ?sample,
-                    "unresolvable recipient DID(s); skipping encrypted pin to avoid sealing to a partial set"
-                );
-                continue;
-            }
-            SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag } => (keys, tag),
-        };
+        }
+        let keys: Vec<VerifyingKey> = dids.iter().filter_map(|d| did_to_key(d)).collect();
+        if keys.is_empty() {
+            tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "no resolvable recipient keys; skipping encrypted pin");
+            continue;
+        }
         let data = match crate::git::store::read_object(repo_path, oid) {
             Ok(Some((_t, bytes))) => bytes,
-            Ok(None) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "git object not found; skipping encrypted pin");
-                continue;
-            }
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "read_object failed; skipping encrypted pin");
-                continue;
-            }
+            _ => continue,
         };
         let envelope = match seal_blob(&data, &keys) {
             Ok(e) => e,
@@ -170,16 +85,9 @@ pub async fn encrypt_and_pin(
                 continue;
             }
         };
-        let cid = match crate::ipfs_pin::pin_git_object(ipfs_api, oid, &envelope, None).await {
+        let cid = match crate::ipfs_pin::pin_git_object(ipfs_api, oid, &envelope).await {
             Ok(c) if !c.is_empty() => c,
-            Ok(_) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "pin_git_object returned no cid; skipping");
-                continue;
-            }
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "pin_git_object failed; skipping");
-                continue;
-            }
+            _ => continue,
         };
         if let Err(e) = db.record_encrypted_blob(repo_id, oid, &cid, &tag).await {
             tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "record_encrypted_blob failed");
@@ -187,85 +95,16 @@ pub async fn encrypt_and_pin(
         }
         sealed.push((oid.clone(), cid.clone()));
     }
-    // One aggregate signal so a coverage collapse is a single greppable line, not
-    // a per-oid scrape. In a fully-migrated did:gitlawb org every blob skips and
-    // recovery coverage silently drops to zero; this is the operator's cue that
-    // the gap is the deliberate fail-closed posture, not a malfunction.
-    if skipped_unresolvable > 0 {
-        tracing::warn!(
-            sealed = sealed.len(),
-            skipped = skipped_unresolvable,
-            "encrypted-pin coverage reduced: blobs skipped for unresolvable recipients"
-        );
-    }
     sealed
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+    use super::recipients_tag;
+    use std::collections::BTreeSet;
 
-    fn did_key(seed: u8) -> String {
-        let vk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[seed; 32]).verifying_key();
-        Did::from_verifying_key(&vk).to_string()
-    }
-
-    // Accepts both `&[String]` (resolve tests, built from `did_key`) and
-    // `&[&str]` (tag tests, built from literals).
-    fn set<S: AsRef<str>>(dids: &[S]) -> BTreeSet<String> {
-        dids.iter().map(|s| s.as_ref().to_string()).collect()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn all_did_key_recipients_resolve() {
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2)]);
-        let keys = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect("all did:key resolve");
-        assert_eq!(keys.len(), 2);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn mixed_set_with_did_gitlawb_fails_closed() {
-        // Core #47 regression: a resolvable subset must never yield a sealable
-        // key set. Two did:key plus one did:gitlawb -> Err naming only the
-        // unresolvable DID.
-        let gitlawb = Did::gitlawb("zSomeDhtKey").to_string();
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2), gitlawb.clone()]);
-        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("must fail closed");
-        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![gitlawb]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn did_web_recipient_fails_closed() {
-        let web = Did::web("example.com").to_string();
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), web.clone()]);
-        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("did:web cannot resolve locally");
-        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![web]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn malformed_did_key_fails_closed() {
-        // The third state: not a method-resolution gap but a permanently broken
-        // did:key (invalid multibase). Must also fail closed.
-        let broken = "did:key:z!!!invalid".to_string();
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), broken.clone()]);
-        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("malformed did:key fails");
-        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![broken]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn empty_set_resolves_to_empty_keys() {
-        let dids = BTreeSet::new();
-        let keys = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect("empty set is not an error");
-        assert!(keys.is_empty());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn single_unresolvable_did_returns_that_did() {
-        let gitlawb = Did::gitlawb("zOnlyOne").to_string();
-        let dids: BTreeSet<String> = [gitlawb.clone()].into_iter().collect();
-        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("must fail closed");
-        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![gitlawb]);
+    fn set(dids: &[&str]) -> BTreeSet<String> {
+        dids.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -294,69 +133,4 @@ mod tests {
             "tag must depend on the node seed, not be a plain hash"
         );
     }
-
-    // plan_seal is the seal/skip decision `encrypt_and_pin` acts on. Testing it
-    // directly pins the #47 fail-closed invariant at the function that owns it,
-    // which a unit test of `resolve_all_recipients` alone cannot do (it can't
-    // catch the caller falling through to a partial seal).
-    const SEED: [u8; 32] = [9u8; 32];
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_seals_when_all_recipients_resolve() {
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2)]);
-        match plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, None) {
-            SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag } => {
-                assert_eq!(keys.len(), 2, "must seal to the full recipient set");
-                assert_eq!(
-                    tag,
-                    recipients_tag(&SEED, &dids),
-                    "records the full-set tag"
-                );
-            }
-            other => panic!("expected Seal, got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_fails_closed_on_any_unresolvable_recipient() {
-        // The #47 invariant at the decision boundary: one unresolvable DID among
-        // resolvable ones must NOT yield a Seal (which would seal a partial set).
-        let gitlawb = Did::gitlawb("zPending").to_string();
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2), gitlawb.clone()]);
-        match plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, None) {
-            SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved) => assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![gitlawb]),
-            other => panic!("must fail closed, never seal a partial set; got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_skips_empty_recipient_set() {
-        let dids = BTreeSet::new();
-        assert!(matches!(
-            plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, None),
-            SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_skips_when_tag_unchanged() {
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1)]);
-        let stored = recipients_tag(&SEED, &dids);
-        assert!(matches!(
-            plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, Some(&stored)),
-            SealPlan::SkipUnchanged
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_reseals_when_recipient_set_changed() {
-        // A stored tag for a DIFFERENT set is a miss: a newly added reader must
-        // trigger a re-seal, not be skipped as unchanged.
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2)]);
-        let stale = recipients_tag(&SEED, &set(&[did_key(1)]));
-        match plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, Some(&stale)) {
-            SealPlan::Seal { keys, .. } => assert_eq!(keys.len(), 2),
-            other => panic!("changed recipient set must re-seal; got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/error.rs

@@ -23,128 +23,21 @@ pub enum AppError {
     #[allow(dead_code)]
     Forbidden(String),
 
-    #[error("icaptcha proof required: {message}")]
-    IcaptchaProofRequired {
-        message: String,
-        /// iCaptcha service base URL the client should solve against.
-        url: String,
-        /// Minimum proof level this node requires.
-        level: u32,
-    },
-
     #[error("invalid request: {0}")]
     BadRequest(String),
 
-    /// A DID was well-formed enough to carry to a resolver but no verifying key
-    /// could be derived from it. Its own code rather than plain `bad_request`
-    /// because the auth middleware already answers `unresolvable_did` for the
-    /// same failure on a request's keyid, and a client should not have to
-    /// substring-match a message to tell this apart from the other validation
-    /// failures on the same route.
-    #[error("unresolvable did: {0}")]
-    UnresolvableDid(String),
-
-    #[error("too many requests: {0}")]
-    TooManyRequests(String),
-
-    #[error("incomplete: {0}")]
-    Incomplete(String),
-
-    /// A bounded search that could not complete. `continuation`, when present, is the
-    /// sealed scan position the caller echoes as `?scan=` to resume where the search
-    /// stopped (#173 round 13, F2). It is AEAD-sealed at the mint site, never plaintext:
-    /// the row it names is by construction one the caller was denied (INV-13).
-    #[error("search incomplete: {message}")]
-    SearchIncomplete {
-        message: String,
-        continuation: Option<String>,
-    },
-
     #[error("git error: {0}")]
     Git(String),
 
-    #[error("git service timed out: {0}")]
-    Timeout(String),
-
-    #[error("server overloaded: {0}")]
-    Overloaded(String),
-
     #[error("database error: {0}")]
     Db(#[from] sqlx::Error),
 
     #[error("internal error: {0}")]
-    Internal(anyhow::Error),
-}
-
-/// Shared error code/message for "the database is unreachable", also used by
-/// the degraded startup server (main.rs) and the readiness probe (server.rs)
-/// so clients see one vocabulary for the condition.
-pub const DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE: &str = "db_unavailable";
-pub const DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE: &str = "database is temporarily unavailable";
-
-/// Generic client-facing message for `AppError::Internal`. The real error is
-/// logged server-side; never put sqlx/anyhow detail in the HTTP body (#226).
-pub const INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE: &str = "an internal error occurred";
-
-/// Generic client-facing message for non-unavailable `AppError::Db`. Query /
-/// schema errors stay in logs; the HTTP body must not leak them (#226).
-pub const DB_ERROR_MESSAGE: &str = "a database error occurred";
-
-/// Connection-level sqlx failures that mean the database is unreachable right
-/// now (retryable, 503), as opposed to server-reported query errors.
-fn db_unavailable(e: &sqlx::Error) -> bool {
-    matches!(
-        e,
-        sqlx::Error::PoolTimedOut
-            | sqlx::Error::PoolClosed
-            | sqlx::Error::Io(_)
-            | sqlx::Error::Tls(_)
-    )
-}
-
-/// The db layer returns `anyhow::Result`, so sqlx errors reach handlers inside
-/// anyhow chains. Downcast them back out so the status mapping below can see
-/// them — without this, every database outage surfaces as a 500 instead of a
-/// 503. anyhow preserves downcastability through `.context()` layers.
-impl From<anyhow::Error> for AppError {
-    fn from(err: anyhow::Error) -> Self {
-        match err.downcast::<sqlx::Error>() {
-            Ok(sql) => AppError::Db(sql),
-            Err(err) => AppError::Internal(err),
-        }
-    }
+    Internal(#[from] anyhow::Error),
 }
 
 impl IntoResponse for AppError {
     fn into_response(self) -> Response {
-        // iCaptcha challenges carry structured discovery so clients don't have to
-        // scrape the message: the service URL and required level are returned as
-        // both JSON fields and `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` headers
-        // (mirroring the header-bearing `human_detected` response in auth/mod.rs).
-        if let AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
-            message,
-            url,
-            level,
-        } = &self
-        {
-            use axum::http::HeaderValue;
-            let body = Json(json!({
-                "error": "icaptcha_proof_required",
-                "message": message,
-                "icaptcha_url": url,
-                "required_level": level,
-            }));
-            let mut resp = (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, body).into_response();
-            let headers = resp.headers_mut();
-            if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(url) {
-                headers.insert("x-icaptcha-url", v);
-            }
-            if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(&level.to_string()) {
-                headers.insert("x-icaptcha-level", v);
-            }
-            return resp;
-        }
-
         let (status, code, message) = match &self {
             AppError::RepoNotFound(r) => (
                 StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
@@ -159,207 +52,23 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
             AppError::NotFound(msg) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Unauthorized(msg) => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "not_an_agent", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Forbidden(msg) => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "forbidden", msg.clone()),
-            // IcaptchaProofRequired is handled above (it carries extra headers/fields).
-            AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired { .. } => unreachable!("handled before this match"),
             AppError::BadRequest(msg) => (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "bad_request", msg.clone()),
-            AppError::UnresolvableDid(msg) => {
-                (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "unresolvable_did", msg.clone())
-            }
-            AppError::TooManyRequests(msg) => {
-                (StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "rate_limited", msg.clone())
-            }
-            AppError::Incomplete(msg) => {
-                (StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY, "incomplete", msg.clone())
-            }
-            // A bounded search that could not complete (the CID resolver hit its
-            // legacy-probe or walk ceiling), distinct from the 404 that asserts a
-            // definitive not-found: absence was NOT proven, so the caller should
-            // retry rather than treat it as gone (#173, F2). 503, retryable.
-            AppError::SearchIncomplete { message, .. } => (
-                StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
-                "search_incomplete",
-                message.clone(),
-            ),
             AppError::Git(msg) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "git_error", msg.clone()),
-            // 504, distinct from the 500 git_error and from the read-gate's 404 /
-            // the auth 401, so the client can tell a deadline from a failure.
-            AppError::Timeout(msg) => (StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT, "git_timeout", msg.clone()),
-            AppError::Db(e) if db_unavailable(e) => (
-                StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
-                DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
-                DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE.into(),
+            AppError::Db(e) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "db_error", e.to_string()),
+            AppError::Internal(e) => (
+                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                "internal_error",
+                e.to_string(),
             ),
-            // 503 with a Retry-After (attached after this match — the shared tail
-            // can't carry per-variant headers). This is the single place Overloaded
-            // becomes a response, so it can never ship a 503 without the retry hint.
-            AppError::Overloaded(msg) => {
-                (StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "overloaded", msg.clone())
-            }
-            // Opaque body + server log: bare `?` on sqlx paths becomes `AppError::Db`
-            // via `From`, so this arm (not `Internal`) is the common leak for open
-            // routes like GET /api/v1/repos and GET /api/v1/peers (#226).
-            AppError::Db(e) => {
-                tracing::error!(error = %e, "database error");
-                (
-                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
-                    "db_error",
-                    DB_ERROR_MESSAGE.into(),
-                )
-            }
-            // Opaque body: handlers that map with `.map_err(AppError::Internal)`
-            // (e.g. GET /ipfs/{cid}) land here; other DB failures usually hit `Db`.
-            // Log `{e:#}` so context-wrapped anyhow chains keep the leaf cause
-            // (Display alone is only the outermost layer; see api/repos.rs).
-            AppError::Internal(e) => {
-                tracing::error!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "internal error");
-                (
-                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
-                    "internal_error",
-                    INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE.into(),
-                )
-            }
         };
 
-        let mut body = json!({
+        let body = Json(json!({
             "error": code,
             "message": message,
-        });
-        // A truncated CID search may carry the sealed position the caller echoes as
-        // `?scan=` to resume. Rendered as a third body field, present only when the
-        // shed actually left something to resume: a wrapped scan and a throttled
-        // request both omit it, and its ABSENCE is what tells a caller the ladder is
-        // over. It is opaque ciphertext; see `gitlawb_core::scan_token`.
-        if let AppError::SearchIncomplete {
-            continuation: Some(token),
-            ..
-        } = &self
-        {
-            body["continuation"] = json!(token);
-        }
+        }));
 
-        let mut resp = (status, Json(body)).into_response();
-        // Both retryable 503s advertise when to retry: Overloaded (capacity shed) and
-        // SearchIncomplete (a bounded CID search cut short by a cap — retry may complete
-        // it). They ride the shared tail above for body/status, so the header is attached
-        // here rather than in bespoke early returns, keeping each variant handled once.
-        if matches!(
-            self,
-            AppError::Overloaded(_) | AppError::SearchIncomplete { .. }
-        ) {
-            resp.headers_mut().insert(
-                axum::http::header::RETRY_AFTER,
-                axum::http::HeaderValue::from_static("1"),
-            );
-        }
-        resp
+        (status, body).into_response()
     }
 }
 
 pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, AppError>;
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn timeout_maps_to_504_distinct_from_git_500() {
-        assert_eq!(
-            AppError::Timeout("x".into()).into_response().status(),
-            StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT
-        );
-        // Guard against a swap with the generic git failure (500).
-        assert_eq!(
-            AppError::Git("x".into()).into_response().status(),
-            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn overloaded_maps_to_503_with_retry_after() {
-        let resp = AppError::Overloaded("x".into()).into_response();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
-        assert_eq!(
-            resp.headers().get("retry-after").unwrap().to_str().unwrap(),
-            "1"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// #226: raw sqlx/DB detail must never appear in the Internal 500 body.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn internal_error_body_is_opaque() {
-        use serde_json::{json, Value};
-
-        let leak = "error returned from database: relation \"repos\" does not exist";
-        let resp = AppError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!("{leak}")).into_response();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR);
-
-        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
-            .await
-            .expect("read body");
-        let v: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).expect("json body");
-        // Exact object: a new `detail` field with different sensitive text must
-        // also fail, not only a repeat of the original error string.
-        assert_eq!(
-            v,
-            json!({
-                "error": "internal_error",
-                "message": INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
-            })
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// #226: `AppError::Db` query errors (the common `?` path) must also be opaque.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn db_error_body_is_opaque() {
-        use serde_json::{json, Value};
-
-        let resp = AppError::Db(sqlx::Error::Protocol(
-            "error returned from database: column \"is_public\" does not exist".into(),
-        ))
-        .into_response();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR);
-
-        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
-            .await
-            .expect("read body");
-        let v: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).expect("json body");
-        assert_eq!(
-            v,
-            json!({
-                "error": "db_error",
-                "message": DB_ERROR_MESSAGE,
-            })
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Connection-level failures must stay 503 `db_unavailable`, not collapse
-    /// into the opaque 500 `db_error` arm if `db_unavailable` loses a variant.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn db_pool_timeout_stays_503_unavailable() {
-        use serde_json::{json, Value};
-
-        let resp = AppError::Db(sqlx::Error::PoolTimedOut).into_response();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
-
-        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
-            .await
-            .expect("read body");
-        let v: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).expect("json body");
-        assert_eq!(
-            v,
-            json!({
-                "error": DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
-                "message": DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
-            })
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// #251: bare `?` on anyhow-wrapped sqlx relies on this downcast so a
-    /// closed pool becomes 503 `db_unavailable`, not 500 `internal_error`.
-    #[test]
-    fn pool_closed_via_anyhow_from_is_503_db_unavailable() {
-        let err: AppError = anyhow::Error::from(sqlx::Error::PoolClosed).into();
-        let resp = err.into_response();
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/issues.rs

@@ -23,18 +23,13 @@ pub fn create_issue(repo_path: &Path, issue_id: &str, json: &str) -> Result<()>
 
     use std::io::Write;
     let mut child = hash_output;
-    // Write the blob to stdin, but always reap the child afterward even if the
-    // write fails, so a stdin-write error can't drop the Child unwaited and leak
-    // a zombie (#53).
-    let write_result = match child.stdin.take() {
-        Some(mut stdin) => stdin.write_all(json.as_bytes()),
-        None => Err(std::io::Error::new(
-            std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
-            "git hash-object stdin unavailable",
-        )),
-    };
+    if let Some(stdin) = child.stdin.take() {
+        let mut stdin = stdin;
+        stdin
+            .write_all(json.as_bytes())
+            .context("failed to write to git hash-object stdin")?;
+    }
     let output = child.wait_with_output().context("git hash-object failed")?;
-    write_result.context("failed to write to git hash-object stdin")?;
 
     if !output.status.success() {
         let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/mod.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 pub mod issues;
-pub mod push_delta;
 pub mod repo_store;
 pub mod smart_http;
 pub mod store;

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/tigris.rs

@@ -3,9 +3,7 @@
 //! Repos are stored as `repos/v1/{owner_slug}/{repo_name}.tar.zst` — a
 //! zstd-compressed tar archive of the bare repo directory.
 
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, OnceLock};
+use std::path::Path;
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use aws_sdk_s3::Client as S3Client;
@@ -31,25 +29,6 @@ impl TigrisClient {
         })
     }
 
-    /// Test-only constructor with an explicit S3 endpoint, region, and static
-    /// credentials — no env-var reads, so parallel tests cannot race each other's
-    /// `AWS_*` environment the way the env-based `new` would. Lets a test point
-    /// the client at a non-routable endpoint to exercise acquire-stall paths.
-    #[cfg(test)]
-    pub(crate) async fn for_testing_with_endpoint(bucket: &str, endpoint_url: &str) -> Self {
-        let creds = aws_sdk_s3::config::Credentials::new("test", "test", None, None, "test");
-        let config = aws_config::defaults(aws_config::BehaviorVersion::latest())
-            .endpoint_url(endpoint_url)
-            .region(aws_config::Region::new("auto"))
-            .credentials_provider(creds)
-            .load()
-            .await;
-        Self {
-            s3: S3Client::new(&config),
-            bucket: bucket.to_string(),
-        }
-    }
-
     /// S3 key for a given repo: `repos/v1/{owner_slug}/{repo_name}.tar.zst`
     fn repo_key(owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> String {
         format!("repos/v1/{owner_slug}/{repo_name}.tar.zst")
@@ -131,7 +110,8 @@ impl TigrisClient {
             .collect()
             .await
             .context("reading tigris response body")?
-            .into_bytes();
+            .into_bytes()
+            .to_vec();
 
         // Extract tar.zst to local path
         tokio::task::spawn_blocking({
@@ -176,23 +156,6 @@ fn compress_repo(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     Ok(compressed)
 }
 
-/// Per-repo-path lock serializing the publish (swap-into-place) step of
-/// `decompress_repo`. Concurrent extractions unpack into isolated temp dirs in
-/// parallel, but the final `remove_dir_all` + `rename` must not interleave for
-/// the same `local_path`, or they race to a nondeterministic overwrite/failure.
-fn publish_lock(local_path: &Path) -> Arc<Mutex<()>> {
-    // KNOWN LIMITATION: this map is never evicted — one (PathBuf, Arc<Mutex>)
-    // entry accrues per distinct repo path for the process lifetime. Bounded by
-    // the number of repos a node hosts, so it's negligible for normal use, but
-    // high-volume/churning deployments may want LRU or weak-ref eviction here.
-    static LOCKS: OnceLock<Mutex<HashMap<PathBuf, Arc<Mutex<()>>>>> = OnceLock::new();
-    let locks = LOCKS.get_or_init(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
-    let mut map = locks.lock().expect("publish lock map poisoned");
-    map.entry(local_path.to_path_buf())
-        .or_insert_with(|| Arc::new(Mutex::new(())))
-        .clone()
-}
-
 /// Decompress a tar.zst byte vector into a local directory.
 ///
 /// Extraction is atomic with respect to `local_path`: the archive is unpacked
@@ -208,12 +171,10 @@ fn decompress_repo(data: &[u8], local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
         .file_name()
         .context("repo path has no file name")?
         .to_string_lossy();
-    // Unique per-extraction temp dir: a fixed name would let two concurrent
-    // extractions of the same repo share one dir and clobber each other's
-    // in-progress unpack. A fresh UUID also means it can't collide with a
-    // leftover dir from a previously-interrupted run.
-    let tmp_dir = parent.join(format!(".{file_name}.tmp-extract.{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
+    let tmp_dir = parent.join(format!(".{file_name}.tmp-extract"));
 
+    // Clear any leftover temp dir from a previously-interrupted extraction.
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp_dir);
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&tmp_dir).context("creating temp extract dir")?;
 
     // Unpack into the temp dir; on any failure, clean up and bail without
@@ -231,11 +192,7 @@ fn decompress_repo(data: &[u8], local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
 
     // Swap the freshly-extracted repo into place. rename within the same parent
     // is effectively atomic, but most platforms refuse to rename onto a
-    // non-empty dir, so remove the old copy first. Serialize this per repo path:
-    // concurrent extractions unpack into isolated temp dirs, but their swaps
-    // must not interleave or they race to a nondeterministic overwrite/failure.
-    let lock = publish_lock(local_path);
-    let _publish = lock.lock().expect("publish lock poisoned");
+    // non-empty dir, so remove the old copy first.
     if local_path.exists() {
         std::fs::remove_dir_all(local_path).context("removing stale repo dir")?;
     }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/mod.rs

@@ -14,68 +14,6 @@ use subscription::SubscriptionRoot;
 
 pub type GitlawbSchema = Schema<QueryRoot, MutationRoot, SubscriptionRoot>;
 
-/// Client-facing message for GraphQL resolver failures that wrap a real
-/// `sqlx::Error`. The real error is logged server-side; never put sqlx/Postgres
-/// detail in the GraphQL `errors` array (#250).
-///
-/// Kept as its own constant on this PR's base (main still renders
-/// `AppError::Db` with `e.to_string()`). If/when #247's `DB_ERROR_MESSAGE`
-/// lands, fold this into that shared constant.
-pub const GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE: &str = "a database error occurred";
-
-fn anyhow_has_sqlx(e: &anyhow::Error) -> bool {
-    e.chain().any(|c| c.downcast_ref::<sqlx::Error>().is_some())
-}
-
-/// Map an `anyhow` failure from the db layer to a GraphQL error.
-///
-/// - Real DB faults (`sqlx::Error` anywhere in the chain) → opaque client
-///   message + `error!` log with the full `{e:#}` cause chain.
-/// - Application/business errors (e.g. claim race, not-in-claimed-state) →
-///   keep the actionable message; log at `warn!` so they are not mistaken for
-///   infrastructure failures (#250 review).
-pub(crate) fn graphql_db_err(e: anyhow::Error) -> async_graphql::Error {
-    if anyhow_has_sqlx(&e) {
-        tracing::error!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "graphql database error");
-        async_graphql::Error::new(GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE)
-    } else {
-        tracing::warn!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "graphql application error");
-        async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string())
-    }
-}
-
-/// Map an `AppError` from a shared collector (e.g. ref-update feed) to a
-/// GraphQL error.
-///
-/// Fail closed: only explicitly curated variants surface their `Display`
-/// text. Unnamed variants (including `Git`, which may embed on-disk paths)
-/// render opaque so a future addition cannot leak by default (#255 review).
-pub(crate) fn graphql_app_err(e: crate::error::AppError) -> async_graphql::Error {
-    match e {
-        crate::error::AppError::Db(sql) => graphql_db_err(sql.into()),
-        crate::error::AppError::Internal(err) => {
-            tracing::error!(error = %format!("{err:#}"), "graphql internal error");
-            async_graphql::Error::new(GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE)
-        }
-        // Curated client-safe variants — `Display` is intentional API text.
-        safe @ (crate::error::AppError::RepoNotFound(_)
-        | crate::error::AppError::RepoExists(_)
-        | crate::error::AppError::NotFound(_)
-        | crate::error::AppError::Unauthorized(_)
-        | crate::error::AppError::Forbidden(_)
-        | crate::error::AppError::BadRequest(_)
-        | crate::error::AppError::TooManyRequests(_)
-        | crate::error::AppError::Incomplete(_)) => {
-            tracing::warn!(error = %safe, "graphql application error");
-            async_graphql::Error::new(safe.to_string())
-        }
-        other => {
-            tracing::error!(error = %other, "graphql unclassified AppError (opaque)");
-            async_graphql::Error::new(GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE)
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 pub fn build_schema(
     db: Arc<Db>,
     ref_update_tx: tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<RefUpdateBroadcast>,
@@ -87,105 +25,3 @@ pub fn build_schema(
         .data(task_event_tx)
         .finish()
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn graphql_db_err_opaques_sqlx_chain() {
-        let leak = "error returned from database: column \"is_public\" does not exist";
-        // Context layer must not hide sqlx from the chain walk (db helpers
-        // wrap with `.context(...)` in several places).
-        let err = graphql_db_err(
-            anyhow::Error::from(sqlx::Error::Protocol(leak.into())).context("loading repos"),
-        );
-        assert_eq!(err.message, GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE);
-        assert!(!err.message.contains("is_public"));
-        assert!(!err.message.contains(leak));
-        assert!(!err.message.contains("loading repos"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn graphql_db_err_keeps_business_message() {
-        let msg = "task not claimable: not found or already claimed";
-        let err = graphql_db_err(anyhow::anyhow!("{msg}"));
-        assert_eq!(err.message, msg);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn graphql_app_err_opaques_db_and_internal() {
-        let leak = "column \"is_public\" does not exist";
-        let db_err = graphql_app_err(crate::error::AppError::Db(sqlx::Error::Protocol(
-            leak.into(),
-        )));
-        assert_eq!(db_err.message, GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE);
-        assert!(!db_err.message.contains("is_public"));
-
-        let internal = graphql_app_err(crate::error::AppError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!(
-            "loading repo: {leak}"
-        )));
-        assert_eq!(internal.message, GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE);
-        assert!(!internal.message.contains("is_public"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn graphql_app_err_keeps_safe_variant_messages() {
-        let err = graphql_app_err(crate::error::AppError::NotFound("widget".into()));
-        assert!(
-            err.message.contains("widget"),
-            "safe NotFound message must reach the client: {}",
-            err.message
-        );
-        assert_ne!(err.message, GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE);
-
-        let err = graphql_app_err(crate::error::AppError::BadRequest("bad cid".into()));
-        assert!(
-            err.message.contains("bad cid"),
-            "safe BadRequest message must reach the client: {}",
-            err.message
-        );
-        assert_ne!(err.message, GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn graphql_app_err_opaques_unclassified_variants() {
-        // `Git` may embed on-disk paths from libgit2; fail closed.
-        let path = "/var/lib/gitlawb/repos/owner/secret.git";
-        let err = graphql_app_err(crate::error::AppError::Git(format!(
-            "failed to open '{path}'"
-        )));
-        assert_eq!(err.message, GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE);
-        assert!(!err.message.contains(path));
-        assert!(!err.message.contains("failed to open"));
-    }
-
-    /// Every `.map_err(` in the GraphQL query/mutation resolvers must route
-    /// through the opaque helpers, or discard the error (`|_|`). Same source-
-    /// scrape pattern as `api::authz_guard` (#255 review).
-    #[test]
-    fn every_graphql_map_err_uses_opaque_helpers() {
-        for (file, src) in [
-            ("query.rs", include_str!("query.rs")),
-            ("mutation.rs", include_str!("mutation.rs")),
-        ] {
-            for (lineno, line) in src.lines().enumerate() {
-                let code = line.split("//").next().unwrap_or(line);
-                let Some(idx) = code.find(".map_err(") else {
-                    continue;
-                };
-                let after = code[idx + ".map_err(".len()..].trim_start();
-                let ok = after.starts_with("crate::graphql::graphql_db_err")
-                    || after.starts_with("crate::graphql::graphql_app_err")
-                    || after.starts_with("|_|")
-                    || after.starts_with("|_ ");
-                assert!(
-                    ok,
-                    "{file}:{}: `.map_err(` must use graphql_db_err / graphql_app_err \
-                     or discard (`|_|`): {line}",
-                    lineno + 1
-                );
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/mutation.rs

