chore(main): release 0.5.0 (#142)

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

.env.example

@@ -90,6 +90,21 @@ GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ=true
 # Maximum git smart-HTTP pack request size, in bytes.
 GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES=2147483648
 
+# ── Push rate limiting (git-receive-pack flood brake) ─────────────────────
+# Max receive-pack requests (info/refs advertisement + push POST) per client
+# IP per hour. 0 disables. Default 600.
+GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT=600
+
+# Which forwarded header the edge is trusted to set, used to resolve the real
+# client IP for the push limiter. One of:
+#   (unset) — no trusted proxy: key on the socket peer address, ignore headers.
+#   fly     — behind Fly's edge (trust Fly-Client-IP).
+#   x-forwarded-for — behind a single reverse proxy like Caddy/NGINX (trust the
+#             rightmost X-Forwarded-For hop).
+# Only set this when a proxy you control actually fronts the node; trusting a
+# forwarded header on a directly-exposed node lets clients spoof the key.
+GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY=
+
 # ── Sync ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Enable automatic background sync from known peers
 GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC=false

.github/workflows/audit-schedule.yml

@@ -37,7 +37,18 @@ jobs:
         with:
           key: audit-schedule
 
-      - name: Install cargo-audit
+      - name: Install cargo-audit (floating; drift canary)
+        # Deliberately UNPINNED, unlike the blocking gate in pr-checks.yml. This
+        # job is cron-only (weekly); it is never pull_request- or push-triggered,
+        # so it NEVER gates a merge no matter what it does. Floating the scanner
+        # here is the drift canary: if a newer cargo-audit regresses, at worst
+        # this weekly run reds (the install step below is unguarded) or its
+        # visibility report changes, and that is exactly the signal that latest
+        # has moved and the pinned gate should not be bumped yet. The scan result
+        # itself never fails the run (the "Full audit report" step is `|| true`
+        # and the only other hard-fail is a Cargo.lock grep). The point is that
+        # drift surfaces here without ever blocking a PR. Do NOT pin to match
+        # pr-checks.yml.
         run: cargo install --locked cargo-audit
 
       # Full advisory report with NO suppressions. Run from a scratch dir that

.github/workflows/pr-checks.yml

@@ -133,10 +133,30 @@ jobs:
       - name: Cache cargo
         uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
         with:
-          key: audit
+          key: audit-0.22.2
 
-      - name: Install cargo-audit
-        run: cargo install --locked cargo-audit
+      - name: Install cargo-audit (pinned)
+        # Pin the scanner on this BLOCKING gate: an unpinned `cargo install`
+        # floats to the latest release, so a regressed cargo-audit could red CI
+        # repo-wide with no code change. Advisory-DB freshness is fetched at scan
+        # time, independent of the binary, so this does not weaken what the gate
+        # catches. The weekly Scheduled Audit (audit-schedule.yml) deliberately
+        # floats to latest as the drift canary; when it shows a newer cargo-audit
+        # behaving differently, bump this version (and the cache key above) as a
+        # deliberate maintainer action. If 0.22.2 is ever yanked from crates.io
+        # this step fails loud until the pin is bumped.
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          cargo install --locked --version 0.22.2 cargo-audit
+          # Assert the pin took effect so an accidental future unpin (or a drift
+          # off 0.22.2) fails loudly here instead of silently running a different
+          # scanner. `cargo audit --version` prints "cargo-audit-audit 0.22.2".
+          installed="$(cargo audit --version)"
+          echo "cargo-audit installed: $installed"
+          echo "$installed" | grep -qE '(^| )0\.22\.2($| )' || {
+            echo "::error::cargo-audit is not the pinned 0.22.2 (got: $installed)"
+            exit 1
+          }
 
       # Hard-fail gate. Suppressions live in .cargo/audit.toml (read automatically
       # from the repo root), each with no available upstream fix. A green check

.gitignore

@@ -23,3 +23,6 @@ keys/
 # Logs
 *.log
 .openclaude-profile.json
+
+# Per-operator Fly config (node1 prod config is pulled from Fly, not tracked)
+infra/fly/node1.fly.toml

.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 {
-  ".": "0.4.0"
+  ".": "0.5.0"
 }

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,25 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## [0.5.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0) (2026-07-05)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* **gl:** sanctioned iCaptcha client flow + secure git lifecycle ([#138](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/138)) ([06388ec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/06388ec26aa29d356ae311276fdb91be054e9ecc))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **gl:** sign the CLI's /ipfs/pins reads under the [#134](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/134) auth gate ([#146](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/146)) ([20d6848](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/20d6848846b3a988d604208833167a528b7d8820))
+* **node,git-remote:** gate receive-pack advertisement, sign client fetch/push ([#119](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/119)) ([6f36fc0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6f36fc07b8e10a650c5948b269feac1cb25cae2a))
+* **node,gossip:** route gossip HTTP through the no-redirect client ([#93](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/93)) ([#140](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/140)) ([563c456](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/563c456803bf3e958d63869db424b3940472bc3d))
+* **node:** close two spam-vector root causes (trust upsert + ungated push) ([#152](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/152)) ([2df6ff9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2df6ff9d30de62f754fa41473e85db316021718e))
+* **node:** gate GET /ipfs/{cid} on reachable allowed-set, not deny-set ([#126](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/126)) ([#133](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/133)) ([466a550](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/466a550915edd711856ef32035f9f474e2577c4f))
+* **node:** gate the ref-updates feeds on read visibility ([#112](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/112), [#114](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/114)) ([#143](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/143)) ([4891db3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/4891db38892663326ee0c1417a2db931988be4b5))
+* **node:** prefer canonical repo row over mirror row in get_repo ([#124](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/124)) ([#141](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/141)) ([6c95592](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6c95592d188222ac3446dc23ef8d9befbf82ad6f))
+* **remote:** include HTTP error response body ([#137](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/137)) ([09a0cb2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/09a0cb23b9f284ccbd69aca6958b70671f3bfb46))
+* **repos:** log the cause when repo create fails ([#103](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/103)) ([2620e97](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2620e973e3cd4835ed42ddd4adcd8183b5b3080e))
+
 ## [0.4.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.3.9...v0.4.0) (2026-06-30)
 
 

Cargo.lock

@@ -3300,10 +3300,11 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
-version = "0.3.9"
+version = "0.4.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "gitlawb-core",
+ "mockito",
  "reqwest",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
@@ -3311,7 +3312,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
-version = "0.3.9"
+version = "0.4.0"
 dependencies = [
  "base64",
  "ed25519-dalek",
@@ -3328,7 +3329,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
-version = "0.3.9"
+version = "0.4.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "base64",
@@ -3355,7 +3356,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
-version = "0.3.9"
+version = "0.4.0"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy",
  "anyhow",
@@ -3411,7 +3412,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gl"
-version = "0.3.9"
+version = "0.4.0"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy",
  "anyhow",
@@ -3419,6 +3420,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "clap",
  "dirs",
  "gitlawb-core",
+ "icaptcha-client",
  "mockito",
  "reqwest",
  "serde",
@@ -3813,6 +3815,19 @@ dependencies = [
  "cc",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "icaptcha-client"
+version = "0.4.0"
+dependencies = [
+ "anyhow",
+ "gitlawb-core",
+ "reqwest",
+ "serde",
+ "serde_json",
+ "thiserror 2.0.18",
+ "tracing",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "icu_collections"
 version = "2.1.1"

Cargo.toml

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ members = [
     "crates/gl",
     "crates/git-remote-gitlawb",
     "crates/gitlawb-attest",
+    "crates/icaptcha-client",
 ]
 
 [workspace.package]

README.md

@@ -185,6 +185,45 @@ git clone gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../my-repo
 
 For public-network use, make sure `GITLAWB_NODE` points to the node you want. The helper defaults to localhost for local development.
 
+### Full lifecycle against an iCaptcha-enforcing node
+
+Public nodes (e.g. `node.gitlawb.com`) require two things on writes:
+
+1. **RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures** — every write is signed by your identity key. `gl`
+   and the `git-remote-gitlawb` helper do this automatically. An old/unsigned CLI
+   fails with `401 not_an_agent`; `gl` will tell you to upgrade and register.
+2. **An iCaptcha proof** on the spam-gated writes (**repo create, fork, register**).
+   `gl` solves this for you: on the node's `403 icaptcha_proof_required` it reads the
+   `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` hints, requests a challenge, solves it
+   locally (arithmetic / algebra / sequence), and **retries the same signed request**
+   with the `x-icaptcha-proof` header — no manual steps, no env vars.
+
+```bash
+gl identity new                                   # create did:key identity
+gl register      --node https://node.gitlawb.com  # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
+gl repo create memlawb --node https://node.gitlawb.com   # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
+git push  origin2 main                            # origin2 = gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb (signed)
+git clone gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb            # public read, no proof needed
+gl doctor                                         # preflight: identity, node, version, iCaptcha
+```
+
+Notes:
+
+- **`requesterId` is always your DID.** The proof's `sub` claim must equal the
+  authenticated signer; `gl`/helper set this automatically and the node enforces
+  `sub == authenticated DID` (so a proof minted for another identity is rejected).
+- **Proofs are short-lived (~5 min TTL) and single-use.** If one expires between
+  solving and use, the client transparently solves a fresh one and retries.
+- **What needs what:** create / fork / register are signed **and** iCaptcha-gated;
+  `git push` is **signed-only** (owner signature is the gate — no per-push challenge);
+  reads (clone / fetch / `repo info`) need no proof. A non-existent repo returns a
+  clear `404`, never a placeholder.
+- **API-key iCaptcha deployments:** set `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL` to your iCaptcha
+  origin and `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY` to its key. The client only talks to an
+  `https` origin whose host is allowlisted (that URL or the public default), and
+  sends the bearer token **only** to your configured origin — never to a URL a
+  node advertises — so a hostile node can't capture the key or redirect the solve.
+
 ---
 
 ## Architecture

bootstrap-peers.json

@@ -1,16 +1,40 @@
 {
   "$comment": "Canonical seed list for the Gitlawb network. Merged with GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS at startup. PRs to add public nodes welcome.",
   "version": 1,
-  "updated": "2026-05-16",
+  "updated": "2026-06-30",
   "peers": [
     {
       "name": "gitlawb",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb (Kevin)",
+      "operator": "Gitlawb",
       "did": "did:key:z6MkqDnb7Siv3Cwj7pGJq4T5EsUisECqR8KpnDLwcaZq5TPr",
       "http_url": "https://node.gitlawb.com",
       "p2p_multiaddr": null,
       "added": "2026-04-29"
     },
+    {
+      "name": "gitlawb-node2",
+      "operator": "Gitlawb",
+      "did": null,
+      "http_url": "https://node2.gitlawb.com",
+      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
+      "added": "2026-06-30"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "gitlawb-node3",
+      "operator": "Gitlawb",
+      "did": null,
+      "http_url": "https://node3.gitlawb.com",
+      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
+      "added": "2026-06-30"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "gitlawb-manila",
+      "operator": "Gitlawb",
+      "did": null,
+      "http_url": "https://manila.gitlawb.com",
+      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
+      "added": "2026-06-30"
+    },
     {
       "name": "rapybus-gitlawb",
       "operator": "RapyBus S.A.C.",

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
 description = "Git remote helper — enables 'git clone gitlawb://did:gitlawb:...'"
-version = "0.4.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.5.0" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
@@ -16,3 +16,6 @@ anyhow = { workspace = true }
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
 tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+mockito = "1"

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src/main.rs

@@ -14,7 +14,13 @@
 //! # Protocol flow (connect capability)
 //!   capabilities → "connect\n\n"
 //!   connect git-upload-pack  → GET /info/refs | POST /git-upload-pack
-//!   connect git-receive-pack → GET /info/refs | POST /git-receive-pack (+ auth header)
+//!   connect git-receive-pack → GET /info/refs | POST /git-receive-pack
+//! Push (git-receive-pack) is RFC-9421 signed from the first request when an
+//! identity keypair is present, since a push can never be anonymous. Fetch
+//! (git-upload-pack) stays anonymous and is signed only on a single retry, after
+//! the node denies the anonymous advertisement with 404 — so a public clone never
+//! discloses the caller's DID, while a private repo's owner (or an authorized
+//! reader) still authenticates when the node demands it.
 
 use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
@@ -63,7 +69,10 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
     let repo_base = format!("{}/{}/{}", node_base, short_owner, repo_name);
     tracing::debug!("repo_base: {repo_base}");
 
-    // Load keypair for signing push requests (optional — push still works unsigned in v0.1)
+    // Load keypair for signing requests (optional). Push always signs when a key is
+    // present; fetch signs only if the node 404s the anonymous advertisement, so
+    // public fetches stay anonymous. Absent a key, public fetch still works and push
+    // falls back to unsigned (v0.1 local alpha only).
     let keypair = load_keypair();
 
     run_helper(&repo_base, keypair.as_ref())
@@ -115,7 +124,7 @@ fn help_text() -> String {
          \n\
          ENVIRONMENT:\n\
          \x20   GITLAWB_NODE   Node base URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:7545)\n\
-         \x20   GITLAWB_KEY    Identity PEM path for signed pushes (default: ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem)\n\
+         \x20   GITLAWB_KEY    Identity PEM path for signed fetch/push (default: ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem)\n\
          \x20   GITLAWB_LOG    Log filter (default: warn)\n\
          \n\
          FLAGS:\n\
@@ -179,11 +188,11 @@ fn run_helper(repo_base: &str, keypair: Option<&Keypair>) -> Result<()> {
 
 // ── HTTP proxy for git smart protocol ────────────────────────────────────────
 
-fn handle_connect(
+fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
     repo_base: &str,
     service: &str,
     keypair: Option<&Keypair>,
-    stdin: &mut io::BufReader<io::Stdin>,
+    stdin: &mut R,
 ) -> Result<()> {
     match service {
         "git-upload-pack" | "git-receive-pack" => {}
@@ -198,19 +207,52 @@ fn handle_connect(
     //
     // The server advertises its refs. git reads this to decide what to fetch/push.
 
+    // Signing policy for this exchange, carried through to the Phase-2 POST:
+    //  - git-receive-pack (push): sign from the first request; a push is
+    //    signature-gated and can never be anonymous.
+    //  - git-upload-pack (fetch): start anonymous so a public clone never discloses
+    //    the caller's DID, then escalate to a single signed retry only if the node
+    //    denies the anonymous advertisement with 404 (how it withholds a private
+    //    repo from an unauthenticated reader).
+    let mut signing_key = if service == "git-receive-pack" {
+        keypair
+    } else {
+        None
+    };
+
     let refs_url = format!("{}/info/refs?service={}", repo_base, service);
     tracing::debug!("GET {refs_url}");
 
-    let refs_resp = client
-        .get(&refs_url)
-        .header("User-Agent", "git/2.0 git-remote-gitlawb/0.1.0")
+    let mut refs_resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, signing_key)
         .send()
         .with_context(|| format!("GET {refs_url}"))?;
 
+    // Fetch escalation: retry the advertisement signed once when the anonymous try
+    // is denied and we hold an identity. A public repo answers 200 on the first
+    // (anonymous) request and never reaches here, so it stays DID-private.
+    if service == "git-upload-pack"
+        && refs_resp.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND
+        && keypair.is_some()
+    {
+        tracing::debug!("anonymous info/refs returned 404; retrying signed");
+        signing_key = keypair;
+        refs_resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, signing_key)
+            .send()
+            .with_context(|| format!("GET {refs_url} (signed retry)"))?;
+    }
+
     if !refs_resp.status().is_success() {
+        let status = refs_resp.status();
+        let body = read_error_body(refs_resp);
         bail!(
-            "GET /info/refs returned {} — is the repo registered on this node?",
-            refs_resp.status()
+            "{}",
+            http_error_message(
+                "GET",
+                "/info/refs",
+                status,
+                &body,
+                Some("— is the repo registered on this node?")
+            )
         );
     }
 
@@ -266,29 +308,7 @@ fn handle_connect(
     let post_url = format!("{}/{}", repo_base, service);
     tracing::debug!("POST {post_url} ({} bytes)", request_body.len());
 
-    // Extract the URL path for signing (e.g., "/z6Mk.../my-repo/git-receive-pack")
-    let path_for_sig = url_path(&post_url);
-
-    let mut req = client
-        .post(&post_url)
-        .header("Content-Type", format!("application/x-{}-request", service))
-        .header("User-Agent", "git/2.0 git-remote-gitlawb/0.1.0");
-
-    // Add RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth on push operations
-    if service == "git-receive-pack" {
-        if let Some(kp) = keypair {
-            let signed = sign_request(kp, "POST", &path_for_sig, &request_body);
-            req = req
-                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
-                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
-                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
-            tracing::debug!("attached RFC 9421 HTTP Signature (DID: {})", kp.did());
-        } else {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                "no identity keypair found — push will be unsigned (v0.1 local alpha only)"
-            );
-        }
-    }
+    let req = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &request_body, signing_key);
 
     // Attach the body after signing so the pack bytes are moved, not cloned —
     // packs can be large and the clone doubled peak memory on push.
@@ -298,7 +318,10 @@ fn handle_connect(
         .with_context(|| format!("POST {post_url}"))?;
 
     if !pack_resp.status().is_success() {
-        bail!("POST /{} returned {}", service, pack_resp.status());
+        let status = pack_resp.status();
+        let body = read_error_body(pack_resp);
+        let path = format!("/{service}");
+        bail!("{}", http_error_message("POST", &path, status, &body, None));
     }
 
     let pack_bytes = pack_resp.bytes().context("reading pack response")?;
@@ -310,6 +333,68 @@ fn handle_connect(
     Ok(())
 }
 
+// ── Smart-protocol request builders ───────────────────────────────────────────
+
+const USER_AGENT: &str = "git/2.0 git-remote-gitlawb/0.1.0";
+
+/// Build the Phase-1 ref-advertisement GET, signing it when an identity is
+/// present. The node gates the ref advertisement on read visibility for BOTH
+/// services, so a private repo's advertisement is denied (404) to an
+/// unauthenticated caller; without this signature the repo's own owner can
+/// neither fetch (upload-pack) nor push (receive-pack) it. Public repos still
+/// work anonymously (no keypair present, or the gate admits anonymous). Sign over
+/// the path *and* query (?service=...) because the node verifies the signature
+/// over its path_and_query.
+fn build_advertisement_request(
+    client: &reqwest::blocking::Client,
+    refs_url: &str,
+    keypair: Option<&Keypair>,
+) -> reqwest::blocking::RequestBuilder {
+    let mut req = client.get(refs_url).header("User-Agent", USER_AGENT);
+    if let Some(kp) = keypair {
+        let signed = sign_request(kp, "GET", &url_path(refs_url), b"");
+        req = req
+            .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
+            .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
+            .header("Signature", signed.signature);
+        tracing::debug!("signed info/refs advertisement (DID: {})", kp.did());
+    }
+    req
+}
+
+/// Build the Phase-2 pack POST, signing it when an identity is present, for BOTH
+/// services. The node read-gates the git-upload-pack POST with visibility_check
+/// at "/", and separately owner-gates the git-receive-pack POST (signature
+/// required, enforced by middleware). The Phase-1 advertisement signature does
+/// not carry to this separate request, so a private repo's owner must
+/// authenticate here too or their fetch/push is denied.
+/// Public-repo fetch still works anonymously when no keypair is present. The body
+/// is signed (content-digest) but NOT attached here, so the caller can move the
+/// (possibly large) pack bytes into `.body()` rather than clone them.
+fn build_pack_post_request(
+    client: &reqwest::blocking::Client,
+    post_url: &str,
+    service: &str,
+    body: &[u8],
+    keypair: Option<&Keypair>,
+) -> reqwest::blocking::RequestBuilder {
+    let mut req = client
+        .post(post_url)
+        .header("Content-Type", format!("application/x-{}-request", service))
+        .header("User-Agent", USER_AGENT);
+    if let Some(kp) = keypair {
+        let signed = sign_request(kp, "POST", &url_path(post_url), body);
+        req = req
+            .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
+            .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
+            .header("Signature", signed.signature);
+        tracing::debug!("signed {service} POST (DID: {})", kp.did());
+    } else if service == "git-receive-pack" {
+        tracing::warn!("no identity keypair found, push will be unsigned (v0.1 local alpha only)");
+    }
+    req
+}
+
 // ── URL helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /// Parse a `gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../repo-name` URL.
@@ -347,7 +432,7 @@ fn parse_gitlawb_url(url: &str) -> Result<(String, String, String)> {
 ///
 /// We also handle the flush-only case (`"0000"`) that git sends when it already
 /// has everything it needs (up-to-date clone).
-fn read_upload_pack_request(stdin: &mut io::BufReader<io::Stdin>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+fn read_upload_pack_request<R: Read>(stdin: &mut R) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let mut buf = Vec::new();
 
     loop {
@@ -433,6 +518,78 @@ fn url_path(url: &str) -> String {
         .unwrap_or_else(|| "/".to_string())
 }
 
+const MAX_ERROR_BODY_BYTES: u64 = 4096;
+const MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS: usize = 2000;
+
+fn read_error_body(mut response: reqwest::blocking::Response) -> String {
+    let mut body = Vec::new();
+    let mut limited = (&mut response).take(MAX_ERROR_BODY_BYTES);
+
+    if limited.read_to_end(&mut body).is_err() {
+        return String::new();
+    }
+
+    String::from_utf8_lossy(&body).into_owned()
+}
+
+fn http_error_message(
+    method: &str,
+    path: &str,
+    status: reqwest::StatusCode,
+    body: &str,
+    empty_body_hint: Option<&str>,
+) -> String {
+    let mut message = format!("{method} {path} returned {status}");
+    let body = safe_error_body_excerpt(body);
+
+    if !body.is_empty() {
+        message.push_str(": ");
+        message.push_str(&body);
+    } else if let Some(hint) = empty_body_hint {
+        message.push(' ');
+        message.push_str(hint);
+    }
+
+    message
+}
+
+fn safe_error_body_excerpt(body: &str) -> String {
+    let mut excerpt = String::new();
+    let mut pending_space = false;
+    let mut kept_chars = 0;
+
+    for ch in body.trim().chars() {
+        if kept_chars >= MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS {
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if ch.is_control() {
+            if matches!(ch, '\n' | '\r' | '\t') {
+                pending_space = true;
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if ch.is_whitespace() {
+            pending_space = true;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if pending_space && !excerpt.is_empty() {
+            excerpt.push(' ');
+            kept_chars += 1;
+            if kept_chars >= MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS {
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        excerpt.push(ch);
+        kept_chars += 1;
+        pending_space = false;
+    }
+
+    excerpt
+}
+
 // ── Keypair loading ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 fn load_keypair() -> Option<Keypair> {
@@ -476,6 +633,467 @@ fn resolve_key_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
+    use std::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
+    use std::thread::JoinHandle;
+
+    struct TestResponse {
+        request_line: &'static str,
+        status: &'static str,
+        body: &'static str,
+    }
+
+    fn serve_http(responses: Vec<TestResponse>) -> (String, JoinHandle<Vec<String>>) {
+        let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+        let base_url = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr().unwrap());
+        let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || {
+            let mut requests = Vec::new();
+
+            for response in responses {
+                let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().unwrap();
+                let request = read_http_request(&mut stream);
+                assert!(
+                    request.starts_with(response.request_line),
+                    "unexpected request:\n{request}"
+                );
+
+                let response_text = format!(
+                    "HTTP/1.1 {}\r\ncontent-type: application/json\r\ncontent-length: {}\r\nconnection: close\r\n\r\n{}",
+                    response.status,
+                    response.body.len(),
+                    response.body
+                );
+                stream.write_all(response_text.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+                requests.push(request);
+            }
+
+            requests
+        });
+
+        (base_url, handle)
+    }
+
+    fn read_http_request(stream: &mut TcpStream) -> String {
+        let mut buf = Vec::new();
+        let mut chunk = [0u8; 512];
+        let mut header_len = None;
+
+        loop {
+            let n = stream.read(&mut chunk).unwrap();
+            if n == 0 {
+                break;
+            }
+            buf.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..n]);
+
+            if header_len.is_none() {
+                header_len = buf.windows(4).position(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n").map(|p| p + 4);
+            }
+
+            if let Some(header_len) = header_len {
+                let header = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..header_len]);
+                let content_len = header
+                    .lines()
+                    .find_map(|line| {
+                        let (name, value) = line.split_once(':')?;
+                        name.eq_ignore_ascii_case("content-length")
+                            .then(|| value.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
+                            .flatten()
+                    })
+                    .unwrap_or(0);
+
+                if buf.len() >= header_len + content_len {
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf).into_owned()
+    }
+
+    /// The regression that round-1 missed: the Phase-2 `git-upload-pack` POST was
+    /// left unsigned, so an owner's fetch of a private repo cleared the (now signed)
+    /// advertisement and then 404'd on the pack POST. Drive BOTH request builders
+    /// against a mock node and assert the RFC-9421 headers actually go out on the
+    /// wire for BOTH services when a keypair is present (the mock only matches when
+    /// the headers exist, so `.assert()` fails if any are dropped).
+    #[test]
+    fn advertisement_and_pack_post_are_signed_for_both_services_with_keypair() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
+        let body = b"0009done\n".to_vec();
+
+        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
+            let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
+            let repo_base = format!("{}/zOwner/myrepo", server.url());
+
+            let get_mock = server
+                .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/info/refs".to_string()))
+                .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+                .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+                .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+                .with_status(200)
+                .create();
+            let refs_url = format!("{repo_base}/info/refs?service={service}");
+            let resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, Some(&kp))
+                .send()
+                .unwrap();
+            assert!(resp.status().is_success());
+            get_mock.assert();
+
+            let post_mock = server
+                .mock("POST", mockito::Matcher::Regex(format!("/{service}$")))
+                .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+                .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+                .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+                .with_status(200)
+                .create();
+            let post_url = format!("{repo_base}/{service}");
+            let resp = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &body, Some(&kp))
+                .body(body.clone())
+                .send()
+                .unwrap();
+            assert!(resp.status().is_success());
+            post_mock.assert();
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Without an identity, the pack POST must go out UNSIGNED so public fetch (and
+    /// alpha unsigned push) still work. `Matcher::Missing` matches only when the
+    /// header is absent, so the mock is hit only if NO signature was attached, for
+    /// BOTH services (the receive-pack iteration also exercises the no-keypair warn
+    /// branch and confirms it does not block the request).
+    #[test]
+    fn pack_post_is_unsigned_without_keypair_for_both_services() {
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
+        let body = b"0009done\n".to_vec();
+
+        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
+            let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
+            let post_url = format!("{}/zOwner/myrepo/{service}", server.url());
+
+            let post_mock = server
+                .mock("POST", mockito::Matcher::Regex(format!("/{service}$")))
+                .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+                .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+                .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+                .with_status(200)
+                .create();
+            let resp = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &body, None)
+                .body(body.clone())
+                .send()
+                .unwrap();
+            assert!(resp.status().is_success());
+            post_mock.assert();
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Symmetric negative case for Phase 1: with no identity the advertisement GET
+    /// carries no signature, so public clones stay anonymous.
+    #[test]
+    fn advertisement_get_is_unsigned_without_keypair() {
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
+        let refs_url = format!(
+            "{}/zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+            server.url()
+        );
+
+        let get_mock = server
+            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/info/refs".to_string()))
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+            .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .create();
+        let resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, None)
+            .send()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(resp.status().is_success());
+        get_mock.assert();
+    }
+
+    // ── Phase-1 retry-on-404 (P2, #119): fetch stays anonymous until the node
+    //    denies it, then escalates to ONE signed retry. Drives handle_connect end to
+    //    end against the recording mock, asserting what actually goes on the wire.
+    //    A request is "signed" iff it carries the `signature-input` header.
+
+    /// Public fetch: the node serves the anonymous advertisement (200), so the
+    /// client never signs — not the advertisement GET, not the upload-pack POST —
+    /// even though an identity is present. This is the privacy fix: a public clone
+    /// must not disclose the caller's DID.
+    #[test]
+    fn fetch_public_stays_anonymous_even_with_keypair() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "0000",
+            },
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "POST /zOwner/myrepo/git-upload-pack",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "",
+            },
+        ]);
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0009done\n".to_vec());
+        handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin)
+            .expect("public fetch should succeed");
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2, "public fetch must not retry");
+        assert!(
+            !requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "the advertisement GET must be anonymous for a public fetch"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "the upload-pack POST must be anonymous for a public fetch"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Private fetch: the anonymous advertisement is denied (404); with an identity
+    /// present the client retries the GET signed and — because Phase 1 needed
+    /// signing — also signs the Phase-2 upload-pack POST. The FIRST request is still
+    /// anonymous: the DID is not disclosed until the node demands authentication.
+    #[test]
+    fn fetch_private_retries_signed_on_404_and_signs_the_pack_post() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+                status: "404 Not Found",
+                body: r#"{"message":"repository is not registered on this node"}"#,
+            },
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "0000",
+            },
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "POST /zOwner/myrepo/git-upload-pack",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "",
+            },
+        ]);
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0009done\n".to_vec());
+        handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin)
+            .expect("signed retry should succeed");
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            requests.len(),
+            3,
+            "expected anon GET, signed GET retry, signed POST"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "the first advertisement GET must be anonymous"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "the retry advertisement GET must be signed"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            requests[2].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "the upload-pack POST must be signed once the fetch needed auth"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Private fetch with no identity: the anonymous advertisement 404s and there is
+    /// no keypair to retry with, so the client surfaces the error after exactly one
+    /// request — no retry, no hang.
+    #[test]
+    fn fetch_without_keypair_does_not_retry_on_404() {
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![TestResponse {
+            request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+            status: "404 Not Found",
+            body: r#"{"message":"not found"}"#,
+        }]);
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
+        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("returned 404 Not Found"));
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 1, "no keypair means no signed retry");
+        assert!(!requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"));
+    }
+
+    /// Private fetch where the SIGNED retry is also denied (caller is not a reader):
+    /// the client retries exactly once, then surfaces the 404 rather than looping.
+    /// Bounds the escalation to a single signed attempt.
+    #[test]
+    fn fetch_signed_retry_still_denied_surfaces_error_once() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+                status: "404 Not Found",
+                body: r#"{"message":"not found"}"#,
+            },
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+                status: "404 Not Found",
+                body: r#"{"message":"not found"}"#,
+            },
+        ]);
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
+        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("returned 404 Not Found"));
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2, "exactly one signed retry, then surface");
+        assert!(!requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"));
+        assert!(requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"));
+    }
+
+    /// Push (git-receive-pack) is unchanged: it signs from the FIRST request — you
+    /// cannot push anonymously — so there is no anonymous-first probe for push.
+    #[test]
+    fn push_advertisement_is_signed_from_the_first_request() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "0000",
+            },
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "POST /zOwner/myrepo/git-receive-pack",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "",
+            },
+        ]);
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0000".to_vec());
+        handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-receive-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin)
+            .expect("push should succeed");
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2);
+        assert!(
+            requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "push advertisement must be signed from the first request"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "push POST must be signed"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Cross-crate seam: the signature the CLIENT actually emits (via the real
+    /// request builders) verifies under the SAME `gitlawb_core::http_sig`
+    /// primitives the node's `require_signature` uses, over the `@path` the client
+    /// genuinely transmits (derived from the built reqwest request, exactly as the
+    /// node derives it from `uri.path_and_query()`). A tampered `@path` must fail:
+    /// this is the byte-match the whole A1 client fix depends on, now executed end
+    /// to end (sign here, verify with the node's verifier), not reasoned.
+    #[test]
+    fn client_signature_verifies_under_node_verification_for_both_services() {
+        use gitlawb_core::http_sig::{build_signing_string, compute_content_digest, HttpSignature};
+        use gitlawb_core::identity::verify;
+        use std::collections::HashMap;
+
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
+        let body = b"0009done\n".to_vec();
+
+        // Re-implements the node's require_signature verification (auth/mod.rs):
+        // parse headers, recompute content-digest from the body, rebuild the signing
+        // string over @method/@path/content-digest, Ed25519-verify. Ok iff the node
+        // would accept it.
+        let node_verifies = |method: &str,
+                             path_and_query: &str,
+                             body: &[u8],
+                             sig_input: &str,
+                             sig_header: &str,
+                             content_digest: &str|
+         -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+            let sig = HttpSignature::parse(sig_input, sig_header)?;
+            sig.check_created()?;
+            assert!(
+                sig.missing_components().is_empty(),
+                "signature must cover all required components"
+            );
+            assert_eq!(sig.alg, "ed25519");
+            assert_eq!(
+                content_digest,
+                compute_content_digest(body),
+                "content-digest must match the body"
+            );
+            let vk = sig.key_id.to_verifying_key()?;
+            let mut values = HashMap::new();
+            values.insert("@method".to_string(), method.to_uppercase());
+            values.insert("@path".to_string(), path_and_query.to_string());
+            values.insert("content-digest".to_string(), content_digest.to_string());
+            let sig_params_value = sig_input.strip_prefix("sig1=").unwrap_or(sig_input);
+            let components: Vec<&str> = sig.components.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
+            let signing_string = build_signing_string(&components, sig_params_value, &values)?;
+            let sig_array: [u8; 64] = sig.signature_bytes.as_slice().try_into()?;
+            verify(&vk, signing_string.as_bytes(), &sig_array)?;
+            Ok(())
+        };
+        // @path exactly as the node reconstructs it from the request it receives.
+        let path_and_query = |req: &reqwest::blocking::Request| match req.url().query() {
+            Some(q) => format!("{}?{}", req.url().path(), q),
+            None => req.url().path().to_string(),
+        };
+        let header = |req: &reqwest::blocking::Request, name: &str| {
+            req.headers()
+                .get(name)
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("missing {name}"))
+                .to_str()
+                .unwrap()
+                .to_string()
+        };
+
+        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
+            // Phase-1 advertisement GET (empty body).
+            let refs_url = format!("http://node.example/zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service={service}");
+            let req = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, Some(&kp))
+                .build()
+                .unwrap();
+            node_verifies(
+                "GET",
+                &path_and_query(&req),
+                b"",
+                &header(&req, "signature-input"),
+                &header(&req, "signature"),
+                &header(&req, "content-digest"),
+            )
+            .expect("client GET signature must verify under the node's verifier");
+
+            // Phase-2 pack POST (real body).
+            let post_url = format!("http://node.example/zOwner/myrepo/{service}");
+            let req = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &body, Some(&kp))
+                .body(body.clone())
+                .build()
+                .unwrap();
+            let pq = path_and_query(&req);
+            node_verifies(
+                "POST",
+                &pq,
+                &body,
+                &header(&req, "signature-input"),
+                &header(&req, "signature"),
+                &header(&req, "content-digest"),
+            )
+            .expect("client POST signature must verify under the node's verifier");
+
+            // Negative: a tampered @path (the A1 attack surface) must NOT verify.
+            let tampered = pq.replace(service, "git-evil");
+            assert!(
+                node_verifies(
+                    "POST",
+                    &tampered,
+                    &body,
+                    &header(&req, "signature-input"),
+                    &header(&req, "signature"),
+                    &header(&req, "content-digest"),
+                )
+                .is_err(),
+                "a tampered @path must fail verification"
+            );
+        }
+    }
 
