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Author SHA1 Message Date
anandh8x 93c4d65c88 fix(sandbox): classify PowerShell removal aliases 2026-07-26 23:41:28 +05:30
anandh8x bdade37c6c fix(windows): harden PowerShell execution 2026-07-26 23:19:20 +05:30
anandh8x 729d5ee96c fix(sandbox): normalize relative Windows paths
Recognize drive-relative, explicit relative, and suffixed backslash executable paths before generic shell escape removal so Windows commands continue to match canonical sandbox risk entries.
2026-07-24 20:22:15 +05:30
anandh8x 9994ad49bb fix(sandbox): normalize absolute Windows command paths
Extract drive-letter and UNC basenames before removing shell escape characters so fully qualified Windows executables continue matching canonical safety and network classifications.

Cover both drive and UNC curl paths with analyzer regressions.
2026-07-24 20:11:47 +05:30
anandh8x 2a0229e729 fix(sandbox): classify Windows executable suffixes
Normalize .exe, .cmd, .bat, and .com command names before safety and network lookup so PowerShell invocations such as curl.cmd receive the same network permission handling as curl.

Add analyzer and engine-level regressions for the Windows PowerShell command shape observed in CI.
2026-07-24 20:02:00 +05:30
anandh8x f51de6dfc6 test(windows): align shell coverage with PowerShell
Make Windows command fixtures and guidance assertions follow the selected host shell, preserve cmd fallback coverage, and use a genuine MSYS executable when PowerShell aliases are available.

Remove the unsupported non-TTY PowerShell stdin assertion; Windows interactive stdin requires a separate PTY transport.
2026-07-24 19:51:03 +05:30
anandh8x fcc6c72c34 fix(windows): prefer PowerShell for command execution
Detect PowerShell 7 or Windows PowerShell before falling back to cmd.exe, and share the selected host shell across agent tools and the interactive shell escape.

Configure UTF-8 output, preserve restricted-sandbox MSYS safeguards, and add Windows coverage for pipelines, workspace writes, and interactive stdin sessions.
2026-07-24 19:35:42 +05:30
Anandan a4a805a6c8 fix(tui): reset quiet clock for new runs (#799)
New turns inherited lastStreamActivity from the prior turn, so a fresh request could immediately look stalled. Initialize stream activity from the same timestamp as turnStartedAt and cover the stale-clock case with a deterministic regression test.
2026-07-24 17:38:10 +05:30
Anandan 9fe02ae52e fix(sandbox): clarify scoped permission prompts (#798) 2026-07-24 17:37:32 +05:30
Anandan 9d5c82d441 test(config): remove Windows startup timing assumptions (#800)
Cold PowerShell startup under concurrent Windows CI can consume most of the provider timeout, so an unsynchronized PID file may never be written and a fixed four-second bound can fail despite correct process-tree cleanup. Treat an absent PID as a helper that never reached startup, retain strict liveness checks for synchronized children, and bound completion by the child's natural lifetime instead.
2026-07-24 15:43:51 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Sonnet 5 97ef90d27a chore: remove code unreachable on every supported platform (#706)
* chore: remove code unreachable on every supported platform

The Security and code health job's advisory deadcode step reports 152
unreachable functions on main. Running the same check under GOOS=linux,
windows, and darwin shows 13 of those are false positives whose callers
live in windows build-tagged files, so only functions unreachable on all
three platforms are touched.

Functions with no references anywhere are deleted, including the
internal/reasoning package, which nothing imports. Functions that only
tests reference move into per-package export_test.go files so tests keep
their seams while the production binary sheds the code. Test call sites
of deleted convenience wrappers are ported to the live APIs (scoped tool
constructors, tools.DeferredSource, FinishReason checks).

Kept despite the report: cron.Store.Runs (only reader of runs.jsonl,
which production writes), and agenteval.TraceEventKeys and
MissingTraceEvents (used across packages by the trace contract test).

* docs(config): correct ValidateFile's errors.As claim

Message is a flattened string (.Error() already called on the parse
error), not a wrapped error, so callers can't recover the concrete
json error type via errors.As. Fix the comment to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* chore(trace,skills): drop obsolete Sink adapters and fix stale doc references

The dead-code pass removed the Emit methods but left Sink, NDJSONSink, and
TextSink exported with a contract nothing implements; remove the types with
their contract. Also remove the stray blank line at EOF of trace.go flagged
by gofmt, and update skills package docs and HOW_ZERO_WORKS.md to stop
directing callers to DiscoveryRoots/Duplicates, which are now test seams.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* chore: clean up remaining review nits on dead code removal

Replace a pointless fmt.Errorf(...%w...).Error() with fmt.Sprintf
using %v, since the wrapped error was discarded immediately anyway.
Remove a comment block that was duplicated verbatim.

* docs(skills): drop remaining references to test-only List/Get

Load and MergedSkills comments still named List/Get as production
entry points after they moved to export_test.go. Point callers at
Load and ListFromRoots instead.

* chore: remove now-unreferenced export_test.go seams

execSessionManager.len() and likelySandboxDenied/sandboxDenialKind had
no remaining callers after the sandbox unify-command-execution rebase;
the production code they wrapped for tests no longer exists.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-24 09:04:41 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 5c58256abc fix(config): kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows (#690)
* fix(config): kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows

taskkill /T walks the process tree by parent PID in user space and can
miss descendants, leaving the sleeping child holding the inherited
stdout/stderr pipes so cmd.Wait() blocked until natural completion
(~10s instead of the 5s timeout).

Assign the started command to a job object with
JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE and terminate the job on timeout so
the kernel kills the whole tree atomically; taskkill remains as a
fallback. Also set cmd.WaitDelay so Wait can never hang on pipes held
by an escaped orphan, and add a regression assertion that the sleeping
child is actually gone after the timeout returns.

Fixes #683

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(config): harden provider-command tree termination

Address code review on PR #690: terminate the process tree when
cmd.Wait() returns exec.ErrWaitDelay (a background descendant kept
inherited pipes open, previously left running); start the Windows
process suspended and assign it to the job object before resuming its
main thread, closing the window where a fast child could escape the
job; drop JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE so a successful command's
detached helpers survive Close() instead of being reaped; escape
single quotes in generated PID-file paths; and correct a misnamed
Windows exit-code constant in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(config): avoid gofmt smart-quote rewrite in doc comment

gofmt's doc-comment formatter rewrites a trailing '' into a curly
closing quote, which CI's gofmt -l check flags as unformatted. Reword
to avoid the pattern instead of embedding a raw quote pair.

* fix(config): terminate leaked descendants on nonzero exit, avoid PID reuse

Terminate the process tree on any error returned from cmd.Wait, not only

exec.ErrWaitDelay. Go only returns ErrWaitDelay when the shell itself

exited successfully; a nonzero exit (e.g. sleep 600 & exit 7) yields the

bare *ExitError instead, so a detached background child that held the

inherited pipes open was never terminated on that path.

Also stop falling through to the taskkill/PID fallback once a job handle

successfully contained the tree: by the time Terminate runs on the

ErrWaitDelay path, cmd.Wait has already reaped the root process, so its

PID may have been reused by an unrelated process, and taskkill /T /PID

against a reused PID would force-kill the wrong tree.

Addresses PR #690 review feedback.

* fix(config): surface suspended-thread resume failures instead of hanging

resumeMainThread now reports whether it actually resumed at least one

thread. If Toolhelp/OpenThread/ResumeThread all fail, the launched

process would otherwise sit suspended forever, never exit on its own,

and get misreported as a plain 5s provider-command timeout instead of

the real resume failure. attachCommandProcess now terminates the

process immediately in that case.

Also documents the known, non-regressive limitation that the taskkill

fallback (used only when job creation/assignment itself fails) can

still miss a descendant that has reparented away from the tree it

walks by PID.

Addresses remaining PR #690 review feedback; PR description corrected

separately to drop the outdated JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE claim.

* fix(config): guard taskkill with retained process identity

* fix(config): retain POSIX process group identity

* test(tui): match provider wizard shortcut

* test(tui): pin credential-step env for deterministic footer assertion

The credential step's footer only shows the /→ shortcut once a key
is present, whether typed or inherited from the provider's
AuthEnvVars. The previous commit changed the assertion to
"Enter/→ continue" without accounting for that, so the test only
passed by coincidence when ANTHROPIC_API_KEY happened to be set in the
environment — failing deterministically on a clean CI runner (as
smoke reported on all three OSes). Pin the env var empty and assert
the no-key footer text so the test is correct regardless of ambient
environment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(config): preserve provider process attributes

* test(config): keep SysProcAttr coverage portable

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-24 09:03:59 +08:00
Felix-Ayush fa8734f179 fix(cli): include plugins info in shell completions (#794)
zero plugins info landed in #773 but the completions tree still only
offered list/add/remove, so generated bash/zsh/fish scripts omitted it.
2026-07-24 08:49:01 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 5bb1bc11c3 fix(tui): fix rendering corruption over multipass + Windows Terminal (#709)
* fix(tui): disable bubbletea hard scroll optimization unconditionally

Vendors a patched charm.land/bubbletea/v2 (via a local go.mod replace)
with hard scroll optimization (using terminal scroll-region sequences
to shift existing lines instead of repainting) disabled unconditionally,
instead of only on GOOS=="windows".

That GOOS check only catches a Windows terminal driving the program
directly. It misses a Linux process running inside a multipass VM
whose output is ultimately displayed by Windows Terminal over a
remote shell, which corrupts rendering badly (garbled/overlapping
text, worse on resize) the same way the check exists to prevent.
There's no reliable way to detect that remote hop from inside the VM,
so scroll optimization is now off in all cases.

* fix(tui): force redraw on streamed newlines to clear stale caret

The streaming caret (appendStreamingCursor) is appended to whichever
visual line is currently last. Over a remote terminal chain
(multipass VM output displayed by Windows Terminal), the renderer's
incremental cell diff sometimes fails to clear the caret's old cell
when a newline moves it to a new line, leaving ghost carets behind.

Fire tea.ClearScreen when a streamed delta contains a newline: that's
exactly the moment the caret moves and the risk exists, so it forces
a full redraw right then instead of leaving it to the incremental
diff, without doing so on every animation tick.

* chore(tui): trim upstream repo metadata from vendored bubbletea fork

The vendored bubbletea-v2-patched module is ~99% byte-identical to
upstream charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8; only cursed_renderer.go
differs (one line disabling hard scroll optimization). The .github
workflows, README.md, UPGRADE_GUIDE_V2.md, Taskfile.yaml and CI config
files are upstream repo metadata that serve no purpose inside this
repo, so remove them to slim the PR. The Go source and testdata golden
files are kept because Go's replace directive requires the full module
to be present and buildable.

Refs #709

* fix(tui): address review round on the rendering workaround and vendored fork

Fork correctness fixes (all flagged by review):

- key.go: KeyMediaRecord repeated the previous const expression and
  decoded record presses as previous-track; map it to uv.KeyMediaRecord.
- mouse.go: MouseButton11 likewise collapsed onto MouseButton10.
- termios_unix.go: BSDLY/BS0 are output-delay bits; read them from Oflag
  instead of Lflag so useBackspace is set correctly.
- cursed_renderer.go: count wrapped rows with (lineWidth-1)/w so an
  exact terminal-width multiple no longer inserts a blank line; compare
  colors by normalized RGBA via a nil-safe helper instead of interface
  equality (which panics on non-comparable implementations); and make
  clearScreen invalidate lastView so the queued erase flushes with the
  next frame instead of deferring until an unrelated view change — the
  reordering that could leave the ghost caret in place.
- exec_test.go: implement reset() on the spy renderer and inject it
  before Run; assert exec preserves renderer state (releaseTerminal
  with reset=false).
- logging_test.go: restore the default logger's output/prefix/flags and
  fail fast on setup errors.
- tea_test.go: tie the Quit-pumping goroutine to a channel closed when
  Run returns instead of leaking it until process exit.

TUI scoping (review P2): the forced redraw on streamed newlines is now
rate-limited to ~10/s so heavy streaming output no longer turns every
newline into a full-screen repaint, and ZERO_NO_STREAM_CLEAR=1 opts a
correctly-rendering terminal back into the fast incremental path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): guarantee deferred stream-clear redraw and other review fixes

A throttled stream-clear could drop the redraw entirely when a
newline arrived in the last delta of a turn, leaving a ghost caret on
screen. Add a one-shot deferred flush timer plus a flush on stream
end. Fix a stale comment and a test that leaked global logger state
in the vendored bubbletea fork.

* fix(tui): use m.now for stream-clear throttle and harden tests

Drive stream-clear rate limiting through the mockable clock and a
shared streamClearThrottle constant so both the agentTextMsg and
flush paths stay in sync. Add an explicit two-newline-within-window
regression and detect ClearScreen by function pointer so tests do not
evaluate Tick side effects.

* fix(tui): relocate bubbletea fork out of third_party

Move the maintained bubbletea/v2 hard-scroll patch from
third_party/bubbletea-v2-patched to patches/bubbletea-v2 and update the
root go.mod replace. third_party/ is immutable vendored content per
AGENTS.md; a maintained fork belongs outside that tree.

* fix(ci,docs): run vendored bubbletea fork tests and document unsupported go install path

patches/bubbletea-v2 is its own Go module so `go test ./...` from the repo
root never touched its 7 test files. Add a CI step (and a make test-patches
target for local use) that runs the fork's own suite across the smoke
matrix.

The root go.mod's local `replace charm.land/bubbletea/v2 =>
./patches/bubbletea-v2` also breaks `go install
github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@<version>`, since a versioned install can't
resolve a replace pointing at a filesystem path. Document that path as
unsupported in README.md and docs/INSTALL.md and point at git clone + go
build instead, per jatmn's review findings on PR #709.

* ci: run vendored bubbletea fork tests with -race

CodeRabbit review on this PR. The fork exists specifically to patch a
concurrency bug (charmbracelet/bubbletea#1690), so its regression test
needs the race detector to actually catch a reintroduced race instead
of just passing on a benign-looking run.

* fix(tui): drop vendored bubbletea fork; keep stream-clear workaround

Maintainers asked not to ship an in-tree bubbletea replace: it breaks
versioned go install and is a large maintenance surface for a narrow
multipass/Windows Terminal scroll bug. Remove patches/bubbletea-v2 and
the replace directive; keep the model.go full-redraw-on-streamed-newline
workaround (ZERO_NO_STREAM_CLEAR to opt out). Restore normal install docs.

Refs Gitlawb/zero#709

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-24 08:48:16 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 d9b882eb0a fix(cron): reserve job IDs atomically (#686)
* fix(cron): reserve job IDs atomically

* fix(cron): hold the per-ID lock from reservation through persistence

Address code review on PR #686: reserveID made the timestamp directory
visible via os.Mkdir before metadata.json existed, but Remove (which
takes the per-ID lock before deleting) never coordinated with that
window. A concurrent `zero cron rm <id>` could delete the bare
reservation and report success right after Add reserved it; writeJob's
MkdirAll would then silently resurrect the directory and persist the
job anyway. A second Add could also re-reserve the same id while the
first writer was still running, putting two writers on the same
metadata path.

reserveID now acquires the same per-ID lock (used by Get/Update/
Mutate/Remove/AppendRun) for each candidate id before attempting
os.Mkdir, and returns it still held; Add releases it only after
writeReservedJob commits (or tears down) the reservation. A concurrent
Remove for that id now blocks until the reservation is resolved one
way or the other, and a concurrent Add attempting the same candidate
id serializes through the lock rather than only racing the Mkdir.

Adds two regression tests: one proving Remove waits for and removes
the committed job rather than the bare reservation, and one proving a
second reserveID call for the same candidate id blocks on the shared
lock and moves on to the next candidate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 19:28:04 +08:00
github-actions[bot] a50574f673 chore(main): release 0.5.0 (#714)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-22 09:37:36 +08:00
nb213andbinyangzhu000-sudo c00a4734b5 Add Atlas Cloud provider preset (#784)
Co-authored-by: binyangzhu000-sudo <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 08:20:21 +08:00
Felix-Ayush 2479884dea feat(plugins): add zero plugins info command (#773)
* feat(plugins): add zero plugins info command

Add plugins info to inspect manifest state, extension counts, and
lockfile source/hash with optional hash drift detection.

* fix(plugins): derive lock dir from plugin install path for info

Remove LockDir from InfoOptions and read the lockfile from
filepath.Dir(plugin.PluginDir) so lock metadata matches the resolved
plugin location. Consolidate duplicate lock hash output lines.
2026-07-22 08:14:00 +08:00
Anandan ab2f9fbd3e Add shell completion generation (#764)
* Add shell completion generation

Add zero completions for bash, zsh, fish, PowerShell, and Elvish using one shared command tree that covers aliases, nested commands, root flags, and common exec flags.

Validate missing and unsupported shell arguments as usage errors and document safe installation examples in command help.

Refs #499

* Complete shell target suggestions

Expose every supported shell as a completions subcommand candidate and document Elvish activation.

Refs #499

* Fix Elvish completion syntax

Close generated Elvish conditional branches, use value equality, and validate generated script structure plus native Bash and Zsh syntax.

Refs #499
2026-07-22 08:13:14 +08:00
PierrunoYTandAmp baa4be13ac fix: make extension installs transactional (#762)
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 08:12:49 +08:00
ddfdf2878e Fix ChatGPT OAuth model discovery and ACP model selection (#724)
* fix: expose authenticated ChatGPT models to ACP

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(acp): persist discovered model selections

* fix(acp): normalize model selections

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 08:11:55 +08:00
Anandan 96859c9bd1 feat(sandbox): unify command execution and enforcement (#781)
* feat(sandbox): unify command execution and enforcement

* test(sandbox): make platform contracts portable

* fix(sandbox): close execution lifecycle races

Bound retained interactive output, preserve interruption state, and start workspace observation before process launch.

Protect active runtime roots with cross-platform leases, capture transient protected-path creation events, and restore process attributes after PTY fallback.

* fix(sandbox): restore strict macOS isolation

Remove Seatbelt host-local network allowances after native validation showed localhost filters can reach host interfaces.

Track process reap completion so retained sessions cannot signal a stale numeric PID.
2026-07-21 18:55:13 +05:30
Vasanth T 3524f795e5 fix(cli): warn when ZERO_PROVIDER overrides a providers-use selection (#767)
Closes #721.

`zero providers use <name>` wrote activeProvider to config.json and reported
"Active provider set to <name>" even when ZERO_PROVIDER was set, which applyEnv
makes win over config.json unconditionally. So the switch was reported as a
success while `providers current` still showed the env-pinned provider, a silent
no-op.

Detect the override and say so: the text path prints a note to stderr naming the
env var and the provider that stays active, and the --json path adds
effectiveProvider / overriddenByEnv fields so a machine consumer is not misled
either. The config write still lands unchanged; only the reporting is honest.

The env read is injected via a new appDeps.getenv (os.Getenv in production, left
nil by fillAppDeps like exportActiveProvider) so tests stay hermetic against an
ambient ZERO_PROVIDER. The related env-derived-profile "not found" case the issue
also mentions is already handled by the unpersisted-provider path (#707) and #716.
2026-07-21 13:00:50 +05:30
Vasanth T b1f41735a7 fix(lsp): make the real-gopls check opt-in so a broken gopls can't fail the suite (#684) (#766)
* fix(lsp): make the real-gopls check opt-in so a broken gopls can't fail the suite

Closes #684.

TestManagerCheckRealGopls skipped only when gopls was absent from PATH, so an
installed-but-unhealthy gopls (e.g. an unusable persistent-index cache that makes
the server exit during initialization with EOF) failed `go test ./...` for every
developer who merely had gopls on PATH.

Gate it behind ZERO_GOPLS_INTEGRATION, matching the repo's other real-server
opt-ins (internal/dictation smoke tests). The default hermetic suite keeps its
coverage on the fake server and never touches the developer's global gopls; the
real check still runs on demand with ZERO_GOPLS_INTEGRATION=1.

* test(lsp): require ZERO_GOPLS_INTEGRATION=1 exactly, so =0 keeps the check off
2026-07-21 13:00:41 +05:30
Vasanth T 4945684fa2 fix(sandbox): bind Windows elevated ACL setup to one no-follow handle (#765)
Closes #728.

The Windows ACL setup resolved each target's pathname independently across
os.Stat, GetNamedSecurityInfo, and SetNamedSecurityInfo (and again on rollback),
so during elevated setup a lower-privileged local user could swap a target for a
symlink/junction between operations and redirect the ACL change onto a system
object the process never validated. That is a TOCTOU across a privilege boundary.

Open each target once with a no-follow handle (FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT plus
FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS, READ_CONTROL|WRITE_DAC) and drive both the read
(GetSecurityInfo) and the write (SetSecurityInfo) through that one handle, so they
hit the same kernel object. isDir is read from the same handle rather than a
separate Stat. A target that resolves to a reparse point is refused outright,
since a setup target that is a symlink/junction during elevated setup is the
swap-attack signature. Rollback re-opens no-follow rather than restoring by
pathname; the residual window is small because the target is ACL-restricted by
then, and one caller discards the rollback closure so handles are not retained for
the whole sandbox lifetime.

Tests (windows-tagged, no elevation needed): the handle-based apply plus rollback
round-trip on a user-owned temp dir, the materialize-and-remove path, reparse
rejection via a junction (needs no admin, so it runs in CI), and the not-exist
mapping. The full privilege-boundary race can't be reproduced in CI, so the guard
is verified structurally (one handle for read and write) and by junction rejection.
2026-07-21 13:00:29 +05:30
Vasanth T 5140d4bf7b docs(contributing): add contribution volume and batching guidance (#783)
Documents expectations for keeping contribution flow sustainable during the
stabilization phase: one issue per bug (no bundled multi-finding audits), keep
only a few items open at a time, and hold AI-assisted contributions to the same
per-item verification bar. Complements the existing issue-approved gate, which
already covers PR-to-issue linkage and scope; the gap was submission volume.
2026-07-21 15:16:22 +08:00
KRATOSandKRATOS 3967d49d64 feat(tui): permission prompt takes free-text feedback inline (#780)
* feat(tui): let the permission prompt take free-text feedback inline

"No, and tell Zero what to do differently" now opens an inline input on the
permission card instead of silently cancelling: type an instruction, Enter sends
it, Esc returns to the option list. The text is delivered as a Deny decision whose
Reason is the typed instruction, so the agent surfaces it via deniedPermissionResult
as the tool result and the model adjusts in the SAME turn — where the old cancel
returned an error and aborted the run. Empty input + Enter falls back to a plain
cancel (the prior meaning).

No agent-side change: PermissionDecision.Reason already carries free text to the
model. The UI mirrors the ask_user "type your own answer" pattern — the feedback
field reuses the shared composer input and the card renders it in the transcript
body.

Also: a focused permission prompt now suppresses the composer (and idle
hints/plan panel), keeping only the status line, exactly like the ask_user modal.
Its keys are inert anyway, so a "describe a task for zero…" box below the card was
misleading — and in feedback mode the shared input would otherwise echo in two
places.

Tests cover open / submit-as-Deny-with-text / empty-cancels / Esc-returns, the
composer suppression in both modes, and that the feedback text renders exactly
once.

* fix(tui): preserve the composer draft across permission feedback (#780 review)

anand + CodeRabbit (Major): entering feedback mode cleared the shared composer
input via SetValue(""), and neither submit nor cancel restored it — so a user
with a half-typed or queued next-turn message who chose "tell Zero what to do
differently" lost that draft.

Snapshot the composer value into pendingPermissionPrompt.savedDraft when feedback
mode opens, and restore it on BOTH exits (submit and Esc-cancel). Only the
feedback text is consumed, delivered via the decision Reason. Adds regression
tests for both paths; mutation-verified against the SetValue("") regression.

* fix(tui): guard permission-feedback backspace and clicks (#780 review)

Vasanthdev2004 review, all on the permission path:

1. Real bug: Backspace on an empty feedback field dropped a staged attachment.
   The keyBackspace case runs before the typing branch and, on an empty composer
   (feedback mode clears it), fell to removeLastAttachment — silently dropping a
   staged image/doc that savedDraft does not restore. Route Backspace to the
   shared input while typing so it is a plain edit of the feedback text.

2. Defence-in-depth: the mouse click resolver in handleTranscriptSelectionMouse
   resolved a clicked permission option (Allow included) with no typing check. It
   is safe today only because renderFocusedPermissionPrompt returns nil clickable
   offsets in feedback mode — a single early-return in a function other PRs also
   edit. Add an explicit !typing guard on the click path so the safety is stated,
   not emergent.

3. Test hardening (also raised by CodeRabbit): assert len(got) == 1 before
   indexing got[0] in the draft-preservation test, so a regression fails cleanly
   instead of panicking.

Tests: TestPermissionFeedbackBackspaceKeepsStagedAttachment (mutation-verified
against the missing guard) and TestPermissionFeedbackRendersNoClickableOptionsWhileTyping.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 23:29:10 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 89bdc6719a fix(tools): read_file recovers a backwards line range instead of erroring (#779)
* fix(tools): read_file recovers a backwards line range instead of erroring

renderReadFileRange hard-failed when end_line < start_line, costing the caller a
whole retry for an arithmetic slip. It was also inconsistent: start_line past EOF
returns a friendly note and end_line past EOF is auto-clamped to the last line —
only a backwards range hard-errored.

Recover it the same way: clamp end_line UP to start_line (read just that line) and
surface the adjustment in the output so it is never silent. Valid ranges
(end_line >= start_line) are byte-for-byte unchanged.

The change is in the argument-validation phase, before any file I/O, so there is
no runtime cost; if anything it saves the agent a wasted retry turn.

Tests: TestReadFileToolRecoversBackwardsRange (recovery + note + reads only
start_line, mutation-verified against the old hard error) and
TestReadFileToolValidRangeUnchangedByRecovery (valid ranges carry no note and read
the identical window).

* test(tools): assert full valid-range output in read_file recovery test (#779 review)

anand + CodeRabbit: TestReadFileToolValidRangeUnchangedByRecovery claimed
byte-for-byte preservation but only checked substrings, so an altered
header/separator or a stray out-of-range line would still pass. Compare the
whole result.Output against the exact expected rendering.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 22:57:25 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 722bb31216 fix(tui): stop the permission card clashing on cool themes (#778)
The focused permission prompt was the only prompt card in the TUI that used
brand/warning colours for its interior, and both read badly on cool themes such
as dracula:

1. The selected option ("Yes, proceed") was filled with zeroTheme.badge — the
   brand chip meant for short labels (" 0 ", " ASK ", " SPEC REVIEW "), a
   full-brightness accent fill. Every other selectable list in the TUI (model
   picker, provider list, / palette) highlights its selected row with onSel/selBg
   instead. The permission card was the outlier, painting a saturated accent slab
   across the row and skipping the card tint every other line composed onto.

2. The card BODY was tinted with permBg, an amber-family wash intended to signal
   a warning surface. It works on the warm default palette but renders as a
   brown-yellow slab over cool themes, and it made the permission card the only
   prompt whose body carries a fill — ask_user, spec review and plan all use a
   transparent body (lipgloss.NewStyle()).

Fix both to match the rest of the TUI: the selected row uses onSel(ink) like
every other picker, and the body drops its permBg fill for a transparent one.
Warning identity is unchanged — the amber PERMISSION badge and the amber-mixed
border still mark it as a permission gate; only the clashing interior fills go.

TestFocusedPermissionSelectedRowUsesSelectionTintNotBrandChip asserts against
palette entries (not hardcoded hex, so it survives a theme retune): the selected
row carries selBg and not the brand accent, the body carries no permBg wash, and
the PERMISSION badge keeps its amber fill so the card still reads as a warning.

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 22:39:50 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS a21a052a4a feat(sandbox): disable the sandbox via config (#687) (#746)
* feat(sandbox): disable the sandbox via config (#687)

Add a sandbox.enabled field (`"sandbox": {"enabled": false}`). ModeDisabled
already short-circuits the engine but had no config surface.

- SandboxConfig.Enabled *bool (pointer distinguishes an explicit false from an
  omitted key).
- mergeConfig honors it (global config / CLI); applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy maps
  enabled:false to ModeDisabled.
- mergeProjectConfig intentionally does NOT merge it: a cloned repo must not be
  able to disable the sandbox that constrains it — same posture as
  AdditionalWriteRoots and the Network tighten-only rule.

* fix(config): honor sandbox.enabled from the CLI override path (#687 review)

applyOverrides copied BlockUnixSockets/MonitorDenials but not the new Enabled
tri-state pointer, so a CLI/programmatic Overrides{Sandbox:{Enabled:&false}} was
dropped — contradicting the 'global config / CLI can disable' contract. Preserve
the pointer in applyOverrides (runs after all config sources, so an explicit
override wins) and add a resolver regression test: an explicit false override
disables, and an explicit true override wins over a lower-precedence config false.

* fix(config): keep sandbox.enabled out of the provider-command path (#687 review)

mergeConfig now copies Sandbox.Enabled, and it is shared by two callers: the
global-config merge (trusted) and the provider-command merge (not). A provider
command is an arbitrary executable named in config, and LoadProviderCommand
parses its stdout into a full FileConfig -- so one returning a valid provider
plus {"sandbox":{"enabled":false}} could disable the sandbox meant to constrain
it, despite the setting being documented as global-config/CLI only. Confirmed
reproducible in both directions before the fix.

Clear Sandbox.Enabled from the provider-command config before merging, mirroring
the carve-out mergeProjectConfig already applies for the same reason. Done at the
call site rather than inside mergeConfig because that helper must keep honouring
the setting for the trusted global-config merge.

Adds TestResolveSandboxEnabledIgnoredFromProviderCommand covering both
directions (cannot disable, cannot enable) and asserting the provider itself is
still applied, so the guard cannot be satisfied by dropping the command wholesale.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 21:07:04 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS f079b90f82 fix(sandbox): AST second opinion for interactive-command bypasses (#473) (#745)
* fix(sandbox): AST second opinion for interactive-command bypasses (#473)

The interactive-command guard split shell commands with a hand-written parser
(splitShellSegments), which mis-handles unusual quoting, command substitution,
subshells, and newline separators — an interactive program hidden by one slips
through and the agent hangs until the per-command timeout.

Add astCommandFields(): mvdan.cc/sh/v3/syntax (already used by analyzer.go) to
re-extract the real simple commands, then apply the SAME per-program checks the
regex path uses (interactivePrograms + hasNonInteractiveFlag). This only ADDS
detections and classifies every program exactly as before — ssh with a trailing
command, python -c, etc. stay allowed — while catching the splitter's bypasses.
Unparseable input (Windows cmd.exe, obfuscation) yields no commands and falls
through to the regex path; the guard never hard-blocks on a parse error.

* fix(sandbox): AST pass runs the full pipeline + guards dynamic programs (#473 review)

Address review on #745:
- The AST second opinion now applies the complete detection pipeline via a new
  inspectCommandFields helper (multi-word interactive segments, sh -c payload
  recursion, then the per-program lookup), so parser-hidden bypasses like
  { git rebase -i HEAD~1; } and { sh -c 'vim file.txt'; } are caught, not just
  bare interactive programs.
- astCommandFields now skips a CallExpr whose program word is not a static
  literal (isLiteralWord), so a substitution concatenated with a literal
  ($(printf foo)vim -> foovim) can't fabricate an interactive program name.

Regression tests added for both boundaries. (The un-braced $(printf foo)vim
false positive is a separate, pre-existing hand-parser behavior — present on
main before this PR — and is out of scope here.)

* fix(sandbox): require literal words for the whole AST call (#473 review)

astCommandFields guarded only the program word, then ran every argument
through wordText, which keeps literal/quoted parts and silently drops
CmdSubst/ParamExp. A dynamic ARGUMENT was therefore reconstructed lossily:
`git $(printf foo)rebase -i HEAD~1` runs as `git foorebase -i` (a
non-existent, non-interactive subcommand) but collapsed to `git rebase -i`
and was blocked -- a false positive on a command the user never wrote, and
new on this branch (the base correctly reports not-interactive).

Extend the literalness guard to every word in the call: if any word carries
an expansion, skip that AST command rather than classify a reconstruction
whose runtime value is unknowable. Skipping is the safe direction -- the
hand-written passes still run first, and a miss falls through to the normal
permission prompt instead of hard-blocking.

Genuine detection is unchanged: `git rebase -i HEAD~1` and the #473 bypass
cases still classify exactly as before.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 21:01:55 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS b30c3971b4 fix(tui): model rows labelled by id when the description is prose; keep the sidebar under the / palette (#775)
* fix(tui): label model rows by id when the description is prose

The model picker (provider wizard AND onboarding, which share displayLabel)
labelled each row with the provider's Description, falling back to the ID only
when the description was "generic". That is right when Description holds a short
display name -- "Grok 4.3" for x-ai/grok-4.3, which is what the field is for and
why the row prefers it over an ugly raw ID.

Providers do not all honour that. Aggregators commonly return a prose blurb
instead ("Fast DeepSeek model for efficient chat, coding help, and agent
loops"), which fails as a label twice: it overflows the row, and because such
blurbs are written per model FAMILY rather than per model, several DIFFERENT
models collapse to byte-identical rows. Observed in a live picker with two
identical "Open-weight GPT model for self-hosted reasoning..." rows and two
identical "Kimi multimodal agent model..." rows -- the distinguishing ID was
visible only in the detail line of whichever row happened to be highlighted, so
the list could not be used to pick between them.

providerWizardGenericModelDescription cannot catch these: it rejects vague
descriptions ("live model", "catalog default"), whereas these are specific, just
shared and sentence-shaped. So gate on shape instead -- a display name is short
and few-worded; anything longer is prose and the ID (unique by construction)
makes the better label. Friendly names are still preferred where providers
supply them, so the existing behaviour is unchanged for well-behaved catalogs.

* fix(tui): keep the sidebar open under the / command palette

sidebarAvailable grouped suggestionsActive() with the full-screen overlays
(setup, wizards, pickers), whose stated rationale is that they "take over the
chat column and render at full width". That is not true of the `/` palette:
suggestionOverlay draws it through centerRenderedBlock at
minInt(width, suggestionPaletteMaxWidth), a centred box capped at 76 cells
floating over the chat column.

Treating it as full-screen collapsed the whole layout on every `/`: the sidebar
disappeared, the plan panel dropped out of it and re-rendered inline above the
composer, and the transcript re-wrapped to full width -- a jarring reflow for a
popup, and worst mid-run with a live plan on screen.

It cannot overlap the sidebar either: twoColumnTranscriptView renders the
overlay with width = chatColumnWidth, so the palette is capped at
min(chatColumn, 76) and centred inside the chat column. Mouse hit-testing is
unaffected because sidebarLineAtMouse carries its own suggestionsActive() guard,
so clicks still reach the palette rather than the sidebar rows beneath it.

The genuinely full-width overlays keep suppressing the sidebar, pinned by the
new test alongside the palette case.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 20:58:11 +05:30
Vasanth T da9fb50f54 fix(tools): give write_stdin's invalid-session errors the same recovery guidance (#749 follow-up) (#768)
* fix(tools): give write_stdin's invalid-session errors the same recovery guidance

Follow-up to #749 (write_stdin session-id probing) / #702.

write_stdin had three "no valid live session" error paths with three different
messages and signatures: a missing session_id returned "session_id is required",
a zero/negative/non-integer one returned "session_id must be at least 1", and
only a valid-but-unknown id got the rich UnknownExecSessionError recovery guidance
("do not guess or probe; start a session with exec_command, or use edit_file/
write_file"). So a model that called write_stdin with session_id 0 (the common
"I have no id" placeholder) got a terse error with no way forward, and naming the
minimum nudged it toward trying 1, 2, 3... the exact id-probing #749 suppresses.
The three signatures also meant a model moving 0 to 1 to 2 reset the
repeated-failure streak on each class of mistake.

Route the missing / non-integer / <1 cases through the same UnknownExecSessionError
message. Now every "no live session" mistake gives the same recovery guidance and,
because that message is id-invariant, shares one repeated-failure signature, so any
mix of missing/zero/probing accumulates toward the halt.

Updates TestWriteStdinRequiresPositiveSessionID to cover missing/zero/negative/
non-integer and assert the recovery message. Guardrail signature/halt tests
unchanged.

* test(tools): cover the explicit session_id: nil case for write_stdin
2026-07-20 13:59:11 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 684901165d fix(sandbox): don't auto-allow shell when re-entrancy skips wrapping (#727) (#744)
The ambient ZERO_SANDBOXED=1 + ZERO_SANDBOX_BACKEND markers are user-controlled
at an unsandboxed process boundary. Policy could auto-allow an ordinary shell
command (backend reports a native wrapping sandbox) while the runner, seeing the
same markers, returned an unwrapped pass-through plan — the command then ran
directly on the host with no isolation and no prompt.

shellSandboxActive now mirrors the runner: when IsAlreadySandboxed() (the markers
are present, so wrapping is skipped) the sandbox is not the boundary for this
command, so it reports inactive and the shell command takes the normal approval
path instead of auto-allowing. Immediate mitigation per the issue; authenticated
launch provenance is the longer-term fix.

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 11:56:36 +05:30
Vasanth T e1975c1b39 fix(perfbench): grant write tools so mutating tasks measure real edits (#763)
* fix(perfbench): grant write tools so mutating tasks measure real edits

The turn benchmark invoked `zero exec` in its default read-only posture,
which exposes no write or shell tools (no edit_file/apply_patch/
write_file/exec_command/bash). So the mutating classes (edit/fix/
refactor) could never apply a change: a run either ground to the turn
ceiling hunting for an edit tool or reported a no-tool blocker, and the
only tasks that 'passed' were ones whose oracle grep matched the stamped
.zero-answer.txt narration rather than a real edit.

This invalidated every mutating-class number in both baselines. A live
trace of fix-07 (a one-line admin->user prefix change) showed the model
calling only read_file/grep/lsp_navigate/update_plan and then stating it
had no file-writing tool. Adding --skip-permissions-unsafe exposes the
full tool set; each task already runs in an isolated throwaway fixture
copy, so there is nothing to protect. With the flag, edit-01/fix-01/
fix-07/refactor-01 go from failing (or false-passing) to 4/4 real
passes, and tool_execution rises from ~0.4% to ~29% of wall as the write
tools are actually exercised.

Adds TestBuildTurnExecArgsGrantsWriteTools pinning the flag as a
correctness contract.

* fix(perfbench): use --auto member and let the oracle judge incomplete exits

Reviewer feedback on the write-tools grant: --skip-permissions-unsafe is
broader than the benchmark needs. It also drops the workspace, network,
and destructive-command guards and auto-retries sandbox-blocked commands
unsandboxed. Switch to --auto member, which grants exactly the write +
sandboxed-shell tools the mutating classes need while keeping those
safeguards.

member-auto's shell is sandboxed, though, so on a host without sandbox
setup the agent's own self-verification (go test/build) can't run and the
turn exits INCOMPLETE even after a correct edit. The runner used to treat
any nonzero exit as failure before consulting the oracle, which would
false-fail those correct edits. Make the oracle authoritative for
oracle-bearing tasks: the stamped test/grep against the actual fixture
files is ground truth, so a correct edit passes regardless of the exit
code. Latency-only tasks have no oracle, so a nonzero exit still fails
them.

Verified with a 4-task glm-5.2 smoke (edit-01/fix-01/fix-07/refactor-01):
4/4 real passes under --auto member. Updates the exec-args test to assert
--auto member is present and --skip-permissions-unsafe is absent, and adds
TestOracleAuthoritativeOnIncompleteExit and
TestNonzeroExitStillFailsLatencyOnly.

* fix(perfbench): reject fixtureless tasks so the write-tools grant can't escape isolation

CodeRabbit and gnanam both flagged the same structural gap: buildTurnExecArgs
grants the write + sandboxed-shell tools to every invocation, but the fixture
isolation was conditional (a task with no workspaceFixture ran in the caller's
cwd). So the grant and the guard could drift apart, and a fixtureless task would
run an agent with write/shell tools in the caller's real repo dir.

Make the isolation a checked precondition: NewTurnExecRunner now rejects a task
with no workspaceFixture before launching zero exec, failing loudly rather than
silently running in cwd. Every shipped task already declares a fixture, so this
only fires on a malformed or newly added one.

Adds TestTurnRunnerRejectsFixturelessTask (rejection is pre-launch: it returns
the fixture error even with a nonexistent binary).

* fix(perfbench): defer to the oracle only for INCOMPLETE (exit 4), not every nonzero exit

anand's follow-up: the previous commit cleared VerifyErr for any nonzero
run_end whenever a VerificationCommand was present, which would also convert
a crash (1), usage error (2), provider failure (3), or interruption (130)
into a passing result whenever a partial edit happened to satisfy the oracle.

Gate the oracle override on exitCode == exitIncomplete (4): the completion
gate's "work maybe done but not signaled" case, the only one where a correct
edit can legitimately exit nonzero (its sandboxed self-verify couldn't run
under --auto member). Every other nonzero exit stays authoritative, so a
partial edit can't launder a crashed or interrupted run into a pass.

The 4-task glm-5.2 smoke stays 4/4 (those tasks exit INCOMPLETE, not some
other code). Adds TestNonIncompleteExitStaysAuthoritative (a correct edit that
reports exit 1 must still fail) and mirrors internal/cli.exitIncomplete as a
local execExitIncomplete constant.

* test(perfbench): pin the exit-4 oracle deferral from both sides; drop dead fixture branch

Follow-ups from a self-review of the exit-4 gating:

- Add TestIncompleteExitStillFailsWhenOracleFails: an INCOMPLETE (exit 4) run
  that did NO work must still FAIL, because deferring to the oracle still means
  the oracle is consulted. The sibling TestOracleAuthoritativeOnIncompleteExit
  applies a correct edit and would pass either way, so without this a regression
  that turned exit 4 into a blanket pass would go unnoticed.
- Broaden TestNonIncompleteExitStaysAuthoritative to a table over exit 1/3/130
  (crash/provider/interrupt), not just 1, so every named launder-risk code is
  covered.
- Tighten the NewTurnExecRunner doc: the verdict gate is the VerificationCommand
  (which runs the stamped OracleTest via go test), not OracleTest on its own.
- Drop the now-dead "if WorkspaceFixture != empty" branch: the fixtureless guard
  added earlier already guarantees it is set.

No behavior change; the 4-task glm-5.2 smoke stays 4/4.
2026-07-20 11:34:20 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 8c6d3022bd feat(tui): add /undo as an alias for /rewind (#698) (#747)
* feat(tui): add /undo as an alias for /rewind (#698)

/undo was unregistered and fell through to commandUnknown. Add it to the
/rewind command's aliases (the same mechanism /quit, /find, /mcp-status use), so
it dispatches to the existing rewind handler with args intact.

* test(tui): cover the /undo numeric-sequence form (#698 review)

Add a parseCommand("/undo 123") assertion so both the latest and numeric
<sequence> forms of the /rewind contract are exercised through the alias.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 11:32:44 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 974fc036c2 fix(oauth): refuse redirects on credential POSTs (#729) (#741)
Token exchange/refresh and the device authorization/poll POSTs validated only
the initial endpoint, then let the http.Client follow a 307/308 that replays the
form body (code, PKCE verifier, refresh_token, client_secret) to an unvalidated
origin.

Add withoutRedirects(): a shallow client copy whose CheckRedirect refuses every
redirect (ErrUnsafeRedirect). Applied at PostToken (covers ExchangeCode, Refresh,
and MCP which delegate to it), RequestDeviceCode, and pollDeviceOnce. The caller's
client is never mutated; legitimate token endpoints that return 200 are unaffected.

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 08:19:37 +05:30
PierrunoYT 4cbd144d11 fix(providers): stop "provider not found" for env-derived profiles (#716)
* fix(providers): stop "provider not found" for env-derived profiles

* fix(providers): address env profile review feedback

* fix(providers): keep env JSON response schemas stable
2026-07-20 10:23:44 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 c0b6b9e5c9 docs(readme): note govulncheck/golangci-lint install to GOPATH/bin (#711)
* docs(readme): note govulncheck/golangci-lint install to GOPATH/bin

The installed binaries land in $GOPATH/bin (default ~/go/bin), which must
be on PATH to run govulncheck directly. Document the export snippet so the
lint/security tooling from the contributor setup actually resolves.

* docs(readme): say "them" instead of singling out govulncheck

golangci-lint installs to the same $GOPATH/bin as govulncheck, so the
PATH note applies to both, not just the one named.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* docs(readme): honor GOBIN and make the PATH snippet idempotent

go install writes to GOBIN when set, with GOPATH/bin as the fallback, and
rerunning the old snippet appended the same directory repeatedly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 10:21:54 +08:00
PierrunoYT d74ceb1127 fix(tui): cache settled alt-screen transcript (#647)
* fix(tui): cache settled alt-screen transcript

* fix(tui): invalidate settled alt-screen cache on in-place status row updates

setDoctorStatusRow, setSandboxSetupStatusRow, and setCompactStatusRow all
mutate an already-flushed transcript row in place (m.transcript[i] = row)
without invalidating the alt-screen settled cache. Since none of frontier,
width, or row count change on such an update, settleTranscript's rebuild
guard never fires and the View fast path serves the stale cached snapshot -
e.g. the doctor connectivity spinner freezes on its first frame.

Zero altScreenSettledWidth on the in-place path, mirroring the existing
pattern in toggleTranscriptRow, so the next settle rebuilds the cache.

Addresses PR #647 review feedback from Vasanthdev2004.

* fix(tui): invalidate settled transcript cache

* fix(tui): invalidate settled file selection cards
2026-07-20 10:20:46 +08:00
Vasanth T fbf85984f6 fix(agent): stop write_stdin session_id probing thrash (#702) (#749)
A model that calls write_stdin with no live session probed sequential
session_ids (1, 2, 3, …), each failing, and the run ground on for a long
time before halting. The repeated-failure guard keys on a normalized,
80-char-truncated signature of the tool error, and the old message
"Unknown exec session_id %d" put the varying id inside that prefix, so
every probe produced a fresh signature and the 6x-same-error halt never
fired.

- Rewrite the unknown-session error so stable recovery guidance leads and
  the id trails past the signature window: probing now collapses to one
  signature and trips the halt, and the model is told how to recover
  (start an exec_command, or use the file-edit tools).
- Pin session_id's schema Minimum to 1 so the advertised schema matches
  the runtime floor (intArg min 1).
- system_prompt: state that session_id is only ever an id returned by a
  still-running exec_command and must never be guessed or probed.

Tests pin the id-invariance of the signature and that distinct-id probing
now halts at the guard's stop threshold, plus the schema floor and the
recovery text. The TUI "Sent input" label on a failed write_stdin
(issue criterion 4) is a separate cosmetic concern in a shared hot path
and is left as a follow-up.
2026-07-19 22:13:35 +05:30
Anandan 9242b9e037 Add transcript-grounded structured task state (#761)
* Add transcript-grounded structured task state

Project existing plan, tool-result, changed-file, verification, and completion events into a deterministic per-run snapshot.

Emit content-free aggregate snapshots to traces. Carry bounded objective context through compaction and ground completion checks only when the projection matches the transcript; mismatches retain transcript-derived behavior and drop stale carried state.

Tested: make fmt-check

Tested: go vet ./...

Tested: go test ./...

