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Author SHA1 Message Date
anandh8x 4d9a68b666 fix: tighten command output summary detection 2026-08-03 19:20:34 +05:30
anandh8x ad152e0049 test: strengthen command reducer guarantees 2026-08-01 11:35:26 +05:30
anandh8x b4b0418daf perf: compact common test output 2026-08-01 00:00:11 +05:30
788 changed files with 7379 additions and 109793 deletions

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-3
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@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ reviews:
- path: "tests/**/*.ts"
instructions: |
Review tests for Bun test idioms, deterministic behavior, and meaningful coverage of safety decisions, provider/runtime flows, session events, and TUI command behavior.
- path: "**/*.go"
instructions: |
Do not request Plan 9 or other unsupported GOOS/GOARCH shims. The five native prebuilt release targets are linux-x64, linux-arm64, macos-arm64, macos-x64, and windows-x64. Android/Termux is also a supported runtime through the documented android-arm64 source build and Linux artifact fallback. Other GOOS/GOARCH combinations are not a review criterion.
tools:
github-checks:
timeout_ms: 300000
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
blank_issues_enabled: false
contact_links:
- name: Questions and setup help
url: https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a
about: Ask in Discussions Q&A. Include zero --version, your OS, provider/model, and zero doctor output for setup problems.
- name: Feature ideas
url: https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas
about: Propose and discuss ideas in Discussions before opening a PR (Zero is in controlled development, see CONTRIBUTING.md).
- name: Security vulnerability
url: https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/security/advisories/new
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/security/advisories/new
about: Report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories (see SECURITY.md). Do not file a public issue.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ body:
- type: markdown
attributes:
value: |
New feature ideas start in [Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
New feature ideas start in [Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
not here. This form is for the step after that: an idea that gained traction in Discussions,
or one a maintainer asked to have tracked as an issue. Please link the discussion below.
Do not begin implementation until the issue has been reviewed and marked with the
+80 -158
View File
@@ -6,109 +6,10 @@ on:
branches:
- main
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
quality:
name: Code Quality & Lint
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.2.2
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.3.0
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
- name: Check formatting
run: make fmt-check
- name: Vet
run: go vet ./...
- name: deadcode (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: make deadcode
- name: golangci-lint (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: make lint-static
test:
name: Unit Tests & Coverage
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.2.2
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.3.0
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
- name: Test with coverage
run: |
go test -count=1 -coverprofile=coverage.out -covermode=atomic ./...
- name: Publish coverage summary
if: always()
shell: bash
run: |
if [ -f coverage.out ]; then
go tool cover -func=coverage.out | awk '
BEGIN {
total = "unknown"
rows = ""
}
$1 == "total:" {
total = $3
next
}
{
rows = rows sprintf("| `%s` | `%s` | **%s** |\n", $1, $2, $3)
}
END {
print "### 📊 Test Coverage Summary: **" total "**"
print "<details><summary>Coverage per function</summary>\n"
print "| File | Function | Coverage |"
print "| :--- | :--- | :--- |"
printf "%s", rows
print "</details>"
}' >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
fi
- name: Upload coverage artifact
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
with:
name: zero-coverage-report
path: coverage.out
if-no-files-found: warn
smoke:
name: Smoke (${{ matrix.os }})
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
timeout-minutes: 15
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
@@ -117,40 +18,6 @@ jobs:
- macos-latest
- windows-latest
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.2.2
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.3.0
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
- name: Test (Fast Non-Race)
run: go test ./...
- name: Build binary
run: go run ./cmd/zero-release build
- name: Smoke binary
run: go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
race:
name: Race Detector
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
# A race the detector newly reports can present as a deadlock rather than a
# failure, and the default job timeout is six hours. This job is expected to
# be the longest in the workflow, so the ceiling is generous but finite.
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
@@ -163,29 +30,72 @@ jobs:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
# Invoke the Makefile target rather than repeating its flags. `make test`
# is already `go test ./... -race -count=1`, so running it here is what
# stops the project's declared test command and what CI actually runs
# from drifting apart again. The race detector needs cgo, which the
# hosted ubuntu runner supplies without an extra setup step.
- name: Test with the race detector
run: make test
- name: Install Make on Windows
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
shell: pwsh
run: choco install make --no-progress -y
- name: Validate quality targets with stock macOS Make
if: matrix.os == 'macos-latest'
env:
GIT_CONFIG_COUNT: 1
GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0: grep.patternType
GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0: fixed
run: make -n vulncheck
- name: Check vulnerabilities through native Windows Make
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
shell: cmd
run: make vulncheck
- name: Check dead code through native Windows Make
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
continue-on-error: true
shell: cmd
run: make deadcode
- name: Run static lint through native Windows Make
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
continue-on-error: true
shell: cmd
run: make lint-static
- name: Check formatting
if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
shell: bash
run: |
unformatted="$(gofmt -l .)"
if [ -n "$unformatted" ]; then
echo "gofmt needed on:" >&2
echo "$unformatted" >&2
exit 1
fi
- name: Vet
if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
run: go vet ./...
- name: Test
run: go test ./...
- name: Build binary
run: go run ./cmd/zero-release build
- name: Smoke binary
run: go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
performance:
name: Performance Smoke
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.2.2
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.3.0
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
@@ -194,39 +104,51 @@ jobs:
run: go run ./cmd/zero-release build
- name: Performance smoke
run: |
mkdir -p dist/perf
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench --output dist/perf/perf-bench.json --ci
run: go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench --output dist/perf/perf-bench.json --ci
- name: Upload performance report
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4
with:
name: zero-performance-smoke
path: dist/perf/perf-bench.json
if-no-files-found: warn
security:
name: Security & Code Health
name: Security & code health
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.2.2
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.3.0
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
- name: govulncheck (linux)
# Hard gate: fails the build when code reaches a known vulnerability. A stdlib
# CVE is cleared by a toolchain bump (see go.mod). May also flag a newly
# published advisory on an unrelated PR — intentional: do not ship known vulns.
- name: govulncheck
run: make vulncheck
- name: govulncheck (windows)
run: make vulncheck-windows
# Advisory: reports functions unreachable from any cmd/* main so dormant
# code is visible in CI. Non-blocking while the dormant subsystems are
# still being wired or removed.
- name: deadcode (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: make deadcode
# Advisory: catches what deadcode's whole-program reachability analysis
# doesn't, unused private functions/assignments reachable within a
# package but never actually called, plus staticcheck-style correctness
# and readability issues. Scoped to a few linters rather than the full
# default battery, and non-blocking, while the existing findings across
# the repo are cleaned up incrementally (see #527).
- name: golangci-lint (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: make lint-static
-1
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@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
+55 -28
View File
@@ -34,15 +34,12 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout
if: ${{ github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' || inputs.ref == '' }}
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Checkout requested ref
if: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.ref != '' }}
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
ref: ${{ inputs.ref }}
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
@@ -100,21 +97,19 @@ jobs:
gh release create "$tag" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --title "$tag" --generate-notes 2>/dev/null || true
gh release upload "$tag" dist/release/* --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --clobber
# Publishes the npm package named in package.json (@twigpine/zero): first
# the five platform payloads (versions of the SAME package at suffixed
# versions like X.Y.Z-linux-x64, carrying the native binary + vendored
# helpers), then the wrapper at X.Y.Z whose optionalDependencies alias those
# platform versions. Platform versions MUST publish first — the wrapper pins
# them exactly, so the reverse order would open a window where installs
# resolve aliases that 404. See docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md for the full contract.
# Publishes @gitlawb/zero to npm: first the five platform payloads (versions
# of the SAME package at suffixed versions like X.Y.Z-linux-x64, carrying the
# native binary + vendored helpers), then the wrapper at X.Y.Z whose
# optionalDependencies alias those platform versions. Platform versions MUST
# publish first — the wrapper pins them exactly, so the reverse order would
# open a window where installs resolve aliases that 404. See
# docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md for the full contract.
#
# Auth is npm OIDC trusted publishing: no NPM_TOKEN secret. The package's
# npmjs.com settings must list this repo + workflow file + the npm-publish
# environment as a trusted publisher, and provenance is then generated
# automatically. npm checks provenance against package.json `repository`,
# so that must name this repository. Note npm only allows configuring a
# trusted publisher on an EXISTING package, so a new package name starts
# with a one-time manual `npm publish` of an empty 0.0.0 placeholder.
# npmjs.com settings must list this repo + workflow file as a trusted
# publisher, and provenance is then generated automatically. Note npm only
# allows configuring a trusted publisher on an EXISTING package, so the very
# first @gitlawb/zero publish is a one-time manual `npm publish` bootstrap.
# Because the platform payloads are versions of the same package, they reuse
# that single trusted-publisher configuration.
publish-npm:
@@ -127,15 +122,13 @@ jobs:
# maintainer approves it in the Actions UI before anything reaches npm.
environment:
name: npm-publish
url: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@twigpine/zero
url: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@gitlawb/zero
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # OIDC token exchange for npm trusted publishing + provenance
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
# No registry-url here on purpose: setup-node's registry-url writes an
# .npmrc line referencing $NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, and npm hard-fails on the
@@ -203,13 +196,47 @@ jobs:
- name: Assemble npm packages
run: node scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs --artifacts-dir dist/artifacts --out-dir dist/npm
# Platform payloads first under the `platform` dist-tag, then the wrapper,
# with the `latest` dist-tag checked before and after (platform versions
# are semver PRERELEASES of the wrapper version and must never become
# `latest`). npm applies publishes asynchronously, so the script waits
# until npm shows every platform version before the wrapper goes out,
# and until `latest` moves after it. Versions already on the registry
# are skipped, so "Re-run failed jobs" is safe after a partial publish.
- name: Publish npm packages
# Platform versions are semver PRERELEASES of the wrapper version
# (X.Y.Z-linux-x64), so they must never publish under the default
# `latest` dist-tag — that would make `npm install @gitlawb/zero`
# deliver a platform payload as the CLI. Publish them under a dedicated
# tag and assert `latest` survived before the wrapper goes out.
- name: Publish platform packages to npm
shell: bash
run: scripts/npm/publish-packages.sh dist/npm
run: |
version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
for dir in dist/npm/platforms/*/; do
echo "publishing ${dir}"
(cd "$dir" && npm publish --access public --tag platform)
done
# Tolerate a failed lookup (registry lag, or no latest tag yet on a
# bootstrap publish): under set -e a bare failure here would abort
# AFTER the platform payloads went out, leaving no wrapper and a
# re-run that fails on republishing existing versions. An empty
# value falls through the guard below.
latest="$(npm view @gitlawb/zero dist-tags.latest || true)"
case "$latest" in
"${version}-"*)
echo "::error::dist-tag latest points at platform version ${latest} — a platform publish clobbered it. Fix the dist-tag before the wrapper publish." >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
echo "dist-tag latest is ${latest} (unchanged by platform publishes)."
- name: Publish wrapper to npm
shell: bash
run: |
version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
(cd dist/npm/wrapper && npm publish --access public)
# Confirm the wrapper owns `latest` (retry: registry metadata can lag
# a publish by a few seconds).
for attempt in 1 2 3 4 5; do
latest="$(npm view @gitlawb/zero dist-tags.latest || true)"
if [ "$latest" = "$version" ]; then
echo "dist-tag latest is ${version}."
exit 0
fi
sleep 5
done
echo "::error::dist-tag latest is ${latest}, expected ${version} after the wrapper publish." >&2
exit 1
-15
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@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ on:
paths:
- action.yml
- docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md
- scripts/action-summary.mjs
- scripts/action-summary.test.mjs
- .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml
push:
branches:
@@ -14,13 +12,8 @@ on:
paths:
- action.yml
- docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md
- scripts/action-summary.mjs
- scripts/action-summary.test.mjs
- .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
validate:
name: Validate action.yml
@@ -31,14 +24,6 @@ jobs:
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Node
uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
with:
node-version: 24
- name: Run action-summary test suite
run: node --test scripts/action-summary.test.mjs
- name: Parse action.yml and assert documented inputs
shell: bash
run: |
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
{".":"0.10.0"}
{".":"0.6.0"}
-90
View File
@@ -67,93 +67,3 @@ requirements. If a related check fails, fix it. If a required check cannot run
because of the environment or fails for an unrelated external reason, report
the exact failure and obtain maintainer direction rather than silently ignoring
it.
## 4. Common Review Blockers
These classes drive multi-round reviews. Fix them before requesting review:
- **Fresh base:** Rebase onto the current PR base (`main` or stacked target)
before review. A stale head that rolls back mainline commits is a hard
blocker, not a merge-time detail. Resolve conflicts by keeping upstream
behavior unless the PR intentionally changes it.
- **Platform truth:** Code and tests must pass on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
Compare paths after canonicalization (physical/`EvalSymlinks` form); never
assert raw `t.TempDir()` spellings (`/var` vs `/private/var` on macOS, short
paths on Windows). Prefer one cross-platform function with small `GOOS`
checks over duplicated helpers that drift.
- **Supported targets only:** CONTRIBUTING.md names the five native prebuilt
release artifacts (`linux-x64`, `linux-arm64`, `macos-arm64`, `macos-x64`,
`windows-x64`) and the additional supported Android/Termux source-build and
artifact-fallback path. Other `GOOS`/`GOARCH` combinations, including
`plan9`, are unsupported and are not a review criterion. Do not block a PR
for failing to compile on an unsupported `GOOS`/`GOARCH`. Tests may use
`plan9` as a fixture for "unsupported".
- **Security edges:** Keep secrets out of argv, env dumps, and logs. Redact
success and error paths (including stderr). Fail closed on ownership, lease,
and permission checks. Do not rely on pre-open path resolution
(`EvalSymlinks` then open) for containment: that is a check-to-use race.
Bind containment at open/use time with rooted or handle-relative,
traversal-resistant APIs. If a no-follow API is used, apply it to every
traversed component and enforce the platform's reparse-point protections;
final-component-only no-follow is insufficient. On multi-step setup, roll back
only what this run created; never destroy pre-existing resources you did
not create; never report success when cleanup or unlock failed.
- **Normalize before matching:** Any transform that REMOVES bytes without
leaving a gap is also a reassembler, so it has to run before whatever matches
on the result. Redacting by shape and then stripping control bytes lets a
credential split by a NUL, an ESC or a C1 byte pass the patterns as two
fragments and be rejoined on the way out; comparing a path against a form
produced by the same resolver the kernel just used makes a redirect agree with
itself. Strip, decode, or canonicalize first, then match. The unsplit value
passing is not evidence, so the test needs a split case.
- **Atomic shared state:** Write a complete temporary file, then atomically
replace the destination so concurrent readers never see a partial write.
Exclusive create or a write lock alone is not enough for readers. Serialize
the full read-modify-write sequence for lockfiles and shared stores.
- **Tests match the claim:** Every behavior or security-boundary change needs a
regression test, including the failure path. Path-sensitive logic needs at
least one non-Linux path case (or a hermetic fake that exercises the same
normalization).
- **Honest scope:** PR description, help text, and comments must match what
shipped. Wire advertised entry points or shrink the claim. Do not bundle
unrelated fixes. Do not widen security allowlists by name alone; check
classification and side effects too.
- **Host tool version floors:** Zero shells out to `git` and other host tools,
and the project does not declare a minimum version for any of them. A flag,
subcommand, or config key that is not long-established therefore raises that
floor silently, and the failure on an older host is an unhelpful usage error
rather than a clear message. Before adding one, check when it landed and say
so where a caller would look. Record the floor for the exact subcommand you
call, not for the flag in general: `--end-of-options` reached Git's shared
parser in 2.24, but `git rev-parse` only accepted it from 2.30, and
`git checkout` and `git reset` later still. Likewise `--show-current` is
`git branch` 2.22, and `branch.autoSetupMerge=inherit` is 2.35. Then either
keep a fallback for older versions or gate the call. A test that depends on a
newer feature must skip below its floor instead of failing, and say which
version it needs.
- **Prove the test fails without the change:** A regression test earns its
place only if it fails on the unfixed code, for the reason it claims. Run it
both ways and quote the failure in the PR. The recurring miss is not a
missing test but a test that never reaches the behavior it names, because an
earlier guard rejects the input first, so it passes with and without the fix.
When a test targets a specific layer, call that layer directly rather than
relying on a public entry point that may refuse earlier.
- **Hermetic tests:** Tests must not read or write the developer's real config,
cache, or state directories. Redirect every root the code under test
resolves, not just config. `os.UserConfigDir` and `os.UserCacheDir` read
`XDG_CONFIG_HOME` and `XDG_CACHE_HOME` only on Linux and the BSDs. On macOS
they derive from `HOME`, and on Windows from `%AppData%` and `%LocalAppData%`.
Setting the XDG variables alone still leaves a macOS run writing to the real
home, so set `HOME` as well, or take the directory as a parameter. Apply it to
every test that reaches the same storage, not only the one where it was first
needed; a test that passes on a clean machine and pollutes a real one is a
blocker.
- **Error codes vary by platform and by flag combination:** A check written
against the code one target returns can be silently inert on another while
still looking correct. `openat(O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW)` on a symlink may
report `ENOTDIR` or `ELOOP` depending on the platform, because the kernel can
reject the directory mismatch before it ever resolves the link; accept both
rather than assuming the one POSIX names. On Windows, `\\?\` and `\\.\`
prefixes are not UNC paths, and an `NtCreateFile` information class must match
the struct actually passed. Confirm the code each supported target returns
instead of reasoning from the man page.
-156
View File
@@ -6,162 +6,6 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## [0.10.0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/compare/v0.9.0...v0.10.0) (2026-10-15)
### Features
* **notify:** make permission-prompt alerts on by default and discoverable ([#1001](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1001)) ([7f8e5f0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/7f8e5f08bb83371ce16cc54c97ab032a010026cf))
* **npm:** publish as @twigpine/zero ([#1142](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1142)) ([530563a](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/530563a0bb58d3cbadceb97b3ee234ef763124df))
* **providers:** add GMI Cloud provider preset and partner listing ([#1127](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1127)) ([1335ca6](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/1335ca6671023ecda81a3cfaae7e9f2ff5d6e0de))
* **providers:** opt-in ZERO_RESPONSE_HEADER_TIMEOUT override for slow first-byte deployments ([#1106](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1106)) ([ddc45f2](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/ddc45f2c8152fdd04b45dc11ed20d246fe7740a5))
* **runtime:** add process-local per-model RPM admission limits ([#1116](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1116)) ([eebb384](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/eebb384676fb567acc1f5a20dcbb17df8a03dc42))
* **sessions:** add zero sessions prune, which never removes a session another process has open ([#1089](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1089)) ([23c27e0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/23c27e0778e3af54c04b8749d1eda846d3253f4e))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** persist the session permission mode across restarts ([#1134](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1134)) ([bb96206](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/bb96206c2781e846fd13437113eec5790afe9c81)), closes [#1125](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1125)
* **acp:** persist token usage events for ACP sessions ([#1137](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1137)) ([300cf62](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/300cf6275f8c94f06da3f00197d21cb8771842d9)), closes [#1118](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1118)
* **acp:** publish sub-run sessions loaded over ACP as view-only ([#1078](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1078)) ([7f11491](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/7f11491078662b2d389c278f3ce5d41d956670c4))
* **agent:** retry mid-stream transport aborts before tool dispatch ([#1076](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1076)) ([b9ef1d2](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/b9ef1d271aa6ebc6d9adad2ef4ff0d695bb40da5))
* **config:** sync atomic config replacements ([#1093](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1093)) ([4d2e9f0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/4d2e9f0d08472f7304652ef7896df587e1cc6c21))
* **cron:** bound run history and read recent records from the tail ([#1094](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1094)) ([42eb6ab](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/42eb6ab5fbe4ae9037f1f4cd42a00243c456a22e))
* **cron:** preserve newer claims when overlapping runs complete ([#1090](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1090)) ([2eb9d94](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/2eb9d94fac56d91d749ea4f96edcf1c87f79b48c))
* **daemon:** bound pending sessions and prune on completion ([#1091](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1091)) ([8a68660](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/8a68660161b04ce9668363faa14ff72c9fbad223))
* **daemon:** do not retry workers that finished with a final exit code ([#1112](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1112)) ([eefa978](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/eefa978f6183332b7416c70c25242bcdfba1a75c)), closes [#1100](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1100)
* **daemon:** stop worker process groups by their launch-time identity ([#1088](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1088)) ([ab018b3](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/ab018b3098b5cb103cf8f90b8698d32a6687bdf7)), closes [#861](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/861)
* **deps:** refresh the lockfile to patched hono and @hono/node-server ([#1080](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1080)) ([aa52040](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/aa52040498e012c41d5e8f6027a91c18eff861d4))
* **deps:** refresh the lockfile to patched shell-quote ([#1131](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1131)) ([c56a4c4](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/c56a4c4e6e598504ab417e8cc4f5ab8d69f1b42f))
* **execution:** reserve process capacity before launching ([#1092](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1092)) ([bb3346a](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/bb3346a82883c19ed8815fe1e874f54950711d69))
* **mcp:** forward image tool results on the existing image channel ([#1077](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1077)) ([0324c1d](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/0324c1d4103328eb90cb24a0b582dba335255b5c))
* **mcp:** refresh OAuth tokens for discovered endpoints and registered clients ([#1113](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1113)) ([571af70](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/571af701bd3d8dfaf40f87b5b112b25e7def5b29)), closes [#1101](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1101)
* **oauth:** give every loopback callback server the bounded shutdown ([#1079](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1079)) ([5473301](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/547330197b20ece591e077e876a4b8ffd015cb6e))
* **providers:** send stable session headers to OpenCode ([#1060](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1060)) ([99721c7](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/99721c762f37cd43ac511007a5f51d1846df959e))
* **redaction:** redact adjacent AWS keys glued end to end ([#1095](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1095)) ([df67ede](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/df67edec13345b73a85327adc003cacc7bdd8009))
* **redaction:** redact credentials split by an invisible character ([#1067](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1067)) ([e20b762](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/e20b7624261cef8336a8eb0fbdd44d536ad77fc2))
* **sandbox:** say when a session's sandbox enforcement is degraded ([#1082](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1082)) ([6b5852d](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/6b5852dc18bb256af1f25745697c2f2e3ea6f112))
* **search:** redact every text field of session metadata, not ten of thirty ([#1073](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1073)) ([9520f2b](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/9520f2bad7e09ce4a8d0d42be7ce77d2ae928ddd))
* **security:** harden shell flag parsing, write roots, and formatters ([#1066](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1066)) ([ac5fe0d](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/ac5fe0d21849b0f74af428dd3ca12e3b80a8b7aa))
* **sessions:** keep a session lease for the life of the process, not of the Store ([#1144](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1144)) ([883e5be](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/883e5bec24dac791d1d60618c7f4927f4659b687))
* **tools:** hint when Windows resolves POSIX paths under root ([#1063](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1063)) ([0c6f179](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/0c6f179a8443d4dfdfbbefe5cc6caf11c2a525f0))
* **tui:** bound live dictation regions ([#985](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/985)) ([feb9927](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/feb992757c582c68f0397e070e206d4bf07071e1))
* **tui:** show provider ownership in Recent and Favorites ([#1083](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1083)) ([1697b7a](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/1697b7a5ce948e781877cdbe9223adac62c3fde6))
* **tui:** stop held peer message Allow/Deny from deadlocking Update ([#1111](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1111)) ([a195e88](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/a195e8848cec1a27b4fe1789ecc572b943c32186)), closes [#1099](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1099)
* unbreak main CI (cron claim tests, Go 1.26.9) ([#1124](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1124)) ([2c418fc](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/2c418fc8ff6763de16703128f372fe526fddd331))
## [0.9.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.8.0...v0.9.0) (2026-09-15)
### Features
* **acp:** add standard session list and resume ([#914](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/914)) ([c1937df](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/c1937dfac72e6ad0e5ade6e48e2d9c17d9c3e5d6))
* **acp:** emit structured file changes in tool updates ([#999](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/999)) ([faec8ee](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/faec8ee2017fdd6d0c2c347add892cb73eb413d7))
* **acp:** surface safe browser tool metadata ([#1000](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1000)) ([a6ec043](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a6ec0435e36b9bea9793b2fd97f2ecd30e3a0f9b))
* **exec:** default headless runs to the turn-budget ceiling ([#1049](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1049)) ([9e609c5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9e609c52420fd322f047fc238c04ac81dd623fdd))
* **tui:** interactive terminal attach for tty exec sessions ([#1055](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1055)) ([d73ec81](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d73ec81e2d3facb5377bc9ad0fe2aa314628a0c0))
* **tui:** offer mid-run model escalation behind --allow-escalation ([#1019](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1019)) ([91d921f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/91d921f4c5b8289a9e437f786218f1b48f2add5a))
* **tui:** richer /resume session browser ([#1047](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1047)) ([2f53117](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2f531178f614e587b629e4f81e0470adda647fbd))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** make configured MCP tools callable ([#1003](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1003)) ([7f5e5af](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7f5e5af7bbdbe5bb4d91706146072d461c0234a4))
* **agent:** stop the tool-schema ratchet meaning a different thing per host ([#1017](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1017)) ([f909266](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f9092668a832ea73a69551f0ea2df4f6eaf356df))
* **background:** treat POSIX zombie leader as already-exited ([#981](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/981)) ([1aacf38](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1aacf38b727d31b5ca09949316d6afa8292aec46))
* **config:** lock config read-modify-write across processes ([#960](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/960)) ([b04fe96](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b04fe96e9ef3f2deda4fb2a972270300629079d2))
* **config:** preserve unknown top-level fields ([#984](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/984)) ([488def6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/488def68dcc6d36701fdf171e94a74a436b090fc))
* **daemon:** publish status files atomically ([#949](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/949)) ([9001421](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/90014210d2ada2e3d61f4eca5087d3f35a3c4b8b))
* **installtxn:** put back an install a killed commit left behind ([#997](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/997)) ([2837f5e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2837f5efb38dcd3c69771b0ba31565f98a206120))
* let the configured forward proxy through the loopback guard ([#1025](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1025)) ([1e4db7c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1e4db7c6643ca7e2c3d8e4b8b30371cfbe43561e))
* **lockutil:** use kernel-held advisory locks ([#950](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/950)) ([6fe0d1e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6fe0d1edcdbadea6d566800fbcca739c1cd54ea1))
* **mcp:** discover OAuth through protected resource metadata ([#991](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/991)) ([1b5db17](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1b5db1765672820caac1684b168c9898b5ba3593))
* **mcp:** reject a server-initiated request as a streamable-HTTP response ([#1054](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1054)) ([2479d94](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2479d946c15dbf74ee3c04a637e97181d1786f08))
* **oauth:** force-close loopback callback connections past the shutdown deadline ([#1051](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1051)) ([176f5a2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/176f5a242b754a86ea4c7121a8dcc1c0d72cf2e4))
* **oauth:** Split an oversized keyring token blob across entries ([#1007](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1007)) ([275e248](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/275e2486695338ce38193a6e3319f8b6a9a5c33c))
* **providerio:** close idle connections periodically to prevent HTTP/2 PROTOCOL_ERROR ([#1058](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1058)) ([b76c764](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b76c764b77926891aa67163e6605a2d8540aacaa))
* **providers:** register Atomic Chat as local OpenAI-compatible runtime ([#550](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/550)) ([79fa142](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/79fa1422ef1a3691b93342788453ebc284d57f9c))
* **redaction:** split camelCase keys in normalizeKey ([#994](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/994)) ([08fbea7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/08fbea7a3221d2061d88038924f90a4cba9af1ac))
* **sandbox:** keep a derived ACL target inside the write root it came from ([#1040](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1040)) ([3b43c43](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3b43c43eca968c8619adadc81fcc1a17e220216a))
* **sandbox:** keep Windows restricted-token SIDs narrow and fail closed on DenyRead ([#1006](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1006)) ([0207f2b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0207f2b2697149a73ecc89a5ab5db0bd665f1911))
* **sandbox:** Make WSL backend tests deterministic. ([#948](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/948)) ([e59bf78](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e59bf78cabc2703678778b904c27c8bc8ef82bc8))
* **sandbox:** protect worktree git pointers ([#805](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/805)) ([f30f550](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f30f550e6037c53f8521ba2d59c984ae6c574917))
* **sandbox:** refcount temporary roots so one holder's cleanup cannot revoke another's ([#911](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/911)) ([7acac7a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7acac7acee65565e25089f2a7b5813c086ce65eb))
* **sessions:** carry an interrupted turn's work into the resume prompt ([#1016](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1016)) ([6ae8396](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6ae8396f0282a5f18a431f0c0ef1a272ecc2ca2b))
* **sessions:** render resume context fields in key order ([#1043](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1043)) ([da244bc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/da244bcbfcfa05e414567ac0acc3cf8ba745ad7d))
* **specialist:** keep the pinned model when a specialist is resumed ([#1009](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1009)) ([aadb4a2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/aadb4a27e9cdb41e774e8e1a8f23cf9c2fb50db2))
* **swarm:** stop original member before handoff ([#957](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/957)) ([0021475](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0021475d4c58c91911098f414795512cf60a0b56))
* **tools:** an edit keeps the reads it did not disturb ([#908](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/908)) ([1649008](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1649008506da0e675431dc056251a01891b15cc8))
* **tools:** make apply_patch tolerant and re-expose edit_file ([#956](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/956)) ([2749447](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2749447cdce4ae5dd333538b36fa919b80ecc66d))
* **tools:** reject fuzzy edits with drifted content ([#983](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/983)) ([8b3d1b1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8b3d1b1597b04bfa6d4bc7f912abc13ca80a6298))
* **tools:** say when format-on-write ran out of time ([#1044](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1044)) ([6937a30](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6937a309cf00825572210a7610a1f3ea8b74c2f9))
* **tui:** move voice capture to Ctrl+Space ([#968](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/968)) ([eeea330](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/eeea3308fed38b37b203522624babaf2f30df91f))
* **update:** keep Windows failed-restore state in trusted recovery records ([#979](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/979)) ([a3852ba](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a3852bac595e06c5d3ca9da22212b281b8796802))
### Performance Improvements
* **agent:** cheap compaction — dedicated summarizer model, input cap… ([#532](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/532)) ([6645f97](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6645f9744b37dda4d52ecc4631578d62cefc89de))
* **providers:** parallelize isolated provider unit tests and shrink retry backoffs ([#955](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/955)) ([d6b25fc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d6b25fc3039a6b7d72a5703a87a097449792b102))
* reduce startup and turn overhead ([#932](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/932)) ([1fde941](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1fde941803c4295c11a4a14559f3c5217d1a9e69))
## [0.8.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.7.0...v0.8.0) (2026-08-21)
### Features
* **security:** path-jail primitive, credential-store locking, worktree git hardening ([#891](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/891)) ([060d38c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/060d38ce716feb7c5b6657b082cd35cb8dda3d75))
* **update:** recognise Homebrew installs and add mise, go install docs ([#910](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/910)) ([01c3498](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/01c3498205e69d26e5f929225f9455b276444f39))
* use Exa as default search provider ([#926](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/926)) ([1ec7219](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1ec7219aee7b2840481ab0905f131644e27d2a4e))
* **zerogit:** auto-create a conventional branch before push/pr on default branch ([#671](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/671)) ([d065467](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d065467cd3ec3ed91c5dc60554c36fc4b4d6de4c))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** three defects a desktop ACP client hits ([#915](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/915)) ([a78c6c3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a78c6c357e1d21146d7cd2e8030a754e06f7f1f5))
* bump Go to 1.26.6 for stdlib vulnerability fixes ([#903](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/903)) ([dc15e82](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dc15e822987d8d7de467c62c375518f435b74d8c))
* **daemon:** clean up child after startup timeout ([#774](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/774)) ([9c29209](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9c292092a26c9092fd873d072b0af1b0d9d39ef0))
* **dictation:** redact API keys from streaming transcriber errors ([#852](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/852)) ([64a783b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/64a783b08caa2c7b21f188033b9ed84a14e00e84))
* **modelregistry:** expose reasoning effort for DeepSeek V4 models ([#931](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/931)) ([90dcfd1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/90dcfd127e8a6d9902ec9f4e72f6d03fef1a0fc6))
* **providers:** discover ChatGPT capabilities ([#890](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/890)) ([2d2450e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2d2450e9a744349f0d01b1d4e9ba29c24ba5650d))
* **sandbox:** normalize launcher names before the command-prefix denylist ([#934](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/934)) ([6edf9a8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6edf9a8b78dc030dc44598919db1c7fa9d4f809a))
## [0.7.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.6.0...v0.7.0) (2026-08-10)
### Features
* **agent:** add PermissionModePlan for interactive read-only planning ([#853](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/853)) ([0176ee4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0176ee49ffddcff6f7edf6ae2ade4967e5b22cc3))
* **providers:** live model lists for OpenRouter and OpenGateway ([#860](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/860)) ([fb4f293](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fb4f293c20eb860ca388a10d22fd566ce282ba1f))
* **tools:** give tool results an image channel and add view_image ([#843](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/843)) ([cd0eb19](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/cd0eb194e4df4b844785796c0701216740a56344))
* **tui:** replace /retitle with local /rename ([#826](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/826)) ([5886354](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/588635487f22ef4d62d350140a219b7b8bb24119))
### Bug Fixes
* **agent:** end the additional_permissions retry loop ([#864](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/864)) ([4ca4fa7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4ca4fa75d31b139dbe55a3badf17da86892ab001))
* **agent:** tell the user a prefix approval leaves the sandbox ([#885](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/885)) ([2ec5c3a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2ec5c3ae6b8fb543887bdeafdb34c4da057b8d36))
* **cli:** report MCP servers that failed to start ([#822](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/822)) ([#827](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/827)) ([021281e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/021281ebbab3f2bbe6a77b2dab4bf121bcfe6b52))
* **lsp:** dispatch notifications off read loop ([#759](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/759)) ([936aa4e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/936aa4e77cf49738560a89395b8ba4d22263a396))
* **mcp:** name the non-text blocks a tool result drops ([#874](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/874)) ([027a670](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/027a67080bea511b876c284bc911ef011eceb308))
* **sandbox:** deny reads of Zero credential stores ([#681](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/681)) ([55fa05f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/55fa05f0ab5a01b495345d43464606cd19a31b4f))
* **sandbox:** stop the Windows write jail honouring Everyone-granted paths ([#865](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/865)) ([91b413c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/91b413c514cc1607d5b4e7936780d40569239814))
* **secrets,worktrees:** fix secret redaction leakage and prune stale worktrees ([#855](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/855)) ([ff62f73](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ff62f73b7f4dc5e2472db21acba43cf6140c06d1))
* **specialist:** make overwrites atomic ([#757](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/757)) ([30f6d8f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/30f6d8f591a0b81638b4182ff56c86c8a50a5c70))
* suppress gosec G204 warning for trusted local config commands ([#848](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/848)) ([c52db05](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/c52db055b0b213758a33c5c5627a411e052f8de4))
* **tui:** a copied NUL byte no longer panics the TUI on Windows ([#876](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/876)) ([cae0269](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/cae0269e77e7a0a493cf799b41c653c9ff9a19de)), closes [#875](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/875)
* **tui:** exclude permission waits from turn time ([#820](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/820)) ([15eb16f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/15eb16f736f903c94203207032f98aacbcf06318))
* **tui:** fall back to CellMotion where AllMotion is unreliable ([#872](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/872)) ([7fbd864](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7fbd864e91433441489902571ea394ebc5b7bd0d))
* **tui:** fill alt-screen frame with theme panel background ([#850](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/850)) ([020c28e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/020c28eaf95e2f38853f99fc06a13cd1568bf3c9))
* **tui:** hide unavailable sidebar shortcut ([#821](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/821)) ([845df6c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/845df6c7d28e02f475e90acfe838733eb37e6aa2))
* use OAuth credentials in provider health checks ([#828](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/828)) ([d37de92](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d37de9214b1ba86542f4f5ef3b060bb96849763b))
### Performance Improvements
* compact common test output ([#846](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/846)) ([edf660a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/edf660ab85131f90a452cee51dc2c3a5cf62d632))
* improve harness context efficiency ([#838](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/838)) ([8e26679](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8e266797a8305e689806eadcf9698da2796481ab))
## [0.6.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.5.0...v0.6.0) (2026-07-29)
+5 -30
View File
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ reports, feature requests, reproduction details, logs, and discussion on existin
issues.
Questions and setup help belong in
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions) (see
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions) (see
[SUPPORT.md](SUPPORT.md)), not in the issue tracker. Feature ideas start in the
[Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) category;
[Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) category;
an idea that gains traction there is the path to an approved issue and,
eventually, an accepted PR.
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ There are three primary ways to contribute:
1. Open a bug report with clear reproduction steps.
2. Propose a feature in
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
describing the problem, use case, and expected behavior. A feature-request
issue is filed only after the idea gains traction there or a maintainer asks
for one.
@@ -126,31 +126,6 @@ not enough. Dependency changes need a clear project benefit, such as fixing a
specific bug, addressing a security issue, improving compatibility, or supporting
an approved feature.
## Supported platforms
Zero publishes five native prebuilt artifacts from
`.github/workflows/release-artifacts.yml`:
- `linux-x64` (`linux/amd64`)
- `linux-arm64` (`linux/arm64`)
- `macos-arm64` (`darwin/arm64`)
- `macos-x64` (`darwin/amd64`)
- `windows-x64` (`windows/amd64`)
The shell installer and npm wrapper resolve the applicable artifacts from that
list. The PowerShell installer supports the published `windows-x64` artifact;
there is no native Windows ARM64 artifact. Windows on ARM users can run the x64
build under emulation or build from source.
Android/Termux is also supported even though it has no distinct release
artifact. The npm wrapper maps Android to the Linux artifact, and
`docs/INSTALL.md` documents the native `android/arm64` source build needed on
devices whose seccomp policy blocks the Linux build's syscall path.
Other `GOOS`/`GOARCH` values, including Plan 9, are unsupported. They are not a
review criterion. Do not block a pull request for failing to compile on an
unsupported target. Tests may use `plan9` as a fixture for an unsupported OS.
## What We Prioritize
The core team will prioritize:
@@ -193,7 +168,7 @@ Clear bug reports are the most useful way to help the project during this phase.
## Submitting a Feature Request
Feature requests start as a thread in
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
not as an issue. The feature-request issue form exists for the step AFTER that:
when an idea has gained traction in Discussions or a maintainer has asked for an
issue to track it. Whether in the discussion or the eventual issue, please
@@ -222,7 +197,7 @@ contribution phase.
General questions, setup help, and "is this a bug or my config" uncertainty all
go to
[Discussions Q&A](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a).
[Discussions Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a).
If you are unsure whether a proposed code change is appropriate, raise it in
Discussions Ideas or on the relevant issue first and ask. Please keep discussion
focused, specific, and respectful of maintainer time.
+3 -9
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ DEADCODE_VERSION := v0.46.0
GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION := v2.12.2
GOVULNCHECK_VERSION := v1.3.0
.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint lint-static deadcode vulncheck vulncheck-windows tidy clean baseline help
.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint lint-static deadcode vulncheck tidy clean baseline help
# Build the main CLI binary into ./zero.
build:
@@ -44,8 +44,7 @@ lint: fmt-check vet
# the possibly stale Go toolchain or consulting a multi-module GOWORK. git grep
# works with both POSIX shells and cmd.exe, including GNU Make 3.81 on macOS.
# The target-specific export is shell-independent.
lint-static deadcode vulncheck vulncheck-windows: export GOTOOLCHAIN = $(GO_TOOLCHAIN)
lint-static deadcode vulncheck vulncheck-windows: export GOWORK = off
lint-static deadcode vulncheck: export GOTOOLCHAIN = $(GO_TOOLCHAIN)
lint-static:
go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/golangci-lint@$(GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION) run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...
@@ -56,11 +55,6 @@ deadcode:
vulncheck:
go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@$(GOVULNCHECK_VERSION) ./...
vulncheck-windows:
mkdir -p "$(CURDIR)/.cache/gobin"
GOBIN="$(CURDIR)/.cache/gobin" go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@$(GOVULNCHECK_VERSION)
GOOS=windows "$(CURDIR)/.cache/gobin/govulncheck" ./...
tidy:
go mod tidy
@@ -83,4 +77,4 @@ baseline: build
--output internal/perfbench/reports/baseline.json
help:
@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, lint-static, deadcode, vulncheck, vulncheck-windows, tidy, clean, baseline"
@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, lint-static, deadcode, vulncheck, tidy, clean, baseline"
+20 -149
View File
@@ -4,17 +4,10 @@
<p align="center"><strong>A terminal coding agent you own.</strong></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=trendshift-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-trendshift-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/trendshift/repositories/70679/daily?language=Go" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=trendshift-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-trendshift-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/trendshift/repositories/70679/weekly?language=Go" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=repository-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-repository-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/repositories/70679" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
</p>
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.26.9+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.9+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
<br>
<strong>English</strong> | <a href="README_ZH.md">中文</a>
</p>
@@ -29,74 +22,10 @@ zero exec "fix the failing test in ./pkg"
zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
## Partners
<table align="center">
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://twigpine.com">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://twigpine.com/logo-dark.png">
<img src="https://twigpine.com/logo.png" alt="Twigpine logo" width="72">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://mimo.mi.com">
<img src="https://mimo.xiaomi.com/mimo-v2-pro/assets/logo.svg" alt="Xiaomi MiMo logo" width="136">
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://novita.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/novita-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/novita-logo.svg" alt="Novita AI logo" width="136">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://concentrate.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/concentrate-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/concentrate-logo.svg" alt="Concentrate logo" width="64">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://exa.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/exa-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/exa-logo.svg" alt="Exa logo" width="110">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center"><a href="https://twigpine.com"><strong>Twigpine</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://mimo.mi.com"><strong>Xiaomi MiMo</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://novita.ai/"><strong>Novita AI</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://concentrate.ai/"><strong>Concentrate</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://exa.ai/"><strong>Exa</strong></a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://www.gmicloud.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/gmi-cloud-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/gmi-cloud-logo.svg" alt="GMI Cloud logo" width="120">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center"><a href="https://www.gmicloud.ai/"><strong>GMI Cloud</strong></a></td>
</tr>
</table>
## Why Zero
- **Use the model you want.** Bring OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Groq, OpenRouter,
DeepSeek, Mistral, xAI, Qwen, Kimi, GitHub Models, Ollama, LM Studio, Atomic Chat, or any
DeepSeek, Mistral, xAI, Qwen, Kimi, GitHub Models, Ollama, LM Studio, or any
OpenAI-/Anthropic-compatible endpoint.
- **Stay in control.** File writes, shell commands, network access, and
out-of-workspace writes go through Zero's permission and sandbox policy.
@@ -116,7 +45,7 @@ zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
### npm
```bash
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
zero
```
@@ -130,38 +59,26 @@ matching GitHub Release whenever it is missing. Windows on ARM runs the x64
build under emulation. See [docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md](docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md) for
how the package is put together.
Installed Zero as `@gitlawb/zero`? The package moved to `@twigpine/zero` in
0.10.0 and the old name gets no further releases. Both packages provide the
`zero` command, so quit any running `zero`, then remove the old package first:
```bash
npm uninstall -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
```
Your config, sessions, and logins are kept; they live outside the package. For
Bun, pnpm, and yarn, see [docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md#moving-from-gitlawbzero).
### Install scripts
Linux/macOS:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
Windows PowerShell:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
### From source
Source builds require Go 1.26.9+.
Source builds require Go 1.26.5+.
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/zero.git
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
@@ -215,8 +132,6 @@ export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export AIMLAPI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
export FIREWORKS_API_KEY=...
export GMI_API_KEY=...
export CONCENTRATE_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAXI_API_KEY=...
```
@@ -239,18 +154,6 @@ To configure Fireworks AI directly, run:
zero providers setup fireworks --set-active
```
To configure GMI Cloud directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup gmicloud --set-active
```
To configure Concentrate directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup concentrate --set-active
```
MiniMax presets use the Anthropic-compatible endpoints for the global and China
regions:
@@ -278,12 +181,8 @@ zero providers add custom-openai-compatible \
--set-active
```
For local models, run Ollama, LM Studio, or the [Atomic Chat](https://atomic.chat)
desktop app, then use `zero setup` or `zero providers detect`. For Atomic Chat,
load a model and enable its local OpenAI-compatible API (default
`http://127.0.0.1:1337/v1`). Choose `atomic-chat-local`; detection includes the
loaded model ID in the add command. If no usable ID is discovered, load a model
and retry. Model IDs requiring shell-specific quoting use interactive setup.
