* fix(providerio): close idle connections periodically to prevent HTTP/2 PROTOCOL_ERROR
OpenRouter and other HTTP/2 backends can silently reset or drop connections
that sit idle in Go's client connection pool across user turns. When a
subsequent turn reuses the stale connection, it fails on stream connect with
PROTOCOL_ERROR.
Launch a background idle connection closer on non-darwin platforms to evict
idle pooled connections on a 30-second interval, forcing fresh handshakes
after idle pauses while preserving connection reuse across fast agent turns.
Refs #1057
* test(providerio): poll for idle connection eviction with bounded deadline
Replace the fixed 60ms sleep in TestStartIdleConnCloserClosesIdleConnections
with a 2-second bounded polling loop to avoid test flakes under heavy CI
load or under the race detector.
Refs #1057
---------
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
* feat(execution): add a stdin-only write for interactive processes
* feat(tui): attach overlay for interactive terminal sessions
* feat(tui): add /attach for interactive terminal sessions
* feat(tools): point the model at tty sessions for interactive prompts
* feat(tui): open the terminal automatically for tty exec sessions
* feat(tools): tell the model to keep polling while the user types
* feat(tui): give attached terminal sessions the full viewport
* feat(tools): route sudo through an escalated tty session
* fix(tui): route the auto-attach tick to its run
* fix(tui): defer auto-attach while another view owns the screen
* fix(tui): keep bracketed-paste framing for attached sessions
* fix(tools): let tty sessions run interactive commands
* fix(tui): capture the auto-attach baseline before the exec starts
* fix(mcp): reject a server-initiated request as a streamable-HTTP response
networkClient.request matched the decoded POST body to the in-flight call on
id alone, so a server that answered tools/call with a method-bearing frame
produced an empty, error-free result. Apply the same isRequestOrNotification
guard the SSE paths already use and return a protocol error naming the method.
Fixes#1050
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Babin <[email protected]>
* fix(mcp): describe the unexpected frame by method, not as a request
A method-bearing frame without an id is a notification, so the error
should not call it a request.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Babin <[email protected]>
---------
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Babin <[email protected]>
Motivation: scripts/action-summary.mjs is invoked by the composite
action in action.yml on every action run, and ships with a 12-test
suite in scripts/action-summary.test.mjs. Neither the action-smoke
workflow nor the main Go-focused ci.yml executed that suite, and the
action-smoke workflow's paths filters did not even include those two
script files, so a change to the helper or its tests triggered no CI
job at all.
Approach: add scripts/action-summary.mjs and
scripts/action-summary.test.mjs to both the pull_request and push
paths filters in .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml, and add a
Setup Node (actions/setup-node, node-version 24, matching the pin
already used in release-artifacts.yml) step followed by a
`node --test scripts/action-summary.test.mjs` step in the validate
job, ahead of the existing action.yml validation steps.
Validation:
- `node --test scripts/action-summary.test.mjs` passes locally: 12/12
tests pass (Node v22.23.1; repo engines field requires >=18, CI pins
24).
- Broke an assertion in a scratch copy of the test file outside the
repo and reran `node --test`: 1 test failed and the process exited
non-zero, confirming the new CI step actually gates on failures as
the issue requires.
- `python3 -c "import yaml; yaml.safe_load(...)"` confirms the edited
workflow YAML still parses.
- Confirmed .github/workflows/ci.yml has no Node step (Go-only
pipeline), so zero-action-smoke.yml is the correct integration
point.
- Base branch CI (upstream/main) is currently green.
Report: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1030
Assisted-by: claude-sonnet-5 (via Claude Code)
Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
Motivation:
release-artifacts.yml's three actions/checkout steps (ordinary checkout,
workflow-dispatch requested-ref checkout, and the npm-publish job
checkout) and pr-auto-review.yml's single checkout step all leave
persist-credentials at its default, so the workflow token stays in the
job's local git config for every later step, including build/test/package
steps that never need it. ci.yml and zero-action-smoke.yml already
disable this. Neither modified file runs git push/commit/tag: the GitHub
Release publish step supplies its own explicit GH_TOKEN, and npm
publishing uses OIDC trusted publishing, so removing the persisted
credential changes no behavior.
Approach:
Add `persist-credentials: false` to each of the four checkout steps,
matching the exact convention already used in ci.yml/zero-action-smoke.yml.
Validation:
- go build ./... and go vet ./... pass.
- gofmt -l . reports nothing.
- go test ./internal/installtest/... passes.
- actionlint on both changed files reports only two pre-existing shellcheck
warnings in release-artifacts.yml (SC2016, SC2034) that are unrelated to
this diff and were confirmed present before the change as well (verified
by stashing and re-running actionlint against the original files).
- A live GitHub Actions run of the release/publish workflows was not
reproducible locally; this change only disables a default the workflows
never rely on, so no functional change is expected.
Report: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1029
Assisted-by: claude-sonnet-5 (via Claude Code)
Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
* fix(oauth): force-close loopback callback connections past the shutdown deadline
Motivation:
LoopbackListener.Close shuts the callback server down with a 1-second
context and discards the result. http.Server.Shutdown only closes idle
connections, so a client that sends a partial request header and never
finishes it counts as active; Shutdown blocks out the full deadline,
times out, and Close returns while that connection and its Serve
goroutine remain open indefinitely. This is a loopback-only (127.0.0.1),
short-lived, single-use server, so the impact is a resource leak past
the end of the flow, not a remote vulnerability or crash.
Approach:
- add a ReadHeaderTimeout to the server so a stalled request header is
bounded on its own;
- follow a timed-out or otherwise failed Shutdown with server.Close()
to forcibly tear down any connection still open past the deadline;
- join the Serve goroutine (via a done channel) before Close returns,
so its completion is observable instead of left dangling.
internal/mcp/oauth.go and internal/provideroauth/openrouter.go build
their own loopback servers with the same pattern; they are left
untouched here to keep this change scoped to the file the issue's
reproduction demonstrates.
Validation:
- go build ./internal/oauth/... and go vet ./internal/oauth/...: clean.
- gofmt -l internal/oauth/: clean (make fmt-check clean repo-wide).
- go test ./internal/oauth/... -race -v -count=1: all pass, including
three new tests (TestLoopbackCloseForceClosesSlowHeaderConnection,
TestLoopbackCloseIsIdempotent,
TestLoopbackCloseReturnsPromptlyAfterSuccessfulCallback).
- Confirmed TestLoopbackCloseForceClosesSlowHeaderConnection fails
against the pre-fix loopback.go (with the new test kept) and passes
with the fix applied.
- Full repo go build ./..., go vet ./..., and go test ./... pass.
- Could not run make lint-static (golangci-lint) locally: it needs a
very large dependency download and the local environment ran out of
disk space fetching it. That check is continue-on-error (advisory)
in .github/workflows/ci.yml, not a required gate.
Report: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1028
Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
Assisted-by: claude-sonnet-5 (via Claude Code)
* test(oauth): synchronize loopback regression tests instead of sleeping
TestLoopbackCloseForceClosesSlowHeaderConnection relied on a fixed
100ms sleep to let Serve accept a connection before sending a stalled
header; under load this could fail or silently skip the force-close
path it's meant to exercise. Use an http.Server.ConnState hook (via a
new unexported newLoopbackListener, set before Serve starts to avoid
a race) to wait for the real StateNew signal instead.
TestLoopbackCloseReturnsPromptlyAfterSuccessfulCallback measured
Close's elapsed time without joining its http.Get goroutine or
draining/closing the response body; join it first so the timing
starts from a connection that's actually back to idle.
Also register t.Cleanup(l.Close) in both tests so a Fatalf between
construction and the existing explicit Close doesn't leak the
listener's Serve goroutine.
Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
---------
Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
* feat(config): report whether the tool-turn budget was explicitly set
ResolvedConfig.MaxTurns is ambiguous today: a configured 80 and the
built-in default 80 are indistinguishable, so a caller that wants a
different default cannot tell "user chose this" from "nobody set it".
FileConfig now records at each merge gate (config files, provider
command, ZERO_MAX_TURNS, CLI overrides) when a source supplies a
positive maxTurns, and Resolve surfaces it as MaxTurnsSet.
* feat(exec): default headless runs to the turn-budget ceiling
The shared 80-turn default is sized for the TUI, where the user can
say "continue" and the run resumes. Headless exec has nobody to do
that, so benchmark evals truncated at 80 turns mid-implementation.
An unset budget now resolves to MaxTurnsCeiling for exec only; any
explicit source (flag, mode preset, ZERO_MAX_TURNS, config file) and
exec-profile budgets keep their precedence. The TUI default is
unchanged.
* test(cli,config): cover the headless turn-budget default
* refactor(cli): extract the headless turn-budget decision
* feat(tui): support an optional detail line on picker rows
Add a faint second line under picker items so richer surfaces can show
secondary metadata (project, model, size) without crowding the label.
The line renders on the selection band, joins the search haystack, and
only appears at medium width and above; detail rows halve the visible
window so the overlay keeps its height, and mouse hit-testing maps a
click on either line to the same item.
* feat(tui): show project, model, and size under /resume rows
Each session row now carries a detail line with the project directory
(~-contracted), the model that ran it, and its event count, plus a
status chip for forks and tagged sessions. The line also joins the
filter haystack, so searching by project path or model name works.
Narrow terminals keep the existing single-line list.
* feat(tui): show relative last-activity age in /resume rows
Replace the absolute timestamp column with relative age ("2h ago",
"12d ago") so recency reads at a glance; distant history still shows
the calendar date. Also adds coverage for the detail line: rendering
at wide vs narrow tiers, status chips, and filtering by model.
* refactor(tui): drop the event count from /resume detail rows
Event count is an internal metric — the detail line now carries just
project, model, and the status chip, which are the fields that
actually discriminate sessions.
* fix(tui): sanitize session metadata before it reaches picker rows
Persisted titles (--session-title, /rename) and other metadata can
legally contain newlines; a stray line would break the picker's fixed
row geometry and misalign mouse hit-testing. Reuse sanitizeCardField
for the label and detail line, and cover the detail-line click path.
* fix(tui): strip carriage returns from rendered session metadata
A \r in a persisted title or model id rewinds the cursor to column 0
and overwrites the row. Fold it into sanitizeCardField alongside the
existing newline handling, and cover it in the picker test.
* fix(tui): pad picker detail lines on the selection band
The detail line only painted its text, so the selection highlight
stopped at the end of the text instead of spanning the row like the
label line above it. Pad the remainder with the row surface.
* test(tui): cover carriage returns in sanitizeCardField
* fix(tui): drop all control runes from rendered session metadata
The picker detail line newly renders cwd, model id, and tag, and any
of them can legally carry ESC/CSI/OSC/BEL/BS/VT/NEL bytes — a project
directory name containing \x1b[2J would repaint the terminal when the
picker opens. sanitizeCardField now maps line separators and tabs to
spaces and drops every remaining control rune, matching the package's
other sanitizers; this also closes the same hole for titles, which
predates the detail line.
* fix(tui): include exactly-30-day sessions in the relative-age branch
* fix(sandbox): keep a derived ACL target inside the write root it came from
FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT refuses a reparse point at the final path
component and resolves every component above it, which is right for a path
the operator named and not enough for one this package derived. The
write-root carveouts are derived: <root>/.git/hooks and <root>/.git/config
are constructed from a root, and <root>/.git is a name an unprivileged
workspace writer can create before setup runs. mklink /J needs no
privilege, so a junction there had the apply open <junction-target>/hooks,
an ordinary directory with nothing wrong about its final component, and
zero sandbox setup wrote a deny ACE on it as Administrator, outside the
workspace.
A derived entry now carries the root it came from, and the apply requires
the object it finally holds to still live under it. The check is on the
handle rather than the name: GetFinalPathNameByHandle answers where the
open object actually is, and both sides go through it so the spelling
normalizes the same way. Materialization is checked before it creates,
since os.MkdirAll follows the same reparse points.
Deliberately not a refusal of every reparse point on the path. Above the
write root the path is the operator's, who may keep a workspace under a
junction or a mapped directory; only the tail the sandbox appended is held
strict.
Closes#1024
* fix(sandbox): reject the reparse ancestor itself before materializing
The pre-create check asked where the deepest existing ancestor lives, and
a junction answers with its own path: the open does not follow a
final-component reparse point, so <root>/.git came back as <root>/.git and
matched. os.MkdirAll does follow it. What disqualifies that ancestor is
that it IS a reparse point, not where it reports living.
Found by reverting the check and watching the test still pass, which said
the guard was doing nothing rather than that the test was weak. Pinned
against the function now, because through the whole apply the create is
made and then removed on the failure path, so the filesystem afterwards
looks identical either way. The plan wiring gets its own test for the same
reason: every apply-level case here hands the group an anchor directly, so
none of them would notice the builder never setting one.
* fix(sandbox): anchor only the carveouts that are under the root, and put the DACL back
Two from review, both right.
ReadOnlySubpaths is a profile field an operator can set to any path, and one
placed outside the write root is a configuration that works today; anchoring
it unconditionally turned that into a containment refusal. Only paths
lexically under the root are anchored now, which is where the derived
carveouts are anyway, and anything else keeps the final-component guard it
always had.
The successful-apply tests left their deny ACE in place, so t.TempDir could
fail to remove the tree. Restoring the snapshot exposed the sharper half:
the ACE denied the group the test runs as, which revoked its own WRITE_DAC
and left the rollback unable to reopen the target. The tests deny a group
this process is not a member of instead, which is what a capability SID is
in production, and roll back afterwards.
* test(sandbox): check the plan anchoring on every platform, out-of-root case included
The plan builder is cross-platform and its anchor tests were in a Windows-only
file, so nothing checked the wiring on Linux or macOS. Moved beside the other
BuildWindowsACLPlan tests, with the case review raised: an out-of-root
ReadOnlySubpath stays unanchored, and an in-root one is still held to its
write root.
* test(sandbox): give the cross-platform anchor tests native paths
Moving these beside the other BuildWindowsACLPlan tests made them run on
Linux and macOS, where their Windows path literals stop meaning what they
say: pathWithinRoot is filepath.Rel underneath, a backslash is an ordinary
character off Windows, and C:\workspace\.git\hooks is then one component
that is not under C:\workspace, so every anchor came back empty. The
neighbouring tests get away with such literals because they only compare
strings they built the same way and never ask whether one contains another.
Paths are built with filepath.Join from temp roots now, so the containment
question is asked in the separator the running platform actually uses.
* feat(acp): add standard session list and resume
Origin-Session: local-abff1c | Claude Code | 7 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: b7d0806d49f9
Origin-Session: local-13d543 | Claude Code | 5 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 6b5eb8ba4e5b
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: d2b8f44a9abc
* fix(acp): preserve notification wire order
Origin-Session: local-abff1c | Claude Code | 7 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: b7d0806d49f9
Origin-Session: local-13d543 | Claude Code | 5 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 6b5eb8ba4e5b
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: d2b8f44a9abc
* fix(acp): bind sessions to persisted workspaces
Origin-Session: local-abff1c | Claude Code | 7 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: b7d0806d49f9
Origin-Session: local-13d543 | Claude Code | 5 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 6b5eb8ba4e5b
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: d2b8f44a9abc
* fix(acp): compare workspaces by filesystem identity, not by spelling
@Vasanthdev2004's three findings, all reproduced before changing anything.
TWO SPELLINGS OF ONE DIRECTORY WERE TWO WORKSPACES. Both comparisons were string
equality on ResolveWorkspaceRoot output, and that resolver is abs plus
filepath.Clean plus a stat — it does not fold case and does not resolve
junctions. A session persisted from the TUI was unresumable from an editor
holding a different spelling of the same project folder, and session/list
filtered by the other spelling returned nothing, which makes it an invisible
failure rather than a reported one. It lands on exactly the case this feature
exists for, and on the two processes most likely to disagree about spelling.
os.SameFile asks the filesystem which directories these are, which is the
question. filepath.EvalSymlinks is NOT the fix on Windows — it normalises a
drive letter and returns a junction path unchanged, so the alias survives it,
and junctions need no privilege. String equality stays as the fast path, and a
stat failure falls back to it rather than widening the match: this gate refuses
access to another workspace's files and configuration, so an unanswerable
comparison denies.
THE TEST COULD NOT SEE ANY OF IT. testDeps resolves with the identity function,
so the guard degenerated to "are these two strings different" fed two unrelated
temp directories — it could only ever answer yes. The rejection direction was
pinned and the acceptance direction was asserted nowhere. The new test uses a
resolver reproducing the production normalisation and drives the ACCEPTANCE
direction through an alias, skipping if the filesystem folds the alias away so
it never passes vacuously. Reverting to string equality fails it three ways:
load, resume, and a list that returns zero.
THE WIRE KEYS ARE AN EXTERNAL CONTRACT. Nothing pinned sessionId, cwd, title,
updatedAt, _meta, modelId, createdAt, sessions, nextCursor, cursor, loadSession,
promptCapabilities, sessionCapabilities, list or resume, so renaming a Go field
would break every client and leave the suite green. Renaming modelId to model_id
now fails.
Origin-Session: local-79d7a0 | Claude Code | 5 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: c175cabb9d50
Origin-Session: local-13d543 | Claude Code | 5 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 6b5eb8ba4e5b
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: d2b8f44a9abc
* fix(acp): test the alias guard where the bug lives, and stop listing unusable sessions
THE TEST COULD NOT RUN ON THE PLATFORM THE BUG IS FROM. @Vasanthdev2004's point,
and he is right that it is not a nit. The alias test built its second name with
os.Symlink, which needs a privilege an ordinary Windows session does not hold, so
it SKIPPED there — and Windows is where junctions exist and where this defect came
from. The identity guard was verified by CI on the two platforms that never had
the problem. It now builds the alias with mklink /J on Windows, which needs no
privilege and is how he found the defect in the first place, and keeps the symlink
arm elsewhere.
This is the second time in this series a correct fix shipped with a test that
could not exercise it: the same helper shape was added to internal/memory for the
same reason a day earlier.
A SESSION WITH NO PERSISTED WORKSPACE IS NOT RESUMABLE, SO IT IS NOT LISTED.
CodeRabbit's finding. activatePersistedSession refuses an empty Cwd, but the
listing advertised it anyway — a menu entry that only fails when taken. The test
asserts both halves, because the listing is only correct relative to what resume
will accept: the omitted session is checked to really fail on resume, and a usable
session is checked to survive the filter.
Mutation-checked: removing the filter advertises the unusable session again.
Origin-Session: local-13d543 | Claude Code | 5 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 6b5eb8ba4e5b
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: d2b8f44a9abc
* fix(acp): resolve every listed workspace, not only when a filter was supplied
@anandh8x's P1, both halves reproduced before changing anything.
The loop resolved item.Cwd only when a cwd filter was present, and skipped only a
blank one. Two shapes stayed on the menu that session/resume then refuses:
- a session whose persisted workspace has since been deleted, advertised as
resumable
- a legacy entry holding a relative path, reported as cwd "." although ACP
requires SessionInfo.cwd to be absolute
Every entry is now resolved unconditionally, anything that cannot resolve is
omitted, and the RESOLVED root is what SessionInfo carries — absolute as the
contract requires, and the same value the client hands back on resume. The
optional identity filter then applies to the resolved roots, which is also where
it belonged.
Listing is a menu: activatePersistedSession resolves and refuses what it cannot
reach, so anything this loop cannot resolve is something a client would be
offered and then denied.
Mutation-checked: restoring the resolve-only-when-filtered shape re-advertises
the deleted workspace and re-emits the relative cwd.
Origin-Session: local-76c8d7 | Claude Code | 6 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 259b715cf0fd
Origin-Session: local-13d543 | Claude Code | 5 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 6b5eb8ba4e5b
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: d2b8f44a9abc
* test(acp): assert the relative entry is retained, not merely absolute
CodeRabbit's catch, and the test was genuinely weaker than it looked. It checked
that the deleted workspace was gone, the live one kept, and every listed cwd
absolute — all of which a "fix" that simply DISCARDED any non-absolute entry
would satisfy, while losing a resumable session.
Presence is now asserted separately from spelling: the relative entry must still
be listed, and listed with an absolute path.
Mutation-checked: skipping non-absolute entries instead of resolving them now
fails with "a session with a resolvable relative workspace was dropped rather
than normalised". The first attempt at that mutation did not compile, so it
proved nothing until it was rewritten — worth saying, because a mutation that
fails to build looks exactly like a test that passes.
Origin-Session: local-13d543 | Claude Code | 5 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 6b5eb8ba4e5b
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: d2b8f44a9abc
* fix(acp): a relative persisted workspace is omitted, not rebased
Reported by @anandh8x. Resolving a stored relative cwd does not recover the
session's workspace, it invents one: ResolveWorkspaceRoot joins it against
whatever directory the ACP server happens to be running in, and that invented
absolute path was then advertised as the session's workspace and accepted as
its home on resume.
Reproduced on f2c6fc9a, a session persisted with cwd ".":
LISTED legacy-rel as cwd="/Users/kratos/dev/f914/internal/acp"
resume with an UNRELATED workspace -> err=... cwd does not match its persisted workspace
resume with NO cwd (falls back to ".") -> err=<nil>
The mismatch check does its job when the client names a workspace, so the only
opening was the fallback path, where the rebased value was compared against
itself and always agreed. A conversation created for one project could be
resumed against another project's files, configuration and tools.
Both doors now take the same guard: handleSessionList omits an entry whose
persisted cwd is not absolute, and activatePersistedSession refuses one rather
than resolving it. The original base is not knowable from the metadata, so
guessing at it is not an option a fix can take.
This reverses an earlier assertion in TestSessionListResolvesEveryWorkspace,
which expected the relative entry to be normalised and retained. That was
requested in review on the grounds that dropping it loses a resumable session.
It does, but the entry was never resumable into its own workspace, only into
this process's. The test now asserts it is dropped, and a new
TestResumeRefusesARelativePersistedWorkspace covers the fallback path that the
listing filter alone leaves open.
Both guards mutation-checked: removing either one fails its test.
Pre-existing on this branch and on its merge-base, unrelated to this change:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider both exit 3 in this environment.
Origin-Session: local-8cd239 | Claude Code | 11 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 365efe3045f2
Origin-Session: local-13d543 | Claude Code | 5 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 6b5eb8ba4e5b
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: d2b8f44a9abc
* test(acp): the resume guard is asserted through both activating methods
Raised by CodeRabbit: the test is named for resume and called session/load.
session/load and session/resume are separate entry points that today share
activatePersistedSession, so an assertion through either one passes while the
guard holds — but the name promised a surface it was not touching. Both are now
named explicitly, which keeps that true: if resume is ever given its own path,
this fails rather than quietly covering half of what it claims to.
With the guard removed, both methods accept a relative persisted workspace on
the no-cwd fallback. The named-workspace case was already refused by the
existing mismatch check; the fallback was the only door open, and it is open on
both.
Not taken in this PR, from the same review: threading a rooted directory handle
through ResolveWorkspaceRoot and workspace construction so a root rename or link
swap cannot redirect later file operations. That is a real question and a
pre-existing one — this change adds a refusal and no path handling — but it is a
capability refactor across workspace and tool access with its own race test, not
something to fold into a session-list fix. Worth its own issue.
Origin-Session: local-8cd239 | Claude Code | 11 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 365efe3045f2
Origin-Session: local-13d543 | Claude Code | 5 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 6b5eb8ba4e5b
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: d2b8f44a9abc
* fix(acp): activation requires an absolute cwd in the REQUEST, not just the record
Reported by @jatmn.
ResumeSessionParams is a type alias for LoadSessionParams, so JSON decoding turns
an OMITTED resume cwd into an empty string. That blank reached the shared
activation path, whose blank-cwd fallback substitutes meta.Cwd — so
{"sessionId":"known"} activated a persisted session, even though ACP v1 requires
session/resume to carry an absolute working directory.
This is a different hole from the persisted-cwd one fixed earlier on this branch.
That guard asks whether the STORED workspace is identifiable; this asks whether
the CALLER named one at all. The earlier fix does not cover it, because a stored
absolute cwd passes that check and the blank request then silently inherits it.
requestedWorkspace validates the request's own cwd before anything reaches the
fallback: absent, empty and whitespace-only are all invalid params, and so is a
relative path. Applied to both activating methods rather than to resume alone —
load's omitted-cwd fallback was inheriting the same way, and leaving one door
open is how this class survived the last fix.
Mutation-checked at the wire, which is where the defect lives: making the blank
case return no error compiles and fails the regression on four separate requests
— session/load and session/resume, each with cwd omitted and with cwd blank. A
Go-level test would not have caught it, since the defect is in decoding an absent
field.
Two notes from a verification pass, neither a defect:
Error precedence changed: a blank cwd with an UNKNOWN session id now reports the
cwd problem instead of "session not found". Kept deliberately and pinned — it
stops the server confirming whether a session exists to a request that named no
workspace.
AdditionalDirectories is declared on two params structs and consumed nowhere in
the repo. Not a hole today, but it is the same shape — client-supplied paths with
no absoluteness rule — so the field now carries a note saying it must go through
requestedWorkspace when wired up.
Rebased onto ad34dc8d. go test -race ./internal/acp/ -count=5: clean.
Pre-existing here and on main: TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics
and TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: d2b8f44a9abc
* fix(acp): resume the conversation a session became, and fail closed when it cannot
Three defects in ACP session restoration, all reported by @jatmn.
loadHistory read the raw event log and kept only EventMessage. A compacted
session stores its original prefix alongside an EventCompaction naming the
events it replaced and carrying their summary, so restoring from the raw log
replayed superseded turns AND dropped the summary that replaced them. It now
reads the same rehydrated view the TUI and exec paths use, and explicitly
projects the compaction summary -- switching readers alone would still drop it,
because rehydration substitutes the compaction event in place of what it
replaced.
historyErr only suppressed replay and raised a warning: the session was
registered and reported ready regardless, so an unreadable events file left the
caller holding a live, promptable session ID whose next prompt ran as a fresh
conversation under the old identity. Resume now fails. Load keeps the
best-effort policy deliberately rather than by inheriting the shared helper.
Tool calls and their results were dropped from session/load, so a restored
transcript showed prose asserting edits with no record that any tool ran. They
now replay through the same toolCallStart/toolCallResult mapping a live turn
uses, keyed on the stored toolCallId so results pair with their calls. They do
not enter turnRecord, so load and resume still consume the same effective
history. Resume stays replay-free.
Also asserts that an unset sessionCapabilities is omitted rather than
serialized as null, raised by CodeRabbit.
* fix(acp): persist tool activity for session replay
* test(acp): bound replay notification waits
* fix(acp): preserve session restore invariants
* fix(acp): restore session lifecycle boundaries
* fix(acp): preserve replay and restore identity
* fix(acp): commit a completed turn as one store batch
A completed turn was buffered until its outcome was known and then persisted
one event per call. Each call took and released the store's session lock, so a
second ACP instance holding the same session -- its turnMu is its own, only the
store is shared -- could append its whole turn between two of them: user A,
user B, answer B, answer A. Every write was individually locked and the log
was valid, but a fresh load pairs prose by order and reconstructed three wrong
turns from two right ones. Before this branch the user and assistant events
went to AppendEvents together; buffering until the outcome is known was the
right change and splitting the commit into singleton writes was not.
The whole buffer now goes through one Store.AppendEvents call, which writes the
batch under one lock and one file write. That is the contiguity being restored:
not a disk transaction, and not a promise about a crash mid-fsync. The outcome
gate still runs first; a hard failure still commits nothing; cancellation still
commits through the same boundary. A persistence failure is now the failure of
the whole batch, so there is no dependent suffix to protect and the rewritten
regression asserts that nothing of the turn is durable, the warning is raised,
and a fresh load replays none of it.
The two-instance regression holds both writers at the commit boundary until
each has arrived and then delegates to the real batch API under the real lock;
it observes what production hands it rather than batching anything itself, so
reverting to singleton writes fails it before any interleaving has to be
provoked. The restored prompt keeps both prose pairs and no historical tool
output.
Also normalizes the expected workspace in the listing test through
filepath.Clean, matching the resolver's output contract, so a TMPDIR spelled
with a ".." component no longer fails a correct result.
Rebased onto main to pick up the ACP browser metadata, specialist model
restoration and worktree pointer protection changes. Both reported by @jatmn.
* fix(tools): say when format-on-write ran out of time
The 10s bound exists so a wedged formatter cannot hang a tool call, which
is right, and on expiry the unformatted write stood with nothing said. Every
other fallback here is a standing fact about the environment (toggle off, no
formatter for the extension, binary not installed) and is silent because
nothing is wrong. A deadline firing is not that: formatting was configured,
available and expected, and the file was written unformatted because the
machine was slow. Left silent, the caller believes it wrote canonical style
and finds out from a CI format check it cannot see, which is the failure
this feature exists to prevent.
The timeout is now reported on the write and edit summaries, naming the file
and the formatter. The caller cancelling and the formatter exiting non-zero
are deliberately not reported: the first is already surfaced as a cancelled
run, and the second usually means content the formatter could not parse,
which a write does not promise to fix.
The bound stays 10s rather than being raised. Raising it makes a wedged
formatter block longer, which is the thing the bound is for; what was
missing was knowing when it fired.
Closes#1022
* fix(tools): put the written bytes back when the formatter fails
These formatters edit in place, so one killed by the deadline, killed by
the caller, or exiting partway through its own rewrite can leave the target
truncated: neither the input nor the output. Returning the written bytes on
top of that left the tracker baseline and the diff preview describing a
file that is not on disk, so the next edit would compare against content the
file does not have. That is a worse failure than the missing formatting the
previous commit set out to disclose.
The failure paths write the bytes back, and when even that fails the user
hears about it, since it is their file. Written back unconditionally on that
path rather than only when the bytes differ: comparing first means reading
the file to find out, and a read that fails leaves the same ambiguity this
exists to remove.
The fixture is proven to damage the file on a throwaway copy, because a
successful restore erases the evidence from the real one. My first attempt
asserted that on the target itself, where it could only pass vacuously or
report the opposite of what it saw.
* fix(sessions): render resume context fields in key order
extractText walked a map[string]any directly and Go randomizes map
iteration, so the same session put the same fields in a different order in
every process: one run rendered a tool call as c1 read_file {"path":...},
the next as {"path":...} c1 read_file. That block is part of the user
prompt, so the prompt itself changed run to run, which leaves a provider
nothing stable to prefix-cache for it and makes two resumes of one session
impossible to diff while debugging.
Only the ordering is decided here. The summary short-circuit is untouched,
a list keeps the order it was written in, and which fields survive at all
stays the caller's projection.
Pinned as exact rendered strings rather than as two renders agreeing: a
same-process repeat passes whenever the random order happens to repeat,
which for a small map is often. The raw-JSON case proved it while being
written, matching on the first five attempts before diverging on the sixth.
Closes#1020
* test(sessions): name the expected context block instead of the first render
Comparing later renders against the first only asks whether the renderer is
stable, and a renderer that is stably wrong passes it: any fixed field order
satisfies it, including the unsorted one this change replaces.
It also hid something. The events were tool calls, which
promptContextEvents filters out of the resume context on this branch, so
the block being compared was a single message line and nothing said so. The
test now names the block it expects, on events that survive the filter, and
both failures are visible.
Creating a symlink on Windows needs SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege, which an
ordinary developer account does not hold, so this reported a failure with
nothing wrong in the code: "A required privilege is not held by the client".
CI runners are elevated, so it only ever appeared locally, where it cost a
round of triage on #1003 before being ruled environmental and would do the
same to any contributor on a stock Windows machine.
The two other symlink tests in this package, and most of the rest of the
repo, already answer this way. Swept the remaining os.Symlink-then-Fatal
sites rather than assuming: internal/release passes, the one in
internal/agent is never reached, and the unix-only files cannot hit it. This
was the outlier.
Closes#1021
* feat(tui): offer mid-run model escalation behind --allow-escalation
Mid-run escalation existed but only exec offered it. The TUI already handled
every consequence of a switch, re-deriving the compaction threshold "after a
mid-run escalate_model switch" and resolving the summarizer against the active
profile, while nothing on that surface could cause one: escalate_model was
registered by exec alone. This closes that, opt-in, the same conservative way
exec answers the question.
Opt-in rather than default because escalation moves a run onto a different model,
which changes what it costs and which provider sees the conversation. That is the
operator's call, and the exec flag already answers it.
The switchers are built per turn from m.providerProfile rather than once at
launch. A TUI session can change models with /model, so a closure capturing the
startup profile would escalate from whatever the session began with instead of
what is in force now, and would carry that stale profile's base URL and
credential with it. exec has no such problem because its profile cannot change
mid-run, which is why the wiring lives in different places on the two surfaces.
The nil-contract logic is now shared rather than copied. providers.
EscalationSwitchers is the single implementation both surfaces call: the loop
swaps only on a non-nil provider, so a (nil, nil) return has to leave everything
untouched including the caller's usage attribution, and the session switcher is
installed only when the run STARTED optimized so escalation cannot change the
transport underneath a session. A second copy of that would only ever have been
exercised on one surface. exec's behaviour is unchanged: its six existing
escalation tests pass against the shared builder.
The tool and the switchers ride on one flag and a test asserts they cannot be
separated. Registering escalate_model without wiring a switcher ships a tool the
loop silently ignores, so the model reports an escalation that never happened;
that is the specific failure worth a guard rather than a comment.
Note this does not answer all of #554. Assigning models per phase, plan with one
and execute with another, is still not built. This makes the mechanism reachable
from the interactive surface, which is the part that was one flag away.
Refs #554
* fix(tui): attribute usage after an escalation to the model in force
exec reassigns currentModel when the escalation switcher fires; the TUI
captured usageModelID once per run and handed the switcher no callback,
so every usage event after a mid-run escalation was billed to the model
the run started on. The switcher now updates usageModelID, and the final
response carries the model per usage event so the batch fallback does
not swing the other way and bill the events before the switch to the
escalated model. Covered by a run through a scripted escalation that
checks both the live and the batch attribution.
* fix(cli): accept the root flags in any order
Each leading-flag splitter stops at the first token it does not own, so
running them once in a fixed sequence made the order load-bearing:
`zero --allow-escalation --theme auto` stranded the theme as an unknown
command and exited with an argument error instead of launching, and the
same happened after --skip-permissions-unsafe. The three splitters now
run until they make no progress, at the root and after the unsafe flag,
so every ordering reaches the TUI with every flag applied. A --theme
written before --skip-permissions-unsafe was dropped on that path; it is
kept now, with a later one winning as the last occurrence does.
* fix(cli): forward a root --allow-escalation into exec, reject it elsewhere
The root flag was stripped before dispatch, so `zero --allow-escalation
exec ...` and `zero --allow-escalation -p ...` ran without the opt-in the
help text promises, and `zero --allow-escalation version` accepted a flag
it could only discard. It now follows --add-dir: re-synthesised into the
exec argument list for the exec and -p shapes, so exec parses it as its
own flag, and rejected loudly for every other command. The ordering test
now generates every permutation of the three root flags, with
--skip-permissions-unsafe absent or at any position.
* fix(tui): record the model on an escalated run persisted usage events
The live usage record carried the model in force; the persisted session
payload did not. The usage report rebuilds cost from that payload and
falls back to the session-wide model when an event does not name one, so
an escalated interactive run was priced end to end at the model it started
on. Written only under escalation, matching what exec records under the
same flag, so an ordinary run persists the same compact payload as before.
* test(cli): isolate the new launch helpers from real user state
A temporary working directory isolates project files and nothing else.
runWithDeps fills the dependencies a test leaves out with production ones,
and the interactive launch path reads user config, opens stores, refreshes
the models.dev cache and migrates any inline plaintext API key into the
credential store before it reaches an injected runTUI callback. Running
these tests on a developer machine therefore rewrote that developer's
config.json and wrote a credential file beside it, and the results depended
on whatever providers, MCP servers and plugins the machine had.
Both new helpers now point every per-user base directory at a throwaway
root, pin the models.dev cache path, disable its background fetch, and
force the file credential backend so nothing reaches the host keyring. A
new test seeds a config with an inline key outside those fixture roots and
fails if either helper rewrites it or leaves a file beside it; without the
isolation it reports the rewritten config and the credentials.enc files.
* test(cli): check each launch helper isolation on its own
t.Setenv restores at the end of the test, not when the helper returns, so
one test exercising both helpers let the first isolation cover for the
second. Each helper now seeds its own emulated user config in a subtest,
and removing the isolation from either one fails that subtest.
* test(cli): pin the isolation itself, not only what this platform writes
The exec helper writes its models.dev cache from a background goroutine,
so a footprint check could not prove its isolation deterministically. Each
subtest now also asserts the helper moved the per-user paths off the
seeded root and disabled the fetch and the keyring backend, which fails
for either helper when the isolation call is removed.
* fix(sessions): carry an interrupted turn's work into the resume prompt
A turn that read six files and then died on a provider error left this behind
for the next turn:
- #1 message: add retries to the http client
- #6 error: provider error: upstream timeout
Nothing named the files, so the next turn re-read them from scratch (#913).
The work was never lost from the session: tool calls and results are recorded as
they happen, and the error path carries them out with everything else.
promptContextEvents then dropped both types on the way into the prompt, so the
record existed and nothing read it.
Filtering them was deliberate (#460) and is right for work an answer already
describes: forty read_file results add length and no information next to the
assistant message explaining them. It is wrong only for work with no answer
after it, and that is exactly what an interruption leaves. A turn that ends
normally was survivable for that reason, which is why this went unnoticed: the
answer was doing the remembering.
So the events after the last assistant message come along and the rest stays
filtered. The tail gets its own allowance rather than sharing the conversation
budget, so a tool-heavy interrupted turn still cannot push an earlier message
out of the context. That is the property #460 added the filter for and it is
asserted directly.
This changes a tested contract. TestFormatExecPromptKeepsConversationMessagesWhenNoisyEventsFollow
asserted that tool results are omitted, and its fixture is an interrupted turn:
43 results after an assistant answer with nothing speaking for them. That is the
#913 shape, so no rule satisfies both and the contract had to move. The test
keeps the guarantee it was written for, that conversation survives a noisy turn,
and a counterpart now pins the other half: work an answer already covers is
still filtered.
Not fixed here, and worth saying plainly: this carries what was DONE, not what
was READ. Zero has no conversation-history parameter at all, agent.Run seeds
from the system prompt and the user prompt every time, so file contents cannot
survive a turn boundary today. The next turn learns it already read a path and
can decide, rather than starting blind.
* fix(sessions): carry the tool outcome, not the tool output
The tail was carrying whole tool-result events, so up to 500 bytes of raw tool
output rode into a later turn prompt. Nothing redacts on the way in, and the
prompt renderer truncates rather than filters, so the only thing standing between
a file read and a later prompt was a length limit.
It bought almost nothing. The tail exists so a resumed turn knows what the
interrupted one did, and the CALL already says that: the tool name and its
arguments, which is the path for a read. The result body is the one part of the
pair that can carry file contents.
The status is kept rather than dropping the result entirely. A bare call reads as
work that succeeded, so a failed read would come back as a file the next turn
believes it already has.
Raised by CodeRabbit on the PR, and right.
* test(sessions): scope the outcome assertion to the tool_result lines
The status check searched the whole prompt for "error", which the provider error
message in the same fixture also contains. Blanking the status out left the test
passing, so it was asserting the presence of an unrelated line.
Scoped to the tool_result lines, it fails on that mutation naming the outcome it
lost.
* test(sessions): pin the whole of every tool line, not a search for one string
Two assertions here were weaker than what they claimed.
Searching the prompt for the fixture's whole secret only rejects that exact
string, so a change that carried a truncated or partly redacted prefix of the
output into the prompt would have passed. And asking whether "ok" and "error"
each appear somewhere among the result lines passes just as well with the two
statuses swapped, or both hung off the wrong call.
Both tool calls and both results are now pinned outright, which says what the
trim actually promises: nothing but the tool name and the outcome survives a
result, and the line order pairs each outcome with its own call. Compared as a
set of fields per line rather than as a string, because the renderer walks the
payload map and Go randomizes that order, so the same events come out in a
different field order on every run.
Reported by CodeRabbit on this PR.
* fix(sessions): keep a tool call's identity and drop its payload in resume context
toolResultOutcome strips a result down to name and status, and calls were left
verbatim, so an interrupted write_file put its content into the next turn's
prompt while the matching result body did not. Same secret, one door left open.
Admitting calls is the #913 fix and has to stay: a resumed turn knowing which
file was read is the whole point. What had to change is the symmetry.
toolCallIdentity is the call-side half of toolResultOutcome. It decodes the
arguments, keeps the fields that say what a call was about, and drops the ones
that carry what it was about to write, run or search for. Paths, directories,
urls, names, patterns and a read window survive; write_file's content, edit_file's
old and new strings, apply_patch's hunks and a shell command line do not.
An allow-list rather than a deny-list, so an argument this file has never seen is
dropped rather than replayed. A new tool with a new body field then shows up as a
missing path in a resume prompt, which is visible, instead of a new leak, which
is not. Keyed by argument name rather than tool name, so an MCP tool whose
argument is a url keeps it without being enumerated. Arguments that do not decode
as an object are removed outright: text that could not be read is text that
cannot be checked.
The tail budget gets a comment rather than a change. Tail slots exist only when
the conversation uses fewer than the 80-event cap, so a session already at the
cap carries no interrupted tool work, which is what every session did before
tool events were admitted and what the #460 cap is there to hold. Reserving a
minimum tail by trimming conversation further is a product decision, and it is
not this one.
Reported by jatmn.
* fix(sessions): scrub credentials out of retained tool-call values
An allow-listed key is not a safe value. web_fetch accepts a credential in
the query string and redacts the URL it reports back, so an interrupted
fetch had its token dropped from the result and kept verbatim in the call,
and this projection then carried it into the next resume or fork prompt.
Retained string values now go through the same redaction web_fetch uses on
its own returned URL: host, path and ordinary query survive, the token does
not, and non-string values are untouched.
* fix(sessions): project a tool call's top-level fields instead of patching one
toolResultOutcome builds its output from the fields it keeps, so a field it
has never heard of cannot reach a prompt through it. The call side edited
arguments in place and returned every sibling key, and returned the payload
untouched when there were no arguments at all, so a producer recording one
more top-level field would put it into the next turn. Both halves now name
what survives and drop the rest.
* fix(sessions): name the value shapes a projected argument may keep, and scope the ambiguous aliases
Two halves of the same gap: the projection decided which KEYS survive and
said nothing about the values under them or about which tool gave them
meaning.
Values. Strings were scrubbed and everything else passed through, which
reads as "a number is nothing to scrub" and is true of a number and not of
an object. MCP schemas allow object and array properties, so
{"query":{"api_key":"...","content":"private body"}} arrived under a
permitted key and carried a whole payload into the next prompt. Redacting a
serialized object would not have helped, since ordinary private text has no
credential shape to match. The retained shapes are named now: a scrubbed
string, and the scalars a read window is made of. A container is dropped and
the call keeps its name and id, so a resumed turn still knows which tool ran.
Meaning. grep accepts "search" for its pattern and edit_file accepts the
same word for the text being replaced, so admitting it globally would have
replayed file contents. It is scoped to grep, and the rule is kept as a
test: an argument name any mutating tool accepts for body content belongs in
the per-tool table or nowhere. The unambiguous supported forms are added to
the shared table: glob's match, and read_file's start_line, end_line,
max_lines, byte_offset and byte_limit.
Driven through the store on both resume and fork, including a call the tool
would have rejected, since the agent records OnToolCall before execution. The
persisted events are asserted unchanged: this is a view for the prompt, not
an edit to the record.
* test(sessions): assert the window key with its value, not the number alone
strings.Contains(out, "40") finds it inside "4096", so the start_line
assertion passed whether or not start_line survived the projection, which
is the opposite of what it claimed. The rendered arguments carry the pairs,
so the assertions name them.
* fix(installtxn): put back an install a killed commit left behind
CommitDir publishes by two renames: the live target moves into a workspace
backup, then the staged copy is renamed into place. Neither is journaled, so a
process killed between them left the target absent with the install's only copy
retained in a workspace nothing ever read. plugins.Load and skills.Load
enumerate directories, so the extension simply disappeared, while the lockfile
went on listing it. Recovering needed one fact the transaction never wrote
down: which install a backup belonged to. CommitDir now records that before it
moves anything, and Recover puts the backup back when the target is absent.
Recovery is a second data-loss surface, so it is bounded on every side. It
refuses a name that is not a single element inside the install root, never
replaces a live target, identifies a workspace by the name StageDir gives one
rather than by contents alone, and leaves intact anything it cannot attribute.
Every path that takes the install lock recovers, not just the two that install.
Recovering on the install path alone is worse than not recovering: a removal
takes the not-present branch, drops the lockfile entry and reports success
while the backup it never looked at stays on disk, and the next install
republishes it, reinstating an extension the user deleted. Removal and the
terminalpet install hold the same lock and now do the same thing first.
Recovery stays an explicit call rather than a side effect of Lock, matching how
the other staged-swap transactions here invoke their repair pass and keeping a
filesystem mutation visible at the sites that cause it.
* fix(installtxn): retire a backup the publish rename already superseded
Recover skipped any workspace whose target was occupied, which left the backup
of a commit that was killed after its publish rename but before its cleanup.
Removing that install then deleted the live target and its lockfile entry but
not the skipped backup, and the next recovery read the absent target as an
interrupted swap and published the stale tree again. plugins.Load and
skills.Load enumerate directories, so the removed extension was loadable again
with nothing in the lockfile naming it.
The target already records how far the commit got, so recovery reads it as the
phase rather than carrying a phase file. Absent means the swap never finished
and the backup is put back as before. Present means the publish rename
committed, so the backup beside it is superseded and its workspace is retired.
The live install is never replaced or removed either way, and the guards that
skip a workspace with no backup, an unreadable or missing marker, or a recorded
name that is not a single element inside the install root are unchanged. The
retire path removes the workspace directly rather than through
cleanupWorkspace, which refuses one holding a previous precisely because it
cannot tell a superseded backup from one still owed a restore.
Reading the target that way is only safe once nothing can leave a partial tree
there. rollback deleted the failed install in place before restoring, so a
process killed partway through that delete left a husk at the target while the
backup was still the only complete copy, and recovery would have taken the husk
for a committed publish and deleted the last good tree. The renames are now
ordered so the target is never partial: the failed install moves aside into the
workspace, the backup moves back to the target, and only then is the set aside
tree removed. A first install has no backup to protect and recorded no target,
so it still deletes in place.
The move aside can fail too, and then the failed install stays live at the
target with the backup still the only copy of what it replaced. Rollback drops
the workspace marker on that path, which leaves a workspace nothing can
attribute, and recovery already leaves those alone.
* fix(installtxn): reconcile both halves of an interrupted commit
Recovery inferred three facts from incidental filesystem shape: target
presence stood in for the transaction phase, a public dot prefix plus two
ordinary filenames stood in for ownership, and a void best effort call stood
in for both "nothing to recover" and "recovery failed".
CommitDir swaps the trees and only then publishes the lockfile, so a kill
between the two leaves exactly what a kill after both leaves. A phase bit
written after the publish only inverts which side of the write the ambiguity
falls on, so Recover now asks the caller which of the two trees its published
metadata records. plugins and skills answer from the recorded hash; the
terminalpet install publishes no metadata and passes nil, where a live target
is the committed one. A backup the metadata still records goes back over the
target through the same move aside ordering rollback uses.
Recover returns an error, and every caller that takes the install lock aborts
on it before reading the lockfile, inspecting the target, installing over it,
or reporting a successful removal. Malformed, legacy, and unattributable
workspaces are still skipped without error; a workspace we own and could not
resolve is reported, and every workspace is processed before returning.
Ownership is now proven rather than inferred. The workspace marker carries a
magic and version first line, so a user authored skill directory that happens
to be named with the workspace prefix and to hold a previous directory is left
alone. A recorded name carrying the workspace prefix is refused too, since it
names another transaction rather than an install. Retirement clears the backup
before the workspace around it: os.RemoveAll unlinks the marker first, so a
failure inside the backup used to cost the workspace the attribution that gets
it reported at all.
* fix(installtxn): do not read a target we could not probe as absent
recoverWorkspace read any os.Lstat failure on the target as nothing being
there, which enters the restore branch: the one branch that moves a tree,
taken on the strength of a question that never got an answer. Only a
not-exist error means the swap did not finish; every other probe failure
leaves the phase unknown, so it is reported and the workspace is left as it
was.
The same distinction the reconcilers already draw between a missing file and
a file that could not be read, applied to the probe that decides which branch
recovery takes at all.
* fix(installtxn): ask the reconciler about the name that resolved the path
recoverableTarget trims the recorded name before resolving the path, but the
raw line went to the reconciler, so the two halves of one decision ran on two
different values. A marker recording "demo " resolves dir/demo and then asks
the lockfile about "demo ". The lookup misses, a miss proves the publish never
ran, and the committed target is replaced with the tree it superseded. Found
by CodeRabbit on the round-2 push; the test observes that replacement before
the fix.
Also fixes the two CI failures on the new tests, neither of which was a
product defect:
macOS and Windows: the skills recovery matrix compared the lock source against
the path the test handed the installer, while Install records
canonicalSource(source). t.TempDir returns /var on macOS where the recorded
value is /private/var, and an 8.3 short name on Windows where it is the long
one. The expectation now comes from the same resolver the installer uses.
Windows: the two plugins failure-injection tests make a directory unwritable to
force a rename or removal to fail. Windows does not block either that way and
root ignores the bits, so the injected failure never fired and the tests
asserted against a success they never meant to produce. They now skip there, as
the installtxn and skills equivalents already did.
* fix(installtxn): stop recovery acting on trees the lockfile never described
An adversarial pass over the recovery protocol, driven end to end through the
built binary rather than package tests, found that the protocol still acted on
evidence it did not have.
The one that loses data: a missing lock entry was read as proof the publish
never ran, so recovery replaced whatever was at the target with the retained
backup. A missing entry proves no such thing. The entry can be lost after a
publish that did run, since a truncated or deleted lockfile reads as an empty
one, and a directory with no entry is a state these packages already support
(Load returns it, Remove handles it). Worse, the tree at the target may have
nothing to do with the transaction: `zero tools make foo` scaffolds into the
plugins root, and a hand-written skill directory is an ordinary thing to find
in the skills root. Both were destroyed and replaced by a stale backup, and the
install reported success. Reproduced through the CLI both ways before the fix.
A missing entry is now PhaseUnknown, which stops every caller and touches
nothing.
The rest are the same class as the target probe fixed in 005fff72, a probe
whose failure was read as a fact:
- A marker that could not be read was skipped as somebody else's content, so
the only copy of an install stayed stranded while the caller was told there
was nothing to do. Present but unreadable is now reported.
- The retained backup was probed with Stat, which follows symlinks and never
checked the type, so a symlink there published content from outside the
install root and a regular file published a file where a directory belongs.
Only a directory is a tree this package set aside.
- An entry at the target was read as an install at the target. A dangling
symlink satisfies Lstat, and treating it as live retired the only real copy.
- Two workspaces claiming one install were acted on in turn, which published
one over the other and deleted the rest. Nothing ranks two claims, so both
are reported.
- A stale `failed` tree from an earlier rollback made the restore rename fail
for good, and since every caller aborts on a recovery error that wedged every
install and removal in the root. The workspace is proven ours, so the stale
tree is cleared first.
- A recorded name carrying a NUL or longer than a path element can be reached
Lstat and came back with an error that is not not-exist, reported on every
pass forever with no way for a caller to clear it. Such a name is not an
install to recover and is skipped.
Unresolved-transaction errors now name the workspace directory, because the
only remedy is to delete it by hand and nothing in the CLI can reach it.
Left alone deliberately: an interrupted RemoveDir still writes no marker, which
the PR body already discloses as a pre-existing residual.
* fix(redaction): split camelCase keys in normalizeKey
A lower-to-upper boundary now inserts an underscore, so accessToken
and refreshToken match the registry instead of leaking into logs.
Token-count fields such as promptTokens stay unredacted.
Fixes#922
* fix(config): replace deprecated reflect.Ptr with reflect.Pointer
* fix(doctor): report auth presence under a non-sensitive key
camelCase normalization treats credentialConfigured as a credential
segment, so check() redacted the set/not-set indicator. authConfigured
does not match the registry.
* docs: name the five supported targets and drop Plan 9 as a review gate
Plan 9 has never compiled and is not a release or CI target. Reviews still
asked for plan9 shims. Document the five release platforms as the supported
set so unsupported GOOS is not a review criterion.
FixesGitlawb/zero#817
* docs: exclude unsupported GOOS/GOARCH from review criteria
CONTRIBUTING.md names five exact release combinations. Align AGENTS.md and
.coderabbit.yaml so other GOOS/GOARCH pairs are not a review criterion.
Unsupported targets such as plan9 remain allowed as fixtures.
* docs: retain Android support in target policy
---------
Co-authored-by: cairn-intern <[email protected]>
* fix(config): lock config read-modify-write across processes
Every config mutator loads the whole document, edits independent fields, and
publishes a complete replacement by rename. The rename is atomic, so a reader
never sees partial JSON — but two processes that loaded the same revision each
write a full document, and the second rename silently discards the first one's
acknowledged update. The result is valid JSON with one update missing and no
error anywhere.
lockConfigFile takes a cross-process advisory lock through lockutil, using the
retry-with-deadline idiom cron, hooks and oauth already share (10s timeout, 20ms
retry). Callers acquire BEFORE their first read, so the lock spans load,
mutation, validation and publication and the read inside it is authoritative —
holding it only around the write would still let both processes start from the
same stale revision.
The lock file is a sibling (config.json.lock), never the config itself: an
advisory lock is held against an inode, and publishing by rename installs a new
one, so locking the config directly would leave each process holding a
different inode.
Covered: all 14 mutators in writer.go, plus ClearProviderKeyStored and
MigratePlaintextProviderKeys in credentials.go. The migration matters most — it
rewrites the config on every startup, so it is the likeliest writer to collide
with an interactive mutation in another Zero. The SetProviderDescription test
seam locks too, so it cannot stand in as the one unsynchronized writer.
Two shapes needed care:
- The lock is not reentrant. EnsureCatalogProvider scans for an existing
profile and then upserts, so UpsertProvider is split into a locking wrapper
and upsertProviderLocked; one lock now spans the scan and the upsert, which
also closes the window where two processes could both create the same
catalog profile.
- SetPet edits raw bytes to preserve unknown members and formatting rather than
round-tripping the struct. It takes the same lock, so it neither clobbers nor
is clobbered by the struct writers.
Regression tests, each verified to FAIL with the lock disabled:
- TestConcurrentMutationsDoNotLoseUpdates — theme, pet, recaps, favorites and a
provider mutated at once; all five are independent fields, so a lost update
shows up as a zero value in exactly one of them.
- TestConcurrentProviderUpsertsAllSurvive — 16 distinct providers added
concurrently, all must be present.
- TestConcurrentSameFieldMutationsSerialize — 24 writers contending on one
field; every call succeeds and the document stays readable.
- TestCrossProcessMutationExcludesAndPreserves — the coordinated two-process
case. Goroutines share this process's descriptors, so only a second OS
process shows the lock is kernel-held. The child announces itself, then the
parent asserts its write cannot land while the lock is held elsewhere, does
its own mutation, releases, and requires both updates to survive.
Fixes#832
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U389qmQUhoZB3YtXkFmiTq
* fix(cli): take the config lock for MCP config edits
The previous commit locked internal/config's mutators, but that is not every
writer of the user config document. internal/cli's MCP editor reads the SAME
file, edits it, and republishes it with the identical temp-file+rename shape,
at three sites (add/update, remove, disable/enable). Locking only one package
left `zero mcp add` free to clobber a concurrent provider or preference write —
and to be clobbered by one — with the file still valid JSON afterwards, which
is the same silent lost update issue #832 reports.
config.LockFile exports the existing helper so the lock is one authority across
packages rather than a private detail of internal/config. A second, adjacent
implementation would drift from the first exactly the way this writer already
drifted from the mutators.
TestRunMCPAddParticipatesInConfigLock is the regression. Racing the two writers
and waiting to observe a lost update is NOT reliable — the losing interleaving
is narrow, and a straightforward concurrent version of this test passed five
consecutive runs against the unlocked code, so it would have shipped as
reassurance that proved nothing. It instead asserts the deterministic property:
while the config lock is held elsewhere, the MCP writer's update cannot land,
and it completes once the lock is released. That fails immediately against the
unlocked code and passes with it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U389qmQUhoZB3YtXkFmiTq
* fix(config): report config unlock failures instead of discarding them
AGENTS.md requires that a mutator never report success when unlock failed, and
the release error was being dropped on the floor. A failed Release can leave the
lock held for the rest of the process, so returning (cfg, nil) after one claims
a state the next mutation cannot reproduce — it will block for the full lock
timeout and then fail.
lockConfigFile now returns lock.Release directly, and every caller joins it into
its own result with the idiom credstore already uses:
defer func() { err = errors.Join(err, unlock()) }()
Joined, not chosen between: a release failure annotates the result rather than
masking the mutation error that explains what actually went wrong. That covers
all 16 mutators in writer.go, both in credentials.go, and the test seam. The
three MCP sites return an exit code rather than an error, so they convert a
release failure into a crash exit and a stderr message, without overwriting a
failure the command had already reported.
A release failure cannot be provoked through the public API — lockutil.Release
is idempotent and reports nil once released — so the mutators call through a
lockConfigFileFn seam that a test can substitute. My first attempt at this test
could only ever t.Skip, which asserts nothing; the seam is what turns it into a
real assertion.
- TestMutationReportsUnlockFailure: SetTheme surfaces the release error AND the
mutation is still published, since a release failure annotates the result
rather than undoing the write.
- TestMutationErrorSurvivesUnlockFailure: an unknown-provider error and the
release failure are both present in the joined error.
Both verified to fail when the defer discards the release error.
Note for review: cron, hooks, oauth and swarm all still discard their
lockutil.Release error, so this makes internal/config stricter than its
siblings. Worth deciding whether the guideline should be applied to them too —
out of scope here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U389qmQUhoZB3YtXkFmiTq
* fix(cli): complete MCP config lock handling
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a043da-1703-70c5-9d8d-904cd8fd964b
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* test(cli): synchronize MCP config lock assertion
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0448f-5860-721c-8a47-5119fc57f685
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
* fix(tui): persist provider model selection atomically
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a04c92-2d1d-7508-91bc-416341b7e8b0
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
* fix(tui): surface unsaved model selections on every switch path
choosePicker replaces handleModelCommand's status text with its own
applied-notice, so the "· not saved (…)" qualifier that text carried was
dropped and the selection reported an unqualified success. The user only
found out at the next launch, when the old persisted model came back.
dispatchCommand drops the same text on a committed switch, so typed
/model had the identical hole — the cross-provider path already returned
the outcome as a value precisely because display copy is not a contract.
handleModelCommand now returns that outcome too, and one
modelAppliedNoticeFor decides how a committed switch is announced for
both entry points, so neither can regain the gap independently.
Recent-model history is written under the same lock, so a selection that
already lost the lock would pay a SECOND full timeout for one keystroke
and add a redundant save error. It now falls back to the in-session
updateRecentModels for exactly that case, keyed on a new
config.ErrLockUnavailable rather than on any persistence failure: a
missing config file also fails the lookup, and that write still has its
own reason to be attempted.
Regressions cover both entry points. The picker test holds the config
lock — the case the review asked for — and bounds elapsed time, which is
what proves one keystroke costs one wait; it fails at 20s against the
previous code. The typed test uses an unwritable config path so it
proves the same plumbing without a second ten-second timeout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01REzorhNj3F1DGPXyn5Uq7j
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
* fix(providers): register Atomic Chat as local OpenAI-compatible runtime
Point atomic-chat at the default local API (http://127.0.0.1:1337/v1),
mark it Local with no API key, and auto-detect it alongside Ollama and
LM Studio. Keep opencode-go-anthropic-compatible in the provider catalog
and curated model list after rebasing onto latest main.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* docs(zh): sync Atomic Chat local runtime into README_ZH
The English README lists Atomic Chat in the provider list and tells
local-model users to run its desktop app on http://127.0.0.1:1337/v1,
but the Chinese README still mentioned only Ollama and LM Studio.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(providers): give the local Atomic Chat runtime its own catalog ID
Repurposing the existing atomic-chat ID from the hosted, key-gated preset
to a keyless local one silently downgraded credential checks for profiles
already saved against the remote endpoint: MissingCredentialEnv resolves
RequiresAuth from the catalog descriptor, so those profiles were reported
as ready and only failed later with an unauthenticated call to
api.atomic.chat.
Keep the hosted atomic-chat descriptor as it was and register the local
runtime under a separate atomic-chat-local ID, mirroring the existing
ollama-cloud/ollama split. Stored profiles keep their identity and no
migration is needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* test(onboarding): assert the full Atomic Chat local endpoint and default model
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(models): drop the placeholder curated list for atomic-chat-local
Atomic Chat's model catalog is a Hugging Face scrape refreshed every 12h
plus arbitrary owner/repo lookups, so the served model ID is whichever
model the user loaded and no hardcoded list stays accurate.
The single local-model entry short-circuited Models() without adding
anything: the descriptor is openai-compatible, so modelMatchesProvider
never matches a registry entry and the fallback already yields the
descriptor's DefaultModel. Output is unchanged; the difference is that
local-model is no longer presented as a curated contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(onboarding): pin the probed model in the local-runtime adopt command
probeLocalRuntime already reads the runtime's /v1/models, but SetupAction
dropped the result and emitted 'zero providers add <id> --set-active'
with no --model. The add path then persisted the catalog DefaultModel,
which for a local runtime is the placeholder 'local-model', and the first
completion failed with an unknown-model response.
SetupAction now pins the probed id via SetupCommandWithModel. The catalog
default wins when the server actually serves it, so an existing Ollama
setup does not switch models; otherwise the first advertised id is used.
An empty probe result leaves the command on the catalog default rather
than inventing an id.
Covers a server whose returned id is not 'local-model'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(onboarding): shell-safe adopt command + reject atomic-chat-local placeholder model
commandArg now POSIX single-quotes rendered args instead of strconv.Quote, so a model id from an untrusted /v1/models response cannot expand when the adopt command is pasted into a shell.
providerProfileForAdd now errors when atomic-chat-local is added without --model instead of persisting the local-model placeholder that fails the first completion.
Adds regression tests for command substitution, backticks, and the require-model guard.
* fix(onboarding): finish Atomic Chat setup across supported shells
Rebase on current main and keep the hosted Atomic Chat preset intact.
Only emit setup arguments that are portable across POSIX, cmd.exe and
PowerShell; show interactive guidance for other model IDs. Reject the
Atomic Chat placeholder before both CLI and TUI persistence, and stop
advertising adoption when discovery finds no usable model.
Validation: full Go test suite, focused race suite, vet, release build,
smoke, formatting, advisory lint and vulncheck pass with isolated config
and inherited Anthropic overrides removed. Onboarding, CLI and TUI test
packages cross-compile for Windows and Linux. Regression tests fail on
the rebased pre-fix code and pass with these changes.
Refs Gitlawb/zero#550 and Gitlawb/zero#592.
* fix(onboarding): preserve option-looking model IDs in adopt commands
Use the existing --model=value grammar when a discovered model begins
with a hyphen. Validate the model separately from the fixed separator so
shell safety remains unchanged and '=' is not added to the allowlist.
Exercise generated detection actions through shell tokenization, the actual
add parser, and profile construction for Atomic Chat, LM Studio and Ollama.
Cover leading hyphens, flag-looking IDs, ordinary IDs, spaces, and unsafe
inline values. Before the fix, the new regression failed with:
generated adoption command rejected by add parser: --model requires a value
Validation: full Go suite, focused race tests, formatting, vet, release
build, smoke, lint-static and vulncheck passed. Affected test packages
cross-compiled for Windows and Linux.
Refs Gitlawb/zero#550.
* fix(onboarding): select eligible chat models and preserve Ollama defaults
P2: apply the existing known-noncoding exclusion before default preference
or first-model fallback. When a nonempty list has no eligible model, offer
commandless guidance instead of persisting the rejected/default model.
P3: recognize an Ollama untagged default's :latest spelling, preserving the
advertised ID. Prefer exact matches and leave other tags/providers alone.
Add selector tests plus a mock-server integration test through discovery,
the generated action, the real add parser, profile persistence, a fresh
process, and the chat completion request. Before this fix, that test failed:
fresh process sent model "text-embedding-local", want eligible model "-loaded chat model"
The Ollama alias case also failed before the fix:
AdoptModel() = "qwen3:8b", want "llama3.1:latest"
Explicit model choices, shell checks, hosted/local provider identities and
Atomic placeholder guards retain their existing behavior.
Validation: full Go suite, focused race tests, formatting, vet, release
build, smoke, lint-static and vulncheck passed. Affected test packages
cross-compiled for Windows and Linux. Integration evidence uses a mock
server; native Windows shell and actual runtime behavior are not claimed.
Refs Gitlawb/zero#550 and Gitlawb/zero#592.
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: alex <[email protected]>
* fix(background): treat POSIX zombie leader as already-exited
terminateOwnedProcess always returned leaderAlreadyExited=false, so
TerminateCommand surfaced "did not exit after SIGKILL" when ps was
unavailable and the leader was already a waitable zombie. Probe the
leader the way Windows uses GetExitCodeProcess, then still signal the
group so live descendants are not skipped.
* fix(background): preserve live-group termination failures
---------
Co-authored-by: cairn-intern <[email protected]>
* ci: harden workflow permissions, add timeouts, concurrency and coverage report
* ci: reuse make fmt-check and refine coverage table formatting
* ci: scan Windows build graph via vulncheck-windows and collapse coverage summary to single-pass awk
* ci: invoke the pinned Windows govulncheck via a local GOBIN
go install writes the binary to GOBIN, which is not necessarily on PATH.
Install into .cache/gobin and run that executable. GOOS=windows applies
only to the scan so the scanner stays a host binary.
* ci: declare contents:read on the action smoke workflow
Pull-request workflows inherit the default GITHUB_TOKEN unless they
set an explicit permission block. The smoke workflow is now covered
by the same least-privilege policy as ci.yml.
* ci: parse workflow permissions structurally and quote the Windows scanner path
The pull-request token check now ignores commented lookalikes and accepts
an inline on: [pull_request] trigger. vulncheck-windows keeps the cache
path as one shell word.
* ci: drop -race from this PR so issue 939 stays with PR 940
Coverage profile remains. The dedicated race-detector job is owned by
the open race PR.
* ci: parse workflow permissions as YAML and scope GOWORK=off
* ci: label the non-race smoke test explicitly
---------
Co-authored-by: cl-ment <[email protected]>
* perf(providers): parallelize isolated provider unit tests and shrink retry backoffs
Enable t.Parallel() on independent provider test cases and shrink default
retry backoffs from seconds to 1ms during test runs, reducing provider test
suite duration from ~300s to ~2.4s without flakiness.
* test(providerio): add unit coverage for ShrinkBackoffForTest and restoration
* test(openai): keep Codex idle-timeout acceptance test serial
StreamIdleTimeout arms a wall-clock watchdog. Parallel scheduling can
lose the 50ms race against response.completed even though the test
only checks that the option is accepted.
* fix(config): replace deprecated reflect.Ptr with reflect.Pointer
---------
Co-authored-by: cl-ment <[email protected]>
* security(mcp): prevent server requests from matching client pending responses
* fix(mcp): send courtesy -32601 reply asynchronously off read loop
* fix(mcp): restore jsonRPCIDEchoable and validate request IDs before responding
* fix(mcp): queue and drop courtesy replies without blocking client callers
* fix(mcp): drop canceled queued requests
* fix(mcp): preserve valid numeric request IDs
* fix(mcp): treat JSON method member presence as the request discriminator
An explicit empty method string is a request, not a response.
Courtesy -32601 is still dropped when the write queue is full: failAll
on that path stopped the reader and blocked inbound pipe writes
(TestStdioClientUndrainedServerDoesNotBlockCallerWithDeadline).
* fix(mcp): count dropped courtesy replies when the write queue is full
The inbound reader must not stop. An empty select default is now an
atomic counter rather than a silent discard.
* fix(mcp): retain method presence, writer lifecycle, and original JSON-RPC IDs
* fix(mcp): bound courtesy overflow, pin writer queue, match exponent IDs
* fix(mcp): skip SSE frames that carry a method member
Treat method presence the same on stdio and SSE so empty or null method
never completes a pending client request.
---------
Co-authored-by: cl-ment <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
* fix(oauth): split an oversized keyring token blob across entries
Store every provider and MCP token in one keyring entry and the store stops
working once the logins outgrow it. On macOS the secret rides inside a
`security -i` command line capped at 4095 bytes, which leaves 3027 bytes of
JSON for all logins combined, so a second OIDC login fails to save and every
write after it fails too.
Split a blob that does not fit across numbered entries and put a manifest in
the anchor account. Chunks live in two alternating generations: a write fills
the one that is not live, then replaces the manifest, so that single write is
the commit point and a crash partway through still reads the previous
generation. `zc1:` cannot prefix base64, so an entry written by an existing
build is still recognised and read without a migration step.
Reserve the range a write will occupy before occupying it. Without that, a
write interrupted while filling a longer generation leaves chunks above the
count the manifest records, and no later cleanup knows to delete them: a
fragment of a token blob would stay in the keychain for good.
Expose the per-entry budget from internal/keyring rather than hardcoding the
macOS figure in the oauth store, sharing one line builder with Set so the
budget and the boundary it describes cannot drift. Backends with no limit
report so and keep the single-entry layout, so Linux is untouched.
Refs #937
* fix(oauth): lock keyring reads, validate manifest digest, and harden chunk tests
* test(oauth): assert Status blocks during keyring lock regression test
* fix(oauth): sweep both chunk generations when a store regrows
A shrink writes the blob back under the anchor, which replaces the manifest
and takes the per-generation chunk counts with it. From then on nothing can
name the chunks a failed cleanup left behind, so the growth branch's sweep of
the target generation is the only one that will ever reach them — and it only
ever targets family A. A keychain that refused one delete during the shrink
therefore kept a superseded generation of access, ID and refresh tokens
indefinitely, with no way for the user to know.
Sweep the other generation alongside the target, and document that the
reclaim waits for the next growth: a store that shrinks once and never grows
again keeps the residue, which sweeping on every whole write would close at a
cost of 128 `security` invocations per save on macOS.
Also record why Load and Status take the cross-process lock, and give the
missing-chunk error the same "log in again" advice the digest failure carries.
Refs #937
* fix(oauth): serialize keyring operations under user-level lock
Derive the keyring backend lock file path from the user's home directory rather than file store configuration, ensuring processes with distinct store paths share the same lock domain for the OS keychain.
Refs #938
* Address review feedback on chunked keyring token store and recovery
Refs #938
* Refine auth reset message and chunk format notation
Refs #938
* Harden OAuth store reset lifecycle, keyring migration recovery, and completions.
Refs #938
* Validate keyring cleanup markers, propagate lock resolution errors, and test reader concurrency.
Refs #938
* Preserve live OAuth credentials when stale cleanup markers survive migration.
Refs #937
* Verify JSON output from OAuth reset to cover its recovery response.
Refs #937
* Verify that JSON OAuth reset actually removes stored logins.
Refs #937
* Require confirmation before resetting shared OAuth credentials.
Refs #937
---------
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
* fix(update): keep Windows failed-restore state in trusted recovery records
A failed restore currently records the last verified binary only as a
.deletable .keep marker in the install directory. Write an unresolved
identity-bound record to the existing per-user update-recovery store on
that failure path too, and consult it during preflight so deleting the
marker cannot silence the tamper refusal.
Fixes#868
* fix(update): keep a fail-closed signal if unresolved recovery records cannot be written
Ignoring a failed appendUnresolvedRecoveryRecord left only the sibling
.keep marker. An install-directory writer can delete that marker, after
which preflight finds no unresolved state and a retry can overwrite the
last verified recovery copy. Relocate that copy to a .recovery name when
the per-user record cannot be persisted so promotion still refuses.
Fixes#868
* fix(update): do not relocate the live binary when failed-restore compensation cannot record
persistFailedRestoreSignal relocated through the handle when the per-user
unresolved record could not be written, without checking that the object
was still the aside copy. A restore that had already put the verified
bytes back at targetPath then had that binary moved out of the executable
path. Verify identity with verifyPromotedTarget before relocating.
Unreadable recovery-state JSON now fails closed instead of looking like
an empty queue. The per-user vs per-machine split is documented: a second
account still relies on the install-directory .keep marker.
Fixes#868
* fix(update): durably commit recovery state on Windows
---------
Co-authored-by: cairn-intern <[email protected]>
* security(update): prevent tar extraction from traversing escaping symlinks (fixes#920)
When extracting tar archives, lexical path cleaning alone does not prevent
subsequent file entries from being written through a previously extracted
directory symlink that resolves outside destDir (Zip/Tar Slip).
This introduces verifyNoSymlinkEscape in safeExtractPath, which recursively
inspects existing path components between destDir and target using os.Lstat
and filepath.EvalSymlinks to reject entries attempting to write through escaping
symlinks.
* test(update): exercise chained symlink escape during file extract
The previous case was a single escaping symlink already rejected by the
existing Linkname check. Seed a mid -> outside chain under destDir and
extract a regular file through it so verifyNoSymlinkEscape is what fails,
with no write outside destDir.
* fix(update): resolve destDir symlinks and permit valid dangling symlinks in archive
* docs(update): document POSIX-only scope for verifyNoSymlinkEscape
* internal/update: test extracting files through directory symlinks
* fix(update): reject dangling symlinks instead of lexical fallback
EvalSymlinks failure used filepath.Clean on the link text, which does
not preserve already-traversed links. A dangling member is now an
error.
* fix(update): resolve dangling symlink chains from the physical parent
* fix(update): authorize tar paths through OpenRoot and reject outbound symlink entries
* fix(update): resolve intermediate symlink parents and cap Root link depth
Walk each path component from the physical parent, reject a ninth link,
and look up release binaries through OpenRoot as regular files only.
---------
Co-authored-by: cl-ment <[email protected]>
* ci: run the race detector on pull requests
The Makefile declares `go test ./... -race -count=1` as the project's test
command, but no workflow invokes that target. ci.yml and pr-auto-review.yml both
run plain `go test ./...`, and `-race` appears nowhere under .github/workflows,
so the detector has never run on a pull request. The concurrent paths where a
race is easiest to introduce and hardest to see in review, the turn loop,
streaming provider I/O, the session store, cron, swarm mailboxes, and the
cross-process lock paths in the credential and OAuth stores, are all unchecked.
Add a dedicated job rather than putting -race on the existing matrix step. A
race run is typically several times a plain one, and the matrix Test step is
followed by build and smoke, so folding it in would serialize behind those and
make that job the new long pole. On its own it runs alongside the Windows job,
which is the current long pole at 9m29s, and a failure reads as a race rather
than as a smoke failure.
Run `make test` instead of repeating its flags, so the project's declared test
command and what CI executes cannot drift apart again.
Refs #939
* ci: add permissions to race detector job
---------
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
* fix(providerhealth,tools): let the configured forward proxy through the loopback guard
With HTTPS_PROXY pointing at a local forward proxy, the transport dials the
proxy first and tunnels the request through it. The SSRF-guarded dialer in
providerhealth refused that dial as a loopback address, so
`zero doctor --connectivity` failed with "proxyconnect tcp: provider
connectivity URL is unsafe: loopback hosts are blocked" for a public
provider that had already been validated, and web_fetch had no proxy
support at all (#569).
Each dialer is now handed its transport's own Proxy function and lets a dial
through unpinned only when the address is exactly the proxy endpoint that
function names for the request scheme: same host, same port, with a missing
proxy port taken as the scheme default. A sibling loopback port is still
refused. The shared check lives in internal/proxydial since providerhealth
and tools otherwise share nothing.
web_fetch honours http.ProxyFromEnvironment again. The guarded fetch had set
Proxy to nil as part of its SSRF hardening; the target is still validated
before the request, and what a forward proxy removes is only the dial-time
rebind pin, which is inherent to using any forward proxy. The pre-permission
URL validation stays in place.
Started from #594 by baoyu0. This version keeps the pre-permission check,
matches the proxy port exactly instead of any port when the proxy URL has
none, and injects the transport's Proxy function instead of reading the
environment a second time.
Closes#569
Co-authored-by: baoyu0 <[email protected]>
* fix(proxydial): have the dialer ask its transport for the proxy at dial time
Copying transport.Proxy into the dialer at construction left the wiring
between the two unpinned: a dialer handed nil would pass every unit test
while a proxied request still died as loopback. The dialer now consults
the transport it is installed on, and each package drives a real request
through a loopback listener acting as the proxy and checks that the
CONNECT arrives. The proxy is substituted on the transport rather than
through HTTPS_PROXY, since http.ProxyFromEnvironment reads the
environment once per process and an env-based test would depend on
test order.
* fix(proxydial): bind the proxy exemption to the route the transport chose
Asking the Proxy function a question of our own invention answered for a
request the transport never made. With NO_PROXY excluding a host, the real
request to that host goes direct while a synthetic probe still comes back
proxied, so a direct dial whose address happened to equal the configured
proxy endpoint skipped the guard and reached whatever the name resolved to
at connect time. A probe on the previous head dials rebind.example:80 with
zero safety lookups; the guard now runs and refuses its private answer.
Host-dependent proxy callbacks make the mismatch general, and no spelling
of the probe host closes it, because the two calls are about different
requests.
The decision is now recorded where it is made. proxydial.Transport wraps
the transport, asks its Proxy function about the actual request, and puts
the answer in that request's context; the transport derives the dial
context from the request context, so the dialer reads back the route this
very connection is being opened for. Per-request, so concurrent requests
cannot overwrite each other, and the context key is unexported so nothing
outside the package can plant one.
