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Author SHA1 Message Date
beardthelion 361805b1bd chore: sync Cargo.lock with manifests (0.5.1 + icaptcha-client sha2 dep)
The committed lockfile lagged the manifests: workspace crates were bumped to
0.5.1 and icaptcha-client's Cargo.toml declares sha2, but the lock still
carried 0.5.0 and no sha2 entry. Every build regenerated it, leaving
Cargo.lock perpetually dirty. Regenerated offline (no dependency upgrades) so
the tree stays clean.
2026-08-28 23:16:43 -05:00
beardthelion 526ee87344 fix(node): make the SDL mutation-fence wiring load-bearing; admit deprecated
An adversarial review of the SDL switch found three gaps:

- The fence's completeness source (SDL) and its hidden-mutation cross-check were
  not load-bearing: because the real MutationRoot has no visible=false field,
  reverting `fields` back to introspection and dropping the cross-check left the
  whole suite green (INV-21). Extract the sourcing + cross-check into a generic
  `assert_mutation_fence<Q,M,S>` that the real fence AND a synthetic hidden schema
  both drive. A new #[should_panic] test (fence_rejects_a_hidden_mutation) feeds a
  visible=false mutation that IS registered, so only the cross-check can fire;
  reverting the SDL source or deleting the cross-check now changes/removes that
  panic and turns the test RED (verified).

- The introspection cross-check used bare `fields { name }` (GraphQL default
  includeDeprecated:false), so a `#[graphql(deprecation = "...")]` mutation --
  executable and present in SDL -- would false-red as a hidden visible=false
  mutation. Use `fields(includeDeprecated: true)`; a new test
  (fence_admits_a_deprecated_mutation) pins it, going RED without the flag.

- schema_lists_exactly_the_registered_mutations still sourced from introspection
  and its comment called introspection "the source of truth", contradicting the
  fix. Retargeted at the SDL set with a corrected comment.

Also folds the two introspection navigations into one generic helper
(introspection_mutation_fields) and points the version-safety test at it, so
there is a single introspection query. cargo test -p gitlawb-node --bins green
(497); clippy and fmt clean. Only api/mod.rs changed.
2026-08-28 23:16:38 -05:00
beardthelion 70b01aa320 fix(node): source the GraphQL mutation fence from SDL, not introspection
Resolves jatmn's #219 P1. The every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate completeness
fence enumerated mutation fields via async-graphql introspection, which filters
out `#[graphql(visible = false)]` fields. Those fields stay executable, so a
future hidden mutation would need no registry row and no marker while both
set-equality checks stayed green -- defeating the fence's guarantee that no live
mutation goes unclassified. (Confirmed by execution: a synthetic visible=false
mutation is absent from introspection, executable, and present in schema.sdl().)

Source completeness from the engine's own SDL instead. A new pure helper
mutation_field_names_from_sdl parses schema.sdl() with async-graphql's parser
AST (async_graphql::parser::parse_schema) and reads the mutation type's fields;
SDL includes visible=false fields and the AST parse is immune to a brace in a
field description. Introspection is kept as a cross-check: any field present in
SDL but hidden from introspection now fails named as a forbidden hidden
mutation. The stale doc comments (which claimed introspection could not hide a
field) are corrected.

A self-checking version-safety test builds a synthetic schema with a
visible=false mutation and asserts the SDL-sourced set includes it while
introspection omits it -- so if a future async-graphql ever filters SDL by
visibility, that test goes RED rather than the gap reopening silently.

Load-bearing verified by execution: stubbing the SDL enumeration to empty turns
four tests RED, including the fence itself; restoring returns green. Only
api/mod.rs changed; the mutation resolvers are untouched. `cargo test -p
gitlawb-node --bins` green (495); clippy and fmt clean.
2026-08-28 23:16:38 -05:00
beardthelion a31fed4a67 docs(node): reconcile GraphQL mutation-auth claims with the shipped state
README's known limitations, the OSS-readiness live-network blockers, and the
maintainer roadmap still listed GraphQL mutation auth as an open item, which
contradicts #87: GraphQL mutations already require a verified signer bound to the
acting DID. Reconcile each to the shipped reality while keeping the genuinely-open
nuance: the GraphQL mutation surface is the agent-task queue, repo writes stay
REST-only, and no owner-gated repo-write mutation is exposed over GraphQL. The
every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate fence forces any new mutation to be classified
in its table; owner-gate and REST parity stay the INV-1 review check.
2026-08-28 23:16:36 -05:00
beardthelion 626c545553 test(node): add a completeness fence over the GraphQL mutation surface
Gate the GraphQL mutation surface the way REST is gated, as a SEPARATE guard with
its own bucket table (a guard over a heterogeneous set must classify per member,
INV-1). every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate asserts the mutation set is complete
(every mutation classified) and that each carries its gate marker.

Completeness is derived from async-graphql's own introspection: the field names
come from the engine as structured data, so no source-text or SDL-format shape
(a brace or async fn in a comment or string, a whitespace/generic/skip variant, a
brace in a rustdoc description) can hide a live mutation. A new unregistered
mutation, including a repo-write, fails the build.

The marker check (does each resolver body call its gate) is a best-effort static
backstop, bounded to each resolver's own comment-masked, string-aware body. It is
explicitly not the completeness guarantee and not load-bearingness: a marker inside
a string literal is a documented vacuity residual, and the adversarial sqlx tests in
graphql/mutation.rs are the real proof the gates reject.

Verified by execution: an unregistered mutation reddens (unclassified), a removed
did_matches gate reddens (missing marker), the clean tree is green; no DB, no
feature flag.
