fix(infra/fly): node.toml to single machine (min_machines_running=1) (#154 )

node was consolidated from 2 machines to 1 on 2026-06-22 to fix a split-brain (per-machine volumes diverged behind one hostname), but this config still declared min_machines_running=2 and "2-machine HA". Deploying it as-is spawns a second machine with a fresh empty volume and reintroduces the exact split-brain the consolidation fixed — hit during the v0.5.0 rollout, where it was corrected out-of-band before deploying. Set min_machines_running=1 and update the header/volume/chown comments to match the single-machine reality. node2/node3 already correctly declare 1. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
feat(infra): Fly configs for node + node2 on the public OSS build
2026-11-08 17:55:53 -10:00 · 2026-07-05 21:24:47 +08:00 · 2026-06-22 07:25:12 +08:00
105 changed files with 1262 additions and 20852 deletions
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-# cargo-audit configuration.
-#
-# cargo-audit reads its config from .cargo/audit.toml (relative to the working
-# directory) or ~/.cargo/audit.toml. It does NOT read a repo-root audit.toml,
-# and there is no CLI flag to point at a config file (`-f` is the lockfile path).
-# This file lives at .cargo/audit.toml for that reason.
-#
-# The audit job stays hard-fail: only the advisories explicitly listed below are
-# suppressed, so any NEW advisory still breaks CI. Each entry below has no
-# available upstream fix; everything fixable is fixed in Cargo.lock instead.
-#
-# Tracking: the hickory ignores are reachable accepted risk. A scheduled re-check
-# (.github/workflows/audit-schedule.yml) runs without these ignores and fails if
-# the lockfile moves off the pinned vulnerable versions while the ignores remain.
-
-[advisories]
-ignore = [
-    # hickory-proto 0.25.2 (pulled by libp2p-dns 0.44 -> hickory-resolver 0.25).
-    # REACHABLE: the node wraps its QUIC transport in the system DNS resolver
-    # (crates/gitlawb-node/src/p2p/mod.rs:238), so a malicious DNS response can
-    # trigger these DoS paths. No fix is available: the latest libp2p-dns on
-    # crates.io is 0.44 and pins hickory 0.25; the fix requires hickory >=0.26.1.
-    # REMOVE both once libp2p-dns ships a release using hickory 0.26 (verified
-    # 2026-06-21: cargo update -p hickory-proto locks 0 packages; still 0.25.2).
-    # Tracking: https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/76
-    "RUSTSEC-2026-0118", # hickory NSEC3 closest-encloser unbounded loop
-    "RUSTSEC-2026-0119", # hickory O(n^2) name-compression CPU exhaustion
-
-    # rsa 0.9.10 (Marvin timing sidechannel). Present in Cargo.lock because sqlx
-    # resolves sqlx-mysql unconditionally, and sqlx-mysql depends on rsa. cargo
-    # audit scans the lockfile, so it flags rsa even though it is NOT linked into
-    # our binary: sqlx is built postgres-only (crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml),
-    # so the MySQL RSA auth path is never compiled and there is no RSA oracle to
-    # attack. No upstream fix exists regardless. REMOVE this ignore if sqlx is
-    # ever built with the `mysql` feature, or any other consumer of rsa enters
-    # the build, at which point it becomes a real reachable advisory.
-    "RUSTSEC-2023-0071", # rsa Marvin attack (no fix; not linked in our build)
-]
@@ -72,12 +72,6 @@ GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS=false
 # rolling upgrades so existing live nodes can still communicate.
 GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false

-# Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on git-receive-pack.
-# A valid did:key signature is authentication, not authorization: anyone can
-# sign as their own DID. When true, pushes from a non-owner DID are rejected.
-# Keep false until the repo owner is ready for owner-only writes.
-GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=false
-
 # Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs.
 # Example: /ip4/1.2.3.4/udp/7546/quic-v1/p2p/12D3KooW...
 GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP=
@@ -90,39 +84,6 @@ GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ=true
 # Maximum git smart-HTTP pack request size, in bytes.
 GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES=2147483648

-# ── Push rate limiting (git-receive-pack flood brake) ─────────────────────
-# Max receive-pack requests (info/refs advertisement + push POST) per client
-# IP per hour. 0 disables. Default 600.
-GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT=600
-
-# Which forwarded header the edge is trusted to set, used to resolve the real
-# client IP for the push limiter. One of:
-#   (unset) — no trusted proxy: key on the socket peer address, ignore headers.
-#   fly     — behind Fly's edge (trust Fly-Client-IP).
-#   x-forwarded-for — behind a single reverse proxy like Caddy/NGINX (trust the
-#             rightmost X-Forwarded-For hop).
-# Only set this when a proxy you control actually fronts the node; trusting a
-# forwarded header on a directly-exposed node lets clients spoof the key.
-GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY=
-
 # ── Sync ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Enable automatic background sync from known peers
 GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC=false
-
-# ── iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate ───────────────────────────────────
-# Optional gate on create_repo + register: require callers to present an
-# iCaptcha proof (X-ICaptcha-Proof header) earned at icaptcha.gitlawb.com.
-# Default off = fully inert (no behavior change).
-#   off     - gate disabled (default)
-#   shadow  - verify + log would-be rejections, but always allow
-#   enforce - reject requests without a valid, strong-enough proof
-ICAPTCHA_MODE=off
-# Optional base64url Ed25519 public key override; if unset it is fetched from
-# ICAPTCHA_URL/v1/pubkey at startup. Recommended in production: pinning the key
-# removes the startup dependency on the iCaptcha service being reachable and
-# avoids silently running inert if that one-time fetch fails.
-ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY=
-# Minimum proof difficulty level required to pass.
-ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL=3
-# Base URL of the iCaptcha service.
-ICAPTCHA_URL=https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-# Ownership for CI, release, and security-sensitive infrastructure.
-# A PR that edits these paths requires review from a code owner once
-# branch protection's "Require review from Code Owners" is enabled.
-
-/.github/                      @beardthelion
-/Dockerfile                    @beardthelion
-/Dockerfile.bins               @beardthelion
-/docker-compose.yml            @beardthelion
-/release-please-config.json    @beardthelion
-/.release-please-manifest.json @beardthelion
-/SECURITY.md                   @beardthelion
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-name: Bug report
-description: Report a defect in a Gitlawb crate or node behavior
-labels: ["bug"]
-body:
-  - type: markdown
-    attributes:
-      value: |
-        Thanks for the report. Please fill in the fields below so we can reproduce the issue.
-        For security vulnerabilities, do NOT open an issue — follow SECURITY.md instead.
-  - type: textarea
-    id: what-happened
-    attributes:
-      label: What happened?
-      description: A clear description of the bug.
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: textarea
-    id: expected
-    attributes:
-      label: Expected behavior
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: textarea
-    id: repro
-    attributes:
-      label: Steps to reproduce
-      placeholder: |
-        1. ...
-        2. ...
-        3. ...
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: dropdown
-    id: crate
-    attributes:
-      label: Affected crate
-      options:
-        - gitlawb-node
-        - gl
-        - git-remote-gitlawb
-        - gitlawb-core
-        - not sure / other
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: input
-    id: version
-    attributes:
-      label: Version or commit
-      description: Output of the binary's `--version`, or the git commit you built.
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: textarea
-    id: environment
-    attributes:
-      label: Environment
-      description: OS, Rust version (`rustc --version`), and anything else relevant.
-    validations:
-      required: false
-  - type: textarea
-    id: logs
-    attributes:
-      label: Relevant logs
-      description: Paste logs or errors. This will be rendered as code, no need for backticks.
-      render: shell
-    validations:
-      required: false
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-blank_issues_enabled: false
-contact_links:
-  - name: Security vulnerability
-    url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/blob/main/SECURITY.md
-    about: Please report security issues privately per our security policy, not as a public issue.
-  - name: Questions & discussion
-    url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/discussions
-    about: For usage questions and open-ended discussion.
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-name: Feature request
-description: Suggest an improvement or new capability
-labels: ["enhancement"]
-body:
-  - type: textarea
-    id: problem
-    attributes:
-      label: Problem / use case
-      description: What are you trying to do that's hard or impossible today?
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: textarea
-    id: proposal
-    attributes:
-      label: Proposed solution
-    validations:
-      required: true
-  - type: textarea
-    id: alternatives
-    attributes:
-      label: Alternatives considered
-    validations:
-      required: false
-  - type: dropdown
-    id: protocol
-    attributes:
-      label: Does this touch the protocol?
-      description: Identity, signatures, UCAN, ref certs, or P2P wire formats. Protocol changes need an issue discussion before any PR.
-      options:
-        - "No"
-        - "Yes"
-        - "Not sure"
-    validations:
-      required: true
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-<!--
-  Thanks for contributing to Gitlawb. Keep PRs focused on one change.
-  Protocol-level changes (identity, signatures, wire format) should start
-  as an issue before code — see CONTRIBUTING.md.
-->
-
-## Summary
-
-<!-- One or two sentences: what changes and why it matters. -->
-
-
-
-## Motivation & context
-
-<!-- What problem does this solve? Link prior discussion if any. -->
-Closes #
-
-## Kind of change
-
- [ ] Bug fix
- [ ] Feature
- [ ] Security fix
- [ ] Docs
- [ ] Tests / CI
- [ ] Refactor (no behavior change)
- [ ] Breaking or protocol change (issue required first)
-
-## What changed
-
-<!-- Bullet the concrete changes. Note the crate(s) touched:
-     gitlawb-core / gitlawb-node / gl / git-remote-gitlawb -->
-
-
-
-## How a reviewer can verify
-
-<!-- Commands to run, or repro steps for a bug plus proof it's fixed. -->
-
-```sh
-
-```
-
-## Before you request review
-
- [ ] Scope is one logical change; no unrelated churn
- [ ] `cargo test --workspace` passes locally
- [ ] New behavior is covered by tests (required for fixes)
- [ ] `cargo fmt --all` and `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` are clean
- [ ] Commit titles use Conventional Commits (`feat(...)`, `fix(...)`, `docs(...)`)
- [ ] Docs / `.env.example` updated if behavior or config changed (or N/A)
- [ ] Checked existing PRs so this isn't a duplicate
-
-## Protocol & signing impact
-
-<!-- Delete this block if your change doesn't touch the protocol. -->
-
- [ ] Touches DID / `did:key`, Ed25519 / RFC 9421 signatures, UCAN, ref certs, or P2P wire formats
- [ ] Discussed in an issue before implementation
- [ ] Backward-compatible with existing nodes and previously signed history
-
-## Notes for reviewers
-
-<!-- Anything out of scope, follow-ups, or known limitations. Optional. -->
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-name: Scheduled Audit
-
-# Self-expiring suppression check (companion to the PR-blocking audit gate in
-# pr-checks.yml). Runs weekly. It re-runs cargo audit WITHOUT the .cargo/audit.toml
-# ignore list to surface the full advisory set for visibility, and it hard-fails
-# if the lockfile has moved off the pinned vulnerable versions while the ignores
-# are still present, i.e. the upstream fix landed but the ignore was not dropped.
-on:
-  schedule:
-    - cron: "0 6 * * 1" # Mondays 06:00 UTC
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-
-env:
-  CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
-
-jobs:
-  scheduled-audit:
-    name: scheduled audit (no ignores)
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 30
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: stable
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: audit-schedule
-
-      - name: Install cargo-audit (floating; drift canary)
-        # Deliberately UNPINNED, unlike the blocking gate in pr-checks.yml. This
-        # job is cron-only (weekly); it is never pull_request- or push-triggered,
-        # so it NEVER gates a merge no matter what it does. Floating the scanner
-        # here is the drift canary: if a newer cargo-audit regresses, at worst
-        # this weekly run reds (the install step below is unguarded) or its
-        # visibility report changes, and that is exactly the signal that latest
-        # has moved and the pinned gate should not be bumped yet. The scan result
-        # itself never fails the run (the "Full audit report" step is `|| true`
-        # and the only other hard-fail is a Cargo.lock grep). The point is that
-        # drift surfaces here without ever blocking a PR. Do NOT pin to match
-        # pr-checks.yml.
-        run: cargo install --locked cargo-audit
-
-      # Full advisory report with NO suppressions. Run from a scratch dir that
-      # has no .cargo/audit.toml so the ignore list does not apply; never fail
-      # the build on this step, it is visibility only.
-      - name: Full audit report (ignores not applied)
-        run: |
-          mkdir -p "$RUNNER_TEMP/full-audit"
-          cp Cargo.lock "$RUNNER_TEMP/full-audit/Cargo.lock"
-          cd "$RUNNER_TEMP/full-audit"
-          {
-            echo '### Full cargo audit (no ignores applied)'
-            echo '```'
-            cargo audit -f Cargo.lock || true
-            echo '```'
-          } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
-
-      # Drift guard: the hickory ignores are only valid while hickory-proto is
-      # pinned at 0.25.x. If the lockfile has moved past that, the upstream fix
-      # is in and the ignores in .cargo/audit.toml must be removed. Fail loudly.
-      - name: Fail if hickory moved past 0.25.x while ignores remain
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          version="$(grep -A1 'name = "hickory-proto"' Cargo.lock | grep '^version' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f2)"
-          echo "hickory-proto in Cargo.lock: ${version:-not present}"
-          ignores_present=false
-          if grep -q 'RUSTSEC-2026-011' .cargo/audit.toml; then
-            ignores_present=true
-          fi
-          # Drift = the lockfile no longer matches what the ignores assume:
-          # hickory moved off 0.25.x (fix shipped) OR was removed entirely
-          # (dead ignore entries left behind). Both must fail.
-          if [ "$ignores_present" = true ] && { [ -z "${version}" ] || [[ "${version}" != 0.25.* ]]; }; then
-            echo "::error::hickory-proto is ${version:-absent from Cargo.lock} but the RUSTSEC-2026-0118/0119 ignores are still in .cargo/audit.toml. The upstream fix appears to be available or the dependency is gone; remove the ignores."
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          echo "No drift: ignore list is consistent with the pinned hickory-proto version."
@@ -9,25 +9,18 @@ on:
 permissions:
  contents: read

-# Cancel superseded runs on the same PR/branch; never cancel runs on main.
-concurrency:
-  group: pr-checks-${{ github.ref }}
-  cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
-
 env:
  CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
  RUST_BACKTRACE: 1

 jobs:
-  fmt-clippy:
-    name: fmt + clippy
+  fmt-clippy-test:
+    name: fmt + clippy + test
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 30
+
    steps:
      - name: Check out repository
        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false

      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
@@ -44,171 +37,5 @@ jobs:
      - name: cargo clippy
        run: cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings

-  test:
-    name: test (${{ matrix.toolchain }})
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 45
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix:
-        toolchain: [stable, beta]
-    # Beta is informational: an upstream beta regression should warn, not block merges.
-    continue-on-error: ${{ matrix.toolchain == 'beta' }}
-    # Postgres for the DB-backed integration tests (#[sqlx::test] provisions an
-    # isolated database per test off this connection). The health-check gate keeps
-    # `cargo test` from racing a not-yet-ready server.
-    services:
-      postgres:
-        image: postgres:16
-        env:
-          POSTGRES_USER: postgres
-          POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres
-          POSTGRES_DB: gitlawb_test
-        ports:
-          - 5432:5432
-        options: >-
-          --health-cmd pg_isready
-          --health-interval 10s
-          --health-timeout 5s
-          --health-retries 5
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
-
      - name: cargo test
-        env:
-          DATABASE_URL: postgres://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/gitlawb_test
        run: cargo test --workspace
-
-  build-release:
-    name: build --release
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 45
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: stable
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: release
-
-      - name: cargo build --release
-        run: cargo build --release --workspace
-
-  audit:
-    name: cargo audit
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 30
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
-        with:
-          toolchain: stable
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: audit-0.22.2
-
-      - name: Install cargo-audit (pinned)
-        # Pin the scanner on this BLOCKING gate: an unpinned `cargo install`
-        # floats to the latest release, so a regressed cargo-audit could red CI
-        # repo-wide with no code change. Advisory-DB freshness is fetched at scan
-        # time, independent of the binary, so this does not weaken what the gate
-        # catches. The weekly Scheduled Audit (audit-schedule.yml) deliberately
-        # floats to latest as the drift canary; when it shows a newer cargo-audit
-        # behaving differently, bump this version (and the cache key above) as a
-        # deliberate maintainer action. If 0.22.2 is ever yanked from crates.io
-        # this step fails loud until the pin is bumped.
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          cargo install --locked --version 0.22.2 cargo-audit
-          # Assert the pin took effect so an accidental future unpin (or a drift
-          # off 0.22.2) fails loudly here instead of silently running a different
-          # scanner. `cargo audit --version` prints "cargo-audit-audit 0.22.2".
-          installed="$(cargo audit --version)"
-          echo "cargo-audit installed: $installed"
-          echo "$installed" | grep -qE '(^| )0\.22\.2($| )' || {
-            echo "::error::cargo-audit is not the pinned 0.22.2 (got: $installed)"
-            exit 1
-          }
-
-      # Hard-fail gate. Suppressions live in .cargo/audit.toml (read automatically
-      # from the repo root), each with no available upstream fix. A green check
-      # here means "no NEW advisories", not "advisory-clean": surface the active
-      # ignore list so a reviewer sees exactly what is being accepted.
-      - name: Show active audit ignores
-        run: |
-          {
-            echo '### cargo audit: accepted advisories (.cargo/audit.toml)'
-            echo '```toml'
-            sed -n '/^\[advisories\]/,$p' .cargo/audit.toml
-            echo '```'
-          } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
-
-      - name: cargo audit
-        run: cargo audit
-
-  msrv:
-    name: MSRV (Rust 1.91)
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 30
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Set up Rust 1.91
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # 1.91
-        with:
-          toolchain: "1.91"
-
-      - name: Cache cargo
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
-        with:
-          key: msrv
-
-      - name: cargo check on MSRV
-        run: cargo check --workspace --all-targets
-
-  docker-build:
-    name: Docker build smoke test
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 30
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Build image
-        run: docker build -t gitlawb-node:ci-test .
-
-      - name: Smoke test --version
-        run: docker run --rm gitlawb-node:ci-test --version
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-name: PR Triage
-
-# Runs on pull_request_target, not pull_request: fork PRs get a read-only
-# GITHUB_TOKEN under pull_request regardless of the permissions below, so the
-# label/comment writes 403. This job never checks out or runs PR head code (it
-# only reads context.payload and the files API), so pull_request_target is safe.
-on:
-  pull_request_target:
-    types: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened]
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-  pull-requests: write
-  issues: write
-
-concurrency:
-  group: pr-triage-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
-  cancel-in-progress: true
-
-jobs:
-  triage:
-    name: Quality-signal triage
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 10
-    steps:
-      - name: Label and guide
-        uses: actions/github-script@f28e40c7f34bde8b3046d885e986cb6290c5673b # v7
-        with:
-          script: |
-            const pr = context.payload.pull_request;
-            const { owner, repo } = context.repo;
-            const prNumber = pr.number;
-
-            // Trusted authors bypass triage entirely.
-            const trusted = ["OWNER", "MEMBER", "COLLABORATOR"];
-            if (trusted.includes(pr.author_association)) {
-              core.info(`Author association ${pr.author_association} is trusted; skipping triage.`);
-              return;
-            }
-
-            // Labels this workflow owns. Anything here may be added or removed each run.
-            const MANAGED = ["needs-issue", "needs-description", "needs-tests", "workflow-change"];
-            const want = new Set();
-
-            const body = pr.body || "";
-
-            // Linked issue: look for "closes/fixes/resolves #N" or any bare #N reference.
-            const hasLinkedIssue =
-              /\b(close[sd]?|fix(e[sd])?|resolve[sd]?)\b[^\n]*#\d+/i.test(body) ||
-              /#\d+/.test(body);
-            if (!hasLinkedIssue) want.add("needs-issue");
-
-            // Description substance: strip HTML comments and markdown headings, then measure.
-            const stripped = body
-              .replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, "")
-              .replace(/^#+.*$/gm, "")
-              .trim();
-            if (stripped.length < 50) want.add("needs-description");
-
-            // File-based signals.
-            const files = await github.paginate(github.rest.pulls.listFiles, {
-              owner, repo, pull_number: prNumber, per_page: 100,
-            });
-            const names = files.map(f => f.filename);
-
-            const isFork = pr.head.repo && pr.head.repo.full_name !== pr.base.repo.full_name;
-            const touchesWorkflows = names.some(n => n.startsWith(".github/workflows/"));
-            if (isFork && touchesWorkflows) want.add("workflow-change");
-
-            const changedRust = names.some(n => n.startsWith("crates/") && n.endsWith(".rs"));
-            // A test can live in a tests/ dir, a *_test.rs file, or (the common Rust
-            // pattern) an inline #[test] / #[cfg(test)] block added inside the source file.
-            const addsInlineTest = files.some(f =>
-              f.filename.endsWith(".rs") && f.patch &&
-              /^\+.*#\[(test\]|cfg\(test\))/m.test(f.patch));
-            const touchedTests =
-              names.some(n => n.includes("/tests/") || n.endsWith("_test.rs")) || addsInlineTest;
-            if (changedRust && !touchedTests) want.add("needs-tests");
-
-            // Reconcile labels: add wanted managed labels, remove managed labels no longer wanted.
-            const current = (await github.rest.issues.listLabelsOnIssue({
-              owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber,
-            })).data.map(l => l.name);
-
-            const toAdd = [...want].filter(l => !current.includes(l));
-            const toRemove = MANAGED.filter(l => current.includes(l) && !want.has(l));
-
-            if (toAdd.length) {
-              await github.rest.issues.addLabels({ owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, labels: toAdd });
-            }
-            for (const name of toRemove) {
-              await github.rest.issues.removeLabel({ owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, name })
-                .catch(() => {}); // ignore if already gone
-            }
-
-            // Guidance comment: only for advisory signals, and only once.
-            const advisory = ["needs-issue", "needs-description", "needs-tests"].filter(l => want.has(l));
-            if (!advisory.length) return;
-
-            const MARKER = "<!-- gitlawb-triage -->";
-            const comments = await github.paginate(github.rest.issues.listComments, {
-              owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, per_page: 100,
-            });
-            if (comments.some(c => c.body && c.body.includes(MARKER))) {
-              core.info("Guidance comment already present; not reposting.");
-              return;
-            }
-
-            const reasons = {
-              "needs-issue": "Link the issue this addresses (`Closes #123`). For protocol changes, open an issue first.",
-              "needs-description": "Add a short summary of what changes and why: the template's Summary and Motivation sections.",
-              "needs-tests": "This changes Rust source but no tests changed. Tests are required for fixes and strongly encouraged for features.",
-            };
-            const lines = advisory.map(l => `- ${reasons[l]}`).join("\n");
-            const comment = [
-              MARKER,
-              "Thanks for the contribution. A couple of things will help us review this faster:",
-              "",
-              lines,
-              "",
-              "See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md). Update the PR and these notes will clear automatically.",
-            ].join("\n");
-
-            await github.rest.issues.createComment({ owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, body: comment });
@@ -9,9 +9,6 @@ concurrency:
  group: release-${{ github.ref }}
  cancel-in-progress: false

-# Least privilege by default; every job opts in to exactly what it needs.
-permissions: {}
-
 jobs:
  release-please:
    if: ${{ github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' }}
@@ -27,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
    steps:
      - name: Run release-please
        id: release
-        uses: googleapis/release-please-action@45996ed1f6d02564a971a2fa1b5860e934307cf7 # v5.0.0
+        uses: googleapis/release-please-action@16a9c90856f42705d54a6fda1823352bdc62cf38 # v4.3.0
        with:
          token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

@@ -44,7 +41,6 @@ jobs:
        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
        with:
          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-          persist-credentials: false

      - name: Set up QEMU
        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@29109295f81e9208d7d86ff1c6c12d2833863392 # v3.6.0
@@ -105,9 +101,6 @@ jobs:
    needs: release-please
    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
-    # Windows is best-effort: a failure there must not fail the job or block the
-    # downstream npm/Homebrew jobs that only consume the unix artifacts.
-    continue-on-error: ${{ startsWith(matrix.target, 'x86_64-pc-windows') }}
    permissions:
      contents: write
    strategy:
@@ -122,14 +115,11 @@ jobs:
            os: macos-13
          - target: aarch64-apple-darwin
            os: macos-14
-          - target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
-            os: windows-latest
    steps:
      - name: Checkout release tag
        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
        with:
          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-          persist-credentials: false

      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
@@ -153,410 +143,30 @@ jobs:
        with:
          key: ${{ matrix.target }}

-      # The gitlawb-node daemon is a Linux/macOS service; on Windows we ship only
-      # the two CLI binaries. A Windows-only failure must not block the release.
-      - name: Determine binaries
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          BINS="gl git-remote-gitlawb gitlawb-node"
-          case "${{ matrix.target }}" in *windows*) BINS="gl git-remote-gitlawb" ;; esac
-          echo "BINS=$BINS" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-
      - name: Build
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          args=""
-          for b in $BINS; do args="$args -p $b"; done
-          cargo build --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} $args
-
-      # Run each packaged binary's --version so a broken release artifact fails the
-      # build instead of shipping. Skipped for cross-compiled targets that can't run
-      # on the host runner (aarch64 linux on an x86_64 runner).
-      - name: Smoke test binaries
-        if: ${{ matrix.target != 'aarch64-unknown-linux-musl' }}
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          VERSION="${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}"
-          BIN_DIR="target/${{ matrix.target }}/release"
-          EXE=""
-          case "${{ matrix.target }}" in *windows*) EXE=".exe" ;; esac
-          for bin in $BINS; do
-            echo "== $bin --version =="
-            out="$("$BIN_DIR/$bin$EXE" --version)"
-            echo "$out"
-            # Each binary prints "<name> <version>"; assert the released version is present.
-            grep -qF "$VERSION" <<<"$out" || {
-              echo "::error::$bin --version did not report expected version $VERSION (got: $out)"
-              exit 1
-            }
-          done
+        run: cargo build --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb -p gitlawb-node

      - name: Package
+        id: pkg
        shell: bash
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
-          TARGET="${{ matrix.target }}"
-          NAME="gitlawb-node-${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}-${TARGET}"
-          BIN_DIR="target/${TARGET}/release"
-          EXE=""
-          case "$TARGET" in *windows*) EXE=".exe" ;; esac
-
-          # Portable sha256 → "<hash>  <file>" so install scripts and brew can parse it.
-          sha256_file() {
-            local f="$1"
-            if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-              sha256sum "$f"
-            elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-              shasum -a 256 "$f"
-            else
-              local h
-              h=$(certutil -hashfile "$f" SHA256 | sed -n 2p | tr -d ' \r')
-              printf '%s  %s\n' "$h" "$f"
-            fi
-          }
-
+          NAME="gitlawb-node-${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}-${{ matrix.target }}"
          mkdir -p "dist/$NAME"
-          for bin in $BINS; do
-            cp "$BIN_DIR/$bin$EXE" "dist/$NAME/"
-          done
+          cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/gl" "dist/$NAME/"
+          cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/git-remote-gitlawb" "dist/$NAME/"
+          cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/gitlawb-node" "dist/$NAME/"
          cp README.md LICENSE-MIT LICENSE-APACHE "dist/$NAME/"
-
          cd dist
-          case "$TARGET" in
-            *windows*)
-              # 7z is preinstalled on windows-latest runners.
-              7z a -tzip "$NAME.zip" "$NAME" >/dev/null
-              sha256_file "$NAME.zip" > "$NAME.zip.sha256"
-              ;;
-            *)
-              tar czf "$NAME.tar.gz" "$NAME"
-              sha256_file "$NAME.tar.gz" > "$NAME.tar.gz.sha256"
-              ;;
-          esac
+          tar czf "$NAME.tar.gz" "$NAME"
+          shasum -a 256 "$NAME.tar.gz" > "$NAME.tar.gz.sha256"
+          echo "asset=dist/$NAME.tar.gz" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo "checksum=dist/$NAME.tar.gz.sha256" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

      - name: Attach to release
        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@72f2c25fcb47643c292f7107632f7a47c1df5cd8 # v2.3.2
        with:
          tag_name: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
          files: |
-            dist/*.tar.gz
-            dist/*.zip
-            dist/*.sha256
-
-  npm-publish:
-    name: Publish to npm
-    needs: [release-please, release-binaries]
-    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read
-      id-token: write # npm provenance
-    steps:
-      - name: Guard on secret
-        id: guard
-        env:
-          NPM_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          if [ -z "${NPM_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
-            echo "::warning::NPM_TOKEN is not set — skipping npm publish."
-            echo "enabled=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
-      - name: Checkout release tag
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Lay in release binaries
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          # npm platform package -> Rust target triple (unix only; Windows is not
-          # published to npm).
-          MAP="
-          gl-darwin-arm64:aarch64-apple-darwin
-          gl-darwin-x64:x86_64-apple-darwin
-          gl-linux-arm64:aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
-          gl-linux-x64:x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
-          "
-          mkdir -p _dl
-          for entry in $MAP; do
-            pkg="${entry%%:*}"
-            target="${entry#*:}"
-            archive="gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-${target}.tar.gz"
-            echo "==> $pkg <- $archive"
-            gh release download "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
-              --pattern "$archive" --dir _dl --clobber
-            tar -xzf "_dl/$archive" -C _dl
-            src="_dl/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-${target}"
-            cp "$src/gl" "npm/packages/$pkg/gl"
-            cp "$src/git-remote-gitlawb" "npm/packages/$pkg/git-remote-gitlawb"
-            chmod +x "npm/packages/$pkg/gl" "npm/packages/$pkg/git-remote-gitlawb"
-          done
-
-      - name: Set versions
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        env:
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          node -e '
-            const fs = require("fs");
-            const v = process.env.VERSION;
-            for (const p of fs.readdirSync("npm/packages")) {
-              const f = `npm/packages/${p}/package.json`;
-              const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(f, "utf8"));
-              pkg.version = v;
-              if (pkg.optionalDependencies) {
-                for (const k of Object.keys(pkg.optionalDependencies)) {
-                  pkg.optionalDependencies[k] = v;
-                }
-              }
-              fs.writeFileSync(f, JSON.stringify(pkg, null, 2) + "\n");
-            }
-          '
-
-      - name: Publish
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        env:
-          NPM_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          echo "//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=${NPM_TOKEN}" > ~/.npmrc
-          # Platform packages first, then the wrapper (so its optionalDependencies resolve).
-          # Skip versions already on the registry so a rerun after a partial publish
-          # is idempotent instead of erroring on the first existing package.
-          for pkg in gl-darwin-arm64 gl-darwin-x64 gl-linux-arm64 gl-linux-x64 gl; do
-            name="@gitlawb/$pkg"
-            if npm view "$name@$VERSION" version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-              echo "==> $name@$VERSION already published, skipping"
-              continue
-            fi
-            echo "==> npm publish $name@$VERSION"
-            npm publish "npm/packages/$pkg" --provenance --access public
-          done
-
-  homebrew-bump:
-    name: Bump Homebrew tap
-    needs: [release-please, release-binaries]
-    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read # GITHUB_TOKEN downloads release assets; the tap push uses HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT
-    steps:
-      - name: Guard on secret
-        id: guard
-        env:
-          HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
-        run: |
-          if [ -z "${HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT:-}" ]; then
-            echo "::warning::HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT is not set — skipping Homebrew bump."
-            echo "enabled=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
-      - name: Checkout tap repo
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          repository: Gitlawb/homebrew-tap
-          token: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
-          path: tap
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Regenerate formula
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          base="https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${TAG}"
-          mkdir -p _sums
-          gh release download "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
-            --pattern '*.tar.gz.sha256' --dir _sums --clobber
-          sha() { awk '{print $1}' "_sums/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-$1.tar.gz.sha256"; }
-          SHA_MAC_ARM="$(sha aarch64-apple-darwin)"
-          SHA_MAC_X64="$(sha x86_64-apple-darwin)"
-          SHA_LNX_ARM="$(sha aarch64-unknown-linux-musl)"
-          SHA_LNX_X64="$(sha x86_64-unknown-linux-musl)"
-
-          mkdir -p tap/Formula
-          cat > tap/Formula/gl.rb <<EOF
-          class Gl < Formula
-            desc "Gitlawb CLI — decentralized git for AI agents and developers"
-            homepage "https://gitlawb.com"
-            version "${VERSION}"
-            license "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-
-            on_macos do
-              on_arm do
-                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz"
-                sha256 "${SHA_MAC_ARM}"
-              end
-              on_intel do
-                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.gz"
-                sha256 "${SHA_MAC_X64}"
-              end
-            end
-
-            on_linux do
-              on_arm do
-                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-aarch64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz"
-                sha256 "${SHA_LNX_ARM}"
-              end
-              on_intel do
-                url "${base}/gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz"
-                sha256 "${SHA_LNX_X64}"
-              end
-            end
-
-            def install
-              bin.install "gl"
-              bin.install "git-remote-gitlawb"
-            end
-
-            test do
-              assert_match version.to_s, shell_output("#{bin}/gl --version")
-            end
-          end
-          EOF
-
-      - name: Commit and push
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        working-directory: tap
-        env:
-          HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
-          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
-          # Stage first so a brand-new (untracked) formula is detected by the no-op check.
-          git add Formula/gl.rb
-          if git diff --cached --quiet; then
-            echo "Formula already up to date."
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          git commit -m "gl ${VERSION}"
-          # Credentials are not persisted in .git/config; supply the token only for the push.
-          git push "https://x-access-token:${HOMEBREW_TAP_PAT}@github.com/Gitlawb/homebrew-tap.git" HEAD:main
-
-  web-sync:
-    name: Sync web (install scripts + version)
-    needs: [release-please, release-binaries]
-    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read # GITHUB_TOKEN checks out node; the web PR uses WEB_SYNC_PAT
-    steps:
-      - name: Guard on secret
-        id: guard
-        env:
-          WEB_SYNC_PAT: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
-        run: |
-          if [ -z "${WEB_SYNC_PAT:-}" ]; then
-            echo "::warning::WEB_SYNC_PAT is not set — skipping web sync."
-            echo "enabled=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
-      - name: Checkout node (release tag)
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-          path: node
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Checkout web
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
-        with:
-          repository: Gitlawb/web
-          token: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
-          path: web
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      # web-sync publishes install.ps1 + version.json, so the Windows ZIP must exist.
-      # Windows is best-effort for npm/Homebrew (continue-on-error), so verify the
-      # asset is present before advertising a release the site can't actually serve.
-      - name: Verify website release assets
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          gh release view "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --json assets \
-            --jq '.assets[].name' > /tmp/release-assets
-          for asset in \
-            "gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip" \
-            "gitlawb-node-${VERSION}-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip.sha256"; do
-            grep -Fxq "$asset" /tmp/release-assets || {
-              echo "::error::release asset missing: $asset (Windows build likely failed); not syncing web"
-              exit 1
-            }
-          done
-
-      - name: Sync and open PR
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.WEB_SYNC_PAT }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          # Canonical install scripts (source of truth lives in the node repo).
-          cp node/install.sh web/public/install.sh
-          cp node/install.ps1 web/public/install.ps1
-          # Single version source the site can read.
-          printf '{\n  "version": "%s",\n  "tag": "%s"\n}\n' "$VERSION" "$TAG" > web/public/version.json
-          # One-time, idempotent drift fixes: drop orphaned binaries, fix stale link.
-          rm -rf web/public/bin
-          if [ -f web/public/skill.md ]; then
-            sed -i 's#github.com/gitlawb/releases#github.com/Gitlawb/node/releases#g' web/public/skill.md
-          fi
-
-          cd web
-          # Stage first so brand-new (untracked) files are caught by the no-op check.
-          git add -A
-          if git diff --cached --quiet; then
-            echo "web already up to date."
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          branch="release-sync/${TAG}"
-          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
-          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
-          git checkout -b "$branch"
-          git commit -m "chore: sync gitlawb ${TAG} (install scripts + version)"
-          # Credentials are not persisted in .git/config; supply the token only for the push.
-          git push --force "https://x-access-token:${GH_TOKEN}@github.com/Gitlawb/web.git" "HEAD:$branch"
-          gh pr create --repo Gitlawb/web --head "$branch" \
-            --title "Sync gitlawb ${TAG}" \
-            --body "Automated sync from Gitlawb/node ${TAG}: install.sh, install.ps1, public/version.json, and one-time drift fixes (removed orphaned public/bin, fixed skill.md releases link). Review and merge to deploy via Vercel." \
-            || {
-              # Only swallow the "PR already exists" case; surface auth/API failures
-              # (a failed gh pr list must not be misread as "PR exists").
-              pr_count="$(gh pr list --repo Gitlawb/web --head "$branch" --state open --json number --jq 'length')" || exit 1
-              if [ "$pr_count" != "0" ]; then
-                echo "PR for $branch already exists; branch was updated."
-              else
-                exit 1
-              fi
-            }
+            ${{ steps.pkg.outputs.asset }}
+            ${{ steps.pkg.outputs.checksum }}
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-name: Stale PRs
-
-on:
-  schedule:
-    - cron: "30 1 * * *"  # daily at 01:30 UTC
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-  pull-requests: write
-  issues: write
-
-jobs:
-  stale:
-    name: Flag and close ignored PRs
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 10
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/stale@5bef64f19d7facfb25b37b414482c7164d639639 # v9
-        with:
-          days-before-stale: 14
-          days-before-close: 7
-          # Act on PRs only; never on issues.
-          days-before-issue-stale: -1
-          days-before-issue-close: -1
-          # Only PRs the triage step flagged as missing a real description.
-          # needs-issue is advisory-only (linking an issue is a SHOULD, and many
-          # legitimate small PRs have none) so it does not drive auto-close.
-          only-pr-labels: "needs-description"
-          stale-pr-label: "stale"
-          exempt-pr-labels: "workflow-change,security,pinned"
-          remove-stale-when-updated: true
-          stale-pr-message: >
-            This PR has been inactive for 14 days and is still missing a description.
-            It will be closed in 7 days if there's no update. Push a change or leave a
-            comment to keep it open. No hard feelings, you can reopen anytime.
-          close-pr-message: >
-            Closing due to inactivity. Reopen whenever you're ready to update it. See
-            CONTRIBUTING.md for what helps us review quickly.
-          ascending: true
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ keys/
 *.log
 .openclaude-profile.json

-# Per-operator Fly config (node1 prod config is pulled from Fly, not tracked)
-infra/fly/node1.fly.toml
+# Local planning / scratch docs (never commit)
+docs/superpowers/
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 {
-  ".": "0.5.0"
+  ".": "0.3.8"
 }
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-# Changelog
-
-## [0.5.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0) (2026-07-05)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* **gl:** sanctioned iCaptcha client flow + secure git lifecycle ([#138](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/138)) ([06388ec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/06388ec26aa29d356ae311276fdb91be054e9ecc))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **gl:** sign the CLI's /ipfs/pins reads under the [#134](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/134) auth gate ([#146](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/146)) ([20d6848](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/20d6848846b3a988d604208833167a528b7d8820))
-* **node,git-remote:** gate receive-pack advertisement, sign client fetch/push ([#119](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/119)) ([6f36fc0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6f36fc07b8e10a650c5948b269feac1cb25cae2a))
-* **node,gossip:** route gossip HTTP through the no-redirect client ([#93](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/93)) ([#140](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/140)) ([563c456](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/563c456803bf3e958d63869db424b3940472bc3d))
-* **node:** close two spam-vector root causes (trust upsert + ungated push) ([#152](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/152)) ([2df6ff9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2df6ff9d30de62f754fa41473e85db316021718e))
-* **node:** gate GET /ipfs/{cid} on reachable allowed-set, not deny-set ([#126](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/126)) ([#133](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/133)) ([466a550](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/466a550915edd711856ef32035f9f474e2577c4f))
-* **node:** gate the ref-updates feeds on read visibility ([#112](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/112), [#114](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/114)) ([#143](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/143)) ([4891db3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/4891db38892663326ee0c1417a2db931988be4b5))
-* **node:** prefer canonical repo row over mirror row in get_repo ([#124](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/124)) ([#141](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/141)) ([6c95592](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6c95592d188222ac3446dc23ef8d9befbf82ad6f))
-* **remote:** include HTTP error response body ([#137](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/137)) ([09a0cb2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/09a0cb23b9f284ccbd69aca6958b70671f3bfb46))
-* **repos:** log the cause when repo create fails ([#103](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/103)) ([2620e97](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2620e973e3cd4835ed42ddd4adcd8183b5b3080e))
-
-## [0.4.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.3.9...v0.4.0) (2026-06-30)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* agent profiles (display name, bio, avatar, social links) ([#23](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/23)) ([09a3397](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/09a339745eca40a2567d911e947e3fc7426fc621))
-* **db:** versioned schema migrations with idempotent backfill ([#21](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/21)) ([927e4d0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/927e4d0cfb4ea11dca6930780939afaa067797ba))
-* encrypted replication for private subtrees (B1/B2/B3) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#36](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/36)) ([5ff7af8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/5ff7af84fa21fab53a12dfa04a0e7fb7e7d672e6))
-* **git-remote-gitlawb:** add --version and --help flags ([#30](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/30)) ([3a401eb](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3a401eb0792f9c5f5a10de6c16861655ab3836e0))
-* **gitlawb-attest:** External Attestation v1 for ref-update certs ([#20](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/20)) ([924bccd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/924bccd8e53e9be2dc9d6d4e4f1376952d6462bb))
-* **node:** blind recipient identities at rest and gate B1 by repo readability ([#40](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/40)) ([abdc775](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/abdc7757708d2bbb2bfda99bb65d50756142a42e))
-* **node:** enforce per-route authorization across the REST and GraphQL surface ([#87](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/87)) ([2202b00](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2202b0097fab6976ab366a2cdc385f1146a72f86))
-* **node:** graceful shutdown + Prometheus metrics endpoint ([#22](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/22)) ([2ce4da9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2ce4da9cc5a4791e8ae5a1cd90270b67f60d9ec3))
-* **node:** iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate on create_repo + register ([#108](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/108)) ([adc20f9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/adc20f9effad7b42fab55002875d209c4ed79518))
-* **node:** iCaptcha-aware repo propagation gate with quarantine ([#125](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/125)) ([8b9ceec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/8b9ceec25ef338965d1db72d39a7f2adb5300cc9))
-* **node:** owner-only push enforcement behind GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH ([#31](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/31)) ([#68](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/68)) ([0a15e76](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/0a15e763d2ab46737a3831715facbe51045b33ba))
-* **node:** peer partial-mirrors for repos with private subtrees ([#35](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/35)) ([e365a57](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e365a57b51c167abf06e87bfeb0565c80ed1b849))
-* **node:** pin the per-push object delta instead of re-enumerating the whole repo ([#90](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/90)) ([1af4fdf](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/1af4fdf485c7084cd160551b757b1ad1eed65cc6))
-* **node:** replication enforcement (Phase 2) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#34](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/34)) ([8680d0f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/8680d0f9d6600bba1a52d15624f8a2802a169511))
-* **node:** signature-gated agent self-deregister ([#29](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/29)) ([#63](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/63)) ([ff492b4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/ff492b452126f5568dac4286a7249f0cadb8b380))
-* **node:** subtree content withholding (Phase 3) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#28](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/28)) ([61b3830](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/61b383019fd895a1a6adfad934ad6c626e0f095e))
-* path-scoped repository visibility (Phase 1) for [#18](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/18) ([#25](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/25)) ([6abaf1d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6abaf1d7ed8fc55c6547568ae7247131311bde98))
-* per-DID rate limiting on creation endpoints (10/hour) ([#13](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/13)) ([b12c6bc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b12c6bc3283c2647224a62fb520a3cb7acf4a747))
-* **sync:** auto-register as replica with origin after successful mirror ([#56](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/56)) ([c03c9af](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c03c9af8fadafe262a2bf3cf25e19edf7160d376))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **api:** blob endpoint returns 400/404 instead of 500 on bad paths ([#37](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/37)) ([b61a1bd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b61a1bd46ffe78b39c0967e97b0ad349eba0b046))
-* **core:** route seed access through the zeroizing wrapper ([#41](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/41)) ([#64](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/64)) ([c9f43b0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c9f43b010576edb3c92a3be3d935cad232250344))
-* **core:** zeroize the derived X25519 secret ([#65](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/65)) ([#91](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/91)) ([2f6611a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2f6611a30fbb66cef9991cf4c6e507548acc5038))
-* **gl:** paginate gl-clone Arweave recovery and make /encrypted-blobs parsing schema-strict ([#49](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/49)) ([#70](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/70)) ([2153b0b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2153b0b7a67a48c29a33cd70b80cfbb69760805d))
-* **infra:** drop fly idle_timeout 600 -&gt; 120 ([#38](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/38)) ([a2217bf](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/a2217bff27ff3d6cae02bd8a12f8a0af7ce2b0a1))
-* **node:** anchor the real old_sha and issue a per-ref certificate ([#72](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/72)) ([6809201](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6809201daa223d6f833be6e95876a7b4e1f2b0b5))
-* **node:** close under-withholding via full ref scope and full-history classification ([#42](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/42)) ([#84](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/84)) ([3e1e904](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3e1e9045e4e3aa5ea0aee69767ceb01637920d2a))
-* **node:** dedupe mirror and canonical repo rows on list surfaces ([#6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/6)) ([#73](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/73)) ([3e8e333](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3e8e333aa03d7a2fe455d5d83f23089d58feb8c9))
-* **node:** enforce path-scoped visibility on the REST read API ([#52](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/52)) ([e37ea7f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e37ea7fec6d5a3171b526c84f884670bbbd258fb))
-* **node:** fail closed when a recipient DID can't be resolved ([#47](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/47)) ([#67](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/67)) ([abc9ad0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/abc9ad03acb48e608234650a25049622673fa53a))
-* **node:** gate fork_repo on per-caller path-scoped visibility ([#98](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/98)) ([#109](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/109)) ([6ae316c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6ae316cc88521747cbacb2a612b9433897d2e490))
-* **node:** gate GET /ipfs/{cid} on per-caller path-scoped visibility ([#110](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/110)) ([#128](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/128)) ([174f25a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/174f25a206380b26796b8782e1bd860b0a409fc9))
-* **node:** gate repo-listing and stats surfaces on visibility ([#97](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/97), [#99](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/99), [#101](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/101), [#104](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/104)) ([#111](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/111)) ([828dd27](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/828dd279a286f58bbb3c73627b2a1e23778b25cf))
-* **node:** make Tigris repo hydration resilient to corrupt archives & failed writes ([#54](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/54)) ([7a99d0f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/7a99d0f27cfa869e9f8a803f16cff30191745a51))
-* **node:** preserve promisor mirror mode on unknown withheld-paths lookup ([#48](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/48)) ([#69](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/69)) ([96fcfdb](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/96fcfdb1ca6d4cd27226670068702c9f177e283a))
-* **node:** reap leaked git child processes ([#53](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/53)) ([#61](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/61)) ([803d83e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/803d83efdbcfa9d98affac1c5aaf8aacc511ae64))
-* **node:** reject malformed path globs with non-trailing or empty-segment wildcards ([#74](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/74)) ([#75](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/75)) ([3d880cd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3d880cd56fed10e4c5ae787b52ce411384950f5e))
-* **node:** skip withheld-walk when no path-scoped rule can withhold ([#60](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/60)) ([338ff83](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/338ff83584f2ab960be7e42ecec64191f5aaeb95))
-* **release:** give crates explicit versions for release-please ([#129](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/129)) ([788a868](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/788a8686c1deafe03573703d72eb927cde81f54d))
-* **release:** use simple release-type + generic Cargo.toml updaters ([#130](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/130)) ([12bfb1b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/12bfb1b3c86b38f0b22d488cd6e85dfd96e0c37f))
-* **security:** gate webhook creation through the public-host validator ([#81](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/81)) ([#92](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/92)) ([f28fa02](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/f28fa02236bd65c6a4fb690131ab14640cc53a12))
-* **security:** reject non-public peer URLs + prune poisoned peers ([#78](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/78)) ([a8cc33a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/a8cc33a185f2649d3fe100ec271ee5739a55eba7))
@@ -55,25 +55,6 @@ Smart contracts live in a separate repo: [github.com/Gitlawb/contracts](https://
 4. **Conventional commits.** Use `feat:`, `fix:`, `docs:`, `refactor:`, `test:`, `chore:`. Releases are automated by [release-please](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please) — your commit prefixes drive the next version bump.
 5. **Format and lint.** Run `cargo fmt --all` and `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` before submitting. CI will reject anything that fails these.

-## What gets merged, what gets closed
-
-We welcome contributions from humans and agents alike. To keep review sustainable, PRs are
-expected to clear a basic quality bar:
-
- **Link an issue.** Bug fixes and features should reference an issue (`Closes #123`). For
-  protocol-level changes (identity, signatures, UCAN, ref certs, wire formats), open the
-  issue *before* writing code.
- **One change per PR.** Unrelated churn slows review and gets sent back.
- **Tests and a green pipeline.** New behavior needs tests; `cargo fmt`, `cargo clippy`,
-  and the full CI suite must pass.
- **A real description.** Say what changes and why. "Update code" is not a description.
-
-A triage bot labels PRs that are missing these and leaves a short note. Nothing is closed
-automatically while you're engaging. A flagged PR still missing a description after 14 days of
-inactivity gets a stale warning, and is closed 7 days later if still untouched. A missing issue
-link alone never triggers closure; that label stays advisory. Closed PRs can be reopened at any
-time once updated.
-
 ## Development environment

 **Requirements:**
@@ -8,16 +8,6 @@ version = "0.11.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "fe438c63458706e03479442743baae6c88256498e6431708f6dfc520a26515d3"

-[[package]]
-name = "aead"
-version = "0.5.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d122413f284cf2d62fb1b7db97e02edb8cda96d769b16e443a4f6195e35662b0"
-dependencies = [
- "crypto-common",
- "generic-array",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "ahash"
 version = "0.8.12"
@@ -329,7 +319,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "keccak-asm",
 "paste",
 "proptest",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
 "rapidhash",
 "ruint",
 "rustc-hash",
@@ -1985,30 +1975,6 @@ version = "0.2.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "613afe47fcd5fac7ccf1db93babcb082c5994d996f20b8b159f2ad1658eb5724"

-[[package]]
-name = "chacha20"
-version = "0.9.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c3613f74bd2eac03dad61bd53dbe620703d4371614fe0bc3b9f04dd36fe4e818"
-dependencies = [
- "cfg-if",
- "cipher",
- "cpufeatures",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "chacha20poly1305"
-version = "0.10.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "10cd79432192d1c0f4e1a0fef9527696cc039165d729fb41b3f4f4f354c2dc35"
-dependencies = [
- "aead",
- "chacha20",
- "cipher",
- "poly1305",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "chrono"
 version = "0.4.44"
@@ -2035,17 +2001,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "unsigned-varint 0.8.0",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "cipher"
-version = "0.4.4"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "773f3b9af64447d2ce9850330c473515014aa235e6a783b02db81ff39e4a3dad"
-dependencies = [
- "crypto-common",
- "inout",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "clap"
 version = "4.5.60"
@@ -2107,7 +2062,7 @@ version = "3.1.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "faf9468729b8cbcea668e36183cb69d317348c2e08e994829fb56ebfdfbaac34"
 dependencies = [
- "windows-sys 0.48.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -2262,7 +2217,7 @@ checksum = "6ddc2d09feefeee8bd78101665bd8645637828fa9317f9f292496dbbd8c65ff3"
 dependencies = [
 "crc",
 "digest 0.10.7",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
 "regex",
 "rustversion",
 ]
@@ -2352,41 +2307,9 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "78c8292055d1c1df0cce5d180393dc8cce0abec0a7102adb6c7b1eef6016d60a"
 dependencies = [
 "generic-array",
- "rand_core 0.6.4",
 "typenum",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "crypto_box"
-version = "0.9.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "16182b4f39a82ec8a6851155cc4c0cda3065bb1db33651726a29e1951de0f009"
-dependencies = [
- "aead",
- "chacha20",
- "crypto_secretbox",
- "curve25519-dalek",
- "salsa20",
- "subtle",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "crypto_secretbox"
-version = "0.1.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b9d6cf87adf719ddf43a805e92c6870a531aedda35ff640442cbaf8674e141e1"
-dependencies = [
- "aead",
- "chacha20",
- "cipher",
- "generic-array",
- "poly1305",
- "salsa20",
- "subtle",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "curve25519-dalek"
 version = "4.1.3"
@@ -2556,7 +2479,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "7ab67060fc6b8ef687992d439ca0fa36e7ed17e9a0b16b25b601e8757df720de"
 dependencies = [
 "data-encoding",
- "syn 1.0.109",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -2928,7 +2851,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "39cab71617ae0d63f51a36d69f866391735b51691dbda63cf6f96d042b63efeb"
 dependencies = [
 "libc",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -3300,11 +3223,10 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
-version = "0.4.0"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "gitlawb-core",
- "mockito",
 "reqwest",
 "tracing",
 "tracing-subscriber",
@@ -3312,7 +3234,7 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
-version = "0.4.0"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
 "base64",
 "ed25519-dalek",
@@ -3329,15 +3251,12 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
-version = "0.4.0"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "base64",
- "chacha20poly1305",
 "chrono",
 "cid",
- "crypto_box",
- "curve25519-dalek",
 "ed25519-dalek",
 "hex",
 "multibase",
@@ -3356,7 +3275,7 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
-version = "0.4.0"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
 "alloy",
 "anyhow",
@@ -3366,19 +3285,16 @@ dependencies = [
 "aws-config",
 "aws-sdk-s3",
 "axum",
- "base64",
 "bytes",
 "chrono",
 "cid",
 "clap",
 "dirs-next",
- "ed25519-dalek",
 "futures",
 "gitlawb-core",
 "hex",
 "hmac",
 "http-body-util",
- "libc",
 "libp2p-core",
 "libp2p-dns",
 "libp2p-gossipsub",
@@ -3405,14 +3321,13 @@ dependencies = [
 "tower-http",
 "tracing",
 "tracing-subscriber",
- "unicode-normalization",
 "uuid",
 "zstd",
 ]

 [[package]]
 name = "gl"
-version = "0.4.0"
+version = "0.3.9"
 dependencies = [
 "alloy",
 "anyhow",
@@ -3420,7 +3335,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "clap",
 "dirs",
 "gitlawb-core",
- "icaptcha-client",
 "mockito",
 "reqwest",
 "serde",
@@ -3603,7 +3517,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "idna",
 "ipnet",
 "once_cell",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
 "ring",
 "thiserror 2.0.18",
 "tinyvec",
@@ -3625,7 +3539,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "moka",
 "once_cell",
 "parking_lot",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
 "resolv-conf",
 "smallvec",
 "thiserror 2.0.18",
@@ -3815,19 +3729,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "cc",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "icaptcha-client"
-version = "0.4.0"
-dependencies = [
- "anyhow",
- "gitlawb-core",
- "reqwest",
- "serde",
- "serde_json",
- "thiserror 2.0.18",
- "tracing",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "icu_collections"
 version = "2.1.1"
@@ -4018,15 +3919,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "serde_core",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "inout"
-version = "0.1.4"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "879f10e63c20629ecabbb64a8010319738c66a5cd0c29b02d63d272b03751d01"
-dependencies = [
- "generic-array",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "ipconfig"
 version = "0.3.4"
@@ -4553,7 +4445,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "hyper-util",
 "log",
 "pin-project-lite",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
 "regex",
 "serde_json",
 "serde_urlencoded",
@@ -4919,12 +4811,6 @@ version = "1.70.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "384b8ab6d37215f3c5301a95a4accb5d64aa607f1fcb26a11b5303878451b4fe"

-[[package]]
-name = "opaque-debug"
-version = "0.3.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c08d65885ee38876c4f86fa503fb49d7b507c2b62552df7c70b2fce627e06381"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "openssl-probe"
 version = "0.2.1"
@@ -5174,17 +5060,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "poly1305"
-version = "0.8.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8159bd90725d2df49889a078b54f4f79e87f1f8a8444194cdca81d38f5393abf"
-dependencies = [
- "cpufeatures",
- "opaque-debug",
- "universal-hash",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "portable-atomic"
 version = "1.13.1"
@@ -5300,7 +5175,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "bit-vec",
 "bitflags 2.11.0",
 "num-traits",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
 "rand_chacha 0.9.0",
 "rand_xorshift",
 "regex-syntax",
@@ -5360,14 +5235,14 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "quinn-proto"
-version = "0.11.15"
+version = "0.11.14"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4fcb935c5bec503c2f0e306bdd3e58bb9029dcb14fa8d9ac76e3a5256ac0763e"
+checksum = "434b42fec591c96ef50e21e886936e66d3cc3f737104fdb9b737c40ffb94c098"
 dependencies = [
 "bytes",
 "getrandom 0.3.4",
 "lru-slab",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
 "ring",
 "rustc-hash",
 "rustls",
@@ -5434,9 +5309,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "rand"
-version = "0.9.3"
+version = "0.9.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7ec095654a25171c2124e9e3393a930bddbffdc939556c914957a4c3e0a87166"
+checksum = "6db2770f06117d490610c7488547d543617b21bfa07796d7a12f6f1bd53850d1"
 dependencies = [
 "rand_chacha 0.9.0",
 "rand_core 0.9.5",
@@ -5756,7 +5631,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "primitive-types",
 "proptest",
 "rand 0.8.6",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
 "rlp",
 "ruint-macro",
 "serde_core",
@@ -5819,7 +5694,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "errno",
 "libc",
 "linux-raw-sys",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -5861,9 +5736,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "rustls-webpki"
-version = "0.103.13"
+version = "0.103.10"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "61c429a8649f110dddef65e2a5ad240f747e85f7758a6bccc7e5777bd33f756e"
+checksum = "df33b2b81ac578cabaf06b89b0631153a3f416b0a886e8a7a1707fb51abbd1ef"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-lc-rs",
 "ring",
@@ -5912,15 +5787,6 @@ version = "0.2.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "6518fc26bced4d53678a22d6e423e9d8716377def84545fe328236e3af070e7f"

-[[package]]
-name = "salsa20"
-version = "0.10.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "97a22f5af31f73a954c10289c93e8a50cc23d971e80ee446f1f6f7137a088213"
-dependencies = [
- "cipher",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "schannel"
 version = "0.1.29"
@@ -6694,9 +6560,9 @@ checksum = "55937e1799185b12863d447f42597ed69d9928686b8d88a1df17376a097d8369"

 [[package]]
 name = "tar"
-version = "0.4.46"
+version = "0.4.45"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3f6221d9a6003c78398e3b239969f352578258df48c8eb051caadae0015bc840"
+checksum = "22692a6476a21fa75fdfc11d452fda482af402c008cdbaf3476414e122040973"
 dependencies = [
 "filetime",
 "libc",
@@ -6713,7 +6579,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "getrandom 0.4.2",
 "once_cell",
 "rustix",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -7076,7 +6942,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "http 1.4.0",
 "httparse",
 "log",
- "rand 0.9.3",
+ "rand 0.9.2",
 "sha1",
 "thiserror 2.0.18",
 "utf-8",
@@ -7169,16 +7035,6 @@ version = "0.2.6"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "ebc1c04c71510c7f702b52b7c350734c9ff1295c464a03335b00bb84fc54f853"

-[[package]]
-name = "universal-hash"
-version = "0.5.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "fc1de2c688dc15305988b563c3854064043356019f97a4b46276fe734c4f07ea"
-dependencies = [
- "crypto-common",
- "subtle",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "unsigned-varint"
 version = "0.7.2"
@@ -6,19 +6,11 @@ members = [
    "crates/gl",
    "crates/git-remote-gitlawb",
    "crates/gitlawb-attest",
-    "crates/icaptcha-client",
 ]

 [workspace.package]
-# Per-crate versions live in each crate's [package] so release-please can manage
-# them (it cannot rewrite an inherited `version.workspace = true`). They are kept
-# in lockstep by release-please's generic updater: each crate's `version` line
-# carries an `# x-release-please-version` annotation and is listed under
-# `extra-files` in release-please-config.json. The release type is `simple`
-# (not `rust`) because the rust strategy unconditionally tries to rewrite this
-# virtual workspace root as a package manifest and errors out.
+version = "0.3.9"
 edition = "2021"
-rust-version = "1.91"
 license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
 authors = ["gitlawb contributors"]
 repository = "https://github.com/gitlawb/node"
@@ -55,7 +47,3 @@ uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4"] }
 reqwest = { version = "0.12", features = ["blocking", "json", "multipart", "rustls-tls"], default-features = false }
 # HMAC
 hmac = "0.12"
-
-[profile.release]
-lto = "thin"
-strip = "symbols"
@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
        git \
        ca-certificates \
        curl \
-        tini \
    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

 # Non-root user for runtime
@@ -73,11 +72,4 @@ VOLUME ["/data"]
 HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=15s --retries=3 \
    CMD curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:${GITLAWB_PORT}/health || exit 1

-# Run under tini so the node is never PID 1. As PID 1 a process must reap
-# reparented orphans itself; the node does not, so git's reparented grandchildren
-# (e.g. pack-objects orphaned when a served upload-pack dies on a client
-# disconnect) would accumulate as zombies until fork() fails with EAGAIN (#53).
-# tini reaps them and forwards SIGTERM/SIGINT to the node, which runs its own
-# graceful shutdown. (No `-g`: the node manages its own children, so group-wide
-# signalling would only disturb in-flight git helpers during shutdown.)
-ENTRYPOINT ["tini", "--", "gitlawb-node"]
+ENTRYPOINT ["gitlawb-node"]
@@ -119,18 +119,10 @@ docker compose down

 ## Install the CLI

+Use the installer once releases are available for your platform:
+
 ```bash
-# npm (macOS / Linux)
-npm install -g @gitlawb/gl
-
-# Homebrew (macOS / Linux)
-brew install gitlawb/tap/gl
-
-# curl (macOS / Linux)
 curl -fsSL https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh
-
-# PowerShell (Windows)
-irm https://gitlawb.com/install.ps1 | iex
 ```

 Or build from source:
@@ -185,45 +177,6 @@ git clone gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../my-repo

 For public-network use, make sure `GITLAWB_NODE` points to the node you want. The helper defaults to localhost for local development.