Address matching is gone with it. A transport opens one connection dial,
and when a proxy is selected that dial goes to the proxy, so the recorded
route already identifies the dial. Comparing the address on top could only
disagree with the transport, which is what a Unicode proxy hostname did:
Go dials xn--bro-hoa.example while the URL still spells it as configured,
and the proxy was refused as an ordinary private address. Both spellings
are now one endpoint with no comparison to get wrong.
Documents where destination enforcement ends: with a proxy configured, the
target hostname is sent to the proxy and the proxy resolves it, so the
local pre-request checks no longer bind the address that is reached. A
forward proxy already sees and can rewrite every request through it, so
that trust comes with configuring one; the alternative is refusing to use
proxies at all, which is the outage in #569.
---------
Co-authored-by: baoyu0 <[email protected]>
* fix(agent): stop the tool-schema ratchet meaning a different thing per host
TestEagerToolSchemaTokenBudget counted exec_command shell guidance along with
the schemas, and that guidance is host-specific. The same tree measured 3498 on
Linux, about 3600 on a Windows host with pwsh 7, and 3653 on Windows PowerShell
5.1, because shellGuidanceForRuntime appends a longer block for 5.1 (it has to
explain that && and || do not work there).
5.1 is stock Windows, and that case has been over the 3650 ceiling since
view_image landed. So `go test ./...` failed for anyone on a stock Windows box
while CI stayed green: the runners have pwsh 7 and take the cheaper branch. The
workflow does run the tests on windows-latest, so this was never a coverage gap,
just a ceiling sized against whichever shell the runner happened to have.
The two halves are now charged separately. The schema ceiling measures the
schemas alone and reads 3498 on Linux and on Windows PowerShell 5.1, so it
ratchets the same thing everywhere. The host guidance gets its own ceiling at
200, above the worst case rather than above this machine: 5.1 is 155 tokens,
pwsh 7 is 110, cmd.exe is 87, POSIX is 0.
No guidance text was trimmed. It is what stops the model writing bash on Windows,
and the 5.1 note is the reason a chained command does not silently do half its
work. Paying 155 tokens for it is the right trade; measuring it as if it were a
schema was not.
HostExecCommandShellGuidance is exported for the budget, which is production
surface added for a test. It is one accessor over existing logic, and the
alternative is a ratchet that cannot tell the two costs apart. A guard in
internal/tools pins that the guidance really is the tail of the description, so
the subtraction cannot silently start measuring the wrong thing.
* test(tools,agent): make the guidance contract checkable off Windows
The ratchet separates the fixed tool schemas from this host's exec_command
shell guidance, and both halves of that separation were only being checked on
Windows.
The description test returned early off Windows once the accessor reported no
guidance, so it never looked at the description. Dropping the GOOS condition in
the constructor would have a POSIX host append its own guidance (about 150
characters on darwin) with the accessor still reporting none and the ratchet
charging every byte of it to the schemas, and nothing would fail. Both the
description and the accessor now take goos, so the contract is checked for all
three platforms from any one of them.
The budget also went from subtracting a separately rounded guidance estimate to
removing the guidance from the description before estimating. ApproxTextTokens
is an integer division, so floor((schema+guidance)/4) - floor(guidance/4) is one
token high whenever the two remainders add past four, and which side of that a
host lands on depends on the length of its guidance. That is the same
host-dependence the ratchet was being fixed for, one token smaller.
No behaviour change: exec_command's description is byte for byte what it was on
every platform.
* fix(sandbox): resolve git metadata carveouts for worktrees
.git is a file (gitdir: ...) in worktrees/submodules, not a dir. The
hooks/config write-deny carveout assumed a directory and pointed at
<root>/.git/hooks, which has no mkdir-able parent under the .git file.
bwrap then failed 'Can't mkdir parents ... Not a directory', blocking
every sandboxed tool in worktree checkouts.
Resolve the real (common) git dir via the gitdir pointer + commondir so
worktrees deny the shared hooks/config like a plain clone. Plain
checkouts (.git dir) and .git-absent roots keep the literal paths.
* fix(sandbox): bound worktree git metadata carveouts to the write root
Refuse gitdir/commondir pointers that escape the workspace instead of
carving outside confinement. Invalid, stale, or non-directory pointers
return no carveouts so bwrap does not mkdir under a .git file.
* fix(sandbox): evaluate gitdir/commondir through symlinks
Containment must use the real path so an in-root symlink cannot punch
hooks/config carveouts outside the write root.
* fix(sandbox): fail closed on gitdir eval and protect the pointer file
Refuse carveouts when EvalSymlinks cannot produce a real in-root path,
compare evaluated roots and targets, and write-deny the .git pointer so
it cannot redirect hooks/config between commands.
* fix(sandbox): deny worktree-local gitdir metadata and parse first gitdir line
Keep hooks/config write-denied on both the common dir and the in-root
worktree gitdir, emit those paths under the lexical write root, and
accept a gitdir: pointer that has trailing comment lines.
* fix(sandbox): skip special git metadata files and re-check carveouts at apply
Read .git and commondir only when they are regular files so a FIFO cannot
block profile construction. At sandbox apply, drop ReadOnlySubpaths that
no longer sit inside the write root after a symlink swap.
* fix(sandbox): follow directory .git symlinks and unix-tag FIFO tests
A .git symlink to a directory is a normal checkout, so keep lexical
hooks/config carveouts. FIFO coverage stays on unix so Windows still
compiles.
* fix(sandbox): protect worktree git pointer directly
* test(sandbox): skip unavailable symlink fixture
* fix(sandbox): preserve git symlink semantics
* fix(sandbox): limit git pointer carveout to regular files
---------
Co-authored-by: jatmn <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: jatmn <[email protected]>
* fix(specialist): keep the pinned model when a specialist is resumed
Metadata.Model exists so a bounded, delegated task can run on a cheaper model
than its parent, and BuildArgs appends it to the child argv through
appendModelArgs. BuildResumeArgs never did.
So a specialist pinned to a cheap model ran on that model exactly once. The
moment the orchestrator resumed it, the child fell back to whatever the
parent's configured model resolved to. Nothing surfaced it: the resumed child
starts normally and does the work, so the only symptom is the bill.
Cost-motivated delegation quietly stopped saving anything.
Resuming does not restore the recorded model on its own. sessions.PrepareExec
records the model a run used but never feeds it back into provider
construction, so the flag has to be passed again rather than relied upon.
BuildResumeArgsInput now carries ParentModel and ParentReasoningEffort, the
same fallbacks the fresh path takes, and runResume passes what TaskRunOptions
already held. The reasoning-effort rule travels with the model unchanged: the
parent's effort is inherited only when the manifest pins no model of its own,
because a manifest that chose a different model has not agreed to the parent's
effort for it.
Regressions drive both builders and compare them, so the two paths cannot
drift again: a pinned model survives resume, an unpinned one still inherits the
parent's, both halves of the effort rule hold, and the flag keeps its position
relative to --auto in both.
Refs #554
* test(specialist): cover the resume call site, not just its builder
The builder tests all call BuildResumeArgs directly, so dropping the
ParentModel field from the runResume call site still compiled and still passed
every one of them. The defect this fixes lived at the call site, so it needs a
test that goes through Run.
Driven through the real dispatch with the RunChild seam capturing argv.
* test(specialist): guard the fresh call site as well
runFresh and runResume each construct their builder input by hand and carry a
byte-identical ParentModel line. Deleting either compiles and, until now,
deleting the fresh one was silent.
The resume half is what this branch repairs. This covers the other half so the
pair cannot drift again in the direction nobody was looking.
* test(execution): fail loudly when ps cannot answer instead of skipping
Every test in process_unix_test.go proves something about zombie detection, and
every one of those proofs is read out of ps. When ps could not answer, the
tests skipped — which is indistinguishable from success in CI output — and one
assertion passed vacuously for the same reason. A regression in ps parsing or
availability would have shown up as green.
requireProcessState probes BOTH ps pipelines against this test process, which
is by definition alive and not a zombie, so a working ps must report a live
state for it. When it cannot:
- Under CI (or ZERO_REQUIRE_PS=1) this is a hard failure. ps is present on every
image used today, so its absence means the pipeline regressed and that has to
surface immediately.
- Otherwise it stays a skip, so a contributor on an unsupported box is not
blocked.
Both pipelines are probed because they are deliberately separate: the tests
assert what the production process-table parser concludes, so this file keeps
its own per-PID ps oracle rather than borrowing that parser to establish its own
preconditions. One regression must not be able to silence both sides at once.
Once the probe passes, failing to observe an EXPECTED state is a defect rather
than an environment problem, so the remaining escapes become failures:
- The zombie waits (awaitZombie) fail instead of skipping. The caller never
waits on the child, so its zombie row persists until reaped — reaching the
deadline means the child never exited or ps stopped answering, and the two
are reported distinctly.
- A zombie group that is not signalable fails instead of skipping: a zombie
still occupies the process table, so if kill(-pid, 0) fails the case under
test is not present and the assertions after it would prove nothing.
- processSignalTarget returning anything but the individual PID fails instead
of skipping: the child inherited this process's group, so its PGID is this
process's PID and can never equal its own PID.
The vacuous assertion in TestTerminateProcessTreeStopsRunningGroup now requires
ok. That is sound rather than merely stricter: the test never waits on the
child, so the group's zombie row must still be present after termination, and
an unknown state means ps stopped answering rather than that the group is
clean.
Verified on Linux (WSL, go1.26.6) rather than by cross-compilation alone:
- all three tests pass unmodified
- with a stub ps that exits 1: CI unset skips with the reason named; CI=true
fails, naming which pipeline could not answer
- the same broken-ps run against the ORIGINAL file produced two silent skips
plus one unrelated failure after 12s, versus an immediate, explicit failure now
Windows is unaffected (the file is !windows); go vet passes for linux, darwin
and windows.
Fixes#863
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U389qmQUhoZB3YtXkFmiTq
* test(execution): treat an unsignalable zombie group as a kernel difference
The macOS Smoke job failed:
the zombie group 5931 is not signalable (operation not permitted)
That was my error. I converted this skip along with the ps-availability ones,
but it never had anything to do with ps: whether kill(2) may signal a group
whose only member is a zombie is a KERNEL difference. Linux permits it, so
signalTargetRunning goes on to consult ps — the branch this test was written
for. Darwin returns EPERM, so signalTargetRunning short-circuits on the kill and
never reaches ps.
Rather than restore the blanket skip, the test now records which branch answers:
- Signal permitted: assert processGroupHasRunningMember directly, so a ps-side
regression cannot hide behind the kill result. This is new coverage; the old
test only checked signalTargetRunning, which conflates the two paths.
- Signal refused: log it and continue.
The outcome assertion — a zombie-only group must not count as running — now runs
on EVERY platform. Previously Darwin skipped before reaching it, so this is
strictly more coverage there, not less.
Any errno other than EPERM still fails: it means the group is not in the state
the test needs, and nothing after it would be meaningful.
TerminateProcessTree is asserted only where the signal is permitted, because
terminateTarget's own kill(2) would hit the same EPERM and return it as a
cleanup error. Worth a maintainer's eye: that may be a real gap in
TerminateProcessTree on such a platform — a zombie-only tree is already exited
and arguably should terminate cleanly rather than report failure, which is the
same spurious-cleanup-failure class #774 set out to remove. Confirming that
needs a Darwin host and is a production change, so it is flagged rather than
guessed at here.
Verified on Linux (WSL, go1.26.6): all three tests pass, including the new
direct ps assertion. The Darwin branch was exercised by forcing the EPERM path
on Linux — it logs both explanations and passes with the outcome assertion
still enforced. go vet passes for linux, darwin and windows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U389qmQUhoZB3YtXkFmiTq
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): a temporary root is refcounted, so one holder's cleanup cannot revoke another's
Split out of #829 as an independent fix, per @Vasanthdev2004's review asking for
the self-contained pieces to arrive separately.
A temporary grant was add-then-remove with no notion of who still needed the
root. The second caller to ask for a root already present got a NO-OP undo, and
the first caller's cleanup then removed the root out from under it — so a live
grant lost its access while its holder still believed it had it.
Two read-only tools in the same parallel batch, both blocked on the same
directory, is exactly that shape, and read-only tools are precisely the ones the
batch runs concurrently.
tempReads/tempWrites now count live holders, and the root is only stripped when
the last one releases.
The release also performs both mutations under ONE hold of the lock. Dropping it
between them left a window where the root was still in readRoots but no longer in
tempReads: a concurrent AddTemporaryRead landing there reads it as a PERMANENT
root, hands its caller a no-op undo, and this call then strips the root — so that
caller believes it holds access it has already silently lost.
Independent of the remaining #829 work; builds and tests against current main on
its own.
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* fix(sandbox): a read covered by a TEMPORARY write root takes a reference too
Found by a self-review of this branch: the refcount closed the defect within
reads and within writes, but not across them.
AddTemporaryRead returned a no-op undo whenever writeRootCoversLocked said a
write root already covered the path, and the comment there claimed that cover was
permanent. It is not: writeRootCoversLocked scans extraRoots, and
AddTemporaryWrite appends TEMPORARY write roots into that same slice. So a read
covered by another holder's temporary write took no reference, and that holder's
cleanup silently revoked the reader's access — the very defect the refcount
exists to close, reached across the read/write boundary instead of within one
side of it.
Demonstrated before fixing, and the regression fails without it:
ReadRoots before release = [ws, …/outer]
ReadRoots after release = [ws]
the write holder's cleanup revoked a live read grant on …/outer/inner
The read now takes a reference on the covering temporary write root, and the
genuinely permanent case — the workspace root, or a session-scoped grant — still
returns a no-op undo.
The regression also asserts the other direction: once the reader releases too,
the root is gone, so the reference does not leak the grant past its last holder.
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* test(sandbox): make the concurrency test concurrent, and portable off macOS
Both raised by CodeRabbit. The third finding on this PR — a read covered by a
TEMPORARY write root taking no reference — was already fixed in 87a722cb with the
regression it asked for; this covers the two that were still live, and both are
cases of a test reporting more than it checked.
THE CONCURRENCY TEST WAS NOT CONCURRENT. The gate spun until hasReadRoot saw
somebody holding the root, which is satisfied by the FIRST holder, then opened
the release. The spin wins that race against goroutines still being scheduled:
instrumented over 200 runs, 194 peaked at a single simultaneous holder and not
one ever reached eight. A test named for concurrent holders was exercising one
holder at a time. Against a deliberately broken refcount, where the first release
strips the root, it passed 33 times in 40 — it was a flaky test that mostly
agreed with broken code. Counting all eight acquisitions makes the overlap real:
200 of 200 runs now peak at eight, and the same broken refcount is caught 40
times in 40. Holders signal the barrier on every path including failure, so a
holder that returns early fails the test rather than hanging it.
THE HELPER SKIPPED ON WINDOWS. scopeOutsideRoots reached for /Users/Shared and
fell back to /var/empty, neither of which exists there, so every test built on it
skipped and reported green having asserted nothing. It now uses the home
directory, which no platform lists as a default write root, matching what
scope_extra_read_test.go already does — and then PROVES the choice against
defaultTempWriteRoots rather than assuming it, so a future default root turns
these tests into an honest skip instead of a silent no-op.
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* fix(sandbox): a permanent grant outlives the temporary one, and an undo is per holder
Both P1s from @anandh8x, both reproduced before changing anything, and both are
the same mistake in different places: treating "something covers this path" as
though it answered "and will it still be there afterwards".
A PERMANENT GRANT WAS REVOKED BY A TEMPORARY HOLDER. extraRoots holds temporary
write roots alongside permanent ones, so Add asked only whether the path was
already covered. A session-scoped grant made while a temporary holder happened to
cover it recorded nothing at all, and disappeared the moment that holder
released. Outliving the request that prompted it is the entire difference between
Add and AddTemporaryWrite, and it was not happening. AddRead had it too,
including across the boundary: a permanent read covered only by a temporary WRITE
root died with that root.
Permanent coverage is now looked for first and across every root, so a temporary
cover cannot decide the answer when a permanent one is also present. The same
root held temporarily is promoted in place — its holders' releases become no-ops,
which is what permanence means here. A BROADER temporary root over a narrower
permanent grant cannot be fixed by promotion, so the narrower root is recorded in
its own right; that is the case he specifically called out, and it is the one a
promotion-only fix would have missed.
ONE HOLDER'S UNDO IS ONE HOLDER'S REFERENCE. The comment on releaseTemporaryRead
claimed each undo is called exactly once and that flooring the count at zero
covered the rest. Flooring stops the count going negative; it does nothing about
a holder's second call consuming a DIFFERENT holder's reference. With two
readers, calling the first's undo twice took the count 2 -> 1 -> 0 and removed a
root the second was still using — the exact revocation this refcount exists to
prevent, reached through a duplicate call rather than a sibling's cleanup, and a
deferred cleanup in a retry path is how a caller does that by accident. Every
undo handed out is now wrapped so it drops its own reference at most once, and
the comment says what is actually true.
Both mutation-checked: unwrapping the undo, and ignoring permanence in Add, each
fail the test that covers them. Race detector clean.
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* chore(sandbox): re-request an automated review of this head
No code change. CodeRabbit's verdict on this PR is pinned to ff85dbcc, a commit
that no longer exists on the branch, and a stale changes-requested keeps the PR
at mergeStateStatus=BLOCKED exactly as a human one would. It re-reviews on push
rather than on request, and repeated @coderabbitai triggers over five days
produced nothing, so this is the only lever available without maintainer rights.
The cost is that this dismisses @Vasanthdev2004's and @anandh8x's approvals of
4a7063aa. The tree they approved is byte-identical to this one.
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* test(sandbox): a fixture failure fails, a report cannot deadlock, and AddRead's
own branches are covered
All raised by CodeRabbit on the full review. Every one verified before changing
anything.
## The concurrent test could hang instead of failing
failures was buffered at one slot per holder, but each goroutine can report at
BOTH hasReadRoot checks — its own grant going missing while held, and again
after the release gate. Nothing drains the channel until after wg.Wait(), so the
ninth report blocks forever, wg.Done() is never reached and the wait hangs. The
test would deadlock in exactly the case it exists to catch: a refcount bug
severe enough to fail more than eight of eight holders. Buffered at 2*holders.
## A broken fixture reported itself as a pass
TestANarrowerRequestHoldsTheCoveringGrant called t.Skip when os.MkdirAll failed.
The directory is the fixture, not a precondition the environment may reasonably
withhold, and the sibling test above it already uses t.Fatal for the same call.
## Two tests assumed something they never checked
Both tests in scope_extra_read_test.go place their grant under $HOME precisely
because NewScope seeds /tmp and $TMPDIR as write roots — a grant that collapsed
into one of those would be writable for a reason unrelated to the property under
test. $HOME is normally clear of them, but a sandboxed or CI environment that
points HOME at a temp directory turns both tests into something that proves
nothing while still reporting PASS.
homeGrantOutsideTempRoots now builds the fixture for both and skips with the
reason when the assumption does not hold. Verified by running with HOME set to a
temp directory: both tests SKIP naming the covering root, where before they
passed. The path is resolved before comparing, because the temp roots are
resolved and /var is a symlink to /private/var on macOS.
## AddRead's branches were only covered from the write side
Two subtests added: a permanent read under a temporary WRITE root, and a narrow
permanent read under a BROAD temporary read root. Both mutation-checked by
removing the corresponding temporary-coverage guard in AddRead — each fails.
The first mutation I ran did not fail its test, and the finding looked wrong: the
pattern being edited occurs in Add, AddRead and AddTemporaryWrite alike, and a
first-match edit had changed Add. Re-run against the line inside AddRead, it
fails as claimed. Recorded because a mutation that misses its target is
indistinguishable from a test that holds.
## Also asserted: the refcount table is empty, not merely invisible
hasReadRoot answers what a caller can see. An entry left at zero in tempReads is
not visible that way and would still leak one map entry per acquire/release
cycle, so the contention test now checks the terminal state directly.
go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=5: clean.
Unrelated and pre-existing here: TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics
and TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.
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* fix(sandbox): a reader outliving its writer keeps read authority, not write
Reported by @jatmn, and it is a privilege escalation rather than a lifetime bug.
AddTemporaryRead, given a path already covered by a temporary WRITE root, took a
reference on that write root and returned an undo that released it. The lifetime
was then correct — the reader no longer lost its access when the writer cleaned
up — but the capability was wrong. extraRoots feeds validate(), which authorises
WRITES, so once the write holder released first the path stayed in extraRoots for
as long as the read holder lived. A caller that asked only to READ could write
anywhere below the former write root after the write grant had ended.
His diagnosis names the root cause exactly: one write-capability reference was
doing two jobs, tracking a lifetime and standing in for a read-only dependent.
The lifetime is now kept as what the caller actually asked for — a temporary READ
root on its own path. AddTemporaryRead consults permanentWriteRootCoversLocked
rather than writeRootCoversLocked, so a merely temporary write cover no longer
short-circuits it into borrowing write authority.
Mutation-checked: restoring writeRootCoversLocked in that branch compiles and
fails the regression on three separate assertions — the reader keeps no read root
of its own, ReadRoots() loses the path, and the writer's cleanup revokes a live
read grant.
Two things a verification pass turned up that are worth recording:
The comment justifying this design said readRoots "feeds ReadRoots() and nothing
else". That was false — it also feeds ExtraReadRoots(). The security argument
survives, because neither confers write authority and validate() reads
workspaceRoot plus extraRoots, which this path never enters. But that sentence IS
the written justification for the whole choice, so it now lists both and says why
neither grants write.
The "the reader releases first" subtest passes on the unfixed tree: the
escalation needs the WRITER to go first. It is a real no-regression control for
the opposite ordering, not evidence the finding is closed, and it is renamed to
say so rather than padding the count.
Rebased onto ad34dc8d as requested. go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=5:
clean. Pre-existing here and on main, unrelated:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.
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* fix(sandbox): a nested write holder keeps only the subtree it asked for
Reported by CodeRabbit, and it is the write-side twin of the read-side
escalation @jatmn found — I had disclosed it on this PR as still open, so this
closes it rather than deferring it again.
AddTemporaryWrite, given a path already covered by a broader TEMPORARY write
root, took a reference on that covering root. The lifetime was right and the
capability was wrong, exactly as on the read side: extraRoots is what validate()
authorises writes from, so keeping the covering root alive handed the nested
holder everything its neighbour had asked for.
Reproduced:
both held tempWrites={outer:2} extraRoots=[... outer]
after outer release tempWrites={outer:1} extraRoots=[... outer]
-> the inner-only holder can WRITE outer/sibling/not-mine.txt
A narrower request now records its own root. Each holder gets exactly the
authority it asked for and a lifetime of its own:
both held tempWrites={outer:1, inner:1} extraRoots=[... outer inner]
after outer release tempWrites={inner:1} extraRoots=[... inner]
-> sibling denied, inner retained
Only an EXACT match shares a refcount entry; a narrower one never does, which is
the distinction the escalation turned on. The nesting costs a redundant
extraRoots entry while both holders are live, which is not wrong — the broader
root already permits everything the narrower one does.
Three regressions: the escalation itself (broad holder releases first), the
opposite order as a control, and two holders of the same root sharing one entry.
Mutation: restoring the covering-root borrow compiles and fails the escalation
test on both the sibling and the covering root itself.
Honest note on a second mutation. Removing the permanent-cover early return
compiles and fails NOTHING. That is correct rather than a coverage gap: a
permanently covered request would then record its own temporary root, which is
redundant but harmless, since the permanent root outlives it and already permits
the writes. The early return is a cleanliness guard, not a correctness one, and
I would rather say so than write a test that pretends otherwise.
go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=5: clean. Pre-existing here and on main:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 5 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 3bb420a0a97b
* test(sandbox): the outside-roots fixture fails loudly instead of skipping
Raised by CodeRabbit, and the helper had already written the argument against
itself: its own comment says "A skip is not a pass" while three of its four exits
were skips.
Every caller of scopeOutsideRoots asserts an AUTHORIZATION boundary — who may
write where, and whose release revokes it. A skipped fixture means that assertion
never ran and the build reported green anyway, which is precisely the failure the
helper was written to close. It closed it for one case (a home directory that
resolves nowhere on Windows) and left the others open.
Three exits become fatal:
os.UserHomeDir failing — resolves on every platform Zero supports
os.MkdirTemp(home) failing — a home that will not take a temp directory is a
broken machine, not a limited one
os.MkdirAll under base — base was just created successfully, so a
subdirectory failing under it is the same
If any fires, the right outcome is a red build somebody fixes, not silent
non-coverage of the sandbox's write rules.
ONE SKIP STAYS, and it is a different kind. When the grant path is already inside
a default write root, the fixture built correctly and the machine is fine — the
grant simply cannot demonstrate anything, because that path is writable before
any temporary grant exists. Running on would assert a permission that was never
in question. The comment now says which kind it is, so the distinction survives
the next reader.
Verified the fatal path fires: forcing the MkdirTemp error compiles and fails
TestANestedWriteHolderKeepsOnlyItsOwnSubtree at the fixture with the reason,
where it previously reported a pass.
go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=3: clean. Pre-existing here and on main:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 13 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: a599377c09e0
* fix(sandbox): least authority for nested readers, and a hermetic grant fixture
@jatmn's three findings, taken as one pass over the grant construct rather than
as three local patches — his point that the same invariant kept not being
reapplied to the symmetric branch was fair, and this is the symmetric branch.
## The nested reader kept its neighbour's tree
AddTemporaryRead had exactly the shape AddTemporaryWrite was fixed for one
commit earlier: reader B asking for outer/inner took a reference on reader A's
covering root. Lifetime correct, capability wrong. readRoots feeds validateRead
and the native sandbox profile, so once A released, B could read outer/sibling.
Reproduced: tempReads={outer:2}; after A releases, the inner-only reader reads a
sibling it never asked for.
The rule is now the same on both sides: permanent coverage decides first, an
EXACT temporary root shares one refcount, and a narrower request records its own
root. Mutation: restoring the borrow fires both escalation assertions.
## Slice order no longer decides permanent coverage
permanentReadRootCoversLocked asks the whole question over both lists before any
insertion order can answer it, and AddRead now uses the same predicate instead of
its own scan, so the two cannot drift.
Honest note: with the borrow gone, this mutation is no longer catchable. Making
the scan return at the first covering entry compiles and fails nothing, because
AddTemporaryRead no longer borrows anything — it either no-ops or records its own
root, and neither escalates. The guard now prevents a redundant refcount entry
rather than an escalation. Verified by measurement, not assumed.
## A test that asserted the defect
TestANarrowerRequestHoldsTheCoveringGrant proved a lifetime property by
asserting the BROAD root was still present after the broad holder released —
which is the escalation written down as a requirement. It is replaced by tests
that assert lifetime and authority separately: the requested path stays readable,
the sibling and the covering root do not, plus the reverse release order,
exact-root sharing, and a permanent narrow root not borrowing a broad temporary
one.
## The obsolete predicate that broke CI
writeRootCoversLocked lost its last caller when the three coverage decisions
moved to permanentWriteRootCoversLocked and exact-root logic. make lint-static
reproduced the Windows `unused` failure locally. Removed rather than suppressed.
This is on me: I did not run lint-static before the previous push, which is a
required step, and CI caught what I should have.
## Fixtures out of the real home
scopeOutsideRoots and homeGrantOutsideTempRoots both built fixtures under
os.UserHomeDir(). Fixed at the cause jatmn identified rather than by relaxing the
setup checks: NewScope seeds the system temp directory as a permanent write root,
which is what made a t.TempDir() grant vacuous and sent the fixture to HOME in the
first place. Both helpers now build the Scope DIRECTLY — the pattern
scopeOutsideDefaults and temporaryWriteFixture already used — so no defaults are
seeded, t.TempDir() is outside by construction, and nothing touches HOME.
Each helper now asserts the NEGATIVE against its own scope before returning: the
target must be unwritable, and unreadable where relevant, before any grant
exists. That is stronger than the old check against defaultTempWriteRoots(),
which asked about a scope these tests no longer build.
Verified with HOME readable but not writable (caches redirected): the sandbox
suite passes. The one remaining failure there is
TestSeatbeltEnforcesExtraWriteRoots in seatbelt_integration_darwin_test.go, which
is NOT in this PR's diff — pre-existing, same shape, and worth its own issue
rather than riding along here.
gofmt, go vet, lint-static (0 issues), go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=5:
all clean. Pre-existing here and on main:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 14 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: a599377c09e0
* refactor(sandbox): drop the child-grant accessors this PR does not consume
Reported by @jatmn.
ExtraRoots and ExtraReadRoots have no production caller anywhere in the tree —
only their own definitions and this PR's tests. They arrived with the initial
split because the extraction was made at the file level: the temporary-root
implementation came across while the CLI and runner wiring that consumes them
stayed behind in #829's child read-grant propagation area. That leaves unrelated
production surface in a branch scoped to refcounting.
Both accessors are removed, along with the getter-only propagation assertion that
existed to exercise them. The refcount regressions that used ExtraRoots only to
inspect beyond-workspace write state now use a test-only helper over Roots(),
because that inspection is a test concern rather than an API this branch needs.
Nothing about the refcount, permanence, least-authority, atomic-release or
hermetic-fixture work changes, and no child propagation is wired here — that
would widen the scope rather than fix the extraction boundary.
One comment needed correcting rather than deleting. The justification for keeping
a reader's lifetime as a READ root named the lists readRoots feeds, and that
sentence has now been wrong in both directions: an earlier draft said "ReadRoots
and nothing else" while ExtraReadRoots also read it, and the accessor it was
corrected to mention is the one being removed here. It now describes what ships
and says why the list has to stay exhaustive as accessors change.
Rebased onto 6fe0d1ed, 0 behind. lint-static: 0 issues.
go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=3: clean. Pre-existing here and on main:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.
* fix(tools): an edit keeps the reads it did not disturb
Split out of #829 as an independent fix, per @Vasanthdev2004's review asking for
the small self-contained pieces to arrive separately.
A successful edit re-baselined the file through RecordHash, which drops EVERY
recorded read range. A file read in three pieces therefore lost all three to a
single two-line edit, and the next six edits into regions that had already been
read were refused as unseen — the model had to re-read what it had just read in
order to keep working.
RecordEdit replaces that on the edit path. Because the edit is ours, the changed
span is known exactly, so ranges the edit did not touch are carried across,
ranges after it are shifted by the line delta, and a range the edit spans is
split around it.
An EXTERNAL change still drops everything, deliberately: once a formatter has
rewritten the file we no longer know which line holds what was read, and the
conservative drop is the only honest answer there.
"Seen whole" is now decided in ONE place. SeenWhole derives the answer from the
ranges because the raw flag is only ever set by a single covering read, but
RecordEdit branched on the flag — so a file read whole in two chunks reported
seen-whole true, then false after one edit, putting back the write_file refusal
the derived answer exists to prevent.
countLines now reports the count a READER would give. strings.Split leaves an
empty final element for content ending in a newline, so it counted 4 lines for a
3-line file; since SeenWhole asks whether the ranges cover 1..total, that
inflated total made full coverage unreachable for a file just read in full.
Nearly every text file ends in a newline, so this was the common case.
Origin-Session: local-de382f | Claude Code | 9 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 92ae33c95cd1
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: ae653221fa15
* chore(tools): re-request an automated review of this head
No code change. CodeRabbit's verdict on this PR is pinned to 6f0cd6c4, a commit
that was force-pushed away five days ago, and a stale changes-requested keeps the
PR at mergeStateStatus=BLOCKED exactly as a human one would. It re-reviews on
push rather than on request, and repeated @coderabbitai triggers over five days
produced nothing, so this is the only lever available without maintainer rights.
The cost is that this dismisses @Vasanthdev2004's and @anandh8x's approvals of
0b6fcf54, which is an unhappy trade for an empty commit — the tree they approved
is byte-identical to this one.
Origin-Session: local-8cd239 | Claude Code | 6 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 149ab98453ad
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: ae653221fa15
* perf(tools): derive the changed-line span from bytes, not from per-line slices
Reported by @jatmn.
changedLineSpan split both file versions into []string, so it allocated one
string header per line for EACH version — work that scales with the size of the
file rather than the size of the edit. countLines then split a third time just to
take a length. All of it ran before RecordEdit had checked whether there was a
tracked observation to update at all.
He measured 32,036,640 bytes for two 2 MB versions of a million short lines, and
extrapolated roughly 1.6 GB of headers for a 100 MB file before counting the
content, the updated bytes and the hashes already live beside them.
The memory was not the sharp end. edit_file writes the updated bytes BEFORE
calling RecordEdit, so an out-of-memory kill lands after the user's file has
changed and before the tracker baseline catches up: the file and the record of it
disagree, and nothing says so. His instruction was to fix the allocation source
rather than add a size guard, and that a guard — if used at all — would have to
reject before os.WriteFile rather than during post-write re-baselining. Taken as
written: there is no new limit, and the same edits are accepted as before.
Two identical byte prefixes share every line that ends inside them, so counting
newlines in the common prefix counts the unchanged leading lines directly. Same
for the suffix, with one rule that the line-array version got for free: the line
a shared tail STARTS in is only shared when the tail begins on a line boundary in
both versions, or its opening bytes differ and it is a changed line that merely
ends the same way.
Measured on his own scenario, two 2 MB versions:
changedLineSpan 32,036,640 bytes -> 0 allocations
countLines per-line slice -> 0 allocations
## The equivalence is tested, not asserted
A rewrite of a diff primitive is only safe if it is behaviour-preserving, so the
replaced implementation is kept in the test file as an oracle and both are asked
the same questions. That caught 206 mismatches in my first attempt at the byte
scan — empty versions, and trailing lines that are only partially shared. Neither
appears in the hand-written cases, and I would have shipped it.
Two regressions: the oracle comparison, and an absolute allocation ceiling rather
than a ratio, so a future rewrite that reintroduces per-line slices fails rather
than merely getting slower. Mutation: restoring strings.Split in either function
allocates 3.2 MB and 3.6 MB against a 4 KB bound.
splitLinesForTracking lost its last caller and is removed — the same obsolete-
helper lint failure that broke Windows CI on #911, caught here by running
make lint-static before pushing rather than after. 0 issues.
Rebased onto ad34dc8d, 0 behind. go test -race ./internal/tools/: clean.
Pre-existing here and on main: TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics
and TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 17 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: a599377c09e0
* perf(agent): cheap compaction — dedicated summarizer model, input caps, free reactive prune, window re-derive
Compaction summarization was the single most expensive recurring event
in a long run: the full elided middle — verbatim tool bodies included —
went to the session's main model at full price (a ~100k-token call near
a 200k window, recursively multiplied on overflow).
Four changes, each independently safe:
- Dedicated summarizer model. Compaction summaries route to a cheap
model resolved as ZERO_COMPACTION_MODEL > preferences.compactionModel
> a curated default on official endpoints (Haiku 4.5 / Gemini
Flash-Lite / gpt-4.1-mini; custom-endpoint catalogs are unknowable so
they get none). Built lazily on the first paid compaction; ANY
failure permanently falls back to the main provider for the run, so a
misconfigured summarizer can never break compaction. "main" at any
level forces the old behavior.
- Summarizer input caps. renderTranscript clamps tool-result bodies to
2,000 chars and tool-call arguments to 500 (head+tail, rune-safe) —
the summary needs what was done and decided, not raw payloads. Cuts
summarizer input 5-10x on tool-heavy sessions.
- Free reactive prune. recover() now runs the same prune-first stage as
the proactive path: a context-limit error is first answered by
pruning stale tool bodies at zero cost, without consuming the
one-shot reactive budget; the paid summarizer only runs when a later
error finds nothing left to prune.
- Window re-derivation on model switch. Options.ContextWindowFor
(wired to the model registry in exec and the TUI) lets the loop
re-derive the compaction threshold after escalate_model, closing the
documented KNOWN LIMITATION where a switch to a smaller-window model
could overflow and a larger one over-compacted.
## Rebase notes (2026-08-25, onto 2749447c)
Rebased across 214 commits. main now summarizes through the context planner
(#879) and switches models via turn sessions, so the agent side was reworked
rather than merged textually:
- Summarizer selection lives on compactionState and is resolved lazily per
main model through summarizeWithPlanner (planner + trace preserved); a
failing dedicated summarizer is marked broken and the same slice is
retried once on the main provider.
- Options.Summarizer now receives the main model in force:
`func(ctx, mainModelID string) (Provider, error)`, and may return
(nil, nil) when no dedicated model applies. After a successful
escalate_model switch the loop calls compactor.switchModel, which
re-derives the window and re-resolves the summarizer — a run that started
on the cheap model and escalated regains cheap summaries (review P2).
- recover()'s free prune stage runs before the one-shot reactive guard
(pruning is free and cannot loop) and mirrors maybeCompact's two prune
passes; the free retry is taken only when the pruned history fits the
window the provider enforces (with a 5% estimate margin), otherwise the
same call falls through to the paid summarizer. Gating on the 70%
proactive threshold would have sent histories in the 70-95% band to the
summarizer unnecessarily (review P1 and the follow-up question).
- ContextWindowFor is wired through the turn-session switch path; the
planner's window is updated alongside the compactor's.
Tests: the PR's suite is ported to the new seams, plus insufficient-prune
fall-through, free prune after the budget is spent, window-vs-threshold
gating, and summarizer re-resolution across a model switch.
* fix(agent): branch on a dedicated-summarizer flag instead of comparing providers
Review follow-ups for #532:
- summarizeProvider now reports whether the dedicated summarizer was
selected and summarizeClosure branches on that flag; the previous
`chosen == provider` compared Provider interface values, which panics
when the dynamic type is not comparable. Regression test uses a provider
with a slice field for both the summarizer and the main provider.
- CompactionModelID's curated-default test covers the official OpenAI
profile alongside Anthropic and Google.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(tools): make apply_patch tolerant and re-expose edit_file
Head-to-head benchmarking against Grok Build on grok-4.6 (3 tasks × 3 runs)
showed Zero solving every task but spending 2.7× the tokens and 2.3× the
time on the multi-file feature task. Every one of the 20 apply_patch calls
in those runs failed, after which the model degraded to whole-file
write_file rewrites and read→write verification loops.
Root causes and fixes:
- The sandbox and the tool both rejected an absolute path that lies inside
the workspace ("must stay inside the workspace"). Models routinely echo
the absolute path read_file showed them. Absolute paths now flow through
the normal workspace-scope validation (inside → allowed, outside → still
denied); unified-diff headers are rewritten to a/ b/ relative form before
git apply, and platform symlink prefixes (/var → /private/var) are
normalised the same way the other file tools do.
- The structured parser demanded a byte-exact "*** Begin Patch" /
"*** End Patch"; grok-4.6 writes "*** Begin Patch ***". Decorated marker
spellings are accepted, and a unified range after "@@" ("-12,4 +12,6",
optionally with a heading) no longer becomes a literal context search.
- Parse errors now carry a one-line format reminder so a failed call is
recoverable in one retry instead of a format-guessing loop.
- edit_file (exact search/replace with uniqueness guard, CRLF and fuzzy
fallbacks) is advertised to the model again alongside apply_patch, and
the apply_patch description shows the structured format.
- Writers (edit_file, write_file, apply_patch) recorded a file's line total
with lineCount, which is one higher than read_file's count for a file
ending in a newline. RecordSeenRange resets every observation when the
total changes, so a partial read_file after a successful edit silently
discarded whole-file knowledge and the next edit was refused with
"content that has not been read exactly in this session". All writers
now record the same total read_file reports (trackedLineTotal).
- read_file's padded " N | " line prefix was ~19% of every read (about
1.5k tokens per 800-line file) and was re-sent on every later call. It is
now the compact "N→" prefix models already know; nothing parsed the old
form.
- The editing-discipline prompt steers: edit_file for a targeted change,
apply_patch for multi-hunk/multi-file changes, write_file only for new
files or full rewrites; a successful edit result is confirmation, so the
file is not re-read to verify it.
Tests: regression tests for decorated markers, writer/reader line-total
agreement (edit → partial read → edit far away still succeeds), range hunk headers,
absolute in-workspace paths (structured + unified), outside-workspace
rejection, header-line-only relativisation, and tool visibility; the
prompt and tool-budget tests updated to the new contract.
Benchmark (grok-4.6, 3 tasks x 3 runs, harness in demo/bench-zero-vs-grok):
Zero 0.8.0 617 s / 1,527k tokens -> with this change 346 s / 493k tokens;
Grok Build 407 s / 713k. Every run of every configuration solved its task.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* fix(tools): keep CRLF line endings when relativizing patch headers
relativizeUnifiedPatchPaths split on a normalized "\n" and rejoined with
"\n", so any CRLF patch that needed a header rewrite lost its line endings
everywhere; git apply could then fail to match a CRLF file. Split on "\n"
only and carry each line's trailing "\r" through, including on rewritten
headers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* fix(sandbox): share the structured-patch classifier with apply_patch
Review follow-ups for #956:
- The tool accepted decorated structured markers ("***Begin Patch") that
the sandbox's applyPatchPaths did not recognise, so for that spelling the
boundary scanned the patch as a unified diff, extracted no targets and
validated nothing. The marker classifier now lives in the sandbox package
(StructuredPatchMarker / IsStructuredPatch) and the tool delegates to it,
so both sides accept exactly the same set; tests cover inside, traversal
and outside targets for the no-space spelling at the boundary.
- Document the containment model at the apply site: structured patches are
applied through an opened os.Root (descriptor-relative, no-follow);
unified diffs keep the pre-existing git-apply pathname flow, which the
absolute-path rewrite does not widen (they become the same root-relative
form relative paths always used).
- OpenAI addendum: the one-file-per-call rule names read_file, edit_file and
write_file explicitly and allows a single multi-file apply_patch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* test(sandbox): compare slash-normalised patch paths so the check passes on Windows
structuredPatchHeaderPaths normalises separators to "/", so the absolute
outside-workspace path in the boundary test must be compared in its slash
form; on Windows the backslash original never matched and the Smoke job
failed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* test(sandbox): validate the parsed patch path at the scope boundary
For each accepted marker spelling, pass the exact path applyPatchRequestPaths
produced to scope.validate: an outside path must be denied and an inside
path accepted, so a separator-handling regression between the parser and the
scope cannot slip past the test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* fix(tools): apply unified diffs in-process through the workspace root
Review follow-up for #956. Unified diffs were validated by pathname and then
handed to git apply, which reopened the targets by name — a check-to-use
window a symlink swap could exploit — and the absolute-path rewrite added in
this PR normalised `diff --git` headers with strings.Fields, which splits a
git C-quoted path containing whitespace.
Both go away by not shelling out at all: parseUnifiedPatch translates a
unified diff into the same operations a structured patch produces, and both
formats are applied by applyPatchOperations through os.OpenRoot — every
stat, read, create and write is descriptor-relative and refuses to follow a
link out of the root. git is no longer required by apply_patch.
Unified-diff support: modifications, creations (--- /dev/null), deletions
(+++ /dev/null), multiple hunks per file, git "rename from/to" (a move,
hunks optional) and "copy from/to" (a new copy operation whose destination
inherits only the tracker credit the source had), "\ No newline at end of
file" on either side, a/ b/ prefixes, C-quoted paths, CRLF patches, and
git's diff/index/mode lines. Hunks are placed at their "@@ -a,b" range when
the expected lines match there and located by context otherwise (so a
stale range still applies and duplicate blocks are disambiguated by the
range). Binary patches are rejected.
Removed: the git apply flow, relativizeUnifiedPatchPaths,
recheckPatchWriteTargets, missingPatchTargets, completeCreatedPatchTargets
and recordCreatedPatchTargets. validatePatchPaths/changedFilesFromPatch stay
for mutation-target listing.
Tests: the existing unified-diff suite now runs through the in-process
applier unchanged; new coverage for quoted whitespace paths (inside applies,
outside is refused untouched), a workspace path swapped for a symlink that
escapes the root (both formats refused, outside file unmodified), create +
delete + no-newline markers, range hint vs context fallback, rename with a
hunk, and binary/empty rejection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* fix(tools): harden unified-diff parsing and cover the copy operation
Review follow-ups for #956 (in-process unified applier):
- A hunk that ends before its declared line counts is reported as
malformed instead of silently absorbing the next file's ---/+++ header
pair (which then failed later against the wrong file). Both shapes are
caught: leftover counts at a header or at end of input, and a --- line
directly followed by +++ inside a hunk. The element after a patch's final
newline is no longer counted as an empty context line, so a truncated
hunk cannot look complete.
- "\ No newline at end of file" may only follow a file's final hunk; a
marker before another hunk is rejected rather than leaking into that
hunk's result.
- Zero-context insertions (git diff -U0) are documented as
position-trusting by design, matching git apply without fuzz; hunks with
context are verified at the range before it is used.
Tests: copy from/to (source kept, destination created with the hunk
applied and tracked with the source's whole-file state; existing
destination refused untouched; copy onto itself refused), over-declared and
truncated hunk counts, and the no-newline marker before vs after the final
hunk.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* fix(tools): require an @@ line before treating ---/+++ inside a hunk as a file boundary
A removed "-- x" line directly followed by an added "++ y" line is valid
hunk content that also matches the ---/+++ header shape; the boundary check
now additionally requires the following line to be a hunk header, and a
regression test keeps such a pair intact. End-of-input strictness for a hunk
cut short is documented as deliberate: applying a truncated hunk would make
a partial change (removals without their replacements).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* refactor(tools): share one line-count implementation between reader and writer
sourceLineCount and trackedLineTotal computed the same count; keeping two
copies invites exactly the reader/writer drift this PR fixed. The reader now
delegates to trackedLineTotal, which carries the tracker contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* fix(tools): verify a unified deletion's expected content before removing the file
A unified diff's "+++ /dev/null" hunks state the content being removed, but
the in-process applier dropped them and deleted unconditionally, so a stale
deletion removed a file whose current content the patch never described.
Unified deletions now keep their hunks, require at least one, and run them
through the same verifier as updates: the hunks must match the current file
and leave nothing behind, otherwise the deletion is refused and the file is
untouched. A structured "*** Delete File" keeps its unconditional meaning.
Hardening from the same review: every non-create change re-reads its source
through the opened root immediately before commit and refuses to proceed if
the bytes differ from what was planned.
Tests: matching deletion, stale deletion (file byte-for-byte unchanged),
partial deletion, header-only deletion, multi-hunk deletion with one stale
hunk (nothing removed) and all-good hunks, structured delete unchanged, and
a source changed between planning and commit for update and delete.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* test(tools): a move with a missing source is refused before publishing
The pre-commit recheck now refuses a move whose source vanished after
planning instead of publishing the destination and then failing; update the
test to the safer contract (error names the recheck, nothing is created).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* fix(tools): byte-exact unified deletions and git's header-only empty-file forms
Review follow-ups for #956:
- A unified deletion is verified byte for byte: the removed lines (with the
removed side's "\ No newline at end of file" honoured) must equal the
current file exactly, with only the file's own line-ending style
normalised. None of the whitespace tolerance used to locate update hunks
applies, and a whitespace-only remainder no longer passes; a deletion is
not recoverable, so it fails closed.
- git describes an empty file's deletion or creation with header lines only
("diff --git", "deleted file mode"/"new file mode", "index") and no
hunks. Both forms are recognised: the deletion is applied only when the
current file is empty, the creation writes an empty file, and they compose
with hunk-carrying files in the same patch.
- The pre-commit recheck test also covers the copy operation and asserts no
destination is created on refusal.
Tests: whitespace/indentation/blank-line/space-only/missing-newline
mismatches all refused with the file unchanged, matching no-newline marker
and CRLF file accepted, header-only deletion of a non-empty file refused,
multi-file patch with header-only delete + create + a normal hunk.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* test(tools): remove the move source after planning via a deterministic hook
The refused-move test now creates source.txt, plans the move, and removes
the file through a test-only pre-commit hook (structuredPatchBeforeCommit)
so it exercises the post-planning disappearance path rather than a source
that was never there. Assertions unchanged: refused before publishing, no
destination created.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* test(tui): read_file fixtures use the compact N→ prefix
Three TUI fixtures still built fake read_file output in the legacy
" N | text" shape; they pass either way but pinned an outdated contract.
They now mirror what appendReadFileRange emits, and the shape comment and
the expanded-card assertion are updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
* fix(tools): name the committed files when a patch is partially applied
Review follow-up for #956. When a later change in a multi-file patch fails
(for example the pre-commit recheck refuses a file that changed after
planning), the error now lists exactly which files were already committed
and states that the rest are unchanged, instead of a generic "partially
applied" warning. The model can then re-read only what actually changed.
Test: a three-file structured patch whose second file is altered after
planning fails with "already committed: first.txt", first.txt holds the
patched content, and the other two files are untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): retire recorded approvals through a policy bump
Ahead of tightening which command prefixes may be approved, make the
upgrade path safe. A grant already on disk that the narrower rules
reject fails validation on read, and that path rejects the entire grants
file rather than the one entry. Every caller treats a read error as "no
grant" (engine.go LookupCommandPrefix, ApprovedCommandPrefixes, and the
Lookup in Evaluate), so one stale prefix would silently disable the
user's persisted deny grants too, with the error text never reaching
them.
Bump the approval policy version instead and let the store's existing
migration handle it: it backs the file up, keeps deny grants,
invalidates prior approvals, and reports the counts once through the
startup notice that both frontends already print. That is what the
mechanism was built for.
The v1-migration test pinned the policy version as a literal, so it now
derives the expected value from the constant and will not need editing
on the next bump.
* fix(sandbox): normalize launcher names before the command-prefix denylist
unsafeCommandPrefixLauncher matched the program name as written, so
python3.11, python2.7, python.exe, node.exe and git.exe all validated as
ordinary commands and could be persisted as command-prefix grants.
Lookup is a string-prefix match, so a single approval then auto-allowed
every later invocation: granting [python3.11 -c] covers
`python3.11 -c "import os; os.system(...)"` with no further prompt.
internal/agent's commandName already normalizes case and Windows
executable extensions for the allow side of the same decision; the deny
side did not, and the two disagreeing is the bug. Reduce the program to
the launcher it actually runs and match on that: executable extension,
Windows' trailing dots and spaces (python. starts python.exe), CPython
ABI flags, then a trailing version, testing the digit-stripped form as
well so python3.11 and python3 both arrive as python. A name is only
ever narrowed toward an existing entry, so the failure direction is an
extra permission prompt, never a silent grant. Digits without a
separator stay part of the name, which keeps base64, 7z and sha256sum
grantable.
Two Windows spellings cannot be resolved by name at all, so the shape is
refused alongside a path: 8.3 short names truncate the stem, which makes
POWERS~1.EXE unrecognizable, and python.exe::$DATA reaches the same
executable through its default stream. Normalizing the first token
before the banned-suggestion comparison keeps git.exe at parity with
git.
The list also gains launchers of the same class it already covers and
that normalization cannot reach: cmd, wsl, the remaining POSIX shells,
busybox, uv and uvx. Entries normalization now covers (/bin/bash,
/bin/zsh, powershell.exe, python3, pypy3) are gone; the first two were
already unreachable behind the path check above them.
Covers the persisted store, the session-scoped grants the agent takes
during a turn, the legacy-schema migration that prunes such a grant
per entry, and the Windows spellings hermetically.
* fix(sandbox): treat free-threaded CPython as a launcher too
The ABI flags came from the pre-3.13 set, so "python3.13t" and
"python3.13t.exe" normalized to themselves and stayed grantable as
command prefixes while the GIL build "python3.13" was refused. A
free-threaded interpreter runs arbitrary code just the same.
Add "t" to the flags trimmed under the existing digit guard, which is
what keeps ordinary names intact: "zstd" and "cat" have no digit beneath
the trimmed letters, so they keep their own names and stay grantable.
Reported by CodeRabbit on #934.
* fix(sandbox): refuse the remaining spellings of listed launchers
Same defect as the free-threaded build, found by sweeping the families
already on the list for names it cannot reach:
- nodejs is node on Debian and Ubuntu, and was grantable.
- python3-dbg, python3.11-dbg and python3.13t-dbg are interpreters that
run arbitrary code; so are bash-static, pwsh-preview and
node-nightly. A closed set of build-channel suffixes now normalizes
them. The set stays closed deliberately: a general "-word" strip would
also swallow node-gyp, python3-config and ruby-lsp, which are ordinary
tools a user should still be able to approve, and those are pinned as
must-stay-grantable.
- pnpm, yarn and bunx run package scripts exactly as npm and npx do, and
npm and npx are already refused.
- sudoedit escalates like sudo.
The launcher-wrapper family (winpty, chroot, unshare, nsenter, parallel,
script, unbuffer, taskset, flock) has the same inconsistency against the
env/nohup/timeout/setsid entries already on the list, and is left for a
separate decision rather than widened here.
* test(sandbox): cover the -debug and -beta launcher suffixes
Four of the six build-channel suffixes had regression cases; -debug and
-beta did not, so removing either from the set left every test green.
Both now fail RED when their entry is dropped.
Reported by CodeRabbit on #934.
deepseek-v4-flash / deepseek-v4-pro expose thinking-mode effort control
through the OpenAI-compatible reasoning_effort parameter (low/high/max;
medium/xhigh map onto high). reasoningEffortsForModelName did not recognize
the deepseek family, so /effort only offered 'auto' for these models.
Advertise {low, high, max} so the /effort picker and Ctrl+T ring work, and
add fallback coverage for deepseek-v4-flash/pro/reasoner/chat.
* feat(update): recognise Homebrew installs and add mise, go install docs
* fix(update): match the keg shape, correct the docs, cover Apply and cross-target
* test(update): build the release fixture from the running platform
* fix(update): require a Homebrew receipt before refusing self-update
Review found the keg check was shape-only, and it was right: a directory
tree a user built themselves can have exactly a keg's shape. Classifying
one as Homebrew refuses a `zero upgrade` that would have worked
perfectly, on a machine Homebrew has never touched.
Two changes, cheap one first. The shape rule now requires the full
<prefix>/Cellar/<formula>/<version>/bin/<binary> depth rather than one
segment fewer, which already excludes the exact path the review raised.
Then, only for a path that still looks like a keg, one Stat for
INSTALL_RECEIPT.json — the file Homebrew writes into every keg and
nothing else does.
The receipt is what the old comment argued against, on the grounds that
it would put filesystem I/O on a path that runs at every version check.
That is no longer true of it: the Stat happens only after the shape test
has already matched, so an ordinary install still reaches no filesystem
here at all.
A directory named INSTALL_RECEIPT.json is not a receipt, which a bare
Stat would have accepted silently.
NOT taken: the same review asked for the Homebrew branch to be moved
ahead of the cross-target one in upgradeGuidance. That ordering is
deliberate and already pinned by
TestUpgradeGuidanceKeepsCrossTargetAnswerForHomebrew, whose comment
predicted exactly this reading — "it reads like an ordering bug until you
see which question is being answered". Homebrew is a property of the
binary on THIS machine; when the check was asked about a different
target the answer belongs to that other machine, and `brew upgrade zero`
would change this one instead. The reasoning is now recorded at the
branch as well as in the test, so the next reader finds it in both
places.
The install docs claimed detection was the Cellar path alone, which
undersold it, and stated the self-update rule absolutely in one paragraph
before excepting mise in the next. Both say the same thing now.
* test(update): give the Homebrew fixtures a receipt, and stop gating the receipt rule on the host
The previous commit made a receipt the thing that distinguishes a keg from any
directory sitting under a path containing "Cellar". Two fixtures still built a
keg without one, so detection correctly answered standalone and both failed:
TestDetectInstallMethodRecognisesAHomebrewKeg keg path: got "standalone", want "homebrew"
TestApplyRefusesToUpdateAHomebrewKeg refusal does not name the command that works:
download release archive: dial tcp: lookup example.test
The second is worth reading twice: with detection returning standalone, Apply
stopped refusing and went to the network, so the failure surfaced as a DNS error
rather than as a missing refusal. Both fixtures write a receipt now.
The reason this reached CI at all is the second half. Every test of the receipt
rule passed runtime.GOOS to isHomebrewPath, which already takes the target as a
parameter, so all of them skipped on Windows and the rule could only ever break
somewhere else. They pass an explicit target now and run everywhere. The two
that exercise DetectInstallMethod stay host-gated, because those are about the
wired entry point rather than the rule, but the rule underneath them is no
longer invisible here.
Verified the receipt path arithmetic on both non-Windows targets rather than
trusting the host-gated tests: isHomebrewPath is false before the receipt is
written and true after, with the receipt at the keg directory hasHomebrewReceipt
actually reads.
* feat: use Exa as default search provider
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a01522-a5f1-7139-8a55-5e417cba2751
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
* fix(config): carry a legacy default's disable across the Exa migration
A user who ran `zero mcp disable firecrawl` chose not to open that outbound
connection. Renaming the built-in default to exa re-opened it under the new
name on upgrade, and because the replacement looked like an untouched default
the startup warning stayed quiet too.
Carry an explicit user-level disable of a retired default onto its successor,
but only when the user never declared the successor themselves — an explicit
exa entry wins either way. The carried-over disable is recorded as a user-level
decision, so the lower-trust project layer cannot lift it while
`zero mcp enable exa` still can.
Regression coverage: the legacy-disabled upgrade path, the explicit-exa
override, a configured-but-enabled legacy entry, the CLI re-enable, the
project-layer re-enable attempt, and the resulting startup behavior
(NormalizeConfig must not hand back an exa server to connect to).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* fix(config): keep a retired default's transport for partial user entries
A user who added an API key to the firecrawl default wrote only the header —
the seeded default supplied the http type and URL. Once the default stops being
seeded that entry resolves with no type, url, or command, and NormalizeConfig
rejects it, taking down startup for every other server too rather than just
that one.
Record what Zero used to ship for a retired default and re-seed it under the
user's own fields. Only for an entry that named no transport of its own: an
entry with a self-hosted url or a stdio command is a complete definition the
user owns, and grafting the retired http default onto a command produces a
server that is rejected outright.
Regression coverage at both ResolveMCP and NormalizeConfig for the header-only
entry and its failure path, the self-hosted stdio entry that must be left
alone, and a disabled retired entry keeping a usable transport so a later
re-enable resolves.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* Fix LM studio (local) model discovery.
* fix(openai): handle typed-nil properties in normalizeToolParameters
The `properties == nil` interface comparison misses typed-nil
`map[string]any` values, which JSON-serialize as `null` instead of
`{}`. Strict OpenAI-compatible servers (LM Studio) reject the request.
Type-assert first, then compare the underlying map, so a typed-nil
properties field is rewritten to an empty object. Adds a regression
test that exercises the typed-nil path.
* test(openai): cover non-map properties in normalizeToolParameters
CodeRabbit follow-up on the typed-nil fix: lock in the behavior
when `properties` is a non-map value (e.g., empty slice) so the
type-assert branch normalizes it to an empty object on the wire.
* fix(acp): four defects a desktop ACP client hits
Found by driving `zero acp` from ZeroApp and comparing both sides of the
wire. None of them fail loudly — they produce a blank transcript, a
silent denial, a spurious crash, or two buttons nobody can tell apart.
session/load restored the conversation into the agent's own memory and
sent nothing. The turns were read from the store and used to build every
later prompt, but not one notification went out, so a client that resumed
opened an empty transcript against a model that remembered everything.
Ask a follow-up and ZERO answers correctly, about a question no longer on
screen. It now replays the loaded turns as user/agent message chunks
before returning, so a client rendering on the reply already has them.
Whole messages rather than per-token deltas: this is a transcript, not a
stream.
A permission option we offered could not be accepted. The fallback list
for a request with no AvailableDecisions lived inside
buildPermissionOptions, while requestPermission validated the client's
answer against the raw field — so whenever ZERO did not enumerate, the
client was sent Allow and Reject and its reply was checked against an
empty slice. Every button it could possibly show failed closed to deny
with "permission option was not offered". The user clicked Allow and ZERO
recorded a denial, and nothing surfaced it, because a denial is a
legitimate answer. One resolver now feeds both, so they agree by
construction. The narrowing this validation exists for is unchanged: an
unoffered broader grant is still refused.
Cancelling a permission prompt came back as an internal error. Only
context.Canceled was recognised, so errPermissionApprovalCanceled fell
through to -32603 carrying the sentinel text, and clients render that as
a failed turn — declining a tool looked like ZERO falling over. For
apply_patch, dismissing the dialog is the only refusal a client is
offered. It maps to StopCancelled now. The sentinel is exported so the
surfaces can recognise it; a genuine failure is still an error.
request_permissions labelled two different decisions "Allow". The label
is the only thing an ACP client shows, and plain allow and strict-review
allow are offered together, so the panel had two identical buttons where
one silently enabled strict auto-review of what was granted. The
distinction cannot live in the option id, which is opaque to the client,
so it is in the name.
Eleven tests, each confirmed to fail without its fix.
* refactor(acp): drop the session/load replay, superseded by #914
gnanam's #914 lands the same fix and does more with it: the replayed
messages carry stable ids derived from the store's event ids, session/load
replays while session/resume deliberately does not, and both are
capability-gated. Keeping a second, weaker replay here would have meant a
conflict in handleSessionLoad and translate.go for no gain.
translate.go is back to its state on main. What remains are the three
defects #914 does not touch: the permission option that could not be
accepted, the cancel that arrived as an internal error, and the two
options labelled the same.
* fix(acp): validate a permission reply against the options that were sent
CodeRabbit caught a hole on the same seam this PR already fixes, in the
other direction.
buildPermissionOptions drops PermissionDecisionCancel, because ACP
expresses cancellation through the outcome rather than an option. But
ZERO enumerates cancel in AvailableDecisions for shell commands and
apply_patch — the two commonest prompts — so validating against the
decisions accepted {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"cancel"}: an
identifier no client was ever shown, aborting the whole turn.
Rather than reject cancel by name, decisionFromOutcome now takes the
[]PermissionOption that were actually sent, and requestPermission builds
that list once and uses it for both halves. "What we offered" and "what we
accept" become the same slice instead of two things kept in step, so
anything optionKindFor declines to render is excluded structurally — the
next such action is covered the day it is added.
The regression test is written over every option-less decision rather
than over cancel specifically, for the same reason. Cancelling through
the outcome still works, which is asserted separately: closing the
selected-id route must not close the real one.
Also adds the cancellation coverage CodeRabbit asked for on the two
sandbox-retry paths. Both wrap ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled and each is
reached by a different denial, and the ACP mapping in this PR depends on
them producing something recognisable. They also assert the escalated
retry does not run: a cancelled prompt that still ran it would run the
command the user had just declined.
* docs(agents): Record four recurring review blockers
These classes come up across unrelated pull requests, are not caught by CI,
and nothing in AGENTS.md currently prevents them, so each is rediscovered by a
reviewer at the cost of a round trip.
Host tool version floors is the clearest case. Zero shells out to git and the
project declares no minimum version anywhere, so adding a modern flag raises
that floor silently and an older host fails with a usage error instead of a
clear message. Prove-the-test-fails addresses a recurring shape where the
problem is not a missing test but one that passes either way, because an
earlier guard rejects the input before the behavior under test runs. Hermetic
tests covers isolation helpers applied to some tests but not others reaching
the same storage. Platform error codes extends the existing platform-truth
rule, which covers path canonicalization but not errno and NTSTATUS values.
Advisory lint findings are deliberately not included: deadcode and lint-static
both run with continue-on-error in ci.yml, and section 3 already requires
fixing findings the change introduces.
Refs #898
* docs(agents): Tighten version-floor, isolation, and errno guidance
Three corrections from review, two of them to claims that were too strong.
Git version floors are per subcommand, not per flag. --end-of-options reached
the shared parser in 2.24 but git rev-parse only accepted it from 2.30, so
recording the flag's general debut would still let a caller ship something
that fails on 2.24 through 2.29.
The hermetic-tests bullet named config, cache, and state but gave a procedure
covering only config. It now covers each root, including %LocalAppData% for
the cache root, which os.UserCacheDir resolves without consulting XDG.
The errno bullet asserted ENOTDIR on Linux and Darwin. Only Linux was actually
measured; Darwin was assumed, in a bullet whose whole point is not to assume.
It now says the call may report either code and both should be accepted, which
is what the guidance was trying to teach.
Refs #898
* docs(agents): Clarify macOS and Windows roots for hermetic test isolation.
os.UserConfigDir and os.UserCacheDir derive from HOME on macOS and AppData/LocalAppData on Windows rather than reading XDG variables.
Refs #899
---------
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
* Checkpoint UI polish
* Fix structured apply patch handling
* Restore tool previews when resuming sessions
* Improve theme-aware code rendering
* Replace persistent sidebar with run details
* Remove inert transcript interactions
* Cover resumed edit previews
* Smooth active run status feedback
* Preserve semantic colors behind overlays
* Normalize ChatGPT model aliases
* Render staged image attachments in terminal
* Polish transcript and tool feedback
* Resolve rebased diff renderer conflict
* Address UI polish review findings
* Fix smoke test regressions
* Harden patch and transcript edge cases
* Bind structured patches to workspace root
* Use unique structured patch temp files
* Retry structured patch temp allocation
* Reuse rooted patch temp allocator
* Fix Windows CI process checks
* Fix structured patch safety boundaries
Preserve read-before-write credit only when the model already knew the full source, reject ambiguous hunk matches, and retain CRLF line endings. Add regression coverage for unsafe overwrites, positive tracking cases, duplicate matches, and Windows-style files.
* Resolve plan test seam after rebase
Drop the obsolete sticky-plan height helper while retaining the PR status test seams brought forward by the UI changes.
* Address final review correctness gaps
Bound narrow waiting labels, reject malformed plan records, preserve missing final newlines, reject out-of-order EOF hunks, clear stale tracking after failed rollback, and keep deferred tool loading aligned with model visibility.
* Harden patch transactions and review edges
Publish new patch targets without overwriting raced destinations, journal only completed mutations, and create replacement temps beside their targets. Reject pre-plan diagnostics, cover tool-search transcript suppression, and leave sufficient cleanup time in the Windows process fixture.
* Bind patch rollback to committed versions
Capture file identity and content before publication, quarantine rollback targets atomically, and refuse destructive undo when a path was replaced or modified in place. Add deterministic coverage for publication and rollback races.
* Align structured patch failure semantics
Use prevalidated sequential application with explicit partial-success errors instead of unsafe multi-file rollback. Retain atomic per-file publication, no-overwrite creates, unsupported-hardlink fallback, and conservative tracker invalidation.
* Preserve patch context bytes
Track source offsets for structured-patch context lines and reuse the exact matched source text during replacement. This keeps tolerant matching from changing indentation or mixed line endings outside the requested edit.
* chore: remove dead wrapper functions and unused test seams
These five functions are unreachable from any cmd/* main even when tests are included (deadcode -test ./...), so they are genuinely dead on every platform:
- TraceEventKeys: one-line alias of ParseTraceEventKeys, no callers
- ValidateToolCapabilities: one-line alias of ValidateCapabilities, no callers
- GetLocalDiffStats and WatchPRState: test seams in internal/tui/export_test.go that no test calls
- ScanSSEData: non-context SSE scanner in internal/providers/providerio, fully superseded by ScanSSEDataWithContext
The five remaining -test findings are //go:build !linux stubs (landlock/seccomp/linux_helper) that are live on Linux, so they are left in place.
Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>
* Bump Go to 1.26.6 so govulncheck and Windows smoke pass.
The 1.26.5 standard library still reports GO-2026-6218 and the Punycode
label check that fail required CI; 1.26.6 matches main and clears them.
---------
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: cairn-code <[email protected]>
* feat(zerogit): auto-create a conventional branch before push/pr on default branch
zero changes push/pr refused to push straight to the default branch but
never offered an alternative, unlike other agent tooling that names and
checks out a feature branch automatically. Add CreateBranch, IsDefaultBranch,
CurrentGitUser, and branch-name slugify/build helpers to zerogit, and wire
push/pr to auto-create a "<user>/<slug>" branch (slug from an LLM when a
provider is configured, otherwise a deterministic fallback from the diff)
whenever the current branch is the default one and --yes/--dry-run weren't
passed.
* fix(zerogit): normalize LLM branch slugs, bound remote lookup, handle existing branches
Address CodeRabbit's review on the auto-branch-naming PR:
- generateAutoBranchSlug now takes the first non-empty, quote-trimmed
line of the model's response before slugifying, instead of folding
any preamble or wrapping quotes into the branch name.
- isDefaultBranch's ls-remote lookup is now bounded by a 5s timeout so
a slow or unreachable remote can't stall push/pr; falls back to the
local main/master heuristic as before.
- CreateBranch checks whether the target branch already exists locally
and checks it out instead of failing checkout -b on the collision.
Also add regression coverage: CurrentGitUser's OS-username fallback
tier, CreateBranch's existing-branch and generic checkout-failure
paths, a CLI-level test for changes pr (previously untested) mirroring
the existing changes push coverage, and a messy-LLM-response case for
the slug normalization fix.
* fix(zerogit,cli): make auto-branching collision-safe, remote-aware, fail-closed, and opt-in for LLM naming
- CreateBranch never checks out an existing branch on a name collision: it
picks a unique suffixed name off the current HEAD (name-2 .. name-9) and
fails visibly when the namespace is exhausted, so a stale branch with
unrelated history can no longer be published while the new commit stays
behind on the default branch.
- ensureFeatureBranch resolves the remote once (explicit --remote, then the
original branch's configured upstream, then origin) via IsDefaultBranch,
which now reports the resolved remote, and push/pr thread that remote into
Push, so a freshly created branch without tracking configuration no longer
falls back to origin in fork setups.
- The default-branch check fails closed: main and master count as default
with no network, an unreachable remote falls back to the local
refs/remotes/<remote>/HEAD record, and when neither answers the push is
refused with guidance instead of silently dropping the confirmation guard
for repositories whose default is trunk or develop.
- LLM branch naming is now opt-in via --auto on push/pr, matching commit
--auto: a configured provider alone no longer causes the change diff to be
uploaded during ordinary git-only pushes.
- After the ordinary commit-then-push sequence the tree is clean, so the
fallback name comes from the HEAD commit subject instead of the constant
user/changes.
* style(zerogit): align fake-runner result comments to gofmt output
* test(zerogit): cover Push's fail-closed path when the default branch is unknown
* fix(zerogit): keep a stale cached remote HEAD from clearing the push guard
When the live ls-remote default-branch lookup fails, isDefaultBranch fell
back to the local refs/remotes/<remote>/HEAD cache and returned
branch == cachedName. That cache is only a hint: if the server renamed its
default (main -> trunk) the record still names main, so checking whether
pushing trunk is safe returned false and the newly protected branch was
pushed without --yes.
Trust the cache only to block a push (a positive match proves the branch is
the recorded default); on a mismatch fall through to the existing
fail-closed unknown-default error instead of treating the branch as
unprotected.
* fix(cli): honor --diff-bytes when inspecting the diff for auto-branch naming
changes push/pr accept and document --diff-bytes, but ensureFeatureBranch
inspected the working tree with only Cwd set. With --auto the resulting
unbounded diff was embedded in the branch-name request to the provider, so a
user who capped the diff to limit how much proprietary source is uploaded
for naming still sent the complete diff.
Thread options.maxDiffBytes through ensureFeatureBranch into InspectOptions,
matching how the commit path already bounds the diff.
* fix(cli): refuse an auto-branch push when HEAD has nothing to publish
The auto-branch path decided to branch solely from working-tree status and
never checked that HEAD was ahead of the default branch. On a clean,
up-to-date default branch it would create and push user/<subject> at the
exact default tip; with only uncommitted edits it named a branch from those
edits but pushed the unchanged HEAD, leaving the edits local, and changes pr
then abandoned the empty branch before the host rejected the comparison.
Add zerogit.CommitsAhead and consult it before branching: when HEAD is
provably not ahead of <remote>/<default>, report "no changes to publish"
instead of creating the branch. An indeterminate count (for example a
remote-tracking ref that was never fetched) is treated as "cannot tell" so a
legitimate first push is not blocked.
* fix(cli): recover the branch slug from preamble or fenced LLM replies
The slug helper returned the first non-empty line verbatim, so a reply like
"Here is a suggested branch name:\nadd-login-page" produced
user/here-is-a-suggested-branch-name, and a reply wrapped in a code fence
slugified the ``` line to nothing and silently fell back to the local name.
Drop Markdown code-fence lines and prefer a line that already reads as a
kebab-case slug, falling back to the first quoted/plain line only when no
slug-shaped line exists. Cover preamble and fenced responses with tests.
* fix(zerogit): harden auto-branch remote handling
Three review findings:
- isDefaultBranch passed the remote to ls-remote before the HEAD
positional with no --, so a remote value shaped like an option
(--upload-pack=/bin/echo) was parsed as one. Terminate options with --
and cover a dash-prefixed remote.
- An unborn remote (freshly created, zero refs) answered ls-remote with
empty output, fell through to the fail-closed unknown-default error,
and made the very first feature-branch push a --yes dead end that
git remote set-head --auto cannot repair. ls-remote succeeding with no
refs now counts as proof there is no protected default; main/master
stay guarded by the name heuristic and every failure path stays
fail-closed.
- CreateBranch probed only local refs/heads for collisions, so a branch
existing only on the target remote (an old merged-PR branch) was
silently fast-forwarded by the later push -u. The target remote's
heads are now probed once (bounded, with --) and count as taken;
an unreachable remote fails visibly before anything is created.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(zerogit): close branch-naming and push safety gaps from review
Require a confirmed unborn HEAD, not just an empty ls-remote --symref,
before granting the first-push exception, since a dangling remote
HEAD looked the same. Resolve branch naming and ahead-count checks
against the remote branch instead of a working-tree snapshot, which
could describe uncommitted edits a commit-only push would never
publish. Guard concurrent branch creation with a force-with-lease
push. Scope the ls-remote timeout to the default-branch preflight
only, so it no longer caps Push's own unrelated check.
* fix(cli): require a clean tree before auto-branch push/pr
Refuse ensureFeatureBranch when the working tree is dirty or the
ahead count against the remote default cannot be determined, so a
default-branch push cannot leave uncommitted edits behind or publish
an empty comparison under a guessed name.
* fix(zerogit): drop fixed five-second remote lookup timeout
IsDefaultBranch and CreateBranch applied a hard 5s bound on ls-remote,
so ordinary feature-branch pushes and the collision probe failed on slow
but reachable remotes (SSH/VPN) before Push could run. Honor the
caller's context instead; callers that need a bound pass a deadline.
* fix(cli): bypass the ahead-count and diff-base checks on a confirmed-unborn remote
jatmn flagged that the confirmed-unborn-remote exception this PR added to
IsDefaultBranch never actually helps the main/master case it was written
for: when the local branch is named main, isDefaultBranch returns true from
the name heuristic before it ever consults the remote, so
ensureFeatureBranch still unconditionally calls commitsAhead against
<remote>/<branch>. On a genuinely empty remote that ref cannot exist, so
`zero changes push`/`pr` from a local default branch against a brand-new
empty remote still dead-ended with "cannot determine whether HEAD is
ahead of origin/main" - the exact bug this PR set out to fix.
Tracing the flow further, the same problem also hit the diff-base Inspect
call right after: it uses the same nonexistent <remote>/<branch> ref, so
bypassing only commitsAhead would have left the dead end one line later.
ensureFeatureBranch now probes the new zerogit.IsUnbornRemote (ls-remote
--heads on the remote) whenever commitsAhead fails, and only bypasses both
checks when that probe positively confirms the remote has no refs at all.
An unreachable remote, or one that answers with refs, still fails closed
exactly as before - the fail-closed "unknown default branch" behavior is
unchanged and covered by TestEnsureFeatureBranchFailsWhenAheadCountUnknown
and the new TestEnsureFeatureBranchFailsWhenUnbornCheckErrors.
TestEnsureFeatureBranchCreatesBranchOnConfirmedUnbornRemote is the
regression test: confirmed failing (with the exact dead-end error) against
the pre-fix logic, passing after.
* fix(zerogit): resolve main/master against the live remote default first
isDefaultBranch short-circuited on the literal branch names main/master
before ever consulting the remote. A repository whose remote default is
genuinely something else (e.g. trunk) could still have a local main branch
tracking that remote, and the shortcut wrongly treated it as protected
instead of trusting the live symref result. The conventional-name check
now only applies as a last-resort fallback, after both the live ls-remote
symref lookup and the local remotes/<remote>/HEAD cache fail to answer.
* fix(cli): preserve push lease on retry and check the live default ref
Two related gaps in ensureFeatureBranch's auto-branch preflight:
- When an auto-branch push loses a force-with-lease race against a
concurrent creator, the generated branch is left checked out locally
with no successful push behind it. A retry took the "already off the
default branch" early return and dropped RequireNewRemoteBranch,
letting the next push silently fast-forward whatever the concurrent
creator published. The lease now stays required unless the branch
already has a configured upstream (proof a push already landed).
- The ahead-of-default check compared HEAD against the local
remote-tracking ref, which is only refreshed at clone or the last
fetch. A stale ref can under-report how far ahead HEAD is, or say
zero when the remote has actually moved past it, so ensureFeatureBranch
now refreshes that tracking ref before trusting it, and fails closed
if the refresh itself cannot be confirmed.
Adds regression coverage for both: a retry after a lease collision keeps
requiring the lease (and an already-published branch does not), and a
stale tracking ref is refreshed before the ahead check runs (with a
fail-closed case when that refresh cannot be confirmed).
* fix(cli): track generated branches, reject PR on unborn remote, classify main on unborn
* fix(zerogit,cli): preserve explicit nonexistence lease on force, propagate marker write errors, check unborn remote before branch switch
* fix(zerogit): preserve non-existence lease on target remote and roll back failed branch marking
Compare target remote against configured upstream remote to retain non-existence lease on target, roll back created branch if marking fails, and allow --yes to bypass PR default-branch preflight.
