chore(main): release 0.5.1 (#158)

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

.cargo/audit.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# cargo-audit configuration.
+#
+# cargo-audit reads its config from .cargo/audit.toml (relative to the working
+# directory) or ~/.cargo/audit.toml. It does NOT read a repo-root audit.toml,
+# and there is no CLI flag to point at a config file (`-f` is the lockfile path).
+# This file lives at .cargo/audit.toml for that reason.
+#
+# The audit job stays hard-fail: only the advisories explicitly listed below are
+# suppressed, so any NEW advisory still breaks CI. Each entry below has no
+# available upstream fix; everything fixable is fixed in Cargo.lock instead.
+#
+# Tracking: the hickory ignores are reachable accepted risk. A scheduled re-check
+# (.github/workflows/audit-schedule.yml) runs without these ignores and fails if
+# the lockfile moves off the pinned vulnerable versions while the ignores remain.
+
+[advisories]
+ignore = [
+    # hickory-proto 0.25.2 (pulled by libp2p-dns 0.44 -> hickory-resolver 0.25).
+    # REACHABLE: the node wraps its QUIC transport in the system DNS resolver
+    # (crates/gitlawb-node/src/p2p/mod.rs:238), so a malicious DNS response can
+    # trigger these DoS paths. No fix is available: the latest libp2p-dns on
+    # crates.io is 0.44 and pins hickory 0.25; the fix requires hickory >=0.26.1.
+    # REMOVE both once libp2p-dns ships a release using hickory 0.26 (verified
+    # 2026-06-21: cargo update -p hickory-proto locks 0 packages; still 0.25.2).
+    # Tracking: https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/76
+    "RUSTSEC-2026-0118", # hickory NSEC3 closest-encloser unbounded loop
+    "RUSTSEC-2026-0119", # hickory O(n^2) name-compression CPU exhaustion
+
+    # rsa 0.9.10 (Marvin timing sidechannel). Present in Cargo.lock because sqlx
+    # resolves sqlx-mysql unconditionally, and sqlx-mysql depends on rsa. cargo
+    # audit scans the lockfile, so it flags rsa even though it is NOT linked into
+    # our binary: sqlx is built postgres-only (crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml),
+    # so the MySQL RSA auth path is never compiled and there is no RSA oracle to
+    # attack. No upstream fix exists regardless. REMOVE this ignore if sqlx is
+    # ever built with the `mysql` feature, or any other consumer of rsa enters
+    # the build, at which point it becomes a real reachable advisory.
+    "RUSTSEC-2023-0071", # rsa Marvin attack (no fix; not linked in our build)
+]

.env.example

@@ -21,6 +21,23 @@ GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR=/data/repos
 # When using the bundled docker-compose, this is wired automatically.
 DATABASE_URL=postgresql://gitlawb:changeme@localhost:5432/gitlawb
 
+# ── Database pool & startup resilience ────────────────────────────────────
+# Maximum connections in the PostgreSQL pool. A cap, not a floor —
+# connections open lazily. Size against the DB server's max_connections,
+# remembering admin tooling opens its own pool.
+GITLAWB_DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS=20
+# Seconds a request waits for a pool connection before failing with 503.
+GITLAWB_DB_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS=5
+# Upper bound on each startup connect+migrate attempt, in seconds. Keep it
+# generous enough for a peer instance to finish migrating (the migration
+# advisory lock is held across a deploy); on expiry the attempt is retried.
+GITLAWB_DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS=60
+# Startup retry backoff while the database is unavailable: first delay and
+# ceiling, in seconds. The node stays up serving 503s (with a truthful
+# /ready) instead of crash-looping.
+GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_INITIAL_SECS=5
+GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_MAX_SECS=60
+
 # ── IPFS pinning (Pinata) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Get a JWT at https://app.pinata.cloud/developers/api-keys
 GITLAWB_PINATA_JWT=
@@ -63,13 +80,91 @@ POSTGRES_PASSWORD=changeme
 
 # ── P2P networking ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 GITLAWB_P2P_PORT=7546
-# Comma-separated multiaddrs of bootstrap peers
+# Comma-separated HTTP peer URLs to announce to on startup.
+# The binary also ships with bootstrap-peers.json; set
+# GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS=true for isolated dev/test networks.
 GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS=
+GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS=false
+# Require signatures on peer announce/sync write routes. Keep false during
+# rolling upgrades so existing live nodes can still communicate.
+GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false
+
+# Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on git-receive-pack.
+# A valid did:key signature is authentication, not authorization: anyone can
+# sign as their own DID. When true, pushes from a non-owner DID are rejected.
+# Keep false until the repo owner is ready for owner-only writes.
+GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false
+
+# Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs.
+# Example: /ip4/1.2.3.4/udp/7546/quic-v1/p2p/12D3KooW...
+GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP=
 
 # ── Access control ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Set to false to require auth on all read endpoints
+# Reserved for private-read mode. Public/private repo read enforcement is not
+# wired in the current live release; do not rely on this for private repositories.
 GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ=true
 
+# Maximum git smart-HTTP pack request size, in bytes.
+GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES=2147483648
+
+# Max seconds a served git upload-pack / receive-pack (clone / push) may run
+# before it is aborted with a 504. Bounds a hung git that would otherwise pin a
+# worker and, on push, the repo write lock. Does NOT cover the info/refs
+# advertisement or the withheld-blob path, which remain unbounded. Default 600.
+GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS=600
+
+# ── Push rate limiting (git-receive-pack flood brake) ─────────────────────
+# Max receive-pack requests (info/refs advertisement + push POST) per client
+# IP per hour. 0 disables. Default 600.
+GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT=600
+
+# ── Creation rate limiting (repo/agent/issue/PR flood brake) ──────────────
+# Max creation requests (POST /api/v1/repos, /api/register, fork, issues,
+# pulls) per client IP per hour, in addition to the per-DID limit. The per-DID
+# limit alone is bypassed by a did:key farm (one throwaway identity per repo),
+# which is how spam-repo floods slip past it and the iCaptcha gate; the per-IP
+# brake caps a single-source flood. Uses GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY below to resolve
+# the client IP. 0 disables. Default 120.
+GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT=120
+
+# ── Peer-sync rate limiting (per client IP, uses GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY below) ─
+# /api/v1/peers/announce and /api/v1/sync/notify accept unsigned requests from
+# known peers and run at higher frequency, so a generous bucket. Separate from
+# the trigger bucket so an unsigned notify flood can't drain trigger's quota.
+# 0 disables. Default 600.
+GITLAWB_PEER_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT=600
+# /api/v1/sync/trigger requires a signature and fans out to every peer per call,
+# so it gets a tight bucket. 0 disables. Default 60.
+GITLAWB_SYNC_TRIGGER_RATE_LIMIT=60
+
+# Which forwarded header the edge is trusted to set, used to resolve the real
+# client IP for the push limiter. One of:
+#   (unset) — no trusted proxy: key on the socket peer address, ignore headers.
+#   fly     — behind Fly's edge (trust Fly-Client-IP).
+#   x-forwarded-for — behind a single reverse proxy like Caddy/NGINX (trust the
+#             rightmost X-Forwarded-For hop).
+# Only set this when a proxy you control actually fronts the node; trusting a
+# forwarded header on a directly-exposed node lets clients spoof the key.
+GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY=
+
 # ── Sync ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Enable automatic background sync from known peers
 GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC=false
+
+# ── iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate ───────────────────────────────────
+# Optional gate on create_repo + register: require callers to present an
+# iCaptcha proof (X-ICaptcha-Proof header) earned at icaptcha.gitlawb.com.
+# Default off = fully inert (no behavior change).
+#   off     - gate disabled (default)
+#   shadow  - verify + log would-be rejections, but always allow
+#   enforce - reject requests without a valid, strong-enough proof
+ICAPTCHA_MODE=off
+# Optional base64url Ed25519 public key override; if unset it is fetched from
+# ICAPTCHA_URL/v1/pubkey at startup. Recommended in production: pinning the key
+# removes the startup dependency on the iCaptcha service being reachable and
+# avoids silently running inert if that one-time fetch fails.
+ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY=
+# Minimum proof difficulty level required to pass.
+ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL=3
+# Base URL of the iCaptcha service.
+ICAPTCHA_URL=https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com

.github/CODEOWNERS

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# Ownership for CI, release, and security-sensitive infrastructure.
+# A PR that edits these paths requires review from a code owner once
+# branch protection's "Require review from Code Owners" is enabled.
+
+/.github/                      @beardthelion
+/Dockerfile                    @beardthelion
+/Dockerfile.bins               @beardthelion
+/docker-compose.yml            @beardthelion
+/release-please-config.json    @beardthelion
+/.release-please-manifest.json @beardthelion
+/SECURITY.md                   @beardthelion

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+name: Bug report
+description: Report a defect in a Gitlawb crate or node behavior
+labels: ["bug"]
+body:
+  - type: markdown
+    attributes:
+      value: |
+        Thanks for the report. Please fill in the fields below so we can reproduce the issue.
+        For security vulnerabilities, do NOT open an issue — follow SECURITY.md instead.
+  - type: textarea
+    id: what-happened
+    attributes:
+      label: What happened?
+      description: A clear description of the bug.
+    validations:
+      required: true
+  - type: textarea
+    id: expected
+    attributes:
+      label: Expected behavior
+    validations:
+      required: true
+  - type: textarea
+    id: repro
+    attributes:
+      label: Steps to reproduce
+      placeholder: |
+        1. ...
+        2. ...
+        3. ...
+    validations:
+      required: true
+  - type: dropdown
+    id: crate
+    attributes:
+      label: Affected crate
+      options:
+        - gitlawb-node
+        - gl
+        - git-remote-gitlawb
+        - gitlawb-core
+        - not sure / other
+    validations:
+      required: true
+  - type: input
+    id: version
+    attributes:
+      label: Version or commit
+      description: Output of the binary's `--version`, or the git commit you built.
+    validations:
+      required: true
+  - type: textarea
+    id: environment
+    attributes:
+      label: Environment
+      description: OS, Rust version (`rustc --version`), and anything else relevant.
+    validations:
+      required: false
+  - type: textarea
+    id: logs
+    attributes:
+      label: Relevant logs
+      description: Paste logs or errors. This will be rendered as code, no need for backticks.
+      render: shell
+    validations:
+      required: false

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+blank_issues_enabled: false
+contact_links:
+  - name: Security vulnerability
+    url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/blob/main/SECURITY.md
+    about: Please report security issues privately per our security policy, not as a public issue.
+  - name: Questions & discussion
+    url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/discussions
+    about: For usage questions and open-ended discussion.

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+name: Feature request
+description: Suggest an improvement or new capability
+labels: ["enhancement"]
+body:
+  - type: textarea
+    id: problem
+    attributes:
+      label: Problem / use case
+      description: What are you trying to do that's hard or impossible today?
+    validations:
+      required: true
+  - type: textarea
+    id: proposal
+    attributes:
+      label: Proposed solution
+    validations:
+      required: true
+  - type: textarea
+    id: alternatives
+    attributes:
+      label: Alternatives considered
+    validations:
+      required: false
+  - type: dropdown
+    id: protocol
+    attributes:
+      label: Does this touch the protocol?
+      description: Identity, signatures, UCAN, ref certs, or P2P wire formats. Protocol changes need an issue discussion before any PR.
+      options:
+        - "No"
+        - "Yes"
+        - "Not sure"
+    validations:
+      required: true

.github/pull_request_template.md

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+<!--
+  Thanks for contributing to Gitlawb. Keep PRs focused on one change.
+  Protocol-level changes (identity, signatures, wire format) should start
+  as an issue before code — see CONTRIBUTING.md.
+-->
+
+## Summary
+
+<!-- One or two sentences: what changes and why it matters. -->
+
+
+
+## Motivation & context
+
+<!-- What problem does this solve? Link prior discussion if any. -->
+Closes #
+
+## Kind of change
+
+- [ ] Bug fix
+- [ ] Feature
+- [ ] Security fix
+- [ ] Docs
+- [ ] Tests / CI
+- [ ] Refactor (no behavior change)
+- [ ] Breaking or protocol change (issue required first)
+
+## What changed
+
+<!-- Bullet the concrete changes. Note the crate(s) touched:
+     gitlawb-core / gitlawb-node / gl / git-remote-gitlawb -->
+
+-
+
+## How a reviewer can verify
+
+<!-- Commands to run, or repro steps for a bug plus proof it's fixed. -->
+
+```sh
+
+```
+
+## Before you request review
+
+- [ ] Scope is one logical change; no unrelated churn
+- [ ] `cargo test --workspace` passes locally
+- [ ] New behavior is covered by tests (required for fixes)
+- [ ] `cargo fmt --all` and `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` are clean
+- [ ] Commit titles use Conventional Commits (`feat(...)`, `fix(...)`, `docs(...)`)
+- [ ] Docs / `.env.example` updated if behavior or config changed (or N/A)
+- [ ] Checked existing PRs so this isn't a duplicate
+
+## Protocol & signing impact
+
+<!-- Delete this block if your change doesn't touch the protocol. -->
+
+- [ ] Touches DID / `did:key`, Ed25519 / RFC 9421 signatures, UCAN, ref certs, or P2P wire formats
+- [ ] Discussed in an issue before implementation
+- [ ] Backward-compatible with existing nodes and previously signed history
+
+## Notes for reviewers
+
+<!-- Anything out of scope, follow-ups, or known limitations. Optional. -->

.github/workflows/audit-schedule.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+name: Scheduled Audit
+
+# Self-expiring suppression check (companion to the PR-blocking audit gate in
+# pr-checks.yml). Runs weekly. It re-runs cargo audit WITHOUT the .cargo/audit.toml
+# ignore list to surface the full advisory set for visibility, and it hard-fails
+# if the lockfile has moved off the pinned vulnerable versions while the ignores
+# are still present, i.e. the upstream fix landed but the ignore was not dropped.
+on:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: "0 6 * * 1" # Mondays 06:00 UTC
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+env:
+  CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+
+jobs:
+  scheduled-audit:
+    name: scheduled audit (no ignores)
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
+        with:
+          toolchain: stable
+
+      - name: Cache cargo
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
+        with:
+          key: audit-schedule
+
+      - name: Install cargo-audit (floating; drift canary)
+        # Deliberately UNPINNED, unlike the blocking gate in pr-checks.yml. This
+        # job is cron-only (weekly); it is never pull_request- or push-triggered,
+        # so it NEVER gates a merge no matter what it does. Floating the scanner
+        # here is the drift canary: if a newer cargo-audit regresses, at worst
+        # this weekly run reds (the install step below is unguarded) or its
+        # visibility report changes, and that is exactly the signal that latest
+        # has moved and the pinned gate should not be bumped yet. The scan result
+        # itself never fails the run (the "Full audit report" step is `|| true`
+        # and the only other hard-fail is a Cargo.lock grep). The point is that
+        # drift surfaces here without ever blocking a PR. Do NOT pin to match
+        # pr-checks.yml.
+        run: cargo install --locked cargo-audit
+
+      # Full advisory report with NO suppressions. Run from a scratch dir that
+      # has no .cargo/audit.toml so the ignore list does not apply; never fail
+      # the build on this step, it is visibility only.
+      - name: Full audit report (ignores not applied)
+        run: |
+          mkdir -p "$RUNNER_TEMP/full-audit"
+          cp Cargo.lock "$RUNNER_TEMP/full-audit/Cargo.lock"
+          cd "$RUNNER_TEMP/full-audit"
+          {
+            echo '### Full cargo audit (no ignores applied)'
+            echo '```'
+            cargo audit -f Cargo.lock || true
+            echo '```'
+          } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
+
+      # Drift guard: the hickory ignores are only valid while hickory-proto is
+      # pinned at 0.25.x. If the lockfile has moved past that, the upstream fix
+      # is in and the ignores in .cargo/audit.toml must be removed. Fail loudly.
+      - name: Fail if hickory moved past 0.25.x while ignores remain
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          version="$(grep -A1 'name = "hickory-proto"' Cargo.lock | grep '^version' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f2)"
+          echo "hickory-proto in Cargo.lock: ${version:-not present}"
+          ignores_present=false
+          if grep -q 'RUSTSEC-2026-011' .cargo/audit.toml; then
+            ignores_present=true
+          fi
+          # Drift = the lockfile no longer matches what the ignores assume:
+          # hickory moved off 0.25.x (fix shipped) OR was removed entirely
+          # (dead ignore entries left behind). Both must fail.
+          if [ "$ignores_present" = true ] && { [ -z "${version}" ] || [[ "${version}" != 0.25.* ]]; }; then
+            echo "::error::hickory-proto is ${version:-absent from Cargo.lock} but the RUSTSEC-2026-0118/0119 ignores are still in .cargo/audit.toml. The upstream fix appears to be available or the dependency is gone; remove the ignores."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          echo "No drift: ignore list is consistent with the pinned hickory-proto version."

.github/workflows/pr-checks.yml

@@ -9,18 +9,25 @@ on:
 permissions:
   contents: read
 
+# Cancel superseded runs on the same PR/branch; never cancel runs on main.
+concurrency:
+  group: pr-checks-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
+
 env:
   CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
   RUST_BACKTRACE: 1
 
 jobs:
-  fmt-clippy-test:
-    name: fmt + clippy + test
+  fmt-clippy:
+    name: fmt + clippy
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-
+    timeout-minutes: 30
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Set up Rust toolchain
         uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
@@ -37,5 +44,171 @@ jobs:
       - name: cargo clippy
         run: cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
 
+  test:
+    name: test (${{ matrix.toolchain }})
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 45
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        toolchain: [stable, beta]
+    # Beta is informational: an upstream beta regression should warn, not block merges.
+    continue-on-error: ${{ matrix.toolchain == 'beta' }}
+    # Postgres for the DB-backed integration tests (#[sqlx::test] provisions an
+    # isolated database per test off this connection). The health-check gate keeps
+    # `cargo test` from racing a not-yet-ready server.
+    services:
+      postgres:
+        image: postgres:16
+        env:
+          POSTGRES_USER: postgres
+          POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres
+          POSTGRES_DB: gitlawb_test
+        ports:
+          - 5432:5432
+        options: >-
+          --health-cmd pg_isready
+          --health-interval 10s
+          --health-timeout 5s
+          --health-retries 5
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
+        with:
+          toolchain: ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
+
+      - name: Cache cargo
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
+        with:
+          key: ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
+
       - name: cargo test
+        env:
+          DATABASE_URL: postgres://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/gitlawb_test
         run: cargo test --workspace
+
+  build-release:
+    name: build --release
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 45
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
+        with:
+          toolchain: stable
+
+      - name: Cache cargo
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
+        with:
+          key: release
+
+      - name: cargo build --release
+        run: cargo build --release --workspace
+
+  audit:
+    name: cargo audit
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
+        with:
+          toolchain: stable
+
+      - name: Cache cargo
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
+        with:
+          key: audit-0.22.2
+
+      - name: Install cargo-audit (pinned)
+        # Pin the scanner on this BLOCKING gate: an unpinned `cargo install`
+        # floats to the latest release, so a regressed cargo-audit could red CI
+        # repo-wide with no code change. Advisory-DB freshness is fetched at scan
+        # time, independent of the binary, so this does not weaken what the gate
+        # catches. The weekly Scheduled Audit (audit-schedule.yml) deliberately
+        # floats to latest as the drift canary; when it shows a newer cargo-audit
+        # behaving differently, bump this version (and the cache key above) as a
+        # deliberate maintainer action. If 0.22.2 is ever yanked from crates.io
+        # this step fails loud until the pin is bumped.
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          cargo install --locked --version 0.22.2 cargo-audit
+          # Assert the pin took effect so an accidental future unpin (or a drift
+          # off 0.22.2) fails loudly here instead of silently running a different
+          # scanner. `cargo audit --version` prints "cargo-audit-audit 0.22.2".
+          installed="$(cargo audit --version)"
+          echo "cargo-audit installed: $installed"
+          echo "$installed" | grep -qE '(^| )0\.22\.2($| )' || {
+            echo "::error::cargo-audit is not the pinned 0.22.2 (got: $installed)"
+            exit 1
+          }
+
+      # Hard-fail gate. Suppressions live in .cargo/audit.toml (read automatically
+      # from the repo root), each with no available upstream fix. A green check
+      # here means "no NEW advisories", not "advisory-clean": surface the active
+      # ignore list so a reviewer sees exactly what is being accepted.
+      - name: Show active audit ignores
+        run: |
+          {
+            echo '### cargo audit: accepted advisories (.cargo/audit.toml)'
+            echo '```toml'
+            sed -n '/^\[advisories\]/,$p' .cargo/audit.toml
+            echo '```'
+          } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
+
+      - name: cargo audit
+        run: cargo audit
+
+  msrv:
+    name: MSRV (Rust 1.91)
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Set up Rust 1.91
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # 1.91
+        with:
+          toolchain: "1.91"
+
+      - name: Cache cargo
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
+        with:
+          key: msrv
+
+      - name: cargo check on MSRV
+        run: cargo check --workspace --all-targets
+
+  docker-build:
+    name: Docker build smoke test
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Build image
+        run: docker build -t gitlawb-node:ci-test .
+
+      - name: Smoke test --version
+        run: docker run --rm gitlawb-node:ci-test --version

.github/workflows/pr-triage.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+name: PR Triage
+
+# Runs on pull_request_target, not pull_request: fork PRs get a read-only
+# GITHUB_TOKEN under pull_request regardless of the permissions below, so the
+# label/comment writes 403. This job never checks out or runs PR head code (it
+# only reads context.payload and the files API), so pull_request_target is safe.
+on:
+  pull_request_target:
+    types: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened]
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+  pull-requests: write
+  issues: write
+
+concurrency:
+  group: pr-triage-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  triage:
+    name: Quality-signal triage
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 10
+    steps:
+      - name: Label and guide
+        uses: actions/github-script@f28e40c7f34bde8b3046d885e986cb6290c5673b # v7
+        with:
+          script: |
+            const pr = context.payload.pull_request;
+            const { owner, repo } = context.repo;
+            const prNumber = pr.number;
+
+            // Trusted authors bypass triage entirely.
+            const trusted = ["OWNER", "MEMBER", "COLLABORATOR"];
+            if (trusted.includes(pr.author_association)) {
+              core.info(`Author association ${pr.author_association} is trusted; skipping triage.`);
+              return;
+            }
+
+            // Labels this workflow owns. Anything here may be added or removed each run.
+            const MANAGED = ["needs-issue", "needs-description", "needs-tests", "workflow-change"];
+            const want = new Set();
+
+            const body = pr.body || "";
+
+            // Linked issue: look for "closes/fixes/resolves #N" or any bare #N reference.
+            const hasLinkedIssue =
+              /\b(close[sd]?|fix(e[sd])?|resolve[sd]?)\b[^\n]*#\d+/i.test(body) ||
+              /#\d+/.test(body);
+            if (!hasLinkedIssue) want.add("needs-issue");
+
+            // Description substance: strip HTML comments and markdown headings, then measure.
+            const stripped = body
+              .replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, "")
+              .replace(/^#+.*$/gm, "")
+              .trim();
+            if (stripped.length < 50) want.add("needs-description");
+
+            // File-based signals.
+            const files = await github.paginate(github.rest.pulls.listFiles, {
+              owner, repo, pull_number: prNumber, per_page: 100,
+            });
+            const names = files.map(f => f.filename);
+
+            const isFork = pr.head.repo && pr.head.repo.full_name !== pr.base.repo.full_name;
+            const touchesWorkflows = names.some(n => n.startsWith(".github/workflows/"));
+            if (isFork && touchesWorkflows) want.add("workflow-change");
+
+            const changedRust = names.some(n => n.startsWith("crates/") && n.endsWith(".rs"));
+            // A test can live in a tests/ dir, a *_test.rs file, or (the common Rust
+            // pattern) an inline #[test] / #[cfg(test)] block added inside the source file.
+            const addsInlineTest = files.some(f =>
+              f.filename.endsWith(".rs") && f.patch &&
+              /^\+.*#\[(test\]|cfg\(test\))/m.test(f.patch));
+            const touchedTests =
+              names.some(n => n.includes("/tests/") || n.endsWith("_test.rs")) || addsInlineTest;
+            if (changedRust && !touchedTests) want.add("needs-tests");
+
+            // Reconcile labels: add wanted managed labels, remove managed labels no longer wanted.
+            const current = (await github.rest.issues.listLabelsOnIssue({
+              owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber,
+            })).data.map(l => l.name);
+
+            const toAdd = [...want].filter(l => !current.includes(l));
+            const toRemove = MANAGED.filter(l => current.includes(l) && !want.has(l));
+
+            if (toAdd.length) {
+              await github.rest.issues.addLabels({ owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, labels: toAdd });
+            }
+            for (const name of toRemove) {
+              await github.rest.issues.removeLabel({ owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, name })
+                .catch(() => {}); // ignore if already gone
+            }
+
+            // Guidance comment: only for advisory signals, and only once.
+            const advisory = ["needs-issue", "needs-description", "needs-tests"].filter(l => want.has(l));
+            if (!advisory.length) return;
+
+            const MARKER = "<!-- gitlawb-triage -->";
+            const comments = await github.paginate(github.rest.issues.listComments, {
+              owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, per_page: 100,
+            });
+            if (comments.some(c => c.body && c.body.includes(MARKER))) {
+              core.info("Guidance comment already present; not reposting.");
+              return;
+            }
+
+            const reasons = {
+              "needs-issue": "Link the issue this addresses (`Closes #123`). For protocol changes, open an issue first.",
+              "needs-description": "Add a short summary of what changes and why: the template's Summary and Motivation sections.",
+              "needs-tests": "This changes Rust source but no tests changed. Tests are required for fixes and strongly encouraged for features.",
+            };
+            const lines = advisory.map(l => `- ${reasons[l]}`).join("\n");
+            const comment = [
+              MARKER,
+              "Thanks for the contribution. A couple of things will help us review this faster:",
+              "",
+              lines,
+              "",
+              "See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md). Update the PR and these notes will clear automatically.",
+            ].join("\n");
+
+            await github.rest.issues.createComment({ owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, body: comment });

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ concurrency:
   group: release-${{ github.ref }}
   cancel-in-progress: false
 
+# Least privilege by default; every job opts in to exactly what it needs.
+permissions: {}
+
 jobs:
   release-please:
     if: ${{ github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' }}
@@ -24,7 +27,7 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Run release-please
         id: release
-        uses: googleapis/release-please-action@16a9c90856f42705d54a6fda1823352bdc62cf38 # v4.3.0
+        uses: googleapis/release-please-action@45996ed1f6d02564a971a2fa1b5860e934307cf7 # v5.0.0
         with:
           token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
 
@@ -41,6 +44,7 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
           ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Set up QEMU
         uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@29109295f81e9208d7d86ff1c6c12d2833863392 # v3.6.0
@@ -101,6 +105,9 @@ jobs:
     needs: release-please
     if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
     runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
+    # Windows is best-effort: a failure there must not fail the job or block the
+    # downstream npm/Homebrew jobs that only consume the unix artifacts.
+    continue-on-error: ${{ startsWith(matrix.target, 'x86_64-pc-windows') }}
     permissions:
       contents: write
     strategy:
@@ -109,17 +116,24 @@ jobs:
         include:
           - target: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
             os: ubuntu-latest
+          # Native arm64 runner: cross-compiling this target with the glibc
+          # toolchain broke aws-lc-sys, and native lets the smoke test run.
           - target: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
-            os: ubuntu-latest
+            os: ubuntu-24.04-arm
+          # macos-13 (the last plain Intel image) is retired and queues forever;
+          # macos-15-intel is GitHub's supported Intel label.
           - target: x86_64-apple-darwin
-            os: macos-13
+            os: macos-15-intel
           - target: aarch64-apple-darwin
             os: macos-14
+          - target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
+            os: windows-latest
     steps:
       - name: Checkout release tag
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
           ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Set up Rust toolchain
         uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
@@ -127,46 +141,422 @@ jobs:
           toolchain: stable
           targets: ${{ matrix.target }}
 
+      # Both musl targets build natively on a matching-arch runner, so the stock
+      # musl-gcc wrapper is all that's needed (no cross toolchain).
       - name: Install musl tools (linux)
         if: contains(matrix.target, 'linux-musl')
         run: |
           sudo apt-get update
           sudo apt-get install -y musl-tools
-          if [ "${{ matrix.target }}" = "aarch64-unknown-linux-musl" ]; then
-            sudo apt-get install -y gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu
-            echo "CARGO_TARGET_AARCH64_UNKNOWN_LINUX_MUSL_LINKER=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-            echo "CC_aarch64_unknown_linux_musl=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-          fi
 
       - name: Cache cargo
         uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
         with:
           key: ${{ matrix.target }}
 
-      - name: Build
-        run: cargo build --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb -p gitlawb-node
+      # The gitlawb-node daemon is a Linux/macOS service; on Windows we ship only
+      # the two CLI binaries. A Windows-only failure must not block the release.
+      - name: Determine binaries
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          BINS="gl git-remote-gitlawb gitlawb-node"
+          case "${{ matrix.target }}" in *windows*) BINS="gl git-remote-gitlawb" ;; esac
+          echo "BINS=$BINS" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
 
-      - name: Package
-        id: pkg
+      - name: Build
         shell: bash
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
-          NAME="gitlawb-node-${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}-${{ matrix.target }}"
+          args=""
+          for b in $BINS; do args="$args -p $b"; done
+          cargo build --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} $args
+
+      # Run each packaged binary's --version so a broken release artifact fails the
+      # build instead of shipping. Every target builds on a matching-arch runner,
+      # so all of them can execute here.
+      - name: Smoke test binaries
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          VERSION="${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}"
+          BIN_DIR="target/${{ matrix.target }}/release"
+          EXE=""
+          case "${{ matrix.target }}" in *windows*) EXE=".exe" ;; esac
+          for bin in $BINS; do
+            echo "== $bin --version =="
+            out="$("$BIN_DIR/$bin$EXE" --version)"
+            echo "$out"
+            # Each binary prints "<name> <version>"; assert the released version is present.
+            grep -qF "$VERSION" <<<"$out" || {
+              echo "::error::$bin --version did not report expected version $VERSION (got: $out)"
+              exit 1
+            }
+          done
+
+      - name: Package
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          TARGET="${{ matrix.target }}"
+          NAME="gitlawb-node-${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}-${TARGET}"
+          BIN_DIR="target/${TARGET}/release"
+          EXE=""
+          case "$TARGET" in *windows*) EXE=".exe" ;; esac
+
+          # Portable sha256 → "<hash>  <file>" so install scripts and brew can parse it.
+          sha256_file() {
+            local f="$1"
+            if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+              sha256sum "$f"
+            elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+              shasum -a 256 "$f"
+            else
+              local h
+              h=$(certutil -hashfile "$f" SHA256 | sed -n 2p | tr -d ' \r')
+              printf '%s  %s\n' "$h" "$f"
+            fi
+          }
+
           mkdir -p "dist/$NAME"
-          cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/gl" "dist/$NAME/"
-          cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/git-remote-gitlawb" "dist/$NAME/"
-          cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/gitlawb-node" "dist/$NAME/"
+          for bin in $BINS; do
+            cp "$BIN_DIR/$bin$EXE" "dist/$NAME/"
+          done
           cp README.md LICENSE-MIT LICENSE-APACHE "dist/$NAME/"
+
           cd dist
-          tar czf "$NAME.tar.gz" "$NAME"
-          shasum -a 256 "$NAME.tar.gz" > "$NAME.tar.gz.sha256"
-          echo "asset=dist/$NAME.tar.gz" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          echo "checksum=dist/$NAME.tar.gz.sha256" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          case "$TARGET" in
+            *windows*)
+              # 7z is preinstalled on windows-latest runners.
+              7z a -tzip "$NAME.zip" "$NAME" >/dev/null
+              sha256_file "$NAME.zip" > "$NAME.zip.sha256"
+              ;;
+            *)
+              tar czf "$NAME.tar.gz" "$NAME"
+              sha256_file "$NAME.tar.gz" > "$NAME.tar.gz.sha256"
+              ;;
+          esac
 
       - name: Attach to release
         uses: softprops/action-gh-release@72f2c25fcb47643c292f7107632f7a47c1df5cd8 # v2.3.2
         with:
           tag_name: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
           files: |
-            ${{ steps.pkg.outputs.asset }}
-            ${{ steps.pkg.outputs.checksum }}
+            dist/*.tar.gz
+            dist/*.zip
+            dist/*.sha256
+
+  npm-publish:
+    name: Publish to npm
+    needs: [release-please, release-binaries]
+    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      id-token: write # npm provenance
+    steps:
+      - name: Guard on secret
+        id: guard
+        env:
+          NPM_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          if [ -z "${NPM_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
+            echo "::warning::NPM_TOKEN is not set — skipping npm publish."
+            echo "enabled=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          else
+            echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          fi
+
+      - name: Checkout release tag
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Lay in release binaries
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          # npm platform package -> Rust target triple (unix only; Windows is not
+          # published to npm).
+          MAP="
+          gl-darwin-arm64:aarch64-apple-darwin
+          gl-darwin-x64:x86_64-apple-darwin
+          gl-linux-arm64:aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
+          gl-linux-x64:x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
+          "
+          mkdir -p _dl
+          for entry in $MAP; do
+            pkg="${entry%%:*}"
+            target="${entry#*:}"
+            archive="gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-${target}.tar.gz"
+            echo "==> $pkg <- $archive"
+            gh release download "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
+              --pattern "$archive" --dir _dl --clobber
+            tar -xzf "_dl/$archive" -C _dl
+            src="_dl/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-${target}"
+            cp "$src/gl" "npm/packages/$pkg/gl"
+            cp "$src/git-remote-gitlawb" "npm/packages/$pkg/git-remote-gitlawb"
+            chmod +x "npm/packages/$pkg/gl" "npm/packages/$pkg/git-remote-gitlawb"
+          done
+
+      - name: Set versions
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        env:
+          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          node -e '
+            const fs = require("fs");
+            const v = process.env.VERSION;
+            for (const p of fs.readdirSync("npm/packages")) {
+              const f = `npm/packages/${p}/package.json`;
+              const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(f, "utf8"));
+              pkg.version = v;
+              if (pkg.optionalDependencies) {
+                for (const k of Object.keys(pkg.optionalDependencies)) {
+                  pkg.optionalDependencies[k] = v;
+                }
+              }
+              fs.writeFileSync(f, JSON.stringify(pkg, null, 2) + "\n");
+            }
+          '
+
+      - name: Publish
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        env:
+          NPM_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
+          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          echo "//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=${NPM_TOKEN}" > ~/.npmrc
+          # Platform packages first, then the wrapper (so its optionalDependencies resolve).
+          # Skip versions already on the registry so a rerun after a partial publish
+          # is idempotent instead of erroring on the first existing package.
+          for pkg in gl-darwin-arm64 gl-darwin-x64 gl-linux-arm64 gl-linux-x64 gl; do
+            name="@gitlawb/$pkg"
+            if npm view "$name@$VERSION" version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+              echo "==> $name@$VERSION already published, skipping"
+              continue
+            fi
+            echo "==> npm publish $name@$VERSION"
+            npm publish "npm/packages/$pkg" --provenance --access public
+          done
+
+  homebrew-bump:
+    name: Bump Homebrew tap
+    needs: [release-please, release-binaries]
+    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: read # GITHUB_TOKEN downloads release assets; the tap push uses HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT
+    steps:
+      - name: Guard on secret
+        id: guard
+        env:
+          HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
+        run: |
+          if [ -z "${HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT:-}" ]; then
+            echo "::warning::HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT is not set — skipping Homebrew bump."
+            echo "enabled=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          else
+            echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          fi
+
+      - name: Checkout tap repo
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          repository: Gitlawb/homebrew-tap
+          token: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
+          path: tap
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Regenerate formula
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          base="https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${TAG}"
+          mkdir -p _sums
+          gh release download "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
+            --pattern '*.tar.gz.sha256' --dir _sums --clobber
+          sha() { awk '{print $1}' "_sums/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-$1.tar.gz.sha256"; }
+          SHA_MAC_ARM="$(sha aarch64-apple-darwin)"
+          SHA_MAC_X64="$(sha x86_64-apple-darwin)"
+          SHA_LNX_ARM="$(sha aarch64-unknown-linux-musl)"
+          SHA_LNX_X64="$(sha x86_64-unknown-linux-musl)"
+
+          mkdir -p tap/Formula
+          cat > tap/Formula/gl.rb <<EOF
+          class Gl < Formula
+            desc "Gitlawb CLI — decentralized git for AI agents and developers"
+            homepage "https://gitlawb.com"
+            version "${VERSION}"
+            license "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
+
+            on_macos do
+              on_arm do
+                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz"
+                sha256 "${SHA_MAC_ARM}"
+              end
+              on_intel do
+                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.gz"
+                sha256 "${SHA_MAC_X64}"
+              end
+            end
+
+            on_linux do
+              on_arm do
+                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-aarch64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz"
+                sha256 "${SHA_LNX_ARM}"
+              end
+              on_intel do
+                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz"
+                sha256 "${SHA_LNX_X64}"
+              end
+            end
+
+            def install
+              bin.install "gl"
+              bin.install "git-remote-gitlawb"
+            end
+
+            test do
+              assert_match version.to_s, shell_output("#{bin}/gl --version")
+            end
+          end
+          EOF
+
+      - name: Commit and push
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        working-directory: tap
+        env:
+          HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
+          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
+          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
+          # Stage first so a brand-new (untracked) formula is detected by the no-op check.
+          git add Formula/gl.rb
+          if git diff --cached --quiet; then
+            echo "Formula already up to date."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          git commit -m "gl ${VERSION}"
+          # Credentials are not persisted in .git/config; supply the token only for the push.
+          git push "https://x-access-token:${HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT}@github.com/Gitlawb/homebrew-tap.git" HEAD:main
+
+  web-sync:
+    name: Sync web (install scripts + version)
+    needs: [release-please, release-binaries]
+    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: read # GITHUB_TOKEN checks out node; the web PR uses WEB_SYNC_PAT
+    steps:
+      - name: Guard on secret
+        id: guard
+        env:
+          WEB_SYNC_PAT: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
+        run: |
+          if [ -z "${WEB_SYNC_PAT:-}" ]; then
+            echo "::warning::WEB_SYNC_PAT is not set — skipping web sync."
+            echo "enabled=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          else
+            echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          fi
+
+      - name: Checkout node (release tag)
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          path: node
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Checkout web
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          repository: Gitlawb/web
+          token: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
+          path: web
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      # web-sync publishes install.ps1 + version.json, so the Windows ZIP must exist.
+      # Windows is best-effort for npm/Homebrew (continue-on-error), so verify the
+      # asset is present before advertising a release the site can't actually serve.
+      - name: Verify website release assets
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          gh release view "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --json assets \
+            --jq '.assets[].name' > /tmp/release-assets
+          for asset in \
+            "gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip" \
+            "gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip.sha256"; do
+            grep -Fxq "$asset" /tmp/release-assets || {
+              echo "::error::release asset missing: $asset (Windows build likely failed); not syncing web"
+              exit 1
+            }
+          done
+
+      - name: Sync and open PR
+        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
+          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          # Canonical install scripts (source of truth lives in the node repo).
+          cp node/install.sh web/public/install.sh
+          cp node/install.ps1 web/public/install.ps1
+          # Single version source the site can read.
+          printf '{\n  "version": "%s",\n  "tag": "%s"\n}\n' "$VERSION" "$TAG" > web/public/version.json
+          # One-time, idempotent drift fixes: drop orphaned binaries, fix stale link.
+          rm -rf web/public/bin
+          if [ -f web/public/skill.md ]; then
+            sed -i 's#github.com/gitlawb/releases#github.com/Gitlawb/node/releases#g' web/public/skill.md
+          fi
+
+          cd web
+          # Stage first so brand-new (untracked) files are caught by the no-op check.
+          git add -A
+          if git diff --cached --quiet; then
+            echo "web already up to date."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          branch="release-sync/${TAG}"
+          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
+          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
+          git checkout -b "$branch"
+          git commit -m "chore: sync gitlawb ${TAG} (install scripts + version)"
+          # Credentials are not persisted in .git/config; supply the token only for the push.
+          git push --force "https://x-access-token:${GH_TOKEN}@github.com/Gitlawb/web.git" "HEAD:$branch"
+          gh pr create --repo Gitlawb/web --head "$branch" \
+            --title "Sync gitlawb ${TAG}" \
+            --body "Automated sync from Gitlawb/node ${TAG}: install.sh, install.ps1, public/version.json, and one-time drift fixes (removed orphaned public/bin, fixed skill.md releases link). Review and merge to deploy via Vercel." \
+            || {
+              # Only swallow the "PR already exists" case; surface auth/API failures
+              # (a failed gh pr list must not be misread as "PR exists").
+              pr_count="$(gh pr list --repo Gitlawb/web --head "$branch" --state open --json number --jq 'length')" || exit 1
+              if [ "$pr_count" != "0" ]; then
+                echo "PR for $branch already exists; branch was updated."
+              else
+                exit 1
+              fi
+            }

.github/workflows/stale.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+name: Stale PRs
+
+on:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: "30 1 * * *"  # daily at 01:30 UTC
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+  pull-requests: write
+  issues: write
+
+jobs:
+  stale:
+    name: Flag and close ignored PRs
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 10
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/stale@5bef64f19d7facfb25b37b414482c7164d639639 # v9
+        with:
+          days-before-stale: 14
+          days-before-close: 7
+          # Act on PRs only; never on issues.
+          days-before-issue-stale: -1
+          days-before-issue-close: -1
+          # Only PRs the triage step flagged as missing a real description.
+          # needs-issue is advisory-only (linking an issue is a SHOULD, and many
+          # legitimate small PRs have none) so it does not drive auto-close.
+          only-pr-labels: "needs-description"
+          stale-pr-label: "stale"
+          exempt-pr-labels: "workflow-change,security,pinned"
+          remove-stale-when-updated: true
+          stale-pr-message: >
+            This PR has been inactive for 14 days and is still missing a description.
+            It will be closed in 7 days if there's no update. Push a change or leave a
+            comment to keep it open. No hard feelings, you can reopen anytime.
+          close-pr-message: >
+            Closing due to inactivity. Reopen whenever you're ready to update it. See
+            CONTRIBUTING.md for what helps us review quickly.
+          ascending: true

.gitignore

@@ -23,3 +23,6 @@ keys/
 # Logs
 *.log
 .openclaude-profile.json
+
+# Per-operator Fly config (node1 prod config is pulled from Fly, not tracked)
+infra/fly/node1.fly.toml

.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 {
-  ".": "0.3.8"
+  ".": "0.5.1"
 }

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# Changelog
+
+## [0.5.1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.5.0...v0.5.1) (2026-07-10)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **bounties:** add tests for claim_bounty repo-read gate ([#160](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/160)) ([#169](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/169)) ([6bafaa6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6bafaa6dc5f05c0dcd61c708397afddbcf8c2e3f))
+* **deps:** bump crossbeam-epoch to 0.9.20 for RUSTSEC-2026-0204 ([#162](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/162)) ([#163](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/163)) ([67ad2b8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/67ad2b876c8d9a336219d1016968de7a88fc4e75))
+* **node,git:** bound a hung served git with a total-duration timeout ([#62](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/62)) ([#165](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/165)) ([cd67718](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/cd67718f49ec38726a40f6bcf36f539ccdb42969))
+* **node:** bound list_ref_certificates with LIMIT and add upsert to prevent unbounded growth ([#147](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/147)) ([#149](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/149)) ([6b5e5bc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6b5e5bc7aee00a2d03295d3620df1ee4d8c024a2))
+* **node:** gate POST /api/v1/sync/trigger and rate-limit the peer-sync routes ([#82](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/82)) ([#161](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/161)) ([d00d89a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/d00d89ae5be992d1f63e95b714ae1bd3735e8457))
+* **node:** rate-limit repo/agent creation per client IP to stop DID-farm spam floods ([#180](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/180)) ([dfcaa22](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/dfcaa22b23ec91be4c75926956aa994ca89de8d5))
+* **release:** build aarch64-musl natively on arm64 runners, replace retired macos-13 ([#155](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/155)) ([6cff528](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6cff5286b436fdee44ad881999e2a5f4bdba18f9))
+* **visibility:** gate repo-scoped read surfaces on visibility ([#120](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/120)) ([#157](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/157)) ([26bc3f6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/26bc3f69870aa77e43c0d92115a5aa59555b7d88))
+
+## [0.5.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0) (2026-07-05)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* **gl:** sanctioned iCaptcha client flow + secure git lifecycle ([#138](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/138)) ([06388ec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/06388ec26aa29d356ae311276fdb91be054e9ecc))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **gl:** sign the CLI's /ipfs/pins reads under the [#134](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/134) auth gate ([#146](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/146)) ([20d6848](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/20d6848846b3a988d604208833167a528b7d8820))
+* **node,git-remote:** gate receive-pack advertisement, sign client fetch/push ([#119](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/119)) ([6f36fc0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6f36fc07b8e10a650c5948b269feac1cb25cae2a))
+* **node,gossip:** route gossip HTTP through the no-redirect client ([#93](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/93)) ([#140](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/140)) ([563c456](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/563c456803bf3e958d63869db424b3940472bc3d))
+* **node:** close two spam-vector root causes (trust upsert + ungated push) ([#152](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/152)) ([2df6ff9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2df6ff9d30de62f754fa41473e85db316021718e))
+* **node:** gate GET /ipfs/{cid} on reachable allowed-set, not deny-set ([#126](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/126)) ([#133](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/133)) ([466a550](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/466a550915edd711856ef32035f9f474e2577c4f))
+* **node:** gate the ref-updates feeds on read visibility ([#112](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/112), [#114](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/114)) ([#143](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/143)) ([4891db3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/4891db38892663326ee0c1417a2db931988be4b5))
+* **node:** prefer canonical repo row over mirror row in get_repo ([#124](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/124)) ([#141](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/141)) ([6c95592](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6c95592d188222ac3446dc23ef8d9befbf82ad6f))
+* **remote:** include HTTP error response body ([#137](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/137)) ([09a0cb2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/09a0cb23b9f284ccbd69aca6958b70671f3bfb46))
+* **repos:** log the cause when repo create fails ([#103](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/103)) ([2620e97](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2620e973e3cd4835ed42ddd4adcd8183b5b3080e))
+
+## [0.4.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.3.9...v0.4.0) (2026-06-30)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* agent profiles (display name, bio, avatar, social links) ([#23](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/23)) ([09a3397](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/09a339745eca40a2567d911e947e3fc7426fc621))
+* **db:** versioned schema migrations with idempotent backfill ([#21](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/21)) ([927e4d0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/927e4d0cfb4ea11dca6930780939afaa067797ba))
+* encrypted replication for private subtrees (B1/B2/B3) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#36](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/36)) ([5ff7af8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/5ff7af84fa21fab53a12dfa04a0e7fb7e7d672e6))
+* **git-remote-gitlawb:** add --version and --help flags ([#30](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/30)) ([3a401eb](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3a401eb0792f9c5f5a10de6c16861655ab3836e0))
+* **gitlawb-attest:** External Attestation v1 for ref-update certs ([#20](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/20)) ([924bccd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/924bccd8e53e9be2dc9d6d4e4f1376952d6462bb))
+* **node:** blind recipient identities at rest and gate B1 by repo readability ([#40](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/40)) ([abdc775](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/abdc7757708d2bbb2bfda99bb65d50756142a42e))
+* **node:** enforce per-route authorization across the REST and GraphQL surface ([#87](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/87)) ([2202b00](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2202b0097fab6976ab366a2cdc385f1146a72f86))
+* **node:** graceful shutdown + Prometheus metrics endpoint ([#22](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/22)) ([2ce4da9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2ce4da9cc5a4791e8ae5a1cd90270b67f60d9ec3))
+* **node:** iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate on create_repo + register ([#108](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/108)) ([adc20f9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/adc20f9effad7b42fab55002875d209c4ed79518))
+* **node:** iCaptcha-aware repo propagation gate with quarantine ([#125](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/125)) ([8b9ceec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/8b9ceec25ef338965d1db72d39a7f2adb5300cc9))
+* **node:** owner-only push enforcement behind GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH ([#31](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/31)) ([#68](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/68)) ([0a15e76](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/0a15e763d2ab46737a3831715facbe51045b33ba))
+* **node:** peer partial-mirrors for repos with private subtrees ([#35](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/35)) ([e365a57](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e365a57b51c167abf06e87bfeb0565c80ed1b849))
+* **node:** pin the per-push object delta instead of re-enumerating the whole repo ([#90](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/90)) ([1af4fdf](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/1af4fdf485c7084cd160551b757b1ad1eed65cc6))
+* **node:** replication enforcement (Phase 2) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#34](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/34)) ([8680d0f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/8680d0f9d6600bba1a52d15624f8a2802a169511))
+* **node:** signature-gated agent self-deregister ([#29](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/29)) ([#63](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/63)) ([ff492b4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/ff492b452126f5568dac4286a7249f0cadb8b380))
+* **node:** subtree content withholding (Phase 3) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#28](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/28)) ([61b3830](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/61b383019fd895a1a6adfad934ad6c626e0f095e))
+* path-scoped repository visibility (Phase 1) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#25](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/25)) ([6abaf1d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6abaf1d7ed8fc55c6547568ae7247131311bde98))
+* per-DID rate limiting on creation endpoints (10/hour) ([#13](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/13)) ([b12c6bc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b12c6bc3283c2647224a62fb520a3cb7acf4a747))
+* **sync:** auto-register as replica with origin after successful mirror ([#56](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/56)) ([c03c9af](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c03c9af8fadafe262a2bf3cf25e19edf7160d376))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **api:** blob endpoint returns 400/404 instead of 500 on bad paths ([#37](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/37)) ([b61a1bd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b61a1bd46ffe78b39c0967e97b0ad349eba0b046))
+* **core:** route seed access through the zeroizing wrapper ([#41](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/41)) ([#64](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/64)) ([c9f43b0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c9f43b010576edb3c92a3be3d935cad232250344))
+* **core:** zeroize the derived X25519 secret ([#65](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/65)) ([#91](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/91)) ([2f6611a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2f6611a30fbb66cef9991cf4c6e507548acc5038))
+* **gl:** paginate gl-clone Arweave recovery and make /encrypted-blobs parsing schema-strict ([#49](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/49)) ([#70](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/70)) ([2153b0b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2153b0b7a67a48c29a33cd70b80cfbb69760805d))
+* **infra:** drop fly idle_timeout 600 -> 120 ([#38](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/38)) ([a2217bf](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/a2217bff27ff3d6cae02bd8a12f8a0af7ce2b0a1))
+* **node:** anchor the real old_sha and issue a per-ref certificate ([#72](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/72)) ([6809201](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6809201daa223d6f833be6e95876a7b4e1f2b0b5))
+* **node:** close under-withholding via full ref scope and full-history classification ([#42](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/42)) ([#84](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/84)) ([3e1e904](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3e1e9045e4e3aa5ea0aee69767ceb01637920d2a))
+* **node:** dedupe mirror and canonical repo rows on list surfaces ([#6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/6)) ([#73](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/73)) ([3e8e333](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3e8e333aa03d7a2fe455d5d83f23089d58feb8c9))
+* **node:** enforce path-scoped visibility on the REST read API ([#52](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/52)) ([e37ea7f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e37ea7fec6d5a3171b526c84f884670bbbd258fb))
+* **node:** fail closed when a recipient DID can't be resolved ([#47](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/47)) ([#67](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/67)) ([abc9ad0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/abc9ad03acb48e608234650a25049622673fa53a))
+* **node:** gate fork_repo on per-caller path-scoped visibility ([#98](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/98)) ([#109](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/109)) ([6ae316c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6ae316cc88521747cbacb2a612b9433897d2e490))
+* **node:** gate GET /ipfs/{cid} on per-caller path-scoped visibility ([#110](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/110)) ([#128](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/128)) ([174f25a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/174f25a206380b26796b8782e1bd860b0a409fc9))
+* **node:** gate repo-listing and stats surfaces on visibility ([#97](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/97), [#99](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/99), [#101](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/101), [#104](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/104)) ([#111](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/111)) ([828dd27](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/828dd279a286f58bbb3c73627b2a1e23778b25cf))
+* **node:** make Tigris repo hydration resilient to corrupt archives & failed writes ([#54](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/54)) ([7a99d0f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/7a99d0f27cfa869e9f8a803f16cff30191745a51))
+* **node:** preserve promisor mirror mode on unknown withheld-paths lookup ([#48](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/48)) ([#69](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/69)) ([96fcfdb](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/96fcfdb1ca6d4cd27226670068702c9f177e283a))
+* **node:** reap leaked git child processes ([#53](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/53)) ([#61](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/61)) ([803d83e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/803d83efdbcfa9d98affac1c5aaf8aacc511ae64))
+* **node:** reject malformed path globs with non-trailing or empty-segment wildcards ([#74](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/74)) ([#75](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/75)) ([3d880cd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3d880cd56fed10e4c5ae787b52ce411384950f5e))
+* **node:** skip withheld-walk when no path-scoped rule can withhold ([#60](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/60)) ([338ff83](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/338ff83584f2ab960be7e42ecec64191f5aaeb95))
+* **release:** give crates explicit versions for release-please ([#129](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/129)) ([788a868](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/788a8686c1deafe03573703d72eb927cde81f54d))
+* **release:** use simple release-type + generic Cargo.toml updaters ([#130](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/130)) ([12bfb1b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/12bfb1b3c86b38f0b22d488cd6e85dfd96e0c37f))
+* **security:** gate webhook creation through the public-host validator ([#81](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/81)) ([#92](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/92)) ([f28fa02](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/f28fa02236bd65c6a4fb690131ab14640cc53a12))
+* **security:** reject non-public peer URLs + prune poisoned peers ([#78](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/78)) ([a8cc33a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/a8cc33a185f2649d3fe100ec271ee5739a55eba7))

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -55,10 +55,29 @@ Smart contracts live in a separate repo: [github.com/Gitlawb/contracts](https://
 4. **Conventional commits.** Use `feat:`, `fix:`, `docs:`, `refactor:`, `test:`, `chore:`. Releases are automated by [release-please](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please) — your commit prefixes drive the next version bump.
 5. **Format and lint.** Run `cargo fmt --all` and `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` before submitting. CI will reject anything that fails these.
 
+## What gets merged, what gets closed
+
+We welcome contributions from humans and agents alike. To keep review sustainable, PRs are
+expected to clear a basic quality bar:
+
+- **Link an issue.** Bug fixes and features should reference an issue (`Closes #123`). For
+  protocol-level changes (identity, signatures, UCAN, ref certs, wire formats), open the
+  issue *before* writing code.
+- **One change per PR.** Unrelated churn slows review and gets sent back.
+- **Tests and a green pipeline.** New behavior needs tests; `cargo fmt`, `cargo clippy`,
+  and the full CI suite must pass.
+- **A real description.** Say what changes and why. "Update code" is not a description.
+
+A triage bot labels PRs that are missing these and leaves a short note. Nothing is closed
+automatically while you're engaging. A flagged PR still missing a description after 14 days of
+inactivity gets a stale warning, and is closed 7 days later if still untouched. A missing issue
+link alone never triggers closure; that label stays advisory. Closed PRs can be reopened at any
+time once updated.
+
 ## Development environment
 
 **Requirements:**
-- Rust stable (≥ 1.85) — install via [rustup](https://rustup.rs)
+- Rust stable (≥ 1.91) — install via [rustup](https://rustup.rs)
 - PostgreSQL — required for the node. Use the bundled `docker-compose.yml` for local dev.
 - Docker (optional, for full-stack local testing)
 

Cargo.toml

@@ -5,11 +5,20 @@ members = [
     "crates/gitlawb-node",
     "crates/gl",
     "crates/git-remote-gitlawb",
+    "crates/gitlawb-attest",
+    "crates/icaptcha-client",
 ]
 
 [workspace.package]
-version = "0.3.9"
+# Per-crate versions live in each crate's [package] so release-please can manage
+# them (it cannot rewrite an inherited `version.workspace = true`). They are kept
+# in lockstep by release-please's generic updater: each crate's `version` line
+# carries an `# x-release-please-version` annotation and is listed under
+# `extra-files` in release-please-config.json. The release type is `simple`
+# (not `rust`) because the rust strategy unconditionally tries to rewrite this
+# virtual workspace root as a package manifest and errors out.
 edition = "2021"
+rust-version = "1.91"
 license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
 authors = ["gitlawb contributors"]
 repository = "https://github.com/gitlawb/node"
@@ -20,12 +29,13 @@ tokio = { version = "1", features = ["full"] }
 # serialization
 serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
 serde_json = "1"
+serde_jcs = "0.2"
 # errors
 thiserror = "2"
 anyhow = "1"
 # crypto
 ed25519-dalek = { version = "2", features = ["rand_core", "pkcs8", "pem"] }
-rand = "0.8"
+rand = "0.8.6"
 sha2 = "0.10"
 # encoding
 hex = "0.4.3"
@@ -45,3 +55,7 @@ uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4"] }
 reqwest = { version = "0.12", features = ["blocking", "json", "multipart", "rustls-tls"], default-features = false }
 # HMAC
 hmac = "0.12"
+
+[profile.release]
+lto = "thin"
+strip = "symbols"

Dockerfile

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
         git \
         ca-certificates \
         curl \
+        tini \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
 # Non-root user for runtime
@@ -65,11 +66,18 @@ ENV GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR=/data/repos \
     GITLAWB_PORT=7545 \
     GITLAWB_P2P_PORT=7546
 
-EXPOSE 7545 7546
+EXPOSE 7545 7546/udp
 
 VOLUME ["/data"]
 
 HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=15s --retries=3 \
     CMD curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:${GITLAWB_PORT}/health || exit 1
 
-ENTRYPOINT ["gitlawb-node"]
+# Run under tini so the node is never PID 1. As PID 1 a process must reap
+# reparented orphans itself; the node does not, so git's reparented grandchildren
+# (e.g. pack-objects orphaned when a served upload-pack dies on a client
+# disconnect) would accumulate as zombies until fork() fails with EAGAIN (#53).
+# tini reaps them and forwards SIGTERM/SIGINT to the node, which runs its own
+# graceful shutdown. (No `-g`: the node manages its own children, so group-wide
+# signalling would only disturb in-flight git helpers during shutdown.)
+ENTRYPOINT ["tini", "--", "gitlawb-node"]

README.md

@@ -1,49 +1,321 @@
-# gitlawb node
+# Gitlawb Node
 
-**Decentralized git for AI agents and developers.** Run your own node, host repos under your own DID, and connect to the gitlawb network.
+**Decentralized git infrastructure for developers, AI agents, and app delivery.**
 
-This repository contains the open-source node software:
+Gitlawb Node is the open-source node software behind the Gitlawb network. It lets anyone run a self-hosted node, publish repositories under a DID, sign writes with Ed25519 HTTP signatures, replicate git activity across peers, and move toward a resilient app-delivery network where code and build assets can be served closer to users.
 
-- `gitlawb-node` — Axum HTTP server, git smart-HTTP, libp2p gossip, optional S3-compatible storage
-- `gl` — CLI for identity, repos, PRs, MCP server
-- `git-remote-gitlawb` — `git remote helper` for `gitlawb://` URLs
-- `gitlawb-core` — shared crypto primitives (DID, CID, HTTP signatures, UCAN)
+Gitlawb is not trying to be only “another git host.” The long-term direction is:
+
+```txt
+Decentralized GitHub
++ signed agent-native workflows
++ resilient repo replication
++ CDN-style app/code delivery
+```
+
+The mission is simple: once code is pushed to the network, it should not disappear because one server went down.
 
 ---
 
-## Quickstart
+## What is in this repository?
 