2026-08-28 23:16:03 -05:00
7 changed files with 590 additions and 531 deletions

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Generated
+12 -93
View File
@@ -770,23 +770,6 @@ dependencies = [
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-ff"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f7a806ac6c8307b929df4645776290a50ee2aac754ad09d8bdf73391309e43af"
dependencies = [
"ark-ff-asm 0.6.0",
"ark-ff-macros 0.6.0",
"ark-serialize 0.6.0",
"ark-std 0.6.0",
"digest 0.10.7",
"educe",
"num-bigint",
"num-traits",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-ff-asm"
version = "0.3.0"
@@ -817,16 +800,6 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-ff-asm"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1479009684adc073dff49a1025d3a7065b317a9ead25aaaca38cdc70058ba8a2"
dependencies = [
"quote",
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-ff-macros"
version = "0.3.0"
@@ -865,19 +838,6 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-ff-macros"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "4a0691ed21ef00ef89c1e9bda832eba493dda3ec2f8d892fb25b705f73f06bb8"
dependencies = [
"num-bigint",
"num-traits",
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-serialize"
version = "0.3.0"
@@ -911,30 +871,6 @@ dependencies = [
"num-bigint",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-serialize"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a74dd304fd536fb95d0a328e72be759209cc496a9da094c5bc56e5fea4f9e86b"
dependencies = [
"ark-serialize-derive",
"ark-std 0.6.0",
"digest 0.10.7",
"num-bigint",
"serde_with",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-serialize-derive"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "4f153690697a2b91e5e1251ff98411ee5371500a111a0fd317a70e588eb300f9"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-std"
version = "0.3.0"
@@ -965,16 +901,6 @@ dependencies = [
"rand 0.8.6",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-std"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "367c9c827ed431bff6868b7aa926e05b16eb46603cc8b6e768e4a5553fa1d155"
dependencies = [
"num-traits",
"rand 0.8.6",
]
[[package]]
name = "arrayref"
version = "0.3.9"
@@ -3374,22 +3300,19 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
version = "0.7.1"
version = "0.5.1"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"gitlawb-core",
"libc",
"mockito",
"reqwest",
"tempfile",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "gitlawb-attest"
version = "0.7.1"
version = "0.5.1"
dependencies = [
"base64",
"ed25519-dalek",
@@ -3406,7 +3329,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "gitlawb-core"
version = "0.7.1"
version = "0.5.1"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"base64",
@@ -3427,14 +3350,13 @@ dependencies = [
"sha2",
"thiserror 2.0.18",
"tokio",
"url",
"uuid",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "gitlawb-node"
version = "0.7.1"
version = "0.5.1"
dependencies = [
"alloy",
"anyhow",
@@ -3490,11 +3412,10 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "gl"
version = "0.7.1"
version = "0.5.1"
dependencies = [
"alloy",
"anyhow",
"base64",
"chrono",
"clap",
"dirs",
@@ -3543,9 +3464,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "h2"
version = "0.4.18"
version = "0.4.13"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "839c0e8a181239723652be9062bb56ca5bf5f64011f73b623f6f4fc59086a228"
checksum = "2f44da3a8150a6703ed5d34e164b875fd14c2cdab9af1252a9a1020bde2bdc54"
dependencies = [
"atomic-waker",
"bytes",
@@ -3864,7 +3785,7 @@ dependencies = [
"libc",
"percent-encoding",
"pin-project-lite",
"socket2 0.5.10",
"socket2 0.6.3",
"tokio",
"tower-service",
"tracing",
@@ -3900,7 +3821,6 @@ version = "0.4.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"gitlawb-core",
"mockito",
"reqwest",
"serde",
"serde_json",
@@ -5432,7 +5352,7 @@ dependencies = [
"quinn-udp",
"rustc-hash",
"rustls",
"socket2 0.5.10",
"socket2 0.6.3",
"thiserror 2.0.18",
"tokio",
"tracing",
@@ -5469,7 +5389,7 @@ dependencies = [
"cfg_aliases",
"libc",
"once_cell",
"socket2 0.5.10",
"socket2 0.6.3",
"tracing",
"windows-sys 0.52.0",
]
@@ -5819,15 +5739,14 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "ruint"
version = "1.20.0"
version = "1.17.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f5e99bff0393163bb25029a6af25d3d8d202ba5b5438a74d1bd8789f5c822970"
checksum = "c141e807189ad38a07276942c6623032d3753c8859c146104ac2e4d68865945a"
dependencies = [
"alloy-rlp",
"ark-ff 0.3.0",
"ark-ff 0.4.2",
"ark-ff 0.5.0",
"ark-ff 0.6.0",
"bytes",
"fastrlp 0.3.1",
"fastrlp 0.4.0",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ Known limitations:
- Agent lifecycle revocation is not enforced by HTTP Signature authorization; do not rely on removing or revoking an agent record to block a compromised signer.
- Read visibility is not a blanket data-classification boundary: task, IPFS-pin, and Arweave-anchor listings are not repository-gated; withheld path names can be visible to a root reader; and later visibility changes cannot retract content already announced or externally anchored.
- Peer writes are signed by upgraded nodes, but strict signed-peer enforcement is opt-in during rolling upgrades.
- Current GraphQL mutations require an authenticated signer, but there is no mutation-specific guardrail that prevents a future mutation from omitting that check.
- GraphQL mutations require a signed identity (a verified signer bound to the acting DID) but are limited to the agent-task queue; repo writes are not exposed over GraphQL and remain REST-only.
- Pull-request review comments do not yet have threaded line-level anchors, and merges do not enforce approval requirements.
See:
-195
View File
@@ -449,198 +449,3 @@ mod lock_pool_shed_tests {
);
}
}
/// #426: end-to-end at the handler seam. A corrupt object store behind a
/// resolving issue ref used to look identical to an absent issue: get returned
/// a fake 404, close returned a fake 404 after releasing the write guard, and
/// list silently under-reported. All three must now surface a git error.
#[cfg(test)]
mod corrupt_store_tests {
use super::*;
use axum::response::IntoResponse;
use sqlx::PgPool;
use tempfile::TempDir;
fn seed_repo(owner_did: &str, name: &str) -> crate::db::RepoRecord {
let now = Utc::now();
crate::db::RepoRecord {
id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
name: name.to_string(),
owner_did: owner_did.to_string(),
description: None,
is_public: true,
default_branch: "main".to_string(),
created_at: now,
updated_at: now,
disk_path: format!("/tmp/{name}"),
forked_from: None,
machine_id: None,
}
}
/// A state whose repo store roots in `repos_dir`, so the test can lay down
/// a real repo and then corrupt it without touching /tmp.
async fn state_with_repos_dir(pool: &PgPool, repos_dir: &std::path::Path) -> AppState {
let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
state.repo_store =
crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(repos_dir.to_path_buf(), pool.clone());
state
}
/// Bare repo at the store's expected path, holding one issue ref.
