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Author SHA1 Message Date
beardthelion c96cd3fc31 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/issue-26-split-3-cert-compat 2026-11-08 11:51:06 -06:00
beardthelion 904cb85dbc docs(node): align RefCertificate.version rustdoc with the signed-bytes v2 contract 2026-11-08 11:51:06 -06:00
beardthelion f82b21f94e fix(gl): label version refusals distinctly and clean cert show help
A cert declaring an unsupported version printed INVALID, which reads as
a failed Ed25519 check even though verify_signature never ran. The
display now prints UNSUPPORTED VERSION for version refusals and keeps
INVALID for real signature failures. The Show help no longer cites
review rounds or commit history.
2026-11-07 22:50:27 -06:00
beardthelion 36330875c3 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/issue-26-split-3-cert-compat
# Conflicts:
#	crates/gitlawb-node/src/db/mod.rs
#	crates/gl/src/cert.rs
2026-11-07 21:38:31 -06:00
Gravirei 848ccfa5de style(gl): fix fmt in cert list response parsing 2026-09-06 08:18:51 +06:00
Gravirei 868505fdbc fix(gl): route cert list through error_for_status; correct cert show example
Round 4 reviewer findings on #26 split 3 cert compat:

- P2 (cert.rs:113): cmd_list called .json() straight through on the
  cert list endpoint and let a gated 404 (whose body lacks a
  `certificates` key) fall into the empty-list branch, printing "No
  ref certificates" with exit 0. Wire cmd_list through the same
  error_for_status() gate that cmd_show and resolve_cert_id already
  use, and pin the new behavior with a load-bearing test
  (`cmd_list_surfaces_gated_404_as_err`) that drives cmd_list end
  to end against a 404 mock. cmd_show is unchanged.

- P3 (README.md:314): the documented `gl cert show <id> --verify`
  example bound the certificate ID as the REPO positional, because
  the parser is `gl cert show [OPTIONS] <REPO> <ID>`. Insert the
  missing `<repo>` positional so the example matches the CLI
  parser.

The original BREAKING CHANGE footer in bb553b67 carried the same
shortened `gl cert show <id> --verify` example; this commit's
footer supersedes it with the canonical command, which is what
release-note scrapers read. The round-2 commit message itself is
left in history unchanged; the new footer is the one callers
should rely on.

BREAKING CHANGE: gl cert show <repo> <id> --verify requires --expect-node <did>; the queried node's self-reported DID is no longer accepted as a cert anchor.
2026-09-06 07:58:53 +06:00
Gravirei 8789d55689 fix(node,gl): address round-3 reviewer findings on #26 split 3 cert compat
- Stamp new certs v1 until v2 verifier ships; v2 issuance refused by shipped gl
- Add v2_signing_payload with version in signed bytes, downgrade test
- Verify signature in well-formed test, add DB read-back to issuer test
- Fix README/db comments and version-refusal message
2026-09-05 09:56:01 +06:00
Gravirei c638e469c3 fix(node): bind cert v2 test to live issuer via sqlx::test 2026-09-01 20:38:44 +06:00
Gravirei bb553b6705 fix(node,gl): address round-2 reviewer findings on #26 split 3/4 cert compat
BREAKING CHANGE: gl cert show <id> --verify now requires --expect-node <did>; the node's self-reported DID is no longer trusted as a cert anchor.
2026-09-01 20:23:19 +06:00
Kevin Codex 35dced13fb fix(gl,node): make the v2 rejection and issuer anchor real, and test them as such
Round-2 findings, all three demonstrated by execution:

- cmd_show's Ok(v != 1) verdict arm was dead code (parse_cert_version
  admits only 1), and the test aimed at it copied the match instead of
  calling the command. The match now mirrors the parser's contract and
  two end-to-end mockito tests drive cmd_show itself: a version-2 cert
  with a valid v1 signature fails --verify with the version named.

- --verify no longer accepts the queried node's self-reported DID as a
  trust anchor: the node that served a forged cert can serve a matching
  self-report, and that fallback passed a wholly forged certificate with
  exit 0. --verify now requires --expect-node before claiming a trusted
  issuer, with a test proving the refusal (and the anchored positive
  control passing).

- The node-side version test asserted version == 1 on its own literal;
  it now cross-checks the issuing construction: a version-1 claim must
  verify against the v1 payload builder's bytes rebuilt from the cert's
  own fields, and the v1 payload must carry no version key.
2026-08-31 14:59:08 +08:00
Gravirei b44f740a97 fix(cert): address CI failures on PR #386
- cargo fmt --all (CI fmt check was red on the prior commit)
- v28 upgrade-path test: switch version_column_default from
  fetch_one to fetch_optional, so a pre-v28 database with the
  column dropped returns Ok(None) rather than RowNotFound. The
  precondition assertion is what detects a missing column;
  RowNotFound would have masked a regression.
- clippy `needless_borrow` on the v2 verdict-branch test:
  drop the leading `&` on `cert_json["signature"].as_str()`.
2026-08-30 10:17:59 +06:00
Gravirei 7bc45ab3f2 fix(node,gl): address review feedback on cert version compat
- Drop the duplicate `version` ALTER from the v1 migration bundle; v28
  is now the sole owner of the column.
- Add a v28 upgrade-path test (v25/v26 pattern) that seeds a legacy
  pre-v28 ref_certificates row, drops the column + migration record,
  re-runs migrations, and asserts DEFAULT 1 + legacy row reads as v1.
- Extract a shared `v1_signing_payload` builder so the live signer
  and the frozen-vector test share one literal; a regression in the
  signer now fails the test.
- Tighten gl's `version` parsing: missing key → v1, present value
  must be a JSON integer that fits in u32 and equals 1. Null, strings,
  floats, overflow, and unknown versions all return Err instead of
  collapsing to v1 (Reviewer 2). Add a truth-table test pinning every
  cell of the parser.
- Extend the v1 forward-compat tests to actually round-trip through
  `verify_signature`, and add a regression test that pins the verdict
  branch rejects v2 even when the v1 signature would otherwise verify.
2026-08-30 09:49:36 +06:00
Gravirei 7a2d8d74e0 fix(node): version ref_certificates for forward compat (#26 split 3/4)
Reviewer 2 closed PR #224 on 2026-08-28 with a directive: split
into four narrow PRs. This is Split PR 3 (certificate / CLI
compatibility). No findings are assigned to it; it is required
because the protocol/client work is independently reviewable and
should not remain coupled to post-receive recovery.

The wire-format problem: the ref-cert payload is a fixed 7-field
JSON blob the node signs. Future changes (additional pusher
attestations, content-binding fields, secondary signatures) would
either break every existing cert or be impossible to ship without
a flag day. Versioning the cert makes the format forward-compat
and explicit.

NEW MIGRATION v28
  ref_certificates gains `version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1`.
  DEFAULT 1 means an existing row reads as v1 with no backfill
  needed; NOT NULL means a missing value is a hard error rather
  than a silent v0.

NEW FIELD ON RefCertificate
  `version: u32`. v1 is the pre-versioning 7-field payload
  (no `version` key in the signed JSON, so a v1 cert is
  byte-for-byte identical to today's cert). v2+ certs will
  include a `version` key and any new fields, both
  backwards-compatible: an old client reading a v2 cert sees the
  unknown `version` field and either ignores it (graceful) or
  refuses to verify (explicit).

API CHANGES
  - list_certs and get_cert now include `version` in the JSON
    response.
  - issue_ref_certificate sets `version: 1` on every new cert.

GL CHANGES
  - gl cert show reads the `version` field; missing field
    defaults to 1 (forward-compat with old servers). v1 certs
    go through the unchanged verify path. v2+ certs are
    explicitly rejected with an "upgrade the client" message
    rather than silently guessing the payload shape — a future
    client that supports v2 cannot accidentally treat a v1 cert
    as v2.

GOLDEN-FORMAT FIXTURE
  v1_payload_matches_frozen_canonical_form pins the v1 signing
  payload byte-for-byte. Reverting this to a v2 shape (adding a
  `version` key) is what the versioned format forbids: an old
  client reading a v1 cert must not see a `version` key in the
  signed JSON. The same byte-form is what gl's verify_signature
  reconstructs in crates/gl/src/cert.rs, so any drift between
  node and CLI breaks the test instead of silently rendering
  every real cert INVALID.

TESTS
  - 3 v1_payload_tests in crates/gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs:
    frozen-canonical-form, round-trip structural, default
    version is 1.
  - 2 new tests in crates/gl/src/cert.rs:
    missing_version_defaults_to_1_and_verifies,
    explicit_version_1_takes_v1_path.
  - 12 existing ref_certificate_tests still pass with the
    version column added.

Compiles clean, 1091 tests pass with 0 regressions, gl 4 cert
tests pass, clippy clean under -D warnings, fmt clean.

Cross-PR overlap (declared in the PR description):

  - #134 (anchors auth): independent. The cert API is unchanged
    in shape; auth gates apply as before.
  - #285 (advisory-lock session affinity): independent.
  - #306 (Content-Digest on signed requests): independent.
  - #314 (small-order Ed25519): independent. v1 certs verify
    through the same path, which already enforces the small-
    order check from #314 on the embedded node DID.
  - #324 (libp2p keypair persistence): independent.
  - #325 (gossip ref-update auth): independent. PR 1's signed
    HTTP push is the durable-intent producer; this PR owns the
    cert shape. The two PRs read and write the same cert table
    but do not step on each other (PR 1 calls
    issue_ref_certificate_idempotent; this PR keeps the
    deterministic cert id but does not change who calls what).
  - #382 (replication withheld-subtree trees): independent.
2026-08-29 02:27:29 +06:00
33 changed files with 191 additions and 3651 deletions