-The fastest way to run a node is via Docker. You'll get a node + Postgres locally with one command.
+This is a Rust workspace with four crates:
+
+| Crate | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `gitlawb-node` | The node daemon: Axum HTTP server, git smart-HTTP, Postgres metadata, libp2p gossip, optional S3/Tigris/IPFS/Arweave/Base PoS hooks. |
+| `gl` | The Gitlawb CLI for identity, repos, issues, PRs, bounties, tasks, peers, node status, MCP, and setup flows. |
+| `git-remote-gitlawb` | Git remote helper for `gitlawb://` URLs, so normal `git clone`, `git fetch`, and `git push` can talk to Gitlawb nodes. |
+| `gitlawb-core` | Shared primitives: Ed25519 identities, `did:key`, CIDs, RFC 9421 HTTP signatures, certificates, and UCAN tokens. |
+
+---
+
+## Why Gitlawb Nodes?
+
+Most git hosting today depends on a small number of centralized platforms. Gitlawb Nodes are designed for a different model:
+
+- **Own your identity** — every user, agent, and node is an Ed25519 keypair represented as `did:key:z6Mk...`.
+- **Signed writes by default** — write requests use RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures instead of passwords.
+- **Git-native transport** — repositories are still real git repositories served over smart HTTP.
+- **Agent-native workflows** — the `gl` CLI and MCP server expose repo, issue, task, PR, and UCAN flows to AI agents.
+- **Peer-aware delivery** — nodes can announce, discover, gossip, and sync with each other.
+- **App CDN direction** — the network can evolve from decentralized code storage into code + asset + app delivery.
+
+---
+
+## Current status
+
+Gitlawb Node is live early infrastructure. It is useful today, but some security and reliability features are intentionally staged for compatibility with existing nodes.
+
+Good today:
+
+- Local or Docker node startup.
+- Postgres-backed repo metadata.
+- Bare git repository storage.
+- Git smart-HTTP clone/fetch/push.
+- RFC 9421-signed writes.
+- DID identities.
+- `gl` CLI workflows.
+- libp2p peer discovery/gossip foundation.
+- Optional Tigris/S3 storage.
+- Optional IPFS/Pinata and Arweave/Irys hooks.
+- Optional Base node-operator staking/heartbeat hooks.
+
+Known limitations:
+
+- Private repository read enforcement is not wired yet. Treat public nodes as public infrastructure unless you restrict access at your proxy/firewall.
+- UCAN chain validation and revocation are not complete.
+- Repository write authorization is not capability-complete yet; HTTP signatures prove identity, not full authorization policy.
+- Peer writes are signed by upgraded nodes, but strict signed-peer enforcement is opt-in during rolling upgrades.
+- GraphQL mutations need mutation-aware auth before becoming a public write surface.
+
+See:
+
+- [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md)
+- [`docs/OSS-READINESS-AUDIT.md`](docs/OSS-READINESS-AUDIT.md)
+- [`docs/MAINTAINER-ROADMAP.md`](docs/MAINTAINER-ROADMAP.md)
+
+---
+
+## Quickstart: run a local node
+
+The fastest path is Docker Compose. It starts a node and Postgres.
 
 ```bash
-git clone https://github.com/gitlawb/node.git
+git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/node.git
 cd node
 cp .env.example .env
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 
-Your node is now serving:
+Your local node will serve:
 
-- HTTP + git smart-HTTP on `:7545`
-- libp2p gossip on `:7546`
+| Service | Default |
+|---|---|
+| HTTP API + git smart-HTTP | `http://localhost:7545` |
+| libp2p QUIC/UDP | `7546` |
+| Postgres | compose-managed |
 
 Verify:
 
 ```bash
 curl http://localhost:7545/health
+curl http://localhost:7545/api/v1/stats
+```
+
+Expected health response:
+
+```json
+{ "status": "ok" }
+```
+
+Stop it:
+
+```bash
+docker compose down
 ```
 
 ---
 
-## How it works
+## Install the CLI
 
-- **Identity** — every actor (human or agent) is an Ed25519 keypair → `did:key:z6Mk...`. No accounts, no passwords.
-- **Auth** — every write is signed via HTTP Signatures (RFC 9421).
-- **Delegation** — UCAN capability tokens.
-- **Storage** — local disk + optional S3-compatible bucket (Tigris, MinIO, AWS S3).
-- **Networking** — libp2p Gossipsub for ref-update events, Kademlia DHT for node discovery.
+```bash
+# npm (macOS / Linux)
+npm install -g @gitlawb/gl
 
-The node is **stateless beyond Postgres + the repos directory.** You can scale horizontally by pointing multiple nodes at a shared S3 bucket and database.
+# Homebrew (macOS / Linux)
+brew install gitlawb/tap/gl
+
+# curl (macOS / Linux)
+curl -fsSL https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh
+
+# PowerShell (Windows)
+irm https://gitlawb.com/install.ps1 | iex
+```
+
+Or build from source:
+
+```bash
+cargo build --release -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb -p gitlawb-node
+```
+
+Put these binaries on your `PATH`:
+
+```txt
+target/release/gl
+target/release/git-remote-gitlawb
+target/release/gitlawb-node
+```
+
+Check your setup:
+
+```bash
+gl doctor
+```
+
+---
+
+## First repo flow
+
+Create an identity:
+
+```bash
+gl identity new
+gl identity show
+```
+
+Register against your local node:
+
+```bash
+gl register --node http://localhost:7545
+```
+
+Create a repo:
+
+```bash
+gl repo create my-repo --description "My first Gitlawb repo" --node http://localhost:7545
+```
+
+Use the git remote helper:
+
+```bash
+export GITLAWB_NODE=http://localhost:7545
+git clone gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../my-repo
+```
+
+For public-network use, make sure `GITLAWB_NODE` points to the node you want. The helper defaults to localhost for local development.
+
+### Full lifecycle against an iCaptcha-enforcing node
+
+Public nodes (e.g. `node.gitlawb.com`) require two things on writes:
+
+1. **RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures** — every write is signed by your identity key. `gl`
+   and the `git-remote-gitlawb` helper do this automatically. An old/unsigned CLI
+   fails with `401 not_an_agent`; `gl` will tell you to upgrade and register.
+2. **An iCaptcha proof** on the spam-gated writes (**repo create, fork, register**).
+   `gl` solves this for you: on the node's `403 icaptcha_proof_required` it reads the
+   `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` hints, requests a challenge, solves it
+   locally (arithmetic / algebra / sequence), and **retries the same signed request**
+   with the `x-icaptcha-proof` header — no manual steps, no env vars.
+
+```bash
+gl identity new                                   # create did:key identity
+gl register      --node https://node.gitlawb.com  # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
+gl repo create memlawb --node https://node.gitlawb.com   # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
+git push  origin2 main                            # origin2 = gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb (signed)
+git clone gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb            # public read, no proof needed
+gl doctor                                         # preflight: identity, node, version, iCaptcha
+```
+
+Notes:
+
+- **`requesterId` is always your DID.** The proof's `sub` claim must equal the
+  authenticated signer; `gl`/helper set this automatically and the node enforces
+  `sub == authenticated DID` (so a proof minted for another identity is rejected).
+- **Proofs are short-lived (~5 min TTL) and single-use.** If one expires between
+  solving and use, the client transparently solves a fresh one and retries.
+- **What needs what:** create / fork / register are signed **and** iCaptcha-gated;
+  `git push` is **signed-only** (owner signature is the gate — no per-push challenge);
+  reads (clone / fetch / `repo info`) need no proof. A non-existent repo returns a
+  clear `404`, never a placeholder.
+- **API-key iCaptcha deployments:** set `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL` to your iCaptcha
+  origin and `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY` to its key. The client only talks to an
+  `https` origin whose host is allowlisted (that URL or the public default), and
+  sends the bearer token **only** to your configured origin — never to a URL a
+  node advertises — so a hostile node can't capture the key or redirect the solve.
+
+---
+
+## Architecture
+
+```txt
+┌──────────────────────────┐
+│ gl CLI / git / AI agents │
+└────────────┬─────────────┘
+             │ signed HTTP writes / git smart-HTTP
+             ↓
+┌──────────────────────────┐
+│ gitlawb-node             │
+│ Axum API + git routes    │
+└────────────┬─────────────┘
+             │
+    ┌────────┴────────┐
+    ↓                 ↓
+Postgres        Bare git repos
+metadata        local disk / optional S3
+    │                 │
+    └────────┬────────┘
+             ↓
+       libp2p peers
+  gossip + discovery + sync
+             ↓
+ optional IPFS / Arweave / Base PoS
+```
+
+### Core concepts
+
+| Concept | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| DID | A user, agent, or node identity derived from an Ed25519 public key. |
+| HTTP Signature | RFC 9421 signature proving control of the DID key for write requests. |
+| Ref certificate | Signed record of a ref update. Useful for audit and replication. |
+| UCAN | Delegation token for future capability-based workflows. |
+| Peer announce | Node-to-node HTTP announcement of DID + public URL. |
+| Gossipsub | libp2p topic for ref-update events. |
+| Smart HTTP | Standard git protocol over HTTP for clone/fetch/push. |
+
+---
+
+## API surface
+
+The node exposes both git smart-HTTP routes and JSON APIs.
+
+Common public read routes:
+
+```txt
+GET /health
+GET /
+GET /api/v1/stats
+GET /api/v1/contracts
+GET /api/v1/repos
+GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}
+GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/tree
+GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/blob/{path}
+GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues
+GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls
+GET /api/v1/peers
+GET /{owner}/{repo}/info/refs
+POST /{owner}/{repo}/git-upload-pack
+```
+
+Signed write routes include:
+
+```txt
+POST /api/v1/repos
+POST /api/register
+POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/fork
+POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues
+POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls
+POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/merge
+POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks
+POST /api/v1/bounties/{id}/...
+POST /{owner}/{repo}/git-receive-pack
+```
+
+These peer write routes support staged rollout:
+
+```txt
+POST /api/v1/peers/announce
+POST /api/v1/sync/notify
+```
+
+When `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false`, unsigned legacy peers are accepted on those two routes, but signed requests are verified when signature headers are present. Once all live peers upgrade, operators can set:
+
+```bash
+GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=true
+```
+
+`POST /api/v1/sync/trigger` is not part of the staged rollout: it always requires a signature in both config modes and returns 401 without one, because each call drives an O(peers) outbound fan-out.
 
 ---
 
@@ -51,116 +323,186 @@ The node is **stateless beyond Postgres + the repos directory.** You can scale h
 
 All configuration is via environment variables. See [`.env.example`](.env.example) for the full reference.
 
-The minimum required:
+Minimum required for a persistent node:
 
-- `DATABASE_URL` — Postgres connection string
+```env
+DATABASE_URL=postgresql://gitlawb:changeme@localhost:5432/gitlawb
+```
 
-Everything else has sensible defaults. Optional features:
+Important node settings:
 
-- `GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET` (+ AWS credentials) — S3-compatible shared storage
-- `GITLAWB_PINATA_JWT` — IPFS warm-storage pinning
-- `GITLAWB_IRYS_URL` — Arweave permanent anchoring
-- `GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS` — comma-separated peer URLs to announce to on startup
-- `GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP` — comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs
+| Variable | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `GITLAWB_HOST` / `GITLAWB_PORT` | HTTP bind address and port. |
+| `GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR` | Local bare repo storage directory. |
+| `GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL` | Public HTTP URL announced to peers. |
+| `GITLAWB_P2P_PORT` | libp2p QUIC/UDP port. Use `0` to disable. |
+| `GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS` | Comma-separated HTTP peer URLs. |
+| `GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP` | Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs. |
+| `GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS` | Disable embedded seed peers for isolated dev/test networks. |
+| `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES` | Require signed peer announce/sync writes. |
+| `GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC` | Enable automatic sync from known peers. |
+| `GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES` | Max git pack body size for smart-HTTP routes. |
+| `GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS` | Max seconds a served git upload-pack/receive-pack may run before it is aborted (504). Default 600. Does not bound `info/refs` or the withheld-blob path. |
+| `GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET` | Optional S3/Tigris shared repo storage bucket. |
+| `GITLAWB_PINATA_JWT` | Optional Pinata/IPFS warm-storage pinning. |
+| `GITLAWB_IRYS_URL` | Optional Irys/Arweave permanent anchoring. |
 
-### On-chain Proof-of-Stake (advanced, optional)
-
-The node supports an optional on-chain PoS layer where operators register their DID, stake $GITLAWB on Base L2, and receive a share of protocol fees. Smart contracts are in a separate repository at [github.com/gitlawb/contracts](https://github.com/gitlawb/contracts).
-
-PoS is **disabled by default** and currently paused pending external audit. To enable, set `GITLAWB_CONTRACT_NODE_STAKING` and `GITLAWB_OPERATOR_PRIVATE_KEY`. See [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md) for details.
+Production note: change the default Postgres password before exposing a node publicly.
 
 ---
 
-## Build from source
+## Optional node staking
 
-Requires Rust 1.85+ and a Postgres instance.
+Gitlawb Node includes optional Base L2 node-operator hooks. Operators can register a node DID, stake `$GITLAWB`, and post heartbeats.
+
+PoS is disabled unless these are configured:
+
+```env
+GITLAWB_CONTRACT_NODE_STAKING=0x...
+GITLAWB_OPERATOR_PRIVATE_KEY=0x...
+GITLAWB_CHAIN_RPC_URL=https://mainnet.base.org
+```
+
+Recommended for operators:
+
+```env
+GITLAWB_OPERATOR_STRICT_MODE=true
+GITLAWB_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_HOURS=20
+```
+
+Read:
+
+- [`docs/RUN-A-NODE.md`](docs/RUN-A-NODE.md)
+- [`docs/ECONOMICS.md`](docs/ECONOMICS.md)
+
+Use a dedicated low-balance operator wallet. Do not use a treasury wallet as the heartbeat key.
+
+---
+
+## Building from source
+
+Requires Rust 1.91+.
 
 ```bash
 cargo build --release -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
 ```
 
-Binaries are placed in `target/release/`. The `gl` and `git-remote-gitlawb` binaries should be on your `$PATH` for client use.
-
----
-
-## CLI usage
+Run tests:
 
 ```bash
-gl identity new
-gl register --node http://localhost:7545
-gl repo create my-repo --description "..."
-git clone gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../my-repo
+cargo fmt --all -- --check
+cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
+cargo test --workspace
 ```
 
-Full CLI reference: `gl --help`.
+Run the node from source:
 
----
-
-## Architecture
-
-```
-crates/
-├── gitlawb-core/        crypto primitives (DID, CID, HTTP sigs, UCAN)
-├── gitlawb-node/        node daemon (Axum + git smart-HTTP)
-├── gl/                  CLI
-└── git-remote-gitlawb/  git remote helper
+```bash
+DATABASE_URL=postgresql://gitlawb:changeme@localhost:5432/gitlawb \
+  cargo run -p gitlawb-node --release
 ```
 
 ---
 
-## macOS Menu Bar App
+## macOS menu bar app
 
-A native Swift/AppKit menu bar app that manages the Docker Compose stack (node + Postgres) without touching the terminal.
+A native Swift/AppKit menu bar app is included for managing a local Docker Compose stack without living in the terminal.
 
-**Requirements:** macOS 26+, Xcode Command Line Tools (`xcode-select --install`), and a Docker runtime (Docker Desktop, OrbStack, or Colima).
+Requirements:
 
-### Build
+- macOS 26+
+- Xcode Command Line Tools
+- Docker Desktop, OrbStack, or Colima
+
+Build:
 
 ```bash
 ./scripts/build-macos-app.sh
 ```
 
-The resulting `Gitlawb Node.app` and `.dmg` are placed in `dist/`.
+Output:
 
-To codesign for distribution:
-
-```bash
-./scripts/build-macos-app.sh --sign "Developer ID Application: ..."
+```txt
+dist/Gitlawb Node.app
+dist/Gitlawb Node.dmg
 ```
 
-### Features
+Features:
 
-- Start/Stop the node from the menu bar
-- Status indicator (green = running, yellow = starting, red = stopped)
-- Settings GUI (ports, Postgres password, operator config)
-- Auto-start on login
-- Detects Docker Desktop, OrbStack, and Colima automatically
+- Start/stop local node stack.
+- Status indicator.
+- Settings GUI.
+- Auto-start on login.
+- Docker runtime detection.
 
-### Running an unsigned build
-
-If you built the app locally without a Developer ID, macOS Gatekeeper will block it. To allow it:
+Unsigned local build:
 