For local models, run Ollama or LM Studio and then use `zero setup` or
`zero providers detect`.
## Daily Use
@@ -313,7 +212,6 @@ Common slash commands:
| `/spec`, `/plan` | draft and review a plan before building |
| `/image` | attach an image for vision-capable models |
| `/resume`, `/rewind` | continue or roll back local sessions |
| `/new` | start a fresh session in place (previous session stays on disk) |
| `/btw [question]` | ask in an isolated fork without adding the side conversation to the main session |
| `/loop` | repeat a prompt or custom `/command` on an interval (`/loop 5m /babysit-prs`) or self-paced |
| `/compact`, `/context` | manage context usage |
@@ -373,19 +271,6 @@ zero sandbox grants list
Zero includes local file/search/edit/shell tools, `web_fetch` for public URLs,
and MCP support for additional tools.
`web_fetch` refuses loopback, private and other special-use addresses: it checks
the URL before asking permission, resolves the host, and dials the address it
validated so a name cannot resolve to something else in between.
If `HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY` is set, `web_fetch` and the provider connectivity
probe use it, and that last step changes: the proxy is dialed and the target
hostname is sent to it, so the proxy decides which address the request actually
reaches. The URL is still checked and resolved locally first, but a proxy that
answers differently can reach a private service. A forward proxy already sees
and can rewrite every request through it, so this is the trust you accept by
configuring one. Leave the variables unset for the checks to be enforced end to
end.
For local dev servers, use shell commands such as `curl` through `exec_command`
so the normal sandbox and permission policy applies. Long-running commands stay
attached to a background terminal session and can be listed or stopped from the
@@ -409,7 +294,7 @@ zero context context-budget report
zero repo-map deterministic repository map
zero repo-info local repository summary
zero search | find search local session history
zero sessions inspect, resume, fork, rewind, and prune sessions
zero sessions inspect, resume, fork, and rewind sessions
zero spec manage spec-mode drafts
zero specialist manage specialist subagents
zero skills manage markdown instruction skills
@@ -423,17 +308,9 @@ zero verify detect and run local verification checks
zero changes inspect and commit local git changes
zero usage token usage and estimated cost
zero cron scheduled agent jobs
zero update --check check for newer releases
zero upgrade download, verify, and install the latest release
zero update check for newer releases
```
Cron keeps the newest 1,000 run outcomes per job in `runs.jsonl`. Each new run
atomically replaces the history with the retained tail; existing larger histories
are trimmed on their next run. Archive the file before that run if you need older
outcomes. This retention does not delete session directories or reset fire counts.
Malformed records and legacy lines of 1 MiB or more are skipped when reading or
compacting history; new records of that size are rejected.
## Extending Zero
### Project and personal instructions
@@ -491,13 +368,9 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench
Experimental: `ZERO_OPENAI_TURN_SESSION=1` enables the optimized OpenAI turn
session (background connection prewarm + request-prefix telemetry) for headless
`zero exec` runs against official OpenAI profiles. Off by default; `0`, `false`,
or `off` disable it. A/B-benchmark it by running the same `zero-perf-bench` suite
with the variable unset and set.
Native ChatGPT Responses sessions are enabled by default. Set
`ZERO_CHATGPT_TURN_SESSION=0`, `false`, or `off` to restore stateless HTTP/SSE
transport.
`zero exec` runs against official OpenAI profiles. Off by default; `0`/`false`
disable. A/B-benchmark it by running the same `zero-perf-bench` suite with the
variable unset and set.
### Code Quality and Security Checks
@@ -542,22 +415,20 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
## Community
Real-time chat happens on the [Discord server](https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn).
Questions, setup help, ideas, and sharing all live in
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions):
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions):
| Category | Use it for |
|---|---|
| [Q&A](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) | Setup help, provider/model configuration, "how do I" questions |
| [Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) | Feature proposals and design discussion before any PR |
| [Show and tell](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/show-and-tell) | Your skills, plugins, MCP setups, themes, and workflows |
| [Announcements](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/announcements) | Releases and project news from the maintainers |
| [Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) | Setup help, provider/model configuration, "how do I" questions |
| [Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) | Feature proposals and design discussion before any PR |
| [Show and tell](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/show-and-tell) | Your skills, plugins, MCP setups, themes, and workflows |
| [Announcements](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/announcements) | Releases and project news from the maintainers |
For a good Q&A answer fast, include `zero --version`, your OS and install
method, the provider/model in use, and `zero doctor` output. See
[SUPPORT.md](SUPPORT.md). Bugs belong in
[issues](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/new/choose); security reports
[issues](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/new/choose); security reports
follow [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md), never a public thread.
## Contributing
+10 -124
View File
@@ -4,17 +4,10 @@
<p align="center"><strong>一个独属于你的终端编码智能体。</strong></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=trendshift-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-trendshift-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/trendshift/repositories/70679/daily?language=Go" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=trendshift-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-trendshift-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/trendshift/repositories/70679/weekly?language=Go" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=repository-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-repository-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/repositories/70679" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
</p>
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.26.9+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.9+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
<br>
<a href="README.md">English</a> | <strong>中文</strong>
</p>
@@ -27,73 +20,9 @@ zero exec "修复 ./pkg 中失败的测试"
zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
## 合作伙伴
<table align="center">
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://twigpine.com">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://twigpine.com/logo-dark.png">
<img src="https://twigpine.com/logo.png" alt="Twigpine logo" width="72">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://mimo.mi.com">
<img src="https://mimo.xiaomi.com/mimo-v2-pro/assets/logo.svg" alt="Xiaomi MiMo logo" width="136">
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://novita.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/novita-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/novita-logo.svg" alt="Novita AI logo" width="136">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://concentrate.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/concentrate-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/concentrate-logo.svg" alt="Concentrate logo" width="64">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://exa.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/exa-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/exa-logo.svg" alt="Exa logo" width="110">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center"><a href="https://twigpine.com"><strong>Twigpine</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://mimo.mi.com"><strong>Xiaomi MiMo</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://novita.ai/"><strong>Novita AI</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://concentrate.ai/"><strong>Concentrate</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://exa.ai/"><strong>Exa</strong></a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://www.gmicloud.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/gmi-cloud-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/gmi-cloud-logo.svg" alt="GMI Cloud logo" width="120">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center"><a href="https://www.gmicloud.ai/"><strong>GMI Cloud</strong></a></td>
</tr>
</table>
## 为什么选择 Zero
- **使用你想要的模型。** 支持 OpenAI、Anthropic、Gemini、Groq、OpenRouter、DeepSeek、Mistral、xAI、Qwen、Kimi、GitHub Models、Ollama、LM Studio、Atomic Chat,或任何 OpenAI/Anthropic 兼容端点。
- **使用你想要的模型。** 支持 OpenAI、Anthropic、Gemini、Groq、OpenRouter、DeepSeek、Mistral、xAI、Qwen、Kimi、GitHub Models、Ollama、LM Studio,或任何 OpenAI/Anthropic 兼容端点。
- **保持控制权。** 文件写入、Shell 命令、网络访问和工作区外写入都经过 Zero 的权限和沙箱策略。
- **在终端中工作。** TUI 具有模型/提供商选择器、图片输入、斜杠命令、实时计划/工具渲染、回滚滚动、主题以及恢复/分叉支持。
- **无 TUI 也能工作。** `zero exec` 可脚本化,支持文本/JSON/stream-JSON I/O、隔离的工作树、规范优先运行,以及用于 CI 的有意义的退出码。
@@ -105,41 +34,32 @@ zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
### npm
```bash
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
zero
```
npm 包是一个小型包装器,其平台构建(Linux 和 macOS 的 x64/arm64、Windows 的 x64,包含浏览器/终端控制辅助工具)作为可选依赖直接从 npm registry 安装——没有安装脚本,也不会从 npm 之外下载任何内容。Bun、pnpm 和 yarn 的行为完全一致,无需任何信任或批准步骤。跳过可选依赖的安装(`--omit=optional`)也能工作:只要二进制文件缺失,包装器就会从对应的 GitHub Release 下载。Windows on ARM 通过模拟运行 x64 构建。详见 [docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md](docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md)。
之前通过 `@gitlawb/zero` 安装过 Zero?从 0.10.0 起,npm 包已迁移到 `@twigpine/zero`,旧包名不再发布新版本。两个包都提供 `zero` 命令,所以请先退出正在运行的 `zero`,再卸载旧包:
```bash
npm uninstall -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
```
配置、会话和登录信息都会保留,它们存放在包之外。Bun、pnpm 和 yarn 的命令见 [docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md#moving-from-gitlawbzero)。
### 安装脚本
Linux/macOS:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
Windows PowerShell:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
### 从源码构建
源码构建需要 Go 1.26.9+。
源码构建需要 Go 1.26.5+。
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/zero.git
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
@@ -185,8 +105,6 @@ export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
export GMI_API_KEY=...
export CONCENTRATE_API_KEY=...
```
要直接配置美团 LongCat(LongCat-2.0),运行:
@@ -195,23 +113,7 @@ export CONCENTRATE_API_KEY=...
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
要直接配置 GMI Cloud,运行:
```bash
zero providers setup gmicloud --set-active
```
要直接配置 Concentrate,运行:
```bash
zero providers setup concentrate --set-active
```
对于本地模型,运行 Ollama、LM Studio 或 [Atomic Chat](https://atomic.chat) 桌面应用,
然后使用 `zero setup` 或 `zero providers detect`。使用 Atomic Chat 时,请先加载模型并启用
本地 OpenAI 兼容 API(默认地址为 `http://127.0.0.1:1337/v1`),再选择 `atomic-chat-local`。
检测生成的添加命令会包含已加载的模型 ID;如果未发现可用的 ID,请加载模型后重试。
对于需要特定 Shell 转义的模型 ID,请使用交互式设置。
对于本地模型,运行 Ollama 或 LM Studio,然后使用 `zero setup` 或 `zero providers detect`。
## 日常使用
@@ -239,7 +141,6 @@ zero
| `/spec`、`/plan` | 在构建之前起草和审查计划 |
| `/image` | 为视觉模型附加图片 |
| `/resume`、`/rewind` | 继续或回滚本地会话 |
| `/new` | 原地开始一个新会话(之前的会话仍保留在磁盘上) |
| `/compact`、`/context` | 管理上下文使用 |
| `/permissions`、`/tools` | 检查可用工具和策略 |
| `/add-dir` | 为此会话授予额外的写入目录 |
@@ -311,7 +212,7 @@ zero context 上下文预算报告
zero repo-map 确定性仓库映射
zero repo-info 本地仓库摘要
zero search | find 搜索本地会话历史
zero sessions 检查、恢复、分叉、回滚和清理会话
zero sessions 检查、恢复、分叉和回滚会话
zero spec 管理规范模式草稿
zero specialist 管理专业子智能体
zero skills 管理 Markdown 指令技能
@@ -325,8 +226,7 @@ zero verify 检测和运行本地验证检查
zero changes 检查和提交本地 Git 变更
zero usage Token 使用量和估算成本
zero cron 定时智能体任务
zero update --check 检查更新版本
zero upgrade 下载、验证并安装最新版本
zero update 检查更新版本
```
## 外观和无障碍
@@ -369,20 +269,6 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
- [性能](docs/PERFORMANCE.md)
- [智能体评估](docs/AGENT_EVALS.md)
## 社区
实时交流在 [Discord 服务器](https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn) 进行。
提问、安装帮助、想法和分享都在
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions):
| 分类 | 用途 |
|---|---|
| [Q&A](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) | 安装帮助、提供商/模型配置、"如何做"类问题 |
| [Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) | 功能提议和 PR 之前的设计讨论 |
| [Show and tell](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/show-and-tell) | 你的技能、插件、MCP 配置、主题和工作流 |
| [Announcements](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/announcements) | 维护者发布的版本和项目动态 |
## 贡献
欢迎贡献。阅读 [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md),运行相关测试,然后提交一个聚焦的拉取请求。
+1 -1
View File
@@ -33,4 +33,4 @@ Please include, where possible:
depend on a user explicitly disabling the sandbox (`--skip-permissions-unsafe`), are generally
out of scope — but please report anything you are unsure about.
- Zero sends no telemetry. Network calls go to the model/tool providers you configure (and, for
keyless web search, to Exa's hosted MCP endpoint at `https://mcp.exa.ai/mcp`).
keyless web search, to the documented Firecrawl endpoint — see the README).
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: ZERO
description: >-
Run the ZERO coding agent headlessly in a GitHub workflow. ZERO is
model- and provider-agnostic: you supply the provider and API key as inputs.
author: Twigpine
author: Gitlawb
branding:
icon: terminal
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ inputs:
zero-repo:
description: Repository to install the ZERO release from (owner/repo).
required: false
default: Twigpine/zero
default: Gitlawb/zero
outputs:
exit-code:
+13 -63
View File
@@ -1,63 +1,11 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeSync } from 'node:fs';
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
const packageRoot = dirname(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)));
const CURRENT_PACKAGE_NAME = '@twigpine/zero';
// The npm package moved from @gitlawb/zero to @twigpine/zero in 0.10.0. That
// release was also published once under the old name, so 0.9.0's `zero
// upgrade` and anyone still installing the old name land on a working build
// that says where the package went (docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md). Nothing is
// published under the old name after that.
const LEGACY_PACKAGE_NAME = '@gitlawb/zero';
// The npm name this wrapper was published under, read from its own
// package.json so the name lives in one place. The platform payload alias and
// every reinstall hint below derive from it.
function readPackageName(root) {
try {
const { name } = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(root, 'package.json'), 'utf8'));
if (typeof name === 'string' && name !== '') return name;
} catch {
// An unreadable manifest must not stop the CLI from launching.
}
return CURRENT_PACKAGE_NAME;
}
const packageName = readPackageName(packageRoot);
// Same note as legacyPackageSwitchMessage in internal/update/installmethod.go.
// Uninstalling first is the only safe order: both packages own the `zero` bin,
// so npm refuses to install the new one over the old (EEXIST), and forcing it
// lets a later uninstall of the old package delete the shared bin.
function legacyPackageNotice() {
return (
`[zero] Zero has moved to ${CURRENT_PACKAGE_NAME} on npm, and ${LEGACY_PACKAGE_NAME} gets no further releases.\n` +
'To keep getting updates, quit zero and run:\n' +
` npm uninstall -g ${LEGACY_PACKAGE_NAME}\n` +
` npm install -g ${CURRENT_PACKAGE_NAME}\n` +
'Uninstall first: both packages provide the `zero` command. With bun, pnpm or yarn, use its global remove and add commands instead.\n'
);
}
// Printed when the wrapper exits rather than before zero starts, because the
// TUI takes over the screen and would hide anything printed first. Only on a
// terminal, so scripts that capture stderr see nothing new. `zero update` and
// `zero upgrade` print the same note themselves.
if (packageName === LEGACY_PACKAGE_NAME && !['update', 'upgrade'].includes(process.argv[2])) {
process.on('exit', () => {
if (process.stderr.isTTY || process.env.ZERO_WRAPPER_SIMULATE_TTY === '1') {
// Synchronous: an exit handler cannot wait for an asynchronous write.
writeSync(2, legacyPackageNotice());
}
});
}
function zeroBinaryName(platform = process.platform) {
return platform === 'win32' ? 'zero.exe' : 'zero';
}
@@ -133,10 +81,10 @@ function bunRecoveryParagraph() {
return (
'You installed with Bun, which does not run dependency lifecycle scripts\n' +
'by default. Trust the package to run the blocked postinstall:\n' +
` bun pm trust ${packageName} (project install)\n` +
` bun pm -g trust ${packageName} (global install)\n` +
' bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero (project install)\n' +
' bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero (global install)\n' +
'On Bun versions without `bun pm trust`, add\n' +
` "trustedDependencies": ["${packageName}"]\n` +
' "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]\n' +
'to your project package.json and reinstall.\n' +
'\n'
);
@@ -145,14 +93,14 @@ function bunRecoveryParagraph() {
function buildFromSourceParagraph() {
return (
'If this platform has no prebuilt binary, build from source:\n' +
'https://github.com/Twigpine/zero (go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.26+).'
'https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero (go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.26+).'
);
}
function missingBinaryContextParagraph() {
return (
`Normally npm installs it as an optional dependency of ${packageName}\n` +
`(${packageName}-${process.platform}-${process.arch}), and the wrapper can\n` +
'Normally npm installs it as an optional dependency of @gitlawb/zero\n' +
`(@gitlawb/zero-${process.platform}-${process.arch}), and the wrapper can\n` +
'also download it from the GitHub Release when it is missing.'
);
}
@@ -165,7 +113,7 @@ function missingNativeRecoveryParagraphs(postinstallScript) {
'\n' +
'Things to try:\n' +
' - reinstall without omitting optional dependencies:\n' +
` npm install -g ${packageName}\n` +
' npm install -g @gitlawb/zero\n' +
' - run the downloader manually (needs write access to the package dir):\n' +
` node "${postinstallScript}"\n` +
'\n' +
@@ -234,12 +182,12 @@ function missingNativeDoctorTextReport(postinstallScript) {
);
}
// The platform payload is a version of this same package, installed under an
// npm: alias (see docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md). The alias name is derived from
// The platform payload is a version of @gitlawb/zero itself, installed under
// an npm: alias (see docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md). The alias name is derived from
// process.platform/process.arch, so an unsupported platform simply fails to
// resolve and we fall through to the downloader.
function platformPackageBinary() {
const aliasedName = `${packageName}-${process.platform}-${process.arch}`;
const aliasedName = `@gitlawb/zero-${process.platform}-${process.arch}`;
let manifestPath;
try {
manifestPath = createRequire(import.meta.url).resolve(`${aliasedName}/package.json`);
@@ -279,6 +227,8 @@ function downloadMissingBinary(packageRoot) {
});
}
const packageRoot = dirname(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)));
function resolveNativeBinary() {
const fromPlatformPackage = platformPackageBinary();
if (fromPlatformPackage) return fromPlatformPackage;
+5 -5
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Twigpine/zero@v1
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
with:
prompt: ${{ inputs.task }}
provider: openai
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ jobs:
| `github-token` | no | `${{ github.token }}` | Token used to post a PR comment. Requires `pull-requests: write`. |
| `working-directory` | no | `${{ github.workspace }}` | Directory to run ZERO in. |
| `zero-version` | no | (action ref → `latest`) | ZERO release version/tag to install, e.g. `v1.2.3` or `latest`. |
| `zero-repo` | no | `Twigpine/zero` | Repository to install the ZERO release from. |
| `zero-repo` | no | `Gitlawb/zero` | Repository to install the ZERO release from. |
## Outputs
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Twigpine/zero@v1
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
with:
prompt: |
Investigate this issue and propose a fix.
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Twigpine/zero@v1
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
id: zero
with:
prompt-file: .github/zero/upgrade-deps.md
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ jobs:
- **Least-privilege tokens.** Grant only the permissions the workflow needs
(`contents: write` to edit files, `pull-requests: write` to comment). The
default `GITHUB_TOKEN` is scoped to the repository.
- **Pin the action.** Reference a tag (`Twigpine/zero@v1`) or a commit SHA so a
- **Pin the action.** Reference a tag (`Gitlawb/zero@v1`) or a commit SHA so a
workflow run uses a known ZERO version. `zero-version` lets you pin the
installed binary independently of the action ref.
- **Linux and macOS runners** are supported; Windows runners are rejected with a
+3 -9
View File
@@ -302,9 +302,8 @@ Conceptually, one requested tool goes through these phases:
the model can inspect it and decide what to do next.
6. **Render and persist** — the result is surfaced to the TUI, stream-JSON
writer, or ACP client. TUI and exec record rich tool/session events for
resume/history; ACP persists conversational messages and completed tool-call
starts/results for load replay. Live streaming details and permission
exchanges remain client notifications rather than durable history.
resume/history; ACP currently persists conversational messages and streams
tool/permission updates to the client.
Tool success and failure are both informative context. A successful `read_file`
result gives the model file contents; a failed `edit_file` result gives the model
@@ -628,12 +627,7 @@ Core tool groups include:
skills, `ask_user`, permission requests.
- **Write tools**: `write_file`, `edit_file`, `apply_patch`, `update_plan`.
- **Shell tools**: `exec_command`, `write_stdin`, legacy `bash`.
- **Network tools**: `web_fetch` and optional web search backend. `web_fetch`
validates the URL before the permission prompt, refuses loopback/private/
special-use addresses, and dials the address it resolved. With
`HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY` set, the proxy is dialed instead and resolves the
target itself, so destination enforcement ends at the proxy; see the note in
the README.
- **Network tools**: `web_fetch` and optional web search backend.
- **Local-control tools**: config-gated wrappers for browser, terminal, desktop,
and artifact helpers backed by packages such as `internal/localcontrol` and
`internal/browser`.
+18 -129
View File
@@ -1,35 +1,19 @@
# Installing Zero
Pick whichever fits how you already install things. None of these is the
blessed one.
Zero is distributed as:
| Method | Command | Self-update |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Install script (Linux, macOS) | `curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.sh \| bash` | `zero upgrade` |
| Install script (Windows) | `irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 \| iex` | `zero upgrade` |
| npm | `npm install -g @twigpine/zero` | `zero upgrade` (runs npm) |
| Release archive | download from [Releases](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/releases) | `zero upgrade` |
| mise | `mise use -g ubi:Twigpine/zero` | `mise upgrade` |
| `go install` | `go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@latest` | rerun the command |
| Source | `go build -o zero ./cmd/zero` | rebuild |
- an npm package, `@gitlawb/zero`
- release archives on GitHub Releases
- source builds with Go 1.26.5+
`zero upgrade` follows whatever owns the binary, with one exception it cannot
detect. It delegates to npm for an npm install, refuses outright for a Homebrew
keg and names `brew upgrade zero`, and replaces the binary in place for
everything else — including a mise-managed one, which is the exception.
mise is the one case it cannot detect: a mise-managed binary is an ordinary
standalone install on disk, so `zero upgrade` will replace it and leave mise
describing a version that is no longer there. Use `mise upgrade` instead.
Release archives are the substrate for most of the above: the install scripts
and the npm fallback both download a platform archive from a published GitHub
Release and verify its checksum.
The install scripts download a platform-specific release archive and require a
published GitHub Release for the requested version. The npm package is
self-contained: the platform binary installs from the npm registry.
## npm
```bash
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
zero
```
@@ -56,47 +40,15 @@ cannot write to keeps failing — rerun the install or the command below with
sufficient permissions). To trigger the fetch manually:
```bash
node "$(npm root -g)/@twigpine/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs"
node "$(npm root -g)/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs"
```
### Moving from @gitlawb/zero
Zero was published as `@gitlawb/zero` up to 0.9.0. From 0.10.0 it is
`@twigpine/zero`, and the old name gets no further releases.
Both packages provide the `zero` command, so npm refuses to install the new
one while the old one is installed (`EEXIST`). Forcing it is worse: a later
uninstall of the old package removes the shared `zero` command. Quit any
running `zero` (on Windows a running `zero.exe` cannot be removed), then
uninstall the old package before installing the new one:
```bash
npm uninstall -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
```
With another package manager, the same two steps:
```bash
bun remove -g @gitlawb/zero && bun add -g @twigpine/zero
pnpm remove -g @gitlawb/zero && pnpm add -g @twigpine/zero
yarn global remove @gitlawb/zero && yarn global add @twigpine/zero
```
Config, sessions, logins, and plugins live in your user config and home
directories, not in the package, so they carry over unchanged.
0.10.0 was also published once as `@gitlawb/zero`, so an old install that
updates lands on a working build. That build prints these steps when `zero`
exits in a terminal, and `zero upgrade` and `zero update --check` print them
too.
## Linux And macOS Script
Install the latest release:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
From a checkout:
@@ -121,7 +73,7 @@ scripts/install.sh --install-dir "$HOME/bin"
Defaults:
- Repository: `Twigpine/zero`
- Repository: `Gitlawb/zero`
- Version: latest GitHub release
- Install path: `~/.local/bin/zero`
@@ -132,7 +84,7 @@ Requirements: Bash, `curl` or `wget`, `tar`, and `shasum` or `sha256sum`.
Install the latest release:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
From a checkout:
@@ -155,53 +107,14 @@ powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts/install.ps1 -InstallDir "$env:U
Defaults:
- Repository: `Twigpine/zero`
- Repository: `Gitlawb/zero`
- Version: latest GitHub release
- Install path: `%LOCALAPPDATA%\zero\bin\zero.exe`
## mise
[mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/) installs Zero straight from the GitHub Release
archives through its `ubi` backend, so there is nothing extra to publish and no
registry in the middle:
```bash
mise use -g ubi:Twigpine/zero
```
Pin a version the same way you would any other tool:
```bash
mise use -g ubi:Twigpine/[email protected]
```
Updates come from `mise upgrade`. `zero upgrade` also works, because a
mise-managed binary is an ordinary standalone install, but then mise's records
describe a version that is no longer on disk. Prefer `mise upgrade`.
## go install
```bash
go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@latest
```
This builds from source, so it needs Go 1.26.9+ and it does not go through the
release archives. Two consequences worth knowing before you pick it:
- On Linux you also need the sandbox helper, which is a separate binary and is
not installed by this command. See
[Sandbox Helpers For Source Builds](#sandbox-helpers-for-source-builds).
Without it, native sandboxing is unavailable.
- `zero upgrade` treats the result as a standalone install and will replace the
binary with a release build rather than rebuilding from source. If you chose
`go install` deliberately, rerun it instead.
macOS and Windows need no extra helper.
## From Source
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/zero.git
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
@@ -212,7 +125,7 @@ Build a local binary:
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
Source builds require Go 1.26.9+.
Source builds require Go 1.26.5+.
### Sandbox Helpers For Source Builds
@@ -245,7 +158,7 @@ seccomp filter on Android:
pkg install golang
# Build Zero for Android
git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/zero.git
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
cd zero
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=android GOARCH=arm64 go build -ldflags="-s -w" -o zero ./cmd/zero
@@ -321,34 +234,10 @@ directory.
## Updating
Check for a newer release, then download, verify, and install it in place:
Check for a newer release:
```bash
zero update --check
zero upgrade
```
See the [update guide](UPDATE.md) for update modes, flags, and platform details.
`zero upgrade` behaves differently depending on how Zero was installed, because
overwriting a binary a package manager owns leaves that manager describing a
version that is no longer there:
- **npm**: runs `npm install -g @twigpine/zero@latest` for you. An install of
the old `@gitlawb/zero` package refuses instead and prints the steps in
[Moving from @gitlawb/zero](#moving-from-gitlawbzero): that name gets no
further releases, so npm would only reinstall the same version.
- **Homebrew**: refuses, and tells you to run `brew upgrade zero`. Replacing the
keg binary directly would be reverted by the next `brew upgrade` or
`brew reinstall`.
- **everything else**: downloads the verified release archive and replaces the
binary in place.
Homebrew is detected by the binary living inside a Cellar keg that carries
Homebrew's own `INSTALL_RECEIPT.json`. The keg shape alone is not enough: a
directory tree you built yourself can have exactly that shape, and refusing to
update an install Homebrew never touched would be a real cost for a made-up
reason. The receipt is the thing only Homebrew writes.
An ordinary install under `/usr/local/bin` is left alone even on an Intel Mac
where that is also the Homebrew prefix.
Then reinstall with npm or rerun the install script for the version you want.
-26
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@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
# Local per-model completion limits
Add `modelRPM` to the existing Zero config file:
```json
{"modelRPM": {"gpt-4.1": 30, "claude-sonnet-4.5": 15}}
```
Keys resolve through the model registry; custom IDs match exactly after trimming
whitespace. Missing keys and zero mean unlimited. Negative limits and conflicting
aliases are configuration errors. Project config may add or tighten a user cap,
but cannot relax it. Changes take effect on the next Zero process start.
For `zero exec` and interactive agent turns, admission happens immediately before
the wrapped turn session's `Stream`. N admissions fit in any sliding 60-second
window; N+1 returns a local rate-limit error before entering that method. The
error reports when a slot expires. Exec uses its existing provider-error exit
code plus a local-limit hint. There is no sleep or hidden retry. Failed admitted
requests still consume a slot.
Sessions and model switches share a limiter in one process. Separate processes
have independent windows; restarting clears them. This is not an account-wide
cap. It counts Stream admissions, not all HTTP requests: setup/prewarm,
compaction, provider-internal retries, discovery and direct calls outside that
boundary are not counted. No TPM, cost budgets, persistence, cross-process
coordination or new runtime/Python dependency is introduced.
+18 -77
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# npm packaging
How `@twigpine/zero` is put together on npm, why it is shaped this way, and the
How `@gitlawb/zero` is put together on npm, why it is shaped this way, and the
rules the release pipeline must follow. Read this before touching
`package.json`, `bin/zero.js`, `scripts/postinstall.mjs`,
`scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs`, or the npm-publish steps of
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ rules the release pipeline must follow. Read this before touching
## Goals
A `npm install -g @twigpine/zero` must be **silent and self-contained**:
A `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero` must be **silent and self-contained**:
- No `EBADENGINE` warnings — ours or from any package in the dependency tree.
- No install scripts anywhere in the tree, so npm's `allow-scripts` gating,
@@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ The model is the one used by Codex, esbuild, and Biome: a tiny wrapper package
plus per-platform payloads carrying the native binaries.
```
@twigpine/zero <- wrapper: bin/zero.js + optionalDependencies
├─ @twigpine/zero-darwin-arm64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-darwin-arm64
├─ @twigpine/zero-darwin-x64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-darwin-x64
├─ @twigpine/zero-linux-arm64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-linux-arm64
├─ @twigpine/zero-linux-x64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-linux-x64
└─ @twigpine/zero-win32-x64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-win32-x64
@gitlawb/zero <- wrapper: bin/zero.js + optionalDependencies
├─ @gitlawb/zero-darwin-arm64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-darwin-arm64
├─ @gitlawb/zero-darwin-x64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-darwin-x64
├─ @gitlawb/zero-linux-arm64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-linux-arm64
├─ @gitlawb/zero-linux-x64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-linux-x64
└─ @gitlawb/zero-win32-x64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-win32-x64
```
- The platform "packages" are **versions of the same `@twigpine/zero` package**,
- The platform "packages" are **versions of the same `@gitlawb/zero` package**,
published at suffixed versions (`0.4.0-linux-x64`) and referenced through
`npm:` aliases in `optionalDependencies`. One package name means one npm
trusted-publisher configuration — no new publish credentials per platform.
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ plus per-platform payloads carrying the native binaries.
### Binary resolution in `bin/zero.js`
1. Resolve `@twigpine/zero-<platform>-<arch>` and exec the `zero` binary from
1. Resolve `@gitlawb/zero-<platform>-<arch>` and exec the `zero` binary from
it. This wins over any previously downloaded copy — the platform version is
pinned to the wrapper release.
2. Fall back to a binary previously downloaded next to the wrapper.
@@ -103,22 +103,10 @@ dependencies of the wrapper:
platform binary (plus the musl variant on linux, which its launcher detects
at runtime) — about 65 MB saved per platform package.
### One package name
The npm name lives in `package.json` and nothing else repeats it:
`scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs` names the wrapper, the platform
versions, the alias names, and the alias targets from it, and `bin/zero.js`
reads its own `package.json` to derive the alias it resolves. The Go side
needs the name as a constant (`npmPackageName` in
`internal/update/installmethod.go`), and a test holds it equal to
`package.json`.
## Publishing rules (release pipeline)
These are the invariants `release-artifacts.yml` must hold. Breaking the first
one is user-visible immediately. `scripts/npm/publish-packages.sh` implements
them, and `internal/npmwrapper/publish_test.go` runs it against a fake
registry.
one is user-visible immediately.
1. **Platform versions must never become `latest`.** `0.4.0-linux-x64` is a
semver *prerelease* of `0.4.0`; publishing it without an explicit
@@ -130,67 +118,20 @@ registry.
bootstrap publish) — a missing value must not abort the job between the
platform and wrapper publishes, which would strand a half-published
release.
2. **Platform versions are on the registry before the wrapper.** The
wrapper's `optionalDependencies` pin exact suffixed versions; publishing
the wrapper first would create a window where installs resolve aliases
that 404. Ordering the uploads is not enough: npm applies a publish
asynchronously, and in 0.10.0 a platform version appeared ten minutes
after its upload returned, after the wrapper. The publish script waits
until npm shows every platform version before it publishes the wrapper,
and waits the same way for `latest` afterwards (up to 30 minutes in all).
2. **Platform versions publish before the wrapper.** The wrapper's
`optionalDependencies` pin exact suffixed versions; publishing the wrapper
first would create a window where installs resolve aliases that 404.
3. **Exact-version pinning.** The wrapper at `X.Y.Z` references platform
versions `X.Y.Z-<platform>-<arch>` exactly — never ranges — so a wrapper
and its binaries can never skew. The publish script refuses to start when
the wrapper's aliases do not match the platform payloads beside it.
and its binaries can never skew.
4. All publishes go through the existing npm OIDC trusted-publishing flow and
the `npm-publish` environment gate; no tokens. Because the platform
payloads are versions of the same package, they reuse the single
trusted-publisher configuration. npm checks provenance against
`package.json` `repository`, so it must name the repository the workflow
runs in.
5. **Re-runs are safe.** A version already on the registry is skipped rather
than republished, so re-running a job that failed between the platform and
wrapper publishes finishes the release. Only npm's E404 counts as "not
published"; a lookup that fails any other way is retried and then stops the
job before anything is published.
trusted-publisher configuration.
`zero update` keeps working unchanged: it detects an npm install by finding a
`package.json` named `@twigpine/zero` next to the running binary — true inside
a platform payload too — and updates via `npm install -g @twigpine/zero@latest`.
## The move from `@gitlawb/zero`
Zero was published as `@gitlawb/zero` up to 0.9.0 and as `@twigpine/zero`
from 0.10.0. There is no in-place migration: both packages own the `zero`
bin, so npm refuses to install one over the other (`EEXIST`), and forcing it
lets a later uninstall of the old package delete the shared bin. The user
has to uninstall the old package and install the new one, in that order.
Deprecating the old package alone would not have reached existing users.
0.9.0's `zero upgrade` runs `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`; with
nothing newer under that name, npm reinstalls nothing, prints no deprecation
warning (it only warns when it installs something), and Zero reports the
update as done. So 0.10.0 was published once more under the old name, as a
bridge:
- The release job assembled the same verified artifacts a second time with
`build-platform-packages.mjs --package-name @gitlawb/zero` and published
them with the same script, after the `@twigpine/zero` publish. The steps
that did this ran once and have been removed from `release-artifacts.yml`.
- The bridge build knows its name from the `package.json` beside it. The Go
binary reports it as `InstallMethodNpmLegacy`: `zero upgrade` refuses
with the switch steps instead of reinstalling it, and `zero update --check`
adds them. `bin/zero.js` prints the same steps after `zero` exits, on a
terminal only. This handling stays in the code, since only a build
installed under the old name ever triggers it.
- Updating from 0.9.0 installs that bridge build, so npm also shows the
deprecation message.
`@gitlawb/zero` is deprecated on every version and no longer has a trusted
publisher, so this release workflow cannot publish it again; another version
would take a maintainer publishing by hand. Its versions stay on the
registry: existing installs resolve their platform payload through them, so
they must never be unpublished.
`package.json` named `@gitlawb/zero` next to the running binary — true inside
a platform payload too — and updates via `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`.
## Runbook: bumping the vendored helpers
+9 -10
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
Run this checklist when a PR changes npm distribution files such as
`package.json`, `bin/zero.js`, `scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs`,
`scripts/npm/publish-packages.sh`, Go build or release tooling, or the npm
`bin` wrapper.
Go build or release tooling, or the npm `bin` wrapper.
## Required Checks
@@ -38,24 +37,24 @@ path:
```bash
# platform-package path
mkdir -p /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine
cp -R dist/npm/wrapper /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero
mkdir -p /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb
cp -R dist/npm/wrapper /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero
cp -R dist/npm/platforms/zero-<platform>-<arch> \
"/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero/bin/zero.js --version
"/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/bin/zero.js --version
# first-run download fallback (delete the platform package first)
rm -rf "/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero/bin/zero.js --version
rm -rf "/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/bin/zero.js --version
```
## Checklist
- `package.json` has the expected package name (`@twigpine/zero`), version,
- `package.json` has the expected package name (`@gitlawb/zero`), version,
`bin.zero` entry, and NO `scripts` entries — the published package must be
free of lifecycle scripts (see NPM_PACKAGING.md).
- `scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs` emits platform payloads whose
`package.json` is `@twigpine/zero@<version>-<platform>-<arch>` with matching
`package.json` is `@gitlawb/zero@<version>-<platform>-<arch>` with matching
`os`/`cpu`, contains the executable binary and the vendored `helpers/` tree
with regular-file (non-symlink) `.bin` shims, and a wrapper payload with no
scripts, no dependencies, and the full five-alias `optionalDependencies`
-1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ Zero.
## User Docs
- [Install](INSTALL.md)
- [Local per-model completion limits](MODEL_RPM.md)
- [Update flow](UPDATE.md)
- [OAuth logins and subscription-backed providers](oauth-subscriptions.md)
-42
View File
@@ -138,45 +138,3 @@ output or stop a still-running task by id.
If Zero is restarted while a background task is still marked `running`, the new
manager marks that task `error` and clears its PID. This avoids sending
`TaskStop` to a stale PID that may now belong to an unrelated process.
## Recovering an Interrupted Overwrite
Zero writes and flushes a complete temporary file before publishing an overwrite,
so a write failure before publication leaves the existing manifest unchanged
instead of truncating it. On Unix, publication uses a same-directory rename and
preserves the existing file's permission bits.
On Windows, Zero uses `ReplaceFileW` to preserve the destination DACL instead of
silently replacing it with the temporary file's inherited DACL. `ReplaceFileW`
is not observer-atomic: another process can briefly observe the destination path
as absent during replacement. Zero serializes specialist loads and managed
mutations within one process, but cannot synchronize external processes or
editors.
Windows errors 1176 (`ERROR_UNABLE_TO_MOVE_REPLACEMENT`) and 1177
(`ERROR_UNABLE_TO_MOVE_REPLACEMENT_2`) are partial replacement failures. With
Zero's managed backup, 1176 leaves the original names intact and needs no manual
recovery. For 1177, Zero has moved the original aside and tries to move it back.
That rollback almost always succeeds, and the failed write changes nothing.
If the rollback itself fails — typically because another process is holding a
lock on the file — the original is not lost, but it is left under a name Zero
does not read:
```text
<specialist dir>/.zero-replace-<random>.backup
```
Only `*.md` files are loaded as specialists, so until that file is renamed the
specialist will not appear in `zero specialist list` or resolve by name. Zero's
error message includes both the backup path and destination path. Recover by
closing whatever holds the lock and renaming the backup back:
```powershell
Move-Item .zero-replace-<random>.backup <name>.md
```
A `.zero-replace-*.backup` can also linger after a *successful* overwrite if the
backup could not be deleted afterward. That case is reported as a warning rather
than an error — the new manifest is already in place, and the leftover file is
safe to delete.
+9 -91
View File
@@ -1,23 +1,16 @@
# Update Flow
`zero update --check` checks the latest GitHub release and compares it with the
local CLI version. `zero update --apply` (or its shorthand, `zero upgrade`)
downloads, verifies, and installs it.
local CLI version.
```bash
zero update --check
zero update --check --json
zero update --check --repo Twigpine/zero
zero update --check --repo Gitlawb/zero
zero update --check --target windows-x64
zero upgrade
zero update --apply
```
`--check` and `--apply` are mutually exclusive. `zero update` requires one of
them explicitly; `zero upgrade` is `zero update` with `--apply` implied.
`--check` is check-only:
The command is intentionally check-only:
- It does not replace the running binary.
- It exits with code `0` when the check succeeds, even when an update is
@@ -26,39 +19,14 @@ them explicitly; `zero upgrade` is `zero update` with `--apply` implied.
- `--json` prints the same result in a machine-readable format for scripts and
CI.
`--apply` installs the update in place:
- npm installs delegate to `npm install -g @twigpine/zero@latest`. An install
of the old `@gitlawb/zero` package refuses, without a release check, and
prints the steps to switch to `@twigpine/zero` (see
[INSTALL.md](INSTALL.md#moving-from-gitlawbzero)); `--check` prints them
too.
- Standalone installs download the release archive, verify its checksum,
extract it, and atomically replace the running binary plus any installed
optional sandbox helpers.
- On Windows, the running executable is renamed aside and cleaned up on the
next `zero update --apply` or `zero upgrade`, since it can't be overwritten
while running.
- `--target` cannot be combined with `--apply`; it only applies to `--check`,
since applying always installs onto the current machine.
- `--repo` and `--endpoint` are ignored when applying to an npm-managed
install: that path delegates to `npm install -g @twigpine/zero@latest` and
takes its release from the npm registry, not from GitHub. They still apply to
`--check` there.
- `--json` serializes Zero's final result. For npm-managed installs, npm may
also write progress output to stdout, so neither
`zero update --apply --json` nor `zero upgrade --json` is guaranteed to
produce a single parseable JSON document. Use `--check --json` for
machine-readable automation.
Useful flags:
| Flag | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `--repo <owner/repo>` | Use another GitHub repository for `--check` and `--apply`/`upgrade`. Ignored by an npm-managed apply. |
| `--endpoint <url\|owner/repo>` | Use a specific release API URL or repository slug for `--check` and `--apply`/`upgrade`. Ignored by an npm-managed apply. |
| `--repo <owner/repo>` | Check another GitHub repository. |
| `--endpoint <url|owner/repo>` | Check a specific release API URL or repository slug. |
| `--timeout <duration>` | Override the default release check timeout. |
| `--target <platform-arch>` | Validate release metadata for another supported target (`--check` only). |
| `--target <platform-arch>` | Validate release metadata for another supported target. |
Supported targets are `linux-x64`, `linux-arm64`, `macos-x64`, `macos-arm64`,
`windows-x64`, and `windows-arm64`. Without `--target`, Zero checks the current
@@ -69,58 +37,8 @@ Endpoint resolution order:
1. `--endpoint`
2. `ZERO_UPDATE_RELEASE_URL`
3. `--repo`
4. `https://api.github.com/repos/Twigpine/zero/releases/latest`
4. `https://api.github.com/repos/Gitlawb/zero/releases/latest`
Installer scripts download the matching release asset for the local platform and
verify its `.sha256` file. If Zero is already installed, run `zero upgrade`
instead of reinstalling.
## Windows recovery state (standalone installs)
This section describes Windows only. On Linux and macOS a standalone update
renames the staged file directly over the executable path through the
installation directory's file descriptor, so the replacement is atomic and no
aside copy, marker, or recovery record is ever created — a failed update leaves
the previous binary in place and nothing to resolve.
On Windows, a running executable cannot be replaced in place, so the previous
binary is moved aside to `<binary>.zero-update-<random>.old` first. The updater
records that exact file — bound to its filesystem identity, in per-user state
outside the installation directory — and deletes only that recorded copy after
the next update is verified in place. Backups it did not create are never
removed, so a file such as `zero.exe.before-manual-patch.old` is left alone. A
recorded copy that something else holds open (an on-access scanner, an editor)
stays recorded and is removed by a later update instead.
An update **refuses to run** while unresolved recovery state exists beside the
binary:
| State on disk | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `<binary>.old` (or `<binary>.<suffix>.old`) plus a `.keep` marker, or a per-user update-recovery record naming that copy | A previous update could not restore the original binary. The `.old` file may be the last binary the updater verified; the installed one may be unverified. The `.keep` marker is in the installation directory and can be deleted; the identity-bound record is not, so deleting the marker alone does not end the refusal. |
| `<binary>.…old.<suffix>.recovery` | A previous update could not even write the marker, so it moved the last verified binary to that name. |
| The binary is missing and one or more `*.old` files exist | The previous attempt was interrupted between moves. |
The refusal names the paths involved and the two moves that end the state:
either move the recovery binary back over the executable path, or — if the
installed binary is the one you want — delete the recovery copy itself (not
only the `.keep` marker) after verifying the installed binary, then update
again. Deleting the marker alone is not enough: a failed restore also records
that copy in per-user state outside the installation directory, and the next
update consults that record even if the marker is gone.
That trusted record lives under `%AppData%\zero\update-recovery` (per-user).