Refs #671
* fix(cli): address review findings for auto feature branch creation
* fix(cli): refine LLM preamble candidate slug extraction and enforce unborn-remote guard
* fix(cli): restore default branch after auto-branch and resolve --yes upstream
Do not leave auto-branch commits on the protected local default branch,
and resolve the real upstream for the unborn-remote guard under --yes
instead of always probing origin.
* test(cli): assert auto-branch passes capped diff into the provider
Thread --auto and a mock provider through DiffBytes coverage so the
cap is checked on the real LLM request path, not only Inspect.
* fix(cli): block auto-branch on unborn remotes and fix lease/restore
Refuse auto-creating a feature branch when the target remote has no refs yet.
Publishing only user/slug leaves remote HEAD dangling, so the next changes pr
fails closed and a later main push has no PR diff. Require push --yes first.
Keep the nonexistence lease unless branch@{upstream} is exactly the target
remote/generated-branch ref from a successful push -u. Inherited origin/main
from branch.autoSetupMerge=inherit must not drop the lease.
Restore the original default branch against its own upstream tip, not the
push destination, so --remote upstream does not rewrite a fork main that
tracks origin/main.
* fix(cli): recover push -u upstream and filter LLM slug preambles
Push -u can publish a remote branch then fail to write local upstream
config. Treat that as incomplete, recover with set-upstream-to, and probe
the remote before reasserting the nonexistence lease on retry. Also skip
one-word LLM acknowledgements before accepting a slug-shaped line.
Refs #671
* fix(cli): decide the branch-collision lease with one live remote check
Replace the local-state inference chain (upstream config, a
zeroAutoBranch marker, per-remote provenance tracking) that kept
producing new collision-safety edge cases across many review rounds
with a single live remoteHasBranch check against the destination
remote: missing there gets the nonexistence lease, already there gets
a plain push, and git's own fast-forward check is the safety net if
that existing branch isn't actually ours.
Removes MarkGeneratedBranch/IsGeneratedBranch, now dead, along with
the tests that pinned the specific local-state heuristics rather than
the collision-safety property itself.
* fix(cli,zerogit): address CodeRabbit findings on auto-branch naming
Recover trailing-punctuation LLM slugs, notice deterministic fallback,
report dual restore/rollback failures, and skip Push upstream repair on
dry-run. Align comments with fail-closed and DryRun behavior.
Refs #671
* fix(tools): set explicit stdin reader and use resolved binary for format-on-write
Use the binary path resolved by exec.LookPath and set formatter.Stdin
to an empty reader so format-on-write does not hang on inherited stdin
handles on Windows.
Refs #671
* fix(cli,zerogit,tools): address CodeRabbit review findings on PR 671
Remove redundant command validation, eliminate duplicate remote lookup in PR
workflow, harden ref options and branch switching, isolate test Git
environment, and add formatter lookup test.
Refs #671
* fix(cli,zerogit): address new CodeRabbit review findings on PR 671
Harden CreateBranch name validation, remove unreachable workflow error check,
complete doc comment, isolate test Git environment, and clean up unused
appDeps field.
Refs #671
* fix(cli,zerogit,tools): address third round of CodeRabbit review findings on PR 671
Use featureBranchOptions struct for ensureFeatureBranch, bound preflight
contexts, add upstream repair mismatch subtest, and centralize test Git
config isolation.
Refs #671
* fix(cli,zerogit): finish ensureFeatureBranch doc contract and close review gaps
The ensureFeatureBranch doc comment ended mid-sentence and sat on the featureBranchOptions type, so go doc attached function prose to the struct. Move it above the function and state which deps are required non-nil (inspectChanges, commitsAhead, headCommitSubject, currentGitUser, createBranch) versus optional and nil-guarded (refreshTrackingRef, isUnbornRemote, branchUpstreamRef, resetBranchRef, deleteBranch). Also extract the branch slug filename with path.Base because git paths are always slash-separated, gate two tests on the git version their fixtures need (autoSetupMerge=inherit requires 2.35, init --bare -b requires 2.28), and cover the literal "user" CurrentGitUser fallback via a test seam.
Refs #671
Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>
* Protect auto-branch publication and default ref restoration
Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>
* fix(cli): wire expected-old restore through the dependency seam
The P1 fix added expectedOld to resetBranchRef but left the appDeps field and the workflows.go import behind, so the CLI package did not compile. Update the field type to the 5-argument signature and restore the filepath import used by worktree release resolution.
Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>
* fix(cli,zerogit): wire CAS tip and close review test gaps
Addresses the CodeRabbit round on 93e3448e: fillAppDeps now defaults currentBranchTip so the compare-and-swap old value actually reaches ResetBranchRef in production; TestEnsureFeatureBranchRestoresDefaultBranchAfterCreate asserts the CAS value; the real-git auto-branch test asserts local main is restored to its upstream tip; docs explain the deliberate context.Background push, CurrentBranchTip semantics, the RemoteHasBranch tip-equality ownership check, and the Git 2.24 requirement for CommitsAhead; CreateBranch gains name-validation subtests.
Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>
* fix(zerogit): make RemoteHasBranch report existence only, not tip equality
RemoteHasBranch's tip-equality check made ensureFeatureBranch reassert the
nonexistence lease (--force-with-lease=<branch>:) on every push after the
first: a second local commit puts HEAD ahead of the just-published remote
tip, so the check reported false for a branch that plainly exists, and Git
rejected the follow-up push with a stale-info error instead of a normal
fast-forward.
The concurrent-creator race the tip check was meant to guard was already
handled one layer up: ensureFeatureBranch drops to a plain push when the
branch exists and relies on Git's own fast-forward check as the safety net
(see TestRunChangesPushDropsLeaseWhenBranchExistsOnRemote), so a race
survivor with unrelated history is rejected there regardless of tip
equality here.
Add TestRemoteHasBranchReportsTrueForDivergedTip, which fails under the old
tip-equality check and passes now.
Refs #671
* fix(cli,zerogit): preserve the generated branch on a compare-and-swap conflict
After auto-branching, ensureFeatureBranch restores the default branch to its
own upstream tip using the compare-and-swap form of update-ref. When that
refused because the default branch had moved concurrently, the failure was
indistinguishable from an ordinary update-ref write error, so the rollback
path ran and deleted the freshly created feature branch. That branch
exclusively owns the user's commits at that point, so a lost race destroyed
work in order to "recover" from it.
Add ErrCompareAndSwapConflict, returned by ResetBranchRef only when an
expected-old value was supplied (the sole way git refuses is a tip mismatch).
ensureFeatureBranch now recognizes it and returns without rolling back,
reporting that the branch was preserved so the user can reconcile the default
branch by hand.
Extend TestResetBranchRefRefusesConcurrentDefaultAdvance, which already drove
a real concurrent advance, to require the sentinel. Add
TestEnsureFeatureBranchPreservesBranchOnCompareAndSwapConflict, which fails
with "must not delete the generated branch" when the new branch is removed.
Refs #671
* Address review feedback for auto-branch workflow.
Refresh the exact configured upstream ref before branching and restoring, guard direct URL and path remote destinations from tracking-ref assertion, and remove undeclared --end-of-options from CommitsAhead.
Refs #671
* fix(zerogit,cli): resolve reviewer feedback on branch restoration and remote handling
Update CommitsAhead and ResetBranchRef to safely terminate option parsing with --, inspect all linked worktrees before ref updates, resolve advertised branches on direct path and URL remotes, and query git configuration directly for tracking remote and merge branch without splitting on slashes.
Refs #671
* fix(zerogit): invoke rev-list without positional delimiter to treat revs correctly
Remove premature option terminator from rev-list command invocation while validating base ref against option-like prefixes.
Refs #671
* fix(cli,zerogit): resolve restore tip commit and enforce push remote unborn policy
Resolve restore tip commits via ResolveRemoteBranchTip for named and direct URL/path upstreams to eliminate bare branch fallback, enforce unborn destination policy on push remotes before branch creation, and extract resolveBranchPushPlan to isolate decision logic from repository mutation.
Refs #671
* fix(cli,zerogit): address review feedback on destination remote and upstream matching
Forward resolved pushRemote to branchPushPlan, update HasUpstream to support multi-segment remote upstream references, clarify IsNamedRemote comment, and extend CLI argument parsing tests.
Refs #671
* docs(cli): complete ensureFeatureBranch documentation and wire branchUpstreamRemoteAndMerge
Refs #671
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: cairn-code <[email protected]>
Three separate changes hit this in a fortnight, each written by someone
being careful about exactly the thing that got them.
A transform that removes bytes without leaving a gap is also a
reassembler. Redaction that matches by shape, run before a sanitizer that
strips control bytes, lets a credential split by a NUL or an ESC pass the
patterns as two fragments and be rejoined on the way out: the MCP failure
reason in #835, and the imported-transcript chokepoint in #878. The path
form of the same mistake is comparing where a handle landed against a
value produced by the same resolver the kernel just used, so a redirect
agrees with itself: the ACL guard in #808, where junctions were caught
only by an accident of Go's mode bits and directory symlinks were not
caught at all.
The unsplit value passing is what makes it survive review, so the note
says the test needs a split case.
* fix(dictation): redact API keys from streaming transcriber errors
Streaming dictation (Deepgram, OpenAI Realtime) injected API keys into
websocket URLs/headers and echoed unredacted transport errors and
server-side error payloads. Wrap those error endpoints with
providerio.Redact and switch the connect-error format specifier from %w
to %s so the raw error cannot leak via errors.Unwrap().
Adds regression tests asserting the API key is not present in the
returned stream error for both transcribers.
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
* fixup(dictation): address review: redact session/write errors, move redaction tests
- Redact API key in OpenAI Realtime session configuration error.
- Return redacted OpenAI Realtime write error from writeErrCh instead of discarding.
- Move TestOpenAIRealtimeStreamTranscribeErrorRedaction and
TestDeepgramStreamTranscribeErrorRedaction next to their source files.
Refs #710
* fixup(dictation): sync Deepgram redaction test on CloseStream before close
Address CodeRabbit nitpick: the server now drains the client's audio frames and
waits for CloseStream before rejecting the connection with an API-key-bearing
policy-violation close reason. This ensures StreamTranscribe observes the close
reason (and redacts it) instead of failing earlier on a write error.
Refs #710
* fix(dictation): preserve context.Canceled through streaming error redaction
Formatting the read error with %s dropped the unwrap chain, so an Esc
abort of a Deepgram or OpenAI Realtime dictation no longer matched
errors.Is(msg.err, context.Canceled) in the TUI and produced a spurious
error toast on top of the cancellation notice. Return the cancellation
sentinel itself before redacting — it carries no key — and keep the
redacted flat string for genuine failures. Adds regression tests that
cancel a live stream and assert the sentinel survives.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(dictation): close remaining cancellation and redaction gaps
Key cancellation detection on ctx.Err() instead of
errors.Is(err, context.Canceled), which was racing against
writer-goroutine transport errors that could overwrite the error
value right before the check. Applied consistently across both
transcriber implementations. Fix goroutine leaks and a possible hang
in the cancellation regression tests.
* test(dictation): cover dial and startup cancel identity
Add regression tests for Esc-abort during WebSocket dial and right after
accept (session update / first write) so those redaction sites keep
returning context.Canceled for the TUI errors.Is check.
* fix(dictation): prefer cancel over a racing OpenAI realtime error
Esc can cancel after conn.Read already has an error frame. Check ctx.Err()
after partial callbacks and on the realtimeError path so the stream still
returns context.Canceled instead of a redacted failure notice.
Refs Gitlawb/zero#710
* fix(dictation): prevent auto-submit on cancelled realtime race
handleDictationTranscribed suppressed context.Canceled but then fell
through to the msg.submit branch. A delta -> Esc -> already-buffered
realtime error race returns a nonempty transcript alongside
context.Canceled, so with stt.autoSubmit on, Esc could submit the
composer's restored pre-existing text instead of doing nothing.
Treat a canceled result as terminal before the auto-submit path is
reached, and add a TUI-level test covering the race.
* test(dictation): exercise writeErrCh cancellation branch in realtime transcriber
* fix(dictation): add custom key header redaction and single-pass redaction tests
* fix(dictation): track dictation sessionID to drop stale completions after Esc and synchronize write cancellation test
* fix(dictation): initialize non-zero session ID and filter stale session 0 messages
Ensure the first dictation session in a process gets stale-message protection by initializing sessionID to 1 in newDictationController and removing msg.sessionID != 0 exemptions in handleDictationTranscribed and handleDictationPartial. Clean up unreachable redaction guards in providerio.
Refs #710
* fix(dictation): redact API keys from streaming transcriber errors
Streaming dictation (Deepgram, OpenAI Realtime) injected API keys into
websocket URLs/headers and echoed unredacted transport errors and
server-side error payloads. Wrap those error endpoints with
providerio.Redact and switch the connect-error format specifier from %w
to %s so the raw error cannot leak via errors.Unwrap().
Adds regression tests asserting the API key is not present in the
returned stream error for both transcribers.
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
* fixup(dictation): address review: redact session/write errors, move redaction tests
- Redact API key in OpenAI Realtime session configuration error.
- Return redacted OpenAI Realtime write error from writeErrCh instead of discarding.
- Move TestOpenAIRealtimeStreamTranscribeErrorRedaction and
TestDeepgramStreamTranscribeErrorRedaction next to their source files.
Refs #710
* fixup(dictation): sync Deepgram redaction test on CloseStream before close
Address CodeRabbit nitpick: the server now drains the client's audio frames and
waits for CloseStream before rejecting the connection with an API-key-bearing
policy-violation close reason. This ensures StreamTranscribe observes the close
reason (and redacts it) instead of failing earlier on a write error.
Refs #710
* fix(dictation): preserve context.Canceled through streaming error redaction
Formatting the read error with %s dropped the unwrap chain, so an Esc
abort of a Deepgram or OpenAI Realtime dictation no longer matched
errors.Is(msg.err, context.Canceled) in the TUI and produced a spurious
error toast on top of the cancellation notice. Return the cancellation
sentinel itself before redacting — it carries no key — and keep the
redacted flat string for genuine failures. Adds regression tests that
cancel a live stream and assert the sentinel survives.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(dictation): close remaining cancellation and redaction gaps
Key cancellation detection on ctx.Err() instead of
errors.Is(err, context.Canceled), which was racing against
writer-goroutine transport errors that could overwrite the error
value right before the check. Applied consistently across both
transcriber implementations. Fix goroutine leaks and a possible hang
in the cancellation regression tests.
* test(dictation): cover dial and startup cancel identity
Add regression tests for Esc-abort during WebSocket dial and right after
accept (session update / first write) so those redaction sites keep
returning context.Canceled for the TUI errors.Is check.
* fix(dictation): prefer cancel over a racing OpenAI realtime error
Esc can cancel after conn.Read already has an error frame. Check ctx.Err()
after partial callbacks and on the realtimeError path so the stream still
returns context.Canceled instead of a redacted failure notice.
Refs Gitlawb/zero#710
* fix(dictation): prevent auto-submit on cancelled realtime race
handleDictationTranscribed suppressed context.Canceled but then fell
through to the msg.submit branch. A delta -> Esc -> already-buffered
realtime error race returns a nonempty transcript alongside
context.Canceled, so with stt.autoSubmit on, Esc could submit the
composer's restored pre-existing text instead of doing nothing.
Treat a canceled result as terminal before the auto-submit path is
reached, and add a TUI-level test covering the race.
* test(dictation): exercise writeErrCh cancellation branch in realtime transcriber
* fix(dictation): add custom key header redaction and single-pass redaction tests
* fix(dictation): track dictation sessionID to drop stale completions after Esc and synchronize write cancellation test
* fix(dictation): initialize non-zero session ID and filter stale session 0 messages
Ensure the first dictation session in a process gets stale-message protection by initializing sessionID to 1 in newDictationController and removing msg.sessionID != 0 exemptions in handleDictationTranscribed and handleDictationPartial. Clean up unreachable redaction guards in providerio.
Refs #710
* fix(dictation): drop providerio widen; pin session and redaction tests
Revert the Token/X-Api-Key providerio.Redact expansion (belongs in its own PR with coverage). Make Deepgram single-pass, cancel-race, and live-session partial tests pin the branches they name, and restore the ST1005 nolint on the user-facing Deepgram error string.
* fix(dictation): ignore stale batch startup by session ID
Gate dictationStartedMsg on session ID so a late Start result after cancel cannot reset a newer recording. Rename and comment cleanups from review; race suite recorded on the PR body.
* fix(dictation): exit writers on cancel and pin dial/write redaction paths
Select on ctx.Done while waiting for audio chunks so cancelled streaming
sessions do not leave writer goroutines blocked on an open idle channel.
Add non-cancellation redaction tests for Deepgram dial failure and OpenAI
Realtime dial, session-configuration, and async writer failures.
Refs #852
* fix(dictation): close the realtime socket on writer failure so a silent server cannot strand the read loop
CodeRabbit review 4885680006 flagged that the OpenAI Realtime writer goroutine pushed write errors to writeErrCh and returned without closing the connection, so conn.Read stays parked forever when the peer goes silent after session setup and the error is never drained. Close the socket on both the append and commit write failure paths (CloseNow, since the close handshake itself would block on a silent peer), and add a silent-server regression test.
Refs #852
Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>
* test(dictation): cancel the silent-server writer failure test during teardown
CodeRabbit review 4909044011 identified that the silent-server regression test used context.Background(), allowing its goroutine to remain blocked in conn.Read after a timeout. Give the test a cancellable context and defer cancellation so teardown always releases the blocked read.
Refs #852
Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: cairn-code <[email protected]>
* fix(daemon): clean up child after startup timeout
* fix(daemon): terminate startup process tree
* test(background): accept reaped-later zombie children
* fix(background): retain configured process group target
* fix(background): address termination review feedback
* fix(daemon): use launch-time group identity, fix zombie/reap classification
Addresses jatmn's three #774 review findings:
- TerminateCommand rediscovered the process group via
execution.TerminateProcessTree's Getpgid(pid) lookup. On Darwin,
that lookup can return ESRCH once an unreaped group leader has
already exited, even though live descendants remain in the group
it configured at launch — silently falling back to signalling only
the (already dead) leader PID and leaving descendants running (the
required macOS smoke job's failure). Add
execution.TerminateProcessGroup, which signals the negative PID
directly using the launch-time Setpgid invariant instead of
rediscovering it, and route TerminateCommand through it.
- signalTargetRunning's zombie check matched the individual-PID
fallback target (a process that is not its own group leader)
against the process table by PGID. That target's actual PGID
differs from its own PID by definition, so no row ever matched,
unknown resulted every time, and a zombie individual-PID target
was always conservatively reported as still running. Branch on the
sign of the target: group members by PGID, individual PIDs by PID.
- TerminateCommand returned the termination error even when the
subsequent reap succeeded — a successful cmd.Wait is authoritative
proof the leader is gone and collected, regardless of how the kill
attempt itself went (e.g. taskkill /T racing an already-exited PID
on Windows). Classify a successful reap as success.
All three regression tests are verified to fail against the pre-fix
code (confirmed by temporarily reverting each fix and rerunning).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(daemon): harden command termination inputs
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-abb8-73de-9489-51e9e6514c6b
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(background): preserve process tree failures
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* docs(daemon): clarify boundary-probe and Setsid-guard comments per PR #774 review
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
Split 1/3 of #829, carved out as the independently-reversible hardening layer
with no dependency on the orchestration work that stacks on top of it.
- internal/pathjail: os.Root handle-relative path confinement — ancestor
traversal is confined, the final component is checked for reparse points
(including a name written with a trailing separator), unprivileged Windows
junctions are covered, temp-name fragments are rejected before they can
escape the directory, whitespace-bearing paths are confined as spelled, and
temp files stay unpredictable and exclusive.
- internal/credstore: file locking around the credential read-modify-write —
exclusive for writers, shared for readers, so a reader cannot race a publish.
- internal/worktrees: git invocation hardening.
pathjail has no importers in this PR by design; internal/memory and
internal/specialist adopt it in the stacked PRs (2/3 and 3/3).
Origin-Session: local-de382f | Claude Code | 4 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 52db9b74dad5
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* security(update): stage binary replacement at an unpredictable, exclusive path
Fixes#742. installBinary staged downloaded release bytes at the fixed
<target>.new path and opened it with O_CREATE|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC. In an
installation directory writable by a lower-privileged process, that
process could pre-create <target>.new as a hard link or reparse point
to another file the (possibly elevated) updater can write; the
truncating open then overwrote that unintended file with verified Zero
executable bytes.
stagingFilePath now generates a cryptographically random suffix so the
path can't be targeted in advance, and platform-specific
createStagingFile opens it exclusively without following a pre-existing
link: O_CREATE|O_EXCL on POSIX (which POSIX guarantees fails on a
pre-existing path, symlink or not, without resolving it), and
CreateFile with CREATE_NEW|FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT plus a
post-open GetFileInformationByHandle check on Windows (not a reparse
point, not a directory, single hard link).
replace_windows.go's rename-swap sequence is unchanged: the dangerous
operation was always the truncating open of the staged path, not the
.old rename/removal that follows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* security(update): bind the binary swap to the staged object, not its pathname
Addresses the two open findings on #751.
[P1] The staged file is no longer promoted by pathname. Randomizing the name
and creating it exclusively stops PRE-creation, but under #742's model — a
lower-privileged principal that can write in the installation directory — the
name can be observed after the fact and the entry replaced between the write and
the swap, so the updater would install the substituted file. installBinary now
keeps the creating handle open and promotes through it:
- Windows renames through the handle itself
(SetFileInformationByHandle/FileRenameInfo, hence the added DELETE access), so
there is no second pathname lookup to win. replaceBinary is gone; promote owns
the aside-rename of the running binary and its restore-on-failure retry.
- POSIX has no rename-by-descriptor, so staging moves into a private directory
created next to the target by os.MkdirTemp (mode 0700, random name, created
exclusively). An attacker who can write in the installation directory cannot
create, replace, or list entries inside it. promote additionally sets the
executable bit through the handle (os.Chmod would re-resolve the path) and
fails closed if the entry ever stops naming the object it wrote.
[P2] Staging cleanup now covers every failure path: the removal defer is
registered before the copy, and stageBinary discards the object if the copy
fails, so a mid-write error (ENOSPC, unreadable source) no longer leaks a
release-sized file that the next attempt will not reuse. CleanupStaleBinary also
sweeps leftovers from a hard crash — staging files on Windows, staging
directories on POSIX, where it used to be a no-op — skipping anything younger
than an hour so a concurrent update is never disturbed.
Tests: substitution-race regression per platform (Windows asserts the verified
bytes are installed despite a replaced staging entry; POSIX asserts the private
0700 directory and that promote refuses a substituted entry), success controls,
cleanup-on-failure, and the crash-leftover sweep. The forced-staging-failure test
for helper refresh now uses a stageBinary seam, because the staging location can
no longer be occupied from outside — which is the point of the fix.
* security(update): close remaining updater staging races
Address jatmn's review findings on PR #751:
- Windows promote() now verifies targetPath is actually reachable after a
reported-successful handle rename before trusting it. Some Windows versions
have been observed accepting SetFileInformationByHandle against a handle
whose directory entry was substituted out from under it without the object
actually moving, which let promote report success while targetPath was
left missing entirely. renameFileByHandle is now a package var so this is
covered by a deterministic regression test rather than relying on
reproducing the exact trigger condition.
- When a promotion failure's restore-to-.old also fails (a writable-parent
attacker occupying targetPath with a lock MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING can't
get past), that combination is now wrapped in ErrTargetPossiblyTampered
instead of reading like an ordinary failed update, with a best-effort
MOVEFILE_DELAY_UNTIL_REBOOT fallback so an admin-context updater can still
recover the original at next boot.
- POSIX promote() now binds its final rename to a directory descriptor
opened when the staging directory is created (unix.Renameat), not a
pathname. The 0700 staging directory protects its contents from a
writable-parent principal, but not its own directory entry — that
principal could rename the staging directory aside and recreate a
look-alike with an attacker file at the same basename in the gap between
the identity check and the rename, which a plain os.Rename would silently
follow.
- Stale-cleanup on both platforms now matches the exact generated artifact
shape (POSIX: prefix + os.MkdirTemp's all-digit suffix; Windows: prefix +
32 lowercase hex chars + ".new") instead of a loose prefix/suffix, so a
user's own similarly-named file or directory is never swept up. Both also
re-check identity immediately before deleting to shrink the window a
writable-parent principal could swap the checked path in.
- copyFrom now copies in chunks and refreshes the POSIX staging directory's
mtime between them, since writing into an already-created file never
touches the parent directory's own mtime — a large or slow copy could
previously look abandoned to a concurrent update's cleanup sweep while
still in progress.
Verified on real Windows and Linux (via WSL), plus cross-compiled build/vet
checks for darwin/linux-arm64.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(update): address staging review findings
* fix(update): verify promoted object identity safely
Bind POSIX staging creation and both rename endpoints to directory descriptors, clean only identity-matched empty directories, and verify Windows promotion by file identity rather than path spelling.
Preserve unverifiable crash leftovers and add adversarial cleanup, hard-link, and reparse-ancestor coverage.
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-27da-72ec-8e6d-5d43f127b6a1
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(update): preserve promotion recovery signals
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(update): keep the recovery copy a failed restore promised
Two error-path follow-ups from the #742 staging review.
When a promotion fails and restoring the original also fails, the error tells
the operator their original is preserved at <binary>.old — and then the next
Apply deleted it, because a present target read as proof the copy was stale.
What occupies the target in exactly that case is the bytes the updater could
not verify, so cleanup was erasing the one it could. A failed restore now marks
the copy, cleanup honors the mark, and a successful promotion clears it.
The POSIX staging flow could also leave an empty .zero-stage-* directory behind
when the stat immediately after mkdirat failed. Nothing knows that name yet, so
it would have stayed for good; it is now removed best-effort with rmdir
semantics, which cannot touch anything but the empty directory just created.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* fix(update): stop the recovery copy from being destroyed by the next attempt
The marker added in d9523ba kept cleanup from deleting <target>.old, but four
paths still undermined the promise it was meant to make.
Promotion destroyed the copy it was preserving. Skipping the pre-rename cleanup
was not enough: os.Rename uses MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING on Windows, so renaming
the running binary aside overwrote the last verified copy with the unverified
bytes the earlier failure left at the target — and a promotion that then failed
could only move those unverified bytes back. Promotion now refuses while the
tamper state is unresolved. Only the operator can say whether the file at the
target is theirs, so the error names both moves that end it: restore the copy,
or delete the marker to accept what is installed.
The marker itself was a predictable link-following truncate write. Its path is
fixed, so a writer in the install directory could pre-create it as a hard link
or reparse point and have the elevated updater write through it. It is now
created with the same CREATE_NEW + FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT + fresh-regular-
file check as a staging file, and never truncates; an existing name is treated
as already-marked rather than an object to open.
A marker that could not be written left the promise unqualified while the next
run's cleanup deleted exactly the file it named. That failure now rides in the
error, telling the operator to copy it somewhere safe now.
Helper refreshes downgraded tampering to a warning. An ordinary helper failure
still warns — a stale helper is better than a failed update — but a helper whose
path may hold unverified content fails the apply, because helpers are resolved
from the install directory and executed by the sandbox runner, and reporting
Applied: true would hand the operator a success while a sibling executable is
suspect. ErrTargetPossiblyTampered moved to apply.go so callers on every
platform can test for it without build tags.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* fix(update): keep the recovery copy when its marker cannot be established
Surfacing a failed marker write told the operator to hurry; it did not stop the
next run from deleting the file they were being told to save. When no marker can
be established, the copy is now moved to an unpredictable sibling name that
routine cleanup never touches — CleanupStaleBinary only ever removes the exact
"<target>.old" — and the error names where it went. Telling the operator to act
now remains the fallback for when even that move fails.
The marker check is conservative in the same direction: only a definite
"not there" allows the copy to be deleted. An Lstat that fails for any other
reason leaves the question open, and deleting is irreversible while keeping
costs one stale file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* fix(update): preserve Windows recovery state across retries
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019faf74-99d4-75cf-ac7a-661c308240ef
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
* fix(update): watch every recovery path and never orphan a partial marker
A failed second-or-later update marks the randomized aside it used, but
promotion only consulted the canonical <target>.old marker, so a retry
proceeded over an unverified target while the verified copy sat marked on a
path the refusal logic did not watch. Promotion now enumerates every recovery
candidate — canonical and randomized asides — and refuses while any of them
is marked, naming each recovery path and its marker.
The missing-target refusal had the same single-path blind spot: with a stale
canonical .old from an earlier successful update plus the aside from an
interrupted attempt, it named only the canonical path, which can be the wrong
binary. It now names the single actual candidate or refuses the ambiguous
layout outright until the operator resolves it.
A failed marker write could also leave a partial .keep behind while the
recovery copy was relocated elsewhere; later refusals then named a location
that no longer held the verified bytes. markOldBinaryPreserved now removes
the entry it created before reporting a write/close failure, and
conservatively reports success when that removal (or the state check) fails
so oldPath stays authoritative. keepUnmarkedRecoveryCopy is handle-bound end
to end: it pins the recovery copy with a no-delete-sharing, no-reparse open,
verifies it is a single-link regular file, renames through the handle with
ReplaceIfExists false, and confirms identity at the destination, failing
closed with ErrTargetPossiblyTampered on any race.
Finally, the error for an unestablishable marker still promised that a later
update would otherwise remove the copy, but CleanupStaleBinary is now a
no-op; the operator is told that a manual copy is required.
* fix(update): tolerate the fail-closed outcome of a fully-unlinked substitution
TestPromoteInstallsTheStagedObjectNotTheStagedPath deletes the staging
file's only directory entry and recreates it as an "attacker" file, then
required promote to succeed with the verified bytes installed. CI's
windows-latest runner permits that delete (this workstation's exclusive
share mode blocks it, so the path went unexercised here); on that runner,
renaming the now fully-unlinked staging handle back into existence is not
something every Windows build honors, so verifyPromotedTarget's post-
rename identity check finds nothing at targetPath, promote fails, and
restoreOriginalBinary moves the pre-update binary back — a safe, fail-
closed outcome, not a security regression.
The test now accepts either outcome after a real substitution: promote
succeeding with the verified bytes, or promote failing as long as the
attacker's substituted bytes were never installed. Any promote failure
that occurs without substitution having actually happened still fails
the test outright.
* fix(update): surface unverified recovery path, match .old case-insensitively
keepUnmarkedRecoveryCopy discarded the destination path when the rename
to it succeeded but the post-rename identity verification failed,
leaving restoreOriginalBinary's error telling the operator to save
oldPath after it had already been vacated. Return the attempted kept
path alongside the verification error so the caller can still name it.
existingRecoveryPaths compared "<target>.old" filenames case-sensitively,
but NTFS is case-insensitive/case-preserving, so a recovery or marker
file spelled e.g. "zero.exe.OLD" could be silently skipped by every
caller's fail-closed check. Fold both sides before matching.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(update): bound Windows recovery cleanup
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbdec-f8dc-71f9-abdd-ea044a902b9a
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(update): secure Windows recovery cleanup
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbec7-a912-7462-8938-1b4a8d95f1f3
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(update): terminate Windows rename paths
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbec7-a912-7462-8938-1b4a8d95f1f3
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* test(update): allow namespaced recovery copies
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbec7-a912-7462-8938-1b4a8d95f1f3
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(update): bind Windows cleanup to handles, drop dead cleanup API
Failure-path staging cleanup on Windows re-resolved the staging pathname
after the exclusive handle was closed, so a principal who can write in the
installation directory could substitute that entry in the gap and have the
updater delete a file of their choosing. Removal is now requested through the
handle (FileDispositionInfo) before it is released, and nothing is removed by
name afterwards; the same change covers the staging-file verification failure
path and the partial recovery marker.
CleanupStaleBinary has had no production caller since bounded, identity-bound
cleanup moved into promote, so the exported no-op and the tests that could only
pass vacuously against it are removed. The POSIX link-regression tests now
drive createStagingFileAt, the primitive createStagedBinary actually uses,
instead of a path-taking helper kept alive only for them.
Also documents the fail-closed Windows recovery states in docs/UPDATE.md,
including the refusal a planted .old/.keep pair can cause.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* fix(update): bind Windows recovery to handles and bound its state
Addresses the 2026-08-02 review round on #751.
Keep the recovery restore bound to the object promote moved aside instead
of its pathname: promote now opens the target with delete access and no
delete sharing before renaming it aside, and restoreOriginalBinary renames
that same handle back (retrying through the handle, never re-resolving the
source name), so a directory writer cannot swap the aside entry during the
promotion gap and have the substitute installed.
Run the recovery-state checks as a standalone-install precondition, under
the same lock promotion uses, so "already up to date" can no longer report
success while a .keep/.recovery state is unresolved. The in-promotion check
stays to close the race.
Make the cleanup record a queue: entries are only retired once their object
is actually gone, so a copy held open by a scanner is retried by a later
update rather than leaking, while records for paths that vanished or that
this updater could never have created are retired instead of accumulating.
Also from review of the above:
- delete the pathname restore chain that lost its production callers
(restoreOriginalBinary's pathname form, openIdentityFile,
recordRecoveryCleanup) and point their tests at the live handle path
- name the relocation path in the error when the post-move verification
fails, since oldPath is already vacated by then
- scope the recovery docs to Windows and describe POSIX replace semantics
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
* Add terminal companions
* Polish interactive terminal companions
* Fix terminal companion edge cases
* Strengthen terminal companion regression tests
* Preserve config layout when selecting pets
* Handle sparse pet preference layouts
* fix(terminalpet): reset SGR before erasing a sixel companion
On Windows Terminal the companion draws a filled black rectangle over the
interface, and dragging it mangles text under and around it. It looks like a
platform quirk. It is an untested code path that only Windows reaches.
Sixel is the only protocol here that erases by PAINTING CHARACTERS. Kitty hands
the terminal an image id and the placement goes away. A sixel is already in the
cell grid, so clearRenderedImage writes literal spaces over the cells it
occupied. Those spaces are ordinary characters and carry whatever SGR the TUI
last set, and nothing normalised it, so every erase stamped a filled block in
the ambient background. A drag erases and repaints on every pixel, so the block
was continuously refreshed over the UI.
It stayed invisible everywhere else because ghostty, kitty, WezTerm and iTerm
all resolve to the Kitty protocol and delete by id, never reaching this code.
Windows Terminal is the only mainstream terminal that lands on the sixel branch,
which is why testing on Linux and macOS could not have caught it.
The erase now resets SGR before painting, and uses DECSC/DECRC rather than
CSI s/u because only DECSC saves the attributes this clobbers. Restoring them
matters: the erase is emitted mid-frame, between styled writes the TUI has
already begun.
Measured before and after rather than reasoned about. Before:
\x1b[s\x1b[3;41H \x1b[4;41H \x1b[5;41H \x1b[u
no reset anywhere. After, the reset leads and DECRC closes.
Tests assert the bytes, since bytes are what the terminal sees: SGR is reset
BEFORE the first row is painted rather than merely present somewhere, the erase
still covers every claimed cell so the fix cannot be satisfied by erasing
nothing, and the Kitty path still deletes by id rather than acquiring the
character-painting erase. Verified by mutation: restoring the old sequence fails
the first of those with the exact reported symptom.
Deliberately not fixed here, since both are design calls rather than defects:
the erase rectangle is computed from the app's own cell maths rather than the
terminal's real footprint, and the sixel path has no in-place move, so every
drag pixel is a full erase and repaint where Kitty gets a cheap reposition.
* fix(tui): ask sixel terminals for their cell size and erase what was painted
The companion blanks a row and a column of live interface on Windows Terminal.
The cause is one predicate.
petPixelProtocolSupported gates two unrelated questions that only looked like
one: whether pixel-precise dragging is available, and whether to ask the
terminal for its cell size with CSI 16 t. It answers true for Kitty only, so on
a sixel terminal the request was never sent, the reply never arrived, and
petCellPixelWidth/Height stayed zero for the whole session.
Everything downstream then took its fallback. petImageHeightPixels returned its
blind preferredHeight of 75 pixels instead of the cell-aware branch below it,
and the erase in clearRenderedImage used petImageColumns and petImageRows. Those
constants describe the RESERVED area, not what was painted. Windows Terminal
reports a 20x10 cell, so a 75-pixel sprite covers 4 rows and about 8 columns
while the erase blanked 5 by 9, taking a row and a column of interface with it
on every move. A drag repaints per pixel, so it did that continuously.
Windows Terminal answers CSI 16 t, confirmed by hand: it replies
ESC [6;20;10t. This was never a question of terminal support. Nothing asked.
So the request now goes out for every image protocol, via a predicate separate
from the dragging one, and the sixel footprint is computed from the rendered
pixel height and the reported cell size rather than from the constants. It is
still clamped to the reserved area, because the layout keeps that many cells
clear and the drag clamps to it, so a larger computed footprint would mean
erasing into live interface.
Deliberately NOT widening petPixelProtocolSupported itself: that would enable
pixel-precise dragging on sixel as a side effect, which is a separate feature
decision rather than part of this defect.
Kitty is untouched and a test pins that. There Columns and Rows are the
placement REQUEST handed to the terminal, which owns the region and scales into
it, so recomputing them would resize the image rather than fix an erase.
Tests use the real 20x10 measurement: the sixel footprint is 4 rows not 5, Kitty
keeps its requested placement, the fallback without metrics stays the reserved
area rather than collapsing to zero and erasing nothing, and every image
protocol asks for the measurement.
* Keep Sixel companions in the reserved dock
---------
Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
* fix(mcp): name the non-text blocks a tool result drops
TextContent keeps only blocks whose type is "text", so a server that
returns an image, audio, or an embedded resource produced "(empty MCP
tool result)". A screenshot or browser server would complete a call
successfully, hand back a perfectly good image, and the model would be
told nothing came back. It then usually retries, which spends another
call to reach the same empty answer, and the user never learns an image
existed at all.
Carrying the payload is the larger half of #823 and is not this change.
Dropping silently is the part that causes the retry loop, and it can be
fixed on its own.
Decode mimeType on Content, and add DroppedContentSummary, which
describes what TextContent discarded ("1 image/png block", "2 resource
blocks, 1 audio/wav block"), grouping by mime type and ordering by first
appearance so the same result always reads the same way. Servers that
omit mimeType fall back to the block type rather than printing an empty
label.
registryTool.Run appends that as a note, and only when something was
actually dropped, so a text-only result is byte-for-byte unchanged. The
note also says retrying will return the same thing, since telling the
model what happened without telling it not to retry only fixes half the
loop.
Refs #823.
* fix(mcp): do not promise a retry returns the same content
The dropped-block note said "Retrying will return the same thing".
registryTool.Run makes a fresh remote call on every retry, so the server
may well answer differently; that is a promise this code is in no
position to make.
What cannot change is that Zero still has nowhere to put a non-text
block, so the note now says retrying cannot RECOVER the payload. Same
guidance, a claim that is actually true.
The test pins both directions: the new wording must be present, and the
absolute claim must not come back.
Raised by CodeRabbit on #874.
* feat(providers): fetch live model lists for OpenRouter and OpenGateway
Prefer each aggregator public /v1/models catalog over the dead OpenGateway
models.json path and models.dev-only OpenRouter mapping so the picker shows
current routes with context windows and free labels.
Refs #859
* fix(providers): parse OpenRouter string pricing and simplify sort assertions
Parse OpenRouter prompt and completion string pricing fields into InputCost and OutputCost, and directly assert alphabetical model sort order in discovery tests.
Refs #859
* fix(providers): scale live pricing and restore OpenRouter fallback
Convert OpenRouter/OpenGateway per-token pricing to per-million for Model costs, and fall back to models.dev when the live OpenRouter fetch fails so the picker still degrades.
* fix(providers): fall back on OpenRouter parse errors; cover live-only merge
Route malformed OpenRouter HTTP 200 bodies through the models.dev fallback,
and exercise catalog vs live payload split so live-only models stay merged.
* fix(providers): address remaining CodeRabbit findings on live catalogs
Reject non-finite OpenRouter pricing, keep capability-marked live-only
models, and harden related regression tests.
---------
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
main is red. TestEagerToolSchemaTokenBudget fails at 3578 tokens against
a 3550 ceiling, and every open PR inherits it.
Bisected: edf660ab and 4ca4fa75 pass, cd0eb194 (#843, which added
view_image to the core set) fails at 3588. #867 later trimmed it to 3578.
#843's own CI was green, because the ceiling is only crossed once the
tool set is combined, so no per-PR check could have caught it.
Raised rather than paid down. The overrun is 28 tokens, and view_image
costs 82, the second cheapest tool in the set against exec_command's 909
and request_permissions' 397. It is simply the one that crossed the line.
The alternative was trimming a description to reclaim 28 tokens,
degrading a tool's usability to satisfy a line drawn against a 2026-07
measurement that predates two tools. The ratchet worked exactly as
intended: it caught the creep and forced a decision instead of a drift.
Also corrects the failure message. It advised "defer a tool", but this
test pins DeferThreshold at 0 so deferral is inactive and marking a tool
deferred leaves it exposed here, changing nothing. Deferring is still
worth doing for real sessions; it just cannot move this number. The
levers that can are a smaller schema, one fewer core tool, or a
deliberate raise, and the message now says so.
Approving a command prefix does not only stop the prompt from reappearing.
shellExecutionArgsForApproval rewrites the call to require_escalated, which
resolves to a nil sandbox engine, so the command runs unsandboxed on the host.
The engine's escalation gate is then satisfied by the PermissionGranted flag
from the approval the user just gave for the sandboxed form.
The escalation itself is deliberate and guarded: proposedCommandPrefix refuses
to offer a prefix when any other segment of the command is not known-safe,
precisely because approval covers the whole command. The defect is that the
prompt never said so. The user chose "allow command prefix for session" and got
"and also run it outside the sandbox".
So this discloses rather than removes. PermissionRequest gains
PrefixApprovalEscalates, computed by shellPrefixApprovalEscalates from the same
guards the rewrite consults, and the two prefix options append "(runs outside
the sandbox)" when it is set. Both the TUI and the ACP path carry it, since an
editor user decides on the same terms as a terminal user.
The main test asserts the disclosure and the rewrite agree on every input
rather than checking each against a fixed expectation, so the two cannot drift
apart later. Verified by mutation: reverting the helper to always-false fails
it, as does making the label unconditional.
* fix(secrets,worktrees): fix secret redaction leakage and prune stale worktrees
1. Prevent trailing redaction leaks in github_token, aws_access_key_id, and google_api_key by adding trailing word boundaries and allowing variable lengths. Refine the openai_key pattern to cleanly distinguish legacy keys and modern prefixed keys (sk-proj-, sk-svcacct-) from ordinary kebab-case phrases.
2. Implement auto-pruning of zero-owned git worktrees older than 24 hours at the start of worktrees.Prepare to prevent indefinite disk space leaks.
* fix(secrets,worktrees): close tail-leak edge case and worktree data-loss risk
Drop the trailing \b anchor on the four secret patterns whose body
class allows "-" (slack_token, google_api_key, the modern openai_key
branch, jwt). \b requires a word/non-word transition, so a secret
ending in "-" right before a delimiter has none, and the engine
backtracked the greedy quantifier to drop that last character instead
of failing the match, leaking it. The body character class already
provides the real stopping boundary, so the anchor was unnecessary.
Fix two issues in worktree Clean flagged in review:
- Staleness was decided by the worktree directory's own mtime, which
only changes when an entry is added/removed/renamed directly inside
it, not when a long-running task edits existing files deeper in the
tree. Clean now walks the tree and treats any recently modified entry
as live, and also skips any worktree a caller has explicitly locked
via git worktree lock.
- baseDir ownership used a raw strings.HasPrefix, so a sibling like
"<baseDir>-other" would false-match. Replaced with a filepath.Rel
path-boundary check.
* fix(worktrees): check exit codes on removal, fail closed on inspection errors
defaultRunGit deliberately returns a nil error alongside a nonzero
CommandResult.ExitCode for a failed git invocation, so the worktree
remove call must check ExitCode itself instead of trusting a nil error
to mean success. Route it through gitOutput, which already does that.
worktreeIsStale treated an inspection failure (an unreadable file, a
WalkDir error) the same as "keep walking," which can let an
incompletely-inspected worktree be judged stale. Any inspection error
now makes it ineligible for removal instead.
* fix(secrets,worktrees): catch appended-suffix keys and scope pruning to owned worktrees
The scanner's trailing \b anchors made a credential vanish entirely when
followed by a word character outside its body class (an appended suffix
like AKIA...EXTRA, or ghp_..._suffix): the fixed or unbounded-greedy
quantifier had no valid word boundary to land on and the whole match
failed, so the real secret reached the redaction output unredacted.
Dropping the trailing anchors lets the body class itself stop the match,
so the credential prefix still gets redacted even when noise follows it.
Also recognize sk-admin- alongside sk-proj-/sk-svcacct- so OpenAI admin
keys aren't skipped by the narrowed modern-key branch.
Clean pruned any worktree under the caller-supplied BaseDir, but Prepare
only ever creates worktrees under a per-repository
zero-worktree-<repoKey> subtree of it. Scope pruning to that subtree so a
worktree a user manages by hand elsewhere under a shared BaseDir is never
force-removed. Also refuse to force-remove a worktree whose mtime looks
stale but that still has uncommitted or untracked changes: a task can
hold live work while waiting on a model, network, or user for longer
than the staleness window without writing to the tree again.
* fix(worktrees): make nested-activity test exercise the deep walk it claims to
activePath/internal was created by the same MkdirAll as the nested pkg
dir but never backdated, so it kept a fresh mtime and worktreeIsStale's
walk reported "not stale" as soon as it hit that directory, before ever
reaching the freshly-written file two levels deeper. The test passed
without actually exercising recursion past the first directory.
* fix(worktrees): lock zero-created worktrees and treat ignored files as dirty
Prepare never called git worktree lock, so the entry.locked skip in Clean
only ever protected worktrees a human locked by hand, never zero's own; a
worktree that finished committing and sat idle (e.g. waiting on a slow
model or network retry) for more than 24h looked clean-and-stale and got
force-removed by the mtime+dirty heuristic alone. Lock every worktree
Prepare creates so it gets the same protection.
worktreeIsDirty also used git status --porcelain with no --ignored, so a
worktree holding only .gitignore-matched task data (credentials, generated
drafts, artifacts) reported as clean and got force-removed with --force,
silently discarding it. Add --ignored so those files count as dirty too.
* fix(worktrees): release Zero's Prepare lock so Clean can reclaim finished worktrees
Prepare locks every worktree it creates so Clean's mtime+dirty staleness
heuristic never force-removes one Zero is still using, but nothing ever
unlocked it, making the automatic disk-space cleanup permanently inert.
Add Release (git worktree unlock) and wire it in two ways: zero exec
--worktree defers a release once its own run finishes, since that flow's
use of the worktree is bound to its own process. zero worktrees prepare
hands the path to a longer-lived external caller with no defined
end-of-life, so a new zero worktrees release <path> subcommand lets that
caller release it explicitly when done.
* fix(worktrees): normalize release path, aggregate Clean errors, unlock deleted worktrees
Address CodeRabbit's review on the lock-release fix:
- zero worktrees release now resolves its path argument to absolute
before calling Release, since git worktree unlock matches against
the path git recorded at creation, not whatever directory the
caller happens to be running from.
- Clean now aggregates removal failures with errors.Join instead of
overwriting lastErr, so multiple stale worktrees failing removal in
the same pass are all reported, not just the last one.
- Release falls back to options.Cwd as the git working directory when
the worktree path itself no longer exists (e.g. a caller deleted a
locked worktree by hand instead of releasing it first), so the
orphaned lock can still be cleared.
Added regression coverage for all three.
* style(worktrees): align aggregation test comments to gofmt output
* fix(worktrees,cli): restore reuse lease and scope unlock to owned locks
- Prepare re-locks a reused worktree so Clean's staleness heuristic cannot
force-remove it while the new caller is still using it; a lock already
held by a live external caller is kept in place and reported through the
new Result.LockAcquired field.
- exec --worktree only releases the lock its own Prepare call acquired and
surfaces a failed release on stderr with the affected path instead of
discarding the error.
- worktrees release wires the resolved workspace root into Options.Cwd so
the deleted-path recovery works outside the worktree directory.
- The relative-path release test derives its expected value via
filepath.Abs, matching the resolution the CLI uses, so macOS /var vs
/private/var spellings no longer break it.
* fix(worktrees,cli): reject in-use leases, validate before cleanup, add release -C
- Prepare rejects a worktree whose lock another run still holds, on both
the reuse and the create-race paths, instead of handing a second live
caller an unprotected shared checkout whose sole Git lock the first
caller's exit would release.
- The automatic stale-worktree pruning runs only after the request itself
validates, so a rejected command (an invalid --name) has no destructive
cleanup side effect; covered end to end with real git in both directions.
- worktrees release accepts -C/--cwd naming the source repository, which
the deleted-path recovery needs when launched outside the repo (the
deleted worktree path is a one-way hash with no way back to its source).
* test(worktrees): canonicalize test roots to physical spelling
git records worktree paths in physical form, so the CI runners' symlinked
(/var -> /private/var) and 8.3-short (RUNNER~1) temp spellings made Clean's
containment check skip the test's stale entry and the pruning assertion
fail on macOS and Windows.
* fix(worktrees): preserve orphaned commits, verify release ownership, canonicalize base dir
Four fixes from the latest review round:
- Clean now creates a durable ref (refs/zero/orphaned-worktree/<sha>)
for a detached worktree's HEAD before force-removing it, when that
commit isn't already reachable from any other ref. Prepare always
creates worktrees with `worktree add --detach`, so a commit made
there had no ref pointing at it once the worktree was deleted,
making it immediately eligible for git gc despite never having been
merged/pushed elsewhere.
- Clean resolves its configured base directory through EvalSymlinks
before comparing it against git's reported worktree paths: `git
worktree list --porcelain` reports each worktree's PHYSICAL location
(resolving symlink components), so a symlinked --worktree-dir made
every worktree created under it permanently unprunable.
- Release now verifies path has a zero-worktree-<repoKey> ancestor
directory component before running `git worktree unlock`, so it
can't be used to clear the lock on a worktree a user or another tool
manages by hand. The check doesn't need to know which --dir a given
Prepare call used (nothing records that against a specific worktree,
and the CLI never threads BaseDir through to Release) — the repoKey
component is Prepare's actual ownership signature regardless of
which directory it was created under.
- Route the release command's printed path and exec's release-failure
diagnostic through the existing CLI redaction helper, and split the
worktrees help text into prepare-specific and release-specific flag
sections (release only ever supported -C/--cwd, not the --name/--dir/
--json the shared block advertised).
All four have regression tests confirmed to fail without their fix
(two using real git worktrees, not just fakeRunner sequences). Build,
vet, and gofmt clean on linux/windows/darwin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(worktrees): recoverable PID leases and reclaimable released worktrees
Two review findings on the cleanup lifecycle:
- A lock left by an abnormal exit (SIGKILL, crash, power loss) was
skipped by Clean forever, recreating the permanent disk leak this PR
set out to fix. exec --worktree now records its PID in the lease
reason; Clean expires a lease whose recorded owner is provably dead,
unlocking only after the staleness, dirty, and HEAD-preservation
guards all pass. Human locks and PID-less leases (external
`worktrees prepare` owners) remain permanent until explicit release,
and any ambiguity in the liveness probe counts as alive.
- An explicitly released worktree holding only gitignored residue
(node_modules, build output) was skipped at every age. Release is the
owner's completion signal, so unlocked entries now block removal only
on tracked/untracked changes; expired crashed leases keep the
conservative --ignored probe since they never signaled completion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(worktrees): address review feedback on lease detection and release safety
Split dead-lease PID checking into posix/windows implementations so
Windows can reliably tell a dead process from a live one. Fix a path
canonicalization mismatch in two release tests. Derive release
ownership from git worktree list instead of the git-dir parent, which
was wrong for repos with a separate git-dir. Refuse to clear a lock
that was not taken by Zero in the first place.
* fix(worktrees): canonicalize paths for clean/release ownership checks
Compare Clean containment and Release ownership against physical path
spellings so macOS /var vs /private/var and symlink TMPDIR layouts match
git worktree list. Require a registered porcelain entry and a Zero lease
reason before unlock; treat an already-unlocked Zero worktree as a no-op.
* fix(worktrees,secrets): address jatmn review findings on #632
- Prepare and Release now agree on repoKey regardless of which worktree
(main or linked) Prepare runs from, by keying off git worktree list's
first entry (always the main worktree) instead of --show-toplevel.
A worktree prepared from a linked checkout previously failed its own
ownership check on release and its lease could never be cleared.
- osProcessAlive on Windows no longer treats every OpenProcess failure
as "process is dead": only ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (a live process this
caller lacks rights to query) is now distinguished from a genuinely
missing PID, so Clean can no longer force-remove an active worktree
whose owning process it simply couldn't query.
- The openai_key redaction pattern now recognizes sk-or-v1- (OpenRouter)
alongside the existing sk-proj-/sk-svcacct-/sk-admin- prefixes, so
hyphenated OpenAI-compatible provider keys are redacted again without
reopening the sk-<kebab-case-phrase> false-positive this pattern was
narrowed to avoid.
- Release/exec --worktree error text is redacted before reaching
stderr, matching the already-redacted success path; ownership errors
interpolate the caller-supplied path, which could carry a key-shaped
segment.
- canonicalizePath resolves symlinks through the nearest existing
ancestor when the target itself no longer exists, so the documented
`release -C` recovery path works again for a worktree deleted by hand
under a symlinked --worktree-dir.
- Prepare rolls back the worktree `git worktree add` just created if the
subsequent lock call fails for a reason other than a concurrent
racer, instead of leaking an unleased checkout until Clean's 24h
staleness window reclaims it.
Not addressed here: the P2 finding that worktree ownership is provable
only by a directory-name convention plus a lock-reason prefix, both of
which a user can reproduce by hand. A durable per-worktree ownership
marker would close that gap, but internal/worktrees has been on main
since #70, so a marker requirement could reject worktrees an
already-installed zero created before this change existed. Needs a
decision on migration before implementing.
* fix(worktrees): prove Prepare ownership with a git-admin marker
Address review findings that path convention plus lease-reason prefix are
forgeable by hand. Prepare now writes a zero-owner marker into the worktree
admin dir; Release and Clean require it before force-touching a path. Clean
also keys its owned subtree off the main worktree root so linked-checkout
calls still prune the same bucket Prepare uses. Tests plant the marker and
list the main worktree first so fixtures match production.
* fix(cli): complete worktrees release in shell completions
* test(worktrees,cli): add coverage for linked-worktree Clean, forged lease rejection, and completions
- TestCleanFromLinkedWorktreePrunesStaleWorktree: pins Clean deriving its
owned-subtree key from the main worktree root (not the invoking linked
checkout's --show-toplevel) so Prepare/Clean run from a linked worktree
actually reclaim the worktrees Prepare created there.
- TestReleaseRejectsForgedZeroLeaseWithoutOwnershipMarker: pins the
ownership-marker requirement against the exact forgery jatmn described - a
worktree under the predictable zero-worktree-<repoKey> path, manually
locked with a reason that merely starts with the zero lease prefix.
- Fix TestPrepareCreatesDetachedGitWorktree: its fake git runner ran out of
canned results at Prepare's post-lock ownership-marker write, so
writeOwnershipMarker resolved gitDir to "" and os.WriteFile wrote
"zero-owner" as a relative path into the test process's real working
directory instead of failing loudly. Give it autoAbsoluteGitDir like the
other Prepare-exercising tests use and assert on the marker-write call.
- completions_test.go: assert `worktrees`/`worktree` completions include
`release` alongside `prepare`.
* fix(redaction,worktrees): sort extra secret values by length descending and canonicalize worktree paths
* fix(secrets,worktrees): restore Anthropic key redaction and handle legacy worktree cleanup
* fix(secrets): add bash output redaction regression test for Anthropic API keys
* fix(worktrees): touch worktree mtime on reuse to prevent stale pruning
When Prepare reuses an existing worktree, it now touches the directory
to refresh its mtime. This prevents Clean from force-removing a
long-running but idle worktree (e.g. waiting on a model) that has no
recent file changes but is still actively in use.
Addresses the data-loss risk flagged in the PR review where mtime-only
staleness + --force removal could discard live worktrees.
Co-authored-by: cairn-code
Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>
* fix(worktrees): properly handle os.Chtimes error on reused worktree path
Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>
* fix(worktrees,secrets): unlock using porcelain entry path, set RepoRoot to primaryRoot, and add anthropic_key pattern
Unlock using matched porcelain entry path, set Result.RepoRoot to primaryRoot in Prepare, add dedicated anthropic_key secret pattern, and canonicalize fake-runner test paths.
Refs #632
* fix(tools): correct redaction placeholder assertion in Anthropic key test
TestFormatBashOutputRedactsAnthropicKey checked for the openai_key
placeholder instead of anthropic_key, a copy-paste leftover. The
redaction itself was already correct; only the assertion was wrong.
* test(worktrees): physicalize test paths for macOS tempdir symlink resolution
* fix(secrets,worktrees): address CodeRabbit review findings
Align RedactString token boundaries with secrets.Scan, strengthen the
Anthropic bash redaction assertion, fix Clean fixtures so they reach
the guards under test, and fail closed on ambiguous processAlive probes.
* fix(secrets,worktrees): restore broad key redaction and legacy Clean safety
Address human review on #855: keep sk- bodies with a digit filter instead
of enumerated vendor prefixes, add a looser JWT form, restore the
sk-test fixture, probe legacy ownership before dirty, treat non-INVALID
Windows OpenProcess errors as alive, redact Abs/cwd release errors, and
reclaim dead-owner leases on Prepare reuse.
* fix(secrets,redaction): always redact known OpenAI key prefixes
Alphabet-only sk-proj-/sk-svcacct-/sk-admin- tokens are still credentials;
keep the digit filter only for unknown sk- vendor forms so kebab phrases
like sk-learn-… stay un-redacted.
* Preserve digit-free legacy keys during redaction.
Refs #855
* fix(secrets,worktrees): address CodeRabbit findings on PR #855
Redact full compact JWE tokens, pin git locale for lock parsing, write the
ownership marker atomically, surface missing-dir unlock failures, and
fail closed when HEAD probes are indeterminate. Align Clean fixtures and
digit-free known-prefix redaction tests with the shipped behavior.
Refs #855
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: cairn-code <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
* feat(agent): add PermissionModePlan for interactive read-only planning
* fix(agent): drop redundant modeName branch, add plan mode regression tests
string(permissionMode) already yields "plan" / "spec-draft", so the
if/else recomputing modeName in the denial message was dead branching
on the same values. Also add plan-mode coverage mirroring three of the
four existing spec-draft regression tests: advertised tool set, and
denied write_file/bash calls. The fourth (submit-and-stop review
control) has no plan-mode analog, since plan mode has no submit tool.
* fix(agent): deny request_permissions in plan/spec-draft even when the registry omits it
request_permissions is dispatched by name in executeToolCall before the
registry-based ToolAdvertised gate runs, so that gate only helps when
the tool happens to be present in the caller's registry. A plan- or
spec-draft-mode registry that simply omits the tool (rather than
registering it as denied) let the call fall through to a real
turn/session-scoped permission grant, defeating the read-only
boundary. Deny it unconditionally at the top of
executeRequestPermissions for both read-only modes instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(agent): suppress executable hooks while plan/spec-draft mode is active
Plan mode promises a read-only turn, but sessionStart/sessionEnd fire on
every run and beforeTool/afterTool fire around allowed read calls, and
all four execute configured host commands outside the advertised-tool
and sandbox gates — so a project hook could mutate the workspace or
spawn a process from a session that advertises it cannot. Gate all four
dispatch points on the run's permission mode, with a regression test
asserting no hook command launches during a plan-mode run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(agent): close plan-mode tool advertisement bypass
toolAdvertisedInPlan whitelisted ask_user and update_plan by name
alone, so a caller could register a mutating tool under either name
and have it advertised and executed in plan mode. Validate every tool
against its Safety() instead. Also exclude lsp_navigate, which is
marked SideEffectRead but lazily spawns a real language-server
process, contradicting plan mode's read-only guarantee. Add
regression tests for both.
* fix(agent): keep trust-gated hooks in spec-draft mode
Plan mode still suppresses executable hooks so a read-only planning turn
cannot spawn host processes via session or tool hooks. Spec-draft keeps
the existing trust model: project hooks fire when the workspace (or its
worktree trust root) is trusted. Unconditionally suppressing hooks in
spec-draft broke TestExecSpecWorktreeInheritsTrustEndToEnd for trusted
worktrees under --use-spec --worktree.
* fix(agent): cover plan-mode spoof and lsp_navigate denials
Expand the name-only spoof regression to both update_plan and ask_user,
and add an execution-path denial for lsp_navigate so plan mode cannot
spawn language servers even when a call still arrives.
* fix(agent): filter tool_search deferred candidates by plan/spec-draft visibility
tool_search resolved and ranked deferred tools by EnabledTools/DisabledTools
only, never by the run's permission-mode visibility. tool_search itself is
already denied at dispatch in plan/spec-draft (its Safety carries no side
effect, so it fails the same SideEffect==Read advertisement gate direct calls
use), so this was not reachable through the normal Run() path today. But it
is a real landmine: if that outer gate is ever loosened independently (e.g.
tool_search's no-side-effect Safety is judged advertisable), the loader had
no gate of its own and would hand a deferred write/mutator tool's name,
description, and full schema straight to a plan/spec-draft model.
Mirror agent.ToolAdvertised's plan/spec-draft branches inside the tools
package (toolAdvertisedForPermissionMode, next to the existing
toolAllowedByFilters mirror that avoids the same import cycle) and apply it
alongside the operator filters in visibleDeferredTools and
visibleEagerToolNames.
Added unit tests in tool_search_test.go for both modes, and an end-to-end
agent test that force-calls tool_search in plan mode and asserts no schema
leaks. Verified by reverting tool_search.go and confirming the new tests fail
(one shows load_tools resolving to the mutator's name); restored and
confirmed they pass. Also confirmed via a temporary probe that if plan mode's
outer advertisement gate is loosened, this filter is what actually stops the
leak.
* fix(agent): require Safety for spec-draft ask_user/submit_spec
Do not advertise or load re-registered control tools by name alone in
spec-draft mode. ask_user must be SideEffectRead+Allow and submit_spec
must be SideEffectWrite+Allow, matching the real tools. Apply the same
filter in tool_search and add spoof regression tests.
Refs Gitlawb/zero#642
* fix(agent): wire plan mode into TUI, CLI, and ACP entry points
Address the P1 finding that PermissionModePlan was documented but never
selected by /plan, zero exec, or ACP mode selectors. /plan on|off now
toggles the session permission mode (restoring the prior mode on off),
zero exec --plan selects plan for a run, and ACP advertises plan as a
client-selectable mode. Integration coverage for each entry path.
* fix(cli): reject --plan combined with --worktree
Worktree preparation runs in runExec before the plan permission mode is
assigned, so `zero exec --plan --worktree` could still trigger workspace
mutation ahead of the read-only gate. Reject the combination during
option validation, alongside the existing --use-spec/--skip-permissions-
unsafe conflict checks, so no worktree prep can occur.
Addresses a coderabbitai finding on PR #642.
* test(tools): assert spoofed tool schema doesn't leak via tool_search
The spoofed-control-tool regression only asserted on the description
string; Parameters() exposed no distinctive schema marker, so a
regression that leaked the schema without the description would still
have passed. Add a spoofed_secret property to the test tool's schema
and assert it's absent from result.Output alongside the description.
Addresses a coderabbitai finding on PR #642.
* fix(tui): gate local mutating commands behind plan mode
/plan on only flips the agent permission mode, which gates agent tool
calls. Local TUI commands that run entirely inside the TUI process
bypass that gate: /rewind restores workspace files from a checkpoint,
/export writes a transcript to disk, and /sandbox-setup spawns a
native host process. Add a shared plan-mode guard at the start of
dispatchCommand (mirroring the existing BTW-unavailable guard) that
rejects these three commands while permissionMode is
agent.PermissionModePlan, with regression coverage proving each is
blocked with no mutation/process spawn in plan mode and unaffected
outside it.
Addresses a coderabbitai finding on PR #642.
* fix(agent,specialist): layer plan mode system prompt and enforce read-only subagent mode
* Fix jatmn review findings for PR 642
* fix(agent,cli,tui): resolve CodeRabbit review comments on active turn model field and --plan permission mode conflict
* fix(agent): propagate permission mode to exec options and serialize ACP mode changes
Parse permissionMode in resolveExecPermissionMode, acquire turnMu.Lock in ACP handleSetMode to serialize mode changes with active turns, and block MCP subcommands in TUI plan mode.
Refs #642
* fix(agent,tui): update tests off removed tools.CoreTools/NewWriteFileTool/NewLSPNavigateTool wrappers
Those were thin unscoped wrappers around the Scoped variants, deleted
upstream in #706 since nothing else called them directly. Only these
tests still did; switch to the Scoped calls main's own tests already
use.
* fix(agent): fail-closed beforeTool vetoes and permission-mode plan guards
Keep beforeTool deny gates active under plan mode so hooksSuppressed no longer
fails open, and stop propagating --permission-mode for auto/ask/member children
so swarm members keep write tools. Apply --plan combination rejects to
--permission-mode plan as well.
Refs #853
* fix(agent): address CodeRabbit findings for plan-mode advertisement and entry paths
Unify plan/spec-draft tool advertisement in tools.ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode
(with PermissionDeny short-circuit), cover ACP config and --permission-mode plan
list-tools paths, and allow bare /mcp while blocking mutating MCP subcommands.
Refs #853
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
* fix(tui): fall back to CellMotion where AllMotion is unreliable
AllMotion (1003) buys exactly one thing over CellMotion (1002): hover
highlighting. Wheel, click and drag all arrive under either. But a
terminal that does not implement 1003 does not degrade to 1002, it sends
nothing at all, and because the TUI holds the alternate screen the
terminal's own scrollback and wheel are gone too. The user is left
unable to scroll by any means, and a long answer then reads as a hang
rather than as a missing highlight. That is how #870 arrived: a
completed turn with "59 more" lines below the fold, reported as a
freeze.
The existing code already conceded 1003 is fragile by carving out PRoot.
The legacy Windows console is the same case and was not covered, so a
bare zero.exe outside Windows Terminal asked for a mode its terminal
does not answer.
Move the decision into mouseModeFor, which trusts terminals that
identify themselves (WT_SESSION for Windows Terminal, TERM_PROGRAM for
hosts like VS Code and mintty) and assumes an unidentified Windows
terminal is the legacy console. Guessing wrong that way costs a hover
highlight; guessing wrong the other way costs every mouse event.
ZERO_MOUSE_MODE=all|cell|off overrides it, so a user on a terminal we
guessed wrong about can fix it without waiting for a release. An
unrecognised value is ignored rather than treated as "off", so a typo
cannot silently kill the mouse.
Refs #870.
* test(tui): pin the inherited-environment limit of the mouse-mode guess
WT_SESSION and TERM_PROGRAM are inherited, so they answer for whichever
process set them rather than for the console host attached now. A shell
started from Windows Terminal or Git Bash that later runs zero.exe
against the legacy console still carries them, and mouseModeFor then
asks for AllMotion on a host that may drop every mouse event: the #870
failure class through a narrower door.
Not fixed, and deliberately so. Telling an inherited variable from a live
one needs the console host rather than the environment, and erring the
other way costs every Windows Terminal user their hover highlighting for
a case that takes an unusual launch path to reach.
So the limit is written down in the code and pinned by a test that also
asserts ZERO_MOUSE_MODE=cell still overrides it, since that override is
the only recourse an affected user has. If real host detection lands
later the test fails by design, and its message says to delete it.
Raised by @jatmn on #872.
* fix(tui): fill alt-screen frame with theme panel background
Blank and cleared cells fell back to the terminal's own default
background instead of the theme's panel color, flashing white on
light themes during resize or when ClearScreen erases the frame.
Wrap the rendered content in zeroTheme.panel sized to the full frame
so every cell is explicitly painted.
* fix(tui): apply theme panel content to tea.View after render
tea.NewView stores the original string; reassigning the local content
variable left the view unchanged. Call SetContent after the panel
render so the alt-screen frame uses the themed output.
* fix: prevent leaking sensitive info in wrapped error responses
Modified `fmt.Errorf` calls in `internal/cli/trust.go` to use `%s` instead of `%w` when wrapping errors that are subsequently redacted via `redaction.ErrorMessage()`. This ensures the underlying error is flattened to a plain string, preventing sensitive information from being exposed later via `errors.Unwrap()`.
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
* chore(cli): drop agent sentinel from trust error-format tidy
Remove .jules/sentinel.md (local agent artifact, not in main). Keep the
trust.go %s flatten as a readability tidy only; redaction.ErrorMessage
already stringifies inline, so this is not a security fix.
* style(cli): note intentional %s flatten on trust resolve errors
Keep a short comment at both sites so the %s form is not "fixed" back to %w; ErrorMessage stringifies inline.
---------
Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(lsp): dispatch notifications off read loop
* fix(lsp): keep notification reads non-blocking
* fix(lsp): make the notification queue lossless
Addresses the P1 on #759.
The previous commit traded the read-loop deadlock for silent protocol-event
loss: at 64 queued items enqueueNotification discarded the OLDEST message. A
textDocument/publishDiagnostics is the server's only report for its URI, so a
dropped one makes session.waitForDiagnostics time out and Manager.Check return
no diagnostics even though the server published them — and the overflow test
codified that loss as intended behavior.
The queue is now unbounded: the read loop still never blocks (so a handler may
make a re-entrant Client.Call), and nothing is discarded. Both alternatives are
worse — blocking on a full buffer is the original deadlock, and dropping loses
state the protocol never repeats. Growth is bounded in practice by what the
server emits while a handler runs; the backing array is released as soon as the
queue drains, so a burst does not retain capacity afterwards.
Tests: TestClientNotificationQueueIsLossless replaces the drop-oldest test, and
the end-to-end burst test now also asserts that all 512 notifications sent while
a handler was blocked in a re-entrant call arrive, in order. Both were checked
against the old drop-oldest policy and fail there (64 of 512 delivered, FIFO
broken), so they have teeth.
* fix(lsp): stop retaining notifications after Close
Addresses the shutdown defect CodeRabbit found in the lossless queue.
Client.Close signals the worker loop to exit, but readLoop keeps consuming
frames until the transport ends — and Server.Shutdown closes the client BEFORE
closing stdin, so a language server emitting notifications while it handles
shutdown/exit fed an unbounded queue that nothing would ever drain.
failPending's closeOnce now marks the queue closed and releases whatever is in
it, and enqueueNotification drops instead of appending once that flag is set.
Both run under notifyMu, so an enqueue racing with shutdown either sees the flag
and drops its item or appends just before it and has the item cleared. Queued
work is dropped rather than drained: the worker is gone by definition of close,
and callers that need diagnostics collect them before shutting the client down.
TestClientDropsNotificationsAfterClose keeps the transport writable after Close,
as Server.Shutdown does, and requires 64 subsequent notifications to neither
reach the handler nor accumulate. Verified against the unguarded enqueue, where
it reports 64 retained notifications.
* fix(lsp): baseline diagnostics against receipt, bound the notification backlog
Addresses jatmn's two #759 review findings:
- Manager.Check captured its diagnostics baseline from publishCount,
which only advances once session.handleNotification actually runs
for a URI. Dispatch happens off a queue now, so a publish for a
version Check is about to supersede could already be sitting
received-but-undispatched at baseline-capture time, then run
afterward and look newer than the baseline purely because handling
lagged receipt. Since many servers omit the version field, the
existing staleness check in handleNotification (positive-version
only) couldn't catch it either. Stamp every notification with a
receipt sequence at enqueue time (Client.NotificationSeq), carry it
through the queue to the handler, and baseline against receipt
instead of against how many publishes have been processed.
- The lossless notification queue had no failure policy: a language
server sustaining a higher notification rate than the single
handler can drain (no stuck handler required) would retain every
full json.RawMessage payload without bound. Add notifyQueueLimit;
exceeding it fails and closes the client observably, letting the
manager's existing dead-session eviction take over on next use,
instead of growing the queue until the heap gives out.
Both regression tests are verified to fail against the pre-fix code:
the receipt-vs-baseline race was reproduced directly against the
pre-fix API (confirmed real, not hypothetical) before porting the
test to the fixed API, and the overload test was confirmed to fail
with the limit check removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(lsp): bound notification backlog bytes
Track retained notification payload bytes in addition to queue length and fail the client before the backlog exceeds 16 MiB. Wake diagnostic waiters when that failure closes the client, preserving already-received fresh diagnostics during debounce. Add race-enabled regression coverage for byte overload cleanup and client-failure wakeup.
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-b80c-717b-b041-5d5135a61d96
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(lsp): preserve diagnostics across client closure
When a fresh publish and client closure wake a diagnostic waiter together, reconcile against the recorded receipt sequence instead of allowing select order to discard the publish.
Add a regression that repeatedly makes both wakeups ready together and verifies diagnostics handled before closure are preserved.
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa55a-5dd3-7118-a7a6-fba8f9d5af29
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(lsp): drain accepted notifications on close
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(lsp): pin the receipt boundary at read time and finish the drain
Stamping a notification's receipt seq at enqueue left a window async dispatch
had opened: readMessage consumes the frame, then json.Unmarshal and the enqueue
run later on the same goroutine while another can capture a publishBaseline. A
publishDiagnostics for superseded text could land above a baseline taken after
it was already off the wire and — most servers omit the version field the
staleness check needs — reach the caller as the answer for the new text. The
read loop now stamps every frame the moment it leaves the wire and hands that
seq to the enqueue, so decoding cost sits outside the boundary. ReceiptSeq
replaces NotificationSeq: the clock counts frames, and gaps in it are fine.
Notification drain handling is now uniform. Every exit from waitForDiagnostics
catches the worker up on notifications it already accepted before reading what
was recorded, instead of only the seq<=baseline closure arm doing so. That
covers cancellation racing an accepted-but-queued publish (which used to make
Check return (nil, nil) for text the server had answered), and the debounce
closure arm returning while a newer publish was still queued (which handed the
caller the older one). After closure the drain is bounded — admission is shut
and a handler's re-entrant Call fails immediately — so it is no longer cut short
by ctx; on a live client the catch-up is bounded by a short grace instead.
Also cap Content-Length before allocating the body, so the notification byte
budget is authoritative rather than measured after a huge frame is materialized.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* fix(lsp): follow publishes accepted while catch-up is waiting
Catch-up snapshotted the accepted sequence once, but the reader keeps running
while it waits. The worker finishing the item that was last at the start
satisfied the check, so catch-up returned with a newer publish for the same URI
still queued — and the caller read diagnosticsFor and got the older one. That is
the failure the closed-client drain exists to prevent, reproduced on the live
path by the async dispatch this PR introduces.
The target is now re-read every pass. This cannot spin forever: the live-client
grace already caps the wait no matter how fast the server publishes, and a
closed client still drains unconditionally because its backlog cannot grow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* test(lsp): wait for follow-up notification enqueue
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019faf74-99d4-75cf-ac7a-661c308240ef
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
* test(lsp): pin receipt stamping to read time, not enqueue
Regression test for the gap flagged in review pullrequestreview-4834747507
on #759: TestPublishBaselineRejectsFrameReadBeforeBaseline calls
stampReceipt directly and never drives readLoop, so it doesn't pin where
the stamp is taken. A response frame (read but never enqueued as a
notification) distinguishes the two call sites directly.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix(specialist): make overwrites atomic
* fix(specialist): harden atomic replacement
* fix(specialist): replace through a Windows-atomic, DACL-preserving primitive
Addresses both P1 findings on #757.
os.Rename — which fsutil.RenameWithRetry wraps — is documented non-atomic
outside Unix, and the retry loop only handles sharing violations. Worse, the
replacement is a freshly created temporary file, so renaming it over the
destination also publishes the directory's inherited DACL in place of the
destination's own: overwriting a specialist that had been explicitly restricted
inside a group-readable directory would expose its system prompt to that group.
temp.Chmod(0o600) cannot prevent that on Windows, where Go maps only the
owner-write bit.
New fsutil.ReplaceWithRetry publishes through a platform primitive:
- Windows uses ReplaceFileW with REPLACEFILE_WRITE_THROUGH, one operation that
carries the replaced file's security descriptor, attributes, and streams over
to the replacement. REPLACEFILE_IGNORE_ACL_ERRORS is deliberately not passed —
silently losing the descriptor is the failure being fixed — so a merge failure
surfaces and leaves the destination untouched. A missing destination falls back
to a rename (nothing to replace or preserve), as do volumes that cannot perform
a replace at all (FAT/exFAT, some network redirectors), which carry no ACL
either. The transient-lock retry is unchanged.
- Unix keeps rename(2), which is already atomic within one filesystem.
Tests: Windows coverage asserts the destination's creation time survives (a
rename would not, proving the call goes through ReplaceFileW) and that a
protected owner-only DACL survives both at the fsutil layer and through the real
`Create --force` path; a plain rename was verified to replace that DACL with the
directory's inherited ACEs, so the assertion has teeth. POSIX covers both
destination shapes.
* fix(fsutil): stop ignoring ACL merge errors, recover partial ReplaceFileW
Addresses jatmn's two #757 review findings:
- The call passed REPLACEFILE_IGNORE_MERGE_ERRORS (0x2) while the
comment claimed ACL failures were fail-closed. Microsoft documents
0x2 and REPLACEFILE_IGNORE_ACL_ERRORS (0x4) identically: with
either set, a call lacking WRITE_DAC "succeeds but the ACLs are not
preserved". Passing 0x2 therefore let a --force overwrite silently
publish the temp file's inherited directory DACL over a restricted
specialist and expose its system prompt. Pass no flags at all.