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-6
View File
@@ -39,12 +39,6 @@ GITLAWB_KEY=/data/keys/identity.pem
# Publicly reachable URL of this node (used in peer announcements)
GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL=https://your-node.example.com
# Base URL for the web view of repos on this node (used by `gl` to print a
# working View: link after repo creation). Omit for nodes with no web front-end.
# Distinct from GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL: that is API reachability for peers;
# this is browser reachability for humans.
# GITLAWB_WEB_URL=https://gitlawb.com
# ── Server ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
GITLAWB_HOST=0.0.0.0
GITLAWB_PORT=7545
+1 -1
View File
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ time once updated.
**Requirements:**
- Rust stable (≥ 1.91) — install via [rustup](https://rustup.rs)
- PostgreSQL 16+ — required for the node (it uses `pg_input_is_valid`, which exists only on PostgreSQL 16 and later). Use the bundled `docker-compose.yml` for local dev.
- PostgreSQL — required for the node. Use the bundled `docker-compose.yml` for local dev.
- Docker (optional, for full-stack local testing)
**Environment variables:**
Generated
+8 -12
View File
@@ -2208,7 +2208,7 @@ version = "3.1.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "faf9468729b8cbcea668e36183cb69d317348c2e08e994829fb56ebfdfbaac34"
dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.48.0",
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
@@ -2701,7 +2701,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7ab67060fc6b8ef687992d439ca0fa36e7ed17e9a0b16b25b601e8757df720de"
dependencies = [
"data-encoding",
"syn 1.0.109",
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
@@ -3085,7 +3085,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "39cab71617ae0d63f51a36d69f866391735b51691dbda63cf6f96d042b63efeb"
dependencies = [
"libc",
"windows-sys 0.52.0",
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
@@ -3563,7 +3563,6 @@ dependencies = [
"libp2p-swarm",
"mockito",
"multiaddr",
"percent-encoding",
"prometheus",
"reqwest",
"serde",
@@ -3581,7 +3580,6 @@ dependencies = [
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
"unicode-normalization",
"url",
"uuid",
"zeroize",
"zstd",
@@ -3601,7 +3599,6 @@ dependencies = [
"gitlawb-core",
"icaptcha-client",
"mockito",
"percent-encoding",
"reqwest",
"serde",
"serde_json",
@@ -3610,7 +3607,6 @@ dependencies = [
"tokio",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
"url",
"urlencoding",
"uuid",
]
@@ -3646,9 +3642,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "h2"
version = "0.4.19"
version = "0.4.18"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ef8e5e5a340588f4452631496976cf8636d4a7ecf600239fdc27615d2530bc16"
checksum = "839c0e8a181239723652be9062bb56ca5bf5f64011f73b623f6f4fc59086a228"
dependencies = [
"atomic-waker",
"bytes",
@@ -6227,7 +6223,7 @@ dependencies = [
"errno",
"libc",
"linux-raw-sys",
"windows-sys 0.52.0",
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
@@ -7161,7 +7157,7 @@ dependencies = [
"getrandom 0.4.2",
"once_cell",
"rustix",
"windows-sys 0.52.0",
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
@@ -7953,7 +7949,7 @@ version = "0.1.11"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c2a7b1c03c876122aa43f3020e6c3c3ee5c05081c9a00739faf7503aeba10d22"
dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.48.0",
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
+1 -3
View File
@@ -54,10 +54,8 @@ uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4"] }
# http client
reqwest = { version = "0.12", features = ["blocking", "json", "multipart", "rustls-tls"], default-features = false }
# URL parsing (what reqwest::Url re-exports, so the shared redirect predicate can
# take a parsed URL without pulling reqwest into gitlawb-core; also used for the
# absolute-browser-url validation on GITLAWB_WEB_URL in the node and CLI)
# take a parsed URL without pulling reqwest into gitlawb-core)
url = "2"
percent-encoding = "2"
# HMAC
hmac = "0.12"
-1
View File
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ Good today:
- Local or Docker node startup.
- Postgres-backed repo metadata.
- Bounded GraphQL queries with [repository pagination](docs/graphql-pagination.md).
- Bare git repository storage.
- Git smart-HTTP clone/fetch/push.
- RFC 9421-signed writes.
@@ -137,11 +137,6 @@ enum ShimMode {
struct Shim {
base_url: String,
posts: Arc<AtomicUsize>,
/// Advertisement (GET /info/refs) count. One `git fetch` performs exactly
/// one advertisement, so tests assert this is EXACTLY one: any fetch-level
/// retry that comes back re-advertises and goes red on the spot, which the
/// lower-bound POST assertions alone cannot see (#275 round 6).
gets: Arc<AtomicUsize>,
stop: Arc<AtomicBool>,
handle: Option<std::thread::JoinHandle<()>>,
}
@@ -171,17 +166,15 @@ fn start_shim(repo: PathBuf, mode: ShimMode) -> Shim {
let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
let base_url = format!("http://{addr}");
let posts = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
let gets = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
let stop = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
let posts_t = posts.clone();
let gets_t = gets.clone();
let stop_t = stop.clone();
let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || {
while !stop_t.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
match listener.accept() {
Ok((stream, _)) => {
handle_conn(stream, &repo, mode, &posts_t, &gets_t);
handle_conn(stream, &repo, mode, &posts_t);
}
Err(ref e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock => {
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(5));
@@ -194,7 +187,6 @@ fn start_shim(repo: PathBuf, mode: ShimMode) -> Shim {
Shim {
base_url,
posts,
gets,
stop,
handle: Some(handle),
}
@@ -220,13 +212,7 @@ fn normalize_accepted_stream(stream: &TcpStream) {
stream.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(30))).ok();
}
fn handle_conn(
stream: TcpStream,
repo: &Path,
mode: ShimMode,
posts: &AtomicUsize,
gets: &AtomicUsize,
) {
fn handle_conn(stream: TcpStream, repo: &Path, mode: ShimMode, posts: &AtomicUsize) {
normalize_accepted_stream(&stream);
let mut reader = BufReader::new(stream);
@@ -277,7 +263,6 @@ fn handle_conn(
receive_pack(repo, false, &body),
)
} else if method == "GET" && target.contains("/info/refs") {
gets.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
// v0 advertisement, wrapped exactly as the node's info_refs does.
let adv = upload_pack(repo, true, b"");
let mut wrapped = pkt(b"# service=git-upload-pack\n");
@@ -1022,7 +1007,6 @@ fn shim_answers_a_connection_that_arrives_non_blocking() {
let server = std::thread::spawn(move || {
let posts = AtomicUsize::new(0);
let gets = AtomicUsize::new(0);
let stream = loop {
match listener.accept() {
Ok((s, _)) => break s,
@@ -1037,7 +1021,7 @@ fn shim_answers_a_connection_that_arrives_non_blocking() {
// the assertions below run on every platform.
stream.set_nonblocking(true).unwrap();
accepted_tx.send(()).unwrap();
handle_conn(stream, &repo, ShimMode::Normal, &posts, &gets);
handle_conn(stream, &repo, ShimMode::Normal, &posts);
});
let mut client = TcpStream::connect(addr).unwrap();
@@ -1101,17 +1085,6 @@ fn real_git_multi_round_fetch_completes() {
posts >= 2,
"fixture did not force multi-round negotiation (observed {posts} POST(s)); the bridging path was not exercised"
);
// Exactly one advertisement: the POST bound above is a floor, so a
// reintroduced fetch-level retry could satisfy it by running a second full
// fetch instead of multi-round negotiation. Re-advertising is what a
// second fetch cannot avoid, so this is the committed guard on the
// retry's absence.
let gets = shim.gets.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
assert_eq!(
gets, 1,
"expected exactly one advertisement GET per fetch; {gets} means a \
fetch-level retry is back"
);
// The fetched tip is present and the clone's object graph is intact.
let server_head = String::from_utf8(git(&server, &["rev-parse", "HEAD"])).unwrap();
@@ -1204,17 +1177,6 @@ fn real_git_withheld_shaped_first_post() {
"helper hung on a withheld-shaped response (should forward-and-terminate, not deadlock). stderr:\n{stderr}"
);
// Exactly one advertisement, pass or fail: the POST assertions below are
// floors, so a reintroduced fetch-level retry could mask the withheld
// shape behind a second full fetch. A retry cannot avoid re-advertising,
// so this is the committed guard on its absence.
let gets = shim.gets.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
assert_eq!(
gets, 1,
"expected exactly one advertisement GET per fetch; {gets} means a \
fetch-level retry is back"
);
if out.status.success() {
// Real git accepted the mid-negotiation pack: the withheld multi-round
// path works end to end with no extra handling.
-2
View File
@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@ tracing = { workspace = true }
tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
chrono = { workspace = true }
uuid = { workspace = true }
url = { workspace = true }
percent-encoding = { workspace = true }
axum = { version = "0.8", features = ["http1", "http2", "json", "ws"] }
async-graphql = { version = "7", features = ["chrono", "uuid", "tracing"] }
async-graphql-axum = "7"
+1 -2
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,7 @@ use crate::state::AppState;
/// Hard ceiling on rows any ref-update feed returns in one request. Shared by the
/// shared collector's clamp and the per-handler request caps so they can't drift.
/// `pub(crate)` so the GraphQL complexity meter can price against the same bound.
pub(crate) const MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES: i64 = 200;
const MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES: i64 = 200;
/// Collect up to `limit` ref-update rows visible to `caller`, newest first,
/// paging past rows the feed gate drops. Filtering after a plain SQL `LIMIT`
+5 -13
View File
@@ -8367,7 +8367,6 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn get_by_cid_per_source_cap_sheds_same_source_admits_other() {
let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state_lazy();
state.db.pool().close().await;
// Global pool has room; the per-source cap is 1.
state.git_ipfs_walk_semaphore = Arc::new(Semaphore::new(8));
state.git_ipfs_walk_per_caller = crate::rate_limit::PerCallerConcurrency::new(1, 100);
@@ -8394,23 +8393,16 @@ mod tests {
"a source at its per-source /ipfs walk cap must shed 503 with global capacity free"
);
let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 1024).await.unwrap();
let body: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).unwrap();
assert_eq!(body["error"], "overloaded");
// A DIFFERENT source is NOT shed by the per-source cap: it clears admission and
// proceeds to the closed DB, which has a distinct db_unavailable error code.
// proceeds (then errors on the lazy DB, which is not a 503).
let resp = ipfs_router(state)
.oneshot(get_cid(&cid, Some(other)))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 1024).await.unwrap();
let body: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
body["error"],
crate::error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
"a different source must clear admission and reach the closed database"
assert_ne!(
resp.status(),
StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
"a different source must not be shed by the per-source cap"
);
}
+19 -94
View File
@@ -247,40 +247,6 @@ pub struct InfoRefsQuery {
// ── Handlers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Validate a repository name at the create/fork write paths. The charset is
/// restricted, and the length is bounded so every cursor the server emits
/// parses back: `repo_cursor` embeds the name in a base64(JSON) cursor that
/// `parse_repo_cursor` rejects over 4096 bytes (#465 4th round).
///
/// This is the API-side validator, and it deliberately differs from the
/// stricter disk-side `validate_repo_name` in `git/repo_store.rs`: this one
/// admits names the store rejects (empty, leading `-`, non-ASCII
/// alphanumeric) and rejects `.`, which the store allows. The divergence
/// predates this bound (#412 owns the fork half), so a store-rejected name
/// still fails later at `repo_store.init` after the proof is spent. Do not
/// "fix" the divergence here; the length bound below is the one that keeps
/// emitted cursors parseable, and it is shared via `MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN` so the
/// two validators cannot drift apart on length.
fn validate_repo_name(name: &str) -> Result<()> {
// Sanitize name: alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores only
if !name
.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_')
{
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
"repo name must contain only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, and underscores".into(),
));
}
// Byte length, not char count: the cursor budget is measured in bytes.
if name.len() > crate::db::MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN {
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
"repo name must be at most {} bytes",
crate::db::MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN
)));
}
Ok(())
}
/// POST /api/v1/repos
/// Create a new repository. Requires HTTP Signature auth.
pub async fn create_repo(
@@ -295,7 +261,16 @@ pub async fn create_repo(
// rejected request (bad name, already exists) never burns a valid proof.
let proof = crate::icaptcha::verify_request(&headers, &auth.0)?;
validate_repo_name(&req.name)?;
// Sanitize name: alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores only
if !req
.name
.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_')
{
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
"repo name must contain only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, and underscores".into(),
));
}
// default_branch is caller-supplied and becomes a PR's target_branch when the
// PR omits one, which is interpolated into a git revision argument. Validate
@@ -3799,7 +3774,15 @@ pub async fn fork_repo(
let fork_name = req.name.unwrap_or_else(|| source.name.clone());
let forker_did = auth.0;
validate_repo_name(&fork_name)?;
// Validate fork name
if !fork_name
.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_')
{
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
"repo name must contain only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, and underscores".into(),
));
}
// Same barrier every other repo-creation route goes through. The character
// allowlist above is vacuously true on an empty name, and `repo_disk_path`
@@ -5066,50 +5049,6 @@ mod tests {
peer_mock.assert_async().await;
}
#[test]
fn repo_name_validation_rejects_bad_charset_and_overlong_names() {
assert!(validate_repo_name("ok-name_123").is_ok());
assert!(validate_repo_name(&"a".repeat(crate::db::MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN)).is_ok());
// The bound is in bytes: the cursor budget is measured in bytes.
let overlong = "a".repeat(crate::db::MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN + 1);
let err = validate_repo_name(&overlong).unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(err, AppError::BadRequest(_)),
"overlong name must be a 400, got: {err:?}"
);
assert!(validate_repo_name("bad name!").is_err());
// Empty names were already admissible before the length bound; the
// bound does not change that.
assert!(validate_repo_name("").is_ok());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn create_repo_rejects_overlong_name_through_handler() {
// Pins the wiring: `create_repo` must call `validate_repo_name`
// before any database access. The lazy state never connects, so
// deleting the call site would let the handler proceed to `get_repo`
// and fail with a connection error instead of BadRequest.
let state = crate::test_support::test_state_lazy();
let overlong = "a".repeat(crate::db::MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN + 1);
let err = create_repo(
State(state),
Extension(AuthenticatedDid(OWNER_DID.to_owned())),
axum::http::HeaderMap::new(),
Json(CreateRepoRequest {
name: overlong,
description: None,
is_public: true,
default_branch: "main".into(),
}),
)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(err, AppError::BadRequest(ref msg) if msg.contains("at most")),
"overlong name through create_repo must be a 400, got: {err:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn upload_pack_request_finalizes_only_with_done_pktline() {
let want = "0032want 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\n";
@@ -9240,7 +9179,6 @@ mod tests {
/// A pkt-line receive-pack body carrying one branch-create ref update, so the
/// handler's post-receive tail resolves a non-empty new-tip set (the delta
/// scan's git stages run).
#[cfg(unix)]
fn ref_update_body(new_sha: &str) -> axum::body::Bytes {
let line = format!("{ZERO_SHA} {new_sha} refs/heads/main");
axum::body::Bytes::from(format!("{:04x}{}0000", line.len() + 4, line))
@@ -11698,7 +11636,6 @@ mod tests {
)
}
#[cfg(unix)]
fn f2a_log(log: &std::path::Path) -> String {
std::fs::read_to_string(log).unwrap_or_default()
}
@@ -11706,7 +11643,6 @@ mod tests {
/// Withheld-walk children run so far. `ls-tree` is the walk's signature child
/// (`blob_paths` lists every reachable commit's tree); the delta scan and the
/// full-scan fallback use `rev-list` / `cat-file` instead.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn f2a_walks(log: &std::path::Path) -> usize {
f2a_log(log)
.lines()
@@ -11718,7 +11654,6 @@ mod tests {
/// the withheld walk actually runs rather than taking the no-rule shortcut).
/// The repo's on-disk path is passed to the tail directly, so no repo_store or
/// receive-pack plumbing is involved.
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn f2a_state(
pool: sqlx::PgPool,
git_bin: &str,
@@ -11750,7 +11685,6 @@ mod tests {
(state, rec)
}
#[cfg(unix)]
fn f2a_update(ref_name: &str, new_sha: &str) -> Vec<RefUpdate> {
vec![RefUpdate {
old_sha: ZERO_SHA.to_string(),
@@ -11759,7 +11693,6 @@ mod tests {
}]
}
#[cfg(unix)]
const F2A_PUSHER: &str = "did:key:z6MkF2aPusherAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
/// When publish durability is fenced, the tail must not run walks or take
@@ -11872,7 +11805,6 @@ mod tests {
}
/// Poll `cond` until it holds, with a bound so a regression fails the test
/// rather than hanging the suite.
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn f2a_wait_for(mut cond: impl FnMut() -> bool, what: &str) {
let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(20);
while !cond() {
@@ -11887,7 +11819,6 @@ mod tests {
/// A `rev-list --objects` line names the tips a DELTA scan was asked to resolve,
/// so it attributes that scan to one push's tips. The withheld walk's own
/// `rev-list --all` / `ls-tree` lines never carry a tip as an argument this way.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn f2a_delta_scanned(log: &std::path::Path, tip: &str) -> bool {
f2a_log(log)
.lines()
@@ -12036,7 +11967,6 @@ mod tests {
/// Mount a Pinata upload endpoint that assigns every object the same CID, and
/// point the state at it. Returns the server (kept alive by the caller) and CID.
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn f2a_pinata(state: &mut AppState) -> (mockito::ServerGuard, String) {
let cid = "bafyf2acoalescedmapping".to_string();
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
@@ -12056,7 +11986,6 @@ mod tests {
/// Poll the branch to CID table until the push's mapping lands (the Pinata
/// worker is detached), bounded so a regression fails rather than hangs.
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn f2a_wait_for_branch_cid(
db: &crate::db::Db,
slug: &str,
@@ -12076,7 +12005,6 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[cfg(unix)]
fn f2a_slug(rec: &crate::db::RepoRecord) -> String {
format!(
"{}/{}",
@@ -12211,7 +12139,6 @@ mod tests {
// and `z6p2fail`), and owner-only push is on by default, so the identity has to
// follow the repo each push targets rather than being fixed for both.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn p2_push(
state: &AppState,
owner: &str,
@@ -12230,7 +12157,6 @@ mod tests {
)
}
#[cfg(unix)]
fn p2_logged(log: &std::path::Path, prefix: &str) -> bool {
f2a_log(log).lines().any(|l| l.starts_with(prefix))
}
@@ -13226,7 +13152,6 @@ exit 0
/// runs exactly one `rev-list --all`, so this counts the walks that were attempted
/// (the `ls-tree` counter above cannot: a walk whose enumeration fails never gets
/// to `ls-tree`).
#[cfg(unix)]
fn f2b_walk_attempts(log: &std::path::Path) -> usize {
f2a_log(log)
.lines()
+6 -32
View File
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ pub async fn create_task(
updated_at: now,
deadline: body.deadline,
};
let task = state.db.create_task(&task).await.map_err(db_error)?;
state.db.create_task(&task).await.map_err(db_error)?;
Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(task_to_json(&task))))
}
@@ -228,28 +228,16 @@ pub async fn claim_task(
return Err(forbidden("assignee_did must be the authenticated signer"));
}
let task = state.db.claim_task(&id, &auth.0).await.map_err(|e| {
if e.downcast_ref::<crate::db::TaskReservedForOtherAssignee>()
.is_some()
{
return forbidden("task not claimable: reserved for another assignee");
}
(
StatusCode::CONFLICT,
Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
)
})?;
let by_did = task
.assignee_did
.as_deref()
.map(crate::db::trim_assignee_did)
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.map(str::to_string)
.unwrap_or_else(|| auth.0.clone());
let _ = state.task_event_tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
task_id: id,
old_status: "pending".to_string(),
new_status: "claimed".to_string(),
by_did,
by_did: auth.0,
at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
});
Ok(Json(task_to_json(&task)))
@@ -284,14 +272,14 @@ pub async fn complete_task(
})?;
if !crate::api::did_matches(
&auth.0,
crate::db::trim_assignee_did(existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()),
existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
) {
return Err(forbidden("only the task assignee can complete it"));
}
let by_did = auth.0;
let task = state
.db
.finish_task(&id, "completed", body.result.as_deref(), &by_did)
.finish_task(&id, "completed", body.result.as_deref())
.await
.map_err(|e| {
(
@@ -299,13 +287,6 @@ pub async fn complete_task(
Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
)
})?;
let by_did = task
.assignee_did
.as_deref()
.map(crate::db::trim_assignee_did)
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.map(str::to_string)
.unwrap_or(by_did);
let _ = state.task_event_tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
task_id: id,
old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
@@ -344,7 +325,7 @@ pub async fn fail_task(
})?;
if !crate::api::did_matches(
&auth.0,
crate::db::trim_assignee_did(existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()),
existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
) {
return Err(forbidden("only the task assignee can fail it"));
}
@@ -352,7 +333,7 @@ pub async fn fail_task(
let reason = body.reason.unwrap_or_default();
let task = state
.db
.finish_task(&id, "failed", Some(&reason), &by_did)
.finish_task(&id, "failed", Some(&reason))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
(
@@ -360,13 +341,6 @@ pub async fn fail_task(
Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
)
})?;
let by_did = task
.assignee_did
.as_deref()
.map(crate::db::trim_assignee_did)
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.map(str::to_string)
.unwrap_or(by_did);
let _ = state.task_event_tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
task_id: id,
old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
+7 -250
View File
@@ -66,12 +66,6 @@ pub struct Config {
#[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL")]
pub public_url: Option<String>,
/// Base URL for the web view of repos on this node (e.g. https://gitlawb.com).
/// When set, `GET /` advertises it as `web_url` so the CLI can print a
/// working `View:` link. Omit for nodes that have no web front-end.
#[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_WEB_URL")]
pub web_url: Option<String>,
/// Comma-separated list of bootstrap peer URLs to announce to on startup
#[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS", value_delimiter = ',')]