Tested: go test -race ./internal/agent ./internal/trace

Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release build

Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke

Tested: govulncheck ./... (no vulnerabilities found)

Advisory: pinned golangci-lint reports only unrelated pre-existing findings

Tested: git diff HEAD --check

* Preserve task objective across repeated compaction

Keep the immutable run objective when plan calls have been elided, while admitting mutable task fields only when plan parity still matches the transcript.

Make plan parsing match update_plan rejection semantics, coalesce and cap task-state trace events, rename parity to its plan-only scope, use explicit nilable dependencies, and remove confirmable objective fingerprints from traces.

Tested: make fmt-check

Tested: go vet ./...

Tested: go test ./...

Tested: go test -race ./internal/agent ./internal/trace

Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release build

Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke

Tested: govulncheck ./... (no vulnerabilities found)

Advisory: pinned golangci-lint reports only unrelated pre-existing findings

Tested: git diff HEAD --check
2026-07-19 21:38:58 +05:30
Anandan 2e267bdbee feat(tui): add isolated /btw conversations (#748)
* feat(tui): add isolated btw conversations

Add /btw with inline-question support, isolated non-resumable session forks, background main-run routing, and safe return behavior.

Refs #637

* test(tui): cover btw return controls

Preserve drafts when Ctrl+C is pressed during an active BTW run and cover returning to the parent through the documented /btw toggle.

* Address BTW isolation review feedback

* Reject explicit resumes of side sessions

* Harden BTW isolation lifecycle
2026-07-19 20:37:38 +05:30
Anandan 739a47e3ea perf(agent): preserve prompt cache prefixes (#760)
* perf(agent): preserve prompt cache prefixes

Build the system prompt once per run, fingerprint the exact emitted prompt and ordered tool definitions, and expose the full system-prompt hash in traces.

Add normalized and serialized two-turn regressions covering append-only messages, stable tools, and a stable session cache key.

* fix(tools): stabilize registry iteration order

Return registered tools in name order so provider-visible tool lists and prompt-prefix fingerprints cannot drift with Go map iteration. Add a regression covering the registry ordering contract.
2026-07-19 20:29:58 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS ce4a996ffa fix(oauth): validate discovered endpoints before merge/use (#511) (#739)
Discovery metadata was merged without the https/loopback endpoint rule that
configured endpoints already pass, letting a malicious issuer downgrade the
authorization/token/device/registration endpoint after config validation.

- Add exported ValidateEndpointURL as the single endpoint-safety rule;
  validateTokenEndpoint now delegates to it.
- Backstop in BuildAuthorizationURL (the choke point both the provider and MCP
  flows build their browser URL through).
- Validate each discovered endpoint before merge in the provider resolveEndpoints
  and validate resolved MCP metadata in both branches; fail closed on insecure.

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-19 09:56:32 +05:30
Vasanth T 378d538e24 perf(agent): execution profiles with one-shot posture escalation (PR10b+PR10c) (#740)
* perf(agent): execution profiles, --exec-profile, bench passthrough, TUI /profile (PR10b+10c)

* fix(execprofile): harden profiles against review findings

- fast escalates on critical-risk mutations, not high: the sandbox marks
  every shell command high before command analysis, so a high trigger
  spent the one-shot on the first go test of any task
- escalation can now restore the provider-default effort a profile
  displaced (PostureEscalation.RestoreDefaultEffort; a plain empty
  target means leave untouched)
- TUI /turns while a profile is active pins the budget: disarms the
  escalation turn target (mirroring exec's explicit --max-turns rule)
  and profile reverts use touched bits instead of value equality, so
  explicit choices survive even when they coincide with profile values
- spec-draft runs get the same escalation policy as the main run
  instead of the displaced budget with no safety net
- bench validates and canonicalizes --exec-profile before spawning:
  an unknown name previously produced an exit-0 report full of
  millisecond usage-error walls
- turn summary prints exec-profile alongside mode; zero exec rejects
  an inline-empty --exec-profile=; balanced trace label documented and
  pinned as deliberate attribution

* fix(execprofile): explicit effort choices disarm the escalation effort restore

An explicit effort set AFTER profile selection could be cleared by a
mid-run escalation (the effort analog of the /turns pin, introduced by
RestoreDefaultEffort): TUI /effort and Ctrl+T now disarm the restore on
a policy clone, and the spec-draft path only arms it when no explicit
--spec-reasoning-effort governs the draft.

* fix(execprofile): address review findings on the profile surfaces

- --use-spec projects away a profile's self-correct knob instead of
  silently arming an option the draft runner ignores (the explicit
  --self-correct --use-spec combination is already a parse-time error)
- RunTurnBench canonicalizes and validates ExecProfile at the library
  boundary, so a direct caller's casing/whitespace cannot fork report
  labels and an unknown name fails before anything runs
- reverting a profile whose displaced budget was zero clears
  ZERO_MAX_TURNS (SetMaxTurnsEnv ignores zero, so sub-agents would have
  kept the removed profile's budget)
- the TUI effort-disarm test fails instead of skipping when the catalog
  stops filling low effort

* fix(tui): reconcile an active profile's effort fill on model switch

The fill is per-model, not a session preference: fast selected on a
model without low fills nothing, and switching to a model that supports
it should behave like selecting the profile there; the reverse switch
must not keep sending a level the destination does not support. Both
switch paths (the /model command and the cross-provider picker) now
re-derive the fill, leaving explicitly touched efforts alone and
keeping the escalation's effort restore in step. Also: the revert-env
test asserts key removal via LookupEnv, and applyProfileTurnBudget's
pinned-budget parameter is named and documented as covering mode
presets, not just the flag.

* fix(tui): void profile effort bookkeeping when the model-switch drop erases it

The /model path's pre-existing unsupported-effort drop ran before the
profile reconciliation and left contradictory state behind: a dropped
touched override kept blocking the profile from governing, and a
dropped profile fill left a stale applied value with the effort restore
still armed. The drop itself is load-bearing (the TUI run path forwards
the effort to the provider unfiltered), so instead of preserving a
known-unsupported level, the voided choice now resets the profile's
effort bookkeeping and the reconcile re-derives from scratch. The whole
sequence lives in one ring-parameterized helper driven by the switch
target's authoritative ring, unit-tested against synthetic rings for
both the void-then-refill arc and the supported-override survival.

* fix(tui): only drop an explicit effort when the target ring is authoritative

A nil ring meant both a catalog model with no effort controls and a
live-discovered custom model the catalog cannot vouch for. The drop now
requires an authoritative ring (a resolved catalog entry, whose ring may
legitimately be empty); an unknown ring preserves an explicit preference,
matching the cross-provider picker's behavior, while the profile's own
fill still applies only where support is known.
2026-07-19 00:53:17 +05:30
Vasanth T 015452c1c9 fix(perfbench): keep the stamped answer file out of negative oracle greps (#737)
* fix(perfbench): keep the stamped answer file out of negative oracle greps

* fix(perfbench): exclude stamped answer from positive oracle greps too
2026-07-18 22:54:02 +05:30
Vasanth T af875df587 perf(agent): posture-escalation signals and controller (PR10a) (#736)
* trace(perf): add posture escalation counter

* feat(agent): typed posture-escalation policy and tool-result risk field

* feat(agent): posture controller wiring and executed-risk stamping

* test(agent): cover posture controller, escalation act path, and risk stamping

* test(agent): pin zero risk on not-executed results

* fix(agent): wire uncertain-path escalation and validate risk thresholds
2026-07-18 22:32:02 +05:30
Vasanth T dbd9443014 fix(perfbench): absolutize the bench binary and make errored tasks first-class (#730)
* fix(perfbench): absolutize the bench binary and make errored tasks first-class

* fix(perfbench): state that errored tasks count as pass-rate failures

* fix(perfbench): align errored-task wording with the actual tier accounting

* chore(perfbench): never commit generated baseline reports
2026-07-18 21:39:52 +05:30
Anandan 0fae754460 docs: refresh repository agent guidelines (#734)
* docs: refresh repository agent guidelines

* docs: make validation guidance non-mutating
2026-07-18 21:37:36 +05:30
Vasanth T 2cc6f43bf7 docs(community): wire Discussions as the front door for questions and ideas (#732)
* docs(community): wire Discussions as the front door for questions and ideas

* docs(community): restore LF endings and make feature routing coherent
2026-07-18 21:34:58 +05:30
uma-prasadandCursor 77960229b8 fix(doctor): detect missing native binary during runtime checks (#450)
* fix(doctor): report missing npm native binary in wrapper

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>

* fix(doctor): preserve JSON output for missing native binary

* fix(doctor): preserve doctor CLI behavior in wrapper fallback

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>

* style: gofmt npmwrapper doctor fallback tests

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>

* fix(doctor): reuse shared Bun recovery helpers in wrapper fallback

Extract bunRecoveryParagraph and related helpers so the doctor missing-binary text path and the generic wrapper bail share the same copy. Add regression tests with ZERO_WRAPPER_SIMULATE_BUN to guard against future drift.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
2026-07-18 22:49:19 +08:00
Vasanth T 60dc84e7a3 perf(openai): optimized turn session — background prewarm and prefix telemetry (PR8) (#723)
* trace(perf): add provider prewarm span and prefix-stability counters

* feat(openai): optimized turn session with prewarm and prefix telemetry

* feat(providers): gate optimized OpenAI turn sessions behind env flag

* feat(cli): wire optimized turn sessions into headless exec

* docs(readme): document the optimized OpenAI turn-session toggle

* fix(openai): include tool descriptions in prefix digest, harden gate and test bounds

* fix(openai): isolate prewarm tracing, skip non-reusable transports, fingerprint wire order and cache key

* test(openai): pin keep-alive transports in probe-expecting tests

* feat(providers): preserve resolved capabilities on switched-model fallback sessions
2026-07-18 14:24:50 +05:30
344 changed files with 19134 additions and 5361 deletions