     #[test]
     fn parse_standard_url() {
@@ -524,6 +1142,100 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn http_error_message_sanitizes_response_body_controls() {
+        let message = http_error_message(
+            "GET",
+            "/info/refs",
+            reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
+            "\u{1b}[2Jrepository\r\nis\tblocked\u{7}",
+            None,
+        );
+
+        assert!(message.contains("repository is blocked"));
+        assert!(!message.contains('\u{1b}'));
+        assert!(!message.contains('\u{7}'));
+        assert!(!message.contains('\r'));
+        assert!(!message.contains('\n'));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn http_error_message_truncates_long_response_body() {
+        let body = "x".repeat(MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS + 100);
+        let message = http_error_message(
+            "POST",
+            "/git-receive-pack",
+            reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+            &body,
+            None,
+        );
+        let prefix = "POST /git-receive-pack returned 403 Forbidden: ";
+
+        assert_eq!(message.len(), prefix.len() + MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS);
+        assert!(message.starts_with(prefix));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn connect_get_error_includes_response_body() {
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![TestResponse {
+            request_line: "GET /z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1",
+            status: "404 Not Found",
+            body: r#"{"message":"repository is not registered on this node"}"#,
+        }]);
+
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/z6Mk/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
+        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
+        let message = err.to_string();
+
+        assert!(message.contains("GET /info/refs returned 404 Not Found"));
+        assert!(message.contains("repository is not registered on this node"));
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 1);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn connect_post_error_includes_response_body() {
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack HTTP/1.1",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "",
+            },
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "POST /z6Mk/myrepo/git-receive-pack HTTP/1.1",
+                status: "403 Forbidden",
+                body: r#"{"error":"forbidden","message":"push rejected: only the repo owner may push"}"#,
+            },
+        ]);
+
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/z6Mk/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0000".to_vec());
+        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-receive-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
+        let message = err.to_string();
+
+        assert!(message.contains("POST /git-receive-pack returned 403 Forbidden"));
+        assert!(message.contains("push rejected: only the repo owner may push"));
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2);
+        assert!(requests[1].contains("\r\n\r\n0000"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn url_path_preserves_query_for_signed_advertisement() {
+        // The Phase-1 advertisement GET is signed over url_path(refs_url), and the
+        // node verifies the signature over its path_and_query, so the ?service=
+        // query MUST survive verbatim or the signatures will not byte-match.
+        assert_eq!(
+            url_path("http://127.0.0.1:7545/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"),
+            "/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            url_path("http://127.0.0.1:7545/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack"),
+            "/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack"
+        );
+    }
+
     fn args(items: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
         items.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
     }

crates/gitlawb-attest/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
 description = "External Attestation v1: pluggable provenance attachments for gitlawb ref-update certs"
-version = "0.4.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.5.0" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

crates/gitlawb-core/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
 description = "Core cryptographic primitives for the gitlawb network: DIDs, CIDs, UCAN, HTTP Signatures, ref-update certificates"
-version = "0.4.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.5.0" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
 description = "The gitlawb node daemon — git hosting over HTTP with DID auth"
-version = "0.4.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.5.0" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/ipfs.rs

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ use std::str::FromStr;
 use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::git::store;
-use crate::git::visibility_pack::{has_path_scoped_rule, withheld_blob_oids};
+use crate::git::visibility_pack::{allowed_blob_set_for_caller, has_path_scoped_rule};
 use crate::state::AppState;
 use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
 
@@ -36,16 +36,24 @@ use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
 /// Search all repos on the node for a git object whose SHA-256 hash matches
 /// the given CIDv1, returning its raw content if the caller may read it.
 ///
-/// Visibility (#110): the object is served only from a repo row the caller
-/// passes. For each iterated row we gate against that row's OWN rules
+/// Visibility (#110, #126): the object is served only from a repo row the
+/// caller passes. For each iterated row we gate against that row's OWN rules
 /// (`visibility_check` at `"/"`), never re-resolving via `authorize_repo_read`
 /// — `get_repo`'s fuzzy match could otherwise authorize a different physical
-/// row than the one read (KTD2a). When the row carries path-scoped rules, a
-/// blob withheld from the caller (`withheld_blob_oids`) is skipped. Denial and
-/// genuine not-found both fall through to an opaque 404.
+/// row than the one read (KTD2a). We check object existence via
+/// `store::object_type` *before* the expensive reachability walk so random-CID
+/// spray cannot trigger full-history git walks on repos that don't carry the
+/// object. When the row carries path-scoped rules (KTD4) the served object
+/// must be either a non-blob (trees/commits are structural; KTD3) OR a blob
+/// in the caller's *reachable* allowed-set (`allowed_blob_set_for_caller`).
+/// The reachable allowed-set excludes dangling blobs — a blob written via
+/// `git hash-object -w` and never committed has no path to gate, so it is
+/// fail-closed 404'd under path-scoped rules (#126). Denial and genuine
+/// not-found both fall through to an opaque 404.
 ///
-/// Scope: this closes the direct unauthenticated scan. A stale-public mirror
-/// row still serves withheld content (tracked separately, #124).
+/// Scope: this closes the direct unauthenticated scan, including the dangling
+/// case. A stale-public mirror row still serves withheld content (tracked
+/// separately, #124).
 pub async fn get_by_cid(
     Path(cid_str): Path<String>,
     State(state): State<AppState>,
@@ -85,11 +93,16 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
         .await
         .map_err(AppError::Internal)?;
 
-    // Request-scoped memo of the per-repo withheld set (KTD1). The caller is
-    // constant for one request, so `repo.id` alone is a safe, sufficient key —
-    // never a coarse caller "class", which `visibility_check`'s exact full-DID
-    // reader match would make unsafe.
-    let mut withheld_memo: HashMap<String, HashSet<String>> = HashMap::new();
+    // Request-scoped memo of the per-repo allowed-blob set (KTD1, #126). The
+    // caller is constant for one request, so `repo.id` alone is a safe,
+    // sufficient key — never a coarse caller "class", which
+    // `visibility_check`'s exact full-DID reader match would make unsafe.
+    //
+    // We flipped from a deny-set (`withheld_blob_oids`) to an allowed-set
+    // (`allowed_blob_set_for_caller`) so dangling blobs — never enumerated by
+    // the reachable walk — fail closed instead of slipping through an empty
+    // deny entry (#126).
+    let mut allowed_memo: HashMap<String, HashSet<String>> = HashMap::new();
 
     for repo in &repos {
         // Repo-level read gate against THIS row's own rules (KTD2a).
@@ -106,9 +119,24 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
             Err(_) => continue,
         };
 
-        // Per-blob withholding only applies when a path-scoped rule exists (KTD4).
-        if has_path_scoped_rule(rules) {
-            if !withheld_memo.contains_key(&repo.id) {
+        // Check whether the object exists in this repo before any expensive
+        // reachability walk. This prevents random-CID spray from triggering
+        // full-history git walks on repos that don't carry the object.
+        let obj_type = match store::object_type(&repo_path, &sha256_hex) {
+            Ok(Some(t)) => t,
+            Ok(None) => continue,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error checking git object type");
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+
+        // Per-blob gating only applies when a path-scoped rule exists (KTD4).
+        // Without any path-scoped rule, the "/" gate above is the whole story.
+        // Trees/commits are always served under path-scoped rules (KTD3).
+        let path_scoped = has_path_scoped_rule(rules);
+        if path_scoped && obj_type == "blob" {
+            if !allowed_memo.contains_key(&repo.id) {
                 let rp = repo_path.clone();
                 let r = rules.to_vec();
                 let is_public = repo.is_public;
@@ -116,7 +144,13 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
                 let caller_for_walk = caller_owned.clone();
                 // Full-history walk shells out to git — keep it off the async runtime.
                 let walk = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
-                    withheld_blob_oids(&rp, &r, is_public, &owner, caller_for_walk.as_deref())
+                    allowed_blob_set_for_caller(
+                        &rp,
+                        &r,
+                        is_public,
+                        &owner,
+                        caller_for_walk.as_deref(),
+                    )
                 })
                 .await;
                 // Fail closed on EITHER a task panic (JoinError) or a walk error:
@@ -125,51 +159,50 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
                 let set = match walk {
                     Ok(Ok(set)) => set,
                     Ok(Err(e)) => {
-                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "withheld walk failed; skipping repo");
+                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "allowed-blob walk failed; skipping repo");
                         continue;
                     }
                     Err(e) => {
-                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "withheld walk task panicked; skipping repo");
+                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "allowed-blob walk task panicked; skipping repo");
                         continue;
                     }
                 };
-                withheld_memo.insert(repo.id.clone(), set);
+                allowed_memo.insert(repo.id.clone(), set);
             }
-            if withheld_memo
+            let in_allowed = allowed_memo
                 .get(&repo.id)
-                .is_some_and(|set| set.contains(&sha256_hex))
-            {
+                .is_some_and(|set| set.contains(&sha256_hex));
+            if !in_allowed {
                 continue;
             }
         }
 
-        match store::read_object(&repo_path, &sha256_hex) {
-            Ok(Some((_obj_type, content))) => {
-                // 3. Return the content with IPFS-style headers
-                let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
-                headers.insert(
-                    HeaderName::from_static("content-type"),
-                    HeaderValue::from_static("application/octet-stream"),
-                );
-                headers.insert(
-                    HeaderName::from_static("x-content-cid"),
-                    HeaderValue::from_str(&cid_str)
-                        .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
-                );
-                headers.insert(
-                    HeaderName::from_static("x-git-hash"),
-                    HeaderValue::from_str(&sha256_hex)
-                        .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
-                );
-
-                return Ok((StatusCode::OK, headers, content).into_response());
-            }
-            Ok(None) => continue,
+        // Now that we've passed the gate, read the content.
+        let content = match store::read_object_content(&repo_path, &sha256_hex, &obj_type) {
+            Ok(c) => c,
             Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error reading git object");
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error reading git object content");
                 continue;
             }
-        }
+        };
+
+        // 3. Return the content with IPFS-style headers
+        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+        headers.insert(
+            HeaderName::from_static("content-type"),
+            HeaderValue::from_static("application/octet-stream"),
+        );
+        headers.insert(
+            HeaderName::from_static("x-content-cid"),
+            HeaderValue::from_str(&cid_str).unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
+        );
+        headers.insert(
+            HeaderName::from_static("x-git-hash"),
+            HeaderValue::from_str(&sha256_hex)
+                .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
+        );
+
+        return Ok((StatusCode::OK, headers, content).into_response());
     }
 
     // Not found in any repo

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/mod.rs

@@ -324,6 +324,118 @@ mod authz_guard {
         })
     }
 
+    /// Collect `.rs` source files under `dir`. Recursive so the completeness scan
+    /// covers nested API modules (`api/<module>/mod.rs` and deeper), not only the
+    /// immediate `api/*.rs` children.
+    fn collect_rs_files(dir: &std::path::Path) -> Vec<std::path::PathBuf> {
+        let mut out = Vec::new();
+        for entry in std::fs::read_dir(dir).expect("read api dir") {
+            let path = entry.expect("dir entry").path();
+            if path.is_dir() {
+                out.extend(collect_rs_files(&path));
+            } else if path.extension().is_some_and(|e| e == "rs") {
+                out.push(path);
+            }
+        }
+        out
+    }
+
+    /// The `.rs` files under `api_root` (as paths RELATIVE to it) that the
+    /// completeness scan must inspect: everything except the top-level `mod.rs` (the
+    /// guard file itself) and the top-level files already covered by the per-handler
+    /// `sources` loop. A nested `api/<module>/<name>.rs` is a distinct source file
+    /// even when its basename matches a listed top-level file, so it stays in scope.
+    fn unlisted_source_files(
+        api_root: &std::path::Path,
+        listed: &std::collections::HashSet<&str>,
+    ) -> Vec<String> {
+        collect_rs_files(api_root)
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|path| {
+                let rel = path
+                    .strip_prefix(api_root)
+                    .ok()?
+                    .to_string_lossy()
+                    .replace('\\', "/");
+                if rel == "mod.rs" || listed.contains(rel.as_str()) {
+                    None
+                } else {
+                    Some(rel)
+                }
+            })
+            .collect()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn collect_rs_files_recurses_subdirs() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = tmp.path();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("a.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("note.txt"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("sub/deep")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/mod.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/deep/c.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        let names: std::collections::HashSet<String> = collect_rs_files(root)
+            .iter()
+            .map(|p| {
+                p.strip_prefix(root)
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .to_string_lossy()
+                    .replace('\\', "/")
+            })
+            .collect();
+        assert!(names.contains("a.rs"));
+        assert!(
+            names.contains("sub/mod.rs"),
+            "nested module file must be collected"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            names.contains("sub/deep/c.rs"),
+            "deeply nested file must be collected"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !names.iter().any(|n| n.ends_with(".txt")),
+            "non-rs files excluded"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(names.len(), 3);
+    }
+
+    // P3 (#119): the completeness scan must skip already-covered files by their path
+    // RELATIVE to api_root, not by basename. A nested api/<module>/repos.rs is a
+    // distinct source file from the covered top-level repos.rs and must still be
+    // scanned, or a new nested module could smuggle in an ungated repo-scoped handler
+    // behind a colliding filename.
+    #[test]
+    fn unlisted_source_files_scans_nested_file_with_colliding_basename() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = tmp.path();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("repos.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("mod.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("sub")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/repos.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/fresh.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        let listed: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = ["repos.rs"].into_iter().collect();
+
+        let unlisted = unlisted_source_files(root, &listed);
+
+        assert!(
+            unlisted.contains(&"sub/repos.rs".to_string()),
+            "a nested file whose basename matches a listed top-level file must still be scanned"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            unlisted.contains(&"sub/fresh.rs".to_string()),
+            "a nested file with a unique name must be scanned"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !unlisted.contains(&"repos.rs".to_string()),
+            "the listed top-level file is covered by the per-handler loop"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !unlisted.contains(&"mod.rs".to_string()),
+            "the top-level guard file is skipped"
+        );
+    }
+
     /// Egress gate guard: every repo-scoped handler (`Path<(String, String..)>`)
     /// must carry an authz marker — a read gate (`authorize_repo_read` /
     /// `visibility_check`), or a write gate (`require_repo_owner` / `require_owner`
@@ -376,19 +488,15 @@ mod authz_guard {
                 "read-guard `sources` lists {f} but the file does not exist"
             );
         }
-        for entry in std::fs::read_dir(api_dir).expect("read src/api") {
-            let path = entry.expect("dir entry").path();
-            let fname = path.file_name().unwrap().to_string_lossy().into_owned();
-            if !fname.ends_with(".rs") || fname == "mod.rs" || listed.contains(fname.as_str()) {
-                continue;
-            }
-            let src = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).expect("read api file");
+        let api_root = std::path::Path::new(api_dir);
+        for rel in unlisted_source_files(api_root, &listed) {
+            let src = std::fs::read_to_string(api_root.join(&rel)).expect("read api file");
             let has_repo_handler = handler_names(&src)
                 .iter()
                 .any(|n| is_repo_scoped(&fn_body(&src, n)));
             assert!(
                 !has_repo_handler,
-                "api/{fname} declares a repo-scoped handler but is not in the egress \
+                "api/{rel} declares a repo-scoped handler but is not in the egress \
                  guard `sources` list — add it so its handlers are gate-checked"
             );
         }
@@ -396,9 +504,6 @@ mod authz_guard {
         // Repo-scoped reads known to be ungated today, each tracked by an issue.
         // Remove an entry the moment its gate lands (the staleness assert enforces it).
         let known_ungated: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
-            // info/refs gates only git-upload-pack today; git-receive-pack
-            // advertisement is ungated until #119 makes the gate unconditional.
-            ("git_info_refs", "#119"),
             ("list_certs", "#120"),
             ("get_cert", "#120"),
             ("list_issues", "#120"),
@@ -407,7 +512,6 @@ mod authz_guard {
             ("list_labels", "#120"),
             ("list_repo_bounties", "#120"),
             ("get_star_status", "#120"),
-            ("list_repo_events", "#94 (PR #113)"),
             ("list_webhooks", "#94 (PR #113)"),
             ("list_replicas", "PR #113"),
             ("list_protected_branches", "PR #113"),

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/peers.rs

@@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ pub async fn trigger_sync(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<serde_js
                 repo.get("name").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
             ) {
                 (Some(owner), Some(name)) => {
-                    // Use short owner (last colon segment) matching DB convention
-                    let short = owner.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner);
+                    // Use short owner (did:key-only normalization) matching DB convention
+                    let short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(owner);
                     format!("{short}/{name}")
                 }
                 _ => continue,

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rs

@@ -211,7 +211,12 @@ pub async fn create_repo(
         .repo_store
         .init(&owner_did, &req.name)
         .await
-        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            // `{:#}` walks the anyhow chain to the leaf cause; the other git
+            // handlers log their failures, this one didn't.
+            tracing::error!(owner = %owner_did, repo = %req.name, err = %format!("{e:#}"), "repo create failed");
+            AppError::Git(e.to_string())
+        })?;
 
     let now = Utc::now();
     let record = crate::db::RepoRecord {
@@ -482,11 +487,13 @@ pub async fn get_tree(
 
 // ── Git smart HTTP endpoints ──────────────────────────────────────────────
 
-/// GET /:owner/:repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack
+/// GET /:owner/:repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack|git-receive-pack
 pub async fn git_info_refs(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Query(query): Query<InfoRefsQuery>,
+    crate::rate_limit::PeerAddr(peer): crate::rate_limit::PeerAddr,
+    headers: axum::http::HeaderMap,
     auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Response> {
     let name = repo.trim_end_matches(".git");
@@ -508,10 +515,14 @@ pub async fn git_info_refs(
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::BadRequest("missing ?service= parameter".into()))?;
     tracing::debug!(service = %service, repo = %name, "info/refs service");
 
-    // Enforce read (clone/fetch) visibility. The push advertisement
-    // (service=git-receive-pack) is authorized separately on the
-    // git-receive-pack POST, so leave it untouched here.
-    if service == "git-upload-pack" {
+    // Enforce read visibility on the ref advertisement, for BOTH services. The
+    // upload-pack (clone/fetch) and receive-pack (push) advertisements expose the
+    // same ref metadata (branch/tag names and commit tips), so a private repo's
+    // advertisement must be withheld from a non-reader regardless of which service
+    // is requested. The push itself stays separately owner-gated on the
+    // git-receive-pack POST; push access implies read access here, so a
+    // legitimate pusher (the owner) always clears this gate.
+    {
         let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
         let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
         // Subtree (mode B) rules do not gate the advertisement: refs expose commit
@@ -519,11 +530,28 @@ pub async fn git_info_refs(
         if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/")
             == Decision::Deny
         {
-            tracing::debug!(repo = %name, caller = ?caller, "info/refs read denied by visibility");
+            tracing::debug!(repo = %name, caller = ?caller, service = %service, "info/refs read denied by visibility");
             return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")));
         }
     }
 
+    // Push flood brake on the advertisement phase. A push always hits this
+    // GET first, and for receive-pack it forces a fresh Tigris download below;
+    // throttling only the receive-pack POST would leave the expensive
+    // fresh-acquire reachable unauthenticated and unlimited. Applied before the
+    // acquire so a rejected request does no Tigris work. Same per-IP limiter and
+    // trusted-proxy policy as the POST middleware (shared buckets).
+    if service == "git-receive-pack" {
+        if let Some(key) = crate::rate_limit::client_key(&headers, peer, state.push_limiter_trust) {
+            if !state.push_rate_limiter.check(&key).await {
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %name, key = %key, "receive-pack advertisement rate limited");
+                return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
+                    "push rate limit exceeded — try again later".into(),
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     // For receive-pack (push), download the latest from Tigris so the client
     // sees the same refs that acquire_write() will operate on.
     let disk_path = if service == "git-receive-pack" {
@@ -945,11 +973,7 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
             .as_deref()
             .unwrap_or("http://127.0.0.1:7545")
             .trim_end_matches('/');
-        let owner_short = record
-            .owner_did
-            .split(':')
-            .next_back()
-            .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+        let owner_short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&record.owner_did);
         let clone_url = format!("{}/{}/{}.git", base_url, owner_short, record.name);
 
         for update in &ref_updates {
@@ -1096,7 +1120,7 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
                     // this push to Arweave, so the oid->cid index survives total
                     // node loss. Best-effort; never fails the push.
                     if !delta.is_empty() && !irys_url.is_empty() {
-                        let owner_short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&owner_did);
+                        let owner_short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&owner_did);
                         let repo_slug = format!("{owner_short}/{repo_name}");
                         let ts = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
                         let manifest = crate::arweave::EncryptedManifest {
@@ -1141,11 +1165,7 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
         let node_did_str = state.node_did.to_string();
         let repo_slug = format!(
             "{}/{}",
-            record
-                .owner_did
-                .split(':')
-                .next_back()
-                .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did),
+            crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&record.owner_did),
             record.name
         );
         let ref_updates_clone = ref_updates
@@ -1213,17 +1233,26 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
             }
 
             // Broadcast ref update to GraphQL subscription listeners — one per ref.
+            // Gated on `announce`: /graphql/ws is unauthenticated (mounted after
+            // the optional_signature layer), and the subscription resolver has no
+            // caller to gate against, so only publicly-readable ref updates may
+            // reach anonymous subscribers. Mirrors the gossip (above) and Arweave
+            // (below) sends, which are already `announce`-gated. Without this a
+            // private-repo push would leak live ref metadata over the socket —
+            // the subscription analog of #112/#114.
             let now_ts = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
-            for (ref_name, old_sha, new_sha) in &ref_updates_clone {
-                let _ = ref_update_tx.send(crate::state::RefUpdateBroadcast {
-                    repo: repo_slug.clone(),
-                    ref_name: ref_name.clone(),
-                    old_sha: old_sha.clone(),
-                    new_sha: new_sha.clone(),
-                    pusher_did: pusher_did_clone.clone(),
-                    node_did: node_did_str.clone(),
-                    timestamp: now_ts.clone(),
-                });
+            if announce {
+                for (ref_name, old_sha, new_sha) in &ref_updates_clone {
+                    let _ = ref_update_tx.send(crate::state::RefUpdateBroadcast {
+                        repo: repo_slug.clone(),
+                        ref_name: ref_name.clone(),
+                        old_sha: old_sha.clone(),
+                        new_sha: new_sha.clone(),
+                        pusher_did: pusher_did_clone.clone(),
+                        node_did: node_did_str.clone(),
+                        timestamp: now_ts.clone(),
+                    });
+                }
             }
 
             // Arweave permanent anchoring — fire for each ref update.
@@ -1474,7 +1503,7 @@ pub async fn fork_repo(
     }
 
     // Check no name conflict under the forker's ownership
-    let forker_short = forker_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&forker_did);
+    let forker_short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&forker_did);
     if state.db.get_repo(forker_short, &fork_name).await?.is_some() {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
             "you already have a repo named {fork_name}"
@@ -1630,13 +1659,17 @@ fn parse_ref_updates(body: &[u8]) -> Vec<RefUpdate> {
 }
 
 // ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// For a non-key DID owner, `normalize_owner_key` returns the full DID, so
+// `clone_url` becomes `/did:gitlawb:z6.../repo.git`. That resolves through
+// `get_repo`, but the colon-bearing path segment would break the `sync.rs`
+// disk-path join (`owner_slug/repo`). Not reachable today (auth is
+// did:key-only), so this is a forward constraint to handle before non-key
+// ownership lands: the owner-first disk layout must either reject colons or
+// encode them.
 
 fn to_response(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, state: &AppState, star_count: i64) -> RepoResponse {
-    let owner_short = record
-        .owner_did
-        .split(':')
-        .next_back()
-        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    let owner_short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&record.owner_did);
 
     let base_url = state
         .config
@@ -1779,6 +1812,32 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    /// `announce` is the single boolean that gates every network-facing emission
+    /// of a push: gossip, Arweave anchoring, and the GraphQL subscription
+    /// broadcast (the last one added in this change). It must be false for a repo
+    /// the anonymous public cannot read, or the unauthenticated `/graphql/ws`
+    /// subscription leaks live private-repo ref metadata. Pin both directions of
+    /// the decision the broadcast now sits behind. No disk access: a non-announce
+    /// repo returns early, and a public repo with no path-scoped rule skips the
+    /// withheld walk.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn replication_announce_false_for_private_true_for_public() {
+        let dummy = std::path::PathBuf::from("/nonexistent");
+
+        // Private: no rules at all.
+        let (announce, _) = replication_withheld_set(None, OWNER_DID, false, dummy.clone()).await;
+        assert!(!announce, "private repo (no rules) must not announce");
+
+        // Private: empty rule set, is_public=false → still not listable at root.
+        let (announce, _) =
+            replication_withheld_set(Some(vec![]), OWNER_DID, false, dummy.clone()).await;
+        assert!(!announce, "private repo (empty rules) must not announce");
+
+        // Public: empty rule set, is_public=true → listable at root, announces.
+        let (announce, _) = replication_withheld_set(Some(vec![]), OWNER_DID, true, dummy).await;
+        assert!(announce, "public repo must announce");
+    }
+
     /// A rejection must be a 403 Forbidden (authenticated but not authorized),
     /// not a 400 — some git/CI clients retry 400s.
     fn assert_forbidden(rejection: Option<AppError>) {
@@ -2340,4 +2399,99 @@ mod tests {
 