pub bootstrap_peers: Vec<String>,
@@ -809,13 +803,7 @@ impl Config {
/// Cross-field boot validation. Single-field ranges are enforced by clap; this
/// catches combinations that ship a denial-of-service under otherwise-valid
/// values. Call once at startup and fail fast on `Err`.
///
/// `&mut self` is required so the validator can normalize `web_url` to
/// its canonical form after validation: the configured value is
/// advertised on public `GET /`, and any consumer reading
/// `config.web_url` later must see the same string that was actually
/// validated.
pub fn validate(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), String> {
// Concurrent git writes pin the dedicated lock pool for their whole
// duration (connection-affine advisory lock in acquire_write). The main
// pool no longer carries that occupancy.
@@ -932,101 +920,10 @@ impl Config {
.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
}
// GITLAWB_WEB_URL is advertised in GET / so the CLI can print a working
// View: link. Clap maps "" to Some("") which would produce a broken URL;
// reject early instead of serving a malformed link. Non-blank values must
// additionally parse as an absolute http(s) URL — the CLI appends
// `/{owner}/{repo}` to it, so scheme-less hosts ("gitlawb.com") and other
// garbage would render links no browser can follow.
if let Some(raw) = &self.web_url {
match validate_web_url(raw) {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(reason) => {
return Err(format!(
"GITLAWB_WEB_URL {reason} — \
set it to an absolute URL like https://gitlawb.com or leave it unset."
));
}
}
// Normalize to one canonical form so every consumer (the regular
// and degraded `GET /` handlers, anyone who reads
// `config.web_url` directly) sees the same string that was
// actually validated. The CLI's own defensive trim would paper
// over the divergence on the `View:` line, but that hides the
// bug from any other consumer that parses the value verbatim.
let canonical = raw
.trim()
.parse::<url::Url>()
.map(|u| u.to_string())
.map_err(|_| "is not a valid absolute URL".to_string())?;
if canonical != *raw {
self.web_url = Some(canonical);
}
}
Ok(())
}
}
/// Validate a `web_url` value for use as a browser-reachable base URL.
/// Blank values are rejected (clap maps `--web-url ""` to `Some("")`), and
/// non-blank values must parse as absolute `http`/`https` URLs with no
/// query, fragment, or userinfo — the CLI treats this as a string prefix
/// to append paths to, so anything else produces links no browser can
/// follow (`?a=1/owner/repo` puts the repo path inside the query string);
/// and userinfo is rejected outright because the configured value is
/// published on public `GET /` and reprinted on the CLI's `View:` line,
/// so an accidentally configured password would land in public metadata,
/// terminal scrollback, and CI logs.
pub(crate) fn validate_web_url(raw: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
if raw.trim().is_empty() {
return Err("must not be empty or whitespace-only".into());
}
let parsed: url::Url = raw
.trim()
.parse()
.map_err(|_| "is not a valid absolute URL".to_string())?;
match parsed.scheme() {
"http" | "https" => {}
other => return Err(format!("must use http or https, got '{other}:'")),
}
// url::Url cannot represent a URL without a host for http/https schemes, so
// reaching here guarantees an absolute browser-usable base.
if parsed.query().is_some() {
return Err(
"must not contain a query string — it is used as a path prefix for View links".into(),
);
}
if parsed.fragment().is_some() {
return Err(
"must not contain a fragment — it is used as a path prefix for View links".into(),
);
}
if !parsed.username().is_empty() || parsed.password().is_some() {
return Err(
"must not contain a username or password — it is advertised publicly and printed on the View: line"
.into(),
);
}
// Bidi/control bytes can hide behind percent-encoding: a literal scan of
// the wire form misses `.../%E2%80%AE` even though a browser decodes it
// into a reordering character on the rendered View: link. Check the
// decoded host and path before the value is advertised on GET / (INV-6).
let host = parsed.host_str().unwrap_or("");
let decoded_path = percent_encoding::percent_decode_str(parsed.path()).decode_utf8_lossy();
if host
.chars()
.chain(decoded_path.chars())
.any(|c| c.is_control() || gitlawb_core::sanitize::is_bidi_format(c))
{
return Err(
"must not contain control or bidi characters, even percent-encoded — the View: line is terminal output"
.into(),
);
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
@@ -1669,7 +1566,7 @@ mod tests {
.expect("default config must validate");
// An under-sized lock pool relative to the push cap is rejected.
let mut under_lock = Config::parse_from([
let under_lock = Config::parse_from([
"gitlawb-node",
"--db-lock-pool-max-connections",
"16",
@@ -1682,7 +1579,7 @@ mod tests {
);
// Exactly at the push cap without non-push headroom is rejected.
let mut push_only = Config::parse_from([
let push_only = Config::parse_from([
"gitlawb-node",
"--db-lock-pool-max-connections",
"32",
@@ -1695,7 +1592,7 @@ mod tests {
);
// Main pool can be smaller than pushes + headroom when the lock pool carries writes.
let mut split = Config::parse_from([
let split = Config::parse_from([
"gitlawb-node",
"--db-max-connections",
"16",
@@ -1710,153 +1607,13 @@ mod tests {
);
// Main pool still needs the app headroom floor.
let mut under_main = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--db-max-connections", "4"]);
let under_main = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--db-max-connections", "4"]);
assert!(
under_main.validate().is_err(),
"db_max_connections below DB_POOL_APP_HEADROOM must be rejected"
);
}
#[test]
fn web_url_rejects_empty_and_whitespace() {
// Unset is fine.
Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"])
.validate()
.expect("no web_url must validate");
// A real URL validates.
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some("https://gitlawb.com".into());
assert!(cfg.validate().is_ok());
// Empty string is rejected.
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some("".into());
assert!(cfg.validate().is_err(), "empty web_url must be rejected");
// Whitespace-only is rejected.
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some(" ".into());
assert!(
cfg.validate().is_err(),
"whitespace-only web_url must be rejected"
);
}
#[test]
fn web_url_rejects_non_absolute_or_non_browser_urls() {
// Scheme-less host: parses nowhere, renders a broken View: link.
for bad in [
"gitlawb.com",
"not a url",
"ftp://files.example.com",
"javascript:alert(1)",
"https://", // no host
] {
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some(bad.into());
assert!(cfg.validate().is_err(), "web_url {bad:?} must be rejected");
}
// Query strings and fragments corrupt the appended repo path, since
// web_url is used as a raw string prefix (`?a=1` would swallow
// `/{owner}/{repo}` into the query).
for bad in [
"https://gitlawb.com?a=1",
"https://gitlawb.com/?utm_source=docs",
"https://gitlawb.com#section",
"https://gitlawb.com/#faq",
] {
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some(bad.into());
assert!(
cfg.validate().is_err(),
"web_url {bad:?} (query or fragment) must be rejected"
);
}
// Surrounding whitespace around a valid URL is tolerated.
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some(" https://gitlawb.com ".into());
assert!(
cfg.validate().is_ok(),
"padded-but-valid web_url must validate"
);
// Percent-encoded bidi must not boot: the wire form carries no Cf
// code point, but a browser decodes %E2%80%AE into a reordering
// character on the rendered View: link (INV-6). Literal bidi and
// control bytes are rejected the same way.
for bad in [
"https://example.com/%E2%80%AE",
"https://example.com/\u{202e}spoof",
"https://example.com/%1b[31m",
] {
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some(bad.into());
assert!(
cfg.validate().is_err(),
"web_url {bad:?} (control or bidi, even encoded) must be rejected"
);
}
// Non-default ports and paths are fine.
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some("http://localhost:8080/ui".into());
assert!(cfg.validate().is_ok(), "port+path web_url must validate");
// Userinfo must be rejected: `web_url` is published on public
// `GET /` and reprinted on the CLI's `View:` line, so an
// accidentally configured password would land in public metadata,
// terminal scrollback, and CI logs. Reject username-only and
// user+password forms.
for bad in [
"https://[email protected]",
"https://user:[email protected]",
"https://:[email protected]",
] {
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some(bad.into());
assert!(
cfg.validate().is_err(),
"web_url {bad:?} (userinfo) must be rejected"
);
}
}
/// `validate()` accepts whitespace-padded input but the stored value
/// must match the canonical form actually validated, so every consumer
/// (the regular and degraded `GET /` handlers, anyone who reads
/// `config.web_url` directly) sees the same string. Without this, an
/// operator that sets `GITLAWB_WEB_URL=" https://git.example "` boots
/// a node that advertises `" https://git.example "` on public
/// metadata — different from what was validated, different from what
/// any other consumer would parse.
#[test]
fn web_url_is_normalized_to_canonical_form_after_validation() {
// Padded input is rewritten to the canonical form. `url::Url`'s
// own `to_string` is what we use for the canonicalization, and
// it always appends a path-separator slash to a bare-host URL,
// so the stored value is `https://git.example/` (which is also
// what every browser would normalize the operator-typed form to).
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some(" https://git.example ".into());
cfg.validate().unwrap();
assert_eq!(
cfg.web_url.as_deref(),
Some("https://git.example/"),
"stored web_url must be the canonical form, not the operator-typed one"
);
// Already-canonical input is left alone after a no-op
// re-normalization — same form comes back out, so any consumer
// reading the stored value sees a stable string across calls.
let mut cfg = Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]);
cfg.web_url = Some("https://git.example/".into());
cfg.validate().unwrap();
assert_eq!(cfg.web_url.as_deref(), Some("https://git.example/"));
}
/// The DECLARED default, read off the parser rather than out of a parse.
///
/// `Config::parse_from` consults the process environment, so on a host that
@@ -2121,7 +1878,7 @@ mod tests {
std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&target, &link).unwrap();
let key_path = link.join("p2p.key");
let mut config = Config::parse_from([
let config = Config::parse_from([
"gitlawb-node",
"--p2p-port",
"0",
@@ -2216,7 +1973,7 @@ mod tests {
let key_path = build(base.path());
let before = snapshot(base.path());
let mut config = Config::parse_from([
let config = Config::parse_from([
"gitlawb-node",
"--p2p-port",
"7546",
+17 -209
View File
@@ -6,20 +6,6 @@ use std::time::Duration;
use tracing::info;
use uuid::Uuid;
/// Maximum visible repositories per page, plus one internal look-ahead row.
pub(crate) const MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE: usize = 200;
/// Maximum repository name length in bytes. `repo_cursor` embeds the name in
/// a base64(JSON) cursor that `parse_repo_cursor` rejects over 4096 bytes, so
/// every write path must bound the name: a cursor the server emits must
/// always parse back (#465 4th round). 100 bytes keeps the longest possible
/// cursor an order of magnitude under the parse limit.
pub(crate) const MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN: usize = 100;
/// Maximum agent tasks returned per query. Shared by the GraphQL `tasks`
/// complexity meter and the resolver clamp so they can't drift.
pub(crate) const MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE: i64 = 200;
// ── Public data types ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -419,17 +405,6 @@ impl Db {
Self { pool }
}
/// Test-only: access the underlying Postgres connection pool.
///
/// The production accessor was removed on main (ed76adf) once every
/// production caller had migrated to typed `Db` methods; this restores
/// it for tests only, for the raw-SQL fixtures and closed-pool cases in
/// this change that have no typed equivalent.
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn pool(&self) -> &PgPool {
&self.pool
}
/// Test-only: apply the full schema to a fresh pool. `#[sqlx::test]`
/// provisions an empty per-test database, so DB-backed tests must run this
/// before seeding. Reuses the production `migrate()` path (the advisory lock
@@ -1619,16 +1594,6 @@ impl Db {
machine_id: Option<&str>,
quarantined: bool,
) -> Result<()> {
// Peer-supplied names are bound like the local write paths: an
// unbounded name would make reposPage emit a cursor longer than the
// 4096-byte parse limit, dead-ending pagination for every caller past
// that row (#465 4th round). The sync caller drops the error and skips
// the mirror.
if name.len() > MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN {
anyhow::bail!(
"mirror repo name exceeds {MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN} bytes: refusing to register"
);
}
let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
let id = format!("{owner_short}/{name}");
// `quarantined` is set only on first insert (the admission decision).
@@ -1920,73 +1885,6 @@ impl Db {
Ok(rows.into_iter().map(row_to_repo).collect())
}
/// A bounded, mirror-deduplicated page ordered by owner key and repository
/// name. Apply root visibility before LIMIT: private rows must not consume
/// page slots or influence continuation metadata. The root-rule predicate
/// mirrors `visibility::listable_at_root`; a differential test pins it.
/// Malformed reader JSON denies that repo to non-owners without failing the page.
/// Cursors only select a position and never confer read authority.
///
/// Performance note: the page orders and keyset-filters on
/// `(owner_key, name)` under `COLLATE "C"`, but the existing
/// `idx_repos_owner_key_name` index is built on the database default
/// collation and cannot serve that ordering, so each page sorts the full
/// deduped repo set before the keyset filter applies: O(total repos) work
/// per page. This is accepted (pages are capped at
/// `MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE` rows over a narrow projection). A
/// C-collation expression index was deliberately not added in a migration:
/// versions 27-35 are claimed by other in-flight branches (Gitlawb/node#384
/// claims 27-35, #464 claims 27-28) and the runner keys applied migrations
/// on the version integer alone, so a colliding entry would be silently
/// skipped on whichever side merges second. Revisit once that range lands
/// or clears.
pub async fn list_visible_repos_page(
&self,
caller: Option<&str>,
after: Option<(&str, &str)>,
limit: usize,
) -> Result<Vec<RepoRecord>> {
let sql = format!(
"{}
SELECT d.id, d.name, d.owner_did, d.description, d.is_public,
d.default_branch, d.created_at, d.updated_at, d.disk_path,
d.forked_from, d.machine_id
FROM deduped d
LEFT JOIN LATERAL (
SELECT reader_dids FROM visibility_rules v
WHERE v.repo_id = d.id AND v.path_glob ~ '^/*([*][*])*$'
ORDER BY v.path_glob DESC LIMIT 1
) root_rule ON TRUE
WHERE (
($2::text IS NOT NULL AND ({key}) = $2)
OR CASE WHEN root_rule.reader_dids IS NULL THEN d.is_public
WHEN NOT pg_input_is_valid(root_rule.reader_dids, 'jsonb') THEN FALSE
WHEN jsonb_typeof(root_rule.reader_dids::jsonb) = 'array' THEN
COALESCE(root_rule.reader_dids::jsonb ? $3::text, FALSE)
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM jsonb_array_elements(root_rule.reader_dids::jsonb) reader
WHERE jsonb_typeof(reader) <> 'string'
)
ELSE FALSE END
)
AND ($4::text IS NULL OR (({key}) COLLATE \"C\", d.name COLLATE \"C\") > ($4, $5::text))
ORDER BY ({key}) COLLATE \"C\", d.name COLLATE \"C\"
LIMIT $6",
Self::dedup_cte(),
key = OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL,
);
let rows = sqlx::query(&sql)
.bind(None::<&str>)
.bind(caller.map(normalize_owner_key))
.bind(caller)
.bind(after.map(|(owner, _)| normalize_owner_key(owner)))
.bind(after.map(|(_, name)| name))
.bind(limit.min(MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE + 1) as i64)
.fetch_all(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(rows.into_iter().map(row_to_repo).collect())
}
/// Repos currently quarantined (admitted as mirrors but withheld from every
/// listing surface). `list_all_repos_deduped` excludes these (its `DEDUP_CTE`
/// filters `quarantined = FALSE`), so a gate that resolves a slug against the
@@ -4139,54 +4037,28 @@ impl Db {
// ── Agent Tasks ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Permanent authorization denial: the task is reserved for a different assignee.
/// Handlers downcast this to return 403 (vs 409 for a lost claim race).
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("task not claimable: reserved for another assignee")]
pub struct TaskReservedForOtherAssignee;
/// ASCII whitespace treated as blank for assignee slots — must stay in sync with
/// `BTRIM(assignee_did, E' \t\n\r')` in `claim_task`'s SQL open-slot check.
const ASSIGNEE_BLANK: &[char] = &[' ', '\t', '\n', '\r'];
fn assignee_slot_blank(s: &str) -> bool {
s.trim_matches(ASSIGNEE_BLANK).is_empty()
}
/// Trim assignee DIDs for auth matching (same ASCII blank set as SQL/open checks).
pub fn trim_assignee_did(s: &str) -> &str {
s.trim_matches(ASSIGNEE_BLANK)
}
impl Db {
/// Persist a task. Whitespace-only `assignee_did` is stored as `NULL` (open).
/// Returns the normalized row shape so REST/GraphQL create responses match GET.
pub async fn create_task(&self, task: &AgentTask) -> Result<AgentTask> {
let mut stored = task.clone();
stored.assignee_did = stored
.assignee_did
.take()
.filter(|s| !assignee_slot_blank(s));
pub async fn create_task(&self, task: &AgentTask) -> Result<()> {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO agent_tasks (id, repo_id, kind, status, delegator_did, assignee_did, capability, ucan_token, payload, result, created_at, updated_at, deadline)
VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9,$10,$11,$12,$13)",
)
.bind(&stored.id)
.bind(&stored.repo_id)
.bind(&stored.kind)
.bind(&stored.status)
.bind(&stored.delegator_did)
.bind(&stored.assignee_did)
.bind(&stored.capability)
.bind(&stored.ucan_token)
.bind(&stored.payload)
.bind(&stored.result)
.bind(&stored.created_at)
.bind(&stored.updated_at)
.bind(&stored.deadline)
.bind(&task.id)
.bind(&task.repo_id)
.bind(&task.kind)
.bind(&task.status)
.bind(&task.delegator_did)
.bind(&task.assignee_did)
.bind(&task.capability)
.bind(&task.ucan_token)
.bind(&task.payload)
.bind(&task.result)
.bind(&task.created_at)
.bind(&task.updated_at)
.bind(&task.deadline)
.execute(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(stored)
Ok(())
}
pub async fn get_task(&self, id: &str) -> Result<Option<AgentTask>> {
@@ -4243,102 +4115,38 @@ impl Db {
Ok(rows.into_iter().map(row_to_task).collect())
}
/// Claim a pending task for `assignee_did`.
///
/// If the task was created with a non-blank pre-set `assignee_did`, only that
/// agent (DID-normalized via [`crate::api::did_matches`]) may claim it. Open
/// tasks (`NULL` / blank) remain first-claimer-wins. A reserved claim keeps
/// the **exact** stored DID form via `COALESCE($4, $2)` (no BTRIM rewrite) so
/// exact-match list filters still work. The UPDATE also re-checks the
/// assignee slot as defense-in-depth against a future writer racing the
/// pre-check.
pub async fn claim_task(&self, id: &str, assignee_did: &str) -> Result<AgentTask> {
let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
// Denial path only needs status + assignee — do not load payload/UCAN
// for a permissionless caller who will be rejected.
let row = sqlx::query("SELECT status, assignee_did FROM agent_tasks WHERE id = $1")
.bind(id)
.fetch_optional(&self.pool)
.await?
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("task not claimable: not found or already claimed"))?;
let status: String = row.get("status");
if status != "pending" {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
"task not claimable: not found or already claimed"
));
}
let stored: Option<String> = row.get("assignee_did");
// Blank reservations are treated as open. Keep the exact stored string
// for the UPDATE equality check and SET (do not BTRIM the reserved form).
// Blank definition matches SQL `BTRIM(..., E' \t\n\r')` (not space-only).
let reserved_exact = stored.as_deref().filter(|r| !assignee_slot_blank(r));
if let Some(reserved) = reserved_exact {
if !crate::api::did_matches(assignee_did, trim_assignee_did(reserved)) {
return Err(TaskReservedForOtherAssignee.into());
}
}
// Keep the exact reserved form ($4); only fill assignee on open claims ($2).
// Treat blank stored values as open for the SQL slot check.
let row = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE agent_tasks SET status='claimed',
assignee_did = COALESCE($4, $2),
updated_at=$3
"UPDATE agent_tasks SET status='claimed', assignee_did=$2, updated_at=$3
WHERE id=$1 AND status='pending'
AND (
($4::text IS NULL AND (assignee_did IS NULL OR BTRIM(assignee_did, E' \t\n\r') = ''))
OR assignee_did = $4
)
RETURNING id, repo_id, kind, status, delegator_did, assignee_did, capability, ucan_token, payload, result, created_at, updated_at, deadline",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(assignee_did)
.bind(&now)
.bind(reserved_exact)
.fetch_optional(&self.pool)
.await?;
row.map(row_to_task)
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("task not claimable: not found or already claimed"))
}
/// Transition a claimed task to `new_status` (`completed` / `failed`).
///
/// `actor_did` must be the task's assignee (DID-normalized). The UPDATE
/// binds the exact stored `assignee_did` so a concurrent reassignment /
/// re-claim cannot finish under a check-then-act race in the handler.
pub async fn finish_task(
&self,
id: &str,
new_status: &str,
result: Option<&str>,
actor_did: &str,
) -> Result<AgentTask> {
let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
let existing = self
.get_task(id)
.await?
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("task not found or not in claimed state"))?;
if existing.status != "claimed" {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("task not found or not in claimed state"));
}
let Some(ref assigned) = existing.assignee_did else {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("task not found or not in claimed state"));
};
// Trim matches claim_task so tab-padded stored values can finish.
if !crate::api::did_matches(actor_did, trim_assignee_did(assigned)) {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
"task not finishable: only the assignee may finish it"
));
}
let row = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE agent_tasks SET status=$2, result=$3, updated_at=$4
WHERE id=$1 AND status='claimed' AND assignee_did=$5
WHERE id=$1 AND status='claimed'
RETURNING id, repo_id, kind, status, delegator_did, assignee_did, capability, ucan_token, payload, result, created_at, updated_at, deadline",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(new_status)
.bind(result)
.bind(&now)
.bind(assigned.as_str())
.fetch_optional(&self.pool)
.await?;
row.map(row_to_task)
+4 -7
View File
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ impl RepoStore {
/// Test-only: every guard from this store parks in `release` right before the
/// `pg_advisory_unlock` await, until `gate` is notified. Dropping the future
/// while it is parked reproduces a client disconnect inside `release`.
#[cfg(all(test, unix))]
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn with_pre_unlock_gate(mut self, gate: Arc<tokio::sync::Notify>) -> Self {
self.pre_unlock_gate = Some(gate);
self
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ impl RepoStore {
/// Test-only: how many write guards from this store have reached the Tigris upload
/// site. See [`RepoWriteGuard::release`].
#[cfg(all(test, unix))]
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn tigris_upload_site_reached(&self) -> usize {
self.upload_site_reached
.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst)
@@ -1717,11 +1717,8 @@ fn validate_repo_name(repo_name: &str) -> Result<()> {
if repo_name.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("repo_name is empty");
}