No files matched your search

+6
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@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
blank_issues_enabled: false
contact_links:
- name: Questions and setup help
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a
about: Ask in Discussions Q&A. Include zero --version, your OS, provider/model, and zero doctor output for setup problems.
- name: Feature ideas
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas
about: Propose and discuss ideas in Discussions before opening a PR (Zero is in controlled development, see CONTRIBUTING.md).
- name: Security vulnerability
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/security/advisories/new
about: Report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories (see SECURITY.md). Do not file a public issue.
+13 -3
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,22 @@
name: Feature request
description: Propose a new capability or change
name: Feature request (previously discussed)
description: File only after your idea gained traction in Discussions Ideas or a maintainer asked for a tracking issue
labels: ["enhancement"]
body:
- type: markdown
attributes:
value: |
Please do not begin implementation until the issue has been reviewed and marked with the
New feature ideas start in [Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
not here. This form is for the step after that: an idea that gained traction in Discussions,
or one a maintainer asked to have tracked as an issue. Please link the discussion below.
Do not begin implementation until the issue has been reviewed and marked with the
`issue-approved` label (see CONTRIBUTING.md).
- type: input
id: discussion
attributes:
label: Ideas discussion
description: Link to the Discussions Ideas thread (or note which maintainer asked for this issue).
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: problem
attributes:
+3
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@@ -55,3 +55,6 @@ docs/superpowers/
zero-termux-arm64
zero-linux-sandbox
zero-seccomp
# Generated benchmark reports are evidence for one configuration, never tree state
internal/perfbench/reports/*.json
+1 -1
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@@ -1 +1 @@
{".":"0.4.0"}
{".":"0.5.0"}
+63 -19
View File
@@ -1,27 +1,71 @@
---
description: Project guidelines for the open-source CLI coding agent (zero) repository.
globs: "*.go, *.js, *.md, *.json, *.toml, *.yaml, *.yml"
alwaysApply: false
---
# Repository Guidelines for Zero
# Repository Conventions for Zero
These instructions apply to all work in this repository. For the user-facing
guide to extending Zero with specialists, hooks, plugins, MCP, and skills, see
[docs/EXTENDING.md](docs/EXTENDING.md).
This file outlines the project conventions and repository guidelines for coding agents when working on the `zero` repository. For the general guide on how to extend Zero (write specialist sub-agents, hooks, plugins, MCP, skills), see [docs/EXTENDING.md](docs/EXTENDING.md).
## 1. Contribution and Pull Request Rules
## 1. Project Conventions
- Before opening any pull request, **all contributors**—including maintainers,
community contributors, and coding agents—must read and follow
[CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md).
- Community pull requests require an existing parent issue with the
`issue-approved` label. Team members may open pull requests through the
internal development process described in `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
- Keep each change focused on the approved or assigned scope. Do not include
unrelated fixes, refactors, formatting churn, generated output, or existing
local changes in the same commit or pull request.
- Discuss new implementation languages, runtimes, major dependency changes,
and broad architectural rewrites with maintainers before implementation.
- Pull request descriptions must explain what changed and why, link the parent
issue when required, and list the tests or verification performed. Include
screenshots or a short recording for user-visible UI changes when practical.
- Build with `make`, not `go build` directly.
- Tests live next to the source file (`foo_test.go` next to `foo.go`).
- Run `make lint` before opening a PR.
- Never edit files under `third_party/` — those are vendored.
- Unify functions/methods where possible to prevent codebase inflation. Prefer a single cross-platform function with conditional checks over duplicating helpers per platform.
## 2. Repository and Implementation Conventions
## 2. Guidelines for Coding Agents
- Use the Go version declared in `go.mod`. Do not hardcode a different local
toolchain version in scripts or documentation.
- Use the repository build and release commands (`make` and
`go run ./cmd/zero-release ...`) instead of inventing parallel build flows.
- Keep tests beside their source files (`foo_test.go` next to `foo.go`). Add a
regression test for behavior changes and run affected concurrent code under
the race detector.
- Never edit files under `third_party/`; they are vendored.
- Prefer one cross-platform function with small conditional checks over
duplicated platform-specific helpers when the behavior can remain unified.
- Do not commit generated benchmark reports from
`internal/perfbench/reports/*.json`; reports are configuration-specific
evidence, not repository state.
- Preserve the user's working tree. Do not overwrite, delete, stage, or commit
unrelated tracked or untracked files.
If you are an AI coding agent executing tasks in this repository, you **MUST** run all Go code quality and security checks before committing code or completing your task:
## 3. Required Validation
1. **Format & Vet**: Run `go fmt ./...` and `go vet ./...`.
2. **Lint**: Run `go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
3. **Security**: Run `go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.
Run validation from the repository root before committing, opening a pull
request, or completing an implementation task:
If any check fails or cannot be run, do not ignore it. Prompt the user for instructions or setup assistance before proceeding.
1. **Formatting check**: `make fmt-check`. If it fails, format with
`go fmt ./...` (or `make fmt`) and run the check again.
2. **Vet**: `go vet ./...` (or `make vet`).
3. **Tests**: `go test ./...`. Use `make test` for the full race-enabled suite,
or run focused tests with `-race`, when concurrency is affected.
4. **Build**: `go run ./cmd/zero-release build`.
5. **Smoke test**: `go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke`.
6. **Advisory lint**:
`go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
7. **Security**:
`go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.
8. **Diff hygiene**: `git diff HEAD --check` (covers staged and unstaged
tracked changes).
`make lint` currently runs the formatting check and `go vet`; it does **not**
run golangci-lint. The pinned golangci-lint job is advisory in CI while the
existing repository-wide backlog is cleaned up. Fix findings introduced by or
related to the current change. Unrelated pre-existing advisory findings do not
justify expanding a focused pull request; report them separately.
Formatting, vet, tests, build, smoke, diff hygiene, and govulncheck are hard
requirements. If a related check fails, fix it. If a required check cannot run
because of the environment or fails for an unrelated external reason, report
the exact failure and obtain maintainer direction rather than silently ignoring
it.
+47
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@@ -6,6 +6,53 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## [0.5.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0) (2026-07-22)
### Features
* **plugins:** add zero plugins info command ([#773](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/773)) ([2479884](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2479884dea49580c853a53536c3bbab22ce8a2bf))
* **sandbox:** disable the sandbox via config ([#687](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/687)) ([#746](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/746)) ([a21a052](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a21a052a4a32ce9cb3c93c94350cd24e138532cd))
* **sandbox:** unify command execution and enforcement ([#781](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/781)) ([96859c9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/96859c9bd16f6dad4e332efc7e68178b9116118a))
* **tui:** add /undo as an alias for /rewind ([#698](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/698)) ([#747](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/747)) ([8c6d302](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8c6d3022bd7801eaad6a0440bb21a27221887297))
* **tui:** add isolated /btw conversations ([#748](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/748)) ([2e267bd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2e267bdbee4a77813e93a7ab51f0c575b66cee8c))
* **tui:** permission prompt takes free-text feedback inline ([#780](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/780)) ([3967d49](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3967d49d64998341af8ef6d7523fc63aeb2a5a7a))
### Bug Fixes
* **agent:** stop write_stdin session_id probing thrash ([#702](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/702)) ([#749](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/749)) ([fbf8598](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fbf85984f679058125951fe2d5e4f200e09a3e2f))
* **cli:** warn when ZERO_PROVIDER overrides a providers-use selection ([#767](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/767)) ([3524f79](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3524f795e5fdbb827166a84f03351cedfc9eba30))
* **doctor:** detect missing native binary during runtime checks ([#450](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/450)) ([7796022](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/77960229b839dca856616f846839aa773f2923f7))
* **lsp:** make the real-gopls check opt-in so a broken gopls can't fail the suite ([#684](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/684)) ([#766](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/766)) ([b1f4173](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b1f41735a7f6b7928a1875e986a4dca39d106cb9))
* make extension installs transactional ([#762](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/762)) ([baa4be1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/baa4be13ac5321da4e9f53e864dd1cd395481200))
* **oauth:** refuse redirects on credential POSTs ([#729](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/729)) ([#741](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/741)) ([974fc03](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/974fc036c2f9a194722f2e8fddbb4fdbf797effe))
* **oauth:** validate discovered endpoints before merge/use ([#511](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/511)) ([#739](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/739)) ([ce4a996](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ce4a996ffac4482e704f0fd61b3e442398fb2401))
* **perfbench:** absolutize the bench binary and make errored tasks first-class ([#730](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/730)) ([dbd9443](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dbd94430143df6754d68551d1028ad8f15b82f1b))
* **perfbench:** grant write tools so mutating tasks measure real edits ([#763](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/763)) ([e1975c1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e1975c1b396b3236ed648870230b4f85863b1d03))
* **perfbench:** keep the stamped answer file out of negative oracle greps ([#737](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/737)) ([015452c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/015452c1c98a39eabb021324182094e188a8bd47))
* **providers:** stop "provider not found" for env-derived profiles ([#716](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/716)) ([4cbd144](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4cbd144d11e5cb67bc5fea46f5b294562dac7a1a))
* **sandbox:** AST second opinion for interactive-command bypasses ([#473](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/473)) ([#745](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/745)) ([f079b90](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f079b90f82dac7b7ae0864b279dc9094e31a6627))
* **sandbox:** bind Windows elevated ACL setup to one no-follow handle ([#765](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/765)) ([4945684](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4945684fa26aa5994eda59dcabedc817423c535d))
* **sandbox:** don't auto-allow shell when re-entrancy skips wrapping ([#727](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/727)) ([#744](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/744)) ([6849011](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/684901165d1b7f50a8bb4af31b1c1951e6926a79))
* **tools:** give write_stdin's invalid-session errors the same recovery guidance ([#749](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/749) follow-up) ([#768](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/768)) ([da9fb50](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/da9fb50f549f6701eb136fc99f6178d0772d9334))
* **tools:** read_file recovers a backwards line range instead of erroring ([#779](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/779)) ([89bdc67](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/89bdc6719a1e1b3a3ef0e36b91a7839b3efdfba9))
* **tui:** cache settled alt-screen transcript ([#647](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/647)) ([d74ceb1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d74ceb11271ed68a21c19248210e098f411805fb))
* **tui:** model rows labelled by id when the description is prose; keep the sidebar under the / palette ([#775](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/775)) ([b30c397](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b30c3971b40b06ba52ad649ba9dc0ad560d4be4c))
* **tui:** stop the permission card clashing on cool themes ([#778](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/778)) ([722bb31](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/722bb3121682d9cd9cd4bc6c127e9014d719262a))
### Performance Improvements
* **agent:** concurrent read-only tool batches via capability gate ([#715](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/715)) ([31d45d5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/31d45d5f14e915acb9946e8b8eb81632c48f126a))
* **agent:** execution profiles with one-shot posture escalation (PR10b+PR10c) ([#740](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/740)) ([378d538](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/378d538e240c289e57821e9f9628f76034419d01))
* **agent:** posture-escalation signals and controller (PR10a) ([#736](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/736)) ([af875df](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/af875df58775484304fc65586bd6c74552ad01a2))
* **agent:** preserve prompt cache prefixes ([#760](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/760)) ([739a47e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/739a47e3eac92c3decc8734f52a4d99c7480c3ca))
* **openai:** optimized turn session — background prewarm and prefix telemetry (PR8) ([#723](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/723)) ([60dc84e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/60dc84e7a38c5544ebc047f3cfaf4625dd1e83b5))
* **output:** add token-aware semantic output budgeting (PR11) ([#717](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/717)) ([e5670c4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e5670c427ff39c628fb0822fd5c9317ee2174583))
* **providers:** provider capabilities and default turn-session adapter (PR7) ([#720](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/720)) ([30e2c3f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/30e2c3f7ffa1d5e487bd10b59d4e823cda191d48))
* **turn-bench:** Phase 0 — strengthen oracles so pass rate can't be misread as correctness ([#712](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/712)) ([727ad4d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/727ad4d321fab45d0cf40f8535522e3d94e55c4a))
## [0.4.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.3.0...v0.4.0) (2026-07-17)
+48 -5
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@@ -8,6 +8,13 @@ stabilizes. Community participation is still welcome, especially through bug
reports, feature requests, reproduction details, logs, and discussion on existing
issues.
Questions and setup help belong in
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions) (see
[SUPPORT.md](SUPPORT.md)), not in the issue tracker. Feature ideas start in the
[Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) category;
an idea that gains traction there is the path to an approved issue and,
eventually, an accepted PR.
Please read this policy before opening a pull request. Pull requests that do not
follow it may be closed without review.
@@ -33,7 +40,11 @@ unless the issue has been explicitly approved for outside contribution.
There are three primary ways to contribute:
1. Open a bug report with clear reproduction steps.
2. Open a feature request describing the problem, use case, and expected behavior.
2. Propose a feature in
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
describing the problem, use case, and expected behavior. A feature-request
issue is filed only after the idea gains traction there or a maintainer asks
for one.
3. Add useful context to an existing issue, such as logs, screenshots, examples,
affected versions, or reproduction cases.
@@ -46,7 +57,8 @@ All community pull requests require an approved parent issue.
Before starting implementation work:
1. Open an issue using the appropriate issue template.
1. For a bug, open an issue using the bug-report template. For a feature, start
in Discussions Ideas; the feature-request issue comes after the discussion.
2. Describe the bug, feature request, or functional change clearly.
3. Wait for the core team to review the issue.
4. Do not open a pull request unless the issue has the `issue-approved` label.
@@ -55,6 +67,28 @@ An approved issue means only that the specific issue has been accepted for work.
It does not approve unrelated future work, future pull requests, or future issues
from the same author. Each issue is reviewed case by case.
## Contribution Volume and Batching
To keep triage and review sustainable while the project stabilizes, please keep
your contribution flow to a size the core team can realistically work through:
- One issue per bug. File each defect as its own issue with its own
reproduction. Please do not bundle several unrelated findings into a single
"audit" issue; separate issues are far easier to triage, approve, and close
individually.
- Keep only a few items open at a time. If you already have several issues or
pull requests awaiting review, let those move through the queue before opening
more. A large simultaneous burst from one contributor slows review for
everyone, even when each item is valid.
- AI-assisted contributions are welcome, held to the same bar. Automated audits
and generated patches are fine, but each issue and pull request must be
individually verified, scoped, and reproducible before you open it. Please do
not post bulk machine-generated findings unfiltered.
These apply to all contributors and are about review bandwidth, not the value of
any single report. Maintainers may ask you to consolidate, split, or hold
submissions to keep the queue manageable.
## Pull Request Requirements
Before opening a community pull request, make sure all of the following are true:
@@ -133,7 +167,12 @@ Clear bug reports are the most useful way to help the project during this phase.
## Submitting a Feature Request
When filing a feature request, please include:
Feature requests start as a thread in
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
not as an issue. The feature-request issue form exists for the step AFTER that:
when an idea has gained traction in Discussions or a maintainer has asked for an
issue to track it. Whether in the discussion or the eventual issue, please
include:
- The problem you are trying to solve.
- The behavior or functionality you are requesting.
@@ -156,5 +195,9 @@ contribution phase.
## Getting Help
If you are unsure whether a change is appropriate, open an issue first and ask.
Please keep discussion focused, specific, and respectful of maintainer time.
General questions, setup help, and "is this a bug or my config" uncertainty all
go to
[Discussions Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a).
If you are unsure whether a proposed code change is appropriate, raise it in
Discussions Ideas or on the relevant issue first and ask. Please keep discussion
focused, specific, and respectful of maintainer time.
+35 -1
View File
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ Useful controls:
| `Ctrl+P` / `Ctrl+N` | previous / next item in menus (arrows still work) |
| `Shift+Tab` | cycle permission mode |
| `Ctrl+B` | show/hide the sidebar |
| `Ctrl+C` | cancel or exit |
| `Ctrl+C` | cancel, exit, or return from a `/btw` conversation |
Common slash commands:
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ Common slash commands:
| `/spec`, `/plan` | draft and review a plan before building |
| `/image` | attach an image for vision-capable models |
| `/resume`, `/rewind` | continue or roll back local sessions |
| `/btw [question]` | ask in an isolated fork without adding the side conversation to the main session |
| `/loop` | repeat a prompt or custom `/command` on an interval (`/loop 5m /babysit-prs`) or self-paced |
| `/compact`, `/context` | manage context usage |
| `/permissions`, `/tools` | inspect available tools and policy |
@@ -358,6 +359,12 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench
```
Experimental: `ZERO_OPENAI_TURN_SESSION=1` enables the optimized OpenAI turn
session (background connection prewarm + request-prefix telemetry) for headless
`zero exec` runs against official OpenAI profiles. Off by default; `0`/`false`
disable. A/B-benchmark it by running the same `zero-perf-bench` suite with the
variable unset and set.
### Code Quality and Security Checks
Before committing any changes, ensure all Go code quality and security checks pass. Pinned `go run` commands matching CI constraints can be used directly without prior installation:
@@ -377,6 +384,15 @@ go install github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected]
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected]
```
The installed binaries land in `$GOBIN` when it is set, otherwise in
`$GOPATH/bin` (default `~/go/bin`). That directory must be on your `PATH` to
run them directly. If it isn't, add it:
```bash
gobin="$(go env GOBIN)"; [ -z "$gobin" ] && gobin="$(go env GOPATH)/bin"
case ":$PATH:" in *":$gobin:"*) ;; *) export PATH="$PATH:$gobin" ;; esac
```
### Cross-Compile Examples
```bash
@@ -396,6 +412,24 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
- [Performance](docs/PERFORMANCE.md)
- [Agent evals](docs/AGENT_EVALS.md)
## Community
Questions, setup help, ideas, and sharing all live in
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions):
| Category | Use it for |
|---|---|
| [Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) | Setup help, provider/model configuration, "how do I" questions |
| [Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) | Feature proposals and design discussion before any PR |
| [Show and tell](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/show-and-tell) | Your skills, plugins, MCP setups, themes, and workflows |
| [Announcements](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/announcements) | Releases and project news from the maintainers |
For a good Q&A answer fast, include `zero --version`, your OS and install
method, the provider/model in use, and `zero doctor` output. See
[SUPPORT.md](SUPPORT.md). Bugs belong in
[issues](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/new/choose); security reports
follow [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md), never a public thread.
## Contributing
Contributions are welcome. Read [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md), run the
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
# Getting help with Zero
## Questions, setup help, configuration
Ask in [GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions). Use
[Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) so answers can
be marked and found by the next person.
The fastest way to a useful answer is to include:
- `zero --version` output
- your OS (Windows, macOS, Linux) and how you installed Zero (npm, install
script, source)
- the provider and model you are using (`zero providers list`)
- `zero doctor` output for setup problems
- the exact command you ran and the exact error text
## Bugs
If Zero does something wrong (crashes, wrong output, broken behavior), file a
[bug report](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/new/choose). If you are not
sure whether it is a bug or a setup problem, start in Discussions and we will
promote it to an issue if it is one.
## Feature ideas
Start a thread in
[Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas). Zero is
in controlled development (see CONTRIBUTING.md), so discussing an idea first is
also the path to getting a PR accepted.
## Security issues
Never file a public issue or discussion. Report privately via
[GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/security/advisories/new)
(see SECURITY.md).
+159 -15
View File
@@ -55,6 +55,133 @@ function localControlHelperManifest(packageRoot) {
return JSON.stringify({ version: 1, helpers });
}
// Mirrors internal/cli/observability.go parseDoctorArgs + writeDoctorHelp so the
// wrapper's missing-binary doctor fallback matches the Go doctor CLI surface.
const DOCTOR_HELP = `Usage:
zero doctor [flags]
Runs Go backend health checks for config and provider setup.
Flags:
--json Print JSON report
--connectivity Include provider endpoint connectivity probe when available
-h, --help Show this help
`;
const EXIT_USAGE = 2;
function installedByBun() {
if (process.env.ZERO_WRAPPER_SIMULATE_BUN === '1') {
return true;
}
return process.execPath.includes('bun') || !!process.versions?.bun;
}
function bunRecoveryParagraph() {
return (
'You installed with Bun, which does not run dependency lifecycle scripts\n' +
'by default. Trust the package to run the blocked postinstall:\n' +
' bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero (project install)\n' +
' bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero (global install)\n' +
'On Bun versions without `bun pm trust`, add\n' +
' "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]\n' +
'to your project package.json and reinstall.\n' +
'\n'
);
}
function buildFromSourceParagraph() {
return (
'If this platform has no prebuilt binary, build from source:\n' +
'https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero (go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.26+).'
);
}
function missingBinaryContextParagraph() {
return (
'Normally npm installs it as an optional dependency of @gitlawb/zero\n' +
`(@gitlawb/zero-${process.platform}-${process.arch}), and the wrapper can\n` +
'also download it from the GitHub Release when it is missing.'
);
}
function missingNativeRecoveryParagraphs(postinstallScript) {
const ranByBun = installedByBun();
return (
missingBinaryContextParagraph() +
'\n' +
'\n' +
'Things to try:\n' +
' - reinstall without omitting optional dependencies:\n' +
' npm install -g @gitlawb/zero\n' +
' - run the downloader manually (needs write access to the package dir):\n' +
` node "${postinstallScript}"\n` +
'\n' +
(ranByBun ? bunRecoveryParagraph() : '') +
buildFromSourceParagraph()
);
}
function formatGenericMissingNativeBinaryMessage(postinstallScript) {
return (
'[zero] No native binary is available for this install.\n' +
missingNativeRecoveryParagraphs(postinstallScript)
);
}
function parseDoctorArgs(args) {
let json = false;
for (const arg of args) {
switch (arg) {
case '-h':
case '--help':
case 'help':
return { kind: 'help' };
case '--json':
json = true;
break;
case '--connectivity':
break;
default:
return { kind: 'error', message: `unknown doctor flag ${JSON.stringify(arg)}` };
}
}
return { kind: 'run', json };
}
function missingNativeDoctorJSONReport(postinstallScript) {
return {
generatedAt: new Date().toISOString().replace(/\.\d{3}Z$/, 'Z'),
ok: false,
checks: [
{
id: 'runtime.go',
label: 'Go runtime',
status: 'fail',
message: 'Native zero binary is missing next to the npm wrapper.',
details: {
remedy: `node "${postinstallScript}"`,
},
},
],
};
}
function missingNativeDoctorTextReport(postinstallScript) {
return (
'Zero doctor report (' +
new Date().toISOString() +
')\n' +
'Overall: fail\n' +
'[fail] runtime.go - Native zero binary is missing next to the npm wrapper.\n' +
' remedy: node "' +
postinstallScript +
'"\n' +
'\n' +
missingNativeRecoveryParagraphs(postinstallScript)
);
}
// The platform payload is a version of @gitlawb/zero itself, installed under
// an npm: alias (see docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md). The alias name is derived from
// process.platform/process.arch, so an unsupported platform simply fails to
@@ -114,21 +241,38 @@ function resolveNativeBinary() {
const nativePath = resolveNativeBinary();
if (!nativePath) {
console.error(
'[zero] No native binary is available for this install.\n' +
'Normally npm installs it as an optional dependency of @gitlawb/zero\n' +
`(@gitlawb/zero-${process.platform}-${process.arch}), and the wrapper can\n` +
'also download it from the GitHub Release when it is missing.\n' +
'\n' +
'Things to try:\n' +
' - reinstall without omitting optional dependencies:\n' +
' npm install -g @gitlawb/zero\n' +
' - run the downloader manually (needs write access to the package dir):\n' +
` node "${join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs')}"\n` +
'\n' +
'If this platform has no prebuilt binary, build from source:\n' +
'https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero (go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.26+).',
);
const postinstallScript = join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs');
// `zero doctor` is the diagnostic command: when the native binary is missing
// it's the one invocation that must NOT bail with the generic wrapper error,
// because that's exactly the blind alley issue #405 reports. Instead, surface
// a doctor-shaped FAIL line for the runtime so the user's diagnostic finds the
// real cause. We branch on a literal 'doctor' subcommand only (matching `zero
// doctor` and `zero doctor --connectivity`), preserving the existing bail for
// every other invocation (exec, providers list, TUI, --version, etc.).
const argv = process.argv.slice(2);
const isDoctor = argv.length > 0 && argv[0] === 'doctor';
if (isDoctor) {
const parsed = parseDoctorArgs(argv.slice(1));
if (parsed.kind === 'help') {
process.stdout.write(DOCTOR_HELP);
process.exit(0);
}
if (parsed.kind === 'error') {
process.stderr.write(`[zero] ${parsed.message}\n`);
process.exit(EXIT_USAGE);
}
if (parsed.json) {
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(missingNativeDoctorJSONReport(postinstallScript), null, 2) + '\n');
process.exit(1);
}
process.stdout.write(missingNativeDoctorTextReport(postinstallScript) + '\n');
process.exit(1);
}
console.error(formatGenericMissingNativeBinaryMessage(postinstallScript));
process.exit(1);
}
+17
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import (
"bytes"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
func TestParseArgsUsesCliAndEnvOverrides(t *testing.T) {
@@ -92,3 +94,18 @@ func TestHelpText(t *testing.T) {
func emptyEnv(string) string {
return ""
}
func TestTurnExitCodeFailsWhenEveryTaskErrored(t *testing.T) {
var stderr bytes.Buffer
allErrored := perfbench.TurnBenchResult{TasksAttempted: 3, TasksErrored: 3}
if code := turnExitCode(allErrored, &stderr); code != 1 {
t.Fatalf("exit=%d, want 1 when every task errored", code)
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "no accepted benchmark sample") {
t.Fatalf("stderr missing explanation: %q", stderr.String())
}
partial := perfbench.TurnBenchResult{TasksAttempted: 3, TasksErrored: 2}
if code := turnExitCode(partial, &stderr); code != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exit=%d, want 0 for partial errors (summary surfaces them)", code)
}
}
+42 -1
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execprofile"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ type turnOptions struct {
SuitePath string
Model string
Mode string
ExecProfile string
SelfCorrect bool
Binary string
Iterations int
@@ -64,6 +66,7 @@ func runTurnCommand(args []string, getenv func(string) string, stdout io.Writer,
result, err := perfbench.RunTurnBench(context.Background(), set, perfbench.TurnBenchConfig{
Model: options.Model,
Mode: options.Mode,
ExecProfile: options.ExecProfile,
SelfCorrect: options.SelfCorrect,
Version: options.Version,
Commit: options.Commit,
@@ -86,9 +89,23 @@ func runTurnCommand(args []string, getenv func(string) string, stdout io.Writer,
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
return 0
return turnExitCode(result, stderr)
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stdout, perfbench.FormatTurnBenchSummary(result))
return turnExitCode(result, stderr)
}
// turnExitCode fails the command when every attempted task errored (no
// iteration produced an accepted benchmark sample): such a report measures
// nothing, and exiting 0 would let a broken configuration (missing binary, bad
// path, failing harness step) pass as a clean baseline. Partial errors keep
// exit 0 — the summary surfaces them loudly and the surviving samples are
// still valid measurements.
func turnExitCode(result perfbench.TurnBenchResult, stderr io.Writer) int {
if result.TasksAttempted > 0 && result.TasksErrored == result.TasksAttempted {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: every task errored with no accepted benchmark sample (see warnings); the report contains no valid measurements")
return 1
}
return 0
}
@@ -123,6 +140,13 @@ func parseTurnArgs(args []string, getenv func(string) string) (turnOptions, erro
}
options.Mode = value
index = next
case "--exec-profile":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.ExecProfile = value
index = next
case "--binary":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
@@ -195,6 +219,20 @@ func parseTurnArgs(args []string, getenv func(string) string) (turnOptions, erro
if strings.TrimSpace(options.Model) == "" && !options.DryRun {
return options, fmt.Errorf("--model is required (or pass --dry-run)")
}
// Validate the profile here, before anything spawns: an unknown name would
// otherwise make every child exit with a usage error in milliseconds, and
// those near-zero walls would be recorded as valid latency samples in an
// exit-0 report — exactly the misread-as-improvement trap the harness
// closed for spawn failures. Normalizing to the catalog name also keeps
// the stamped execProfile canonical (Lookup is case-insensitive), so two
// captures of the same posture always compare equal.
if raw := strings.TrimSpace(options.ExecProfile); raw != "" {
profile, ok := execprofile.Lookup(raw)
if !ok {
return options, fmt.Errorf("unknown execution profile %q for --exec-profile. Valid profiles: %s", raw, strings.Join(execprofile.Names(), ", "))
}
options.ExecProfile = profile.Name
}
return options, nil
}
@@ -225,6 +263,9 @@ func turnHelpText() string {
" --suite <path> Task set JSON file (required)",
" --model <model> Model to run (required unless --dry-run)",
" --mode <name> Exec mode preset to apply",
" --exec-profile <name>",
" Execution profile for every task (fast|balanced|thorough);",
" forwarded to zero exec and stamped into the result",
" --self-correct Enable the post-edit verify-and-correct loop",
" --binary <path> Path to the `zero` binary (default: zero on PATH / repo root)",
" --iterations <n> Times to run each task (default: 1)",
+65
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
package main
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestParseTurnArgsExecProfile(t *testing.T) {
getenv := func(string) string { return "" }
options, err := parseTurnArgs([]string{
"--suite", "suite.json",
"--model", "m",
"--exec-profile", "fast",
}, getenv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTurnArgs: %v", err)
}
if options.ExecProfile != "fast" {
t.Fatalf("ExecProfile = %q, want fast", options.ExecProfile)
}
// Inline form.
options, err = parseTurnArgs([]string{
"--suite=suite.json",
"--model=m",
"--exec-profile=thorough",
}, getenv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTurnArgs inline: %v", err)
}
if options.ExecProfile != "thorough" {
t.Fatalf("ExecProfile = %q, want thorough", options.ExecProfile)
}
}
// The bench validates the profile BEFORE spawning anything: an unknown name
// would otherwise make every child exit with a usage error in milliseconds
// and record those near-zero walls as valid latency samples in an exit-0
// report. Lookup normalization also keeps the stamped name canonical so two
// captures of the same posture compare equal.
func TestParseTurnArgsExecProfileValidatesAndNormalizes(t *testing.T) {
getenv := func(string) string { return "" }
options, err := parseTurnArgs([]string{
"--suite", "suite.json", "--model", "m", "--exec-profile", "FAST",
}, getenv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTurnArgs: %v", err)
}
if options.ExecProfile != "fast" {
t.Fatalf("ExecProfile = %q, want the canonical fast", options.ExecProfile)
}
_, err = parseTurnArgs([]string{
"--suite", "suite.json", "--model", "m", "--exec-profile", "blanced",
}, getenv)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("an unknown profile must fail parse, before anything spawns")
}
for _, name := range []string{"balanced", "fast", "thorough"} {
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), name) {
t.Fatalf("error must list %q, got %q", name, err.Error())
}
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ Install and manage:
```bash
zero plugins add ./github-pr-review # copy into ~/.config/zero/plugins/ or ./.zero/plugins/
zero plugins list
zero plugins info github-pr-review # show manifest path, enabled state, lock metadata
zero plugins remove github-pr-review # alias: rm
```
+1 -1
View File
@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ flowchart TD
- **Plugins** can add tools, hooks, and skill roots. Bootstrap always registers a
multi-root skill tool: primary Zero skills dir, optional `~/.agents/skills`,
then plugin skill roots (earlier wins). `internal/skills` owns that merge via
`LoadFromRoots` / `DiscoveryRoots`; single-root `Load` remains for install/write.
`LoadFromRoots`; single-root `Load` remains for install/write.
- **Hooks** can observe or block tool lifecycle events.
## End-to-End Data Flow
+178 -27
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providercatalog"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodelcatalog"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
@@ -23,9 +26,10 @@ import (
// means the editor only hosts the thread — ZERO owns BYOK and telemetry-free
// operation.
type Deps struct {
ResolveConfig func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error)
NewProvider func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)
RunAgent func(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error)
ResolveConfig func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error)
DiscoverModels func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error)
NewProvider func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)
RunAgent func(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error)
// BuildWorkspace builds the SCOPED tool registry and the sandbox engine for a
// validated workspace root, so ACP shell tools (bash/exec_command) are confined
// exactly like the exec surface — never run unconfined on the host.
@@ -60,13 +64,16 @@ type acpSession struct {
// turnMu serializes prompt turns for one session: concurrent session/prompt
// calls run one at a time so they can't interleave history or clobber the
// single cancel slot.
turnMu sync.Mutex
turnMu sync.Mutex
modelMu sync.Mutex
mu sync.Mutex
mode agent.PermissionMode
model string // override; "" => config default
cancel context.CancelFunc
history []turnRecord
mu sync.Mutex
mode agent.PermissionMode
model string
models []SessionConfigOptionValue
restrictModels bool
cancel context.CancelFunc
history []turnRecord
}
// NewAgent builds the ACP server and registers its method handlers on conn.
@@ -83,9 +90,6 @@ func NewAgent(conn *Conn, deps Deps) *Agent {
return a
}
// Serve runs the connection read loop until the stream closes or ctx is done.
func (a *Agent) Serve(ctx context.Context) error { return a.conn.Serve(ctx) }
// ---- initialize ----
func (a *Agent) handleInitialize(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
@@ -120,7 +124,7 @@ func (a *Agent) handleInitialize(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any
// ---- session lifecycle ----
func (a *Agent) handleSessionNew(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
func (a *Agent) handleSessionNew(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p NewSessionParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid session/new params")
@@ -129,18 +133,23 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSessionNew(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, err.Error())
}
meta, err := a.deps.Store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{Title: "ACP session", Cwd: root})
model, models, restrictModels, err := a.resolveModelChoices(ctx, root)
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "config: "+err.Error())
}
meta, err := a.deps.Store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{Title: "ACP session", Cwd: root, ModelID: model})
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "create session: "+err.Error())
}
sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, nil)
sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, nil, model, models, restrictModels)
return NewSessionResult{
SessionID: sess.id,
Modes: a.modeState(sess),
SessionID: sess.id,
ConfigOptions: a.configOptions(sess),
Modes: a.modeState(sess),
}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p LoadSessionParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid session/load params")
@@ -161,7 +170,17 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (an
// a half-initialized session (registerSession sets history under the lock and
// reuses an already-live session rather than orphaning its in-flight turn).
history, historyErr := a.loadHistory(meta.SessionID)
sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, history)
model, models, restrictModels, err := a.resolveModelChoices(ctx, root)
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "config: "+err.Error())
}
if persistedModel := strings.TrimSpace(meta.ModelID); persistedModel != "" && (!restrictModels || modelChoiceExists(models, persistedModel)) {
model = persistedModel
if !modelChoiceExists(models, persistedModel) {
models = append(models, SessionConfigOptionValue{Value: persistedModel, Name: persistedModel})
}
}
sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, history, model, models, restrictModels)
a.warnPersistence(
&notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id},
"load session history",
@@ -169,7 +188,8 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (an
historyErr,
)
return LoadSessionResult{
Modes: a.modeState(sess),
ConfigOptions: a.configOptions(sess),
Modes: a.modeState(sess),
}, nil
}
@@ -354,11 +374,27 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSetConfigOption(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
if sess == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
}
if p.ConfigID != configIDModel {
switch p.ConfigID {
case configIDModel:
model := strings.TrimSpace(p.Value)
if err := a.updateModel(sess, model, sess.restrictModels); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
case configIDMode:
mode := agent.PermissionMode(p.Value)
switch mode {
case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk:
sess.setMode(mode)
(&notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id}).currentMode(string(mode))
case agent.PermissionModeUnsafe:
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "mode not permitted over ACP: "+p.Value)
default:
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown mode: "+p.Value)
}
default:
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown config option: "+p.ConfigID)
}
sess.setModel(p.Value)
return SetSessionConfigOptionResult{}, nil
return SetSessionConfigOptionResult{ConfigOptions: a.configOptions(sess)}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) handleZeroSetModel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
@@ -370,8 +406,24 @@ func (a *Agent) handleZeroSetModel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (a
if sess == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
}
sess.setModel(p.Model)
return ZeroSetModelResult{Model: p.Model}, nil
model := strings.TrimSpace(p.Model)
if err := a.updateModel(sess, model, false); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return ZeroSetModelResult{Model: model}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) updateModel(sess *acpSession, model string, restrictModels bool) error {
sess.modelMu.Lock()
defer sess.modelMu.Unlock()
if restrictModels && !sess.hasModel(model) {
return RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown model: "+model)
}
if _, err := a.deps.Store.UpdateModel(sess.id, model); err != nil {
return RPCError(codeInternalError, "save model selection: "+err.Error())
}
sess.setModel(model)
return nil
}
func (a *Agent) handleCancel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) {
@@ -398,6 +450,76 @@ func (a *Agent) modeState(s *acpSession) *SessionModeState {
}
}
// resolveModelChoices advertises authenticated live models when discovery is
// available. The configured model is always retained as the sole fallback.
func (a *Agent) resolveModelChoices(ctx context.Context, cwd string) (string, []SessionConfigOptionValue, bool, error) {
resolved, err := a.deps.ResolveConfig(cwd, config.Overrides{})
if err != nil {
return "", nil, false, err
}
selected := strings.TrimSpace(resolved.Provider.Model)
options := make([]SessionConfigOptionValue, 0, 8)
seen := make(map[string]bool)
add := func(id, description string) {
id = strings.TrimSpace(id)
if id == "" || seen[id] {
return
}
seen[id] = true
options = append(options, SessionConfigOptionValue{Value: id, Name: id, Description: description})
}
add(selected, "")
descriptor, knownProvider := providercatalog.Get(resolved.Provider.CatalogID)
restrictModels := knownProvider && !descriptor.Custom
if a.deps.DiscoverModels != nil {
discovered, discoverErr := a.deps.DiscoverModels(ctx, resolved.Provider)
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return "", nil, false, ctx.Err()
}
if discoverErr == nil && len(discovered) > 0 {
for _, model := range discovered {
if providermodelcatalog.ModelIDAllowedForProvider(resolved.Provider.CatalogID, model.ID) {
add(model.ID, model.Description)
}
}
}
}
return selected, options, restrictModels, nil
}
func modelChoiceExists(models []SessionConfigOptionValue, model string) bool {
for _, option := range models {
if option.Value == model {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (a *Agent) configOptions(s *acpSession) []SessionConfigOption {
model, models, mode := s.configState()
return []SessionConfigOption{{
ID: configIDModel,
Name: "Model",
Description: "Model used for this session.",
Category: configCategoryModel,
Type: configOptionTypeSelect,
CurrentValue: model,
Options: models,
}, {
ID: configIDMode,
Name: "Mode",
Description: "Permission mode used for this session.",
Category: configCategoryMode,
Type: configOptionTypeSelect,
CurrentValue: string(mode),
Options: []SessionConfigOptionValue{
{Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAuto), Name: "Auto", Description: "Run safe tools automatically; ask before risky ones."},
{Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk), Name: "Ask", Description: "Ask before every tool that changes state."},
},
}}
}
// ---- persistence + continuity ----
func (a *Agent) persistTurn(sess *acpSession, user, assistant string) error {
@@ -525,13 +647,13 @@ func promptImages(blocks []ContentBlock) []zeroruntime.ImageBlock {
// session is returned unchanged rather than orphaning its turn or resetting its
// mode/model. history is set BEFORE publishing so no concurrent prompt can read a
// half-initialized session.
func (a *Agent) registerSession(id, cwd string, history []turnRecord) *acpSession {
func (a *Agent) registerSession(id, cwd string, history []turnRecord, model string, models []SessionConfigOptionValue, restrictModels bool) *acpSession {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
if existing := a.sessions[id]; existing != nil {
return existing
}
sess := &acpSession{id: id, cwd: cwd, mode: agent.PermissionModeAuto, history: history}
sess := &acpSession{id: id, cwd: cwd, mode: agent.PermissionModeAuto, model: model, models: models, restrictModels: restrictModels, history: history}
a.sessions[id] = sess
return sess
}
@@ -570,7 +692,18 @@ func (s *acpSession) currentMode() agent.PermissionMode {
}
func (s *acpSession) setModel(model string) {
model = strings.TrimSpace(model)
s.mu.Lock()
found := false
for _, option := range s.models {
if option.Value == model {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found && model != "" {
s.models = append(s.models, SessionConfigOptionValue{Value: model, Name: model})
}
s.model = model
s.mu.Unlock()
}
@@ -581,6 +714,24 @@ func (s *acpSession) currentModel() string {
return s.model
}
func (s *acpSession) hasModel(model string) bool {
model = strings.TrimSpace(model)
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
for _, option := range s.models {
if option.Value == model {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (s *acpSession) configState() (string, []SessionConfigOptionValue, agent.PermissionMode) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return s.model, append([]SessionConfigOptionValue(nil), s.models...), s.mode
}
func (s *acpSession) appendHistory(rec turnRecord) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.history = append(s.history, rec)
+212
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
@@ -13,6 +14,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
@@ -137,6 +139,12 @@ func TestACPEndToEndPrompt(t *testing.T) {
if newRes.Modes == nil || newRes.Modes.CurrentModeID != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
t.Fatalf("expected auto mode, got %+v", newRes.Modes)
}
if len(newRes.ConfigOptions) != 2 || newRes.ConfigOptions[0].ID != configIDModel || newRes.ConfigOptions[0].CurrentValue != "fake-model" {
t.Fatalf("model config option = %+v, want fake-model fallback", newRes.ConfigOptions)
}
if newRes.ConfigOptions[1].ID != configIDMode || newRes.ConfigOptions[1].CurrentValue != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
t.Fatalf("mode config option = %+v", newRes.ConfigOptions[1])
}
// session/prompt
var promptRes PromptResult
@@ -156,6 +164,201 @@ func TestACPEndToEndPrompt(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestACPModelConfigOptionsCatalogSelectionAndLoad(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.ResolveConfig = func(_ string, o config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
model := "gpt-5.5"
if o.Provider.Model != "" {
model = o.Provider.Model
}
return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "ChatGPT", CatalogID: "chatgpt", Model: model,
}}, nil
}
deps.DiscoverModels = func(_ context.Context, _ config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{
{ID: " gpt-5.4-mini ", Description: "Fast"},
{ID: "gpt-5.5", Description: "duplicate configured model"},
}, nil
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
option := created.ConfigOptions[0]
if option.CurrentValue != "gpt-5.5" || len(option.Options) < 2 {
t.Fatalf("new model option = %+v", option)
}
for _, choice := range option.Options {
if choice.Name != choice.Value {
t.Fatalf("model choice name = %q, want model id %q", choice.Name, choice.Value)
}
}
var selected SetSessionConfigOptionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDModel, Value: " gpt-5.4-mini ",
}, &selected); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set_config_option: %v", err)
}
if got := selected.ConfigOptions[0].CurrentValue; got != "gpt-5.4-mini" {
t.Fatalf("selected model = %q", got)
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDModel, Value: "not-advertised",
}, &SetSessionConfigOptionResult{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("unknown standard model selection was accepted")
}
h.stop()
h = newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
var loaded LoadSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID}, &loaded); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/load: %v", err)
}
if len(loaded.ConfigOptions) != 2 || loaded.ConfigOptions[0].CurrentValue != "gpt-5.4-mini" {
t.Fatalf("load model option = %+v", loaded.ConfigOptions)
}
if loaded.ConfigOptions[1].CurrentValue != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
t.Fatalf("load mode option = %+v", loaded.ConfigOptions[1])
}
}
func TestACPModelDiscoveryFailureUsesConfiguredFallbackOnly(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.ResolveConfig = func(_ string, _ config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "ChatGPT", CatalogID: "chatgpt", Model: " configured-model ",
}}, nil
}
deps.DiscoverModels = func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("discovery unavailable")
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
option := created.ConfigOptions[0]
if option.CurrentValue != "configured-model" || len(option.Options) != 1 || option.Options[0].Value != "configured-model" {
t.Fatalf("fallback model option = %+v", option)
}
}
func TestACPCustomProviderAllowsUnadvertisedModel(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.ResolveConfig = func(_ string, o config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
model := "configured-model"
if o.Provider.Model != "" {
model = o.Provider.Model
}
return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "Custom", CatalogID: "custom-openai-compatible", Model: model,
}}, nil
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
var selected SetSessionConfigOptionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDModel, Value: " vendor/model ",
}, &selected); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set custom model: %v", err)
}
if got := selected.ConfigOptions[0].CurrentValue; got != "vendor/model" {
t.Fatalf("custom model = %q", got)
}
h.stop()
h = newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
var loaded LoadSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID}, &loaded); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/load: %v", err)
}
option := loaded.ConfigOptions[0]
if option.CurrentValue != "vendor/model" || !modelChoiceExists(option.Options, "vendor/model") {
t.Fatalf("loaded custom model option = %+v", option)
}
}
func TestACPModelDiscoveryFiltersProviderIncompatibleModels(t *testing.T) {
a := &Agent{deps: Deps{
ResolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
CatalogID: "opencode-go-anthropic-compatible", Model: "minimax-m3",
}}, nil
},
DiscoverModels: func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{{ID: "qwen3.7-plus"}, {ID: "claude-sonnet-4.5"}}, nil
},
}}
_, options, restricted, err := a.resolveModelChoices(context.Background(), t.TempDir())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !restricted || !modelChoiceExists(options, "qwen3.7-plus") || modelChoiceExists(options, "claude-sonnet-4.5") {
t.Fatalf("filtered model options = %+v, restricted=%v", options, restricted)
}
}
func TestACPModelDiscoveryHonorsCancellation(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
a := &Agent{deps: Deps{
ResolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{Model: "configured-model"}}, nil
},
DiscoverModels: func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return nil, context.Canceled
},
}}
if _, _, _, err := a.resolveModelChoices(ctx, t.TempDir()); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("resolve error = %v, want context canceled", err)
}
}
func TestACPConfigOptionWireSchema(t *testing.T) {
b, err := json.Marshal(SessionConfigOption{
ID: "model", Name: "Model", Description: "desc", Category: "model",
Type: configOptionTypeSelect, CurrentValue: "m1",
Options: []SessionConfigOptionValue{{Value: "m1", Name: "m1", Description: "choice"}},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var wire map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &wire); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, key := range []string{"type", "category", "currentValue", "options"} {
if _, ok := wire[key]; !ok {
t.Errorf("wire field %q absent: %s", key, b)
}
}
if _, ok := wire["value"]; ok {
t.Errorf("obsolete option value field present: %s", b)
}
if _, ok := wire["values"]; ok {
t.Errorf("obsolete values field present: %s", b)
}
choice := wire["options"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)
if choice["value"] != "m1" {
t.Errorf("options[].value = %#v", choice["value"])
}
}
func TestACPUnknownSessionPromptErrors(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t, testDeps(t))
defer h.stop()
@@ -181,6 +384,15 @@ func TestACPSetModeUpdatesSession(t *testing.T) {
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk)}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set_mode ask: %v", err)
}
var configured SetSessionConfigOptionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDMode, Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAuto),
}, &configured); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set_config_option mode: %v", err)
}
if got := configured.ConfigOptions[1].CurrentValue; got != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
t.Fatalf("configured mode = %q", got)
}
// Unsafe must be rejected over ACP — a client can't self-grant no-prompt host access.
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModeUnsafe)}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected Unsafe mode to be rejected over ACP")
+11
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package acp
import "context"
// Serve runs the connection read loop until the stream closes or ctx is done.
func (a *Agent) Serve(ctx context.Context) error { return a.conn.Serve(ctx) }
func ImageBlock(base64Data, mimeType string) ContentBlock {
return ContentBlock{Type: "image", Data: base64Data, MimeType: mimeType}
}
+19 -19
View File
@@ -103,10 +103,6 @@ type ContentBlock struct {
func TextBlock(text string) ContentBlock { return ContentBlock{Type: "text", Text: text} }
func ImageBlock(base64Data, mimeType string) ContentBlock {
return ContentBlock{Type: "image", Data: base64Data, MimeType: mimeType}
}
// ---- sessions ----
// McpServer mirrors the editor-provided MCP server entry. ZERO owns its own MCP
@@ -233,10 +229,6 @@ func ToolContent(block ContentBlock) ToolCallContent {
return ToolCallContent{Type: "content", Content: &block}
}
func ToolDiff(path, oldText, newText string) ToolCallContent {
return ToolCallContent{Type: "diff", Path: path, OldText: oldText, NewText: newText}
}
type ToolCallLocation struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Line *int `json:"line,omitempty"`
@@ -337,19 +329,22 @@ type SetSessionModeParams struct {
type SetSessionModeResult struct{}
// ---- session config options (model selection) ----
// ---- session config options ----
type SessionConfigOptionValue struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Value string `json:"value"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
}
type SessionConfigOption struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
Value string `json:"value"`
Values []SessionConfigOptionValue `json:"values,omitempty"`
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
Category string `json:"category,omitempty"`
Type string `json:"type"`
CurrentValue string `json:"currentValue"`
Options []SessionConfigOptionValue `json:"options"`
}
type SetSessionConfigOptionParams struct {
@@ -373,6 +368,11 @@ type ZeroSetModelResult struct {
Model string `json:"model"`
}
// configIDModel is the SessionConfigOption id ZERO uses to expose model choice
// through the standard session/set_config_option method.
const configIDModel = "model"
const (
configIDModel = "model"
configIDMode = "mode"
configOptionTypeSelect = "select"
configCategoryModel = "model"
configCategoryMode = "mode"
)
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import (
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsMissingAdditionalPermissionsBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
promptCalls := 0
result, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsMissingAdditionalPermissionsBeforePrompt(t *testi
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsAdditionalPermissionsWithoutFlagBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
promptCalls := 0
result, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsAdditionalPermissionsWithoutFlagBeforePrompt(t *t
func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing
func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
promptCalls := 0
_, err := executeToolCall(
-12
View File
@@ -501,15 +501,3 @@ func hasStringPrefix(values []string, prefix []string) bool {
}
return true
}
func equalStringSlices(left []string, right []string) bool {
if len(left) != len(right) {
return false
}
for index := range left {
if left[index] != right[index] {
return false
}
}
return true
}
+12 -3
View File
@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ type CompactionOptions struct {
// injected so Compact stays pure and testable; the agent loop wires it to a
// real provider call.
Summarize func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error)
// taskState is a snapshot supplied by the running agent. Its immutable
// objective is always preserved; mutable fields are admitted only when its
// plan projection still matches the transcript.
taskState *taskStateSnapshot
}
// CompactionResult is the metadata-bearing result returned by CompactMessages.
@@ -220,7 +224,7 @@ func CompactMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) (Co