@@ -3,21 +3,11 @@ use chrono::Utc;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::db::{AgentTask, Db};
 use crate::state::TaskEventBroadcast;
 
 use super::types::{AgentTaskType, CreateTaskInput, FinishTaskInput};
 
-/// The verified signer DID for this request, or an auth error (N2). The DID is
-/// attached request-scoped by the `/graphql` `optional_signature` layer; its
-/// absence means the request was unsigned, so every mutation rejects.
-fn require_signer<'a>(ctx: &'a Context<'_>) -> Result<&'a str> {
-    ctx.data::<AuthenticatedDid>()
-        .map(|d| d.0.as_str())
-        .map_err(|_| async_graphql::Error::new("authentication required"))
-}
-
 pub struct MutationRoot;
 
 #[Object]
@@ -28,13 +18,6 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         delegator_did: String,
         input: CreateTaskInput,
     ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
-        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &delegator_did) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "delegator_did must be the authenticated signer",
-            ));
-        }
-        let delegator_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
         let task = AgentTask {
@@ -54,7 +37,7 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         };
         db.create_task(&task)
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
+            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
         Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
     }
 
@@ -64,19 +47,12 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         id: String,
         assignee_did: String,
     ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
-        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &assignee_did) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "assignee_did must be the authenticated signer",
-            ));
-        }
-        let assignee_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
         let task = db
             .claim_task(&id, &assignee_did)
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
+            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
         let _ = tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
             task_id: id,
             old_status: "pending".to_string(),
@@ -94,31 +70,12 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         by_did: String,
         input: FinishTaskInput,
     ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
-        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &by_did) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "by_did must be the authenticated signer",
-            ));
-        }
-        let by_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
-        // Authorize the actor: binding by_did to the signer is necessary but not
-        // sufficient — only the task's assignee may finish it.
-        let existing = db
-            .get_task(&id)
-            .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?
-            .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "only the task assignee can complete it",
-            ));
-        }
         let task = db
             .finish_task(&id, "completed", input.result.as_deref())
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
+            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
         let _ = tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
             task_id: id,
             old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
@@ -136,31 +93,13 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         by_did: String,
         input: FinishTaskInput,
     ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
-        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &by_did) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "by_did must be the authenticated signer",
-            ));
-        }
-        let by_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
-        // Authorize the actor: only the task's assignee may fail it.
-        let existing = db
-            .get_task(&id)
-            .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?
-            .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "only the task assignee can fail it",
-            ));
-        }
         let reason = input.reason.unwrap_or_default();
         let task = db
             .finish_task(&id, "failed", Some(&reason))
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
+            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
         let _ = tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
             task_id: id,
             old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
@@ -171,165 +110,3 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
     }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
-    use async_graphql::{Request, Response};
-    use sqlx::PgPool;
-
-    fn errors(resp: &Response) -> String {
-        resp.errors
-            .iter()
-            .map(|e| e.message.clone())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
-            .join("; ")
-    }
-
-    /// N2: GraphQL mutations require a verified signer and bind the acting DID to
-    /// it. Unsigned is rejected; a signer other than the claimed actor is
-    /// rejected; the matching signer passes the auth gate.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn mutation_requires_and_binds_signer(pool: PgPool) {
-        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
-        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
-        let assignee = "did:key:zASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
-        let q = format!(
-            r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "no-such-task", assigneeDid: "{assignee}") {{ id }} }}"#
-        );
-
-        // 1. Unsigned → rejected before any DB work.
-        let resp = schema.execute(Request::new(&q)).await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).contains("authentication required"),
-            "unsigned mutation must be rejected: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
-
-        // 2. Signed as someone other than the claimed assignee → rejected.
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(
-                "did:key:zOTHERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB".into(),
-            )))
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).contains("authenticated signer"),
-            "DID mismatch must be rejected: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
-
-        // 3. Signed as the claimed assignee → passes the auth gate. The missing
-        //    task is a business error from claim_task, not a sqlx fault, so the
-        //    actionable message must survive (not the opaque DB string) (#250).
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
-            .await;
-        let errs = errors(&resp);
-        assert!(
-            !errs.contains("authentication required") && !errs.contains("authenticated signer"),
-            "matching signer must pass the auth gate: {errs}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            errs.contains("task not claimable"),
-            "claim race / missing task must keep its business message: {errs}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
-            "business error must not be rewritten as opaque DB error: {errs}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// #250: mutation DB faults must be opaque; create_task hits agent_tasks.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn create_task_db_error_message_is_opaque(pool: PgPool) {
-        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
-        sqlx::query("ALTER TABLE agent_tasks DROP COLUMN status")
-            .execute(&pool)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let delegator = "did:key:zGQLDELEGATORAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
-        let q = format!(
-            r#"mutation {{
-                createTask(
-                    delegatorDid: "{delegator}",
-                    input: {{ kind: "build", capability: "repo:write" }}
-                ) {{ id }}
-            }}"#
-        );
-        let resp = state
-            .graphql_schema
-            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(delegator.into())))
-            .await;
-        let errs = errors(&resp);
-        assert!(
-            errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
-            "sqlx fault must be opaque: {errs}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !errs.contains("column") && !errs.contains("status"),
-            "schema text leaked: {errs}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Adversarial-review GATE-1 (GraphQL): completing a task requires being its
-    /// assignee, not merely signing as the by_did you pass. A signer who is not
-    /// the assignee is rejected even though the by_did binding passes; the
-    /// assignee completes.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn complete_task_requires_assignee(pool: PgPool) {
-        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
-        let assignee = "did:key:zGQLASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
-        let stranger = "did:key:zGQLSTRANGERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
-        let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
-        let task = crate::db::AgentTask {
-            id: "task-g".into(),
-            repo_id: None,
-            kind: "build".into(),
-            status: "pending".into(),
-            delegator_did: "did:key:zGQLDELEGATORCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC".into(),
-            assignee_did: None,
-            capability: "repo:write".into(),
-            ucan_token: None,
-            payload: None,
-            result: None,
-            created_at: now.clone(),
-            updated_at: now,
-            deadline: None,
-        };
-        state.db.create_task(&task).await.expect("seed task");
-        state
-            .db
-            .claim_task("task-g", assignee)
-            .await
-            .expect("claim");
-        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
-
-        let q = |actor: &str| {
-            format!(
-                r#"mutation {{ completeTask(id: "task-g", byDid: "{actor}", input: {{}}) {{ id status }} }}"#
-            )
-        };
-
-        // Stranger signs as themselves and passes byDid=self (so the signer
-        // binding passes), but is not the assignee → rejected by authorization.
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(q(stranger)).data(AuthenticatedDid(stranger.into())))
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).contains("assignee"),
-            "a non-assignee signer must be rejected: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
-
-        // The assignee completes with no error.
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(q(assignee)).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).is_empty(),
-            "the assignee should complete the task: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/query.rs

@@ -12,29 +12,11 @@ impl QueryRoot {
     async fn repos(&self, ctx: &Context<'_>) -> Result<Vec<RepoType>> {
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let repos = db
-            .list_all_repos_deduped()
+            .list_all_repos()
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
-
-        // Apply the same "/" visibility gate the REST/per-repo endpoints use so
-        // this surface does not enumerate private repos (#97). The caller DID is
-        // threaded onto the context by optional_signature; absent = anonymous.
-        let caller = ctx
-            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
-            .ok()
-            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
-        let ids: Vec<String> = repos.iter().map(|r| r.id.clone()).collect();
-        let rules_by_repo = db
-            .list_visibility_rules_for_repos(&ids)
-            .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
-
+            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
         Ok(repos
             .into_iter()
-            .filter(|r| {
-                let rules = rules_by_repo.get(&r.id).map(Vec::as_slice).unwrap_or(&[]);
-                crate::visibility::listable_at_root(rules, r.is_public, &r.owner_did, caller)
-            })
             .map(|r| RepoType {
                 name: r.name,
                 owner_did: r.owner_did,
@@ -49,49 +31,16 @@ impl QueryRoot {
         &self,
         ctx: &Context<'_>,
         repo: Option<String>,
-        #[graphql(
-            default = 20,
-            desc = "Max 200; larger requests return the newest 200 rows (no continuation cursor)."
-        )]
-        limit: i64,
+        #[graphql(default = 20)] limit: i64,
     ) -> Result<Vec<RefUpdateType>> {
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
-
-        // Gate each row on the same "/" visibility decision the repos resolver
-        // uses, so anonymous callers get no row for a local repo they can't read
-        // (#112). The shared collector applies the fail-closed gate *before* the
-        // limit (paging past dropped private rows) so a small limit still returns
-        // the latest visible events, and keeps this surface byte-identical to the
-        // REST feed (#114). The row slug is peer-supplied, so the pure filter
-        // treats it as untrusted input; remote (no local match) rows pass.
-        let caller = ctx
-            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
-            .ok()
-            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
-        let updates =
-            crate::api::events::collect_visible_ref_updates(db, repo.as_deref(), limit, caller)
-                .await
-                .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_app_err)?;
-
-        // Resolve the trusted display owner_did per row, identical to the REST
-        // feed: the stored wire value is untrusted, so it is echoed only when it
-        // matches the canonical owner of the local repo the slug names (#P1);
-        // legacy None rows are attributed via an exact unique local match (#P3).
-        // The batch resolver issues at most one query per distinct local repo
-        // rather than one per event row (#P2).
-        let pairs: Vec<(&str, Option<&str>)> = updates
-            .iter()
-            .map(|u| (u.repo.as_str(), u.owner_did.as_deref()))
-            .collect();
-        let owner_dids = db
-            .resolve_ref_update_owner_dids(&pairs)
+        let updates = db
+            .list_ref_updates_filtered(repo.as_deref(), limit)
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
-
-        let resolved: Vec<RefUpdateType> = updates
+            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
+        Ok(updates
             .into_iter()
-            .zip(owner_dids)
-            .map(|(u, owner_did)| RefUpdateType {
+            .map(|u| RefUpdateType {
                 repo: u.repo,
                 ref_name: u.ref_name,
                 old_sha: u.old_sha,
@@ -99,10 +48,8 @@ impl QueryRoot {
                 pusher_did: u.pusher_did,
                 node_did: u.node_did,
                 timestamp: u.timestamp,
-                owner_did,
             })
-            .collect();
-        Ok(resolved)
+            .collect())
     }
 
     async fn tasks(
@@ -110,21 +57,13 @@ impl QueryRoot {
         ctx: &Context<'_>,
         status: Option<String>,
         assignee_did: Option<String>,
-        #[graphql(
-            default = 50,
-            desc = "Max 200; larger requests are clamped to 200 (no error). Negative values clamp to 0."
-        )]
-        limit: i64,
+        #[graphql(default = 50)] limit: i64,
     ) -> Result<Vec<AgentTaskType>> {
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
-        // Clamp before SQL: a negative LIMIT is a client fault that Postgres
-        // rejects with 2201W, which would otherwise trip the opaque DB path
-        // and write an error-level log on every probe (#250 review).
-        let limit = limit.clamp(0, 200);
         let tasks = db
             .list_tasks(status.as_deref(), assignee_did.as_deref(), limit)
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
+            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
         Ok(tasks.into_iter().map(AgentTaskType::from).collect())
     }
 
@@ -133,385 +72,7 @@ impl QueryRoot {
         let t = db
             .get_task(&id)
             .await
-            .map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
+            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
         Ok(t.map(AgentTaskType::from))
     }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::db::{Db, ReceivedRefUpdate, RepoRecord};
-    use chrono::Utc;
-    use sqlx::PgPool;
-    use std::sync::Arc;
-
-    const OWNER: &str = "did:key:z6MkOwner";
-
-    async fn db(pool: PgPool) -> Arc<Db> {
-        let db = Db::for_testing(pool);
-        db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
-        Arc::new(db)
-    }
-
-    fn schema(db: Arc<Db>) -> super::super::GitlawbSchema {
-        let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
-        let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
-        super::super::build_schema(db, ref_tx, task_tx)
-    }
-
-    fn repo(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
-        RepoRecord {
-            id: id.into(),
-            name: name.into(),
-            owner_did: owner_did.into(),
-            description: None,
-            is_public,
-            default_branch: "main".into(),
-            created_at: Utc::now(),
-            updated_at: Utc::now(),
-            disk_path: format!("/srv/{id}"),
-            forked_from: None,
-            machine_id: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn ref_row(id: &str, slug: &str) -> ReceivedRefUpdate {
-        ReceivedRefUpdate {
-            id: id.into(),
-            node_did: "did:key:z6MkNode".into(),
-            pusher_did: "did:key:z6MkPusher".into(),
-            repo: slug.into(),
-            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: "0".repeat(40),
-            new_sha: "a".repeat(40),
-            timestamp: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-            cert_id: None,
-            received_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-            from_peer: "peer1".into(),
-            owner_did: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Count `refUpdates` rows in a GraphQL response.
-    fn count(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> usize {
-        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
-        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
-            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
-        };
-        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").expect("refUpdates key")
-        else {
-            panic!("refUpdates not a list");
-        };
-        rows.len()
-    }
-
-    async fn anon(schema: &super::super::GitlawbSchema, query: &str) -> async_graphql::Response {
-        schema.execute(async_graphql::Request::new(query)).await
-    }
-
-    async fn authed(
-        schema: &super::super::GitlawbSchema,
-        query: &str,
-        did: &str,
-    ) -> async_graphql::Response {
-        schema
-            .execute(
-                async_graphql::Request::new(query)
-                    .data(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid(did.to_string())),
-            )
-            .await
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 1 — anon must not get a private local repo's row on the
-    // repo:Some branch. This is the load-bearing RED→GREEN case.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_private_repo_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkOwner/widget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        // The GraphQL `repo` arg is the raw slug DB filter, so it must equal the
-        // stored slug to select the row at all — this is the exact leak path.
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(repo: "z6MkOwner/widget") { refName newSha pusherDid } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 2 — owner still sees their own private repo's row.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_private_repo_kept_for_owner(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkOwner/widget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(repo: "z6MkOwner/widget") { refName } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&authed(&schema, q, OWNER).await), 1);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 3 — unfiltered (repo:None): anon gets only the public row.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_unfiltered_anon_gets_only_public(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("pub", OWNER, "openrepo", true))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.create_repo(&repo("priv", OWNER, "secret", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u_pub", "z6MkOwner/openrepo"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u_priv", "z6MkOwner/secret"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo refName ownerDid } }"#;
-        let resp = anon(&schema, q).await;
-        assert_eq!(count(&resp), 1);
-        // The one row returned must be the public repo's with owner_did echoed.
-        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").unwrap() else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        let async_graphql::Value::Object(row) = &rows[0] else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        assert_eq!(
-            row.get("repo").unwrap(),
-            &async_graphql::Value::from("z6MkOwner/openrepo")
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            row.get("ownerDid").unwrap(),
-            &async_graphql::Value::from(OWNER),
-            "ownerDid must fall back to the local record's owner for legacy rows"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 4 — alias fail-closed: private repo's row stored full-DID form.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_full_did_slug_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", "did:key:zABC", "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "did:key:zABC/widget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        // repo:None so the slug is not the DB filter key (which is verbatim);
-        // the gate must still drop it.
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 5 — truncated-key fail-closed: 8-char-prefix owner form.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_truncated_key_slug_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", "did:key:zABCDEFGH", "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "zABCDEF/widget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 6 — remote slug (no local match) is returned to anon.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_remote_slug_kept_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        // Row whose slug matches no local repo (different owner + name).
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "zZZZOTHER/gadget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 1);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 7 (#114 P2) — a small limit must page past the newest rows when
-    // they are private, so the older public rows are still returned. Before the
-    // gate moved ahead of the limit this returned 0 (the newest `limit` rows were
-    // all private and got filtered after the SQL LIMIT). RED→GREEN.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_small_limit_pages_past_newest_private(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("pub", OWNER, "openrepo", true))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.create_repo(&repo("priv", OWNER, "secret", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        // 3 older PUBLIC rows …
-        for i in 0..3 {
-            let mut r = ref_row(&format!("pub{i}"), "z6MkOwner/openrepo");
-            r.timestamp = format!("2026-07-01T10:00:0{i}+00:00");
-            db.insert_ref_update(&r).await.unwrap();
-        }
-        // … then 5 NEWER PRIVATE rows (the newest in the feed).
-        for i in 0..5 {
-            let mut r = ref_row(&format!("priv{i}"), "z6MkOwner/secret");
-            r.timestamp = format!("2026-07-01T10:00:1{i}+00:00");
-            db.insert_ref_update(&r).await.unwrap();
-        }
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        // limit 3 < the 5 newest (all private): anon must still get 3 public rows.
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(limit: 3) { repo } }"#;
-        let resp = anon(&schema, q).await;
-        assert_eq!(count(&resp), 3, "paging must reach the older public rows");
-        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").unwrap() else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        for row in rows {
-            let async_graphql::Value::Object(r) = row else {
-                unreachable!()
-            };
-            assert_eq!(
-                r.get("repo").unwrap(),
-                &async_graphql::Value::from("z6MkOwner/openrepo"),
-                "every returned row must be the public repo's"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 8 — a quarantined mirror is withheld on the GraphQL surface too.
-    // Guards that the resolver keeps delegating to the shared collector (where the
-    // quarantine fold lives); a REST-only test would miss a resolver that stopped.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_quarantined_mirror_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.upsert_mirror_repo("z6MkQuar", "secret", "/tmp/q", None, true)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkQuar/secret"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 8b — the GraphQL surface also withholds a quarantined repo from an
-    // authenticated OWNER, not just anon. Without the collector's quarantine drop
-    // the owner short-circuit in visibility_check keeps the row on this surface
-    // too, so the REST owner test alone would not guard the resolver.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_quarantined_repo_dropped_for_owner(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("q1", "did:key:z6MkQuar", "secret", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.set_repo_quarantine("q1", true).await.unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkQuar/secret"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&authed(&schema, q, "did:key:z6MkQuar").await), 0);
-    }
-
-    /// #250: anonymous GraphQL query DB failures must not leak sqlx/schema text.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn repos_query_db_error_message_is_opaque(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool.clone()).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", true))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        sqlx::query("ALTER TABLE repos DROP COLUMN is_public")
-            .execute(&pool)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let resp = anon(&schema, "{ repos { name ownerDid } }").await;
-        assert!(
-            !resp.errors.is_empty(),
-            "DB failure must surface as a GraphQL error"
-        );
-        for err in &resp.errors {
-            assert_eq!(
-                err.message,
-                crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE,
-                "raw DB detail leaked into GraphQL error: {}",
-                err.message
-            );
-            assert!(
-                !err.message.contains("is_public") && !err.message.contains("column"),
-                "schema text leaked: {}",
-                err.message
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// #250: negative tasks(limit) must not hit Postgres (and must not 500-log).
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn tasks_negative_limit_clamped(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let resp = anon(&schema, "{ tasks(limit: -1) { id } }").await;
-        assert!(
-            resp.errors.is_empty(),
-            "negative limit must clamp, not fail: {:?}",
-            resp.errors
-        );
-        assert_eq!(count_tasks(&resp), 0);
-    }
-
-    /// #255: ceiling of the tasks(limit) clamp must be held (schema promises Max 200).
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn tasks_limit_ceiling_clamped_to_200(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
-        for i in 0..201 {
-            db.create_task(&crate::db::AgentTask {
-                id: format!("task-ceil-{i}"),
-                repo_id: None,
-                kind: "build".into(),
-                status: "pending".into(),
-                delegator_did: OWNER.into(),
-                assignee_did: None,
-                capability: "repo:write".into(),
-                ucan_token: None,
-                payload: None,
-                result: None,
-                created_at: now.clone(),
-                updated_at: now.clone(),
-                deadline: None,
-            })
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        }
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let resp = anon(&schema, "{ tasks(limit: 5000) { id } }").await;
-        assert_eq!(count_tasks(&resp), 200, "limit above 200 must clamp to 200");
-    }
-
-    fn count_tasks(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> usize {
-        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
-        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
-            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
-        };
-        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("tasks").expect("tasks key") else {
-            panic!("tasks not a list");
-        };
-        rows.len()
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/subscription.rs

@@ -11,15 +11,6 @@ pub struct SubscriptionRoot;
 
 #[Subscription]
 impl SubscriptionRoot {
-    /// Live ref-update stream. `/graphql/ws` is mounted outside the
-    /// `optional_signature` layer, so this resolver has NO caller identity and
-    /// cannot gate per-subscriber — it relays whatever enters the broadcast
-    /// channel to any anonymous client. Its visibility safety therefore rests
-    /// entirely on the WRITE side: the push handler only sends a
-    /// `RefUpdateBroadcast` for repos the anonymous public may read (inside its
-    /// `if announce` block, `api/repos.rs`). This is a single-point invariant —
-    /// any new sender to `ref_update_tx` MUST be `announce`-gated, or private-repo
-    /// ref metadata leaks here to unauthenticated subscribers (#112/#114 class).
     async fn ref_updates(
         &self,
         ctx: &Context<'_>,
@@ -39,7 +30,6 @@ impl SubscriptionRoot {
                     pusher_did: ev.pusher_did,
                     node_did: ev.node_did,
                     timestamp: ev.timestamp,
-                    owner_did: Some(ev.owner_did),
                 }),
                 _ => None,
             }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/types.rs

@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ pub struct RefUpdateType {
     pub pusher_did: String,
     pub node_did: String,
     pub timestamp: String,
-    pub owner_did: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(SimpleObject, Clone)]