- With no backup file, ERROR_UNABLE_TO_MOVE_REPLACEMENT (1176) and
ERROR_UNABLE_TO_MOVE_REPLACEMENT_2 (1177) leave the destination
deleted (1176) or renamed to an unreachable name (1177) while the
replacement survives only under its temporary name. Returning those
unrepaired let the caller's deferred temp-file cleanup remove the
sole surviving copy, so one failed 'specialist create --force'
destroyed both the old manifest and the new one. recoverPartialReplace
now moves the replacement into place and still reports the error,
since the destination's descriptor died with the destination.
Also drops the doc claim that REPLACEFILE_WRITE_THROUGH (0x1) flushes
before returning: Microsoft documents that value as "not supported".
The two fsutil regression tests are verified to fail against the
pre-fix code. The specialist-side test guards the caller half of the
recovery contract and does not fail pre-fix; its comment says so.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* fix(fsutil): preserve Windows replacement backups
Use a managed ReplaceFileW backup so partial failures can restore the original file and DACL. Fail closed when atomic replacement is unsupported, retry rollback and backup cleanup, and retain a known backup if rollback cannot complete.\n\nCover unsupported volumes, 1176/1177 semantics, cleanup, rollback retries, and symlink rejection.
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-be8e-75eb-b274-b7e22af373a0
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(specialist): report committed cleanup warnings
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* docs(specialist): describe what a failed overwrite actually leaves behind
The Windows partial-replace recovery errors told an operator the replacement
"remains at" the caller's temporary path, but the only caller removes that file
in a deferred cleanup before the error ever surfaces — it named a file that was
already gone. Recovery from a failed overwrite is always about the original, so
the errors now describe only what the replace itself left on disk: the state of
the destination and of the managed backup. The replacement path is no longer a
parameter, since nothing reports it.
The one terminal state that needs a human — 1177 whose rollback exhausted its
retries — now says so outright. The original then exists only under an opaque
.zero-replace-*.backup name, and the loader reads *.md, so the specialist stays
invisible until somebody moves it back. The error names both paths and the
action; docs/SPECIALISTS.md walks through it; and loadDirectory records why the
non-.md siblings an interrupted overwrite can leave are skipped rather than
guessed at.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* fix(specialist): serialize managed loads during replacement
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019faf74-99d4-75cf-ac7a-661c308240ef
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Addresses a Gosec G204 (Command Injection) warning where provider command strings were passed directly into `sh -c` and `cmd /C`. Since these commands originate from the user's trusted local config and explicitly require shell features (like pipes and variable expansions) to function, removing the shell invocation introduces a breaking change. This adds a documented `#nosec` annotation to suppress the false positive instead of degrading functionality.
Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(sandbox): deny reads of zero credential stores
* fix(sandbox): address PR review comments
- Deny reads of mcp-oauth-tokens.json.secret in the default Zero
config candidates: file-backed oauth stores keep their encryption
secret in a sibling .secret file, so the default MCP token store
needs the same protection as the override paths (CodeRabbit).
- Clarify that explicit credential-file overrides are still filtered
by on-disk existence like every other candidate (Copilot).
- Align the zeroUserConfigDir doc comment with config.UserConfigDir:
macOS honors XDG_CONFIG_HOME before falling back to ~/.config
(Copilot).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): deny the whole Zero config dir, not itemized filenames
Address code review on PR #681:
- Deny credentialDenyReadPaths' Zero-config candidate as the containing
directory instead of an itemized filename list. The token/credential/
config stores each publish through a randomly-named .tmp-<pid>-<nanos>
sibling before their atomic rename, and the legacy MCP token store
leaves a mcp-oauth-tokens.json.migrated backup after importing it —
none of those names were covered by the old itemized list, so a
sandboxed command could read them under the read-all posture.
- Stop dropping default candidates that don't exist yet at profile-build
time. A store created later in a long-lived sandboxed session (e.g. a
concurrent ) previously got no deny rule at all; every
backend already treats a deny rule over a not-yet-existing path as a
harmless no-op that still takes effect once the path appears.
- Resolve ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH / ZERO_MCP_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH overrides
the same way the token stores resolve them (relative-to-cwd, no ~
expansion) instead of through normalizeProfilePath, which tilde-expands
and so could derive a deny path different from where the store actually
writes.
Adds regression coverage for the directory-wide deny (including the
migrated backup and synthetic temp-file siblings), for building the
profile before the store directory exists, and for the tilde-override
resolution mismatch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): address macOS deny-path test and config parity
Recompute the expected Zero config deny path after MkdirAll and resolve
the temp base with EvalSymlinks so macOS /var -> /private/var does not
flake TestPermissionProfileDeniesZeroCredentialFiles. Add a parity test
that sandbox.zeroUserConfigDir stays aligned with config.UserConfigDir.
Co-authored-by: PierrunoYT <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): harden credential deny paths
* test(cli): normalize credential deny baseline
* fix(sandbox): close credential path gaps
* test(sandbox): normalize command credential path
* fix(sandbox): handle absent credential paths safely
* fix(sandbox): protect MCP OAuth siblings
* fix(sandbox): protect OAuth lock siblings
* docs(sandbox): clarify Linux future-path limits
* test(sandbox): probe credential store reads in the Linux smoke test
The smoke test wired HOME/XDG_CONFIG_HOME at credential directories but never
attempted a read through the sandbox, so it could not catch a real-bwrap
regression for the paths this change protects. Write a secret into ~/.aws and
$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/zero and add both to the deny-read table.
* fix(sandbox): keep the credential deny usable, current, and unguessable
Four problems with the credential deny baseline, all in the same mechanism.
The whole-directory deny over $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/zero also hid the supported
user plugin, specialist, and command roots, whose commands and scripts are
executed through this sandbox, so an installed user plugin could no longer
start. Narrowing the deny to itemized files was not an option: the stores
publish through temporary names and a concurrent login can add a store that
did not exist when the profile was built, and only a directory rule covers
both. The directory deny therefore stays, and the non-secret subtrees are
carved back out through a new DenyReadCarveouts field: seatbelt re-allows
them after the deny (SBPL is last-match-wins) plus ancestor metadata so path
resolution can reach them, and bubblewrap masks the directory with --perms
111 instead of 000 -- unlistable but traversable -- and re-binds the carveout
read-only before the tmpfs is remounted read-only.
A relative ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH, ZERO_MCP_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH, or
XDG_CONFIG_HOME was resolved against the command directory only, while
oauth.ResolveStorePath and mcp.ResolveTokenStorePath call filepath.Abs, i.e.
resolve against the Zero process working directory. A command run from a
subdirectory therefore had the wrong path denied and the real store stayed
readable under the read-all posture. Relative candidates now resolve against
both directories, since the process that resolves the value is not
necessarily the one that writes the store. The regression test runs the
command from a different directory than the process, which the previous
tests did not.
bubblewrap cannot mount over a path that is absent when the namespace is
assembled, so a store created mid-session stayed readable through the live
read-only host-root bind for the rest of a long-lived sandbox session. The
directories Zero owns -- its config directory and the per-store publication
directories -- are now reported as EnsureDenyReadDirs and created (0700)
before the namespace is assembled, so their mask always exists. Third-party
stores such as ~/.aws are still skipped when absent: Zero must not create
them, and that limitation stays documented on the field.
The fixed <store>.tmp publication sibling made the plaintext token, and via
the same path its encryption key, observable to a same-user sandboxed process
with write access to an override parent: it could wait for the known name and
rename the opened inode into an allowed path. Both stores now publish through
a per-store <store>.publish directory with a randomly-named file inside. The
directory name is derived from the store path, so the profile can deny it up
front, while the random name inside is what cannot be waited for or renamed
away. A test keeps the duplicated suffix in step with oauth.PublicationDirSuffix.
Also adds the seatbelt render coverage that was missing: dropping
DenyReadIfExists from denyReadRules made every credential store readable
again on macOS without failing a single test.
* fix(sandbox): close credential deny review gaps
Preserve process credential roots alongside command overrides while limiting host precreation and read carveouts to trusted process-derived paths.
Canonicalize future credential roots through existing path aliases, reject symlink carveouts, and collapse automatic masks already covered by user or automatic directory denies. Normalize the policy golden and add regression coverage across profile, Seatbelt, and bubblewrap rendering.
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-2f41-7398-8692-75327064c6f0
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): normalize credential carveout paths
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-2f41-7398-8692-75327064c6f0
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): canonicalize backend credential masks
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-2f41-7398-8692-75327064c6f0
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* test(sandbox): normalize backend mask expectations
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-2f41-7398-8692-75327064c6f0
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): fail closed for replaceable token stores
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): allow keyring token path overrides
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbdfa-8469-731e-87c0-b26b7641cf59
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): harden command credential roots
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbec7-c723-74d9-a323-026040b94436
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): close credential deny review gaps
Reapply credential denies after Seatbelt extension carveouts and model the legacy MCP token path as a migration input rather than an atomic writer.
Retain Bubblewrap fail-closed markers for OAuth outputs exposed through readable carveouts, and add regressions for both platform policies.
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbf55-f6b0-71fc-b384-652ba32b9645
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: PierrunoYT <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
* docs(readme): document /new, zero upgrade, and add Discord link
Add the /new slash command and zero upgrade command to the README's
command references, expand docs/UPDATE.md to cover the --apply install
flow, and link the project Discord server.
* docs(update): escape pipe in --endpoint table cell
CodeRabbit flagged the unescaped | in the --endpoint placeholder
breaking the Markdown table layout.
* docs(readme-zh): bring /new and zero upgrade in line with README.md
README_ZH.md had picked up the Discord link but was still missing the
/new slash command and zero upgrade entries added to README.md,
letting the translation drift out of sync.
* cli: add upgrade to root help output
* Potential fix for pull request finding
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
* docs: make required update flag explicit in common commands
zero update errors without --check or --apply, so the bare form in
the common-commands examples was misleading. Addresses the Copilot
finding from the PR #489 review.
* docs: use a permanent (non-expiring) Discord invite in the READMEs
* docs(cli): match upgrade help summary to download/verify/install wording
Copilot flagged the root zero --help summary for upgrade as less
specific than the download/verify/install phrasing already used in
README.md and docs/UPDATE.md for the same command.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* docs: use discord.gg short link for the community invite
discord.com/invite/<code> and discord.gg/<code> resolve to the same
invite; discord.gg is the canonical short form to publish.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(update,readme-zh): keep npm --json stdout clean, add ZH Discussions route
`zero upgrade --json` (and `zero update --apply --json`) on an npm-managed
install wired npm's own stdout directly to the process stdout, so its
progress output landed ahead of the JSON result and made it unparseable.
Route npm's stdout into a buffer when JSON output is requested, only
surfacing it in the error message if the install fails.
README_ZH.md's Community section only pointed to Discord, unlike the
English README, which reserves Discord for real-time chat and routes
Q&A/ideas/sharing to GitHub Discussions per SUPPORT.md/CONTRIBUTING.md
policy. Bring the Chinese section in line with the same split.
Addresses the outstanding findings from jatmn's review on PR #489.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* docs(update): qualify npm-managed JSON output
Document the npm subprocess output caveat instead of promising a single parseable JSON document for apply operations. Drop the JSON-specific updater plumbing and tests so the PR remains focused on documentation and help discovery.
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa55a-8bcd-71bc-9bde-9b4c28b78b38
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* docs(update): align upgrade guidance
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(update): keep the upgrade recommendation about this machine
`zero update --check --target windows-x64` answers a question about a different
machine, but the new call to action told the user to run `zero upgrade`, which
only ever installs onto this one — replacing the target-specific download
guidance the flag used to print. The recommendation is now conditional: a
current-platform check keeps it, and a cross-target check gets the manual
instruction plus a note naming the machine `zero upgrade` would have touched
instead.
Also align two flag contracts with what the code does: `zero update --help`
described --repo/--endpoint as check-only although apply honors them, and
UPDATE.md did not mention that both are ignored on an npm-managed apply, which
takes its release from the npm registry rather than GitHub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* fix(update): do not send a custom-source check to the default source
`zero upgrade` is a fresh invocation: it does not inherit the --repo/--endpoint
of the check that suggested it, so recommending it bare after a custom-source
check told the user to install from a repository they never asked about. The
check now records the flag it was given and the guidance repeats it, naming
where a bare upgrade would install from instead.
ZERO_UPDATE_RELEASE_URL is deliberately not recorded: every Check reads it from
the environment, including the one inside Apply, so a bare upgrade already
follows it and telling the user to repeat it would be wrong.
Two smaller edges from the same review: a cross-target check on a host with no
published release target no longer ends by describing what `zero upgrade` does
there, since it does not work there at all; and the flag table and help text now
carry the npm caveat the prose bullet already had, so docs and help agree.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* fix(update): keep source guidance accurate
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fafa2-7d9d-75bc-8801-6d0efc8db1df
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
* Add cross-session messaging
* Harden cross-session messaging
Authenticate sender metadata against live registry records, bound peer lifecycle state, preserve records across transient discovery failures, and make receipt delivery direct and bounded.
Also serialize TUI peer approvals, harden platform runtime paths and transport deadlines, widen session references, and add regression coverage for identity spoofing, queue limits, path boundaries, and tool failures.
* Support canonical macOS socket paths
Resolve Unix transport directories to their physical path before applying strict no-symlink traversal, allowing the standard /var to /private/var macOS alias without weakening runtime-directory validation.
* Fix macOS socket path regression test
Create the canonicalization fixture beneath a guaranteed short Unix path so it exercises the primary endpoint on macOS, and report temporary-directory cleanup failures.
* Harden peer messaging lifecycle
* Fix Windows peer directory traversal
* Handle Windows token-owned peer directories
* Accept equivalent Windows ACL masks
* Build Windows peer ACL explicitly
* Pin Windows ACL trustee SIDs
* Validate Windows peer ACL semantics
* Propagate Windows peer handle cleanup errors
* Use null handle for Windows close failure test
* Test held-message eviction callback
* docs(agents): codify recurring review blockers in AGENTS.md
Capture the high-frequency classes that drive multi-round maintainer reviews
(stale bases, path canonicalization, secret handling, partial setup, missing
regression tests, scope honesty) so coding agents fix them before first review.
Refs #856
* docs(agents): tighten security and atomic-write review guidance
Require open-time containment binding instead of pre-open EvalSymlinks, and
require temp-file then atomic replace rather than exclusive create alone.
Refs #856
* docs(agents): require traversal-wide containment for no-follow APIs
Final-component-only O_NOFOLLOW is insufficient on Linux and reparse
points need platform protections. Align the Security edges guidance
with the full-path containment requirement from review.
syscall.StringToUTF16 PANICS rather than returning an error when the
string contains a NUL — documented standard-library behaviour — and
github.com/atotto/clipboard's Windows path calls it directly. So one NUL
anywhere in a copied transcript selection killed the whole program:
"zero: tui error: program was killed: program experienced a panic",
reported from a real Windows machine.
The NUL reaches the clipboard because ansi.Strip removes escape
SEQUENCES and leaves C0 bytes untouched, and the transcript carries them
from two independent directions: tool output (a binary read, git's -z
NUL-separated listings — which this repo itself parses in
files_git_sweep.go) and Zero's own card protocol, whose row prefixes are
literally "\x00command-card\x00" and "\x00plan-card\x00".
Sanitised at the WRITE rather than at each source, because the sources
are unbounded: any tool result a user can select from is one, and a fix
per source is a fix the next tool re-breaks. The same pass protects the
OSC52 fallback, where a stray control byte terminates the escape
sequence early and silently corrupts the copy instead of crashing —
which is likely why this went unnoticed off Windows, where the identical
NUL produces a bad copy rather than a dead process.
\n and \t survive: a multi-line selection is the normal case and both
are legal clipboard content.
Fixes#875
* feat(tools): give tool results an image channel and add view_image
Closes#824.
tools.Result carried only text, so no tool could hand the model a picture.
The sharpest edge was our own capture tooling: browser_screenshot,
desktop_screenshot and browser_pdf wrote a PNG, set Meta["artifact_path"]
and returned "Artifact captured: <path>". Nothing read that path
afterwards, so the model asked for a screenshot, was told one existed, and
could not look at it.
Zero was never image-blind on the way in — zeroruntime.ImageBlock,
Message.Images and internal/imageinput are mature. What was missing is the
model-initiated leg.
Result.Images is delivered as a following USER message, not on the tool
result itself. Every provider drops images on a tool-role message:
Anthropic maps a tool result to a tool_result block whose content is a
string, Gemini to a functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image
content-parts to the user role with an explicit comment saying so. Attaching
them to the tool result would have plumbed the whole path and delivered
nothing. A separate message also keeps one tool result per tool call, which
the providers validate.
Blocks with no data, or a media type outside the provider allow-list, are
dropped rather than sent — a rejected image would fail the whole turn, and
the tool's text still stands on its own. The message names the tool, since
the images arrive detached from their result and nothing else says which
call produced them when several ran in one turn.
view_image resolves through resolveScopedReadPath before imageinput.LoadFile.
That scoping is load-bearing: LoadFile joins a relative path to the
workspace root and otherwise takes the path as given, so without it the tool
would read anywhere on disk. It is registered with the other scoped readers
and declared read-only and thread-safe, matching read_file.
The capture tools now attach what they wrote. A PDF or an unreadable file
yields no image and the text stands alone, so a capture is never failed over
its attachment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(agent): keep tool results contiguous when a tool returns an image
The image messages are user-role, and the first version appended each one
immediately after its own tool result. With two tool calls in a turn that
produces tool_result, user, tool_result — and a user message between two
tool results breaks strict provider replay.
Anthropic makes it concrete. appendUserBlocks coalesces consecutive user
content into one block list, and tool_result blocks must come first in that
message, so the interleaved shape maps to:
[tool_result, text, image, tool_result]
which the API rejects. loop.go already documents this exact rule three lines
below the change, for the self-correction feedback it defers for the same
reason.
Images are now collected during the tool loop and appended once every
tool_result is recorded — including the aborted placeholders on the abort,
stop-reason and repeated-failure paths, so an early exit cannot strand them
mid-sequence either.
The original test used a single tool call, which cannot exhibit the bug. The
new one runs two calls where the first returns an image and asserts the image
message does not fall between the first and last tool result.
Also from review: view_image joins the "execute" tool category, which grants
read_file but not view_image, so a specialist declared with tools: [execute]
could not look at a screenshot it had just captured. Covered by a test that
holds for every category granting read_file rather than naming one. And the
core read-only set is now asserted by tool name, not only by count — a count
still passes when one reader is swapped for another.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* test(agent): pin the tool-result/image ordering contract
The assertions only tracked the first and last tool-result index, so four
distinct broken orderings passed: a message wedged between the two tool results,
a duplicated image flush, a duplicated tool result, and both results answering
the same tool_call_id. Mutation-testing each of those against the real loop
confirmed the old assertions were green on all four.
Now it collects every tool-result index and id and requires exactly two, in
c1-then-c2 order, at adjacent indexes, with the image following the last one and
delivered exactly once. Adjacency is the assertion that carries the contract:
Anthropic needs every tool_result block ahead of any other block in the user
message they coalesce into, so anything between the two results is the 400 this
change exists to avoid.
The image is deliberately NOT pinned to exactly last+1. appendUserBlocks merges
consecutive user-role content, so [tool_result, tool_result, text, image] maps to
tool_result blocks first and replays fine; pinning would fail that valid shape
while killing nothing the adjacency and count assertions do not already catch.
messageShape reports the actual role ordering on failure, and the loop uses two
ifs rather than a switch so an image left on a tool-role message is reported as
the misplacement it is instead of "the image never reached the model".
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(agent): end the additional_permissions retry loop
Asking the agent to run an ordinary read-only command on Windows could leave it
oscillating between two rejections instead of executing:
additional_permissions requires sandbox_permissions set to "with_additional_permissions"
additional_permissions must include at least one of network or file_system, ...
Both come from inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile, and each names only the fix
that ADDS something. The first pushes the model toward setting the flag; the
second pushes it back toward requesting a permission the command does not need.
Neither ever says to omit the field, which is the correct action for a read-only
command, so the two messages form a two-state oscillator. Every rejection now
carries that remedy.
The schema half is why the object is attached at all. Neither field description
said to omit them for ordinary commands, so a model that legitimately used
with_additional_permissions once in a session had nothing telling it to stop
attaching a permission object to the next command. Both descriptions now lead
with "omit", and they are shared constants rather than duplicated verbatim in
bash.go and exec_command.go, where they were free to drift.
Rejection is still rejection. Nothing that was refused is now accepted on the
strength of an empty or mismatched payload, and sandbox_permissions is never
upgraded on the model's behalf; only the guidance changed.
The one behavioural change is that an explicit additional_permissions: null is
now treated as the omitted field, since a null grants nothing and carries no
flag. That flips three shapes from reject to execute: null with use_default,
with require_escalated, and with no mode at all. The escalated one still routes
through the normal escalation prompt and is not a new capability — the identical
request without the null key already behaved that way. A FLAGGED null still
errors, so with_additional_permissions plus null is not silently downgraded.
Fixes#845. Fixes#847.
* fix(tools): condition the omit guidance on needed access, not read-only
The description said to omit sandbox_permissions "for ordinary commands,
including every read-only one". That overstates it: curl and gh are read-only
and still need sandboxed network, so a model following it literally would omit
the override on a command that genuinely needs one and hit the opposite failure.
It now says to omit unless the command needs access the sandbox does not already
give it. That is the claim that is actually true, and it is one a model can act
on without first deciding what counts as read-only.
The schema test asserted the wrong half too — a bare substring check for
"read-only" pinned the overstatement rather than the contract. It now pins the
conditional, with the reasoning recorded so the weaker assertion does not come
back.
Reported by CodeRabbit on #864.
* fix(sandbox): stop the Windows write jail honouring Everyone-granted paths
The restricted token put the World SID (S-1-1-0, Everyone) in its
restricted-SID list unconditionally, from the original sandbox baseline
and with no comment saying why.
A WRITE_RESTRICTED token runs two checks for a write and needs both: the
normal one against its enabled SIDs, and a second against the restricted
list. The write jail rests entirely on that second check only succeeding
where Zero has explicitly ACL'd a capability SID. Everyone is a SID every
principal carries, so on any path whose DACL grants Everyone write, the
restricted half passed for free and confinement fell back to the ordinary
user's own permissions -- the exact boundary this token exists to be
stricter than.
Reachable with no privilege, no symlink and no race: an Everyone-writable
directory is enough, and share roots opened with Everyone:F and loose
third-party installer ACLs supply them. Ruled out as the common case:
C:\Users\Public\Documents grants BATCH, not Everyone.
The runner already stated the rule this broke -- it declines to add the
user SID, Administrators or SYSTEM because "each has write access nearly
everywhere" -- while listing Everyone among the restricted SIDs.
Removed only from the WRITE_RESTRICTED token, because without that flag it
is load-bearing rather than gratuitous. The restricted-SID check then
applies to reads too, and default Windows DACLs grant BUILTIN\Users rather
than anything in this list, so a token with no Everyone cannot open cmd.exe
and dies at launch with STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (0xC0000022). Dropping it
there was tried first and takes TestWindowsUnelevatedRealSandboxSmoke with
it. That path is taken only when a profile configures DenyRead, which is
already the posture trading capability for read-deny enforcement (#612), so
the bypass survives there deliberately and narrowly; closing it needs a
read-side grant that is not a universal group.
Verified against real tokens rather than reasoned about. The new smoke test
drives the real runner and asserts three outcomes that only agree when the
jail is intact: a granted root is writable, an ordinary outside path is
denied, and an Everyone-writable outside path is denied too. Before the
change its third case wrote the file with exit 0; the first two were
already correct, which is what made the gap invisible. Restoring the SID
unconditionally turns it red again.
* test(sandbox): make a denied write distinguishable from a runner failure
The denial assertions expected exit 1, which the runner also returns for
its own errors -- a failed marker validation, a bad argument, a token it
could not build. Written that way the test passes both when the sandbox
denies the write and when nothing ever ran, and the second case proves
nothing while being indistinguishable from success.
That is a poor property for any test and a bad one for this test, whose
entire job is to notice a confinement regression. The leading
"granted root is writable" assertion covered part of it, but said nothing
about whether the two later commands launched.
The denial commands now report a distinctive exit code the runner cannot
produce for itself, so the code proves cmd.exe actually ran and its
redirect was refused.
Re-checked in both directions rather than assumed: the test passes against
the fix, and restoring the World SID unconditionally fails it with
"exit code = 0, want 77" -- still catching the bug it was written for.
Raised by CodeRabbit on #865.
* fix(cli): report MCP servers that failed to start (#822)
`zero mcp check` inspected only the error returned by registration and then
printed "is reachable". RegisterTools is best-effort by design, so a server
that fails to connect is recorded on the runtime and registration returns
nil. That is right for startup, where one bad server must not stop Zero
launching, and wrong here: this is the command a user runs when a server is
misbehaving, and it told them the broken server was fine.
The failure data already existed as SkippedServer{Name, Err}; nothing
consumed it in this path. The check now fails with the recorded error, in
both text and JSON output.
Covered by a test that spawns a genuinely missing command rather than
stubbing the runtime, because the defect was precisely a mismatch between
what registration returns and what it records. Reverting the fix makes it
print "MCP server broken is reachable. 0 tool(s) available."
* test(cli): cover the unreachable --json contract
The text path was covered and the JSON path was not, though the change
adds its own return with a different payload: status "unreachable" plus a
redacted error, rather than status "ok" with a tool count. A caller
parsing that shape was relying on something nothing pinned.
Reverting the fix now fails both cases. The JSON one is the more useful
of the two, because the wrong output is still valid JSON and would decode
cleanly into a caller expecting success.
* Improve harness context efficiency
* Address harness efficiency review findings
* Make recaps idle and cancellable
Delay recap generation until the session has been inactive, orient it around the active goal and next task, cancel stale work on activity, and render the result ephemerally above the composer.
Also strengthen the formatter safety regression to exercise formatter-modified edit output.
* Track every replace-all edit span
Translate each replacement into its post-edit line range, including cumulative shifts from earlier replacements, so follow-up edits remain authorized for every model-supplied change.
* Make review regressions cross-platform
Verify replace-all tracking through the canonical edit tool path instead of a platform-sensitive temp path, and cover cancellation when recaps are disabled during generation.
* fix(tools): derive SeenWhole from the recorded ranges
SeenWhole was a flag set only by a SINGLE read covering the file, while
SeenRange judged coverage from the accumulated ranges. The two then
disagreed about identical reads: after reading lines 1-50 and 51-100 of a
100-line file, SeenRange(1,100) was true and SeenWhole was false.
That matters because write_file gates overwrites on SeenWhole. A file past
the read byte budget cannot be read whole in one call — the read is
truncated and RecordSeenRange is correctly skipped, since the model did not
see those lines — so no sequence of reads could ever set the flag, and the
overwrite was refused permanently with:
the intended change depends on content that has not been read exactly
in this session. Read the affected lines with read_file, then retry.
Advice that could not change the answer. edit_file was unaffected because it
gates on SeenRange, so the escape was to edit rather than rewrite, but a
model following the error text would loop.
SeenWhole is now computed from the ranges against the file's recorded line
count, so scoped reads that together cover a file make it writable and the
error text becomes actionable. The observation carries that line count, and
a read reporting a different one clears the accumulated ranges: they
describe a shape the file no longer has.
Coverage is judged by merging sorted ranges rather than walking every line
against every range, which the previous SeenRange did — same answer, and it
no longer scans line-by-line over a large file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* test(tools): key the large-file test on the resolved path
read_file resolves the workspace root through EvalSymlinks before recording
anything, so the tracker is keyed on the resolved path. The test asserted
against the raw t.TempDir() path, which is the same string on Windows and a
different one on macOS, where the temp dir sits under /var — a symlink to
/private/var. The SeenWhole assertions would have looked up a key that never
existed: passing here, failing on macOS CI.
Also switches the line generator to fmt.Fprintf (staticcheck QF1012).
Both from CodeRabbit on #842.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* test(tools): actually switch the line generator to fmt.Fprintf
The previous commit's message claimed this was done. It was not: the edit
silently did not apply and I reported it fixed without re-reading the file,
so builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(...)) survived at the head — caught by
@anandh8x, not by me.
Verified this time by running the linter rather than by reading the diff:
golangci-lint --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./internal/tools/
reports 0 issues.
* fix: keep exact-read workflows recoverable
* test: cover permission normalization wiring
* fix: commit file observations after output budgeting
* fix: defer file observations across retries
* test: normalize patch line endings
---------
Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
* fix: use OAuth credentials in provider health checks
* fix(providerhealth): verify OAuth login for all probes
* fix(providerhealth): retain API key redaction
* fix(providerhealth): redact bare OAuth tokens
* test(cli): isolate OAuth doctor config
* test(cli): isolate doctor config path
* fix(acp): interrupt idle reads on cancellation
* fix(acp): make idle-read interruption per-Read, not per-Serve-call
Addresses the P2 on #782.
The previous design raced a single, whole-connection Once (endRead) between the
read loop's own "I have a terminal result" claim and a watcher goroutine's
"ctx is done, treat this as interrupted" claim. This has a real, deterministic
failure mode that has nothing to do with goroutine-scheduling luck: bufio.Reader
can obtain data AND a terminal error from ONE underlying Read call (io.Reader
explicitly permits returning (n>0, err) together). If a line delimiter is found
within that data, ReadBytes returns the line with a nil error for that call, but
bufio caches the error internally and returns it — without ever touching the
underlying reader again — on the very next ReadBytes call. If cancellation
happens in the gap between that first, successful read and the next one (e.g.
while a synchronously-dispatched handler is still writing its response), the
watcher's ctx.Done() case fires and claims the Once BEFORE the read loop ever
gets back to a ReadBytes call — so when the cached error then surfaces (with
zero contact with the underlying reader, let alone anything closing it), it is
misattributed as a cancellation-driven interruption and silently swallowed as a
clean shutdown, hiding a genuine broken transport.
The fix moves interruption-detection down to the Read call itself instead of
bracketing the whole Serve loop. interruptibleReader wraps the connection's
reader: each Read runs the underlying call on its own goroutine and races it
against ctx.Done(). If the underlying call finishes first, its result is
returned untouched — cancellation a moment later has no bearing on a call that
already had its answer. If ctx.Done() fires first, the reader is closed (when
closable) to nudge a genuinely blocked read, a generation counter is bumped, and
the call still waits for and returns the underlying call's own result rather
than a synthesized one.
Serve then brackets each ReadBytes call (which may invoke the wrapped Read zero
or more times — zero when bufio answers from its own buffer, including a
previously-cached error) with a snapshot of that counter before and after. A
read whose bracket shows no change was never raced against cancellation — either
answered from the buffer or genuinely completed before ctx.Done() could matter —
so its outcome is reported truthfully regardless of the ctx state by the time it
surfaces. Only a bracket that changed proves this specific call actually took
the cancellation branch.
Verified the fix has teeth: reverted to the original implementation and
confirmed the new regression test (which forces the exact bufio-caching
sequence deterministically, with a panic guard proving the underlying reader is
never called a second time) fails 100% of the time against it, then restored
the fix and confirmed it passes.
Also applied the two open review threads on the existing tests: readStarted and
writeStarted are now buffered channels with non-blocking sends rather than
close(), so a future change causing an extra read or write can't panic on a
double-close.
Validated with go build/vet/test on Windows, plus go vet/build and
`go test -race ./internal/acp/... -count=50` (and count=100 focused on the
cancellation/error tests) under WSL/Linux — this session's Windows host has no
C toolchain for -race directly.
* fix(acp): preserve decided read results and require explicit reader ownership
Addresses jatmn's two #782 review findings:
- interruptibleReader.Read's select between resultCh and ctx.Done()
chooses pseudo-randomly when both are ready, so a real terminal read
error decided just before cancellation could be misattributed to
shutdown and silently swallowed. Re-check resultCh non-blockingly
before claiming a call for cancellation.
- NewConn inferred reader ownership from an io.Closer assertion and
closed any reader that happened to implement it, including one a
caller merely borrowed. Split into NewConn (never closes r) and
NewOwnedConn (explicit ownership, closes r on cancellation), and
switch the sole production call site (process stdin) to the latter.
Also applies CodeRabbit's atomic.Int64 and leading-ctx-parameter nits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(acp): synchronize read completion with cancellation
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-9e4e-7506-85ab-e151888bfd71
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(acp): preserve read completion across cancellation
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa55a-483a-7119-92aa-4953a72f2a76
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* test(acp): bound buffered error synchronization
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa55a-483a-7119-92aa-4953a72f2a76
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(acp): report shutdown transport errors
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* test(acp): inject cancellation context
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
* fix(swarm): close lifecycle admission on shutdown
* fix(swarm): admit lifecycle work without holding the lock across Launch
Addresses the P1 on #776 plus the two documentation P3s.
[P1] beginLifecycleAdmission returned with lifecycleMu.RLock() held for the
caller's entire duration — including the call into the injected
MemberLauncher.Launch. Close needs the write lock before it can call s.cancel(),
so a launcher that blocks in Launch waiting on its context (the ordinary shape of
a launcher that waits for a slot, a daemon connection, or a sandbox handshake)
deadlocked every Close caller: the launch held the read lock while Close waited
for the write lock to reach the very cancellation the launch needed to unblock.
beginLifecycleAdmission is now a counted ticket: it holds lifecycleMu only across
the closed check and a lifecycleWork.Add(1), then returns a release func
(lifecycleWork.Done) the caller defers. Close flips closed and releases the lock
BEFORE calling cancel, then waits out lifecycleWork (admitted-but-unfinished
work) followed by watchers (goroutines admitted work may still be starting) — so
it remains a true completion barrier without holding any lock across external
launcher code. Every call site (Spawn, Handoff, AdoptOrphans, the retry path in
watch, and afterExit) moved to the ticket pattern.
[P3] beginLifecycleAdmission's contract and the Scheduler/Close handoff are now
both documented at the point that matters: the func-returning signature makes
the release contract explicit in the type itself, and Scheduler's comment spells
out why the read/write lock ordering guarantees exactly one of Scheduler or
Close closes whatever scheduler ends up installed.
Tests: TestCloseCancelsLauncherBlockedInLaunch reproduces the exact deadlock
(spawn parked in Launch, Close in a second goroutine, both must complete once
cancellation reaches the launcher) — verified it hangs under the old held-lock
pattern by temporarily restoring it. TestCloseWaitsForAdmittedSpawn is the
converse: Close must not return while an admitted spawn is still running.
Validated with `go test -race ./internal/swarm/... -count=1` under WSL/Linux
(this session's Windows host has no C toolchain for -race directly), plus
`go vet ./...` under WSL and go build/vet/test on Windows.
* fix(swarm): fail late queue admissions and dequeues after shutdown
Addresses jatmn's two #776 review findings:
- Close swept (clearQueue) every team's queue before waiting for
admitted-but-in-flight lifecycle operations to finish. A Spawn,
Handoff, or AdoptOrphans call that got its ticket right before
closed flipped could still append to a team's queue after the
sweep ran, stranding that spec forever (never launched, since
shutdown began; never failed, since the sweep won't run again).
Reorder Close to wait for lifecycleWork before sweeping queues, so
every queue append from already-admitted work is visible to the
sweep.
- afterExitAdmitted dequeued a queued spec (t.onExit) and launched it
unconditionally once its own ticket was granted, even though Close
can flip closed in the gap between that dequeue (which makes the
spec invisible to the clearQueue sweep) and the launch. Re-check
closed after dequeuing so a spec pulled off the queue after
shutdown began fails with ErrSwarmClosed instead of starting a new
worker.
Both regression tests are verified to fail against the pre-fix code
(confirmed by temporarily reverting each fix and rerunning).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(swarm): snapshot teams after lifecycle work stops
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-a4d5-7078-a80b-802bab23607e
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(swarm): reject late admitted launches during shutdown
Re-check the closed state at the final launcher boundary so lifecycle work admitted before Close cannot start or retry a member after shutdown has already won the race.
Add deterministic late-dispatch and scheduler-handoff coverage, stress concurrent Spawn and Close under the race detector, and keep the late-team snapshot regression isolated from launcher behavior.
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa55a-4f7f-766e-a312-a7db232b9987
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(swarm): reject post-close launch commits
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(swarm): gate retry relaunch on the post-close commit
The post-Launch shutdown gate added for spawns and queue drains was missing
from the bounded-retry path, which called the launcher and swapped in the new
handle unguarded. Since FuncLauncher returns a live handle immediately without
consulting its context, a Close landing between the pre-check and Launch's
return left the watcher supervising a member relaunched after shutdown began —
and recording that member's outcome on the task.
Extract the commit gate as commitLaunch and route the relaunch through it via
relaunchAdmitted, so an initial launch and a retry pass the same three gates:
admission, the pre-Launch re-check, and the post-Launch commit. When shutdown
wins, the handle is reaped and the watcher records the terminal failure instead
of adopting it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
* fix(providers): retry provably pre-send transport failures (#447)
A flaky link that failed the streaming completion POST at connect time
stopped the turn and forced a manual continue, because the shared retry
layer never retries transport errors: a completion POST is
non-idempotent, so a replay could duplicate billable work.
That rationale does not apply to a PROVABLY pre-send failure, where no
request bytes ever left this host: a replay cannot duplicate anything,
exactly like a 429/503 where the server told us it did not accept the
request. SendWithRetry now retries, with the existing backoff, only that
narrow class: DNS resolution failure, a refused or unreachable dial, and
a TLS handshake timeout. Every ambiguous or post-send failure stays
unretried and is checked first so a mixed message can never be misread:
connection reset, broken pipe, EOF, a bare i/o timeout, context
deadline. All three providers route their completion POST through this
layer, so one change covers them uniformly.
This deliberately narrows the issue's ask (which listed connection
reset) to the provably-safe subset, and keeps the reset-stays-unretried
test green. Tests cover the retry-on-pre-send, no-retry-on-ambiguous,
and predicate-classification paths.
NOTE FOR REVIEW: this refines a deliberately conservative, documented
no-retry stance. Opening it for the owner's sign-off on the stance, not
as a settled call.
* fix(providers): classify pre-send dials by errno so Windows retries too
CodeRabbit flagged that the pre-send predicate matched only POSIX dial
wording, so a refused or unreachable dial on Windows (whose text differs
entirely: 'No connection could be made because the target machine
actively refused it') would not be retried.
Match the syscall errno via errors.Is instead: Go maps ECONNREFUSED /
ENETUNREACH / EHOSTUNREACH / ECONNRESET to the host's real values,
including the WSA codes on Windows, so classification is identical on
every platform. Errno matching is also authoritative where the string
markers were only heuristic, closing the theoretical substring gap. The
string markers stay as a fallback for errors already flattened to text.
ECONNRESET is added to the post-send exclusions by identity so a Windows
reset is excluded too.
Tests build the production error shape (net.OpError -> os.SyscallError ->
errno) so the Windows path is exercised portably on every platform, plus
an end-to-end SendWithRetry case for an errno-wrapped refused dial. Cross
-compiled and vetted for linux and darwin.
* fix(providers): scope pre-send retry to the dial phase and fail fast on permanent errors
Addresses gnanam's two [Major] review findings on this PR.
[Major] Pre-send errno classification was not scoped to the dial, so a post-send
read/write carrying ECONNREFUSED/ENETUNREACH/EHOSTUNREACH (a route dropping
mid-generation) was misclassified "provably pre-send" and could replay a
non-idempotent completion POST up to 6 times. errors.Is matches an errno
anywhere in the chain regardless of which operation raised it, so
isPreSendTransportError now requires an Op=="dial" *net.OpError before admitting
those errnos or their POSIX wording. That makes "no request bytes were sent"
structural: a post-send failure can no longer replay a POST. The dial errno
match still covers Windows (Go maps the WSA* codes), so the platform coverage
this PR added is preserved.
[Major] Permanent failures hung the agent ~60s on the 429-tuned schedule.
NXDOMAIN (net.DNSError with IsNotFound) is now treated as permanent and not
retried, and the pre-send path gets its own short bound and sub-second schedule
(preSendMaxAttempts=3, 500ms/1s) instead of reusing the 2/4/8/16/30s rate-limit
backoff, so a mistyped host or a dead local daemon fails in about 1.5s.
[Minor] Fixed the stale SendWithRetry doc that still claimed transport errors are
never replayed.
Tests: post-send read/write errnos and NXDOMAIN now assert exactly 1 call (no
replay); dial errnos plus the string fallback assert the pre-send cap; added the
pre-send backoff schedule. Race detector and all provider packages green.
* fix(providers): match Windows WSA dial errnos so refused dials retry on Windows too
CodeRabbit caught a real Windows bug, which I verified with a real dial on
Windows: errors.Is(err, syscall.ECONNREFUSED) returns FALSE for a refused dial
there, because a real Windows dial carries the raw WSAECONNREFUSED (10061) while
Go's syscall.ECONNREFUSED is a distinct value the net package never produces. The
POSIX string fallback ("connection refused") does not match the Windows wording
("No connection could be made because the target machine actively refused it")
either. So the pre-send dial classification silently never fired on Windows, the
exact platform this PR set out to fix.
Move the dial errnos into a platform-specific list (dialPreSendErrnos): POSIX
everywhere, plus the WSA* codes on Windows. The existing wrapDialErrno fixtures
wrap the Go syscall constants, which is why they passed on both platforms and
missed this. Adds TestIsPreSendTransportErrorRealRefusedDial, which does a REAL
refused dial and asserts pre-send classification, so the platform's true error
shape is exercised on every OS.
* fix(providers): exclude Plan 9 from the POSIX dial-errno build tag
* fix(providers): keep the pre-send errno classification off Plan 9
retry.go referenced syscall.ECONNRESET and dialPreSendErrnos directly, but the
errno definitions live in build-tagged files that exclude Plan 9 (which has no
BSD-style errno constants), so the package stopped compiling for GOOS=plan9 on
this branch even though it builds on the merge base.
Move the two syscall touch-points behind per-platform helpers: retry.go now
calls isConnResetErrno and ranges dialPreSendErrnos, both provided by
retry_dialerrno.go, retry_dialerrno_windows.go, and a new
retry_dialerrno_plan9.go. The Plan 9 variant supplies an empty errno list and a
false isConnResetErrno, so retry.go falls back to its existing string-marker
heuristics there. Behavior on linux/darwin/windows is unchanged (isConnResetErrno
matches the same syscall.ECONNRESET as before). retry_test.go is tagged !plan9
because it constructs real syscall.Errno dial shapes.
Verified: GOOS=plan9 build and vet now pass; windows and linux build, vet, gofmt,
and the full providerio test suite stay green.
* fix(providers): stop pre-send retry from replaying a redirected POST
Addresses jatmn's review on #750.
[P1] client.Do could follow a 307/308 after already transmitting the original
POST, and a dial failure to the redirect target then satisfied
isPreSendTransportError and replayed the request, re-billing a completion the
first host already received. SendWithRetry now disables redirect following
(CheckRedirect returns http.ErrUseLastResponse on a cloned client), so any
dial/DNS/TLS error from Do can only come from the single initial request and
the pre-send classification is sound. A 3xx surfaces as the response for the
caller's existing non-2xx handling. Regression test asserts the POST is sent
once and the 307 is not followed.
[P2] The pre-send retry used the loop-wide attempt counter shared with 429/503
retries, so a couple of status retries exhausted the pre-send budget and the
first dial/DNS/TLS blip after them got no retry. Track pre-send failures and
their backoff ordinal in a separate counter. Regression test covers a
status-then-transport-failure sequence.
[P3] Correct the Plan 9 and wrapDialErrno comments: the Plan 9 string-marker
fallback keeps the pre-send inclusions and the separate reset exclusion, and
the errno fixtures do not reproduce a real Windows dial (that carries distinct
WSA errnos), which the real-dial test covers.
* fix(providers): decouple the status retry budget from pre-send retries
Addresses jatmn's follow-up on #750.
The previous change gave pre-send failures their own counter, but every retry
still advanced the loop-wide attempt counter that the 429/503 branch used. So
the coupling survived in the opposite direction: two safely replayed refused
dials shortened the later status retry window and started its backoff at a
later rung.
Give the status path its own statusAttempts counter and backoff ordinal. With
both budgets tracked separately the shared loop counter has no remaining
reader, so the loop no longer carries one. Behaviour is unchanged when only one
kind of failure occurs: the first retryable status still waits on rung 1 and
still gets maxAttempts requests.
Adds TestSendWithRetryStatusBudgetSurvivesPreSendRetries, the inverse of the
existing mixed-sequence test: two refused dials followed by rate limiting must
still leave the status path its full window.
* fix(providers): keep following redirects, but never replay a redirected POST
Addresses jatmn's follow-up on #750.
Blocking redirects outright was too blunt. SendWithRetry is the shared
completion path, so replacing every caller's CheckRedirect with
ErrUseLastResponse turned a legitimate 307/308 from a redirecting
OpenAI-compatible gateway into a terminal non-2xx that providers report as an
upstream error, and it discarded an injected client's redirect policy.
Observe the redirect instead of preventing it: a per-attempt flag is set from
CheckRedirect, which then delegates to the caller's policy when one is set and
otherwise mirrors net/http's default ten-hop cap. The pre-send retry is gated on
that flag, so an attempt that entered a redirect is never replayed while
redirecting endpoints keep working. The safety property is unchanged, since a
dial failure on a redirect hop follows a POST the origin already received.
Adds three regressions: a redirect is followed through to the final response, a
dial failure after a redirect is not replayed, and a caller-supplied
CheckRedirect still runs and still decides.
* test(providerio): pin the redirect asymmetry for retryable statuses
A reviewer read the redirect guard as incomplete, because it stops a redirected
POST being replayed after a transport error but not after a 429/503/529. The
asymmetry is intentional, and nothing recorded that, so the next reader would
reasonably reach the same conclusion.
The two cases differ in what is known about the request. A transport failure
after a redirect leaves it unknown whether the redirect target received and
began processing the POST, so replaying could duplicate billable work. A
retryable status means every hop answered: the 307/308 is the origin declining
and delegating, and the 429 is the target declining as well, so nothing accepted
the request and a replay duplicates nothing.
The exposure is also the same as a retryable status with no redirect involved,
which this package has always retried, so guarding here would not close a gap.
It would make a rate-limited completion behind a redirecting gateway fail
outright rather than back off, which is the regression class already raised
against disabling redirects wholesale.
Adds the case as a test asserting the intended behaviour, plus a comment at the
branch explaining why it is not guarded.
* fix(providers): retry connect timeouts and proxy CONNECT failures
Three classification gaps against #447, all raised in review.
A connect-phase timeout was never retried. It is provably pre-send for the same
structural reason a refused dial is, since the connection was never established
and no request bytes left this host, but it arrives carrying "i/o timeout" and
the blanket wording exclusion rejected it before the connect gate could admit
it. Intermittent connect timeouts are exactly the transient failure the issue
is about, so the most common case was the one not covered. It is now admitted
ahead of the wording exclusions, gated on the connect phase so a post-send read
timeout, which is also Timeout(), still cannot replay a POST.
A failed CONNECT through an HTTP proxy was never retried either. net tags it Op
"proxyconnect" rather than "dial", so it missed the gate entirely. Same
guarantee applies: the tunnel to the model host was never built. The gate now
accepts both, which matters most in the environment where transient connect
failures are most common.
ETIMEDOUT and WSAETIMEDOUT join the errno lists so a connect timeout still
classifies if it reaches us with the errno but without the timeout flag.
The pre-send budget also now resets after a hop that reaches the server. It is
meant to bound consecutive connect failures, not the lifetime of the call, and
without the reset an early run of blips permanently spent it, so a later blip
surfaced as a transport error while the status budget still had room. That is
the coupling the two counters were split apart to remove, in the one ordering
the earlier tests missed. Total work stays bounded, since every reset costs a
status attempt and those are capped.
Also corrects the SendWithAuthRetry comment, which still claimed the inner path
retried only 429/503/529.
Tests cover dial and proxyconnect timeouts as retryable and read/write timeouts
as not, a refused proxy CONNECT, and the interleaved pre-send/status/pre-send
sequence. Each fix fails its test when reverted.
providerCommandTimeout bounded only the wait, so the call could take arbitrarily
longer than the 5s its error text promised. Two phases sat outside it.
Starting the process ran before the clock began. On Windows that is
CREATE_SUSPENDED, job-object creation and assignment, and a system-wide thread
snapshot, none of it fast on a cold or contended machine. The deadline is now
armed first and the start races it, so process creation is inside the budget.
Draining after termination was unbounded too: the timer path called Terminate
and then received on the wait with no limit. Terminate normally makes that
immediate, which is exactly why it survived unnoticed, but a tree that resists
termination held the call open long past the deadline that had just expired.
That receive is now bounded, and a call that gives up leaves cmd.Wait running,
so the output buffers are synchronised: the I/O pump keeps writing into buffers
the caller already holds, which a plain bytes.Buffer cannot survive.
The timeout error also carried nothing actionable. It was a bare string with the
underlying error and the command's stderr both dropped, so a user whose provider
command was slow got no clue which phase ran out or what the command had said.
It now names the phase, wraps the cause, and includes the redacted output the
failure path already had.
Both bounds are asserted on extracted helpers rather than end to end, because
end to end they are untestable: a terminated command stops writing and its wait
returns at once, so an unbounded drain and an unsynchronised buffer both pass a
whole-call test. The first version of these tests did exactly that and proved
nothing. Removing either bound now fails, as does arming the deadline after the
start, which reports the wrong phase.
* feat(providers): add Fireworks AI provider preset
Add an OpenAI-compatible Fireworks catalog entry with curated coding
models, models.dev alias mapping, onboarding tests, and README setup.
* fix(provider): use correct Fireworks DeepSeek V3 model ID
Update default and catalog model IDs to deepseek-v3-0324 per Fireworks API.
scrubSensitiveEnv removed ZERO_DAEMON_REMOTE_TOKEN but not its file
counterpart. TokenFromEnv accepts either form, so a sandboxed command
still inherited the path to the bridge token, and the default posture is
read-all, so it could then read the token itself.
Scrubbing the pointer is the whole fix rather than half of one: the path
comes from this variable alone and TokenFromEnv has no default location
to fall back on, so a command that never sees the variable has nothing to
guess at. This mirrors GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, which is already
scrubbed for the same reason.
Extends the existing scrub table, which compares the surviving
environment exactly, so the case fails if the entry is dropped. Verified:
without the fix the assertion reports ZERO_DAEMON_REMOTE_TOKEN_FILE
surviving into the scrubbed environment.
* fix(sandbox): deny reads of git's credential stores (#815)
git's credential-store backend keeps host passwords and personal access tokens
in cleartext, at ~/.git-credentials or ~/.config/git/credentials depending on
whether the user is on the XDG layout. Neither was on the deny list, so any
command the agent runs could read them.
Scoped to those two files deliberately. #815 also covers SSH private keys and
the GPG keyring, and those are a harder trade: denying ~/.ssh stops a sandboxed
git push over SSH from working, and excluding that directory is not even
sufficient, since an IdentityFile directive can point key material anywhere.
These two cost nothing by comparison, because git reads them to authenticate
rather than to know who the user is, so a sandboxed git keeps working and
simply cannot act as the user.
The XDG one denies the file rather than the directory around it, which is the
opposite of the choice made for ~/.config/zero and is deliberate: ~/.config/git
also holds the global git config, which userGitConfigReadPaths grants on
purpose so a sandboxed git can read user.name and aliases instead of failing
outright. Denying the directory would take that away.
Tests assert both stores are denied, that the git config beside the XDG one
stays readable, and that an explicit read grant still re-includes them like
every other entry. Dropping either entry fails the first; widening the XDG
entry to the directory fails the config assertion.
* test(sandbox): assert the credential deny exists before the grant lifts it
The allow-read case only checked that the credential store was absent from
the deny list once an explicit grant covered it. A deny rule that was never
added satisfies that just as well, so the test passed with the production
change reverted and proved nothing about the interaction it was named for.
Check both runs: denied with no grant, absent with one. The first leg is
what establishes there is something for the grant to override.
* test(tools): stop internal/tools failing on stock Windows
This package fails on every run on a Windows box without PowerShell 7, which
is what a stock install is: PowerShell 7 is a separate download. CI never sees
any of it, because the runners have 7. Three distinct causes, all surfaced by
the move to PowerShell in #804.
The stop-intent test waited a fixed second for a session to die and asserted on
whatever was true by then. Under cmd.exe that was enough; under PowerShell the
tree is slower to stand up and tear down, and the FIRST stop in a fresh process
pays the interpreter's cold start, so it routinely returned with termination
under way but unfinished. The assertion read that as a failed stop. It now
re-sends the stop until the session reports it has exited. Repeating is safe,
since Terminate is a no-op against an already-dead tree, and it keeps the
interrupt flag that a poll with empty chars would drop.
Separately, and pre-existing, every test that starts a session hit a teardown
race: a terminated process does not release its handles the instant the session
reports exited, and Windows refuses to remove a directory with an open handle
where POSIX does not. t.TempDir removes once and fails the test on the sharing
violation, so ordinary teardown timing was reported as a broken test. Those
roots now clean up with a bounded retry, and give up quietly rather than
failing: the process is already terminated, so the worst case is a stale
directory under the OS temp root.
Last, the MSYS guard test asserted a windows_shell_syntax block using a command
containing `&&`. On PowerShell 5.1 the windows_powershell_version preflight
added by #804 fires first and shadows it. The `&&` was incidental to what that
case is about, so it is gone. This one is worth noting as a shape rather than a
typo: a new preflight silently changed which block an older assertion got, and
only on the shell CI does not run.
Verified by running the package repeatedly rather than once: previously failing
on every run, now passing 3 of 3, and the stop-intent test passing 8 of 8 alone
and 6 of 6 under CPU contention. Disabling the terminate path still fails it,
so the assertion continues to bind.
* test(tools): assert the stop intent killed the session
The retry loop added to survive a slow PowerShell teardown also made the
test unfalsifiable. The helper sleeps 5s, well inside the 30s deadline, so
a terminate that did nothing at all would let the sleep end on its own and
every existing assertion would still hold: the session reports exited, it
reports an exit code, and the interrupted flag echoes the request rather
than the outcome. Neutering KillProcessTree confirmed it, the test passed.
Assert instead that the helper's completion line never appears, which
distinguishes a killed session from a finished one without depending on
how long the loop took. Output is accumulated across every poll rather
than read off the last result, because each continuation returns only what
the session produced since the previous collection.
* fix(tui): paste clipboard images with Ctrl+V
Ctrl+V did nothing when the clipboard held a screenshot, while right-click
paste attached it. The image plumbing was already there: routePaste probes the
OS clipboard for an image whenever a paste arrives with empty text.
The gap is that a clipboard holding only an image produces no bracketed paste
at all, since the terminal has no text to send, so routePaste never runs and its
probe never fires. Right-click reached the probe only because that path always
delivers a clipboardReadMsg, empty or not. Bubble's own Ctrl+V binding stays
disabled, so nothing else was listening for the key.
Handle Ctrl+V by issuing the image probe directly. It reads image content only,
never text, so bracketed paste remains the single text path and a Ctrl+V with
text on the clipboard is unaffected. The probe yields no message when there is
no image, keeping it a silent no-op, and it is gated on noBlockingModal so a
permission prompt or picker still swallows the key.
readClipboardImage becomes a var so the tests stub it instead of depending on
the machine's real clipboard.
Fixes#534
* fix(tui): also probe the clipboard on Cmd+V, and test the real key route
Two things raised in review, both fair.
The handler matched keyCtrl only, which is ModCtrl. macOS reports Command as
ModSuper, as the rest of the TUI already models it, so Cmd+V never reached the
image probe even though the change claimed to cover it. It now matches both, via
a keySuper helper alongside the existing modifier helpers.
Worth being precise about the limit: this only helps where the terminal delivers
the key to the application. A terminal that handles Cmd+V itself pastes the
clipboard TEXT and sends no key event at all, so an image-only clipboard still
produces nothing for this to react to. That is a separate problem from the one
being fixed here.
The tests also did not exercise the route they were named for. One asserted that
Update returned some non-nil command and then ran a freshly built probe; the
other never called Update at all. Both now stub the reader BEFORE Update and run
the command Update actually returned.
That matters more than it sounds. Making the branch return a different non-nil
command leaves the old assertion passing and fails the new one, which is exactly
the hole: the old test proved a command was issued, not that it was the image
probe. Removing the route entirely, or reverting to ModCtrl only, also fails now.
* fix(imageinput): report an unreadable clipboard image instead of silence
On macOS the clipboard reader shells to pngpaste or a PyObjC one-liner, and
neither ships with the OS: pngpaste is Homebrew-only and Apple dropped the
bundled PyObjC. A stock Mac therefore fails every time, and the failure was
returned as (nil, nil), which the caller reads as "no image on the clipboard"
and treats as a silent no-op. Pressing Ctrl+V produced nothing at all: no
image, no error, no hint that anything was missing.
The darwin path already knows the difference. It probes with `clipboard info`
first and only reaches the extraction step once the clipboard is confirmed to
hold an image, so a failure there is not absence, it is "there is an image and
nothing here can read it". That now returns ErrClipboardImageUnreadable, which
the existing error path turns into a transcript notice naming what to install.
The defect predates this branch, but this branch is what makes the path
reachable from Ctrl+V, so shipping without it would close#534 with a feature
that is inert on one of the three platforms. Raised by gnanam, who measured it
on a real Mac rather than inferring it.
Deliberately narrow. The Linux arm cannot tell "no tool" from "no image"
without probing separately, and Windows uses PowerShell, which is always
present, so neither is touched.
The test drives the whole path: stubbed reader returns the error, Ctrl+V
issues the probe, and the assertion is that the failure reaches the transcript
as an error row rather than stopping earlier. Swallowing the error again makes
it fail.
* test(imageinput): cover the darwin unreadable-clipboard decision itself
The test added with the fix asserted around the change rather than on it. It
substituted ReadClipboardImage with a stub returning the error, which proves
the TUI surfaces an error handed to it, but never reaches
readClipboardImageDarwin, where the decision lives. Reverting both production
return sites to nil,nil left every package green, which is the definition of a
test that is not testing the change. Caught by gnanam.
readClipboardImageDarwin shells out twice and had no seam, so the two steps are
now package-level vars, the same shape as the readClipboardImage var this
change already relied on. That makes the case that matters reachable: the info
probe succeeds and reports an image, and the extractor then fails. It cannot be
arranged from outside the function, because from there both steps are one
opaque call.
Five cases, and the negative ones carry as much weight as the positive. An
image with no working extractor, and an extractor that exits 0 with no bytes,
must both be actionable. A clipboard offering no image, and a failing info
probe, must both stay silent, because turning those into a notice would make
every stray Ctrl+V nag the user. The extractor must not run at all in either
silent case.
Repeating gnanam's experiment now fails: reverting both return sites to nil,nil
fails the two actionable cases and leaves the silent ones passing, which is
exactly the discrimination the fix is supposed to add.
* fix(sandbox): preserve user config and retry denied writes
Keep user identity and configuration paths discoverable while retaining managed cache and temporary storage. Classify native sandbox failures as typed recoverable denials so approved commands can retry outside the sandbox.
Add regression coverage for global Git ignores, typed denial handling, and permission retry behavior.
* fix(sandbox): tighten denial retry safeguards
* test(sandbox): assert denial contract
* fix(sandbox): trust typed denials and restore Cargo state
Stop promoting command output keywords into recoverable unrestricted denials, so only structured adapter facts can enter the approved unsandboxed retry path.
Restore the managed CARGO_HOME directory and environment override so Cargo remains writable while the caller's real home stays read-only.
* fix(sandbox): mask preserved credential configs
Preserving caller configuration made credential-bearing tool files discoverable under Linux's read-all sandbox profile. Add default and environment-overridden npm, GitHub CLI, netrc, Docker, Kubernetes, and Zero config paths to the credential deny set, with regression coverage.
Clarify the typed-denial retry and platform read-model comments without changing the approval behavior.
* fix(sandbox): protect custom gcloud config
CLOUDSDK_CONFIG can relocate gcloud credentials outside the XDG-derived default. Include the configured directory in the credential deny profile and cover the override with a regression test.
* fix(sandbox): deny zero credential directory
* test(sandbox): keep zero credential directory deny path expectations
* fix(windows): prefer PowerShell for command execution
Detect PowerShell 7 or Windows PowerShell before falling back to cmd.exe, and share the selected host shell across agent tools and the interactive shell escape.
Configure UTF-8 output, preserve restricted-sandbox MSYS safeguards, and add Windows coverage for pipelines, workspace writes, and interactive stdin sessions.
* test(windows): align shell coverage with PowerShell
Make Windows command fixtures and guidance assertions follow the selected host shell, preserve cmd fallback coverage, and use a genuine MSYS executable when PowerShell aliases are available.
Remove the unsupported non-TTY PowerShell stdin assertion; Windows interactive stdin requires a separate PTY transport.
* fix(sandbox): classify Windows executable suffixes
Normalize .exe, .cmd, .bat, and .com command names before safety and network lookup so PowerShell invocations such as curl.cmd receive the same network permission handling as curl.
Add analyzer and engine-level regressions for the Windows PowerShell command shape observed in CI.
* fix(sandbox): normalize absolute Windows command paths
Extract drive-letter and UNC basenames before removing shell escape characters so fully qualified Windows executables continue matching canonical safety and network classifications.
Cover both drive and UNC curl paths with analyzer regressions.
* fix(sandbox): normalize relative Windows paths
Recognize drive-relative, explicit relative, and suffixed backslash executable paths before generic shell escape removal so Windows commands continue to match canonical sandbox risk entries.
* fix(windows): harden PowerShell execution
* fix(sandbox): classify PowerShell removal aliases
* test(cli): order the prewarm probe against the turn
TestRunExecOptimizedSessionUnderGate intermittently sees zero prewarm HEAD
probes on the Windows runner. It polled for up to 5s after the run returned,
reasoning that the deadline exceeded the 3s prewarm timeout so a slow probe
could not flake it. That reasoning does not hold. The probe is issued on the
run's context and runExec cancels that context as it returns, because the stop
function signalContext hands back is a CancelFunc. Once the run is over the
probe is cancelled rather than slow, so polling cannot observe one that has not
already landed, at any deadline.
Against a mock server the turn finishes in microseconds, which leaves the probe
racing teardown. The turn now blocks until the probe arrives, giving it a
window while the run is still alive. The wait is bounded, so a probe that never
fires still fails the assertion with a useful message.
This widens the window rather than closing it: prewarmTimeout is armed inside
the probe goroutine, so holding the turn cannot extend it. The comment says so,
and names prewarmTimeout as the thing to look at if this ever recurs.
* test(cli): fail when the prewarm hold gives up
The bounded wait let the turn proceed after its guard expired, so a probe that
arrived late still left the count at 1 and the test passed. That proves the
probe was eventually received, not that it preceded the turn, which is the only
thing this test claims. Raised by CodeRabbit.
The expiry is now recorded and checked before the count, since the count cannot
tell the two apart.
Verified by suppressing the probe, which makes the guard expire: the assertion
fires with its own message rather than the count assertion, and the run takes
the full guard duration.
* fix(sandbox): add platform-specific write lock around grant state file (#752)
Add grants_lock_unix.go and grants_lock_windows.go with a lockStateFile
method that serializes access to the persisted grant state across
processes. Wire the lock into Grant, GrantCommandPrefix, Revoke,
RevokePath, and Clear.
Also add .gitattributes to force LF line endings for Go files so
gofmt checks pass on Windows.
Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)
Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(sandbox): do not lock the grants file when there is no notice to consume
Addresses jatmn's #755 finding.
ConsumeMigrationNotice took the interprocess lock unconditionally, and
lockStateFile MkdirAlls the grants directory and creates
<grants>.lockfile. Every startup and every 'zero exec' calls this, so it
turned reading the grant state into requiring a WRITABLE grants
directory: a user with no grants file whose ZERO_SANDBOX_GRANTS_PATH (or
its parent config directory) sits on a read-only mount failed outright
with 'failed to migrate sandbox grants', where the pre-lock code read an
empty state and wrote nothing.
Peek at the state without the lock first and return early when no
migration write is required. Only when one is — a schema/policy
migration, or clearing NoticePending — take the lock and re-read under
it, since the unlocked peek is a snapshot another process may have
already consumed or migrated, and is meaningless by contract when
needsMigration is set.
Both regression tests are verified to fail against the pre-fix code.
The read-only-directory test skips on Windows (mode bits do not deny
writes) and as root (permissions are bypassed), so a portable companion
asserts the same requirement by requiring that nothing is created at
all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
* fix pinned Go quality toolchain
* fix(make): use a POSIX GOTOOLCHAIN prefix for pinned tool targets
The Windows_NT branch used cmd.exe syntax (set "..." &&), but GNU Make
runs recipes through sh even on Windows (MSYS/Git Bash), where that
form fails and breaks make lint-static/deadcode/vulncheck. A plain
GOTOOLCHAIN=... prefix works everywhere, so the OS check is gone.
Also switch GO_VERSION/GO_TOOLCHAIN to recursive expansion so
'go list -m' only runs when a tool target actually needs it, instead
of at parse time for every target. Addresses PR review from CodeRabbit
and Copilot.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(build): make pinned-tool targets shell-neutral, fix README drift
Address code review on PR #689:
- lint-static/deadcode/vulncheck previously set GOTOOLCHAIN via a
POSIX `VAR=value cmd` recipe prefix. GNU Make on Windows runs
recipes through whatever SHELL is configured, and under a native
cmd.exe setup that syntax is invalid — cmd.exe treats the whole
"GOTOOLCHAIN=go1.26.5" token as the program to run and fails before
go ever executes (reproduced locally: cmd.exe errors with
"'MYVAR' is not recognized..." for the equivalent pattern). Switched
to a target-specific `export`, which sets the variable in the child
process environment via Make itself, before is invoked —
works under sh, cmd.exe, and PowerShell alike (verified against all
three targets with SHELL := cmd.exe).
- README.md's Code Quality and Security Checks section still told
contributors to run the raw `go run ...@version` commands this PR
identifies as selecting the wrong (older) toolchain and failing to
load this Go 1.26.5 module — only CI and AGENTS.md had been updated
to the new make targets. Points steps 3-4 at `make lint-static` /
`make vulncheck` instead, matching AGENTS.md.
Verified end-to-end: `make vulncheck`, `make deadcode`, and `make
lint-static` all run successfully and reach their tools (deadcode's
advisory report and lint-static's 35 pre-existing findings match the
PR's documented baseline).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(build): support stock macOS make
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Both background-child tests fail intermittently on the Windows runner, and
have since #690. #800 and #802 each relaxed an assertion, which is why neither
held: the deadline itself was the problem.
The tests drove LoadProviderCommand, so the fixture's own startup was billed to
the production 5s budget. On a loaded runner the outer timer won the select in
runProviderCommand, and both symptoms follow from that. The nonzero-exit test
saw a timeout instead of the exit status it asserts, because the timer
preempted the shell's exit. The other test lost its PID file, because the
timer's Terminate killed the background child before it could record a PID,
putting the file permanently out of reach however long the assertion polled.
Neither test is a claim about the 5s budget. They assert which error each
cmd.Wait path yields and that the leftover descendant is killed, so they now
call runProviderCommand directly with a budget of their own and the production
deadline stops competing with process startup. Making the child outlive that
budget lets both drop their elapsed-versus-lifetime bounds as well, so no
wall-clock assertion is left in either test.
That is only worth doing if the two timeout paths can be told apart, and they
could not: the WaitDelay path and the outer-timer path both returned the same
bare sentinel, so asserting on it would have been satisfied by the very timeout
the tests exist to rule out. The WaitDelay path now wraps rather than replaces.
Callers asking errors.Is for the sentinel are unaffected, so no user-visible
message changes.
The Windows fixture also waited for its ready marker by launching a second
PowerShell. That cold start is pure overhead added after the PID is already
written, so the wait now runs in cmd itself and is bounded.
Verified by looping both tests under CPU contention: 7 failures in 16
iterations before, none in 32 after, with per-iteration time going from a
spread of 2.3s to 66s down to a steady 2.1s. Removing the wrap makes the
WaitDelay assertion fail, so it is load-bearing rather than decorative.
Mirror plugin info: compare on-disk SKILL.md to the skills.lock hash so
edited installs are visible. Also drop the nonexistent skills lock
command from EXTENDING.md.
New turns inherited lastStreamActivity from the prior turn, so a fresh request could immediately look stalled. Initialize stream activity from the same timestamp as turnStartedAt and cover the stale-clock case with a deterministic regression test.
Cold PowerShell startup under concurrent Windows CI can consume most of the provider timeout, so an unsynchronized PID file may never be written and a fixed four-second bound can fail despite correct process-tree cleanup. Treat an absent PID as a helper that never reached startup, retain strict liveness checks for synchronized children, and bound completion by the child's natural lifetime instead.
* chore: remove code unreachable on every supported platform
The Security and code health job's advisory deadcode step reports 152
unreachable functions on main. Running the same check under GOOS=linux,
windows, and darwin shows 13 of those are false positives whose callers
live in windows build-tagged files, so only functions unreachable on all
three platforms are touched.
Functions with no references anywhere are deleted, including the
internal/reasoning package, which nothing imports. Functions that only
tests reference move into per-package export_test.go files so tests keep
their seams while the production binary sheds the code. Test call sites
of deleted convenience wrappers are ported to the live APIs (scoped tool
constructors, tools.DeferredSource, FinishReason checks).
Kept despite the report: cron.Store.Runs (only reader of runs.jsonl,
which production writes), and agenteval.TraceEventKeys and
MissingTraceEvents (used across packages by the trace contract test).
* docs(config): correct ValidateFile's errors.As claim
Message is a flattened string (.Error() already called on the parse
error), not a wrapped error, so callers can't recover the concrete
json error type via errors.As. Fix the comment to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* chore(trace,skills): drop obsolete Sink adapters and fix stale doc references
The dead-code pass removed the Emit methods but left Sink, NDJSONSink, and
TextSink exported with a contract nothing implements; remove the types with
their contract. Also remove the stray blank line at EOF of trace.go flagged
by gofmt, and update skills package docs and HOW_ZERO_WORKS.md to stop
directing callers to DiscoveryRoots/Duplicates, which are now test seams.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* chore: clean up remaining review nits on dead code removal
Replace a pointless fmt.Errorf(...%w...).Error() with fmt.Sprintf
using %v, since the wrapped error was discarded immediately anyway.
Remove a comment block that was duplicated verbatim.
* docs(skills): drop remaining references to test-only List/Get
Load and MergedSkills comments still named List/Get as production
entry points after they moved to export_test.go. Point callers at
Load and ListFromRoots instead.
* chore: remove now-unreferenced export_test.go seams
execSessionManager.len() and likelySandboxDenied/sandboxDenialKind had
no remaining callers after the sandbox unify-command-execution rebase;
the production code they wrapped for tests no longer exists.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(config): kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows
taskkill /T walks the process tree by parent PID in user space and can
miss descendants, leaving the sleeping child holding the inherited
stdout/stderr pipes so cmd.Wait() blocked until natural completion
(~10s instead of the 5s timeout).
Assign the started command to a job object with
JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE and terminate the job on timeout so
the kernel kills the whole tree atomically; taskkill remains as a
fallback. Also set cmd.WaitDelay so Wait can never hang on pipes held
by an escaped orphan, and add a regression assertion that the sleeping
child is actually gone after the timeout returns.
Fixes#683
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(config): harden provider-command tree termination
Address code review on PR #690: terminate the process tree when
cmd.Wait() returns exec.ErrWaitDelay (a background descendant kept
inherited pipes open, previously left running); start the Windows
process suspended and assign it to the job object before resuming its
main thread, closing the window where a fast child could escape the
job; drop JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE so a successful command's
detached helpers survive Close() instead of being reaped; escape
single quotes in generated PID-file paths; and correct a misnamed
Windows exit-code constant in a comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(config): avoid gofmt smart-quote rewrite in doc comment
gofmt's doc-comment formatter rewrites a trailing '' into a curly
closing quote, which CI's gofmt -l check flags as unformatted. Reword
to avoid the pattern instead of embedding a raw quote pair.
* fix(config): terminate leaked descendants on nonzero exit, avoid PID reuse
Terminate the process tree on any error returned from cmd.Wait, not only
exec.ErrWaitDelay. Go only returns ErrWaitDelay when the shell itself
exited successfully; a nonzero exit (e.g. sleep 600 & exit 7) yields the
bare *ExitError instead, so a detached background child that held the
inherited pipes open was never terminated on that path.
Also stop falling through to the taskkill/PID fallback once a job handle
successfully contained the tree: by the time Terminate runs on the
ErrWaitDelay path, cmd.Wait has already reaped the root process, so its
PID may have been reused by an unrelated process, and taskkill /T /PID
against a reused PID would force-kill the wrong tree.
Addresses PR #690 review feedback.
* fix(config): surface suspended-thread resume failures instead of hanging
resumeMainThread now reports whether it actually resumed at least one
thread. If Toolhelp/OpenThread/ResumeThread all fail, the launched
process would otherwise sit suspended forever, never exit on its own,
and get misreported as a plain 5s provider-command timeout instead of
the real resume failure. attachCommandProcess now terminates the
process immediately in that case.
Also documents the known, non-regressive limitation that the taskkill
fallback (used only when job creation/assignment itself fails) can
still miss a descendant that has reparented away from the tree it
walks by PID.
Addresses remaining PR #690 review feedback; PR description corrected
separately to drop the outdated JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE claim.
* fix(config): guard taskkill with retained process identity
* fix(config): retain POSIX process group identity
* test(tui): match provider wizard shortcut
* test(tui): pin credential-step env for deterministic footer assertion
The credential step's footer only shows the /→ shortcut once a key
is present, whether typed or inherited from the provider's
AuthEnvVars. The previous commit changed the assertion to
"Enter/→ continue" without accounting for that, so the test only
passed by coincidence when ANTHROPIC_API_KEY happened to be set in the
environment — failing deterministically on a clean CI runner (as
smoke reported on all three OSes). Pin the env var empty and assert
the no-key footer text so the test is correct regardless of ambient
environment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(config): preserve provider process attributes
* test(config): keep SysProcAttr coverage portable
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(tui): disable bubbletea hard scroll optimization unconditionally
Vendors a patched charm.land/bubbletea/v2 (via a local go.mod replace)
with hard scroll optimization (using terminal scroll-region sequences
to shift existing lines instead of repainting) disabled unconditionally,
instead of only on GOOS=="windows".
That GOOS check only catches a Windows terminal driving the program
directly. It misses a Linux process running inside a multipass VM
whose output is ultimately displayed by Windows Terminal over a
remote shell, which corrupts rendering badly (garbled/overlapping
text, worse on resize) the same way the check exists to prevent.
There's no reliable way to detect that remote hop from inside the VM,
so scroll optimization is now off in all cases.
* fix(tui): force redraw on streamed newlines to clear stale caret
The streaming caret (appendStreamingCursor) is appended to whichever
visual line is currently last. Over a remote terminal chain
(multipass VM output displayed by Windows Terminal), the renderer's
incremental cell diff sometimes fails to clear the caret's old cell
when a newline moves it to a new line, leaving ghost carets behind.
Fire tea.ClearScreen when a streamed delta contains a newline: that's
exactly the moment the caret moves and the risk exists, so it forces
a full redraw right then instead of leaving it to the incremental
diff, without doing so on every animation tick.
* chore(tui): trim upstream repo metadata from vendored bubbletea fork
The vendored bubbletea-v2-patched module is ~99% byte-identical to
upstream charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8; only cursed_renderer.go
differs (one line disabling hard scroll optimization). The .github
workflows, README.md, UPGRADE_GUIDE_V2.md, Taskfile.yaml and CI config
files are upstream repo metadata that serve no purpose inside this
repo, so remove them to slim the PR. The Go source and testdata golden
files are kept because Go's replace directive requires the full module
to be present and buildable.
Refs #709
* fix(tui): address review round on the rendering workaround and vendored fork
Fork correctness fixes (all flagged by review):
- key.go: KeyMediaRecord repeated the previous const expression and
decoded record presses as previous-track; map it to uv.KeyMediaRecord.
- mouse.go: MouseButton11 likewise collapsed onto MouseButton10.
- termios_unix.go: BSDLY/BS0 are output-delay bits; read them from Oflag
instead of Lflag so useBackspace is set correctly.
- cursed_renderer.go: count wrapped rows with (lineWidth-1)/w so an
exact terminal-width multiple no longer inserts a blank line; compare
colors by normalized RGBA via a nil-safe helper instead of interface
equality (which panics on non-comparable implementations); and make
clearScreen invalidate lastView so the queued erase flushes with the
next frame instead of deferring until an unrelated view change — the
reordering that could leave the ghost caret in place.
- exec_test.go: implement reset() on the spy renderer and inject it
before Run; assert exec preserves renderer state (releaseTerminal
with reset=false).
- logging_test.go: restore the default logger's output/prefix/flags and
fail fast on setup errors.
- tea_test.go: tie the Quit-pumping goroutine to a channel closed when
Run returns instead of leaking it until process exit.
TUI scoping (review P2): the forced redraw on streamed newlines is now
rate-limited to ~10/s so heavy streaming output no longer turns every
newline into a full-screen repaint, and ZERO_NO_STREAM_CLEAR=1 opts a
correctly-rendering terminal back into the fast incremental path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(tui): guarantee deferred stream-clear redraw and other review fixes
A throttled stream-clear could drop the redraw entirely when a
newline arrived in the last delta of a turn, leaving a ghost caret on
screen. Add a one-shot deferred flush timer plus a flush on stream
end. Fix a stale comment and a test that leaked global logger state
in the vendored bubbletea fork.