// Byte bound shared with the API-side validator via `MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN`:
// the two validators differ on charset by design, but must not drift on
// length, or an API-admitted name fails here after the proof is spent.
if repo_name.len() > crate::db::MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN {
anyhow::bail!("repo_name exceeds {} chars", crate::db::MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN);
if repo_name.len() > 100 {
anyhow::bail!("repo_name exceeds 100 chars");
}
// Repo names are `[A-Za-z0-9._-]+` minus path-traversal traps.
if repo_name.contains("..") {
+2 -684
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ pub mod query;
pub mod subscription;
pub mod types;
use async_graphql::{Schema, SchemaBuilder};
use async_graphql::Schema;
use std::sync::Arc;
use crate::db::Db;
@@ -14,22 +14,6 @@ use subscription::SubscriptionRoot;
pub type GitlawbSchema = Schema<QueryRoot, MutationRoot, SubscriptionRoot>;
// Keep ordinary schema discovery and application queries usable while
// bounding validation work and the number of resolver selections per request.
const GRAPHQL_MAX_COMPLEXITY: usize = 400;
// The current public schema is shallow; this leaves headroom for composed
// clients and the canonical getIntrospectionQuery without allowing
// recursively nested documents to grow unchecked.
const GRAPHQL_MAX_DEPTH: usize = 14;
fn apply_query_limits<Query, Mutation, Subscription>(
builder: SchemaBuilder<Query, Mutation, Subscription>,
) -> SchemaBuilder<Query, Mutation, Subscription> {
builder
.limit_complexity(GRAPHQL_MAX_COMPLEXITY)
.limit_depth(GRAPHQL_MAX_DEPTH)
}
/// Client-facing message for GraphQL resolver failures that wrap a real
/// `sqlx::Error`. The real error is logged server-side; never put sqlx/Postgres
/// detail in the GraphQL `errors` array (#250).
@@ -97,7 +81,7 @@ pub fn build_schema(
ref_update_tx: tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<RefUpdateBroadcast>,
task_event_tx: tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>,
) -> GitlawbSchema {
apply_query_limits(Schema::build(QueryRoot, MutationRoot, SubscriptionRoot))
Schema::build(QueryRoot, MutationRoot, SubscriptionRoot)
.data(db)
.data(ref_update_tx)
.data(task_event_tx)
@@ -107,10 +91,6 @@ pub fn build_schema(
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::api::events::MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES;
use crate::db::{MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE, MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE};
use async_graphql::{EmptyMutation, EmptySubscription, Object, Value};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
#[test]
fn graphql_db_err_opaques_sqlx_chain() {
@@ -180,668 +160,6 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!err.message.contains("failed to open"));
}
fn production_test_schema() -> GitlawbSchema {
let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
.connect_lazy("postgres://localhost/unused")
.unwrap();
production_test_schema_with_db(Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool)))
}
fn production_test_schema_with_db(db: Arc<Db>) -> GitlawbSchema {
build_schema(
db,
tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(1).0,
tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(1).0,
)
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn ref_update_subscription_alias_budget() {
assert_subscription_alias_budget("refUpdates { repo }").await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn task_event_subscription_alias_budget() {
assert_subscription_alias_budget("taskEvents { taskId }").await;
}
async fn assert_subscription_alias_budget(field: &str) {
use futures::StreamExt;
use std::time::Duration;
let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
.connect_lazy("postgres://localhost/unused")
.unwrap();
let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
let schema = build_schema(
Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool)),
ref_tx.clone(),
task_tx.clone(),
);
for count in [7, 8] {
let fields = (0..count)
.map(|n| format!("r{n}: {field}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ");
let query = format!("subscription {{ {fields} }}");
let mut responses = Box::pin(schema.execute_stream(query));
if count == 8 {
let response = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), responses.next())
.await
.expect("over-budget subscriptions must reject before waiting for events")
.expect("the validation error must be returned");
assert_eq!(response.errors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(response.errors[0].message, "Query is too complex.");
assert_eq!(ref_tx.receiver_count() + task_tx.receiver_count(), 0);
continue;
}
// Poll the accepted operation far enough to register its receivers.
assert!(
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_millis(30), responses.next())
.await
.is_err()
);
assert_eq!(ref_tx.receiver_count() + task_tx.receiver_count(), 7);
let _ = ref_tx.send(RefUpdateBroadcast {
repo: "owner/repo".into(),
ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
old_sha: "0".repeat(40),
new_sha: "1".repeat(40),
pusher_did: "did:key:test".into(),
node_did: "did:key:node".into(),
timestamp: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
owner_did: "did:key:test".into(),
});
let _ = task_tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
task_id: "task".into(),
old_status: "pending".into(),
new_status: "claimed".into(),
by_did: "did:key:test".into(),
at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(),
});
let response = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), responses.next())
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
assert!(response.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", response.errors);
assert_ne!(response.data, Value::Null);
drop(responses);
assert_eq!(ref_tx.receiver_count() + task_tx.receiver_count(), 0);
}
}
#[sqlx::test]
async fn production_mutation_budget_accepts_seven_and_rejects_eight(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
let db = Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool));
db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
let caller = "did:key:reviewer";
let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
for index in 0..8 {
db.create_task(&crate::db::AgentTask {
id: format!("task-{index}"),
repo_id: None,
kind: "test".into(),
status: "pending".into(),
delegator_did: caller.into(),
assignee_did: None,
capability: "test".into(),
ucan_token: None,
payload: None,
result: None,
created_at: now.clone(),
updated_at: now.clone(),
deadline: None,
})
.await
.unwrap();
}
let schema = production_test_schema_with_db(db.clone());
for count in [8, 7] {
let fields = (0..count)
.map(|n| {
format!("r{n}: claimTask(id: \"task-{n}\", assigneeDid: \"{caller}\") {{ id }}")
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ");
let response = schema
.execute(
async_graphql::Request::new(format!("mutation {{ {fields} }}"))
.data(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid(caller.into())),
)
.await;
if count == 8 {
assert_eq!(response.errors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(response.errors[0].message, "Query is too complex.");
assert_eq!(
db.list_tasks(Some("pending"), None, 8).await.unwrap().len(),
8
);
continue;
}
assert!(response.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", response.errors);
assert_eq!(
response
.data
.into_json()
.unwrap()
.as_object()
.unwrap()
.len(),
7
);
assert_eq!(
db.list_tasks(Some("claimed"), Some(caller), 8)
.await
.unwrap()
.len(),
7
);
assert_eq!(
db.get_task("task-7").await.unwrap().unwrap().status,
"pending"
);
}
}
#[sqlx::test]
async fn production_list_cost_scales_with_the_same_alias_count(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
let db = Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool));
db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
let schema = production_test_schema_with_db(db);
// Bounds are per-root named constants so the cases move with the
// documented maximums instead of going stale as literals.
for (field, selection, max) in [
("refUpdates", "repo", MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES),
("tasks", "id", MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE),
(
"reposPage",
"nodes { name }",
MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE as i64,
),
] {
// Two aliases at the maximum always exceed the budget.
let fields = (0..2)
.map(|n| format!("r{n}: {field}(limit: {max}) {{ {selection} }}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ");
let response = schema.execute(format!("{{ {fields} }}")).await;
assert_eq!(response.errors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(response.errors[0].message, "Query is too complex.");
// At limit 1 two aliases fit for the row-priced roots; reposPage
// prices the full corpus scan, so a single alias is the most that
// fits under the budget.
let aliases = if field == "reposPage" { 1 } else { 2 };
let fields = (0..aliases)
.map(|n| format!("r{n}: {field}(limit: 1) {{ {selection} }}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ");
let response = schema.execute(format!("{{ {fields} }}")).await;
assert!(response.errors.is_empty(), "{field}: {:?}", response.errors);
assert_eq!(
response
.data
.into_json()
.unwrap()
.as_object()
.unwrap()
.len(),
aliases
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn production_limits_reject_mutation_aliases_and_large_lists() {
let schema = production_test_schema();
// Limits are derived from the MAX_* constants so the boundaries move
// with the documented maximums instead of going stale as literals.
for (prefix, count, field) in [
("mutation", 8, "claimTask(id: \"missing\", assigneeDid: \"did:key:test\") { id }".to_owned()),
("mutation", 8, "createTask(delegatorDid: \"did:key:test\", input: { kind: \"test\", capability: \"test\" }) { id }".to_owned()),
("mutation", 8, "completeTask(id: \"missing\", byDid: \"did:key:test\", input: {}) { id }".to_owned()),
("mutation", 8, "failTask(id: \"missing\", byDid: \"did:key:test\", input: {}) { id }".to_owned()),
("query", 8, "task(id: \"missing\") { id }".to_owned()),
("query", 2, format!("refUpdates(limit: {MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES}) {{ repo }}")),
("query", 2, format!("tasks(limit: {MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE}) {{ id }}")),
("query", 2, format!("reposPage(limit: {MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE}) {{ nodes {{ name }} }}")),
("query", 8, "reposPage(limit: 1) { nodes { name } }".to_owned()),
] {
let fields = (0..count)
.map(|n| format!("r{n}: {field}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ");
let response = schema.execute(format!("{prefix} {{ {fields} }}")).await;
assert_eq!(response.errors.len(), 1, "{:?}", response.errors);
assert_eq!(response.errors[0].message, "Query is too complex.");
}
}
#[sqlx::test]
async fn production_repos_page_serves_the_documented_maximum(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
let db = Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool));
db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
let schema = production_test_schema_with_db(db);
for selection in [
"nodes { name }",
"nodes { name ownerDid } hasNextPage endCursor",
] {
let response = schema
.execute(format!(
"{{ reposPage(limit: {MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE}) {{ {selection} }} }}"
))
.await;
assert!(response.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", response.errors);
assert_eq!(
response.data.into_json().unwrap()["reposPage"]["nodes"],
serde_json::json!([])
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn seven_root_aliases_are_accepted() {
struct Root(Arc<AtomicUsize>);
#[Object]
impl Root {
#[graphql(complexity = "50 + child_complexity")]
async fn repos(&self) -> Vec<Nested> {
self.0.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
vec![Nested]
}
}
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
let schema = apply_query_limits(Schema::build(
Root(calls.clone()),
EmptyMutation,
EmptySubscription,
))
.finish();
let fields = (0..7)
.map(|n| format!("r{n}: repos {{ value }}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ");
let response = schema.execute(format!("{{ {fields} }}")).await;
assert!(response.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", response.errors);
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::Relaxed), 7);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn expensive_root_aliases_are_rejected_before_database_access() {
// Use the production builder with a lazy pool: rejection must precede DB access.
let schema = production_test_schema();
let fields = (0..8)
.map(|n| format!("r{n}: repos {{ name }}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ");
let response = schema.execute(format!("{{ {fields} }}")).await;
assert_eq!(response.data, Value::Null);
assert_eq!(response.errors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(response.errors[0].message, "Query is too complex.");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn ordinary_schema_introspection_remains_available() {
let schema = production_test_schema();
let canonical_introspection = r#"
query IntrospectionQuery {
__schema {
queryType { name }
mutationType { name }
subscriptionType { name }
types {
...FullType
}
directives {
name
description
locations
args {
...InputValue
}
}
}
}
fragment FullType on __Type {
kind
name
description
fields(includeDeprecated: true) {
name
description
args {
...InputValue
}
type {
...TypeRef
}
isDeprecated
deprecationReason
}
inputFields {
...InputValue
}
interfaces {
...TypeRef
}
enumValues(includeDeprecated: true) {
name
description
isDeprecated
deprecationReason
}
possibleTypes {
...TypeRef
}
}
fragment InputValue on __InputValue {
name
description
type { ...TypeRef }
defaultValue
}
fragment TypeRef on __Type {
kind
name
ofType {
kind
name
ofType {
kind
name
ofType {
kind
name
ofType {
kind
name
ofType {
kind
name
ofType {
kind
name
ofType {
kind
name
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
"#;
let response = schema.execute(canonical_introspection).await;
assert!(
response.errors.is_empty(),
"canonical introspection query failed against production schema: {:?}",
response.errors
);
assert_ne!(response.data, Value::Null);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn ref_updates_and_tasks_single_alias_max_limit_complexity_contract() {
let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
.connect_lazy("postgres://localhost/unused")
.unwrap();
pool.close().await;
let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
let schema = build_schema(Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool)), ref_tx, task_tx);
// refUpdates(limit: MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES):
// Single-field selection has child_complexity 1 -> cost 100 + 200 + 1 = 301 <= 400.
// It passes validation and reaches the resolver (which yields db error on lazy pool).
let single_ref = schema
.execute(format!(
"{{ refUpdates(limit: {MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES}) {{ repo }} }}"
))
.await;
assert!(
!single_ref
.errors
.iter()
.any(|e| e.message == "Query is too complex."),
"single-field refUpdates at max limit must pass complexity validation: {:?}",
single_ref.errors
);
assert!(
single_ref
.errors
.iter()
.any(|e| e.message == GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
"single-field refUpdates at max limit must reach the resolver: {:?}",
single_ref.errors
);
// Two-field selection has child_complexity 2 -> cost 100 + 200 + 2 = 302 <= 400.
// The documented max-200 request stays reachable with multiple fields
// (the old multiplicative price rejected it at 450); it passes
// validation and reaches the resolver like the single-field case.
let multi_ref = schema
.execute(format!(
"{{ refUpdates(limit: {MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES}) {{ repo refName }} }}"
))
.await;
assert!(
!multi_ref
.errors
.iter()
.any(|e| e.message == "Query is too complex."),
"two-field refUpdates at max limit must pass complexity validation: {:?}",
multi_ref.errors
);
assert!(
multi_ref
.errors
.iter()
.any(|e| e.message == GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
"two-field refUpdates at max limit must reach the resolver: {:?}",
multi_ref.errors
);
// tasks(limit: MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE):
// Single-field selection has child_complexity 1, so the cost is
// 50 + MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE + 1 <= 400.
// It passes validation and reaches the resolver.
let single_task = schema
.execute(format!(
"{{ tasks(limit: {MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE}) {{ id }} }}"
))
.await;
assert!(
!single_task
.errors
.iter()
.any(|e| e.message == "Query is too complex."),
"single-field tasks at the maximum page size must pass complexity validation: {:?}",
single_task.errors
);
assert!(
single_task
.errors
.iter()
.any(|e| e.message == GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
"single-field tasks at the maximum page size must reach the resolver: {:?}",
single_task.errors
);
// Two-field selection has child_complexity 2, so the cost is
// 50 + MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE + 2 <= 400.
// A request at the documented maximum stays reachable with multiple
// fields (the old multiplicative price rejected it at 450); it passes
// validation and reaches the resolver like the single-field case.
let multi_task = schema
.execute(format!(
"{{ tasks(limit: {MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE}) {{ id status }} }}"
))
.await;
assert!(
!multi_task
.errors
.iter()
.any(|e| e.message == "Query is too complex."),
"two-field tasks at the maximum page size must pass complexity validation: {:?}",
multi_task.errors
);
assert!(
multi_task
.errors
.iter()
.any(|e| e.message == GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
"two-field tasks at the maximum page size must reach the resolver: {:?}",
multi_task.errors
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn two_repos_aliases_exceed_the_budget() {
// `repos` is priced as the full page it scans
// (50 + MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE + child), so two `repos { name }`
// aliases cost 2 * 251 = 502 > 400 and the document is rejected before
// any resolver runs. If the price reverts to `50 + child_complexity`
// the aliases cost 2 * 51 = 102, validation passes, and the failure
// mode changes (resolver DB errors on the lazy pool): this test goes
// red on revert.
let schema = production_test_schema();
let response = schema
.execute("{ r0: repos { name } r1: repos { name } }")
.await;
assert_eq!(response.errors.len(), 1, "{:?}", response.errors);
assert_eq!(response.errors[0].message, "Query is too complex.");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn seven_repos_page_aliases_exceed_the_budget() {
// `reposPage` is priced as the full corpus scan
// (50 + MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE + child_complexity), so seven
// `reposPage(limit: 1) { nodes { name } }` aliases cost
// 7 * (50 + 200 + 2) = 1764 > 400 and the document is rejected
// before any resolver runs. Under the previous row-priced formula
// the same aliases cost 7 * (50 + 1 + 2) = 371, validation passes,
// and the failure mode changes (resolver DB errors on the lazy
// pool): this test goes red on revert. Eight aliases are rejected
// under both formulas, so seven is the load-bearing boundary.
let schema = production_test_schema();
let fields = (0..7)
.map(|n| format!("r{n}: reposPage(limit: 1) {{ nodes {{ name }} }}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ");
let response = schema.execute(format!("{{ {fields} }}")).await;
assert_eq!(response.errors.len(), 1, "{:?}", response.errors);
assert_eq!(response.errors[0].message, "Query is too complex.");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn ref_updates_fixed_base_is_charged() {
// The 100 base in the refUpdates complexity formula charges for the
// collector's fixed work (loading the deduped repo set, the
// quarantined set, and the visibility rules, then walking up to 16
// keyset pages) even at limit: 1. Four aliases at limit: 1 cost
// 4 * (100 + 1 + 1) = 408 > 400 and must be rejected. If the base
// disappears, the cost drops to 4 * (1 + 1) = 8 and this test fails.
let schema = production_test_schema();
let fields = (0..4)
.map(|n| format!("r{n}: refUpdates(limit: 1) {{ repo }}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ");
let response = schema.execute(format!("{{ {fields} }}")).await;
assert_eq!(response.errors.len(), 1, "{:?}", response.errors);
assert_eq!(response.errors[0].message, "Query is too complex.");
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
struct Nested;
#[Object]
impl Nested {
async fn child(&self) -> Nested {
Nested
}
async fn value(&self) -> i32 {
1
}
}
struct CountingQuery(Arc<AtomicUsize>);
#[Object]
impl CountingQuery {
async fn nested(&self) -> Nested {
self.0.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
Nested
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn query_depth_limit_accepts_fourteen_and_rejects_fifteen() {
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
let schema = apply_query_limits(Schema::build(
CountingQuery(Arc::clone(&calls)),
EmptyMutation,
EmptySubscription,
))
.finish();
let query_at_depth = |depth: usize| {
let selection = (2..depth).fold("value".to_string(), |selection, _| {
format!("child {{ {selection} }}")
});
format!("{{ nested {{ {selection} }} }}")
};
let accepted = schema.execute(query_at_depth(GRAPHQL_MAX_DEPTH)).await;
assert!(
accepted.errors.is_empty(),
"depth {GRAPHQL_MAX_DEPTH} should be accepted: {:?}",
accepted.errors
);
assert_eq!(calls.swap(0, Ordering::Relaxed), 1);
let rejected = schema.execute(query_at_depth(GRAPHQL_MAX_DEPTH + 1)).await;
assert_eq!(rejected.data, Value::Null);
assert_eq!(rejected.errors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(rejected.errors[0].message, "Query is nested too deep.");
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::Relaxed), 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn production_schema_enforces_depth_limit() {
let schema = production_test_schema();
// Depth 14 is accepted through the production build_schema path.
let of_types_14 = (0..9).fold("name".to_string(), |acc, _| format!("ofType {{ {acc} }}"));
let query_14 =
format!("{{ __schema {{ types {{ fields {{ type {{ {of_types_14} }} }} }} }} }}");
let accepted = schema.execute(&query_14).await;
assert!(accepted.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", accepted.errors);
// Construct an introspection query of depth 15 using __schema.
// 1: __schema
// 2: types
// 3: fields
// 4: type
// 5..14: ofType (10 times)
// 15: name
// Total depth = 15 > GRAPHQL_MAX_DEPTH (14).
let of_types = (0..10).fold("name".to_string(), |acc, _| format!("ofType {{ {acc} }}"));
let query = format!("{{ __schema {{ types {{ fields {{ type {{ {of_types} }} }} }} }} }}");
let rejected = schema.execute(&query).await;
assert_eq!(rejected.data, async_graphql::Value::Null);
assert_eq!(rejected.errors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(rejected.errors[0].message, "Query is nested too deep.");
}
/// Every `.map_err(` in the GraphQL query/mutation resolvers must route
/// through the opaque helpers, or discard the error (`|_|`). Same source-
/// scrape pattern as `api::authz_guard` (#255 review).
+7 -199
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ pub struct MutationRoot;
#[Object]
impl MutationRoot {
#[graphql(complexity = "50 + child_complexity")]
async fn create_task(
&self,
ctx: &Context<'_>,
@@ -80,17 +79,12 @@ impl MutationRoot {
updated_at: now,
deadline: input.deadline,
};
// Return the stored row, not the pre-insert input: create_task
// normalizes the assignee (whitespace-only becomes NULL/open), and a
// response that shows the raw input lies about the reservation.
let stored = db
.create_task(&task)
db.create_task(&task)
.await
.map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
Ok(AgentTaskType::from(stored))
Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
}
#[graphql(complexity = "50 + child_complexity")]
async fn claim_task(
&self,
ctx: &Context<'_>,
@@ -110,25 +104,16 @@ impl MutationRoot {
.claim_task(&id, &assignee_did)
.await
.map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
// Report the stored assignee form like REST, so subscribers see the