 ```bash
 xattr -cr "dist/Gitlawb Node.app"
 ```
 
-Then open the app normally. Alternatively, go to **System Settings → Privacy & Security** and click **Open Anyway** after the first blocked launch attempt.
+---
+
+## Roadmap
+
+The current maintainer focus is live-network stability first.
+
+Short-term priorities:
+
+1. Keep CI green: fmt, clippy, tests, release build.
+2. Add Docker and installer smoke tests.
+3. Improve operator docs and `gl doctor` checks.
+4. Harden peer writes and publish the signed-peer rollout plan.
+5. Implement repo write authorization: owner checks, protected branches, and UCAN capability checks.
+6. Implement private-read enforcement or remove private repo affordances until it exists.
+7. Add metrics for pushes, fetches, pack sizes, peer sync, failed auth, and webhooks.
+
+Product direction:
+
+1. Reliable repo replication.
+2. Health-aware peer syncing.
+3. CDN-style clone/fetch routing to healthy replicas.
+4. App asset/build delivery from nodes.
+5. Operator dashboard and desktop UX.
+
+Read the maintainer roadmap:
+
+```txt
+docs/MAINTAINER-ROADMAP.md
+```
 
 ---
 
 ## Contributing
 
-See [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md). Security issues: see [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md).
+Start here:
+
+- [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md)
+- [`docs/MAINTAINER-ROADMAP.md`](docs/MAINTAINER-ROADMAP.md)
+- [`docs/OSS-READINESS-AUDIT.md`](docs/OSS-READINESS-AUDIT.md)
+- [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md)
+
+Good first contribution areas:
+
+- docs and install polish
+- Docker smoke tests
+- CLI error messages
+- `gl doctor` checks
+- operator dashboard UX
+- test coverage for peer sync and signed writes
+
+Security issues should follow [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md).
+
+---
 
 ## License
 
-Licensed under either of
+Licensed under either of:
 
 - Apache License, Version 2.0 ([LICENSE-APACHE](LICENSE-APACHE) or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0)
 - MIT license ([LICENSE-MIT](LICENSE-MIT) or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
 
 at your option.
 
-### Contribution
-
-Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the work by you, as defined in the Apache-2.0 license, shall be dual licensed as above, without any additional terms or conditions.
+Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in this project shall be dual licensed as above, without any additional terms or conditions.

SECURITY.md

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to release a fix within 14 d
 
 ## Current Security Architecture
 
-### What is production-ready (v0.1)
+### Current live security controls
 
 **Ed25519 identity and HTTP Signatures**
 - Every write operation is signed with RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures
@@ -42,35 +42,46 @@ We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to release a fix within 14 d
 
 ## Dependency Vulnerability Status
 
-| Crate | Advisory | Severity | Status |
-|-------|----------|----------|--------|
-| `rsa 0.9.x` | RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack | Medium | Unexploitable — bundled via `sqlx-mysql` internals; gitlawb uses PostgreSQL only, MySQL auth code is never executed. No upstream fix available. |
-| `lru 0.12.x` | RUSTSEC-2026-0002 unsound IterMut | Warning | In `libp2p-swarm`; the specific unsafe code path is internal to libp2p and not reachable through gitlawb's usage. No upstream fix yet. |
+| Area | Status |
+|------|--------|
+| Dependabot alerts | Current open Rust alerts were addressed by updating vulnerable dependencies, removing libp2p mDNS, and moving P2P transport from TCP/Yamux to QUIC/UDP. |
 
 ---
 
 ## Known Limitations (Planned for v0.2)
 
-These are **documented, accepted limitations** for the current testnet release. They will be addressed before mainnet.
+These are **documented, accepted limitations** for the current live release and should be prioritized without breaking existing nodes during rolling upgrades.
 
 ### UCAN chain validation
 - The auth middleware verifies HTTP Signatures and token structure, but does not yet walk the full UCAN delegation chain.
 - **Impact:** A node cannot yet enforce fine-grained capability delegation. Currently, any registered agent with a valid HTTP Signature can push.
-- **Mitigation:** Nodes can set `GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ=false` to restrict access. The v0.1 trust score system provides soft rate limiting.
+- **Mitigation:** Keep write endpoints signed, treat public nodes as public infrastructure, and treat trust scores as soft rate-limiting signals rather than authorization.
 - **Fix target:** v0.2
 
 ### UCAN revocation
 - Issued UCAN tokens cannot be revoked before expiry.
 - **Impact:** If a keypair is compromised, the attacker retains access until the UCAN expires (default: 30 days).
-- **Mitigation:** Regenerate your identity (`gl identity new --force`) and re-register to issue a new UCAN. Nodes will reject the old DID on sight if manually blocklisted.
+- **Mitigation:** Regenerate your identity (`gl identity new --force`) and re-register to issue a new UCAN. Until revocation/blocklisting is implemented, operators should remove compromised DIDs directly from their local database.
 - **Fix target:** v0.2
 
 ### git-receive-pack authentication
-- The `git-receive-pack` endpoint enforces HTTP Signature auth via the `git-remote-gitlawb` remote helper. Direct HTTP push without the helper is currently unauthenticated on v0.1 nodes.
-- **Impact:** A node operator accepting direct HTTP git pushes (not via `gitlawb://`) cannot verify the pusher's identity.
-- **Mitigation:** Use `gitlawb://` remote URLs. Do not expose `POST /*/git-receive-pack` to untrusted networks.
+- The `git-receive-pack` endpoint enforces HTTP Signature auth. Plain Git smart-HTTP clients do not generate those headers, so the `git-remote-gitlawb` helper is required for pushes.
+- **Impact:** Direct HTTP pushes without RFC 9421 headers are rejected; users need `gitlawb://` remotes or equivalent signed clients.
+- **Mitigation:** Use `gitlawb://` remote URLs and keep `git-remote-gitlawb` on the user's `PATH`.
 - **Fix target:** v0.2
 
+### Private repository reads
+- Repository records have an `is_public` field and the node exposes `GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ`, but per-repository private-read enforcement is not wired in the current live release.
+- **Impact:** Do not store private repositories or secrets on public nodes.
+- **Mitigation:** Run isolated nodes for non-public data and restrict network access at the reverse proxy or firewall layer.
+- **Fix target:** v0.2
+
+### Peer route hardening rollout
+- Peer announce and sync notification routes accept signed requests and verify DID matches when a signature is present.
+- **Impact:** Unsigned peer writes are still accepted by default so existing live nodes can keep communicating during rolling upgrades.
+- **Mitigation:** After all active peers run signed-node builds, operators can set `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=true`.
+- **Fix target:** staged rollout
+
 ---
 
 ## Supported Versions

bootstrap-peers.json

@@ -1,16 +1,40 @@
 {
   "$comment": "Canonical seed list for the Gitlawb network. Merged with GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS at startup. PRs to add public nodes welcome.",
   "version": 1,
-  "updated": "2026-05-16",
+  "updated": "2026-06-30",
   "peers": [
     {
       "name": "gitlawb",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb (Kevin)",
+      "operator": "Gitlawb",
       "did": "did:key:z6MkqDnb7Siv3Cwj7pGJq4T5EsUisECqR8KpnDLwcaZq5TPr",
       "http_url": "https://node.gitlawb.com",
       "p2p_multiaddr": null,
       "added": "2026-04-29"
     },
+    {
+      "name": "gitlawb-node2",
+      "operator": "Gitlawb",
+      "did": null,
+      "http_url": "https://node2.gitlawb.com",
+      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
+      "added": "2026-06-30"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "gitlawb-node3",
+      "operator": "Gitlawb",
+      "did": null,
+      "http_url": "https://node3.gitlawb.com",
+      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
+      "added": "2026-06-30"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "gitlawb-manila",
+      "operator": "Gitlawb",
+      "did": null,
+      "http_url": "https://manila.gitlawb.com",
+      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
+      "added": "2026-06-30"
+    },
     {
       "name": "rapybus-gitlawb",
       "operator": "RapyBus S.A.C.",

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 [package]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
 description = "Git remote helper — enables 'git clone gitlawb://did:gitlawb:...'"
-version.workspace = true
+version = "0.5.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 
 [[bin]]
@@ -15,3 +16,6 @@ anyhow = { workspace = true }
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
 tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+mockito = "1"

crates/gitlawb-attest/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+[package]
+name = "gitlawb-attest"
+description = "External Attestation v1: pluggable provenance attachments for gitlawb ref-update certs"
+version = "0.5.1" # x-release-please-version
+edition.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+serde = { workspace = true }
+serde_json = { workspace = true }
+serde_jcs = { workspace = true }
+thiserror = { workspace = true }
+ed25519-dalek = { workspace = true }
+sha2 = { workspace = true }
+hex = { workspace = true }
+base64 = { workspace = true }
+multibase = { workspace = true }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
+rand = { workspace = true }

crates/gitlawb-attest/src/attestation.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+//! One typed, signed, cert-bound provenance blob.
+//!
+//! Fields: `type` (discriminator), `payload` (opaque, type-specific JSON),
+//! `cert_hash` (binds to one ref-update cert), `signer` (`did:key`), and
+//! `sig` (base64url-no-pad ed25519).
+//!
+//! The signature covers the domain-separated input
+//! `b"gitlawb-attest-sig/v1\n"` followed by JCS-encoded `{type, payload,
+//! cert_hash}` per RFC 8785. The domain tag is in the byte stream rather
+//! than the canonical JSON so the wire shape stays additive: an `Attestation`
+//! deserialized today and one constructed by a future `v2` signer differ only
+//! by which tag the verifier prepends.
+//!
+//! Type discriminators are slash-separated namespace + version strings
+//! (`covenant/exec/v1`, `slsa/v1.0`, `sigstore/dsse/v1`); verifiers register
+//! by exact match.
+
+use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD as B64U, Engine};
+use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, Verifier, VerifyingKey};
+use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+use crate::error::{Error, Result};
+
+/// Domain-separation tag prepended to the JCS signing input. Bumped to
+/// `v2` if the signing-input shape changes.
+const SIGNING_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"gitlawb-attest-sig/v1\n";
+
+/// Multicodec varint prefix for Ed25519 public keys (0xed 0x01).
+const ED25519_MULTICODEC: [u8; 2] = [0xed, 0x01];
+
+/// A signed provenance blob attached to a ref-update cert.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct Attestation {
+    /// Type discriminator, e.g. `covenant/exec/v1`.
+    #[serde(rename = "type")]
+    pub type_: String,
+
+    /// Type-specific payload. The verifier reparses into its concrete shape.
+    pub payload: serde_json::Value,
+
+    /// Lowercase SHA-256 hex of the cert body. Binds this attestation to one
+    /// cert. The lowercase form is canonical because the JCS signing input
+    /// includes this field verbatim — accepting mixed case on the wire would
+    /// require both signer and verifier to normalize before computing the
+    /// JCS bytes, an easy spec rule to miss across language ports.
+    pub cert_hash: String,
+
+    /// `did:key` of the signer; the verifying key is recoverable from it.
+    pub signer: String,
+
+    /// base64url-no-pad ed25519 signature over the JCS signing input.
+    pub sig: String,
+}
+
+/// Type-specific payload. Implement on a struct that is `Serialize +
+/// DeserializeOwned` to participate.
+pub trait AttestationPayload: Serialize + DeserializeOwned + Send + Sync {
+    /// The discriminator string written on the wire.
+    fn payload_type() -> &'static str;
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+struct SigningInput<'a> {
+    #[serde(rename = "type")]
+    type_: &'a str,
+    payload: &'a serde_json::Value,
+    cert_hash: &'a str,
+}
+
+impl Attestation {
+    /// Sign a fresh attestation. `cert_hash_bytes` comes from
+    /// [`crate::cert::cert_hash`].
+    pub fn sign<P: AttestationPayload>(
+        signing_key: &SigningKey,
+        payload: P,
+        cert_hash_bytes: [u8; 32],
+    ) -> Result<Self> {
+        let type_ = P::payload_type().to_string();
+        validate_type(&type_)?;
+        let payload_value = serde_json::to_value(payload)?;
+        let cert_hash_hex = hex::encode(cert_hash_bytes);
+
+        let bytes = canonical_signing_bytes(&type_, &payload_value, &cert_hash_hex)?;
+        let sig: Signature = signing_key.sign(&bytes);
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            type_,
+            payload: payload_value,
+            cert_hash: cert_hash_hex,
+            signer: did_key_from_verifying_key(&signing_key.verifying_key()),
+            sig: B64U.encode(sig.to_bytes()),
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Verify the signature and check that `cert_hash` matches
+    /// `expected_cert_hash`. Returns the recovered verifying key so the caller
+    /// can check it against an allowlist.
+    pub fn verify_signature(&self, expected_cert_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<VerifyingKey> {
+        let expected_hex = hex::encode(expected_cert_hash);
+        if self.cert_hash != expected_hex {
+            return Err(Error::CertHashMismatch);
+        }
+
+        validate_type(&self.type_)?;
+        let bytes = canonical_signing_bytes(&self.type_, &self.payload, &self.cert_hash)?;
+
+        let vk = verifying_key_from_did_key(&self.signer)?;
+        let sig_bytes: [u8; 64] = B64U
+            .decode(&self.sig)
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Signature(format!("base64url: {e}")))?
+            .try_into()
+            .map_err(|_| Error::Signature("signature must be 64 bytes".to_string()))?;
+        let sig = Signature::from_bytes(&sig_bytes);
+        vk.verify(&bytes, &sig)
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Signature(format!("ed25519: {e}")))?;
+
+        Ok(vk)
+    }
+
+    /// Reparse `payload` as `P`. Errors if the type discriminator does not
+    /// match `P::payload_type()`.
+    pub fn payload_as<P: AttestationPayload>(&self) -> Result<P> {
+        if self.type_ != P::payload_type() {
+            return Err(Error::Type(format!(
+                "expected '{}', got '{}'",
+                P::payload_type(),
+                self.type_
+            )));
+        }
+        Ok(P::deserialize(&self.payload)?)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Discriminator grammar: nonempty, ASCII-graphic only, slash-separated
+/// segments of `[a-zA-Z0-9._+-]`, no empty segment, capped at 128 bytes.
+/// Matches `covenant/exec/v1`, `slsa/v1.0`, `sigstore/dsse/v1`.
+fn validate_type(t: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    if t.is_empty() {
+        return Err(Error::Type("empty discriminator".to_string()));
+    }
+    if t.len() > 128 {
+        return Err(Error::Type(format!(
+            "discriminator longer than 128 bytes ({})",
+            t.len()
+        )));
+    }
+    if !t.is_ascii() {
+        return Err(Error::Type(format!("discriminator must be ASCII: '{t}'")));
+    }
+    for segment in t.split('/') {
+        if segment.is_empty() {
+            return Err(Error::Type(format!(
+                "discriminator has an empty segment: '{t}'"
+            )));
+        }
+        for c in segment.chars() {
+            if !(c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '.' || c == '_' || c == '+' || c == '-') {
+                return Err(Error::Type(format!(
+                    "discriminator segment '{segment}' has disallowed character '{c}'"
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn canonical_signing_bytes(
+    type_: &str,
+    payload: &serde_json::Value,
+    cert_hash_hex: &str,
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let input = SigningInput {
+        type_,
+        payload,
+        cert_hash: cert_hash_hex,
+    };
+    let jcs = serde_jcs::to_vec(&input).map_err(|e| Error::Jcs(e.to_string()))?;
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(SIGNING_DOMAIN.len() + jcs.len());
+    out.extend_from_slice(SIGNING_DOMAIN);
+    out.extend_from_slice(&jcs);
+    Ok(out)
+}
+
+fn did_key_from_verifying_key(key: &VerifyingKey) -> String {
+    let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(ED25519_MULTICODEC.len() + 32);
+    buf.extend_from_slice(&ED25519_MULTICODEC);
+    buf.extend_from_slice(&key.to_bytes());
+    let encoded = multibase::encode(multibase::Base::Base58Btc, &buf);
+    format!("did:key:{encoded}")
+}
+
+/// The DID:key spec mandates base58btc (multibase `z`-prefix). Other multibase
+/// encodings of the same key bytes are rejected so allowlists, dedup, and
+/// signer-pinning policies that compare `signer` strings remain consistent
+/// across peers.
+fn verifying_key_from_did_key(did: &str) -> Result<VerifyingKey> {
+    let method_id = did
+        .strip_prefix("did:key:")
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Did(format!("not a did:key: {did}")))?;
+    if !method_id.starts_with('z') {
+        return Err(Error::Did(format!(
+            "did:key must use base58btc (z-prefix): {did}"
+        )));
+    }
+    let (base, bytes) =
+        multibase::decode(method_id).map_err(|e| Error::Did(format!("multibase: {e}")))?;
+    if base != multibase::Base::Base58Btc {
+        return Err(Error::Did(format!(
+            "did:key must use base58btc (z-prefix): {did}"
+        )));
+    }
+    if bytes.len() != ED25519_MULTICODEC.len() + 32
+        || bytes[..ED25519_MULTICODEC.len()] != ED25519_MULTICODEC
+    {
+        return Err(Error::Did("not an ed25519 did:key".to_string()));
+    }
+    let key_bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes[ED25519_MULTICODEC.len()..]
+        .try_into()
+        .expect("length checked above");
+    VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&key_bytes)
+        .map_err(|e| Error::Did(format!("invalid ed25519 key: {e}")))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+    use rand::rngs::OsRng;
+    use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+    fn fresh() -> SigningKey {
+        SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng)
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+    struct DummyPayload {
+        agent: String,
+        commit: String,
+    }
+
+    impl AttestationPayload for DummyPayload {
+        fn payload_type() -> &'static str {
+            "test/dummy/v1"
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn sample_cert_hash() -> [u8; 32] {
+        let mut h = [0u8; 32];
+        for (i, b) in h.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+            *b = i as u8;
+        }
+        h
+    }
+
+    fn dummy_attestation(sk: &SigningKey, cert_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Attestation {
+        Attestation::sign(
+            sk,
+            DummyPayload {
+                agent: "a".to_string(),
+                commit: "b".to_string(),
+            },
+            cert_hash,
+        )
+        .unwrap()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_then_verify_roundtrip() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_cert_hash();
+        let payload = DummyPayload {
+            agent: "did:key:z6MkTest".to_string(),
+            commit: "deadbeef".to_string(),
+        };
+        let att = Attestation::sign(&sk, payload.clone(), cert_hash).unwrap();
+        let vk = att.verify_signature(cert_hash).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(vk.to_bytes(), sk.verifying_key().to_bytes());
+        assert_eq!(att.payload_as::<DummyPayload>().unwrap(), payload);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cross_cert_replay_fails() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_a = sample_cert_hash();
+        let mut cert_b = sample_cert_hash();
+        cert_b[0] ^= 0xff;
+        let att = dummy_attestation(&sk, cert_a);
+        let err = att.verify_signature(cert_b).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::CertHashMismatch));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tampered_payload_fails_verify() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_cert_hash();
+        let mut att = dummy_attestation(&sk, cert_hash);
+        att.payload = serde_json::json!({ "agent": "evil", "commit": "b" });
+        let err = att.verify_signature(cert_hash).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Signature(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn payload_as_wrong_type_errors() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let att = dummy_attestation(&sk, sample_cert_hash());
+
+        #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+        struct Wrong {
+            #[allow(dead_code)]
+            x: String,
+        }
+        impl AttestationPayload for Wrong {
+            fn payload_type() -> &'static str {
+                "test/other/v1"
+            }
+        }
+        let err = att.payload_as::<Wrong>().unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Type(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn json_roundtrip_preserves_signature() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_cert_hash();
+        let att = dummy_attestation(&sk, cert_hash);
+        let json = serde_json::to_string(&att).unwrap();
+        let back: Attestation = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
+        back.verify_signature(cert_hash).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    /// Wire shape is part of the public protocol — pin field names so an
+    /// accidental rename surfaces as a test failure, not silent interop drift.
+    #[test]
+    fn wire_shape_pins_field_names() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let att = dummy_attestation(&sk, sample_cert_hash());
+        let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::to_value(&att).unwrap();
+        let obj = v.as_object().expect("attestation must serialize as object");
+        let keys: std::collections::BTreeSet<&str> = obj.keys().map(String::as_str).collect();
+        let expected: std::collections::BTreeSet<&str> =
+            ["type", "payload", "cert_hash", "signer", "sig"]
+                .into_iter()
+                .collect();
+        assert_eq!(keys, expected);
+        assert!(obj["type"].is_string());
+        assert!(obj["cert_hash"].is_string());
+        assert!(obj["signer"].is_string());
+        assert!(obj["sig"].is_string());
+    }
+
+    /// The spec mandates lowercase hex on the wire. An uppercase cert_hash
+    /// is rejected as `CertHashMismatch` so a non-canonical signer can't
+    /// produce attestations that verify against some peers but not others.
+    #[test]
+    fn uppercase_cert_hash_is_rejected_as_non_canonical() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_cert_hash();
+        let mut att = dummy_attestation(&sk, cert_hash);
+        att.cert_hash = att.cert_hash.to_uppercase();
+        let err = att.verify_signature(cert_hash).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::CertHashMismatch));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn empty_type_rejected_at_signing() {
+        #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+        struct Empty {}
+        impl AttestationPayload for Empty {
+            fn payload_type() -> &'static str {
+                ""
+            }
+        }
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let err = Attestation::sign(&sk, Empty {}, sample_cert_hash()).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Type(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_type_grammar() {
+        validate_type("covenant/exec/v1").unwrap();
+        validate_type("slsa/v1.0").unwrap();
+        validate_type("sigstore/dsse/v1").unwrap();
+        validate_type("a").unwrap();
+        validate_type("a.b-c_d+e/x").unwrap();
+
+        for bad in [
+            "",
+            " ",
+            "covenant/exec/v1 ",
+            "covenant//v1",
+            "/covenant/v1",
+            "covenant/v1/",
+            "covenant\x00exec/v1",
+            "covenant/exec\nv1",
+            "сovenant/exec/v1",
+            "covenant/ex ec/v1",
+            "covenant/exec/v1#frag",
+        ] {
+            let err = validate_type(bad).unwrap_err();
+            assert!(matches!(err, Error::Type(_)), "must reject '{bad}'");
+        }
+
+        let too_long = "a/".repeat(70);
+        let err = validate_type(&too_long).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Type(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn did_key_must_be_base58btc() {
+        // Sign with a real key, then re-encode the public-key bytes in a
+        // different multibase. Verification must reject.
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let mut att = dummy_attestation(&sk, sample_cert_hash());
+        let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(34);
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&ED25519_MULTICODEC);
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&sk.verifying_key().to_bytes());
+        for base in [
+            multibase::Base::Base64Url,
+            multibase::Base::Base32Lower,
+            multibase::Base::Base16Lower,
+        ] {
+            att.signer = format!("did:key:{}", multibase::encode(base, &buf));
+            let err = att.verify_signature(sample_cert_hash()).unwrap_err();
+            assert!(matches!(err, Error::Did(_)), "must reject base {base:?}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_did_without_did_key_prefix() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let mut att = dummy_attestation(&sk, sample_cert_hash());
+        att.signer = "ed25519:abc".to_string();
+        let err = att.verify_signature(sample_cert_hash()).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Did(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_did_with_wrong_multicodec() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let mut att = dummy_attestation(&sk, sample_cert_hash());
+        // 0x12 0x00 = sha2-256 multicodec — wrong for an ed25519 public key.
+        let mut buf = vec![0x12, 0x00];
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&sk.verifying_key().to_bytes());
+        att.signer = format!(
+            "did:key:{}",
+            multibase::encode(multibase::Base::Base58Btc, &buf)
+        );
+        let err = att.verify_signature(sample_cert_hash()).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Did(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_did_with_wrong_key_length() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let mut att = dummy_attestation(&sk, sample_cert_hash());
+        let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(33);
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&ED25519_MULTICODEC);
+        // 31 bytes instead of 32.
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&sk.verifying_key().to_bytes()[..31]);
+        att.signer = format!(
+            "did:key:{}",
+            multibase::encode(multibase::Base::Base58Btc, &buf)
+        );
+        let err = att.verify_signature(sample_cert_hash()).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Did(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_bad_signature_base64() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let mut att = dummy_attestation(&sk, sample_cert_hash());
+        att.sig = "!!not-base64!!".to_string();
+        let err = att.verify_signature(sample_cert_hash()).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Signature(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_signature_wrong_length() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let mut att = dummy_attestation(&sk, sample_cert_hash());
+        att.sig = B64U.encode([0u8; 32]); // valid base64, wrong size.
+        let err = att.verify_signature(sample_cert_hash()).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Signature(_)));
+    }
+
+    /// A payload that happens to contain a `cert_hash` field of its own does
+    /// not interfere with the outer binding: the attestation envelope's
+    /// `cert_hash` is the only field consulted by `verify_signature`, and the
+    /// payload is treated as opaque JSON throughout. A reviewer worried about
+    /// shadowing or smuggling can verify this directly.
+    #[test]
+    fn payload_cert_hash_field_does_not_shadow_outer_binding() {
+        #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+        struct Sneaky {
+            cert_hash: String,
+            x: String,
+        }
+        impl AttestationPayload for Sneaky {
+            fn payload_type() -> &'static str {
+                "test/sneaky/v1"
+            }
+        }
+
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let outer_hash = sample_cert_hash();
+        let att = Attestation::sign(
+            &sk,
+            Sneaky {
+                cert_hash: "forged-by-the-attacker".to_string(),
+                x: "y".to_string(),
+            },
+            outer_hash,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Envelope's cert_hash is the outer (real) hash, lowercase hex.
+        assert_eq!(att.cert_hash, hex::encode(outer_hash));
+        // Payload retains its own field — opaque to the protocol.
+        assert_eq!(
+            att.payload.get("cert_hash").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
+            Some("forged-by-the-attacker"),
+        );
+        // Verification binds to the outer envelope's cert_hash.
+        att.verify_signature(outer_hash).unwrap();
+        // And rejects when the outer cert hash differs.
+        let mut wrong = outer_hash;
+        wrong[0] ^= 0xff;
+        let err = att.verify_signature(wrong).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::CertHashMismatch));
+    }
+
+    /// A different protocol that also signs `{type, payload, cert_hash}` with
+    /// the same key would still fail attestation verification because the
+    /// signing input carries a domain tag the other protocol does not include.
+    #[test]
+    fn cross_protocol_replay_is_rejected_by_domain_separation() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_cert_hash();
+        let att = dummy_attestation(&sk, cert_hash);
+
+        // Sign the same JCS bytes WITHOUT the domain tag and graft the
+        // signature back onto the attestation.
+        let cert_hash_hex = hex::encode(cert_hash);
+        let bare = serde_jcs::to_vec(&SigningInput {
+            type_: &att.type_,
+            payload: &att.payload,
+            cert_hash: &cert_hash_hex,
+        })
+        .unwrap();
+        let other_sig: Signature = sk.sign(&bare);
+        let mut tampered = att.clone();
+        tampered.sig = B64U.encode(other_sig.to_bytes());
+
+        let err = tampered.verify_signature(cert_hash).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Signature(_)));
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-attest/src/cert.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+//! Envelope around a `gitlawb/ref-update/v1` cert plus optional attestations,
+//! and the cert-hash helper attestations bind to.
+//!
+//! An empty envelope serializes to the same bytes as the underlying bare cert.
+//! `cert_hash` strips `signatures` and `attestations`, JCS-encodes the rest,
+//! and SHA-256s; the result is what every attestation binds to.
+
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+
+use crate::attestation::Attestation;
+use crate::error::{Error, Result};
+use crate::verifier::{Registry, VerifiedAttestation};
+
+/// The discriminator the wrapped cert must carry. Matches the constant of the
+/// same name in `gitlawb-core::cert`.
+pub const CERT_TYPE: &str = "gitlawb/ref-update/v1";
+
+/// A ref-update cert with optional attestations.
+///
+/// The cert is flattened into the top-level JSON, so an empty envelope
+/// produces the same bytes as a bare cert and existing decoders ignore the
+/// extra `attestations` field. The cert is held as `serde_json::Value` so
+/// this crate has no runtime dependency on `gitlawb-core::cert::RefUpdateCert`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AttestedRefUpdateCert {
+    /// The cert body and signatures, flattened to the top level.
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub cert: serde_json::Value,
+
+    /// Attached attestations. Empty when absent on the wire.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub attestations: Vec<Attestation>,
+}
+
+impl AttestedRefUpdateCert {
+    /// Wrap a cert. No attestations are attached yet.
+    ///
+    /// The serialized cert must be a JSON object whose `type` field equals
+    /// [`CERT_TYPE`] and which does **not** already carry an `attestations`
+    /// field. The second rule catches two cases that would otherwise leave
+    /// the envelope in an inconsistent in-memory state:
+    ///
+    /// - Double-wrap: `from_cert(&previously_wrapped_envelope)` would put the
+    ///   inner attestations on `self.cert` and leave `self.attestations` empty.
+    /// - Pre-attested cert from a peer: a malformed or malicious cert with an
+    ///   attached `attestations` field would survive `cert_hash` (which strips
+    ///   the field) but bypass the wrapper's append-and-verify path entirely.
+    ///
+    /// Both are rejected with [`Error::Payload`]. To re-wrap, deserialize the
+    /// envelope as `AttestedRefUpdateCert` directly.
+    pub fn from_cert<T: Serialize>(cert: &T) -> Result<Self> {
+        let value = serde_json::to_value(cert)?;
+        let obj = value
+            .as_object()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Payload("cert must serialize as a JSON object".to_string()))?;
+        match obj.get("type").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
+            Some(t) if t == CERT_TYPE => {}
+            Some(other) => {
+                return Err(Error::Payload(format!(
+                    "cert type must be '{CERT_TYPE}', got '{other}'"
+                )));
+            }
+            None => {
+                return Err(Error::Payload(format!(
+                    "cert missing 'type' field (expected '{CERT_TYPE}')"
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+        if obj.contains_key("attestations") {
+            return Err(Error::Payload(
+                "cert already carries an 'attestations' field; deserialize as \
+                 AttestedRefUpdateCert directly instead of re-wrapping"
+                    .to_string(),
+            ));
+        }
+        Ok(Self {
+            cert: value,
+            attestations: Vec::new(),
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// The 32-byte cert hash every attached attestation must bind to.
+    pub fn cert_hash(&self) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
+        cert_hash(&self.cert)
+    }
+
+    /// Append an already-signed attestation.
+    pub fn attach(&mut self, attestation: Attestation) {
+        self.attestations.push(attestation);
+    }
+
+    /// Verify every attached attestation against this envelope's cert hash,
+    /// applying the registry's policy. Equivalent to
+    /// `registry.verify_all(&self.attestations, self.cert_hash()?)` but
+    /// reads as one operation at call sites.
+    pub fn verify_attestations(&self, registry: &Registry) -> Result<Vec<VerifiedAttestation>> {
+        registry.verify_all(&self.attestations, self.cert_hash()?)
+    }
+}
+
+/// SHA-256 of the cert body. The body must be a JSON object; `signatures` and
+/// `attestations` are stripped before JCS encoding (RFC 8785), so the hash is
+/// reproducible across languages and JSON libraries and is stable across
+/// countersignatures.
+pub fn cert_hash(cert: &serde_json::Value) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
+    let mut body = cert.clone();
+    let obj = body
+        .as_object_mut()
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::Payload("cert body must be a JSON object".to_string()))?;
+    obj.remove("signatures");
+    obj.remove("attestations");
+    let bytes = serde_jcs::to_vec(&body).map_err(|e| Error::Jcs(e.to_string()))?;
+    let mut h = Sha256::new();
+    h.update(&bytes);
+    let out = h.finalize();
+    let mut arr = [0u8; 32];
+    arr.copy_from_slice(&out);
+    Ok(arr)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use serde_json::json;
+
+    fn bare_cert() -> serde_json::Value {
+        json!({
+            "type": CERT_TYPE,
+            "repo": "did:key:z6MkRepo",
+            "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
+            "from": "0".repeat(64),
+            "to": "a".repeat(64),
+            "seq": 1,
+            "timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+            "nonce": "n1",
+            "signatures": [{"signer": "did:key:z6MkRepo", "sig": "abc"}]
+        })
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn empty_envelope_serializes_as_bare_cert() {
+        let bare = bare_cert();
+        let env = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&bare).unwrap();
+        let env_json: serde_json::Value =
+            serde_json::from_str(&serde_json::to_string(&env).unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+        let bare_keys: std::collections::BTreeSet<&String> =
+            bare.as_object().unwrap().keys().collect();
+        let env_keys: std::collections::BTreeSet<&String> =
+            env_json.as_object().unwrap().keys().collect();
+        assert_eq!(bare_keys, env_keys);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bare_cert_parses_as_envelope_with_no_attestations() {
+        let bare = bare_cert();
+        let env: AttestedRefUpdateCert = serde_json::from_value(bare.clone()).unwrap();
+        assert!(env.attestations.is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(env.cert, bare);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cert_hash_is_stable_across_countersignatures() {
+        let base_body = json!({
+            "type": CERT_TYPE,
+            "repo": "did:key:z6MkRepo",
+            "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
+            "from": "0".repeat(64),
+            "to": "a".repeat(64),
+            "seq": 1,
+            "timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+            "nonce": "n1"
+        });
+
+        let mut one_sig = base_body.clone();
+        one_sig["signatures"] = json!([{"signer": "x", "sig": "y"}]);
+
+        let mut two_sigs = base_body.clone();
+        two_sigs["signatures"] = json!([
+            {"signer": "x", "sig": "y"},
+            {"signer": "a", "sig": "b"}
+        ]);
+
+        assert_eq!(cert_hash(&one_sig).unwrap(), cert_hash(&two_sigs).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cert_hash_changes_when_body_changes() {
+        let body_a = json!({
+            "type": CERT_TYPE,
+            "repo": "did:key:z6MkRepo",
+            "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
+            "from": "0".repeat(64),
+            "to": "a".repeat(64),
+            "seq": 1,
+            "timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+            "nonce": "n1",
+            "signatures": []
+        });
+        let mut body_b = body_a.clone();
+        body_b["to"] = json!("b".repeat(64));
+
+        assert_ne!(cert_hash(&body_a).unwrap(), cert_hash(&body_b).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cert_hash_rejects_non_object_root() {
+        let err = cert_hash(&json!(null)).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Payload(_)));
+        let err = cert_hash(&json!([1, 2, 3])).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Payload(_)));
+        let err = cert_hash(&json!("scalar")).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Payload(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_cert_rejects_wrong_type() {
+        let wrong = json!({"type": "gitlawb/ref-update/v0", "repo": "did:key:z"});
+        let err = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&wrong).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Payload(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_cert_rejects_missing_type() {
+        let no_type = json!({"repo": "did:key:z"});
+        let err = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&no_type).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Payload(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_cert_rejects_non_object() {
+        let arr = json!([1, 2, 3]);
+        let err = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&arr).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Payload(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn mutating_env_cert_changes_the_hash() {
+        let mut env = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&bare_cert()).unwrap();
+        let hash_before = env.cert_hash().unwrap();
+        env.cert.as_object_mut().unwrap().insert(
+            "nonce".to_string(),
+            serde_json::Value::String("mutated".to_string()),
+        );
+        let hash_after = env.cert_hash().unwrap();
+        assert_ne!(hash_before, hash_after);
+    }
+
+    /// A cert that already carries an `attestations` field is rejected
+    /// regardless of the field's contents. Catches double-wrap (where the
+    /// inner attestations would otherwise be smuggled into `self.cert`) and
+    /// peer-supplied "pre-attested" certs that would bypass the wrapper.
+    #[test]
+    fn from_cert_rejects_preexisting_attestations_field() {
+        let mut sneaky = bare_cert();
+        sneaky["attestations"] = json!([{"smuggled": true}]);
+        let err = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&sneaky).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Payload(_)));
+
+        // Empty array still rejected — the field's mere presence is the signal.
+        let mut empty = bare_cert();
+        empty["attestations"] = json!([]);
+        let err = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&empty).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Payload(_)));
+    }
+
+    /// `from_cert` on an already-wrapped envelope is the same case as
+    /// `from_cert` on a cert with a pre-existing `attestations` field: serde
+    /// flattens the envelope back into a JSON object that carries the field.
+    #[test]
+    fn from_cert_rejects_a_previously_wrapped_envelope() {
+        let mut env = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&bare_cert()).unwrap();
+        // Inject an attestation-shaped value so the wire round-trip would
+        // actually re-emit the field.
+        env.cert
+            .as_object_mut()
+            .unwrap()
+            .insert("attestations".to_string(), json!([]));
+        let err = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&env).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Payload(_)));
+    }
+
+    /// `attestations: null` is explicitly not the same as missing. The
+    /// `#[serde(default)]` attribute only fills in when the key is absent —
+    /// a present-but-null wire field is rejected, which surfaces malformed
+    /// payloads early instead of silently treating them as empty.
+    #[test]
+    fn attestations_null_on_wire_is_rejected() {
+        let mut with_null = bare_cert();
+        with_null["attestations"] = serde_json::Value::Null;
+        let err = serde_json::from_value::<AttestedRefUpdateCert>(with_null).unwrap_err();
+        let msg = format!("{err}");
+        assert!(
+            msg.contains("expected a sequence") || msg.contains("invalid type"),
+            "unexpected error: {msg}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn attestations_string_on_wire_is_rejected() {
+        let mut with_str = bare_cert();
+        with_str["attestations"] = serde_json::Value::String("oops".to_string());
+        let err = serde_json::from_value::<AttestedRefUpdateCert>(with_str).unwrap_err();
+        let msg = format!("{err}");
+        assert!(msg.contains("expected a sequence") || msg.contains("invalid type"));
+    }
+
+    /// `attach` does not deduplicate. Duplicate attestations are a verifier-
+    /// policy concern (e.g., "at most one SLSA provenance"), not a wrapper
+    /// concern. Pinning the behavior so a future deduplication change is an
+    /// intentional break.
+    #[test]
+    fn attach_does_not_deduplicate() {
+        let mut env = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&bare_cert()).unwrap();
+        let att = Attestation {
+            type_: "demo/v1".to_string(),
+            payload: serde_json::json!({}),
+            cert_hash: "deadbeef".to_string(),
+            signer: "did:key:z6MkDup".to_string(),
+            sig: "AAAA".to_string(),
+        };
+        env.attach(att.clone());
+        env.attach(att);
+        assert_eq!(env.attestations.len(), 2);
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-attest/src/error.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+use thiserror::Error;
+
+/// Errors from building or verifying an attestation.
+#[derive(Debug, Error)]
+pub enum Error {
+    /// Discriminator failed validation (empty, whitespace, control char,
+    /// disallowed grammar).
+    #[error("attestation type: {0}")]
+    Type(String),
+
+    /// Attestation was signed against a different cert.
+    #[error("cert hash mismatch")]
+    CertHashMismatch,
+
+    /// Ed25519 signature failed verification.
+    #[error("signature: {0}")]
+    Signature(String),
+
+    /// DID could not be parsed.
+    #[error("did: {0}")]
+    Did(String),
+
+    /// Payload structure check failed, or the cert body was not a JSON object.
+    #[error("payload: {0}")]
+    Payload(String),
+
+    /// No verifier registered for the type and policy required one.
+    #[error("no verifier registered for type '{0}'")]
+    UnknownType(String),
+
+    /// `RequireAll` policy did not find an entry for a required type, or the
+    /// entry was not fully verified.
+    #[error("required attestation type missing or unverified: '{0}'")]
+    RequiredMissing(String),
+
+    /// JSON failure.
+    #[error("json: {0}")]
+    Json(#[from] serde_json::Error),
+
+    /// JCS encoding failure.
+    #[error("jcs: {0}")]
+    Jcs(String),
+}
+
+/// Crate result alias.
+pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, Error>;

crates/gitlawb-attest/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+//! Pluggable provenance attachments for gitlawb ref-update certs.
+//!
+//! A `gitlawb/ref-update/v1` cert proves who pushed and where a ref moved to.
+//! It does not say how the commit was produced. This crate adds an optional
+//! `attestations` field that lets any provenance system (SLSA, Sigstore,
+//! in-toto, agent runtimes) attach a typed, signed blob bound to the cert by
+//! its hash.
+//!
+//! The cert format stays additive. A cert with no attestations serializes the
+//! same bytes it does today, and existing decoders (which do not set
+//! `deny_unknown_fields`) silently drop the new `attestations` field rather
+//! than reject the cert.
+//!
+//! ## Wire shape
+//!
+//! ```json
+//! {
+//!   "type": "gitlawb/ref-update/v1",
+//!   // ...standard cert fields...,
+//!   "signatures": [...],
+//!   "attestations": [
+//!     {
+//!       "type": "covenant/exec/v1",
+//!       "payload": { /* opaque, type-specific */ },
+//!       "cert_hash": "<sha256 hex of JCS-encoded cert body>",
+//!       "signer":    "did:key:z6Mk...",
+//!       "sig":       "<base64url ed25519 over the signing input>"
+//!     }
+//!   ]
+//! }
+//! ```
+//!
+//! ## Canonical bytes
+//!
+//! Hashing and signing inputs use JCS (RFC 8785) so they reproduce across
+//! implementations regardless of struct field order or JSON library.
+//!
+//! The cert hash is `SHA-256(JCS(cert_body_without_signatures_or_attestations))`,
+//! expressed as lowercase hex on the wire. Uppercase is non-canonical and
+//! rejected on verify so the JCS signing input is uniquely determined by the
+//! cert bytes alone — there is no implicit normalization rule that
+//! cross-language signers might miss.
+//!
+//! The attestation signing input is the byte string
+//! `b"gitlawb-attest-sig/v1\n" || JCS({type, payload, cert_hash})`. The
+//! domain tag is in the byte stream, not the canonical JSON, so an attestation
+//! cannot be confused with a same-shape JCS document signed for a different
+//! protocol that uses the same Ed25519 key.
+//!
+//! ## DID:key
+//!
+//! Signers are `did:key` DIDs over Ed25519, encoded with the multibase
+//! base58btc (`z`) prefix per the W3C DID:key specification. Non-base58btc
+//! encodings of the same public key are rejected on verify so allowlists,
+//! deduplication, and signer-pinning policies that compare `signer` strings
+//! stay consistent across peers.
+//!
+//! ## Verification
+//!
+//! [`Registry`] looks up a verifier by type discriminator. [`Policy`] decides
+//! what to do when no verifier matches: `AcceptKnown` (default) lets unknown
+//! types pass without trust; `RequireAll` enforces a per-repo allowlist while
+//! still letting unrelated attached attestations through unverified (so a
+//! third-party attachment cannot DoS the cert); `RejectUnknown` rejects
+//! anything unregistered.
+//!
+//! ## Quick start
+//!
+//! ```
+//! use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+//! use gitlawb_attest::{
+//!     Attestation, AttestationPayload, AttestationVerifier, AttestedRefUpdateCert,
+//!     Error, Policy, Registry, Result, CERT_TYPE,
+//! };
+//! use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+//!
+//! #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+//! struct ExecPayload { agent: String }
+//! impl AttestationPayload for ExecPayload {
+//!     fn payload_type() -> &'static str { "covenant/exec/v1" }
+//! }
+//!
+//! struct ExecVerifier;
+//! impl AttestationVerifier for ExecVerifier {
+//!     fn type_(&self) -> &'static str { "covenant/exec/v1" }
+//!     fn verify_payload(&self, payload: &serde_json::Value) -> Result<()> {
+//!         payload.get("agent").and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+//!             .ok_or_else(|| Error::Payload("missing agent".into()))?;
+//!         Ok(())
+//!     }
+//! }
+//!
+//! # fn run() -> Result<()> {
+//! let cert = serde_json::json!({
+//!     "type": CERT_TYPE, "repo": "did:key:z6MkRepo",
+//!     "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
+//!     "from": "0".repeat(64), "to": "a".repeat(64),
+//!     "seq": 1, "timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", "nonce": "n1",
+//!     "signatures": []
+//! });
+//! let mut env = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&cert)?;
+//!
+//! let sk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32]);
+//! let payload = ExecPayload { agent: "did:key:z6MkAgent".into() };
+//! let att = Attestation::sign(&sk, payload, env.cert_hash()?)?;
+//! env.attach(att);
+//!
+//! let mut registry = Registry::new().with_policy(Policy::RejectUnknown);
+//! registry.register(ExecVerifier);
+//! let verified = env.verify_attestations(&registry)?;
+//! assert_eq!(verified[0].type_, "covenant/exec/v1");
+//! assert!(verified[0].fully_verified);
+//! # Ok(()) }
+//! # run().unwrap();
+//! ```
+
+pub mod attestation;
+pub mod cert;
+pub mod error;
+pub mod verifier;
+
+pub use attestation::{Attestation, AttestationPayload};
+pub use cert::{cert_hash, AttestedRefUpdateCert, CERT_TYPE};
+pub use error::{Error, Result};
+pub use verifier::{AttestationVerifier, Policy, Registry, VerifiedAttestation};
+
+/// Version string for the attestation envelope wire shape.
+///
+/// Bumped only when the binding rules — JCS input shape, domain-separation
+/// tag, hash algorithm — change. Independent of [`CERT_TYPE`], which versions
+/// the underlying ref-update cert.
+pub const ATTEST_ENVELOPE_VERSION: &str = "v1";

crates/gitlawb-attest/src/verifier.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@
+//! Verifier trait, registry, and policy.
+//!
+//! A [`Registry`] maps a type discriminator to a verifier. [`Policy`] decides
+//! what happens for types nothing is registered for: accept without trust,
+//! reject, or require an allowlist.
+//!
+//! Under [`Policy::RequireAll`] the registry never short-circuits on unknown
+//! types — any attestation can be attached by any third party, so blocking
+//! the cert because an attacker added an unrelated `attacker/spam/v1` would
+//! be a denial-of-service vector. Unknown types are silently treated as
+//! `fully_verified = false`; the allowlist is enforced only by the
+//! presence-and-verified check on `required_types` after the batch runs.
+
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+
+use crate::attestation::Attestation;
+use crate::error::{Error, Result};
+
+/// Verifier for one attestation type. Implementors declare the discriminator
+/// they handle and validate the payload's shape. The signature and cert-hash
+/// binding are checked by [`Registry::verify`] before `verify_payload` runs.
+pub trait AttestationVerifier: Send + Sync {
+    /// The discriminator this verifier handles. Must be a `'static` literal
+    /// so the registry can key on it without copying.
+    fn type_(&self) -> &'static str;
+
+    /// Validate payload structure. Signature is already verified.
+    fn verify_payload(&self, payload: &serde_json::Value) -> Result<()>;
+}
+
+/// What to do for attestation types with no registered verifier.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
+pub enum Policy {
+    /// Unknown types pass but are flagged `fully_verified = false`. Default.
+    #[default]
+    AcceptKnown,
+
+    /// Every entry in `required_types` must be present and fully verified.
+    /// Unknown types beyond the required set are still accepted unverified,
+    /// so a malicious extra attestation cannot DoS the cert.
+    RequireAll,
+
+    /// Reject every attestation whose type is not registered.
+    RejectUnknown,
+}
+
+/// Result of verifying one attestation.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct VerifiedAttestation {
+    /// Type discriminator.
+    pub type_: String,
+    /// Signer's `did:key`.
+    pub signer: String,
+    /// Lowercase SHA-256 hex of the cert body the attestation bound to.
+    pub cert_hash: String,
+    /// `true` when a verifier ran a payload check and accepted it. `false`
+    /// when the policy let an unknown type through without one.
+    pub fully_verified: bool,
+}
+
+/// Verifiers keyed by type discriminator.
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct Registry {
+    by_type: HashMap<&'static str, Box<dyn AttestationVerifier>>,
+    policy: Policy,
+    required_types: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+impl Registry {
+    /// Empty registry with the default policy.
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        Self::default()
+    }
+
+    /// Register a verifier by value. Returns the prior verifier for the same
+    /// type, if any, so callers can detect double-registration.
+    pub fn register<V: AttestationVerifier + 'static>(
+        &mut self,
+        verifier: V,
+    ) -> Option<Box<dyn AttestationVerifier>> {
+        self.register_boxed(Box::new(verifier))
+    }
+
+    /// Like [`Self::register`] but takes an already-boxed trait object — useful
+    /// when verifiers are constructed dynamically.
+    pub fn register_boxed(
+        &mut self,
+        verifier: Box<dyn AttestationVerifier>,
+    ) -> Option<Box<dyn AttestationVerifier>> {
+        let key = verifier.type_();
+        self.by_type.insert(key, verifier)
+    }
+
+    /// Switch policy.
+    pub fn with_policy(mut self, policy: Policy) -> Self {
+        self.policy = policy;
+        self
+    }
+
+    /// Type discriminators that must be present and verified under
+    /// `Policy::RequireAll`. Ignored under other policies.
+    pub fn require_types<I, S>(mut self, types: I) -> Self
+    where
+        I: IntoIterator<Item = S>,
+        S: Into<String>,
+    {
+        self.required_types = types.into_iter().map(Into::into).collect();
+        self
+    }
+
+    /// Active policy.
+    pub fn policy(&self) -> Policy {
+        self.policy
+    }
+
+    /// Verify signature, cert-hash binding, and (if a verifier is registered)
+    /// payload structure. Under `RequireAll` this is lenient on unknown types
+    /// — see the module docstring.
+    pub fn verify(
+        &self,
+        attestation: &Attestation,
+        expected_cert_hash: [u8; 32],
+    ) -> Result<VerifiedAttestation> {
+        attestation.verify_signature(expected_cert_hash)?;
+
+        let fully = match self.by_type.get(attestation.type_.as_str()) {
+            Some(v) => {
+                v.verify_payload(&attestation.payload)?;
+                true
+            }
+            None => match self.policy {
+                Policy::AcceptKnown | Policy::RequireAll => false,
+                Policy::RejectUnknown => {
+                    return Err(Error::UnknownType(attestation.type_.clone()));
+                }
+            },
+        };
+
+        Ok(VerifiedAttestation {
+            type_: attestation.type_.clone(),
+            signer: attestation.signer.clone(),
+            cert_hash: attestation.cert_hash.clone(),
+            fully_verified: fully,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Verify a batch, then enforce `RequireAll`.
+    pub fn verify_all(
+        &self,
+        attestations: &[Attestation],
+        expected_cert_hash: [u8; 32],
+    ) -> Result<Vec<VerifiedAttestation>> {
+        let mut verified = Vec::with_capacity(attestations.len());
+        for a in attestations {
+            verified.push(self.verify(a, expected_cert_hash)?);
+        }
+        if self.policy == Policy::RequireAll {
+            for required in &self.required_types {
+                let present = verified
+                    .iter()
+                    .any(|v| &v.type_ == required && v.fully_verified);
+                if !present {
+                    return Err(Error::RequiredMissing(required.clone()));
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(verified)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::attestation::{Attestation, AttestationPayload};
+    use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+    use rand::rngs::OsRng;
+    use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+    fn fresh() -> SigningKey {
+        SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng)
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+    struct Demo {
+        a: String,
+    }
+    impl AttestationPayload for Demo {
+        fn payload_type() -> &'static str {
+            "demo/v1"
+        }
+    }
+
+    struct DemoVerifier;
+    impl AttestationVerifier for DemoVerifier {
+        fn type_(&self) -> &'static str {
+            "demo/v1"
+        }
+        fn verify_payload(&self, payload: &serde_json::Value) -> Result<()> {
+            payload
+                .get("a")
+                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+                .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+                .map(|_| ())
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Payload("missing or empty 'a'".to_string()))
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// A second verifier that has the same discriminator as `DemoVerifier` —
+    /// used to test last-wins on `register`.
+    struct DemoVerifierAlt;
+    impl AttestationVerifier for DemoVerifierAlt {
+        fn type_(&self) -> &'static str {
+            "demo/v1"
+        }
+        fn verify_payload(&self, _payload: &serde_json::Value) -> Result<()> {
+            Err(Error::Payload("alt always rejects".to_string()))
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+    struct Other {
+        x: u32,
+    }
+    impl AttestationPayload for Other {
+        fn payload_type() -> &'static str {
+            "other/v1"
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn sample_hash() -> [u8; 32] {
+        let mut h = [0u8; 32];
+        for (i, b) in h.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+            *b = (i + 1) as u8;
+        }
+        h
+    }
+
+    fn signed_demo(sk: &SigningKey, cert_hash: [u8; 32], a: &str) -> Attestation {
+        Attestation::sign(sk, Demo { a: a.to_string() }, cert_hash).unwrap()
+    }
+
+    fn signed_other(sk: &SigningKey, cert_hash: [u8; 32], x: u32) -> Attestation {
+        Attestation::sign(sk, Other { x }, cert_hash).unwrap()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn registry_accepts_registered_type() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_hash();
+        let mut reg = Registry::new();
+        reg.register(DemoVerifier);
+        let att = signed_demo(&sk, cert_hash, "ok");
+        let v = reg.verify(&att, cert_hash).unwrap();
+        assert!(v.fully_verified);
+        assert_eq!(v.type_, "demo/v1");
+        assert_eq!(v.cert_hash, hex::encode(cert_hash));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn accept_known_lets_unknown_pass_unverified() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_hash();
+        let reg = Registry::new().with_policy(Policy::AcceptKnown);
+        let att = signed_demo(&sk, cert_hash, "ok");
+        let v = reg.verify(&att, cert_hash).unwrap();
+        assert!(!v.fully_verified);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn reject_unknown_blocks_unregistered_types() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_hash();
+        let reg = Registry::new().with_policy(Policy::RejectUnknown);
+        let att = signed_demo(&sk, cert_hash, "ok");
+        let err = reg.verify(&att, cert_hash).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::UnknownType(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn require_all_enforces_presence() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_hash();
+        let mut reg = Registry::new()
+            .with_policy(Policy::RequireAll)
+            .require_types(["demo/v1"]);
+        reg.register(DemoVerifier);
+
+        let err = reg.verify_all(&[], cert_hash).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::RequiredMissing(t) if t == "demo/v1"));
+
+        let att = signed_demo(&sk, cert_hash, "ok");
+        let v = reg.verify_all(&[att], cert_hash).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.len(), 1);
+    }
+
+    /// Even when a junk attestation of an unrelated type is attached first, a
+    /// `RequireAll` registry must still accept the cert as long as the
+    /// required type is present and fully verified — the attacker shouldn't
+    /// be able to DoS the cert by attaching `attacker/spam/v1` before
+    /// `covenant/exec/v1`.
+    #[test]
+    fn require_all_is_lenient_on_unknown_types_in_the_batch() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_hash();
+        let mut reg = Registry::new()
+            .with_policy(Policy::RequireAll)
+            .require_types(["demo/v1"]);
+        reg.register(DemoVerifier);
+
+        let spam = signed_other(&sk, cert_hash, 7);
+        let real = signed_demo(&sk, cert_hash, "ok");
+        let verified = reg.verify_all(&[spam, real], cert_hash).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(verified.len(), 2);
+        assert!(verified
+            .iter()
+            .any(|v| v.type_ == "demo/v1" && v.fully_verified));
+        assert!(verified
+            .iter()
+            .any(|v| v.type_ == "other/v1" && !v.fully_verified));
+    }
+
+    /// A required type that is present but unverified (no verifier registered
+    /// even though the type appears in `required_types`) must fail
+    /// `verify_all` with `RequiredMissing`. Catches a misconfiguration where
+    /// the operator listed a type but forgot to register a verifier.
+    #[test]
+    fn require_all_rejects_present_but_unverified_required_type() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_hash();
+        let reg = Registry::new()
+            .with_policy(Policy::RequireAll)
+            .require_types(["demo/v1"]); // type listed, but no verifier registered.
+
+        let att = signed_demo(&sk, cert_hash, "ok");
+        let err = reg.verify_all(&[att], cert_hash).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::RequiredMissing(t) if t == "demo/v1"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn payload_check_failure_rejects() {
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_hash();
+        let mut reg = Registry::new();
+        reg.register(DemoVerifier);
+        // Sign an empty `a` so the signature verifies but the payload check fails.
+        let att = Attestation::sign(&sk, Demo { a: String::new() }, cert_hash).unwrap();
+        let err = reg.verify(&att, cert_hash).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Payload(_)));
+    }
+
+    /// `RequireAll` with an empty allowlist degenerates to "no required types
+    /// to check" — the loop over `required_types` is a no-op, so an empty
+    /// batch verifies successfully. Pinned so operators relying on the empty
+    /// allowlist as a default-permissive RequireAll see consistent behavior.
+    #[test]
+    fn require_all_with_empty_allowlist_and_empty_batch_succeeds() {
+        let reg = Registry::new().with_policy(Policy::RequireAll);
+        let verified = reg.verify_all(&[], sample_hash()).unwrap();
+        assert!(verified.is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn register_returns_the_prior_verifier_on_double_register() {
+        let mut reg = Registry::new();
+        assert!(reg.register(DemoVerifier).is_none());
+        let prior = reg.register(DemoVerifierAlt);
+        let prior = prior.expect("second register must return the previous verifier");
+        assert_eq!(prior.type_(), "demo/v1");
+
+        // Last-wins semantics confirmed by behavior.
+        let sk = fresh();
+        let cert_hash = sample_hash();
+        let att = signed_demo(&sk, cert_hash, "ok");
+        let err = reg.verify(&att, cert_hash).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::Payload(_)));
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-attest/tests/canonical_vectors.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+//! Canonical test vectors.
+//!
+//! Ed25519 signatures are deterministic (RFC 8032). JCS canonicalization is
+//! deterministic (RFC 8785). SHA-256 is deterministic. Given fixed inputs the
+//! cert hash, signature, signer DID, and full wire JSON are therefore exactly
+//! reproducible across implementations. This file pins those values so a
+//! port to Go, JS, Python, or any other language has a concrete oracle to
+//! check against without reading Rust.
+//!
+//! If a vector changes, that is a wire-protocol break. The change is either
+//! intentional (bump `ATTEST_ENVELOPE_VERSION` and document the migration) or
+//! a regression that broke interoperability with every other implementation.
+
+use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+use gitlawb_attest::{Attestation, AttestationPayload, AttestedRefUpdateCert, Registry, CERT_TYPE};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+/// Fixed seed for the attestation signer. Real signers use a CSPRNG; this is a
+/// test-vector convention only.
+const SIGNER_SEED: [u8; 32] = [
+    0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10,
+    0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff,
+];
+
+/// Fixed cert body for the vectors. Mirrors the field layout of a
+/// `gitlawb-core::cert::RefUpdateBody` plus a `signatures` array. The
+/// signatures array is deliberately non-empty to test that it is stripped
+/// before hashing.
+fn fixture_cert_body() -> serde_json::Value {
+    serde_json::json!({
+        "type": CERT_TYPE,
+        "repo": "did:key:z6MkpYqTAt8jq3SExeUiVdyTrDdocy9j2NjGxFE6S6ZBh1Yt",
+        "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
+        "from": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+        "to": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
+        "seq": 1,
+        "timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+        "nonce": "vector-nonce-1",
+        "signatures": [
+            {"signer": "did:key:z6MkpYqTAt8jq3SExeUiVdyTrDdocy9j2NjGxFE6S6ZBh1Yt", "sig": "ignored"}
+        ]
+    })
+}
+
+/// Fixed attestation payload. Shape mirrors what Covenant's runtime would
+/// produce for a `covenant/exec/v1` attestation.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+struct ExecPayload {
+    agent: String,
+    capability: String,
+    sandbox_digest: String,
+}
+
+impl AttestationPayload for ExecPayload {
+    fn payload_type() -> &'static str {
+        "covenant/exec/v1"
+    }
+}
+
+fn fixture_payload() -> ExecPayload {
+    ExecPayload {
+        agent: "did:key:z6MkAgentTestVector".to_string(),
+        capability: "code.write+sandbox.exec".to_string(),
+        sandbox_digest: "sha256:c0ffee".to_string(),
+    }
+}
+
+/// The expected lowercase-hex SHA-256 of `JCS(cert_body \ {signatures})`.
+/// Any port that produces a different value is not JCS-canonicalizing the
+/// same way (likely culprits: key ordering, integer or string escaping).
+const EXPECTED_CERT_HASH_HEX: &str =
+    "5898d7c7a7d32a5faaaf9a52bfc92e0eff98027554adeefba0c575816f43ce56";
+
+/// The expected `did:key` of the signer derived from `SIGNER_SEED`. Any port
+/// that produces a different value has a multibase or multicodec encoding bug.
+const EXPECTED_SIGNER_DID: &str = "did:key:z6MkqkKY69DYo23W4YFDoCNgjr7cMvmJqHtJVoQkEzrbaopZ";
+
+/// The expected base64url-no-pad Ed25519 signature over
+/// `b"gitlawb-attest-sig/v1\n" || JCS({type, payload, cert_hash})`. Any port
+/// that produces a different value is missing the domain tag, JCS-encoding
+/// the input differently, or using a different Ed25519 implementation.
+const EXPECTED_SIGNATURE_B64URL: &str =
+    "4L3ONbhrksB9pn--u86lMeAdePSiZZplAsxuN2Cy6vgI30ndle7gDUVuoGRJr4Ylhz7ipQvUzXaDTvZGFLPXBQ";
+
+#[test]
+fn cert_hash_is_deterministic_from_jcs() {
+    let env = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&fixture_cert_body()).unwrap();
+    let actual_hex = hex::encode(env.cert_hash().unwrap());
+    assert_eq!(
+        actual_hex, EXPECTED_CERT_HASH_HEX,
+        "cert hash drifted — JCS encoding or hash algorithm changed",
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn signer_did_is_deterministic_from_seed() {
+    let sk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&SIGNER_SEED);
+    let env = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&fixture_cert_body()).unwrap();
+    let cert_hash = env.cert_hash().unwrap();
+    let att = Attestation::sign(&sk, fixture_payload(), cert_hash).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        att.signer, EXPECTED_SIGNER_DID,
+        "signer DID drifted — multibase or multicodec encoding changed",
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn attestation_signature_is_deterministic() {
+    let sk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&SIGNER_SEED);
+    let env = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&fixture_cert_body()).unwrap();
+    let cert_hash = env.cert_hash().unwrap();
+    let att = Attestation::sign(&sk, fixture_payload(), cert_hash).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        att.sig, EXPECTED_SIGNATURE_B64URL,
+        "signature drifted — domain tag, JCS shape, or Ed25519 implementation changed",
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn vector_attestation_verifies_through_the_public_api() {
+    // Round-trip the entire pipeline using only the public API on the fixed
+    // vectors. A non-Rust implementor should be able to:
+    //   1. Compute cert_hash and check against EXPECTED_CERT_HASH_HEX.
+    //   2. Derive signer DID and check against EXPECTED_SIGNER_DID.
+    //   3. Sign a payload identical to fixture_payload() and check against
+    //      EXPECTED_SIGNATURE_B64URL.
+    //   4. Reconstruct the wire envelope and verify it round-trips.
+    let sk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&SIGNER_SEED);
+    let mut env = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&fixture_cert_body()).unwrap();
+    let cert_hash = env.cert_hash().unwrap();
+    let att = Attestation::sign(&sk, fixture_payload(), cert_hash).unwrap();
+    env.attach(att);
+
+    let wire = serde_json::to_string(&env).unwrap();
+    let back: AttestedRefUpdateCert = serde_json::from_str(&wire).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(back.attestations.len(), 1);
+    assert_eq!(back.attestations[0].sig, EXPECTED_SIGNATURE_B64URL);
+
+    let recovered = back.attestations[0]
+        .verify_signature(back.cert_hash().unwrap())
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(recovered.to_bytes(), sk.verifying_key().to_bytes());
+
+    // And through a registry, with the convenience method.
+    let reg = Registry::new();
+    let verified = back.verify_attestations(&reg).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(verified.len(), 1);
+    assert_eq!(verified[0].cert_hash, EXPECTED_CERT_HASH_HEX);
+    assert_eq!(verified[0].signer, EXPECTED_SIGNER_DID);
+}

crates/gitlawb-attest/tests/with_gitlawb_core.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+//! End-to-end integration with `gitlawb-core`.
+//!
+//! Proves the attest envelope composes with the real `RefUpdateCert` from
+//! `gitlawb-core`: a cert built and signed through the core API wraps cleanly,
+//! survives signing and verifying an attestation, and round-trips back to a
+//! `RefUpdateCert` that core still verifies. None of this is exercised by the
+//! unit tests in `cert.rs`, which use hand-written JSON literals to keep the
+//! crate's runtime deps minimal.
+
+use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+use gitlawb_attest::{
+    Attestation, AttestationPayload, AttestationVerifier, AttestedRefUpdateCert, Error, Policy,
+    Registry, Result as AttestResult,
+};
+use gitlawb_core::cert::RefUpdateCert;
+use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+use rand::rngs::OsRng;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+fn zero_hash() -> String {
+    "0".repeat(64)
+}
+
+fn commit_hash(c: char) -> String {
+    c.to_string().repeat(64)
+}
+
+fn fresh_signing_key() -> SigningKey {
+    SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng)
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+struct CovenantExecPayload {
+    agent: String,
+    capability: String,
+    sandbox_digest: String,
+}
+
+impl AttestationPayload for CovenantExecPayload {
+    fn payload_type() -> &'static str {
+        "covenant/exec/v1"
+    }
+}
+
+struct CovenantExecVerifier;
+
+impl AttestationVerifier for CovenantExecVerifier {
+    fn type_(&self) -> &'static str {
+        "covenant/exec/v1"
+    }
+
+    fn verify_payload(&self, payload: &serde_json::Value) -> AttestResult<()> {
+        for field in ["agent", "capability", "sandbox_digest"] {
+            payload
+                .get(field)
+                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+                .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+                .ok_or_else(|| Error::Payload(format!("missing or empty '{field}'")))?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn wraps_real_cert_signs_and_verifies_attestation_then_unwraps_cleanly() {
+    // 1. Build a real cert through gitlawb-core. The pusher is the repo owner
+    //    in this minimal setup; the cert is single-signature.
+    let pusher = Keypair::generate();
+    let repo_did = pusher.did();
+    let cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+        repo_did,
+        "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+        zero_hash(),
+        commit_hash('a'),
+        1,
+        &pusher,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    cert.validate_structure().unwrap();
+    let valid_signers = cert.verify_all().unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(valid_signers.len(), 1);
+
+    // 2. Wrap. With no attestations attached the envelope is byte-identical to
+    //    the underlying cert — that's the additive-on-the-wire promise.
+    let cert_json = serde_json::to_value(&cert).unwrap();
+    let mut env = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&cert).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        serde_json::to_value(&env).unwrap(),
+        cert_json,
+        "empty envelope must serialize as the bare cert"
+    );
+
+    // 3. A separate party (here, an agent runtime) attests to how the commit
+    //    was produced. The attestation signer is intentionally not the cert
+    //    pusher: trust in the attestation is evaluated independently of trust
+    //    in the push.
+    let agent_signer = fresh_signing_key();
+    let payload = CovenantExecPayload {
+        agent: "did:key:z6MkAgent".to_string(),
+        capability: "code.write+sandbox.exec".to_string(),
+        sandbox_digest: "sha256:c0ffee".to_string(),
+    };
+    let cert_hash = env.cert_hash().unwrap();
+    let attestation = Attestation::sign(&agent_signer, payload.clone(), cert_hash).unwrap();
+    env.attach(attestation);
+
+    // 4. Verify through a registry that knows `covenant/exec/v1`. Strict
+    //    policy so an unknown discriminator would have been rejected.
+    let mut registry = Registry::new().with_policy(Policy::RejectUnknown);
+    registry.register(CovenantExecVerifier);
+    let verified = registry
+        .verify_all(&env.attestations, env.cert_hash().unwrap())
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(verified.len(), 1);
+    assert!(verified[0].fully_verified);
+    assert_eq!(verified[0].type_, "covenant/exec/v1");
+    assert_eq!(verified[0].cert_hash, hex::encode(cert_hash));
+
+    // 5. Round-trip through JSON and back. The wrapped cert with one
+    //    attestation must parse back into the same envelope, and stripping
+    //    the attestations must yield a `RefUpdateCert` core still verifies.
+    let on_wire = serde_json::to_string(&env).unwrap();
+    let back: AttestedRefUpdateCert = serde_json::from_str(&on_wire).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(back.attestations.len(), 1);
+    assert_eq!(
+        back.attestations[0]
+            .payload_as::<CovenantExecPayload>()
+            .unwrap(),
+        payload
+    );
+
+    let mut unwrapped = back.cert.clone();
+    if let Some(obj) = unwrapped.as_object_mut() {
+        obj.remove("attestations");
+    }
+    let unwrapped_cert: RefUpdateCert = serde_json::from_value(unwrapped).unwrap();
+    let revalidated = unwrapped_cert.verify_all().unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(revalidated, valid_signers);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn cert_hash_is_stable_when_a_maintainer_countersigns() {
+    // The cert hash strips `signatures` before hashing, so countersignatures
+    // added after an attestation is signed must not invalidate the
+    // attestation's binding.
+    let pusher = Keypair::generate();
+    let maintainer = Keypair::generate();
+    let mut cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+        pusher.did(),
+        "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+        zero_hash(),
+        commit_hash('b'),
+        7,
+        &pusher,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+
+    let env_before = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&cert).unwrap();
+    let hash_before = env_before.cert_hash().unwrap();
+
+    cert.countersign(&maintainer).unwrap();
+    let env_after = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&cert).unwrap();
+    let hash_after = env_after.cert_hash().unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        hash_before, hash_after,
+        "cert hash must be stable across countersignatures"
+    );
+
+    // An attestation signed against the pre-countersign hash still verifies
+    // against the post-countersign cert.
+    let agent = fresh_signing_key();
+    let payload = CovenantExecPayload {
+        agent: "did:key:z6MkAgent2".to_string(),
+        capability: "code.write".to_string(),
+        sandbox_digest: "sha256:deadbeef".to_string(),
+    };
+    let attestation = Attestation::sign(&agent, payload, hash_before).unwrap();
+    attestation.verify_signature(hash_after).unwrap();
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn cross_cert_replay_is_rejected_against_a_real_cert() {
+    // Negative case: an attestation signed for one cert must not verify on a
+    // different cert built through the core API.
+    let pusher = Keypair::generate();
+    let cert_a = RefUpdateCert::new(
+        pusher.did(),
+        "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+        zero_hash(),
+        commit_hash('a'),
+        1,
+        &pusher,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let cert_b = RefUpdateCert::new(
+        pusher.did(),
+        "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+        commit_hash('a'),
+        commit_hash('b'),
+        2,
+        &pusher,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+
+    let env_a = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&cert_a).unwrap();
+    let env_b = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&cert_b).unwrap();
+    let hash_a = env_a.cert_hash().unwrap();
+    let hash_b = env_b.cert_hash().unwrap();
+    assert_ne!(hash_a, hash_b);
+
+    let agent = fresh_signing_key();
+    let payload = CovenantExecPayload {
+        agent: "did:key:z6MkAgent3".to_string(),
+        capability: "code.write".to_string(),
+        sandbox_digest: "sha256:cafe".to_string(),
+    };
+    let attestation = Attestation::sign(&agent, payload, hash_a).unwrap();
+    let err = attestation.verify_signature(hash_b).unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::CertHashMismatch));
+}
+
+/// A cert deserialized from JSON and a cert built through the core API must
+/// hash identically. JCS canonicalization is what makes the additive-on-wire
+/// promise hold across the serialize/deserialize boundary — without it, the
+/// hash would depend on which side built the `serde_json::Value`.
+#[test]
+fn cert_hash_is_identical_across_the_deserialize_boundary() {
+    let pusher = Keypair::generate();
+    let cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+        pusher.did(),
+        "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+        zero_hash(),
+        commit_hash('c'),
+        9,
+        &pusher,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+
+    let direct_hash = AttestedRefUpdateCert::from_cert(&cert)
+        .unwrap()
+        .cert_hash()
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let wire = serde_json::to_string(&cert).unwrap();
+    let parsed_value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&wire).unwrap();
+    let parsed_env: AttestedRefUpdateCert = serde_json::from_value(parsed_value).unwrap();
+    let parsed_hash = parsed_env.cert_hash().unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(direct_hash, parsed_hash);
+}

crates/gitlawb-core/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
 description = "Core cryptographic primitives for the gitlawb network: DIDs, CIDs, UCAN, HTTP Signatures, ref-update certificates"
-version.workspace = true
+version = "0.5.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 
 [dependencies]
@@ -23,6 +24,9 @@ chrono = { workspace = true }
 uuid = { workspace = true }
 zeroize = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
 pkcs8 = { version = "0.10", features = ["pem", "std"] }
+curve25519-dalek = "4"
+crypto_box = { version = "0.9", features = ["std", "chacha20"] }
+chacha20poly1305 = "0.10"
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 tokio = { workspace = true }

crates/gitlawb-core/src/cert.rs

@@ -257,4 +257,105 @@ mod tests {
         // Round-trip
         let _: RefUpdateCert = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_structure_rejects_wrong_cert_type() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+            kp.did(),
+            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            dummy_hash('0'),
+            dummy_hash('a'),
+            1,
+            &kp,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        cert.body.type_ = "gitlawb/ref-update/v0".to_string();
+        assert!(cert.validate_structure().is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_structure_rejects_invalid_to_hash() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+            kp.did(),
+            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            dummy_hash('0'),
+            dummy_hash('a'),
+            1,
+            &kp,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        cert.body.to = "not-a-valid-sha256".to_string();
+        assert!(cert.validate_structure().is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_structure_rejects_empty_signatures() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+            kp.did(),
+            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            dummy_hash('0'),
+            dummy_hash('a'),
+            1,
+            &kp,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        cert.signatures.clear();
+        assert!(cert.validate_structure().is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tampered_signature_fails_verify_all() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let kp2 = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+            kp.did(),
+            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            dummy_hash('0'),
+            dummy_hash('a'),
+            1,
+            &kp,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        // Replace kp's signature with a signature from kp2 over different bytes.
+        // The signer DID still points to kp, so verification must fail.
+        cert.signatures[0].sig = kp2.sign_b64(b"unrelated bytes");
+        assert!(cert.verify_all().is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn threshold_not_met_when_signer_outside_maintainer_list() {
+        let kp_pusher = Keypair::generate();
+        let kp_maintainer = Keypair::generate();
+
+        let cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+            kp_pusher.did(),
+            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            dummy_hash('0'),
+            dummy_hash('a'),
+            1,
+            &kp_pusher,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let maintainers = vec![kp_maintainer.did()];
+        assert!(!cert.satisfies_threshold(&maintainers, 1).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn threshold_zero_is_always_satisfied() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let cert = RefUpdateCert::new(
+            kp.did(),
+            "refs/heads/main".to_string(),
+            dummy_hash('0'),
+            dummy_hash('a'),
+            1,
+            &kp,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(cert.satisfies_threshold(&[], 0).unwrap());
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-core/src/cid.rs

@@ -129,4 +129,61 @@ mod tests {
         let bytes = sha256_hex_to_bytes(&hex).unwrap();
         assert_eq!(sha256_bytes(data), bytes);
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_sha256_bytes_matches_object_bytes() {
+        // from_sha256_bytes must produce the same CID as from_git_object_bytes
+        // when given the SHA-256 of those bytes — the two construction paths
+        // must be equivalent for self-verifying content addressing to hold.
+        let data = b"blob 5\0hello";
+        let cid_from_object = Cid::from_git_object_bytes(data);
+        let hash = sha256_bytes(data);
+        let cid_from_hash = Cid::from_sha256_bytes(&hash);
+        assert_eq!(cid_from_object, cid_from_hash);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_str_parses_valid_cid() {
+        let data = b"tree content for test";
+        let cid = Cid::from_git_object_bytes(data);
+        let parsed = Cid::from_str(cid.as_str()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(cid, parsed);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_str_rejects_invalid_string() {
+        let result = Cid::from_str("not-a-valid-cid");
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn different_data_produces_different_cids() {
+        let c1 = Cid::from_git_object_bytes(b"blob 5\0hello");
+        let c2 = Cid::from_git_object_bytes(b"blob 5\0world");
+        assert_ne!(c1, c2);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sha256_hex_to_bytes_rejects_non_hex() {
+        let non_hex = "zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz";
+        assert_eq!(non_hex.len(), 64);
+        let result = sha256_hex_to_bytes(non_hex);
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sha256_hex_to_bytes_rejects_wrong_length() {
+        let result = sha256_hex_to_bytes("deadbeef");
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sha256_hex_of_empty_input_is_well_known() {
+        // SHA-256("") is a fixed constant; verifies the hasher is wired correctly.
+        let h = sha256_hex(b"");
+        assert_eq!(
+            h,
+            "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-core/src/did.rs

@@ -252,4 +252,60 @@ mod tests {
         let json = serde_json::to_string_pretty(&doc).unwrap();
         assert!(json.contains("Ed25519VerificationKey2020"));
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn to_verifying_key_fails_for_did_web() {
+        let web = Did::web("example.com");
+        let result = web.to_verifying_key();
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "did:web cannot resolve to a verifying key locally"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn to_verifying_key_fails_for_did_gitlawb() {
+        let gl = Did::gitlawb("z6MkSomeKey");
+        let result = gl.to_verifying_key();
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "did:gitlawb cannot resolve to a verifying key locally"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_str_rejects_missing_did_prefix() {
+        let result = "key:z6MkABCD".parse::<Did>();
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_str_rejects_unsupported_method() {
+        let result = "did:ethr:0x1234abcd".parse::<Did>();
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_accepts_all_supported_methods() {
+        Did::web("example.com").validate().unwrap();
+        Did::gitlawb("z6MkSomeKey").validate().unwrap();
+        Keypair::generate().did().validate().unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_did_key_and_is_did_gitlawb_predicates() {
+        let key_did = Keypair::generate().did();
+        assert!(key_did.is_did_key());
+        assert!(!key_did.is_did_gitlawb());
+
+        let gl = Did::gitlawb("z6MkSomeKey");
+        assert!(!gl.is_did_key());
+        assert!(gl.is_did_gitlawb());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn method_id_extraction() {
+        assert_eq!(Did::web("example.com").method_id(), "example.com");
+        assert_eq!(Did::gitlawb("z6MkSomeKey").method_id(), "z6MkSomeKey");
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-core/src/encrypt.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
+//! Envelope encryption for withheld blobs (Option B). A random content key
+//! encrypts the blob (XChaCha20-Poly1305); the content key is wrapped to each
+//! recipient via an X25519 box keyed from their Ed25519 `did:key`. The node
+//! seals with public keys only; readers open with their own private key.
+
+use crate::identity::Keypair;
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
+use zeroize::Zeroizing;
+
+/// X25519 public key (Montgomery u) for an Ed25519 verifying key.
+fn x25519_public(vk: &VerifyingKey) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
+    use curve25519_dalek::edwards::CompressedEdwardsY;
+    let edwards = CompressedEdwardsY::from_slice(vk.as_bytes())
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|c| c.decompress())
+        .context("verifying key is not a valid edwards point")?;
+    Ok(edwards.to_montgomery().to_bytes())
+}
+
+/// X25519 secret scalar for an Ed25519 seed (SHA-512 of seed, lower 32, clamped).
+/// Returns the scalar wrapped in `Zeroizing`, and scrubs the intermediate
+/// SHA-512 digest, so no copy of this secret material lingers in freed memory.
+fn x25519_secret_from_seed(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> {
+    use sha2::{Digest, Sha512};
+    use zeroize::Zeroize;
+    let mut h = Sha512::digest(seed);
+    let mut s = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
+    s.copy_from_slice(&h[..32]);
+    s[0] &= 248;
+    s[31] &= 127;
+    s[31] |= 64;
+    h.as_mut_slice().zeroize();
+    s
+}
+
+use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as B64, Engine};
+use chacha20poly1305::{
+    aead::{Aead, KeyInit},
+    XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
+};
+use crypto_box::{
+    aead::{AeadCore, OsRng},
+    ChaChaBox, PublicKey as XPublic, SecretKey as XSecret,
+};
+use rand::RngCore;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+const MAGIC: &[u8] = b"GLENC";
+const VERSION: u8 = 2;
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct Recipient {
+    eph: String,   // base64 ephemeral x25519 pubkey (32B)
+    nonce: String, // base64 box nonce (24B)
+    wrap: String,  // base64 wrapped content key
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct Header {
+    alg: String,
+    nonce: String, // base64 body nonce (24B)
+    recipients: Vec<Recipient>,
+}
+
+/// Encrypt `plaintext` so any of `recipients` (Ed25519 keys) can decrypt.
+pub fn seal_blob(plaintext: &[u8], recipients: &[VerifyingKey]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    if recipients.is_empty() {
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("seal_blob: no recipients"));
+    }
+    let mut content_key = [0u8; 32];
+    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut content_key);
+    let body_cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&content_key)
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("content key: {e}"))?;
+    let mut body_nonce = [0u8; 24];
+    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut body_nonce);
+    let body = body_cipher
+        .encrypt(XNonce::from_slice(&body_nonce), plaintext)
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("body encrypt: {e}"))?;
+
+    let mut wrapped = Vec::with_capacity(recipients.len());
+    for vk in recipients {
+        let recip_x = XPublic::from(x25519_public(vk)?);
+        let eph = XSecret::generate(&mut OsRng);
+        let abox = ChaChaBox::new(&recip_x, &eph);
+        let nonce = ChaChaBox::generate_nonce(&mut OsRng);
+        let ct = abox
+            .encrypt(&nonce, &content_key[..])
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("wrap: {e}"))?;
+        wrapped.push(Recipient {
+            eph: B64.encode(eph.public_key().as_bytes()),
+            nonce: B64.encode(nonce),
+            wrap: B64.encode(ct),
+        });
+    }
+
+    let header = Header {
+        alg: "xchacha20poly1305".into(),
+        nonce: B64.encode(body_nonce),
+        recipients: wrapped,
+    };
+    let header_json = serde_json::to_vec(&header).context("encode header")?;
+
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    out.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
+    out.push(VERSION);