The recovery copy and its `.keep` marker sit in the installation directory
(per-machine). A second Windows account on the same machine does not see the
first account's unresolved record; the sibling marker is the machine-visible
signal for every account. There is no separate machine-wide store: writing one
would need a shared writable location and ACL rules the updater does not own.
This is deliberately fail-closed and differs from older releases, which deleted
`<binary>.old` and proceeded. The trade-off is that anyone who can write in the
installation directory can plant `<binary>.old` and `<binary>.old.keep` there
and make every subsequent update refuse until an operator clears them. That is
the safe direction: the alternative is an update that overwrites the only
verified copy of the previous binary. If updates start refusing, inspect those
files before removing them — an installation directory that a lower-privileged
account can write to is itself worth fixing.
verify its `.sha256` file. If Zero is already installed, run `zero update --check`
before reinstalling.
-3
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<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 80 80" width="80" height="80">
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+3 -6
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@@ -1,28 +1,25 @@
module github.com/Gitlawb/zero
go 1.26.9
go 1.26.5
require (
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.9
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5
github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0
github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.4.1
github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.3
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260703014108-f5a850f9c2b7
github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.11.7
github.com/charmbracelet/x/term v0.2.2
github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.15
github.com/ledongthuc/pdf v0.0.0-20250511090121-5959a4027728
golang.org/x/image v0.45.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1
)
require (
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260703014108-f5a850f9c2b7 // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/golden v0.0.0-20260615092313-b57e5e6d29bb // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/termios v0.1.1 // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/windows v0.2.2 // indirect
+2 -10
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1 h1:7r55WzBxpo/R3z98hGmY7KKPd3ET6vsf0Fb9sDHOV60=
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1/go.mod h1:GE6M31gaWZVXzGw73OeuTTgy4lX+OtkH0E5ymnNsHxo=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.9 h1:DpJCMWKgzQK8SJv4zbKKFHAI10ymWy/evClPFk0k0f8=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.9/go.mod h1:2SkdgoTXluXJHOUwAoRlRXF/28vklb1rFl6GcgV1/ss=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8 h1:SxTJMhCAI3lbPmy4SgX5LWZ24AdINr4I6UEqzZvYJuY=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8/go.mod h1:2SkdgoTXluXJHOUwAoRlRXF/28vklb1rFl6GcgV1/ss=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5 h1:kbNxgeeUOYv5J0YdpxFjfvf3dFvqH8Aci4zB6xqFtrY=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5/go.mod h1:9oqhxt4yxIMe6q5A4kHr44DremZk7J9UNh74GlWa5nc=
github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2 h1:F2VQgta7ecxGYO8k3ZZz3RS8fVIXVxONVUPlNERoyfY=
github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2/go.mod h1:yd8OoFMLzJbo9gZq8j5qaps8bJ9aShtEA8Ipt1oGCvU=
github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0 h1:2Q9r3ki8+JYXvGsDyBXwH3LcJ+WK5D0gc5E8vS6K3D0=
github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0/go.mod h1:Bze95FyfUr7x34QZrjL+XP+0qgp/zg8yS+TtBj1WA3k=
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0 h1:FodwmyOBgJULFYmDqibcp9pvfDLWdtPRh9v/r5BXYZs=
@@ -64,15 +62,9 @@ github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e h1:JVG44RsyaB9T2KIHavM
github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e/go.mod h1:RbqR21r5mrJuqunuUZ/Dhy/avygyECGrLceyNeo4LiM=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976 h1:X8Hz2ImujgbmetVuW+w2YkyZChE3cBpZi2P158rTG9M=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976/go.mod h1:vnf4pv9iKZXY58sQE1L86zmNWJ4159e1RkcWiLCkeEY=
golang.org/x/image v0.45.0 h1:FMb1nTbH5H9vF55SriQHgFw5GnNL9Jg6L25BwXKzhB0=
golang.org/x/image v0.45.0/go.mod h1:n62x/7RqlwXDvGsSU4u6IUTUf6KghUZ9Bt7cG/T9Fx4=
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 h1:SZjpbeLmrCk4xhRSZFNZW5gFUeCeFgjekvI/+gfScek=
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405 h1:yhCVgyC4o1eVCa2tZl7eS0r+SDo693bJlVdllGtEeKM=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1 h1:DP3TfgZhDkT7lerUdnp6PTGKyxxzz6T+cOlY/xEvfWk=
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1/go.mod h1:lXJ8SexMvEVcHCoDvAGLZgFJ9Wsm2sulmoNEXGhYZD0=
+70 -768
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+17 -2278
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-217
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@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
package acp
// desktopinterop_test.go covers three defects found by driving the real `zero
// acp` binary from a desktop ACP client. Each is a case where ZERO and a
// conforming client disagreed about the wire, and none of them failed loudly —
// they produced a silent denial, a spurious crash, or two buttons the user
// could not tell apart.
//
// A fourth, session/load restoring history without replaying it, is fixed by
// #914 rather than here: that one also gives the replayed messages stable ids
// and keeps session/resume replay-free, which this did not.
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
)
// ---- an offered option is an acceptable answer ----
// The list the options were BUILT from and the list the answer was CHECKED
// against were different whenever ZERO did not enumerate: the client was sent
// Allow and Reject, and its reply was validated against an empty slice, so
// every button it could possibly show failed closed to deny. The user clicked
// Allow and ZERO recorded a denial, with nothing on screen to say so.
func TestAnOfferedOptionIsAccepted(t *testing.T) {
// No AvailableDecisions: the fallback path, which is every permission event
// that is not a prompt.
req := agent.PermissionRequest{ToolName: "bash"}
options := buildPermissionOptions(req)
if len(options) == 0 {
t.Fatal("no options were offered")
}
for _, option := range options {
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: option.OptionID},
buildPermissionOptions(req),
)
if string(decision.Action) != option.OptionID {
t.Fatalf("option %q was answered with %q (%s) — an offered option must be accepted",
option.OptionID, decision.Action, decision.Reason)
}
}
}
// The narrowing this validation exists for still holds: a client must not be
// able to return a broader grant than it was shown.
func TestAnOptionThatWasNotOfferedIsStillRefused(t *testing.T) {
req := agent.PermissionRequest{ToolName: "bash"}
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: string(agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow)},
buildPermissionOptions(req),
)
if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionDeny {
t.Fatalf("an unoffered broader grant was accepted as %q", decision.Action)
}
}
// The resolver is the single source of truth for both sides, which is what
// makes the two agree by construction rather than by being kept in step.
func TestOfferedDecisionsMatchWhatWasSent(t *testing.T) {
for _, req := range []agent.PermissionRequest{
{ToolName: "bash"},
{ToolName: "bash", AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}},
} {
offered := buildPermissionOptions(req)
for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(req) {
if !actionOffered(option.OptionID, offered) {
t.Fatalf("option %q was sent but is not in the offered set %v", option.OptionID, offered)
}
}
}
}
// ---- two options the user can tell apart ----
// request_permissions offers plain allow and strict-review allow together, and
// both were labelled "Allow". The label is the only thing an ACP client shows,
// so the panel presented two identical buttons where one silently enabled
// strict auto-review of what was granted.
func TestEveryOfferedOptionHasADistinctLabel(t *testing.T) {
req := agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: "request_permissions",
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
},
}
seen := map[string]string{}
for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(req) {
if previous, clash := seen[option.Name]; clash {
t.Fatalf("options %q and %q share the label %q — a user cannot tell them apart",
previous, option.OptionID, option.Name)
}
seen[option.Name] = option.OptionID
}
}
// The two remain distinct decisions: the label changed, the round trip did not.
func TestStrictAllowStillRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
req := agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: "request_permissions",
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict,
},
}
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: string(agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict)},
buildPermissionOptions(req),
)
if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict {
t.Fatalf("strict allow round-tripped as %q", decision.Action)
}
}
// ---- cancelling a permission is a cancellation, not a crash ----
// Only context.Canceled was recognised, so dismissing a permission dialog came
// back as JSON-RPC -32603 carrying the internal sentinel text. Clients render
// that as a failed turn, so declining a tool looked like ZERO falling over —
// and for apply_patch, dismissing is the ONLY refusal a client is offered.
func TestCancellingAPermissionEndsTheTurnAsCancelled(t *testing.T) {
canceled := fmt.Errorf("%w for apply_patch", agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled)
reason, err := stopReasonFor(agent.Result{}, canceled)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stopReasonFor returned an error for a cancellation: %v", err)
}
if reason != StopCancelled {
t.Fatalf("stop reason = %q, want %q", reason, StopCancelled)
}
}
// A genuine failure must still be an error. Mapping too much to cancelled would
// hide real faults behind a clean ending, which is the opposite mistake.
func TestARealFailureIsStillAnError(t *testing.T) {
failure := errors.New("provider exploded")
if _, err := stopReasonFor(agent.Result{}, failure); !errors.Is(err, failure) {
t.Fatalf("stopReasonFor(%v) = %v, want the failure preserved", failure, err)
}
}
// The sentinel is matched through errors.Is, so it survives the wrapping every
// return site applies — each one adds the tool name.
func TestPermissionCancellationSurvivesWrapping(t *testing.T) {
if !errors.Is(fmt.Errorf("%w for bash", agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled), agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
t.Fatal("a wrapped permission cancellation was not recognised")
}
if errors.Is(errors.New("something else"), agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
t.Fatal("an unrelated error was reported as a permission cancellation")
}
}
// A decision that never became an option cannot be selected.
//
// PermissionDecisionCancel is the case that exists today: optionKindFor drops
// it because ACP expresses cancellation through the outcome, yet ZERO
// enumerates it in AvailableDecisions for shell commands and apply_patch. While
// the reply was validated against the DECISIONS rather than the sent options, a
// client could return {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"cancel"} — an id it was
// never shown — and abort the whole turn.
//
// Written over every option-less decision rather than over "cancel", so a
// future action that optionKindFor declines to render is covered the day it is
// added rather than the day someone remembers this test.
func TestADecisionThatIsNotAnOptionCannotBeSelected(t *testing.T) {
for _, toolName := range []string{"bash", "apply_patch"} {
req := agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: toolName,
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
agent.PermissionDecisionCancel,
},
}
options := buildPermissionOptions(req)
for _, action := range req.AvailableDecisions {
if actionOffered(string(action), options) {
continue // it was sent; selecting it is legitimate
}
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: string(action)},
options,
)
if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionDeny {
t.Fatalf("%s: %q was never sent as an option but was accepted as %q",
toolName, action, decision.Action)
}
}
}
}
// Cancelling is still reachable — through the outcome, which is where ACP puts
// it. Closing the selected-id route must not close the real one.
func TestCancellingThroughTheOutcomeStillWorks(t *testing.T) {
options := buildPermissionOptions(agent.PermissionRequest{ToolName: "apply_patch"})
decision := decisionFromOutcome(RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeCancelled}, options)
if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionCancel {
t.Fatalf("outcome=cancelled gave %q, want cancel", decision.Action)
}
}
+10 -43
View File
@@ -89,13 +89,6 @@ type Conn struct {
handlers map[string]HandlerFunc
notifiers map[string]NotifyFunc
// Notifications for one method are an ordered stream: session/update in
// particular is stateful, so dispatching every frame in an unrelated
// goroutine can make a later chunk overtake an earlier one. Different
// methods retain independent tails, keeping session/cancel responsive while
// an update handler is busy.
notifyMu sync.Mutex
notifyTails map[string]chan struct{}
mu sync.Mutex
nextID int64
@@ -113,12 +106,11 @@ type Conn struct {
// lifetime.
func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
return &Conn{
rawReader: r,
w: w,
handlers: make(map[string]HandlerFunc),
notifiers: make(map[string]NotifyFunc),
notifyTails: make(map[string]chan struct{}),
pending: make(map[int64]chan rpcMessage),
rawReader: r,
w: w,
handlers: make(map[string]HandlerFunc),
notifiers: make(map[string]NotifyFunc),
pending: make(map[int64]chan rpcMessage),
}
}
@@ -311,7 +303,11 @@ func (c *Conn) handleLine(ctx context.Context, line []byte) {
}(msg)
case msg.isNotify():
if fn := c.notifiers[msg.Method]; fn != nil {
c.dispatchNotification(ctx, msg, fn)
c.wg.Add(1)
go func(m rpcMessage) {
defer c.wg.Done()
fn(ctx, m.Params)
}(msg)
}
default:
// Malformed frame; reply only if we can identify a request id.
@@ -321,35 +317,6 @@ func (c *Conn) handleLine(ctx context.Context, line []byte) {
}
}
// dispatchNotification preserves wire order within one method without making
// unrelated notification methods wait for each other. The read loop installs
// each tail before starting its goroutine, so goroutine scheduling cannot
// reorder the chain it observes.
func (c *Conn) dispatchNotification(ctx context.Context, msg rpcMessage, fn NotifyFunc) {
c.notifyMu.Lock()
previous := c.notifyTails[msg.Method]
done := make(chan struct{})
c.notifyTails[msg.Method] = done
c.notifyMu.Unlock()
c.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer c.wg.Done()
defer func() {
close(done)
c.notifyMu.Lock()
if c.notifyTails[msg.Method] == done {
delete(c.notifyTails, msg.Method)
}
c.notifyMu.Unlock()
}()
if previous != nil {
<-previous
}
fn(ctx, msg.Params)
}()
}
func (c *Conn) dispatchRequest(ctx context.Context, msg rpcMessage) {
fn := c.handlers[msg.Method]
if fn == nil {
-80
View File
@@ -360,86 +360,6 @@ func TestConnNotification(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestConnNotificationsForOneMethodStayInWireOrder(t *testing.T) {
a, b, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
firstStarted := make(chan struct{})
releaseFirst := make(chan struct{})
delivered := make(chan int, 2)
b.HandleNotify("update", func(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) {
var in struct{ Sequence int }
_ = json.Unmarshal(params, &in)
if in.Sequence == 1 {
close(firstStarted)
<-releaseFirst
}
delivered <- in.Sequence
})
if err := a.Notify("update", map[string]int{"Sequence": 1}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first notify: %v", err)
}
select {
case <-firstStarted:
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("first notification did not start")
}
if err := a.Notify("update", map[string]int{"Sequence": 2}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second notify: %v", err)
}
select {
case sequence := <-delivered:
t.Fatalf("notification %d overtook the blocked first notification", sequence)
case <-time.After(25 * time.Millisecond):
}
close(releaseFirst)
for want := 1; want <= 2; want++ {
select {
case got := <-delivered:
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("notification order = ...,%d; want %d", got, want)
}
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatalf("notification %d was not delivered", want)
}
}
}
func TestConnDifferentNotificationMethodsStayConcurrent(t *testing.T) {
a, b, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
updateStarted := make(chan struct{})
releaseUpdate := make(chan struct{})
cancelDelivered := make(chan struct{})
b.HandleNotify("update", func(context.Context, json.RawMessage) {
close(updateStarted)
<-releaseUpdate
})
b.HandleNotify("cancel", func(context.Context, json.RawMessage) {
close(cancelDelivered)
})
if err := a.Notify("update", nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("update notify: %v", err)
}
select {
case <-updateStarted:
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("update notification did not start")
}
if err := a.Notify("cancel", nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cancel notify: %v", err)
}
select {
case <-cancelDelivered:
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("different notification method was blocked behind update")
}
close(releaseUpdate)
}
func TestConnMethodNotFound(t *testing.T) {
a, _, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
-213
View File
@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
package acp
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// captureAgentOptions makes every turn record the agent.Options it was built
// with, so a test can assert the permission mode the next prompt actually runs
// with rather than only what the wire reports.
func captureAgentOptions(deps *Deps) *agent.Options {
var captured agent.Options
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
captured = opts
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "ok"}, nil
}
return &captured
}
func newHarnessT(t *testing.T, deps Deps) *clientHarness {
t.Helper()
h := newHarness(t, deps)
t.Cleanup(h.stop)
return h
}
func mustCall(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, h *clientHarness, method string, params any, result any) {
t.Helper()
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, method, params, result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: %v", method, err)
}
}
// restartHarness replaces the live agent with a fresh one over the same store,
// which is the process restart the persisted mode has to survive.
func restartHarness(t *testing.T, h *clientHarness, deps Deps) *clientHarness {
t.Helper()
h.stop()
return newHarnessT(t, deps)
}
func modeOptionValue(t *testing.T, options []SessionConfigOption) string {
t.Helper()
for _, option := range options {
if option.ID == configIDMode {
return option.CurrentValue
}
}
t.Fatalf("no mode config option in %+v", options)
return ""
}
func assertModeReported(t *testing.T, result LoadSessionResult, want agent.PermissionMode) {
t.Helper()
if result.Modes == nil || result.Modes.CurrentModeID != string(want) {
t.Fatalf("modes = %+v, want currentModeId %q", result.Modes, want)
}
if got := modeOptionValue(t, result.ConfigOptions); got != string(want) {
t.Fatalf("mode config option = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestACPModePersistsAcrossRestartLoadAndResume(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
captured := captureAgentOptions(&deps)
h := newHarnessT(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
workspace := t.TempDir()
var created NewSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &created)
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModePlan)}, &SetSessionModeResult{})
meta, err := deps.Store.Get(created.SessionID)
if err != nil || meta == nil {
t.Fatalf("store.Get: %v", err)
}
if meta.PermissionMode != string(agent.PermissionModePlan) {
t.Fatalf("stored mode = %q, want plan", meta.PermissionMode)
}
// LOAD after a restart: the response must report the stored mode, and the
// next prompt must actually run with it.
h = restartHarness(t, h, deps)
var loaded LoadSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &loaded)
assertModeReported(t, loaded, agent.PermissionModePlan)
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("continue")}}, &PromptResult{})
if captured.PermissionMode != agent.PermissionModePlan {
t.Fatalf("after load, agent.Options.PermissionMode = %q, want plan", captured.PermissionMode)
}
// RESUME after another restart reports the same.
h = restartHarness(t, h, deps)
var resumed ResumeSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionResume, ResumeSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &resumed)
assertModeReported(t, resumed, agent.PermissionModePlan)
}
func TestACPModePersistsViaSetConfigOption(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
h := newHarnessT(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
workspace := t.TempDir()
var created NewSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &created)
var configured SetSessionConfigOptionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDMode, Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk),
}, &configured)
if got := modeOptionValue(t, configured.ConfigOptions); got != string(agent.PermissionModeAsk) {
t.Fatalf("configured mode = %q, want ask", got)
}
meta, err := deps.Store.Get(created.SessionID)
if err != nil || meta == nil {
t.Fatalf("store.Get: %v", err)
}
if meta.PermissionMode != string(agent.PermissionModeAsk) {
t.Fatalf("stored mode = %q, want ask", meta.PermissionMode)
}
h = restartHarness(t, h, deps)
var loaded LoadSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &loaded)
assertModeReported(t, loaded, agent.PermissionModeAsk)
}
// TestACPModeRestoreFallback pins the restore boundary: no stored value keeps
// the historical auto default, and a stored value outside the three offered
// modes must never come back weaker than ask (and never unsafe).
func TestACPModeRestoreFallback(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
seed string // "" means metadata written before modes were persisted
want agent.PermissionMode
}{
{name: "unset keeps auto", want: agent.PermissionModeAuto},
{name: "ask preserved", seed: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk), want: agent.PermissionModeAsk},
{name: "unknown falls back to ask", seed: "bogus", want: agent.PermissionModeAsk},
{name: "unsafe never restored", seed: string(agent.PermissionModeUnsafe), want: agent.PermissionModeAsk},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
captured := captureAgentOptions(&deps)
h := newHarnessT(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
workspace := t.TempDir()
var created NewSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &created)
if tc.seed != "" {
if _, err := deps.Store.UpdateMode(created.SessionID, tc.seed); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed mode: %v", err)
}
}
h = restartHarness(t, h, deps)
var loaded LoadSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &loaded)
assertModeReported(t, loaded, tc.want)
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("go")}}, &PromptResult{})
if captured.PermissionMode != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("next prompt PermissionMode = %q, want %q", captured.PermissionMode, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestACPSetModeWriteFailureKeepsLiveMode pins the store-first order: when the
// mode cannot be saved the request fails and the live session is untouched.
func TestACPSetModeWriteFailureKeepsLiveMode(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
captured := captureAgentOptions(&deps)
h := newHarnessT(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir(), McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &created)
// Remove the metadata file so UpdateMode fails but the live session stays
// promptable (turn persistence only warns when the file is gone).
metadataPath := filepath.Join(deps.Store.RootDir, created.SessionID, sessions.MetadataFile)
if err := os.Remove(metadataPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("remove metadata: %v", err)
}
err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModePlan)}, &SetSessionModeResult{})
var rpcErr *rpcError
if !errors.As(err, &rpcErr) || rpcErr.Code != codeInternalError {
t.Fatalf("set_mode with an unsavable mode = %v, want internal error", err)
}
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("still auto")}}, &PromptResult{})
if captured.PermissionMode != agent.PermissionModeAuto {
t.Fatalf("failed set_mode changed the live mode: PermissionMode = %q, want auto", captured.PermissionMode)
}
}
+23 -80
View File
@@ -15,10 +15,17 @@ import (
// PermissionOptions. Only the actions ZERO actually presented (AvailableDecisions)
// are surfaced; the optionId is the ZERO action string for a clean round-trip.
func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
actions := offeredDecisions(req)
actions := req.AvailableDecisions
if len(actions) == 0 {
// Sensible default if ZERO didn't enumerate: allow once / reject.
actions = []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}
}
options := make([]PermissionOption, 0, len(actions))
for _, action := range actions {
kind, name := optionKindFor(action, req.PrefixApprovalEscalates)
kind, name := optionKindFor(action)
if kind == "" {
continue // skip actions that have no clean ACP option (e.g. cancel)
}
@@ -31,61 +38,21 @@ func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
return options
}
// offeredDecisions resolves what this request actually offers the client.
//
// ONE RESOLVER, USED BY BOTH SIDES, and that is the entire point of it existing.
// The fallback below used to live inside buildPermissionOptions while
// requestPermission validated the client's answer against the raw
// req.AvailableDecisions. When ZERO did not enumerate — which is every
// permission event that is not a prompt, and includes a shell call whose sandbox
// decision came back deny — the two disagreed completely: the client was sent
// "Allow" and "Reject", and validation was performed against an EMPTY list, so
// every option the client could possibly click failed closed to deny with
// "permission option was not offered".
//
// The user clicked Allow and ZERO recorded a denial. Nothing surfaced it,
// because a denial is a legitimate answer — the tool was simply refused and the
// turn carried on as though the user had rejected it.
func offeredDecisions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []agent.PermissionDecisionAction {
if len(req.AvailableDecisions) > 0 {
return req.AvailableDecisions
}
// Sensible default if ZERO didn't enumerate: allow once / reject.
return []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}
}
// optionKindFor maps a ZERO decision action to an ACP PermissionOptionKind and a
// human label. Returns an empty kind for actions that ACP expresses through the
// outcome rather than an option (cancel).
//
// escalates reports that approving a command prefix will also run the command
// outside the sandbox. The two prefix options say so in their label, since the
// label is all an ACP client shows and the option id carries no room for it. An
// editor user is deciding on exactly the same terms as a terminal user, so the
// disclosure cannot be TUI-only.
func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, escalates bool) (kind, name string) {
func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction) (kind, name string) {
switch action {
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllow:
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllow, agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict:
return PermAllowOnce, "Allow"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict:
// SPLIT FROM PLAIN ALLOW because the label is the only thing an ACP
// client shows. Both were labelled "Allow", and request_permissions
// offers them together — so the panel presented two identical buttons,
// and whichever the user picked looked the same while one of them
// silently turned on strict auto-review of what was granted. The option
// id carries no room for the distinction, so it has to be in the name.
return PermAllowOnce, "Allow with strict review"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession:
return PermAllowAlways, "Allow for this session"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix:
return PermAllowAlways, withSandboxEscalationNote("Allow this command for the session", escalates)
return PermAllowAlways, "Allow this command for the session"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow:
return PermAllowAlways, "Always allow"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix:
return PermAllowAlways, withSandboxEscalationNote("Always allow this command", escalates)
return PermAllowAlways, "Always allow this command"
case agent.PermissionDecisionDeny:
return PermRejectOnce, "Reject"
case agent.PermissionDecisionCancel:
@@ -97,31 +64,19 @@ func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, escalates bool) (kind,
// decisionFromOutcome maps the client's permission outcome back to a ZERO
// decision. A cancelled outcome cancels the run; a selected option id is the ZERO
// action verbatim (validated against what was actually sent); anything
// unrecognized fails closed to deny.
//
// IT TAKES THE OPTIONS THAT WERE SENT, not the decisions the request offered,
// and the two are not the same list. Some actions never become options —
// PermissionDecisionCancel is dropped by optionKindFor because ACP expresses
// cancellation through the outcome instead — yet it IS enumerated in
// AvailableDecisions for shell commands and apply_patch, the two commonest
// prompts. Validating against the decisions therefore accepted
// {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"cancel"}: an identifier no client was ever
// shown, aborting the whole turn.
//
// Passing the sent options makes "what we offered" and "what we accept" the
// same slice rather than two things kept in step, so anything optionKindFor
// declines to render is excluded structurally instead of by name.
func decisionFromOutcome(outcome RequestPermissionOutcome, offered []PermissionOption) agent.PermissionDecision {
// action verbatim (validated against what was offered); anything unrecognized
// fails closed to deny.
func decisionFromOutcome(outcome RequestPermissionOutcome, offered []agent.PermissionDecisionAction) agent.PermissionDecision {
switch outcome.Outcome {
case OutcomeCancelled:
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionCancel, Reason: "client cancelled"}
case OutcomeSelected:
action := agent.PermissionDecisionAction(outcome.OptionID)
// Bind to what was actually offered for THIS call: a client must not be able
// to return a broader grant (always_allow / allow_for_session) that wasn't
// presented. Anything not offered fails closed to deny.
if actionOffered(outcome.OptionID, offered) {
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionAction(outcome.OptionID)}
if actionOffered(action, offered) {
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: action}
}
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "permission option was not offered"}
default:
@@ -129,9 +84,9 @@ func decisionFromOutcome(outcome RequestPermissionOutcome, offered []PermissionO
}
}
func actionOffered(optionID string, offered []PermissionOption) bool {
for _, option := range offered {
if option.OptionID == optionID {
func actionOffered(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, offered []agent.PermissionDecisionAction) bool {
for _, a := range offered {
if a == action {
return true
}
}
@@ -142,15 +97,13 @@ func actionOffered(optionID string, offered []PermissionOption) bool {
// session/request_permission request from a ZERO permission request.
func permissionToolCall(req agent.PermissionRequest) ToolCallUpdate {
args := marshalArgs(req.Args)
upd := ToolCallUpdate{
return ToolCallUpdate{
ToolCallID: req.ToolCallID,
Title: toolTitle(req.ToolName, string(args)),
Kind: toolKindFor(req.ToolName),
Status: ToolStatusPending,
RawInput: rawInputBytes(args),
}
attachBrowserToolDetails(&upd, req.ToolName)
return upd
}
func marshalArgs(args map[string]any) []byte {
@@ -170,13 +123,3 @@ func rawInputBytes(data []byte) json.RawMessage {
}
return json.RawMessage(data)
}
// withSandboxEscalationNote appends the escalation disclosure to a prefix
// option's label. Kept parallel to the TUI's wording so the same consequence is
// not described two different ways depending on which client the user runs.
func withSandboxEscalationNote(name string, escalates bool) string {
if !escalates {
return name
}
return name + " (runs outside the sandbox)"
}
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
package acp
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
)
func escalationRequest(escalates bool) agent.PermissionRequest {
return agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: "bash",
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix,
agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
},
PrefixApprovalEscalates: escalates,
}
}
// An ACP client renders only Name, so if the escalation is not in the label the
// editor user approves it blind. They face exactly the outcome a terminal user
// faces, so the disclosure has to reach both clients or it is not a fix.
func TestACPPrefixOptionsDiscloseLeavingTheSandbox(t *testing.T) {
found := 0
for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(escalationRequest(true)) {
action := agent.PermissionDecisionAction(option.OptionID)
if action != agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix && action != agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix {
if strings.Contains(option.Name, "sandbox") {
t.Errorf("option %q carries the disclosure but does not escalate", option.Name)
}
continue
}
found++
if !strings.Contains(option.Name, "outside the sandbox") {
t.Errorf("prefix option %q does not say the command leaves the sandbox", option.Name)
}
}
if found != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected both prefix options, saw %d", found)
}
}
func TestACPPrefixOptionsStaySilentWithoutEscalation(t *testing.T) {
for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(escalationRequest(false)) {
if strings.Contains(option.Name, "sandbox") {
t.Errorf("option %q warns about the sandbox when approving would not leave it", option.Name)
}
}
}
// The disclosure must live in the label only. The option id is the decision
// action round-tripped verbatim, and decisionFromOutcome matches it against
// what was offered, so decorating it would fail every prefix approval closed.
func TestACPDisclosureDoesNotDisturbTheOptionIDRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
request := escalationRequest(true)
options := buildPermissionOptions(request)
for _, option := range options {
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: option.OptionID},
options,
)
if string(decision.Action) != option.OptionID {
t.Errorf("option id %q round-tripped to %q (%s)", option.OptionID, decision.Action, decision.Reason)
}
}
}
+5 -22
View File
@@ -39,14 +39,11 @@ func TestBuildPermissionOptionsDefault(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestDecisionFromOutcome(t *testing.T) {
offered := buildPermissionOptions(agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: "bash",
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
},
})
offered := []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}
if d := decisionFromOutcome(RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeCancelled}, offered); d.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionCancel {
t.Errorf("cancelled -> %q, want cancel", d.Action)
}
@@ -82,17 +79,3 @@ func TestPermissionToolCall(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("expected rawInput from args")
}
}
func TestPermissionToolCallKeepsTheBrowserDescriptor(t *testing.T) {
call := permissionToolCall(agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolCallID: "browser-1",
ToolName: "browser_connect",
Args: map[string]any{"target": "127.0.0.1:9222"},
})
if got := browserDescriptor(t, call); got != (BrowserToolDetails{Version: 1, Command: "connect"}) {
t.Fatalf("browser descriptor = %#v", got)
}
if call.Title != "browser connect" {
t.Fatalf("title = %q", call.Title)
}
}
+5 -169
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,7 @@ package acp
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/url"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"unicode"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
@@ -20,14 +17,6 @@ func agentMessageChunk(delta string) ContentChunk {
return ContentChunk{SessionUpdate: UpdateAgentMessageChunk, Content: TextBlock(delta)}
}
func replayMessageChunk(role, messageID, text string) ContentChunk {
update := UpdateAgentMessageChunk
if role == "user" {
update = UpdateUserMessageChunk
}
return ContentChunk{SessionUpdate: update, MessageID: messageID, Content: TextBlock(text)}
}
func agentThoughtChunk(delta string) ContentChunk {
return ContentChunk{SessionUpdate: UpdateAgentThoughtChunk, Content: TextBlock(delta)}
}
@@ -55,125 +44,12 @@ func toolKindFor(name string) string {
// toolTitle builds a concise human title, e.g. "read_file src/main.go".
func toolTitle(name, rawArgs string) string {
if browser, ok := browserToolDetails(name); ok {
return browserToolTitle(browser.Command, rawArgs)
}
if hint := primaryArgHint(rawArgs); hint != "" {
return name + " " + hint
}
return name
}
// browserToolDetails identifies ZERO's local browser helpers without treating
// similarly named MCP tools as browser automation. The descriptor intentionally
// contains no request data: ACP tool input is already protocol-visible, but a
// durable UI must not need to retain text, local CDP targets, or full URLs just
// to recognise the browser operation.
func browserToolDetails(name string) (*BrowserToolDetails, bool) {
const prefix = "browser_"
command, ok := strings.CutPrefix(name, prefix)
if !ok {
return nil, false
}
switch command {
case "install", "launch", "connect", "open", "snapshot", "click", "type", "press", "action":
return &BrowserToolDetails{Version: 1, Command: command}, true
default:
return nil, false
}
}
const zeroBrowserMetaKey = "github.com/Gitlawb/zero/browser"
// attachBrowserToolDetails stores ZERO's browser descriptor in ACP's reserved
// extension channel. Keeping this in one helper prevents start, result, and
// permission payloads from drifting onto different wire shapes.
func attachBrowserToolDetails(update *ToolCallUpdate, name string) {
browser, ok := browserToolDetails(name)
if !ok {
return
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(browser)
if err != nil {
return
}
update.Meta = map[string]json.RawMessage{zeroBrowserMetaKey: raw}
}
// browserToolTitle avoids putting browser_type text, an attached DevTools
// endpoint, or a URL query/fragment in a tool-card title. Those values can
// carry credentials or session data; the UI only needs the operation and, for
// navigation, a human-recognisable origin.
func browserToolTitle(command, rawArgs string) string {
switch command {
case "action":
action, ok := exactJSONStringArg(rawArgs, "command")
if !ok {
return "browser action"
}
if action, ok := tools.NormalizedBrowserActionCommand(action); ok {
return "browser action " + action
}
return "browser action"
case "open":
rawURL, ok := exactJSONStringArg(rawArgs, "url")
if !ok {
return "browser open"
}
normalized, err := tools.NormalizeBrowserOpenURL(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return "browser open"
}
u, err := url.Parse(normalized)
if err != nil || u.Scheme == "" || u.Host == "" {
return "browser open"
}
origin := u.Scheme + "://" + u.Host
if !browserTitleTextSafe(origin) {
return "browser open"
}
return "browser open " + truncateHint(origin)
default:
return "browser " + command
}
}
// browserTitleTextSafe validates text after URL parsing has decoded escaped
// UTF-8 in the host. Valid UTF-8 alone is not presentation-safe: whitespace, control,
// format/bidi, and line/paragraph separator runes can reorder or split the
// permission label shown to a user. The execution URL remains unchanged.
func browserTitleTextSafe(text string) bool {
if !utf8.ValidString(text) {
return false
}
for _, r := range text {
if unicode.IsSpace(r) || unicode.IsControl(r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Cf, r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Zl, r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Zp, r) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// exactJSONStringArg mirrors ZERO's map-based tool argument decoding: only the
// exact JSON key is considered, and a non-string value is invalid. In
// particular, an incidental "URL" key must not change a permission title when
// browser_open will only read "url".
func exactJSONStringArg(rawArgs, key string) (string, bool) {
var args map[string]json.RawMessage
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(rawArgs), &args) != nil {
return "", false
}
raw, ok := args[key]
if !ok {
return "", false
}
var value string
if json.Unmarshal(raw, &value) != nil {
return "", false
}
return value, true
}
// primaryArgHint extracts the most relevant argument (path/pattern/command) from
// raw JSON arguments. Best-effort; returns "" when it can't parse.
func primaryArgHint(rawArgs string) string {
@@ -213,7 +89,7 @@ func rawInput(args string) json.RawMessage {
// toolCallStart maps an advertised ZERO tool call to the initial ACP "tool_call"
// update (status in_progress — ZERO executes immediately after advertising).
func toolCallStart(call agent.ToolCall) ToolCallUpdate {
upd := ToolCallUpdate{
return ToolCallUpdate{
SessionUpdate: UpdateToolCall,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Title: toolTitle(call.Name, call.Arguments),
@@ -221,8 +97,6 @@ func toolCallStart(call agent.ToolCall) ToolCallUpdate {
Status: ToolStatusInProgress,
RawInput: rawInput(call.Arguments),
}
attachBrowserToolDetails(&upd, call.Name)
return upd
}
// toolCallResult maps a finished ZERO tool result to a "tool_call_update".
@@ -242,64 +116,26 @@ func toolCallResult(result agent.ToolResult) ToolCallUpdate {
if locs := toolResultLocations(result); len(locs) > 0 {
upd.Locations = locs
}
attachBrowserToolDetails(&upd, result.Name)
return upd
}
func toolResultContent(result agent.ToolResult) []ToolCallContent {
content := make([]ToolCallContent, 0, 1+len(result.FileDiffs))
text := strings.TrimRight(result.Output, "\n")
if text == "" {
text = result.Display.Summary
}
if text == "" {
return appendToolResultDiffs(content, result.FileDiffs)
return nil
}
content = append(content, ToolContent(TextBlock(text)))
return appendToolResultDiffs(content, result.FileDiffs)
}
func appendToolResultDiffs(content []ToolCallContent, diffs []tools.FileDiff) []ToolCallContent {
for _, diff := range diffs {
if !filepath.IsAbs(diff.Path) || (!diff.OldExists && !diff.NewExists) {
continue
}
var oldText *string
if diff.OldExists {
old := diff.OldText
oldText = &old
}
var newText *string
if diff.NewExists {
updated := diff.NewText
newText = &updated
}
content = append(content, ToolCallContent{Type: "diff", Path: diff.Path, OldText: oldText, NewText: newText})
}
return content
return []ToolCallContent{ToolContent(TextBlock(text))}
}
func toolResultLocations(result agent.ToolResult) []ToolCallLocation {
locs := make([]ToolCallLocation, 0, len(result.FileDiffs)+len(result.ChangedFiles))
seen := make(map[string]bool, len(result.FileDiffs)+len(result.ChangedFiles))
for _, diff := range result.FileDiffs {
path := diff.Path
if path == "" || seen[path] {
continue
}
seen[path] = true
locs = append(locs, ToolCallLocation{Path: path})
}
// FileDiff.Path is canonical absolute path data while ChangedFiles is
// normally workspace-relative. Without the trusted workspace root these
// coordinate systems cannot be correlated safely: a suffix match would let
// /workspace/sub/a.go consume the fallback for a distinct root a.go. The
// shared seen set deduplicates only identities already exactly comparable.