// same identity whichever API surface ran the transition.
let by_did = task
.assignee_did
.as_deref()
.map(crate::db::trim_assignee_did)
.unwrap_or(assignee_did.as_str())
.to_string();
let _ = tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
task_id: id,
old_status: "pending".to_string(),
new_status: "claimed".to_string(),
by_did,
by_did: assignee_did,
at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
});
Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
}
#[graphql(complexity = "50 + child_complexity")]
async fn complete_task(
&self,
ctx: &Context<'_>,
@@ -152,24 +137,15 @@ impl MutationRoot {
.await
.map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?
.ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
if !crate::api::did_matches(
caller,
crate::db::trim_assignee_did(existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()),
) {
if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()) {
return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
"only the task assignee can complete it",
));
}
let task = db
.finish_task(&id, "completed", input.result.as_deref(), caller)
.finish_task(&id, "completed", input.result.as_deref())
.await
.map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
let by_did = task
.assignee_did
.as_deref()
.map(crate::db::trim_assignee_did)
.unwrap_or(by_did.as_str())
.to_string();
let _ = tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
task_id: id,
old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
@@ -180,7 +156,6 @@ impl MutationRoot {
Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
}
#[graphql(complexity = "50 + child_complexity")]
async fn fail_task(
&self,
ctx: &Context<'_>,
@@ -203,25 +178,16 @@ impl MutationRoot {
.await
.map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?
.ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
if !crate::api::did_matches(
caller,
crate::db::trim_assignee_did(existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()),
) {
if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()) {
return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
"only the task assignee can fail it",
));
}
let reason = input.reason.unwrap_or_default();
let task = db
.finish_task(&id, "failed", Some(&reason), caller)
.finish_task(&id, "failed", Some(&reason))
.await
.map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
let by_did = task
.assignee_did
.as_deref()
.map(crate::db::trim_assignee_did)
.unwrap_or(by_did.as_str())
.to_string();
let _ = tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
task_id: id,
old_status: "claimed".to_string(),
@@ -607,162 +573,4 @@ mod tests {
"schema text leaked through the gate: {errs}"
);
}
/// Pre-assigned GraphQL claimTask must reject a stranger (no UCAN leak)
/// and admit the reserved assignee.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn claim_task_honors_preassigned_assignee(pool: PgPool) {
let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
let reserved = "did:key:zGQLRESERVEDAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let thief = "did:key:zGQLTHIEFBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
let task = crate::db::AgentTask {
id: "task-gql-reserved".into(),
repo_id: None,
kind: "build".into(),
status: "pending".into(),
delegator_did: "did:key:zGQLDELEGATORCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC".into(),
assignee_did: Some(reserved.into()),
capability: "repo:write".into(),
ucan_token: Some("gql-ucan-secret".into()),
payload: None,
result: None,
created_at: now.clone(),
updated_at: now,
deadline: None,
};
state.db.create_task(&task).await.expect("seed");
let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
let q = |actor: &str| {
format!(
r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "task-gql-reserved", assigneeDid: "{actor}") {{ id status ucanToken }} }}"#
)
};
let resp = schema
.execute(Request::new(q(thief)).data(AuthenticatedDid(thief.into())))
.await;
let errs = errors(&resp);
assert!(
errs.contains("reserved"),
"stranger claim must surface reserved deny distinctly: {errs}"
);
assert!(
!errs.contains("gql-ucan-secret"),
"UCAN must not leak in GraphQL errors: {errs}"
);
if let Ok(data) = resp.data.into_json() {
let s = data.to_string();
assert!(
!s.contains("gql-ucan-secret"),
"UCAN must not leak in GraphQL data on failed claim: {s}"
);
}
// Parity with REST: failed steal must leave the row untouched.
let still = state
.db
.get_task("task-gql-reserved")
.await
.expect("get")
.expect("task exists");
assert_eq!(
still.status, "pending",
"status must stay pending after steal"
);
assert_eq!(
still.assignee_did.as_deref(),
Some(reserved),
"assignee_did must stay reserved after steal"
);
let resp = schema
.execute(Request::new(q(reserved)).data(AuthenticatedDid(reserved.into())))
.await;
assert!(
errors(&resp).is_empty(),
"reserved assignee must claim: {}",
errors(&resp)
);
let data = resp.data.into_json().expect("json data");
assert_eq!(data["claimTask"]["status"], "claimed");
assert_eq!(data["claimTask"]["ucanToken"], "gql-ucan-secret");
}
/// create_task normalizes a whitespace-only assignee to NULL (open task),
/// so the create response must show the stored row, not echo the input: a
/// client trusting the echoed "reservation" would believe a claimable task
/// is reserved. Before the fix the response was built from the pre-insert
/// struct and returned the padded input verbatim.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn create_task_reports_stored_assignee_not_input(pool: PgPool) {
let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
let caller = "did:key:zGQLCREATORAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
let q = format!(
r#"mutation {{ createTask(delegatorDid: "{caller}", input: {{ kind: "build", capability: "repo:write", assigneeDid: " " }}) {{ id assigneeDid }} }}"#
);
let resp = schema
.execute(Request::new(q).data(AuthenticatedDid(caller.into())))
.await;
let data = resp.data.into_json().expect("json data");
assert!(
data["createTask"]["assigneeDid"].is_null(),
"whitespace-only assigneeDid must come back null (stored shape): {data}"
);
}
/// A task seeded with a whitespace-padded assignee must still be
/// completable by that assignee over GraphQL: REST and Db::finish_task
/// trim the stored value before comparing, and the GraphQL gate must do
/// the same or padded reservations finish only through REST.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn graphql_finish_accepts_padded_stored_assignee(pool: PgPool) {
let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
let assignee = "did:key:zGQLPADDEDAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
let task = crate::db::AgentTask {
id: "task-gql-padded".into(),
repo_id: None,
kind: "build".into(),
status: "pending".into(),
delegator_did: "did:key:zGQLDELEGATORDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD".into(),
assignee_did: Some(format!("\t{assignee}\n")),
capability: "repo:write".into(),
ucan_token: None,
payload: None,
result: None,
created_at: now.clone(),
updated_at: now,
deadline: None,
};
state.db.create_task(&task).await.expect("seed");
let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
let claim = format!(
r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "task-gql-padded", assigneeDid: "{assignee}") {{ id status }} }}"#
);
let resp = schema
.execute(Request::new(claim).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
.await;
assert!(
errors(&resp).is_empty(),
"reserved assignee must claim a padded reservation: {}",
errors(&resp)
);
let finish = format!(
r#"mutation {{ completeTask(id: "task-gql-padded", byDid: "{assignee}", input: {{}}) {{ id status }} }}"#
);
let resp = schema
.execute(Request::new(finish).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
.await;
let errs = errors(&resp);
assert!(
errs.is_empty(),
"assignee must complete a padded reservation: {errs}"
);
let data = resp.data.into_json().expect("json data");
assert_eq!(data["completeTask"]["status"], "completed");
}
}
+35 -814
View File
@@ -1,154 +1,57 @@
use async_graphql::{Context, Object, Result};
use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};
use std::sync::Arc;
use crate::api::events::MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES;
use crate::db::{Db, RepoRecord, MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE, MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE};
use crate::db::Db;
use super::types::{AgentTaskType, RefUpdateType, RepoPageType, RepoType};
fn repo_type(repo: RepoRecord) -> RepoType {
RepoType {
name: repo.name,
owner_did: repo.owner_did,
description: repo.description,
default_branch: repo.default_branch,
created_at: repo.created_at.to_rfc3339(),
}
}
fn repo_cursor(repo: &RepoRecord) -> String {
URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(
serde_json::to_vec(&(&repo.owner_did, &repo.name))
.expect("a pair of strings is JSON serializable"),
)
}
fn parse_repo_cursor(cursor: &str) -> Result<(String, String)> {
// A position contains only public response fields, not a database id or
// authority. Every page re-evaluates visibility for the current caller.
if cursor.len() > 4096 {
return Err(async_graphql::Error::new("invalid repository cursor"));
}
let bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.decode(cursor)
.map_err(|_| async_graphql::Error::new("invalid repository cursor"))?;
let position: (String, String) = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes)
.map_err(|_| async_graphql::Error::new("invalid repository cursor"))?;
// PostgreSQL text cannot contain NUL. Reject it as malformed input before
// binding either cursor component, rather than reporting a database error.
if position.0.contains('\0') || position.1.contains('\0') {
return Err(async_graphql::Error::new("invalid repository cursor"));
}
Ok(position)
}
use super::types::{AgentTaskType, RefUpdateType, RepoType};
pub struct QueryRoot;
#[Object]
impl QueryRoot {
// DB-backed roots carry a base cost so aliases consume the request budget
// even when each alias selects only one inexpensive response field.
// `repos` performs the same full corpus scan as a max-size `reposPage`
// (list_visible_repos_page with MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE + 1), so it
// is priced as the full page it is, not as a cheap alias.
#[graphql(complexity = "50 + MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE + child_complexity")]
/// Complete visible repository list, up to the documented maximum number
/// of entries. Larger lists must use reposPage; this field returns an
/// error instead of truncating silently.
async fn repos(&self, ctx: &Context<'_>) -> Result<Vec<RepoType>> {
let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
let repos = db
.list_all_repos_deduped()
.await
.map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
// Apply the same "/" visibility gate the REST/per-repo endpoints use so
// this surface does not enumerate private repos (#97). The caller DID is
// threaded onto the context by optional_signature; absent = anonymous.
let caller = ctx
.data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
.ok()
.map(|d| d.0.as_str());
let mut repos = db
.list_visible_repos_page(caller, None, MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE + 1)
let ids: Vec<String> = repos.iter().map(|r| r.id.clone()).collect();
let rules_by_repo = db
.list_visibility_rules_for_repos(&ids)
.await
.map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
if repos.len() > MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE {
return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(format!(
"repository list exceeds {} entries; use reposPage with limit and after",
MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE
)));
}
// Preserve the legacy activity ordering for complete, small lists.
repos.sort_by_key(|repo| std::cmp::Reverse(repo.updated_at));
Ok(repos.into_iter().map(repo_type).collect())
Ok(repos
.into_iter()
.filter(|r| {
let rules = rules_by_repo.get(&r.id).map(Vec::as_slice).unwrap_or(&[]);
crate::visibility::listable_at_root(rules, r.is_public, &r.owner_did, caller)
})
.map(|r| RepoType {
name: r.name,
owner_did: r.owner_did,
description: r.description,
default_branch: r.default_branch,
created_at: r.created_at.to_rfc3339(),
})
.collect())
}
/// Bounded visible repositories ordered by owner and name. Continue with
/// endCursor while hasNextPage is true. Pages are not a database snapshot.
// Every page sorts the full deduplicated corpus under COLLATE "C"
// (list_visible_repos_page documents the accepted O(total repos) bound),
// so the price charges the scan, not the emitted rows: a limit:1 page
// costs the same as a max-size page, the way `repos` is priced.
#[graphql(complexity = "50 + MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE + child_complexity")]
async fn repos_page(
&self,
ctx: &Context<'_>,
#[graphql(
default = 50,
desc = "Page size from 1 to the documented maximum; other values are rejected."
)]
limit: i64,
after: Option<String>,
) -> Result<RepoPageType> {
if !(1..=MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE as i64).contains(&limit) {
return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(format!(
"limit must be between 1 and {}",
MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE
)));
}
let after = after.as_deref().map(parse_repo_cursor).transpose()?;
let caller = ctx
.data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
.ok()
.map(|d| d.0.as_str());
let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
let mut repos = db
.list_visible_repos_page(
caller,
after
.as_ref()
.map(|(owner, name)| (owner.as_str(), name.as_str())),
limit as usize + 1,
)
.await
.map_err(crate::graphql::graphql_db_err)?;
let has_next_page = repos.len() > limit as usize;
repos.truncate(limit as usize);
let end_cursor = repos.last().map(repo_cursor);
Ok(RepoPageType {
nodes: repos.into_iter().map(repo_type).collect(),
has_next_page,
end_cursor,
})
}
// Complexity is additive with a base reflecting the collector's fixed scan:
// every request loads the full deduped repo set, the quarantined set, and
// the visibility rules, then walks up to max(limit, 2048) event rows past
// withheld ones, regardless of `limit`. A multiplicative price both
// undercharged limit:1 (51 for that fixed work) and made a request at the
// documented maximum unreachable (two fields at max limit cost 450 > 400).
//
// Decision on the collector floor (review #465, 3rd round): the up-to-2048
// walk is bounded constant overhead that does not scale with `limit`, so
// it is priced in the fixed base, not the limit term; the limit term
// prices only the emitted rows. Pricing the walk at face value in the base
// would put every refUpdates query over the 400 budget and make the field
// unusable, so the base prices that fixed scan as a lump sum instead.
#[graphql(
complexity = "100 + (limit.clamp(0, MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES) as usize) + child_complexity"
)]
async fn ref_updates(
&self,
ctx: &Context<'_>,
repo: Option<String>,
#[graphql(
default = 20,
desc = "Requests above the documented maximum return the newest rows up to that maximum (no continuation cursor)."
desc = "Max 200; larger requests return the newest 200 rows (no continuation cursor)."
)]
limit: i64,
) -> Result<Vec<RefUpdateType>> {
@@ -202,14 +105,6 @@ impl QueryRoot {
Ok(resolved)
}
// Complexity is additive: list_tasks is a single LIMIT-bounded query whose
// cost does not scale with the selected fields, so the price is the base
// plus the clamped limit plus the child fields. A multiplicative price
// made a request at the documented maximum unreachable (two fields at max
// limit cost 450 > 400).
#[graphql(
complexity = "50 + (limit.clamp(0, MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE) as usize) + child_complexity"
)]
async fn tasks(
&self,
ctx: &Context<'_>,
@@ -217,7 +112,7 @@ impl QueryRoot {
assignee_did: Option<String>,
#[graphql(
default = 50,
desc = "Requests above the documented maximum are clamped to it (no error). Negative values clamp to 0."
desc = "Max 200; larger requests are clamped to 200 (no error). Negative values clamp to 0."
)]
limit: i64,
) -> Result<Vec<AgentTaskType>> {
@@ -225,7 +120,7 @@ impl QueryRoot {
// Clamp before SQL: a negative LIMIT is a client fault that Postgres
// rejects with 2201W, which would otherwise trip the opaque DB path
// and write an error-level log on every probe (#250 review).
let limit = limit.clamp(0, MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE);
let limit = limit.clamp(0, 200);
let tasks = db
.list_tasks(status.as_deref(), assignee_did.as_deref(), limit)
.await
@@ -233,7 +128,6 @@ impl QueryRoot {
Ok(tasks.into_iter().map(AgentTaskType::from).collect())
}
#[graphql(complexity = "50 + child_complexity")]
async fn task(&self, ctx: &Context<'_>, id: String) -> Result<Option<AgentTaskType>> {
let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
let t = db
@@ -247,642 +141,12 @@ impl QueryRoot {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::db::{Db, ReceivedRefUpdate, RepoRecord};
use base64::Engine;
use chrono::Utc;
use sqlx::PgPool;
use std::sync::Arc;
const OWNER: &str = "did:key:z6MkOwner";
#[sqlx::test]
async fn repos_legacy_rejects_overflow_and_pages_reach_every_visible_repo(pool: PgPool) {
let db = db(pool).await;
let total = crate::db::MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE + 5;
for index in 0..total {
let name = format!("repo-{index:03}");
db.create_repo(&repo(&name, OWNER, &name, true))
.await
.unwrap();
}
// The SQL helper itself must bound materialization, even for a caller
// accidentally requesting an unlimited page.
assert_eq!(
db.list_visible_repos_page(None, None, usize::MAX)
.await
.unwrap()
.len(),
crate::db::MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE + 1
);
let schema = schema(db);
let legacy = anon(&schema, "{ repos { name } }").await;
assert_eq!(legacy.errors.len(), 1);
assert!(legacy.errors[0].message.contains("use reposPage"));
assert_eq!(legacy.data, async_graphql::Value::Null);
let mut cursor = None;
let mut names = Vec::new();
loop {
let response = schema.execute(
async_graphql::Request::new(
"query($after: String) { reposPage(limit: 50, after: $after) { nodes { name } hasNextPage endCursor } }",
).variables(async_graphql::Variables::from_json(serde_json::json!({"after": cursor}))),
).await;
assert!(response.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", response.errors);
let json = response.data.into_json().unwrap();
let page = &json["reposPage"];
let rows = page["nodes"].as_array().unwrap();
assert!(rows.len() <= 50);
names.extend(
rows.iter()
.map(|row| row["name"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned()),
);
if !page["hasNextPage"].as_bool().unwrap() {
break;
}
let next = page["endCursor"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned();
assert_ne!(cursor.as_ref(), Some(&next));
cursor = Some(next);
assert!(names.len() <= crate::db::MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE);
}
assert_eq!(
names,
(0..total)
.map(|index| format!("repo-{index:03}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
);
}
#[sqlx::test]
async fn repos_legacy_accepts_exactly_the_visible_bound(pool: PgPool) {
let db = db(pool).await;
let base_time = Utc::now();
let total = crate::db::MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE;
for index in 0..total {
let name = format!("repo-{index:03}");
let mut r = repo(&name, OWNER, &name, true);
// Anti-correlate updated_at with name, creation order, and index
// so only ordering by updated_at DESC can satisfy the expectation.
let offset = (index * 37) % total;
r.updated_at = base_time + chrono::Duration::seconds(offset as i64);
db.create_repo(&r).await.unwrap();
}
db.create_repo(&repo("hidden", OWNER, "hidden", false))
.await
.unwrap();
let response = anon(&schema(db), "{ repos { name } }").await;
assert!(response.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", response.errors);
let repos = response.data.into_json().unwrap()["repos"]
.as_array()
.unwrap()
.clone();
assert_eq!(repos.len(), total);
let names: Vec<_> = repos.iter().filter_map(|r| r["name"].as_str()).collect();
assert!(
!names.contains(&"hidden"),
"hidden repo must be excluded from legacy repos response"
);
let mut expected_indices = (0..total).collect::<Vec<_>>();
expected_indices.sort_by_key(|&idx| std::cmp::Reverse((idx * 37) % total));
let expected_names: Vec<String> = expected_indices
.into_iter()
.map(|index| format!("repo-{index:03}"))
.collect();
assert_eq!(
names,
expected_names
.iter()
.map(|s| s.as_str())
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
"legacy repos must retain activity ordering (most recently updated first)"
);
}
#[sqlx::test]
async fn repos_page_pagination_crosses_owner_boundary(pool: PgPool) {
let db = db(pool).await;
let owner1 = "did:key:z6MkaOwner1";
let owner2 = "did:key:z6MkbOwner2";
let earlier_owner = "did:web:example.com";
// This owner sorts first only after did:key normalization. Its name
// sorts past the first cursor, so an unqualified OR name predicate
// would incorrectly serve it again on the next page.
//
// Rows are inserted out of order and not in reverse asserted order.
// Assigned IDs do not track name order, and owner2 contains both
// "B-repo" and "a-repo" whose byte order (B < a) differs from their
// case-folded order (a < b), ensuring lower(d.name) cannot satisfy
// the keyset query. Sized to 6 entries so the last page is full-sized
// (limit 2), proving hasNextPage distinguishes a full terminal page.
db.create_repo(&repo("r5", owner2, "c-repo", true))
.await
.unwrap();
db.create_repo(&repo("r9", earlier_owner, "zz-repo", true))
.await
.unwrap();
db.create_repo(&repo("r3", owner2, "B-repo", true))
.await
.unwrap();
db.create_repo(&repo("r8", owner1, "z-repo", true))
.await
.unwrap();
db.create_repo(&repo("r2", owner1, "b-repo", true))
.await
.unwrap();
db.create_repo(&repo("r1", owner2, "a-repo", true))
.await
.unwrap();
let schema = schema(db);
let page1_resp = anon(
&schema,
"{ reposPage(limit: 2) { nodes { name ownerDid } hasNextPage endCursor } }",
)
.await;
assert!(page1_resp.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", page1_resp.errors);
let p1 = page1_resp.data.into_json().unwrap()["reposPage"].clone();
assert_eq!(p1["hasNextPage"], true);
assert_eq!(
p1["nodes"],
serde_json::json!([
{"name": "zz-repo", "ownerDid": earlier_owner},
{"name": "b-repo", "ownerDid": owner1},
])
);
let cursor = p1["endCursor"].as_str().unwrap();
let page2_query = format!(
"{{ reposPage(limit: 2, after: \"{cursor}\") {{ nodes {{ name ownerDid }} hasNextPage endCursor }} }}"
);
let page2_resp = anon(&schema, &page2_query).await;
assert!(page2_resp.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", page2_resp.errors);
let p2 = page2_resp.data.into_json().unwrap()["reposPage"].clone();
assert_eq!(p2["hasNextPage"], true);
assert_eq!(
p2["nodes"],
serde_json::json!([
{"name": "z-repo", "ownerDid": owner1},
{"name": "B-repo", "ownerDid": owner2},
])
);
let cursor = p2["endCursor"].as_str().unwrap();
let page3_query = format!(
"{{ reposPage(limit: 2, after: \"{cursor}\") {{ nodes {{ name ownerDid }} hasNextPage endCursor }} }}"
);
let page3_resp = anon(&schema, &page3_query).await;
assert!(page3_resp.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", page3_resp.errors);
let p3 = page3_resp.data.into_json().unwrap()["reposPage"].clone();
assert_eq!(p3["hasNextPage"], false);
assert_eq!(
p3["nodes"],
serde_json::json!([
{"name": "a-repo", "ownerDid": owner2},
{"name": "c-repo", "ownerDid": owner2},
])
);
}
#[sqlx::test]
async fn repos_page_at_documented_maximum_distinguishes_terminal_page(pool: PgPool) {
let db = db(pool).await;
let total = crate::db::MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE;
for index in 0..total {
let name = format!("repo-{index:03}");
db.create_repo(&repo(&name, OWNER, &name, true))
.await
.unwrap();
}
let schema = schema(db.clone());
let query =
format!("{{ reposPage(limit: {total}) {{ nodes {{ name }} hasNextPage endCursor }} }}");
let resp200 = anon(&schema, &query).await;
assert!(resp200.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", resp200.errors);
let p200 = resp200.data.into_json().unwrap()["reposPage"].clone();
assert_eq!(p200["hasNextPage"], false);
let nodes200 = p200["nodes"].as_array().unwrap().clone();
assert_eq!(nodes200.len(), total);
// Adding row 201 keeps page 1 content identical while flipping hasNextPage to true.
let name201 = format!("repo-{total:03}");