-### Full lifecycle against an iCaptcha-enforcing node
-
-Public nodes (e.g. `node.gitlawb.com`) require two things on writes:
-
-1. **RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures** — every write is signed by your identity key. `gl`
-   and the `git-remote-gitlawb` helper do this automatically. An old/unsigned CLI
-   fails with `401 not_an_agent`; `gl` will tell you to upgrade and register.
-2. **An iCaptcha proof** on the spam-gated writes (**repo create, fork, register**).
-   `gl` solves this for you: on the node's `403 icaptcha_proof_required` it reads the
-   `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` hints, requests a challenge, solves it
-   locally (arithmetic / algebra / sequence), and **retries the same signed request**
-   with the `x-icaptcha-proof` header — no manual steps, no env vars.
-
-```bash
-gl identity new                                   # create did:key identity
-gl register      --node https://node.gitlawb.com  # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
-gl repo create memlawb --node https://node.gitlawb.com   # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
-git push  origin2 main                            # origin2 = gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb (signed)
-git clone gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb            # public read, no proof needed
-gl doctor                                         # preflight: identity, node, version, iCaptcha
-```
-
-Notes:
-
- **`requesterId` is always your DID.** The proof's `sub` claim must equal the
-  authenticated signer; `gl`/helper set this automatically and the node enforces
-  `sub == authenticated DID` (so a proof minted for another identity is rejected).
- **Proofs are short-lived (~5 min TTL) and single-use.** If one expires between
-  solving and use, the client transparently solves a fresh one and retries.
- **What needs what:** create / fork / register are signed **and** iCaptcha-gated;
-  `git push` is **signed-only** (owner signature is the gate — no per-push challenge);
-  reads (clone / fetch / `repo info`) need no proof. A non-existent repo returns a
-  clear `404`, never a placeholder.
- **API-key iCaptcha deployments:** set `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL` to your iCaptcha
-  origin and `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY` to its key. The client only talks to an
-  `https` origin whose host is allowlisted (that URL or the public default), and
-  sends the bearer token **only** to your configured origin — never to a URL a
-  node advertises — so a hostile node can't capture the key or redirect the solve.
-
 ---

 ## Architecture
@@ -1,40 +1,16 @@
 {
  "$comment": "Canonical seed list for the Gitlawb network. Merged with GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS at startup. PRs to add public nodes welcome.",
  "version": 1,
-  "updated": "2026-06-30",
+  "updated": "2026-05-16",
  "peers": [
    {
      "name": "gitlawb",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
+      "operator": "Gitlawb (Kevin)",
      "did": "did:key:z6MkqDnb7Siv3Cwj7pGJq4T5EsUisECqR8KpnDLwcaZq5TPr",
      "http_url": "https://node.gitlawb.com",
      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
      "added": "2026-04-29"
    },
-    {
-      "name": "gitlawb-node2",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
-      "did": null,
-      "http_url": "https://node2.gitlawb.com",
-      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
-      "added": "2026-06-30"
-    },
-    {
-      "name": "gitlawb-node3",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
-      "did": null,
-      "http_url": "https://node3.gitlawb.com",
-      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
-      "added": "2026-06-30"
-    },
-    {
-      "name": "gitlawb-manila",
-      "operator": "Gitlawb",
-      "did": null,
-      "http_url": "https://manila.gitlawb.com",
-      "p2p_multiaddr": null,
-      "added": "2026-06-30"
-    },
    {
      "name": "rapybus-gitlawb",
      "operator": "RapyBus S.A.C.",
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 [package]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
 description = "Git remote helper — enables 'git clone gitlawb://did:gitlawb:...'"
-version = "0.5.0" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
-rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

 [[bin]]
@@ -16,6 +15,3 @@ anyhow = { workspace = true }
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
 tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
-
-[dev-dependencies]
-mockito = "1"
@@ -14,13 +14,7 @@
 //! # Protocol flow (connect capability)
 //!   capabilities → "connect\n\n"
 //!   connect git-upload-pack  → GET /info/refs | POST /git-upload-pack
-//!   connect git-receive-pack → GET /info/refs | POST /git-receive-pack
-//! Push (git-receive-pack) is RFC-9421 signed from the first request when an
-//! identity keypair is present, since a push can never be anonymous. Fetch
-//! (git-upload-pack) stays anonymous and is signed only on a single retry, after
-//! the node denies the anonymous advertisement with 404 — so a public clone never
-//! discloses the caller's DID, while a private repo's owner (or an authorized
-//! reader) still authenticates when the node demands it.
+//!   connect git-receive-pack → GET /info/refs | POST /git-receive-pack (+ auth header)

 use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
@@ -69,10 +63,7 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
    let repo_base = format!("{}/{}/{}", node_base, short_owner, repo_name);
    tracing::debug!("repo_base: {repo_base}");

-    // Load keypair for signing requests (optional). Push always signs when a key is
-    // present; fetch signs only if the node 404s the anonymous advertisement, so
-    // public fetches stay anonymous. Absent a key, public fetch still works and push
-    // falls back to unsigned (v0.1 local alpha only).
+    // Load keypair for signing push requests (optional — push still works unsigned in v0.1)
    let keypair = load_keypair();

    run_helper(&repo_base, keypair.as_ref())
@@ -124,7 +115,7 @@ fn help_text() -> String {
         \n\
         ENVIRONMENT:\n\
         \x20   GITLAWB_NODE   Node base URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:7545)\n\
-         \x20   GITLAWB_KEY    Identity PEM path for signed fetch/push (default: ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem)\n\
+         \x20   GITLAWB_KEY    Identity PEM path for signed pushes (default: ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem)\n\
         \x20   GITLAWB_LOG    Log filter (default: warn)\n\
         \n\
         FLAGS:\n\
@@ -188,11 +179,11 @@ fn run_helper(repo_base: &str, keypair: Option<&Keypair>) -> Result<()> {

 // ── HTTP proxy for git smart protocol ────────────────────────────────────────

-fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
+fn handle_connect(
    repo_base: &str,
    service: &str,
    keypair: Option<&Keypair>,
-    stdin: &mut R,
+    stdin: &mut io::BufReader<io::Stdin>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
    match service {
        "git-upload-pack" | "git-receive-pack" => {}
@@ -207,52 +198,19 @@ fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
    //
    // The server advertises its refs. git reads this to decide what to fetch/push.

-    // Signing policy for this exchange, carried through to the Phase-2 POST:
-    //  - git-receive-pack (push): sign from the first request; a push is
-    //    signature-gated and can never be anonymous.
-    //  - git-upload-pack (fetch): start anonymous so a public clone never discloses
-    //    the caller's DID, then escalate to a single signed retry only if the node
-    //    denies the anonymous advertisement with 404 (how it withholds a private
-    //    repo from an unauthenticated reader).
-    let mut signing_key = if service == "git-receive-pack" {
-        keypair
-    } else {
-        None
-    };
-
    let refs_url = format!("{}/info/refs?service={}", repo_base, service);
    tracing::debug!("GET {refs_url}");

-    let mut refs_resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, signing_key)
+    let refs_resp = client
+        .get(&refs_url)
+        .header("User-Agent", "git/2.0 git-remote-gitlawb/0.1.0")
        .send()
        .with_context(|| format!("GET {refs_url}"))?;

-    // Fetch escalation: retry the advertisement signed once when the anonymous try
-    // is denied and we hold an identity. A public repo answers 200 on the first
-    // (anonymous) request and never reaches here, so it stays DID-private.
-    if service == "git-upload-pack"
-        && refs_resp.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND
-        && keypair.is_some()
-    {
-        tracing::debug!("anonymous info/refs returned 404; retrying signed");
-        signing_key = keypair;
-        refs_resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, signing_key)
-            .send()
-            .with_context(|| format!("GET {refs_url} (signed retry)"))?;
-    }
-
    if !refs_resp.status().is_success() {
-        let status = refs_resp.status();
-        let body = read_error_body(refs_resp);
        bail!(
-            "{}",
-            http_error_message(
-                "GET",
-                "/info/refs",
-                status,
-                &body,
-                Some("— is the repo registered on this node?")
-            )
+            "GET /info/refs returned {} — is the repo registered on this node?",
+            refs_resp.status()
        );
    }

@@ -308,20 +266,35 @@ fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
    let post_url = format!("{}/{}", repo_base, service);
    tracing::debug!("POST {post_url} ({} bytes)", request_body.len());

-    let req = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &request_body, signing_key);
+    // Extract the URL path for signing (e.g., "/z6Mk.../my-repo/git-receive-pack")
+    let path_for_sig = url_path(&post_url);

-    // Attach the body after signing so the pack bytes are moved, not cloned —
-    // packs can be large and the clone doubled peak memory on push.
-    let pack_resp = req
-        .body(request_body)
-        .send()
-        .with_context(|| format!("POST {post_url}"))?;
+    let mut req = client
+        .post(&post_url)
+        .header("Content-Type", format!("application/x-{}-request", service))
+        .header("User-Agent", "git/2.0 git-remote-gitlawb/0.1.0")
+        .body(request_body.clone());
+
+    // Add RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth on push operations
+    if service == "git-receive-pack" {
+        if let Some(kp) = keypair {
+            let signed = sign_request(kp, "POST", &path_for_sig, &request_body);
+            req = req
+                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
+                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
+                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
+            tracing::debug!("attached RFC 9421 HTTP Signature (DID: {})", kp.did());
+        } else {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                "no identity keypair found — push will be unsigned (v0.1 local alpha only)"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    let pack_resp = req.send().with_context(|| format!("POST {post_url}"))?;

    if !pack_resp.status().is_success() {
-        let status = pack_resp.status();
-        let body = read_error_body(pack_resp);
-        let path = format!("/{service}");
-        bail!("{}", http_error_message("POST", &path, status, &body, None));
+        bail!("POST /{} returned {}", service, pack_resp.status());
    }

    let pack_bytes = pack_resp.bytes().context("reading pack response")?;
@@ -333,68 +306,6 @@ fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
    Ok(())
 }

-// ── Smart-protocol request builders ───────────────────────────────────────────
-
-const USER_AGENT: &str = "git/2.0 git-remote-gitlawb/0.1.0";
-
-/// Build the Phase-1 ref-advertisement GET, signing it when an identity is
-/// present. The node gates the ref advertisement on read visibility for BOTH
-/// services, so a private repo's advertisement is denied (404) to an
-/// unauthenticated caller; without this signature the repo's own owner can
-/// neither fetch (upload-pack) nor push (receive-pack) it. Public repos still
-/// work anonymously (no keypair present, or the gate admits anonymous). Sign over
-/// the path *and* query (?service=...) because the node verifies the signature
-/// over its path_and_query.
-fn build_advertisement_request(
-    client: &reqwest::blocking::Client,
-    refs_url: &str,
-    keypair: Option<&Keypair>,
-) -> reqwest::blocking::RequestBuilder {
-    let mut req = client.get(refs_url).header("User-Agent", USER_AGENT);
-    if let Some(kp) = keypair {
-        let signed = sign_request(kp, "GET", &url_path(refs_url), b"");
-        req = req
-            .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
-            .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
-            .header("Signature", signed.signature);
-        tracing::debug!("signed info/refs advertisement (DID: {})", kp.did());
-    }
-    req
-}
-
-/// Build the Phase-2 pack POST, signing it when an identity is present, for BOTH
-/// services. The node read-gates the git-upload-pack POST with visibility_check
-/// at "/", and separately owner-gates the git-receive-pack POST (signature
-/// required, enforced by middleware). The Phase-1 advertisement signature does
-/// not carry to this separate request, so a private repo's owner must
-/// authenticate here too or their fetch/push is denied.
-/// Public-repo fetch still works anonymously when no keypair is present. The body
-/// is signed (content-digest) but NOT attached here, so the caller can move the
-/// (possibly large) pack bytes into `.body()` rather than clone them.
-fn build_pack_post_request(
-    client: &reqwest::blocking::Client,
-    post_url: &str,
-    service: &str,
-    body: &[u8],
-    keypair: Option<&Keypair>,
-) -> reqwest::blocking::RequestBuilder {
-    let mut req = client
-        .post(post_url)
-        .header("Content-Type", format!("application/x-{}-request", service))
-        .header("User-Agent", USER_AGENT);
-    if let Some(kp) = keypair {
-        let signed = sign_request(kp, "POST", &url_path(post_url), body);
-        req = req
-            .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
-            .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
-            .header("Signature", signed.signature);
-        tracing::debug!("signed {service} POST (DID: {})", kp.did());
-    } else if service == "git-receive-pack" {
-        tracing::warn!("no identity keypair found, push will be unsigned (v0.1 local alpha only)");
-    }
-    req
-}
-
 // ── URL helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 /// Parse a `gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../repo-name` URL.
@@ -432,7 +343,7 @@ fn parse_gitlawb_url(url: &str) -> Result<(String, String, String)> {
 ///
 /// We also handle the flush-only case (`"0000"`) that git sends when it already
 /// has everything it needs (up-to-date clone).
-fn read_upload_pack_request<R: Read>(stdin: &mut R) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+fn read_upload_pack_request(stdin: &mut io::BufReader<io::Stdin>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let mut buf = Vec::new();

    loop {
@@ -518,78 +429,6 @@ fn url_path(url: &str) -> String {
        .unwrap_or_else(|| "/".to_string())
 }

-const MAX_ERROR_BODY_BYTES: u64 = 4096;
-const MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS: usize = 2000;
-
-fn read_error_body(mut response: reqwest::blocking::Response) -> String {
-    let mut body = Vec::new();
-    let mut limited = (&mut response).take(MAX_ERROR_BODY_BYTES);
-
-    if limited.read_to_end(&mut body).is_err() {
-        return String::new();
-    }
-
-    String::from_utf8_lossy(&body).into_owned()
-}
-
-fn http_error_message(
-    method: &str,
-    path: &str,
-    status: reqwest::StatusCode,
-    body: &str,
-    empty_body_hint: Option<&str>,
-) -> String {
-    let mut message = format!("{method} {path} returned {status}");
-    let body = safe_error_body_excerpt(body);
-
-    if !body.is_empty() {
-        message.push_str(": ");
-        message.push_str(&body);
-    } else if let Some(hint) = empty_body_hint {
-        message.push(' ');
-        message.push_str(hint);
-    }
-
-    message
-}
-
-fn safe_error_body_excerpt(body: &str) -> String {
-    let mut excerpt = String::new();
-    let mut pending_space = false;
-    let mut kept_chars = 0;
-
-    for ch in body.trim().chars() {
-        if kept_chars >= MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS {
-            break;
-        }
-
-        if ch.is_control() {
-            if matches!(ch, '\n' | '\r' | '\t') {
-                pending_space = true;
-            }
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        if ch.is_whitespace() {
-            pending_space = true;
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        if pending_space && !excerpt.is_empty() {
-            excerpt.push(' ');
-            kept_chars += 1;
-            if kept_chars >= MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS {
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        excerpt.push(ch);
-        kept_chars += 1;
-        pending_space = false;
-    }
-
-    excerpt
-}
-
 // ── Keypair loading ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 fn load_keypair() -> Option<Keypair> {
@@ -633,467 +472,6 @@ fn resolve_key_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
-    use std::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
-    use std::thread::JoinHandle;
-
-    struct TestResponse {
-        request_line: &'static str,
-        status: &'static str,
-        body: &'static str,
-    }
-
-    fn serve_http(responses: Vec<TestResponse>) -> (String, JoinHandle<Vec<String>>) {
-        let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
-        let base_url = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr().unwrap());
-        let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || {
-            let mut requests = Vec::new();
-
-            for response in responses {
-                let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().unwrap();
-                let request = read_http_request(&mut stream);
-                assert!(
-                    request.starts_with(response.request_line),
-                    "unexpected request:\n{request}"
-                );
-
-                let response_text = format!(
-                    "HTTP/1.1 {}\r\ncontent-type: application/json\r\ncontent-length: {}\r\nconnection: close\r\n\r\n{}",
-                    response.status,
-                    response.body.len(),
-                    response.body
-                );
-                stream.write_all(response_text.as_bytes()).unwrap();
-                requests.push(request);
-            }
-
-            requests
-        });
-
-        (base_url, handle)
-    }
-
-    fn read_http_request(stream: &mut TcpStream) -> String {
-        let mut buf = Vec::new();
-        let mut chunk = [0u8; 512];
-        let mut header_len = None;
-
-        loop {
-            let n = stream.read(&mut chunk).unwrap();
-            if n == 0 {
-                break;
-            }
-            buf.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..n]);
-
-            if header_len.is_none() {
-                header_len = buf.windows(4).position(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n").map(|p| p + 4);
-            }
-
-            if let Some(header_len) = header_len {
-                let header = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..header_len]);
-                let content_len = header
-                    .lines()
-                    .find_map(|line| {
-                        let (name, value) = line.split_once(':')?;
-                        name.eq_ignore_ascii_case("content-length")
-                            .then(|| value.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
-                            .flatten()
-                    })
-                    .unwrap_or(0);
-
-                if buf.len() >= header_len + content_len {
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf).into_owned()
-    }
-
-    /// The regression that round-1 missed: the Phase-2 `git-upload-pack` POST was
-    /// left unsigned, so an owner's fetch of a private repo cleared the (now signed)
-    /// advertisement and then 404'd on the pack POST. Drive BOTH request builders
-    /// against a mock node and assert the RFC-9421 headers actually go out on the
-    /// wire for BOTH services when a keypair is present (the mock only matches when
-    /// the headers exist, so `.assert()` fails if any are dropped).
-    #[test]
-    fn advertisement_and_pack_post_are_signed_for_both_services_with_keypair() {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
-        let body = b"0009done\n".to_vec();
-
-        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
-            let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
-            let repo_base = format!("{}/zOwner/myrepo", server.url());
-
-            let get_mock = server
-                .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/info/refs".to_string()))
-                .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-                .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-                .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-                .with_status(200)
-                .create();
-            let refs_url = format!("{repo_base}/info/refs?service={service}");
-            let resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, Some(&kp))
-                .send()
-                .unwrap();
-            assert!(resp.status().is_success());
-            get_mock.assert();
-
-            let post_mock = server
-                .mock("POST", mockito::Matcher::Regex(format!("/{service}$")))
-                .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-                .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-                .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-                .with_status(200)
-                .create();
-            let post_url = format!("{repo_base}/{service}");
-            let resp = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &body, Some(&kp))
-                .body(body.clone())
-                .send()
-                .unwrap();
-            assert!(resp.status().is_success());
-            post_mock.assert();
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Without an identity, the pack POST must go out UNSIGNED so public fetch (and
-    /// alpha unsigned push) still work. `Matcher::Missing` matches only when the
-    /// header is absent, so the mock is hit only if NO signature was attached, for
-    /// BOTH services (the receive-pack iteration also exercises the no-keypair warn
-    /// branch and confirms it does not block the request).
-    #[test]
-    fn pack_post_is_unsigned_without_keypair_for_both_services() {
-        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
-        let body = b"0009done\n".to_vec();
-
-        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
-            let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
-            let post_url = format!("{}/zOwner/myrepo/{service}", server.url());
-
-            let post_mock = server
-                .mock("POST", mockito::Matcher::Regex(format!("/{service}$")))
-                .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-                .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-                .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-                .with_status(200)
-                .create();
-            let resp = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &body, None)
-                .body(body.clone())
-                .send()
-                .unwrap();
-            assert!(resp.status().is_success());
-            post_mock.assert();
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Symmetric negative case for Phase 1: with no identity the advertisement GET
-    /// carries no signature, so public clones stay anonymous.
-    #[test]
-    fn advertisement_get_is_unsigned_without_keypair() {
-        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
-        let refs_url = format!(
-            "{}/zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-            server.url()
-        );
-
-        let get_mock = server
-            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/info/refs".to_string()))
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-            .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .create();
-        let resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, None)
-            .send()
-            .unwrap();
-        assert!(resp.status().is_success());
-        get_mock.assert();
-    }
-
-    // ── Phase-1 retry-on-404 (P2, #119): fetch stays anonymous until the node
-    //    denies it, then escalates to ONE signed retry. Drives handle_connect end to
-    //    end against the recording mock, asserting what actually goes on the wire.
-    //    A request is "signed" iff it carries the `signature-input` header.
-
-    /// Public fetch: the node serves the anonymous advertisement (200), so the
-    /// client never signs — not the advertisement GET, not the upload-pack POST —
-    /// even though an identity is present. This is the privacy fix: a public clone
-    /// must not disclose the caller's DID.
-    #[test]
-    fn fetch_public_stays_anonymous_even_with_keypair() {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "0000",
-            },
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "POST /zOwner/myrepo/git-upload-pack",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "",
-            },
-        ]);
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0009done\n".to_vec());
-        handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin)
-            .expect("public fetch should succeed");
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2, "public fetch must not retry");
-        assert!(
-            !requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "the advertisement GET must be anonymous for a public fetch"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "the upload-pack POST must be anonymous for a public fetch"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Private fetch: the anonymous advertisement is denied (404); with an identity
-    /// present the client retries the GET signed and — because Phase 1 needed
-    /// signing — also signs the Phase-2 upload-pack POST. The FIRST request is still
-    /// anonymous: the DID is not disclosed until the node demands authentication.
-    #[test]
-    fn fetch_private_retries_signed_on_404_and_signs_the_pack_post() {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-                status: "404 Not Found",
-                body: r#"{"message":"repository is not registered on this node"}"#,
-            },
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "0000",
-            },
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "POST /zOwner/myrepo/git-upload-pack",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "",
-            },
-        ]);
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0009done\n".to_vec());
-        handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin)
-            .expect("signed retry should succeed");
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            requests.len(),
-            3,
-            "expected anon GET, signed GET retry, signed POST"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "the first advertisement GET must be anonymous"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "the retry advertisement GET must be signed"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            requests[2].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "the upload-pack POST must be signed once the fetch needed auth"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Private fetch with no identity: the anonymous advertisement 404s and there is
-    /// no keypair to retry with, so the client surfaces the error after exactly one
-    /// request — no retry, no hang.
-    #[test]
-    fn fetch_without_keypair_does_not_retry_on_404() {
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![TestResponse {
-            request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-            status: "404 Not Found",
-            body: r#"{"message":"not found"}"#,
-        }]);
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
-        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.to_string().contains("returned 404 Not Found"));
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 1, "no keypair means no signed retry");
-        assert!(!requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"));
-    }
-
-    /// Private fetch where the SIGNED retry is also denied (caller is not a reader):
-    /// the client retries exactly once, then surfaces the 404 rather than looping.
-    /// Bounds the escalation to a single signed attempt.
-    #[test]
-    fn fetch_signed_retry_still_denied_surfaces_error_once() {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-                status: "404 Not Found",
-                body: r#"{"message":"not found"}"#,
-            },
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
-                status: "404 Not Found",
-                body: r#"{"message":"not found"}"#,
-            },
-        ]);
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
-        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.to_string().contains("returned 404 Not Found"));
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2, "exactly one signed retry, then surface");
-        assert!(!requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"));
-        assert!(requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"));
-    }
-
-    /// Push (git-receive-pack) is unchanged: it signs from the FIRST request — you
-    /// cannot push anonymously — so there is no anonymous-first probe for push.
-    #[test]
-    fn push_advertisement_is_signed_from_the_first_request() {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "0000",
-            },
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "POST /zOwner/myrepo/git-receive-pack",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "",
-            },
-        ]);
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0000".to_vec());
-        handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-receive-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin)
-            .expect("push should succeed");
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2);
-        assert!(
-            requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "push advertisement must be signed from the first request"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
-            "push POST must be signed"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Cross-crate seam: the signature the CLIENT actually emits (via the real
-    /// request builders) verifies under the SAME `gitlawb_core::http_sig`
-    /// primitives the node's `require_signature` uses, over the `@path` the client
-    /// genuinely transmits (derived from the built reqwest request, exactly as the
-    /// node derives it from `uri.path_and_query()`). A tampered `@path` must fail:
-    /// this is the byte-match the whole A1 client fix depends on, now executed end
-    /// to end (sign here, verify with the node's verifier), not reasoned.
-    #[test]
-    fn client_signature_verifies_under_node_verification_for_both_services() {
-        use gitlawb_core::http_sig::{build_signing_string, compute_content_digest, HttpSignature};
-        use gitlawb_core::identity::verify;
-        use std::collections::HashMap;
-
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
-        let body = b"0009done\n".to_vec();
-
-        // Re-implements the node's require_signature verification (auth/mod.rs):
-        // parse headers, recompute content-digest from the body, rebuild the signing
-        // string over @method/@path/content-digest, Ed25519-verify. Ok iff the node
-        // would accept it.
-        let node_verifies = |method: &str,
-                             path_and_query: &str,
-                             body: &[u8],
-                             sig_input: &str,
-                             sig_header: &str,
-                             content_digest: &str|
-         -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-            let sig = HttpSignature::parse(sig_input, sig_header)?;
-            sig.check_created()?;
-            assert!(
-                sig.missing_components().is_empty(),
-                "signature must cover all required components"
-            );
-            assert_eq!(sig.alg, "ed25519");
-            assert_eq!(
-                content_digest,
-                compute_content_digest(body),
-                "content-digest must match the body"
-            );
-            let vk = sig.key_id.to_verifying_key()?;
-            let mut values = HashMap::new();
-            values.insert("@method".to_string(), method.to_uppercase());
-            values.insert("@path".to_string(), path_and_query.to_string());
-            values.insert("content-digest".to_string(), content_digest.to_string());
-            let sig_params_value = sig_input.strip_prefix("sig1=").unwrap_or(sig_input);
-            let components: Vec<&str> = sig.components.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
-            let signing_string = build_signing_string(&components, sig_params_value, &values)?;
-            let sig_array: [u8; 64] = sig.signature_bytes.as_slice().try_into()?;
-            verify(&vk, signing_string.as_bytes(), &sig_array)?;
-            Ok(())
-        };
-        // @path exactly as the node reconstructs it from the request it receives.
-        let path_and_query = |req: &reqwest::blocking::Request| match req.url().query() {
-            Some(q) => format!("{}?{}", req.url().path(), q),
-            None => req.url().path().to_string(),
-        };
-        let header = |req: &reqwest::blocking::Request, name: &str| {
-            req.headers()
-                .get(name)
-                .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("missing {name}"))
-                .to_str()
-                .unwrap()
-                .to_string()
-        };
-
-        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
-            // Phase-1 advertisement GET (empty body).
-            let refs_url = format!("http://node.example/zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service={service}");
-            let req = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, Some(&kp))
-                .build()
-                .unwrap();
-            node_verifies(
-                "GET",
-                &path_and_query(&req),
-                b"",
-                &header(&req, "signature-input"),
-                &header(&req, "signature"),
-                &header(&req, "content-digest"),
-            )
-            .expect("client GET signature must verify under the node's verifier");
-
-            // Phase-2 pack POST (real body).
-            let post_url = format!("http://node.example/zOwner/myrepo/{service}");
-            let req = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &body, Some(&kp))
-                .body(body.clone())
-                .build()
-                .unwrap();
-            let pq = path_and_query(&req);
-            node_verifies(
-                "POST",
-                &pq,
-                &body,
-                &header(&req, "signature-input"),
-                &header(&req, "signature"),
-                &header(&req, "content-digest"),
-            )
-            .expect("client POST signature must verify under the node's verifier");
-
-            // Negative: a tampered @path (the A1 attack surface) must NOT verify.
-            let tampered = pq.replace(service, "git-evil");
-            assert!(
-                node_verifies(
-                    "POST",
-                    &tampered,
-                    &body,
-                    &header(&req, "signature-input"),
-                    &header(&req, "signature"),
-                    &header(&req, "content-digest"),
-                )
-                .is_err(),
-                "a tampered @path must fail verification"
-            );
-        }
-    }

    #[test]
    fn parse_standard_url() {
@@ -1142,100 +520,6 @@ mod tests {
        );
    }

-    #[test]
-    fn http_error_message_sanitizes_response_body_controls() {
-        let message = http_error_message(
-            "GET",
-            "/info/refs",
-            reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
-            "\u{1b}[2Jrepository\r\nis\tblocked\u{7}",
-            None,
-        );
-
-        assert!(message.contains("repository is blocked"));
-        assert!(!message.contains('\u{1b}'));
-        assert!(!message.contains('\u{7}'));
-        assert!(!message.contains('\r'));
-        assert!(!message.contains('\n'));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn http_error_message_truncates_long_response_body() {
-        let body = "x".repeat(MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS + 100);
-        let message = http_error_message(
-            "POST",
-            "/git-receive-pack",
-            reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
-            &body,
-            None,
-        );
-        let prefix = "POST /git-receive-pack returned 403 Forbidden: ";
-
-        assert_eq!(message.len(), prefix.len() + MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS);
-        assert!(message.starts_with(prefix));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn connect_get_error_includes_response_body() {
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![TestResponse {
-            request_line: "GET /z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1",
-            status: "404 Not Found",
-            body: r#"{"message":"repository is not registered on this node"}"#,
-        }]);
-
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/z6Mk/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
-        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
-        let message = err.to_string();
-
-        assert!(message.contains("GET /info/refs returned 404 Not Found"));
-        assert!(message.contains("repository is not registered on this node"));
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 1);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn connect_post_error_includes_response_body() {
-        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "GET /z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack HTTP/1.1",
-                status: "200 OK",
-                body: "",
-            },
-            TestResponse {
-                request_line: "POST /z6Mk/myrepo/git-receive-pack HTTP/1.1",
-                status: "403 Forbidden",
-                body: r#"{"error":"forbidden","message":"push rejected: only the repo owner may push"}"#,
-            },
-        ]);
-
-        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/z6Mk/myrepo");
-        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0000".to_vec());
-        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-receive-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
-        let message = err.to_string();
-
-        assert!(message.contains("POST /git-receive-pack returned 403 Forbidden"));
-        assert!(message.contains("push rejected: only the repo owner may push"));
-        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2);
-        assert!(requests[1].contains("\r\n\r\n0000"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn url_path_preserves_query_for_signed_advertisement() {
-        // The Phase-1 advertisement GET is signed over url_path(refs_url), and the
-        // node verifies the signature over its path_and_query, so the ?service=
-        // query MUST survive verbatim or the signatures will not byte-match.
-        assert_eq!(
-            url_path("http://127.0.0.1:7545/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"),
-            "/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            url_path("http://127.0.0.1:7545/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack"),
-            "/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack"
-        );
-    }
-
    fn args(items: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
        items.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
    }
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
 description = "External Attestation v1: pluggable provenance attachments for gitlawb ref-update certs"
-version = "0.5.0" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
-rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

 [dependencies]
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ impl Attestation {
                self.type_
            )));
        }
-        Ok(P::deserialize(&self.payload)?)
+        Ok(serde_json::from_value(self.payload.clone())?)
    }
 }

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
 description = "Core cryptographic primitives for the gitlawb network: DIDs, CIDs, UCAN, HTTP Signatures, ref-update certificates"
-version = "0.5.0" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
-rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

 [dependencies]
@@ -24,9 +23,6 @@ chrono = { workspace = true }
 uuid = { workspace = true }
 zeroize = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
 pkcs8 = { version = "0.10", features = ["pem", "std"] }
-curve25519-dalek = "4"
-crypto_box = { version = "0.9", features = ["std", "chacha20"] }
-chacha20poly1305 = "0.10"

 [dev-dependencies]
 tokio = { workspace = true }
@@ -1,296 +0,0 @@
-//! Envelope encryption for withheld blobs (Option B). A random content key
-//! encrypts the blob (XChaCha20-Poly1305); the content key is wrapped to each
-//! recipient via an X25519 box keyed from their Ed25519 `did:key`. The node
-//! seals with public keys only; readers open with their own private key.
-
-use crate::identity::Keypair;
-use anyhow::{Context, Result};
-use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
-use zeroize::Zeroizing;
-
-/// X25519 public key (Montgomery u) for an Ed25519 verifying key.
-fn x25519_public(vk: &VerifyingKey) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
-    use curve25519_dalek::edwards::CompressedEdwardsY;
-    let edwards = CompressedEdwardsY::from_slice(vk.as_bytes())
-        .ok()
-        .and_then(|c| c.decompress())
-        .context("verifying key is not a valid edwards point")?;
-    Ok(edwards.to_montgomery().to_bytes())
-}
-
-/// X25519 secret scalar for an Ed25519 seed (SHA-512 of seed, lower 32, clamped).
-/// Returns the scalar wrapped in `Zeroizing`, and scrubs the intermediate
-/// SHA-512 digest, so no copy of this secret material lingers in freed memory.
-fn x25519_secret_from_seed(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> {
-    use sha2::{Digest, Sha512};
-    use zeroize::Zeroize;
-    let mut h = Sha512::digest(seed);
-    let mut s = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
-    s.copy_from_slice(&h[..32]);
-    s[0] &= 248;
-    s[31] &= 127;
-    s[31] |= 64;
-    h.as_mut_slice().zeroize();
-    s
-}
-
-use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as B64, Engine};
-use chacha20poly1305::{
-    aead::{Aead, KeyInit},
-    XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
-};
-use crypto_box::{
-    aead::{AeadCore, OsRng},
-    ChaChaBox, PublicKey as XPublic, SecretKey as XSecret,
-};
-use rand::RngCore;
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-
-const MAGIC: &[u8] = b"GLENC";
-const VERSION: u8 = 2;
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-struct Recipient {
-    eph: String,   // base64 ephemeral x25519 pubkey (32B)
-    nonce: String, // base64 box nonce (24B)
-    wrap: String,  // base64 wrapped content key
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-struct Header {
-    alg: String,
-    nonce: String, // base64 body nonce (24B)
-    recipients: Vec<Recipient>,
-}
-
-/// Encrypt `plaintext` so any of `recipients` (Ed25519 keys) can decrypt.
-pub fn seal_blob(plaintext: &[u8], recipients: &[VerifyingKey]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    if recipients.is_empty() {
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("seal_blob: no recipients"));
-    }
-    let mut content_key = [0u8; 32];
-    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut content_key);
-    let body_cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&content_key)
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("content key: {e}"))?;
-    let mut body_nonce = [0u8; 24];
-    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut body_nonce);
-    let body = body_cipher
-        .encrypt(XNonce::from_slice(&body_nonce), plaintext)
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("body encrypt: {e}"))?;
-
-    let mut wrapped = Vec::with_capacity(recipients.len());
-    for vk in recipients {
-        let recip_x = XPublic::from(x25519_public(vk)?);
-        let eph = XSecret::generate(&mut OsRng);
-        let abox = ChaChaBox::new(&recip_x, &eph);
-        let nonce = ChaChaBox::generate_nonce(&mut OsRng);
-        let ct = abox
-            .encrypt(&nonce, &content_key[..])
-            .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("wrap: {e}"))?;
-        wrapped.push(Recipient {
-            eph: B64.encode(eph.public_key().as_bytes()),
-            nonce: B64.encode(nonce),
-            wrap: B64.encode(ct),
-        });
-    }
-
-    let header = Header {
-        alg: "xchacha20poly1305".into(),
-        nonce: B64.encode(body_nonce),
-        recipients: wrapped,
-    };
-    let header_json = serde_json::to_vec(&header).context("encode header")?;
-
-    let mut out = Vec::new();
-    out.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
-    out.push(VERSION);
-    out.extend_from_slice(&(header_json.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
-    out.extend_from_slice(&header_json);
-    out.extend_from_slice(&body);
-    Ok(out)
-}
-
-/// Decrypt an envelope with `keypair`. Errors if not a recipient or on auth fail.
-pub fn open_blob(envelope: &[u8], keypair: &Keypair) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let mut p = 0;
-    if envelope.len() < MAGIC.len() + 1 + 4 || &envelope[..MAGIC.len()] != MAGIC {
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("bad envelope magic"));
-    }
-    p += MAGIC.len();
-    if envelope[p] != VERSION {
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("unsupported envelope version"));
-    }
-    p += 1;
-    let hlen = u32::from_le_bytes(envelope[p..p + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
-    p += 4;
-    let header: Header =
-        serde_json::from_slice(envelope.get(p..p + hlen).context("truncated header")?)
-            .context("decode header")?;
-    let body = &envelope[p + hlen..];
-
-    let my_x = XSecret::from(*x25519_secret_from_seed(&keypair.to_seed()));
-
-    // Identities are blinded: no entry says which recipient it belongs to, so
-    // try each one. The ChaChaBox AEAD tag authenticates, so exactly the
-    // reader's own entry unwraps; every other entry fails cleanly.
-    let mut content_key: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
-    for entry in &header.recipients {
-        let eph = match B64
-            .decode(&entry.eph)
-            .ok()
-            .and_then(|b| <[u8; 32]>::try_from(b.as_slice()).ok())
-        {
-            Some(b) => XPublic::from(b),
-            None => continue,
-        };
-        // from_slice panics on a wrong length, and the envelope is attacker
-        // controlled, so validate the 24-byte box nonce before using it.
-        let nonce = match B64
-            .decode(&entry.nonce)
-            .ok()
-            .and_then(|n| <[u8; 24]>::try_from(n.as_slice()).ok())
-        {
-            Some(n) => n,
-            None => continue,
-        };
-        let wrap = match B64.decode(&entry.wrap) {
-            Ok(w) => w,
-            Err(_) => continue,
-        };
-        let abox = ChaChaBox::new(&eph, &my_x);
-        if let Ok(ck) = abox.decrypt(
-            crypto_box::aead::generic_array::GenericArray::from_slice(&nonce),
-            wrap.as_slice(),
-        ) {
-            content_key = Some(ck);
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    let content_key = content_key.context("not a recipient of this envelope")?;
-
-    let body_cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&content_key)
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("content key: {e}"))?;
-    let body_nonce = B64
-        .decode(&header.nonce)
-        .ok()
-        .and_then(|n| <[u8; 24]>::try_from(n.as_slice()).ok())
-        .context("invalid body nonce")?;
-    body_cipher
-        .decrypt(XNonce::from_slice(&body_nonce), body)
-        .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("body decrypt failed"))
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use crate::identity::Keypair;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ed25519_to_x25519_keypair_agrees() {
-        // The X25519 public derived from the Ed25519 public must equal the
-        // X25519 public of the X25519 secret derived from the same seed.
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        let seed = kp.to_seed();
-        let xpub_from_public = x25519_public(&kp.verifying_key()).unwrap();
-        let xsec = x25519_secret_from_seed(&seed);
-        let xpub_from_secret = crypto_box::SecretKey::from(*xsec).public_key().to_bytes();
-        assert_eq!(xpub_from_public, xpub_from_secret);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn seal_open_round_trip_for_recipients() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let reader_a = Keypair::generate();
-        let reader_b = Keypair::generate();
-        let msg = b"private blob contents";
-
-        let env = seal_blob(msg, &[owner.verifying_key(), reader_a.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(open_blob(&env, &owner).unwrap(), msg);
-        assert_eq!(open_blob(&env, &reader_a).unwrap(), msg);
-        assert!(
-            open_blob(&env, &reader_b).is_err(),
-            "non-recipient must fail"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tampered_envelope_fails() {
-        let owner = Keypair::generate();
-        let mut env = seal_blob(b"hi", &[owner.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
-        let last = env.len() - 1;
-        env[last] ^= 0x01;
-        assert!(open_blob(&env, &owner).is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn v2_header_contains_no_recipient_pubkey() {
-        // The blinded envelope header must not carry any recipient's public key.
-        let reader = Keypair::generate();
-        let env = seal_blob(b"private blob contents", &[reader.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
-
-        // Slice out the header bytes using the envelope framing:
-        // MAGIC | version(1B) | header_len(4B LE) | header_json | body
-        let mut p = MAGIC.len() + 1; // skip MAGIC + version byte
-        let hlen = u32::from_le_bytes(env[p..p + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
-        p += 4;
-        let header = &env[p..p + hlen];
-        let header_str = String::from_utf8_lossy(header);
-
-        let pubkey_b64 = B64.encode(reader.verifying_key().as_bytes());
-        assert!(
-            !header_str.contains(&pubkey_b64),
-            "recipient public key must not appear in the blinded header"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn v1_envelope_is_rejected() {
-        let reader = Keypair::generate();
-        let mut env = seal_blob(b"hi", &[reader.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
-        // Flip the version byte (immediately after MAGIC) from 2 to 1.
-        env[MAGIC.len()] = 1;
-        let err = open_blob(&env, &reader).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string().contains("unsupported envelope version"),
-            "expected version-rejection error, got: {err}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn malformed_nonce_returns_err_not_panic() {
-        // from_slice panics on wrong-length input; a crafted envelope on the
-        // public recovery path must surface an error, never panic.
-        let reader = Keypair::generate();
-        let env = seal_blob(b"private blob contents", &[reader.verifying_key()]).unwrap();
-
-        // Split the envelope framing into header JSON and body.
-        let mut p = MAGIC.len() + 1;
-        let hlen = u32::from_le_bytes(env[p..p + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
-        p += 4;
-        let header_bytes = &env[p..p + hlen];
-        let body = &env[p + hlen..];
-
-        let reframe = |header: &serde_json::Value| -> Vec<u8> {
-            let hj = serde_json::to_vec(header).unwrap();
-            let mut out = Vec::new();
-            out.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
-            out.push(VERSION);
-            out.extend_from_slice(&(hj.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
-            out.extend_from_slice(&hj);
-            out.extend_from_slice(body);
-            out
-        };
-        let bad_nonce = serde_json::Value::String(B64.encode([0u8; 12]));
-
-        // Corrupted per-recipient nonce: entry is skipped, no match.
-        let mut header: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(header_bytes).unwrap();
-        header["recipients"][0]["nonce"] = bad_nonce.clone();
-        assert!(open_blob(&reframe(&header), &reader).is_err());
-
-        // Corrupted body nonce: unwrap succeeds, body nonce is rejected.
-        let mut header: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(header_bytes).unwrap();
-        header["nonce"] = bad_nonce;
-        assert!(open_blob(&reframe(&header), &reader).is_err());
-    }
-}
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ impl HttpSignature {
    pub fn missing_components(&self) -> Vec<&str> {
        COVERED_COMPONENTS
            .iter()
-            .filter(|c| !self.components.iter().any(|s| s.as_str() == **c))
+            .filter(|c| !self.components.contains(&c.to_string()))
            .copied()
            .collect()
    }
@@ -52,9 +52,7 @@ impl Keypair {
        URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(sig.to_bytes())
    }

-    /// The raw 32-byte Ed25519 seed, wrapped in `Zeroizing` so the copy is
-    /// scrubbed on drop. This is the only seed accessor; it is used to derive
-    /// the X25519 secret for envelope decryption (see `crate::encrypt`).
+    /// Export the signing key as raw 32-byte seed (wrapped in Zeroizing).
    pub fn to_seed(&self) -> Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> {
        Zeroizing::new(self.signing_key.to_bytes())
    }
@@ -168,20 +166,6 @@ mod tests {
        assert_eq!(kp.verifying_key(), kp2.verifying_key());
    }

-    // `to_seed()` is the only seed accessor on `Keypair` (the raw, unzeroized
-    // `seed_bytes()` was removed in #41). Pin its return type so a bare-array
-    // accessor can't slip back in, and confirm it is deterministic. The
-    // from_seed -> verifying_key round-trip is already covered by
-    // `from_seed_round_trip`.
-    #[test]
-    fn to_seed_returns_zeroizing_and_is_deterministic() {
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        // The type annotation is the regression guard: the seed must be handed
-        // out wrapped in `Zeroizing`, never as a bare `[u8; 32]`.
-        let seed: Zeroizing<[u8; 32]> = kp.to_seed();
-        assert_eq!(*kp.to_seed(), *seed); // stable across calls
-    }
-
    #[test]
    fn sign_b64_decodes_to_valid_signature() {
        use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 pub mod cert;
 pub mod cid;
 pub mod did;
-pub mod encrypt;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod http_sig;
 pub mod identity;
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
 description = "The gitlawb node daemon — git hosting over HTTP with DID auth"
-version = "0.5.0" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
-rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

 [[bin]]
@@ -12,8 +11,6 @@ path = "src/main.rs"

 [dependencies]
 gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
-ed25519-dalek = { workspace = true }
-base64 = { workspace = true }
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }
@@ -29,10 +26,9 @@ async-graphql-axum = "7"
 tokio-stream = { version = "0.1", features = ["sync"] }
 tower = "0.5"
 tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["cors", "trace", "request-id", "limit"] }
-sqlx = { version = "0.8", features = ["postgres", "runtime-tokio-rustls", "chrono", "uuid", "macros", "migrate"] }
+sqlx = { version = "0.8", features = ["postgres", "runtime-tokio-rustls", "chrono", "uuid"] }
 clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive", "env"] }
 bytes = "1"
-libc = "0.2"
 cid = { workspace = true }
 hex = { workspace = true }
 sha2 = { workspace = true }
@@ -40,9 +36,6 @@ hmac = { workspace = true }
 http-body-util = "0.1"
 tokio-util = { version = "0.7", features = ["io"] }
 dirs-next = "2"
-# NFC-normalize visibility globs/paths at the matcher seam so a deny rule
-# withholds a canonically-equivalent path regardless of NFC/NFD form (#101).
-unicode-normalization = "0.1"
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
 libp2p-core = "0.43"
 libp2p-gossipsub = "0.49.4"
@@ -2,10 +2,9 @@

 use axum::extract::{Path, Query, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
-use axum::{Extension, Json};
+use axum::Json;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::state::AppState;

@@ -21,14 +20,6 @@ fn agent_key_segment(did: &str) -> &str {
    did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(did)
 }

-/// Whether `caller` (the verified `AuthenticatedDid`) is the same identity as
-/// `target` (the DID being acted on), tolerant of full `did:key:...` vs short
-/// key-only forms on either side. Used to gate self-deregistration so a DID
-/// can only retire itself.
-fn caller_matches_did(caller: &str, target: &str) -> bool {
-    agent_key_segment(caller) == agent_key_segment(target)
-}
-
 async fn resolve_agent_did(state: &AppState, did: &str) -> Result<String> {
    let normalized_did = normalize_agent_did(did);
    if state.db.get_agent(&normalized_did).await?.is_some() {
@@ -80,8 +71,6 @@ pub struct AgentResponse {
    pub capabilities: Vec<String>,
    pub registered_at: String,
    pub last_seen: Option<String>,
-    /// Lifecycle status: `active` or `revoked`.
-    pub status: String,
 }

 /// GET /api/v1/agents
@@ -98,7 +87,6 @@ pub async fn list_agents(
            capabilities: a.capabilities,
            registered_at: a.registered_at,
            last_seen: a.last_seen,
-            status: a.status,
        })
        .collect();
    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "agents": list })))
@@ -123,7 +111,6 @@ pub async fn show_agent(
            capabilities: agent.capabilities,
            registered_at: agent.registered_at,
            last_seen: agent.last_seen,
-            status: agent.status,
        }),
    ))
 }
@@ -146,97 +133,9 @@ pub async fn get_trust(
    }))
 }

-/// DELETE /api/v1/agents/{did}
-///
-/// Self-deregistration: the holder of a DID's key marks their own agent
-/// `revoked`, removing it from discovery (issue #29). Authenticated by the
-/// rfc9421 signature middleware; a caller may only retire its own DID.
-pub async fn deregister_agent(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
-    Path(did): Path<String>,
-) -> Result<StatusCode> {
-    // Authorize on the verified identity, and act on it too. The path DID is
-    // only an intent check (it must name the caller); the row we revoke is the
-    // authenticated DID itself, never a value derived from the untrusted path.
-    // Revoking `resolve_agent_did(did)` instead would let the fuzzy prefix
-    // resolver act on a different identity than the one just authorized.
-    if !caller_matches_did(&auth.0, &did) {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "an agent can only deregister itself".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    if state.db.revoke_agent(&auth.0).await? {
-        Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
-    } else {
-        Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("agent {} not found", auth.0)))
-    }
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-    use super::{agent_key_segment, caller_matches_did, normalize_agent_did, AgentResponse};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn caller_matches_own_did_full_form() {
-        assert!(caller_matches_did(
-            "did:key:z6MkExample",
-            "did:key:z6MkExample"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn caller_matches_own_did_short_form() {
-        // Authenticated full DID vs short path form, and vice versa.
-        assert!(caller_matches_did("did:key:z6MkExample", "z6MkExample"));
-        assert!(caller_matches_did("z6MkExample", "did:key:z6MkExample"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn caller_cannot_revoke_a_different_did() {
-        // The core authorization property for issue #29.
-        assert!(!caller_matches_did(
-            "did:key:z6MkAttacker",
-            "did:key:z6MkVictim"
-        ));
-        assert!(!caller_matches_did("did:key:z6MkAttacker", "z6MkVictim"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn agent_response_surfaces_status() {
-        // A revoked DID's response must carry its status so callers can see it
-        // is retired (issue #29).
-        let resp = AgentResponse {
-            did: "did:key:orphan".to_string(),
-            trust_score: 0.1,
-            capabilities: vec!["reputation:score".to_string()],
-            registered_at: "2026-06-19T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
-            last_seen: None,
-            status: "revoked".to_string(),
-        };
-
-        let json = serde_json::to_value(&resp).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(json["status"], "revoked");
-        assert!(json.get("replaced_by").is_none());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn agent_response_active_status() {
-        let resp = AgentResponse {
-            did: "did:key:active".to_string(),
-            trust_score: 0.5,
-            capabilities: vec![],
-            registered_at: "2026-06-19T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
-            last_seen: None,
-            status: "active".to_string(),
-        };
-
-        let json = serde_json::to_value(&resp).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(json["status"], "active");
-    }
+    use super::{agent_key_segment, normalize_agent_did};

    #[test]
    fn normalize_agent_did_preserves_full_did() {
@@ -79,9 +79,12 @@ pub async fn create_bounty(
        return Err(AppError::BadRequest("amount must be positive".into()));
    }

-    // Read-gate: anyone who can read the repo may fund a bounty on it (this closes
-    // the private-repo bounty leak); ownership is not required.
-    crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    // Verify repo exists
+    let _ = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;

    let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
    let bounty = BountyRecord {
@@ -210,12 +213,8 @@ pub async fn submit_bounty(
            bounty.status
        )));
    }
-    let is_claimant = bounty
-        .claimant_did
-        .as_deref()
-        .is_some_and(|c| crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, c));
-    if !is_claimant {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden("only the claimant can submit".into()));
+    if bounty.claimant_did.as_deref() != Some(&auth.0) {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest("only the claimant can submit".into()));
    }

    let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
@@ -250,8 +249,8 @@ pub async fn approve_bounty(
            bounty.status
        )));
    }
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &bounty.creator_did) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    if bounty.creator_did != auth.0 {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
            "only the bounty creator can approve".into(),
        ));
    }
@@ -297,8 +296,8 @@ pub async fn cancel_bounty(
            bounty.status
        )));
    }
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &bounty.creator_did) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    if bounty.creator_did != auth.0 {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
            "only the bounty creator can cancel".into(),
        ));
    }
@@ -333,19 +332,6 @@ pub async fn dispute_bounty(
        )));
    }

-    // Only the bounty creator or the current claimant may dispute (N19 — this
-    // endpoint had no identity check at all).
-    let is_creator = crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &bounty.creator_did);
-    let is_claimant = bounty
-        .claimant_did
-        .as_deref()
-        .is_some_and(|c| crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, c));
-    if !is_creator && !is_claimant {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "only the bounty creator or claimant can dispute this bounty".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
    // Check if deadline exceeded
    if let Some(ref claimed_at) = bounty.claimed_at {
        if let Ok(claimed) = chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339(claimed_at) {
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
 //! Changelog endpoint — unified timeline of commits, merged PRs, and closed issues.