fn bare_repo_with_issue(
repos_dir: &std::path::Path,
owner: &str,
name: &str,
) -> (std::path::PathBuf, String) {
let repo_path = repos_dir
.join(owner.replace([':', '/'], "_"))
.join(format!("{name}.git"));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&repo_path).unwrap();
let out = std::process::Command::new("git")
.args(["init", "--bare"])
.arg(&repo_path)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(out.status.success());
let issue_id = "aaaabbbb-0000-0000-0000-000000000000".to_string();
git_issues::create_issue(
&repo_path,
&issue_id,
&serde_json::json!({
"id": issue_id,
"title": "t",
"status": "open",
})
.to_string(),
)
.unwrap();
(repo_path, issue_id)
}
/// Delete the blob object behind the issue ref and put garbage in its
/// place: `cat-file` fails while `rev-parse` still resolves the ref.
fn corrupt_issue_object(repo_path: &std::path::Path, issue_id: &str) {
let out = std::process::Command::new("git")
.args(["rev-parse", &format!("refs/gitlawb/issues/{issue_id}")])
.current_dir(repo_path)
.output()
.unwrap();
let oid = String::from_utf8(out.stdout).unwrap().trim().to_string();
let obj = repo_path.join("objects").join(&oid[..2]).join(&oid[2..]);
std::fs::remove_file(&obj).unwrap();
std::fs::write(&obj, b"garbage").unwrap();
}
/// The regression: closing over a corrupt store used to return a fake 404
/// (or panic deeper in). It must reach the caller as a git 500, and the
/// handler must return rather than unwind.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn close_issue_on_corrupt_store_returns_git_error_not_panic(pool: PgPool) {
let owner = "did:key:zISSUECORRUPTCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC";
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let state = state_with_repos_dir(&pool, dir.path()).await;
state
.db
.create_repo(&seed_repo(owner, "corrupt-close"))
.await
.expect("seed repo");
let (repo_path, issue_id) = bare_repo_with_issue(dir.path(), owner, "corrupt-close");
corrupt_issue_object(&repo_path, &issue_id);
let err = close_issue(
State(state),
Extension(AuthenticatedDid(owner.to_string())),
Path((owner.to_string(), "corrupt-close".to_string(), issue_id)),
)
.await
.expect_err("a corrupt store must error, not panic or 404");
assert_eq!(
err.into_response().status(),
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
"a read failure is a git 500, not a fake not-found"
);
}
/// get on a corrupt store: 500, not the 404 the fold used to produce.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn get_issue_on_corrupt_store_returns_500_not_404(pool: PgPool) {
let owner = "did:key:zISSUECORRUPTGETDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD";
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let state = state_with_repos_dir(&pool, dir.path()).await;
state
.db
.create_repo(&seed_repo(owner, "corrupt-get"))
.await
.expect("seed repo");
let (repo_path, issue_id) = bare_repo_with_issue(dir.path(), owner, "corrupt-get");
corrupt_issue_object(&repo_path, &issue_id);
let err = get_issue(
State(state),
Path((owner.to_string(), "corrupt-get".to_string(), issue_id)),
None,
)
.await
.expect_err("a corrupt store must error, not 404");
assert_eq!(
err.into_response().status(),
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
);
}
/// list on a corrupt store must fail outright; a 200 that silently drops
/// the unreadable issue is the other half of the fold.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn list_issues_on_corrupt_store_returns_git_error(pool: PgPool) {
let owner = "did:key:zISSUECORRUPTLISTEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE";
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let state = state_with_repos_dir(&pool, dir.path()).await;
state
.db
.create_repo(&seed_repo(owner, "corrupt-list"))
.await
.expect("seed repo");
let (repo_path, issue_id) = bare_repo_with_issue(dir.path(), owner, "corrupt-list");
corrupt_issue_object(&repo_path, &issue_id);
let err = list_issues(
State(state),
Path((owner.to_string(), "corrupt-list".to_string())),
None,
)
.await
.expect_err("a corrupt store must error, not under-report");
assert_eq!(
err.into_response().status(),
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
);
}
/// Must-not direction: a genuinely absent issue still gets the 404.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn get_issue_on_absent_ref_still_returns_404(pool: PgPool) {
let owner = "did:key:zISSUEABSENTFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF";
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let state = state_with_repos_dir(&pool, dir.path()).await;
state
.db
.create_repo(&seed_repo(owner, "absent-get"))
.await
.expect("seed repo");
bare_repo_with_issue(dir.path(), owner, "absent-get");
let err = get_issue(
State(state),
Path((
owner.to_string(),
"absent-get".to_string(),
"ffffffff-0000-0000-0000-000000000000".to_string(),
)),
None,
)
.await
.expect_err("a missing issue is still not-found");
assert_eq!(err.into_response().status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
}
}
+548
View File
@@ -279,6 +279,554 @@ mod authz_guard {
}
}
/// Completeness fence over the GraphQL mutation surface: the mirror of
/// `every_in_scope_mutation_has_its_gate` for `graphql/mutation.rs`. Kept a
/// SEPARATE guard with its own table (never folded into the REST rows above):
/// a guard over a heterogeneous set must classify per member, and these
/// same-named task rows belong to the GraphQL surface, not `api/tasks.rs`.
///
/// COMPLETENESS comes from the engine's own SDL (`schema.sdl()`), parsed as a
/// structured AST (#219), NOT introspection and NOT a text parse of source.
/// This matters: async-graphql OMITS `#[graphql(visible = false)]` fields from
/// introspection while leaving them executable, so an introspection-sourced fence
/// could be defeated by a hidden mutation. SDL includes those fields, so no
/// visibility flag (and, via the AST parse, no brace-in-description quirk) can hide
/// a live mutation. The SDL field set must equal the registered set: a new field with
/// no row fails (a repo-write cannot slip in unlisted); a registered name absent from
/// the schema fails (renamed or removed). The set is also cross-checked against
/// introspection, so any field present in SDL but hidden from introspection fails
/// named as a forbidden hidden mutation.
///
/// The MARKER check is the only source-scraped part, and it is not the
/// completeness guarantee. Three honest limits, so a green check is not misread
/// as full authorization coverage:
/// 1. A present marker is not load-bearingness (the gate may not redden on a
/// hostile probe: the #203 present-but-vacuous case). The adversarial tests
/// in `graphql/mutation.rs` are the load-bearing layer.
/// 2. A present marker is not gate-correctness (it may be the wrong bucket for
/// the operation's resource: a repo-write registered as signer-self would
/// pass, so INV-1 review remains the defense).