locs := make([]ToolCallLocation, 0, len(result.ChangedFiles))
for _, f := range result.ChangedFiles {
if f == "" || seen[f] {
if strings.TrimSpace(f) == "" {
continue
}
seen[f] = true
locs = append(locs, ToolCallLocation{Path: f})
}
return locs
+3 -425
View File
@@ -1,30 +1,14 @@
package acp
import (
"encoding/json"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"unicode"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
func browserDescriptor(t *testing.T, update ToolCallUpdate) BrowserToolDetails {
t.Helper()
raw, ok := update.Meta[zeroBrowserMetaKey]
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("browser metadata = %#v, want %q", update.Meta, zeroBrowserMetaKey)
}
var details BrowserToolDetails
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &details); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode browser metadata: %v", err)
}
return details
}
func TestAgentMessageAndThoughtChunks(t *testing.T) {
m := agentMessageChunk("hello")
if m.SessionUpdate != UpdateAgentMessageChunk || m.Content.Type != "text" || m.Content.Text != "hello" {
@@ -72,223 +56,6 @@ func TestToolTitleAndHint(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestBrowserToolUpdatesAreStructuredAndPresentationSafe(t *testing.T) {
start := toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{
ID: "browser-1",
Name: "browser_open",
Arguments: `{"url":"https://example.com/settings?token=not-for-a-title#account"}`,
})
if got := browserDescriptor(t, start); got != (BrowserToolDetails{Version: 1, Command: "open"}) {
t.Fatalf("browser descriptor = %#v, want open", got)
}
if start.Title != "browser open https://example.com" {
t.Fatalf("browser title = %q", start.Title)
}
if strings.Contains(start.Title, "token=") || strings.Contains(start.Title, "#account") {
t.Fatalf("browser title leaked URL-sensitive data: %q", start.Title)
}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(start)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var wire struct {
Meta map[string]json.RawMessage `json:"_meta"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &wire); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, ok := wire.Meta[zeroBrowserMetaKey]; !ok {
t.Fatalf("browser wire metadata = %#v", wire.Meta)
}
typed := toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{
ID: "browser-2",
Name: "browser_type",
Arguments: `{"ref":"email","text":"[email protected]"}`,
})
if got := browserDescriptor(t, typed); got.Command != "type" {
t.Fatalf("browser type descriptor = %#v", got)
}
if typed.Title != "browser type" || strings.Contains(typed.Title, "[email protected]") {
t.Fatalf("browser type title = %q", typed.Title)
}
action := toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{
ID: "browser-3",
Name: "browser_action",
Arguments: `{"command":"keyboard_insert_text","args":["[email protected]"]}`,
})
if action.Title != "browser action keyboard_insert_text" {
t.Fatalf("browser action title = %q", action.Title)
}
result := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "browser-2",
Name: "browser_type",
Status: tools.StatusOK,
})
if got := browserDescriptor(t, result); got.Command != "type" {
t.Fatalf("browser result descriptor = %#v", got)
}
}
func TestBrowserDescriptorSurvivesProtocolShapedRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
updates := []ToolCallUpdate{
toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{
ID: "start",
Name: "browser_open",
Arguments: `{"url":"https://user:[email protected]/private?token=secret#fragment"}`,
}),
toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "result",
Name: "browser_type",
Status: tools.StatusOK,
}),
permissionToolCall(agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolCallID: "permission",
ToolName: "browser_connect",
Args: map[string]any{"target": "127.0.0.1:9222"},
}),
}
type protocolToolCallUpdate struct {
SessionUpdate string `json:"sessionUpdate,omitempty"`
ToolCallID string `json:"toolCallId"`
Title string `json:"title,omitempty"`
Kind string `json:"kind,omitempty"`
Status string `json:"status,omitempty"`
RawInput json.RawMessage `json:"rawInput,omitempty"`
Content []ToolCallContent `json:"content,omitempty"`
Locations []ToolCallLocation `json:"locations,omitempty"`
Meta map[string]json.RawMessage `json:"_meta,omitempty"`
}
for _, update := range updates {
encoded, err := json.Marshal(update)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var root map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &root); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, ok := root["browser"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("browser descriptor escaped ACP _meta: %s", encoded)
}
var protocol protocolToolCallUpdate
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &protocol); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
forwarded, err := json.Marshal(protocol)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var roundTripped ToolCallUpdate
if err := json.Unmarshal(forwarded, &roundTripped); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
details := browserDescriptor(t, roundTripped)
if details.Version != 1 || details.Command == "" {
t.Fatalf("round-tripped browser descriptor = %#v", details)
}
descriptorJSON := string(roundTripped.Meta[zeroBrowserMetaKey])
for _, secret := range []string{"password", "private", "token", "fragment", "127.0.0.1", "9222"} {
if strings.Contains(descriptorJSON, secret) {
t.Fatalf("browser descriptor leaked %q: %s", secret, descriptorJSON)
}
}
}
}
func TestBrowserPermissionTitlesMirrorSafeToolArguments(t *testing.T) {
if got := browserToolTitle("open", `{"url":"evil.example.test/pay?token=hidden#fragment"}`); got != "browser open https://evil.example.test" {
t.Fatalf("bare-host title = %q", got)
}
if got := browserToolTitle("open", `{"URL":"https://different.example.test"}`); got != "browser open" {
t.Fatalf("case-variant URL title = %q", got)
}
if got := browserToolTitle("open", `{"URL":"https://different.example.test","url":"https://actual.example.test/path"}`); got != "browser open https://actual.example.test" {
t.Fatalf("exact URL key title = %q", got)
}
if got := browserToolTitle("action", `{"command":"not an action"}`); got != "browser action" {
t.Fatalf("unknown browser action title = %q", got)
}
longHost := "https://" + strings.Repeat("a", 200) + ".example.test/path?token=hidden"
title := browserToolTitle("open", `{"url":"`+longHost+`"}`)
if !utf8.ValidString(title) || utf8.RuneCountInString(title) > len("browser open ")+61 || strings.Contains(title, "token=") {
t.Fatalf("bounded browser origin title = %q", title)
}
}
func TestBrowserOpenTitlesRejectDecodedUnicodePresentationControls(t *testing.T) {
for _, rawURL := range []string{
"https://safe.example%C2%A0evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E2%80%83evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E3%80%80evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E2%80%AEevil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E2%81%A6evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%C2%85evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E2%80%A8evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E2%80%A9evil.test/path",
} {
t.Run(rawURL, func(t *testing.T) {
normalized, err := tools.NormalizeBrowserOpenURL(rawURL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("execution URL rejected: %v", err)
}
if normalized != rawURL {
t.Fatalf("execution URL = %q, want unchanged %q", normalized, rawURL)
}
args, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"url": rawURL})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if title := browserToolTitle("open", string(args)); title != "browser open" {
t.Errorf("unsafe origin accepted before permission translation: %q", title)
}
updates := []ToolCallUpdate{
toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{ID: "start", Name: "browser_open", Arguments: string(args)}),
permissionToolCall(agent.PermissionRequest{ToolCallID: "permission", ToolName: "browser_open", Args: map[string]any{"url": rawURL}}),
}
for _, update := range updates {
encoded, err := json.Marshal(update)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var decoded ToolCallUpdate
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &decoded); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if decoded.Title != "browser open" {
t.Fatalf("unsafe browser title survived wire round trip: %q", decoded.Title)
}
for _, r := range decoded.Title {
if unicode.IsControl(r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Cf, r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Zl, r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Zp, r) {
t.Fatalf("browser title contains unsafe presentation rune %U: %q", r, decoded.Title)
}
}
}
})
}
}
func TestBrowserDescriptorDoesNotClaimSimilarlyNamedMCPTools(t *testing.T) {
start := toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{ID: "mcp-1", Name: "browser_plugin_open", Arguments: `{}`})
if len(start.Meta) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("MCP-like tool received built-in browser metadata: %#v", start.Meta)
}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(start)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if strings.Contains(string(encoded), `"browser"`) {
t.Fatalf("non-browser tool encoded browser field: %s", encoded)
}
}
func TestToolCallStart(t *testing.T) {
upd := toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{ID: "tc1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`})
if upd.SessionUpdate != UpdateToolCall {
@@ -307,26 +74,21 @@ func TestToolCallStart(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestToolCallResult(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a.go")
ok := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "tc1",
Name: "edit_file",
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: "applied\n",
ChangedFiles: []string{"a.go", ""},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before\n", NewText: "after\n"}},
})
if ok.SessionUpdate != UpdateToolCallUpdate || ok.Status != ToolStatusCompleted {
t.Fatalf("unexpected ok result: %+v", ok)
}
if len(ok.Content) != 2 || ok.Content[0].Type != "content" || ok.Content[0].Content.Text != "applied" {
if len(ok.Content) != 1 || ok.Content[0].Type != "content" || ok.Content[0].Content.Text != "applied" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected content: %+v", ok.Content)
}
if diff := ok.Content[1]; diff.Type != "diff" || diff.Path != path || diff.OldText == nil || *diff.OldText != "before\n" || diff.NewText == nil || *diff.NewText != "after\n" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected diff content: %+v", diff)
}
if len(ok.Locations) != 2 || ok.Locations[0].Path != path || ok.Locations[1].Path != "a.go" {
t.Fatalf("unproven absolute/relative aliases must both remain visible, got %+v", ok.Locations)
if len(ok.Locations) != 1 || ok.Locations[0].Path != "a.go" {
t.Fatalf("blank changed files should be dropped, got %+v", ok.Locations)
}
failed := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{ToolCallID: "tc2", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "boom"})
@@ -335,190 +97,6 @@ func TestToolCallResult(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestToolCallDiffJSONDistinguishesEmptyFilesAndDeletion(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "empty.txt")
content := appendToolResultDiffs(nil, []tools.FileDiff{
{Path: path, OldExists: false, NewExists: true, NewText: ""},
{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before", NewText: ""},
{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: false, OldText: "before"},
})
if len(content) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("diff content = %#v", content)
}
for index, diff := range content {
encoded, err := json.Marshal(diff)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var wire map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &wire); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if wire["path"] != path {
t.Fatalf("wire diff %d = %s", index, encoded)
}
switch index {
case 0:
oldText, present := wire["oldText"]
if !present || oldText != nil || wire["newText"] != "" {
t.Fatalf("create diff = %s, want null oldText and empty newText", encoded)
}
case 1:
if wire["oldText"] != "before" || wire["newText"] != "" {
t.Fatalf("empty replacement diff = %s", encoded)
}
case 2:
newText, present := wire["newText"]
if wire["oldText"] != "before" || !present || newText != nil {
t.Fatalf("deletion diff = %s, want oldText and null newText", encoded)
}
}
}
}
func TestToolResultLocationsPreserveDistinctPathIdentities(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
rootPath := filepath.Join(root, "a.go")
nestedPath := filepath.Join(root, "sub", "a.go")
diff := func(path string) tools.FileDiff {
return tools.FileDiff{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before", NewText: "after"}
}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
diffs []tools.FileDiff
want []string
}{
{name: "both rich", diffs: []tools.FileDiff{diff(rootPath), diff(nestedPath)}, want: []string{rootPath, nestedPath, "a.go", filepath.Join("sub", "a.go")}},
{name: "root rich", diffs: []tools.FileDiff{diff(rootPath)}, want: []string{rootPath, "a.go", filepath.Join("sub", "a.go")}},
{name: "nested rich", diffs: []tools.FileDiff{diff(nestedPath)}, want: []string{nestedPath, "a.go", filepath.Join("sub", "a.go")}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
locations := toolResultLocations(agent.ToolResult{
ChangedFiles: []string{"a.go", filepath.Join("sub", "a.go")},
FileDiffs: tc.diffs,
})
if len(locations) != len(tc.want) {
t.Fatalf("locations = %#v, want %#v", locations, tc.want)
}
for index := range tc.want {
if locations[index].Path != tc.want[index] {
t.Fatalf("locations = %#v, want %#v", locations, tc.want)
}
}
})
}
}
func TestToolCallResultPreservesWhitespaceInFilePaths(t *testing.T) {
relativePath := " report.txt "
absolutePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), relativePath)
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ChangedFiles: []string{relativePath},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: absolutePath, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before", NewText: "after",
}},
})
if len(update.Content) != 1 || update.Content[0].Path != absolutePath {
t.Fatalf("diff content path = %#v, want %q", update.Content, absolutePath)
}
if len(update.Locations) != 2 || update.Locations[0].Path != absolutePath || update.Locations[1].Path != relativePath {
t.Fatalf("locations = %#v, want exact paths %q and %q", update.Locations, absolutePath, relativePath)
}
}
func TestToolResultLocationsDeduplicateOnlyExactPaths(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a.go")
locations := toolResultLocations(agent.ToolResult{
ChangedFiles: []string{path, path},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before", NewText: "after"}},
})
if len(locations) != 1 || locations[0].Path != path {
t.Fatalf("exact duplicate locations = %#v", locations)
}
}
func TestDeletedFileEmitsDiffAndKeepsLocations(t *testing.T) {
relativePath := "deleted.go"
absolutePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), relativePath)
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ChangedFiles: []string{relativePath},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: absolutePath, OldExists: true, NewExists: false, OldText: "before",
}},
})
if len(update.Content) != 1 || update.Content[0].OldText == nil || *update.Content[0].OldText != "before" || update.Content[0].NewText != nil {
t.Fatalf("deleted file diff = %#v, want oldText with null newText", update.Content)
}
if len(update.Locations) != 2 || update.Locations[0].Path != absolutePath || update.Locations[1].Path != relativePath {
t.Fatalf("deleted file locations = %#v", update.Locations)
}
}
func TestToolCallResultEmitsOnlyRedactedFileDiffs(t *testing.T) {
secret := "sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret.txt")
scrubbed := tools.ScrubResultSecrets(tools.Result{FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "token=" + secret, NewText: "safe",
}}})
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{ToolCallID: "call", Status: tools.StatusError, FileDiffs: scrubbed.FileDiffs})
if len(update.Content) != 1 || update.Content[0].OldText == nil || strings.Contains(*update.Content[0].OldText, secret) {
t.Fatalf("ACP content leaked unredacted diff: %#v", update.Content)
}
}
func TestToolCallResultOmitsSemanticallyUnchangedRedactedDiff(t *testing.T) {
oldSecret := "ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
newSecret := "ghp_9876543210ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"
scrubbed := tools.ScrubResultSecrets(tools.Result{
ChangedFiles: []string{"credentials.txt"},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "credentials.txt"), OldExists: true, NewExists: true,
OldText: "token=" + oldSecret, NewText: "token=" + newSecret,
}},
})
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "call", Status: tools.StatusOK,
ChangedFiles: scrubbed.ChangedFiles, FileDiffs: scrubbed.FileDiffs,
})
if len(update.Content) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("ACP emitted semantically unchanged redacted diff: %#v", update.Content)
}
if len(update.Locations) != 1 || update.Locations[0].Path != "credentials.txt" {
t.Fatalf("ACP path fallback = %#v", update.Locations)
}
}
func TestToolCallResultOmitsDefaultIgnorableSplitSecretsOnEitherSide(t *testing.T) {
secret := "sk-ant-api03-AAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGG"
for name, separator := range map[string]string{
"combining grapheme joiner": "\u034f",
"variation selector": "\ufe0f",
} {
for _, side := range []string{"old", "new"} {
t.Run(name+" "+side, func(t *testing.T) {
obfuscated := secret[:20] + separator + secret[20:]
diff := tools.FileDiff{
Path: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret.txt"), OldExists: true, NewExists: true,
OldText: "safe old", NewText: "safe new",
}
if side == "old" {
diff.OldText = obfuscated
} else {
diff.NewText = obfuscated
}
scrubbed := tools.ScrubResultSecrets(tools.Result{FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{diff}})
if !scrubbed.Redacted || len(scrubbed.FileDiffs) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("registry boundary retained an obfuscated secret: %#v", scrubbed)
}
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{ToolCallID: "call", Status: tools.StatusOK, FileDiffs: scrubbed.FileDiffs})
if len(update.Content) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("ACP content retained an obfuscated secret: %#v", update.Content)
}
})
}
}
}
func TestPlanUpdateAndStatus(t *testing.T) {
upd := planUpdate([]tools.PlanItem{
{Content: "step a", Status: "completed"},
+8 -93
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@ const (
MethodAuthenticate = "authenticate"
MethodSessionNew = "session/new"
MethodSessionLoad = "session/load"
MethodSessionList = "session/list"
MethodSessionResume = "session/resume"
MethodSessionPrompt = "session/prompt"
MethodSessionCancel = "session/cancel" // notification
MethodSessionUpdate = "session/update" // notification (agent -> client)
@@ -64,16 +62,8 @@ type PromptCapabilities struct {
}
type AgentCapabilities struct {
LoadSession bool `json:"loadSession"`
PromptCapabilities PromptCapabilities `json:"promptCapabilities"`
SessionCapabilities *SessionCapabilities `json:"sessionCapabilities,omitempty"`
}
// Empty capability objects are presence flags in ACP v1. Pointers preserve
// the wire distinction between an advertised `{}` and an omitted capability.
type SessionCapabilities struct {
List *struct{} `json:"list,omitempty"`
Resume *struct{} `json:"resume,omitempty"`
LoadSession bool `json:"loadSession"`
PromptCapabilities PromptCapabilities `json:"promptCapabilities"`
}
type AuthMethod struct {
@@ -127,14 +117,9 @@ type McpServer struct {
}
type NewSessionParams struct {
Cwd string `json:"cwd"`
McpServers []McpServer `json:"mcpServers"`
// AdditionalDirectories is declared by the protocol and consumed nowhere in
// this repo yet. When it is wired up it must go through requestedWorkspace
// like Cwd does: these are client-supplied paths with no absoluteness rule of
// their own, which is the same shape as the resume-cwd hole that made
// {"sessionId":"known"} activate a session against this process's directory.
AdditionalDirectories []string `json:"additionalDirectories,omitempty"`
Cwd string `json:"cwd"`
McpServers []McpServer `json:"mcpServers"`
AdditionalDirectories []string `json:"additionalDirectories,omitempty"`
}
type NewSessionResult struct {
@@ -155,39 +140,6 @@ type LoadSessionResult struct {
Modes *SessionModeState `json:"modes,omitempty"`
}
// ListSessionsParams and the following types implement ACP v1 session/list.
// Transcript contents stay behind session/load; this method returns metadata
// only and leaves the optional pagination cursor opaque.
type ListSessionsParams struct {
Cwd string `json:"cwd,omitempty"`
Cursor string `json:"cursor,omitempty"`
}
type SessionInfoMeta struct {
ModelID string `json:"modelId,omitempty"`
CreatedAt string `json:"createdAt,omitempty"`
}
type SessionInfo struct {
SessionID string `json:"sessionId"`
Cwd string `json:"cwd"`
Title string `json:"title,omitempty"`
UpdatedAt string `json:"updatedAt,omitempty"`
Meta *SessionInfoMeta `json:"_meta,omitempty"`
}
type ListSessionsResult struct {
Sessions []SessionInfo `json:"sessions"`
NextCursor string `json:"nextCursor,omitempty"`
}
// session/resume takes session/load's wire shape, so its cwd is a plain string
// too and an omitted one decodes exactly like an empty one. Sharing the type is
// safe only because activatePersistedSession requires an absolute cwd from the
// request itself — nothing downstream may supply a default for either method.
type ResumeSessionParams = LoadSessionParams
type ResumeSessionResult = LoadSessionResult
// ---- prompt turn ----
type PromptParams struct {
@@ -222,7 +174,6 @@ type SessionNotification struct {
// ContentBlock under "content"; the variant is set via SessionUpdate.
type ContentChunk struct {
SessionUpdate string `json:"sessionUpdate"`
MessageID string `json:"messageId,omitempty"`
Content ContentBlock `json:"content"`
}
@@ -259,21 +210,6 @@ type ToolCallUpdate struct {
RawInput json.RawMessage `json:"rawInput,omitempty"`
Content []ToolCallContent `json:"content,omitempty"`
Locations []ToolCallLocation `json:"locations,omitempty"`
// Meta is ACP's extension channel. ZERO-owned values must remain beneath a
// namespaced key so protocol-shaped clients can preserve them while decoding
// and re-encoding a tool call.
Meta map[string]json.RawMessage `json:"_meta,omitempty"`
}
// BrowserToolDetails identifies the browser helper operation behind a tool
// call. Version is the schema version for this optional ZERO extension;
// Command is one of install, launch, connect, open, snapshot, click, type,
// press, or action. Future fields must remain display-safe and must not
// include browser profile data, cookies, typed text, URL paths/queries, or
// DevTools endpoints.
type BrowserToolDetails struct {
Version int `json:"version"`
Command string `json:"command"`
}
// ToolCallContent is a tool call's rendered output. ZERO emits "content" (a
@@ -284,30 +220,9 @@ type ToolCallContent struct {
// type == "content"
Content *ContentBlock `json:"content,omitempty"`
// type == "diff"
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
OldText *string `json:"oldText,omitempty"`
NewText *string `json:"newText,omitempty"`
}
// MarshalJSON preserves ACP's discriminated content union. A diff always has
// path, while nullable oldText/newText distinguish creation, deletion, and an
// existing file replaced with empty content. Other content variants omit all
// diff fields rather than serializing irrelevant nulls.
func (content ToolCallContent) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
if content.Type == "diff" {
return json.Marshal(struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Path string `json:"path"`
OldText *string `json:"oldText"`
NewText *string `json:"newText"`
}{
Type: content.Type, Path: content.Path, OldText: content.OldText, NewText: content.NewText,
})
}
return json.Marshal(struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Content *ContentBlock `json:"content,omitempty"`
}{Type: content.Type, Content: content.Content})
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
OldText string `json:"oldText,omitempty"`
NewText string `json:"newText,omitempty"`
}
func ToolContent(block ContentBlock) ToolCallContent {
-309
View File
@@ -1,309 +0,0 @@
package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// `zero exec` persists every provider usage report as a session usage event, so
// `zero usage report --session <id>` can total a run. The ACP agent did not set
// OnUsage, which dropped the token counts of every ACP session. A turn with two
// provider requests (a tool round trip) must leave two usage events, in the shape
// the usage report reads, next to the turn's messages.
func TestACPPromptPersistsProviderUsage(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
if opts.OnUsage == nil {
t.Errorf("agent.Options.OnUsage is not wired: the ACP agent drops provider token usage")
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "done"}, nil
}
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 1200, OutputTokens: 34})
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 1300, OutputTokens: 21, CachedInputTokens: 900})
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "done"}, nil
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var result PromptResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("count my tokens")},
}, &result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
}
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
type usagePayload struct {
PromptTokens int `json:"promptTokens"`
CompletionTokens int `json:"completionTokens"`
TotalTokens int `json:"totalTokens"`
CachedInputTokens int `json:"cachedInputTokens"`
}
var got []usagePayload
messages := 0
for _, event := range events {
switch event.Type {
case sessions.EventUsage:
var payload usagePayload
if err := json.Unmarshal(event.Payload, &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("usage payload %s: %v", event.Payload, err)
}
assertUsagePayloadIsTokenCountsOnly(t, event.Payload)
got = append(got, payload)
case sessions.EventMessage:
messages++
}
}
want := []usagePayload{
{PromptTokens: 1200, CompletionTokens: 34, TotalTokens: 1234},
{PromptTokens: 1300, CompletionTokens: 21, TotalTokens: 1321, CachedInputTokens: 900},
}
if len(got) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("usage events = %+v, want %+v", got, want)
}
for i := range want {
if got[i] != want[i] {
t.Fatalf("usage event %d = %+v, want %+v", i, got[i], want[i])
}
}
if messages != 2 {
t.Fatalf("message events = %d, want the user and assistant messages of the turn", messages)
}
}
// Usage joins the turn's buffered batch, so a hard run failure that aborts the
// turn leaves nothing durable, exactly as it does for the turn's messages.
func TestACPHardTurnFailureDropsItsUsageWithTheTurn(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
if opts.OnUsage == nil {
t.Errorf("agent.Options.OnUsage is not wired: the ACP agent drops provider token usage")
return agent.Result{}, errors.New("injected hard run failure")
}
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 500, OutputTokens: 5})
return agent.Result{}, errors.New("injected hard run failure")
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("failing turn")},
}, &PromptResult{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("hard RunAgent failure was reported as a successful turn")
}
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(events) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("aborted turn left durable events: %+v", events)
}
}
// StopCancelled is a successful ACP outcome: the turn commits. Tokens the
// provider already reported were spent, so they stay in the session log even
// though the client cancelled. A hard error (the test above) is the path that
// drops them.
func TestACPCancelledTurnKeepsReportedUsage(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
if opts.OnUsage == nil {
t.Errorf("agent.Options.OnUsage is not wired: the ACP agent drops provider token usage")
return agent.Result{}, context.Canceled
}
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 80, OutputTokens: 3})
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "partial"}, context.Canceled
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var result PromptResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("cancelled turn")},
}, &result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cancelled turn returned an RPC error: %v", err)
}
if result.StopReason != StopCancelled {
t.Fatalf("stop reason = %q, want %q", result.StopReason, StopCancelled)
}
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
usageEvents := 0
for _, event := range events {
if event.Type != sessions.EventUsage {
continue
}
usageEvents++
assertUsagePayloadIsTokenCountsOnly(t, event.Payload)
var payload struct {
PromptTokens int `json:"promptTokens"`
CompletionTokens int `json:"completionTokens"`
TotalTokens int `json:"totalTokens"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(event.Payload, &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if payload.PromptTokens != 80 || payload.CompletionTokens != 3 || payload.TotalTokens != 83 {
t.Fatalf("cancelled-turn usage = %+v, want 80/3/83", payload)
}
}
if usageEvents != 1 {
t.Fatalf("usage events = %d, want the one report from the cancelled turn", usageEvents)
}
}
// Usage events sit in the same log session/load and session/resume read, but
// history reconstruction skips them. The wire replay stays the conversation,
// and the next turn's prompt stays the conversation: token counts never become
// context and never cross the ACP wire.
func TestACPLoadAndResumeIgnoreUsageEvents(t *testing.T) {
const userLine = "unique-acp-user-line"
const answer = "unique-acp-answer"
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
if opts.OnUsage == nil {
t.Errorf("agent.Options.OnUsage is not wired: the ACP agent drops provider token usage")
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: answer}, nil
}
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 1200, OutputTokens: 34})
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: answer}, nil
}
workspace := t.TempDir()
h := newHarness(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock(userLine)},
}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
}
h.stop()
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
sawUsage := false
for _, event := range events {
if event.Type == sessions.EventUsage {
sawUsage = true
assertUsagePayloadIsTokenCountsOnly(t, event.Payload)
}
}
if !sawUsage {
t.Fatal("session log has no usage event to ignore")
}
loader := newHarness(t, deps)
if err := loader.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{},
}, &LoadSessionResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/load: %v", err)
}
var replayed []string
for {
select {
case update := <-loader.notifications:
replayed = append(replayed, update.Content.Text)
case <-time.After(150 * time.Millisecond):
goto drained
}
}
drained:
loader.stop()
if len(replayed) != 2 || replayed[0] != userLine || replayed[1] != answer {
t.Fatalf("session/load replay = %#v, want the user line and the answer only", replayed)
}
for _, text := range replayed {
if strings.Contains(text, "promptTokens") || strings.Contains(text, "1200") {
t.Fatalf("session/load replayed usage onto the wire: %q", text)
}
}
var gotPrompt string
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, prompt string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, _ agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
gotPrompt = prompt
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "continued"}, nil
}
resumer := newHarness(t, deps)
defer resumer.stop()
if err := resumer.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionResume, ResumeSessionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{},
}, &ResumeSessionResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/resume: %v", err)
}
if err := resumer.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("carry on")},
}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("resumed session/prompt: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(gotPrompt, userLine) || !strings.Contains(gotPrompt, answer) {
t.Fatalf("resumed prompt = %q, want the prior conversation", gotPrompt)
}
if strings.Contains(gotPrompt, "promptTokens") || strings.Contains(gotPrompt, "1200") {
t.Fatalf("resumed prompt contains persisted usage: %q", gotPrompt)
}
}
// usagePayloadAllowedKeys is the non-escalating EventUsagePayload shape. ACP
// has no model escalation, and the writer must not grow a prompt, tool
// argument, or other raw field.
var usagePayloadAllowedKeys = map[string]bool{
"promptTokens": true,
"completionTokens": true,
"totalTokens": true,
"cachedInputTokens": true,
"cacheWriteTokens": true,
"reasoningTokens": true,
}
func assertUsagePayloadIsTokenCountsOnly(t *testing.T, payload json.RawMessage) {
t.Helper()
var raw map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &raw); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("usage payload %s: %v", payload, err)
}
if len(raw) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("usage payload is empty: %s", payload)
}
for key := range raw {
if !usagePayloadAllowedKeys[key] {
t.Fatalf("usage payload key %q is not a token count: %s", key, payload)
}
}
}
@@ -127,7 +127,9 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, `{"network": {"enabled": true}}`) {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want a concrete additional_permissions example", result.Output)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "missing additional_permissions", result.Output)
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "omit sandbox_permissions") {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want guidance that the flag can simply be omitted", result.Output)
}
}
// A well-formed additional_permissions payload must still reach the normal
@@ -163,123 +165,6 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T)
}
}
// runShellCall drives one shell tool call through the real registry (and so
// through Registry.RunWithOptions) exactly as the agent loop would.
func runShellCall(t *testing.T, root string, arguments string) ToolResult {
t.Helper()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedExecCommandTool(root, nil, nil))
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: arguments},
PermissionModeUnsafe,
Options{Cwd: root},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
return result
}
// TestAdditionalPermissionsRejectionsConverge is the regression guard for
// #845/#847. A model that attaches a permission object to a command needing
// none used to be told only "set sandbox_permissions", which pushed it into the
// OTHER invalid shape (flag set, payload empty) and its "include a permission"
// error pushed it straight back — the reported loop that burned turns on
// `git branch --show-current`.
//
// The contract this pins is convergence, not tolerance: both shapes are still
// REJECTED (nothing here grants access), but each rejection must name the one
// follow-up call that works, and that follow-up must actually succeed.
func TestAdditionalPermissionsRejectionsConverge(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
const readOnly = `"cmd":"git --version"`
// Step 1 of the reported loop: a permission object with no flag.
first := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`,"additional_permissions":{"network":{"enabled":true}}}`)
if first.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("unflagged additional_permissions status = %q, want error (rejecting is correct)", first.Status)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "unflagged additional_permissions", first.Output)
// Step 2 of the reported loop: the model keeps the flag but empties the
// payload. This must not be the dead end it was.
second := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`,"sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions"}`)
if second.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("flag without payload status = %q, want error", second.Status)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "flag without payload", second.Output)
// The call both errors point at must actually work.
converged := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`}`)
if converged.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("the call both errors instruct the model to make failed: status=%q output=%q", converged.Status, converged.Output)
}
}
// assertNamesOmitRemedy pins the actionable half of the error text: the message
// must spell out that BOTH fields can simply be dropped. "Set the flag" or
// "include a permission" alone is what made the two errors chase each other.
func assertNamesOmitRemedy(t *testing.T, label string, output string) {
t.Helper()
if !strings.Contains(output, "omit both sandbox_permissions and additional_permissions") {
t.Fatalf("%s error = %q, want it to say to omit both fields entirely", label, output)
}
if !strings.Contains(output, "retry") {
t.Fatalf("%s error = %q, want it to tell the model to retry", label, output)
}
}
// The empty-payload rejection carries the same remedy. It is pinned on the
// validator directly because normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions absorbs the
// empty payload before executeToolCall reaches this branch;
// inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile is still the shared source of truth that
// buildPermissionEvent and the grant path re-run, so its text must converge too.
func TestEmptyAdditionalPermissionsErrorNamesOmitRemedy(t *testing.T) {
args := map[string]any{
"cmd": "git --version",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
"file_system": map[string]any{"read": []any{}, "write": []any{}},
},
}
_, requested, err := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, t.TempDir())
if !requested {
t.Fatal("requested = false, want true for an explicit with_additional_permissions call")
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("an empty additional_permissions payload was accepted; it must still be rejected")
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "empty payload", err.Error())
}
// A provider that materializes every optional property may send
// "additional_permissions": null. That grants nothing and carries no flag, so it
// is the field omitted — rejecting it stalled an ordinary command behind an
// error the model could not act on.
func TestExecuteToolCallTreatsNullAdditionalPermissionsAsOmitted(t *testing.T) {
result := runShellCall(t, t.TempDir(), `{"cmd":"git --version","additional_permissions":null}`)
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("null additional_permissions was rejected: status=%q output=%q", result.Status, result.Output)
}
}
// A null payload alongside the flag must still be rejected, and must land on
// the same error as an absent payload rather than being quietly downgraded.
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsFlaggedNullAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
result := runShellCall(t, t.TempDir(),
`{"cmd":"git --version","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions","additional_permissions":null}`)
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("flagged null status = %q, want error", result.Status)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "no additional_permissions object was provided") {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want the missing-payload error", result.Output)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "flagged null", result.Output)
}
func TestNormalizeProviderExpandedEmptyAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
for _, mode := range []string{
string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault),
+18 -6
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/testutil"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
@@ -112,11 +111,7 @@ func TestAsyncDiagnosticsReEditReplacesResult(t *testing.T) {
diagnostics := newAsyncDiagnostics(check, "/ws")
diagnostics.enqueue(context.Background(), []string{"a.go"})
testutil.WaitFor(t, "worker idle", func() bool {
diagnostics.mu.Lock()
defer diagnostics.mu.Unlock()
return diagnostics.working == nil
})
waitForIdle(t, diagnostics)
mu.Lock()
response = "ERR new"
mu.Unlock()
@@ -128,6 +123,23 @@ func TestAsyncDiagnosticsReEditReplacesResult(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func waitForIdle(t *testing.T, diagnostics *asyncDiagnostics) {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
for {
diagnostics.mu.Lock()
busy := diagnostics.working
diagnostics.mu.Unlock()
if busy == nil {
return
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatal("worker never went idle")
}
time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
}
}
// changedFilesTool is a fake mutating tool reporting a changed file without
// touching the filesystem.
type changedFilesTool struct{}
-37
View File
@@ -99,43 +99,6 @@ func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsUnsafeRequestedPrefix(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// The launcher denylist is only worth anything if it holds on the path a user
// actually sees. A model naming its own prefix_rule is that path: before
// launcher names were normalized, "python3.11" was offered as a one-token
// grant, and hasStringPrefix then matched every later python3.11 invocation.
func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsLauncherSpellingsInRequestedPrefix(t *testing.T) {
for _, testCase := range []struct {
command string
rule []any
}{
{"python3.11 script.py", []any{"python3.11"}},
{"python.exe script.py", []any{"python.exe"}},
{"node.exe app.js", []any{"node.exe"}},
{"cmd /c whoami", []any{"cmd"}},
{"busybox sh -c id", []any{"busybox"}},
{"uv run main.py", []any{"uv", "run"}},
{"python3.11 -c import_os", []any{"python3.11", "-c"}},
} {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
"command": testCase.command,
"prefix_rule": testCase.rule,
})
if got != nil {
t.Errorf("prefix_rule %v for %q was offered as %#v, want rejected", testCase.rule, testCase.command, got)
}
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixStillOffersOrdinaryCommands(t *testing.T) {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
"command": "cargo build --release",
"prefix_rule": []any{"cargo", "build"},
})
if len(got) != 2 || got[0] != "cargo" || got[1] != "build" {
t.Fatalf("ordinary prefix rule = %#v, want [cargo build]", got)
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsUnsafeShellForms(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{
"cat < in > out",
+29 -257
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strconv"
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
@@ -40,9 +38,8 @@ const compactionTriggerRatio = 0.7
// transcript (and so tests can assert on it).
const summaryLabel = "[Summary of earlier conversation]"
// CompactionSummaryInstructions is the system prompt handed to both automatic
// and manually requested compaction summarizers.
const CompactionSummaryInstructions = "You are compacting a coding-assistant conversation to save context. " +
// summaryInstructions is the system prompt handed to the summarizer model.
const summaryInstructions = "You are compacting a coding-assistant conversation to save context. " +
"Write a dense, factual summary of the conversation so far. Preserve: the user's goals and explicit constraints; " +
"decisions made and why; files created or modified (with paths) and key code changes; commands run and their important " +
"results; and anything still in progress or unresolved. Omit pleasantries. Use terse bullet points. Do not invent details. " +
@@ -78,12 +75,6 @@ type CompactionResult struct {
// summary message also includes summaryLabel and any preserved structured
// state needed by later compactions.
SummaryText string
// ProjectedChars is the text content sent to the summarizer after semantic
// projection, excluding provider protocol framing.
ProjectedChars int
// Truncated reports whether projection dropped content to satisfy its
// bounded brief or previous-summary limits.
Truncated bool
// Compacted reports whether Messages contains an injected summary.
Compacted bool
}
@@ -146,17 +137,11 @@ func estimateToolDefTokens(tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) int {
for _, tool := range tools {
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Name)
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Description)
total += ApproxTextTokens(string(tool.Type))
if len(tool.Parameters) > 0 {
if encoded, err := json.Marshal(tool.Parameters); err == nil {
total += ApproxTextTokens(string(encoded))
}
}
if tool.Format != nil {
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Format.Type)
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Format.Syntax)
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Format.Definition)
}
total += 4 // per-tool overhead
}
return total
@@ -231,11 +216,11 @@ func CompactMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) (Co
}, nil
}
summaryResult, err := SummarizeCompactionMessages(middle, opts.Summarize)
summary, err := opts.Summarize(middle)
if err != nil {
return CompactionResult{}, err
}
summary := summaryResult.SummaryText
summary = strings.TrimSpace(summary)
// Preserve structured state (active plan + loaded skills) from the elided
// middle verbatim, so it is not lost or paraphrased away by the prose summary.
@@ -253,53 +238,10 @@ func CompactMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) (Co
RemovedCount: len(middle),
PreservedCount: len(messages) - len(middle),
SummaryText: summary,
ProjectedChars: summaryResult.ProjectedChars,
Truncated: summaryResult.Truncated,
Compacted: true,
}, nil
}
// CompactionSummaryResult describes the shared summarization input and output.
type CompactionSummaryResult struct {
SummaryText string
ProjectedChars int
Truncated bool
}
// SummarizeCompactionMessages applies the shared semantic projection before
// invoking a caller-supplied summarizer. Automatic context-pressure compaction
// and manual session compaction both use this path.
func SummarizeCompactionMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, summarize func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error)) (CompactionSummaryResult, error) {
if summarize == nil {
return CompactionSummaryResult{}, errors.New("compaction requires a Summarize function")
}
projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
summaryInput := projection.messages
if len(summaryInput) == 0 {
summaryInput = messages
}
summary, err := summarize(summaryInput)
if err != nil {
return CompactionSummaryResult{}, err
}
return CompactionSummaryResult{
SummaryText: strings.TrimSpace(summary),
ProjectedChars: compactionMessageChars(summaryInput),
Truncated: projection.truncated,
}, nil
}
func compactionMessageChars(messages []zeroruntime.Message) int {
total := 0
for _, message := range messages {
total += len(message.Content)
for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
total += len(call.Name) + len(call.Arguments)
}
}
return total
}
// safeSuffixBoundary walks the preserve boundary backward (toward systemEnd) so
// the preserved suffix begins on a user or assistant message rather than a
// tool/tool_result message. A tool result with no preceding assistant tool call
@@ -389,8 +331,6 @@ type compactionState struct {
// but its token COST must still be counted so usage reports and budgets include it.
onUsage func(Usage)
task *taskState
planner *contextPlanner
trace *trace.Recorder
// calibrationRatio scales the raw byte/4 token estimate toward the provider's
// real prompt-token count. ApproxTextTokens over-counts code-heavy content by
@@ -398,27 +338,6 @@ type compactionState struct {
// starts at 1.0 and converges via an EMA as each turn reports actual usage, so
// later turns compact nearer to real capacity. Zero is treated as 1.0.
calibrationRatio float64
// summarizerFactory lazily builds the dedicated (cheap) summarizer provider
// (Options.Summarizer) for the current main model. summarizerProvider
// memoizes the built provider and summarizerResolved records that the
// factory ran (it may legitimately return no provider: the main model is
// already the cheap one). summarizerBroken is the sticky fallback: once a
// build or call fails, the run stays on the main provider until the next
// model switch — a misconfigured cheap model must never break (or
// repeatedly delay) compaction.
summarizerFactory func(ctx context.Context, mainModelID string) (Provider, error)
summarizerProvider Provider
summarizerResolved bool
summarizerBroken bool
// window is the context window the threshold was derived from. The
// reactive free-prune stage compares against it (the limit the provider
// enforces), not against the 70% proactive threshold — a pruned history
// between the two would still succeed on retry.
window int
// mainModel is the model the run currently streams on; the summarizer
// choice is made against it and remade after a mid-run switch.
mainModel string
}
// calibrate folds one turn's (rawEstimate, actualPromptTokens) sample into the
@@ -453,88 +372,15 @@ func (state *compactionState) calibratedTokens(raw int) int {
func newCompactionState(options Options, task *taskState) *compactionState {
state := &compactionState{
enabled: options.ContextWindow > 0,
threshold: compactionThreshold(options.ContextWindow),
window: options.ContextWindow,
mainModel: options.Model,
preserveLast: options.CompactionPreserveLast,
onUsage: options.OnUsage,
task: task,
planner: newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{contextWindow: options.ContextWindow, serviceTier: options.ServiceTier}),
trace: options.Trace,
summarizerFactory: options.Summarizer,
enabled: options.ContextWindow > 0,
threshold: compactionThreshold(options.ContextWindow),
preserveLast: options.CompactionPreserveLast,
onUsage: options.OnUsage,
task: task,
}
return state
}
// updateWindow re-derives the compaction threshold after a mid-run model
// switch. The low-water mark is reset: it was measured against the old
// threshold, and keeping it could suppress a compaction the smaller window
// now requires. <= 0 (unknown model) leaves everything unchanged.
func (state *compactionState) updateWindow(window int) {
if window <= 0 {
return
}
state.enabled = true
state.window = window
state.threshold = compactionThreshold(window)
state.lowWaterMark = 0
if state.planner != nil {
state.planner.config.contextWindow = window
}
}
// switchModel records a mid-run model switch: the window is re-derived
// (window <= 0 keeps the old one) and the summarizer choice is forgotten so
// the next compaction re-resolves it against the new main model. A run that
// started on the cheap model (no dedicated summarizer) and escalated to an
// expensive one therefore regains cheap summaries — the exact workflow a
// dedicated summarizer exists for.
func (state *compactionState) switchModel(modelID string, window int) {
state.mainModel = modelID
state.updateWindow(window)
state.summarizerProvider = nil
state.summarizerResolved = false
state.summarizerBroken = false
}
// summarizeProvider returns the provider summarization calls should use and
// whether it is the dedicated summarizer: that one when it applies to the
// current main model and is healthy, else the main provider. The factory runs
// at most once per main model; a build error marks the summarizer broken for
// that model. Callers branch on the boolean rather than comparing Provider
// values — interface comparison panics on a non-comparable dynamic type.
func (state *compactionState) summarizeProvider(ctx context.Context, main Provider) (Provider, bool) {
if state.summarizerFactory == nil || state.summarizerBroken {
return main, false
}
if !state.summarizerResolved {
state.summarizerResolved = true
built, err := state.summarizerFactory(ctx, state.mainModel)
if err != nil {
state.summarizerBroken = true
return main, false
}
state.summarizerProvider = built
}
if state.summarizerProvider == nil {
return main, false
}
return state.summarizerProvider, true
}
// fitsWindow reports whether a calibrated size is safely under the limit the
// provider enforces. The proactive threshold (70% of the window) is a trigger
// for the paid summarizer, not the hard limit; the reactive path compares
// against the window itself, with a small margin for estimate error, so a
// history pruned to, say, 85% of the window takes the free retry.
func (state *compactionState) fitsWindow(size int) bool {
if state.window <= 0 {
return size <= state.threshold
}
return size <= state.window-state.window/20
}
// maybeCompact runs proactive compaction at the top of a turn. It returns the
// (possibly compacted) message slice. It is a no-op when compaction is disabled,
// when the history is under threshold, or when the history has not grown past
@@ -586,7 +432,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
Summarize: state.summarizeClosure(ctx, provider),
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
taskState: state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
@@ -628,40 +474,16 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
// context-limit error never triggers an unexpected summarization call.
return messages, false, nil
}
if !isContextLimitError(errorMessage) {
if state.reactiveAttempted {
return messages, false, nil
}
// CHEAP FIRST STAGE (mirrors maybeCompact): a context-limit failure can
// often be fixed for free by dropping superseded reads and pruning old
// tool-result bodies. It runs regardless of the one-shot reactive budget
// (it costs nothing and cannot loop: a second pass finds nothing left to
// prune). The free retry is taken only when the pruned history fits the
// window the provider enforces — otherwise a retry would fail the same
// way, so fall through to the paid summarizer in this same call.
toolTokens := estimateToolDefTokens(tools)
prunedAny := false
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages); reclaimed > 0 {
messages, prunedAny = pruned, true
}
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(messages, state.preserveLast); reclaimed > 0 {
messages, prunedAny = pruned, true
}
if prunedAny {
size := state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
if state.fitsWindow(size) {
state.lowWaterMark = size
return messages, true, nil
}
}
if state.reactiveAttempted {
if !isContextLimitError(errorMessage) {
return messages, false, nil
}
result, compactErr := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
Summarize: state.summarizeClosure(ctx, provider),
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
taskState: state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if compactErr != nil {
@@ -695,22 +517,9 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
// provider call. The summary stream intentionally does NOT forward OnText (so
// compaction stays invisible on the user-facing surface), but it DOES forward
// OnUsage so the summarizer's token cost is still counted by usage/budgeting.
// The call goes to the dedicated (cheap) summarizer when one applies; if that
// call fails the summarizer is marked broken for the current model and the
// same slice is retried once on the main provider, so the caller sees at most
// one (main-provider-quality) error.
func (state *compactionState) summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider) func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
if state.planner == nil {
state.planner = newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{})
}
func summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, onUsage func(Usage)) func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
return func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
chosen, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(ctx, provider)
summary, err := summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, chosen, toSummarize, state.onUsage, state.planner, state.trace)
if err == nil || !dedicated {
return summary, err
}
state.summarizerBroken = true
return summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, toSummarize, state.onUsage, state.planner, state.trace)
return summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, toSummarize, onUsage)
}
}
@@ -722,11 +531,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Pro
// Non-context-limit errors (and a single message that still won't fit) surface
// to the caller unchanged.
func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage)) (string, error) {
return summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage, newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{}), nil)
}
func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage), planner *contextPlanner, recorder *trace.Recorder) (string, error) {
summary, err := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage, planner, recorder)
summary, err := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage)
if err == nil {
return summary, nil
}
@@ -735,11 +540,11 @@ func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zer
}
mid := len(messages) / 2
left, leftErr := summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages[:mid], onUsage, planner, recorder)
left, leftErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[:mid], onUsage)
if leftErr != nil {
return "", leftErr
}
right, rightErr := summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages[mid:], onUsage, planner, recorder)
right, rightErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[mid:], onUsage)
if rightErr != nil {
return "", rightErr
}
@@ -752,7 +557,7 @@ func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zer
combined := strings.TrimSpace(left + "\n\n" + right)
reduced, reduceErr := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: combined},
}, onUsage, planner, recorder)
}, onUsage)
if reduceErr != nil {
if isContextLimitError(reduceErr.Error()) {
// Even the two combined partials don't fit (extreme): fall back to the
@@ -768,15 +573,15 @@ func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zer
}
// summarizeMessagesOnce performs a single tool-less summarization call.
func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage), planner *contextPlanner, recorder *trace.Recorder) (string, error) {
requestMessages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: CompactionSummaryInstructions},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Summarize this conversation:\n\n" + renderTranscript(messages)},
func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage)) (string, error) {
request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: summaryInstructions},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Summarize this conversation:\n\n" + renderTranscript(messages)},
},
// No tools: this is a plain text summarization call.
}
parts := systemPromptParts{prompt: CompactionSummaryInstructions, baseInstructions: CompactionSummaryInstructions}
plan := planner.planWithPromptParts(requestMessages, nil, "", parts)
recordContextPlanTrace(recorder, plan)
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, plan.Request)
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
@@ -793,41 +598,8 @@ func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []ze
return summary, nil
}
// summaryToolResultClamp bounds each tool-result body in the summarizer input.
// Tool outputs dominate the elided middle's bulk (build logs, file reads,
// search results), yet the summary instructions only need their gist — the
// model that ACTED on the full output already turned it into decisions the
// surrounding messages record. 2,000 chars (~500 tokens) keeps the useful
// head+tail of a result while cutting the summarizer input by 5-10x on
// tool-heavy sessions; the summarizer's own cost is the price being cut.
const summaryToolResultClamp = 2000
// summaryToolArgsClamp bounds each tool-call argument blob in the transcript:
// a write_file call carries the whole file body in its arguments.
const summaryToolArgsClamp = 500
// clampForSummary head+tail-truncates text for the summarizer transcript,
// snapping to rune boundaries so the clamp never splits a UTF-8 sequence.
func clampForSummary(text string, max int) string {
if max <= 0 || len(text) <= max {
return text
}
head := max * 3 / 4
tail := max - head
for head > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(text[head]) {
head--
}
start := len(text) - tail
for start < len(text) && !utf8.RuneStart(text[start]) {
start++
}
return text[:head] + "\n…[" + strconv.Itoa(len(text)-head-(len(text)-start)) + " chars omitted for summarization]…\n" + text[start:]
}
// renderTranscript flattens messages into a plain-text transcript for the
// summarizer. Secret scrubbing already happened upstream at the tool boundary.