         _mock.assert_async().await;
     }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn to_response_generates_correct_clone_url_slug() {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state_lazy();
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now();
+
+        // 1. did:key owner (should strip did:key: prefix)
+        let repo_key = crate::db::RepoRecord {
+            id: "uuid-1".into(),
+            name: "my-repo".into(),
+            owner_did: "did:key:z6Mkwbud".into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: true,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: now,
+            updated_at: now,
+            disk_path: "/tmp/my-repo".into(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        };
+        let response_key = to_response(&repo_key, &state, 5);
+        assert!(
+            response_key.clone_url.contains("/z6Mkwbud/my-repo.git"),
+            "clone_url should use the bare did:key ID. got: {}",
+            response_key.clone_url
+        );
+
+        // 2. did:gitlawb owner (non-key DID method, should NOT strip)
+        let repo_non_key = crate::db::RepoRecord {
+            id: "uuid-2".into(),
+            name: "other-repo".into(),
+            owner_did: "did:gitlawb:z6Mkwbud".into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: true,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: now,
+            updated_at: now,
+            disk_path: "/tmp/other-repo".into(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        };
+        let response_non_key = to_response(&repo_non_key, &state, 10);
+        assert!(
+            response_non_key
+                .clone_url
+                .contains("/did:gitlawb:z6Mkwbud/other-repo.git"),
+            "clone_url should preserve the full non-key owner DID. got: {}",
+            response_non_key.clone_url
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The receive-pack *advertisement* (`GET info/refs?service=git-receive-pack`)
+    /// must be throttled by the per-IP push limiter BEFORE it does the fresh
+    /// Tigris acquire — otherwise the flood brake on the POST is bypassable via
+    /// the cheaper unauthenticated GET (PR #152 review P1). Pre-filling the
+    /// bucket makes the assertion deterministic and keeps the test off the
+    /// acquire path entirely.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn receive_pack_advertisement_is_rate_limited(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        use axum::body::Body;
+        use axum::extract::ConnectInfo;
+        use axum::http::{Method, Request, StatusCode};
+        use std::net::SocketAddr;
+        use std::time::Duration;
+        use tower::ServiceExt;
+
+        let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
+        // Tiny limit, keyed on the socket peer (no trusted proxy).
+        state.push_rate_limiter = crate::rate_limit::RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None;
+        state
+            .db
+            .upsert_mirror_repo("z6advowner", "adv", "/tmp/adv", None, false)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.55:6000".parse().unwrap();
+        // Exhaust this peer's single-request budget up front.
+        assert!(state.push_rate_limiter.check(&peer.ip().to_string()).await);
+
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let mut req = Request::builder()
+            .method(Method::GET)
+            .uri("/z6advowner/adv/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack")
+            .body(Body::empty())
+            .unwrap();
+        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
+
+        let status = router.oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status();
+        assert_eq!(
+            status,
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+            "receive-pack advertisement must be throttled before the Tigris acquire"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/auth/mod.rs

@@ -514,6 +514,8 @@ mod tests {
             machine_id: None,
             repo_store: crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), pool),
             rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(100, Duration::from_secs(60)),
+            push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+            push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None,
             shutdown_tx: tokio::sync::watch::channel(false).0,
         }
     }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/db/mod.rs

@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ const MIGRATIONS: &[Migration] = &[
             // the matching expression index. The CASE must stay byte-for-byte in
             // sync with DEDUP_CTE / count_repos_deduped or Postgres won't use it.
             "DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_repos_owner_short_name",
+            // Keep byte-identical to OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL so Postgres uses the index.
             "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_repos_owner_key_name ON repos ((CASE WHEN owner_did LIKE 'did:key:%' AND position(':' in substr(owner_did, 9)) = 0 THEN substr(owner_did, 9) ELSE owner_did END), name)",
         ],
     },
@@ -826,6 +827,85 @@ const MIGRATIONS: &[Migration] = &[
 
 // ── Repos ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
+pub(crate) fn normalize_owner_key(did: &str) -> &str {
+    match did.strip_prefix("did:key:") {
+        Some(rest) if !rest.contains(':') => rest,
+        _ => did,
+    }
+}
+
+/// SQL CASE expression byte-identical to `normalize_owner_key`. All queries that
+/// filter or group by owner key use this const so the Rust and SQL sides cannot
+/// drift apart. If you change `normalize_owner_key`, update this const too.
+const OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL: &str = "CASE WHEN owner_did LIKE 'did:key:%' AND position(':' in substr(owner_did, 9)) = 0 THEN substr(owner_did, 9) ELSE owner_did END";
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod normalize_owner_key_tests {
+    use super::normalize_owner_key;
+
+    // Boundary set matching the SQL CASE: did:key short/full, empty residual,
+    // did:key:z:extra, non-key, bare, empty, uppercase.
+    #[test]
+    fn strips_did_key_prefix() {
+        assert_eq!(normalize_owner_key("did:key:z6Mkfoo"), "z6Mkfoo");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn keeps_full_did_key_unchanged_when_not_a_prefix() {
+        assert_eq!(normalize_owner_key("z6Mkfoo"), "z6Mkfoo");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn leaves_non_key_did_intact() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            normalize_owner_key("did:gitlawb:z6Mkfoo"),
+            "did:gitlawb:z6Mkfoo"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn leaves_web_did_intact() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            normalize_owner_key("did:web:example.com:alice"),
+            "did:web:example.com:alice"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn does_not_strip_did_key_with_extra_colon() {
+        // did:key:did:gitlawb:z6... — the remainder contains ':', so it's left whole.
+        assert_eq!(
+            normalize_owner_key("did:key:did:gitlawb:z6Mkfoo"),
+            "did:key:did:gitlawb:z6Mkfoo"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn empty_string_returns_empty() {
+        assert_eq!(normalize_owner_key(""), "");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bare_did_key_colon_becomes_empty() {
+        // did:key: with nothing after still has the prefix stripped.
+        assert_eq!(normalize_owner_key("did:key:"), "");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn uppercase_prefix_is_untouched() {
+        assert_eq!(normalize_owner_key("DID:KEY:z6Mkfoo"), "DID:KEY:z6Mkfoo");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strips_did_key_even_with_trailing_slash() {
+        // did:key:z6Mkfoo/extra has no ':' in the remainder, so it strips.
+        assert_eq!(
+            normalize_owner_key("did:key:z6Mkfoo/extra"),
+            "z6Mkfoo/extra"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
 impl Db {
     pub async fn create_repo(&self, repo: &RepoRecord) -> Result<()> {
         sqlx::query(
@@ -887,16 +967,32 @@ impl Db {
     }
 
     pub async fn get_repo(&self, owner_did: &str, name: &str) -> Result<Option<RepoRecord>> {
-        let row = sqlx::query(
+        // Normalize owner_did to its did:key short form, mirroring did_matches and
+        // the DEDUP_CTE's owner-key CASE: strip `did:key:` only when the remainder
+        // is a bare key id (no further `:`). This keeps `did:key:z...` and bare
+        // `z...` interchangeable while `did:gitlawb:z...` / `did:web:z...` stay
+        // distinct — the old LIKE '%:' || $1 || '%' was too broad (issue #124 P2).
+        let owner_key = normalize_owner_key(owner_did);
+        let sql = format!(
             "SELECT id, name, owner_did, description, is_public, default_branch,
                     created_at, updated_at, disk_path, forked_from, machine_id
              FROM repos
-             WHERE (owner_did = $1 OR owner_did LIKE '%:' || $1 || '%') AND name = $2",
-        )
-        .bind(owner_did)
-        .bind(name)
-        .fetch_optional(&self.pool)
-        .await?;
+              WHERE ({key}) = $1
+                AND name = $2
+             -- Prefer canonical rows (UUID id, no slash) over mirror rows (slash id).
+             -- Mirror rows are inserted by upsert_mirror_repo with is_public=true and
+             -- no visibility rules; using them for visibility checks would bypass the
+             -- canonical row's gate (issue #124).
+             ORDER BY CASE WHEN position('/' in id) > 0 THEN 1 ELSE 0 END,
+                      created_at ASC, id ASC
+             LIMIT 1",
+            key = OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL
+        );
+        let row = sqlx::query(&sql)
+            .bind(owner_key)
+            .bind(name)
+            .fetch_optional(&self.pool)
+            .await?;
 
         Ok(row.map(row_to_repo))
     }
@@ -969,15 +1065,17 @@ impl Db {
     /// full tie still picks a deterministic survivor. `list_all_repos_deduped_with_stars`,
     /// `list_all_repos_deduped`, and the marker logic in
     /// `crate::api::repos::dedupe_canonical_repos` must stay in sync.
-    const DEDUP_CTE: &'static str = "WITH deduped AS (
-                 SELECT DISTINCT ON (CASE WHEN owner_did LIKE 'did:key:%' AND position(':' in substr(owner_did, 9)) = 0 THEN substr(owner_did, 9) ELSE owner_did END, name)
+    fn dedup_cte() -> String {
+        format!(
+            "WITH deduped AS (
+                 SELECT DISTINCT ON ({key}, name)
                      id, name, owner_did, description, is_public, default_branch,
                      created_at,
                      -- group MAX, not the canonical row's own value: pushes that
                      -- arrive via gossip touch only the mirror row, so the
                      -- canonical updated_at goes stale
                      MAX(updated_at) OVER (
-                         PARTITION BY CASE WHEN owner_did LIKE 'did:key:%' AND position(':' in substr(owner_did, 9)) = 0 THEN substr(owner_did, 9) ELSE owner_did END, name
+                         PARTITION BY {key}, name
                      ) AS updated_at,
                      disk_path, forked_from, machine_id
                  FROM repos
@@ -987,15 +1085,18 @@ impl Db {
                  -- does. Callers bind the already-normalized key ($1).
                  -- Quarantined mirrors (admitted but unvalidated by the iCaptcha
                  -- propagation gate) are withheld from every listing surface.
-                 WHERE quarantined = FALSE AND ($1::text IS NULL OR (CASE WHEN owner_did LIKE 'did:key:%' AND position(':' in substr(owner_did, 9)) = 0 THEN substr(owner_did, 9) ELSE owner_did END) = $1)
-                 ORDER BY CASE WHEN owner_did LIKE 'did:key:%' AND position(':' in substr(owner_did, 9)) = 0 THEN substr(owner_did, 9) ELSE owner_did END, name,
-                     -- mirror rows carry a slash-form id (\"{owner_short}/{name}\"),
+                 WHERE quarantined = FALSE AND ($1::text IS NULL OR ({key}) = $1)
+                 ORDER BY {key}, name,
+                     -- mirror rows carry a slash-form id (\"{{owner_short}}/{{name}}\"),
                      -- written only by upsert_mirror_repo; canonical ids are UUIDs.
                      -- Rank canonical (no slash) ahead of the mirror in each group,
                      -- keyed on the structural id, not the user-settable description.
                      CASE WHEN position('/' in id) > 0 THEN 1 ELSE 0 END,
                      created_at ASC, id ASC
-             )";
+             )",
+            key = OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL
+        )
+    }
 
     /// All repos with star counts, mirror-deduplicated via `DEDUP_CTE` and
     /// ordered newest-first, optionally filtered to one owner. Returns the full
@@ -1015,10 +1116,7 @@ impl Db {
         // Mirror did_matches: strip `did:key:` only when the remainder is a bare
         // key id (no further `:`). The DEDUP_CTE applies the identical CASE to
         // owner_did, so the two compare on the same normalized key.
-        let owner_key = owner_filter.map(|o| match o.strip_prefix("did:key:") {
-            Some(rest) if !rest.contains(':') => rest,
-            _ => o,
-        });
+        let owner_key = owner_filter.map(normalize_owner_key);
         let sql = format!(
             "{}
              SELECT
@@ -1031,7 +1129,7 @@ impl Db {
                  SELECT repo_id, COUNT(*) AS cnt FROM repo_stars GROUP BY repo_id
              ) s ON s.repo_id = d.id
              ORDER BY d.updated_at DESC",
-            Self::DEDUP_CTE
+            Self::dedup_cte()
         );
         let rows = sqlx::query(&sql)
             .bind(owner_key)
@@ -1049,7 +1147,7 @@ impl Db {
 
     /// Deduped repo list (no stars, no paging) for the unfiltered read surfaces
     /// (GraphQL `repos`). One logical repo per mirror+canonical group, ordered by
-    /// the group's most recent activity. Shares `DEDUP_CTE` with the paged path so
+    /// the group's most recent activity. Shares `dedup_cte()` with the paged path so
     /// the dedup rule cannot drift; binds a NULL owner filter (all rows).
     pub async fn list_all_repos_deduped(&self) -> Result<Vec<RepoRecord>> {
         let sql = format!(
@@ -1059,7 +1157,7 @@ impl Db {
                  d.forked_from, d.machine_id
              FROM deduped d
              ORDER BY d.updated_at DESC",
-            Self::DEDUP_CTE
+            Self::dedup_cte()
         );
         let rows = sqlx::query(&sql)
             .bind(None::<&str>)
@@ -1069,6 +1167,22 @@ impl Db {
         Ok(rows.into_iter().map(row_to_repo).collect())
     }
 
+    /// Repos currently quarantined (admitted as mirrors but withheld from every
+    /// listing surface). `list_all_repos_deduped` excludes these (its `DEDUP_CTE`
+    /// filters `quarantined = FALSE`), so a gate that resolves a slug against the
+    /// deduped set must also match against these and fail closed, or a quarantined
+    /// repo's row is misclassified as remote/gossip-only and served.
+    pub async fn list_quarantined_repos(&self) -> Result<Vec<RepoRecord>> {
+        let rows = sqlx::query(
+            "SELECT id, name, owner_did, description, is_public, default_branch,
+                    created_at, updated_at, disk_path, forked_from, machine_id
+             FROM repos WHERE quarantined = TRUE",
+        )
+        .fetch_all(&self.pool)
+        .await?;
+        Ok(rows.into_iter().map(row_to_repo).collect())
+    }
+
     /// Count of distinct logical repos (mirror + canonical collapsed). Uses the
     /// same did:key-aware owner-key grouping as `DEDUP_CTE` (the CASE must stay
     /// byte-identical); the marker/tiebreak only decide which row would survive,
@@ -1080,11 +1194,11 @@ impl Db {
     /// CASE that the live list paths depend on. Allowed dead outside tests.
     #[cfg_attr(not(test), allow(dead_code))]
     pub async fn count_repos_deduped(&self) -> Result<i64> {
-        let row = sqlx::query(
-            "SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT (CASE WHEN owner_did LIKE 'did:key:%' AND position(':' in substr(owner_did, 9)) = 0 THEN substr(owner_did, 9) ELSE owner_did END, name)) AS cnt FROM repos",
-        )
-        .fetch_one(&self.pool)
-        .await?;
+        let sql = format!(
+            "SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT ({key}, name)) AS cnt FROM repos",
+            key = OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL
+        );
+        let row = sqlx::query(&sql).fetch_one(&self.pool).await?;
         Ok(row.get::<i64, _>("cnt"))
     }
 
@@ -1258,18 +1372,18 @@ impl Db {
         Ok(row.map(|r| r.get::<f64, _>("trust_score")).unwrap_or(0.0))
     }
 
+    /// Update an EXISTING agent's trust score; a no-op for unregistered DIDs.
+    /// Deliberately never inserts: the only path into the agents table is
+    /// `register_agent`, which sits behind the iCaptcha gate on /api/register.
+    /// This used to be an upsert, which let any authenticated push/issue/PR
+    /// re-create a deregistered DID's row with a fresh `registered_at`,
+    /// bypassing the registration gate entirely.
     pub async fn update_trust_score(&self, agent_did: &str, score: f64) -> Result<()> {
-        let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
-        sqlx::query(
-            "INSERT INTO agents (did, trust_score, capabilities, registered_at)
-             VALUES ($1, $2, '[]', $3)
-             ON CONFLICT(did) DO UPDATE SET trust_score = $2",
-        )
-        .bind(agent_did)
-        .bind(score)
-        .bind(&now)
-        .execute(&self.pool)
-        .await?;
+        sqlx::query("UPDATE agents SET trust_score = $2 WHERE did = $1")
+            .bind(agent_did)
+            .bind(score)
+            .execute(&self.pool)
+            .await?;
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -2109,61 +2223,63 @@ impl Db {
         Ok(())
     }
 
-    pub async fn list_ref_updates(&self, limit: i64) -> Result<Vec<ReceivedRefUpdate>> {
-        let rows = sqlx::query(
-            "SELECT id, node_did, pusher_did, repo, ref_name, old_sha, new_sha, timestamp,
-                    cert_id, received_at, from_peer
-             FROM received_ref_updates ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT $1",
-        )
-        .bind(limit)
-        .fetch_all(&self.pool)
-        .await?;
-        Ok(rows.into_iter().map(row_to_ref_update).collect())
-    }
-
-    pub async fn list_repo_ref_updates(
-        &self,
-        repo: &str,
-        limit: i64,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<ReceivedRefUpdate>> {
-        let rows = sqlx::query(
-            "SELECT id, node_did, pusher_did, repo, ref_name, old_sha, new_sha, timestamp,
-                    cert_id, received_at, from_peer
-             FROM received_ref_updates WHERE repo = $1 ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT $2",
-        )
-        .bind(repo)
-        .bind(limit)
-        .fetch_all(&self.pool)
-        .await?;
-        Ok(rows.into_iter().map(row_to_ref_update).collect())
-    }
-
-    /// Filtered ref updates — optionally scoped to a specific repo.
-    pub async fn list_ref_updates_filtered(
+    /// One page of ref updates (newest first), optionally scoped to one repo.
+    /// The `(timestamp DESC, id DESC)` order gives a stable tiebreak so offset
+    /// paging does not skip or duplicate rows when timestamps collide. Used by
+    /// the visibility-gated feed collector, which pages past dropped private rows
+    /// so a small limit still returns the latest visible events (#114).
+    /// One page of ref updates for the visibility collector, ordered
+    /// `timestamp DESC, id DESC`, using a **keyset** cursor rather than
+    /// `LIMIT/OFFSET`.
+    ///
+    /// `after` is the `(timestamp, id)` of the last row of the previous page;
+    /// the next page reads rows strictly older than it via the row-value
+    /// predicate `(timestamp, id) < (after_ts, after_id)`, which matches the
+    /// `ORDER BY` exactly (same id tie-break). Because a concurrently inserted
+    /// row is newer (larger `timestamp`) and so sorts to the front, it lands
+    /// *above* the window we are paging through and cannot shift it. That keeps
+    /// a single multi-page scan free of the duplicate/skip that OFFSET paging
+    /// suffers when `received_ref_updates` is written between page reads.
+    pub async fn list_ref_updates_keyset(
         &self,
         repo: Option<&str>,
         limit: i64,
+        after: Option<(&str, &str)>,
     ) -> Result<Vec<ReceivedRefUpdate>> {
-        let rows = if let Some(r) = repo {
-            sqlx::query(
-                "SELECT id, node_did, pusher_did, repo, ref_name, old_sha, new_sha, timestamp,
-                        cert_id, received_at, from_peer
-                 FROM received_ref_updates WHERE repo=$1 ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT $2",
-            )
-            .bind(r)
-            .bind(limit)
-            .fetch_all(&self.pool)
-            .await?
+        const COLS: &str = "id, node_did, pusher_did, repo, ref_name, old_sha, new_sha, \
+                            timestamp, cert_id, received_at, from_peer";
+
+        // Positional params in bind order: repo?, after_ts?, after_id?, limit.
+        let mut conds: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+        let mut n = 0;
+        if repo.is_some() {
+            n += 1;
+            conds.push(format!("repo = ${n}"));
+        }
+        if after.is_some() {
+            let (a, b) = (n + 1, n + 2);
+            n += 2;
+            conds.push(format!("(timestamp, id) < (${a}, ${b})"));
+        }
+        let where_clause = if conds.is_empty() {
+            String::new()
         } else {
-            sqlx::query(
-                "SELECT id, node_did, pusher_did, repo, ref_name, old_sha, new_sha, timestamp,
-                        cert_id, received_at, from_peer
-                 FROM received_ref_updates ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT $1",
-            )
-            .bind(limit)
-            .fetch_all(&self.pool)
-            .await?
+            format!(" WHERE {}", conds.join(" AND "))
         };
+        let sql = format!(
+            "SELECT {COLS} FROM received_ref_updates{where_clause} \
+             ORDER BY timestamp DESC, id DESC LIMIT ${}",
+            n + 1
+        );
+
+        let mut q = sqlx::query(&sql);
+        if let Some(r) = repo {
+            q = q.bind(r.to_string());
+        }
+        if let Some((ts, id)) = after {
+            q = q.bind(ts.to_string()).bind(id.to_string());
+        }
+        let rows = q.bind(limit).fetch_all(&self.pool).await?;
         Ok(rows.into_iter().map(row_to_ref_update).collect())
     }
 }
@@ -3346,6 +3462,42 @@ mod dedup_db_tests {
         );
     }
 