crates/gitlawb-node/src/icaptcha.rs

@@ -1,650 +0,0 @@
-//! iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate.
-//!
-//! Spam-prone endpoints (repo creation, agent registration) can require the
-//! caller to present an iCaptcha proof: a small Ed25519-signed token minted by
-//! <https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com> after the caller solves an escalating
-//! challenge. We verify the proof OFFLINE (no per-request call to iCaptcha)
-//! using its published public key, and bind each proof to the authenticated
-//! agent DID so a proof cannot be shared between identities.
-//!
-//! Behaviour is controlled by `ICAPTCHA_MODE`:
-//!   * `off`     (default) — gate is inert, nothing is checked.
-//!   * `shadow`  — verify and log would-be rejections, but always allow.
-//!   * `enforce` — reject requests without a valid, sufficiently-strong proof.
-//!
-//! Config (env):
-//!   ICAPTCHA_MODE            off | shadow | enforce         (default off)
-//!   ICAPTCHA_URL             base URL                        (default https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com)
-//!   ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY          base64url Ed25519 public key    (optional; else fetched from /v1/pubkey)
-//!   ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL  minimum proof level             (default 3)
-
-use std::sync::OnceLock;
-use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
-
-use axum::http::HeaderMap;
-use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
-use base64::Engine;
-use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
-use serde::Deserialize;
-
-use crate::error::AppError;
-
-const PROOF_HEADER: &str = "x-icaptcha-proof";
-
-/// How long a mirror-admission `jti` stays in the replay ledger. The direct
-/// request path spends a proof against its own `exp` (it can't be presented once
-/// expired). The propagation path deliberately accepts already-expired proofs,
-/// so spending against `exp` would store an already-past expiry that the next
-/// sweep deletes — letting the same token admit another mirror minutes later.
-/// We instead retain the mirror replay record for a long, fixed window so the
-/// per-node single-use property is durable.
-const MIRROR_REPLAY_RETENTION_SECS: i64 = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60;
-
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub enum Mode {
-    Off,
-    Shadow,
-    Enforce,
-}
-
-impl Mode {
-    fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
-        match self {
-            Mode::Off => "off",
-            Mode::Shadow => "shadow",
-            Mode::Enforce => "enforce",
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Parse `ICAPTCHA_MODE`. Returns `None` for unrecognized values so the caller
-/// can surface the typo instead of silently disabling the gate.
-fn parse_mode(s: &str) -> Option<Mode> {
-    match s.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
-        "" | "off" => Some(Mode::Off),
-        "shadow" => Some(Mode::Shadow),
-        "enforce" => Some(Mode::Enforce),
-        _ => None,
-    }
-}
-
-/// Parse `ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL`. Defaults to 3; warns (rather than silently
-/// lowering the threshold) when a non-empty value fails to parse.
-fn parse_required_level() -> u32 {
-    const DEFAULT: u32 = 3;
-    match std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL") {
-        Ok(v) if !v.trim().is_empty() => v.trim().parse().unwrap_or_else(|_| {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                value = %v,
-                default = DEFAULT,
-                "invalid ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL; using default"
-            );
-            DEFAULT
-        }),
-        _ => DEFAULT,
-    }
-}
-
-struct Verifier {
-    mode: Mode,
-    url: String,
-    required_level: u32,
-    key: Option<VerifyingKey>,
-}
-
-static VERIFIER: OnceLock<Verifier> = OnceLock::new();
-
-#[derive(Deserialize, Debug)]
-struct ProofClaims {
-    sub: String,
-    level: u32,
-    exp: i64,
-    /// Unique proof id, consumed once so a proof cannot be replayed.
-    jti: String,
-}
-
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-struct Jwk {
-    x: String,
-}
-
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-struct Jwks {
-    keys: Vec<Jwk>,
-}
-
-fn now_secs() -> i64 {
-    SystemTime::now()
-        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
-        .map(|d| d.as_secs() as i64)
-        .unwrap_or(0)
-}
-
-fn decode_key(b64url: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
-    let bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(b64url.trim()).ok()?;
-    let arr: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().ok()?;
-    VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&arr).ok()
-}
-
-async fn fetch_key(url: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
-    let endpoint = format!("{}/v1/pubkey", url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-    // Bounded request: a hung /v1/pubkey must never block node startup. On
-    // timeout/error we return None and the gate stays inert (fail safe).
-    let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
-        .timeout(Duration::from_secs(5))
-        .build()
-        .ok()?;
-    let jwks: Jwks = client.get(&endpoint).send().await.ok()?.json().await.ok()?;
-    decode_key(&jwks.keys.first()?.x)
-}
-
-/// Initialize the gate from the environment. Call once at startup. Never panics;
-/// if the gate is active but no key can be loaded, it stays inert and warns.
-pub async fn init() {
-    let raw_mode = std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_MODE").unwrap_or_default();
-    let mode = parse_mode(&raw_mode).unwrap_or_else(|| {
-        tracing::warn!(value = %raw_mode, "invalid ICAPTCHA_MODE; disabling iCaptcha gate");
-        Mode::Off
-    });
-    let url = std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_URL")
-        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string());
-    let required_level = parse_required_level();
-
-    let key = if mode == Mode::Off {
-        None
-    } else {
-        match std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY") {
-            Ok(b64) if !b64.is_empty() => decode_key(&b64),
-            _ => fetch_key(&url).await,
-        }
-    };
-
-    if mode != Mode::Off {
-        if key.is_some() {
-            tracing::info!(mode = mode.as_str(), required_level, "iCaptcha gate active");
-        } else {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                mode = mode.as_str(),
-                "iCaptcha gate enabled but no public key could be loaded; staying inert"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    let _ = VERIFIER.set(Verifier {
-        mode,
-        url,
-        required_level,
-        key,
-    });
-}
-
-/// Outcome of the synchronous, IO-free decision step.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-enum Decision {
-    /// Allow the request (off, shadow, inert/no-key, or verified non-enforcing).
-    Allow,
-    /// Enforce mode and verification failed; reject with this reason.
-    Reject(String),
-    /// Enforce mode and the proof verified; the caller must consume its `jti`
-    /// (and reject replays) before allowing, then may persist it.
-    Consume(VerifiedProof),
-}
-
-/// A verified proof: the raw token plus the claims we act on. Carried by a
-/// [`ProofGuard`] so that, once consumed, the gated handler can persist it with
-/// the created repo — letting the proof travel with the repo when it propagates
-/// to peers (see [`admit_mirror`]).
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct VerifiedProof {
-    token: String,
-    sub: String,
-    level: u32,
-    jti: String,
-    exp: i64,
-}
-
-impl VerifiedProof {
-    /// Persist this proof against a freshly-created repo so a mirroring peer can
-    /// re-verify it. Best-effort callers may ignore failures; the gate's
-    /// security does not depend on it (propagation just falls back to quarantine).
-    pub async fn record_for_repo(&self, db: &crate::db::Db, repo_id: &str) -> Result<(), AppError> {
-        db.record_repo_proof(
-            repo_id,
-            &self.token,
-            &self.sub,
-            self.level as i32,
-            &self.jti,
-            self.exp,
-        )
-        .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-/// A verified proof awaiting consumption. Verification (which rejects invalid or
-/// missing proofs) is separated from consumption (which spends the single-use
-/// `jti`) so a request rejected by later validation never burns a valid proof.
-/// The caller must `consume()` this guard immediately before the gated write.
-/// For off/shadow/inert there is nothing to consume.
-#[must_use = "a verified iCaptcha proof must be consumed before the gated action"]
-pub struct ProofGuard(Option<VerifiedProof>);
-
-impl ProofGuard {
-    /// Spend the proof's `jti` (single-use) and return the verified proof so the
-    /// caller can persist it. A replay is rejected. Returns `None` when there is
-    /// nothing to consume (off/shadow/inert).
-    pub async fn consume(self, db: &crate::db::Db) -> Result<Option<VerifiedProof>, AppError> {
-        match self.0 {
-            Some(p) => {
-                if !db.consume_proof_jti(&p.jti, p.exp).await? {
-                    let (url, level) = url_and_level();
-                    return Err(AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
-                        message: "iCaptcha proof already used (replay); solve a fresh challenge"
-                            .to_string(),
-                        url,
-                        level,
-                    });
-                }
-                Ok(Some(p))
-            }
-            None => Ok(None),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Verify the proof in `headers` belongs to `did`. Rejects missing/invalid
-/// proofs early (enforce mode); off/shadow never reject. Returns a [`ProofGuard`]
-/// the caller must `consume()` right before the gated write. Off/shadow/inert
-/// yield a no-op guard that consumes nothing.
-pub fn verify_request(headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str) -> Result<ProofGuard, AppError> {
-    let v = match VERIFIER.get() {
-        Some(v) => v,
-        None => return Ok(ProofGuard(None)), // not initialized -> inert
-    };
-    match decide(v, headers, did, now_secs()) {
-        Decision::Allow => Ok(ProofGuard(None)),
-        Decision::Reject(reason) => Err(reject_error(v, &reason)),
-        Decision::Consume(proof) => Ok(ProofGuard(Some(proof))),
-    }
-}
-
-fn reject_error(v: &Verifier, reason: &str) -> AppError {
-    AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
-        message: format!(
-            "iCaptcha proof required ({reason}). Solve a challenge at {} for level >= {} and resend with the {} header.",
-            v.url, v.required_level, PROOF_HEADER
-        ),
-        url: v.url.clone(),
-        level: v.required_level,
-    }
-}
-
-/// iCaptcha service url + required level for error responses, read from the
-/// initialized verifier (falls back to defaults if somehow uninitialized).
-fn url_and_level() -> (String, u32) {
-    VERIFIER
-        .get()
-        .map(|v| (v.url.clone(), v.required_level))
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| ("https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(), 3))
-}
-
-/// Mode-aware decision. Pure and IO-free (no DB; clock injected via `now`) so it
-/// is fully unit-testable. The caller performs jti consumption for `Consume`.
-fn decide(v: &Verifier, headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str, now: i64) -> Decision {
-    if v.mode == Mode::Off {
-        return Decision::Allow;
-    }
-
-    // Fail safe: if no public key could be loaded (e.g. iCaptcha was unreachable
-    // at startup), stay inert rather than rejecting every request. The operator
-    // already saw a startup warning. An iCaptcha hiccup must never break repo
-    // creation or registration.
-    if v.key.is_none() {
-        return Decision::Allow;
-    }
-
-    let token = headers.get(PROOF_HEADER).and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok());
-    let result = match token {
-        Some(t) => verify_token(v, t, did, now, true).map(|claims| (t, claims)),
-        None => Err("missing proof header".to_string()),
-    };
-
-    match result {
-        Ok((token, claims)) => match v.mode {
-            Mode::Enforce => Decision::Consume(VerifiedProof {
-                token: token.to_string(),
-                sub: claims.sub,
-                level: claims.level,
-                jti: claims.jti,
-                exp: claims.exp,
-            }),
-            // Shadow/Off: never reject, and do not consume (observational only).
-            _ => Decision::Allow,
-        },
-        Err(reason) => match v.mode {
-            Mode::Shadow => {
-                tracing::warn!(did = %did, reason, "iCaptcha (shadow) would reject");
-                Decision::Allow
-            }
-            Mode::Enforce => Decision::Reject(reason),
-            Mode::Off => Decision::Allow,
-        },
-    }
-}
-
-/// Header-extracting wrapper over [`verify_token`] (enforces expiry). The
-/// production path inlines this in [`decide`]; retained as the unit-test entry
-/// point that also exercises header extraction.
-#[cfg(test)]
-fn verify(v: &Verifier, headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str, now: i64) -> Result<ProofClaims, String> {
-    let proof = headers
-        .get(PROOF_HEADER)
-        .and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok())
-        .ok_or("missing proof header")?;
-    verify_token(v, proof, did, now, true)
-}
-
-/// Core verification of a raw proof token, separated for testability and reuse.
-/// Checks the Ed25519 signature, the required level, and the DID binding. `exp`
-/// is only enforced when `check_exp` is true: the direct request path enforces
-/// freshness, but the propagation path ([`admit_mirror`]) does not — a proof has
-/// usually expired by the time a repo mirrors, and the origin enforced freshness
-/// at creation. `now` is unix seconds.
-fn verify_token(
-    v: &Verifier,
-    token: &str,
-    did: &str,
-    now: i64,
-    check_exp: bool,
-) -> Result<ProofClaims, String> {
-    let key = v.key.as_ref().ok_or("verifier has no public key")?;
-
-    let (payload, sig_b64) = token.split_once('.').ok_or("malformed proof")?;
-    let sig_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
-        .decode(sig_b64)
-        .map_err(|_| "bad signature encoding")?;
-    let sig = Signature::from_slice(&sig_bytes).map_err(|_| "bad signature length")?;
-    key.verify_strict(payload.as_bytes(), &sig)
-        .map_err(|_| "signature verification failed")?;
-
-    let claims_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
-        .decode(payload)
-        .map_err(|_| "bad payload encoding")?;
-    let claims: ProofClaims = serde_json::from_slice(&claims_bytes).map_err(|_| "bad claims")?;
-
-    if check_exp && claims.exp < now {
-        return Err("proof expired".to_string());
-    }
-    if claims.level < v.required_level {
-        return Err(format!(
-            "level {} below required {}",
-            claims.level, v.required_level
-        ));
-    }
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(did, &claims.sub) {
-        return Err("proof subject does not match authenticated DID".to_string());
-    }
-    Ok(claims)
-}
-
-/// Outcome of admitting a repo mirrored from a peer.
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub enum MirrorAdmission {
-    /// Admit the mirror normally (off/shadow/inert, or a valid proof in enforce).
-    Admit,
-    /// Enforce mode and the mirror's proof is missing/invalid/replayed — mirror
-    /// it but quarantine until an operator releases it. Carries the reason.
-    Quarantine(String),
-}
-
-/// Decide whether to admit a repo being mirrored from a peer, given the proof
-/// token the origin served (`None` if it had none or the fetch failed) and the
-/// mirrored repo's owner DID.
-///
-/// Off/shadow/inert always admit (shadow logs the would-be quarantine and writes
-/// nothing). In enforce mode the proof is re-verified offline against the local
-/// public key — signature, level, and owner-DID binding, but NOT expiry — and
-/// its `jti` is consumed in the local ledger, so one solved challenge admits at
-/// most one mirror per node (a malicious origin cannot reuse one proof to bless
-/// many spam repos here).
-///
-/// LIMITATION (proof is not repo-bound): an iCaptcha proof commits only to the
-/// solver's DID (`sub`), never to a repo — the proof is minted before the repo
-/// exists. So the guarantee enforced here is "a level≥N challenge was solved by
-/// this repo's owner DID", not "the owner intended THIS repo". A malicious origin
-/// that harvests a victim's public proof (served by `get_icaptcha_proof`) can use
-/// it to get ONE spam repo nominally owned by that victim admitted per node — the
-/// per-node `jti` single-use caps the amplification at one repo per distinct
-/// harvested proof, but does not eliminate it. Fully binding a proof to a repo
-/// would require the iCaptcha service to embed a repo/target identifier in the
-/// signed challenge (a protocol change, tracked as future work).
-pub async fn admit_mirror(
-    db: &crate::db::Db,
-    token: Option<&str>,
-    owner_did: &str,
-) -> MirrorAdmission {
-    let v = match VERIFIER.get() {
-        Some(v) => v,
-        None => return MirrorAdmission::Admit, // not initialized -> inert
-    };
-    // Off, or inert because no key could be loaded: admit unconditionally.
-    if v.mode == Mode::Off || v.key.is_none() {
-        return MirrorAdmission::Admit;
-    }
-    let shadow = v.mode == Mode::Shadow;
-
-    // Quarantine in enforce; in shadow just log and admit (observational, no IO).
-    let quarantine = |reason: String| -> MirrorAdmission {
-        if shadow {
-            tracing::warn!(owner = %owner_did, reason, "iCaptcha (shadow) would quarantine mirror");
-            MirrorAdmission::Admit
-        } else {
-            MirrorAdmission::Quarantine(reason)
-        }
-    };
-
-    let token = match token {
-        Some(t) => t,
-        None => return quarantine("origin served no iCaptcha proof".to_string()),
-    };
-
-    match verify_token(v, token, owner_did, now_secs(), false) {
-        Ok(claims) => {
-            if shadow {
-                // Observational: a valid proof would admit. Do not consume, so a
-                // later switch to enforce still sees the jti as fresh.
-                return MirrorAdmission::Admit;
-            }
-            // Retain the replay record on a fixed forward window, NOT the proof's
-            // own (already-past) exp — otherwise the next sweep frees the jti and
-            // the same token could admit another mirror here.
-            let retain_until = now_secs().saturating_add(MIRROR_REPLAY_RETENTION_SECS);
-            match db.consume_proof_jti(&claims.jti, retain_until).await {
-                Ok(true) => MirrorAdmission::Admit,
-                Ok(false) => MirrorAdmission::Quarantine(
-                    "iCaptcha proof already used to admit another mirror".to_string(),
-                ),
-                Err(e) => {
-                    tracing::warn!(owner = %owner_did, err = %e, "iCaptcha mirror ledger error; quarantining");
-                    MirrorAdmission::Quarantine("iCaptcha proof ledger unavailable".to_string())
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        Err(reason) => quarantine(reason),
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    // Real values captured from https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com (a live proof).
-    const PUBKEY_X: &str = "xjyPNqIbvc9U-kwXW6u9mDqRJ7E2UUMOaJdUWhpEXq8";
-    const PROOF: &str = "eyJzdWIiOiJkaWQ6a2V5Onp0ZXN0IiwibGV2ZWwiOjMsImlzcyI6ImljYXB0Y2hhIiwiaWF0IjoxNzgyNTcyODUxLCJleHAiOjE3ODI1NzMxNTEsImp0aSI6IjRiNTIyOGE1YmVkNzEyMmRlZTlmNDdmZiJ9.5UXVPZ8Eo91VnlcvgDXtW-Fx7J2jr7h535SAstQEpigxBr7FF7V6R0XB4PBDgdoBPnhdH_kVEfRPfdHPSdB0CA";
-    const SUB: &str = "did:key:ztest";
-    const IAT: i64 = 1782572851; // within the proof's validity window
-
-    fn verifier(level: u32) -> Verifier {
-        Verifier {
-            mode: Mode::Enforce,
-            url: "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(),
-            required_level: level,
-            key: decode_key(PUBKEY_X),
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn headers_with(proof: &str) -> HeaderMap {
-        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
-        h.insert(PROOF_HEADER, proof.parse().unwrap());
-        h
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn accepts_a_real_proof() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        assert!(verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, IAT).is_ok());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_expired_proof() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        let err = verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, 9_999_999_999).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.contains("expired"), "{err}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_wrong_did() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        let err = verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), "did:key:zsomeoneelse", IAT).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.contains("subject"), "{err}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_insufficient_level() {
-        let v = verifier(5); // proof is level 3
-        let err = verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, IAT).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.contains("below required"), "{err}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_tampered_signature() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        // Flip one base64url char in the signature so it is guaranteed different.
-        let (payload, sig) = PROOF.split_once('.').unwrap();
-        let mut chars: Vec<char> = sig.chars().collect();
-        chars[0] = if chars[0] == 'A' { 'B' } else { 'A' };
-        let tampered = format!("{}.{}", payload, chars.into_iter().collect::<String>());
-        assert!(verify(&v, &headers_with(&tampered), SUB, IAT).is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_missing_header() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        let err = verify(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.contains("missing"), "{err}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn parse_mode_accepts_documented_values_and_rejects_junk() {
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode(""), Some(Mode::Off));
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("off"), Some(Mode::Off));
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("  Shadow "), Some(Mode::Shadow));
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("ENFORCE"), Some(Mode::Enforce));
-        // Typos must NOT silently disable the gate.
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("enforced"), None);
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("on"), None);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn off_mode_allows_everything() {
-        let mut v = verifier(3);
-        v.mode = Mode::Off;
-        assert!(matches!(
-            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
-            Decision::Allow
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn enforce_without_key_stays_inert() {
-        // iCaptcha unreachable at startup -> no key -> must not reject.
-        let v = Verifier {
-            mode: Mode::Enforce,
-            url: "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(),
-            required_level: 3,
-            key: None,
-        };
-        assert!(matches!(
-            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
-            Decision::Allow
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn enforce_with_key_rejects_missing_proof() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        assert!(matches!(
-            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
-            Decision::Reject(_)
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn shadow_allows_despite_bad_proof() {
-        let mut v = verifier(3);
-        v.mode = Mode::Shadow;
-        assert!(matches!(
-            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
-            Decision::Allow
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn enforce_valid_proof_requires_consuming_its_jti() {
-        // A verified proof under enforce must yield Consume carrying the jti, so
-        // the caller can spend it once and reject replays.
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        match decide(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, IAT) {
-            Decision::Consume(p) => {
-                assert_eq!(p.jti, "4b5228a5bed7122dee9f47ff");
-                assert_eq!(p.exp, 1782573151);
-                assert_eq!(p.token, PROOF, "the raw token is retained for persistence");
-                assert_eq!(p.sub, SUB);
-            }
-            other => panic!("expected Consume, got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn propagation_accepts_an_expired_proof() {
-        // The mirror-admission path verifies sig/level/DID but NOT expiry, since a
-        // proof has usually expired by the time a repo propagates. The same proof
-        // that the direct path rejects as expired must verify here.
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        let now = 9_999_999_999; // far past the proof's exp
-        assert!(
-            verify_token(&v, PROOF, SUB, now, true).is_err(),
-            "direct path (check_exp=true) rejects the expired proof"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            verify_token(&v, PROOF, SUB, now, false).is_ok(),
-            "propagation path (check_exp=false) accepts it"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn propagation_still_enforces_signature_level_and_did() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        // wrong owner DID
-        assert!(verify_token(&v, PROOF, "did:key:zother", IAT, false).is_err());
-        // insufficient level
-        let v5 = verifier(5);
-        assert!(verify_token(&v5, PROOF, SUB, IAT, false).is_err());
-        // tampered signature
-        let (payload, sig) = PROOF.split_once('.').unwrap();
-        let mut chars: Vec<char> = sig.chars().collect();
-        chars[0] = if chars[0] == 'A' { 'B' } else { 'A' };
-        let tampered = format!("{}.{}", payload, chars.into_iter().collect::<String>());
-        assert!(verify_token(&v, &tampered, SUB, IAT, false).is_err());
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/metrics.rs

@@ -57,15 +57,10 @@ static PEERS_CONNECTED: OnceLock<IntGauge> = OnceLock::new();
 /// more than once is a silent no-op. MUST be called from `main()` after
 /// the node DID is known.
 pub fn init(version: &str, node_did: &str) {
-    // Guard with Once so two concurrent callers cannot both pass an unsynchronized
-    // `REGISTRY.get()` check and then race on `OnceLock::set(...).expect(...)`,
-    // panicking the loser (#192 F4). Once runs the body exactly once, so the
-    // `.expect("set X once")` calls below can never observe an already-set slot.
-    static INIT: std::sync::Once = std::sync::Once::new();
-    INIT.call_once(|| init_inner(version, node_did));
-}
+    if REGISTRY.get().is_some() {
+        return;
+    }
 
-fn init_inner(version: &str, node_did: &str) {
     let registry = Registry::new();
 
     let info = IntGaugeVec::new(
@@ -223,17 +218,6 @@ pub fn record_fetch(repo: &str) {
     }
 }
 
-/// Test-only: current `gitlawb_fetches_total` value for `repo` (0 if the registry
-/// is not initialized). Lets api-layer tests assert the completed-fetch count with
-/// a unique label instead of scraping the encoded text.
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub fn fetch_count_for_test(repo: &str) -> u64 {
-    FETCHES
-        .get()
-        .map(|c| c.with_label_values(&[repo]).get())
-        .unwrap_or(0)
-}
-
 /// Record one HTTP signature check that passed.
 #[allow(dead_code)] // wired in a follow-up; helpers are part of the public metrics surface
 pub fn record_auth_success(route: &str) {
@@ -251,11 +235,7 @@ pub fn record_auth_failure(route: &str, reason: &str) {
     }
 }
 
-/// Record one sync_queue item outcome. `status` ∈ {done, failed, skipped,
-/// rejected, deferred}. `rejected` is terminal and caused by a guard (a
-/// malformed slug, or a path resolving outside repos_dir); `deferred` leaves
-/// the row pending for a later pass, so a queue stalled on an operator
-/// condition is visible rather than looking idle.
+/// Record one sync_queue item outcome. `status` ∈ {done, failed, skipped}.
 pub fn record_sync_processed(status: &str) {
     if let Some(c) = SYNC_PROCESSED.get() {
         c.with_label_values(&[status]).inc();
@@ -302,11 +282,11 @@ pub fn encode() -> Result<String, prometheus::Error> {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
-    // Note: cargo runs tests in a binary in parallel via threads, and several
-    // tests here call init(). init() is guarded by std::sync::Once, so concurrent
-    // callers run the body exactly once and never race on the OnceLock setters
-    // (#192 F4). The encode test below is structured so it's safe to run alongside
-    // other tests in the same binary regardless of ordering.
+    // Note: these tests are not run in parallel by default (cargo runs
+    // tests in a binary in parallel via threads but the OnceLock guard
+    // means only the first init() call succeeds; subsequent ones are
+    // no-ops). The encode test below is structured so it's safe to run
+    // alongside other tests in the same binary.
 
     #[test]
     fn encode_after_init_returns_prometheus_text() {
@@ -337,24 +317,6 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
-    /// #192 F4: `init` is idempotent and safe to call repeatedly. The panic that
-    /// hit concurrent callers (both passing the old unsynchronized `REGISTRY.get()`
-    /// check, then racing on `OnceLock::set(...).expect(...)`) is fixed by the
-    /// `Once` guard. That race is inherently non-deterministic to assert in the
-    /// shared-binary suite — a 32-thread barrier stress-test reproduces it only in
-    /// isolation (verified: RED before the `Once` fix, GREEN after). This guard
-    /// covers the deterministic half of the contract: a repeat call is a no-op,
-    /// never a panic, and the registry stays usable.
-    #[test]
-    fn init_is_idempotent_no_panic_on_repeat() {
-        init("0.0.0-a", "did:key:a");
-        init("0.0.0-b", "did:key:b");
-        assert!(
-            encode().is_ok(),
-            "registry must stay usable after a repeated init"
-        );
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn record_helpers_are_noops_before_init() {
         // These don't panic. They also don't show up in encode() output

crates/gitlawb-node/src/p2p/mod.rs

@@ -39,11 +39,6 @@ pub struct RefUpdateEvent {
     pub pusher_did: String,
     /// Repository identifier (owner/name)
     pub repo: String,
-    /// Full owner DID — added in #144 for display and storage; not yet
-    /// wired into the feed gate matcher. Optional for backward compat with
-    /// older peers that don't include it.
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub owner_did: Option<String>,
     /// Git ref that changed (e.g., "refs/heads/main")
     pub ref_name: String,
     /// SHA before the push (all-zeros for new ref)
@@ -312,7 +307,6 @@ pub async fn start(
                                     node_did: event.node_did.clone(),
                                     pusher_did: event.pusher_did.clone(),
                                     repo: event.repo.clone(),
-                                    owner_did: event.owner_did.clone(),
                                     ref_name: event.ref_name.clone(),
                                     old_sha: event.old_sha.clone(),
                                     new_sha: event.new_sha.clone(),
@@ -438,67 +432,3 @@ pub async fn start(
 
     Ok(handle)
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ref_update_event_round_trip_with_owner_did() {
-        let event = RefUpdateEvent {
-            node_did: "did:key:zNode".into(),
-            pusher_did: "did:key:zPusher".into(),
-            repo: "zOwner/myrepo".into(),
-            owner_did: Some("did:key:zOwner".into()),
-            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000".into(),
-            new_sha: "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa".into(),
-            timestamp: "2026-07-02T12:00:00Z".into(),
-            cert_id: None,
-            cid: None,
-        };
-        let json = serde_json::to_value(&event).unwrap();
-        // owner_did must be present in the serialized output
-        assert_eq!(json["owner_did"], "did:key:zOwner");
-        assert_eq!(json["repo"], "zOwner/myrepo");
-
-        let deserialized: RefUpdateEvent = serde_json::from_value(json).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(deserialized.owner_did, Some("did:key:zOwner".into()));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ref_update_event_backward_compat_no_owner_did() {
-        let old_json = serde_json::json!({
-            "node_did": "did:key:zNode",
-            "pusher_did": "did:key:zPusher",
-            "repo": "zOwner/myrepo",
-            "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
-            "old_sha": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
-            "new_sha": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
-            "timestamp": "2026-07-02T12:00:00Z",
-            "cert_id": null,
-            "cid": null
-        });
-        let deserialized: RefUpdateEvent = serde_json::from_value(old_json).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(deserialized.owner_did, None);
-        assert_eq!(deserialized.repo, "zOwner/myrepo");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ref_update_event_backward_compat_null_owner_did() {
-        let with_null = serde_json::json!({
-            "node_did": "did:key:zNode",
-            "pusher_did": "did:key:zPusher",
-            "repo": "zOwner/myrepo",
-            "owner_did": null,
-            "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
-            "old_sha": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
-            "new_sha": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
-            "timestamp": "2026-07-02T12:00:00Z",
-            "cert_id": null,
-            "cid": null
-        });
-        let deserialized: RefUpdateEvent = serde_json::from_value(with_null).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(deserialized.owner_did, None);
-    }
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/rate_limit.rs

@@ -1,21 +1,15 @@
 use std::collections::HashMap;
-use std::net::SocketAddr;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
-use axum::extract::{ConnectInfo, Request};
-use axum::http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode};
+use axum::extract::Request;
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
 use axum::middleware::Next;
 use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
 use tokio::sync::Mutex;
 
 use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 
-/// Default ceiling on the number of distinct keys a limiter tracks. Bounds the
-/// limiter's own memory so a caller that can vary the key (many DIDs, or a
-/// spoofable IP header) cannot grow the map without limit.
-const DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS: usize = 100_000;
-
 #[derive(Clone)]
 struct Window {
     timestamps: Vec<Instant>,
@@ -26,121 +20,31 @@ pub struct RateLimiter {
     state: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Window>>>,
     max_requests: usize,
     window: Duration,
-    /// Hard cap on tracked keys. When full, expired keys are evicted (at most
-    /// once per [`sweep_interval`](Self::sweep_interval), see below); if still
-    /// full, a request under a *new* key is rejected rather than inserted — so
-    /// the map can never exceed this bound and a rejected request never
-    /// allocates a new entry.
-    max_keys: usize,
-    /// Timestamp of the last inline capacity sweep. The eviction scan is
-    /// O(max_keys), so under a distinct-key flood (when the map sits at the
-    /// cap) running it on every miss would serialize all traffic behind a full
-    /// scan. Gating it to at most once per interval amortizes that cost; the
-    /// background [`cleanup`](Self::cleanup) loop still reclaims on its own.
-    last_sweep: Arc<Mutex<Instant>>,
 }
 
 impl RateLimiter {
-    // Retained for tests and callers that don't need a tight key bound;
-    // production limiters use `new_bounded`.
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
     pub fn new(max_requests: usize, window: Duration) -> Self {
-        Self::new_bounded(max_requests, window, DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS)
-    }
-
-    /// Like [`new`] but with an explicit cap on the number of distinct keys.
-    /// Production limiters keyed on client-influenced values (per-DID, per-IP)
-    /// set this so the limiter's own state cannot be turned into a
-    /// memory-exhaustion vector.
-    pub fn new_bounded(max_requests: usize, window: Duration, max_keys: usize) -> Self {
         Self {
             state: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
             max_requests,
             window,
-            max_keys: max_keys.max(1),
-            last_sweep: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Instant::now())),
         }
     }
 