// Preserve structured state (active plan + loaded skills) from the elided
// middle verbatim, so it is not lost or paraphrased away by the prose summary.
content := appendPreservedState(summaryLabel+"\n"+summary, middle)
content := appendPreservedState(summaryLabel+"\n"+summary, middle, opts.taskState)
compacted := make([]zeroruntime.Message, 0, systemEnd+1+(len(messages)-boundary))
compacted = append(compacted, messages[:systemEnd]...)
@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ type compactionState struct {
// OnText is deliberately NOT forwarded (compaction stays invisible to the user),
// but its token COST must still be counted so usage reports and budgets include it.
onUsage func(Usage)
task *taskState
// calibrationRatio scales the raw byte/4 token estimate toward the provider's
// real prompt-token count. ApproxTextTokens over-counts code-heavy content by
@@ -365,13 +370,15 @@ func (state *compactionState) calibratedTokens(raw int) int {
return int(float64(raw) * state.calibrationRatio)
}
func newCompactionState(options Options) *compactionState {
return &compactionState{
func newCompactionState(options Options, task *taskState) *compactionState {
state := &compactionState{
enabled: options.ContextWindow > 0,
threshold: compactionThreshold(options.ContextWindow),
preserveLast: options.CompactionPreserveLast,
onUsage: options.OnUsage,
task: task,
}
return state
}
// maybeCompact runs proactive compaction at the top of a turn. It returns the
@@ -418,6 +425,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
taskState: state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
// Summarizer failed: keep the original history. The reactive path (or a
@@ -468,6 +476,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
result, compactErr := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
taskState: state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if compactErr != nil {
// A genuine compaction attempt was made (and failed): the budget is spent
+60 -38
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ const (
const (
maxRecentEdits = 20
maxEditNoteBytes = 160
// maxTaskObjectiveBytes keeps the original objective recognizable after
// compaction without allowing an unusually large prompt to recreate the
// context pressure the compaction just removed.
maxTaskObjectiveBytes = 512
)
const (
@@ -76,32 +80,14 @@ func extractLatestPlan(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
// ({"plan":[{content,status,...}]}) as terse status-tagged bullet lines. Returns
// "" on malformed arguments or an empty plan.
func formatPlanArguments(arguments string) string {
var parsed struct {
Plan []struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
Step string `json:"step"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Notes string `json:"notes"`
} `json:"plan"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments)), &parsed); err != nil {
plan, ok := parseTaskPlan(arguments)
if !ok {
return ""
}
lines := make([]string, 0, len(parsed.Plan))
for _, item := range parsed.Plan {
content := strings.TrimSpace(item.Content)
if content == "" {
content = strings.TrimSpace(item.Step)
}
if content == "" {
continue
}
status := strings.TrimSpace(item.Status)
if status == "" {
status = "pending"
}
line := "- [" + status + "] " + content
if notes := strings.TrimSpace(item.Notes); notes != "" {
lines := make([]string, 0, len(plan))
for _, item := range plan {
line := "- [" + item.Status + "] " + item.Content
if notes := item.Notes; notes != "" {
line += "\n Notes: " + notes
}
lines = append(lines, line)
@@ -431,12 +417,25 @@ func capBody(body string) string {
// preservedState is the JSON shape of the carried-across-compaction block.
type preservedState struct {
Plan string `json:"plan,omitempty"`
Task *preservedTaskState `json:"task,omitempty"`
RecentEdits []preservedEdit `json:"recent_edits,omitempty"`
Tools []preservedTool `json:"tools,omitempty"`
Skills []preservedSkill `json:"skills,omitempty"`
ProjectInstructions []preservedInstruction `json:"project_instructions,omitempty"`
}
type preservedTaskState struct {
Objective string `json:"objective"`
Status taskStatus `json:"status,omitempty"`
Pending int `json:"pending,omitempty"`
InProgress int `json:"in_progress,omitempty"`
Completed int `json:"completed,omitempty"`
Failed int `json:"failed,omitempty"`
VerificationPassed int `json:"verification_passed,omitempty"`
VerificationFailed int `json:"verification_failed,omitempty"`
VerificationOutcome Outcome `json:"verification_outcome,omitempty"`
}
type preservedEdit struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Note string `json:"note,omitempty"`
@@ -464,8 +463,27 @@ type preservedInstruction struct {
// may live only inside the injected summary message, which on a later compaction
// lands in middle with no real tool calls left to extract. Fresh tool calls and
// instruction blocks override the carried-forward copy by name/source.
func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message) string {
func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnapshot *taskStateSnapshot) string {
priorState := parsePreservedStateBlock(latestSummaryContent(middle))
task := priorState.Task
if taskSnapshot != nil {
task = &preservedTaskState{
Objective: capTaskObjective(taskSnapshot.Objective),
}
// Plan parity corroborates only the mutable task projection. The objective
// comes directly from the run prompt and is immutable, so it must survive
// even after compaction removes the plan tool call needed for comparison.
if taskSnapshot.PlanParity == taskPlanParityMatch {
task.Status = taskSnapshot.Status
task.Pending = taskSnapshot.Plan.Pending
task.InProgress = taskSnapshot.Plan.InProgress
task.Completed = taskSnapshot.Plan.Completed
task.Failed = taskSnapshot.Plan.Failed
task.VerificationPassed = taskSnapshot.Verification.Passed
task.VerificationFailed = taskSnapshot.Verification.Failed
task.VerificationOutcome = taskSnapshot.Verification.LastOutcome
}
}
// Plan: a fresh update_plan in middle is authoritative; otherwise carry the
// plan preserved by an earlier compaction.
@@ -493,12 +511,25 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message) string {
projectInstructionEntries(middle),
)
if block := formatPreservedState(plan, edits, tools, skills, instructions); block != "" {
if block := formatPreservedState(plan, task, edits, tools, skills, instructions); block != "" {
summary += "\n\n" + block
}
return summary
}
func capTaskObjective(objective string) string {
objective = strings.TrimSpace(objective)
if len(objective) <= maxTaskObjectiveBytes {
return objective
}
const suffix = "…"
limit := maxTaskObjectiveBytes - len(suffix)
for limit > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(objective[limit]) {
limit--
}
return strings.TrimSpace(objective[:limit]) + suffix
}
// mergeRecentEdits overlays fresh edits onto edits preserved by an earlier
// compaction. Unlike mergeSkillEntries (which keeps refreshed entries in their
// original slot), a path touched again by a fresh edit MOVES to the newest
@@ -555,11 +586,11 @@ func preservedEditsToEntries(edits []preservedEdit) []skillEntry {
// formatPreservedState renders state as the labelled, single-line
// JSON block. Returns "" when there is nothing to preserve.
func formatPreservedState(plan string, edits, tools, skills, instructions []skillEntry) string {
if plan == "" && len(edits) == 0 && len(tools) == 0 && len(skills) == 0 && len(instructions) == 0 {
func formatPreservedState(plan string, task *preservedTaskState, edits, tools, skills, instructions []skillEntry) string {
if plan == "" && task == nil && len(edits) == 0 && len(tools) == 0 && len(skills) == 0 && len(instructions) == 0 {
return ""
}
state := preservedState{Plan: plan}
state := preservedState{Plan: plan, Task: task}
for _, e := range edits {
state.RecentEdits = append(state.RecentEdits, preservedEdit{Path: e.name, Note: e.body})
}
@@ -579,15 +610,6 @@ func formatPreservedState(plan string, edits, tools, skills, instructions []skil
return preservedStateLabel + "\n" + string(encoded)
}
// parsePreservedState recovers the plan + skills from a prior summary's preserved
// block. JSON escaping makes this lossless even when a skill body contains
// markdown headings, code fences, or quotes. Returns ("", nil) when absent or
// malformed.
func parsePreservedState(summaryContent string) (string, []skillEntry) {
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent)
return state.Plan, preservedSkillsToEntries(state.Skills)
}
func parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent string) preservedState {
idx := strings.LastIndex(summaryContent, preservedStateLabel)
if idx < 0 {
+101 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
"unicode/utf8"
@@ -59,6 +60,103 @@ func TestCompactPreservesActivePlan(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCompactPreservesBoundedTaskContext(t *testing.T) {
objective := strings.Repeat("世", maxTaskObjectiveBytes)
task := newTaskState(objective, nil)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"write code","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"add tests","status":"pending"}]}`})
messages := stateConversation()
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SUMMARY", nil },
taskState: task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Compact: %v", err)
}
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(compacted[1].Content)
if state.Task == nil || state.Task.Status != taskStatusActive || state.Task.InProgress != 1 || state.Task.Pending != 1 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected compact task state: %#v", state.Task)
}
if len(state.Task.Objective) > maxTaskObjectiveBytes || !utf8.ValidString(state.Task.Objective) {
t.Fatalf("objective was not safely bounded: %d bytes %q", len(state.Task.Objective), state.Task.Objective)
}
}
func TestCompactPreservesObjectiveAfterPlanParityMismatch(t *testing.T) {
prior := preservedState{Task: &preservedTaskState{Objective: "stale objective", Status: taskStatusActive, Pending: 1}}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(prior)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: summaryLabel + "\nold\n\n" + preservedStateLabel + "\n" + string(encoded)},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "continuing"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "more"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "again"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "done"},
}
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SUMMARY", nil },
taskState: &taskStateSnapshot{
Objective: "current objective",
PlanParity: taskPlanParityMismatch,
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Compact: %v", err)
}
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(compacted[1].Content)
if state.Task == nil || state.Task.Objective != "current objective" {
t.Fatalf("immutable objective was lost on plan mismatch: %#v", state.Task)
}
if state.Task.Status != "" || state.Task.Pending != 0 {
t.Fatalf("uncorroborated mutable task fields survived plan mismatch: %#v", state.Task)
}
}
func TestTaskObjectiveSurvivesRepeatedCompactionWithoutPlanRefresh(t *testing.T) {
task := newTaskState("keep this objective", nil)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"write code","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"add tests","status":"pending"}]}`})
messages := stateConversation()
first, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "FIRST", nil },
taskState: task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Compact: %v", err)
}
secondInput := append(append([]zeroruntime.Message{}, first...),
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "more"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "again"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "done"},
)
snapshot := task.snapshotForCompaction(secondInput)
if snapshot.PlanParity != taskPlanParityMismatch {
t.Fatalf("plan call should be absent after first compaction, parity=%q", snapshot.PlanParity)
}
second, err := Compact(secondInput, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SECOND", nil },
taskState: snapshot,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second Compact: %v", err)
}
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(second[1].Content)
if state.Task == nil || state.Task.Objective != "keep this objective" {
t.Fatalf("objective lost after second compaction: %#v", state.Task)
}
if state.Task.Status != "" || state.Task.InProgress != 0 {
t.Fatalf("uncorroborated mutable fields survived second compaction: %#v", state.Task)
}
}
func TestCompactPreservesLoadedSkills(t *testing.T) {
summary := compactStateConversation(t, stateConversation())
if !strings.Contains(summary, preservedStateLabel) {
@@ -283,12 +381,10 @@ func TestExtractLatestPlanReturnsMostRecent(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestFormatPlanArgumentsAcceptsStepAlias(t *testing.T) {
func TestFormatPlanArgumentsRejectsUnsupportedStepAlias(t *testing.T) {
got := formatPlanArguments(`{"plan":[{"step":"write failing test","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"keep existing shape","status":"pending"}]}`)
for _, want := range []string{"- [in_progress] write failing test", "- [pending] keep existing shape"} {
if !strings.Contains(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected %q in formatted plan, got %q", want, got)
}
if got != "" {
t.Fatalf("unsupported alias should reject the whole plan like update_plan, got %q", got)
}
}
+6 -6
View File
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ func TestRunProactiveCompactionTriggers(t *testing.T) {
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("y", 8000), provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ func TestRunNoCompactionWhenContextWindowZero(t *testing.T) {
},
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
_, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("y", 8000), provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
// the compaction closure. read_file also returns a sizeable result that
// bloats the history.
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
// ContextWindow large enough that proactive compaction never triggers, so
// only the reactive path can save the run.
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ func TestRunReactiveRetryDoesNotDoubleEmitText(t *testing.T) {
finalText: "recovered",
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
var deltas []string
result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("z", 6000), provider, Options{
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ func TestCompactNeverProducesConsecutiveUserMessages(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRecoverNoopDoesNotConsumeReactiveBudget(t *testing.T) {
st := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 1000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2})
st := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 1000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "SUMMARY"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ func TestRecoverNoopDoesNotConsumeReactiveBudget(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRecoverDisabledIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
st := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 0})
st := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 0}, nil)
msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "x"}}
called := false
// recover must not invoke the provider/summarize when disabled, even on a
+2 -2
View File
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ func newCompletionPolicy(requireSemanticCheck bool) *completionPolicy {
return &completionPolicy{requireSemanticCheck: requireSemanticCheck}
}
func (policy *completionPolicy) evaluate(text string, planPending bool) completionEvaluation {
func (policy *completionPolicy) evaluate(text string, context completionContext) completionEvaluation {
// A direct admission is strong local evidence and takes precedence over all
// weaker signals, avoiding both continuation nudges and semantic checks.
if reason := selfReportedIncompletion(text); reason != "" {
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func (policy *completionPolicy) evaluate(text string, planPending bool) completi
// weak evidence because bookkeeping can be stale. Both get a bounded chance
// to continue, but only a persisted cue is ultimately incomplete.
cue := endsWithContinuationCue(text)
if cue || planPending {
if cue || context.PlanPending {
if policy.continueNudges < maxContinueNudges {
policy.continueNudges++
reason := "your message ended mid-step"
+20 -9
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,19 @@
package agent
import "testing"
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestCompletionPolicyLocalEvidenceDecidesWithoutSemanticCheck(t *testing.T) {
policy := newCompletionPolicy(false)
complete := policy.evaluate("Done. All required checks pass.", false)
complete := policy.evaluate("Done. All required checks pass.", completionContext{})
if complete.Decision != CompletionComplete {
t.Fatalf("confident completion decision = %q, want %q", complete.Decision, CompletionComplete)
}
incomplete := policy.evaluate("I couldn't verify the result, so this is my best guess.", false)
incomplete := policy.evaluate("I couldn't verify the result, so this is my best guess.", completionContext{})
if incomplete.Decision != CompletionIncomplete {
t.Fatalf("admitted failure decision = %q, want %q", incomplete.Decision, CompletionIncomplete)
}
@@ -19,13 +22,13 @@ func TestCompletionPolicyLocalEvidenceDecidesWithoutSemanticCheck(t *testing.T)
func TestCompletionPolicyPreservesBoundedPlanStallProtection(t *testing.T) {
policy := newCompletionPolicy(false)
for attempt := 0; attempt < maxContinueNudges; attempt++ {
got := policy.evaluate("Let me inspect the remaining configuration:", true)
got := policy.evaluate("Let me inspect the remaining configuration:", completionContext{PlanPending: true})
if got.Decision != CompletionUncertain || got.Action != completionActionContinue {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d = (%q, %q), want uncertain continue", attempt+1, got.Decision, got.Action)
}
}
got := policy.evaluate("Let me inspect the remaining configuration:", true)
got := policy.evaluate("Let me inspect the remaining configuration:", completionContext{PlanPending: true})
if got.Decision != CompletionIncomplete {
t.Fatalf("decision after nudge budget = %q, want %q", got.Decision, CompletionIncomplete)
}
@@ -34,13 +37,13 @@ func TestCompletionPolicyPreservesBoundedPlanStallProtection(t *testing.T) {
func TestCompletionPolicyTreatsPendingPlanAsWeakEvidence(t *testing.T) {
policy := newCompletionPolicy(false)
for attempt := 0; attempt < maxContinueNudges; attempt++ {
got := policy.evaluate("All set.", true)
got := policy.evaluate("All set.", completionContext{PlanPending: true})
if got.Decision != CompletionUncertain || got.Action != completionActionContinue {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d = (%q, %q), want uncertain continue", attempt+1, got.Decision, got.Action)
}
}
got := policy.evaluate("All set.", true)
got := policy.evaluate("All set.", completionContext{PlanPending: true})
if got.Decision != CompletionComplete {
t.Fatalf("stale plan decision after nudge budget = %q, want %q", got.Decision, CompletionComplete)
}
@@ -49,12 +52,12 @@ func TestCompletionPolicyTreatsPendingPlanAsWeakEvidence(t *testing.T) {
func TestCompletionPolicyAllowsExactlyOneRequiredSemanticCheck(t *testing.T) {
policy := newCompletionPolicy(true)
first := policy.evaluate("Implemented and tested.", false)
first := policy.evaluate("Implemented and tested.", completionContext{})
if first.Decision != CompletionUncertain || first.Action != completionActionSemanticCheck {
t.Fatalf("first decision = (%q, %q), want uncertain semantic check", first.Decision, first.Action)
}
second := policy.evaluate("PASS. The result meets the task criterion.", false)
second := policy.evaluate("PASS. The result meets the task criterion.", completionContext{})
if second.Decision != CompletionComplete {
t.Fatalf("post-check decision = %q, want %q", second.Decision, CompletionComplete)
}
@@ -62,3 +65,11 @@ func TestCompletionPolicyAllowsExactlyOneRequiredSemanticCheck(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("semantic check was requested more than once")
}
}
func TestAcceptanceVerificationNudgeIncludesBoundedObjective(t *testing.T) {
objective := "make the requested behavior observable"
nudge := acceptanceVerificationNudge(objective)
if !strings.Contains(nudge, "Task objective: "+objective) {
t.Fatalf("semantic check was not grounded in the objective: %q", nudge)
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ func assertNoDeferredDiscoveryMessage(t *testing.T, request zeroruntime.Completi
func TestPartitionToolsInactiveIsByteIdenticalAndDropsToolSearch(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__a", desc: "tool a"})
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})
@@ -305,8 +305,8 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveExcludesDisabledDeferredFromDiscoveryAndExposed(t *
func TestPartitionToolsActiveHidesUnloadedExposesLoaded(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root)) // non-deferred builtin
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{}) // non-deferred, must stay exposed
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil)) // non-deferred builtin
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{}) // non-deferred, must stay exposed
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha tool"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta tool"})
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
func TestExecuteToolCallCategorizesFilteredDenial(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
result, _ := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"x"}`}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{
DisabledTools: []string{"read_file"},
+41
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package agent
import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func equalStringSlices(left []string, right []string) bool {
if len(left) != len(right) {
return false
}
for index := range left {
if left[index] != right[index] {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// parsePreservedState recovers the plan + skills from a prior summary's preserved
// block. JSON escaping makes this lossless even when a skill body contains
// markdown headings, code fences, or quotes. Returns ("", nil) when absent or
// malformed.
func parsePreservedState(summaryContent string) (string, []skillEntry) {
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent)
return state.Plan, preservedSkillsToEntries(state.Skills)
}
// partitionTools builds the per-turn advertised tool list and optional
// tool_search discovery text. INACTIVE (DeferThreshold <= 0 or the eligible count is
// below it): every visible tool is exposed with its full schema EXCEPT tool_search
// (dropped so it is never advertised when it cannot help), and the discovery text is
// empty — byte-identical to the pre-deferral output. ACTIVE: a deferred-eligible
// tool is exposed only when loaded[name]; otherwise it is hidden and searchable
// through tool_search. Non-deferred tools (including tool_search) are always
// exposed. The exposed slice is alpha-sorted by name, matching the legacy order
// so the inactive path is stable.
func partitionTools(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, loaded map[string]bool) ([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, string) {
return partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, nil)
}
+11 -13
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -127,9 +126,8 @@ func endsWithContinuationCue(text string) bool {
// which the update_plan tool coerces to "pending") counts as remaining, matching
// that tool's own status normalization.
func planStatusRemaining(status string) bool {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(status)) {
case "completed", "complete", "done", "finished", "resolved", "✓", "x", "[x]",
"failed", "fail", "error", "errored", "blocked", "cancelled", "canceled", "abandoned", "skipped":
switch normalizeTaskPlanStatus(status) {
case "completed", "failed":
return false
default:
return true
@@ -307,8 +305,8 @@ func hasAnyPrefix(s string, prefixes []string) bool {
// the bug-hunt surfaced: well-formed output treated as correct; pre-existing tests
// passing treated as the objective being met; and a result that merely matches a
// baseline the task asked to beat or improve. General — no task-specific content.
func acceptanceVerificationNudge() string {
return "Before this task can be marked complete, " + acceptanceNudgeMarker + " — " +
func acceptanceVerificationNudge(objective string) string {
nudge := "Before this task can be marked complete, " + acceptanceNudgeMarker + " — " +
"NOT the shape or format of your output, NOT that pre-existing tests pass, and NOT that your " +
"result merely matches a baseline you were asked to beat or improve. " +
"Re-read the original task, then run a concrete check that exercises the actual requirement: " +
@@ -316,6 +314,10 @@ func acceptanceVerificationNudge() string {
"thing the task asked you to produce, recover, fix, or optimize. " +
"If that check passes, reply PASS and cite the evidence. " +
"If it does not pass — or you cannot run such a check — say so plainly and keep working; do not claim success."
if objective = capTaskObjective(objective); objective != "" {
nudge += "\n\nTask objective: " + objective
}
return nudge
}
// toolFailureHintMarker is a stable substring for tests.
@@ -553,16 +555,12 @@ func (state *guardState) pendingPlanItems() bool {
// many items are still remaining. Malformed arguments leave the prior count
// unchanged (best-effort — the plan panel itself tolerates the same).
func (state *guardState) observePlanUpdate(arguments string) {
var parsed struct {
Plan []struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
} `json:"plan"`
}
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(arguments), &parsed) != nil {
plan, ok := parseTaskPlan(arguments)
if !ok {
return
}
pending := 0
for _, item := range parsed.Plan {
for _, item := range plan {
if planStatusRemaining(item.Status) {
pending++
}
+38 -7
View File
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ func TestRunResetsEmptyTurnCounterOnToolCall(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -169,6 +169,37 @@ func TestRunResetsEmptyTurnCounterOnToolCall(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// The whole point of #702's fix: the unknown-session error's normalized
// signature must not vary with the session id, so a model probing ids 1, 2,
// 3, … produces one repeated signature the failure guard can count. If the id
// leaked into the first 80 normalized chars, each probe would reset the streak
// and the halt would never fire.
func TestUnknownExecSessionErrorSignatureIsIDInvariant(t *testing.T) {
a := errorSignature(tools.UnknownExecSessionError(1))
b := errorSignature(tools.UnknownExecSessionError(999999))
if a != b {
t.Fatalf("unknown-session signature varies with id:\n %q\n %q", a, b)
}
}
// End to end: with an id-invariant signature, probing a different unknown id
// each turn now trips the repeated-failure halt at toolFailureStopAt, where
// before the fix it never would.
func TestUnknownExecSessionProbingTripsFailureHalt(t *testing.T) {
var state guardState
var stoppedAt int
for i := 1; i <= toolFailureStopAt; i++ {
out := state.observeToolResult(tools.WriteStdinToolName, true, tools.UnknownExecSessionError(i))
if out.Stop {
stoppedAt = i
break
}
}
if stoppedAt != toolFailureStopAt {
t.Fatalf("probing distinct unknown ids stopped at %d, want %d", stoppedAt, toolFailureStopAt)
}
}
func TestGuardStateResetsToolOnlyStreakOnEmptyNonToolTurn(t *testing.T) {
var state guardState
toolOnly := zeroruntime.CollectedStream{
@@ -229,7 +260,7 @@ func TestRunInjectsPlanNotCalledReminderForMultiStepTask(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -260,7 +291,7 @@ func TestRunDoesNotInjectPlanReminderForTrivialTask(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -288,7 +319,7 @@ func TestRunDoesNotInjectNotCalledReminderWhenPlanUsed(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
provider := &mockProvider{
@@ -318,7 +349,7 @@ func TestRunInjectsStalePlanReminderAfterManyToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
// Turn 1 calls update_plan (so the not-called reminder never triggers), then
@@ -352,7 +383,7 @@ func TestRunStalePlanReminderIsOneShotPerInterval(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
turns := [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -387,7 +418,7 @@ func TestRunInjectsToolOnlyProgressReminder(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, toolOnlyProgressReminderAt+1)
for i := 0; i < toolOnlyProgressReminderAt; i++ {
+169 -69
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/redaction"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
@@ -181,10 +182,46 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
options.runPermissions = runPermissions
defer runPermissions.cleanup()
messages := zeroruntime.SeedMessagesWithImages(buildSystemPrompt(options), prompt, options.Images)
promptParts := buildSystemPromptParts(options)
messages := zeroruntime.SeedMessagesWithImages(promptParts.prompt, prompt, options.Images)
guards := newGuardState()
compactor := newCompactionState(options)
task := newTaskState(prompt, options.Trace)
compactor := newCompactionState(options, task)
defer func() {
// A final transcript comparison is observational. It records drift but
// never rewrites the result or changes execution after the fact.
task.observePlanParity(result.Messages)
// Tool-result observations are intentionally coalesced; this final event
// guarantees their aggregate counts are present even on an early return.
task.emit()
}()
// The execution-profile posture controller. nil Options.Profile (every
// existing caller) makes every observe/decide call a no-op, keeping the
// loop byte-identical for unprofiled runs.
posture := newProfileController(options.Profile)
// applyPosture applies at most one posture escalation when an armed trigger
// has fired: raise the hoisted turn ceiling, restore effort and the
// completion gate, stamp the counter. Shared by the end-of-turn tail and
// the completion-gate uncertain path (which continues the loop before the
// tail runs). No-op forever after the first escalation and for unprofiled
// runs.
applyPosture := func() {
if target, fired := posture.maybeEscalate(); fired {
if target.MaxTurns > maxTurns {
maxTurns = target.MaxTurns
}
if target.ReasoningEffort != "" {
options.ReasoningEffort = target.ReasoningEffort
} else if target.RestoreDefaultEffort {
options.ReasoningEffort = ""
}
if target.RestoreCompletionGate {
options.RequireCompletionSignal = true
}
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterPostureEscalations, 1)
}
}
// Background post-edit diagnostics: files changed by mutating tools are
// checked off the tool-call critical path and any errors are appended as a
@@ -230,10 +267,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
})
}
// Build the per-turn tool list first so proactive compaction can include
// the tool-definition tokens (they ride on every request) in its estimate.
// partitionTools depends only on registry/permissions/options/loaded, not on
// the messages, so computing it before compaction is safe.
// Build the per-turn tool list first so proactive compaction can include
// the tool-definition tokens (they ride on every request) in its estimate.
// partitionTools depends only on registry/permissions/options/loaded, not on
@@ -242,16 +275,14 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
exposed, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, toolDefCache)
toolPartitionSpan.End()
// Prompt-prefix fingerprint: hash the seven cacheable sub-components
// of this turn's request (system prompt sections, project context,
// skills, partitioned tool list, tool schemas) and emit one trace
// event. Stable across turns => cacheable. Drift in any sub-hash
// names the sub-component that broke the cache for this turn. The
// computation is pure and cheap (seven SHA-256s of small strings)
// and is a no-op when tracing is off.
// Fingerprint the exact system prompt built at run start plus this turn's
// provider-visible tool definitions in their emitted order. Reusing the
// retained prompt parts avoids rebuilding workspace context while ensuring
// the trace describes the same bytes carried by the request.
if options.Trace != nil {
fp := ComputePrefixFingerprint(options, exposed)
fp := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(promptParts, exposed))
options.Trace.EmitPrefixHash(trace.PrefixHash{
SystemPromptHash: fp.SystemPromptHash,
BaseInstructionsHash: fp.BaseInstructionsHash,
ConfirmationPolicyHash: fp.ConfirmationPolicyHash,
ProjectContextHash: fp.ProjectContextHash,
@@ -545,7 +576,9 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// model's final answer ONLY when the work is actually done. Default off
// (RequireCompletionSignal), so interactive runs stay byte-identical.
if options.RequireCompletionSignal {
evaluation := completionPolicy.evaluate(collected.Text, guards.pendingPlanItems())
completionContext := task.completionContext(messages, guards.pendingPlanItems())
evaluation := completionPolicy.evaluate(collected.Text, completionContext)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventCompletion, completion: evaluation})
switch evaluation.Decision {
case CompletionIncomplete:
result.Incomplete = true
@@ -554,6 +587,11 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, nil
case CompletionUncertain:
// Observe the uncertainty signal and apply any escalation NOW:
// this branch continues the turn loop before the end-of-turn
// act point, so deferring would skip escalation entirely.
posture.observeUncertain()
applyPosture()
switch evaluation.Action {
case completionActionContinue:
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterCompletionNudges, 1)
@@ -565,13 +603,15 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterAcceptanceChecks, 1)
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: acceptanceVerificationNudge(),
Content: acceptanceVerificationNudge(completionContext.Objective),
})
}
continue
case CompletionComplete:
// Local evidence is sufficient; proceed to final diagnostics.
}
} else {
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventCompletion, completion: completionEvaluation{Decision: CompletionComplete}})
}
// Finalization diagnostics gate: edits from this run may still have
// checks in flight — the per-turn drain waits only briefly and defers
@@ -595,6 +635,11 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// executing so the empty-turn counter resets and plan-tracking signals
// stay current.
guards.observeTurn(collected)
for _, call := range collected.ToolCalls {
if call.Name == planToolName {
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: call.Arguments})
}
}
failureHint := ""
// turnRequestedModel records the FIRST mid-run escalation target requested
@@ -646,6 +691,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
}
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterToolCalls, 1)
recordOutputBudgetTrace(options.Trace, toolResult)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: toolResult})
if options.OnToolResult != nil {
options.OnToolResult(toolResult)
}
@@ -692,6 +738,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// would misdirect the model toward JSON shape or blocked behavior.
retriableFailure := isRetriableToolError(toolResult)
outcome := guards.observeToolResult(call.Name, retriableFailure, toolResult.Output)
posture.observeToolOutcome(outcome, toolResult)
if outcome.Stop {
// The assistant message advertised EVERY collected tool call, but
// the guard halts mid-turn so the calls after this one never run.
@@ -724,7 +771,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// the assistant's tool_results stay contiguous (a user message between
// tool_results breaks strict provider replay). nil SelfCorrect is a no-op.
if options.SelfCorrect != nil && len(changedFilesThisBatch) > 0 {
if feedback, _ := options.SelfCorrect.AfterEdit(ctx, dedupeStrings(changedFilesThisBatch)); feedback != "" {
feedback, selfCorrectOutcome := options.SelfCorrect.AfterEdit(ctx, dedupeStrings(changedFilesThisBatch))
posture.observeSelfCorrect(selfCorrectOutcome)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventVerification, verification: selfCorrectOutcome})
if feedback != "" {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: feedback,
@@ -817,6 +867,13 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
Content: reminder,
})
}
// One-shot posture escalation: when an armed profile trigger fired this
// turn, restore the stricter knob values the profile displaced. Mutates
// only per-turn-read policy (the hoisted turn ceiling, reasoning effort,
// completion gate); never messages, model, or session. No-op forever
// after the first escalation and for every unprofiled run.
applyPosture()
}
if ctx.Err() != nil {
@@ -1110,6 +1167,17 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
decisionCommandPrefix = grant.Prefix
}
}
// An explicit additional-permissions request is an elevation only when it
// expands the current effective policy. If the same capability was already
// approved for this session, reuse that grant across equivalent commands
// instead of prompting again merely because their command prefixes differ.
if toolFound && !permissionGranted && isShellCommandTool(call.Name) && options.Sandbox != nil {
if profile, requested, profileErr := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, options.Cwd); profileErr == nil && requested && options.Sandbox.CoversRequestPermissions(profile) {
permissionGranted = true
decisionAction = PermissionDecisionAllowForSession
decisionReason = "requested sandbox capabilities already granted for this session"
}
}
var preflightDecision *sandbox.Decision
if toolFound && options.Sandbox != nil {
@@ -1338,20 +1406,36 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
result = registry.RebudgetAfterHook(call.Name, args, result)
}
}
// Stamp the sandbox risk classification for this EXECUTED call so run-policy
// observers can see the risk of an allowed mutation. Prefer the preflight
// decision's classification when the sandbox evaluated the call; otherwise
// run the same pure classifier the permission path uses. Denied/canceled
// results returned earlier keep the zero value.
executedRisk := sandbox.Risk{}
if preflightDecision != nil {
executedRisk = preflightDecision.Risk
} else if toolFound {
// Unknown-tool results fall through here with a nil tool; they carry a
// denial and keep the zero risk value.
executedRisk = sandbox.Classify(sandboxRequest(call.Name, tool, args, permissionGranted, permissionMode, options))
}
// Secret scrubbing happens at the registry boundary (the single point both
// the agent loop and the MCP server pass through), so result.Output is
// already redacted here and result.Redacted reflects whether it changed.
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.Output,
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: result.Meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
Display: result.Display,
LoadedTools: loadedToolsFromResult(result.Meta),
Risk: executedRisk,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.Output,
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: result.Meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: result.Display,
LoadedTools: loadedToolsFromResult(result.Meta),
// A tool may signal a mid-run model escalation by carrying the target id
// in Meta["escalate_to_model"]. Lift it into the typed loop-level field;
// the Run turn loop performs the actual provider switch. Empty for every
@@ -1471,8 +1555,15 @@ func sandboxDeniedNetworkRetryCandidate(call ToolCall, args map[string]any, resu
if options.Sandbox == nil || !isShellCommandTool(call.Name) {
return false
}
if result.Meta[tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta] != "true" || result.Meta[tools.SandboxDenialKindMeta] != tools.SandboxDenialKindNetwork {
return false
if result.ExecutionOutcome != nil {
denial := result.ExecutionOutcome.Denial
if denial == nil || denial.Capability.Kind != execution.CapabilityExternalNetwork {
return false
}
} else {
if result.Meta[tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta] != "true" || result.Meta[tools.SandboxDenialKindMeta] != tools.SandboxDenialKindNetwork {
return false
}
}
if value, _ := args["sandbox_permissions"].(string); strings.TrimSpace(value) == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated) {
return false
@@ -1525,6 +1616,11 @@ func sandboxRestrictedShellRetryCandidate(call ToolCall, args map[string]any, re
}
func sandboxDeniedShellResult(result tools.Result) bool {
if result.ExecutionOutcome != nil {
// Typed denials must be handled by their exact capability path. Never
// turn a structured narrow denial into the legacy unrestricted retry.
return false
}
return result.Status == tools.StatusError && result.Meta[tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta] == "true"
}
@@ -1653,17 +1749,18 @@ func toolResultFromPrePermissionReject(call ToolCall, result tools.Result) ToolR
}
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: output,
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted || outputRedacted || summaryRedacted || metaRedacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
Display: display,
LoadedTools: loadedToolsFromResult(meta),
RequestedModel: meta["escalate_to_model"],
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: output,
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted || outputRedacted || summaryRedacted || metaRedacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: display,
LoadedTools: loadedToolsFromResult(meta),
RequestedModel: meta["escalate_to_model"],
}
}
@@ -1923,15 +2020,16 @@ func askUserFallbackResult(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call T
Cwd: options.Cwd,
})
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.Output,
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: result.Meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
Display: result.Display,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.Output,
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: result.Meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: result.Display,
}
}
return ToolResult{
@@ -2495,7 +2593,8 @@ func buildPermissionEvent(call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, p
if profile, ok, err := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, options.Cwd); ok && err == nil {
scopeText = requestPermissionsScope(profile)
}
reason = userFacingPermissionReason(call.Name, args, reason)
decisionReason := strings.TrimSpace(reason)
reason = userFacingPermissionReason(call.Name, args, reason, safety.Reason)
return PermissionEvent{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
@@ -2508,6 +2607,7 @@ func buildPermissionEvent(call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, p
Autonomy: options.Autonomy,
SideEffect: string(safety.SideEffect),
Reason: reason,
DecisionReason: decisionReason,
Scope: scopeText,
Risk: risk,
Block: block,
@@ -2517,18 +2617,31 @@ func buildPermissionEvent(call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, p
}, true
}
func userFacingPermissionReason(toolName string, args map[string]any, reason string) string {
func userFacingPermissionReason(toolName string, args map[string]any, reason string, fallback string) string {
reason = strings.TrimSpace(reason)
if !isShellCommandTool(toolName) || !shellCommandRequiresEscalated(args) {
if !isShellCommandTool(toolName) {
return reason
}
if justification, ok := firstStringArg(args, "justification"); ok {
return justification
// Policy and sandbox explanations are authoritative. The tool's static
// safety copy is only an internal fallback; presenting it as the reason for
// every ordinary shell approval makes prompts generic and obscures the cases
// where policy has an actionable explanation.
fallback = strings.TrimSpace(fallback)
if reason != "" && reason != fallback && reason != "tool requires approval before execution" && reason != sandbox.ReasonEscalatedSandboxRequired {
return reason
}
if reason == "" || reason == sandbox.ReasonEscalatedSandboxRequired {
if shellCommandRequiresEscalated(args) {
if justification, ok := firstStringArg(args, "justification"); ok {
return justification
}
return "This command needs to run outside the sandbox."
}
return reason
// Ordinary shell approvals need no invented explanation. The raw fallback is
// retained separately as DecisionReason for traces and policy auditing.
return ""
}
func grantDecisionAction(grant *sandbox.Grant) PermissionDecisionAction {
@@ -2749,19 +2862,6 @@ func permissionActionFromSandbox(action sandbox.Action) PermissionAction {
}
}
// partitionTools builds the per-turn advertised tool list and optional
// tool_search discovery text. INACTIVE (DeferThreshold <= 0 or the eligible count is
// below it): every visible tool is exposed with its full schema EXCEPT tool_search
// (dropped so it is never advertised when it cannot help), and the discovery text is
// empty — byte-identical to the pre-deferral output. ACTIVE: a deferred-eligible
// tool is exposed only when loaded[name]; otherwise it is hidden and searchable
// through tool_search. Non-deferred tools (including tool_search) are always
// exposed. The exposed slice is alpha-sorted by name, matching the legacy order
// so the inactive path is stable.
func partitionTools(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, loaded map[string]bool) ([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, string) {
return partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, nil)
}
// partitionToolsCached is partitionTools with an optional per-tool definition
// cache. The partitioning itself (visibility, deferral, ordering) is recomputed
// every call — it must be, because a tool's deferred state can flip mid-run (e.g.
+154 -53
View File
@@ -8,10 +8,12 @@ import (
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/specmode"
@@ -25,6 +27,59 @@ type mockProvider struct {
requests []zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
}
func TestTypedExecutionOutcomeOverridesLegacySandboxHeuristics(t *testing.T) {
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir(), Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy()})
call := ToolCall{Name: tools.ExecCommandToolName}
options := Options{Sandbox: engine}
legacyMeta := map[string]string{
tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta: "true",
tools.SandboxDenialKindMeta: tools.SandboxDenialKindNetwork,
}
applicationFailure := tools.Result{
Status: tools.StatusError,
Meta: legacyMeta,
ExecutionOutcome: &execution.Outcome{
State: execution.StateFailed,
Kind: execution.OutcomeApplicationFailure,
Exit: &execution.Exit{Code: 1},
},
}
if sandboxDeniedNetworkRetryCandidate(call, nil, applicationFailure, options) || sandboxRestrictedShellRetryCandidate(call, nil, applicationFailure, options) {
t.Fatal("typed application failure must not be retried from legacy sandbox-like text")
}
protectedDenial := applicationFailure
protectedDenial.ExecutionOutcome = &execution.Outcome{
State: execution.StateDenied,
Kind: execution.OutcomeEnforcementDenied,
Denial: &execution.Denial{
Capability: execution.Capability{Kind: execution.CapabilityProtectedMetadata, Scope: "/workspace/.zero"},
Source: execution.DenialSourceConfiguredPolicy,
Reason: "protected metadata",
NextAction: execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
},
}
if sandboxRestrictedShellRetryCandidate(call, nil, protectedDenial, options) {
t.Fatal("narrow protected-metadata denial must not become an unrestricted retry")
}
networkDenial := protectedDenial
networkDenial.ExecutionOutcome = &execution.Outcome{
State: execution.StateDenied,
Kind: execution.OutcomeEnforcementDenied,
Denial: &execution.Denial{
Capability: execution.Capability{Kind: execution.CapabilityExternalNetwork},
Source: execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox,
Reason: "external network denied",
NextAction: execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
},
}
if !sandboxDeniedNetworkRetryCandidate(call, nil, networkDenial, options) {
t.Fatal("typed external-network denial should use the narrow network approval path")
}
}
func (provider *mockProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
provider.requests = append(provider.requests, request)
@@ -808,9 +863,6 @@ func TestRunReportsTruncationFinishReason(t *testing.T) {
if result.FinishReason != zeroruntime.FinishReasonLength {
t.Fatalf("FinishReason = %q, want %q", result.FinishReason, zeroruntime.FinishReasonLength)
}
if !result.Truncated() {
t.Fatal("Truncated() = false, want true for a length-capped response")
}
if result.TruncationNotice() == "" {
t.Fatal("TruncationNotice() empty for a truncated response")
}
@@ -828,7 +880,7 @@ func TestRunNormalCompletionIsNotTruncated(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Truncated() || result.TruncationNotice() != "" {
if result.TruncationNotice() != "" {
t.Fatalf("normal completion reported as truncated: reason=%q", result.FinishReason)
}
}
@@ -905,7 +957,7 @@ func TestRunEmitsUsageEvents(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunAdvertisesRuntimeToolDefinitions(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
@@ -1112,9 +1164,9 @@ func TestRunRequestsPermissionBeforeWebSearchExecution(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunFiltersAdvertisedTools(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewGrepTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedGrepTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
@@ -1142,7 +1194,7 @@ func TestRunFiltersAdvertisedTools(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunRejectsFilteredToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1179,7 +1231,7 @@ func TestRunRejectsFilteredToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunRejectsToolCallsOutsideEnabledList(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1217,7 +1269,7 @@ func TestRunExecutesToolCallThroughRegistry(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), "alpha\nbeta\n")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1258,10 +1310,50 @@ func TestRunExecutesToolCallThroughRegistry(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunPreservesRequestPrefixAcrossTurns(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), "alpha\n")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "read_file"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"notes.txt"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "read notes", provider, Options{
Cwd: root,
Registry: registry,
SessionID: "session-stable-prefix",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("provider requests = %d, want 2", len(provider.requests))
}
first, second := provider.requests[0], provider.requests[1]
if len(second.Messages) < len(first.Messages) || !reflect.DeepEqual(second.Messages[:len(first.Messages)], first.Messages) {
t.Fatalf("first request messages must be an exact prefix of the second:\nfirst=%#v\nsecond=%#v", first.Messages, second.Messages)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(first.Tools, second.Tools) {
t.Fatalf("tool definitions drifted between turns:\nfirst=%#v\nsecond=%#v", first.Tools, second.Tools)
}
if first.PromptCacheKey != "session-stable-prefix" || second.PromptCacheKey != first.PromptCacheKey {
t.Fatalf("prompt cache key must remain stable: first=%q second=%q", first.PromptCacheKey, second.PromptCacheKey)
}
}
func TestRunSanitizesMalformedToolCallArgumentsBeforeRetry(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1329,7 +1421,7 @@ func TestRunRecoversFirstObjectFromConcatenatedToolArgs(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1376,8 +1468,8 @@ func TestRunDefersSelfCorrectFeedbackUntilAfterToolBatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -1452,7 +1544,7 @@ func TestRunBatchesSelfCorrectOncePerTurn(t *testing.T) {
// after a later call in the same turn supersedes it.
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -1509,7 +1601,7 @@ func TestRunBatchesSelfCorrectOncePerTurn(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunDeniesPromptToolWithoutUnsafePermission(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write denied")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1552,7 +1644,7 @@ func TestRunDeniesPromptToolWithoutUnsafePermission(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunRequestsPromptToolPermissionBeforeExecution(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write approved")
var requests []PermissionRequest
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1608,7 +1700,7 @@ func TestRunRequestsPromptToolPermissionBeforeExecution(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunAllowsWorkspaceWriteWithoutPromptWhenSandboxPolicyPermits(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write done")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1657,7 +1749,7 @@ func TestRunAllowsWorkspaceWriteWithoutPromptWhenSandboxPolicyPermits(t *testing
func TestRunDeniesPromptToolWhenPermissionRequestDenied(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write denied")
var requests []PermissionRequest
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1705,7 +1797,7 @@ func TestRunDeniesPromptToolWhenPermissionRequestDenied(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunAbortsWhenPermissionRequestCanceled(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write should not continue")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1801,7 +1893,7 @@ func TestRunPersistsAlwaysAllowPermissionDecision(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write approved")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
policy := sandbox.DefaultPolicy()
@@ -1873,7 +1965,7 @@ func TestRunSessionAllowSkipsMatchingPromptWithoutPersistentGrant(t *testing.T)
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1954,7 +2046,7 @@ func TestRunSessionAllowSkipsMatchingPromptWithoutPersistentGrant(t *testing.T)
func TestRunCommandPrefixApprovalSkipsLaterMatchingBashPrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2156,7 +2248,7 @@ func TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixApprovalSkipsFutureSessionPrompt(t *testing.T
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
policy := sandbox.DefaultPolicy()
policy.Network = sandbox.NetworkAllow
@@ -2263,7 +2355,7 @@ func TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("seed command prefix: %v", err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2312,7 +2404,11 @@ func TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
command := "PATH=.:$PATH curl https://example.com"
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
command = "set PATH=.;%PATH% && curl https://example.com"
if windowsTestUsesPowerShell() {
command = `$env:PATH = '.;' + $env:PATH; curl.cmd https://example.com`
} else {
command = "set PATH=.;%PATH% && curl https://example.com"
}
fakeCurl := filepath.Join(root, "curl.cmd")
if err := os.WriteFile(fakeCurl, []byte("@echo fake curl %*\r\n"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -2324,7 +2420,7 @@ func TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant(t *testing.T) {
}
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2391,7 +2487,7 @@ func TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunDoesNotOfferPrefixApprovalForUnsafeBashCommand(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2433,13 +2529,17 @@ func TestRunDoesNotOfferPrefixApprovalForUnsafeBashCommand(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunPromptsForDestructiveShellInsteadOfSandboxDeny(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
command := "echo rm -rf /"
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" && windowsTestUsesPowerShell() {
command = `Write-Output 'rm -rf /'`
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "bash"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"command":"echo rm -rf /"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"command":` + quoteJSONString(command) + `}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
@@ -2503,7 +2603,7 @@ func TestRunAlwaysAllowWithoutSandboxStillAllowsCall(t *testing.T) {
// prior code denied it because persistPermissionGrant errors when Sandbox==nil.
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write approved")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -2535,6 +2635,12 @@ func TestRunAlwaysAllowWithoutSandboxStillAllowsCall(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func windowsTestUsesPowerShell() bool {
executable, _ := tools.HostShellCommand("")
name := strings.ToLower(filepath.Base(executable))
return strings.Contains(name, "powershell") || strings.HasPrefix(name, "pwsh")
}
func containsPermissionDecision(decisions []PermissionDecisionAction, want PermissionDecisionAction) bool {
for _, decision := range decisions {
if decision == want {
@@ -2567,7 +2673,7 @@ func TestRunCancellationPreservesContextCanceledIdentity(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunGrantsPromptToolInUnsafeMode(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write done")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -2619,7 +2725,7 @@ func TestRunEmitsPermissionEventForPersistentSandboxGrant(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write done")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -2798,7 +2904,7 @@ func TestRunAppliesSandboxEvenInUnsafeMode(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
outside := filepath.Join(tempDirOutsideDefaultTemp(t), "escape.txt")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWritePathThenAnswer(outside, "sandbox handled")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -2847,7 +2953,7 @@ func TestRunStopsAfterMaxTurns(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "read_file"},
@@ -2877,7 +2983,7 @@ func TestRunRequestsFinalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -3068,22 +3174,17 @@ func TestBuildSystemPromptInjectsHostShellContext(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected operating system in environment block, got %q", prompt)
}
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
for _, want := range []string{"Windows cmd.exe syntax", "cwd argument", "MSYS binaries", "grep", "require_escalated", "use double quotes around the value"} {
if !strings.Contains(prompt, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected Windows shell guidance to mention %q, got %q", want, prompt)
}
wants := []string{"workdir/cwd", "MSYS binaries"}
if windowsTestUsesPowerShell() {
wants = append(wants, "PowerShell", "Get-ChildItem", "Select-String", "$env:NAME", "require_escalated")
} else {
wants = append(wants, "cmd.exe", "double quotes")
}
// The examples must themselves use the safe (double-quoted) form; a
// single-quoted example here would teach the model the exact syntax
// that fails under cmd.exe.
for _, want := range []string{`--jq ".a | b"`, `-run "A|B"`} {
for _, want := range wants {
if !strings.Contains(prompt, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected double-quoted example %q in Windows shell guidance, got %q", want, prompt)
t.Fatalf("expected selected Windows shell guidance to mention %q, got %q", want, prompt)
}
}
if strings.Contains(prompt, `'.a | b'`) || strings.Contains(prompt, `'A|B'`) {
t.Fatalf("Windows shell guidance must not show the unsafe single-quoted form, got %q", prompt)
}
} else if !strings.Contains(prompt, "/bin/sh syntax") {
t.Fatalf("expected POSIX shell guidance in prompt, got %q", prompt)
}
@@ -3136,7 +3237,7 @@ func TestBuildSystemPromptAllowsSpecModeOverride(t *testing.T) {
func TestSpecDraftAdvertisesOnlySafeDraftTools(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreTools(root) {
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(root, nil) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
specmode.RegisterDraftTools(registry, root, nil)
@@ -3173,7 +3274,7 @@ func TestSpecDraftAdvertisesOnlySafeDraftTools(t *testing.T) {
func TestSpecDraftDeniesHiddenToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("done")
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "draft", provider, Options{
@@ -3206,7 +3307,7 @@ func TestSpecDraftDeniesHiddenToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
func TestSpecDraftDeniesBashToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -3347,7 +3448,7 @@ func TestRunSurfacesDroppedToolCallAlongsideValidCall(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveAppendsLoadedToolAfterEagerBlock(t *testing.T) {
// "read_file".
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root)) // non-deferred, "read_file"
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil)) // non-deferred, "read_file"
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
@@ -68,3 +68,61 @@ func TestBuildPermissionEventKeepsAllowForOrdinaryAllowedCommand(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("shouldRequestPermission must be false for an ordinary sandbox-allowed command")
}
}
func TestBuildPermissionEventReusesCoveredAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
call := ToolCall{ID: "call_3", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
args := map[string]any{
"command": "npm install",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": true},
},
}
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow, AutoAllowed: true}
if shouldRequestPermission(promptShellTool{}, args, true, decision) {
t.Fatal("an already-covered capability must not trigger another prompt")
}
event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, true, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("covered capability should still produce an auditable allow event")
}
if event.Action != PermissionActionAllow {
t.Fatalf("Action = %q, want allow for an already-covered capability", event.Action)
}
}
func TestBuildPermissionEventOmitsGenericShellReasonFromPrompt(t *testing.T) {
call := ToolCall{ID: "call_4", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
args := map[string]any{"command": "make test"}
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionPrompt, Reason: "runs a shell command"}
event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("generic shell approval must produce an event")
}
if event.Reason != "" {
t.Fatalf("user-facing reason = %q, want omitted generic tool text", event.Reason)