/// 3. The marker check scrapes the comment-masked, brace-bounded resolver body;
/// a `{`/`}` or a `did_matches(` inside a STRING literal is not masked, so it
/// could mis-slice that body or satisfy the marker vacuously (the same
/// vacuous-marker class as limit 1). Completeness is unaffected: it comes
/// from the SDL AST, not from this scrape.
#[test]
fn every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate() {
// (Rust snake name, schema field in camelCase, expected gate marker). The
// four are Bucket C signer-self (`did_matches(`); a repo-write would be
// Bucket A (`require_repo_owner(`). Same-named REST rows live in the guard
// above against `api/tasks.rs`.
let registered: &[(&str, &str, &str)] = &[
("create_task", "createTask", "did_matches("),
("claim_task", "claimTask", "did_matches("),
("complete_task", "completeTask", "did_matches("),
("fail_task", "failTask", "did_matches("),
];
// Completeness + hidden-mutation cross-check against the REAL schema (#219),
// delegated to the generic `assert_mutation_fence` so the SDL sourcing and the
// cross-check are ALSO exercised by a synthetic hidden schema in
// `fence_rejects_a_hidden_mutation` (INV-21). Because the real MutationRoot has no
// hidden field today, that synthetic test — not a hypothetical production canary —
// is what turns reverting the SDL source or deleting the cross-check RED.
{
use crate::graphql::mutation::MutationRoot;
use crate::graphql::query::QueryRoot;
use crate::graphql::subscription::SubscriptionRoot;
let schema =
async_graphql::Schema::build(QueryRoot, MutationRoot, SubscriptionRoot).finish();
let registered_camel: Vec<&str> = registered.iter().map(|(_, c, _)| *c).collect();
assert_mutation_fence(&schema, &registered_camel);
}
// Marker present (source scrape; the vacuity limit, backstopped by the
// adversarial tests): each resolver body carries its bucket marker.
let masked = mask_comments(include_str!("../graphql/mutation.rs"));
for (snake, _, marker) in registered {
let body = resolver_body(&masked, snake);
assert!(
body.contains(marker),
"GraphQL mutation `{snake}` is missing its gate marker `{marker}`: gate removed"
);
}
}
/// Version-safety self-check (#219, INV-21): the fence's completeness guarantee rests
/// on `schema.sdl()` INCLUDING `visible = false` fields while introspection omits
/// them. That is observed async-graphql behavior, not a documented contract, so pin
/// it here: a synthetic schema with a hidden mutation must have that field in its
/// SDL-derived set and NOT in its introspection-derived set. If a future
/// async-graphql upgrade ever filters SDL by visibility, the first assertion flips
/// RED — the assumption is load-bearing, not trusted.
#[test]
fn sdl_source_sees_hidden_mutations_that_introspection_omits() {
use async_graphql::{EmptySubscription, Object, Schema};
struct Q;
#[Object]
impl Q {
async fn ping(&self) -> i32 {
0
}
}
struct M;
#[Object]
impl M {
async fn visible_mut(&self) -> i32 {
1
}
#[graphql(visible = false)]
async fn hidden_mut(&self) -> i32 {
2
}
}
let schema = Schema::build(Q, M, EmptySubscription).finish();
// SDL source (the fix): includes the hidden field.
let sdl_fields = mutation_field_names_from_sdl(&schema.sdl());
assert!(
sdl_fields.iter().any(|f| f == "hiddenMut"),
"SDL-sourced set MUST include the visible=false mutation; if this is RED, \
async-graphql started filtering SDL by visibility and the fence's \
completeness guarantee is broken: {sdl_fields:?}"
);
// Introspection (the fence's own helper): OMITS the hidden field. This is the
// exact gap the fix closes — an introspection-sourced fence never sees `hiddenMut`.
let introspected = introspection_mutation_fields(&schema);
assert!(
!introspected.iter().any(|f| f == "hiddenMut"),
"introspection is expected to OMIT the visible=false mutation (that is the \
gap the SDL source closes); got {introspected:?}"
);
// The exact diff the fence computes: hidden ∈ (sdl \ introspection).
let hidden: Vec<&String> = sdl_fields
.iter()
.filter(|f| !introspected.iter().any(|i| i == *f))
.collect();
assert_eq!(
hidden,
vec!["hiddenMut"],
"the SDL-vs-introspection diff must surface exactly the hidden mutation"
);
}
/// INV-21 wiring guard (#219): drives the generic `assert_mutation_fence` — the SAME
/// helper the real fence calls — against a synthetic schema whose mutation is
/// `visible = false` and IS registered, so completeness passes and ONLY the
/// hidden-from-introspection cross-check can fail. This is what makes the fence's SDL
/// sourcing load-bearing without a production canary: reverting the source to
/// introspection (the hidden field then absent from the SDL set) or deleting the
/// cross-check removes this panic (or changes its message), turning the
/// `should_panic` test RED. The real MutationRoot has no hidden field, so nothing on
/// the real schema could catch that regression.
#[test]
#[should_panic(expected = "hidden from introspection")]
fn fence_rejects_a_hidden_mutation() {
use async_graphql::{EmptySubscription, Object, Schema};
struct Q;
#[Object]
impl Q {
async fn ping(&self) -> i32 {
0
}
}
struct M;
#[Object]
impl M {
async fn visible_mut(&self) -> i32 {
1
}
#[graphql(visible = false)]
async fn hidden_mut(&self) -> i32 {
2
}
}
let schema = Schema::build(Q, M, EmptySubscription).finish();
// Both fields registered, so completeness passes and only the cross-check fires.
assert_mutation_fence(&schema, &["visibleMut", "hiddenMut"]);
}
/// Deprecated-mutation guard (#219): a `#[graphql(deprecation = "...")]` mutation is
/// executable and present in SDL, but GraphQL introspection omits it by default. The
/// fence's introspection helper uses `includeDeprecated: true`, so a deprecated (but
/// visible) mutation is NOT mistaken for a hidden one. With it registered, the fence
/// must NOT panic. Remove `includeDeprecated: true` and this goes RED — the deprecated
/// field would look hidden and false-red as a forbidden visible=false mutation.