-use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, Query, State};
+use axum::extract::{Path, Query, State};
 use axum::Json;
 use serde::Deserialize;

-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::git::store;
 use crate::state::AppState;
@@ -28,11 +27,12 @@ pub async fn get_changelog(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
    Query(query): Query<ChangelogQuery>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;

    let limit = query.limit.min(100);

@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
-//! Authenticated discovery + fetch for encrypted withheld blobs (Option B1).
-
-use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
-use axum::Json;
-
-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
-use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
-use crate::state::AppState;
-use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
-
-/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs
-/// Returns [{oid, cid}] for every encrypted blob in the repo, to any caller who
-/// can read the repo. Not recipient-scoped: recipient identities are not stored,
-/// so access control here is repo readability and decryption is gated by the
-/// envelope crypto (only a real recipient can open an envelope).
-pub async fn list_encrypted_blobs(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
-    Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
-) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
-    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny
-    {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")));
-    }
-    let rows = state.db.list_all_encrypted_blobs(&record.id).await?;
-    let blobs: Vec<_> = rows
-        .into_iter()
-        .map(|(oid, cid)| serde_json::json!({ "oid": oid, "cid": cid }))
-        .collect();
-    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "blobs": blobs })))
-}
-
-/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blob/{oid}
-/// Returns raw envelope bytes to callers who can read the repo; the envelope
-/// crypto still ensures only true recipients can decrypt.
-pub async fn get_encrypted_blob(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
-    Path((owner, repo, oid)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
-    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny
-    {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}/{oid}")));
-    }
-    let cid = state
-        .db
-        .encrypted_blob_cid(&record.id, &oid)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}/{oid}")))?;
-    let bytes = crate::ipfs_pin::cat(&state.config.ipfs_api, &cid)
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
-    Ok(bytes)
-}
-
-/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs/replicate
-/// Returns [{oid, cid}] for every encrypted blob in the repo, for peer-mirror
-/// replication (Option B2). Gated by repo readability, like discovery, so a
-/// non-readable repo does not expose its blob index; for the intended case (a
-/// public repo with withheld subtrees) the public root keeps this open to peers.
-/// Recipient identities are deliberately withheld: the v2 envelopes no longer
-/// carry recipient public keys, so peers must not learn the reader set either. A
-/// mirror detects a re-seal by the CID changing (the OID is stable across
-/// re-seals). Ciphertext metadata only, never plaintext.
-pub async fn replicate_encrypted_blobs(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
-    Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
-) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
-    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny
-    {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")));
-    }
-    let rows = state.db.list_all_encrypted_blobs(&record.id).await?;
-    let blobs: Vec<_> = rows
-        .into_iter()
-        .map(|(oid, cid)| replicate_blob_json(oid, cid))
-        .collect();
-    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "blobs": blobs })))
-}
-
-/// Serialize one blob for the replication wire. Recipient identities are
-/// intentionally absent so a mirror never learns the reader set.
-fn replicate_blob_json(oid: String, cid: String) -> serde_json::Value {
-    serde_json::json!({ "oid": oid, "cid": cid })
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::replicate_blob_json;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn replicate_blob_json_omits_recipients() {
-        let v = replicate_blob_json("oid1".into(), "cidA".into());
-        assert_eq!(v["oid"], "oid1");
-        assert_eq!(v["cid"], "cidA");
-        assert!(
-            v.get("recipients").is_none(),
-            "replication wire must not carry recipient identities"
-        );
-    }
-}
@@ -9,55 +9,28 @@
 //! `git cat-file <type> <sha256>` (i.e. without the git framing header).
 //! This is consistent with how `gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes`
 //! computes CIDs when objects are pushed.
-//!
-//! Serving is access-controlled: an object is returned only from a repo row the
-//! requesting caller is permitted to read (per-caller path-scoped visibility,
-//! see `get_by_cid`).

 use axum::{
    extract::{Path, State},
    http::{HeaderMap, HeaderName, HeaderValue, StatusCode},
    response::{IntoResponse, Response},
-    Extension, Json,
+    Json,
 };
 use cid::CidGeneric;
-use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
 use std::str::FromStr;

-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::git::store;
-use crate::git::visibility_pack::{allowed_blob_set_for_caller, has_path_scoped_rule};
 use crate::state::AppState;
-use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};

 /// GET /ipfs/{cid}
 ///
 /// Search all repos on the node for a git object whose SHA-256 hash matches
-/// the given CIDv1, returning its raw content if the caller may read it.
-///
-/// Visibility (#110, #126): the object is served only from a repo row the
-/// caller passes. For each iterated row we gate against that row's OWN rules
-/// (`visibility_check` at `"/"`), never re-resolving via `authorize_repo_read`
-/// — `get_repo`'s fuzzy match could otherwise authorize a different physical
-/// row than the one read (KTD2a). We check object existence via
-/// `store::object_type` *before* the expensive reachability walk so random-CID
-/// spray cannot trigger full-history git walks on repos that don't carry the
-/// object. When the row carries path-scoped rules (KTD4) the served object
-/// must be either a non-blob (trees/commits are structural; KTD3) OR a blob
-/// in the caller's *reachable* allowed-set (`allowed_blob_set_for_caller`).
-/// The reachable allowed-set excludes dangling blobs — a blob written via
-/// `git hash-object -w` and never committed has no path to gate, so it is
-/// fail-closed 404'd under path-scoped rules (#126). Denial and genuine
-/// not-found both fall through to an opaque 404.
-///
-/// Scope: this closes the direct unauthenticated scan, including the dangling
-/// case. A stale-public mirror row still serves withheld content (tracked
-/// separately, #124).
+/// the given CIDv1. Returns the raw object content bytes with appropriate
+/// headers if found, or 404 if not found.
 pub async fn get_by_cid(
    Path(cid_str): Path<String>,
    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Response> {
    // 1. Decode the CID and extract the SHA-256 digest
    let cid = CidGeneric::<64>::from_str(&cid_str)
@@ -73,8 +46,6 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
    }

    let sha256_hex = hex::encode(mh.digest());
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let caller_owned = caller.map(|c| c.to_string());

    // 2. Search all repos for an object with this SHA-256
    let repos = state
@@ -83,126 +54,39 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
        .await
        .map_err(AppError::Internal)?;

-    // Fetch every repo's visibility rules in one query rather than one per row
-    // (the gate runs each row against its OWN rules — KTD2a). A row absent from
-    // the map has no rules.
-    let repo_ids: Vec<String> = repos.iter().map(|r| r.id.clone()).collect();
-    let rules_by_repo = state
-        .db
-        .list_visibility_rules_for_repos(&repo_ids)
-        .await
-        .map_err(AppError::Internal)?;
-
-    // Request-scoped memo of the per-repo allowed-blob set (KTD1, #126). The
-    // caller is constant for one request, so `repo.id` alone is a safe,
-    // sufficient key — never a coarse caller "class", which
-    // `visibility_check`'s exact full-DID reader match would make unsafe.
-    //
-    // We flipped from a deny-set (`withheld_blob_oids`) to an allowed-set
-    // (`allowed_blob_set_for_caller`) so dangling blobs — never enumerated by
-    // the reachable walk — fail closed instead of slipping through an empty
-    // deny entry (#126).
-    let mut allowed_memo: HashMap<String, HashSet<String>> = HashMap::new();
-
    for repo in &repos {
-        // Repo-level read gate against THIS row's own rules (KTD2a).
-        let rules: &[crate::db::VisibilityRule] = rules_by_repo
-            .get(&repo.id)
-            .map(Vec::as_slice)
-            .unwrap_or(&[]);
-        if visibility_check(rules, repo.is_public, &repo.owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Deny {
-            continue;
-        }
-
        let repo_path = match state.repo_store.acquire(&repo.owner_did, &repo.name).await {
            Ok(p) => p,
            Err(_) => continue,
        };

-        // Check whether the object exists in this repo before any expensive
-        // reachability walk. This prevents random-CID spray from triggering
-        // full-history git walks on repos that don't carry the object.
-        let obj_type = match store::object_type(&repo_path, &sha256_hex) {
-            Ok(Some(t)) => t,
+        match store::read_object(&repo_path, &sha256_hex) {
+            Ok(Some((_obj_type, content))) => {
+                // 3. Return the content with IPFS-style headers
+                let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+                headers.insert(
+                    HeaderName::from_static("content-type"),
+                    HeaderValue::from_static("application/octet-stream"),
+                );
+                headers.insert(
+                    HeaderName::from_static("x-content-cid"),
+                    HeaderValue::from_str(&cid_str)
+                        .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
+                );
+                headers.insert(
+                    HeaderName::from_static("x-git-hash"),
+                    HeaderValue::from_str(&sha256_hex)
+                        .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
+                );
+
+                return Ok((StatusCode::OK, headers, content).into_response());
+            }
            Ok(None) => continue,
            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error checking git object type");
-                continue;
-            }
-        };
-
-        // Per-blob gating only applies when a path-scoped rule exists (KTD4).
-        // Without any path-scoped rule, the "/" gate above is the whole story.
-        // Trees/commits are always served under path-scoped rules (KTD3).
-        let path_scoped = has_path_scoped_rule(rules);
-        if path_scoped && obj_type == "blob" {
-            if !allowed_memo.contains_key(&repo.id) {
-                let rp = repo_path.clone();
-                let r = rules.to_vec();
-                let is_public = repo.is_public;
-                let owner = repo.owner_did.clone();
-                let caller_for_walk = caller_owned.clone();
-                // Full-history walk shells out to git — keep it off the async runtime.
-                let walk = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
-                    allowed_blob_set_for_caller(
-                        &rp,
-                        &r,
-                        is_public,
-                        &owner,
-                        caller_for_walk.as_deref(),
-                    )
-                })
-                .await;
-                // Fail closed on EITHER a task panic (JoinError) or a walk error:
-                // we cannot prove the caller may read here, so skip this repo and
-                // let a public copy (if any) serve. Never serve on an unproven gate.
-                let set = match walk {
-                    Ok(Ok(set)) => set,
-                    Ok(Err(e)) => {
-                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "allowed-blob walk failed; skipping repo");
-                        continue;
-                    }
-                    Err(e) => {
-                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "allowed-blob walk task panicked; skipping repo");
-                        continue;
-                    }
-                };
-                allowed_memo.insert(repo.id.clone(), set);
-            }
-            let in_allowed = allowed_memo
-                .get(&repo.id)
-                .is_some_and(|set| set.contains(&sha256_hex));
-            if !in_allowed {
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error reading git object");
                continue;
            }
        }
-
-        // Now that we've passed the gate, read the content.
-        let content = match store::read_object_content(&repo_path, &sha256_hex, &obj_type) {
-            Ok(c) => c,
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error reading git object content");
-                continue;
-            }
-        };
-
-        // 3. Return the content with IPFS-style headers
-        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
-        headers.insert(
-            HeaderName::from_static("content-type"),
-            HeaderValue::from_static("application/octet-stream"),
-        );
-        headers.insert(
-            HeaderName::from_static("x-content-cid"),
-            HeaderValue::from_str(&cid_str).unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
-        );
-        headers.insert(
-            HeaderName::from_static("x-git-hash"),
-            HeaderValue::from_str(&sha256_hex)
-                .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
-        );
-
-        return Ok((StatusCode::OK, headers, content).into_response());
    }

    // Not found in any repo
@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ pub async fn create_issue(
    Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
    Json(req): Json<CreateIssueRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<IssueRecord>)> {
-    // Authorize the caller as a reader before accepting an issue: a non-reader
-    // must not be able to file an issue against a private repo they cannot read.
-    // Mirrors create_issue_comment / create_review / create_bounty.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;

    let issue_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
    let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
@@ -161,9 +161,11 @@ pub async fn create_issue_comment(
        ));
    }

-    // Read-gate: a commenter must be able to read the repo, but need not own it.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;

    let disk_path = state
        .repo_store
@@ -205,7 +207,7 @@ pub async fn list_issue_comments(
 /// POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{id}/close
 pub async fn close_issue(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Extension(_auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
    Path((owner, repo, issue_id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
    let record = state
@@ -221,33 +223,6 @@ pub async fn close_issue(
        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
    let disk_path = guard.path().to_path_buf();

-    // Owner OR issue author may close. The author lives in the issue's git-JSON
-    // blob (not a DB column); a None author (legacy issues) falls back to
-    // owner-only. Read it under the write guard, before mutating.
-    let author_did: Option<String> = match git_issues::get_issue(&disk_path, &issue_id) {
-        Ok(Some(raw)) => serde_json::from_str::<IssueRecord>(&raw)
-            .ok()
-            .and_then(|i| i.author),
-        Ok(None) => {
-            guard.release(false).await;
-            return Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("issue {issue_id} not found")));
-        }
-        Err(e) => {
-            guard.release(false).await;
-            return Err(AppError::Git(e.to_string()));
-        }
-    };
-    let is_owner = crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0).is_ok();
-    let is_author = author_did
-        .as_deref()
-        .is_some_and(|a| crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, a));
-    if !is_owner && !is_author {
-        guard.release(false).await;
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "only the repo owner or the issue author can close this issue".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
    let close_result = git_issues::close_issue(&disk_path, &issue_id);

    // Always release the advisory lock — even on error; upload to Tigris only on success.
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ pub struct LabelRequest {
 /// POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/labels
 pub async fn add_label(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Extension(_auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
    Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
    Json(req): Json<LabelRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ pub async fn add_label(
        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;

    let added = state.db.add_label(&record.id, &label).await?;
    let status = if added {
@@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ pub async fn add_label(
 /// DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/labels/:label
 pub async fn remove_label(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
+    Extension(_auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
    Path((owner, name, label)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
    let record = state
@@ -64,7 +63,6 @@ pub async fn remove_label(
        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;

    state.db.remove_label(&record.id, &label).await?;
    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "label": label, "removed": true })))
@@ -1,14 +1,8 @@
-use crate::db::{RepoRecord, VisibilityRule};
-use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
-use crate::state::AppState;
-use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
-
 pub mod agents;
 pub mod arweave;
 pub mod bounties;
 pub mod certs;
 pub mod changelog;
-pub mod encrypted;
 pub mod events;
 pub mod ipfs;
 pub mod issues;
@@ -25,651 +19,3 @@ pub mod stars;
 pub mod tasks;
 pub mod visibility;
 pub mod webhooks;
-
-/// Resolve a repo for a read request and enforce path-scoped visibility.
-///
-/// Returns 404 (`RepoNotFound`) if the repo does not exist or the caller may not
-/// read `path`, using the same opaque response the git serve path returns so
-/// existence is not confirmed. Returns the record and its visibility rules so a
-/// content handler can apply an extra per-path check without a second DB query.
-///
-/// Callers pass `"/"` for repo-level reads (listings); content endpoints pass the
-/// specific path so a withheld subtree is denied even on an otherwise-public repo.
-pub(crate) async fn authorize_repo_read(
-    state: &AppState,
-    owner: &str,
-    name: &str,
-    caller: Option<&str>,
-    path: &str,
-) -> Result<(RepoRecord, Vec<VisibilityRule>)> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(owner, name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    // A quarantined mirror (admitted by the iCaptcha propagation gate but not
-    // validated) is hidden from every reader — serve/clone and fork alike — as if
-    // it did not exist, until an operator releases it. Checked before the
-    // visibility gate so its existence is never disclosed.
-    if state.db.is_repo_quarantined(&record.id).await? {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")));
-    }
-    let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
-    if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, path) == Decision::Deny
-    {
-        return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")));
-    }
-    Ok((record, rules))
-}
-
-/// Match a presented DID against a stored DID that may be the full `did:key:<id>`
-/// form or the bare `<id>` short form (mirror rows store the bare key). Collapse
-/// representation only within `did:key`; never let a bare id match across methods —
-/// `did:web` / `did:gitlawb` share the base58 space with `did:key`, so a
-/// trailing-segment compare would treat `did:key:X` and `did:gitlawb:X` as equal.
-pub(crate) fn did_matches(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
-    if a == b {
-        return true;
-    }
-    fn key_id(d: &str) -> &str {
-        d.strip_prefix("did:key:").unwrap_or(d)
-    }
-    let (ka, kb) = (key_id(a), key_id(b));
-    // After stripping `did:key:`, a value still containing ':' is a non-key full
-    // DID — do not let it match a bare `did:key` id.
-    !ka.contains(':') && !kb.contains(':') && ka == kb
-}
-
-/// 403 unless `caller` is the repo owner. Uses [`did_matches`] so the owner check
-/// and the author check (close policy) share one normalization.
-pub(crate) fn require_repo_owner(record: &RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> Result<()> {
-    if did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
-        Ok(())
-    } else {
-        Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "only the repo owner can perform this action".into(),
-        ))
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod did_tests {
-    use super::did_matches;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn full_matches_bare_same_key() {
-        assert!(did_matches("did:key:zABC", "zABC"));
-        assert!(did_matches("zABC", "did:key:zABC"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_cross_method_collision() {
-        assert!(!did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:gitlawb:zABC"));
-        assert!(!did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:web:zABC"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn exact_match_and_distinct_keys() {
-        assert!(did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:key:zABC"));
-        assert!(!did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:key:zXYZ"));
-        assert!(!did_matches("zABC", "zXYZ"));
-    }
-}
-
-/// Drift guard (plan 002 §Gate-type table, Step 5). Every in-scope mutation
-/// handler must contain its expected gate marker in its own body; removing a
-/// gate fails this test. Source-level (no DB), so it runs everywhere. When a new
-/// route is added to an in-scope group, add its row here with a deliberate gate
-/// type — that forced decision is the point.
-///
-/// Markers are gate-SHAPED — a call (`require_repo_owner(`, `did_matches(`) or a
-/// binding/comparison expression (`caller != &record.owner_did`,
-/// `let owner_did = auth.0`) — never a bare identifier that could also appear in
-/// a log line. Full-line comments are stripped before matching, so a marker that
-/// survives only as a comment above a deleted gate does NOT satisfy a row.
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod authz_guard {
-    /// The body of `func` with full-line comments removed. Bounds the slice at the
-    /// next top-level fn item so a marker in a later handler can't leak in,
-    /// tolerating `pub async`, `pub(crate) async`, `async`, `pub`, and bare `fn`
-    /// declarations (the old single-`pub async fn` delimiter over-ran on any other
-    /// form).
-    fn fn_body(src: &str, func: &str) -> String {
-        let needle = format!("fn {func}(");
-        let start = src
-            .find(&needle)
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("handler `{func}` not found (renamed or removed?)"));
-        let rest = &src[start..];
-        let end = [
-            "\npub async fn ",
-            "\npub(crate) async fn ",
-            "\nasync fn ",
-            "\npub fn ",
-            "\nfn ",
-        ]
-        .iter()
-        .filter_map(|p| rest[1..].find(p).map(|i| i + 1))
-        .min()
-        .unwrap_or(rest.len());
-        rest[..end]
-            .lines()
-            .filter(|l| !l.trim_start().starts_with("//"))
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
-            .join("\n")
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn every_in_scope_mutation_has_its_gate() {
-        let pulls = include_str!("pulls.rs");
-        let webhooks = include_str!("webhooks.rs");
-        let labels = include_str!("labels.rs");
-        let issues = include_str!("issues.rs");
-        let bounties = include_str!("bounties.rs");
-        let replicas = include_str!("replicas.rs");
-        let tasks = include_str!("tasks.rs");
-        let stars = include_str!("stars.rs");
-        let protect = include_str!("protect.rs");
-        let visibility = include_str!("visibility.rs");
-        let profiles = include_str!("profiles.rs");
-        let repos = include_str!("repos.rs");
-        let register = include_str!("register.rs");
-        let ipfs = include_str!("ipfs.rs");
-
-        // (source, handler, expected gate marker)
-        let rows: &[(&str, &str, &str)] = &[
-            // Bucket A — owner-gate (require_repo_owner -> 403)
-            (pulls, "merge_pr", "require_repo_owner("),
-            (webhooks, "create_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
-            (webhooks, "delete_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
-            (labels, "add_label", "require_repo_owner("),
-            (labels, "remove_label", "require_repo_owner("),
-            // Bucket A' — owner OR author (did_matches against the author)
-            (pulls, "close_pr", "did_matches("),
-            (issues, "close_issue", "did_matches("),
-            // Bucket B — read-gate (authorize_repo_read)
-            (pulls, "create_review", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (pulls, "create_comment", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (pulls, "create_pr", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (issues, "create_issue_comment", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (issues, "create_issue", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (bounties, "create_bounty", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            (repos, "fork_repo", "authorize_repo_read("),
-            // get_by_cid gates each iterated repo row directly via visibility_check
-            // (KTD2a: it must NOT route through authorize_repo_read's fuzzy re-resolve).
-            (ipfs, "get_by_cid", "visibility_check("),
-            // Bucket C — signer-self: the acting DID is matched/bound to auth.0
-            (tasks, "create_task", "did_matches("),
-            (tasks, "claim_task", "did_matches("),
-            (tasks, "complete_task", "did_matches("),
-            (tasks, "fail_task", "did_matches("),
-            (repos, "create_repo", "let owner_did = auth.0"),
-            (profiles, "set_profile", "let did = auth.0"),
-            (register, "register", "did_matches("),
-            (stars, "star_repo", "caller = &auth.0"),
-            (stars, "unstar_repo", "caller = &auth.0"),
-            // Bucket D — non-owner-by-design, positive per-route marker
-            (bounties, "claim_bounty", "claim_bounty(&id, &auth.0"),
-            (bounties, "submit_bounty", "did_matches("),
-            (bounties, "approve_bounty", "did_matches("),
-            (bounties, "cancel_bounty", "did_matches("),
-            (bounties, "dispute_bounty", "did_matches("),
-            (replicas, "register_replica", "did_matches("),
-            (replicas, "unregister_replica", "replica_did = &auth.0"),
-            // PRE-GATED — already owner-gated, in-scope group; guard the gate itself
-            (protect, "protect_branch", "did_matches("),
-            (protect, "unprotect_branch", "did_matches("),
-            (visibility, "set_visibility", "require_owner("),
-            (visibility, "remove_visibility", "require_owner("),
-            (visibility, "list_visibility", "require_owner("),
-        ];
-
-        // The visibility rows prove require_owner is CALLED; this proves the helper
-        // itself does DID-safe matching, not a raw/trailing-segment compare.
-        assert!(
-            fn_body(visibility, "require_owner").contains("did_matches("),
-            "visibility::require_owner must use did_matches for DID-safe owner matching"
-        );
-
-        for (src, func, marker) in rows {
-            let body = fn_body(src, func);
-            assert!(
-                body.contains(marker),
-                "handler `{func}` is missing its gate marker `{marker}` — gate removed or route reclassified"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Proves the comment-stripping that GUARD-1 added: a marker that appears only
-    /// in a full-line comment (the real `replicas.rs` false-pass shape) must NOT
-    /// satisfy a row.
-    #[test]
-    fn comment_only_marker_does_not_satisfy_a_row() {
-        let src = "pub async fn demo() {\n    // did_matches( handles the owner form\n    do_thing();\n}\n";
-        assert!(
-            !fn_body(src, "demo").contains("did_matches("),
-            "a marker present only in a comment must not count as an enforced gate"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// All `pub async fn` / `pub(crate) async fn` handler names declared in `src`.
-    /// Verb-agnostic on purpose: a repo-scoped read of any name is in scope, so a
-    /// handler named `fetch_*` / `replicate_*` / `info_refs` cannot escape the gate
-    /// check by not being called `list_*` / `get_*`.
-    fn handler_names(src: &str) -> Vec<String> {
-        ["pub async fn ", "pub(crate) async fn "]
-            .iter()
-            .flat_map(|decl| {
-                src.match_indices(decl).map(move |(i, _)| {
-                    src[i + decl.len()..]
-                        .chars()
-                        .take_while(|c| c.is_alphanumeric() || *c == '_')
-                        .collect::<String>()
-                })
-            })
-            .collect()
-    }
-
-    /// True when the handler's signature takes an owner+repo path
-    /// (`Path<(String, String...)>`), i.e. it is a repo-scoped read rather than a
-    /// node-wide aggregate (`/stats`, `/ipfs/pins`, the global feeds).
-    fn is_repo_scoped(body: &str) -> bool {
-        let header = &body[..body.find('{').unwrap_or(body.len())];
-        header.contains("Path<(String, String")
-    }
-
-    /// True when at least one gate marker runs for EVERY service — i.e. some
-    /// marker sits outside any `if service == ...` discriminator block. A gate
-    /// that appears ONLY inside such a block (as the info/refs advertisement gate
-    /// did before #119: `visibility_check` ran under `if service ==
-    /// "git-upload-pack"`, leaving `git-receive-pack` ungated) covers a subset of
-    /// services and must NOT count as a full gate. Other handlers carry no
-    /// `service ==` discriminator, so for them this matches the plain
-    /// substring check. NOTE: only `if service ==` is detected — a
-    /// `match service { .. }` discriminator is NOT tracked and a gate inside one
-    /// arm would pass as full; avoid that shape, or extend the span loop below.
-    fn gate_runs_unconditionally(body: &str, markers: &[&str]) -> bool {
-        // Brace-matched spans of each `if service == ...` block.
-        let mut cond_spans: Vec<(usize, usize)> = Vec::new();
-        let mut search = 0;
-        while let Some(rel) = body[search..].find("if service ==") {
-            let cond_start = search + rel;
-            let Some(brace_rel) = body[cond_start..].find('{') else {
-                break;
-            };
-            let open = cond_start + brace_rel;
-            let mut depth = 0i32;
-            let mut end = body.len();
-            for (i, c) in body[open..].char_indices() {
-                match c {
-                    '{' => depth += 1,
-                    '}' => {
-                        depth -= 1;
-                        if depth == 0 {
-                            end = open + i;
-                            break;
-                        }
-                    }
-                    _ => {}
-                }
-            }
-            cond_spans.push((open, end));
-            // On an unclosed block `end` stays at body.len() (the fail-safe
-            // direction: treat the rest as conditional rather than mask a gate);
-            // clamp so the next slice can't index past the end and panic.
-            search = (end + 1).min(body.len());
-        }
-        markers.iter().any(|m| {
-            body.match_indices(m)
-                .any(|(pos, _)| !cond_spans.iter().any(|(s, e)| pos >= *s && pos <= *e))
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Collect `.rs` source files under `dir`. Recursive so the completeness scan
-    /// covers nested API modules (`api/<module>/mod.rs` and deeper), not only the
-    /// immediate `api/*.rs` children.
-    fn collect_rs_files(dir: &std::path::Path) -> Vec<std::path::PathBuf> {
-        let mut out = Vec::new();
-        for entry in std::fs::read_dir(dir).expect("read api dir") {
-            let path = entry.expect("dir entry").path();
-            if path.is_dir() {
-                out.extend(collect_rs_files(&path));
-            } else if path.extension().is_some_and(|e| e == "rs") {
-                out.push(path);
-            }
-        }
-        out
-    }
-
-    /// The `.rs` files under `api_root` (as paths RELATIVE to it) that the
-    /// completeness scan must inspect: everything except the top-level `mod.rs` (the
-    /// guard file itself) and the top-level files already covered by the per-handler
-    /// `sources` loop. A nested `api/<module>/<name>.rs` is a distinct source file
-    /// even when its basename matches a listed top-level file, so it stays in scope.
-    fn unlisted_source_files(
-        api_root: &std::path::Path,
-        listed: &std::collections::HashSet<&str>,
-    ) -> Vec<String> {
-        collect_rs_files(api_root)
-            .iter()
-            .filter_map(|path| {
-                let rel = path
-                    .strip_prefix(api_root)
-                    .ok()?
-                    .to_string_lossy()
-                    .replace('\\', "/");
-                if rel == "mod.rs" || listed.contains(rel.as_str()) {
-                    None
-                } else {
-                    Some(rel)
-                }
-            })
-            .collect()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn collect_rs_files_recurses_subdirs() {
-        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let root = tmp.path();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("a.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("note.txt"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("sub/deep")).unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/mod.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/deep/c.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        let names: std::collections::HashSet<String> = collect_rs_files(root)
-            .iter()
-            .map(|p| {
-                p.strip_prefix(root)
-                    .unwrap()
-                    .to_string_lossy()
-                    .replace('\\', "/")
-            })
-            .collect();
-        assert!(names.contains("a.rs"));
-        assert!(
-            names.contains("sub/mod.rs"),
-            "nested module file must be collected"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            names.contains("sub/deep/c.rs"),
-            "deeply nested file must be collected"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !names.iter().any(|n| n.ends_with(".txt")),
-            "non-rs files excluded"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(names.len(), 3);
-    }
-
-    // P3 (#119): the completeness scan must skip already-covered files by their path
-    // RELATIVE to api_root, not by basename. A nested api/<module>/repos.rs is a
-    // distinct source file from the covered top-level repos.rs and must still be
-    // scanned, or a new nested module could smuggle in an ungated repo-scoped handler
-    // behind a colliding filename.
-    #[test]
-    fn unlisted_source_files_scans_nested_file_with_colliding_basename() {
-        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let root = tmp.path();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("repos.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("mod.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("sub")).unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/repos.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/fresh.rs"), "").unwrap();
-        let listed: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = ["repos.rs"].into_iter().collect();
-
-        let unlisted = unlisted_source_files(root, &listed);
-
-        assert!(
-            unlisted.contains(&"sub/repos.rs".to_string()),
-            "a nested file whose basename matches a listed top-level file must still be scanned"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            unlisted.contains(&"sub/fresh.rs".to_string()),
-            "a nested file with a unique name must be scanned"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !unlisted.contains(&"repos.rs".to_string()),
-            "the listed top-level file is covered by the per-handler loop"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !unlisted.contains(&"mod.rs".to_string()),
-            "the top-level guard file is skipped"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Egress gate guard: every repo-scoped handler (`Path<(String, String..)>`)
-    /// must carry an authz marker — a read gate (`authorize_repo_read` /
-    /// `visibility_check`), or a write gate (`require_repo_owner` / `require_owner`
-    /// / `did_matches` / a `&auth.0` self-binding) — or be listed in KNOWN_UNGATED
-    /// (the tracked, ungated reads). A new ungated handler of ANY verb trips this,
-    /// and a completeness scan over `src/api/` trips it for a whole new module that
-    /// adds a repo-scoped handler without being wired into `sources`. Mutations are
-    /// also checked precisely, per handler, by the mutation guard above; here they
-    /// only need *some* binding so the net stays verb-agnostic.
-    ///
-    /// Scope and limits (this is a source scrape; the runtime route guard covers
-    /// behaviour):
-    /// - It proves a gate is CALLED, not that it runs on the requested path: a
-    ///   content handler gating `"/"` instead of the subtree still passes here.
-    /// - It sees handlers taking the owner+repo tuple `Path<(String, String..)>`; a
-    ///   repo identified by a struct/custom extractor would be missed (the helper
-    ///   unit tests pin these boundaries).
-    /// - KNOWN_UNGATED entries need a real open issue and review; the staleness
-    ///   assert removes one only once its gate lands.
-    #[test]
-    fn every_repo_scoped_handler_is_gated() {
-        let sources: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
-            (include_str!("bounties.rs"), "bounties.rs"),
-            (include_str!("certs.rs"), "certs.rs"),
-            (include_str!("changelog.rs"), "changelog.rs"),
-            (include_str!("encrypted.rs"), "encrypted.rs"),
-            (include_str!("events.rs"), "events.rs"),
-            (include_str!("issues.rs"), "issues.rs"),
-            (include_str!("labels.rs"), "labels.rs"),
-            (include_str!("protect.rs"), "protect.rs"),
-            (include_str!("pulls.rs"), "pulls.rs"),
-            (include_str!("replicas.rs"), "replicas.rs"),
-            (include_str!("repos.rs"), "repos.rs"),
-            (include_str!("stars.rs"), "stars.rs"),
-            (include_str!("visibility.rs"), "visibility.rs"),
-            (include_str!("webhooks.rs"), "webhooks.rs"),
-        ];
-        let listed: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = sources.iter().map(|(_, f)| *f).collect();
-        assert!(!listed.is_empty(), "read-guard `sources` is empty");
-
-        // Completeness: every api/*.rs NOT already in `sources` must declare no
-        // repo-scoped handler, so a brand-new module cannot add an ungated handler
-        // the scrape never looks at. Reads the directory at test time (so the list
-        // cannot silently drift from the filesystem) and only inspects unlisted
-        // files — listed files are covered by the per-handler loop below.
-        let api_dir = concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/src/api");
-        for (_, f) in sources {
-            assert!(
-                std::path::Path::new(api_dir).join(f).exists(),
-                "read-guard `sources` lists {f} but the file does not exist"
-            );
-        }
-        let api_root = std::path::Path::new(api_dir);
-        for rel in unlisted_source_files(api_root, &listed) {
-            let src = std::fs::read_to_string(api_root.join(&rel)).expect("read api file");
-            let has_repo_handler = handler_names(&src)
-                .iter()
-                .any(|n| is_repo_scoped(&fn_body(&src, n)));
-            assert!(
-                !has_repo_handler,
-                "api/{rel} declares a repo-scoped handler but is not in the egress \
-                 guard `sources` list — add it so its handlers are gate-checked"
-            );
-        }
-
-        // Repo-scoped reads known to be ungated today, each tracked by an issue.
-        // Remove an entry the moment its gate lands (the staleness assert enforces it).
-        let known_ungated: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
-            ("list_certs", "#120"),
-            ("get_cert", "#120"),
-            ("list_issues", "#120"),
-            ("get_issue", "#120"),
-            ("list_issue_comments", "#120"),
-            ("list_labels", "#120"),
-            ("list_repo_bounties", "#120"),
-            ("get_star_status", "#120"),
-            ("list_webhooks", "#94 (PR #113)"),
-            ("list_replicas", "PR #113"),
-            ("list_protected_branches", "PR #113"),
-        ];
-        let is_known = |n: &str| known_ungated.iter().any(|(k, _)| *k == n);
-        // Any one of these = the handler binds the caller to an authz decision: the
-        // first two are read gates, the rest are the write/owner/self-binding forms.
-        // A repo-scoped mutation passes here on its write gate; the mutation guard
-        // above additionally verifies the exact gate type per handler. NOTE: a local
-        // rename of `caller`/`replica_did` must be paired with a marker update here.
-        let markers = [
-            "authorize_repo_read(",
-            "visibility_check(",
-            "require_repo_owner(",
-            "require_owner(",
-            "did_matches(",
-            "caller = &auth.0",
-            "replica_did = &auth.0",
-        ];
-
-        // Every KNOWN_UNGATED name must be a real handler (catch typos / renames).
-        let all: std::collections::HashSet<String> =
-            sources.iter().flat_map(|(s, _)| handler_names(s)).collect();
-        for (n, _) in known_ungated {
-            assert!(
-                all.contains(*n),
-                "KNOWN_UNGATED lists `{n}`, which is not a real handler (renamed or removed?)"
-            );
-        }
-
-        let mut checked = 0usize;
-        for (src, file) in sources {
-            for name in handler_names(src) {
-                let body = fn_body(src, &name);
-                if !is_repo_scoped(&body) {
-                    continue; // node-wide aggregate, not a repo-scoped surface
-                }
-                checked += 1;
-                let gated = gate_runs_unconditionally(&body, &markers);
-                assert!(
-                    gated || is_known(&name),
-                    "repo-scoped handler `{name}` ({file}) has no authz gate and is \
-                     not in KNOWN_UNGATED — add the visibility/owner gate with the \
-                     caller, or track it there"
-                );
-                assert!(
-                    !(gated && is_known(&name)),
-                    "handler `{name}` ({file}) is now gated — remove it from \
-                     KNOWN_UNGATED so the allowlist stays an accurate gap list"
-                );
-            }
-        }
-        // Tripwire: if the scrape silently stopped finding handlers (e.g. a parser
-        // regression in handler_names/is_repo_scoped), this floor fails loudly
-        // instead of the guard passing vacuously. Current count is ~54 repo-scoped
-        // handlers; 20 is a deliberate floor that trips only on a gross regression.
-        assert!(
-            checked >= 20,
-            "egress guard only checked {checked} repo-scoped handlers — the scrape likely broke"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Pins the `handler_names` boundary: it collects every `pub`/`pub(crate)
-    /// async fn` regardless of verb (so a `fetch_*` read cannot escape), and skips
-    /// private `async fn` and sync `fn` helpers.
-    #[test]
-    fn handler_names_finds_all_pub_async_and_skips_others() {
-        let src = "pub async fn list_things() {}\n\
-                   pub async fn fetch_thing() {}\n\
-                   pub(crate) async fn get_crate_thing() {}\n\
-                   async fn private_helper() {}\n\
-                   fn sync_helper() {}\n";
-        let names = handler_names(src);
-        // Verb-agnostic: a non-list/get read verb is still seen.
-        assert!(names.contains(&"list_things".to_string()));
-        assert!(names.contains(&"fetch_thing".to_string()));
-        // pub(crate) routed handlers are in scope too.
-        assert!(names.contains(&"get_crate_thing".to_string()));
-        // Private/sync helpers are not routed handlers and are skipped.
-        assert!(!names
-            .iter()
-            .any(|n| n == "private_helper" || n == "sync_helper"));
-    }
-
-    /// Pins the `is_repo_scoped` boundary: an owner+repo tuple Path is repo-scoped;
-    /// a single-segment or absent Path is a node-wide aggregate.
-    #[test]
-    fn is_repo_scoped_requires_owner_repo_path() {
-        let repo =
-            "fn get_x(s: State, Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>) {\n  body();\n}";
-        let three = "fn get_y(Path((o, n, id)): Path<(String, String, String)>) {\n  body();\n}";
-        let node_wide = "fn list_z(s: State<AppState>) {\n  body();\n}";
-        let single = "fn get_w(Path(cid): Path<String>) {\n  body();\n}";
-        assert!(is_repo_scoped(repo), "owner+repo tuple is repo-scoped");
-        assert!(is_repo_scoped(three), "owner+repo+id tuple is repo-scoped");
-        assert!(!is_repo_scoped(node_wide), "no Path is node-wide");
-        assert!(
-            !is_repo_scoped(single),
-            "single-segment Path is not repo-scoped"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Pins `gate_runs_unconditionally`: a gate nested only inside an
-    /// `if service == ...` block is conditional (does NOT count), while the same
-    /// gate at the top level — or an additional unconditional one — does.
-    #[test]
-    fn conditional_service_gate_is_not_a_full_gate() {
-        let markers = ["visibility_check("];
-        // Gate runs only for one service: not a full gate.
-        let conditional = "fn f() {\n  \
-            if service == \"git-upload-pack\" {\n    \
-                visibility_check(rules, caller);\n  \
-            }\n  \
-            if service == \"git-receive-pack\" { acquire_fresh(); }\n}";
-        assert!(
-            !gate_runs_unconditionally(conditional, &markers),
-            "a gate only inside `if service ==` covers a subset of services"
-        );
-        // Same gate at top level: full gate.
-        let unconditional = "fn f() {\n  \
-            visibility_check(rules, caller);\n  \
-            if service == \"git-receive-pack\" { acquire_fresh(); }\n}";
-        assert!(
-            gate_runs_unconditionally(unconditional, &markers),
-            "an unconditional gate runs for every service"
-        );
-        // A gate inside EACH of two service blocks, none outside: still a
-        // subset (no service clears it unconditionally), so not a full gate.
-        let both_conditional = "fn f() {\n  \
-            if service == \"git-upload-pack\" { visibility_check(a); }\n  \
-            if service == \"git-receive-pack\" { visibility_check(b); }\n}";
-        assert!(
-            !gate_runs_unconditionally(both_conditional, &markers),
-            "a gate inside every service block is still conditional"
-        );
-        // A marker inside one block AND again unconditionally: the
-        // unconditional occurrence makes it a full gate (exercises the
-        // match_indices scan past the in-block hit).
-        let inside_and_outside = "fn f() {\n  \
-            if service == \"git-upload-pack\" { visibility_check(a); }\n  \
-            visibility_check(b);\n}";
-        assert!(
-            gate_runs_unconditionally(inside_and_outside, &markers),
-            "an unconditional occurrence counts even when another is conditional"
-        );
-        // No marker at all: not gated.
-        assert!(!gate_runs_unconditionally(
-            "fn f() { do_thing(); }",
-            &markers
-        ));
-        // An unclosed `if service ==` block (e.g. phantom brace from a string
-        // literal) must not panic on the slice advance; the span runs to EOF, so
-        // the in-block marker reads as conditional. Real Rust source is balanced,
-        // so this only guards the scraper against a future pathological body.
-        let unclosed = "fn f() { if service == \"x\" { visibility_check(a);";
-        assert!(
-            !gate_runs_unconditionally(unclosed, &markers),
-            "an unclosed service block must not panic and stays conditional"
-        );
-    }
-}
@@ -40,123 +40,6 @@ pub struct PeerResponse {
    pub reachable: bool,
 }

-/// Extract an IPv4 address embedded in an IPv6 literal across the transition
-/// formats that carry one: IPv4-mapped (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`), IPv4-compatible
-/// (`::a.b.c.d`), 6to4 (`2002:WWXX:YYZZ::/16`), and the NAT64 well-known prefix
-/// (`64:ff9b::/96`). Returns `None` for native IPv6. Callers fold the result
-/// back through the v4 range checks so loopback/private addresses smuggled in
-/// via any of these encodings are rejected, not just the mapped/compatible pair.
-///
-/// INCOMPLETE-NAT64 CONTRACT: non-well-known NAT64 prefixes (e.g. the RFC 8215
-/// local-use `64:ff9b:1::/48`) are deliberately **not** decoded here — their v4
-/// sits at a prefix-length-dependent offset (RFC 6052 §2.2) — so they return
-/// `None`. Any caller that needs them blocked must reject the wider
-/// `64:ff9b::/32` itself; `is_public_http_url` does this in its native-v6 arm.
-fn embedded_ipv4(v6: std::net::Ipv6Addr) -> Option<std::net::Ipv4Addr> {
-    if let Some(v4) = v6.to_ipv4_mapped().or_else(|| v6.to_ipv4()) {
-        return Some(v4);
-    }
-    let s = v6.segments();
-    // 6to4 (2002::/16) embeds W.X.Y.Z in the next two segments.
-    if s[0] == 0x2002 {
-        let [a, b] = s[1].to_be_bytes();
-        let [c, d] = s[2].to_be_bytes();
-        return Some(std::net::Ipv4Addr::new(a, b, c, d));
-    }
-    // NAT64 well-known prefix (64:ff9b::/96) embeds the IPv4 in the low 32 bits.
-    if s[0] == 0x0064 && s[1] == 0xff9b && s[2..6] == [0, 0, 0, 0] {
-        let [a, b] = s[6].to_be_bytes();
-        let [c, d] = s[7].to_be_bytes();
-        return Some(std::net::Ipv4Addr::new(a, b, c, d));
-    }
-    None
-}
-
-/// Whether a peer `http_url` is a public http(s) endpoint safe to register.
-/// Rejects non-http(s) schemes, loopback/unspecified/private/link-local IPs,
-/// and `localhost` / `.local` / `.internal` hostnames. Used at announce time
-/// and by the boot-time prune of already-poisoned rows.
-pub fn is_public_http_url(raw: &str) -> bool {
-    let url = match reqwest::Url::parse(raw) {
-        Ok(u) => u,
-        Err(_) => return false,
-    };
-    if !matches!(url.scheme(), "http" | "https") {
-        return false;
-    }
-    let mut host = match url.host_str() {
-        Some(h) => h.to_ascii_lowercase(),
-        None => return false,
-    };
-    // Drop a single trailing dot (FQDN root): `localhost.` resolves the same as
-    // `localhost`, so normalize before the suffix/equality checks below.
-    if let Some(stripped) = host.strip_suffix('.') {
-        host = stripped.to_string();
-    }
-    if host.is_empty()
-        || host == "localhost"
-        || host.ends_with(".local")
-        || host.ends_with(".internal")
-    {
-        return false;
-    }
-    // host_str() keeps brackets on IPv6 literals (e.g. "[::1]"); strip them
-    // before parsing as an IP.
-    let ip_candidate = host.trim_start_matches('[').trim_end_matches(']');
-    if let Ok(ip) = ip_candidate.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>() {
-        // Reject loopback/unspecified on the literal as given — catches `::1`
-        // and `::` before the IPv4-folding below (`::1`.to_ipv4() would
-        // otherwise map to a non-loopback `0.0.0.1`).
-        if ip.is_loopback() || ip.is_unspecified() {
-            return false;
-        }
-        // Fold any IPv6 literal that embeds an IPv4 address (mapped, compatible,
-        // 6to4, NAT64) down to that IPv4 so the v4 range checks catch
-        // loopback/private addresses smuggled in via an IPv6 encoding, then
-        // re-check loopback/unspecified.
-        let ip = match ip {
-            std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => embedded_ipv4(v6).map(std::net::IpAddr::V4).unwrap_or(ip),
-            v4 => v4,
-        };
-        if ip.is_loopback() || ip.is_unspecified() {
-            return false;
-        }
-        match ip {
-            std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
-                let o = v4.octets();
-                // RFC1918 private, link-local, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), or the
-                // RFC1122 "this host" block 0.0.0.0/8 (never a valid destination;
-                // 0.0.0.0 itself is already caught by the is_unspecified check).
-                if v4.is_private()
-                    || v4.is_link_local()
-                    || (o[0] == 100 && (o[1] & 0xc0) == 64)
-                    || o[0] == 0
-                {
-                    return false;
-                }
-            }
-            std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
-                let s = v6.segments();
-                // fc00::/7 (unique-local) or fe80::/10 (link-local)
-                if (s[0] & 0xfe00) == 0xfc00 || (s[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80 {
-                    return false;
-                }
-                // Any NAT64 address (64:ff9b::/32) that is not the cleanly
-                // decodable well-known /96 — e.g. the RFC 8215 local-use
-                // 64:ff9b:1::/48 — carries a translated target whose embedded v4
-                // sits at a prefix-length-dependent offset (RFC 6052 §2.2).
-                // Rather than risk a wrong decode across every prefix length we
-                // reject the whole NAT64 space here. The well-known /96 was
-                // already folded to its v4 above and never reaches this arm.
-                if s[0] == 0x0064 && s[1] == 0xff9b {
-                    return false;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    true
-}
-
 /// GET /api/v1/peers
 pub async fn list_peers(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
    let peers = state.db.list_peers().await?;
@@ -200,14 +83,10 @@ pub async fn announce(
        );
    }

-    // Validate the URL is a public http(s) endpoint. The announce route is
-    // reachable unauthenticated (until all peers sign), so without this an
-    // attacker can register loopback/private "peers" (localhost:5432, etc.)
-    // and turn our outbound sync-notify fan-out into an SSRF probe — and bury
-    // the real peers under junk so node-origin repos stop replicating.
-    if !is_public_http_url(&req.http_url) {
+    // Validate the URL is HTTP/HTTPS
+    if !req.http_url.starts_with("http://") && !req.http_url.starts_with("https://") {
        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "http_url must be a public http(s) URL (no loopback, private, or .internal/.local hosts)".into(),
+            "http_url must start with http:// or https://".into(),
        ));
    }

@@ -296,8 +175,8 @@ pub async fn trigger_sync(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<serde_js
                repo.get("name").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
            ) {
                (Some(owner), Some(name)) => {
-                    // Use short owner (did:key-only normalization) matching DB convention
-                    let short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(owner);
+                    // Use short owner (last colon segment) matching DB convention
+                    let short = owner.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner);
                    format!("{short}/{name}")
                }
                _ => continue,
@@ -432,13 +311,7 @@ pub async fn ping_peer(

    // Async ping
    let url = format!("{}/health", peer.http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-    // Use the shared no-redirect client: bare `reqwest::get` follows redirects,
-    // so a peer could answer with `302 -> http://127.0.0.1/` and turn the ping
-    // into an SSRF probe.
-    let ok = state
-        .http_client
-        .get(&url)
-        .send()
+    let ok = reqwest::get(&url)
        .await
        .map(|r| r.status().is_success())
        .unwrap_or(false);
@@ -451,90 +324,3 @@ pub async fn ping_peer(
        "reachable": ok,
    })))
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::is_public_http_url;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn accepts_public_https_and_http() {
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("https://node.gitlawb.com"));
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("https://manila.gitlawb.com/"));
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://203.0.113.10:7545"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_loopback_private_and_internal() {
-        for bad in [
-            "http://localhost:7545",
-            "http://127.0.0.1:5432/",
-            "http://localhost:22/",
-            "http://0.0.0.0:7545",
-            // RFC1122 "this host" block 0.0.0.0/8 beyond 0.0.0.0 itself,
-            // including the upper boundary (1.0.0.0 is public, tested below).
-            "http://0.0.0.1:7545",
-            "http://0.1.2.3/",
-            "http://0.255.255.255/",
-            "http://10.0.0.5:7545",
-            "http://192.168.1.10/",
-            "http://172.16.0.1:7545",
-            "http://169.254.1.1/",
-            "http://[::1]:7545",
-            "http://gitlawb-node.internal:7545",
-            "http://my-node.local/",
-            "ftp://node.gitlawb.com",
-            "not-a-url",
-            "",
-            // Trailing-dot FQDN of an internal host.
-            "http://localhost./",
-            // CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10).
-            "http://100.64.0.1:7545",
-            "http://100.127.255.255/",
-            // IPv4-mapped / IPv4-compatible IPv6 smuggling private/loopback v4.
-            "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:7545",
-            "http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/",
-            "http://[::ffff:192.168.1.1]:7545",
-            "http://[::127.0.0.1]/",
-            // 6to4 (2002::/16) embedding loopback/private v4.
-            "http://[2002:7f00:1::]:7545",
-            "http://[2002:a00:1::]/",
-            "http://[2002:c0a8:101::]/",
-            // NAT64 well-known prefix (64:ff9b::/96) embedding loopback/private v4.
-            "http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/",
-            "http://[64:ff9b::a00:1]:7545",
-            // NAT64 local-use prefix (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215) — rejected
-            // outright rather than decoded, so the whole NAT64 space is closed.
-            "http://[64:ff9b:1::7f00:1]/",
-            "http://[64:ff9b:1::a00:1]:7545",
-            "http://[64:ff9b:1:a00::]/",
-            // Local-use NAT64 wrapping a *public* v4 (203.0.113.10) is still
-            // rejected: the block is prefix-based, not payload-based.
-            "http://[64:ff9b:1::cb00:710a]/",
-        ] {
-            assert!(!is_public_http_url(bad), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn accepts_6to4_and_nat64_wrapping_public_v4() {
-        // Fold-and-recheck stays consistent with the mapped/compatible handling:
-        // a transition address that wraps a public v4 is allowed, only the
-        // private/loopback-wrapping forms above are rejected. 203.0.113.10.
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://[2002:cb00:710a::]/"));
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://[64:ff9b::cb00:710a]/"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn accepts_public_outside_cgnat_range() {
-        // 100.0.0.0/10 boundary: .63 and .128 are public, only 100.64-127 is CGNAT.
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://100.63.255.255:7545"));
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://100.128.0.1/"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn accepts_first_address_above_this_host_block() {
-        // 1.0.0.0 is the first address above the rejected 0.0.0.0/8 block;
-        // pins the `o[0] == 0` check against an off-by-one into 1.x.
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://1.0.0.0/"));
-    }
-}
@@ -23,10 +23,15 @@ pub async fn protect_branch(
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;

-    // Only the repo owner can protect branches (DID-safe match, shared idiom).
+    // Only the repo owner can protect branches
    let caller = &auth.0;
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    let owner_short = record
+        .owner_did
+        .split(':')
+        .next_back()
+        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    if caller != &record.owner_did && caller != owner_short {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
            "only the repo owner can protect branches".into(),
        ));
    }
@@ -58,8 +63,13 @@ pub async fn unprotect_branch(
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;

    let caller = &auth.0;
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    let owner_short = record
+        .owner_did
+        .split(':')
+        .next_back()
+        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    if caller != &record.owner_did && caller != owner_short {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
            "only the repo owner can unprotect branches".into(),
        ));
    }
@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ pub async fn create_pr(
    Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
    Json(req): Json<CreatePrRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<PullRequest>)> {
-    // Authorize the caller as a reader before accepting a PR: a non-reader must
-    // not be able to open a PR (and fire its webhooks) against a private repo
-    // they cannot read. Mirrors create_review / create_comment / create_bounty.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;

    let author_did = auth.0;
    let target_branch = req
@@ -101,11 +101,12 @@ pub async fn create_pr(
 pub async fn list_prs(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;

    let prs = state.db.list_prs(&record.id).await?;
    Ok(Json(
@@ -117,11 +118,12 @@ pub async fn list_prs(
 pub async fn get_pr(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<PullRequest>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;

    let pr = state
        .db
@@ -136,11 +138,12 @@ pub async fn get_pr(
 pub async fn get_pr_diff(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;

    let pr = state
        .db
@@ -153,25 +156,6 @@ pub async fn get_pr_diff(
        .acquire(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
-
-    // Withhold the entire diff if it touches a path the caller cannot read, so a
-    // PR diff cannot leak private-subtree content of an otherwise-public repo.
-    let touched = store::branch_diff_names(&disk_path, &pr.target_branch, &pr.source_branch)
-        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
-    for p in &touched {
-        let gate = format!("/{}", p.trim_start_matches('/'));
-        if crate::visibility::visibility_check(
-            &rules,
-            record.is_public,
-            &record.owner_did,
-            caller,
-            &gate,
-        ) == crate::visibility::Decision::Deny
-        {
-            return Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("PR #{number} not found")));
-        }
-    }
-
    let diff = store::branch_diff(&disk_path, &pr.target_branch, &pr.source_branch)
        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;