}
if event.DecisionReason != "runs a shell command" {
t.Fatalf("decision reason = %q, want raw audit reason retained", event.DecisionReason)
}
}
func TestBuildPermissionEventPrefersPolicyReasonOverModelJustification(t *testing.T) {
call := ToolCall{ID: "call_5", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
args := map[string]any{
"command": "curl https://example.test",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated),
"justification": "Run without sandboxing.",
}
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionPrompt, Reason: sandbox.ReasonNetworkBlocked}
event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("policy approval must produce an event")
}
if event.Reason != sandbox.ReasonNetworkBlocked {
t.Fatalf("user-facing reason = %q, want policy reason %q", event.Reason, sandbox.ReasonNetworkBlocked)
}
}
+118
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
package agent
import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
// profileController observes per-turn run signals and decides at most one
// posture escalation per run for the armed execution profile. A nil policy (or
// a policy without Escalate) makes every method a no-op, so runs without a
// profile are byte-identical to before — the same opt-in convention as Trace
// and SelfCorrect.
//
// The controller only ever CHANGES loop policy knobs (turn ceiling, reasoning
// effort, completion gate) through the values the loop applies at its act
// point; it never injects messages, never touches the model or session, and
// never interacts with the model-initiated escalate_model path.
type profileController struct {
policy *PostureEscalation
escalated bool
uncertainSeen int
failureTripped bool
riskTripped bool
scTripped bool
uncertainTrip bool
}
// newProfileController is nil-safe: a nil ProfilePolicy (the default for every
// existing caller) or a nil Escalate yields a controller that observes and
// decides nothing.
func newProfileController(policy *ProfilePolicy) *profileController {
if policy == nil {
return &profileController{}
}
return &profileController{policy: policy.Escalate}
}
// observeToolOutcome watches two signals from an executed tool call: the
// repeated-failure guard's streak (reusing the guard's own counting, not a
// second failure model) and the sandbox risk classification of an executed
// result.
func (c *profileController) observeToolOutcome(outcome toolFailureOutcome, result ToolResult) {
if c.policy == nil || c.escalated {
return
}
if c.policy.OnToolFailureStreak > 0 && outcome.Count >= c.policy.OnToolFailureStreak {
c.failureTripped = true
}
if threshold := riskRank(c.policy.OnRiskyMutation); threshold > 0 &&
result.DenialReason == DenialNone &&
riskRank(result.Risk.Level) >= threshold {
// The call EXECUTED (was not denied): partial failures count too, since
// the mutation ran. An unrecognized threshold ranks 0 and disables the
// signal instead of matching everything.
c.riskTripped = true
}
}
// observeUncertain counts uncertain completion evaluations (continue nudges and
// semantic checks). Headless-only by construction: the completion gate never
// runs interactively.
func (c *profileController) observeUncertain() {
if c.policy == nil || c.escalated || c.policy.OnCompletionUncertain <= 0 {
return
}
c.uncertainSeen++
if c.uncertainSeen >= c.policy.OnCompletionUncertain {
c.uncertainTrip = true
}
}
// observeSelfCorrect watches the post-edit verification outcome. Any failing
// outcome (correcting, reported, aborted) is a signal; passed and disabled are
// not.
func (c *profileController) observeSelfCorrect(outcome Outcome) {
if c.policy == nil || c.escalated || !c.policy.OnSelfCorrectFailure {
return
}
switch outcome {
case OutcomeCorrecting, OutcomeReported, OutcomeAborted:
c.scTripped = true
}
}
// maybeEscalate reports the escalation target exactly once, the first time any
// armed trigger has fired. Subsequent calls return false for the rest of the
// run: escalation is one-shot and never de-escalates, so no cooldown state is
// needed.
func (c *profileController) maybeEscalate() (PostureEscalation, bool) {
if c.policy == nil || c.escalated {
return PostureEscalation{}, false
}
if !(c.failureTripped || c.riskTripped || c.scTripped || c.uncertainTrip) {
return PostureEscalation{}, false
}
c.escalated = true
return *c.policy, true
}
// riskRank orders sandbox risk levels for threshold comparison. Unknown levels
// rank 0: an unrecognized RESULT level can never meet a valid threshold, and an
// unrecognized THRESHOLD is rejected before comparison (rank 0 disables the
// signal) so a typo in a profile can never make every result match.
func riskRank(level sandbox.RiskLevel) int {
switch level {
case sandbox.RiskLow:
return 1
case sandbox.RiskMedium:
return 2
case sandbox.RiskHigh:
return 3
case sandbox.RiskCritical:
return 4
default:
return 0
}
}
+345
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestProfileControllerNilPolicyIsNoOp(t *testing.T) {
for _, controller := range []*profileController{
newProfileController(nil),
newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Name: "balanced"}), // Escalate nil
} {
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{Count: 99}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, Risk: sandbox.Risk{Level: sandbox.RiskCritical}})
controller.observeUncertain()
controller.observeSelfCorrect(OutcomeAborted)
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("nil policy must never escalate")
}
}
}
func TestProfileControllerEscalatesOnFailureStreak(t *testing.T) {
controller := newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Escalate: &PostureEscalation{OnToolFailureStreak: 2, MaxTurns: 80}})
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{Count: 1}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError})
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("streak below threshold must not escalate")
}
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{Count: 2}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError})
target, fired := controller.maybeEscalate()
if !fired || target.MaxTurns != 80 {
t.Fatalf("expected escalation with the policy target, got fired=%t target=%+v", fired, target)
}
}
func TestProfileControllerEscalatesOnRiskyMutation(t *testing.T) {
controller := newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Escalate: &PostureEscalation{OnRiskyMutation: sandbox.RiskHigh}})
// Medium risk on an executed result: below threshold.
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, Risk: sandbox.Risk{Level: sandbox.RiskMedium}})
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("medium risk must not trip a high threshold")
}
// Critical risk on a DENIED result: never counts (the mutation never ran).
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, DenialReason: DenialSandboxBlock, Risk: sandbox.Risk{Level: sandbox.RiskCritical}})
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("a denied result must not trip the risky-mutation signal")
}
// Critical risk on an executed PARTIAL FAILURE (error status, no denial):
// the mutation ran, so it counts.
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Risk: sandbox.Risk{Level: sandbox.RiskCritical}})
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); !fired {
t.Fatal("an executed partial failure at critical risk must trip a high threshold")
}
}
func TestProfileControllerIgnoresInvalidRiskThreshold(t *testing.T) {
controller := newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Escalate: &PostureEscalation{OnRiskyMutation: sandbox.RiskLevel("hgih")}})
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, Risk: sandbox.Risk{Level: sandbox.RiskCritical}})
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("an unrecognized threshold must disable the signal, not match every result")
}
}
func TestProfileControllerEscalatesOnSelfCorrectFailure(t *testing.T) {
controller := newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Escalate: &PostureEscalation{OnSelfCorrectFailure: true}})
controller.observeSelfCorrect(OutcomePassed)
controller.observeSelfCorrect(OutcomeDisabled)
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("passing/disabled outcomes must not escalate")
}
controller.observeSelfCorrect(OutcomeReported)
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); !fired {
t.Fatal("a failing verification outcome must escalate")
}
}
func TestProfileControllerEscalatesOnUncertainCompletion(t *testing.T) {
controller := newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Escalate: &PostureEscalation{OnCompletionUncertain: 2}})
controller.observeUncertain()
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("first uncertain evaluation must not trip a threshold of 2")
}
controller.observeUncertain()
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); !fired {
t.Fatal("second uncertain evaluation must escalate")
}
}
func TestProfileControllerEscalatesAtMostOnce(t *testing.T) {
controller := newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Escalate: &PostureEscalation{OnToolFailureStreak: 1}})
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{Count: 1}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError})
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); !fired {
t.Fatal("expected first escalation")
}
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{Count: 5}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, Risk: sandbox.Risk{Level: sandbox.RiskCritical}})
controller.observeUncertain()
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("escalation must be one-shot per run")
}
}
// TestPostureEscalationOnUncertainCompletion proves the uncertain-path act
// point: the completion gate's continue branch escapes the end-of-turn tail,
// so escalation must apply before the continue. A cue turn under the gate
// counts as uncertain, escalates, and the very next request carries the target
// effort.
func TestPostureEscalationOnUncertainCompletion(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "Let me read the file:"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "Done. All set."},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("posture-session", "run-2", "fast")
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
MaxTurns: 10,
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
Trace: recorder,
Profile: &ProfilePolicy{
Name: "fast",
Escalate: &PostureEscalation{
ReasoningEffort: "high",
OnCompletionUncertain: 1,
},
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "Done. All set." {
t.Fatalf("expected the completed answer, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 requests, got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
if provider.requests[1].ReasoningEffort != "high" {
t.Fatalf("expected the post-escalation request to carry the target effort, got %q", provider.requests[1].ReasoningEffort)
}
tr := recorder.Finish()
if got := tr.Counter(trace.CounterPostureEscalations); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("posture_escalations = %d, want 1", got)
}
}
// A profile that filled the run's effort displaced the provider default ("");
// RestoreDefaultEffort lets escalation restore that default, which a plain ""
// ReasoningEffort target cannot express (it means "leave untouched").
func TestPostureEscalationRestoresDefaultEffort(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "Let me read the file:"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "Done. All set."},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
MaxTurns: 10,
ReasoningEffort: "low",
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
Profile: &ProfilePolicy{
Name: "fast",
Escalate: &PostureEscalation{
RestoreDefaultEffort: true,
OnCompletionUncertain: 1,
},
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "Done. All set." {
t.Fatalf("expected the completed answer, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 requests, got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
if provider.requests[0].ReasoningEffort != "low" {
t.Fatalf("pre-escalation request effort = %q, want the profile's low", provider.requests[0].ReasoningEffort)
}
if provider.requests[1].ReasoningEffort != "" {
t.Fatalf("post-escalation request effort = %q, want the restored provider default (empty)", provider.requests[1].ReasoningEffort)
}
}
// failingProfileTool always errors with the same signature so the repeated-
// failure guard builds a streak.
type failingProfileTool struct{}
func (failingProfileTool) Name() string { return "flaky_probe" }
func (failingProfileTool) Description() string { return "always fails identically (test)" }
func (failingProfileTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
}
func (failingProfileTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (failingProfileTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "probe exploded: same signature"}
}
// TestPostureEscalationRaisesTurnCeilingMidRun proves the end-to-end act path:
// a Fast-style run with a 2-turn ceiling hits a failure streak, escalates, and
// finishes on a turn the original ceiling would have cut off, with the effort
// target applied to the post-escalation request and the counter emitted.
func TestPostureEscalationRaisesTurnCeilingMidRun(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(failingProfileTool{})
toolTurn := []zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "flaky_probe"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
toolTurn,
toolTurn,
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "recovered after escalation"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("posture-session", "run-1", "fast")
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: 2,
Trace: recorder,
Profile: &ProfilePolicy{
Name: "fast",
Escalate: &PostureEscalation{
MaxTurns: 4,
ReasoningEffort: "high",
OnToolFailureStreak: 2,
},
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "recovered after escalation" {
t.Fatalf("expected the run to continue past the original 2-turn ceiling, got %q (turns=%d)", result.FinalAnswer, result.Turns)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected 3 requests (ceiling raised from 2 to 4), got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
if provider.requests[2].ReasoningEffort != "high" {
t.Fatalf("expected the post-escalation request to carry the target effort, got %q", provider.requests[2].ReasoningEffort)
}
tr := recorder.Finish()
if got := tr.Counter(trace.CounterPostureEscalations); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("posture_escalations = %d, want 1", got)
}
}
// TestPostureEscalationAbsentWithoutProfile pins the no-regression invariant at
// the loop level: the identical failing script without a profile ends at the
// original ceiling with the max-turns answer.
func TestPostureEscalationAbsentWithoutProfile(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(failingProfileTool{})
toolTurn := []zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "flaky_probe"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{toolTurn, toolTurn}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(provider.requests) > 3 {
t.Fatalf("unprofiled run must not extend the ceiling, got %d requests", len(provider.requests))
}
if !strings.Contains(result.FinalAnswer, "maximum number of turns") {
t.Fatalf("unprofiled run must end with the max-turns answer, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
}
// TestExecuteToolCallClassifiesRiskWithoutSandbox verifies the executed-risk
// stamp on the unsandboxed path: a read-only tool classifies low.
func TestExecuteToolCallClassifiesRiskWithoutSandbox(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(failingProfileTool{})
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "flaky_probe"},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{},
)
if abortErr != nil {
t.Fatal(abortErr)
}
if result.Risk.Level == "" {
t.Fatal("executed result must carry a risk classification")
}
if riskRank(result.Risk.Level) > riskRank(sandbox.RiskMedium) {
t.Fatalf("read-only tool classified %q, want at most medium", result.Risk.Level)
}
}
// TestUnknownToolResultCarriesZeroRisk verifies a call that never executed a
// tool (unknown name, nil tool) keeps the zero risk value instead of panicking
// or inventing a classification.
func TestUnknownToolResultCarriesZeroRisk(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "no_such_tool"},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{},
)
if abortErr != nil {
t.Fatal(abortErr)
}
if result.Status == tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatal("expected an error result for an unknown tool")
}
if result.Risk.Level != "" {
t.Fatalf("not-executed result must keep the zero risk value, got %q", result.Risk.Level)
}
}
+5 -5
View File
@@ -14,13 +14,13 @@ import (
// deliberately) or trimmed — the per-turn floor should not creep up silently.
//
// Measured baselines (2026-07): base system prompt ~3160 tokens; the tools a normal
// (auto permission-mode) interactive turn sends ~2430 tokens. The tool figure is
// the auto-mode advertised set, not the full core registry — higher-risk tools that
// only advertise in other modes are excluded, matching what a real turn actually
// pays.
// (auto permission-mode) interactive turn sends ~3230 tokens. The tool figure is
// the auto-mode advertised set, including exec_command: auto mode must expose both
// process creation and write_stdin process interaction or the latter is unusable
// without a session id. Higher-risk tools that do not opt into auto remain excluded.
const (
maxBaseSystemPromptTokens = 3500
maxEagerToolSchemaTokens = 2700
maxEagerToolSchemaTokens = 3550
)
func TestSystemPromptTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
+42 -98
View File
@@ -11,12 +11,11 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// promptSubstrings are the seven cacheable sub-components of the prompt a run
// sends to a model. Each is the literal content the sub-component would emit
// into the system prompt or tool list, hashed so a downstream observer can
// detect drift turn-over-turn. The substrings are produced by
// buildPromptSubstrings and consumed by ComputePrefixFingerprint.
// promptSubstrings are the cacheable components of the prompt a run sends to a
// model. systemPrompt is the exact joined system-message content. The remaining
// fields retain useful diagnostic boundaries within that prompt and tool list.
type promptSubstrings struct {
systemPrompt string
baseInstructions string
confirmationPolicy string
projectContext string
@@ -25,92 +24,55 @@ type promptSubstrings struct {
schema string
}
// buildPromptSubstrings assembles the seven cacheable sub-components of the
// prompt without joining them. The system prompt sections are produced by the
// same private builders that buildSystemPrompt uses, so the substrings are
// byte-identical to what would have appeared in the joined prompt. The tools
// and schema substrings are derived from the partitioned tool list (caller-
// provided) so this helper does not need to re-run the partition.
//
// This is the seam ComputePrefixFingerprint reads from. It exists as a
// separate function (rather than returning both prompt and substrings from
// buildSystemPrompt) so existing callers of buildSystemPrompt are unaffected
// and the substrings helper is independently testable.
// buildPromptSubstrings builds the prompt and retains both its exact joined
// form and narrower diagnostic components. Callers that already built the
// prompt should use buildPromptSubstringsFromParts to avoid repeating workspace
// reads.
func buildPromptSubstrings(options Options, exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) promptSubstrings {
core := strings.TrimSpace(options.SystemPrompt)
if core == "" {
core = strings.TrimSpace(coreSystemPrompt)
}
if core == "" {
core = fallbackSystemPrompt
}
return buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(buildSystemPromptParts(options), exposed)
}
// The confirmation policy is appended unconditionally in buildSystemPrompt;
// the substring here is the same constant.
policy := strings.TrimSpace(confirmationPolicy)
// projectContext is the joined output of workspaceContext, which itself
// walks the AGENTS.md / ZERO.md / .zero/AGENTS.md chain. Hashing the
// joined string captures every guideline file's contribution and the
// ordering between them.
project := workspaceContext(options.Cwd)
// skills is the joined output of skillsContext, with each skill on its own
// line. The substring is the literal text the model would see.
skills := skillsContext(options)
// tools and schema are derived from the partitioned tool list. The list
// passed in is already in stable order (partitionToolsCached is the
// canonical stable partitioner) so concatenating in slice order is
// sufficient — we sort names again defensively in case a future caller
// hands us a list from a different partitioner.
func buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(parts systemPromptParts, exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) promptSubstrings {
toolsSubstr, schemaSubstr := toolSubstrings(exposed)
return promptSubstrings{
baseInstructions: core,
confirmationPolicy: policy,
projectContext: project,
skills: skills,
systemPrompt: parts.prompt,
baseInstructions: parts.baseInstructions,
confirmationPolicy: parts.confirmationPolicy,
projectContext: parts.projectContext,
skills: parts.skills,
tools: toolsSubstr,
schema: schemaSubstr,
}
}
// toolSubstrings extracts a stable, name-sorted digest of the partitioned tool
// list. The tools substring is "name1\nname2\n..." (sorted) so a reordering of
// the partition produces a different hash. The schema substring is the
// concatenation of each tool's JSON schema in name order, so a schema change
// is detected independently of the tool ordering.
// toolSubstrings preserves the emitted tool order. Names and descriptions are
// fingerprinted separately from schemas so either kind of drift is identifiable.
// Order is part of request identity: silently sorting here would hide a provider-
// visible reordering and could report a false cache hit.
func toolSubstrings(exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) (toolsSubstr, schemaSubstr string) {
if len(exposed) == 0 {
return "", ""
}
names := make([]string, 0, len(exposed))
byName := make(map[string]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, len(exposed))
for _, def := range exposed {
names = append(names, def.Name)
byName[def.Name] = def
}
sort.Strings(names)
var toolsSB, schemaSB strings.Builder
for i, name := range names {
if i > 0 {
toolsSB.WriteByte('\n')
}
toolsSB.WriteString(name)
def := byName[name]
for _, def := range exposed {
writeLengthPrefixed(&toolsSB, def.Name)
writeLengthPrefixed(&toolsSB, def.Description)
// Parameters is rendered to a canonical JSON string per tool. The
// schema-render cache in internal/agent (used by partitionToolsCached)
// guarantees the same render is byte-identical across turns for the
// same tool, so this substring is a stable hash input.
schemaSB.WriteString(name)
schemaSB.WriteByte('\n')
schemaSB.WriteString(canonicalSchemaString(def.Parameters))
schemaSB.WriteByte('\n')
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, def.Name)
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, canonicalSchemaString(def.Parameters))
}
return toolsSB.String(), schemaSB.String()
}
func writeLengthPrefixed(sb *strings.Builder, value string) {
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d:", len(value))
sb.WriteString(value)
}
// canonicalSchemaString renders a tool's parameter schema to a stable string.
// tools.ToolDef.Parameters is a map[string]any in the common case; Go's
// fmt.Sprintf("%v", m) iterates a map in random order, which would produce
@@ -227,36 +189,16 @@ func writeStable(sb *strings.Builder, v any) {
}
}
// ComputePrefixFingerprint returns a trace.PrefixHash (a 7-field fingerprint
// of the prompt prefix) for one turn of a run. The seven sub-hashes are
// independent SHA-256s of the corresponding sub-component; the complete-prefix
// hash is a SHA-256 of the canonical concatenation of the other six, so any
// sub-component drift is observable both individually and in aggregate.
//
// I/O side effects: buildPromptSubstrings calls workspaceContext, which runs
// git (gitBranchForPrompt, FindProjectGitRoot) and reads the AGENTS.md /
// ZERO.md / .zero/AGENTS.md chain plus the repo map. The same workspace-
// context work is performed separately by buildSystemPrompt a few lines
// later in the request-build path, so on every traced turn the file and
// git reads happen twice. The duplication is intentional for this PR (a
// follow-up will pass substrings through) and is a known perf cost only on
// the opt-in trace path.
//
// A stable CompletePrefixHash across turns means the four captured
// sub-components (baseInstructions, confirmationPolicy, projectContext,
// skills) are byte-identical. It does NOT rule out drift in the seven
// uncaptured sections of buildSystemPrompt (modelPromptAddendum,
// sessionRuntimeContext, approvedCommandPrefixContext, workspaceSeedContext,
// userGuidelines, specialistDelegationContext, responseStyleContext). For
// default Options the four captured substrings are the full prompt; for
// non-default Options the seven uncaptured sections may contribute, and a
// consumer correlating CompletePrefix stability with cached_input_tokens
// must cross-check the model_switches counter (modelPromptAddendum changes
// on a model switch) to disambiguate "no drift" from "drift in an
// uncaptured section."
// ComputePrefixFingerprint builds and fingerprints a prompt for callers that do
// not already have one. The agent loop uses computePrefixFingerprint with the
// prompt parts it built once at run start, ensuring tracing observes the exact
// request content without repeating workspace I/O.
func ComputePrefixFingerprint(options Options, exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) prefixFingerprint {
subs := buildPromptSubstrings(options, exposed)
return computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstrings(options, exposed))
}
func computePrefixFingerprint(subs promptSubstrings) prefixFingerprint {
systemPrompt := sha256hex(subs.systemPrompt)
base := sha256hex(subs.baseInstructions)
policy := sha256hex(subs.confirmationPolicy)
project := sha256hex(subs.projectContext)
@@ -264,9 +206,10 @@ func ComputePrefixFingerprint(options Options, exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinit
toolsH := sha256hex(subs.tools)
schema := sha256hex(subs.schema)
complete := sha256hex(strings.Join([]string{
base, policy, project, skills, toolsH, schema,
systemPrompt, toolsH, schema,
}, "|"))
return prefixFingerprint{
SystemPromptHash: systemPrompt,
BaseInstructionsHash: base,
ConfirmationPolicyHash: policy,
ProjectContextHash: project,
@@ -282,6 +225,7 @@ func ComputePrefixFingerprint(options Options, exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinit
// in loop.go) so the trace package does not need to import this one. The field
// names match the trace.PrefixHash JSON tags 1:1.
type prefixFingerprint struct {
SystemPromptHash string
BaseInstructionsHash string
ConfirmationPolicyHash string
ProjectContextHash string
+37 -31
View File
@@ -28,38 +28,28 @@ func TestComputePrefixFingerprintStableAcrossCalls(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestComputePrefixFingerprintToolsHashIsNameSetSensitive asserts the
// name-set sensitivity of the ToolsHash. The test name used to read as
// "reorder changes hash" but the assertion is the opposite: the hash is
// name-set sensitive, not name-order sensitive (toolSubstrings sorts
// names before hashing). The partitioner is expected to produce a stable
// order, so a name-order change is not a hash signal — a name-set change
// is. The test asserts both: permutation of the same tools produces the
// same hash, and adding a tool produces a different hash.
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintToolsHashIsNameSetSensitive(t *testing.T) {
// Tool order and descriptions are provider-visible and therefore part of the
// cacheable prefix identity.
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintToolsHashMatchesEmittedOrderAndDescriptions(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
a := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-read"}},
{Name: "grep", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-grep"}},
{Name: "read_file", Description: "read", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-read"}},
{Name: "grep", Description: "search", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-grep"}},
}
b := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
{Name: "grep", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-grep"}},
{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-read"}},
{Name: "grep", Description: "search", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-grep"}},
{Name: "read_file", Description: "read", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-read"}},
}
// toolSubstrings sorts names internally, so the ToolsHash is identical
// for a permutation of the same tools. We assert that here to document
// the contract: name-order independence, name-set sensitivity.
fpA := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, a)
fpB := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, b)
if fpA.ToolsHash != fpB.ToolsHash {
t.Fatalf("ToolsHash must be name-set sensitive, not name-order sensitive: a=%s b=%s", fpA.ToolsHash, fpB.ToolsHash)
if fpA.ToolsHash == fpB.ToolsHash {
t.Fatalf("ToolsHash must change when emitted order changes: a=%s b=%s", fpA.ToolsHash, fpB.ToolsHash)
}
// A different tool set must produce a different ToolsHash.
c := append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{}, a...)
c = append(c, zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{Name: "bash", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-bash"}})
c := append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition(nil), a...)
c[0].Description = "read a file"
fpC := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, c)
if fpA.ToolsHash == fpC.ToolsHash {
t.Fatalf("ToolsHash must change when the tool set changes: a=%s c=%s", fpA.ToolsHash, fpC.ToolsHash)
t.Fatalf("ToolsHash must change when a description changes: a=%s c=%s", fpA.ToolsHash, fpC.ToolsHash)
}
}
@@ -101,25 +91,35 @@ func TestComputePrefixFingerprintSystemPromptChangeChangesBaseHash(t *testing.T)
}
}
// TestComputePrefixFingerprintCompleteIsAggregateOfSubHashes asserts the
// canonical-join property: CompletePrefixHash must depend on every sub-hash.
// This is the regression catch for "did anyone reorder or drop a sub-hash
// from the canonical join without updating CompletePrefixHash."
// CompletePrefixHash represents the exact joined system prompt and the ordered
// tool definitions. Narrower system-section hashes remain diagnostic only.
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintCompleteIsAggregateOfSubHashes(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
exposed := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"k": "v"}}}
fp := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, exposed)
// Manually compute what the canonical join should be.
expected := sha256hex(strings.Join([]string{
fp.BaseInstructionsHash,
fp.ConfirmationPolicyHash,
fp.ProjectContextHash,
fp.SkillsHash,
fp.SystemPromptHash,
fp.ToolsHash,
fp.SchemaHash,
}, "|"))
if fp.CompletePrefixHash != expected {
t.Fatalf("CompletePrefixHash must equal sha256hex of the canonical join of the other six:\n got: %s\n expected: %s", fp.CompletePrefixHash, expected)
t.Fatalf("CompletePrefixHash must equal sha256hex of the exact system, tools, and schema hashes:\n got: %s\n expected: %s", fp.CompletePrefixHash, expected)
}
}
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintCoversEverySystemPromptSection(t *testing.T) {
base := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core", Model: "gpt-5"}
changed := base
changed.ResponseStyle = "concise"
fpBase := ComputePrefixFingerprint(base, nil)
fpChanged := ComputePrefixFingerprint(changed, nil)
if fpBase.SystemPromptHash == fpChanged.SystemPromptHash {
t.Fatal("SystemPromptHash must change when any rendered system section changes")
}
if fpBase.CompletePrefixHash == fpChanged.CompletePrefixHash {
t.Fatal("CompletePrefixHash must include the exact full system prompt")
}
}
@@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ func TestBuildPromptSubstringsDefaultOptions(t *testing.T) {
if subs.baseInstructions != "test core" {
t.Fatalf("baseInstructions substring must equal the core system prompt: got %q want %q", subs.baseInstructions, "test core")
}
if subs.systemPrompt != buildSystemPrompt(opts) {
t.Fatal("systemPrompt substring must equal the exact joined system prompt")
}
if subs.confirmationPolicy == "" {
t.Fatalf("confirmationPolicy substring must be non-empty (the embedded policy is always present)")
}
@@ -151,6 +154,9 @@ func TestBuildPromptSubstringsDefaultOptions(t *testing.T) {
// sha256hex of the substrings, with no truncation or reformatting
// between the two layers.
fp := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, nil)
if fp.SystemPromptHash != sha256hex(subs.systemPrompt) {
t.Fatalf("SystemPromptHash in fingerprint must equal sha256hex of the joined prompt")
}
if fp.BaseInstructionsHash != sha256hex(subs.baseInstructions) {
t.Fatalf("BaseInstructionsHash in fingerprint must equal sha256hex of the substring")
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ func TestInlineAdditionalPermissionsRequiresPromptUnderAutoAllow(t *testing.T) {
},
}
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow, AutoAllowed: true}
if !shouldRequestPermission(tools.NewBashTool(t.TempDir()), args, false, decision) {
if !shouldRequestPermission(tools.NewScopedBashTool(t.TempDir(), nil), args, false, decision) {
t.Fatal("inline additional permissions must request approval even when a sandboxed shell would otherwise auto-allow")
}
}
+32 -10
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/repomap"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/workspaceseed"
)
@@ -70,6 +71,22 @@ const (
// guidelines), and the safety confirmation policy. It is built once per run so
// every turn shares one (cacheable) system turn.
func buildSystemPrompt(options Options) string {
return buildSystemPromptParts(options).prompt
}
// systemPromptParts retains both the exact joined prompt and the diagnostic
// sections used by prompt-prefix tracing. Building these together prevents the
// tracing path from re-reading workspace state and guarantees that the hash is
// computed from the same prompt bytes placed in the request.
type systemPromptParts struct {
prompt string
baseInstructions string
confirmationPolicy string
projectContext string
skills string
}
func buildSystemPromptParts(options Options) systemPromptParts {
core := strings.TrimSpace(options.SystemPrompt)
if core == "" {
core = strings.TrimSpace(coreSystemPrompt)
@@ -97,22 +114,31 @@ func buildSystemPrompt(options Options) string {
if user := userGuidelines(); user != "" {
sections = append(sections, user)
}
if ws := workspaceContext(options.Cwd); ws != "" {
sections = append(sections, ws)
project := workspaceContext(options.Cwd)
if project != "" {
sections = append(sections, project)
}
if delegation := specialistDelegationContext(options); delegation != "" {
sections = append(sections, delegation)
}
if skillsBlock := skillsContext(options); skillsBlock != "" {
skillsBlock := skillsContext(options)
if skillsBlock != "" {
sections = append(sections, skillsBlock)
}
if style := responseStyleContext(options); style != "" {
sections = append(sections, style)
}
if policy := strings.TrimSpace(confirmationPolicy); policy != "" {
policy := strings.TrimSpace(confirmationPolicy)
if policy != "" {
sections = append(sections, policy)
}
return strings.Join(sections, "\n\n")
return systemPromptParts{
prompt: strings.Join(sections, "\n\n"),
baseInstructions: core,
confirmationPolicy: policy,
projectContext: project,
skills: skillsBlock,
}
}
// responseStyleContext renders the operator-selected reply style (TUI /style) as
@@ -285,11 +311,7 @@ func workspaceContext(cwd string) string {
b.WriteString("<environment>\n")
b.WriteString("Working directory: " + cwd + "\n")
b.WriteString("Operating system: " + runtime.GOOS + "\n")
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
b.WriteString("Shell syntax: Windows cmd.exe syntax for exec_command/bash tools. To put | & > < etc inside an arg value, use double quotes around the value, not single quotes (single quotes do not protect metachars in cmd.exe): gh --jq \".a | b\", go test -run \"A|B\". Do not pipe to or invoke POSIX coreutils from Git for Windows (usr\\bin head/grep/tail/cat/...): they are MSYS binaries and fail under the write-restricted sandbox; use native Zero tools (grep, read_file, list_directory, glob) or cmd.exe findstr/more instead, or sandbox_permissions require_escalated only when host-level execution is truly required. Prefer the workdir/cwd argument over cd when changing directories.\n")
} else {
b.WriteString("Shell syntax: /bin/sh syntax for exec_command/bash tools; prefer the workdir/cwd argument instead of cd when changing directories.\n")
}
b.WriteString(tools.HostShellEnvironmentGuidance() + "\n")
if branch := gitBranchForPrompt(cwd); branch != "" {
b.WriteString("Git branch: " + branch + "\n")
}
+3
View File
@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ work.
- Use exec_command with `tty: true` for interactive terminal-style commands that
need stdin beyond Ctrl-C. `/ps` and `/stop` are user-facing TUI commands; when
you need to clean up a running foreground command yourself, use write_stdin.
- write_stdin's session_id is only ever an id returned by a still-running
exec_command; never guess or probe ids. If you have no such session, start one
with exec_command, or use write_file/edit_file/apply_patch for file changes.
- write_stdin with empty input polls an existing exec_command session, and
`\u0003` interrupts it. Sending other stdin bytes may require approval because
it can drive the running process beyond the original command. Non-tty sessions
+359
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"reflect"
"sort"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type taskStatus string
const (
taskStatusActive taskStatus = "active"
taskStatusComplete taskStatus = "complete"
taskStatusIncomplete taskStatus = "incomplete"
)
type taskPlanParity string
const (
taskPlanParityUnknown taskPlanParity = "unknown"
taskPlanParityMatch taskPlanParity = "match"
taskPlanParityMismatch taskPlanParity = "mismatch"
)
type taskPlanItem struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Notes string `json:"notes,omitempty"`
}
type taskPlanState struct {
Items []taskPlanItem `json:"items,omitempty"`
Pending int `json:"pending"`
InProgress int `json:"in_progress"`
Completed int `json:"completed"`
Failed int `json:"failed"`
}
type taskToolState struct {
Succeeded int `json:"succeeded"`
Failed int `json:"failed"`
}
type taskVerificationState struct {
Passed int `json:"passed"`
Failed int `json:"failed"`
LastOutcome Outcome `json:"last_outcome,omitempty"`
}
type taskStateSnapshot struct {
Revision int `json:"revision"`
Objective string `json:"objective"`
Status taskStatus `json:"status"`
Plan taskPlanState `json:"plan"`
Tools taskToolState `json:"tools"`
Verification taskVerificationState `json:"verification"`
ChangedFiles []string `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
CompletionDecision CompletionDecision `json:"completion_decision,omitempty"`
CompletionReason string `json:"completion_reason,omitempty"`
PlanParity taskPlanParity `json:"plan_parity"`
}
type taskStateEventKind int
const (
taskStateEventPlan taskStateEventKind = iota + 1
taskStateEventToolResult
taskStateEventVerification
taskStateEventCompletion
)
type taskStateEvent struct {
kind taskStateEventKind
arguments string
toolResult ToolResult
verification Outcome
completion completionEvaluation
}
// taskState is a deterministic projection of facts the loop already observes.
// It does not initiate work or replace the transcript; consumers must check
// transcript parity before using its compact representation.
type taskState struct {
snapshotValue taskStateSnapshot
changedFiles map[string]struct{}
recorder *trace.Recorder
planObserved bool
}
func newTaskState(objective string, recorder *trace.Recorder) *taskState {
state := &taskState{
snapshotValue: taskStateSnapshot{
Objective: strings.TrimSpace(objective),
Status: taskStatusActive,
PlanParity: taskPlanParityUnknown,
},
changedFiles: map[string]struct{}{},
}
state.recorder = recorder
return state
}
func (state *taskState) observe(event taskStateEvent) bool {
if state == nil {
return false
}
changed := false
switch event.kind {
case taskStateEventPlan:
plan, ok := parseTaskPlan(event.arguments)
if !ok {
return false
}
state.snapshotValue.Plan = summarizeTaskPlan(plan)
state.planObserved = true
state.markActive()
changed = true
case taskStateEventToolResult:
state.markActive()
if event.toolResult.Status == tools.StatusOK {
state.snapshotValue.Tools.Succeeded++
} else {
state.snapshotValue.Tools.Failed++
}
for _, path := range event.toolResult.ChangedFiles {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path != "" {
state.changedFiles[path] = struct{}{}
}
}
state.snapshotValue.ChangedFiles = sortedKeys(state.changedFiles)
changed = true
case taskStateEventVerification:
if event.verification == OutcomeDisabled {
return false
}
state.markActive()
state.snapshotValue.Verification.LastOutcome = event.verification
switch event.verification {
case OutcomePassed:
state.snapshotValue.Verification.Passed++
case OutcomeCorrecting, OutcomeReported, OutcomeAborted:
state.snapshotValue.Verification.Failed++
}
changed = true
case taskStateEventCompletion:
state.snapshotValue.CompletionDecision = event.completion.Decision
state.snapshotValue.CompletionReason = event.completion.Reason
switch event.completion.Decision {
case CompletionComplete:
state.snapshotValue.Status = taskStatusComplete
case CompletionIncomplete:
state.snapshotValue.Status = taskStatusIncomplete
default:
state.snapshotValue.Status = taskStatusActive
}
changed = true
}
if changed {
state.snapshotValue.Revision++
if event.kind != taskStateEventToolResult {
state.emit()
}
}
return changed
}
func (state *taskState) markActive() {
state.snapshotValue.Status = taskStatusActive
state.snapshotValue.CompletionDecision = ""
state.snapshotValue.CompletionReason = ""
}
func (state *taskState) snapshot() taskStateSnapshot {
if state == nil {
return taskStateSnapshot{}
}
snapshot := state.snapshotValue
snapshot.Plan.Items = append([]taskPlanItem(nil), state.snapshotValue.Plan.Items...)
snapshot.ChangedFiles = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.ChangedFiles...)
return snapshot
}
// observePlanParity compares only the latest plan projection with the plan tool
// calls still present in messages. It mutates the snapshot and emits when the
// parity value changes; objective, tool, and verification fields are not part of
// this comparison.
func (state *taskState) observePlanParity(messages []zeroruntime.Message) taskPlanParity {
if state == nil {
return taskPlanParityUnknown
}
transcriptPlan, found, valid := latestTaskPlan(messages)
tracked := state.snapshotValue.Plan.Items
parity := taskPlanParityMatch
if !valid || found != state.planObserved || (found && !reflect.DeepEqual(transcriptPlan, tracked)) {
parity = taskPlanParityMismatch
}
if state.snapshotValue.PlanParity != parity {
state.snapshotValue.PlanParity = parity
state.snapshotValue.Revision++
state.emit()
}
return parity
}
type completionContext struct {
Objective string
PlanPending bool
PlanMatchesTranscript bool
}
func (state *taskState) completionContext(messages []zeroruntime.Message, transcriptPlanPending bool) completionContext {
context := completionContext{PlanPending: transcriptPlanPending}
if state == nil {
return context
}
context.Objective = state.snapshotValue.Objective
context.PlanMatchesTranscript = state.observePlanParity(messages) == taskPlanParityMatch
if context.PlanMatchesTranscript {
context.PlanPending = state.snapshotValue.Plan.Pending+state.snapshotValue.Plan.InProgress > 0
}
return context
}
func (state *taskState) snapshotForCompaction(messages []zeroruntime.Message) *taskStateSnapshot {
if state == nil {
return nil
}
state.observePlanParity(messages)
snapshot := state.snapshot()
return &snapshot
}
func (state *taskState) emit() {
if state == nil || state.recorder == nil {
return
}
snapshot := state.snapshotValue
state.recorder.EmitTaskState(trace.TaskStateEvent{
Revision: snapshot.Revision,
Status: string(snapshot.Status),
PlanPending: snapshot.Plan.Pending,
PlanInProgress: snapshot.Plan.InProgress,
PlanCompleted: snapshot.Plan.Completed,
PlanFailed: snapshot.Plan.Failed,
ToolsSucceeded: snapshot.Tools.Succeeded,
ToolsFailed: snapshot.Tools.Failed,
VerificationPassed: snapshot.Verification.Passed,
VerificationFailed: snapshot.Verification.Failed,
VerificationOutcome: string(snapshot.Verification.LastOutcome),
ChangedFileCount: len(snapshot.ChangedFiles),
CompletionDecision: string(snapshot.CompletionDecision),
PlanParity: string(snapshot.PlanParity),
})
}
func parseTaskPlan(arguments string) ([]taskPlanItem, bool) {
var object map[string]json.RawMessage
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments)), &object) != nil {
return nil, false
}
rawPlan, ok := object["plan"]
if !ok || string(rawPlan) == "null" {
return nil, false
}
var parsed []struct {
ID *string `json:"id"`
Content string `json:"content"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Notes string `json:"notes"`
}
if json.Unmarshal(rawPlan, &parsed) != nil {
return nil, false
}
plan := make([]taskPlanItem, 0, len(parsed))
for _, raw := range parsed {
if raw.Content == "" {
return nil, false
}
plan = append(plan, taskPlanItem{
Content: raw.Content,
Status: normalizeTaskPlanStatus(raw.Status),
Notes: raw.Notes,
})
}
lastInProgress := -1
for index := range plan {
if plan[index].Status == "in_progress" {
if lastInProgress >= 0 {
plan[lastInProgress].Status = "completed"
}
lastInProgress = index
}
}
if len(plan) == 0 {
return nil, true
}
return plan, true
}
func normalizeTaskPlanStatus(status string) string {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(status)) {
case "completed", "complete", "done", "finished", "resolved", "✓", "x", "[x]":
return "completed"
case "in_progress", "in-progress", "inprogress", "in progress", "active", "doing", "started", "current", "wip", "ongoing", "running":
return "in_progress"
case "failed", "fail", "error", "errored", "blocked", "cancelled", "canceled", "abandoned", "skipped":
return "failed"
default:
return "pending"
}
}
func summarizeTaskPlan(items []taskPlanItem) taskPlanState {
plan := taskPlanState{Items: append([]taskPlanItem(nil), items...)}
for _, item := range items {
switch item.Status {
case "completed":
plan.Completed++
case "in_progress":
plan.InProgress++
case "failed":
plan.Failed++
default:
plan.Pending++
}
}
return plan
}
func latestTaskPlan(messages []zeroruntime.Message) ([]taskPlanItem, bool, bool) {
for i := len(messages) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
for j := len(messages[i].ToolCalls) - 1; j >= 0; j-- {
call := messages[i].ToolCalls[j]
if call.Name != planToolName {
continue
}
plan, ok := parseTaskPlan(call.Arguments)
return plan, true, ok
}
}
return nil, false, true
}
func sortedKeys(values map[string]struct{}) []string {
keys := make([]string, 0, len(values))
for value := range values {
keys = append(keys, value)
}
// Paths are evidence, not chronology. Stable ordering makes replay snapshots
// deterministic even if events originate from parallel read batches later.
sort.Strings(keys)
return keys
}
+204
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"reflect"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestTaskStateReplayIsDeterministic(t *testing.T) {
events := []taskStateEvent{
{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"inspect","status":"done"},{"content":"implement","status":"in progress"},{"content":"verify"}]}`},
{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: ToolResult{Name: "apply_patch", Status: tools.StatusOK, ChangedFiles: []string{"a.go", "a.go", "b.go"}}},
{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: ToolResult{Name: "go test", Status: tools.StatusError}},
{kind: taskStateEventVerification, verification: OutcomePassed},
{kind: taskStateEventCompletion, completion: completionEvaluation{Decision: CompletionUncertain, Reason: "pending work"}},
}
first := newTaskState("ship the change", nil)
second := newTaskState("ship the change", nil)
for _, event := range events {
first.observe(event)
second.observe(event)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(first.snapshot(), second.snapshot()) {
t.Fatalf("replaying the same events produced different snapshots:\nfirst: %#v\nsecond: %#v", first.snapshot(), second.snapshot())
}
got := first.snapshot()
if got.Status != taskStatusActive || got.Plan.Pending != 1 || got.Plan.InProgress != 1 || got.Plan.Completed != 1 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected plan snapshot: %#v", got)
}
if got.Tools.Succeeded != 1 || got.Tools.Failed != 1 || len(got.ChangedFiles) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected evidence snapshot: %#v", got)
}
if got.Verification.Passed != 1 || got.Verification.Failed != 0 || got.Verification.LastOutcome != OutcomePassed {
t.Fatalf("unexpected verification snapshot: %#v", got.Verification)
}
}
func TestTaskStateCoalescesToolResultsIntoNextTraceEvent(t *testing.T) {
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("session", "run", "")
state := newTaskState("objective", recorder)
for range 20 {
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK}})
}
if events := recorder.Finish().TaskStates; len(events) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("tool results should be coalesced, got %d trace events", len(events))
}
recorder = trace.NewRecorder("session", "run-2", "")
state = newTaskState("objective", recorder)
for range 20 {
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK}})
}
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventCompletion, completion: completionEvaluation{Decision: CompletionComplete}})
events := recorder.Finish().TaskStates
if len(events) != 1 || events[0].ToolsSucceeded != 20 {
t.Fatalf("coalesced tool total missing from completion snapshot: %#v", events)
}
}
func TestRunEmitsTaskStateFromExistingLoopEvents(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "plan-1", ToolName: planToolName},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "plan-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"plan":[{"content":"implement","status":"completed"}]}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "plan-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("session", "run", "")
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "implement the change", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
Trace: recorder,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want done", result.FinalAnswer)
}
events := recorder.Finish().TaskStates
if len(events) < 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected plan, tool, completion, and parity snapshots, got %#v", events)
}
last := events[len(events)-1]
if last.Status != string(taskStatusComplete) || last.PlanCompleted != 1 || last.ToolsSucceeded != 1 || last.PlanParity != string(taskPlanParityMatch) {
t.Fatalf("unexpected final task snapshot: %#v", last)
}
}
func TestTaskStateSnapshotIsImmutable(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"one","status":"pending"}]}`})
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, ChangedFiles: []string{"one.go"}}})
snapshot := state.snapshot()
snapshot.Plan.Items[0].Content = "mutated"
snapshot.ChangedFiles[0] = "mutated.go"
fresh := state.snapshot()
if fresh.Plan.Items[0].Content != "one" || fresh.ChangedFiles[0] != "one.go" {
t.Fatalf("snapshot mutation leaked into task state: %#v", fresh)
}
}
func TestTaskStatePlanParityUsesLatestPlan(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"old","status":"completed"}]}`})
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"new","status":"in_progress"}]}`})
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{Name: planToolName, Arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"new","status":"in_progress"}]}`},
}}}
if parity := state.observePlanParity(messages); parity != taskPlanParityMatch {
t.Fatalf("parity = %q, want match", parity)
}
messages[0].ToolCalls[0].Arguments = `{"plan":[{"content":"different","status":"pending"}]}`
if parity := state.observePlanParity(messages); parity != taskPlanParityMismatch {
t.Fatalf("parity = %q, want mismatch", parity)
}
}
func TestTaskStateMatchesPlanToolNormalization(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
arguments := `{"plan":[{"content":"first","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"second","status":"in_progress"}]}`
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: arguments})
snapshot := state.snapshot()
if snapshot.Plan.Completed != 1 || snapshot.Plan.InProgress != 1 {
t.Fatalf("multiple active items were not normalized like the plan tool: %#v", snapshot.Plan)
}
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{Name: planToolName, Arguments: arguments}}}}
if parity := state.observePlanParity(messages); parity != taskPlanParityMatch {
t.Fatalf("normalized state should still match its transcript event, got %q", parity)
}
empty := newTaskState("objective", nil)
empty.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[]}`})
emptyMessages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{Name: planToolName, Arguments: `{"plan":[]}`}}}}
if parity := empty.observePlanParity(emptyMessages); parity != taskPlanParityMatch {
t.Fatalf("explicit empty plan should match transcript, got %q", parity)
}
}
func TestTaskStateContextFallsBackWhenTranscriptDiffers(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"tracked","status":"completed"}]}`})
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{Name: planToolName, Arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"transcript","status":"pending"}]}`},
}}}
context := state.completionContext(messages, true)
if !context.PlanPending || context.PlanMatchesTranscript {
t.Fatalf("completion context must retain transcript truth on mismatch: %#v", context)
}
if context.Objective != "objective" {
t.Fatalf("objective lost from completion context: %#v", context)
}
}
func TestTaskStateCompactionSnapshotRetainsObjectiveOnPlanMismatch(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"verify","status":"pending"}]}`})
matching := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{Name: planToolName, Arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"verify","status":"pending"}]}`},
}}}
if snapshot := state.snapshotForCompaction(matching); snapshot == nil || snapshot.Objective != "objective" {
t.Fatalf("matching transcript should produce compact state, got %#v", snapshot)
}
mismatching := append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), matching...)
mismatching[0].ToolCalls = []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{Name: planToolName, Arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"other","status":"pending"}]}`}}
if snapshot := state.snapshotForCompaction(mismatching); snapshot == nil || snapshot.Objective != "objective" || snapshot.PlanParity != taskPlanParityMismatch {
t.Fatalf("plan mismatch must retain immutable objective and mark mutable state uncorroborated, got %#v", snapshot)
}
}
func TestParseTaskPlanRejectsArgumentsTheToolWouldReject(t *testing.T) {
for _, arguments := range []string{
`{}`,
`{"plan":null}`,
`{"plan":[{"step":"alias is not accepted"}]}`,
`{"plan":[{"content":""}]}`,
`{"plan":[{"content":"valid"},{"content":""}]}`,
`{"plan":[{"id":4,"content":"valid"}]}`,
} {
if plan, ok := parseTaskPlan(arguments); ok {
t.Fatalf("parseTaskPlan(%s) = %#v, true; want rejected", arguments, plan)
}
}
}
+65 -8
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package agent
import (
"context"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/streamjson"
@@ -71,10 +72,19 @@ type ToolResult struct {
Meta map[string]string
Redacted bool
ChangedFiles []string
Display tools.Display
// ChangeSummaries are non-selectable generated-tree summaries emitted by
// command execution; callers must not schedule per-file work from them.
ChangeSummaries []execution.Change
Display tools.Display
// DenialReason categorizes why a tool call was blocked (empty when it ran).
// It lets a surface distinguish the cause precisely instead of parsing Output.
DenialReason DenialCategory
// Risk is the sandbox risk classification of this call, stamped for EXECUTED
// results so run-policy observers (the execution-profile controller) can see
// the risk level of an allowed mutation. It mirrors the classification the
// permission path already computes; denied or canceled results keep the zero
// value. Pure observation: nothing about permissions or sandboxing changes.
Risk sandbox.Risk
// LoadedTools carries the deferred-tool names a tool_search call asked the
// loop to expose next turn (lifted from Meta["load_tools"]). nil for every
// ordinary tool result; only tool_search populates it.
@@ -98,6 +108,54 @@ const (
DenialHookBlocked DenialCategory = "hook_blocked" // vetoed by a beforeTool hook
)
// ProfilePolicy is the loop-facing slice of a selected execution profile.
// The surface (exec flag, TUI command) resolves a named profile into this
// policy; the loop only ever sees the policy, never the catalog.
type ProfilePolicy struct {
// Name labels trace counters and diagnostics (e.g. "fast"). The trace
// recorder's profile label is set by the caller at recorder construction.
Name string
// Escalate, when non-nil, arms one-shot in-run posture escalation.
Escalate *PostureEscalation
}
// PostureEscalation describes a one-shot escalation to stricter knob values,
// applied mid-run when an armed trigger fires. Targets are the values the
// selected profile DISPLACED at run start (i.e. "restore the balanced
// posture"), so escalation can never introduce a value that was not already
// valid for this run and model. Zero-valued targets leave that knob untouched.
type PostureEscalation struct {
// MaxTurns raises the turn ceiling to this value when greater than the
// ceiling in effect. 0 leaves the ceiling untouched.
MaxTurns int
// ReasoningEffort replaces the run's effort when non-empty.
ReasoningEffort string
// RestoreDefaultEffort clears the run's effort override (back to the
// provider/model default) when true. It exists because the displaced value
// of a profile-filled effort is "" — which as a ReasoningEffort target
// means "leave untouched" — so restoring the default needs its own signal.
// Ignored when ReasoningEffort is non-empty.
RestoreDefaultEffort bool
// RestoreCompletionGate re-enables RequireCompletionSignal (headless
// completion semantics) when true.
RestoreCompletionGate bool
// Triggers. A zero value disables that signal entirely.
// OnToolFailureStreak fires when the repeated-failure guard observes a
// same-tool retriable-failure streak of at least this length.
OnToolFailureStreak int
// OnCompletionUncertain fires on the Nth uncertain completion evaluation
// (continue nudge or semantic check). Headless only: the completion gate
// never runs interactively.
OnCompletionUncertain int
// OnSelfCorrectFailure fires when a post-edit verification cycle reports a
// failing outcome (correcting, reported, or aborted).
OnSelfCorrectFailure bool
// OnRiskyMutation fires when an EXECUTED tool result carries a sandbox risk
// level at or above this threshold. Empty disables the signal.
OnRiskyMutation sandbox.RiskLevel
}
type PermissionRequest struct {
ToolCallID string `json:"toolCallId"`
ToolName string `json:"name"`
@@ -298,6 +356,12 @@ type Options struct {
// contract as ModelSwitcher: a returned error records a note and the run
// continues on the current model and session.
ModelSessionSwitcher func(ctx context.Context, modelID string) (zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider, error)
// Profile, when set, arms the execution-profile posture controller for this
// run (auto-escalation to stricter knob values on failure/uncertainty/risky
// mutation signals). nil — the default everywhere today — leaves the loop
// byte-identical: no observation, no escalation, no counters. Same opt-in
// convention as Trace and SelfCorrect.
Profile *ProfilePolicy
// Trace, when set, records per-turn timing for the run: the loop stamps
// spans (prompt build, generation, tool execution, permission wait,
// compaction, provider connect) and counters (model requests, tool calls,
@@ -363,13 +427,6 @@ type Result struct {
IncompleteReason string
}
// Truncated reports whether the final response ended abnormally (cut off at the
// output token cap or withheld by a content filter) rather than completing
// naturally. Callers can use it to warn the user that FinalAnswer is incomplete.
func (result Result) Truncated() bool {
return result.FinishReason != ""
}
// TruncationNotice returns a user-facing warning when the final response was
// truncated, or "" for a normal completion. Shared by the CLI and TUI so the
// wording stays consistent.
-4
View File
@@ -31,10 +31,6 @@ type AgentRunner interface {
type AgentRunnerFunc func(context.Context, AgentRunInput) AgentRunResult
func (fn AgentRunnerFunc) Run(ctx context.Context, input AgentRunInput) AgentRunResult {
return fn(ctx, input)
}
// defaultAgentOutputLimit caps captured stdout/stderr per stream so a chatty or
// runaway agent cannot exhaust memory or bloat the benchmark report.
const defaultAgentOutputLimit = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB per stream
+8
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package agenteval
import "context"
func (fn AgentRunnerFunc) Run(ctx context.Context, input AgentRunInput) AgentRunResult {
return fn(ctx, input)
}
+4 -74
View File
@@ -3,11 +3,10 @@
package background
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"os/exec"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
)
// terminationGracePeriod is how long a process has to exit after SIGTERM before
@@ -22,10 +21,7 @@ var (
// the negative PID (the group), so any process the child forks dies with it
// instead of being orphaned. Must be called before cmd.Start.
func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
if cmd.SysProcAttr == nil {
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{}
}