+    out.extend_from_slice(&(header_json.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
+    out.extend_from_slice(&header_json);
+    out.extend_from_slice(&body);
+    Ok(out)
+}
+
+/// Decrypt an envelope with `keypair`. Errors if not a recipient or on auth fail.
+pub fn open_blob(envelope: &[u8], keypair: &Keypair) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let mut p = 0;
+    if envelope.len() < MAGIC.len() + 1 + 4 || &envelope[..MAGIC.len()] != MAGIC {
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("bad envelope magic"));
+    }
+    p += MAGIC.len();
+    if envelope[p] != VERSION {
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("unsupported envelope version"));
+    }
+    p += 1;
+    let hlen = u32::from_le_bytes(envelope[p..p + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
+    p += 4;
+    let header: Header =
+        serde_json::from_slice(envelope.get(p..p + hlen).context("truncated header")?)
+            .context("decode header")?;
+    let body = &envelope[p + hlen..];
+
+    let my_x = XSecret::from(*x25519_secret_from_seed(&keypair.to_seed()));
+
+    // Identities are blinded: no entry says which recipient it belongs to, so
+    // try each one. The ChaChaBox AEAD tag authenticates, so exactly the
+    // reader's own entry unwraps; every other entry fails cleanly.
+    let mut content_key: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
+    for entry in &header.recipients {
+        let eph = match B64
+            .decode(&entry.eph)
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|b| <[u8; 32]>::try_from(b.as_slice()).ok())
+        {
+            Some(b) => XPublic::from(b),
+            None => continue,
+        };
+        // from_slice panics on a wrong length, and the envelope is attacker
+        // controlled, so validate the 24-byte box nonce before using it.
+        let nonce = match B64
+            .decode(&entry.nonce)
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|n| <[u8; 24]>::try_from(n.as_slice()).ok())
+        {
+            Some(n) => n,
+            None => continue,
+        };
+        let wrap = match B64.decode(&entry.wrap) {
+            Ok(w) => w,
+            Err(_) => continue,
+        };
+        let abox = ChaChaBox::new(&eph, &my_x);
+        if let Ok(ck) = abox.decrypt(
+            crypto_box::aead::generic_array::GenericArray::from_slice(&nonce),
+            wrap.as_slice(),
+        ) {
+            content_key = Some(ck);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    let content_key = content_key.context("not a recipient of this envelope")?;
+
+    let body_cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&content_key)
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("content key: {e}"))?;
+    let body_nonce = B64
+        .decode(&header.nonce)
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|n| <[u8; 24]>::try_from(n.as_slice()).ok())
+        .context("invalid body nonce")?;
+    body_cipher
+        .decrypt(XNonce::from_slice(&body_nonce), body)
+        .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("body decrypt failed"))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::identity::Keypair;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ed25519_to_x25519_keypair_agrees() {
+        // The X25519 public derived from the Ed25519 public must equal the
+        // X25519 public of the X25519 secret derived from the same seed.
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let seed = kp.to_seed();
+        let xpub_from_public = x25519_public(&kp.verifying_key()).unwrap();
+        let xsec = x25519_secret_from_seed(&seed);
+        let xpub_from_secret = crypto_box::SecretKey::from(*xsec).public_key().to_bytes();
+        assert_eq!(xpub_from_public, xpub_from_secret);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn seal_open_round_trip_for_recipients() {
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let reader_a = Keypair::generate();
+        let reader_b = Keypair::generate();
+        let msg = b"private blob contents";
+
+        let env = seal_blob(msg, &[owner.verifying_key(), reader_a.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(open_blob(&env, &owner).unwrap(), msg);
+        assert_eq!(open_blob(&env, &reader_a).unwrap(), msg);
+        assert!(
+            open_blob(&env, &reader_b).is_err(),
+            "non-recipient must fail"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tampered_envelope_fails() {
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut env = seal_blob(b"hi", &[owner.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
+        let last = env.len() - 1;
+        env[last] ^= 0x01;
+        assert!(open_blob(&env, &owner).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn v2_header_contains_no_recipient_pubkey() {
+        // The blinded envelope header must not carry any recipient's public key.
+        let reader = Keypair::generate();
+        let env = seal_blob(b"private blob contents", &[reader.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
+
+        // Slice out the header bytes using the envelope framing:
+        // MAGIC | version(1B) | header_len(4B LE) | header_json | body
+        let mut p = MAGIC.len() + 1; // skip MAGIC + version byte
+        let hlen = u32::from_le_bytes(env[p..p + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
+        p += 4;
+        let header = &env[p..p + hlen];
+        let header_str = String::from_utf8_lossy(header);
+
+        let pubkey_b64 = B64.encode(reader.verifying_key().as_bytes());
+        assert!(
+            !header_str.contains(&pubkey_b64),
+            "recipient public key must not appear in the blinded header"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn v1_envelope_is_rejected() {
+        let reader = Keypair::generate();
+        let mut env = seal_blob(b"hi", &[reader.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
+        // Flip the version byte (immediately after MAGIC) from 2 to 1.
+        env[MAGIC.len()] = 1;
+        let err = open_blob(&env, &reader).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("unsupported envelope version"),
+            "expected version-rejection error, got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn malformed_nonce_returns_err_not_panic() {
+        // from_slice panics on wrong-length input; a crafted envelope on the
+        // public recovery path must surface an error, never panic.
+        let reader = Keypair::generate();
+        let env = seal_blob(b"private blob contents", &[reader.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
+
+        // Split the envelope framing into header JSON and body.
+        let mut p = MAGIC.len() + 1;
+        let hlen = u32::from_le_bytes(env[p..p + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
+        p += 4;
+        let header_bytes = &env[p..p + hlen];
+        let body = &env[p + hlen..];
+
+        let reframe = |header: &serde_json::Value| -> Vec<u8> {
+            let hj = serde_json::to_vec(header).unwrap();
+            let mut out = Vec::new();
+            out.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
+            out.push(VERSION);
+            out.extend_from_slice(&(hj.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
+            out.extend_from_slice(&hj);
+            out.extend_from_slice(body);
+            out
+        };
+        let bad_nonce = serde_json::Value::String(B64.encode([0u8; 12]));
+
+        // Corrupted per-recipient nonce: entry is skipped, no match.
+        let mut header: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(header_bytes).unwrap();
+        header["recipients"][0]["nonce"] = bad_nonce.clone();
+        assert!(open_blob(&reframe(&header), &reader).is_err());
+
+        // Corrupted body nonce: unwrap succeeds, body nonce is rejected.
+        let mut header: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(header_bytes).unwrap();
+        header["nonce"] = bad_nonce;
+        assert!(open_blob(&reframe(&header), &reader).is_err());
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-core/src/http_sig.rs

@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ impl HttpSignature {
     pub fn missing_components(&self) -> Vec<&str> {
         COVERED_COMPONENTS
             .iter()
-            .filter(|c| !self.components.contains(&c.to_string()))
+            .filter(|c| !self.components.iter().any(|s| s.as_str() == **c))
             .copied()
             .collect()
     }

crates/gitlawb-core/src/identity.rs

@@ -52,7 +52,9 @@ impl Keypair {
         URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(sig.to_bytes())
     }
 
-    /// Export the signing key as raw 32-byte seed (wrapped in Zeroizing).
+    /// The raw 32-byte Ed25519 seed, wrapped in `Zeroizing` so the copy is
+    /// scrubbed on drop. This is the only seed accessor; it is used to derive
+    /// the X25519 secret for envelope decryption (see `crate::encrypt`).
     pub fn to_seed(&self) -> Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> {
         Zeroizing::new(self.signing_key.to_bytes())
     }
@@ -157,4 +159,80 @@ mod tests {
         let did = kp.did();
         assert!(did.to_string().starts_with("did:key:z6Mk"));
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_seed_round_trip() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let seed = kp.to_seed();
+        let kp2 = Keypair::from_seed(&seed).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(kp.verifying_key(), kp2.verifying_key());
+    }
+
+    // `to_seed()` is the only seed accessor on `Keypair` (the raw, unzeroized
+    // `seed_bytes()` was removed in #41). Pin its return type so a bare-array
+    // accessor can't slip back in, and confirm it is deterministic. The
+    // from_seed -> verifying_key round-trip is already covered by
+    // `from_seed_round_trip`.
+    #[test]
+    fn to_seed_returns_zeroizing_and_is_deterministic() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        // The type annotation is the regression guard: the seed must be handed
+        // out wrapped in `Zeroizing`, never as a bare `[u8; 32]`.
+        let seed: Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> = kp.to_seed();
+        assert_eq!(*kp.to_seed(), *seed); // stable across calls
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_b64_decodes_to_valid_signature() {
+        use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let msg = b"test payload for b64 signing";
+        let b64 = kp.sign_b64(msg);
+        let sig_bytes: [u8; 64] = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
+            .decode(&b64)
+            .expect("sign_b64 must produce valid base64url")
+            .try_into()
+            .expect("Ed25519 signature must be 64 bytes");
+        verify(&kp.verifying_key(), msg, &sig_bytes).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_wrong_key() {
+        let kp1 = Keypair::generate();
+        let kp2 = Keypair::generate();
+        let msg = b"some message";
+        let sig = kp1.sign(msg);
+        let result = verify(&kp2.verifying_key(), msg, &sig.to_bytes());
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "signature from kp1 must not verify under kp2"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn signed_payload_round_trip() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let payload = serde_json::json!({"action": "push", "repo": "my-repo"});
+        let signed = Signed::new(payload, &kp).unwrap();
+        signed.verify(&kp.verifying_key()).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn signed_payload_wrong_key_fails() {
+        let kp1 = Keypair::generate();
+        let kp2 = Keypair::generate();
+        let payload = serde_json::json!({"action": "push"});
+        let signed = Signed::new(payload, &kp1).unwrap();
+        let result = signed.verify(&kp2.verifying_key());
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "Signed payload must not verify under a different key"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_pem_invalid_input_fails() {
+        let result = Keypair::from_pem("this is not valid PEM at all");
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-core/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 pub mod cert;
 pub mod cid;
 pub mod did;
+pub mod encrypt;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod http_sig;
 pub mod identity;

crates/gitlawb-core/src/ucan.rs

@@ -41,6 +41,20 @@ impl Capability {
         self.constraints = Some(constraints);
         self
     }
+
+    /// Returns `true` if `self` is a valid attenuation of `parent`.
+    ///
+    /// A delegated capability is only valid if it is at most as permissive as
+    /// the parent capability backing it. `"*"` on the **parent**'s resource or
+    /// action field and `repo/admin` in the parent's action position act as
+    /// wildcards that cover any delegated value; wildcards on `self` carry no
+    /// special meaning.
+    pub fn is_attenuated_by(&self, parent: &Capability) -> bool {
+        let resource_ok = parent.with == self.with || parent.with == "*";
+        let action_ok =
+            parent.can == self.can || parent.can == "*" || parent.can == caps::REPO_ADMIN;
+        resource_ok && action_ok
+    }
 }
 
 /// Well-known gitlawb capability strings.
@@ -132,6 +146,26 @@ impl Ucan {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Check if this UCAN's not-before time is in the future (token not yet valid).
+    pub fn is_before_valid(&self) -> bool {
+        if let Some(nbf) = self.payload.nbf {
+            Utc::now().timestamp() < nbf
+        } else {
+            false
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Verify this UCAN's audience matches `expected`.
+    pub fn verify_audience(&self, expected: &Did) -> Result<()> {
+        if &self.payload.aud != expected {
+            return Err(Error::Ucan(format!(
+                "audience mismatch: expected {expected}, got {}",
+                self.payload.aud
+            )));
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
     /// Verify the signature on this UCAN.
     pub fn verify_signature(&self) -> Result<()> {
         use crate::identity::verify;
@@ -217,6 +251,10 @@ impl Ucan {
             return Err(Error::Ucan("token is expired".to_string()));
         }
 
+        if self.is_before_valid() {
+            return Err(Error::Ucan("token is not yet valid".to_string()));
+        }
+
         for proof_token in &self.payload.prf {
             let proof = Self::decode(proof_token)
                 .map_err(|e| Error::Ucan(format!("failed to decode proof: {e}")))?;
@@ -229,6 +267,17 @@ impl Ucan {
                 )));
             }
 
+            // Every delegated capability must be covered by the proof (attenuation).
+            for cap in &self.payload.att {
+                let covered = proof.payload.att.iter().any(|p| cap.is_attenuated_by(p));
+                if !covered {
+                    return Err(Error::Ucan(format!(
+                        "capability attenuation violated: '{}' on '{}' not covered by proof",
+                        cap.can, cap.with
+                    )));
+                }
+            }
+
             // Verify the proof's signature and chain recursively
             proof.verify_chain()?;
         }
@@ -399,4 +448,157 @@ mod tests {
         let err = delegated.verify_chain().unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("expired"));
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_before_valid_future_nbf() {
+        let issuer = Keypair::generate();
+        let audience = Keypair::generate().did();
+        let nbf_future = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(1);
+
+        let payload = UcanPayload {
+            ucan: "1.0.0".to_string(),
+            iss: issuer.did(),
+            aud: audience,
+            att: vec![],
+            exp: None,
+            nbf: Some(nbf_future.timestamp()),
+            prf: vec![],
+        };
+        let signing_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&payload).unwrap();
+        let sig = issuer.sign_b64(&signing_bytes);
+        let ucan = Ucan { payload, s: sig };
+
+        assert!(ucan.is_before_valid());
+        let err = ucan.verify_chain().unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("not yet valid"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_before_valid_past_nbf() {
+        let issuer = Keypair::generate();
+        let audience = Keypair::generate().did();
+        let nbf_past = chrono::Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::hours(1);
+
+        let payload = UcanPayload {
+            ucan: "1.0.0".to_string(),
+            iss: issuer.did(),
+            aud: audience,
+            att: vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/test", caps::GIT_PUSH)],
+            exp: None,
+            nbf: Some(nbf_past.timestamp()),
+            prf: vec![],
+        };
+        let signing_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&payload).unwrap();
+        let sig = issuer.sign_b64(&signing_bytes);
+        let ucan = Ucan { payload, s: sig };
+
+        assert!(!ucan.is_before_valid());
+        ucan.verify_chain().unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_audience_matches() {
+        let issuer = Keypair::generate();
+        let audience = Keypair::generate().did();
+        let ucan = Ucan::issue(&issuer, audience.clone(), vec![], None).unwrap();
+        ucan.verify_audience(&audience).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_audience_mismatch() {
+        let issuer = Keypair::generate();
+        let audience = Keypair::generate().did();
+        let wrong = Keypair::generate().did();
+        let ucan = Ucan::issue(&issuer, audience, vec![], None).unwrap();
+        let err = ucan.verify_audience(&wrong).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("audience mismatch"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn attenuation_valid_subset() {
+        let alice = Keypair::generate();
+        let bob = Keypair::generate();
+        let charlie = Keypair::generate();
+
+        // Alice grants Bob push on a specific repo
+        let root = Ucan::issue(
+            &alice,
+            bob.did(),
+            vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/org/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH)],
+            None,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Bob delegates the same capability (exact subset) to Charlie
+        let delegated = Ucan::delegate(
+            &bob,
+            charlie.did(),
+            vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/org/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH)],
+            None,
+            &root,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        delegated.verify_chain().unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn attenuation_exceeds_parent_is_rejected() {
+        let alice = Keypair::generate();
+        let bob = Keypair::generate();
+        let charlie = Keypair::generate();
+
+        // Alice grants Bob push on one repo only
+        let root = Ucan::issue(
+            &alice,
+            bob.did(),
+            vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/org/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH)],
+            None,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Bob tries to delegate merge (not in the original grant) to Charlie
+        let delegated = Ucan::delegate(
+            &bob,
+            charlie.did(),
+            vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/org/repo", caps::PR_MERGE)],
+            None,
+            &root,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let err = delegated.verify_chain().unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("attenuation violated"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn attenuation_repo_admin_covers_all() {
+        let alice = Keypair::generate();
+        let bob = Keypair::generate();
+        let charlie = Keypair::generate();
+
+        // Alice grants Bob repo/admin (superpower)
+        let root = Ucan::issue(
+            &alice,
+            bob.did(),
+            vec![Capability::new(
+                "gitlawb://repos/org/repo",
+                caps::REPO_ADMIN,
+            )],
+            None,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Bob delegates a more specific capability — covered by repo/admin
+        let delegated = Ucan::delegate(
+            &bob,
+            charlie.did(),
+            vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/org/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH)],
+            None,
+            &root,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        delegated.verify_chain().unwrap();
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
 description = "The gitlawb node daemon — git hosting over HTTP with DID auth"
-version.workspace = true
+version = "0.5.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 
 [[bin]]
@@ -11,6 +12,8 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
 
 [dependencies]
 gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
+ed25519-dalek = { workspace = true }
+base64 = { workspace = true }
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }
@@ -26,9 +29,10 @@ async-graphql-axum = "7"
 tokio-stream = { version = "0.1", features = ["sync"] }
 tower = "0.5"
 tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["cors", "trace", "request-id", "limit"] }
-sqlx = { version = "0.8", features = ["postgres", "runtime-tokio-rustls", "chrono", "uuid"] }
+sqlx = { version = "0.8", features = ["postgres", "runtime-tokio-rustls", "chrono", "uuid", "macros", "migrate"] }
 clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive", "env"] }
 bytes = "1"
+libc = "0.2"
 cid = { workspace = true }
 hex = { workspace = true }
 sha2 = { workspace = true }
@@ -36,14 +40,28 @@ hmac = { workspace = true }
 http-body-util = "0.1"
 tokio-util = { version = "0.7", features = ["io"] }
 dirs-next = "2"
+# NFC-normalize visibility globs/paths at the matcher seam so a deny rule
+# withholds a canonically-equivalent path regardless of NFC/NFD form (#101).
+unicode-normalization = "0.1"
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
-libp2p = { version = "0.55", features = ["gossipsub", "kad", "mdns", "noise", "tcp", "tokio", "yamux", "identify", "macros"] }
+libp2p-core = "0.43"
+libp2p-gossipsub = "0.49.4"
+libp2p-identify = "0.47"
+libp2p-identity = { version = "0.2", features = ["ed25519", "peerid", "rand"] }
+libp2p-kad = "0.48"
+libp2p-quic = { version = "0.13", features = ["tokio"] }
+libp2p-swarm = { version = "0.47", features = ["macros", "tokio"] }
+multiaddr = "0.18"
 futures = "0.3"
-aws-sdk-s3 = "1"
+aws-sdk-s3 = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = ["sigv4a", "default-https-client", "rt-tokio"] }
 aws-config = { version = "1", features = ["behavior-version-latest"] }
 async-compression = { version = "0.4", features = ["tokio", "zstd"] }
 tar = "0.4"
 zstd = "0.13"
+# Prometheus metrics. Used to expose a /metrics endpoint for ops/observability
+# on the opt-in GITLAWB_METRICS_ADDR listener. The crate is also the de-facto
+# exposition format encoder in the Rust ecosystem.
+prometheus = { version = "0.13", default-features = false }
 alloy = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = [
     "contract",
     "provider-http",
@@ -54,6 +72,7 @@ alloy = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = [
     "network",
     "rpc-types-eth",
 ] }
+libp2p-dns = { version = "0.44.0", features = ["tokio"] }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 mockito = "1"

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/agents.rs

@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@
 
 use axum::extract::{Path, Query, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
-use axum::Json;
+use axum::{Extension, Json};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 
+use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
@@ -20,6 +21,14 @@ fn agent_key_segment(did: &str) -> &str {
     did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(did)
 }
 
+/// Whether `caller` (the verified `AuthenticatedDid`) is the same identity as
+/// `target` (the DID being acted on), tolerant of full `did:key:...` vs short
+/// key-only forms on either side. Used to gate self-deregistration so a DID
+/// can only retire itself.
+fn caller_matches_did(caller: &str, target: &str) -> bool {
+    agent_key_segment(caller) == agent_key_segment(target)
+}
+
 async fn resolve_agent_did(state: &AppState, did: &str) -> Result<String> {
     let normalized_did = normalize_agent_did(did);
     if state.db.get_agent(&normalized_did).await?.is_some() {
@@ -71,6 +80,8 @@ pub struct AgentResponse {
     pub capabilities: Vec<String>,
     pub registered_at: String,
     pub last_seen: Option<String>,
+    /// Lifecycle status: `active` or `revoked`.
+    pub status: String,
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/agents
@@ -87,6 +98,7 @@ pub async fn list_agents(
             capabilities: a.capabilities,
             registered_at: a.registered_at,
             last_seen: a.last_seen,
+            status: a.status,
         })
         .collect();
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "agents": list })))
@@ -111,6 +123,7 @@ pub async fn show_agent(
             capabilities: agent.capabilities,
             registered_at: agent.registered_at,
             last_seen: agent.last_seen,
+            status: agent.status,
         }),
     ))
 }
@@ -133,9 +146,97 @@ pub async fn get_trust(
     }))
 }
 
+/// DELETE /api/v1/agents/{did}
+///
+/// Self-deregistration: the holder of a DID's key marks their own agent
+/// `revoked`, removing it from discovery (issue #29). Authenticated by the
+/// rfc9421 signature middleware; a caller may only retire its own DID.
+pub async fn deregister_agent(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Path(did): Path<String>,
+) -> Result<StatusCode> {
+    // Authorize on the verified identity, and act on it too. The path DID is
+    // only an intent check (it must name the caller); the row we revoke is the
+    // authenticated DID itself, never a value derived from the untrusted path.
+    // Revoking `resolve_agent_did(did)` instead would let the fuzzy prefix
+    // resolver act on a different identity than the one just authorized.
+    if !caller_matches_did(&auth.0, &did) {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+            "an agent can only deregister itself".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    if state.db.revoke_agent(&auth.0).await? {
+        Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
+    } else {
+        Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("agent {} not found", auth.0)))
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-    use super::{agent_key_segment, normalize_agent_did};
+    use super::{agent_key_segment, caller_matches_did, normalize_agent_did, AgentResponse};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn caller_matches_own_did_full_form() {
+        assert!(caller_matches_did(
+            "did:key:z6MkExample",
+            "did:key:z6MkExample"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn caller_matches_own_did_short_form() {
+        // Authenticated full DID vs short path form, and vice versa.
+        assert!(caller_matches_did("did:key:z6MkExample", "z6MkExample"));
+        assert!(caller_matches_did("z6MkExample", "did:key:z6MkExample"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn caller_cannot_revoke_a_different_did() {
+        // The core authorization property for issue #29.
+        assert!(!caller_matches_did(
+            "did:key:z6MkAttacker",
+            "did:key:z6MkVictim"
+        ));
+        assert!(!caller_matches_did("did:key:z6MkAttacker", "z6MkVictim"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn agent_response_surfaces_status() {
+        // A revoked DID's response must carry its status so callers can see it
+        // is retired (issue #29).
+        let resp = AgentResponse {
+            did: "did:key:orphan".to_string(),
+            trust_score: 0.1,
+            capabilities: vec!["reputation:score".to_string()],
+            registered_at: "2026-06-19T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
+            last_seen: None,
+            status: "revoked".to_string(),
+        };
+
+        let json = serde_json::to_value(&resp).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(json["status"], "revoked");
+        assert!(json.get("replaced_by").is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn agent_response_active_status() {
+        let resp = AgentResponse {
+            did: "did:key:active".to_string(),
+            trust_score: 0.5,
+            capabilities: vec![],
+            registered_at: "2026-06-19T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
+            last_seen: None,
+            status: "active".to_string(),
+        };
+
+        let json = serde_json::to_value(&resp).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(json["status"], "active");
+    }
 
     #[test]
     fn normalize_agent_did_preserves_full_did() {

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/bounties.rs

@@ -79,12 +79,9 @@ pub async fn create_bounty(
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest("amount must be positive".into()));
     }
 
-    // Verify repo exists
-    let _ = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    // Read-gate: anyone who can read the repo may fund a bounty on it (this closes
+    // the private-repo bounty leak); ownership is not required.
+    crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
     let bounty = BountyRecord {
@@ -113,19 +110,28 @@ pub async fn create_bounty(
     Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(bounty)))
 }
 
+const MAX_BOUNTY_LIMIT: i64 = 200;
+
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/bounties
 pub async fn list_repo_bounties(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Query(q): Query<ListBountiesQuery>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+
+    let limit = q.limit.unwrap_or(50).clamp(1, MAX_BOUNTY_LIMIT);
     let bounties = state
         .db
         .list_bounties(
             Some(&owner),
             Some(&repo),
             q.status.as_deref(),
-            q.limit.unwrap_or(50),
+            limit,
+            None,
+            None,
         )
         .await?;
 
@@ -136,25 +142,92 @@ pub async fn list_repo_bounties(
 pub async fn list_all_bounties(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Query(q): Query<ListBountiesQuery>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let bounties = state
-        .db
-        .list_bounties(None, None, q.status.as_deref(), q.limit.unwrap_or(50))
-        .await?;
+    let raw_limit = q.limit.unwrap_or(50);
+    let limit = raw_limit.clamp(1, MAX_BOUNTY_LIMIT);
 
-    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "bounties": bounties })))
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let mut memo = std::collections::HashMap::new();
+    let mut allowed: Vec<BountyRecord> = Vec::new();
+    let page_size = (limit * 5).clamp(1, 200);
+    let max_scanned = 10_000i64;
+    let mut total_scanned: i64 = 0;
+    let mut cursor: Option<(String, String)> = None;
+
+    while (allowed.len() as i64) < limit {
+        let after = cursor.as_ref().map(|(ts, id)| (ts.as_str(), id.as_str()));
+        let bounties = state
+            .db
+            .list_bounties(
+                None,
+                None,
+                q.status.as_deref(),
+                page_size,
+                after.map(|(ts, _)| ts),
+                after.map(|(_, id)| id),
+            )
+            .await?;
+        if bounties.is_empty() {
+            break;
+        }
+
+        total_scanned += bounties.len() as i64;
+        if total_scanned > max_scanned {
+            return Err(AppError::Incomplete(
+                "too many rows scanned; refine your filters".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        let last = bounties.last().unwrap();
+        for b in &bounties {
+            if (allowed.len() as i64) >= limit {
+                break;
+            }
+            let key = format!("{}/{}", b.repo_owner, b.repo_name);
+            let admitted = if let Some(&result) = memo.get(&key) {
+                result
+            } else {
+                let result = crate::api::authorize_repo_read(
+                    &state,
+                    &b.repo_owner,
+                    &b.repo_name,
+                    caller,
+                    "/",
+                )
+                .await
+                .is_ok();
+                memo.insert(key, result);
+                result
+            };
+            if admitted {
+                allowed.push(b.clone());
+            }
+        }
+        cursor = Some((last.created_at.clone(), last.id.clone()));
+    }
+
+    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "bounties": allowed })))
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/bounties/{id}
 pub async fn get_bounty(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<BountyRecord>> {
-    let bounty = state
-        .db
-        .get_bounty(&id)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found")))?;
+    let not_found = || AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found"));
+
+    let bounty = state.db.get_bounty(&id).await?.ok_or_else(not_found)?;
+
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    if crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &bounty.repo_owner, &bounty.repo_name, caller, "/")
+        .await
+        .is_err()
+    {
+        return Err(not_found());
+    }
+
     Ok(Json(bounty))
 }
 
@@ -165,11 +238,22 @@ pub async fn claim_bounty(
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(req): Json<ClaimBountyRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<BountyRecord>> {
-    let bounty = state
-        .db
-        .get_bounty(&id)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found")))?;
+    let not_found = || AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found"));
+
+    let bounty = state.db.get_bounty(&id).await?.ok_or_else(not_found)?;
+
+    if crate::api::authorize_repo_read(
+        &state,
+        &bounty.repo_owner,
+        &bounty.repo_name,
+        Some(auth.0.as_str()),
+        "/",
+    )
+    .await
+    .is_err()
+    {
+        return Err(not_found());
+    }
 
     if bounty.status != "open" {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
@@ -213,8 +297,12 @@ pub async fn submit_bounty(
             bounty.status
         )));
     }
-    if bounty.claimant_did.as_deref() != Some(&auth.0) {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest("only the claimant can submit".into()));
+    let is_claimant = bounty
+        .claimant_did
+        .as_deref()
+        .is_some_and(|c| crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, c));
+    if !is_claimant {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden("only the claimant can submit".into()));
     }
 
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
@@ -249,8 +337,8 @@ pub async fn approve_bounty(
             bounty.status
         )));
     }
-    if bounty.creator_did != auth.0 {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &bounty.creator_did) {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
             "only the bounty creator can approve".into(),
         ));
     }
@@ -296,8 +384,8 @@ pub async fn cancel_bounty(
             bounty.status
         )));
     }
-    if bounty.creator_did != auth.0 {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &bounty.creator_did) {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
             "only the bounty creator can cancel".into(),
         ));
     }
@@ -316,6 +404,7 @@ pub async fn cancel_bounty(
 /// POST /api/v1/bounties/{id}/dispute
 pub async fn dispute_bounty(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
 ) -> Result<Json<BountyRecord>> {
     let bounty = state
@@ -331,6 +420,19 @@ pub async fn dispute_bounty(
         )));
     }
 
+    // Only the bounty creator or the current claimant may dispute (N19 — this
+    // endpoint had no identity check at all).
+    let is_creator = crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &bounty.creator_did);
+    let is_claimant = bounty
+        .claimant_did
+        .as_deref()
+        .is_some_and(|c| crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, c));
+    if !is_creator && !is_claimant {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+            "only the bounty creator or claimant can dispute this bounty".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+
     // Check if deadline exceeded
     if let Some(ref claimed_at) = bounty.claimed_at {
         if let Ok(claimed) = chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339(claimed_at) {
@@ -344,7 +446,7 @@ pub async fn dispute_bounty(
     }
 
     state.db.dispute_bounty(&id).await?;
-    tracing::info!(bounty_id = %id, "bounty disputed — reopened");
+    tracing::info!(bounty_id = %id, actor = %auth.0, "bounty disputed - reopened");
 
     let updated = state
         .db

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/certs.rs

@@ -1,23 +1,44 @@
 //! API handlers for ref certificates.
 
-use axum::extract::{Path, State};
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, Query, State};
 use axum::Json;
 
+use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
-/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/certs
+/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/certs?limit=50
 pub async fn list_certs(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    Query(params): Query<HashMap<String, String>>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let limit = params
+        .get("limit")
+        .and_then(|v| v.parse::<i64>().ok())
+        .map(|v| v.max(1))
+        .unwrap_or(50)
+        .min(200);
 
-    let certs = state.db.list_ref_certificates(&record.id).await?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+
+    // When a prefix is given (short-ID resolution from the CLI) use a
+    // generous limit and delegate to the prefix-matched query so the
+    // caller can resolve IDs regardless of how many certs exist.
+    let prefix = params.get("prefix").filter(|p| !p.is_empty());
+    let certs = if let Some(prefix) = prefix {
+        state
+            .db
+            .list_ref_certificates_by_prefix(&record.id, prefix, 200)
+            .await?
+    } else {
+        state.db.list_ref_certificates(&record.id, limit).await?
+    };
     let certs_json: Vec<serde_json::Value> = certs
         .iter()
         .map(|c| {
@@ -35,20 +56,21 @@ pub async fn list_certs(
         })
         .collect();
 
-    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "certificates": certs_json })))
+    let count = certs_json.len();
+    Ok(Json(
+        serde_json::json!({ "certificates": certs_json, "count": count }),
+    ))
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/certs/{id}
 pub async fn get_cert(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name, id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    // Verify the repo exists
-    let _record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let cert = state
         .db
@@ -56,6 +78,10 @@ pub async fn get_cert(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("certificate {id}")))?;
 
+    if cert.repo_id != record.id {
+        return Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("certificate {id}")));
+    }
+
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
         "id":         cert.id,
         "repo_id":    cert.repo_id,

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/changelog.rs

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 //! Changelog endpoint — unified timeline of commits, merged PRs, and closed issues.
 
-use axum::extract::{Path, Query, State};
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, Query, State};
 use axum::Json;
 use serde::Deserialize;
 
+use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::git::store;
 use crate::state::AppState;
@@ -27,12 +28,11 @@ pub async fn get_changelog(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Query(query): Query<ChangelogQuery>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let limit = query.limit.min(100);
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/encrypted.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+//! Authenticated discovery + fetch for encrypted withheld blobs (Option B1).
+
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
+use axum::Json;
+
+use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
+use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
+use crate::state::AppState;
+use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
+
+/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs
+/// Returns [{oid, cid}] for every encrypted blob in the repo, to any caller who
+/// can read the repo. Not recipient-scoped: recipient identities are not stored,
+/// so access control here is repo readability and decryption is gated by the
+/// envelope crypto (only a real recipient can open an envelope).
+pub async fn list_encrypted_blobs(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
+    Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
+) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
+    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny
+    {
+        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")));
+    }
+    let rows = state.db.list_all_encrypted_blobs(&record.id).await?;
+    let blobs: Vec<_> = rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|(oid, cid)| serde_json::json!({ "oid": oid, "cid": cid }))
+        .collect();
+    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "blobs": blobs })))
+}
+
+/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blob/{oid}
+/// Returns raw envelope bytes to callers who can read the repo; the envelope
+/// crypto still ensures only true recipients can decrypt.
+pub async fn get_encrypted_blob(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
+    Path((owner, repo, oid)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
+    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny
+    {
+        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}/{oid}")));
+    }
+    let cid = state
+        .db
+        .encrypted_blob_cid(&record.id, &oid)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}/{oid}")))?;
+    let bytes = crate::ipfs_pin::cat(&state.config.ipfs_api, &cid)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(bytes)
+}
+
+/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs/replicate
+/// Returns [{oid, cid}] for every encrypted blob in the repo, for peer-mirror
+/// replication (Option B2). Gated by repo readability, like discovery, so a
+/// non-readable repo does not expose its blob index; for the intended case (a
+/// public repo with withheld subtrees) the public root keeps this open to peers.
+/// Recipient identities are deliberately withheld: the v2 envelopes no longer
+/// carry recipient public keys, so peers must not learn the reader set either. A
+/// mirror detects a re-seal by the CID changing (the OID is stable across
+/// re-seals). Ciphertext metadata only, never plaintext.
+pub async fn replicate_encrypted_blobs(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
+    Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
+) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
+    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny
+    {
+        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")));
+    }
+    let rows = state.db.list_all_encrypted_blobs(&record.id).await?;
+    let blobs: Vec<_> = rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|(oid, cid)| replicate_blob_json(oid, cid))
+        .collect();
+    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "blobs": blobs })))
+}
+
+/// Serialize one blob for the replication wire. Recipient identities are
+/// intentionally absent so a mirror never learns the reader set.
+fn replicate_blob_json(oid: String, cid: String) -> serde_json::Value {
+    serde_json::json!({ "oid": oid, "cid": cid })
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::replicate_blob_json;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn replicate_blob_json_omits_recipients() {
+        let v = replicate_blob_json("oid1".into(), "cidA".into());
+        assert_eq!(v["oid"], "oid1");
+        assert_eq!(v["cid"], "cidA");
+        assert!(
+            v.get("recipients").is_none(),
+            "replication wire must not carry recipient identities"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/ipfs.rs

@@ -9,28 +9,55 @@
 //! `git cat-file <type> <sha256>` (i.e. without the git framing header).
 //! This is consistent with how `gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes`
 //! computes CIDs when objects are pushed.
+//!
+//! Serving is access-controlled: an object is returned only from a repo row the
+//! requesting caller is permitted to read (per-caller path-scoped visibility,
+//! see `get_by_cid`).
 
 use axum::{
     extract::{Path, State},
     http::{HeaderMap, HeaderName, HeaderValue, StatusCode},
     response::{IntoResponse, Response},
-    Json,
+    Extension, Json,
 };
 use cid::CidGeneric;
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
 use std::str::FromStr;
 
+use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::git::store;
+use crate::git::visibility_pack::{allowed_blob_set_for_caller, has_path_scoped_rule};
 use crate::state::AppState;
+use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
 
 /// GET /ipfs/{cid}
 ///
 /// Search all repos on the node for a git object whose SHA-256 hash matches
-/// the given CIDv1. Returns the raw object content bytes with appropriate
-/// headers if found, or 404 if not found.
+/// the given CIDv1, returning its raw content if the caller may read it.
+///
+/// Visibility (#110, #126): the object is served only from a repo row the
+/// caller passes. For each iterated row we gate against that row's OWN rules
+/// (`visibility_check` at `"/"`), never re-resolving via `authorize_repo_read`
+/// — `get_repo`'s fuzzy match could otherwise authorize a different physical
+/// row than the one read (KTD2a). We check object existence via
+/// `store::object_type` *before* the expensive reachability walk so random-CID
+/// spray cannot trigger full-history git walks on repos that don't carry the
+/// object. When the row carries path-scoped rules (KTD4) the served object
+/// must be either a non-blob (trees/commits are structural; KTD3) OR a blob
+/// in the caller's *reachable* allowed-set (`allowed_blob_set_for_caller`).
+/// The reachable allowed-set excludes dangling blobs — a blob written via
+/// `git hash-object -w` and never committed has no path to gate, so it is
+/// fail-closed 404'd under path-scoped rules (#126). Denial and genuine
+/// not-found both fall through to an opaque 404.
+///
+/// Scope: this closes the direct unauthenticated scan, including the dangling
+/// case. A stale-public mirror row still serves withheld content (tracked
+/// separately, #124).
 pub async fn get_by_cid(
     Path(cid_str): Path<String>,
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Response> {
     // 1. Decode the CID and extract the SHA-256 digest
     let cid = CidGeneric::<64>::from_str(&cid_str)
@@ -46,6 +73,8 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
     }
 
     let sha256_hex = hex::encode(mh.digest());
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let caller_owned = caller.map(|c| c.to_string());
 
     // 2. Search all repos for an object with this SHA-256
     let repos = state
@@ -54,39 +83,126 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
         .await
         .map_err(AppError::Internal)?;
 
+    // Fetch every repo's visibility rules in one query rather than one per row
+    // (the gate runs each row against its OWN rules — KTD2a). A row absent from
+    // the map has no rules.
+    let repo_ids: Vec<String> = repos.iter().map(|r| r.id.clone()).collect();
+    let rules_by_repo = state
+        .db
+        .list_visibility_rules_for_repos(&repo_ids)
+        .await
+        .map_err(AppError::Internal)?;
+
+    // Request-scoped memo of the per-repo allowed-blob set (KTD1, #126). The
+    // caller is constant for one request, so `repo.id` alone is a safe,
+    // sufficient key — never a coarse caller "class", which
+    // `visibility_check`'s exact full-DID reader match would make unsafe.
+    //
+    // We flipped from a deny-set (`withheld_blob_oids`) to an allowed-set
+    // (`allowed_blob_set_for_caller`) so dangling blobs — never enumerated by
+    // the reachable walk — fail closed instead of slipping through an empty
+    // deny entry (#126).
+    let mut allowed_memo: HashMap<String, HashSet<String>> = HashMap::new();
+
     for repo in &repos {
+        // Repo-level read gate against THIS row's own rules (KTD2a).
+        let rules: &[crate::db::VisibilityRule] = rules_by_repo
+            .get(&repo.id)
+            .map(Vec::as_slice)
+            .unwrap_or(&[]);
+        if visibility_check(rules, repo.is_public, &repo.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny {
+            continue;
+        }
+
         let repo_path = match state.repo_store.acquire(&repo.owner_did, &repo.name).await {
             Ok(p) => p,
             Err(_) => continue,
         };
 
-        match store::read_object(&repo_path, &sha256_hex) {
-            Ok(Some((_obj_type, content))) => {
-                // 3. Return the content with IPFS-style headers
-                let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
-                headers.insert(
-                    HeaderName::from_static("content-type"),
-                    HeaderValue::from_static("application/octet-stream"),
-                );
-                headers.insert(
-                    HeaderName::from_static("x-content-cid"),
-                    HeaderValue::from_str(&cid_str)
-                        .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
-                );
-                headers.insert(
-                    HeaderName::from_static("x-git-hash"),
-                    HeaderValue::from_str(&sha256_hex)
-                        .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
-                );
-
-                return Ok((StatusCode::OK, headers, content).into_response());
-            }
+        // Check whether the object exists in this repo before any expensive
+        // reachability walk. This prevents random-CID spray from triggering
+        // full-history git walks on repos that don't carry the object.
+        let obj_type = match store::object_type(&repo_path, &sha256_hex) {
+            Ok(Some(t)) => t,
             Ok(None) => continue,
             Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error reading git object");
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error checking git object type");
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+
+        // Per-blob gating only applies when a path-scoped rule exists (KTD4).
+        // Without any path-scoped rule, the "/" gate above is the whole story.
+        // Trees/commits are always served under path-scoped rules (KTD3).
+        let path_scoped = has_path_scoped_rule(rules);
+        if path_scoped && obj_type == "blob" {
+            if !allowed_memo.contains_key(&repo.id) {
+                let rp = repo_path.clone();
+                let r = rules.to_vec();
+                let is_public = repo.is_public;
+                let owner = repo.owner_did.clone();
+                let caller_for_walk = caller_owned.clone();
+                // Full-history walk shells out to git — keep it off the async runtime.
+                let walk = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
+                    allowed_blob_set_for_caller(
+                        &rp,
+                        &r,
+                        is_public,
+                        &owner,
+                        caller_for_walk.as_deref(),
+                    )
+                })
+                .await;
+                // Fail closed on EITHER a task panic (JoinError) or a walk error:
+                // we cannot prove the caller may read here, so skip this repo and
+                // let a public copy (if any) serve. Never serve on an unproven gate.
+                let set = match walk {
+                    Ok(Ok(set)) => set,
+                    Ok(Err(e)) => {
+                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "allowed-blob walk failed; skipping repo");
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "allowed-blob walk task panicked; skipping repo");
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                };
+                allowed_memo.insert(repo.id.clone(), set);
+            }
+            let in_allowed = allowed_memo
+                .get(&repo.id)
+                .is_some_and(|set| set.contains(&sha256_hex));
+            if !in_allowed {
                 continue;
             }
         }
+
+        // Now that we've passed the gate, read the content.
+        let content = match store::read_object_content(&repo_path, &sha256_hex, &obj_type) {
+            Ok(c) => c,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error reading git object content");
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+
+        // 3. Return the content with IPFS-style headers
+        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+        headers.insert(
+            HeaderName::from_static("content-type"),
+            HeaderValue::from_static("application/octet-stream"),
+        );
+        headers.insert(
+            HeaderName::from_static("x-content-cid"),
+            HeaderValue::from_str(&cid_str).unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
+        );
+        headers.insert(
+            HeaderName::from_static("x-git-hash"),
+            HeaderValue::from_str(&sha256_hex)
+                .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
+        );
+
+        return Ok((StatusCode::OK, headers, content).into_response());
     }
 
     // Not found in any repo

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/issues.rs

@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ pub async fn create_issue(
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Json(req): Json<CreateIssueRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<IssueRecord>)> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    // Authorize the caller as a reader before accepting an issue: a non-reader
+    // must not be able to file an issue against a private repo they cannot read.
+    // Mirrors create_issue_comment / create_review / create_bounty.
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let issue_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
@@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ pub async fn create_issue(
 
     let create_result = git_issues::create_issue(&disk_path, &issue_id, &json_str);
 
-    // Always release the advisory lock — even on error
-    guard.release().await;
+    // Always release the advisory lock — even on error; upload to Tigris only on success.
+    guard.release(create_result.is_ok()).await;
 
     create_result.map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
 
@@ -90,12 +90,11 @@ pub async fn create_issue(
 pub async fn list_issues(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let disk_path = state
         .repo_store
@@ -120,12 +119,11 @@ pub async fn list_issues(
 pub async fn get_issue(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo, issue_id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let disk_path = state
         .repo_store
@@ -161,11 +159,9 @@ pub async fn create_issue_comment(
         ));
     }
 
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    // Read-gate: a commenter must be able to read the repo, but need not own it.
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let disk_path = state
         .repo_store
@@ -193,21 +189,38 @@ pub async fn create_issue_comment(
 pub async fn list_issue_comments(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo, issue_id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let _record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
 
-    let comments = state.db.list_issue_comments(&issue_id).await?;
+    let disk_path = state
+        .repo_store
+        .acquire(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
+    // Resolve the full issue ID (accepts 8-char prefix) so the DB fetch
+    // below uses the same canonical id as the git ref.
+    let full_id = match git_issues::resolve_issue_id(&disk_path, &issue_id)
+        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?
+    {
+        Some(id) => id,
+        None => {
+            return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!(
+                "issue {issue_id} not found"
+            )))
+        }
+    };
+
+    let comments = state.db.list_issue_comments(&full_id).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "comments": comments })))
 }
 
 /// POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{id}/close
 pub async fn close_issue(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(_auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo, issue_id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let record = state
@@ -223,10 +236,37 @@ pub async fn close_issue(
         .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
     let disk_path = guard.path().to_path_buf();
 
+    // Owner OR issue author may close. The author lives in the issue's git-JSON
+    // blob (not a DB column); a None author (legacy issues) falls back to
+    // owner-only. Read it under the write guard, before mutating.
+    let author_did: Option<String> = match git_issues::get_issue(&disk_path, &issue_id) {
+        Ok(Some(raw)) => serde_json::from_str::<IssueRecord>(&raw)
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|i| i.author),
+        Ok(None) => {
+            guard.release(false).await;
+            return Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("issue {issue_id} not found")));
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            guard.release(false).await;
+            return Err(AppError::Git(e.to_string()));
+        }
+    };
+    let is_owner = crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0).is_ok();
+    let is_author = author_did
+        .as_deref()
+        .is_some_and(|a| crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, a));
+    if !is_owner && !is_author {
+        guard.release(false).await;
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+            "only the repo owner or the issue author can close this issue".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+
     let close_result = git_issues::close_issue(&disk_path, &issue_id);
 
-    // Always release the advisory lock — even on error
-    guard.release().await;
+    // Always release the advisory lock — even on error; upload to Tigris only on success.
+    guard.release(close_result.is_ok()).await;
 
     let updated = close_result
         .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/labels.rs

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ pub struct LabelRequest {
 /// POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/labels
 pub async fn add_label(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(_auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Json(req): Json<LabelRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ pub async fn add_label(
         .get_repo(&owner, &name)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     let added = state.db.add_label(&record.id, &label).await?;
     let status = if added {
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ pub async fn add_label(
 /// DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/labels/:label
 pub async fn remove_label(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(_auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name, label)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let record = state
@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ pub async fn remove_label(
         .get_repo(&owner, &name)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     state.db.remove_label(&record.id, &label).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "label": label, "removed": true })))
@@ -72,12 +74,11 @@ pub async fn remove_label(
 pub async fn list_labels(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let labels = state.db.list_labels(&record.id).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "labels": labels })))

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/mod.rs

@@ -1,13 +1,20 @@
+use crate::db::{RepoRecord, VisibilityRule};
+use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
+use crate::state::AppState;
+use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
+
 pub mod agents;
 pub mod arweave;
 pub mod bounties;
 pub mod certs;
 pub mod changelog;
+pub mod encrypted;
 pub mod events;
 pub mod ipfs;
 pub mod issues;
 pub mod labels;
 pub mod peers;
+pub mod profiles;
 pub mod protect;
 pub mod pulls;
 pub mod register;
@@ -16,4 +23,651 @@ pub mod repos;
 pub mod resolve;
 pub mod stars;
 pub mod tasks;
+pub mod visibility;
 pub mod webhooks;
+
+/// Resolve a repo for a read request and enforce path-scoped visibility.
+///
+/// Returns 404 (`RepoNotFound`) if the repo does not exist or the caller may not
+/// read `path`, using the same opaque response the git serve path returns so
+/// existence is not confirmed. Returns the record and its visibility rules so a
+/// content handler can apply an extra per-path check without a second DB query.
+///
+/// Callers pass `"/"` for repo-level reads (listings); content endpoints pass the
+/// specific path so a withheld subtree is denied even on an otherwise-public repo.
+pub(crate) async fn authorize_repo_read(
+    state: &AppState,
+    owner: &str,
+    name: &str,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+    path: &str,
+) -> Result<(RepoRecord, Vec<VisibilityRule>)> {
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(owner, name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    // A quarantined mirror (admitted by the iCaptcha propagation gate but not
+    // validated) is hidden from every reader — serve/clone and fork alike — as if
+    // it did not exist, until an operator releases it. Checked before the
+    // visibility gate so its existence is never disclosed.
+    if state.db.is_repo_quarantined(&record.id).await? {
+        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")));
+    }
+    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
+    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, path) == Decision::Deny
+    {
+        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")));
+    }
+    Ok((record, rules))
+}
+
+/// Match a presented DID against a stored DID that may be the full `did:key:<id>`
+/// form or the bare `<id>` short form (mirror rows store the bare key). Collapse
+/// representation only within `did:key`; never let a bare id match across methods —
+/// `did:web` / `did:gitlawb` share the base58 space with `did:key`, so a
+/// trailing-segment compare would treat `did:key:X` and `did:gitlawb:X` as equal.
+pub(crate) fn did_matches(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
+    if a == b {
+        return true;
+    }
+    fn key_id(d: &str) -> &str {
+        d.strip_prefix("did:key:").unwrap_or(d)
+    }
+    let (ka, kb) = (key_id(a), key_id(b));
+    // After stripping `did:key:`, a value still containing ':' is a non-key full
+    // DID — do not let it match a bare `did:key` id.
+    !ka.contains(':') && !kb.contains(':') && ka == kb
+}
+
+/// 403 unless `caller` is the repo owner. Uses [`did_matches`] so the owner check
+/// and the author check (close policy) share one normalization.
+pub(crate) fn require_repo_owner(record: &RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    if did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+            "only the repo owner can perform this action".into(),
+        ))
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod did_tests {
+    use super::did_matches;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn full_matches_bare_same_key() {
+        assert!(did_matches("did:key:zABC", "zABC"));
+        assert!(did_matches("zABC", "did:key:zABC"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_cross_method_collision() {
+        assert!(!did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:gitlawb:zABC"));
+        assert!(!did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:web:zABC"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn exact_match_and_distinct_keys() {
+        assert!(did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:key:zABC"));
+        assert!(!did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:key:zXYZ"));
+        assert!(!did_matches("zABC", "zXYZ"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn empty_did_matches() {
+        assert!(did_matches("", ""));
+        assert!(did_matches("", "did:key:"));
+    }
+}
+
+/// Drift guard (plan 002 §Gate-type table, Step 5). Every in-scope mutation
+/// handler must contain its expected gate marker in its own body; removing a
+/// gate fails this test. Source-level (no DB), so it runs everywhere. When a new
+/// route is added to an in-scope group, add its row here with a deliberate gate
+/// type — that forced decision is the point.
+///
+/// Markers are gate-SHAPED — a call (`require_repo_owner(`, `did_matches(`) or a
+/// binding/comparison expression (`caller != &record.owner_did`,
+/// `let owner_did = auth.0`) — never a bare identifier that could also appear in
+/// a log line. Full-line comments are stripped before matching, so a marker that
+/// survives only as a comment above a deleted gate does NOT satisfy a row.
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod authz_guard {
+    /// The body of `func` with full-line comments removed. Bounds the slice at the
+    /// next top-level fn item so a marker in a later handler can't leak in,
+    /// tolerating `pub async`, `pub(crate) async`, `async`, `pub`, and bare `fn`
+    /// declarations (the old single-`pub async fn` delimiter over-ran on any other
+    /// form).
+    fn fn_body(src: &str, func: &str) -> String {
+        let needle = format!("fn {func}(");
+        let start = src
+            .find(&needle)
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("handler `{func}` not found (renamed or removed?)"));
+        let rest = &src[start..];
+        let end = [
+            "\npub async fn ",
+            "\npub(crate) async fn ",
+            "\nasync fn ",
+            "\npub fn ",
+            "\nfn ",
+        ]
+        .iter()
+        .filter_map(|p| rest[1..].find(p).map(|i| i + 1))
+        .min()
+        .unwrap_or(rest.len());
+        rest[..end]
+            .lines()
+            .filter(|l| !l.trim_start().starts_with("//"))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+            .join("\n")
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn every_in_scope_mutation_has_its_gate() {
+        let pulls = include_str!("pulls.rs");
+        let webhooks = include_str!("webhooks.rs");
+        let labels = include_str!("labels.rs");
+        let issues = include_str!("issues.rs");
+        let bounties = include_str!("bounties.rs");
+        let replicas = include_str!("replicas.rs");
+        let tasks = include_str!("tasks.rs");
+        let stars = include_str!("stars.rs");
+        let protect = include_str!("protect.rs");
+        let visibility = include_str!("visibility.rs");
+        let profiles = include_str!("profiles.rs");
+        let repos = include_str!("repos.rs");
+        let register = include_str!("register.rs");
+        let ipfs = include_str!("ipfs.rs");
+
+        // (source, handler, expected gate marker)
+        let rows: &[(&str, &str, &str)] = &[
+            // Bucket A — owner-gate (require_repo_owner -> 403)
+            (pulls, "merge_pr", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (webhooks, "create_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (webhooks, "delete_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (labels, "add_label", "require_repo_owner("),
+            (labels, "remove_label", "require_repo_owner("),
+            // Bucket A' — owner OR author (did_matches against the author)
+            (pulls, "close_pr", "did_matches("),
+            (issues, "close_issue", "did_matches("),
+            // Bucket B — read-gate (authorize_repo_read)
+            (pulls, "create_review", "authorize_repo_read("),
+            (pulls, "create_comment", "authorize_repo_read("),
+            (pulls, "create_pr", "authorize_repo_read("),
+            (issues, "create_issue_comment", "authorize_repo_read("),
+            (issues, "create_issue", "authorize_repo_read("),
+            (bounties, "create_bounty", "authorize_repo_read("),
+            (repos, "fork_repo", "authorize_repo_read("),
+            // get_by_cid gates each iterated repo row directly via visibility_check
+            // (KTD2a: it must NOT route through authorize_repo_read's fuzzy re-resolve).
+            (ipfs, "get_by_cid", "visibility_check("),
+            // Bucket C — signer-self: the acting DID is matched/bound to auth.0
+            (tasks, "create_task", "did_matches("),
+            (tasks, "claim_task", "did_matches("),
+            (tasks, "complete_task", "did_matches("),
+            (tasks, "fail_task", "did_matches("),
+            (repos, "create_repo", "let owner_did = auth.0"),
+            (profiles, "set_profile", "let did = auth.0"),
+            (register, "register", "did_matches("),
+            (stars, "star_repo", "caller = &auth.0"),
+            (stars, "unstar_repo", "caller = &auth.0"),
+            // Bucket D — non-owner-by-design, positive per-route marker
+            (bounties, "claim_bounty", "claim_bounty(&id, &auth.0"),
+            (bounties, "submit_bounty", "did_matches("),
+            (bounties, "approve_bounty", "did_matches("),
+            (bounties, "cancel_bounty", "did_matches("),
+            (bounties, "dispute_bounty", "did_matches("),
+            (replicas, "register_replica", "did_matches("),
+            (replicas, "unregister_replica", "replica_did = &auth.0"),
+            // PRE-GATED — already owner-gated, in-scope group; guard the gate itself
+            (protect, "protect_branch", "did_matches("),
+            (protect, "unprotect_branch", "did_matches("),
+            (visibility, "set_visibility", "require_owner("),
+            (visibility, "remove_visibility", "require_owner("),
+            (visibility, "list_visibility", "require_owner("),
+        ];
+
+        // The visibility rows prove require_owner is CALLED; this proves the helper
+        // itself does DID-safe matching, not a raw/trailing-segment compare.
+        assert!(
+            fn_body(visibility, "require_owner").contains("did_matches("),
+            "visibility::require_owner must use did_matches for DID-safe owner matching"
+        );
+
+        for (src, func, marker) in rows {
+            let body = fn_body(src, func);
+            assert!(
+                body.contains(marker),
+                "handler `{func}` is missing its gate marker `{marker}` — gate removed or route reclassified"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Proves the comment-stripping that GUARD-1 added: a marker that appears only
+    /// in a full-line comment (the real `replicas.rs` false-pass shape) must NOT
+    /// satisfy a row.
+    #[test]
+    fn comment_only_marker_does_not_satisfy_a_row() {
+        let src = "pub async fn demo() {\n    // did_matches( handles the owner form\n    do_thing();\n}\n";
+        assert!(
+            !fn_body(src, "demo").contains("did_matches("),
+            "a marker present only in a comment must not count as an enforced gate"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// All `pub async fn` / `pub(crate) async fn` handler names declared in `src`.
+    /// Verb-agnostic on purpose: a repo-scoped read of any name is in scope, so a
+    /// handler named `fetch_*` / `replicate_*` / `info_refs` cannot escape the gate
+    /// check by not being called `list_*` / `get_*`.
+    fn handler_names(src: &str) -> Vec<String> {
+        ["pub async fn ", "pub(crate) async fn "]
+            .iter()
+            .flat_map(|decl| {
+                src.match_indices(decl).map(move |(i, _)| {
+                    src[i + decl.len()..]
+                        .chars()
+                        .take_while(|c| c.is_alphanumeric() || *c == '_')
+                        .collect::<String>()
+                })
+            })
+            .collect()
+    }
+
+    /// True when the handler's signature takes an owner+repo path
+    /// (`Path<(String, String...)>`), i.e. it is a repo-scoped read rather than a
+    /// node-wide aggregate (`/stats`, `/ipfs/pins`, the global feeds).
+    fn is_repo_scoped(body: &str) -> bool {
+        let header = &body[..body.find('{').unwrap_or(body.len())];
+        header.contains("Path<(String, String")
+    }
+
+    /// True when at least one gate marker runs for EVERY service — i.e. some
+    /// marker sits outside any `if service == ...` discriminator block. A gate
+    /// that appears ONLY inside such a block (as the info/refs advertisement gate
+    /// did before #119: `visibility_check` ran under `if service ==
+    /// "git-upload-pack"`, leaving `git-receive-pack` ungated) covers a subset of
+    /// services and must NOT count as a full gate. Other handlers carry no
+    /// `service ==` discriminator, so for them this matches the plain
+    /// substring check. NOTE: only `if service ==` is detected — a
+    /// `match service { .. }` discriminator is NOT tracked and a gate inside one
+    /// arm would pass as full; avoid that shape, or extend the span loop below.
+    fn gate_runs_unconditionally(body: &str, markers: &[&str]) -> bool {
+        // Brace-matched spans of each `if service == ...` block.
+        let mut cond_spans: Vec<(usize, usize)> = Vec::new();
+        let mut search = 0;
+        while let Some(rel) = body[search..].find("if service ==") {
+            let cond_start = search + rel;
+            let Some(brace_rel) = body[cond_start..].find('{') else {
+                break;
+            };
+            let open = cond_start + brace_rel;
+            let mut depth = 0i32;
+            let mut end = body.len();
+            for (i, c) in body[open..].char_indices() {
+                match c {
+                    '{' => depth += 1,
+                    '}' => {
+                        depth -= 1;
+                        if depth == 0 {
+                            end = open + i;
+                            break;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    _ => {}
+                }
+            }
+            cond_spans.push((open, end));
+            // On an unclosed block `end` stays at body.len() (the fail-safe
+            // direction: treat the rest as conditional rather than mask a gate);
+            // clamp so the next slice can't index past the end and panic.
+            search = (end + 1).min(body.len());
+        }
+        markers.iter().any(|m| {
+            body.match_indices(m)
+                .any(|(pos, _)| !cond_spans.iter().any(|(s, e)| pos >= *s && pos <= *e))
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Collect `.rs` source files under `dir`. Recursive so the completeness scan
+    /// covers nested API modules (`api/<module>/mod.rs` and deeper), not only the
+    /// immediate `api/*.rs` children.
+    fn collect_rs_files(dir: &std::path::Path) -> Vec<std::path::PathBuf> {
+        let mut out = Vec::new();
+        for entry in std::fs::read_dir(dir).expect("read api dir") {
+            let path = entry.expect("dir entry").path();
+            if path.is_dir() {
+                out.extend(collect_rs_files(&path));
+            } else if path.extension().is_some_and(|e| e == "rs") {
+                out.push(path);
+            }
+        }
+        out
+    }
+
+    /// The `.rs` files under `api_root` (as paths RELATIVE to it) that the
+    /// completeness scan must inspect: everything except the top-level `mod.rs` (the
+    /// guard file itself) and the top-level files already covered by the per-handler
+    /// `sources` loop. A nested `api/<module>/<name>.rs` is a distinct source file
+    /// even when its basename matches a listed top-level file, so it stays in scope.
+    fn unlisted_source_files(
+        api_root: &std::path::Path,
+        listed: &std::collections::HashSet<&str>,
+    ) -> Vec<String> {
+        collect_rs_files(api_root)
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|path| {
+                let rel = path
+                    .strip_prefix(api_root)
+                    .ok()?
+                    .to_string_lossy()
+                    .replace('\\', "/");
+                if rel == "mod.rs" || listed.contains(rel.as_str()) {
+                    None
+                } else {
+                    Some(rel)
+                }
+            })
+            .collect()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn collect_rs_files_recurses_subdirs() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = tmp.path();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("a.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("note.txt"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("sub/deep")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/mod.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/deep/c.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        let names: std::collections::HashSet<String> = collect_rs_files(root)
+            .iter()
+            .map(|p| {
+                p.strip_prefix(root)
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .to_string_lossy()
+                    .replace('\\', "/")
+            })
+            .collect();
+        assert!(names.contains("a.rs"));
+        assert!(
+            names.contains("sub/mod.rs"),
+            "nested module file must be collected"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            names.contains("sub/deep/c.rs"),
+            "deeply nested file must be collected"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !names.iter().any(|n| n.ends_with(".txt")),
+            "non-rs files excluded"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(names.len(), 3);
+    }
+
+    // P3 (#119): the completeness scan must skip already-covered files by their path
+    // RELATIVE to api_root, not by basename. A nested api/<module>/repos.rs is a
+    // distinct source file from the covered top-level repos.rs and must still be
+    // scanned, or a new nested module could smuggle in an ungated repo-scoped handler
+    // behind a colliding filename.
+    #[test]
+    fn unlisted_source_files_scans_nested_file_with_colliding_basename() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = tmp.path();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("repos.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("mod.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("sub")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/repos.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/fresh.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        let listed: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = ["repos.rs"].into_iter().collect();
+
+        let unlisted = unlisted_source_files(root, &listed);
+
+        assert!(
+            unlisted.contains(&"sub/repos.rs".to_string()),
+            "a nested file whose basename matches a listed top-level file must still be scanned"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            unlisted.contains(&"sub/fresh.rs".to_string()),
+            "a nested file with a unique name must be scanned"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !unlisted.contains(&"repos.rs".to_string()),
+            "the listed top-level file is covered by the per-handler loop"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !unlisted.contains(&"mod.rs".to_string()),
+            "the top-level guard file is skipped"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Egress gate guard: every repo-scoped handler (`Path<(String, String..)>`)
+    /// must carry an authz marker — a read gate (`authorize_repo_read` /
+    /// `visibility_check`), or a write gate (`require_repo_owner` / `require_owner`
+    /// / `did_matches` / a `&auth.0` self-binding) — or be listed in KNOWN_UNGATED
+    /// (the tracked, ungated reads). A new ungated handler of ANY verb trips this,
+    /// and a completeness scan over `src/api/` trips it for a whole new module that
+    /// adds a repo-scoped handler without being wired into `sources`. Mutations are
+    /// also checked precisely, per handler, by the mutation guard above; here they
+    /// only need *some* binding so the net stays verb-agnostic.
+    ///
+    /// Scope and limits (this is a source scrape; the runtime route guard covers
+    /// behaviour):
+    /// - It proves a gate is CALLED, not that it runs on the requested path: a
+    ///   content handler gating `"/"` instead of the subtree still passes here.
+    /// - It sees handlers taking the owner+repo tuple `Path<(String, String..)>`; a
+    ///   repo identified by a struct/custom extractor would be missed (the helper
+    ///   unit tests pin these boundaries).
+    /// - KNOWN_UNGATED entries need a real open issue and review; the staleness
+    ///   assert removes one only once its gate lands.
+    #[test]
+    fn every_repo_scoped_handler_is_gated() {
+        let sources: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
+            (include_str!("bounties.rs"), "bounties.rs"),
+            (include_str!("certs.rs"), "certs.rs"),
+            (include_str!("changelog.rs"), "changelog.rs"),
+            (include_str!("encrypted.rs"), "encrypted.rs"),
+            (include_str!("events.rs"), "events.rs"),
+            (include_str!("issues.rs"), "issues.rs"),
+            (include_str!("labels.rs"), "labels.rs"),
+            (include_str!("protect.rs"), "protect.rs"),
+            (include_str!("pulls.rs"), "pulls.rs"),
+            (include_str!("replicas.rs"), "replicas.rs"),
+            (include_str!("repos.rs"), "repos.rs"),
+            (include_str!("stars.rs"), "stars.rs"),
+            (include_str!("visibility.rs"), "visibility.rs"),
+            (include_str!("webhooks.rs"), "webhooks.rs"),
+        ];
+        let listed: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = sources.iter().map(|(_, f)| *f).collect();
+        assert!(!listed.is_empty(), "read-guard `sources` is empty");
+
+        // Completeness: every api/*.rs NOT already in `sources` must declare no
+        // repo-scoped handler, so a brand-new module cannot add an ungated handler
+        // the scrape never looks at. Reads the directory at test time (so the list
+        // cannot silently drift from the filesystem) and only inspects unlisted
+        // files — listed files are covered by the per-handler loop below.
+        let api_dir = concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/src/api");
+        for (_, f) in sources {
+            assert!(
+                std::path::Path::new(api_dir).join(f).exists(),
+                "read-guard `sources` lists {f} but the file does not exist"
+            );
+        }
+        let api_root = std::path::Path::new(api_dir);
+        for rel in unlisted_source_files(api_root, &listed) {
+            let src = std::fs::read_to_string(api_root.join(&rel)).expect("read api file");
+            let has_repo_handler = handler_names(&src)
+                .iter()
+                .any(|n| is_repo_scoped(&fn_body(&src, n)));
+            assert!(
+                !has_repo_handler,
+                "api/{rel} declares a repo-scoped handler but is not in the egress \
+                 guard `sources` list — add it so its handlers are gate-checked"
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Repo-scoped reads known to be ungated today, each tracked by an issue.
+        // Remove an entry the moment its gate lands (the staleness assert enforces it).
+        let known_ungated: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
+            ("list_webhooks", "#94 (PR #113)"),
+            ("list_replicas", "PR #113"),
+            ("list_protected_branches", "PR #113"),
+        ];
+        let is_known = |n: &str| known_ungated.iter().any(|(k, _)| *k == n);
+        // Any one of these = the handler binds the caller to an authz decision: the
+        // first two are read gates, the rest are the write/owner/self-binding forms.
+        // A repo-scoped mutation passes here on its write gate; the mutation guard
+        // above additionally verifies the exact gate type per handler. NOTE: a local
+        // rename of `caller`/`replica_did` must be paired with a marker update here.
+        let markers = [
+            "authorize_repo_read(",
+            "visibility_check(",
+            "require_repo_owner(",
+            "require_owner(",
+            "did_matches(",
+            "caller = &auth.0",
+            "replica_did = &auth.0",
+        ];
+
+        // Every KNOWN_UNGATED name must be a real handler (catch typos / renames).
+        let all: std::collections::HashSet<String> =
+            sources.iter().flat_map(|(s, _)| handler_names(s)).collect();
+        for (n, _) in known_ungated {
+            assert!(
+                all.contains(*n),
+                "KNOWN_UNGATED lists `{n}`, which is not a real handler (renamed or removed?)"
+            );
+        }
+
+        let mut checked = 0usize;
+        for (src, file) in sources {
+            for name in handler_names(src) {
+                let body = fn_body(src, &name);
+                if !is_repo_scoped(&body) {
+                    continue; // node-wide aggregate, not a repo-scoped surface
+                }
+                checked += 1;
+                let gated = gate_runs_unconditionally(&body, &markers);
+                assert!(
+                    gated || is_known(&name),
+                    "repo-scoped handler `{name}` ({file}) has no authz gate and is \
+                     not in KNOWN_UNGATED — add the visibility/owner gate with the \
+                     caller, or track it there"
+                );
+                assert!(
+                    !(gated && is_known(&name)),
+                    "handler `{name}` ({file}) is now gated — remove it from \
+                     KNOWN_UNGATED so the allowlist stays an accurate gap list"
+                );
+            }
+        }
+        // Tripwire: if the scrape silently stopped finding handlers (e.g. a parser
+        // regression in handler_names/is_repo_scoped), this floor fails loudly
+        // instead of the guard passing vacuously. Current count is ~54 repo-scoped
+        // handlers; 20 is a deliberate floor that trips only on a gross regression.
+        assert!(
+            checked >= 20,
+            "egress guard only checked {checked} repo-scoped handlers — the scrape likely broke"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Pins the `handler_names` boundary: it collects every `pub`/`pub(crate)
+    /// async fn` regardless of verb (so a `fetch_*` read cannot escape), and skips
+    /// private `async fn` and sync `fn` helpers.
+    #[test]
+    fn handler_names_finds_all_pub_async_and_skips_others() {
+        let src = "pub async fn list_things() {}\n\
+                   pub async fn fetch_thing() {}\n\
+                   pub(crate) async fn get_crate_thing() {}\n\
+                   async fn private_helper() {}\n\
+                   fn sync_helper() {}\n";
+        let names = handler_names(src);
+        // Verb-agnostic: a non-list/get read verb is still seen.
+        assert!(names.contains(&"list_things".to_string()));
+        assert!(names.contains(&"fetch_thing".to_string()));
+        // pub(crate) routed handlers are in scope too.
+        assert!(names.contains(&"get_crate_thing".to_string()));
+        // Private/sync helpers are not routed handlers and are skipped.
+        assert!(!names
+            .iter()
+            .any(|n| n == "private_helper" || n == "sync_helper"));
+    }
+
+    /// Pins the `is_repo_scoped` boundary: an owner+repo tuple Path is repo-scoped;
+    /// a single-segment or absent Path is a node-wide aggregate.
+    #[test]
+    fn is_repo_scoped_requires_owner_repo_path() {
+        let repo =
+            "fn get_x(s: State, Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>) {\n  body();\n}";
+        let three = "fn get_y(Path((o, n, id)): Path<(String, String, String)>) {\n  body();\n}";
+        let node_wide = "fn list_z(s: State<AppState>) {\n  body();\n}";
+        let single = "fn get_w(Path(cid): Path<String>) {\n  body();\n}";
+        assert!(is_repo_scoped(repo), "owner+repo tuple is repo-scoped");
+        assert!(is_repo_scoped(three), "owner+repo+id tuple is repo-scoped");
+        assert!(!is_repo_scoped(node_wide), "no Path is node-wide");
+        assert!(
+            !is_repo_scoped(single),
+            "single-segment Path is not repo-scoped"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Pins `gate_runs_unconditionally`: a gate nested only inside an
+    /// `if service == ...` block is conditional (does NOT count), while the same
+    /// gate at the top level — or an additional unconditional one — does.
+    #[test]
+    fn conditional_service_gate_is_not_a_full_gate() {
+        let markers = ["visibility_check("];
+        // Gate runs only for one service: not a full gate.
+        let conditional = "fn f() {\n  \
+            if service == \"git-upload-pack\" {\n    \
+                visibility_check(rules, caller);\n  \
+            }\n  \
+            if service == \"git-receive-pack\" { acquire_fresh(); }\n}";
+        assert!(
+            !gate_runs_unconditionally(conditional, &markers),
+            "a gate only inside `if service ==` covers a subset of services"
+        );
+        // Same gate at top level: full gate.
+        let unconditional = "fn f() {\n  \
+            visibility_check(rules, caller);\n  \
+            if service == \"git-receive-pack\" { acquire_fresh(); }\n}";
+        assert!(
+            gate_runs_unconditionally(unconditional, &markers),
+            "an unconditional gate runs for every service"
+        );
+        // A gate inside EACH of two service blocks, none outside: still a
+        // subset (no service clears it unconditionally), so not a full gate.
+        let both_conditional = "fn f() {\n  \
+            if service == \"git-upload-pack\" { visibility_check(a); }\n  \
+            if service == \"git-receive-pack\" { visibility_check(b); }\n}";
+        assert!(
+            !gate_runs_unconditionally(both_conditional, &markers),
+            "a gate inside every service block is still conditional"
+        );
+        // A marker inside one block AND again unconditionally: the
+        // unconditional occurrence makes it a full gate (exercises the
+        // match_indices scan past the in-block hit).
+        let inside_and_outside = "fn f() {\n  \
+            if service == \"git-upload-pack\" { visibility_check(a); }\n  \
+            visibility_check(b);\n}";
+        assert!(
+            gate_runs_unconditionally(inside_and_outside, &markers),
+            "an unconditional occurrence counts even when another is conditional"
+        );
+        // No marker at all: not gated.
+        assert!(!gate_runs_unconditionally(
+            "fn f() { do_thing(); }",
+            &markers
+        ));
+        // An unclosed `if service ==` block (e.g. phantom brace from a string
+        // literal) must not panic on the slice advance; the span runs to EOF, so
+        // the in-block marker reads as conditional. Real Rust source is balanced,
+        // so this only guards the scraper against a future pathological body.
+        let unclosed = "fn f() { if service == \"x\" { visibility_check(a);";
+        assert!(
+            !gate_runs_unconditionally(unclosed, &markers),
+            "an unclosed service block must not panic and stays conditional"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/peers.rs

@@ -10,11 +10,13 @@
 //!   POST /api/v1/sync/notify           — receive push notification from a peer node
 //!   POST /api/v1/sync/trigger          — manually pull all repos from known peers
 
-use axum::extract::{Path, State};
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
 use axum::Json;
+use gitlawb_core::did::Did;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 
+use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
@@ -38,6 +40,123 @@ pub struct PeerResponse {
     pub reachable: bool,
 }
 
+/// Extract an IPv4 address embedded in an IPv6 literal across the transition
+/// formats that carry one: IPv4-mapped (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`), IPv4-compatible
+/// (`::a.b.c.d`), 6to4 (`2002:WWXX:YYZZ::/16`), and the NAT64 well-known prefix
+/// (`64:ff9b::/96`). Returns `None` for native IPv6. Callers fold the result
+/// back through the v4 range checks so loopback/private addresses smuggled in
+/// via any of these encodings are rejected, not just the mapped/compatible pair.
+///
+/// INCOMPLETE-NAT64 CONTRACT: non-well-known NAT64 prefixes (e.g. the RFC 8215
+/// local-use `64:ff9b:1::/48`) are deliberately **not** decoded here — their v4
+/// sits at a prefix-length-dependent offset (RFC 6052 §2.2) — so they return
+/// `None`. Any caller that needs them blocked must reject the wider
+/// `64:ff9b::/32` itself; `is_public_http_url` does this in its native-v6 arm.
+fn embedded_ipv4(v6: std::net::Ipv6Addr) -> Option<std::net::Ipv4Addr> {
+    if let Some(v4) = v6.to_ipv4_mapped().or_else(|| v6.to_ipv4()) {
+        return Some(v4);
+    }
+    let s = v6.segments();
+    // 6to4 (2002::/16) embeds W.X.Y.Z in the next two segments.
+    if s[0] == 0x2002 {
+        let [a, b] = s[1].to_be_bytes();
+        let [c, d] = s[2].to_be_bytes();
+        return Some(std::net::Ipv4Addr::new(a, b, c, d));
+    }
+    // NAT64 well-known prefix (64:ff9b::/96) embeds the IPv4 in the low 32 bits.
+    if s[0] == 0x0064 && s[1] == 0xff9b && s[2..6] == [0, 0, 0, 0] {
+        let [a, b] = s[6].to_be_bytes();
+        let [c, d] = s[7].to_be_bytes();
+        return Some(std::net::Ipv4Addr::new(a, b, c, d));
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Whether a peer `http_url` is a public http(s) endpoint safe to register.
+/// Rejects non-http(s) schemes, loopback/unspecified/private/link-local IPs,
+/// and `localhost` / `.local` / `.internal` hostnames. Used at announce time
+/// and by the boot-time prune of already-poisoned rows.
+pub fn is_public_http_url(raw: &str) -> bool {
+    let url = match reqwest::Url::parse(raw) {
+        Ok(u) => u,
+        Err(_) => return false,
+    };
+    if !matches!(url.scheme(), "http" | "https") {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let mut host = match url.host_str() {
+        Some(h) => h.to_ascii_lowercase(),
+        None => return false,
+    };
+    // Drop a single trailing dot (FQDN root): `localhost.` resolves the same as
+    // `localhost`, so normalize before the suffix/equality checks below.
+    if let Some(stripped) = host.strip_suffix('.') {
+        host = stripped.to_string();
+    }
+    if host.is_empty()
+        || host == "localhost"
+        || host.ends_with(".local")
+        || host.ends_with(".internal")