@@ -194,11 +178,6 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;

-    // Owner-only merge (N7). Merging writes the served tree, so this is the same
-    // trust boundary as owner-only push; it subsumes branch protection (a
-    // non-owner cannot merge to any branch, protected or not).
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
-
    let pr = state
        .db
        .get_pr(&record.id, number)
@@ -257,7 +236,6 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
 /// POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/pulls/:number/close
 pub async fn close_pr(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
    Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
    let record = state
@@ -272,15 +250,6 @@ pub async fn close_pr(
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("PR #{number} not found")))?;

-    // Owner OR author may close (forge norm).
-    let is_owner = crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0).is_ok();
-    let is_author = crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &pr.author_did);
-    if !is_owner && !is_author {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "only the repo owner or the PR author can close this PR".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
    state.db.close_pr(&pr.id).await?;

    webhooks::fire_event(
@@ -305,9 +274,11 @@ pub async fn create_review(
    Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
    Json(req): Json<CreateReviewRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<PrReview>)> {
-    // Read-gate: a reviewer must be able to read the repo, but need not own it.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;

    let pr = state
        .db
@@ -353,11 +324,12 @@ pub async fn create_review(
 pub async fn list_reviews(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;

    let pr = state
        .db
@@ -382,9 +354,11 @@ pub async fn create_comment(
        ));
    }

-    // Read-gate: a commenter must be able to read the repo, but need not own it.
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;

    let pr = state
        .db
@@ -409,11 +383,12 @@ pub async fn create_comment(
 pub async fn list_comments(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
-    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
-    let (record, _rules) =
-        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+    let record = state
+        .db
+        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;

    let pr = state
        .db
@@ -35,32 +35,14 @@ pub struct RegisterResponse {
 /// Accepts only requests with a valid HTTP Signature (enforced by middleware).
 pub async fn register(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    axum::Extension(auth): axum::Extension<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>,
-    headers: axum::http::HeaderMap,
    Json(req): Json<RegisterRequest>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<RegisterResponse>)> {
-    // iCaptcha gate (inert unless ICAPTCHA_MODE is set). Verify up front; spend
-    // the proof only once the request is admissible, just before the write, so a
-    // rejected request never burns a valid proof.
-    let proof = crate::icaptcha::verify_request(&headers, &auth.0)?;
-
    // Parse and validate the DID
    let agent_did: Did = req
        .did
        .parse()
        .map_err(|e: gitlawb_core::Error| AppError::BadRequest(e.to_string()))?;

-    // Bind registration to the authenticated signer: an agent may only register
-    // itself, not create or refresh a trust row for a DID it does not control.
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, agent_did.as_str()) {
-        return Err(AppError::Forbidden(
-            "did must be the authenticated signer".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    // Request is admissible — spend the proof now, immediately before the write.
-    proof.consume(&state.db).await?;
-
    // Store the agent in the local index
    state
        .db
@@ -47,9 +47,8 @@ pub async fn register_replica(

    let replica_did = &auth.0;

-    // Don't let an owner register themselves as a replica of their own repo
-    // (did_matches handles the full vs bare did:key owner form).
-    if crate::api::did_matches(replica_did, &record.owner_did) {
+    // Don't let an owner register themselves as a replica of their own repo.
+    if replica_did == &record.owner_did {
        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
            "the repo owner is not a replica of their own repo".into(),
        ));
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 //!   POST   /api/v1/tasks/{id}/fail          — fail task

 use axum::{
-    extract::{Extension, Path, Query, State},
+    extract::{Path, Query, State},
    http::StatusCode,
    Json,
 };
@@ -18,18 +18,9 @@ use serde::Deserialize;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use uuid::Uuid;

-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::db::AgentTask;
 use crate::state::{AppState, TaskEventBroadcast};

-/// 403 in this module's error shape (`(StatusCode, Json<Value>)`, not `AppError`).
-fn forbidden(msg: &str) -> (StatusCode, Json<Value>) {
-    (
-        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
-        Json(json!({ "error": "forbidden", "message": msg })),
-    )
-}
-
 // ── Request / response types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -64,11 +55,13 @@ pub struct ClaimTaskBody {
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 pub struct CompleteTaskBody {
    pub result: Option<String>,
+    pub by_did: Option<String>,
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 pub struct FailTaskBody {
    pub reason: Option<String>,
+    pub by_did: Option<String>,
 }

 fn task_to_json(t: &AgentTask) -> Value {
@@ -94,20 +87,15 @@ fn task_to_json(t: &AgentTask) -> Value {
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks
 pub async fn create_task(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
    Json(body): Json<CreateTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<Value>), (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    // Bind the delegator to the authenticated signer (N13).
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &body.delegator_did) {
-        return Err(forbidden("delegator_did must be the authenticated signer"));
-    }
    let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
    let task = AgentTask {
        id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
        repo_id: body.repo_id,
        kind: body.kind,
        status: "pending".to_string(),
-        delegator_did: auth.0,
+        delegator_did: body.delegator_did,
        assignee_did: body.assignee_did,
        capability: body.capability,
        ucan_token: body.ucan_token,
@@ -166,25 +154,24 @@ pub async fn get_task(
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/claim
 pub async fn claim_task(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
    Path(id): Path<String>,
    Json(body): Json<ClaimTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    // Bind the assignee to the authenticated signer (N13).
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(&auth.0, &body.assignee_did) {
-        return Err(forbidden("assignee_did must be the authenticated signer"));
-    }
-    let task = state.db.claim_task(&id, &auth.0).await.map_err(|e| {
-        (
-            StatusCode::CONFLICT,
-            Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
-        )
-    })?;
+    let task = state
+        .db
+        .claim_task(&id, &body.assignee_did)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            (
+                StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
+            )
+        })?;
    let _ = state.task_event_tx.send(TaskEventBroadcast {
        task_id: id,
        old_status: "pending".to_string(),
        new_status: "claimed".to_string(),
-        by_did: auth.0,
+        by_did: body.assignee_did,
        at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
    });
    Ok(Json(task_to_json(&task)))
@@ -193,44 +180,17 @@ pub async fn claim_task(
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/complete
 pub async fn complete_task(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
    Path(id): Path<String>,
    Json(body): Json<CompleteTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    // Authorize the actor, not just bind their identity: the N13 signer-binding
-    // proved the caller was whoever they claimed, but never that they were the
-    // task's assignee. Load the task and require the caller to be its assignee;
-    // finish_task then transitions only a claimed task.
-    let existing = state
-        .db
-        .get_task(&id)
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            (
-                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
-                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
-            )
-        })?
-        .ok_or_else(|| {
-            (
-                StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
-                Json(json!({ "error": "task not found" })),
-            )
-        })?;
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(
-        &auth.0,
-        existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
-    ) {
-        return Err(forbidden("only the task assignee can complete it"));
-    }
-    let by_did = auth.0;
+    let by_did = body.by_did.unwrap_or_default();
    let task = state
        .db
        .finish_task(&id, "completed", body.result.as_deref())
        .await
        .map_err(|e| {
            (
-                StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+                StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
            )
        })?;
@@ -247,36 +207,10 @@ pub async fn complete_task(
 /// POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/fail
 pub async fn fail_task(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
    Path(id): Path<String>,
    Json(body): Json<FailTaskBody>,
 ) -> Result<Json<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
-    // Authorize the actor, not just bind their identity (see complete_task): only
-    // the task's assignee may fail it, and finish_task transitions only a claimed
-    // task.
-    let existing = state
-        .db
-        .get_task(&id)
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            (
-                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
-                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
-            )
-        })?
-        .ok_or_else(|| {
-            (
-                StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
-                Json(json!({ "error": "task not found" })),
-            )
-        })?;
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(
-        &auth.0,
-        existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
-    ) {
-        return Err(forbidden("only the task assignee can fail it"));
-    }
-    let by_did = auth.0;
+    let by_did = body.by_did.unwrap_or_default();
    let reason = body.reason.unwrap_or_default();
    let task = state
        .db
@@ -284,7 +218,7 @@ pub async fn fail_task(
        .await
        .map_err(|e| {
            (
-                StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+                StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
                Json(json!({ "error": e.to_string() })),
            )
        })?;
@@ -26,16 +26,17 @@ pub struct RemoveVisibilityRequest {
 }

 fn require_owner(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> Result<()> {
-    // DID-safe owner match (collapses did:key full vs bare on both sides, never
-    // across methods), shared with require_repo_owner — not a trailing-segment
-    // compare that only normalized the owner side.
-    if crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) {
-        Ok(())
-    } else {
-        Err(AppError::Forbidden(
+    let owner_short = record
+        .owner_did
+        .split(':')
+        .next_back()
+        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    if caller != record.owner_did && caller != owner_short {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
            "only the repo owner can manage visibility".into(),
-        ))
+        ));
    }
+    Ok(())
 }

 /// Reject malformed globs before they reach the store, where they would
@@ -56,23 +57,9 @@ fn validate_path_glob(path_glob: &str) -> Result<()> {
            "path_glob must not end with '/'".into(),
        ));
    }
-    // Reject empty path segments. `glob_prefix` collapses "//**" to "/" (whole
-    // repo), so without this an operator could bypass the "/**" guard above and
-    // grant repo-wide read with "//**", or set a dead rule like "//secret/**"
-    // whose prefix never matches a real single-slash path and silently leaves
-    // the subtree readable.
-    if path_glob.contains("//") {
+    if path_glob.contains('*') && !path_glob.ends_with("/**") {
        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "path_glob must not contain empty path segments".into(),
-        ));
-    }
-    // Strip the one permitted trailing "/**" before checking for stray
-    // wildcards, otherwise a "*" elsewhere in the prefix (e.g. "/a*b/**" or
-    // "/a/**/**") slips through because the string still ends with "/**".
-    let prefix = path_glob.strip_suffix("/**").unwrap_or(path_glob);
-    if prefix.contains('*') {
-        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "the only supported wildcard is a single trailing '/**'".into(),
+            "the only supported wildcard is a trailing '/**'".into(),
        ));
    }
    Ok(())
@@ -253,22 +240,9 @@ mod tests {

    #[test]
    fn rejects_malformed_globs() {
-        // empty, no leading slash, whole-repo via "/**", trailing slash,
-        // non-trailing wildcards, double wildcards, and empty path segments
-        // (which would collapse to whole-repo or a dead rule) are all rejected.
-        for g in [
-            "",
-            "secret/**",
-            "/**",
-            "/**/**",
-            "/secret/",
-            "/a*b",
-            "/*/x",
-            "/a*b/**",
-            "/a/**/**",
-            "//**",
-            "//secret/**",
-        ] {
+        // empty, no leading slash, whole-repo via "/**", trailing slash, and
+        // non-trailing wildcards are all rejected.
+        for g in ["", "secret/**", "/**", "/secret/", "/a*b", "/*/x"] {
            assert!(validate_path_glob(g).is_err(), "{g} should be rejected");
        }
    }
@@ -38,16 +38,11 @@ pub async fn create_webhook(
        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;

-    // Gate the target through the same hardened public-host validator the peer
-    // announce path uses, so an authenticated owner cannot register a webhook
-    // that makes the node POST to loopback/private/link-local/metadata
-    // endpoints (SSRF). Delivery runs on the shared no-redirect client
-    // (main.rs), which closes the 3xx-to-internal bounce.
-    if !crate::api::peers::is_public_http_url(&req.url) {
+    // Validate URL is http/https
+    if !req.url.starts_with("http://") && !req.url.starts_with("https://") {
        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
-            "webhook URL must be a public http(s) URL (no loopback, private, or .internal/.local hosts)".into(),
+            "webhook URL must be http:// or https://".into(),
        ));
    }

@@ -100,7 +95,6 @@ pub async fn list_webhooks(
 /// DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks/:id
 pub async fn delete_webhook(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
    Path((owner, name, id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
    let record = state
@@ -108,7 +102,6 @@ pub async fn delete_webhook(
        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
-    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;

    // Verify the webhook belongs to this repo
    let hook = state
@@ -124,35 +117,3 @@ pub async fn delete_webhook(
    state.db.delete_webhook(&id).await?;
    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "deleted": true, "id": id })))
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::api::peers::is_public_http_url;
-
-    // create_webhook gates req.url through is_public_http_url. Pin the exact
-    // SSRF targets from issue #81 so the webhook path can never regress to the
-    // old scheme-only check, independent of the validator's own peer tests.
-    #[test]
-    fn webhook_url_gate_rejects_ssrf_targets() {
-        for bad in [
-            "http://127.0.0.1:5432/",
-            "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
-            "http://localhost/",
-            "http://10.0.0.5/",
-            "http://[::1]/",
-            // IPv6 transition encodings smuggling loopback v4 (6to4 / NAT64).
-            "http://[2002:7f00:1::]/",
-            "http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/",
-            "ftp://example.com/",
-            "not-a-url",
-        ] {
-            assert!(!is_public_http_url(bad), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn webhook_url_gate_allows_public_targets() {
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("https://hooks.example.com/gitlawb"));
-        assert!(is_public_http_url("http://203.0.113.10:7545/"));
-    }
-}
@@ -103,108 +103,6 @@ pub async fn anchor_ref_update(
    Ok(tx_id)
 }

-/// A per-push manifest of the blobs encrypted this push (Option B3). The
-/// `blobs` slice is `(oid, cid)` tuples. Anchored directly to Arweave as its JSON
-/// body so the discovery index survives total node loss. Recipient identities are
-/// never part of the manifest.
-pub struct EncryptedManifest<'a> {
-    pub repo: &'a str,
-    pub owner_did: &'a str,
-    pub node_did: &'a str,
-    pub timestamp: &'a str,
-    pub blobs: &'a [(String, String)],
-}
-
-/// Anchor a per-push encrypted-blob manifest to Arweave via Irys. The manifest
-/// JSON body is the payload (not a CID pointer to IPFS), so the index is
-/// permanent and self-contained. Recipient identities are deliberately omitted:
-/// the anchor is permanent and public, and the v2 envelopes no longer expose
-/// recipients, so the reader set must not be written to Arweave either.
-///
-/// Returns the Irys/Arweave transaction ID, or `Ok("")` when `irys_url` is empty
-/// (anchoring disabled) or there are no blobs to anchor.
-pub async fn anchor_encrypted_manifest(
-    client: &reqwest::Client,
-    irys_url: &str,
-    manifest: &EncryptedManifest<'_>,
-) -> Result<String> {
-    if irys_url.is_empty() || manifest.blobs.is_empty() {
-        return Ok(String::new());
-    }
-
-    let blobs_json: Vec<serde_json::Value> = manifest
-        .blobs
-        .iter()
-        .map(|(oid, cid)| manifest_blob_json(oid, cid))
-        .collect();
-
-    let payload = json!({
-        "schema": "gitlawb/encrypted-manifest/v1",
-        "repo": manifest.repo,
-        "owner_did": manifest.owner_did,
-        "node_did": manifest.node_did,
-        "timestamp": manifest.timestamp,
-        "blobs": blobs_json,
-    });
-
-    let body = serde_json::to_vec(&payload)?;
-    let url = format!("{}/upload", irys_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-
-    let resp = client
-        .post(&url)
-        .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
-        .header("x-irys-tags", build_manifest_tags_header(manifest))
-        .body(body)
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Irys upload failed: {e}"))?;
-
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        let status = resp.status();
-        let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Irys returned {status}: {body}"));
-    }
-
-    let json: serde_json::Value = resp
-        .json()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to parse Irys response: {e}"))?;
-
-    let tx_id = json["id"]
-        .as_str()
-        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("no 'id' in Irys response: {json}"))?
-        .to_string();
-
-    tracing::info!(
-        repo = %manifest.repo,
-        tx_id = %tx_id,
-        blobs = manifest.blobs.len(),
-        "anchored encrypted manifest to Arweave"
-    );
-
-    Ok(tx_id)
-}
-
-/// Serialize one blob for the Arweave manifest. Recipient identities are
-/// intentionally absent so the permanent public anchor never records who can
-/// read a blob.
-fn manifest_blob_json(oid: &str, cid: &str) -> serde_json::Value {
-    json!({ "oid": oid, "cid": cid })
-}
-
-/// Build the Irys tag header for an encrypted-blob manifest. `Repo` and `Schema`
-/// are the tags the `gl` recovery query filters on.
-fn build_manifest_tags_header(manifest: &EncryptedManifest<'_>) -> String {
-    [
-        "App-Name:gitlawb".to_string(),
-        "Schema:gitlawb/encrypted-manifest/v1".to_string(),
-        format!("Repo:{}", sanitize_tag(manifest.repo)),
-        format!("Owner-DID:{}", sanitize_tag(manifest.owner_did)),
-        format!("Node-DID:{}", sanitize_tag(manifest.node_did)),
-    ]
-    .join(",")
-}
-
 /// Arweave permanent URL for a given Irys transaction ID.
 pub fn arweave_url(tx_id: &str) -> String {
    format!("https://arweave.net/{tx_id}")
@@ -243,7 +141,7 @@ mod tests {
            repo: "alice/myrepo".into(),
            owner_did: "did:key:z6Mk...".into(),
            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000".into(),
+            old_sha: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".into(),
            new_sha: "a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2".into(),
            cid: Some("bafyreib5...".into()),
            timestamp: "2026-03-14T00:00:00Z".into(),
@@ -270,7 +168,7 @@ mod tests {
            repo: "alice/myrepo".into(),
            owner_did: "did:key:z6Mk...".into(),
            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: "0".repeat(40),
+            old_sha: "0".repeat(64),
            new_sha: "a1b2c3d4".repeat(8),
            cid: None,
            timestamp: "2026-03-14T00:00:00Z".into(),
@@ -286,44 +184,6 @@ mod tests {
        _mock.assert_async().await;
    }

-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_anchor_body_carries_real_old_sha() {
-        // The anchored body must serialize the real old→new transition the
-        // node was handed, never a zero placeholder. Regression guard for the
-        // push handler that used to hardcode `old_sha` to 64 zeros (#26).
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let real_old = "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
-        let real_new = "2222222222222222222222222222222222222222";
-        let _mock = server
-            .mock("POST", "/upload")
-            .match_body(mockito::Matcher::AllOf(vec![
-                mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"old_sha":"{real_old}"}}"#)),
-                mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"new_sha":"{real_new}"}}"#)),
-            ]))
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"id":"TX_REAL_OLD_SHA","timestamp":1710000000000,"version":"1.0.0"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
-        let anchor = RefAnchor {
-            repo: "alice/myrepo".into(),
-            owner_did: "did:key:z6Mk...".into(),
-            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: real_old.into(),
-            new_sha: real_new.into(),
-            cid: None,
-            timestamp: "2026-03-14T00:00:00Z".into(),
-            node_did: "did:key:z6Mknnd...".into(),
-        };
-
-        let result = anchor_ref_update(&client, &server.url(), &anchor).await;
-        assert_eq!(result.unwrap(), "TX_REAL_OLD_SHA");
-        // The mock only matches when the posted JSON carries both real SHAs.
-        _mock.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
    #[test]
    fn test_arweave_url() {
        let url = arweave_url("7xGpIoHUQ8j9GhD3Y2mKzP1NsVtXwRcFe4bEaLnMuOk");
@@ -333,79 +193,6 @@ mod tests {
        );
    }

-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_manifest_anchor_noop_when_url_empty() {
-        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
-        let blobs = vec![("oid1".to_string(), "cid1".to_string())];
-        let m = EncryptedManifest {
-            repo: "alice/r",
-            owner_did: "did:key:zO",
-            node_did: "did:key:zN",
-            timestamp: "2026-06-11T00:00:00Z",
-            blobs: &blobs,
-        };
-        assert_eq!(
-            anchor_encrypted_manifest(&client, "", &m).await.unwrap(),
-            ""
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_manifest_anchor_noop_when_no_blobs() {
-        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
-        let blobs: Vec<(String, String)> = vec![];
-        let m = EncryptedManifest {
-            repo: "alice/r",
-            owner_did: "did:key:zO",
-            node_did: "did:key:zN",
-            timestamp: "2026-06-11T00:00:00Z",
-            blobs: &blobs,
-        };
-        // Non-empty URL, but no blobs: still a no-op.
-        assert_eq!(
-            anchor_encrypted_manifest(&client, "https://example.invalid", &m)
-                .await
-                .unwrap(),
-            ""
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_manifest_anchor_success() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let _mock = server
-            .mock("POST", "/upload")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"id":"MANIFESTTX123","timestamp":1710000000000,"version":"1.0.0"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
-        let blobs = vec![("oid1".to_string(), "cid1".to_string())];
-        let m = EncryptedManifest {
-            repo: "alice/r",
-            owner_did: "did:key:zO",
-            node_did: "did:key:zN",
-            timestamp: "2026-06-11T00:00:00Z",
-            blobs: &blobs,
-        };
-        let r = anchor_encrypted_manifest(&client, &server.url(), &m).await;
-        assert_eq!(r.unwrap(), "MANIFESTTX123");
-        _mock.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn manifest_blob_json_omits_recipients() {
-        let v = manifest_blob_json("oid1", "cidA");
-        assert_eq!(v["oid"], "oid1");
-        assert_eq!(v["cid"], "cidA");
-        assert!(
-            v.get("recipients").is_none(),
-            "Arweave manifest must not anchor recipient identities"
-        );
-    }
-
    #[test]
    fn test_sanitize_tag() {
        assert_eq!(sanitize_tag("alice/myrepo"), "alice/myrepo");
@@ -17,18 +17,6 @@ use crate::state::AppState;
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct AuthenticatedDid(pub String);

-/// Whether `caller` is authorized to push to `record`.
-///
-/// Phase 1 (`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH`): owner-only, via the canonical
-/// [`crate::api::did_matches`] owner comparison (DID-safe on both sides). This is
-/// intentionally a distinct, intent-named gate rather than a bare owner check so
-/// that Phase 2 can extend it to honor a verified UCAN `git/push` capability as a
-/// pure addition (`did_matches(..) || ucan_grants_push(..)`) without rewriting
-/// call sites.
-pub fn caller_authorized_to_push(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, caller: &str) -> bool {
-    crate::api::did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did)
-}
-
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::{
    build_signing_string, compute_content_digest, HttpSignature, COVERED_COMPONENTS,
 };
@@ -514,8 +502,6 @@ mod tests {
            machine_id: None,
            repo_store: crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), pool),
            rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(100, Duration::from_secs(60)),
-            push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
-            push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None,
            shutdown_tx: tokio::sync::watch::channel(false).0,
        }
    }
@@ -49,14 +49,6 @@ pub struct Config {
    )]
    pub require_signed_peer_writes: bool,

-    /// Require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on `git-receive-pack`.
-    /// Authentication (a valid did:key signature) is not authorization on its own:
-    /// any party can sign as their own DID. When true, pushes whose authenticated
-    /// DID is not the repo owner are rejected. Keep false during rolling upgrades;
-    /// flip it on once owners are ready for owner-only writes.
-    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH", default_value_t = false)]
-    pub enforce_owner_push: bool,
-
    /// URL of local IPFS/Kubo node HTTP API (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:5001)
    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_IPFS_API", default_value = "")]
    pub ipfs_api: String,
@@ -1,362 +0,0 @@
-//! Encrypt-then-pin for withheld blobs (Option B1). Each withheld blob is sealed
-//! to its recipient DIDs and the envelope pinned to IPFS, recorded in
-//! `encrypted_blobs`. Best-effort per blob: a failure is logged and skipped,
-//! never pinned in plaintext.
-
-use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
-use std::path::Path;
-use std::str::FromStr;
-
-use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
-use gitlawb_core::did::Did;
-use gitlawb_core::encrypt::seal_blob;
-
-use crate::db::Db;
-
-use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
-use sha2::Sha256;
-
-type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
-
-/// Opaque, node-keyed fingerprint of a blob's recipient set. Stored in place of
-/// the cleartext DID list so a DB compromise cannot reveal the reader set; used
-/// only to detect a recipient-set change so an unchanged blob is not re-sealed.
-/// Order-insensitive (the input `BTreeSet` is already sorted).
-pub fn recipients_tag(node_seed: &[u8; 32], dids: &BTreeSet<String>) -> String {
-    let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(node_seed).expect("HMAC accepts any key length");
-    mac.update(b"gitlawb/recipients-tag/v1");
-    for did in dids {
-        mac.update(b"\n");
-        mac.update(did.as_bytes());
-    }
-    hex::encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes())
-}
-
-/// Resolve a DID string to its Ed25519 verifying key, or None if it carries no
-/// inline key (e.g. did:web / did:gitlawb).
-fn did_to_key(did: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
-    Did::from_str(did).ok()?.to_verifying_key().ok()
-}
-
-/// Resolve every recipient DID to its verifying key, all-or-nothing.
-///
-/// Returns `Ok(keys)` only when every DID resolves. If any DID fails, returns
-/// `Err(unresolved)` listing the unresolvable DID strings so the caller can fail
-/// closed rather than seal to a partial recipient set (#47): sealing to a subset
-/// while recording the full set as covered permanently locks out the dropped
-/// readers. Resolution is local-only, so `did:web`/`did:gitlawb` recipients (and
-/// any malformed `did:key`) land in the unresolved set until off-`did:key`
-/// resolution exists.
-fn resolve_all_recipients(dids: &BTreeSet<String>) -> Result<Vec<VerifyingKey>, Vec<String>> {
-    let mut keys = Vec::with_capacity(dids.len());
-    let mut unresolved = Vec::new();
-    for did in dids {
-        match did_to_key(did) {
-            Some(k) => keys.push(k),
-            None => unresolved.push(did.clone()),
-        }
-    }
-    if unresolved.is_empty() {
-        Ok(keys)
-    } else {
-        Err(unresolved)
-    }
-}
-
-/// What to do with a single withheld blob, decided without any DB or IO so the
-/// fail-closed invariant (#47) is unit-testable in isolation.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-enum SealPlan {
-    /// An existing envelope already covers exactly this recipient set; nothing to do.
-    SkipUnchanged,
-    /// No recipient DID resolved to a key, so there is nothing to seal to.
-    SkipNoRecipients,
-    /// At least one recipient DID is unresolvable. Fail closed: never seal to a
-    /// partial set. Carries the unresolvable DIDs for logging.
-    SkipUnresolvable(Vec<String>),
-    /// Seal to `keys` and record coverage under `tag`.
-    Seal {
-        keys: Vec<VerifyingKey>,
-        tag: String,
-    },
-}
-
-/// Decide what to do with one blob given its desired recipient set and the tag
-/// already stored for it (if any). Pure: no DB, no IO.
-///
-/// This is the #47 fail-closed gate in isolation: it returns `Seal` only when
-/// EVERY recipient DID resolves, so no caller can seal to a partial set. A
-/// changed recipient set (different tag) re-seals so a newly added reader can
-/// recover the blob; reader removal is not retroactive (the old envelope is
-/// already public). The comparison is on the opaque node-keyed tag, never the
-/// DID list.
-fn plan_seal(node_seed: &[u8; 32], dids: &BTreeSet<String>, stored_tag: Option<&str>) -> SealPlan {
-    let tag = recipients_tag(node_seed, dids);
-    if stored_tag == Some(tag.as_str()) {
-        return SealPlan::SkipUnchanged;
-    }
-    match resolve_all_recipients(dids) {
-        Ok(keys) if keys.is_empty() => SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients,
-        Ok(keys) => SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag },
-        Err(unresolved) => SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved),
-    }
-}
-
-/// Encrypt and pin every withheld blob. `recipients` maps blob oid -> DID set;
-/// `node_seed` keys the opaque recipients tag. Returns `(oid, cid)` for each blob
-/// actually sealed and recorded this call (the per-push delta), used by Option B3
-/// to anchor a manifest. Recipient identities are never stored or returned.
-pub async fn encrypt_and_pin(
-    ipfs_api: &str,
-    repo_path: &Path,
-    db: &Db,
-    repo_id: &str,
-    node_seed: &[u8; 32],
-    recipients: &HashMap<String, BTreeSet<String>>,
-) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
-    let mut sealed = Vec::new();
-    let mut skipped_unresolvable = 0usize;
-    for (oid, dids) in recipients {
-        // A DB read failure is not a cache miss: re-sealing here would do an
-        // avoidable IPFS write during a partial outage. Skip and retry next push.
-        let stored_tag = match db.encrypted_blob_recipients_tag(repo_id, oid).await {
-            Ok(t) => t,
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "recipients_tag lookup failed; skipping reseal");
-                continue;
-            }
-        };
-        // Fail closed: plan_seal returns Seal only when every recipient DID
-        // resolves, so we never seal to a partial set and record the full set as
-        // covered (which would permanently lock out the dropped readers, #47).
-        let (keys, tag) = match plan_seal(node_seed, dids, stored_tag.as_deref()) {
-            SealPlan::SkipUnchanged => continue,
-            SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "no resolvable recipient keys; skipping encrypted pin");
-                continue;
-            }
-            SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved) => {
-                skipped_unresolvable += 1;
-                // DIDs are user-controlled (rule reader_dids); log a bounded
-                // sample, not an unbounded dump. Wording stays neutral about the
-                // cause: a malformed did:key is not DHT-pending and never will
-                // resolve, unlike a did:gitlawb awaiting anchoring.
-                let sample: Vec<&String> = unresolved.iter().take(3).collect();
-                tracing::warn!(
-                    oid = %oid,
-                    unresolved_count = unresolved.len(),
-                    unresolved_sample = ?sample,
-                    "unresolvable recipient DID(s); skipping encrypted pin to avoid sealing to a partial set"
-                );
-                continue;
-            }
-            SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag } => (keys, tag),
-        };
-        let data = match crate::git::store::read_object(repo_path, oid) {
-            Ok(Some((_t, bytes))) => bytes,
-            Ok(None) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "git object not found; skipping encrypted pin");
-                continue;
-            }
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "read_object failed; skipping encrypted pin");
-                continue;
-            }
-        };
-        let envelope = match seal_blob(&data, &keys) {
-            Ok(e) => e,
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "seal_blob failed; skipping");
-                continue;
-            }
-        };
-        let cid = match crate::ipfs_pin::pin_git_object(ipfs_api, oid, &envelope).await {
-            Ok(c) if !c.is_empty() => c,
-            Ok(_) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, "pin_git_object returned no cid; skipping");
-                continue;
-            }
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "pin_git_object failed; skipping");
-                continue;
-            }
-        };
-        if let Err(e) = db.record_encrypted_blob(repo_id, oid, &cid, &tag).await {
-            tracing::warn!(oid = %oid, err = %e, "record_encrypted_blob failed");
-            continue;
-        }
-        sealed.push((oid.clone(), cid.clone()));
-    }
-    // One aggregate signal so a coverage collapse is a single greppable line, not
-    // a per-oid scrape. In a fully-migrated did:gitlawb org every blob skips and
-    // recovery coverage silently drops to zero; this is the operator's cue that
-    // the gap is the deliberate fail-closed posture, not a malfunction.
-    if skipped_unresolvable > 0 {
-        tracing::warn!(
-            sealed = sealed.len(),
-            skipped = skipped_unresolvable,
-            "encrypted-pin coverage reduced: blobs skipped for unresolvable recipients"
-        );
-    }
-    sealed
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
-
-    fn did_key(seed: u8) -> String {
-        let vk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[seed; 32]).verifying_key();
-        Did::from_verifying_key(&vk).to_string()
-    }
-
-    // Accepts both `&[String]` (resolve tests, built from `did_key`) and
-    // `&[&str]` (tag tests, built from literals).
-    fn set<S: AsRef<str>>(dids: &[S]) -> BTreeSet<String> {
-        dids.iter().map(|s| s.as_ref().to_string()).collect()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn all_did_key_recipients_resolve() {
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2)]);
-        let keys = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect("all did:key resolve");
-        assert_eq!(keys.len(), 2);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn mixed_set_with_did_gitlawb_fails_closed() {
-        // Core #47 regression: a resolvable subset must never yield a sealable
-        // key set. Two did:key plus one did:gitlawb -> Err naming only the
-        // unresolvable DID.
-        let gitlawb = Did::gitlawb("zSomeDhtKey").to_string();
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2), gitlawb.clone()]);
-        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("must fail closed");
-        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![gitlawb]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn did_web_recipient_fails_closed() {
-        let web = Did::web("example.com").to_string();
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), web.clone()]);
-        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("did:web cannot resolve locally");
-        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![web]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn malformed_did_key_fails_closed() {
-        // The third state: not a method-resolution gap but a permanently broken
-        // did:key (invalid multibase). Must also fail closed.
-        let broken = "did:key:z!!!invalid".to_string();
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), broken.clone()]);
-        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("malformed did:key fails");
-        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![broken]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn empty_set_resolves_to_empty_keys() {
-        let dids = BTreeSet::new();
-        let keys = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect("empty set is not an error");
-        assert!(keys.is_empty());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn single_unresolvable_did_returns_that_did() {
-        let gitlawb = Did::gitlawb("zOnlyOne").to_string();
-        let dids: BTreeSet<String> = [gitlawb.clone()].into_iter().collect();
-        let unresolved = resolve_all_recipients(&dids).expect_err("must fail closed");
-        assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![gitlawb]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tag_is_order_insensitive() {
-        let seed = [7u8; 32];
-        let a = recipients_tag(&seed, &set(&["did:key:zA", "did:key:zB"]));
-        let b = recipients_tag(&seed, &set(&["did:key:zB", "did:key:zA"]));
-        assert_eq!(a, b);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tag_differs_for_different_sets() {
-        let seed = [7u8; 32];
-        let a = recipients_tag(&seed, &set(&["did:key:zA"]));
-        let b = recipients_tag(&seed, &set(&["did:key:zA", "did:key:zB"]));
-        assert_ne!(a, b);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tag_is_keyed_by_node_seed() {
-        let dids = set(&["did:key:zA", "did:key:zB"]);
-        let a = recipients_tag(&[1u8; 32], &dids);
-        let b = recipients_tag(&[2u8; 32], &dids);
-        assert_ne!(
-            a, b,
-            "tag must depend on the node seed, not be a plain hash"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // plan_seal is the seal/skip decision `encrypt_and_pin` acts on. Testing it
-    // directly pins the #47 fail-closed invariant at the function that owns it,
-    // which a unit test of `resolve_all_recipients` alone cannot do (it can't
-    // catch the caller falling through to a partial seal).
-    const SEED: [u8; 32] = [9u8; 32];
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_seals_when_all_recipients_resolve() {
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2)]);
-        match plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, None) {
-            SealPlan::Seal { keys, tag } => {
-                assert_eq!(keys.len(), 2, "must seal to the full recipient set");
-                assert_eq!(
-                    tag,
-                    recipients_tag(&SEED, &dids),
-                    "records the full-set tag"
-                );
-            }
-            other => panic!("expected Seal, got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_fails_closed_on_any_unresolvable_recipient() {
-        // The #47 invariant at the decision boundary: one unresolvable DID among
-        // resolvable ones must NOT yield a Seal (which would seal a partial set).
-        let gitlawb = Did::gitlawb("zPending").to_string();
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2), gitlawb.clone()]);
-        match plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, None) {
-            SealPlan::SkipUnresolvable(unresolved) => assert_eq!(unresolved, vec![gitlawb]),
-            other => panic!("must fail closed, never seal a partial set; got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_skips_empty_recipient_set() {
-        let dids = BTreeSet::new();
-        assert!(matches!(
-            plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, None),
-            SealPlan::SkipNoRecipients
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_skips_when_tag_unchanged() {
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1)]);
-        let stored = recipients_tag(&SEED, &dids);
-        assert!(matches!(
-            plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, Some(&stored)),
-            SealPlan::SkipUnchanged
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn plan_seal_reseals_when_recipient_set_changed() {
-        // A stored tag for a DIFFERENT set is a miss: a newly added reader must
-        // trigger a re-seal, not be skipped as unchanged.
-        let dids = set(&[did_key(1), did_key(2)]);
-        let stale = recipients_tag(&SEED, &set(&[did_key(1)]));
-        match plan_seal(&SEED, &dids, Some(&stale)) {
-            SealPlan::Seal { keys, .. } => assert_eq!(keys.len(), 2),
-            other => panic!("changed recipient set must re-seal; got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
-}
@@ -23,21 +23,9 @@ pub enum AppError {
    #[allow(dead_code)]
    Forbidden(String),

-    #[error("icaptcha proof required: {message}")]
-    IcaptchaProofRequired {
-        message: String,
-        /// iCaptcha service base URL the client should solve against.
-        url: String,
-        /// Minimum proof level this node requires.
-        level: u32,
-    },
-
    #[error("invalid request: {0}")]
    BadRequest(String),

-    #[error("too many requests: {0}")]
-    TooManyRequests(String),
-
    #[error("git error: {0}")]
    Git(String),

@@ -50,34 +38,6 @@ pub enum AppError {

 impl IntoResponse for AppError {
    fn into_response(self) -> Response {
-        // iCaptcha challenges carry structured discovery so clients don't have to
-        // scrape the message: the service URL and required level are returned as
-        // both JSON fields and `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` headers
-        // (mirroring the header-bearing `human_detected` response in auth/mod.rs).
-        if let AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
-            message,
-            url,
-            level,
-        } = &self
-        {
-            use axum::http::HeaderValue;
-            let body = Json(json!({
-                "error": "icaptcha_proof_required",
-                "message": message,
-                "icaptcha_url": url,
-                "required_level": level,
-            }));
-            let mut resp = (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, body).into_response();
-            let headers = resp.headers_mut();
-            if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(url) {
-                headers.insert("x-icaptcha-url", v);
-            }
-            if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(&level.to_string()) {
-                headers.insert("x-icaptcha-level", v);
-            }
-            return resp;
-        }
-
        let (status, code, message) = match &self {
            AppError::RepoNotFound(r) => (
                StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
@@ -92,12 +52,7 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
            AppError::NotFound(msg) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found", msg.clone()),
            AppError::Unauthorized(msg) => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "not_an_agent", msg.clone()),
            AppError::Forbidden(msg) => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "forbidden", msg.clone()),
-            // IcaptchaProofRequired is handled above (it carries extra headers/fields).
-            AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired { .. } => unreachable!("handled before this match"),
            AppError::BadRequest(msg) => (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "bad_request", msg.clone()),
-            AppError::TooManyRequests(msg) => {
-                (StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "rate_limited", msg.clone())
-            }
            AppError::Git(msg) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "git_error", msg.clone()),
            AppError::Db(e) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "db_error", e.to_string()),
            AppError::Internal(e) => (
@@ -23,18 +23,13 @@ pub fn create_issue(repo_path: &Path, issue_id: &str, json: &str) -> Result<()>

    use std::io::Write;
    let mut child = hash_output;
-    // Write the blob to stdin, but always reap the child afterward even if the
-    // write fails, so a stdin-write error can't drop the Child unwaited and leak
-    // a zombie (#53).
-    let write_result = match child.stdin.take() {
-        Some(mut stdin) => stdin.write_all(json.as_bytes()),
-        None => Err(std::io::Error::new(
-            std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
-            "git hash-object stdin unavailable",
-        )),
-    };
+    if let Some(stdin) = child.stdin.take() {
+        let mut stdin = stdin;
+        stdin
+            .write_all(json.as_bytes())
+            .context("failed to write to git hash-object stdin")?;
+    }
    let output = child.wait_with_output().context("git hash-object failed")?;
-    write_result.context("failed to write to git hash-object stdin")?;

    if !output.status.success() {
        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 pub mod issues;
-pub mod push_delta;
 pub mod repo_store;
 pub mod smart_http;
 pub mod store;
@@ -1,663 +0,0 @@
-//! Push-delta object enumeration for the IPFS/Pinata pin path.
-//!
-//! The pin path needs the set of git objects to consider for pinning after a
-//! push. Historically both pin functions enumerated the *whole* repo
-//! (`git cat-file --batch-all-objects`) on every push, so cost scaled with
-//! repo size rather than push size (finding N16). This module computes the
-//! per-push *delta* instead — the objects a push introduced — and keeps the
-//! whole-repo lister for the reconciliation sweep and the fail-closed fallback.
-//!
-//! ## Correctness framing (do not confuse with the #84 withholding direction)
-//!
-//! The pin enumeration is part of the *exposure* set, not the withheld filter.
-//! On the *delta* path, narrowing per push only *shrinks* what is pinned, so it
-//! cannot create an under-withholding leak — the reachable-only withheld filter
-//! (`visibility_pack`) still subtracts from the smaller set we feed it. The only
-//! risk there is *under-pinning* (a durability gap) the sweep backstops.
-//!
-//! The *full-scan* path is different: `list_all_objects` includes dangling
-//! objects the reachable withheld set never classified, so subtracting that set
-//! is not enough — a dangling private blob would slip through (#99). The caller
-//! signals a full scan via [`PinCandidateSet::full_scan`] and must then apply
-//! the fail-closed blob filter (`visibility_pack::replicable_objects_fail_closed`)
-//! instead of the plain reachable-only subtraction.
-//!
-//! Because the pin candidate set needs only the OID *set* (never the per-path
-//! information the withheld classifier needs), `git rev-list --objects
-//! --no-object-names` is safe here. The "rev-list reports one path per object"
-//! trap from #84 applies only to `visibility_pack`'s per-path `ls-tree` walk.
-
-use std::collections::HashSet;
-use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
-use std::process::Command;
-
-use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
-
-/// Env var that forces the push path to always full-scan, bypassing the delta
-/// optimization (KTD7 kill-switch). Reuses the already-tested fallback branch
-/// rather than introducing a second enumeration path. Does not gate the sweep.
-const FORCE_FULL_SCAN_ENV: &str = "GITLAWB_PIN_FORCE_FULLSCAN";
-
-/// The objects a push introduced, or a signal that the delta could not be
-/// computed safely and the caller should fall back to a full scan.
-///
-/// Three-valued by design: `Delta(vec![])` (a no-op push — pin nothing) is a
-/// *different* fact from `FullScanRequired` (could not compute — fall back),
-/// and they drive different actions.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub enum PinCandidates {
-    /// Objects reachable from the new tips but not the old tips.
-    Delta(Vec<String>),
-    /// The delta is not safe to use; the caller must enumerate the whole repo
-    /// with [`list_all_objects`] instead. Returned on a non-commit tip, any git
-    /// error, or the force-full-scan kill-switch.
-    FullScanRequired,
-}
-
-/// Resolve the set of objects introduced by a push from its ref updates.
-///
-/// `new_tips` / `old_tips` are the non-zero new/old SHAs of the push's ref
-/// updates (the caller strips the all-zeros create/delete sentinel). Keeping
-/// the helper on plain SHA slices (not the `api` `RefUpdate` type) keeps it
-/// unit-testable without the HTTP layer.
-///
-/// Fail-closed: any condition where the introduced set cannot be safely
-/// determined returns [`PinCandidates::FullScanRequired`] rather than a partial
-/// set, so the caller full-scans instead of silently under-pinning.
-pub fn resolve_push_delta(repo_path: &Path, new_tips: &[&str], old_tips: &[&str]) -> PinCandidates {
-    // KTD7 kill-switch: force the (already-tested) full-scan fallback. The env
-    // read is split out from the pure logic so the resolver stays unit-testable
-    // without touching process-global state.
-    resolve_push_delta_inner(repo_path, new_tips, old_tips, force_full_scan())
-}
-
-/// Whether the force-full-scan kill-switch env var is set.
-fn force_full_scan() -> bool {
-    std::env::var_os(FORCE_FULL_SCAN_ENV).is_some()
-}
-
-// Intentionally private but reachable from the test module (via `use super::*`)
-// so the kill-switch can be exercised without mutating process-global env.
-fn resolve_push_delta_inner(
-    repo_path: &Path,
-    new_tips: &[&str],
-    old_tips: &[&str],
-    force_full_scan: bool,
-) -> PinCandidates {
-    if force_full_scan {
-        tracing::debug!("{FORCE_FULL_SCAN_ENV} set — forcing full scan");
-        return PinCandidates::FullScanRequired;
-    }
-
-    // A push that only deleted refs introduces no objects.
-    if new_tips.is_empty() {
-        return PinCandidates::Delta(Vec::new());
-    }
-
-    // Ref-type guard (the fail-closed mechanism). `git rev-list` does NOT error
-    // on a non-commit tip — a blob/tree/tag-of-non-commit all exit 0 and walk
-    // the object — so the rev-list exit code cannot catch this. Check each new
-    // tip's *fully-peeled* type with `cat-file -t '<sha>^{}'` (recursive peel:
-    // tag-of-commit -> commit, tag-of-tree -> tree, tag-of-tag-of-commit ->
-    // commit). Bare `cat-file -t` returns `tag` for an annotated tag, and
-    // `for-each-ref %(*objecttype)` peels only one level — neither is correct.
-    for tip in new_tips {
-        match peeled_object_type(repo_path, tip) {
-            Some(t) if t == "commit" => {}
-            other => {
-                tracing::debug!(
-                    tip = %tip,
-                    peeled_type = ?other,
-                    "push tip is not a commit (or type lookup failed) — forcing full scan"
-                );
-                return PinCandidates::FullScanRequired;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    match rev_list_delta(repo_path, new_tips, old_tips) {
-        Ok(oids) => PinCandidates::Delta(oids),
-        Err(e) => {
-            tracing::debug!(err = %e, "push-delta rev-list failed — forcing full scan");
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Return the fully-peeled object type of `sha` (e.g. `commit`, `tree`,
-/// `blob`), or `None` if the object is missing/unpeelable or git errored.
-fn peeled_object_type(repo_path: &Path, sha: &str) -> Option<String> {
-    let output = Command::new("git")
-        .args(["cat-file", "-t", &format!("{sha}^{{}}")])
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output()
-        .ok()?;
-    if !output.status.success() {
-        return None;
-    }
-    Some(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim().to_string())
-}
-
-/// Run `git rev-list --objects --no-object-names <new> --not <old>` and return
-/// the bare OID set. Decides on `status.success()` *before* parsing stdout, so
-/// a walk that prints a valid prefix then errors mid-walk is discarded.
-fn rev_list_delta(repo_path: &Path, new_tips: &[&str], old_tips: &[&str]) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
-    let mut args: Vec<&str> = vec!["rev-list", "--objects", "--no-object-names"];
-    args.extend_from_slice(new_tips);
-    if !old_tips.is_empty() {
-        args.push("--not");
-        args.extend_from_slice(old_tips);
-    }
-
-    let output = Command::new("git")
-        .args(&args)
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output()
-        .context("failed to run git rev-list for push delta")?;
-
-    if !output.status.success() {
-        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
-        bail!("git rev-list failed: {stderr}");
-    }
-
-    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
-    Ok(stdout
-        .lines()
-        .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
-        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
-        .collect())
-}
-
-/// List every object in the repository via
-/// `git cat-file --batch-all-objects --batch-check='%(objectname)'`.
-///
-/// This is the whole-repo enumeration the push path falls back to and the
-/// reconciliation sweep relies on. It returns *all* objects (including
-/// unreachable/dangling ones), which is what the sweep needs to catch
-/// stragglers — do not swap it for a reachability walk.
-pub fn list_all_objects(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
-    let output = Command::new("git")
-        .args([
-            "cat-file",
-            "--batch-all-objects",
-            "--batch-check=%(objectname)",
-        ])
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output()
-        .context("failed to run git cat-file")?;
-
-    if !output.status.success() {
-        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
-        bail!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}");
-    }
-
-    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
-    Ok(stdout
-        .lines()
-        .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
-        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
-        .collect())
-}
-
-/// Like [`list_all_objects`] but pairs each OID with its object type, via
-/// `--batch-check='%(objectname) %(objecttype)'`. The pin path's fail-closed
-/// filter needs to tell blobs (content, withholdable) from commits/trees
-/// (structural, never withheld) without typing the candidate list itself.
-pub fn list_all_objects_with_type(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>> {
-    let output = Command::new("git")
-        .args([
-            "cat-file",
-            "--batch-all-objects",
-            "--batch-check=%(objectname) %(objecttype)",
-        ])
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output()
-        .context("failed to run git cat-file")?;
-
-    if !output.status.success() {
-        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
-        bail!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}");
-    }
-
-    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
-    Ok(stdout
-        .lines()
-        .filter_map(|l| {
-            let mut it = l.split_whitespace();
-            let oid = it.next()?;
-            let ty = it.next()?;
-            Some((oid.to_string(), ty.to_string()))
-        })
-        .collect())
-}
-
-/// Every blob OID in the repo, including unreachable/dangling ones. The
-/// fail-closed pin filter drops any candidate blob absent from the reachable,
-/// visibility-allowed set; a dangling private blob is in this set but not the
-/// allowed set, so it never replicates (#99).
-pub fn all_blob_oids(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<HashSet<String>> {
-    Ok(list_all_objects_with_type(repo_path)?
-        .into_iter()
-        .filter(|(_, ty)| ty == "blob")
-        .map(|(oid, _)| oid)
-        .collect())
-}
-
-/// The pin candidate OIDs for a push plus whether they came from a full-repo
-/// scan. `full_scan` is true when the delta could not be used and the whole
-/// object DB (including dangling objects) was enumerated — the caller must then
-/// apply the fail-closed blob filter, because the reachable-only withheld set
-/// cannot classify dangling blobs (#99).
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct PinCandidateSet {
-    pub candidates: Vec<String>,
-    pub full_scan: bool,
-}
-
-/// Resolve the pin candidate OID set for a push, off the async worker.
-///
-/// Runs [`resolve_push_delta`] in `spawn_blocking` (git subprocess) and applies
-/// the full-scan fallback for [`PinCandidates::FullScanRequired`]. Owns the
-/// dispatch so the push call site stays thin and this wiring is unit-testable
-/// without the HTTP layer.
-///
-/// Every degraded path is **logged**, not silent: a full-scan fallback, a
-/// failed full scan, and a panicked blocking task each emit a warning. On a
-/// failed full scan or a task panic the candidate set is empty (pin nothing
-/// this push); that is a durability gap the reconciliation sweep backstops, and
-/// it can never leak because the withheld/fail-closed filter still runs on
-/// whatever set is returned. `full_scan` rides on the returned set so the caller
-/// knows when the dangling-inclusive filter is required.
-pub async fn resolve_candidates_for_push(
-    repo_path: PathBuf,
-    new_tips: Vec<String>,
-    old_tips: Vec<String>,
-) -> PinCandidateSet {
-    tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
-        let new_refs: Vec<&str> = new_tips.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
-        let old_refs: Vec<&str> = old_tips.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
-        match resolve_push_delta(&repo_path, &new_refs, &old_refs) {
-            PinCandidates::Delta(objs) => {
-                tracing::info!(delta = objs.len(), repo = %repo_path.display(), "pin candidate set from push delta");
-                PinCandidateSet { candidates: objs, full_scan: false }
-            }
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired => {
-                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo_path.display(), "pin delta unavailable (non-commit tip, git error, or force-full-scan) — full-scan fallback");
-                match list_all_objects(&repo_path) {
-                    Ok(objs) => PinCandidateSet { candidates: objs, full_scan: true },
-                    Err(e) => {
-                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo_path.display(), err = %e, "full-scan fallback failed; pinning nothing this push (reconciliation sweep backstops)");
-                        PinCandidateSet { candidates: Vec::new(), full_scan: false }
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    })
-    .await
-    .unwrap_or_else(|e| {
-        tracing::warn!(err = %e, "pin candidate computation task panicked; pinning nothing this push (reconciliation sweep backstops)");
-        PinCandidateSet { candidates: Vec::new(), full_scan: false }
-    })
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use std::collections::HashSet;
-    use tempfile::TempDir;
-
-    /// Minimal git helper for building test repos.
-    struct Repo {
-        _td: TempDir,
-        path: std::path::PathBuf,
-    }
-
-    impl Repo {
-        fn new() -> Self {
-            let td = TempDir::new().unwrap();
-            let path = td.path().to_path_buf();
-            let r = Repo { _td: td, path };
-            r.git(&["init", "-q", "-b", "main"]);
-            r.git(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
-            r.git(&["config", "user.name", "t"]);
-            r
-        }
-
-        fn git(&self, args: &[&str]) -> String {
-            let out = Command::new("git")
-                .args(args)
-                .current_dir(&self.path)
-                .output()
-                .unwrap();
-            assert!(
-                out.status.success(),
-                "git {args:?} failed: {}",
-                String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
-            );
-            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
-        }
-
-        fn commit_file(&self, name: &str, body: &str) -> String {
-            std::fs::write(self.path.join(name), body).unwrap();
-            self.git(&["add", name]);
-            self.git(&["commit", "-qm", &format!("add {name}")]);
-            self.git(&["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
-        }
-
-        fn rev(&self, r: &str) -> String {
-            self.git(&["rev-parse", r])
-        }
-    }
-
-    const ZERO: &str = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
-
-    fn delta(c: PinCandidates) -> Vec<String> {
-        match c {
-            PinCandidates::Delta(v) => v,
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired => panic!("expected Delta, got FullScanRequired"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn single_new_commit_delta_excludes_preexisting_objects() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let c2 = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&c2], &[&c1]))
-            .into_iter()
-            .collect();
-        // The new blob b.txt and commit c2 are in the delta; the old blob a.txt
-        // and commit c1 are not.
-        let new_blob = repo.rev("HEAD:b.txt");
-        let old_blob = repo.rev(&format!("{c1}:a.txt"));
-        assert!(got.contains(&c2), "new commit in delta");
-        assert!(got.contains(&new_blob), "new blob in delta");
-        assert!(!got.contains(&c1), "old commit excluded");
-        assert!(!got.contains(&old_blob), "old blob excluded");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn created_ref_is_superset_of_new_objects() {
-        // A created ref (old tip all-zeros, filtered out by caller) with no old
-        // tips walks everything reachable from the new tip — a superset of the
-        // genuinely new objects, never fewer.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&c1], &[]))
-            .into_iter()
-            .collect();
-        assert!(got.contains(&c1));
-        assert!(got.contains(&repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt")));
-        assert!(got.contains(&repo.rev("HEAD^{tree}")));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn force_push_delta_is_objects_unique_to_new_tip() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let base = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let old_tip = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
-        // Rewrite history: reset to base, commit a different file.
-        repo.git(&["reset", "-q", "--hard", &base]);
-        let new_tip = repo.commit_file("c.txt", "three\n");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&new_tip], &[&old_tip]))
-            .into_iter()
-            .collect();
-        assert!(got.contains(&new_tip), "new tip in delta");
-        assert!(got.contains(&repo.rev(&format!("{new_tip}:c.txt"))));
-        // No error; force-push computes new-minus-old cleanly.
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn deleted_ref_only_yields_empty_delta_without_git() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        // All updates were deletions => new_tips empty after the caller strips zeros.
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[], &[ZERO]),
-            PinCandidates::Delta(Vec::new())
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blob_tip_forces_full_scan() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let blob = repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt");
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&blob], &[]),
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired,
-            "a blob tip must force full scan (rev-list would exit 0 and walk it)"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tree_tip_forces_full_scan() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let tree = repo.rev("HEAD^{tree}");
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&tree], &[]),
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn annotated_tag_of_tree_forces_full_scan() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let tree = repo.rev("HEAD^{tree}");
-        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "treetag", "-m", "x", &tree]);
-        let tag = repo.rev("treetag");
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&tag], &[]),
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired,
-            "annotated tag peeling to a tree must force full scan"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tag_of_tag_of_noncommit_forces_full_scan() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let blob = repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt");
-        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "t1", "-m", "x", &blob]);
-        let t1 = repo.rev("t1");
-        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "t2", "-m", "x", &t1]);
-        let t2 = repo.rev("t2");
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&t2], &[]),
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn annotated_tag_of_commit_proceeds_as_delta() {
-        // DISCRIMINATING positive-path regression: an annotated tag whose peeled
-        // target is a commit must return Delta, not FullScanRequired. A
-        // FullScanRequired here means the guard used bare `cat-file -t` (returns
-        // `tag`) instead of the `^{}` peel.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "rel", "-m", "release", &c1]);
-        let tag = repo.rev("rel");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&tag], &[]))
-            .into_iter()
-            .collect();
-        assert!(
-            got.contains(&c1),
-            "peeled commit's objects are in the delta"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn tag_of_tag_of_commit_proceeds_as_delta() {
-        // Deep-peel positive path: tag -> tag -> commit must recurse to `commit`
-        // via `^{}` and return Delta. Complements tag_of_tag_of_noncommit (which
-        // forces full scan) — guards against a regression in peel depth that
-        // would silently downgrade a legitimate nested-tag push to full scan.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "t1", "-m", "x", &c1]);
-        let t1 = repo.rev("t1");
-        repo.git(&["tag", "-a", "t2", "-m", "x", &t1]);
-        let t2 = repo.rev("t2");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&t2], &[]))
-            .into_iter()
-            .collect();
-        assert!(
-            got.contains(&c1),
-            "peeled commit's objects are in the delta"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn resolve_candidates_for_push_returns_delta() {
-        // The extracted wiring returns the per-push delta on the happy path.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let c2 = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
-        let set =
-            resolve_candidates_for_push(repo.path.clone(), vec![c2.clone()], vec![c1.clone()])
-                .await;
-        assert!(!set.full_scan, "happy-path delta is not a full scan");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = set.candidates.into_iter().collect();
-        let new_blob = repo.rev("HEAD:b.txt");
-        assert!(
-            got.contains(&c2) && got.contains(&new_blob),
-            "new objects pinned"
-        );
-        assert!(!got.contains(&c1), "old commit excluded from delta");
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn resolve_candidates_for_push_falls_back_to_full_scan_on_noncommit_tip() {
-        // A non-commit tip forces FullScanRequired, and the wiring resolves that
-        // to the whole-repo list (a superset), never an empty set.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let blob = repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt");
-        let all: HashSet<String> = list_all_objects(&repo.path).unwrap().into_iter().collect();
-        let set = resolve_candidates_for_push(repo.path.clone(), vec![blob], vec![]).await;
-        assert!(set.full_scan, "non-commit tip is signalled as a full scan");
-        let got: HashSet<String> = set.candidates.into_iter().collect();
-        assert_eq!(got, all, "non-commit tip falls back to full repo scan");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn missing_oid_tip_forces_full_scan() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let bogus = "deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef";
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[bogus], &[]),
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired,
-            "a missing/corrupt tip OID must force full scan"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn present_noncommit_old_tip_is_safe() {
-        // A present-but-non-commit old_sha (a --not arg) must not under-pin:
-        // either rev-list errors (FullScanRequired) or it over-lists (Delta).
-        // Either way the new tip's objects are covered; never fewer.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let c2 = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
-        let old_tree = repo.rev(&format!("{c1}^{{tree}}"));
-        let result = resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&c2], &[&old_tree]);
-        match result {
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired => {} // safe: caller full-scans
-            PinCandidates::Delta(objs) => {
-                // Safe direction: must still contain the new commit (over-list ok).
-                assert!(objs.contains(&c2), "new tip objects must be covered");
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn multi_ref_push_unions_ranges() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let base = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        // branch1 advances
-        let b1 = repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
-        // branch2 from base advances independently
-        repo.git(&["checkout", "-q", "-b", "branch2", &base]);
-        let b2 = repo.commit_file("c.txt", "three\n");
-        let got: HashSet<String> =
-            delta(resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[&b1, &b2], &[&base, &base]))
-                .into_iter()
-                .collect();
-        assert!(got.contains(&b1), "branch1 new commit");
-        assert!(got.contains(&b2), "branch2 new commit");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn empty_repo_no_tips_yields_empty_delta() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta(&repo.path, &[], &[]),
-            PinCandidates::Delta(Vec::new())
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn force_full_scan_flag_overrides() {
-        // Test the kill-switch via the pure inner fn so we never touch
-        // process-global env (which would race with parallel tests, and is
-        // unsafe in Rust 2024). The public resolve_push_delta wires the env
-        // read into this same flag.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_push_delta_inner(&repo.path, &[&c1], &[], true),
-            PinCandidates::FullScanRequired
-        );
-        // And with the flag off, the same push yields a Delta.
-        assert!(matches!(
-            resolve_push_delta_inner(&repo.path, &[&c1], &[], false),
-            PinCandidates::Delta(_)
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn list_all_objects_returns_full_repo() {
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        repo.commit_file("b.txt", "two\n");
-        let all = list_all_objects(&repo.path).unwrap();
-        // 2 commits + 2 trees + 2 blobs = 6 objects.
-        assert_eq!(all.len(), 6, "got: {all:?}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn all_blob_oids_includes_dangling_and_excludes_nonblobs() {
-        // The all-blob universe must include a dangling blob (the #99 hazard) and
-        // exclude commits/trees, so the fail-closed filter can tell a blob from a
-        // structural object without typing the candidate list.
-        let repo = Repo::new();
-        let c1 = repo.commit_file("a.txt", "one\n");
-        let reachable_blob = repo.rev("HEAD:a.txt");
-        let tree = repo.rev("HEAD^{tree}");
-        // Write a blob referenced by no tree/commit — dangling.
-        std::fs::write(repo.path.join("orphan.bin"), b"dangling\n").unwrap();
-        let dangling = repo.git(&["hash-object", "-w", "orphan.bin"]);
-
-        let blobs = all_blob_oids(&repo.path).unwrap();
-        assert!(blobs.contains(&reachable_blob), "reachable blob present");
-        assert!(
-            blobs.contains(&dangling),
-            "dangling blob present in the all-blob universe"
-        );
-        assert!(!blobs.contains(&c1), "commit is not a blob");
-        assert!(!blobs.contains(&tree), "tree is not a blob");
-
-        // The typed lister tags each object; spot-check the dangling blob's type.
-        let typed = list_all_objects_with_type(&repo.path).unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            typed
-                .iter()
-                .any(|(oid, ty)| oid == &dangling && ty == "blob"),
-            "dangling object is typed as a blob"
-        );
-    }
-}
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ pub async fn info_refs(repo_path: &Path, service: &str) -> Result<Response> {
 /// Serves pack data for a clone or fetch. This is stateless — the entire
 /// negotiation happens in a single request/response.
 pub async fn upload_pack(repo_path: &Path, request_body: Bytes) -> Result<Response> {
-    let output = run_git_service("git", "git-upload-pack", repo_path, request_body).await?;
+    let output = run_git_service("git-upload-pack", repo_path, request_body).await?;