cmd.SysProcAttr.Setpgid = true
execution.ConfigureProcessGroup(cmd)
}
// terminateProcess stops a background process. It first asks politely with
@@ -41,71 +37,5 @@ func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
// back to signalling only the individual PID, which also avoids reporting a false
// success when a non-leader group-signal returns ESRCH.
func terminateProcess(pid int) error {
// Guard pid <= 1: kill(-0) would target our OWN process group and kill(-1)
// every process we can signal. A real child PID is always > 1, so never let a
// bogus 0/1 expand into either.
if pid <= 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing to terminate invalid pid %d", pid)
}
// Signal the whole group only when pid leads its own group; otherwise the
// individual process. See the doc comment for why a non-leader is signalled
// directly rather than via its (foreign) group.
target := pid
if pgid, err := syscall.Getpgid(pid); err == nil {
if pgid == pid {
target = -pid
}
} else if processGoneError(err) {
return nil // already gone
}
alive := func() bool { return syscall.Kill(target, syscall.Signal(0)) == nil }
if err := syscall.Kill(target, syscall.SIGTERM); err != nil {
if processGoneError(err) {
return nil
}
return err
}
// Poll liveness so we return promptly once it exits, rather than always
// waiting out the full grace period.
deadline := time.Now().Add(terminationGracePeriod)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
if !alive() {
return nil
}
time.Sleep(terminationPollInterval)
}
if !alive() {
return nil
}
// Still alive after the grace period: force-kill.
if err := syscall.Kill(target, syscall.SIGKILL); err != nil && !processGoneError(err) {
return err
}
// SIGKILL is asynchronous: the kernel may not have reaped it yet. Poll again
// so this helper only reports success once the target is actually gone —
// otherwise the caller gets nil while descendants are still racing.
deadline = time.Now().Add(terminationGracePeriod)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
if !alive() {
return nil
}
time.Sleep(terminationPollInterval)
}
if alive() {
return fmt.Errorf("process %d did not exit after SIGKILL", pid)
}
return nil
}
// processGoneError reports whether an error means the process group has already
// exited (so termination is effectively done). syscall.Kill reports ESRCH when
// no process in the target group remains.
func processGoneError(err error) bool {
return errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH)
return execution.TerminateProcessTree(pid, terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval)
}
+6 -26
View File
@@ -3,36 +3,16 @@
package background
import (
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
)
// ConfigureChildProcessGroup is a no-op on Windows: terminateProcess uses
// `taskkill /T` to kill the whole process tree, so no launch-time process-group
// ConfigureChildProcessGroup is a no-op on Windows: process-tree termination is
// delegated to execution.TerminateProcessTree, so no launch-time process-group
// setup is required (the POSIX build sets Setpgid here instead).
func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) {}
func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) { execution.ConfigureProcessGroup(cmd) }
func terminateProcess(pid int) error {
taskkill := taskkillPath()
if err := exec.Command(taskkill, "/T", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(pid)).Run(); err == nil {
return nil
}
process, err := os.FindProcess(pid)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return process.Kill()
}
func taskkillPath() string {
systemRoot := os.Getenv("SystemRoot")
if systemRoot == "" {
systemRoot = os.Getenv("windir")
}
if systemRoot == "" {
systemRoot = `C:\Windows`
}
return filepath.Join(systemRoot, "System32", "taskkill.exe")
return execution.TerminateProcessTree(pid, 0, 0)
}
+5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package cli
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
@@ -9,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/acp"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
@@ -43,6 +45,9 @@ func runACP(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int
conn := acp.NewConn(deps.stdin, stdout)
acp.NewAgent(conn, acp.Deps{
ResolveConfig: deps.resolveConfig,
DiscoverModels: func(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return defaultDiscoverProviderModels(ctx, discoveryCredentialProfile(profile))
},
// deps.newProvider is wrapped in fillAppDeps to apply the stored API key,
// so ACP is authenticated for apiKeyStored profiles like every other
// surface — no ACP-specific credential handling needed.
+37 -16
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/localcontrol"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/mcp"
@@ -58,7 +59,11 @@ type appDeps struct {
// config.SetActiveProviderEnv, set in defaultAppDeps — deliberately NOT filled
// by fillAppDeps, so tests never mutate the process environment unless they
// inject it). nil ⇒ no export.
exportActiveProvider func(providerName string)
exportActiveProvider func(providerName string)
// getenv reads a process environment variable (production: os.Getenv, set in
// defaultAppDeps — deliberately NOT filled by fillAppDeps, so tests are hermetic
// against ambient vars like ZERO_PROVIDER unless they inject it). nil ⇒ empty.
getenv func(string) string
probeProviderHealth func(context.Context, providerhealth.Options) providerhealth.Result
discoverProviderModels func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error)
detectLocalRuntimes func(context.Context, provideronboarding.LocalDetectOptions) []provideronboarding.DetectedLocalRuntime
@@ -118,6 +123,7 @@ func defaultAppDeps() appDeps {
stdin: os.Stdin,
userConfigPath: config.DefaultUserConfigPath,
exportActiveProvider: config.SetActiveProviderEnv,
getenv: os.Getenv,
resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
options, err := config.DefaultResolveOptions(workspaceRoot)
if err != nil {
@@ -368,6 +374,8 @@ func runWithDeps(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
case "exec":
// Forward leading --add-dir occurrences so exec's own parser collects them.
return runExec(append(addDirFlagArgs(addDirs), args[1:]...), stdout, stderr, deps)
case "completions":
return runCompletions(args[1:], stdout, stderr)
case "daemon":
return runDaemon(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
case "config":
@@ -678,6 +686,26 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
registry := newCoreRegistryScoped(workspaceRoot, scope)
registerLocalControlTools(registry, workspaceRoot, resolved.LocalControl)
executionRunner := execution.NewRunner(nil)
sandboxStore, err := deps.newSandboxStore()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to initialize sandbox grants: "+err.Error(), 1)
}
if notice, err := sandboxStore.ConsumeMigrationNotice(); err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to migrate sandbox grants: "+err.Error(), 1)
} else if notice != "" {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] "+notice)
}
sandboxBackend := deps.selectSandboxBackend(sandbox.BackendOptions{})
sandboxEngine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Policy: applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(sandbox.DefaultPolicy(), resolved.Sandbox),
Store: sandboxStore,
Backend: sandboxBackend,
Scope: scope,
SensitiveEnvKeys: providerSensitiveEnvKeys(resolved),
})
executionRunner.SetPreparer(sandboxEngine)
specialistRuntime, err := registerSpecialistTools(registry, workspaceRoot, resolved.Swarm.MaxTeamSize)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to initialize specialist tools: "+err.Error(), 1)
@@ -712,6 +740,8 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
mcpRuntime, err = deps.registerMCPTools(context.Background(), registry, mcpConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions{
PermissionStore: mcpPermissionStore,
Autonomy: mcp.AutonomyLow,
Execution: executionRunner,
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
})
}
if err != nil {
@@ -738,7 +768,7 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
// The interactive TUI is not worktree-reassigned, so the trust root is the
// launch directory itself.
trustRoot := workspaceRoot
pluginActivation := activatePlugins(workspaceRoot, registry, deps, stderr, trustRoot)
pluginActivation := activatePlugins(workspaceRoot, registry, deps, stderr, trustRoot, executionRunner)
// Ask (not Auto) is the interactive default: in Auto, ToolAdvertised exposes
// only PermissionAllow tools, so prompt-gated tools (write_file/edit_file/bash/
// apply_patch) would never be offered to the model — the TUI could neither edit
@@ -760,19 +790,6 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
// unchanged. The interactive surface applies no operator tool filters, so
// enabled/disabled are nil — matching the AgentOptions below.
registerToolSearchIfEligible(registry, resolved.Tools.DeferThreshold, permissionMode, nil, nil)
sandboxStore, err := deps.newSandboxStore()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to initialize sandbox grants: "+err.Error(), 1)
}
sandboxBackend := deps.selectSandboxBackend(sandbox.BackendOptions{})
sandboxEngine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Policy: applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(sandbox.DefaultPolicy(), resolved.Sandbox),
Store: sandboxStore,
Backend: sandboxBackend,
Scope: scope,
SensitiveEnvKeys: providerSensitiveEnvKeys(resolved),
})
lastKnownMCPConfig := mcpConfig
fileTracker := tools.NewFileTracker()
var scratchBaseline scratchFileBaseline
@@ -789,7 +806,7 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
// Build the hooks dispatcher out of the AgentOptions literal so its trust skip
// report can be combined with the plugin activation's, and emit at most one
// notice when project hooks/plugins were dropped for an untrusted workspace.
hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks, trustRoot)
hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks, trustRoot, executionRunner)
emitTrustNotice(stderr, hookSkip, pluginActivation.trustSkip, mcpSkip)
return deps.runTUI(context.Background(), tui.Options{
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
@@ -1157,6 +1174,7 @@ Usage:
Commands:
exec Run a one-shot prompt through the Go agent runtime
completions Generate shell completion scripts
daemon Manage the local background worker daemon (start/stop/status/run/attach)
setup Guide first-run provider setup
config Inspect resolved Go configuration without leaking secrets
@@ -1341,6 +1359,9 @@ Flags:
--spec-reasoning-effort <effort>
Override draft reasoning effort when --use-spec is set
--max-turns <number> Override the maximum agent loop turns
--exec-profile <name> Apply an execution profile (balanced, fast, thorough): loop
posture only (turn budget, effort, self-correction, escalation);
composes with --mode (which picks the model) and explicit flags win
--auto <low|medium|high> Set exec autonomy; high enables unsafe tools
--enabled-tools <tools> Only expose these comma or space separated tools
--disabled-tools <tools> Hide these comma or space separated tools
+404
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
package cli
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"sort"
"strings"
)
type completionNode struct {
names []string
flags []string
children []completionNode
}
type completionContext struct {
path string
candidates []string
transitions map[string]string
}
var completionRoot = completionNode{
flags: []string{"-h", "--help", "-v", "--version", "-p", "--prompt", "--add-dir", "--theme", "--skip-permissions-unsafe"},
children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"exec"}, flags: []string{
"-h", "--help", "-f", "--file", "--image", "--add-dir", "--mode", "-m", "--model",
"--use-spec", "--spec-model", "--spec-reasoning-effort", "--max-turns", "--exec-profile",
"--auto", "--enabled-tools", "--disabled-tools", "--list-tools", "--profile", "-r",
"--reasoning-effort", "-C", "--cwd", "-w", "--worktree", "--worktree-dir", "-i",
"--input-format", "-o", "--output-format", "--prompt", "--resume", "--fork",
"--calling-session-id", "--calling-tool-use-id", "--tag", "--depth", "--session-title",
"--init-session-id", "--skip-permissions-unsafe", "--allow-escalation", "--self-correct",
"--notify", "--no-notify", "--no-completion-gate",
}},
{
names: []string{"completions"},
flags: []string{"-h", "--help"},
children: leafNodes("bash", "zsh", "fish", "powershell", "elvish"),
},
{names: []string{"daemon"}, children: leafNodes("start", "stop", "status", "run", "attach", "serve-remote", "link")},
{names: []string{"setup"}},
{names: []string{"config"}},
{names: []string{"models"}, children: []completionNode{{names: []string{"list", "ls"}}}},
{names: []string{"providers"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"current"}}, {names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"catalog"}},
{names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"check"}}, {names: []string{"use"}},
{names: []string{"remove", "rm"}}, {names: []string{"rename"}}, {names: []string{"setup"}},
{names: []string{"detect"}}, {names: []string{"models"}},
}},
{names: []string{"doctor"}},
{names: []string{"context"}},
{names: []string{"repo-map", "repomap"}},
{names: []string{"search", "find"}},
{names: []string{"sessions", "session"}, children: leafNodes("list", "children", "lineage", "tree", "rewind-plan", "rewind", "compact-plan")},
{names: []string{"spec"}, children: leafNodes("show", "approve", "reject")},
{names: []string{"init"}},
{names: []string{"specialists", "specialist"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"show"}}, {names: []string{"create"}},
{names: []string{"delete", "rm"}}, {names: []string{"edit"}}, {names: []string{"path"}},
}},
{names: []string{"plugins", "plugin"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"info"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}},
}},
{names: []string{"backends", "backend"}, children: leafNodes("doctor")},
{names: []string{"skills", "skill"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"info"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}},
}},
{names: []string{"tools", "tool"}, children: leafNodes("make", "list")},
{names: []string{"hooks"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}},
{names: []string{"enable"}}, {names: []string{"disable"}},
}},
{names: []string{"mcp"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}}, {names: []string{"enable"}},
{names: []string{"disable"}}, {names: []string{"check"}}, {names: []string{"list"}},
{names: []string{"permissions"}, children: leafNodes("list", "revoke", "clear")},
{names: []string{"tools"}, children: leafNodes("list")},
{names: []string{"oauth"}, children: leafNodes("login", "logout", "status")},
}},
{names: []string{"auth"}, children: leafNodes("openrouter", "chatgpt", "login", "logout", "status", "refresh")},
{names: []string{"sandbox"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"policy"}}, {names: []string{"setup"}}, {names: []string{"check"}},
{names: []string{"grants"}, children: leafNodes("list", "allow", "deny", "revoke", "clear")},
}},
{names: []string{"update"}},
{names: []string{"upgrade"}},
{names: []string{"worktrees", "worktree"}, children: leafNodes("prepare")},
{names: []string{"verify"}},
{names: []string{"trust"}, children: leafNodes("list", "remove")},
{names: []string{"eval"}, children: leafNodes("validate", "run", "bench")},
{names: []string{"changes", "change"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"inspect", "status"}}, {names: []string{"commit"}}, {names: []string{"push"}},
{names: []string{"pr", "pull-request"}},
}},
{names: []string{"usage"}, children: leafNodes("report")},
{names: []string{"cron"}, children: leafNodes("add", "list", "rm", "pause", "resume", "run")},
{names: []string{"repo-info", "repoinfo"}},
{names: []string{"serve"}},
{names: []string{"acp"}},
{names: []string{"help"}},
{names: []string{"version"}},
},
}
func leafNodes(names ...string) []completionNode {
nodes := make([]completionNode, 0, len(names))
for _, name := range names {
nodes = append(nodes, completionNode{names: []string{name}})
}
return nodes
}
func runCompletions(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) int {
if len(args) == 1 && (args[0] == "-h" || args[0] == "--help" || args[0] == "help") {
if err := writeCompletionsHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if len(args) == 0 {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "shell required. Use `zero completions <bash|zsh|fish|powershell|elvish>`.")
}
if len(args) != 1 {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("unexpected completions argument %q", args[1]))
}
contexts := completionContexts(completionRoot)
var err error
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(args[0])) {
case "bash":
err = writeBashCompletions(stdout, contexts)
case "zsh":
err = writeZshCompletions(stdout, contexts)
case "fish":
err = writeFishCompletions(stdout, contexts)
case "powershell":
err = writePowerShellCompletions(stdout, contexts)
case "elvish":
err = writeElvishCompletions(stdout, contexts)
default:
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("unsupported shell %q; expected bash, zsh, fish, powershell, or elvish", args[0]))
}
if err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
func writeCompletionsHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Generate shell completion scripts.
Usage:
zero completions <shell>
Arguments:
<shell> Target shell: bash, zsh, fish, powershell, or elvish
Examples:
source <(zero completions bash)
source <(zero completions zsh)
zero completions fish > ~/.config/fish/completions/zero.fish
zero completions powershell >> $PROFILE
eval (zero completions elvish | slurp)
Flags:
-h, --help Show this help
`)
return err
}
func completionContexts(root completionNode) []completionContext {
contexts := []completionContext{}
var visit func(completionNode, []string)
visit = func(node completionNode, paths []string) {
candidates := append([]string{}, node.flags...)
transitions := map[string]string{}
for _, child := range node.children {
candidates = append(candidates, child.names...)
for _, path := range paths {
for _, name := range child.names {
childPath := strings.TrimSpace(path + " " + name)
transitions[path+"|"+name] = childPath
}
}
}
candidates = uniqueStrings(candidates)
for _, path := range paths {
contexts = append(contexts, completionContext{path: path, candidates: candidates, transitions: transitions})
}
for _, child := range node.children {
childPaths := make([]string, 0, len(paths)*len(child.names))
for _, path := range paths {
for _, name := range child.names {
childPaths = append(childPaths, strings.TrimSpace(path+" "+name))
}
}
visit(child, childPaths)
}
}
visit(root, []string{""})
sort.SliceStable(contexts, func(i, j int) bool { return contexts[i].path < contexts[j].path })
return contexts
}
func uniqueStrings(values []string) []string {
seen := map[string]bool{}
result := make([]string, 0, len(values))
for _, value := range values {
if value == "" || seen[value] {
continue
}
seen[value] = true
result = append(result, value)
}
return result
}
func allTransitions(contexts []completionContext) map[string]string {
transitions := map[string]string{}
for _, context := range contexts {
for key, value := range context.transitions {
transitions[key] = value
}
}
return transitions
}
func sortedTransitionKeys(transitions map[string]string) []string {
keys := make([]string, 0, len(transitions))
for key := range transitions {
keys = append(keys, key)
}
sort.Strings(keys)
return keys
}
func shellWords(values []string) string {
return strings.Join(values, " ")
}
func writeBashCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "# bash completion for zero\n_zero() {\n local cur context token i candidates\n cur=\"${COMP_WORDS[COMP_CWORD]}\"\n context=\"\""); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := writePOSIXContextLoop(w, contexts, " for ((i = 1; i < COMP_CWORD; i++)); do", " token=\"${COMP_WORDS[i]}\"", " done"); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := writePOSIXCandidateCase(w, contexts, " "); err != nil {
return err
}
_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " COMPREPLY=( $(compgen -W \"$candidates\" -- \"$cur\") )\n}\ncomplete -F _zero zero")
return err
}
func writeZshCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "#compdef zero\n_zero() {\n local context token i\n local -a candidates\n context=\"\""); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := writePOSIXContextLoop(w, contexts, " for ((i = 2; i < CURRENT; i++)); do", " token=\"${words[i]}\"", " done"); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " case \"$context\" in"); err != nil {
return err
}
for _, context := range contexts {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " %q) candidates=(%s) ;;\n", context.path, quotedWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " esac\n compadd -- \"${candidates[@]}\"\n}\ncompdef _zero zero")
return err
}
func writePOSIXContextLoop(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext, start string, token string, end string) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, start); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, token); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " case \"$context|$token\" in"); err != nil {
return err
}
transitions := allTransitions(contexts)
for _, key := range sortedTransitionKeys(transitions) {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " %q) context=%q ;;\n", key, transitions[key]); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " esac"); err != nil {
return err
}
_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, end)
return err
}
func writePOSIXCandidateCase(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext, indent string) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, indent+"case \"$context\" in"); err != nil {
return err
}
for _, context := range contexts {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s %q) candidates=%q ;;\n", indent, context.path, shellWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, indent+"esac")
return err
}
func quotedWords(values []string) string {
quoted := make([]string, 0, len(values))
for _, value := range values {
quoted = append(quoted, fmt.Sprintf("%q", value))
}
return strings.Join(quoted, " ")
}
func writeFishCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "# fish completion for zero\nfunction __zero_completion_context\n set -l context ''\n set -l tokens (commandline -opc)"); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " for token in $tokens[2..-1]\n switch \"$context|$token\""); err != nil {
return err
}
transitions := allTransitions(contexts)
for _, key := range sortedTransitionKeys(transitions) {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " case %q\n set context %q\n", key, transitions[key]); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " end\n end\n if test -z \"$context\"\n echo __root__\n else\n echo \"$context\"\n end\nend"); err != nil {
return err
}
for _, context := range contexts {
path := context.path
if path == "" {
path = "__root__"
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "complete -c zero -f -n 'test (__zero_completion_context) = %q' -a %q\n", path, shellWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func writePowerShellCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "# PowerShell completion for zero\nRegister-ArgumentCompleter -Native -CommandName zero -ScriptBlock {\n param($wordToComplete, $commandAst, $cursorPosition)\n $context = ''\n $elements = @($commandAst.CommandElements)\n $limit = $elements.Count\n if ($wordToComplete -ne '' -and $limit -gt 1) { $limit-- }\n for ($i = 1; $i -lt $limit; $i++) {\n $token = $elements[$i].Extent.Text\n switch (\"$context|$token\") {"); err != nil {
return err
}
transitions := allTransitions(contexts)
for _, key := range sortedTransitionKeys(transitions) {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " '%s' { $context = '%s'; break }\n", key, transitions[key]); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " }\n }\n $candidates = switch ($context) {"); err != nil {
return err
}
for _, context := range contexts {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " '%s' { @(%s) }\n", context.path, powershellWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " }\n $candidates | Where-Object { $_ -like \"$wordToComplete*\" } | ForEach-Object {\n [System.Management.Automation.CompletionResult]::new($_, $_, 'ParameterValue', $_)\n }\n}")
return err
}
func powershellWords(values []string) string {
quoted := make([]string, 0, len(values))
for _, value := range values {
quoted = append(quoted, "'"+strings.ReplaceAll(value, "'", "''")+"'")
}
return strings.Join(quoted, ", ")
}
func writeElvishCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "# Elvish completion for zero\nset edit:completion:arg-completer[zero] = {|@args|\n var context = ''\n for token $args[1..-1] {"); err != nil {
return err
}
transitions := allTransitions(contexts)
for index, key := range sortedTransitionKeys(transitions) {
keyword := "if"
if index > 0 {
keyword = "} elif"
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " %s (eq $context'|'$token %q) {\n set context = %q\n", keyword, key, transitions[key]); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " }\n }"); err != nil {
return err
}
for index, context := range contexts {
keyword := "if"
if index > 0 {
keyword = "} elif"
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " %s (eq $context %q) {\n put %s\n", keyword, context.path, shellWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " }\n}")
return err
}
+177
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
package cli
import (
"bytes"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestCompletionsHelpAndRootHelp(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"completions", "--help"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("completion help exit code = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
for _, want := range []string{
"zero completions <shell>",
"bash, zsh, fish, powershell, or elvish",
"source <(zero completions bash)",
"~/.config/fish/completions/zero.fish",
"eval (zero completions elvish | slurp)",
} {
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), want) {
t.Errorf("completion help missing %q:\n%s", want, stdout.String())
}
}
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"--help"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("root help exit code = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "completions Generate shell completion scripts") {
t.Fatalf("root help does not list completions command:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
}
func TestCompletionsRejectsMissingUnknownAndExtraShellArguments(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
args []string
want string
}{
{name: "missing", args: []string{"completions"}, want: "shell required"},
{name: "unknown", args: []string{"completions", "nu"}, want: "unsupported shell"},
{name: "extra", args: []string{"completions", "bash", "extra"}, want: "unexpected completions argument"},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps(test.args, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitUsage {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitUsage, stderr.String())
}
if stdout.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("stdout = %q, want empty", stdout.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), test.want) {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want substring %q", stderr.String(), test.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestCompletionsGeneratesEverySupportedShell(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
shell string
marker string
syntaxShell string
}{
{shell: "bash", marker: "complete -F _zero zero", syntaxShell: "bash"},
{shell: "zsh", marker: "#compdef zero", syntaxShell: "zsh"},
{shell: "fish", marker: "complete -c zero"},
{shell: "powershell", marker: "Register-ArgumentCompleter -Native -CommandName zero"},
{shell: "elvish", marker: "edit:completion:arg-completer[zero]"},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.shell, func(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"completions", test.shell}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), test.marker) {
t.Fatalf("%s completion missing marker %q:\n%s", test.shell, test.marker, stdout.String())
}
for _, want := range []string{"daemon", "mcp oauth", "sandbox grants", "--output-format"} {
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), want) {
t.Errorf("%s completion missing %q", test.shell, want)
}
}
script := stdout.String()
switch test.shell {
case "fish":
assertBalancedFishBlocks(t, script)
case "powershell", "elvish":
assertBalancedBraces(t, script)
}
if test.syntaxShell != "" {
assertNativeShellSyntax(t, test.syntaxShell, script)
}
})
}
}
func assertBalancedBraces(t *testing.T, script string) {
t.Helper()
if opens, closes := strings.Count(script, "{"), strings.Count(script, "}"); opens != closes {
t.Errorf("unbalanced braces: %d opening, %d closing", opens, closes)
}
}
func assertBalancedFishBlocks(t *testing.T, script string) {
t.Helper()
depth := 0
for _, line := range strings.Split(script, "\n") {
fields := strings.Fields(line)
if len(fields) == 0 {
continue
}
switch fields[0] {
case "function", "for", "switch", "if":
depth++
case "end":
depth--
if depth < 0 {
t.Fatal("fish completion closes a block before one is opened")
}
}
}
if depth != 0 {
t.Errorf("fish completion has %d unclosed blocks", depth)
}
}
func assertNativeShellSyntax(t *testing.T, shell, script string) {
t.Helper()
path, err := exec.LookPath(shell)
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("%s is not installed", shell)
}
command := exec.Command(path, "-n")
command.Stdin = strings.NewReader(script)
if output, err := command.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s syntax check failed: %v\n%s", shell, err, output)
}
}
func TestCompletionTreeCoversAliasesNestingAndCommonFlags(t *testing.T) {
contexts := completionContexts(completionRoot)
byPath := make(map[string][]string, len(contexts))
for _, context := range contexts {
byPath[context.path] = context.candidates
}
assertCandidates(t, byPath[""], "sessions", "session", "plugins", "plugin", "worktrees", "worktree", "--add-dir", "--theme", "-p", "--prompt")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["exec"], "--model", "--cwd", "--worktree", "--output-format", "--resume", "--skip-permissions-unsafe")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["daemon"], "start", "stop", "status", "run", "attach")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["mcp oauth"], "login", "logout", "status")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["sandbox grants"], "list", "allow", "deny", "revoke", "clear")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["completions"], "bash", "zsh", "fish", "powershell", "elvish")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["plugins"], "list", "add", "info", "remove", "rm")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["plugin"], "list", "add", "info", "remove", "rm")
}
func assertCandidates(t *testing.T, got []string, wants ...string) {
t.Helper()
set := make(map[string]bool, len(got))
for _, candidate := range got {
set[candidate] = true
}
for _, want := range wants {
if !set[want] {
t.Errorf("candidates %v do not contain %q", got, want)
}
}
}
+122
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"path/filepath"
"sort"
"strings"
@@ -252,6 +253,115 @@ func runPluginRemove(args []string, dir string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writ
return exitSuccess
}
func runPluginInfo(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
id, options, help, err := parsePluginInfoArgs(args)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if help {
if err := writePluginInfoHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if id == "" {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "usage: zero plugins info <id> [--user] [--json]")
}
cwd, err := deps.getwd()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to resolve workspace: "+err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
info, err := plugins.Info(plugins.InfoOptions{
LoadOptions: pluginLoadOptions(deps, cwd, options.user),
}, id)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, plugins.ErrNotInstalled) {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(err, redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
}
if options.json {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, redaction.RedactValue(info, redaction.Options{})); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
plugin := info.Plugin
lines := []string{fmt.Sprintf("%s (%s) %s", plugin.ID, plugin.Name, plugin.Version)}
state := "enabled"
if !plugin.Enabled {
state = "disabled"
}
lines = append(lines, " state: "+state)
lines = append(lines, " source: "+string(plugin.Source))
if len(plugin.Tools) > 0 {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf(" tools: %d", len(plugin.Tools)))
}
if len(plugin.Hooks) > 0 {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf(" hooks: %d", len(plugin.Hooks)))
}
if len(plugin.Skills) > 0 {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf(" skills: %d", len(plugin.Skills)))
}
if len(plugin.Prompts) > 0 {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf(" prompts: %d", len(plugin.Prompts)))
}
if info.LockSource != "" {
lines = append(lines, " lock source: "+info.LockSource)
}
if info.LockHash != "" {
lines = append(lines, " lock hash: "+info.LockHash)
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf(" hash drift: %t", info.HashDrift))
}
lines = append(lines, " manifest: "+plugin.ManifestPath)
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, redaction.RedactString(strings.Join(lines, "\n"), redaction.Options{})); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
type pluginInfoOptions struct {
json bool
user bool
}
func parsePluginInfoArgs(args []string) (string, pluginInfoOptions, bool, error) {
options := pluginInfoOptions{}
id := ""
for _, arg := range args {
switch arg {
case "-h", "--help", "help":
return "", options, true, nil
case "--json":
options.json = true
case "--user":
options.user = true
default:
if strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-") {
return "", options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unknown plugins info flag %q", arg)}
}
if id != "" {
return "", options, false, execUsageError{"plugins info takes a single id"}
}
id = arg
}
}
return id, options, false, nil
}
func pluginLoadOptions(deps appDeps, cwd string, userOnly bool) plugins.LoadOptions {
opts := plugins.LoadOptions{Cwd: cwd, ExcludeProject: userOnly}
roots := []plugins.Root{{Source: plugins.SourceUser, Path: deps.pluginsDir()}}
if !userOnly {
roots = append(roots, plugins.Root{Source: plugins.SourceProject, Path: filepath.Join(cwd, ".zero", "plugins")})
}
opts.Roots = roots
return opts
}
// --- tools make / list ---
func runTools(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
@@ -567,6 +677,18 @@ Removes an installed plugin directory and its plugins.lock entry.
return err
}
func writePluginInfoHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero plugins info <id> [flags]
Flags:
--user Target only user plugins (ignore ./.zero/plugins)
--json Print plugin info as JSON
-h, --help Show this help
`)
return err
}
func writeToolsHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero tools <command>
+9
View File
@@ -177,6 +177,15 @@ func TestRunPluginAddListRemove(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("add output missing id:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"plugin", "info", "zero.demo"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
t.Fatalf("plugin info exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "zero.demo") || !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "manifest:") {
t.Fatalf("info output missing plugin details:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
// remove
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
+179 -54
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/errhint"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execprofile"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/imageinput"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lsp"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
@@ -69,7 +71,14 @@ type execOptions struct {
// intentionally inert: nothing consumes it. Model selection is driven by
// --model / --mode instead. See writeExecHelp ("Accept legacy model profile
// selection") and TestRunExecAcceptsLegacyModelProfileFlags.
modelProfile string
modelProfile string
// execProfile selects a named execution profile (balanced, fast, thorough):
// a loop-posture bundle (turn budget, reasoning effort, self-correction,
// escalation triggers) applied AFTER --mode with the same
// fill-only-if-unset rule, so precedence is explicit flag > mode > profile.
// Distinct from the mode preset also named "fast" (which picks a model) and
// from the legacy inert --profile above. See internal/execprofile.
execProfile string
reasoningEffort string
useSpec bool
specModel string
@@ -167,6 +176,14 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
if err := applyExecMode(&options); err != nil {
return writeExecFormatUsageError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, err.Error())
}
// A profile tunes loop posture the way a mode tunes model selection, and
// runs after it so the mode's fills count as "set" and win. MaxTurns is
// deferred to config resolution below, where the displaced resolved budget
// is known and becomes the escalation restore target.
execProfile, execProfileFilledEffort, err := applyExecProfile(&options)
if err != nil {
return writeExecFormatUsageError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, err.Error())
}
workspaceRoot, err := resolveWorkspaceRoot(options.cwd, deps)
if err != nil {
@@ -190,6 +207,7 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
}
registry := newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot)
executionRunner := execution.NewRunner(nil)
// Register the escalate_model tool only when the run opted into mid-run
// escalation. It is registered before --list-tools formatting and
// validateExecToolFilters so the tool is both listable and filter-validatable.
@@ -222,16 +240,13 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
if options.useSpec {
permissionMode = agent.PermissionModeSpecDraft
}
mcpRuntime, mcpSkip, err := registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(context.Background(), workspaceRoot, registry, deps, execMCPAutonomy(options), trustRoot)
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "mcp_error", err.Error())
}
defer closeMCPRuntime(stderr, mcpRuntime)
var mcpRuntime mcpToolRuntime
var mcpSkip trustSkip
// Make local plugins live for this run: register their declared tools into the
// registry and collect their hooks + skill roots for the dispatcher and skill
// tool below. Done before --list-tools and filter validation so plugin tools
// are listable and filter-validatable; it fails OPEN (a bad plugin is skipped).
pluginActivation := activatePlugins(workspaceRoot, registry, deps, stderr, trustRoot)
var pluginActivation pluginActivation
if options.useSpec {
specmode.RegisterDraftTools(registry, workspaceRoot, deps.now)
}
@@ -272,6 +287,31 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
}
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "provider_error", err.Error())
}
var displacedMaxTurns int
resolved.MaxTurns, displacedMaxTurns = applyProfileTurnBudget(execProfile, options.maxTurns, resolved.MaxTurns)
execScope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspaceRoot, append(append([]string{}, resolved.Sandbox.AdditionalWriteRoots...), options.addDirs...))
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", err.Error())
}
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(workspaceRoot, execScope) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
sandboxEngine, err := buildExecSandboxEngine(workspaceRoot, resolved, deps, execScope)
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", err.Error())
}
if notice, err := sandboxEngine.ConsumeGrantMigrationNotice(); err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", "migrate sandbox grants: "+err.Error())
} else if notice != "" {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] "+notice)
}
executionRunner.SetPreparer(sandboxEngine)
mcpRuntime, mcpSkip, err = registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(context.Background(), workspaceRoot, registry, deps, execMCPAutonomy(options), trustRoot, executionRunner)
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "mcp_error", err.Error())
}
defer closeMCPRuntime(stderr, mcpRuntime)
pluginActivation = activatePlugins(workspaceRoot, registry, deps, stderr, trustRoot, executionRunner)
registerLocalControlTools(registry, workspaceRoot, resolved.LocalControl)
if err := validateExecToolFilters(options, registry); err != nil {
return writeExecFormatUsageError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, err.Error())
@@ -339,28 +379,6 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
}
images = nil
}
execScope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspaceRoot, append(append([]string{}, resolved.Sandbox.AdditionalWriteRoots...), options.addDirs...))
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", err.Error())
}
// Re-register the core tools with the run scope, OVERWRITING the nil-scope
// instances registered before config resolve (the registry must exist that
// early for --list-tools and tool-filter validation, which run without a
// provider). This is safe only while two invariants hold:
// 1. Registry.Register replaces by NAME, so every path-confining core
// tool is swapped wholesale; and
// 2. nothing between the initial registration and this point captures a
// core-tool INSTANCE (tool_search holds the *Registry* and resolves
// names lazily; --list-tools and filter validation use names only).
// A new wrapper that snapshots a core tool before this line would silently
// ship nil-scope enforcement — add it below this re-registration instead.
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(workspaceRoot, execScope) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
sandboxEngine, err := buildExecSandboxEngine(workspaceRoot, resolved, deps, execScope)
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", err.Error())
}
runReasoningEffort := options.reasoningEffort
if options.useSpec && options.specReasoningEffort != "" {
runReasoningEffort = options.specReasoningEffort
@@ -412,6 +430,36 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
}
}
// Optimized OpenAI turn sessions (ZERO_OPENAI_TURN_SESSION, default off).
// nil when gated off or the profile is ineligible: agent.Run then wraps the
// provider in its default adapter — the exact code path of today. The
// session switcher is installed only when the run START is optimized, so
// the legacy ModelSwitcher path above stays untouched otherwise.
turnSessions, _ := providers.OptimizedTurnSessions(resolved.Provider, provider, providers.Options{})
var modelSessionSwitcher func(context.Context, string) (zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider, error)
if options.allowEscalation && turnSessions != nil {
modelSessionSwitcher = func(_ context.Context, modelID string) (zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider, error) {
switchedProfile := resolved.Provider
switchedProfile.Model = modelID
switchedProvider, err := deps.newProvider(switchedProfile)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if switchedProvider == nil {
// The loop treats a nil session source as "no swap" — mirror the
// legacy closure's (nil, nil) contract.
return nil, nil
}
currentModel = modelID
if optimized, ok := providers.OptimizedTurnSessions(switchedProfile, switchedProvider, providers.Options{}); ok {
return optimized, nil
}
// Ineligible switch target: default adapter, but with the switched
// model's resolved capability projection preserved.
return providers.DefaultTurnSessions(switchedProfile, switchedProvider, providers.Options{}), nil
}
}
runMetadata, err := resolveExecRunMetadata(resolved.Provider)
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "provider_error", err.Error())
@@ -456,6 +504,13 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
reasoningEffort: forwardEffort,
specPermissionMode: permissionMode,
notifier: notifier,
// The profile displaced resolved.MaxTurns above, so the spec-draft
// run arms the same escalation policy as the main run (in practice
// only the failure-streak and risky-mutation triggers can fire
// here: the draft runs without the completion gate or a
// self-corrector).
profilePolicy: execProfile.Policy(displacedMaxTurns,
specProfileEffortFilled(execProfileFilledEffort, options.specReasoningEffort)),
})
}
@@ -498,7 +553,7 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
var traceRecorder *trace.Recorder
var traceSnapshot *trace.TurnTrace
if tracePath != "" {
traceRecorder = trace.NewRecorder(preparedSession.Session.SessionID, runID, "")
traceRecorder = trace.NewRecorder(preparedSession.Session.SessionID, runID, execProfile.Name)
defer func() {
if err := writeTraceSnapshot(traceSnapshot, tracePath, stderr); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "[zero] failed to write trace: %s\n", err)
@@ -569,32 +624,35 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
// Build the hooks dispatcher out of the struct literal so its trust skip report
// can be combined with the plugin activation's, and emit at most one notice when
// project hooks/plugins were dropped for an untrusted workspace.
hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks, trustRoot)
hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks, trustRoot, executionRunner)
emitTrustNotice(stderr, hookSkip, pluginActivation.trustSkip, mcpSkip)
result, err := agent.Run(runCtx, agentPrompt, provider, agent.Options{
MaxTurns: resolved.MaxTurns,
ContextWindow: resolveAgentContextWindow(runCtx, modelRegistry, resolved.Provider),
DeferThreshold: effectiveDeferThreshold,
Specialists: specialistRuntime.specialistInfos(),
Skills: pluginActivation.skillInfos(deps.skillsDir()),
SessionID: preparedSession.Session.SessionID,
CallingSessionID: options.callingSessionID,
CallingToolUseID: options.callingToolUseID,
Tag: options.tag,
Depth: options.depth,
SessionTitle: sessionTitle,
ProviderName: resolved.Provider.Name,
Model: resolved.Provider.Model,
ModelSwitcher: modelSwitcher,
ReasoningEffort: forwardEffort,
Trace: traceRecorder,
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Images: images,
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: permissionMode,
Autonomy: options.autonomy,
SelfCorrect: selfCorrector,
FileDiagnostics: fileDiagnostics,
MaxTurns: resolved.MaxTurns,
ContextWindow: resolveAgentContextWindow(runCtx, modelRegistry, resolved.Provider),
DeferThreshold: effectiveDeferThreshold,
Specialists: specialistRuntime.specialistInfos(),
Skills: pluginActivation.skillInfos(deps.skillsDir()),
SessionID: preparedSession.Session.SessionID,
CallingSessionID: options.callingSessionID,
CallingToolUseID: options.callingToolUseID,
Tag: options.tag,
Depth: options.depth,
SessionTitle: sessionTitle,
ProviderName: resolved.Provider.Name,
Model: resolved.Provider.Model,
ModelSwitcher: modelSwitcher,
TurnSessionProvider: turnSessions,
ModelSessionSwitcher: modelSessionSwitcher,
ReasoningEffort: forwardEffort,
Trace: traceRecorder,
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Images: images,
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: permissionMode,
Autonomy: options.autonomy,
SelfCorrect: selfCorrector,
FileDiagnostics: fileDiagnostics,
Profile: execProfile.Policy(displacedMaxTurns, execProfileFilledEffort),
// Headless exec: don't accept a no-tool-call turn as "done" while work
// clearly remains (pending plan items / a mid-step continuation cue) —
// nudge to continue, and finalize as INCOMPLETE rather than false success
@@ -881,6 +939,12 @@ func providerSensitiveEnvKeys(resolved config.ResolvedConfig) []string {
// applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy overlays every config-sourced sandbox knob onto
// the default policy.
func applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(policy sandbox.Policy, cfg config.SandboxConfig) sandbox.Policy {
// An explicit `"sandbox": {"enabled": false}` disables the sandbox: every
// request is allowed and commands run unwrapped. Only reachable from global
// config / CLI — project config never sets Enabled (see mergeProjectConfig).
if cfg.Enabled != nil && !*cfg.Enabled {
policy.Mode = sandbox.ModeDisabled
}
if network := strings.TrimSpace(cfg.Network); network != "" {
switch sandbox.NetworkMode(network) {
case sandbox.NetworkAllow, sandbox.NetworkDeny:
@@ -1101,6 +1165,67 @@ func applyExecMode(options *execOptions) error {
return nil
}
// applyExecProfile expands an --exec-profile selection onto the exec options.
// Like applyExecMode it only fills fields the caller left unset, and it runs
// AFTER the mode so a mode-filled field counts as set: precedence is explicit
// flag > --mode > --exec-profile. Only the options-level knobs are applied here
// (reasoning effort still flows through the model-supported gating downstream;
// self-correct is presence-only so a profile can only turn it on). MaxTurns is
// intentionally NOT applied here — the profile displaces the resolved budget
// after config resolution, where the displaced value is known and becomes the
// escalation restore target. An unknown profile is a usage error listing the
// valid names. Not to be confused with the legacy inert --profile flag.
// The second return reports whether the profile actually filled the reasoning
// effort (false when the user set one explicitly), so the escalation policy
// knows the displaced effort was the provider default and can restore it.
func applyExecProfile(options *execOptions) (execprofile.Profile, bool, error) {
name := strings.TrimSpace(options.execProfile)
if name == "" {
return execprofile.Profile{}, false, nil
}
profile, ok := execprofile.Lookup(name)
if !ok {
return execprofile.Profile{}, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unknown execution profile %q. Valid profiles: %s.", options.execProfile, strings.Join(execprofile.Names(), ", "))}
}
effortFilled := false
if options.reasoningEffort == "" && profile.ReasoningEffort != "" {
options.reasoningEffort = profile.ReasoningEffort
effortFilled = true
}
// Spec-safe projection: the spec-draft path wires no self-corrector (an
// explicit --self-correct --use-spec is rejected at parse time, before
// profiles apply), so a profile's self-correct knob is meaningless there.
// Project it away rather than erroring: the user asked for a thorough
// DRAFT, and the profile's other knobs (budget, effort) apply to it fine.
if profile.SelfCorrect && !options.useSpec {
options.selfCorrect = true
}
return profile, effortFilled, nil
}
// specProfileEffortFilled reports whether the profile's effort fill actually
// governs the spec-draft run. An explicit --spec-reasoning-effort replaces the
// filled effort for the draft, so the escalation's effort restore must not arm
// there: escalation must never clear an effort the user pinned by hand.
func specProfileEffortFilled(effortFilled bool, specReasoningEffort string) bool {
return effortFilled && strings.TrimSpace(specReasoningEffort) == ""
}
// applyProfileTurnBudget decides the run's turn budget once config is resolved.
// The profile displaces the RESOLVED value, not the flag: a pinned budget
// always wins and the profile backs off entirely, while an env/config budget
// is the "balanced posture" a mid-run escalation can restore. pinnedMaxTurns
// is any caller-pinned budget — an explicit --max-turns flag OR a mode
// preset's fill (both land in options.maxTurns, and a mode outranks a profile
// just like the flag does). displaced is 0 when nothing was displaced, so an
// escalation leaves the ceiling untouched.
func applyProfileTurnBudget(profile execprofile.Profile, pinnedMaxTurns int, resolvedMaxTurns int) (effective int, displaced int) {
if profile.MaxTurns > 0 && pinnedMaxTurns == 0 {
return profile.MaxTurns, resolvedMaxTurns
}
return resolvedMaxTurns, 0
}
// resolveSelectedModel routes a user-supplied --model value through the model
// registry so that fuzzy aliases (e.g. "sonnet 4.5") resolve to canonical ids
// and deprecated models auto-redirect to their fallback. It returns the model id
+13
View File
@@ -147,6 +147,19 @@ func parseExecArgs(args []string) (execOptions, bool, error) {
index = next
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--profile="):
options.modelProfile = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--profile="))
case arg == "--exec-profile":
value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
if err != nil {
return options, false, err
}
options.execProfile = strings.TrimSpace(value)
index = next
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--exec-profile="):
value, err := requiredInlineFlagValue(arg, "--exec-profile")
if err != nil {
return options, false, err
}
options.execProfile = value
case arg == "-r" || arg == "--reasoning-effort":
value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
if err != nil {
+224
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
package cli
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execprofile"
)
func TestApplyExecProfileFillsOnlyUnset(t *testing.T) {
// Unset effort: the profile fills it and reports the fill, so the
// escalation policy knows the displaced effort was the provider default.
options := execOptions{execProfile: "fast"}
profile, effortFilled, err := applyExecProfile(&options)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecProfile: %v", err)
}
if profile.Name != "fast" {
t.Fatalf("profile.Name = %q, want fast", profile.Name)
}
if options.reasoningEffort != "low" {
t.Fatalf("reasoningEffort = %q, want the profile's low", options.reasoningEffort)
}
if !effortFilled {
t.Fatal("the profile filled the effort, so effortFilled must report it")
}
// Set effort (explicit flag or a mode's fill): the profile backs off.
options = execOptions{execProfile: "fast", reasoningEffort: "high"}
_, effortFilled, err = applyExecProfile(&options)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecProfile: %v", err)
}
if options.reasoningEffort != "high" {
t.Fatalf("reasoningEffort = %q, an explicit value must win over the profile", options.reasoningEffort)
}
if effortFilled {
t.Fatal("the profile backed off, so effortFilled must be false")
}
}
func TestApplyExecProfileThoroughArmsSelfCorrect(t *testing.T) {
options := execOptions{execProfile: "thorough"}
if _, _, err := applyExecProfile(&options); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecProfile: %v", err)
}
if !options.selfCorrect {
t.Fatal("thorough must arm the post-edit self-correct loop")
}
if options.reasoningEffort != "high" {
t.Fatalf("reasoningEffort = %q, want high", options.reasoningEffort)
}
}
// The spec-draft path wires no self-corrector (explicit --self-correct
// --use-spec is rejected at parse time, before profiles apply), so a profile's
// self-correct knob is projected away under --use-spec instead of silently
// arming a knob the draft runner ignores. The other knobs still apply.
func TestApplyExecProfileSpecProjectsAwaySelfCorrect(t *testing.T) {
options := execOptions{execProfile: "thorough", useSpec: true}
if _, _, err := applyExecProfile(&options); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecProfile: %v", err)
}
if options.selfCorrect {
t.Fatal("thorough under --use-spec must not arm self-correct (the draft runner has none)")
}
if options.reasoningEffort != "high" {
t.Fatalf("reasoningEffort = %q, the profile's other knobs must still apply", options.reasoningEffort)
}
}
func TestApplyExecProfileUnknownIsUsageError(t *testing.T) {
options := execOptions{execProfile: "turbo"}
_, _, err := applyExecProfile(&options)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected a usage error for an unknown profile")
}
if _, ok := err.(execUsageError); !ok {
t.Fatalf("expected execUsageError, got %T: %v", err, err)
}
for _, name := range execprofile.Names() {
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), name) {
t.Fatalf("usage error must list %q, got %q", name, err.Error())
}
}
}
// Precedence: explicit flag > --mode > --exec-profile. The deep mode fills
// effort=high and max-turns=160; the fast profile must not override either,
// because a mode-filled field counts as set by the time the profile runs.
func TestExecProfilePrecedenceFlagOverModeOverProfile(t *testing.T) {
options := execOptions{mode: "deep", execProfile: "fast"}
if err := applyExecMode(&options); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecMode: %v", err)
}
profile, _, err := applyExecProfile(&options)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecProfile: %v", err)
}
if options.reasoningEffort != "high" {
t.Fatalf("reasoningEffort = %q, the mode's high must win over the profile's low", options.reasoningEffort)
}
// The mode filled options.maxTurns, so the turn budget must not be displaced.
effective, displaced := applyProfileTurnBudget(profile, options.maxTurns, options.maxTurns)
if effective != 160 || displaced != 0 {
t.Fatalf("turn budget = (%d, displaced %d), the mode's 160 must win with nothing displaced", effective, displaced)
}
}
func TestApplyProfileTurnBudget(t *testing.T) {
fast, _ := execprofile.Lookup("fast")
balanced, _ := execprofile.Lookup("balanced")
// No explicit flag: the profile displaces the resolved budget.
if effective, displaced := applyProfileTurnBudget(fast, 0, 80); effective != 30 || displaced != 80 {
t.Fatalf("fast over resolved 80 = (%d, %d), want (30, 80)", effective, displaced)
}
// Explicit --max-turns pins the budget; the profile backs off entirely.
if effective, displaced := applyProfileTurnBudget(fast, 50, 50); effective != 50 || displaced != 0 {
t.Fatalf("fast with explicit 50 = (%d, %d), want (50, 0)", effective, displaced)
}
// Balanced never displaces anything.
if effective, displaced := applyProfileTurnBudget(balanced, 0, 80); effective != 80 || displaced != 0 {
t.Fatalf("balanced over resolved 80 = (%d, %d), want (80, 0)", effective, displaced)
}
}
// The no-regression invariant at the options level: selecting balanced leaves
// the options byte-identical to not selecting a profile at all, and produces
// no loop policy.
func TestExecProfileBalancedLeavesOptionsUntouched(t *testing.T) {
options := execOptions{execProfile: "balanced"}
reference := options
profile, _, err := applyExecProfile(&options)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecProfile: %v", err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(options, reference) {
t.Fatalf("balanced changed the options: %+v vs %+v", options, reference)
}
if policy := profile.Policy(80, false); policy != nil {
t.Fatalf("balanced must produce a nil policy, got %+v", policy)
}
}
// --exec-profile= with an inline empty value must error like its two-token
// form and the sibling --mode=, not silently run the default posture (the
// classic shell hazard: an unset variable expanding into the inline form).
func TestParseExecProfileInlineEmptyIsError(t *testing.T) {
_, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--exec-profile=", "hello"})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "--exec-profile requires a value") {
t.Fatalf("expected a required-value error, got %v", err)
}
}
// Full echo-provider run: the selected profile must be stamped into the
// per-turn trace so benchmark attribution can group runs by posture.
func TestRunExecTraceRecordsSelectedProfile(t *testing.T) {
tracePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "trace.ndjson")
exitCode, _, stderr := runExecWithEcho(t, []string{
"exec", "--exec-profile", "fast", "--trace", tracePath, "hello",
})
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr)
}
raw, err := os.ReadFile(tracePath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read trace: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(string(raw), `"profile":"fast"`) {
t.Fatalf("trace must record the selected profile, got %s", raw)
}
}
// An explicit --spec-reasoning-effort governs the spec draft's effort, so the
// escalation effort-restore must not arm there even when the profile filled
// the (unused) main effort.
func TestSpecProfileEffortFilled(t *testing.T) {
if !specProfileEffortFilled(true, "") {
t.Fatal("no explicit spec effort: the profile's fill governs, restore must arm")
}
if specProfileEffortFilled(true, "high") {
t.Fatal("an explicit spec effort must disarm the effort restore")
}
if specProfileEffortFilled(false, "") {
t.Fatal("nothing filled, nothing to restore")
}
}
// The trace label deliberately records the SELECTED profile, balanced
// included, so captures are self-describing. Run behavior stays identical
// (balanced fills nothing and arms no policy); the label is the one intended
// difference in the opt-in trace artifact.
func TestRunExecTraceRecordsBalancedSelection(t *testing.T) {
tracePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "trace.ndjson")
exitCode, _, stderr := runExecWithEcho(t, []string{
"exec", "--exec-profile", "balanced", "--trace", tracePath, "hello",
})
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr)
}
raw, err := os.ReadFile(tracePath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read trace: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(string(raw), `"profile":"balanced"`) {
t.Fatalf("trace must record the balanced selection, got %s", raw)
}
}
func TestRunExecUnknownExecProfileIsUsageError(t *testing.T) {
exitCode, _, stderr := runExecWithEcho(t, []string{
"exec", "--exec-profile", "turbo", "hello",
})
if exitCode != exitUsage {
t.Fatalf("expected usage exit %d, got %d", exitUsage, exitCode)
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr, "unknown execution profile") {
t.Fatalf("expected an unknown-profile usage error, got %q", stderr)
}
}
+4 -1
View File
@@ -72,8 +72,11 @@ func preflightExecSession(options execOptions) error {
if session == nil {
return execUsageError{"Zero session not found: " + options.resume}
}
if !sessions.IsResumableKind(session.SessionKind) {
return execUsageError{"Zero session is not resumable: " + options.resume}
}
case options.resumeLatest:
latest, err := store.Latest()
latest, err := store.LatestResumable()
if err != nil {
return err
}
+26
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