+    /// A PRIVATE canonical repo and a PUBLIC mirror row for the same
+    /// (owner, name) collapse to a single survivor whose `is_public` is the
+    /// canonical `false`, not the mirror's `true`. `upsert_mirror_repo` always
+    /// writes `is_public=true`, so without this the deduped set could carry a
+    /// public flag for a locally-private repo and the ref-updates feed gate
+    /// would over-serve. Pins the DEDUP_CTE tiebreak so a future regression
+    /// that flips the survivor can't leak silently.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn deduped_private_canonical_beats_public_mirror(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        // Private canonical row (rec() forces is_public=true, so build inline).
+        let mut canonical = rec(
+            "uuid-private-canonical",
+            "did:key:z6Mkwbud",
+            "nipmod",
+            "private canonical",
+            "2026-01-15T00:00:00Z",
+            "2026-01-15T00:00:00Z",
+        );
+        canonical.is_public = false;
+        db.create_repo(&canonical).await.unwrap();
+        // Public mirror row for the same (owner, name): id = "z6Mkwbud/nipmod",
+        // is_public = true.
+        db.upsert_mirror_repo("z6Mkwbud", "nipmod", "/srv/mirror", None, false)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let out = db.list_all_repos_deduped().await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(out.len(), 1, "the pair collapses to one logical repo");
+        assert_eq!(out[0].owner_did, "did:key:z6Mkwbud", "canonical row wins");
+        assert!(
+            !out[0].is_public,
+            "survivor keeps the canonical private is_public=false, not the mirror's true"
+        );
+    }
+
     /// upsert_mirror_repo's own rows dedupe against a canonical twin (proves the
     /// real mirror writer's row shape is classified correctly).
     #[sqlx::test]
@@ -3700,6 +3852,248 @@ mod dedup_db_tests {
         assert_eq!(list_len, 2);
         assert_eq!(count, list_len, "count must equal the deduped list length");
     }
+
+    /// get_repo must prefer the canonical row over the mirror row when both match,
+    /// so the visibility gate keys off the canonical row's rules and is_public flag
+    /// rather than the mirror's hardcoded public-with-no-rules (issue #124).
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn get_repo_prefers_canonical_over_mirror(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        let short = "z6Mkwbud";
+        let owner_did = "did:key:z6Mkwbud";
+
+        // Mirror row seeded FIRST — hardcoded is_public=true, no visibility rules.
+        // Without the ORDER BY fix, fetch_optional returns this row by insertion order,
+        // so the test fails (proving it locks in the fix).
+        db.upsert_mirror_repo(short, "secret-repo", "/srv/mirror", None, false)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // Canonical row with is_public=false.
+        let canonical = RepoRecord {
+            id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+            name: "secret-repo".into(),
+            owner_did: owner_did.to_string(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: false,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            // Date after the mirror (Utc::now()) so that created_at ASC alone
+            // would pick the mirror; the CASE WHEN position('/' in id) > 0 term
+            // is what makes the canonical row win.
+            created_at: ts("2126-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
+            updated_at: ts("2126-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
+            disk_path: "/srv/secret".into(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        };
+        db.create_repo(&canonical).await.unwrap();
+
+        // Querying with bare short DID should return the canonical row.
+        let got = db
+            .get_repo(short, "secret-repo")
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .expect("get_repo should find the repo");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            got.owner_did, owner_did,
+            "canonical row (did:key: form) must win over mirror row (bare short DID)"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !got.id.contains('/'),
+            "canonical row id must not contain a slash"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !got.is_public,
+            "canonical row's is_public must be preserved"
+        );
+
+        // Querying with full did:key: form should also return the canonical row.
+        let got_full = db
+            .get_repo(owner_did, "secret-repo")
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .expect("get_repo should find the repo with full did:key");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            got_full.owner_did, owner_did,
+            "canonical row must be found using full did:key: form"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !got_full.id.contains('/'),
+            "canonical row id must not contain a slash"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !got_full.is_public,
+            "canonical row's is_public must be preserved"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Seed a private canonical plus a public mirror twin for the same owner+name
+    /// (mirror inserted first), call authorize_repo_read with caller=None, and
+    /// assert Err(RepoNotFound). That locks the property at the gate.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn authorize_repo_read_denies_private_canonical_even_with_public_mirror(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
+        let short = "z6Mkwbud";
+        let owner_did = "did:key:z6Mkwbud";
+
+        // Mirror row seeded FIRST — hardcoded is_public=true, no visibility rules.
+        state
+            .db
+            .upsert_mirror_repo(short, "secret-repo", "/srv/mirror", None, false)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // Canonical row with is_public=false.
+        let canonical = RepoRecord {
+            id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+            name: "secret-repo".into(),
+            owner_did: owner_did.to_string(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: false,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: ts("2126-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
+            updated_at: ts("2126-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
+            disk_path: "/srv/secret".into(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        };
+        state.db.create_repo(&canonical).await.unwrap();
+
+        // call authorize_repo_read with caller=None, and assert Err(RepoNotFound)
+        let res = crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, short, "secret-repo", None, "/").await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(res, Err(crate::error::AppError::RepoNotFound(_))),
+            "expected Err(RepoNotFound), got {res:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// get_repo still returns the mirror row when no canonical row exists
+    /// (mirror-only group), so sync and read paths remain functional.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn get_repo_returns_mirror_when_no_canonical(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.upsert_mirror_repo("z6Lonely", "orphan", "/srv/m", None, false)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let got = db
+            .get_repo("z6Lonely", "orphan")
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .expect("get_repo should find the mirror");
+
+        assert_eq!(got.id, "z6Lonely/orphan", "mirror row is returned");
+        assert!(got.is_public, "mirror row's is_public should be true");
+    }
+
+    /// get_repo must NOT match a non-key DID row (e.g. did:gitlawb:) when queried
+    /// with the bare short DID — the old LIKE '%:' || $1 || '%' was too broad and
+    /// could rank a non-key canonical row ahead of the exact mirror.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn get_repo_does_not_match_non_key_did(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        let short = "z6Mkwbud";
+
+        // Mirror row for the bare short DID.
+        db.upsert_mirror_repo(short, "shared-name", "/srv/m", None, false)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // Non-key DID row sharing the same trailing id — must stay distinct.
+        let non_key = RepoRecord {
+            id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+            name: "shared-name".into(),
+            owner_did: format!("did:gitlawb:{short}"),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: false,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: ts("2126-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
+            updated_at: ts("2126-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
+            disk_path: "/srv/other".into(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        };
+        db.create_repo(&non_key).await.unwrap();
+
+        // Querying with the bare short DID must return the mirror, NOT the
+        // did:gitlawb row (different DID method, separate owner).
+        let got = db
+            .get_repo(short, "shared-name")
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .expect("get_repo should find the mirror row");
+
+        assert!(
+            got.id.contains('/'),
+            "must return the mirror (slash id), not a non-key canonical row"
+        );
+        assert!(got.is_public, "mirror row's is_public should be true");
+
+        // Querying with the full non-key DID must return that exact row.
+        let got = db
+            .get_repo(&format!("did:gitlawb:{short}"), "shared-name")
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .expect("get_repo should find the non-key DID row");
+
+        assert!(
+            !got.id.contains('/'),
+            "must return the non-key canonical row (UUID id)"
+        );
+        assert!(!got.is_public, "non-key row's is_public must be preserved");
+    }
+
+    /// Verify that the Rust `normalize_owner_key` and the `OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL`
+    /// expression agree on every boundary value in the owner-key normalization
+    /// set. A mismatch would let the Rust code bind a different key than the SQL
+    /// predicate filters on, silently breaking the did:key-only matching contract.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn normalize_owner_key_matches_sql_case(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The full boundary set: did:key short/full, bare, non-key DIDs,
+        // did:key with extra colon, empty, empty residual, uppercase.
+        let boundary_values = [
+            "did:key:z6Mkfoo",
+            "z6Mkfoo",
+            "did:gitlawb:z6Mkfoo",
+            "did:web:example.com:alice",
+            "did:key:did:gitlawb:z6Mkfoo",
+            "",
+            "did:key:",
+            "DID:KEY:z6Mkfoo",
+        ];
+
+        // Build a VALUES list with the column aliased as `owner_did` so the
+        // OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL expression (which references `owner_did`) works
+        // verbatim — no search-and-replace that could hide a drift.
+        let values_sql: String = boundary_values
+            .iter()
+            .map(|v| format!("('{}'::text)", v))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+            .join(", ");
+        let sql = format!(
+            "WITH data(owner_did) AS (VALUES {values_sql})
+             SELECT owner_did, ({key}) AS normalized FROM data ORDER BY owner_did",
+            key = super::OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL
+        );
+
+        let rows: Vec<(String, String)> = sqlx::query_as(&sql).fetch_all(&pool).await.unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            rows.len(),
+            boundary_values.len(),
+            "every boundary value must produce a row"
+        );
+
+        for (val, sql_result) in &rows {
+            let rust_result = super::normalize_owner_key(val);
+            assert_eq!(
+                sql_result, rust_result,
+                "normalize_owner_key(\"{val}\") mismatch: Rust = \"{rust_result}\", SQL CASE = \"{sql_result}\""
+            );
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 /// Exercises the iCaptcha single-use proof ledger (`icaptcha_consumed_proofs`),
@@ -3908,4 +4302,301 @@ mod icaptcha_quarantine_tests {
         let with_stars = db.list_all_repos_deduped_with_stars(None).await.unwrap();
         assert!(with_stars.iter().all(|(r, _)| r.name != "spam"));
     }
+
+    /// `update_trust_score` must never create an agent row. Registration (behind
+    /// the iCaptcha gate) is the only way in; otherwise a push/issue/PR from a
+    /// deregistered DID would silently re-register it and bypass the gate.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn update_trust_score_never_creates_agent(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        let did = "did:key:zNeverRegistered";
+
+        // Unregistered DID: updating its score is a no-op, not an insert.
+        db.update_trust_score(did, 0.9).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            db.get_agent(did).await.unwrap().is_none(),
+            "update_trust_score must not resurrect an unregistered DID"
+        );
+
+        // Once genuinely registered, the score updates in place.
+        db.register_agent(did, &[]).await.unwrap();
+        db.update_trust_score(did, 0.9).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(db.get_trust_score(did).await.unwrap(), 0.9);
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod ref_update_keyset_paging_tests {
+    use super::{Db, ReceivedRefUpdate};
+    use sqlx::PgPool;
+
+    fn rru(id: &str, ts: &str) -> ReceivedRefUpdate {
+        ReceivedRefUpdate {
+            id: id.into(),
+            node_did: "did:key:zN".into(),
+            pusher_did: "did:key:zP".into(),
+            repo: "z6MkOwner/openrepo".into(),
+            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
+            old_sha: "0".into(),
+            new_sha: "1".into(),
+            timestamp: ts.into(),
+            cert_id: None,
+            received_at: ts.into(),
+            from_peer: "peer".into(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn seed_r1_to_r4(db: &Db) {
+        for i in 1..=4 {
+            db.insert_ref_update(&rru(
+                &format!("r{i}"),
+                &format!("2026-07-01T10:00:0{i}+00:00"),
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Documents the bug jatmn flagged: OFFSET paging re-reads a page-1 row when a
+    // newer row is inserted between page reads (the newer row shifts every offset).
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn offset_paging_duplicates_a_row_under_concurrent_insert(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
+        seed_r1_to_r4(&db).await;
+
+        let offset_page = |limit: i64, offset: i64| {
+            let pool = db.pool.clone();
+            async move {
+                sqlx::query_scalar::<_, String>(
+                    "SELECT id FROM received_ref_updates \
+                     ORDER BY timestamp DESC, id DESC LIMIT $1 OFFSET $2",
+                )
+                .bind(limit)
+                .bind(offset)
+                .fetch_all(&pool)
+                .await
+                .unwrap()
+            }
+        };
+
+        let p1 = offset_page(2, 0).await;
+        assert_eq!(p1, vec!["r4", "r3"], "offset page 1");
+        // concurrent insert of a newer row shifts every later offset by one
+        db.insert_ref_update(&rru("r5", "2026-07-01T10:00:09+00:00"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let p2 = offset_page(2, 2).await;
+        assert!(
+            p2.contains(&"r3".to_string()),
+            "OFFSET paging re-reads r3 after the concurrent insert (the bug keyset fixes); got {p2:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // The fix: keyset paging on (timestamp, id) reads strictly older rows each
+    // page, so a concurrent newer insert cannot duplicate or skip a row.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn keyset_paging_is_stable_under_concurrent_insert(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
+        seed_r1_to_r4(&db).await;
+
+        let p1 = db.list_ref_updates_keyset(None, 2, None).await.unwrap();
+        let p1_ids: Vec<String> = p1.iter().map(|u| u.id.clone()).collect();
+        assert_eq!(p1_ids, vec!["r4", "r3"], "keyset page 1");
+        let last = p1.last().unwrap();
+        let cursor = (last.timestamp.clone(), last.id.clone());
+
+        // concurrent insert of a newer row between page reads
+        db.insert_ref_update(&rru("r5", "2026-07-01T10:00:09+00:00"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let p2 = db
+            .list_ref_updates_keyset(None, 2, Some((cursor.0.as_str(), cursor.1.as_str())))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let p2_ids: Vec<String> = p2.iter().map(|u| u.id.clone()).collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            p2_ids,
+            vec!["r2", "r1"],
+            "keyset page 2 reads strictly older rows, unaffected by the concurrent insert"
+        );
+
+        let all: Vec<String> = p1_ids.into_iter().chain(p2_ids).collect();
+        let uniq: std::collections::HashSet<&String> = all.iter().collect();
+        assert_eq!(uniq.len(), 4, "no row appears twice across pages");
+        assert!(
+            !all.iter().any(|id| id == "r5"),
+            "a row inserted above the scan window is not folded in mid-scan"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod ref_update_keyset_repo_filtered_tests {
+    use super::{Db, ReceivedRefUpdate};
+    use sqlx::PgPool;
+
+    fn rru_repo(id: &str, ts: &str, repo: &str) -> ReceivedRefUpdate {
+        ReceivedRefUpdate {
+            id: id.into(),
+            node_did: "did:key:zN".into(),
+            pusher_did: "did:key:zP".into(),
+            repo: repo.into(),
+            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
+            old_sha: "0".into(),
+            new_sha: "1".into(),
+            timestamp: ts.into(),
+            cert_id: None,
+            received_at: ts.into(),
+            from_peer: "peer".into(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Exercises the (Some(repo), Some(after)) keyset branch: a repo-filtered
+    // multi-page continuation that emits `WHERE repo=$1 AND (timestamp,id)<($2,$3)`
+    // with four binds. Also confirms the repo filter holds across pages, noise
+    // rows are excluded, and a concurrent insert does not duplicate or skip.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn keyset_repo_filtered_multipage_stable_under_concurrent_insert(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
+        let target = "z6MkOwner/target";
+        let other = "z6MkOwner/other";
+
+        // 3 target rows (older) + 2 noise rows for another repo (newer, so they
+        // sort to the front of the global order and must be filtered out).
+        for (id, ts) in [("T1", "01"), ("T2", "02"), ("T3", "03")] {
+            db.insert_ref_update(&rru_repo(
+                id,
+                &format!("2026-07-01T10:00:{ts}+00:00"),
+                target,
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        }
+        for (id, ts) in [("O1", "04"), ("O2", "05")] {
+            db.insert_ref_update(&rru_repo(
+                id,
+                &format!("2026-07-01T10:00:{ts}+00:00"),
+                other,
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        }
+
+        // page 1: (Some(repo), None) -> two newest TARGET rows only
+        let p1 = db
+            .list_ref_updates_keyset(Some(target), 2, None)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let p1_ids: Vec<String> = p1.iter().map(|u| u.id.clone()).collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            p1_ids,
+            vec!["T3", "T2"],
+            "repo-filtered page 1 excludes other-repo rows"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            p1.iter().all(|u| u.repo == target),
+            "no noise rows on page 1"
+        );
+        let last = p1.last().unwrap();
+        let cursor = (last.timestamp.clone(), last.id.clone());
+
+        // concurrent insert of a newer TARGET row between page reads
+        db.insert_ref_update(&rru_repo("T4", "2026-07-01T10:00:06+00:00", target))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // page 2: (Some(repo), Some(after)) -> the four-bind continuation branch
+        let p2 = db
+            .list_ref_updates_keyset(
+                Some(target),
+                2,
+                Some((cursor.0.as_str(), cursor.1.as_str())),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let p2_ids: Vec<String> = p2.iter().map(|u| u.id.clone()).collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            p2_ids,
+            vec!["T1"],
+            "repo-filtered keyset page 2 reads only older target rows"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            p2.iter().all(|u| u.repo == target),
+            "no noise rows on page 2"
+        );
+
+        let all: Vec<String> = p1_ids.into_iter().chain(p2_ids).collect();
+        let uniq: std::collections::HashSet<&String> = all.iter().collect();
+        assert_eq!(uniq.len(), 3, "each target row exactly once across pages");
+        assert!(
+            !all.iter().any(|id| id == "T4"),
+            "concurrent newer row not folded in mid-scan"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod ref_update_keyset_same_timestamp_tests {
+    use super::{Db, ReceivedRefUpdate};
+    use sqlx::PgPool;
+
+    fn row(id: &str, ts: &str) -> ReceivedRefUpdate {
+        ReceivedRefUpdate {
+            id: id.into(),
+            node_did: "did:key:zN".into(),
+            pusher_did: "did:key:zP".into(),
+            repo: "z6MkOwner/openrepo".into(),
+            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
+            old_sha: "0".into(),
+            new_sha: "1".into(),
+            timestamp: ts.into(),
+            cert_id: None,
+            received_at: ts.into(),
+            from_peer: "peer".into(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Load-bearing for the `id` half of the (timestamp, id) keyset cursor: all
+    // rows share ONE timestamp, so ordering and the page boundary fall entirely
+    // on `id DESC`. A timestamp-only cursor would return nothing for page 2 and
+    // silently skip b and a; the (timestamp, id) tie-break must advance instead.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn keyset_advances_within_an_equal_timestamp_run(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
+        let ts = "2026-07-01T10:00:00+00:00";
+        for id in ["a", "b", "c", "d"] {
+            db.insert_ref_update(&row(id, ts)).await.unwrap();
+        }
+
+        // id DESC over equal timestamps: d, c, b, a
+        let p1 = db.list_ref_updates_keyset(None, 2, None).await.unwrap();
+        let p1_ids: Vec<String> = p1.iter().map(|u| u.id.clone()).collect();
+        assert_eq!(p1_ids, vec!["d", "c"], "page 1 by id DESC");
+        let last = p1.last().unwrap();
+
+        // page boundary lands INSIDE the equal-timestamp group (cursor = (ts, "c"))
+        let p2 = db
+            .list_ref_updates_keyset(None, 2, Some((last.timestamp.as_str(), last.id.as_str())))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let p2_ids: Vec<String> = p2.iter().map(|u| u.id.clone()).collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            p2_ids,
+            vec!["b", "a"],
+            "keyset must advance by id within an equal-timestamp run (a timestamp-only cursor would skip these)"
+        );
+
+        let all: Vec<String> = p1_ids.into_iter().chain(p2_ids).collect();
+        let uniq: std::collections::HashSet<&String> = all.iter().collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            uniq.len(),
+            4,
+            "no dup or skip across a same-timestamp page boundary"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/error.rs

@@ -23,12 +23,21 @@ pub enum AppError {
     #[allow(dead_code)]
     Forbidden(String),
 
-    #[error("icaptcha proof required: {0}")]
-    IcaptchaProofRequired(String),
+    #[error("icaptcha proof required: {message}")]
+    IcaptchaProofRequired {
+        message: String,
+        /// iCaptcha service base URL the client should solve against.
+        url: String,
+        /// Minimum proof level this node requires.
+        level: u32,
+    },
 
     #[error("invalid request: {0}")]
     BadRequest(String),
 
+    #[error("too many requests: {0}")]
+    TooManyRequests(String),
+
     #[error("git error: {0}")]
     Git(String),
 
@@ -41,6 +50,34 @@ pub enum AppError {
 
 impl IntoResponse for AppError {
     fn into_response(self) -> Response {
+        // iCaptcha challenges carry structured discovery so clients don't have to
+        // scrape the message: the service URL and required level are returned as
+        // both JSON fields and `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` headers
+        // (mirroring the header-bearing `human_detected` response in auth/mod.rs).
+        if let AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
+            message,
+            url,
+            level,
+        } = &self
+        {
+            use axum::http::HeaderValue;
+            let body = Json(json!({
+                "error": "icaptcha_proof_required",
+                "message": message,
+                "icaptcha_url": url,
+                "required_level": level,
+            }));
+            let mut resp = (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, body).into_response();
+            let headers = resp.headers_mut();
+            if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(url) {
+                headers.insert("x-icaptcha-url", v);
+            }
+            if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(&level.to_string()) {
+                headers.insert("x-icaptcha-level", v);
+            }
+            return resp;
+        }
+
         let (status, code, message) = match &self {
             AppError::RepoNotFound(r) => (
                 StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
@@ -55,16 +92,12 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
             AppError::NotFound(msg) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Unauthorized(msg) => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "not_an_agent", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Forbidden(msg) => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "forbidden", msg.clone()),
-            // 403, not 401: the caller IS an authenticated agent (credentials are
-            // valid) but is forbidden from this action without a valid, fresh
-            // iCaptcha proof. The distinct `icaptcha_proof_required` code — which
-            // clients branch on — keeps it separable from a plain `forbidden`.
-            AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired(msg) => (
-                StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
-                "icaptcha_proof_required",
-                msg.clone(),
-            ),
+            // IcaptchaProofRequired is handled above (it carries extra headers/fields).
+            AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired { .. } => unreachable!("handled before this match"),
             AppError::BadRequest(msg) => (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "bad_request", msg.clone()),
+            AppError::TooManyRequests(msg) => {
+                (StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "rate_limited", msg.clone())
+            }
             AppError::Git(msg) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "git_error", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Db(e) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "db_error", e.to_string()),
             AppError::Internal(e) => (

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/smart_http.rs

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ pub async fn info_refs(repo_path: &Path, service: &str) -> Result<Response> {
 /// Serves pack data for a clone or fetch. This is stateless — the entire
 /// negotiation happens in a single request/response.
 pub async fn upload_pack(repo_path: &Path, request_body: Bytes) -> Result<Response> {
-    let output = run_git_service("git-upload-pack", repo_path, request_body).await?;
+    let output = run_git_service("git", "git-upload-pack", repo_path, request_body).await?;
 
     Ok(Response::builder()
         .status(StatusCode::OK)
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ pub async fn upload_pack(repo_path: &Path, request_body: Bytes) -> Result<Respon
 /// Accepts a push. The caller MUST verify HTTP Signature auth before
 /// calling this function.
 pub async fn receive_pack(repo_path: &Path, request_body: Bytes) -> Result<Response> {
-    let output = run_git_service("git-receive-pack", repo_path, request_body).await?;
+    let output = run_git_service("git", "git-receive-pack", repo_path, request_body).await?;
 
     Ok(Response::builder()
         .status(StatusCode::OK)
@@ -112,8 +112,19 @@ impl Drop for KillGroupOnDrop {
     }
 }
 
-async fn run_git_service(service: &str, repo_path: &Path, input: Bytes) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let mut command = Command::new("git");
+/// Run a stateless-rpc git service and return its stdout.
+///
+/// `git_bin` is the git executable to spawn; production callers pass `"git"`
+/// (resolved via `PATH`). It is injectable purely so the process-group teardown
+/// wiring (`process_group(0)` + [`KillGroupOnDrop`]) can be driven end-to-end by
+/// a fake `git` in tests without mutating the process-global `PATH`.
+async fn run_git_service(
+    git_bin: &str,
+    service: &str,
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    input: Bytes,
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let mut command = Command::new(git_bin);
     command
         .arg(service_to_command(service))
         .arg("--stateless-rpc")
@@ -876,4 +887,214 @@ mod tests {
         let _ = child.kill().await;
         let _ = child.wait().await;
     }
+
+    // ── #62 PR1: end-to-end teardown wiring through run_git_service ─────────
+    //
+    // The kill_group_guard_* tests above build a KillGroupOnDrop by hand and
+    // never call run_git_service, so deleting `process_group(0)` (spawn site) or
+    // the guard-arming, or the post-reap disarm, would leave them green. These
+    // drive the REAL run_git_service via an injected fake `git` (the `git_bin`
+    // seam) and assert the production spawn path actually wires the teardown up.
+    // Faithful to the real invocation: run_git_service spawns
+    // `<git_bin> <cmd> --stateless-rpc <repo_path>` in its own process group.
+
+    /// SIGKILLs the given pids on drop (ignoring all kill errors, e.g. ESRCH for
+    /// an already-dead pid) so a panicking assertion can't leak the fake `git` or
+    /// its grandchild onto the test runner.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    struct ReapOnPanic(Vec<i32>);
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    impl Drop for ReapOnPanic {
+        fn drop(&mut self) {
+            for &pid in &self.0 {
+                unsafe {
+                    libc::kill(pid, libc::SIGKILL);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Write an executable fake `git` (named `git`) into `dir`; return its path.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn write_fake_git(dir: &std::path::Path, body: &str) -> std::path::PathBuf {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
+        let path = dir.join("git");
+        std::fs::write(&path, body).unwrap();
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+        path
+    }
+
+    /// Read a two-line `leader\ngrandchild` pidfile once both lines are present.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn read_two_pids(pidfile: &std::path::Path) -> Option<(i32, i32)> {
+        let s = std::fs::read_to_string(pidfile).ok()?;
+        let mut lines = s.lines();
+        let leader: i32 = lines.next()?.trim().parse().ok()?;
+        let grandchild: i32 = lines.next()?.trim().parse().ok()?;
+        Some((leader, grandchild))
+    }
+
+    // Dropping the request future mid-flight (client disconnect) must SIGTERM the
+    // whole group so git AND its pack-objects grandchild die together. Goes RED
+    // if `process_group(0)` or the guard-arming is removed: without its own
+    // group, kill(-pgid) hits no group and the grandchild survives.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn run_git_service_tears_down_group_when_future_dropped() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let pidfile = tmp.path().join("pids");
+        // Fork a grandchild (stands in for pack-objects), record leader+grandchild
+        // pids, then hang so run_git_service parks in wait_with_output.
+        let body = format!(
+            "#!/bin/sh\nsleep 300 &\nprintf '%s\\n%s\\n' \"$$\" \"$!\" > \"{}\"\nwait\n",
+            pidfile.display()
+        );
+        let git_bin = write_fake_git(tmp.path(), &body);
+
+        let mut fut = Box::pin(run_git_service(
+            git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
+            "git-upload-pack",
+            tmp.path(),
+            Bytes::new(),
+        ));
+
+        // Advance the future until the fake has spawned its grandchild.
+        let mut pids = None;
+        for _ in 0..500 {
+            let _ = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10), &mut fut).await;
+            if let Some(p) = read_two_pids(&pidfile) {
+                pids = Some(p);
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        // Dropping the future (below or on the None arm) makes tokio reap the
+        // fake leader itself, so only the grandchild needs panic-cleanup —
+        // carrying the already-reaped leader pid risks SIGKILLing a recycled pid
+        // under parallel test load.
+        let (_leader, grandchild) = match pids {
+            Some(p) => p,
+            // Drop the still-armed future first so its guard reaps the fake
+            // group, then fail — otherwise a spawn hiccup orphans the processes.
+            None => {
+                drop(fut);
+                panic!("fake git should spawn a grandchild and write its pids");
+            }
+        };
+        let _cleanup = ReapOnPanic(vec![grandchild]);
+        assert!(
+            alive(grandchild),
+            "grandchild should be running before the drop"
+        );
+
+        // Client disconnect: drop the request future. The armed KillGroupOnDrop
+        // must SIGTERM the whole group.
+        drop(fut);
+
+        let mut gone = false;
+        for _ in 0..500 {
+            if !alive(grandchild) {
+                gone = true;
+                break;
+            }
+            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
+        }
+        assert!(
+            gone,
+            "grandchild must be torn down via the process group on future-drop \
+             (proves run_git_service sets process_group(0) and arms the guard)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // A request that runs to completion must DISARM the guard after reaping, so
+    // no stray group SIGTERM fires. The fake exits non-zero (surfacing as Err)
+    // but leaves a grandchild alive; the grandchild must survive. Goes RED if the
+    // post-reap disarm is removed: the guard would then fire on return and, since
+    // the grandchild still holds the group open, sweep it.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn run_git_service_disarms_on_completion_leaving_group_alive() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let pidfile = tmp.path().join("pids");
+        // The grandchild is long-lived with stdio redirected to /dev/null:
+        // /dev/null so it doesn't inherit (and hold open) run_git_service's stdout
+        // pipe (which would block wait_with_output until it exits); long-lived so
+        // the "still alive" assertion below can't race the sleep exiting on its own
+        // under a starved scheduler. ReapOnPanic cleans it up.
+        let body = format!(
+            "#!/bin/sh\nsleep 300 >/dev/null 2>&1 &\nprintf '%s\\n%s\\n' \"$$\" \"$!\" > \"{}\"\nexit 1\n",
+            pidfile.display()
+        );
+        let git_bin = write_fake_git(tmp.path(), &body);
+
+        let result = run_git_service(
+            git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
+            "git-upload-pack",
+            tmp.path(),
+            Bytes::new(),
+        )
+        .await;
+
+        // wait_with_output already reaped the fake leader, so only the grandchild
+        // needs panic-cleanup — SIGKILLing the reaped leader pid could hit a
+        // recycled pid under parallel test load.
+        let (_leader, grandchild) =
+            read_two_pids(&pidfile).expect("fake git should have written its pids");
+        let _cleanup = ReapOnPanic(vec![grandchild]);
+
+        assert!(result.is_err(), "non-zero git exit must surface as Err");
+        // A mutant that left the guard armed fires SIGTERM on return; poll a short
+        // window so a killed grandchild is reliably observed dead — a single
+        // alive() check can race the SIGTERM+reap and miss it.
+        for _ in 0..30 {
+            assert!(
+                alive(grandchild),
+                "grandchild must survive: run_git_service must disarm the guard after \
+                 reaping, not fire a group SIGTERM on the completion path"
+            );
+            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // The SUCCESS path (exit 0, Ok) must disarm too — the disarm test above only
+    // exercises the exit-1/Err branch. Goes RED if disarm is gated on failure
+    // (e.g. moved inside the `!status.success()` branch): the guard would then
+    // fire after a clean completion and sweep the still-live grandchild.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn run_git_service_disarms_on_success_leaving_group_alive() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let pidfile = tmp.path().join("pids");
+        // Long-lived, stdio to /dev/null (same reasons as the exit-1 test).
+        let body = format!(
+            "#!/bin/sh\nsleep 300 >/dev/null 2>&1 &\nprintf '%s\\n%s\\n' \"$$\" \"$!\" > \"{}\"\nexit 0\n",
+            pidfile.display()
+        );
+        let git_bin = write_fake_git(tmp.path(), &body);
+
+        let result = run_git_service(
+            git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
+            "git-upload-pack",
+            tmp.path(),
+            Bytes::new(),
+        )
+        .await;
+
+        let (_leader, grandchild) =
+            read_two_pids(&pidfile).expect("fake git should have written its pids");
+        let _cleanup = ReapOnPanic(vec![grandchild]);
+
+        assert!(result.is_ok(), "zero-exit git must surface as Ok");
+        // Poll a short window (see the exit-1 test): a mutant that disarms only on
+        // failure fires the guard on this success path, and a single alive() check
+        // can race the SIGTERM+reap.
+        for _ in 0..30 {
+            assert!(
+                alive(grandchild),
+                "grandchild must survive: run_git_service must disarm on the success \
+                 path too, not fire a group SIGTERM after a clean completion"
+            );
+            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
+        }
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/store.rs

@@ -271,9 +271,8 @@ pub struct TreeEntry {
 /// `/ipfs/<cid>` is computed from these same content bytes via
 /// `gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes`.
 ///
-/// Returns `None` if the object does not exist in this repo.
-pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String, Vec<u8>)>> {
-    // First check if the object exists and get its type
+/// Get just the object type. Returns `None` if the object doesn't exist.
+pub fn object_type(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
     let type_output = Command::new("git")
         .args(["cat-file", "-t", sha256_hex])
         .current_dir(repo_path)
@@ -284,13 +283,17 @@ pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String,
         return Ok(None);
     }
 
-    let obj_type = String::from_utf8_lossy(&type_output.stdout)
-        .trim()
-        .to_string();
+    Ok(Some(
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&type_output.stdout)
+            .trim()
+            .to_string(),
+    ))
+}
 
-    // Read the raw content bytes
+/// Read an object's content if its type is already known.
+pub fn read_object_content(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str, obj_type: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let content_output = Command::new("git")
-        .args(["cat-file", &obj_type, sha256_hex])
+        .args(["cat-file", obj_type, sha256_hex])
         .current_dir(repo_path)
         .output()
         .context("failed to run git cat-file <type>")?;
@@ -300,7 +303,24 @@ pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String,
         bail!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}");
     }
 
-    Ok(Some((obj_type, content_output.stdout)))
+    Ok(content_output.stdout)
+}
+
+/// Read a git object by its SHA-256 hex object ID.
+///
+/// Returns `(object_type, content_bytes)` where `content_bytes` is the raw
+/// object content (without the git framing header). The CID served over
+/// `/ipfs/<cid>` is computed from these same content bytes via
+/// `gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes`.
+///
+/// Returns `None` if the object does not exist in this repo.
+pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String, Vec<u8>)>> {
+    let obj_type = match object_type(repo_path, sha256_hex)? {
+        Some(t) => t,
+        None => return Ok(None),
+    };
+    let content = read_object_content(repo_path, sha256_hex, &obj_type)?;
+    Ok(Some((obj_type, content)))
 }
 
 /// Get the diff between two branches: changes on source_branch not in target_branch.

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/visibility_pack.rs

@@ -309,11 +309,33 @@ pub fn replicable_blob_set(
     rules: &[VisibilityRule],
     is_public: bool,
     owner_did: &str,
+) -> Result<HashSet<String>> {
+    allowed_blob_set_for_caller(repo_path, rules, is_public, owner_did, None)
+}
+
+/// Reachable blob OIDs that visibility ALLOWS `caller` at some path. The
+/// caller-aware generalization of `replicable_blob_set` (which is the anonymous
+/// `caller = None` case). Used by `GET /ipfs/{cid}` to gate fail-closed against
+/// dangling/unreachable blobs (#126): a blob written via `git hash-object -w`
+/// but unreferenced is absent from the reachable walk, so it is never in this
+/// set and the IPFS serve path drops it — even from the owner, who has no path
+/// to authorize the blob at.
+///
+/// A blob reachable at an allowed path is included even when also denied
+/// elsewhere (its content is readable to this caller elsewhere). Trees and
+/// commits are NOT included here; the caller decides per object type whether
+/// the allow-set applies (it does not for trees/commits — KTD3).
+pub fn allowed_blob_set_for_caller(
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    rules: &[VisibilityRule],
+    is_public: bool,
+    owner_did: &str,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
 ) -> Result<HashSet<String>> {
     let pairs = blob_paths(repo_path)?;
     let mut allowed = HashSet::new();
     for (oid, path) in &pairs {
-        if visibility_check(rules, is_public, owner_did, None, path) == Decision::Allow {
+        if visibility_check(rules, is_public, owner_did, caller, path) == Decision::Allow {
             allowed.insert(oid.clone());
         }
     }
@@ -743,6 +765,78 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn allowed_set_excludes_dangling_blob_for_every_caller() {
+        // #126: a blob written via `git hash-object -w` but never referenced has
+        // no path to gate on, so it is absent from the reachable allowed-set —
+        // for anonymous callers, listed readers, AND the owner. The IPFS serve
+        // path relies on this fail-closed property to drop dangling withheld
+        // blobs that the deny-set model leaked.
+        let td = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let work = td.path().join("work");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(work.join("public")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(work.join("public/a.txt"), b"public bytes\n").unwrap();
+        let run = |args: &[&str]| {
+            assert!(
+                Command::new("git")
+                    .args(args)
+                    .current_dir(&work)
+                    .status()
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .success(),
+                "git {args:?} failed"
+            );
+        };
+        run(&["init", "-q"]);
+        run(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
+        run(&["config", "user.name", "t"]);
+        run(&["add", "."]);
+        run(&["commit", "-qm", "init"]);
+        let oid_of = |rev: &str| {
+            let out = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["rev-parse", rev])
+                .current_dir(&work)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
+        };
+        let public_oid = oid_of("HEAD:public/a.txt");
+
+        std::fs::write(work.join("orphan.bin"), b"DANGLING SECRET\n").unwrap();
+        let dangling_oid = {
+            let out = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["hash-object", "-w", "orphan.bin"])
+                .current_dir(&work)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
+        };
+        assert!(
+            matches!(dangling_oid.len(), 40 | 64),
+            "precondition: hash-object stored the dangling blob"
+        );
+
+        // Path-scoped rule: /secret/** denied to anon, allowed to a listed reader.
+        let reader = "did:key:zReader";
+        let rules = [rule("/secret/**", &[reader])];
+
+        // Every gate-relevant caller: anonymous, listed reader, owner. None of
+        // them can put the dangling blob in the allowed set — it has no path.
+        for caller in [None, Some(reader), Some(OWNER)] {
+            let allowed = allowed_blob_set_for_caller(&work, &rules, true, OWNER, caller).unwrap();
+            assert!(
+                !allowed.contains(&dangling_oid),
+                "dangling blob must be absent from allowed-set (caller={caller:?})"
+            );
+            // Sanity: the reachable public blob is still in the set for every
+            // caller (the rule does not deny /public/**).
+            assert!(
+                allowed.contains(&public_oid),
+                "reachable public blob must be in allowed-set (caller={caller:?})"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn recipients_are_owner_plus_allowed_readers_only() {
         let (_td, repo, secret_oid, public_oid) = fixture();