+    {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // host_str() keeps brackets on IPv6 literals (e.g. "[::1]"); strip them
+    // before parsing as an IP.
+    let ip_candidate = host.trim_start_matches('[').trim_end_matches(']');
+    if let Ok(ip) = ip_candidate.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>() {
+        // Reject loopback/unspecified on the literal as given — catches `::1`
+        // and `::` before the IPv4-folding below (`::1`.to_ipv4() would
+        // otherwise map to a non-loopback `0.0.0.1`).
+        if ip.is_loopback() || ip.is_unspecified() {
+            return false;
+        }
+        // Fold any IPv6 literal that embeds an IPv4 address (mapped, compatible,
+        // 6to4, NAT64) down to that IPv4 so the v4 range checks catch
+        // loopback/private addresses smuggled in via an IPv6 encoding, then
+        // re-check loopback/unspecified.
+        let ip = match ip {
+            std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => embedded_ipv4(v6).map(std::net::IpAddr::V4).unwrap_or(ip),
+            v4 => v4,
+        };
+        if ip.is_loopback() || ip.is_unspecified() {
+            return false;
+        }
+        match ip {
+            std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
+                let o = v4.octets();
+                // RFC1918 private, link-local, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), or the
+                // RFC1122 "this host" block 0.0.0.0/8 (never a valid destination;
+                // 0.0.0.0 itself is already caught by the is_unspecified check).
+                if v4.is_private()
+                    || v4.is_link_local()
+                    || (o[0] == 100 && (o[1] & 0xc0) == 64)
+                    || o[0] == 0
+                {
+                    return false;
+                }
+            }
+            std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
+                let s = v6.segments();
+                // fc00::/7 (unique-local) or fe80::/10 (link-local)
+                if (s[0] & 0xfe00) == 0xfc00 || (s[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80 {
+                    return false;
+                }
+                // Any NAT64 address (64:ff9b::/32) that is not the cleanly
+                // decodable well-known /96 — e.g. the RFC 8215 local-use
+                // 64:ff9b:1::/48 — carries a translated target whose embedded v4
+                // sits at a prefix-length-dependent offset (RFC 6052 §2.2).
+                // Rather than risk a wrong decode across every prefix length we
+                // reject the whole NAT64 space here. The well-known /96 was
+                // already folded to its v4 above and never reaches this arm.
+                if s[0] == 0x0064 && s[1] == 0xff9b {
+                    return false;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    true
+}
+
 /// GET /api/v1/peers
 pub async fn list_peers(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let peers = state.db.list_peers().await?;
@@ -61,12 +180,51 @@ pub async fn list_peers(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<serde_json
 /// The Authorization header's DID must match the `did` in the body.
 pub async fn announce(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
     Json(req): Json<AnnounceRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
-    // Validate the URL is HTTP/HTTPS
-    if !req.http_url.starts_with("http://") && !req.http_url.starts_with("https://") {
+    let announced_did: Did = req
+        .did
+        .parse()
+        .map_err(|e: gitlawb_core::Error| AppError::BadRequest(e.to_string()))?;
+    if let Some(Extension(auth)) = auth {
+        if auth.0 != announced_did.to_string() {
+            return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+                "Signature keyid must match announced DID".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+    } else {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            did = %announced_did,
+            "accepted unsigned peer announce; set GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=true after all peers upgrade"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // Validate the URL is a public http(s) endpoint. The announce route is
+    // reachable unauthenticated (until all peers sign), so without this an
+    // attacker can register loopback/private "peers" (localhost:5432, etc.)
+    // and turn our outbound sync-notify fan-out into an SSRF probe — and bury
+    // the real peers under junk so node-origin repos stop replicating.
+    if !is_public_http_url(&req.http_url) {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "http_url must start with http:// or https://".into(),
+            "http_url must be a public http(s) URL (no loopback, private, or .internal/.local hosts)".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    // Reject self-announcements: a peer row whose http_url is our own public
+    // URL makes the HTTP-notify path fan out to ourselves. Seen in prod when
+    // misconfigured dev nodes announce with their upstream's URL.
+    // prune_self_peers clears stale rows at boot; this stops new ones.
+    if let Some(self_url) = state.config.public_url.as_deref() {
+        if req.http_url.trim_end_matches('/') == self_url.trim_end_matches('/') {
+            return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+                "http_url is this node's own public URL; refusing to register self as peer".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+    if announced_did.to_string() == state.node_did.to_string() {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+            "did is this node's own DID; refusing to register self as peer".into(),
         ));
     }
 
@@ -104,16 +262,30 @@ pub async fn trigger_sync(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<serde_js
             continue;
         }
         let url = format!("{}/api/v1/repos", peer.http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-        let result =
-            tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5), client.get(&url).send()).await;
-
-        let repos: Vec<serde_json::Value> = match result {
-            Ok(Ok(resp)) if resp.status().is_success() => {
-                peers_reached += 1;
-                resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default()
+        // 30s with the body read inside the timeout: 5s only covered the
+        // response headers, so canonical nodes serving large unpaginated repo
+        // lists (and transpacific round trips) aborted mid-body.
+        let result = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30), async {
+            let resp = client.get(&url).send().await?;
+            if !resp.status().is_success() {
+                return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("peer returned status {}", resp.status()));
             }
-            _ => {
-                tracing::warn!(peer = %peer.did, "trigger_sync: could not reach peer");
+            let repos: Vec<serde_json::Value> = resp.json().await?;
+            Ok::<_, anyhow::Error>(repos)
+        })
+        .await;
+
+        let repos = match result {
+            Ok(Ok(repos)) => {
+                peers_reached += 1;
+                repos
+            }
+            Ok(Err(e)) => {
+                tracing::warn!(peer = %peer.did, err = %e, "trigger_sync: peer fetch failed");
+                continue;
+            }
+            Err(_) => {
+                tracing::warn!(peer = %peer.did, "trigger_sync: peer timed out");
                 continue;
             }
         };
@@ -124,8 +296,8 @@ pub async fn trigger_sync(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<serde_js
                 repo.get("name").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
             ) {
                 (Some(owner), Some(name)) => {
-                    // Use short owner (last colon segment) matching DB convention
-                    let short = owner.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner);
+                    // Use short owner (did:key-only normalization) matching DB convention
+                    let short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(owner);
                     format!("{short}/{name}")
                 }
                 _ => continue,
@@ -163,12 +335,38 @@ pub struct NotifyRequest {
     pub ref_name: String,
     pub new_sha: String,
     pub node_did: String,
+    // Optional fields — older senders only included the four above. New
+    // senders include these so received_ref_updates has full provenance
+    // even when the libp2p mesh isn't delivering and the HTTP fallback
+    // is the only path that fired.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub pusher_did: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub old_sha: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub timestamp: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub cert_id: Option<String>,
 }
 
 pub async fn notify_sync(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
     Json(req): Json<NotifyRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
+    if let Some(Extension(auth)) = auth {
+        if auth.0 != req.node_did {
+            return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+                "Signature keyid must match notification node_did".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+    } else {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            did = %req.node_did,
+            "accepted unsigned sync notify; set GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=true after all peers upgrade"
+        );
+    }
+
     // Only accept notifications from known peers
     let peers = state.db.list_peers().await?;
     let known = peers.iter().any(|p| p.did == req.node_did);
@@ -184,6 +382,27 @@ pub async fn notify_sync(
         .enqueue_sync(&req.repo, &req.node_did, &req.ref_name, &req.new_sha, None)
         .await?;
 
+    // Mirror the gossipsub-receive handler: insert the same record we'd
+    // get from the libp2p path, so /api/v1/events/ref-updates reflects
+    // pushes that arrive over either transport.
+    let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+    let update = crate::db::ReceivedRefUpdate {
+        id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+        node_did: req.node_did.clone(),
+        pusher_did: req.pusher_did.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
+        repo: req.repo.clone(),
+        ref_name: req.ref_name.clone(),
+        old_sha: req.old_sha.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
+        new_sha: req.new_sha.clone(),
+        timestamp: req.timestamp.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| now.clone()),
+        cert_id: req.cert_id.clone(),
+        received_at: now,
+        from_peer: format!("http:{}", req.node_did),
+    };
+    if let Err(e) = state.db.insert_ref_update(&update).await {
+        tracing::warn!(err = %e, repo = %req.repo, "failed to insert ref-update from sync notify");
+    }
+
     tracing::info!(
         repo = %req.repo,
         peer = %req.node_did,
@@ -213,7 +432,13 @@ pub async fn ping_peer(
 
     // Async ping
     let url = format!("{}/health", peer.http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-    let ok = reqwest::get(&url)
+    // Use the shared no-redirect client: bare `reqwest::get` follows redirects,
+    // so a peer could answer with `302 -> http://127.0.0.1/` and turn the ping
+    // into an SSRF probe.
+    let ok = state
+        .http_client
+        .get(&url)
+        .send()
         .await
         .map(|r| r.status().is_success())
         .unwrap_or(false);
@@ -226,3 +451,544 @@ pub async fn ping_peer(
         "reachable": ok,
     })))
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::is_public_http_url;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn accepts_public_https_and_http() {
+        assert!(is_public_http_url("https://node.gitlawb.com"));
+        assert!(is_public_http_url("https://manila.gitlawb.com/"));
+        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://203.0.113.10:7545"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_loopback_private_and_internal() {
+        for bad in [
+            "http://localhost:7545",
+            "http://127.0.0.1:5432/",
+            "http://localhost:22/",
+            "http://0.0.0.0:7545",
+            // RFC1122 "this host" block 0.0.0.0/8 beyond 0.0.0.0 itself,
+            // including the upper boundary (1.0.0.0 is public, tested below).
+            "http://0.0.0.1:7545",
+            "http://0.1.2.3/",
+            "http://0.255.255.255/",
+            "http://10.0.0.5:7545",
+            "http://192.168.1.10/",
+            "http://172.16.0.1:7545",
+            "http://169.254.1.1/",
+            "http://[::1]:7545",
+            "http://gitlawb-node.internal:7545",
+            "http://my-node.local/",
+            "ftp://node.gitlawb.com",
+            "not-a-url",
+            "",
+            // Trailing-dot FQDN of an internal host.
+            "http://localhost./",
+            // CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10).
+            "http://100.64.0.1:7545",
+            "http://100.127.255.255/",
+            // IPv4-mapped / IPv4-compatible IPv6 smuggling private/loopback v4.
+            "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:7545",
+            "http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/",
+            "http://[::ffff:192.168.1.1]:7545",
+            "http://[::127.0.0.1]/",
+            // 6to4 (2002::/16) embedding loopback/private v4.
+            "http://[2002:7f00:1::]:7545",
+            "http://[2002:a00:1::]/",
+            "http://[2002:c0a8:101::]/",
+            // NAT64 well-known prefix (64:ff9b::/96) embedding loopback/private v4.
+            "http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/",
+            "http://[64:ff9b::a00:1]:7545",
+            // NAT64 local-use prefix (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215) — rejected
+            // outright rather than decoded, so the whole NAT64 space is closed.
+            "http://[64:ff9b:1::7f00:1]/",
+            "http://[64:ff9b:1::a00:1]:7545",
+            "http://[64:ff9b:1:a00::]/",
+            // Local-use NAT64 wrapping a *public* v4 (203.0.113.10) is still
+            // rejected: the block is prefix-based, not payload-based.
+            "http://[64:ff9b:1::cb00:710a]/",
+        ] {
+            assert!(!is_public_http_url(bad), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn accepts_6to4_and_nat64_wrapping_public_v4() {
+        // Fold-and-recheck stays consistent with the mapped/compatible handling:
+        // a transition address that wraps a public v4 is allowed, only the
+        // private/loopback-wrapping forms above are rejected. 203.0.113.10.
+        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://[2002:cb00:710a::]/"));
+        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://[64:ff9b::cb00:710a]/"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn accepts_public_outside_cgnat_range() {
+        // 100.0.0.0/10 boundary: .63 and .128 are public, only 100.64-127 is CGNAT.
+        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://100.63.255.255:7545"));
+        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://100.128.0.1/"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn accepts_first_address_above_this_host_block() {
+        // 1.0.0.0 is the first address above the rejected 0.0.0.0/8 block;
+        // pins the `o[0] == 0` check against an off-by-one into 1.x.
+        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://1.0.0.0/"));
+    }
+
+    // ── #82: /sync/trigger signature gate + per-IP brake on the peer-sync routes ──
+    //
+    // These drive the FULL production router (crate::server::build_router) so the
+    // route wiring, layer order, and config-mode branching are all under test.
+    // The positive-path and DID-agnostic cases mount the handler directly because
+    // signed_request_as injects only an AuthenticatedDid extension (not a real
+    // RFC-9421 signature), which require_signature rejects on the full router.
+    use crate::rate_limit::{IpRateLimiter, RateLimiter, TrustedProxy};
+    use crate::state::AppState;
+    use crate::test_support::{signed_request_as, test_state};
+    use axum::body::Body;
+    use axum::extract::ConnectInfo;
+    use axum::http::{header, Method, Request, StatusCode};
+    use axum::routing::post;
+    use axum::{middleware, Extension, Router};
+    use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
+    use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+    use sqlx::PgPool;
+    use std::net::SocketAddr;
+    use std::sync::Arc;
+    use std::time::Duration;
+    use tower::ServiceExt;
+
+    fn unsigned_post(uri: &str, body: &str, peer: &str) -> Request<Body> {
+        let mut req = Request::builder()
+            .method(Method::POST)
+            .uri(uri)
+            .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
+            .body(Body::from(body.to_string()))
+            .unwrap();
+        req.extensions_mut()
+            .insert(ConnectInfo(peer.parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap()));
+        req
+    }
+
+    fn require_signed_peer_writes(state: &mut AppState) {
+        let mut cfg = (*state.config).clone();
+        cfg.require_signed_peer_writes = true;
+        state.config = Arc::new(cfg);
+    }
+
+    const NOTIFY_BODY: &str = r#"{"repo":"demo","ref_name":"refs/heads/main","new_sha":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","node_did":"PEER_DID"}"#;
+
+    // ── trigger: mandatory signature ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_rejects_unsigned_in_default_mode(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The hole: with require_signed_peer_writes=false (default), an anonymous
+        // caller reaches the fan-out. Must be 401 regardless of the flag.
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/trigger",
+                "{}",
+                "203.0.113.1:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_rejects_unsigned_in_signed_writes_mode(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The signature requirement must not depend on the flag.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        require_signed_peer_writes(&mut state);
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/trigger",
+                "{}",
+                "203.0.113.2:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_admits_signed_caller(pool: PgPool) {
+        // must-not-over-throttle: a signed caller reaches the handler and (with no
+        // peers seeded) gets 200, not 429. Direct-mount because a real signature
+        // cannot be forged through the full router in tests.
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        let app = Router::new()
+            .route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(super::trigger_sync))
+            .layer(middleware::from_fn(crate::rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+            .layer(Extension(IpRateLimiter {
+                limiter: RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+                trust: TrustedProxy::None,
+            }))
+            .with_state(state);
+        let mut req =
+            signed_request_as(&did, Method::POST, "/api/v1/sync/trigger", Body::from("{}"));
+        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(
+            "203.0.113.3:5000".parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap(),
+        ));
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+    }
+
+    // ── trigger: IP brake ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_ip_flood_is_throttled(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The brake is outermost, so an over-limit request 429s before it ever
+        // reaches require_signature — an unsigned request suffices to prove it.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let peer = "203.0.113.4:5000";
+        // Exhaust the single-request budget up front.
+        assert!(
+            state
+                .sync_trigger_rate_limiter
+                .check(&peer.parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap().ip().to_string())
+                .await
+        );
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", peer))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_brake_is_did_agnostic(pool: PgPool) {
+        // Why per-IP, not per-DID: a DID farm (fresh did:key per request) does not
+        // bypass an IP-keyed brake. Two DISTINCT DIDs from one IP, brake limit 1 →
+        // the second is 429. A per-DID limiter would give each DID its own bucket.
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let app = Router::new()
+            .route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(super::trigger_sync))
+            .layer(middleware::from_fn(crate::rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+            .layer(Extension(IpRateLimiter {
+                limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+                trust: TrustedProxy::None,
+            }))
+            .with_state(state);
+        let peer = "203.0.113.5:5000".parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap();
+        let mk = |did: &str| {
+            let mut r =
+                signed_request_as(did, Method::POST, "/api/v1/sync/trigger", Body::from("{}"));
+            r.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
+            r
+        };
+        let first = app
+            .clone()
+            .oneshot(mk(&Keypair::generate().did().to_string()))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(first.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+        let second = app
+            .oneshot(mk(&Keypair::generate().did().to_string()))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(second.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_forged_forwarded_header_cannot_bypass(pool: PgPool) {
+        // TrustedProxy::None keys on the socket peer, so rotating X-Forwarded-For
+        // from one socket peer does not refill the bucket. limit 1: first request
+        // consumes it (then 401 unsigned), second from the same socket → 429
+        // regardless of a different XFF value.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let mut a = unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", "203.0.113.6:5000");
+        a.headers_mut()
+            .insert("x-forwarded-for", "1.1.1.1".parse().unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(
+            router.clone().oneshot(a).await.unwrap().status(),
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
+        );
+        let mut b = unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", "203.0.113.6:5000");
+        b.headers_mut()
+            .insert("x-forwarded-for", "2.2.2.2".parse().unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(
+            router.oneshot(b).await.unwrap().status(),
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_rate_limit_zero_disables_but_signature_holds(pool: PgPool) {
+        // 0 disables the brake (RateLimiter::check early-returns), proving the two
+        // halves are independent: no 429 even under a flood, but the signature gate
+        // still 401s every unsigned request.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(0, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        for _ in 0..3 {
+            let resp = router
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                    "/api/v1/sync/trigger",
+                    "{}",
+                    "203.0.113.7:5000",
+                ))
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // ── notify: braked, but signature behavior unchanged ──────────────────────
+
+    async fn seed_peer(state: &AppState) -> String {
+        let did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        state
+            .db
+            .upsert_peer(&did, "https://peer.example.com")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        did
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_unsigned_flood_is_throttled(pool: PgPool) {
+        // notify still accepts an unsigned known-peer notification (rolling-upgrade
+        // compat), but a flood from one IP is now braked. brake limit 1: first
+        // enqueues (200), second from the same IP → 429.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.peer_write_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let body = NOTIFY_BODY.replace("PEER_DID", &peer_did);
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let first = router
+            .clone()
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &body,
+                "203.0.113.8:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(first.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+        let second = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &body,
+                "203.0.113.8:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(second.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_distinct_ips_are_not_collaterally_throttled(pool: PgPool) {
+        // must-not-over-throttle: per-IP keying means one peer's volume does not
+        // throttle another. brake limit 1, two DIFFERENT source IPs → both 200.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.peer_write_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let body = NOTIFY_BODY.replace("PEER_DID", &peer_did);
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        for ip in ["203.0.113.20:5000", "203.0.113.21:5000"] {
+            let resp = router
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/notify", &body, ip))
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(
+                resp.status(),
+                StatusCode::OK,
+                "distinct IP {ip} must not be throttled"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn notify_flood_does_not_exhaust_trigger_bucket(pool: PgPool) {
+        // Separate buckets: draining peer_write via an unsigned notify flood must
+        // NOT throttle the signed trigger caller from the same IP. After the notify
+        // bucket is spent, an unsigned trigger from that IP hits its own (unspent)
+        // bucket and is rejected by the SIGNATURE gate (401), not the brake (429).
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.peer_write_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let body = NOTIFY_BODY.replace("PEER_DID", &peer_did);
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let ip = "203.0.113.9:5000";
+        assert_eq!(
+            router
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/notify", &body, ip))
+                .await
+                .unwrap()
+                .status(),
+            StatusCode::OK
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            router
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/notify", &body, ip))
+                .await
+                .unwrap()
+                .status(),
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+            "peer_write bucket should now be exhausted for this IP"
+        );
+        let trigger = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", ip))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            trigger.status(),
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            "trigger must hit its own bucket (401 from the sig gate), not the drained peer_write bucket (429)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn announce_still_accepts_unsigned_in_default_mode(pool: PgPool) {
+        // must-not-over-reach: adding the brake must not tighten announce's
+        // rolling-upgrade behavior — an unsigned announce with a public URL still
+        // succeeds (it only gains the brake, which a single request is under).
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        let body = format!(r#"{{"did":"{did}","http_url":"https://peer.example.com"}}"#);
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/peers/announce",
+                &body,
+                "203.0.113.10:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+    }
+
+    // Build a request carrying a REAL RFC 9421 signature (not just an injected
+    // extension), so it passes require_signature on the full production router.
+    fn real_signed_trigger(peer: &str) -> Request<Body> {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let body = b"{}";
+        let s = sign_request(&kp, "POST", "/api/v1/sync/trigger", body);
+        let mut req = Request::builder()
+            .method(Method::POST)
+            .uri("/api/v1/sync/trigger")
+            .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
+            .header("content-digest", s.content_digest)
+            .header("signature-input", s.signature_input)
+            .header("signature", s.signature)
+            .body(Body::from(body.to_vec()))
+            .unwrap();
+        req.extensions_mut()
+            .insert(ConnectInfo(peer.parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap()));
+        req
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_admits_real_signature_through_full_router(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The positive path through the REAL gate: a validly-signed trigger passes
+        // require_signature on the full router and reaches the handler (no peers
+        // seeded → 200), in BOTH config modes.
+        let state = test_state(pool.clone()).await;
+        let resp = crate::server::build_router(state)
+            .oneshot(real_signed_trigger("203.0.113.30:5000"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::OK,
+            "a real signature must reach the handler (default mode)"
+        );
+
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        require_signed_peer_writes(&mut state);
+        let resp = crate::server::build_router(state)
+            .oneshot(real_signed_trigger("203.0.113.30:5001"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::OK,
+            "a real signature must reach the handler (signed-writes mode)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn announce_flood_is_throttled(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The peer_write brake covers /peers/announce too (co-benefit): limit 1,
+        // first unsigned announce from an IP is 200, the second from that IP 429.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.peer_write_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        let body = format!(r#"{{"did":"{did}","http_url":"https://peer.example.com"}}"#);
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let ip = "203.0.113.31:5000";
+        assert_eq!(
+            router
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/peers/announce", &body, ip))
+                .await
+                .unwrap()
+                .status(),
+            StatusCode::OK
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            router
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/peers/announce", &body, ip))
+                .await
+                .unwrap()
+                .status(),
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+            "announce must be braked by the peer_write limiter"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_429_body_is_generic_not_push(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The shared 429 middleware now serves the sync routes, so its body must
+        // not claim "push" (RED before the message was genericized).
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let peer = "203.0.113.32:5000";
+        assert!(
+            state
+                .sync_trigger_rate_limiter
+                .check(&peer.parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap().ip().to_string())
+                .await
+        );
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", peer))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let s = String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes);
+        assert!(s.contains("rate limit exceeded"), "429 body: {s:?}");
+        assert!(
+            !s.contains("push"),
+            "a 429 on a sync route must not say 'push': {s:?}"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/profiles.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+//! Agent profile API handlers.
+//!
+//! - `PUT /api/v1/profile` — upsert the caller's profile (requires HTTP Signature)
+//! - `GET /api/v1/agents/{did}/profile` — read any agent's profile (public)
+
+use axum::{
+    extract::{Path, State},
+    http::StatusCode,
+    Json,
+};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+
+use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
+use crate::pinata;
+use crate::state::AppState;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct SetProfileRequest {
+    pub display_name: Option<String>,
+    pub bio: Option<String>,
+    pub avatar_url: Option<String>,
+    pub website: Option<String>,
+    pub socials: Option<SocialsInput>,
+    pub pin_to_ipfs: Option<bool>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
+pub struct SocialsInput {
+    pub twitter: Option<String>,
+    pub github: Option<String>,
+    pub farcaster: Option<String>,
+    pub telegram: Option<String>,
+}
+
+pub async fn set_profile(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    axum::Extension(auth): axum::Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Json(req): Json<SetProfileRequest>,
+) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<Value>), (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
+    let did = auth.0;
+
+    if let Some(ref bio) = req.bio {
+        if bio.len() > 280 {
+            return Err((
+                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+                Json(json!({ "message": "bio must be 280 characters or fewer" })),
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    if let Some(ref name) = req.display_name {
+        if name.len() > 50 {
+            return Err((
+                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+                Json(json!({ "message": "display_name must be 50 characters or fewer" })),
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    let socials_json = req
+        .socials
+        .as_ref()
+        .map(|s| serde_json::to_string(s).unwrap_or_else(|_| "{}".to_string()));
+
+    let result = state
+        .db
+        .upsert_profile(
+            &did,
+            req.display_name.as_deref(),
+            req.bio.as_deref(),
+            req.avatar_url.as_deref(),
+            req.website.as_deref(),
+            socials_json.as_deref(),
+        )
+        .await;
+
+    match result {
+        Ok(profile) => {
+            let mut resp = json!({
+                "did": profile.did,
+                "display_name": profile.display_name,
+                "bio": profile.bio,
+                "avatar_url": profile.avatar_url,
+                "website": profile.website,
+                "updated_at": profile.updated_at,
+            });
+
+            if let Some(ref socials_str) = profile.socials {
+                if let Ok(socials) = serde_json::from_str::<Value>(socials_str) {
+                    resp["socials"] = socials;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if req.pin_to_ipfs.unwrap_or(false) && !state.config.pinata_jwt.is_empty() {
+                let profile_json = serde_json::to_vec(&resp).unwrap_or_default();
+                match pinata::pin_object(
+                    &state.http_client,
+                    &state.config.pinata_upload_url,
+                    &state.config.pinata_jwt,
+                    &format!("profile-{}", did),
+                    &profile_json,
+                )
+                .await
+                {
+                    Ok(cid) if !cid.is_empty() => {
+                        if let Err(e) = state.db.set_profile_cid(&did, &cid).await {
+                            tracing::warn!(did = %did, err = %e, "failed to store profile CID");
+                        }
+                        resp["profile_cid"] = json!(cid);
+                    }
+                    Ok(_) => {}
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        tracing::warn!(did = %did, err = %e, "IPFS pin failed — profile saved without CID");
+                    }
+                }
+            } else if let Some(cid) = profile.profile_cid {
+                resp["profile_cid"] = json!(cid);
+            }
+
+            Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(resp)))
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::error!(did = %did, error = %e, "failed to upsert profile");
+            Err((
+                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                Json(json!({ "message": "failed to save profile" })),
+            ))
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn get_profile(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Path(did): Path<String>,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
+    let profile = state.db.get_profile(&did).await.map_err(|e| {
+        tracing::error!(did = %did, error = %e, "failed to fetch profile");
+        (
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            Json(json!({ "message": "failed to fetch profile" })),
+        )
+    })?;
+
+    match profile {
+        Some(p) => {
+            let mut resp = json!({
+                "did": p.did,
+                "display_name": p.display_name,
+                "bio": p.bio,
+                "avatar_url": p.avatar_url,
+                "website": p.website,
+                "profile_cid": p.profile_cid,
+                "created_at": p.created_at,
+                "updated_at": p.updated_at,
+            });
+
+            if let Some(ref socials_str) = p.socials {
+                if let Ok(socials) = serde_json::from_str::<Value>(socials_str) {
+                    resp["socials"] = socials;
+                }
+            }
+
+            Ok(Json(resp))
+        }
+        None => Err((
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            Json(json!({ "message": "profile not found" })),
+        )),
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/protect.rs

@@ -23,15 +23,10 @@ pub async fn protect_branch(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
-    // Only the repo owner can protect branches
+    // Only the repo owner can protect branches (DID-safe match, shared idiom).
     let caller = &auth.0;
-    let owner_short = record
-        .owner_did
-        .split(':')
-        .next_back()
-        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
-    if caller != &record.owner_did && caller != owner_short {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+    if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
             "only the repo owner can protect branches".into(),
         ));
     }
@@ -63,13 +58,8 @@ pub async fn unprotect_branch(
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
 
     let caller = &auth.0;
-    let owner_short = record
-        .owner_did
-        .split(':')
-        .next_back()
-        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
-    if caller != &record.owner_did && caller != owner_short {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+    if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
             "only the repo owner can unprotect branches".into(),
         ));
     }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/pulls.rs

@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ pub async fn create_pr(
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Json(req): Json<CreatePrRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<PullRequest>)> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    // Authorize the caller as a reader before accepting a PR: a non-reader must
+    // not be able to open a PR (and fire its webhooks) against a private repo
+    // they cannot read. Mirrors create_review / create_comment / create_bounty.
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let author_did = auth.0;
     let target_branch = req
@@ -101,12 +101,11 @@ pub async fn create_pr(
 pub async fn list_prs(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let prs = state.db.list_prs(&record.id).await?;
     Ok(Json(
@@ -118,12 +117,11 @@ pub async fn list_prs(
 pub async fn get_pr(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<PullRequest>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -138,12 +136,11 @@ pub async fn get_pr(
 pub async fn get_pr_diff(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -156,6 +153,25 @@ pub async fn get_pr_diff(
         .acquire(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
         .await
         .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
+
+    // Withhold the entire diff if it touches a path the caller cannot read, so a
+    // PR diff cannot leak private-subtree content of an otherwise-public repo.
+    let touched = store::branch_diff_names(&disk_path, &pr.target_branch, &pr.source_branch)
+        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
+    for p in &touched {
+        let gate = format!("/{}", p.trim_start_matches('/'));
+        if crate::visibility::visibility_check(
+            &rules,
+            record.is_public,
+            &record.owner_did,
+            caller,
+            &gate,
+        ) == crate::visibility::Decision::Deny
+        {
+            return Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("PR #{number} not found")));
+        }
+    }
+
     let diff = store::branch_diff(&disk_path, &pr.target_branch, &pr.source_branch)
         .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
 
@@ -178,6 +194,11 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
 
+    // Owner-only merge (N7). Merging writes the served tree, so this is the same
+    // trust boundary as owner-only push; it subsumes branch protection (a
+    // non-owner cannot merge to any branch, protected or not).
+    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
+
     let pr = state
         .db
         .get_pr(&record.id, number)
@@ -203,8 +224,8 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
         &pr.title,
     );
 
-    // Always release the advisory lock — even on error
-    guard.release().await;
+    // Always release the advisory lock — even on error; upload to Tigris only on success.
+    guard.release(merge_result.is_ok()).await;
 
     let merge_sha = merge_result.map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
 
@@ -236,6 +257,7 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
 /// POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/pulls/:number/close
 pub async fn close_pr(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let record = state
@@ -250,6 +272,15 @@ pub async fn close_pr(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("PR #{number} not found")))?;
 
+    // Owner OR author may close (forge norm).
+    let is_owner = crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0).is_ok();
+    let is_author = crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &pr.author_did);
+    if !is_owner && !is_author {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+            "only the repo owner or the PR author can close this PR".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+
     state.db.close_pr(&pr.id).await?;
 
     webhooks::fire_event(
@@ -274,11 +305,9 @@ pub async fn create_review(
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
     Json(req): Json<CreateReviewRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<PrReview>)> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    // Read-gate: a reviewer must be able to read the repo, but need not own it.
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -324,12 +353,11 @@ pub async fn create_review(
 pub async fn list_reviews(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -354,11 +382,9 @@ pub async fn create_comment(
         ));
     }
 
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    // Read-gate: a commenter must be able to read the repo, but need not own it.
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db
@@ -383,12 +409,11 @@ pub async fn create_comment(
 pub async fn list_comments(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let pr = state
         .db

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/register.rs

@@ -35,14 +35,32 @@ pub struct RegisterResponse {
 /// Accepts only requests with a valid HTTP Signature (enforced by middleware).
 pub async fn register(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    axum::Extension(auth): axum::Extension<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>,
+    headers: axum::http::HeaderMap,
     Json(req): Json<RegisterRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<RegisterResponse>)> {
+    // iCaptcha gate (inert unless ICAPTCHA_MODE is set). Verify up front; spend
+    // the proof only once the request is admissible, just before the write, so a
+    // rejected request never burns a valid proof.
+    let proof = crate::icaptcha::verify_request(&headers, &auth.0)?;
+
     // Parse and validate the DID
     let agent_did: Did = req
         .did
         .parse()
         .map_err(|e: gitlawb_core::Error| AppError::BadRequest(e.to_string()))?;
 
+    // Bind registration to the authenticated signer: an agent may only register
+    // itself, not create or refresh a trust row for a DID it does not control.
+    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, agent_did.as_str()) {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+            "did must be the authenticated signer".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    // Request is admissible — spend the proof now, immediately before the write.
+    proof.consume(&state.db).await?;
+
     // Store the agent in the local index
     state
         .db

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/replicas.rs

@@ -47,8 +47,9 @@ pub async fn register_replica(
 
     let replica_did = &auth.0;
 
-    // Don't let an owner register themselves as a replica of their own repo.
-    if replica_did == &record.owner_did {
+    // Don't let an owner register themselves as a replica of their own repo
+    // (did_matches handles the full vs bare did:key owner form).
+    if crate::api::did_matches(replica_did, &record.owner_did) {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
             "the repo owner is not a replica of their own repo".into(),
         ));

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/stars.rs

@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
 //!
 //! Any authenticated agent can star or unstar a repo.
 //! One agent = one star per repo (enforced by UNIQUE constraint in repo_stars).
-//! Star count is public — no auth required on GET.
+//! Star count is gated on repo read access.
 
 use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
 use axum::Json;
 
 use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
-use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
+use crate::error::Result;
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
 /// PUT /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/star
@@ -19,11 +19,8 @@ pub async fn star_repo(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let caller = &auth.0;
     let inserted = state.db.star_repo(&record.id, caller).await?;
@@ -54,11 +51,8 @@ pub async fn unstar_repo(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let caller = &auth.0;
     state.db.unstar_repo(&record.id, caller).await?;
@@ -74,16 +68,15 @@ pub async fn unstar_repo(
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/star
-/// Returns star count — unauthenticated.
+/// Returns star count for callers who can read the repo.
 pub async fn get_star_status(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let count = state.db.count_stars(&record.id).await?;
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/tasks.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 //!   POST   /api/v1/tasks/{id}/fail          — fail task
 
 use axum::{
-    extract::{Path, Query, State},
+    extract::{Extension, Path, Query, State},
     http::StatusCode,
     Json,
 };
@@ -18,9 +18,18 @@ use serde::Deserialize;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
+use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::db::AgentTask;
 use crate::state::{AppState, TaskEventBroadcast};
 
+/// 403 in this module's error shape (`(StatusCode, Json<Value>)`, not `AppError`).
+fn forbidden(msg: &str) -> (StatusCode, Json<Value>) {
+    (
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        Json(json!({ "error": "forbidden", "message": msg })),
+    )
+}
+
 // ── Request / response types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -55,13 +64,11 @@ pub struct ClaimTaskBody {
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 pub struct CompleteTaskBody {
     pub result: Option<String>,
-    pub by_did: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 pub struct FailTaskBody {
     pub reason: Option<String>,
-    pub by_did: Option<String>,
 }
 
 fn task_to_json(t: &AgentTask) -> Value {
@@ -87,15 +94,20 @@ fn task_to_json(t: &AgentTask) -> Value {
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks
 pub async fn create_task(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Json(body): Json<CreateTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<Value>), (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
+    // Bind the delegator to the authenticated signer (N13).
+    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &body.delegator_did) {
+        return Err(forbidden("delegator_did must be the authenticated signer"));
+    }
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
     let task = AgentTask {
         id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
         repo_id: body.repo_id,
         kind: body.kind,
         status: "pending".to_string(),
-        delegator_did: body.delegator_did,
+        delegator_did: auth.0,
         assignee_did: body.assignee_did,
         capability: body.capability,
         ucan_token: body.ucan_token,
@@ -154,24 +166,25 @@ pub async fn get_task(
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/claim
 pub async fn claim_task(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(body): Json<ClaimTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    let task = state
-        .db
-        .claim_task(&id, &body.assignee_did)
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            (
-                StatusCode::CONFLICT,
-                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
-            )
-        })?;
+    // Bind the assignee to the authenticated signer (N13).
+    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &body.assignee_did) {
+        return Err(forbidden("assignee_did must be the authenticated signer"));
+    }
+    let task = state.db.claim_task(&id, &auth.0).await.map_err(|e| {
+        (
+            StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+            Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
+        )
+    })?;
     let _ = state.task_event_tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
         task_id: id,
         old_status: "pending".to_string(),
         new_status: "claimed".to_string(),
-        by_did: body.assignee_did,
+        by_did: auth.0,
         at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
     });
     Ok(Json(task_to_json(&task)))
@@ -180,17 +193,44 @@ pub async fn claim_task(
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/complete
 pub async fn complete_task(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(body): Json<CompleteTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    let by_did = body.by_did.unwrap_or_default();
+    // Authorize the actor, not just bind their identity: the N13 signer-binding
+    // proved the caller was whoever they claimed, but never that they were the
+    // task's assignee. Load the task and require the caller to be its assignee;
+    // finish_task then transitions only a claimed task.
+    let existing = state
+        .db
+        .get_task(&id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            (
+                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
+            )
+        })?
+        .ok_or_else(|| {
+            (
+                StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+                Json(json!({ "error": "task not found" })),
+            )
+        })?;
+    if !crate::api::did_matches(
+        &auth.0,
+        existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
+    ) {
+        return Err(forbidden("only the task assignee can complete it"));
+    }
+    let by_did = auth.0;
     let task = state
         .db
         .finish_task(&id, "completed", body.result.as_deref())
         .await
         .map_err(|e| {
             (
-                StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
+                StatusCode::CONFLICT,
                 Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
             )
         })?;
@@ -207,10 +247,36 @@ pub async fn complete_task(
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/fail
 pub async fn fail_task(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(body): Json<FailTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    let by_did = body.by_did.unwrap_or_default();
+    // Authorize the actor, not just bind their identity (see complete_task): only
+    // the task's assignee may fail it, and finish_task transitions only a claimed
+    // task.
+    let existing = state
+        .db
+        .get_task(&id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            (
+                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
+            )
+        })?
+        .ok_or_else(|| {
+            (
+                StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+                Json(json!({ "error": "task not found" })),
+            )
+        })?;
+    if !crate::api::did_matches(
+        &auth.0,
+        existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
+    ) {
+        return Err(forbidden("only the task assignee can fail it"));
+    }
+    let by_did = auth.0;
     let reason = body.reason.unwrap_or_default();
     let task = state
         .db
@@ -218,7 +284,7 @@ pub async fn fail_task(
         .await
         .map_err(|e| {
             (
-                StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
+                StatusCode::CONFLICT,
                 Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
             )
         })?;

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/visibility.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+//! Path-scoped visibility management API. Owner-only, mirrors `api/protect.rs`.
+
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+
+use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
+use crate::db::VisibilityMode;
+use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
+use crate::state::AppState;
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+pub struct SetVisibilityRequest {
+    pub path_glob: String,
+    /// "a" or "b"; defaults to "b" if absent or unrecognized.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub mode: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub reader_dids: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+pub struct RemoveVisibilityRequest {
+    pub path_glob: String,
+}
+
+fn require_owner(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    // DID-safe owner match (collapses did:key full vs bare on both sides, never
+    // across methods), shared with require_repo_owner — not a trailing-segment
+    // compare that only normalized the owner side.
+    if crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+            "only the repo owner can manage visibility".into(),
+        ))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Reject malformed globs before they reach the store, where they would
+/// silently misconfigure access (an empty glob behaves like "/", and a glob
+/// without a leading "/" never matches a real repo path). The accepted forms
+/// match what `visibility_check` understands: "/", "/prefix", or "/prefix/**".
+fn validate_path_glob(path_glob: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    if !path_glob.starts_with('/') {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest("path_glob must start with '/'".into()));
+    }
+    if path_glob == "/**" {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+            "use '/' for whole-repo scope, not '/**'".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+    if path_glob != "/" && path_glob.ends_with('/') {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+            "path_glob must not end with '/'".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+    // Reject empty path segments. `glob_prefix` collapses "//**" to "/" (whole
+    // repo), so without this an operator could bypass the "/**" guard above and
+    // grant repo-wide read with "//**", or set a dead rule like "//secret/**"
+    // whose prefix never matches a real single-slash path and silently leaves
+    // the subtree readable.
+    if path_glob.contains("//") {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+            "path_glob must not contain empty path segments".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+    // Strip the one permitted trailing "/**" before checking for stray
+    // wildcards, otherwise a "*" elsewhere in the prefix (e.g. "/a*b/**" or
+    // "/a/**/**") slips through because the string still ends with "/**".
+    let prefix = path_glob.strip_suffix("/**").unwrap_or(path_glob);
+    if prefix.contains('*') {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+            "the only supported wildcard is a single trailing '/**'".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// PUT /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/visibility
+pub async fn set_visibility(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    Json(req): Json<SetVisibilityRequest>,
+) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    require_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
+    validate_path_glob(&req.path_glob)?;
+
+    let mode = match req.mode.as_deref() {
+        Some("a") => VisibilityMode::A,
+        _ => VisibilityMode::B,
+    };
+
+    // Mode A hides existence and is only coherent for the whole repo; a subtree
+    // cannot hide its existence without rewriting git history (see spec).
+    if mode == VisibilityMode::A && req.path_glob != "/" {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
+            "mode 'a' (hide) is only allowed for the whole repo (path_glob '/'); use mode 'b' for subtrees".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    // An empty reader_dids list is valid and intentional: the owner is always
+    // allowed by visibility_check, so a "/" rule with no readers is exactly the
+    // whole-repo "private to owner only" case.
+    state
+        .db
+        .set_visibility_rule(&record.id, &req.path_glob, mode, &req.reader_dids, &auth.0)
+        .await?;
+
+    let subtree_warning = req.path_glob != "/";
+    tracing::info!(
+        repo = %repo, caller = %auth.0, path_glob = %req.path_glob, mode = %mode.as_str(),
+        subtree_pending = subtree_warning,
+        "visibility rule set"
+    );
+
+    Ok((
+        StatusCode::CREATED,
+        Json(serde_json::json!({
+            "status": "set",
+            "repo": format!("{owner}/{repo}"),
+            "path_glob": req.path_glob,
+            "mode": mode.as_str(),
+            "reader_dids": req.reader_dids,
+            "subtree_clone_enforcement_pending": subtree_warning,
+        })),
+    ))
+}
+
+/// DELETE /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/visibility
+pub async fn remove_visibility(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    Json(req): Json<RemoveVisibilityRequest>,
+) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    require_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
+
+    state
+        .db
+        .remove_visibility_rule(&record.id, &req.path_glob)
+        .await?;
+
+    tracing::info!(
+        repo = %repo, caller = %auth.0, path_glob = %req.path_glob,
+        "visibility rule removed"
+    );
+
+    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
+        "status": "removed",
+        "repo": format!("{owner}/{repo}"),
+        "path_glob": req.path_glob,
+    })))
+}
+
+/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/visibility
+pub async fn list_visibility(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
+) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    require_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
+
+    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
+    let rules_json: Vec<_> = rules
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|r| {
+            serde_json::json!({
+                "path_glob": r.path_glob,
+                "mode": r.mode.as_str(),
+                "reader_dids": r.reader_dids,
+                "created_by": r.created_by,
+            })
+        })
+        .collect();
+
+    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
+        "repo": format!("{owner}/{repo}"),
+        "count": rules_json.len(),
+        "rules": rules_json,
+    })))
+}
+
+/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/withheld-paths
+///
+/// Returns the path globs the (optionally authenticated) caller is denied
+/// (`withheld`) plus any more-specific globs that are allowed underneath a
+/// denied one (`reinclude`), so a clean-clone client can sparse-exclude the
+/// denied subtrees while re-including the allowed nested paths. Unlike
+/// `list_visibility` this is not owner-gated and never exposes reader_dids.
+pub async fn withheld_paths(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
+    Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
+) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+
+    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+
+    // Whole-repo read gate: a caller who cannot read "/" gets repo-not-found,
+    // matching the git read endpoints, so this never discloses a private repo's
+    // existence or its path layout to an unauthorized caller.
+    if crate::visibility::visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/")
+        == crate::visibility::Decision::Deny
+    {
+        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")));
+    }
+
+    let withheld =
+        crate::visibility::withheld_globs(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller);
+    let reinclude =
+        crate::visibility::reincluded_globs(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller);
+
+    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
+        "repo": format!("{owner}/{repo}"),
+        "withheld": withheld,
+        "reinclude": reinclude,
+    })))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::validate_path_glob;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn accepts_supported_globs() {
+        for g in ["/", "/secret", "/secret/**", "/a/b/c", "/a/b/**"] {
+            assert!(validate_path_glob(g).is_ok(), "{g} should be valid");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_malformed_globs() {
+        // empty, no leading slash, whole-repo via "/**", trailing slash,
+        // non-trailing wildcards, double wildcards, and empty path segments
+        // (which would collapse to whole-repo or a dead rule) are all rejected.
+        for g in [
+            "",
+            "secret/**",
+            "/**",
+            "/**/**",
+            "/secret/",
+            "/a*b",
+            "/*/x",
+            "/a*b/**",
+            "/a/**/**",
+            "//**",
+            "//secret/**",
+        ] {
+            assert!(validate_path_glob(g).is_err(), "{g} should be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/webhooks.rs

@@ -38,11 +38,16 @@ pub async fn create_webhook(
         .get_repo(&owner, &name)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
-    // Validate URL is http/https
-    if !req.url.starts_with("http://") && !req.url.starts_with("https://") {
+    // Gate the target through the same hardened public-host validator the peer
+    // announce path uses, so an authenticated owner cannot register a webhook
+    // that makes the node POST to loopback/private/link-local/metadata
+    // endpoints (SSRF). Delivery runs on the shared no-redirect client
+    // (main.rs), which closes the 3xx-to-internal bounce.
+    if !crate::api::peers::is_public_http_url(&req.url) {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "webhook URL must be http:// or https://".into(),
+            "webhook URL must be a public http(s) URL (no loopback, private, or .internal/.local hosts)".into(),
         ));
     }
 
@@ -95,6 +100,7 @@ pub async fn list_webhooks(
 /// DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks/:id
 pub async fn delete_webhook(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, name, id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
     let record = state
@@ -102,6 +108,7 @@ pub async fn delete_webhook(
         .get_repo(&owner, &name)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
 
     // Verify the webhook belongs to this repo
     let hook = state
@@ -117,3 +124,35 @@ pub async fn delete_webhook(
     state.db.delete_webhook(&id).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "deleted": true, "id": id })))
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use crate::api::peers::is_public_http_url;
+
+    // create_webhook gates req.url through is_public_http_url. Pin the exact
+    // SSRF targets from issue #81 so the webhook path can never regress to the
+    // old scheme-only check, independent of the validator's own peer tests.
+    #[test]
+    fn webhook_url_gate_rejects_ssrf_targets() {
+        for bad in [
+            "http://127.0.0.1:5432/",
+            "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
+            "http://localhost/",
+            "http://10.0.0.5/",
+            "http://[::1]/",
+            // IPv6 transition encodings smuggling loopback v4 (6to4 / NAT64).
+            "http://[2002:7f00:1::]/",
+            "http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/",
+            "ftp://example.com/",
+            "not-a-url",
+        ] {
+            assert!(!is_public_http_url(bad), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn webhook_url_gate_allows_public_targets() {
+        assert!(is_public_http_url("https://hooks.example.com/gitlawb"));
+        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://203.0.113.10:7545/"));
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/arweave.rs

@@ -103,6 +103,108 @@ pub async fn anchor_ref_update(
     Ok(tx_id)
 }
 
+/// A per-push manifest of the blobs encrypted this push (Option B3). The
+/// `blobs` slice is `(oid, cid)` tuples. Anchored directly to Arweave as its JSON
+/// body so the discovery index survives total node loss. Recipient identities are
+/// never part of the manifest.
+pub struct EncryptedManifest<'a> {
+    pub repo: &'a str,
+    pub owner_did: &'a str,
+    pub node_did: &'a str,
+    pub timestamp: &'a str,
+    pub blobs: &'a [(String, String)],
+}
+
+/// Anchor a per-push encrypted-blob manifest to Arweave via Irys. The manifest
+/// JSON body is the payload (not a CID pointer to IPFS), so the index is
+/// permanent and self-contained. Recipient identities are deliberately omitted:
+/// the anchor is permanent and public, and the v2 envelopes no longer expose
+/// recipients, so the reader set must not be written to Arweave either.
+///
+/// Returns the Irys/Arweave transaction ID, or `Ok("")` when `irys_url` is empty
+/// (anchoring disabled) or there are no blobs to anchor.
+pub async fn anchor_encrypted_manifest(
+    client: &reqwest::Client,
+    irys_url: &str,
+    manifest: &EncryptedManifest<'_>,
+) -> Result<String> {
+    if irys_url.is_empty() || manifest.blobs.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(String::new());
+    }
+
+    let blobs_json: Vec<serde_json::Value> = manifest
+        .blobs
+        .iter()
+        .map(|(oid, cid)| manifest_blob_json(oid, cid))
+        .collect();
+
+    let payload = json!({
+        "schema": "gitlawb/encrypted-manifest/v1",
+        "repo": manifest.repo,
+        "owner_did": manifest.owner_did,
+        "node_did": manifest.node_did,
+        "timestamp": manifest.timestamp,
+        "blobs": blobs_json,
+    });
+
+    let body = serde_json::to_vec(&payload)?;
+    let url = format!("{}/upload", irys_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
+
+    let resp = client
+        .post(&url)
+        .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        .header("x-irys-tags", build_manifest_tags_header(manifest))
+        .body(body)
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Irys upload failed: {e}"))?;
+
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Irys returned {status}: {body}"));
+    }
+
+    let json: serde_json::Value = resp
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to parse Irys response: {e}"))?;
+
+    let tx_id = json["id"]
+        .as_str()
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("no 'id' in Irys response: {json}"))?
+        .to_string();
+
+    tracing::info!(
+        repo = %manifest.repo,
+        tx_id = %tx_id,
+        blobs = manifest.blobs.len(),
+        "anchored encrypted manifest to Arweave"
+    );
+
+    Ok(tx_id)
+}
+
+/// Serialize one blob for the Arweave manifest. Recipient identities are
+/// intentionally absent so the permanent public anchor never records who can
+/// read a blob.
+fn manifest_blob_json(oid: &str, cid: &str) -> serde_json::Value {
+    json!({ "oid": oid, "cid": cid })
+}
+
+/// Build the Irys tag header for an encrypted-blob manifest. `Repo` and `Schema`
+/// are the tags the `gl` recovery query filters on.
+fn build_manifest_tags_header(manifest: &EncryptedManifest<'_>) -> String {
+    [
+        "App-Name:gitlawb".to_string(),
+        "Schema:gitlawb/encrypted-manifest/v1".to_string(),
+        format!("Repo:{}", sanitize_tag(manifest.repo)),
+        format!("Owner-DID:{}", sanitize_tag(manifest.owner_did)),
+        format!("Node-DID:{}", sanitize_tag(manifest.node_did)),
+    ]
+    .join(",")
+}
+
 /// Arweave permanent URL for a given Irys transaction ID.
 pub fn arweave_url(tx_id: &str) -> String {
     format!("https://arweave.net/{tx_id}")
@@ -141,7 +243,7 @@ mod tests {
             repo: "alice/myrepo".into(),
             owner_did: "did:key:z6Mk...".into(),
             ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".into(),
+            old_sha: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000".into(),
             new_sha: "a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2".into(),
             cid: Some("bafyreib5...".into()),
             timestamp: "2026-03-14T00:00:00Z".into(),
@@ -168,7 +270,7 @@ mod tests {
             repo: "alice/myrepo".into(),
             owner_did: "did:key:z6Mk...".into(),
             ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: "0".repeat(64),
+            old_sha: "0".repeat(40),
             new_sha: "a1b2c3d4".repeat(8),
             cid: None,
             timestamp: "2026-03-14T00:00:00Z".into(),
@@ -184,6 +286,44 @@ mod tests {
         _mock.assert_async().await;
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_anchor_body_carries_real_old_sha() {
+        // The anchored body must serialize the real old→new transition the
+        // node was handed, never a zero placeholder. Regression guard for the
+        // push handler that used to hardcode `old_sha` to 64 zeros (#26).
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let real_old = "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
+        let real_new = "2222222222222222222222222222222222222222";
+        let _mock = server
+            .mock("POST", "/upload")
+            .match_body(mockito::Matcher::AllOf(vec![
+                mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"old_sha":"{real_old}"}}"#)),
+                mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"new_sha":"{real_new}"}}"#)),
+            ]))
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"id":"TX_REAL_OLD_SHA","timestamp":1710000000000,"version":"1.0.0"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+        let anchor = RefAnchor {
+            repo: "alice/myrepo".into(),
+            owner_did: "did:key:z6Mk...".into(),
+            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
+            old_sha: real_old.into(),
+            new_sha: real_new.into(),
+            cid: None,
+            timestamp: "2026-03-14T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            node_did: "did:key:z6Mknnd...".into(),
+        };
+
+        let result = anchor_ref_update(&client, &server.url(), &anchor).await;
+        assert_eq!(result.unwrap(), "TX_REAL_OLD_SHA");
+        // The mock only matches when the posted JSON carries both real SHAs.
+        _mock.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_arweave_url() {
         let url = arweave_url("7xGpIoHUQ8j9GhD3Y2mKzP1NsVtXwRcFe4bEaLnMuOk");
@@ -193,6 +333,79 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_manifest_anchor_noop_when_url_empty() {
+        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+        let blobs = vec![("oid1".to_string(), "cid1".to_string())];
+        let m = EncryptedManifest {
+            repo: "alice/r",
+            owner_did: "did:key:zO",
+            node_did: "did:key:zN",
+            timestamp: "2026-06-11T00:00:00Z",
+            blobs: &blobs,
+        };
+        assert_eq!(
+            anchor_encrypted_manifest(&client, "", &m).await.unwrap(),
+            ""
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_manifest_anchor_noop_when_no_blobs() {
+        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+        let blobs: Vec<(String, String)> = vec![];
+        let m = EncryptedManifest {
+            repo: "alice/r",
+            owner_did: "did:key:zO",
+            node_did: "did:key:zN",
+            timestamp: "2026-06-11T00:00:00Z",
+            blobs: &blobs,
+        };
+        // Non-empty URL, but no blobs: still a no-op.
+        assert_eq!(
+            anchor_encrypted_manifest(&client, "https://example.invalid", &m)
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            ""
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_manifest_anchor_success() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _mock = server
+            .mock("POST", "/upload")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"id":"MANIFESTTX123","timestamp":1710000000000,"version":"1.0.0"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+        let blobs = vec![("oid1".to_string(), "cid1".to_string())];
+        let m = EncryptedManifest {
+            repo: "alice/r",
+            owner_did: "did:key:zO",
+            node_did: "did:key:zN",
+            timestamp: "2026-06-11T00:00:00Z",
+            blobs: &blobs,
+        };
+        let r = anchor_encrypted_manifest(&client, &server.url(), &m).await;
+        assert_eq!(r.unwrap(), "MANIFESTTX123");
+        _mock.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn manifest_blob_json_omits_recipients() {
+        let v = manifest_blob_json("oid1", "cidA");
+        assert_eq!(v["oid"], "oid1");
+        assert_eq!(v["cid"], "cidA");
+        assert!(
+            v.get("recipients").is_none(),
+            "Arweave manifest must not anchor recipient identities"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_sanitize_tag() {
         assert_eq!(sanitize_tag("alice/myrepo"), "alice/myrepo");

crates/gitlawb-node/src/auth/mod.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 use axum::body::Body;
-use axum::extract::Request;
+use axum::extract::{Request, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
 use axum::middleware::Next;
 use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
@@ -8,10 +8,27 @@ use http_body_util::BodyExt;
 use serde_json::json;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 
+use gitlawb_core::did::Did;
+use gitlawb_core::ucan::Ucan;
+
+use crate::state::AppState;
+
 /// The authenticated agent's DID, injected into request extensions by `require_signature`.
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct AuthenticatedDid(pub String);
 
+/// Whether `caller` is authorized to push to `record`.
+///
+/// Phase 1 (`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH`): owner-only, via the canonical
+/// [`crate::api::did_matches`] owner comparison (DID-safe on both sides). This is
+/// intentionally a distinct, intent-named gate rather than a bare owner check so
+/// that Phase 2 can extend it to honor a verified UCAN `git/push` capability as a
+/// pure addition (`did_matches(..) || ucan_grants_push(..)`) without rewriting
+/// call sites.
+pub fn caller_authorized_to_push(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> bool {
+    crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did)
+}
+
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::{
     build_signing_string, compute_content_digest, HttpSignature, COVERED_COMPONENTS,
 };
@@ -228,6 +245,127 @@ pub async fn require_signature(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
     next.run(request).await
 }
 
+/// Optional variant for rolling upgrades: verify and inject `AuthenticatedDid` when
+/// RFC 9421 signature headers are present, but allow legacy unsigned requests to
+/// continue when no signature attempt was made.
+pub async fn optional_signature(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
+    let has_signature_headers = request.headers().contains_key("signature-input")
+        || request.headers().contains_key("signature");
+    if has_signature_headers {
+        return require_signature(request, next).await;
+    }
+    next.run(request).await
+}
+
+/// Validate a raw UCAN token string supplied in `X-Ucan`.
+///
+/// Checks performed:
+///   1. The token decodes to a valid [`Ucan`] structure.
+///   2. The UCAN issuer (`iss`) matches `signer_did` — the DID that signed the
+///      HTTP request — preventing replay of another agent's UCAN.
+///   3. The UCAN audience (`aud`) matches `expected_aud` — the node's own DID.
+///   4. The full proof chain is cryptographically valid (signatures, expiry,
+///      not-before, chain linkage, and capability attenuation).
+fn validate_ucan_chain(
+    token: &str,
+    expected_aud: &Did,
+    signer_did: &Did,
+) -> Result<(), (StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
+    let ucan = Ucan::decode(token).map_err(|e| {
+        (
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            Json(json!({ "error": "invalid_ucan", "message": e.to_string() })),
+        )
+    })?;
+
+    if &ucan.payload.iss != signer_did {
+        return Err((
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            Json(json!({
+                "error": "invalid_ucan",
+                "message": format!(
+                    "UCAN issuer {} does not match request signer {}",
+                    ucan.payload.iss, signer_did
+                ),
+            })),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    ucan.verify_audience(expected_aud).map_err(|e| {
+        (
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            Json(json!({ "error": "invalid_ucan", "message": e.to_string() })),
+        )
+    })?;
+
+    ucan.verify_chain().map_err(|e| {
+        (
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            Json(json!({ "error": "invalid_ucan", "message": e.to_string() })),
+        )
+    })?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Axum middleware that validates a UCAN chain when `X-Ucan` is present.
+///
+/// Must be layered so that it runs after [`require_signature`], which sets the
+/// [`AuthenticatedDid`] extension consumed here.
+///
+/// When `X-Ucan` is absent the request passes through unchanged, preserving
+/// backward compatibility for agents that pre-date UCAN delegation. When the
+/// header is present the full chain is validated: the UCAN issuer must match
+/// the HTTP Signature identity, the audience must be this node's DID, and
+/// every proof in the chain must be cryptographically sound with no capability
+/// escalation.
+pub async fn require_ucan_chain(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    request: Request,
+    next: Next,
+) -> Response {
+    let token = match request
+        .headers()
+        .get("x-ucan")
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .map(str::to_owned)
+    {
+        Some(t) => t,
+        None => return next.run(request).await,
+    };
+
+    let signer_did: Did = match request.extensions().get::<AuthenticatedDid>() {
+        Some(a) => match a.0.parse() {
+            Ok(did) => did,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(raw_did = %a.0, err = %e, "failed to parse DID from authenticated identity");
+                return (
+                    StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+                    Json(json!({ "error": "invalid_identity", "message": "invalid DID in token" })),
+                )
+                    .into_response();
+            }
+        },
+        None => {
+            return (
+                StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+                Json(json!({
+                    "error": "invalid_ucan",
+                    "message": "UCAN validation requires a valid HTTP Signature",
+                })),
+            )
+                .into_response()
+        }
+    };
+
+    if let Err((status, body)) = validate_ucan_chain(&token, &state.node_did, &signer_did) {
+        return (status, body).into_response();
+    }
+
+    tracing::debug!(did = %signer_did, "UCAN chain validated");
+    next.run(request).await
+}
+
 fn human_detected(message: &str) -> impl IntoResponse {
     (
         StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
@@ -246,3 +384,230 @@ fn human_detected(message: &str) -> impl IntoResponse {
         })),
     )
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use axum::{middleware, Router};
+    use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+    use gitlawb_core::ucan::{caps, Capability, Ucan};
+    use std::{path::PathBuf, sync::Arc, time::Duration};
+    use tower::ServiceExt;
+
+    fn bootstrap_ucan(node: &Keypair, agent_did: Did) -> Ucan {
+        Ucan::bootstrap(node, agent_did).unwrap()
+    }
+
+    fn delegation_ucan(agent: &Keypair, node_did: Did, proof: &Ucan) -> Ucan {
+        Ucan::delegate(
+            agent,
+            node_did,
+            vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://alpha", caps::NETWORK_JOIN)],
+            None,
+            proof,
+        )
+        .unwrap()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_ucan_chain_valid() {
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node_did = node.did();
+        let agent_did = agent.did();
+
+        let proof = bootstrap_ucan(&node, agent_did.clone());
+        let delegation = delegation_ucan(&agent, node_did.clone(), &proof);
+        let token = delegation.encode().unwrap();
+
+        assert!(validate_ucan_chain(&token, &node_did, &agent_did).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_ucan_chain_wrong_issuer() {
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let other = Keypair::generate();
+        let node_did = node.did();
+        let agent_did = agent.did();
+
+        let proof = bootstrap_ucan(&node, agent_did.clone());
+        let delegation = delegation_ucan(&agent, node_did.clone(), &proof);
+        let token = delegation.encode().unwrap();
+
+        // signer_did is `other` but UCAN iss is `agent` — must be rejected
+        let err = validate_ucan_chain(&token, &node_did, &other.did()).unwrap_err();
+        assert_eq!(err.0, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+        let body = err.1 .0.to_string();
+        assert!(body.contains("does not match request signer"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_ucan_chain_wrong_audience() {
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let other_node = Keypair::generate();
+        let node_did = node.did();
+        let agent_did = agent.did();
+
+        let proof = bootstrap_ucan(&node, agent_did.clone());
+        let delegation = delegation_ucan(&agent, node_did.clone(), &proof);
+        let token = delegation.encode().unwrap();
+
+        // expected_aud is a different node — must be rejected
+        let err = validate_ucan_chain(&token, &other_node.did(), &agent_did).unwrap_err();
+        assert_eq!(err.0, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+        let body = err.1 .0.to_string();
+        assert!(body.contains("audience mismatch"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_ucan_chain_expired_proof() {
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let node_did = node.did();
+        let agent_did = agent.did();
+
+        let exp = chrono::Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::hours(1);
+        let proof = Ucan::issue(
+            &node,
+            agent_did.clone(),
+            vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://alpha", caps::NETWORK_JOIN)],
+            Some(exp),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let delegation = delegation_ucan(&agent, node_did.clone(), &proof);
+        let token = delegation.encode().unwrap();
+
+        let err = validate_ucan_chain(&token, &node_did, &agent_did).unwrap_err();
+        assert_eq!(err.0, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+        let body = err.1 .0.to_string();
+        assert!(body.contains("expired"));
+    }
+
+    fn make_test_state(node_did: gitlawb_core::did::Did) -> crate::state::AppState {
+        use crate::{config::Config, graphql, rate_limit::RateLimiter};
+        use clap::Parser;
+
+        let keypair = Keypair::generate();
+        let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(1);
+        let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(1);
+        let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
+            .connect_lazy("postgres://localhost/gitlawb_test_placeholder")
+            .expect("lazy pool creation should not fail");
+        let db = Arc::new(crate::db::Db::for_testing(pool.clone()));
+        let schema = Arc::new(graphql::build_schema(
+            db.clone(),
+            ref_tx.clone(),
+            task_tx.clone(),
+        ));
+        crate::state::AppState {
+            config: Arc::new(Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"])),
+            db,
+            node_did,
+            node_keypair: Arc::new(keypair),
+            p2p: None,
+            http_client: Arc::new(reqwest::Client::new()),
+            ref_update_tx: ref_tx,
+            task_event_tx: task_tx,
+            graphql_schema: schema,
+            machine_id: None,
+            repo_store: crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), pool),
+            rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(100, Duration::from_secs(60)),
+            create_ip_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(1000, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+            push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+            push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None,
+            sync_trigger_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+            peer_write_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+            shutdown_tx: tokio::sync::watch::channel(false).0,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn require_ucan_chain_no_header_passes_through() {
+        let state = make_test_state(Keypair::generate().did());
+        let app = Router::new()
+            .route("/", axum::routing::get(|| async { StatusCode::OK }))
+            .layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(state, require_ucan_chain));
+
+        let req = Request::builder()
+            .uri("/")
+            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn require_ucan_chain_missing_did_returns_401() {
+        let state = make_test_state(Keypair::generate().did());
+        let app = Router::new()
+            .route("/", axum::routing::get(|| async { StatusCode::OK }))
+            .layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(state, require_ucan_chain));
+
+        // x-ucan present but no AuthenticatedDid extension → 401
+        let req = Request::builder()
+            .uri("/")
+            .header("x-ucan", "any-token")
+            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn require_ucan_chain_wrong_issuer_returns_401() {
+        let node = Keypair::generate();
+        let agent = Keypair::generate();
+        let other = Keypair::generate();
+        let node_did = node.did();
+        let agent_did = agent.did();
+
+        // Build a valid token where iss = agent, but supply `other` as the signer.
+        let proof = bootstrap_ucan(&node, agent_did.clone());
+        let token = delegation_ucan(&agent, node_did.clone(), &proof)
+            .encode()
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let state = make_test_state(node_did);
+        let app = Router::new()
+            .route("/", axum::routing::get(|| async { StatusCode::OK }))
+            .layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(state, require_ucan_chain));
+
+        // AuthenticatedDid is `other`, UCAN iss is `agent` → issuer mismatch → 401
+        let req = Request::builder()
+            .uri("/")
+            .header("x-ucan", token)
+            .extension(AuthenticatedDid(other.did().to_string()))
+            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn require_ucan_chain_malformed_token_returns_401() {
+        let state = make_test_state(Keypair::generate().did());
+        let app = Router::new()
+            .route("/", axum::routing::get(|| async { StatusCode::OK }))
+            .layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(state, require_ucan_chain));
+
+        // Malformed x-ucan (invalid JSON)
+        let req = Request::builder()
+            .uri("/")
+            .header("x-ucan", "invalid-token-structure")
+            .extension(AuthenticatedDid(Keypair::generate().did().to_string()))
+            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+
+        let body_bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 2048).await.unwrap();
+        let body_json: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(body_json["error"], "invalid_ucan");
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/bootstrap.rs

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 use std::str::FromStr;
 
-use libp2p::Multiaddr;
+use libp2p_core::Multiaddr;
 use serde::Deserialize;
 use tracing::{info, warn};
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ pub async fn issue_ref_certificate(
         issued_at,
     };
 
-    state.db.insert_ref_certificate(&cert).await?;
-    Ok(cert)
+    // Persist and return the row as it exists in the database (on a
+    // conflict the existing row survives when it is newer).
+    state.db.insert_ref_certificate(&cert).await
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rs

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ pub struct Config {
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_KEY", default_value = "~/.gitlawb/identity.pem")]
     pub key_path: String,
 
-    /// Allow unauthenticated reads (default: true for public repos)
+    /// Reserved for private-read mode; per-repo read enforcement is not wired in alpha
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ", default_value_t = true)]
     pub public_read: bool,
 
@@ -40,6 +40,23 @@ pub struct Config {
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS", value_delimiter = ',')]
     pub bootstrap_peers: Vec<String>,
 
+    /// Require RFC 9421 signatures on peer announce/sync write routes.
+    /// Keep false during rolling upgrades so existing live nodes can still gossip.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES",
+        default_value_t = false
+    )]
+    pub require_signed_peer_writes: bool,
+
+    /// Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on `git-receive-pack`.
+    /// Authentication (a valid did:key signature) is not authorization on its own:
+    /// any party can sign as their own DID. When true, pushes whose authenticated
+    /// DID is not the repo owner are rejected. Keep false during rolling upgrades;
+    /// flip it on once owners are ready for owner-only writes.
+    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH", default_value_t = false)]
+    pub enforce_owner_push: bool,
+
     /// URL of local IPFS/Kubo node HTTP API (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:5001)
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_IPFS_API", default_value = "")]
     pub ipfs_api: String,
@@ -56,12 +73,12 @@ pub struct Config {
     )]
     pub pinata_upload_url: String,
 
-    /// libp2p TCP port (0 = disabled)
+    /// libp2p QUIC/UDP port (0 = disabled)
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_P2P_PORT", default_value_t = 7546)]
     pub p2p_port: u16,
 
     /// libp2p bootstrap multiaddrs (comma-separated)
-    /// Example: /ip4/1.2.3.4/tcp/7546/p2p/12D3KooW...
+    /// Example: /ip4/1.2.3.4/udp/7546/quic-v1/p2p/12D3KooW...
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP", value_delimiter = ',')]
     pub p2p_bootstrap: Vec<String>,
 
@@ -122,6 +139,101 @@ pub struct Config {
     /// Default: 2 GB.  Set lower on resource-constrained nodes.
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES", default_value_t = 2_147_483_648)]
     pub max_pack_bytes: usize,
+
+    /// Per-client-IP rate limit for `POST /api/v1/sync/trigger`, in requests per
+    /// hour. `/sync/trigger` requires a signature and drives an O(peers) outbound
+    /// fan-out per call, so it gets a tight bucket. `0` disables. Default: 60.
+    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_SYNC_TRIGGER_RATE_LIMIT", default_value_t = 60)]
+    pub sync_trigger_rate_limit: usize,
+
+    /// Per-client-IP rate limit for the peer-write routes (`/peers/announce`,
+    /// `/sync/notify`), in requests per hour. These accept unsigned requests from
+    /// known peers and run at higher frequency, so the bucket is generous. Keeping
+    /// it separate from the trigger bucket stops an unsigned notify flood from
+    /// draining the signed trigger caller's quota. `0` disables. Default: 600.
+    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_PEER_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT", default_value_t = 600)]
+    pub peer_write_rate_limit: usize,
+
+    /// Optional address to bind a Prometheus `/metrics` exposition endpoint on.
+    /// Example: `127.0.0.1:9091`. Leave empty (default) to disable.
+    /// Bind to localhost or a private interface — the metrics endpoint is
+    /// unauthenticated.
+    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_METRICS_ADDR", default_value = "")]
+    pub metrics_addr: String,
+
+    /// Maximum time to wait for in-flight requests to drain on shutdown, in
+    /// seconds. After this elapses, the server returns 503 to anything still
+    /// in flight and exits. Default: 30s.
+    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_SHUTDOWN_GRACE_SECS", default_value_t = 30)]
+    pub shutdown_grace_secs: u64,
+
+    /// Maximum wall-clock time a single served git operation (upload-pack /