// Tool-result bodies and tool-call arguments are clamped (see the constants
// above): the summary needs what was done and decided, not the raw payloads.
func renderTranscript(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
lines := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
for _, message := range messages {
@@ -837,13 +609,13 @@ func renderTranscript(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
if len(message.ToolCalls) > 0 {
calls := make([]string, 0, len(message.ToolCalls))
for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
calls = append(calls, call.Name+"("+clampForSummary(call.Arguments, summaryToolArgsClamp)+")")
calls = append(calls, call.Name+"("+call.Arguments+")")
}
line += "\n[tool calls: " + strings.Join(calls, "; ") + "]"
}
lines = append(lines, line)
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool:
lines = append(lines, "tool result: "+clampForSummary(message.Content, summaryToolResultClamp))
lines = append(lines, "tool result: "+message.Content)
default:
lines = append(lines, string(message.Role)+": "+message.Content)
}
-469
View File
@@ -1,469 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// compactableHistory returns a history whose middle is large enough to trip
// the proactive threshold for a 1000-token window.
func compactableHistory() []zeroruntime.Message {
return []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "sys"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: strings.Repeat("u", 4000)},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: strings.Repeat("a", 4000)},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "u2"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "a2"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "u3"},
}
}
// Summarization must run on the dedicated (cheap) summarizer when one is
// configured — the main provider sees no summarize traffic at all.
func TestMaybeCompactUsesDedicatedSummarizer(t *testing.T) {
cheap := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "CHEAP SUMMARY"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
main := &mockProvider{}
factoryCalls := 0
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Summarizer: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) {
factoryCalls++
return cheap, nil
},
}, nil)
compacted := state.maybeCompact(context.Background(), main, compactableHistory(), nil)
if len(cheap.requests) == 0 {
t.Fatal("dedicated summarizer never received the summarize call")
}
if len(main.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("main provider must see no summarize traffic, got %d requests", len(main.requests))
}
if factoryCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("summarizer factory calls = %d, want 1 (lazy, memoized)", factoryCalls)
}
if estimateTokens(compacted) >= estimateTokens(compactableHistory()) {
t.Fatal("compaction did not shrink the history")
}
found := false
for _, message := range compacted {
if strings.Contains(message.Content, "CHEAP SUMMARY") {
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatal("cheap summarizer's summary missing from the compacted history")
}
}
// A failing summarizer falls back to the main provider for the SAME slice and
// stays broken for the rest of the run — no repeated failed cheap calls.
func TestSummarizerFailureFallsBackToMainAndSticks(t *testing.T) {
broken := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: "boom: model not found"},
}}}
main := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "MAIN SUMMARY"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "MAIN SUMMARY 2"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
}}
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Summarizer: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) { return broken, nil },
}, nil)
summarize := state.summarizeClosure(context.Background(), main)
input := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "history"}}
summary, err := summarize(input)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("fallback must succeed via the main provider: %v", err)
}
if summary != "MAIN SUMMARY" {
t.Fatalf("summary = %q, want the main provider's", summary)
}
if len(broken.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("broken summarizer requests = %d, want exactly 1", len(broken.requests))
}
if !state.summarizerBroken {
t.Fatal("a failed summarizer must be marked broken for the run")
}
// Second summarization: straight to main, no cheap retry.
if _, err := summarize(input); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(broken.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("broken summarizer was retried (%d requests)", len(broken.requests))
}
if len(main.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("main provider requests = %d, want 2", len(main.requests))
}
}
// A factory that errors (misconfigured model) is equivalent to no summarizer:
// main provider used, factory not retried.
func TestSummarizerFactoryErrorFallsBack(t *testing.T) {
main := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "MAIN SUMMARY"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
factoryCalls := 0
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Summarizer: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) {
factoryCalls++
return nil, errors.New("unknown model")
},
}, nil)
summarize := state.summarizeClosure(context.Background(), main)
summary, err := summarize([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "history"}})
if err != nil || summary != "MAIN SUMMARY" {
t.Fatalf("summary = %q, err = %v; want main provider fallback", summary, err)
}
if factoryCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("factory calls = %d, want 1 (sticky failure)", factoryCalls)
}
if _, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); dedicated {
t.Fatal("after a factory failure the run must stay on the main provider")
}
if factoryCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("factory retried after failure (%d calls)", factoryCalls)
}
}
// Tool payloads are clamped in the summarizer transcript: results to
// summaryToolResultClamp, call arguments to summaryToolArgsClamp.
func TestRenderTranscriptClampsToolPayloads(t *testing.T) {
bigResult := strings.Repeat("r", 50_000)
bigArgs := strings.Repeat("w", 20_000)
transcript := renderTranscript([]zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "editing", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "c1", Name: "write_file", Arguments: bigArgs},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "c1", Content: bigResult},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "keep going"},
})
if len(transcript) > summaryToolResultClamp+summaryToolArgsClamp+1024 {
t.Fatalf("transcript is %d bytes; clamps did not apply", len(transcript))
}
if !strings.Contains(transcript, "chars omitted for summarization") {
t.Fatal("clamped transcript must carry the omission marker")
}
if !strings.Contains(transcript, "keep going") {
t.Fatal("non-tool content must survive unclamped")
}
// Head AND tail of the clamped payloads survive.
if !strings.HasPrefix(transcript[strings.Index(transcript, "tool result: ")+len("tool result: "):], "r") ||
!strings.Contains(transcript, "rrr\n\nuser: keep going") {
t.Fatalf("head/tail of the tool result lost:\n%s", transcript[:200])
}
}
// bigToolHistory returns a history with n large tool results (~40k estimated
// tokens each): the trailing protection window keeps the newest verbatim,
// the older ones are prunable.
func bigToolHistory(n int) []zeroruntime.Message {
bigBody := strings.Repeat("x", 160_000)
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "sys"}}
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
id := string(rune('a' + i))
messages = append(messages,
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: id, Name: "read_file", Arguments: "{\"path\":\"" + id + "\"}"}}},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: id, Content: bigBody},
)
}
return append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "go"})
}
func summaryProvider(text string) *mockProvider {
return &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: text}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: text}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
}}
}
// A context-limit error is first answered with the free prune stage; when the
// pruned history fits the window the retry is free (no summarizer call) and
// the one-shot reactive budget is untouched. The paid summarizer only runs
// when a later error finds nothing left to prune.
func TestRecoverPrunesBeforeSummarizing(t *testing.T) {
provider := summaryProvider("SUMMARY")
// The protected trailing tool output (~40k tokens) must fit the window.
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 200_000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
messages := bigToolHistory(5)
pruned, retried, err := state.recover(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried {
t.Fatal("prunable history that fits must produce a free retry")
}
if len(provider.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("free prune stage must not call the summarizer (%d requests)", len(provider.requests))
}
if state.reactiveAttempted {
t.Fatal("a free prune retry must not consume the reactive budget")
}
if estimateTokens(pruned) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
t.Fatal("prune did not shrink the history")
}
// Second context-limit error on the pruned history: nothing meaningfully
// prunable remains, so the paid summarizer fires and consumes the budget.
_, retried, err = state.recover(context.Background(), provider, pruned, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried {
t.Fatal("second recover must compact and retry")
}
if len(provider.requests) == 0 {
t.Fatal("second recover must reach the summarizer")
}
if !state.reactiveAttempted {
t.Fatal("a paid recover must consume the reactive budget")
}
}
// When pruning reclaims something but the pruned history still exceeds the
// window, recover falls through to the paid summarizer in the SAME call
// instead of spending a retry that would fail the same way.
func TestRecoverFallsThroughToSummarizerWhenPruneIsInsufficient(t *testing.T) {
provider := summaryProvider("SUMMARY")
// A 1,000-token window: even the protected trailing output overflows it.
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 1000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
messages := bigToolHistory(5)
compacted, retried, err := state.recover(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried {
t.Fatal("insufficient prune must still end in a retry via summarization")
}
if len(provider.requests) == 0 {
t.Fatal("insufficient prune must reach the summarizer in the same recover call")
}
if !state.reactiveAttempted {
t.Fatal("the paid summarizer consumes the reactive budget")
}
if estimateTokens(compacted) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
t.Fatal("recover did not shrink the history")
}
}
// The free prune stage is not gated behind the one-shot budget: after a paid
// reactive compaction, a later context-limit error still gets a free retry
// when pruning makes the history fit.
func TestRecoverFreePruneRunsAfterBudgetIsSpent(t *testing.T) {
provider := summaryProvider("SUMMARY")
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 200_000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
state.reactiveAttempted = true
messages := bigToolHistory(5)
pruned, retried, err := state.recover(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried || len(provider.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("free prune must retry without the summarizer even when the budget is spent (retried=%v, requests=%d)", retried, len(provider.requests))
}
if estimateTokens(pruned) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
t.Fatal("prune did not shrink the history")
}
// With nothing left to prune and the budget spent, the caller keeps its
// original error — recover neither loops nor summarizes.
_, retried, err = state.recover(context.Background(), provider, pruned, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil || retried || len(provider.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("spent budget must not summarize again (retried=%v, requests=%d, err=%v)", retried, len(provider.requests), err)
}
}
// The free-retry gate compares against the window the provider enforces, not
// the 70% proactive threshold: a history pruned to ~80% of the window still
// takes the free retry.
func TestRecoverFreeRetryGateUsesWindowNotThreshold(t *testing.T) {
provider := summaryProvider("SUMMARY")
messages := bigToolHistory(5)
pruned, _ := pruneStaleToolOutput(messages, 2)
prunedTokens := estimateTokens(pruned)
// Choose a window so the pruned size sits between 70% and 95% of it.
window := prunedTokens * 100 / 80
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: window, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
if prunedTokens <= state.threshold {
t.Fatalf("test setup: pruned size %d must exceed the proactive threshold %d", prunedTokens, state.threshold)
}
_, retried, err := state.recover(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried || len(provider.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("a history that fits the window must take the free retry (retried=%v, requests=%d)", retried, len(provider.requests))
}
}
// After a mid-run model switch the summarizer is re-resolved against the new
// main model: a run that started on the cheap model (no dedicated summarizer)
// and escalated gets a cheap summarizer, and a previously broken one is
// retried for the new model.
func TestSwitchModelReresolvesSummarizer(t *testing.T) {
cheap := summaryProvider("CHEAP SUMMARY")
main := summaryProvider("MAIN SUMMARY")
var factoryModels []string
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Model: "cheap-model",
Summarizer: func(_ context.Context, mainModelID string) (Provider, error) {
factoryModels = append(factoryModels, mainModelID)
if mainModelID == "cheap-model" {
return nil, nil // main already is the cheap model
}
return cheap, nil
},
}, nil)
if _, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); dedicated {
t.Fatal("on the cheap model the main provider must summarize")
}
if _, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); dedicated || len(factoryModels) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("factory must run once per main model, calls=%v", factoryModels)
}
state.switchModel("big-model", 400_000)
if state.threshold != compactionThreshold(400_000) || state.window != 400_000 {
t.Fatalf("switchModel must re-derive the window, got threshold=%d window=%d", state.threshold, state.window)
}
if got, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); !dedicated || got != Provider(cheap) {
t.Fatal("after escalating to an expensive model the dedicated cheap summarizer must be used")
}
if len(factoryModels) != 2 || factoryModels[1] != "big-model" {
t.Fatalf("factory must be re-invoked with the new main model, calls=%v", factoryModels)
}
// A broken summarizer is retried after the next switch.
state.summarizerBroken = true
if _, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); dedicated {
t.Fatal("a broken summarizer must fall back to main")
}
state.switchModel("other-model", 0)
if got, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); !dedicated || got != Provider(cheap) {
t.Fatal("a model switch must clear the broken flag and rebuild the summarizer")
}
}
func TestCompactionUpdateWindow(t *testing.T) {
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 100_000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
state.lowWaterMark = 50_000
before := state.threshold
state.updateWindow(0) // unknown model: unchanged
if state.threshold != before || state.lowWaterMark != 50_000 {
t.Fatal("updateWindow(0) must be a no-op")
}
state.updateWindow(10_000)
if state.threshold >= before {
t.Fatalf("threshold = %d, want re-derived below %d", state.threshold, before)
}
if state.lowWaterMark != 0 {
t.Fatal("low-water mark must reset on a window change")
}
if !state.enabled {
t.Fatal("a positive window must keep compaction enabled")
}
}
// End-to-end: after escalate_model switches providers, the loop re-derives the
// context window via ContextWindowFor, visible in the OnContext report.
func TestRunEscalationRederivesContextWindow(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(escalatingTool{target: "big-model"})
switched := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "escalate"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
var windows []int
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
ContextWindow: 100_000,
Model: "small-model",
ModelSwitcher: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) { return switched, nil },
ContextWindowFor: func(modelID string) int {
if modelID == "big-model" {
return 400_000
}
return 0
},
OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) { windows = append(windows, breakdown.ContextWindow) },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(windows) < 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected at least 2 OnContext reports, got %d", len(windows))
}
if windows[0] != 100_000 {
t.Fatalf("turn 1 window = %d, want the original 100000", windows[0])
}
if windows[len(windows)-1] != 400_000 {
t.Fatalf("post-escalation window = %d, want 400000", windows[len(windows)-1])
}
}
// nonComparableProvider has a slice field, so comparing two Provider interface
// values holding it would panic; the summarizer path must never compare them.
type nonComparableProvider struct {
inner *mockProvider
tags []string
}
func (p nonComparableProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
return p.inner.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
}
func TestSummarizeClosureNeverComparesProviderValues(t *testing.T) {
broken := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: "boom: model not found"},
}}}
main := nonComparableProvider{inner: summaryProvider("MAIN SUMMARY"), tags: []string{"x"}}
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Summarizer: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) { return nonComparableProvider{inner: broken}, nil },
}, nil)
summary, err := state.summarizeClosure(context.Background(), main)([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "history"}})
if err != nil || summary != "MAIN SUMMARY" {
t.Fatalf("fallback with non-comparable providers must not panic and must use main, got %q err=%v", summary, err)
}
// And with no dedicated summarizer at all the closure still works.
state = newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 1000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
if _, err := state.summarizeClosure(context.Background(), main)([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "history"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
+2 -43
View File
@@ -43,14 +43,8 @@ func TestCompactMessagesReturnsMetadataForManualCompaction(t *testing.T) {
if result.SummaryText != "manual summary" {
t.Fatalf("SummaryText = %q, want trimmed summary", result.SummaryText)
}
if result.ProjectedChars != compactionMessageChars(captured) || result.ProjectedChars == 0 {
t.Fatalf("ProjectedChars = %d, want %d", result.ProjectedChars, compactionMessageChars(captured))
}
if result.Truncated {
t.Fatal("Truncated = true for a projection within its limits")
}
if len(captured) != 1 || !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, "first question") || !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, "second question") {
t.Fatalf("summarized projection = %#v, want intent from the non-preserved middle", captured)
if len(captured) != 3 || captured[0].Content != "first question" || captured[2].Content != "second question" {
t.Fatalf("summarized middle = %#v, want the three non-preserved non-system messages", captured)
}
if len(result.Messages) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("compacted message count = %d, want 4", len(result.Messages))
@@ -102,46 +96,11 @@ func TestCompactMessagesNoopReturnsUncompactedMetadata(t *testing.T) {
if result.SummaryText != "" {
t.Fatalf("SummaryText = %q, want empty", result.SummaryText)
}
if result.ProjectedChars != 0 || result.Truncated {
t.Fatalf("no-op projection metadata = (%d, %t), want zero values", result.ProjectedChars, result.Truncated)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(result.Messages, messages) {
t.Fatalf("Messages changed on no-op: %#v", result.Messages)
}
}
func TestCompactMessagesReturnsTruncatedProjectionMetadata(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"}}
for index := range 20 {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: strings.Repeat("contextword ", 256) + string(rune('a'+index)),
})
}
messages = append(messages,
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "recent answer"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "latest question"},
)
var captured []zeroruntime.Message
result, err := CompactMessages(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
captured = append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), toSummarize...)
return "bounded summary", nil
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !result.Compacted || !result.Truncated {
t.Fatalf("compaction metadata = compacted %t, truncated %t; want both true", result.Compacted, result.Truncated)
}
if result.ProjectedChars != compactionMessageChars(captured) || result.ProjectedChars == 0 {
t.Fatalf("ProjectedChars = %d, want %d", result.ProjectedChars, compactionMessageChars(captured))
}
}
func TestCompactMessagesPropagatesSummarizeError(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
+12 -131
View File
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ type skillEntry struct {
body string
}
// recentEdits returns files mutated by editing calls in messages
// recentEdits returns the files mutated by write_file/edit_file calls in messages
// — latest note per path, in last-seen order — as skillEntry{name: path, body:
// note}. After compaction elides the editing turns, this tells the model WHAT it
// changed in each file (from the tool's result) so it need not re-read to
@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ type skillEntry struct {
// rather than an earlier, now-stale entry.
func recentEdits(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
pathByID := map[string]string{}
noteByPath := map[string]string{}
sequence := make([]string, 0)
for _, message := range messages {
for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
@@ -130,24 +129,12 @@ func recentEdits(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
sequence = append(sequence, path)
}
}
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || len(message.ChangedFiles) == 0 {
continue
}
for _, path := range message.ChangedFiles {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path == "" {
continue
}
sequence = append(sequence, path)
noteByPath[path] = editNote(message.Content)
}
}
order := lastSeenOrder(sequence)
if len(order) == 0 {
return nil
}
noteByPath := map[string]string{}
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || message.ToolCallID == "" {
continue
@@ -438,20 +425,15 @@ type preservedState struct {
}
type preservedTaskState struct {
Objective string `json:"objective"`
Status taskStatus `json:"status,omitempty"`
Pending int `json:"pending,omitempty"`
InProgress int `json:"in_progress,omitempty"`
Completed int `json:"completed,omitempty"`
Failed int `json:"failed,omitempty"`
VerificationPassed int `json:"verification_passed,omitempty"`
VerificationFailed int `json:"verification_failed,omitempty"`
VerificationOutcome Outcome `json:"verification_outcome,omitempty"`
Constraints []string `json:"constraints,omitempty"`
ChangedFiles []string `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
UnresolvedFailures []taskFailureState `json:"unresolved_failures,omitempty"`
Approvals []taskApprovalState `json:"approvals,omitempty"`
Artifacts []taskArtifactState `json:"artifacts,omitempty"`
Objective string `json:"objective"`
Status taskStatus `json:"status,omitempty"`
Pending int `json:"pending,omitempty"`
InProgress int `json:"in_progress,omitempty"`
Completed int `json:"completed,omitempty"`
Failed int `json:"failed,omitempty"`
VerificationPassed int `json:"verification_passed,omitempty"`
VerificationFailed int `json:"verification_failed,omitempty"`
VerificationOutcome Outcome `json:"verification_outcome,omitempty"`
}
type preservedEdit struct {
@@ -486,12 +468,7 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnap
task := priorState.Task
if taskSnapshot != nil {
task = &preservedTaskState{
Objective: capTaskObjective(taskSnapshot.Objective),
Constraints: mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskConstraints(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Constraints, maxTaskConstraints),
ChangedFiles: mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskChangedFiles(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.ChangedFiles, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
UnresolvedFailures: mergeTaskFailures(priorTaskFailures(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.UnresolvedFailures, taskSnapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys),
Approvals: mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskApprovals(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Approvals, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
Artifacts: mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskArtifacts(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Artifacts, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
Objective: capTaskObjective(taskSnapshot.Objective),
}
// Plan parity corroborates only the mutable task projection. The objective
// comes directly from the run prompt and is immutable, so it must survive
@@ -507,13 +484,6 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnap
task.VerificationOutcome = taskSnapshot.Verification.LastOutcome
}
}
freshConstraints := explicitConstraintsFromMessages(middle)
if len(freshConstraints) > 0 {
if task == nil {
task = &preservedTaskState{}
}
task.Constraints = mergeBoundedComparable(task.Constraints, freshConstraints, maxTaskConstraints)
}
// Plan: a fresh update_plan in middle is authoritative; otherwise carry the
// plan preserved by an earlier compaction.
@@ -547,95 +517,6 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnap
return summary
}
func explicitConstraintsFromMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []string {
var constraints []string
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser || strings.Contains(message.Content, preservedStateLabel) {
continue
}
if _, body := projectInstructionBlock(message.Content); body != "" {
continue
}
constraints = mergeBoundedComparable(constraints, extractExplicitConstraints(message.Content), maxTaskConstraints)
}
return constraints
}
func priorTaskConstraints(task *preservedTaskState) []string {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.Constraints
}
func priorTaskChangedFiles(task *preservedTaskState) []string {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.ChangedFiles
}
func priorTaskFailures(task *preservedTaskState) []taskFailureState {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.UnresolvedFailures
}
func priorTaskApprovals(task *preservedTaskState) []taskApprovalState {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.Approvals
}
func priorTaskArtifacts(task *preservedTaskState) []taskArtifactState {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.Artifacts
}
func mergeTaskFailures(older, newer []taskFailureState, resolved []string) []taskFailureState {
resolvedSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(resolved))
for _, key := range resolved {
resolvedSet[key] = struct{}{}
}
merged := make([]taskFailureState, 0, len(older)+len(newer))
for _, failure := range append(append([]taskFailureState(nil), older...), newer...) {
if _, ok := resolvedSet[failure.Key]; ok {
continue
}
withoutSameKey := make([]taskFailureState, 0, len(merged))
for _, existing := range merged {
if existing.Key != failure.Key {
withoutSameKey = append(withoutSameKey, existing)
}
}
merged = append(withoutSameKey, failure)
}
if len(merged) > maxTaskEvidenceEntries {
merged = merged[len(merged)-maxTaskEvidenceEntries:]
}
return merged
}
func mergeBoundedComparable[T comparable](older, newer []T, limit int) []T {
merged := make([]T, 0, len(older)+len(newer))
seen := make(map[T]struct{}, len(older)+len(newer))
for _, value := range append(append([]T(nil), older...), newer...) {
if _, ok := seen[value]; ok {
continue
}
seen[value] = struct{}{}
merged = append(merged, value)
}
if len(merged) > limit {
merged = merged[len(merged)-limit:]
}
return merged
}
func capTaskObjective(objective string) string {
objective = strings.TrimSpace(objective)
if len(objective) <= maxTaskObjectiveBytes {
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"testing"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
@@ -65,9 +64,6 @@ func TestCompactPreservesBoundedTaskContext(t *testing.T) {
objective := strings.Repeat("世", maxTaskObjectiveBytes)
task := newTaskState(objective, nil)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"write code","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"add tests","status":"pending"}]}`})
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"patch":"*** Update File: internal/db.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
Name: "apply_patch", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/db.go"},
}})
messages := stateConversation()
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
@@ -84,69 +80,6 @@ func TestCompactPreservesBoundedTaskContext(t *testing.T) {
if len(state.Task.Objective) > maxTaskObjectiveBytes || !utf8.ValidString(state.Task.Objective) {
t.Fatalf("objective was not safely bounded: %d bytes %q", len(state.Task.Objective), state.Task.Objective)
}
if len(state.Task.ChangedFiles) != 1 || state.Task.ChangedFiles[0] != "internal/db.go" {
t.Fatalf("changed files were not preserved: %#v", state.Task.ChangedFiles)
}
}
func TestCompactPreservesRuntimeEvidenceAcrossRepeatedCompaction(t *testing.T) {
task := newTaskState("Please keep the change focused.", nil)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./..."}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: tests failed",
Meta: map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/tests.txt"},
}})
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPermission, permission: PermissionEvent{
ToolName: "exec_command", DecisionAction: PermissionDecisionAllowForSession, Scope: "/tmp",
}})
messages := stateConversation()
first, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "FIRST", nil },
taskState: task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./..."}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: tests still fail with newer evidence",
Meta: map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/tests.txt"},
}})
secondInput := append(append([]zeroruntime.Message{}, first...),
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Never add background memory models."},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "understood"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "continue"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working"},
)
second, err := Compact(secondInput, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SECOND", nil },
taskState: task.snapshotForCompaction(secondInput),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(second[1].Content)
if state.Task == nil || len(state.Task.UnresolvedFailures) != 1 || len(state.Task.Approvals) != 1 || len(state.Task.Artifacts) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("runtime evidence did not survive repeated compaction: %#v", state.Task)
}
if got := state.Task.UnresolvedFailures[0].Summary; got != "Error: tests still fail with newer evidence" {
t.Fatalf("newer failure evidence did not replace the older summary: %#v", state.Task.UnresolvedFailures)
}
for _, want := range []string{"Please keep the change focused.", "Never add background memory models."} {
if !containsString(state.Task.Constraints, want) {
t.Fatalf("constraint %q missing after repeated compaction: %#v", want, state.Task.Constraints)
}
}
}
func containsString(values []string, want string) bool {
for _, value := range values {
if value == want {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func TestCompactPreservesObjectiveAfterPlanParityMismatch(t *testing.T) {
-318
View File
@@ -1,318 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"regexp"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
const (
compactionUserWordBudget = 256
compactionAssistantWordBudget = 200
compactionToolCallsPerTurn = 8
compactionToolArgumentBytes = 120
compactionErrorBytes = 150
compactionResultBytes = 1200
compactionPreviousSummaryBytes = 16 * 1024
compactionBriefMaxBytes = 24 * 1024
)
var compactionWordPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[\p{L}\p{N}]+`)
type compactionProjection struct {
messages []zeroruntime.Message
truncated bool
}
// projectCompactionInput removes reconstructible tool output before the model
// summary call. It retains a bounded transcript of user intent, assistant
// decisions, tool actions, and concise errors. Exact durable state is appended
// separately from the original messages after the summary returns.
func projectCompactionInput(messages []zeroruntime.Message) compactionProjection {
sections := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
previousSummary := ""
truncated := false
for index, message := range messages {
switch message.Role {
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser:
content := message.Content
if marker := strings.Index(content, preservedStateLabel); marker >= 0 {
content = content[:marker]
}
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(content)
if strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, summaryLabel) {
fullSummary := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(trimmed, summaryLabel))
previousSummary = clipHeadTailBytes(fullSummary, compactionPreviousSummaryBytes)
truncated = truncated || len(fullSummary) > compactionPreviousSummaryBytes
continue
}
if content = clipInformativeWords(content, compactionUserWordBudget); content != "" {
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[user #%d]\n%s", index, content))
}
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant:
lines := make([]string, 0, 1+len(message.ToolCalls))
if content := clipInformativeWords(message.Content, compactionAssistantWordBudget); content != "" {
lines = append(lines, content)
}
calls := message.ToolCalls
omitted := 0
if len(calls) > compactionToolCallsPerTurn {
omitted = len(calls) - compactionToolCallsPerTurn
calls = calls[omitted:]
}
if omitted > 0 {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("* (%d earlier tool calls omitted)", omitted))
}
for _, call := range calls {
lines = append(lines, compactionToolCallLine(call))
}
if len(lines) > 0 {
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[assistant #%d]\n%s", index, strings.Join(lines, "\n")))
}
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool:
// New tool-result messages carry the execution status directly, as the
// source ToolResult does. Keep the text check for older session history
// created before Message exposed IsError.
name := toolNameForResult(messages, index)
mustPreserve := name == "ask_user" || len(message.ChangedFiles) > 0
if !mustPreserve && !message.IsError && !isLikelyToolError(message.Content) {
continue
}
if name == "" {
name = "tool"
}
switch {
case message.IsError || isLikelyToolError(message.Content):
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[tool_error #%d] %s\n%s", index, name, clipBytes(firstLine(message.Content), compactionErrorBytes)))
case name == "ask_user":
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[user_answer #%d] %s\n%s", index, name, clipBytes(message.Content, compactionResultBytes)))
default:
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[tool_result #%d] %s changed %s\n%s", index, name,
clipBytes(strings.Join(message.ChangedFiles, ", "), compactionToolArgumentBytes), clipBytes(firstLine(message.Content), compactionErrorBytes)))
}
}
}
if len(sections) == 0 && previousSummary == "" {
return compactionProjection{}
}
brief, briefTruncated := capCompactionBrief(strings.Join(sections, "\n\n"))
truncated = truncated || briefTruncated
if previousSummary != "" {
brief = "[previous summary]\n" + previousSummary + "\n\n" + brief
}
return compactionProjection{
messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: strings.TrimSpace(brief)}},
truncated: truncated,
}
}
func capCompactionBrief(brief string) (string, bool) {
if len(brief) <= compactionBriefMaxBytes {
return brief, false
}
marker := "\n\n...[middle transcript omitted to fit compaction budget]...\n\n"
available := compactionBriefMaxBytes - len(marker)
// Keep both chronological edges: the oldest material has not necessarily
// been summarized before, while the newest material is most actionable.
headBytes := available * 2 / 5
tailBytes := available - headBytes
head := clipPrefixAtBoundary(brief, headBytes)
tail := clipSuffixAtBoundary(brief, tailBytes)
return strings.TrimSpace(head) + marker + strings.TrimSpace(tail), true
}
func compactionToolCallLine(call zeroruntime.ToolCall) string {
detail := ""
if call.Freeform && call.Name == "apply_patch" {
detail = strings.Join(patchPaths(call.Arguments), ", ")
}
var arguments map[string]any
if detail == "" && json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments)), &arguments) == nil {
for _, key := range []string{"file_path", "path", "url", "query", "pattern", "prompt", "description", "question"} {
if value, ok := arguments[key].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(value) != "" {
detail = value
break
}
}
if detail == "" && call.Name == "ask_user" {
detail = askUserQuestionsDetail(arguments)
}
if detail == "" && call.Name == "apply_patch" {
if patch, ok := arguments["patch"].(string); ok {
detail = strings.Join(patchPaths(patch), ", ")
}
}
}
if detail == "" {
detail = commandFromArguments(call.Arguments)
}
if detail == "" {
return "* " + call.Name
}
return fmt.Sprintf("* %s %q", call.Name, clipBytes(detail, compactionToolArgumentBytes))
}
func isLikelyToolError(content string) bool {
prefix := strings.TrimSpace(content)
if len(prefix) > compactionErrorBytes {
prefix = prefix[:compactionErrorBytes]
}
lower := strings.ToLower(prefix)
for _, prefix := range []string{"error:", "tool error:", "failed:", "permission denied", "command failed"} {
if strings.HasPrefix(lower, prefix) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func clipInformativeWords(text string, limit int) string {
flat := strings.Join(strings.Fields(text), " ")
if flat == "" || limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
count := 0
for _, location := range compactionWordPattern.FindAllStringIndex(flat, -1) {
word := strings.ToLower(flat[location[0]:location[1]])
if compactionStopWords[word] {
continue
}
count++
if count > limit {
end := location[0]
return strings.TrimSpace(flat[:end]) + "...(truncated)"
}
}
return flat
}
func clipBytes(text string, limit int) string {
text = strings.TrimSpace(text)
if limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
if len(text) <= limit {
return text
}
if limit <= 3 {
end := limit
for end > 0 && end < len(text) && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
end--
}
return text[:end]
}
end := limit - 3
for end > 0 && end < len(text) && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
end--
}
return strings.TrimSpace(text[:end]) + "..."
}
func clipHeadTailBytes(text string, limit int) string {
text = strings.TrimSpace(text)
if len(text) <= limit {
return text
}
if limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
marker := "\n...[middle omitted]...\n"
if limit <= len(marker) {
return clipBytes(text, limit)
}
available := limit - len(marker)
head := clipPrefixAtBoundary(text, available/2)
tail := clipSuffixAtBoundary(text, available-available/2)
return strings.TrimSpace(head) + marker + strings.TrimSpace(tail)
}
func clipPrefixAtBoundary(text string, limit int) string {
if limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
if len(text) <= limit {
return text
}
end := limit
for end > 0 && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
end--
}
if boundary := strings.LastIndex(text[:end], "\n\n["); boundary > 0 {
end = boundary
}
return text[:end]
}
func clipSuffixAtBoundary(text string, limit int) string {
if limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
if len(text) <= limit {
return text
}
start := len(text) - limit
for start < len(text) && text[start]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
start++
}
if boundary := strings.Index(text[start:], "\n\n["); boundary >= 0 {
start += boundary + 2
}
return text[start:]
}
func askUserQuestionsDetail(arguments map[string]any) string {
raw, ok := arguments["questions"].([]any)
if !ok {
return ""
}
questions := make([]string, 0, len(raw))
for _, item := range raw {
object, ok := item.(map[string]any)
if !ok {
continue
}
if question, ok := object["question"].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(question) != "" {
questions = append(questions, strings.TrimSpace(question))
}
}
return strings.Join(questions, " | ")
}
func patchPaths(patch string) []string {
var paths []string
seen := map[string]bool{}
for _, line := range strings.Split(patch, "\n") {
for _, prefix := range []string{"*** Add File: ", "*** Update File: ", "*** Delete File: ", "*** Move to: "} {
if !strings.HasPrefix(line, prefix) {
continue
}
path := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, prefix))
if path != "" && !seen[path] {
seen[path] = true
paths = append(paths, path)
}
}
}
return paths
}
var compactionStopWords = map[string]bool{
"a": true, "an": true, "the": true, "is": true, "are": true, "was": true, "were": true,
"be": true, "been": true, "being": true, "have": true, "has": true, "had": true,
"do": true, "does": true, "did": true, "will": true, "would": true, "could": true,
"should": true, "may": true, "might": true, "shall": true, "can": true, "need": true, "must": true,
"to": true, "of": true, "in": true, "for": true, "on": true, "with": true, "at": true,
"by": true, "from": true, "as": true, "into": true, "through": true, "during": true,
"before": true, "after": true, "above": true, "below": true, "between": true, "under": true, "over": true,
"and": true, "but": true, "or": true, "nor": true, "not": true, "so": true, "yet": true,
"both": true, "either": true, "neither": true, "each": true, "every": true, "all": true,
"any": true, "few": true, "more": true, "most": true, "other": true, "some": true, "such": true, "no": true,
"that": true, "this": true, "these": true, "those": true, "it": true, "its": true,
"i": true, "me": true, "my": true, "we": true, "our": true, "you": true, "your": true,
"he": true, "him": true, "his": true, "she": true, "her": true, "they": true, "them": true, "their": true,
"who": true, "which": true, "what": true, "if": true, "then": true, "than": true,
"when": true, "where": true, "how": true, "just": true, "also": true,
}
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestClipBytesHandlesTinyLimitsOnRuneBoundaries(t *testing.T) {
for _, limit := range []int{0, 1, 2, 3} {
if clipped := clipBytes("世界", limit); len(clipped) > limit || !utf8.ValidString(clipped) {
t.Fatalf("clipBytes limit %d returned invalid result %q", limit, clipped)
}
}
}
func TestBoundaryClippersHandleNonPositiveLimits(t *testing.T) {
for _, clip := range []func(string, int) string{clipPrefixAtBoundary, clipSuffixAtBoundary} {
for _, limit := range []int{-1, 0} {
if got := clip("世界", limit); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("clipper limit %d = %q, want empty", limit, got)
}
}
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputDropsRecoverableToolBodies(t *testing.T) {
largeBody := strings.Repeat("recoverable source line\n", 1000)
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Inspect the parser and preserve its current behavior."},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "I will inspect before editing.", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "read", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/parser.go"}`}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "read", Content: largeBody},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "test", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./internal/parser"}`}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "test", Content: "Error: parser regression\nlong diagnostic details"},
}
projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
projected := projection.messages
if len(projected) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("projection = %#v, want one compact message", projected)
}
content := projected[0].Content
for _, want := range []string{"Inspect the parser", `read_file "internal/parser.go"`, `exec_command "go test ./internal/parser"`, "Error: parser regression"} {
if !strings.Contains(content, want) {
t.Fatalf("projection missing %q: %q", want, content)
}
}
if strings.Contains(content, "recoverable source line") || strings.Contains(content, "long diagnostic details") {
t.Fatalf("projection retained reconstructible or overlong tool output: %q", content)
}
if estimateTokens(projected)*20 >= estimateTokens(messages) {
t.Fatalf("projection did not materially reduce tokens: before=%d after=%d", estimateTokens(messages), estimateTokens(projected))
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputRetainsStructurallyMarkedToolErrors(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "git", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: `{"cmd":"git status"}`}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "git", Content: "fatal: not a git repository", IsError: true},
}
projected := projectCompactionInput(messages).messages
if len(projected) != 1 || !strings.Contains(projected[0].Content, "fatal: not a git repository") {
t.Fatalf("structured tool error was dropped from projection: %#v", projected)
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputRetainsAskUserExchangeAndSemanticArguments(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "ask", Name: "ask_user", Arguments: `{"questions":[{"question":"Which database should remain?"}]}`}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "ask", Content: "Which database should remain?: Postgres only; do not touch MySQL."},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "patch", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: `{"patch":"*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: internal/db.go\n*** End Patch"}`},
{ID: "raw-patch", Name: "apply_patch", Freeform: true, Arguments: "*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: internal/api.go\n*** Add File: internal/config.go\n*** End Patch\n"},
{ID: "fetch", Name: "web_fetch", Arguments: `{"url":"https://example.com/spec"}`},
{ID: "task", Name: "task", Arguments: `{"prompt":"Inspect the Windows implementation"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "patch", Content: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/db.go"}},
}
content := projectCompactionInput(messages).messages[0].Content
for _, want := range []string{"Which database should remain?", "Postgres only; do not touch MySQL", "internal/db.go", "internal/api.go", "internal/config.go", "https://example.com/spec", "Inspect the Windows implementation"} {
if !strings.Contains(content, want) {
t.Fatalf("projection missing %q: %q", want, content)
}
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputCapsToolCallsPerTurn(t *testing.T) {
calls := make([]zeroruntime.ToolCall, 12)
for index := range calls {
calls[index] = zeroruntime.ToolCall{Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"file.go"}`}
}
projected := projectCompactionInput([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: calls}}).messages
content := projected[0].Content
if strings.Count(content, "* read_file") != compactionToolCallsPerTurn || !strings.Contains(content, "4 earlier tool calls omitted") {
t.Fatalf("tool-call tail was not bounded: %q", content)
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputCarriesPreviousSummaryOutsideBriefCap(t *testing.T) {
previous := "keep the earlier architecture decision\n" + strings.Repeat("prior detail ", 2000) + "\nkeep the newest prior decision"
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: summaryLabel + "\n" + previous + "\n\n" + preservedStateLabel + "\n{}"}}
for index := range 500 {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: strings.Repeat("later transcript detail ", 20)})
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "later request " + strings.Repeat("context ", 20) + string(rune('a'+index%26))})
}
projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
content := projection.messages[0].Content
if !strings.Contains(content, "[previous summary]\nkeep the earlier architecture decision") || !strings.Contains(content, "keep the newest prior decision") {
t.Fatalf("previous summary was lost when the brief tail was capped: %q", content)
}
if !strings.Contains(content, "middle transcript omitted to fit compaction budget") {
t.Fatalf("oversized brief was not head/tail capped: %q", content)
}
if !projection.truncated {
t.Fatal("projection did not structurally report truncation")
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputDoesNotInferTruncationFromUserText(t *testing.T) {
projection := projectCompactionInput([]zeroruntime.Message{{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Keep this literal marker: [middle omitted]",
}})
if projection.truncated {
t.Fatal("literal user text produced a false truncation signal")
}
}
@@ -20,15 +20,11 @@ func TestRecentEditsExtractsPathsAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
{ID: "e2", Name: "edit_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/bar.go","old_string":"a","new_string":"b"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e2", Content: "Applied edit to internal/bar.go"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "e3", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: `{"patch":"*** Update File: internal/baz.go"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e3", Content: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/baz.go"}},
}
edits := recentEdits(messages)
if len(edits) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected 3 edited files, got %d: %#v", len(edits), edits)
if len(edits) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 edited files, got %d: %#v", len(edits), edits)
}
if edits[0].name != "internal/foo.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[0].body, "12 lines") {
t.Fatalf("first edit = %#v, want foo.go with its note", edits[0])
@@ -36,9 +32,6 @@ func TestRecentEditsExtractsPathsAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
if edits[1].name != "internal/bar.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[1].body, "Applied edit") {
t.Fatalf("second edit = %#v, want bar.go with its note", edits[1])
}
if edits[2].name != "internal/baz.go" || edits[2].body != "Done!" {
t.Fatalf("third edit = %#v, want apply_patch changed file with its note", edits[2])
}
}
// After compaction elides the editing turns, the preserved-state block still
+5 -92
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
@@ -59,15 +58,12 @@ func TestCompactKeepsSystemAndPreservedSuffix(t *testing.T) {
if last.Content != "most recent question" {
t.Fatalf("expected most recent message preserved, got %q", last.Content)
}
// The summarizer receives a compact semantic projection of the middle rather
// than reconstructible raw tool output.
if len(captured) != 1 || captured[0].Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser {
t.Fatalf("expected one projected summary input, got %#v", captured)
// The summarized middle excludes system and preserved suffix.
if len(captured) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected 3 summarized messages, got %d: %#v", len(captured), captured)
}
for _, want := range []string{"[user #0]", "first question", "[assistant #1]", "first answer", "second question"} {
if !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, want) {
t.Fatalf("projected summary input missing %q: %q", want, captured[0].Content)
}
if captured[0].Content != "first question" {
t.Fatalf("expected oldest non-system message first, got %#v", captured[0])
}
// Compaction must shrink the conversation.
if estimateTokens(result) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
@@ -275,27 +271,6 @@ func TestEstimateToolDefTokensCountsDefinitions(t *testing.T) {
if estimateToolDefTokens(one) <= 0 {
t.Fatal("a tool definition (name + description + schema) should estimate > 0 tokens")
}
typed := append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition(nil), one...)
typed[0].Type = zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFreeform
if estimateToolDefTokens(typed) <= estimateToolDefTokens(one) {
t.Fatal("a non-empty tool type must increase the estimated request cost")
}
for _, test := range []struct {
name string
format zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat
}{
{name: "type", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Type: "grammar"}},
{name: "syntax", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Syntax: "lark"}},
{name: "definition", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Definition: "start: WORD"}},
} {
t.Run("format "+test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
formatted := append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition(nil), one...)
formatted[0].Format = &test.format
if estimateToolDefTokens(formatted) <= estimateToolDefTokens(one) {
t.Fatalf("a non-empty format %s must increase the estimated request cost", test.name)
}
})
}
two := append(append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{}, one...), zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
Name: "write_file",
Description: "Write contents to a file in the workspace.",
@@ -450,7 +425,6 @@ type reactiveProvider struct {
summarizeCalls int
turnRequests int
failedOnce bool
connectError bool
bigText string
finalText string
}
@@ -472,9 +446,6 @@ func (provider *reactiveProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request
return streamEvents(toolTurnWithText(provider.bigText, "1", "read_file", `{"path":"x"}`)), nil
case provider.turnRequests == 2 && !provider.failedOnce:
provider.failedOnce = true
if provider.connectError {
return nil, errors.New("context_length_exceeded")
}
return streamEvents([]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: "This model's maximum context length is 1000 tokens. Please reduce the length of the messages."},
}), nil
@@ -483,39 +454,6 @@ func (provider *reactiveProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request
}
}
func TestRunConnectErrorCompactionRecordsReplacementPlan(t *testing.T) {
provider := &reactiveProvider{
connectError: true,
bigText: strings.Repeat("b", 6000),
finalText: "recovered",
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("connect-compaction", "run-1", "test")
var contextPlans []ContextBreakdown
result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("z", 6000), provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModeUnsafe,
ContextWindow: 10_000_000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Trace: recorder,
OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) {
contextPlans = append(contextPlans, breakdown)
},
})
if err != nil || result.FinalAnswer != "recovered" {
t.Fatalf("connect-error compaction failed: result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
}
if len(contextPlans) != 3 || contextPlans[2].MessageTokens >= contextPlans[1].MessageTokens {
t.Fatalf("replacement request context not reported: %#v", contextPlans)
}
gotTrace := recorder.Finish()
if len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes) != 4 || gotTrace.PrefixHashes[3].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" {
t.Fatalf("replacement request trace not recorded: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
}
}
func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
provider := &reactiveProvider{
bigText: strings.Repeat("b", 6000),
@@ -527,8 +465,6 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
// bloats the history.
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("reactive-compaction", "run-1", "test")
var contextPlans []ContextBreakdown
// ContextWindow large enough that proactive compaction never triggers, so
// only the reactive path can save the run.
@@ -537,10 +473,6 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
PermissionMode: PermissionModeUnsafe,
ContextWindow: 10_000_000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Trace: recorder,
OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) {
contextPlans = append(contextPlans, breakdown)
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected reactive compaction to recover the run, got error: %v", err)
@@ -551,25 +483,6 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
if provider.summarizeCalls == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected reactive compaction to invoke the summarizer")
}
if len(contextPlans) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("main request context callbacks = %d, want initial turns plus compacted retry", len(contextPlans))
}
if contextPlans[2].MessageTokens >= contextPlans[1].MessageTokens {
t.Fatalf("retry context was not updated after compaction: before=%d after=%d", contextPlans[1].MessageTokens, contextPlans[2].MessageTokens)
}
gotTrace := recorder.Finish()
if len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("prefix evidence count = %d, want two turns, compaction, and retry: %#v", len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes), gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
}
if gotTrace.PrefixHashes[0].InvalidationReason != "initial" ||
gotTrace.PrefixHashes[1].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" ||
gotTrace.PrefixHashes[2].InvalidationReason != "initial" ||
gotTrace.PrefixHashes[3].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected request-specific invalidation evidence: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
}
if gotTrace.PrefixHashes[2].CompletePrefixHash == gotTrace.PrefixHashes[1].CompletePrefixHash {
t.Fatalf("compaction fingerprint reused the main request prefix: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
}
}
// midStreamReactiveProvider forwards some text BEFORE surfacing a context-limit
-36
View File
@@ -23,24 +23,6 @@ type ContextBreakdown struct {
TotalTokens int // SystemTokens + ToolTokens + MessageTokens
ContextWindow int // model context window; 0 when unknown
UsedFraction float64 // TotalTokens / ContextWindow; 0 when window unknown
// Blocks explain why each model-visible category is present without exposing
// its content. The planner currently preserves all three categories.