#[test]
fn fence_admits_a_deprecated_mutation() {
use async_graphql::{EmptySubscription, Object, Schema};
struct Q;
#[Object]
impl Q {
async fn ping(&self) -> i32 {
0
}
}
struct M;
#[Object]
impl M {
async fn visible_mut(&self) -> i32 {
1
}
#[graphql(deprecation = "use visibleMut")]
async fn deprecated_mut(&self) -> i32 {
2
}
}
let schema = Schema::build(Q, M, EmptySubscription).finish();
// Must not panic: the deprecated field is visible (present in introspection with
// includeDeprecated) and registered, so it is neither hidden nor unclassified.
assert_mutation_fence(&schema, &["visibleMut", "deprecatedMut"]);
}
/// Completeness + hidden-mutation cross-check for a BUILT schema (#219). Generic over
/// the schema type so the real fence AND the synthetic `fence_rejects_a_hidden_mutation`
/// / `fence_admits_a_deprecated_mutation` tests drive the SAME sourcing and cross-check.
/// Completeness is sourced from SDL (which includes `visible = false` fields); the
/// cross-check fails any SDL field hidden from introspection. This genericity is the
/// INV-21 fix: because the real MutationRoot has no hidden field, only a synthetic
/// hidden schema through THIS helper makes reverting the SDL source or removing the
/// cross-check RED, rather than leaving the class latent behind a production canary.
fn assert_mutation_fence<Q, M, S>(
schema: &async_graphql::Schema<Q, M, S>,
registered_camel: &[&str],
) where
Q: async_graphql::ObjectType + 'static,
M: async_graphql::ObjectType + 'static,
S: async_graphql::SubscriptionType + 'static,
{
let sdl_fields = mutation_field_names_from_sdl(&schema.sdl());
let introspected = introspection_mutation_fields(schema);
// No SDL field may be hidden from introspection (a visible=false mutation).
for f in &sdl_fields {
assert!(
introspected.iter().any(|i| i == f),
"GraphQL mutation `{f}` is in the schema but hidden from introspection \
(a `#[graphql(visible = false)]` field): hidden mutations are forbidden \
by this fence — make it visible so its classification is enforceable, or \
remove it"
);
}
// Completeness both directions against the registered (camelCase) set.
for f in &sdl_fields {
assert!(
registered_camel.contains(&f.as_str()),
"unclassified GraphQL mutation `{f}`: add it to \
every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate with a deliberate gate \
(`require_repo_owner(` for a repo-write, `did_matches(` for a task op)"
);
}
for c in registered_camel {
assert!(
sdl_fields.iter().any(|f| f == c),
"registered GraphQL mutation `{c}` is not in the schema \
(renamed or removed); update the table"
);
}
}
/// The mutation field names via the engine's introspection, run against a passed
/// schema. STRUCTURED (names arrive as data). Uses `fields(includeDeprecated: true)`:
/// GraphQL's default omits `@deprecated` fields, but a `#[graphql(deprecation = "...")]`
/// mutation is still executable and present in SDL, so without this the cross-check
/// above would false-red a deprecated mutation as a hidden (visible=false) one. Only a
/// real visibility filter should trip that arm; deprecation is a lifecycle marker.
fn introspection_mutation_fields<Q, M, S>(
schema: &async_graphql::Schema<Q, M, S>,
) -> Vec<String>
where
Q: async_graphql::ObjectType + 'static,
M: async_graphql::ObjectType + 'static,
S: async_graphql::SubscriptionType + 'static,
{
use async_graphql::Value;
let resp = tokio::runtime::Runtime::new()
.expect("tokio runtime")
.block_on(schema.execute(
"{ __schema { mutationType { fields(includeDeprecated: true) { name } } } }",
));
assert!(
resp.errors.is_empty(),
"schema introspection failed: {:?}",
resp.errors
);
let mut names = Vec::new();
if let Value::Object(root) = &resp.data {
if let Some(Value::Object(sc)) = root.get("__schema") {
if let Some(Value::Object(mt)) = sc.get("mutationType") {
if let Some(Value::List(field_list)) = mt.get("fields") {
for field in field_list {
if let Value::Object(fo) = field {
if let Some(Value::String(n)) = fo.get("name") {
names.push(n.clone());
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
names
}
/// The mutation field names sourced from the built schema's SDL — the completeness
/// source (#219). Builds the same DB-free schema as the introspection helper and runs
/// its `.sdl()` (sync, no runtime needed) through [`mutation_field_names_from_sdl`].
/// SDL includes `#[graphql(visible = false)]` fields, so this source cannot be
/// defeated by hiding a mutation from introspection.
fn graphql_mutation_fields_from_sdl() -> Vec<String> {
use crate::graphql::mutation::MutationRoot;
use crate::graphql::query::QueryRoot;
use crate::graphql::subscription::SubscriptionRoot;
let schema =
async_graphql::Schema::build(QueryRoot, MutationRoot, SubscriptionRoot).finish();
mutation_field_names_from_sdl(&schema.sdl())
}
/// The mutation type's field names extracted from an async-graphql SDL string via
/// the engine's OWN parser AST (`async_graphql::parser::parse_schema`), NOT
/// introspection. This is the completeness source (#219): unlike introspection,
/// which async-graphql filters by `visible` (a `#[graphql(visible = false)]`
/// mutation is executable but ABSENT from introspection), `schema.sdl()` includes
/// every registered field, so a hidden mutation still appears here and must carry a
/// classified row. Parsing the AST (not a brace/line text scan) means a `}` inside a
/// field description cannot mis-slice the type block. camelCase, as async-graphql
/// emits. An empty result on a navigation miss is safe: the set-equality in
/// `every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate` turns "no fields" into a loud failure for
/// every registered name, never a vacuous pass.
fn mutation_field_names_from_sdl(sdl: &str) -> Vec<String> {
use async_graphql::parser::parse_schema;
use async_graphql::parser::types::{TypeKind, TypeSystemDefinition};
let doc = parse_schema(sdl).expect("async-graphql SDL must parse");
// The mutation root type name: from the `schema { mutation: X }` block if
// present, else the GraphQL default "Mutation".
let mutation_type = doc
.definitions
.iter()
.find_map(|def| match def {
TypeSystemDefinition::Schema(s) => s
.node
.mutation
.as_ref()
.map(|m| m.node.as_str().to_string()),
_ => None,
})
.unwrap_or_else(|| "Mutation".to_string());
// The fields of that object type.
doc.definitions
.iter()
.find_map(|def| match def {
TypeSystemDefinition::Type(t) if t.node.name.node.as_str() == mutation_type => {
match &t.node.kind {
TypeKind::Object(obj) => Some(
obj.fields
.iter()
.map(|f| f.node.name.node.as_str().to_string())
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
),
_ => None,
}
}
_ => None,
})
.unwrap_or_default()
}
#[test]
fn sdl_extractor_includes_a_hidden_visible_false_field() {
// A field that would be hidden from introspection must still be listed from SDL.