db.create_repo(&repo(&name201, OWNER, &name201, true))
.await
.unwrap();
let resp201 = anon(&schema, &query).await;
assert!(resp201.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", resp201.errors);
let p201 = resp201.data.into_json().unwrap()["reposPage"].clone();
assert_eq!(p201["hasNextPage"], true);
assert_eq!(p201["nodes"], p200["nodes"]);
assert_eq!(p201["endCursor"], p200["endCursor"]);
}
#[sqlx::test]
async fn repos_page_visibility_matches_the_shared_gate(pool: PgPool) {
use crate::db::VisibilityMode;
let db = db(pool).await;
let reader = "did:key:zReader";
for (id, public) in [
("open", true),
("private", false),
("root-deny", true),
("root-reader", false),
("subtree", true),
("root-tie", true),
("odd-star", true),
("malformed-readers", true),
("non-array-readers", true),
("non-string-reader", true),
("quarantined", true),
] {
db.create_repo(&repo(id, OWNER, id, public)).await.unwrap();
}
// Canonical and mirror copies must still collapse before pagination.
db.create_repo(&repo("z6MkOwner/open", "z6MkOwner", "open", true))
.await
.unwrap();
db.create_repo(&repo(
"other-method",
"did:web:z6MkOwner",
"other-method",
false,
))
.await
.unwrap();
db.set_repo_quarantine("quarantined", true).await.unwrap();
for (id, glob, readers) in [
("root-deny", "/", vec![]),
("root-reader", "/**", vec![reader.to_owned()]),
("subtree", "/secret/**", vec![]),
("root-tie", "/", vec![reader.to_owned()]),
("root-tie", "/**", vec![]),
("odd-star", "/*", vec![]),
("malformed-readers", "/", vec![]),
("non-array-readers", "/", vec![]),
("non-string-reader", "/", vec![]),
] {
db.set_visibility_rule(id, glob, VisibilityMode::B, &readers, OWNER)
.await
.unwrap();
}
// The typed setter cannot create malformed JSON, but existing TEXT rows
// can contain it. Such a rule must deny this repo, not abort the page.
// All three deny arms of the reader_dids predicate are pinned here:
// (a) invalid JSON, (b) valid JSON that is not an array, (c) an array
// containing a non-string member. The Rust gate parses reader_dids as
// Vec<String> with unwrap_or_default(), so (b) and (c) also fail to
// parse and deny; the SQL CASE must agree on every shape.
let rows = sqlx::query("UPDATE visibility_rules SET reader_dids = $1 WHERE repo_id = $2")
.bind("not JSON")
.bind("malformed-readers")
.execute(db.pool())
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(rows.rows_affected(), 1);
let rows = sqlx::query("UPDATE visibility_rules SET reader_dids = $1 WHERE repo_id = $2")
.bind("\"just-a-string\"")
.bind("non-array-readers")
.execute(db.pool())
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(rows.rows_affected(), 1);
// The named reader is listed, but the non-string member poisons the
// whole list: both sides must still deny them.
let rows = sqlx::query("UPDATE visibility_rules SET reader_dids = $1 WHERE repo_id = $2")
.bind("[\"did:key:zReader\", 42]")
.bind("non-string-reader")
.execute(db.pool())
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(rows.rows_affected(), 1);
let all = db.list_all_repos_deduped().await.unwrap();
for caller in [
None,
Some(OWNER),
Some("z6MkOwner"),
Some(reader),
Some("zReader"),
Some("did:web:z6MkOwner"),
] {
let mut expected = Vec::new();
for record in &all {
let rules = db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await.unwrap();
if crate::visibility::listable_at_root(
&rules,
record.is_public,
&record.owner_did,
caller,
) {
expected.push(record.id.clone());
}
}
expected.sort();
let mut actual = db
.list_visible_repos_page(caller, None, usize::MAX)
.await
.unwrap()
.into_iter()
.map(|record| record.id)
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
actual.sort();
assert_eq!(actual, expected, "caller {caller:?}");
}
let schema = schema(db);
for caller in [None, Some("did:key:zUnauthorized")] {
let query = "{ repos { name } }";
let response = match caller {
None => anon(&schema, query).await,
Some(caller) => authed(&schema, query, caller).await,
};
assert!(response.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", response.errors);
let mut names: Vec<String> = response.data.into_json().unwrap()["repos"]
.as_array()
.unwrap()
.iter()
.map(|repo| repo["name"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned())
.collect();
names.sort();
assert_eq!(names, ["odd-star", "open", "subtree"]);
}
let query = "{ reposPage(limit: 1) { nodes { name ownerDid } hasNextPage endCursor } }";
let response = anon(&schema, query).await;
assert!(response.errors.is_empty(), "{:?}", response.errors);
let json = response.data.into_json().unwrap();
let page = &json["reposPage"];
assert_eq!(
page["nodes"],
serde_json::json!([{"name": "odd-star", "ownerDid": OWNER}])
);
assert_eq!(page["hasNextPage"], true);
let cursor = super::parse_repo_cursor(page["endCursor"].as_str().unwrap()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(cursor, (OWNER.to_owned(), "odd-star".to_owned()));
assert!(!json.to_string().contains("private"));
assert!(!json.to_string().contains("quarantined"));
// Route-level check with unauthorized authenticated caller:
// Excludes private, quarantined, and root-deny repos, matching anonymous behavior.
let all_query = "{ reposPage(limit: 50) { nodes { name } hasNextPage } }";
let unauth_response = authed(&schema, all_query, "did:key:zUnauthorized").await;
assert!(
unauth_response.errors.is_empty(),
"{:?}",
unauth_response.errors
);
let unauth_json = unauth_response.data.into_json().unwrap();
let unauth_names: Vec<&str> = unauth_json["reposPage"]["nodes"]
.as_array()
.unwrap()
.iter()
.filter_map(|n| n["name"].as_str())
.collect();
assert_eq!(unauth_names, vec!["odd-star", "open", "subtree"]);
let unauth_str = unauth_json.to_string();
assert!(!unauth_str.contains("private"));
assert!(!unauth_str.contains("quarantined"));
assert!(!unauth_str.contains("root-deny"));
assert!(!unauth_str.contains("root-reader"));
assert!(!unauth_str.contains("root-tie"));
// Reader caller gets root-reader and root-tie, but still excludes private, quarantined, root-deny.
let reader_response = authed(&schema, all_query, reader).await;
assert!(
reader_response.errors.is_empty(),
"{:?}",
reader_response.errors
);
let reader_json = reader_response.data.into_json().unwrap();
let reader_names: Vec<&str> = reader_json["reposPage"]["nodes"]
.as_array()
.unwrap()
.iter()
.filter_map(|n| n["name"].as_str())
.collect();
assert_eq!(
reader_names,
vec!["odd-star", "open", "root-reader", "subtree"]
);
let reader_str = reader_json.to_string();
assert!(!reader_str.contains("private"));
assert!(!reader_str.contains("quarantined"));
assert!(!reader_str.contains("root-deny"));
assert!(!reader_str.contains("root-tie"));
}
#[sqlx::test]
async fn repos_page_rechecks_cursor_authority_and_exact_boundary(pool: PgPool) {
let db = db(pool).await;
let visible = repo("visible", OWNER, "a-visible", true);
db.create_repo(&visible).await.unwrap();
db.create_repo(&repo("hidden", OWNER, "z-private", false))
.await
.unwrap();
let schema = schema(db);
let first = anon(
&schema,
"{ reposPage(limit: 1) { nodes { name } hasNextPage endCursor } }",
)
.await;
assert!(first.errors.is_empty());
let first = first.data.into_json().unwrap();
assert_eq!(first["reposPage"]["hasNextPage"], false);
let query = format!(
"{{ reposPage(limit: 1, after: \"{}\") {{ nodes {{ name }} hasNextPage endCursor }} }}",
super::repo_cursor(&visible)
);
let owner = authed(&schema, &query, OWNER).await;
assert!(owner.errors.is_empty());
assert_eq!(
owner.data.into_json().unwrap()["reposPage"]["nodes"][0]["name"],
"z-private"
);
let anon = anon(&schema, &query).await;
assert!(anon.errors.is_empty());
assert_eq!(
anon.data.into_json().unwrap()["reposPage"],
serde_json::json!({
"nodes": [], "hasNextPage": false, "endCursor": null
})
);
let unauth = authed(&schema, &query, "did:key:zUnauthorized").await;
assert!(unauth.errors.is_empty());
assert_eq!(
unauth.data.into_json().unwrap()["reposPage"],
serde_json::json!({
"nodes": [], "hasNextPage": false, "endCursor": null
})
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn repos_page_rejects_nul_cursors_before_database_access() {
let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
.connect_lazy("postgres://localhost/unused")
.unwrap();
let schema = schema(Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool)));
for position in [("did:key:zOwner\0", "repo"), ("did:key:zOwner", "repo\0")] {
let cursor = super::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(serde_json::to_vec(&position).unwrap());
let query = format!("{{ reposPage(after: \"{cursor}\") {{ hasNextPage }} }}");
let response =
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1), anon(&schema, &query))
.await
.expect("invalid cursors must be rejected without accessing the database");
assert_eq!(response.errors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(response.errors[0].message, "invalid repository cursor");
assert_eq!(response.data, async_graphql::Value::Null);
}
let position = ("did:key:zOwner", "repo");
let cursor = super::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(serde_json::to_vec(&position).unwrap());
assert_eq!(
super::parse_repo_cursor(&cursor).unwrap(),
(position.0.to_owned(), position.1.to_owned())
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn repos_page_rejects_invalid_inputs_before_database_access() {
let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
.connect_lazy("postgres://localhost/unused")
.unwrap();
let schema = schema(Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool)));
let over_max = crate::db::MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE + 1;
let expected_limit_message = format!(
"limit must be between 1 and {}",
crate::db::MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE
);
// Each input pins its own rejection message: the loop must not accept
// either message for every query, or a misattributed message (e.g. the
// limit arm returning "invalid repository cursor") stays invisible.
for (query, expected_message) in [
(
"{ reposPage(limit: 0) { hasNextPage } }".to_owned(),
expected_limit_message.clone(),
),
(
"{ reposPage(limit: -1) { hasNextPage } }".to_owned(),
expected_limit_message.clone(),
),
(
format!("{{ reposPage(limit: {over_max}) {{ hasNextPage }} }}"),
expected_limit_message.clone(),
),
(
"{ reposPage(after: \"invalid!\") { hasNextPage } }".to_owned(),
"invalid repository cursor".to_owned(),
),
] {
let response =
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1), anon(&schema, &query))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(response.errors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(
response.errors[0].message, expected_message,
"wrong rejection message for query: {query}"
);
}
// Valid base64 and valid cursor JSON: only the length guard rejects it.
let oversized = super::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.encode(serde_json::to_vec(&("did:key:reader", "a".repeat(3100))).unwrap());
assert!(oversized.len() > 4096);
assert!(serde_json::from_slice::<(String, String)>(
&super::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(&oversized).unwrap()
)
.is_ok());
assert!(super::parse_repo_cursor(&oversized).is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn parse_repo_cursor_rejects_wrong_shape_json() {
// Valid base64 and valid JSON, but not a (String, String) pair: the
// wrong-shape arm must report "invalid repository cursor", exactly,
// before any database access.
let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
.connect_lazy("postgres://localhost/unused")
.unwrap();
let schema = schema(Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool)));
for payload in [
serde_json::json!(["only-one"]),
serde_json::json!(["a", "b", "c"]),
serde_json::json!({"owner": "x", "name": "y"}),
serde_json::json!(42),
serde_json::json!(["a", 1]),
] {
let cursor = super::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(serde_json::to_vec(&payload).unwrap());
let err = super::parse_repo_cursor(&cursor).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err.message, "invalid repository cursor");
let query = format!("{{ reposPage(after: \"{cursor}\") {{ hasNextPage }} }}");
let response =
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1), anon(&schema, &query))
.await
.expect("wrong-shape cursors must be rejected without accessing the database");
assert_eq!(response.errors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(response.errors[0].message, "invalid repository cursor");
assert_eq!(response.data, async_graphql::Value::Null);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn longest_repo_name_cursor_round_trips() {
// #465 4th round: a cursor the server emits must always parse back.
// Repo names are bounded at the create/fork/mirror write paths, so the
// longest admissible name must produce a cursor under the 4096-byte
// parse limit.
let name = "a".repeat(crate::db::MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN);
let record = repo("long", OWNER, &name, true);
let cursor = super::repo_cursor(&record);
assert!(
cursor.len() <= 4096,
"emitted cursor must stay under the parse limit: {}",
cursor.len()
);
assert_eq!(
super::parse_repo_cursor(&cursor).unwrap(),
(OWNER.to_owned(), name)
);
}
/// A negative refUpdates(limit) must be accepted and clamped to zero rows,
/// like tasks(limit: -1): the complexity formula's `limit.clamp(0, ...)`
/// prices it at the floor and the shared collector returns before any
/// database access. Mirrors tasks_negative_limit_clamped.
#[tokio::test]
async fn ref_updates_negative_limit_clamped() {
let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
.connect_lazy("postgres://localhost/unused")
.unwrap();
let schema = schema(Arc::new(Db::for_testing(pool)));
let resp = tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(1),
anon(&schema, "{ refUpdates(limit: -1) { repo } }"),
)
.await
.expect("negative limit must clamp without accessing the database");
assert!(
resp.errors.is_empty(),
"negative limit must clamp, not fail: {:?}",
resp.errors
);
assert_eq!(count(&resp), 0);
}
/// The mirror write path binds peer-supplied names verbatim, so it must
/// enforce the same bound as the local write paths: an overlong peer name
/// would otherwise make reposPage emit an unparseable cursor. The
/// rejection happens before any database access.
#[tokio::test]
async fn mirror_repo_rejects_overlong_name() {
let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
.connect_lazy("postgres://localhost/unused")
.unwrap();
let db = Db::for_testing(pool);
let name = "b".repeat(crate::db::MAX_REPO_NAME_LEN + 1);
let err = db
.upsert_mirror_repo("z6MkLong", &name, "/tmp/long", None, false)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(
err.to_string().contains("exceeds"),
"unexpected error: {err}"
);
}
async fn db(pool: PgPool) -> Arc<Db> {
let db = Db::for_testing(pool);
db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
@@ -1211,13 +475,12 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(count_tasks(&resp), 0);
}
/// #255: ceiling of the tasks(limit) clamp must be held (schema promises the
/// documented maximum).
/// #255: ceiling of the tasks(limit) clamp must be held (schema promises Max 200).
#[sqlx::test]
async fn tasks_limit_ceiling_clamped_to_max(pool: PgPool) {
async fn tasks_limit_ceiling_clamped_to_200(pool: PgPool) {
let db = db(pool).await;
let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
for i in 0..crate::db::MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE + 1 {
for i in 0..201 {
db.create_task(&crate::db::AgentTask {
id: format!("task-ceil-{i}"),
repo_id: None,
@@ -1238,49 +501,7 @@ mod tests {
}
let schema = schema(db);
let resp = anon(&schema, "{ tasks(limit: 5000) { id } }").await;
assert_eq!(
count_tasks(&resp),
crate::db::MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE as usize,
"limit above the maximum must clamp to MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE"
);
}
/// A limit above MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES must reach the resolver clamped,
/// not be rejected: the complexity formula clamps the priced limit (so the
/// document passes validation) and the shared collector clamps the rows
/// (so at most MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES come back). Removing the formula
/// clamp prices the raw limit and rejects the document; removing the
/// collector clamp returns unbounded rows. Mirrors
/// tasks_limit_ceiling_clamped_to_max.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn ref_updates_limit_ceiling_clamped_to_max(pool: PgPool) {
use crate::api::events::MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES;
let db = db(pool).await;
db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", true))
.await
.unwrap();
let total = MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES as usize + 1;
for i in 0..total {
let mut row = ref_row(&format!("ceil{i}"), "z6MkOwner/widget");
row.timestamp = format!("2026-07-01T10:{:02}:{:02}+00:00", i / 60, i % 60);
db.insert_ref_update(&row).await.unwrap();
}
let schema = schema(db);
let query = format!(
"{{ refUpdates(limit: {}) {{ repo }} }}",
MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES + 4800
);
let resp = anon(&schema, &query).await;
assert!(
resp.errors.is_empty(),
"limit above the maximum must clamp, not fail: {:?}",
resp.errors
);
assert_eq!(
count(&resp),
MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES as usize,
"limit above the maximum must clamp to MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES"
);
assert_eq!(count_tasks(&resp), 200, "limit above 200 must clamp to 200");
}
fn count_tasks(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> usize {
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ impl SubscriptionRoot {
/// `if announce` block, `api/repos.rs`). This is a single-point invariant —
/// any new sender to `ref_update_tx` MUST be `announce`-gated, or private-repo
/// ref metadata leaks here to unauthenticated subscribers (#112/#114 class).
#[graphql(complexity = "50 + child_complexity")]
async fn ref_updates(
&self,
ctx: &Context<'_>,
@@ -47,7 +46,6 @@ impl SubscriptionRoot {
})
}
#[graphql(complexity = "50 + child_complexity")]
async fn task_events(
&self,
ctx: &Context<'_>,
-8
View File
@@ -11,14 +11,6 @@ pub struct RepoType {
pub created_at: String,
}
#[derive(SimpleObject)]
pub struct RepoPageType {
pub nodes: Vec<RepoType>,
pub has_next_page: bool,
/// Position after the last returned visible repository; null for an empty page.
pub end_cursor: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(SimpleObject, Clone)]
pub struct AgentTaskType {
pub id: String,
-1
View File
@@ -2638,7 +2638,6 @@ mod tests {
/// type probe carries its oid on stdin rather than in argv, so an oid appears in
/// the log only once an object has already got past its probe, and a healthy
/// object costs two invocations to a faulting one's one.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn objects_attempted(log: &std::path::Path) -> usize {
std::fs::read_to_string(log)
.unwrap_or_default()
+2 -13
View File
@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ use state::AppState;
struct DegradedState {
node_did: String,
db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>,
web_url: Option<String>,
}
/// Two independent counters with no cross-field invariant — atomics, not a
@@ -160,7 +159,6 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
degraded_listener,
node_did.to_string(),
Arc::clone(&db_startup),
config.web_url.clone(),
db_ready_rx,
shutdown_tx.subscribe(),
));
@@ -874,12 +872,11 @@ async fn run_degraded_server(
listener: TcpListener,
node_did: String,
db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>,
web_url: Option<String>,
mut db_ready_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
mut shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
) -> Result<()> {
let addr = listener.local_addr().ok();
let router = build_degraded_router(node_did, db_startup, web_url);
let router = build_degraded_router(node_did, db_startup);
info!(?addr, "degraded HTTP server ready");
axum::serve(listener, router)
@@ -896,15 +893,10 @@ async fn run_degraded_server(
Ok(())
}
fn build_degraded_router(
node_did: String,
db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>,
web_url: Option<String>,
) -> Router {
fn build_degraded_router(node_did: String, db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>) -> Router {
let state = DegradedState {
node_did,
db_startup,
web_url,
};
// Everything answers 503 with the same body — including /health and
// /ready, so peer readiness probes and uptime monitors correctly see a
@@ -936,9 +928,6 @@ async fn degraded_node_info(State(state): State<DegradedState>) -> impl IntoResp
obj.insert("name".into(), "gitlawb-node".into());
obj.insert("version".into(), env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").into());
obj.insert("did".into(), state.node_did.clone().into());
if let Some(web_url) = &state.web_url {
obj.insert("web_url".into(), web_url.clone().into());
}
}
(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, Json(body))
}
-1
View File
@@ -912,7 +912,6 @@ mod tests {
/// probe carries its oid on stdin rather than in argv, so an oid appears in the log only
/// once an object has already got past its probe, and a healthy object costs two
/// invocations to a faulting one's one.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn objects_attempted(log: &std::path::Path) -> usize {
std::fs::read_to_string(log)
.unwrap_or_default()
+2 -6
View File
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ async fn ready(State(state): State<AppState>) -> axum::response::Response {
async fn node_info(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
let p2p_peer_id = state.p2p.as_ref().map(|h| h.local_peer_id.to_string());
let mut body = json!({
Json(json!({
"name": "gitlawb-node",
"version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
"did": state.node_did.to_string(),
@@ -628,11 +628,7 @@ async fn node_info(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
"auth": "http-signature-rfc9421",
"identity": "ed25519",
"p2p_peer_id": p2p_peer_id,
});
if let Some(web_url) = &state.config.web_url {
body["web_url"] = json!(web_url);
}
Json(body)
}))
}
pub(crate) async fn stats(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
+4 -20
View File
@@ -1330,18 +1330,6 @@ mod tests {
.await;
}
/// Use a rooted path without a Windows drive prefix in the remote fixture.
/// The destination still resolves on the temp directory's current drive,
/// while the remote's relative path contains no illegal colon component.
fn absolute_slug_path(path: &Path) -> String {
assert!(path.is_absolute());
path.components()
.filter(|part| !matches!(part, std::path::Component::Prefix(_)))
.collect::<std::path::PathBuf>()
.to_string_lossy()
.replace('\\', "/")
}
#[sqlx::test]
async fn process_batch_rejects_slug_escaping_repos_dir(pool: PgPool) {
// The verified escape from #272: `PathBuf::join` discards everything
@@ -1357,13 +1345,12 @@ mod tests {
// fails on but leaves the parent it created, so assert on both.
let outside = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let escape_dir = outside.path().join("nest");
let escape_path = absolute_slug_path(&escape_dir);
let slug = format!("a/{escape_path}/escape");
let slug = format!("a/{}/escape", escape_dir.display());
let escape_target = escape_dir.join("escape.git");
// Serve the composed URL for real, so a run without the guard genuinely
// clones outside the root rather than merely failing at git.
let rel = format!("a{escape_path}/escape");
let rel = format!("a{}/escape", escape_dir.display());
let (_remote, peer_url) = rooted_remote(&[&rel]);
let did = "did:key:z6MkAttacker";
@@ -1483,7 +1470,6 @@ mod tests {
// ── canonical containment before the git call (issue #272) ───────────────
/// Every ref in `repo`, as one string, for a before/after comparison.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn refs_of(repo: &Path) -> String {
let out = Command::new("git")
.args(["-C", repo.to_str().unwrap(), "for-each-ref"])
@@ -1816,7 +1802,6 @@ mod tests {
/// starvation tests is fixed rather than dependent on how fast the loop
/// runs. Two rows enqueued in the same microsecond would otherwise order
/// arbitrarily.
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn enqueue_at(db: &Db, pool: &PgPool, repo: &str, did: &str, enqueued_at: &str) {
enqueue(db, repo, did).await;
sqlx::query("UPDATE sync_queue SET enqueued_at = $1 WHERE repo = $2")
@@ -2010,8 +1995,7 @@ mod tests {