    Ok(Response::builder()
        .status(StatusCode::OK)
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ pub async fn upload_pack(repo_path: &Path, request_body: Bytes) -> Result<Respon
 /// Accepts a push. The caller MUST verify HTTP Signature auth before
 /// calling this function.
 pub async fn receive_pack(repo_path: &Path, request_body: Bytes) -> Result<Response> {
-    let output = run_git_service("git", "git-receive-pack", repo_path, request_body).await?;
+    let output = run_git_service("git-receive-pack", repo_path, request_body).await?;

    Ok(Response::builder()
        .status(StatusCode::OK)
@@ -75,94 +75,23 @@ pub async fn receive_pack(repo_path: &Path, request_body: Bytes) -> Result<Respo
        .body(Body::from(output))?)
 }

-/// Sends SIGTERM to a child's whole process group on drop, unless disarmed first.
-///
-/// A served `git upload-pack`/`receive-pack` forks helpers such as `pack-objects`.
-/// If the request future is dropped (client disconnect) or returns early, dropping
-/// the tokio `Child` does not signal `git`; it lingers until EPIPE, and its
-/// `pack-objects` child can reparent to PID 1 and never be reaped — a zombie that
-/// accumulates until `fork()` fails with EAGAIN (#53). Spawning the child in its
-/// own process group and signalling that group here tears the whole tree down at
-/// the source. SIGTERM (not SIGKILL) lets `git` run its cleanup — notably removing
-/// `.git/*.lock` files mid-`receive-pack` — before it exits, so an aborted push
-/// can't leave a stale lock that blocks the next one. The guard is disarmed once
-/// `wait_with_output()` returns, so a request that completed cleanly never signals.
-#[cfg(unix)]
-struct KillGroupOnDrop {
-    pgid: Option<i32>,
-}
-
-#[cfg(unix)]
-impl KillGroupOnDrop {
-    fn disarm(&mut self) {
-        self.pgid = None;
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(unix)]
-impl Drop for KillGroupOnDrop {
-    fn drop(&mut self) {
-        if let Some(pgid) = self.pgid {
-            // SAFETY: kill(2) takes only integer arguments and borrows no Rust
-            // memory. Signalling a stale group just returns ESRCH, which we ignore.
-            unsafe {
-                libc::kill(-pgid, libc::SIGTERM);
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Run a stateless-rpc git service and return its stdout.
-///
-/// `git_bin` is the git executable to spawn; production callers pass `"git"`
-/// (resolved via `PATH`). It is injectable purely so the process-group teardown
-/// wiring (`process_group(0)` + [`KillGroupOnDrop`]) can be driven end-to-end by
-/// a fake `git` in tests without mutating the process-global `PATH`.
-async fn run_git_service(
-    git_bin: &str,
-    service: &str,
-    repo_path: &Path,
-    input: Bytes,
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let mut command = Command::new(git_bin);
-    command
+async fn run_git_service(service: &str, repo_path: &Path, input: Bytes) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let mut child = Command::new("git")
        .arg(service_to_command(service))
        .arg("--stateless-rpc")
        .arg(repo_path)
        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
        .stdout(Stdio::piped())
-        .stderr(Stdio::piped());
+        .stderr(Stdio::piped())
+        .spawn()?;

-    // Run git in its own process group so the whole tree (git + pack-objects)
-    // can be signalled together on disconnect rather than orphaning a grandchild.
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    command.process_group(0);
-
-    let mut child = command.spawn()?;
-
-    // Arm the group-kill guard for the lifetime of the request. With
-    // process_group(0) the child is its own group leader, so pgid == its pid.
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    let mut group_guard = KillGroupOnDrop {
-        pgid: child.id().map(|id| id as i32),
-    };
-
-    // Write the request body to git's stdin, but don't early-return on a write
-    // error: always reap the child first (below), so the guard only ever fires on
-    // an actual future-drop (client disconnect), never on a pid we just reaped.
-    let write_result: std::io::Result<()> = match child.stdin.take() {
-        Some(mut stdin) => stdin.write_all(&input).await,
-        None => Ok(()),
-    };
+    // Write request body to git's stdin
+    if let Some(mut stdin) = child.stdin.take() {
+        stdin.write_all(&input).await?;
+    }

    let output = child.wait_with_output().await?;

-    // Child reaped, so its group is gone: disarm before surfacing any error.
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    group_guard.disarm();
-
-    write_result.context("failed to write to git stdin")?;
-
    if !output.status.success() {
        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
        bail!("{service} failed: {stderr}");
@@ -223,25 +152,13 @@ pub fn build_filtered_pack(repo_path: &Path, withheld: &HashSet<String>) -> Resu
        .stdout(Stdio::piped())
        .stderr(Stdio::piped())
        .spawn()?;
-    // Feed the object ids on stdin, but always reap the child afterward even if
-    // the write fails or stdin is missing, so an error can't drop the Child
-    // unwaited and leak a zombie (#53).
-    let write_result: std::io::Result<()> = {
+    {
        use std::io::Write as _;
-        match child.stdin.take() {
-            Some(mut stdin) => {
-                let mut data = keep.join("\n").into_bytes();
-                data.push(b'\n');
-                stdin.write_all(&data)
-            }
-            None => Err(std::io::Error::new(
-                std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
-                "git pack-objects stdin unavailable",
-            )),
-        }
-    };
+        let mut stdin = child.stdin.take().expect("stdin");
+        stdin.write_all(keep.join("\n").as_bytes())?;
+        stdin.write_all(b"\n")?;
+    }
    let out = child.wait_with_output()?;
-    write_result.context("failed to write object ids to git pack-objects stdin")?;
    if !out.status.success() {
        bail!(
            "git pack-objects failed: {}",
@@ -771,330 +688,4 @@ mod tests {

        server.abort();
    }
-
-    // ── #53 regression: served-git process-group teardown ──────────────────
-    //
-    // run_git_service runs git in its own process group and SIGTERMs that group
-    // when the request future is dropped (client disconnect) or returns early, so
-    // git AND its pack-objects child die together instead of orphaning a zombie.
-    // These exercise the KillGroupOnDrop guard that wires that up.
-
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    fn alive(pid: i32) -> bool {
-        // kill(pid, 0) probes existence: returns 0 while the pid exists, -1 once
-        // it's gone (ESRCH). Same-uid here, so EPERM never applies.
-        unsafe { libc::kill(pid, 0) == 0 }
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn kill_group_guard_terminates_child_on_drop() {
-        let mut child = tokio::process::Command::new("sleep")
-            .arg("300")
-            .process_group(0)
-            .spawn()
-            .unwrap();
-        let pgid = child.id().map(|id| id as i32);
-
-        {
-            let _guard = KillGroupOnDrop { pgid };
-        } // guard drops here -> SIGTERM to the group
-
-        use std::os::unix::process::ExitStatusExt;
-        let status = child.wait().await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            status.signal(),
-            Some(libc::SIGTERM),
-            "child must be terminated by SIGTERM via its process group"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn kill_group_guard_reaps_grandchild_on_drop() {
-        // The #53 scenario: git forks pack-objects. A group kill must reach the
-        // grandchild, not just the direct child. sh (the group leader) backgrounds
-        // a sleep (standing in for pack-objects) and prints its pid.
-        use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
-        let mut child = tokio::process::Command::new("sh")
-            .arg("-c")
-            .arg("sleep 300 & echo \"$!\"; wait")
-            .stdout(Stdio::piped())
-            .process_group(0)
-            .spawn()
-            .unwrap();
-        let pgid = child.id().map(|id| id as i32);
-
-        // Read the backgrounded grandchild's pid from the first stdout line.
-        let mut stdout = child.stdout.take().unwrap();
-        let mut buf = Vec::new();
-        loop {
-            let mut byte = [0u8; 1];
-            let n = stdout.read(&mut byte).await.unwrap();
-            if n == 0 || byte[0] == b'\n' {
-                break;
-            }
-            buf.push(byte[0]);
-        }
-        let grandchild: i32 = String::from_utf8(buf).unwrap().trim().parse().unwrap();
-        assert!(alive(grandchild), "grandchild should be running");
-
-        {
-            let _guard = KillGroupOnDrop { pgid };
-        } // group SIGTERM reaches sh AND the sleep grandchild
-
-        let _ = child.wait().await; // reap sh
-
-        // The grandchild reparents to init and is reaped; poll until it's gone.
-        let mut gone = false;
-        for _ in 0..200 {
-            if !alive(grandchild) {
-                gone = true;
-                break;
-            }
-            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
-        }
-        assert!(
-            gone,
-            "grandchild must be terminated by the group signal (#53)"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn kill_group_guard_disarmed_does_not_kill() {
-        // A request that completed cleanly disarms the guard; dropping it must not
-        // signal anything.
-        let mut child = tokio::process::Command::new("sleep")
-            .arg("300")
-            .process_group(0)
-            .spawn()
-            .unwrap();
-
-        {
-            let mut guard = KillGroupOnDrop {
-                pgid: child.id().map(|id| id as i32),
-            };
-            guard.disarm();
-        } // disarmed -> no kill
-
-        assert!(
-            child.try_wait().unwrap().is_none(),
-            "disarmed guard must not kill the child"
-        );
-
-        // Clean up the still-running child.
-        let _ = child.kill().await;
-        let _ = child.wait().await;
-    }
-
-    // ── #62 PR1: end-to-end teardown wiring through run_git_service ─────────
-    //
-    // The kill_group_guard_* tests above build a KillGroupOnDrop by hand and
-    // never call run_git_service, so deleting `process_group(0)` (spawn site) or
-    // the guard-arming, or the post-reap disarm, would leave them green. These
-    // drive the REAL run_git_service via an injected fake `git` (the `git_bin`
-    // seam) and assert the production spawn path actually wires the teardown up.
-    // Faithful to the real invocation: run_git_service spawns
-    // `<git_bin> <cmd> --stateless-rpc <repo_path>` in its own process group.
-
-    /// SIGKILLs the given pids on drop (ignoring all kill errors, e.g. ESRCH for
-    /// an already-dead pid) so a panicking assertion can't leak the fake `git` or
-    /// its grandchild onto the test runner.
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    struct ReapOnPanic(Vec<i32>);
-
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    impl Drop for ReapOnPanic {
-        fn drop(&mut self) {
-            for &pid in &self.0 {
-                unsafe {
-                    libc::kill(pid, libc::SIGKILL);
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Write an executable fake `git` (named `git`) into `dir`; return its path.
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    fn write_fake_git(dir: &std::path::Path, body: &str) -> std::path::PathBuf {
-        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
-        let path = dir.join("git");
-        std::fs::write(&path, body).unwrap();
-        std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
-        path
-    }
-
-    /// Read a two-line `leader\ngrandchild` pidfile once both lines are present.
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    fn read_two_pids(pidfile: &std::path::Path) -> Option<(i32, i32)> {
-        let s = std::fs::read_to_string(pidfile).ok()?;
-        let mut lines = s.lines();
-        let leader: i32 = lines.next()?.trim().parse().ok()?;
-        let grandchild: i32 = lines.next()?.trim().parse().ok()?;
-        Some((leader, grandchild))
-    }
-
-    // Dropping the request future mid-flight (client disconnect) must SIGTERM the
-    // whole group so git AND its pack-objects grandchild die together. Goes RED
-    // if `process_group(0)` or the guard-arming is removed: without its own
-    // group, kill(-pgid) hits no group and the grandchild survives.
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn run_git_service_tears_down_group_when_future_dropped() {
-        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let pidfile = tmp.path().join("pids");
-        // Fork a grandchild (stands in for pack-objects), record leader+grandchild
-        // pids, then hang so run_git_service parks in wait_with_output.
-        let body = format!(
-            "#!/bin/sh\nsleep 300 &\nprintf '%s\\n%s\\n' \"$$\" \"$!\" > \"{}\"\nwait\n",
-            pidfile.display()
-        );
-        let git_bin = write_fake_git(tmp.path(), &body);
-
-        let mut fut = Box::pin(run_git_service(
-            git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
-            "git-upload-pack",
-            tmp.path(),
-            Bytes::new(),
-        ));
-
-        // Advance the future until the fake has spawned its grandchild.
-        let mut pids = None;
-        for _ in 0..500 {
-            let _ = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10), &mut fut).await;
-            if let Some(p) = read_two_pids(&pidfile) {
-                pids = Some(p);
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        // Dropping the future (below or on the None arm) makes tokio reap the
-        // fake leader itself, so only the grandchild needs panic-cleanup —
-        // carrying the already-reaped leader pid risks SIGKILLing a recycled pid
-        // under parallel test load.
-        let (_leader, grandchild) = match pids {
-            Some(p) => p,
-            // Drop the still-armed future first so its guard reaps the fake
-            // group, then fail — otherwise a spawn hiccup orphans the processes.
-            None => {
-                drop(fut);
-                panic!("fake git should spawn a grandchild and write its pids");
-            }
-        };
-        let _cleanup = ReapOnPanic(vec![grandchild]);
-        assert!(
-            alive(grandchild),
-            "grandchild should be running before the drop"
-        );
-
-        // Client disconnect: drop the request future. The armed KillGroupOnDrop
-        // must SIGTERM the whole group.
-        drop(fut);
-
-        let mut gone = false;
-        for _ in 0..500 {
-            if !alive(grandchild) {
-                gone = true;
-                break;
-            }
-            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
-        }
-        assert!(
-            gone,
-            "grandchild must be torn down via the process group on future-drop \
-             (proves run_git_service sets process_group(0) and arms the guard)"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // A request that runs to completion must DISARM the guard after reaping, so
-    // no stray group SIGTERM fires. The fake exits non-zero (surfacing as Err)
-    // but leaves a grandchild alive; the grandchild must survive. Goes RED if the
-    // post-reap disarm is removed: the guard would then fire on return and, since
-    // the grandchild still holds the group open, sweep it.
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn run_git_service_disarms_on_completion_leaving_group_alive() {
-        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let pidfile = tmp.path().join("pids");
-        // The grandchild is long-lived with stdio redirected to /dev/null:
-        // /dev/null so it doesn't inherit (and hold open) run_git_service's stdout
-        // pipe (which would block wait_with_output until it exits); long-lived so
-        // the "still alive" assertion below can't race the sleep exiting on its own
-        // under a starved scheduler. ReapOnPanic cleans it up.
-        let body = format!(
-            "#!/bin/sh\nsleep 300 >/dev/null 2>&1 &\nprintf '%s\\n%s\\n' \"$$\" \"$!\" > \"{}\"\nexit 1\n",
-            pidfile.display()
-        );
-        let git_bin = write_fake_git(tmp.path(), &body);
-
-        let result = run_git_service(
-            git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
-            "git-upload-pack",
-            tmp.path(),
-            Bytes::new(),
-        )
-        .await;
-
-        // wait_with_output already reaped the fake leader, so only the grandchild
-        // needs panic-cleanup — SIGKILLing the reaped leader pid could hit a
-        // recycled pid under parallel test load.
-        let (_leader, grandchild) =
-            read_two_pids(&pidfile).expect("fake git should have written its pids");
-        let _cleanup = ReapOnPanic(vec![grandchild]);
-
-        assert!(result.is_err(), "non-zero git exit must surface as Err");
-        // A mutant that left the guard armed fires SIGTERM on return; poll a short
-        // window so a killed grandchild is reliably observed dead — a single
-        // alive() check can race the SIGTERM+reap and miss it.
-        for _ in 0..30 {
-            assert!(
-                alive(grandchild),
-                "grandchild must survive: run_git_service must disarm the guard after \
-                 reaping, not fire a group SIGTERM on the completion path"
-            );
-            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
-        }
-    }
-
-    // The SUCCESS path (exit 0, Ok) must disarm too — the disarm test above only
-    // exercises the exit-1/Err branch. Goes RED if disarm is gated on failure
-    // (e.g. moved inside the `!status.success()` branch): the guard would then
-    // fire after a clean completion and sweep the still-live grandchild.
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn run_git_service_disarms_on_success_leaving_group_alive() {
-        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let pidfile = tmp.path().join("pids");
-        // Long-lived, stdio to /dev/null (same reasons as the exit-1 test).
-        let body = format!(
-            "#!/bin/sh\nsleep 300 >/dev/null 2>&1 &\nprintf '%s\\n%s\\n' \"$$\" \"$!\" > \"{}\"\nexit 0\n",
-            pidfile.display()
-        );
-        let git_bin = write_fake_git(tmp.path(), &body);
-
-        let result = run_git_service(
-            git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
-            "git-upload-pack",
-            tmp.path(),
-            Bytes::new(),
-        )
-        .await;
-
-        let (_leader, grandchild) =
-            read_two_pids(&pidfile).expect("fake git should have written its pids");
-        let _cleanup = ReapOnPanic(vec![grandchild]);
-
-        assert!(result.is_ok(), "zero-exit git must surface as Ok");
-        // Poll a short window (see the exit-1 test): a mutant that disarms only on
-        // failure fires the guard on this success path, and a single alive() check
-        // can race the SIGTERM+reap.
-        for _ in 0..30 {
-            assert!(
-                alive(grandchild),
-                "grandchild must survive: run_git_service must disarm on the success \
-                 path too, not fire a group SIGTERM after a clean completion"
-            );
-            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
-        }
-    }
 }
@@ -271,8 +271,9 @@ pub struct TreeEntry {
 /// `/ipfs/<cid>` is computed from these same content bytes via
 /// `gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes`.
 ///
-/// Get just the object type. Returns `None` if the object doesn't exist.
-pub fn object_type(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
+/// Returns `None` if the object does not exist in this repo.
+pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String, Vec<u8>)>> {
+    // First check if the object exists and get its type
    let type_output = Command::new("git")
        .args(["cat-file", "-t", sha256_hex])
        .current_dir(repo_path)
@@ -283,17 +284,13 @@ pub fn object_type(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<String>>
        return Ok(None);
    }

-    Ok(Some(
-        String::from_utf8_lossy(&type_output.stdout)
-            .trim()
-            .to_string(),
-    ))
-}
+    let obj_type = String::from_utf8_lossy(&type_output.stdout)
+        .trim()
+        .to_string();

-/// Read an object's content if its type is already known.
-pub fn read_object_content(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str, obj_type: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    // Read the raw content bytes
    let content_output = Command::new("git")
-        .args(["cat-file", obj_type, sha256_hex])
+        .args(["cat-file", &obj_type, sha256_hex])
        .current_dir(repo_path)
        .output()
        .context("failed to run git cat-file <type>")?;
@@ -303,24 +300,7 @@ pub fn read_object_content(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str, obj_type: &str) -
        bail!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}");
    }

-    Ok(content_output.stdout)
-}
-
-/// Read a git object by its SHA-256 hex object ID.
-///
-/// Returns `(object_type, content_bytes)` where `content_bytes` is the raw
-/// object content (without the git framing header). The CID served over
-/// `/ipfs/<cid>` is computed from these same content bytes via
-/// `gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes`.
-///
-/// Returns `None` if the object does not exist in this repo.
-pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String, Vec<u8>)>> {
-    let obj_type = match object_type(repo_path, sha256_hex)? {
-        Some(t) => t,
-        None => return Ok(None),
-    };
-    let content = read_object_content(repo_path, sha256_hex, &obj_type)?;
-    Ok(Some((obj_type, content)))
+    Ok(Some((obj_type, content_output.stdout)))
 }

 /// Get the diff between two branches: changes on source_branch not in target_branch.
@@ -334,39 +314,6 @@ pub fn branch_diff(repo_path: &Path, target_branch: &str, source_branch: &str) -
    Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).to_string())
 }

-/// The repo-relative paths changed by `git diff target...source` (the same range
-/// as `branch_diff`). Used to enforce per-path visibility on a PR diff: if the
-/// caller cannot read one of these paths, the diff is withheld.
-pub fn branch_diff_names(
-    repo_path: &Path,
-    target_branch: &str,
-    source_branch: &str,
-) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
-    let output = Command::new("git")
-        .args([
-            "diff",
-            "--name-only",
-            "-z",
-            &format!("{target_branch}...{source_branch}"),
-        ])
-        .current_dir(repo_path)
-        .output()
-        .context("failed to run git diff --name-only")?;
-    if !output.status.success() {
-        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
-        bail!("git diff --name-only failed: {stderr}");
-    }
-    // Split on NUL (`-z`) so paths containing newlines keep their exact bytes;
-    // `--name-only` without `-z` would quote/escape such paths and they would no
-    // longer match the visibility globs in get_pr_diff, leaking the diff.
-    Ok(output
-        .stdout
-        .split(|b| *b == b'\0')
-        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
-        .map(|s| String::from_utf8_lossy(s).into_owned())
-        .collect())
-}
-
 /// Merge source_branch into target_branch in a bare repo using a temporary worktree.
 /// Returns the new merge commit hash.
 pub fn merge_branch(
@@ -452,53 +399,3 @@ pub fn repo_disk_path(repos_dir: &Path, owner_did: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Pat
    let owner_slug = owner_did.replace([':', '/'], "_");
    repos_dir.join(owner_slug).join(format!("{repo_name}.git"))
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::branch_diff_names;
-    use std::path::Path;
-    use std::process::Command;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn branch_diff_names_lists_changed_paths() {
-        let td = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let work: &Path = td.path();
-        let g = |args: &[&str]| {
-            assert!(Command::new("git")
-                .args(args)
-                .current_dir(work)
-                .status()
-                .unwrap()
-                .success());
-        };
-        g(&["init", "-q"]);
-        g(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
-        g(&["config", "user.name", "t"]);
-        std::fs::write(work.join("base.txt"), b"base\n").unwrap();
-        g(&["add", "."]);
-        g(&["commit", "-qm", "base"]);
-        let main = {
-            let o = Command::new("git")
-                .args(["symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD"])
-                .current_dir(work)
-                .output()
-                .unwrap();
-            String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stdout).trim().to_string()
-        };
-        g(&["checkout", "-q", "-b", "feature"]);
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(work.join("secret")).unwrap();
-        std::fs::write(work.join("secret/x.txt"), b"secret\n").unwrap();
-        g(&["add", "."]);
-        g(&["commit", "-qm", "feat"]);
-
-        let names = branch_diff_names(work, &main, "feature").unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            names.iter().any(|p| p == "secret/x.txt"),
-            "expected secret/x.txt in changed paths, got {names:?}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !names.iter().any(|p| p == "base.txt"),
-            "unchanged file must not appear: {names:?}"
-        );
-    }
-}
@@ -3,9 +3,7 @@
 //! Repos are stored as `repos/v1/{owner_slug}/{repo_name}.tar.zst` — a
 //! zstd-compressed tar archive of the bare repo directory.

-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, OnceLock};
+use std::path::Path;

 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use aws_sdk_s3::Client as S3Client;
@@ -112,7 +110,8 @@ impl TigrisClient {
            .collect()
            .await
            .context("reading tigris response body")?
-            .into_bytes();
+            .into_bytes()
+            .to_vec();

        // Extract tar.zst to local path
        tokio::task::spawn_blocking({
@@ -157,23 +156,6 @@ fn compress_repo(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
    Ok(compressed)
 }

-/// Per-repo-path lock serializing the publish (swap-into-place) step of
-/// `decompress_repo`. Concurrent extractions unpack into isolated temp dirs in
-/// parallel, but the final `remove_dir_all` + `rename` must not interleave for
-/// the same `local_path`, or they race to a nondeterministic overwrite/failure.
-fn publish_lock(local_path: &Path) -> Arc<Mutex<()>> {
-    // KNOWN LIMITATION: this map is never evicted — one (PathBuf, Arc<Mutex>)
-    // entry accrues per distinct repo path for the process lifetime. Bounded by
-    // the number of repos a node hosts, so it's negligible for normal use, but
-    // high-volume/churning deployments may want LRU or weak-ref eviction here.
-    static LOCKS: OnceLock<Mutex<HashMap<PathBuf, Arc<Mutex<()>>>>> = OnceLock::new();
-    let locks = LOCKS.get_or_init(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
-    let mut map = locks.lock().expect("publish lock map poisoned");
-    map.entry(local_path.to_path_buf())
-        .or_insert_with(|| Arc::new(Mutex::new(())))
-        .clone()
-}
-
 /// Decompress a tar.zst byte vector into a local directory.
 ///
 /// Extraction is atomic with respect to `local_path`: the archive is unpacked
@@ -189,12 +171,10 @@ fn decompress_repo(data: &[u8], local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
        .file_name()
        .context("repo path has no file name")?
        .to_string_lossy();
-    // Unique per-extraction temp dir: a fixed name would let two concurrent
-    // extractions of the same repo share one dir and clobber each other's
-    // in-progress unpack. A fresh UUID also means it can't collide with a
-    // leftover dir from a previously-interrupted run.
-    let tmp_dir = parent.join(format!(".{file_name}.tmp-extract.{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
+    let tmp_dir = parent.join(format!(".{file_name}.tmp-extract"));

+    // Clear any leftover temp dir from a previously-interrupted extraction.
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp_dir);
    std::fs::create_dir_all(&tmp_dir).context("creating temp extract dir")?;

    // Unpack into the temp dir; on any failure, clean up and bail without
@@ -212,11 +192,7 @@ fn decompress_repo(data: &[u8], local_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {

    // Swap the freshly-extracted repo into place. rename within the same parent
    // is effectively atomic, but most platforms refuse to rename onto a
-    // non-empty dir, so remove the old copy first. Serialize this per repo path:
-    // concurrent extractions unpack into isolated temp dirs, but their swaps
-    // must not interleave or they race to a nondeterministic overwrite/failure.
-    let lock = publish_lock(local_path);
-    let _publish = lock.lock().expect("publish lock poisoned");
+    // non-empty dir, so remove the old copy first.
    if local_path.exists() {
        std::fs::remove_dir_all(local_path).context("removing stale repo dir")?;
    }
@@ -3,21 +3,11 @@ use chrono::Utc;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use uuid::Uuid;

-use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::db::{AgentTask, Db};
 use crate::state::TaskEventBroadcast;

 use super::types::{AgentTaskType, CreateTaskInput, FinishTaskInput};

-/// The verified signer DID for this request, or an auth error (N2). The DID is
-/// attached request-scoped by the `/graphql` `optional_signature` layer; its
-/// absence means the request was unsigned, so every mutation rejects.
-fn require_signer<'a>(ctx: &'a Context<'_>) -> Result<&'a str> {
-    ctx.data::<AuthenticatedDid>()
-        .map(|d| d.0.as_str())
-        .map_err(|_| async_graphql::Error::new("authentication required"))
-}
-
 pub struct MutationRoot;

 #[Object]
@@ -28,13 +18,6 @@ impl MutationRoot {
        delegator_did: String,
        input: CreateTaskInput,
    ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
-        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &delegator_did) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "delegator_did must be the authenticated signer",
-            ));
-        }
-        let delegator_did = caller.to_string();
        let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
        let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
        let task = AgentTask {
@@ -64,13 +47,6 @@ impl MutationRoot {
        id: String,
        assignee_did: String,
    ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
-        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &assignee_did) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "assignee_did must be the authenticated signer",
-            ));
-        }
-        let assignee_did = caller.to_string();
        let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
        let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
        let task = db
@@ -94,27 +70,8 @@ impl MutationRoot {
        by_did: String,
        input: FinishTaskInput,
    ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
-        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &by_did) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "by_did must be the authenticated signer",
-            ));
-        }
-        let by_did = caller.to_string();
        let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
        let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
-        // Authorize the actor: binding by_did to the signer is necessary but not
-        // sufficient — only the task's assignee may finish it.
-        let existing = db
-            .get_task(&id)
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?
-            .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "only the task assignee can complete it",
-            ));
-        }
        let task = db
            .finish_task(&id, "completed", input.result.as_deref())
            .await
@@ -136,26 +93,8 @@ impl MutationRoot {
        by_did: String,
        input: FinishTaskInput,
    ) -> Result<AgentTaskType> {
-        let caller = require_signer(ctx)?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, &by_did) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "by_did must be the authenticated signer",
-            ));
-        }
-        let by_did = caller.to_string();
        let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
        let tx = ctx.data_unchecked::<tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<TaskEventBroadcast>>();
-        // Authorize the actor: only the task's assignee may fail it.
-        let existing = db
-            .get_task(&id)
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?
-            .ok_or_else(|| async_graphql::Error::new("task not found"))?;
-        if !crate::api::did_matches(caller, existing.assignee_did.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()) {
-            return Err(async_graphql::Error::new(
-                "only the task assignee can fail it",
-            ));
-        }
        let reason = input.reason.unwrap_or_default();
        let task = db
            .finish_task(&id, "failed", Some(&reason))
@@ -171,123 +110,3 @@ impl MutationRoot {
        Ok(AgentTaskType::from(task))
    }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
-    use async_graphql::{Request, Response};
-    use sqlx::PgPool;
-
-    fn errors(resp: &Response) -> String {
-        resp.errors
-            .iter()
-            .map(|e| e.message.clone())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
-            .join("; ")
-    }
-
-    /// N2: GraphQL mutations require a verified signer and bind the acting DID to
-    /// it. Unsigned is rejected; a signer other than the claimed actor is
-    /// rejected; the matching signer passes the auth gate.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn mutation_requires_and_binds_signer(pool: PgPool) {
-        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
-        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
-        let assignee = "did:key:zASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
-        let q = format!(
-            r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "no-such-task", assigneeDid: "{assignee}") {{ id }} }}"#
-        );
-
-        // 1. Unsigned → rejected before any DB work.
-        let resp = schema.execute(Request::new(&q)).await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).contains("authentication required"),
-            "unsigned mutation must be rejected: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
-
-        // 2. Signed as someone other than the claimed assignee → rejected.
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(
-                "did:key:zOTHERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB".into(),
-            )))
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).contains("authenticated signer"),
-            "DID mismatch must be rejected: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
-
-        // 3. Signed as the claimed assignee → passes the auth gate (any remaining
-        //    error is the missing task, not an auth error).
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
-            .await;
-        let errs = errors(&resp);
-        assert!(
-            !errs.contains("authentication required") && !errs.contains("authenticated signer"),
-            "matching signer must pass the auth gate: {errs}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Adversarial-review GATE-1 (GraphQL): completing a task requires being its
-    /// assignee, not merely signing as the by_did you pass. A signer who is not
-    /// the assignee is rejected even though the by_did binding passes; the
-    /// assignee completes.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn complete_task_requires_assignee(pool: PgPool) {
-        let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
-        let assignee = "did:key:zGQLASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
-        let stranger = "did:key:zGQLSTRANGERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
-        let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
-        let task = crate::db::AgentTask {
-            id: "task-g".into(),
-            repo_id: None,
-            kind: "build".into(),
-            status: "pending".into(),
-            delegator_did: "did:key:zGQLDELEGATORCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC".into(),
-            assignee_did: None,
-            capability: "repo:write".into(),
-            ucan_token: None,
-            payload: None,
-            result: None,
-            created_at: now.clone(),
-            updated_at: now,
-            deadline: None,
-        };
-        state.db.create_task(&task).await.expect("seed task");
-        state
-            .db
-            .claim_task("task-g", assignee)
-            .await
-            .expect("claim");
-        let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
-
-        let q = |actor: &str| {
-            format!(
-                r#"mutation {{ completeTask(id: "task-g", byDid: "{actor}", input: {{}}) {{ id status }} }}"#
-            )
-        };
-
-        // Stranger signs as themselves and passes byDid=self (so the signer
-        // binding passes), but is not the assignee → rejected by authorization.
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(q(stranger)).data(AuthenticatedDid(stranger.into())))
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).contains("assignee"),
-            "a non-assignee signer must be rejected: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
-
-        // The assignee completes with no error.
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(q(assignee)).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).is_empty(),
-            "the assignee should complete the task: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
-    }
-}
@@ -12,29 +12,11 @@ impl QueryRoot {
    async fn repos(&self, ctx: &Context<'_>) -> Result<Vec<RepoType>> {
        let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
        let repos = db
-            .list_all_repos_deduped()
+            .list_all_repos()
            .await
            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
-
-        // Apply the same "/" visibility gate the REST/per-repo endpoints use so
-        // this surface does not enumerate private repos (#97). The caller DID is
-        // threaded onto the context by optional_signature; absent = anonymous.
-        let caller = ctx
-            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
-            .ok()
-            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
-        let ids: Vec<String> = repos.iter().map(|r| r.id.clone()).collect();
-        let rules_by_repo = db
-            .list_visibility_rules_for_repos(&ids)
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
-
        Ok(repos
            .into_iter()
-            .filter(|r| {
-                let rules = rules_by_repo.get(&r.id).map(Vec::as_slice).unwrap_or(&[]);
-                crate::visibility::listable_at_root(rules, r.is_public, &r.owner_did, caller)
-            })
            .map(|r| RepoType {
                name: r.name,
                owner_did: r.owner_did,
@@ -49,30 +31,13 @@ impl QueryRoot {
        &self,
        ctx: &Context<'_>,
        repo: Option<String>,
-        #[graphql(
-            default = 20,
-            desc = "Max 200; larger requests return the newest 200 rows (no continuation cursor)."
-        )]
-        limit: i64,
+        #[graphql(default = 20)] limit: i64,
    ) -> Result<Vec<RefUpdateType>> {
        let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
-
-        // Gate each row on the same "/" visibility decision the repos resolver
-        // uses, so anonymous callers get no row for a local repo they can't read
-        // (#112). The shared collector applies the fail-closed gate *before* the
-        // limit (paging past dropped private rows) so a small limit still returns
-        // the latest visible events, and keeps this surface byte-identical to the
-        // REST feed (#114). The row slug is peer-supplied, so the pure filter
-        // treats it as untrusted input; remote (no local match) rows pass.
-        let caller = ctx
-            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
-            .ok()
-            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
-        let updates =
-            crate::api::events::collect_visible_ref_updates(db, repo.as_deref(), limit, caller)
-                .await
-                .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
-
+        let updates = db
+            .list_ref_updates_filtered(repo.as_deref(), limit)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
        Ok(updates
            .into_iter()
            .map(|u| RefUpdateType {
@@ -111,288 +76,3 @@ impl QueryRoot {
        Ok(t.map(AgentTaskType::from))
    }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::db::{Db, ReceivedRefUpdate, RepoRecord};
-    use chrono::Utc;
-    use sqlx::PgPool;
-    use std::sync::Arc;
-
-    const OWNER: &str = "did:key:z6MkOwner";
-
-    async fn db(pool: PgPool) -> Arc<Db> {
-        let db = Db::for_testing(pool);
-        db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
-        Arc::new(db)
-    }
-
-    fn schema(db: Arc<Db>) -> super::super::GitlawbSchema {
-        let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
-        let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
-        super::super::build_schema(db, ref_tx, task_tx)
-    }
-
-    fn repo(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
-        RepoRecord {
-            id: id.into(),
-            name: name.into(),
-            owner_did: owner_did.into(),
-            description: None,
-            is_public,
-            default_branch: "main".into(),
-            created_at: Utc::now(),
-            updated_at: Utc::now(),
-            disk_path: format!("/srv/{id}"),
-            forked_from: None,
-            machine_id: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn ref_row(id: &str, slug: &str) -> ReceivedRefUpdate {
-        ReceivedRefUpdate {
-            id: id.into(),
-            node_did: "did:key:z6MkNode".into(),
-            pusher_did: "did:key:z6MkPusher".into(),
-            repo: slug.into(),
-            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
-            old_sha: "0".repeat(40),
-            new_sha: "a".repeat(40),
-            timestamp: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-            cert_id: None,
-            received_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-            from_peer: "peer1".into(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Count `refUpdates` rows in a GraphQL response.
-    fn count(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> usize {
-        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
-        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
-            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
-        };
-        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").expect("refUpdates key")
-        else {
-            panic!("refUpdates not a list");
-        };
-        rows.len()
-    }
-
-    async fn anon(schema: &super::super::GitlawbSchema, query: &str) -> async_graphql::Response {
-        schema.execute(async_graphql::Request::new(query)).await
-    }
-
-    async fn authed(
-        schema: &super::super::GitlawbSchema,
-        query: &str,
-        did: &str,
-    ) -> async_graphql::Response {
-        schema
-            .execute(
-                async_graphql::Request::new(query)
-                    .data(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid(did.to_string())),
-            )
-            .await
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 1 — anon must not get a private local repo's row on the
-    // repo:Some branch. This is the load-bearing RED→GREEN case.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_private_repo_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkOwner/widget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        // The GraphQL `repo` arg is the raw slug DB filter, so it must equal the
-        // stored slug to select the row at all — this is the exact leak path.
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(repo: "z6MkOwner/widget") { refName newSha pusherDid } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 2 — owner still sees their own private repo's row.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_private_repo_kept_for_owner(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkOwner/widget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(repo: "z6MkOwner/widget") { refName } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&authed(&schema, q, OWNER).await), 1);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 3 — unfiltered (repo:None): anon gets only the public row.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_unfiltered_anon_gets_only_public(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("pub", OWNER, "openrepo", true))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.create_repo(&repo("priv", OWNER, "secret", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u_pub", "z6MkOwner/openrepo"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u_priv", "z6MkOwner/secret"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo refName } }"#;
-        let resp = anon(&schema, q).await;
-        assert_eq!(count(&resp), 1);
-        // The one row returned must be the public repo's.
-        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").unwrap() else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        let async_graphql::Value::Object(row) = &rows[0] else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        assert_eq!(
-            row.get("repo").unwrap(),
-            &async_graphql::Value::from("z6MkOwner/openrepo")
-        );
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 4 — alias fail-closed: private repo's row stored full-DID form.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_full_did_slug_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", "did:key:zABC", "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "did:key:zABC/widget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        // repo:None so the slug is not the DB filter key (which is verbatim);
-        // the gate must still drop it.
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 5 — truncated-key fail-closed: 8-char-prefix owner form.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_truncated_key_slug_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", "did:key:zABCDEFGH", "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "zABCDEF/widget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 6 — remote slug (no local match) is returned to anon.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_remote_slug_kept_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        // Row whose slug matches no local repo (different owner + name).
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "zZZZOTHER/gadget"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 1);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 7 (#114 P2) — a small limit must page past the newest rows when
-    // they are private, so the older public rows are still returned. Before the
-    // gate moved ahead of the limit this returned 0 (the newest `limit` rows were
-    // all private and got filtered after the SQL LIMIT). RED→GREEN.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_small_limit_pages_past_newest_private(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("pub", OWNER, "openrepo", true))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.create_repo(&repo("priv", OWNER, "secret", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        // 3 older PUBLIC rows …
-        for i in 0..3 {
-            let mut r = ref_row(&format!("pub{i}"), "z6MkOwner/openrepo");
-            r.timestamp = format!("2026-07-01T10:00:0{i}+00:00");
-            db.insert_ref_update(&r).await.unwrap();
-        }
-        // … then 5 NEWER PRIVATE rows (the newest in the feed).
-        for i in 0..5 {
-            let mut r = ref_row(&format!("priv{i}"), "z6MkOwner/secret");
-            r.timestamp = format!("2026-07-01T10:00:1{i}+00:00");
-            db.insert_ref_update(&r).await.unwrap();
-        }
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        // limit 3 < the 5 newest (all private): anon must still get 3 public rows.
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(limit: 3) { repo } }"#;
-        let resp = anon(&schema, q).await;
-        assert_eq!(count(&resp), 3, "paging must reach the older public rows");
-        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").unwrap() else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-        for row in rows {
-            let async_graphql::Value::Object(r) = row else {
-                unreachable!()
-            };
-            assert_eq!(
-                r.get("repo").unwrap(),
-                &async_graphql::Value::from("z6MkOwner/openrepo"),
-                "every returned row must be the public repo's"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 8 — a quarantined mirror is withheld on the GraphQL surface too.
-    // Guards that the resolver keeps delegating to the shared collector (where the
-    // quarantine fold lives); a REST-only test would miss a resolver that stopped.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_quarantined_mirror_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.upsert_mirror_repo("z6MkQuar", "secret", "/tmp/q", None, true)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkQuar/secret"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
-    }
-
-    // Scenario 8b — the GraphQL surface also withholds a quarantined repo from an
-    // authenticated OWNER, not just anon. Without the collector's quarantine drop
-    // the owner short-circuit in visibility_check keeps the row on this surface
-    // too, so the REST owner test alone would not guard the resolver.
-    #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn ref_updates_quarantined_repo_dropped_for_owner(pool: PgPool) {
-        let db = db(pool).await;
-        db.create_repo(&repo("q1", "did:key:z6MkQuar", "secret", false))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        db.set_repo_quarantine("q1", true).await.unwrap();
-        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkQuar/secret"))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let schema = schema(db);
-        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
-        assert_eq!(count(&authed(&schema, q, "did:key:z6MkQuar").await), 0);
-    }
-}
@@ -11,15 +11,6 @@ pub struct SubscriptionRoot;