let sdl = "schema { query: QueryRoot mutation: MutationRoot }\n\
type QueryRoot { ping: Int! }\n\
type MutationRoot { createTask: Int! hiddenMut: Int! }\n";
let fields = mutation_field_names_from_sdl(sdl);
assert!(
fields.iter().any(|f| f == "createTask"),
"visible field must be listed: {fields:?}"
);
assert!(
fields.iter().any(|f| f == "hiddenMut"),
"a visible=false field (present in SDL, hidden from introspection) MUST be \
listed by the completeness source: {fields:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn sdl_extractor_is_not_fooled_by_a_brace_in_a_field_description() {
// A `}` inside a field description must not truncate the type block (the AST
// parse is immune to the text-parse quirk the old design feared).
let sdl = "schema { query: QueryRoot mutation: MutationRoot }\n\
type QueryRoot { ping: Int! }\n\
type MutationRoot {\n\
\"\"\"a description with a } brace and { another\"\"\"\n\
createTask: Int!\n\
claimTask: Int!\n\
}\n";
let fields = mutation_field_names_from_sdl(sdl);
assert!(
fields.iter().any(|f| f == "createTask") && fields.iter().any(|f| f == "claimTask"),
"both fields must be extracted despite a brace in a description: {fields:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn sdl_extractor_returns_empty_for_a_query_only_schema() {
let sdl = "schema { query: QueryRoot }\ntype QueryRoot { ping: Int! }\n";
assert!(
mutation_field_names_from_sdl(sdl).is_empty(),
"a schema with no mutation root yields no mutation fields (no panic)"
);
}
/// The comment-masked body of `async fn <snake>` in `graphql/mutation.rs`, bounded
/// to the resolver's OWN braces (its `{ .. }`), for the marker check. Brace-matching
/// on the comment-masked source means a `}` in a trailing helper cannot extend the
/// body and a comment marker does not count. A `{`/`}` inside a STRING literal is
/// not masked, a documented marker-check-only residual (limit 3); completeness does
/// not use this.
fn resolver_body(masked_src: &str, snake: &str) -> String {
let needle = format!("async fn {snake}(");
let start = masked_src.find(&needle).unwrap_or_else(|| {
panic!("resolver `async fn {snake}(` not found in graphql/mutation.rs")
});
let open = start
+ masked_src[start..]
.find('{')
.expect("resolver body opening brace");
let mut depth = 0i32;
let mut end = masked_src.len();
for (i, c) in masked_src[open..].char_indices() {
match c {
'{' => depth += 1,
'}' => {
depth -= 1;
if depth == 0 {
end = open + i + 1;
break;
}
}
_ => {}
}
}
masked_src[open..end].to_string()
}
/// `src` with `//` line comments and `/* */` block comments (nested) blanked to
/// spaces, WITHOUT opening a comment inside a `"..."` string (so a `"https://"` does
/// not erase the rest of its line). String CONTENTS are left intact, so a brace or
/// a gate marker inside a string is not masked; for the marker check that is a
/// documented vacuity residual (limit 3), and completeness does not use this at
/// all. Char literals and raw/byte strings are not tracked (absent in resolver
/// bodies); a `'"'` char or a raw string is the remaining narrow residual.
fn mask_comments(src: &str) -> String {
let chars: Vec<char> = src.chars().collect();
let mut out = String::with_capacity(src.len());
let mut i = 0;
let mut block_depth = 0usize;
let mut in_string = false;
while i < chars.len() {
let c = chars[i];
let next = chars.get(i + 1).copied();
if block_depth > 0 {
if c == '/' && next == Some('*') {
block_depth += 1;
out.push_str(" ");
i += 2;
} else if c == '*' && next == Some('/') {
block_depth -= 1;
out.push_str(" ");
i += 2;
} else {
out.push(if c == '\n' { '\n' } else { ' ' });
i += 1;
}
} else if in_string {
out.push(c);
if c == '\\' {
if let Some(n) = next {
out.push(n);
i += 2;
} else {
i += 1;
}
} else {
if c == '"' {
in_string = false;
}
i += 1;
}
} else if c == '"' {
in_string = true;
out.push('"');
i += 1;
} else if c == '/' && next == Some('/') {
while i < chars.len() && chars[i] != '\n' {
out.push(' ');
i += 1;
}
} else if c == '/' && next == Some('*') {
block_depth = 1;
out.push_str(" ");
i += 2;
} else {
out.push(c);
i += 1;
}
}
out
}
/// The SDL field set (the completeness source of truth, #219) is exactly the
/// registered mutations. If async-graphql adds or renames a field, this reddens
/// and forces the `every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate` table to be updated. Uses
/// SDL, not introspection: introspection omits `visible = false` fields, so an
/// introspection-based pin here would go green while a hidden mutation existed.
#[test]
fn schema_lists_exactly_the_registered_mutations() {
let mut fields = graphql_mutation_fields_from_sdl();
fields.sort();
assert_eq!(
fields,
vec!["claimTask", "completeTask", "createTask", "failTask"],
"the SDL mutation field set is the authoritative discovered set"
);
}
/// The marker check is bounded to a resolver's OWN body and is comment- and
/// string-aware: a `//` inside a `"https://"` string does not erase a real gate on
/// that line (no false-red), and a trailing module helper's `did_matches(` does not
/// rescue a resolver whose own gate was removed (no false-green).
#[test]
fn resolver_body_is_bounded_and_comment_and_string_aware() {
let src = "\
impl MutationRoot {
async fn ok(&self) -> Result<u32> {
let _ = (\"see https://x/y\", did_matches(a, b)); // URL string then gate, one line
Ok(0)
}
async fn last(&self) -> Result<u32> {
// did_matches( only in a comment
Ok(0)
}
}
fn helper() { let _ = did_matches(z, z); }
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests { async fn t() { let _ = did_matches(x, y); } }
";
let masked = mask_comments(src);
assert!(
resolver_body(&masked, "ok").contains("did_matches("),
"a `//` inside a string must not erase the real gate on that line"
);
assert!(
!resolver_body(&masked, "last").contains("did_matches("),
"the marker check must be bounded to the resolver's own body (a trailing \
helper's marker must not rescue a resolver whose gate was removed)"
);
}
/// Proves the comment-stripping that GUARD-1 added: a marker that appears only
/// in a full-line comment (the real `replicas.rs` false-pass shape) must NOT
/// satisfy a row.