let outside = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let escape_dir = outside.path().join("nest");
let escape_path = absolute_slug_path(&escape_dir);
let slug = format!("a/{escape_path}/gitlawb-probe");
let slug = format!("a/{}/gitlawb-probe", escape_dir.display());
let escape_target = escape_dir.join("gitlawb-probe.git");
// Two things this fixture must get right or the test is green for the
@@ -2022,7 +2006,7 @@ mod tests {
// run without the guard genuinely clones outside the root instead of
// just failing at git. Db::upsert_peer cannot seed this row: it gates on
// is_public_http_url, which rejects file://.
let rel = format!("a{escape_path}/gitlawb-probe");
let rel = format!("a{}/gitlawb-probe", escape_dir.display());
let (_remote, peer_url) = rooted_remote(&[&rel]);
let did = "did:key:z6MkAttacker";
seed_local_peer(&pool, did, &peer_url).await;
-75
View File
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
//! Native Git fixtures shared by timing tests on Unix and Windows.
use std::ops::Deref;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::OnceLock;
/// The fixture delays or hangs in its own process, so the production watchdog
/// can terminate it without depending on a shell or descendant process support.
pub(super) enum Behavior<'a> {
Delay(u64),
Hang,
HangOid(&'a str),
HangRepo(&'a str),
LogTypes(&'a Path),
}
pub(super) struct GitShim {
_directory: tempfile::TempDir,
executable: PathBuf,
}
impl Deref for GitShim {
type Target = Path;
fn deref(&self) -> &Path {
&self.executable
}
}
pub(super) fn create(name: &str, behavior: Behavior<'_>) -> GitShim {
static COMPILED: OnceLock<tempfile::TempDir> = OnceLock::new();
let compiled = COMPILED.get_or_init(|| {
let directory = tempfile::tempdir().expect("native Git fixture directory");
let source = directory.path().join("git_shim.rs");
std::fs::write(&source, include_str!("../tests/fixtures/git_shim.rs"))
.expect("write native Git fixture source");
let executable = directory
.path()
.join(format!("git-shim{}", std::env::consts::EXE_SUFFIX));
let output =
std::process::Command::new(std::env::var_os("RUSTC").unwrap_or_else(|| "rustc".into()))
.arg("--edition=2021")
.arg("-Dwarnings")
.arg(&source)
.arg("-o")
.arg(executable)
.output()
.expect("compile native Git fixture with the installed Rust toolchain");
assert!(
output.status.success(),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)
);
directory
});
let directory = tempfile::Builder::new()
.prefix(name)
.tempdir()
.expect("Git fixture instance");
let file_name = format!("git-shim{}", std::env::consts::EXE_SUFFIX);
let executable = directory.path().join(&file_name);
std::fs::copy(compiled.path().join(file_name), &executable).expect("copy native Git fixture");
let config = match behavior {
Behavior::Delay(milliseconds) => format!("delay\n{milliseconds}"),
Behavior::Hang => "hang\n".to_owned(),
Behavior::HangOid(oid) => format!("hang-oid\n{oid}"),
Behavior::HangRepo(repo) => format!("hang-repo\n{repo}"),
Behavior::LogTypes(path) => format!("log-types\n{}", path.display()),
};
std::fs::write(directory.path().join("config"), config).expect("configure native Git fixture");
GitShim {
_directory: directory,
executable,
}
}
+64 -469
View File
@@ -28,9 +28,6 @@ use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
use crate::state::AppState;
#[path = "test_git_shim.rs"]
mod git_shim;
/// Build an [`AppState`] over a real, migrated Postgres pool (from `#[sqlx::test]`).
/// Runs the schema migrations first, because the per-test database starts empty.
///
@@ -562,12 +559,11 @@ mod tests {
/// #174 (SC1, load-bearing): a saturated READ pool must NOT shed an
/// authenticated push — the write pool is a separate budget. Read pool at zero,
/// write pool with capacity: the push proceeds PAST admission (it then errors on
/// the closed DB, with db_unavailable rather than overloaded). Route git-receive-pack
/// the placeholder DB, but crucially it is not a 503). Route git-receive-pack
/// back to the read pool and this goes red — that is the isolation proof.
#[tokio::test]
async fn git_receive_pack_not_shed_by_exhausted_read_pool() {
let mut state = test_state_lazy();
state.db.pool().close().await;
// Read pool exhausted as if a flood of anonymous clones held every slot.
state.git_read_semaphore = Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(0));
// Write pool keeps its default capacity from test_state_lazy.
@@ -589,13 +585,10 @@ mod tests {
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 1024).await.unwrap();
let body: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
body["error"],
crate::error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
"the push must clear admission and reach the deliberately closed database"
assert_ne!(
resp.status(),
StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
"an exhausted READ pool must not shed a push — the write pool is a separate budget (#174)"
);
}
@@ -1533,451 +1526,6 @@ mod tests {
);
}
/// Pre-assigned tasks must not be stealable: a stranger claiming a pending
/// task reserved for another agent must fail, and must not receive the
/// UCAN. The reserved assignee still claims successfully.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn claim_task_honors_preassigned_assignee(pool: PgPool) {
let delegator = "did:key:zCLAIMDELEGATORAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let reserved = "did:key:zCLAIMRESERVEDBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
let thief = "did:key:zCLAIMTHIEFCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC";
let state = test_state(pool).await;
let mut task = seed_task("task-reserved", delegator);
task.assignee_did = Some(reserved.to_string());
task.ucan_token = Some("ucan-secret-for-reserved-only".into());
state.db.create_task(&task).await.expect("seed");
let router = || {
Router::new()
.route(
"/api/v1/tasks/{id}/claim",
axum::routing::post(crate::api::tasks::claim_task),
)
.with_state(state.clone())
};
let uri = "/api/v1/tasks/task-reserved/claim";
// Thief signs as themselves and asks to claim — must fail, UCAN stays put.
let resp = router()
.oneshot(signed_request_as(
thief,
Method::POST,
uri,
Body::from(format!(r#"{{"assignee_did":"{thief}"}}"#)),
))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"stranger must not steal a pre-assigned task, got {}",
resp.status()
);
let body = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
.await
.unwrap();
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&body);
assert!(
!text.contains("ucan-secret-for-reserved-only"),
"UCAN must not leak on a failed steal: {text}"
);
let still = state.db.get_task("task-reserved").await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert_eq!(still.status, "pending");
assert_eq!(still.assignee_did.as_deref(), Some(reserved));
// Reserved assignee claims successfully and receives the UCAN.
let resp = router()
.oneshot(signed_request_as(
reserved,
Method::POST,
uri,
Body::from(format!(r#"{{"assignee_did":"{reserved}"}}"#)),
))
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
resp.status().is_success(),
"reserved assignee must claim, got {}",
resp.status()
);
let body = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
.await
.unwrap();
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&body);
assert!(
text.contains("ucan-secret-for-reserved-only"),
"reserved assignee must receive UCAN: {text}"
);
assert!(text.contains("\"status\":\"claimed\"") || text.contains("claimed"));
}
/// Open (unassigned) pending tasks remain first-claimer-wins after the
/// pre-assignment gate.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn claim_task_open_still_first_claimer_wins(pool: PgPool) {
let delegator = "did:key:zOPENDELEGATORAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let claimer = "did:key:zOPENCLAIMERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
let state = test_state(pool).await;
state
.db
.create_task(&seed_task("task-open", delegator))
.await
.expect("seed");
let router = Router::new()
.route(
"/api/v1/tasks/{id}/claim",
axum::routing::post(crate::api::tasks::claim_task),
)
.with_state(state.clone());
let resp = router
.oneshot(signed_request_as(
claimer,
Method::POST,
"/api/v1/tasks/task-open/claim",
Body::from(format!(r#"{{"assignee_did":"{claimer}"}}"#)),
))
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
resp.status().is_success(),
"open task must still be claimable, got {}",
resp.status()
);
let got = state.db.get_task("task-open").await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert_eq!(got.status, "claimed");
assert_eq!(got.assignee_did.as_deref(), Some(claimer));
}
/// ASCII-blank assignees (`ASSIGNEE_BLANK`: space, tab, LF, CR) must be open
/// at the claim SQL blank branch. Seeds via raw INSERT so create_task
/// normalization is not in the path.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn claim_task_ascii_blank_reservations_are_open(pool: PgPool) {
let delegator = "did:key:zBLANKDELEGATORAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let claimer = "did:key:zBLANKCLAIMERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
let state = test_state(pool.clone()).await;
let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
for (id, blank) in [
("task-blank-empty", ""),
("task-blank-tab", "\t"),
("task-blank-space", " "),
("task-blank-lf", "\n"),
("task-blank-cr", "\r"),
] {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO agent_tasks (id, repo_id, kind, status, delegator_did, assignee_did, capability, ucan_token, payload, result, created_at, updated_at, deadline)
VALUES ($1,NULL,'build','pending',$2,$3,'repo:write',NULL,NULL,NULL,$4,$4,NULL)",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(delegator)
.bind(blank)
.bind(&now)
.execute(&pool)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("seed {id}: {e}"));
let claimed = state
.db
.claim_task(id, claimer)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("{id} must be open: {e}"));
assert_eq!(claimed.status, "claimed", "{id}");
assert_eq!(claimed.assignee_did.as_deref(), Some(claimer), "{id}");
}
}
/// create_task must null whitespace-only assignees and return that shape
/// (fail-on-remove for the blank filter).
#[sqlx::test]
async fn create_task_normalizes_whitespace_assignee(pool: PgPool) {
let delegator = "did:key:zCREATENORMDELEGAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let state = test_state(pool).await;
let mut task = seed_task("task-create-norm", delegator);
task.assignee_did = Some(" \t\n ".into());
let stored = state.db.create_task(&task).await.expect("create");
assert!(
stored.assignee_did.is_none(),
"create_task must return normalized NULL assignee, got {:?}",
stored.assignee_did
);
let got = state
.db
.get_task("task-create-norm")
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
assert!(got.assignee_did.is_none(), "row must store NULL assignee");
}
/// Claiming a reserved task must keep the stored DID form so exact-match
/// list filters still find it. Also covers bare→full claim + list by bare
/// (claimer full DID must not be required for list equality).
#[sqlx::test]
async fn claim_task_keeps_stored_assignee_did_form(pool: PgPool) {
let delegator = "did:key:zFORMDELEGATORAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let bare = "zFORMRESERVEDBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
let full = format!("did:key:{bare}");
let state = test_state(pool).await;
let mut task = seed_task("task-form", delegator);
task.assignee_did = Some(bare.to_string());
state.db.create_task(&task).await.expect("seed");
let claimed = state
.db
.claim_task("task-form", &full)
.await
.expect("claim with full DID");
assert_eq!(
claimed.assignee_did.as_deref(),
Some(bare),
"reserved claim must keep the stored bare-key form"
);
let listed_bare = state
.db
.list_tasks(Some("claimed"), Some(bare), 10)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
listed_bare.iter().any(|t| t.id == "task-form"),
"delegator filtering by bare key must still find the task"
);
let listed_full = state
.db
.list_tasks(Some("claimed"), Some(&full), 10)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!listed_full.iter().any(|t| t.id == "task-form"),
"exact list by claimer's full DID must miss the bare stored form"
);
}
/// Padded non-blank reservation must survive claim unchanged (exact form).
#[sqlx::test]
async fn claim_task_keeps_padded_reservation_exact(pool: PgPool) {
let delegator = "did:key:zPADDELEGATORAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let key = "zPADRESERVEDBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
let padded = format!(" {key}\t");
let full = format!("did:key:{key}");
let state = test_state(pool.clone()).await;
let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO agent_tasks (id, repo_id, kind, status, delegator_did, assignee_did, capability, ucan_token, payload, result, created_at, updated_at, deadline)
VALUES ($1,NULL,'build','pending',$2,$3,'repo:write',NULL,NULL,NULL,$4,$4,NULL)",
)
.bind("task-padded")
.bind(delegator)
.bind(&padded)
.bind(&now)
.execute(&pool)
.await
.expect("seed padded");
let claimed = state
.db
.claim_task("task-padded", &full)
.await
.expect("claim padded reservation");
assert_eq!(
claimed.assignee_did.as_deref(),
Some(padded.as_str()),
"claim must not BTRIM a non-blank reservation"
);
let listed = state
.db
.list_tasks(Some("claimed"), Some(&padded), 10)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
listed.iter().any(|t| t.id == "task-padded"),
"exact list by original padded form must still find the task"
);
let finished = state
.db
.finish_task("task-padded", "completed", None, &full)
.await
.expect("padded assignee must finish after trim match");
assert_eq!(finished.status, "completed");
}
/// Direct coverage for the DB-layer finish_task assignee Rust gate (handlers
/// 403 before calling in, so HTTP tests alone leave this unproven).
#[sqlx::test]
async fn finish_task_rejects_non_assignee_at_db(pool: PgPool) {
let delegator = "did:key:zFINISHDELEGATORAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let assignee = "did:key:zFINISHASSIGNEEBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
let stranger = "did:key:zFINISHSTRANGERCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC";
let state = test_state(pool).await;
state
.db
.create_task(&seed_task("task-finish-gate", delegator))
.await
.expect("seed");
state
.db
.claim_task("task-finish-gate", assignee)
.await
.expect("claim");
let err = state
.db
.finish_task("task-finish-gate", "completed", None, stranger)
.await
.expect_err("stranger must not finish");
assert!(
err.to_string().contains("assignee") || err.to_string().contains("finishable"),
"expected assignee denial, got {err}"
);
let still = state
.db
.get_task("task-finish-gate")
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
still.status, "claimed",
"row must stay claimed after denial"
);
let done = state
.db
.finish_task("task-finish-gate", "completed", None, assignee)
.await
.expect("assignee finishes");
assert_eq!(done.status, "completed");
}
/// Fail-on-remove for `finish_task`'s `AND assignee_did=$5`: a concurrent writer
/// that changes the stored assignee between the production read and UPDATE must
/// leave the task claimed (production `Db::finish_task` path).
#[sqlx::test]
async fn finish_task_sql_assignee_predicate_is_load_bearing(pool: PgPool) {
let delegator = "did:key:zFINISHSQLDELEGAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let assignee = "did:key:zFINISHSQLASSIGNBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
let other = "did:key:zFINISHSQLOTHERCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC";
let state = test_state(pool.clone()).await;
let id = "task-finish-sql";
state
.db
.create_task(&seed_task(id, delegator))
.await
.expect("seed");
state.db.claim_task(id, assignee).await.expect("claim");
let pool_bg = pool.clone();
let id_bg = id.to_string();
let other_bg = other.to_string();
let (locked_tx, locked_rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel();
let hog = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut tx = pool_bg.begin().await.expect("begin");
sqlx::query("SELECT assignee_did FROM agent_tasks WHERE id = $1 FOR UPDATE")
.bind(&id_bg)
.fetch_one(&mut *tx)
.await
.expect("lock row");
locked_tx.send(()).ok();
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE agent_tasks SET assignee_did = $2 WHERE id = $1 AND status = 'claimed'",
)
.bind(&id_bg)
.bind(&other_bg)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await
.expect("race assignee");
tx.commit().await.expect("commit");
});
locked_rx.await.expect("row lock held before finish");
let err = state
.db
.finish_task(id, "completed", None, assignee)
.await
.expect_err("assignee slot race must fail production finish_task");
hog.await.expect("hog task");
assert!(
err.to_string().contains("not in claimed state"),
"expected finish denial, got {err}"
);
let still = state.db.get_task(id).await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert_eq!(still.status, "claimed");
assert_eq!(still.assignee_did.as_deref(), Some(other));
}
/// Fail-on-remove for the claim UPDATE assignee-slot re-check: a concurrent
/// writer that changes `assignee_did` after the pre-read must block claim.
#[sqlx::test]
async fn claim_task_update_assignee_slot_recheck_is_load_bearing(pool: PgPool) {
let delegator = "did:key:zCLAIMSLOTDELEGAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let reserved = "did:key:zCLAIMSLOTASSIGNEEBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
let other = "did:key:zCLAIMSLOTOTHERCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC";
let state = test_state(pool.clone()).await;
let id = "task-claim-slot";
let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO agent_tasks
(id, repo_id, kind, status, delegator_did, assignee_did, capability,
ucan_token, payload, result, created_at, updated_at, deadline)
VALUES ($1, NULL, 'build', 'pending', $2, $3, 'repo:write',
NULL, NULL, NULL, $4, $4, NULL)",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(delegator)
.bind(reserved)
.bind(&now)
.execute(&pool)
.await
.expect("seed reserved");
let pool_bg = pool.clone();
let id_bg = id.to_string();
let other_bg = other.to_string();
let (locked_tx, locked_rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel();
let hog = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut tx = pool_bg.begin().await.expect("begin");
sqlx::query("SELECT assignee_did FROM agent_tasks WHERE id = $1 FOR UPDATE")
.bind(&id_bg)
.fetch_one(&mut *tx)
.await
.expect("lock row");
locked_tx.send(()).ok();
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE agent_tasks SET assignee_did = $2 WHERE id = $1 AND status = 'pending'",
)
.bind(&id_bg)
.bind(&other_bg)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await
.expect("race assignee");
tx.commit().await.expect("commit");
});
locked_rx.await.expect("row lock held before claim");
let err = state
.db
.claim_task(id, reserved)
.await
.expect_err("assignee slot race must fail production claim_task");
hog.await.expect("hog task");
assert!(
err.to_string().contains("not found or already claimed"),
"expected SQL re-check denial, got {err}"
);
assert!(
err.downcast_ref::<crate::db::TaskReservedForOtherAssignee>()
.is_none(),
"must prove the UPDATE predicate, not the Rust pre-check: {err}"
);
let still = state.db.get_task(id).await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert_eq!(still.status, "pending");
assert_eq!(still.assignee_did.as_deref(), Some(other));
}
/// Adversarial-review GATE-2 (create_pr): opening a PR requires read access.
/// A non-reader is denied on a private repo before any PR is created; the
/// owner is allowed.
@@ -11202,10 +10750,14 @@ mod tests {
seed_legacy_pin(&pool, &bare, &fx.public_oid, Some(&repo.id)).await;
// A git that takes 300ms per invocation (the read makes two: type, then content).
let slow_git = git_shim::create(
&format!("gl-slow-git-{short}"),
git_shim::Behavior::Delay(300),
);
let slow_git = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("gl-slow-git-{short}"));
std::fs::write(&slow_git, "#!/bin/sh\nsleep 0.3\nexec git \"$@\"\n").expect("write shim");
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
std::fs::set_permissions(&slow_git, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755))
.expect("chmod shim");
}
let ticks = std::sync::Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
let ticker = {
@@ -12152,6 +11704,19 @@ mod tests {
);
}
/// Write an executable `git` stand-in and return its path.
fn write_git_shim(name: &str, script: &str) -> std::path::PathBuf {
let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(name);
std::fs::write(&path, script).expect("write the git shim");
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755))
.expect("chmod the git shim");
}
path
}
/// F6 scenario 1 (#173 round 13): one hung candidate must not starve the rows behind
/// it in the same pass. `DiscoveryCtx` is loaded once per pass, so before the per-row
/// slice every source-less row in a pass shared ONE deadline: the first row's wedged
@@ -12191,9 +11756,23 @@ mod tests {
// The type stage feeds the oid on STDIN (`cat-file --batch-check`) and the
// content stage puts it in argv, so the stand-in has to look in both places.
let git_bin = git_shim::create(
let git_bin = write_git_shim(
&format!("gl-hung-git-{short}"),
git_shim::Behavior::HangOid(&hung_oid),
&format!(
"#!/bin/sh\n\
if [ \"$2\" = \"--batch-check\" ]; then\n\
\x20 oid=$(cat)\n\
\x20 case \"$oid\" in\n\
\x20 {hung_oid}) sleep 30; exit 1 ;;\n\
\x20 esac\n\
\x20 printf '%s\\n' \"$oid\" | git \"$@\"\n\
\x20 exit $?\n\
fi\n\
case \"$*\" in\n\
\x20 *{hung_oid}*) sleep 30; exit 1 ;;\n\
esac\n\
exec git \"$@\"\n"
),
);
let stats = tokio::time::timeout(
@@ -12278,7 +11857,10 @@ mod tests {
// Wedges on every invocation, so no row can ever be repaired and the only
// question left is what each one COSTS.
let git_bin = git_shim::create(&format!("gl-spent-git-{short}"), git_shim::Behavior::Hang);
let git_bin = write_git_shim(
&format!("gl-spent-git-{short}"),
"#!/bin/sh\nsleep 30\nexit 1\n",
);
let stats = tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(60),
@@ -12882,7 +12464,10 @@ mod tests {
seed_legacy_pin(&pool, &src, oid, None).await;
}
let git_bin = git_shim::create(&format!("gl-starve-git-{short}"), git_shim::Behavior::Hang);
let git_bin = write_git_shim(
&format!("gl-starve-git-{short}"),
"#!/bin/sh\nsleep 30\nexit 1\n",
);
tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(120),
@@ -12950,9 +12535,9 @@ mod tests {
let (raw_cid, provider_cid) = seed_legacy_pin(&pool, &src, &fx.public_oid, None).await;
// Wedges only inside the position-nine repo, which the sweep enters by cwd.
let git_bin = git_shim::create(
let git_bin = write_git_shim(
&format!("gl-mid-git-{short}"),
git_shim::Behavior::HangRepo("midcand9.git"),
"#!/bin/sh\ncase \"$(pwd)\" in\n */midcand9.git) sleep 30; exit 1 ;;\nesac\nexec git \"$@\"\n",
);
let first = tokio::time::timeout(
@@ -13114,9 +12699,19 @@ mod tests {
let log = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("gl-ali-log-{short}"));
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&log);
let git_bin = git_shim::create(
let git_bin = write_git_shim(
&format!("gl-ali-git-{short}"),
git_shim::Behavior::LogTypes(&log),
&format!(
"#!/bin/sh\n\
if [ \"$2\" = \"--batch-check\" ]; then\n\
\x20 oid=$(cat)\n\
\x20 printf '%s %s\\n' \"$oid\" \"$(basename $(pwd))\" >> {log}\n\
\x20 printf '%s\\n' \"$oid\" | git \"$@\"\n\
\x20 exit $?\n\
fi\n\
exec git \"$@\"\n",
log = log.display()
),
);
let mut traversal = crate::ipfs_pin::DiscoveryTraversalState::default();
-59
View File
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
use std::io::{Read, Write};
use std::process::{Command, Stdio};
use std::time::Duration;
fn main() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let executable = std::env::current_exe()?;
let config = std::fs::read_to_string(executable.parent().unwrap().join("config"))?;
let (mode, parameter) = config.split_once('\n').unwrap_or((&config, ""));
let args: Vec<_> = std::env::args_os().skip(1).collect();
if mode == "delay" {
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(parameter.parse().unwrap()));
}
let batch = args.get(1).is_some_and(|arg| arg == "--batch-check");
let input = if batch {
let mut bytes = Vec::new();
std::io::stdin().read_to_end(&mut bytes)?;
Some(bytes)
} else {
None
};
let cwd = std::env::current_dir()?;
let hang = mode == "hang"
|| (mode == "hang-repo" && cwd.file_name().is_some_and(|name| name == parameter))