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/query.rs

@@ -49,13 +49,30 @@ impl QueryRoot {
         &self,
         ctx: &Context<'_>,
         repo: Option<String>,
-        #[graphql(default = 20)] limit: i64,
+        #[graphql(
+            default = 20,
+            desc = "Max 200; larger requests return the newest 200 rows (no continuation cursor)."
+        )]
+        limit: i64,
     ) -> Result<Vec<RefUpdateType>> {
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
-        let updates = db
-            .list_ref_updates_filtered(repo.as_deref(), limit)
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
+
+        // Gate each row on the same "/" visibility decision the repos resolver
+        // uses, so anonymous callers get no row for a local repo they can't read
+        // (#112). The shared collector applies the fail-closed gate *before* the
+        // limit (paging past dropped private rows) so a small limit still returns
+        // the latest visible events, and keeps this surface byte-identical to the
+        // REST feed (#114). The row slug is peer-supplied, so the pure filter
+        // treats it as untrusted input; remote (no local match) rows pass.
+        let caller = ctx
+            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
+            .ok()
+            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
+        let updates =
+            crate::api::events::collect_visible_ref_updates(db, repo.as_deref(), limit, caller)
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
+
         Ok(updates
             .into_iter()
             .map(|u| RefUpdateType {
@@ -94,3 +111,288 @@ impl QueryRoot {
         Ok(t.map(AgentTaskType::from))
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use crate::db::{Db, ReceivedRefUpdate, RepoRecord};
+    use chrono::Utc;
+    use sqlx::PgPool;
+    use std::sync::Arc;
+
+    const OWNER: &str = "did:key:z6MkOwner";
+
+    async fn db(pool: PgPool) -> Arc<Db> {
+        let db = Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
+        Arc::new(db)
+    }
+
+    fn schema(db: Arc<Db>) -> super::super::GitlawbSchema {
+        let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
+        let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
+        super::super::build_schema(db, ref_tx, task_tx)
+    }
+
+    fn repo(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
+        RepoRecord {
+            id: id.into(),
+            name: name.into(),
+            owner_did: owner_did.into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: Utc::now(),
+            updated_at: Utc::now(),
+            disk_path: format!("/srv/{id}"),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn ref_row(id: &str, slug: &str) -> ReceivedRefUpdate {
+        ReceivedRefUpdate {
+            id: id.into(),
+            node_did: "did:key:z6MkNode".into(),
+            pusher_did: "did:key:z6MkPusher".into(),
+            repo: slug.into(),
+            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
+            old_sha: "0".repeat(40),
+            new_sha: "a".repeat(40),
+            timestamp: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            cert_id: None,
+            received_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            from_peer: "peer1".into(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Count `refUpdates` rows in a GraphQL response.
+    fn count(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> usize {
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").expect("refUpdates key")
+        else {
+            panic!("refUpdates not a list");
+        };
+        rows.len()
+    }
+
+    async fn anon(schema: &super::super::GitlawbSchema, query: &str) -> async_graphql::Response {
+        schema.execute(async_graphql::Request::new(query)).await
+    }
+
+    async fn authed(
+        schema: &super::super::GitlawbSchema,
+        query: &str,
+        did: &str,
+    ) -> async_graphql::Response {
+        schema
+            .execute(
+                async_graphql::Request::new(query)
+                    .data(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid(did.to_string())),
+            )
+            .await
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 1 — anon must not get a private local repo's row on the
+    // repo:Some branch. This is the load-bearing RED→GREEN case.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_private_repo_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkOwner/widget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        // The GraphQL `repo` arg is the raw slug DB filter, so it must equal the
+        // stored slug to select the row at all — this is the exact leak path.
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(repo: "z6MkOwner/widget") { refName newSha pusherDid } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 2 — owner still sees their own private repo's row.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_private_repo_kept_for_owner(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkOwner/widget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(repo: "z6MkOwner/widget") { refName } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&authed(&schema, q, OWNER).await), 1);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 3 — unfiltered (repo:None): anon gets only the public row.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_unfiltered_anon_gets_only_public(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("pub", OWNER, "openrepo", true))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.create_repo(&repo("priv", OWNER, "secret", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u_pub", "z6MkOwner/openrepo"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u_priv", "z6MkOwner/secret"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo refName } }"#;
+        let resp = anon(&schema, q).await;
+        assert_eq!(count(&resp), 1);
+        // The one row returned must be the public repo's.
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").unwrap() else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(row) = &rows[0] else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        assert_eq!(
+            row.get("repo").unwrap(),
+            &async_graphql::Value::from("z6MkOwner/openrepo")
+        );
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 4 — alias fail-closed: private repo's row stored full-DID form.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_full_did_slug_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", "did:key:zABC", "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "did:key:zABC/widget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        // repo:None so the slug is not the DB filter key (which is verbatim);
+        // the gate must still drop it.
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 5 — truncated-key fail-closed: 8-char-prefix owner form.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_truncated_key_slug_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", "did:key:zABCDEFGH", "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "zABCDEF/widget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 6 — remote slug (no local match) is returned to anon.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_remote_slug_kept_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        // Row whose slug matches no local repo (different owner + name).
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "zZZZOTHER/gadget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 1);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 7 (#114 P2) — a small limit must page past the newest rows when
+    // they are private, so the older public rows are still returned. Before the
+    // gate moved ahead of the limit this returned 0 (the newest `limit` rows were
+    // all private and got filtered after the SQL LIMIT). RED→GREEN.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_small_limit_pages_past_newest_private(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("pub", OWNER, "openrepo", true))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.create_repo(&repo("priv", OWNER, "secret", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        // 3 older PUBLIC rows …
+        for i in 0..3 {
+            let mut r = ref_row(&format!("pub{i}"), "z6MkOwner/openrepo");
+            r.timestamp = format!("2026-07-01T10:00:0{i}+00:00");
+            db.insert_ref_update(&r).await.unwrap();
+        }
+        // … then 5 NEWER PRIVATE rows (the newest in the feed).
+        for i in 0..5 {
+            let mut r = ref_row(&format!("priv{i}"), "z6MkOwner/secret");
+            r.timestamp = format!("2026-07-01T10:00:1{i}+00:00");
+            db.insert_ref_update(&r).await.unwrap();
+        }
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        // limit 3 < the 5 newest (all private): anon must still get 3 public rows.
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(limit: 3) { repo } }"#;
+        let resp = anon(&schema, q).await;
+        assert_eq!(count(&resp), 3, "paging must reach the older public rows");
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").unwrap() else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        for row in rows {
+            let async_graphql::Value::Object(r) = row else {
+                unreachable!()
+            };
+            assert_eq!(
+                r.get("repo").unwrap(),
+                &async_graphql::Value::from("z6MkOwner/openrepo"),
+                "every returned row must be the public repo's"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 8 — a quarantined mirror is withheld on the GraphQL surface too.
+    // Guards that the resolver keeps delegating to the shared collector (where the
+    // quarantine fold lives); a REST-only test would miss a resolver that stopped.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_quarantined_mirror_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.upsert_mirror_repo("z6MkQuar", "secret", "/tmp/q", None, true)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkQuar/secret"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 8b — the GraphQL surface also withholds a quarantined repo from an
+    // authenticated OWNER, not just anon. Without the collector's quarantine drop
+    // the owner short-circuit in visibility_check keeps the row on this surface
+    // too, so the REST owner test alone would not guard the resolver.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_quarantined_repo_dropped_for_owner(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("q1", "did:key:z6MkQuar", "secret", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.set_repo_quarantine("q1", true).await.unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkQuar/secret"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&authed(&schema, q, "did:key:z6MkQuar").await), 0);
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/subscription.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,15 @@ pub struct SubscriptionRoot;
 
 #[Subscription]
 impl SubscriptionRoot {
+    /// Live ref-update stream. `/graphql/ws` is mounted outside the
+    /// `optional_signature` layer, so this resolver has NO caller identity and
+    /// cannot gate per-subscriber — it relays whatever enters the broadcast
+    /// channel to any anonymous client. Its visibility safety therefore rests
+    /// entirely on the WRITE side: the push handler only sends a
+    /// `RefUpdateBroadcast` for repos the anonymous public may read (inside its
+    /// `if announce` block, `api/repos.rs`). This is a single-point invariant —
+    /// any new sender to `ref_update_tx` MUST be `announce`-gated, or private-repo
+    /// ref metadata leaks here to unauthenticated subscribers (#112/#114 class).
     async fn ref_updates(
         &self,
         ctx: &Context<'_>,

crates/gitlawb-node/src/icaptcha.rs

@@ -237,9 +237,13 @@ impl ProofGuard {
         match self.0 {
             Some(p) => {
                 if !db.consume_proof_jti(&p.jti, p.exp).await? {
-                    return Err(AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired(
-                        "iCaptcha proof already used (replay); solve a fresh challenge".to_string(),
-                    ));
+                    let (url, level) = url_and_level();
+                    return Err(AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
+                        message: "iCaptcha proof already used (replay); solve a fresh challenge"
+                            .to_string(),
+                        url,
+                        level,
+                    });
                 }
                 Ok(Some(p))
             }
@@ -265,10 +269,23 @@ pub fn verify_request(headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str) -> Result<ProofGuard, AppE
 }
 
 fn reject_error(v: &Verifier, reason: &str) -> AppError {
-    AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired(format!(
-        "iCaptcha proof required ({reason}). Solve a challenge at {} for level >= {} and resend with the {} header.",
-        v.url, v.required_level, PROOF_HEADER
-    ))
+    AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
+        message: format!(
+            "iCaptcha proof required ({reason}). Solve a challenge at {} for level >= {} and resend with the {} header.",
+            v.url, v.required_level, PROOF_HEADER
+        ),
+        url: v.url.clone(),
+        level: v.required_level,
+    }
+}
+
+/// iCaptcha service url + required level for error responses, read from the
+/// initialized verifier (falls back to defaults if somehow uninitialized).
+fn url_and_level() -> (String, u32) {
+    VERIFIER
+        .get()
+        .map(|v| (v.url.clone(), v.required_level))
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| ("https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(), 3))
 }
 
 /// Mode-aware decision. Pure and IO-free (no DB; clock injected via `now`) so it

crates/gitlawb-node/src/main.rs

@@ -145,16 +145,8 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         None
     };
 
-    // Do not follow redirects: this client fans out to peer-supplied URLs
-    // (sync trigger, profile/repo fetches). A peer answering `302 Location:
-    // http://127.0.0.1/` would otherwise bypass the announce-time public-URL
-    // check and turn the redirect into an SSRF.
-    let http_client = Arc::new(
-        reqwest::Client::builder()
-            .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
-            .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
-            .build()?,
-    );
+    // Shared no-redirect HTTP client. See build_http_client for the SSRF rationale.
+    let http_client = Arc::new(build_http_client()?);
 
     let (ref_update_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel::<state::RefUpdateBroadcast>(256);
     let (task_event_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel::<state::TaskEventBroadcast>(256);
@@ -190,7 +182,36 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     let repo_store =
         git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(config.repos_dir.clone(), tigris, db.pool().clone());
 
-    let rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new(10, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600));
+    // Per-DID limiter for the creation endpoints. Keyed on the authenticated
+    // DID (attacker-varied), so bound its key set to cap memory.
+    let rate_limiter =
+        rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(10, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600), 200_000);
+
+    // Push-path flood brake: max git-receive-pack requests per client IP per
+    // hour (counts both the info/refs advertisement and the push POST). Sized
+    // for heavy agent automation while still stopping flood traffic (the June
+    // 2026 attack pushed several times per second per IP). GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT
+    // overrides; 0 disables. Bounded key set — the key is a client-influenced IP.
+    let push_limit = std::env::var("GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT")
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
+        .unwrap_or(600);
+    let push_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
+        push_limit,
+        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
+        200_000,
+    );
+    if push_limit == 0 {
+        tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT=0 — per-IP push rate limiting disabled");
+    }
+
+    // Which forwarded header the edge is trusted to set. Default None (trust
+    // nothing, key on the socket peer). Fly nodes set GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY=fly;
+    // a node behind Caddy/NGINX sets it to x-forwarded-for.
+    let push_limiter_trust = rate_limit::TrustedProxy::from_env_value(
+        &std::env::var("GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY").unwrap_or_default(),
+    );
+    tracing::info!(trust = ?push_limiter_trust, push_limit, "push rate limiter configured");
 
     // Initialize the iCaptcha proof gate (inert unless ICAPTCHA_MODE is set).
     icaptcha::init().await;
@@ -208,6 +229,8 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         machine_id,
         repo_store,
         rate_limiter,
+        push_rate_limiter,
+        push_limiter_trust,
         shutdown_tx: shutdown_tx.clone(),
     };
 
@@ -268,6 +291,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     // Periodic cleanup of expired rate limit entries + consumed-proof ledger
     {
         let rl = state.rate_limiter.clone();
+        let push_rl = state.push_rate_limiter.clone();
         let db = state.db.clone();
         let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
         tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -275,6 +299,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
                 tokio::select! {
                     _ = tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(300)) => {
                         rl.cleanup().await;
+                        push_rl.cleanup().await;
                         let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
                             .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
                             .map(|d| d.as_secs() as i64)
@@ -399,19 +424,25 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     let grace = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.shutdown_grace_secs);
     info!(grace_secs = config.shutdown_grace_secs, "axum server ready");
 
-    let serve_result = axum::serve(listener, router)
-        .with_graceful_shutdown(async move {
-            let mut rx = shutdown_signal_for_axum;
-            // Wait until the watcher flips to true, then return so axum
-            // can begin draining.
-            while !*rx.borrow_and_update() {
-                if rx.changed().await.is_err() {
-                    // Sender dropped — treat as shutdown.
-                    break;
-                }
+    // `into_make_service_with_connect_info` exposes the socket peer address as
+    // `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` so the push limiter can key on the real client
+    // when no trusted proxy header applies (see `rate_limit::client_key`).
+    let serve_result = axum::serve(
+        listener,
+        router.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>(),
+    )
+    .with_graceful_shutdown(async move {
+        let mut rx = shutdown_signal_for_axum;
+        // Wait until the watcher flips to true, then return so axum
+        // can begin draining.
+        while !*rx.borrow_and_update() {
+            if rx.changed().await.is_err() {
+                // Sender dropped — treat as shutdown.
+                break;
             }
-        })
-        .await;
+        }
+    })
+    .await;
 
     // Server has stopped accepting new connections and drained in-flight
     // requests. Tear the rest of the system down.
@@ -515,7 +546,12 @@ async fn gossip_task(
         }
     }
 
-    let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+    // Reuse the shared no-redirect client for every gossip outbound call (the
+    // bootstrap announce POST and the periodic peer /health ping). Peer URLs are
+    // attacker-influenceable, so a 3xx to a private address must not be followed.
+    // Do NOT fall back to reqwest::Client::new(): its default follows redirects
+    // and would reintroduce the SSRF closed here (#93).
+    let client = state.http_client.clone();
     let my_did = state.node_did.to_string();
     let my_url = state.config.public_url.clone().unwrap_or_default();
 
@@ -590,13 +626,7 @@ async fn gossip_task(
                     Err(_) => continue,
                 };
                 for peer in peers {
-                    let url = format!("{}/health", peer.http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-                    let ok = client
-                        .get(&url)
-                        .send()
-                        .await
-                        .map(|r| r.status().is_success())
-                        .unwrap_or(false);
+                    let ok = ping_peer_health(&client, &peer.http_url).await;
                     let _ = state.db.mark_peer_ping(&peer.did, ok).await;
                 }
             }
@@ -610,6 +640,38 @@ async fn gossip_task(
     }
 }
 
+/// Build the shared node HTTP client used for every outbound fan-out (sync
+/// trigger, profile/repo fetches, gossip announce + peer pings).
+///
+/// No redirects: peer URLs are attacker-influenceable, so a `3xx` to a private
+/// address must not be followed (SSRF guard, #78/#93). Do NOT replace with
+/// `reqwest::Client::new()` — its default follows redirects. Kept as a named
+/// builder so tests bind the redirect guarantee to the real client the node
+/// runs, not a hand-rolled equivalent.
+fn build_http_client() -> reqwest::Result<reqwest::Client> {
+    reqwest::Client::builder()
+        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
+        .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
+        .build()
+}
+
+/// Ping a peer's `/health` endpoint and report whether it answered 2xx.
+///
+/// Takes the client by reference so callers supply the shared, no-redirect
+/// `state.http_client`. Peer URLs are attacker-influenceable, so a `3xx` to a
+/// private address must not be followed. Do NOT call this with a bare
+/// `reqwest::Client::new()`: its default follows redirects and would
+/// reintroduce the SSRF this guards against (#93).
+async fn ping_peer_health(client: &reqwest::Client, http_url: &str) -> bool {
+    let url = format!("{}/health", http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
+    client
+        .get(&url)
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .map(|r| r.status().is_success())
+        .unwrap_or(false)
+}
+
 fn load_or_create_keypair(config: &Config) -> Result<Keypair> {
     let key_path = config.resolved_key_path();
 
@@ -642,3 +704,64 @@ fn load_or_create_keypair(config: &Config) -> Result<Keypair> {
         Ok(kp)
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod gossip_ssrf_tests {
+    use super::ping_peer_health;
+
+    // Build the client exactly as production does (super::build_http_client) so
+    // these tests bind the redirect guarantee to the real shared client the
+    // node runs. A regression that makes build_http_client follow redirects
+    // fails ping_peer_health_does_not_follow_redirect.
+    fn production_http_client() -> reqwest::Client {
+        super::build_http_client().expect("failed to build production http client")
+    }
+
+    // A peer answering `/health` with a 302 toward an internal address must not
+    // be followed: the redirect target must never be requested (#93).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ping_peer_health_does_not_follow_redirect() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let internal = server
+            .mock("GET", "/internal-metadata")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .expect(0)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let _health = server
+            .mock("GET", "/health")
+            .with_status(302)
+            .with_header("location", &format!("{}/internal-metadata", server.url()))
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), &server.url()).await;
+
+        assert!(!ok, "a 302 must not count as a healthy peer");
+        // expect(0) is enforced only at assert time; this fails if the redirect
+        // was followed to the internal target.
+        internal.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ping_peer_health_reports_success_on_200() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _health = server
+            .mock("GET", "/health")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), &server.url()).await;
+
+        assert!(ok, "a 200 /health must count as a healthy peer");
+    }
+
+    // A transport error (nothing listening) must map to unhealthy, never a
+    // spurious healthy — the .unwrap_or(false) arm.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ping_peer_health_reports_unhealthy_on_connection_error() {
+        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), "http://127.0.0.1:1").await;
+        assert!(!ok, "a connection error must count as an unhealthy peer");
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/rate_limit.rs

@@ -1,15 +1,21 @@
 use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
-use axum::extract::Request;
-use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::extract::{ConnectInfo, Request};
+use axum::http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode};
 use axum::middleware::Next;
 use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
 use tokio::sync::Mutex;
 
 use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 
+/// Default ceiling on the number of distinct keys a limiter tracks. Bounds the
+/// limiter's own memory so a caller that can vary the key (many DIDs, or a
+/// spoofable IP header) cannot grow the map without limit.
+const DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS: usize = 100_000;
+
 #[derive(Clone)]
 struct Window {
     timestamps: Vec<Instant>,
@@ -20,38 +26,98 @@ pub struct RateLimiter {
     state: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Window>>>,
     max_requests: usize,
     window: Duration,
+    /// Hard cap on tracked keys. When full, expired keys are evicted (at most
+    /// once per [`sweep_interval`](Self::sweep_interval), see below); if still
+    /// full, a request under a *new* key is rejected rather than inserted — so
+    /// the map can never exceed this bound and a rejected request never
+    /// allocates a new entry.
+    max_keys: usize,
+    /// Timestamp of the last inline capacity sweep. The eviction scan is
+    /// O(max_keys), so under a distinct-key flood (when the map sits at the
+    /// cap) running it on every miss would serialize all traffic behind a full
+    /// scan. Gating it to at most once per interval amortizes that cost; the
+    /// background [`cleanup`](Self::cleanup) loop still reclaims on its own.
+    last_sweep: Arc<Mutex<Instant>>,
 }
 
 impl RateLimiter {
+    // Retained for tests and callers that don't need a tight key bound;
+    // production limiters use `new_bounded`.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
     pub fn new(max_requests: usize, window: Duration) -> Self {
+        Self::new_bounded(max_requests, window, DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS)
+    }
+
+    /// Like [`new`] but with an explicit cap on the number of distinct keys.
+    /// Production limiters keyed on client-influenced values (per-DID, per-IP)
+    /// set this so the limiter's own state cannot be turned into a
+    /// memory-exhaustion vector.
+    pub fn new_bounded(max_requests: usize, window: Duration, max_keys: usize) -> Self {
         Self {
             state: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
             max_requests,
             window,
+            max_keys: max_keys.max(1),
+            last_sweep: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Instant::now())),
         }
     }
 
-    async fn check(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
+    /// How often the inline capacity sweep may run: at most once per second, or
+    /// once per window when the window is shorter. Bounds post-flood staleness
+    /// (a full map self-heals within one interval) without paying the O(max_keys)
+    /// scan on every capacity miss.
+    fn sweep_interval(&self) -> Duration {
+        self.window.min(Duration::from_secs(1))
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) async fn check(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
+        // max_requests == 0 means the limiter is disabled, not "block all".
+        if self.max_requests == 0 {
+            return true;
+        }
         let now = Instant::now();
         let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
-        // Look up before inserting so the common case (key already tracked)
-        // doesn't allocate a String per request.
-        if !state.contains_key(key) {
-            state.insert(
-                key.to_string(),
-                Window {
-                    timestamps: Vec::new(),
-                },
-            );
+
+        // Fast path: an already-tracked key never allocates and never grows the
+        // map, so it is unaffected by the key cap.
+        if let Some(window) = state.get_mut(key) {
+            window
+                .timestamps
+                .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
+            if window.timestamps.len() >= self.max_requests {
+                return false;
+            }
+            window.timestamps.push(now);
+            return true;
         }
-        let window = state.get_mut(key).expect("window just ensured");
-        window
-            .timestamps
-            .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
-        if window.timestamps.len() >= self.max_requests {
-            return false;
+
+        // New key. Enforce the cap BEFORE inserting so a flood of distinct keys
+        // cannot grow the map, and a rejected request never allocates an entry.
+        if state.len() >= self.max_keys {
+            // Reclaim expired keys, but at most once per sweep interval — the
+            // scan is O(max_keys) and the map sits at the cap precisely during a
+            // distinct-key flood, so sweeping per miss would serialize traffic
+            // behind a full scan. Between sweeps a new key is simply rejected.
+            let mut last_sweep = self.last_sweep.lock().await;
+            if now.duration_since(*last_sweep) >= self.sweep_interval() {
+                state.retain(|_, w| {
+                    w.timestamps
+                        .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
+                    !w.timestamps.is_empty()
+                });
+                *last_sweep = now;
+            }
+            drop(last_sweep);
+            if state.len() >= self.max_keys {
+                return false;
+            }
         }
-        window.timestamps.push(now);
+        state.insert(
+            key.to_string(),
+            Window {
+                timestamps: vec![now],
+            },
+        );
         true
     }
 
@@ -88,6 +154,134 @@ pub async fn rate_limit_by_did(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
     next.run(request).await
 }
 
+/// Which forwarded header (if any) the operator's edge is trusted to set. Only
+/// a proxy the operator controls may be believed; a raw client can put any
+/// value in `Fly-Client-IP` / `X-Forwarded-For`, so trusting them unconditionally
+/// lets a flooder rotate the header and never fill a bucket. Configured via
+/// `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub enum TrustedProxy {
+    /// No trusted proxy: ignore forwarded headers, key on the socket peer IP.
+    /// Safe default for direct/self-hosted nodes.
+    None,
+    /// Behind Fly's edge, which sets (and overwrites any client-supplied)
+    /// `Fly-Client-IP`.
+    Fly,
+    /// Behind a single reverse proxy (e.g. Caddy on the AWS image) that appends
+    /// the real client as the rightmost `X-Forwarded-For` hop.
+    XForwardedFor,
+}
+
+impl TrustedProxy {
+    /// Parse `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`. Unknown/empty → `None` (trust nothing).
+    pub fn from_env_value(s: &str) -> Self {
+        match s.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
+            "fly" | "fly-client-ip" => TrustedProxy::Fly,
+            "xff" | "x-forwarded-for" | "caddy" => TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor,
+            _ => TrustedProxy::None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn trimmed_nonempty(v: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let t = v.trim();
+    (!t.is_empty()).then(|| t.to_string())
+}
+
+/// Resolve the rate-limit key for a request. In a trusted-proxy mode the
+/// operator's edge header is preferred; when that header is missing or empty we
+/// fall back to the socket peer address rather than skipping the limiter (a
+/// malformed header must never disable the brake). With no trusted proxy the
+/// socket peer is always used and forwarded headers are ignored entirely.
+/// Returns `None` only when neither a trusted header nor a peer address is
+/// available (e.g. a synthetic test request with no `ConnectInfo`).
+pub fn client_key(
+    headers: &HeaderMap,
+    peer: Option<SocketAddr>,
+    trust: TrustedProxy,
+) -> Option<String> {
+    let from_header = match trust {
+        TrustedProxy::None => None,
+        TrustedProxy::Fly => headers
+            .get("fly-client-ip")
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .and_then(trimmed_nonempty),
+        // Rightmost hop = the value appended by the immediately-upstream trusted
+        // proxy. The leftmost hop is client-controlled and must not be trusted.
+        TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor => headers
+            .get("x-forwarded-for")
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .and_then(|v| v.rsplit(',').next())
+            .and_then(trimmed_nonempty),
+    };
+    from_header.or_else(|| peer.map(|p| p.ip().to_string()))
+}
+
+/// Per-client-IP limiter for the git push path, carrying the trusted-proxy
+/// policy. A newtype so it can live in request extensions (keyed by type)
+/// alongside the per-DID [`RateLimiter`]. Per-DID limits are useless against a
+/// push flood from a DID farm (one throwaway DID per repo), so the push path
+/// throttles on the resolved client IP instead.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct IpRateLimiter {
+    pub limiter: RateLimiter,
+    pub trust: TrustedProxy,
+}
+
+/// Infallible extractor for the socket peer address from `ConnectInfo`. Yields
+/// `None` when the server was started without connect-info (e.g. `oneshot` in
+/// tests), so a handler never 500s on its absence — the limiter simply falls
+/// back per [`client_key`].
+pub struct PeerAddr(pub Option<SocketAddr>);
+
+impl<S: Send + Sync> axum::extract::FromRequestParts<S> for PeerAddr {
+    type Rejection = std::convert::Infallible;
+
+    async fn from_request_parts(
+        parts: &mut axum::http::request::Parts,
+        _state: &S,
+    ) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
+        Ok(PeerAddr(
+            parts
+                .extensions
+                .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
+                .map(|c| c.0),
+        ))
+    }
+}
+
+/// The shared 429 response for the push flood brake.
+pub fn too_many_requests() -> Response {
+    (
+        StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+        [("retry-after", "60")],
+        "push rate limit exceeded — try again later",
+    )
+        .into_response()
+}
+
+/// Throttle the git push path by resolved client IP. The socket peer address is
+/// read from `ConnectInfo` (see `into_make_service_with_connect_info` in
+/// `main`). Only skips the limiter when no key can be resolved at all.
+pub async fn rate_limit_by_ip(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
+    let limiter = request.extensions().get::<IpRateLimiter>().cloned();
+    let peer = request
+        .extensions()
+        .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
+        .map(|c| c.0);
+
+    if let Some(limiter) = limiter {
+        if let Some(key) = client_key(request.headers(), peer, limiter.trust) {
+            if !limiter.limiter.check(&key).await {
+                tracing::warn!(key = %key, path = %request.uri().path(), "push rate limit exceeded");
+                return too_many_requests();
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    next.run(request).await
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -134,4 +328,217 @@ mod tests {
         let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
         assert!(state.is_empty());
     }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn zero_limit_disables() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new(0, Duration::from_secs(60));
+        for _ in 0..1000 {
+            assert!(limiter.check("k").await);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // ── key-cap / memory-bound (P2) ──────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn caps_tracked_keys_and_rejects_new_ones_when_full() {
+        // Cap of 2 distinct keys; generous request budget so rejection is due to
+        // the key cap, not the per-key limit.
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(60), 2);
+        assert!(limiter.check("a").await);
+        assert!(limiter.check("b").await);
+        // Third distinct key would grow the map past the cap → rejected.
+        assert!(!limiter.check("c").await);
+        // The map never exceeded the cap, and the rejected key was NOT inserted.
+        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
+        assert_eq!(state.len(), 2);
+        assert!(!state.contains_key("c"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn known_key_unaffected_by_cap() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(60), 1);
+        assert!(limiter.check("a").await); // fills the single slot
+        assert!(limiter.check("a").await); // same key still served
+        assert!(!limiter.check("b").await); // new key rejected — cap full
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn expired_keys_evicted_to_admit_new_when_full() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_millis(40), 1);
+        assert!(limiter.check("old").await);
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(55)).await;
+        // "old" is now expired; a new key triggers inline eviction and is admitted.
+        assert!(limiter.check("new").await);
+        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
+        assert!(state.contains_key("new"));
+        assert!(!state.contains_key("old"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn capacity_sweep_is_amortized_within_interval() {
+        // The O(max_keys) eviction scan must not run on every capacity miss.
+        // With a 1s sweep interval, the resident (unexpired) key is never
+        // evicted by a burst of misses, so repeated new keys are all rejected
+        // without disturbing existing state.
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(1), 1);
+        assert!(limiter.check("resident").await);
+        for i in 0..100 {
+            assert!(
+                !limiter.check(&format!("flood-{i}")).await,
+                "new key must be rejected while the single slot is held"
+            );
+        }
+        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
+        assert_eq!(state.len(), 1, "no flood key was ever inserted");
+        assert!(state.contains_key("resident"));
+    }
+
+    // ── client_key / trusted-proxy resolution (P1 + P2) ─────────────────
+
+    fn headers(pairs: &[(&str, &str)]) -> HeaderMap {
+        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+        for (k, v) in pairs {
+            h.insert(
+                axum::http::HeaderName::from_bytes(k.as_bytes()).unwrap(),
+                v.parse().unwrap(),
+            );
+        }
+        h
+    }
+
+    fn peer(s: &str) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
+        Some(s.parse().unwrap())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn none_mode_ignores_headers_and_uses_peer() {
+        // Even a well-formed Fly header is ignored without a trusted proxy.
+        let h = headers(&[("fly-client-ip", "203.0.113.7")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::None).as_deref(),
+            Some("198.51.100.9")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fly_mode_trusts_fly_header() {
+        let h = headers(&[
+            ("fly-client-ip", "203.0.113.7"),
+            ("x-forwarded-for", "1.2.3.4"),
+        ]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::Fly).as_deref(),
+            Some("203.0.113.7")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fly_mode_empty_header_falls_back_to_peer_not_skip() {
+        // Empty Fly-Client-IP must NOT collapse traffic onto Some("") nor skip
+        // the limiter — it falls back to the real peer.
+        let h = headers(&[("fly-client-ip", "")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::Fly).as_deref(),
+            Some("198.51.100.9")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn xff_mode_uses_rightmost_hop_not_client_controlled_first() {
+        // Client prepends spoofed hops; only the rightmost (proxy-appended) is trusted.
+        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", "9.9.9.9, 8.8.8.8, 198.51.100.9")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
+            Some("198.51.100.9")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn xff_mode_empty_leading_hop_does_not_disable_brake() {
+        // "X-Forwarded-For: ,1.2.3.4" — rightmost hop is used; never None-skips.
+        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", ",1.2.3.4")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
+            Some("1.2.3.4")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn malformed_xff_falls_back_to_peer() {
+        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", " , ")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
+            Some("198.51.100.9")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn trusted_proxy_parsing() {
+        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value("fly"), TrustedProxy::Fly);
+        assert_eq!(
+            TrustedProxy::from_env_value("X-Forwarded-For"),
+            TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            TrustedProxy::from_env_value("caddy"),
+            TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor
+        );
+        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value(""), TrustedProxy::None);
+        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value("garbage"), TrustedProxy::None);
+    }
+
+    // ── middleware 429 path ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    /// A minimal router with the push limiter layered over an OK handler,
+    /// driven via `oneshot`. `ConnectInfo` is attached to each request directly
+    /// (as the production make-service does) so the middleware resolves a peer.
+    fn ip_limited_router(limiter: IpRateLimiter) -> axum::Router {
+        axum::Router::new()
+            .route(
+                "/o/r/git-receive-pack",
+                axum::routing::post(|| async { StatusCode::OK }),
+            )
+            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(rate_limit_by_ip))
+            .layer(axum::Extension(limiter))
+    }
+
+    async fn post_from(router: &axum::Router, peer: SocketAddr) -> StatusCode {
+        use tower::ServiceExt;
+        let mut req = axum::http::Request::builder()
+            .method(axum::http::Method::POST)
+            .uri("/o/r/git-receive-pack")
+            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
+            .unwrap();
+        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
+        router.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status()
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_returns_429_over_limit() {
+        let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
+            limiter: RateLimiter::new(2, Duration::from_secs(60)),
+            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
+        });
+        let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.7:5000".parse().unwrap();
+        // Two requests inside the budget, the third over it (shared Arc state).
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, peer).await, StatusCode::OK);
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, peer).await, StatusCode::OK);
+        assert_eq!(
+            post_from(&router, peer).await,
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_isolates_distinct_peers() {
+        let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
+            limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60)),
+            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
+        });
+        let a: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.1:1".parse().unwrap();
+        let b: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.2:1".parse().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, a).await, StatusCode::OK);
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, b).await, StatusCode::OK); // independent bucket
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, a).await, StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/server.rs