+27 -240
View File
@@ -61,119 +61,6 @@ pub fn create_issue(repo_path: &Path, issue_id: &str, json: &str) -> Result<()>
Ok(())
}
/// Issue ids are UUIDs; refs under `refs/gitlawb/issues/` only ever carry
/// `[0-9a-zA-Z_-]` names. Anything else is not a value we pass to git.
fn issue_ref_name_is_safe(ref_name: &str) -> bool {
let Some(id) = ref_name.strip_prefix("refs/gitlawb/issues/") else {
return false;
};
!id.is_empty()
&& id
.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_')
}
/// Resolve a ref name without putting it on a command line: enumerate refs
/// (constant argv) and match in memory. A nonzero exit propagates, so "cannot
/// determine" is an error rather than a quiet `false`.
fn ref_name_resolves(repo_path: &Path, ref_name: &str) -> Result<bool> {
// allow-unbounded-git: failure-path existence recheck, module convention.
let out = Command::new("git")
.args(["for-each-ref", "--format=%(refname)"])
.current_dir(repo_path)
.output()
.context("failed to run git for-each-ref")?;
if !out.status.success() {
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr);
anyhow::bail!("git for-each-ref failed: {}", stderr.trim());
}
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout);
Ok(stdout.lines().any(|line| line.trim() == ref_name))
}
/// Read the blob behind an issue ref.
///
/// `Ok(None)` means the ref itself is absent. A ref that resolves but whose
/// object cannot be read (corrupt object, unreadable store, a mid-read gc) is
/// an error, not an absence (#426).
///
/// The ref name reaches git on stdin, never argv: `cat-file --batch` answers
/// `<oid> <type> <size>\n<body>\n` for a readable object and
/// `<spec> missing\n` for an absent ref or an unreadable object alike, so the
/// `missing` case is re-resolved by name enumeration to tell them apart.
fn read_issue_blob(repo_path: &Path, ref_name: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
if !issue_ref_name_is_safe(ref_name) {
anyhow::bail!("refusing issue ref outside the issues namespace: {ref_name}");
}
// allow-unbounded-git: this module's spawns predate the bounded runner and
// its callers run inside issue handlers that already hold the repo guard.
let mut child = Command::new("git")
.args(["cat-file", "--batch"])
.current_dir(repo_path)
.stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.spawn()
.context("failed to spawn git cat-file --batch")?;
use std::io::Write;
// Reap the child even when the write fails so a stdin error cannot drop an
// unwaited Child and leak a zombie (#53).
let write_result = match child.stdin.take() {
Some(mut stdin) => stdin
.write_all(ref_name.as_bytes())
.and_then(|()| stdin.write_all(b"\n")),
None => Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
"git cat-file --batch stdin unavailable",
)),
};
let output = child
.wait_with_output()
.context("git cat-file --batch failed")?;
write_result.context("failed to write ref name to git cat-file stdin")?;
if !output.status.success() {
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
anyhow::bail!("git cat-file --batch failed: {}", stderr.trim());
}
// "<spec> missing\n" covers an absent ref and an unreadable object; only a
// ref that still resolves is the error case.
let missing = format!("{ref_name} missing\n");
if output.stdout.as_slice() == missing.as_bytes() {
return match ref_name_resolves(repo_path, ref_name)? {
true => anyhow::bail!("issue ref resolves but its object is unreadable: {ref_name}"),
false => Ok(None),
};
}
// Header: "<oid> <type> <size>\n" then exactly <size> bytes plus a newline.
let header_end = output
.stdout
.iter()
.position(|b| *b == b'\n')
.context("unexpected git cat-file --batch output")?;
let header = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout[..header_end]);
let mut parts = header.split(' ');
parts.next();
let obj_type = parts.next().unwrap_or("");
if obj_type != "blob" {
anyhow::bail!("issue ref {ref_name} resolves to a non-blob object");
}
let size: usize = parts
.next()
.and_then(|s| s.parse().ok())
.context("unexpected git cat-file --batch header")?;
let body = &output.stdout[header_end + 1..];
anyhow::ensure!(
body.len() >= size,
"truncated git cat-file --batch body for {ref_name}"
);
Ok(Some(String::from_utf8_lossy(&body[..size]).to_string()))
}
/// List all issue refs and return their JSON content.
pub fn list_issues(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
// List all refs under refs/gitlawb/issues/
@@ -187,11 +74,9 @@ pub fn list_issues(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
.output()
.context("failed to run git for-each-ref")?;
// for-each-ref exits 0 with empty output when no refs match, so a nonzero
// exit is a real enumeration failure, not "no issues yet".
if !list_output.status.success() {
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&list_output.stderr);
anyhow::bail!("git for-each-ref failed: {}", stderr.trim());
// No issues yet
return Ok(vec![]);
}
let refs_str = String::from_utf8_lossy(&list_output.stdout);
@@ -203,12 +88,16 @@ pub fn list_issues(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
continue;
}
// Read the blob content. A ref that vanished between for-each-ref and
// here is skipped; a ref that resolves but fails to read propagates so
// a degraded object store errors the listing instead of under-reporting.
match read_issue_blob(repo_path, ref_name)? {
Some(content) => issues.push(content),
None => continue,
// Read the blob content
let cat_output = Command::new("git")
.args(["cat-file", "blob", ref_name])
.current_dir(repo_path)
.output()
.context("failed to run git cat-file")?;
if cat_output.status.success() {
let content = String::from_utf8_lossy(&cat_output.stdout).to_string();
issues.push(content);
}
}
@@ -238,12 +127,8 @@ pub fn resolve_issue_id(repo_path: &Path, id_or_prefix: &str) -> Result<Option<S
.output()
.context("failed to run git for-each-ref")?;
// for-each-ref exits 0 with empty output when nothing matches, so a
// nonzero exit is a real enumeration failure (e.g. not a repo), not
// "issue not found".
if !list.status.success() {
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&list.stderr);
anyhow::bail!("git for-each-ref failed: {}", stderr.trim());
return Ok(None);
}
let output = String::from_utf8_lossy(&list.stdout);
@@ -276,12 +161,8 @@ pub fn close_issue(repo_path: &Path, issue_id: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
None => return Ok(None),
};
// A ref that resolved and is now absent was deleted between the two calls;
// any other read failure propagates as an error rather than panic (#426).
let raw = match get_issue(repo_path, &full_id)? {
Some(raw) => raw,
None => return Ok(None),
};
let raw = get_issue(repo_path, &full_id)?