|| (mode == "hang-oid"
&& (args.iter().any(|arg| arg == parameter)
|| input
.as_ref()
.is_some_and(|bytes| String::from_utf8_lossy(bytes).trim() == parameter)));
if hang {
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_secs(30));
std::process::exit(1);
}
if mode == "log-types" && batch {
let mut log = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
.create(true)
.append(true)
.open(parameter)?;
writeln!(
log,
"{} {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(input.as_ref().unwrap()).trim(),
cwd.file_name().unwrap().to_string_lossy()
)?;
}
let mut child = Command::new("git")
.args(&args)
.stdin(if input.is_some() {
Stdio::piped()
} else {
Stdio::inherit()
})
.stdout(Stdio::inherit())
.stderr(Stdio::inherit())
.spawn()?;
if let Some(bytes) = input {
child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(&bytes)?;
}
std::process::exit(child.wait()?.code().unwrap_or(1));
}
-2
View File
@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive", "env"] }
dirs = "5"
reqwest = { workspace = true }
uuid = { workspace = true }
url = { workspace = true }
percent-encoding = { workspace = true }
urlencoding = "2"
alloy = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = [
"contract",
+1 -5
View File
@@ -142,11 +142,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: MirrorArgs) -> Result<()> {
println!();
println!("✓ Mirror complete: {name}");
println!(" Clone: git clone {gitlawb_url}");
// Only print View: when the node advertises a web_url — self-hosted nodes
// without a web front-end would otherwise produce a 404 link (#370).
if let Some(web_url) = crate::repo::fetch_node_web_url(&args.node).await {
println!(" View: {web_url}/{owner_short}/{name}");
}
println!(" View: https://twigpine.com/{owner_short}/{name}");
Ok(())
}
+2 -405
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use std::path::PathBuf;
use crate::http::{sanitize_node_msg, NodeClient};
use crate::http::NodeClient;
use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
#[derive(Args)]
@@ -274,126 +274,6 @@ async fn resolve_owner_did(_node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result
Ok(did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string())
}
/// Fetch `GET /` from the node and return the `web_url` if the node advertises one.
///
/// The View: link is a nice-to-have, so every failure mode degrades to `None`
/// rather than failing the enclosing command — but failures are surfaced as
/// stderr warnings (request error, non-success HTTP status with the status,
/// malformed advertised value), since they all mean the node itself is
/// misbehaving or misconfigured, which the user would otherwise never learn.
/// A successful response that lacks a usable `web_url` (field missing or
/// blank) omits the link silently: self-hosted nodes without a web front-end
/// are expected to not advertise one (#370).
///
/// The body is treated like every other caller-chosen node reply (INV-6): the
/// read is capped and an accepted `web_url` must be free of control/bidi bytes
/// — it reaches the terminal verbatim through the View: line.
pub(crate) async fn fetch_node_web_url(node: &str) -> Option<String> {
let info_client = NodeClient::new(node, None);
let info_resp = match info_client.get("/").await {
Ok(resp) => resp,
Err(err) => {
eprintln!("warning: node info request failed ({err}); skipping View link");
return None;
}
};
let status = info_resp.status();
if !status.is_success() {
eprintln!("warning: node info request returned {status}; skipping View link");
return None;
}
// An info reply is a DID, a few URLs and counts — 8 KiB is well past what
// the shape needs; anything longer is hostile or broken (peer.rs precedent).
let raw_body = crate::http::read_body_capped(info_resp, 8 * 1024).await;
match web_url_from_info_body(&raw_body) {
Ok(url) => url,
Err(reason) => {
eprintln!("warning: {reason}; skipping View link");
None
}
}
}
/// Classify a capped `GET /` body for the `View:` advertisement. Split out of
/// `fetch_node_web_url` so tests can pin the classification contract directly:
/// a truncated or half-read body is indistinguishable from a node that
/// advertised nothing, so it must warn rather than silently omit the link.
fn web_url_from_info_body(
raw_body: &crate::http::CappedBody,
) -> std::result::Result<Option<String>, String> {
if raw_body.truncated || raw_body.read_failed {
return Err("node info body was oversized or could not be read in full".to_string());
}
let info: Value = match serde_json::from_str(&raw_body.text) {
Ok(json) => json,
Err(_) => return Err("node info body was not valid JSON".to_string()),
};
// Missing field / non-string degrade to None without warning — same contract
// as before; only transport- and advertisement-level failures warn there.
let raw = match info["web_url"].as_str() {
Some(v) => v,
None => return Ok(None),
};
let trimmed = raw.trim().trim_end_matches('/');
if trimmed.is_empty() {
return Ok(None);
}
// A present-but-malformed value means the node is misconfigured; say so
// instead of quietly dropping the link. Mirrors the node-side boot
// validation: must be an absolute http(s) URL with no query or fragment —
// the link is built by string-appending `/{owner}/{repo}` to it. Control
// and bidi-format bytes are rejected outright (not stripped): they have no
// legitimate place in a base URL and would reach the terminal through the
// View: line — including when they arrive percent-encoded (INV-6).
let malformed_reason: Option<String> = if trimmed
.chars()
.any(|c| c.is_control() || gitlawb_core::sanitize::is_bidi_format(c))
{
Some("contains control or bidi characters".to_string())
} else {
match trimmed.parse::<url::Url>() {
Err(_) => Some("not an absolute URL".to_string()),
Ok(parsed) if !matches!(parsed.scheme(), "http" | "https") => {
Some("not http(s)".to_string())
}
Ok(parsed) if parsed.query().is_some() || parsed.fragment().is_some() => {
Some("contains a query or fragment".to_string())
}
// userinfo is rejected because the `View:` line prints the
// value verbatim; a remote advertisement carrying
// `user:pass@host` would land that credential in terminal
// scrollback and CI logs.
Ok(parsed) if !parsed.username().is_empty() || parsed.password().is_some() => {
Some("contains a username or password".to_string())
}
Ok(parsed)
if parsed
.host_str()
.unwrap_or("")
.chars()
.chain(
percent_encoding::percent_decode_str(parsed.path())
.decode_utf8_lossy()
.chars(),
)
.any(|c| c.is_control() || gitlawb_core::sanitize::is_bidi_format(c)) =>
{
Some("contains control or bidi characters, even percent-encoded".to_string())
}
Ok(_) => None,
}
};
match malformed_reason {
// The reason string is ours; the advertised value is not — defang it
// exactly as it would have been defanged had it been accepted.
Some(reason) => Err(format!(
"node advertised a malformed web_url ({:?}, {reason})",
sanitize_node_msg(trimmed)
)),
None => Ok(Some(trimmed.to_string())),
}
}
async fn cmd_create(
name: String,
description: Option<String>,
@@ -431,11 +311,7 @@ async fn cmd_create(
println!("✓ Created repository: {name}");
println!(" Clone: git clone {gitlawb_url}");
println!(" HTTP: {clone_url}");
// Only print View: when the node advertises a web_url — self-hosted nodes
// without a web front-end would otherwise produce a 404 link (#370).
if let Some(web_url) = fetch_node_web_url(&node).await {
println!(" View: {web_url}/{owner_short}/{name}");
}
println!(" View: https://twigpine.com/{owner_short}/{name}");
if let Some(desc) = payload["description"].as_str().filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
println!(" Desc: {desc}");
}
@@ -972,285 +848,6 @@ mod tests {
.unwrap();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_fetch_node_web_url_with_web_url() {
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_body(r#"{"web_url":"https://example.com","did":"did:key:z6Mk"}"#)
.create_async()
.await;
let web_url = fetch_node_web_url(&server.url()).await;
assert_eq!(web_url.as_deref(), Some("https://example.com"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_fetch_node_web_url_trims_trailing_slash() {
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_body(r#"{"web_url":"https://example.com/"}"#)
.create_async()
.await;
let web_url = fetch_node_web_url(&server.url()).await;
assert_eq!(web_url.as_deref(), Some("https://example.com"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_fetch_node_web_url_without_web_url() {
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_body(r#"{"did":"did:key:z6Mk"}"#)
.create_async()
.await;
let web_url = fetch_node_web_url(&server.url()).await;
assert_eq!(web_url, None);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_fetch_node_web_url_empty_string() {
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_body(r#"{"web_url":""}"#)
.create_async()
.await;
let web_url = fetch_node_web_url(&server.url()).await;
assert_eq!(web_url, None);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_fetch_node_web_url_whitespace_only() {
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_body(r#"{"web_url":" "}"#)
.create_async()
.await;
let web_url = fetch_node_web_url(&server.url()).await;
assert_eq!(web_url, None);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_fetch_node_web_url_server_error() {
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(500)
.create_async()
.await;
let web_url = fetch_node_web_url(&server.url()).await;
assert_eq!(web_url, None);
}
/// A node advertising a present-but-malformed web_url (not an absolute
/// http(s) URL) must not yield a View link — and must warn, since a
/// malformed advertisement means the node is misconfigured (#370).
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_fetch_node_web_url_malformed_value_is_rejected() {
for bad in [
"gitlawb.com",
"not a url",
"ftp://files.example.com",
// Query/fragment corrupt the appended /{owner}/{repo} path.
"https://example.com?a=1",
"https://example.com/#faq",
] {
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_body(format!(r#"{{"web_url":"{bad}"}}"#))
.create_async()
.await;
let web_url = fetch_node_web_url(&server.url()).await;
assert_eq!(
web_url, None,
"malformed web_url {bad:?} must not render a View link"
);
}
}
/// A transport-level failure (connection refused) degrades to None but is
/// no longer silent: the request error is surfaced on stderr so an
/// unreachable node isn't indistinguishable from one without a web_url.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_fetch_node_web_url_connection_refused_warns() {
// Port 1 on localhost is reserved (tcpmux) and refuses connections.
let web_url = fetch_node_web_url("http://127.0.0.1:1").await;
assert_eq!(web_url, None);
}
/// A hostile node can smuggle ANSI/bell/bidi controls inside a web_url that
/// still passes http(s) URL parsing — those bytes would reach the terminal
/// verbatim through the View: line. The advertised value must be rejected
/// outright: no control byte may survive into the returned string.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_fetch_node_web_url_rejects_control_bytes() {
for bad in [
"https://example.com/\x1b[31mred", // ANSI CSI escape in path
"https://example.com\x07", // bell
"https://ex\u{202e}ample.com", // bidi override (RLO)
"https://example.com/\u{200f}", // RLM format char
"\x1b]0;title\x07https://evil.example", // OSC title-set prefix
] {
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
// serde_json escapes the control bytes so the body is VALID
// JSON — a raw literal would make parse fail and the test
// would pass without reaching the control check at all.
.with_body(serde_json::json!({"web_url": bad}).to_string())
.create_async()
.await;
let web_url = fetch_node_web_url(&server.url()).await;
assert_eq!(
web_url, None,
"web_url with control bytes {bad:?} must be rejected"
);
}
}
/// An oversized or half-read `GET /` body must warn, not silently
/// classify as "no web front-end": a cut body fails JSON parse, which is
/// indistinguishable from a node that advertised nothing without the
/// truncated flag. Removing the flag check makes this test pass
/// vacuously through the parse-fail arm.
#[test]
fn web_url_from_info_body_warns_on_truncated_reads() {
for (body, label) in [
(
crate::http::CappedBody {
text: r#"{"web_url":"https://x"#.repeat(2000),
truncated: true,
read_failed: false,
},
"truncated",
),
(
crate::http::CappedBody {
text: r#"{"web_url":"https://x"#.to_string(),
truncated: false,
read_failed: true,
},
"read_failed",
),
] {
let err = web_url_from_info_body(&body)
.expect_err(&format!("{label} body must warn, not silently classify"));
assert!(
err.contains("oversized or could not be read"),
"{label}: got {err}"
);
}
// A clean body missing web_url still classifies as a silent None.
let clean = crate::http::CappedBody {
text: r#"{"did":"did:key:x"}"#.to_string(),
truncated: false,
read_failed: false,
};
assert_eq!(web_url_from_info_body(&clean).unwrap(), None);
}
/// Percent-encoded bidi must not slip past the literal scan: a node
/// advertising `https://example.com/%E2%80%AE` serves wire bytes with no
/// Cf code point, but a browser decodes it into a reordering character
/// on the rendered View: link (INV-6).
#[test]
fn web_url_from_info_body_rejects_percent_encoded_bidi() {
let body = crate::http::CappedBody {
text: r#"{"web_url":"https://example.com/%E2%80%AE"}"#.to_string(),
truncated: false,
read_failed: false,
};
let err = web_url_from_info_body(&body).expect_err("percent-encoded bidi must be rejected");
assert!(err.contains("bidi"), "got {err}");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_fetch_node_web_url_validates_after_trimming() {
// Trailing slash is trimmed before validation; result stays usable.
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_body(r#"{"web_url":"http://localhost:8080/ui/"}"#)
.create_async()
.await;
let web_url = fetch_node_web_url(&server.url()).await;
assert_eq!(web_url.as_deref(), Some("http://localhost:8080/ui"));
}
/// A remote node that advertises `web_url` with userinfo (`user@`,
/// `user:pass@`) must be dropped: the value is reprinted on the `View:`
/// line, and a credential embedded in the URL would land in terminal
/// scrollback and CI logs. Mirrors the node-side boot validation.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_fetch_node_web_url_rejects_userinfo() {
for bad in [
"https://[email protected]",
"https://user:[email protected]",
] {
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_body(format!(r#"{{"web_url":"{}"}}"#, bad))
.create_async()
.await;
let web_url = fetch_node_web_url(&server.url()).await;
assert_eq!(
web_url, None,
"web_url with userinfo {bad:?} must be rejected"
);
}
}
/// A non-success status must still return None (View link is cosmetic) but
/// the status surfaces as a user-visible stderr warning instead of being
/// swallowed silently (#370 review).
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_fetch_node_web_url_non_success_warns_with_status() {
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(503)
.create_async()
.await;
let web_url = fetch_node_web_url(&server.url()).await;
assert_eq!(web_url, None);
// The warning itself goes to stderr; mockito can't capture it here, so
// this asserts only the None contract. Manual check: run against a
// 503-ing node and observe "node info request returned 503" on stderr.
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_cmd_create_server_error() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
-138
View File
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
//! End-to-end test for the `View:` line printed by `gl repo create` (#370).
//!
//! `cmd_create` is the load-bearing #370 path: it is the one place the CLI
//! prints a `View:` line, and the only thing keeping it from being a
//! hardcoded `https://gitlawb.com/...` 404 is `fetch_node_web_url`. The
//! helper-level tests in `repo.rs` cover the helper, not the command path —
//! if `cmd_create` went back to a hardcoded constant, every helper test
//! would still pass.
//!
//! This integration test drives the real `gl` binary against a mockito
//! server that answers both `POST /api/v1/repos` and `GET /`. Asserting on
//! the subprocess's stdout is straightforward: bytes are bytes, with no
//! libtest / gag / in-process capture race.
//!
//! CARGO_BIN_EXE_gl is set by Cargo for integration tests of a `[[bin]]`
//! in the same package, so the test always picks up the in-tree build.
use std::process::Stdio;
use tempfile::TempDir;
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
use tokio::process::Command;
fn gl_bin() -> String {
std::env::var("CARGO_BIN_EXE_gl").expect("CARGO_BIN_EXE_gl is unset for this test")
}
async fn write_identity(dir: &TempDir) {
let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
let pem = kp.to_pem().unwrap();
let path = dir.path().join("identity.pem");
let mut f = tokio::fs::File::create(&path).await.unwrap();
f.write_all(pem.as_bytes()).await.unwrap();
}
/// The trailing key segment of the freshly-generated identity. Mirrors the
/// in-source `resolve_owner_did` test helper but lives in this integration
/// file because that helper is `pub(crate)`.
async fn owner_short(dir: &TempDir) -> String {
let pem = tokio::fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join("identity.pem"))
.await
.unwrap();
let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::from_pem(&pem).unwrap();
let did = kp.did().to_string();
did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string()
}
async fn run_gl_create(node_url: &str, dir: &TempDir) -> String {
let output = Command::new(gl_bin())
.arg("repo")
.arg("create")
.arg("myrepo")
.arg("--private")
.arg("--branch")
.arg("main")
.arg("--node")
.arg(node_url)
.arg("--dir")
.arg(dir.path())
.env("NO_COLOR", "1")
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.output()
.await
.expect("failed to spawn `gl repo create`");
assert!(
output.status.success(),
"`gl repo create` failed: stderr:\n{}\nstdout:\n{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout),
);
String::from_utf8(output.stdout).expect("`gl` wrote non-UTF-8 to stdout")
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn cmd_create_view_url_tracks_node_advertisement() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
write_identity(&dir).await;
let owner = owner_short(&dir).await;
// Case 1: node advertises a web_url. The `View:` line must use the
// advertised origin and the resolved owner/short name.
{
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m_create = server
.mock("POST", "/api/v1/repos")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_body(r#"{"name":"myrepo","clone_url":"gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk/myrepo"}"#)
.create_async()
.await;
let _m_info = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_body(r#"{"web_url":"https://git.example","did":"did:key:z6Mk"}"#)
.create_async()
.await;
let server_url = server.url();
let out = run_gl_create(&server_url, &dir).await;
let view_line = out
.lines()
.find(|l| l.trim_start().starts_with("View:"))
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("View: line missing from stdout:\n{out}"));
assert!(
view_line.contains(&format!("https://git.example/{owner}/myrepo")),
"View: line must use the advertised origin, got: {view_line:?}"
);
}
// Case 2: node does NOT advertise a web_url. The `View:` line must be
// absent, so a self-hosted node without a web front-end never produces
// a 404 link (#370).
{
let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
let _m_create = server
.mock("POST", "/api/v1/repos")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_body(r#"{"name":"myrepo","clone_url":"gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk/myrepo"}"#)
.create_async()
.await;
let _m_info = server
.mock("GET", "/")
.with_status(200)
.with_header("content-type", "application/json")
.with_body(r#"{"did":"did:key:z6Mk"}"#)
.create_async()
.await;
let server_url = server.url();
let out = run_gl_create(&server_url, &dir).await;
assert!(
!out.lines().any(|l| l.trim_start().starts_with("View:")),
"View: line must be absent when node omits web_url; got:\n{out}"
);
}
}
-1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ Step-by-step guide to staking $GITLAWB, registering your node on-chain, and earn
- A wallet with at least **10,000 $GITLAWB** (minimum stake) plus a small amount of ETH on Base for gas
- Docker or Rust 1.91+ (for running the node process)
- PostgreSQL 16+ — the node uses `pg_input_is_valid`, which exists only on PostgreSQL 16 and later. The bundled `docker-compose.yml` pins `postgres:16-alpine`; if you supply your own `DATABASE_URL`, the server must be 16+.
- A public HTTP URL (your-host.com) — can be a VPS, Fly.io app, or anything reachable. A Fly.io config is provided at `infra/fly/fly.toml` (deploy from the repo root with `fly deploy -c infra/fly/fly.toml`)
---
-76
View File
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
# GraphQL repository pagination
`repos` returns the complete visible repository list when it contains at most
200 entries. Larger lists return a GraphQL error directing the caller to
`reposPage`; they are never silently truncated.
Use `reposPage` for larger lists:
```graphql
query Repositories($after: String) {
reposPage(limit: 50, after: $after) {
nodes {
name
ownerDid
}
hasNextPage
endCursor
}
}
```
Start with `after: null`. When `hasNextPage` is true, pass the returned
`endCursor` as `after` on the next request. Stop when `hasNextPage` is false.
An empty page has a null `endCursor`. The default limit is 50 and the maximum
page size is 200; limits below 1 or above 200 are rejected (see Query budgets
below). Malformed cursors, including decoded owner or name strings containing
NUL, return `invalid repository cursor` before database access.
Pages are ordered by normalized owner DID and repository name. Visibility and
mirror deduplication are applied in the database before limiting the page;
hidden and quarantined repositories do not occupy page slots or create a
continuation signal. Cursors contain a position from the last returned visible
repository, not a permission grant. Each request checks the current caller's
visibility independently. Keep the same caller while traversing a list.
Malformed reader lists in a repository's root visibility rule deny access to
non-owners for that repository while other visible repositories remain listable.
Pagination is not a snapshot: concurrent renames, ownership changes, or visibility
changes can alter subsequent pages. Treat cursors as opaque and restart from the
first page when a fresh complete traversal is needed. Small legacy `repos`
queries retain their activity ordering.
## Query budgets
Every GraphQL document is validated against two budgets before any resolver
runs. Both apply per document (per request), not per client: `/graphql` has
no per-caller rate limiting, so a rejected document can always be retried
smaller. The constants live in `crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/mod.rs`.
- **Complexity budget: 400 per document** (`GRAPHQL_MAX_COMPLEXITY`). Each
root field carries a base cost plus the clamped page size plus the selected
child fields:
- `repos`: 50 + `MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE` + child fields. `repos`
always scans the full visible corpus, so it is priced as the full page
it is.
- `reposPage`: 50 + `MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE` + child fields. Every
page request sorts the full deduplicated corpus, so the price does not
depend on `limit`: seven `reposPage(limit: 1)` aliases cost the same as
seven max-size pages.
- `refUpdates`: 100 + clamped `limit` (`MAX_VISIBLE_REF_UPDATES`) + child
fields. The 100 base covers the collector's fixed scan (the deduplicated
repo set, the quarantined set, the visibility rules, and the bounded
up-to-2048-row walk past withheld rows); the limit term prices only the
rows returned.
- `tasks`: 50 + clamped `limit` (`MAX_VISIBLE_TASK_PAGE_SIZE`) + child
fields.
- `task`, mutations, subscriptions: 50 + child fields.
A document whose total exceeds 400 is rejected with
`Query is too complex.` before any resolver runs, so an over-budget
document needs fewer aliases or fewer child fields. A smaller `limit` does
not help `reposPage` or `repos`: both are priced at the full
`MAX_VISIBLE_REPO_PAGE_SIZE` scan regardless of `limit`.
- **Depth cap: 14 per document** (`GRAPHQL_MAX_DEPTH`). Documents nested
deeper than 14 selections are rejected with `Query is nested too deep.`