@@ -175,6 +175,14 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
     // HTTP Signature is enforced on receive-pack (push) — the git-remote-gitlawb
     // helper signs requests with RFC 9421 signatures using the agent's keypair.
     let pack_limit = state.config.max_pack_bytes;
+    // Per-IP throttle wraps the auth layer (outermost = runs first): flood
+    // traffic is rejected before signature verification burns CPU. Per-DID
+    // limiting is deliberately NOT used here — a DID farm (one throwaway
+    // identity per repo, as in the June 2026 push flood) never trips it.
+    let push_limiter = rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
+        limiter: state.push_rate_limiter.clone(),
+        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
+    };
     let git_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
         Router::new()
             .route(
@@ -184,7 +192,9 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             .layer(DefaultBodyLimit::disable())
             .layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(pack_limit)),
         state.clone(),
-    );
+    )
+    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+    .layer(axum::Extension(push_limiter));
 
     // ── IPFS content-addressed retrieval and pin listing ──────────────────
     // `/ipfs/{cid}` carries `optional_signature` so `get_by_cid` sees the caller

crates/gitlawb-node/src/state.rs

@@ -51,6 +51,13 @@ pub struct AppState {
     pub repo_store: RepoStore,
     /// Per-DID rate limiter for creation endpoints (repos, issues, PRs)
     pub rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// Per-client-IP rate limiter for git-receive-pack. Per-DID limits cannot
+    /// brake a push flood from a DID farm (one throwaway DID per repo), so the
+    /// push path throttles on the resolved client IP instead.
+    pub push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// Which forwarded header (if any) the edge is trusted to set, for
+    /// resolving the push limiter's client-IP key. See `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`.
+    pub push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy,
     /// Process-wide graceful-shutdown signal. Sending `true` causes every
     /// task that holds a `watch::Receiver` to exit at its next await point.
     /// Used by:

crates/gitlawb-node/src/test_support.rs

@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ fn build_state(db: Arc<crate::db::Db>, pool: PgPool) -> AppState {
         machine_id: None,
         repo_store: crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), pool),
         rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(100, Duration::from_secs(60)),
+        push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+        push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None,
         shutdown_tx: tokio::sync::watch::channel(false).0,
     }
 }
@@ -669,6 +671,436 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    // ── #119: git-info-refs advertisement gate + client signing ──────────────
+
+    /// A1 read-gate bypass + its client remedy. `git_info_refs` serves BOTH the
+    /// `git-upload-pack` (clone/fetch) and `git-receive-pack` (push) ref
+    /// advertisement off one route, but the visibility gate was wrapped in
+    /// `if service == "git-upload-pack"`, so a private repo's ref advertisement
+    /// (branch/tag names + commit tips) leaked to any anonymous caller who asked
+    /// for `?service=git-receive-pack`. The fix gates the advertisement for both
+    /// services. Because the gate now denies an *unauthenticated* advertisement
+    /// of a private repo for both services, `git-remote-gitlawb` signs its
+    /// Phase-1 advertisement GET (over path_and_query) so the owner can still
+    /// fetch and push; this test exercises that exact request with a REAL
+    /// RFC-9421 signature through the production `optional_signature` middleware.
+    ///
+    /// Denied → 404 (`RepoNotFound`, existence-hiding) at the gate, before disk
+    /// access. Allowed → the handler clears the gate and falls through to
+    /// `acquire` + real `git ... --advertise-refs` against a repo absent from the
+    /// test disk, returning 500; that 500 (anything but 404) is the signal the
+    /// caller cleared the gate.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn git_info_refs_gates_advertisement_for_both_services(pool: PgPool) {
+        use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
+        use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let owner_did = kp.did().to_string();
+        // Short owner form in the URL so the signed @path and the node's
+        // path_and_query() match byte-for-byte; get_repo's owner LIKE + did_matches
+        // still authorize the full-DID signer as the owner.
+        let short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap().to_string();
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+
+        let mut priv_repo = seed_repo(&owner_did, "ir-priv");
+        priv_repo.is_public = false;
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_repo(&priv_repo)
+            .await
+            .expect("seed private repo");
+        // A public repo to guard against the unconditional gate accidentally
+        // denying public, anonymous clones.
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_repo(&seed_repo(&owner_did, "ir-pub"))
+            .await
+            .expect("seed public repo");
+
+        // Production-shaped router: the real optional_signature middleware, so a
+        // signed request is genuinely verified (not the injected-DID shortcut).
+        let router = || {
+            Router::new()
+                .route(
+                    "/{owner}/{repo}/info/refs",
+                    axum::routing::get(crate::api::repos::git_info_refs),
+                )
+                .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(crate::auth::optional_signature))
+                .with_state(state.clone())
+        };
+        let path = |service: &str| format!("/{short}/ir-priv.git/info/refs?service={service}");
+        let anon = |service: &str| {
+            Request::builder()
+                .method(Method::GET)
+                .uri(path(service))
+                .body(Body::empty())
+                .unwrap()
+        };
+        // The advertisement GET exactly as git-remote-gitlawb now builds it: a
+        // real signature over the path_and_query, empty body.
+        let signed = |service: &str| {
+            let p = path(service);
+            let s = sign_request(&kp, "GET", &p, b"");
+            Request::builder()
+                .method(Method::GET)
+                .uri(&p)
+                .header("content-digest", s.content_digest)
+                .header("signature-input", s.signature_input)
+                .header("signature", s.signature)
+                .body(Body::empty())
+                .unwrap()
+        };
+
+        // Leak fix: anonymous advertisement of a private repo is denied (404) for
+        // BOTH services. Pre-fix the receive-pack case returned 500 (gate skipped).
+        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
+            let resp = router().oneshot(anon(service)).await.unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(
+                resp.status(),
+                StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+                "anonymous {service} advertisement of a private repo must be denied"
+            );
+        }
+
+        // No-regression: a PUBLIC repo's advertisement stays anonymous for BOTH
+        // services. The gate admits the anonymous caller, so the handler clears it
+        // and 500s on the missing test-disk repo; anything but 404 (a gate denial)
+        // proves the unconditional gate did not accidentally lock out public reads.
+        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
+            let req = Request::builder()
+                .method(Method::GET)
+                .uri(format!("/{short}/ir-pub.git/info/refs?service={service}"))
+                .body(Body::empty())
+                .unwrap();
+            let resp = router().oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
+            // 500 (not just non-404): the gate admits the public anonymous caller,
+            // so the handler reaches acquire + git advertise-refs on the missing
+            // test-disk repo. Pinning the exact 500 rules out a 401/403 regression
+            // masquerading as "not gated".
+            assert_eq!(
+                resp.status(),
+                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                "anonymous {service} advertisement of a PUBLIC repo must not be gated"
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Client remedy: the owner's SIGNED advertisement GET clears the gate for
+        // BOTH services (so fetch and push of a private repo keep working). It
+        // 500s on the missing test-disk repo; anything but 404 means cleared.
+        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
+            let resp = router().oneshot(signed(service)).await.unwrap();
+            // INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR specifically: the signature VERIFIED (passed
+            // require_signature, not 401/403) and the owner cleared the read gate
+            // (not 404), so the handler proceeded to acquire + git on a repo absent
+            // from the test disk. Asserting the exact 500 (rather than merely
+            // "not 404") proves the request got PAST auth, not rejected by it.
+            assert_eq!(
+                resp.status(),
+                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                "the owner's signed {service} advertisement must verify and clear the gate"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Push is signature-gated, not merely owner-gated: an UNSIGNED
+    /// git-receive-pack POST is rejected by `require_signature` (401) before
+    /// reaching `git_receive_pack`. 401 (not the handler's 404/500) is the
+    /// discriminator that proves the request never reached the handler.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn unsigned_receive_pack_post_is_rejected(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let owner_did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        let short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap().to_string();
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_repo(&seed_repo(&owner_did, "rp-repo"))
+            .await
+            .expect("seed repo");
+
+        // Production wiring: the receive-pack POST sits behind require_signature
+        // (server.rs add_auth_layers); apply that same layer here.
+        let router = Router::new()
+            .route(
+                "/{owner}/{repo}/git-receive-pack",
+                axum::routing::post(crate::api::repos::git_receive_pack),
+            )
+            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(crate::auth::require_signature))
+            .with_state(state);
+
+        let req = Request::builder()
+            .method(Method::POST)
+            .uri(format!("/{short}/rp-repo.git/git-receive-pack"))
+            .body(Body::from(&b"0000"[..]))
+            .unwrap();
+        let resp = router.oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            "an unsigned receive-pack POST must be rejected by require_signature, \
+             not reach the handler"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A1 Phase-2 contract: the `git-upload-pack` POST (the actual fetch, after
+    /// the advertisement) is itself read-visibility gated. An ANONYMOUS upload-pack
+    /// POST against a private repo is denied (404), so signing only the Phase-1
+    /// advertisement GET is NOT enough; `git-remote-gitlawb` must also sign this
+    /// POST, or an owner's fetch of their own private repo clears the advertisement
+    /// and then dies on the pack POST. A real owner signature clears the gate
+    /// (non-404; the missing test-disk repo then errors downstream).
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn git_upload_pack_post_is_read_gated_on_private_repo(pool: PgPool) {
+        use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
+        use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let owner_did = kp.did().to_string();
+        let short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap().to_string();
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+
+        let mut priv_repo = seed_repo(&owner_did, "up-priv");
+        priv_repo.is_public = false;
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_repo(&priv_repo)
+            .await
+            .expect("seed private repo");
+
+        let router = || {
+            Router::new()
+                .route(
+                    "/{owner}/{repo}/git-upload-pack",
+                    axum::routing::post(crate::api::repos::git_upload_pack),
+                )
+                .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(crate::auth::optional_signature))
+                .with_state(state.clone())
+        };
+        // A non-empty body (git-remote-gitlawb skips the POST when the body is empty).
+        let body = b"0032want 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\n".to_vec();
+        let path = format!("/{short}/up-priv.git/git-upload-pack");
+
+        // Anonymous Phase-2 fetch of a private repo: denied at the gate (404). This
+        // is exactly the request git-remote-gitlawb sends today for upload-pack
+        // (the unsigned POST), which is why fetch breaks for the owner.
+        let anon = Request::builder()
+            .method(Method::POST)
+            .uri(&path)
+            .header("content-type", "application/x-git-upload-pack-request")
+            .body(Body::from(body.clone()))
+            .unwrap();
+        let resp = router().oneshot(anon).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            "an anonymous upload-pack POST against a private repo must be denied"
+        );
+
+        // The same POST signed by the owner clears the read gate (non-404). This is
+        // the request the client must send once it signs the upload-pack POST.
+        let signed = sign_request(&kp, "POST", &path, &body);
+        let signed_req = Request::builder()
+            .method(Method::POST)
+            .uri(&path)
+            .header("content-type", "application/x-git-upload-pack-request")
+            .header("content-digest", signed.content_digest)
+            .header("signature-input", signed.signature_input)
+            .header("signature", signed.signature)
+            .body(Body::from(body))
+            .unwrap();
+        let resp = router().oneshot(signed_req).await.unwrap();
+        // 500 (not merely non-404): the signature VERIFIED (passed require_signature,
+        // not 401/403) AND the owner cleared the read gate (not 404), so the handler
+        // reached git on the missing test-disk repo. Pinning 500 proves the request
+        // got past auth; a 401 regression would slip through a bare `!= 404`.
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            "the owner's signed upload-pack POST must verify and clear the read gate"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Served-content seam: with a REAL on-disk bare repo (branch
+    /// `topsecret-branch`), the advertisement serves the actual ref names to
+    /// authorized callers and withholds them from denied ones, proving real
+    /// content egress + withholding, not just the gate decision (the other tests
+    /// land on a 500 from a missing-disk repo). Asserts the branch name appears for
+    /// allowed callers and never appears in a denied 404 body.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn advertisement_serves_real_refs_only_to_authorized_callers(pool: PgPool) {
+        use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
+        use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+        use std::process::Command;
+
+        // repo_store::for_testing fixes the on-disk layout (/tmp/<slug>/<name>.git
+        // and /tmp/gl-seam-src-<short>), so tempfile::TempDir's random paths don't
+        // fit. Wrap each known path in a Drop guard so the dirs are removed even if
+        // an assertion below panics.
+        struct DirGuard(std::path::PathBuf);
+        impl Drop for DirGuard {
+            fn drop(&mut self) {
+                let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&self.0);
+            }
+        }
+
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let owner_did = kp.did().to_string();
+        let short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap().to_string();
+        // repo_store::for_testing uses /tmp; local_path = /tmp/<slug>/<name>.git
+        // with slug = owner_did with ':' and '/' replaced by '_'.
+        let slug = owner_did.replace([':', '/'], "_");
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+
+        let run = |args: &[&str], cwd: &std::path::Path| {
+            let out = Command::new("git")
+                .args(args)
+                .current_dir(cwd)
+                .output()
+                .expect("git runs");
+            assert!(
+                out.status.success(),
+                "git {args:?} failed: {}",
+                String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
+            );
+        };
+
+        // Source repo with a recognizable branch + one commit.
+        let src = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("gl-seam-src-{short}"));
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&src);
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&src).unwrap();
+        let _src_guard = DirGuard(src.clone());
+        run(&["init", "-q", "-b", "topsecret-branch"], &src);
+        run(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"], &src);
+        run(&["config", "user.name", "t"], &src);
+        std::fs::write(src.join("f.txt"), b"hi").unwrap();
+        run(&["add", "f.txt"], &src);
+        run(&["commit", "-q", "-m", "seed"], &src);
+
+        // Bare-clone into the exact path repo_store.acquire() will read.
+        let bare_for = |name: &str| {
+            let dir = std::path::PathBuf::from("/tmp")
+                .join(&slug)
+                .join(format!("{name}.git"));
+            let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+            std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.parent().unwrap()).unwrap();
+            let out = Command::new("git")
+                .args([
+                    "clone",
+                    "--bare",
+                    "-q",
+                    src.to_str().unwrap(),
+                    dir.to_str().unwrap(),
+                ])
+                .output()
+                .expect("git clone runs");
+            assert!(
+                out.status.success(),
+                "bare clone failed: {}",
+                String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
+            );
+            dir
+        };
+        let pub_dir = bare_for("served-pub");
+        let _pub_guard = DirGuard(pub_dir.clone());
+        let priv_dir = bare_for("served-priv");
+        let _priv_guard = DirGuard(priv_dir.clone());
+
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_repo(&seed_repo(&owner_did, "served-pub"))
+            .await
+            .expect("seed public repo");
+        let mut priv_repo = seed_repo(&owner_did, "served-priv");
+        priv_repo.is_public = false;
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_repo(&priv_repo)
+            .await
+            .expect("seed private repo");
+
+        let router = || {
+            Router::new()
+                .route(
+                    "/{owner}/{repo}/info/refs",
+                    axum::routing::get(crate::api::repos::git_info_refs),
+                )
+                .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(crate::auth::optional_signature))
+                .with_state(state.clone())
+        };
+        async fn body_of(resp: axum::response::Response) -> String {
+            let b = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&b).to_string()
+        }
+
+        // Public repo, anonymous → 200 and the real ref name is served.
+        let resp = router()
+            .oneshot(
+                Request::builder()
+                    .method(Method::GET)
+                    .uri(format!(
+                        "/{short}/served-pub.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"
+                    ))
+                    .body(Body::empty())
+                    .unwrap(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+        assert!(
+            body_of(resp).await.contains("topsecret-branch"),
+            "public advertisement must serve the real ref name"
+        );
+
+        // Private repo, anonymous → 404 and the ref name is withheld.
+        let resp = router()
+            .oneshot(
+                Request::builder()
+                    .method(Method::GET)
+                    .uri(format!(
+                        "/{short}/served-priv.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"
+                    ))
+                    .body(Body::empty())
+                    .unwrap(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
+        assert!(
+            !body_of(resp).await.contains("topsecret-branch"),
+            "a denied 404 must not leak the real ref name"
+        );
+
+        // Private repo, owner's REAL signature → 200 and the real ref is served.
+        let path = format!("/{short}/served-priv.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack");
+        let s = sign_request(&kp, "GET", &path, b"");
+        let resp = router()
+            .oneshot(
+                Request::builder()
+                    .method(Method::GET)
+                    .uri(&path)
+                    .header("content-digest", s.content_digest)
+                    .header("signature-input", s.signature_input)
+                    .header("signature", s.signature)
+                    .body(Body::empty())
+                    .unwrap(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::OK,
+            "the owner's signed request reads the private advertisement"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            body_of(resp).await.contains("topsecret-branch"),
+            "the verified owner gets the real ref name"
+        );
+
+        // Cleanup runs via the DirGuard Drop impls above, on success or panic.
+    }
+
     // ── #97: repo-listing surfaces are visibility-gated ──────────────────────
 
     fn seed_private_repo(owner_did: &str, name: &str) -> RepoRecord {
@@ -1842,4 +2274,116 @@ mod tests {
             "walk error fails closed: repo skipped, even the public blob is not served"
         );
     }
+
+    /// #126: a dangling blob (written via `git hash-object -w`, never referenced
+    /// by any commit/tree) must 404 through `GET /ipfs/{cid}` under path-scoped
+    /// rules — for anon AND the owner. The pre-#126 deny-set was fail-open by
+    /// construction: dangling oids were absent from the reachable enumeration
+    /// and thus absent from the deny-set, so the handler served 200. The
+    /// allowed-set is fail-closed: dangling oids are absent from the reachable
+    /// allowed-set, so the handler 404s (per team memory: the owner shift to
+    /// 404 is the accepted fail-closed default — owners can still
+    /// `git cat-file` directly).
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ipfs_cid_dangling_blob_fails_closed_under_path_rules(pool: PgPool) {
+        use crate::db::VisibilityMode;
+        use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+
+        let owner = Keypair::generate();
+        let owner_did = owner.did().to_string();
+        let slug = owner_did.replace([':', '/'], "_");
+        let short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap().to_string();
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+
+        // Seed a normal repo with `secret/b.txt` reachable from HEAD, so the
+        // path-scoped rule has something to match — without this the rule has
+        // no anchor and we'd be testing nothing.
+        let _fx = seed_cid_repos(&slug, &short, &["dangling"]);
+        let bare = std::path::PathBuf::from("/tmp")
+            .join(&slug)
+            .join("dangling.git");
+
+        // Write a dangling blob: `git hash-object -w --stdin` adds it to the
+        // object DB but nothing references it, so the reachable walk never
+        // enumerates it.
+        let mut cmd = std::process::Command::new("git");
+        cmd.args(["hash-object", "-w", "--stdin"])
+            .current_dir(&bare)
+            .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped())
+            .stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped());
+        let mut child = cmd.spawn().expect("spawn git hash-object");
+        {
+            use std::io::Write;
+            let stdin = child.stdin.as_mut().expect("stdin");
+            stdin.write_all(b"DANGLING SECRET\n").expect("write stdin");
+        }
+        let out = child.wait_with_output().expect("hash-object output");
+        assert!(
+            out.status.success(),
+            "git hash-object: {}",
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
+        );
+        let dangling_oid = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string();
+        // Sanity: must be a 64-hex sha256 oid, since the repo is sha256-format.
+        assert_eq!(
+            dangling_oid.len(),
+            64,
+            "expected sha256 oid: {dangling_oid}"
+        );
+        let dangling_cid = cid_for_oid(&dangling_oid);
+
+        state
+            .db
+            .create_repo(&seed_repo(&owner_did, "dangling"))
+            .await
+            .expect("seed repo");
+        let rec = state
+            .db
+            .get_repo(&owner_did, "dangling")
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .unwrap();
+        // Path-scoped rule triggers the per-blob allowed-set gate (KTD4).
+        state
+            .db
+            .set_visibility_rule(&rec.id, "/secret/**", VisibilityMode::B, &[], &owner_did)
+            .await
+            .expect("deny rule");
+
+        // anon: the dangling blob is absent from the reachable allowed-set →
+        // 404, no leak. Pre-#126 (deny-set) would serve 200.
+        let (st, body) = cid_parts(
+            cid_router(&state)
+                .oneshot(cid_anon(&dangling_cid))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+        )
+        .await;
+        assert_eq!(
+            st,
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            "dangling blob must 404 under path-scoped rules"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !body.contains("DANGLING SECRET"),
+            "404 body must not leak the dangling content"
+        );
+
+        // owner (signed): same 404. The dangling blob has no path, so it's
+        // never visibility-checked → never in the allowed set, even for the
+        // owner. This is the accepted fail-closed shift documented in the PR.
+        let (st, body) = cid_parts(
+            cid_router(&state)
+                .oneshot(cid_signed(&owner, &dangling_cid))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+        )
+        .await;
+        assert_eq!(
+            st,
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            "owner also 404s on dangling blobs under path-scoped rules (fail-closed default)"
+        );
+        assert!(!body.contains("DANGLING SECRET"));
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/visibility.rs

@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
 //! based on the repo's visibility rules with a fallback to the legacy
 //! `is_public` flag. It performs no I/O so it is exhaustively unit tested.
 
-use crate::db::VisibilityRule;
+use crate::db::{RepoRecord, VisibilityRule};
+use std::collections::HashMap;
 use unicode_normalization::UnicodeNormalization;
 
 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
@@ -24,10 +25,14 @@ fn nfc(s: &str) -> String {
     s.nfc().collect()
 }
 
-/// True if `caller` is the repo owner (matches full did:key or its short form),
-/// mirroring the owner-match idiom in `api/protect.rs`.
+/// True if `caller` is the repo owner. Matches exactly or against the
+/// did:key short form — a non-key DID (did:gitlawb:/did:web:) in `owner_did`
+/// never matches a bare short segment, and a non-key DID in `caller` never
+/// matches a did:key owner's short form. Uses `normalize_owner_key` (not
+/// `did_matches`) so the did:key-only rule is stricter: cross-method matching
+/// would let a non-key canonical row bypass the #124 visibility gate.
 fn is_owner(owner_did: &str, caller: &str) -> bool {
-    let owner_short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner_did);
+    let owner_short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(owner_did);
     caller == owner_did || caller == owner_short
 }
 
@@ -127,6 +132,105 @@ pub fn listable_at_root(
     visibility_check(rules, is_public, owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Allow
 }
 
+/// Whether a single `received_ref_updates` row (identified by its peer-supplied
+/// `row_repo` slug) should be shown to `caller` (None = anonymous) on the
+/// cross-repo ref-updates feeds (#112 GraphQL, #114 REST).
+///
+/// Pure and I/O-free: both call sites load the deduped local repo set and its
+/// visibility rules once per request and pass them in, so the gate logic lives
+/// here and visibility.rs keeps its "no I/O" property.
+///
+/// The slug is written verbatim from the inbound gossip/notify message, so it is
+/// untrusted input, not a canonical key. The decision is fail-closed by
+/// construction: the only KEEP paths are (a) a slug with no `/` (cannot name a
+/// local `owner/name` pair, so remote by definition), (b) all matched local
+/// records are readable, and (c) no local record matches (remote/gossip-only).
+/// Any local match the caller cannot read at root DROPs the row. There is no
+/// catch-all keep on unexpected state.
+///
+/// Slug/record owner keys are matched prefix-tolerantly (one is a prefix of the
+/// other), covering the exact short-key, the full `did:key:` form, and the
+/// URL-truncated 8-char form. Prefix over-match can only over-drop a genuinely
+/// remote row (fail-safe), never over-serve a private local one.
+///
+/// The live call sites are the #112 (GraphQL) and #114 (REST) feed handlers,
+/// added in the following units; exercised by the unit tests below meanwhile.
+pub fn ref_update_row_visible(
+    deduped: &[RepoRecord],
+    rules_by_repo: &HashMap<String, Vec<VisibilityRule>>,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+    row_repo: &str,
+) -> bool {
+    // A slug with no '/' cannot name a local owner/name pair — remote by
+    // definition (same branch as "matches nothing local") → KEEP.
+    if row_repo.rsplit_once('/').is_none() {
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    // Match each local record with the shared slug predicate (one matcher, so
+    // this gate and the collector's quarantine drop cannot disagree about which
+    // rows a repo owns), then fail closed on any matched record the caller
+    // cannot read at root.
+    for record in deduped {
+        if !ref_update_row_names_repo(record, row_repo) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let rules = rules_by_repo
+            .get(&record.id)
+            .map(Vec::as_slice)
+            .unwrap_or(&[]);
+        if !listable_at_root(rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller) {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Reached only if every matched local record is readable, or nothing local
+    // matched (remote/gossip-only). Both are the KEEP paths; there is no
+    // default-keep on unexpected state — an unreadable match already returned.
+    true
+}
+
+/// Whether `row_repo`'s peer-supplied slug names the local `record`. The single
+/// match predicate shared by the feed gate ([`ref_update_row_visible`]) and the
+/// quarantine hard-drop in the ref-update collector, so the two cannot diverge
+/// about which rows a repo owns — a second, drifting matcher is exactly the #134
+/// slug-collision class.
+///
+/// A record matches when the slug's `name` half is equal and one owner key is a
+/// prefix of the other (prefix-tolerant: exact short key, full `did:key:` form,
+/// and the URL-truncated 8-char form). Both the slug owner and the record owner
+/// are reduced to their last ':'-delimited segment before comparing. The node's
+/// own emitter builds the wire slug via `normalize_owner_key` (bare short key for
+/// a single-segment `did:key:`, the full DID for every other method; see
+/// api/repos.rs), but the stored slug is UNTRUSTED: a peer can broadcast a row
+/// under any owner form, including a method-stripped `user/name`. Reducing both
+/// sides to the trailing segment matches a repo's own rows whichever form keyed
+/// them, and still catches an attacker-planted short slug.
+///
+/// This intentionally diverges from `did_matches` / `DEDUP_CTE`, which strip only
+/// bare `did:key:` and keep other DID methods whole: those compare trusted,
+/// canonical DIDs, while this slug is untrusted. Applying the keep-whole rule here
+/// would fail open: a hostile `user/name` slug would not prefix-match a private
+/// `did:web:host:user` record and would leak. The price is a fail-SAFE over-match
+/// when a remote owner shares both a trailing segment and a repo name with a local
+/// private repo (negligible for full did:key ids; only did:web / truncated forms
+/// collide): it can hide a genuinely remote row, never serve a private one.
+pub fn ref_update_row_names_repo(record: &RepoRecord, row_repo: &str) -> bool {
+    let Some((owner_part, name)) = row_repo.rsplit_once('/') else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    if record.name != name {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let row_key = owner_part.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner_part);
+    let record_key = record
+        .owner_did
+        .split(':')
+        .next_back()
+        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    record_key.starts_with(row_key) || row_key.starts_with(record_key)
+}
+
 /// The subtree path globs that `caller` (None = anonymous) may NOT read, given
 /// the repo's rules. Whole-repo ("/") rules are excluded: a denied whole-repo
 /// read is handled by the 404 gate before a clone ever starts. Each remaining
@@ -299,6 +403,31 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn non_key_owner_bare_short_does_not_match() {
+        // A non-key DID owner (did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo) probed with the bare last
+        // segment (z6MkFoo) must NOT match — the old is_owner would return true
+        // via split(':').next_back(), which this PR tightens.
+        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, false, "did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo", Some("z6MkFoo"), "/"),
+            Decision::Deny,
+            "bare short must not match a non-key DID owner"
+        );
+        // The full non-key DID still matches itself.
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(
+                &rules,
+                false,
+                "did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo",
+                Some("did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo"),
+                "/"
+            ),
+            Decision::Allow,
+            "full non-key DID still matches itself"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn root_rule_allows_listed_reader() {
         let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
@@ -403,6 +532,260 @@ mod tests {
         ));
     }
 