.expect("ref existed in resolve but not in get — should be impossible");
let mut issue: serde_json::Value =
serde_json::from_str(&raw).context("invalid issue JSON in git ref")?;
@@ -300,7 +181,18 @@ pub fn get_issue(repo_path: &Path, issue_id: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
};
let ref_name = format!("refs/gitlawb/issues/{full_id}");
read_issue_blob(repo_path, &ref_name)
let cat_output = Command::new("git")
.args(["cat-file", "blob", &ref_name])
.current_dir(repo_path)
.output()
.context("failed to run git cat-file")?;
if !cat_output.status.success() {
return Ok(None);
}
let content = String::from_utf8_lossy(&cat_output.stdout).to_string();
Ok(Some(content))
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -402,109 +294,4 @@ mod tests {
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&updated).unwrap();
assert_eq!(v["status"], "closed");
}
/// Overwrite the loose object behind an issue ref with garbage, so
/// `cat-file` fails while `rev-parse` still resolves the ref (#426).
fn corrupt_issue_object(dir: &TempDir, full_id: &str) {
let oid_out = Command::new("git")
.args(["rev-parse", &format!("refs/gitlawb/issues/{full_id}")])
.current_dir(dir.path())
.output()
.unwrap();
let oid = String::from_utf8(oid_out.stdout)
.unwrap()
.trim()
.to_string();
let obj = dir
.path()
.join(".git/objects")
.join(&oid[..2])
.join(&oid[2..]);
std::fs::remove_file(&obj).unwrap();
std::fs::write(&obj, b"garbage").unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn test_get_and_close_missing_issue_return_none() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
init_repo(&dir);
assert_eq!(get_issue(dir.path(), "nosuch00").unwrap(), None);
assert_eq!(close_issue(dir.path(), "nosuch00").unwrap(), None);
}
// #426: a directory that is not a repo makes `cat-file --batch` exit
// nonzero; that failure is an error, not a quiet None.
#[test]
fn test_issue_read_on_non_repo_errors_instead_of_none() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let not_a_repo = dir.path().join("not-a-repo");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&not_a_repo).unwrap();
assert!(read_issue_blob(&not_a_repo, "refs/gitlawb/issues/deadbeef").is_err());
}
// #426: the ref name is constrained to the issues namespace and a safe
// charset before it is fed to git, even on stdin (a newline would smuggle
// a second `--batch` spec).
#[test]
fn test_issue_read_rejects_ref_outside_issues_namespace() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
init_repo(&dir);
assert!(read_issue_blob(dir.path(), "refs/heads/main").is_err());
assert!(read_issue_blob(dir.path(), "refs/gitlawb/issues/../x").is_err());
}
// #426: a failed for-each-ref enumeration is an error, not an empty list.
#[test]
fn test_list_issues_on_non_repo_errors_instead_of_empty() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let not_a_repo = dir.path().join("not-a-repo");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&not_a_repo).unwrap();
assert!(list_issues(&not_a_repo).is_err());
}
// #426: the same enumeration failure inside resolve_issue_id must reach
// get_issue/close_issue as an error, not a "not found" None.
#[test]
fn test_get_and_close_on_non_repo_error_instead_of_none() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let not_a_repo = dir.path().join("not-a-repo");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&not_a_repo).unwrap();
assert!(get_issue(&not_a_repo, "nosuch00").is_err());
assert!(close_issue(&not_a_repo, "nosuch00").is_err());
}
// #426: a ref that resolves but whose object is corrupt is a read error,
// not an absent issue. `close_issue` used to `expect()` on that None and
// panic inside a request handler holding the write guard.
#[test]
fn test_corrupt_issue_object_errors_instead_of_panicking() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
init_repo(&dir);
let full_id = "bad00000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000";
create_issue(dir.path(), full_id, r#"{"status":"open"}"#).unwrap();
corrupt_issue_object(&dir, full_id);
assert!(get_issue(dir.path(), full_id).is_err());
assert!(close_issue(dir.path(), full_id).is_err());
assert!(list_issues(dir.path()).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_list_issues_returns_all() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
init_repo(&dir);
create_issue(
dir.path(),
"aaa00000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
r#"{"status":"open"}"#,
)
.unwrap();
create_issue(
dir.path(),
"bbb00000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
r#"{"status":"open"}"#,
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(list_issues(dir.path()).unwrap().len(), 2);
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Owner focus: protocol/auth.
- Close default-open repo write authorization and wire trusted UCAN delegation into repository permissions.
- Close the remaining visibility gaps: restrict or document task, pin, and anchor metadata routes, and publish an irreversible-publication policy.
- Add UCAN revocation or blocklisting, with an emergency compromised-key runbook.
- Add mutation-aware GraphQL auth before GraphQL becomes a public write API surface.
- GraphQL mutations require a verified signer (shipped, #87). Keep the surface limited to the agent-task queue; do not expose an owner-gated repo-write mutation over GraphQL without its owner-gate and REST parity. The `every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate` fence forces any new mutation to be classified in its table (discovered from the schema, so none can slip in unlisted); the owner-gate and REST parity themselves stay the INV-1 review check, not something the fence proves.
- Harden peer registration and outbound peer calls against SSRF and peer-list poisoning.
- After all live peers upgrade, enable signed peer writes by default.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Fixed or staged in this pass:
Live-network blockers to prioritize:
- GraphQL POST is still open for compatibility; GraphQL mutations should get mutation-aware auth before it becomes a public write API surface.
- GraphQL mutations now require a verified signer bound to the acting DID (#87), and the surface stays limited to the agent-task queue, so there is no public repo-write GraphQL API to gate. Queries remain open by design. (Resolved; kept here as posture, not a live blocker.)
- Push authorization is still not capability-complete. A valid DID signature is authentication, not authorization. Owner checks are now enforced on every branch, protected or not (`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH`, on by default); what remains is that a UCAN `git/push` capability is not yet honored, so a delegated or CI key cannot push.
- UCAN chain validation is incomplete and UCAN revocation/blocklisting is not implemented as an operator feature.
- Private repository reads are not enforced. `is_public` and `GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ` exist, but per-repository private-read behavior is not wired.