* fix(tui): use m.now for stream-clear throttle and harden tests
Drive stream-clear rate limiting through the mockable clock and a
shared streamClearThrottle constant so both the agentTextMsg and
flush paths stay in sync. Add an explicit two-newline-within-window
regression and detect ClearScreen by function pointer so tests do not
evaluate Tick side effects.
* fix(tui): relocate bubbletea fork out of third_party
Move the maintained bubbletea/v2 hard-scroll patch from
third_party/bubbletea-v2-patched to patches/bubbletea-v2 and update the
root go.mod replace. third_party/ is immutable vendored content per
AGENTS.md; a maintained fork belongs outside that tree.
* fix(ci,docs): run vendored bubbletea fork tests and document unsupported go install path
patches/bubbletea-v2 is its own Go module so `go test ./...` from the repo
root never touched its 7 test files. Add a CI step (and a make test-patches
target for local use) that runs the fork's own suite across the smoke
matrix.
The root go.mod's local `replace charm.land/bubbletea/v2 =>
./patches/bubbletea-v2` also breaks `go install
github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@<version>`, since a versioned install can't
resolve a replace pointing at a filesystem path. Document that path as
unsupported in README.md and docs/INSTALL.md and point at git clone + go
build instead, per jatmn's review findings on PR #709.
* ci: run vendored bubbletea fork tests with -race
CodeRabbit review on this PR. The fork exists specifically to patch a
concurrency bug (charmbracelet/bubbletea#1690), so its regression test
needs the race detector to actually catch a reintroduced race instead
of just passing on a benign-looking run.
* fix(tui): drop vendored bubbletea fork; keep stream-clear workaround
Maintainers asked not to ship an in-tree bubbletea replace: it breaks
versioned go install and is a large maintenance surface for a narrow
multipass/Windows Terminal scroll bug. Remove patches/bubbletea-v2 and
the replace directive; keep the model.go full-redraw-on-streamed-newline
workaround (ZERO_NO_STREAM_CLEAR to opt out). Restore normal install docs.
Refs Gitlawb/zero#709
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(cron): reserve job IDs atomically
* fix(cron): hold the per-ID lock from reservation through persistence
Address code review on PR #686: reserveID made the timestamp directory
visible via os.Mkdir before metadata.json existed, but Remove (which
takes the per-ID lock before deleting) never coordinated with that
window. A concurrent `zero cron rm <id>` could delete the bare
reservation and report success right after Add reserved it; writeJob's
MkdirAll would then silently resurrect the directory and persist the
job anyway. A second Add could also re-reserve the same id while the
first writer was still running, putting two writers on the same
metadata path.
reserveID now acquires the same per-ID lock (used by Get/Update/
Mutate/Remove/AppendRun) for each candidate id before attempting
os.Mkdir, and returns it still held; Add releases it only after
writeReservedJob commits (or tears down) the reservation. A concurrent
Remove for that id now blocks until the reservation is resolved one
way or the other, and a concurrent Add attempting the same candidate
id serializes through the lock rather than only racing the Mkdir.
Adds two regression tests: one proving Remove waits for and removes
the committed job rather than the bare reservation, and one proving a
second reserveID call for the same candidate id blocks on the shared
lock and moves on to the next candidate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* feat(plugins): add zero plugins info command
Add plugins info to inspect manifest state, extension counts, and
lockfile source/hash with optional hash drift detection.
* fix(plugins): derive lock dir from plugin install path for info
Remove LockDir from InfoOptions and read the lockfile from
filepath.Dir(plugin.PluginDir) so lock metadata matches the resolved
plugin location. Consolidate duplicate lock hash output lines.
* Add shell completion generation
Add zero completions for bash, zsh, fish, PowerShell, and Elvish using one shared command tree that covers aliases, nested commands, root flags, and common exec flags.
Validate missing and unsupported shell arguments as usage errors and document safe installation examples in command help.
Refs #499
* Complete shell target suggestions
Expose every supported shell as a completions subcommand candidate and document Elvish activation.
Refs #499
* Fix Elvish completion syntax
Close generated Elvish conditional branches, use value equality, and validate generated script structure plus native Bash and Zsh syntax.
Refs #499
* feat(sandbox): unify command execution and enforcement
* test(sandbox): make platform contracts portable
* fix(sandbox): close execution lifecycle races
Bound retained interactive output, preserve interruption state, and start workspace observation before process launch.
Protect active runtime roots with cross-platform leases, capture transient protected-path creation events, and restore process attributes after PTY fallback.
* fix(sandbox): restore strict macOS isolation
Remove Seatbelt host-local network allowances after native validation showed localhost filters can reach host interfaces.
Track process reap completion so retained sessions cannot signal a stale numeric PID.
Closes#721.
`zero providers use <name>` wrote activeProvider to config.json and reported
"Active provider set to <name>" even when ZERO_PROVIDER was set, which applyEnv
makes win over config.json unconditionally. So the switch was reported as a
success while `providers current` still showed the env-pinned provider, a silent
no-op.
Detect the override and say so: the text path prints a note to stderr naming the
env var and the provider that stays active, and the --json path adds
effectiveProvider / overriddenByEnv fields so a machine consumer is not misled
either. The config write still lands unchanged; only the reporting is honest.
The env read is injected via a new appDeps.getenv (os.Getenv in production, left
nil by fillAppDeps like exportActiveProvider) so tests stay hermetic against an
ambient ZERO_PROVIDER. The related env-derived-profile "not found" case the issue
also mentions is already handled by the unpersisted-provider path (#707) and #716.
* fix(lsp): make the real-gopls check opt-in so a broken gopls can't fail the suite
Closes#684.
TestManagerCheckRealGopls skipped only when gopls was absent from PATH, so an
installed-but-unhealthy gopls (e.g. an unusable persistent-index cache that makes
the server exit during initialization with EOF) failed `go test ./...` for every
developer who merely had gopls on PATH.
Gate it behind ZERO_GOPLS_INTEGRATION, matching the repo's other real-server
opt-ins (internal/dictation smoke tests). The default hermetic suite keeps its
coverage on the fake server and never touches the developer's global gopls; the
real check still runs on demand with ZERO_GOPLS_INTEGRATION=1.
* test(lsp): require ZERO_GOPLS_INTEGRATION=1 exactly, so =0 keeps the check off
Closes#728.
The Windows ACL setup resolved each target's pathname independently across
os.Stat, GetNamedSecurityInfo, and SetNamedSecurityInfo (and again on rollback),
so during elevated setup a lower-privileged local user could swap a target for a
symlink/junction between operations and redirect the ACL change onto a system
object the process never validated. That is a TOCTOU across a privilege boundary.
Open each target once with a no-follow handle (FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT plus
FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS, READ_CONTROL|WRITE_DAC) and drive both the read
(GetSecurityInfo) and the write (SetSecurityInfo) through that one handle, so they
hit the same kernel object. isDir is read from the same handle rather than a
separate Stat. A target that resolves to a reparse point is refused outright,
since a setup target that is a symlink/junction during elevated setup is the
swap-attack signature. Rollback re-opens no-follow rather than restoring by
pathname; the residual window is small because the target is ACL-restricted by
then, and one caller discards the rollback closure so handles are not retained for
the whole sandbox lifetime.
Tests (windows-tagged, no elevation needed): the handle-based apply plus rollback
round-trip on a user-owned temp dir, the materialize-and-remove path, reparse
rejection via a junction (needs no admin, so it runs in CI), and the not-exist
mapping. The full privilege-boundary race can't be reproduced in CI, so the guard
is verified structurally (one handle for read and write) and by junction rejection.
Documents expectations for keeping contribution flow sustainable during the
stabilization phase: one issue per bug (no bundled multi-finding audits), keep
only a few items open at a time, and hold AI-assisted contributions to the same
per-item verification bar. Complements the existing issue-approved gate, which
already covers PR-to-issue linkage and scope; the gap was submission volume.
* feat(tui): let the permission prompt take free-text feedback inline
"No, and tell Zero what to do differently" now opens an inline input on the
permission card instead of silently cancelling: type an instruction, Enter sends
it, Esc returns to the option list. The text is delivered as a Deny decision whose
Reason is the typed instruction, so the agent surfaces it via deniedPermissionResult
as the tool result and the model adjusts in the SAME turn — where the old cancel
returned an error and aborted the run. Empty input + Enter falls back to a plain
cancel (the prior meaning).
No agent-side change: PermissionDecision.Reason already carries free text to the
model. The UI mirrors the ask_user "type your own answer" pattern — the feedback
field reuses the shared composer input and the card renders it in the transcript
body.
Also: a focused permission prompt now suppresses the composer (and idle
hints/plan panel), keeping only the status line, exactly like the ask_user modal.
Its keys are inert anyway, so a "describe a task for zero…" box below the card was
misleading — and in feedback mode the shared input would otherwise echo in two
places.
Tests cover open / submit-as-Deny-with-text / empty-cancels / Esc-returns, the
composer suppression in both modes, and that the feedback text renders exactly
once.
* fix(tui): preserve the composer draft across permission feedback (#780 review)
anand + CodeRabbit (Major): entering feedback mode cleared the shared composer
input via SetValue(""), and neither submit nor cancel restored it — so a user
with a half-typed or queued next-turn message who chose "tell Zero what to do
differently" lost that draft.
Snapshot the composer value into pendingPermissionPrompt.savedDraft when feedback
mode opens, and restore it on BOTH exits (submit and Esc-cancel). Only the
feedback text is consumed, delivered via the decision Reason. Adds regression
tests for both paths; mutation-verified against the SetValue("") regression.
* fix(tui): guard permission-feedback backspace and clicks (#780 review)
Vasanthdev2004 review, all on the permission path:
1. Real bug: Backspace on an empty feedback field dropped a staged attachment.
The keyBackspace case runs before the typing branch and, on an empty composer
(feedback mode clears it), fell to removeLastAttachment — silently dropping a
staged image/doc that savedDraft does not restore. Route Backspace to the
shared input while typing so it is a plain edit of the feedback text.
2. Defence-in-depth: the mouse click resolver in handleTranscriptSelectionMouse
resolved a clicked permission option (Allow included) with no typing check. It
is safe today only because renderFocusedPermissionPrompt returns nil clickable
offsets in feedback mode — a single early-return in a function other PRs also
edit. Add an explicit !typing guard on the click path so the safety is stated,
not emergent.
3. Test hardening (also raised by CodeRabbit): assert len(got) == 1 before
indexing got[0] in the draft-preservation test, so a regression fails cleanly
instead of panicking.
Tests: TestPermissionFeedbackBackspaceKeepsStagedAttachment (mutation-verified
against the missing guard) and TestPermissionFeedbackRendersNoClickableOptionsWhileTyping.
---------
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
* fix(tools): read_file recovers a backwards line range instead of erroring
renderReadFileRange hard-failed when end_line < start_line, costing the caller a
whole retry for an arithmetic slip. It was also inconsistent: start_line past EOF
returns a friendly note and end_line past EOF is auto-clamped to the last line —
only a backwards range hard-errored.
Recover it the same way: clamp end_line UP to start_line (read just that line) and
surface the adjustment in the output so it is never silent. Valid ranges
(end_line >= start_line) are byte-for-byte unchanged.
The change is in the argument-validation phase, before any file I/O, so there is
no runtime cost; if anything it saves the agent a wasted retry turn.
Tests: TestReadFileToolRecoversBackwardsRange (recovery + note + reads only
start_line, mutation-verified against the old hard error) and
TestReadFileToolValidRangeUnchangedByRecovery (valid ranges carry no note and read
the identical window).
* test(tools): assert full valid-range output in read_file recovery test (#779 review)
anand + CodeRabbit: TestReadFileToolValidRangeUnchangedByRecovery claimed
byte-for-byte preservation but only checked substrings, so an altered
header/separator or a stray out-of-range line would still pass. Compare the
whole result.Output against the exact expected rendering.
---------
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
The focused permission prompt was the only prompt card in the TUI that used
brand/warning colours for its interior, and both read badly on cool themes such
as dracula:
1. The selected option ("Yes, proceed") was filled with zeroTheme.badge — the
brand chip meant for short labels (" 0 ", " ASK ", " SPEC REVIEW "), a
full-brightness accent fill. Every other selectable list in the TUI (model
picker, provider list, / palette) highlights its selected row with onSel/selBg
instead. The permission card was the outlier, painting a saturated accent slab
across the row and skipping the card tint every other line composed onto.
2. The card BODY was tinted with permBg, an amber-family wash intended to signal
a warning surface. It works on the warm default palette but renders as a
brown-yellow slab over cool themes, and it made the permission card the only
prompt whose body carries a fill — ask_user, spec review and plan all use a
transparent body (lipgloss.NewStyle()).
Fix both to match the rest of the TUI: the selected row uses onSel(ink) like
every other picker, and the body drops its permBg fill for a transparent one.
Warning identity is unchanged — the amber PERMISSION badge and the amber-mixed
border still mark it as a permission gate; only the clashing interior fills go.
TestFocusedPermissionSelectedRowUsesSelectionTintNotBrandChip asserts against
palette entries (not hardcoded hex, so it survives a theme retune): the selected
row carries selBg and not the brand accent, the body carries no permBg wash, and
the PERMISSION badge keeps its amber fill so the card still reads as a warning.
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
* feat(sandbox): disable the sandbox via config (#687)
Add a sandbox.enabled field (`"sandbox": {"enabled": false}`). ModeDisabled
already short-circuits the engine but had no config surface.
- SandboxConfig.Enabled *bool (pointer distinguishes an explicit false from an
omitted key).
- mergeConfig honors it (global config / CLI); applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy maps
enabled:false to ModeDisabled.
- mergeProjectConfig intentionally does NOT merge it: a cloned repo must not be
able to disable the sandbox that constrains it — same posture as
AdditionalWriteRoots and the Network tighten-only rule.
* fix(config): honor sandbox.enabled from the CLI override path (#687 review)
applyOverrides copied BlockUnixSockets/MonitorDenials but not the new Enabled
tri-state pointer, so a CLI/programmatic Overrides{Sandbox:{Enabled:&false}} was
dropped — contradicting the 'global config / CLI can disable' contract. Preserve
the pointer in applyOverrides (runs after all config sources, so an explicit
override wins) and add a resolver regression test: an explicit false override
disables, and an explicit true override wins over a lower-precedence config false.
* fix(config): keep sandbox.enabled out of the provider-command path (#687 review)
mergeConfig now copies Sandbox.Enabled, and it is shared by two callers: the
global-config merge (trusted) and the provider-command merge (not). A provider
command is an arbitrary executable named in config, and LoadProviderCommand
parses its stdout into a full FileConfig -- so one returning a valid provider
plus {"sandbox":{"enabled":false}} could disable the sandbox meant to constrain
it, despite the setting being documented as global-config/CLI only. Confirmed
reproducible in both directions before the fix.
Clear Sandbox.Enabled from the provider-command config before merging, mirroring
the carve-out mergeProjectConfig already applies for the same reason. Done at the
call site rather than inside mergeConfig because that helper must keep honouring
the setting for the trusted global-config merge.
Adds TestResolveSandboxEnabledIgnoredFromProviderCommand covering both
directions (cannot disable, cannot enable) and asserting the provider itself is
still applied, so the guard cannot be satisfied by dropping the command wholesale.
---------
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): AST second opinion for interactive-command bypasses (#473)
The interactive-command guard split shell commands with a hand-written parser
(splitShellSegments), which mis-handles unusual quoting, command substitution,
subshells, and newline separators — an interactive program hidden by one slips
through and the agent hangs until the per-command timeout.
Add astCommandFields(): mvdan.cc/sh/v3/syntax (already used by analyzer.go) to
re-extract the real simple commands, then apply the SAME per-program checks the
regex path uses (interactivePrograms + hasNonInteractiveFlag). This only ADDS
detections and classifies every program exactly as before — ssh with a trailing
command, python -c, etc. stay allowed — while catching the splitter's bypasses.
Unparseable input (Windows cmd.exe, obfuscation) yields no commands and falls
through to the regex path; the guard never hard-blocks on a parse error.
* fix(sandbox): AST pass runs the full pipeline + guards dynamic programs (#473 review)
Address review on #745:
- The AST second opinion now applies the complete detection pipeline via a new
inspectCommandFields helper (multi-word interactive segments, sh -c payload
recursion, then the per-program lookup), so parser-hidden bypasses like
{ git rebase -i HEAD~1; } and { sh -c 'vim file.txt'; } are caught, not just
bare interactive programs.
- astCommandFields now skips a CallExpr whose program word is not a static
literal (isLiteralWord), so a substitution concatenated with a literal
($(printf foo)vim -> foovim) can't fabricate an interactive program name.
Regression tests added for both boundaries. (The un-braced $(printf foo)vim
false positive is a separate, pre-existing hand-parser behavior — present on
main before this PR — and is out of scope here.)
* fix(sandbox): require literal words for the whole AST call (#473 review)
astCommandFields guarded only the program word, then ran every argument
through wordText, which keeps literal/quoted parts and silently drops
CmdSubst/ParamExp. A dynamic ARGUMENT was therefore reconstructed lossily:
`git $(printf foo)rebase -i HEAD~1` runs as `git foorebase -i` (a
non-existent, non-interactive subcommand) but collapsed to `git rebase -i`
and was blocked -- a false positive on a command the user never wrote, and
new on this branch (the base correctly reports not-interactive).
Extend the literalness guard to every word in the call: if any word carries
an expansion, skip that AST command rather than classify a reconstruction
whose runtime value is unknowable. Skipping is the safe direction -- the
hand-written passes still run first, and a miss falls through to the normal
permission prompt instead of hard-blocking.
Genuine detection is unchanged: `git rebase -i HEAD~1` and the #473 bypass
cases still classify exactly as before.
---------
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
* fix(tui): label model rows by id when the description is prose
The model picker (provider wizard AND onboarding, which share displayLabel)
labelled each row with the provider's Description, falling back to the ID only
when the description was "generic". That is right when Description holds a short
display name -- "Grok 4.3" for x-ai/grok-4.3, which is what the field is for and
why the row prefers it over an ugly raw ID.
Providers do not all honour that. Aggregators commonly return a prose blurb
instead ("Fast DeepSeek model for efficient chat, coding help, and agent
loops"), which fails as a label twice: it overflows the row, and because such
blurbs are written per model FAMILY rather than per model, several DIFFERENT
models collapse to byte-identical rows. Observed in a live picker with two
identical "Open-weight GPT model for self-hosted reasoning..." rows and two
identical "Kimi multimodal agent model..." rows -- the distinguishing ID was
visible only in the detail line of whichever row happened to be highlighted, so
the list could not be used to pick between them.
providerWizardGenericModelDescription cannot catch these: it rejects vague
descriptions ("live model", "catalog default"), whereas these are specific, just
shared and sentence-shaped. So gate on shape instead -- a display name is short
and few-worded; anything longer is prose and the ID (unique by construction)
makes the better label. Friendly names are still preferred where providers
supply them, so the existing behaviour is unchanged for well-behaved catalogs.
* fix(tui): keep the sidebar open under the / command palette
sidebarAvailable grouped suggestionsActive() with the full-screen overlays
(setup, wizards, pickers), whose stated rationale is that they "take over the
chat column and render at full width". That is not true of the `/` palette:
suggestionOverlay draws it through centerRenderedBlock at
minInt(width, suggestionPaletteMaxWidth), a centred box capped at 76 cells
floating over the chat column.
Treating it as full-screen collapsed the whole layout on every `/`: the sidebar
disappeared, the plan panel dropped out of it and re-rendered inline above the
composer, and the transcript re-wrapped to full width -- a jarring reflow for a
popup, and worst mid-run with a live plan on screen.
It cannot overlap the sidebar either: twoColumnTranscriptView renders the
overlay with width = chatColumnWidth, so the palette is capped at
min(chatColumn, 76) and centred inside the chat column. Mouse hit-testing is
unaffected because sidebarLineAtMouse carries its own suggestionsActive() guard,
so clicks still reach the palette rather than the sidebar rows beneath it.
The genuinely full-width overlays keep suppressing the sidebar, pinned by the
new test alongside the palette case.
---------
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
* fix(tools): give write_stdin's invalid-session errors the same recovery guidance
Follow-up to #749 (write_stdin session-id probing) / #702.
write_stdin had three "no valid live session" error paths with three different
messages and signatures: a missing session_id returned "session_id is required",
a zero/negative/non-integer one returned "session_id must be at least 1", and
only a valid-but-unknown id got the rich UnknownExecSessionError recovery guidance
("do not guess or probe; start a session with exec_command, or use edit_file/
write_file"). So a model that called write_stdin with session_id 0 (the common
"I have no id" placeholder) got a terse error with no way forward, and naming the
minimum nudged it toward trying 1, 2, 3... the exact id-probing #749 suppresses.
The three signatures also meant a model moving 0 to 1 to 2 reset the
repeated-failure streak on each class of mistake.
Route the missing / non-integer / <1 cases through the same UnknownExecSessionError
message. Now every "no live session" mistake gives the same recovery guidance and,
because that message is id-invariant, shares one repeated-failure signature, so any
mix of missing/zero/probing accumulates toward the halt.
Updates TestWriteStdinRequiresPositiveSessionID to cover missing/zero/negative/
non-integer and assert the recovery message. Guardrail signature/halt tests
unchanged.
* test(tools): cover the explicit session_id: nil case for write_stdin
The ambient ZERO_SANDBOXED=1 + ZERO_SANDBOX_BACKEND markers are user-controlled
at an unsandboxed process boundary. Policy could auto-allow an ordinary shell
command (backend reports a native wrapping sandbox) while the runner, seeing the
same markers, returned an unwrapped pass-through plan — the command then ran
directly on the host with no isolation and no prompt.
shellSandboxActive now mirrors the runner: when IsAlreadySandboxed() (the markers
are present, so wrapping is skipped) the sandbox is not the boundary for this
command, so it reports inactive and the shell command takes the normal approval
path instead of auto-allowing. Immediate mitigation per the issue; authenticated
launch provenance is the longer-term fix.
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
* fix(perfbench): grant write tools so mutating tasks measure real edits
The turn benchmark invoked `zero exec` in its default read-only posture,
which exposes no write or shell tools (no edit_file/apply_patch/
write_file/exec_command/bash). So the mutating classes (edit/fix/
refactor) could never apply a change: a run either ground to the turn
ceiling hunting for an edit tool or reported a no-tool blocker, and the
only tasks that 'passed' were ones whose oracle grep matched the stamped
.zero-answer.txt narration rather than a real edit.
This invalidated every mutating-class number in both baselines. A live
trace of fix-07 (a one-line admin->user prefix change) showed the model
calling only read_file/grep/lsp_navigate/update_plan and then stating it
had no file-writing tool. Adding --skip-permissions-unsafe exposes the
full tool set; each task already runs in an isolated throwaway fixture
copy, so there is nothing to protect. With the flag, edit-01/fix-01/
fix-07/refactor-01 go from failing (or false-passing) to 4/4 real
passes, and tool_execution rises from ~0.4% to ~29% of wall as the write
tools are actually exercised.
Adds TestBuildTurnExecArgsGrantsWriteTools pinning the flag as a
correctness contract.
* fix(perfbench): use --auto member and let the oracle judge incomplete exits
Reviewer feedback on the write-tools grant: --skip-permissions-unsafe is
broader than the benchmark needs. It also drops the workspace, network,
and destructive-command guards and auto-retries sandbox-blocked commands
unsandboxed. Switch to --auto member, which grants exactly the write +
sandboxed-shell tools the mutating classes need while keeping those
safeguards.
member-auto's shell is sandboxed, though, so on a host without sandbox
setup the agent's own self-verification (go test/build) can't run and the
turn exits INCOMPLETE even after a correct edit. The runner used to treat
any nonzero exit as failure before consulting the oracle, which would
false-fail those correct edits. Make the oracle authoritative for
oracle-bearing tasks: the stamped test/grep against the actual fixture
files is ground truth, so a correct edit passes regardless of the exit
code. Latency-only tasks have no oracle, so a nonzero exit still fails
them.
Verified with a 4-task glm-5.2 smoke (edit-01/fix-01/fix-07/refactor-01):
4/4 real passes under --auto member. Updates the exec-args test to assert
--auto member is present and --skip-permissions-unsafe is absent, and adds
TestOracleAuthoritativeOnIncompleteExit and
TestNonzeroExitStillFailsLatencyOnly.
* fix(perfbench): reject fixtureless tasks so the write-tools grant can't escape isolation
CodeRabbit and gnanam both flagged the same structural gap: buildTurnExecArgs
grants the write + sandboxed-shell tools to every invocation, but the fixture
isolation was conditional (a task with no workspaceFixture ran in the caller's
cwd). So the grant and the guard could drift apart, and a fixtureless task would
run an agent with write/shell tools in the caller's real repo dir.
Make the isolation a checked precondition: NewTurnExecRunner now rejects a task
with no workspaceFixture before launching zero exec, failing loudly rather than
silently running in cwd. Every shipped task already declares a fixture, so this
only fires on a malformed or newly added one.
Adds TestTurnRunnerRejectsFixturelessTask (rejection is pre-launch: it returns
the fixture error even with a nonexistent binary).
* fix(perfbench): defer to the oracle only for INCOMPLETE (exit 4), not every nonzero exit
anand's follow-up: the previous commit cleared VerifyErr for any nonzero
run_end whenever a VerificationCommand was present, which would also convert
a crash (1), usage error (2), provider failure (3), or interruption (130)
into a passing result whenever a partial edit happened to satisfy the oracle.
Gate the oracle override on exitCode == exitIncomplete (4): the completion
gate's "work maybe done but not signaled" case, the only one where a correct
edit can legitimately exit nonzero (its sandboxed self-verify couldn't run
under --auto member). Every other nonzero exit stays authoritative, so a
partial edit can't launder a crashed or interrupted run into a pass.
The 4-task glm-5.2 smoke stays 4/4 (those tasks exit INCOMPLETE, not some
other code). Adds TestNonIncompleteExitStaysAuthoritative (a correct edit that
reports exit 1 must still fail) and mirrors internal/cli.exitIncomplete as a
local execExitIncomplete constant.
* test(perfbench): pin the exit-4 oracle deferral from both sides; drop dead fixture branch
Follow-ups from a self-review of the exit-4 gating:
- Add TestIncompleteExitStillFailsWhenOracleFails: an INCOMPLETE (exit 4) run
that did NO work must still FAIL, because deferring to the oracle still means
the oracle is consulted. The sibling TestOracleAuthoritativeOnIncompleteExit
applies a correct edit and would pass either way, so without this a regression
that turned exit 4 into a blanket pass would go unnoticed.
- Broaden TestNonIncompleteExitStaysAuthoritative to a table over exit 1/3/130
(crash/provider/interrupt), not just 1, so every named launder-risk code is
covered.
- Tighten the NewTurnExecRunner doc: the verdict gate is the VerificationCommand
(which runs the stamped OracleTest via go test), not OracleTest on its own.
- Drop the now-dead "if WorkspaceFixture != empty" branch: the fixtureless guard
added earlier already guarantees it is set.
No behavior change; the 4-task glm-5.2 smoke stays 4/4.
* feat(tui): add /undo as an alias for /rewind (#698)
/undo was unregistered and fell through to commandUnknown. Add it to the
/rewind command's aliases (the same mechanism /quit, /find, /mcp-status use), so
it dispatches to the existing rewind handler with args intact.
* test(tui): cover the /undo numeric-sequence form (#698 review)
Add a parseCommand("/undo 123") assertion so both the latest and numeric
<sequence> forms of the /rewind contract are exercised through the alias.
---------
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
Token exchange/refresh and the device authorization/poll POSTs validated only
the initial endpoint, then let the http.Client follow a 307/308 that replays the
form body (code, PKCE verifier, refresh_token, client_secret) to an unvalidated
origin.
Add withoutRedirects(): a shallow client copy whose CheckRedirect refuses every
redirect (ErrUnsafeRedirect). Applied at PostToken (covers ExchangeCode, Refresh,
and MCP which delegate to it), RequestDeviceCode, and pollDeviceOnce. The caller's
client is never mutated; legitimate token endpoints that return 200 are unaffected.
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
* docs(readme): note govulncheck/golangci-lint install to GOPATH/bin
The installed binaries land in $GOPATH/bin (default ~/go/bin), which must
be on PATH to run govulncheck directly. Document the export snippet so the
lint/security tooling from the contributor setup actually resolves.
* docs(readme): say "them" instead of singling out govulncheck
golangci-lint installs to the same $GOPATH/bin as govulncheck, so the
PATH note applies to both, not just the one named.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* docs(readme): honor GOBIN and make the PATH snippet idempotent
go install writes to GOBIN when set, with GOPATH/bin as the fallback, and
rerunning the old snippet appended the same directory repeatedly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(tui): cache settled alt-screen transcript
* fix(tui): invalidate settled alt-screen cache on in-place status row updates
setDoctorStatusRow, setSandboxSetupStatusRow, and setCompactStatusRow all
mutate an already-flushed transcript row in place (m.transcript[i] = row)
without invalidating the alt-screen settled cache. Since none of frontier,
width, or row count change on such an update, settleTranscript's rebuild
guard never fires and the View fast path serves the stale cached snapshot -
e.g. the doctor connectivity spinner freezes on its first frame.
Zero altScreenSettledWidth on the in-place path, mirroring the existing
pattern in toggleTranscriptRow, so the next settle rebuilds the cache.
Addresses PR #647 review feedback from Vasanthdev2004.
* fix(tui): invalidate settled transcript cache
* fix(tui): invalidate settled file selection cards
A model that calls write_stdin with no live session probed sequential
session_ids (1, 2, 3, …), each failing, and the run ground on for a long
time before halting. The repeated-failure guard keys on a normalized,
80-char-truncated signature of the tool error, and the old message
"Unknown exec session_id %d" put the varying id inside that prefix, so
every probe produced a fresh signature and the 6x-same-error halt never
fired.
- Rewrite the unknown-session error so stable recovery guidance leads and
the id trails past the signature window: probing now collapses to one
signature and trips the halt, and the model is told how to recover
(start an exec_command, or use the file-edit tools).
- Pin session_id's schema Minimum to 1 so the advertised schema matches
the runtime floor (intArg min 1).
- system_prompt: state that session_id is only ever an id returned by a
still-running exec_command and must never be guessed or probed.
Tests pin the id-invariance of the signature and that distinct-id probing
now halts at the guard's stop threshold, plus the schema floor and the
recovery text. The TUI "Sent input" label on a failed write_stdin
(issue criterion 4) is a separate cosmetic concern in a shared hot path
and is left as a follow-up.
* Add transcript-grounded structured task state
Project existing plan, tool-result, changed-file, verification, and completion events into a deterministic per-run snapshot.
Emit content-free aggregate snapshots to traces. Carry bounded objective context through compaction and ground completion checks only when the projection matches the transcript; mismatches retain transcript-derived behavior and drop stale carried state.
Tested: make fmt-check
Tested: go vet ./...
Tested: go test ./...
Tested: go test -race ./internal/agent ./internal/trace
Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release build
Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
Tested: govulncheck ./... (no vulnerabilities found)
Advisory: pinned golangci-lint reports only unrelated pre-existing findings
Tested: git diff HEAD --check
* Preserve task objective across repeated compaction
Keep the immutable run objective when plan calls have been elided, while admitting mutable task fields only when plan parity still matches the transcript.
Make plan parsing match update_plan rejection semantics, coalesce and cap task-state trace events, rename parity to its plan-only scope, use explicit nilable dependencies, and remove confirmable objective fingerprints from traces.
Tested: make fmt-check
Tested: go vet ./...
Tested: go test ./...
Tested: go test -race ./internal/agent ./internal/trace
Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release build
Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
Tested: govulncheck ./... (no vulnerabilities found)
Advisory: pinned golangci-lint reports only unrelated pre-existing findings
Tested: git diff HEAD --check
* feat(tui): add isolated btw conversations
Add /btw with inline-question support, isolated non-resumable session forks, background main-run routing, and safe return behavior.
Refs #637
* test(tui): cover btw return controls
Preserve drafts when Ctrl+C is pressed during an active BTW run and cover returning to the parent through the documented /btw toggle.
* Address BTW isolation review feedback
* Reject explicit resumes of side sessions
* Harden BTW isolation lifecycle
* perf(agent): preserve prompt cache prefixes
Build the system prompt once per run, fingerprint the exact emitted prompt and ordered tool definitions, and expose the full system-prompt hash in traces.
Add normalized and serialized two-turn regressions covering append-only messages, stable tools, and a stable session cache key.
* fix(tools): stabilize registry iteration order
Return registered tools in name order so provider-visible tool lists and prompt-prefix fingerprints cannot drift with Go map iteration. Add a regression covering the registry ordering contract.
Discovery metadata was merged without the https/loopback endpoint rule that
configured endpoints already pass, letting a malicious issuer downgrade the
authorization/token/device/registration endpoint after config validation.
- Add exported ValidateEndpointURL as the single endpoint-safety rule;
validateTokenEndpoint now delegates to it.
- Backstop in BuildAuthorizationURL (the choke point both the provider and MCP
flows build their browser URL through).
- Validate each discovered endpoint before merge in the provider resolveEndpoints
and validate resolved MCP metadata in both branches; fail closed on insecure.
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
* perf(agent): execution profiles, --exec-profile, bench passthrough, TUI /profile (PR10b+10c)
* fix(execprofile): harden profiles against review findings
- fast escalates on critical-risk mutations, not high: the sandbox marks
every shell command high before command analysis, so a high trigger
spent the one-shot on the first go test of any task
- escalation can now restore the provider-default effort a profile
displaced (PostureEscalation.RestoreDefaultEffort; a plain empty
target means leave untouched)
- TUI /turns while a profile is active pins the budget: disarms the
escalation turn target (mirroring exec's explicit --max-turns rule)
and profile reverts use touched bits instead of value equality, so
explicit choices survive even when they coincide with profile values
- spec-draft runs get the same escalation policy as the main run
instead of the displaced budget with no safety net
- bench validates and canonicalizes --exec-profile before spawning:
an unknown name previously produced an exit-0 report full of
millisecond usage-error walls
- turn summary prints exec-profile alongside mode; zero exec rejects
an inline-empty --exec-profile=; balanced trace label documented and
pinned as deliberate attribution
* fix(execprofile): explicit effort choices disarm the escalation effort restore
An explicit effort set AFTER profile selection could be cleared by a
mid-run escalation (the effort analog of the /turns pin, introduced by
RestoreDefaultEffort): TUI /effort and Ctrl+T now disarm the restore on
a policy clone, and the spec-draft path only arms it when no explicit
--spec-reasoning-effort governs the draft.
* fix(execprofile): address review findings on the profile surfaces
- --use-spec projects away a profile's self-correct knob instead of
silently arming an option the draft runner ignores (the explicit
--self-correct --use-spec combination is already a parse-time error)
- RunTurnBench canonicalizes and validates ExecProfile at the library
boundary, so a direct caller's casing/whitespace cannot fork report
labels and an unknown name fails before anything runs
- reverting a profile whose displaced budget was zero clears
ZERO_MAX_TURNS (SetMaxTurnsEnv ignores zero, so sub-agents would have
kept the removed profile's budget)
- the TUI effort-disarm test fails instead of skipping when the catalog
stops filling low effort
* fix(tui): reconcile an active profile's effort fill on model switch
The fill is per-model, not a session preference: fast selected on a
model without low fills nothing, and switching to a model that supports
it should behave like selecting the profile there; the reverse switch
must not keep sending a level the destination does not support. Both
switch paths (the /model command and the cross-provider picker) now
re-derive the fill, leaving explicitly touched efforts alone and
keeping the escalation's effort restore in step. Also: the revert-env
test asserts key removal via LookupEnv, and applyProfileTurnBudget's
pinned-budget parameter is named and documented as covering mode
presets, not just the flag.
* fix(tui): void profile effort bookkeeping when the model-switch drop erases it
The /model path's pre-existing unsupported-effort drop ran before the
profile reconciliation and left contradictory state behind: a dropped
touched override kept blocking the profile from governing, and a
dropped profile fill left a stale applied value with the effort restore
still armed. The drop itself is load-bearing (the TUI run path forwards
the effort to the provider unfiltered), so instead of preserving a
known-unsupported level, the voided choice now resets the profile's
effort bookkeeping and the reconcile re-derives from scratch. The whole
sequence lives in one ring-parameterized helper driven by the switch
target's authoritative ring, unit-tested against synthetic rings for
both the void-then-refill arc and the supported-override survival.
* fix(tui): only drop an explicit effort when the target ring is authoritative
A nil ring meant both a catalog model with no effort controls and a
live-discovered custom model the catalog cannot vouch for. The drop now
requires an authoritative ring (a resolved catalog entry, whose ring may
legitimately be empty); an unknown ring preserves an explicit preference,
matching the cross-provider picker's behavior, while the profile's own
fill still applies only where support is known.
* fix(perfbench): absolutize the bench binary and make errored tasks first-class
* fix(perfbench): state that errored tasks count as pass-rate failures
* fix(perfbench): align errored-task wording with the actual tier accounting
* chore(perfbench): never commit generated baseline reports
* fix(doctor): report missing npm native binary in wrapper
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix(doctor): preserve JSON output for missing native binary
* fix(doctor): preserve doctor CLI behavior in wrapper fallback
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* style: gofmt npmwrapper doctor fallback tests
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix(doctor): reuse shared Bun recovery helpers in wrapper fallback
Extract bunRecoveryParagraph and related helpers so the doctor missing-binary text path and the generic wrapper bail share the same copy. Add regression tests with ZERO_WRAPPER_SIMULATE_BUN to guard against future drift.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
Extract completion decisions from the agent loop into a feature-gated typed policy with complete, incomplete, and uncertain outcomes. Preserve bounded plan-stall nudges and allow at most one semantic acceptance check for self-correcting runs.
Tested: make build
Tested: make test
Tested: go fmt ./...
Tested: go vet ./...
Tested: make lint
Tested: govulncheck ./...
Note: repository-wide pinned golangci-lint reports 36 pre-existing unrelated findings; internal/agent/... reports 0 issues.
Upgrade the parallel tool planner from SideEffectRead probes to the PR5
CapabilitiesOf contract: EffectReadOnly + ThreadSafe + auto-allowed, with
resource-key conflict boundaries so same-path reads stay sequential.
Mark audited pure reads ThreadSafe (read_file, read_minified_file,
list_directory, glob, grep, skill, web_fetch). Glob/grep use scopedScan
directory keys (nil for workspace-wide "." so scans do not false-conflict).
Tests cover the capability gate, key conflicts, extendParallelRun windows,
and catalog ThreadSafe audit for concurrent-safe reads.
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
* perf(turn-bench): Phase 0 — strengthen oracles so pass rate can't be misread as correctness
The baseline manifest's pass/fail contract had three holes that let a weak
or no-op agent read as a pass:
- edit grep oracles were substring checks: a reworded line (e.g.
fmt.Println("debug: starting") -> fmt.Println("starting up")) passed
`! grep 'debug: starting'`.
- refactor lived in the build tier with a non-positive `go build ./...`,
so a no-op refactor passed.
- the 24 read-only tasks (nav/longproc/longctx/parallel) had no oracle;
a zero-exit only proved the turn ran.
This makes the tiers honest:
- edit/refactor now carry a stamped oracle_test.go compiled by
`go test ./...` — the Go compiler is the structural verifier, so a
no-op refactor, a missing field, or a reworded-but-not-removed line
fails to compile/run. The test is stamped into the fixture copy AFTER
the agent run, so it can't interfere with the agent's own build or be
pre-seen.
- nav gains an answer-oracle: the harness captures the agent's final
answer (.zero-answer.txt) and greps it for determinable facts. Count
tasks (nav-04/05/08) use a structured `count: N` token so the oracle is
tight rather than a loose prose-contains on "0".
- refactor graduates from build to correctness (its oracle is now
positive); nav graduates from latency-only to correctness. The build
tier is empty (buildOnlyClasses: []).
- longproc/longctx/parallel stay permanently latency-only — there is no
deterministic oracle for "report whether the build succeeds" or
"summarize a large file"; documented in MANIFEST.md.
Tier counts: correctness 34 (edit 10 + fix 8 + nav 10 + refactor 6),
build 0, latency 14. Total 48 unchanged.
TurnSchemaVersion 2 -> 3: the result shape is unchanged (only class-list
membership shifts) but correctnessPassRate now means something strictly
stronger, so the bump prevents a v2->v2 cross-version comparison from
misreading the jump as a model improvement.
Prerequisite fix: the mutating fixtures had no go.mod, so `go test ./...`
in the temp copy failed with "cannot find main module". Added go.mod per
fixture (edit/fix/refactor/nav) and moved copyFixture's temp dir one level
below the system temp root — Go ignores go.mod in direct children of the
temp dir (a hijack guard), which would have broken every compiler-backed
oracle. This also fixes the pre-existing fix/refactor oracles, which were
silently broken because the test suite used fake runners that never ran
go test.
Tests: stub-binary gating tests prove each oracle fails the wrong thing
(no-op refactor, missing field, wrong nav answer, reworded debug print) and
passes the right thing (real refactor, added field, correct answer); an
edit-01 test proves the scoped negative grep doesn't false-fail a correct
rename that leaves the doc comment. Aggregation, schema, and unit tests
cover the v3 tier model and the answer-capture helper.
* Address CodeRabbit review on PR #712: tighten oracles + isolation
- nav count oracles (nav-01/04/05/08): anchored line-exact
`^count: N$` with the fixture's exact expected count, so a substring
like "the count: 0" or a wrong count like "count: 3" fails instead
of rubber-stamping. nav-01 added to the structured-count contract.
- stampOracleAndAnswer now errors when a task has an oracle or
verification but no workspace fixture, so verification can't run in
the caller's cwd with the oracle never compiled (false-pass closed).
- copyFixture uses a unique 0700 os.MkdirTemp parent under the temp
root and nests the copy beneath it (grandchild of temp root), so the
Go go.mod hijack guard is satisfied and cleanup removes the whole
parent. Avoids a predictable shared world-readable dir.
- Rejection tests require a non-empty VerifyErr via a shared
assertVerifyFailed helper, proving the failure came from
verification rather than a harness error or a silent non-pass.
- Unify streamJSONExitCode + streamJSONFinalText behind one
parseStreamJSON parser (behavior-preserving; scanner limits and
malformed-event handling now live in one place).
* Address gnanam1990 review on PR #712: close count=0 gameability + stronger oracles
- nav count tasks (nav-04/05/08) had a count=0 ground truth, so an agent
that never opened the workspace and always emitted "count: 0" passed
three correctness tasks -- the exact pass-rate-misread-as-correctness
failure this PR closes. nav-04 now has a real TestGreet (count 1) and
nav-05 a real TODO (count 1); nav-01's file count moves to 5. nav-08
stays at 0 (a real third-party import would need a network fetch and
break the offline suite) but its oracle now requires the answer to name
both stdlib imports (fmt from main.go, testing from main_test.go), so a
blind count:0 or a main.go-only read fails. nav-08's prompt now asks the
agent to enumerate and classify every import, so naming the stdlib
imports is part of a correct answer, not a false-fail.
- refactor-05: stamp a behavioral oracle (TestGreetWrapped) so deleting
both Wrapper and greetWrapped, or stubbing the caller to return "",
fails to compile/run. The negative grep alone passed that wrong edit.
- refactor-04: replace the brittle exact-text shell grep with a stamped
file-reading oracle using a spacing-tolerant regex, so a bare
map[string]int decl under any spacing/:= variant can't dodge it, and
the Stats type must be referenced in main.go.
- edit-05: also assert the "debug: starting" message text is absent, so
a respell onto fmt.Printf / backticks / log.Println / println that
still prints the message fails (the fmt.Println(" check missed those).
- v3 doc comments on ClassSummary / TurnBenchResult /
FormatTurnBenchSummary now describe the v3 tiers (correctness =
edit/fix/nav/refactor, build empty, latency = longproc/longctx/
parallel) instead of the stale v2 model.
- stampOracleAndAnswer failure now mutates the existing outcome instead
of returning a fresh one, so the already-parsed trace and trace issue
survive a stamp error (attribution is preserved, pass/fail unchanged).
- Schema comment provenance: "PR #701" -> neutral "Phase 0 oracle
hardening" (this PR is #712).
- New gating + satisfiable stub tests for refactor-04/05 and edit-05, and
count-oracle zero-guess / inspection-proof tests for nav-04/05/08.
* Fix macOS CI: copyFixture isolation test was slash-sensitive
TestCopyFixtureIsolatesSourceFromMutation compared filepath.Dir(parent)
against os.TempDir() verbatim. On macOS $TMPDIR ends in a trailing slash
("/var/folders/.../T/") while filepath.Dir strips it, so the equality
false-failed even though the parent is genuinely a direct child of the
temp root. Linux (/tmp, no slash) and Windows (no slash in this Go
build) matched by accident.
The production copyFixture nesting is correct on all platforms (the
grandchild copy sits one level below the temp root, satisfying Go's
go.mod hijack guard); only the assertion was slash-sensitive. Normalize
both sides with filepath.Clean.
* Close nav-04/05 blind-count-one gameability (anandh8x review)
nav-04 and nav-05 had a count-only oracle (anchored '^count:1$'). Once the
ground truth became 1, an agent that never inspects the fixture and always
emits 'count: 1' passed both — the blind-count-one surface the prior
non-zero-ground-truth fix opened. Pair the count with a workspace-derived
named fact that proves inspection, mirroring nav-08's fmt+testing:
- nav-04 now also requires 'TestGreet' (the one test function in
main_test.go) — a specific, non-generic name a blind agent can't produce
without reading main.go to learn a greet function exists. Fully closes
the blind-count-one surface.
- nav-05 now also requires 'main.go' (the file holding the one TODO).
main.go is the conventional entrypoint and the most guessable filename, so
this reduces rather than fully closes the surface — a blind 'count: 1, in
main.go' can still pass. Accepted for Phase 0: the blind floor drops below
100% (a bare 'count: 1' fails), so a model still moves the pass rate by
inspecting. MANIFEST.md documents this residual honestly.
Two gating tests per task: RejectsBlindCountOne (bare 'count: 1' now fails)
and, for nav-05, RejectsSubstring (main.go present but unanchored count
still fails — parity with nav-04). Existing accept tests still pass (their
answers already name TestGreet / main.go).
Doc nits also fixed: MANIFEST.md #701 -> #712; refactor-05 removed from the
'no oracleTest' inventory (it now has TestGreetWrapped); the nav-01 named-
fact prose corrected to the three files the oracle actually anchors on;
test comment #701 -> #712.
* fix(sandbox): scrub dynamic credential env vars
* fix(sandbox): tolerate env assignments in configured sensitive keys
A config value mistakenly given as a full assignment (e.g.
"COMPANY_LLM_SECRET=...") would never match the real env key during
scrubbing, silently re-exposing the credential to sandboxed commands.
normalizeSensitiveEnvKeys now keeps only the name part before '=' and
re-trims it, per PR review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): scrub credentials on direct/degraded command plans
directCommandPlan (used when the native sandbox backend is unavailable,
disabled, or not required, including the EnforcementDegraded fallback)
left Env nil whenever spec.Env was nil, so exec.Cmd inherited the full
caller environment unscrubbed. Configured apiKeyEnv credentials and
dynamically named ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_CLIENT_SECRET variables leaked
through that path even though the wrapped sandbox plans already
scrubbed them.
Route direct plans through scrubSensitiveEnv the same way wrapped
plans do, snapshotting os.Environ() when spec.Env is nil so scrubbing
still applies. Adds a regression test covering the degraded-fallback
path with both a configured and a dynamically named secret.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
A user-level MCP server disable is now sticky. The project config
(a cloned repo's ./.zero/config.json) cannot re-enable a server the
user disabled, and cannot disable a server the user explicitly enabled.
The previous merge just assigned base.Disabled = next.Disabled, so a repo
that set disabled:true could silently defeat a user's explicit mcp enable
<server>. The guard is now symmetric via a mergeMCPServer canReenable
flag: once a higher-trust scope has explicitly set the disabled flag, a
lower-trust layer may not override that decision in either direction. Only
the CLI override scope (canReenable=true) may lift a sticky user decision.
The prior disabledSet-before-check ordering bug is also fixed: the
higher-trust scope's prior disabledSet/Disabled is captured before folding
in next's flag, so a project layer can still disable a default-enabled
server (e.g. firecrawl) rather than being silently ignored.
Ports the fix onto main's refactored MCP merge (internal/config/mcp_merge.go
and mergeProjectMCPConfig), which splits project-scope merging from the
general mergeMCPConfig path.
Fixes#512
* fix(hooks): run sessionEnd hooks after Esc/Ctrl+C interrupts
On interrupt, Run returns with ctx already canceled. The deferred
dispatchSessionEnd call passed that same ctx into Hooks.Dispatch, whose
context.WithTimeout derives an already-canceled child context, so the
hook process never actually launches (recorded as timed-out/error in
the audit log). Since most sessions end via interrupt, sessionEnd
hooks were effectively unreliable.
Detach the sessionEnd dispatch from the run context's cancellation
with context.WithoutCancel so the dispatcher's own timeout still
applies without being short-circuited by the run's cancellation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* test(agent): fall back to GOROOT for hook regression
* test(agent): justify GOROOT fallback
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* feat(aimlapi): AI/ML API guided onboarding (top-up + key issuance)
Add the AI/ML API provider integration to the zero CLI: a guided TUI
onboarding sub-flow that takes an existing key or an email top-up and
writes the issued key into the provider profile, attributed to the
Gitlawb rebate partner.
- internal/aimlapi: OpenAI-compatible client, partner-checkout top-up,
key validation, streaming, and endpoint config (Paths A/B/C).
- providercatalog / providermodelcatalog: register the aimlapi provider
with default headers and models.
- tui: aimlapi onboarding screen wired into the provider wizard and
onboarding flow.
Default endpoints point at production (auth/app/api/pay/aimlapi.com);
each is overridable via AIMLAPI_*_URL env vars.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(aimlapi): address review findings in onboarding flow
- topup: use errors.As for the 5xx retry check so a wrapped APIError
still retries instead of aborting a paid checkout.
- onboarding: a Path-A top-up on an email with no account now lands on a
single coherent "key saved, balance not topped up" screen instead of a
green "ready" plus a red error.
- onboarding: an empty amount field is rejected instead of silently
falling through to the $25 default.
- collapse the two identical top-up prompt constants into MsgTopUpPrompt
and drop the dead amountPrompt() branch.
- reuse stdlib maps.Clone instead of a third bespoke header-copy helper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(aimlapi): retry transient poll errors and sharpen amount validation
* fix(aimlapi): retry transient poll errors and surface real amount errors
* docs(aimlapi): document exported client API; drop out-of-scope gitignore entry
Addresses the two CodeRabbit PR checks on #655:
- Add doc comments to the exported aimlapi client API (Client, APIError,
the session/checkout/onboarding types and their methods) and
ParseAmountUSD, to satisfy the docstring-coverage check.
- Remove the unrelated /zero.exe~ .gitignore entry that an earlier
review-fix commit added; it is out of scope for the provider work, so
the PR no longer touches .gitignore.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* fix(aimlapi): render aimlapi row like other recommended providers
* fix(aimlapi): resolve onboarding review findings (Path A funding, base URL, request cancellation)
* fix(aimlapi): validate pasted API keys
* test(aimlapi): clarify pasted key validation
* test(aimlapi): cover key-balance low-balance transition
* fix(aimlapi): reject non-finite top-up amounts
* fix(cli): scope and canonicalize provider headers
* fix(tui): distinguish invalid verification codes
* feat(aimlapi): resume account-bound top-ups safely
* feat(tui): offer top-up for existing AIMLAPI keys
* feat(tui): reuse AIMLAPI env key on first run
* feat(tui): reuse configured AIMLAPI profiles
* test(aimlapi): trim redundant flow coverage
* fix(tui): preserve existing AIMLAPI profile metadata
* fix(tui): clone AIMLAPI headers in env fallback
* fix(aimlapi): address remaining review findings
* fix(aimlapi): harden onboarding lifecycle
* fix(aimlapi): preserve validated checkout context
* fix(aimlapi): harden checkout retry state
* fix(tui): clarify AIMLAPI configured choices
* fix(aimlapi): make checkout retries idempotent
* fix(aimlapi): validate checkout responses
* fix(providers): reconcile aimlapi catalog after rebase
---------
Co-authored-by: Lookoff123 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
* perf(tools): add explicit tool effect metadata
Introduce fail-closed EffectClass and ToolCapabilities on every built-in
tool so a later concurrent read-only batch PR can decide safety from
explicit metadata rather than tool names. Plugin and MCP tools stay
EffectUnknown. No concurrent execution is enabled.
* fix(tools): address review feedback on effect metadata
Harden capability normalization and resource keys before PR6 consumes them:
- Force ThreadSafe=false for every non-ReadOnly effect at read time
- Reject duplicate builtin names in ValidateBuiltinCatalog
- Coerce numeric session ids and accept "session" for process keys
- Strip path/query before userinfo in endpoint host parsing
- Wire apply_patch keys from unified-diff paths + cwd
- Reclassify bash as WorkspaceWrite (one-shot shell mutator)
- Expand regression tests for keys, normalization, and gates
* fix(tools): keep multiFileResourceKeys used by apply_patch keys
Satisfies unused lint after switching apply_patch to applyPatchResourceKeys.
* fix(tools): resolve CodeRabbit residual capability/key issues
- Join apply_patch diff paths under cwd for conflict keys
- Validate constructor-declared capabilities before normalization
- Unify session/process ID key extraction helper
---------
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
Compute a seven-field SHA-256 fingerprint of the cacheable prompt
prefix (base instructions, confirmation policy, project context, skills,
tools, tool schemas, complete) and emit one prefix_hash event per turn
through the trace recorder. The complete hash is the SHA-256 of the
canonical join of the other six, so any sub-component drift is
observable both individually and in aggregate.
The decomposition exists so a downstream observer can detect which
sub-component of the prefix broke cache stability across turns: a
stable complete_prefix hash means the cacheable prefix is byte-
identical, and the sub-hash that changed names the culprit.
No behavior change for untraced runs. For OpenAI, the existing
prompt_cache_key (session ID) is unchanged; the fingerprint is purely
additive observability. The Anthropic cache_control breakpoint work
already in main is not touched.
Co-authored-by: anandh8x <[email protected]>
* feat(tui): Ctrl+X leader chords and emacs menu navigation
Add Ctrl+X leader shortcuts for common slash commands (with Ctrl+X ?
chord map), and Ctrl+P/N previous/next selection in modals and pickers.
* fix(tui): drop Ctrl+X e /edit leader chord
/edit replaces the composer and would discard an in-progress draft; leave
it unbound so leader shortcuts stay draft-preserving.
* fix(tui): consume idle Ctrl+N as a no-op
Reserve Ctrl+N for emacs menu navigation so it never falls through to
remapped global bindings when no selection surface is open.
* docs: drop manual CHANGELOG entries for TUI shortcuts
* fix(tui): stop the composer cursor blinking while typing or unfocused
The composer's cursor blinked on a fixed timer unconditionally, including
mid-keystroke, which made typing feel janky since the cursor's job is to mark
the current position. Gate the existing blink tick on two states instead:
force solid while a keystroke landed within the last 500ms (reusing the
existing lastCharTime tracker), and hide it entirely while the terminal
window is unfocused (new terminalFocused field, driven by tea.FocusMsg/
BlurMsg). Idle and focused keeps the prior blink behavior unchanged.
Also decouples view.ReportFocus from the notifier (it was previously gated on
m.notifier != nil, which is effectively always true in production but left
cursor-focus behavior fragile if that ever changes) so focus reporting is
requested unconditionally.
* fix(tui): apply caret visibility synchronously and in the argument-hint line
- A keypress, focus, or blur now updates composerCursorVisible in its own
message handler instead of waiting for the next 530ms composerBlinkMsg
tick, which could render a typed character caret-less, leave a visible
caret in an unfocused terminal, or keep it hidden after a refocus.
- commandArgumentHintComposerLine takes the caret visibility state instead
of painting its cursor cell unconditionally, so the required-argument
hint path follows the same focus and blink contract as the main
composer renderer.
- New tests assert the state immediately after each message, with no blink
tick in between, and cover the argument-hint render in both states.
* fix(tui): apply the caret state on composer paste
A paste is the same immediate-input transition as a keypress: routePaste now
refreshes lastCharTime and sets the caret visible for both the bracketed
tea.PasteMsg and right-click clipboardReadMsg paths, so a paste right after
the blink phase hid the caret renders solid immediately instead of waiting
for a tick that would toggle off a stale idle state.
* draft(tui): add theme interface and Claude/Codex presets proposal
Introduces the Theme interface alongside the initial specifications and styling models for the Claude (card-based, warm) and Codex (high-density, split-screen cyberpunk) layout presets. Detailed design plans are documented in docs/THEMES.md.
* fix(tui): implement Claude/Codex themes on the existing palette system
theme.go had replaced the tuiTheme/buildTheme/palette architecture every
renderer depends on with a standalone Theme interface using the wrong
lipgloss import, breaking the build and orphaning the existing theme
registry, /theme command, and picker.
Revert theme.go to the working implementation and add claude and codex
as real palette entries in theme_palettes.go, following the file's own
extension pattern. Both pass the WCAG AA contrast and gray-ramp
invariants asserted across the whole registry, and are picked up
automatically by --theme, ZERO_THEME, /theme, and the picker.
Rewrite docs/THEMES.md to describe the actual palette-registry
architecture instead of the removed interface.
* fix(tui): rename Claude/Codex to neutral Dune/Neon, ensure WCAG AA contrast compliance, and add tests
* style(tui): gofmt theme_select_test.go (drop trailing whitespace)
The ubuntu smoke run fails on gofmt -l; this clears the only unformatted
file in the draft so CI goes green.
* test(tui): cover the CLI/env resolution path for the dune and neon presets
TestNewThemePresetsWired only checked lookupTheme and the IsDark
grouping. Add coverage for the actual --theme/ZERO_THEME precedence
path (resolveThemeMode) and confirm applyTheme swaps zeroTheme to each
preset's own palette rather than a built-in fallback.
* fix(tui): raise Dune/Neon palette contrast and fix theme docs
Darken dune's accent, blue, and red tokens so the selected-row caret,
local-model dot, and diff deletion text clear WCAG AA against selBg and
delBg, including after ANSI-256 downsampling. Also correct THEMES.md's
description of bare /theme (it opens a live-preview picker, not a
list), and add the dune/neon names to the ZERO_THEME/--theme tables in
README.md and README_ZH.md.
* fix(tui): keep Dune and Neon readable after ANSI-256 downsampling
- Dune's accent becomes #724028: still AA on selBg and panel in truecolor
(5.46:1 and 7.03:1), and its xterm-256 quantization (#444444) now clears
AA on quantized selBg at 6.47:1 where the previous #7c4712 quantized to
#875f00 at 3.81:1. Blue already survived quantization at 4.67:1.
- Neon's diff bands move to hexes that quantize to distinct green and red
xterm entries (addBg #083c10 -> #005f00, delBg #3c0810 -> #5f0000,
addBgWord #147828 -> #008700, delBgWord #74202e -> #870000) instead of
collapsing to the same grays, while keeping every truecolor invariant.
- New TestExtendedThemeANSI256Contrast quantizes the palette tokens the way
a 256-color terminal does and asserts the Dune selected-row pairs stay AA
and the Neon bands keep their green/red identity and mutual separation.
- docs/THEMES.md is now linked from the Documentation sections of both
READMEs, and the Unreleased changelog inventory says twelve themes and
names dune and neon.
* fix(tui): keep Neon diff content AA after quantization, fix error border
- faintest becomes #74c468: line numbers now quantize to #87d75f, which
clears AA on the xterm-green addBg (#005f00) where the old #58af69
quantized to 2.95:1, while staying dimmer than faint so the gray ramp
stays monotonic.
- addInk becomes #ecffdc, quantizing to #ffffd7 for 4.60:1 on the word
band's #008700 (was 4.29:1). Both rendered diff-content pairs are now
asserted in the ANSI-256 test instead of documented as omissions.
- cardErr becomes #9a4042: 3.01:1 against the panel (2.43:1 before) and
3.65:1 quantized, meeting the 3:1 non-text component threshold, with the
border surface asserted in both renderings.
- docs/THEMES.md no longer claims the extended invariants run against the
whole registry: it now says new palettes must be added to the
per-palette contrast tests or given equivalent coverage.
* feat(cli): show ZERO wordmark on --version
The TUI's empty-state ZERO ascii art gets exposed via a new tui.Wordmark
helper and printed above the version line for `zero -v`/`--version`.
Coloring only applies when stdout is a real TTY and NO_COLOR isn't set,
so redirected or piped output (scripts parsing the version) stays plain.
* fix(release): match --version output by suffix, not exact string
The release smoke check compared zero --version output to an exact
"zero <version>" string, which broke once --version started printing
the wordmark above the version line. Check for a "version: <version>"
suffix instead so the smoke check doesn't couple to the wordmark art.
* fix(cli,tui): keep --version machine-readable off-TTY, drop wordmark color
- When stdout is not a terminal, --version prints exactly "zero <version>"
again: pipes, redirects, command substitutions, and the release smoke
contract all parse that single record, so the banner is a TTY-only
affordance now.
- The TTY path keeps the banner but restores "zero <version>" as the
version record instead of "version: <version>".
- Wordmark renders uncolored: only newModel resolves --theme/ZERO_THEME,
so painting the global dark palette here was unreadable on light
terminals. The terminal's default foreground works on any background.
- smokeVersion goes back to requiring the exact "zero <version>" output
instead of the suffix match that papered over the banner.
* feat(providers): add AI/ML API preset
* fix(providers): relocate aimlapi preset and drop referral header
Addresses the two review asks on #402:
- Move the AI/ML API descriptor out of catalog slot #2 (it sat above the
first-party OpenAI/Anthropic/Google entries) down next to openrouter in
the aggregator cluster. Re-sync expectedCatalogIDs and the
TransportOpenAICompat order-list to match.
- Drop the always-on X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID / Integration-Repo /
Integration-Version attribution headers. There's no partner arrangement
behind the preset, so a non-overridable referral tag on every user's
request isn't something to ship on a community preset. aimlapi now rides
through plain CopyHeaders like every other provider. Removes
HeadersForCatalog (it existed only for this special-case), reverts the
factory and discovery call sites to CopyHeaders, and drops the header
test. The factory/discovery tests now assert the endpoint, auth, and the
user's own custom headers survive while no attribution header is sent.
* fix(providers): address CodeRabbit review on #621
- Document AIMLAPIID for docstring coverage.
- Apply providerio.CopyHeaders for Anthropic and Google provider paths,
matching the OpenAI path introduced for aimlapi header isolation.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix(providers): gofmt factory.go to unblock CI smoke
Remove mixed tab/space indentation in the openai.New options block so
ubuntu-latest fmt-check passes.
---------
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Tumanov <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
* feat(skills): discover shared ~/.agents/skills with multi-root skill loading
Add ~/.agents/skills as a read-only global discovery root after the
primary
Zero skills dir and before plugin roots. Unify runtime and CLI discovery
on
one multi-root path (DiscoveryRoots / LoadFromRoots / GlobalRoots) and
always
register the multi-root skill tool so bare runs and plugin runs share
the
same load surface.
Install/remove/lock still target only the primary Zero skills directory.
Fixes#610
* docs(skills): note lock stays on the primary write root
Document that install/remove/lock target only the primary Zero skills
directory, matching multi-root discovery write-root isolation.
* fix(skills): bubble primary root load errors from LoadFromRoots
Return non-missing failures from the first non-empty skills root so a
broken primary dir is not reported as an empty skill list. Keep fail-open
behavior for optional roots (~/.agents/skills, plugins).
* fix(skills): treat non-directory skills root as error on Windows
Windows maps ENOTDIR to ErrNotExist, so ReadDir on a regular file looked
like a missing skills dir. Reclassify existing non-directories and assert
the portable load behavior in tests.
* Add per-turn tracing and a turn-benchmark harness (Phase 0 baseline)
Introduce an opt-in `internal/trace` package that attributes a run's wall
time to named spans — prompt build, provider connect/queue, generation,
tool queue/execution, permission wait, verification, compaction,
persistence — plus counters for model requests, tool calls, retries,
reconnects, compactions, completion nudges, acceptance checks, model
switches, and input/cached/output tokens. The recorder is nil-safe (a nil
*Recorder is a no-op), so every stamp site can call it unguarded; an
untraced run is byte-identical to today.
The recorder threads into agent.Run via a new `Options.Trace` field and a
single `trace.WithContext` assignment, so the shared providerio seam
(connect around client.Do, queue around OAuth resolve, first token at the
first non-keepalive SSE payload) reaches it through `trace.FromContext`
without any provider-interface change. All instrumentation is opt-in: when
`Options.Trace` is nil the hot path is untouched.
Headless `zero exec` gains `--trace <path>` (and `ZERO_TRACE=<path>`),
writing an agenteval-contract-compatible NDJSON trace (`-` for stderr).
The trace is pure observation; enabling it does not change behavior.
A new per-turn benchmark harness extends `internal/perfbench` (reusing the
existing TaskSet/NumericStats/subprocess runner shapes): `RunTurnBench`
aggregates per-span median/P95 across iterations, ranks the top three
controllable latency sources by share of attributed time, rolls up per
task class, and totals tokens/counts. A checked-in 42-task manifest across
seven classes (nav, edit, fix, refactor, longproc, longctx, parallel) and
local offline fixtures back it, and `make baseline` runs it against the
built `zero`, writing `internal/perfbench/reports/baseline.json`. The
report is machine-specific and regenerated, not hand-edited.
The manifest is JSON rather than YAML to avoid adding a dependency;
per-task verification targets the specific test (`go test -run <name>`)
so fix tasks are independent. Each task is a fresh `zero exec` process, so
iterations are cold-start samples; a warm in-process path is left for
follow-up.
Verified: `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `gofmt -l` clean on touched
files; `go test -race` green for internal/trace, internal/agent,
internal/perfbench, and cmd/zero-perf-bench.
* test(trace): make TestAttributionRatio clock-independent
The test recorded two synthetic 10ms spans with no real delay and asserted
the attribution ratio stayed <= 1.0. On a precise clock (Linux/macOS CI) the
wall is microseconds while attributed is 20ms, so attributed/wall blows past
1.0 and the test failed — even though the ratio legitimately exceeds 1.0
when spans overlap (parallel tool execution). On Windows the coarse timer
masked it, so the failure only surfaced in CI.
Assert the contract instead: attributed is the deterministic sum of span
durations, and the ratio equals attributed/wall (0 when wall is zero). Add a
zero-wall case for the divide-by-zero guard.
* Address review feedback on the per-turn tracer + benchmark harness
Benchmark runner (internal/perfbench):
- A nonzero agent exit code no longer counts as Passed. The runner set
VerifyErr but then fell through to outcome.Passed = true, so a crashed
run could be recorded as a pass. Return before the verification block
when VerifyErr is already set.
- A task now passes only when every iteration passes. The previous
"any iteration passes" rule let a flaky fail hide behind one good run.
- Each invocation copies its workspace fixture to a fresh temp dir and
runs the agent + verifier there, so mutating tasks (edit/fix/refactor)
can't dirty the checked-in fixtures or bleed into the next iteration.
- Trace load failures (missing/malformed trace file) are surfaced as
result warnings via a new TraceIssue field instead of being swallowed.
Tracer (internal/trace):
- Finish freezes the recorder: Counter, addSpan, and the first-event
stamps are dropped after Finish returns, so a snapshot captures exactly
one turn and late stamps can't mutate it.
- WriteText propagates the first write error instead of silently
swallowing sink failures.
Provider seam (internal/providers/providerio):
- FirstTokenAt is stamped only after a payload is accepted as real model
output, not before handle() decides to drop it as an error payload.
Agent loop (internal/agent):
- The compaction counter increments only when the history actually
shrinks, in both the proactive and reactive paths — paid no-ops no
longer inflate the compaction total.
- Document on Options.Trace that a fresh Recorder is required per Run.
CLI (internal/cli/exec):
- Finish the trace at the agent.Run boundary and defer only the
serialization, so the snapshot covers exactly the turn.
- Reject --trace / ZERO_TRACE for spec-draft runs with a clear error
instead of silently accepting and writing nothing.
Manifest + fixtures:
- Strengthen the edit verifiers: rename and value-bump tasks now assert
the old symbol is gone, and the getter task greps the method signature.
- Add the missing testdata/edit fixture (10 edit tasks referenced a
directory that was never committed, so the whole edit class errored
out at run time).
- The manifest test now stats each fixture so a missing dir fails at
load time instead of at every run.
- longproc benchmark keeps Process live across the loop; README code
fence gets a language tag and documents the per-invocation fixture copy.
- Add tests for the tracing wrapper (nil vs wired recorder, OnUsage
forwarding, token aggregation) and the frozen-recorder contract.
* Address review feedback: exclusive-time attribution + wired spans + fix-suite compile
Rewrite the trace attribution model so concurrent/nested spans no longer
double-count. Spans record wall intervals; the recorder derives a parent for
each by interval containment and computes exclusive time (duration minus the
union of its children). AttributedDuration sums only top-level spans; Coverage
is the union of intervals over wall, capped at 1, the honest ">=95%" metric.
Top-latency ranking uses exclusive time so shares sum to ~1 instead of being
inflated by overlapping provider_connect/generation and nested
permission_wait/tool_execution.
Wire the spans that were named but never stamped: verification around the
self-correct verify pass, and StampFirstVisibleEvent on the first forwarded
text event. Drop the tool_queue/process_wait/persistence constants that had no
stamps, and rename the misnamed near-noise prompt_build span to tool_partition.
Trim RequiredEventKeys to events a healthy short run actually emits; move
conditional phases (tools, permission, compaction, verification) to
OptionalEventKeys so a short trace does not false-fail.
Make ReadNDJSON fail loudly on a corrupt file: require a type:trace header,
error on span/counter lines that appear before it, and error when a header
yields no spans or counters.
Fix the blocking fix-suite compile error: Label's %d format verb on a string
tripped go test's vet before any fix task could verify. Make it a runtime
wrong-prefix bug ("admin-" vs "user-") that still type-checks, so each fix
task is independent again.
Manifest: correct refactor-04's stats.go to main.go, reword fix-07 to the
wrong-prefix bug, add a latency-only description (read-only tasks carry no
verification oracle by design), and frame the report README on exclusive time
and coverage.
Tests updated for the occurrence/exclusive/coverage model; trace, perfbench,
and agent green under -race.
* Fix exclusive-time round-trip, identical-interval nesting, and empty-trace parse
Three correctness bugs in the attribution model found by an adversarial review
of the prior commit, all undermining the no-double-count guarantee:
1. exclusive_ms:0 was overwritten with the inclusive Duration on re-parse. A
parent whose children tile its interval legitimately has exclusive time 0;
WriteNDJSON emits exclusive_ms:0, but ReadNDJSON's "<= 0 means missing"
fallback turned that back into the full duration, so every re-parsed trace
re-introduced the double-counting the model exists to prevent (the benchmark
harness, which ranks re-parsed traces, inherits it). Gate the fallback on
key ABSENCE, so a written 0 is preserved.
2. deriveNesting formed a 2-cycle for two spans with identical [start, end]
intervals: the symmetric containment check made each parent the other,
dropping both from top-level and zeroing AttributedDuration. Break the tie
deterministically — strict containment is an unambiguous parent; for
identical intervals, only the lower-indexed span may parent the other, so
one stays top-level.
3. ReadNDJSON returned a valid empty TurnTrace for empty/blank-only input, so a
run that crashed before emitting a trace (or where --trace was not honored)
masqueraded as a clean zero-attribution sample. Empty input now errors, so
the harness records a TraceIssue.
Also: decode counters via json.Number so int64 values above 2^53 round-trip
exactly instead of losing precision through float64; and drop the harness's
own "exclusive <= 0 -> Duration" ranking fallback, which was the same
double-count on the re-parsed path. Added regression tests covering the
zero-exclusive round-trip, the identical-interval nesting, empty-input
rejection, and counter precision.
* perf(turn-bench): split pass/fail into oracle tiers so the pass rate can't be misread as correctness
The turn benchmark counted any exit-0 task as passed, including the 24
read-only tasks (nav/longproc/longctx/parallel) that carry no verification
oracle — so the JSON tasksPassed / "N/M passed" headline could read as a
correctness verdict it never was. Split pass/fail into three oracle tiers:
- correctness (edit grep + fix go test): the only pass rate that can move
with model quality (tasksVerified / tasksPassed / correctnessPassRate)
- build-only (refactor go build): a non-positive oracle, reported as
buildPassRate and excluded from correctnessPassRate; the manifest declares
buildOnlyClasses: ["refactor"]
- latency-only (no oracle): counted in latencyOnlyTasks, never in any pass
rate
NewTurnExecRunner no longer sets Passed=true for tasks with no
verificationCommand, and the summary headline names each tier explicitly so
an exit-0 read-only run cannot inflate a correctness number. Bumps
TurnSchemaVersion to 2. Class breakdown and tier contract documented in
internal/perfbench/MANIFEST.md and reports/README.md.
Also install the trace first-token/visible-event forwarding handlers in
agent.Run whenever options.Trace is set, not only when a UI OnText /
OnReasoning callback is set, so a headless traced run (zero exec --trace)
still captures FirstTokenAt. forwardedVisibleText stays tied to the user
callback so stall-retry semantics are unchanged. Adds a regression
assertion to the existing traced-run test.
* Address CodeRabbit review on 2bfb3406: omitempty + crash visibility
Three findings from CodeRabbit's review of the 3-tier pass-rate fix:
- BuildPassRate dropped its omitempty so an explicit 0.0 (all refactor
tasks fail to compile) is no longer indistinguishable from 'no build
tasks ran' in the JSON. Matches CorrectnessPassRate's always-serialize
behavior, which is the whole point of the tier split: the report
cannot be misread.
- A crashed sample (outcome.Err) now emits a Warning mirroring the
TraceIssue path, so a run that died every iteration can't look like a
normal benchmark with fewer measurements instead of a failure.
- cmd.Run()'s returned error is preserved on the no-run_end path: when
stderr is empty and Run failed (binary missing, exec permission
denied), the actual OS error is reported instead of collapsing to the
generic 'missing terminal run_end event'.
go build/vet/gofmt clean; go test -race green for perfbench/agent/trace.
* Address CodeRabbit re-review: anti-averaging README + fixture-isolation test
Re-review at d0615249 asked for the pass-rate contract to be loud to
downstream consumers and for the fixture-isolation property to be asserted,
not just read from code.
- reports/README.md gains a prominent 'do not average the tier pass rates /
do not report a single pass rate' warning. The schema offers no headline
pass rate on purpose; a consumer must name the tier it is reporting. This
is the durability fix for the misread the tier split exists to prevent.
- turn_bench_test.go gains TestCopyFixtureIsolatesSourceFromMutation: copies
a fixture, mutates the copy, and asserts the source is byte-identical
(and that a file added to the copy never appears in the source). Proves the
'fixtures stay clean across runs' property without needing the binary.
Items the re-review also raised that were already satisfied: the
oracle-presence-over-declared-list precedence is documented on the
BuildOnlyClasses field (taskbench.go), and the PR body already says
'48-task manifest'. The Share->exclusiveShare rename is tracked in #701.
go build/vet/gofmt clean; go test -race green for perfbench.
* feat(cli): wire MCP serve WorkspaceRoot and --add-dir scope
Pass the resolved workspace into mcp.ServeOptions and honor --add-dir so
resources/list and scoped tools can expose extra roots beyond cwd.
* fix(cli): keep lexical serve --add-dir roots for path matching
Use symlink-resolved paths only for deduplication so Scope roots stay
aligned with the un-evaluated WorkspaceRoot MCP serve already passes.
The launcher recording a spawn and the job's Runs counter incrementing
are sequential but distinct steps in the scheduler goroutine
(fireIfIdle's Spawn call, then run's job.incRuns()). The test polled
only the launcher's recorded count, then asserted Runs immediately
with no wait, so a scheduler goroutine preempted between those two
steps could be observed with a stale Runs value under CI load. Wait
for Runs itself instead of assuming the launcher signal implies it.
* fix(windows): retry atomic file renames on Access is denied / Sharing violation
* test(swarm): add unit tests for rename retry and non-retryable errors
* test(swarm): skip TestMailboxRenameRetry on non-Windows platforms
* fix(sandbox): scrub sensitive provider credentials from sandbox env
* refactor(sandbox): unify environment creation and reduce lines of code
* fix(sandbox): forward workspaceRoot through sandboxEnvironment, gate Windows env on backend
* style(sandbox,swarm): remove stray blank lines flagged by gofmt
* refactor(fsutil): extract shared rename retry helper, derive scrub list from provider catalog
Address CodeRabbit review feedback:
- Add internal/fsutil.RenameWithRetry with an injectable rename override and
move the four duplicated renameWithRetry/isWindowsSharingViolation copies
(cron, sessions, sandbox, swarm) onto it. Mailbox keeps its rename test
seam by passing its field through. Add fsutil tests for the Windows retry
and non-retryable paths.
- Remove the orphaned metadata.json.tmp in cron writeJob when the rename
permanently fails, matching the sibling writers.
- Derive scrubSensitiveEnv keys from providercatalog AuthEnvVars plus a
static list of non-catalog secrets, so new providers are scrubbed
automatically. AWS_PROFILE and GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS stay
because they are pointers, not secrets.