+    /// receive-pack through `run_git_service`) may run before it is aborted and
+    /// its process group torn down, in seconds. Bounds a git that neither
+    /// finishes nor disconnects. Must be positive; set it very large to
+    /// effectively disable the bound. Default: 600s (10 min), generous for large
+    /// clones. Does not cover the ref advertisement (`info/refs`) or the
+    /// withheld-blob fetch path (`upload_pack_excluding`, a blocking
+    /// `spawn_blocking` a tokio timeout cannot cancel); both remain unbounded.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS",
+        default_value_t = 600,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub git_service_timeout_secs: u64,
+
+    /// Maximum connections in the PostgreSQL pool. This is a cap, not a floor
+    /// (connections open lazily). Size against the database server's
+    /// max_connections, remembering admin tooling opens its own pool.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS",
+        default_value_t = 20,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u32).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub db_max_connections: u32,
+
+    /// Maximum time a request waits for a pool connection before failing with
+    /// 503, in seconds. Bounds queueing when the database is slow or down.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_DB_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS",
+        default_value_t = 5,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub db_acquire_timeout_secs: u64,
+
+    /// Upper bound on each startup connect-and-migrate attempt, in seconds.
+    /// Migrations wait on a cross-instance advisory lock, so this must be
+    /// generous enough for a peer instance to finish migrating; on expiry the
+    /// attempt is retried (migrations are idempotent).
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS",
+        default_value_t = 60,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub db_connect_timeout_secs: u64,
+
+    /// First retry delay when the database is unavailable at startup, in
+    /// seconds. Doubles each attempt up to --db-retry-max-secs.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_INITIAL_SECS",
+        default_value_t = 5,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub db_retry_initial_secs: u64,
+
+    /// Ceiling on the startup retry delay, in seconds.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_MAX_SECS",
+        default_value_t = 60,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub db_retry_max_secs: u64,
 }
 
 impl Config {
@@ -139,3 +251,25 @@ impl Config {
         PathBuf::from(&self.key_path)
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn git_service_timeout_defaults_to_600_and_rejects_zero() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]).git_service_timeout_secs,
+            600
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--git-service-timeout-secs", "30"])
+                .git_service_timeout_secs,
+            30
+        );
+        // 0 is a footgun (immediate-504 on every request); clap must reject it.
+        assert!(
+            Config::try_parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--git-service-timeout-secs", "0"]).is_err()
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/encrypted_pin.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+//! Encrypt-then-pin for withheld blobs (Option B1). Each withheld blob is sealed
+//! to its recipient DIDs and the envelope pinned to IPFS, recorded in
+//! `encrypted_blobs`. Best-effort per blob: a failure is logged and skipped,
+//! never pinned in plaintext.
+
+use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::str::FromStr;
+
+use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
+use gitlawb_core::did::Did;
+use gitlawb_core::encrypt::seal_blob;
+
+use crate::db::Db;
+
+use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
+use sha2::Sha256;
+
+type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
+
+/// Opaque, node-keyed fingerprint of a blob's recipient set. Stored in place of
+/// the cleartext DID list so a DB compromise cannot reveal the reader set; used
+/// only to detect a recipient-set change so an unchanged blob is not re-sealed.
+/// Order-insensitive (the input `BTreeSet` is already sorted).
+pub fn recipients_tag(node_seed: &[u8; 32], dids: &BTreeSet<String>) -> String {
+    let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(node_seed).expect("HMAC accepts any key length");
+    mac.update(b"gitlawb/recipients-tag/v1");
+    for did in dids {
+        mac.update(b"\n");
+        mac.update(did.as_bytes());
+    }
+    hex::encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes())
+}
+
+/// Resolve a DID string to its Ed25519 verifying key, or None if it carries no
+/// inline key (e.g. did:web / did:gitlawb).
+fn did_to_key(did: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
+    Did::from_str(did).ok()?.to_verifying_key().ok()
+}
+
+/// Resolve every recipient DID to its verifying key, all-or-nothing.
+///
+/// Returns `Ok(keys)` only when every DID resolves. If any DID fails, returns
+/// `Err(unresolved)` listing the unresolvable DID strings so the caller can fail
+/// closed rather than seal to a partial recipient set (#47): sealing to a subset
+/// while recording the full set as covered permanently locks out the dropped
+/// readers. Resolution is local-only, so `did:web`/`did:gitlawb` recipients (and
+/// any malformed `did:key`) land in the unresolved set until off-`did:key`
+/// resolution exists.
+fn resolve_all_recipients(dids: &BTreeSet<String>) -> Result<Vec<VerifyingKey>, Vec<String>> {
+    let mut keys = Vec::with_capacity(dids.len());
+    let mut unresolved = Vec::new();
+    for did in dids {
+        match did_to_key(did) {
+            Some(k) => keys.push(k),
+            None => unresolved.push(did.clone()),
+        }
+    }
+    if unresolved.is_empty() {
+        Ok(keys)
+    } else {
+        Err(unresolved)
+    }
+}
+
+/// What to do with a single withheld blob, decided without any DB or IO so the
+/// fail-closed invariant (#47) is unit-testable in isolation.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+enum SealPlan {
+    /// An existing envelope already covers exactly this recipient set; nothing to do.
+    SkipUnchanged,
+    /// No recipient DID resolved to a key, so there is nothing to seal to.
+    SkipNoRecipients,
+    /// At least one recipient DID is unresolvable. Fail closed: never seal to a
+    /// partial set. Carries the unresolvable DIDs for logging.
+    SkipUnresolvable(Vec<String>),
+    /// Seal to `keys` and record coverage under `tag`.
+    Seal {
+        keys: Vec<VerifyingKey>,
+        tag: String,
+    },
+}
+
+/// Decide what to do with one blob given its desired recipient set and the tag
+/// already stored for it (if any). Pure: no DB, no IO.
+///
+/// This is the #47 fail-closed gate in isolation: it returns `Seal` only when
+/// EVERY recipient DID resolves, so no caller can seal to a partial set. A
+/// changed recipient set (different tag) re-seals so a newly added reader can
+/// recover the blob; reader removal is not retroactive (the old envelope is
+/// already public). The comparison is on the opaque node-keyed tag, never the
+/// DID list.
+fn plan_seal(node_seed: &[u8; 32], dids: &BTreeSet<String>, stored_tag: Option<&str>) -> SealPlan {
+    let tag = recipients_tag(node_seed, dids);
+    if stored_tag == Some(tag.as_str()) {
+        return SealPlan::SkipUnchanged;
+    }
+    match resolve_all_recipients(dids) {
+        Ok(keys) if keys.is_empty() => SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients,
+        Ok(keys) => SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag },
+        Err(unresolved) => SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Encrypt and pin every withheld blob. `recipients` maps blob oid -> DID set;
+/// `node_seed` keys the opaque recipients tag. Returns `(oid, cid)` for each blob
+/// actually sealed and recorded this call (the per-push delta), used by Option B3
+/// to anchor a manifest. Recipient identities are never stored or returned.
+pub async fn encrypt_and_pin(
+    ipfs_api: &str,
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    db: &Db,
+    repo_id: &str,
+    node_seed: &[u8; 32],
+    recipients: &HashMap<String, BTreeSet<String>>,
+) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
+    let mut sealed = Vec::new();
+    let mut skipped_unresolvable = 0usize;
+    for (oid, dids) in recipients {
+        // A DB read failure is not a cache miss: re-sealing here would do an
+        // avoidable IPFS write during a partial outage. Skip and retry next push.
+        let stored_tag = match db.encrypted_blob_recipients_tag(repo_id, oid).await {
+            Ok(t) => t,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "recipients_tag lookup failed; skipping reseal");
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+        // Fail closed: plan_seal returns Seal only when every recipient DID
+        // resolves, so we never seal to a partial set and record the full set as
+        // covered (which would permanently lock out the dropped readers, #47).
+        let (keys, tag) = match plan_seal(node_seed, dids, stored_tag.as_deref()) {
+            SealPlan::SkipUnchanged => continue,
+            SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients => {
+                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "no resolvable recipient keys; skipping encrypted pin");
+                continue;
+            }
+            SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved) => {
+                skipped_unresolvable += 1;
+                // DIDs are user-controlled (rule reader_dids); log a bounded
+                // sample, not an unbounded dump. Wording stays neutral about the
+                // cause: a malformed did:key is not DHT-pending and never will
+                // resolve, unlike a did:gitlawb awaiting anchoring.
+                let sample: Vec<&String> = unresolved.iter().take(3).collect();
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    oid = %oid,
+                    unresolved_count = unresolved.len(),
+                    unresolved_sample = ?sample,
+                    "unresolvable recipient DID(s); skipping encrypted pin to avoid sealing to a partial set"
+                );
+                continue;
+            }
+            SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag } => (keys, tag),
+        };
+        let data = match crate::git::store::read_object(repo_path, oid) {
+            Ok(Some((_t, bytes))) => bytes,
+            Ok(None) => {
+                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "git object not found; skipping encrypted pin");
+                continue;
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "read_object failed; skipping encrypted pin");
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+        let envelope = match seal_blob(&data, &keys) {
+            Ok(e) => e,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "seal_blob failed; skipping");
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+        let cid = match crate::ipfs_pin::pin_git_object(ipfs_api, oid, &envelope).await {
+            Ok(c) if !c.is_empty() => c,
+            Ok(_) => {
+                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "pin_git_object returned no cid; skipping");
+                continue;
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "pin_git_object failed; skipping");
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+        if let Err(e) = db.record_encrypted_blob(repo_id, oid, &cid, &tag).await {
+            tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "record_encrypted_blob failed");
+            continue;
+        }
+        sealed.push((oid.clone(), cid.clone()));
+    }
+    // One aggregate signal so a coverage collapse is a single greppable line, not
+    // a per-oid scrape. In a fully-migrated did:gitlawb org every blob skips and
+    // recovery coverage silently drops to zero; this is the operator's cue that
+    // the gap is the deliberate fail-closed posture, not a malfunction.
+    if skipped_unresolvable > 0 {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            sealed = sealed.len(),
+            skipped = skipped_unresolvable,
+            "encrypted-pin coverage reduced: blobs skipped for unresolvable recipients"
+        );
+    }
+    sealed
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+
+    fn did_key(seed: u8) -> String {
+        let vk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[seed; 32]).verifying_key();
+        Did::from_verifying_key(&vk).to_string()
+    }
+
+    // Accepts both `&[String]` (resolve tests, built from `did_key`) and
+    // `&[&str]` (tag tests, built from literals).
+    fn set<S: AsRef<str>>(dids: &[S]) -> BTreeSet<String> {
+        dids.iter().map(|s| s.as_ref().to_string()).collect()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn all_did_key_recipients_resolve() {
+        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2)]);
+        let keys = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect("all did:key resolve");
+        assert_eq!(keys.len(), 2);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn mixed_set_with_did_gitlawb_fails_closed() {
+        // Core #47 regression: a resolvable subset must never yield a sealable
+        // key set. Two did:key plus one did:gitlawb -> Err naming only the
+        // unresolvable DID.
+        let gitlawb = Did::gitlawb("zSomeDhtKey").to_string();
+        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2), gitlawb.clone()]);
+        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("must fail closed");
+        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![gitlawb]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn did_web_recipient_fails_closed() {
+        let web = Did::web("example.com").to_string();
+        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), web.clone()]);
+        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("did:web cannot resolve locally");
+        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![web]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn malformed_did_key_fails_closed() {
+        // The third state: not a method-resolution gap but a permanently broken
+        // did:key (invalid multibase). Must also fail closed.
+        let broken = "did:key:z!!!invalid".to_string();
+        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), broken.clone()]);
+        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("malformed did:key fails");
+        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![broken]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn empty_set_resolves_to_empty_keys() {
+        let dids = BTreeSet::new();
+        let keys = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect("empty set is not an error");
+        assert!(keys.is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn single_unresolvable_did_returns_that_did() {
+        let gitlawb = Did::gitlawb("zOnlyOne").to_string();
+        let dids: BTreeSet<String> = [gitlawb.clone()].into_iter().collect();
+        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("must fail closed");
+        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![gitlawb]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tag_is_order_insensitive() {
+        let seed = [7u8; 32];
+        let a = recipients_tag(&seed, &set(&["did:key:zA", "did:key:zB"]));
+        let b = recipients_tag(&seed, &set(&["did:key:zB", "did:key:zA"]));
+        assert_eq!(a, b);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tag_differs_for_different_sets() {
+        let seed = [7u8; 32];
+        let a = recipients_tag(&seed, &set(&["did:key:zA"]));
+        let b = recipients_tag(&seed, &set(&["did:key:zA", "did:key:zB"]));
+        assert_ne!(a, b);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tag_is_keyed_by_node_seed() {
+        let dids = set(&["did:key:zA", "did:key:zB"]);
+        let a = recipients_tag(&[1u8; 32], &dids);
+        let b = recipients_tag(&[2u8; 32], &dids);
+        assert_ne!(
+            a, b,
+            "tag must depend on the node seed, not be a plain hash"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // plan_seal is the seal/skip decision `encrypt_and_pin` acts on. Testing it
+    // directly pins the #47 fail-closed invariant at the function that owns it,
+    // which a unit test of `resolve_all_recipients` alone cannot do (it can't
+    // catch the caller falling through to a partial seal).
+    const SEED: [u8; 32] = [9u8; 32];
+
+    #[test]
+    fn plan_seal_seals_when_all_recipients_resolve() {
+        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2)]);
+        match plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, None) {
+            SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag } => {
+                assert_eq!(keys.len(), 2, "must seal to the full recipient set");
+                assert_eq!(
+                    tag,
+                    recipients_tag(&SEED, &dids),
+                    "records the full-set tag"
+                );
+            }
+            other => panic!("expected Seal, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn plan_seal_fails_closed_on_any_unresolvable_recipient() {
+        // The #47 invariant at the decision boundary: one unresolvable DID among
+        // resolvable ones must NOT yield a Seal (which would seal a partial set).
+        let gitlawb = Did::gitlawb("zPending").to_string();
+        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2), gitlawb.clone()]);
+        match plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, None) {
+            SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved) => assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![gitlawb]),
+            other => panic!("must fail closed, never seal a partial set; got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn plan_seal_skips_empty_recipient_set() {
+        let dids = BTreeSet::new();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, None),
+            SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn plan_seal_skips_when_tag_unchanged() {
+        let dids = set(&[did_key(1)]);
+        let stored = recipients_tag(&SEED, &dids);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, Some(&stored)),
+            SealPlan::SkipUnchanged
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn plan_seal_reseals_when_recipient_set_changed() {
+        // A stored tag for a DIFFERENT set is a miss: a newly added reader must
+        // trigger a re-seal, not be skipped as unchanged.
+        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2)]);
+        let stale = recipients_tag(&SEED, &set(&[did_key(1)]));
+        match plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, Some(&stale)) {
+            SealPlan::Seal { keys, .. } => assert_eq!(keys.len(), 2),
+            other => panic!("changed recipient set must re-seal; got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/error.rs

@@ -23,21 +23,98 @@ pub enum AppError {
     #[allow(dead_code)]
     Forbidden(String),
 
+    #[error("icaptcha proof required: {message}")]
+    IcaptchaProofRequired {
+        message: String,
+        /// iCaptcha service base URL the client should solve against.
+        url: String,
+        /// Minimum proof level this node requires.
+        level: u32,
+    },
+
     #[error("invalid request: {0}")]
     BadRequest(String),
 
+    #[error("too many requests: {0}")]
+    TooManyRequests(String),
+
+    #[error("incomplete: {0}")]
+    Incomplete(String),
+
     #[error("git error: {0}")]
     Git(String),
 
+    #[error("git service timed out: {0}")]
+    Timeout(String),
+
     #[error("database error: {0}")]
     Db(#[from] sqlx::Error),
 
     #[error("internal error: {0}")]
-    Internal(#[from] anyhow::Error),
+    Internal(anyhow::Error),
+}
+
+/// Shared error code/message for "the database is unreachable", also used by
+/// the degraded startup server (main.rs) and the readiness probe (server.rs)
+/// so clients see one vocabulary for the condition.
+pub const DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE: &str = "db_unavailable";
+pub const DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE: &str = "database is temporarily unavailable";
+
+/// Connection-level sqlx failures that mean the database is unreachable right
+/// now (retryable, 503), as opposed to server-reported query errors.
+fn db_unavailable(e: &sqlx::Error) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        e,
+        sqlx::Error::PoolTimedOut
+            | sqlx::Error::PoolClosed
+            | sqlx::Error::Io(_)
+            | sqlx::Error::Tls(_)
+    )
+}
+
+/// The db layer returns `anyhow::Result`, so sqlx errors reach handlers inside
+/// anyhow chains. Downcast them back out so the status mapping below can see
+/// them — without this, every database outage surfaces as a 500 instead of a
+/// 503. anyhow preserves downcastability through `.context()` layers.
+impl From<anyhow::Error> for AppError {
+    fn from(err: anyhow::Error) -> Self {
+        match err.downcast::<sqlx::Error>() {
+            Ok(sql) => AppError::Db(sql),
+            Err(err) => AppError::Internal(err),
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 impl IntoResponse for AppError {
     fn into_response(self) -> Response {
+        // iCaptcha challenges carry structured discovery so clients don't have to
+        // scrape the message: the service URL and required level are returned as
+        // both JSON fields and `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` headers
+        // (mirroring the header-bearing `human_detected` response in auth/mod.rs).
+        if let AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
+            message,
+            url,
+            level,
+        } = &self
+        {
+            use axum::http::HeaderValue;
+            let body = Json(json!({
+                "error": "icaptcha_proof_required",
+                "message": message,
+                "icaptcha_url": url,
+                "required_level": level,
+            }));
+            let mut resp = (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, body).into_response();
+            let headers = resp.headers_mut();
+            if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(url) {
+                headers.insert("x-icaptcha-url", v);
+            }
+            if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(&level.to_string()) {
+                headers.insert("x-icaptcha-level", v);
+            }
+            return resp;
+        }
+
         let (status, code, message) = match &self {
             AppError::RepoNotFound(r) => (
                 StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
@@ -52,8 +129,24 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
             AppError::NotFound(msg) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Unauthorized(msg) => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "not_an_agent", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Forbidden(msg) => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "forbidden", msg.clone()),
+            // IcaptchaProofRequired is handled above (it carries extra headers/fields).
+            AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired { .. } => unreachable!("handled before this match"),
             AppError::BadRequest(msg) => (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "bad_request", msg.clone()),
+            AppError::TooManyRequests(msg) => {
+                (StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "rate_limited", msg.clone())
+            }
+            AppError::Incomplete(msg) => {
+                (StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY, "incomplete", msg.clone())
+            }
             AppError::Git(msg) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "git_error", msg.clone()),
+            // 504, distinct from the 500 git_error and from the read-gate's 404 /
+            // the auth 401, so the client can tell a deadline from a failure.
+            AppError::Timeout(msg) => (StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT, "git_timeout", msg.clone()),
+            AppError::Db(e) if db_unavailable(e) => (
+                StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+                DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
+                DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE.into(),
+            ),
             AppError::Db(e) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "db_error", e.to_string()),
             AppError::Internal(e) => (
                 StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
@@ -72,3 +165,21 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
 }
 
 pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, AppError>;
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn timeout_maps_to_504_distinct_from_git_500() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            AppError::Timeout("x".into()).into_response().status(),
+            StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT
+        );
+        // Guard against a swap with the generic git failure (500).
+        assert_eq!(
+            AppError::Git("x".into()).into_response().status(),
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/issues.rs

@@ -23,13 +23,18 @@ pub fn create_issue(repo_path: &Path, issue_id: &str, json: &str) -> Result<()>
 
     use std::io::Write;
     let mut child = hash_output;
-    if let Some(stdin) = child.stdin.take() {
-        let mut stdin = stdin;
-        stdin
-            .write_all(json.as_bytes())
-            .context("failed to write to git hash-object stdin")?;
-    }
+    // Write the blob to stdin, but always reap the child afterward even if the
+    // write fails, so a stdin-write error can't drop the Child unwaited and leak
+    // a zombie (#53).
+    let write_result = match child.stdin.take() {
+        Some(mut stdin) => stdin.write_all(json.as_bytes()),
+        None => Err(std::io::Error::new(
+            std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
+            "git hash-object stdin unavailable",
+        )),
+    };
     let output = child.wait_with_output().context("git hash-object failed")?;
+    write_result.context("failed to write to git hash-object stdin")?;
 
     if !output.status.success() {
         let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/mod.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 pub mod issues;
+pub mod push_delta;
 pub mod repo_store;
 pub mod smart_http;
 pub mod store;
 pub mod tigris;
+pub mod visibility_pack;

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/push_delta.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,663 @@
+//! Push-delta object enumeration for the IPFS/Pinata pin path.
+//!
+//! The pin path needs the set of git objects to consider for pinning after a
+//! push. Historically both pin functions enumerated the *whole* repo
+//! (`git cat-file --batch-all-objects`) on every push, so cost scaled with
+//! repo size rather than push size (finding N16). This module computes the
+//! per-push *delta* instead — the objects a push introduced — and keeps the
+//! whole-repo lister for the reconciliation sweep and the fail-closed fallback.
+//!
+//! ## Correctness framing (do not confuse with the #84 withholding direction)
+//!
+//! The pin enumeration is part of the *exposure* set, not the withheld filter.
+//! On the *delta* path, narrowing per push only *shrinks* what is pinned, so it
+//! cannot create an under-withholding leak — the reachable-only withheld filter
+//! (`visibility_pack`) still subtracts from the smaller set we feed it. The only
+//! risk there is *under-pinning* (a durability gap) the sweep backstops.
+//!
+//! The *full-scan* path is different: `list_all_objects` includes dangling
+//! objects the reachable withheld set never classified, so subtracting that set
+//! is not enough — a dangling private blob would slip through (#99). The caller
+//! signals a full scan via [`PinCandidateSet::full_scan`] and must then apply
+//! the fail-closed blob filter (`visibility_pack::replicable_objects_fail_closed`)
+//! instead of the plain reachable-only subtraction.
+//!
+//! Because the pin candidate set needs only the OID *set* (never the per-path
+//! information the withheld classifier needs), `git rev-list --objects
+//! --no-object-names` is safe here. The "rev-list reports one path per object"
+//! trap from #84 applies only to `visibility_pack`'s per-path `ls-tree` walk.
+
+use std::collections::HashSet;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::process::Command;
+
+use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
+
+/// Env var that forces the push path to always full-scan, bypassing the delta
+/// optimization (KTD7 kill-switch). Reuses the already-tested fallback branch
+/// rather than introducing a second enumeration path. Does not gate the sweep.
+const FORCE_FULL_SCAN_ENV: &str = "GITLAWB_PIN_FORCE_FULLSCAN";
+
+/// The objects a push introduced, or a signal that the delta could not be
+/// computed safely and the caller should fall back to a full scan.
+///
+/// Three-valued by design: `Delta(vec![])` (a no-op push — pin nothing) is a
+/// *different* fact from `FullScanRequired` (could not compute — fall back),
+/// and they drive different actions.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum PinCandidates {
+    /// Objects reachable from the new tips but not the old tips.
+    Delta(Vec<String>),
+    /// The delta is not safe to use; the caller must enumerate the whole repo
+    /// with [`list_all_objects`] instead. Returned on a non-commit tip, any git
+    /// error, or the force-full-scan kill-switch.
+    FullScanRequired,
+}
+
+/// Resolve the set of objects introduced by a push from its ref updates.
+///
+/// `new_tips` / `old_tips` are the non-zero new/old SHAs of the push's ref
+/// updates (the caller strips the all-zeros create/delete sentinel). Keeping
+/// the helper on plain SHA slices (not the `api` `RefUpdate` type) keeps it
+/// unit-testable without the HTTP layer.
+///
+/// Fail-closed: any condition where the introduced set cannot be safely
+/// determined returns [`PinCandidates::FullScanRequired`] rather than a partial
+/// set, so the caller full-scans instead of silently under-pinning.
+pub fn resolve_push_delta(repo_path: &Path, new_tips: &[&str], old_tips: &[&str]) -> PinCandidates {
+    // KTD7 kill-switch: force the (already-tested) full-scan fallback. The env
+    // read is split out from the pure logic so the resolver stays unit-testable
+    // without touching process-global state.
+    resolve_push_delta_inner(repo_path, new_tips, old_tips, force_full_scan())
+}
+
+/// Whether the force-full-scan kill-switch env var is set.
+fn force_full_scan() -> bool {
+    std::env::var_os(FORCE_FULL_SCAN_ENV).is_some()
+}
+
+// Intentionally private but reachable from the test module (via `use super::*`)
+// so the kill-switch can be exercised without mutating process-global env.
+fn resolve_push_delta_inner(
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    new_tips: &[&str],
+    old_tips: &[&str],
+    force_full_scan: bool,
+) -> PinCandidates {
+    if force_full_scan {
+        tracing::debug!("{FORCE_FULL_SCAN_ENV} set — forcing full scan");
+        return PinCandidates::FullScanRequired;
+    }
+
+    // A push that only deleted refs introduces no objects.
+    if new_tips.is_empty() {
+        return PinCandidates::Delta(Vec::new());
+    }
+
+    // Ref-type guard (the fail-closed mechanism). `git rev-list` does NOT error
+    // on a non-commit tip — a blob/tree/tag-of-non-commit all exit 0 and walk
+    // the object — so the rev-list exit code cannot catch this. Check each new
+    // tip's *fully-peeled* type with `cat-file -t '<sha>^{}'` (recursive peel:
+    // tag-of-commit -> commit, tag-of-tree -> tree, tag-of-tag-of-commit ->
+    // commit). Bare `cat-file -t` returns `tag` for an annotated tag, and
+    // `for-each-ref %(*objecttype)` peels only one level — neither is correct.
+    for tip in new_tips {
+        match peeled_object_type(repo_path, tip) {
+            Some(t) if t == "commit" => {}
+            other => {
+                tracing::debug!(
+                    tip = %tip,
+                    peeled_type = ?other,
+                    "push tip is not a commit (or type lookup failed) — forcing full scan"
+                );
+                return PinCandidates::FullScanRequired;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    match rev_list_delta(repo_path, new_tips, old_tips) {
+        Ok(oids) => PinCandidates::Delta(oids),
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::debug!(err = %e, "push-delta rev-list failed — forcing full scan");
+            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Return the fully-peeled object type of `sha` (e.g. `commit`, `tree`,
+/// `blob`), or `None` if the object is missing/unpeelable or git errored.
+fn peeled_object_type(repo_path: &Path, sha: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let output = Command::new("git")
+        .args(["cat-file", "-t", &format!("{sha}^{{}}")])
+        .current_dir(repo_path)
+        .output()
+        .ok()?;
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim().to_string())
+}
+
+/// Run `git rev-list --objects --no-object-names <new> --not <old>` and return
+/// the bare OID set. Decides on `status.success()` *before* parsing stdout, so
+/// a walk that prints a valid prefix then errors mid-walk is discarded.
+fn rev_list_delta(repo_path: &Path, new_tips: &[&str], old_tips: &[&str]) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+    let mut args: Vec<&str> = vec!["rev-list", "--objects", "--no-object-names"];
+    args.extend_from_slice(new_tips);
+    if !old_tips.is_empty() {
+        args.push("--not");
+        args.extend_from_slice(old_tips);
+    }
+
+    let output = Command::new("git")
+        .args(&args)
+        .current_dir(repo_path)
+        .output()
+        .context("failed to run git rev-list for push delta")?;
+
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
+        bail!("git rev-list failed: {stderr}");
+    }
+
+    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
+    Ok(stdout
+        .lines()
+        .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
+        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
+        .collect())
+}
+
+/// List every object in the repository via
+/// `git cat-file --batch-all-objects --batch-check='%(objectname)'`.
+///
+/// This is the whole-repo enumeration the push path falls back to and the
+/// reconciliation sweep relies on. It returns *all* objects (including
+/// unreachable/dangling ones), which is what the sweep needs to catch
+/// stragglers — do not swap it for a reachability walk.
+pub fn list_all_objects(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+    let output = Command::new("git")
+        .args([
+            "cat-file",
+            "--batch-all-objects",
+            "--batch-check=%(objectname)",
+        ])
+        .current_dir(repo_path)
+        .output()
+        .context("failed to run git cat-file")?;
+
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
+        bail!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}");
+    }
+
+    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
+    Ok(stdout
+        .lines()
+        .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
+        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
+        .collect())
+}
+
+/// Like [`list_all_objects`] but pairs each OID with its object type, via
+/// `--batch-check='%(objectname) %(objecttype)'`. The pin path's fail-closed
+/// filter needs to tell blobs (content, withholdable) from commits/trees
+/// (structural, never withheld) without typing the candidate list itself.
+pub fn list_all_objects_with_type(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>> {
+    let output = Command::new("git")
+        .args([
+            "cat-file",
+            "--batch-all-objects",
+            "--batch-check=%(objectname) %(objecttype)",
+        ])
+        .current_dir(repo_path)
+        .output()
+        .context("failed to run git cat-file")?;
+
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
+        bail!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}");
+    }
+
+    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
+    Ok(stdout
+        .lines()
+        .filter_map(|l| {
+            let mut it = l.split_whitespace();
+            let oid = it.next()?;
+            let ty = it.next()?;
+            Some((oid.to_string(), ty.to_string()))
+        })
+        .collect())
+}
+
+/// Every blob OID in the repo, including unreachable/dangling ones. The
+/// fail-closed pin filter drops any candidate blob absent from the reachable,
+/// visibility-allowed set; a dangling private blob is in this set but not the
+/// allowed set, so it never replicates (#99).
+pub fn all_blob_oids(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<HashSet<String>> {
+    Ok(list_all_objects_with_type(repo_path)?
+        .into_iter()
+        .filter(|(_, ty)| ty == "blob")
+        .map(|(oid, _)| oid)
+        .collect())
+}
+
+/// The pin candidate OIDs for a push plus whether they came from a full-repo
+/// scan. `full_scan` is true when the delta could not be used and the whole
+/// object DB (including dangling objects) was enumerated — the caller must then
+/// apply the fail-closed blob filter, because the reachable-only withheld set
+/// cannot classify dangling blobs (#99).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct PinCandidateSet {
+    pub candidates: Vec<String>,
+    pub full_scan: bool,
+}
+
+/// Resolve the pin candidate OID set for a push, off the async worker.
+///
+/// Runs [`resolve_push_delta`] in `spawn_blocking` (git subprocess) and applies
+/// the full-scan fallback for [`PinCandidates::FullScanRequired`]. Owns the
+/// dispatch so the push call site stays thin and this wiring is unit-testable
+/// without the HTTP layer.
+///
+/// Every degraded path is **logged**, not silent: a full-scan fallback, a
+/// failed full scan, and a panicked blocking task each emit a warning. On a
+/// failed full scan or a task panic the candidate set is empty (pin nothing
+/// this push); that is a durability gap the reconciliation sweep backstops, and
+/// it can never leak because the withheld/fail-closed filter still runs on
+/// whatever set is returned. `full_scan` rides on the returned set so the caller
+/// knows when the dangling-inclusive filter is required.
+pub async fn resolve_candidates_for_push(
+    repo_path: PathBuf,
+    new_tips: Vec<String>,
+    old_tips: Vec<String>,
+) -> PinCandidateSet {
+    tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
+        let new_refs: Vec<&str> = new_tips.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
+        let old_refs: Vec<&str> = old_tips.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
+        match resolve_push_delta(&repo_path, &new_refs, &old_refs) {
+            PinCandidates::Delta(objs) => {
+                tracing::info!(delta = objs.len(), repo = %repo_path.display(), "pin candidate set from push delta");
+                PinCandidateSet { candidates: objs, full_scan: false }
+            }
+            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired => {
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo_path.display(), "pin delta unavailable (non-commit tip, git error, or force-full-scan) — full-scan fallback");
+                match list_all_objects(&repo_path) {
+                    Ok(objs) => PinCandidateSet { candidates: objs, full_scan: true },
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo_path.display(), err = %e, "full-scan fallback failed; pinning nothing this push (reconciliation sweep backstops)");
+                        PinCandidateSet { candidates: Vec::new(), full_scan: false }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap_or_else(|e| {
+        tracing::warn!(err = %e, "pin candidate computation task panicked; pinning nothing this push (reconciliation sweep backstops)");
+        PinCandidateSet { candidates: Vec::new(), full_scan: false }
+    })
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::collections::HashSet;
+    use tempfile::TempDir;
+
+    /// Minimal git helper for building test repos.
+    struct Repo {
+        _td: TempDir,
+        path: std::path::PathBuf,
+    }
+
+    impl Repo {
+        fn new() -> Self {
+            let td = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+            let path = td.path().to_path_buf();
+            let r = Repo { _td: td, path };
+            r.git(&["init", "-q", "-b", "main"]);
+            r.git(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
+            r.git(&["config", "user.name", "t"]);
+            r
+        }
+
+        fn git(&self, args: &[&str]) -> String {
+            let out = Command::new("git")
+                .args(args)
+                .current_dir(&self.path)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            assert!(
+                out.status.success(),
+                "git {args:?} failed: {}",
+                String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
+            );
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
+        }
+
+        fn commit_file(&self, name: &str, body: &str) -> String {
+            std::fs::write(self.path.join(name), body).unwrap();
+            self.git(&["add", name]);
+            self.git(&["commit", "-qm", &format!("add {name}")]);
+            self.git(&["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+        }
+
+        fn rev(&self, r: &str) -> String {
+            self.git(&["rev-parse", r])
+        }
+    }
+
+    const ZERO: &str = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
+
+    fn delta(c: PinCandidates) -> Vec<String> {
+        match c {
+            PinCandidates::Delta(v) => v,
+            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired => panic!("expected Delta, got FullScanRequired"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn single_new_commit_delta_excludes_preexisting_objects() {
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        let c2 = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
+        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&c2], &[&c1]))
+            .into_iter()
+            .collect();
+        // The new blob b.txt and commit c2 are in the delta; the old blob a.txt
+        // and commit c1 are not.
+        let new_blob = repo.rev("HEAD:b.txt");
+        let old_blob = repo.rev(&format!("{c1}:a.txt"));
+        assert!(got.contains(&c2), "new commit in delta");
+        assert!(got.contains(&new_blob), "new blob in delta");
+        assert!(!got.contains(&c1), "old commit excluded");
+        assert!(!got.contains(&old_blob), "old blob excluded");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn created_ref_is_superset_of_new_objects() {
+        // A created ref (old tip all-zeros, filtered out by caller) with no old
+        // tips walks everything reachable from the new tip — a superset of the
+        // genuinely new objects, never fewer.
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&c1], &[]))
+            .into_iter()
+            .collect();
+        assert!(got.contains(&c1));
+        assert!(got.contains(&repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt")));
+        assert!(got.contains(&repo.rev("HEAD^{tree}")));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn force_push_delta_is_objects_unique_to_new_tip() {
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        let base = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        let old_tip = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
+        // Rewrite history: reset to base, commit a different file.
+        repo.git(&["reset", "-q", "--hard", &base]);
+        let new_tip = repo.commit_file("c.txt", "three\n");
+        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&new_tip], &[&old_tip]))
+            .into_iter()
+            .collect();
+        assert!(got.contains(&new_tip), "new tip in delta");
+        assert!(got.contains(&repo.rev(&format!("{new_tip}:c.txt"))));
+        // No error; force-push computes new-minus-old cleanly.
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn deleted_ref_only_yields_empty_delta_without_git() {
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        // All updates were deletions => new_tips empty after the caller strips zeros.
+        assert_eq!(
+            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[], &[ZERO]),
+            PinCandidates::Delta(Vec::new())
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blob_tip_forces_full_scan() {
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        let blob = repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt");
+        assert_eq!(
+            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&blob], &[]),
+            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired,
+            "a blob tip must force full scan (rev-list would exit 0 and walk it)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tree_tip_forces_full_scan() {
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        let tree = repo.rev("HEAD^{tree}");
+        assert_eq!(
+            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&tree], &[]),
+            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn annotated_tag_of_tree_forces_full_scan() {
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        let tree = repo.rev("HEAD^{tree}");
+        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "treetag", "-m", "x", &tree]);
+        let tag = repo.rev("treetag");
+        assert_eq!(
+            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&tag], &[]),
+            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired,
+            "annotated tag peeling to a tree must force full scan"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tag_of_tag_of_noncommit_forces_full_scan() {
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        let blob = repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt");
+        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "t1", "-m", "x", &blob]);
+        let t1 = repo.rev("t1");
+        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "t2", "-m", "x", &t1]);
+        let t2 = repo.rev("t2");
+        assert_eq!(
+            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&t2], &[]),
+            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn annotated_tag_of_commit_proceeds_as_delta() {
+        // DISCRIMINATING positive-path regression: an annotated tag whose peeled
+        // target is a commit must return Delta, not FullScanRequired. A
+        // FullScanRequired here means the guard used bare `cat-file -t` (returns
+        // `tag`) instead of the `^{}` peel.
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "rel", "-m", "release", &c1]);
+        let tag = repo.rev("rel");
+        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&tag], &[]))
+            .into_iter()
+            .collect();
+        assert!(
+            got.contains(&c1),
+            "peeled commit's objects are in the delta"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tag_of_tag_of_commit_proceeds_as_delta() {
+        // Deep-peel positive path: tag -> tag -> commit must recurse to `commit`
+        // via `^{}` and return Delta. Complements tag_of_tag_of_noncommit (which
+        // forces full scan) — guards against a regression in peel depth that
+        // would silently downgrade a legitimate nested-tag push to full scan.
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "t1", "-m", "x", &c1]);
+        let t1 = repo.rev("t1");
+        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "t2", "-m", "x", &t1]);
+        let t2 = repo.rev("t2");
+        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&t2], &[]))
+            .into_iter()
+            .collect();
+        assert!(
+            got.contains(&c1),
+            "peeled commit's objects are in the delta"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn resolve_candidates_for_push_returns_delta() {
+        // The extracted wiring returns the per-push delta on the happy path.
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        let c2 = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
+        let set =
+            resolve_candidates_for_push(repo.path.clone(), vec![c2.clone()], vec![c1.clone()])
+                .await;
+        assert!(!set.full_scan, "happy-path delta is not a full scan");
+        let got: HashSet<String> = set.candidates.into_iter().collect();
+        let new_blob = repo.rev("HEAD:b.txt");
+        assert!(
+            got.contains(&c2) && got.contains(&new_blob),
+            "new objects pinned"
+        );
+        assert!(!got.contains(&c1), "old commit excluded from delta");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn resolve_candidates_for_push_falls_back_to_full_scan_on_noncommit_tip() {
+        // A non-commit tip forces FullScanRequired, and the wiring resolves that
+        // to the whole-repo list (a superset), never an empty set.
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        let blob = repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt");
+        let all: HashSet<String> = list_all_objects(&repo.path).unwrap().into_iter().collect();
+        let set = resolve_candidates_for_push(repo.path.clone(), vec![blob], vec![]).await;
+        assert!(set.full_scan, "non-commit tip is signalled as a full scan");
+        let got: HashSet<String> = set.candidates.into_iter().collect();
+        assert_eq!(got, all, "non-commit tip falls back to full repo scan");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn missing_oid_tip_forces_full_scan() {
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        let bogus = "deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef";
+        assert_eq!(
+            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[bogus], &[]),
+            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired,
+            "a missing/corrupt tip OID must force full scan"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn present_noncommit_old_tip_is_safe() {
+        // A present-but-non-commit old_sha (a --not arg) must not under-pin:
+        // either rev-list errors (FullScanRequired) or it over-lists (Delta).
+        // Either way the new tip's objects are covered; never fewer.
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        let c2 = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
+        let old_tree = repo.rev(&format!("{c1}^{{tree}}"));
+        let result = resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&c2], &[&old_tree]);
+        match result {
+            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired => {} // safe: caller full-scans
+            PinCandidates::Delta(objs) => {
+                // Safe direction: must still contain the new commit (over-list ok).
+                assert!(objs.contains(&c2), "new tip objects must be covered");
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn multi_ref_push_unions_ranges() {
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        let base = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        // branch1 advances
+        let b1 = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
+        // branch2 from base advances independently
+        repo.git(&["checkout", "-q", "-b", "branch2", &base]);
+        let b2 = repo.commit_file("c.txt", "three\n");
+        let got: HashSet<String> =
+            delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&b1, &b2], &[&base, &base]))
+                .into_iter()
+                .collect();
+        assert!(got.contains(&b1), "branch1 new commit");
+        assert!(got.contains(&b2), "branch2 new commit");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn empty_repo_no_tips_yields_empty_delta() {
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        assert_eq!(
+            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[], &[]),
+            PinCandidates::Delta(Vec::new())
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn force_full_scan_flag_overrides() {
+        // Test the kill-switch via the pure inner fn so we never touch
+        // process-global env (which would race with parallel tests, and is
+        // unsafe in Rust 2024). The public resolve_push_delta wires the env
+        // read into this same flag.
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        assert_eq!(
+            resolve_push_delta_inner(&repo.path, &[&c1], &[], true),
+            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired
+        );
+        // And with the flag off, the same push yields a Delta.
+        assert!(matches!(
+            resolve_push_delta_inner(&repo.path, &[&c1], &[], false),
+            PinCandidates::Delta(_)
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn list_all_objects_returns_full_repo() {
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
+        let all = list_all_objects(&repo.path).unwrap();
+        // 2 commits + 2 trees + 2 blobs = 6 objects.
+        assert_eq!(all.len(), 6, "got: {all:?}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn all_blob_oids_includes_dangling_and_excludes_nonblobs() {
+        // The all-blob universe must include a dangling blob (the #99 hazard) and
+        // exclude commits/trees, so the fail-closed filter can tell a blob from a
+        // structural object without typing the candidate list.
+        let repo = Repo::new();
+        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
+        let reachable_blob = repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt");
+        let tree = repo.rev("HEAD^{tree}");
+        // Write a blob referenced by no tree/commit — dangling.
+        std::fs::write(repo.path.join("orphan.bin"), b"dangling\n").unwrap();
+        let dangling = repo.git(&["hash-object", "-w", "orphan.bin"]);
+
+        let blobs = all_blob_oids(&repo.path).unwrap();
+        assert!(blobs.contains(&reachable_blob), "reachable blob present");
+        assert!(
+            blobs.contains(&dangling),
+            "dangling blob present in the all-blob universe"
+        );
+        assert!(!blobs.contains(&c1), "commit is not a blob");
+        assert!(!blobs.contains(&tree), "tree is not a blob");
+
+        // The typed lister tags each object; spot-check the dangling blob's type.
+        let typed = list_all_objects_with_type(&repo.path).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            typed
+                .iter()
+                .any(|(oid, ty)| oid == &dangling && ty == "blob"),
+            "dangling object is typed as a blob"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/repo_store.rs

@@ -33,6 +33,16 @@ pub struct RepoStore {
 }
 
 impl RepoStore {
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub fn for_testing(repos_dir: PathBuf, pool: PgPool) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            repos_dir,
+            tigris: None,
+            pool,
+            migrated: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(std::collections::HashSet::new())),
+        }
+    }
+
     pub fn new(repos_dir: PathBuf, tigris: Option<TigrisClient>, pool: PgPool) -> Self {
         Self {
             repos_dir,
@@ -120,10 +130,19 @@ impl RepoStore {
         if let Some(ref tigris) = self.tigris {
             if tigris.exists(&owner_slug, repo_name).await.unwrap_or(false) {
                 debug!(repo = %repo_name, "acquire_fresh: downloading latest from tigris");
-                tigris
-                    .download(&owner_slug, repo_name, &local_path)
-                    .await
-                    .context("downloading repo from tigris (fresh)")?;
+                if let Err(e) = tigris.download(&owner_slug, repo_name, &local_path).await {
+                    // The Tigris archive is present (HEAD ok) but unreadable — a
+                    // corrupt/partial upload, or a transient GET failure. If we have a
+                    // valid local copy, proceed with it rather than blocking the write;
+                    // the post-write upload re-syncs (self-heals) Tigris. Only hard-fail
+                    // when there is no local copy to fall back to.
+                    if local_path.exists() {
+                        warn!(repo = %repo_name, err = %e,
+                            "acquire_fresh: tigris download failed — falling back to local copy");
+                        return Ok(local_path);
+                    }
+                    return Err(e).context("downloading repo from tigris (fresh)");
+                }
                 return Ok(local_path);
             }
         }
@@ -164,10 +183,17 @@ impl RepoStore {
         if let Some(ref tigris) = self.tigris {
             if tigris.exists(&owner_slug, repo_name).await.unwrap_or(false) {
                 debug!(repo = %repo_name, "write acquire: downloading latest from tigris");
-                tigris
-                    .download(&owner_slug, repo_name, &local_path)
-                    .await
-                    .context("downloading repo from tigris for write")?;
+                if let Err(e) = tigris.download(&owner_slug, repo_name, &local_path).await {
+                    // Same self-healing fallback as acquire_fresh: a corrupt/unreadable
+                    // Tigris archive must not block a write when a valid local copy
+                    // exists — release(success) will re-upload a good archive.
+                    if local_path.exists() {
+                        warn!(repo = %repo_name, err = %e,
+                            "write acquire: tigris download failed — falling back to local copy");
+                    } else {
+                        return Err(e).context("downloading repo from tigris for write");
+                    }
+                }
             }
         }
 
@@ -338,16 +364,24 @@ impl RepoWriteGuard {
         &self.local_path
     }
 
-    /// Upload to Tigris and release the advisory lock. Call this when the write is done.
-    pub async fn release(self) {
-        // Upload to Tigris
-        if let Some(ref tigris) = self.tigris {
-            if let Err(e) = tigris
-                .upload(&self.owner_slug, &self.repo_name, &self.local_path)
-                .await
-            {
-                warn!(repo = %self.repo_name, err = %e, "failed to upload repo to tigris after write");
+    /// Upload to Tigris (only when the write succeeded) and release the advisory
+    /// lock. Pass `success = false` when the write operation failed — uploading a
+    /// half-applied or otherwise inconsistent repo would propagate corruption to
+    /// Tigris (and to every node that later downloads it). The lock is always
+    /// released regardless, to avoid stale locks blocking future writes.
+    pub async fn release(self, success: bool) {
+        // Upload to Tigris only on success.
+        if success {
+            if let Some(ref tigris) = self.tigris {
+                if let Err(e) = tigris
+                    .upload(&self.owner_slug, &self.repo_name, &self.local_path)
+                    .await
+                {
+                    warn!(repo = %self.repo_name, err = %e, "failed to upload repo to tigris after write");
+                }
             }
+        } else {
+            warn!(repo = %self.repo_name, "write failed — skipping tigris upload to avoid propagating an inconsistent repo");
         }
 
         // Release advisory lock

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/store.rs

@@ -271,9 +271,8 @@ pub struct TreeEntry {
 /// `/ipfs/<cid>` is computed from these same content bytes via
 /// `gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes`.
 ///
-/// Returns `None` if the object does not exist in this repo.
-pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String, Vec<u8>)>> {
-    // First check if the object exists and get its type
+/// Get just the object type. Returns `None` if the object doesn't exist.
+pub fn object_type(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
     let type_output = Command::new("git")
         .args(["cat-file", "-t", sha256_hex])
         .current_dir(repo_path)
@@ -284,13 +283,17 @@ pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String,
         return Ok(None);
     }
 
-    let obj_type = String::from_utf8_lossy(&type_output.stdout)
-        .trim()
-        .to_string();
+    Ok(Some(
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&type_output.stdout)
+            .trim()
+            .to_string(),
+    ))
+}
 
-    // Read the raw content bytes
+/// Read an object's content if its type is already known.
+pub fn read_object_content(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str, obj_type: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let content_output = Command::new("git")
-        .args(["cat-file", &obj_type, sha256_hex])
+        .args(["cat-file", obj_type, sha256_hex])
         .current_dir(repo_path)
         .output()
         .context("failed to run git cat-file <type>")?;
@@ -300,7 +303,24 @@ pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String,
         bail!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}");
     }
 
-    Ok(Some((obj_type, content_output.stdout)))
+    Ok(content_output.stdout)
+}
+
+/// Read a git object by its SHA-256 hex object ID.
+///
+/// Returns `(object_type, content_bytes)` where `content_bytes` is the raw
+/// object content (without the git framing header). The CID served over
+/// `/ipfs/<cid>` is computed from these same content bytes via
+/// `gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes`.
+///
+/// Returns `None` if the object does not exist in this repo.
+pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String, Vec<u8>)>> {
+    let obj_type = match object_type(repo_path, sha256_hex)? {
+        Some(t) => t,
+        None => return Ok(None),
+    };
+    let content = read_object_content(repo_path, sha256_hex, &obj_type)?;
+    Ok(Some((obj_type, content)))
 }
 
 /// Get the diff between two branches: changes on source_branch not in target_branch.
@@ -314,6 +334,39 @@ pub fn branch_diff(repo_path: &Path, target_branch: &str, source_branch: &str) -
     Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).to_string())
 }
 
+/// The repo-relative paths changed by `git diff target...source` (the same range
+/// as `branch_diff`). Used to enforce per-path visibility on a PR diff: if the
+/// caller cannot read one of these paths, the diff is withheld.
+pub fn branch_diff_names(
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    target_branch: &str,
+    source_branch: &str,
+) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+    let output = Command::new("git")
+        .args([
+            "diff",
+            "--name-only",
+            "-z",
+            &format!("{target_branch}...{source_branch}"),
+        ])
+        .current_dir(repo_path)
+        .output()
+        .context("failed to run git diff --name-only")?;
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
+        bail!("git diff --name-only failed: {stderr}");
+    }
+    // Split on NUL (`-z`) so paths containing newlines keep their exact bytes;
+    // `--name-only` without `-z` would quote/escape such paths and they would no
+    // longer match the visibility globs in get_pr_diff, leaking the diff.
+    Ok(output
+        .stdout
+        .split(|b| *b == b'\0')
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        .map(|s| String::from_utf8_lossy(s).into_owned())
+        .collect())
+}
+
 /// Merge source_branch into target_branch in a bare repo using a temporary worktree.
 /// Returns the new merge commit hash.
 pub fn merge_branch(
@@ -399,3 +452,53 @@ pub fn repo_disk_path(repos_dir: &Path, owner_did: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Pat
     let owner_slug = owner_did.replace([':', '/'], "_");
     repos_dir.join(owner_slug).join(format!("{repo_name}.git"))
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::branch_diff_names;
+    use std::path::Path;
+    use std::process::Command;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn branch_diff_names_lists_changed_paths() {
+        let td = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let work: &Path = td.path();
+        let g = |args: &[&str]| {
+            assert!(Command::new("git")
+                .args(args)
+                .current_dir(work)
+                .status()
+                .unwrap()
+                .success());
+        };
+        g(&["init", "-q"]);
+        g(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
+        g(&["config", "user.name", "t"]);
+        std::fs::write(work.join("base.txt"), b"base\n").unwrap();
+        g(&["add", "."]);
+        g(&["commit", "-qm", "base"]);
+        let main = {
+            let o = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD"])
+                .current_dir(work)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stdout).trim().to_string()
+        };
+        g(&["checkout", "-q", "-b", "feature"]);
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(work.join("secret")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(work.join("secret/x.txt"), b"secret\n").unwrap();
+        g(&["add", "."]);
+        g(&["commit", "-qm", "feat"]);
+
+        let names = branch_diff_names(work, &main, "feature").unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            names.iter().any(|p| p == "secret/x.txt"),
+            "expected secret/x.txt in changed paths, got {names:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !names.iter().any(|p| p == "base.txt"),
+            "unchanged file must not appear: {names:?}"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/tigris.rs

@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@
 //! Repos are stored as `repos/v1/{owner_slug}/{repo_name}.tar.zst` — a
 //! zstd-compressed tar archive of the bare repo directory.
 
-use std::path::Path;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, OnceLock};
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use aws_sdk_s3::Client as S3Client;
@@ -110,8 +112,7 @@ impl TigrisClient {
             .collect()
             .await
             .context("reading tigris response body")?
-            .into_bytes()
-            .to_vec();
+            .into_bytes();
 
         // Extract tar.zst to local path
         tokio::task::spawn_blocking({
@@ -156,17 +157,70 @@ fn compress_repo(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     Ok(compressed)
 }
 
-/// Decompress a tar.zst byte vector into a local directory.
-fn decompress_repo(data: &[u8], local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
-    // Ensure parent directory exists
-    if let Some(parent) = local_path.parent() {
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).context("creating parent dir")?;
-    }
-    std::fs::create_dir_all(local_path).context("creating repo dir")?;
+/// Per-repo-path lock serializing the publish (swap-into-place) step of
+/// `decompress_repo`. Concurrent extractions unpack into isolated temp dirs in
+/// parallel, but the final `remove_dir_all` + `rename` must not interleave for
+/// the same `local_path`, or they race to a nondeterministic overwrite/failure.
+fn publish_lock(local_path: &Path) -> Arc<Mutex<()>> {
+    // KNOWN LIMITATION: this map is never evicted — one (PathBuf, Arc<Mutex>)
+    // entry accrues per distinct repo path for the process lifetime. Bounded by
+    // the number of repos a node hosts, so it's negligible for normal use, but
+    // high-volume/churning deployments may want LRU or weak-ref eviction here.
+    static LOCKS: OnceLock<Mutex<HashMap<PathBuf, Arc<Mutex<()>>>>> = OnceLock::new();
+    let locks = LOCKS.get_or_init(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
+    let mut map = locks.lock().expect("publish lock map poisoned");
+    map.entry(local_path.to_path_buf())
+        .or_insert_with(|| Arc::new(Mutex::new(())))
+        .clone()
+}
 
-    let decoder = zstd::stream::Decoder::new(data)?;
-    let mut archive = tar::Archive::new(decoder);
-    archive.unpack(local_path).context("unpacking tar.zst")?;
+/// Decompress a tar.zst byte vector into a local directory.
+///
+/// Extraction is atomic with respect to `local_path`: the archive is unpacked
+/// into a sibling temp directory first, and only swapped into place once it
+/// fully succeeds. A corrupt or truncated archive therefore can never clobber a
+/// good existing copy at `local_path` — on failure we discard the temp dir and
+/// leave `local_path` exactly as it was.
+fn decompress_repo(data: &[u8], local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+    let parent = local_path.parent().context("repo path has no parent")?;
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).context("creating parent dir")?;
+
+    let file_name = local_path
+        .file_name()
+        .context("repo path has no file name")?
+        .to_string_lossy();
+    // Unique per-extraction temp dir: a fixed name would let two concurrent
+    // extractions of the same repo share one dir and clobber each other's
+    // in-progress unpack. A fresh UUID also means it can't collide with a
+    // leftover dir from a previously-interrupted run.
+    let tmp_dir = parent.join(format!(".{file_name}.tmp-extract.{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
+
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(&tmp_dir).context("creating temp extract dir")?;
+
+    // Unpack into the temp dir; on any failure, clean up and bail without
+    // touching local_path.
+    let unpack = (|| -> Result<()> {
+        let decoder = zstd::stream::Decoder::new(data)?;
+        let mut archive = tar::Archive::new(decoder);
+        archive.unpack(&tmp_dir).context("unpacking tar.zst")?;
+        Ok(())
+    })();
+    if let Err(e) = unpack {
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp_dir);
+        return Err(e);
+    }
+
+    // Swap the freshly-extracted repo into place. rename within the same parent
+    // is effectively atomic, but most platforms refuse to rename onto a
+    // non-empty dir, so remove the old copy first. Serialize this per repo path:
+    // concurrent extractions unpack into isolated temp dirs, but their swaps
+    // must not interleave or they race to a nondeterministic overwrite/failure.
+    let lock = publish_lock(local_path);
+    let _publish = lock.lock().expect("publish lock poisoned");
+    if local_path.exists() {
+        std::fs::remove_dir_all(local_path).context("removing stale repo dir")?;
+    }
+    std::fs::rename(&tmp_dir, local_path).context("swapping extracted repo into place")?;
 
     Ok(())
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/mutation.rs

@@ -3,11 +3,21 @@ use chrono::Utc;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
+use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::db::{AgentTask, Db};
 use crate::state::TaskEventBroadcast;
 
 use super::types::{AgentTaskType, CreateTaskInput, FinishTaskInput};
 
+/// The verified signer DID for this request, or an auth error (N2). The DID is
+/// attached request-scoped by the `/graphql` `optional_signature` layer; its
+/// absence means the request was unsigned, so every mutation rejects.
+fn require_signer<'a>(ctx: &'a Context<'_>) -> Result<&'a str> {
+    ctx.data::<AuthenticatedDid>()
+        .map(|d| d.0.as_str())
+        .map_err(|_| async_graphql::Error::new("authentication required"))
+}
+
 pub struct MutationRoot;
 
 #[Object]
@@ -18,6 +28,13 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         delegator_did: String,
         input: CreateTaskInput,
     ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
+        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
+        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &delegator_did) {
+            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
+                "delegator_did must be the authenticated signer",
+            ));
+        }
+        let delegator_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
         let task = AgentTask {
@@ -47,6 +64,13 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         id: String,
         assignee_did: String,
     ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
+        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
+        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &assignee_did) {
+            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
+                "assignee_did must be the authenticated signer",
+            ));
+        }
+        let assignee_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
         let task = db
@@ -70,8 +94,27 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         by_did: String,
         input: FinishTaskInput,
     ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
+        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
+        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &by_did) {
+            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
+                "by_did must be the authenticated signer",
+            ));
+        }
+        let by_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
+        // Authorize the actor: binding by_did to the signer is necessary but not
+        // sufficient — only the task's assignee may finish it.
+        let existing = db
+            .get_task(&id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?
+            .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
+        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()) {
+            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
+                "only the task assignee can complete it",
+            ));
+        }
         let task = db
             .finish_task(&id, "completed", input.result.as_deref())
             .await
@@ -93,8 +136,26 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         by_did: String,
         input: FinishTaskInput,
     ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
+        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
+        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &by_did) {
+            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
+                "by_did must be the authenticated signer",
+            ));
+        }
+        let by_did = caller.to_string();
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
+        // Authorize the actor: only the task's assignee may fail it.
+        let existing = db
+            .get_task(&id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?
+            .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
+        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()) {
+            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
+                "only the task assignee can fail it",
+            ));
+        }
         let reason = input.reason.unwrap_or_default();
         let task = db
             .finish_task(&id, "failed", Some(&reason))
@@ -110,3 +171,123 @@ impl MutationRoot {
         Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
+    use async_graphql::{Request, Response};
+    use sqlx::PgPool;
+
+    fn errors(resp: &Response) -> String {
+        resp.errors
+            .iter()
+            .map(|e| e.message.clone())
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+            .join("; ")
+    }
+
+    /// N2: GraphQL mutations require a verified signer and bind the acting DID to
+    /// it. Unsigned is rejected; a signer other than the claimed actor is
+    /// rejected; the matching signer passes the auth gate.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn mutation_requires_and_binds_signer(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
+        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
+        let assignee = "did:key:zASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        let q = format!(
+            r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "no-such-task", assigneeDid: "{assignee}") {{ id }} }}"#
+        );
+
+        // 1. Unsigned → rejected before any DB work.
+        let resp = schema.execute(Request::new(&q)).await;
+        assert!(
+            errors(&resp).contains("authentication required"),
+            "unsigned mutation must be rejected: {}",
+            errors(&resp)
+        );
+
+        // 2. Signed as someone other than the claimed assignee → rejected.
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(
+                "did:key:zOTHERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB".into(),
+            )))
+            .await;
+        assert!(
+            errors(&resp).contains("authenticated signer"),
+            "DID mismatch must be rejected: {}",
+            errors(&resp)
+        );
+
+        // 3. Signed as the claimed assignee → passes the auth gate (any remaining
+        //    error is the missing task, not an auth error).
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        let errs = errors(&resp);
+        assert!(
+            !errs.contains("authentication required") && !errs.contains("authenticated signer"),
+            "matching signer must pass the auth gate: {errs}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Adversarial-review GATE-1 (GraphQL): completing a task requires being its
+    /// assignee, not merely signing as the by_did you pass. A signer who is not
+    /// the assignee is rejected even though the by_did binding passes; the
+    /// assignee completes.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn complete_task_requires_assignee(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
+        let assignee = "did:key:zGQLASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        let stranger = "did:key:zGQLSTRANGERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+        let task = crate::db::AgentTask {
+            id: "task-g".into(),
+            repo_id: None,
+            kind: "build".into(),
+            status: "pending".into(),
+            delegator_did: "did:key:zGQLDELEGATORCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC".into(),
+            assignee_did: None,
+            capability: "repo:write".into(),
+            ucan_token: None,
+            payload: None,
+            result: None,
+            created_at: now.clone(),
+            updated_at: now,
+            deadline: None,
+        };
+        state.db.create_task(&task).await.expect("seed task");
+        state
+            .db
+            .claim_task("task-g", assignee)
+            .await
+            .expect("claim");
+        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
+
+        let q = |actor: &str| {
+            format!(
+                r#"mutation {{ completeTask(id: "task-g", byDid: "{actor}", input: {{}}) {{ id status }} }}"#
+            )
+        };
+
+        // Stranger signs as themselves and passes byDid=self (so the signer
+        // binding passes), but is not the assignee → rejected by authorization.
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(q(stranger)).data(AuthenticatedDid(stranger.into())))
+            .await;
+        assert!(
+            errors(&resp).contains("assignee"),
+            "a non-assignee signer must be rejected: {}",
+            errors(&resp)
+        );
+
+        // The assignee completes with no error.
+        let resp = schema
+            .execute(Request::new(q(assignee)).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
+            .await;
+        assert!(
+            errors(&resp).is_empty(),
+            "the assignee should complete the task: {}",
+            errors(&resp)
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/query.rs

@@ -12,11 +12,29 @@ impl QueryRoot {
     async fn repos(&self, ctx: &Context<'_>) -> Result<Vec<RepoType>> {
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
         let repos = db
-            .list_all_repos()
+            .list_all_repos_deduped()
             .await
             .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
+
+        // Apply the same "/" visibility gate the REST/per-repo endpoints use so
+        // this surface does not enumerate private repos (#97). The caller DID is
+        // threaded onto the context by optional_signature; absent = anonymous.
+        let caller = ctx
+            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
+            .ok()
+            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
+        let ids: Vec<String> = repos.iter().map(|r| r.id.clone()).collect();
+        let rules_by_repo = db
+            .list_visibility_rules_for_repos(&ids)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
+
         Ok(repos
             .into_iter()
+            .filter(|r| {
+                let rules = rules_by_repo.get(&r.id).map(Vec::as_slice).unwrap_or(&[]);
+                crate::visibility::listable_at_root(rules, r.is_public, &r.owner_did, caller)
+            })
             .map(|r| RepoType {
                 name: r.name,
                 owner_did: r.owner_did,
@@ -31,13 +49,30 @@ impl QueryRoot {
         &self,
         ctx: &Context<'_>,
         repo: Option<String>,
-        #[graphql(default = 20)] limit: i64,
+        #[graphql(
+            default = 20,
+            desc = "Max 200; larger requests return the newest 200 rows (no continuation cursor)."
+        )]
+        limit: i64,
     ) -> Result<Vec<RefUpdateType>> {
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
-        let updates = db
-            .list_ref_updates_filtered(repo.as_deref(), limit)
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
+
+        // Gate each row on the same "/" visibility decision the repos resolver
+        // uses, so anonymous callers get no row for a local repo they can't read
+        // (#112). The shared collector applies the fail-closed gate *before* the
+        // limit (paging past dropped private rows) so a small limit still returns
+        // the latest visible events, and keeps this surface byte-identical to the
+        // REST feed (#114). The row slug is peer-supplied, so the pure filter
+        // treats it as untrusted input; remote (no local match) rows pass.
+        let caller = ctx
+            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
+            .ok()
+            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
+        let updates =
+            crate::api::events::collect_visible_ref_updates(db, repo.as_deref(), limit, caller)
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
+
         Ok(updates
             .into_iter()
             .map(|u| RefUpdateType {
@@ -76,3 +111,288 @@ impl QueryRoot {
         Ok(t.map(AgentTaskType::from))
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use crate::db::{Db, ReceivedRefUpdate, RepoRecord};
+    use chrono::Utc;
+    use sqlx::PgPool;
+    use std::sync::Arc;
+
+    const OWNER: &str = "did:key:z6MkOwner";
+
+    async fn db(pool: PgPool) -> Arc<Db> {
+        let db = Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
+        Arc::new(db)
+    }
+
+    fn schema(db: Arc<Db>) -> super::super::GitlawbSchema {
+        let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
+        let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
+        super::super::build_schema(db, ref_tx, task_tx)
+    }
+
+    fn repo(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
+        RepoRecord {
+            id: id.into(),
+            name: name.into(),
+            owner_did: owner_did.into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: Utc::now(),
+            updated_at: Utc::now(),
+            disk_path: format!("/srv/{id}"),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn ref_row(id: &str, slug: &str) -> ReceivedRefUpdate {
+        ReceivedRefUpdate {
+            id: id.into(),
+            node_did: "did:key:z6MkNode".into(),
+            pusher_did: "did:key:z6MkPusher".into(),
+            repo: slug.into(),
+            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
+            old_sha: "0".repeat(40),
+            new_sha: "a".repeat(40),
+            timestamp: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            cert_id: None,
+            received_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            from_peer: "peer1".into(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Count `refUpdates` rows in a GraphQL response.
+    fn count(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> usize {
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").expect("refUpdates key")
+        else {
+            panic!("refUpdates not a list");
+        };
+        rows.len()
+    }
+
+    async fn anon(schema: &super::super::GitlawbSchema, query: &str) -> async_graphql::Response {
+        schema.execute(async_graphql::Request::new(query)).await
+    }
+
+    async fn authed(
+        schema: &super::super::GitlawbSchema,
+        query: &str,
+        did: &str,
+    ) -> async_graphql::Response {
+        schema
+            .execute(
+                async_graphql::Request::new(query)
+                    .data(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid(did.to_string())),
+            )
+            .await
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 1 — anon must not get a private local repo's row on the
+    // repo:Some branch. This is the load-bearing RED→GREEN case.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_private_repo_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkOwner/widget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        // The GraphQL `repo` arg is the raw slug DB filter, so it must equal the
+        // stored slug to select the row at all — this is the exact leak path.
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(repo: "z6MkOwner/widget") { refName newSha pusherDid } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 2 — owner still sees their own private repo's row.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_private_repo_kept_for_owner(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkOwner/widget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(repo: "z6MkOwner/widget") { refName } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&authed(&schema, q, OWNER).await), 1);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 3 — unfiltered (repo:None): anon gets only the public row.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_unfiltered_anon_gets_only_public(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("pub", OWNER, "openrepo", true))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.create_repo(&repo("priv", OWNER, "secret", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u_pub", "z6MkOwner/openrepo"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u_priv", "z6MkOwner/secret"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo refName } }"#;
+        let resp = anon(&schema, q).await;
+        assert_eq!(count(&resp), 1);
+        // The one row returned must be the public repo's.
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").unwrap() else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(row) = &rows[0] else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        assert_eq!(
+            row.get("repo").unwrap(),
+            &async_graphql::Value::from("z6MkOwner/openrepo")
+        );
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 4 — alias fail-closed: private repo's row stored full-DID form.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_full_did_slug_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", "did:key:zABC", "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "did:key:zABC/widget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        // repo:None so the slug is not the DB filter key (which is verbatim);
+        // the gate must still drop it.
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 5 — truncated-key fail-closed: 8-char-prefix owner form.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_truncated_key_slug_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", "did:key:zABCDEFGH", "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "zABCDEF/widget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 6 — remote slug (no local match) is returned to anon.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_remote_slug_kept_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        // Row whose slug matches no local repo (different owner + name).
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "zZZZOTHER/gadget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 1);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 7 (#114 P2) — a small limit must page past the newest rows when
+    // they are private, so the older public rows are still returned. Before the
+    // gate moved ahead of the limit this returned 0 (the newest `limit` rows were
+    // all private and got filtered after the SQL LIMIT). RED→GREEN.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_small_limit_pages_past_newest_private(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("pub", OWNER, "openrepo", true))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.create_repo(&repo("priv", OWNER, "secret", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        // 3 older PUBLIC rows …
+        for i in 0..3 {
+            let mut r = ref_row(&format!("pub{i}"), "z6MkOwner/openrepo");
+            r.timestamp = format!("2026-07-01T10:00:0{i}+00:00");
+            db.insert_ref_update(&r).await.unwrap();
+        }
+        // … then 5 NEWER PRIVATE rows (the newest in the feed).
+        for i in 0..5 {
+            let mut r = ref_row(&format!("priv{i}"), "z6MkOwner/secret");
+            r.timestamp = format!("2026-07-01T10:00:1{i}+00:00");
+            db.insert_ref_update(&r).await.unwrap();
+        }
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        // limit 3 < the 5 newest (all private): anon must still get 3 public rows.
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(limit: 3) { repo } }"#;
+        let resp = anon(&schema, q).await;
+        assert_eq!(count(&resp), 3, "paging must reach the older public rows");
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").unwrap() else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        for row in rows {
+            let async_graphql::Value::Object(r) = row else {
+                unreachable!()
+            };
+            assert_eq!(
+                r.get("repo").unwrap(),
+                &async_graphql::Value::from("z6MkOwner/openrepo"),
+                "every returned row must be the public repo's"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 8 — a quarantined mirror is withheld on the GraphQL surface too.
+    // Guards that the resolver keeps delegating to the shared collector (where the
+    // quarantine fold lives); a REST-only test would miss a resolver that stopped.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_quarantined_mirror_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.upsert_mirror_repo("z6MkQuar", "secret", "/tmp/q", None, true)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkQuar/secret"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 8b — the GraphQL surface also withholds a quarantined repo from an
+    // authenticated OWNER, not just anon. Without the collector's quarantine drop
+    // the owner short-circuit in visibility_check keeps the row on this surface
+    // too, so the REST owner test alone would not guard the resolver.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_quarantined_repo_dropped_for_owner(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("q1", "did:key:z6MkQuar", "secret", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.set_repo_quarantine("q1", true).await.unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkQuar/secret"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&authed(&schema, q, "did:key:z6MkQuar").await), 0);
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/subscription.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,15 @@ pub struct SubscriptionRoot;
 
 #[Subscription]
 impl SubscriptionRoot {
+    /// Live ref-update stream. `/graphql/ws` is mounted outside the
+    /// `optional_signature` layer, so this resolver has NO caller identity and
+    /// cannot gate per-subscriber — it relays whatever enters the broadcast
+    /// channel to any anonymous client. Its visibility safety therefore rests
+    /// entirely on the WRITE side: the push handler only sends a
+    /// `RefUpdateBroadcast` for repos the anonymous public may read (inside its
+    /// `if announce` block, `api/repos.rs`). This is a single-point invariant —
+    /// any new sender to `ref_update_tx` MUST be `announce`-gated, or private-repo
+    /// ref metadata leaks here to unauthenticated subscribers (#112/#114 class).
     async fn ref_updates(
         &self,
         ctx: &Context<'_>,

crates/gitlawb-node/src/icaptcha.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,650 @@
+//! iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate.
+//!
+//! Spam-prone endpoints (repo creation, agent registration) can require the
+//! caller to present an iCaptcha proof: a small Ed25519-signed token minted by
+//! <https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com> after the caller solves an escalating
+//! challenge. We verify the proof OFFLINE (no per-request call to iCaptcha)
+//! using its published public key, and bind each proof to the authenticated
+//! agent DID so a proof cannot be shared between identities.
+//!
+//! Behaviour is controlled by `ICAPTCHA_MODE`:
+//!   * `off`     (default) — gate is inert, nothing is checked.
+//!   * `shadow`  — verify and log would-be rejections, but always allow.
+//!   * `enforce` — reject requests without a valid, sufficiently-strong proof.
+//!
+//! Config (env):
+//!   ICAPTCHA_MODE            off | shadow | enforce         (default off)
+//!   ICAPTCHA_URL             base URL                        (default https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com)
+//!   ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY          base64url Ed25519 public key    (optional; else fetched from /v1/pubkey)
+//!   ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL  minimum proof level             (default 3)
+
+use std::sync::OnceLock;
+use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+
+use axum::http::HeaderMap;
+use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
+use base64::Engine;
+use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
+use serde::Deserialize;
+
+use crate::error::AppError;
+
+const PROOF_HEADER: &str = "x-icaptcha-proof";
+
+/// How long a mirror-admission `jti` stays in the replay ledger. The direct
+/// request path spends a proof against its own `exp` (it can't be presented once
+/// expired). The propagation path deliberately accepts already-expired proofs,
+/// so spending against `exp` would store an already-past expiry that the next
+/// sweep deletes — letting the same token admit another mirror minutes later.
+/// We instead retain the mirror replay record for a long, fixed window so the
+/// per-node single-use property is durable.
+const MIRROR_REPLAY_RETENTION_SECS: i64 = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub enum Mode {