Blocks []ContextBlock
// CompletePrefixHash identifies the provider-visible system+tool prefix.
CompletePrefixHash string
// PrefixInvalidationReason is "initial", "unchanged", or a stable comma-
// separated list of changed prefix categories.
PrefixInvalidationReason string
}
// ContextBlock is content-free evidence for one model-visible context category.
type ContextBlock struct {
Kind string
Tokens int
CacheClass string
Authority string
Recoverable bool
Reason string
}
// MeasureContext estimates the per-category token footprint of a request: the
@@ -59,24 +41,6 @@ func MeasureContext(messages []zeroruntime.Message, tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefi
ContextWindow: contextWindow,
}
breakdown.TotalTokens = breakdown.SystemTokens + breakdown.ToolTokens + breakdown.MessageTokens
if breakdown.SystemTokens > 0 {
breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
Kind: "system", Tokens: breakdown.SystemTokens, CacheClass: "stable_prefix",
Authority: "required", Reason: "instructions, workspace policy, and safety policy",
})
}
if breakdown.ToolTokens > 0 {
breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
Kind: "tools", Tokens: breakdown.ToolTokens, CacheClass: "stable_prefix",
Authority: "capability", Reason: "currently permitted and selected tool definitions",
})
}
if breakdown.MessageTokens > 0 {
breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
Kind: "conversation", Tokens: breakdown.MessageTokens, CacheClass: "dynamic_tail",
Authority: "transcript", Reason: "valid provider replay history and current task context",
})
}
if contextWindow > 0 {
breakdown.UsedFraction = float64(breakdown.TotalTokens) / float64(contextWindow)
}
@@ -32,9 +32,6 @@ func TestMeasureContextSplitsByCategory(t *testing.T) {
if breakdown.UsedFraction != wantFraction {
t.Fatalf("UsedFraction = %v, want %v", breakdown.UsedFraction, wantFraction)
}
if len(breakdown.Blocks) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("Blocks = %#v, want system/tools/conversation", breakdown.Blocks)
}
}
func TestMeasureContextUnknownWindowHasZeroFraction(t *testing.T) {
-189
View File
@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type contextPlannerConfig struct {
contextWindow int
promptCacheKey string
serviceTier string
promptParts systemPromptParts
}
// contextPlanner is the single seam for constructing model-visible requests.
// Planning is deterministic and does not retrieve content, execute tools, or
// change permissions. The initial implementation deliberately preserves every
// message and tool definition while making composition and cache drift
// inspectable; later selection policies must continue to cross this seam.
type contextPlanner struct {
config contextPlannerConfig
previousPrefix prefixFingerprint
hasPrevious bool
toolSnapshotKey string
toolSnapshot []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition
}
type contextPlan struct {
Request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
Breakdown ContextBreakdown
PrefixFingerprint prefixFingerprint
}
func newContextPlanner(config contextPlannerConfig) *contextPlanner {
return &contextPlanner{config: config}
}
// Plan returns a provider request snapshot plus content-free accounting.
// It intentionally performs no relevance filtering: preserving current model
// capability is the baseline contract for future planner policies.
func (planner *contextPlanner) Plan(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string) contextPlan {
return planner.plan(messages, toolDefs, reasoningEffort, planner.config.promptParts)
}
// planWithPromptParts plans a request whose stable system sections differ from
// the planner's configured main-run prompt, such as a compaction summary call.
func (planner *contextPlanner) planWithPromptParts(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string, parts systemPromptParts) contextPlan {
return planner.plan(messages, toolDefs, reasoningEffort, parts)
}
func (planner *contextPlanner) plan(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string, parts systemPromptParts) contextPlan {
requestMessages := copyMessages(messages)
requestSystemPrompt := leadingSystemContent(requestMessages)
if parts.prompt != requestSystemPrompt {
// Component boundaries from a different request would make the detailed
// invalidation reason misleading. Retain the exact request prefix and
// classify it conservatively as an unstructured system prompt instead.
parts = systemPromptParts{prompt: requestSystemPrompt}
}
fingerprint := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(parts, toolDefs))
request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: requestMessages,
Tools: planner.snapshotTools(toolDefs, fingerprint),
ReasoningEffort: reasoningEffort,
ServiceTier: planner.config.serviceTier,
PromptCacheKey: planner.config.promptCacheKey,
}
breakdown := MeasureContext(request.Messages, request.Tools, planner.config.contextWindow)
breakdown.CompletePrefixHash = fingerprint.CompletePrefixHash
var previous *prefixFingerprint
if planner.hasPrevious {
previous = &planner.previousPrefix
}
breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason = explainPrefixChange(previous, fingerprint)
planner.previousPrefix = fingerprint
planner.hasPrevious = true
return contextPlan{
Request: request,
Breakdown: breakdown,
PrefixFingerprint: fingerprint,
}
}
// snapshotTools freezes provider-visible tool definitions when their semantic
// fingerprint changes. Stable turns reuse the frozen schemas instead of
// recursively cloning every map and slice for every request.
func (planner *contextPlanner) snapshotTools(toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, fingerprint prefixFingerprint) []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
key := fingerprint.ToolsHash + "\x00" + fingerprint.SchemaHash
if planner.toolSnapshotKey != key {
planner.toolSnapshot = copyToolDefinitions(toolDefs)
planner.toolSnapshotKey = key
}
return planner.toolSnapshot
}
func copyToolDefinitions(toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
if toolDefs == nil {
return nil
}
copied := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, len(toolDefs))
for index, definition := range toolDefs {
copied[index] = definition
copied[index].Parameters = copySchemaMap(definition.Parameters)
if definition.Format != nil {
format := *definition.Format
copied[index].Format = &format
}
}
return copied
}
func copySchemaMap(schema map[string]any) map[string]any {
if schema == nil {
return nil
}
copied := make(map[string]any, len(schema))
for key, value := range schema {
copied[key] = copySchemaValue(value)
}
return copied
}
func copySchemaValue(value any) any {
switch typed := value.(type) {
case map[string]any:
return copySchemaMap(typed)
case []any:
copied := make([]any, len(typed))
for index, item := range typed {
copied[index] = copySchemaValue(item)
}
return copied
case []string:
return append([]string(nil), typed...)
default:
return value
}
}
func leadingSystemContent(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
contents := make([]string, 0, 1)
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem {
break
}
contents = append(contents, message.Content)
}
return strings.Join(contents, "\n\n")
}
func explainPrefixChange(previous *prefixFingerprint, current prefixFingerprint) string {
if previous == nil {
return "initial"
}
if previous.CompletePrefixHash == current.CompletePrefixHash {
return "unchanged"
}
reasons := make([]string, 0, 3)
if previous.SystemPromptHash != current.SystemPromptHash {
parts := make([]string, 0, 4)
if previous.BaseInstructionsHash != current.BaseInstructionsHash {
parts = append(parts, "base_instructions")
}
if previous.ConfirmationPolicyHash != current.ConfirmationPolicyHash {
parts = append(parts, "confirmation_policy")
}
if previous.ProjectContextHash != current.ProjectContextHash {
parts = append(parts, "project_context")
}
if previous.SkillsHash != current.SkillsHash {
parts = append(parts, "skills")
}
if len(parts) == 0 {
parts = append(parts, "system_prompt")
}
reasons = append(reasons, parts...)
}
if previous.ToolsHash != current.ToolsHash {
reasons = append(reasons, "tools")
}
if previous.SchemaHash != current.SchemaHash {
reasons = append(reasons, "schema")
}
if len(reasons) == 0 {
return "prefix_changed"
}
return strings.Join(reasons, ",")
}
-190
View File
@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"reflect"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestContextPlannerPreservesProviderRequest(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "inspect this", Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: "image/png", Data: []byte{1, 2, 3}}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "call-1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"main.go"}`}}, Reasoning: []zeroruntime.ReasoningBlock{{Provider: "test", Type: "thinking", Signature: "sig"}}},
}
toolDefs := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
Name: "read_file", Description: "Read a file",
Format: &zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Type: "grammar", Syntax: "lark", Definition: "start: PATH"},
Parameters: map[string]any{
"type": "object",
"required": []string{"path"},
"properties": map[string]any{"path": map[string]any{"type": "string"}},
"anyOf": []any{map[string]any{"type": "object"}},
},
}}
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{
contextWindow: 128_000,
promptCacheKey: "session-1",
serviceTier: "priority",
promptParts: systemPromptParts{prompt: "system", baseInstructions: "system"},
})
plan := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
want := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: toolDefs,
ReasoningEffort: "medium",
ServiceTier: "priority",
PromptCacheKey: "session-1",
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(plan.Request, want) {
t.Fatalf("planned request changed provider input:\n got: %#v\nwant: %#v", plan.Request, want)
}
stable := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
if &stable.Request.Tools[0] != &plan.Request.Tools[0] {
t.Fatal("stable tool fingerprint rebuilt the immutable schema snapshot")
}
// A plan owns its request snapshot; later caller mutation cannot change its
// messages or its recursively nested tool schema.
messages[1].Content = "changed"
messages[1].Images[0].Data[0] = 9
toolDefs[0].Name = "changed_tool"
toolDefs[0].Parameters["required"].([]string)[0] = "other"
toolDefs[0].Parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)["path"].(map[string]any)["type"] = "integer"
toolDefs[0].Parameters["anyOf"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["type"] = "array"
toolDefs[0].Format.Definition = "changed"
if plan.Request.Messages[1].Content != "inspect this" || plan.Request.Messages[1].Images[0].Data[0] != 1 {
t.Fatalf("planned messages alias caller state: %#v", plan.Request.Messages[1])
}
if plan.Request.Tools[0].Name != "read_file" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Format == nil || plan.Request.Tools[0].Format.Definition != "start: PATH" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["required"].([]string)[0] != "path" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)["path"].(map[string]any)["type"] != "string" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["anyOf"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["type"] != "object" {
t.Fatalf("planned tools alias caller state: %#v", plan.Request.Tools[0])
}
next := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
if next.PrefixFingerprint == plan.PrefixFingerprint || next.Request.Tools[0].Name != "changed_tool" {
t.Fatalf("changed tool schema did not refresh snapshot: %#v", next)
}
if plan.Request.Tools[0].Name != "read_file" {
t.Fatalf("refresh mutated earlier request: %#v", plan.Request.Tools[0])
}
}
func TestContextPlannerReportsInspectableBlocks(t *testing.T) {
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{contextWindow: 100_000})
plan := planner.Plan([]zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: filler(400)},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: filler(200)},
}, []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Description: "Read a file"}}, "")
if plan.Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason != "initial" || plan.Breakdown.CompletePrefixHash == "" {
t.Fatalf("prefix evidence = %#v", plan.Breakdown)
}
if len(plan.Breakdown.Blocks) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("blocks = %#v, want system/tools/conversation", plan.Breakdown.Blocks)
}
wantKinds := []string{"system", "tools", "conversation"}
total := 0
for index, block := range plan.Breakdown.Blocks {
if block.Kind != wantKinds[index] || block.Tokens <= 0 || block.Reason == "" || block.Authority == "" || block.CacheClass == "" {
t.Fatalf("block %d = %#v", index, block)
}
total += block.Tokens
}
if total != plan.Breakdown.TotalTokens {
t.Fatalf("block tokens = %d, want total %d", total, plan.Breakdown.TotalTokens)
}
}
func TestContextPlannerFingerprintsActualRequestSystemPrompt(t *testing.T) {
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{promptParts: systemPromptParts{
prompt: "configured system", baseInstructions: "configured system",
}})
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "request-specific system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "task"},
}
plan := planner.Plan(messages, nil, "")
want := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(
systemPromptParts{prompt: "request-specific system"}, nil,
))
if plan.PrefixFingerprint != want {
t.Fatalf("fingerprint describes configured prompt instead of request:\n got: %#v\nwant: %#v", plan.PrefixFingerprint, want)
}
}
func TestContextPlannerExplainsPrefixInvalidation(t *testing.T) {
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{promptParts: systemPromptParts{
prompt: "system", baseInstructions: "base", projectContext: "project",
}})
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"}, {Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "task"}}
tools := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Description: "Read", Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object"}}}
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "initial" {
t.Fatalf("first reason = %q, want initial", got)
}
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "unchanged" {
t.Fatalf("stable reason = %q, want unchanged", got)
}
tools[0].Description = "Read an exact file"
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "tools" {
t.Fatalf("tool reason = %q, want tools", got)
}
tools[0].Parameters["required"] = []any{"path"}
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "schema" {
t.Fatalf("schema reason = %q, want schema", got)
}
planner.config.promptParts.prompt = "system with changed project"
planner.config.promptParts.projectContext = "changed project"
messages[0].Content = "system with changed project"
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "project_context" {
t.Fatalf("project reason = %q, want project_context", got)
}
}
func TestExplainPrefixChangeNamesEveryChangedComponent(t *testing.T) {
baseline := prefixFingerprint{
SystemPromptHash: "system",
BaseInstructionsHash: "base",
ConfirmationPolicyHash: "policy",
ProjectContextHash: "project",
SkillsHash: "skills",
ToolsHash: "tools",
SchemaHash: "schema",
CompletePrefixHash: "complete",
}
tests := []struct {
name string
mutate func(*prefixFingerprint)
want string
}{
{name: "base instructions", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
value.SystemPromptHash, value.BaseInstructionsHash = "changed", "changed"
}, want: "base_instructions"},
{name: "confirmation policy", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
value.SystemPromptHash, value.ConfirmationPolicyHash = "changed", "changed"
}, want: "confirmation_policy"},
{name: "project context", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
value.SystemPromptHash, value.ProjectContextHash = "changed", "changed"
}, want: "project_context"},
{name: "skills", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.SystemPromptHash, value.SkillsHash = "changed", "changed" }, want: "skills"},
{name: "unclassified system prompt", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.SystemPromptHash = "changed" }, want: "system_prompt"},
{name: "tools and schema", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.ToolsHash, value.SchemaHash = "changed", "changed" }, want: "tools,schema"},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
current := baseline
test.mutate(&current)
current.CompletePrefixHash = "changed"
if got := explainPrefixChange(&baseline, current); got != test.want {
t.Fatalf("reason = %q, want %q", got, test.want)
}
})
}
}
-95
View File
@@ -797,98 +797,3 @@ func TestDisabledToolSearchFallsBackToEager(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("deferred tool must be callable under eager fallback, got status=%s output=%q", result.Status, result.Output)
}
}
// fakeDeferredMutatorTool is a deferred-eligible tool with mutating Safety
// (SideEffectWrite), standing in for a real write/mutator MCP tool that would
// be hidden behind tool_search once deferral activates.
type fakeDeferredMutatorTool struct{ name string }
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Name() string { return t.name }
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Description() string { return "mutates the workspace, deferred" }
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
}
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "mutates"}
}
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "mutated"}
}
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Deferred() bool { return true }
// TestPlanModeToolSearchNeverLeaksDeferredMutatorSchema guards the concern
// raised in PR #642 review (jatmn, P2): that tool_search filters deferred
// candidates only by EnabledTools/DisabledTools, not by plan-mode visibility,
// so a plan-mode model could call `tool_search select:<deferred write tool>`
// and receive that tool's full schema even though a direct call to it is
// correctly denied the following turn.
//
// tool_search's own Safety is SideEffectNone, and ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode (the
// same gate executeToolCall uses to deny a direct call) requires
// SideEffect==Read to advertise a tool in plan mode. That means tool_search
// itself is never advertised, never activates deferral (loaderUsable in
// partitionToolsCached requires ToolAdvertised(loader, permissionMode)), and
// is denied at dispatch like any other hidden tool if a stale/adversarial
// call reaches it anyway — so a deferred mutator's schema can never reach the
// model through tool_search while in plan mode. This test pins that
// end-to-end: tool_search is absent from the advertised tool list, and a
// forced call to it is denied before rendering any tool schema.
func TestPlanModeToolSearchNeverLeaksDeferredMutatorSchema(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(fakeDeferredMutatorTool{name: "mcp__srv__mutate"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredMutatorTool{name: "mcp__srv__mutate2"})
registry.Register(tools.NewToolSearchTool(registry))
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{ // turn 1: force a call to tool_search even though it should not be advertised.
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: tools.ToolSearchToolName},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"query":"select:mcp__srv__mutate"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{ // turn 2: final answer.
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
DeferThreshold: 2, // 2 deferred mutators registered => eligible for deferral.
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// tool_search (and the deferred mutators) must not be advertised in plan
// mode's turn 1 tool list at all.
for _, def := range provider.requests[0].Tools {
if def.Name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
t.Fatalf("plan mode must not advertise tool_search, got %#v", provider.requests[0].Tools)
}
if def.Name == "mcp__srv__mutate" || def.Name == "mcp__srv__mutate2" {
t.Fatalf("plan mode must not advertise a deferred mutator, got %#v", provider.requests[0].Tools)
}
}
// The forced call must be denied outright, never a loaded-schema result:
// the tool result must not mention the mutator's name or carry a
// load_tools signal.
var toolMessage string
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
toolMessage = message.Content
break
}
}
if !strings.Contains(toolMessage, "not available in plan mode") {
t.Fatalf("expected tool_search call denied in plan mode, got %q", toolMessage)
}
if strings.Contains(toolMessage, "mcp__srv__mutate") {
t.Fatalf("denial must not leak the deferred mutator's name/schema, got %q", toolMessage)
}
}
+6 -17
View File
@@ -144,10 +144,9 @@ func TestRunSwitchesProviderOnEscalationRequest(t *testing.T) {
var switchedTo string
switchCount := 0
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", firstProvider, Options{
Registry: registry,
Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5",
ServiceTier: "priority",
MaxTurns: 4,
Registry: registry,
Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5",
MaxTurns: 4,
ModelSwitcher: func(_ context.Context, modelID string) (Provider, error) {
switchCount++
switchedTo = modelID
@@ -168,15 +167,9 @@ func TestRunSwitchesProviderOnEscalationRequest(t *testing.T) {
if len(firstProvider.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected first provider to handle exactly the escalation turn, got %d requests", len(firstProvider.requests))
}
if got := firstProvider.requests[0].ServiceTier; got != "priority" {
t.Fatalf("initial request service tier = %q, want priority", got)
}
if len(secondProvider.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected second provider to handle the post-switch turn, got %d requests", len(secondProvider.requests))
}
if got := secondProvider.requests[0].ServiceTier; got != "" {
t.Fatalf("post-switch request retained service tier %q", got)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "answered on the upgraded model" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer from the swapped provider, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
@@ -218,10 +211,9 @@ func TestRunEscalationSwitcherErrorIsNonFatal(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: escalateThenAnswerTurns("recovered")}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5",
ServiceTier: "priority",
MaxTurns: 4,
Registry: registry,
Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5",
MaxTurns: 4,
ModelSwitcher: func(_ context.Context, _ string) (Provider, error) {
return nil, errors.New("provider build blew up")
},
@@ -233,9 +225,6 @@ func TestRunEscalationSwitcherErrorIsNonFatal(t *testing.T) {
if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected the run to continue on the original provider, got %d requests", len(provider.requests))
}
if got := provider.requests[1].ServiceTier; got != "priority" {
t.Fatalf("failed-switch request service tier = %q, want priority", got)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "recovered" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer after non-fatal switch error, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
-378
View File
@@ -1,378 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type customApplyPatchTool struct {
calls int
}
type fixedPathScope struct {
roots []string
}
func (scope fixedPathScope) Roots() []string {
return append([]string(nil), scope.roots...)
}
func newFixedPathScope(t *testing.T, roots ...string) fixedPathScope {
t.Helper()
resolved := make([]string, 0, len(roots))
for _, root := range roots {
absolute, err := filepath.Abs(root)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Abs(%q): %v", root, err)
}
if physical, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absolute); err == nil {
absolute = physical
}
resolved = append(resolved, absolute)
}
return fixedPathScope{roots: resolved}
}
func (*customApplyPatchTool) Name() string { return "apply_patch" }
func (*customApplyPatchTool) Description() string { return "custom JSON tool" }
func (*customApplyPatchTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"value": {Type: "string"}}}
}
func (*customApplyPatchTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead}
}
func (tool *customApplyPatchTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
tool.calls++
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchUsesExistingToolExecutionPath(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil))
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: hello.txt\n+hello\n*** End Patch\n"
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1",
Name: "apply_patch",
Arguments: patch,
Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: root, FileTracker: tools.NewFileTracker()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("freeform apply_patch status = %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
content, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, "hello.txt"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read patched file: %v", err)
}
if string(content) != "hello\n" {
t.Fatalf("patched content = %q, want hello newline", content)
}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchSupportsGrantedExtraRoot(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
extra := t.TempDir()
scope, err := sandbox.NewScope(root, []string{extra})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewScope: %v", err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, scope))
target := filepath.Join(extra, "hello.txt")
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: " + target + "\n+hello\n*** End Patch\n"
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: patch, Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: root, FileTracker: tools.NewFileTracker()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("freeform extra-root apply_patch status = %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
content, err := os.ReadFile(target)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read extra-root patched file: %v", err)
}
if string(content) != "hello\n" {
t.Fatalf("patched content = %q, want hello newline", content)
}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchRejectsMixedWorkspaceAndExtraRoots(t *testing.T) {
for _, extraHasMatchingPath := range []bool{false, true} {
name := "extra target missing"
if extraHasMatchingPath {
name = "extra target exists"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
workspace := t.TempDir()
extra := t.TempDir()
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(workspace, "src"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
workspaceTarget := filepath.Join(workspace, "src", "a.go")
if err := os.WriteFile(workspaceTarget, []byte("old\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
extraTarget := filepath.Join(extra, "src", "a.go")
if extraHasMatchingPath {
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(extraTarget), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(extraTarget, []byte("old\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
scope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspace, []string{extra})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(workspace, scope))
extraCreated := filepath.Join(extra, "b.go")
patch := strings.Join([]string{
"*** Begin Patch",
"*** Update File: src/a.go",
"@@",
"-old",
"+new",
"*** Add File: " + extraCreated,
"+extra",
"*** End Patch",
}, "\n")
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: patch, Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: workspace, FileTracker: tools.NewFileTracker()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError || !strings.Contains(result.Output, "mixes workspace-relative paths with an extra write root") {
t.Fatalf("mixed-root patch result = %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
if content, err := os.ReadFile(workspaceTarget); err != nil || string(content) != "old\n" {
t.Fatalf("workspace target changed: content=%q err=%v", content, err)
}
if extraHasMatchingPath {
if content, err := os.ReadFile(extraTarget); err != nil || string(content) != "old\n" {
t.Fatalf("extra-root target changed: content=%q err=%v", content, err)
}
}
if _, err := os.Stat(extraCreated); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("mixed-root patch created extra file: %v", err)
}
})
}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchAcceptsOneSemanticRoot(t *testing.T) {
for _, test := range []struct {
name string
useExtraRoot bool
}{
{name: "workspace"},
{name: "extra root", useExtraRoot: true},
} {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
workspace := t.TempDir()
extra := t.TempDir()
scope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspace, []string{extra})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
root := workspace
if test.useExtraRoot {
root = extra
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(root, "src"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
target := filepath.Join(root, "src", "a.go")
if err := os.WriteFile(target, []byte("old\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
updatePath := target
if !test.useExtraRoot {
updatePath = filepath.Join("src", "a.go")
}
created := filepath.Join(root, "b.go")
patch := strings.Join([]string{
"*** Begin Patch",
"*** Update File: " + updatePath,
"@@",
"-old",
"+new",
"*** Add File: " + created,
"+created",
"*** End Patch",
}, "\n")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(workspace, scope))
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: patch, Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: workspace, FileTracker: tools.NewFileTracker()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("single-root patch status = %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
if content, err := os.ReadFile(target); err != nil || string(content) != "new\n" {
t.Fatalf("updated content=%q err=%v", content, err)
}
if content, err := os.ReadFile(created); err != nil || string(content) != "created\n" {
t.Fatalf("created content=%q err=%v", content, err)
}
})
}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchRejectsAbsolutePathOutsideGrantedRoots(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
granted := t.TempDir()
outside := t.TempDir()
scope := newFixedPathScope(t, root, granted)
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, scope))
target := filepath.Join(outside, "blocked.txt")
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: " + target + "\n+blocked\n*** End Patch\n"
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: patch, Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: root})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("ungranted absolute patch status = %s, want error: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(target); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("ungranted absolute patch created target: %v", err)
}
}
func TestPreparedFreeformPatchRejectsIntermediateSymlinkSwap(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("creating directory symlinks requires privileges on Windows")
}
root := t.TempDir()
extra := t.TempDir()
outside := t.TempDir()
intermediate := filepath.Join(extra, "nested")
if err := os.Mkdir(intermediate, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Mkdir: %v", err)
}
scope := newFixedPathScope(t, root, extra)
tool := tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, scope)
target := filepath.Join(intermediate, "blocked.txt")
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: " + target + "\n+blocked\n*** End Patch\n"
args, err := tools.PrepareFreeformApplyPatchArguments(tool, patch)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("PrepareFreeformApplyPatchArguments: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Remove(intermediate); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Remove intermediate: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Symlink(outside, intermediate); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Symlink: %v", err)
}
result := tool.Run(context.Background(), args)
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("symlink-swapped patch status = %s, want error: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(outside, "blocked.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("symlink-swapped patch wrote outside root: %v", err)
}
}
func TestUnknownFreeformToolFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), tools.NewRegistry(), zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "unknown", Arguments: "raw", Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("unknown freeform status = %s, want error", result.Status)
}
}
func TestCustomApplyPatchCannotUseFreeformContract(t *testing.T) {
custom := &customApplyPatchTool{}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(custom)
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: "raw patch", Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError || !strings.Contains(result.Output, "Unsupported freeform tool call") {
t.Fatalf("custom freeform apply_patch result = %#v, want unsupported error", result)
}
if custom.calls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("custom apply_patch executed %d times", custom.calls)
}
}
func TestDeniedFreeformApplyPatchDoesNotWrite(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil))
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: denied.txt\n+must not exist\n*** End Patch\n"
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1",
Name: "apply_patch",
Arguments: patch,
Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeAsk, Options{
Cwd: root,
OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "test denial"}, nil
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("denied freeform status = %s, want error", result.Status)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "denied.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("denied freeform patch changed the workspace: %v", err)
}
}
func TestHistorySafeToolCallsPreservesRawFreeformArguments(t *testing.T) {
raw := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: internal/main.go\n@@\n-old\n+new\n*** End Patch\n"
safe := historySafeToolCalls([]ToolCall{{
ID: "call-1", ProviderCallID: "provider-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: raw, Freeform: true,
}})
if len(safe) != 1 || safe[0].Arguments != raw || safe[0].ProviderCallID != "provider-1" || !safe[0].Freeform {
t.Fatalf("freeform history changed raw call: %#v", safe)
}
}
func TestAbortedToolResultPreservesProviderCallID(t *testing.T) {
messages := appendAbortedToolResults(nil, []ToolCall{{
ID: "call-1", ProviderCallID: "provider-1", Name: "read_file",
}})
if len(messages) != 1 || messages[0].ToolCallID != "call-1" || messages[0].ToolCallProviderID != "provider-1" || !messages[0].IsError {
t.Fatalf("aborted tool result lost provider identity: %#v", messages)
}
}
+9 -8
View File
@@ -33,11 +33,11 @@ const (
// knows before spending more tool turns.
toolOnlyProgressReminderAt = 6
// planReminderTurn and planReminderToolThreshold keep bounded implementation
// work plan-free while still nudging a genuinely sustained run that has not
// established any structured progress. Both thresholds must be met.
planReminderTurn = 7
planReminderToolThreshold = 7
// planReminderTurn is the turn (1-based) by the end of which a multi-step
// task should have called update_plan; if it hasn't, a one-time reminder is
// injected. Set to 3 (not 2) so short, legitimate two-step tasks finish
// without a spurious planning nag.
planReminderTurn = 3
// planToolName is the planning tool the loop watches for by name.
planToolName = "update_plan"
@@ -591,12 +591,13 @@ func (state *guardState) planReminder(turn int) string {
return planStaleReminder(state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate)
}
// NOT-CALLED reminder: once both the turn and tool-call thresholds are met,
// sustained work should have called update_plan. One-shot for the whole run.
// NOT-CALLED reminder: by the end of planReminderTurn the model should have
// called update_plan if it's doing a multi-step task (>=1 other tool call).
// One-shot for the whole run.
if !state.notCalledReminderSent &&
!state.planEverCalled &&
turn >= planReminderTurn &&
state.totalToolCalls >= planReminderToolThreshold {
state.totalToolCalls >= 1 {
state.notCalledReminderSent = true
return planNotCalledReminder()
}
+8 -43
View File
@@ -257,16 +257,19 @@ func TestRunDoesNotCountDroppedToolCallTurnsAsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRunInjectsPlanNotCalledReminderForMultiStepTask(t *testing.T) {
const expectedThreshold = 7
if planReminderToolThreshold != expectedThreshold {
t.Fatalf("plan reminder tool threshold = %d, want %d", planReminderToolThreshold, expectedThreshold)
}
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{turns: append(repeatedReadTurns(expectedThreshold), textTurn("done"))}
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
toolTurn("call-1", "read_file", `{"path":"notes.txt"}`), // turn 1: other tool call
toolTurn("call-2", "read_file", `{"path":"notes.txt"}`), // turn 2: still no update_plan
toolTurn("call-3", "read_file", `{"path":"notes.txt"}`), // turn 3: reminder fires here
textTurn("done"),
},
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
@@ -284,44 +287,6 @@ func TestRunInjectsPlanNotCalledReminderForMultiStepTask(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunDoesNotInjectPlanReminderForBoundedToolSequence(t *testing.T) {
const expectedThreshold = 7
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{turns: append(repeatedReadTurns(expectedThreshold-1), textTurn("done"))}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{Registry: registry, MaxTurns: 12})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if count := countUserMessagesContaining(result.Messages, planNotCalledReminderMarker); count != 0 {
t.Fatalf("bounded tool sequence must not draw a plan reminder, got %d", count)
}
}
func TestPlanReminderWaitsForTurnThresholdAfterEnoughToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
state := guardState{totalToolCalls: 7}
if got := state.planReminder(6); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("planReminder(6) = %q, want no reminder before turn threshold", got)
}
if state.notCalledReminderSent {
t.Fatal("early turn marked the not-called reminder as sent")
}
}
func repeatedReadTurns(count int) [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent {
turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, count)
for range count {
turns = append(turns, toolTurn("call", "read_file", `{"path":"notes.txt"}`))
}
return turns
}
func TestRunDoesNotInjectPlanReminderForTrivialTask(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
+123 -429
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/redaction"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/streamjson"
@@ -26,18 +25,14 @@ const maxTurnsAnswer = "Agent reached maximum number of turns without a final an
const maxTurnsFinalAnswerPrompt = "You have reached the tool-turn limit. Do not call tools. Give a concise final answer now: summarize what you completed, what you found, and any remaining blockers."
// maxStreamStallRetries bounds how many times a turn that timed out (idle/stall)
// OR hit a mid-stream transport abort (#973) with no answer text yet is re-issued
// on a fresh connection before giving up. Incomplete tool-call previews are
// allowed through the gate (they are never dispatched before the error return).
// The safety claim is only that visible answer prose is not duplicated on retry —
// not that every partial stream shape is excluded. Covers a stalled/dead pooled
// connection or a socket abort before tool dispatch.
// WITH NO OUTPUT yet is re-issued on a fresh connection before giving up. Only
// the no-output case is retried (a partial turn would duplicate), so this is a
// safe recovery for a stalled/dead pooled connection.
//
// Set to 1 (not 2): each attempt can itself idle for the full stream timeout
// (~5min) before the stall is even detected, so 2 retries left an interactive
// session frozen for ~15min. One retry keeps the common single-hiccup recovery
// while bounding the worst case to ~2× the idle timeout. Mid-stream transport
// aborts share this bound (do not raise it for #973).
// while bounding the worst case to ~2× the idle timeout.
const maxStreamStallRetries = 1
const (
@@ -45,15 +40,7 @@ const (
toolResultControlSpecReview = "spec_review_required"
)
// ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled ends a run because the caller cancelled a
// permission prompt, rather than because anything failed.
//
// EXPORTED FOR THE SURFACES. A cancel is a normal ending and each surface says
// so its own way — the TUI unwinds, and ACP has a "cancelled" stop reason for
// exactly this. While it was unexported ACP could not distinguish it from a
// fault and reported it as an internal error, so declining a tool looked like
// the agent crashing.
var ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled = errors.New("permission approval cancelled")
var errPermissionApprovalCanceled = errors.New("permission approval cancelled")
// isImageRejectionError reports whether err is a provider 400 that rejects
// image/multimodal content. This is checked BEFORE the compaction-retry path
@@ -146,7 +133,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
}
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterInputTokens, int64(usage.InputTokens))
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterCachedInputTokens, int64(usage.CachedInputTokens))
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterCacheWriteTokens, int64(usage.CacheWriteTokens))
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterOutputTokens, int64(usage.OutputTokens))
}
}
@@ -197,23 +183,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
defer runPermissions.cleanup()
promptParts := buildSystemPromptParts(options)
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{
contextWindow: options.ContextWindow,
promptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
serviceTier: options.ServiceTier,
promptParts: promptParts,
})
messages := zeroruntime.SeedMessagesWithImages(promptParts.prompt, prompt, options.Images)
guards := newGuardState()
task := newTaskState(prompt, options.Trace)
onPermission := options.OnPermission
options.OnPermission = func(event PermissionEvent) {
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPermission, permission: event})
if onPermission != nil {
onPermission(event)
}
}
compactor := newCompactionState(options, task)
defer func() {
// A final transcript comparison is observational. It records drift but
@@ -302,15 +275,42 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
exposed, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, toolDefCache)
toolPartitionSpan.End()
// Fingerprint the exact system prompt built at run start plus this turn's
// provider-visible tool definitions in their emitted order. Reusing the
// retained prompt parts avoids rebuilding workspace context while ensuring
// the trace describes the same bytes carried by the request.
if options.Trace != nil {
fp := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(promptParts, exposed))
options.Trace.EmitPrefixHash(trace.PrefixHash{
SystemPromptHash: fp.SystemPromptHash,
BaseInstructionsHash: fp.BaseInstructionsHash,
ConfirmationPolicyHash: fp.ConfirmationPolicyHash,
ProjectContextHash: fp.ProjectContextHash,
SkillsHash: fp.SkillsHash,
ToolsHash: fp.ToolsHash,
SchemaHash: fp.SchemaHash,
CompletePrefixHash: fp.CompletePrefixHash,
})
}
// PROACTIVE compaction: if the history is approaching the model's
// context window, summarize the oldest middle before building the
// request. A no-op when ContextWindow == 0 (compaction disabled).
compactionSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanCompaction)
messages = compactor.maybeCompact(ctx, provider, messages, exposed)
compactionSpan.End()
plan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
request := plan.Request
recordContextPlan(options, plan)
request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}
// Report the per-category context budget for this turn so a surface can
// show utilization. Opt-in: a no-op when OnContext is unset.
if options.OnContext != nil {
options.OnContext(MeasureContext(messages, request.Tools, options.ContextWindow))
}
// A transient upstream disconnect on the initial connect is retried with
// backoff (before any content is forwarded, so no OnText is duplicated);
@@ -335,9 +335,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// on registry+loaded, not on the messages, so they stay valid after
// compaction. Using the bare toolDefinitions here would route through an
// empty-loaded partition, re-hiding every already-loaded deferred tool.
retryPlan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
request = retryPlan.Request
recordContextPlan(options, retryPlan)
request = zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}
// Pre-content connect after a context-limit compaction: route through the
// reconnect helper so a transient upstream hiccup here doesn't fail the
// whole run and re-burn every token (AUDIT-L1).
@@ -379,11 +382,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
rec.StampFirstToken()
}
if onText != nil {
// Zero-length chunks are not committed answer prose; counting
// them would block an eligible mid-stream abort retry.
if s != "" {
forwardedVisibleText = true
}
forwardedVisibleText = true
onText(s)
}
}
@@ -425,9 +424,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// Reuse the SAME active-mode partition (exposed) from this turn rather
// than the bare toolDefinitions: exposed depends on registry+loaded (not
// the messages), so it stays valid after compaction.
retryPlan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
retryRequest := retryPlan.Request
recordContextPlan(options, retryPlan)
retryRequest := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}
retryStream, retryStreamErr := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, retryRequest, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
if retryStreamErr != nil {
return collected, retryStreamErr
@@ -459,14 +461,9 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, ctx.Err()
}
// A stream idle/stall timeout OR mid-stream transport abort (#973 — wsarecv /
// connection reset / unexpected EOF / connection closed / broken pipe) is
// safely re-issued when the turn committed NO answer text — no forwarded
// visible prose (forwardedVisibleText) and no collected final text
// (collected.Text). The abort gate matches midStreamAbortNeedles only, not
// the full shouldReconnect list: connect-phase timeouts and connection
// refused are NOT retried here (a slow healthy server must not cost a
// second prefill). This covers three cases:
// A stream idle/stall timeout is safely re-issued when the turn committed NO
// answer text — no forwarded visible prose (forwardedVisibleText) and no
// collected final text (collected.Text). This covers two cases:
// 1. Nothing streamed at all before the connection died (the original
// macOS stale-pooled-connection hang past the response-header timeout).
// 2. The model streamed transient reasoning and began a tool call (e.g. a
@@ -477,55 +474,34 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// re-render is transient previews, not duplicated answer text. This is
// why the gate no longer excludes collected.ToolCalls: an incomplete
// tool call from a timed-out stream is discard-and-retry, not output.
// 3. Mid-stream socket abort after connect succeeded (Windows WSAECONNABORTED /
// wsarecv, connection reset by peer). Same no-tool-executed safety: the
// error returns before tool dispatch, so a bounded retry is safe.
// A turn that forwarded real prose is NOT retried (it would duplicate visible
// answer text) and falls through to the error return below. Capped +
// exponential backoff, with a user-visible notice per attempt.
for attempt := 1; attempt <= maxStreamStallRetries &&
(isStreamTimeoutError(collected.Error) || isMidStreamTransportAbort(collected.Error)) &&
!forwardedVisibleText &&
isStreamTimeoutError(collected.Error) && !forwardedVisibleText &&
collected.Text == ""; attempt++ {
var notify reconnectNotifier
if isStreamTimeoutError(collected.Error) {
notify = stallRetryNoticeFor(options)
} else {
notify = reconnectNoticeFor(options)
// Count this post-connect reissue even when the replacement
// connect succeeds immediately. streamWithReconnect only
// increments reconnect_count after a failed connect attempt.
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterReconnectCount, 1)
}
if notify != nil {
if notify := stallRetryNoticeFor(options); notify != nil {
notify(attempt, maxStreamStallRetries)
}
if err := sleepWithContext(ctx, backoffFor(attempt)); err != nil {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, err
}
retryPlan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
retryRequest := retryPlan.Request
recordContextPlan(options, retryPlan)
retryRequest := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}
retryStream, retryErr := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, retryRequest, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
if retryErr != nil {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return result, ctx.Err()
}
return result, retryErr
}
stallGenSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanGeneration)
collected = zeroruntime.CollectStreamWithOptions(ctx, retryStream, forwardingOpts)
stallGenSpan.End()
}
// Recheck ctx after a retried CollectStream: helpers.go stores
// ctx.Err().Error() in collected.Error, and errors.New of that string
// drops the context.Canceled sentinel ACP branches on.
if ctx.Err() != nil {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, ctx.Err()
}
if collected.Error != "" {
// Route a reissued stream's non-stall error through the SAME recovery as
// the initial stream (image-rejection wrapping / context-limit compaction)
@@ -536,10 +512,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, stop
}
if ctx.Err() != nil {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, ctx.Err()
}
if collected.Error != "" {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, errors.New(collected.Error)
@@ -684,29 +656,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// between tool_results breaks strict provider replay) — same after-batch
// rationale as turnRequestedModel above.
var changedFilesThisBatch []string
// Images produced by tools this turn, held until every tool_result is
// recorded. They travel as user messages, and a user message between two
// tool_results breaks strict provider replay — Anthropic coalesces them
// into one user block list and requires the tool_result blocks first, so
// Images ride a following USER message rather than the tool result
// above. Every provider drops images on a tool-role message —
// Anthropic's tool_result content is a string, Gemini's is a
// functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image parts to the user role
// — so attaching them there would silently deliver nothing. A separate
// message also keeps the one-tool-result-per-tool-call pairing intact,
// which the providers validate. Vision-gate evaluation is deferred until
// after any model switch this turn resolves, so images can reach an
// escalated vision-capable model.
var toolResultsWithImages []ToolResult
buildToolImageMessages := func() []zeroruntime.Message {
var out []zeroruntime.Message
for _, tr := range toolResultsWithImages {
if imageMessage, ok := toolResultImageMessage(tr, options); ok {
out = append(out, imageMessage)
}
}
return out
}
// Parallel read-ahead state: results for calls[precomputedStart:precomputedEnd]
// executed concurrently, consumed strictly in order below.
var precomputed []precomputedToolResult
@@ -742,7 +691,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
}
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterToolCalls, 1)
recordOutputBudgetTrace(options.Trace, toolResult)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: call.Arguments, toolResult: toolResult})
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: toolResult})
if options.OnToolResult != nil {
options.OnToolResult(toolResult)
}
@@ -756,16 +705,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
turnRequestedModel = toolResult.RequestedModel
}
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
Content: toolResult.ModelOutput(),
ToolCallID: toolResult.ToolCallID,
ToolCallProviderID: call.ProviderCallID,
IsError: toolResult.Status == tools.StatusError,
ChangedFiles: append([]string(nil), toolResult.ChangedFiles...),
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
Content: toolResult.Output,
ToolCallID: toolResult.ToolCallID,
})
if len(toolResult.Images) > 0 {
toolResultsWithImages = append(toolResultsWithImages, toolResult)
}
// A tool may demand the run ABORT — a canceled/timed-out ask_user prompt
// returns context.Canceled rather than fabricating a headless answer. Stop
@@ -776,14 +719,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
}
if abortErr != nil {
messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
messages = append(messages, buildToolImageMessages()...)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, abortErr
}
if stopReason := stopReasonFromToolResult(toolResult); stopReason != "" {
messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
messages = append(messages, buildToolImageMessages()...)
result.FinalAnswer = toolResult.ModelOutput()
result.FinalAnswer = toolResult.Output
result.StopReason = stopReason
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, nil
@@ -796,7 +737,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// aren't fixed by reformatting the call, so a "match this schema" hint
// would misdirect the model toward JSON shape or blocked behavior.
retriableFailure := isRetriableToolError(toolResult)
outcome := guards.observeToolResult(call.Name, retriableFailure, toolResult.ModelOutput())
outcome := guards.observeToolResult(call.Name, retriableFailure, toolResult.Output)
posture.observeToolOutcome(outcome, toolResult)
if outcome.Stop {
// The assistant message advertised EVERY collected tool call, but
@@ -806,13 +747,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// messages stay valid for a strict provider replay (Anthropic
// rejects a tool_use with no answering tool_result).
messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
messages = append(messages, buildToolImageMessages()...)
result.FinalAnswer = toolFailureStopAnswer(call.Name, outcome.Count)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, nil
}
if outcome.InjectHint && failureHint == "" {
failureHint = toolFailureHint(call.Name, toolSchemaJSON(registry, call.Name), toolResult.ModelOutput())
failureHint = toolFailureHint(call.Name, toolSchemaJSON(registry, call.Name), toolResult.Output)
}
// Collect the files this successful mutating tool changed. Self-correct
@@ -887,37 +827,16 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
_ = session.Prewarm(ctx)
provider = sessionProvider{session: session}
options.Model = turnRequestedModel
// Service tiers are model capabilities. A successful escalation may
// target a model that does not support the tier selected before the
// switch, so let the destination use its default.
options.ServiceTier = ""
planner.config.serviceTier = ""
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterModelSwitches, 1)
// Re-derive the context window for the new model so compaction and
// the OnContext budget report track the model actually in force —
// without this a switch to a smaller-window model can overflow the
// target, and a switch to a larger one over-compacts. An unknown
// model (<= 0) keeps the original window. The compactor also
// re-resolves its dedicated summarizer against the new model.
window := 0
if options.ContextWindowFor != nil {
window = options.ContextWindowFor(turnRequestedModel)
}
if window > 0 {
options.ContextWindow = window
planner.config.contextWindow = window
}
compactor.switchModel(turnRequestedModel, window)
// KNOWN LIMITATION (deferred): the compactor's context-window budget
// is fixed at run start from options.ContextWindow and is NOT updated
// here, so a switch to a model with a different window keeps compacting
// against the original budget. Fixing it needs the switcher to also
// report the new window — out of scope for this change.