* fix(sandbox): deny sandboxed reads of cloud credential stores by default
Address CodeRabbit finding that scrubbed env pointers still left the
underlying credential files readable under the read-all workspace posture:
- Add credentialDenyReadPaths: default profile-level deny-read entries for
~/.aws, ~/.config/gcloud, ~/.azure, and the GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS
target file, wired into both permission profile builders so the seatbelt
and Linux helper backends enforce them. Entries are stat-filtered and a
store nested under a user AllowRead entry is dropped, keeping an explicit
opt-out.
- Keep the defaults out of Policy.DenyRead, whose emptiness gates escalated
execution, and skip Windows so the profile deny list does not flip the
runner off the WRITE_RESTRICTED token path.
- Scrub GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS from the sandbox env; keep AWS_PROFILE
since the deny-read rule on ~/.aws is the real protection and the SDKs
fall back to the default profile regardless.
- Add credential deny path tests, extend the scrub test, relax the profile
test's exact deny count to containment.
* test(cli): pin HOME in sandbox policy golden test
The default credential-store deny-read entries depend on what exists in the
real home directory (the macOS CI image ships ~/.aws), which leaked host
paths into the policy JSON golden comparison. Point HOME at an empty temp
directory so the golden stays hermetic.
* fix(sandbox): protect GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS without a home, retry lock violations
Address CodeRabbit review feedback:
- credentialDenyReadPaths no longer returns early when the home lookup
fails; home-based candidates become conditional and the
GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS target is always considered.
- fsutil.RenameWithRetry also retries ERROR_LOCK_VIOLATION (errno 33),
matching the mcp lock handling; helper renamed to
isWindowsSharingOrLockViolation.
- Extend tests: homeless GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS case and a lock
violation step in the retry sequence.
* fix(sandbox): tighten env-scrub test assertion and add missing secret keys
TestScrubSensitiveEnv only checked an allowlist plus a length count, so a
duplicate allowed key silently replacing a required one would still pass.
Compare the exact expected key/value map instead.
Also add ZERO_WEBSEARCH_API_KEY and ZERO_DAEMON_REMOTE_TOKEN to
scrubSensitiveEnv's sensitiveKeys list: both are real bearer secrets read
from the environment but were missing from the scrub list, leaving them
readable by sandboxed commands when set in the parent shell.
* fix(tools): classify silent wrapped Windows command failures as sandbox denials
A Windows restricted-token sandbox failure is often completely silent:
when the token cannot open the target executable or its DLLs (or an
MSYS runtime dies during init), the command exits nonzero having
written zero bytes to stdout and stderr. The existing detection is
keyword-based, so these failures were never marked as sandbox denials,
the agent loop never offered the unsandboxed-retry prompt, and the
model was left staring at 'Command completed with no output' until it
gave up.
Treat a wrapped command on the Windows restricted-token or elevated
backend that exits nonzero with completely empty output as a likely
sandbox denial. A command that legitimately fails silently (findstr
with no match, for example) now costs one extra approval prompt; the
inverse misclassification silently strands the session, so the trade
goes to prompting.
* test(tools): cover the elevated Windows backend in the silent-denial test
The heuristic treats windows-elevated identically to
windows-restricted-token, but only the latter was exercised.
Parameterize the silent-failure test over both backends.
* fix(keyring): pass generic password via stdin on macOS
Pass the generic password secret to security add-generic-password via stdin instead of passing it as a command-line argument. This prevents the secret from leaking to the local process list (visible via ps) and aligns the macOS keyring implementation with the Linux secret-tool implementation.
* fix(keyring): pipe secret twice for macOS security password+retype prompt
The macOS security add-generic-password command prompts for both a password and a retype confirmation when -w has no trailing value. The previous stdin approach only piped the secret once, causing a passwords don't match failure. Write the secret twice separated by newlines to satisfy both prompts.
* fix(keyring): reject multiline secrets on macOS instead of corrupting them
Addresses jatmn's review:
- security's -w password+retype prompt reads stdin line by line, so a
secret containing its own newline can't be distinguished from the
password/retype separator: the first line read back would silently
truncate the stored value. Set now rejects a secret containing \r or
\n on darwin before invoking security, rather than storing a
corrupted value. Linux's secret-tool has no such restriction (reads
the whole stdin payload), so it is unaffected.
- Updated the package doc comment, which still described the old
argv-based (process-list-exposed) macOS path this PR replaced.
Added TestKeyringSetRejectsMultilineSecretOnDarwin and
TestKeyringSetAllowsMultilineSecretOnLinux.
* fix(keyring): drive security -i for macOS Set instead of the -w prompt
The trailing -w prompt uses getpass(3), which reads from /dev/tty whenever
the process has a controlling terminal, so the piped secret was ignored in
any interactive session, and getpass's small fixed buffer would truncate
long secrets (like the base64 OAuth blob) when the fallback did engage.
Interactive mode reads whole commands from stdin, keeping argv at just -i.
Arguments are quoted for SecurityTool's split_line parser (backslash and
double quote escaped inside double quotes). The parser is line-based with a
4096-byte buffer, so Set rejects newlines and oversized payloads up front
rather than corrupting the stored value.
* feat(tui): press up to edit queued messages
Pressing up with a message queued pops it back into the composer for
editing, taking priority over history recall. While a message is queued
the empty composer shows a hint placeholder. A second prompt queued
during the same run now stacks under the first instead of replacing it.
* refactor(tui): remove openclaude references from queued_message comments
Removing the WRITE_RESTRICTED flag in #612 made the restricted-SID check
apply to reads as well as writes. Default Windows DACLs grant
BUILTIN\Users rather than any SID in the token's restricted list
(random capability SIDs, logon SID, Everyone), so the sandboxed process
could no longer open any executable or non-KnownDlls DLL: every spawned
command failed with exit 1 and no output, including cmd builtins'
children (gh, git, where.exe). The existing
TestWindowsRestrictedTokenNestedPipeCapture smoke test reproduces the
regression.
Restore WRITE_RESTRICTED, but only when the permission profile has no
DenyRead paths. The flag makes the kernel skip restricted-SID deny ACEs
for reads, which is exactly the DenyRead bypass #612 fixed, so profiles
that configure DenyRead keep the fully restricted token and trade spawn
capability for read-deny enforcement. DenyRead is empty by default, so
the common case regains a working sandbox while #612's guarantee holds
for the profiles that rely on it.
* fix(sandbox): stop blocking git fetch/commit/add by unblocking .git writes
The sandbox denied every write under .git for shell-executed commands,
so any git operation that touches its own metadata (fetch, commit, add,
pull, merge, stash) failed under the default sandbox. Narrow the block
to .git/hooks (auto-executing scripts) and .git/config (remote URLs,
credential.helper, core.hooksPath), the two subpaths that are actually
dangerous to write; the rest of .git stays writable to git subprocesses
since those writes go through git's own invariants.
The app-level auto-allow gate for direct file-tool writes (write_file,
edit_file, apply_patch) is unaffected and still treats all of .git as
protected, since hand-editing git's internals bypasses those invariants.
* test(cli): normalize Windows path separators in sandbox policy golden
The sandbox policy golden is shared across platforms, but readOnlySubpaths
carve-outs are built with filepath.Join and render as backslash paths on
Windows. normalizePortableJSONRootString only converted a bare backslash, so
the Windows smoke run diverged from the forward-slash golden. Replace all
backslashes with slashes during normalization so the shared golden passes on
every runner.
* fix(agent): raise default and deep-mode turn budgets
The default per-run tool-turn budget of 50 was still too low for larger
multi-step tasks that span several files: agents hit the ceiling and
stopped with a "remaining work" summary instead of finishing. Raise the
default from 50 to 80.
The "deep" preset also carried MaxTurns: 50, identical to the default, so
its "larger turn budget" promise no longer held on the turn-budget axis.
Raise it to 160 so deep runs get a genuinely larger budget again.
Users can still override per-session with /turns or --max-turns (bounded
by MaxTurnsCeiling).
* test(cli): expect deep-mode MaxTurns=160 after budget raise
* fix(config): surface unknown/typo'd config fields instead of silently dropping them
json.Unmarshal ignores unknown JSON keys by default, so typos such as
"maxTurn" or "sandbox.network" were silently discarded: the user
believed a setting (e.g. a sandbox hardening option) was active while
Zero used its default. Worse, "zero doctor" reported
"config files parsed and validated successfully" even when fields were dropped.
Add a reflection-based unknown-field scanner
(internal/config/unknownfields.go) that walks the FileConfig JSON schema
and recurses into nested objects, arrays, and maps, reporting each
unknown key with its full JSON path and a near-match suggestion
("did you mean 'maxTurns'?"). The two legacy top-level aliases
(mcpServers, mcp_servers) are allowlisted so they are not flagged,
and detection only inspects json tags, so a config written by a newer
Zero with new fields still loads and merges normally — validate/doctor
just surface the unknown keys as issues rather than rejecting the file.
Wire the scanner into ValidateBytes/ValidateFile, which zero doctor
already uses, so doctor now reports the unknown fields instead of
"validation passed".
Add tests for unknown top-level keys, unknown nested keys, unknown
keys inside a provider entry, and that the legacy aliases are not
flagged.
Fixes#644
* fix(config): address review comments on unknown-field scanner
- Treat JSON keys case-insensitively (matching encoding/json), so a
valid case variant such as "MaxTurns" is not falsely flagged as
unknown. Canonical (correct-case) names are kept only for the
"did you mean" hint.
- Allowlist ProviderProfile's legacy snake_case keys (providerKind,
catalog_id, base_url, api_key, ...) that ProviderProfile.UnmarshalJSON
accepts but which are not fields on the Go type, so existing
configs using them are not false-positive'd in zero doctor.
- Make the near-match suggestion deterministic: sort candidates before
picking so an edit-distance tie always resolves to the same lexical
winner (map-range order was nondeterministic and could flake).
- Make the unknown-field test assertions order-independent (search by
FieldPath instead of assuming issues[0]).
Add regression coverage for legacy provider keys and valid case
variants not being flagged.
* fix(lock): prevent POSIX lock file overwrite and leak on Windows/Unix
During lock reclamation, reclaiming a suspected stale lock renames the file aside and renames it back if not stale. On POSIX systems, the rename back silently overwrites any new lock file created in the gap. On Windows, it fails to rename back and leaks the stale file.
Introduce a cross-platform restoreLockFile helper:
- On POSIX: Use os.Link to link the file back (which atomic-fails if the target already exists), then remove the temporary link.
- On Windows: Use os.Rename (which safely fails if the target exists).
If restoring fails, delete the temporary file immediately to prevent leaks.
* fix(lockutil): fix Windows build by using golang.org/x/sys/windows
Addresses jatmn's follow-up review: the required Windows smoke check was
failing because syscall.MoveFileEx is not exported by the standard
library's syscall package on this platform, so internal/lockutil (and
everything importing it: cron, daemon, hooks, oauth) failed to compile
on Windows.
Switched to golang.org/x/sys/windows, which does export MoveFileEx with
the same signature, already a direct module dependency. Verified on a
real Windows machine that the no-flags call still fails with
ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS when the destination exists, and that this
satisfies errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist), which cron/daemon/hooks/oauth's
reclaim paths all depend on to decide whether the sidelined lock was
genuinely superseded (safe to discard) versus some other, unrelated
failure (must be preserved).
TestRestoreLockFile already covered both the successful-restore and
fail-when-target-exists cases; it now passes on Windows.
* fix(lockutil): route lock file deletes through RemoveLockFile with Windows retry loop
* fix(lockutil): close restore split-brain and unify RemoveLockFile
RestoreLockFile could fail with errors other than os.ErrExist (hardlink-
incapable filesystems such as FAT or some FUSE/network mounts, ENOSPC,
Windows sharing violations). Callers only clean up on os.ErrExist, so any
other failure left the lock path missing with the live holder's lock
stranded in the sidelined file; the next O_EXCL create then succeeded and
two processes held the lock. RestoreLockFile now falls back to an O_EXCL
copy in that case, which preserves the no-overwrite guarantee, and a
successful restore with a failed sidelined-file cleanup reports nil
instead of a failed restore.
RemoveLockFile now has one cross-platform contract: removing an already
missing file reports nil on POSIX too, matching Windows, and daemon
release() drops its caller-side ErrNotExist filter.
Tests: TestRestoreByCopy and TestRemoveLockFile run on all platforms;
Windows-tagged tests pin the ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS mapping to os.ErrExist
and exercise the RemoveLockFile retry loop to success and to bounded
exhaustion. The package doc comment documents the shared contract.
* refactor(swarm): extract reclaimStaleLock to mirror other lock callers
The stale-lock reclaim in acquireLock was inline, so its restore path
(a holder rotated a fresh lock in the gap between the stale check and
the rename) could not be regression-tested the way cron, daemon, hooks,
and oauth test theirs. Extract it into reclaimStaleLock with the same
shape as the other callers, behavior unchanged, and add the mirrored
regression test.
* test(hooks,oauth): add stale lock reclaim regression tests
Mirror the cron reclaim test in the two packages that lacked coverage
for reclaimStaleLock: a genuinely stale lock is reclaimed, a fresh lock
(reacquired in the gap) is restored intact rather than stolen, and a
missing lock reports no reclaim. daemon already had equivalent tests in
lock_test.go.
* fix(lock): fail closed and drop sidelined file when restore fails
A non-os.ErrExist error from RestoreLockFile means both the no-replace
restore and its O_EXCL copy fallback failed, so the lock path may be
missing while the sidelined holder is live. Callers previously swallowed
that error and their next O_EXCL create would succeed, breaking mutual
exclusion. reclaimStaleLock in cron, daemon, hooks, oauth, and swarm now
returns an error for that case and the acquire loops fail closed instead
of re-acquiring.
The sidelined .stale.* file is now removed on every restore failure, not
only os.ErrExist: once the restore has failed it has no protocol
function (release only consults the lock path), so keeping it only
leaked files.
Also replace the numeric errno literals in the Windows RemoveLockFile
retry loop with windows.ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION and
windows.ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED.
* refactor(lockutil): extract shared ReclaimStaleLock helper
Consolidate the duplicated reclaimStaleLock functions from cron, hooks,
oauth, and swarm into lockutil.ReclaimStaleLock. Each caller now passes
an mtime-based isLive predicate to the shared helper, which owns the
rename-aside, restore-if-live, cleanup, ErrExist handling, and
fail-closed error propagation.
Daemon keeps its own reclaimStaleLock because it uses PID-based liveness
(different predicate shape and no staleAfter duration).
The per-package reclaim regression tests are removed since the shared
helper is thoroughly tested in lockutil/reclaim_test.go (dead lock
reclaimed, live lock restored, missing lock, fail-closed on restore
error, sidelined file dropped when new holder wins).
* fix(lockutil): propagate non-contention rename failures from ReclaimStaleLock
A rename-aside failure that is not a lost race previously mapped to the
benign lost-race result, so acquirers spun until their deadline and
reported a timeout instead of the real failure. Keep only a missing
source and the Windows sharing-violation/access-denied contention
errnos benign (neither Windows errno maps to os.ErrExist, and
ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION does not map to os.ErrPermission either, so the
classification compares raw errnos) and return everything else so
callers fail closed.
Also convert daemon's private reclaimStaleLock to the shared helper so
it picks up the same contract, and reword the caller error messages
from "restore reclaimed" to "reclaim stale" since the error can now
come from the rename aside as well.
* fix(lockutil): publish restore-by-copy atomically and honor lost mailbox reclaims
restoreByCopy created the destination lock file empty before copying into
it, so a crash mid-copy could leave a live holder's lock permanently
unrepresented at the lock path. Stage the copy under a private name and
publish it with the platform's no-replace primitive instead.
swarm's mailbox lock discarded the reclaimed boolean and always retried
immediately, so a lost reclaim race (or Windows sharing-violation
contention) could hot-spin past the lock timeout instead of falling
through to the bounded wait like the other lock callers.
* fix(lockutil): shrink the reclaim/restore window with a fast replacing rename
Restoring a lock that turned out live went through the no-replace path
(plus its copy fallback on some failures) first, which is slow enough
that a fourth process's unrelated O_EXCL create could win lockPath while
it was absent for the whole call. RestoreLockFile's no-replace contract
would then report os.ErrExist and the caller silently dropped the
sidelined lock, orphaning the still-running original holder.
restoreLiveLock now tries a single replacing rename straight back first,
falling back to the no-replace path only if that fails. It shrinks the
window from a whole restore call down to roughly one syscall; it does
not close it, since the fast path can silently overwrite a competing
lock rather than detect it. A fully race-free reclaim would need an
OS-level advisory lock checked non-destructively instead of by moving
the file, which is a larger change than this.
* docs: add Go code quality & security checks and bump Go version to 1.26+
* docs: address CodeRabbit review comments and use pinned versions and Go 1.26.5+
* docs: remove trailing blank lines at end of AGENTS.md
* docs: add missing /v2/ segment to golangci-lint install path
The go install command pointed at the v1 module path
(golangci-lint/cmd/golangci-lint), which does not resolve for
v2.12.2. The go run invocation earlier in the same section already
had the correct v2 path.
* docs: trim AGENTS.md below 8 KiB guideline and clean up README cross-compile header
* docs: address CodeRabbit review feedback on extending guide
When writing credentials or generating user secrets, files are written using a write-to-temp-then-rename pattern. However, neither package called Sync (fsync) on the temporary file before closing and renaming. If a crash or power failure occurred shortly after write, this could result in truncated or 0-byte key/credential files on disk.
Add tmp.Sync() calls to writeNewSecretFile and Store.write to guarantee durability.
* fix(plugins): resolve relative executable paths against plugin root
When a plugin registers a tool or a hook command as a relative path (e.g. ./tools/helper.sh), running it in the caller's workspace CWD allows local execution hijacking by placing a malicious script at that path in the untrusted workspace. Update expandPluginRootPath to resolve relative executable paths containing path separators to absolute paths inside the plugin's install directory.
* fix(plugins): remove ineffectual permission initializer in toolSafety
The initial assignment to permission was always overwritten by one of
the switch arms below it, including a case that just reassigned the
same PermissionPrompt value the initializer already held. Flagged by
ineffassign in CI.
* feat(npm): ship the native binary as platform optionalDependencies
Replace the postinstall downloader with Codex-style platform packages:
suffixed versions of @gitlawb/zero (X.Y.Z-<platform>-<arch>) carrying the
binary, sandbox helpers, and the vendored agent-browser/tuistory tree,
referenced from the wrapper via npm: aliases in optionalDependencies.
The published wrapper has no lifecycle scripts and no dependencies, so
npm/Bun/pnpm installs are silent: no EBADENGINE from agent-browser's
node>=24 engines pin, no allow-scripts warnings, no network outside the
npm registry. The old downloader remains as a checksum-verified first-run
fallback for --omit=optional installs and unsupported platforms.
scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs assembles the payloads from the
release archives at publish time: it materializes npm's symlink .bin
shims into regular sh shims (npm pack silently drops symlinks) and prunes
agent-browser's other-platform binaries (~65 MB per package). The publish
job uploads platform versions first under --tag platform, asserts the
latest dist-tag survived (platform versions are semver prereleases of the
wrapper version), then publishes the wrapper.
See docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md for the architecture and publishing rules.
* fix(npm): address PR review — LICENSE in payloads, dist-tag lookup guard, accurate fallback and platform docs
- Ship the repo LICENSE in both the wrapper and platform payloads (npm only
includes a license file physically present in the packed directory).
- Guard the platform-publish dist-tag lookup with || true so a transient
npm view failure (or a bootstrap publish with no latest tag) cannot abort
the job between the platform and wrapper publishes.
- Gate the wrapper's fallback downloader on the release matrix so platforms
with no asset (windows-arm64 and unknown combos) skip the spawn instead of
attempting it every run; keep deliberate retry-on-failure for supported
platforms and say so honestly in the notice and docs.
- Correct Windows support wording everywhere: x64 only, ARM runs under
emulation (README, README_ZH, INSTALL.md incl. the release-target list).
Interactive TUI always has a session ID, so every completion request
forwarded OpenAI's prompt_cache_key. Strict openai-compatible gateways
(e.g. NVIDIA NIM) reject unknown fields with a 400, while plain zero
exec usually has no session and omits the field.
Disable prompt_cache_key for ProviderKindOpenAICompatible; keep it for
official OpenAI. ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY remains a global kill
switch.
Fixes#624
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
When executing a security-critical beforeTool hook, if the hook command fails to launch (e.g. binary not found, missing execute permission), it previously failed open and let tool execution proceed.
Update classifyResult to return AuditBlocked, true when a launch error occurs on a beforeTool hook, enforcing a fail-closed policy. Observational afterTool hooks still fail open.
Inside fireJob, the Mutate transaction callback previously returned the stale in-memory job copy (read at tick start). This clobbered any concurrent updates made to the job (such asExpr, Prompt, or Cwd edits) while the job was running.
Update the callback to apply schedule and status changes directly onto the fresh current job loaded from disk, and return current.
When a run is completed or canceled (agentResponseMsg) while an askUser prompt is pending, or when a stale/superseded askUserRequestMsg is received, the answer callback is now invoked with nil. This unblocks the waiting agent loop goroutine, preventing goroutine leaks and runner hangs.
When parsing CLI flags, positional prompt text placed immediately after flags requiring values (e.g. --auto, --notify, --max-turns) would be greedily consumed as their value by nextFlagValue. Refine nextFlagValue to validate choices/types (autonomy levels, notify modes, integers) to detect invalid values early and fail validation rather than eating positional arguments.
When falling back from a failed PTY start to a pipe execution, the command attributes are reset. Previously, resetExecCommandForPipeFallback set command.SysProcAttr = nil, which stripped custom settings like Windows CmdLine quoting. Update the fallback logic to restore the original SysProcAttr instance, and add TestStartExecProcessPTYFallbackPreservesSysProcAttr to cover.
Using unqualified taskkill / taskkill.exe commands on Windows can allow binary hijacking under certain conditions. Update all process termination callers on Windows to resolve the absolute path to taskkill.exe under System32 (referencing SystemRoot/windir environment variables, falling back to C:\Windows).
On Windows, a concurrent holder's os.Remove leaves the lock file in a 'delete pending' state, causing a racing O_EXCL create to fail with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (mapped to os.ErrPermission). Treat os.ErrPermission as lock contention / already-existing lock, matching the collision checks in cron, hooks, oauth, and securefile.
* fix(securefile): reclaim stale lock files to prevent permanent DOS
When createSecretFile fails to acquire the O_EXCL lock because it already exists, check if the file is stale (older than 10 seconds). If so, atomically reclaim it via a rename-aside check, preventing a permanent DOS after abrupt process crashes. Update the lock file to write and verify process-specific tokens, and add TestCreateSecretFileReclaimsStaleLock to cover the stale reclaim flow.
* style(securefile): gofmt const block alignment
truncateHint slices string hints using a raw byte offset (s[:max]), which can split multi-byte UTF-8 characters (like CJK characters, emojis, or accents) in half and produce invalid UTF-8 sequences. Update it to count and slice by runes to guarantee valid UTF-8, and add a unit test TestToolTitleTruncateHintRuneSafe to verify.
Currently, both gitBranchForPrompt (agent) and gitBranch (tui) check for a .git entry directly inside the current working directory. When starting Zero in nested folders/subdirectories of a repository, the check fails and the branch segment is omitted.
Export findProjectGitRoot as FindProjectGitRoot in agent package, and use it in both functions to resolve the correct repository root before checking HEAD and resolving the branch name. Also resolve relative worktree gitdirs relative to the repository root.
On Windows, creating restricted tokens with windowsWriteRestricted (0x08) instructs the kernel to skip checking the restricted SIDs list for read operations. This bypasses DenyRead path policies on NTFS. Remove the flag to enforce restricted SID constraints on both read and write operations, and add integration test assertions to verify that DenyRead paths are correctly blocked.
* fix(agent): scope self-reported incompletion to sentences about the current objective
The detector matched inability stems anywhere in the final message, so a
conversational recap of a past exchange ("You asked if I could work
autonomously ... so I couldn't actually do it at the time") downgraded a
completed run to INCOMPLETE. Match per sentence instead, drop quoted spans,
and skip sentences that retell a past exchange. The real transcript is now a
regression test, and genuine admissions still fire, both present tense and
past tense about the current task.
* feat(exec): add --no-completion-gate for conversational callers
A chat frontend driving zero exec has an operator present, so a final
message that hands the turn back ("the sandbox blocks network egress,
approve it and I'll continue") is a complete conversational answer, not an
unfinished task. The headless completion gate still stamped such runs
INCOMPLETE (exit 4) on the honest inability phrasing, and no phrase
heuristic can fix that case because the admission is true. The new flag
maps to RequireCompletionSignal=false so conversational callers can opt
out. Default behavior is unchanged.
* fix(exec): address review findings on quote stripping and --use-spec combination
stripQuoted now removes only balanced quoted spans: an opening delimiter
that never closes is restored verbatim, so a stray quote cannot swallow
the rest of the message and hide a genuine admission from the detector.
Regression tests cover dangling straight, curly, and backtick delimiters.
--no-completion-gate combined with --use-spec is now rejected at parse
time, mirroring the --self-correct check: the spec-draft path never
consults the completion gate, so the flag would be silently ignored.
* feat(workspacetrust): add exact-match trust store for project config gating
* feat(hooks): add ExcludeProject option to LoadConfig
* feat(plugins): add ExcludeProject option to Load
* feat(cli): gate project hooks and plugins behind workspace trust
Trust check lives inside newHookDispatcherWithExtra and activatePlugins
(fail-closed by construction); trustRoot is the original launch dir so a
--worktree run inherits the source repo's trust. Callers OR the skip
reports and emit one combined stderr notice.
* feat(cli): add zero trust command (trust/list/remove)
* fix(review): key spec-draft trust on the original launch dir; cover trust CLI edge branches
Spec-draft runs (zero exec --use-spec --worktree) passed the reassigned
worktree path as trustRoot, dropping a trusted repo's project hooks
(fail-closed, but breaks worktree-inheritance). Thread the captured
pre-worktree trustRoot into execSpecDraftRun. Add tests for the trust
'remove' too-many-args and --help branches, and a resolveTrust comment
noting the per-chokepoint check must not be hoisted to callers.
* test(cli): end-to-end trust-gate coverage through agent.Run and exec --worktree
Drives the real agent loop with a fake tool-calling provider so a project
beforeTool hook actually fires (or is gated away) through production code:
gate blocks a tool call via agent.Run, and --worktree / --use-spec --worktree
key trust on the original launch dir. All three are load-bearing (RED when the
gate or the trustRoot threading regresses).
* style(cli): gofmt struct alignment in exec_spec.go
* fix(workspacetrust): compare stored trust entries literally, no symlink re-resolution
External adversarial review (codex) found a false positive: IsTrusted
re-normalized stored entries on every check (Abs+EvalSymlinks), so a trusted
path later replaced by a symlink to attacker content re-resolved to the new
target and matched. Stored entries are already canonical (normalized once at
Trust time); compare them as literals and only normalize the incoming query.
Add a regression test for the symlink-retarget case.
* feat(mcp): gate project-scoped MCP servers behind workspace trust
Closes the P0 an external adversarial review (codex) found: project
./.zero/config.json stdio MCP servers spawned before the hook/plugin gate,
an ungated arbitrary-execution path that could also self-trust the workspace.
Add ExcludeProject to config.ResolveMCP (skips the project layer) and thread a
fail-closed trust check into every MCP spawn site (exec, TUI setup+refresh,
mcp tools list, mcp check); reporting sites stay ungated. Verified the sole
server-command exec (mcp/client.go) is reachable only through the now-gated
RegisterTools paths.
* test(cli): cover default-mode beforeTool firing through the trust gate
Assert a project beforeTool hook fires in the default auto and ask permission
modes (not only under unsafe), and is blocked when the workspace is untrusted,
so the gate is verified in the mode a normal run actually uses.
* docs(cli): note MCP servers in zero trust help text and doc comment
The gate covers project hooks, plugins, and MCP servers, but the help string and
runTrust doc comment listed only hooks and plugins.
* test(cli): make workspace-trust tests portable on macOS and Windows
setTrustConfigRoot set HOME on darwin, but config.UserConfigDir is XDG-first
there (=$HOME/.config), so tests wrote trust.json and user hooks.json where the
code never read them; set XDG_CONFIG_HOME on every non-Windows platform instead.
writeMarkerHook shells out to /bin/sh, absent on Windows, so its trusted-case
marker never appeared; skip it there like writeMarkerHookScript already does.
TestRunTrustAddThenList compared `trust list` output (canonicalized via
EvalSymlinks) against the raw cwd, which diverges on the Windows runner's 8.3
short names (RUNNER~1 -> runneradmin); compare the resolved path, and add
TestRunTrustListShowsCanonicalPath to exercise that via a symlink on any platform.
* feat(cli): surface the project MCP skip in the workspace-trust notice
Project MCP servers were dropped silently in an untrusted workspace: the trust
notice covered hooks and plugins but not MCP, and app.go discarded the
resolveTrust error. registerMCPToolsForWorkspace now returns a trustSkip, gated
on a new projectMCPConfigExists check plus the previously-dropped store-read
error, and emitTrustNotice is variadic so the exec, spec-draft, interactive, and
`mcp tools list` paths all fold in the MCP skip.
The skip drives the notice only; the gate stays on resolveTrust/excludeProject,
so a trusted workspace is unaffected and an untrusted one still fails closed.
* fix(cli): print zero trust --help to stdout with a success exit
zero trust -h/--help/help routed usage to stderr with the usage exit code, unlike
every other subcommand (mcp, sandbox, skills, cron, ...) which prints help to
stdout and returns success. Align it; the unknown-subcommand path still writes to
stderr with the usage exit code.
* fix(cli): gate oauth MCP login and surface mcp-check trust notice
Two project-scoped MCP activation sites were left outside the workspace
trust gate.
zero mcp oauth login loaded a project-defined OAuth server from an
untrusted workspace and ran the full discovery/registration/token-exchange
flow against its configured URL. Gate resolveOAuthServer with resolveTrust
so an untrusted clone's ./.zero/config.json OAuth server is dropped before
login, and emit the same one-line trust notice the other spawn sites use.
zero mcp check already gated the project layer but discarded the trust-check
result and never emitted the notice, so a gated project server read as a
bare "not configured". Emit the notice on the not-found branch.
The three remaining ungated resolveMCPConfig(cwd, false) sites (backends
doctor/snapshot and the extensions listing) are enumeration-only and stay
ungated.
* test(cli): adapt MCP startup-skip tests to two-arg resolveMCPConfig
---------
Co-authored-by: Kevin Codex <[email protected]>
* fix(update): clearer error on unsupported release platform (android/termux)
zero update/upgrade fails on Android/Termux because GOOS "android" has
no published release archive. Replace the generic "unsupported release
platform: android" error with a clear, actionable message explaining
that no release builds are published for the platform, listing the
supported platforms, and suggesting a rebuild from source. The command
still fails gracefully (clean stderr message, exit 1, no panic/stack
trace) rather than crashing.
Fixes#598
* fix(update): address review feedback on unsupported-platform error
- Condense the explanatory comment for the unsupported GOOS branch.
- Replace the Unicode em dash with plain ASCII punctuation.
- Align internal/release.ReleasePlatform's error message with the
updater's so both flows give identical guidance.
* fix(update): npm-based upgrade guidance for platforms without release assets
Address review feedback: the previous message implied Android/Termux was an unsupported platform and told users to rebuild from source. Termux runs zero fine via the npm wrapper; it just has no self-updating release archive. Point users at 'npm update -g @gitlawb/zero', the documented Termux install/upgrade path, instead.
* fix(modelregistry): reject oversized models.dev cache responses
Read modelsDevFetchLimit+1 bytes instead of modelsDevFetchLimit. If the
response exceeds the 32 MiB guard, return an error and leave any
existing cache untouched.
Fixes#510
* address review: include byte count in error, make oversized test hermetic
- error message now reports actual bytes read vs the limit
- test payload is limit+1 bytes (matches the reported repro)
- test explicitly clears ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH so it exercises
the oversized path regardless of the outer environment
* fix: warn about untracked scratch files left behind after a run
Fixes#551. Headless exec runs could leave behind debug/scratch files
(e.g. _fix_test.py, _debug.py) created by write_file during iteration,
which would then be silently swept up by a later git add -A.
- FileTracker now records brand-new files (RecordCreated/CreatedFiles),
distinct from the existing version-baseline tracking used for
conflict detection.
- write_file records a path as created only on first write, not on
overwrite of an existing file.
- After a headless run completes, exec.go checks git status for any
created file still present and untracked, and surfaces a warning via
the existing writer.warning() (works across text/-o json/stream-json).
No files are deleted automatically — a wrong guess at 'scratch' could
destroy real work, so this only surfaces what git already knows.
Co-authored-by: Copilot App <[email protected]>
* fix: address scratch warning review comments
* test: normalize created file tracker paths
* fix: track apply_patch-created scratch files
* fix: address scratch warning review feedback
* fix: tighten scratch warning lifecycle
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot App <[email protected]>
* merge: rebase onto main, combine Windows shell guidance with #476's MSYS text
#476 merged into main and rewrote the same "Shell syntax: Windows cmd.exe..."
guidance string in system_prompt.go and shellGuidanceForGOOS in
shell_runtime.go that this branch also edits (this PR's fix for the broken
single-quoted quoting examples). Combined both into one coherent string in
each spot: the double-quote/single-quote metachar rule with correct
examples, plus #476's MSYS coreutils warning and require_escalated
mention. Merged the corresponding test assertions in loop_test.go the
same way.
internal/imageinput/clipboard.go, internal/tools/bash_tool_test.go, and
internal/tools/exec_command_test.go applied cleanly with no overlap.
* test(tools): add host shell syntax description test for exec_command
* chore: retrigger CI after infra flake
* style(tools): gofmt exec_command_test.go
---------
Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
* fix(mcp): skip RFC 8414 discovery when OAuth endpoints are preconfigured
resolveAuthorizationServer performed a real network metadata discovery call even when the MCP server config already supplied both the authorization and token endpoints. When discovery blocks (offline, unreachable issuer, or test fixtures pointing at invalid hosts) the whole Login flow hangs and never reaches the browser/loopback step, so mcp oauth login could not complete.
When both endpoints are present, return them directly and skip discovery entirely; discovery remains the fallback for any endpoint the config leaves blank. This also fixes TestRunMCPOAuthLoginStoresTokens, which timed out because the loopback callback was never driven (the URL was never printed).
Removes scratch test files left over from investigation (internal/mcp/scratch_cli_test.go, internal/cli/scratch_oauth_test.go).
* fix: trim fast-path endpoints, restore fallback test, fix picker_test compile error
- Trim AuthorizationEndpoint/TokenEndpoint/RegistrationEndpoint in the
skip-discovery fast path to match the fallback path (P3 from @jatmn).
- Update TestResolveEndpointsFallsBackToConfig to only configure one
endpoint so discovery still runs and fails, exercising the fallback.
- Add TestResolveEndpointsSkipsDiscoveryWhenBothConfigured to verify
discovery is skipped when both endpoints are configured (P2 from @jatmn).
- Fix picker_test.go:771 to capture 4 return values from switchProviderModel
(pre-existing compile error on main blocking CI smoke).
* test(mcp): prove discovery is skipped via request-failing transport
The skip-discovery test passed even without the fast path, because
discovery against the invalid URL failed instantly and the config
fallback produced identical trimmed endpoints. Use a transport that
fails the test on any outbound request so the fast path is actually
what is being verified.
---------
Co-authored-by: gnanam1990 <[email protected]>
* test(config): make Resolve local-control tests env-independent
Resolve reads ZERO_PROVIDER from the environment via applyEnv, then fails with "no active provider configured" when that provider is not present in the config. This made TestResolveLocalControlFromUserConfig, TestResolveLocalControlIgnoresProjectOptIn, TestLocalControlDefaultsBrowserAndTerminalOn, and TestLocalControlExplicitGlobalDisable fail whenever the process environment happened to export ZERO_PROVIDER (e.g. an agent session), even though the tests never intended to exercise provider resolution.
Pass Env: map[string]string{} to the affected Resolve calls so the tests assert only local-control resolution and are unaffected by ambient environment variables. Verified the four tests pass even with ZERO_PROVIDER=gitlawb-opengateway set.
* fix(tui): align picker_test switchProviderModel call with 4-value return
* Fix OpenGateway credential lookup, stream error code mapping, and model catalog
* fix(providers): map semantic OpenAI stream error codes, not just numeric
Addresses jatmn's review (following up on CodeRabbit's original request):
the streamed error classifier only recognized numeric codes ("429", 401,
403 as string/float64/int), so semantic string codes OpenAI-compatible
providers commonly send instead (rate_limit_exceeded, insufficient_quota,
invalid_api_key) fell back to a generic 500 and lost their rate-limit/auth
classification.
Unified the numeric and semantic mappings into one
openAIStreamErrorStatusByCode table so both forms of the same condition
classify identically. insufficient_quota maps to 429, matching OpenAI's
own API behavior for quota-exceeded errors.
Added TestStreamCompletionClassifiesStreamErrorCode covering both forms.
* test(providermodelcatalog): cover the new gitlawb-opengateway catalog IDs
Addresses jatmn's review (completing CodeRabbit's original request):
TestModelsAreProviderScoped only asserted mimo-v2.5-pro and tencent/hy3
for gitlawb-opengateway, missing the other newly curated IDs added in
this PR (xiaomi/mimo-v2.5-pro, minimax/minimax-m3, qwen/qwen3.7-max,
google/gemini-3.1-flash-lite, z-ai/glm-5.2,
nvidia/nemotron-3-ultra-550b-a55b:free). A typo or accidental removal
in any of them would not have failed a test.
* test: cover the last catalog ID and probeProviderHealth's stored-key wrap
Addresses jatmn's second follow-up review on PR #580:
- TestModelsAreProviderScoped still missed xiaomi/mimo-v2.5 (distinct
from xiaomi/mimo-v2.5-pro) among the newly curated gitlawb-opengateway
catalog entries.
- fillAppDeps wraps probeProviderHealth the same way it wraps
newProvider, applying the stored credential-store key before
delegating, but only newProvider's wrap had a regression test
(TestFillAppDepsWrapsNewProviderWithStoredKey). Added the parallel
TestFillAppDepsWrapsProbeProviderHealthWithStoredKey so the health-check
path used by `zero providers check --connectivity`, `zero doctor
--connectivity`, and the TUI doctor panel can't silently regress back
to keyless probes.
* fix(tui): paste protection for Termux char-by-char paste
Termux context menu paste injects characters one at a time, including
newlines as raw KeyEnter events. This caused every pasted multiline
text to be submitted prematurely before the user could review it.
The fix adds a timing-based paste detector that works alongside the
existing bracketed-paste handler (tea.PasteMsg):
- Three new model fields: lastCharTime, lastKeyTime, burstCount
- Timing trackers run before any early return in case tea.KeyPressMsg
- Enter handler checks burstCount > 1 (2+ chars within 100ms = paste)
- Composer check gated with burstCount > 0 to avoid infinite composer lock
- burstCount reset at every intentional action (permission, picker,
submit, wizard, spec review, etc.) so normal typing is unaffected
The 100ms window catches all observed Termux paste speeds while
remaining under typical human inter-key intervals. The burstCount
resets at modal boundaries prevent false triggers in tests and
real usage.
* fix(tui): reset burstCount in Enter handler wizard paths
CodeRabbit review found 3 Enter-handler paths (providerWizard,
mcpAddWizard, mcpManager) that delegated without resetting burstCount.
The equivalent post-switch paths already had the reset but the
Enter-specific branches were missing it, creating a window where
stale burst state could cause false paste detection.
* fix(tui): raise paste burst threshold to >2, use injectable clock
* fix(tui): gate paste detection to Termux only, add bidirectional tests
- Paste burst detection (insert newline on rapid Enter) now only
activates under Termux (TERMUX_VERSION env var), so fast desktop
typing never false-triggers.
- Switched burst tracker from time.Now() to m.now() for deterministic
testing.
- Added 3 tests:
• TestTermuxBurstInsertsNewline — Termux + 3 chars + Enter → newline
• TestTermuxFastTypingSubmits — Termux + 2 chars + Enter → submit
• TestDesktopBurstNotAffected — Desktop + 3 chars + Enter → submit
* test: extract burst test helper, fix assertions, add reset-after-submit test
- Extracted shared burstTestModel helper + typeKeys helper to eliminate
duplication across the 3 tests (CodeRabbit nitpick).
- Added m.pending assertion to submit tests (cmd != nil alone is weak).
- Added TestBurstResetAfterSubmit verifying burstCount is properly
reset after submission — 2 chars + Enter still submits.
* test: add explicit pending check and lastKeyTime reset in burst reset test
* fix(tui): align composer-multiline guard with same burstCount > 2 threshold
* test: add TestMultilineBurstSubmits for multiline composer + 2-char burst
---------
Co-authored-by: PatrickNoFilter <[email protected]>
* fix(update): support safe symlink extraction during updates
Allow extracting symlinks from TarGz and Zip update archives to support Unix npm shim symlinks. Prevent path traversal vulnerabilities by rejecting absolute link targets and verifying that relative link targets do not escape the destination directory.
* revert(update): keep zip symlink entries rejected
Addresses jatmn's review: the stated bug (standalone update extraction
broken on Unix/macOS) is about .tar.gz archives; the zip path handles
Windows release archives. Adding zip symlink support alongside the
tar.gz fix reversed the existing zip symlink-rejection hardening
(TestExtractZipRejectsSymlinkEntry) and failed Windows CI, since
filepath.IsAbs does not reliably reject a slash-rooted target like
"/some/other/path" on Windows (which needs a drive letter or UNC
prefix to be absolute).
Reverted extractZip's symlink handling back to unconditional rejection
and removed the two zip-symlink tests that covered it. The tar.gz
symlink support and its tests (the actual fix for the reported bug)
are unchanged.
* fix(auth): persist OpenRouter API key after login
zero auth openrouter minted a key but only printed it, leaving the
provider unusable unless the user manually exported it or edited
config by hand. Now the key is saved into the credential store, the
provider profile is created/activated, and stale inline/env key
fields are cleared. Auth-failure hints also now point at zero setup
and zero auth openrouter instead of the vaguer zero auth.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(auth): sanitize minted key and roll back orphaned credential on save failure
Addresses PR review comments: trim the OpenRouter key right after
login so both the save path and the manual fallback instructions use
the sanitized value, and delete the just-written credential-store
entry if persisting the stored-key marker in config.json fails, so a
partial failure doesn't leave an orphaned secret.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): give Windows-appropriate suggestions when blocking interactive commands
DetectInteractiveCommand already receives goos, but its remediation
text for pagers (less/more/most), process monitors (top/htop/btop/
btm), and `tail -f` hardcoded POSIX-only alternatives (cat, head,
tail -n N, ps aux) regardless of platform. On Windows none of those
exist either, so blocking e.g. `type file | more` correctly stopped
the interactive command but then pointed the model at three more
commands cmd.exe doesn't have — directly undermining the guidance
this check exists to give. Reported in the wild (screenshot showing
`more` blocked with a "use cat, head, or tail -n N" suggestion on a
Windows session).
Adds an optional windowsSuggestion per program/segment, used in
place of the POSIX suggestion when goos == "windows" — `type` for
pagers, `tasklist` for process monitors, the read_file tool for
tail -f. Non-Windows suggestions are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* test(sandbox): cover remaining Windows suggestion overrides and fix GOOS-blind assertion
TestBashToolBlocksInteractiveCommandThroughSandbox asserted the pager
guard message always contains "cat", but on Windows it now correctly
suggests "type" — breaking Smoke (windows-latest) CI. Make the
assertion GOOS-aware. Also extend the safe_command windowsSuggestion
test table to cover most/top/btop/btm, which were missing alongside
the already-tested more/less/htop/tail -f.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
* fix(tools): block MSYS and WSL shells under the Windows sandbox
Git-for-Windows bash.exe and sh.exe are MSYS binaries: the MSYS runtime
secures its signal pipe and shared-memory sections with explicit DACLs
granting only the user, Administrators, and SYSTEM (sigproc.cc
sigproc_init -> sec_user_nih), so under the WRITE_RESTRICTED token the
second access check can never pass and startup dies with "couldn't
create signal pipe" or "CreateFileMapping <SID>.1", Win32 error 5. The
System32 WSL bash launcher fails equivalently: the restricted token
cannot connect to the WSL service (Bash/Service/CreateInstance/
E_ACCESSDENIED). Every executable a bare bash can resolve to fails, so
block bash and sh preflight like the MSYS coreutils from #476, mention
the indirect spawn paths (git hooks, git/gh credential helpers) in the
shared suggestion, detect the WSL launcher's UTF-16LE service-denied
stderr, and document the root cause in the runner's KNOWN LIMITATION
comment beside the Schannel note.
* fix(tui): align picker_test switchProviderModel call with 4-value return
* test(tools): cover sh.exe in Windows shell blocking test
#568 added a bool return to switchProviderModel (model, string, bool,
tea.Cmd) and updated every call site except picker_test.go:771, which
still assigned three values. That broke the internal/tui test build
and turned Smoke red on main. Add the missing receiver here.
* fix: gitignore Windows sandbox helpers and npm version marker
Add three missing build artifacts to .gitignore:
- /zero-windows-command-runner.exe — helper built by cmd/zero-windows-command-runner
- /zero-windows-sandbox-setup.exe — helper built by cmd/zero-windows-sandbox-setup
- /.zero-binary-version — marker file written by scripts/postinstall.mjs during npm install
These are generated files analogous to the already-ignored /zero, /zero.exe,
zero-termux-arm64, and zero-linux-sandbox entries.
* fix: gitignore the Linux zero-seccomp helper too
Addresses jatmn's review: scripts/postinstall.mjs copies zero-seccomp
next to zero-linux-sandbox, and README.md documents building it, but
.gitignore only covered the Windows helpers and zero-linux-sandbox.
A Linux source build or npm postinstall could still leave this
generated helper visible to git status.
* fix(tui): bypass toggleSidebar and toggleMouse global shortcuts when composer is non-empty
Allows standard readline/Emacs cursor movement keybindings (Ctrl+B and Ctrl+E) to work inside the prompt composer when typing a prompt. This prevents these keys from being globally intercepted to toggle the sidebar or mouse mode when the composer is populated.
* fix(tui): remove trailing whitespace, scope composer guard to default chords
Addresses jatmn's review:
- Removed a trailing-whitespace-only blank line in
keybinding_help_test.go that was failing the diff-hygiene CI check.
- The composerValue() == "" guard on toggleMouse/toggleSidebar applied
to the whole keyMatch(...) result, so a user who remaps either
binding to a chord that doesn't conflict with readline navigation
(Ctrl+E/Ctrl+B) lost that shortcut entirely while typing. The guard
now only applies when the match came through the default chord;
a remapped binding fires regardless of composer state.
Added TestRemappedToggleBindingsIgnoreComposerGuard covering both
bindings.
* fix(tui): treat an explicit default-chord config the same as unset
Addresses jatmn's follow-up review: the prior fix checked
!b.isZero() to decide whether a binding is a genuine, non-conflicting
remap, but a user can explicitly configure toggleMouse: "ctrl+e" or
toggleSidebar: "ctrl+b" (the same chord as the built-in default).
parseBinding gives that a non-zero parsedBinding, so isZero() alone
wrongly treated it as safe to bypass the composer guard, letting
Ctrl+E/Ctrl+B hijack keystrokes mid-sentence again.
requiresEmptyComposer now compares the resolved binding against the
canonical default chord directly (parsedBinding is a plain comparable
struct), so both "unset" and "explicitly re-affirmed to the same
chord" require an empty composer; only a binding that resolves to a
genuinely different chord bypasses it.
Added TestExplicitDefaultChordConfigStillRequiresEmptyComposer.
* refactor(tui): dedupe the composer-gated toggle check
CodeRabbit nitpick: the toggleMouse/toggleSidebar dispatch cases both
repeated !requiresEmptyComposer(...) || m.composerValue() == "" inline.
Extracted canFireComposerGatedToggle so both cases share one
expression.
* feat(tui): remember recent provider+model selections in /model picker
The /model picker's "Recent" section only ever showed the currently active
model, making it hard to switch back to a previously used provider+model pair
once you've moved on to something else (especially when the same model name
exists across multiple providers). Track a short automatic history of
provider-qualified switches instead: newest first, capped at 5, deduped by
provider+model pair (not model name alone), and selectable across providers
like any other picker row.
Closes Gitlawb/zero#562
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* chore: gofmt fixes
* fix(tui): restore favorites one-row-per-model semantics in /model picker
Favorites de-dup had switched to the provider+model key, letting the same
favorited model ID surface once per provider. Revert to per-Value de-dup for
Favorites, and skip any model ID already shown under Favorites from Recent
and Catalog so favorited models don't reappear in a second group. Recent and
Catalog still de-dup among themselves by provider+model so cross-provider
rows remain distinct.
Also correct the recordRecentModel doc comment: in-memory history is updated
even without a user config path (only persistence is skipped), not a no-op.
Addresses Copilot review comments on #568.
* fix(tui): set OwnerProvider on registry catalog rows; dedupe recent-model normalization
- registryModelPickerItem now tags rows with OwnerProvider (the registry
entry's canonical provider), fixing the plain-registry fallback path (no
saved providers resolved any models) where two providers offering the same
model id would collide in pickerItemDedupKey and silently drop a row.
- Export config.NormalizeRecentModels and have
internal/tui/picker.go's normalizeRecentModelEntries delegate to it instead
of maintaining an independent copy of the same trim/dedupe/cap logic, so the
TUI and persisted-config normalization can never drift apart.
- Add regression tests for both.
Addresses remaining CodeRabbit review comments on #568.
* fix(tui): batch recent-model persistence into one write per switch; tighten tests
- Add recordRecentModels(pairs...), a batched form of recordRecentModel that
normalizes and persists exactly once per switch instead of twice (outgoing
+ incoming pair each triggered their own read-modify-write to
userConfigPath). handleModelCommand and switchProviderModel now call it
once with both pairs.
- picker_test.go: capture and assert switchProviderModel's status return in
TestSwitchProviderModelRecordsRecentHistory instead of discarding it, so a
failed switch fails at the actual point of failure.
- picker_test.go: also assert the persisted config (not just in-memory
recentModels) after the reorder/dedupe case in
TestModelCommandRecordsAndPersistsRecentHistory.
- picker_test.go: pin down the surviving Favorites row's OwnerProvider in
TestAssembleModelPickerItemsFavoritesDedupByModelIDAndHideFromOtherGroups,
and drop the tautological otherRecent assertion (other-model was never
added to recent, so it could never fail).
- resolver_test.go: add TestResolveIgnoresProjectOnlyRecentModels, covering
the case where only project config sets preferences.recentModels and user
config omits it — resolved value must stay empty.
Addresses remaining CodeRabbit nitpick comments on #568.
* fix(tui): route unresolvable OwnerProvider rows in-place; align recent-history keys
- choosePicker: only treat a picker row as cross-provider when its
OwnerProvider resolves to an actual saved provider. Registry-fallback
catalog rows (tagged with a provider *kind* string) and stale "Recent"
rows referencing a since-removed provider now fall back to an in-place
model switch instead of erroring "unknown provider".
- handleModelCommand/switchProviderModel: capture and record recent-history
entries using m.providerName (the resolved value recentModelPairsForPicker
pins the active row with) instead of the raw, possibly-empty provider
profile Name, so a no-name provider profile can no longer produce a
duplicate "Recent" row for the same switch.
- newModelPicker: scope the registry-fallback's active-model exclusion by
provider too, consistent with the provider-aware de-dup used elsewhere.
- recentModelPairsForPicker: delegate to config.NormalizeRecentModels
instead of reimplementing the same trim/dedup/cap logic.
- Remove the unused recordRecentModel wrapper.
- assembleModelPickerItems: build Favorites from recent/catalog directly
instead of allocating a concatenated copy of both slices.
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
* fix(mcp): silence startup warning for unconfigured default servers
Firecrawl is seeded as an always-on default MCP server with no
credentials (config.DefaultMCPServers), so every fresh install prints
a loud "warning: MCP server firecrawl unavailable, skipped: ... HTTP
401" line on first launch, even though the user never configured or
touched it.
Add config.IsUnconfiguredDefault to detect a server whose resolved
config is byte-identical to its built-in default, thread it through
mcp.Server and mcp.SkippedServer, and skip the startup warning in
app.go when a skipped server is an untouched default. Servers the
user actually configured still warn loudly on failure.
Fixes#552
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(mcp): address review feedback on #563
- mergeMCPServer now marks disabledSet on the merged config whenever a
disabled toggle was explicitly applied, so an explicit re-enable
(e.g. `zero mcp enable firecrawl`) is no longer indistinguishable
from an untouched default even though the resolved value matches —
the toggle itself is the "configured" signal for IsUnconfiguredDefault.
- Tighten TestRegisterToolsFlagsUnconfiguredDefaultOnSkip to assert
presence in the Skipped() map before checking UnconfiguredDefault,
so a missing entry fails loudly instead of comparing zero values.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(config): close IsUnconfiguredDefault gap for redeclared default values
IsUnconfiguredDefault compared the resolved MCPServerConfig against
DefaultMCPServers() with reflect.DeepEqual. A user who explicitly
redeclares a default's exact field values in their config JSON (e.g.
copying firecrawl's default type/url verbatim, perhaps intending to add
credentials later) produced a resolved value byte-identical to the
default, so the comparison silently treated a real, deliberate config
entry as "unconfigured" — the same trap the disabled/enabled toggle
case was already patched for, just left open for every other field.
Add an unexported `configured` field to MCPServerConfig, set whenever
MCPServerConfig.UnmarshalJSON actually runs for a server key (built-in
defaults are seeded as Go struct literals and never unmarshaled, so
they start unconfigured). IsUnconfiguredDefault now requires both
!configured and the value still matching the default — the value check
remains as a fallback for callers that construct MCPServerConfig
directly rather than through the JSON/merge pipeline, where configured
is always false.
This also lets mergeMCPServer drop the disabledSet-specific
"mark as touched" workaround added for the toggle case, since
`configured` now generalizes it.
Adds TestResolveMCPExplicitRedeclareOfDefaultValuesIsNotUnconfiguredDefault
covering the redeclared-values case.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(provider): stop dropping custom no-auth providers on restart
Custom OpenAI/Anthropic-compatible catalog entries hardcode
RequiresAuth as a template default for the setup wizard, not a fact
about the user's actual endpoint. Leaving the credential step blank
(e.g. a local llama.cpp server) still stamped the saved profile with
a guessed OPENAI_API_KEY/ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var, and that same
static RequiresAuth flag then made the profile look like it was
missing a required credential on the next run, silently filtering it
out of /model.
Add a Custom flag to the catalog descriptor so both the wizard
(write side) and setupMissingCredentialEnv (read side) judge these
profiles by their own explicit APIKeyEnv instead of the catalog's
static default.
Fixes#555
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(provider): self-heal legacy custom profiles stamped by the old wizard bug
CodeRabbit flagged that profiles saved before this fix could already
carry the phantom APIKeyEnv the old wizard stamped on every custom
provider (e.g. OPENAI_API_KEY), and the new custom-branch logic would
keep treating any non-empty APIKeyEnv as an explicit requirement —
leaving already-affected users' providers filtered out of /model even
after upgrading.
Treat an APIKeyEnv that exactly matches the catalog's own guessed
default as indistinguishable from unset, so already-broken saved
profiles self-heal without a config.json migration. A deliberately
different env var name (e.g. via --api-key-env) still means auth is
required.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(provider): centralize custom-endpoint credential logic, fix two more surfaces
Copilot's review of the earlier fix found the same RequiresAuth-as-
authoritative bug in two more places that decide whether a saved
provider needs a credential:
- validateProviderRuntimeReady (zero providers check) would hard-error
a no-auth custom endpoint with "requires API key".
- providerWizardCredentialLabel and providerCredentialRequired (/providers
status, wizard summary) would still claim/warn that one was needed.
Added config.ProviderProfile.MissingCredentialEnv as the single source
of truth for this decision (custom-endpoint self-heal included), and
had setupMissingCredentialEnv and validateProviderRuntimeReady delegate
to it. providerWizardCredentialLabel and providerCredentialRequired
take the same Custom-aware fix directly, since their non-catalog
fallback path uses runtime-resolved provider-kind metadata that
shouldn't be collapsed into the canonical helper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
* fix(ci): request pinned Go toolchain directly
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
* Introduce opencode-go-anthropic that uses anthropic SDK for qwen and minimax models.
* Adjust naming to match convention format.
* Adjut naming to match convention.
* Update name for opencode-go-anthropic-compatible
* Update curated models for opencode anthropic and adjust test.
* Adjust filter for opencode anthropic provider and cover with tests.
* Adjust discovery model filtering - tolerate ModlIDAllowedForProvider rules.
* Change model descriptors to lowercase for minimax models.
* CLI call triggers model filtering for opencode-go-anthropic-compatible.
* feat: gate runtime model resolution on provider allowlist (PR #544 P2)
Apply ModelIDAllowedForProvider(profile.CatalogID, model) at profile
resolution and ResolveRuntimeMetadata so TUI /model and headless
--model overrides cannot escape the provider-scoped filter for
catalog-backed profiles such as opencode-go-anthropic-compatible.
resolveProfile is the single funnel for both New() and
ResolveRuntimeMetadata, so a single validation call in each return
path covers every caller (TUI command_center, exec, provider health,
context report, zerocommands). Restricted providers reject; the
default branch keeps unrestricted providers unchanged.
less/more/most now suggest `type` instead of cat/head/tail on Windows,
since those tools don't exist there. Drop `more` from the MSYS sandbox
suggestion too, since more is itself blocked as an interactive pager
and would send the model straight into that guard next.
detectShellCommandIssue also strips double-quoted spans and cmd.exe
caret escapes before matching the bash-style `cd /foo` pattern, so a
cd-shaped string inside a quoted argument (e.g. a commit message) isn't
mistaken for an actual command.
* ## Speech-to-text dictation
Adds voice dictation to Zero. Run `/voice` to enter hold-to-record mode, then hold **Space** to dictate and release to transcribe (run `/voice` again to turn it off so Space types normally). Pick a backend with `/stt-model`.
### Backends
- **Local (sherpa-onnx)** — offline, no API key. Auto-downloads a model via `/stt-model`; the engine binary is fetched once and shared across models. Family auto-detection covers the mainstream offline families (Whisper, transducer/Zipformer, Moonshine, Paraformer, SenseVoice, and the CTC families FireRedASR, NeMo, TeleSpeech, WeNet, Zipformer-CTC, Dolphin, Omnilingual — plus the encoder/decoder families Canary and FireRedASR-AED).
- **Cloud batch** — Groq and OpenAI Whisper. Keys resolve from a configured provider, the encrypted credential store, or the env var; a missing/invalid key is entered inline.
- **Streaming** — a warm local sherpa-onnx websocket server (live transcript as you speak) on desktop, or Deepgram / OpenAI Realtime.
### Highlights
- Live audio-reactive waveform while recording (real mic levels when streaming; a synthesized wave for batch).
- `/stt-model` download chooser: recommended models first, Live/Batch tag per row, size + download state, and a search filter.
- Streaming transcript is inserted live into the composer and committed on stop; batch inserts on stop. Insert-for-review by default (`stt.autoSubmit` to fire straight at the agent).
- The warm streaming server is released when `/voice` is turned off and on exit.
### Implementation notes
- No CGO and no bundled runtimes — every OS integration shells out via `exec.Command` with discrete argv (never a shell string).
- The streaming server manager mirrors the LSP manager's warm-subprocess lifecycle.
- OS-boundary code (recorders, transcribers, server) is unit-tested via injected fakes; real microphone / websocket behavior is covered by env-gated smoke tests.
### Testing
- `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, and the config / dictation / cli / tui suites pass.
- Verified end-to-end against real downloaded binaries + models (offline batch, streaming websocket server, and the model auto-download), including the FireRedASR-CTC and NeMo streaming transducer families.
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
* **New Features**
* Added speech-to-text dictation with both batch and streaming modes, supporting local (sherpa-onnx) and cloud providers, including WAV/M4A detection.
* Introduced voice dictation mode with STT model selection, local engine/model auto-download, and an inline prompt to save cloud API keys.
* Added new TUI commands for voice/STT model selection and enabled F1–F12 key bindings.
* **Bug Fixes**
* Improved streaming dictation to preserve accumulated transcript partials and keep the editor region consistent.
* Refined TUI status/picker rendering, including clearer loading/search behavior and more reliable selection alignment.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
* fix(dictation): address CodeRabbit review feedback
- validateSTTConfig: add NumThreads bounds check
- downloadVerifyExtract: stage extraction into a sibling temp dir,
atomic-rename into destDir on success so a partial extract cannot
leave a truncated engine binary that passes fileExists() on next run
- startProcess: close pipe fds when cmd.Start() fails
- ServerManager.Shutdown: honor the caller's context deadline
- audioSpillDir: tighten any pre-existing directory to 0700
- startVariantDownload: refuse re-entry while a download is in flight
- maybeOpenSTTDownloadPicker: defer Provider=local persistence to
applyEngineComponents (commit-on-success), matching the cloud flow
- fetchSTTModelsCmd: bound with a 30s timeout client+context
- newSTTDownloadPickerFrom.isCurrent: compare path segments via
filepath.Base to avoid substring false-positives
* fix(dictation): harden recorder.Stop, Esc-cancel priority, streaming region
Three correctness issues from PR review:
1) recorder.Stop() panicked (nil-deref) when called on a StartStreaming
session because StartStreaming intentionally leaves r.proc nil. Reject
that misuse with a clear error. Termux's batch path also leaves
r.proc nil by design — keep that path working.
2) Esc was consumed by an active dictation session before the
confirming second Esc could cancel a pending run, so a user
mid-recording who double-Esc's to kill the run found the first Esc
swallowed by dictation. Gate dictation-cancel on the Esc not being
a pending-run confirm.
3) applyStreamingText hard-reset the cursor to regionStart on every
partial, yanking focus away from users editing elsewhere in the
composer, and stored regionStart/End as absolute indices that became
stale the moment the user typed or pasted before the live region.
Preserve the cursor when it's outside the region, and snapshot the
prefix BEFORE the region so the next partial can detect external
edits and shift [start,end) to stay aligned.
* feat(providers): OAuth login profiles and list-first /provider manager
Make multiple providers a first-class workflow: every OAuth login is now a
visible, switchable provider, and /provider manages the whole lifecycle.
OAuth logins become provider profiles:
- zero auth chatgpt / zero auth login <preset> and all four TUI login paths
(wizard + first-run, browser + device-code) now upsert a catalog-backed
profile via config.EnsureCatalogProvider after storing the token — without
stealing the active provider. Previously the token was stored invisibly:
the provider showed up nowhere and 'providers use' failed not-found.
- Switching to an OAuth provider no longer inlines the bearer as an API key,
which suppressed the runtime resolver (no token refresh, no Codex
chatgpt-account-id header → guaranteed 401s). The credential gate now
recognizes stored OAuth logins on keyless profiles.
- providers list / current report truthful credential state: stored keys
count as configured (APIKeySet honors apiKeyStored) and token logins show
'oauth login'; providers check accepts an OAuth login as a credential.
List-first /provider manager (TUI):
- /provider opens the saved-provider list: Enter activates via the shared
switch path, 'a' adds (existing wizard), 'e' opens a field-level editor
(endpoint, model, key, description, and safe rename — the stored key,
activeProvider, and live ZERO_PROVIDER follow the new name), 'd' deletes
with an inline confirm and stored-key cleanup. Esc walks back one level.
- Credential states resolve asynchronously so keychain reads never block
the render loop; 'stored key missing' surfaces broken keychain entries.
- Implemented as manager steps on providerWizardState so every existing
overlay gate, key route, and mouse hook covers it unchanged.
CLI + config parity:
- zero providers remove <name> (deletes the stored key, hands the active
pointer off) and zero providers rename <old> <new>.
- config.RemoveProvider / RenameProvider: read-modify-atomic-write; rename
migrates the credential-store entry write-new-then-delete-old so an
interruption can never lose the key.
* fix(providers): address PR #560 review findings
All six review findings validated as real; fixes with regression tests:
- Persist the apiKeyStored marker when a key is captured onto an existing
profile: mergeProfile deliberately ignores the marker (a project config
must not claim the user's stored keys at resolve time), so the user-config
WRITE path (UpsertProvider) now re-applies it — previously editing a key
onto an env/no-key profile stranded the secret in the credential store
while every ApplyStoredAPIKey gate skipped it. [jatmn P2]
- Let active-pointer recovery select OAuth-login providers:
firstUsableProvider now applies the same providerHasOAuthLogin check as
setupRequired/usableSavedProviders, so a stale activeProvider plus a saved
ChatGPT/xAI login recovers instead of forcing onboarding. [jatmn P2]
- Delete stored keys from the store BESIDE the config being edited:
providers remove and the TUI manager delete now use ProviderKeyStoreAt
(matching setup/rename) instead of the default-path store. [jatmn P2]
- Roll back the key migration when RenameProvider's config write fails, so
the store and config.json can't desync (key under the new name, config
still naming the old one). [CodeRabbit]
- Clear provider descriptions for real: new SetProviderDescription writes
the field verbatim (the upsert merge treats empty as unchanged); the
manager's editor routes description changes through it. [jatmn P3]
- Surface stored-key deletion failures in providers remove (stderr warning
+ keyError in the JSON payload) and the TUI delete status, instead of
letting a lingering secret read as a clean removal. [CodeRabbit]
* fix(providers): second review round — case-only rename, logout hint, test hermeticity
- Skip the credential-store migration on case-only renames (groq -> Groq):
the store normalizes names case-insensitively, so Set(new)+Delete(old)
target ONE entry and the delete removed the key that was just "moved".
The existing entry already serves the new name. [CodeRabbit]
- Point the delete flow's cleanup hint at the stored login that actually
exists: after a rename ({name:"codex", catalogID:"chatgpt"}) the token
lives under the catalog id, and `zero auth logout codex` would delete
nothing. oauthLoginName resolves the same FirstStored candidate the
runtime uses. [jatmn P3]
- Lock in APIKeyEnv semantics after a key edit: the env reference survives
as an explicit override (a SET env var wins at resolve time; the stored
key applies when it is absent). [CodeRabbit nitpick]
- Make main's new firstUsableProvider tests hermetic: they read the REAL
OAuth token store, so any developer with an actual xai/chatgpt login gets
spurious failures (found because this machine has one).
Also rebased onto main; the only conflict was comment wording in
firstUsableProvider, where the audit commit (#481) independently landed the
same OAuth-login fallback check this branch added.
* fix(tui): read stored keys from the active config's credential store
The TUI's write paths (SecureProviderProfile capture, rename migration,
manager delete) all target the store beside m.userConfigPath, but the read
paths still opened the DEFAULT-path store: profileWithCredential (feeding
the /model and manager switch gate), the model picker's discovery
credential lookup, and the manager's async credential-status probe. With a
non-default config path, a provider saved with only apiKeyStored had its
key in the config-adjacent store, so the gate rejected it as having no
usable credential and the manager showed 'stored key missing' for a
healthy profile.
All TUI stored-key reads now resolve through providerKeyStoreForPath
(config-adjacent, default-path fallback for ephemeral sessions), so the UI
reads from the same store it writes to. Regression test covers both the
credential probe and the switch path with a key seeded only beside the
config.
Also consolidates the OAuth test-store seeding on withAuthStore (now pins
ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE=file so an inherited keyring backend can't bypass the
temp path) per review nitpick.
* fix(providers): resolve self-review findings — atomic edits, key normalization, threading
Findings from a multi-agent code review of this branch (8 finder angles,
independently verified); all confirmed against the code, several with
empirical repros.
Correctness:
- config.EditProvider: one atomic read-modify-write for the manager's Save
(rename + fields + verbatim description + stored-key marker + key
migration with write-failure rollback). Replaces the rename→upsert→
describe sequence that (a) turned a case-only rename (groq → Groq) into a
DUPLICATE profile via UpsertProvider's case-sensitive merge, and (b) could
fail halfway, leaving config.json renamed while savedProviders and
ZERO_PROVIDER still held the old name (retry then failed 'not found').
A rename now also migrates a freshly captured replacement key (captured
under the current name; the migration moves it).
- savedProviders is mutated surgically on manager delete/edit instead of
being replaced with the raw user-config list — the session list is seeded
from the RESOLVED (project-config layered) and usability-FILTERED set, so
wholesale replacement dropped project-contributed providers and
resurrected filtered stubs for the rest of the session.
- oauth.ProviderKey normalizes provider names to lower case at the single
write/lookup choke point: `zero auth login xAI` stored provider:xAI while
every candidate lookup was case-sensitive — a successful login invisible
to the runtime. Map-based presence checks lowercase to match.
- OAuth login persistence moved onto the Update goroutine (message handlers)
— a background tea.Cmd (device-code polls land minutes later) doing an
unlocked config read-modify-write raced UI-thread writes (lost updates).
The write error is now surfaced and the in-memory mirror is skipped on
failure, so a profile that never reached disk can't show as a working
provider that vanishes on restart.
UX / consistency:
- Esc inside a manager-launched add flow walks back to the provider list
from EVERY step (was: first step only; deeper steps destroyed the overlay
and the user's place). In-flight OAuth logins are invalidated on the way
out; footers say 'Esc back'.
- switchProviderModel returns a structured outcome; the manager branches on
it instead of strings.Contains(text, "Switched to") — UI copy is no longer
a control-flow contract (a provider named 'Switched to prod' could close
the manager on a refusal).
- Manager delete's keychain subprocess + OAuth lookup run in a follow-up
tea.Cmd (the confirm keypress no longer blocks the render loop); the
credential probe takes ONE token-store snapshot instead of 2 reads per
row, and resolved states carry over across reloads (no 'checking…' flash).
- Credential-state reporting converges: /provider status recognizes OAuth
logins (was 'api key: not set' + warning for a WORKING provider), doctor
uses the shared HasConfiguredCredential definition plus OAuth awareness
(its 'matching ProviderSnapshot.APIKeySet' claim is true again), and the
manager's classifier falls through a stale stored-key marker to env/OAuth
the way the runtime does.
* Fix provider manager test formatting
* fix: address bugs found in a multi-agent codebase audit
Five parallel review agents each swept a different area (self-update,
TUI keybindings, agent/session handling, sandbox/shell safety, and
auth/credential storage) and surfaced nine concrete defects, all fixed
here with regression tests:
- sandbox: grant_scope path comparisons were case-sensitive, letting a
persisted deny grant be bypassed by spelling a Windows path with
different case
- securefile/oauth: createSecretFile's Windows ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
handling was only applied to the oauth token store, not the shared
credstore backend; both also masked the real lock-contention error
behind a misleading "file does not exist" timeout
- cli: firstUsableProvider ignored OAuth logins when picking a
fallback provider, forcing unnecessary re-onboarding for an
already-authenticated user
- sessions: exec prompt summarization truncated on a raw byte offset,
which could split a multi-byte UTF-8 rune and embed invalid UTF-8
into a resumed session's prompt
- tui: configurable keybindings had no collision detection, so a
remapped chord could silently make a hardcoded shortcut (or another
configured binding) permanently unreachable
- tools: the Windows shell-syntax pre-flight check wasn't quote-aware
and could block harmless commands whose quoted arguments merely
contained operator-like text
- update: checksum verification didn't cross-check the archive
filename it verified against the one being extracted; extractZip
didn't reject symlink-mode entries like extractTarGz already did;
replaceBinary's restore-on-failure rename had no retry, risking a
permanently missing binary on a transient Windows file lock
* fix: close remaining PR 481 review findings
* Potential fix for pull request finding
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
* fix(tools): drop stale ; test case after rebasing onto main's MSYS check
Rebasing fix/bug-hunt-findings onto main pulled in #476, which replaced
this file's regex-based windows_shell_syntax detection with a
segment/word-anchored check and deliberately stopped treating ; as a
command separator on Windows (cmd.exe doesn't split on ; the way bash
does). detectShellCommandIssue itself came out of the rebase unchanged
from main (our quote-masking version was fully superseded by #476's
more thorough segment-based approach), but the quoted-content test
this PR added still asserted the old bash-style semantics for
`echo "foo" ; ls -la`, which now correctly returns no issue since it's
a single echo invocation with literal arguments under cmd.exe, not a
real ls invocation.
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
The home screen orientation line now leads with the build version
(v0.2.0 · cwd · branch · model). Release builds already inject
internal/cli.version via ldflags; dev builds show "dev".
* feat(tui): /loop foundation — command parsing, loop state, safety bounds
First slice of the /loop feature (#501): the self-contained core with no TUI
wiring yet. parseLoopCommand handles the leading-interval, trailing-"every",
bare-self-paced, and list/stop forms; loopState models one session-scoped loop
with doom-loop + iteration-cap fields; interval/self-pace clamps and duration
formatting round it out, with unit tests. Because Zero drives loops off a Go
timer rather than a cron backend, arbitrary intervals (90s, 7m) are supported
with no whitelist limitation.
* feat(tui): wire /loop into the turn lifecycle — dispatch, idle tick, continuation
Second slice of #501. Adds the controller and wires it in:
- /loop command registered (commands.go) and dispatched to handleLoopCommand.
- Loop state on the model (loops, activeLoopID, loopSeq/loopTicking poll guards,
loopNextWake/loopDone self-pace channel).
- An idle poll tick (loopTickMsg, ~1s) fires the earliest due loop only when the
session is idle — mirrors the launchQueuedMessageIfReady guard so loops and a
user's queued prompt never collide; a self-perpetuating tea.Tick that stops when
no loops remain.
- The agentResponseMsg completion seam advances a loop iteration (schedule next
wake for fixed, model delay for self-paced) with doom-loop, iteration-cap, and
done stop conditions, restarting the ticker if other loops remain.
- /loop list|stop|stop all, footer summary + list rendering, and a guard that only
a prompt or custom /command may loop (not a built-in).
Controller tests cover start/advance/self-paced-delay/done/doom/cap/stop/busy.
* feat(tui): /loop self-paced adaptive cadence + footer summary + /clear note
Third slice of #501.
- Self-paced loops now use an adaptive cadence (2m early -> 30m heartbeat as
iterations accrue), with the loopNextWake channel kept as an override for a
future explicit model signal.
- Persistent footer segment "↻ N loops · next 3:05pm" while loops are active.
- /clear notes that loops keep running (it wipes the transcript, not the session)
so a loop never silently fires into a cleared screen.
- Tests for adaptive cadence + footer summary.
* test(tui): drive /loop end-to-end through Update (submit + stale tick)
* docs(readme): add /loop to the slash-command table
* fix(tui): stop looping on repeated failure + clear loop tag on cancel
Addresses CodeRabbit review on #502:
- advanceLoop now counts consecutive failed iterations (loopMaxFailures=3) and
stops the loop, so a loop whose turns keep erroring no longer churns to the
iteration cap (the doom guard only sees identical non-empty answers).
- cancelRun clears activeLoopID and re-arms the interrupted loop for its next
cadence, so a cancelled iteration is not left running forever and the next
unrelated turn is not misattributed as that loop's completion.
* fix(tui): finish /loop v1 — real self-paced completion, session scope, leave gate
Response to the review. The self-paced path was the real gap: it advertised
model-chosen completion but nothing ever wrote the done/next-wake fields, so it
was just adaptive polling dressed up. Replaced that with an actual control
channel — each self-paced iteration runs a short maintenance playbook and ends
its reply with a control line (LOOP: DONE / LOOP: CONTINUE [interval]) that
advanceLoop parses to stop the loop or pick the next wake. The two dead model
fields are gone; done and next-wake now come from the model's output.
Rest of the review:
- loops stop on a session switch (/new, /resume) instead of firing the previous
conversation's prompt into the new one
- validateLoopTarget resolves custom /commands up front and rejects unknowns, so
a mistyped `/loop 5m /nope` isn't scheduled and then re-sent as literal text
- a one-shot confirm gates /clear and /quit while loops are active
- age-based auto-expire (24h) next to the iteration cap
- the two CodeRabbit test nits (HasPrefix footer check, bare `/loop stop` on a
single loop)
Hardening from a self-review pass over the above:
- normalize CRLF and allow a trailing note on the control line, so
`LOOP: DONE — all clean` and \r\n replies still stop the loop
- disarm the leave-confirm before the queue/exit early returns, so an interposed
prompt can't leave it falsely armed
- a loop no longer fires behind an open picker/modal; a run launched behind the
/resume picker would otherwise complete into whatever session you switch to
* fix(tui): address /loop review round 2 — ticker re-arm, self-paced command, resume guard
- stopLoop re-arms the poll ticker after removing one loop, so stopping one of
several no longer strands the rest with no tick scheduled (jatmn).
- a bare self-paced /command is rejected with a pointer to the interval form:
self-paced drives a free-form goal via the playbook + LOOP: control line, which
a custom command's expanded template never carries, so it would silently
degrade to adaptive polling (jatmn).
- /resume only tears loops down on an actual session-id change; /resume latest or
/resume <currentID> can resolve to the already-active session, whose loops are
its own, not a "previous" session's (CodeRabbit).
- tests: skipped-behind-modal loop stays scheduled, footer carries the next-wake
time, the confirmed /clear actually wipes the transcript, plus multi-loop stop
keeping the ticker alive and self-paced-/command rejection.
* docs(readme): clarify /loop runs a prompt or custom command, not built-ins
- Remove unused safeRequestedPrefix, safeShellCommandTokens
(internal/agent/command_prefix.go), and truncateHeadTail
(internal/tools/bash.go): each was a thin wrapper with no remaining
callers.
- Drop an ineffectual assignment in stringListArgWebSearch: every
return path after it already sets the named return explicitly.
- Simplify a negated-and condition in
partition_cache_stable_test.go via De Morgan's law.
- Use strings.Contains instead of strings.Index(...) < 0 in
edit_replacers.go.