-    /// How often the inline capacity sweep may run: at most once per second, or
-    /// once per window when the window is shorter. Bounds post-flood staleness
-    /// (a full map self-heals within one interval) without paying the O(max_keys)
-    /// scan on every capacity miss.
-    fn sweep_interval(&self) -> Duration {
-        self.window.min(Duration::from_secs(1))
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) async fn check(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
-        // max_requests == 0 means the limiter is disabled, not "block all".
-        if self.max_requests == 0 {
-            return true;
-        }
+    async fn check(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
         let now = Instant::now();
         let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
-
-        // Fast path: an already-tracked key never allocates and never grows the
-        // map, so it is unaffected by the key cap.
-        if let Some(window) = state.get_mut(key) {
-            window
-                .timestamps
-                .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
-            if window.timestamps.len() >= self.max_requests {
-                return false;
-            }
-            window.timestamps.push(now);
-            return true;
-        }
-
-        // New key. Enforce the cap BEFORE inserting so a flood of distinct keys
-        // cannot grow the map, and a rejected request never allocates an entry.
-        if state.len() >= self.max_keys {
-            // Reclaim expired keys, but at most once per sweep interval — the
-            // scan is O(max_keys) and the map sits at the cap precisely during a
-            // distinct-key flood, so sweeping per miss would serialize traffic
-            // behind a full scan. Between sweeps a new key is simply rejected.
-            let mut last_sweep = self.last_sweep.lock().await;
-            if now.duration_since(*last_sweep) >= self.sweep_interval() {
-                state.retain(|_, w| {
-                    w.timestamps
-                        .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
-                    !w.timestamps.is_empty()
-                });
-                *last_sweep = now;
-            }
-            drop(last_sweep);
-            if state.len() >= self.max_keys {
-                return false;
-            }
-        }
-        state.insert(
-            key.to_string(),
-            Window {
-                timestamps: vec![now],
-            },
-        );
-        true
-    }
-
-    /// Non-consuming check: is this key ALREADY at its limit for the current window?
-    /// Unlike [`check`], it records nothing and never inserts a new key — used to shed
-    /// expensive preparatory work (e.g. the `/ipfs/{cid}` legacy scan's O(repos) DB
-    /// preload) BEFORE it runs, without perturbing the per-unit budget the consuming
-    /// `check` maintains (#173, F3). An unknown key or a disabled limiter is not
-    /// throttled. Prunes the key's expired timestamps as a side effect (keeps state
-    /// tidy) but adds none, so it cannot itself fill or grow the map.
-    pub(crate) async fn is_throttled(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
-        if self.max_requests == 0 {
+        let window = state.entry(key.to_string()).or_insert_with(|| Window {
+            timestamps: Vec::new(),
+        });
+        window
+            .timestamps
+            .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
+        if window.timestamps.len() >= self.max_requests {
             return false;
         }
-        let now = Instant::now();
-        let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
-        if let Some(window) = state.get_mut(key) {
-            window
-                .timestamps
-                .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
-            return window.timestamps.len() >= self.max_requests;
-        }
-        false
+        window.timestamps.push(now);
+        true
     }
 
     pub async fn cleanup(&self) {
@@ -152,118 +56,6 @@ impl RateLimiter {
             !w.timestamps.is_empty()
         });
     }
-
-    /// Number of distinct keys currently tracked. Test-only introspection so a
-    /// cross-module test can assert that a sweep actually evicted expired entries
-    /// and observe what it reclaimed. There is no production reader.
-    #[cfg(test)]
-    pub(crate) async fn tracked_keys(&self) -> usize {
-        self.state.lock().await.len()
-    }
-}
-
-/// Per-source concurrency cap derived from the write-pool size: one resolved client
-/// key (see [`client_key`]) may hold at most an eighth of the pool, so saturating it
-/// takes ~8 distinct keys. Real for an IPv4 or single-address caller; a caller with a
-/// routed IPv6 /64 has 2^64 keys, because `client_key` returns the full address with
-/// no prefix folding. Narrowing that keying is a deferred decision, so this cap is a
-/// bound per key, not a bound per operator.
-///
-/// Floored at 1 because the value feeds [`PerCallerConcurrency`], where a cap of 0
-/// would shed EVERY receive-pack advertisement and break all pushes. The floor is
-/// load-bearing at the minimum write-pool size (1), which integer-divides to 0.
-pub(crate) fn per_source_push_cap(max_concurrent_git_pushes: usize) -> usize {
-    (max_concurrent_git_pushes / 8).max(1)
-}
-
-/// A bounded per-caller CONCURRENCY limiter — distinct from [`RateLimiter`], which
-/// caps request RATE. Each caller key may hold at most `per_caller` in-flight
-/// permits at once; beyond that [`try_acquire`](Self::try_acquire) returns `None`
-/// and the caller sheds. Used to stop one caller (a single anonymous source-IP or
-/// DID) monopolizing the served-git read pool (#174).
-///
-/// The key map is self-bounding: a key is removed the instant its in-flight count
-/// reaches zero, so it never holds more keys than there are concurrently-active
-/// callers (itself bounded by the read semaphore). A `max_keys` reject-before-insert
-/// backstop guarantees a key farm can never grow the map even if that invariant
-/// weakened — a NEW key at the cap is rejected WITHOUT allocating an entry (INV-15).
-///
-/// Uses a `std::sync::Mutex` (not the file's `tokio::sync::Mutex`) because the
-/// permit's `Drop` must release synchronously; the critical section holds no await.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct PerCallerConcurrency {
-    state: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<HashMap<String, usize>>>,
-    per_caller: usize,
-    max_keys: usize,
-}
-
-/// RAII permit from [`PerCallerConcurrency::try_acquire`]. On drop it decrements
-/// the caller's in-flight count and removes the key when it reaches zero.
-pub struct PerCallerPermit {
-    state: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<HashMap<String, usize>>>,
-    key: String,
-}
-
-impl PerCallerConcurrency {
-    pub fn new(per_caller: usize, max_keys: usize) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            state: Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
-            per_caller: per_caller.max(1),
-            max_keys: max_keys.max(1),
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Convenience constructor with the default key bound.
-    pub fn with_default_max_keys(per_caller: usize) -> Self {
-        Self::new(per_caller, DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS)
-    }
-
-    /// `Some(permit)` when the caller is under its cap and the map has room;
-    /// `None` (shed) otherwise. Reject-before-insert: a new key at `max_keys` is
-    /// rejected without allocating.
-    pub fn try_acquire(&self, key: &str) -> Option<PerCallerPermit> {
-        // Recover from a poisoned lock rather than panicking: the critical section
-        // is pure counter arithmetic and cannot itself panic, so a poisoned mutex
-        // would only ever come from an unrelated abort, and a slightly-off count
-        // self-heals as permits drop. A panic here would instead brick the limiter
-        // for every caller (each subsequent lock re-panics).
-        let mut map = self.state.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
-        match map.get_mut(key) {
-            Some(count) => {
-                if *count >= self.per_caller {
-                    return None;
-                }
-                *count += 1;
-            }
-            None => {
-                if map.len() >= self.max_keys {
-                    return None;
-                }
-                map.insert(key.to_string(), 1);
-            }
-        }
-        Some(PerCallerPermit {
-            state: self.state.clone(),
-            key: key.to_string(),
-        })
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(test)]
-    pub fn tracked_keys(&self) -> usize {
-        self.state.lock().unwrap().len()
-    }
-}
-
-impl Drop for PerCallerPermit {
-    fn drop(&mut self) {
-        let mut map = self.state.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
-        if let Some(count) = map.get_mut(&self.key) {
-            *count -= 1;
-            if *count == 0 {
-                map.remove(&self.key);
-            }
-        }
-    }
 }
 
 pub async fn rate_limit_by_did(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
@@ -288,197 +80,10 @@ pub async fn rate_limit_by_did(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
     next.run(request).await
 }
 
-/// Which forwarded header (if any) the operator's edge is trusted to set. Only
-/// a proxy the operator controls may be believed; a raw client can put any
-/// value in `Fly-Client-IP` / `X-Forwarded-For`, so trusting them unconditionally
-/// lets a flooder rotate the header and never fill a bucket. Configured via
-/// `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub enum TrustedProxy {
-    /// No trusted proxy: ignore forwarded headers, key on the socket peer IP.
-    /// Safe default for direct/self-hosted nodes.
-    None,
-    /// Behind Fly's edge, which sets (and overwrites any client-supplied)
-    /// `Fly-Client-IP`.
-    Fly,
-    /// Behind a single reverse proxy (e.g. Caddy on the AWS image) that appends
-    /// the real client as the rightmost `X-Forwarded-For` hop.
-    XForwardedFor,
-}
-
-impl TrustedProxy {
-    /// Parse `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`. Unknown/empty → `None` (trust nothing).
-    pub fn from_env_value(s: &str) -> Self {
-        match s.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
-            "fly" | "fly-client-ip" => TrustedProxy::Fly,
-            "xff" | "x-forwarded-for" | "caddy" => TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor,
-            _ => TrustedProxy::None,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-fn trimmed_nonempty(v: &str) -> Option<String> {
-    let t = v.trim();
-    (!t.is_empty()).then(|| t.to_string())
-}
-
-/// Resolve the rate-limit key for a request. In a trusted-proxy mode the
-/// operator's edge header is preferred; when that header is missing or empty we
-/// fall back to the socket peer address rather than skipping the limiter (a
-/// malformed header must never disable the brake). With no trusted proxy the
-/// socket peer is always used and forwarded headers are ignored entirely.
-/// Returns `None` only when neither a trusted header nor a peer address is
-/// available (e.g. a synthetic test request with no `ConnectInfo`).
-pub fn client_key(
-    headers: &HeaderMap,
-    peer: Option<SocketAddr>,
-    trust: TrustedProxy,
-) -> Option<String> {
-    let from_header = match trust {
-        TrustedProxy::None => None,
-        TrustedProxy::Fly => headers
-            .get("fly-client-ip")
-            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-            .and_then(trimmed_nonempty),
-        // Rightmost hop = the value appended by the immediately-upstream trusted
-        // proxy. The leftmost hop is client-controlled and must not be trusted.
-        TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor => headers
-            .get("x-forwarded-for")
-            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-            .and_then(|v| v.rsplit(',').next())
-            .and_then(trimmed_nonempty),
-    };
-    from_header.or_else(|| peer.map(|p| p.ip().to_string()))
-}
-
-/// Per-client-IP limiter for the git push path, carrying the trusted-proxy
-/// policy. A newtype so it can live in request extensions (keyed by type)
-/// alongside the per-DID [`RateLimiter`]. Per-DID limits are useless against a
-/// push flood from a DID farm (one throwaway DID per repo), so the push path
-/// throttles on the resolved client IP instead.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct IpRateLimiter {
-    pub limiter: RateLimiter,
-    pub trust: TrustedProxy,
-}
-
-/// Infallible extractor for the socket peer address from `ConnectInfo`. Yields
-/// `None` when the server was started without connect-info (e.g. `oneshot` in
-/// tests), so a handler never 500s on its absence — the limiter simply falls
-/// back per [`client_key`].
-pub struct PeerAddr(pub Option<SocketAddr>);
-
-impl<S: Send + Sync> axum::extract::FromRequestParts<S> for PeerAddr {
-    type Rejection = std::convert::Infallible;
-
-    async fn from_request_parts(
-        parts: &mut axum::http::request::Parts,
-        _state: &S,
-    ) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
-        Ok(PeerAddr(
-            parts
-                .extensions
-                .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
-                .map(|c| c.0),
-        ))
-    }
-}
-
-/// The shared 429 response for the per-IP flood brakes. Route-agnostic: this
-/// middleware now serves the push path AND the peer-sync routes, so the message
-/// stays generic (the offending path is recorded in the warn log below).
-pub fn too_many_requests() -> Response {
-    (
-        StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
-        [("retry-after", "60")],
-        "rate limit exceeded — try again later",
-    )
-        .into_response()
-}
-
-/// Throttle the git push path by resolved client IP. The socket peer address is
-/// read from `ConnectInfo` (see `into_make_service_with_connect_info` in
-/// `main`). Only skips the limiter when no key can be resolved at all.
-pub async fn rate_limit_by_ip(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
-    let limiter = request.extensions().get::<IpRateLimiter>().cloned();
-    let peer = request
-        .extensions()
-        .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
-        .map(|c| c.0);
-
-    if let Some(limiter) = limiter {
-        if let Some(key) = client_key(request.headers(), peer, limiter.trust) {
-            if !limiter.limiter.check(&key).await {
-                tracing::warn!(key = %key, path = %request.uri().path(), "per-IP rate limit exceeded");
-                return too_many_requests();
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    next.run(request).await
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
-    #[test]
-    fn per_caller_concurrency_caps_one_caller_and_frees_on_drop() {
-        let lim = PerCallerConcurrency::new(2, 100);
-        let p1 = lim.try_acquire("did:key:zA").expect("first under cap");
-        let p2 = lim.try_acquire("did:key:zA").expect("second under cap");
-        assert!(
-            lim.try_acquire("did:key:zA").is_none(),
-            "a third in-flight op for the same caller sheds (over the per-caller cap)"
-        );
-        // A DIFFERENT caller is unaffected — the cap is per-caller, not global.
-        let _other = lim
-            .try_acquire("did:key:zB")
-            .expect("a different caller has its own budget");
-        drop(p1);
-        assert!(
-            lim.try_acquire("did:key:zA").is_some(),
-            "freeing one in-flight slot lets the same caller back in"
-        );
-        drop(p2);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn per_caller_concurrency_map_is_self_bounding_and_reject_before_insert() {
-        // Self-bounding: acquire+drop many distinct keys — the map never grows
-        // because a key is removed the instant its in-flight count hits zero.
-        let lim = PerCallerConcurrency::new(4, 3);
-        for i in 0..50 {
-            let _p = lim.try_acquire(&format!("k{i}"));
-        }
-        assert_eq!(
-            lim.tracked_keys(),
-            0,
-            "keys with zero in-flight ops are removed, so an acquire+drop flood leaves the map empty"
-        );
-        // Reject-before-insert: HOLD max_keys distinct keys, then a new key sheds
-        // WITHOUT growing the map past the cap (INV-15 — a rejected request never
-        // allocates an entry).
-        let held: Vec<_> = (0..3)
-            .map(|i| lim.try_acquire(&format!("h{i}")).unwrap())
-            .collect();
-        assert_eq!(
-            lim.tracked_keys(),
-            3,
-            "three distinct callers held concurrently"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            lim.try_acquire("h3").is_none(),
-            "a new key at max_keys is rejected"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            lim.tracked_keys(),
-            3,
-            "the rejected new key did not allocate an entry (reject-before-insert)"
-        );
-        drop(held);
-    }
-
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn allows_within_limit() {
         let limiter = RateLimiter::new(3, Duration::from_secs(60));
@@ -521,279 +126,4 @@ mod tests {
         let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
         assert!(state.is_empty());
     }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn zero_limit_disables() {
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new(0, Duration::from_secs(60));
-        for _ in 0..1000 {
-            assert!(limiter.check("k").await);
-        }
-    }
-
-    // ── key-cap / memory-bound (P2) ──────────────────────────────────────
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn caps_tracked_keys_and_rejects_new_ones_when_full() {
-        // Cap of 2 distinct keys; generous request budget so rejection is due to
-        // the key cap, not the per-key limit.
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(60), 2);
-        assert!(limiter.check("a").await);
-        assert!(limiter.check("b").await);
-        // Third distinct key would grow the map past the cap → rejected.
-        assert!(!limiter.check("c").await);
-        // The map never exceeded the cap, and the rejected key was NOT inserted.
-        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
-        assert_eq!(state.len(), 2);
-        assert!(!state.contains_key("c"));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn known_key_unaffected_by_cap() {
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(60), 1);
-        assert!(limiter.check("a").await); // fills the single slot
-        assert!(limiter.check("a").await); // same key still served
-        assert!(!limiter.check("b").await); // new key rejected — cap full
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn expired_keys_evicted_to_admit_new_when_full() {
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_millis(40), 1);
-        assert!(limiter.check("old").await);
-        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(55)).await;
-        // "old" is now expired; a new key triggers inline eviction and is admitted.
-        assert!(limiter.check("new").await);
-        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
-        assert!(state.contains_key("new"));
-        assert!(!state.contains_key("old"));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn capacity_sweep_is_amortized_within_interval() {
-        // The O(max_keys) eviction scan must not run on every capacity miss.
-        // With a 1s sweep interval, the resident (unexpired) key is never
-        // evicted by a burst of misses, so repeated new keys are all rejected
-        // without disturbing existing state.
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(1), 1);
-        assert!(limiter.check("resident").await);
-        for i in 0..100 {
-            assert!(
-                !limiter.check(&format!("flood-{i}")).await,
-                "new key must be rejected while the single slot is held"
-            );
-        }
-        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
-        assert_eq!(state.len(), 1, "no flood key was ever inserted");
-        assert!(state.contains_key("resident"));
-    }
-
-    // ── client_key / trusted-proxy resolution (P1 + P2) ─────────────────
-
-    fn headers(pairs: &[(&str, &str)]) -> HeaderMap {
-        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
-        for (k, v) in pairs {
-            h.insert(
-                axum::http::HeaderName::from_bytes(k.as_bytes()).unwrap(),
-                v.parse().unwrap(),
-            );
-        }
-        h
-    }
-
-    fn peer(s: &str) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
-        Some(s.parse().unwrap())
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn none_mode_ignores_headers_and_uses_peer() {
-        // Even a well-formed Fly header is ignored without a trusted proxy.
-        let h = headers(&[("fly-client-ip", "203.0.113.7")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::None).as_deref(),
-            Some("198.51.100.9")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn fly_mode_trusts_fly_header() {
-        let h = headers(&[
-            ("fly-client-ip", "203.0.113.7"),
-            ("x-forwarded-for", "1.2.3.4"),
-        ]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::Fly).as_deref(),
-            Some("203.0.113.7")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn fly_mode_empty_header_falls_back_to_peer_not_skip() {
-        // Empty Fly-Client-IP must NOT collapse traffic onto Some("") nor skip
-        // the limiter — it falls back to the real peer.
-        let h = headers(&[("fly-client-ip", "")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::Fly).as_deref(),
-            Some("198.51.100.9")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn xff_mode_uses_rightmost_hop_not_client_controlled_first() {
-        // Client prepends spoofed hops; only the rightmost (proxy-appended) is trusted.
-        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", "9.9.9.9, 8.8.8.8, 198.51.100.9")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
-            Some("198.51.100.9")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn xff_mode_empty_leading_hop_does_not_disable_brake() {
-        // "X-Forwarded-For: ,1.2.3.4" — rightmost hop is used; never None-skips.
-        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", ",1.2.3.4")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
-            Some("1.2.3.4")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn malformed_xff_falls_back_to_peer() {
-        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", " , ")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
-            Some("198.51.100.9")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn trusted_proxy_parsing() {
-        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value("fly"), TrustedProxy::Fly);
-        assert_eq!(
-            TrustedProxy::from_env_value("X-Forwarded-For"),
-            TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            TrustedProxy::from_env_value("caddy"),
-            TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor
-        );
-        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value(""), TrustedProxy::None);
-        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value("garbage"), TrustedProxy::None);
-    }
-
-    // ── middleware 429 path ─────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-    /// A minimal router with the push limiter layered over an OK handler,
-    /// driven via `oneshot`. `ConnectInfo` is attached to each request directly
-    /// (as the production make-service does) so the middleware resolves a peer.
-    fn ip_limited_router(limiter: IpRateLimiter) -> axum::Router {
-        axum::Router::new()
-            .route(
-                "/o/r/git-receive-pack",
-                axum::routing::post(|| async { StatusCode::OK }),
-            )
-            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(rate_limit_by_ip))
-            .layer(axum::Extension(limiter))
-    }
-
-    async fn post_from(router: &axum::Router, peer: SocketAddr) -> StatusCode {
-        use tower::ServiceExt;
-        let mut req = axum::http::Request::builder()
-            .method(axum::http::Method::POST)
-            .uri("/o/r/git-receive-pack")
-            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
-            .unwrap();
-        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
-        router.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status()
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn middleware_returns_429_over_limit() {
-        let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
-            limiter: RateLimiter::new(2, Duration::from_secs(60)),
-            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
-        });
-        let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.7:5000".parse().unwrap();
-        // Two requests inside the budget, the third over it (shared Arc state).
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, peer).await, StatusCode::OK);
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, peer).await, StatusCode::OK);
-        assert_eq!(
-            post_from(&router, peer).await,
-            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn middleware_isolates_distinct_peers() {
-        let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
-            limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60)),
-            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
-        });
-        let a: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.1:1".parse().unwrap();
-        let b: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.2:1".parse().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, a).await, StatusCode::OK);
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, b).await, StatusCode::OK); // independent bucket
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, a).await, StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
-    }
-
-    // ── creation-route layering: IP brake runs BEFORE auth ──────────────
-
-    /// A minimal stand-in for the creation route group: an inner "auth" layer
-    /// that rejects every request with 401 (as signature verification would for
-    /// an unsigned caller), wrapped by the per-IP creation limiter as the
-    /// outermost layer — exactly the ordering `server::build_router` applies to
-    /// `/api/v1/repos` et al. Lets us assert the security-relevant property
-    /// (flood traffic is braked before auth burns CPU) without a database, which
-    /// the full `#[sqlx::test]` route test in `api::repos` cannot cover in the
-    /// plain unit-test pass.
-    fn ip_limited_over_auth_router(limiter: IpRateLimiter) -> axum::Router {
-        async fn always_unauthorized(_req: Request, _next: Next) -> Response {
-            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED.into_response()
-        }
-        axum::Router::new()
-            .route(
-                "/api/v1/repos",
-                axum::routing::post(|| async { StatusCode::CREATED }),
-            )
-            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(always_unauthorized))
-            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(rate_limit_by_ip))
-            .layer(axum::Extension(limiter))
-    }
-
-    async fn post_repos_from(router: &axum::Router, peer: SocketAddr) -> StatusCode {
-        use tower::ServiceExt;
-        let mut req = axum::http::Request::builder()
-            .method(axum::http::Method::POST)
-            .uri("/api/v1/repos")
-            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
-            .unwrap();
-        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
-        router.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status()
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn creation_ip_brake_rejects_before_auth() {
-        // A DID farm mints a fresh signature per repo, so the per-DID limiter
-        // never trips; the per-IP brake is what stops the flood. It must run
-        // outermost, ahead of auth, so a flood is rejected with 429 before
-        // signature verification — otherwise every request would reach (and pay
-        // for) auth and merely 401.
-        let router = ip_limited_over_auth_router(IpRateLimiter {
-            limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60)),
-            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
-        });
-        let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.42:7000".parse().unwrap();
-
-        // First request passes the IP brake and reaches the (failing) auth layer.
-        assert_eq!(
-            post_repos_from(&router, peer).await,
-            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
-        );
-        // Budget now exhausted: the IP brake short-circuits with 429 *before*
-        // auth — proving the limiter is the outermost layer.
-        assert_eq!(
-            post_repos_from(&router, peer).await,
-            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
-            "an exhausted IP must be braked with 429 before auth runs, not leak to 401"
-        );
-    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/server.rs

@@ -20,19 +20,8 @@ use crate::auth;
 use crate::rate_limit;
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
-async fn graphql_handler(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    auth: Option<axum::Extension<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>>,
-    req: GraphQLRequest,
-) -> GraphQLResponse {
-    // `optional_signature` attaches the verified DID when a signature is present.
-    // Thread it into request-scoped GraphQL data; mutations enforce its presence
-    // in-resolver (N2) while queries stay open.
-    let mut inner = req.into_inner();
-    if let Some(axum::Extension(did)) = auth {
-        inner = inner.data(did);
-    }
-    state.graphql_schema.execute(inner).await.into()
+async fn graphql_handler(State(state): State<AppState>, req: GraphQLRequest) -> GraphQLResponse {
+    state.graphql_schema.execute(req.into_inner()).await.into()
 }
 
 async fn graphql_playground() -> impl IntoResponse {
@@ -60,10 +49,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
     let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref().clone();
     let graphql_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/graphql", get(graphql_playground).post(graphql_handler))
-        // Attach the verified DID to /graphql when a signature is present. The
-        // layer covers only routes added before it, so /graphql/ws (added after,
-        // read-only subscriptions) stays open.
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature))
         .route_service("/graphql/ws", GraphQLSubscription::new(schema));
 
     // ── Task routes (write — require HTTP Signature) ───────────────────────
@@ -81,19 +66,8 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route("/api/v1/tasks", get(tasks::list_tasks))
         .route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}", get(tasks::get_task));
 
-    // ── Rate-limited creation routes — require HTTP Signature, plus a per-DID
-    // throttle AND a per-IP flood brake. The per-DID limiter (inner) caps a
-    // single identity; the per-IP limiter (outer) caps a DID farm that mints a
-    // fresh throwaway did:key per repo to slip past both the per-DID limit and
-    // the iCaptcha gate — the mechanism behind the recurring spam-repo floods.
-    // The per-IP layer wraps the auth layer (outermost = runs first) so flood
-    // traffic is rejected before signature verification burns CPU, matching the
-    // push path.
+    // ── Rate-limited creation routes — require HTTP Signature + per-DID throttle
     let limiter = state.rate_limiter.clone();
-    let create_ip_limiter = rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
-        limiter: state.create_ip_rate_limiter.clone(),
-        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
-    };
     let creation_routes = add_auth_layers(
         Router::new()
             .route("/api/v1/repos", post(repos::create_repo))
@@ -107,9 +81,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_did))
             .layer(axum::Extension(limiter)),
         state.clone(),
-    )
-    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
-    .layer(axum::Extension(create_ip_limiter));
+    );
 
     // ── Write routes — require HTTP Signature (no rate limit) ─────────────
     let write_routes = add_auth_layers(
@@ -175,10 +147,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
                 axum::routing::put(visibility::set_visibility)
                     .delete(visibility::remove_visibility)
                     .get(visibility::list_visibility),
-            )
-            .route(
-                "/api/v1/agents/{did}",
-                axum::routing::delete(agents::deregister_agent),
             ),
         state.clone(),
     );
@@ -188,14 +156,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
     // HTTP Signature is enforced on receive-pack (push) — the git-remote-gitlawb
     // helper signs requests with RFC 9421 signatures using the agent's keypair.
     let pack_limit = state.config.max_pack_bytes;
-    // Per-IP throttle wraps the auth layer (outermost = runs first): flood
-    // traffic is rejected before signature verification burns CPU. Per-DID
-    // limiting is deliberately NOT used here — a DID farm (one throwaway
-    // identity per repo, as in the June 2026 push flood) never trips it.
-    let push_limiter = rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
-        limiter: state.push_rate_limiter.clone(),
-        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
-    };
     let git_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
         Router::new()
             .route(
@@ -205,30 +165,12 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             .layer(DefaultBodyLimit::disable())
             .layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(pack_limit)),
         state.clone(),
-    )
-    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
-    .layer(axum::Extension(push_limiter));
+    );
 
     // ── IPFS content-addressed retrieval and pin listing ──────────────────
-    // `/ipfs/{cid}` carries `optional_signature` so `get_by_cid` sees the caller
-    // identity and can apply per-repo visibility (#110); anonymous callers stay
-    // anonymous and still read genuinely public content. `/api/v1/ipfs/pins`
-    // stays unsigned — gating the pin index is tracked separately (#121).
-    // `/ipfs/{cid}` also carries a per-IP flood brake: it is anon-reachable and each
-    // request can drive a full-history git walk, so the per-IP rate limiter is the
-    // outermost layer (rejects a flood before the walk-admission work), mirroring the
-    // push/create routers. The extension MUST be attached or rate_limit_by_ip is a
-    // silent no-op. `/api/v1/ipfs/pins` (no walk) is merged in unbraked, as before.
-    let ipfs_limiter = rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
-        limiter: state.ipfs_rate_limiter.clone(),
-        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
-    };
     let ipfs_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/ipfs/{cid}", get(ipfs::get_by_cid))
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature))
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
-        .layer(axum::Extension(ipfs_limiter))
-        .merge(Router::new().route("/api/v1/ipfs/pins", get(ipfs::list_pins)));
+        .route("/api/v1/ipfs/pins", get(ipfs::list_pins));
 
     // ── Arweave permanent anchors ──────────────────────────────────────────
     let arweave_routes = Router::new().route("/api/v1/arweave/anchors", get(arweave::list_anchors));
@@ -272,8 +214,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route(
             "/api/v1/agents/{did}/bounties",
             get(bounties::agent_bounty_stats),
-        )
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature));
+        );
 