 #[Subscription]
 impl SubscriptionRoot {
-    /// Live ref-update stream. `/graphql/ws` is mounted outside the
-    /// `optional_signature` layer, so this resolver has NO caller identity and
-    /// cannot gate per-subscriber — it relays whatever enters the broadcast
-    /// channel to any anonymous client. Its visibility safety therefore rests
-    /// entirely on the WRITE side: the push handler only sends a
-    /// `RefUpdateBroadcast` for repos the anonymous public may read (inside its
-    /// `if announce` block, `api/repos.rs`). This is a single-point invariant —
-    /// any new sender to `ref_update_tx` MUST be `announce`-gated, or private-repo
-    /// ref metadata leaks here to unauthenticated subscribers (#112/#114 class).
    async fn ref_updates(
        &self,
        ctx: &Context<'_>,
@@ -1,650 +0,0 @@
-//! iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate.
-//!
-//! Spam-prone endpoints (repo creation, agent registration) can require the
-//! caller to present an iCaptcha proof: a small Ed25519-signed token minted by
-//! <https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com> after the caller solves an escalating
-//! challenge. We verify the proof OFFLINE (no per-request call to iCaptcha)
-//! using its published public key, and bind each proof to the authenticated
-//! agent DID so a proof cannot be shared between identities.
-//!
-//! Behaviour is controlled by `ICAPTCHA_MODE`:
-//!   * `off`     (default) — gate is inert, nothing is checked.
-//!   * `shadow`  — verify and log would-be rejections, but always allow.
-//!   * `enforce` — reject requests without a valid, sufficiently-strong proof.
-//!
-//! Config (env):
-//!   ICAPTCHA_MODE            off | shadow | enforce         (default off)
-//!   ICAPTCHA_URL             base URL                        (default https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com)
-//!   ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY          base64url Ed25519 public key    (optional; else fetched from /v1/pubkey)
-//!   ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL  minimum proof level             (default 3)
-
-use std::sync::OnceLock;
-use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
-
-use axum::http::HeaderMap;
-use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
-use base64::Engine;
-use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
-use serde::Deserialize;
-
-use crate::error::AppError;
-
-const PROOF_HEADER: &str = "x-icaptcha-proof";
-
-/// How long a mirror-admission `jti` stays in the replay ledger. The direct
-/// request path spends a proof against its own `exp` (it can't be presented once
-/// expired). The propagation path deliberately accepts already-expired proofs,
-/// so spending against `exp` would store an already-past expiry that the next
-/// sweep deletes — letting the same token admit another mirror minutes later.
-/// We instead retain the mirror replay record for a long, fixed window so the
-/// per-node single-use property is durable.
-const MIRROR_REPLAY_RETENTION_SECS: i64 = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60;
-
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub enum Mode {
-    Off,
-    Shadow,
-    Enforce,
-}
-
-impl Mode {
-    fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
-        match self {
-            Mode::Off => "off",
-            Mode::Shadow => "shadow",
-            Mode::Enforce => "enforce",
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Parse `ICAPTCHA_MODE`. Returns `None` for unrecognized values so the caller
-/// can surface the typo instead of silently disabling the gate.
-fn parse_mode(s: &str) -> Option<Mode> {
-    match s.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
-        "" | "off" => Some(Mode::Off),
-        "shadow" => Some(Mode::Shadow),
-        "enforce" => Some(Mode::Enforce),
-        _ => None,
-    }
-}
-
-/// Parse `ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL`. Defaults to 3; warns (rather than silently
-/// lowering the threshold) when a non-empty value fails to parse.
-fn parse_required_level() -> u32 {
-    const DEFAULT: u32 = 3;
-    match std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL") {
-        Ok(v) if !v.trim().is_empty() => v.trim().parse().unwrap_or_else(|_| {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                value = %v,
-                default = DEFAULT,
-                "invalid ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL; using default"
-            );
-            DEFAULT
-        }),
-        _ => DEFAULT,
-    }
-}
-
-struct Verifier {
-    mode: Mode,
-    url: String,
-    required_level: u32,
-    key: Option<VerifyingKey>,
-}
-
-static VERIFIER: OnceLock<Verifier> = OnceLock::new();
-
-#[derive(Deserialize, Debug)]
-struct ProofClaims {
-    sub: String,
-    level: u32,
-    exp: i64,
-    /// Unique proof id, consumed once so a proof cannot be replayed.
-    jti: String,
-}
-
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-struct Jwk {
-    x: String,
-}
-
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-struct Jwks {
-    keys: Vec<Jwk>,
-}
-
-fn now_secs() -> i64 {
-    SystemTime::now()
-        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
-        .map(|d| d.as_secs() as i64)
-        .unwrap_or(0)
-}
-
-fn decode_key(b64url: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
-    let bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(b64url.trim()).ok()?;
-    let arr: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().ok()?;
-    VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&arr).ok()
-}
-
-async fn fetch_key(url: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
-    let endpoint = format!("{}/v1/pubkey", url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-    // Bounded request: a hung /v1/pubkey must never block node startup. On
-    // timeout/error we return None and the gate stays inert (fail safe).
-    let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
-        .timeout(Duration::from_secs(5))
-        .build()
-        .ok()?;
-    let jwks: Jwks = client.get(&endpoint).send().await.ok()?.json().await.ok()?;
-    decode_key(&jwks.keys.first()?.x)
-}
-
-/// Initialize the gate from the environment. Call once at startup. Never panics;
-/// if the gate is active but no key can be loaded, it stays inert and warns.
-pub async fn init() {
-    let raw_mode = std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_MODE").unwrap_or_default();
-    let mode = parse_mode(&raw_mode).unwrap_or_else(|| {
-        tracing::warn!(value = %raw_mode, "invalid ICAPTCHA_MODE; disabling iCaptcha gate");
-        Mode::Off
-    });
-    let url = std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_URL")
-        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string());
-    let required_level = parse_required_level();
-
-    let key = if mode == Mode::Off {
-        None
-    } else {
-        match std::env::var("ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY") {
-            Ok(b64) if !b64.is_empty() => decode_key(&b64),
-            _ => fetch_key(&url).await,
-        }
-    };
-
-    if mode != Mode::Off {
-        if key.is_some() {
-            tracing::info!(mode = mode.as_str(), required_level, "iCaptcha gate active");
-        } else {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                mode = mode.as_str(),
-                "iCaptcha gate enabled but no public key could be loaded; staying inert"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
-    let _ = VERIFIER.set(Verifier {
-        mode,
-        url,
-        required_level,
-        key,
-    });
-}
-
-/// Outcome of the synchronous, IO-free decision step.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-enum Decision {
-    /// Allow the request (off, shadow, inert/no-key, or verified non-enforcing).
-    Allow,
-    /// Enforce mode and verification failed; reject with this reason.
-    Reject(String),
-    /// Enforce mode and the proof verified; the caller must consume its `jti`
-    /// (and reject replays) before allowing, then may persist it.
-    Consume(VerifiedProof),
-}
-
-/// A verified proof: the raw token plus the claims we act on. Carried by a
-/// [`ProofGuard`] so that, once consumed, the gated handler can persist it with
-/// the created repo — letting the proof travel with the repo when it propagates
-/// to peers (see [`admit_mirror`]).
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct VerifiedProof {
-    token: String,
-    sub: String,
-    level: u32,
-    jti: String,
-    exp: i64,
-}
-
-impl VerifiedProof {
-    /// Persist this proof against a freshly-created repo so a mirroring peer can
-    /// re-verify it. Best-effort callers may ignore failures; the gate's
-    /// security does not depend on it (propagation just falls back to quarantine).
-    pub async fn record_for_repo(&self, db: &crate::db::Db, repo_id: &str) -> Result<(), AppError> {
-        db.record_repo_proof(
-            repo_id,
-            &self.token,
-            &self.sub,
-            self.level as i32,
-            &self.jti,
-            self.exp,
-        )
-        .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-/// A verified proof awaiting consumption. Verification (which rejects invalid or
-/// missing proofs) is separated from consumption (which spends the single-use
-/// `jti`) so a request rejected by later validation never burns a valid proof.
-/// The caller must `consume()` this guard immediately before the gated write.
-/// For off/shadow/inert there is nothing to consume.
-#[must_use = "a verified iCaptcha proof must be consumed before the gated action"]
-pub struct ProofGuard(Option<VerifiedProof>);
-
-impl ProofGuard {
-    /// Spend the proof's `jti` (single-use) and return the verified proof so the
-    /// caller can persist it. A replay is rejected. Returns `None` when there is
-    /// nothing to consume (off/shadow/inert).
-    pub async fn consume(self, db: &crate::db::Db) -> Result<Option<VerifiedProof>, AppError> {
-        match self.0 {
-            Some(p) => {
-                if !db.consume_proof_jti(&p.jti, p.exp).await? {
-                    let (url, level) = url_and_level();
-                    return Err(AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
-                        message: "iCaptcha proof already used (replay); solve a fresh challenge"
-                            .to_string(),
-                        url,
-                        level,
-                    });
-                }
-                Ok(Some(p))
-            }
-            None => Ok(None),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Verify the proof in `headers` belongs to `did`. Rejects missing/invalid
-/// proofs early (enforce mode); off/shadow never reject. Returns a [`ProofGuard`]
-/// the caller must `consume()` right before the gated write. Off/shadow/inert
-/// yield a no-op guard that consumes nothing.
-pub fn verify_request(headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str) -> Result<ProofGuard, AppError> {
-    let v = match VERIFIER.get() {
-        Some(v) => v,
-        None => return Ok(ProofGuard(None)), // not initialized -> inert
-    };
-    match decide(v, headers, did, now_secs()) {
-        Decision::Allow => Ok(ProofGuard(None)),
-        Decision::Reject(reason) => Err(reject_error(v, &reason)),
-        Decision::Consume(proof) => Ok(ProofGuard(Some(proof))),
-    }
-}
-
-fn reject_error(v: &Verifier, reason: &str) -> AppError {
-    AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
-        message: format!(
-            "iCaptcha proof required ({reason}). Solve a challenge at {} for level >= {} and resend with the {} header.",
-            v.url, v.required_level, PROOF_HEADER
-        ),
-        url: v.url.clone(),
-        level: v.required_level,
-    }
-}
-
-/// iCaptcha service url + required level for error responses, read from the
-/// initialized verifier (falls back to defaults if somehow uninitialized).
-fn url_and_level() -> (String, u32) {
-    VERIFIER
-        .get()
-        .map(|v| (v.url.clone(), v.required_level))
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| ("https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(), 3))
-}
-
-/// Mode-aware decision. Pure and IO-free (no DB; clock injected via `now`) so it
-/// is fully unit-testable. The caller performs jti consumption for `Consume`.
-fn decide(v: &Verifier, headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str, now: i64) -> Decision {
-    if v.mode == Mode::Off {
-        return Decision::Allow;
-    }
-
-    // Fail safe: if no public key could be loaded (e.g. iCaptcha was unreachable
-    // at startup), stay inert rather than rejecting every request. The operator
-    // already saw a startup warning. An iCaptcha hiccup must never break repo
-    // creation or registration.
-    if v.key.is_none() {
-        return Decision::Allow;
-    }
-
-    let token = headers.get(PROOF_HEADER).and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok());
-    let result = match token {
-        Some(t) => verify_token(v, t, did, now, true).map(|claims| (t, claims)),
-        None => Err("missing proof header".to_string()),
-    };
-
-    match result {
-        Ok((token, claims)) => match v.mode {
-            Mode::Enforce => Decision::Consume(VerifiedProof {
-                token: token.to_string(),
-                sub: claims.sub,
-                level: claims.level,
-                jti: claims.jti,
-                exp: claims.exp,
-            }),
-            // Shadow/Off: never reject, and do not consume (observational only).
-            _ => Decision::Allow,
-        },
-        Err(reason) => match v.mode {
-            Mode::Shadow => {
-                tracing::warn!(did = %did, reason, "iCaptcha (shadow) would reject");
-                Decision::Allow
-            }
-            Mode::Enforce => Decision::Reject(reason),
-            Mode::Off => Decision::Allow,
-        },
-    }
-}
-
-/// Header-extracting wrapper over [`verify_token`] (enforces expiry). The
-/// production path inlines this in [`decide`]; retained as the unit-test entry
-/// point that also exercises header extraction.
-#[cfg(test)]
-fn verify(v: &Verifier, headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str, now: i64) -> Result<ProofClaims, String> {
-    let proof = headers
-        .get(PROOF_HEADER)
-        .and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok())
-        .ok_or("missing proof header")?;
-    verify_token(v, proof, did, now, true)
-}
-
-/// Core verification of a raw proof token, separated for testability and reuse.
-/// Checks the Ed25519 signature, the required level, and the DID binding. `exp`
-/// is only enforced when `check_exp` is true: the direct request path enforces
-/// freshness, but the propagation path ([`admit_mirror`]) does not — a proof has
-/// usually expired by the time a repo mirrors, and the origin enforced freshness
-/// at creation. `now` is unix seconds.
-fn verify_token(
-    v: &Verifier,
-    token: &str,
-    did: &str,
-    now: i64,
-    check_exp: bool,
-) -> Result<ProofClaims, String> {
-    let key = v.key.as_ref().ok_or("verifier has no public key")?;
-
-    let (payload, sig_b64) = token.split_once('.').ok_or("malformed proof")?;
-    let sig_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
-        .decode(sig_b64)
-        .map_err(|_| "bad signature encoding")?;
-    let sig = Signature::from_slice(&sig_bytes).map_err(|_| "bad signature length")?;
-    key.verify_strict(payload.as_bytes(), &sig)
-        .map_err(|_| "signature verification failed")?;
-
-    let claims_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
-        .decode(payload)
-        .map_err(|_| "bad payload encoding")?;
-    let claims: ProofClaims = serde_json::from_slice(&claims_bytes).map_err(|_| "bad claims")?;
-
-    if check_exp && claims.exp < now {
-        return Err("proof expired".to_string());
-    }
-    if claims.level < v.required_level {
-        return Err(format!(
-            "level {} below required {}",
-            claims.level, v.required_level
-        ));
-    }
-    if !crate::api::did_matches(did, &claims.sub) {
-        return Err("proof subject does not match authenticated DID".to_string());
-    }
-    Ok(claims)
-}
-
-/// Outcome of admitting a repo mirrored from a peer.
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub enum MirrorAdmission {
-    /// Admit the mirror normally (off/shadow/inert, or a valid proof in enforce).
-    Admit,
-    /// Enforce mode and the mirror's proof is missing/invalid/replayed — mirror
-    /// it but quarantine until an operator releases it. Carries the reason.
-    Quarantine(String),
-}
-
-/// Decide whether to admit a repo being mirrored from a peer, given the proof
-/// token the origin served (`None` if it had none or the fetch failed) and the
-/// mirrored repo's owner DID.
-///
-/// Off/shadow/inert always admit (shadow logs the would-be quarantine and writes
-/// nothing). In enforce mode the proof is re-verified offline against the local
-/// public key — signature, level, and owner-DID binding, but NOT expiry — and
-/// its `jti` is consumed in the local ledger, so one solved challenge admits at
-/// most one mirror per node (a malicious origin cannot reuse one proof to bless
-/// many spam repos here).
-///
-/// LIMITATION (proof is not repo-bound): an iCaptcha proof commits only to the
-/// solver's DID (`sub`), never to a repo — the proof is minted before the repo
-/// exists. So the guarantee enforced here is "a level≥N challenge was solved by
-/// this repo's owner DID", not "the owner intended THIS repo". A malicious origin
-/// that harvests a victim's public proof (served by `get_icaptcha_proof`) can use
-/// it to get ONE spam repo nominally owned by that victim admitted per node — the
-/// per-node `jti` single-use caps the amplification at one repo per distinct
-/// harvested proof, but does not eliminate it. Fully binding a proof to a repo
-/// would require the iCaptcha service to embed a repo/target identifier in the
-/// signed challenge (a protocol change, tracked as future work).
-pub async fn admit_mirror(
-    db: &crate::db::Db,
-    token: Option<&str>,
-    owner_did: &str,
-) -> MirrorAdmission {
-    let v = match VERIFIER.get() {
-        Some(v) => v,
-        None => return MirrorAdmission::Admit, // not initialized -> inert
-    };
-    // Off, or inert because no key could be loaded: admit unconditionally.
-    if v.mode == Mode::Off || v.key.is_none() {
-        return MirrorAdmission::Admit;
-    }
-    let shadow = v.mode == Mode::Shadow;
-
-    // Quarantine in enforce; in shadow just log and admit (observational, no IO).
-    let quarantine = |reason: String| -> MirrorAdmission {
-        if shadow {
-            tracing::warn!(owner = %owner_did, reason, "iCaptcha (shadow) would quarantine mirror");
-            MirrorAdmission::Admit
-        } else {
-            MirrorAdmission::Quarantine(reason)
-        }
-    };
-
-    let token = match token {
-        Some(t) => t,
-        None => return quarantine("origin served no iCaptcha proof".to_string()),
-    };
-
-    match verify_token(v, token, owner_did, now_secs(), false) {
-        Ok(claims) => {
-            if shadow {
-                // Observational: a valid proof would admit. Do not consume, so a
-                // later switch to enforce still sees the jti as fresh.
-                return MirrorAdmission::Admit;
-            }
-            // Retain the replay record on a fixed forward window, NOT the proof's
-            // own (already-past) exp — otherwise the next sweep frees the jti and
-            // the same token could admit another mirror here.
-            let retain_until = now_secs().saturating_add(MIRROR_REPLAY_RETENTION_SECS);
-            match db.consume_proof_jti(&claims.jti, retain_until).await {
-                Ok(true) => MirrorAdmission::Admit,
-                Ok(false) => MirrorAdmission::Quarantine(
-                    "iCaptcha proof already used to admit another mirror".to_string(),
-                ),
-                Err(e) => {
-                    tracing::warn!(owner = %owner_did, err = %e, "iCaptcha mirror ledger error; quarantining");
-                    MirrorAdmission::Quarantine("iCaptcha proof ledger unavailable".to_string())
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        Err(reason) => quarantine(reason),
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    // Real values captured from https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com (a live proof).
-    const PUBKEY_X: &str = "xjyPNqIbvc9U-kwXW6u9mDqRJ7E2UUMOaJdUWhpEXq8";
-    const PROOF: &str = "eyJzdWIiOiJkaWQ6a2V5Onp0ZXN0IiwibGV2ZWwiOjMsImlzcyI6ImljYXB0Y2hhIiwiaWF0IjoxNzgyNTcyODUxLCJleHAiOjE3ODI1NzMxNTEsImp0aSI6IjRiNTIyOGE1YmVkNzEyMmRlZTlmNDdmZiJ9.5UXVPZ8Eo91VnlcvgDXtW-Fx7J2jr7h535SAstQEpigxBr7FF7V6R0XB4PBDgdoBPnhdH_kVEfRPfdHPSdB0CA";
-    const SUB: &str = "did:key:ztest";
-    const IAT: i64 = 1782572851; // within the proof's validity window
-
-    fn verifier(level: u32) -> Verifier {
-        Verifier {
-            mode: Mode::Enforce,
-            url: "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(),
-            required_level: level,
-            key: decode_key(PUBKEY_X),
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn headers_with(proof: &str) -> HeaderMap {
-        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
-        h.insert(PROOF_HEADER, proof.parse().unwrap());
-        h
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn accepts_a_real_proof() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        assert!(verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, IAT).is_ok());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_expired_proof() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        let err = verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, 9_999_999_999).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.contains("expired"), "{err}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_wrong_did() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        let err = verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), "did:key:zsomeoneelse", IAT).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.contains("subject"), "{err}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_insufficient_level() {
-        let v = verifier(5); // proof is level 3
-        let err = verify(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, IAT).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.contains("below required"), "{err}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_tampered_signature() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        // Flip one base64url char in the signature so it is guaranteed different.
-        let (payload, sig) = PROOF.split_once('.').unwrap();
-        let mut chars: Vec<char> = sig.chars().collect();
-        chars[0] = if chars[0] == 'A' { 'B' } else { 'A' };
-        let tampered = format!("{}.{}", payload, chars.into_iter().collect::<String>());
-        assert!(verify(&v, &headers_with(&tampered), SUB, IAT).is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_missing_header() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        let err = verify(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(err.contains("missing"), "{err}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn parse_mode_accepts_documented_values_and_rejects_junk() {
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode(""), Some(Mode::Off));
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("off"), Some(Mode::Off));
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("  Shadow "), Some(Mode::Shadow));
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("ENFORCE"), Some(Mode::Enforce));
-        // Typos must NOT silently disable the gate.
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("enforced"), None);
-        assert_eq!(parse_mode("on"), None);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn off_mode_allows_everything() {
-        let mut v = verifier(3);
-        v.mode = Mode::Off;
-        assert!(matches!(
-            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
-            Decision::Allow
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn enforce_without_key_stays_inert() {
-        // iCaptcha unreachable at startup -> no key -> must not reject.
-        let v = Verifier {
-            mode: Mode::Enforce,
-            url: "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(),
-            required_level: 3,
-            key: None,
-        };
-        assert!(matches!(
-            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
-            Decision::Allow
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn enforce_with_key_rejects_missing_proof() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        assert!(matches!(
-            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
-            Decision::Reject(_)
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn shadow_allows_despite_bad_proof() {
-        let mut v = verifier(3);
-        v.mode = Mode::Shadow;
-        assert!(matches!(
-            decide(&v, &HeaderMap::new(), SUB, IAT),
-            Decision::Allow
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn enforce_valid_proof_requires_consuming_its_jti() {
-        // A verified proof under enforce must yield Consume carrying the jti, so
-        // the caller can spend it once and reject replays.
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        match decide(&v, &headers_with(PROOF), SUB, IAT) {
-            Decision::Consume(p) => {
-                assert_eq!(p.jti, "4b5228a5bed7122dee9f47ff");
-                assert_eq!(p.exp, 1782573151);
-                assert_eq!(p.token, PROOF, "the raw token is retained for persistence");
-                assert_eq!(p.sub, SUB);
-            }
-            other => panic!("expected Consume, got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn propagation_accepts_an_expired_proof() {
-        // The mirror-admission path verifies sig/level/DID but NOT expiry, since a
-        // proof has usually expired by the time a repo propagates. The same proof
-        // that the direct path rejects as expired must verify here.
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        let now = 9_999_999_999; // far past the proof's exp
-        assert!(
-            verify_token(&v, PROOF, SUB, now, true).is_err(),
-            "direct path (check_exp=true) rejects the expired proof"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            verify_token(&v, PROOF, SUB, now, false).is_ok(),
-            "propagation path (check_exp=false) accepts it"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn propagation_still_enforces_signature_level_and_did() {
-        let v = verifier(3);
-        // wrong owner DID
-        assert!(verify_token(&v, PROOF, "did:key:zother", IAT, false).is_err());
-        // insufficient level
-        let v5 = verifier(5);
-        assert!(verify_token(&v5, PROOF, SUB, IAT, false).is_err());
-        // tampered signature
-        let (payload, sig) = PROOF.split_once('.').unwrap();
-        let mut chars: Vec<char> = sig.chars().collect();
-        chars[0] = if chars[0] == 'A' { 'B' } else { 'A' };
-        let tampered = format!("{}.{}", payload, chars.into_iter().collect::<String>());
-        assert!(verify_token(&v, &tampered, SUB, IAT, false).is_err());
-    }
-}
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 //! If `ipfs_api` is empty the functions are no-ops, so the node works fine
 //! without a local IPFS daemon.

+use std::collections::HashSet;
+
 use anyhow::Result;
 use gitlawb_core::cid::Cid;

@@ -70,40 +72,31 @@ pub async fn pin_git_object(ipfs_api: &str, sha256_hex: &str, data: &[u8]) -> Re
    Ok(cid)
 }

-/// Fetch raw bytes for a CID from the local Kubo node (`/api/v0/cat`).
-pub async fn cat(ipfs_api: &str, cid: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    if ipfs_api.is_empty() {
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("IPFS not configured"));
-    }
-    let url = format!("{}/api/v0/cat?arg={}", ipfs_api.trim_end_matches('/'), cid);
-    let resp = reqwest::Client::new().post(&url).send().await?;
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("ipfs cat {cid}: {}", resp.status()));
-    }
-    Ok(resp.bytes().await?.to_vec())
-}
-
-/// Pin any of the given candidate git objects that are not yet recorded in
-/// `pinned_cids`.
-///
-/// `object_list` is the already-withheld-filtered OID set to pin: the caller
-/// applies `visibility_pack::replicable_objects` on the delta path or the
-/// `..._fail_closed` filter on the full-scan path before calling, so this
-/// function never sees a withheld blob. `repo_path` is still needed to read each
-/// object's bytes. The twin in `pinata.rs` mirrors this shape — change both in
-/// lockstep.
+/// List all git objects in the given bare repo and pin any that are not yet
+/// recorded in `pinned_cids`.
 ///
 /// Returns a list of `(sha256_hex, cid)` pairs for objects pinned this call.
 pub async fn pin_new_objects(
    ipfs_api: &str,
    repo_path: &std::path::Path,
-    object_list: Vec<String>,
    db: &crate::db::Db,
+    withheld: &HashSet<String>,
 ) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
    if ipfs_api.is_empty() {
        return vec![];
    }

+    // Enumerate all objects in the repo
+    let object_list = match list_all_objects(repo_path) {
+        Ok(v) => v,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!(repo = %repo_path.display(), err = %e, "failed to list git objects for IPFS pinning");
+            return vec![];
+        }
+    };
+
+    let object_list = crate::git::visibility_pack::replicable_objects(object_list, withheld);
+
    let mut pinned = Vec::new();

    for sha in object_list {
@@ -144,3 +137,31 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(

    pinned
 }
+
+/// Run `git cat-file --batch-all-objects --batch-check='%(objectname)'`
+/// to get all object SHA-256 hashes in the repository.
+fn list_all_objects(repo_path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+    let output = std::process::Command::new("git")
+        .args([
+            "cat-file",
+            "--batch-all-objects",
+            "--batch-check=%(objectname)",
+        ])
+        .current_dir(repo_path)
+        .output()
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to run git cat-file: {e}"))?;
+
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}"));
+    }
+
+    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
+    let hashes = stdout
+        .lines()
+        .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
+        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
+        .collect();
+
+    Ok(hashes)
+}
@@ -5,11 +5,9 @@ mod bootstrap;
 mod cert;
 mod config;
 mod db;
-mod encrypted_pin;
 mod error;
 mod git;
 mod graphql;
-mod icaptcha;
 mod ipfs_pin;
 mod metrics;
 mod operator;
@@ -19,8 +17,6 @@ mod rate_limit;
 mod server;
 mod state;
 mod sync;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod test_support;
 mod visibility;
 mod webhooks;

@@ -101,15 +97,6 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
        }
    }

-    // Prune peer rows with non-public hosts (loopback/private/internal) that
-    // were injected via the unauthenticated announce route — they poison the
-    // sync-notify fan-out (SSRF + crowding out real peers).
-    match db.prune_non_public_peers().await {
-        Ok(0) => {}
-        Ok(n) => info!(removed = n, "pruned non-public (poisoned) peer rows"),
-        Err(e) => warn!(err = %e, "prune_non_public_peers failed (non-fatal)"),
-    }
-
    // Ensure repos directory exists
    std::fs::create_dir_all(&config.repos_dir).context("failed to create repos directory")?;

@@ -145,8 +132,11 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
        None
    };

-    // Shared no-redirect HTTP client. See build_http_client for the SSRF rationale.
-    let http_client = Arc::new(build_http_client()?);
+    let http_client = Arc::new(
+        reqwest::Client::builder()
+            .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
+            .build()?,
+    );

    let (ref_update_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel::<state::RefUpdateBroadcast>(256);
    let (task_event_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel::<state::TaskEventBroadcast>(256);
@@ -182,39 +172,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
    let repo_store =
        git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(config.repos_dir.clone(), tigris, db.pool().clone());

-    // Per-DID limiter for the creation endpoints. Keyed on the authenticated
-    // DID (attacker-varied), so bound its key set to cap memory.
-    let rate_limiter =
-        rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(10, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600), 200_000);
-
-    // Push-path flood brake: max git-receive-pack requests per client IP per
-    // hour (counts both the info/refs advertisement and the push POST). Sized
-    // for heavy agent automation while still stopping flood traffic (the June
-    // 2026 attack pushed several times per second per IP). GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT
-    // overrides; 0 disables. Bounded key set — the key is a client-influenced IP.
-    let push_limit = std::env::var("GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT")
-        .ok()
-        .and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
-        .unwrap_or(600);
-    let push_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
-        push_limit,
-        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
-        200_000,
-    );
-    if push_limit == 0 {
-        tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT=0 — per-IP push rate limiting disabled");
-    }
-
-    // Which forwarded header the edge is trusted to set. Default None (trust
-    // nothing, key on the socket peer). Fly nodes set GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY=fly;
-    // a node behind Caddy/NGINX sets it to x-forwarded-for.
-    let push_limiter_trust = rate_limit::TrustedProxy::from_env_value(
-        &std::env::var("GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY").unwrap_or_default(),
-    );
-    tracing::info!(trust = ?push_limiter_trust, push_limit, "push rate limiter configured");
-
-    // Initialize the iCaptcha proof gate (inert unless ICAPTCHA_MODE is set).
-    icaptcha::init().await;
+    let rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new(10, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600));

    let state = AppState {
        config: Arc::new(config.clone()),
@@ -229,8 +187,6 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
        machine_id,
        repo_store,
        rate_limiter,
-        push_rate_limiter,
-        push_limiter_trust,
        shutdown_tx: shutdown_tx.clone(),
    };

@@ -288,25 +244,15 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
        });
    }

-    // Periodic cleanup of expired rate limit entries + consumed-proof ledger
+    // Periodic cleanup of expired rate limit entries
    {
        let rl = state.rate_limiter.clone();
-        let push_rl = state.push_rate_limiter.clone();
-        let db = state.db.clone();
        let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
        tokio::spawn(async move {
            loop {
                tokio::select! {
                    _ = tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(300)) => {
                        rl.cleanup().await;
-                        push_rl.cleanup().await;
-                        let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
-                            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
-                            .map(|d| d.as_secs() as i64)
-                            .unwrap_or(0);
-                        if let Err(e) = db.sweep_expired_proofs(now).await {
-                            tracing::warn!(err = %e, "failed to sweep expired iCaptcha proofs");
-                        }
                    }
                    _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
                        if *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
@@ -424,25 +370,19 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
    let grace = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.shutdown_grace_secs);
    info!(grace_secs = config.shutdown_grace_secs, "axum server ready");

-    // `into_make_service_with_connect_info` exposes the socket peer address as
-    // `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` so the push limiter can key on the real client
-    // when no trusted proxy header applies (see `rate_limit::client_key`).
-    let serve_result = axum::serve(
-        listener,
-        router.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>(),
-    )
-    .with_graceful_shutdown(async move {
-        let mut rx = shutdown_signal_for_axum;
-        // Wait until the watcher flips to true, then return so axum
-        // can begin draining.
-        while !*rx.borrow_and_update() {
-            if rx.changed().await.is_err() {
-                // Sender dropped — treat as shutdown.
-                break;
+    let serve_result = axum::serve(listener, router)
+        .with_graceful_shutdown(async move {
+            let mut rx = shutdown_signal_for_axum;
+            // Wait until the watcher flips to true, then return so axum
+            // can begin draining.
+            while !*rx.borrow_and_update() {
+                if rx.changed().await.is_err() {
+                    // Sender dropped — treat as shutdown.
+                    break;
+                }
            }
-        }
-    })
-    .await;
+        })
+        .await;

    // Server has stopped accepting new connections and drained in-flight
    // requests. Tear the rest of the system down.
@@ -546,12 +486,7 @@ async fn gossip_task(
        }
    }

-    // Reuse the shared no-redirect client for every gossip outbound call (the
-    // bootstrap announce POST and the periodic peer /health ping). Peer URLs are
-    // attacker-influenceable, so a 3xx to a private address must not be followed.
-    // Do NOT fall back to reqwest::Client::new(): its default follows redirects
-    // and would reintroduce the SSRF closed here (#93).
-    let client = state.http_client.clone();
+    let client = reqwest::Client::new();
    let my_did = state.node_did.to_string();
    let my_url = state.config.public_url.clone().unwrap_or_default();

@@ -626,7 +561,13 @@ async fn gossip_task(
                    Err(_) => continue,
                };
                for peer in peers {
-                    let ok = ping_peer_health(&client, &peer.http_url).await;
+                    let url = format!("{}/health", peer.http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
+                    let ok = client
+                        .get(&url)
+                        .send()
+                        .await
+                        .map(|r| r.status().is_success())
+                        .unwrap_or(false);
                    let _ = state.db.mark_peer_ping(&peer.did, ok).await;
                }
            }
@@ -640,38 +581,6 @@ async fn gossip_task(
    }
 }

-/// Build the shared node HTTP client used for every outbound fan-out (sync
-/// trigger, profile/repo fetches, gossip announce + peer pings).
-///
-/// No redirects: peer URLs are attacker-influenceable, so a `3xx` to a private
-/// address must not be followed (SSRF guard, #78/#93). Do NOT replace with
-/// `reqwest::Client::new()` — its default follows redirects. Kept as a named
-/// builder so tests bind the redirect guarantee to the real client the node
-/// runs, not a hand-rolled equivalent.
-fn build_http_client() -> reqwest::Result<reqwest::Client> {
-    reqwest::Client::builder()
-        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
-        .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
-        .build()
-}
-
-/// Ping a peer's `/health` endpoint and report whether it answered 2xx.
-///
-/// Takes the client by reference so callers supply the shared, no-redirect
-/// `state.http_client`. Peer URLs are attacker-influenceable, so a `3xx` to a
-/// private address must not be followed. Do NOT call this with a bare
-/// `reqwest::Client::new()`: its default follows redirects and would
-/// reintroduce the SSRF this guards against (#93).
-async fn ping_peer_health(client: &reqwest::Client, http_url: &str) -> bool {
-    let url = format!("{}/health", http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-    client
-        .get(&url)
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .map(|r| r.status().is_success())
-        .unwrap_or(false)
-}
-
 fn load_or_create_keypair(config: &Config) -> Result<Keypair> {
    let key_path = config.resolved_key_path();

@@ -704,64 +613,3 @@ fn load_or_create_keypair(config: &Config) -> Result<Keypair> {
        Ok(kp)
    }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod gossip_ssrf_tests {
-    use super::ping_peer_health;
-
-    // Build the client exactly as production does (super::build_http_client) so
-    // these tests bind the redirect guarantee to the real shared client the
-    // node runs. A regression that makes build_http_client follow redirects
-    // fails ping_peer_health_does_not_follow_redirect.
-    fn production_http_client() -> reqwest::Client {
-        super::build_http_client().expect("failed to build production http client")
-    }
-
-    // A peer answering `/health` with a 302 toward an internal address must not
-    // be followed: the redirect target must never be requested (#93).
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn ping_peer_health_does_not_follow_redirect() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let internal = server
-            .mock("GET", "/internal-metadata")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .expect(0)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-        let _health = server
-            .mock("GET", "/health")
-            .with_status(302)
-            .with_header("location", &format!("{}/internal-metadata", server.url()))
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), &server.url()).await;
-
-        assert!(!ok, "a 302 must not count as a healthy peer");
-        // expect(0) is enforced only at assert time; this fails if the redirect
-        // was followed to the internal target.
-        internal.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn ping_peer_health_reports_success_on_200() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let _health = server
-            .mock("GET", "/health")
-            .with_status(200)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), &server.url()).await;
-
-        assert!(ok, "a 200 /health must count as a healthy peer");
-    }
-
-    // A transport error (nothing listening) must map to unhealthy, never a
-    // spurious healthy — the .unwrap_or(false) arm.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn ping_peer_health_reports_unhealthy_on_connection_error() {
-        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), "http://127.0.0.1:1").await;
-        assert!(!ok, "a connection error must count as an unhealthy peer");
-    }
-}
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 //! no-op, so nodes without Pinata backing work fine.

 use anyhow::Result;
+use std::collections::HashSet;

 /// Pin a single git object's raw bytes on Pinata (v3 API).
 ///
@@ -66,28 +67,35 @@ pub async fn pin_object(
    Ok(cid)
 }

-/// Pin any of the given candidate git objects that haven't yet been sent to
-/// Pinata.
+/// Pin all git objects in a repo that haven't yet been sent to Pinata.
 ///
-/// `object_list` is the already-withheld-filtered OID set to pin: the caller
-/// applies `visibility_pack::replicable_objects` on the delta path or the
-/// `..._fail_closed` filter on the full-scan path before calling. `repo_path` is
-/// still needed to read each object's bytes. The twin in `ipfs_pin.rs` mirrors
-/// this shape — change both in lockstep. Objects already recorded with a
-/// `pinata_cid` are skipped. Returns `(sha_hex, cid)` pairs for each newly
-/// pinned object.
+/// Objects already recorded with a `pinata_cid` in the DB are skipped.
+/// Returns `(sha_hex, cid)` pairs for each newly pinned object.
 pub async fn pin_new_objects(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    upload_url: &str,
    jwt: &str,
    repo_path: &std::path::Path,
-    object_list: Vec<String>,
    db: &crate::db::Db,
+    withheld: &HashSet<String>,
 ) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
    if jwt.is_empty() {
        return vec![];
    }

+    let object_list = match list_all_objects(repo_path) {
+        Ok(v) => v,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                repo = %repo_path.display(),
+                err = %e,
+                "failed to list git objects for Pinata upload"
+            );
+            return vec![];
+        }
+    };
+    let object_list = crate::git::visibility_pack::replicable_objects(object_list, withheld);
+
    let mut pinned = Vec::new();

    for sha in object_list {
@@ -126,6 +134,29 @@ pub async fn pin_new_objects(
    pinned
 }

+fn list_all_objects(repo_path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+    let out = std::process::Command::new("git")
+        .args([
+            "cat-file",
+            "--batch-all-objects",
+            "--batch-check=%(objectname)",
+        ])
+        .current_dir(repo_path)
+        .output()
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to run git cat-file: {e}"))?;
+
+    if !out.status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr);
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}"));
+    }
+
+    Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout)
+        .lines()
+        .map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
+        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
+        .collect())
+}
+
 // ── Tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 #[cfg(test)]
@@ -1,21 +1,15 @@
 use std::collections::HashMap;
-use std::net::SocketAddr;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::{Duration, Instant};

-use axum::extract::{ConnectInfo, Request};
-use axum::http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode};
+use axum::extract::Request;
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
 use axum::middleware::Next;
 use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
 use tokio::sync::Mutex;

 use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;

-/// Default ceiling on the number of distinct keys a limiter tracks. Bounds the
-/// limiter's own memory so a caller that can vary the key (many DIDs, or a
-/// spoofable IP header) cannot grow the map without limit.
-const DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS: usize = 100_000;
-
 #[derive(Clone)]
 struct Window {
    timestamps: Vec<Instant>,
@@ -26,98 +20,30 @@ pub struct RateLimiter {
    state: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Window>>>,
    max_requests: usize,
    window: Duration,
-    /// Hard cap on tracked keys. When full, expired keys are evicted (at most
-    /// once per [`sweep_interval`](Self::sweep_interval), see below); if still
-    /// full, a request under a *new* key is rejected rather than inserted — so
-    /// the map can never exceed this bound and a rejected request never
-    /// allocates a new entry.
-    max_keys: usize,
-    /// Timestamp of the last inline capacity sweep. The eviction scan is
-    /// O(max_keys), so under a distinct-key flood (when the map sits at the
-    /// cap) running it on every miss would serialize all traffic behind a full
-    /// scan. Gating it to at most once per interval amortizes that cost; the
-    /// background [`cleanup`](Self::cleanup) loop still reclaims on its own.
-    last_sweep: Arc<Mutex<Instant>>,
 }

 impl RateLimiter {
-    // Retained for tests and callers that don't need a tight key bound;
-    // production limiters use `new_bounded`.
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
    pub fn new(max_requests: usize, window: Duration) -> Self {
-        Self::new_bounded(max_requests, window, DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS)
-    }
-
-    /// Like [`new`] but with an explicit cap on the number of distinct keys.
-    /// Production limiters keyed on client-influenced values (per-DID, per-IP)
-    /// set this so the limiter's own state cannot be turned into a
-    /// memory-exhaustion vector.
-    pub fn new_bounded(max_requests: usize, window: Duration, max_keys: usize) -> Self {
        Self {
            state: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
            max_requests,
            window,
-            max_keys: max_keys.max(1),
-            last_sweep: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Instant::now())),
        }
    }

-    /// How often the inline capacity sweep may run: at most once per second, or
-    /// once per window when the window is shorter. Bounds post-flood staleness
-    /// (a full map self-heals within one interval) without paying the O(max_keys)
-    /// scan on every capacity miss.
-    fn sweep_interval(&self) -> Duration {
-        self.window.min(Duration::from_secs(1))
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) async fn check(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
-        // max_requests == 0 means the limiter is disabled, not "block all".
-        if self.max_requests == 0 {
-            return true;
-        }
+    async fn check(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
        let now = Instant::now();
        let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
-
-        // Fast path: an already-tracked key never allocates and never grows the
-        // map, so it is unaffected by the key cap.
-        if let Some(window) = state.get_mut(key) {
-            window
-                .timestamps
-                .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
-            if window.timestamps.len() >= self.max_requests {
-                return false;
-            }
-            window.timestamps.push(now);
-            return true;
+        let window = state.entry(key.to_string()).or_insert_with(|| Window {
+            timestamps: Vec::new(),
+        });
+        window
+            .timestamps
+            .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
+        if window.timestamps.len() >= self.max_requests {
+            return false;
        }
-
-        // New key. Enforce the cap BEFORE inserting so a flood of distinct keys
-        // cannot grow the map, and a rejected request never allocates an entry.
-        if state.len() >= self.max_keys {
-            // Reclaim expired keys, but at most once per sweep interval — the
-            // scan is O(max_keys) and the map sits at the cap precisely during a
-            // distinct-key flood, so sweeping per miss would serialize traffic
-            // behind a full scan. Between sweeps a new key is simply rejected.
-            let mut last_sweep = self.last_sweep.lock().await;
-            if now.duration_since(*last_sweep) >= self.sweep_interval() {
-                state.retain(|_, w| {
-                    w.timestamps
-                        .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
-                    !w.timestamps.is_empty()
-                });
-                *last_sweep = now;
-            }
-            drop(last_sweep);
-            if state.len() >= self.max_keys {
-                return false;
-            }
-        }
-        state.insert(
-            key.to_string(),
-            Window {
-                timestamps: vec![now],
-            },
-        );
+        window.timestamps.push(now);
        true
    }

@@ -154,134 +80,6 @@ pub async fn rate_limit_by_did(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
    next.run(request).await
 }

-/// Which forwarded header (if any) the operator's edge is trusted to set. Only
-/// a proxy the operator controls may be believed; a raw client can put any
-/// value in `Fly-Client-IP` / `X-Forwarded-For`, so trusting them unconditionally
-/// lets a flooder rotate the header and never fill a bucket. Configured via
-/// `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub enum TrustedProxy {
-    /// No trusted proxy: ignore forwarded headers, key on the socket peer IP.
-    /// Safe default for direct/self-hosted nodes.
-    None,
-    /// Behind Fly's edge, which sets (and overwrites any client-supplied)
-    /// `Fly-Client-IP`.
-    Fly,
-    /// Behind a single reverse proxy (e.g. Caddy on the AWS image) that appends
-    /// the real client as the rightmost `X-Forwarded-For` hop.
-    XForwardedFor,
-}
-
-impl TrustedProxy {
-    /// Parse `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`. Unknown/empty → `None` (trust nothing).
-    pub fn from_env_value(s: &str) -> Self {
-        match s.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
-            "fly" | "fly-client-ip" => TrustedProxy::Fly,
-            "xff" | "x-forwarded-for" | "caddy" => TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor,
-            _ => TrustedProxy::None,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-fn trimmed_nonempty(v: &str) -> Option<String> {
-    let t = v.trim();
-    (!t.is_empty()).then(|| t.to_string())
-}
-
-/// Resolve the rate-limit key for a request. In a trusted-proxy mode the
-/// operator's edge header is preferred; when that header is missing or empty we
-/// fall back to the socket peer address rather than skipping the limiter (a
-/// malformed header must never disable the brake). With no trusted proxy the
-/// socket peer is always used and forwarded headers are ignored entirely.
-/// Returns `None` only when neither a trusted header nor a peer address is
-/// available (e.g. a synthetic test request with no `ConnectInfo`).
-pub fn client_key(
-    headers: &HeaderMap,
-    peer: Option<SocketAddr>,
-    trust: TrustedProxy,
-) -> Option<String> {
-    let from_header = match trust {
-        TrustedProxy::None => None,
-        TrustedProxy::Fly => headers
-            .get("fly-client-ip")
-            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-            .and_then(trimmed_nonempty),
-        // Rightmost hop = the value appended by the immediately-upstream trusted
-        // proxy. The leftmost hop is client-controlled and must not be trusted.
-        TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor => headers
-            .get("x-forwarded-for")
-            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-            .and_then(|v| v.rsplit(',').next())
-            .and_then(trimmed_nonempty),
-    };
-    from_header.or_else(|| peer.map(|p| p.ip().to_string()))
-}
-
-/// Per-client-IP limiter for the git push path, carrying the trusted-proxy
-/// policy. A newtype so it can live in request extensions (keyed by type)
-/// alongside the per-DID [`RateLimiter`]. Per-DID limits are useless against a
-/// push flood from a DID farm (one throwaway DID per repo), so the push path
-/// throttles on the resolved client IP instead.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct IpRateLimiter {
-    pub limiter: RateLimiter,
-    pub trust: TrustedProxy,
-}
-
-/// Infallible extractor for the socket peer address from `ConnectInfo`. Yields
-/// `None` when the server was started without connect-info (e.g. `oneshot` in
-/// tests), so a handler never 500s on its absence — the limiter simply falls
-/// back per [`client_key`].
-pub struct PeerAddr(pub Option<SocketAddr>);
-
-impl<S: Send + Sync> axum::extract::FromRequestParts<S> for PeerAddr {
-    type Rejection = std::convert::Infallible;
-
-    async fn from_request_parts(
-        parts: &mut axum::http::request::Parts,
-        _state: &S,
-    ) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
-        Ok(PeerAddr(
-            parts
-                .extensions
-                .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
-                .map(|c| c.0),
-        ))
-    }
-}
-
-/// The shared 429 response for the push flood brake.
-pub fn too_many_requests() -> Response {
-    (
-        StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
-        [("retry-after", "60")],
-        "push rate limit exceeded — try again later",
-    )
-        .into_response()
-}
-
-/// Throttle the git push path by resolved client IP. The socket peer address is
-/// read from `ConnectInfo` (see `into_make_service_with_connect_info` in
-/// `main`). Only skips the limiter when no key can be resolved at all.
-pub async fn rate_limit_by_ip(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
-    let limiter = request.extensions().get::<IpRateLimiter>().cloned();
-    let peer = request
-        .extensions()
-        .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
-        .map(|c| c.0);
-
-    if let Some(limiter) = limiter {
-        if let Some(key) = client_key(request.headers(), peer, limiter.trust) {
-            if !limiter.limiter.check(&key).await {
-                tracing::warn!(key = %key, path = %request.uri().path(), "push rate limit exceeded");
-                return too_many_requests();
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    next.run(request).await
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
@@ -328,217 +126,4 @@ mod tests {
        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
        assert!(state.is_empty());
    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn zero_limit_disables() {
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new(0, Duration::from_secs(60));
-        for _ in 0..1000 {
-            assert!(limiter.check("k").await);
-        }
-    }
-
-    // ── key-cap / memory-bound (P2) ──────────────────────────────────────
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn caps_tracked_keys_and_rejects_new_ones_when_full() {
-        // Cap of 2 distinct keys; generous request budget so rejection is due to
-        // the key cap, not the per-key limit.
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(60), 2);
-        assert!(limiter.check("a").await);
-        assert!(limiter.check("b").await);
-        // Third distinct key would grow the map past the cap → rejected.
-        assert!(!limiter.check("c").await);
-        // The map never exceeded the cap, and the rejected key was NOT inserted.
-        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
-        assert_eq!(state.len(), 2);
-        assert!(!state.contains_key("c"));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn known_key_unaffected_by_cap() {
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(60), 1);
-        assert!(limiter.check("a").await); // fills the single slot
-        assert!(limiter.check("a").await); // same key still served
-        assert!(!limiter.check("b").await); // new key rejected — cap full
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn expired_keys_evicted_to_admit_new_when_full() {
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_millis(40), 1);
-        assert!(limiter.check("old").await);
-        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(55)).await;
-        // "old" is now expired; a new key triggers inline eviction and is admitted.
-        assert!(limiter.check("new").await);
-        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
-        assert!(state.contains_key("new"));
-        assert!(!state.contains_key("old"));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn capacity_sweep_is_amortized_within_interval() {
-        // The O(max_keys) eviction scan must not run on every capacity miss.
-        // With a 1s sweep interval, the resident (unexpired) key is never
-        // evicted by a burst of misses, so repeated new keys are all rejected
-        // without disturbing existing state.
-        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(1), 1);
-        assert!(limiter.check("resident").await);
-        for i in 0..100 {
-            assert!(
-                !limiter.check(&format!("flood-{i}")).await,
-                "new key must be rejected while the single slot is held"
-            );
-        }
-        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
-        assert_eq!(state.len(), 1, "no flood key was ever inserted");
-        assert!(state.contains_key("resident"));
-    }
-
-    // ── client_key / trusted-proxy resolution (P1 + P2) ─────────────────
-
-    fn headers(pairs: &[(&str, &str)]) -> HeaderMap {
-        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
-        for (k, v) in pairs {
-            h.insert(
-                axum::http::HeaderName::from_bytes(k.as_bytes()).unwrap(),
-                v.parse().unwrap(),
-            );
-        }
-        h
-    }
-
-    fn peer(s: &str) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
-        Some(s.parse().unwrap())
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn none_mode_ignores_headers_and_uses_peer() {
-        // Even a well-formed Fly header is ignored without a trusted proxy.
-        let h = headers(&[("fly-client-ip", "203.0.113.7")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::None).as_deref(),
-            Some("198.51.100.9")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn fly_mode_trusts_fly_header() {
-        let h = headers(&[
-            ("fly-client-ip", "203.0.113.7"),
-            ("x-forwarded-for", "1.2.3.4"),
-        ]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::Fly).as_deref(),
-            Some("203.0.113.7")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn fly_mode_empty_header_falls_back_to_peer_not_skip() {
-        // Empty Fly-Client-IP must NOT collapse traffic onto Some("") nor skip
-        // the limiter — it falls back to the real peer.
-        let h = headers(&[("fly-client-ip", "")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::Fly).as_deref(),
-            Some("198.51.100.9")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn xff_mode_uses_rightmost_hop_not_client_controlled_first() {
-        // Client prepends spoofed hops; only the rightmost (proxy-appended) is trusted.
-        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", "9.9.9.9, 8.8.8.8, 198.51.100.9")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
-            Some("198.51.100.9")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn xff_mode_empty_leading_hop_does_not_disable_brake() {
-        // "X-Forwarded-For: ,1.2.3.4" — rightmost hop is used; never None-skips.
-        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", ",1.2.3.4")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
-            Some("1.2.3.4")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn malformed_xff_falls_back_to_peer() {
-        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", " , ")]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
-            Some("198.51.100.9")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn trusted_proxy_parsing() {
-        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value("fly"), TrustedProxy::Fly);
-        assert_eq!(
-            TrustedProxy::from_env_value("X-Forwarded-For"),
-            TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            TrustedProxy::from_env_value("caddy"),
-            TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor
-        );
-        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value(""), TrustedProxy::None);
-        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value("garbage"), TrustedProxy::None);
-    }
-
-    // ── middleware 429 path ─────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-    /// A minimal router with the push limiter layered over an OK handler,
-    /// driven via `oneshot`. `ConnectInfo` is attached to each request directly
-    /// (as the production make-service does) so the middleware resolves a peer.
-    fn ip_limited_router(limiter: IpRateLimiter) -> axum::Router {
-        axum::Router::new()
-            .route(
-                "/o/r/git-receive-pack",
-                axum::routing::post(|| async { StatusCode::OK }),
-            )
-            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(rate_limit_by_ip))
-            .layer(axum::Extension(limiter))
-    }
-
-    async fn post_from(router: &axum::Router, peer: SocketAddr) -> StatusCode {
-        use tower::ServiceExt;
-        let mut req = axum::http::Request::builder()
-            .method(axum::http::Method::POST)
-            .uri("/o/r/git-receive-pack")
-            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
-            .unwrap();
-        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
-        router.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status()
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn middleware_returns_429_over_limit() {
-        let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
-            limiter: RateLimiter::new(2, Duration::from_secs(60)),
-            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
-        });
-        let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.7:5000".parse().unwrap();
-        // Two requests inside the budget, the third over it (shared Arc state).
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, peer).await, StatusCode::OK);
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, peer).await, StatusCode::OK);
-        assert_eq!(
-            post_from(&router, peer).await,
-            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn middleware_isolates_distinct_peers() {
-        let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
-            limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60)),
-            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
-        });
-        let a: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.1:1".parse().unwrap();
-        let b: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.2:1".parse().unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, a).await, StatusCode::OK);
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, b).await, StatusCode::OK); // independent bucket
-        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, a).await, StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
-    }
 }
@@ -20,19 +20,8 @@ use crate::auth;
 use crate::rate_limit;
 use crate::state::AppState;

-async fn graphql_handler(
-    State(state): State<AppState>,
-    auth: Option<axum::Extension<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>>,
-    req: GraphQLRequest,
-) -> GraphQLResponse {
-    // `optional_signature` attaches the verified DID when a signature is present.
-    // Thread it into request-scoped GraphQL data; mutations enforce its presence
-    // in-resolver (N2) while queries stay open.
-    let mut inner = req.into_inner();
-    if let Some(axum::Extension(did)) = auth {
-        inner = inner.data(did);
-    }
-    state.graphql_schema.execute(inner).await.into()
+async fn graphql_handler(State(state): State<AppState>, req: GraphQLRequest) -> GraphQLResponse {
+    state.graphql_schema.execute(req.into_inner()).await.into()
 }

 async fn graphql_playground() -> impl IntoResponse {
@@ -60,10 +49,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
    let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref().clone();
    let graphql_routes = Router::new()
        .route("/graphql", get(graphql_playground).post(graphql_handler))
-        // Attach the verified DID to /graphql when a signature is present. The
-        // layer covers only routes added before it, so /graphql/ws (added after,
-        // read-only subscriptions) stays open.
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature))
        .route_service("/graphql/ws", GraphQLSubscription::new(schema));

    // ── Task routes (write — require HTTP Signature) ───────────────────────
@@ -162,10 +147,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
                axum::routing::put(visibility::set_visibility)
                    .delete(visibility::remove_visibility)
                    .get(visibility::list_visibility),
-            )
-            .route(
-                "/api/v1/agents/{did}",
-                axum::routing::delete(agents::deregister_agent),
            ),
        state.clone(),
    );
@@ -175,14 +156,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
    // HTTP Signature is enforced on receive-pack (push) — the git-remote-gitlawb
    // helper signs requests with RFC 9421 signatures using the agent's keypair.
    let pack_limit = state.config.max_pack_bytes;
-    // Per-IP throttle wraps the auth layer (outermost = runs first): flood
-    // traffic is rejected before signature verification burns CPU. Per-DID
-    // limiting is deliberately NOT used here — a DID farm (one throwaway
-    // identity per repo, as in the June 2026 push flood) never trips it.
-    let push_limiter = rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
-        limiter: state.push_rate_limiter.clone(),
-        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
-    };
    let git_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
        Router::new()
            .route(
@@ -192,19 +165,12 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
            .layer(DefaultBodyLimit::disable())
            .layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(pack_limit)),
        state.clone(),
-    )
-    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
-    .layer(axum::Extension(push_limiter));
+    );

    // ── IPFS content-addressed retrieval and pin listing ──────────────────
-    // `/ipfs/{cid}` carries `optional_signature` so `get_by_cid` sees the caller
-    // identity and can apply per-repo visibility (#110); anonymous callers stay
-    // anonymous and still read genuinely public content. `/api/v1/ipfs/pins`
-    // stays unsigned — gating the pin index is tracked separately (#121).
    let ipfs_routes = Router::new()
        .route("/ipfs/{cid}", get(ipfs::get_by_cid))
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature))
-        .merge(Router::new().route("/api/v1/ipfs/pins", get(ipfs::list_pins)));
+        .route("/api/v1/ipfs/pins", get(ipfs::list_pins));

    // ── Arweave permanent anchors ──────────────────────────────────────────
    let arweave_routes = Router::new().route("/api/v1/arweave/anchors", get(arweave::list_anchors));
@@ -376,8 +342,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
        .route(
            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/replicas",
            get(replicas::list_replicas),
-        )
-        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature));
+        );

    // git-upload-pack (clone/fetch) — same raised body limit as receive-pack so
    // large pack responses from the server don't get truncated on the client side.
@@ -391,22 +356,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/withheld-paths",
            axum::routing::get(visibility::withheld_paths),
        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/icaptcha-proof",
-            axum::routing::get(repos::get_icaptcha_proof),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs",
-            axum::routing::get(crate::api::encrypted::list_encrypted_blobs),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blob/{oid}",
-            axum::routing::get(crate::api::encrypted::get_encrypted_blob),
-        )
-        .route(
-            "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs/replicate",
-            axum::routing::get(crate::api::encrypted::replicate_encrypted_blobs),
-        )
        .layer(DefaultBodyLimit::disable())
        .layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(pack_limit))
        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature));
@@ -470,31 +419,13 @@ async fn node_info(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
    }))
 }

-pub(crate) async fn stats(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
-    // Count only the repos an anonymous caller could list, so the aggregate does
-    // not leak the existence of private/mode-A repos (#104 count oracle). Mirror
-    // the listing seam (api/repos.rs): over-fetch the deduped set, batch-load the
-    // visibility rules, and keep rows that pass listable_at_root. The caller is
-    // always None — meta_routes carries no auth layer (see the route group in this
-    // file). Fail closed: any DB error collapses the whole count to 0 (an
-    // under-count never leaks existence), preserving the prior `.unwrap_or(0)`.
-    let repos = async {
-        // stats only needs the count, so use the no-stars deduped list (same
-        // DEDUP_CTE) and skip the repo_stars aggregation the listing path needs.
-        let rows = state.db.list_all_repos_deduped().await?;
-        let ids: Vec<String> = rows.iter().map(|r| r.id.clone()).collect();
-        let rules_by_repo = state.db.list_visibility_rules_for_repos(&ids).await?;
-        let count = rows
-            .iter()
-            .filter(|r| {
-                let rules = rules_by_repo.get(&r.id).map(Vec::as_slice).unwrap_or(&[]);
-                crate::visibility::listable_at_root(rules, r.is_public, &r.owner_did, None)
-            })
-            .count() as i64;
-        Ok::<i64, anyhow::Error>(count)
-    }
-    .await
-    .unwrap_or(0);
+async fn stats(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
+    let repos = state
+        .db
+        .list_all_repos()
+        .await
+        .map(|r| r.len() as i64)
+        .unwrap_or(0);
    let agents = state.db.count_agents().await.unwrap_or(0);
    let pushes = state.db.count_pushes().await.unwrap_or(0);
    Json(json!({
@@ -51,13 +51,6 @@ pub struct AppState {
    pub repo_store: RepoStore,
    /// Per-DID rate limiter for creation endpoints (repos, issues, PRs)
    pub rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
-    /// Per-client-IP rate limiter for git-receive-pack. Per-DID limits cannot
-    /// brake a push flood from a DID farm (one throwaway DID per repo), so the
-    /// push path throttles on the resolved client IP instead.
-    pub push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
-    /// Which forwarded header (if any) the edge is trusted to set, for
-    /// resolving the push limiter's client-IP key. See `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`.
-    pub push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy,
    /// Process-wide graceful-shutdown signal. Sending `true` causes every
    /// task that holds a `watch::Receiver` to exit at its next await point.
    /// Used by:
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
 //!   5. On success, register ourselves as a replica with the origin node so
 //!      its `replica_count` reflects reality (best-effort, idempotent).