- Fix error string style (ST1005): lowercase "unsafe redirect URL"
and drop the trailing period from webFetchPublicOnlyHint.
Skipped the errcheck findings on this pass (unchecked defer
Close()/Write() errors): those are stylistic, not correctness bugs,
and this repo's CI only runs go vet, not golangci-lint.
go vet, gofmt, govulncheck, and deadcode don't catch unused private
functions/assignments reachable within a package but never called, or
staticcheck-style correctness/readability issues. deadcode's whole-program
reachability analysis specifically missed several of these; golangci-lint's
truncateHeadTail nitpick on #476 assumed it would fail CI, but nothing in
this repo actually ran it.
Scoped to unused, ineffassign, and staticcheck rather than the full default
battery, and continue-on-error like deadcode, so this surfaces the existing
findings across the repo (being cleaned up incrementally per #527) without
blocking in-flight PRs on a big-bang adoption.
* fix(tools): block MSYS coreutils under Windows sandbox
Git for Windows usr\bin coreutils (head, grep, cat, ...) are MSYS PE binaries that fail with ACCESS_DENIED and cygheap/signal-pipe errors when Zero runs them in the write-restricted Windows sandbox. Detect and block these commands before execution, surface MSYS runtime failures from stderr, steer agents toward native Zero tools or require_escalated, and exclude MSYS-prone names from known-safe command tails.
Refs #458
* fix(tools): anchor the last MSYS failure heuristic to MSYS markers
CodeRabbit review feedback: the win32-error-5 plus terminating check
had no MSYS-specific anchor, so unrelated access-denied failures could
be mislabeled as windows_msys_sandbox. Require an MSYS marker like the
neighboring checks do.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(tools): let escalation bypass the MSYS guard and make detection quote-aware
Addresses jatmn's review on PR #476:
- bash and exec_command called detectShellCommandIssue before resolving
sandbox_permissions into a command engine, so a require_escalated retry of
a blocked command was still hard-blocked by the same preflight check.
Resolve the command engine first and only bypass the windows_msys_sandbox
issue kind when that resolves to true unsandboxed execution; other issue
kinds (real cmd.exe syntax problems) still block regardless of escalation.
- Unify all MSYS-prone command name checks (MsysProneCommandName, the
preflight scan, and transitively command_prefix.go's known-safe guard)
behind one windowsMsysProneNames set. This fixes expr (in the name set but
missing from the old regex alternations, so never proactively flagged) and
ls (hit the older windows_shell_syntax branch first, so it got different
metadata than every other MSYS-prone name).
- Make the preflight scan quote-aware: split the command into cmd.exe-
operator-separated segments respecting double-quote grouping, and only
check the first word of each segment instead of scanning raw text anywhere.
Fixes false positives on quoted text like commit messages or PR comment
bodies that merely mention a coreutil name.
* test(tools): decouple MSYS-guard bypass tests from real command output
TestBashToolRequireEscalatedMsysGuard and
TestExecCommandRequireEscalatedBypassesMsysGuardAfterApproval asserted
shell_issue == "" to prove the require_escalated bypass worked. Once
bypassed, "cat somefile.txt" actually runs unsandboxed, and its real,
PATH-dependent output could trip the unrelated post-execution
detectShellOutputIssue heuristic, failing the assertion for reasons
unrelated to the preflight guard under test.
Assert on the exit_code "-1" sentinel (set only by shellIssueBlockResult)
instead, which directly reflects whether the preflight guard blocked the
command.
* fix(tools): anchor MSYS path detection to command position, fix prefix approval gap
Address jatmn's latest review on PR #476:
- shell_runtime.go: the explicit MSYS binary-path check (usr\bin\,
mingw64\bin\, msys-2.0.dll, cygwin1.dll) ran against the raw command
string, so a quoted mention (e.g. a commit message describing a
usr\bin\head.exe failure) was still hard-blocked. It now runs against
the first word of each operator-separated segment, same as the
coreutil-name check. windowsCommandSegments also stopped treating ;
as a command separator (cmd.exe does not split on ;, unlike bash) and
now respects cmd.exe's ^ escape character, so escaped operators like
echo ^| head are no longer misread as a real head invocation.
- command_prefix.go: proposedCommandPrefix could offer to approve a
single segment (e.g. "ps aux" in "ps aux | head -5") without checking
that every other segment was independently safe. Since approving a
prefix escalates the whole command to bypass the sandbox, an
MSYS-prone or otherwise unsafe segment could ride along uncovered.
It now only proposes a segment as the prefix when every other
segment in the command is known-safe on its own.
Added regression tests for quoted MSYS path mentions, caret-escaped
operators, semicolon text, and the prefix-approval gap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(tools): treat redirection as a command boundary, stop using command text as output evidence
Addresses jatmn's latest review on PR #476:
- firstCommandWord only split on whitespace, so cmd.exe redirection
attached directly to a command name (head>out.txt, cat<in.txt,
grep>matches.txt) was read as one word and never matched against the
MSYS-prone name set. It now also stops at < and >.
- detectShellOutputIssue scanned command+output together, so a command
whose own argument text merely quoted an MSYS failure string (e.g. a
gh pr comment --body describing the bug) could be mislabeled after
running even though the real stdout/stderr was unrelated. Removed the
command parameter entirely from detectShellOutputIssue and both call
sites (bash.go, exec_command.go), so the command line can never be
used as post-execution evidence again.
* fix(tools): remove unused truncateHeadTail wrapper
CodeRabbit nitpick: truncateHeadTailWithTotal is called directly
everywhere, so this wrapper is dead code that trips golangci-lint's
unused check and fails CI.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* feat(tools): universal token-based output ceiling with spill-to-disk
Cap every tool result at the registry boundary (16k estimated tokens,
ZERO_TOOL_OUTPUT_CEILING_TOKENS-tunable, 0 disables) unless the tool
manages its own deliberate budget. Head+tail truncation, full output
spilled to the existing redacted spill dir and re-readable via
grep/read_file, so nothing is lost — only deferred.
This closes the three unbounded paths a single call could flood the
context window through (and then re-bill every following turn):
- web_fetch: up to 256KiB default / 2MiB max of non-HTML body
- skill: full SKILL.md returned uncapped
- MCP-served tools: no budget at all
Self-budgeting tools opt out via an unexported marker interface (an MCP
server can never exempt itself): bash, exec_command (model-raisable),
read_file, read_minified_file, grep, glob, list_directory. Browser
snapshots deliberately stay under the net.
bash itself is tightened to match the unified token model: emit budget
96KiB -> 32KiB per stream (~24k -> ~8k tokens worst case per stream),
while capture retention stays at 96KiB head+tail so the new spill file
covers 6x more of the output than the transcript shows.
* perf(agent): collect post-edit LSP diagnostics off the tool-call path
Inline post-edit diagnostics blocked every edit_file/write_file result on
the language server: a >=300ms quiet-period debounce that reset on each
publish, seconds on the first edit per language, capped at 10s — the
largest recurring latency tax in an edit-heavy session.
Diagnostics are now collected in the background: a file is enqueued the
moment a mutating tool finishes, a single worker checks it while the rest
of the batch executes, and the loop drains completed results just before
building the NEXT provider request, appending errors as a user nudge.
The model always issues another request after an edit turn (to read its
tool results), so it still sees introduced errors at the same decision
point — no tool call ever stalls on the language server.
A file re-edited before its check runs is checked once in its final
state (the checker re-reads the file); re-edited after, it is re-queued
and the newer result wins. A drain that finds the worker still busy
gives up after 3s and delivers on a later turn — results stay accurate
because any further edit re-enqueues the file.
The tools-side inline mechanism (tools.RunOptions.Diagnostics) is kept
for direct API callers; the loop just no longer wires it.
* fix: address review — max-turns diagnostics drain, capture-gap marker, test hardening
- Drain background diagnostics before the max-turns final-answer request
so an error introduced by the LAST turn's edit is reported in the
summary instead of silently dropped (+ regression test).
- spillBashStreams marks the head/tail junction with a capture-gap
marker when boundedBuffer dropped the middle of a stream, so a spilled
log never reads as contiguous when it is not; junction position is
asserted in the test.
- Tests override TMP/TEMP alongside TMPDIR (os.TempDir reads TMP/TEMP on
Windows) via a shared setTestTempDir helper.
- TestBudgetBashCaptureReportsTrueTotal now asserts spill_path meta and
spill file content; exemption-list test gains read_minified_file.
* fix(test): use a real workspace root in async diagnostics tests
filepath.IsAbs("/ws") is false on Windows (no drive letter), so the
collector test's workspace-absolute assertion failed on the windows
smoke job. Root the fake workspace at t.TempDir() — absolute on every
platform — and assert against it.
* fix: pattern-scrub spill files and gate finalization on pending diagnostics
Review follow-ups (Vasanthdev2004):
- Spill files now pass the pattern-based secret scanner (AWS keys,
GitHub/Slack/OpenAI tokens, PEM blocks, JWTs) in addition to the
configured-key scrub. A bash spill runs before formatBashOutput's
scan, so without this a spilled file held in cleartext exactly the
credentials the transcript redacts. Applied centrally in
spillTruncatedOutput, covering bash, exec_command, and ceiling spills.
- Finalization diagnostics gate: a no-tool-call final answer now drains
pending post-edit diagnostics with the full inline-era budget (10s,
vs the 3s per-turn wait) before the run is accepted; introduced
errors append the nudge and give the model one more turn instead of
being silently dropped when no later turn exists. The max-turns
summary path uses the same finalization budget. Free for runs that
never edited — an idle collector returns immediately.
* feat(skills): make skill invocation deterministic and discoverable
Skills were model-pulled only: the model had to notice a skill in a
640-byte system-prompt list (~6 skills visible; the rest collapsed into
'…and N more') and call the skill tool on its own. Users could not run a
skill at all — typing /<skill-name> reported 'unknown command'. The two
halves of the fix:
User invocation
- /<skill-name> [args] now runs an installed skill directly: resolved
after builtins and user commands, the skill body is inlined as the
prompt with the typed args appended, and submitted through the same
launch path user commands use.
- /skills lists installed skills with their slash form, live from disk.
Labels are honest: a skill shadowed by a builtin, alias, user command,
or a case-colliding sibling is listed bare with a '(via skill tool)'
note instead of advertising a dead /name.
- The slash palette suggests skills (labeled '(skill)') read through the
same loader dispatch uses, so mid-session installs appear and shadowed
or case-colliding names are never advertised.
- Skill and user-command invocations now apply the plain-prompt run-state
guards: mid-run submissions queue the EXPANDED prompt (the queue flush
submits literal text), compaction-in-flight warns, exiting drops.
- Skills resolve through a lazy plugin-aware loader (default dir merged
with plugin skill roots — the same set the skill tool and the system
prompt see), TTL-cached so palette keystrokes don't re-read SKILL.md
bodies.
Model triggering
- Raise the skills-list budget 640 -> 4096 bytes: the list is the model's
only discovery surface, and the old cap made skills past ~6 invisible —
invocation reliability collapsed exactly for users invested in skills.
- Raise description truncation 100 -> 200 runes: the description carries
the trigger conditions ('use when…'); cutting them is what stopped the
model from firing the skill.
- Strengthen the instruction line: scan the list before acting, call the
matching skill FIRST, don't substitute your own approach.
* feat(tui): /skills opens a searchable skill picker
Replace the static /skills card with the same picker UX /model uses:
type-to-filter (ranked search), arrow-key selection, Enter runs the
chosen skill immediately. Selection is by the skill's exact name, so
skills the slash path cannot reach — names shadowed by a builtin or
user command, or names that don't fit a slash token — are still
runnable from the picker, where the choice is unambiguous. The text
card remains only as the no-skills install hint, and the picker path
applies the same run-state guards as slash invocation.
* feat(tui): ask-first guard for bare skill invocations
A skill invoked with no request submits only its body — instructions
with no target ("review the PR" — which PR?) — and the model improvises
a target instead of asking, which is especially wrong in a fresh
session. Bare invocations (slash and picker) now append a conditional
note: if the instructions need a target or details not already clear
from the conversation, ask first; self-contained skills still just run.
Invocations that carry a request are unchanged.
* fix(tui): review follow-ups — restore typed invocation on compaction guard, cap merged suggestions
- The compaction-in-flight guard for skill/user-command invocations fired
after the dispatch path had already cleared the composer, so the typed
"/name args" was lost and had to be retyped; thread the raw invocation
through and restore it into the composer (the plain-prompt guard keeps
the composer intact by firing before the clear). The picker path has no
typed form and restores nothing.
- Cap the merged autocomplete list at the shared bound: each source
self-caps, but three sources could stack to ~3x the palette limit.
- Tighten the shadowed-skill palette test to assert on the advertised
Name rather than the fallback Desc wording.
* chore: ignore zero-skills local build artifact
A locally built test binary under this name was accidentally committed
(and has been scrubbed from the branch history); ignore the name so it
cannot recur.
* docs: document AGENTS.md/ZERO.md and plugin manifest format
Add an "Extending Zero" section to the README covering the
AGENTS.md/ZERO.md project-instructions lookup chain and the
plugin.json manifest fields, neither of which were previously
documented outside the source.
Closes#521
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* Potential fix for pull request finding
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
* docs: fix plugin path scope and add per-user ZERO.md guidelines
- Correct project-scope plugin discovery to <cwd>/.zero/plugins, not
the repo root.
- Clarify that user-scope plugin discovery always resolves under
~/.config regardless of OS, separate from config.UserConfigDir()
(which is OS-aware and used for the per-user ZERO.md file).
- Document the per-user ZERO.md guidelines file added in #475.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* Potential fix for pull request finding
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
* fix(tui): TracerPid PRoot detection, Ctrl+U/D direction, composer guard
- Replace Termux env var detection with isRunningUnderPRoot()
via /proc/self/status TracerPid, cached with sync.OnceValue
- Mouse mode falls back to CellMotion (not AllMotion) under PRoot
to fix broken touch scrolling
- Add Shift+Up/Shift+Down before plain KeyDown/KeyUp for transcript
scroll with permission/askuser cursor + composer guard
- Add Ctrl+U (scroll up) and Ctrl+D (scroll down) with proper
direction: Ctrl+U=move up, Ctrl+D=move down
- Add guards for active modals (wizard, picker, spec review, etc.)
to avoid intercepting their Ctrl+U/D keybindings
- Tests: TestPermissionCursorCtrlU/D (direction regression),
TestShiftUp/DownComposerGuard (composer guard)
- References issue #507
* fix(sandbox): avoid faccessat2 for Termux/Android portability
Replace exec.LookPath with lookupExecutable that uses os.Stat
instead of the faccessat2 syscall. The faccessat2 syscall (439)
is blocked by the Samsung seccomp filter on Android, causing
SIGSYS termination. os.Stat uses the newfstatat/statx syscalls
which are universally permitted.
This is part of broader Termux/Android support for Zero.
* docs(install): add Termux/Android build and configuration guide
Document how to build Zero for native Android/Termux: GOOS=android
to avoid the SIGSYS crash, proot bind-mount for DNS resolution,
PRoot scroll fix, and free-tier provider setup.
* fix(sandbox): skip empty PATH segments, use platform-aware executable check
* feat(openai): forward prompt_cache_key for server-side prefix cache routing
Send the session ID as OpenAI's prompt_cache_key on every completion
request so consecutive turns route to a backend replica that already
holds the conversation prefix in its prompt cache, instead of re-billing
the full ~11k-token system+tools prefix each turn on OpenAI-compatible
endpoints (which get no cache_control breakpoints, unlike Anthropic).
Keyless requests serialize byte-identically to before, and
ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY=1 suppresses the field for strict
endpoints that reject unknown parameters. The Codex (Responses API)
flavor is deliberately untouched: the ChatGPT backend is a separate,
stricter surface.
* fix(openai): parse prompt-cache-key kill switch as a boolean flag
ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY=0 or =false previously disabled forwarding
because any non-empty value tripped the check. Parse it the same way
ZERO_FORMAT_ON_WRITE parses boolean flags, so explicitly-falsy values
are a no-op and only truthy values flip the toggle.
The editing discipline already caps the diff size and scope, but a small diff can
still over-build the solution — speculative abstraction, unrequested
configurability, handling for cases that cannot occur. Add a guardrail: solve the
problem as posed, nothing the user did not ask for; if a 200-line solution could
be 50, rewrite it.
Validated with a before/after eval on five over-engineering-prone tasks: 3/5
solutions came out simpler with the guardrail, none more complex, none broke
correctness (avg 9 vs 11 non-blank lines); the baseline gold-plated on two of them
(an unrequested cache-introspection attribute and header-merge config). No effect
on trivial tasks, where the baseline is already minimal.
Closes#516
* fix(tui): strip all ANSI escapes from copied transcript text
renderAssistantMarkdownText embeds bold markers for prose and ANSI color sequences from chroma for fenced code blocks. stripMarkdownRenderControls only stripped the bold markers, leaking ANSI codes into clipboard text. Switch to ansi.Strip() to remove all escape sequences.
* refactor(tui): extract rendering dispatch and add detailed bool to transcriptBodyItems
Extract rowRenderFn and transcriptRowDispatchFn types and refactor rendering methods into *Fn variants parameterized by the render function.
Add detailed bool parameter to transcriptBodyItems to prepare for the detailed transcript viewport. All callers pass false so there is no behavior change yet.
Extract transcriptRowBodyHeightCacheKeyOpts from transcriptRowBodyHeightCacheKey so the body cap can be configured per caller.
* feat(tui): scrollable detailed transcript viewport with sidebar suppression
Enable keyboard scrolling (PgUp/PgDown/Up/Down) in detailed transcript mode by routing through scrollChat instead of swallowing the keys.
Rewrite detailedTranscriptView to use the transcriptBodyItems pipeline so the body renders through the same viewport/scroll engine as the live view.
Implement detailedTranscriptFooter with copy-status and jump-to-bottom hint integration.
Suppress the sidebar in detailed mode so the full chat width is available for reading uncapped tool output.
* test(tui): detailed transcript scroll with PgUp/Down and Up/Down arrows
TestPgUpDownScrollsDetailedTranscript verifies that PgUp scrolls toward older content and PgDown returns to the bottom in detailed mode.
TestUpDownArrowsScrollDetailedTranscript verifies that arrow keys scroll one line at a time and bottom is clamped at offset 0.
* test(tui): ANSI strip verification for markdown rendering controls and selectable text
TestStripMarkdownRenderControlsStripsAllANSI verifies bold markers, color sequences, and combined sequences are stripped.
TestSelectedTranscriptTextStripsANSIFromHighlightedCode verifies that chroma-highlighted code blocks produce clean plain text in the selectable layer.
* fix for coderabit, and better fewer code.
* fix(tui): address PR review feedback dead code, hover clear, and
rebindable key label
* format
* addressing the review issue
1. the ctrl + b in detailed mode, added the guard to not be able to do
it in detailed mode so it affect its state in the normal mode.
2. added a test coverage for keyDown after `keDown then keyUp` so it
covers that.
* fix(tui): close file drill-in when entering detailed transcript
toggleDetailedTranscript now calls exitFileView before returning, so an active file drill-in is automatically closed when the user enters detailed transcript mode.
* test(tui): verify file drill-in closes on detailed toggle
Adds TestDetailedTranscriptClosesFileView and TestDetailedTranscriptStaysClosedOnSecondToggle to guard against the file-view bypass bug.
* fix(tui): block composer hit-test while detailed transcript is active
composerMouseSelectionBlocked and mouseOverComposer now check m.transcriptDetailed so mouse clicks and wheel events in the composer area reach the transcript body instead of being silently consumed.
* test(tui): verify composer mouse is ignored in detailed mode
Adds TestComposerMouseSelectionBlockedInDetailedMode to guard against composer hit-test swallowing mouse events during detailed transcript viewing.
* Add-user-ZERO-guidelines-to-system-prompt
* fix(agent): resolve user ZERO.md under config.UserConfigDir()/zero
Review feedback: every other user-level config (config.json, commands,
specialists) lives under config.UserConfigDir()/zero, so the per-user
guidelines file now resolves there instead of ~/.zero. The basename match
is case-insensitive to mirror the project guideline loader.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* refactor(agent): extract shared guideline truncation and lookup helpers
CodeRabbit review feedback: the rune-safe truncation block and the
case-insensitive basename scan were duplicated across the project and
user guideline loaders. Extract truncateGuidelineContent and
findCaseInsensitiveFile and use them in both paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(agent): keep truncated guideline content within the byte limit
CodeRabbit review feedback: truncateGuidelineContent appended the
truncation marker after slicing to the limit, so the result could
exceed the requested budget by the marker length. Reserve space for
the marker before choosing the cut point.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(agent): fix small-limit truncation, precedence, and test isolation for user guidelines
Address remaining review feedback on PR #475:
- truncateGuidelineContent still exceeded the limit when limit was
smaller than the truncation marker itself. Fall back to a hard,
rune-safe cut with no marker in that case so the result never
exceeds the caller's budget.
- Reorder buildSystemPrompt so user guidelines are injected before
workspace/project guidelines, and add an explicit precedence note
in the user guidelines section text, so a repo's AGENTS.md/ZERO.md
is the later, more specific instruction and wins on conflict.
- Add a TestMain in the agent package that stubs userConfigDirForPrompt
to an empty temp directory by default, so buildSystemPrompt(Options{})
calls in unrelated tests don't pick up a contributor's real
~/.config/zero/ZERO.md.
- Document the per-user ZERO.md location and its precedence relative
to project guidelines in AGENTS.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* feat: agent quality, caching, retry, and tooling upgrades
Ten self-contained improvements to the core agent engine and tools:
- edit_file: fuzzy fallback matching (7-strategy cascade with uniqueness
protection and a disproportion guard) when old_string does not match
byte-for-byte; exact match remains the fast path
- edit_file/write_file: inline error-severity LSP diagnostics in tool
output so the model sees a break it introduced in the same turn
- lsp: expand server registry from 4 to 28 languages; doctor grades only
tier-1 servers and lists the long tail informationally
- agent: consecutive read-only tool calls execute concurrently (bounded
at 8), consumed in original order, never spanning a mutating call
- anthropic: cache_control breakpoints on the last two conversation
messages so the transcript prefix stays a prompt-cache hit
- providerio: retry schedule raised to 6 attempts with exponential
2s-30s backoff when the server sends no Retry-After
- tools: truncated exec/bash output spills to a redacted temp file
referenced in the truncation notice; bash output (previously
unbounded) now shares exec_command's token budget
- web_fetch: dependency-free HTML-to-markdown conversion (format:
auto|raw|markdown) and larger limits (256KiB default, 2MiB max, 30s)
- modelregistry: live models.dev overlay refreshes context limits and
base pricing from a TTL-cached fetch; opt-in at the CLI entrypoint
- tools: opt-in format-on-write (ZERO_FORMAT_ON_WRITE=1) runs standard
formatters across 27 extensions, ordered before the file-tracker
re-baseline so conflict detection is preserved
* fix: address PR review feedback on fuzzy edits, diagnostics, spill
- edit_file: adapt the replacement to the fuzzy-resolved span — when the
span is a uniformly deeper-indented copy of old_string (line-trimmed /
indentation-flexible matches), the same indentation delta is applied to
new_string, and a span ending in a bare CR keeps its CR so CRLF files
never gain a mixed line ending; block-anchor matches with drifted
interiors are deliberately left untouched
- diagnostics: render workspace-relative paths in inline post-edit
diagnostics (base name outside the workspace) so absolute paths never
leak the local username or directory layout into the model prompt or
session transcript
- spill: harden the spill directory for shared temp dirs — per-uid name,
reject symlinked or non-directory paths (MkdirAll follows symlinks),
and on Unix require current-user ownership
- bash: the branch's output cap and truncation-flag threading are
superseded by main's capture-time bounding (boundedBuffer +
budgetBashCapture), which already sets Result.Truncated; this rebase
adopts that design and keeps spill-to-disk on exec_command, where the
full output is still buffered and a spill is genuinely complete
* fix: address review round 2 — permission-event race, fuzzy ambiguity, spill reachability
- agent: serialize OnPermission behind the same mutex as
OnPermissionRequest in the parallel read batch. buildPermissionEvent
fires for batched reads with a non-trivial sandbox decision (e.g. a
grant-matched extra root), and front-end handlers append to shared
session-recording state without their own locking — two batched reads
emitting concurrently was a data race the pre-batch serial loop never
allowed.
- edit_file: reject two or more DISTINCT candidate spans from one fuzzy
strategy as ambiguous instead of silently editing the first. Duplicate
blocks at different indentation each resolve to a unique literal, so
the previous occurrence-uniqueness check passed and wrote the wrong
span. A single candidate occurring at multiple positions still
cascades to stricter strategies as before.
- tools: make spill files actually reachable by the recovery path the
truncation notice advertises — resolveScopedReadPath now recognizes
files inside the per-uid spill dir (containment verified after symlink
resolution, so a planted link cannot smuggle an out-of-scope file
through the gate); read_file/grep can follow the notice instead of
re-running the command.
* fix: surface competing block-anchor spans; make write-barrier test observe cross-probe order
- edit_file: blockAnchorReplacer now returns every span clearing the
similarity threshold (best first) instead of silently picking the
single most-similar block. Hiding competitors from the cascade's
distinct-candidate check could edit the wrong block when two blocks
share anchors and both interiors are plausible; one clear winner still
resolves, two plausible blocks now report ambiguity (covered by a
two-block test that asserts the file is untouched).
- agent tests: the parallel write-barrier test now records both probes
into one mutex-guarded shared log and asserts the cross-probe ordering
it always claimed to (write starts after the first read batch ends;
second read batch starts after the write ends). The previous version
only compared indices within the read probe's own log, which a
regression letting the write overlap a batch could still pass; the
stray no-op mutex assignment is gone.
* fix(sandbox): fix nested pipe creation under the Windows restricted token
Any subprocess spawned FROM WITHIN a process already running under Zero's
write-restricted token, that captures the child's output via a pipe, failed
with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED. Reproduces with `gh pr list` (gh shells out to git
and captures its output), with a bare Go program doing exec.Command(...).
Output(), and with cmd.exe's own FOR /F ('...') construct, which uses the
identical CreatePipe+CreateProcess pattern internally with no external tools
involved.
Root cause: a WRITE_RESTRICTED token requires a WRITE-type access check to
match BOTH the normal enabled-SID grant and a separate grant to one of the
token's restricted SIDs. CreateRestrictedToken does not modify the default
DACL it inherits from the base token, so a pipe created with a default
security descriptor (the common case; every language runtime's "spawn a
subprocess and capture output" primitive does this) only carries ACEs for
the base identity, none of which are in the restricted-SID list, so the
second check fails. This is the same failure family already documented for
Schannel/SEC_E_NO_CREDENTIALS, but broader in scope: it affects any pipe,
event, mutex, or other kernel object created with default security by a
process running under the token.
Fix: add the token's own logon SID (already unconditionally present in its
restricted-SID list) to the token's default DACL, so objects it creates
without an explicit security descriptor automatically satisfy the extra
check. This does not touch filesystem access: NTFS write-jailing is
enforced by the explicit ACL grants applied to workspace paths, created
WITH an explicit security descriptor, and the token's default DACL is only
consulted when none is supplied. Exposure is bounded to the same logon
session (only other processes running as the same signed-in user could, in
principle, open a NAMED object the sandboxed process creates with default
security; anonymous pipes have no name and are reachable only via an
inherited handle, so this is a no-op for the actual objects this fixes).
This is not specific to the unelevated tier added in #427 - the affected
token-construction code is shared by both the fully elevated and unelevated
restricted-token paths, so this predates that work.
Verified on Windows 11 (before/after, using an unfixed build for
comparison):
- Before: FOR /F fails with Win32 error 5 (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED), masked
behind cmd.exe's generic "not recognized" message; `gh pr list` fails
with "failed to run git: pipe: Access is denied."; a bare Go nested
exec.Command(...).Output() fails with "pipe: Access is denied."
- After: all three succeed; `gh pr list` returns real PR data.
- Write-jail regression check: a write outside every granted root is still
denied by the OS after the fix (unchanged from before).
New TestWindowsRestrictedTokenNestedPipeCapture (ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE=1)
pins the FOR /F case using only cmd.exe, no external dependency. go vet and
the full internal/sandbox suite are clean (excluding pre-existing failures
already present identically on unmodified main, unrelated to this change).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(sandbox): fix dangling-buffer use-after-scope in default DACL merge
Addresses the blocker from review on this PR (Vasanthdev2004, gnanam1990,
coderabbitai): windowsTokenDefaultDacl returned a *windows.ACL that points
INTO the local buf byte slice backing TOKEN_DEFAULT_DACL - Windows embeds
the ACL data in the same allocation GetTokenInformation fills. The
function's own runtime.KeepAlive(buf) only covered buf up to that
function's own return; nothing kept it alive across the caller's later use.
In broadenWindowsRestrictedTokenDefaultDacl, the returned ACL pointer was
then dereferenced by native code in setEntriesInACL after intervening
allocations (the EXPLICIT_ACCESS literal, TrusteeValueFromSID) that are
GC-safepoint-eligible - a real use-after-free window in code that
constructs part of the sandbox's own restricted token, even though Go's
current non-moving GC meant it didn't manifest in testing.
windowsTokenDefaultDacl now returns the backing buffer alongside the ACL;
the caller holds runtime.KeepAlive(oldDaclBuf) until after
SetEntriesInAclW (the last point that dereferences it) returns.
Also from review: SetEntriesInAclW reports its Win32 error directly in the
return value, not via GetLastError, so setEntriesInACL now uses that
return value directly instead of the (potentially stale/unrelated) syscall
error. And narrowed the default-DACL grant from GENERIC_ALL to GENERIC_READ
| GENERIC_WRITE - the second WRITE_RESTRICTED access check only needs a
read/write match; GENERIC_ALL also implied DELETE/WRITE_DAC/WRITE_OWNER
that the pipe/event/mutex use case never needed.
Re-verified on Windows 11 with the fixed runner: nested pipe capture still
succeeds (pure Go exec.Command(...).Output(), and TestWindowsRestrictedTokenNestedPipeCapture
via go test itself), and the write-jail regression check (write denied
outside every granted root, allowed inside) is unchanged. Full
internal/sandbox suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* feat(tui): actionable hints on provider/model errors
Classify a failed turn's provider error into auth / rate-limit /
connectivity / model-not-found / context-overflow and render a one-line
next step below the red error row, instead of dumping an identical raw
blob for every failure mode.
The classifier lives in a new internal/errhint package so both the TUI
error row and the CLI exec path can share it (TUIHint references slash
commands, CLIHint references zero subcommands). Classification is a
conservative string heuristic keyed off providerio.ClassifiedError's
prefixes plus lower-level DNS/TLS/timeout/context-length signatures,
since the numeric HTTP status is gone by the time the error reaches a UI
surface.
* feat(tools): budget bash output with head+tail truncation
bash was the one tool that returned command output with no byte cap —
'cat large.log' or a verbose test run could dump megabytes into context
and force compaction, while every other read/search tool already applies
a budget.
Cap stdout and stderr at 96KB each, keeping the head and tail of an
oversized stream (build/test failures usually land at the tail) and
dropping the middle behind a marker that points at redirect-to-file +
read_file. Record raw_bytes/emitted_bytes/estimated_tokens/truncated in
Meta like the other tools. Sandbox-denial and shell-issue detection still
run on the full raw output before budgeting.
* fix(gemini): retry 401 with refreshed OAuth token
The Gemini provider used providerio.SendWithRetry (429/503/529 only),
so an expired OAuth token surfaced as a terminal 'API key not valid'
auth error while OpenAI and Anthropic silently recovered via
SendWithAuthRetry's force-refresh-and-replay on 401.
Plumb OAuthResolver through gemini.Options/Provider and the factory
(exactly as the other two providers already do) and switch the stream
send to SendWithAuthRetry. With a nil resolver (API-key users) behavior
is unchanged.
* fix(errhint): gate classification on provider-origin marker
Address CodeRabbit review on #1: agentResponseMsg.err can also carry
local failures (a tool's 'permission denied', a 'file does not exist',
a config error), and broad substrings would have attached a bogus
/provider or /model hint to those.
Classify now returns Unknown unless the message carries a provider marker
the provider layer always attaches (auth error: / rate limit error: /
provider error: / provider request error: / provider stream error:).
Local errors never draw a provider hint; provider errors sub-classify as
before. Added local-failure test cases proving they stay Unknown.
* feat(cli): actionable hint on text-mode exec provider errors
zero exec printed provider failures as a bare '[zero] <raw error>' with
no next step. Append a one-line hint (reusing the shared errhint
classifier) for recognized provider failures — 'run `zero auth`',
'run `zero doctor`', etc. The provider-origin gate means non-provider
codes (sandbox_error, mcp_error) and JSON/stream-json output are
untouched.
* fix(tools): set Result.Truncated for budgeted bash output
Address CodeRabbit review on #3: budgetBashOutput recorded truncation in
meta["truncated"] but never set the Result.Truncated struct field, so
consumers reading the struct (like glob/web_fetch/read_minified do) would
miss truncated bash results. Return the bool from budgetBashOutput and
set Result.Truncated on every return path.
* perf(tui): reuse one LSP manager across prompts
runAgentWithOptions built a fresh lsp.NewManager per run and shut it down
when the run returned, so gopls (and every other language server)
cold-started on the first edit of every turn — 200ms-2s of latency the
manager's own design (long-lived, reused servers) exists to avoid.
Build one manager per session in newModel (cheap: servers start lazily on
first Check) and reuse it across runs; the SelfCorrector still gets a
fresh checker wrapping the shared manager each run. Torn down with a
short deadline in quit(). Runs fall back to a per-run manager when the
session manager is absent (cwd unknown, or a directly-built test model).
* perf(tui): accumulate streamingText as []byte (O(1) append)
m.streamingText += msg.delta was O(len) per delta -> O(n²) across a long
generation (a 10k-token code gen allocates hundreds of MB of intermediate
strings and the UI gets progressively laggier). Accumulate into a []byte
with append (O(1) amortized) and read via streamingTextString().
A []byte rather than strings.Builder because the TUI model is copied by
value on every Update, which would trip strings.Builder's copy check;
[]byte is nil-safe and copies cleanly like the other slice fields.
* perf(tui): coalesce streamed text deltas to one frame
Every OnText delta was its own tea.Msg, so a fast provider (100+ tok/s)
drove 100+ full Update->View cycles per second, each re-parsing the
growing markdown — visible stutter over SSH and wasted CPU.
Batch agentTextMsg deltas at the runtime sink over a ~16ms frame and
forward them as a single message, decoupling render rate from token rate.
Any non-text message flushes pending text first so ordering with
tool-call / reasoning / row messages is preserved; the final
agentResponseMsg (a tea.Cmd return, not a sink message) is safe because
the model already drops deltas for an inactive runID.
* fix(agent): raise tool-failure stop threshold 4->6
guardrails.go halted a run after 4 consecutive same-error tool failures.
A corrective hint fires at 2, and a model iterating on a genuinely tricky
edit can legitimately fail a couple more times after the hint while
converging — stopping at 4 cut those runs short. Raise to 6; the streak
still resets the instant the tool succeeds or hits a different error, so
only true same-error loops are affected.
* fix(agent): more reconnect retries with jitter; narrow to transport errors
#19: bump maxStreamReconnects 2->4 and add up-to-50% jitter on the
exponential backoff (capped at 8s), so a multi-second network blip is
ridden out instead of killing the run on a 2s hiccup, and concurrent runs
(swarms, cron fleets) don't reconnect in lockstep.
#34: drop the '502'/'503' substring matches from shouldReconnect. 503
already exhausted providerio.SendWithRetry (retrying here is a redundant
double-retry) and 502 is non-idempotent by providerio's rule (the POST
may have been processed). Only genuine transport failures — where no
response was received — reconnect now.
* fix(agent): reduce stall retries 2->1 to bound stuck-session time
A no-output stream stall is detected only after the full stream idle
timeout (~5min) elapses, and each retry can idle again — so 2 retries
left an interactive session frozen for ~15min. Drop to 1 retry: keeps the
common single-hiccup recovery while bounding the worst case to ~2x the
idle timeout.
* fix(tui): serialize coalescer forwarding to preserve message order
Address CodeRabbit review on #7: flush() and the run-switch path drained
the text buffer under c.mu but called forward() after releasing it, so a
timer-fired text flush could race a concurrent non-text send() and land
after the tool-call/reasoning message it should precede.
Hold c.mu across drain AND forward (drainAndForwardLocked), so whoever
holds the lock delivers atomically and the other caller blocks until it
is done — text can never overtake a following non-text message. Added a
concurrency stress test (timer racing an inline send) that passes under
-race.
* feat(tui): accept /compact now
Bare /compact already triggers compaction, but /compact now — what users
reach for when the context gauge climbs — hit the usage-error branch.
Accept the 'now' keyword and advertise it in the command usage.
* feat(tui): add /retry, /edit, /copy, /export commands
/retry resends the last prompt; /edit recalls it into the composer to
tweak and resend — both read a new lastPrompt field captured verbatim
(pre-expansion) in launchPrompt. /copy puts the last answer on the
clipboard via the existing copy machinery; /export writes a plain
role-prefixed transcript to a file (timestamped default, or a given
path). Real gaps for SSH users with no mouse select.
* feat(tools): separator-insensitive tool_search matching
tool_search ranked deferred tools by exact substring, so a model that
typed 'webfetch' (dropping the underscore) matched nothing and looped.
Add a separator-squashing fallback ('web_fetch' -> 'webfetch') scored
below an exact substring match, so precise queries still rank first.
* feat(tools): signal ask_user dismissal distinctly from a blank field
Empty answers all rendered as '(no answer provided)', so the model
couldn't tell a wholesale dismissal (user closed the prompt without
answering anything) from one field left blank amid real answers — and
might invent a default. FormatAskUserAnswers now flags a full dismissal
up front as a skip and marks individual empties '(left blank)' vs
'(skipped)'.
* feat(tui): fuzzy ranking in model/session pickers
The pickers filtered by flat strings.Contains with no ranking, so
finding 'sonnet 4.5' among 50+ models meant an exact prefix or scrolling.
Rank matches (exact < prefix < contains < subsequence, reusing
fuzzySubsequenceGap) so the closest match lands on top, and 'snt45' now
matches 'Sonnet 4.5'. Groups stay contiguous — ordered by their best
match, never split — so the grouped model picker still renders one header
per provider. Covers both /model and /resume (shared commandPicker).
* perf(agent): cache per-tool schema render across turns
partitionTools re-ran the recursive schema->map conversion
(schemaToRuntimeMap) for every tool on every turn — redundant, since a
tool's advertised name/description/schema is stable for the run. Add a
per-run definition cache keyed by tool name (nil-safe; the plain
partitionTools entrypoint and tests pass nil for fresh renders).
The partitioning itself (visibility, deferral, ordering) still recomputes
every turn — it must, because a tool's deferred state can flip mid-run
(swarm tools un-defer once a swarm is active). Only the expensive schema
render is memoized. tool_search is excluded by its callers (dynamic
description) so it never poisons the cache.
* perf(agent): calibrate compaction estimate against real prompt tokens
The byte/4 heuristic (ApproxTextTokens) over-counts code-heavy content
~15-20%, so with triggerRatio=0.7 compaction fired at ~60% of true
capacity — premature summarizer calls that degrade quality. Each turn now
folds (rawEstimate, provider InputTokens) into an EMA calibration ratio,
clamped per-sample to a sane band; maybeCompact and the reactive path
scale their estimates by it. Turn 1 uses the raw estimate (no data yet);
later turns compact near real capacity.
* style: gofmt the new agent test files
The CI gofmt check flagged the #22/#25 test files (struct-field and
switch alignment). No behavior change.
* feat(agent): turn-based plan staleness reminder
The stale-plan nudge only fired after 10 tool calls since the last
update_plan, so a plan that drifts stale across many low-tool-call turns
(one call per turn) took many turns to catch — the 'plan set turn 1 stays
pending forever' case. Add a turn-count complement: after
stalePlanTurnThreshold (8) turns without an update AND with items still
pending, fire the same one-shot reminder. Gated on pending items so a
fully-completed plan is never nagged; the existing tool-call trigger is
unchanged. (The roadmap's fuzzy 'tool calls unrelated to plan items'
relevance match is deliberately omitted — too false-positive-prone.)
* feat(agent): preserve recent-edits summary across compaction
Compaction preserved the plan, loaded skills, tool schemas, and project
instructions, but not file edits — so after the editing turns were elided
the model knew it had changed a file only vaguely, and would re-read to
rediscover its own footprint. Extract write_file/edit_file targets from
the elided middle with a one-line note from each tool result, merge them
across repeated compactions (newer note per path wins), and carry them in
the preserved-state JSON (capped at 20 paths / 160 bytes per note).
* feat(tui): workspace-scoped /resume + fewer event reads
/resume listed sessions from every project globally, and read the full
event file for each of them to test for resumable content. Filter the
picker (and /resume latest) by the current workspace Cwd, checked BEFORE
the per-session read so a large global history no longer pays N full file
reads to build one workspace's list; also skip zero-event sessions via
metadata without any read. Sessions with no recorded Cwd (older runs) and
an unknown current workspace stay visible so nothing is hidden that can't
be confidently placed. Explicit /resume <id> still resolves any session.
* feat(tui): warn on model switch that drops staged images
Staged images were silently dropped at submit when the active model had
no vision support — the user only learned after sending. Chips already
render above the composer (renderAttachmentChips); add an immediate amber
warning line to the /model switch status (both same-provider and
cross-provider paths) when images are staged and the newly selected model
can't accept them, so the drop is surfaced at switch time.
* feat(tui): inline recovery affordance on setup errors
A first-run setup error rendered as a bare red 'error: <text>' with no
pointer to the fix. Append a faint, stage-tailored recovery line (edit
the endpoint/name/key above then Enter, or pick another model) that names
only keys the stage's footer confirms, so the guidance is always accurate.
Empty for stages whose footer already makes recovery obvious.
* fix: address CodeRabbit review (5 findings)
- loop.go: recompute the compaction calibration estimate at calibration
time, not request-build time, so a reactive-compaction reissue that
shrinks the request feeds the EMA the sample that actually completed.
- errhint: match bare HTTP status codes (401/403/429/529) only at digit
boundaries, so an incidental number ('4290ms', 'id 14015') isn't
mis-bucketed as auth/rate-limit.
- bash: drop the stray unmatched ']' in the output-truncation marker.
- tui /retry: apply the same exiting/compactInFlight guards commandPrompt
has, so a retry can't race compactResultMsg's rewrite of session state.
- tui /export: write the transcript 0o600 (it may contain echoed
secrets), not world/group-readable 0o644.
* test(tui): skip export file-mode assertion on Windows
os.WriteFile ignores Unix permission bits on Windows and Stat reports
0666, so the 0o600 assertion failed there. The production 0o600 is
honored on Linux/macOS (where it matters); guard the check with
runtime.GOOS so Windows smoke passes.
* fix(tui): align /resume latest filters + case-insensitive workspace match on Windows
Address CodeRabbit review on #21:
- latestResumableInWorkspace now applies the SAME filters as the picker
(skip zero-event metadata and empty/failed runs), so /resume latest
can't land on a session the picker intentionally hides.
- sessionMatchesWorkspace compares paths case-insensitively on Windows
(its filesystem is), so the same workspace spelled with different casing
no longer hides resumable sessions; other platforms stay case-sensitive.
* fix(tui): /retry resends the last prompt's image/PDF attachments
/retry relaunched only lastPrompt's text, but launchPrompt clears the
pending image/document queues once a turn is sent. A vision- or PDF-backed
prompt that failed would silently retry as text-only and answer a different
task. Snapshot the consumed attachments at launch and re-stage them on
/retry so launchPrompt rebuilds an identical request (document preamble,
images, and the submit-time vision re-check). startNewSession drops the
snapshot so a post-/new /retry cannot leak the previous session's
attachments. Also correct the OAuthResolver factory comment, which omitted
the Gemini provider it is now passed to.
* fix: address jatmn review (reconnect 5xx, /edit attachments, edit-cap, coalescer test)
- reconnect: exclude HTTP 5xx (500/502/503/504) before the transport
substring match so "504 Gateway Timeout" no longer slips through on the
generic "timeout" needle. A gateway timeout is non-idempotent — the
completion POST may already have reached the model — so replaying the
connect risked duplicate billable work. Reuses a digit-boundary status
matcher exported from errhint (HasStatusCode). Test asserts 504/500 stay
non-reconnectable.
- tui /edit: re-stage the remembered image/PDF snapshot alongside the
recalled prompt text, mirroring the /retry fix — editing a vision- or
document-backed prompt no longer silently resends a text-only version.
- compaction recent-edits: order edits by LAST edit, not first, and move a
re-touched path to the newest position on merge, so the maxRecentEdits
tail cap keeps the file the model most recently edited instead of dropping
it. Adds mergeRecentEdits (edit-specific) and a capped-list regression.
- coalescer test: inject the frame timer via afterFunc so
TestCoalescerBatchesDeltas proves buffering deterministically instead of
racing the real 16ms wall-clock timer.
* fix(tools): bound bash output capture in memory, not just model-visible text
Previously stdout/stderr streamed into unbounded bytes.Buffers and were only
truncated to the 96 KiB budget AFTER the command finished, so a runaway command
(cat huge.log, yes) could grow Zero's memory until it stalled or OOMed before
budgetBashOutput ever ran. Replace the capture with boundedBuffer, an io.Writer
that keeps only the head+tail each stream will surface and discards the middle as
it arrives, while counting the true total for the truncation marker. Memory is now
bounded to ~head+2×tail per stream regardless of output size.
truncateHeadTail is refactored onto a total-aware core so the string path (and its
tests) are unchanged, and budgetBashCapture reports the true raw_bytes even though
only a bounded slice was held. Adds boundedBuffer/capture unit tests and an
end-to-end test that streams ~5× the budget and asserts bounded emission with an
accurate raw_bytes.
Setting ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to a proxy/gateway failed setup with "anthropic
provider anthropic requires official baseURL https://api.anthropic.com".
OPENAI_BASE_URL already auto-promotes a non-official env URL to the
openai-compatible kind, but Anthropic had no equivalent, so the universal
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL proxy convention was rejected outright.
Mirror the OpenAI behaviour: a non-official ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL from the
environment promotes the profile to anthropic-compatible. This stays env-only
on purpose -- a custom baseURL in a project config.json is still rejected by
Resolve, so an untrusted project can't redirect a first-party key to another
host (TestResolveRejectsAnthropicOfficialProviderCustomBaseURL still passes).
Fixes#479
* fix(specialist): cap max specialist nesting depth
A Task specialist can recursively spawn further specialists via --depth.
Without a ceiling, a runaway or malicious chain of Task calls can recurse
indefinitely, exhausting process and memory resources. Reject any run whose
depth exceeds a hard cap of 8.
Related to #470, not closing it: today's normal specialist/swarm path
cannot reach this recursively, since child sessions are launched with
--tag specialist and shouldRegisterExecSpecialistTools suppresses the Task
tool for that tag (see PR description for details). This is a
defense-in-depth guard, not a fix for an active exploit. Split out of #468
at reviewer request.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(specialist): reject depth cap at the boundary, not past it
Addresses jatmn's review on PR #491:
- Executor.Run checked `CurrentDepth > maxSpecialistDepth`, but this call is
what launches the child at CurrentDepth+1. A parent already AT the cap
passed the check and started a child one level past it, only getting
rejected on that child's own next call. Change to `>=` so the guard fires
before the over-cap child is launched.
- Add TestRunRejectsDepthAtMax to cover the boundary explicitly.
* test(specialist): cover resume boundary in depth-cap guard
The pre-branch depth guard in Run sits before the fresh/resume split, but
the boundary test only exercised the fresh path, leaving a future refactor
free to move the guard without any test catching a resume regression.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(tools): fix cmd.exe /S/C corrupting commands with embedded quotes
Any shell command whose own text contains embedded double quotes -
python -c "print(15 / 3)", git commit -m "message", node -e "..." - was
silently corrupted on Windows before reaching the target program. Reported
live: a model ran python -c "print(15 / 3)" and got back a SyntaxError
showing the code Python received as literally "print(15, truncated right
before the /.
Root cause: bash.go passes the full command text as ONE argv element to
cmd.exe /d /s /c, and Go's os/exec escapes it correctly for a standard
CommandLineToArgvW-style parser (wrapping it in quotes, backslash-escaping
the embedded ones). But cmd.exe's own /C remainder parsing does not follow
those rules once /S is present: per its documented behavior, it strips the
FIRST and LAST literal quote character in the whole remainder - not a
matched pair - before handing the (now corrupted) text along to be
re-tokenized. The escaping was correct for one layer of parsing; the
command line actually goes through two.
Fix: on Windows, write commandText to a temp .cmd script file and point
/c at the file's path instead of the raw command text. This sidesteps
cmd.exe's /C-remainder heuristic entirely, since the remainder is then
just a plain path with no quotes to mis-strip. @echo off is prepended
since cmd.exe treats a /c target ending in .cmd as a batch file and
echoes each line it runs by default, which would otherwise pollute
captured stdout (caught by the existing bash tool test suite before this
commit, not left in).
buildBashCommand now returns a cleanup func (in addition to plan.Cleanup)
for the temp file. Both callers updated: bash.go's one-shot run defers it
immediately; exec_command.go's persistent session composes it with
startExecProcess's own cleanup and runs it after the session's process
actually exits, not before.
This fix lives upstream of the sandbox wrapping, in how the Name/Args spec
is constructed before either the direct or sandboxed code path consumes
it, so both benefit without separate sandbox-specific changes - cmd.exe's
own command-line parsing does not depend on what token launched it.
New TestBashToolPreservesEmbeddedQuotesOnWindows pins the exact failure
shape via a self-dispatch test helper (a quoted argument containing a
space and a slash, matching the original bug report's truncation point),
with no dependency on python being installed. Full internal/tools suite
green, excluding 3 failures pre-existing and identical on unmodified main
in my environment (unrelated path-assumption issues under a deeply nested
working directory).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(tools): pass the shell command line to cmd.exe raw instead of via a temp script
Review on the original fix found real problems with running commandText
from a temporary .cmd file: it silently changed cmd.exe command-line
syntax into batch-file syntax (for example, for %i loops need %%i only
inside an actual .bat/.cmd file), /s was still corrupting the script
path itself if it contained spaces, and the script leaked on sandbox
planning errors.
The actual root cause was narrower than the temp-file approach assumed.
cmd.exe's own /C remainder parsing is not CommandLineToArgvW-compatible:
it strips the first and last literal quote from the remainder whenever
it starts with a quote, without undoing backslash-escaping. Passing
commandText as a normal exec.Cmd argument makes Go wrap it in exactly
that shape (quoted because it has spaces, inner quotes escaped as \")
since it contains embedded quotes, which is what the stripping then
corrupts.
Fixes it at the source instead: commandText now reaches cmd.exe
completely unescaped (via SysProcAttr.CmdLine for the unwrapped path,
and the same treatment inside the sandboxed runner's own process
creation for the wrapped path), exactly as if it had been typed at an
interactive prompt. No outer quotes means the stripping heuristic never
triggers for a command like `python -c "print(15 / 3)"`, and a command
that legitimately starts with a quoted executable path is handled by
cmd.exe's own careful quote-preserving special case for that shape.
Also drops /s, which forced the more aggressive of cmd.exe's two
stripping behaviors. No temp file, so nothing to leak on error, and no
batch-file reinterpretation of the command text.
internal/sandbox/windows_runner.go now owns the shared shell-argv shape
(WindowsShellArgs/WindowsShellCommandLine) so internal/tools/bash.go
and the sandboxed runner's windowsCommandLine build the exact same raw
command line instead of duplicating the flag literals in two places.
* chore: retrigger CI
The Windows smoke job failed on TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges in internal/oauth (a lock-file access-denied flake), unrelated to this change. internal/tools and internal/sandbox, the packages this PR touches, both passed. Retriggering to confirm.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(tools): make grep and glob respect run cancellation
grep and glob's Run/RunWithSandbox discarded their context parameter
entirely (bound to _) and ran a synchronous filepath.WalkDir with no way
to know it should stop. An unscoped search over a large tree - a broad
parent directory, not just the workspace, which the model can and does
reach for - could run long enough to be effectively unkillable: the TUI's
Ctrl+C/exit path calls the stored CancelFunc and immediately marks the run
"cancelled" in the UI, but the underlying walk kept running regardless,
because nothing in it ever checked ctx.Err(). Worse, the TUI's quit path
explicitly waits for the cancelled run's own response (to drain
flushRunIDs, so /rewind checkpoints stay consistent) before it will
actually exit - so with the walk unable to hear the cancellation, neither
a second Ctrl+C nor /exit could complete. The only way out was killing the
process.
Thread ctx through Run/RunWithSandbox into grepFiles/scanGlob and check
ctx.Err() at the top of each WalkDir callback, ahead of walkErr, so a
cancelled run aborts the walk on its very next entry instead of visiting
every remaining file. Checked the rest of the tools package for the same
_ context.Context pattern: list_directory (single-level os.ReadDir, no
walk), skill, ask_user, and update_plan don't touch the filesystem, so
grep and glob were the only two tools with this gap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(tools): thread cancellation through grep's match-collection phase
The walk-level fix in grepFiles stopped a cancelled search from visiting
new filesystem entries, but collectGrepMatches still read and
regex-scanned every file the walk had already found, so a search that
had discovered its full file list before cancellation kept running
regardless. Adds the same per-item ctx.Err() check to that phase, plus
a deterministic test that cancels after a fixed number of files instead
of relying on timing.
* test(tools): add mid-walk cancellation coverage and shared helper
Add deterministic mid-walk tests for grepFiles and scanGlob using countingCancelContext, and extract searchCancelledResult so grep/glob share the same cancellation Result mapping.
* style(tools): gofmt search_cancel.go (add missing trailing newline)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* polish: cut per-turn overhead, stabilize cache, add /new
Context economy
- Compaction: preserveLast 8->6, triggerRatio 0.8->0.7 (both copies in sync).
- System prompt: kill the "ELABORATE summary" directive; scale summary to
the work. Comment discipline moved into the core prompt for all model
families (was Anthropic-only); Minimax/DeepSeek/Qwen/etc. now get it.
- Token-budget regression test ratchets the fixed per-turn overhead (base
prompt + eager tool schemas) using the runtime's own estimator, so silent
prompt/schema growth fails CI.
Response quality
- defaultResponseStyle balanced->concise. Reversible via /style.
Tool discovery
- <available_skills> block in the system prompt lists installed skills
(name + one-line description) so the model loads the right one on the
first call instead of guessing and reading the failure. Budget-capped at
640 bytes with an "...and N more" fallback; renders nothing when no
skills are installed (byte-identical to prior prompt).
Session lifecycle
- /new starts a fresh session in place; previous session stays on disk and
is named in the confirmation for /resume. Guards against mid-run reset.
- /clear now notes that context persists and points to /new.
Performance & caching
- partitionTools no longer alpha-sorts the whole tools array every turn,
which inserted a loaded deferred tool mid-array and shifted the cached
prefix on every load. It now builds append-only regions
[eager sorted] + [tool_search] + [loaded deferred sorted] so a
mid-session load grows the tail instead of busting the eager prefix.
Regression test asserts the eager block precedes any loaded tool.
- /context now shows cache hit rate (flags low rate over >5 turns as a
possible unstable prefix) and rolling average turn latency with
time-to-first-token. Both reset on /new.
Measured baselines (auto-mode, no workspace): base prompt 3162 tokens,
eager tool schemas 2433 across 12 tools. Budget ceilings set ~10% above.
Deliberately deferred (need a decision): inverted safety-policy rewrite
(sandbox doesn't catch ~half the B-tier rules), core-tool/web_fetch
deferral (activation-semantics blocker), aggressive prompt slim.
* fix(tui): clear staged attachments + queued message on /new
CodeRabbit: startNewSession reset conversation/usage/latency state but not
the staged input (pendingImages, pendingImageLabels, pendingDocuments,
queuedMessage), which is only consumed at prompt-submit. Without clearing it,
the fresh session's first prompt silently inherited the previous session's
images/documents/queued text. Test now stages all four and asserts they clear.
* feat(tui): add search/filter to provider picker in setup wizard
Add a search input to the provider step of the setup wizard, matching
the existing model picker search UX. Typing filters the provider list
in real-time via case-insensitive substring matching on name, ID, and
aliases.
Fixes#392
* fix(tui): resolve provider index before clearing search on advance
Clearing providerSearch before using currentProvider() caused the wrong
provider to be selected — selectedProvider is an index into the filtered
slice, and clearing the search swaps to the full unfiltered list.
Also update placeholder to reflect that search matches ID and aliases.
* fix(tui): guard empty-filter Enter and add provider search tests
- Enter on an empty provider filter is now a no-op instead of advancing
with the wrong provider (first full-list entry)
- Add table tests for filteredProviders/name/ID/alias matching
- Add tests for selectedProvider reset on edit, empty-match noop,
Ctrl+U clear restores full list, and filtered advance selection
Addresses review feedback from @Vasanthdev2004 and @gnanam1990 on PR #400
* feat(update): add zero upgrade command to apply self-updates
Extends the existing `zero update --check` (which only reported an
available release) with an actual install step:
- `zero update --apply` / `zero upgrade` download, sha256-verify, and
install the latest release.
- npm installs delegate to `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`.
- Standalone installs download the release archive, verify its
checksum, extract it (zip-slip guarded), and atomically replace the
running binary plus any pre-existing optional sandbox helpers. On
Windows, the running exe is renamed aside (NTFS allows this even
while it's executing) since it can't be overwritten directly; the
leftover ".old" file is cleaned up on a later invocation.
Closes#459.
* fix(update): correct macOS expectations in apply test
The optional-helper assertion in TestApplyStandaloneUpdateReplacesBinary
assumed every non-Windows platform has a linux-style "zero-seccomp"
helper to refresh, but applyStandaloneUpdate correctly ships no optional
helpers on macOS (matching scripts/postinstall.mjs). This made the test
fail on macOS CI. Only assert the helper refresh on linux/windows.
* fix(update): address CodeRabbit review findings on zero upgrade
- Reject --target when combined with --apply/upgrade: applying installs
onto the current machine, so a mismatched --target could replace the
running binary with an incompatible-arch build.
- Bound archive/checksum downloads with a dedicated timeout separate
from the release-metadata check timeout, so a stalled connection
can't hang zero upgrade forever.
- Surface a failed rollback in the Windows replaceBinary path instead
of swallowing it, so a botched install is reported rather than
silently leaving the binary missing.
- Run CleanupStaleBinary regardless of whether an update is available,
so a leftover Windows ".old" file isn't stuck waiting for a future
upgrade that may never come.
- Report optional sandbox-helper refresh failures as warnings on
ApplyResult (surfaced in text and JSON output) instead of discarding
them silently.
* fix(oauth): retry secret-lock on Windows delete-pending race to unblock CI
TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges was failing this PR's Windows
smoke job with "create token secret lock: ...Access is denied." — a
pre-existing flake in internal/oauth, not in the upgrade code. On Windows
a concurrent holder's os.Remove leaves the .lock in a delete-pending
state, so an O_EXCL create races it with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
(os.ErrPermission) rather than ErrExist; createSecretFile only treated
ErrExist as contention and hard-failed otherwise.
Treat os.ErrPermission as retryable too, mirroring acquireFileLock in
lock.go. This is the same root-cause fix as #445 (diagnosis by
@gnanam1990); folded in here to make this PR's CI green. Verified on
Windows: the concurrent-converge test passes 30/30.
---------
Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
* fix(agent): reject a malformed additional_permissions payload before prompting
A shell tool call that sets sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions
but omits (or malforms) the additional_permissions payload was accepted into
the normal permission-prompt flow. buildPermissionEvent silently swallowed
the validation error while rendering the prompt's scope text, so the user
saw an ordinary-looking request, approved it, and only then hit a hard
denial from the same validation running again at grant time (loop.go's
grantInlineAdditionalPermissions), with the confusing message "failed to
grant session additional permissions: missing additional_permissions".
A malformed payload can never succeed regardless of the user's decision, so
run the same check (inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile, already the single
source of truth for this shape) up front, before any prompt, and return a
plain tool error the driving model can see and retry from. This also covers
the mismatched case (additional_permissions present without the flag).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(agent): make the additional_permissions rejection message actionable
The rejection added in the previous commit correctly stops a malformed
sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions call before any prompt,
but its message ("missing additional_permissions; provide at least one of
network or file_system") gave a model nothing concrete to correct itself
with. Observed in practice: a weaker tool-calling model (xai/grok-build-0.1)
kept re-attaching sandbox_permissions out of habit from an earlier, correct
gh/git call onto later commands that didn't need it (network was already
open via a session-scoped grant), hit this same rejection 4 times in a row
with no change in its retry, and gave up.
Both messages (missing payload, and empty-but-present payload) now include
a concrete, schema-accurate example - {"network": {"enabled": true}} or
{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}} - and the missing-payload message
adds the other half of the fix: if the command doesn't actually need
elevated permissions, omit sandbox_permissions entirely and retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
The Bun instructions told global installers to run the postinstall script
manually against the global install path, because trustedDependencies only
works in a project package.json. Current Bun has a simpler sanctioned path
that works for both project and global installs: `bun pm trust
@gitlawb/zero` (with -g for globals) runs the blocked postinstall after the
fact. Verified on Bun 1.3.14 on Windows 11: `bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero`
fetched the binary and `zero --version` runs.
Lead with that in README.md, README_ZH.md, and docs/INSTALL.md, keep
trustedDependencies and the manual installer as alternatives for project
installs and older Bun versions, and teach the wrapper's missing-binary
message the same commands for the Bun case.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
createSecretFile's secret-lock loop only retried on os.ErrExist. On Windows a
concurrent holder's `defer os.Remove(lockPath)` leaves the lock file in a
"delete pending" state, so a racer's O_EXCL create returns ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
(os.ErrPermission) rather than ErrExist — which fell through to a hard
"create token secret lock: Access is denied" error instead of retrying. Mirrors
the identical handling already present in acquireFileLock (lock.go, from #261).
Fixes the flaky Windows-CI failure TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges
that was intermittently red-flagging every PR's Windows smoke job.
Verified on macOS: build/vet/gofmt clean, oauth package green, concurrent-
converge test passes under -race (5x). The Windows delete-pending path can't be
reproduced off Windows, so the definitive proof is the Windows CI on this PR.
* fix: allow non-TLS connections to private-network provider endpoints
The provider wizard and health probe rejected `http://` endpoints with a
non-loopback host, so users could not configure a local-network provider
like llama.cpp on another LAN machine (e.g. `http://192.168.1.100:8080/v1`).
Only loopback was relaxed.
Expand the "loopback-only" checks to also cover private-network addresses
(192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12) via `netip.Addr.IsPrivate()`:
- `providerhealth.endpointIsLoopback` → `endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate`
(also returns true for private IP literals).
- `providerhealth.allowLoopback` → `allowLoopbackOrPrivate` — the flag
now relaxes both loopback and private addresses in `validateEndpoint`
and `safeDialContext`.
- `providerWizardIsLoopbackHost` in the TUI wizard now accepts private
IPs, so `http://192.168.x.y` passes the endpoint URL validation.
- `providerProfileIsLocal` in headless setup recognizes private-network
IPs as local (skip API key for keyless LAN providers).
- `baseURLIsLoopback` in app.go recognizes private-network IPs for
credential-requirement logic.
Link-local (169.254.x.x), cloud metadata, and other special ranges
remain blocked. Redirects to any local/private address remain blocked
regardless of the flag (SSRF protection for 3xx targets is unchanged).
Fixes#431
* chore: fix gofmt indentation in connectivity client test
* fix(auth): route `zero auth login chatgpt` to the dedicated ChatGPT flow
`zero auth login chatgpt` went through the generic OAuth manager loopback
path, which builds a random-port http://127.0.0.1:<port>/callback
redirect_uri with no extra authorize params. OpenAI's ChatGPT client
registration requires exactly http://localhost:1455/auth/callback plus the
id_token_add_organizations, codex_cli_simplified_flow, and originator
params, so the authorize endpoint rejected the request with an
"Authentication Error" before any browser interaction.
Route the chatgpt provider to the existing dedicated ChatGPT login
(provideroauth.ChatGPTLogin), which already binds the fixed port, uses the
localhost host, the /auth/callback path, and sends the required params.
`zero auth login chatgpt` now behaves identically to `zero auth chatgpt`.
--device is rejected with a clear message since ChatGPT has no device-code
path.
Fixes#430
* fix(auth): reject --scope on ChatGPT login instead of silently dropping it
`zero auth login chatgpt --scope <x>` reached the dedicated ChatGPT flow,
which ignores the generic manager's ExtraScopes — the scopes were silently
dropped while --device was explicitly rejected. Reject --scope up front
with a clear message, since the Codex client registration pins a fixed
scope set (incl. api.connectors.*) that custom scopes would risk dropping.
Addresses CodeRabbit review on #443.
normalizeProfileForProvider rewrote profile.Name to the catalog provider.ID
whenever normalizeIdentity was true — which includes any first-party provider
whose saved baseURL matches the catalog default. The credential store is keyed
by profile.Name, and this rewrite runs before profileWithCredential, so the
stored-key lookup missed and the rebuilt provider went out with no key: a 401 on
every /model switch for a profile named differently from its catalog id (e.g.
"my-openai").
Only canonicalize an empty or generic placeholder name now; a real user-provided
name is preserved. CatalogID canonicalization is unchanged (it is not the store
key). Adds regression tests covering a custom-named first-party profile surviving
normalization and placeholder names still canonicalizing.
Fixes#440
* fix(sandbox): gate /tmp test assertions on GOOS, not path existence
TestPermissionProfileFromPolicyIncludesDefaultTempWriteRoots and
TestNewScopeNormalizesAndValidatesExtraRoots guard their /tmp assertion with
pathExists("/tmp"), intending to skip it on Windows. But Go resolves the bare
path /tmp against the current drive on Windows, so on any host where C:\tmp
exists the guard passes while the product code (correctly, by design - see
defaultTempWriteRootCandidatesForGOOS) uses %TEMP%/%TMP% instead, and both
tests fail. Gate the assertion on runtime.GOOS != "windows" as well; POSIX
behavior is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* chore: retrigger CI
The Windows smoke job failed on TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges in internal/oauth, unrelated to this change. Retriggering to confirm it was a flake.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* Make shortcuts reconfigurable via the config file.
* Use sidebarToggleAllowed. Fix fmt errors.
* Fix: combination matching superset.
* Remove non-default shortcut combination from the comment.
* feat: add --auto flag to changes commit for LLM-generated commit messages
* fix: address CodeRabbit review suggestions on auto-commit message generation
* fix: resolve auto-commit message and flag validation tests
* fix: add 60s timeout for LLM call in --auto and surface --dry-run in help
Addresses gnanam1990 non-blocking feedback:
- Wrap provider call with context.WithTimeout (60s) to prevent hung provider
- Note --dry-run in --auto help text as preview escape hatch
* fix(tools): flag piped POSIX utilities (head/tail/grep/...) before running on Windows
Zero always executes the bash tool through native cmd.exe on Windows
(shellExecutable() in bash.go), but the pre-flight Windows-syntax
detector only caught bash-style `cd /...` and bare `ls`. Anything
piped into head/tail/grep/wc/awk/sed/cut/xargs/tr — very common in
model-generated commands like `git log ... | head` — ran straight
through to cmd.exe, which has no such builtins, wasting a turn on a
guaranteed failure. Reported in the wild via `git log ... | head`
and a `git blame ... | grep` pipeline.
detectShellCommandIssue now also flags these before the command
runs, with the same "translate to cmd.exe / use Zero's native tools"
guidance already used for the cd/ls cases.
Note: the existing detectShellOutputIssue path (matching cmd.exe's
error text post-execution) only recognizes English strings and will
miss this on non-English Windows locales — the pre-flight check
above is locale-independent since it inspects the model-generated
command text rather than cmd.exe's translated error output.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(tools): require whitespace/end after POSIX utility name, not just \b
CodeRabbit review on PR #412: windowsPosixUtilityPattern used \b after
the utility alternation, but \b only requires a non-word character
next — so tail-log.sh, grep-cli, and sed.exe would all false-positive
(the hyphen/dot satisfies \b without being a real command boundary).
Match windowsLSCommandPattern's existing convention: require
whitespace or end-of-string after the utility name instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
When config.json has providers configured but none marked active
(e.g. a blank/stale activeProvider field, or a config with 2+
providers where none was ever selected), normalizeProviders threw
away the already-normalized provider list on ErrNoActiveProvider.
That meant the interactive TUI's existing "fall back to an
already-configured usable provider" logic (firstUsableProvider)
never got a chance to run for this case — the app instead wiped
resolved to a zero value and forced the user into a brand-new
onboarding wizard, even though a usable, already-saved provider
existed.
- normalizeProviders/Resolve now return the normalized providers
list alongside ErrNoActiveProvider instead of discarding it.
- runInteractiveTUIWithSetup tries firstUsableProvider on that list
before forcing setup; onboarding only runs when no configured
provider is actually usable, matching the existing fallback
already used for a different flavor of this problem
(active-provider-present-but-no-credential).
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vasanth T <[email protected]>
humanCount (the status-line/sidebar token formatter) only ever produced a K
suffix, so a 1,000,000-token context window rendered as "1000K" instead of
"1M" - visible with any 1M-context model (e.g. xai/grok-build-0.1). Its
sibling formatContextWindow already switches to "M" above a million; extend
the same behavior to humanCount, generalized for arbitrary (non-round)
values rather than formatContextWindow's round-number-only heuristic, since
humanCount also renders live, arbitrary "used" token counts.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
`npm install -g @gitlawb/zero` failed on Android/Termux with EBADPLATFORM
because `package.json` `os` array lacked `"android"`. Termux provides a
Linux userspace — the existing `linux-arm64` binary works natively.
- Add `"android"` to the `os` array in package.json.
- Map `android` platform to `linux` in postinstall.mjs resolvePlatform().
Fixes#449
* fix(install): persist install dir to user PATH on Windows
The PowerShell installer only printed a suggestion to add the
install directory to PATH but never actually did it, so `zero`
was unusable from a fresh terminal after install.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(install): don't abort install if PATH persistence fails
Address CodeRabbit review on PR #407:
- Wrap the [Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable call in try/catch
so a PATH-persistence failure (e.g. restricted user profile) warns
instead of aborting the whole install under $ErrorActionPreference
= Stop.
- Factor the repeated PATH-contains check for user/session scopes
into a Test-ZeroPathContainsDir helper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
A malformed/truncated windows-unelevated-setup.json returned a hard error
from loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker, bricking every unelevated command
until the file was hand-deleted, while the unknown-schema path already
reset to an empty marker. Treat corrupt JSON the same way: the marker only
memoizes idempotent ACL applies, so a reset can only cost redundant work,
never skip enforcement.
Addresses the review feedback from coderabbitai and @anandh8x on #427.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* fix(provider-wizard): allow multiple custom OpenAI-compatible providers
Generic/custom providers (custom-openai-compatible, custom-anthropic-compatible)
all share the same CatalogID. wizardProviderStoredKey matched by CatalogID,
which blocked creating more than one custom provider.
Fix: in advanceProviderWizard, skip the ManageKey diversion for custom
providers and route directly to the endpoint step instead. The user can
overwrite an existing instance by re-entering the same name, or create a
new one with a different name.
Named providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.) are unaffected — ManageKey is
still shown for them.
Fixes#375
* refactor(provider-wizard): deduplicate advance/discovery branch, add anthropic-compatible test
---------
Co-authored-by: Baran3575 <[email protected]>
Before the one-time elevated `zero sandbox setup` has run, Windows dropped
straight from the native sandbox to the in-process policy gate: commands ran
with no OS enforcement at all. But only the WFP network filters actually need
Administrator rights - the write-restricted token and the workspace ACL grants
(DACL edits on user-owned roots) work unelevated.
Add an `unelevated` enforcement tier between native and degraded: when the
elevated setup marker is missing and the profile restricts the filesystem, the
command still wraps through the command runner at a new `unelevated` sandbox
level. The runner applies the workspace ACL plan itself (recording applied
plans by hash in windows-unelevated-setup.json so repeat commands skip the
apply) and launches under the same write-restricted token, so the OS-level
write-jail holds. Network enforcement stays with the per-command approval gate
at this tier, and the downgrade reason says so; profiles that need the sandbox
only for network isolation keep the old degrade behavior, and `--sandbox
require` still errors with the setup hint.
Verified end to end on Windows 11 without elevation: a write inside the
workspace succeeds under the restricted token, a write outside every granted
root is denied by the OS (new ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE integration test, using
cmd.exe because managed PowerShell cannot initialize its crypto provider under
a write-restricted token on some hosts).
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
* feat(providers): split minimax zai into intl cn
- Add minimaxi-cn (api.minimaxi.com) sharing model catalog with minimax
- Add zai-cn (open.bigmodel.cn) splitting zai from china to intl
- Decouple env vars: ZAI_API_KEY vs ZHIPU_API_KEY for zai/zai-cn,
MINIMAX_API_KEY vs MINIMAXI_API_KEY for minimax/minimaxi-cn
- Map zai-cn and minimaxi-cn to models.dev providers "zai" and "minimax"
so the model catalog hydrates for both endpoints
* chore(providers): address review feedback on intl/cn split
- Run gofmt on internal/providermodelcatalog/catalog.go (map-value
alignment on the \"zai\" entry was off by one space, fails CI lint)
- Update stale comment in TestResolveAppliesZaiInternationalCatalogDefaults
to say glm-4.5 default (live discovery upgrades to glm-5.2)
- Add missing ProviderKind, APIKeyEnv, and APIKey assertions to
TestResolveAppliesZaiInternationalCatalogDefaults so it would catch
a silent regression in ZAI_API_KEY routing
Add LongCat-2.0 as a first-class OpenAI-compatible provider preset so it can be
selected by name in the setup wizard / `zero providers setup longcat` instead of
hand-entering a custom endpoint.
LongCat-2.0 is Meituan's open, OpenAI- and Anthropic-compatible model. This
wires the OpenAI-compatible transport:
base URL: https://api.longcat.chat/openai (Zero appends /chat/completions)
model: LongCat-2.0
auth: Bearer via LONGCAT_API_KEY
Purely additive — one descriptor plus its catalog/onboarding tests and a README
env-var line; no shared plumbing is touched, so existing providers are
unaffected. Placed with the other OpenAI-compatible third parties (after
moonshot), below the first-party providers.
Verified: go build / vet / test green (catalog + cli onboarding), gofmt clean,
and `zero providers catalog` lists the descriptor with the correct fields.
Endpoint is wired by-spec from LongCat's published docs; a live completion still
needs a real LONGCAT_API_KEY to confirm.
* fix(tui): compose help overlay through the viewport overlay pipeline
exactly like how other popups works.
* fix for the CI/CD of formatting
* Added regression tests for the help overlay
* formatted code
Bun does not run dependency lifecycle scripts by default, so the npm
wrapper's postinstall (which fetches the native Zero binary from GitHub
Releases) is silently skipped. The first run then fails with an
unhelpful "No native binary found" message that points at a source-only
build command, leaving Bun users stuck.
Add a Bun section to README.md and docs/INSTALL.md with the two working
install paths (run postinstall.mjs manually, or add the package to the
project's trustedDependencies). Rewrite the wrapper's missing-binary
error to give an actionable fix for everyone and a Bun-specific hint
when run under Bun, instead of only suggesting a source checkout.
A goroutine dump of a run "stuck for 33 minutes" showed the agent parked
forever in executeToolCall -> requestPermission, blocked on the TUI's
decision channel. Root cause: a shell command whose sandbox decision was
Allow but which requested additional sandbox permissions
(sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions) made shouldRequestPermission
block on OnPermissionRequest, yet buildPermissionEvent stamped the event
Action=allow. The TUI's permissionRequestMsg handler only rendered/resolved
Action=prompt requests and silently dropped everything else — so the decide
callback was never called, the agent waited on a channel nothing would signal
(no ctx cancellation on the active run), and the UI showed "Working" with no
prompt and zero network activity. Intermittent and model-dependent: gpt-5.5's
folder-creation command set the additional-permissions flag, glm's did not,
which is exactly why one hung and the other ran clean.
Two-part fix:
- agent (buildPermissionEvent): an additional-permissions request is an
ELEVATION the user must consent to, even over a sandbox Allow, so mark it
Action=prompt (matching shouldRequestPermission's own condition). It now
surfaces as a real prompt instead of a dropped auto-allow.
- tui (permissionRequestMsg handler): enforce the contract that a blocked
agent ALWAYS gets a decision. A non-prompt action resolves immediately and
FAILS CLOSED (deny; cancel stays cancel) so the UI can never silently grant
an unsurfaced permission; a superseded-run (runID mismatch) resolves as
cancel so its parked goroutine unblocks without depending on ctx-cancel
ordering. Matches the ACP handler's always-resolve, fail-closed contract.
Red-green: reverting the tui branch reproduces the deadlock (decide never
called); reverting the agent override reproduces Action=allow. End-to-end
against a mock backend emitting the exact triggering tool call, the real TUI
now renders the permission prompt and the run completes on approval, where
before it parked forever.
The model picker rendered each row's title from the model's description via
modelPickerDisplayName, which returned the description whenever it was non-empty
and not a known-generic placeholder. Catalog/discovery descriptions come from
models.dev as full sentences (e.g. "DeepSeek chat model for instruction
following, coding, and analysis"), and several models share the same sentence —
so the picker showed sentence-long titles and rows that looked like exact
duplicates, with the real model id surviving only in the meta line.
Prefer the (prettified) model id as the row title; fall back to a non-generic
description only when there is no id to name the row. Distinct ids that share a
catalog description now render as distinct rows.