+    // ── ref_update_row_visible (feed gate) ──────────────────────────────────
+
+    fn rec(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
+        RepoRecord {
+            id: id.into(),
+            name: name.into(),
+            owner_did: owner_did.into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: Utc::now(),
+            updated_at: Utc::now(),
+            disk_path: format!("/srv/{id}"),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn rules_for(entries: &[(&str, &[VisibilityRule])]) -> HashMap<String, Vec<VisibilityRule>> {
+        entries
+            .iter()
+            .map(|(id, rs)| (id.to_string(), rs.to_vec()))
+            .collect()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_public_local_repo_kept_for_anon() {
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", true)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_private_local_repo_dropped_for_anon_kept_for_owner() {
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        // Anonymous → drop.
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+        // Owner (full DID) → keep.
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            Some("did:key:z6MkOwner"),
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_root_rule_reader_reincluded() {
+        // Private repo (is_public=false) with a root rule granting a named
+        // reader. Delegates to listable_at_root: anon and non-reader denied,
+        // named reader allowed.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", OWNER, "widget", false)];
+        let root = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
+        let rules = rules_for(&[("r1", &root)]);
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            Some("did:key:z6MkStranger"),
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            Some("did:key:z6MkFriend"),
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_alias_full_did_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // Owner stored full-DID; slug also carries the full-DID form. Still
+        // matches (row_key normalizes to the short key) → drop. Round 1's
+        // string-match would have leaked this.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:zABC", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "did:key:zABC/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_truncated_key_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // Slug carries an 8-char URL-truncated prefix of the owner key; still
+        // matches via prefix tolerance → drop. Round 2's get_repo path leaked.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:zABCDEFGH", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "zABCDEF/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_mirror_coexistence_private_canonical_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // Pure-level mirror-coexistence: the deduped set contains only the
+        // private canonical record for (owner,name). A matching slug drops for
+        // anon. (DB-level dedup survivor property is pinned separately.)
+        let deduped = [rec("uuid-canonical", "did:key:z6Mkwbud", "nipmod", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6Mkwbud/nipmod"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_empty_owner_slug_matches_and_drops() {
+        // Slug "/name": empty owner_part → row_key "" → starts_with("") matches
+        // every same-named record. Fail-safe pin for a private repo.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "/widget"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_one_char_owner_slug_matches_and_drops() {
+        // 1-char owner prefix that the private repo's key starts with → match.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "z/widget"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_remote_slug_no_match_kept() {
+        // Different owner key, no prefix relation → no local match → keep.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "zZZZOTHER/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_private_didweb_short_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // A private did:web repo must drop its row for anon when the slug arrives
+        // in the short `{last-segment}/{name}` form. Post-#141 the emitter no longer
+        // produces this form for did:web (normalize_owner_key keeps the full DID),
+        // so this is the untrusted/crafted variant a peer can broadcast; the full-DID
+        // variant the emitter now sends is covered by the next test. A did:key-aware
+        // (keep-whole) rule would fail to match `alice` against `did:web:host:alice`
+        // and leak.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:alice", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "alice/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_multi_segment_did_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // A private repo owned by a multi-segment DID must also fail closed under
+        // the full-DID slug form. Post-#141 this IS the form the emitter broadcasts
+        // (normalize_owner_key keeps non-did:key methods whole), and a peer can craft
+        // it too. The gate drops it: both sides reduce to the last ':' segment
+        // ("user"), so they match. Fail-safe regardless of which form keyed the row.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:user", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "did:web:host:user/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_multi_segment_did_slug_kept_for_public() {
+        // Symmetric keep-side: a PUBLIC multi-segment-DID repo's row must still be
+        // returned to anon after the last-':'-segment normalization — guards
+        // against a regression that over-drops legitimate did:web rows.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:user", "widget", true)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "did:web:host:user/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_malformed_slug_no_slash_kept_no_panic() {
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "noslug"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_empty_deduped_set_keeps_any_slug() {
+        let deduped: [RepoRecord; 0] = [];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "anything"));
+    }
+
+    // The shared slug matcher underpinning both the feed gate and the collector's
+    // quarantine drop: it must recognize a repo's own row across every owner-DID
+    // form (bare short key, full did:key, URL-truncated prefix) and must not
+    // over-match a different name or an unrelated owner. The quarantine drop calls
+    // this directly, so its match contract is load-bearing for withholding a
+    // quarantined mirror from a caller who matches the mirror's owner_did.
+    #[test]
+    fn names_repo_matches_owner_forms_and_rejects_mismatches() {
+        // Bare short owner key (the form upsert_mirror_repo stores).
+        let bare = rec("m", "z6MkQuar", "secret", false);
+        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
+        // Full did:key owner; the short-segment slug still matches via last-segment.
+        let full = rec("c", "did:key:z6MkQuar", "secret", false);
+        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&full, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
+        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&full, "did:key:z6MkQuar/secret"));
+        // URL-truncated 8-char prefix slug → prefix-tolerant match.
+        let long = rec("l", "did:key:z6MkQuarLONGKEY", "secret", false);
+        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&long, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
+        // Different name, different owner, and no-slash → no match.
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkQuar/other"));
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkOther/secret"));
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "noslash"));
+    }
+
     // #101: a deny rule must withhold a path that denotes the same characters in
     // a different Unicode normalization form. Without NFC normalization at the
     // matcher seam, an NFC-authored rule byte-compares unequal to an NFD-stored

crates/gl/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gl"
 description = "The gitlawb CLI — identity management, node control, MCP server"
-version = "0.4.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.5.0" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
 
 [dependencies]
 gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
+icaptcha-client = { path = "../icaptcha-client" }
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }

crates/gl/src/doctor.rs

@@ -174,6 +174,19 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
                 "node",
                 format!("{} — v{version} ({short_did}…)", args.node),
             ));
+            // Capability drift: a node newer than this CLI may require features
+            // (RFC 9421 signing, iCaptcha) the CLI doesn't speak.
+            let gl_ver = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
+            if version != "?" && is_newer(version, gl_ver) {
+                checks.push(Check::warn(
+                    "gl version",
+                    format!(
+                        "node is v{version} but gl is v{gl_ver} — your CLI may be missing \
+                         features (signing / iCaptcha) this node requires"
+                    ),
+                    "upgrade gl: curl -sSf https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh",
+                ));
+            }
         }
         Ok(resp) => {
             checks.push(Check::fail(
@@ -191,6 +204,31 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
         }
     }
 
+    // ── 4b. iCaptcha capability ───────────────────────────────────────────
+    // Gated writes (repo create / register / fork) auto-solve a challenge at the
+    // iCaptcha service; check it's reachable so the failure mode is obvious.
+    let icaptcha_url = std::env::var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL")
+        .unwrap_or_else(|_| icaptcha_client::DEFAULT_URL.to_string());
+    match NodeClient::new(&icaptcha_url, None).get("/v1/pubkey").await {
+        Ok(resp) if resp.status().is_success() => {
+            checks.push(Check::pass("iCaptcha", format!("{icaptcha_url} reachable")));
+        }
+        Ok(resp) => {
+            checks.push(Check::warn(
+                "iCaptcha",
+                format!("{icaptcha_url} returned HTTP {}", resp.status()),
+                "gated writes (repo create / register) may fail until iCaptcha is reachable",
+            ));
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            checks.push(Check::warn(
+                "iCaptcha",
+                format!("{icaptcha_url} unreachable: {e}"),
+                "set GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL or check connectivity — repo create / register solve a challenge there",
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
     // ── 5. git-remote-gitlawb helper ──────────────────────────────────────
     // Use PATH lookup only — invoking the binary directly triggers git internals
     // that error with "fatal: not a git repository" outside of a git repo.

crates/gl/src/http.rs

@@ -1,8 +1,19 @@
 //! Signed HTTP client for gitlawb API calls (async).
+//!
+//! Writes are signed with RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures. When the node gates a write
+//! behind iCaptcha (HTTP 403 `icaptcha_proof_required`, advertised via the
+//! `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` headers), the client transparently
+//! solves the challenge and retries the same signed request with the
+//! `x-icaptcha-proof` header — see `crates/icaptcha-client`.
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
 use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+use icaptcha_client::IcaptchaCfg;
+
+/// Max times we'll fetch a fresh proof and retry a 403-iCaptcha response
+/// (absorbs proof expiry / first-seen replay).
+const MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES: usize = 2;
 
 pub struct NodeClient {
     inner: reqwest::Client,
@@ -52,63 +63,116 @@ impl NodeClient {
         req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("GET {url}"))
     }
 
-    /// POST with JSON body + RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth.
+    /// POST with JSON body + RFC 9421 signing + transparent iCaptcha solve/retry.
     pub async fn post(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
-        let mut req = self
-            .inner
-            .post(&url)
-            .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
-            .body(body.to_vec());
-
-        if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
-            let signed = sign_request(kp, "POST", path, body);
-            req = req
-                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
-                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
-                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
-        }
-
-        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("POST {url}"))
+        self.send_signed("POST", path, body).await
     }
 
-    /// PUT with RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth (idempotent write).
+    /// PUT with RFC 9421 signing + transparent iCaptcha solve/retry.
     pub async fn put(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
-        let mut req = self
-            .inner
-            .put(&url)
-            .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
-            .body(body.to_vec());
-
-        if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
-            let signed = sign_request(kp, "PUT", path, body);
-            req = req
-                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
-                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
-                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
-        }
-
-        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("PUT {url}"))
+        self.send_signed("PUT", path, body).await
     }
 
-    /// DELETE with RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth.
+    /// DELETE with RFC 9421 signing + transparent iCaptcha solve/retry.
     pub async fn delete(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
+        self.send_signed("DELETE", path, body).await
+    }
+
+    /// Sign + send a write. On a 403 iCaptcha challenge (detected via the
+    /// `x-icaptcha-*` headers) solve it and retry the same signed request with
+    /// the proof header, up to [`MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES`]. Emits an actionable
+    /// hint on a 401 "not an agent" (the old-CLI / unregistered failure mode).
+    async fn send_signed(
+        &self,
+        method: &str,
+        path: &str,
+        body: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
+        let mut proof: Option<String> = None;
+        let mut attempts = 0;
+        loop {
+            let resp = self.send_once(method, path, body, proof.as_deref()).await?;
+            let status = resp.status();
+
+            if status == reqwest::StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
+                && resp
+                    .headers()
+                    .get("x-gitlawb-error")
+                    .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+                    == Some("human_detected")
+            {
+                eprintln!(
+                    "note: this node requires signed requests (RFC 9421). If writes keep \
+                     failing, your `gl` may be too old — upgrade it — or you're not registered: \
+                     run `gl register`."
+                );
+            }
+
+            if status == reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN && attempts < MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES {
+                if let Some(cfg) = self.icaptcha_cfg(resp.headers())? {
+                    attempts += 1;
+                    proof = Some(obtain_proof(cfg).await?);
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+            return Ok(resp);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Build, sign, and send one request, optionally attaching a proof header.
+    async fn send_once(
+        &self,
+        method: &str,
+        path: &str,
+        body: &[u8],
+        proof: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
         let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
         let mut req = self
             .inner
-            .delete(&url)
+            .request(method.parse().expect("valid HTTP method"), &url)
             .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
             .body(body.to_vec());
 
         if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
-            let signed = sign_request(kp, "DELETE", path, body);
+            let signed = sign_request(kp, method, path, body);
             req = req
                 .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
                 .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
                 .header("Signature", signed.signature);
         }
+        if let Some(p) = proof {
+            req = req.header(icaptcha_client::PROOF_HEADER, p);
+        }
 
-        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("DELETE {url}"))
+        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("{method} {url}"))
+    }
+
+    /// If `headers` describe an iCaptcha 403, build the solve config (binding the
+    /// proof's `sub` to our DID). Returns `None` for a non-iCaptcha 403.
+    fn icaptcha_cfg(&self, headers: &reqwest::header::HeaderMap) -> Result<Option<IcaptchaCfg>> {
+        let url = headers.get("x-icaptcha-url").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
+        let level = headers
+            .get("x-icaptcha-level")
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
+        if url.is_none() && level.is_none() {
+            return Ok(None); // not an iCaptcha challenge
+        }
+        let kp = self
+            .keypair
+            .as_ref()
+            .context("iCaptcha challenge requires an identity keypair (run `gl identity new`)")?;
+        Ok(Some(IcaptchaCfg::new(
+            kp.did().to_string(),
+            url.map(str::to_string),
+            level.and_then(|l| l.parse().ok()),
+        )))
     }
 }
+
+/// Run the (blocking) iCaptcha solve loop off the async runtime.
+async fn obtain_proof(cfg: IcaptchaCfg) -> Result<String> {
+    tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || icaptcha_client::obtain_proof(&cfg, None))
+        .await
+        .context("iCaptcha solver task panicked")?
+}

crates/gl/src/ipfs_cmd.rs

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
 //! Communicates with the gitlawb node to list pinned CIDs and retrieve git
 //! objects by their content-addressed CID.
 
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -21,6 +23,9 @@ pub enum IpfsCmd {
     List {
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Retrieve and display a git object from the node by its CIDv1
     Get {
@@ -33,19 +38,24 @@ pub enum IpfsCmd {
 
 pub async fn run(args: IpfsArgs) -> Result<()> {
     match args.cmd {
-        IpfsCmd::List { node } => cmd_list(node).await,
+        IpfsCmd::List { node, dir } => cmd_list(node, dir).await,
         IpfsCmd::Get { cid, node } => cmd_get(cid, node).await,
     }
 }
 
-async fn cmd_list(node: String) -> Result<()> {
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
-    let resp: Value = client
-        .get("/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-        .await?
-        .json()
-        .await
-        .context("failed to parse pins response")?;
+async fn cmd_list(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
+    // #134 gates /api/v1/ipfs/pins behind auth: sign the request with the
+    // caller's identity. On no identity, propagate load_keypair_from_dir's
+    // error (it already names `gl identity new`) rather than a bare 401.
+    let keypair = crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref())?;
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, Some(keypair));
+    let resp = client.get_signed("/api/v1/ipfs/pins").await?;
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
+        anyhow::bail!("node returned {status} for pins listing: {body}");
+    }
+    let resp: Value = resp.json().await.context("failed to parse pins response")?;
 
     let pins = resp["pins"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
     let count = resp["count"].as_u64().unwrap_or(pins.len() as u64);
@@ -108,3 +118,121 @@ async fn cmd_get(cid: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
 
     Ok(())
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// Seed a keypair into a temp dir the way `load_keypair_from_dir` expects,
+    /// then return the dir handle (keeps it alive for the test's duration).
+    fn seed_keystore() -> tempfile::TempDir {
+        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
+        std::fs::write(
+            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
+            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        dir
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_list_signs_request_and_renders_pins() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let keystore = seed_keystore();
+
+        // Happy path: signed GET to /api/v1/ipfs/pins carrying the RFC 9421
+        // signature headers, node returns a populated pins body.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(
+                r#"{"pins":[{"cid":"bafyone","sha256_hex":"abc123","pinned_at":"2026-07-02T12:00:00.123456Z"}],"count":1}"#,
+            )
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        cmd_list(server.url(), Some(keystore.path().to_path_buf()))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_list_empty_pins() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let keystore = seed_keystore();
+
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"pins":[],"count":0}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        cmd_list(server.url(), Some(keystore.path().to_path_buf()))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_list_no_identity_errors_without_request() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        // Empty keystore dir: no identity.pem present.
+        let empty = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+
+        // The endpoint must never be hit when there is no identity.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .expect(0)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let err = cmd_list(server.url(), Some(empty.path().to_path_buf()))
+            .await
+            .expect_err("no identity should be an error");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("gl identity new")
+                || err.to_string().contains("no identity found"),
+            "error should name `gl identity new`, got: {err}"
+        );
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_list_non_success_status_is_error_not_empty() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let keystore = seed_keystore();
+
+        // A signed request the node rejects (401) must surface as an error,
+        // not be silently parsed into an empty pin list.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(401)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"error":"unauthorized"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let err = cmd_list(server.url(), Some(keystore.path().to_path_buf()))
+            .await
+            .expect_err("non-2xx status should be an error");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("401"),
+            "error should mention the status, got: {err}"
+        );
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+}

crates/gl/src/node.rs

@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@
 
 use anyhow::Result;
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
+use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
 use serde_json::Value;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
+use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 use crate::node_stake;
 
 #[derive(Args)]
@@ -20,6 +22,9 @@ pub enum NodeCmd {
     Status {
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Check trust score for a DID
     Trust {
@@ -121,7 +126,7 @@ pub enum NodeCmd {
 
 pub async fn run(args: NodeArgs) -> Result<()> {
     match args.cmd {
-        NodeCmd::Status { node } => cmd_status(node).await,
+        NodeCmd::Status { node, dir } => cmd_status(node, dir).await,
         NodeCmd::Trust { did, node } => cmd_trust(did, node).await,
         NodeCmd::Resolve { did, node } => cmd_resolve(did, node).await,
         NodeCmd::Register {
@@ -177,7 +182,101 @@ async fn try_get_json(client: &NodeClient, path: &str) -> Option<Value> {
     resp.json::<Value>().await.ok()
 }
 
-async fn cmd_status(node: String) -> Result<()> {
+/// Outcome of fetching the IPFS pins panel for `gl node status`.
+///
+/// #134 gates `/api/v1/ipfs/pins` behind auth, so this panel signs its request
+/// when an identity is available and otherwise reports that the caller must
+/// sign in. A pins failure never aborts the dashboard.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+enum PinsPanel {
+    /// Signed read succeeded and returned pins (carries the resolved count).
+    Pins(u64),
+    /// Signed read succeeded but the node has no pins recorded.
+    Empty,
+    /// Signed read was rejected (401/other) or errored.
+    Unavailable,
+    /// No identity available; no request was issued.
+    NeedsIdentity,
+    /// An explicit `--dir` was given but held no usable identity; carries the dir
+    /// so the panel can name it instead of the misleading "sign in" prompt.
+    IdentityError(PathBuf),
+}
+
+/// Identity resolved for the signed pins read, decided before the request so the
+/// dashboard can distinguish "no identity at all" from "an explicit `--dir` that
+/// could not be loaded".
+enum PinsAuth {
+    /// A usable keypair; the read will be signed.
+    Keyed(Keypair),
+    /// No identity requested and none in the default keystore.
+    Anonymous,
+    /// An explicit `--dir` was given but held no usable identity (carries the dir).
+    DirUnusable(PathBuf),
+}
+
+/// Resolve the pins-panel identity from an optional `--dir`. Mirrors `gl ipfs
+/// list`'s identity selection: an explicit `--dir` that fails to load is reported
+/// as `DirUnusable` (so the panel names the bad path) rather than collapsing to
+/// the misleading "sign in to view"; a missing default keystore (no `--dir`)
+/// degrades quietly to `Anonymous`.
+fn resolve_pins_auth(dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> PinsAuth {
+    match load_keypair_from_dir(dir) {
+        Ok(kp) => PinsAuth::Keyed(kp),
+        Err(_) => match dir {
+            Some(d) => PinsAuth::DirUnusable(d.to_path_buf()),
+            None => PinsAuth::Anonymous,
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+/// Fetch the pins panel state. With a keypair, signs the `/api/v1/ipfs/pins`
+/// read and maps the outcome; with no identity it returns `NeedsIdentity`, and
+/// with an unusable explicit `--dir` it returns `IdentityError` — both without
+/// issuing a request. Injectable (node URL + resolved auth) so tests drive it
+/// with a mock server and never touch the default keystore.
+async fn fetch_pins(node: &str, auth: PinsAuth) -> PinsPanel {
+    let kp = match auth {
+        PinsAuth::Keyed(kp) => kp,
+        PinsAuth::Anonymous => return PinsPanel::NeedsIdentity,
+        PinsAuth::DirUnusable(dir) => return PinsPanel::IdentityError(dir),
+    };
+    let client = NodeClient::new(node, Some(kp));
+    let resp = match client.get_signed("/api/v1/ipfs/pins").await {
+        Ok(r) => r,
+        Err(_) => return PinsPanel::Unavailable,
+    };
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        return PinsPanel::Unavailable;
+    }
+    let Ok(body) = resp.json::<Value>().await else {
+        return PinsPanel::Unavailable;
+    };
+    let count = body["count"]
+        .as_u64()
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| body["pins"].as_array().map(|a| a.len() as u64).unwrap_or(0));
+    if count == 0 {
+        PinsPanel::Empty
+    } else {
+        PinsPanel::Pins(count)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Render the one-line pins-panel status for the `gl node status` dashboard.
+fn pins_status_line(panel: &PinsPanel) -> String {
+    match panel {
+        PinsPanel::Pins(count) => format!("  Pinned CIDs: {count}"),
+        PinsPanel::Empty => "  Pinned CIDs: 0".to_string(),
+        PinsPanel::Unavailable => "  IPFS pins: unavailable".to_string(),
+        PinsPanel::NeedsIdentity => {
+            "  IPFS pins: sign in to view (run `gl identity new`)".to_string()
+        }
+        PinsPanel::IdentityError(dir) => {
+            format!("  IPFS pins: no usable identity in {}", dir.display())
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+async fn cmd_status(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
     let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
 
     // ── Fetch node info (required — bail if unreachable) ──────────────────
@@ -194,13 +293,21 @@ async fn cmd_status(node: String) -> Result<()> {
     let version = info["version"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown");
     let network = info["network"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown");
 
+    // The pins panel signs its read (#134 gates /api/v1/ipfs/pins behind auth).
+    // `--dir` selects the same identity directory as `gl ipfs list` (#146); an
+    // explicit --dir that can't be loaded is surfaced in the panel rather than
+    // masquerading as "no identity", while a missing default keystore degrades
+    // quietly. A pins failure never aborts the dashboard.
+    let pins_auth = resolve_pins_auth(dir.as_deref());
+
     // ── Fetch remaining endpoints in parallel ─────────────────────────────
-    let (peers_val, repos_val, p2p_val, events_val, pins_val) = tokio::join!(
+    // Peers/repos/p2p/events stay anonymous; only pins is signed.
+    let (peers_val, repos_val, p2p_val, events_val, pins_panel) = tokio::join!(
         try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/peers"),
         try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/repos"),
         try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/p2p/info"),
         try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/events/ref-updates?limit=5"),
-        try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/ipfs/pins"),
+        fetch_pins(&node, pins_auth),
     );
 
     // ── Render dashboard ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -307,14 +414,7 @@ async fn cmd_status(node: String) -> Result<()> {
 
     // Pins
     println!("Pins");
-    if let Some(ref pins) = pins_val {
-        let count = pins["count"]
-            .as_u64()
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| pins["pins"].as_array().map(|a| a.len() as u64).unwrap_or(0));
-        println!("  Pinned CIDs: {count}");
-    } else {
-        println!("  IPFS not configured");
-    }
+    println!("{}", pins_status_line(&pins_panel));
     println!();
 
     Ok(())
@@ -409,3 +509,270 @@ async fn cmd_resolve(did: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
 
     Ok(())
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_keyed_happy_signs_and_returns_pins() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+
+        // A keyed fetch must sign the request (RFC 9421 headers) and, on a
+        // populated 200 body, land in the Pins state carrying the pins.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(
+                r#"{"pins":[{"cid":"bafyone","sha256_hex":"abc123","pinned_at":"2026-07-02T12:00:00Z"}],"count":1}"#,
+            )
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
+        match panel {
+            PinsPanel::Pins(count) => assert_eq!(count, 1),
+            other => panic!("expected Pins, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_keyed_empty_returns_empty() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"pins":[],"count":0}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::Empty),
+            "expected Empty, got {panel:?}"
+        );
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_keyed_rejected_returns_unavailable() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+
+        // Node rejects the signed read (401): the panel must degrade to
+        // Unavailable without panicking, so cmd_status still completes.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(401)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"error":"unauthorized"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::Unavailable),
+            "expected Unavailable, got {panel:?}"
+        );
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_unkeyed_needs_identity_without_request() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+
+        // With no keypair the endpoint must never be hit.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .expect(0)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Anonymous).await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::NeedsIdentity),
+            "expected NeedsIdentity, got {panel:?}"
+        );
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_malformed_body_returns_unavailable() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+
+        // 2xx but the body is not valid JSON: must degrade to Unavailable,
+        // never panic.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body("not json{{{")
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::Unavailable),
+            "malformed body -> Unavailable, got {panel:?}"
+        );
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_transport_error_returns_unavailable() {
+        // Bind then drop to obtain a definitely-closed port -> connection
+        // refused -> get_signed Err -> Unavailable (no panic).
+        let port = {
+            let l = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+            l.local_addr().unwrap().port()
+        };
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}"), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::Unavailable),
+            "transport error -> Unavailable, got {panel:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_pins_status_line_renders_each_state() {
+        assert_eq!(pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::Pins(3)), "  Pinned CIDs: 3");
+        assert_eq!(pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::Empty), "  Pinned CIDs: 0");
+        assert_eq!(
+            pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::Unavailable),
+            "  IPFS pins: unavailable"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::NeedsIdentity),
+            "  IPFS pins: sign in to view (run `gl identity new`)"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::IdentityError(PathBuf::from("/tmp/id"))),
+            "  IPFS pins: no usable identity in /tmp/id"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // Adversarial follow-up to jatmn #146 P2: an explicit `--dir` that holds no
+    // usable identity must resolve to DirUnusable (which names the path), NOT the
+    // Anonymous "sign in to view / run `gl identity new`" case — otherwise a user
+    // who did supply an identity dir is misdirected to create one they may have.
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_pins_auth_reports_explicit_bad_dir_as_unusable() {
+        let bad = PathBuf::from("/nonexistent/gl-id-xyz");
+        match resolve_pins_auth(Some(&bad)) {
+            PinsAuth::DirUnusable(d) => assert_eq!(d, bad),
+            _ => panic!("explicit unusable --dir must be DirUnusable, not Anonymous"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Mirror of the above for the absent-`--dir` case: `None` must never resolve to
+    // DirUnusable — it degrades to Anonymous (no default keystore) or Keyed (one
+    // present). Env-independent: only the None->DirUnusable mapping is guarded, so it
+    // holds whether or not the runner has a default `~/.gitlawb` identity.
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_pins_auth_none_is_never_dir_unusable() {
+        assert!(
+            !matches!(resolve_pins_auth(None), PinsAuth::DirUnusable(_)),
+            "absent --dir must degrade to Anonymous (or Keyed), never DirUnusable"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // The success wiring for #146: an explicit --dir with a valid identity must
+    // load that key (dir -> load_keypair_from_dir -> Keyed), so the pins read is
+    // signed with the selected identity rather than the default keystore.
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_pins_auth_loads_keyed_identity_from_explicit_dir() {
+        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        std::fs::write(
+            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
+            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let PinsAuth::Keyed(loaded) = resolve_pins_auth(Some(dir.path())) else {
+            panic!("an explicit --dir with a valid identity must resolve to Keyed");
+        };
+        // A bare `Keyed(_)` match would also pass if load fell through to the default
+        // keystore; assert the loaded identity is the one written to --dir so the pins
+        // read signs with the selected key, never the default.
+        assert_eq!(
+            loaded.did(),
+            kp.did(),
+            "must sign with the identity from --dir, not the default keystore"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_dir_unusable_reports_identity_error_without_request() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        // An unusable explicit --dir must render the identity error and never hit
+        // the endpoint (no identity to sign with).
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .expect(0)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let bad = PathBuf::from("/nonexistent/gl-id-xyz");
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::DirUnusable(bad.clone())).await;
+        match panel {
+            PinsPanel::IdentityError(d) => assert_eq!(d, bad),
+            other => panic!("expected IdentityError, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    // jatmn #146 P2: `gl node status` must accept the same `--dir` identity
+    // selector as `gl ipfs list`, so a user who selected an identity via --dir can
+    // authenticate the status pins panel instead of seeing "sign in to view".
+    #[test]
+    fn status_accepts_dir_identity_selector() {
+        use clap::Parser;
+        #[derive(Parser)]
+        struct TestCli {
+            #[command(flatten)]
+            args: NodeArgs,
+        }
+        let cli = TestCli::try_parse_from([
+            "gl",
+            "status",
+            "--node",
+            "http://example",
+            "--dir",
+            "/tmp/id",
+        ])
+        .expect("`node status` must accept --dir");
+        let NodeCmd::Status { dir, .. } = cli.args.cmd else {
+            panic!("expected the Status subcommand");
+        };
+        assert_eq!(dir, Some(PathBuf::from("/tmp/id")));
+
+        // Absent --dir must stay None so the default keystore path is unchanged.
+        let cli = TestCli::try_parse_from(["gl", "status"]).expect("status parses without --dir");
+        let NodeCmd::Status { dir, .. } = cli.args.cmd else {
+            panic!("expected the Status subcommand");
+        };
+        assert_eq!(dir, None);
+    }
+}

crates/gl/src/repo.rs

@@ -208,20 +208,16 @@ pub async fn run(args: RepoArgs) -> Result<()> {
 }
 
 /// Derive the short DID key segment from a keypair, or fall back to the node's DID.
-async fn resolve_owner_did(node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<String> {
-    if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(dir) {
-        let did = kp.did().to_string();
-        return Ok(did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string());
-    }
-    let client = NodeClient::new(node, None);
-    let info: Value = client
-        .get("/")
-        .await?
-        .json()
-        .await
-        .context("failed to fetch node info")?;
-    let did = info["did"].as_str().context("node missing DID")?;
-    Ok(did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(did).to_string())
+/// Resolve the owner short-DID for a bare repo name from the LOCAL identity.
+/// Never falls back to the node's own DID (that produced bogus "owned by the
+/// node" results for repos that don't exist) — if there's no local identity the
+/// caller must pass an explicit `owner/name`.
+async fn resolve_owner_did(_node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<String> {
+    let kp = load_keypair_from_dir(dir).context(
+        "no local identity to resolve the repo owner — pass `owner/name`, or run `gl identity new`",
+    )?;
+    let did = kp.did().to_string();
+    Ok(did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string())
 }
 
 async fn cmd_create(
@@ -306,25 +302,28 @@ async fn cmd_list(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
 }
 
 async fn cmd_clone(name: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
-    let did = if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref()) {
-        kp.did().to_string()
+    // Owner is taken from an explicit `owner/name`, else the LOCAL identity —
+    // never the node's own DID. A missing repo then surfaces as the helper's
+    // clear 404 rather than a clone under an invented owner.
+    let (did, repo_name) = if let Some((owner, rest)) = name.split_once('/') {
+        (owner.to_string(), rest.to_string())
     } else {
-        let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
-        let info: Value = client.get("/").await?.json().await?;
-        info["did"]
-            .as_str()
-            .context("node missing DID")?
-            .to_string()
+        // Bare name: derive the SHORT owner key via the same helper the other
+        // commands use, so the URL is `gitlawb://z6Mk.../name` — not the full
+        // `did:key:z6Mk...` form, whose colons in the authority break the helper.
+        (resolve_owner_did(&node, dir.as_deref()).await?, name)
     };
-    let url = format!("gitlawb://{did}/{name}");
+    let url = format!("gitlawb://{did}/{repo_name}");
     println!("  cloning {url}");
     let status = std::process::Command::new("git")
         .arg("clone")
         .arg(&url)
+        // Point the remote helper at the same node the user selected.
+        .env("GITLAWB_NODE", &node)
         .status()
         .context("failed to run git clone — is git installed?")?;
     if !status.success() {
-        anyhow::bail!("git clone failed");
+        anyhow::bail!("git clone failed — does the repo exist on this node?");
     }
     Ok(())
 }
@@ -340,12 +339,24 @@ async fn cmd_info(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()
         (short, repo)
     };
 