package cli
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
)
func TestPreflightRejectsSideSessions(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("XDG_DATA_HOME", t.TempDir())
store := sessions.NewStore(sessions.StoreOptions{})
if _, err := store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{SessionID: "side", SessionKind: sessions.SessionKindSide}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create side session: %v", err)
}
err := preflightExecSession(execOptions{resumeLatest: true})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "No Zero sessions available to resume") {
t.Fatalf("preflightExecSession error = %v, want no resumable sessions", err)
}
err = preflightExecSession(execOptions{resume: "side"})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "Zero session is not resumable: side") {
t.Fatalf("explicit side-session preflight error = %v, want non-resumable rejection", err)
}
}
+8 -1
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/notify"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
@@ -46,6 +47,11 @@ type execSpecDraftRun struct {
reasoningEffort string
specPermissionMode agent.PermissionMode
notifier *notify.Notifier
// profilePolicy carries the selected execution profile's escalation policy
// (nil when none): the profile displaces resolved.MaxTurns before this
// path branches off, so the spec-draft run needs the same safety net as
// the main run.
profilePolicy *agent.ProfilePolicy
}
type execSpecDraftInfo struct {
@@ -109,7 +115,7 @@ func runExecSpecDraft(run execSpecDraftRun) int {
// may be a --worktree path; this keeps a --use-spec --worktree run of a trusted
// repo trusted. Emit at most one notice when project hooks or the project MCP
// layer (registered earlier in runExec, carried in run.mcpSkip) were dropped.
hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcher(run.workspaceRoot, run.trustRoot)
hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcher(run.workspaceRoot, run.trustRoot, execution.NewRunner(run.sandboxEngine))
emitTrustNotice(run.stderr, hookSkip, run.mcpSkip)
result, err := agent.Run(runCtx, run.prompt, run.provider, agent.Options{
MaxTurns: run.resolved.MaxTurns,
@@ -119,6 +125,7 @@ func runExecSpecDraft(run execSpecDraftRun) int {
ProviderName: run.resolved.Provider.Name,
Model: run.resolved.Provider.Model,
ReasoningEffort: run.reasoningEffort,
Profile: run.profilePolicy,
Cwd: run.workspaceRoot,
SystemPrompt: specmode.DraftSystemPrompt,
Images: run.images,
+4
View File
@@ -549,10 +549,14 @@ func TestExecMemberAutoToolListIncludesMutators(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRunExecAcceptsLegacyModelProfileFlags(t *testing.T) {
// --profile (legacy, inert model profile) and --exec-profile (execution
// profile) are distinct flags and must coexist on one invocation.
exitCode, stdout, stderr := runExecWithEcho(t, []string{
"exec",
"--profile",
"fast",
"--exec-profile",
"balanced",
"--reasoning-effort",
"low",
"hello",
+125
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
package cli
import (
"bytes"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers/openai"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// TestRunExecOptimizedSessionUnderGate proves the end-to-end wiring: with
// ZERO_OPENAI_TURN_SESSION on and a real official-OpenAI provider, a headless
// run streams through the optimized session — the server sees the prewarm HEAD
// probe in addition to the turn's POST.
func TestRunExecOptimizedSessionUnderGate(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("XDG_DATA_HOME", t.TempDir())
t.Setenv("ZERO_OPENAI_TURN_SESSION", "1")
cwd := t.TempDir()
var heads, posts atomic.Int64
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodHead:
heads.Add(1)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/chat/completions"):
posts.Add(1)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("data: {\"choices\":[{\"delta\":{\"content\":\"done\"}}]}\n\n"))
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("data: [DONE]\n\n"))
default:
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
}
}))
defer server.Close()
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"exec", "say done"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
resolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return config.ResolvedConfig{
ActiveProvider: "official-openai",
Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "official-openai",
ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAI,
BaseURL: server.URL,
APIKey: "sk-exec-test",
Model: "pr8-exec-model",
},
}, nil
},
newProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
// Pin a keep-alive transport so the probe fires on every platform:
// the shared default transport disables keep-alives on macOS, where
// the session correctly skips the prewarm.
transport := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
transport.DisableKeepAlives = false
return openai.New(openai.Options{
APIKey: profile.APIKey,
BaseURL: profile.BaseURL,
Model: profile.Model,
HTTPClient: &http.Client{Transport: transport},
})
},
})
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exitCode = %d stdout=%s stderr=%s", exitCode, stdout.String(), stderr.String())
}
if got := posts.Load(); got < 1 {
t.Fatalf("server saw %d chat-completions POSTs, want >= 1", got)
}
// The prewarm probe is asynchronous; it fires well before the model turn
// finishes, but poll rather than assuming scheduling order. The deadline
// exceeds the production prewarmTimeout (3s) so a slow probe cannot flake
// this assertion.
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for heads.Load() == 0 && time.Now().Before(deadline) {
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
}
if got := heads.Load(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("server saw %d prewarm HEAD probes, want exactly 1", got)
}
}
// TestRunExecGateOnFallsBackForFakeProvider proves fallback safety: with the
// gate on but a provider that is not the concrete *openai.Provider, the run
// proceeds on the default path exactly as today.
func TestRunExecGateOnFallsBackForFakeProvider(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("XDG_DATA_HOME", t.TempDir())
t.Setenv("ZERO_OPENAI_TURN_SESSION", "1")
cwd := t.TempDir()
var builds int
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"exec", "--model", "claude-haiku-4.5", "hello"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
resolveConfig: func(_ string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
model := "claude-haiku-4.5"
if overrides.Provider.Model != "" {
model = overrides.Provider.Model
}
cfg := execResolvedConfig()
cfg.Provider.ProviderKind = config.ProviderKindAnthropic
cfg.Provider.Model = model
cfg.MaxTurns = 3
return cfg, nil
},
newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
builds++
return &escalatingExecProvider{}, nil
},
})
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exitCode = %d stdout=%s stderr=%s", exitCode, stdout.String(), stderr.String())
}
if builds != 1 {
t.Fatalf("newProvider called %d times, want 1 (default path, no optimized session)", builds)
}
}
+3
View File
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ func runPlugins(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
return exitSuccess
case "add":
return runPluginAdd(args[1:], deps.pluginsDir(), stdout, stderr)
case "info":
return runPluginInfo(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
case "remove", "rm":
return runPluginRemove(args[1:], deps.pluginsDir(), stdout, stderr)
default:
@@ -561,6 +563,7 @@ func writePluginsHelp(w io.Writer) error {
Commands:
list List local Zero plugins
info <id> Show plugin details and lockfile metadata
add <git-url|path> Install a plugin (manifest-validated, pinned in plugins.lock)
remove <id> Remove an installed plugin and its lockfile entry
`)
+12 -6
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/workspacetrust"
)
@@ -56,8 +57,8 @@ func resolveTrust(trustRoot string) (excludeProject bool, trustCheckErrored bool
//
// trustRoot is the original launch directory (resolved before any --worktree
// reassignment); the project layer loads only when that root is trusted.
func newHookDispatcher(workspaceRoot string, trustRoot string) (*hooks.Dispatcher, trustSkip) {
return newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, nil, trustRoot)
func newHookDispatcher(workspaceRoot string, trustRoot string, runners ...*execution.Runner) (*hooks.Dispatcher, trustSkip) {
return newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, nil, trustRoot, runners...)
}
// newHookDispatcherWithExtra builds the dispatcher like newHookDispatcher but also
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ func newHookDispatcher(workspaceRoot string, trustRoot string) (*hooks.Dispatche
// trust store cannot be read, or the workspace is not trusted (fail-closed). The
// returned trustSkip lets the caller emit one combined notice; the notice itself
// is NOT emitted here.
func newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot string, extra []hooks.Definition, trustRoot string) (*hooks.Dispatcher, trustSkip) {
func newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot string, extra []hooks.Definition, trustRoot string, runners ...*execution.Runner) (*hooks.Dispatcher, trustSkip) {
excludeProject, trustCheckErrored := resolveTrust(trustRoot)
skip := trustSkip{
excludedProjectConfig: excludeProject && projectHooksFileExists(workspaceRoot),
@@ -106,10 +107,15 @@ func newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot string, extra []hooks.Definition,
}
config.Hooks = merged
}
var runner *execution.Runner
if len(runners) > 0 {
runner = runners[0]
}
return hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{
Config: config,
Audit: audit,
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Config: config,
Audit: audit,
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Execution: runner,
}), skip
}
+8 -1
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/mcp"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ type mcpToolListItem struct {
// It returns a trustSkip alongside the runtime so the caller can fold the MCP gate
// into the one-line trust notice (mirroring the hooks and plugins chokepoints);
// otherwise a workspace whose only project config is MCP would be gated silently.
func registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(ctx context.Context, workspaceRoot string, registry *tools.Registry, deps appDeps, autonomy mcp.PermissionAutonomy, trustRoot string) (mcpToolRuntime, trustSkip, error) {
func registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(ctx context.Context, workspaceRoot string, registry *tools.Registry, deps appDeps, autonomy mcp.PermissionAutonomy, trustRoot string, runners ...*execution.Runner) (mcpToolRuntime, trustSkip, error) {
excludeProject, trustCheckErrored := resolveTrust(trustRoot)
skip := trustSkip{
excludedProjectConfig: excludeProject && projectMCPConfigExists(workspaceRoot),
@@ -46,9 +47,15 @@ func registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(ctx context.Context, workspaceRoot string, reg
if err != nil {
return nil, skip, err
}
var runner *execution.Runner
if len(runners) > 0 {
runner = runners[0]
}
runtime, err := deps.registerMCPTools(ctx, registry, cfg, mcp.RegisterOptions{
PermissionStore: store,
Autonomy: autonomy,
Execution: runner,
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
})
return runtime, skip, err
}
+7 -2
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/plugins"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ type pluginActivation struct {
// trustRoot is the original launch directory (resolved before any --worktree
// reassignment). The returned activation carries the skip report so the caller can
// emit one combined notice; the notice itself is NOT emitted here.
func activatePlugins(workspaceRoot string, registry *tools.Registry, deps appDeps, stderr io.Writer, trustRoot string) pluginActivation {
func activatePlugins(workspaceRoot string, registry *tools.Registry, deps appDeps, stderr io.Writer, trustRoot string, runners ...*execution.Runner) pluginActivation {
excludeProject, trustCheckErrored := resolveTrust(trustRoot)
skip := trustSkip{
excludedProjectConfig: excludeProject && projectPluginsDirExists(workspaceRoot),
@@ -65,7 +66,11 @@ func activatePlugins(workspaceRoot string, registry *tools.Registry, deps appDep
writePluginActivationWarning(stderr, formatLoadDiagnostic(diagnostic))
}
result := plugins.Activate(registry, loaded.Plugins, plugins.ActivateOptions{Cwd: workspaceRoot})
var runner *execution.Runner
if len(runners) > 0 {
runner = runners[0]
}
result := plugins.Activate(registry, loaded.Plugins, plugins.ActivateOptions{Cwd: workspaceRoot, Execution: runner})
for _, warning := range result.Warnings {
writePluginActivationWarning(stderr, warning)
}
+7 -1
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodelcatalog"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers"
)
type providerModelsOptions struct {
@@ -137,7 +138,12 @@ func discoveryCredentialProfile(profile config.ProviderProfile) config.ProviderP
// the provider's model-listing endpoint with no curated-catalog merge or
// coding-model filtering, so a custom provider's full model list is returned.
func defaultDiscoverProviderModels(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return providermodeldiscovery.Discover(ctx, profile, providermodeldiscovery.Options{})
resolver, loginKey := oauthLoginForProfile(profile)
return providermodeldiscovery.Discover(ctx, profile, providermodeldiscovery.Options{
OAuthResolver: resolver,
CodexAccountResolver: providers.CodexAccountResolverForLogin(loginKey),
UserAgent: userAgent(),
})
}
func parseProviderModelsArgs(args []string) (providerModelsOptions, bool, error) {
+191 -2
View File
@@ -53,16 +53,39 @@ func runProvidersUse(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps app
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
// SetActiveProvider only ever matches profiles persisted in config.json
// (see config.ProviderPersisted), but a provider can be visible in
// `zero providers list`/the TUI picker purely because Resolve()
// synthesized it in-memory from an ambient env var (e.g. OPENAI_API_KEY)
// without ever writing a row to disk. Without this check, switching to
// that provider by name always fails with a confusing "not found" even
// though it is genuinely usable this session (issue #707).
persisted, err := config.ProviderPersisted(configPath, options.name)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
if !persisted {
if exit, handled := reportUnpersistedProviderUse(stdout, stderr, deps, options, configPath); handled {
return exit
}
}
cfg, err := config.SetActiveProvider(configPath, options.name)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
override := activeProviderEnvOverride(deps.getenv, cfg.ActiveProvider)
if options.json {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, map[string]any{
payload := map[string]any{
"activeProvider": cfg.ActiveProvider,
"configPath": configPath,
}); err != nil {
}
if override != "" {
// A JSON consumer must not read this as an effective switch either.
payload["effectiveProvider"] = override
payload["overriddenByEnv"] = config.ActiveProviderEnv
}
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, payload); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
@@ -70,9 +93,32 @@ func runProvidersUse(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps app
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Active provider set to %s\nnext: %s\n", cfg.ActiveProvider, providerCheckCommand(cfg.ActiveProvider, false)); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
if override != "" {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "Note: %s=%s is set and overrides config.json, so %s stays the active provider until you unset %s.\n", config.ActiveProviderEnv, override, override, config.ActiveProviderEnv); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
}
return exitSuccess
}
// activeProviderEnvOverride returns the ZERO_PROVIDER value when it is set and
// names a DIFFERENT provider than the one just selected, meaning the saved
// `providers use` selection will NOT be the effective active provider until the
// env var is unset. applyEnv (resolver.go) makes ZERO_PROVIDER win over
// config.json unconditionally, so reporting the write as a plain success reads as
// a switch that silently has no effect (issue #721). Empty when nothing overrides
// (including when getenv is nil, e.g. a test that did not inject the environment).
func activeProviderEnvOverride(getenv func(string) string, selected string) string {
if getenv == nil {
return ""
}
override := strings.TrimSpace(getenv(config.ActiveProviderEnv))
if override == "" || strings.EqualFold(override, strings.TrimSpace(selected)) {
return ""
}
return override
}
func runProvidersSetup(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
options, help, err := parseProviderSetupArgs(args)
if err != nil {
@@ -352,6 +398,22 @@ func runProvidersRemove(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
name := options.names[0]
// RemoveProvider only ever matches profiles persisted in config.json (see
// config.ProviderPersisted), but a provider can be visible in
// `zero providers list`/the TUI picker purely because Resolve()
// synthesized it in-memory from an ambient env var (e.g. OPENAI_API_KEY)
// without ever writing a row to disk. Without this check, deleting that
// provider by name always fails with a confusing "not found" even though
// it is genuinely visible/usable this session (issue #707).
persisted, err := config.ProviderPersisted(configPath, name)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
if !persisted {
if exit, handled := reportUnpersistedProviderRemove(stdout, stderr, deps, name, options.json, configPath); handled {
return exit
}
}
cfg, err := config.RemoveProvider(configPath, name)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
@@ -428,6 +490,16 @@ func runProvidersRename(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
oldName := options.names[0]
persisted, err := config.ProviderPersisted(configPath, oldName)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
if !persisted {
if exit, handled := reportUnpersistedProviderRename(stdout, stderr, deps, oldName, options.json, configPath); handled {
return exit
}
}
cfg, err := config.RenameProvider(configPath, options.names[0], options.names[1])
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
@@ -447,3 +519,120 @@ func runProvidersRename(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps
}
return exitSuccess
}
// providerResolvedByName reports whether name matches a provider in a
// resolved provider list — used to tell a genuinely unknown name (a typo)
// apart from a real, env-derived provider that just has no config.json row.
func providerResolvedByName(providers []config.ProviderProfile, name string) bool {
name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
for _, provider := range providers {
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(provider.Name), name) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// reportUnpersistedProviderUse handles `zero providers use <name>` for a
// provider that is not persisted in config.json. If it's not resolvable at
// all (an unknown/misspelled name), it returns handled=false so the caller
// falls through to SetActiveProvider's real "not found" error. If it IS
// resolvable — an env-derived profile (e.g. ambient OPENAI_API_KEY) —
// SetActiveProvider would only ever fail "not found" against it, so this
// reports the situation plainly instead of that confusing error (issue
// #707).
func reportUnpersistedProviderUse(stdout, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, options providerUseOptions, configPath string) (int, bool) {
resolved, exitCode := resolveCommandCenterConfig(stderr, deps)
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
// resolveCommandCenterConfig already wrote its own error to stderr;
// stop here instead of letting the caller try SetActiveProvider too.
return exitCode, true
}
if !providerResolvedByName(resolved.Providers, options.name) {
return exitCode, false
}
message := fmt.Sprintf(
"Provider %q is not saved in config.json (likely set via an environment variable), so there is no saved profile to switch to.\nIt is available whenever its environment variable is set, but is only active when selected (for example via ZERO_PROVIDER); unset its environment variable to stop Zero from detecting it automatically.",
options.name,
)
if options.json {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, map[string]any{
"activeProvider": resolved.ActiveProvider,
"configPath": configPath,
"persisted": false,
"message": message,
}); err != nil {
return exitCrash, true
}
return exitSuccess, true
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, message); err != nil {
return exitCrash, true
}
return exitSuccess, true
}
// reportUnpersistedProviderRemove handles `zero providers remove <name>` for
// a provider that is not persisted in config.json, mirroring the TUI
// provider manager's delete handling (internal/tui/provider_manager.go). If
// name isn't resolvable at all, it returns handled=false so the caller falls
// through to RemoveProvider's real "not found" error.
func reportUnpersistedProviderRemove(stdout, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, name string, jsonOutput bool, configPath string) (int, bool) {
resolved, exitCode := resolveCommandCenterConfig(stderr, deps)
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
return exitCode, true
}
if !providerResolvedByName(resolved.Providers, name) {
return exitCode, false
}
message := fmt.Sprintf(
"Provider %q is not saved in config.json (likely set via an environment variable) — nothing to remove there.\nUnset its environment variable to stop Zero from detecting it automatically.",
name,
)
if jsonOutput {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, map[string]any{
"removed": "",
"keyRemoved": false,
"activeProvider": resolved.ActiveProvider,
"configPath": configPath,
"persisted": false,
"message": message,
}); err != nil {
return exitCrash, true
}
return exitSuccess, true
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, message); err != nil {
return exitCrash, true
}
return exitSuccess, true
}
func reportUnpersistedProviderRename(stdout, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, name string, jsonOutput bool, configPath string) (int, bool) {
resolved, exitCode := resolveCommandCenterConfig(stderr, deps)
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
return exitCode, true
}
if !providerResolvedByName(resolved.Providers, name) {
return exitCode, false
}
message := fmt.Sprintf(
"Provider %q is not saved in config.json (likely set via an environment variable), so there is no saved profile to rename.",
name,
)
if jsonOutput {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, map[string]any{
"renamed": nil,
"configPath": configPath,
"persisted": false,
"message": message,
}); err != nil {
return exitCrash, true
}
return exitSuccess, true
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, message); err != nil {
return exitCrash, true
}
return exitSuccess, true
}
+201
View File
@@ -75,6 +75,207 @@ func TestRunProvidersUseJSONIncludesActiveProviderAndConfigPath(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func providersUseOverrideConfig(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
writeProviderOnboardingConfig(t, configPath, config.FileConfig{
ActiveProvider: "work",
Providers: []config.ProviderProfile{
{Name: "work", ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAI, BaseURL: config.OpenAIBaseURL, Model: "gpt-4.1"},
{Name: "fast", ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAICompatible, BaseURL: "https://api.groq.com/openai/v1", Model: "llama-3.3-70b-versatile"},
},
})
return configPath
}
// The write to config.json still succeeds, but when ZERO_PROVIDER names a
// different provider the saved selection is NOT effective, so the command must
// warn instead of reporting a silent success (issue #721).
func TestRunProvidersUseWarnsWhenEnvOverrides(t *testing.T) {
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
configPath := providersUseOverrideConfig(t)
deps := providerSetupDeps(configPath)
deps.getenv = func(key string) string {
if key == config.ActiveProviderEnv {
return "work" // ZERO_PROVIDER=work overrides the switch to fast
}
return ""
}
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "use", "fast"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
if cfg := readFileConfig(t, configPath); cfg.ActiveProvider != "fast" {
t.Fatalf("ActiveProvider = %q, want fast (the write still lands)", cfg.ActiveProvider)
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "Active provider set to fast") {
t.Fatalf("stdout missing the success line: %q", stdout.String())
}
note := stderr.String()
for _, want := range []string{config.ActiveProviderEnv, "overrides config.json", "work"} {
if !strings.Contains(note, want) {
t.Fatalf("override note missing %q, got %q", want, note)
}
}
}
func TestRunProvidersUseJSONFlagsEnvOverride(t *testing.T) {
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
deps := providerSetupDeps(providersUseOverrideConfig(t))
deps.getenv = func(key string) string {
if key == config.ActiveProviderEnv {
return "work"
}
return ""
}
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "use", "fast", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
var payload struct {
ActiveProvider string `json:"activeProvider"`
EffectiveProvider string `json:"effectiveProvider"`
OverriddenByEnv string `json:"overriddenByEnv"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("JSON did not decode: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
}
if payload.ActiveProvider != "fast" || payload.EffectiveProvider != "work" || payload.OverriddenByEnv != config.ActiveProviderEnv {
t.Fatalf("JSON must flag the env override, got %#v", payload)
}
}
// No override note when ZERO_PROVIDER is unset or already names the selection.
func TestRunProvidersUseNoWarnWithoutEnvOverride(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]func(string) string{
"env unset": func(string) string { return "" },
"env matches fast": func(key string) string {
if key == config.ActiveProviderEnv {
return "fast"
}
return ""
},
}
for name, getenv := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
deps := providerSetupDeps(providersUseOverrideConfig(t))
deps.getenv = getenv
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "use", "fast"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d: %s", code, stderr.String())
}
if stderr.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected no override note, got %q", stderr.String())
}
})
}
}
func TestRunProvidersUseSurfacesMalformedConfig(t *testing.T) {
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte("{"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write malformed config: %v", err)
}
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "use", "openai"}, &stdout, &stderr, providerSetupDeps(configPath))
if exitCode != exitCrash {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d", exitCode, exitCrash)
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "invalid config JSON") {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want malformed-config error", stderr.String())
}
}
func TestRunProvidersUseEnvDerivedJSONIncludesConfigPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "sk-env")
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
writeProviderOnboardingConfig(t, configPath, config.FileConfig{})
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "use", "openai", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, providerSetupDeps(configPath))
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d: %s", exitCode, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
var payload struct {
ConfigPath string `json:"configPath"`
Persisted bool `json:"persisted"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode JSON: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
}
if payload.ConfigPath != configPath || payload.Persisted {
t.Fatalf("unexpected payload: %+v", payload)
}
}
func TestRunProvidersRemoveEnvDerivedJSONKeepsSchema(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "sk-env")
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
writeProviderOnboardingConfig(t, configPath, config.FileConfig{})
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "remove", "openai", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, providerSetupDeps(configPath))
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d: %s", exitCode, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
var payload struct {
Removed string `json:"removed"`
KeyRemoved bool `json:"keyRemoved"`
Persisted bool `json:"persisted"`
ConfigPath string `json:"configPath"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode JSON: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
}
if payload.Removed != "" || payload.KeyRemoved || payload.Persisted || payload.ConfigPath != configPath {
t.Fatalf("unexpected payload: %+v", payload)
}
}
func TestRunProvidersRenameEnvDerivedExplainsNoSavedProfile(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "sk-env")
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
writeProviderOnboardingConfig(t, configPath, config.FileConfig{})
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "rename", "openai", "renamed"}, &stdout, &stderr, providerSetupDeps(configPath))
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d: %s", exitCode, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "no saved profile to rename") {
t.Fatalf("stdout = %q, want unpersisted explanation", stdout.String())
}
}
func TestRunProvidersRenameEnvDerivedJSONKeepsSchema(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "sk-env")
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
writeProviderOnboardingConfig(t, configPath, config.FileConfig{})
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "rename", "openai", "renamed", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, providerSetupDeps(configPath))
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d: %s", exitCode, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
var payload struct {
Renamed *struct{} `json:"renamed"`
ConfigPath string `json:"configPath"`
Persisted bool `json:"persisted"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode JSON: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
}
if payload.Renamed != nil || payload.ConfigPath != configPath || payload.Persisted {
t.Fatalf("unexpected payload: %+v", payload)
}
}
func TestRunProvidersUseRejectsUsageErrors(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
+15
View File
@@ -1001,3 +1001,18 @@ func sandboxPolicyCapabilityStatus(capabilities []sandbox.BackendCapability, key
}
return ""
}
func TestApplyConfiguredSandboxPolicyEnabledFalseDisables(t *testing.T) {
disabled := false
if got := applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(sandbox.DefaultPolicy(), config.SandboxConfig{Enabled: &disabled}); got.Mode != sandbox.ModeDisabled {
t.Fatalf("enabled:false must yield ModeDisabled, got %q", got.Mode)
}
// Omitted (nil) and explicit true keep the default enforcing mode.
if got := applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(sandbox.DefaultPolicy(), config.SandboxConfig{}); got.Mode == sandbox.ModeDisabled {
t.Fatal("omitted enabled must not disable the sandbox")
}
enabled := true
if got := applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(sandbox.DefaultPolicy(), config.SandboxConfig{Enabled: &enabled}); got.Mode == sandbox.ModeDisabled {
t.Fatal("enabled:true must not disable the sandbox")
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -216,10 +216,10 @@ func parseNonEmptySessionsFlag(flag string, value string) (string, error) {
func parseSessionKindFlag(value string) (sessions.SessionKind, error) {
kind := sessions.SessionKind(strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(value)))
switch kind {
case sessions.SessionKindFork, sessions.SessionKindChild, sessions.SessionKindSpecDraft, sessions.SessionKindSpecImpl:
case sessions.SessionKindFork, sessions.SessionKindChild, sessions.SessionKindSide, sessions.SessionKindSpecDraft, sessions.SessionKindSpecImpl:
return kind, nil
default:
return "", execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("invalid --kind %q. Expected fork, child, spec-draft, or spec-impl.", value)}
return "", execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("invalid --kind %q. Expected fork, child, side, spec-draft, or spec-impl.", value)}
}
}
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ Commands:
Flags:
--json Print JSON output
--kind <kind> Filter list by fork, child, spec-draft, or spec-impl
--kind <kind> Filter list by fork, child, side, spec-draft, or spec-impl
--sequence <n> Rewind target sequence (rewind-plan, rewind)
--event <id> Rewind target event id (rewind-plan, rewind)
--exclude-target Drop the target event (rewind-plan, rewind)
+14
View File
@@ -233,6 +233,9 @@ func TestRunSessionsListFiltersByKind(t *testing.T) {
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{SessionID: "side", SessionKind: sessions.SessionKindSide, Title: "BTW side"}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
@@ -249,6 +252,17 @@ func TestRunSessionsListFiltersByKind(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("filtered sessions output = %q", output)
}
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
exitCode = runWithDeps([]string{"sessions", "list", "--kind", "side"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
newSessionStore: func() *sessions.Store {
return store
},
})
if exitCode != exitSuccess || !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "side") || strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "regular") {
t.Fatalf("sessions list --kind side exit=%d stdout=%q stderr=%q", exitCode, stdout.String(), stderr.String())
}
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
exitCode = runWithDeps([]string{"sessions", "tree", "draft", "--kind", "spec-draft"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
+19 -3
View File
@@ -42,16 +42,20 @@ var errProviderCommandTimeout = errors.New("provider command timeout")
func runProviderCommand(command string, timeout time.Duration) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
cmd := shellCommand(command)
configureCommandProcess(cmd)
// Bound the time Wait spends draining I/O pipes after the process exits,
// in case an orphaned descendant still holds the write ends open.
cmd.WaitDelay = time.Second
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stdout = &stdout
cmd.Stderr = &stderr
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
proc, err := startCommandProcess(cmd)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
defer proc.Close()
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
@@ -63,9 +67,21 @@ func runProviderCommand(command string, timeout time.Duration) ([]byte, []byte,
select {
case err := <-done:
if err != nil {
// The shell exited (whether via ErrWaitDelay because a
// background descendant kept the inherited stdout/stderr pipes
// open, or via a nonzero exit status) but a leftover descendant
// may still be running. Terminate is a no-op against an
// already-dead tree, so always call it rather than gating on
// the specific error to avoid leaking that descendant.
proc.Terminate()
}
if errors.Is(err, exec.ErrWaitDelay) {
return stdout.Bytes(), stderr.Bytes(), errProviderCommandTimeout
}
return stdout.Bytes(), stderr.Bytes(), err
case <-timer.C:
terminateCommandProcess(cmd)
proc.Terminate()
<-done
return stdout.Bytes(), stderr.Bytes(), errProviderCommandTimeout
}
+142 -2
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
package config
import (
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -67,7 +69,8 @@ func TestLoadProviderCommandFailureIncludesExitAndRedactsOutput(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestLoadProviderCommandTimeout(t *testing.T) {
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{SleepSeconds: 10})
pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "sleep.pid")
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{SleepSeconds: 10, PidFile: pidFile})
start := time.Now()
_, err := LoadProviderCommand(command)
@@ -85,6 +88,102 @@ func TestLoadProviderCommandTimeout(t *testing.T) {
if elapsed > maxElapsed {
t.Fatalf("timeout returned after %s, want roughly 5s", elapsed)
}
assertProcessTerminatedIfStarted(t, pidFile)
}
// TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChild covers a command that
// exits immediately but leaves a detached child holding the inherited
// stdout/stderr pipes open (e.g. `sleep 600 & exit`). cmd.Wait() only
// unblocks once WaitDelay elapses, and that path must still terminate the
// leftover child instead of just returning and leaking it.
func TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChild(t *testing.T) {
pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "bg.pid")
childLifetime := 10 * time.Second
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{
Stdout: `{"name":"cmd","provider":"openai","apiKey":"sk-command","model":"gpt-command"}`,
BackgroundSleepSeconds: int(childLifetime / time.Second),
BackgroundPidFile: pidFile,
})
start := time.Now()
_, err := LoadProviderCommand(command)
elapsed := time.Since(start)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("LoadProviderCommand() error = nil, want error from WaitDelay-bounded wait")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "timed out after 5s") {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want timeout", err.Error())
}
if elapsed >= childLifetime {
t.Fatalf("returned after %s, want before the background child finishes naturally after %s", elapsed, childLifetime)
}
assertProcessTerminated(t, pidFile)
}
// TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChildOnFailure covers the same
// leaked-descendant scenario as TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChild,
// but with a shell that exits nonzero. Go's exec.Cmd.Wait only returns
// exec.ErrWaitDelay when the command itself exited successfully; a nonzero
// exit yields the bare *ExitError instead, so the leftover child must still
// be terminated on that path.
func TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChildOnFailure(t *testing.T) {
pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "bg-fail.pid")
childLifetime := 10 * time.Second
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{
Stderr: "boom",
ExitCode: 7,
BackgroundSleepSeconds: int(childLifetime / time.Second),
BackgroundPidFile: pidFile,
})
start := time.Now()
_, err := LoadProviderCommand(command)
elapsed := time.Since(start)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("LoadProviderCommand() error = nil, want failure from nonzero exit")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "exit status") {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want exit status failure", err.Error())
}
if elapsed >= childLifetime {
t.Fatalf("returned after %s, want before the background child finishes naturally after %s", elapsed, childLifetime)
}
assertProcessTerminated(t, pidFile)
}
func assertProcessTerminatedIfStarted(t *testing.T, pidFile string) {
t.Helper()
// The basic timeout fixture is intentionally unsynchronized. On a loaded
// Windows runner, the cold PowerShell child can be terminated before it
// records its PID; the synchronized background-child tests below retain
// the strict PID and liveness checks.
if _, err := os.Stat(pidFile); errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return
}
assertProcessTerminated(t, pidFile)
}
func assertProcessTerminated(t *testing.T, pidFile string) {
t.Helper()
data, err := os.ReadFile(pidFile)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read sleeper pid file: %v", err)
}
pid, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(data)))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse sleeper pid %q: %v", data, err)
}
deadline := time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
if !processAlive(pid) {
return
}
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
}
t.Fatalf("sleeper process %d still alive after timeout", pid)
}
func TestLoadProviderCommandInvalidJSON(t *testing.T) {
@@ -118,6 +217,14 @@ type commandScript struct {
Stderr string
ExitCode int
SleepSeconds int
PidFile string
// BackgroundSleepSeconds, if set, spawns a detached child that keeps the
// inherited stdout/stderr handles open well after the script itself
// exits, simulating a `sleep 600 & exit` style command. BackgroundPidFile
// records the detached child's PID.
BackgroundSleepSeconds int
BackgroundPidFile string
}
func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
@@ -128,7 +235,11 @@ func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
path := filepath.Join(dir, "provider.cmd")
lines := []string{"@echo off"}
if script.SleepSeconds > 0 {
lines = append(lines, "powershell -NoProfile -Command \"Start-Sleep -Seconds "+itoa(script.SleepSeconds)+"\"")
sleep := "Start-Sleep -Seconds " + itoa(script.SleepSeconds)
if script.PidFile != "" {
sleep = "Set-Content -Path '" + psSingleQuote(script.PidFile) + "' -Value $PID -Encoding Ascii; " + sleep
}
lines = append(lines, "powershell -NoProfile -Command \""+sleep+"\"")
}
if script.Stdout != "" {
lines = append(lines, "echo "+script.Stdout)
@@ -136,6 +247,15 @@ func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
if script.Stderr != "" {
lines = append(lines, "echo "+script.Stderr+" 1>&2")
}
if script.BackgroundSleepSeconds > 0 {
readyFile := script.BackgroundPidFile + ".ready"
bgSleep := "Set-Content -LiteralPath '" + psSingleQuote(script.BackgroundPidFile) + "' -Value $PID -Encoding Ascii; " +
"Set-Content -LiteralPath '" + psSingleQuote(readyFile) + "' -Value ready -Encoding Ascii; " +
"Start-Sleep -Seconds " + itoa(script.BackgroundSleepSeconds)
lines = append(lines, "start /B powershell -NoProfile -Command \""+bgSleep+"\"")
waitForReady := "while (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath '" + psSingleQuote(readyFile) + "')) { Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 10 }"
lines = append(lines, "powershell -NoProfile -Command \""+waitForReady+"\"")
}
lines = append(lines, "exit /b "+itoa(script.ExitCode))
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(strings.Join(lines, "\r\n")), 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write command: %v", err)
@@ -146,6 +266,9 @@ func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
path := filepath.Join(dir, "provider.sh")
lines := []string{"#!/bin/sh"}
if script.SleepSeconds > 0 {
if script.PidFile != "" {
lines = append(lines, "echo $$ > '"+shSingleQuote(script.PidFile)+"'")
}
lines = append(lines, "sleep "+itoa(script.SleepSeconds))
}
if script.Stdout != "" {
@@ -154,6 +277,10 @@ func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
if script.Stderr != "" {
lines = append(lines, "printf '%s\\n' '"+script.Stderr+"' >&2")
}
if script.BackgroundSleepSeconds > 0 {
lines = append(lines, "sleep "+itoa(script.BackgroundSleepSeconds)+" &")
lines = append(lines, "echo $! > '"+shSingleQuote(script.BackgroundPidFile)+"'")
}
lines = append(lines, "exit "+itoa(script.ExitCode))
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(strings.Join(lines, "\n")), 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write command: %v", err)
@@ -161,6 +288,19 @@ func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
return path
}
// psSingleQuote escapes a value for interpolation inside a PowerShell
// single-quoted string literal, where a literal quote is doubled.
func psSingleQuote(value string) string {
return strings.ReplaceAll(value, "'", "''")
}
// shSingleQuote escapes a value for interpolation inside a POSIX shell
// single-quoted string literal, where a literal quote must close the
// quoted section, emit an escaped quote, then reopen it.
func shSingleQuote(value string) string {
return strings.ReplaceAll(value, "'", `'\''`)
}
func itoa(value int) string {
if value == 0 {
return "0"
+72
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package config
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"os"
"strings"
)
// ToolsOverride builds a ToolsConfig that explicitly overrides the deferred-tool
// threshold (including to 0, which disables deferral). Use this for programmatic
// Overrides — a bare ToolsConfig{DeferThreshold: 0} is indistinguishable from
// "unset" and will not override.
func ToolsOverride(deferThreshold int) ToolsConfig {
return ToolsConfig{DeferThreshold: deferThreshold, deferThresholdSet: true}
}
// ValidateFile reads and parses path as a Zero FileConfig and runs the same
// semantic provider/model rules used during resolution. It returns the parsed
// config (zero value on parse failure) plus any structured issues. A parse
// failure yields a single issue whose Message is the underlying JSON error's
// text (already flattened via Error(), not chained — callers cannot recover
// the original *json.SyntaxError / *json.UnmarshalTypeError via errors.As).
func ValidateFile(path string) (FileConfig, []Issue) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, []Issue{{Message: fmt.Sprintf("read config %s: %v", path, err)}}
}
var cfg FileConfig
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, []Issue{{Message: fmt.Sprintf("invalid config JSON %s: %v", path, err)}}
}
issues := validateSemantics(cfg)
issues = append(issues, unknownFieldIssues(data)...)
return cfg, issues
}
// SetProviderDescription sets a provider's description VERBATIM — including to
// empty. The generic UpsertProvider merge treats empty fields as "leave
// unchanged", so clearing a description needs this dedicated setter.
func SetProviderDescription(path string, name string, description string) (FileConfig, error) {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path == "" {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("config path is required")
}
name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
if name == "" {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider name is required")
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("read config %s: %w", path, err)
}
cfg := FileConfig{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid config JSON %s: %w", path, err)
}
for index := range cfg.Providers {
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(cfg.Providers[index].Name), name) {
cfg.Providers[index].Description = strings.TrimSpace(description)
if err := writeConfigFile(path, cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, err
}
return cfg, nil
}
}
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider %q not found", name)
}
+48 -7
View File
@@ -3,18 +3,59 @@
package config
import (
"io"
"os/exec"
"syscall"
)
func configureCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true}
type commandProcess struct {
groupID int
anchor *exec.Cmd
anchorInput io.WriteCloser
}
func terminateCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
if cmd.Process == nil {
return
// startCommandProcess retains a live process-group leader until cleanup. The
// provider shell may be reaped before Wait finishes draining descendant-held
// pipes, so its PID cannot safely identify the group after Wait returns.
func startCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) (*commandProcess, error) {
anchor := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "read _")
anchor.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true}
anchorInput, err := anchor.StdinPipe()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
_ = syscall.Kill(-cmd.Process.Pid, syscall.SIGKILL)
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
if err := anchor.Start(); err != nil {
_ = anchorInput.Close()
return nil, err
}
proc := &commandProcess{groupID: anchor.Process.Pid, anchor: anchor, anchorInput: anchorInput}
if cmd.SysProcAttr == nil {
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{}
}
cmd.SysProcAttr.Setpgid = true
cmd.SysProcAttr.Pgid = proc.groupID
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
proc.Close()
return nil, err
}
return proc, nil
}
func (p *commandProcess) Terminate() {
if p.groupID != 0 {
_ = syscall.Kill(-p.groupID, syscall.SIGKILL)
}
}
func (p *commandProcess) Close() {
if p.anchorInput != nil {
_ = p.anchorInput.Close()
p.anchorInput = nil
}
if p.anchor != nil {
_ = p.anchor.Wait()
p.anchor = nil
}
p.groupID = 0
}
+66
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
//go:build !windows
package config
import (
"os/exec"
"syscall"
"testing"
)
func TestCommandProcessPreservesSysProcAttr(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "exit 0")
attr := &syscall.SysProcAttr{}
cmd.SysProcAttr = attr
proc, err := startCommandProcess(cmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("startCommandProcess: %v", err)
}
defer proc.Close()
if cmd.SysProcAttr != attr {
t.Fatal("startCommandProcess replaced SysProcAttr")
}
if !cmd.SysProcAttr.Setpgid || cmd.SysProcAttr.Pgid != proc.groupID {
t.Fatalf("process group = Setpgid %v, Pgid %d; want true, %d", cmd.SysProcAttr.Setpgid, cmd.SysProcAttr.Pgid, proc.groupID)
}
if err := cmd.Wait(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Wait: %v", err)
}
}
func TestCommandProcessRetainsGroupIdentityAfterProviderWait(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "exit 7")
proc, err := startCommandProcess(cmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("startCommandProcess: %v", err)
}
defer func() {
proc.Terminate()
proc.Close()
}()
providerPID := cmd.Process.Pid
anchorPID := proc.groupID
if err := cmd.Wait(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Wait error = nil, want nonzero exit")
}
if anchorPID == providerPID {
t.Fatalf("group identity reused provider PID %d", providerPID)
}
if !processAlive(anchorPID) {
t.Fatalf("group leader %d exited before cleanup", anchorPID)
}
proc.Terminate()
proc.Close()
if processAlive(anchorPID) {
t.Fatalf("group leader %d still alive after cleanup", anchorPID)
}
}
func processAlive(pid int) bool {
err := syscall.Kill(pid, 0)
return err == nil || err == syscall.EPERM
}
+147 -5
View File
@@ -3,23 +3,165 @@
package config
import (
"context"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"syscall"
"time"
"unsafe"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
func configureCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) {}
// configureCommandProcess starts the process suspended so it can be
// assigned to the job object before its main thread (and therefore any
// code it runs) executes. Without this, a fast command can spawn and
// detach a descendant before AssignProcessToJobObject runs, letting that
// descendant escape the job and survive termination.
func configureCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{CreationFlags: windows.CREATE_SUSPENDED}
}
func terminateCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
func startCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) (*commandProcess, error) {
configureCommandProcess(cmd)
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return attachCommandProcess(cmd), nil
}
// commandProcess tracks a started provider command so its entire process
// tree can be terminated on timeout. It prefers a job object: taskkill /T
// walks the tree by parent PID in user space and can miss descendants,
// letting them run to completion while Wait blocks on inherited pipes.
type commandProcess struct {
cmd *exec.Cmd
job windows.Handle
processHandle windows.Handle
}
func attachCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) *commandProcess {
proc := &commandProcess{cmd: cmd}
if cmd.Process == nil {
return proc
}
// The main thread is suspended (see configureCommandProcess); resume it
// once we're done attaching, however that turns out. If resuming fails
// outright (Toolhelp/OpenThread/ResumeThread errors are otherwise
// swallowed), the process would sit suspended forever and never exit on
// its own, making the failure look like an ordinary 5s provider-command
// timeout. Terminate it immediately instead so the real cause surfaces
// quickly and no suspended process is left behind.
defer func() {
if !resumeMainThread(cmd.Process.Pid) {
proc.Terminate()
}
}()
handle, err := windows.OpenProcess(windows.PROCESS_SET_QUOTA|windows.PROCESS_TERMINATE|windows.PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, false, uint32(cmd.Process.Pid))
if err != nil {
return proc
}
proc.processHandle = handle
job, err := windows.CreateJobObject(nil, nil)
if err != nil {
return proc
}
if err := windows.AssignProcessToJobObject(job, handle); err != nil {
_ = windows.CloseHandle(job)
return proc
}
proc.job = job
return proc
}
// resumeMainThread resumes every (assumed suspended) thread of pid and
// reports whether at least one was actually resumed. Callers must treat a
// false result as a failed resume, not a benign no-op: a suspended process
// that's never woken up will neither exit nor produce output on its own.
func resumeMainThread(pid int) bool {
snapshot, err := windows.CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(windows.TH32CS_SNAPTHREAD, 0)
if err != nil {
return false
}
defer func() { _ = windows.CloseHandle(snapshot) }()
var entry windows.ThreadEntry32
entry.Size = uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(entry))
resumed := false
for err := windows.Thread32First(snapshot, &entry); err == nil; err = windows.Thread32Next(snapshot, &entry) {
if entry.OwnerProcessID != uint32(pid) {
continue
}
thread, err := windows.OpenThread(windows.THREAD_SUSPEND_RESUME, false, entry.ThreadID)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if _, err := windows.ResumeThread(thread); err == nil {
resumed = true
}
_ = windows.CloseHandle(thread)
}
return resumed
}
func (p *commandProcess) Terminate() {
if p.job != 0 {
// A job handle means the process tree was contained from launch, so
// TerminateJobObject alone kills every member atomically. Don't also
// fall through to the taskkill/PID path below: by the time
// Terminate runs on the ErrWaitDelay path, cmd.Wait has already
// reaped the root process, so its PID may have been reused by an
// unrelated process, and forcing /T /PID against a reused PID would
// kill the wrong tree.
_ = windows.TerminateJobObject(p.job, 1)
return
}
taskkill := taskkillPath()
_ = exec.Command(taskkill, "/T", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(cmd.Process.Pid)).Run()
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
if p.cmd.Process == nil {
return
}
if p.processHandle == 0 {
// Without a retained identity, never target a numeric PID that may
// have been reaped and reused. os.Process.Kill uses Go's original
// process state instead.
_ = p.cmd.Process.Kill()
return
}
// Fallback for the rare case where job creation or assignment failed:
// only invoke taskkill while the identity-preserving handle confirms the
// original root is still active. Keeping that handle open through Run
// prevents Windows from reusing its PID for an unrelated process.
var exitCode uint32
if err := windows.GetExitCodeProcess(p.processHandle, &exitCode); err == nil && exitCode == stillActive {
taskkill := taskkillPath()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
_ = exec.CommandContext(ctx, taskkill, "/T", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(p.cmd.Process.Pid)).Run()
cancel()
}
_ = windows.TerminateProcess(p.processHandle, 1)
}
// Close releases the retained handles without touching any still-running
// descendants: the job carries no KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE limit, so on the success
// path a provider command's detached helpers keep running exactly as they did
// before job objects were introduced. Descendant termination happens
// explicitly via Terminate, called only on timeout/error.
func (p *commandProcess) Close() {
if p.job != 0 {
_ = windows.CloseHandle(p.job)
p.job = 0
}
if p.processHandle != 0 {
_ = windows.CloseHandle(p.processHandle)
p.processHandle = 0
}
}
const stillActive = uint32(259) // STILL_ACTIVE
func taskkillPath() string {
systemRoot := os.Getenv("SystemRoot")
if systemRoot == "" {
+65
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
//go:build windows
package config
import (
"os/exec"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// TestResumeMainThreadReportsFailureForUnknownPID covers the contract
// attachCommandProcess relies on: when no thread belonging to pid can be
// found (here, because the pid doesn't correspond to a live process),
// resumeMainThread must report false rather than silently doing nothing,
// so a caller can react (e.g. terminate the process) instead of leaving it
// suspended indefinitely.
func TestResumeMainThreadReportsFailureForUnknownPID(t *testing.T) {
if resumeMainThread(0) {
t.Fatal("resumeMainThread(0) = true, want false for a pid with no threads")
}
}
func TestCommandProcessRetainsIdentityAfterWait(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command("cmd", "/C", "exit /b 0")
configureCommandProcess(cmd)
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Start: %v", err)
}
proc := attachCommandProcess(cmd)
t.Cleanup(proc.Close)
if proc.processHandle == 0 {
t.Fatal("attachCommandProcess did not retain a process handle")
}
if err := cmd.Wait(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Wait: %v", err)
}
var code uint32
if err := windows.GetExitCodeProcess(proc.processHandle, &code); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetExitCodeProcess after Wait: %v", err)
}
if code == stillActive {
t.Fatalf("exit code = STILL_ACTIVE after Wait")
}
proc.Close()
if proc.job != 0 || proc.processHandle != 0 {
t.Fatalf("Close left handles open: job=%v process=%v", proc.job, proc.processHandle)
}
}
func processAlive(pid int) bool {
handle, err := windows.OpenProcess(windows.PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, false, uint32(pid))
if err != nil {
return false
}
defer func() { _ = windows.CloseHandle(handle) }()
var code uint32
if err := windows.GetExitCodeProcess(handle, &code); err != nil {
return false
}
return code == stillActive
}
+20
View File
@@ -93,6 +93,16 @@ func Resolve(options ResolveOptions) (ResolvedConfig, error) {
if err != nil {
return ResolvedConfig{}, err
}
// Sandbox.Enabled is NOT accepted from a provider command, for the same
// reason project config cannot set it (see mergeProjectConfig): only
// global config and the CLI may turn the sandbox off. A provider command
// is an arbitrary executable named in config, and LoadProviderCommand
// parses its stdout into a full FileConfig — so without this, a command
// returning a valid provider plus {"sandbox":{"enabled":false}} would
// disable the very sandbox meant to constrain what it can do. Cleared
// here rather than in mergeConfig because that helper is shared with the
// trusted global-config merge, which must keep honouring the setting.
commandConfig.Sandbox.Enabled = nil
mergeConfig(&cfg, commandConfig)
}
@@ -216,6 +226,9 @@ func mergeConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) {
mergeProvider(dst, provider)
}
mergeMCPConfig(&dst.MCP, src.MCP, true)
if src.Sandbox.Enabled != nil {
dst.Sandbox.Enabled = src.Sandbox.Enabled
}
if network := strings.TrimSpace(src.Sandbox.Network); network != "" {
dst.Sandbox.Network = network
}
@@ -273,6 +286,10 @@ func mergeProjectConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) error {
if err := mergeProjectMCPConfig(&dst.MCP, src.MCP); err != nil {
return err
}
// Sandbox.Enabled is intentionally NOT merged from project config: a cloned
// repo's .zero/config.json must not be able to disable the sandbox that
// constrains it. Only global config and CLI can turn the sandbox off.
//
// Sandbox.AdditionalWriteRoots is intentionally NOT merged from project
// config: a cloned repo's .zero/config.json must not be able to grant
// itself write access outside the workspace. Global config and CLI flags
@@ -688,6 +705,9 @@ func applyOverrides(cfg *FileConfig, overrides Overrides) {
if overrides.MaxTurns > 0 {
cfg.MaxTurns = overrides.MaxTurns
}
if overrides.Sandbox.Enabled != nil {
cfg.Sandbox.Enabled = overrides.Sandbox.Enabled
}
if overrides.Sandbox.BlockUnixSockets {
cfg.Sandbox.BlockUnixSockets = true
}
+79
View File
@@ -1744,6 +1744,85 @@ func TestResolveSandboxNetworkProjectConfigCannotWeaken(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestResolveSandboxEnabledUserConfigDisables(t *testing.T) {
userPath := writeConfig(t, `{"sandbox": {"enabled": false}}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: userPath, Env: map[string]string{}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
}
if resolved.Sandbox.Enabled == nil || *resolved.Sandbox.Enabled {
t.Fatalf("user config enabled:false must resolve to a false pointer, got %v", resolved.Sandbox.Enabled)
}
}
func TestResolveSandboxDisableIgnoredFromProjectConfig(t *testing.T) {
// Security: a cloned repo's project config must NOT be able to disable the
// sandbox that constrains it. Only global config / CLI can turn it off.
userPath := writeConfig(t, `{}`)
projectPath := writeConfig(t, `{"sandbox": {"enabled": false}}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: userPath, ProjectConfigPath: projectPath, Env: map[string]string{}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
}
if resolved.Sandbox.Enabled != nil {
t.Fatalf("project config enabled:false must be ignored, got %v — a repo could disable the sandbox", *resolved.Sandbox.Enabled)
}
}
func TestResolveSandboxEnabledIgnoredFromProviderCommand(t *testing.T) {
// Security: a provider command is an arbitrary executable named in config, and
// its stdout is parsed into a full FileConfig — so it must NOT be able to reach
// Sandbox.Enabled, in either direction. Same rule as project config: only global
// config / CLI may turn the sandbox off.
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
value string
}{
{name: "cannot disable", value: "false"},
{name: "cannot enable", value: "true"},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{
Stdout: `{"activeProvider":"cmd","providers":[{"name":"cmd","provider":"openai","apiKey":"sk-command","model":"gpt-command"}],"sandbox":{"enabled":` + tc.value + `}}`,
})
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{ProviderCommand: command, Env: map[string]string{}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
}
// The provider itself must still be applied — only the sandbox toggle is dropped.
if resolved.ActiveProvider != "cmd" {
t.Fatalf("ActiveProvider = %q, want cmd (provider command must still apply)", resolved.ActiveProvider)
}
if resolved.Sandbox.Enabled != nil {