-use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::path::Path;
 use std::sync::Arc;

@@ -32,91 +31,22 @@ enum MirrorMode {
    Promisor,
 }

-/// The on-disk promisor state of an existing mirror, read from
-/// `remote.origin.promisor`. Three-valued so a git error is not mistaken for a
-/// definitive "not a promisor": `git config --get` collapses "key absent" and
-/// "git failed" into the same non-zero exit otherwise, and treating an errored
-/// probe as `NotPromisor` would let a transient failure downgrade a still-withheld
-/// mirror (issue #48).
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
-enum PromisorProbe {
-    /// `remote.origin.promisor` is `"true"`.
-    Promisor,
-    /// The key is absent (git exit 1) or set to a non-`true` value.
-    NotPromisor,
-    /// The probe itself failed (git spawn error or other non-zero exit).
-    Unknown,
-}
-
-/// Decide the mirror mode from the origin's `withheld-paths` response plus, when
-/// the response is unknown, the existing mirror's on-disk promisor state.
+/// Decide the mirror mode from the origin's `withheld-paths` response.
 ///
 /// `Some(non-empty)` → the repo has a private subtree → `Promisor`.
 /// `Some(empty)`     → fully public → `Plain`.
-/// `None`            → the lookup 404'd or failed; the answer is *unknown*, which
-///                     is not the same as "public". For a fresh clone this stays
-///                     `Plain` (a mode-A repo also 404s the git read endpoint, so
-///                     the clone fails and nothing is mirrored — fail-closed at the
-///                     git layer — while a public repo on a peer that predates the
-///                     `withheld-paths` route still gets mirrored). For an existing
-///                     mirror it *biases toward preserving* the promisor state: a
-///                     genuine public transition returns `Some(empty)`, so on
-///                     `None` we cannot distinguish "still withheld, unreachable"
-///                     from "newly public, unreachable" and prefer the recoverable
-///                     choice over destroying the partial-clone config. An
-///                     indeterminate probe (`Unknown`) preserves for the same
-///                     reason (defense-in-depth, #48).
-fn resolve_mirror_mode(
-    withheld: Option<Vec<String>>,
-    exists: bool,
-    promisor: PromisorProbe,
-) -> MirrorMode {
+/// `None`            → the lookup 404'd or failed. Attempt a `Plain` mirror; a
+///                     mode-A repo also 404s the git read endpoint, so the clone
+///                     fails and nothing is mirrored (fail-closed at the git
+///                     layer), while a public repo on a peer that predates the
+///                     `withheld-paths` route still gets mirrored.
+fn classify_mirror(withheld: Option<Vec<String>>) -> MirrorMode {
    match withheld {
        Some(globs) if !globs.is_empty() => MirrorMode::Promisor,
-        Some(_) => MirrorMode::Plain,
-        None if exists && promisor != PromisorProbe::NotPromisor => MirrorMode::Promisor,
-        None => MirrorMode::Plain,
+        _ => MirrorMode::Plain,
    }
 }

-/// One encrypted blob as advertised by an origin's `encrypted-blobs/replicate`
-/// endpoint (Option B2). Ciphertext metadata only; recipient identities are
-/// withheld from peers, so a re-seal is detected by the CID changing.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, serde::Deserialize)]
-struct ReplicaBlob {
-    oid: String,
-    cid: String,
-}
-
-/// The shape of the `encrypted-blobs/replicate` JSON response.
-#[derive(Debug, serde::Deserialize)]
-struct ReplicateResponse {
-    #[serde(default)]
-    blobs: Vec<ReplicaBlob>,
-}
-
-/// Decide which of the origin's encrypted blobs this mirror must (re)replicate.
-///
-/// `have` maps each already-stored blob's oid to the CID the mirror pinned. A
-/// remote blob is returned when the mirror has no row for that oid, or when the
-/// stored CID differs from the advertised one. A re-seal regenerates the
-/// envelope (new content key, nonce, and per-recipient wraps), so the CID
-/// changes while the OID stays stable; comparing CIDs detects a re-seal without
-/// the mirror ever holding recipient identities.
-fn blobs_needing_replication(
-    remote: &[ReplicaBlob],
-    have: &HashMap<String, String>,
-) -> Vec<ReplicaBlob> {
-    remote
-        .iter()
-        .filter(|b| match have.get(&b.oid) {
-            None => true,
-            Some(stored_cid) => stored_cid != &b.cid,
-        })
-        .cloned()
-        .collect()
-}
-
 /// Start the background sync worker. Returns immediately; the worker runs
 /// as a detached tokio task that exits cleanly when `shutdown_rx` flips
 /// to `true`.
@@ -140,17 +70,10 @@ async fn run(
    let machine_id = std::env::var("FLY_MACHINE_ID").ok();
    // Bound each peer HTTP call (withheld-paths lookup + replica registration)
    // so a stalled peer cannot hang the worker.
-    // No redirects: peer URLs are attacker-influenceable, so a 3xx to a
-    // loopback/private address must not be followed (SSRF guard, matching the
-    // shared http_client and announce-time validation).
-    // Panic rather than fall back to reqwest::Client::new(): the default
-    // builder follows redirects, which would silently reintroduce the SSRF
-    // vector Policy::none() is here to close.
    let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30))
-        .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
        .build()
-        .expect("failed to build no-redirect sync HTTP client");
+        .unwrap_or_else(|_| reqwest::Client::new());
    info!("sync worker started (auto_sync=true)");
    let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30));
    loop {
@@ -168,17 +91,6 @@ async fn run(
    }
 }

-/// Find the origin node's base HTTP URL for a sync item, trimming any trailing
-/// slash so callers can append `/{path}` cleanly. Returns `None` when no peer
-/// row matches the item's origin DID. Kept pure (no DB) so the per-batch peer
-/// resolution can be unit-tested without a database.
-fn resolve_origin_url(peers: &[crate::db::PeerRecord], node_did: &str) -> Option<String> {
-    peers
-        .iter()
-        .find(|p| p.did == node_did)
-        .map(|p| p.http_url.trim_end_matches('/').to_string())
-}
-
 async fn process_batch(
    db: &Db,
    config: &Config,
@@ -194,27 +106,19 @@ async fn process_batch(
        }
    };

-    // Nothing queued — the common case on the 30s idle poll. Bail before the
-    // peer lookup so an empty batch costs zero extra DB round-trips.
-    if items.is_empty() {
-        return;
-    }
-
-    // Resolve the peer table once per batch — every item only needs a lookup.
-    let peers = match db.list_peers().await {
-        Ok(p) => p,
-        Err(e) => {
-            warn!(err = %e, "failed to list peers for sync");
-            for item in &items {
-                let _ = db.mark_sync_failed(&item.id).await;
-            }
-            return;
-        }
-    };
-
    for item in items {
-        let origin_url = match resolve_origin_url(&peers, &item.node_did) {
-            Some(url) => url,
+        // Resolve origin node HTTP URL from peer table
+        let peers = match db.list_peers().await {
+            Ok(p) => p,
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!(err = %e, "failed to list peers for sync");
+                let _ = db.mark_sync_failed(&item.id).await;
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+
+        let origin_url = match peers.iter().find(|p| p.did == item.node_did) {
+            Some(p) => p.http_url.trim_end_matches('/').to_string(),
            None => {
                warn!(node_did = %item.node_did, repo = %item.repo, "no peer URL found for sync origin — skipping");
                let _ = db.mark_sync_failed(&item.id).await;
@@ -243,30 +147,9 @@ async fn process_batch(
        let remote_url = format!("{}/{}", origin_url, item.repo);

        let withheld = fetch_withheld(client, &origin_url, owner_short, repo_name).await;
-        let exists = local_path.exists();
-        let lookup_unknown = withheld.is_none();
-        // Only probe the on-disk promisor state when the lookup is unknown and the
-        // repo already exists — the sole case where it changes the resolved mode.
-        let promisor = if lookup_unknown && exists {
-            let local_str = local_path.to_str().unwrap_or(".");
-            existing_promisor_state(local_str).await
-        } else {
-            PromisorProbe::NotPromisor
-        };
-        let mode = resolve_mirror_mode(withheld, exists, promisor);
-        // Surface the case where an unknown withheld-paths lookup kept (or, on an
-        // indeterminate probe, defensively applied) promisor mode instead of
-        // downgrading to a full clone. Derived from the resolved mode so it cannot
-        // drift from resolve_mirror_mode's preserve branch.
-        if lookup_unknown && mode == MirrorMode::Promisor {
-            warn!(
-                repo = %item.repo,
-                origin = %origin_url,
-                "withheld-paths lookup unavailable; using promisor mirror mode to avoid an unsafe full-clone downgrade"
-            );
-        }
+        let mode = classify_mirror(withheld);

-        let result = if exists {
+        let result = if local_path.exists() {
            fetch_repo(&local_path, &remote_url, mode).await
        } else {
            clone_repo(&remote_url, &local_path, mode).await
@@ -275,39 +158,6 @@ async fn process_batch(
        match result {
            Ok(()) => {
                info!(repo = %item.repo, origin = %origin_url, "synced repo from peer");
-                // iCaptcha propagation gate: on a first-time mirror, re-verify the
-                // proof the repo was created with (fetched from the origin) before
-                // admitting it. A node that enforces iCaptcha quarantines a mirror
-                // it cannot validate — kept on disk but hidden from serve/clone and
-                // listings until an operator releases it. Re-syncs of an already
-                // admitted repo keep their prior decision (upsert preserves it).
-                //
-                // "First-time" is keyed on DB-row absence, NOT on-disk presence: a
-                // prior attempt could have cloned to disk but crashed before the
-                // upsert, leaving no DB row. Disk-keying would skip admission on the
-                // retry and admit it unquarantined. On a DB lookup error, default to
-                // running the gate (fail toward quarantine, never silently admit).
-                let is_new_in_db = db
-                    .get_repo(owner_short, repo_name)
-                    .await
-                    .map(|r| r.is_none())
-                    .unwrap_or(true);
-                let quarantined = if is_new_in_db {
-                    let proof =
-                        fetch_icaptcha_proof(client, &origin_url, owner_short, repo_name).await;
-                    match crate::icaptcha::admit_mirror(db, proof.as_deref(), owner_short).await {
-                        crate::icaptcha::MirrorAdmission::Admit => false,
-                        crate::icaptcha::MirrorAdmission::Quarantine(reason) => {
-                            warn!(
-                                repo = %item.repo, origin = %origin_url, reason,
-                                "quarantining mirrored repo: failed iCaptcha propagation gate"
-                            );
-                            true
-                        }
-                    }
-                } else {
-                    false
-                };
                // Register in DB so git smart HTTP can serve the mirrored repo
                let _ = db
                    .upsert_mirror_repo(
@@ -315,23 +165,8 @@ async fn process_batch(
                        repo_name,
                        local_path.to_str().unwrap_or(""),
                        machine_id,
-                        quarantined,
                    )
                    .await;
-                // Option B2: carry the encrypted withheld-blob envelopes too, so an
-                // authorized reader can recover private content from this mirror if
-                // the origin dies. `item.repo` is the slug "{owner_short}/{name}",
-                // which is the id upsert_mirror_repo wrote (the local repo_id).
-                replicate_encrypted_blobs(
-                    client,
-                    &origin_url,
-                    owner_short,
-                    repo_name,
-                    db,
-                    &item.repo,
-                    &config.ipfs_api,
-                )
-                .await;
                let _ = db.mark_sync_done(&item.id).await;
                crate::metrics::record_sync_processed("done");

@@ -359,7 +194,7 @@ async fn process_batch(

 /// Query the origin's anonymous `withheld-paths` endpoint. Returns the withheld
 /// glob list on a 2xx, or `None` on any non-success / network / parse error
-/// (treated as "unknown" by `resolve_mirror_mode`).
+/// (treated as "unknown" by `classify_mirror`).
 async fn fetch_withheld(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    origin_url: &str,
@@ -381,25 +216,6 @@ async fn fetch_withheld(
    Some(globs)
 }

-/// Fetch the iCaptcha proof token the origin recorded for this repo, used by the
-/// mirror-admission gate. Returns `None` on any non-success / network / parse
-/// error, or when the origin has no proof for the repo (treated as "no proof" by
-/// `icaptcha::admit_mirror`, which quarantines in enforce mode).
-async fn fetch_icaptcha_proof(
-    client: &reqwest::Client,
-    origin_url: &str,
-    owner: &str,
-    repo: &str,
-) -> Option<String> {
-    let url = format!("{origin_url}/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/icaptcha-proof");
-    let resp = client.get(&url).send().await.ok()?;
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        return None;
-    }
-    let body: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await.ok()?;
-    body.get("proof")?.as_str().map(str::to_string)
-}
-
 /// Signed request path for replica registration on the origin node.
 fn replica_registration_path(owner: &str, repo: &str) -> String {
    format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/replicas")
@@ -461,81 +277,6 @@ async fn register_replica_with_origin(
    }
 }

-/// Replicate the origin's encrypted withheld blobs onto this mirror (Option B2).
-///
-/// After the git objects are mirrored, fetch the origin's replication listing,
-/// then for each blob the mirror does not already hold (or whose CID changed,
-/// i.e. the origin re-sealed) pull the ciphertext envelope over IPFS, pin it
-/// locally, and record the `encrypted_blobs` row keyed by this mirror's local
-/// `repo_id`. The mirror stores no recipient identities.
-///
-/// Best-effort and idempotent: any per-blob failure is logged and skipped, to be
-/// retried on the next sync. Confidentiality is never at risk; the mirror only
-/// ever handles ciphertext and never decrypts. Cleanly a no-op when IPFS is
-/// unconfigured, the origin reports no encrypted blobs, or the replicate endpoint
-/// is absent (older peer) or unreachable.
-async fn replicate_encrypted_blobs(
-    client: &reqwest::Client,
-    origin_url: &str,
-    owner: &str,
-    repo: &str,
-    db: &Db,
-    repo_id: &str,
-    ipfs_api: &str,
-) {
-    if ipfs_api.is_empty() {
-        return;
-    }
-
-    let url = format!("{origin_url}/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/encrypted-blobs/replicate");
-    let resp = match client.get(&url).send().await {
-        Ok(r) if r.status().is_success() => r,
-        _ => return,
-    };
-    let parsed: ReplicateResponse = match resp.json().await {
-        Ok(p) => p,
-        Err(e) => {
-            warn!(repo = %repo, err = %e, "failed to parse encrypted-blobs/replicate response");
-            return;
-        }
-    };
-    if parsed.blobs.is_empty() {
-        return;
-    }
-
-    let have: HashMap<String, String> = match db.list_all_encrypted_blobs(repo_id).await {
-        Ok(rows) => rows.into_iter().collect(),
-        Err(e) => {
-            warn!(repo = %repo, err = %e, "failed to list local encrypted blobs for replication");
-            return;
-        }
-    };
-
-    for blob in blobs_needing_replication(&parsed.blobs, &have) {
-        let envelope = match crate::ipfs_pin::cat(ipfs_api, &blob.cid).await {
-            Ok(bytes) => bytes,
-            Err(e) => {
-                warn!(oid = %blob.oid, cid = %blob.cid, err = %e, "failed to fetch encrypted envelope over IPFS; will retry next sync");
-                continue;
-            }
-        };
-        match crate::ipfs_pin::pin_git_object(ipfs_api, &blob.oid, &envelope).await {
-            Ok(cid) if !cid.is_empty() => {
-                if cid != blob.cid {
-                    warn!(oid = %blob.oid, expected = %blob.cid, got = %cid, "replicated envelope CID mismatch; skipping record");
-                    continue;
-                }
-                if let Err(e) = db.record_encrypted_blob(repo_id, &blob.oid, &cid, "").await {
-                    warn!(oid = %blob.oid, err = %e, "failed to record replicated encrypted blob");
-                }
-            }
-            _ => {
-                warn!(oid = %blob.oid, "failed to pin replicated encrypted envelope; will retry next sync");
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 /// Run a git subprocess, returning an error with stderr on non-zero exit.
 async fn git_run(args: &[&str]) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let out = tokio::process::Command::new("git")
@@ -573,38 +314,6 @@ async fn git_config_get(repo: &str, key: &str) -> Option<String> {
    (!value.is_empty()).then_some(value)
 }

-/// Probe an existing mirror's `remote.origin.promisor` config as a three-valued
-/// state. Unlike [`git_config_get`], this distinguishes a definitively-absent key
-/// from a probe failure so a transient git error cannot be read as "not a
-/// promisor" and trigger a downgrade (issue #48).
-///
-/// `git config --get` exits 0 when the key is set, 1 when it is absent (or the
-/// directory is not a git repo) — both definitive `NotPromisor` — and other
-/// non-zero codes (e.g. 128 for a bad path or unreadable config) on error. A spawn
-/// failure or any non-{0,1} exit is `Unknown`.
-async fn existing_promisor_state(repo: &str) -> PromisorProbe {
-    let out = match tokio::process::Command::new("git")
-        .args(["-C", repo, "config", "--get", "remote.origin.promisor"])
-        .output()
-        .await
-    {
-        Ok(out) => out,
-        Err(_) => return PromisorProbe::Unknown,
-    };
-    match out.status.code() {
-        Some(0) => {
-            let value = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string();
-            if value == "true" {
-                PromisorProbe::Promisor
-            } else {
-                PromisorProbe::NotPromisor
-            }
-        }
-        Some(1) => PromisorProbe::NotPromisor,
-        _ => PromisorProbe::Unknown,
-    }
-}
-
 /// Mirror-clone a repo from a remote URL into a local bare repo.
 /// `Promisor` mode adds `--filter=blob:limit=10g`, which marks the repo a git
 /// promisor (so a pack with origin-omitted withheld blobs is accepted) while
@@ -695,118 +404,23 @@ mod tests {
    use tempfile::TempDir;

    #[test]
-    fn resolve_promisor_when_withheld_nonempty() {
-        let mode = resolve_mirror_mode(
-            Some(vec!["/secret/**".to_string()]),
-            true,
-            PromisorProbe::NotPromisor,
-        );
+    fn classify_promisor_when_withheld_nonempty() {
+        let mode = classify_mirror(Some(vec!["/secret/**".to_string()]));
        assert!(matches!(mode, MirrorMode::Promisor));
    }

    #[test]
-    fn resolve_plain_when_withheld_empty() {
-        // A genuine public transition returns Some(empty) and still downgrades,
-        // regardless of whether the mirror exists or was a promisor.
-        for exists in [true, false] {
-            for probe in [
-                PromisorProbe::Promisor,
-                PromisorProbe::NotPromisor,
-                PromisorProbe::Unknown,
-            ] {
-                let mode = resolve_mirror_mode(Some(vec![]), exists, probe);
-                assert!(matches!(mode, MirrorMode::Plain));
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn resolve_preserves_promisor_on_unknown_lookup_for_existing_mirror() {
-        // Regression for #48: a transient withheld-paths outage (None) must NOT
-        // downgrade a still-withheld promisor mirror to a full clone.
-        let mode = resolve_mirror_mode(None, true, PromisorProbe::Promisor);
-        assert!(matches!(mode, MirrorMode::Promisor));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn resolve_preserves_promisor_on_indeterminate_probe() {
-        // Defense-in-depth (#48): if the config probe itself fails (Unknown) in the
-        // same cycle as a withheld-paths outage, bias toward preserving rather than
-        // firing the destructive downgrade.
-        let mode = resolve_mirror_mode(None, true, PromisorProbe::Unknown);
-        assert!(matches!(mode, MirrorMode::Promisor));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn resolve_plain_when_unknown_lookup_for_non_promisor_mirror() {
-        // An existing non-promisor mirror is unaffected by the preserve branch.
-        let mode = resolve_mirror_mode(None, true, PromisorProbe::NotPromisor);
+    fn classify_plain_when_withheld_empty() {
+        let mode = classify_mirror(Some(vec![]));
        assert!(matches!(mode, MirrorMode::Plain));
    }

    #[test]
-    fn resolve_plain_when_unknown_lookup_for_fresh_clone() {
-        // No local mirror yet: None stays Plain (fail-closed at the git layer).
-        for probe in [
-            PromisorProbe::Promisor,
-            PromisorProbe::NotPromisor,
-            PromisorProbe::Unknown,
-        ] {
-            let mode = resolve_mirror_mode(None, false, probe);
-            assert!(matches!(mode, MirrorMode::Plain));
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn rb(oid: &str, cid: &str) -> ReplicaBlob {
-        ReplicaBlob {
-            oid: oid.to_string(),
-            cid: cid.to_string(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn replicate_stores_new_blob() {
-        let remote = vec![rb("oid1", "cidA")];
-        let have = HashMap::new();
-        assert_eq!(blobs_needing_replication(&remote, &have), remote);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn replicate_skips_already_present_same_cid() {
-        let remote = vec![rb("oid1", "cidA")];
-        let mut have = HashMap::new();
-        have.insert("oid1".to_string(), "cidA".to_string());
-        assert!(blobs_needing_replication(&remote, &have).is_empty());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn replicate_restores_on_cid_change() {
-        // The origin re-sealed: same oid, new envelope, new cid.
-        let remote = vec![rb("oid1", "cidB")];
-        let mut have = HashMap::new();
-        have.insert("oid1".to_string(), "cidA".to_string());
-        assert_eq!(blobs_needing_replication(&remote, &have), remote);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn replicate_empty_remote_is_noop() {
-        assert!(blobs_needing_replication(&[], &HashMap::new()).is_empty());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn replicate_response_parses() {
-        // An older origin may still send a recipients field; it must be ignored.
-        let json = r#"{"blobs":[{"oid":"o1","cid":"c1","recipients":["did:key:zA"]}]}"#;
-        let parsed: ReplicateResponse = serde_json::from_str(json).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(parsed.blobs.len(), 1);
-        assert_eq!(parsed.blobs[0].oid, "o1");
-        assert_eq!(parsed.blobs[0].cid, "c1");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn replicate_response_empty_blobs_parses() {
-        let parsed: ReplicateResponse = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"blobs":[]}"#).unwrap();
-        assert!(parsed.blobs.is_empty());
+    fn classify_plain_when_lookup_failed() {
+        // None == 404 / network error / parse failure: attempt a plain mirror
+        // and let the git read endpoint fail-close a mode-A repo.
+        let mode = classify_mirror(None);
+        assert!(matches!(mode, MirrorMode::Plain));
    }

    fn g(args: &[&str], dir: &Path) {
@@ -896,38 +510,6 @@ mod tests {
        assert_eq!(git_config(&dest, "remote.origin.mirror"), "true");
    }

-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn probe_reports_promisor_for_promisor_mirror() {
-        let (td, url) = bare_remote(&[("public/a.txt", b"pub\n")]);
-        let dest = td.path().join("mirror.git");
-        clone_repo(&url, &dest, MirrorMode::Promisor).await.unwrap();
-
-        let probe = existing_promisor_state(dest.to_str().unwrap()).await;
-        assert_eq!(probe, PromisorProbe::Promisor);
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn probe_reports_not_promisor_when_key_absent() {
-        // A plain mirror never sets remote.origin.promisor, so `git config --get`
-        // exits 1 (key absent) — the probe must read that as NotPromisor, never
-        // Unknown (which would wrongly preserve and upgrade a plain mirror).
-        let (td, url) = bare_remote(&[("public/a.txt", b"pub\n")]);
-        let dest = td.path().join("mirror.git");
-        clone_repo(&url, &dest, MirrorMode::Plain).await.unwrap();
-
-        let probe = existing_promisor_state(dest.to_str().unwrap()).await;
-        assert_eq!(probe, PromisorProbe::NotPromisor);
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn probe_reports_unknown_on_git_error() {
-        // A path git cannot resolve as a repo at all (exit 128) is an indeterminate
-        // probe, not a definitive "not a promisor" — it must map to Unknown so the
-        // caller preserves rather than downgrades (#48 defense-in-depth).
-        let probe = existing_promisor_state("/nonexistent/gitlawb-probe-xyz").await;
-        assert_eq!(probe, PromisorProbe::Unknown);
-    }
-
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn promisor_fetch_updates_existing_mirror() {
        let (td, url) = bare_remote(&[("public/a.txt", b"pub\n")]);
@@ -993,43 +575,4 @@ mod tests {
        register_replica_with_origin(&client, &keypair, Some(""), "http://127.0.0.1:1", "o", "r")
            .await;
    }
-
-    fn peer(did: &str, http_url: &str) -> crate::db::PeerRecord {
-        crate::db::PeerRecord {
-            did: did.to_string(),
-            http_url: http_url.to_string(),
-            last_seen: None,
-            last_ping_ok: false,
-            announced_at: String::new(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn resolve_origin_url_matches_and_trims_trailing_slash() {
-        let peers = vec![
-            peer("did:key:a", "https://a.example/"),
-            peer("did:key:b", "https://b.example"),
-        ];
-        // Trailing slash is trimmed so callers can append `/{path}` cleanly.
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_origin_url(&peers, "did:key:a").as_deref(),
-            Some("https://a.example")
-        );
-        // Already-trimmed URLs pass through unchanged.
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_origin_url(&peers, "did:key:b").as_deref(),
-            Some("https://b.example")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn resolve_origin_url_returns_none_for_unknown_did() {
-        let peers = vec![peer("did:key:a", "https://a.example")];
-        assert_eq!(resolve_origin_url(&peers, "did:key:unknown"), None);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn resolve_origin_url_returns_none_for_empty_peer_list() {
-        assert_eq!(resolve_origin_url(&[], "did:key:a"), None);
-    }
 }
@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@
 //! based on the repo's visibility rules with a fallback to the legacy
 //! `is_public` flag. It performs no I/O so it is exhaustively unit tested.

-use crate::db::{RepoRecord, VisibilityRule};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use unicode_normalization::UnicodeNormalization;
+use crate::db::VisibilityRule;

 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum Decision {
@@ -14,25 +12,10 @@ pub enum Decision {
    Deny,
 }

-/// NFC-normalize a glob prefix or path so the matcher compares canonically
-/// equivalent strings byte-for-byte. Without this, a deny rule authored NFC
-/// (`é` = U+00E9) byte-compares unequal to a path committed NFD (`e` + U+0301)
-/// and the blob slips past the rule on the replication path (#101). NFC, not
-/// NFKC: compatibility folding (ligatures, full-width forms) would merge paths
-/// the filesystem treats as distinct and over-withhold. Both sides of every
-/// comparison must pass through this, or the skew just moves.
-fn nfc(s: &str) -> String {
-    s.nfc().collect()
-}
-
-/// True if `caller` is the repo owner. Matches exactly or against the
-/// did:key short form — a non-key DID (did:gitlawb:/did:web:) in `owner_did`
-/// never matches a bare short segment, and a non-key DID in `caller` never
-/// matches a did:key owner's short form. Uses `normalize_owner_key` (not
-/// `did_matches`) so the did:key-only rule is stricter: cross-method matching
-/// would let a non-key canonical row bypass the #124 visibility gate.
+/// True if `caller` is the repo owner (matches full did:key or its short form),
+/// mirroring the owner-match idiom in `api/protect.rs`.
 fn is_owner(owner_did: &str, caller: &str) -> bool {
-    let owner_short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(owner_did);
+    let owner_short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner_did);
    caller == owner_did || caller == owner_short
 }

@@ -53,17 +36,12 @@ fn glob_matches(glob: &str, path: &str) -> bool {
    if prefix == "/" {
        return true;
    }
-    // Compare in NFC so an NFC rule matches a canonically-equivalent NFD path
-    // (and vice versa). Both sides normalized here — the single matcher seam.
-    let prefix = nfc(prefix);
-    let path = nfc(path);
    path == prefix || path.starts_with(&format!("{prefix}/"))
 }

-/// Specificity = length of the (normalized) match prefix; longer is more
-/// specific. Normalized so ranking stays consistent with `glob_matches`.
+/// Specificity = length of the match prefix; longer is more specific.
 fn specificity(glob: &str) -> usize {
-    nfc(glob_prefix(glob)).len()
+    glob_prefix(glob).len()
 }

 /// Decide whether `caller` (None = anonymous) may read `path` in a repo.
@@ -118,119 +96,6 @@ pub fn visibility_check(
    }
 }

-/// Whether `caller` (None = anonymous) may see a repo in a listing — the `"/"`
-/// visibility decision, shared by every repo-listing surface (REST list,
-/// federated list, GraphQL `repos`) so they enforce one rule, not three drifting
-/// copies. Not a bare `is_public` test: a repo can be `is_public=false` with a
-/// root rule granting readers, or `is_public=true` with a root deny (#97).
-pub fn listable_at_root(
-    rules: &[VisibilityRule],
-    is_public: bool,
-    owner_did: &str,
-    caller: Option<&str>,
-) -> bool {
-    visibility_check(rules, is_public, owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Allow
-}
-
-/// Whether a single `received_ref_updates` row (identified by its peer-supplied
-/// `row_repo` slug) should be shown to `caller` (None = anonymous) on the
-/// cross-repo ref-updates feeds (#112 GraphQL, #114 REST).
-///
-/// Pure and I/O-free: both call sites load the deduped local repo set and its
-/// visibility rules once per request and pass them in, so the gate logic lives
-/// here and visibility.rs keeps its "no I/O" property.
-///
-/// The slug is written verbatim from the inbound gossip/notify message, so it is
-/// untrusted input, not a canonical key. The decision is fail-closed by
-/// construction: the only KEEP paths are (a) a slug with no `/` (cannot name a
-/// local `owner/name` pair, so remote by definition), (b) all matched local
-/// records are readable, and (c) no local record matches (remote/gossip-only).
-/// Any local match the caller cannot read at root DROPs the row. There is no
-/// catch-all keep on unexpected state.
-///
-/// Slug/record owner keys are matched prefix-tolerantly (one is a prefix of the
-/// other), covering the exact short-key, the full `did:key:` form, and the
-/// URL-truncated 8-char form. Prefix over-match can only over-drop a genuinely
-/// remote row (fail-safe), never over-serve a private local one.
-///
-/// The live call sites are the #112 (GraphQL) and #114 (REST) feed handlers,
-/// added in the following units; exercised by the unit tests below meanwhile.
-pub fn ref_update_row_visible(
-    deduped: &[RepoRecord],
-    rules_by_repo: &HashMap<String, Vec<VisibilityRule>>,
-    caller: Option<&str>,
-    row_repo: &str,
-) -> bool {
-    // A slug with no '/' cannot name a local owner/name pair — remote by
-    // definition (same branch as "matches nothing local") → KEEP.
-    if row_repo.rsplit_once('/').is_none() {
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    // Match each local record with the shared slug predicate (one matcher, so
-    // this gate and the collector's quarantine drop cannot disagree about which
-    // rows a repo owns), then fail closed on any matched record the caller
-    // cannot read at root.
-    for record in deduped {
-        if !ref_update_row_names_repo(record, row_repo) {
-            continue;
-        }
-        let rules = rules_by_repo
-            .get(&record.id)
-            .map(Vec::as_slice)
-            .unwrap_or(&[]);
-        if !listable_at_root(rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller) {
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Reached only if every matched local record is readable, or nothing local
-    // matched (remote/gossip-only). Both are the KEEP paths; there is no
-    // default-keep on unexpected state — an unreadable match already returned.
-    true
-}
-
-/// Whether `row_repo`'s peer-supplied slug names the local `record`. The single
-/// match predicate shared by the feed gate ([`ref_update_row_visible`]) and the
-/// quarantine hard-drop in the ref-update collector, so the two cannot diverge
-/// about which rows a repo owns — a second, drifting matcher is exactly the #134
-/// slug-collision class.
-///
-/// A record matches when the slug's `name` half is equal and one owner key is a
-/// prefix of the other (prefix-tolerant: exact short key, full `did:key:` form,
-/// and the URL-truncated 8-char form). Both the slug owner and the record owner
-/// are reduced to their last ':'-delimited segment before comparing. The node's
-/// own emitter builds the wire slug via `normalize_owner_key` (bare short key for
-/// a single-segment `did:key:`, the full DID for every other method; see
-/// api/repos.rs), but the stored slug is UNTRUSTED: a peer can broadcast a row
-/// under any owner form, including a method-stripped `user/name`. Reducing both
-/// sides to the trailing segment matches a repo's own rows whichever form keyed
-/// them, and still catches an attacker-planted short slug.
-///
-/// This intentionally diverges from `did_matches` / `DEDUP_CTE`, which strip only
-/// bare `did:key:` and keep other DID methods whole: those compare trusted,
-/// canonical DIDs, while this slug is untrusted. Applying the keep-whole rule here
-/// would fail open: a hostile `user/name` slug would not prefix-match a private
-/// `did:web:host:user` record and would leak. The price is a fail-SAFE over-match
-/// when a remote owner shares both a trailing segment and a repo name with a local
-/// private repo (negligible for full did:key ids; only did:web / truncated forms
-/// collide): it can hide a genuinely remote row, never serve a private one.
-pub fn ref_update_row_names_repo(record: &RepoRecord, row_repo: &str) -> bool {
-    let Some((owner_part, name)) = row_repo.rsplit_once('/') else {
-        return false;
-    };
-    if record.name != name {
-        return false;
-    }
-    let row_key = owner_part.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner_part);
-    let record_key = record
-        .owner_did
-        .split(':')
-        .next_back()
-        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
-    record_key.starts_with(row_key) || row_key.starts_with(record_key)
-}
-
 /// The subtree path globs that `caller` (None = anonymous) may NOT read, given
 /// the repo's rules. Whole-repo ("/") rules are excluded: a denied whole-repo
 /// read is handled by the 404 gate before a clone ever starts. Each remaining
@@ -403,31 +268,6 @@ mod tests {
        );
    }

-    #[test]
-    fn non_key_owner_bare_short_does_not_match() {
-        // A non-key DID owner (did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo) probed with the bare last
-        // segment (z6MkFoo) must NOT match — the old is_owner would return true
-        // via split(':').next_back(), which this PR tightens.
-        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, false, "did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo", Some("z6MkFoo"), "/"),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "bare short must not match a non-key DID owner"
-        );
-        // The full non-key DID still matches itself.
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(
-                &rules,
-                false,
-                "did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo",
-                Some("did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo"),
-                "/"
-            ),
-            Decision::Allow,
-            "full non-key DID still matches itself"
-        );
-    }
-
    #[test]
    fn root_rule_allows_listed_reader() {
        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
@@ -531,292 +371,4 @@ mod tests {
            true
        ));
    }
-
-    // ── ref_update_row_visible (feed gate) ──────────────────────────────────
-
-    fn rec(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
-        RepoRecord {
-            id: id.into(),
-            name: name.into(),
-            owner_did: owner_did.into(),
-            description: None,
-            is_public,
-            default_branch: "main".into(),
-            created_at: Utc::now(),
-            updated_at: Utc::now(),
-            disk_path: format!("/srv/{id}"),
-            forked_from: None,
-            machine_id: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn rules_for(entries: &[(&str, &[VisibilityRule])]) -> HashMap<String, Vec<VisibilityRule>> {
-        entries
-            .iter()
-            .map(|(id, rs)| (id.to_string(), rs.to_vec()))
-            .collect()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_public_local_repo_kept_for_anon() {
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", true)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_private_local_repo_dropped_for_anon_kept_for_owner() {
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        // Anonymous → drop.
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-        // Owner (full DID) → keep.
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            Some("did:key:z6MkOwner"),
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_root_rule_reader_reincluded() {
-        // Private repo (is_public=false) with a root rule granting a named
-        // reader. Delegates to listable_at_root: anon and non-reader denied,
-        // named reader allowed.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", OWNER, "widget", false)];
-        let root = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
-        let rules = rules_for(&[("r1", &root)]);
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            Some("did:key:z6MkStranger"),
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            Some("did:key:z6MkFriend"),
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_alias_full_did_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // Owner stored full-DID; slug also carries the full-DID form. Still
-        // matches (row_key normalizes to the short key) → drop. Round 1's
-        // string-match would have leaked this.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:zABC", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "did:key:zABC/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_truncated_key_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // Slug carries an 8-char URL-truncated prefix of the owner key; still
-        // matches via prefix tolerance → drop. Round 2's get_repo path leaked.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:zABCDEFGH", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "zABCDEF/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_mirror_coexistence_private_canonical_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // Pure-level mirror-coexistence: the deduped set contains only the
-        // private canonical record for (owner,name). A matching slug drops for
-        // anon. (DB-level dedup survivor property is pinned separately.)
-        let deduped = [rec("uuid-canonical", "did:key:z6Mkwbud", "nipmod", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6Mkwbud/nipmod"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_empty_owner_slug_matches_and_drops() {
-        // Slug "/name": empty owner_part → row_key "" → starts_with("") matches
-        // every same-named record. Fail-safe pin for a private repo.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "/widget"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_one_char_owner_slug_matches_and_drops() {
-        // 1-char owner prefix that the private repo's key starts with → match.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "z/widget"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_remote_slug_no_match_kept() {
-        // Different owner key, no prefix relation → no local match → keep.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "zZZZOTHER/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_private_didweb_short_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // A private did:web repo must drop its row for anon when the slug arrives
-        // in the short `{last-segment}/{name}` form. Post-#141 the emitter no longer
-        // produces this form for did:web (normalize_owner_key keeps the full DID),
-        // so this is the untrusted/crafted variant a peer can broadcast; the full-DID
-        // variant the emitter now sends is covered by the next test. A did:key-aware
-        // (keep-whole) rule would fail to match `alice` against `did:web:host:alice`
-        // and leak.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:alice", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "alice/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_multi_segment_did_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
-        // A private repo owned by a multi-segment DID must also fail closed under
-        // the full-DID slug form. Post-#141 this IS the form the emitter broadcasts
-        // (normalize_owner_key keeps non-did:key methods whole), and a peer can craft
-        // it too. The gate drops it: both sides reduce to the last ':' segment
-        // ("user"), so they match. Fail-safe regardless of which form keyed the row.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:user", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "did:web:host:user/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_multi_segment_did_slug_kept_for_public() {
-        // Symmetric keep-side: a PUBLIC multi-segment-DID repo's row must still be
-        // returned to anon after the last-':'-segment normalization — guards
-        // against a regression that over-drops legitimate did:web rows.
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:user", "widget", true)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "did:web:host:user/widget"
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_malformed_slug_no_slash_kept_no_panic() {
-        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "noslug"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn feed_empty_deduped_set_keeps_any_slug() {
-        let deduped: [RepoRecord; 0] = [];
-        let rules = HashMap::new();
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
-            &deduped,
-            &rules,
-            None,
-            "z6MkOwner/widget"
-        ));
-        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "anything"));
-    }
-
-    // The shared slug matcher underpinning both the feed gate and the collector's
-    // quarantine drop: it must recognize a repo's own row across every owner-DID
-    // form (bare short key, full did:key, URL-truncated prefix) and must not
-    // over-match a different name or an unrelated owner. The quarantine drop calls
-    // this directly, so its match contract is load-bearing for withholding a
-    // quarantined mirror from a caller who matches the mirror's owner_did.
-    #[test]
-    fn names_repo_matches_owner_forms_and_rejects_mismatches() {
-        // Bare short owner key (the form upsert_mirror_repo stores).
-        let bare = rec("m", "z6MkQuar", "secret", false);
-        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
-        // Full did:key owner; the short-segment slug still matches via last-segment.
-        let full = rec("c", "did:key:z6MkQuar", "secret", false);
-        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&full, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
-        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&full, "did:key:z6MkQuar/secret"));
-        // URL-truncated 8-char prefix slug → prefix-tolerant match.
-        let long = rec("l", "did:key:z6MkQuarLONGKEY", "secret", false);
-        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&long, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
-        // Different name, different owner, and no-slash → no match.
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkQuar/other"));
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkOther/secret"));
-        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "noslash"));
-    }
-
-    // #101: a deny rule must withhold a path that denotes the same characters in
-    // a different Unicode normalization form. Without NFC normalization at the
-    // matcher seam, an NFC-authored rule byte-compares unequal to an NFD-stored
-    // path and the blob leaks on the replication path.
-    #[test]
-    fn matcher_withholds_across_nfc_nfd_normalization_skew() {
-        // "é" composed (NFC, U+00E9) in the rule; decomposed (NFD, e + U+0301)
-        // in the committed path.
-        let nfc_rule = "/s\u{00e9}cret/**";
-        let nfd_path = "/se\u{0301}cret/key.pem";
-        let rules = [rule(nfc_rule, VisibilityMode::B, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, None, nfd_path),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "NFC-authored deny rule must withhold the canonically-equivalent NFD path"
-        );
-
-        // Mirror: rule authored NFD, path committed NFC.
-        let nfd_rule = "/se\u{0301}cret/**";
-        let nfc_path = "/s\u{00e9}cret/key.pem";
-        let rules2 = [rule(nfd_rule, VisibilityMode::B, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules2, true, OWNER, None, nfc_path),
-            Decision::Deny,
-            "NFD-authored deny rule must withhold the canonically-equivalent NFC path"
-        );
-
-        // A genuinely different path is still allowed (no over-withholding).
-        assert_eq!(
-            visibility_check(&rules, true, OWNER, None, "/public/x.txt"),
-            Decision::Allow
-        );
-    }
 }
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 [package]
 name = "gl"
 description = "The gitlawb CLI — identity management, node control, MCP server"
-version = "0.5.0" # x-release-please-version
+version.workspace = true
 edition.workspace = true
-rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

 [[bin]]
@@ -12,7 +11,6 @@ path = "src/main.rs"

 [dependencies]
 gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
-icaptcha-client = { path = "../icaptcha-client" }
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }
@@ -174,19 +174,6 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
                "node",
                format!("{} — v{version} ({short_did}…)", args.node),
            ));
-            // Capability drift: a node newer than this CLI may require features
-            // (RFC 9421 signing, iCaptcha) the CLI doesn't speak.
-            let gl_ver = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
-            if version != "?" && is_newer(version, gl_ver) {
-                checks.push(Check::warn(
-                    "gl version",
-                    format!(
-                        "node is v{version} but gl is v{gl_ver} — your CLI may be missing \
-                         features (signing / iCaptcha) this node requires"
-                    ),
-                    "upgrade gl: curl -sSf https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh",
-                ));
-            }
        }
        Ok(resp) => {
            checks.push(Check::fail(
@@ -204,31 +191,6 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
        }
    }

-    // ── 4b. iCaptcha capability ───────────────────────────────────────────
-    // Gated writes (repo create / register / fork) auto-solve a challenge at the
-    // iCaptcha service; check it's reachable so the failure mode is obvious.
-    let icaptcha_url = std::env::var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL")
-        .unwrap_or_else(|_| icaptcha_client::DEFAULT_URL.to_string());
-    match NodeClient::new(&icaptcha_url, None).get("/v1/pubkey").await {
-        Ok(resp) if resp.status().is_success() => {
-            checks.push(Check::pass("iCaptcha", format!("{icaptcha_url} reachable")));
-        }
-        Ok(resp) => {
-            checks.push(Check::warn(
-                "iCaptcha",
-                format!("{icaptcha_url} returned HTTP {}", resp.status()),
-                "gated writes (repo create / register) may fail until iCaptcha is reachable",
-            ));
-        }
-        Err(e) => {
-            checks.push(Check::warn(
-                "iCaptcha",
-                format!("{icaptcha_url} unreachable: {e}"),
-                "set GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL or check connectivity — repo create / register solve a challenge there",
-            ));
-        }
-    }
-
    // ── 5. git-remote-gitlawb helper ──────────────────────────────────────
    // Use PATH lookup only — invoking the binary directly triggers git internals
    // that error with "fatal: not a git repository" outside of a git repo.
@@ -1,19 +1,8 @@
 //! Signed HTTP client for gitlawb API calls (async).
-//!
-//! Writes are signed with RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures. When the node gates a write
-//! behind iCaptcha (HTTP 403 `icaptcha_proof_required`, advertised via the
-//! `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` headers), the client transparently
-//! solves the challenge and retries the same signed request with the
-//! `x-icaptcha-proof` header — see `crates/icaptcha-client`.

 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
 use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
-use icaptcha_client::IcaptchaCfg;
-
-/// Max times we'll fetch a fresh proof and retry a 403-iCaptcha response
-/// (absorbs proof expiry / first-seen replay).
-const MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES: usize = 2;

 pub struct NodeClient {
    inner: reqwest::Client,
@@ -63,116 +52,63 @@ impl NodeClient {
        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("GET {url}"))
    }

-    /// POST with JSON body + RFC 9421 signing + transparent iCaptcha solve/retry.
+    /// POST with JSON body + RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth.
    pub async fn post(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        self.send_signed("POST", path, body).await
-    }
-
-    /// PUT with RFC 9421 signing + transparent iCaptcha solve/retry.
-    pub async fn put(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        self.send_signed("PUT", path, body).await
-    }
-
-    /// DELETE with RFC 9421 signing + transparent iCaptcha solve/retry.
-    pub async fn delete(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        self.send_signed("DELETE", path, body).await
-    }
-
-    /// Sign + send a write. On a 403 iCaptcha challenge (detected via the
-    /// `x-icaptcha-*` headers) solve it and retry the same signed request with
-    /// the proof header, up to [`MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES`]. Emits an actionable
-    /// hint on a 401 "not an agent" (the old-CLI / unregistered failure mode).
-    async fn send_signed(
-        &self,
-        method: &str,
-        path: &str,
-        body: &[u8],
-    ) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        let mut proof: Option<String> = None;
-        let mut attempts = 0;
-        loop {
-            let resp = self.send_once(method, path, body, proof.as_deref()).await?;
-            let status = resp.status();
-
-            if status == reqwest::StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
-                && resp
-                    .headers()
-                    .get("x-gitlawb-error")
-                    .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-                    == Some("human_detected")
-            {
-                eprintln!(
-                    "note: this node requires signed requests (RFC 9421). If writes keep \
-                     failing, your `gl` may be too old — upgrade it — or you're not registered: \
-                     run `gl register`."
-                );
-            }
-
-            if status == reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN && attempts < MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES {
-                if let Some(cfg) = self.icaptcha_cfg(resp.headers())? {
-                    attempts += 1;
-                    proof = Some(obtain_proof(cfg).await?);
-                    continue;
-                }
-            }
-            return Ok(resp);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Build, sign, and send one request, optionally attaching a proof header.
-    async fn send_once(
-        &self,
-        method: &str,
-        path: &str,
-        body: &[u8],
-        proof: Option<&str>,
-    ) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
        let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
        let mut req = self
            .inner
-            .request(method.parse().expect("valid HTTP method"), &url)
+            .post(&url)
            .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
            .body(body.to_vec());

        if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
-            let signed = sign_request(kp, method, path, body);
+            let signed = sign_request(kp, "POST", path, body);
            req = req
                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
        }
-        if let Some(p) = proof {
-            req = req.header(icaptcha_client::PROOF_HEADER, p);
-        }

-        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("{method} {url}"))
+        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("POST {url}"))
    }

-    /// If `headers` describe an iCaptcha 403, build the solve config (binding the
-    /// proof's `sub` to our DID). Returns `None` for a non-iCaptcha 403.
-    fn icaptcha_cfg(&self, headers: &reqwest::header::HeaderMap) -> Result<Option<IcaptchaCfg>> {
-        let url = headers.get("x-icaptcha-url").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
-        let level = headers
-            .get("x-icaptcha-level")
-            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
-        if url.is_none() && level.is_none() {
-            return Ok(None); // not an iCaptcha challenge
+    /// PUT with RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth (idempotent write).
+    pub async fn put(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
+        let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
+        let mut req = self
+            .inner
+            .put(&url)
+            .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            .body(body.to_vec());
+
+        if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
+            let signed = sign_request(kp, "PUT", path, body);
+            req = req
+                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
+                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
+                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
        }
-        let kp = self
-            .keypair
-            .as_ref()
-            .context("iCaptcha challenge requires an identity keypair (run `gl identity new`)")?;
-        Ok(Some(IcaptchaCfg::new(
-            kp.did().to_string(),
-            url.map(str::to_string),
-            level.and_then(|l| l.parse().ok()),
-        )))
+
+        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("PUT {url}"))
+    }
+
+    /// DELETE with RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth.
+    pub async fn delete(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
+        let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
+        let mut req = self
+            .inner
+            .delete(&url)
+            .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            .body(body.to_vec());
+
+        if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
+            let signed = sign_request(kp, "DELETE", path, body);
+            req = req
+                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
+                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
+                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
+        }
+
+        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("DELETE {url}"))
    }
 }
-
-/// Run the (blocking) iCaptcha solve loop off the async runtime.
-async fn obtain_proof(cfg: IcaptchaCfg) -> Result<String> {
-    tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || icaptcha_client::obtain_proof(&cfg, None))
-        .await
-        .context("iCaptcha solver task panicked")?
-}
@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@
 //! Communicates with the gitlawb node to list pinned CIDs and retrieve git
 //! objects by their content-addressed CID.

-use std::path::PathBuf;
-
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -23,9 +21,6 @@ pub enum IpfsCmd {
    List {
        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
        node: String,
-        /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
-        #[arg(long)]
-        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
    },
    /// Retrieve and display a git object from the node by its CIDv1
    Get {
@@ -38,24 +33,19 @@ pub enum IpfsCmd {

 pub async fn run(args: IpfsArgs) -> Result<()> {
    match args.cmd {
-        IpfsCmd::List { node, dir } => cmd_list(node, dir).await,
+        IpfsCmd::List { node } => cmd_list(node).await,
        IpfsCmd::Get { cid, node } => cmd_get(cid, node).await,
    }
 }

-async fn cmd_list(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
-    // #134 gates /api/v1/ipfs/pins behind auth: sign the request with the
-    // caller's identity. On no identity, propagate load_keypair_from_dir's
-    // error (it already names `gl identity new`) rather than a bare 401.
-    let keypair = crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref())?;
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, Some(keypair));
-    let resp = client.get_signed("/api/v1/ipfs/pins").await?;
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        let status = resp.status();
-        let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-        anyhow::bail!("node returned {status} for pins listing: {body}");
-    }
-    let resp: Value = resp.json().await.context("failed to parse pins response")?;
+async fn cmd_list(node: String) -> Result<()> {
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    let resp: Value = client
+        .get("/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+        .await?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("failed to parse pins response")?;

    let pins = resp["pins"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
    let count = resp["count"].as_u64().unwrap_or(pins.len() as u64);
@@ -118,121 +108,3 @@ async fn cmd_get(cid: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {

    Ok(())
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    /// Seed a keypair into a temp dir the way `load_keypair_from_dir` expects,
-    /// then return the dir handle (keeps it alive for the test's duration).
-    fn seed_keystore() -> tempfile::TempDir {
-        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
-        std::fs::write(
-            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
-            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        dir
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_cmd_list_signs_request_and_renders_pins() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let keystore = seed_keystore();
-
-        // Happy path: signed GET to /api/v1/ipfs/pins carrying the RFC 9421
-        // signature headers, node returns a populated pins body.
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(
-                r#"{"pins":[{"cid":"bafyone","sha256_hex":"abc123","pinned_at":"2026-07-02T12:00:00.123456Z"}],"count":1}"#,
-            )
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        cmd_list(server.url(), Some(keystore.path().to_path_buf()))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_cmd_list_empty_pins() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let keystore = seed_keystore();
-
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"pins":[],"count":0}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        cmd_list(server.url(), Some(keystore.path().to_path_buf()))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_cmd_list_no_identity_errors_without_request() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        // Empty keystore dir: no identity.pem present.
-        let empty = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-
-        // The endpoint must never be hit when there is no identity.
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .expect(0)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let err = cmd_list(server.url(), Some(empty.path().to_path_buf()))
-            .await
-            .expect_err("no identity should be an error");
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string().contains("gl identity new")
-                || err.to_string().contains("no identity found"),
-            "error should name `gl identity new`, got: {err}"
-        );
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_cmd_list_non_success_status_is_error_not_empty() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let keystore = seed_keystore();
-
-        // A signed request the node rejects (401) must surface as an error,
-        // not be silently parsed into an empty pin list.
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(401)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"error":"unauthorized"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let err = cmd_list(server.url(), Some(keystore.path().to_path_buf()))
-            .await
-            .expect_err("non-2xx status should be an error");
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string().contains("401"),
-            "error should mention the status, got: {err}"
-        );
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-}
@@ -2,12 +2,10 @@

 use anyhow::Result;
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
-use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
 use serde_json::Value;
 use std::path::PathBuf;

 use crate::http::NodeClient;
-use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 use crate::node_stake;

 #[derive(Args)]
@@ -22,9 +20,6 @@ pub enum NodeCmd {
    Status {
        #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
        node: String,
-        /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
-        #[arg(long)]
-        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
    },
    /// Check trust score for a DID
    Trust {
@@ -126,7 +121,7 @@ pub enum NodeCmd {

 pub async fn run(args: NodeArgs) -> Result<()> {
    match args.cmd {
-        NodeCmd::Status { node, dir } => cmd_status(node, dir).await,
+        NodeCmd::Status { node } => cmd_status(node).await,
        NodeCmd::Trust { did, node } => cmd_trust(did, node).await,
        NodeCmd::Resolve { did, node } => cmd_resolve(did, node).await,
        NodeCmd::Register {
@@ -182,101 +177,7 @@ async fn try_get_json(client: &NodeClient, path: &str) -> Option<Value> {
    resp.json::<Value>().await.ok()
 }

-/// Outcome of fetching the IPFS pins panel for `gl node status`.
-///
-/// #134 gates `/api/v1/ipfs/pins` behind auth, so this panel signs its request
-/// when an identity is available and otherwise reports that the caller must
-/// sign in. A pins failure never aborts the dashboard.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-enum PinsPanel {
-    /// Signed read succeeded and returned pins (carries the resolved count).
-    Pins(u64),
-    /// Signed read succeeded but the node has no pins recorded.
-    Empty,
-    /// Signed read was rejected (401/other) or errored.
-    Unavailable,
-    /// No identity available; no request was issued.
-    NeedsIdentity,
-    /// An explicit `--dir` was given but held no usable identity; carries the dir
-    /// so the panel can name it instead of the misleading "sign in" prompt.
-    IdentityError(PathBuf),
-}
-
-/// Identity resolved for the signed pins read, decided before the request so the
-/// dashboard can distinguish "no identity at all" from "an explicit `--dir` that
-/// could not be loaded".
-enum PinsAuth {
-    /// A usable keypair; the read will be signed.
-    Keyed(Keypair),
-    /// No identity requested and none in the default keystore.
-    Anonymous,
-    /// An explicit `--dir` was given but held no usable identity (carries the dir).
-    DirUnusable(PathBuf),
-}
-
-/// Resolve the pins-panel identity from an optional `--dir`. Mirrors `gl ipfs
-/// list`'s identity selection: an explicit `--dir` that fails to load is reported
-/// as `DirUnusable` (so the panel names the bad path) rather than collapsing to
-/// the misleading "sign in to view"; a missing default keystore (no `--dir`)
-/// degrades quietly to `Anonymous`.
-fn resolve_pins_auth(dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> PinsAuth {
-    match load_keypair_from_dir(dir) {
-        Ok(kp) => PinsAuth::Keyed(kp),
-        Err(_) => match dir {
-            Some(d) => PinsAuth::DirUnusable(d.to_path_buf()),
-            None => PinsAuth::Anonymous,
-        },
-    }
-}
-
-/// Fetch the pins panel state. With a keypair, signs the `/api/v1/ipfs/pins`
-/// read and maps the outcome; with no identity it returns `NeedsIdentity`, and
-/// with an unusable explicit `--dir` it returns `IdentityError` — both without
-/// issuing a request. Injectable (node URL + resolved auth) so tests drive it
-/// with a mock server and never touch the default keystore.
-async fn fetch_pins(node: &str, auth: PinsAuth) -> PinsPanel {
-    let kp = match auth {
-        PinsAuth::Keyed(kp) => kp,
-        PinsAuth::Anonymous => return PinsPanel::NeedsIdentity,
-        PinsAuth::DirUnusable(dir) => return PinsPanel::IdentityError(dir),
-    };
-    let client = NodeClient::new(node, Some(kp));
-    let resp = match client.get_signed("/api/v1/ipfs/pins").await {
-        Ok(r) => r,
-        Err(_) => return PinsPanel::Unavailable,
-    };
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        return PinsPanel::Unavailable;
-    }
-    let Ok(body) = resp.json::<Value>().await else {
-        return PinsPanel::Unavailable;
-    };
-    let count = body["count"]
-        .as_u64()
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| body["pins"].as_array().map(|a| a.len() as u64).unwrap_or(0));
-    if count == 0 {
-        PinsPanel::Empty
-    } else {
-        PinsPanel::Pins(count)
-    }
-}
-
-/// Render the one-line pins-panel status for the `gl node status` dashboard.
-fn pins_status_line(panel: &PinsPanel) -> String {
-    match panel {
-        PinsPanel::Pins(count) => format!("  Pinned CIDs: {count}"),
-        PinsPanel::Empty => "  Pinned CIDs: 0".to_string(),
-        PinsPanel::Unavailable => "  IPFS pins: unavailable".to_string(),
-        PinsPanel::NeedsIdentity => {
-            "  IPFS pins: sign in to view (run `gl identity new`)".to_string()
-        }
-        PinsPanel::IdentityError(dir) => {
-            format!("  IPFS pins: no usable identity in {}", dir.display())
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-async fn cmd_status(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
+async fn cmd_status(node: String) -> Result<()> {
    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);

    // ── Fetch node info (required — bail if unreachable) ──────────────────
@@ -293,21 +194,13 @@ async fn cmd_status(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
    let version = info["version"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown");
    let network = info["network"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown");