* feat(providers): add KiloCode and OpenCode provider support
Add KiloCode (Kilo Gateway), OpenCode Zen, and OpenCode Go as catalog
entries using the existing openAICompat transport. No new runtime code
needed — both gateways expose standard OpenAI-compatible /chat/completions.
Fixes#383
* fix(providers): swap OpenCode Zen default model to deepseek-v4-flash
gpt-5.5 is served via /responses on Zen, not /chat/completions.
deepseek-v4-flash works with openAICompat transport.
Co-Authored-By: Vasanthdev2004
`zero providers` had no way to list the models a provider actually serves, so a
custom OpenAI-/Anthropic-compatible endpoint (e.g. a self-hosted proxy serving a
dozen models) forced users to hand-write a config object per model. Live model
discovery already existed for the TUI picker but had no headless CLI surface.
Add `zero providers models [name] [--json]`: it probes the provider's live
model-listing endpoint (an OpenAI-compatible /v1/models or the Anthropic /models)
via providermodeldiscovery.Discover, using the profile's base URL and resolved
credential (inline -> stored -> env). This uses the raw discovery primitive with
no curated-catalog merge or coding-model filtering, so a custom provider's full
model list is returned. Configure the provider once, run `zero providers models`
to see what it serves, and use any id with `zero exec --model <id>` (Zero passes
unknown model ids through to the provider) -- no per-model config needed.
Wired through a new appDeps.discoverProviderModels hook (default:
providermodeldiscovery.Discover) so the command is unit-tested hermetically.
Fixes#381.
* fix(config): default missing google/anthropic models from the catalog
A hand-written provider entry like {name: "google", provider_kind:
"google", apiKey: ...} with no model bricked Zero: config resolution
failed with "provider google requires model", and since zero config and
bare zero setup both resolve up front, the only commands that could have
fixed the config died with the same error (reported in the wild — the
one working escape, zero setup google --model <m>, is undiscoverable
from that message).
The openai kind has always defaulted a missing model
(modelregistry.DefaultModelID); google and anthropic were missed. Fall
back to their provider-catalog default models (gemini-2.5-pro /
claude-sonnet-4.5) the same way, behind the same gate: provider-command
configs (normalizeProvidersWithoutModelDefaults) still surface exactly
what the external command returned. An explicitly configured model
always wins, and profiles with a catalogID already got this via
applyCatalogDescriptor — this covers the catalog-less hand-written case.
The residual requires-model error (openai-compatible customs, which
have no catalog default) now carries an actionable hint: add "model" in
config.json or re-run zero setup with --model.
Tests: google/anthropic defaulting (red-green: reverting the google
fallback reproduces the exact reported error), explicit model wins,
provider-command gate still errors with the hint, and validation treats
official-kind model-less profiles as clean while still flagging customs.
* fix(cli): enter setup on a requires-model config and hint zero auth login
Two residual first-run gaps after the catalog model-defaulting fix:
- An active provider whose model has NO catalog default to fall back on
(custom openai-/anthropic-compatible endpoints) still bricked bare
`zero` and `zero setup` — the exact commands that could have repaired
the config. Tag that resolve failure with ErrProviderRequiresModel and
extend the interactive TUI's fixable-error fallback (previously only
ErrNoActiveProvider) to drop into the setup wizard for it. The sentinel
is attached via a message-preserving wrapper (multi-target Unwrap), so
headless commands (zero config / zero exec) print the exact actionable
text unchanged and every other resolve error stays fatal.
- `zero login` / `zero logout` don't exist (it's `zero auth login`);
first-run users try them and got only "unknown command" (reported in
the wild). The unknown-command error now answers: did you mean
"zero auth login"? Unrelated unknown commands get no suggestion.
Tests: the sentinel comes from a REAL Resolve over a real config file
(message-prefix asserted, no key leak); the TUI fallback is red-green
(reverting the condition reproduces the exact brick with the old error);
the existing no-active-provider fallback and other-errors-stay-fatal
tests still pass; login/logout hint with a no-false-positive check.
* fix(tools): CRLF line ending mismatch in edit_file tool on Windows
* fix: resolve gofmt error, add robust CRLF guard, and fix Windows sandbox and OAuth test flakiness
* security(config): project config should not override sandbox.network to allow
* fix(config): use NormalizeNetworkMode in project config merge, per coderabbit review
Every exec against the Google/Gemini provider failed: Zero emits tool
parameter schemas in OpenAI's JSON Schema dialect, which always includes
`additionalProperties` (schemaToRuntimeMap writes it unconditionally).
Google's functionDeclarations schema doesn't recognize that keyword and
400s the whole request — "Unknown name \"additionalProperties\" …
Cannot find field" — so no tool-using call ever reached the model.
Sanitize tool parameters in the Gemini mapper (only there — the field is
valid and wanted for OpenAI strict mode and harmless for Anthropic):
- sanitizeGeminiSchema keeps only the keywords Gemini's Schema type
supports (type, description, enum, properties, required, items, anyOf,
default, nullable, format, and the min/max/length constraints) via an
allowlist, so any future OpenAI-ism or MCP-supplied field can't leak.
- Recurses through properties, items, and anyOf so nested schemas are
cleaned at every depth, not just the top level.
Tests: a unit test on the sanitizer (nesting, legit fields preserved,
nil-safe) and an end-to-end test asserting the outgoing request body's
functionDeclarations[].parameters carry no additionalProperties while the
real schema survives. Bypassing the sanitizer reproduces the reported
payload, so the coverage is red-green.
Fixes#373
On macOS, DefaultUserConfigPath used Go's os.UserConfigDir which returns
~/Library/Application Support, while users (and Claude Code) place config
at ~/.config/zero/config.json. The user config was never read, leaving
activeProvider empty and the launch failing with `active provider "" not
found` on a fresh `go run cmd/zero setup`.
- Add config.UserConfigDir(): on darwin, resolve to ~/.config (honoring
XDG_CONFIG_HOME), matching Linux and Claude Code. DefaultUserConfigPath,
the TUI user-commands dir, and specialist manifests all route through it.
- Add config.ErrNoActiveProvider sentinel; the interactive TUI now drops
into the setup wizard when resolve fails solely due to a missing/
unresolvable active provider, instead of exiting fatally. Other resolve
errors (malformed JSON, directory conflicts) remain fatal.
Note: `zero setup`/`zero auth` already MkdirAll the config dir before
writing, so the directory is auto-created on first write.
Co-authored-by: smallnest <smallnest@gmail>
The publish-npm job now targets the npm-publish environment, whose
required-reviewer rule pauses the job for maintainer approval in the
Actions UI before anything reaches the registry. Also removes the
release-as 0.1.0 pin from release-please-config.json now that v0.1.0
has shipped — leaving it would stamp every future release 0.1.0.
* feat: publish zero to npm via release-please
Adds release-please to automate versioning and releases from
conventional commits on main:
- release-please-config.json / .release-please-manifest.json: node
release type (package.json is the version source of truth), plain
v-prefixed tags, bootstrap-sha at current HEAD, and release-as 0.1.0
to pin the first release (remove after v0.1.0 ships).
- .github/workflows/release-please.yml: maintains the release PR; on
merge it tags + creates the GitHub Release, then dispatches
release-artifacts.yml at the tag (GITHUB_TOKEN-created tags cannot
fire on-push-tags workflows).
- .github/workflows/release-artifacts.yml: tag-gated steps now match
the ref instead of the push event so the dispatched-at-tag run
publishes assets, and a new publish-npm job publishes @gitlawb/zero
after verifying every postinstall asset URL is publicly downloadable
(also blocks publishing while the repo is private).
* Update .github/workflows/release-please.yml
Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat: publish to npm via OIDC trusted publishing instead of NPM_TOKEN
npm's trusted publishing exchanges the workflow's OIDC token for
publish auth, so no long-lived NPM_TOKEN secret exists to leak, and
provenance is generated automatically. Drops registry-url from
setup-node (its .npmrc line hard-fails on the unset NODE_AUTH_TOKEN)
and updates npm first (OIDC needs npm >= 11.5.1). One-time caveat:
npm only lets you configure a trusted publisher on an existing
package, so the first @gitlawb/zero publish is a manual bootstrap.
* fix: drop npm@latest from the OIDC publish path
Rely on the npm bundled with the pinned Node 24 toolchain (>= 11.5.1,
the trusted-publishing minimum) instead of pulling an unpinned
npm@latest from the registry inside the publish job, and fail fast
with a clear error if a future toolchain change regresses it.
---------
Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(auth): propagate credentials to every provider-build surface and pin children to the live provider
Sub-agents, swarm members, ACP sessions, and mid-run escalation switches
could build providers without the credentials the parent was running with.
This consolidates credential resolution so every surface gets the same auth:
- Wrap deps.newProvider once in fillAppDeps to fold the stored API key in
centrally; ACP, exec escalation, and buildProvider no longer patch it
per call site (an apiKeyStored profile previously went out keyless on
those paths and 401'd).
- Export ZERO_PROVIDER at startup (buildProvider) and keep exporting on
every runtime switch (wizard, onboarding, /model, /provider), so spawned
children resolve the parent's live provider instead of whatever another
process last persisted to config.json. Injected via appDeps so tests
never mutate the process environment.
- Share one OAuth login selection end to end: ProviderProfile.
OAuthLoginCandidates (name, then catalog-ID fallback; nothing for a
profile with its own configured credential) + oauth.FirstStored resolve
the login ONCE, and the bound store key is threaded through
providers.Options.OAuthLoginKey so the Codex account-id header always
reads the same login that issued the bearer token. A renamed profile
(name != catalog ID) now finds its login; an explicit API key is never
silently overridden by a same-name or catalog-shared OAuth login.
- Export ProviderProfile.HasConfiguredCredential as the single "profile is
key-authed" predicate (cli/tui/config previously had three copies).
- applyProviderWizard commits live state (provider, profile, name, env
export) only after BOTH the build and the config persist succeed, so a
persist failure no longer leaves the chat running on a provider the
status line and children disagree with.
Covered by red-green tests for each path: stored-key wrap, escalation
switch, catalog-ID fallback (incl. case-variant names), explicit-key
protection, same-login account selection, wizard persist-failure rollback,
onboarding/startup env export.
* test: isolate OAuth/config test storage and fix the flaky MCP response-id test
Review + CI fixes, all test-only:
- factory/cli OAuth tests: pin ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE=file next to the temp
ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH — an inherited "keyring" value sends NewStore to
the OS keychain and ignores the temp path entirely, so the tests could
read (or clobber) the developer's real logins. newOAuthStoreForTest now
owns both pins so a future call site can't forget them.
- TestApplyProviderWizardExportsActiveProviderEnv: point m.userConfigPath
at a temp config and stub newProvider, so the SUCCESS path exercises the
full build+persist+commit sequence in isolation (the default empty path
silently skipped persist; a changed default must never reach the real
user config).
- TestClientRequestWaitsForMatchingResponseID (ubuntu smoke flake): the
responses were pre-loaded into a bytes.Buffer, so the client's reader
goroutine could consume the matching response — and hit EOF — before
request() registered its pending id, failing with "request() error =
EOF" on fast runners. The fake server now sits on pipes and responds
only after reading the outgoing request, matching production ordering;
survives -race -count=50.
* feat(tui): FILES sidebar panel with click-to-select and file drill-in
Add a FILES section to the right context sidebar showing the files the
session has touched — newest first, with A/M status badges, aggregated
+/− diffstats, and a pulsing row for the file being written right now.
Clicking a row selects the file (accent marker, edit cards tint in the
chat, transcript scrolls to the latest edit); a second click opens a
drill-in view: the chat column swaps to the file's stacked edit cards,
`f` toggles to the syntax-highlighted on-disk file with markers on
session-added lines, `d` back to diff, Esc returns to the chat.
The roster is fed from two sources: changedFiles carried by
write_file/edit_file/apply_patch results (persisted per session, so it
survives /resume), and a git sweep — baseline snapshot at startup,
re-check after command tools and at turn end — so files created through
bash/exec_command scaffolding or subagents show up too.
* fix(tui): address FILES sidebar review findings
Review fixes for the FILES panel / drill-in / git sweep:
- touchedFiles: split multi-file diffs per file (perFileDiffStats) so an
apply_patch spanning several files no longer charges the whole patch's
+/- totals to every file it touched; order by lastRowIndex descending
so a re-touched file lists first (reversing first-seen order kept it in
its original slot).
- sidebarFileLines: filter the live-writing row out before computing the
"+N more" trailer so the skipped entry no longer inflates the count.
- git sweep: run `git diff --numstat -z` and parse the NUL-terminated
rename records (counts + preimage + postimage) — plain --numstat
brace-mangles renamed paths ("src/{old => new}"), so their diffstat
never matched a porcelain path and renamed files stayed at 0/0;
gitTouchedFiles now yields newest detection first to match the
roster's ordering.
- file view: stream the full-mode read and stop at fileViewMaxLines
(os.ReadFile loaded a multi-GB file wholesale before truncating — the
exact freeze the cap exists to prevent); re-opening the file already
being viewed is a no-op so a stray re-click can't bounce full mode
back to diff or reset scroll; skip sub-4-char lines in the changed-line
markers so common braces/returns don't mark unrelated occurrences.
- keys: gate the drill-in's d/f and Esc handling on noBlockingModal so a
permission prompt / ask-user / wizard keeps its own key handling.
- sidebar: a live in-flight write counts as content, so the FILES pulse
shows for the session's first mutation.
- tests: numstat test now feeds real -z record shapes and asserts the
rename postimage key; new coverage for per-file stats, re-touch
ordering, live-row overflow, same-file reopen, truncation, modal
gating, live-write content, and a real-repo rename sweep.
---------
Co-authored-by: Gnanam <[email protected]>
* fix: cut the content-stall dead-wait and auto-retry a mid-tool-call stall
Root-caused (via a verified multi-agent audit) the chatgpt/gpt-5.5 "stuck"
reports: the ChatGPT Codex backend pauses real generation mid-stream on
large single tool-call outputs (a ~1000-line write_file) while continuing
SSE keep-alive heartbeats. That is an upstream limitation, not a Zero bug
or a connection-pooling issue (the darwin DisableKeepAlives fix is applied
and confirmed not the cause). Zero already detected it, but two UX gaps
made it feel like a hang:
1. Faster abort. The content-stall watchdog fired at idle*2 = 10 minutes.
A heartbeat-pause stall on gpt-5.x rarely recovers, so 10 minutes of a
frozen token counter was a terrible wait for a doomed turn. Replaced the
StreamContentStallFactor=2 const with ContentStallTimeout(idle)=idle*1.2
(6 minutes at the default). It still only ever fires on a TRUE zero-output
freeze — any real data line resets it — so healthy slow-reasoning runs are
unaffected. Scales with ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT; returns 0 (disabled)
when idle is disabled.
2. Auto-retry the actual stall. The existing stall-retry only fired when
NOTHING had been forwarded — so the common case (model streamed transient
reasoning + began the big write_file, then froze mid-arguments) was NOT
retried, because the incomplete tool call is collected and transient
output was forwarded. Relaxed the gate to retry when no visible PROSE was
shown (forwardedVisibleText, marked only by OnText) and no final text was
collected — dropping the len(ToolCalls)==0 exclusion, since an incomplete
tool call from a timed-out stream is never executed (the turn returns on
the error before dispatch) and never appended to messages, so the retry
re-sends clean context with no duplication. A visible
"[no output — model stalled; retrying N/max]" notice fires per attempt.
Forwarded prose still blocks the retry (it would duplicate answer text).
Verified: full -race suite green; a 4-dimension root-cause audit and a
3-dimension adversarial review of this diff both passed with no confirmed
defects. New tests: TestRunRetriesStallAfterIncompleteToolCall (the exact
gpt-5.x case), TestRunRetriesStallAfterOnlyReasoning; preserved
TestRunDoesNotRetryStallAfterPartialOutput (prose still blocks retry).
* fix(providerio): make ContentStallTimeout overflow-safe
Address PR #362 review: idleTimeout*6/5 could overflow int64 for a
pathologically large ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT and wrap to a NEGATIVE
duration, which would arm the content-stall timer to fire immediately and
abort every stream. Compute 1.2× as idle + idle/5 with a clamp to the max
duration on overflow (which just means "effectively no content watchdog",
the sane result for an absurd idle timeout). The normal 1.2× values are
unchanged (5m->6m, 30s->36s, 100ms->120ms).
New test: TestContentStallTimeout covers the scaled values, the
zero/disabled case, and the MaxInt64 overflow guard.
A message typed while a run is active is queued for the next turn. Its
"[queued] …" preview rendered on the line BELOW the input box; move it to
directly ABOVE the box so it reads as "waiting to send," sitting on top of
what you're currently typing, and doesn't get visually detached from the
composer by the status line beneath it. Footer height is unchanged (the
preview line just moves from below to above the box).
New test: TestQueuedPromptPreviewSitsAboveComposer asserts the preview
line index is above the composer box top border.
This codebase already has a documented, previously-diagnosed macOS-only
bug: "sharedHTTPClient... defeats the stale-pooled-connection hang...
reproduced on BOTH chatgpt and ollama... surfaces on macOS far more than
Linux because macOS keeps dead pooled connections around longer." The
existing mitigation (ResponseHeaderTimeout=120s, IdleConnTimeout=30s)
catches a reused connection that never responds at all, or one that sat
idle too long.
Traced a live report that doesn't fit either case: a session accumulated
301 real completion tokens over ~12.5 minutes (~0.4 tok/s) on
chatgpt/gpt-5.5 before being manually cancelled - not silent, just
catastrophically slow, on a retry shortly after a prior attempt on the
same host. That's a third failure mode: a reused connection that's
alive-but-severely-degraded, still delivering real bytes (enough to keep
resetting Zero's stream idle/content-stall watchdogs, which only fire on
true silence) but never at a usable rate. Basic network diagnostics on
the affected machine (DNS, TCP connect, TLS handshake) were all healthy
and routed directly with no VPN/proxy involved, pointing at the same
connection-reuse class of bug rather than a local network misconfig.
DisableKeepAlives removes pooling from the equation entirely rather than
just tightening the timeout window, since a degraded-not-dead connection
isn't reliably distinguishable from genuine backend slowness once inside
the stream. Scoped to darwin only via runtime.GOOS: a fresh TCP+TLS
handshake per request costs low tens of milliseconds (measured ~92ms
against a real host on the affected machine) against potential
minutes-long stalls, and Linux/Windows don't exhibit this OS-level
pooled-connection behavior, so they keep full connection reuse.
New test: TestHTTPClientReturnsStallHardenedSharedClient extended to
assert DisableKeepAlives matches runtime.GOOS == "darwin".
Both failed on windows-latest today, on merges of otherwise-unrelated
PRs (#349, #356) - neither PR touched internal/specialist or
internal/agenteval. Windows GitHub Actions runners have coarser default
timer granularity and more scheduling contention than Linux/macOS, so
tight timing margins that hold on the other two platforms aren't
reliable there.
- TestOutputToolBlocksUntilTaskCompletes: a 100ms poll timeout against a
5ms background write left only 20x margin. Widened the timeout to
2000ms (a ceiling, not a target - PollInterval keeps the test fast in
the success case; it only changes how much CI jitter it tolerates
before failing).
- TestHarnessTimeoutCancelsBlockedAgent: confirmed there's no actual data
race (harness.Agent.Run is a direct synchronous call, not a spawned
goroutine racing the assertions) - the failure was workspace
materialization alone consuming the full 10s budget on a contended
Windows runner, so the agent was never reached. Widened to 30s. This
test's own design blocks for the full timeout to observe cancellation,
so unlike the other fix this directly costs ~20s more wall-clock time,
but that's inherent to what it's testing.
Zero is always in alt-screen mode (useAltScreen() is unconditionally
true), and transcriptView's `if m.altScreen && m.height > 0` gate is what
pads the rendered frame out to fill the full terminal height
(scrollableTranscriptItemsView pads bodyWindow to window.height). If
m.height is ever 0 - Bubble Tea documents an initial WindowSizeMsg as
delivered automatically on program start, but that's the terminal
proactively pushing a size, and nothing else ever asks again if that
push is missed (a slow/unusual terminal, a multiplexer, a startup race)
- Zero falls back to the unpadded, non-fullscreen render path for the
rest of the session: content only occupies as many rows as it needs,
leaving the remaining terminal height as plain unfilled background
instead of the alt-screen's painted panel color.
Fixed by explicitly firing tea.RequestWindowSize in Init(), the same
defensive pattern already used for tea.RequestBackgroundColor right below
it - Zero doesn't rely solely on an unprompted push for either.
Zero already has a content-stall watchdog built specifically for this
exact case (providerio.ErrStreamStalled's own doc comment: "observed on
chatgpt/gpt-5.x and ollama reasoning models") - a heartbeating-but-silent
upstream is aborted after idleTimeout * StreamContentStallFactor (5min *
2 = 10min by default). It works. The gap is that until it fires, the
"still generating... Xs" cue is the ONLY signal the user has, and it
looks completely identical whether real (if slow) content is still
coming or the stream is already dead and just hasn't been caught yet -
confirmed against a live report where the token count sat frozen for
7+ minutes with no way to tell from the UI alone.
Past half the effective idle timeout, quietGenerationHint() now escalates
to name what's actually happening and when Zero will act on its own:
"still generating... Xs - unusually quiet, Zero will auto-recover by
~Ys if it doesn't resume". Exported StreamContentStallFactor from
providerio (was unexported) so the TUI can compute the same ceiling the
watchdog itself uses, instead of duplicating the constant.
New test: TestQuietGenerationHintEscalatesPastHalfIdleTimeout, using
ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT to shrink the timeout so the test runs fast
while exercising the exact same math the real watchdog uses.
2026-07-01 21:25:27 +05:30
1134 changed files with 186196 additions and 11765 deletions
Review tests for Bun test idioms, deterministic behavior, and meaningful coverage of safety decisions, provider/runtime flows, session events, and TUI command behavior.
- path:"**/*.go"
instructions:|
Do not request Plan 9 or other unsupported GOOS/GOARCH shims. The five native prebuilt release targets are linux-x64, linux-arm64, macos-arm64, macos-x64, and windows-x64. Android/Termux is also a supported runtime through the documented android-arm64 source build and Linux artifact fallback. Other GOOS/GOARCH combinations are not a review criterion.
for url in "${base}/${asset}" "${base}/${asset}.sha256"; do
if ! curl -fsSLI -o /dev/null "$url"; then
echo "::error::${url} is not publicly downloadable — the wrapper's fallback downloader and install.sh would fail. Is the repo public and are all assets uploaded?" >&2
exit 1
fi
done
done
echo "all release assets for v${version} are publicly downloadable."
echo "::error::dist-tag latest points at platform version ${latest} — a platform publish clobbered it. Fix the dist-tag before the wrapper publish." >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
echo "dist-tag latest is ${latest} (unchanged by platform publishes)."
* **acp:** add standard session list and resume ([#914](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/914)) ([c1937df](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/c1937dfac72e6ad0e5ade6e48e2d9c17d9c3e5d6))
* **acp:** make configured MCP tools callable ([#1003](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1003)) ([7f5e5af](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7f5e5af7bbdbe5bb4d91706146072d461c0234a4))
* **agent:** stop the tool-schema ratchet meaning a different thing per host ([#1017](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1017)) ([f909266](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f9092668a832ea73a69551f0ea2df4f6eaf356df))
* **background:** treat POSIX zombie leader as already-exited ([#981](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/981)) ([1aacf38](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1aacf38b727d31b5ca09949316d6afa8292aec46))
* **config:** lock config read-modify-write across processes ([#960](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/960)) ([b04fe96](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b04fe96e9ef3f2deda4fb2a972270300629079d2))
* **daemon:** publish status files atomically ([#949](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/949)) ([9001421](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/90014210d2ada2e3d61f4eca5087d3f35a3c4b8b))
* **installtxn:** put back an install a killed commit left behind ([#997](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/997)) ([2837f5e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2837f5efb38dcd3c69771b0ba31565f98a206120))
* let the configured forward proxy through the loopback guard ([#1025](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1025)) ([1e4db7c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1e4db7c6643ca7e2c3d8e4b8b30371cfbe43561e))
* **lockutil:** use kernel-held advisory locks ([#950](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/950)) ([6fe0d1e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6fe0d1edcdbadea6d566800fbcca739c1cd54ea1))
* **mcp:** discover OAuth through protected resource metadata ([#991](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/991)) ([1b5db17](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1b5db1765672820caac1684b168c9898b5ba3593))
* **mcp:** reject a server-initiated request as a streamable-HTTP response ([#1054](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1054)) ([2479d94](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2479d946c15dbf74ee3c04a637e97181d1786f08))
* **oauth:** force-close loopback callback connections past the shutdown deadline ([#1051](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1051)) ([176f5a2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/176f5a242b754a86ea4c7121a8dcc1c0d72cf2e4))
* **oauth:** Split an oversized keyring token blob across entries ([#1007](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1007)) ([275e248](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/275e2486695338ce38193a6e3319f8b6a9a5c33c))
* **providerio:** close idle connections periodically to prevent HTTP/2 PROTOCOL_ERROR ([#1058](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1058)) ([b76c764](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b76c764b77926891aa67163e6605a2d8540aacaa))
* **providers:** register Atomic Chat as local OpenAI-compatible runtime ([#550](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/550)) ([79fa142](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/79fa1422ef1a3691b93342788453ebc284d57f9c))
* **redaction:** split camelCase keys in normalizeKey ([#994](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/994)) ([08fbea7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/08fbea7a3221d2061d88038924f90a4cba9af1ac))
* **sandbox:** keep a derived ACL target inside the write root it came from ([#1040](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1040)) ([3b43c43](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3b43c43eca968c8619adadc81fcc1a17e220216a))
* **sandbox:** keep Windows restricted-token SIDs narrow and fail closed on DenyRead ([#1006](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1006)) ([0207f2b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0207f2b2697149a73ecc89a5ab5db0bd665f1911))
* **sandbox:** Make WSL backend tests deterministic. ([#948](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/948)) ([e59bf78](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e59bf78cabc2703678778b904c27c8bc8ef82bc8))
* **sandbox:** refcount temporary roots so one holder's cleanup cannot revoke another's ([#911](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/911)) ([7acac7a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7acac7acee65565e25089f2a7b5813c086ce65eb))
* **sessions:** carry an interrupted turn's work into the resume prompt ([#1016](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1016)) ([6ae8396](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6ae8396f0282a5f18a431f0c0ef1a272ecc2ca2b))
* **sessions:** render resume context fields in key order ([#1043](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1043)) ([da244bc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/da244bcbfcfa05e414567ac0acc3cf8ba745ad7d))
* **specialist:** keep the pinned model when a specialist is resumed ([#1009](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1009)) ([aadb4a2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/aadb4a27e9cdb41e774e8e1a8f23cf9c2fb50db2))
* **swarm:** stop original member before handoff ([#957](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/957)) ([0021475](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0021475d4c58c91911098f414795512cf60a0b56))
* **tools:** an edit keeps the reads it did not disturb ([#908](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/908)) ([1649008](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1649008506da0e675431dc056251a01891b15cc8))
* **tools:** make apply_patch tolerant and re-expose edit_file ([#956](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/956)) ([2749447](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2749447cdce4ae5dd333538b36fa919b80ecc66d))
* **tools:** reject fuzzy edits with drifted content ([#983](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/983)) ([8b3d1b1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8b3d1b1597b04bfa6d4bc7f912abc13ca80a6298))
* **tools:** say when format-on-write ran out of time ([#1044](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1044)) ([6937a30](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6937a309cf00825572210a7610a1f3ea8b74c2f9))
* **tui:** move voice capture to Ctrl+Space ([#968](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/968)) ([eeea330](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/eeea3308fed38b37b203522624babaf2f30df91f))
* **update:** keep Windows failed-restore state in trusted recovery records ([#979](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/979)) ([a3852ba](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a3852bac595e06c5d3ca9da22212b281b8796802))
* **update:** recognise Homebrew installs and add mise, go install docs ([#910](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/910)) ([01c3498](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/01c3498205e69d26e5f929225f9455b276444f39))
* use Exa as default search provider ([#926](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/926)) ([1ec7219](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1ec7219aee7b2840481ab0905f131644e27d2a4e))
* **zerogit:** auto-create a conventional branch before push/pr on default branch ([#671](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/671)) ([d065467](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d065467cd3ec3ed91c5dc60554c36fc4b4d6de4c))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** three defects a desktop ACP client hits ([#915](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/915)) ([a78c6c3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a78c6c357e1d21146d7cd2e8030a754e06f7f1f5))
* bump Go to 1.26.6 for stdlib vulnerability fixes ([#903](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/903)) ([dc15e82](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dc15e822987d8d7de467c62c375518f435b74d8c))
* **daemon:** clean up child after startup timeout ([#774](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/774)) ([9c29209](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9c292092a26c9092fd873d072b0af1b0d9d39ef0))
* **dictation:** redact API keys from streaming transcriber errors ([#852](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/852)) ([64a783b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/64a783b08caa2c7b21f188033b9ed84a14e00e84))
* **agent:** add PermissionModePlan for interactive read-only planning ([#853](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/853)) ([0176ee4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0176ee49ffddcff6f7edf6ae2ade4967e5b22cc3))
* **providers:** live model lists for OpenRouter and OpenGateway ([#860](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/860)) ([fb4f293](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fb4f293c20eb860ca388a10d22fd566ce282ba1f))
* **tools:** give tool results an image channel and add view_image ([#843](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/843)) ([cd0eb19](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/cd0eb194e4df4b844785796c0701216740a56344))
* **tui:** replace /retitle with local /rename ([#826](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/826)) ([5886354](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/588635487f22ef4d62d350140a219b7b8bb24119))
### Bug Fixes
* **agent:** end the additional_permissions retry loop ([#864](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/864)) ([4ca4fa7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4ca4fa75d31b139dbe55a3badf17da86892ab001))
* **agent:** tell the user a prefix approval leaves the sandbox ([#885](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/885)) ([2ec5c3a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2ec5c3ae6b8fb543887bdeafdb34c4da057b8d36))
* **cli:** report MCP servers that failed to start ([#822](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/822)) ([#827](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/827)) ([021281e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/021281ebbab3f2bbe6a77b2dab4bf121bcfe6b52))
* **lsp:** dispatch notifications off read loop ([#759](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/759)) ([936aa4e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/936aa4e77cf49738560a89395b8ba4d22263a396))
* **mcp:** name the non-text blocks a tool result drops ([#874](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/874)) ([027a670](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/027a67080bea511b876c284bc911ef011eceb308))
* **sandbox:** deny reads of Zero credential stores ([#681](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/681)) ([55fa05f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/55fa05f0ab5a01b495345d43464606cd19a31b4f))
* **sandbox:** stop the Windows write jail honouring Everyone-granted paths ([#865](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/865)) ([91b413c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/91b413c514cc1607d5b4e7936780d40569239814))
* **secrets,worktrees:** fix secret redaction leakage and prune stale worktrees ([#855](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/855)) ([ff62f73](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ff62f73b7f4dc5e2472db21acba43cf6140c06d1))
* **specialist:** make overwrites atomic ([#757](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/757)) ([30f6d8f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/30f6d8f591a0b81638b4182ff56c86c8a50a5c70))
* suppress gosec G204 warning for trusted local config commands ([#848](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/848)) ([c52db05](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/c52db055b0b213758a33c5c5627a411e052f8de4))
* **tui:** a copied NUL byte no longer panics the TUI on Windows ([#876](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/876)) ([cae0269](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/cae0269e77e7a0a493cf799b41c653c9ff9a19de)), closes [#875](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/875)
* **tui:** exclude permission waits from turn time ([#820](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/820)) ([15eb16f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/15eb16f736f903c94203207032f98aacbcf06318))
* **tui:** fall back to CellMotion where AllMotion is unreliable ([#872](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/872)) ([7fbd864](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7fbd864e91433441489902571ea394ebc5b7bd0d))
* **tui:** fill alt-screen frame with theme panel background ([#850](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/850)) ([020c28e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/020c28eaf95e2f38853f99fc06a13cd1568bf3c9))
* use OAuth credentials in provider health checks ([#828](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/828)) ([d37de92](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d37de9214b1ba86542f4f5ef3b060bb96849763b))
### Performance Improvements
* compact common test output ([#846](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/846)) ([edf660a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/edf660ab85131f90a452cee51dc2c3a5cf62d632))
* **providers:** add Fireworks AI provider preset ([#772](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/772)) ([58daea7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/58daea7a482927e5ab35afaf97761c60bb35e113))
* **skills:** report hash drift in skill info ([#795](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/795)) ([9fbdc34](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9fbdc341551601c13434cf7b9b6f5e4ea4c483b1))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** interrupt idle reads on cancellation ([#782](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/782)) ([15b7a54](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/15b7a5475cfeefddbc59634551451a8872b996b7))
* **cli:** include plugins info in shell completions ([#794](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/794)) ([fa8734f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fa8734f17927de8832dfe041e043cfb86f93d12a))
* **config:** kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows ([#690](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/690)) ([5c58256](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5c58256abc29c185b449f8ce79647eb3fae61882))
* **config:** make the provider-command timeout an upper bound ([#811](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/811)) ([#813](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/813)) ([1c38e8c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1c38e8cba50db255f3cda8b7cf4298712b2933e1))
* **config:** stop billing provider-command fixtures to the 5s timeout ([#810](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/810)) ([f5fa4ff](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f5fa4ffc64537897aa78a56edca36d8f1dacd021))
* **providers:** retry provably pre-send transport failures ([#447](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/447)) ([#750](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/750)) ([8acd42a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8acd42a3bd743a35807d762f23a33fb61c171839))
* **sandbox:** add platform-specific write lock around grant state file ([#752](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/752)) ([#755](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/755)) ([88fb7b6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/88fb7b6192c1ac8173089967d5e9119f92d7a101))
* **swarm:** close lifecycle admission on shutdown ([#776](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/776)) ([bdbda89](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/bdbda89f3e42d93e8058ab3e1e9ef402659530cd))
* **tui:** fix rendering corruption over multipass + Windows Terminal ([#709](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/709)) ([5bb1bc1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5bb1bc11c3188dcea7709ff07c8b25dda3541de8))
* **tui:** paste clipboard images with Ctrl+V ([#534](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/534)) ([#807](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/807)) ([ec3b822](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ec3b8225050eb62f0f41a9582ed2881d2f9dcc8e))
* **tui:** reset quiet clock for new runs ([#799](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/799)) ([a4a805a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a4a805a6c82c51cb255e909bd87ca183c8805cf2))
* **windows:** use PowerShell for command execution ([#804](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/804)) ([518d2e5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/518d2e53ba3fa073090a9b41c278face85b59b64))
* **plugins:** add zero plugins info command ([#773](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/773)) ([2479884](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2479884dea49580c853a53536c3bbab22ce8a2bf))
* **sandbox:** disable the sandbox via config ([#687](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/687)) ([#746](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/746)) ([a21a052](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a21a052a4a32ce9cb3c93c94350cd24e138532cd))
* **sandbox:** unify command execution and enforcement ([#781](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/781)) ([96859c9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/96859c9bd16f6dad4e332efc7e68178b9116118a))
* **tui:** add /undo as an alias for /rewind ([#698](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/698)) ([#747](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/747)) ([8c6d302](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8c6d3022bd7801eaad6a0440bb21a27221887297))
* **lsp:** make the real-gopls check opt-in so a broken gopls can't fail the suite ([#684](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/684)) ([#766](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/766)) ([b1f4173](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b1f41735a7f6b7928a1875e986a4dca39d106cb9))
* make extension installs transactional ([#762](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/762)) ([baa4be1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/baa4be13ac5321da4e9f53e864dd1cd395481200))
* **oauth:** refuse redirects on credential POSTs ([#729](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/729)) ([#741](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/741)) ([974fc03](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/974fc036c2f9a194722f2e8fddbb4fdbf797effe))
* **oauth:** validate discovered endpoints before merge/use ([#511](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/511)) ([#739](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/739)) ([ce4a996](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ce4a996ffac4482e704f0fd61b3e442398fb2401))
* **perfbench:** absolutize the bench binary and make errored tasks first-class ([#730](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/730)) ([dbd9443](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dbd94430143df6754d68551d1028ad8f15b82f1b))
* **perfbench:** grant write tools so mutating tasks measure real edits ([#763](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/763)) ([e1975c1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e1975c1b396b3236ed648870230b4f85863b1d03))
* **perfbench:** keep the stamped answer file out of negative oracle greps ([#737](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/737)) ([015452c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/015452c1c98a39eabb021324182094e188a8bd47))
* **providers:** stop "provider not found" for env-derived profiles ([#716](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/716)) ([4cbd144](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4cbd144d11e5cb67bc5fea46f5b294562dac7a1a))
* **sandbox:** AST second opinion for interactive-command bypasses ([#473](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/473)) ([#745](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/745)) ([f079b90](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f079b90f82dac7b7ae0864b279dc9094e31a6627))
* **sandbox:** bind Windows elevated ACL setup to one no-follow handle ([#765](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/765)) ([4945684](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4945684fa26aa5994eda59dcabedc817423c535d))
* **tools:** give write_stdin's invalid-session errors the same recovery guidance ([#749](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/749) follow-up) ([#768](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/768)) ([da9fb50](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/da9fb50f549f6701eb136fc99f6178d0772d9334))
* **tools:** read_file recovers a backwards line range instead of erroring ([#779](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/779)) ([89bdc67](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/89bdc6719a1e1b3a3ef0e36b91a7839b3efdfba9))
* **tui:** model rows labelled by id when the description is prose; keep the sidebar under the / palette ([#775](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/775)) ([b30c397](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b30c3971b40b06ba52ad649ba9dc0ad560d4be4c))
* **tui:** stop the permission card clashing on cool themes ([#778](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/778)) ([722bb31](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/722bb3121682d9cd9cd4bc6c127e9014d719262a))
* **aimlapi:** AI/ML API provider with guided onboarding (top-up + key issuance) ([#655](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/655)) ([6b9c2f0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6b9c2f0c083e02bcd3aad68fb7af0501a9e7cd61))
* **cli:** show ZERO wordmark on --version ([#673](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/673)) ([9acb411](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9acb4113cc3337b3f361a16278e9cf11ca105e34))
* **tui:** Ctrl+X leader chords and emacs menu navigation ([#699](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/699)) ([7f669f4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7f669f455021be51319ee3b8298cd48a17f745c7))
* **tui:** press up to edit queued messages ([#656](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/656)) ([4c986d3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4c986d327b5ed26338d295c23bea5839681db8d0))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** make truncateHint rune-safe ([#614](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/614)) ([ddc4927](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ddc4927aac5544bf4dd2c46615aeda5a81c96576))
* **agent,tui:** resolve git branch detection when starting Zero in subdirectories ([#613](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/613)) ([0184581](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0184581ec234ea414e0a47bc33e8b0f4ddfb497b))
* **agent:** raise default and deep-mode turn budgets ([#650](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/650)) ([635c93a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/635c93af51ebc20f3e0917917e55a79edfe27c35))
* **cli:** prevent consuming positional arguments as flag values ([#619](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/619)) ([5b4f48d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5b4f48d2dcb66402c13bde0c3cfe9c9371da19fb))
* **config:** enforce MCP trust boundary so project config cannot override user disable ([#609](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/609)) ([4d8c31c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4d8c31cf16a3080344e3be7039408fcae71c075d)), closes [#512](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/512)
* **config:** surface unknown/typo'd config fields instead of silently dropping them ([#645](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/645)) ([893b7b4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/893b7b424cc203a2fcf92327a4e25c84286a90e0))
* **hooks:** fail closed on launch failures for beforeTool hooks ([#629](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/629)) ([dc06fe7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dc06fe72caf45f72d2cba1e8a835c0f5b405c1e8))
* **hooks:** run sessionEnd hooks after Esc/Ctrl+C interrupts ([#606](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/606)) ([824ecdb](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/824ecdbcf9c467c35ef4e2666770fdadcb5bf402))
* **keyring:** pass generic password via stdin on macOS ([#574](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/574)) ([91ea6de](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/91ea6ded7503538834a84d090f78670a363c62d3))
* **lock:** prevent POSIX lock file overwrite and leak on Windows/Unix ([#628](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/628)) ([da41c3a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/da41c3a75b782d6e0836fe13346321e40a90fbb4))
* **sandbox:** remove windowsWriteRestricted flag to fix DenyRead bypass ([#612](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/612)) ([3d96ac7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3d96ac7e55c760a97f28c0e6ceaf1ec3b4ab717a))
* **sandbox:** scrub dynamic credential env vars ([#682](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/682)) ([9043bae](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9043baedcff7776c7373645b57563cac06b31847))
* **sandbox:** scrub sensitive credentials from sandbox environment ([#660](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/660)) ([6fc1220](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6fc1220f6ac66fb3ae67b637cbbed7068d2213c0))
* **sandbox:** unblock git fetch/commit/add under the write-restricted sandbox ([#654](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/654)) ([5c4815a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5c4815a66ed07d9cf90b825adfd936d3ac07639d))
* **sandbox:** use WRITE_RESTRICTED token when no DenyRead paths are configured ([#658](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/658)) ([a5d2e32](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a5d2e327c8681671aa8a9e5378801215b747edcf))
* **securefile,credstore:** call Sync on temp file before close and rename ([#631](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/631)) ([212734a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/212734adf3b5f982e22385161205aa1afe4634fe))
* **securefile:** reclaim stale lock files to prevent permanent DOS ([#615](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/615)) ([8536cc8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8536cc87f7a885f9e436d6ef28f5f325201623dc))
* **swarm:** wait for job.Runs directly in scheduler skip test ([#667](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/667)) ([1bb6b57](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1bb6b5745af90321d1e657a12a1976cded5dd1bd))
* **tools:** classify silent wrapped Windows command failures as sandbox denials ([#659](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/659)) ([8bd9742](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8bd9742fa95c41b93ea4e718628aed0ff3ae9dd0))
* **tools:** preserve SysProcAttr during PTY fallback ([#618](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/618)) ([f78b36c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f78b36c770daa4577a9f99265b18a354454e36eb))
* **tui:** stop the composer cursor blinking while typing or unfocused ([#672](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/672)) ([2b42cd5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2b42cd567b96d6f7e0818594e53ff31cce1e42e9))
* **windows:** resolve absolute path for taskkill to prevent hijacking ([#617](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/617)) ([2db00ee](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2db00ee3d57db97e0fbe23cb8628e8bcb47f6f09))
* **modelregistry:** infer reasoning efforts for Hunyuan and vendor-prefixed model ids ([#599](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/599)) ([92a92ce](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/92a92ceb29dc63f5216ab140ef9a6dd9afe17df8))
* **tui:** show CLI version on the startup home screen ([#538](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/538)) ([fd69233](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fd69233e334f1823a06b5794085a9255b3abdfa8))
* address bugs found in a multi-agent codebase audit ([#481](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/481)) ([008bc9b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/008bc9b3f3ba13c7d4822b9559b020f381ff555b))
* **agent:** keep tools exposed for max-turn finalization ([#533](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/533)) ([3f0503b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3f0503bc2312ae29d5ade784d8824dc9a3524958))
* **auth:** persist OpenRouter API key after login ([#595](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/595)) ([2a062aa](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2a062aa4014c6cd5e20a57dad4a685f88966f109))
* bump Go to 1.26.5 for crypto/tls fix (GO-2026-5856) ([#607](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/607)) ([a7cfb99](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a7cfb99fed7b88ebc09a2f251cb82864d3c2cade))
* gitignore Windows sandbox helpers and npm version marker ([#578](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/578)) ([25653f6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/25653f686c016f95b81ceb7ff5d5452d37c4d4f3))
* **sandbox:** Windows-appropriate suggestions when blocking interactive commands ([#414](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/414)) ([ba4c007](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ba4c00755dc1c31b3dcca18e50b20f62c6bf5d1f))
* **tools:** block MSYS and WSL shells under the Windows sandbox ([#587](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/587)) ([0666818](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/066681855b80e3baf5d07d7397610b25f724e353))
* **tools:** platform-specific pager suggestions, quote/caret-safe cd detection ([#543](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/543)) ([8b248f4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8b248f4e1198dc86ab332a697fba4cf520823cbd))
* **tools:** Windows cmd.exe quoting guidance and clipboard escaping fix ([#468](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/468)) ([f10ed0c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f10ed0c893ce6de08923f143d681ba96f0fcfe3a))
* **tui:** bypass toggleSidebar and toggleMouse global shortcuts when composer is non-empty ([#576](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/576)) ([c7346fb](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/c7346fbcf01fe7e70ed2fcfccbf9965e5985727b))
* **tui:** paste protection for Termux char-by-char paste ([#573](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/573)) ([8e9149f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8e9149f1a296bebebf95cae9dd2a7c5156c9dbb6))
* **tui:** update picker_test for switchProviderModel 4-value return ([#589](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/589)) ([8f15650](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8f156506dc92449bd24caa14e36f28477ba00fff))
* **update:** support safe symlink extraction during updates ([#575](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/575)) ([ce9cb91](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ce9cb912958a3d9ae0b052bfebb849c28e0e719b))
* warn about untracked scratch files left behind after a run ([#571](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/571)) ([062328b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/062328b632a2d27353a6d47c522bbd22d7282539))
### Performance Improvements
* **grep:** stop content scan after head limit ([#601](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/601)) ([8a05e64](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8a05e6486f7a63281b869064db03dfc5531e6a04))
* add --auto flag for LLM-generated commit messages ([#423](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/423)) ([b0abde7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b0abde7d0697e808480cd59d69a6f4d0c6320475))
* add zero changes push and pr subcommands, and extra repo-info metrics ([#391](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/391)) ([2312abe](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2312abe5ddd95f4c6ef373cfb61cc03092f48cdd))
* agent quality, caching, retry, and tooling upgrades ([#506](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/506)) ([3c81fea](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3c81fea22873ee3df7fc97b10cb4f77792706c4b))
* **agent:** curb over-engineering the solution in the editing discipline ([#517](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/517)) ([f4c998a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f4c998ac30c4f07ff313a2d706791e857293be49)), closes [#516](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/516)
* **agent:** inject per-user config.UserConfigDir()/zero/ZERO.md guidelines into system prompt ([#475](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/475)) ([7b10aab](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7b10aab74bf14a01166b2cea22deab79bba9850b))
* **providers:** add `zero providers models` to discover a provider's models ([#386](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/386)) ([0bc8074](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0bc8074c97b0310e4a9d70c3f967003ee5e8a59f))
* **providers:** add KiloCode and OpenCode provider support ([#388](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/388)) ([b1ccb6d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b1ccb6d9c1875377f5e5ea81a1304edd1e41ab4f))
* **providers:** split minimax zai into intl cn ([#398](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/398)) ([aaad4d2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/aaad4d271270f41af837b6f3b60ae80beba0c645))
* require manual approval before npm publish + drop release-as pin ([#369](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/369)) ([bd89a1f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/bd89a1f451643c1b65ec803070abc7b116631ebe))
* **sandbox:** unelevated Windows fallback tier instead of prompts-only degrade ([#427](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/427)) ([b9ddd6f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b9ddd6f42138312a1fee8d8bb67c46c8eb1dea2f))
* support shift enter for composer newlines ([#462](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/462)) ([daf65e0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/daf65e0af9a040314d4ab337b0ad59c55416b7bc))
* **tui:** /loop — repeat a prompt or command on an interval or self-paced ([#502](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/502)) ([387fe67](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/387fe67ee7cd81317c9c969f5906a4437080fea3))
* **tui:** add search/filter to provider picker in setup wizard ([#400](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/400)) ([2fcea71](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2fcea71778d23e050c93409c471aef45b68c1621))
* **update:** add zero upgrade command to apply self-updates ([#461](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/461)) ([5f36349](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5f36349c1884e81fa9bc66bb5fe813b627e897b7))
### Bug Fixes
* **action:** keep provider key scoped to zero step ([#448](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/448)) ([407a927](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/407a92739ff508cba32d2c12b3f36f0efcdd54c3))
* add android platform support for Termux npm install ([#455](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/455)) ([9bd93c6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9bd93c62f8d57fb74057284aa66a1b6e1429dcdd)), closes [#449](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/449)
* **agent:** reject a malformed additional_permissions payload before prompting ([#453](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/453)) ([e4f760e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e4f760ee8bd57299cd2fcb37e8e23130037c2607))
* allow non-TLS connections to private-network provider endpoints ([#444](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/444)) ([1d86384](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1d8638466ca31517eb9db2b9353d3dce1cbeeabc))
* **auth:** route zero auth login chatgpt to the dedicated ChatGPT flow ([#443](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/443)) ([305a62c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/305a62c954ca6cec00bc58d5398f933415156aff))
* **config:** fall back to a usable saved provider instead of forcing full re-onboarding ([#410](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/410)) ([c60ad87](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/c60ad8729f79bb841114d352ee2d2fe29d5d0e41))
* **config:** let a gateway ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL resolve as anthropic-compatible ([#497](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/497)) ([30dd7c3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/30dd7c3112ad22d42fa12b5addd4e38f4beda42a)), closes [#479](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/479)
* **config:** unbrick first-run setup — default google/anthropic models, enter setup on fixable config errors ([#385](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/385)) ([72eed06](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/72eed06b4f94c43d75d31fe54a58d2f566de059e))
* **config:** use ~/.config on macOS and enter setup when no provider ([#371](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/371)) ([#372](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/372)) ([027a8f2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/027a8f2768b17b89f5c8270887f156e2ccda69ea))
* **install:** persist install dir to user PATH on Windows ([#407](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/407)) ([bdb1b0e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/bdb1b0ecd15859b1712a6037d296dace7f9c3c3f))
* **oauth:** treat Windows ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED as lock contention in createSecretFile ([#445](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/445)) ([d05e914](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d05e9148a7f79f67d1d3c31fca2775f21fbd331e))
* **sandbox:** fix nested pipe creation under the Windows restricted token ([#456](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/456)) ([563a6db](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/563a6dbe91e65d5daeefd7626e8a77e30a6d8fb2))
* **sandbox:** gate /tmp test assertions on GOOS, not path existence ([#426](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/426)) ([f653dca](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f653dcac363fb69ad7be5b35e6e0fa6d2bce476d))
* **sandbox:** self-heal a corrupt unelevated setup marker ([#437](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/437)) ([8d0c5fe](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8d0c5feccb8bdbfb015df0508aa6e3bcbd1fd0e8))
* **specialist:** cap max specialist nesting depth ([#491](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/491)) ([177442c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/177442cfe4015bd8df04cc9894f98b468ee796d4))
* **tools:** Block MSYS coreutils under Windows sandbox ([#476](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/476)) ([81aad58](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/81aad58d97839e51c068e2f08907618991fdc3fb))
* **tools:** CRLF line ending mismatch in edit_file tool on Windows ([#378](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/378)) ([33dc7ae](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/33dc7ae2cc82c5389675531e1416856dae7151ce))
* **tools:** flag piped POSIX utilities before running on Windows ([#412](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/412)) ([5658a36](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5658a366274fc59a9d5336b06a21019c9c25cbf1))
* **tools:** make grep and glob respect run cancellation ([#464](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/464)) ([ba6c026](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ba6c0264697b7d7ed479f6e782fba9700a481e3d))
* **tools:** require permission before web_search requests ([#382](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/382)) ([960db96](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/960db9660e4e31dc588fe8f7d6f116ff5e225566))
* **tui:** compose help overlay through the viewport overlay pipeline ([#421](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/421)) ([5b2b4de](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5b2b4dea1aaf9e0f68baa25e97e83296fb17b1a2))
* **tui:** keep the profile name on /model switch so the stored key resolves ([#441](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/441)) ([9134148](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9134148f4df3e4e556fba6c2f8babfdf6fcfeee1)), closes [#440](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/440)
* **tui:** resolve every permission request so the agent can't deadlock ([#397](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/397)) ([952788f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/952788f72d32957659fe004521fcc8372b9ba9b4))
* **tui:** show an M suffix for million-scale token counts ([#457](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/457)) ([0562e3b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0562e3bef7df2328610a48a1e81632a8da4aec64))
* **tui:** title /model rows by model name, not the catalog description ([#395](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/395)) ([cdf9d83](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/cdf9d839ae57a729f292f36f7c5b0c67b41b288d))
### Performance Improvements
* cache TUI model registry ([#496](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/496)) ([e7d88b4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e7d88b4b518049733da25a8447c00144bd1da518))
* publish zero to npm via release-please ([#367](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/367)) ([8eccc26](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8eccc2669887bc38d35bc16a315c888e4d9ec43a))
* **tui:** FILES sidebar panel with click-to-select and file drill-in ([#365](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/365)) ([142c548](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/142c548c89a8652ce300e64ddf1228ee36df7606))
### Bug Fixes
* **auth:** propagate credentials to every provider-build surface and pin children to the live provider ([#366](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/366)) ([6e0a665](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6e0a665118fe0e09c4b07d482dd18f86045acd2b))
## [Unreleased]
### Added
- Shared multi-agent skills discovery: when present, `~/.agents/skills` is searched after the primary
Zero skills dir (and before plugin skill roots). `zero skills list` / `info` and the runtime `skill`
tool share one multi-root discovery path; install/remove/lock still target only the Zero skills directory.
-`SECURITY.md` with a private vulnerability-reporting path, `CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`, this changelog, and
GitHub issue/PR templates.
- Interactive `/theme` picker: bare `/theme` opens a popup that live-previews each palette as you move
and applies on select (Esc reverts).
- Ten built-in color themes alongside the `dark`/`light` built-ins — `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`,
`tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, and
`solarized-light` — selectable via `/theme <name>`, `--theme <name>`, or`ZERO_THEME`. Every palette
is contrast-audited to WCAG AA. The built-in light theme was reworked for legibility.
- Twelve built-in color themes alongside the `dark`/`light` built-ins — `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`,
@@ -271,7 +386,39 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench
```
Cross-compile examples:
Experimental: `ZERO_OPENAI_TURN_SESSION=1` enables the optimized OpenAI turn
session (background connection prewarm + request-prefix telemetry) for headless
`zero exec` runs against official OpenAI profiles. Off by default; `0`, `false`,
or `off` disable it. A/B-benchmark it by running the same `zero-perf-bench` suite
with the variable unset and set.
Native ChatGPT Responses sessions are enabled by default. Set
`ZERO_CHATGPT_TURN_SESSION=0`, `false`, or `off` to restore stateless HTTP/SSE
transport.
### Code Quality and Security Checks
Before committing any changes, ensure all Go code quality and security checks pass. The `make` targets below pin each tool to this module's Go version, so they load correctly even when your default `go` toolchain is older — running the plain `go run ...@version` form yourself can select the tool module's own (older) toolchain and fail to load this module instead.
1.**Formatting**: Run `make fmt` (or `go fmt ./...`).
2.**Vetting**: Run `make vet` (or `go vet ./...`).
3.**Linting**: Run `make lint-static`.
4.**Vulnerability Scan**: Run `make vulncheck`.
Use the repository-managed targets rather than globally installed binaries:
the targets apply the module's required Go toolchain as well as the reviewed,
pinned tool versions.
The installed binaries land in `$GOBIN` when it is set, otherwise in
`$GOPATH/bin` (default `~/go/bin`). That directory must be on your `PATH` to
_,_=fmt.Fprintln(stderr,"[zero] Turn benchmark failed: every task errored with no accepted benchmark sample (see warnings); the report contains no valid measurements")
description:Extending Zero — how to write AGENTS.md files, custom specialists, skills, hooks, MCP servers, and plugins for the open-source CLI coding agent.
Zero is an open-source terminal coding agent. Out of the box it does the obvious things — read, edit, run, search — but the design point of the project is that **every surface is configurable**. This document is the user-facing guide for that configuration.
If you only want to *use* Zero, the [README](README.md) is enough. This page is for the other three jobs:
If you only want to *use* Zero, the [README](../README.md) is enough. This page is for the other three jobs:
1. Tell the agent about *your* project (drop an `AGENTS.md` in your repo).
2. Add new specialist sub-agents.
@@ -26,7 +20,7 @@ Accepted file names, in priority order at each level:
| `./ZERO.md` | Brand-specific alias. Same format, lower priority. |
| `./.zero/AGENTS.md` | Project-local, hidden, gitignored. Personal notes that stay out of git. |
Matching is **case-insensitive** on the basename, so `AGENTS.md`, `Agents.md`, and `agents.md` resolve to the same file on Windows and macOS. The git-tracked filename in this repo is `AGENTS.MD` (uppercase `MD`) — keep that on case-sensitive filesystems (Linux, the WSL filesystem, or a CI runner) to match what the loader looks for.
Matching is **case-insensitive** on the basename, so `AGENTS.md`, `Agents.md`, and `agents.md` resolve to the same file on Windows and macOS. The git-tracked filename in this repo is `AGENTS.md` — keep that on case-sensitive filesystems (Linux, the WSL filesystem, or a CI runner) to match what the loader looks for.
Both files use the same format. YAML frontmatter is optional; the markdown body is loaded as instructions for the agent. Zero reads the file once at session start, so changes take effect on the next `zero` launch — not mid-session.
@@ -47,6 +41,12 @@ Tips:
- In a monorepo, drop a narrower `AGENTS.md` in each sub-tree (e.g. `services/api/AGENTS.md`). Zero picks those up automatically when you launch from inside the sub-tree.
- A YAML frontmatter block (`---\n...\n---`) at the top is preserved verbatim in the injected prompt but is not parsed for `globs:` or `alwaysApply:` scoping today — keep the body self-contained.
### Personal guidelines, across every project
For preferences that follow *you*, not a specific repo (tone, tooling habits, workflow), drop a `ZERO.md` in your user config directory: `~/.config/zero/ZERO.md` on Linux/macOS, `%AppData%\zero\ZERO.md` on Windows — the same directory as `config.json` and your personal specialists. Same format and 8 KiB cap as the project files above, and the same case-insensitive basename match.
This file is injected as its own `## User guidelines` section, before the project's `AGENTS.md`/`ZERO.md`, and is labeled as personal preference in the prompt: project guidelines are the later, more specific instruction and take precedence over it when the two conflict.
## 2. Custom specialists
Specialists are Zero's sub-agents. Three scopes, in priority order:
@@ -94,22 +94,32 @@ zero specialist delete api-reviewer --project
zero specialist path # prints the resolved specialists directory
```
The full format spec (frontmatter fields, tool scopes, prompt conventions) is in [`docs/SPECIALISTS.md`](docs/SPECIALISTS.md).
The full format spec (frontmatter fields, tool scopes, prompt conventions) is in [`docs/SPECIALISTS.md`](SPECIALISTS.md).
> **Roadmap.** An in-UI specialist manager (create / edit / delete / preview) is on the backlog. Today you use the `zero specialist` CLI subcommands above.
## 3. Skills
Skills are markdown instruction packs the agent can pull in on demand. Each skill is a directory containing a `SKILL.md`. Skills are **user-level only** in this version — there's no project-scoped skill directory yet, so anything you want shared with the team goes in `AGENTS.md` (section 1) or as a hook (section 4).
Skills are markdown instruction packs the agent can pull in on demand. Each skill is a directory containing a `SKILL.md`. Standalone project skill directories are not supported in this version (shared project-wide skills must go in `AGENTS.md` or as a hook). However, project plugins (section 6) may bundle skills, which are merged into the active run.
Discovery root: `$ZERO_SKILLS_DIR` → `$XDG_DATA_HOME/zero/skills` → `~/.local/share/zero/skills/`. A missing directory is fine — Zero just reports "no skills".
Discovery roots (earlier wins on name collisions):
```
~/.local/share/zero/skills/
1.**Primary Zero dir** — `$ZERO_SKILLS_DIR` if set, else `$XDG_DATA_HOME/zero/skills`, else `~/.local/share/zero/skills/`
2.**Shared multi-agent dir** — `~/.agents/skills/` when present (read-only discovery; never an install target)
3.**Plugin skill roots** — skills bundled by active plugins (section 6)
A missing directory is fine — Zero just omits it. Management commands (`zero skill add` / `zero skill remove`) always write to the primary Zero dir only; `list` / `info` search primary + `~/.agents/skills`. `skill info` reports lock source/hash when present and whether the on-disk `SKILL.md` has drifted from the recorded hash.
@@ -126,9 +136,9 @@ description: Run the project's benchmark suite and summarize the deltas.
3. Report any regression > 5% with the function name and the previous value.
```
Only `name` and `description` are recognized in the frontmatter today. The `name` defaults to the directory name. If two skills declare the same name, the one in the lexicographically-first directory wins — duplicates are dropped silently. Plugin-declared skills (section 6) are not yet merged into the loader, so a `skills:` entry inside a plugin's `plugin.json` is not visible to the `skill` tool today.
Only `name` and `description` are recognized in the frontmatter today. The `name` defaults to the directory name. Within a single skills root, duplicate names are resolved by lexicographic directory order. Across roots, Zero loads the primary directory first, then `~/.agents/skills`, then plugin skill roots; earlier roots win name collisions. Plugin-declared skills (section 6) are merged into the active agent run at plugin activation time, so bundled skills appear in the available skills list and can be loaded with the `skill` tool.
The `skill` core tool lets the agent load any discovered skill by name.
The `skill` tool lets the agent load any discovered skill by name (primary, agents, or plugin).
## 4. Hooks
@@ -229,14 +239,24 @@ Servers are merged from user and project configs (project wins on conflicts). To
- A `--header` value produced by command substitution (`"Authorization=Bearer $(print-token)"`) in a private shell config that you keep out of git.
- A secret manager that injects the env var your MCP server reads on its own (the `command` and `args` then run inside that environment).
Project MCP config remains supported for shared team servers, but a project layer
that changes an existing server's target (`url`, `command`, or `args`) does not
inherit user credentials. Clear or replace `headers`, `env`, or `oauth` explicitly,
or use a new server name. OAuth tokens are bound to the resolved server identity,
so changing a server target can require `zero mcp oauth login <server>` again.
OAuth server names ending in `.<32 hex chars>` are reserved for token storage.
### As a server — expose Zero's tools to another agent
```bash
zero serve --mcp
zero serve --mcp -C /path/to/workspace
zero serve --mcp --add-dir /path/to/extra
```
The server speaks MCP over stdio. Configure it from the receiving side as a `stdio` server whose command is `zero serve --mcp`.
`-C/--cwd` sets the workspace root exposed as MCP resources and used by core tools. `--add-dir` (repeatable) widens that resource/tool scope beyond the workspace without granting the sandbox temp roots used by interactive runs.
## 6. Plugins
A plugin is a self-contained directory that bundles tools, hooks, and skills for one capability. Plugins live at:
@@ -269,6 +289,7 @@ Install and manage:
```bash
zero plugins add ./github-pr-review # copy into ~/.config/zero/plugins/ or ./.zero/plugins/
zero plugins list
zero plugins info github-pr-review # show manifest path, enabled state, lock metadata
zero plugins remove github-pr-review # alias: rm
```
@@ -276,19 +297,19 @@ A plugin is enabled by being present in the plugins directory and disabled by re
Plugin commands run with the plugin directory as their working directory. Use relative paths; the loader resolves them at activation time.
> **Roadmap.** An in-UI plugins manager (browse, install, enable / disable) is on the backlog. Today you use the `zero plugins` CLI subcommands above. Skills declared inside a plugin's `plugin.json` are not yet merged into the `skill` tool's discovery (see section 3).
> **Roadmap.** An in-UI plugins manager (browse, install, enable / disable) is on the backlog. Today you use the `zero plugins` CLI subcommands above.
## 7. Configuration locations
Three layers, applied in order (later layers override earlier ones):
Five configuration sources, in precedence order (later sources override earlier ones):
| Layer | Path | Notes |
| Source | Path / Key | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Built-in defaults | compiled in | Lowest priority. |
| User config | `~/.config/zero/config.json` | Your machine. Never committed. |
| Project config | `./.zero/config.json` | The repo. Committed (or not, your call). |
The user config holds things that should follow the user across projects (default provider, default model, theme). The project config holds things the team agreed on (provider catalog, sandbox policies, model restrictions).
@@ -301,19 +322,20 @@ A team that wants every contributor's Zero to behave the same way commits:
> provider-neutral: `api-key-env` is the environment variable name the chosen
> provider reads its key from (for example `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `GEMINI_API_KEY`,
> `OPENROUTER_API_KEY`), and `api-key` is the secret value. The action exports
> that variable for the run and never prints it. If your repository already
> commits a `.zero/config.json` with an active provider, you can omit `provider`.
> that variable only for the ZERO step and never prints it. If your repository
> already commits a `.zero/config.json` with an active provider, you can omit
> `provider`.
## Inputs
@@ -51,8 +52,8 @@ jobs:
| `prompt` | one of `prompt`/`prompt-file` | `""` | The instruction for ZERO to execute. |
| `prompt-file` | one of `prompt`/`prompt-file` | `""` | Path (relative to `working-directory`) to a file whose contents are the prompt. |
| `provider` | no | `""` | Provider id to activate (e.g. `openai`, `anthropic`, `gemini`, `ollama`, or any compatible endpoint). |
| `api-key` | no | `""` | The provider API key. Pass from a secret; never logged. |
| `api-key-env` | no | `""` | Env var name the provider reads its key from (e.g. `OPENAI_API_KEY`). Exported with `api-key`. |
| `api-key` | no | `""` | The provider API key. Pass from a secret; exported only for the ZERO step and never logged. |
| `api-key-env` | no | `""` | Env var name the provider reads its key from (e.g. `OPENAI_API_KEY`). Exported only for the ZERO step when used with `api-key`. |
| `model` | no | `""` | Model id. Defaults to the resolved provider's default. |
| `mode` | no | `""` | Run mode (`zero exec --mode`), e.g. `smart`, `deep`, `fast`. |
| `auto` | no | `low` | Autonomy ceiling (`zero exec --auto`): `low`, `medium`, or `high`. Conservative by default. |
@@ -162,9 +163,10 @@ jobs:
## Security notes
- **Secrets are passed as Action secrets and never logged.** The action exports
`api-key` (under `api-key-env`) and`slack-webhook-url` into the step
environment only. They are never echoed, and ZERO redacts secret-shaped
strings from its own output.
`api-key` (under `api-key-env`) only for the ZERO step.`slack-webhook-url`
is passed only to the Slack post step. They are never echoed or persisted to
later workflow steps, and ZERO redacts secret-shaped strings from its own
output.
- **The sandbox is always active.** This action never passes
`--skip-permissions-unsafe`, so writes stay inside the checked-out repository
(plus any roots you grant with `add-dir`). Unsafe mode is never enabled
| “Maybe compact context” | [Context Budget and Compaction](#context-budget-and-compaction) |
| Model requests a tool | [Tool Execution Lifecycle](#tool-execution-lifecycle), then [Tools and Capabilities](#tools-and-capabilities) |
| Tool needs approval or sandbox access | [Permission and Sandbox Model](#permission-and-sandbox-model) |
| Events appear in the UI or stream-JSON | [How the TUI and Agent Loop Connect](#how-the-tui-and-agent-loop-connect), [Stream-JSON Protocol](#stream-json-protocol) |
| Resume, fork, rewind, or sub-agent history | [Session Storage and History](#session-storage-and-history) |
## Main Packages
The sections above describe the architecture in concepts. If you want to connect
those concepts to implementation details, use this table as the code map before
| `internal/agent` | Core loop that sends messages to the model, streams output, executes tools, handles permissions, compaction, retries, and final answers. |
{"schemaVersion":2,"type":"permission_request","runId":"run_20260603_abc123","id":"call_2","name":"write_file","action":"prompt","permission":"prompt","permissionMode":"ask","sideEffect":"write","reason":"Creates or overwrites files."}
`zero update --check` checks the latest GitHub release and compares it with the
local CLI version.
local CLI version.`zero update --apply` (or its shorthand, `zero upgrade`)
downloads, verifies, and installs it.
```bash
zero update --check
zero update --check --json
zero update --check --repo Gitlawb/zero
zero update --check --target windows-x64
zero upgrade
zero update --apply
```
The command is intentionally check-only:
`--check` and `--apply` are mutually exclusive. `zero update` requires one of
them explicitly; `zero upgrade` is `zero update` with `--apply` implied.
`--check` is check-only:
- It does not replace the running binary.
- It exits with code `0` when the check succeeds, even when an update is
@@ -19,14 +26,35 @@ The command is intentionally check-only:
-`--json` prints the same result in a machine-readable format for scripts and
CI.
`--apply` installs the update in place:
- npm installs delegate to `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`.
- Standalone installs download the release archive, verify its checksum,
extract it, and atomically replace the running binary plus any installed
optional sandbox helpers.
- On Windows, the running executable is renamed aside and cleaned up on the
next `zero update --apply` or `zero upgrade`, since it can't be overwritten
while running.
-`--target` cannot be combined with `--apply`; it only applies to `--check`,
since applying always installs onto the current machine.
-`--repo` and `--endpoint` are ignored when applying to an npm-managed
install: that path delegates to `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest` and
takes its release from the npm registry, not from GitHub. They still apply to
`--check` there.
-`--json` serializes Zero's final result. For npm-managed installs, npm may
also write progress output to stdout, so neither
`zero update --apply --json` nor `zero upgrade --json` is guaranteed to
produce a single parseable JSON document. Use `--check --json` for
machine-readable automation.
Useful flags:
| Flag | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `--repo <owner/repo>` | Check another GitHub repository. |
| `--endpoint <url|owner/repo>` | Check a specific release API URL or repository slug. |
| `--repo <owner/repo>` | Use another GitHub repository for `--check` and `--apply`/`upgrade`. Ignored by an npm-managed apply. |
| `--endpoint <url\|owner/repo>` | Use a specific release API URL or repository slug for `--check` and `--apply`/`upgrade`. Ignored by an npm-managed apply. |
Installer scripts download the matching release asset for the local platform and
verify its `.sha256` file. If Zero is already installed, run `zero update --check`
before reinstalling.
verify its `.sha256` file. If Zero is already installed, run `zero upgrade`
instead of reinstalling.
## Windows recovery state (standalone installs)
This section describes Windows only. On Linux and macOS a standalone update
renames the staged file directly over the executable path through the
installation directory's file descriptor, so the replacement is atomic and no
aside copy, marker, or recovery record is ever created — a failed update leaves
the previous binary in place and nothing to resolve.
On Windows, a running executable cannot be replaced in place, so the previous
binary is moved aside to `<binary>.zero-update-<random>.old` first. The updater
records that exact file — bound to its filesystem identity, in per-user state
outside the installation directory — and deletes only that recorded copy after
the next update is verified in place. Backups it did not create are never
removed, so a file such as `zero.exe.before-manual-patch.old` is left alone. A
recorded copy that something else holds open (an on-access scanner, an editor)
stays recorded and is removed by a later update instead.
An update **refuses to run** while unresolved recovery state exists beside the
binary:
| State on disk | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `<binary>.old` (or `<binary>.<suffix>.old`) plus a `.keep` marker, or a per-user update-recovery record naming that copy | A previous update could not restore the original binary. The `.old` file may be the last binary the updater verified; the installed one may be unverified. The `.keep` marker is in the installation directory and can be deleted; the identity-bound record is not, so deleting the marker alone does not end the refusal. |
| `<binary>.…old.<suffix>.recovery` | A previous update could not even write the marker, so it moved the last verified binary to that name. |
| The binary is missing and one or more `*.old` files exist | The previous attempt was interrupted between moves. |
The refusal names the paths involved and the two moves that end the state:
either move the recovery binary back over the executable path, or — if the
installed binary is the one you want — delete the recovery copy itself (not
only the `.keep` marker) after verifying the installed binary, then update
again. Deleting the marker alone is not enough: a failed restore also records
that copy in per-user state outside the installation directory, and the next
update consults that record even if the marker is gone.
That trusted record lives under `%AppData%\zero\update-recovery` (per-user).
The recovery copy and its `.keep` marker sit in the installation directory
(per-machine). A second Windows account on the same machine does not see the
first account's unresolved record; the sibling marker is the machine-visible
signal for every account. There is no separate machine-wide store: writing one
would need a shared writable location and ACL rules the updater does not own.
This is deliberately fail-closed and differs from older releases, which deleted
`<binary>.old` and proceeded. The trade-off is that anyone who can write in the
installation directory can plant `<binary>.old` and `<binary>.old.keep` there
and make every subsequent update refuse until an operator clears them. That is
the safe direction: the alternative is an update that overwrites the only
verified copy of the previous binary. If updates start refusing, inspect those
files before removing them — an installation directory that a lower-privileged
ifgot:=browserToolTitle("open",`{"URL":"https://different.example.test","url":"https://actual.example.test/path"}`);got!="browser open https://actual.example.test"{
t.Fatalf("exact URL key title = %q",got)
}
ifgot:=browserToolTitle("action",`{"command":"not an action"}`);got!="browser action"{
{"I replaced the placeholder value with the computed key.",false},
{"The retry uses exponential backoff as a fallback.",false},
{"Without proper error handling the function would crash, so I added it.",false},
// real false positive (conversational recap): retelling a PAST exchange is
// not an admission about the current objective — the sentence carries its
// own narrative context ("You asked …", "at the time"):
{"You asked if I could work autonomously on zero if you gave me a GitHub account — I was honest that my sandbox had no repo, no build system, and no network/integration wired up yet, so I couldn't actually do it at the time.",false},
{"When we last spoke, I couldn't reach the GitHub API from the sandbox.",false},
{"Last session I was unable to build the project; that is what we should retry now.",false},
// quoted admissions (the model citing its own earlier message or a log
// line) must NOT be flagged:
{`My earlier reply said "I couldn't do it" but the tooling is now installed.`,false},
{"The run log contains `I cannot access the network`, which is expected inside the sandbox.",false},
// current-objective admissions must STILL be flagged, including past tense
// and multi-sentence finals whose other sentences are narrative:
{"I couldn't complete the refactor.",true},
{"I hit an error I could not resolve, so the migration is unfinished.",true},
{"You asked me to port the parser. I couldn't finish the second half.",true},
// unbalanced delimiters must not swallow the tail (only BALANCED quoted
// spans are stripped), so an admission after a stray quote still fires:
{"The log ends with a stray \" and I couldn't finish the migration.",true},
{"There is an unterminated `code span and I cannot proceed with the fix.",true},
{"The doc opens with “a curly quote and I was unable to complete the task.",true},
{Role:zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,Content:"Inspect the parser and preserve its current behavior."},
{Role:zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant,Content:"I will inspect before editing.",ToolCalls:[]zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID:"read",Name:"read_file",Arguments:`{"path":"internal/parser.go"}`}}},
{Role:zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant,ToolCalls:[]zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID:"test",Name:"exec_command",Arguments:`{"cmd":"go test ./internal/parser"}`}}},
{Role:zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant,ToolCalls:[]zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID:"ask",Name:"ask_user",Arguments:`{"questions":[{"question":"Which database should remain?"}]}`}}},
{Role:zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,ToolCallID:"ask",Content:"Which database should remain?: Postgres only; do not touch MySQL."},
for_,want:=range[]string{"Which database should remain?","Postgres only; do not touch MySQL","internal/db.go","internal/api.go","internal/config.go","https://example.com/spec","Inspect the Windows implementation"}{
if!strings.Contains(content,"[previous summary]\nkeep the earlier architecture decision")||!strings.Contains(content,"keep the newest prior decision"){
t.Fatalf("previous summary was lost when the brief tail was capped: %q",content)
}
if!strings.Contains(content,"middle transcript omitted to fit compaction budget"){
t.Fatalf("oversized brief was not head/tail capped: %q",content)
}
if!projection.truncated{
t.Fatal("projection did not structurally report truncation")
t.Fatalf("prompt discloses escalation=%v but approving actually escalates=%v; the prompt and the rewrite disagree, which is the consent gap this guards",disclosed,escalates)
}
})
}
}
// The two prefix decisions are the only ones that escalate, so a disclosure
// attached to a request offering neither would be a false alarm. Checked
// against the same predicate the rewrite consults.
t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: this host's shell guidance came off %d descriptions, want exactly exec_command's; internal/tools pins it as that description's tail",stripped)
// NOT "defer a tool": this test pins DeferThreshold at 0, so marking a
// tool deferred leaves it exposed here and changes nothing. Deferral is
// still worth doing for real sessions, it just cannot move this number.
// The levers that do are a smaller schema, one fewer core tool, or a
// deliberate raise.
t.Fatalf("eager tool schemas are %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — trim a schema, drop a core tool, or raise the ceiling deliberately (deferring will NOT help: this test disables deferral)",got,maxEagerToolSchemaTokens)
t.Fatalf("this host's exec_command shell guidance is %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — trim the guidance in internal/tools/shell_runtime.go or raise the ceiling deliberately",guidanceTokens,maxExecCommandShellGuidanceTokens)
// Manually compute what the canonical join should be.
expected:=sha256hex(strings.Join([]string{
fp.SystemPromptHash,
fp.ToolsHash,
fp.SchemaHash,
},"|"))
iffp.CompletePrefixHash!=expected{
t.Fatalf("CompletePrefixHash must equal sha256hex of the exact system, tools, and schema hashes:\n got: %s\n expected: %s",fp.CompletePrefixHash,expected)
t.Fatalf("canonicalSchemaString fallback must produce identical output for maps with the same key/value pairs in different declaration orders:\n first=%s\n second=%s",first,canonicalSchemaString(reordered))
}
// The fallback must include the "__non_json:" prefix so a consumer
// can tell the bytes are not a JSON-marshaled schema (a hash collision
// between a json.Marshal result and a stableStringify result is
// possible in theory; the prefix makes the source observable).
if!strings.HasPrefix(first,"__non_json:"){
t.Fatalf("canonicalSchemaString fallback must start with the __non_json: prefix, got: %s",first)
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