+    Off,
+    Shadow,
+    Enforce,
+}
+
+impl Mode {
+    fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Mode::Off => "off",
+            Mode::Shadow => "shadow",
+            Mode::Enforce => "enforce",
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Parse `ICAPTCHA_MODE`. Returns `None` for unrecognized values so the caller
+/// can surface the typo instead of silently disabling the gate.
+fn parse_mode(s: &str) -> Option<Mode> {
+    match s.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
+        "" | "off" => Some(Mode::Off),
+        "shadow" => Some(Mode::Shadow),
+        "enforce" => Some(Mode::Enforce),
+        _ => None,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Parse `ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL`. Defaults to 3; warns (rather than silently
+/// lowering the threshold) when a non-empty value fails to parse.
+fn parse_required_level() -> u32 {
+    const DEFAULT: u32 = 3;
+    match std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL") {
+        Ok(v) if !v.trim().is_empty() => v.trim().parse().unwrap_or_else(|_| {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                value = %v,
+                default = DEFAULT,
+                "invalid ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL; using default"
+            );
+            DEFAULT
+        }),
+        _ => DEFAULT,
+    }
+}
+
+struct Verifier {
+    mode: Mode,
+    url: String,
+    required_level: u32,
+    key: Option<VerifyingKey>,
+}
+
+static VERIFIER: OnceLock<Verifier> = OnceLock::new();
+
+#[derive(Deserialize, Debug)]
+struct ProofClaims {
+    sub: String,
+    level: u32,
+    exp: i64,
+    /// Unique proof id, consumed once so a proof cannot be replayed.
+    jti: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+struct Jwk {
+    x: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+struct Jwks {
+    keys: Vec<Jwk>,
+}
+
+fn now_secs() -> i64 {
+    SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .map(|d| d.as_secs() as i64)
+        .unwrap_or(0)
+}
+
+fn decode_key(b64url: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
+    let bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(b64url.trim()).ok()?;
+    let arr: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().ok()?;
+    VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&arr).ok()
+}
+
+async fn fetch_key(url: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
+    let endpoint = format!("{}/v1/pubkey", url.trim_end_matches('/'));
+    // Bounded request: a hung /v1/pubkey must never block node startup. On
+    // timeout/error we return None and the gate stays inert (fail safe).
+    let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
+        .timeout(Duration::from_secs(5))
+        .build()
+        .ok()?;
+    let jwks: Jwks = client.get(&endpoint).send().await.ok()?.json().await.ok()?;
+    decode_key(&jwks.keys.first()?.x)
+}
+
+/// Initialize the gate from the environment. Call once at startup. Never panics;
+/// if the gate is active but no key can be loaded, it stays inert and warns.
+pub async fn init() {
+    let raw_mode = std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_MODE").unwrap_or_default();
+    let mode = parse_mode(&raw_mode).unwrap_or_else(|| {
+        tracing::warn!(value = %raw_mode, "invalid ICAPTCHA_MODE; disabling iCaptcha gate");
+        Mode::Off
+    });
+    let url = std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_URL")
+        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string());
+    let required_level = parse_required_level();
+
+    let key = if mode == Mode::Off {
+        None
+    } else {
+        match std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY") {
+            Ok(b64) if !b64.is_empty() => decode_key(&b64),
+            _ => fetch_key(&url).await,
+        }
+    };
+
+    if mode != Mode::Off {
+        if key.is_some() {
+            tracing::info!(mode = mode.as_str(), required_level, "iCaptcha gate active");
+        } else {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                mode = mode.as_str(),
+                "iCaptcha gate enabled but no public key could be loaded; staying inert"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    let _ = VERIFIER.set(Verifier {
+        mode,
+        url,
+        required_level,
+        key,
+    });
+}
+
+/// Outcome of the synchronous, IO-free decision step.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+enum Decision {
+    /// Allow the request (off, shadow, inert/no-key, or verified non-enforcing).
+    Allow,
+    /// Enforce mode and verification failed; reject with this reason.
+    Reject(String),
+    /// Enforce mode and the proof verified; the caller must consume its `jti`
+    /// (and reject replays) before allowing, then may persist it.
+    Consume(VerifiedProof),
+}
+
+/// A verified proof: the raw token plus the claims we act on. Carried by a
+/// [`ProofGuard`] so that, once consumed, the gated handler can persist it with
+/// the created repo — letting the proof travel with the repo when it propagates
+/// to peers (see [`admit_mirror`]).
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct VerifiedProof {
+    token: String,
+    sub: String,
+    level: u32,
+    jti: String,
+    exp: i64,
+}
+
+impl VerifiedProof {
+    /// Persist this proof against a freshly-created repo so a mirroring peer can
+    /// re-verify it. Best-effort callers may ignore failures; the gate's
+    /// security does not depend on it (propagation just falls back to quarantine).
+    pub async fn record_for_repo(&self, db: &crate::db::Db, repo_id: &str) -> Result<(), AppError> {
+        db.record_repo_proof(
+            repo_id,
+            &self.token,
+            &self.sub,
+            self.level as i32,
+            &self.jti,
+            self.exp,
+        )
+        .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+/// A verified proof awaiting consumption. Verification (which rejects invalid or
+/// missing proofs) is separated from consumption (which spends the single-use
+/// `jti`) so a request rejected by later validation never burns a valid proof.
+/// The caller must `consume()` this guard immediately before the gated write.
+/// For off/shadow/inert there is nothing to consume.
+#[must_use = "a verified iCaptcha proof must be consumed before the gated action"]
+pub struct ProofGuard(Option<VerifiedProof>);
+
+impl ProofGuard {
+    /// Spend the proof's `jti` (single-use) and return the verified proof so the
+    /// caller can persist it. A replay is rejected. Returns `None` when there is
+    /// nothing to consume (off/shadow/inert).
+    pub async fn consume(self, db: &crate::db::Db) -> Result<Option<VerifiedProof>, AppError> {
+        match self.0 {
+            Some(p) => {
+                if !db.consume_proof_jti(&p.jti, p.exp).await? {
+                    let (url, level) = url_and_level();
+                    return Err(AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
+                        message: "iCaptcha proof already used (replay); solve a fresh challenge"
+                            .to_string(),
+                        url,
+                        level,
+                    });
+                }
+                Ok(Some(p))
+            }
+            None => Ok(None),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Verify the proof in `headers` belongs to `did`. Rejects missing/invalid
+/// proofs early (enforce mode); off/shadow never reject. Returns a [`ProofGuard`]
+/// the caller must `consume()` right before the gated write. Off/shadow/inert
+/// yield a no-op guard that consumes nothing.
+pub fn verify_request(headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str) -> Result<ProofGuard, AppError> {
+    let v = match VERIFIER.get() {
+        Some(v) => v,
+        None => return Ok(ProofGuard(None)), // not initialized -> inert
+    };
+    match decide(v, headers, did, now_secs()) {
+        Decision::Allow => Ok(ProofGuard(None)),
+        Decision::Reject(reason) => Err(reject_error(v, &reason)),
+        Decision::Consume(proof) => Ok(ProofGuard(Some(proof))),
+    }
+}
+
+fn reject_error(v: &Verifier, reason: &str) -> AppError {
+    AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
+        message: format!(
+            "iCaptcha proof required ({reason}). Solve a challenge at {} for level >= {} and resend with the {} header.",
+            v.url, v.required_level, PROOF_HEADER
+        ),
+        url: v.url.clone(),
+        level: v.required_level,
+    }
+}
+
+/// iCaptcha service url + required level for error responses, read from the
+/// initialized verifier (falls back to defaults if somehow uninitialized).
+fn url_and_level() -> (String, u32) {
+    VERIFIER
+        .get()
+        .map(|v| (v.url.clone(), v.required_level))
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| ("https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(), 3))
+}
+
+/// Mode-aware decision. Pure and IO-free (no DB; clock injected via `now`) so it
+/// is fully unit-testable. The caller performs jti consumption for `Consume`.
+fn decide(v: &Verifier, headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str, now: i64) -> Decision {
+    if v.mode == Mode::Off {
+        return Decision::Allow;
+    }
+
+    // Fail safe: if no public key could be loaded (e.g. iCaptcha was unreachable
+    // at startup), stay inert rather than rejecting every request. The operator
+    // already saw a startup warning. An iCaptcha hiccup must never break repo
+    // creation or registration.
+    if v.key.is_none() {
+        return Decision::Allow;
+    }
+
+    let token = headers.get(PROOF_HEADER).and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok());
+    let result = match token {
+        Some(t) => verify_token(v, t, did, now, true).map(|claims| (t, claims)),
+        None => Err("missing proof header".to_string()),
+    };
+
+    match result {
+        Ok((token, claims)) => match v.mode {
+            Mode::Enforce => Decision::Consume(VerifiedProof {
+                token: token.to_string(),
+                sub: claims.sub,
+                level: claims.level,
+                jti: claims.jti,
+                exp: claims.exp,
+            }),
+            // Shadow/Off: never reject, and do not consume (observational only).
+            _ => Decision::Allow,
+        },
+        Err(reason) => match v.mode {
+            Mode::Shadow => {
+                tracing::warn!(did = %did, reason, "iCaptcha (shadow) would reject");
+                Decision::Allow
+            }
+            Mode::Enforce => Decision::Reject(reason),
+            Mode::Off => Decision::Allow,
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+/// Header-extracting wrapper over [`verify_token`] (enforces expiry). The
+/// production path inlines this in [`decide`]; retained as the unit-test entry
+/// point that also exercises header extraction.
+#[cfg(test)]
+fn verify(v: &Verifier, headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str, now: i64) -> Result<ProofClaims, String> {
+    let proof = headers
+        .get(PROOF_HEADER)
+        .and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok())
+        .ok_or("missing proof header")?;
+    verify_token(v, proof, did, now, true)
+}
+
+/// Core verification of a raw proof token, separated for testability and reuse.
+/// Checks the Ed25519 signature, the required level, and the DID binding. `exp`
+/// is only enforced when `check_exp` is true: the direct request path enforces
+/// freshness, but the propagation path ([`admit_mirror`]) does not — a proof has
+/// usually expired by the time a repo mirrors, and the origin enforced freshness
+/// at creation. `now` is unix seconds.
+fn verify_token(
+    v: &Verifier,
+    token: &str,
+    did: &str,
+    now: i64,
+    check_exp: bool,
+) -> Result<ProofClaims, String> {
+    let key = v.key.as_ref().ok_or("verifier has no public key")?;
+
+    let (payload, sig_b64) = token.split_once('.').ok_or("malformed proof")?;
+    let sig_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
+        .decode(sig_b64)
+        .map_err(|_| "bad signature encoding")?;
+    let sig = Signature::from_slice(&sig_bytes).map_err(|_| "bad signature length")?;
+    key.verify_strict(payload.as_bytes(), &sig)
+        .map_err(|_| "signature verification failed")?;
+
+    let claims_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
+        .decode(payload)
+        .map_err(|_| "bad payload encoding")?;
+    let claims: ProofClaims = serde_json::from_slice(&claims_bytes).map_err(|_| "bad claims")?;
+
+    if check_exp && claims.exp < now {
+        return Err("proof expired".to_string());
+    }
+    if claims.level < v.required_level {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "level {} below required {}",
+            claims.level, v.required_level
+        ));
+    }
+    if !crate::api::did_matches(did, &claims.sub) {
+        return Err("proof subject does not match authenticated DID".to_string());
+    }
+    Ok(claims)
+}
+
+/// Outcome of admitting a repo mirrored from a peer.
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum MirrorAdmission {
+    /// Admit the mirror normally (off/shadow/inert, or a valid proof in enforce).
+    Admit,
+    /// Enforce mode and the mirror's proof is missing/invalid/replayed — mirror
+    /// it but quarantine until an operator releases it. Carries the reason.
+    Quarantine(String),
+}
+
+/// Decide whether to admit a repo being mirrored from a peer, given the proof
+/// token the origin served (`None` if it had none or the fetch failed) and the
+/// mirrored repo's owner DID.
+///
+/// Off/shadow/inert always admit (shadow logs the would-be quarantine and writes
+/// nothing). In enforce mode the proof is re-verified offline against the local
+/// public key — signature, level, and owner-DID binding, but NOT expiry — and
+/// its `jti` is consumed in the local ledger, so one solved challenge admits at
+/// most one mirror per node (a malicious origin cannot reuse one proof to bless
+/// many spam repos here).
+///
+/// LIMITATION (proof is not repo-bound): an iCaptcha proof commits only to the
+/// solver's DID (`sub`), never to a repo — the proof is minted before the repo
+/// exists. So the guarantee enforced here is "a level≥N challenge was solved by
+/// this repo's owner DID", not "the owner intended THIS repo". A malicious origin
+/// that harvests a victim's public proof (served by `get_icaptcha_proof`) can use
+/// it to get ONE spam repo nominally owned by that victim admitted per node — the
+/// per-node `jti` single-use caps the amplification at one repo per distinct
+/// harvested proof, but does not eliminate it. Fully binding a proof to a repo
+/// would require the iCaptcha service to embed a repo/target identifier in the
+/// signed challenge (a protocol change, tracked as future work).
+pub async fn admit_mirror(
+    db: &crate::db::Db,
+    token: Option<&str>,
+    owner_did: &str,
+) -> MirrorAdmission {
+    let v = match VERIFIER.get() {
+        Some(v) => v,
+        None => return MirrorAdmission::Admit, // not initialized -> inert
+    };
+    // Off, or inert because no key could be loaded: admit unconditionally.
+    if v.mode == Mode::Off || v.key.is_none() {
+        return MirrorAdmission::Admit;
+    }
+    let shadow = v.mode == Mode::Shadow;
+
+    // Quarantine in enforce; in shadow just log and admit (observational, no IO).
+    let quarantine = |reason: String| -> MirrorAdmission {
+        if shadow {
+            tracing::warn!(owner = %owner_did, reason, "iCaptcha (shadow) would quarantine mirror");
+            MirrorAdmission::Admit
+        } else {
+            MirrorAdmission::Quarantine(reason)
+        }
+    };
+
+    let token = match token {
+        Some(t) => t,
+        None => return quarantine("origin served no iCaptcha proof".to_string()),
+    };
+
+    match verify_token(v, token, owner_did, now_secs(), false) {
+        Ok(claims) => {
+            if shadow {
+                // Observational: a valid proof would admit. Do not consume, so a
+                // later switch to enforce still sees the jti as fresh.
+                return MirrorAdmission::Admit;
+            }
+            // Retain the replay record on a fixed forward window, NOT the proof's
+            // own (already-past) exp — otherwise the next sweep frees the jti and
+            // the same token could admit another mirror here.
+            let retain_until = now_secs().saturating_add(MIRROR_REPLAY_RETENTION_SECS);
+            match db.consume_proof_jti(&claims.jti, retain_until).await {
+                Ok(true) => MirrorAdmission::Admit,
+                Ok(false) => MirrorAdmission::Quarantine(
+                    "iCaptcha proof already used to admit another mirror".to_string(),
+                ),
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::warn!(owner = %owner_did, err = %e, "iCaptcha mirror ledger error; quarantining");
+                    MirrorAdmission::Quarantine("iCaptcha proof ledger unavailable".to_string())
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        Err(reason) => quarantine(reason),
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    // Real values captured from https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com (a live proof).
+    const PUBKEY_X: &str = "xjyPNqIbvc9U-kwXW6u9mDqRJ7E2UUMOaJdUWhpEXq8";
+    const PROOF: &str = "eyJzdWIiOiJkaWQ6a2V5Onp0ZXN0IiwibGV2ZWwiOjMsImlzcyI6ImljYXB0Y2hhIiwiaWF0IjoxNzgyNTcyODUxLCJleHAiOjE3ODI1NzMxNTEsImp0aSI6IjRiNTIyOGE1YmVkNzEyMmRlZTlmNDdmZiJ9.5UXVPZ8Eo91VnlcvgDXtW-Fx7J2jr7h535SAstQEpigxBr7FF7V6R0XB4PBDgdoBPnhdH_kVEfRPfdHPSdB0CA";
+    const SUB: &str = "did:key:ztest";
+    const IAT: i64 = 1782572851; // within the proof's validity window
+
+    fn verifier(level: u32) -> Verifier {
+        Verifier {
+            mode: Mode::Enforce,
+            url: "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(),
+            required_level: level,
+            key: decode_key(PUBKEY_X),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn headers_with(proof: &str) -> HeaderMap {
+        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+        h.insert(PROOF_HEADER, proof.parse().unwrap());
+        h
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn accepts_a_real_proof() {
+        let v = verifier(3);
+        assert!(verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, IAT).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_expired_proof() {
+        let v = verifier(3);
+        let err = verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, 9_999_999_999).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.contains("expired"), "{err}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_wrong_did() {
+        let v = verifier(3);
+        let err = verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), "did:key:zsomeoneelse", IAT).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.contains("subject"), "{err}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_insufficient_level() {
+        let v = verifier(5); // proof is level 3
+        let err = verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, IAT).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.contains("below required"), "{err}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_tampered_signature() {
+        let v = verifier(3);
+        // Flip one base64url char in the signature so it is guaranteed different.
+        let (payload, sig) = PROOF.split_once('.').unwrap();
+        let mut chars: Vec<char> = sig.chars().collect();
+        chars[0] = if chars[0] == 'A' { 'B' } else { 'A' };
+        let tampered = format!("{}.{}", payload, chars.into_iter().collect::<String>());
+        assert!(verify(&v, &headers_with(&tampered), SUB, IAT).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_missing_header() {
+        let v = verifier(3);
+        let err = verify(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.contains("missing"), "{err}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_mode_accepts_documented_values_and_rejects_junk() {
+        assert_eq!(parse_mode(""), Some(Mode::Off));
+        assert_eq!(parse_mode("off"), Some(Mode::Off));
+        assert_eq!(parse_mode("  Shadow "), Some(Mode::Shadow));
+        assert_eq!(parse_mode("ENFORCE"), Some(Mode::Enforce));
+        // Typos must NOT silently disable the gate.
+        assert_eq!(parse_mode("enforced"), None);
+        assert_eq!(parse_mode("on"), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn off_mode_allows_everything() {
+        let mut v = verifier(3);
+        v.mode = Mode::Off;
+        assert!(matches!(
+            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
+            Decision::Allow
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn enforce_without_key_stays_inert() {
+        // iCaptcha unreachable at startup -> no key -> must not reject.
+        let v = Verifier {
+            mode: Mode::Enforce,
+            url: "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(),
+            required_level: 3,
+            key: None,
+        };
+        assert!(matches!(
+            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
+            Decision::Allow
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn enforce_with_key_rejects_missing_proof() {
+        let v = verifier(3);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
+            Decision::Reject(_)
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn shadow_allows_despite_bad_proof() {
+        let mut v = verifier(3);
+        v.mode = Mode::Shadow;
+        assert!(matches!(
+            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
+            Decision::Allow
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn enforce_valid_proof_requires_consuming_its_jti() {
+        // A verified proof under enforce must yield Consume carrying the jti, so
+        // the caller can spend it once and reject replays.
+        let v = verifier(3);
+        match decide(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, IAT) {
+            Decision::Consume(p) => {
+                assert_eq!(p.jti, "4b5228a5bed7122dee9f47ff");
+                assert_eq!(p.exp, 1782573151);
+                assert_eq!(p.token, PROOF, "the raw token is retained for persistence");
+                assert_eq!(p.sub, SUB);
+            }
+            other => panic!("expected Consume, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn propagation_accepts_an_expired_proof() {
+        // The mirror-admission path verifies sig/level/DID but NOT expiry, since a
+        // proof has usually expired by the time a repo propagates. The same proof
+        // that the direct path rejects as expired must verify here.
+        let v = verifier(3);
+        let now = 9_999_999_999; // far past the proof's exp
+        assert!(
+            verify_token(&v, PROOF, SUB, now, true).is_err(),
+            "direct path (check_exp=true) rejects the expired proof"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            verify_token(&v, PROOF, SUB, now, false).is_ok(),
+            "propagation path (check_exp=false) accepts it"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn propagation_still_enforces_signature_level_and_did() {
+        let v = verifier(3);
+        // wrong owner DID
+        assert!(verify_token(&v, PROOF, "did:key:zother", IAT, false).is_err());
+        // insufficient level
+        let v5 = verifier(5);
+        assert!(verify_token(&v5, PROOF, SUB, IAT, false).is_err());
+        // tampered signature
+        let (payload, sig) = PROOF.split_once('.').unwrap();
+        let mut chars: Vec<char> = sig.chars().collect();
+        chars[0] = if chars[0] == 'A' { 'B' } else { 'A' };
+        let tampered = format!("{}.{}", payload, chars.into_iter().collect::<String>());
+        assert!(verify_token(&v, &tampered, SUB, IAT, false).is_err());
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/ipfs_pin.rs

@@ -70,28 +70,40 @@ pub async fn pin_git_object(ipfs_api: &str, sha256_hex: &str, data: &[u8]) -> Re
     Ok(cid)
 }
 
-/// List all git objects in the given bare repo and pin any that are not yet
-/// recorded in `pinned_cids`.
+/// Fetch raw bytes for a CID from the local Kubo node (`/api/v0/cat`).
+pub async fn cat(ipfs_api: &str, cid: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    if ipfs_api.is_empty() {
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("IPFS not configured"));
+    }
+    let url = format!("{}/api/v0/cat?arg={}", ipfs_api.trim_end_matches('/'), cid);
+    let resp = reqwest::Client::new().post(&url).send().await?;
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("ipfs cat {cid}: {}", resp.status()));
+    }
+    Ok(resp.bytes().await?.to_vec())
+}
+
+/// Pin any of the given candidate git objects that are not yet recorded in
+/// `pinned_cids`.
+///
+/// `object_list` is the already-withheld-filtered OID set to pin: the caller
+/// applies `visibility_pack::replicable_objects` on the delta path or the
+/// `..._fail_closed` filter on the full-scan path before calling, so this
+/// function never sees a withheld blob. `repo_path` is still needed to read each
+/// object's bytes. The twin in `pinata.rs` mirrors this shape — change both in
+/// lockstep.
 ///
 /// Returns a list of `(sha256_hex, cid)` pairs for objects pinned this call.
 pub async fn pin_new_objects(
     ipfs_api: &str,
     repo_path: &std::path::Path,
+    object_list: Vec<String>,
     db: &crate::db::Db,
 ) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
     if ipfs_api.is_empty() {
         return vec![];
     }
 
-    // Enumerate all objects in the repo
-    let object_list = match list_all_objects(repo_path) {
-        Ok(v) => v,
-        Err(e) => {
-            tracing::warn!(repo = %repo_path.display(), err = %e, "failed to list git objects for IPFS pinning");
-            return vec![];
-        }
-    };
-
     let mut pinned = Vec::new();
 
     for sha in object_list {
@@ -132,31 +144,3 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
 
     pinned
 }
-
-/// Run `git cat-file --batch-all-objects --batch-check='%(objectname)'`
-/// to get all object SHA-256 hashes in the repository.
-fn list_all_objects(repo_path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
-    let output = std::process::Command::new("git")
-        .args([
-            "cat-file",
-            "--batch-all-objects",
-            "--batch-check=%(objectname)",
-        ])
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output()
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to run git cat-file: {e}"))?;
-
-    if !output.status.success() {
-        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}"));
-    }
-
-    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
-    let hashes = stdout
-        .lines()
-        .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
-        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
-        .collect();
-
-    Ok(hashes)
-}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/main.rs

@@ -5,30 +5,59 @@ mod bootstrap;
 mod cert;
 mod config;
 mod db;
+mod encrypted_pin;
 mod error;
 mod git;
 mod graphql;
+mod icaptcha;
 mod ipfs_pin;
+mod metrics;
 mod operator;
 mod p2p;
 mod pinata;
+mod rate_limit;
 mod server;
 mod state;
 mod sync;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test_support;
+mod visibility;
 mod webhooks;
 
-use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
+use axum::extract::State;
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::response::IntoResponse;
+use axum::routing::get;
+use axum::{Json, Router};
 use clap::Parser;
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use tokio::net::TcpListener;
+use tokio::sync::watch;
 use tracing::{info, warn};
 
+use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
 use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
 
 use config::Config;
 use db::Db;
 use state::AppState;
 
+#[derive(Clone)]
+struct DegradedState {
+    node_did: String,
+    db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>,
+}
+
+/// Two independent counters with no cross-field invariant — atomics, not a
+/// lock, so the retry loop and the degraded handlers never contend.
+#[derive(Default)]
+struct DbStartupStatus {
+    attempts: AtomicU64,
+    next_retry_secs: AtomicU64,
+}
+
 #[tokio::main]
 async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     tracing_subscriber::fmt()
@@ -45,25 +74,123 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     // bootstrap peers. Operators can opt out via GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS.
     bootstrap::merge_seeds(&mut config);
 
+    if !config.public_read {
+        warn!(
+            "GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ=false is reserved; per-repository private-read enforcement is not wired in alpha"
+        );
+    }
+
     // Load or generate the node's identity keypair
     let keypair = load_or_create_keypair(&config)?;
     let node_did = keypair.did();
 
+    // One-time metrics init. Must run before any handler that calls into
+    // `metrics::record_*` so the registry exists when the first event fires.
+    // Safe to call even when GITLAWB_METRICS_ADDR is unset — those helpers
+    // are simply no-ops until something reads from the registry.
+    metrics::init(env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), &node_did.to_string());
+
     info!("╔══════════════════════════════════════════╗");
     info!(
         "║         gitlawb node v{}             ║",
         env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")
     );
     info!("╚══════════════════════════════════════════╝");
-    info!(did = %node_did, "node identity");
-    info!(addr = %config.bind_addr(), "listening");
+    // Process-wide shutdown signal. One sender lives in AppState (cloned
+    // into every handler); main() keeps a clone and flips it on SIGINT
+    // or SIGTERM. Tasks that hold a watch::Receiver get notified at
+    // their next await point.
+    let (shutdown_tx, _shutdown_rx_for_main) = watch::channel(false);
+    spawn_shutdown_signal(shutdown_tx.clone());
 
-    // Connect to PostgreSQL database
-    let db = Arc::new(
-        Db::connect(&config.database_url)
-            .await
-            .context("failed to connect to database")?,
-    );
+    info!(did = %node_did, "node identity");
+    info!(addr = %config.bind_addr(), "binding HTTP listener");
+
+    // Bind HTTP once, before dependency initialization, and keep this socket
+    // for the life of the process. The degraded server accepts on a dup of the
+    // same socket, so the degraded→full handoff never closes the port: while
+    // the full server initializes, connections queue in the shared backlog
+    // instead of being refused.
+    let listener = TcpListener::bind(config.bind_addr())
+        .await
+        .with_context(|| format!("failed to bind to {}", config.bind_addr()))?;
+    let full_std_listener = listener.into_std()?;
+    let degraded_listener = TcpListener::from_std(
+        full_std_listener
+            .try_clone()
+            .context("failed to clone HTTP listener for degraded server")?,
+    )?;
+
+    // Metrics must stay observable during a database outage — the degraded
+    // window is exactly when dashboards need data — so this listener starts
+    // before the DB connects.
+    let metrics_handle = if !config.metrics_addr.is_empty() {
+        match spawn_metrics_server(&config.metrics_addr, shutdown_tx.subscribe()).await {
+            Ok(handle) => {
+                info!(addr = %config.metrics_addr, "metrics endpoint listening");
+                Some(handle)
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!(err = %e, addr = %config.metrics_addr, "failed to start metrics endpoint — continuing without");
+                None
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        info!("metrics endpoint disabled (GITLAWB_METRICS_ADDR not set)");
+        None
+    };
+
+    let db_startup = Arc::new(DbStartupStatus::default());
+    let (db_ready_tx, db_ready_rx) = watch::channel(false);
+    let mut degraded_handle = tokio::spawn(run_degraded_server(
+        degraded_listener,
+        node_did.to_string(),
+        Arc::clone(&db_startup),
+        db_ready_rx,
+        shutdown_tx.subscribe(),
+    ));
+
+    // Connect to PostgreSQL database. A transient outage or bad secret should
+    // not crash-loop the process and hammer the database provider; permanent
+    // misconfiguration surfaces through error-level logs and the /ready check.
+    let db = tokio::select! {
+        db = connect_db_with_retry(&config, Arc::clone(&db_startup), shutdown_tx.subscribe()) => {
+            match db {
+                Some(db) => db,
+                None => {
+                    // Shutdown requested while waiting for the database. The
+                    // degraded server only serves one-shot 503s — abort it
+                    // rather than drain, so a slow client can't stall exit.
+                    degraded_handle.abort();
+                    return Ok(());
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        degraded = &mut degraded_handle => {
+            if *shutdown_tx.borrow() {
+                return Ok(());
+            }
+            return match degraded {
+                Ok(Ok(())) => Err(anyhow!("degraded HTTP server stopped before database became ready")),
+                Ok(Err(err)) => Err(err.context("degraded HTTP server failed")),
+                Err(err) => Err(anyhow!("degraded HTTP server task failed: {err}")),
+            };
+        }
+    };
+
+    // Flip the degraded server into graceful shutdown, but do NOT await the
+    // drain: one slow in-flight request must not delay the full server, and
+    // the shared socket means there is no port gap to cover. The drain
+    // finishes (and logs) in the background.
+    db_ready_tx.send(true).ok();
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        match degraded_handle.await {
+            Ok(Ok(())) => {}
+            Ok(Err(err)) => warn!(err = %err, "degraded HTTP server exited with error"),
+            Err(err) => warn!(err = %err, "degraded HTTP server task failed"),
+        }
+    });
+    info!(addr = %config.bind_addr(), "database ready; starting full HTTP server");
 
     // Prune peer rows that point back at this node (stale self-loop entries)
     if let Some(public_url) = config.public_url.as_deref() {
@@ -74,6 +201,15 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         }
     }
 
+    // Prune peer rows with non-public hosts (loopback/private/internal) that
+    // were injected via the unauthenticated announce route — they poison the
+    // sync-notify fan-out (SSRF + crowding out real peers).
+    match db.prune_non_public_peers().await {
+        Ok(0) => {}
+        Ok(n) => info!(removed = n, "pruned non-public (poisoned) peer rows"),
+        Err(e) => warn!(err = %e, "prune_non_public_peers failed (non-fatal)"),
+    }
+
     // Ensure repos directory exists
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&config.repos_dir).context("failed to create repos directory")?;
 
@@ -84,12 +220,14 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
             .iter()
             .filter_map(|s| s.parse().ok())
             .collect();
+        let shutdown_rx = shutdown_tx.subscribe();
         match p2p::start(
             &node_did.to_string(),
             config.p2p_port,
             bootstrap_addrs,
             Arc::clone(&db),
             config.auto_sync,
+            shutdown_rx,
         )
         .await
         {
@@ -107,11 +245,8 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         None
     };
 
-    let http_client = Arc::new(
-        reqwest::Client::builder()
-            .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
-            .build()?,
-    );
+    // Shared no-redirect HTTP client. See build_http_client for the SSRF rationale.
+    let http_client = Arc::new(build_http_client()?);
 
     let (ref_update_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel::<state::RefUpdateBroadcast>(256);
     let (task_event_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel::<state::TaskEventBroadcast>(256);
@@ -147,6 +282,83 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     let repo_store =
         git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(config.repos_dir.clone(), tigris, db.pool().clone());
 
+    // Per-DID limiter for the creation endpoints. Keyed on the authenticated
+    // DID (attacker-varied), so bound its key set to cap memory.
+    let rate_limiter =
+        rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(10, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600), 200_000);
+
+    // Per-client-IP flood brake for the creation endpoints. The per-DID limiter
+    // above is bypassed by a DID farm (one throwaway did:key per repo), which is
+    // exactly how the recurring spam-repo floods get past both it and the
+    // iCaptcha gate. Keyed on the resolved client IP so a single-source flood is
+    // capped regardless of how many identities it mints. Sized well above any
+    // legitimate per-IP creation rate; GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT overrides, 0
+    // disables. Bounded key set — the key is a client-influenced IP.
+    let create_limit = std::env::var("GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT")
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
+        .unwrap_or(120);
+    let create_ip_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
+        create_limit,
+        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
+        200_000,
+    );
+    if create_limit == 0 {
+        tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT=0 — per-IP creation rate limiting disabled");
+    }
+
+    // Push-path flood brake: max git-receive-pack requests per client IP per
+    // hour (counts both the info/refs advertisement and the push POST). Sized
+    // for heavy agent automation while still stopping flood traffic (the June
+    // 2026 attack pushed several times per second per IP). GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT
+    // overrides; 0 disables. Bounded key set — the key is a client-influenced IP.
+    let push_limit = std::env::var("GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT")
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
+        .unwrap_or(600);
+    let push_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
+        push_limit,
+        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
+        200_000,
+    );
+    if push_limit == 0 {
+        tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT=0 — per-IP push rate limiting disabled");
+    }
+
+    // Which forwarded header the edge is trusted to set. Default None (trust
+    // nothing, key on the socket peer). Fly nodes set GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY=fly;
+    // a node behind Caddy/NGINX sets it to x-forwarded-for.
+    let push_limiter_trust = rate_limit::TrustedProxy::from_env_value(
+        &std::env::var("GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY").unwrap_or_default(),
+    );
+    tracing::info!(trust = ?push_limiter_trust, push_limit, "push rate limiter configured");
+
+    // Peer-sync flood brakes, keyed on the resolved client IP (per-DID is useless
+    // here — a did:key farm self-registers). Two buckets so an unsigned notify
+    // flood can't drain the signed trigger caller's quota (#82). Bounded key sets
+    // (the key is a client-influenced IP); 0 disables each.
+    let sync_trigger_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
+        config.sync_trigger_rate_limit,
+        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
+        200_000,
+    );
+    let peer_write_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
+        config.peer_write_rate_limit,
+        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
+        200_000,
+    );
+    if config.sync_trigger_rate_limit == 0 {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            "GITLAWB_SYNC_TRIGGER_RATE_LIMIT=0 — /sync/trigger IP rate limiting disabled"
+        );
+    }
+    if config.peer_write_rate_limit == 0 {
+        tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_PEER_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT=0 — peer-write IP rate limiting disabled");
+    }
+
+    // Initialize the iCaptcha proof gate (inert unless ICAPTCHA_MODE is set).
+    icaptcha::init().await;
+
     let state = AppState {
         config: Arc::new(config.clone()),
         db,
@@ -159,12 +371,82 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         graphql_schema,
         machine_id,
         repo_store,
+        rate_limiter,
+        create_ip_rate_limiter,
+        push_rate_limiter,
+        push_limiter_trust,
+        sync_trigger_rate_limiter,
+        peer_write_rate_limiter,
+        shutdown_tx: shutdown_tx.clone(),
     };
 
+    // Periodic peer-count poll for the metrics gauge. If p2p is disabled
+    // we still set the gauge to 0 so dashboards don't show "no data".
+    {
+        let p2p_for_metrics = state.p2p.clone();
+        let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(std::time::Duration::from_secs(15));
+            loop {
+                tokio::select! {
+                    _ = interval.tick() => {
+                        let count = match &p2p_for_metrics {
+                            Some(h) => h.status().await.map(|s| s.connected_peers).unwrap_or(0),
+                            None => 0,
+                        };
+                        metrics::set_peers_connected(count as i64);
+                    }
+                    _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
+                        if *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
+                            return;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        });
+    }
+
+    // Periodic cleanup of expired rate limit entries + consumed-proof ledger
+    {
+        let rl = state.rate_limiter.clone();
+        let create_ip_rl = state.create_ip_rate_limiter.clone();
+        let push_rl = state.push_rate_limiter.clone();
+        let sync_trigger_rl = state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter.clone();
+        let peer_write_rl = state.peer_write_rate_limiter.clone();
+        let db = state.db.clone();
+        let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            loop {
+                tokio::select! {
+                    _ = tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(300)) => {
+                        rl.cleanup().await;
+                        create_ip_rl.cleanup().await;
+                        push_rl.cleanup().await;
+                        sync_trigger_rl.cleanup().await;
+                        peer_write_rl.cleanup().await;
+                        let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+                            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+                            .map(|d| d.as_secs() as i64)
+                            .unwrap_or(0);
+                        if let Err(e) = db.sweep_expired_proofs(now).await {
+                            tracing::warn!(err = %e, "failed to sweep expired iCaptcha proofs");
+                        }
+                    }
+                    _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
+                        if *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
+                            break;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        });
+    }
+
     let router = server::build_router(state.clone());
-    let listener = TcpListener::bind(config.bind_addr())
-        .await
-        .with_context(|| format!("failed to bind to {}", config.bind_addr()))?;
+    // Re-register the socket bound at startup — same fd, so there was never a
+    // moment with the port closed between the degraded and full servers.
+    let listener = TcpListener::from_std(full_std_listener)
+        .context("failed to re-register HTTP listener with the runtime")?;
 
     info!("✓ node started — did:{}", node_did);
     info!("  repos dir: {}", config.repos_dir.display());
@@ -183,9 +465,13 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
             timestamp: chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
         };
         let p2p_clone = Arc::clone(p2p);
+        let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
         tokio::spawn(async move {
             // Small delay so Kademlia can find peers first
-            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5)) => {}
+                _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => return,
+            }
             p2p_clone.put_did(did_record).await;
             info!("DID record published to Kademlia DHT");
         });
@@ -195,14 +481,20 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     {
         let gossip_state = state.clone();
         let bootstrap_peers = config.bootstrap_peers.clone();
+        let shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
         tokio::spawn(async move {
-            gossip_task(gossip_state, bootstrap_peers).await;
+            gossip_task(gossip_state, bootstrap_peers, shutdown_rx).await;
         });
     }
 
     // Start multi-node sync worker if auto_sync is enabled
     if config.auto_sync {
-        sync::start(Arc::clone(&state.db), Arc::clone(&state.config));
+        sync::start(
+            Arc::clone(&state.db),
+            Arc::clone(&state.config),
+            Arc::clone(&state.node_keypair),
+            state.subscribe_shutdown(),
+        );
         info!("auto-sync worker started");
     }
 
@@ -214,7 +506,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
             Ok(client) => match operator::startup_check(&client).await {
                 Ok(_) => {
                     let arc_client = Arc::new(client);
-                    arc_client.spawn_heartbeat_loop();
+                    arc_client.spawn_heartbeat_loop(state.subscribe_shutdown());
                 }
                 Err(e) => {
                     if state.config.operator_strict_mode {
@@ -234,10 +526,307 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         info!("on-chain PoS disabled (GITLAWB_CONTRACT_NODE_STAKING or GITLAWB_OPERATOR_PRIVATE_KEY unset)");
     }
 
-    axum::serve(listener, router).await?;
+    // axum's `with_graceful_shutdown` waits for in-flight requests to
+    // complete (up to the configured grace) once the future resolves.
+    let shutdown_signal_for_axum = state.subscribe_shutdown();
+    let grace = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.shutdown_grace_secs);
+    info!(grace_secs = config.shutdown_grace_secs, "axum server ready");
+
+    // `into_make_service_with_connect_info` exposes the socket peer address as
+    // `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` so the push limiter can key on the real client
+    // when no trusted proxy header applies (see `rate_limit::client_key`).
+    let serve_result = axum::serve(
+        listener,
+        router.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>(),
+    )
+    .with_graceful_shutdown(async move {
+        let mut rx = shutdown_signal_for_axum;
+        // Wait until the watcher flips to true, then return so axum
+        // can begin draining.
+        while !*rx.borrow_and_update() {
+            if rx.changed().await.is_err() {
+                // Sender dropped — treat as shutdown.
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    })
+    .await;
+
+    // Server has stopped accepting new connections and drained in-flight
+    // requests. Tear the rest of the system down.
+    info!("HTTP server stopped, beginning process shutdown");
+    if let Some(h) = metrics_handle {
+        h.abort();
+    }
+    let _ = grace; // recorded for operators in the log above; not enforced
+    serve_result?;
+    info!("clean exit");
     Ok(())
 }
 
+fn spawn_shutdown_signal(tx: watch::Sender<bool>) {
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        #[cfg(unix)]
+        {
+            use tokio::signal::unix::{signal as unix_signal, SignalKind};
+            let mut sigterm =
+                unix_signal(SignalKind::terminate()).expect("install SIGTERM handler");
+            let mut sigint = unix_signal(SignalKind::interrupt()).expect("install SIGINT handler");
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = sigterm.recv() => info!("SIGTERM received, shutting down"),
+                _ = sigint.recv()  => info!("SIGINT received, shutting down"),
+            }
+        }
+        #[cfg(not(unix))]
+        {
+            use tokio::signal;
+            let _ = signal::ctrl_c().await;
+            info!("Ctrl-C received, shutting down");
+        }
+        tx.send(true).ok();
+    });
+}
+
+async fn connect_db_with_retry(
+    config: &Config,
+    db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>,
+    mut shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
+) -> Option<Arc<Db>> {
+    let initial_retry_secs = config.db_retry_initial_secs;
+    let max_retry_secs = config.db_retry_max_secs.max(initial_retry_secs);
+    let acquire_timeout = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.db_acquire_timeout_secs);
+    let attempt_timeout = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.db_connect_timeout_secs);
+    let mut attempts = 0_u64;
+
+    loop {
+        if *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
+            return None;
+        }
+
+        attempts = attempts.saturating_add(1);
+        db_startup.attempts.store(attempts, Ordering::Relaxed);
+
+        // Bound the whole attempt, not just the pool connect: migrations
+        // block on a cross-instance advisory lock, and an unbounded wait
+        // there would wedge this loop — no retries, no logs, no recovery.
+        // Timing out and retrying is safe; migrations are idempotent.
+        let attempt = match tokio::time::timeout(
+            attempt_timeout,
+            Db::connect(
+                &config.database_url,
+                config.db_max_connections,
+                acquire_timeout,
+            ),
+        )
+        .await
+        {
+            Ok(result) => result,
+            Err(_) => Err(anyhow!(
+                "connect + migrate attempt exceeded {}s (GITLAWB_DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS); \
+                 is another instance holding the migration lock?",
+                attempt_timeout.as_secs()
+            )),
+        };
+
+        match attempt {
+            Ok(db) => {
+                info!(attempts, "database connection established");
+                return Some(Arc::new(db));
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                // A bad DATABASE_URL or rejected credentials won't heal on
+                // their own. Still retry (exiting would crash-loop and hammer
+                // the provider — and take liveness down with it), but log at
+                // error level and skip straight to the maximum backoff; the
+                // /ready health check is what surfaces this to deploys.
+                let permanent = is_likely_permanent_db_error(&err);
+                let retry_secs = if permanent {
+                    max_retry_secs
+                } else {
+                    database_retry_delay_secs(initial_retry_secs, max_retry_secs, attempts)
+                };
+                db_startup
+                    .next_retry_secs
+                    .store(retry_secs, Ordering::Relaxed);
+                if permanent {
+                    tracing::error!(
+                        attempts,
+                        retry_secs,
+                        err = %err,
+                        "database rejected our configuration (bad DATABASE_URL or credentials?) — retrying, but operator action is likely required"
+                    );
+                } else {
+                    warn!(
+                        attempts,
+                        retry_secs,
+                        err = %err,
+                        "database unavailable during startup; retrying"
+                    );
+                }
+
+                tokio::select! {
+                    _ = tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(retry_secs)) => {}
+                    changed = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
+                        if changed.is_err() || *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
+                            return None;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Errors that indicate misconfiguration rather than a transient outage: a
+/// malformed DATABASE_URL, or a server that answered and rejected us —
+/// Postgres error class 28xxx (invalid authorization) or 3D000 (database
+/// does not exist). Best-effort: an error that anyhow can't downcast back to
+/// sqlx just counts as transient.
+fn is_likely_permanent_db_error(err: &anyhow::Error) -> bool {
+    match err.downcast_ref::<sqlx::Error>() {
+        Some(sqlx::Error::Configuration(_)) => true,
+        Some(sqlx::Error::Database(db)) => db
+            .code()
+            .map(|c| c.starts_with("28") || c.starts_with("3D"))
+            .unwrap_or(false),
+        _ => false,
+    }
+}
+
+fn database_retry_delay_secs(initial_secs: u64, max_secs: u64, attempts: u64) -> u64 {
+    // The exponent bound only keeps the u32 cast safe — max_secs is the real
+    // (operator-configurable) cap, and saturating math handles overflow.
+    let exponent = attempts.saturating_sub(1).min(63) as u32;
+    initial_secs
+        .saturating_mul(2_u64.saturating_pow(exponent))
+        .min(max_secs)
+}
+
+async fn run_degraded_server(
+    listener: TcpListener,
+    node_did: String,
+    db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>,
+    mut db_ready_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
+    mut shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let addr = listener.local_addr().ok();
+    let router = build_degraded_router(node_did, db_startup);
+    info!(?addr, "degraded HTTP server ready");
+
+    axum::serve(listener, router)
+        .with_graceful_shutdown(async move {
+            // wait_for resolves on predicate-true or sender-drop; either way
+            // this phase is over.
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = db_ready_rx.wait_for(|ready| *ready) => {}
+                _ = shutdown_rx.wait_for(|stop| *stop) => {}
+            }
+        })
+        .await?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn build_degraded_router(node_did: String, db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>) -> Router {
+    let state = DegradedState {
+        node_did,
+        db_startup,
+    };
+    // Everything answers 503 with the same body — including /health and
+    // /ready, so peer pings (which treat any 2xx /health as alive) and
+    // uptime monitors correctly see a node that cannot serve traffic.
+    // `/` additionally carries the node identity for probing peers.
+    Router::new()
+        .route("/", get(degraded_node_info))
+        .fallback(degraded_unavailable)
+        .with_state(state)
+}
+
+/// One source of truth for the degraded 503 body, sharing the error
+/// vocabulary with error.rs so clients see the same code/message for
+/// "database unavailable" regardless of which phase produced it.
+fn degraded_body(db_startup: &DbStartupStatus) -> serde_json::Value {
+    serde_json::json!({
+        "status": "degraded",
+        "database": "initializing",
+        "error": error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
+        "message": error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
+        "db_attempts": db_startup.attempts.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
+        "db_next_retry_secs": db_startup.next_retry_secs.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
+    })
+}
+
+async fn degraded_node_info(State(state): State<DegradedState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
+    let mut body = degraded_body(&state.db_startup);
+    if let Some(obj) = body.as_object_mut() {
+        obj.insert("name".into(), "gitlawb-node".into());
+        obj.insert("version".into(), env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").into());
+        obj.insert("did".into(), state.node_did.clone().into());
+    }
+    (StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, Json(body))
+}
+
+async fn degraded_unavailable(State(state): State<DegradedState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
+    (
+        StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+        Json(degraded_body(&state.db_startup)),
+    )
+}
+
+/// Spawn a small axum router that exposes only `GET /metrics` on its own
+/// listener. Returns the JoinHandle so `main()` can abort it on shutdown.
+/// This is deliberately separate from the main router so the metrics port
+/// can be firewalled differently from the API port — bind to localhost
+/// or a private interface only.
+async fn spawn_metrics_server(
+    addr: &str,
+    mut shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
+) -> Result<tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>> {
+    use axum::{response::IntoResponse, routing::get, Router};
+
+    async fn metrics_handler() -> impl IntoResponse {
+        match metrics::encode() {
+            Ok(body) => (
+                axum::http::StatusCode::OK,
+                [(
+                    axum::http::header::CONTENT_TYPE,
+                    "text/plain; version=0.0.4; charset=utf-8",
+                )],
+                body,
+            ),
+            Err(e) => (
+                axum::http::StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                [(
+                    axum::http::header::CONTENT_TYPE,
+                    "text/plain; charset=utf-8",
+                )],
+                format!("metrics encode error: {e}"),
+            ),
+        }
+    }
+
+    let listener = TcpListener::bind(addr)
+        .await
+        .with_context(|| format!("failed to bind metrics listener to {addr}"))?;
+    let app = Router::new().route("/metrics", get(metrics_handler));
+
+    let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
+        if let Err(e) = axum::serve(listener, app)
+            .with_graceful_shutdown(async move {
+                while !*shutdown_rx.borrow_and_update() {
+                    if shutdown_rx.changed().await.is_err() {
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            warn!(err = %e, "metrics server exited with error");
+        }
+    });
+    Ok(handle)
+}
+
 fn build_operator_client(
     config: &config::Config,
     node_did: &str,
@@ -260,23 +849,70 @@ fn build_operator_client(
 }
 
 /// Announce to bootstrap peers on startup, then periodically ping all known peers.
-async fn gossip_task(state: AppState, bootstrap_peers: Vec<String>) {
-    // Small delay to let the HTTP server come up before we try to announce
-    tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
+async fn gossip_task(
+    state: AppState,
+    bootstrap_peers: Vec<String>,
+    mut shutdown_rx: tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bool>,
+) {
+    // If shutdown arrives during the initial delay, exit before announcing.
+    tokio::select! {
+        _ = tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2)) => {}
+        _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
+            if *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
+                info!("gossip: shutdown during startup delay, exiting");
+                return;
+            }
+        }
+    }
 
-    let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+    // Reuse the shared no-redirect client for every gossip outbound call (the
+    // bootstrap announce POST and the periodic peer /health ping). Peer URLs are
+    // attacker-influenceable, so a 3xx to a private address must not be followed.
+    // Do NOT fall back to reqwest::Client::new(): its default follows redirects
+    // and would reintroduce the SSRF closed here (#93).
+    let client = state.http_client.clone();
     let my_did = state.node_did.to_string();
     let my_url = state.config.public_url.clone().unwrap_or_default();
 
     // Announce ourselves to each bootstrap peer
     for peer_url in &bootstrap_peers {
-        let announce_url = format!("{}/api/v1/peers/announce", peer_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
+        // Cooperative shutdown between peers — a slow peer shouldn't
+        // block the node exiting.
+        if *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
+            info!("gossip: shutdown signalled during peer announce, exiting");
+            return;
+        }
+        let path = "/api/v1/peers/announce";
+        let announce_url = format!("{}{}", peer_url.trim_end_matches('/'), path);
         let body = serde_json::json!({
-            "did": my_did,
-            "http_url": my_url,
+            "did": my_did.clone(),
+            "http_url": my_url.clone(),
         });
-        match client.post(&announce_url).json(&body).send().await {
-            Ok(resp) => {
+        let body_bytes = match serde_json::to_vec(&body) {
+            Ok(bytes) => bytes,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(err = %e, "failed to serialize peer announce body");
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+        let signed = sign_request(state.node_keypair.as_ref(), "POST", path, &body_bytes);
+        // Per-request timeout inside the loop; do not let one hung peer
+        // block others. The request itself is a normal tokio future so
+        // it's cancel-safe on shutdown.
+        match tokio::time::timeout(
+            std::time::Duration::from_secs(5),
+            client
+                .post(&announce_url)
+                .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
+                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
+                .header("Signature", signed.signature)
+                .body(body_bytes)
+                .send(),
+        )
+        .await
+        {
+            Ok(Ok(resp)) => {
                 if resp.status().is_success() {
                     if let Ok(json) = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await {
                         // Add them back to our peer list
@@ -292,33 +928,69 @@ async fn gossip_task(state: AppState, bootstrap_peers: Vec<String>) {
                     }
                 }
             }
-            Err(e) => {
+            Ok(Err(e)) => {
                 tracing::warn!(url = %announce_url, err = %e, "failed to announce to bootstrap peer")
             }
+            Err(_) => tracing::warn!(url = %announce_url, "bootstrap peer announce timed out (5s)"),
         }
     }
 
-    // Periodic ping every 5 minutes
+    // Periodic ping every 5 minutes — exit on shutdown.
     let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(std::time::Duration::from_secs(300));
     loop {
-        interval.tick().await;
-        let peers = match state.db.list_peers().await {
-            Ok(p) => p,
-            Err(_) => continue,
-        };
-        for peer in peers {
-            let url = format!("{}/health", peer.http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-            let ok = client
-                .get(&url)
-                .send()
-                .await
-                .map(|r| r.status().is_success())
-                .unwrap_or(false);
-            let _ = state.db.mark_peer_ping(&peer.did, ok).await;
+        tokio::select! {
+            _ = interval.tick() => {
+                let peers = match state.db.list_peers().await {
+                    Ok(p) => p,
+                    Err(_) => continue,
+                };
+                for peer in peers {
+                    let ok = ping_peer_health(&client, &peer.http_url).await;
+                    let _ = state.db.mark_peer_ping(&peer.did, ok).await;
+                }
+            }
+            _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
+                if *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
+                    info!("gossip task: shutdown signal received, exiting");
+                    return;
+                }
+            }
         }
     }
 }
 
+/// Build the shared node HTTP client used for every outbound fan-out (sync
+/// trigger, profile/repo fetches, gossip announce + peer pings).
+///
+/// No redirects: peer URLs are attacker-influenceable, so a `3xx` to a private
+/// address must not be followed (SSRF guard, #78/#93). Do NOT replace with
+/// `reqwest::Client::new()` — its default follows redirects. Kept as a named
+/// builder so tests bind the redirect guarantee to the real client the node
+/// runs, not a hand-rolled equivalent.
+fn build_http_client() -> reqwest::Result<reqwest::Client> {
+    reqwest::Client::builder()
+        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
+        .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
+        .build()
+}
+
+/// Ping a peer's `/health` endpoint and report whether it answered 2xx.
+///
+/// Takes the client by reference so callers supply the shared, no-redirect
+/// `state.http_client`. Peer URLs are attacker-influenceable, so a `3xx` to a
+/// private address must not be followed. Do NOT call this with a bare
+/// `reqwest::Client::new()`: its default follows redirects and would
+/// reintroduce the SSRF this guards against (#93).
+async fn ping_peer_health(client: &reqwest::Client, http_url: &str) -> bool {
+    let url = format!("{}/health", http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
+    client
+        .get(&url)
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .map(|r| r.status().is_success())
+        .unwrap_or(false)
+}
+
 fn load_or_create_keypair(config: &Config) -> Result<Keypair> {
     let key_path = config.resolved_key_path();
 
@@ -351,3 +1023,64 @@ fn load_or_create_keypair(config: &Config) -> Result<Keypair> {
         Ok(kp)
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod gossip_ssrf_tests {
+    use super::ping_peer_health;
+
+    // Build the client exactly as production does (super::build_http_client) so
+    // these tests bind the redirect guarantee to the real shared client the
+    // node runs. A regression that makes build_http_client follow redirects
+    // fails ping_peer_health_does_not_follow_redirect.
+    fn production_http_client() -> reqwest::Client {
+        super::build_http_client().expect("failed to build production http client")
+    }
+
+    // A peer answering `/health` with a 302 toward an internal address must not
+    // be followed: the redirect target must never be requested (#93).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ping_peer_health_does_not_follow_redirect() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let internal = server
+            .mock("GET", "/internal-metadata")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .expect(0)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let _health = server
+            .mock("GET", "/health")
+            .with_status(302)
+            .with_header("location", &format!("{}/internal-metadata", server.url()))
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), &server.url()).await;
+
+        assert!(!ok, "a 302 must not count as a healthy peer");
+        // expect(0) is enforced only at assert time; this fails if the redirect
+        // was followed to the internal target.
+        internal.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ping_peer_health_reports_success_on_200() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _health = server
+            .mock("GET", "/health")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), &server.url()).await;
+
+        assert!(ok, "a 200 /health must count as a healthy peer");
+    }
+
+    // A transport error (nothing listening) must map to unhealthy, never a
+    // spurious healthy — the .unwrap_or(false) arm.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ping_peer_health_reports_unhealthy_on_connection_error() {
+        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), "http://127.0.0.1:1").await;
+        assert!(!ok, "a connection error must count as an unhealthy peer");
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/metrics.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+//! Prometheus metrics for the gitlawb node.
+//!
+//! Exposes a small, deliberately conservative set of counters and histograms
+//! that cover the questions an operator actually asks of a live node:
+//!
+//!   * is push traffic flowing? — `gitlawb_pushes_total`
+//!   * is fetch traffic flowing? — `gitlawb_fetches_total`
+//!   * are signature checks passing or failing? —
+//!     `gitlawb_auth_successes_total` / `gitlawb_auth_failures_total`
+//!   * is the sync worker making progress? —
+//!     `gitlawb_sync_queue_processed_total{status}`
+//!   * are webhooks reaching their endpoints? —
+//!     `gitlawb_webhook_deliveries_total{result}`
+//!   * how big are the packs we're sending and receiving? —
+//!     `gitlawb_pack_size_bytes`
+//!   * a single `gitlawb_info{version, did}` gauge = 1, for joins/dashboards
+//!   * currently-connected peer count — `gitlawb_peers_connected`
+//!
+//! All metrics live in a single process-wide registry initialized by
+//! [`init`]. Increment helpers (`record_push`, `record_auth_failure`, ...)
+//! are no-ops until [`init`] has been called, so unit tests and benchmarks
+//! that don't go through `main()` don't need to do anything special.
+//!
+//! The endpoint is opt-in via `GITLAWB_METRICS_ADDR`; if unset, no listener
+//! is bound and no exposition happens. Increments are atomic and effectively
+//! free.
+//!
+//! Follow-ups (not in this module):
+//!   * per-route latency histograms (TraceLayer already gives us spans)
+//!   * per-peer p2p counters
+//!   * ipfs / pinata counters
+
+use std::sync::OnceLock;
+
+use prometheus::{
+    Encoder, Histogram, HistogramOpts, IntCounterVec, IntGauge, IntGaugeVec, Opts, Registry,
+    TextEncoder,
+};
+
+/// The single, process-wide metrics registry. Initialized by [`init`].
+/// Wrapped in `OnceLock` so unit tests can run without going through
+/// `main()` — the public `record_*` helpers treat an uninitialized
+/// registry as a silent no-op.
+static REGISTRY: OnceLock<Registry> = OnceLock::new();
+static INFO: OnceLock<IntGaugeVec> = OnceLock::new();
+static PUSHES: OnceLock<IntCounterVec> = OnceLock::new();
+static FETCHES: OnceLock<IntCounterVec> = OnceLock::new();
+static AUTH_SUCCESSES: OnceLock<IntCounterVec> = OnceLock::new();
+static AUTH_FAILURES: OnceLock<IntCounterVec> = OnceLock::new();
+static SYNC_PROCESSED: OnceLock<IntCounterVec> = OnceLock::new();
+static WEBHOOK_DELIVERIES: OnceLock<IntCounterVec> = OnceLock::new();
+static PACK_SIZE: OnceLock<Histogram> = OnceLock::new();
+static PEERS_CONNECTED: OnceLock<IntGauge> = OnceLock::new();
+
+/// One-time initializer. Builds the registry, registers every metric,
+/// and sets the constant `gitlawb_info` gauge. Idempotent — calling
+/// more than once is a silent no-op. MUST be called from `main()` after
+/// the node DID is known.
+pub fn init(version: &str, node_did: &str) {
+    if REGISTRY.get().is_some() {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    let registry = Registry::new();
+
+    let info = IntGaugeVec::new(
+        Opts::new(
+            "gitlawb_info",
+            "Constant 1 labelled with version and node DID",
+        ),
+        &["version", "did"],
+    )
+    .expect("gitlawb_info metric definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(info.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_info");
+    info.with_label_values(&[version, node_did]).set(1);
+    INFO.set(info).expect("set INFO once");
+
+    let pushes = IntCounterVec::new(
+        Opts::new(
+            "gitlawb_pushes_total",
+            "Total successful git push (receive-pack) completions",
+        ),
+        &["repo"],
+    )
+    .expect("gitlawb_pushes_total definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(pushes.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_pushes_total");
+    PUSHES.set(pushes).expect("set PUSHES once");
+
+    let fetches = IntCounterVec::new(
+        Opts::new(
+            "gitlawb_fetches_total",
+            "Total successful git fetch (upload-pack) completions",
+        ),
+        &["repo"],
+    )
+    .expect("gitlawb_fetches_total definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(fetches.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_fetches_total");
+    FETCHES.set(fetches).expect("set FETCHES once");
+
+    let auth_successes = IntCounterVec::new(
+        Opts::new(
+            "gitlawb_auth_successes_total",
+            "Total HTTP signature checks that passed",
+        ),
+        &["route"],
+    )
+    .expect("gitlawb_auth_successes_total definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(auth_successes.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_auth_successes_total");
+    AUTH_SUCCESSES
+        .set(auth_successes)
+        .expect("set AUTH_SUCCESSES once");
+
+    let auth_failures = IntCounterVec::new(
+        Opts::new(
+            "gitlawb_auth_failures_total",
+            "Total HTTP signature checks that failed",
+        ),
+        &["route", "reason"],
+    )
+    .expect("gitlawb_auth_failures_total definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(auth_failures.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_auth_failures_total");
+    AUTH_FAILURES
+        .set(auth_failures)
+        .expect("set AUTH_FAILURES once");
+
+    let sync_processed = IntCounterVec::new(
+        Opts::new(
+            "gitlawb_sync_queue_processed_total",
+            "Total sync_queue items the worker has processed",
+        ),
+        &["status"],
+    )
+    .expect("gitlawb_sync_queue_processed_total definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(sync_processed.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_sync_queue_processed_total");
+    SYNC_PROCESSED
+        .set(sync_processed)
+        .expect("set SYNC_PROCESSED once");
+
+    let webhook_deliveries = IntCounterVec::new(
+        Opts::new(
+            "gitlawb_webhook_deliveries_total",
+            "Total webhook delivery attempts and their outcomes",
+        ),
+        &["result"],
+    )
+    .expect("gitlawb_webhook_deliveries_total definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(webhook_deliveries.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_webhook_deliveries_total");
+    WEBHOOK_DELIVERIES
+        .set(webhook_deliveries)
+        .expect("set WEBHOOK_DELIVERIES once");
+
+    let pack_size = Histogram::with_opts(
+        HistogramOpts::new(
+            "gitlawb_pack_size_bytes",
+            "Distribution of git pack body sizes processed (bytes)",
+        )
+        .buckets(vec![
+            1_024.0,         // 1 KB
+            64_000.0,        // ~64 KB
+            1_000_000.0,     // 1 MB
+            16_000_000.0,    // 16 MB
+            64_000_000.0,    // 64 MB
+            256_000_000.0,   // 256 MB
+            1_073_741_824.0, // 1 GiB
+            2_147_483_648.0, // 2 GiB (current cap)
+        ]),
+    )
+    .expect("gitlawb_pack_size_bytes definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(pack_size.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_pack_size_bytes");
+    PACK_SIZE.set(pack_size).expect("set PACK_SIZE once");
+
+    let peers_connected = IntGauge::with_opts(Opts::new(
+        "gitlawb_peers_connected",
+        "Currently connected libp2p peers",
+    ))
+    .expect("gitlawb_peers_connected definition");
+    registry
+        .register(Box::new(peers_connected.clone()))
+        .expect("register gitlawb_peers_connected");
+    PEERS_CONNECTED
+        .set(peers_connected)
+        .expect("set PEERS_CONNECTED once");
+
+    REGISTRY
+        .set(registry)
+        .expect("set REGISTRY once (init must be called exactly once)");
+}
+
+/// Record one successful push (receive-pack completion). Labelled with
+/// the repo in the form `owner_short/repo_name`. No-op if `init` was
+/// never called (e.g. inside a unit test that doesn't go through main).
+pub fn record_push(repo: &str) {
+    if let Some(c) = PUSHES.get() {
+        c.with_label_values(&[repo]).inc();
+    }
+}
+
+/// Record one successful fetch (upload-pack completion).
+pub fn record_fetch(repo: &str) {
+    if let Some(c) = FETCHES.get() {
+        c.with_label_values(&[repo]).inc();
+    }
+}
+
+/// Record one HTTP signature check that passed.
+#[allow(dead_code)] // wired in a follow-up; helpers are part of the public metrics surface
+pub fn record_auth_success(route: &str) {
+    if let Some(c) = AUTH_SUCCESSES.get() {
+        c.with_label_values(&[route]).inc();
+    }
+}
+
+/// Record one HTTP signature check that failed. `reason` is a short,
+/// machine-friendly token (e.g. `expired`, `bad_signature`, `missing_header`).
+#[allow(dead_code)] // wired in a follow-up; helpers are part of the public metrics surface
+pub fn record_auth_failure(route: &str, reason: &str) {
+    if let Some(c) = AUTH_FAILURES.get() {
+        c.with_label_values(&[route, reason]).inc();
+    }
+}
+
+/// Record one sync_queue item outcome. `status` ∈ {done, failed, skipped}.
+pub fn record_sync_processed(status: &str) {
+    if let Some(c) = SYNC_PROCESSED.get() {
+        c.with_label_values(&[status]).inc();
+    }
+}
+
+/// Record one webhook delivery attempt outcome. `result` ∈
+/// {ok, http_error, network_error, skipped}.
+pub fn record_webhook_delivery(result: &str) {
+    if let Some(c) = WEBHOOK_DELIVERIES.get() {
+        c.with_label_values(&[result]).inc();
+    }
+}
+
+/// Record a pack body size observation (bytes).
+pub fn observe_pack_size(bytes: f64) {
+    if let Some(h) = PACK_SIZE.get() {
+        h.observe(bytes);
+    }
+}
+
+/// Update the currently-connected peer count gauge.
+pub fn set_peers_connected(count: i64) {
+    if let Some(g) = PEERS_CONNECTED.get() {
+        g.set(count);
+    }
+}
+
+/// Encode the registry as the standard Prometheus text exposition format.
+/// Returns an error if `init` was never called.
+pub fn encode() -> Result<String, prometheus::Error> {
+    let registry = REGISTRY
+        .get()
+        .ok_or_else(|| prometheus::Error::Msg("metrics::init() was never called".into()))?;
+    let metric_families = registry.gather();
+    let mut buf = Vec::new();
+    let encoder = TextEncoder::new();
+    encoder.encode(&metric_families, &mut buf)?;
+    String::from_utf8(buf)
+        .map_err(|e| prometheus::Error::Msg(format!("non-UTF8 in metric buffer: {e}")))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    // Note: these tests are not run in parallel by default (cargo runs
+    // tests in a binary in parallel via threads but the OnceLock guard
+    // means only the first init() call succeeds; subsequent ones are
+    // no-ops). The encode test below is structured so it's safe to run
+    // alongside other tests in the same binary.
+
+    #[test]
+    fn encode_after_init_returns_prometheus_text() {
+        // Reset is not supported by OnceLock, so this test relies on
+        // either being the first to run, or `init` being a no-op on
+        // second call. Both paths are exercised: if init() was already
+        // called by another test, the no-op branch still leaves the
+        // registry usable.
+        init("0.0.0-test", "did:key:test");
+        PUSHES
+            .get()
+            .expect("PUSHES set after init")
+            .with_label_values(&["alice/repo"])
+            .inc();
+
+        let body = encode().expect("encode should succeed after init");
+        assert!(
+            body.contains("# HELP gitlawb_info"),
+            "expected gitlawb_info HELP line in: {body}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            body.contains("# TYPE gitlawb_pushes_total counter"),
+            "expected gitlawb_pushes_total TYPE line in: {body}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            body.contains("gitlawb_pushes_total{repo=\"alice/repo\"} 1"),
+            "expected the incremented counter to be visible in: {body}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn record_helpers_are_noops_before_init() {
+        // These don't panic. They also don't show up in encode() output
+        // because the registry doesn't exist yet.
+        record_push("test/repo");
+        record_fetch("test/repo");
+        record_auth_success("test/route");
+        record_auth_failure("test/route", "test_reason");
+        record_sync_processed("done");
+        record_webhook_delivery("ok");
+        observe_pack_size(1024.0);
+        set_peers_connected(0);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn encode_before_init_returns_error() {
+        // encode() must error rather than panic if init() was never called.
+        // This test is meaningful only if NO other test in this binary
+        // ran first. cargo runs tests on multiple threads within a
+        // single binary, so this is racy — but worst case the assertion
+        // below is "encode succeeded with a non-empty body", which is
+        // still a valid state.
+        let result = encode();
+        match result {
+            Err(_) => { /* expected when init wasn't called */ }
+            Ok(body) => {
+                // Some other test ran init() first; that's fine, the
+                // body should still be a valid exposition payload.
+                assert!(!body.is_empty(), "non-empty exposition body");
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/operator.rs

@@ -145,8 +145,12 @@ impl OperatorClient {
     }
 
     /// Spawn a background task that posts a heartbeat on `heartbeat_interval` cadence.
-    /// Errors are logged and retried on the next tick.
-    pub fn spawn_heartbeat_loop(self: Arc<Self>) {
+    /// Errors are logged and retried on the next tick. The task exits cleanly
+    /// when `shutdown_rx` flips to `true`.
+    pub fn spawn_heartbeat_loop(
+        self: Arc<Self>,
+        mut shutdown_rx: tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bool>,
+    ) {
         let interval_secs = self.cfg.heartbeat_interval.as_secs();
         info!(
             interval_hours = interval_secs / 3600,
@@ -158,11 +162,20 @@ impl OperatorClient {
             // First tick fires immediately — use it to send an initial heartbeat
             interval.tick().await;
             loop {
-                match self.send_heartbeat().await {
-                    Ok(tx) => info!(tx = %tx, "operator heartbeat sent"),
-                    Err(e) => warn!(err = %e, "operator heartbeat failed — will retry"),
+                tokio::select! {
+                    _ = interval.tick() => {
+                        match self.send_heartbeat().await {
+                            Ok(tx) => info!(tx = %tx, "operator heartbeat sent"),
+                            Err(e) => warn!(err = %e, "operator heartbeat failed — will retry"),
+                        }
+                    }
+                    _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
+                        if *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
+                            info!("operator heartbeat loop: shutdown signal received, exiting");
+                            return;
+                        }
+                    }
                 }
-                interval.tick().await;
             }
         });
     }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/p2p/mod.rs

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 //! Provides:
 //!   - Peer discovery via Kademlia DHT (DID → multiaddr mapping)
 //!   - Real-time ref-update events via Gossipsub
-//!   - Local network discovery via mDNS
 //!
 //! The node's PeerId is derived from its Ed25519 identity keypair,
 //! so the gitlawb DID and libp2p PeerId share the same key.
@@ -15,12 +14,13 @@ use std::time::Duration;
 
 use anyhow::Result;
 use chrono::Utc;
-use libp2p::futures::StreamExt;
-use libp2p::{
-    gossipsub, identify, kad, mdns, noise,
-    swarm::{NetworkBehaviour, SwarmEvent},
-    tcp, yamux, Multiaddr, PeerId,
-};
+use futures::StreamExt;
+use libp2p_core::{muxing::StreamMuxerBox, Multiaddr, PeerId, Transport};
+use libp2p_gossipsub as gossipsub;
+use libp2p_identify as identify;
+use libp2p_identity as identity;
+use libp2p_kad as kad;
+use libp2p_swarm::{NetworkBehaviour, Swarm, SwarmEvent};
 use tokio::sync::{mpsc, oneshot};
 use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
 use uuid::Uuid;
@@ -152,21 +152,23 @@ fn did_to_kad_key(did: &str) -> kad::RecordKey {
 
 /// Combined libp2p behaviour.
 #[derive(NetworkBehaviour)]
+#[behaviour(prelude = "libp2p_swarm::derive_prelude")]
 struct GitlawbBehaviour {
     kademlia: kad::Behaviour<kad::store::MemoryStore>,
     gossipsub: gossipsub::Behaviour,
     identify: identify::Behaviour,
-    mdns: mdns::tokio::Behaviour,
 }
 
 /// Start the libp2p swarm. Returns a handle for sending commands and the
-/// listening multiaddrs. Runs the event loop as a background tokio task.
+/// listening multiaddrs. Runs the event loop as a background tokio task
+/// that exits cleanly when `shutdown_rx` flips to `true`.
 pub async fn start(
     node_did: &str,
     listen_port: u16,
     bootstrap_addrs: Vec<Multiaddr>,
     db: Arc<Db>,
     auto_sync: bool,
+    shutdown_rx: tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bool>,
 ) -> Result<P2pHandle> {
     // Derive a stable libp2p Ed25519 key from a seed based on the node DID.
     // In production you'd load/persist this key alongside the identity PEM.
@@ -183,7 +185,7 @@ pub async fn start(
         seed_bytes[i * 8..(i + 1) * 8].copy_from_slice(&seed.wrapping_add(i as u64).to_le_bytes());
     }
 
-    let local_key = libp2p::identity::Keypair::ed25519_from_bytes(seed_bytes)
+    let local_key = identity::Keypair::ed25519_from_bytes(seed_bytes)
         .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to create p2p keypair: {e}"))?;
     let local_peer_id = PeerId::from(local_key.public());
 
@@ -196,65 +198,66 @@ pub async fn start(
         local_peer_id,
     };
 
-    // Build the swarm
-    let mut swarm = libp2p::SwarmBuilder::with_existing_identity(local_key)
-        .with_tokio()
-        .with_tcp(
-            tcp::Config::default(),
-            noise::Config::new,
-            yamux::Config::default,
-        )?
-        .with_behaviour(|key| {
-            let peer_id = PeerId::from(key.public());
+    let kad_store = kad::store::MemoryStore::new(local_peer_id);
+    let mut kademlia = kad::Behaviour::new(local_peer_id, kad_store);
+    kademlia.set_mode(Some(kad::Mode::Server));
 
-            // Kademlia
-            let kad_store = kad::store::MemoryStore::new(peer_id);
-            let mut kademlia = kad::Behaviour::new(peer_id, kad_store);
-            kademlia.set_mode(Some(kad::Mode::Server));
+    let gossipsub_config = gossipsub::ConfigBuilder::default()
+        .heartbeat_interval(Duration::from_secs(10))
+        .validation_mode(gossipsub::ValidationMode::Permissive)
+        .message_id_fn(|msg: &gossipsub::Message| {
+            let mut h = DefaultHasher::new();
+            msg.data.hash(&mut h);
+            gossipsub::MessageId::from(h.finish().to_string())
+        })
+        .build()
+        .expect("gossipsub config");
+    let gossipsub = gossipsub::Behaviour::new(
+        gossipsub::MessageAuthenticity::Signed(local_key.clone()),
+        gossipsub_config,
+    )
+    .expect("gossipsub behaviour");
 
-            // Gossipsub — message_id based on content hash to deduplicate
-            let gossipsub_config = gossipsub::ConfigBuilder::default()
-                .heartbeat_interval(Duration::from_secs(10))
-                .validation_mode(gossipsub::ValidationMode::Permissive)
-                .message_id_fn(|msg: &gossipsub::Message| {
-                    let mut h = DefaultHasher::new();
-                    msg.data.hash(&mut h);
-                    gossipsub::MessageId::from(h.finish().to_string())
-                })
-                .build()
-                .expect("gossipsub config");
-            let gossipsub = gossipsub::Behaviour::new(
-                gossipsub::MessageAuthenticity::Signed(key.clone()),
-                gossipsub_config,
-            )
-            .expect("gossipsub behaviour");
+    let identify = identify::Behaviour::new(identify::Config::new(
+        "/gitlawb/1.0.0".to_string(),
+        local_key.public(),
+    ));
 
-            // Identify — so peers can exchange their observed addresses
-            let identify = identify::Behaviour::new(identify::Config::new(
-                "/gitlawb/1.0.0".to_string(),
-                key.public(),
-            ));
-
-            // mDNS — local network peer discovery
-            let mdns = mdns::tokio::Behaviour::new(mdns::Config::default(), peer_id)
-                .expect("mdns behaviour");
-
-            GitlawbBehaviour {
-                kademlia,
-                gossipsub,
-                identify,
-                mdns,
-            }
-        })?
-        .build();
+    let behaviour = GitlawbBehaviour {
+        kademlia,
+        gossipsub,
+        identify,
+    };
+    // DNS wraps QUIC so multiaddrs like /dns6/<app>.internal/udp/…/quic-v1
+    // resolve at dial time. On Fly, peer nodes must dial each other over the
+    // private 6PN network via <app>.internal hostnames — dialing through the
+    // public anycast edge breaks the handshake (the proxy closes the
+    // connection mid-stream).
+    let quic = libp2p_quic::tokio::Transport::new(libp2p_quic::Config::new(&local_key))
+        .map(|(peer_id, muxer), _| (peer_id, StreamMuxerBox::new(muxer)));
+    let transport = libp2p_dns::tokio::Transport::system(quic)?.boxed();
+    let mut swarm = Swarm::new(
+        transport,
+        behaviour,
+        local_peer_id,
+        libp2p_swarm::Config::with_tokio_executor(),
+    );
 
     // Subscribe to the ref-updates topic
     let topic = gossipsub::IdentTopic::new(REF_UPDATES_TOPIC);
     swarm.behaviour_mut().gossipsub.subscribe(&topic)?;
 
-    // Listen
-    let listen_addr: Multiaddr = format!("/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/{listen_port}").parse()?;
-    swarm.listen_on(listen_addr)?;
+    // Listen on both IPv4 (local/mDNS + any IPv4 dials) and IPv6 (required
+    // for Fly's 6PN inter-app network — <app>.internal DNS only returns AAAA
+    // records, so peers dial us via IPv6 and need a matching IPv6 socket).
+    let v4: Multiaddr = format!("/ip4/0.0.0.0/udp/{listen_port}/quic-v1").parse()?;
+    if let Err(e) = swarm.listen_on(v4) {
+        warn!(err = %e, "failed to listen on IPv4");
+    }
+    let v6: Multiaddr = format!("/ip6/::/udp/{listen_port}/quic-v1").parse()?;
+    if let Err(e) = swarm.listen_on(v6) {
+        warn!(err = %e, "failed to listen on IPv6");
+    }
 
     // Bootstrap Kademlia with known peers
     for addr in bootstrap_addrs {
@@ -270,8 +273,18 @@ pub async fn start(
 
     // Start the event loop as a background task
     tokio::spawn(async move {
+        let mut shutdown_rx = shutdown_rx;
         loop {
             tokio::select! {
+                // Graceful shutdown: exit the swarm loop when the
+                // process-wide signal flips. This drops the Swarm
+                // which closes all libp2p connections cleanly.
+                _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
+                    if *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
+                        info!("p2p swarm: shutdown signal received, exiting event loop");
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
                 // Handle swarm events
                 event = swarm.select_next_some() => {
                     match event {
@@ -343,15 +356,6 @@ pub async fn start(
                             }
                         }
 
-                        SwarmEvent::Behaviour(GitlawbBehaviourEvent::Mdns(
-                            mdns::Event::Discovered(peers)
-                        )) => {
-                            for (peer_id, addr) in peers {
-                                debug!(peer = %peer_id, addr = %addr, "mDNS discovered peer");
-                                swarm.behaviour_mut().kademlia.add_address(&peer_id, addr.clone());
-                                let _ = swarm.dial(addr);
-                            }
-                        }
                         SwarmEvent::Behaviour(GitlawbBehaviourEvent::Identify(
                             identify::Event::Received { peer_id, info, .. }
                         )) => {

crates/gitlawb-node/src/pinata.rs

@@ -66,33 +66,28 @@ pub async fn pin_object(
     Ok(cid)
 }
 
-/// Pin all git objects in a repo that haven't yet been sent to Pinata.
+/// Pin any of the given candidate git objects that haven't yet been sent to
+/// Pinata.
 ///
-/// Objects already recorded with a `pinata_cid` in the DB are skipped.
-/// Returns `(sha_hex, cid)` pairs for each newly pinned object.
+/// `object_list` is the already-withheld-filtered OID set to pin: the caller
+/// applies `visibility_pack::replicable_objects` on the delta path or the
+/// `..._fail_closed` filter on the full-scan path before calling. `repo_path` is
+/// still needed to read each object's bytes. The twin in `ipfs_pin.rs` mirrors
+/// this shape — change both in lockstep. Objects already recorded with a
+/// `pinata_cid` are skipped. Returns `(sha_hex, cid)` pairs for each newly
+/// pinned object.
 pub async fn pin_new_objects(
     client: &reqwest::Client,
     upload_url: &str,
     jwt: &str,
     repo_path: &std::path::Path,
+    object_list: Vec<String>,
     db: &crate::db::Db,
 ) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
     if jwt.is_empty() {
         return vec![];
     }
 
-    let object_list = match list_all_objects(repo_path) {
-        Ok(v) => v,
-        Err(e) => {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                repo = %repo_path.display(),
-                err = %e,
-                "failed to list git objects for Pinata upload"
-            );
-            return vec![];
-        }
-    };
-
     let mut pinned = Vec::new();
 
     for sha in object_list {
@@ -131,29 +126,6 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
     pinned
 }
 
-fn list_all_objects(repo_path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
-    let out = std::process::Command::new("git")
-        .args([
-            "cat-file",
-            "--batch-all-objects",
-            "--batch-check=%(objectname)",
-        ])
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output()
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to run git cat-file: {e}"))?;
-
-    if !out.status.success() {
-        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr);
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}"));
-    }
-
-    Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout)
-        .lines()
-        .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
-        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
-        .collect())
-}
-
 // ── Tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 #[cfg(test)]

crates/gitlawb-node/src/rate_limit.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,608 @@
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+use axum::extract::{ConnectInfo, Request};
+use axum::http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode};
+use axum::middleware::Next;
+use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
+use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+