     // ── Profile routes (write — require HTTP Signature) ─────────────────
     let profile_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
@@ -302,41 +243,15 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route("/api/v1/peers", get(peers::list_peers))
         .route("/api/v1/peers/{did}/ping", get(peers::ping_peer));
 
-    // /sync/trigger drives an O(peers) outbound fan-out + per-repo enqueue, so it
-    // ALWAYS requires a signature (both config modes) and carries a tight per-IP
-    // brake. A signature alone does not cap cost — a did:key farm self-registers
-    // (INV-10) — so the IP brake is a separate, load-bearing half. The brake is
-    // outermost (runs before signature verification burns CPU) and is keyed on the
-    // client IP before any DID is read, so DID rotation cannot bypass it.
-    let sync_trigger_routes = add_auth_layers(
-        Router::new().route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(peers::trigger_sync)),
-        state.clone(),
-    )
-    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
-    .layer(axum::Extension(rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
-        limiter: state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter.clone(),
-        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
-    }));
-
-    // announce + notify keep their rolling-upgrade signature behavior (unsigned
-    // accepted until all peers upgrade), but both reach peer-write side effects —
-    // notify hits the same enqueue_sync sink as trigger — so they carry a per-IP
-    // brake too, on a SEPARATE bucket from trigger's, so an unsigned notify flood
-    // cannot drain the signed trigger caller's quota.
     let mut peer_write_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/api/v1/peers/announce", post(peers::announce))
+        .route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(peers::trigger_sync))
         .route("/api/v1/sync/notify", post(peers::notify_sync));
     peer_write_routes = if state.config.require_signed_peer_writes {
         add_auth_layers(peer_write_routes, state.clone())
     } else {
         peer_write_routes.layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature))
     };
-    let peer_write_routes = peer_write_routes
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
-        .layer(axum::Extension(rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
-            limiter: state.peer_write_rate_limiter.clone(),
-            trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
-        }));
 
     // ── Read routes — open for public repos ───────────────────────────────
     let read_routes = Router::new()
@@ -442,10 +357,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/withheld-paths",
             axum::routing::get(visibility::withheld_paths),
         )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/icaptcha-proof",
-            axum::routing::get(repos::get_icaptcha_proof),
-        )
         .route(
             "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs",
             axum::routing::get(crate::api::encrypted::list_encrypted_blobs),
@@ -466,7 +377,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
     let meta_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/", get(node_info))
         .route("/health", get(health))
-        .route("/ready", get(ready))
         .route("/api/v1/p2p/info", get(p2p_info))
         .route("/api/v1/stats", get(stats))
         .route("/api/v1/contracts", get(contracts_info));
@@ -486,7 +396,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .merge(read_routes)
         .merge(peer_read_routes)
         .merge(peer_write_routes)
-        .merge(sync_trigger_routes)
         .merge(ipfs_routes)
         .merge(arweave_routes)
         .merge(meta_routes)
@@ -509,26 +418,6 @@ async fn health() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
     Json(json!({ "status": "ok" }))
 }
 
-/// Readiness = "this node can serve real traffic", and every real endpoint
-/// depends on the database, so probe it rather than reporting a constant.
-/// The probe gets its own short bound so a wedged pool can't hang the health
-/// check for the full acquire timeout.
-async fn ready(State(state): State<AppState>) -> axum::response::Response {
-    let probe = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2), state.db.ping()).await;
-    match probe {
-        Ok(Ok(())) => Json(json!({ "status": "ready" })).into_response(),
-        _ => (
-            axum::http::StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
-            Json(json!({
-                "status": "degraded",
-                "error": crate::error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
-                "message": crate::error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
-            })),
-        )
-            .into_response(),
-    }
-}
-
 async fn node_info(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
     let p2p_peer_id = state.p2p.as_ref().map(|h| h.local_peer_id.to_string());
     Json(json!({
@@ -543,31 +432,13 @@ async fn node_info(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
     }))
 }
 
-pub(crate) async fn stats(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
-    // Count only the repos an anonymous caller could list, so the aggregate does
-    // not leak the existence of private/mode-A repos (#104 count oracle). Mirror
-    // the listing seam (api/repos.rs): over-fetch the deduped set, batch-load the
-    // visibility rules, and keep rows that pass listable_at_root. The caller is
-    // always None — meta_routes carries no auth layer (see the route group in this
-    // file). Fail closed: any DB error collapses the whole count to 0 (an
-    // under-count never leaks existence), preserving the prior `.unwrap_or(0)`.
-    let repos = async {
-        // stats only needs the count, so use the no-stars deduped list (same
-        // DEDUP_CTE) and skip the repo_stars aggregation the listing path needs.
-        let rows = state.db.list_all_repos_deduped().await?;
-        let ids: Vec<String> = rows.iter().map(|r| r.id.clone()).collect();
-        let rules_by_repo = state.db.list_visibility_rules_for_repos(&ids).await?;
-        let count = rows
-            .iter()
-            .filter(|r| {
-                let rules = rules_by_repo.get(&r.id).map(Vec::as_slice).unwrap_or(&[]);
-                crate::visibility::listable_at_root(rules, r.is_public, &r.owner_did, None)
-            })
-            .count() as i64;
-        Ok::<i64, anyhow::Error>(count)
-    }
-    .await
-    .unwrap_or(0);
+async fn stats(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
+    let repos = state
+        .db
+        .list_all_repos()
+        .await
+        .map(|r| r.len() as i64)
+        .unwrap_or(0);
     let agents = state.db.count_agents().await.unwrap_or(0);
     let pushes = state.db.count_pushes().await.unwrap_or(0);
     Json(json!({

crates/gitlawb-node/src/visibility.rs

@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@
 //! based on the repo's visibility rules with a fallback to the legacy
 //! `is_public` flag. It performs no I/O so it is exhaustively unit tested.
 
-use crate::db::{RepoRecord, VisibilityRule};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use unicode_normalization::UnicodeNormalization;
+use crate::db::VisibilityRule;
 
 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum Decision {
@@ -14,23 +12,11 @@ pub enum Decision {
     Deny,
 }
 
-/// NFC-normalize a glob prefix or path so the matcher compares canonically
-/// equivalent strings byte-for-byte. Without this, a deny rule authored NFC
-/// (`é` = U+00E9) byte-compares unequal to a path committed NFD (`e` + U+0301)
-/// and the blob slips past the rule on the replication path (#101). NFC, not
-/// NFKC: compatibility folding (ligatures, full-width forms) would merge paths
-/// the filesystem treats as distinct and over-withhold. Both sides of every
-/// comparison must pass through this, or the skew just moves.
-fn nfc(s: &str) -> String {
-    s.nfc().collect()
-}
-
-/// True if `caller` is the repo owner. Uses [`crate::api::did_matches`] so the
-/// owner check is representation-agnostic within `did:key` (full `did:key:z...`
-/// matches bare `z...` stored by mirror rows) while still denying cross-method
-/// collisions (`did:gitlawb:z...` vs bare `z...`).
+/// True if `caller` is the repo owner (matches full did:key or its short form),
+/// mirroring the owner-match idiom in `api/protect.rs`.
 fn is_owner(owner_did: &str, caller: &str) -> bool {
-    crate::api::did_matches(owner_did, caller)
+    let owner_short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner_did);
+    caller == owner_did || caller == owner_short
 }
 
 /// The match prefix for a glob: "/" stays "/", "/secret/**" becomes "/secret".
@@ -50,17 +36,12 @@ fn glob_matches(glob: &str, path: &str) -> bool {
     if prefix == "/" {
         return true;
     }
-    // Compare in NFC so an NFC rule matches a canonically-equivalent NFD path
-    // (and vice versa). Both sides normalized here — the single matcher seam.
-    let prefix = nfc(prefix);
-    let path = nfc(path);
     path == prefix || path.starts_with(&format!("{prefix}/"))
 }
 
-/// Specificity = length of the (normalized) match prefix; longer is more
-/// specific. Normalized so ranking stays consistent with `glob_matches`.
+/// Specificity = length of the match prefix; longer is more specific.
 fn specificity(glob: &str) -> usize {
-    nfc(glob_prefix(glob)).len()
+    glob_prefix(glob).len()
 }
 
 /// Decide whether `caller` (None = anonymous) may read `path` in a repo.
@@ -115,119 +96,6 @@ pub fn visibility_check(
     }
 }
 
-/// Whether `caller` (None = anonymous) may see a repo in a listing — the `"/"`
-/// visibility decision, shared by every repo-listing surface (REST list,
-/// federated list, GraphQL `repos`) so they enforce one rule, not three drifting
-/// copies. Not a bare `is_public` test: a repo can be `is_public=false` with a
-/// root rule granting readers, or `is_public=true` with a root deny (#97).
-pub fn listable_at_root(
-    rules: &[VisibilityRule],
-    is_public: bool,
-    owner_did: &str,
-    caller: Option<&str>,
-) -> bool {
-    visibility_check(rules, is_public, owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Allow
-}
-
-/// Whether a single `received_ref_updates` row (identified by its peer-supplied
-/// `row_repo` slug) should be shown to `caller` (None = anonymous) on the
-/// cross-repo ref-updates feeds (#112 GraphQL, #114 REST).
-///
-/// Pure and I/O-free: both call sites load the deduped local repo set and its
-/// visibility rules once per request and pass them in, so the gate logic lives
-/// here and visibility.rs keeps its "no I/O" property.
-///
-/// The slug is written verbatim from the inbound gossip/notify message, so it is
-/// untrusted input, not a canonical key. The decision is fail-closed by
-/// construction: the only KEEP paths are (a) a slug with no `/` (cannot name a
-/// local `owner/name` pair, so remote by definition), (b) all matched local
-/// records are readable, and (c) no local record matches (remote/gossip-only).
-/// Any local match the caller cannot read at root DROPs the row. There is no
-/// catch-all keep on unexpected state.
-///
-/// Slug/record owner keys are matched prefix-tolerantly (one is a prefix of the
-/// other), covering the exact short-key, the full `did:key:` form, and the
-/// URL-truncated 8-char form. Prefix over-match can only over-drop a genuinely
-/// remote row (fail-safe), never over-serve a private local one.
-///
-/// The live call sites are the #112 (GraphQL) and #114 (REST) feed handlers,
-/// added in the following units; exercised by the unit tests below meanwhile.
-pub fn ref_update_row_visible(
-    deduped: &[RepoRecord],
-    rules_by_repo: &HashMap<String, Vec<VisibilityRule>>,
-    caller: Option<&str>,
-    row_repo: &str,
-) -> bool {
-    // A slug with no '/' cannot name a local owner/name pair — remote by
-    // definition (same branch as "matches nothing local") → KEEP.
-    if row_repo.rsplit_once('/').is_none() {
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    // Match each local record with the shared slug predicate (one matcher, so
-    // this gate and the collector's quarantine drop cannot disagree about which
-    // rows a repo owns), then fail closed on any matched record the caller
-    // cannot read at root.
-    for record in deduped {
-        if !ref_update_row_names_repo(record, row_repo) {
-            continue;
-        }
-        let rules = rules_by_repo
-            .get(&record.id)
-            .map(Vec::as_slice)
-            .unwrap_or(&[]);
-        if !listable_at_root(rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller) {
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Reached only if every matched local record is readable, or nothing local
-    // matched (remote/gossip-only). Both are the KEEP paths; there is no
-    // default-keep on unexpected state — an unreadable match already returned.
-    true
-}
-
-/// Whether `row_repo`'s peer-supplied slug names the local `record`. The single
-/// match predicate shared by the feed gate ([`ref_update_row_visible`]) and the
-/// quarantine hard-drop in the ref-update collector, so the two cannot diverge
-/// about which rows a repo owns — a second, drifting matcher is exactly the #134
-/// slug-collision class.
-///
-/// A record matches when the slug's `name` half is equal and one owner key is a
-/// prefix of the other (prefix-tolerant: exact short key, full `did:key:` form,
-/// and the URL-truncated 8-char form). Both the slug owner and the record owner
-/// are reduced to their last ':'-delimited segment before comparing. The node's
-/// own emitter builds the wire slug via `normalize_owner_key` (bare short key for
-/// a single-segment `did:key:`, the full DID for every other method; see
-/// api/repos.rs), but the stored slug is UNTRUSTED: a peer can broadcast a row
-/// under any owner form, including a method-stripped `user/name`. Reducing both
-/// sides to the trailing segment matches a repo's own rows whichever form keyed
-/// them, and still catches an attacker-planted short slug.
-///
-/// This intentionally diverges from `did_matches` / `DEDUP_CTE`, which strip only
-/// bare `did:key:` and keep other DID methods whole: those compare trusted,
-/// canonical DIDs, while this slug is untrusted. Applying the keep-whole rule here
-/// would fail open: a hostile `user/name` slug would not prefix-match a private
-/// `did:web:host:user` record and would leak. The price is a fail-SAFE over-match
-/// when a remote owner shares both a trailing segment and a repo name with a local
-/// private repo (negligible for full did:key ids; only did:web / truncated forms
-/// collide): it can hide a genuinely remote row, never serve a private one.
-pub fn ref_update_row_names_repo(record: &RepoRecord, row_repo: &str) -> bool {
-    let Some((owner_part, name)) = row_repo.rsplit_once('/') else {
-        return false;
-    };
-    if record.name != name {
-        return false;
-    }
-    let row_key = owner_part.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner_part);
-    let record_key = record
-        .owner_did
-        .split(':')
-        .next_back()
-        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
-    record_key.starts_with(row_key) || row_key.starts_with(record_key)
-}
-
 /// The subtree path globs that `caller` (None = anonymous) may NOT read, given
 /// the repo's rules. Whole-repo ("/") rules are excluded: a denied whole-repo
 /// read is handled by the 404 gate before a clone ever starts. Each remaining
@@ -400,85 +268,6 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn non_key_owner_bare_short_does_not_match() {
-        // A non-key DID owner (did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo) probed with the bare last
-        // segment (z6MkFoo) must NOT match — the old is_owner would return true
-        // via split(':').next_back(), which this PR tightens.
-        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, false, "did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo", Some("z6MkFoo"), "/"),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "bare short must not match a non-key DID owner"
-        );
-        // The full non-key DID still matches itself.
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(
-                &rules,
-                false,
-                "did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo",
-                Some("did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo"),
-                "/"
-            ),
-            Decision::Allow,
-            "full non-key DID still matches itself"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // #153 forward guard: is_owner must match across bare-key / full-did:key
-    // representations should someone revert to single-side normalize_owner_key.
-    #[test]
-    fn bare_owner_full_caller_allows_owner() {
-        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, false, "z6MkOwner", Some("did:key:z6MkOwner"), "/"),
-            Decision::Allow,
-            "bare owner + full did:key caller must match (guard against single-side revert)"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // #135 T1: a Mode-B rule on `/secret/**` must DENY the withheld directory's
-    // OWN path `/secret` (the `path == prefix` arm), not just strict descendants —
-    // otherwise get_by_cid's tree gate would serve the /secret tree object and leak
-    // its children. Pins parity with get_tree, which denies the /secret path.
-    #[test]
-    fn subtree_rule_denies_the_withheld_directory_itself() {
-        let reader = "did:key:z6MkReader";
-        let rules = [rule("/secret/**", VisibilityMode::B, &[reader])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, None, "/secret"),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "anon denied at the withheld directory's OWN path /secret"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, None, "/public"),
-            Decision::Allow,
-            "anon allowed at a sibling path outside the withheld subtree"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, Some(reader), "/secret"),
-            Decision::Allow,
-            "listed reader allowed at the withheld directory (caller-aware)"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // #153 regression: cross-method DID must still be denied even when the
-    // trailing segment collides with a bare owner key.
-    #[test]
-    fn cross_method_did_denied_with_bare_owner() {
-        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, false, "z6MkFoo", Some("did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo"), "/"),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "cross-method DID must not match a bare did:key owner"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, false, "z6MkFoo", Some("did:web:z6MkFoo"), "/"),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "did:web must not match a bare did:key owner"
-        );
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn root_rule_allows_listed_reader() {
         let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
@@ -582,292 +371,4 @@ mod tests {
             true
         ));
     }
-
-    // ── ref_update_row_visible (feed gate) ──────────────────────────────────
-
-    fn rec(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
-        RepoRecord {
-            id: id.into(),
-            name: name.into(),
-            owner_did: owner_did.into(),
-            description: None,
-            is_public,
-            default_branch: "main".into(),
-            created_at: Utc::now(),
-            updated_at: Utc::now(),
-            disk_path: format!("/srv/{id}"),
-            forked_from: None,
-            machine_id: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn rules_for(entries: &[(&str, &[VisibilityRule])]) -> HashMap<String, Vec<VisibilityRule>> {
-        entries
-            .iter()
-            .map(|(id, rs)| (id.to_string(), rs.to_vec()))
-            .collect()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_public_local_repo_kept_for_anon() {
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", true)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_private_local_repo_dropped_for_anon_kept_for_owner() {
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        // Anonymous → drop.
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-        // Owner (full DID) → keep.
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            Some("did:key:z6MkOwner"),
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_root_rule_reader_reincluded() {
-        // Private repo (is_public=false) with a root rule granting a named
-        // reader. Delegates to listable_at_root: anon and non-reader denied,
-        // named reader allowed.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", OWNER, "widget", false)];
-        let root = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
-        let rules = rules_for(&[("r1", &root)]);
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            Some("did:key:z6MkStranger"),
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            Some("did:key:z6MkFriend"),
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_alias_full_did_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // Owner stored full-DID; slug also carries the full-DID form. Still
-        // matches (row_key normalizes to the short key) → drop. Round 1's
-        // string-match would have leaked this.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:zABC", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "did:key:zABC/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_truncated_key_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // Slug carries an 8-char URL-truncated prefix of the owner key; still
-        // matches via prefix tolerance → drop. Round 2's get_repo path leaked.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:zABCDEFGH", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "zABCDEF/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_mirror_coexistence_private_canonical_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // Pure-level mirror-coexistence: the deduped set contains only the
-        // private canonical record for (owner,name). A matching slug drops for
-        // anon. (DB-level dedup survivor property is pinned separately.)
-        let deduped = [rec("uuid-canonical", "did:key:z6Mkwbud", "nipmod", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6Mkwbud/nipmod"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_empty_owner_slug_matches_and_drops() {
-        // Slug "/name": empty owner_part → row_key "" → starts_with("") matches
-        // every same-named record. Fail-safe pin for a private repo.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "/widget"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_one_char_owner_slug_matches_and_drops() {
-        // 1-char owner prefix that the private repo's key starts with → match.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "z/widget"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_remote_slug_no_match_kept() {
-        // Different owner key, no prefix relation → no local match → keep.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "zZZZOTHER/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_private_didweb_short_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // A private did:web repo must drop its row for anon when the slug arrives
-        // in the short `{last-segment}/{name}` form. Post-#141 the emitter no longer
-        // produces this form for did:web (normalize_owner_key keeps the full DID),
-        // so this is the untrusted/crafted variant a peer can broadcast; the full-DID
-        // variant the emitter now sends is covered by the next test. A did:key-aware
-        // (keep-whole) rule would fail to match `alice` against `did:web:host:alice`
-        // and leak.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:alice", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "alice/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_multi_segment_did_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // A private repo owned by a multi-segment DID must also fail closed under
-        // the full-DID slug form. Post-#141 this IS the form the emitter broadcasts
-        // (normalize_owner_key keeps non-did:key methods whole), and a peer can craft
-        // it too. The gate drops it: both sides reduce to the last ':' segment
-        // ("user"), so they match. Fail-safe regardless of which form keyed the row.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:user", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "did:web:host:user/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_multi_segment_did_slug_kept_for_public() {
-        // Symmetric keep-side: a PUBLIC multi-segment-DID repo's row must still be
-        // returned to anon after the last-':'-segment normalization — guards
-        // against a regression that over-drops legitimate did:web rows.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:user", "widget", true)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "did:web:host:user/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_malformed_slug_no_slash_kept_no_panic() {
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "noslug"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_empty_deduped_set_keeps_any_slug() {
-        let deduped: [RepoRecord; 0] = [];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "anything"));
-    }
-
-    // The shared slug matcher underpinning both the feed gate and the collector's
-    // quarantine drop: it must recognize a repo's own row across every owner-DID
-    // form (bare short key, full did:key, URL-truncated prefix) and must not
-    // over-match a different name or an unrelated owner. The quarantine drop calls
-    // this directly, so its match contract is load-bearing for withholding a
-    // quarantined mirror from a caller who matches the mirror's owner_did.
-    #[test]
-    fn names_repo_matches_owner_forms_and_rejects_mismatches() {
-        // Bare short owner key (the form upsert_mirror_repo stores).
-        let bare = rec("m", "z6MkQuar", "secret", false);
-        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
-        // Full did:key owner; the short-segment slug still matches via last-segment.
-        let full = rec("c", "did:key:z6MkQuar", "secret", false);
-        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&full, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
-        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&full, "did:key:z6MkQuar/secret"));
-        // URL-truncated 8-char prefix slug → prefix-tolerant match.
-        let long = rec("l", "did:key:z6MkQuarLONGKEY", "secret", false);
-        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&long, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
-        // Different name, different owner, and no-slash → no match.
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkQuar/other"));
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkOther/secret"));
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "noslash"));
-    }
-
-    // #101: a deny rule must withhold a path that denotes the same characters in
-    // a different Unicode normalization form. Without NFC normalization at the
-    // matcher seam, an NFC-authored rule byte-compares unequal to an NFD-stored
-    // path and the blob leaks on the replication path.
-    #[test]
-    fn matcher_withholds_across_nfc_nfd_normalization_skew() {
-        // "é" composed (NFC, U+00E9) in the rule; decomposed (NFD, e + U+0301)
-        // in the committed path.
-        let nfc_rule = "/s\u{00e9}cret/**";
-        let nfd_path = "/se\u{0301}cret/key.pem";
-        let rules = [rule(nfc_rule, VisibilityMode::B, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, None, nfd_path),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "NFC-authored deny rule must withhold the canonically-equivalent NFD path"
-        );
-
-        // Mirror: rule authored NFD, path committed NFC.
-        let nfd_rule = "/se\u{0301}cret/**";
-        let nfc_path = "/s\u{00e9}cret/key.pem";
-        let rules2 = [rule(nfd_rule, VisibilityMode::B, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules2, true, OWNER, None, nfc_path),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "NFD-authored deny rule must withhold the canonically-equivalent NFC path"
-        );
-
-        // A genuinely different path is still allowed (no over-withholding).
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, None, "/public/x.txt"),
-            Decision::Allow
-        );
-    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/tests/inv22_gates.rs