-    let r: Value = client
-        .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}"))
-        .await?
-        .json()
-        .await
-        .context("repo not found")?;
+    let resp = client.get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}")).await?;
+    // A non-existent (or unreadable/quarantined) repo is a real 404 from the
+    // node — surface it plainly instead of printing a stub card with `?` fields
+    // and a placeholder owner DID.
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        if resp.status().as_u16() == 404 {
+            anyhow::bail!("repository '{owner}/{name}' not found");
+        }
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let msg = resp
+            .json::<Value>()
+            .await
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|v| v["message"].as_str().map(String::from))
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| "request failed".to_string());
+        anyhow::bail!("repo info failed ({status}): {msg}");
+    }
+    let r: Value = resp.json().await.context("parse repo info")?;
 
     let owner_did = r["owner_did"].as_str().unwrap_or(&owner);
     let gitlawb_url = format!("gitlawb://{owner_did}/{name}");

crates/icaptcha-client/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+[package]
+name = "icaptcha-client"
+version = "0.4.0" # x-release-please-version
+edition.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+repository.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
+reqwest = { workspace = true }
+serde = { workspace = true }
+serde_json = { workspace = true }
+anyhow = { workspace = true }
+thiserror = { workspace = true }
+tracing = { workspace = true }

crates/icaptcha-client/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
+//! Client for the iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence service.
+//!
+//! The node gates spam-prone writes (repo create / fork / register) behind an
+//! iCaptcha proof. This crate implements the *sanctioned client flow*: on a
+//! `403 icaptcha_proof_required`, request a challenge for the required level,
+//! solve the deterministic computational types locally, obtain the signed
+//! proof, and hand it back so the caller can retry the original signed request
+//! with the `x-icaptcha-proof` header.
+//!
+//! `requesterId` is always the caller's DID, so the proof's `sub` claim matches
+//! the authenticated signer (the node enforces `sub == authenticated DID`).
+//!
+//! Blocking HTTP (reqwest::blocking) so the git remote helper can use it
+//! directly; `gl` (async) calls it via `tokio::task::spawn_blocking`.
+
+use std::io::Read;
+
+use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use serde_json::json;
+
+pub mod solvers;
+
+/// Default iCaptcha service base URL (used when the node doesn't advertise one).
+pub const DEFAULT_URL: &str = "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com";
+/// Default required level (the node's default floor).
+pub const DEFAULT_LEVEL: u32 = 3;
+/// Header the gated write must echo the proof back in.
+pub const PROOF_HEADER: &str = "x-icaptcha-proof";
+
+/// Cap on bytes read from an error response, and characters kept in the excerpt.
+/// The iCaptcha origin is only as trusted as the node that advertised it (a MITM
+/// on the default transport qualifies), so its error bodies are attacker-
+/// influenceable bytes that reach the TTY — they must be bounded and stripped of
+/// control characters before printing (CWE-150, same treatment as #137).
+const MAX_ERR_BYTES: u64 = 4096;
+const MAX_ERR_CHARS: usize = 500;
+
+/// Read a bounded error body and return a control-char-stripped, length-capped
+/// single-line excerpt safe to print to a terminal.
+fn error_excerpt(resp: reqwest::blocking::Response) -> String {
+    let mut buf = Vec::new();
+    if resp.take(MAX_ERR_BYTES).read_to_end(&mut buf).is_err() {
+        return String::new();
+    }
+    sanitize_excerpt(&String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf))
+}
+
+/// Strip C0/C1 control characters, collapse whitespace runs to single spaces,
+/// and cap the length — so a hostile response body cannot inject terminal
+/// escapes or flood the TTY.
+fn sanitize_excerpt(s: &str) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::new();
+    let mut pending_space = false;
+    let mut kept = 0;
+    for ch in s.trim().chars() {
+        if kept >= MAX_ERR_CHARS {
+            break;
+        }
+        if ch.is_control() {
+            if matches!(ch, '\n' | '\r' | '\t') {
+                pending_space = true;
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+        if ch.is_whitespace() {
+            pending_space = true;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if pending_space && !out.is_empty() {
+            out.push(' ');
+            kept += 1;
+            if kept >= MAX_ERR_CHARS {
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        out.push(ch);
+        kept += 1;
+        pending_space = false;
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+/// Whether `u` parses as an `https` URL.
+fn is_https(u: &str) -> bool {
+    reqwest::Url::parse(u)
+        .map(|p| p.scheme() == "https")
+        .unwrap_or(false)
+}
+
+/// Lowercased host of a URL, if it parses and has one.
+fn host_of(u: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    reqwest::Url::parse(u)
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|p| p.host_str().map(|h| h.to_ascii_lowercase()))
+}
+
+/// Decide which iCaptcha origin to actually talk to, and whether it is trusted
+/// enough to receive the operator's API key.
+///
+/// The node-advertised `x-icaptcha-url` is untrusted: a hostile node could point
+/// it at an attacker origin (client-side SSRF) or capture a bearer token on the
+/// first hop. So an advertised URL is honored only when it is `https` AND its
+/// host is allowlisted — the public default host, or the operator's own
+/// `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL`. Otherwise we fall back to the operator/default origin.
+///
+/// The API key is attached only when the resolved origin is the operator's
+/// explicitly-configured host (never a node-discovered one), so a key is never
+/// exfiltrated to an origin the operator did not choose.
+fn resolve_solver_url(advertised: Option<&str>, operator: Option<&str>) -> (String, bool) {
+    let operator = operator.filter(|u| is_https(u));
+    let operator_host = operator.and_then(host_of);
+    let default_host = host_of(DEFAULT_URL);
+
+    let allowed = |host: &Option<String>| -> bool {
+        host.as_ref()
+            .map(|h| Some(h) == default_host.as_ref() || Some(h) == operator_host.as_ref())
+            .unwrap_or(false)
+    };
+
+    let fallback = || {
+        operator
+            .map(String::from)
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| DEFAULT_URL.to_string())
+    };
+
+    let chosen = match advertised {
+        Some(a) if is_https(a) && allowed(&host_of(a)) => a.to_string(),
+        Some(a) => {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                advertised = %a,
+                "ignoring iCaptcha URL advertised by node (must be https with an allowlisted host); using trusted origin"
+            );
+            fallback()
+        }
+        None => fallback(),
+    };
+
+    // Key goes only to the operator's own configured origin.
+    let key_trusted = operator_host.is_some() && host_of(&chosen) == operator_host;
+    (chosen, key_trusted)
+}
+
+/// Computational challenge types this client solves locally. Restricting the
+/// request to these avoids dictionary (anagram/logic) and LLM (wordproblem/
+/// riddle) types, which can't be auto-solved.
+const SOLVABLE_TYPES: [&str; 3] = ["arithmetic", "algebra", "sequence"];
+
+/// Bound on challenge/answer rounds (the service escalates difficulty on a miss;
+/// correct solvers shouldn't escalate, but cap it regardless).
+const MAX_ROUNDS: usize = 8;
+
+/// Where + at what level to solve. `did` becomes the proof's `sub`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct IcaptchaCfg {
+    pub url: String,
+    pub did: String,
+    pub level: u32,
+    /// Optional bearer token for an API-key-protected iCaptcha deployment.
+    pub api_key: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl IcaptchaCfg {
+    /// Build config from the caller DID plus an optionally node-advertised
+    /// url/level (e.g. the `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` headers) and
+    /// optional level.
+    ///
+    /// The advertised URL is validated and allowlisted (see [`resolve_solver_url`])
+    /// so a hostile node cannot redirect the solve to an attacker origin. The
+    /// `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY` bearer token is attached only when the resolved
+    /// origin is the operator's own `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL`, never a
+    /// node-discovered one.
+    pub fn new(did: impl Into<String>, url: Option<String>, level: Option<u32>) -> Self {
+        let operator = std::env::var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL")
+            .ok()
+            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty());
+        let (resolved_url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(url.as_deref(), operator.as_deref());
+        let api_key = if key_trusted {
+            std::env::var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY")
+                .ok()
+                .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        } else {
+            None
+        };
+        Self {
+            url: resolved_url,
+            did: did.into(),
+            level: level.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_LEVEL),
+            api_key,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// A challenge handed back by the service (mirrors `icaptcha` `Challenge`).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct Challenge {
+    pub challenge_id: String,
+    #[serde(rename = "type")]
+    pub kind: String,
+    pub difficulty: u32,
+    pub prompt: String,
+    pub token: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(tag = "status", rename_all = "lowercase")]
+enum AnswerResult {
+    Passed { proof: String },
+    Continue { challenge: Challenge },
+    Failed { reason: String },
+}
+
+/// Solver callback for types this crate can't solve deterministically.
+pub type Solver<'a> = dyn Fn(&Challenge) -> Option<String> + 'a;
+
+/// Run the full challenge → solve → answer loop and return a fresh proof token.
+///
+/// `solver` is consulted for challenge types the built-in solvers don't handle
+/// (anagram/logic/LLM); pass `None` to fall back to an interactive stdin prompt.
+pub fn obtain_proof(cfg: &IcaptchaCfg, solver: Option<&Solver>) -> Result<String> {
+    let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::builder()
+        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30))
+        .build()
+        .context("build iCaptcha http client")?;
+
+    let mut challenge = request_challenge(&client, cfg)?;
+    for _ in 0..MAX_ROUNDS {
+        let answer = solvers::solve(&challenge.kind, &challenge.prompt)
+            .or_else(|| solver.and_then(|s| s(&challenge)))
+            .or_else(|| interactive_prompt(&challenge))
+            .ok_or_else(|| {
+                anyhow!(
+                    "cannot solve iCaptcha challenge type '{}' automatically; \
+                     set GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY/solver or solve interactively",
+                    challenge.kind
+                )
+            })?;
+
+        match submit_answer(&client, cfg, &challenge.token, &answer)? {
+            AnswerResult::Passed { proof } => return Ok(proof),
+            AnswerResult::Continue { challenge: next } => challenge = next,
+            AnswerResult::Failed { reason } => {
+                bail!("iCaptcha challenge failed: {}", sanitize_excerpt(&reason))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    bail!("iCaptcha not solved within {MAX_ROUNDS} rounds")
+}
+
+fn request_challenge(client: &reqwest::blocking::Client, cfg: &IcaptchaCfg) -> Result<Challenge> {
+    let url = format!("{}/v1/challenge", cfg.url.trim_end_matches('/'));
+    let body = json!({
+        "requesterId": cfg.did,
+        "requiredLevel": cfg.level,
+        "types": SOLVABLE_TYPES,
+    });
+    let mut req = client.post(&url).json(&body);
+    if let Some(key) = &cfg.api_key {
+        req = req.bearer_auth(key);
+    }
+    let resp = req.send().with_context(|| format!("POST {url}"))?;
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let text = error_excerpt(resp);
+        bail!("iCaptcha challenge request failed ({status}): {text}");
+    }
+    resp.json::<Challenge>().context("parse iCaptcha challenge")
+}
+
+fn submit_answer(
+    client: &reqwest::blocking::Client,
+    cfg: &IcaptchaCfg,
+    token: &str,
+    answer: &str,
+) -> Result<AnswerResult> {
+    let url = format!("{}/v1/answer", cfg.url.trim_end_matches('/'));
+    let mut req = client
+        .post(&url)
+        .json(&json!({ "token": token, "answer": answer }));
+    if let Some(key) = &cfg.api_key {
+        req = req.bearer_auth(key);
+    }
+    let resp = req.send().with_context(|| format!("POST {url}"))?;
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let text = error_excerpt(resp);
+        bail!("iCaptcha answer request failed ({status}): {text}");
+    }
+    resp.json::<AnswerResult>()
+        .context("parse iCaptcha answer result")
+}
+
+/// Last-resort fallback: show the prompt and read an answer from the terminal.
+/// Returns `None` when stdin isn't a usable interactive source (e.g. an agent),
+/// so the caller surfaces a clear "couldn't auto-solve" error instead.
+fn interactive_prompt(challenge: &Challenge) -> Option<String> {
+    use std::io::{stderr, stdin, Write};
+    let mut err = stderr();
+    let _ = writeln!(
+        err,
+        "iCaptcha challenge ({}, level {}): {}\nAnswer: ",
+        challenge.kind, challenge.difficulty, challenge.prompt
+    );
+    let _ = err.flush();
+    let mut line = String::new();
+    match stdin().read_line(&mut line) {
+        Ok(0) | Err(_) => None,
+        Ok(_) => {
+            let a = line.trim().to_string();
+            if a.is_empty() {
+                None
+            } else {
+                Some(a)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    // ── P1: hostile error bodies must not reach the terminal raw ──────────
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_strips_control_chars_and_escapes() {
+        // ESC-based terminal escape + NUL + bell must all be removed.
+        let hostile = "\x1b[2J\x1b[31mowned\x07\0 done";
+        let clean = sanitize_excerpt(hostile);
+        assert!(!clean.contains('\x1b'), "ESC survived: {clean:?}");
+        assert!(
+            !clean.chars().any(|c| c.is_control()),
+            "control survived: {clean:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(clean.contains("owned") && clean.contains("done"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_collapses_whitespace_and_caps_length() {
+        let collapsed = sanitize_excerpt("a\n\n\t  b");
+        assert_eq!(collapsed, "a b");
+        let long = "x".repeat(MAX_ERR_CHARS + 500);
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_excerpt(&long).chars().count(), MAX_ERR_CHARS);
+    }
+
+    // ── P2: never talk to (or hand a key to) an untrusted node-chosen URL ──
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_non_https_advertised_url() {
+        // A plaintext node-advertised URL is ignored; we fall back to default.
+        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(Some("http://evil.example/x"), None);
+        assert_eq!(url, DEFAULT_URL);
+        assert!(!key_trusted);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_https_url_with_non_allowlisted_host() {
+        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(Some("https://evil.example"), None);
+        assert_eq!(url, DEFAULT_URL, "attacker host must not be honored");
+        assert!(!key_trusted);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn honors_advertised_default_host_but_withholds_key_without_operator() {
+        // Default public host is allowlisted for talking, but with no operator
+        // origin configured the API key has no trusted destination.
+        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(Some("https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com/v2"), None);
+        assert_eq!(url, "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com/v2");
+        assert!(!key_trusted);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn key_trusted_only_for_operator_configured_origin() {
+        let op = "https://icap.mynode.example";
+        // Node advertises the operator's own origin → talk there, key allowed.
+        let (url, key_trusted) =
+            resolve_solver_url(Some("https://icap.mynode.example/v1"), Some(op));
+        assert_eq!(url, "https://icap.mynode.example/v1");
+        assert!(key_trusted);
+
+        // Node advertises an attacker origin while an operator is configured →
+        // ignore the advert, fall back to the operator origin, key stays with it.
+        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(Some("https://evil.example"), Some(op));
+        assert_eq!(url, op);
+        assert!(key_trusted);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_advert_uses_operator_or_default() {
+        let op = "https://icap.mynode.example";
+        assert_eq!(resolve_solver_url(None, Some(op)), (op.to_string(), true));
+        assert_eq!(
+            resolve_solver_url(None, None),
+            (DEFAULT_URL.to_string(), false)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn non_https_operator_is_not_trusted() {
+        // A misconfigured plaintext operator URL is not a valid key destination.
+        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(None, Some("http://icap.mynode.example"));
+        assert_eq!(url, DEFAULT_URL);
+        assert!(!key_trusted);
+    }
+}

crates/icaptcha-client/src/solvers.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+//! Deterministic solvers for the computational iCaptcha challenge types.
+//!
+//! Prompt/answer formats mirror the iCaptcha service generators
+//! (`icaptcha/src/generators/{arithmetic,algebra,sequence}.ts`). The service
+//! grades numerics by value (`Number(a) === Number(b)`), so returning the plain
+//! integer string is sufficient. Anagram/logic (need a dictionary/parser) and
+//! the LLM types are intentionally NOT solved here — the client requests only
+//! these three types and falls back to a hook/interactive prompt otherwise.
+
+/// Solve a challenge of the given `type` from its prompt. Returns `None` for
+/// types we don't solve locally or when the prompt can't be parsed.
+pub fn solve(challenge_type: &str, prompt: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    match challenge_type {
+        "arithmetic" => solve_arithmetic(prompt).map(|n| n.to_string()),
+        "algebra" => solve_algebra(prompt).map(|n| n.to_string()),
+        "sequence" => solve_sequence(prompt).map(|n| n.to_string()),
+        _ => None,
+    }
+}
+
+/// `What is 12 + 7 - 3?` -> evaluate the additive chain left to right.
+fn solve_arithmetic(prompt: &str) -> Option<i64> {
+    let expr = prompt
+        .trim()
+        .strip_prefix("What is ")?
+        .trim_end_matches('?')
+        .trim();
+    let mut tokens = expr.split_whitespace();
+    let mut acc: i64 = tokens.next()?.parse().ok()?;
+    while let Some(op) = tokens.next() {
+        let n: i64 = tokens.next()?.parse().ok()?;
+        match op {
+            "+" => acc += n,
+            "-" => acc -= n,
+            _ => return None,
+        }
+    }
+    Some(acc)
+}
+
+/// `Solve for x: 3x + 4 = 19` (and the `=`-both-sides and `a(x + b)` variants).
+/// Parses each side into `coeff*x + const`, then x = (cR - cL) / (aL - aR).
+fn solve_algebra(prompt: &str) -> Option<i64> {
+    let eq = prompt.trim().strip_prefix("Solve for x:")?.trim();
+    let (lhs, rhs) = eq.split_once('=')?;
+    let (al, cl) = parse_linear(lhs.trim())?;
+    let (ar, cr) = parse_linear(rhs.trim())?;
+    let denom = al - ar;
+    if denom == 0 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let num = cr - cl;
+    if num % denom != 0 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some(num / denom)
+}
+
+/// Parse a linear expression in `x` into `(coeff_of_x, constant)`.
+/// Handles `Nx`, `x`, integer constants, and a single `N(x ± M)` product,
+/// with `+`/`-` separators (the formats the generator emits).
+fn parse_linear(s: &str) -> Option<(i64, i64)> {
+    let s = s.trim();
+    // Parenthesized product: a(x ± b)  ->  coeff a, const a*(±b).
+    if let Some(open) = s.find('(') {
+        let a: i64 = s[..open].trim().parse().ok()?;
+        let close = s.find(')')?;
+        let inner = &s[open + 1..close]; // "x + 4" / "x - 4"
+        let mut it = inner.split_whitespace();
+        if it.next()? != "x" {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let (coeff_inner, const_inner) = match it.next() {
+            None => (1, 0),
+            Some(op) => {
+                let m: i64 = it.next()?.parse().ok()?;
+                match op {
+                    "+" => (1, m),
+                    "-" => (1, -m),
+                    _ => return None,
+                }
+            }
+        };
+        return Some((a * coeff_inner, a * const_inner));
+    }
+
+    // Sum of `±`-separated terms.
+    let mut coeff = 0i64;
+    let mut konst = 0i64;
+    let mut sign = 1i64;
+    for tok in s.split_whitespace() {
+        match tok {
+            "+" => sign = 1,
+            "-" => sign = -1,
+            t => {
+                if let Some(cpart) = t.strip_suffix('x') {
+                    let c: i64 = match cpart {
+                        "" | "+" => 1,
+                        "-" => -1,
+                        _ => cpart.parse().ok()?,
+                    };
+                    coeff += sign * c;
+                } else {
+                    let n: i64 = t.parse().ok()?;
+                    konst += sign * n;
+                }
+                sign = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Some((coeff, konst))
+}
+
+/// `What is the next number in this sequence? 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, ?`
+fn solve_sequence(prompt: &str) -> Option<i64> {
+    let tail = prompt.split_once("sequence?")?.1;
+    let nums: Vec<i64> = tail
+        .split(',')
+        .filter_map(|t| t.trim().parse::<i64>().ok())
+        .collect();
+    if nums.len() < 3 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    next_in_sequence(&nums)
+}
+
+fn next_in_sequence(n: &[i64]) -> Option<i64> {
+    let last = *n.last()?;
+
+    // Arithmetic: constant first difference.
+    let d = n[1] - n[0];
+    if n.windows(2).all(|w| w[1] - w[0] == d) {
+        return Some(last + d);
+    }
+
+    // Geometric: constant integer ratio.
+    if n.iter().all(|&v| v != 0) && n[0] != 0 && n[1] % n[0] == 0 {
+        let r = n[1] / n[0];
+        if r != 0 && n.windows(2).all(|w| w[1] == w[0] * r) {
+            return Some(last * r);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Fibonacci-like: each term is the sum of the two before it.
+    if n.len() >= 3 && (2..n.len()).all(|i| n[i] == n[i - 1] + n[i - 2]) {
+        return Some(n[n.len() - 1] + n[n.len() - 2]);
+    }
+
+    // Squares: all perfect squares with consecutive roots.
+    let roots: Option<Vec<i64>> = n.iter().map(|&v| isqrt_exact(v)).collect();
+    if let Some(roots) = roots {
+        if roots.windows(2).all(|w| w[1] == w[0] + 1) {
+            let nr = roots[roots.len() - 1] + 1;
+            return Some(nr * nr);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Alternating sign over an arithmetic magnitude (generator starts positive).
+    let signs_alternate = n
+        .iter()
+        .enumerate()
+        .all(|(i, &v)| if i % 2 == 0 { v >= 0 } else { v < 0 });
+    let mags: Vec<i64> = n.iter().map(|v| v.abs()).collect();
+    let md = mags[1] - mags[0];
+    if signs_alternate && mags.windows(2).all(|w| w[1] - w[0] == md) {
+        let next_mag = mags[mags.len() - 1] + md;
+        let next_sign = if last >= 0 { -1 } else { 1 };
+        return Some(next_sign * next_mag);
+    }
+
+    None
+}
+
+/// Exact integer square root, or `None` if `v` isn't a perfect square.
+fn isqrt_exact(v: i64) -> Option<i64> {
+    if v < 0 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let r = (v as f64).sqrt().round() as i64;
+    [r - 1, r, r + 1]
+        .into_iter()
+        .find(|&cand| cand >= 0 && cand * cand == v)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn arithmetic_chains() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("arithmetic", "What is 12 + 7 - 3?").as_deref(),
+            Some("16")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(solve("arithmetic", "What is 5?").as_deref(), Some("5"));
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("arithmetic", "What is 100 - 40 - 35 + 2?").as_deref(),
+            Some("27")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn algebra_linear() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 3x + 4 = 19").as_deref(),
+            Some("5")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 5x - 8 = 12").as_deref(),
+            Some("4")
+        );
+        // both sides: 2x + 16 = 5x - 8  -> 3x = 24 -> x=8
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 2x + 16 = 5x - 8").as_deref(),
+            Some("8")
+        );
+        // parenthesized: 3(x - 4) = 9 -> x-4=3 -> x=7
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 3(x - 4) = 9").as_deref(),
+            Some("7")
+        );
+        // negative solution: 2x + 10 = 4  -> x=-3
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 2x + 10 = 4").as_deref(),
+            Some("-3")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sequence_patterns() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve(
+                "sequence",
+                "What is the next number in this sequence? 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, ?"
+            )
+            .as_deref(),
+            Some("12")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve(
+                "sequence",
+                "What is the next number in this sequence? 3, 6, 12, 24, 48, ?"
+            )
+            .as_deref(),
+            Some("96")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve(
+                "sequence",
+                "What is the next number in this sequence? 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, ?"
+            )
+            .as_deref(),
+            Some("36")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve(
+                "sequence",
+                "What is the next number in this sequence? 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, ?"
+            )
+            .as_deref(),
+            Some("8")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unsupported_types_return_none() {
+        assert_eq!(solve("anagram", "Unscramble: tca"), None);
+        assert_eq!(solve("riddle", "What has keys but no locks?"), None);
+    }
+}

infra/aws/compose.yaml.tftpl

@@ -58,6 +58,16 @@ services:
       GITLAWB_P2P_PORT: "${p2p_port}"
       GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR: /data/repos
       GITLAWB_KEY: /data/keys/identity.pem
+      # Only trust X-Forwarded-For when the Caddy sidecar above is actually
+      # deployed (domain_name != ""). Caddy appends the real client as the
+      # rightmost hop, letting the push rate limiter key on the true client IP
+      # rather than Caddy's container address. Without Caddy, this header is
+      # fully client-controlled and must not be trusted.
+      GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY: "${domain_name != "" ? "x-forwarded-for" : ""}"
+      # iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate (spam protection on create/fork/register)
+      ICAPTCHA_MODE: ${icaptcha_mode}
+      ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY: ${icaptcha_pubkey}
+      ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL: "${icaptcha_required_level}"
       GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL: $${GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL}
       GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS: $${GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS}
       GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC: $${GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC}

infra/aws/main.tf

@@ -290,16 +290,19 @@ locals {
   )
 
   compose_yaml = templatefile("${path.module}/compose.yaml.tftpl", {
-    image_repo     = local.image_repo
-    image_tag      = var.image_tag
-    domain_name    = var.domain_name
-    db_host        = var.use_rds ? aws_db_instance.node[0].address : ""
-    gitlawb_port   = var.gitlawb_port
-    p2p_port       = var.gitlawb_p2p_port
-    metrics_port   = var.metrics_port
-    expose_metrics = local.expose_metrics
-    pg_user        = var.postgres_user
-    pg_db          = var.postgres_db
+    image_repo              = local.image_repo
+    image_tag               = var.image_tag
+    domain_name             = var.domain_name
+    db_host                 = var.use_rds ? aws_db_instance.node[0].address : ""
+    gitlawb_port            = var.gitlawb_port
+    p2p_port                = var.gitlawb_p2p_port
+    metrics_port            = var.metrics_port
+    expose_metrics          = local.expose_metrics
+    pg_user                 = var.postgres_user
+    pg_db                   = var.postgres_db
+    icaptcha_mode           = var.icaptcha_mode
+    icaptcha_pubkey         = var.icaptcha_pubkey
+    icaptcha_required_level = var.icaptcha_required_level
   })
 
   user_data = templatefile("${path.module}/user-data.sh.tftpl", {

infra/aws/variables.tf

@@ -81,6 +81,28 @@ variable "image_tag" {
   default     = "latest"
 }
 
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate (spam protection on writes)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+variable "icaptcha_mode" {
+  description = "iCaptcha gate mode: off | shadow | enforce. The live gitlawb network enforces."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "enforce"
+}
+
+variable "icaptcha_pubkey" {
+  description = "base64url Ed25519 public key of the iCaptcha service, pinned so startup doesn't depend on fetching it. This is the live icaptcha.gitlawb.com key."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "xjyPNqIbvc9U-kwXW6u9mDqRJ7E2UUMOaJdUWhpEXq8"
+}
+
+variable "icaptcha_required_level" {
+  description = "Minimum iCaptcha proof level required to pass the gate."
+  type        = number
+  default     = 3
+}
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Networking / ingress
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

infra/fly/fly.toml

@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ primary_region = "iad"
   GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS = "https://node.gitlawb.com,https://node2.gitlawb.com,https://node3.gitlawb.com"
   GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC = "true"
   GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES = "524288000"
+  # On Fly: the edge sets Fly-Client-IP (overwriting any client-supplied value),
+  # so the push rate limiter keys on the real client. Without this the limiter
+  # would fall back to the socket peer (Fly's proxy) and over-throttle.
+  GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY = "fly"
 
 [http_service]
   internal_port = 7545