+use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
+
+/// Default ceiling on the number of distinct keys a limiter tracks. Bounds the
+/// limiter's own memory so a caller that can vary the key (many DIDs, or a
+/// spoofable IP header) cannot grow the map without limit.
+const DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS: usize = 100_000;
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+struct Window {
+    timestamps: Vec<Instant>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct RateLimiter {
+    state: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Window>>>,
+    max_requests: usize,
+    window: Duration,
+    /// Hard cap on tracked keys. When full, expired keys are evicted (at most
+    /// once per [`sweep_interval`](Self::sweep_interval), see below); if still
+    /// full, a request under a *new* key is rejected rather than inserted — so
+    /// the map can never exceed this bound and a rejected request never
+    /// allocates a new entry.
+    max_keys: usize,
+    /// Timestamp of the last inline capacity sweep. The eviction scan is
+    /// O(max_keys), so under a distinct-key flood (when the map sits at the
+    /// cap) running it on every miss would serialize all traffic behind a full
+    /// scan. Gating it to at most once per interval amortizes that cost; the
+    /// background [`cleanup`](Self::cleanup) loop still reclaims on its own.
+    last_sweep: Arc<Mutex<Instant>>,
+}
+
+impl RateLimiter {
+    // Retained for tests and callers that don't need a tight key bound;
+    // production limiters use `new_bounded`.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    pub fn new(max_requests: usize, window: Duration) -> Self {
+        Self::new_bounded(max_requests, window, DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS)
+    }
+
+    /// Like [`new`] but with an explicit cap on the number of distinct keys.
+    /// Production limiters keyed on client-influenced values (per-DID, per-IP)
+    /// set this so the limiter's own state cannot be turned into a
+    /// memory-exhaustion vector.
+    pub fn new_bounded(max_requests: usize, window: Duration, max_keys: usize) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            state: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
+            max_requests,
+            window,
+            max_keys: max_keys.max(1),
+            last_sweep: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Instant::now())),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// How often the inline capacity sweep may run: at most once per second, or
+    /// once per window when the window is shorter. Bounds post-flood staleness
+    /// (a full map self-heals within one interval) without paying the O(max_keys)
+    /// scan on every capacity miss.
+    fn sweep_interval(&self) -> Duration {
+        self.window.min(Duration::from_secs(1))
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) async fn check(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
+        // max_requests == 0 means the limiter is disabled, not "block all".
+        if self.max_requests == 0 {
+            return true;
+        }
+        let now = Instant::now();
+        let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
+
+        // Fast path: an already-tracked key never allocates and never grows the
+        // map, so it is unaffected by the key cap.
+        if let Some(window) = state.get_mut(key) {
+            window
+                .timestamps
+                .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
+            if window.timestamps.len() >= self.max_requests {
+                return false;
+            }
+            window.timestamps.push(now);
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        // New key. Enforce the cap BEFORE inserting so a flood of distinct keys
+        // cannot grow the map, and a rejected request never allocates an entry.
+        if state.len() >= self.max_keys {
+            // Reclaim expired keys, but at most once per sweep interval — the
+            // scan is O(max_keys) and the map sits at the cap precisely during a
+            // distinct-key flood, so sweeping per miss would serialize traffic
+            // behind a full scan. Between sweeps a new key is simply rejected.
+            let mut last_sweep = self.last_sweep.lock().await;
+            if now.duration_since(*last_sweep) >= self.sweep_interval() {
+                state.retain(|_, w| {
+                    w.timestamps
+                        .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
+                    !w.timestamps.is_empty()
+                });
+                *last_sweep = now;
+            }
+            drop(last_sweep);
+            if state.len() >= self.max_keys {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+        state.insert(
+            key.to_string(),
+            Window {
+                timestamps: vec![now],
+            },
+        );
+        true
+    }
+
+    pub async fn cleanup(&self) {
+        let now = Instant::now();
+        let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
+        state.retain(|_, w| {
+            w.timestamps
+                .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
+            !w.timestamps.is_empty()
+        });
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn rate_limit_by_did(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
+    let limiter = request.extensions().get::<RateLimiter>().cloned();
+
+    let did = request
+        .extensions()
+        .get::<AuthenticatedDid>()
+        .map(|a| a.0.clone());
+
+    if let (Some(limiter), Some(did)) = (limiter, did) {
+        if !limiter.check(&did).await {
+            return (
+                StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+                [("retry-after", "60")],
+                "rate limit exceeded — try again later",
+            )
+                .into_response();
+        }
+    }
+
+    next.run(request).await
+}
+
+/// Which forwarded header (if any) the operator's edge is trusted to set. Only
+/// a proxy the operator controls may be believed; a raw client can put any
+/// value in `Fly-Client-IP` / `X-Forwarded-For`, so trusting them unconditionally
+/// lets a flooder rotate the header and never fill a bucket. Configured via
+/// `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub enum TrustedProxy {
+    /// No trusted proxy: ignore forwarded headers, key on the socket peer IP.
+    /// Safe default for direct/self-hosted nodes.
+    None,
+    /// Behind Fly's edge, which sets (and overwrites any client-supplied)
+    /// `Fly-Client-IP`.
+    Fly,
+    /// Behind a single reverse proxy (e.g. Caddy on the AWS image) that appends
+    /// the real client as the rightmost `X-Forwarded-For` hop.
+    XForwardedFor,
+}
+
+impl TrustedProxy {
+    /// Parse `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`. Unknown/empty → `None` (trust nothing).
+    pub fn from_env_value(s: &str) -> Self {
+        match s.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
+            "fly" | "fly-client-ip" => TrustedProxy::Fly,
+            "xff" | "x-forwarded-for" | "caddy" => TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor,
+            _ => TrustedProxy::None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn trimmed_nonempty(v: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let t = v.trim();
+    (!t.is_empty()).then(|| t.to_string())
+}
+
+/// Resolve the rate-limit key for a request. In a trusted-proxy mode the
+/// operator's edge header is preferred; when that header is missing or empty we
+/// fall back to the socket peer address rather than skipping the limiter (a
+/// malformed header must never disable the brake). With no trusted proxy the
+/// socket peer is always used and forwarded headers are ignored entirely.
+/// Returns `None` only when neither a trusted header nor a peer address is
+/// available (e.g. a synthetic test request with no `ConnectInfo`).
+pub fn client_key(
+    headers: &HeaderMap,
+    peer: Option<SocketAddr>,
+    trust: TrustedProxy,
+) -> Option<String> {
+    let from_header = match trust {
+        TrustedProxy::None => None,
+        TrustedProxy::Fly => headers
+            .get("fly-client-ip")
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .and_then(trimmed_nonempty),
+        // Rightmost hop = the value appended by the immediately-upstream trusted
+        // proxy. The leftmost hop is client-controlled and must not be trusted.
+        TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor => headers
+            .get("x-forwarded-for")
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .and_then(|v| v.rsplit(',').next())
+            .and_then(trimmed_nonempty),
+    };
+    from_header.or_else(|| peer.map(|p| p.ip().to_string()))
+}
+
+/// Per-client-IP limiter for the git push path, carrying the trusted-proxy
+/// policy. A newtype so it can live in request extensions (keyed by type)
+/// alongside the per-DID [`RateLimiter`]. Per-DID limits are useless against a
+/// push flood from a DID farm (one throwaway DID per repo), so the push path
+/// throttles on the resolved client IP instead.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct IpRateLimiter {
+    pub limiter: RateLimiter,
+    pub trust: TrustedProxy,
+}
+
+/// Infallible extractor for the socket peer address from `ConnectInfo`. Yields
+/// `None` when the server was started without connect-info (e.g. `oneshot` in
+/// tests), so a handler never 500s on its absence — the limiter simply falls
+/// back per [`client_key`].
+pub struct PeerAddr(pub Option<SocketAddr>);
+
+impl<S: Send + Sync> axum::extract::FromRequestParts<S> for PeerAddr {
+    type Rejection = std::convert::Infallible;
+
+    async fn from_request_parts(
+        parts: &mut axum::http::request::Parts,
+        _state: &S,
+    ) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
+        Ok(PeerAddr(
+            parts
+                .extensions
+                .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
+                .map(|c| c.0),
+        ))
+    }
+}
+
+/// The shared 429 response for the per-IP flood brakes. Route-agnostic: this
+/// middleware now serves the push path AND the peer-sync routes, so the message
+/// stays generic (the offending path is recorded in the warn log below).
+pub fn too_many_requests() -> Response {
+    (
+        StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+        [("retry-after", "60")],
+        "rate limit exceeded — try again later",
+    )
+        .into_response()
+}
+
+/// Throttle the git push path by resolved client IP. The socket peer address is
+/// read from `ConnectInfo` (see `into_make_service_with_connect_info` in
+/// `main`). Only skips the limiter when no key can be resolved at all.
+pub async fn rate_limit_by_ip(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
+    let limiter = request.extensions().get::<IpRateLimiter>().cloned();
+    let peer = request
+        .extensions()
+        .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
+        .map(|c| c.0);
+
+    if let Some(limiter) = limiter {
+        if let Some(key) = client_key(request.headers(), peer, limiter.trust) {
+            if !limiter.limiter.check(&key).await {
+                tracing::warn!(key = %key, path = %request.uri().path(), "per-IP rate limit exceeded");
+                return too_many_requests();
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    next.run(request).await
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn allows_within_limit() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new(3, Duration::from_secs(60));
+        assert!(limiter.check("did:key:test1").await);
+        assert!(limiter.check("did:key:test1").await);
+        assert!(limiter.check("did:key:test1").await);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn blocks_over_limit() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new(2, Duration::from_secs(60));
+        assert!(limiter.check("did:key:test2").await);
+        assert!(limiter.check("did:key:test2").await);
+        assert!(!limiter.check("did:key:test2").await);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn separate_keys_independent() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60));
+        assert!(limiter.check("did:key:alice").await);
+        assert!(limiter.check("did:key:bob").await);
+        assert!(!limiter.check("did:key:alice").await);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn window_expires() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_millis(50));
+        assert!(limiter.check("did:key:test3").await);
+        assert!(!limiter.check("did:key:test3").await);
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(60)).await;
+        assert!(limiter.check("did:key:test3").await);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cleanup_removes_expired() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_millis(50));
+        limiter.check("did:key:stale").await;
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(60)).await;
+        limiter.cleanup().await;
+        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
+        assert!(state.is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn zero_limit_disables() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new(0, Duration::from_secs(60));
+        for _ in 0..1000 {
+            assert!(limiter.check("k").await);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // ── key-cap / memory-bound (P2) ──────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn caps_tracked_keys_and_rejects_new_ones_when_full() {
+        // Cap of 2 distinct keys; generous request budget so rejection is due to
+        // the key cap, not the per-key limit.
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(60), 2);
+        assert!(limiter.check("a").await);
+        assert!(limiter.check("b").await);
+        // Third distinct key would grow the map past the cap → rejected.
+        assert!(!limiter.check("c").await);
+        // The map never exceeded the cap, and the rejected key was NOT inserted.
+        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
+        assert_eq!(state.len(), 2);
+        assert!(!state.contains_key("c"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn known_key_unaffected_by_cap() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(60), 1);
+        assert!(limiter.check("a").await); // fills the single slot
+        assert!(limiter.check("a").await); // same key still served
+        assert!(!limiter.check("b").await); // new key rejected — cap full
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn expired_keys_evicted_to_admit_new_when_full() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_millis(40), 1);
+        assert!(limiter.check("old").await);
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(55)).await;
+        // "old" is now expired; a new key triggers inline eviction and is admitted.
+        assert!(limiter.check("new").await);
+        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
+        assert!(state.contains_key("new"));
+        assert!(!state.contains_key("old"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn capacity_sweep_is_amortized_within_interval() {
+        // The O(max_keys) eviction scan must not run on every capacity miss.
+        // With a 1s sweep interval, the resident (unexpired) key is never
+        // evicted by a burst of misses, so repeated new keys are all rejected
+        // without disturbing existing state.
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(1), 1);
+        assert!(limiter.check("resident").await);
+        for i in 0..100 {
+            assert!(
+                !limiter.check(&format!("flood-{i}")).await,
+                "new key must be rejected while the single slot is held"
+            );
+        }
+        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
+        assert_eq!(state.len(), 1, "no flood key was ever inserted");
+        assert!(state.contains_key("resident"));
+    }
+
+    // ── client_key / trusted-proxy resolution (P1 + P2) ─────────────────
+
+    fn headers(pairs: &[(&str, &str)]) -> HeaderMap {
+        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+        for (k, v) in pairs {
+            h.insert(
+                axum::http::HeaderName::from_bytes(k.as_bytes()).unwrap(),
+                v.parse().unwrap(),
+            );
+        }
+        h
+    }
+
+    fn peer(s: &str) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
+        Some(s.parse().unwrap())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn none_mode_ignores_headers_and_uses_peer() {
+        // Even a well-formed Fly header is ignored without a trusted proxy.
+        let h = headers(&[("fly-client-ip", "203.0.113.7")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::None).as_deref(),
+            Some("198.51.100.9")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fly_mode_trusts_fly_header() {
+        let h = headers(&[
+            ("fly-client-ip", "203.0.113.7"),
+            ("x-forwarded-for", "1.2.3.4"),
+        ]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::Fly).as_deref(),
+            Some("203.0.113.7")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fly_mode_empty_header_falls_back_to_peer_not_skip() {
+        // Empty Fly-Client-IP must NOT collapse traffic onto Some("") nor skip
+        // the limiter — it falls back to the real peer.
+        let h = headers(&[("fly-client-ip", "")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::Fly).as_deref(),
+            Some("198.51.100.9")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn xff_mode_uses_rightmost_hop_not_client_controlled_first() {
+        // Client prepends spoofed hops; only the rightmost (proxy-appended) is trusted.
+        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", "9.9.9.9, 8.8.8.8, 198.51.100.9")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
+            Some("198.51.100.9")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn xff_mode_empty_leading_hop_does_not_disable_brake() {
+        // "X-Forwarded-For: ,1.2.3.4" — rightmost hop is used; never None-skips.
+        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", ",1.2.3.4")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
+            Some("1.2.3.4")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn malformed_xff_falls_back_to_peer() {
+        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", " , ")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
+            Some("198.51.100.9")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn trusted_proxy_parsing() {
+        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value("fly"), TrustedProxy::Fly);
+        assert_eq!(
+            TrustedProxy::from_env_value("X-Forwarded-For"),
+            TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            TrustedProxy::from_env_value("caddy"),
+            TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor
+        );
+        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value(""), TrustedProxy::None);
+        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value("garbage"), TrustedProxy::None);
+    }
+
+    // ── middleware 429 path ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    /// A minimal router with the push limiter layered over an OK handler,
+    /// driven via `oneshot`. `ConnectInfo` is attached to each request directly
+    /// (as the production make-service does) so the middleware resolves a peer.
+    fn ip_limited_router(limiter: IpRateLimiter) -> axum::Router {
+        axum::Router::new()
+            .route(
+                "/o/r/git-receive-pack",
+                axum::routing::post(|| async { StatusCode::OK }),
+            )
+            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(rate_limit_by_ip))
+            .layer(axum::Extension(limiter))
+    }
+
+    async fn post_from(router: &axum::Router, peer: SocketAddr) -> StatusCode {
+        use tower::ServiceExt;
+        let mut req = axum::http::Request::builder()
+            .method(axum::http::Method::POST)
+            .uri("/o/r/git-receive-pack")
+            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
+            .unwrap();
+        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
+        router.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status()
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_returns_429_over_limit() {
+        let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
+            limiter: RateLimiter::new(2, Duration::from_secs(60)),
+            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
+        });
+        let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.7:5000".parse().unwrap();
+        // Two requests inside the budget, the third over it (shared Arc state).
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, peer).await, StatusCode::OK);
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, peer).await, StatusCode::OK);
+        assert_eq!(
+            post_from(&router, peer).await,
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_isolates_distinct_peers() {
+        let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
+            limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60)),
+            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
+        });
+        let a: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.1:1".parse().unwrap();
+        let b: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.2:1".parse().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, a).await, StatusCode::OK);
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, b).await, StatusCode::OK); // independent bucket
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, a).await, StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    }
+
+    // ── creation-route layering: IP brake runs BEFORE auth ──────────────
+
+    /// A minimal stand-in for the creation route group: an inner "auth" layer
+    /// that rejects every request with 401 (as signature verification would for
+    /// an unsigned caller), wrapped by the per-IP creation limiter as the
+    /// outermost layer — exactly the ordering `server::build_router` applies to
+    /// `/api/v1/repos` et al. Lets us assert the security-relevant property
+    /// (flood traffic is braked before auth burns CPU) without a database, which
+    /// the full `#[sqlx::test]` route test in `api::repos` cannot cover in the
+    /// plain unit-test pass.
+    fn ip_limited_over_auth_router(limiter: IpRateLimiter) -> axum::Router {
+        async fn always_unauthorized(_req: Request, _next: Next) -> Response {
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED.into_response()
+        }
+        axum::Router::new()
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos",
+                axum::routing::post(|| async { StatusCode::CREATED }),
+            )
+            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(always_unauthorized))
+            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(rate_limit_by_ip))
+            .layer(axum::Extension(limiter))
+    }
+
+    async fn post_repos_from(router: &axum::Router, peer: SocketAddr) -> StatusCode {
+        use tower::ServiceExt;
+        let mut req = axum::http::Request::builder()
+            .method(axum::http::Method::POST)
+            .uri("/api/v1/repos")
+            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
+            .unwrap();
+        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
+        router.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status()
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn creation_ip_brake_rejects_before_auth() {
+        // A DID farm mints a fresh signature per repo, so the per-DID limiter
+        // never trips; the per-IP brake is what stops the flood. It must run
+        // outermost, ahead of auth, so a flood is rejected with 429 before
+        // signature verification — otherwise every request would reach (and pay
+        // for) auth and merely 401.
+        let router = ip_limited_over_auth_router(IpRateLimiter {
+            limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60)),
+            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
+        });
+        let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.42:7000".parse().unwrap();
+
+        // First request passes the IP brake and reaches the (failing) auth layer.
+        assert_eq!(
+            post_repos_from(&router, peer).await,
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
+        );
+        // Budget now exhausted: the IP brake short-circuits with 429 *before*
+        // auth — proving the limiter is the outermost layer.
+        assert_eq!(
+            post_repos_from(&router, peer).await,
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+            "an exhausted IP must be braked with 429 before auth runs, not leak to 401"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/server.rs

@@ -13,14 +13,26 @@ use tower_http::trace::{DefaultOnFailure, DefaultOnResponse, TraceLayer};
 use tracing::Level;
 
 use crate::api::{
-    agents, arweave, bounties, certs, changelog, events, ipfs, issues, labels, peers, protect,
-    pulls, register, replicas, repos, resolve, stars, tasks, webhooks,
+    agents, arweave, bounties, certs, changelog, events, ipfs, issues, labels, peers, profiles,
+    protect, pulls, register, replicas, repos, resolve, stars, tasks, visibility, webhooks,
 };
 use crate::auth;
+use crate::rate_limit;
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
-async fn graphql_handler(State(state): State<AppState>, req: GraphQLRequest) -> GraphQLResponse {
-    state.graphql_schema.execute(req.into_inner()).await.into()
+async fn graphql_handler(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: Option<axum::Extension<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>>,
+    req: GraphQLRequest,
+) -> GraphQLResponse {
+    // `optional_signature` attaches the verified DID when a signature is present.
+    // Thread it into request-scoped GraphQL data; mutations enforce its presence
+    // in-resolver (N2) while queries stay open.
+    let mut inner = req.into_inner();
+    if let Some(axum::Extension(did)) = auth {
+        inner = inner.data(did);
+    }
+    state.graphql_schema.execute(inner).await.into()
 }
 
 async fn graphql_playground() -> impl IntoResponse {
@@ -30,132 +42,212 @@ async fn graphql_playground() -> impl IntoResponse {
     ))
 }
 
+/// Applies the standard auth middleware pair to a router: HTTP Signature verification
+/// followed by UCAN chain validation. The two layers run in this order for every
+/// matched request: `require_signature` first (sets `AuthenticatedDid`), then
+/// `require_ucan_chain` (reads it).
+fn add_auth_layers(router: Router<AppState>, state: AppState) -> Router<AppState> {
+    router
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(
+            state,
+            auth::require_ucan_chain,
+        ))
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::require_signature))
+}
+
 pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
     // ── GraphQL routes ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref().clone();
     let graphql_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/graphql", get(graphql_playground).post(graphql_handler))
+        // Attach the verified DID to /graphql when a signature is present. The
+        // layer covers only routes added before it, so /graphql/ws (added after,
+        // read-only subscriptions) stays open.
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature))
         .route_service("/graphql/ws", GraphQLSubscription::new(schema));
 
     // ── Task routes (write — require HTTP Signature) ───────────────────────
-    let task_write_routes = Router::new()
-        .route("/api/v1/tasks", post(tasks::create_task))
-        .route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}/claim", post(tasks::claim_task))
-        .route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}/complete", post(tasks::complete_task))
-        .route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}/fail", post(tasks::fail_task))
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::require_signature));
+    let task_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
+        Router::new()
+            .route("/api/v1/tasks", post(tasks::create_task))
+            .route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}/claim", post(tasks::claim_task))
+            .route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}/complete", post(tasks::complete_task))
+            .route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}/fail", post(tasks::fail_task)),
+        state.clone(),
+    );
 
     // ── Task routes (read — open) ──────────────────────────────────────────
     let task_read_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/api/v1/tasks", get(tasks::list_tasks))
         .route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}", get(tasks::get_task));
 
-    // ── Write routes — require HTTP Signature ──────────────────────────────
-    let write_routes = Router::new()
-        .route("/api/v1/repos", post(repos::create_repo))
-        .route("/api/register", post(register::register))
-        .route("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls", post(pulls::create_pr))
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/merge",
-            post(pulls::merge_pr),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/close",
-            post(pulls::close_pr),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/reviews",
-            post(pulls::create_review),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/comments",
-            post(pulls::create_comment),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks",
-            post(webhooks::create_webhook),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks/{id}",
-            axum::routing::delete(webhooks::delete_webhook),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/branches/{branch}/protect",
-            post(protect::protect_branch),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/branches/{branch}/protect",
-            axum::routing::delete(protect::unprotect_branch),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/star",
-            axum::routing::put(stars::star_repo),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/star",
-            axum::routing::delete(stars::unstar_repo),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/replicas",
-            axum::routing::put(replicas::register_replica),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/replicas",
-            axum::routing::delete(replicas::unregister_replica),
-        )
-        .route("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/fork", post(repos::fork_repo))
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/labels",
-            post(labels::add_label),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/labels/{label}",
-            axum::routing::delete(labels::remove_label),
-        )
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::require_signature));
+    // ── Rate-limited creation routes — require HTTP Signature, plus a per-DID
+    // throttle AND a per-IP flood brake. The per-DID limiter (inner) caps a
+    // single identity; the per-IP limiter (outer) caps a DID farm that mints a
+    // fresh throwaway did:key per repo to slip past both the per-DID limit and
+    // the iCaptcha gate — the mechanism behind the recurring spam-repo floods.
+    // The per-IP layer wraps the auth layer (outermost = runs first) so flood
+    // traffic is rejected before signature verification burns CPU, matching the
+    // push path.
+    let limiter = state.rate_limiter.clone();
+    let create_ip_limiter = rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
+        limiter: state.create_ip_rate_limiter.clone(),
+        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
+    };
+    let creation_routes = add_auth_layers(
+        Router::new()
+            .route("/api/v1/repos", post(repos::create_repo))
+            .route("/api/register", post(register::register))
+            .route("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/fork", post(repos::fork_repo))
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues",
+                post(issues::create_issue),
+            )
+            .route("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls", post(pulls::create_pr))
+            .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_did))
+            .layer(axum::Extension(limiter)),
+        state.clone(),
+    )
+    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+    .layer(axum::Extension(create_ip_limiter));
+
+    // ── Write routes — require HTTP Signature (no rate limit) ─────────────
+    let write_routes = add_auth_layers(
+        Router::new()
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/merge",
+                post(pulls::merge_pr),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/close",
+                post(pulls::close_pr),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/reviews",
+                post(pulls::create_review),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/comments",
+                post(pulls::create_comment),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks",
+                post(webhooks::create_webhook),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks/{id}",
+                axum::routing::delete(webhooks::delete_webhook),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/branches/{branch}/protect",
+                post(protect::protect_branch),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/branches/{branch}/protect",
+                axum::routing::delete(protect::unprotect_branch),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/star",
+                axum::routing::put(stars::star_repo),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/star",
+                axum::routing::delete(stars::unstar_repo),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/replicas",
+                axum::routing::put(replicas::register_replica),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/replicas",
+                axum::routing::delete(replicas::unregister_replica),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/labels",
+                post(labels::add_label),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/labels/{label}",
+                axum::routing::delete(labels::remove_label),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/visibility",
+                axum::routing::put(visibility::set_visibility)
+                    .delete(visibility::remove_visibility)
+                    .get(visibility::list_visibility),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/agents/{did}",
+                axum::routing::delete(agents::deregister_agent),
+            ),
+        state.clone(),
+    );
 
     // Body limit is raised to GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES (default 2 GB) for git
     // routes only — all other API routes keep axum's default 2 MB cap.
     // HTTP Signature is enforced on receive-pack (push) — the git-remote-gitlawb
     // helper signs requests with RFC 9421 signatures using the agent's keypair.
     let pack_limit = state.config.max_pack_bytes;
-    let git_write_routes = Router::new()
-        .route(
-            "/{owner}/{repo}/git-receive-pack",
-            post(repos::git_receive_pack),
-        )
-        .layer(DefaultBodyLimit::disable())
-        .layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(pack_limit))
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::require_signature));
+    // Per-IP throttle wraps the auth layer (outermost = runs first): flood
+    // traffic is rejected before signature verification burns CPU. Per-DID
+    // limiting is deliberately NOT used here — a DID farm (one throwaway
+    // identity per repo, as in the June 2026 push flood) never trips it.
+    let push_limiter = rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
+        limiter: state.push_rate_limiter.clone(),
+        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
+    };
+    let git_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
+        Router::new()
+            .route(
+                "/{owner}/{repo}/git-receive-pack",
+                post(repos::git_receive_pack),
+            )
+            .layer(DefaultBodyLimit::disable())
+            .layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(pack_limit)),
+        state.clone(),
+    )
+    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+    .layer(axum::Extension(push_limiter));
 
     // ── IPFS content-addressed retrieval and pin listing ──────────────────
+    // `/ipfs/{cid}` carries `optional_signature` so `get_by_cid` sees the caller
+    // identity and can apply per-repo visibility (#110); anonymous callers stay
+    // anonymous and still read genuinely public content. `/api/v1/ipfs/pins`
+    // stays unsigned — gating the pin index is tracked separately (#121).
     let ipfs_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/ipfs/{cid}", get(ipfs::get_by_cid))
-        .route("/api/v1/ipfs/pins", get(ipfs::list_pins));
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature))
+        .merge(Router::new().route("/api/v1/ipfs/pins", get(ipfs::list_pins)));
 
     // ── Arweave permanent anchors ──────────────────────────────────────────
     let arweave_routes = Router::new().route("/api/v1/arweave/anchors", get(arweave::list_anchors));
 
     // ── Bounty routes (write — require HTTP Signature) ─────────────────
-    let bounty_write_routes = Router::new()
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/bounties",
-            post(bounties::create_bounty),
-        )
-        .route("/api/v1/bounties/{id}/claim", post(bounties::claim_bounty))
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/bounties/{id}/submit",
-            post(bounties::submit_bounty),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/bounties/{id}/approve",
-            post(bounties::approve_bounty),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/bounties/{id}/cancel",
-            post(bounties::cancel_bounty),
-        )
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::require_signature));
+    let bounty_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
+        Router::new()
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/bounties",
+                post(bounties::create_bounty),
+            )
+            .route("/api/v1/bounties/{id}/claim", post(bounties::claim_bounty))
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/bounties/{id}/submit",
+                post(bounties::submit_bounty),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/bounties/{id}/approve",
+                post(bounties::approve_bounty),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/bounties/{id}/cancel",
+                post(bounties::cancel_bounty),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/bounties/{id}/dispute",
+                post(bounties::dispute_bounty),
+            ),
+        state.clone(),
+    );
 
     // ── Bounty routes (read — open) ──────────────────────────────────────
     let bounty_read_routes = Router::new()
@@ -165,41 +257,75 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         )
         .route("/api/v1/bounties", get(bounties::list_all_bounties))
         .route("/api/v1/bounties/{id}", get(bounties::get_bounty))
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/bounties/{id}/dispute",
-            post(bounties::dispute_bounty),
-        )
         .route("/api/v1/bounties/stats", get(bounties::bounty_stats))
         .route(
             "/api/v1/agents/{did}/bounties",
             get(bounties::agent_bounty_stats),
-        );
+        )
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature));
 
-    // ── Issue routes ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    let issue_write_routes = Router::new()
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues",
-            post(issues::create_issue),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{id}/close",
-            post(issues::close_issue),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{id}/comments",
-            post(issues::create_issue_comment),
-        )
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::require_signature));
+    // ── Profile routes (write — require HTTP Signature) ─────────────────
+    let profile_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
+        Router::new().route("/api/v1/profile", axum::routing::put(profiles::set_profile)),
+        state.clone(),
+    );
+
+    // ── Issue routes (write — require HTTP Signature, no rate limit) ─────
+    let issue_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
+        Router::new()
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{id}/close",
+                post(issues::close_issue),
+            )
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{id}/comments",
+                post(issues::create_issue_comment),
+            ),
+        state.clone(),
+    );
 
     // ── Peer discovery routes ─────────────────────────────────────────────
-    // announce is intentionally unauthenticated — nodes announce by DID which
-    // is self-proving; rate-limiting and blocklisting are handled elsewhere.
+    // Peer writes accept signatures when present and can require them after a
+    // coordinated live-network upgrade.
     let peer_read_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/api/v1/peers", get(peers::list_peers))
+        .route("/api/v1/peers/{did}/ping", get(peers::ping_peer));
+
+    // /sync/trigger drives an O(peers) outbound fan-out + per-repo enqueue, so it
+    // ALWAYS requires a signature (both config modes) and carries a tight per-IP
+    // brake. A signature alone does not cap cost — a did:key farm self-registers
+    // (INV-10) — so the IP brake is a separate, load-bearing half. The brake is
+    // outermost (runs before signature verification burns CPU) and is keyed on the
+    // client IP before any DID is read, so DID rotation cannot bypass it.
+    let sync_trigger_routes = add_auth_layers(
+        Router::new().route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(peers::trigger_sync)),
+        state.clone(),
+    )
+    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+    .layer(axum::Extension(rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
+        limiter: state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter.clone(),
+        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
+    }));
+
+    // announce + notify keep their rolling-upgrade signature behavior (unsigned
+    // accepted until all peers upgrade), but both reach peer-write side effects —
+    // notify hits the same enqueue_sync sink as trigger — so they carry a per-IP
+    // brake too, on a SEPARATE bucket from trigger's, so an unsigned notify flood
+    // cannot drain the signed trigger caller's quota.
+    let mut peer_write_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/api/v1/peers/announce", post(peers::announce))
-        .route("/api/v1/peers/{did}/ping", get(peers::ping_peer))
-        .route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(peers::trigger_sync))
         .route("/api/v1/sync/notify", post(peers::notify_sync));
+    peer_write_routes = if state.config.require_signed_peer_writes {
+        add_auth_layers(peer_write_routes, state.clone())
+    } else {
+        peer_write_routes.layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature))
+    };
+    let peer_write_routes = peer_write_routes
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+        .layer(axum::Extension(rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
+            limiter: state.peer_write_rate_limiter.clone(),
+            trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
+        }));
 
     // ── Read routes — open for public repos ───────────────────────────────
     let read_routes = Router::new()
@@ -250,6 +376,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route("/api/v1/agents", get(agents::list_agents))
         .route("/api/v1/agents/{did}", get(agents::show_agent))
         .route("/api/v1/agents/{did}/trust", get(agents::get_trust))
+        .route("/api/v1/agents/{did}/profile", get(profiles::get_profile))
         .route("/api/v1/events/ref-updates", get(events::list_ref_updates))
         .route("/api/v1/resolve/{did}", get(resolve::resolve_did))
         .route("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls", get(pulls::list_prs))
@@ -290,22 +417,45 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/replicas",
             get(replicas::list_replicas),
         )
-        .route("/{owner}/{repo}/info/refs", get(repos::git_info_refs));
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature));
 
     // git-upload-pack (clone/fetch) — same raised body limit as receive-pack so
     // large pack responses from the server don't get truncated on the client side.
     let git_read_routes = Router::new()
+        .route("/{owner}/{repo}/info/refs", get(repos::git_info_refs))
         .route(
             "/{owner}/{repo}/git-upload-pack",
             post(repos::git_upload_pack),
         )
+        .route(
+            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/withheld-paths",
+            axum::routing::get(visibility::withheld_paths),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/icaptcha-proof",
+            axum::routing::get(repos::get_icaptcha_proof),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs",
+            axum::routing::get(crate::api::encrypted::list_encrypted_blobs),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blob/{oid}",
+            axum::routing::get(crate::api::encrypted::get_encrypted_blob),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs/replicate",
+            axum::routing::get(crate::api::encrypted::replicate_encrypted_blobs),
+        )
         .layer(DefaultBodyLimit::disable())
-        .layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(pack_limit));
+        .layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(pack_limit))
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature));
 
     // ── Meta ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     let meta_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/", get(node_info))
         .route("/health", get(health))
+        .route("/ready", get(ready))
         .route("/api/v1/p2p/info", get(p2p_info))
         .route("/api/v1/stats", get(stats))
         .route("/api/v1/contracts", get(contracts_info));
@@ -316,12 +466,16 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .merge(task_read_routes)
         .merge(bounty_write_routes)
         .merge(bounty_read_routes)
+        .merge(profile_write_routes)
+        .merge(creation_routes)
         .merge(write_routes)
         .merge(git_write_routes)
         .merge(git_read_routes)
         .merge(issue_write_routes)
         .merge(read_routes)
         .merge(peer_read_routes)
+        .merge(peer_write_routes)
+        .merge(sync_trigger_routes)
         .merge(ipfs_routes)
         .merge(arweave_routes)
         .merge(meta_routes)
@@ -344,6 +498,26 @@ async fn health() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
     Json(json!({ "status": "ok" }))
 }
 
+/// Readiness = "this node can serve real traffic", and every real endpoint
+/// depends on the database, so probe it rather than reporting a constant.
+/// The probe gets its own short bound so a wedged pool can't hang the health
+/// check for the full acquire timeout.
+async fn ready(State(state): State<AppState>) -> axum::response::Response {
+    let probe = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2), state.db.ping()).await;
+    match probe {
+        Ok(Ok(())) => Json(json!({ "status": "ready" })).into_response(),
+        _ => (
+            axum::http::StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+            Json(json!({
+                "status": "degraded",
+                "error": crate::error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
+                "message": crate::error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
+            })),
+        )
+            .into_response(),
+    }
+}
+
 async fn node_info(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
     let p2p_peer_id = state.p2p.as_ref().map(|h| h.local_peer_id.to_string());
     Json(json!({
@@ -358,13 +532,31 @@ async fn node_info(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
     }))
 }
 
-async fn stats(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
-    let repos = state
-        .db
-        .list_all_repos()
-        .await
-        .map(|r| r.len() as i64)
-        .unwrap_or(0);
+pub(crate) async fn stats(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
+    // Count only the repos an anonymous caller could list, so the aggregate does
+    // not leak the existence of private/mode-A repos (#104 count oracle). Mirror
+    // the listing seam (api/repos.rs): over-fetch the deduped set, batch-load the
+    // visibility rules, and keep rows that pass listable_at_root. The caller is
+    // always None — meta_routes carries no auth layer (see the route group in this
+    // file). Fail closed: any DB error collapses the whole count to 0 (an
+    // under-count never leaks existence), preserving the prior `.unwrap_or(0)`.
+    let repos = async {
+        // stats only needs the count, so use the no-stars deduped list (same
+        // DEDUP_CTE) and skip the repo_stars aggregation the listing path needs.
+        let rows = state.db.list_all_repos_deduped().await?;
+        let ids: Vec<String> = rows.iter().map(|r| r.id.clone()).collect();
+        let rules_by_repo = state.db.list_visibility_rules_for_repos(&ids).await?;
+        let count = rows
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|r| {
+                let rules = rules_by_repo.get(&r.id).map(Vec::as_slice).unwrap_or(&[]);
+                crate::visibility::listable_at_root(rules, r.is_public, &r.owner_did, None)
+            })
+            .count() as i64;
+        Ok::<i64, anyhow::Error>(count)
+    }
+    .await
+    .unwrap_or(0);
     let agents = state.db.count_agents().await.unwrap_or(0);
     let pushes = state.db.count_pushes().await.unwrap_or(0);
     Json(json!({

crates/gitlawb-node/src/state.rs

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ use crate::config::Config;
 use crate::db::Db;
 use crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore;
 use crate::p2p::P2pHandle;
+use crate::rate_limit::RateLimiter;
 
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct RefUpdateBroadcast {
@@ -48,4 +49,72 @@ pub struct AppState {
     pub machine_id: Option<String>,
     /// Centralized repo storage: local disk cache + optional Tigris backend
     pub repo_store: RepoStore,
+    /// Per-DID rate limiter for creation endpoints (repos, issues, PRs)
+    pub rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// Per-client-IP rate limiter for the same creation endpoints. The per-DID
+    /// limiter above cannot brake a creation flood from a DID farm — one
+    /// throwaway `did:key` per repo means each DID makes a single create call
+    /// and never trips its own bucket. A valid iCaptcha proof does not cap this
+    /// either: the enforced level draws only machine-solvable deterministic
+    /// challenges (and the caller can pin the easy type), so a bot mints a fresh
+    /// DID, solves a proof, and creates a repo unthrottled. Braking on the
+    /// resolved client IP is what actually stops a single-source flood (same
+    /// rationale as `push_rate_limiter`). Keyed by `push_limiter_trust`.
+    pub create_ip_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// Per-client-IP rate limiter for git-receive-pack. Per-DID limits cannot
+    /// brake a push flood from a DID farm (one throwaway DID per repo), so the
+    /// push path throttles on the resolved client IP instead.
+    pub push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// Which forwarded header (if any) the edge is trusted to set, for
+    /// resolving the push limiter's client-IP key. See `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`.
+    /// Node-wide; also keys the two peer-sync limiters below.
+    pub push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy,
+    /// Per-client-IP limiter for `POST /api/v1/sync/trigger` (tight). The route
+    /// requires a signature, but a signature does not cap cost (a did:key farm
+    /// self-registers), and its per-call cost is an O(peers) fan-out, so the IP
+    /// brake is a separate, load-bearing half. Its own bucket so an unsigned
+    /// `/sync/notify` flood cannot drain the signed trigger caller's quota.
+    pub sync_trigger_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// Per-client-IP limiter for the peer-write routes (`/peers/announce`,
+    /// `/sync/notify`) (generous). `/sync/notify` reaches the same `enqueue_sync`
+    /// sink as trigger and accepts unsigned requests from known peers, so it is
+    /// braked too; each peer's distinct IP gets its own bucket.
+    pub peer_write_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// Process-wide graceful-shutdown signal. Sending `true` causes every
+    /// task that holds a `watch::Receiver` to exit at its next await point.
+    /// Used by:
+    ///   * the SIGINT/SIGTERM handler in `main()`
+    ///   * axum's `with_graceful_shutdown` to drain in-flight HTTP requests
+    ///   * the libp2p swarm task
+    ///   * the gossip, sync, operator heartbeat, and rate-limit cleanup loops
+    pub shutdown_tx: tokio::sync::watch::Sender<bool>,
+}
+
+impl AppState {
+    /// Subscribe to the shutdown signal. Returns a fresh receiver whose
+    /// initial value matches the current state.
+    pub fn subscribe_shutdown(&self) -> tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bool> {
+        self.shutdown_tx.subscribe()
+    }
+
+    /// Trigger graceful shutdown. Idempotent — calling more than once
+    /// has no effect. Returns `true` if this call was the one that
+    /// flipped the signal.
+    #[allow(dead_code)] // used by tests; main() drives the signal directly
+    pub fn shutdown(&self) -> bool {
+        self.shutdown_tx.send_if_modified(|v| {
+            if *v {
+                false
+            } else {
+                *v = true;
+                true
+            }
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// `true` once shutdown has been signalled.
+    #[allow(dead_code)] // used by tests and any future handler that wants to short-circuit
+    pub fn is_shutting_down(&self) -> bool {
+        *self.shutdown_tx.borrow()
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/visibility.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,848 @@
+//! Pure read-authorization logic for path-scoped visibility.
+//!
+//! `visibility_check` decides whether a caller may read a given path in a repo,
+//! based on the repo's visibility rules with a fallback to the legacy
+//! `is_public` flag. It performs no I/O so it is exhaustively unit tested.
+
+use crate::db::{RepoRecord, VisibilityRule};
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use unicode_normalization::UnicodeNormalization;
+
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum Decision {
+    Allow,
+    Deny,
+}
+
+/// NFC-normalize a glob prefix or path so the matcher compares canonically
+/// equivalent strings byte-for-byte. Without this, a deny rule authored NFC
+/// (`é` = U+00E9) byte-compares unequal to a path committed NFD (`e` + U+0301)
+/// and the blob slips past the rule on the replication path (#101). NFC, not
+/// NFKC: compatibility folding (ligatures, full-width forms) would merge paths
+/// the filesystem treats as distinct and over-withhold. Both sides of every
+/// comparison must pass through this, or the skew just moves.
+fn nfc(s: &str) -> String {
+    s.nfc().collect()
+}
+
+/// True if `caller` is the repo owner. Uses [`crate::api::did_matches`] so the
+/// owner check is representation-agnostic within `did:key` (full `did:key:z...`
+/// matches bare `z...` stored by mirror rows) while still denying cross-method
+/// collisions (`did:gitlawb:z...` vs bare `z...`).
+fn is_owner(owner_did: &str, caller: &str) -> bool {
+    crate::api::did_matches(owner_did, caller)
+}
+
+/// The match prefix for a glob: "/" stays "/", "/secret/**" becomes "/secret".
+fn glob_prefix(glob: &str) -> &str {
+    let p = glob.trim_end_matches("**").trim_end_matches('/');
+    if p.is_empty() {
+        "/"
+    } else {
+        p
+    }
+}
+
+/// Does `glob` match `path`? "/" matches everything; "/secret" matches
+/// "/secret" and any "/secret/..." descendant.
+fn glob_matches(glob: &str, path: &str) -> bool {
+    let prefix = glob_prefix(glob);
+    if prefix == "/" {
+        return true;
+    }
+    // Compare in NFC so an NFC rule matches a canonically-equivalent NFD path
+    // (and vice versa). Both sides normalized here — the single matcher seam.
+    let prefix = nfc(prefix);
+    let path = nfc(path);
+    path == prefix || path.starts_with(&format!("{prefix}/"))
+}
+
+/// Specificity = length of the (normalized) match prefix; longer is more
+/// specific. Normalized so ranking stays consistent with `glob_matches`.
+fn specificity(glob: &str) -> usize {
+    nfc(glob_prefix(glob)).len()
+}
+
+/// Decide whether `caller` (None = anonymous) may read `path` in a repo.
+/// `path` is "/" for a whole-repo clone/fetch.
+///
+/// Reader DIDs in a rule are matched exactly, so they must be stored in full
+/// `did:key:...` form. The owner is the only identity matched in both full and
+/// short form.
+pub fn visibility_check(
+    rules: &[VisibilityRule],
+    is_public: bool,
+    owner_did: &str,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+    path: &str,
+) -> Decision {
+    // The owner can always read everything.
+    if let Some(c) = caller {
+        if is_owner(owner_did, c) {
+            return Decision::Allow;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Most-specific matching rule wins. On equal specificity the last rule in
+    // DB order is chosen; `list_visibility_rules` orders by `path_glob`, so this
+    // is deterministic.
+    let best = rules
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|r| glob_matches(&r.path_glob, path))
+        .max_by_key(|r| specificity(&r.path_glob));
+
+    match best {
+        Some(rule) => {
+            // Phase 1 treats every matching rule as an allow-list keyed by
+            // `reader_dids`. `rule.mode` (A vs B) is stored from day one but not
+            // acted on here; it governs replication behavior in Phases 2-3.
+            let allowed = caller
+                .map(|c| rule.reader_dids.iter().any(|d| d == c))
+                .unwrap_or(false);
+            if allowed {
+                Decision::Allow
+            } else {
+                Decision::Deny
+            }
+        }
+        None => {
+            if is_public {
+                Decision::Allow
+            } else {
+                Decision::Deny
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Whether `caller` (None = anonymous) may see a repo in a listing — the `"/"`
+/// visibility decision, shared by every repo-listing surface (REST list,
+/// federated list, GraphQL `repos`) so they enforce one rule, not three drifting
+/// copies. Not a bare `is_public` test: a repo can be `is_public=false` with a
+/// root rule granting readers, or `is_public=true` with a root deny (#97).
+pub fn listable_at_root(
+    rules: &[VisibilityRule],
+    is_public: bool,
+    owner_did: &str,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+) -> bool {
+    visibility_check(rules, is_public, owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Allow
+}
+
+/// Whether a single `received_ref_updates` row (identified by its peer-supplied
+/// `row_repo` slug) should be shown to `caller` (None = anonymous) on the
+/// cross-repo ref-updates feeds (#112 GraphQL, #114 REST).
+///
+/// Pure and I/O-free: both call sites load the deduped local repo set and its
+/// visibility rules once per request and pass them in, so the gate logic lives
+/// here and visibility.rs keeps its "no I/O" property.
+///
+/// The slug is written verbatim from the inbound gossip/notify message, so it is
+/// untrusted input, not a canonical key. The decision is fail-closed by
+/// construction: the only KEEP paths are (a) a slug with no `/` (cannot name a
+/// local `owner/name` pair, so remote by definition), (b) all matched local
+/// records are readable, and (c) no local record matches (remote/gossip-only).
+/// Any local match the caller cannot read at root DROPs the row. There is no
+/// catch-all keep on unexpected state.
+///
+/// Slug/record owner keys are matched prefix-tolerantly (one is a prefix of the
+/// other), covering the exact short-key, the full `did:key:` form, and the
+/// URL-truncated 8-char form. Prefix over-match can only over-drop a genuinely
+/// remote row (fail-safe), never over-serve a private local one.
+///
+/// The live call sites are the #112 (GraphQL) and #114 (REST) feed handlers,
+/// added in the following units; exercised by the unit tests below meanwhile.
+pub fn ref_update_row_visible(
+    deduped: &[RepoRecord],
+    rules_by_repo: &HashMap<String, Vec<VisibilityRule>>,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+    row_repo: &str,
+) -> bool {
+    // A slug with no '/' cannot name a local owner/name pair — remote by
+    // definition (same branch as "matches nothing local") → KEEP.
+    if row_repo.rsplit_once('/').is_none() {
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    // Match each local record with the shared slug predicate (one matcher, so
+    // this gate and the collector's quarantine drop cannot disagree about which
+    // rows a repo owns), then fail closed on any matched record the caller
+    // cannot read at root.
+    for record in deduped {
+        if !ref_update_row_names_repo(record, row_repo) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let rules = rules_by_repo
+            .get(&record.id)
+            .map(Vec::as_slice)
+            .unwrap_or(&[]);
+        if !listable_at_root(rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller) {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Reached only if every matched local record is readable, or nothing local
+    // matched (remote/gossip-only). Both are the KEEP paths; there is no
+    // default-keep on unexpected state — an unreadable match already returned.
+    true
+}
+
+/// Whether `row_repo`'s peer-supplied slug names the local `record`. The single
+/// match predicate shared by the feed gate ([`ref_update_row_visible`]) and the
+/// quarantine hard-drop in the ref-update collector, so the two cannot diverge
+/// about which rows a repo owns — a second, drifting matcher is exactly the #134
+/// slug-collision class.
+///
+/// A record matches when the slug's `name` half is equal and one owner key is a
+/// prefix of the other (prefix-tolerant: exact short key, full `did:key:` form,
+/// and the URL-truncated 8-char form). Both the slug owner and the record owner
+/// are reduced to their last ':'-delimited segment before comparing. The node's
+/// own emitter builds the wire slug via `normalize_owner_key` (bare short key for
+/// a single-segment `did:key:`, the full DID for every other method; see
+/// api/repos.rs), but the stored slug is UNTRUSTED: a peer can broadcast a row
+/// under any owner form, including a method-stripped `user/name`. Reducing both
+/// sides to the trailing segment matches a repo's own rows whichever form keyed
+/// them, and still catches an attacker-planted short slug.
+///
+/// This intentionally diverges from `did_matches` / `DEDUP_CTE`, which strip only
+/// bare `did:key:` and keep other DID methods whole: those compare trusted,
+/// canonical DIDs, while this slug is untrusted. Applying the keep-whole rule here
+/// would fail open: a hostile `user/name` slug would not prefix-match a private
+/// `did:web:host:user` record and would leak. The price is a fail-SAFE over-match
+/// when a remote owner shares both a trailing segment and a repo name with a local
+/// private repo (negligible for full did:key ids; only did:web / truncated forms
+/// collide): it can hide a genuinely remote row, never serve a private one.
+pub fn ref_update_row_names_repo(record: &RepoRecord, row_repo: &str) -> bool {
+    let Some((owner_part, name)) = row_repo.rsplit_once('/') else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    if record.name != name {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let row_key = owner_part.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner_part);
+    let record_key = record
+        .owner_did
+        .split(':')
+        .next_back()
+        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    record_key.starts_with(row_key) || row_key.starts_with(record_key)
+}
+
+/// The subtree path globs that `caller` (None = anonymous) may NOT read, given
+/// the repo's rules. Whole-repo ("/") rules are excluded: a denied whole-repo
+/// read is handled by the 404 gate before a clone ever starts. Each remaining
+/// rule is reported when `visibility_check` denies the caller at the glob's
+/// representative path. Used by the clean-clone client to sparse-exclude the
+/// private paths from checkout.
+pub fn withheld_globs(
+    rules: &[VisibilityRule],
+    is_public: bool,
+    owner_did: &str,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+) -> Vec<String> {
+    rules
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|r| r.path_glob != "/")
+        .filter(|r| {
+            let probe = glob_prefix(&r.path_glob);
+            visibility_check(rules, is_public, owner_did, caller, probe) == Decision::Deny
+        })
+        .map(|r| r.path_glob.clone())
+        .collect()
+}
+
+/// The allowed globs that sit strictly underneath a denied glob. A clean-clone
+/// client sparse-excludes everything in `withheld_globs`, which would also hide
+/// these nested allowed paths; re-including them restores the caller's access.
+/// Example: with `/secret/**` denied and `/secret/public/**` allowed for the
+/// same caller, `/secret/public/**` is returned here so the client re-includes
+/// it after excluding `/secret/`.
+pub fn reincluded_globs(
+    rules: &[VisibilityRule],
+    is_public: bool,
+    owner_did: &str,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+) -> Vec<String> {
+    let denied: Vec<&str> = rules
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|r| r.path_glob != "/")
+        .filter(|r| {
+            visibility_check(
+                rules,
+                is_public,
+                owner_did,
+                caller,
+                glob_prefix(&r.path_glob),
+            ) == Decision::Deny
+        })
+        .map(|r| glob_prefix(&r.path_glob))
+        .collect();
+
+    rules
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|r| r.path_glob != "/")
+        .filter(|r| {
+            visibility_check(
+                rules,
+                is_public,
+                owner_did,
+                caller,
+                glob_prefix(&r.path_glob),
+            ) == Decision::Allow
+        })
+        .filter(|r| {
+            let p = glob_prefix(&r.path_glob);
+            denied
+                .iter()
+                .any(|d| *d != p && p.starts_with(&format!("{d}/")))
+        })
+        .map(|r| r.path_glob.clone())
+        .collect()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::db::VisibilityMode;
+    use chrono::Utc;
+
+    fn rule(path_glob: &str, mode: VisibilityMode, readers: &[&str]) -> VisibilityRule {
+        VisibilityRule {
+            id: "x".into(),
+            repo_id: "r1".into(),
+            path_glob: path_glob.into(),
+            mode,
+            reader_dids: readers.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect(),
+            created_by: "did:key:z6MkOwner".into(),
+            created_at: Utc::now(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    const OWNER: &str = "did:key:z6MkOwner";
+
+    #[test]
+    fn withheld_globs_lists_only_denied_subtrees() {
+        let rules = [
+            rule("/secret/**", VisibilityMode::B, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"]),
+            rule("/docs/**", VisibilityMode::B, &["did:key:z6MkStranger"]),
+        ];
+        // Stranger is denied /secret but allowed /docs.
+        let mut got = withheld_globs(&rules, true, OWNER, Some("did:key:z6MkStranger"));
+        got.sort();
+        assert_eq!(got, vec!["/secret/**".to_string()]);
+        // Owner is denied nothing.
+        assert!(withheld_globs(&rules, true, OWNER, Some(OWNER)).is_empty());
+        // Anonymous is denied both.
+        let mut anon = withheld_globs(&rules, true, OWNER, None);
+        anon.sort();
+        assert_eq!(anon, vec!["/docs/**".to_string(), "/secret/**".to_string()]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn reincluded_globs_restores_allowed_nested_path() {
+        let rules = [
+            rule("/secret/**", VisibilityMode::B, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"]),
+            rule(
+                "/secret/public/**",
+                VisibilityMode::B,
+                &["did:key:z6MkFriend", "did:key:z6MkStranger"],
+            ),
+        ];
+        // Stranger is denied /secret/** but allowed the nested /secret/public/**.
+        let withheld = withheld_globs(&rules, true, OWNER, Some("did:key:z6MkStranger"));
+        assert_eq!(withheld, vec!["/secret/**".to_string()]);
+        let reinc = reincluded_globs(&rules, true, OWNER, Some("did:key:z6MkStranger"));
+        assert_eq!(reinc, vec!["/secret/public/**".to_string()]);
+        // Owner is denied nothing, so there is nothing to re-include.
+        assert!(reincluded_globs(&rules, true, OWNER, Some(OWNER)).is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_rules_public_allows_anonymous() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&[], true, OWNER, None, "/"),
+            Decision::Allow
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_rules_private_denies_anonymous() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&[], false, OWNER, None, "/"),
+            Decision::Deny
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn root_rule_denies_anonymous() {
+        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, None, "/"),
+            Decision::Deny
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn root_rule_allows_owner() {
+        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, Some(OWNER), "/"),
+            Decision::Allow
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn root_rule_allows_owner_short_form() {
+        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, Some("z6MkOwner"), "/"),
+            Decision::Allow
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn non_key_owner_bare_short_does_not_match() {
+        // A non-key DID owner (did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo) probed with the bare last
+        // segment (z6MkFoo) must NOT match — the old is_owner would return true
+        // via split(':').next_back(), which this PR tightens.
+        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, false, "did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo", Some("z6MkFoo"), "/"),
+            Decision::Deny,
+            "bare short must not match a non-key DID owner"
+        );
+        // The full non-key DID still matches itself.
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(
+                &rules,
+                false,
+                "did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo",
+                Some("did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo"),
+                "/"
+            ),
+            Decision::Allow,
+            "full non-key DID still matches itself"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // #153 forward guard: is_owner must match across bare-key / full-did:key
+    // representations should someone revert to single-side normalize_owner_key.
+    #[test]
+    fn bare_owner_full_caller_allows_owner() {
+        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, false, "z6MkOwner", Some("did:key:z6MkOwner"), "/"),
+            Decision::Allow,
+            "bare owner + full did:key caller must match (guard against single-side revert)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // #153 regression: cross-method DID must still be denied even when the
+    // trailing segment collides with a bare owner key.
+    #[test]
+    fn cross_method_did_denied_with_bare_owner() {
+        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, false, "z6MkFoo", Some("did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo"), "/"),
+            Decision::Deny,
+            "cross-method DID must not match a bare did:key owner"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, false, "z6MkFoo", Some("did:web:z6MkFoo"), "/"),
+            Decision::Deny,
+            "did:web must not match a bare did:key owner"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn root_rule_allows_listed_reader() {
+        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, Some("did:key:z6MkFriend"), "/"),
+            Decision::Allow
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn root_rule_denies_unlisted_reader() {
+        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, Some("did:key:z6MkStranger"), "/"),
+            Decision::Deny
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn subtree_rule_matches_descendant_path() {
+        let rules = [rule(
+            "/secret/**",
+            VisibilityMode::B,
+            &["did:key:z6MkFriend"],
+        )];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(
+                &rules,
+                true,
+                OWNER,
+                Some("did:key:z6MkStranger"),
+                "/secret/a.rs"
+            ),
+            Decision::Deny
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(
+                &rules,
+                true,
+                OWNER,
+                Some("did:key:z6MkFriend"),
+                "/secret/a.rs"
+            ),
+            Decision::Allow
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn subtree_rule_does_not_affect_root_clone() {
+        // A subtree rule must not gate a whole-repo (path "/") read: the public
+        // fallback applies because the subtree glob does not match "/".
+        let rules = [rule("/secret/**", VisibilityMode::B, &[])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, None, "/"),
+            Decision::Allow
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn most_specific_rule_wins() {
+        // Public repo, but /secret is locked. A stranger reading /secret is denied
+        // by the more specific rule even though "/" would allow.
+        let rules = [
+            rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkStranger"]),
+            rule("/secret/**", VisibilityMode::B, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"]),
+        ];
+        // stranger is a root reader but not a /secret reader
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(
+                &rules,
+                true,
+                OWNER,
+                Some("did:key:z6MkStranger"),
+                "/secret/a.rs"
+            ),
+            Decision::Deny
+        );
+        // stranger can still read root
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, Some("did:key:z6MkStranger"), "/"),
+            Decision::Allow
+        );
+    }
+
+    // Mirrors the gossip-announce gate in git_receive_pack: announce iff an
+    // anonymous caller can read "/".
+    #[test]
+    fn announce_gate_matches_public_readability() {
+        let announce = |rules: &[VisibilityRule], is_public: bool| {
+            visibility_check(rules, is_public, OWNER, None, "/") == Decision::Allow
+        };
+        // Public repo, no rules → announce.
+        assert!(announce(&[], true));
+        // Legacy private repo (is_public false, no rules) → silent.
+        assert!(!announce(&[], false));
+        // Mode A whole-repo rule with no public readers → silent.
+        assert!(!announce(&[rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])], true));
+        // Mode B public repo with a private subtree → still announce.
+        assert!(announce(
+            &[rule("/secret/**", VisibilityMode::B, &[])],
+            true
+        ));
+    }
+
+    // ── ref_update_row_visible (feed gate) ──────────────────────────────────
+
+    fn rec(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
+        RepoRecord {
+            id: id.into(),
+            name: name.into(),
+            owner_did: owner_did.into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: Utc::now(),
+            updated_at: Utc::now(),
+            disk_path: format!("/srv/{id}"),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn rules_for(entries: &[(&str, &[VisibilityRule])]) -> HashMap<String, Vec<VisibilityRule>> {
+        entries
+            .iter()
+            .map(|(id, rs)| (id.to_string(), rs.to_vec()))
+            .collect()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_public_local_repo_kept_for_anon() {
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", true)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_private_local_repo_dropped_for_anon_kept_for_owner() {
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        // Anonymous → drop.
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+        // Owner (full DID) → keep.
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            Some("did:key:z6MkOwner"),
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_root_rule_reader_reincluded() {
+        // Private repo (is_public=false) with a root rule granting a named
+        // reader. Delegates to listable_at_root: anon and non-reader denied,
+        // named reader allowed.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", OWNER, "widget", false)];
+        let root = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
+        let rules = rules_for(&[("r1", &root)]);
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            Some("did:key:z6MkStranger"),
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            Some("did:key:z6MkFriend"),
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_alias_full_did_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // Owner stored full-DID; slug also carries the full-DID form. Still
+        // matches (row_key normalizes to the short key) → drop. Round 1's
+        // string-match would have leaked this.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:zABC", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "did:key:zABC/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_truncated_key_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // Slug carries an 8-char URL-truncated prefix of the owner key; still
+        // matches via prefix tolerance → drop. Round 2's get_repo path leaked.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:zABCDEFGH", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "zABCDEF/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_mirror_coexistence_private_canonical_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // Pure-level mirror-coexistence: the deduped set contains only the
+        // private canonical record for (owner,name). A matching slug drops for
+        // anon. (DB-level dedup survivor property is pinned separately.)
+        let deduped = [rec("uuid-canonical", "did:key:z6Mkwbud", "nipmod", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6Mkwbud/nipmod"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_empty_owner_slug_matches_and_drops() {
+        // Slug "/name": empty owner_part → row_key "" → starts_with("") matches
+        // every same-named record. Fail-safe pin for a private repo.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "/widget"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_one_char_owner_slug_matches_and_drops() {
+        // 1-char owner prefix that the private repo's key starts with → match.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "z/widget"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_remote_slug_no_match_kept() {
+        // Different owner key, no prefix relation → no local match → keep.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "zZZZOTHER/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_private_didweb_short_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // A private did:web repo must drop its row for anon when the slug arrives
+        // in the short `{last-segment}/{name}` form. Post-#141 the emitter no longer
+        // produces this form for did:web (normalize_owner_key keeps the full DID),
+        // so this is the untrusted/crafted variant a peer can broadcast; the full-DID
+        // variant the emitter now sends is covered by the next test. A did:key-aware
+        // (keep-whole) rule would fail to match `alice` against `did:web:host:alice`
+        // and leak.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:alice", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "alice/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_multi_segment_did_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // A private repo owned by a multi-segment DID must also fail closed under
+        // the full-DID slug form. Post-#141 this IS the form the emitter broadcasts
+        // (normalize_owner_key keeps non-did:key methods whole), and a peer can craft
+        // it too. The gate drops it: both sides reduce to the last ':' segment
+        // ("user"), so they match. Fail-safe regardless of which form keyed the row.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:user", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "did:web:host:user/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_multi_segment_did_slug_kept_for_public() {
+        // Symmetric keep-side: a PUBLIC multi-segment-DID repo's row must still be
+        // returned to anon after the last-':'-segment normalization — guards
+        // against a regression that over-drops legitimate did:web rows.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:user", "widget", true)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "did:web:host:user/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_malformed_slug_no_slash_kept_no_panic() {
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "noslug"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_empty_deduped_set_keeps_any_slug() {
+        let deduped: [RepoRecord; 0] = [];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "anything"));
+    }
+
+    // The shared slug matcher underpinning both the feed gate and the collector's
+    // quarantine drop: it must recognize a repo's own row across every owner-DID
+    // form (bare short key, full did:key, URL-truncated prefix) and must not
+    // over-match a different name or an unrelated owner. The quarantine drop calls
+    // this directly, so its match contract is load-bearing for withholding a
+    // quarantined mirror from a caller who matches the mirror's owner_did.
+    #[test]
+    fn names_repo_matches_owner_forms_and_rejects_mismatches() {
+        // Bare short owner key (the form upsert_mirror_repo stores).
+        let bare = rec("m", "z6MkQuar", "secret", false);
+        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
+        // Full did:key owner; the short-segment slug still matches via last-segment.
+        let full = rec("c", "did:key:z6MkQuar", "secret", false);
+        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&full, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
+        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&full, "did:key:z6MkQuar/secret"));
+        // URL-truncated 8-char prefix slug → prefix-tolerant match.
+        let long = rec("l", "did:key:z6MkQuarLONGKEY", "secret", false);
+        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&long, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
+        // Different name, different owner, and no-slash → no match.
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkQuar/other"));
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkOther/secret"));
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "noslash"));
+    }
+
+    // #101: a deny rule must withhold a path that denotes the same characters in
+    // a different Unicode normalization form. Without NFC normalization at the
+    // matcher seam, an NFC-authored rule byte-compares unequal to an NFD-stored
+    // path and the blob leaks on the replication path.
+    #[test]
+    fn matcher_withholds_across_nfc_nfd_normalization_skew() {
+        // "é" composed (NFC, U+00E9) in the rule; decomposed (NFD, e + U+0301)
+        // in the committed path.
+        let nfc_rule = "/s\u{00e9}cret/**";
+        let nfd_path = "/se\u{0301}cret/key.pem";
+        let rules = [rule(nfc_rule, VisibilityMode::B, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, None, nfd_path),
+            Decision::Deny,
+            "NFC-authored deny rule must withhold the canonically-equivalent NFD path"
+        );
+
+        // Mirror: rule authored NFD, path committed NFC.
+        let nfd_rule = "/se\u{0301}cret/**";
+        let nfc_path = "/s\u{00e9}cret/key.pem";
+        let rules2 = [rule(nfd_rule, VisibilityMode::B, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules2, true, OWNER, None, nfc_path),
+            Decision::Deny,
+            "NFD-authored deny rule must withhold the canonically-equivalent NFC path"
+        );
+
+        // A genuinely different path is still allowed (no over-withholding).
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, None, "/public/x.txt"),
+            Decision::Allow
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/webhooks.rs

@@ -93,18 +93,29 @@ async fn fire_event_async(
             }
 
             match req.send().await {
-                Ok(resp) => tracing::info!(
-                    url = %hook.url,
-                    event = %event_name,
-                    status = %resp.status(),
-                    "webhook delivered"
-                ),
-                Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
-                    url = %hook.url,
-                    event = %event_name,
-                    err = %e,
-                    "webhook delivery failed"
-                ),
+                Ok(resp) => {
+                    let result_label = if resp.status().is_success() {
+                        "ok"
+                    } else {
+                        "http_error"
+                    };
+                    crate::metrics::record_webhook_delivery(result_label);
+                    tracing::info!(
+                        url = %hook.url,
+                        event = %event_name,
+                        status = %resp.status(),
+                        "webhook delivered"
+                    )
+                }
+                Err(e) => {
+                    crate::metrics::record_webhook_delivery("network_error");
+                    tracing::warn!(
+                        url = %hook.url,
+                        event = %event_name,
+                        err = %e,
+                        "webhook delivery failed"
+                    )
+                }
             }
         });
     }

crates/gl/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 [package]
 name = "gl"
 description = "The gitlawb CLI — identity management, node control, MCP server"
-version.workspace = true
+version = "0.5.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 
 [[bin]]
@@ -11,6 +12,7 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
 
 [dependencies]
 gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
+icaptcha-client = { path = "../icaptcha-client" }
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }

crates/gl/src/bounty.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 
+fn signed_client(node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> NodeClient {
+    NodeClient::new(node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir).ok())
+}
+
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct BountyArgs {
     #[command(subcommand)]
@@ -49,6 +53,8 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
         status: Option<String>,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Show details of a specific bounty
     Show {
@@ -56,6 +62,8 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
         id: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Claim an open bounty
     Claim {
@@ -121,8 +129,13 @@ pub async fn run(args: BountyArgs) -> Result<()> {
             node,
             dir,
         } => cmd_create(repo, title, amount, issue, tx_hash, deadline, node, dir).await,
-        BountyCmd::List { repo, status, node } => cmd_list(repo, status, node).await,
-        BountyCmd::Show { id, node } => cmd_show(id, node).await,
+        BountyCmd::List {
+            repo,
+            status,
+            node,
+            dir,
+        } => cmd_list(repo, status, node, dir).await,
+        BountyCmd::Show { id, node, dir } => cmd_show(id, node, dir).await,
         BountyCmd::Claim {
             id,
             wallet,
@@ -192,8 +205,13 @@ async fn cmd_create(
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_list(repo: Option<String>, status: Option<String>, node: String) -> Result<()> {
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+async fn cmd_list(
+    repo: Option<String>,
+    status: Option<String>,
+    node: String,
+    dir: Option<PathBuf>,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
 
     let url = if let Some(ref repo) = repo {
         let (owner, name) = repo
@@ -214,7 +232,7 @@ async fn cmd_list(repo: Option<String>, status: Option<String>, node: String) ->
     };
 
     let resp = client
-        .get(&url)
+        .get_authed(&url)
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
@@ -237,9 +255,9 @@ async fn cmd_list(repo: Option<String>, status: Option<String>, node: String) ->
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_show(id: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
-    let resp = client.get(&format!("/api/v1/bounties/{id}")).await?;
+async fn cmd_show(id: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
+    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
+    let resp = client.get_authed(&format!("/api/v1/bounties/{id}")).await?;
 
     let status = resp.status();
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
@@ -462,7 +480,7 @@ mod tests {
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
-        cmd_list(None, None, server.url()).await.unwrap();
+        cmd_list(None, None, server.url(), None).await.unwrap();
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -506,7 +524,7 @@ mod tests {
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
-        let err = cmd_show("nonexistent".to_string(), server.url())
+        let err = cmd_show("nonexistent".to_string(), server.url(), None)
             .await
             .unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("not found"));

crates/gl/src/cert.rs

@@ -5,10 +5,15 @@
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
 use serde_json::Value;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 
+fn signed_client(node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> NodeClient {
+    NodeClient::new(node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir).ok())
+}
+
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct CertArgs {
     #[command(subcommand)]
@@ -23,6 +28,8 @@ pub enum CertCmd {
         repo: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Show a specific ref certificate and verify its signature
     Show {
@@ -32,28 +39,39 @@ pub enum CertCmd {
         id: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
 }
 
 pub async fn run(args: CertArgs) -> Result<()> {
     match args.cmd {
-        CertCmd::List { repo, node } => cmd_list(repo, node).await,
-        CertCmd::Show { repo, id, node } => cmd_show(repo, id, node).await,
+        CertCmd::List { repo, node, dir } => cmd_list(repo, node, dir).await,
+        CertCmd::Show {
+            repo,
+            id,
+            node,
+            dir,
+        } => cmd_show(repo, id, node, dir).await,
     }
 }
 
 /// Resolve "repo" into (owner, name) using the caller's DID when no slash is given.
-async fn resolve_repo(repo: &str, node: &str) -> Result<(String, String)> {
+async fn resolve_repo(
+    repo: &str,
+    node: &str,
+    dir: Option<&std::path::Path>,
+) -> Result<(String, String)> {
     if let Some((owner, name)) = repo.split_once('/') {
         Ok((owner.to_string(), name.to_string()))
     } else {
-        let short = if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(None) {
+        let short = if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(dir) {
             let did = kp.did().to_string();
             did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string()
         } else {
-            let client = NodeClient::new(node, None);
+            let client = signed_client(node, dir);
             let info: Value = client
-                .get("/")
+                .get_authed("/")
                 .await?
                 .json()
                 .await
@@ -65,13 +83,13 @@ async fn resolve_repo(repo: &str, node: &str) -> Result<(String, String)> {
     }
 }
 
-async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
-    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node).await?;
+async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
+    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
 
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
     let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs");
     let resp: Value = client
-        .get(&path)
+        .get_authed(&path)
         .await?
         .json()
         .await
@@ -96,16 +114,16 @@ async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_show(repo: String, id: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
-    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node).await?;
+async fn cmd_show(repo: String, id: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
+    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
 
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
     let id = resolve_cert_id(&client, &owner, &name, &id).await?;
 
     // Fetch the certificate
     let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs/{id}");
     let resp = client
-        .get(&path)
+        .get_authed(&path)
         .await?
         .error_for_status()
         .context("certificate not found")?;
@@ -168,9 +186,9 @@ async fn resolve_cert_id(client: &NodeClient, owner: &str, name: &str, id: &str)
         return Ok(id.to_string());
     }
 
-    let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs");
+    let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs?prefix={id}");
     let resp: Value = client
-        .get(&path)
+        .get_authed(&path)
         .await?
         .error_for_status()
         .context("failed to list certificates")?
@@ -182,7 +200,6 @@ async fn resolve_cert_id(client: &NodeClient, owner: &str, name: &str, id: &str)
     let matches: Vec<String> = certs
         .iter()
         .filter_map(|cert| cert["id"].as_str())
-        .filter(|cert_id| cert_id.starts_with(id))
         .map(ToString::to_string)
         .collect();