@@ -1,573 +0,0 @@
-//! #174 U6 — INV-22 completeness guard (rung-raising).
-//!
-//! INV-22: a permit held per op recovers only if every path that holds it is also
-//! duration-bounded and reaps the process group before releasing admission, and every
-//! detached git/blocking task carries its own admission. PR #174 fixed five paths
-//! (U1-U5) that violated this. Each fix has a per-unit RED/GREEN regression; together
-//! those form the five-revert matrix. This guard adds the missing piece: a source-scan
-//! tripwire that fails when a NEW site reintroduces the class, or when one of the five
-//! gates is removed.
-//!
-//! It lives in `tests/` (a separate crate) on purpose: a guard that scanned the same
-//! file it lives in would match its own identifier literals and pass vacuously. Here
-//! the scanned `src/` files never contain this file's literals, so each check is
-//! load-bearing — reverting the named gate turns the assertion red.
-//!
-//! These are deliberately coarse structural checks, not a parser. They cannot prove a
-//! gate is *correct* (the per-unit tests do that); they prove a gate is *present and
-//! not bypassed*, which is what stops the class from silently regressing.
-
-use std::path::Path;
-
-fn src(rel: &str) -> String {
-    let p = Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("src").join(rel);
-    std::fs::read_to_string(&p).unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("read {}: {e}", p.display()))
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn inv22_concurrency_gates_present_and_not_bypassed() {
-    let repos = src("api/repos.rs");
-    let smart_http = src("git/smart_http.rs");
-    let vis = src("git/visibility_pack.rs");
-    let ipfs = src("api/ipfs.rs");
-
-    // U1 / P1-a: run_bounded_git stands the watchdog down only after confirming the
-    // child actually terminated (WNOWAIT), not on the raw stdout-drain EOF — otherwise
-    // a child that closes stdout then hangs pins the permit past the deadline. The
-    // probe is defined and called, so >= 2 occurrences; reverting the fix removes both.
-    assert!(
-        vis.matches("child_terminated_without_reaping").count() >= 2,
-        "U1/P1-a gate missing: run_bounded_git must confirm child exit via \
-         child_terminated_without_reaping before signalling the watchdog"
-    );
-
-    // U2 / P1-c: on client disconnect KillGroupOnDrop must launch a detached reaper
-    // that runs the full TERM/grace/KILL/reap, not a lone SIGTERM. The reaper is spawned
-    // via a runtime handle in Drop; `Handle::try_current` is unique to that launch (the
-    // timeout path already has an async context and never calls it).
-    assert!(
-        smart_http.contains("Handle::try_current"),
-        "U2/P1-c gate missing: KillGroupOnDrop::drop must launch the full \
-         TERM/grace/KILL reaper on disconnect (Handle::try_current), not a lone SIGTERM"
-    );
-
-    // U4 / P1-d: git_receive_pack must acquire the per-source write sub-cap before the
-    // global write permit. The acquire reads `state.git_write_per_caller`; comments name
-    // the field without the `state.` prefix, so this targets the real acquire site.
-    assert!(
-        repos.contains("state.git_write_per_caller"),
-        "U4/P1-d gate missing: git_receive_pack must acquire the per-source write cap \
-         (state.git_write_per_caller) before the global write permit"
-    );
-
-    // U5 / P1-e: the detached post-push encryption walk must run through the
-    // admission-gated helper, which is wired to the shared encrypt pool.
-    assert!(
-        repos.contains("fn withheld_recipients_gated")
-            && repos.contains("state.git_encrypt_semaphore"),
-        "U5/P1-e gate missing: the encryption walk must run through \
-         withheld_recipients_gated, which acquires git_encrypt_semaphore"
-    );
-
-    // U1 / R2 (#173 round-10): the path-scoped filtered-pack serve must thread the
-    // caller's AdmissionGuard through BOTH git stages so read + per-caller admission is
-    // held until the pack-objects group is reaped on disconnect, closing the cap bypass
-    // the plain upload_pack path already fixed. Two load-bearing markers: rev-list hands
-    // the disarmed guard back (its tuple return type), and build_filtered_pack forwards
-    // that guard into the pack-objects stage (the `admission` arg after the
-    // "pack-objects" label). Reverting either — dropping the guard between stages, or
-    // passing `None` to pack-objects — trips this.
-    assert!(
-        smart_http.contains("Result<(Vec<String>, Option<AdmissionGuard>)>")
-            && smart_http.contains("\"pack-objects\",\n        admission,"),
-        "U1/R2 gate missing: build_filtered_pack must thread the AdmissionGuard through \
-         rev-list -> pack-objects so the permits are held until the pack-objects group \
-         is reaped on disconnect (the path-scoped half of #174 P1-a)"
-    );
-
-    // U2 / R1: a cancelled or timed-out `GET /ipfs/{cid}` must release admission only
-    // after the blocking work it admitted has finished, not the instant the handler
-    // future drops (the /ipfs half of #174 P1-a). The mechanism is the shared
-    // `Arc<WalkAdmission>`: both walk permits are moved into it once per request and a
-    // clone rides every `spawn_blocking`, so the permits release when the LAST holder
-    // drops. Reverting to handler-local permits trips this; the per-site clones are
-    // bound separately by `inv22_ipfs_walk_admission_reaches_every_blocking_site`.
-    //
-    // This previously required the permits to be owned by a detached `tokio::spawn`
-    // running the whole pipeline. That closed the same bypass but kept an abandoned
-    // request's full legacy scan running against a held slot, so the merge of #173 and
-    // #174 kept the Arc and dropped the detached task.
-    assert!(
-        ipfs.contains("struct WalkAdmission")
-            && ipfs.contains("let admission = std::sync::Arc::new(WalkAdmission {"),
-        "U2/R1 gate missing: get_by_cid must move both /ipfs admission permits into a \
-         shared Arc<WalkAdmission> whose clones ride the blocking work, so admission is \
-         released only once that work completes (the /ipfs half of #174 P1-a)"
-    );
-
-    // U2 / KTD2 (#173 round-10): the probe/read children on the /ipfs path must be the
-    // duration-bounded twins (process-group teardown via run_bounded_git), not the bare
-    // `store::object_type` / `read_object_content` (or an unbounded `cat-file -s`) a tokio
-    // timeout cannot cancel — otherwise a wedged cat-file lingers and pins the held
-    // admission past the deadline. Reverting any twin call site back to a bare read trips
-    // this.
-    assert!(
-        ipfs.contains("object_type_bounded(")
-            && ipfs.contains("object_size_bounded(")
-            && ipfs.contains("read_object_content_bounded("),
-        "U2/KTD2 gate missing: the /ipfs probe+read must call the run_bounded_git-backed \
-         *_bounded twins so a wedged cat-file is reaped at the deadline, not left to pin \
-         the held /ipfs walk admission"
-    );
-
-    // P1-e non-bypass tripwire: the bounded recipients walk is spawn_blocking'd nowhere
-    // but inside withheld_recipients_gated. A second call site (count > 1) is a new
-    // detached git walk that skips the admission gate — exactly the class U5 closed.
-    assert_eq!(
-        repos.matches("withheld_blob_recipients_bounded").count(),
-        1,
-        "P1-e bypass: the bounded recipients walk must be invoked only inside \
-         withheld_recipients_gated; a new call site bypasses the encrypt-walk admission cap"
-    );
-
-    // U4 / P2-2: the detached post-push encryption task must be gated by the per-repo
-    // coalescing set (`encrypt_inflight.try_begin`) so the OUTSTANDING parked-task set is
-    // bounded to <=1 per repo. Removing the gate lets N rapid pushes spawn N parked
-    // waiters (the unbounded set U4 closed); the semaphore only caps active walks.
-    assert!(
-        repos.contains("state.encrypt_inflight.try_begin"),
-        "U4/P2-2 gate missing: the detached post-push encryption spawn must consult \
-         encrypt_inflight.try_begin to coalesce per repo (bound the outstanding-task set)"
-    );
-
-    // F5: coalescing must REQUEUE, not shed. The in-flight task pins only its own
-    // pre-spawn snapshot, so a coalesced push's tip pairs are recorded on its key and
-    // the task must loop-drain them (`finish_or_take_pending`) before releasing it.
-    // Removing the drain reverts to the silent loss: a coalesced push's pins and
-    // recovery copies are absent until an unrelated later push. Scan only the
-    // production half of the file — the u5 tests in its `mod tests` also name the
-    // drain call, and matching them would make this check vacuous.
-    // Split at the TEST MODULE, not at the first `#[cfg(test)]`. api/repos.rs carries
-    // test-only items (the drain fault seam, the task entry point) ABOVE the production
-    // code these gates scan for, so splitting on the attribute truncated the production
-    // half above every line being checked and the gate went vacuously blind.
-    let repos_production = repos
-        .split("\nmod tests {")
-        .next()
-        .expect("split always yields a first chunk");
-    assert!(
-        repos_production.contains("finish_or_take_pending"),
-        "F5 gate missing: the post-push encryption task must loop-drain coalesced \
-         pushes via finish_or_take_pending before releasing its repo key"
-    );
-
-    // F4: every post-receive scan helper admits itself to the shared scan pool via
-    // `crate::state::acquire_scan_permit` BEFORE its spawn_blocking git walk, so a
-    // push burst cannot accumulate unbounded concurrent scans once the write permit
-    // is released. Two halves, both load-bearing: the helper body must actually
-    // acquire the pool (state.rs sits the helper at the end of the file, so the
-    // definition tail contains no other `acquire_owned` to match vacuously), and
-    // within each scan helper the first qualified call precedes the first
-    // `spawn_blocking`. Severing a call site pushes the next occurrence past the
-    // helper's own `spawn_blocking` (or off the end of the file), turning the
-    // assertion red; comments name the helper without the `crate::state::` prefix,
-    // so this targets the real call sites.
-    let state_rs = src("state.rs");
-    let helper_def = state_rs
-        .find("fn acquire_scan_permit")
-        .expect("F4 gate missing: state.rs no longer defines acquire_scan_permit");
-    assert!(
-        state_rs[helper_def..].contains("acquire_owned"),
-        "F4 gate gutted: acquire_scan_permit must acquire the scan pool via acquire_owned"
-    );
-    let push_delta = src("git/push_delta.rs");
-    for (file_src, file, helper) in [
-        (&repos, "api/repos.rs", "fn replication_withheld_set"),
-        (&repos, "api/repos.rs", "fn fail_closed_full_scan_objects"),
-        (
-            &push_delta,
-            "git/push_delta.rs",
-            "fn resolve_candidates_for_push",
-        ),
-    ] {
-        let start = file_src
-            .find(helper)
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{file}: `{helper}` not found"));
-        let tail = &file_src[start..];
-        let acquire = tail
-            .find("crate::state::acquire_scan_permit(")
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| {
-                panic!("F4 gate missing: {file} `{helper}` no longer acquires a scan permit")
-            });
-        let spawn = tail.find("spawn_blocking").unwrap_or_else(|| {
-            panic!("{file}: `{helper}` lost its spawn_blocking walk — update this guard")
-        });
-        assert!(
-            acquire < spawn,
-            "F4 gate bypassed: {file} `{helper}` must acquire its git_encrypt_semaphore \
-             permit BEFORE dispatching the blocking git scan"
-        );
-    }
-}
-
-/// F4 (repo_store advisory-unlock cancellation safety): `RepoWriteGuard::release`
-/// must await `pg_advisory_unlock` while `self` still owns the pooled connection,
-/// and must not mark itself `released` until that await resolves. Either shape,
-/// reintroduced, re-opens the mid-unlock cancellation leak: taking the connection
-/// early leaves `Drop` with `conn == None`, and setting `released = true` early
-/// leaves the `Drop` backstop inert — both strand the session lock on cancellation.
-///
-/// Scoped to the `release` fn body: the `Drop` impl legitimately takes the
-/// connection and unlocks, so a whole-file scan would match it and read as a false
-/// pass. Reverting either ordering turns this red (proven load-bearing).
-#[test]
-fn f4_release_keeps_conn_owned_until_unlock_resolves() {
-    let repo_store = src("git/repo_store.rs");
-
-    let rel_start = repo_store
-        .find("pub async fn release(mut self")
-        .expect("F4 gate: repo_store.rs no longer defines RepoWriteGuard::release");
-    let rel_end = repo_store[rel_start..]
-        .find("impl Drop for RepoWriteGuard")
-        .map(|off| rel_start + off)
-        .expect("F4 gate: release fn / Drop impl markers moved — update this guard");
-    let release_body = &repo_store[rel_start..rel_end];
-
-    let unlock = release_body
-        .find("pg_advisory_unlock")
-        .expect("F4 gate: release must still issue pg_advisory_unlock");
-    let before_unlock = &release_body[..unlock];
-
-    // (a) the connection must still be owned by `self` at the unlock await.
-    assert!(
-        !before_unlock.contains("self.conn.take()"),
-        "F4 regression: RepoWriteGuard::release takes self.conn BEFORE awaiting \
-         pg_advisory_unlock. A cancellation during the unlock await then strands the \
-         session advisory lock (Drop sees conn == None and skips its backstop). \
-         Unlock through the still-owned connection instead."
-    );
-    // (b) `released` must not be set before the unlock await — the other
-    // reintroduction shape a single-reorder check on (a) alone is blind to.
-    assert!(
-        !before_unlock.contains("released = true"),
-        "F4 regression: RepoWriteGuard::release sets `released = true` BEFORE awaiting \
-         pg_advisory_unlock. A cancellation during the await then leaves the Drop \
-         backstop inert (it early-returns on released). Set released only AFTER the \
-         unlock await resolves."
-    );
-}
-
-/// F6/KTD-5 (IPFS metadata queries deadline-wrapped): `get_by_cid` acquires
-/// the scarce walk permits (RAII, held for the whole request) BEFORE its metadata
-/// queries, and the per-repo loop's first budget gate runs only later. So
-/// both `list_repos_page_for_scan` and `list_visibility_rules_for_repos` must be clamped to the
-/// remaining request budget — otherwise a query blocked in Postgres pins the walk slot
-/// for the whole stall, past the budget. This scans the PRODUCTION half of `api/ipfs.rs`
-/// (the `mod tests` half names the same calls in its own harness and would make the
-/// check vacuous) and asserts each query call is immediately preceded by a
-/// `tokio::time::timeout(` wrapper. Removing either wrapper turns this red (proven
-/// load-bearing).
-#[test]
-fn f6_ipfs_metadata_queries_are_deadline_wrapped() {
-    let ipfs = src("api/ipfs.rs");
-    // Split at the TEST MODULE, not at the first `#[cfg(test)]`: the handler carries
-    // in-line `#[cfg(test)]` query counters, so splitting on the attribute cut the
-    // production half off above the calls this guard exists to check and the scan went
-    // vacuously quiet (found 0 of each rather than failing on a missing wrapper).
-    let production = ipfs
-        .split("\nmod tests {")
-        .next()
-        .expect("split always yields a first chunk");
-
-    // EVERY occurrence must be wrapped, not just the first. The handler now reaches
-    // these queries from two places (the provenance fast path, one repo at a time, and
-    // the legacy scan's preload), and an exact-count check would have to be relaxed
-    // every time a call site is added, which is how a guard quietly stops covering the
-    // site that matters. Requiring all of them scales with the code instead.
-    for call in [
-        ".list_repos_page_for_scan(",
-        ".list_visibility_rules_for_repos(",
-        ".get_repo_by_id(",
-        ".is_repo_quarantined(",
-    ] {
-        let occurrences = production.matches(call).count();
-        assert!(
-            occurrences >= 1,
-            "F6 guard stale: api/ipfs.rs no longer calls `{call}` — update this guard"
-        );
-        for (n, (idx, _)) in production.match_indices(call).enumerate() {
-            // The wrapper opens a few lines above the call (match tokio::time::timeout(
-            // ... remaining budget ..., <query> )); a 240-char lookback covers it
-            // without reaching the previous statement.
-            let window = &production[idx.saturating_sub(240)..idx];
-            assert!(
-                window.contains("tokio::time::timeout("),
-                "F6 gate missing: occurrence {n} of `{call}` (of {occurrences}) is not \
-                 wrapped in tokio::time::timeout(...) clamped to the remaining request \
-                 budget. An unwrapped await pins the held walk permit for the whole DB \
-                 stall, past GITLAWB_IPFS_REQUEST_BUDGET_SECS."
-            );
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// #174 F2 / KTD-3: the detached post-receive Pinata replication task must enqueue
-/// only the push's `(ref, old, new)` tuples and RE-DERIVE its object set inside the
-/// worker once a pin slot frees — it must NOT move the full per-push object list into
-/// the closure and hold it across the `pin_semaphore` acquire. Retaining the list makes
-/// every parked task (under a slow Pinata backend) hold an MB-scale OID list, so
-/// outstanding memory grows O(pushes x object-list). Coalescing/shedding the task is
-/// forbidden (its per-ref effects are non-idempotent), so the fix bounds the retained
-/// data, not the task count.
-///
-/// Two load-bearing checks, both against the PRODUCTION half of `api/repos.rs` (the
-/// `mod tests` half names the same identifiers in its own harness and would make the
-/// scan vacuous): (a) the closure-local `object_list_pinata` binding — the retain form —
-/// must be gone; reintroducing `let object_list_pinata = object_list;` turns this red.
-/// (b) the re-derivation (`pinata_object_list_for_refs`) must appear AFTER the Pinata
-/// pin permit is acquired, so the object list is materialized only inside the pin-bounded
-/// section and a parked task holds O(ref tuples).
-#[test]
-fn f2_pinata_enqueues_refs_not_retained_object_lists() {
-    let repos = src("api/repos.rs");
-    // Split at the TEST MODULE, not at the first `#[cfg(test)]`. api/repos.rs carries
-    // test-only items (the drain fault seam, the task entry point) ABOVE the production
-    // code these gates scan for, so splitting on the attribute truncated the production
-    // half above every line being checked and the gate went vacuously blind.
-    let production = repos
-        .split("\nmod tests {")
-        .next()
-        .expect("split always yields a first chunk");
-
-    // (a) the retained-list form must be gone from production.
-    assert!(
-        !production.contains("object_list_pinata"),
-        "F2/KTD-3 regression: the Pinata task retains a full per-push object list \
-         (`object_list_pinata`) across the pin-permit acquire. Enqueue only the ref \
-         tuples and re-derive the object set inside the worker (pinata_object_list_for_refs)."
-    );
-
-    // (b) the re-derivation runs AFTER the pin permit is acquired. Anchor on the
-    // Pinata pin-admission clone so the window is the Pinata task, not the sibling
-    // IPFS/encrypt spawn (which shares `pin_semaphore` but never re-derives).
-    let anchor = production
-        .find("let pin_sem_pinata")
-        .expect("F2 gate stale: the Pinata pin-admission clone (pin_sem_pinata) moved");
-    let tail = &production[anchor..];
-    let acquire = tail
-        .find(".acquire_owned()")
-        .expect("F2 gate: the Pinata task no longer acquires a pin permit (acquire_owned)");
-    let rederive = tail.find("pinata_object_list_for_refs(").expect(
-        "F2 gate missing: the Pinata task must re-derive its object set via \
-         pinata_object_list_for_refs; it can no longer move a pre-resolved list into the closure",
-    );
-    assert!(
-        acquire < rederive,
-        "F2 gate bypassed: the Pinata object-set re-derivation must run AFTER the pin \
-         permit is acquired, so a parked task never holds the MB-scale object list"
-    );
-
-    // The re-derivation is driven by the push's ref tuples (the enqueued unit), not a
-    // retained object list — tie "enqueue ref_updates" to the call explicitly.
-    assert!(
-        tail[rederive..].starts_with("pinata_object_list_for_refs(")
-            && tail[rederive..]
-                .get(..400)
-                .map(|w| w.contains("ref_updates_clone"))
-                .unwrap_or(false),
-        "F2 gate: pinata_object_list_for_refs must re-derive from the push's ref tuples \
-         (ref_updates_clone), the small unit the parked task retains"
-    );
-}
-
-/// #174 U2 / F3 (second same-repo writer serialized until a disconnected first push's
-/// git group is reaped): `git_receive_pack` must take the per-repo in-process write
-/// lease and CARRY it on the write-path `AdmissionGuard` (via `.with_lease`), so the
-/// lease rides `KillGroupOnDrop`'s detached reaper and frees only after the group is
-/// reaped — supplementing the pg advisory lock, which `RepoWriteGuard::Drop` releases at
-/// the disconnect instant. Tying the lease to `RepoWriteGuard` instead (or dropping the
-/// `.with_lease` carry) reopens the race; the behavioral RED/GREEN test
-/// (`f3_second_push_serialized_until_disconnected_group_reaped`) is the real bar, this
-/// is the completeness tripwire. Scanned against the PRODUCTION half of `api/repos.rs`
-/// (the `mod tests` half names these identifiers in its own harness).
-#[test]
-fn f3_second_writer_leased_until_reap() {
-    let repos = src("api/repos.rs");
-    let smart_http = src("git/smart_http.rs");
-    // Split at the TEST MODULE, not at the first `#[cfg(test)]`. api/repos.rs carries
-    // test-only items (the drain fault seam, the task entry point) ABOVE the production
-    // code these gates scan for, so splitting on the attribute truncated the production
-    // half above every line being checked and the gate went vacuously blind.
-    let repos_production = repos
-        .split("\nmod tests {")
-        .next()
-        .expect("split always yields a first chunk");
-
-    // The lease is acquired, then carried by the AdmissionGuard (.with_lease), before
-    // receive_pack runs the write. Severing any of the three turns this red.
-    let lease_acquire = repos_production.find("repo_write_leases").expect(
-        "F3 gate missing: git_receive_pack no longer takes the per-repo write lease \
-         (state.repo_write_leases)",
-    );
-    let with_lease = repos_production.find(".with_lease(").expect(
-        "F3 gate missing: the write-path AdmissionGuard no longer carries the lease \
-         (.with_lease). The lease must ride the disconnect reaper via the AdmissionGuard, \
-         NOT RepoWriteGuard (which drops at the disconnect instant, reopening F3).",
-    );
-    let receive = repos_production
-        .find("smart_http::receive_pack(")
-        .expect("F3 gate stale: git_receive_pack no longer calls smart_http::receive_pack");
-    assert!(
-        lease_acquire < with_lease && with_lease < receive,
-        "F3 gate bypassed: the write lease must be acquired, then carried by the \
-         AdmissionGuard (.with_lease), BEFORE receive_pack runs the write"
-    );
-
-    // The AdmissionGuard must actually hold the lease (Option<RepoWriteLease>) via a
-    // with_lease setter, so it travels into the detached reaper. Removing the field or
-    // method turns this red.
-    assert!(
-        smart_http.contains("_lease: Option<crate::state::RepoWriteLease>")
-            && smart_http.contains("pub fn with_lease("),
-        "F3 gate missing: AdmissionGuard must hold an Option<RepoWriteLease> set via \
-         with_lease, so the lease rides the guard into KillGroupOnDrop's reaper"
-    );
-}
-
-/// #174 U1 — every blocking walk in the `/ipfs` scan carries the request's walk
-/// admission.
-///
-/// The admission is an `Arc<WalkAdmission>` cloned into each `spawn_blocking`
-/// closure, so the global + per-source permits release only when the last holder
-/// drops: a client disconnect leaves the abandoned closure holding the slot, and a
-/// panicking closure leaves the handler holding it.
-///
-/// Only the walk site runs under `state.git_bin`, so only it can be pinned by the
-/// fake-git harness and mutation-verified dynamically (see
-/// `get_by_cid_walk_permit_held_through_blocking_walk`). The probe and the content
-/// read deliberately shell to the real `git`, which is why this structural check
-/// exists: it binds all three sites, and any blocking site added to this loop
-/// later, without reversing that deliberate independence.
-///
-/// MUTATION (RED): delete any one `Arc::clone(ctx.admission)` binding, or drop the
-/// clone from inside its closure, and the count falls below three.
-#[test]
-fn inv22_ipfs_walk_admission_reaches_every_blocking_site() {
-    let ipfs = src("api/ipfs.rs");
-
-    // The shared owner must exist and be built once per request.
-    assert!(
-        ipfs.contains("struct WalkAdmission") && ipfs.contains("Arc::new(WalkAdmission {"),
-        "U1 gate missing: the /ipfs walk admission must be a shared WalkAdmission, \
-         not a handler-local permit pair"
-    );
-
-    // Every blocking site in the scan takes its own clone...
-    // `Arc::clone(ctx.admission)` in the gate, `Arc::clone(&admission)` if a site is
-    // ever added back in the handler body itself; count both spellings.
-    let clones = ipfs.matches("Arc::clone(ctx.admission)").count()
-        + ipfs.matches("Arc::clone(&admission)").count();
-    assert!(
-        clones >= 3,
-        "U1 gate bypassed: expected an admission clone for each of the three \
-         /ipfs spawn_blocking sites (probe, walk, read); found {clones}. A blocking \
-         walk that does not hold the admission lets a disconnect or a panic free the \
-         slot while its git child is still running."
-    );
-
-    // ...and each clone is actually moved INTO the blocking closure, not merely
-    // created in the async frame (which would hold nothing across the join).
-    let held = ipfs.matches("let _admission = ").count();
-    assert!(
-        held >= 3,
-        "U1 gate bypassed: each admission clone must be bound inside its \
-         spawn_blocking closure so the blocking work owns it; found {held} of 3."
-    );
-
-    // The count of blocking sites is itself the thing being covered: if a fourth
-    // appears, it needs an admission clone too and this gate must be revisited.
-    let sites = ipfs.matches("spawn_blocking(move ||").count();
-    assert_eq!(
-        sites, 3,
-        "the /ipfs scan grew or lost a spawn_blocking site ({sites} found, expected 3); \
-         give any new blocking walk its own Arc::clone(&admission) and update this gate"
-    );
-}
-
-/// #174 U5: the post-receive replication tail is spawned at the DURABILITY BOUNDARY,
-/// which is the moment receive-pack returns success, not the end of the handler and
-/// not after `guard.release()`.
-///
-/// The tail owes this push its pins, recovery copy, and announcements. Everything
-/// below the spawn stays in the cancellable request future, so anything the tail is
-/// spawned after is a window where a client disconnect drops that work while the pack
-/// is already durable on disk. `guard.release()` is such a window: on success it
-/// awaits the Tigris upload and then the advisory unlock.
-///
-/// The lower bound matters just as much as the upper one: `release` runs on failure
-/// too, so an ungated spawn would fire for a push git rejected, pinning and announcing
-/// a half-applied repo. Above `release` the `?` on `receive_result` can no longer be
-/// what gates it, so the success check is explicit and this gate binds it: the spawn
-/// must sit inside `if push_succeeded`, and `release` must consume the same flag so
-/// the two cannot drift apart.
-///
-/// This is an ordering check rather than a cancellation-race test on purpose: it is
-/// the companion to `receive_pack_tail_survives_a_disconnect_during_release`, which
-/// drives the actual disconnect through a parked `release`. Same instrument the F3
-/// gate above uses.
-///
-/// MUTATION (RED): move the `tokio::spawn(post_receive_replication_tail` call below
-/// `guard.release(` and the ordering assertion fails; take it out of the
-/// `if push_succeeded` block and the failed-push assertion fails.
-#[test]
-fn inv22_replication_tail_spawns_at_the_durability_boundary() {
-    let repos = src("api/repos.rs");
-    // Production half only — the tests below name these identifiers too.
-    // Split at the TEST MODULE, not at the first `#[cfg(test)]`. api/repos.rs carries
-    // test-only items (the drain fault seam, the task entry point) ABOVE the production
-    // code these gates scan for, so splitting on the attribute truncated the production
-    // half above every line being checked and the gate went vacuously blind.
-    let production = repos
-        .split("\nmod tests {")
-        .next()
-        .expect("split always yields a first chunk");
-
-    let success_flag = production
-        .find("let push_succeeded = receive_result.is_ok();")
-        .expect(
-            "U5 gate missing: the tail's success gate must be bound from receive_result.is_ok()",
-        );
-    let gate_open = production
-        .find("if push_succeeded {")
-        .expect("U5 gate missing: the tail spawn must be gated on the push having succeeded");
-    let spawn = production
-        .find("tokio::spawn(post_receive_replication_tail(")
-        .expect("U5 gate missing: the replication tail must be spawned by git_receive_pack");
-    let release = production
-        .find(".release(push_succeeded)")
-        .expect("U5 gate stale: release must consume the same success flag as the tail gate");
-    let touch = production
-        .find("state.db.touch_repo(")
-        .expect("U5 gate stale: git_receive_pack no longer calls touch_repo");
-    let webhook = production
-        .find("webhooks::fire_event(")
-        .expect("U5 gate stale: git_receive_pack no longer fires push webhooks");
-
-    assert!(
-        success_flag < gate_open && gate_open < spawn,
-        "U5 gate bypassed: the tail must be spawned inside `if push_succeeded`, or a \
-         rejected push spawns a tail that pins and announces a half-applied repo"
-    );
-    // Still inside that block: no `}` may close it between the gate and the spawn.
-    assert!(
-        !production[gate_open + "if push_succeeded {".len()..spawn].contains('}'),
-        "U5 gate bypassed: the tail spawn left the `if push_succeeded` block, so a \
-         rejected push now spawns a tail"
-    );
-    assert!(
-        spawn < release && spawn < touch && spawn < webhook,
-        "U5 gate bypassed: the tail must be spawned BEFORE guard.release, touch_repo \
-         and the webhook fan-out, so a disconnect in any of those windows cannot drop \
-         this push's pins, recovery copy, and announcements"
-    );
-}

crates/gl/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gl"
 description = "The gitlawb CLI — identity management, node control, MCP server"
-version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ name = "gl"
 path = "src/main.rs"
 
 [dependencies]
-gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core", features = ["redirect"] }
-icaptcha-client = { path = "../icaptcha-client" }
-base64 = { workspace = true }
+gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }

crates/gl/src/agent.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
+use serde_json::Value;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
@@ -56,16 +57,24 @@ async fn cmd_list(node: String, capability: Option<String>) -> Result<()> {
         .get(&path)
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
-    // Keep the bespoke 404 hint (older node without the agents API) ahead of
-    // read_json; every other status routes through it (capped + sanitized error).
-    if resp.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
+    let status = resp.status();
+
+    if status == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
         anyhow::bail!(
             "this node does not yet support the agents API (v0.3+)\n\
              upgrade the node or check GITLAWB_NODE is pointing to the right server"
         );
     }
 
-    let body = crate::http::read_json(resp, "list agents").await?;
+    let body: Value = resp
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("invalid JSON from node — is GITLAWB_NODE correct?")?;
+
+    if !status.is_success() {
+        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
+        anyhow::bail!("list agents failed ({status}): {msg}");
+    }
 
     let agents = body["agents"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
 
@@ -108,15 +117,24 @@ async fn cmd_show(did: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
         .get(&format!("/api/v1/agents/{did}"))
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
-    // Keep the bespoke 404 hint ahead of read_json; other statuses route through it.
-    if resp.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
+    let status = resp.status();
+
+    if status == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
         anyhow::bail!(
             "agent not found, or this node does not yet support the agents API (v0.3+)\n\
              upgrade the node or check GITLAWB_NODE is pointing to the right server"
         );
     }
 
-    let agent = crate::http::read_json(resp, "agent").await?;
+    let agent: Value = resp
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("invalid JSON from node — is GITLAWB_NODE correct?")?;
+
+    if !status.is_success() {
+        let msg = agent["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
+        anyhow::bail!("agent not found ({status}): {msg}");
+    }
 
     let full_did = agent["did"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
     let trust = agent["trust_score"].as_f64().unwrap_or(0.0);
@@ -197,14 +215,11 @@ mod tests {
             .with_status(404)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"message":"not found"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
         let err = cmd_list(server.url(), None).await.unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("agents API"));
-        // Prove the mocked route was actually requested; a non-matching request (mockito's 501, also non-2xx) would otherwise satisfy the error assertion vacuously.
-        _m.assert_async().await;
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -215,14 +230,11 @@ mod tests {
             .with_status(500)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"message":"internal error"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
         let err = cmd_list(server.url(), None).await.unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("list agents failed"));
-        // Prove the mocked route was actually requested; a non-matching request (mockito's 501, also non-2xx) would otherwise satisfy the error assertion vacuously.
-        _m.assert_async().await;
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -249,7 +261,6 @@ mod tests {
             .with_status(404)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"message":"agent not found"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
@@ -257,8 +268,6 @@ mod tests {
             .await
             .unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("agents API") || err.to_string().contains("not found"));
-        // Prove the mocked route was actually requested; a non-matching request (mockito's 501, also non-2xx) would otherwise satisfy the error assertion vacuously.
-        _m.assert_async().await;
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]

crates/gl/src/bounty.rs

@@ -2,15 +2,12 @@
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
+use serde_json::Value;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 
-fn signed_client(node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> NodeClient {
-    NodeClient::new(node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir).ok())
-}
-
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct BountyArgs {
     #[command(subcommand)]
@@ -52,8 +49,6 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
         status: Option<String>,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
-        #[arg(long)]
-        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Show details of a specific bounty
     Show {
@@ -61,8 +56,6 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
         id: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
-        #[arg(long)]
-        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Claim an open bounty
     Claim {
@@ -128,13 +121,8 @@ pub async fn run(args: BountyArgs) -> Result<()> {
             node,
             dir,
         } => cmd_create(repo, title, amount, issue, tx_hash, deadline, node, dir).await,
-        BountyCmd::List {
-            repo,
-            status,
-            node,
-            dir,
-        } => cmd_list(repo, status, node, dir).await,
-        BountyCmd::Show { id, node, dir } => cmd_show(id, node, dir).await,
+        BountyCmd::List { repo, status, node } => cmd_list(repo, status, node).await,
+        BountyCmd::Show { id, node } => cmd_show(id, node).await,
         BountyCmd::Claim {
             id,
             wallet,
@@ -188,7 +176,13 @@ async fn cmd_create(
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
 