}
}
}
// Every tool_result, self-correct notice, and model-switch update for this
// turn is now in place; evaluate and append image messages against the
// effective (potentially escalated) model.
messages = append(messages, buildToolImageMessages()...)
toolResultsWithImages = nil
// A turn can mix valid tool calls with a dropped (nameless) one. The valid
// calls executed above; surface the dropped call too so it is never
// silently ignored just because the turn also did real work. This is
@@ -977,7 +896,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
})
}
finalExposed, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, toolDefCache)
if answer, finalMessages, finishReason := finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx, provider, planner, messages, finalExposed, options); strings.TrimSpace(answer) != "" {
if answer, finalMessages, finishReason := finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx, provider, messages, finalExposed, options); strings.TrimSpace(answer) != "" {
result.FinalAnswer = answer
result.FinishReason = finishReason
result.Messages = copyMessages(finalMessages)
@@ -1001,21 +920,6 @@ func recordOutputBudgetTrace(recorder *trace.Recorder, result ToolResult) {
if recorder == nil || result.Meta["output_budget_category"] == "" {
return
}
if result.Outcome.Finalized() {
diagnostics := result.Outcome.Diagnostics
recorder.EmitOutputBudget(trace.OutputBudgetEvent{
Tool: result.Name,
Category: diagnostics.Category,
OriginalBytes: diagnostics.OriginalBytes,
RetainedBytes: diagnostics.ModelBytes,
EstimatedOriginalTokens: diagnostics.EstimatedOriginalTokens,
EstimatedRetainedTokens: diagnostics.EstimatedModelTokens,
Truncated: diagnostics.Truncated,
Reason: diagnostics.Reason,
SpillCreated: result.Outcome.Artifact != nil,
})
return
}
parseInt := func(key string) int {
value, _ := strconv.Atoi(result.Meta[key])
return value
@@ -1034,32 +938,7 @@ func recordOutputBudgetTrace(recorder *trace.Recorder, result ToolResult) {
})
}
func recordContextPlan(options Options, plan contextPlan) {
recordContextPlanTrace(options.Trace, plan)
if options.OnContext != nil {
options.OnContext(plan.Breakdown)
}
}
func recordContextPlanTrace(recorder *trace.Recorder, plan contextPlan) {
if recorder == nil {
return
}
fingerprint := plan.PrefixFingerprint
recorder.EmitPrefixHash(trace.PrefixHash{
SystemPromptHash: fingerprint.SystemPromptHash,
BaseInstructionsHash: fingerprint.BaseInstructionsHash,
ConfirmationPolicyHash: fingerprint.ConfirmationPolicyHash,
ProjectContextHash: fingerprint.ProjectContextHash,
SkillsHash: fingerprint.SkillsHash,
ToolsHash: fingerprint.ToolsHash,
SchemaHash: fingerprint.SchemaHash,
CompletePrefixHash: fingerprint.CompletePrefixHash,
InvalidationReason: plan.Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason,
})
}
func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, planner *contextPlanner, messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, options Options) (string, []zeroruntime.Message, string) {
func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, options Options) (string, []zeroruntime.Message, string) {
finalMessages := copyMessages(messages)
finalMessages = append(finalMessages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
@@ -1068,9 +947,12 @@ func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, planner *c
// The max-turns final-answer call is a pre-content connect, often after a long
// autonomous/cron run — route it through the reconnect helper so a single
// transient hiccup doesn't drop the final summary (AUDIT-L1).
plan := planner.Plan(finalMessages, toolDefs, options.ReasoningEffort)
recordContextPlan(options, plan)
stream, err := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, plan.Request, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
stream, err := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(finalMessages),
Tools: toolDefs,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
if err != nil {
return "", messages, ""
}
@@ -1100,9 +982,6 @@ func historySafeToolCalls(calls []ToolCall) []ToolCall {
safe := make([]ToolCall, len(calls))
for i, call := range calls {
safe[i] = call
if call.Freeform {
continue
}
args := strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments)
switch {
case args == "":
@@ -1186,28 +1065,8 @@ func decodeToolArguments(arguments string, v any) error {
}
func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options) (ToolResult, error) {
tool, toolFound := registry.Get(call.Name)
args := map[string]any{}
if call.Freeform {
if !toolFound || !tools.IsBuiltInApplyPatch(tool) {
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: tools.StatusError,
Output: "Error: Unsupported freeform tool call for " + call.Name + ".",
}, nil
}
prepared, err := tools.PrepareFreeformApplyPatchArguments(tool, call.Arguments)
if err != nil {
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: tools.StatusError,
Output: "Error: Invalid freeform apply_patch input: " + err.Error(),
}, nil
}
args = prepared
} else if call.Arguments != "" {
if call.Arguments != "" {
if err := decodeToolArguments(call.Arguments, &args); err != nil {
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
@@ -1235,13 +1094,13 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
DenialReason: DenialFiltered,
}, nil
}
if (permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft || permissionMode == PermissionModePlan) && toolFound && !ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode) {
modeName := string(permissionMode)
tool, toolFound := registry.Get(call.Name)
if permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft && toolFound && !ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode) {
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: tools.StatusError,
Output: `Error: Tool "` + call.Name + `" is not available in ` + modeName + ` mode.`,
Output: `Error: Tool "` + call.Name + `" is not available in spec-draft mode.`,
DenialReason: DenialFiltered,
}, nil
}
@@ -1459,7 +1318,7 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
}
case PermissionDecisionCancel:
emitCanceledPermission(options, call, requestEvent, decisionReason)
return canceledPermissionResult(call, decisionReason, requestEvent), fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
return canceledPermissionResult(call, decisionReason, requestEvent), fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", errPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
default:
emitDeniedPermission(options, call, requestEvent, decisionReason)
return deniedPermissionResult(call, decisionReason, requestEvent), nil
@@ -1574,16 +1433,13 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.ModelOutput(),
Output: result.Output,
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: result.Meta,
Images: result.Images,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
FileDiffs: result.FileDiffs,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: result.HumanDisplay(),
Outcome: result.Outcome,
Display: result.Display,
LoadedTools: loadedToolsFromResult(result.Meta),
// A tool may signal a mid-run model escalation by carrying the target id
// in Meta["escalate_to_model"]. Lift it into the typed loop-level field;
@@ -1644,7 +1500,7 @@ func maybeRetryUnsandboxedAfterSandboxRestriction(ctx context.Context, registry
case PermissionDecisionCancel:
emitCanceledPermission(options, call, requestEvent, reason)
canceled := canceledPermissionResult(call, reason, requestEvent)
return result, &canceled, true, decision.Action, reason, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
return result, &canceled, true, decision.Action, reason, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", errPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
default:
emitDeniedPermission(options, call, requestEvent, reason)
denied := deniedPermissionResult(call, reason, requestEvent)
@@ -1692,7 +1548,7 @@ func maybeRetryWithNetworkAfterSandboxDenial(ctx context.Context, registry *tool
case PermissionDecisionCancel:
emitCanceledPermission(options, call, requestEvent, reason)
canceled := canceledPermissionResult(call, reason, requestEvent)
return result, &canceled, true, decision.Action, reason, fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
return result, &canceled, true, decision.Action, reason, fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", errPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
default:
emitDeniedPermission(options, call, requestEvent, reason)
denied := deniedPermissionResult(call, reason, requestEvent)
@@ -1887,10 +1743,6 @@ func runToolForUnsandboxedRetry(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, n
}
func toolResultFromPrePermissionReject(call ToolCall, result tools.Result) ToolResult {
// PrePermissionRejecter runs before Registry.RunWithOptions, so it must
// explicitly cross the same transcript/redaction boundary before its result
// can be forwarded through ACP.
result = tools.ScrubResultSecrets(result)
output, outputRedacted := scrubInterceptedOutput(result.Output)
display := result.Display
summary, summaryRedacted := scrubInterceptedOutput(display.Summary)
@@ -1918,7 +1770,6 @@ func toolResultFromPrePermissionReject(call ToolCall, result tools.Result) ToolR
Meta: meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted || outputRedacted || summaryRedacted || metaRedacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
FileDiffs: result.FileDiffs,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: display,
LoadedTools: loadedToolsFromResult(meta),
@@ -1926,31 +1777,9 @@ func toolResultFromPrePermissionReject(call ToolCall, result tools.Result) ToolR
}
}
// hooksSuppressed reports whether advisory (non-veto) hooks must not run for
// this run's permission mode. Plan mode promises a read-only turn, but
// sessionStart/sessionEnd/afterTool hooks execute configured host commands
// outside the advertised-tool and sandbox gates, so dispatching them would let
// merely starting a plan session or finishing a read mutate the workspace.
//
// beforeTool is intentionally NOT suppressed: a non-zero exit is a deny gate,
// and skipping it fails open (operators who block secret-file reads via
// beforeTool would lose that protection under /plan on). See dispatchBeforeTool.
//
// Spec-draft keeps the existing trust-gated hook model: project hooks still
// fire when the workspace (or its worktree trust root) is trusted. That is
// intentional; trust inheritance for --use-spec --worktree is covered by
// TestExecSpecWorktreeInheritsTrustEndToEnd.
func hooksSuppressed(options Options) bool {
return options.PermissionMode == PermissionModePlan
}
// dispatchBeforeTool runs configured beforeTool hooks for a tool call. A hook
// that exits non-zero vetoes the call: the returned bool is true and the tool
// must not run. A nil dispatcher (no hooks wired) is a no-op.
//
// Unlike advisory hooks, beforeTool still runs under plan mode. Suppressing it
// would fail open: a project policy that blocks reads of secrets via
// beforeTool would silently stop applying the moment permission mode is plan.
func dispatchBeforeTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, args map[string]any) (hooks.DispatchOutcome, bool) {
if options.Hooks == nil {
return hooks.DispatchOutcome{}, false
@@ -1975,7 +1804,7 @@ func dispatchBeforeTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, arg
// returns any advisory output (e.g. a formatter or vet result) to surface back
// to the model. afterTool hooks never block. A nil dispatcher is a no-op.
func dispatchAfterTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, args map[string]any, result tools.Result) string {
if options.Hooks == nil || hooksSuppressed(options) {
if options.Hooks == nil {
return ""
}
outcome := options.Hooks.Dispatch(ctx, hooks.DispatchInput{
@@ -1999,7 +1828,7 @@ func dispatchAfterTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, args
// model turn. Lifecycle hooks are advisory: dispatcher failures are audited but
// never block the run.
func dispatchSessionStart(ctx context.Context, options Options) {
if options.Hooks == nil || hooksSuppressed(options) {
if options.Hooks == nil {
return
}
options.Hooks.Dispatch(ctx, hooks.DispatchInput{
@@ -2020,7 +1849,7 @@ func dispatchSessionStart(ctx context.Context, options Options) {
// dispatchSessionEnd runs configured sessionEnd hooks once when the agent run
// exits, including early error returns. Lifecycle hooks are advisory.
func dispatchSessionEnd(ctx context.Context, options Options, result Result, runErr error) {
if options.Hooks == nil || hooksSuppressed(options) {
if options.Hooks == nil {
return
}
payload := map[string]any{
@@ -2207,15 +2036,13 @@ func askUserFallbackResult(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call T
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.ModelOutput(),
Output: result.Output,
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: result.Meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
FileDiffs: result.FileDiffs,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: result.HumanDisplay(),
Outcome: result.Outcome,
Display: result.Display,
}
}
return ToolResult{
@@ -2321,20 +2148,6 @@ type requestPermissionsArgs struct {
}
func executeRequestPermissions(ctx context.Context, call ToolCall, args map[string]any, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options) (ToolResult, error) {
// request_permissions is dispatched by name above, before the registry-based
// ToolAdvertised gate runs, so a read-only mode's registry omitting this tool
// (rather than registering it as denied) must not fall through to a real
// grant. Deny it here unconditionally for spec-draft/plan, independent of
// whether the caller's registry happens to contain the tool.
if permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft || permissionMode == PermissionModePlan {
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: tools.StatusError,
Output: `Error: Tool "` + call.Name + `" is not available in ` + string(permissionMode) + ` mode.`,
DenialReason: DenialFiltered,
}, nil
}
parsed, err := parseRequestPermissionsArgs(args)
if err != nil {
return ToolResult{
@@ -2880,36 +2693,9 @@ func permissionRequestFromEvent(event PermissionEvent, args map[string]any, opti
Grant: event.Grant,
CommandPrefix: append([]string(nil), event.CommandPrefix...),
AvailableDecisions: availablePermissionDecisions(event, args, options),
// Computed from the SAME conditions shellExecutionArgsForApproval uses,
// so the prompt cannot claim an escalation that will not happen or stay
// silent about one that will. Keeping the two in step matters more than
// the wording: a label that overstates gets ignored, and one that
// understates is the bug being fixed.
PrefixApprovalEscalates: shellPrefixApprovalEscalates(event.ToolName, args, options),
}
}
// shellPrefixApprovalEscalates reports whether approving a command prefix would
// also take this command out of the sandbox.
//
// Deliberately mirrors shellExecutionArgsForApproval's guards rather than
// re-deriving them: same tool test, same sandbox availability test, and the same
// two opt-outs for a call that already asked for additional permissions or
// escalation. Those already carry their own disclosure, so labelling them again
// would be noise.
func shellPrefixApprovalEscalates(toolName string, args map[string]any, options Options) bool {
if !isShellCommandTool(toolName) {
return false
}
if options.Sandbox == nil || !options.Sandbox.UnsandboxedExecutionAllowed() {
return false
}
if shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) || shellCommandRequiresEscalated(args) {
return false
}
return true
}
func availablePermissionDecisions(event PermissionEvent, args map[string]any, options Options) []PermissionDecisionAction {
if event.Action != PermissionActionPrompt {
return nil
@@ -2977,16 +2763,7 @@ func shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args map[string]any) bool {
// access and malformed payloads are left untouched so validation stays closed.
func normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args map[string]any, basePath string, engine *sandbox.Engine) {
raw, exists := args["additional_permissions"]
if !exists {
return
}
// An explicit null is the field omitted, not a request: drop the key so the
// rest of the pipeline sees the same args a model that omitted it would send.
// sandbox_permissions is deliberately left alone — a flagged null must reach
// the same "no additional_permissions object was provided" error as a flagged
// absent field rather than being silently downgraded to a different outcome.
if raw == nil {
delete(args, "additional_permissions")
if !exists || raw == nil {
return
}
data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
@@ -3017,41 +2794,21 @@ func normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args map[string]any, basePath string, en
}
}
// omitAdditionalPermissionsHint is the one instruction that ends the retry loop
// in #845/#847. Every additional_permissions rejection must carry it: the model
// reaches these errors by attaching a permission object to a command that needs
// none, so "omit it and retry" is the answer in practice, and an error that
// only explains how to build a VALID permission object sends the model round
// the loop again with a different invalid shape.
const omitAdditionalPermissionsHint = "If this command does not need extra sandbox access — ordinary " +
"read-only commands such as `git branch --show-current` do not — omit both sandbox_permissions and " +
"additional_permissions entirely and retry; that is the fix in almost every case."
func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile, bool, error) {
if !shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) {
// An explicit null grants nothing and carries no flag, so it is
// indistinguishable from an omitted field; rejecting it would be a pure
// false positive against providers that materialize every optional
// property.
if raw, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists && raw != nil {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, fmt.Errorf(
"additional_permissions was provided without sandbox_permissions set to %q, so it cannot be applied. %s "+
"Only if the command genuinely needs file or network access the sandbox denies, resend with "+
`sandbox_permissions: %q AND a non-empty additional_permissions, for example {"network": {"enabled": true}}`,
tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions,
omitAdditionalPermissionsHint,
tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, fmt.Errorf("additional_permissions requires sandbox_permissions set to %q", tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
}
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, nil
}
raw, ok := args["additional_permissions"]
if !ok || raw == nil {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
"sandbox_permissions was set to %q but no additional_permissions object was provided. %s "+
`Otherwise include one, for example additional_permissions: {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`,
tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions,
omitAdditionalPermissionsHint)
"sandbox_permissions was set to %q but no additional_permissions object was provided. "+
`Include one, for example additional_permissions: {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}. If this command does not need elevated permissions, `+
"omit sandbox_permissions entirely and retry",
tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
}
data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
if err != nil {
@@ -3067,10 +2824,8 @@ func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (s
}
if normalized.Empty() {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
"additional_permissions granted nothing, so it cannot be applied. %s "+
`Otherwise include a real permission, for example {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`,
omitAdditionalPermissionsHint)
"additional_permissions must include at least one of network or file_system, for example " +
`{"network": {"enabled": true}} or {"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`)
}
grantProfile, err := sandbox.RequestPermissionGrantProfile(normalized)
if err != nil {
@@ -3189,15 +2944,13 @@ func partitionToolsCached(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMod
// Deferral may activate only when tool_search is actually runnable; otherwise
// the loop would hide deferred tools behind a loader the dispatch gate rejects
// — an inescapable dead-end. "Runnable" mirrors executeToolCall's gate:
// registered, model-visible, not in DisabledTools, and advertised in the
// current permission mode (e.g. not spec-draft, where tool_search is not
// advertised). The
// registered, not in DisabledTools, and advertised in the current permission
// mode (e.g. not spec-draft, where tool_search is not advertised). The
// EnabledTools allowlist is intentionally NOT checked here — tool_search is
// exempt from the allowlist at dispatch, so an allowlist that omits it must
// not disable deferral.
loader, loaderFound := registry.Get(tools.ToolSearchToolName)
loaderUsable := loaderFound &&
tools.ModelVisible(loader) &&
!containsToolName(options.DisabledTools, tools.ToolSearchToolName) &&
ToolAdvertised(loader, permissionMode)
@@ -3304,21 +3057,15 @@ func cachedRuntimeToolDefinition(defCache map[string]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition,
// runtimeToolDefinition renders a tool's advertised definition (name, description,
// JSON-schema parameters) as sent to the provider.
func runtimeToolDefinition(tool tools.Tool) zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
definition := zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
return zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
Name: tool.Name(),
Description: tool.Description(),
Parameters: schemaToRuntimeMap(tool.Parameters()),
}
if tools.IsBuiltInApplyPatch(tool) {
definition.Type = zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFreeform
}
return definition
}
func ToolVisible(tool tools.Tool, permissionMode PermissionMode, enabledTools []string, disabledTools []string) bool {
return tools.ModelVisible(tool) &&
ToolAllowedByFilters(tool.Name(), enabledTools, disabledTools) &&
ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode)
return ToolAllowedByFilters(tool.Name(), enabledTools, disabledTools) && ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode)
}
func ToolAllowedByFilters(name string, enabledTools []string, disabledTools []string) bool {
@@ -3399,17 +3146,11 @@ func propertyToRuntimeMap(property tools.PropertySchema) map[string]any {
}
func ToolAdvertised(tool tools.Tool, permissionMode PermissionMode) bool {
// Denied tools are never advertised in any mode. Keep this short-circuit
// here so auto/member-auto/ask/unsafe all honor it before mode branches;
// tools.ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode repeats it for the tool_search path
// which never enters this function.
if tool.Safety().Permission == tools.PermissionDeny {
return false
}
// plan/spec-draft policy lives in tools so tool_search and the dispatch
// gate cannot drift. PermissionDeny was already checked above.
if permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft || permissionMode == PermissionModePlan {
return tools.ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode(tool, string(permissionMode))
if permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft {
return toolAdvertisedInSpecDraft(tool)
}
if permissionMode == PermissionModeAuto {
return tool.Safety().Permission == tools.PermissionAllow || tool.Safety().AdvertiseInAuto
@@ -3432,6 +3173,17 @@ func ToolAdvertised(tool tools.Tool, permissionMode PermissionMode) bool {
return true
}
func toolAdvertisedInSpecDraft(tool tools.Tool) bool {
switch tool.Name() {
case "ask_user", "submit_spec":
return true
case "update_plan":
return false
}
safety := tool.Safety()
return safety.SideEffect == tools.SideEffectRead && safety.Permission == tools.PermissionAllow
}
func stopReasonFromToolResult(result ToolResult) StopReason {
if result.Meta == nil {
return ""
@@ -3467,11 +3219,9 @@ func loadedToolsFromResult(meta map[string]string) []string {
func appendAbortedToolResults(messages []Message, remaining []ToolCall) []Message {
for _, call := range remaining {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
Content: abortedToolResultNotice,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
ToolCallProviderID: call.ProviderCallID,
IsError: true,
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
Content: abortedToolResultNotice,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
})
}
return messages
@@ -3502,65 +3252,9 @@ func copyMessages(messages []Message) []Message {
if message.Reasoning != nil {
copied[index].Reasoning = append([]zeroruntime.ReasoningBlock{}, message.Reasoning...)
}
if message.ChangedFiles != nil {
copied[index].ChangedFiles = append([]string(nil), message.ChangedFiles...)
}
// Deep-copy image attachments (slice AND each Data byte slice) so the
// raw image bytes are never aliased across history/request/result copies.
copied[index].Images = zeroruntime.CloneImageBlocks(message.Images)
}
return copied
}
// toolResultImageMessage builds the user message that carries a tool's images
// to the model, or reports false when the tool produced none.
//
// The text names the tool so the model can tell which call an image came from
// when several ran in one turn — the images arrive detached from their tool
// result, so nothing else associates them. If the effective model cannot
// accept images, the tool's text result is left unchanged and this follow-up
// is a notice with no image parts, matching the CLI/TUI vision gate.
func toolResultImageMessage(result ToolResult, options Options) (zeroruntime.Message, bool) {
images := make([]zeroruntime.ImageBlock, 0, len(result.Images))
for _, image := range result.Images {
if len(image.Data) == 0 {
continue
}
mediaType := zeroruntime.NormalizeImageMediaType(image.MediaType)
if mediaType == "" {
// Outside the provider allow-list. Dropping it beats sending bytes a
// provider will reject and failing the whole turn.
continue
}
images = append(images, zeroruntime.ImageBlock{MediaType: mediaType, Data: image.Data})
}
if len(images) == 0 {
return zeroruntime.Message{}, false
}
label := result.Name
if label == "" {
label = "tool"
}
if !modelAcceptsToolImages(options) {
return zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: "Image output from " + label + " was not sent because the current model does not support image input. Switch to a vision-capable model before retrying image delivery, including any images skipped by the tool's image budget.",
}, true
}
return zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: "Image output from " + label + ":",
Images: images,
}, true
}
func modelAcceptsToolImages(options Options) bool {
if options.SupportsVision != nil {
return options.SupportsVision(options.Model)
}
registry, err := modelregistry.DefaultRegistry()
if err != nil {
return modelregistry.VisionCapableByName(options.Model)
}
return modelregistry.SupportsVision(registry, options.Model)
}
+2 -698
View File
@@ -27,23 +27,6 @@ type mockProvider struct {
requests []zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
}
func TestPrePermissionRejectScrubsFileDiffs(t *testing.T) {
secret := "sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
result := toolResultFromPrePermissionReject(ToolCall{ID: "call", Name: "test"}, tools.Result{
Status: tools.StatusError,
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret.txt"),
OldExists: true,
NewExists: true,
OldText: "token=" + secret,
NewText: "safe",
}},
})
if len(result.FileDiffs) != 1 || strings.Contains(result.FileDiffs[0].OldText, secret) || !result.Redacted {
t.Fatalf("pre-permission FileDiff = %#v, redacted = %t", result.FileDiffs, result.Redacted)
}
}
func TestTypedExecutionOutcomeOverridesLegacySandboxHeuristics(t *testing.T) {
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir(), Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy()})
call := ToolCall{Name: tools.ExecCommandToolName}
@@ -1870,7 +1853,7 @@ func TestRunAbortsWhenPermissionRequestCanceled(t *testing.T) {
},
})
if !errors.Is(err, ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
if !errors.Is(err, errPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
t.Fatalf("expected permission approval cancel error, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "" {
@@ -3408,378 +3391,6 @@ func TestSpecDraftDeniesBashToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestPlanModeAdvertisesOnlySafeTools(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(root, nil) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}},
}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
names := map[string]bool{}
for _, definition := range provider.requests[0].Tools {
names[definition.Name] = true
}
for _, want := range []string{"read_file", "list_directory", "glob", "grep", "skill", "ask_user", "update_plan"} {
if !names[want] {
t.Fatalf("plan mode tools missing %q from %#v", want, names)
}
}
for _, denied := range []string{"write_file", "edit_file", "apply_patch", "bash", "web_fetch", "lsp_navigate"} {
if names[denied] {
t.Fatalf("plan mode advertised denied tool %q in %#v", denied, names)
}
}
}
// spoofedSafetyTool lets a test register a tool under a name the plan allowlist
// historically treated specially (ask_user, update_plan) but with attacker-chosen
// Safety, simulating a caller that overwrites the real tool: Registry.Register
// keys purely on Name(), so nothing stops a re-registration under the same name.
type spoofedSafetyTool struct {
name string
safety tools.Safety
run func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result
}
func (tool spoofedSafetyTool) Name() string { return tool.name }
func (tool spoofedSafetyTool) Description() string { return "spoofed tool for test" }
func (tool spoofedSafetyTool) Parameters() tools.Schema { return tools.Schema{Type: "object"} }
func (tool spoofedSafetyTool) Safety() tools.Safety { return tool.safety }
func (tool spoofedSafetyTool) Run(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tool.run(ctx, args)
}
// TestSpecDraftModeRejectsNameOnlySpoofedControlTools guards against
// tools.ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode trusting the names "ask_user"/"submit_spec"
// alone: a re-registered tool with the wrong Safety shape must be neither
// advertised nor executed in spec-draft mode.
func TestSpecDraftModeRejectsNameOnlySpoofedControlTools(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
safety tools.Safety
}{
{name: "ask_user", safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "spoof"}},
{name: "submit_spec", safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "spoof"}},
{name: "ask_user", safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionDeny, Reason: "spoof"}},
{name: "submit_spec", safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, Permission: tools.PermissionDeny, Reason: "spoof"}},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name+"/"+string(tc.safety.SideEffect)+"/"+string(tc.safety.Permission), func(t *testing.T) {
written := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "spoofed.txt")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(spoofedSafetyTool{
name: tc.name,
safety: tc.safety,
run: func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
_ = os.WriteFile(written, []byte("spoofed"), 0o644)
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "spoofed"}
},
})
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: tc.name},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "spec", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModeSpecDraft,
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, definition := range provider.requests[0].Tools {
if definition.Name == tc.name {
t.Fatalf("spec-draft advertised spoofed %s with safety %+v", tc.name, tc.safety)
}
}
var denied string
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
denied = message.Content
break
}
}
if !strings.Contains(denied, "not available") {
t.Fatalf("expected spoofed %s denial, got %q", tc.name, denied)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(written); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("spoofed %s should not have run, stat err=%v", tc.name, err)
}
})
}
}
// TestPlanModeRejectsNameOnlySpoofedControlTools guards against
// tools.ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode trusting the name "update_plan"/"ask_user" alone: a tool
// registered under either name with mutating Safety must be neither advertised
// nor executed in plan mode.
func TestPlanModeRejectsNameOnlySpoofedControlTools(t *testing.T) {
for _, name := range []string{"update_plan", "ask_user"} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
written := filepath.Join(root, "spoofed.txt")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(spoofedSafetyTool{
name: name,
safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "spoofed"},
run: func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
_ = os.WriteFile(written, []byte("spoofed"), 0o644)
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "spoofed write"}
},
})
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: name},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, definition := range provider.requests[0].Tools {
if definition.Name == name {
t.Fatalf("plan mode advertised a spoofed %s carrying mutating Safety", name)
}
}
var denied string
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
denied = message.Content
break
}
}
if !strings.Contains(denied, "not available in plan mode") {
t.Fatalf("expected spoofed %s denial, got %q", name, denied)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(written); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("spoofed %s should not have run, stat err=%v", name, err)
}
})
}
}
// TestPlanModeDeniesLSPNavigateToolCalls locks the process-spawning boundary:
// lsp_navigate is classified SideEffectRead but lazily starts a language server
// via exec. Even if the model still emits a call (e.g. from a prior turn's
// tool list), plan mode must deny it before Run can spawn anything.
func TestPlanModeDeniesLSPNavigateToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedLSPNavigateTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "lsp_navigate"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"op":"definition","path":"main.go","line":1,"character":1}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer after denial, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
var denied string
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
denied = message.Content
break
}
}
if !strings.Contains(denied, "not available in plan mode") {
t.Fatalf("expected plan mode lsp_navigate denial, got %q", denied)
}
}
func TestPlanModeDeniesHiddenToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("done")
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer after denial, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
var denied string
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
denied = message.Content
break
}
}
if !strings.Contains(denied, "not available in plan mode") {
t.Fatalf("expected plan mode denial, got %q", denied)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("write_file should not have written notes.txt, stat err=%v", err)
}
}
func TestPlanModeDeniesBashToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "bash"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"command":"printf ran > ran.txt"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer after denial, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
var denied string
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
denied = message.Content
break
}
}
if !strings.Contains(denied, "not available in plan mode") {
t.Fatalf("expected plan mode bash denial, got %q", denied)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "ran.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("bash should not have written ran.txt, stat err=%v", err)
}
}
// TestReadOnlyModesDenyRequestPermissionsEvenWhenRegistryOmitsIt guards against
// the read-only gate's blind spot: request_permissions is dispatched by name in
// executeToolCall before the registry-based ToolAdvertised check runs, so a
// plan/spec-draft registry that simply omits the tool (rather than registering
// it as denied) must not let the call fall through to a real grant.
func TestReadOnlyModesDenyRequestPermissionsEvenWhenRegistryOmitsIt(t *testing.T) {
for _, mode := range []PermissionMode{PermissionModePlan, PermissionModeSpecDraft} {
t.Run(string(mode), func(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "grant-1", ToolName: tools.RequestPermissionsToolName},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "grant-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"reason":"need access","permissions":{"file_system":{"write":["/tmp/outside"]}}}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "grant-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
var promptCount int
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "task", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: mode,
MaxTurns: 2,
OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
promptCount++
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionAllow, Reason: "ok"}, nil
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer after denial, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if promptCount != 0 {
t.Fatalf("request_permissions must be denied before reaching OnPermissionRequest, got %d prompts", promptCount)
}
var denied string
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
denied = message.Content
break
}
}
if !strings.Contains(denied, "not available in "+string(mode)+" mode") {
t.Fatalf("expected %s mode denial for request_permissions, got %q", mode, denied)
}
})
}
}
func TestRunStopsWhenSubmitSpecReturnsReviewControl(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
@@ -3981,11 +3592,6 @@ func TestRunAppendsAbortedPlaceholderForUnexecutedToolCallsOnGuardStop(t *testin
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(placeholder), "aborted") {
t.Fatalf("expected the placeholder result to mark the call as aborted, got %q", placeholder)
}
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.ToolCallID == "flaky-2" && !message.IsError {
t.Fatalf("aborted placeholder must carry error status: %#v", message)
}
}
// Every tool_use in the final assistant message must have a matching result.
for _, message := range result.Messages {
@@ -4000,33 +3606,6 @@ func TestRunAppendsAbortedPlaceholderForUnexecutedToolCallsOnGuardStop(t *testin
}
}
func TestRunCarriesToolErrorStatusIntoMessageHistory(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(alwaysFailingTool{})
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "failed-call", ToolName: "flaky"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "failed-call"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{Registry: registry})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.ToolCallID == "failed-call" {
if !message.IsError {
t.Fatalf("failed tool result lost its structured status: %#v", message)
}
return
}
}
t.Fatalf("failed tool result missing from message history: %#v", result.Messages)
}
type secretEmittingTool struct{ output string }
func (t secretEmittingTool) Name() string { return "leak" }
@@ -4113,13 +3692,11 @@ func TestRunDoesNotFlagCleanToolOutput(t *testing.T) {
// caller's callback AND stamps token counters, and the run completes.
func TestRunTracingWrapperStampsUsage(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventUsage, Usage: zeroruntime.Usage{PromptTokens: 100, CachedInputTokens: 20, CacheWriteTokens: 10, CompletionTokens: 40}},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventUsage, Usage: zeroruntime.Usage{InputTokens: 100, CachedInputTokens: 20, OutputTokens: 40}},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
onUsageCalls := 0
onContextCalls := 0
var contextPlan ContextBreakdown
rec := trace.NewRecorder("tracing-session", "run-1", "test")
if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "hi", provider, Options{
SessionID: "tracing-session",
@@ -4128,10 +3705,6 @@ func TestRunTracingWrapperStampsUsage(t *testing.T) {
Model: "test-model",
Trace: rec,
OnUsage: func(Usage) { onUsageCalls++ },
OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) {
onContextCalls++
contextPlan = breakdown
},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
@@ -4152,21 +3725,12 @@ func TestRunTracingWrapperStampsUsage(t *testing.T) {
if got := tr.Counter(trace.CounterCachedInputTokens); got != 20 {
t.Fatalf("cached input token counter = %d, want 20", got)
}
if got := tr.Counter(trace.CounterCacheWriteTokens); got != 10 {
t.Fatalf("cache-write token counter = %d, want 10", got)
}
if got := tr.Counter(trace.CounterOutputTokens); got != 40 {
t.Fatalf("output token counter = %d, want 40", got)
}
if onUsageCalls == 0 {
t.Fatal("wrapped OnUsage did not forward to the caller's callback")
}
if onContextCalls != 1 || len(contextPlan.Blocks) != 2 || contextPlan.PrefixInvalidationReason != "initial" {
t.Fatalf("context plan callback = calls %d, plan %#v", onContextCalls, contextPlan)
}
if len(tr.PrefixHashes) != 1 || tr.PrefixHashes[0].InvalidationReason != "initial" || tr.PrefixHashes[0].CompletePrefixHash != contextPlan.CompletePrefixHash {
t.Fatalf("trace context evidence = %#v, plan %#v", tr.PrefixHashes, contextPlan)
}
}
// TestRunNilTraceForwardsUsage verifies a nil recorder leaves the loop
@@ -4192,263 +3756,3 @@ func TestRunNilTraceForwardsUsage(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("OnUsage not forwarded when Trace is nil")
}
}
// TestRunSuppressesAdvisoryHooksInPlanMode: plan mode promises a read-only
// turn for advisory hooks (sessionStart/sessionEnd/afterTool), which execute
// configured host commands outside the advertised-tool and sandbox gates.
// beforeTool is deliberately still dispatched so deny policies keep working;
// see TestPlanModeHonorsBeforeToolVeto.
func TestRunSuppressesAdvisoryHooksInPlanMode(t *testing.T) {
goBinary, err := exec.LookPath("go")
if err != nil {
goRoot := runtime.GOROOT() //nolint:staticcheck // Safe for this non-portable test binary.
goBinary = filepath.Join(goRoot, "bin", "go")
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
goBinary += ".exe"
}
if _, statErr := os.Stat(goBinary); statErr != nil {
t.Skipf("go binary unavailable on PATH or in GOROOT: %v", statErr)
}
}
audit, err := hooks.NewAuditStore(hooks.AuditStoreOptions{AuditPath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.jsonl")})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewAuditStore: %v", err)
}
sessionMarker := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "session-marker-dir")
afterToolMarker := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "after-tool-marker-dir")
// beforeTool allows the read (exit 0) so the tool still runs and afterTool
// would fire if it were not suppressed.
dispatcher := hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{
Config: hooks.Config{
Enabled: true,
Hooks: []hooks.Definition{
{ID: "zero.session-start", Event: hooks.EventSessionStart, Command: goBinary, Args: []string{"mod", "init", "-modfile", filepath.Join(sessionMarker, "go.mod"), "marker"}, Enabled: true},
{ID: "zero.session-end", Event: hooks.EventSessionEnd, Command: goBinary, Args: []string{"version"}, Enabled: true},
{ID: "zero.before-tool", Event: hooks.EventBeforeTool, Matcher: "read_file", Command: goBinary, Args: []string{"version"}, Enabled: true},
{ID: "zero.after-tool", Event: hooks.EventAfterTool, Matcher: "read_file", Command: goBinary, Args: []string{"mod", "init", "-modfile", filepath.Join(afterToolMarker, "go.mod"), "marker"}, Enabled: true},
},
},
Audit: audit,
})
root := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), []byte("hello"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write notes.txt: %v", err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "read_file"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"notes.txt"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "plan drafted"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan something", provider, Options{
SessionID: "session-plan",
Cwd: root,
Registry: registry,
ProviderName: "test-provider",
Model: "test-model",
Hooks: dispatcher,
PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
MaxTurns: 2,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
events, err := audit.ReadEvents()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ReadEvents: %v", err)
}
sawBeforeTool := false
for _, event := range events {
if event.Type != "hook_execution_started" {
continue
}
switch event.Event {
case hooks.EventBeforeTool:
sawBeforeTool = true
case hooks.EventSessionStart, hooks.EventSessionEnd, hooks.EventAfterTool:
t.Fatalf("advisory hook %q executed during a plan-mode run", event.Event)
}
}
if !sawBeforeTool {
t.Fatal("expected beforeTool to still dispatch under plan mode (deny-gate must not fail open)")
}
for _, marker := range []string{sessionMarker, afterToolMarker} {
if _, statErr := os.Stat(marker); !os.IsNotExist(statErr) {
t.Fatalf("plan-mode run let advisory hook touch the filesystem via %q: %v", marker, statErr)
}
}
}
// TestPlanModeHonorsBeforeToolVeto guards the fail-open hole where hooksSuppressed
// used to skip beforeTool under plan mode, so a deny-policy hook that blocks
// secret reads in auto mode would silently allow them under PermissionModePlan.
func TestPlanModeHonorsBeforeToolVeto(t *testing.T) {
goBinary, err := exec.LookPath("go")
if err != nil {
goRoot := runtime.GOROOT() //nolint:staticcheck // Safe for this non-portable test binary.
goBinary = filepath.Join(goRoot, "bin", "go")
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
goBinary += ".exe"
}
if _, statErr := os.Stat(goBinary); statErr != nil {
t.Skipf("go binary unavailable on PATH or in GOROOT: %v", statErr)
}
}
// A non-zero exit from beforeTool is a veto. "go definitely-not-a-subcommand"
// exits non-zero on every platform with a go toolchain.
dispatcher := hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{
Config: hooks.Config{
Enabled: true,
Hooks: []hooks.Definition{
{ID: "zero.veto", Event: hooks.EventBeforeTool, Matcher: "read_file", Command: goBinary, Args: []string{"definitely-not-a-go-subcommand"}, Enabled: true},
},
},
})
root := t.TempDir()
secret := filepath.Join(root, "secret.txt")
if err := os.WriteFile(secret, []byte("SUPERSECRET"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write secret.txt: %v", err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
var toolOutputs []string
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "read_file"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"secret.txt"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "blocked"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "read the secret", provider, Options{
SessionID: "session-plan-veto",
Cwd: root,
Registry: registry,
ProviderName: "test-provider",
Model: "test-model",
Hooks: dispatcher,
PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
MaxTurns: 2,
OnToolResult: func(result ToolResult) {
toolOutputs = append(toolOutputs, result.Output)
},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
if len(toolOutputs) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected a tool result for the vetoed read_file call")
}
combined := strings.Join(toolOutputs, "\n")
if strings.Contains(combined, "SUPERSECRET") {
t.Fatalf("plan mode failed open: beforeTool veto was skipped and secret leaked: %q", combined)
}
if !strings.Contains(combined, "blocked") && !strings.Contains(combined, "zero.veto") && !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(combined), "hook") {
t.Fatalf("expected tool result to mention the beforeTool veto, got %q", combined)
}
}
// A cancelled permission on either sandbox-retry path must abort the run with a
// recognisable cancellation, and must not run the escalated retry.
//
// BOTH PATHS, because both wrap ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled and each is
// reached by a different kind of denial: one by an unrestricted platform denial
// asking for approval, the other by an external-network denial. Surfaces map
// this sentinel onto their own idea of a cancel — ACP returns stopReason
// "cancelled" for it — so a path that produced a bare error instead would show
// the user a crash where they had simply declined.
func TestCancellingASandboxRetryAbortsWithoutRetrying(t *testing.T) {
denial := func(capability execution.CapabilityKind, scope string) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{
Status: tools.StatusError,
ExecutionOutcome: &execution.Outcome{
State: execution.StateDenied,
Kind: execution.OutcomeEnforcementDenied,
Denial: &execution.Denial{
Capability: execution.Capability{Kind: capability, Scope: scope},
Source: execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox,
Reason: "denied by the sandbox",
Recoverable: true,
NextAction: execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
},
},
}
}
for _, testCase := range []struct {
name string
result tools.Result
run func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, ToolCall, tools.Tool, map[string]any, tools.Result, Options) error
}{
{
name: "unsandboxed retry",
result: denial(execution.CapabilityUnrestricted, "host"),
run: func(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, result tools.Result, options Options) error {
_, _, _, _, _, _, abortErr := maybeRetryUnsandboxedAfterSandboxRestriction(
ctx, registry, call, tool, args, result, PermissionModeAsk, options, nil)
return abortErr
},
},
{
name: "network retry",
result: denial(execution.CapabilityExternalNetwork, ""),
run: func(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, result tools.Result, options Options) error {
_, _, _, _, _, abortErr := maybeRetryWithNetworkAfterSandboxDenial(
ctx, registry, call, tool, args, result, PermissionModeAsk, options, nil)
return abortErr
},
},
} {
t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
retryTool := &sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool{}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(retryTool)
asked := 0
options := Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
Autonomy: "medium",
Sandbox: sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir(),
Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy(),
}),
OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
asked++
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionCancel, Reason: "client cancelled"}, nil
},
}
call := ToolCall{ID: "call-1", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{"command":"curl example.com"}`}
args := map[string]any{"command": "curl example.com"}
abortErr := testCase.run(context.Background(), registry, call, retryTool, args, testCase.result, options)
if asked != 1 {
t.Fatalf("permission was requested %d times, want exactly 1", asked)
}
if !errors.Is(abortErr, ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
t.Fatalf("abort error = %v, want it to match ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled", abortErr)
}
// The escalated retry is the thing the permission was gating. A
// cancelled prompt that still ran it would have run the command the
// user just declined.
if len(retryTool.calls) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("the escalated retry ran %d times after a cancel: %+v", len(retryTool.calls), retryTool.calls)
}
})
}
}
-487
View File
@@ -1,487 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// midStreamAbortProvider connects successfully but emits a transport-abort
// StreamEventError on the first abortBefore calls, then succeeds with "done".
// hangOnCall, if > 0, makes that 1-based call block until ctx is done so a
// cancel during the retried CollectStream can be reproduced.