-    // The pins panel signs its read (#134 gates /api/v1/ipfs/pins behind auth).
-    // `--dir` selects the same identity directory as `gl ipfs list` (#146); an
-    // explicit --dir that can't be loaded is surfaced in the panel rather than
-    // masquerading as "no identity", while a missing default keystore degrades
-    // quietly. A pins failure never aborts the dashboard.
-    let pins_auth = resolve_pins_auth(dir.as_deref());
-
    // ── Fetch remaining endpoints in parallel ─────────────────────────────
-    // Peers/repos/p2p/events stay anonymous; only pins is signed.
-    let (peers_val, repos_val, p2p_val, events_val, pins_panel) = tokio::join!(
+    let (peers_val, repos_val, p2p_val, events_val, pins_val) = tokio::join!(
        try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/peers"),
        try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/repos"),
        try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/p2p/info"),
        try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/events/ref-updates?limit=5"),
-        fetch_pins(&node, pins_auth),
+        try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/ipfs/pins"),
    );

    // ── Render dashboard ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -414,7 +307,14 @@ async fn cmd_status(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {

    // Pins
    println!("Pins");
-    println!("{}", pins_status_line(&pins_panel));
+    if let Some(ref pins) = pins_val {
+        let count = pins["count"]
+            .as_u64()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| pins["pins"].as_array().map(|a| a.len() as u64).unwrap_or(0));
+        println!("  Pinned CIDs: {count}");
+    } else {
+        println!("  IPFS not configured");
+    }
    println!();

    Ok(())
@@ -509,270 +409,3 @@ async fn cmd_resolve(did: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {

    Ok(())
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_fetch_pins_keyed_happy_signs_and_returns_pins() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-
-        // A keyed fetch must sign the request (RFC 9421 headers) and, on a
-        // populated 200 body, land in the Pins state carrying the pins.
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(
-                r#"{"pins":[{"cid":"bafyone","sha256_hex":"abc123","pinned_at":"2026-07-02T12:00:00Z"}],"count":1}"#,
-            )
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
-        match panel {
-            PinsPanel::Pins(count) => assert_eq!(count, 1),
-            other => panic!("expected Pins, got {other:?}"),
-        }
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_fetch_pins_keyed_empty_returns_empty() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"pins":[],"count":0}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
-        assert!(
-            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::Empty),
-            "expected Empty, got {panel:?}"
-        );
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_fetch_pins_keyed_rejected_returns_unavailable() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-
-        // Node rejects the signed read (401): the panel must degrade to
-        // Unavailable without panicking, so cmd_status still completes.
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(401)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"{"error":"unauthorized"}"#)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
-        assert!(
-            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::Unavailable),
-            "expected Unavailable, got {panel:?}"
-        );
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_fetch_pins_unkeyed_needs_identity_without_request() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-
-        // With no keypair the endpoint must never be hit.
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .expect(0)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Anonymous).await;
-        assert!(
-            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::NeedsIdentity),
-            "expected NeedsIdentity, got {panel:?}"
-        );
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_fetch_pins_malformed_body_returns_unavailable() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-
-        // 2xx but the body is not valid JSON: must degrade to Unavailable,
-        // never panic.
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
-            .with_status(200)
-            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body("not json{{{")
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
-        assert!(
-            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::Unavailable),
-            "malformed body -> Unavailable, got {panel:?}"
-        );
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_fetch_pins_transport_error_returns_unavailable() {
-        // Bind then drop to obtain a definitely-closed port -> connection
-        // refused -> get_signed Err -> Unavailable (no panic).
-        let port = {
-            let l = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
-            l.local_addr().unwrap().port()
-        };
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-
-        let panel = fetch_pins(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}"), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
-        assert!(
-            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::Unavailable),
-            "transport error -> Unavailable, got {panel:?}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_pins_status_line_renders_each_state() {
-        assert_eq!(pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::Pins(3)), "  Pinned CIDs: 3");
-        assert_eq!(pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::Empty), "  Pinned CIDs: 0");
-        assert_eq!(
-            pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::Unavailable),
-            "  IPFS pins: unavailable"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::NeedsIdentity),
-            "  IPFS pins: sign in to view (run `gl identity new`)"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::IdentityError(PathBuf::from("/tmp/id"))),
-            "  IPFS pins: no usable identity in /tmp/id"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // Adversarial follow-up to jatmn #146 P2: an explicit `--dir` that holds no
-    // usable identity must resolve to DirUnusable (which names the path), NOT the
-    // Anonymous "sign in to view / run `gl identity new`" case — otherwise a user
-    // who did supply an identity dir is misdirected to create one they may have.
-    #[test]
-    fn resolve_pins_auth_reports_explicit_bad_dir_as_unusable() {
-        let bad = PathBuf::from("/nonexistent/gl-id-xyz");
-        match resolve_pins_auth(Some(&bad)) {
-            PinsAuth::DirUnusable(d) => assert_eq!(d, bad),
-            _ => panic!("explicit unusable --dir must be DirUnusable, not Anonymous"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Mirror of the above for the absent-`--dir` case: `None` must never resolve to
-    // DirUnusable — it degrades to Anonymous (no default keystore) or Keyed (one
-    // present). Env-independent: only the None->DirUnusable mapping is guarded, so it
-    // holds whether or not the runner has a default `~/.gitlawb` identity.
-    #[test]
-    fn resolve_pins_auth_none_is_never_dir_unusable() {
-        assert!(
-            !matches!(resolve_pins_auth(None), PinsAuth::DirUnusable(_)),
-            "absent --dir must degrade to Anonymous (or Keyed), never DirUnusable"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // The success wiring for #146: an explicit --dir with a valid identity must
-    // load that key (dir -> load_keypair_from_dir -> Keyed), so the pins read is
-    // signed with the selected identity rather than the default keystore.
-    #[test]
-    fn resolve_pins_auth_loads_keyed_identity_from_explicit_dir() {
-        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
-        let kp = Keypair::generate();
-        std::fs::write(
-            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
-            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        let PinsAuth::Keyed(loaded) = resolve_pins_auth(Some(dir.path())) else {
-            panic!("an explicit --dir with a valid identity must resolve to Keyed");
-        };
-        // A bare `Keyed(_)` match would also pass if load fell through to the default
-        // keystore; assert the loaded identity is the one written to --dir so the pins
-        // read signs with the selected key, never the default.
-        assert_eq!(
-            loaded.did(),
-            kp.did(),
-            "must sign with the identity from --dir, not the default keystore"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_fetch_pins_dir_unusable_reports_identity_error_without_request() {
-        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
-        // An unusable explicit --dir must render the identity error and never hit
-        // the endpoint (no identity to sign with).
-        let m = server
-            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-            .expect(0)
-            .create_async()
-            .await;
-
-        let bad = PathBuf::from("/nonexistent/gl-id-xyz");
-        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::DirUnusable(bad.clone())).await;
-        match panel {
-            PinsPanel::IdentityError(d) => assert_eq!(d, bad),
-            other => panic!("expected IdentityError, got {other:?}"),
-        }
-
-        m.assert_async().await;
-    }
-
-    // jatmn #146 P2: `gl node status` must accept the same `--dir` identity
-    // selector as `gl ipfs list`, so a user who selected an identity via --dir can
-    // authenticate the status pins panel instead of seeing "sign in to view".
-    #[test]
-    fn status_accepts_dir_identity_selector() {
-        use clap::Parser;
-        #[derive(Parser)]
-        struct TestCli {
-            #[command(flatten)]
-            args: NodeArgs,
-        }
-        let cli = TestCli::try_parse_from([
-            "gl",
-            "status",
-            "--node",
-            "http://example",
-            "--dir",
-            "/tmp/id",
-        ])
-        .expect("`node status` must accept --dir");
-        let NodeCmd::Status { dir, .. } = cli.args.cmd else {
-            panic!("expected the Status subcommand");
-        };
-        assert_eq!(dir, Some(PathBuf::from("/tmp/id")));
-
-        // Absent --dir must stay None so the default keystore path is unchanged.
-        let cli = TestCli::try_parse_from(["gl", "status"]).expect("status parses without --dir");
-        let NodeCmd::Status { dir, .. } = cli.args.cmd else {
-            panic!("expected the Status subcommand");
-        };
-        assert_eq!(dir, None);
-    }
-}
@@ -208,16 +208,20 @@ pub async fn run(args: RepoArgs) -> Result<()> {
 }

 /// Derive the short DID key segment from a keypair, or fall back to the node's DID.
-/// Resolve the owner short-DID for a bare repo name from the LOCAL identity.
-/// Never falls back to the node's own DID (that produced bogus "owned by the
-/// node" results for repos that don't exist) — if there's no local identity the
-/// caller must pass an explicit `owner/name`.
-async fn resolve_owner_did(_node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<String> {
-    let kp = load_keypair_from_dir(dir).context(
-        "no local identity to resolve the repo owner — pass `owner/name`, or run `gl identity new`",
-    )?;
-    let did = kp.did().to_string();
-    Ok(did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string())
+async fn resolve_owner_did(node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<String> {
+    if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(dir) {
+        let did = kp.did().to_string();
+        return Ok(did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string());
+    }
+    let client = NodeClient::new(node, None);
+    let info: Value = client
+        .get("/")
+        .await?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("failed to fetch node info")?;
+    let did = info["did"].as_str().context("node missing DID")?;
+    Ok(did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(did).to_string())
 }

 async fn cmd_create(
@@ -302,28 +306,25 @@ async fn cmd_list(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
 }

 async fn cmd_clone(name: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
-    // Owner is taken from an explicit `owner/name`, else the LOCAL identity —
-    // never the node's own DID. A missing repo then surfaces as the helper's
-    // clear 404 rather than a clone under an invented owner.
-    let (did, repo_name) = if let Some((owner, rest)) = name.split_once('/') {
-        (owner.to_string(), rest.to_string())
+    let did = if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref()) {
+        kp.did().to_string()
    } else {
-        // Bare name: derive the SHORT owner key via the same helper the other
-        // commands use, so the URL is `gitlawb://z6Mk.../name` — not the full
-        // `did:key:z6Mk...` form, whose colons in the authority break the helper.
-        (resolve_owner_did(&node, dir.as_deref()).await?, name)
+        let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+        let info: Value = client.get("/").await?.json().await?;
+        info["did"]
+            .as_str()
+            .context("node missing DID")?
+            .to_string()
    };
-    let url = format!("gitlawb://{did}/{repo_name}");
+    let url = format!("gitlawb://{did}/{name}");
    println!("  cloning {url}");
    let status = std::process::Command::new("git")
        .arg("clone")
        .arg(&url)
-        // Point the remote helper at the same node the user selected.
-        .env("GITLAWB_NODE", &node)
        .status()
        .context("failed to run git clone — is git installed?")?;
    if !status.success() {
-        anyhow::bail!("git clone failed — does the repo exist on this node?");
+        anyhow::bail!("git clone failed");
    }
    Ok(())
 }
@@ -339,24 +340,12 @@ async fn cmd_info(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()
        (short, repo)
    };

-    let resp = client.get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}")).await?;
-    // A non-existent (or unreadable/quarantined) repo is a real 404 from the
-    // node — surface it plainly instead of printing a stub card with `?` fields
-    // and a placeholder owner DID.
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        if resp.status().as_u16() == 404 {
-            anyhow::bail!("repository '{owner}/{name}' not found");
-        }
-        let status = resp.status();
-        let msg = resp
-            .json::<Value>()
-            .await
-            .ok()
-            .and_then(|v| v["message"].as_str().map(String::from))
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| "request failed".to_string());
-        anyhow::bail!("repo info failed ({status}): {msg}");
-    }
-    let r: Value = resp.json().await.context("parse repo info")?;
+    let r: Value = client
+        .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}"))
+        .await?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("repo not found")?;

    let owner_did = r["owner_did"].as_str().unwrap_or(&owner);
    let gitlawb_url = format!("gitlawb://{owner_did}/{name}");
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "icaptcha-client"
-version = "0.4.0" # x-release-please-version
-edition.workspace = true
-rust-version.workspace = true
-license.workspace = true
-authors.workspace = true
-repository.workspace = true
-
-[dependencies]
-gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
-reqwest = { workspace = true }
-serde = { workspace = true }
-serde_json = { workspace = true }
-anyhow = { workspace = true }
-thiserror = { workspace = true }
-tracing = { workspace = true }
@@ -1,406 +0,0 @@
-//! Client for the iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence service.
-//!
-//! The node gates spam-prone writes (repo create / fork / register) behind an
-//! iCaptcha proof. This crate implements the *sanctioned client flow*: on a
-//! `403 icaptcha_proof_required`, request a challenge for the required level,
-//! solve the deterministic computational types locally, obtain the signed
-//! proof, and hand it back so the caller can retry the original signed request
-//! with the `x-icaptcha-proof` header.
-//!
-//! `requesterId` is always the caller's DID, so the proof's `sub` claim matches
-//! the authenticated signer (the node enforces `sub == authenticated DID`).
-//!
-//! Blocking HTTP (reqwest::blocking) so the git remote helper can use it
-//! directly; `gl` (async) calls it via `tokio::task::spawn_blocking`.
-
-use std::io::Read;
-
-use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
-use serde::Deserialize;
-use serde_json::json;
-
-pub mod solvers;
-
-/// Default iCaptcha service base URL (used when the node doesn't advertise one).
-pub const DEFAULT_URL: &str = "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com";
-/// Default required level (the node's default floor).
-pub const DEFAULT_LEVEL: u32 = 3;
-/// Header the gated write must echo the proof back in.
-pub const PROOF_HEADER: &str = "x-icaptcha-proof";
-
-/// Cap on bytes read from an error response, and characters kept in the excerpt.
-/// The iCaptcha origin is only as trusted as the node that advertised it (a MITM
-/// on the default transport qualifies), so its error bodies are attacker-
-/// influenceable bytes that reach the TTY — they must be bounded and stripped of
-/// control characters before printing (CWE-150, same treatment as #137).
-const MAX_ERR_BYTES: u64 = 4096;
-const MAX_ERR_CHARS: usize = 500;
-
-/// Read a bounded error body and return a control-char-stripped, length-capped
-/// single-line excerpt safe to print to a terminal.
-fn error_excerpt(resp: reqwest::blocking::Response) -> String {
-    let mut buf = Vec::new();
-    if resp.take(MAX_ERR_BYTES).read_to_end(&mut buf).is_err() {
-        return String::new();
-    }
-    sanitize_excerpt(&String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf))
-}
-
-/// Strip C0/C1 control characters, collapse whitespace runs to single spaces,
-/// and cap the length — so a hostile response body cannot inject terminal
-/// escapes or flood the TTY.
-fn sanitize_excerpt(s: &str) -> String {
-    let mut out = String::new();
-    let mut pending_space = false;
-    let mut kept = 0;
-    for ch in s.trim().chars() {
-        if kept >= MAX_ERR_CHARS {
-            break;
-        }
-        if ch.is_control() {
-            if matches!(ch, '\n' | '\r' | '\t') {
-                pending_space = true;
-            }
-            continue;
-        }
-        if ch.is_whitespace() {
-            pending_space = true;
-            continue;
-        }
-        if pending_space && !out.is_empty() {
-            out.push(' ');
-            kept += 1;
-            if kept >= MAX_ERR_CHARS {
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        out.push(ch);
-        kept += 1;
-        pending_space = false;
-    }
-    out
-}
-
-/// Whether `u` parses as an `https` URL.
-fn is_https(u: &str) -> bool {
-    reqwest::Url::parse(u)
-        .map(|p| p.scheme() == "https")
-        .unwrap_or(false)
-}
-
-/// Lowercased host of a URL, if it parses and has one.
-fn host_of(u: &str) -> Option<String> {
-    reqwest::Url::parse(u)
-        .ok()
-        .and_then(|p| p.host_str().map(|h| h.to_ascii_lowercase()))
-}
-
-/// Decide which iCaptcha origin to actually talk to, and whether it is trusted
-/// enough to receive the operator's API key.
-///
-/// The node-advertised `x-icaptcha-url` is untrusted: a hostile node could point
-/// it at an attacker origin (client-side SSRF) or capture a bearer token on the
-/// first hop. So an advertised URL is honored only when it is `https` AND its
-/// host is allowlisted — the public default host, or the operator's own
-/// `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL`. Otherwise we fall back to the operator/default origin.
-///
-/// The API key is attached only when the resolved origin is the operator's
-/// explicitly-configured host (never a node-discovered one), so a key is never
-/// exfiltrated to an origin the operator did not choose.
-fn resolve_solver_url(advertised: Option<&str>, operator: Option<&str>) -> (String, bool) {
-    let operator = operator.filter(|u| is_https(u));
-    let operator_host = operator.and_then(host_of);
-    let default_host = host_of(DEFAULT_URL);
-
-    let allowed = |host: &Option<String>| -> bool {
-        host.as_ref()
-            .map(|h| Some(h) == default_host.as_ref() || Some(h) == operator_host.as_ref())
-            .unwrap_or(false)
-    };
-
-    let fallback = || {
-        operator
-            .map(String::from)
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| DEFAULT_URL.to_string())
-    };
-
-    let chosen = match advertised {
-        Some(a) if is_https(a) && allowed(&host_of(a)) => a.to_string(),
-        Some(a) => {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                advertised = %a,
-                "ignoring iCaptcha URL advertised by node (must be https with an allowlisted host); using trusted origin"
-            );
-            fallback()
-        }
-        None => fallback(),
-    };
-
-    // Key goes only to the operator's own configured origin.
-    let key_trusted = operator_host.is_some() && host_of(&chosen) == operator_host;
-    (chosen, key_trusted)
-}
-
-/// Computational challenge types this client solves locally. Restricting the
-/// request to these avoids dictionary (anagram/logic) and LLM (wordproblem/
-/// riddle) types, which can't be auto-solved.
-const SOLVABLE_TYPES: [&str; 3] = ["arithmetic", "algebra", "sequence"];
-
-/// Bound on challenge/answer rounds (the service escalates difficulty on a miss;
-/// correct solvers shouldn't escalate, but cap it regardless).
-const MAX_ROUNDS: usize = 8;
-
-/// Where + at what level to solve. `did` becomes the proof's `sub`.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub struct IcaptchaCfg {
-    pub url: String,
-    pub did: String,
-    pub level: u32,
-    /// Optional bearer token for an API-key-protected iCaptcha deployment.
-    pub api_key: Option<String>,
-}
-
-impl IcaptchaCfg {
-    /// Build config from the caller DID plus an optionally node-advertised
-    /// url/level (e.g. the `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` headers) and
-    /// optional level.
-    ///
-    /// The advertised URL is validated and allowlisted (see [`resolve_solver_url`])
-    /// so a hostile node cannot redirect the solve to an attacker origin. The
-    /// `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY` bearer token is attached only when the resolved
-    /// origin is the operator's own `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL`, never a
-    /// node-discovered one.
-    pub fn new(did: impl Into<String>, url: Option<String>, level: Option<u32>) -> Self {
-        let operator = std::env::var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL")
-            .ok()
-            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty());
-        let (resolved_url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(url.as_deref(), operator.as_deref());
-        let api_key = if key_trusted {
-            std::env::var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY")
-                .ok()
-                .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
-        } else {
-            None
-        };
-        Self {
-            url: resolved_url,
-            did: did.into(),
-            level: level.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_LEVEL),
-            api_key,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// A challenge handed back by the service (mirrors `icaptcha` `Challenge`).
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-pub struct Challenge {
-    pub challenge_id: String,
-    #[serde(rename = "type")]
-    pub kind: String,
-    pub difficulty: u32,
-    pub prompt: String,
-    pub token: String,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(tag = "status", rename_all = "lowercase")]
-enum AnswerResult {
-    Passed { proof: String },
-    Continue { challenge: Challenge },
-    Failed { reason: String },
-}
-
-/// Solver callback for types this crate can't solve deterministically.
-pub type Solver<'a> = dyn Fn(&Challenge) -> Option<String> + 'a;
-
-/// Run the full challenge → solve → answer loop and return a fresh proof token.
-///
-/// `solver` is consulted for challenge types the built-in solvers don't handle
-/// (anagram/logic/LLM); pass `None` to fall back to an interactive stdin prompt.
-pub fn obtain_proof(cfg: &IcaptchaCfg, solver: Option<&Solver>) -> Result<String> {
-    let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::builder()
-        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30))
-        .build()
-        .context("build iCaptcha http client")?;
-
-    let mut challenge = request_challenge(&client, cfg)?;
-    for _ in 0..MAX_ROUNDS {
-        let answer = solvers::solve(&challenge.kind, &challenge.prompt)
-            .or_else(|| solver.and_then(|s| s(&challenge)))
-            .or_else(|| interactive_prompt(&challenge))
-            .ok_or_else(|| {
-                anyhow!(
-                    "cannot solve iCaptcha challenge type '{}' automatically; \
-                     set GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY/solver or solve interactively",
-                    challenge.kind
-                )
-            })?;
-
-        match submit_answer(&client, cfg, &challenge.token, &answer)? {
-            AnswerResult::Passed { proof } => return Ok(proof),
-            AnswerResult::Continue { challenge: next } => challenge = next,
-            AnswerResult::Failed { reason } => {
-                bail!("iCaptcha challenge failed: {}", sanitize_excerpt(&reason))
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    bail!("iCaptcha not solved within {MAX_ROUNDS} rounds")
-}
-
-fn request_challenge(client: &reqwest::blocking::Client, cfg: &IcaptchaCfg) -> Result<Challenge> {
-    let url = format!("{}/v1/challenge", cfg.url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-    let body = json!({
-        "requesterId": cfg.did,
-        "requiredLevel": cfg.level,
-        "types": SOLVABLE_TYPES,
-    });
-    let mut req = client.post(&url).json(&body);
-    if let Some(key) = &cfg.api_key {
-        req = req.bearer_auth(key);
-    }
-    let resp = req.send().with_context(|| format!("POST {url}"))?;
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        let status = resp.status();
-        let text = error_excerpt(resp);
-        bail!("iCaptcha challenge request failed ({status}): {text}");
-    }
-    resp.json::<Challenge>().context("parse iCaptcha challenge")
-}
-
-fn submit_answer(
-    client: &reqwest::blocking::Client,
-    cfg: &IcaptchaCfg,
-    token: &str,
-    answer: &str,
-) -> Result<AnswerResult> {
-    let url = format!("{}/v1/answer", cfg.url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-    let mut req = client
-        .post(&url)
-        .json(&json!({ "token": token, "answer": answer }));
-    if let Some(key) = &cfg.api_key {
-        req = req.bearer_auth(key);
-    }
-    let resp = req.send().with_context(|| format!("POST {url}"))?;
-    if !resp.status().is_success() {
-        let status = resp.status();
-        let text = error_excerpt(resp);
-        bail!("iCaptcha answer request failed ({status}): {text}");
-    }
-    resp.json::<AnswerResult>()
-        .context("parse iCaptcha answer result")
-}
-
-/// Last-resort fallback: show the prompt and read an answer from the terminal.
-/// Returns `None` when stdin isn't a usable interactive source (e.g. an agent),
-/// so the caller surfaces a clear "couldn't auto-solve" error instead.
-fn interactive_prompt(challenge: &Challenge) -> Option<String> {
-    use std::io::{stderr, stdin, Write};
-    let mut err = stderr();
-    let _ = writeln!(
-        err,
-        "iCaptcha challenge ({}, level {}): {}\nAnswer: ",
-        challenge.kind, challenge.difficulty, challenge.prompt
-    );
-    let _ = err.flush();
-    let mut line = String::new();
-    match stdin().read_line(&mut line) {
-        Ok(0) | Err(_) => None,
-        Ok(_) => {
-            let a = line.trim().to_string();
-            if a.is_empty() {
-                None
-            } else {
-                Some(a)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    // ── P1: hostile error bodies must not reach the terminal raw ──────────
-
-    #[test]
-    fn sanitize_strips_control_chars_and_escapes() {
-        // ESC-based terminal escape + NUL + bell must all be removed.
-        let hostile = "\x1b[2J\x1b[31mowned\x07\0 done";
-        let clean = sanitize_excerpt(hostile);
-        assert!(!clean.contains('\x1b'), "ESC survived: {clean:?}");
-        assert!(
-            !clean.chars().any(|c| c.is_control()),
-            "control survived: {clean:?}"
-        );
-        assert!(clean.contains("owned") && clean.contains("done"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn sanitize_collapses_whitespace_and_caps_length() {
-        let collapsed = sanitize_excerpt("a\n\n\t  b");
-        assert_eq!(collapsed, "a b");
-        let long = "x".repeat(MAX_ERR_CHARS + 500);
-        assert_eq!(sanitize_excerpt(&long).chars().count(), MAX_ERR_CHARS);
-    }
-
-    // ── P2: never talk to (or hand a key to) an untrusted node-chosen URL ──
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_non_https_advertised_url() {
-        // A plaintext node-advertised URL is ignored; we fall back to default.
-        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(Some("http://evil.example/x"), None);
-        assert_eq!(url, DEFAULT_URL);
-        assert!(!key_trusted);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rejects_https_url_with_non_allowlisted_host() {
-        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(Some("https://evil.example"), None);
-        assert_eq!(url, DEFAULT_URL, "attacker host must not be honored");
-        assert!(!key_trusted);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn honors_advertised_default_host_but_withholds_key_without_operator() {
-        // Default public host is allowlisted for talking, but with no operator
-        // origin configured the API key has no trusted destination.
-        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(Some("https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com/v2"), None);
-        assert_eq!(url, "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com/v2");
-        assert!(!key_trusted);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn key_trusted_only_for_operator_configured_origin() {
-        let op = "https://icap.mynode.example";
-        // Node advertises the operator's own origin → talk there, key allowed.
-        let (url, key_trusted) =
-            resolve_solver_url(Some("https://icap.mynode.example/v1"), Some(op));
-        assert_eq!(url, "https://icap.mynode.example/v1");
-        assert!(key_trusted);
-
-        // Node advertises an attacker origin while an operator is configured →
-        // ignore the advert, fall back to the operator origin, key stays with it.
-        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(Some("https://evil.example"), Some(op));
-        assert_eq!(url, op);
-        assert!(key_trusted);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn no_advert_uses_operator_or_default() {
-        let op = "https://icap.mynode.example";
-        assert_eq!(resolve_solver_url(None, Some(op)), (op.to_string(), true));
-        assert_eq!(
-            resolve_solver_url(None, None),
-            (DEFAULT_URL.to_string(), false)
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn non_https_operator_is_not_trusted() {
-        // A misconfigured plaintext operator URL is not a valid key destination.
-        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(None, Some("http://icap.mynode.example"));
-        assert_eq!(url, DEFAULT_URL);
-        assert!(!key_trusted);
-    }
-}
@@ -1,270 +0,0 @@
-//! Deterministic solvers for the computational iCaptcha challenge types.
-//!
-//! Prompt/answer formats mirror the iCaptcha service generators
-//! (`icaptcha/src/generators/{arithmetic,algebra,sequence}.ts`). The service
-//! grades numerics by value (`Number(a) === Number(b)`), so returning the plain
-//! integer string is sufficient. Anagram/logic (need a dictionary/parser) and
-//! the LLM types are intentionally NOT solved here — the client requests only
-//! these three types and falls back to a hook/interactive prompt otherwise.
-
-/// Solve a challenge of the given `type` from its prompt. Returns `None` for
-/// types we don't solve locally or when the prompt can't be parsed.
-pub fn solve(challenge_type: &str, prompt: &str) -> Option<String> {
-    match challenge_type {
-        "arithmetic" => solve_arithmetic(prompt).map(|n| n.to_string()),
-        "algebra" => solve_algebra(prompt).map(|n| n.to_string()),
-        "sequence" => solve_sequence(prompt).map(|n| n.to_string()),
-        _ => None,
-    }
-}
-
-/// `What is 12 + 7 - 3?` -> evaluate the additive chain left to right.
-fn solve_arithmetic(prompt: &str) -> Option<i64> {
-    let expr = prompt
-        .trim()
-        .strip_prefix("What is ")?
-        .trim_end_matches('?')
-        .trim();
-    let mut tokens = expr.split_whitespace();
-    let mut acc: i64 = tokens.next()?.parse().ok()?;
-    while let Some(op) = tokens.next() {
-        let n: i64 = tokens.next()?.parse().ok()?;
-        match op {
-            "+" => acc += n,
-            "-" => acc -= n,
-            _ => return None,
-        }
-    }
-    Some(acc)
-}
-
-/// `Solve for x: 3x + 4 = 19` (and the `=`-both-sides and `a(x + b)` variants).
-/// Parses each side into `coeff*x + const`, then x = (cR - cL) / (aL - aR).
-fn solve_algebra(prompt: &str) -> Option<i64> {
-    let eq = prompt.trim().strip_prefix("Solve for x:")?.trim();
-    let (lhs, rhs) = eq.split_once('=')?;
-    let (al, cl) = parse_linear(lhs.trim())?;
-    let (ar, cr) = parse_linear(rhs.trim())?;
-    let denom = al - ar;
-    if denom == 0 {
-        return None;
-    }
-    let num = cr - cl;
-    if num % denom != 0 {
-        return None;
-    }
-    Some(num / denom)
-}
-
-/// Parse a linear expression in `x` into `(coeff_of_x, constant)`.
-/// Handles `Nx`, `x`, integer constants, and a single `N(x ± M)` product,
-/// with `+`/`-` separators (the formats the generator emits).
-fn parse_linear(s: &str) -> Option<(i64, i64)> {
-    let s = s.trim();
-    // Parenthesized product: a(x ± b)  ->  coeff a, const a*(±b).
-    if let Some(open) = s.find('(') {
-        let a: i64 = s[..open].trim().parse().ok()?;
-        let close = s.find(')')?;
-        let inner = &s[open + 1..close]; // "x + 4" / "x - 4"
-        let mut it = inner.split_whitespace();
-        if it.next()? != "x" {
-            return None;
-        }
-        let (coeff_inner, const_inner) = match it.next() {
-            None => (1, 0),
-            Some(op) => {
-                let m: i64 = it.next()?.parse().ok()?;
-                match op {
-                    "+" => (1, m),
-                    "-" => (1, -m),
-                    _ => return None,
-                }
-            }
-        };
-        return Some((a * coeff_inner, a * const_inner));
-    }
-
-    // Sum of `±`-separated terms.
-    let mut coeff = 0i64;
-    let mut konst = 0i64;
-    let mut sign = 1i64;
-    for tok in s.split_whitespace() {
-        match tok {
-            "+" => sign = 1,
-            "-" => sign = -1,
-            t => {
-                if let Some(cpart) = t.strip_suffix('x') {
-                    let c: i64 = match cpart {
-                        "" | "+" => 1,
-                        "-" => -1,
-                        _ => cpart.parse().ok()?,
-                    };
-                    coeff += sign * c;
-                } else {
-                    let n: i64 = t.parse().ok()?;
-                    konst += sign * n;
-                }
-                sign = 1;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    Some((coeff, konst))
-}
-
-/// `What is the next number in this sequence? 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, ?`
-fn solve_sequence(prompt: &str) -> Option<i64> {
-    let tail = prompt.split_once("sequence?")?.1;
-    let nums: Vec<i64> = tail
-        .split(',')
-        .filter_map(|t| t.trim().parse::<i64>().ok())
-        .collect();
-    if nums.len() < 3 {
-        return None;
-    }
-    next_in_sequence(&nums)
-}
-
-fn next_in_sequence(n: &[i64]) -> Option<i64> {
-    let last = *n.last()?;
-
-    // Arithmetic: constant first difference.
-    let d = n[1] - n[0];
-    if n.windows(2).all(|w| w[1] - w[0] == d) {
-        return Some(last + d);
-    }
-
-    // Geometric: constant integer ratio.
-    if n.iter().all(|&v| v != 0) && n[0] != 0 && n[1] % n[0] == 0 {
-        let r = n[1] / n[0];
-        if r != 0 && n.windows(2).all(|w| w[1] == w[0] * r) {
-            return Some(last * r);
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Fibonacci-like: each term is the sum of the two before it.
-    if n.len() >= 3 && (2..n.len()).all(|i| n[i] == n[i - 1] + n[i - 2]) {
-        return Some(n[n.len() - 1] + n[n.len() - 2]);
-    }
-
-    // Squares: all perfect squares with consecutive roots.
-    let roots: Option<Vec<i64>> = n.iter().map(|&v| isqrt_exact(v)).collect();
-    if let Some(roots) = roots {
-        if roots.windows(2).all(|w| w[1] == w[0] + 1) {
-            let nr = roots[roots.len() - 1] + 1;
-            return Some(nr * nr);
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Alternating sign over an arithmetic magnitude (generator starts positive).
-    let signs_alternate = n
-        .iter()
-        .enumerate()
-        .all(|(i, &v)| if i % 2 == 0 { v >= 0 } else { v < 0 });
-    let mags: Vec<i64> = n.iter().map(|v| v.abs()).collect();
-    let md = mags[1] - mags[0];
-    if signs_alternate && mags.windows(2).all(|w| w[1] - w[0] == md) {
-        let next_mag = mags[mags.len() - 1] + md;
-        let next_sign = if last >= 0 { -1 } else { 1 };
-        return Some(next_sign * next_mag);
-    }
-
-    None
-}
-
-/// Exact integer square root, or `None` if `v` isn't a perfect square.
-fn isqrt_exact(v: i64) -> Option<i64> {
-    if v < 0 {
-        return None;
-    }
-    let r = (v as f64).sqrt().round() as i64;
-    [r - 1, r, r + 1]
-        .into_iter()
-        .find(|&cand| cand >= 0 && cand * cand == v)
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn arithmetic_chains() {
-        assert_eq!(
-            solve("arithmetic", "What is 12 + 7 - 3?").as_deref(),
-            Some("16")
-        );
-        assert_eq!(solve("arithmetic", "What is 5?").as_deref(), Some("5"));
-        assert_eq!(
-            solve("arithmetic", "What is 100 - 40 - 35 + 2?").as_deref(),
-            Some("27")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn algebra_linear() {
-        assert_eq!(
-            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 3x + 4 = 19").as_deref(),
-            Some("5")
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 5x - 8 = 12").as_deref(),
-            Some("4")
-        );
-        // both sides: 2x + 16 = 5x - 8  -> 3x = 24 -> x=8
-        assert_eq!(
-            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 2x + 16 = 5x - 8").as_deref(),
-            Some("8")
-        );
-        // parenthesized: 3(x - 4) = 9 -> x-4=3 -> x=7
-        assert_eq!(
-            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 3(x - 4) = 9").as_deref(),
-            Some("7")
-        );
-        // negative solution: 2x + 10 = 4  -> x=-3
-        assert_eq!(
-            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 2x + 10 = 4").as_deref(),
-            Some("-3")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn sequence_patterns() {
-        assert_eq!(
-            solve(
-                "sequence",
-                "What is the next number in this sequence? 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, ?"
-            )
-            .as_deref(),
-            Some("12")
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            solve(
-                "sequence",
-                "What is the next number in this sequence? 3, 6, 12, 24, 48, ?"
-            )
-            .as_deref(),
-            Some("96")
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            solve(
-                "sequence",
-                "What is the next number in this sequence? 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, ?"
-            )
-            .as_deref(),
-            Some("36")
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            solve(
-                "sequence",
-                "What is the next number in this sequence? 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, ?"
-            )
-            .as_deref(),
-            Some("8")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn unsupported_types_return_none() {
-        assert_eq!(solve("anagram", "Unscramble: tca"), None);
-        assert_eq!(solve("riddle", "What has keys but no locks?"), None);
-    }
-}
@@ -19,14 +19,6 @@ services:

  node:
    build: .
-    # Reap reparented orphan processes so git's grandchildren (e.g. pack-objects
-    # left behind when a served clone disconnects) can't accumulate as zombies
-    # and exhaust the PID table (#53). The image also runs under tini, so this is
-    # belt-and-suspenders for the quickstart.
-    init: true
-    # Cap the process table so a regression fails loudly instead of taking the
-    # host down. Sits well above normal concurrent git fan-out.
-    pids_limit: 1024
    depends_on:
      postgres:
        condition: service_healthy
@@ -141,34 +141,6 @@ During the cooldown your node still earns rewards if it keeps heartbeating.

 ---

-## Hardening: owner-only push
-
-By default the node authenticates every `git-receive-pack` push (a valid RFC 9421
-`did:key` signature) but does **not** check that the pusher owns the repo, except
-on branches that are explicitly protected. Because `did:key` is self-certifying,
-any party can generate a key, derive its DID, sign, and push to an unprotected
-branch — authentication is not authorization.
-
-To require the authenticated pusher to be the repo owner on **every** branch, set:
-
-```bash
-GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH=true
-```
-
- **Default `false`** — preserves current behavior so live nodes are unaffected by
-  an upgrade. Turn it on once you're ready for owner-only writes.
- **When `true`** — a push whose authenticated DID is not the repo owner is
-  rejected (HTTP 403) before any ref update is applied. The owner is matched in
-  both the full `did:key:z6Mk…` form and its bare `z6Mk…` suffix.
- **Caution: this blocks every non-owner pusher, including your own delegated and
-  CI agents.** Push authorization is owner-only today — a UCAN `git/push`
-  capability is verified but not yet honored for authorization, so delegated keys
-  cannot push while this is on. Don't enable it until every identity that pushes
-  to your repos is the owner, or you'll lock out your own automation. Scoped
-  collaborator / UCAN-delegated push rights are a planned follow-up.
-
---
-
 ## Operational checklist

 | Concern | Recommendation |
@@ -58,16 +58,6 @@ services:
      GITLAWB_P2P_PORT: "${p2p_port}"
      GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR: /data/repos
      GITLAWB_KEY: /data/keys/identity.pem
-      # Only trust X-Forwarded-For when the Caddy sidecar above is actually
-      # deployed (domain_name != ""). Caddy appends the real client as the
-      # rightmost hop, letting the push rate limiter key on the true client IP
-      # rather than Caddy's container address. Without Caddy, this header is
-      # fully client-controlled and must not be trusted.
-      GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY: "${domain_name != "" ? "x-forwarded-for" : ""}"
-      # iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate (spam protection on create/fork/register)
-      ICAPTCHA_MODE: ${icaptcha_mode}
-      ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY: ${icaptcha_pubkey}
-      ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL: "${icaptcha_required_level}"
      GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL: $${GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL}
      GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS: $${GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS}
      GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC: $${GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC}
@@ -290,19 +290,16 @@ locals {
  )

  compose_yaml = templatefile("${path.module}/compose.yaml.tftpl", {
-    image_repo              = local.image_repo
-    image_tag               = var.image_tag
-    domain_name             = var.domain_name
-    db_host                 = var.use_rds ? aws_db_instance.node[0].address : ""
-    gitlawb_port            = var.gitlawb_port
-    p2p_port                = var.gitlawb_p2p_port
-    metrics_port            = var.metrics_port
-    expose_metrics          = local.expose_metrics
-    pg_user                 = var.postgres_user
-    pg_db                   = var.postgres_db
-    icaptcha_mode           = var.icaptcha_mode
-    icaptcha_pubkey         = var.icaptcha_pubkey
-    icaptcha_required_level = var.icaptcha_required_level
+    image_repo     = local.image_repo
+    image_tag      = var.image_tag
+    domain_name    = var.domain_name
+    db_host        = var.use_rds ? aws_db_instance.node[0].address : ""
+    gitlawb_port   = var.gitlawb_port
+    p2p_port       = var.gitlawb_p2p_port
+    metrics_port   = var.metrics_port
+    expose_metrics = local.expose_metrics
+    pg_user        = var.postgres_user
+    pg_db          = var.postgres_db
  })

  user_data = templatefile("${path.module}/user-data.sh.tftpl", {
@@ -81,28 +81,6 @@ variable "image_tag" {
  default     = "latest"
 }

-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate (spam protection on writes)
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-variable "icaptcha_mode" {
-  description = "iCaptcha gate mode: off | shadow | enforce. The live gitlawb network enforces."
-  type        = string
-  default     = "enforce"
-}
-
-variable "icaptcha_pubkey" {
-  description = "base64url Ed25519 public key of the iCaptcha service, pinned so startup doesn't depend on fetching it. This is the live icaptcha.gitlawb.com key."
-  type        = string
-  default     = "xjyPNqIbvc9U-kwXW6u9mDqRJ7E2UUMOaJdUWhpEXq8"
-}
-
-variable "icaptcha_required_level" {
-  description = "Minimum iCaptcha proof level required to pass the gate."
-  type        = number
-  default     = 3
-}
-
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Networking / ingress
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -16,10 +16,6 @@ primary_region = "iad"
  GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS = "https://node.gitlawb.com,https://node2.gitlawb.com,https://node3.gitlawb.com"
  GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC = "true"
  GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES = "524288000"
-  # On Fly: the edge sets Fly-Client-IP (overwriting any client-supplied value),
-  # so the push rate limiter keys on the real client. Without this the limiter
-  # would fall back to the socket peer (Fly's proxy) and over-throttle.
-  GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY = "fly"

 [http_service]
  internal_port = 7545
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# Fly config for node.gitlawb.com — deploys the public Gitlawb/node source.
+# The primary/busiest bootstrap node: a SINGLE machine in sjc with its own
+# 250GB volume. Deploy from the repo root:
+#   fly deploy -a gitlawb-node -c infra/fly/node.toml --ha=false
+#
+# NOTE: node was consolidated from 2 machines to 1 (2026-06-22) to fix a
+# split-brain (per-machine volumes diverged behind one hostname). Keep this at
+# a single machine — min_machines_running=2 would spawn a second machine with a
+# fresh empty volume and reintroduce the split-brain.
+#
+# Reuses the sjc volume `gitlawb_data` (identity key + repos), the attached
+# Postgres (DATABASE_URL), and Tigris S3 + Pinata + contract secrets — all
+# app-level, preserved across deploys.
+#
+# IMPORTANT: the volume was created by the old root image, so /data is
+# root-owned. If the machine crash-loops on first boot of the public image,
+# chown /data to uid 1000:
+#   fly ssh console -a gitlawb-node --machine <id> -C "chown -R 1000:1000 /data"
+app = "gitlawb-node"
+primary_region = "sjc"
+
+[build]
+  dockerfile = "../../Dockerfile"
+
+[env]
+  GITLAWB_HOST = "0.0.0.0"
+  GITLAWB_PORT = "7545"
+  GITLAWB_P2P_PORT = "7546"
+  GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR = "/data/repos"
+  GITLAWB_KEY = "/data/keys/identity.pem"
+  GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL = "https://node.gitlawb.com"
+  GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS = "https://node2.gitlawb.com,https://node3.gitlawb.com"
+  GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC = "true"
+  GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES = "524288000"
+
+[http_service]
+  internal_port = 7545
+  force_https = true
+  auto_stop_machines = false
+  auto_start_machines = true
+  # Single-machine node (see header): keep this at 1. Raising it spawns a
+  # second machine with a fresh volume and reintroduces the split-brain.
+  min_machines_running = 1
+
+  [http_service.concurrency]
+    type = "connections"
+    hard_limit = 500
+    soft_limit = 400
+
+  [http_service.http_options]
+    idle_timeout = 120
+
+[[services]]
+  protocol = "udp"
+  internal_port = 7546
+
+  [[services.ports]]
+    port = 7546
+
+[[vm]]
+  size = "shared-cpu-4x"
+  memory = 8192
+
+[[mounts]]
+  source = "gitlawb_data"
+  destination = "/data"
+
+[metrics]
+  port = 9091
+  path = "/metrics"
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# Fly config for node2.gitlawb.com — deploys the public Gitlawb/node source.
+# Migrated after node3 (see node3.toml). Deploy from the repo root:
+#   fly deploy -a gitlawb-node-2 -c infra/fly/node2.toml
+#
+# Reuses the existing sjc volume `gitlawb_data` (identity key + repos) and the
+# attached Postgres `gitlawb-node-2-db` (DATABASE_URL secret). Extra app
+# secrets (contract registries, Irys URL) persist across deploys.
+#
+# IMPORTANT: the volume was created by the old root image, so /data is
+# root-owned. chown it to uid 1000 (the public image's `gitlawb` user) BEFORE
+# this deploy or it crash-loops on "failed to read key … Permission denied":
+#   fly ssh console -a gitlawb-node-2 -C "chown -R 1000:1000 /data"
+app = "gitlawb-node-2"
+primary_region = "sjc"
+
+[build]
+  dockerfile = "../../Dockerfile"
+
+[env]
+  GITLAWB_HOST = "0.0.0.0"
+  GITLAWB_PORT = "7545"
+  GITLAWB_P2P_PORT = "7546"
+  GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR = "/data/repos"
+  GITLAWB_KEY = "/data/keys/identity.pem"
+  GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL = "https://node2.gitlawb.com"
+  # Bootstrap to the other two production nodes (not self).
+  GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS = "https://node.gitlawb.com,https://node3.gitlawb.com"
+  GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC = "true"
+  GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES = "524288000"
+
+[http_service]
+  internal_port = 7545
+  force_https = true
+  auto_stop_machines = false
+  auto_start_machines = true
+  min_machines_running = 1
+
+  [http_service.concurrency]
+    type = "connections"
+    hard_limit = 500
+    soft_limit = 400
+
+  [http_service.http_options]
+    idle_timeout = 120
+
+[[services]]
+  protocol = "udp"
+  internal_port = 7546
+
+  [[services.ports]]
+    port = 7546
+
+[[vm]]
+  size = "shared-cpu-1x"
+  # 1024MB: node2 mirrors the whole network. Prior 256MB was too small for v0.3.9.
+  memory = 1024
+
+[[mounts]]
+  source = "gitlawb_data"
+  destination = "/data"
+
+[metrics]
+  port = 9091
+  path = "/metrics"
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-<#
-.SYNOPSIS
-  gitlawb installer for Windows - downloads pre-built binaries from GitHub Releases.
-.EXAMPLE
-  irm https://gitlawb.com/install.ps1 | iex
-.EXAMPLE
-  & ([scriptblock]::Create((irm https://gitlawb.com/install.ps1))) -Version v0.3.9
-#>
-[CmdletBinding()]
-param(
-  [string]$Version = "latest"
-)
-
-$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"
-
-# Windows PowerShell 5.1 may default to TLS 1.0; GitHub requires TLS 1.2+.
-[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
-
-$Repo = if ($env:GITLAWB_RELEASE_REPO) { $env:GITLAWB_RELEASE_REPO } else { "Gitlawb/node" }
-$InstallDir = if ($env:GITLAWB_INSTALL_DIR) { $env:GITLAWB_INSTALL_DIR } else { "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Programs\gitlawb" }
-
-$arch = if ($env:PROCESSOR_ARCHITEW6432) {
-  $env:PROCESSOR_ARCHITEW6432
-} else {
-  $env:PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE
-}
-if ($arch -ne "AMD64") {
-  throw "Unsupported architecture: $arch. Only x64 Windows binaries are published. Use WSL for arm64."
-}
-$target = "x86_64-pc-windows-msvc"
-
-if ($Version -eq "latest") {
-  Write-Host "Fetching latest release version..."
-  $rel = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://api.github.com/repos/$Repo/releases/latest" -UseBasicParsing -Headers @{ "User-Agent" = "gitlawb-installer" }
-  $tag = $rel.tag_name
-} elseif ($Version.StartsWith("v")) {
-  $tag = $Version
-} else {
-  $tag = "v$Version"
-}
-$ver = $tag.TrimStart("v")
-
-$archive = "gitlawb-node-$ver-$target.zip"
-$url = "https://github.com/$Repo/releases/download/$tag/$archive"
-
-Write-Host "Installing gitlawb $tag for windows/x64"
-Write-Host "  Archive: $archive"
-Write-Host "  Into:    $InstallDir"
-
-$tmp = Join-Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) ("gitlawb-" + [System.Guid]::NewGuid().ToString("N"))
-New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $tmp | Out-Null
-try {
-  $zipPath = Join-Path $tmp $archive
-  Write-Host "Downloading..."
-  Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -OutFile $zipPath -UseBasicParsing -Headers @{ "User-Agent" = "gitlawb-installer" }
-
-  # Verify checksum. Every published asset has a matching .sha256, so fail closed
-  # if it cannot be fetched rather than installing an unverified binary.
-  $sumPath = "$zipPath.sha256"
-  Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "$url.sha256" -OutFile $sumPath -UseBasicParsing -Headers @{ "User-Agent" = "gitlawb-installer" }
-  $expected = ((Get-Content $sumPath -Raw).Trim() -split '\s+')[0].ToLower()
-  $actual = (Get-FileHash $zipPath -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLower()
-  if ($expected -ne $actual) {
-    throw "checksum mismatch! expected $expected got $actual"
-  }
-  Write-Host "  checksum OK"
-
-  Write-Host "Extracting..."
-  $extract = Join-Path $tmp "extract"
-  Expand-Archive -Path $zipPath -DestinationPath $extract -Force
-  $pkgDir = Get-ChildItem -Path $extract -Directory | Select-Object -First 1
-
-  New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $InstallDir -Force | Out-Null
-  # The Windows archive always ships the two CLI binaries; the daemon is optional.
-  $requiredBins = @("gl.exe", "git-remote-gitlawb.exe")
-  $optionalBins = @("gitlawb-node.exe")
-  $missing = $requiredBins | Where-Object {
-    -not (Test-Path (Join-Path $pkgDir.FullName $_))
-  }
-  if ($missing.Count -gt 0) {
-    throw "archive is missing required binaries: $($missing -join ', ')"
-  }
-
-  $installed = @()
-  foreach ($bin in $requiredBins + $optionalBins) {
-    $src = Join-Path $pkgDir.FullName $bin
-    if (Test-Path $src) {
-      Copy-Item -Path $src -Destination (Join-Path $InstallDir $bin) -Force
-      $installed += $bin
-    }
-  }
-
-  # Drop binaries no longer shipped (e.g. an optional one removed in a new release)
-  # so an upgrade in place never leaves a stale, mixed-version install behind.
-  foreach ($bin in $requiredBins + $optionalBins) {
-    if ($installed -notcontains $bin) {
-      $dst = Join-Path $InstallDir $bin
-      if (Test-Path $dst) { Remove-Item -Path $dst -Force }
-    }
-  }
-
-  Write-Host ""
-  Write-Host "Installed gitlawb $tag"
-  foreach ($bin in $installed) { Write-Host "  $bin -> $InstallDir\$bin" }
-}
-finally {
-  Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $tmp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
-}
-
-# Add to the user PATH if missing.
-$userPath = [Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable("Path", "User")
-if (($userPath -split ';') -notcontains $InstallDir) {
-  $newPath = if ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($userPath)) { $InstallDir } else { "$userPath;$InstallDir" }
-  [Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable("Path", $newPath, "User")
-  Write-Host ""
-  Write-Host "Added $InstallDir to your PATH. Restart your terminal, then run:"
-} else {
-  Write-Host ""
-  Write-Host "Run:"
-}
-Write-Host "  gl doctor"
-Write-Host "  gl quickstart"
-Write-Host ""
-Write-Host "Docs: https://docs.gitlawb.com"
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-node_modules/
-
-# Platform binaries — laid in by the release workflow at publish time, not committed.
-packages/gl-darwin-arm64/gl
-packages/gl-darwin-arm64/git-remote-gitlawb
-packages/gl-darwin-x64/gl
-packages/gl-darwin-x64/git-remote-gitlawb
-packages/gl-linux-arm64/gl
-packages/gl-linux-arm64/git-remote-gitlawb
-packages/gl-linux-x64/gl
-packages/gl-linux-x64/git-remote-gitlawb
-
-# Wrapper bin placeholders are overwritten by postinstall.
-packages/gl/bin/gl
-packages/gl/bin/git-remote-gitlawb
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-# npm distribution for the gitlawb CLI
-
-This directory packages the `gl` and `git-remote-gitlawb` binaries as the
-[`@gitlawb/gl`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@gitlawb/gl) npm package.
-
-It uses the **optionalDependencies platform-package** pattern (the same one
-esbuild/swc/turbo use): the wrapper `@gitlawb/gl` declares four per-platform
-packages as `optionalDependencies`, each gated by `os`/`cpu`. npm installs only
-the one matching the host, and the wrapper's `postinstall` (`install.js`) copies
-the binary out of it into `bin/`. No binaries are downloaded at install time.
-
-```text
-packages/
-  gl/                  @gitlawb/gl            wrapper (postinstall, bin shims)
-  gl-darwin-arm64/     @gitlawb/gl-darwin-arm64   aarch64-apple-darwin
-  gl-darwin-x64/       @gitlawb/gl-darwin-x64     x86_64-apple-darwin
-  gl-linux-arm64/      @gitlawb/gl-linux-arm64    aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
-  gl-linux-x64/        @gitlawb/gl-linux-x64      x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
-```
-
-## Publishing
-
-Publishing is **automated** by `.github/workflows/release.yml` (the `npm-publish`
-job) on every release-please release. That job:
-
-1. Downloads the four unix release tarballs from the `Gitlawb/node` GitHub release.
-2. Lays `gl` + `git-remote-gitlawb` into each platform package.
-3. Rewrites every `package.json` `version` (and the wrapper's
-   `optionalDependencies` pins) to the release version.
-4. Publishes the four platform packages first, then the wrapper, with
-   `npm publish --provenance --access public`.
-
-The committed `version` fields here are placeholders; the workflow is the single
-source of truth and always uses the release tag. There is no manual publish step.
-
-Windows is intentionally not published to npm — the wrapper points Windows users
-at the curl/PowerShell installer instead.
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "@gitlawb/gl-darwin-arm64",
-  "version": "0.3.9",
-  "description": "Gitlawb CLI binary for macOS Apple Silicon (arm64)",
-  "license": "MIT",
-  "os": ["darwin"],
-  "cpu": ["arm64"],
-  "publishConfig": {
-    "access": "public",
-    "registry": "https://registry.npmjs.org/"
-  },
-  "repository": {
-    "type": "git",
-    "url": "https://github.com/Gitlawb/node",
-    "directory": "npm/packages/gl-darwin-arm64"
-  },
-  "files": [
-    "gl",
-    "git-remote-gitlawb"
-  ]
-}
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "@gitlawb/gl-darwin-x64",
-  "version": "0.3.9",
-  "description": "Gitlawb CLI binary for macOS Intel (x64)",
-  "license": "MIT",
-  "os": ["darwin"],
-  "cpu": ["x64"],
-  "publishConfig": {
-    "access": "public",
-    "registry": "https://registry.npmjs.org/"
-  },
-  "repository": {
-    "type": "git",
-    "url": "https://github.com/Gitlawb/node",
-    "directory": "npm/packages/gl-darwin-x64"
-  },
-  "files": [
-    "gl",
-    "git-remote-gitlawb"
-  ]
-}
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "@gitlawb/gl-linux-arm64",
-  "version": "0.3.9",
-  "description": "Gitlawb CLI binary for Linux arm64",
-  "license": "MIT",
-  "os": ["linux"],
-  "cpu": ["arm64"],
-  "publishConfig": {
-    "access": "public",
-    "registry": "https://registry.npmjs.org/"
-  },
-  "repository": {
-    "type": "git",
-    "url": "https://github.com/Gitlawb/node",
-    "directory": "npm/packages/gl-linux-arm64"
-  },
-  "files": [
-    "gl",
-    "git-remote-gitlawb"
-  ]
-}
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "@gitlawb/gl-linux-x64",
-  "version": "0.3.9",
-  "description": "Gitlawb CLI binary for Linux x64",
-  "license": "MIT",
-  "os": ["linux"],
-  "cpu": ["x64"],
-  "publishConfig": {
-    "access": "public",
-    "registry": "https://registry.npmjs.org/"
-  },
-  "repository": {
-    "type": "git",
-    "url": "https://github.com/Gitlawb/node",
-    "directory": "npm/packages/gl-linux-x64"
-  },
-  "files": [
-    "gl",
-    "git-remote-gitlawb"
-  ]
-}