-    let body = crate::http::read_json(resp, "create bounty").await?;
+    let status = resp.status();
+    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
+
+    if !status.is_success() {
+        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
+        anyhow::bail!("create bounty failed ({status}): {msg}");
+    }
 
     let id = body["id"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
     println!("Bounty created: {id}");
@@ -198,13 +192,8 @@ async fn cmd_create(
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_list(
-    repo: Option<String>,
-    status: Option<String>,
-    node: String,
-    dir: Option<PathBuf>,
-) -> Result<()> {
-    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
+async fn cmd_list(repo: Option<String>, status: Option<String>, node: String) -> Result<()> {
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
 
     let url = if let Some(ref repo) = repo {
         let (owner, name) = repo
@@ -224,14 +213,11 @@ async fn cmd_list(
         u
     };
 
-    let body = crate::http::read_json(
-        client
-            .get_authed(&url)
-            .await
-            .context("failed to connect to node")?,
-        "bounties",
-    )
-    .await?;
+    let resp = client
+        .get(&url)
+        .await
+        .context("failed to connect to node")?;
+    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
 
     let bounties = body["bounties"].as_array();
     if let Some(arr) = bounties {
@@ -251,11 +237,17 @@ async fn cmd_list(
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_show(id: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
-    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
-    let resp = client.get_authed(&format!("/api/v1/bounties/{id}")).await?;
+async fn cmd_show(id: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    let resp = client.get(&format!("/api/v1/bounties/{id}")).await?;
 
-    let body = crate::http::read_json(resp, "show bounty").await?;
+    let status = resp.status();
+    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
+
+    if !status.is_success() {
+        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("not found");
+        anyhow::bail!("bounty not found: {msg}");
+    }
 
     println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&body)?);
     Ok(())
@@ -279,7 +271,13 @@ async fn cmd_claim(
         )
         .await?;
 
-    let _ = crate::http::read_json(resp, "claim").await?;
+    let status = resp.status();
+    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
+
+    if !status.is_success() {
+        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
+        anyhow::bail!("claim failed ({status}): {msg}");
+    }
 
     println!("Bounty {id} claimed. Deadline starts now.");
     Ok(())
@@ -298,7 +296,13 @@ async fn cmd_submit(id: String, pr: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>)
         )
         .await?;
 
-    let _ = crate::http::read_json(resp, "submit").await?;
+    let status = resp.status();
+    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
+
+    if !status.is_success() {
+        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
+        anyhow::bail!("submit failed ({status}): {msg}");
+    }
 
     println!("Bounty {id} submitted with PR {pr}. Awaiting creator approval.");
     Ok(())
@@ -322,7 +326,13 @@ async fn cmd_approve(
         )
         .await?;
 
-    let _ = crate::http::read_json(resp, "approve").await?;
+    let status = resp.status();
+    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
+
+    if !status.is_success() {
+        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
+        anyhow::bail!("approve failed ({status}): {msg}");
+    }
 
     println!("Bounty {id} approved! Payout released to agent.");
     Ok(())
@@ -341,7 +351,13 @@ async fn cmd_cancel(id: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()
         )
         .await?;
 
-    let _ = crate::http::read_json(resp, "cancel").await?;
+    let status = resp.status();
+    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
+
+    if !status.is_success() {
+        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
+        anyhow::bail!("cancel failed ({status}): {msg}");
+    }
 
     println!("Bounty {id} cancelled. Tokens refunded.");
     Ok(())
@@ -349,11 +365,8 @@ async fn cmd_cancel(id: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()
 
 async fn cmd_stats(node: String) -> Result<()> {
     let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
-    // Route through read_json so a node denial (403/404/5xx, incl. a non-JSON
-    // body) surfaces as an error instead of a fake `Bounty Stats` with every
-    // counter zeroed (#186, the denial-as-success class #123 fixes elsewhere).
-    let body =
-        crate::http::read_json(client.get("/api/v1/bounties/stats").await?, "bounty stats").await?;
+    let resp = client.get("/api/v1/bounties/stats").await?;
+    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
 
     let open = body["open"].as_i64().unwrap_or(0);
     let claimed = body["claimed"].as_i64().unwrap_or(0);
@@ -449,7 +462,7 @@ mod tests {
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
-        cmd_list(None, None, server.url(), None).await.unwrap();
+        cmd_list(None, None, server.url()).await.unwrap();
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -490,16 +503,13 @@ mod tests {
             .with_status(404)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"message":"not found"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
-        let err = cmd_show("nonexistent".to_string(), server.url(), None)
+        let err = cmd_show("nonexistent".to_string(), server.url())
             .await
             .unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("not found"));
-        // Prove the mocked route was actually requested; a non-matching request (mockito's 501, also non-2xx) would otherwise satisfy the error assertion vacuously.
-        _m.assert_async().await;
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -516,86 +526,4 @@ mod tests {
 
         cmd_stats(server.url()).await.unwrap();
     }
-
-    /// #186 (F1): a node denial on the stats endpoint must surface as an error,
-    /// not print a fake `Bounty Stats` with every counter zeroed. RED before the
-    /// fix (unwrap_or_default + no status check -> Ok with zeros), GREEN after
-    /// (read_json bails on the non-2xx).
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn cmd_stats_surfaces_denial_not_fake_result() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/stats$".to_string()))
-            .with_status(403)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"message":"forbidden"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let err = cmd_stats(server.url())
-            .await
-            .expect_err("a 403 must be an error, not a zeroed fake result");
-        assert!(err.to_string().contains("403"), "err={err}");
-        // Pin the mock hit explicitly. The status assertion above already fails
-        // when the route does not match (mockito answers an unmatched route with
-        // 501, so "403" is absent), but that proof is incidental to mockito's
-        // fallback status; assert the hit directly so it survives a reworded
-        // assertion.
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    /// #186 (F1): the same denial-as-error behavior across the non-2xx response
-    /// classes, not just 403 — a 404 and a 500 (incl. a non-JSON body) must each
-    /// surface as an error with the status, never a zeroed fake result.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn cmd_stats_surfaces_denial_across_status_classes() {
-        for (status, body, json) in [
-            (404, r#"{"message":"not found"}"#, true),
-            (500, "internal boom", false),
-        ] {
-            let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-            let mut m = server
-                .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/stats$".to_string()))
-                .with_status(status)
-                .with_body(body);
-            if json {
-                m = m.with_header("content-type", "application/json");
-            }
-            let m = m.expect(1).create_async().await;
-
-            let err = cmd_stats(server.url()).await.unwrap_err().to_string();
-            assert!(
-                err.contains(&status.to_string()),
-                "status {status} must surface as an error, got: {err}"
-            );
-            m.assert_async().await;
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn cmd_list_repo_scoped_surfaces_denial_not_empty() {
-        // `gl bounty list --repo owner/name` hits the gated /repos/{o}/{n}/bounties;
-        // a 404 must Err, not silently print nothing.
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let _m = server
-            .mock(
-                "GET",
-                mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/repos/alice/secret/bounties".to_string()),
-            )
-            .with_status(404)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"message":"repository 'alice/secret' not found"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let result = cmd_list(Some("alice/secret".to_string()), None, server.url(), None).await;
-        assert!(
-            result.is_err(),
-            "bounty list --repo must Err on a gated 404"
-        );
-        // Prove the gated repo-scoped path was actually requested: without this,
-        // an unmatched route (mockito's 501, also non-2xx) would satisfy is_err().
-        _m.assert_async().await;
-    }
 }

crates/gl/src/cert.rs

@@ -4,15 +4,11 @@
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
-use std::path::PathBuf;
+use serde_json::Value;
 
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 
-fn signed_client(node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> NodeClient {
-    NodeClient::new(node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir).ok())
-}
-
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct CertArgs {
     #[command(subcommand)]
@@ -27,8 +23,6 @@ pub enum CertCmd {
         repo: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
-        #[arg(long)]
-        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Show a specific ref certificate and verify its signature
     Show {
@@ -38,50 +32,32 @@ pub enum CertCmd {
         id: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
-        #[arg(long)]
-        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
-        /// Exit non-zero unless the Ed25519 signature verifies AND the
-        /// issuing node matches the queried node (or --expect-node)
-        #[arg(long)]
-        verify: bool,
-        /// Expected issuing node DID for --verify. A valid signature alone
-        /// only proves the cert is internally consistent — signed by whatever
-        /// key it names — so --verify also anchors the issuer to a DID you
-        /// trust: this value when given, else the queried node's DID.
-        #[arg(long, requires = "verify")]
-        expect_node: Option<String>,
     },
 }
 
 pub async fn run(args: CertArgs) -> Result<()> {
     match args.cmd {
-        CertCmd::List { repo, node, dir } => cmd_list(repo, node, dir).await,
-        CertCmd::Show {
-            repo,
-            id,
-            node,
-            dir,
-            verify,
-            expect_node,
-        } => cmd_show(repo, id, node, dir, verify, expect_node).await,
+        CertCmd::List { repo, node } => cmd_list(repo, node).await,
+        CertCmd::Show { repo, id, node } => cmd_show(repo, id, node).await,
     }
 }
 
 /// Resolve "repo" into (owner, name) using the caller's DID when no slash is given.
-async fn resolve_repo(
-    repo: &str,
-    node: &str,
-    dir: Option<&std::path::Path>,
-) -> Result<(String, String)> {
+async fn resolve_repo(repo: &str, node: &str) -> Result<(String, String)> {
     if let Some((owner, name)) = repo.split_once('/') {
         Ok((owner.to_string(), name.to_string()))
     } else {
-        let short = if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(dir) {
+        let short = if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(None) {
             let did = kp.did().to_string();
             did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string()
         } else {
-            let client = signed_client(node, dir);
-            let info = crate::http::read_json(client.get_authed("/").await?, "node info").await?;
+            let client = NodeClient::new(node, None);
+            let info: Value = client
+                .get("/")
+                .await?
+                .json()
+                .await
+                .context("failed to fetch node info")?;
             let did = info["did"].as_str().context("node info missing 'did'")?;
             did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(did).to_string()
         };
@@ -89,12 +65,17 @@ async fn resolve_repo(
     }
 }
 
-async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
-    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
+async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
+    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node).await?;
 
-    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
     let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs");
-    let resp = crate::http::read_json(client.get_authed(&path).await?, "certificates").await?;
+    let resp: Value = client
+        .get(&path)
+        .await?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("failed to list certificates")?;
 
     let certs = resp["certificates"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
 
@@ -115,23 +96,20 @@ async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_show(
-    repo: String,
-    id: String,
-    node: String,
-    dir: Option<PathBuf>,
-    require_valid: bool,
-    expect_node: Option<String>,
-) -> Result<()> {
-    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
+async fn cmd_show(repo: String, id: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
+    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node).await?;
 
-    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
     let id = resolve_cert_id(&client, &owner, &name, &id).await?;
 
-    // Fetch the certificate. read_json checks status first and surfaces the node's
-    // capped+sanitized message on a non-2xx (a bounded error read, not the whole body).
+    // Fetch the certificate
     let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs/{id}");
-    let cert = crate::http::read_json(client.get_authed(&path).await?, "certificate").await?;
+    let resp = client
+        .get(&path)
+        .await?
+        .error_for_status()
+        .context("certificate not found")?;
+    let cert: Value = resp.json().await.context("certificate not found")?;
 
     let cert_id = cert["id"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
     let ref_name = cert["ref_name"].as_str().unwrap_or("?");
@@ -152,169 +130,59 @@ async fn cmd_show(
     println!("  Signature: {signature}");
     println!();
 
-    // Verify the Ed25519 signature: rebuild the exact canonical payload the
-    // node signed (see gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs::issue_ref_certificate) and
-    // check it against the public key embedded in the certificate's node DID.
-    // This proves the cert is internally authentic — signed by the key it
-    // names; the node-DID comparison below covers *which* node that is.
-    let repo_id = cert["repo_id"].as_str().unwrap_or("");
-    let verdict = verify_signature(
-        repo_id, ref_name, old_sha, new_sha, pusher, node_did, issued_at, signature,
-    );
+    // Reconstruct the signing payload and verify
+    // Fetch the node's current public key to verify
+    let info: Value = client
+        .get("/")
+        .await?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("failed to fetch node info")?;
+    let current_node_did = info["did"].as_str().unwrap_or("");
 
     println!("Signature verification:");
-    match &verdict {
-        Ok(()) => {
-            println!(
-                "  VALID — Ed25519 signature verified against the key the certificate names ({node_did})"
-            );
-        }
-        Err(reason) => {
-            println!("  INVALID — {reason}");
-        }
+    println!("  Signing payload would be:");
+    println!("    {{\"repo_id\": ..., \"ref\": \"{ref_name}\", \"old\": \"{old_sha}\",");
+    println!("      \"new\": \"{new_sha}\", \"pusher\": \"{pusher}\",");
+    println!("      \"node\": \"{node_did}\", \"ts\": \"{issued_at}\"}}");
+    println!();
+
+    if current_node_did == node_did {
+        println!("  Node DID matches current node. Signature is an Ed25519/base64url value.");
+        println!("  To verify offline, use the node's Ed25519 public key derived from:");
+        println!("    did:key → {node_did}");
+    } else {
+        println!("  WARNING: Certificate node DID ({node_did}) does not match");
+        println!("           current node DID ({current_node_did}).");
+        println!("           This certificate was issued by a different node.");
     }
 
-    // Contextual only — the verdict above stands on its own, so a node-info
-    // hiccup here must not turn a successfully displayed certificate into an
-    // error exit. Route the lookup through read_json so a denial or a capped
-    // error body yields a reportable reason instead of an opaque None, and keep
-    // "carried no DID" distinct from "the lookup failed": an empty DID must not
-    // reach the comparison and fabricate a mismatch warning.
-    let current: std::result::Result<String, String> = match client.get("/").await {
-        Ok(resp) => match crate::http::read_json(resp, "node info").await {
-            Ok(info) => did_from_node_info(&info),
-            Err(e) => Err(e.to_string()),
-        },
-        Err(e) => Err(e.to_string()),
-    };
-    let current_node_did = current.as_ref().ok().cloned();
-    for line in did_check_report(&current, node_did) {
-        println!("{line}");
-    }
-
-    if require_valid {
-        if let Err(reason) = verdict {
-            anyhow::bail!("certificate signature did not verify: {reason}");
-        }
-        // A valid signature proves internal consistency only: the payload was
-        // signed by whatever key the certificate itself names. A hostile
-        // source can mint a keypair, put its DID in node_did, and self-sign.
-        // --verify therefore also anchors the issuer to a trusted DID:
-        // --expect-node when given, else the DID of the node being queried.
-        let expected = expect_node.as_deref().or(current_node_did.as_deref());
-        match expected {
-            Some(expected) if expected == node_did => {}
-            Some(expected) => anyhow::bail!(
-                "certificate is signed by {node_did}, but the expected issuer is {expected} — \
-                 a valid signature alone proves internal consistency, not a trusted issuer"
-            ),
-            None => anyhow::bail!(
-                "cannot anchor the issuer: node info is unreachable and no --expect-node was given"
-            ),
-        }
-    }
+    println!();
+    println!("  Signature (base64url): {signature}");
 
     Ok(())
 }
 
-/// Pull the node's DID out of a `GET /` body for the comparison in `cmd_show`.
-///
-/// A missing OR empty `did` is a failure, not a value: letting `""` through
-/// would reach the comparison and print a mismatch WARNING against a DID the
-/// node never claimed, which reads as "issued by a different node" when the
-/// truth is that the lookup told us nothing.
-fn did_from_node_info(info: &serde_json::Value) -> std::result::Result<String, String> {
-    match info["did"].as_str() {
-        Some(did) if !did.is_empty() => Ok(did.to_string()),
-        _ => Err("node info response carried no DID".to_string()),
-    }
-}
-
-/// Select the report lines for the node-DID comparison in `cmd_show`.
-///
-/// `current` is the current node's DID, or the reason it could not be
-/// determined. A comparison verdict (match or WARNING) is only produced when a
-/// real DID was obtained; otherwise the report degrades to a could-not-compare
-/// hint naming the reason, plus the offline-verification guidance. The signature
-/// verdict printed above stands on its own either way — this block only answers
-/// *which* node issued the certificate.
-fn did_check_report(current: &std::result::Result<String, String>, node_did: &str) -> Vec<String> {
-    match current {
-        Ok(current) if current == node_did => {
-            vec!["  Issuing node DID matches the node being queried.".to_string()]
-        }
-        Ok(current) => vec![
-            format!("  WARNING: Certificate node DID ({node_did}) does not match"),
-            format!("           current node DID ({current})."),
-            "           This certificate was issued by a different node.".to_string(),
-        ],
-        Err(reason) => vec![
-            format!("  Could not fetch the current node's DID ({reason}), so the comparison"),
-            "  with the certificate's node DID is unavailable.".to_string(),
-            "  To verify offline, use the node's Ed25519 public key derived from:".to_string(),
-            format!("    did:key → {node_did}"),
-        ],
-    }
-}
-
-/// Rebuild the node's canonical signing payload (field order must match
-/// gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs::issue_ref_certificate exactly) and verify the
-/// certificate's Ed25519 signature against the key embedded in `node_did`.
-#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
-fn verify_signature(
-    repo_id: &str,
-    ref_name: &str,
-    old_sha: &str,
-    new_sha: &str,
-    pusher: &str,
-    node_did: &str,
-    issued_at: &str,
-    signature_b64: &str,
-) -> std::result::Result<(), String> {
-    use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};
-    use std::str::FromStr;
-
-    let payload = serde_json::json!({
-        "repo_id": repo_id,
-        "ref":     ref_name,
-        "old":     old_sha,
-        "new":     new_sha,
-        "pusher":  pusher,
-        "node":    node_did,
-        "ts":      issued_at,
-    });
-    let payload_bytes =
-        serde_json::to_vec(&payload).map_err(|e| format!("could not serialize payload: {e}"))?;
-
-    let did =
-        gitlawb_core::did::Did::from_str(node_did).map_err(|e| format!("bad node DID: {e}"))?;
-    let verifying_key = did
-        .to_verifying_key()
-        .map_err(|e| format!("cannot derive a public key from {node_did}: {e}"))?;
-
-    let sig_vec = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
-        .decode(signature_b64)
-        .map_err(|e| format!("signature is not valid base64url: {e}"))?;
-    let sig_bytes: [u8; 64] = sig_vec
-        .try_into()
-        .map_err(|_| "signature is not 64 bytes".to_string())?;
-
-    gitlawb_core::identity::verify(&verifying_key, &payload_bytes, &sig_bytes)
-        .map_err(|_| "Ed25519 signature does not match the signed payload".to_string())
-}
-
 async fn resolve_cert_id(client: &NodeClient, owner: &str, name: &str, id: &str) -> Result<String> {
     if id.len() >= 36 {
         return Ok(id.to_string());
     }
 
-    let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs?prefix={id}");
-    let resp = crate::http::read_json(client.get_authed(&path).await?, "certificates").await?;
+    let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs");
+    let resp: Value = client
+        .get(&path)
+        .await?
+        .error_for_status()
+        .context("failed to list certificates")?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("failed to list certificates")?;
 
     let certs = resp["certificates"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
     let matches: Vec<String> = certs
         .iter()
         .filter_map(|cert| cert["id"].as_str())
+        .filter(|cert_id| cert_id.starts_with(id))
         .map(ToString::to_string)
         .collect();
 