t.Fatalf("provider command set sandbox.enabled=%s, got %v — a provider command could toggle the sandbox", tc.value, *resolved.Sandbox.Enabled)
}
})
}
}
func TestResolveSandboxEnabledCLIOverride(t *testing.T) {
// A CLI/programmatic override (applied after every config source) must be able
// to disable the sandbox, even with no config file.
disabled := false
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{Env: map[string]string{}, Overrides: Overrides{Sandbox: SandboxConfig{Enabled: &disabled}}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
}
if resolved.Sandbox.Enabled == nil || *resolved.Sandbox.Enabled {
t.Fatalf("CLI override enabled:false must disable the sandbox, got %v", resolved.Sandbox.Enabled)
}
// An explicit true override must win over a lower-precedence global-config false.
userPath := writeConfig(t, `{"sandbox": {"enabled": false}}`)
enabled := true
resolved2, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: userPath, Env: map[string]string{}, Overrides: Overrides{Sandbox: SandboxConfig{Enabled: &enabled}}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
}
if resolved2.Sandbox.Enabled == nil || !*resolved2.Sandbox.Enabled {
t.Fatalf("CLI override enabled:true must win over config false, got %v", resolved2.Sandbox.Enabled)
}
}
func TestResolveNotifyValid(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{"notify":{"mode":"both","focusMode":"always"}}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
+6 -8
View File
@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ func HasProviderProfile(profile ProviderProfile) bool {
}
type SandboxConfig struct {
// Enabled turns the sandbox off when set to false (`"sandbox": {"enabled":
// false}`). A pointer distinguishes an explicit false (disable) from an
// omitted key (keep the default: enabled). Honored from the GLOBAL user
// config and CLI only — deliberately NOT project config, so a cloned repo
// cannot disable the sandbox that constrains it. nil / true keep enforcement.
Enabled *bool `json:"enabled,omitempty"`
// Network controls whether shell commands classified as network-touching
// (curl, git push, package installs, …) are allowed: "allow" or "deny".
// Empty keeps the built-in default (deny). Without this knob the engine's
@@ -316,14 +322,6 @@ type SwarmConfig struct {
MaxTeamSize int `json:"maxTeamSize,omitempty"`
}
// ToolsOverride builds a ToolsConfig that explicitly overrides the deferred-tool
// threshold (including to 0, which disables deferral). Use this for programmatic
// Overrides — a bare ToolsConfig{DeferThreshold: 0} is indistinguishable from
// "unset" and will not override.
func ToolsOverride(deferThreshold int) ToolsConfig {
return ToolsConfig{DeferThreshold: deferThreshold, deferThresholdSet: true}
}
func (cfg *ToolsConfig) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
type rawTools struct {
DeferThreshold *int `json:"deferThreshold"`
-23
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package config
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"os"
)
// Issue is a single structured problem found while validating a config file.
@@ -13,28 +12,6 @@ type Issue struct {
Message string `json:"message"`
}
// ValidateFile reads and parses path as a Zero FileConfig and runs the same
// semantic provider/model rules used during resolution. It returns the parsed
// config (zero value on parse failure) plus any structured issues. A parse
// failure yields a single issue whose Message wraps the underlying JSON error
// so callers can extract *json.SyntaxError / *json.UnmarshalTypeError offsets
// via errors.As.
func ValidateFile(path string) (FileConfig, []Issue) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, []Issue{{Message: fmt.Sprintf("read config %s: %v", path, err)}}
}
var cfg FileConfig
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, []Issue{{Message: fmt.Errorf("invalid config JSON %s: %w", path, err).Error()}}
}
issues := validateSemantics(cfg)
issues = append(issues, unknownFieldIssues(data)...)
return cfg, issues
}
// ValidateBytes parses data as a Zero FileConfig and runs the same semantic
// provider/model rules as ValidateFile. It returns the parsed config (zero
// value on parse failure) plus any structured issues. A parse failure yields a
+27 -33
View File
@@ -177,6 +177,33 @@ func SetActiveProvider(path string, name string) (FileConfig, error) {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider %q not found", name)
}
// ProviderPersisted reports whether a provider profile named name actually has
// a row in the config file at path. A provider can appear in the resolved/
// in-memory provider list without ever being written to config.json — e.g.
// applyProviderEnv synthesizes an "openai" profile purely from an ambient
// OPENAI_API_KEY environment variable on every Resolve() call, without ever
// persisting it. RemoveProvider/SetActiveProvider/SetProviderModel only ever
// look at what's on disk, so a caller offering to mutate a provider by name
// should check this first: "not on disk" needs different handling (nothing to
// persist/remove there) than a name that doesn't exist anywhere at all.
func ProviderPersisted(path string, name string) (bool, error) {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
if path == "" || name == "" {
return false, nil
}
cfg, err := loadConfigFile(path)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
for _, provider := range cfg.Providers {
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(provider.Name), name) {
return true, nil
}
}
return false, nil
}
// RemoveProvider deletes the named provider profile from the config at path.
// When the removed profile was active, activeProvider hands off to the first
// remaining provider (or clears when none remain) so the config never points at
@@ -404,39 +431,6 @@ func EditProvider(path string, edit ProviderEdit) (FileConfig, error) {
return cfg, nil
}
// SetProviderDescription sets a provider's description VERBATIM — including to
// empty. The generic UpsertProvider merge treats empty fields as "leave
// unchanged", so clearing a description needs this dedicated setter.
func SetProviderDescription(path string, name string, description string) (FileConfig, error) {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path == "" {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("config path is required")
}
name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
if name == "" {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider name is required")
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("read config %s: %w", path, err)
}
cfg := FileConfig{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid config JSON %s: %w", path, err)
}
for index := range cfg.Providers {
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(cfg.Providers[index].Name), name) {
cfg.Providers[index].Description = strings.TrimSpace(description)
if err := writeConfigFile(path, cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, err
}
return cfg, nil
}
}
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider %q not found", name)
}
// migrateStoredProviderKey moves a credential-store entry to a new provider
// name: write-new-then-delete-old, so an interruption can leave a duplicate but
// never a missing key. A missing source entry is a no-op (the marker may be
+2 -2
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ func TestBuildCountsProjectGuidelinesAndFreeBudget(t *testing.T) {
writeTestFile(t, root, "AGENTS.md", strings.Repeat("project rules\n", 200))
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreTools(root) {
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(root, nil) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ func TestBuildHasStableJSONContractAndCategoryMath(t *testing.T) {
writeTestFile(t, root, "ZERO.md", strings.Repeat("zero rules\n", 16))
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreTools(root) {
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(root, nil) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
+4
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package cron
func (s Schedule) String() string { return s.expr }
-2
View File
@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@ type Schedule struct {
expr string
}
func (s Schedule) String() string { return s.expr }
// full returns a bitset with every value in [min,max] set.
func full(min, max int) uint64 {
var m uint64
+42 -7
View File
@@ -99,35 +99,60 @@ func (s *Store) Add(job Job) (Job, error) {
job.Status = StatusActive
}
job.CreatedAt = s.now().UTC()
id, err := s.allocID()
id, unlock, err := s.reserveID()
if err != nil {
return Job{}, err
}
// Held from reservation through initial persistence: without this, Remove
// (which takes the same per-ID lock before deleting) could delete the
// bare reservation directory the instant after Mkdir and report success,
// then writeJob's MkdirAll would silently resurrect it and persist the
// job anyway — or a second Add could re-reserve the freed id while this
// writer is still running, putting two writers on the same metadata path.
defer unlock()
job.ID = id
if err := s.writeJob(job); err != nil {
if err := s.writeReservedJob(job); err != nil {
return Job{}, err
}
return job, nil
}
func (s *Store) allocID() (string, error) {
// reserveID atomically reserves an unused job id (by os.Mkdir-ing its
// directory) and returns the per-ID lock held for that id, still acquired.
// The caller must release it (via the returned unlock) only once the
// reservation has been committed (metadata.json written) or torn down —
// see Add.
func (s *Store) reserveID() (string, func(), error) {
if err := os.MkdirAll(s.root, 0o700); err != nil {
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("create cron store root: %w", err)
}
base := s.now().UTC().Format("20060102-150405")
for n := 0; n < 100; n++ {
id := base
if n > 0 {
id = fmt.Sprintf("%s-%d", base, n)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(s.root, id)); errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return id, nil
unlock, err := s.lockJob(id)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
mkErr := os.Mkdir(s.jobDir(id), 0o700)
if mkErr == nil {
return id, unlock, nil
}
unlock()
if errors.Is(mkErr, os.ErrExist) {
continue
}
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("reserve cron job id %q: %w", id, mkErr)
}
return "", errors.New("could not allocate a unique cron job id")
return "", nil, errors.New("could not allocate a unique cron job id")
}
func (s *Store) jobDir(id string) string { return filepath.Join(s.root, id) }
// validID rejects ids that could escape the store root (path separators or
// traversal). allocID-generated timestamp ids always pass; this guards
// traversal). reserveID-generated timestamp ids always pass; this guards
// externally-supplied ids (get/update/remove/append).
func validID(id string) bool {
return id != "" && id != "." && id != ".." && !strings.ContainsAny(id, `/\`) && filepath.Base(id) == id
@@ -153,6 +178,16 @@ func (s *Store) writeJob(job Job) error {
return nil
}
func (s *Store) writeReservedJob(job Job) error {
if err := s.writeJob(job); err != nil {
if cleanupErr := os.RemoveAll(s.jobDir(job.ID)); cleanupErr != nil {
return errors.Join(err, fmt.Errorf("remove failed cron job reservation: %w", cleanupErr))
}
return err
}
return nil
}
func (s *Store) Get(id string) (Job, error) {
if !validID(id) {
return Job{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid cron job id %q", id)
+156
View File
@@ -2,9 +2,11 @@ package cron
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
)
@@ -74,6 +76,160 @@ func TestStoreAddListGetRemove(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestStoreAddReservesUniqueIDsAcrossConcurrentStores(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
now := func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC() }
const adds = 32
start := make(chan struct{})
results := make(chan Job, adds)
errs := make(chan error, adds)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for i := 0; i < adds; i++ {
wg.Add(1)
go func(index int) {
defer wg.Done()
store := NewStore(StoreOptions{RootDir: root, Now: now})
<-start
job, err := store.Add(Job{Expr: "* * * * *", Prompt: fmt.Sprintf("job-%d", index)})
if err != nil {
errs <- err
return
}
results <- job
}(i)
}
close(start)
wg.Wait()
close(results)
close(errs)
for err := range errs {
t.Errorf("concurrent Add: %v", err)
}
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, adds)
reader := NewStore(StoreOptions{RootDir: root, Now: now})
for job := range results {
if _, duplicate := seen[job.ID]; duplicate {
t.Errorf("concurrent Add returned duplicate ID %q", job.ID)
}
seen[job.ID] = struct{}{}
persisted, err := reader.Get(job.ID)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Get(%q): %v", job.ID, err)
continue
}
if persisted.Prompt != job.Prompt {
t.Errorf("Get(%q).Prompt = %q, want %q", job.ID, persisted.Prompt, job.Prompt)
}
}
if len(seen) != adds {
t.Fatalf("unique jobs = %d, want %d", len(seen), adds)
}
}
// TestAddDoesNotLeakReservationToConcurrentRemove reproduces the audit
// finding that Remove could observe and delete an in-flight Add's bare
// reservation directory (Mkdir'd but not yet holding metadata.json) and
// report success — after which Add's writeJob would silently resurrect the
// directory and persist the job anyway. Add now holds the same per-ID lock
// Remove takes, from reservation through initial persistence, so a
// concurrent Remove for that id must wait until the reservation is either
// committed or torn down, never observing the bare reservation in between.
func TestAddDoesNotLeakReservationToConcurrentRemove(t *testing.T) {
store := newTestStore(t)
// Simulate the in-flight window Add now holds the lock across: the id is
// reserved (its directory exists) but metadata.json has not been written.
id, unlock, err := store.reserveID()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("reserveID: %v", err)
}
if _, statErr := os.Stat(store.jobDir(id)); statErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("reservation directory missing: %v", statErr)
}
removeErr := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
removeErr <- store.Remove(id)
}()
// Remove cannot proceed past the shared per-ID lock we're holding, so it's
// safe to commit the job here, before releasing it: if Remove could race
// ahead of this write, it would delete the bare reservation instead of
// waiting to observe (and remove) the committed job.
job := Job{ID: id, Expr: "* * * * *", Prompt: "job", Status: StatusActive}
if err := store.writeJob(job); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("writeJob: %v", err)
}
unlock()
if err := <-removeErr; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Remove of the committed job: %v", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(store.jobDir(id)); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("job directory should be gone after Remove: %v", err)
}
if _, err := store.Get(id); !errors.Is(err, ErrJobNotFound) {
t.Fatalf("Get after Remove = %v, want ErrJobNotFound", err)
}
}
// TestReserveIDSerializesOnPerIDLock covers the other half of the audit
// finding: a second Add attempting the SAME candidate id while the first
// reservation is still held must block on the shared per-ID lock (not just
// race the directory Mkdir), so it never ends up writing metadata.json for
// an id whose first writer is still in flight. It moves on to the next
// candidate id instead.
func TestReserveIDSerializesOnPerIDLock(t *testing.T) {
store := newTestStore(t)
id, unlock, err := store.reserveID()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first reserveID: %v", err)
}
type reservation struct {
id string
err error
}
second := make(chan reservation, 1)
go func() {
id2, unlock2, err := store.reserveID()
if err == nil {
unlock2()
}
second <- reservation{id: id2, err: err}
}()
// The second reserveID cannot observe an id until this lock is released:
// it contends on the same per-ID lock file before ever attempting Mkdir.
unlock()
got := <-second
if got.err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second reserveID: %v", got.err)
}
if got.id == id {
t.Fatalf("second reserveID returned the first id %q while its reservation was still held", got.id)
}
}
func TestWriteReservedJobRemovesReservationOnFailure(t *testing.T) {
store := newTestStore(t)
job := Job{ID: "reserved", Expr: "* * * * *", Prompt: "job"}
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(store.jobDir(job.ID), "metadata.json.tmp"), 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := store.writeReservedJob(job); err == nil {
t.Fatal("writeReservedJob error = nil, want metadata write failure")
}
if _, err := os.Stat(store.jobDir(job.ID)); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("failed reservation still exists: %v", err)
}
}
func TestStoreAppendRun(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestStore(t)
job, _ := s.Add(Job{Expr: "* * * * *", Prompt: "x", Status: StatusActive})
-10
View File
@@ -37,16 +37,6 @@ const (
StreamProviderOpenAI = "openai"
)
// BatchProviders lists valid stt.provider values, for config validation.
func BatchProviders() []string {
return []string{ProviderLocal, ProviderGroq, ProviderOpenAI}
}
// StreamProviders lists valid stt.streamProvider values, for config validation.
func StreamProviders() []string {
return []string{StreamProviderLocal, StreamProviderDeepgram, StreamProviderOpenAI}
}
// AudioFormat identifies a recorded container format, sniffed from the bytes —
// desktop recorders produce WAV, Termux's recorder produces M4A/AAC.
type AudioFormat string
+153
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
// Package execprofile defines named execution profiles: bundles of loop-posture
// knobs (turn budget, reasoning effort, self-correction, escalation triggers)
// that tune how hard the agent loop tries, independent of which model runs.
// Profiles COMPOSE with --mode: a mode answers "what runs" (model, tools),
// a profile answers "how hard the loop tries". Selection precedence is
// explicit flag > --mode > profile, enforced by the callers applying profiles
// last with the same fill-only-if-unset rule modes use.
//
// The catalog is deliberately tiny and value-stable: balanced is the empty
// profile (selecting it leaves the run's options, budget, and loop behavior
// identical to an unflagged run — asserted by test; only the opt-in trace and
// bench artifacts record the selected profile name, by design, so captures are
// self-describing), fast trades turn budget and effort for latency with a
// one-shot escalation back to the displaced posture as the safety net, and
// thorough raises the budget and arms full self-correction.
package execprofile
import (
"sort"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
// Profile is a named execution posture. Zero-valued fields inherit the run's
// existing value (flag, mode, config, or built-in default) — a profile only
// ever fills knobs the caller left unset, except MaxTurns which REPLACES the
// resolved budget (that displacement is what escalation restores).
type Profile struct {
// Name identifies the profile in traces, help text, and diagnostics.
Name string
// MaxTurns replaces the resolved per-run tool-turn budget when > 0 and the
// user did not pass an explicit --max-turns. The displaced resolved value
// becomes the escalation target (see Policy).
MaxTurns int
// ReasoningEffort fills the run's effort when the user left it unset. It
// still flows through the model-supported gating at the call site, so an
// unsupported level degrades exactly like an explicit flag would.
ReasoningEffort string
// SelfCorrect arms the post-edit verify-and-correct loop. Profiles can only
// turn it ON (the flag is presence-only, so false is indistinguishable from
// unset and must never override an explicit opt-in).
SelfCorrect bool
// Escalation triggers. All zero means the profile never escalates and
// Policy returns nil (the loop stays byte-identical to a nil-profile run).
// Targets are NOT part of the catalog: escalation restores the values the
// profile displaced at selection time, never invented ones, so targets are
// stamped by Policy from what the caller measured.
EscalateOnToolFailureStreak int
EscalateOnCompletionUncertain int
EscalateOnSelfCorrectFailure bool
EscalateOnRiskyMutation sandbox.RiskLevel
}
// The catalog. Values marked provisional are floors/ceilings derived from the
// Phase 0 baseline's read-class evidence (successful nav runs used single-digit
// turns; the mutating classes produced no successful samples to tune from) and
// are expected to be re-tuned from the post-oracle-fix re-capture. The
// escalation safety net is what makes shipping provisional Fast values safe:
// a run that hits trouble gets its displaced budget back mid-run.
var (
// Balanced is the default posture: empty on purpose. Selecting it changes
// nothing — the no-regression invariant of the whole feature.
Balanced = Profile{Name: "balanced"}
// Fast starts cheap (30 turns, low effort) and arms every escalation
// trigger so a struggling run restores its displaced posture: two
// same-tool retriable failures in a row, a second uncertain completion
// evaluation, a failing self-correction cycle, or a critical-risk
// mutation. The risk threshold is deliberately Critical, not High: the
// sandbox classifies EVERY shell command as at least high risk before any
// command analysis, so a High trigger would fire on the first `go test`
// of virtually any coding task and spend the one-shot on turn one.
// Critical marks the genuinely scary categories (destructive commands,
// piped installers, out-of-workspace writes, network mutations).
Fast = Profile{
Name: "fast",
MaxTurns: 30,
ReasoningEffort: "low",
EscalateOnToolFailureStreak: 2,
EscalateOnCompletionUncertain: 2,
EscalateOnSelfCorrectFailure: true,
EscalateOnRiskyMutation: sandbox.RiskCritical,
}
// Thorough doubles the default budget, asks for high effort, and arms the
// full post-edit verify-and-correct loop. Already the maximum posture, so
// it has nothing to escalate to.
Thorough = Profile{
Name: "thorough",
MaxTurns: 160,
ReasoningEffort: "high",
SelfCorrect: true,
}
)
var catalog = map[string]Profile{
Balanced.Name: Balanced,
Fast.Name: Fast,
Thorough.Name: Thorough,
}
// Lookup resolves a profile by name, case-insensitively and ignoring
// surrounding whitespace.
func Lookup(name string) (Profile, bool) {
profile, ok := catalog[strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(name))]
return profile, ok
}
// Names returns the catalog's profile names, sorted, for usage errors and help.
func Names() []string {
names := make([]string, 0, len(catalog))
for name := range catalog {
names = append(names, name)
}
sort.Strings(names)
return names
}
// Policy projects the profile into the loop-facing ProfilePolicy.
//
// displacedMaxTurns is the turn budget this profile displaced at selection time
// (what the run would have used without it) and becomes the escalation's
// restore target; pass 0 when the profile did not displace the budget (e.g.
// the user pinned --max-turns explicitly) so escalation leaves the ceiling
// untouched. effortFilled reports whether the profile actually filled the
// run's reasoning effort (it backs off when the user set one explicitly); the
// displaced effort is then "" (the provider default) by construction, which
// the escalation restores via RestoreDefaultEffort — a plain "" target would
// mean "leave untouched".
//
// Profiles with no armed triggers return nil: the loop treats a nil policy as
// "no profile" (no observation, no counters), which keeps balanced and
// thorough runs byte-identical to the same knob values set by hand.
func (p Profile) Policy(displacedMaxTurns int, effortFilled bool) *agent.ProfilePolicy {
if p.EscalateOnToolFailureStreak == 0 && p.EscalateOnCompletionUncertain == 0 &&
!p.EscalateOnSelfCorrectFailure && p.EscalateOnRiskyMutation == "" {
return nil
}
return &agent.ProfilePolicy{
Name: p.Name,
Escalate: &agent.PostureEscalation{
MaxTurns: displacedMaxTurns,
RestoreDefaultEffort: effortFilled,
OnToolFailureStreak: p.EscalateOnToolFailureStreak,
OnCompletionUncertain: p.EscalateOnCompletionUncertain,
OnSelfCorrectFailure: p.EscalateOnSelfCorrectFailure,
OnRiskyMutation: p.EscalateOnRiskyMutation,
},
}
}
+131
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@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
package execprofile
import (
"reflect"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
// The no-regression invariant of the whole feature: balanced must be the empty
// profile (nothing but a name), so selecting it cannot change a run.
func TestBalancedProfileIsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
profile, ok := Lookup("balanced")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("balanced must exist in the catalog")
}
if profile.Name != "balanced" {
t.Fatalf("Name = %q, want %q", profile.Name, "balanced")
}
profile.Name = ""
if !reflect.DeepEqual(profile, Profile{}) {
t.Fatalf("balanced must be zero-valued apart from its name, got %+v", profile)
}
if policy := Balanced.Policy(80, false); policy != nil {
t.Fatalf("balanced Policy must be nil (byte-identical loop), got %+v", policy)
}
}
func TestLookupIsCaseAndSpaceInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
for _, name := range []string{"fast", "Fast", " FAST "} {
if _, ok := Lookup(name); !ok {
t.Fatalf("Lookup(%q) should resolve", name)
}
}
if _, ok := Lookup("turbo"); ok {
t.Fatal("Lookup(turbo) should not resolve")
}
}
func TestNamesAreSorted(t *testing.T) {
want := []string{"balanced", "fast", "thorough"}
if got := Names(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("Names() = %v, want %v", got, want)
}
}
// Escalation targets must be the displaced values only — the catalog carries
// triggers, the call site supplies what was displaced, and nothing else may
// appear in the escalation.
func TestFastPolicyTargetsDisplacedValuesOnly(t *testing.T) {
policy := Fast.Policy(80, true)
if policy == nil {
t.Fatal("fast must arm an escalation policy")
}
if policy.Name != "fast" {
t.Fatalf("policy.Name = %q, want fast", policy.Name)
}
esc := policy.Escalate
if esc == nil {
t.Fatal("fast policy must carry an escalation")
}
if esc.MaxTurns != 80 {
t.Fatalf("Escalate.MaxTurns = %d, want the displaced 80", esc.MaxTurns)
}
if esc.ReasoningEffort != "" {
t.Fatalf("Escalate.ReasoningEffort = %q, want empty (displaced effort is the provider default by construction)", esc.ReasoningEffort)
}
if !esc.RestoreDefaultEffort {
t.Fatal("effort was profile-filled, so escalation must restore the provider default")
}
if esc.RestoreCompletionGate {
t.Fatal("fast does not touch the completion gate, so escalation must not either")
}
if esc.OnToolFailureStreak != Fast.EscalateOnToolFailureStreak ||
esc.OnCompletionUncertain != Fast.EscalateOnCompletionUncertain ||
esc.OnSelfCorrectFailure != Fast.EscalateOnSelfCorrectFailure ||
esc.OnRiskyMutation != Fast.EscalateOnRiskyMutation {
t.Fatalf("escalation triggers must mirror the catalog, got %+v", esc)
}
}
// The effort restore arms only when the profile actually filled the effort:
// with an explicit user effort the profile backed off, so escalation must not
// clear the user's choice.
func TestFastPolicyExplicitEffortIsNeverRestored(t *testing.T) {
policy := Fast.Policy(80, false)
if policy == nil || policy.Escalate == nil {
t.Fatal("fast must still arm its triggers")
}
if policy.Escalate.RestoreDefaultEffort {
t.Fatal("the profile did not fill the effort, so escalation must leave it alone")
}
}
// A profile that did not displace the budget (explicit --max-turns pinned it)
// must not let escalation move the ceiling at all.
func TestFastPolicyZeroDisplacedLeavesCeilingUntouched(t *testing.T) {
policy := Fast.Policy(0, false)
if policy == nil || policy.Escalate == nil {
t.Fatal("fast must still arm its triggers with a zero displaced budget")
}
if policy.Escalate.MaxTurns != 0 {
t.Fatalf("Escalate.MaxTurns = %d, want 0 (no displaced value to restore)", policy.Escalate.MaxTurns)
}
}
// Thorough is already the maximum posture: no triggers, so no policy — the
// loop must stay byte-identical to the same knobs set by hand.
func TestThoroughPolicyIsNil(t *testing.T) {
if policy := Thorough.Policy(80, true); policy != nil {
t.Fatalf("thorough Policy must be nil, got %+v", policy)
}
}
// Pin the catalog's provisional values so a retune is a deliberate,
// test-visible diff (these floors came from the Phase 0 baseline's read-class
// evidence and are expected to move after the post-oracle-fix re-capture).
func TestCatalogProvisionalValues(t *testing.T) {
if Fast.MaxTurns != 30 || Fast.ReasoningEffort != "low" || Fast.SelfCorrect {
t.Fatalf("fast knobs changed: %+v", Fast)
}
// Critical, not High: the sandbox classifies every shell command as at
// least high risk, so a High trigger would spend the one-shot escalation
// on the first benign `go test` of any coding task.
if Fast.EscalateOnRiskyMutation != sandbox.RiskCritical {
t.Fatalf("fast risky-mutation trigger = %q, want %q", Fast.EscalateOnRiskyMutation, sandbox.RiskCritical)
}
if Thorough.MaxTurns != 160 || Thorough.ReasoningEffort != "high" || !Thorough.SelfCorrect {
t.Fatalf("thorough knobs changed: %+v", Thorough)
}
}
+214
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@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
package execution
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"io"
"io/fs"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
const (
maxObservedFiles = 20_000
maxHashedFileBytes = 1 << 20
maxTotalHashedBytes = 32 << 20
)
type ChangeKind string
const (
ChangeCreated ChangeKind = "created"
ChangeModified ChangeKind = "modified"
ChangeDeleted ChangeKind = "deleted"
)
type Change struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Kind ChangeKind `json:"kind"`
Aggregated bool `json:"aggregated,omitempty"`
Count int `json:"count,omitempty"`
}
type fileFingerprint struct {
Mode fs.FileMode
Size int64
ModTime int64
Digest [sha256.Size]byte
Hashed bool
// Aggregated marks a bounded fingerprint for a generated directory. The
// observer never enumerates that tree into individual changes.
Aggregated bool
Count int
}
// ChangeObserver records a bounded workspace snapshot around a command. It
// deliberately skips Zero/repository control metadata and large generated
// dependency trees; those paths must neither be read as command evidence nor
// flood the Files panel.
type ChangeObserver struct {
root string
before map[string]fileFingerprint
valid bool
}
func NewChangeObserver(root string) *ChangeObserver {
root = filepath.Clean(strings.TrimSpace(root))
before, ok := snapshotWorkspace(root)
return &ChangeObserver{root: root, before: before, valid: ok}
}
func (observer *ChangeObserver) Changes() []Change {
if observer == nil || !observer.valid {
return nil
}
after, ok := snapshotWorkspace(observer.root)
if !ok {
return nil
}
changes := make([]Change, 0)
for path, current := range after {
previous, existed := observer.before[path]
if !existed {
changes = append(changes, changeFromFingerprint(path, ChangeCreated, current))
continue
}
if previous != current {
changes = append(changes, changeFromFingerprint(path, ChangeModified, current))
}
}
for path, previous := range observer.before {
if _, exists := after[path]; !exists {
changes = append(changes, changeFromFingerprint(path, ChangeDeleted, previous))
}
}
sort.Slice(changes, func(i, j int) bool { return changes[i].Path < changes[j].Path })
return changes
}
func snapshotWorkspace(root string) (map[string]fileFingerprint, bool) {
if root == "" || root == "." {
return nil, false
}
files := make(map[string]fileFingerprint)
hashedBytes := int64(0)
ok := true
err := filepath.WalkDir(root, func(path string, entry fs.DirEntry, walkErr error) error {
if walkErr != nil {
return nil
}
if path == root {
return nil
}
relative, err := filepath.Rel(root, path)
if err != nil || relative == "." || strings.HasPrefix(relative, ".."+string(filepath.Separator)) {
return nil
}
if entry.IsDir() {
if protectedObservationDirectory(entry.Name()) {
return filepath.SkipDir
}
if generatedObservationDirectory(entry.Name()) {
files[filepath.ToSlash(relative)+"/"] = generatedTreeFingerprint(path)
return filepath.SkipDir
}
return nil
}
if !entry.Type().IsRegular() {
return nil
}
if len(files) >= maxObservedFiles {
ok = false
return fs.SkipAll
}
info, err := entry.Info()
if err != nil {
return nil
}
fingerprint := fileFingerprint{Mode: info.Mode(), Size: info.Size(), ModTime: info.ModTime().UnixNano()}
if info.Size() <= maxHashedFileBytes && hashedBytes+info.Size() <= maxTotalHashedBytes {
if digest, err := hashObservedFile(path); err == nil {
fingerprint.Digest = digest
fingerprint.Hashed = true
hashedBytes += info.Size()
}
}
files[filepath.ToSlash(relative)] = fingerprint
return nil
})
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
return files, ok
}
func protectedObservationDirectory(name string) bool {
switch name {
case ".git", ".zero", ".agents":
return true
default:
return false
}
}
func generatedObservationDirectory(name string) bool {
switch name {
case "node_modules", ".pnpm-store", ".yarn", "dist", "coverage", ".cache":
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// generatedTreeFingerprint samples only direct children and caps the work. It
// is intentionally qualitative: the UI needs to say that a generated tree
// changed, not inventory dependency contents.
func generatedTreeFingerprint(root string) fileFingerprint {
directory, err := os.Open(root)
if err != nil {
return fileFingerprint{Aggregated: true, Count: -1}
}
defer directory.Close()
const maxEntries = 256
entries, err := directory.ReadDir(maxEntries + 1)
if err != nil && err != io.EOF {
return fileFingerprint{Aggregated: true, Count: -1}
}
hash := sha256.New()
count := len(entries)
if count > maxEntries {
entries = entries[:maxEntries]
count = -1
}
for _, entry := range entries {
_, _ = io.WriteString(hash, entry.Name())
if info, infoErr := entry.Info(); infoErr == nil {
_, _ = io.WriteString(hash, info.Mode().String())
_, _ = io.WriteString(hash, strconv.FormatInt(info.ModTime().UnixNano(), 10))
}
}
var digest [sha256.Size]byte
copy(digest[:], hash.Sum(nil))
return fileFingerprint{Digest: digest, Hashed: true, Aggregated: true, Count: count}
}
func changeFromFingerprint(path string, kind ChangeKind, fingerprint fileFingerprint) Change {
return Change{Path: path, Kind: kind, Aggregated: fingerprint.Aggregated, Count: fingerprint.Count}
}
func hashObservedFile(path string) ([sha256.Size]byte, error) {
file, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
return [sha256.Size]byte{}, err
}
defer file.Close()
hash := sha256.New()
if _, err := io.Copy(hash, file); err != nil {
return [sha256.Size]byte{}, err
}
var digest [sha256.Size]byte
copy(digest[:], hash.Sum(nil))
return digest, nil
}
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
package execution
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"testing"
)
func TestChangeObserverReportsCreateModifyAndDelete(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
modified := filepath.Join(root, "modified.txt")
deleted := filepath.Join(root, "deleted.txt")
if err := os.WriteFile(modified, []byte("before"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(deleted, []byte("delete"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
observer := NewChangeObserver(root)
if err := os.WriteFile(modified, []byte("after!"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.Remove(deleted); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(root, "src"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "src", "created.ts"), []byte("export {}"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
want := []Change{
{Path: "deleted.txt", Kind: ChangeDeleted},
{Path: "modified.txt", Kind: ChangeModified},
{Path: "src/created.ts", Kind: ChangeCreated},
}
if got := observer.Changes(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("Changes() = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
}
}
func TestChangeObserverSkipsControlMetadataAndSummarizesGeneratedTrees(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
observer := NewChangeObserver(root)
for _, path := range []string{
filepath.Join(root, ".zero", "config.json"),
filepath.Join(root, ".agents", "skills", "x"),
filepath.Join(root, ".git", "config"),
filepath.Join(root, "node_modules", "pkg", "index.js"),
filepath.Join(root, "dist", "bundle.js"),
} {
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("generated"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
want := []Change{
{Path: "dist/", Kind: ChangeCreated, Aggregated: true, Count: 1},
{Path: "node_modules/", Kind: ChangeCreated, Aggregated: true, Count: 1},
}
if got := observer.Changes(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("Changes() = %#v, want generated summaries without control metadata %#v", got, want)
}
}
+248
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
// Package execution defines the platform-neutral command execution contract.
// Frontends and tools use these types without depending on native sandbox or
// process-management details.
package execution
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
)
const PolicyVersion = 1
type Origin string
const (
OriginInteractiveCommand Origin = "interactive_command"
OriginHook Origin = "hook"
OriginPlugin Origin = "plugin"
OriginMCPServer Origin = "mcp_server"
OriginBackgroundTask Origin = "background_task"
)
type Mode string
const (
ModeCaptured Mode = "captured"
ModeInteractive Mode = "interactive"
ModeDurable Mode = "durable"
)
type Command struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Args []string `json:"args,omitempty"`
Env []string `json:"env,omitempty"`
}
type CapabilityKind string
const (
CapabilityRead CapabilityKind = "filesystem_read"
CapabilityWorkspaceWrite CapabilityKind = "workspace_write"
CapabilityProtectedMetadata CapabilityKind = "protected_metadata"
CapabilityExternalNetwork CapabilityKind = "external_network"
CapabilityIsolatedLoopback CapabilityKind = "isolated_loopback"
CapabilityHostVisibleBinding CapabilityKind = "host_visible_binding"
CapabilityProcessSpawn CapabilityKind = "process_spawn"
CapabilityProcessControl CapabilityKind = "process_control"
CapabilityEnvironment CapabilityKind = "environment"
CapabilityUnrestricted CapabilityKind = "unrestricted"
)
type Capability struct {
Kind CapabilityKind `json:"kind"`
Scope string `json:"scope,omitempty"`
}
type ApprovalContext struct {
SessionID string `json:"sessionId,omitempty"`
PolicyVersion int `json:"policyVersion"`
}
type Request struct {
Origin Origin `json:"origin"`
Mode Mode `json:"mode"`
Command Command `json:"command"`
WorkingDirectory string `json:"workingDirectory"`
WorkspaceRoots []string `json:"workspaceRoots"`
Capabilities []Capability `json:"capabilities,omitempty"`
Approval ApprovalContext `json:"approval"`
}
func (request Request) Validate() error {
if !validOrigin(request.Origin) {
return errors.New("execution request requires a valid origin")
}
if request.Mode != ModeCaptured && request.Mode != ModeInteractive && request.Mode != ModeDurable {
return errors.New("execution request requires a valid mode")
}
if strings.TrimSpace(request.Command.Name) == "" {
return errors.New("execution request requires a command")
}
if strings.TrimSpace(request.WorkingDirectory) == "" {
return errors.New("execution request requires a working directory")
}
if len(request.WorkspaceRoots) == 0 {
return errors.New("execution request requires at least one workspace root")
}
for _, root := range request.WorkspaceRoots {
if strings.TrimSpace(root) == "" {
return errors.New("execution request contains an empty workspace root")
}
}
for _, capability := range request.Capabilities {
if !validCapabilityKind(capability.Kind) {
return fmt.Errorf("execution request contains invalid capability %q", capability.Kind)
}
}
return nil
}
type State string
const (
StateRequested State = "requested"
StateEvaluated State = "evaluated"
StateAwaitingApproval State = "awaiting_approval"
StatePrepared State = "prepared"
StateRunning State = "running"
StateRetained State = "retained"
StateCompleted State = "completed"
StateDenied State = "denied"
StateFailed State = "failed"
StateCancelled State = "cancelled"
)
type OutcomeKind string
const (
OutcomeRunning OutcomeKind = "running"
OutcomeSuccess OutcomeKind = "success"
OutcomePolicyDenied OutcomeKind = "policy_denied"
OutcomeEnforcementDenied OutcomeKind = "enforcement_denied"
OutcomeApplicationFailure OutcomeKind = "application_failure"
OutcomeSandboxSetupFailure OutcomeKind = "sandbox_setup_failure"
OutcomeExecutableNotFound OutcomeKind = "executable_not_found"
OutcomeCancelled OutcomeKind = "cancelled"
OutcomeTimedOut OutcomeKind = "timed_out"
OutcomeEnforcementDegraded OutcomeKind = "enforcement_degraded"
)
type Exit struct {
Code int `json:"code"`
Signal string `json:"signal,omitempty"`
}
type DenialSource string
const (
DenialSourceConfiguredPolicy DenialSource = "configured_policy"
DenialSourcePlatformSandbox DenialSource = "platform_sandbox"
DenialSourceApproval DenialSource = "approval"
)
type DenialNextAction string
const (
DenialNextActionNone DenialNextAction = "none"
DenialNextActionRequestApproval DenialNextAction = "request_approval"
DenialNextActionChangeCommand DenialNextAction = "change_command"
DenialNextActionEnableSandbox DenialNextAction = "enable_sandbox"
)
type Denial struct {
Capability Capability `json:"capability"`
Source DenialSource `json:"source"`
Reason string `json:"reason"`
Recoverable bool `json:"recoverable"`
NextAction DenialNextAction `json:"nextAction"`
}
type Enforcement struct {
Backend string `json:"backend,omitempty"`
Level string `json:"level,omitempty"`
Degraded bool `json:"degraded,omitempty"`
DowngradeReason string `json:"downgradeReason,omitempty"`
}
type Outcome struct {
State State `json:"state"`
Kind OutcomeKind `json:"kind"`
ProcessID string `json:"processId,omitempty"`
Exit *Exit `json:"exit,omitempty"`
Denial *Denial `json:"denial,omitempty"`
Enforcement Enforcement `json:"enforcement"`
Changes []Change `json:"changes,omitempty"`
}
// AdapterReport is the structured, machine-readable result emitted by a
// platform enforcement adapter. It is separate from stdout and stderr so
// command text cannot impersonate a policy decision.
type AdapterReport struct {
Denial *Denial `json:"denial,omitempty"`
}
func (outcome Outcome) Validate() error {
if outcome.State == "" || outcome.Kind == "" {
return errors.New("execution outcome requires state and kind")
}
switch outcome.State {
case StateRetained, StateRunning:
if outcome.Kind != OutcomeRunning || strings.TrimSpace(outcome.ProcessID) == "" {
return errors.New("running execution outcome requires a process id")
}
case StateCompleted:
if outcome.Kind != OutcomeSuccess || outcome.Exit == nil || outcome.Exit.Code != 0 {
return errors.New("completed execution outcome requires a successful exit")
}
case StateDenied:
if (outcome.Kind != OutcomePolicyDenied && outcome.Kind != OutcomeEnforcementDenied) || outcome.Denial == nil {
return errors.New("denied execution outcome requires structured denial details")
}
if err := outcome.Denial.Validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
case StateFailed:
if outcome.Kind == OutcomeRunning || outcome.Kind == OutcomeSuccess || outcome.Exit == nil {
return errors.New("failed execution outcome requires a failure kind and exit")
}
case StateCancelled:
if outcome.Kind != OutcomeCancelled {
return errors.New("cancelled execution outcome requires cancelled kind")
}
default:
return fmt.Errorf("execution outcome state %q is not terminal or externally observable", outcome.State)
}
return nil
}
func (denial Denial) Validate() error {
if !validCapabilityKind(denial.Capability.Kind) {
return errors.New("execution denial requires a valid capability")
}
if denial.Source == "" || strings.TrimSpace(denial.Reason) == "" || denial.NextAction == "" {
return errors.New("execution denial requires source, reason, and next action")
}
return nil
}
func validOrigin(origin Origin) bool {
switch origin {
case OriginInteractiveCommand, OriginHook, OriginPlugin, OriginMCPServer, OriginBackgroundTask:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
func validCapabilityKind(kind CapabilityKind) bool {
switch kind {
case CapabilityRead, CapabilityWorkspaceWrite, CapabilityProtectedMetadata,
CapabilityExternalNetwork, CapabilityIsolatedLoopback, CapabilityHostVisibleBinding,
CapabilityProcessSpawn, CapabilityProcessControl, CapabilityEnvironment, CapabilityUnrestricted:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
+78
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
package execution
import "testing"
func TestRequestValidationRequiresConcreteExecutionContext(t *testing.T) {
request := Request{
Origin: OriginInteractiveCommand,
Mode: ModeCaptured,
Command: Command{Name: "/bin/sh", Args: []string{"-c", "true"}},
WorkingDirectory: "/workspace",
WorkspaceRoots: []string{"/workspace"},
Capabilities: []Capability{{
Kind: CapabilityWorkspaceWrite,
Scope: "/workspace",
}},
}
if err := request.Validate(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Validate: %v", err)
}
request.Origin = ""
if err := request.Validate(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("request without origin unexpectedly validated")
}
}
func TestOutcomeValidationPinsTerminalStateContracts(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
outcome Outcome
valid bool
}{
{
name: "retained process",
outcome: Outcome{State: StateRetained, Kind: OutcomeRunning, ProcessID: "1000"},
valid: true,
},
{
name: "successful completion",
outcome: Outcome{State: StateCompleted, Kind: OutcomeSuccess, Exit: &Exit{Code: 0}},
valid: true,
},
{
name: "structured denial",
outcome: Outcome{
State: StateDenied,
Kind: OutcomePolicyDenied,
Denial: &Denial{
Capability: Capability{Kind: CapabilityProtectedMetadata, Scope: "/workspace/.zero"},
Source: DenialSourceConfiguredPolicy,
Reason: "protected workspace metadata cannot be created",
NextAction: DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
},
},
valid: true,
},
{
name: "retained without process id",
outcome: Outcome{State: StateRetained, Kind: OutcomeRunning},
},
{
name: "denied without denial",
outcome: Outcome{State: StateDenied, Kind: OutcomePolicyDenied},
},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := test.outcome.Validate()
if test.valid && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Validate: %v", err)
}
if !test.valid && err == nil {
t.Fatal("invalid outcome unexpectedly validated")
}
})
}
}
+645
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@@ -0,0 +1,645 @@
package execution
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os/exec"
"sort"
"sync"
"time"
)
const (
defaultCompletedRetention = 30 * time.Second
defaultMaxProcesses = 64
maxPendingOutputBytes = 2 * 1024 * 1024
recentOutputBytes = 4096
processStopTimeout = 3 * time.Second
maxInteractiveYield = 30 * time.Second
maxEmptyPollYield = 5 * time.Minute
)
var (
ErrProcessNotFound = errors.New("execution process not found")
ErrProcessStdinDisabled = errors.New("execution process does not accept stdin")
)
type ProcessManagerOptions struct {
CompletedRetention time.Duration
MaxProcesses int
}
// ProcessManager owns retained interactive-process identity, transport,
// bounded output, continuation, cancellation, completion, and cleanup.
type ProcessManager struct {
mu sync.Mutex
nextID int
processes map[int]*managedProcess
completedRetention time.Duration
maxProcesses int
startTransport processTransportStarter
}
type ProcessStart struct {
Prepared PreparedCommand
Request Request
CommandText string
RelativeCwd string
TTY bool
Metadata map[string]string
// AfterWait may append adapter diagnostics collected by a platform monitor.
AfterWait func() []byte
}
type ProcessContinue struct {
ProcessID int
Input []byte
Interrupt bool
Wait time.Duration
}
type ProcessResult struct {
ProcessID int
CommandText string
RelativeCwd string
TTY bool
Output string
OutputTruncated bool
Exited bool
ExitCode int
Interrupted bool
Request Request
Enforcement Enforcement
Report AdapterReport
ReportErr error
Changes []Change
Metadata map[string]string
}
type ProcessSnapshot struct {
ID int
Command string
Cwd string
RelativeCwd string
StartedAt time.Time
LastUsedAt time.Time
TTY bool
Status string
ExitCode *int
RecentOutput string
OutputTruncated bool
}
func NewProcessManager(options ProcessManagerOptions) *ProcessManager {
retention := options.CompletedRetention
if retention == 0 {
retention = defaultCompletedRetention
}
maxProcesses := options.MaxProcesses
if maxProcesses == 0 {
maxProcesses = defaultMaxProcesses
}
return &ProcessManager{
nextID: 1000,
processes: make(map[int]*managedProcess),
completedRetention: retention,
maxProcesses: maxProcesses,
startTransport: startProcessTransport,
}
}
func (manager *ProcessManager) Start(ctx context.Context, input ProcessStart, wait time.Duration) (ProcessResult, error) {
if manager == nil {
return ProcessResult{}, errors.New("execution process manager is not configured")
}
if err := input.Request.Validate(); err != nil {
return ProcessResult{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid execution request: %w", err)
}
if input.Prepared.Command == nil {
return ProcessResult{}, errors.New("prepared execution has no command")
}
command := input.Prepared.Command
buffer := newProcessOutputBuffer()
request := input.Request
observer := NewChangeObserver(request.WorkspaceRoots[0])
stdin, tty, transportCleanup, err := manager.startTransport(command, buffer, input.TTY)
if err != nil {
if input.Prepared.Cleanup != nil {
input.Prepared.Cleanup()
}
return ProcessResult{}, err
}
if tty {
request.Mode = ModeInteractive
} else {
request.Mode = ModeCaptured
}
now := time.Now()
process := &managedProcess{
id: manager.allocateID(),
commandText: input.CommandText,
cwd: request.WorkingDirectory,
relativeCwd: input.RelativeCwd,
startedAt: now,
lastUsedAt: now,
tty: tty,
command: command,
request: request,
enforcement: input.Prepared.Enforcement,
report: input.Prepared.Report,
cleanup: input.Prepared.Cleanup,
stdin: stdin,
output: buffer,
reaped: make(chan struct{}),
done: make(chan struct{}),
kill: KillProcessTree,
metadata: cloneStringMap(input.Metadata),
}
manager.store(process)
manager.removeCompletedLater(process)
go func() {
waitErr := command.Wait()
close(process.reaped)
if input.AfterWait != nil {
if diagnostic := input.AfterWait(); len(diagnostic) > 0 {
_, _ = buffer.Write(diagnostic)
}
}
if transportCleanup != nil {
transportCleanup()
}
adapterReport, reportErr := AdapterReport{}, error(nil)
if process.report != nil {
adapterReport, reportErr = process.report()
}
changes := observer.Changes()
if process.cleanup != nil {
process.cleanup()
}
process.markDone(waitErr, commandExitCode(waitErr), adapterReport, reportErr, changes)
}()
result := process.collectResult(ctx, clampInitialProcessWait(wait), false)
if ctx != nil && ctx.Err() != nil && !result.Exited {
process.terminate()
more := process.collectResult(context.Background(), time.Second, true)
var mergeTruncated bool
result.Output, mergeTruncated = appendBoundedProcessOutputString(result.Output, more.Output)
result.OutputTruncated = result.OutputTruncated || more.OutputTruncated
result.OutputTruncated = result.OutputTruncated || mergeTruncated
result.Exited = more.Exited
result.ExitCode = more.ExitCode
result.Interrupted = result.Interrupted || more.Interrupted
result.Report = more.Report
result.ReportErr = more.ReportErr
result.Changes = more.Changes
}
if result.Exited {
manager.Remove(process.id)
}
return result, nil
}
func (manager *ProcessManager) Continue(ctx context.Context, input ProcessContinue) (ProcessResult, error) {
process, ok := manager.get(input.ProcessID)
if !ok {
return ProcessResult{}, ErrProcessNotFound
}
process.touch()
if input.Interrupt {
process.terminate()
} else if len(input.Input) > 0 {
if !process.tty || process.stdin == nil {
return ProcessResult{}, ErrProcessStdinDisabled
}
if _, err := process.stdin.Write(input.Input); err != nil && !process.doneClosed() {
return ProcessResult{}, err
}
}
result := process.collectResult(ctx, clampContinuationWait(input.Wait, len(input.Input) == 0), input.Interrupt)
if result.Exited {
manager.Remove(process.id)
}
return result, nil
}
func clampInitialProcessWait(wait time.Duration) time.Duration {
return min(wait, maxInteractiveYield)
}
func clampContinuationWait(wait time.Duration, emptyPoll bool) time.Duration {
if emptyPoll {
return min(wait, maxEmptyPollYield)
}
return min(wait, maxInteractiveYield)
}
func (manager *ProcessManager) List() []ProcessSnapshot {
manager.mu.Lock()
processes := make([]*managedProcess, 0, len(manager.processes))
for _, process := range manager.processes {
if !process.doneClosed() {
processes = append(processes, process)
}
}
manager.mu.Unlock()
snapshots := make([]ProcessSnapshot, 0, len(processes))
for _, process := range processes {
snapshots = append(snapshots, process.snapshot())
}
sort.Slice(snapshots, func(i, j int) bool { return snapshots[i].ID < snapshots[j].ID })
return snapshots
}
func (manager *ProcessManager) Snapshot(id int) (ProcessSnapshot, bool) {
process, ok := manager.get(id)
if !ok {
return ProcessSnapshot{}, false
}
return process.snapshot(), true
}
func (manager *ProcessManager) Stop(id int) bool {
process, ok := manager.get(id)
if !ok {
return false
}
process.terminate()
return true
}
func (manager *ProcessManager) StopAll() []int {
manager.mu.Lock()
processes := make([]*managedProcess, 0, len(manager.processes))
for _, process := range manager.processes {
if !process.doneClosed() {
processes = append(processes, process)
}
}
manager.mu.Unlock()
ids := make([]int, 0, len(processes))
for _, process := range processes {
process.terminate()
ids = append(ids, process.id)
}
waitForProcesses(processes, processStopTimeout)
sort.Ints(ids)
return ids
}
func (manager *ProcessManager) Remove(id int) {
manager.mu.Lock()
delete(manager.processes, id)
manager.mu.Unlock()
}
func (manager *ProcessManager) Len() int {
manager.mu.Lock()
defer manager.mu.Unlock()
return len(manager.processes)
}
func (manager *ProcessManager) allocateID() int {
manager.mu.Lock()
defer manager.mu.Unlock()
id := manager.nextID
manager.nextID++
return id
}
func (manager *ProcessManager) get(id int) (*managedProcess, bool) {
manager.mu.Lock()
defer manager.mu.Unlock()
process, ok := manager.processes[id]
return process, ok
}
func (manager *ProcessManager) store(process *managedProcess) {
manager.mu.Lock()
var evicted *managedProcess
if manager.maxProcesses > 0 && len(manager.processes) >= manager.maxProcesses {
evicted = manager.processToPruneLocked()
if evicted != nil && evicted.doneClosed() {
delete(manager.processes, evicted.id)
evicted = nil
}
}
manager.processes[process.id] = process
manager.mu.Unlock()
if evicted != nil {
_, _ = evicted.output.Write([]byte("[zero] session evicted: too many background terminals\n"))
evicted.terminate()
}
}
func (manager *ProcessManager) processToPruneLocked() *managedProcess {
var processes []*managedProcess
for _, process := range manager.processes {
processes = append(processes, process)
}
sort.Slice(processes, func(i, j int) bool { return processes[i].lastUsed().Before(processes[j].lastUsed()) })
for _, process := range processes {
if process.doneClosed() {
return process
}
}
if len(processes) > 8 {
return processes[0]
}
return nil
}
func (manager *ProcessManager) removeCompletedLater(process *managedProcess) {
go func() {
<-process.done
if manager.completedRetention > 0 {
timer := time.NewTimer(manager.completedRetention)
<-timer.C
}
manager.Remove(process.id)
}()
}
type managedProcess struct {
id int
commandText string
cwd string
relativeCwd string
startedAt time.Time
lastUsedAt time.Time
tty bool
command *exec.Cmd
request Request
enforcement Enforcement
report func() (AdapterReport, error)
cleanup func()
stdin io.WriteCloser
output *processOutputBuffer
reaped chan struct{}
doneOnce sync.Once
done chan struct{}
kill func(int) error
mu sync.Mutex
exitCode *int
waitErr error
resultReport AdapterReport
reportErr error
changes []Change
metadata map[string]string
}
func (process *managedProcess) markDone(err error, exitCode int, report AdapterReport, reportErr error, changes []Change) {
process.mu.Lock()
process.waitErr = err
process.exitCode = &exitCode
process.resultReport = report
process.reportErr = reportErr
process.changes = append([]Change(nil), changes...)
process.mu.Unlock()
process.doneOnce.Do(func() { close(process.done) })
}
func (process *managedProcess) collectResult(ctx context.Context, wait time.Duration, interrupted bool) ProcessResult {
output, truncated := process.collect(ctx, wait)
process.mu.Lock()
exitCode := 0
exited := process.exitCode != nil
if exited {
exitCode = *process.exitCode
}
result := ProcessResult{
ProcessID: process.id, CommandText: process.commandText, RelativeCwd: process.relativeCwd,
TTY: process.tty, Output: output, OutputTruncated: truncated, Exited: exited,
ExitCode: exitCode, Interrupted: interrupted, Request: process.request,
Enforcement: process.enforcement, Report: process.resultReport, ReportErr: process.reportErr,
Changes: append([]Change(nil), process.changes...), Metadata: cloneStringMap(process.metadata),
}
process.mu.Unlock()
return result
}
func (process *managedProcess) collect(ctx context.Context, wait time.Duration) (string, bool) {
if ctx == nil {
ctx = context.Background()
}
deadline := time.Now().Add(wait)
var output []byte
truncated := false
finish := func() (string, bool) {
truncated = truncated || process.output.consumeTruncated()
return string(output), truncated
}
for {
if chunk := process.output.drain(); len(chunk) > 0 {
var chunkTruncated bool
output, chunkTruncated = appendBoundedProcessOutput(output, chunk)
truncated = truncated || chunkTruncated
truncated = truncated || process.output.consumeTruncated()
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
return finish()
}
continue
}
if process.doneClosed() {
var chunkTruncated bool
output, chunkTruncated = appendBoundedProcessOutput(output, process.output.drain())
truncated = truncated || chunkTruncated
return finish()
}
remaining := time.Until(deadline)
if remaining <= 0 {
return finish()
}
timer := time.NewTimer(remaining)
select {
case <-process.output.notify:
case <-process.done:
case <-ctx.Done():
if !timer.Stop() {
select {
case <-timer.C:
default:
}
}
return finish()
case <-timer.C:
return finish()
}
if !timer.Stop() {
select {
case <-timer.C:
default:
}
}
}
}
func appendBoundedProcessOutput(output []byte, chunk []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
if len(chunk) == 0 {
return output, false
}
if len(chunk) >= maxPendingOutputBytes {
bounded := make([]byte, maxPendingOutputBytes)
copy(bounded, chunk[len(chunk)-maxPendingOutputBytes:])
return bounded, len(output) > 0 || len(chunk) > maxPendingOutputBytes
}
if len(output)+len(chunk) <= maxPendingOutputBytes {
return append(output, chunk...), false
}
drop := len(output) + len(chunk) - maxPendingOutputBytes
copy(output, output[drop:])
output = output[:len(output)-drop]
return append(output, chunk...), true
}
func appendBoundedProcessOutputString(output string, chunk string) (string, bool) {
bounded, truncated := appendBoundedProcessOutput([]byte(output), []byte(chunk))
return string(bounded), truncated
}
func (process *managedProcess) doneClosed() bool {
select {
case <-process.done:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
func (process *managedProcess) touch() {
process.mu.Lock()
process.lastUsedAt = time.Now()
process.mu.Unlock()
}
func (process *managedProcess) lastUsed() time.Time {
process.mu.Lock()
defer process.mu.Unlock()
return process.lastUsedAt
}
func (process *managedProcess) terminate() {
if process.reapedClosed() || process.command.Process == nil {
return
}
kill := process.kill
if kill == nil {
kill = KillProcessTree
}
_ = kill(process.command.Process.Pid)
}
func (process *managedProcess) reapedClosed() bool {
if process.reaped == nil {
return false
}
select {
case <-process.reaped:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
func (process *managedProcess) snapshot() ProcessSnapshot {
process.mu.Lock()
defer process.mu.Unlock()
var exit *int
if process.exitCode != nil {
value := *process.exitCode
exit = &value
}
status := "running"
if exit != nil {
status = "exited"
}
return ProcessSnapshot{ID: process.id, Command: process.commandText, Cwd: process.cwd, RelativeCwd: process.relativeCwd,
StartedAt: process.startedAt, LastUsedAt: process.lastUsedAt, TTY: process.tty, Status: status,
ExitCode: exit, RecentOutput: process.output.recentString(), OutputTruncated: process.output.peekTruncated()}
}
func waitForProcesses(processes []*managedProcess, timeout time.Duration) {
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
for _, process := range processes {
remaining := time.Until(deadline)
if remaining <= 0 {
return
}
timer := time.NewTimer(remaining)
select {
case <-process.done:
case <-timer.C:
return
}
if !timer.Stop() {
select {
case <-timer.C:
default:
}
}
}
}
type processOutputBuffer struct {
mu sync.Mutex
data []byte
recent []byte
truncated bool
notify chan struct{}
}
func newProcessOutputBuffer() *processOutputBuffer {
return &processOutputBuffer{notify: make(chan struct{}, 1)}
}
func (buffer *processOutputBuffer) Write(data []byte) (int, error) {
buffer.mu.Lock()
buffer.data = append(buffer.data, data...)
if len(buffer.data) > maxPendingOutputBytes {
buffer.data = buffer.data[len(buffer.data)-maxPendingOutputBytes:]
buffer.truncated = true
}
buffer.recent = append(buffer.recent, data...)
if len(buffer.recent) > recentOutputBytes {
buffer.recent = buffer.recent[len(buffer.recent)-recentOutputBytes:]
}
buffer.mu.Unlock()
select {
case buffer.notify <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
return len(data), nil
}
func (buffer *processOutputBuffer) drain() []byte {
buffer.mu.Lock()
defer buffer.mu.Unlock()
data := append([]byte(nil), buffer.data...)
buffer.data = nil
return data
}
func (buffer *processOutputBuffer) recentString() string {
buffer.mu.Lock()
defer buffer.mu.Unlock()
return string(buffer.recent)
}
func (buffer *processOutputBuffer) consumeTruncated() bool {
buffer.mu.Lock()
defer buffer.mu.Unlock()
value := buffer.truncated
buffer.truncated = false
return value
}
func (buffer *processOutputBuffer) peekTruncated() bool {
buffer.mu.Lock()
defer buffer.mu.Unlock()
return buffer.truncated
}
func cloneStringMap(input map[string]string) map[string]string {
if len(input) == 0 {
return nil
}
output := make(map[string]string, len(input))
for key, value := range input {
output[key] = value
}
return output
}
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