@@ -324,642 +192,3 @@ async fn resolve_cert_id(client: &NodeClient, owner: &str, name: &str, id: &str)
         _ => anyhow::bail!("certificate prefix {id} matches multiple certificates"),
     }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    /// Pins gl's payload reconstruction to the frozen canonical byte form the
-    /// node signs (default serde_json maps = alphabetically ordered keys). If
-    /// serialization drifts — a field added, or a preserve_order feature
-    /// landing anywhere in the workspace (feature unification flips every
-    /// crate at once) — this literal stops matching and the test fails,
-    /// instead of every real certificate silently rendering INVALID.
-    #[test]
-    fn payload_serialization_matches_frozen_canonical_form() {
-        let payload = serde_json::json!({
-            "repo_id": "repo-1",
-            "ref":     "refs/heads/main",
-            "old":     "oldsha",
-            "new":     "newsha",
-            "pusher":  "did:key:z6MkPusher",
-            "node":    "did:key:z6MkNode",
-            "ts":      "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
-        });
-        let frozen = concat!(
-            r#"{"new":"newsha","node":"did:key:z6MkNode","old":"oldsha","#,
-            r#""pusher":"did:key:z6MkPusher","ref":"refs/heads/main","#,
-            r#""repo_id":"repo-1","ts":"2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00"}"#,
-        );
-        assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&payload).unwrap(), frozen);
-    }
-
-    /// Signing exactly as the node does must round-trip through
-    /// verify_signature; any field tampering must fail it.
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_signature_round_trip_and_tamper() {
-        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        let node_did = kp.did().as_str().to_string();
-
-        let payload = serde_json::json!({
-            "repo_id": "repo-1",
-            "ref":     "refs/heads/main",
-            "old":     "0".repeat(40),
-            "new":     "a".repeat(40),
-            "pusher":  "did:key:z6MkPusher",
-            "node":    node_did,
-            "ts":      "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
-        });
-        let sig = kp.sign_b64(&serde_json::to_vec(&payload).unwrap());
-
-        let ok = verify_signature(
-            "repo-1",
-            "refs/heads/main",
-            &"0".repeat(40),
-            &"a".repeat(40),
-            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
-            &node_did,
-            "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
-            &sig,
-        );
-        assert!(ok.is_ok(), "expected valid signature, got: {ok:?}");
-
-        let tampered = verify_signature(
-            "repo-1",
-            "refs/heads/main",
-            &"0".repeat(40),
-            &"b".repeat(40), // new_sha changed after signing
-            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
-            &node_did,
-            "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
-            &sig,
-        );
-        assert!(tampered.is_err(), "tampered payload must not verify");
-
-        let garbage = verify_signature(
-            "repo-1",
-            "refs/heads/main",
-            &"0".repeat(40),
-            &"a".repeat(40),
-            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
-            &node_did,
-            "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
-            "not-base64url!!!",
-        );
-        assert!(garbage.is_err(), "malformed signature must not verify");
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn cmd_list_surfaces_denial_not_empty() {
-        // A gated 404 on the repo-scoped certs read must Err, not print "No certificates".
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let _m = server
-            .mock(
-                "GET",
-                mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"^/api/v1/repos/alice/secret/certs$".to_string()),
-            )
-            .with_status(404)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"message":"repository 'alice/secret' not found"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let result = cmd_list("alice/secret".to_string(), server.url(), None).await;
-        assert!(result.is_err(), "cert list must Err on a gated 404");
-        // Prove the gated certs path was actually requested: without this, an
-        // unmatched route (mockito's 501, also non-2xx) would satisfy is_err().
-        _m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn resolve_repo_surfaces_denial() {
-        // A slash-free repo with an empty identity dir forces the GET / node-info
-        // fetch. A gated 404 there must Err (surfacing the status), proving the
-        // read_json conversion is load-bearing rather than silently ignored.
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap(); // empty, no identity.pem, forces the GET / branch
-        let _m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/")
-            .with_status(404)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"message":"denied"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let err = resolve_repo("noslash", &server.url(), Some(dir.path()))
-            .await
-            .unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.to_string().contains("404"), "got: {err}");
-        _m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    // The `GET /` node-info lookup after the cert loads is a fail-soft diagnostic:
-    // a response-level failure degrades to a could-not-compare hint and the command
-    // completes Ok, never a fabricated mismatch warning and never a fatal Err. The
-    // cert fetch itself stays fail-closed. A >=36-char id skips resolve_cert_id so
-    // only two mocks are needed.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn cmd_show_completes_with_degraded_hint_when_node_info_denied() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let long_id = "a".repeat(36);
-        let _cert = server
-            .mock(
-                "GET",
-                format!("/api/v1/repos/alice/secret/certs/{long_id}").as_str(),
-            )
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(
-                r#"{"id":"c1","ref_name":"refs/heads/main","old_sha":"0","new_sha":"1","pusher_did":"p","node_did":"n","signature":"s","issued_at":"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"}"#,
-            )
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let _root = server
-            .mock("GET", "/")
-            .with_status(403)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"message":"denied"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let result = cmd_show(
-            "alice/secret".to_string(),
-            long_id,
-            server.url(),
-            None,
-            false,
-            None,
-        )
-        .await;
-        assert!(
-            result.is_ok(),
-            "cert show must complete despite a denied node-info lookup"
-        );
-        _cert.assert_async().await;
-        _root.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn cmd_show_degrades_on_malformed_node_info() {
-        // A 2xx node-info body that fails to parse degrades the same way a denial
-        // does: hint printed, command completes Ok.
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let long_id = "a".repeat(36);
-        let _cert = server
-            .mock(
-                "GET",
-                format!("/api/v1/repos/alice/secret/certs/{long_id}").as_str(),
-            )
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(
-                r#"{"id":"c1","ref_name":"refs/heads/main","old_sha":"0","new_sha":"1","pusher_did":"p","node_did":"n","signature":"s","issued_at":"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"}"#,
-            )
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let _root = server
-            .mock("GET", "/")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_body("not json")
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let result = cmd_show(
-            "alice/secret".to_string(),
-            long_id,
-            server.url(),
-            None,
-            false,
-            None,
-        )
-        .await;
-        assert!(
-            result.is_ok(),
-            "cert show must complete despite malformed node info"
-        );
-        _cert.assert_async().await;
-        _root.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn cmd_show_degrades_when_node_info_lacks_did() {
-        // A 2xx node-info body with no `did` routes to the degraded hint, not a
-        // fabricated empty-DID mismatch warning; the command completes Ok.
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let long_id = "a".repeat(36);
-        let _cert = server
-            .mock(
-                "GET",
-                format!("/api/v1/repos/alice/secret/certs/{long_id}").as_str(),
-            )
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(
-                r#"{"id":"c1","ref_name":"refs/heads/main","old_sha":"0","new_sha":"1","pusher_did":"p","node_did":"n","signature":"s","issued_at":"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"}"#,
-            )
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let _root = server
-            .mock("GET", "/")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body("{}")
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let result = cmd_show(
-            "alice/secret".to_string(),
-            long_id,
-            server.url(),
-            None,
-            false,
-            None,
-        )
-        .await;
-        assert!(
-            result.is_ok(),
-            "cert show must complete when node info lacks a DID"
-        );
-        _cert.assert_async().await;
-        _root.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    // Must-not case: the certificate fetch itself stays fail-closed. A gated 404
-    // aborts the command with the status surfaced, and the node-info lookup is
-    // never reached (the expect(0) assert proves it never ran).
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn cmd_show_surfaces_denied_certificate() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let long_id = "a".repeat(36);
-        let _cert = server
-            .mock(
-                "GET",
-                format!("/api/v1/repos/alice/secret/certs/{long_id}").as_str(),
-            )
-            .with_status(404)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"message":"repository not found"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let _root = server
-            .mock("GET", "/")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"did":"n"}"#)
-            .expect(0)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let err = cmd_show(
-            "alice/secret".to_string(),
-            long_id,
-            server.url(),
-            None,
-            false,
-            None,
-        )
-        .await
-        .unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.to_string().contains("404"), "got: {err}");
-        _cert.assert_async().await;
-        _root.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn cmd_show_reports_matching_node_did() {
-        // Pins the unchanged success path: node info fetched, DIDs compared, Ok.
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let long_id = "a".repeat(36);
-        let _cert = server
-            .mock(
-                "GET",
-                format!("/api/v1/repos/alice/secret/certs/{long_id}").as_str(),
-            )
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(
-                r#"{"id":"c1","ref_name":"refs/heads/main","old_sha":"0","new_sha":"1","pusher_did":"p","node_did":"n","signature":"s","issued_at":"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"}"#,
-            )
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let _root = server
-            .mock("GET", "/")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"did":"n"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let result = cmd_show(
-            "alice/secret".to_string(),
-            long_id,
-            server.url(),
-            None,
-            false,
-            None,
-        )
-        .await;
-        assert!(result.is_ok(), "cert show must report a matching node DID");
-        _cert.assert_async().await;
-        _root.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn cmd_show_warns_on_mismatching_node_did() {
-        // A real, differing node DID drives the WARNING branch end to end; the
-        // command still completes Ok.
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let long_id = "a".repeat(36);
-        let _cert = server
-            .mock(
-                "GET",
-                format!("/api/v1/repos/alice/secret/certs/{long_id}").as_str(),
-            )
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(
-                r#"{"id":"c1","ref_name":"refs/heads/main","old_sha":"0","new_sha":"1","pusher_did":"p","node_did":"n","signature":"s","issued_at":"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"}"#,
-            )
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let _root = server
-            .mock("GET", "/")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"did":"did:key:other"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let result = cmd_show(
-            "alice/secret".to_string(),
-            long_id,
-            server.url(),
-            None,
-            false,
-            None,
-        )
-        .await;
-        assert!(
-            result.is_ok(),
-            "cert show must warn, not fail, on a mismatching node DID"
-        );
-        _cert.assert_async().await;
-        _root.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    // ── --verify issuer anchoring ────────────────────────────────────────────
-    //
-    // Every other cmd_show test passes require_valid=false, so the whole
-    // `if require_valid` block went unexecuted. It is the security-bearing half of
-    // the command: a valid signature only proves the certificate is internally
-    // consistent (a hostile node can mint a keypair, name it in node_did, and
-    // self-sign), so --verify must additionally anchor the issuer to a DID the
-    // caller trusts. These drive all four outcomes plus the must-not case.
-    //
-    // The certificate must carry a REAL signature over the canonical payload:
-    // with a bogus one, --verify bails on the signature and never reaches the
-    // anchoring, which would make every assertion below vacuous.
-    fn signed_cert(node_kp: &gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair) -> (String, String) {
-        let node_did = node_kp.did().as_str().to_string();
-        let id = "a".repeat(36); // >= 36 chars skips resolve_cert_id's prefix lookup
-        let payload = serde_json::json!({
-            "repo_id": "repo-1",
-            "ref":     "refs/heads/main",
-            "old":     "0".repeat(40),
-            "new":     "b".repeat(40),
-            "pusher":  "did:key:z6MkPusher",
-            "node":    node_did,
-            "ts":      "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
-        });
-        let sig = node_kp.sign_b64(&serde_json::to_vec(&payload).unwrap());
-        let body = serde_json::json!({
-            "id": id,
-            "repo_id": "repo-1",
-            "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
-            "old_sha": "0".repeat(40),
-            "new_sha": "b".repeat(40),
-            "pusher_did": "did:key:z6MkPusher",
-            "node_did": node_did,
-            "signature": sig,
-            "issued_at": "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
-        })
-        .to_string();
-        (id, body)
-    }
-
-    /// Mount the cert fetch, plus a `GET /` answering with `node_info` (a JSON
-    /// body) or a denial when `None`.
-    async fn cert_server(
-        server: &mut mockito::Server,
-        id: &str,
-        cert_body: &str,
-        node_info: Option<&str>,
-    ) -> (mockito::Mock, mockito::Mock) {
-        let cert = server
-            .mock("GET", format!("/api/v1/repos/alice/r/certs/{id}").as_str())
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(cert_body)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let root = match node_info {
-            Some(b) => {
-                server
-                    .mock("GET", "/")
-                    .with_status(200)
-                    .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-                    .with_body(b)
-                    .create_async()
-                    .await
-            }
-            None => {
-                server
-                    .mock("GET", "/")
-                    .with_status(403)
-                    .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-                    .with_body(r#"{"message":"denied"}"#)
-                    .create_async()
-                    .await
-            }
-        };
-        (cert, root)
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn verify_ok_when_issuing_node_is_the_queried_node() {
-        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        let (id, body) = signed_cert(&kp);
-        let info = format!(r#"{{"did":"{}"}}"#, kp.did().as_str());
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let (cert, _root) = cert_server(&mut server, &id, &body, Some(&info)).await;
-
-        let got = cmd_show("alice/r".to_string(), id, server.url(), None, true, None).await;
-        assert!(got.is_ok(), "valid sig + matching issuer must pass");
-        cert.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn verify_bails_when_issuer_is_a_different_node() {
-        // The self-signing-hostile-node case: the signature verifies against the
-        // key the cert names, but that key is not the node we queried.
-        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        let (id, body) = signed_cert(&kp);
-        let other = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        let info = format!(r#"{{"did":"{}"}}"#, other.did().as_str());
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let (cert, _root) = cert_server(&mut server, &id, &body, Some(&info)).await;
-
-        let err = cmd_show("alice/r".to_string(), id, server.url(), None, true, None)
-            .await
-            .unwrap_err()
-            .to_string();
-        assert!(err.contains("expected issuer"), "got: {err}");
-        cert.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn verify_bails_when_node_info_denied_and_no_expect_node() {
-        // Fail closed: with no trusted DID to anchor against, --verify must NOT
-        // fall through to a pass just because the signature checked out.
-        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        let (id, body) = signed_cert(&kp);
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let (cert, _root) = cert_server(&mut server, &id, &body, None).await;
-
-        let err = cmd_show("alice/r".to_string(), id, server.url(), None, true, None)
-            .await
-            .unwrap_err()
-            .to_string();
-        assert!(err.contains("cannot anchor the issuer"), "got: {err}");
-        cert.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn verify_ok_when_expect_node_anchors_a_denied_lookup() {
-        // --expect-node supplies the trust anchor the denied lookup could not, so
-        // the same denial that fails the case above now passes.
-        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        let (id, body) = signed_cert(&kp);
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let (cert, _root) = cert_server(&mut server, &id, &body, None).await;
-
-        let got = cmd_show(
-            "alice/r".to_string(),
-            id,
-            server.url(),
-            None,
-            true,
-            Some(kp.did().as_str().to_string()),
-        )
-        .await;
-        assert!(got.is_ok(), "explicit anchor must pass");
-        cert.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn verify_bails_on_a_bad_signature_before_anchoring() {
-        // The must-not: a forged certificate naming the queried node must fail on
-        // the signature, even though its issuer would otherwise anchor cleanly.
-        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        let (id, body) = signed_cert(&kp);
-        let forged = body.replace(&"b".repeat(40), &"c".repeat(40));
-        let info = format!(r#"{{"did":"{}"}}"#, kp.did().as_str());
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let (cert, _root) = cert_server(&mut server, &id, &forged, Some(&info)).await;
-
-        let err = cmd_show("alice/r".to_string(), id, server.url(), None, true, None)
-            .await
-            .unwrap_err()
-            .to_string();
-        assert!(err.contains("signature did not verify"), "got: {err}");
-        cert.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    // The must-not case for the DID extraction: an empty or missing `did` has to
-    // become a could-not-compare reason. If it leaks through as a value, the
-    // comparison below fabricates a mismatch WARNING against a DID the node
-    // never claimed.
-    #[test]
-    fn did_from_node_info_rejects_empty_and_missing() {
-        assert!(did_from_node_info(&serde_json::json!({"did": "n"})).is_ok());
-        for body in [
-            serde_json::json!({"did": ""}),
-            serde_json::json!({}),
-            serde_json::json!({"did": 7}),
-        ] {
-            let got = did_from_node_info(&body);
-            assert!(
-                got.is_err(),
-                "must not yield a comparable DID: {body} -> {got:?}"
-            );
-        }
-        // And the reason it produces must route to the degraded hint, never a verdict.
-        let report =
-            did_check_report(&did_from_node_info(&serde_json::json!({"did": ""})), "n").join("\n");
-        assert!(
-            !report.contains("WARNING"),
-            "fabricated a mismatch: {report}"
-        );
-        assert!(report.contains("Could not fetch"), "got: {report}");
-    }
-
-    // did_check_report is the three-way selector between the match text, the
-    // mismatch WARNING, and the degraded could-not-compare hint. Substring
-    // asserts (not full-line equality) so cosmetic wording edits don't break them.
-
-    #[test]
-    fn did_check_report_match() {
-        let report = did_check_report(&Ok("n".to_string()), "n").join("\n");
-        assert!(
-            report.contains("matches the node being queried"),
-            "got: {report}"
-        );
-        assert!(!report.contains("WARNING"), "got: {report}");
-        assert!(!report.contains("Could not fetch"), "got: {report}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn did_check_report_mismatch() {
-        let report = did_check_report(&Ok("did:key:other".to_string()), "n").join("\n");
-        assert!(report.contains("WARNING"), "got: {report}");
-        assert!(report.contains("does not match"), "got: {report}");
-        assert!(report.contains("did:key:other"), "got: {report}");
-        assert!(!report.contains("Could not fetch"), "got: {report}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn did_check_report_missing_did_reason() {
-        let report =
-            did_check_report(&Err("node info response carried no DID".to_string()), "n").join("\n");
-        assert!(report.contains("Could not fetch"), "got: {report}");
-        assert!(
-            report.contains("node info response carried no DID"),
-            "got: {report}"
-        );
-        assert!(report.contains("verify offline"), "got: {report}");
-        // The must-not case: no real DID was obtained, so no comparison verdict
-        // may be claimed in either direction.
-        assert!(!report.contains("WARNING"), "got: {report}");
-        assert!(
-            !report.contains("matches the node being queried"),
-            "got: {report}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn did_check_report_lookup_error_reason() {
-        let report =
-            did_check_report(&Err("node info failed (403): denied".to_string()), "n").join("\n");
-        assert!(report.contains("Could not fetch"), "got: {report}");
-        assert!(report.contains("403"), "got: {report}");
-        assert!(report.contains("verify offline"), "got: {report}");
-        assert!(!report.contains("WARNING"), "got: {report}");
-    }
-}

crates/gl/src/changelog.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::Args;
+use serde_json::Value;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
@@ -41,7 +42,12 @@ pub async fn run(args: ChangelogArgs) -> Result<()> {
             did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string()
         } else {
             let client = NodeClient::new(&args.node, None);
-            let info = crate::http::read_json(client.get("/").await?, "node info").await?;
+            let info: Value = client
+                .get("/")
+                .await?
+                .json()
+                .await
+                .context("failed to fetch node info")?;
             let did = info["did"].as_str().context("node missing DID")?;
             did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(did).to_string()
         };
@@ -58,7 +64,13 @@ pub async fn run(args: ChangelogArgs) -> Result<()> {
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
 
-    let body = crate::http::read_json(resp, "changelog").await?;
+    let status = resp.status();
+    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
+
+    if !status.is_success() {
+        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
+        anyhow::bail!("changelog failed ({status}): {msg}");
+    }
 
     let events = body["events"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
 
@@ -200,7 +212,6 @@ mod tests {
             .with_status(404)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"message":"repo not found"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
@@ -212,8 +223,6 @@ mod tests {
         };
         let err = run(args).await.unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("changelog failed"));
-        // Prove the mocked route was actually requested; a non-matching request (mockito's 501, also non-2xx) would otherwise satisfy the error assertion vacuously.
-        _m.assert_async().await;
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -261,31 +270,4 @@ mod tests {
         let err = rt.block_on(run(args)).unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("no repo specified"));
     }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn resolve_via_run_surfaces_denial() {
-        // A slash-free repo with an empty identity dir forces the inline GET /
-        // node-info fetch during resolution. A gated 404 there must Err (surfacing
-        // the status), proving the read_json conversion is load-bearing.
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap(); // empty, no identity.pem, forces the GET / branch
-        let _m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/")
-            .with_status(404)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"message":"denied"}"#)
-            .expect(1)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let err = run(ChangelogArgs {
-            repo: Some("noslash".to_string()),
-            limit: 20,
-            node: server.url(),
-            dir: Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.to_string().contains("404"), "got: {err}");
-        _m.assert_async().await;
-    }
 }

crates/gl/src/doctor.rs

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 
 const PUBLIC_NODE: &str = "https://node.gitlawb.com";
-const GITHUB_API_BASE: &str = "https://api.github.com";
 
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct DoctorArgs {
@@ -142,20 +141,18 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
 
     // ── 3. GITLAWB_NODE env var ───────────────────────────────────────────
     match std::env::var("GITLAWB_NODE") {
-        // A loopback host is a legitimate setup (self-hosted node, dev
-        // harness) — the connectivity check below fails loudly if it is not
-        // actually reachable, so don't red-flag the configuration itself.
-        Ok(v) if is_loopback_url(&v) => {
-            checks.push(Check::pass(
+        Ok(v) if !v.is_empty() && !v.contains("127.0.0.1") && !v.contains("localhost") => {
+            checks.push(Check::pass("GITLAWB_NODE", v.to_string()));
+        }
+        Ok(v) if v.contains("127.0.0.1") || v.contains("localhost") => {
+            checks.push(Check::fail(
                 "GITLAWB_NODE",
                 format!(
-                    "{v} (local node — intentional for self-hosting/dev; unset to target the public network)"
+                    "set to local address ({v}) — git push/clone will fail against remote nodes"
                 ),
+                "export GITLAWB_NODE=https://node.gitlawb.com",
             ));
         }
-        Ok(v) if !v.is_empty() => {
-            checks.push(Check::pass("GITLAWB_NODE", v.to_string()));
-        }
         _ => {
             checks.push(Check::fail(
                 "GITLAWB_NODE",
@@ -177,19 +174,6 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
                 "node",
                 format!("{} — v{version} ({short_did}…)", args.node),
             ));
-            // Capability drift: a node newer than this CLI may require features
-            // (RFC 9421 signing, iCaptcha) the CLI doesn't speak.
-            let gl_ver = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
-            if version != "?" && is_newer(version, gl_ver) {
-                checks.push(Check::warn(
-                    "gl version",
-                    format!(
-                        "node is v{version} but gl is v{gl_ver} — your CLI may be missing \
-                         features (signing / iCaptcha) this node requires"
-                    ),
-                    "upgrade gl: curl -sSf https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh",
-                ));
-            }
         }
         Ok(resp) => {
             checks.push(Check::fail(
@@ -207,31 +191,6 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
         }
     }
 
-    // ── 4b. iCaptcha capability ───────────────────────────────────────────
-    // Gated writes (repo create / register / fork) auto-solve a challenge at the
-    // iCaptcha service; check it's reachable so the failure mode is obvious.
-    let icaptcha_url = std::env::var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL")
-        .unwrap_or_else(|_| icaptcha_client::DEFAULT_URL.to_string());
-    match NodeClient::new(&icaptcha_url, None).get("/v1/pubkey").await {
-        Ok(resp) if resp.status().is_success() => {
-            checks.push(Check::pass("iCaptcha", format!("{icaptcha_url} reachable")));
-        }
-        Ok(resp) => {
-            checks.push(Check::warn(
-                "iCaptcha",
-                format!("{icaptcha_url} returned HTTP {}", resp.status()),
-                "gated writes (repo create / register) may fail until iCaptcha is reachable",
-            ));
-        }
-        Err(e) => {
-            checks.push(Check::warn(
-                "iCaptcha",
-                format!("{icaptcha_url} unreachable: {e}"),
-                "set GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL or check connectivity — repo create / register solve a challenge there",
-            ));
-        }
-    }
-
     // ── 5. git-remote-gitlawb helper ──────────────────────────────────────
     // Use PATH lookup only — invoking the binary directly triggers git internals
     // that error with "fatal: not a git repository" outside of a git repo.
@@ -245,15 +204,6 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
         ));
     }
 
-    // ── 5b. shell alias shadowing ─────────────────────────────────────────
-    // oh-my-zsh's default `git` plugin aliases gl='git pull', which silently
-    // shadows this binary in every interactive zsh — the classic symptom is
-    // `gl` printing "fatal: not a git repository". Aliases beat PATH, so no
-    // install method can fix it; the user's rc file has to unalias.
-    if let Some(check) = check_shell_alias_shadowing(dirs::home_dir()) {
-        checks.push(check);
-    }
-
     // ── 6. git ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     match std::process::Command::new("git")
         .arg("--version")
@@ -275,7 +225,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
 
     // ── 7. Version up to date ─────────────────────────────────────────────
     let current = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
-    checks.push(check_version(current, GITHUB_API_BASE).await);
+    checks.push(check_version(current).await);
 
     // ── Render ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     for check in &checks {
@@ -320,83 +270,6 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
 }
 
 /// Check if a binary name exists anywhere on PATH.
-/// True when the rc file contains a real `unalias` command naming `gl` —
-/// not a comment, and not a longer word like `unalias global`. Ordering
-/// relative to oh-my-zsh loading is not modeled (an unalias placed before the
-/// plugin loads would be ineffective); acceptable slack for a warning check.
-fn rc_unaliases_gl(rc: &str) -> bool {
-    rc.lines().any(|line| {
-        let line = line.trim_start();
-        if line.starts_with('#') {
-            return false;
-        }
-        line.split([';', '&', '|']).any(|cmd| {
-            // A trailing comment must not count: `unalias foo  # gl`
-            let cmd = cmd.split('#').next().unwrap_or("");
-            let mut tokens = cmd.split_whitespace();
-            tokens.next() == Some("unalias") && tokens.any(|t| t == "gl")
-        })
-    })
-}
-
-/// True when the URL's host is exactly a loopback address. Substring checks
-/// misclassify hosts like `localhost.example` or URLs with "localhost" in the
-/// path, so parse and compare the actual host.
-fn is_loopback_url(value: &str) -> bool {
-    reqwest::Url::parse(value)
-        .ok()
-        .and_then(|u| {
-            u.host_str()
-                .map(|h| h == "localhost" || h == "127.0.0.1" || h == "[::1]" || h == "::1")
-        })
-        .unwrap_or(false)
-}
-
-/// Detect interactive-shell setups where an alias shadows `gl` (aliases beat
-/// PATH, so no install method can fix this). Best-effort heuristic over
-/// ~/.zshrc: an explicit `alias gl=`, or oh-my-zsh's `git` plugin (which
-/// ships gl='git pull'). Returns None when nothing suspicious is found or the
-/// rc file already contains an `unalias gl`.
-fn check_shell_alias_shadowing(home: Option<PathBuf>) -> Option<Check> {
-    let home = home?;
-    let rc = std::fs::read_to_string(home.join(".zshrc")).ok()?;
-    if rc_unaliases_gl(&rc) {
-        return None;
-    }
-
-    let explicit_alias = rc.lines().any(|l| l.trim_start().starts_with("alias gl="));
-    // Single-line `plugins=(git ...)` is the overwhelmingly common form; a
-    // multi-line plugins array slips past this heuristic, which is acceptable
-    // for a warning-level check.
-    let omz_git_plugin = home.join(".oh-my-zsh/plugins/git").exists()
-        && rc.lines().any(|l| {
-            let l = l.trim_start();
-            l.starts_with("plugins=")
-                && l.trim_start_matches("plugins=(")
-                    .trim_end_matches(')')
-                    .split_whitespace()
-                    .any(|p| p == "git")
-        });
-
-    if explicit_alias || omz_git_plugin {
-        let source = if explicit_alias {
-            "~/.zshrc defines `alias gl=`"
-        } else {
-            "oh-my-zsh's git plugin aliases gl='git pull'"
-        };
-        Some(Check::warn(
-            "shell alias",
-            format!(
-                "{source} — interactive shells run that instead of this binary \
-                 (symptom: `gl` prints \"fatal: not a git repository\")"
-            ),
-            "echo 'unalias gl 2>/dev/null' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc  (must come after oh-my-zsh loads)",
-        ))
-    } else {
-        None
-    }
-}
-
 fn which_in_path(name: &str) -> bool {
     std::env::var_os("PATH")
         .map(|paths| {
@@ -408,9 +281,8 @@ fn which_in_path(name: &str) -> bool {
         .unwrap_or(false)
 }
 
-/// Fetch the latest release tag from Gitlawb/node (the actual release repo — see install.sh's
-/// `GITLAWB_RELEASE_REPO` default) and compare to current version.
-async fn check_version(current: &'static str, github_api_base: &str) -> Check {
+/// Fetch the latest release tag from gitlawb/releases and compare to current version.
+async fn check_version(current: &'static str) -> Check {
     let client = match reqwest::Client::builder()
         .user_agent(format!("gl/{current}"))
         .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))
@@ -421,9 +293,7 @@ async fn check_version(current: &'static str, github_api_base: &str) -> Check {
     };
 
     let resp = match client
-        .get(format!(
-            "{github_api_base}/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest"
-        ))
+        .get("https://api.github.com/repos/gitlawb/releases/releases/latest")
         .send()
         .await
     {
@@ -431,13 +301,6 @@ async fn check_version(current: &'static str, github_api_base: &str) -> Check {
         Err(_) => return Check::pass("version", format!("v{current} (offline — could not check)")),
     };
 
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        return Check::pass(
-            "version",
-            format!("v{current} (GitHub API returned HTTP {})", resp.status()),
-        );
-    }
-
     let body: serde_json::Value = match resp.json().await {
         Ok(v) => v,
         Err(_) => return Check::pass("version", format!("v{current} (invalid response)")),
@@ -481,88 +344,6 @@ fn is_newer(latest: &str, current: &str) -> bool {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
-    fn fake_home(zshrc: Option<&str>, with_omz_git: bool) -> tempfile::TempDir {
-        let home = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        if let Some(rc) = zshrc {
-            std::fs::write(home.path().join(".zshrc"), rc).unwrap();
-        }
-        if with_omz_git {
-            std::fs::create_dir_all(home.path().join(".oh-my-zsh/plugins/git")).unwrap();
-        }
-        home
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn alias_shadowing_flags_omz_git_plugin() {
-        let home = fake_home(Some("plugins=(git z)\nsource $ZSH/oh-my-zsh.sh\n"), true);
-        let check = check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf()));
-        assert!(check.is_some(), "omz git plugin without unalias must warn");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn alias_shadowing_flags_explicit_alias() {
-        let home = fake_home(Some("alias gl='git pull'\n"), false);
-        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_some());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn alias_shadowing_silent_when_unaliased() {
-        let home = fake_home(
-            Some("plugins=(git z)\nsource $ZSH/oh-my-zsh.sh\nunalias gl 2>/dev/null\n"),
-            true,
-        );
-        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_none());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn alias_shadowing_ignores_fake_unaliases() {
-        // None of these actually free `gl` — the warning must survive them.
-        for rc in [
-            "plugins=(git)\n# unalias gl\n",          // commented out
-            "plugins=(git)\nunalias global\n",        // longer word
-            "plugins=(git)\nunalias foo  # gl\n",     // gl only in a comment
-            "plugins=(git)\necho unalias-gl-later\n", // not an unalias command
-        ] {
-            let home = fake_home(Some(rc), true);
-            assert!(
-                check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_some(),
-                "must still warn for rc: {rc:?}"
-            );
-        }
-        // Real unalias forms that do free it — all must silence the warning.
-        for rc in [
-            "plugins=(git)\nunalias gl\n",
-            "plugins=(git)\nunalias gl 2>/dev/null\n",
-            "plugins=(git)\ntrue; unalias gl\n",
-            "plugins=(git)\nunalias glog gl gst\n",
-        ] {
-            let home = fake_home(Some(rc), true);
-            assert!(
-                check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_none(),
-                "must be silent for rc: {rc:?}"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn loopback_url_detection_is_host_exact() {
-        assert!(is_loopback_url("http://127.0.0.1:7545"));
-        assert!(is_loopback_url("http://localhost:7545"));
-        assert!(is_loopback_url("http://[::1]:7545"));
-        assert!(!is_loopback_url("https://localhost.example"));
-        assert!(!is_loopback_url("https://node.gitlawb.com/localhost"));
-        assert!(!is_loopback_url("not a url"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn alias_shadowing_silent_without_signals() {
-        let home = fake_home(Some("plugins=(z)\nexport EDITOR=vim\n"), false);
-        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_none());
-        let no_rc = fake_home(None, false);
-        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(no_rc.path().to_path_buf())).is_none());
-        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(None).is_none());
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn test_is_newer_minor_bump() {
         assert!(is_newer("0.2.0", "0.1.0"));
@@ -598,50 +379,4 @@ mod tests {
     fn test_which_in_path_missing_binary() {
         assert!(!which_in_path("this-binary-does-not-exist-gl-test-12345"));
     }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_check_version_queries_gitlawb_node_releases() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let _m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"tag_name":"v9.9.9"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let check = check_version("0.1.0", &server.url()).await;
-        assert!(matches!(check.state, CheckState::Warn));
-        assert!(check.detail.contains("v9.9.9"));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_check_version_up_to_date() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let _m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"tag_name":"v0.1.0"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let check = check_version("0.1.0", &server.url()).await;
-        assert!(matches!(check.state, CheckState::Ok));
-        assert!(check.detail.contains("up to date"));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_check_version_http_error() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let _m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest")
-            .with_status(403)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let check = check_version("0.1.0", &server.url()).await;
-        assert!(matches!(check.state, CheckState::Ok));
-        assert!(check.detail.contains("GitHub API returned HTTP 403"));
-    }
 }

crates/gl/src/init.rs

@@ -38,23 +38,13 @@ pub async fn run(args: InitArgs) -> Result<()> {
     let git_dir = cwd.join(".git");
     if !git_dir.exists() {
         println!("Initializing git repository...");
-        // -b main: the push flow targets `main`; without it a fresh repo uses
-        // the user's init.defaultBranch (often `master`). Older git (<2.28)
-        // lacks the flag, so fall back to a plain init.
         let status = std::process::Command::new("git")
-            .args(["init", "-b", "main"])
+            .args(["init"])
             .current_dir(&cwd)
             .status()
             .context("failed to run git init")?;
         if !status.success() {
-            let status = std::process::Command::new("git")
-                .args(["init"])
-                .current_dir(&cwd)
-                .status()
-                .context("failed to run git init")?;
-            if !status.success() {
-                anyhow::bail!("git init failed");
-            }
+            anyhow::bail!("git init failed");
         }
     } else {
         println!("Git repository detected.");
@@ -175,47 +165,9 @@ pub async fn run(args: InitArgs) -> Result<()> {
         }
     }
 
-    // The hint must match the repo's actual state: with no commits yet, a bare
-    // `git push` fails with "src refspec ... does not match any" — exactly the
-    // trap a zero-to-push command must not set.
-    let has_commits = std::process::Command::new("git")
-        .args(["rev-parse", "--verify", "HEAD"])
-        .current_dir(&cwd)
-        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
-        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
-        .status()
-        .map(|s| s.success())
-        .unwrap_or(false);
-    // symbolic-ref succeeds on a branch (including an unborn one) and fails
-    // on a detached HEAD — where guessing "main" could push the wrong ref.
-    let branch = std::process::Command::new("git")
-        .args(["symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD"])
-        .current_dir(&cwd)
-        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
-        .output()
-        .ok()
-        .filter(|o| o.status.success())
-        .and_then(|o| String::from_utf8(o.stdout).ok())
-        .map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
-        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty());
-
     println!();
-    match (branch, has_commits) {
-        (Some(branch), true) => {
-            println!("Ready! Push with:");
-            println!("  git push gitlawb {branch}");
-        }
-        (Some(branch), false) => {
-            println!("Ready! Nothing is committed yet — commit, then push:");
-            println!("  git add -A && git commit -m \"initial commit\"");
-            println!("  git push gitlawb {branch}");
-        }
-        (None, _) => {
-            println!("Ready! HEAD is detached — create or switch to a branch, then push:");
-            println!("  git switch -c main");
-            println!("  git push gitlawb main");
-        }
-    }
+    println!("Ready! Push with:");
+    println!("  git push gitlawb main");
 
     Ok(())
 }