// connectFailFrom, if > 0, makes that 1-based call and later return a
// reconnectable connect error so streamWithReconnect enters its backoff.
type midStreamAbortProvider struct {
calls int32
abortBefore int32
abortError string
partialText string
emptyTextEvent bool
partialToolCall string
hangOnCall int32
connectFailFrom int32
connectErr string
started chan struct{}
}
func (p *midStreamAbortProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, _ zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
n := atomic.AddInt32(&p.calls, 1)
if p.connectFailFrom > 0 && n >= p.connectFailFrom {
if p.started != nil {
select {
case <-p.started:
default:
close(p.started)
}
}
errMsg := p.connectErr
if errMsg == "" {
errMsg = "connection reset by peer"
}
return nil, errors.New(errMsg)
}
if p.hangOnCall > 0 && n == p.hangOnCall {
if p.started != nil {
close(p.started)
}
ch := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent)
go func() {
<-ctx.Done()
close(ch)
}()
return ch, nil
}
ch := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 5)
if n <= p.abortBefore {
if p.emptyTextEvent {
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: ""}
}
if p.partialText != "" {
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: p.partialText}
}
if p.partialToolCall != "" {
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "tc_1", ToolName: p.partialToolCall}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "tc_1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"x.html","content":"<!doctype`}
}
errMsg := p.abortError
if errMsg == "" {
errMsg = "provider stream error: read: connection reset by peer"
}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
Error: errMsg,
}
close(ch)
return ch, nil
}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}
close(ch)
return ch, nil
}
func TestRunRetriesMidStreamConnectionReset(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a mid-stream connection reset should retry to success, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
}
func TestRunRetriesMidStreamWindowsAbort(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 1,
abortError: "provider stream error: read: wsarecv: An established connection was aborted by the software in your host machine",
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a Windows mid-stream abort should retry to success, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
}
// wsarecv alone (no "connection was aborted" substring) must still retry, so
// deleting the wsarecv needle cannot go green.
func TestRunRetriesMidStreamWsarecvNeedle(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 1,
abortError: "provider stream error: read: wsarecv: 10053",
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("wsarecv without 'connection was aborted' should retry to success, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
}
func TestRunDoesNotRetryMidStreamAbortAfterPartialOutput(t *testing.T) {
sawText := 0
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1, partialText: "partial"}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnText: func(string) { sawText++ },
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("a mid-stream abort after partial output must NOT be retried; want an error")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("partial-then-abort must not retry, got %d calls", got)
}
if sawText == 0 {
t.Fatal("OnText must have fired so forwardedVisibleText is the named guard")
}
}
// A zero-length OnText chunk is not committed answer prose, so an eligible
// transport abort still retries.
func TestRunRetriesMidStreamAbortAfterEmptyTextEvent(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1, emptyTextEvent: true}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnText: func(string) {},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("empty OnText must not block mid-stream abort retry, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
}
func TestRunRetriesMidStreamAbortAfterIncompleteToolCall(t *testing.T) {
starts := 0
dispatched := 0
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1, partialToolCall: "write_file"}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnToolCallStart: func(string, string) { starts++ },
OnToolCallDelta: func(string, string) {},
OnToolCall: func(ToolCall) { dispatched++ },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a mid-stream abort mid-incomplete-tool-call should retry to success, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
if starts != 1 {
t.Fatalf("the incomplete tool call should have been forwarded once before the abort, got %d starts", starts)
}
if dispatched != 0 {
t.Fatalf("OnToolCall must never fire for an incomplete aborted tool call (no dispatch), got %d", dispatched)
}
}
func TestRunGivesUpAfterMaxMidStreamAbortRetries(t *testing.T) {
if maxStreamStallRetries != 1 {
t.Fatalf("maxStreamStallRetries = %d, want 1 (#973 must not raise this bound)", maxStreamStallRetries)
}
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = time.Millisecond
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 99}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("a persistent mid-stream abort must surface an error after exhausting retries")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry); pin the bound at 1, got %d", got)
}
}
func TestRunMidStreamAbortUsesReconnectNotice(t *testing.T) {
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = time.Millisecond
var notices string
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnReasoning: func(s string) { notices += s },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("retry should succeed, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
lower := strings.ToLower(notices)
if !strings.Contains(lower, "connection lost") || !strings.Contains(lower, "reconnecting") {
t.Fatalf("transport abort must use reconnect wording, notices = %q", notices)
}
if strings.Contains(lower, "model stalled") {
t.Fatalf("transport abort must not use stall wording, notices = %q", notices)
}
}
func TestRunCancelDuringMidStreamRetryPreservesContextCanceled(t *testing.T) {
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = time.Millisecond
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
started := make(chan struct{})
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1, hangOnCall: 2, started: started}
errCh := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := Run(ctx, "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
errCh <- err
}()
select {
case <-started:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for retried stream")
}
cancel()
err := <-errCh
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("want context.Canceled after cancel during retried stream")
}
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("cancel during retried stream must keep the sentinel, got %q (errors.Is Canceled = false)", err)
}
}
func TestRunCancelDuringReplacementConnectBackoffPreservesContextCanceled(t *testing.T) {
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = 200 * time.Millisecond
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
started := make(chan struct{})
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1, connectFailFrom: 2, started: started}
errCh := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := Run(ctx, "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
errCh <- err
}()
select {
case <-started:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for replacement connect failure")
}
cancel()
err := <-errCh
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("want context.Canceled after cancel during replacement connect backoff")
}
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("cancel during replacement connect backoff must keep the sentinel, got %q (errors.Is Canceled = false)", err)
}
}
func TestRunMidStreamAbortRecordsReconnectCountOnImmediateReplacement(t *testing.T) {
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = time.Millisecond
rec := trace.NewRecorder("midstream-abort", "run-1", "test")
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
Trace: rec,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("retry should succeed, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 immediate replacement), got %d", got)
}
gotTrace := rec.Finish()
if got := gotTrace.Counter(trace.CounterReconnectCount); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("reconnect_count = %d, want 1 for a successful replacement connection", got)
}
if got := gotTrace.Counter(trace.CounterModelRequests); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("model_requests = %d, want 2 (initial + replacement)", got)
}
}
func TestRunDoesNotRetryResponseHeaderTimeout(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 99,
abortError: "net/http: timeout awaiting response headers",
}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("a response-header timeout must not be retried as a mid-stream abort")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("header timeout must not retry, got %d calls", got)
}
}
func TestIsMidStreamTransportAbort(t *testing.T) {
aborts := []string{
"provider stream error: read: connection reset by peer",
"provider stream error: unexpected EOF",
"provider stream error: read: wsarecv: 10053",
"provider stream error: read: wsarecv: An established connection was aborted by the software in your host machine",
"An existing connection was forcibly closed by the remote host",
"provider stream error: read: connection closed",
"write: broken pipe",
"provider stream error: server closed the connection",
"provider stream error: software caused connection abort",
}
for _, m := range aborts {
if !isMidStreamTransportAbort(m) {
t.Fatalf("want mid-stream transport abort: %q", m)
}
}
notAborts := []string{
"",
"context length exceeded",
"rate limit error: slow down",
"model not found",
"net/http: timeout awaiting response headers",
"dial tcp 10.0.0.1:443: connect: connection refused",
"i/o timeout",
"500 Internal Server Error",
"502 Bad Gateway",
"503 Service Unavailable",
"504 Gateway Timeout",
"provider request error: request does not satisfy oneOf schema",
"provider request error: connection closed is not a supported finish reason",
"provider error: connection closed is not a supported finish reason",
"provider error: upstream connection reset by peer",
"provider error: unexpected EOF while reading upstream response",
"provider error: 502 Bad Gateway",
"auth error: connection reset by peer",
"rate limit error: server closed",
"schema error: property oneOf is invalid",
}
for _, m := range notAborts {
if isMidStreamTransportAbort(m) {
t.Fatalf("must NOT classify as mid-stream transport abort: %q", m)
}
}
}
func TestRunDoesNotRetryClassifiedProviderErrorWithSocketPhrase(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 1,
abortError: "provider request error: connection closed is not a supported finish reason",
}
var notices string
opts := Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnReasoning: func(s string) { notices += s },
}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, opts)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected application error, got nil")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("classified provider error with 'connection closed' must not retry (got %d calls, want 1)", got)
}
if notices != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected no reconnect notices, got %q", notices)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "connection closed") {
t.Fatalf("expected original error preserved, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestRunDoesNotRetryProviderErrorWithSocketPhrase(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 1,
abortError: "provider error: unexpected EOF while reading upstream response",
}
var notices string
opts := Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnReasoning: func(s string) { notices += s },
}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, opts)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected application error, got nil")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("provider error with 'unexpected EOF' must not retry (got %d calls, want 1)", got)
}
if notices != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected no reconnect notices, got %q", notices)
}
if got := err.Error(); got != p.abortError {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want original provider error %q", got, p.abortError)
}
}
func TestRunDoesNotRetryApplicationErrorContainingEOFSubstring(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 1,
abortError: "provider request error: request does not satisfy oneOf schema",
}
var notices string
opts := Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnReasoning: func(s string) { notices += s },
}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, opts)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected application error, got nil")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("application error with 'oneOf' must not retry (got %d calls, want 1)", got)
}
if notices != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected no reconnect notices, got %q", notices)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "oneOf") {
t.Fatalf("expected original error preserved, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestRunRetriesMidStreamUnexpectedEOF(t *testing.T) {
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = time.Millisecond
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 1,
abortError: "provider stream error: unexpected EOF",
}
var notices string
opts := Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnReasoning: func(s string) { notices += s },
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, opts)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected EOF should retry to success, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
lower := strings.ToLower(notices)
if !strings.Contains(lower, "connection lost") || !strings.Contains(lower, "reconnecting") {
t.Fatalf("expected reconnect notice, got %q", notices)
}
}
-13
View File
@@ -31,19 +31,6 @@ func (t countingSchemaTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Resul
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
func TestRuntimeToolDefinitionMarksOnlyBuiltInApplyPatchFreeform(t *testing.T) {
builtIn := runtimeToolDefinition(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
if builtIn.Type != zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFreeform {
t.Fatalf("built-in apply_patch type = %q, want freeform", builtIn.Type)
}
calls := 0
custom := runtimeToolDefinition(countingSchemaTool{name: "apply_patch", calls: &calls})
if custom.Type != "" {
t.Fatalf("custom apply_patch type = %q, want legacy function shape", custom.Type)
}
}
// The cache renders a tool's schema once and reuses it across calls, and its
// output is identical to the uncached path.
func TestPartitionToolsCacheRendersOnceAndMatchesUncached(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// escalatingEngine allows unsandboxed escalation: no denied reads, so
// UnsandboxedExecutionAllowed is true and a prefix approval would rewrite the
// call to require_escalated.
func escalatingEngine(t *testing.T) *sandbox.Engine {
t.Helper()
policy := sandbox.DefaultPolicy()
policy.DenyRead = nil
return sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir(), Policy: policy})
}
// nonEscalatingEngine has a denied read, which is exactly the condition under
// which escalation is refused, so no disclosure should be made.
func nonEscalatingEngine(t *testing.T) *sandbox.Engine {
t.Helper()
root := t.TempDir()
policy := sandbox.DefaultPolicy()
policy.DenyRead = []string{filepath.Join(root, "secret.txt")}
return sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: root, Policy: policy})
}
// THE POINT OF THE FILE. The prompt's disclosure and the args rewrite must
// agree on every input, because the defect being fixed is precisely that the
// two disagreed: the rewrite escalated out of the sandbox while the prompt said
// only "allow command prefix for session".
//
// Asserting agreement rather than asserting each side's expected value is what
// makes this hold up. If someone later widens or narrows the rewrite's guards
// and forgets the flag, the two diverge here and this fails, which a pair of
// independent expected-value tests would not catch.
func TestPrefixEscalationDisclosureMatchesTheArgsRewrite(t *testing.T) {
escalating := Options{Sandbox: escalatingEngine(t)}
denied := Options{Sandbox: nonEscalatingEngine(t)}
cases := []struct {
name string
toolName string
args map[string]any
options Options
}{
{"plain bash command", "bash", map[string]any{"command": "go test ./..."}, escalating},
{"plain exec_command", "exec_command", map[string]any{"cmd": "go build ./..."}, escalating},
{"not a shell tool", "read_file", map[string]any{"path": "go.mod"}, escalating},
{"no sandbox configured", "bash", map[string]any{"command": "go test ./..."}, Options{}},
{"escalation refused by denied reads", "bash", map[string]any{"command": "go test ./..."}, denied},
{
"call already asks for escalation",
"bash",
map[string]any{"command": "go test ./...", "sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated)},
escalating,
},
{
"call already asks for additional permissions",
"bash",
map[string]any{"command": "go test ./...", "sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)},
escalating,
},
// An unrecognized value is NOT an opt-out: the rewrite overwrites it, so
// the disclosure has to fire. Included because the obvious reading of
// the guards says otherwise, and a case asserting the wrong thing here
// would have passed silently.
{
"unrecognized sandbox_permissions value",
"bash",
map[string]any{"command": "go test ./...", "sandbox_permissions": "all"},
escalating,
},
{"empty args", "bash", map[string]any{}, escalating},
{"nil args", "bash", nil, escalating},
}
for _, testCase := range cases {
t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
disclosed := shellPrefixApprovalEscalates(testCase.toolName, testCase.args, testCase.options)
// What the user's approval would actually be turned into.
rewritten := shellExecutionArgsForApproval(testCase.toolName, testCase.args, PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix, testCase.options)
escalates := shellCommandRequiresEscalated(rewritten) && !shellCommandRequiresEscalated(testCase.args)
if disclosed != escalates {
t.Fatalf("prompt discloses escalation=%v but approving actually escalates=%v; the prompt and the rewrite disagree, which is the consent gap this guards", disclosed, escalates)
}
})
}
}
// The two prefix decisions are the only ones that escalate, so a disclosure
// attached to a request offering neither would be a false alarm. Checked
// against the same predicate the rewrite consults.
func TestOnlyPrefixDecisionsEscalate(t *testing.T) {
escalating := map[PermissionDecisionAction]bool{
PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix: true,
PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix: true,
}
for _, action := range []PermissionDecisionAction{
PermissionDecisionAllow,
PermissionDecisionAllowStrict,
PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix,
PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix,
PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow,
PermissionDecisionDeny,
PermissionDecisionCancel,
} {
if got := shellPrefixApprovalBypassesSandbox(action); got != escalating[action] {
t.Errorf("decision %q bypasses sandbox=%v, want %v", action, got, escalating[action])
}
}
}
+4 -89
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// These ceilings are a deliberate ratchet on Zero's fixed per-turn overhead — the
@@ -22,37 +20,7 @@ import (
// without a session id. Higher-risk tools that do not opt into auto remain excluded.
const (
maxBaseSystemPromptTokens = 3500
// Raised deliberately from 3550 on 2026-08-08. view_image (#843) took the set
// to 3588, and #867 trimmed it back to 3578: still 28 tokens over.
//
// The overrun is a rounding error rather than a regression. view_image costs
// 82 tokens, the second cheapest tool in the set, against exec_command's 909
// and request_permissions' 397; it is simply the one that crossed the line.
// Raised rather than paid down because the alternative was trimming a
// description to claw back 28 tokens, degrading a tool's usability to satisfy
// a line drawn against a 2026-07 measurement that predates two tools.
//
// The ratchet did its job: it caught the creep and forced a decision instead
// of a drift. That is the point of it, so keep raising it deliberately rather
// than reflexively.
//
// THIS COUNTS THE SCHEMAS ONLY, NOT THE HOST'S SHELL GUIDANCE. Until
// 2026-09-07 it counted both, and that made it a different measurement on
// every machine: exec_command appends shell guidance whose size depends on
// which shell was detected, so the same tree measured 3498 on Linux, ~3600 on
// a Windows host with pwsh 7, and 3653 on Windows PowerShell 5.1, which is
// stock Windows. The 5.1 case has been over this ceiling since view_image
// landed, so `go test ./...` failed for anyone on a stock Windows box while
// CI stayed green, because the runners have pwsh 7 and take the cheaper
// branch. A budget that passes or fails on which PowerShell happens to be
// installed is not ratcheting anything.
maxEagerToolSchemaTokens = 3650
// The host-specific half, ratcheted on its own so it cannot creep either.
// Measured 2026-09-07: Windows PowerShell 5.1 is the most expensive host at
// 155 tokens (722 chars), pwsh 7 is 110, cmd.exe is 87, and every POSIX host
// is 0 because no guidance is appended there. Set above the worst case, not
// above whatever this machine happens to be.
maxExecCommandShellGuidanceTokens = 200
maxEagerToolSchemaTokens = 3550
)
func TestSystemPromptTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
@@ -75,62 +43,9 @@ func TestEagerToolSchemaTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
// Options{} keeps DeferThreshold at 0, so deferral is inactive and every core
// tool is exposed eagerly — exactly what a plugin-free session sends each turn.
exposed, _ := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{}, map[string]bool{})
total := estimateToolDefTokens(exposed)
// exec_command's description carries this host's shell guidance, and that
// guidance is the one part of the eager set that is not the same everywhere.
// Charged separately below rather than folded in here, or this ceiling would
// mean a different thing on every machine. See the constants above.
//
// Removed from the description BEFORE estimating rather than subtracted from
// the total afterwards. ApproxTextTokens is an integer division, so
// floor((schema+guidance)/4) - floor(guidance/4) comes out one token high
// whenever the two remainders add past four, and which side of that line a
// host lands on depends on the length of its guidance: exactly the
// host-dependence this number is supposed to be rid of.
guidance := tools.HostExecCommandShellGuidance()
schemas := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, len(exposed))
copy(schemas, exposed)
stripped := 0
for index := range schemas {
without := strings.TrimSuffix(schemas[index].Description, guidance)
if without != schemas[index].Description {
stripped++
}
schemas[index].Description = without
}
if guidance != "" && stripped != 1 {
t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: this host's shell guidance came off %d descriptions, want exactly exec_command's; internal/tools pins it as that description's tail", stripped)
}
got := estimateToolDefTokens(schemas)
guidanceTokens := ApproxTextTokens(guidance)
t.Logf("eager core tool schemas: %d tokens across %d tools (%d total, %d host shell guidance)", got, len(exposed), total, guidanceTokens)
got := estimateToolDefTokens(exposed)
t.Logf("eager core tool schemas: %d tokens across %d tools", got, len(exposed))
if got > maxEagerToolSchemaTokens {
// NOT "defer a tool": this test pins DeferThreshold at 0, so marking a
// tool deferred leaves it exposed here and changes nothing. Deferral is
// still worth doing for real sessions, it just cannot move this number.
// The levers that do are a smaller schema, one fewer core tool, or a
// deliberate raise.
t.Fatalf("eager tool schemas are %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — trim a schema, drop a core tool, or raise the ceiling deliberately (deferring will NOT help: this test disables deferral)", got, maxEagerToolSchemaTokens)
}
if guidanceTokens > maxExecCommandShellGuidanceTokens {
t.Fatalf("this host's exec_command shell guidance is %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — trim the guidance in internal/tools/shell_runtime.go or raise the ceiling deliberately", guidanceTokens, maxExecCommandShellGuidanceTokens)
}
}
func TestAgentAdvertisesBothEditTools(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(t.TempDir(), nil) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
exposed, _ := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, map[string]bool{})
names := make(map[string]bool, len(exposed))
for _, definition := range exposed {
names[definition.Name] = true
}
if !names["apply_patch"] {
t.Fatal("agent must retain apply_patch for multi-hunk changes")
}
if !names["edit_file"] {
t.Fatal("agent must receive edit_file for targeted exact replacements")
t.Fatalf("eager tool schemas are %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — defer a tool or raise the ceiling deliberately", got, maxEagerToolSchemaTokens)
}
}
-6
View File
@@ -58,18 +58,12 @@ func toolSubstrings(exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) (toolsSubstr, schemaSu
for _, def := range exposed {
writeLengthPrefixed(&toolsSB, def.Name)
writeLengthPrefixed(&toolsSB, def.Description)
writeLengthPrefixed(&toolsSB, string(def.Type))
// Parameters is rendered to a canonical JSON string per tool. The
// schema-render cache in internal/agent (used by partitionToolsCached)
// guarantees the same render is byte-identical across turns for the
// same tool, so this substring is a stable hash input.
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, def.Name)
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, canonicalSchemaString(def.Parameters))
if def.Format != nil {
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, def.Format.Type)
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, def.Format.Syntax)
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, def.Format.Definition)
}
}
return toolsSB.String(), schemaSB.String()
}
-47
View File
@@ -73,38 +73,6 @@ func TestComputePrefixFingerprintSchemaChangeChangesSchemaHash(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintIncludesToolTypeAndFormat(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
base := zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{Name: "apply_patch", Description: "Patch files"}
baseFingerprint := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{base})
typed := base
typed.Type = zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFreeform
if got := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{typed}); got.ToolsHash == baseFingerprint.ToolsHash {
t.Fatal("ToolsHash must change when tool Type changes")
}
formatCases := []struct {
name string
format zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat
}{
{name: "type", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Type: "grammar"}},
{name: "syntax", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Syntax: "lark"}},
{name: "definition", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Definition: "start: PATCH"}},
{name: "empty", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{}},
}
for _, test := range formatCases {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
withFormat := base
withFormat.Format = &test.format
got := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{withFormat})
if got.SchemaHash == baseFingerprint.SchemaHash {
t.Fatalf("SchemaHash must change for %s format input", test.name)
}
})
}
}
// TestComputePrefixFingerprintSystemPromptChangeChangesBaseHash asserts the
// most common drift path: a system-prompt edit (e.g. an agent.md update, a
// model addendum change) must move the base-instructions hash, which moves
@@ -155,21 +123,6 @@ func TestComputePrefixFingerprintCoversEverySystemPromptSection(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintCoversTransientSystemPrompt(t *testing.T) {
base := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
changed := base
changed.TransientSystemPrompt = "turn-only guidance"
fpBase := ComputePrefixFingerprint(base, nil)
fpChanged := ComputePrefixFingerprint(changed, nil)
if fpBase.SystemPromptHash == fpChanged.SystemPromptHash {
t.Fatal("SystemPromptHash must change for transient system guidance")
}
if fpBase.CompletePrefixHash == fpChanged.CompletePrefixHash {
t.Fatal("CompletePrefixHash must cover transient system guidance")
}
}
// TestBuildPromptSubstringsDefaultOptions asserts the invariants of the
// substrings helper for default Options: which substrings are non-empty,
// which are empty, and that the substring-to-hash round-trip is lossless.
-89
View File
@@ -144,15 +144,6 @@ func shouldReconnect(ctx context.Context, err error) bool {
"i/o timeout",
"server closed",
"unexpected end",
// Windows mid-stream aborts (WSAECONNABORTED / wsarecv) — host or AV
// forcibly closes an established socket during CollectStream.
// "software caused connection abort" is the Unix/macOS ECONNABORTED
// text; it also appears in midStreamAbortNeedles, which must stay a
// subset of this list.
"wsarecv",
"connection was aborted",
"software caused connection abort",
"forcibly closed",
} {
if strings.Contains(msg, needle) {
return true
@@ -161,86 +152,6 @@ func shouldReconnect(ctx context.Context, err error) bool {
return false
}
// midStreamAbortNeedles are the transport-abort classes retried AFTER connect
// succeeded and the stream body has started. This is a subset of shouldReconnect:
// connect-phase signals (timeout, connection refused, "temporarily unavailable")
// stay on the connect retry path, because matching them here would re-prefill a
// healthy-but-slow server (ollama cloud header timeouts) and tell the user the
// connection was lost. Issue #973 names WSAECONNABORTED / connection reset /
// unexpected stream EOF.
var midStreamAbortNeedles = []string{
"unexpected end",
"connection reset",
"broken pipe",
"connection closed",
"server closed",
"wsarecv",
"connection was aborted",
"software caused connection abort",
"forcibly closed",
}
var classifiedNonTransportPrefixes = []string{
"provider request error:",
"provider error:",
"auth error:",
"rate limit error:",
}
// isMidStreamTransportAbort reports whether a collected stream error string is a
// retryable mid-stream transport abort. It does NOT delegate to shouldReconnect:
// that list is a connect-phase argument ("no response was received"). The stream
// body has already started here, so only abort/reset/EOF/close classes retry.
//
// Used for failures DURING the stream body AFTER a successful connect and BEFORE
// tool dispatch — the incomplete turn committed no answer text and executed no
// tools, so a bounded re-issue is safe (same safety rules as the stall path).
func isMidStreamTransportAbort(message string) bool {
lowered := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(message))
if lowered == "" || isContextLimitError(lowered) {
return false
}
for _, prefix := range classifiedNonTransportPrefixes {
if strings.Contains(lowered, prefix) {
return false
}
}
if errhint.HasStatusCode(lowered, "500", "502", "503", "504") {
return false
}
if containsWordBoundary(lowered, "eof") {
return true
}
for _, needle := range midStreamAbortNeedles {
if strings.Contains(lowered, needle) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func containsWordBoundary(text, word string) bool {
start := 0
for {
idx := strings.Index(text[start:], word)
if idx < 0 {
return false
}
pos := start + idx
endPos := pos + len(word)
leftBoundary := pos == 0 || !isAlphaNumByte(text[pos-1])
rightBoundary := endPos == len(text) || !isAlphaNumByte(text[endPos])
if leftBoundary && rightBoundary {
return true
}
start = pos + 1
}
}
func isAlphaNumByte(c byte) bool {
return (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || c == '_'
}
// backoffFor is the deterministic exponential base delay for a 1-based attempt,
// capped at streamReconnectMax. Jitter is layered on separately (jitteredBackoff).
func backoffFor(attempt int) time.Duration {
-6
View File
@@ -92,12 +92,6 @@ func TestShouldReconnectClassification(t *testing.T) {
disconnects := []string{
"unexpected EOF", "connection reset by peer", "broken pipe",
"i/o timeout", "server closed the connection", "connection refused",
// Windows socket aborts also remain reconnectable at connect time.
"wsarecv: An established connection was aborted by the software in your host machine",
"read: connection was aborted",
// Unix/macOS ECONNABORTED text.
"read: software caused connection abort",
"An existing connection was forcibly closed by the remote host",
}
for _, m := range disconnects {
if !shouldReconnect(ctx, errors.New(m)) {
-15
View File
@@ -95,9 +95,6 @@ func buildSystemPromptParts(options Options) systemPromptParts {
core = fallbackSystemPrompt
}
sections := []string{core}
if transient := strings.TrimSpace(options.TransientSystemPrompt); transient != "" {
sections = append(sections, transient)
}
if addendum := modelPromptAddendum(options.Model); addendum != "" {
sections = append(sections, addendum)
}
@@ -121,9 +118,6 @@ func buildSystemPromptParts(options Options) systemPromptParts {
if project != "" {
sections = append(sections, project)
}
if modeCtx := permissionModeContext(options); modeCtx != "" {
sections = append(sections, modeCtx)
}
if delegation := specialistDelegationContext(options); delegation != "" {
sections = append(sections, delegation)
}
@@ -685,12 +679,3 @@ func gitBranchForPrompt(cwd string) string {
}
return ref
}
func permissionModeContext(options Options) string {
switch options.PermissionMode {
case PermissionModePlan:
return "Plan mode is active on this session. Your role is read-only exploration and planning: inspect the workspace and shape the plan with update_plan, but do not make changes to files or execute commands."
default:
return ""
}
}
+20 -35
View File
@@ -30,10 +30,11 @@ work.
read-before-edit discipline: inspect the target file and nearby callers,
tests, or config before you modify behavior. Never edit a file you have not
read.
2. **Plan.** Use update_plan for multi-component, sequencing-uncertain, or long
work. Skip it for bounded changes in one component. Update only when the
overall phase changes, keep at most one item in_progress, and never create a
plan after the work is complete.
2. **Plan.** For multi-step work, call update_plan with an ordered checklist and
keep it current at meaningful milestones. Mark completed work and the next
in-progress step together when practical; do not spend separate model turns
updating the plan after every file or command. Keep at most one item
in_progress. Skip the plan for trivial one-step tasks.
3. **Implement.** Make focused changes that match the surrounding code's style,
naming, and conventions. Prefer the smallest change that fully solves the
problem. Avoid broad refactors, unrelated rewrites, dependency churn, and
@@ -48,49 +49,34 @@ work.
## Editing discipline
- Choose the narrowest tool that safely accomplishes the step. Prefer native
file tools - read_file, read_minified_file, list_directory, glob, grep,
edit_file, apply_patch, write_file - over shelling out to
cat/sed/awk/python for file operations.
file tools - read_file, list_directory, glob, grep, write_file, edit_file,
apply_patch - over shelling out to cat/sed/awk/python for file operations.
They are safer, reviewable, and produce clean diffs.
- Use read_minified_file only to explore large or unfamiliar source. Use
read_file for small or likely edit targets and exact text, comments, or line
numbers. Do not read both unless a new need for exact content appears.
- Keep edits focused and reviewable. A single patch may update several related
files when they form one coherent change; do not hide unrelated edits in a
bulk shell or script rewrite.
- For edits to existing files, use edit_file for a targeted change (old_string
must match the file exactly and be unique, so include a few surrounding
lines) and apply_patch when one coherent change spans several hunks or
files. Use write_file only to create a file or when most of it changes; do
not rewrite a whole file to change a few lines. Match the existing
indentation, imports, and idioms. Match the file's comment density: do not
add explanatory comments unless the user asks or the code is already
comment-dense.
- A successful edit result already confirms the change; do not re-read a file
just to verify an edit that succeeded. If an edit fails, read the error, fix
the old_string or hunk, and retry the same tool rather than switching to a
full rewrite.
- For edits to existing files, prefer edit_file or apply_patch with minimal,
targeted diffs. Match the existing indentation, imports, and idioms. Match the
file's comment density: do not add explanatory comments unless the user asks or
the code is already comment-dense.
- Solve the problem as posed, not a more general version of it. Add no
speculative abstraction, configurability, or handling for cases that cannot
occur, and nothing the user did not ask for. A small diff can still be
over-built; if a 200-line solution could be 50, rewrite it. Once the required
behavior passes validation, stop instead of adding optional cleanup.
over-built; if a 200-line solution could be 50, rewrite it.
- Preserve behavior you were not asked to change. Do not delete or rewrite code
you did not author unless the task requires it; if you must, say so.
## Testing gate (mandatory)
- After code changes, run the project's documented appropriate validators.
Scope iteration checks, combine compatible commands when diagnostics stay
useful, and run the final set once after the last edit. Rerun only after a
change or failure.
- If unsure which entry points apply, inspect the Makefile, manifests, or CI;
do not invent a parallel flow.
- After any change to code, verify after edits by running the project's
validators before you summarize or commit: tests, type-checks, linters, and/or
the build, as appropriate. Scope them to the change while iterating; reserve
full-suite runs for milestones.
- If you are unsure which validators apply, search the repo (Makefile, package
manifests, CI config) to find them.
- Never claim a task is done, and never commit, while validators are failing. If
they fail, fix the cause and rerun; do not paper over it. If you could not run
a validator, say so explicitly rather than implying success.
- A successful native patch confirms the edit. Reread only when the next change
needs exact content or the result was ambiguous.
## Tool use
@@ -112,7 +98,7 @@ work.
you need to clean up a running foreground command yourself, use write_stdin.
- write_stdin's session_id is only ever an id returned by a still-running
exec_command; never guess or probe ids. If you have no such session, start one
with exec_command, or use edit_file/apply_patch/write_file for file changes.
with exec_command, or use write_file/edit_file/apply_patch for file changes.
- write_stdin with empty input polls an existing exec_command session, and
`\u0003` interrupts it. Sending other stdin bytes may require approval because
it can drive the running process beyond the original command. Non-tty sessions
@@ -148,7 +134,6 @@ work.
- Default to concise, skimmable output. Lead with the answer or the result.
- Use GitHub-flavored Markdown: headings to structure longer replies, fenced
code blocks for code, and `inline code` for file paths, commands, symbols, and
short snippets. Reference code with file paths and include line numbers when
already known; do not look them up solely for the final summary.
short snippets. Reference code as `file:line` so it is clickable.
- Report outcomes faithfully: if tests failed, show it; if a step was skipped,
say so; when something is done and verified, state it plainly without hedging.
+3 -7
View File
@@ -60,11 +60,8 @@ const openAIPromptAddendum = `<model_guidance>
longer answers, fenced code blocks for code, and ` + "`inline code`" + ` for paths,
commands, and symbols.
- Strongly prefer the native file tools (read_file, list_directory, grep, glob,
edit_file, apply_patch, write_file) over shelling out to cat/sed/awk/python for
file work. Use them directly; never run apply_patch through exec_command.
read_file, edit_file and write_file take one file per call, while one coherent
apply_patch may span several files. Keep independent native calls in the same
turn, and do not batch file writes into a script.
write_file, edit_file, apply_patch) over shelling out to cat/sed/awk/python for
file work. Make one tool call per file; do not batch file writes into a script.
- Persist until the task is fully handled this turn: gather context, implement,
run the validators, and report — do not stop at a partial result.
</model_guidance>`
@@ -74,6 +71,5 @@ const geminiPromptAddendum = `<model_guidance>
equivalent shell commands; they are safer and produce cleaner diffs.
- Be concise and concrete. When you run a shell command with side effects, state
in one short clause why it is needed.
- Use update_plan only for work with at least three meaningful dependent steps;
skip it for simple lookups and never create one after the work is complete.
- Use update_plan for any multi-step task and keep it current.
</model_guidance>`
@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ func TestBuildSystemPromptAppendsModelAddendum(t *testing.T) {
if got := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Model: "gpt-5"}); !strings.Contains(got, openAIPromptAddendum) {
t.Fatalf("expected the OpenAI addendum in the gpt-5 prompt")
}
if got := strings.Join(strings.Fields(strings.ToLower(buildSystemPrompt(Options{Model: "gpt-5"}))), " "); !strings.Contains(got, "never run apply_patch through exec_command") {
t.Fatalf("OpenAI prompt must route edits through the native patch tool:\n%s", got)
}
// Claude is aligned with the core prompt and gets no family addendum now that
// comment discipline is universal; it must not pick up another family's block.
claude := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Model: "claude-opus-4-6"})
+2 -22
View File
@@ -29,17 +29,14 @@ func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
}
func TestCoreSystemPromptIncludesCodingQualityRules(t *testing.T) {
prompt := strings.Join(strings.Fields(strings.ToLower(buildSystemPrompt(Options{}))), " ")
if strings.Contains(prompt, "clickable file paths") {
t.Fatalf("system prompt must not claim inline-code file paths are clickable: %s", prompt)
}
prompt := strings.ToLower(buildSystemPrompt(Options{}))
for _, want := range []string{
"read-before-edit",
"inspect the target file",
"plan then act",
"choose the narrowest tool",
"for edits to existing files, use edit_file",
"prefer edit_file or apply_patch",
"verify after edits",
"honor the active permission mode",
"avoid broad refactors",
@@ -47,13 +44,6 @@ func TestCoreSystemPromptIncludesCodingQualityRules(t *testing.T) {
"do not recognize",
"scaled to the work",
"comment density",
"skip it for bounded changes in one component",
"do not read both unless a new need for exact content appears",
"combine compatible commands when diagnostics stay useful",
"do not invent a parallel flow",
"a successful native patch confirms the edit",
"once the required behavior passes validation, stop",
"do not look them up solely for the final summary",
} {
if !strings.Contains(prompt, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected core system prompt to include %q, got:\n%s", want, buildSystemPrompt(Options{}))
@@ -61,16 +51,6 @@ func TestCoreSystemPromptIncludesCodingQualityRules(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestTransientSystemPromptIsIncludedOnlyWhenProvided(t *testing.T) {
const transient = "Handle this peer request under the current session policy."
if prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{}); strings.Contains(prompt, transient) {
t.Fatal("ordinary system prompt unexpectedly contains transient instructions")
}
if prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{TransientSystemPrompt: transient}); !strings.Contains(prompt, transient) {
t.Fatalf("transient instructions missing from system prompt:\n%s", prompt)
}
}
func TestSystemPromptExplainsSandboxEscalationForHiddenHostState(t *testing.T) {
prompt := strings.ToLower(buildSystemPrompt(Options{}))
for _, want := range []string{
+10 -217
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,10 @@
package agent
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"reflect"
"regexp"
"sort"
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
@@ -56,41 +52,17 @@ type taskVerificationState struct {
LastOutcome Outcome `json:"last_outcome,omitempty"`
}
type taskFailureState struct {
Key string `json:"key,omitempty"`
Tool string `json:"tool"`
Command string `json:"command,omitempty"`
Summary string `json:"summary"`
}
type taskApprovalState struct {
Tool string `json:"tool"`
Decision PermissionDecisionAction `json:"decision,omitempty"`
Scope string `json:"scope,omitempty"`
Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"`
}
type taskArtifactState struct {
Tool string `json:"tool"`
Path string `json:"path"`
}
type taskStateSnapshot struct {
Revision int `json:"revision"`
Objective string `json:"objective"`
Status taskStatus `json:"status"`
Plan taskPlanState `json:"plan"`
Tools taskToolState `json:"tools"`
Verification taskVerificationState `json:"verification"`
ChangedFiles []string `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
Constraints []string `json:"constraints,omitempty"`
UnresolvedFailures []taskFailureState `json:"unresolved_failures,omitempty"`
Approvals []taskApprovalState `json:"approvals,omitempty"`
Artifacts []taskArtifactState `json:"artifacts,omitempty"`
ResolvedFailureKeys []string `json:"-"`
CompletionDecision CompletionDecision `json:"completion_decision,omitempty"`
CompletionReason string `json:"completion_reason,omitempty"`
PlanParity taskPlanParity `json:"plan_parity"`
Revision int `json:"revision"`
Objective string `json:"objective"`
Status taskStatus `json:"status"`
Plan taskPlanState `json:"plan"`
Tools taskToolState `json:"tools"`
Verification taskVerificationState `json:"verification"`
ChangedFiles []string `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
CompletionDecision CompletionDecision `json:"completion_decision,omitempty"`
CompletionReason string `json:"completion_reason,omitempty"`
PlanParity taskPlanParity `json:"plan_parity"`
}
type taskStateEventKind int
@@ -100,7 +72,6 @@ const (
taskStateEventToolResult
taskStateEventVerification
taskStateEventCompletion
taskStateEventPermission
)
type taskStateEvent struct {
@@ -109,7 +80,6 @@ type taskStateEvent struct {
toolResult ToolResult
verification Outcome
completion completionEvaluation
permission PermissionEvent
}
// taskState is a deterministic projection of facts the loop already observes.
@@ -131,7 +101,6 @@ func newTaskState(objective string, recorder *trace.Recorder) *taskState {
},
changedFiles: map[string]struct{}{},
}
state.snapshotValue.Constraints = extractExplicitConstraints(objective)
state.recorder = recorder
return state
}
@@ -165,7 +134,6 @@ func (state *taskState) observe(event taskStateEvent) bool {
}
}
state.snapshotValue.ChangedFiles = sortedKeys(state.changedFiles)
state.observeToolEvidence(event.arguments, event.toolResult)
changed = true
case taskStateEventVerification:
if event.verification == OutcomeDisabled {
@@ -192,10 +160,6 @@ func (state *taskState) observe(event taskStateEvent) bool {
state.snapshotValue.Status = taskStatusActive
}
changed = true
case taskStateEventPermission:
state.markActive()
state.observePermission(event.permission)
changed = true
}
if changed {
state.snapshotValue.Revision++
@@ -219,180 +183,9 @@ func (state *taskState) snapshot() taskStateSnapshot {
snapshot := state.snapshotValue
snapshot.Plan.Items = append([]taskPlanItem(nil), state.snapshotValue.Plan.Items...)
snapshot.ChangedFiles = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.ChangedFiles...)
snapshot.Constraints = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.Constraints...)
snapshot.UnresolvedFailures = append([]taskFailureState(nil), state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures...)
snapshot.Approvals = append([]taskApprovalState(nil), state.snapshotValue.Approvals...)
snapshot.Artifacts = append([]taskArtifactState(nil), state.snapshotValue.Artifacts...)
snapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys...)
return snapshot
}
const (
maxTaskEvidenceEntries = 8
maxTaskEvidenceBytes = 320
maxTaskConstraints = 10
)
func (state *taskState) observeToolEvidence(arguments string, result ToolResult) {
command := capTaskEvidence(commandFromArguments(arguments))
key := taskFailureKey(result.Name, command, arguments)
if result.Status == tools.StatusOK {
if hasTaskFailure(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, key) {
state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures = removeTaskFailure(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, key)
state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys = appendBoundedUnique(state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys, key, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
}
} else {
state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys = removeString(state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys, key)
state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures = removeTaskFailure(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, key)
state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures = appendBounded(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, taskFailureState{
Key: key, Tool: result.Name, Command: command, Summary: capTaskEvidence(firstLine(result.Output)),
}, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
}
for _, metaKey := range []string{"spill_path", "artifact_path"} {
if path := strings.TrimSpace(result.Meta[metaKey]); path != "" {
state.snapshotValue.Artifacts = appendBoundedUnique(state.snapshotValue.Artifacts,
taskArtifactState{Tool: result.Name, Path: capTaskEvidence(path)}, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
}
}
}
func taskFailureKey(toolName, command, arguments string) string {
identity := command
if identity == "" {
canonical := []byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments))
var value any
if json.Unmarshal(canonical, &value) == nil {
if encoded, err := json.Marshal(value); err == nil {
canonical = encoded
}
}
digest := sha256.Sum256(canonical)
identity = fmt.Sprintf("args:%x", digest[:8])
}
return strings.TrimSpace(toolName) + "\x00" + identity
}
func (state *taskState) observePermission(event PermissionEvent) {
decision := event.DecisionAction
if decision == "" {
decision = PermissionDecisionAction(event.Action)
}
state.snapshotValue.Approvals = appendBoundedUnique(state.snapshotValue.Approvals, taskApprovalState{
Tool: event.ToolName, Decision: decision, Scope: capTaskEvidence(event.Scope),
Reason: capTaskEvidence(firstNonEmptyString(event.DecisionReason, event.Reason)),
}, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
}
func commandFromArguments(arguments string) string {
var object map[string]json.RawMessage
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments)), &object) != nil {
return ""
}
for _, key := range []string{"cmd", "command", "script", "shell"} {
var command string
if raw, ok := object[key]; ok && json.Unmarshal(raw, &command) == nil {
return strings.TrimSpace(command)
}
}
return ""
}
func firstLine(value string) string {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if index := strings.IndexByte(value, '\n'); index >= 0 {
value = value[:index]
}
return value
}
func capTaskEvidence(value string) string {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if len(value) <= maxTaskEvidenceBytes {
return value
}
limit := maxTaskEvidenceBytes - 3
for limit > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(value[limit]) {
limit--
}
return strings.TrimSpace(value[:limit]) + "..."
}
var explicitConstraintPatterns = []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bprefer(?:s|red|ring)?\s+\w`),
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bdon'?t want\b`),
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\balways (?:use|do|run|prefer|keep|make|format|write|add|set|put|prefix|start|include|append)\b`),
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bnever (?:use|do|run|push|commit|write|ignore|add|set|put|remove|delete|include|deploy)\b`),
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bplease (?:use|avoid|keep|make|don'?t|do not|format|write)\b`),
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\b(?:style|format|language|naming)\s*[:=]\s*\S`),
}
func extractExplicitConstraints(text string) []string {
var constraints []string
for _, line := range strings.Split(text, "\n") {
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if len(line) < 5 || len(line) > 200 || strings.HasSuffix(line, "?") || strings.Contains(line, "?...") {
continue
}
for _, pattern := range explicitConstraintPatterns {
if pattern.MatchString(line) {
constraints = appendBoundedUnique(constraints, line, maxTaskConstraints)
break
}
}
if len(constraints) == maxTaskConstraints {
break
}
}
return constraints
}
func appendBounded[T any](values []T, value T, limit int) []T {
values = append(values, value)
if len(values) > limit {
values = values[len(values)-limit:]
}
return values
}
func appendBoundedUnique[T comparable](values []T, value T, limit int) []T {
filtered := values[:0]
for _, existing := range values {
if existing != value {
filtered = append(filtered, existing)
}
}
return appendBounded(filtered, value, limit)
}
func hasTaskFailure(values []taskFailureState, key string) bool {
for _, value := range values {
if value.Key == key {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func removeTaskFailure(values []taskFailureState, key string) []taskFailureState {
out := values[:0]
for _, value := range values {
if value.Key != key {
out = append(out, value)
}
}
return out
}
func removeString(values []string, target string) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(values))
for _, value := range values {
if value != target {
out = append(out, value)
}
}
return out
}
// observePlanParity compares only the latest plan projection with the plan tool
// calls still present in messages. It mutates the snapshot and emits when the
// parity value changes; objective, tool, and verification fields are not part of
-62
View File
@@ -115,68 +115,6 @@ func TestTaskStateSnapshotIsImmutable(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestTaskStateRecordsDurableRuntimeEvidence(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("Please keep the change focused.\nNever commit generated reports.", nil)
arguments := `{"cmd":"go test ./internal/agent"}`
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: arguments, toolResult: ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "test-1", Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError,
Output: "Error: TestResumeRetainsState failed\nfull diagnostic",
Meta: map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/test-1.txt"},
}})
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPermission, permission: PermissionEvent{
ToolName: "exec_command", DecisionAction: PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
Scope: "/tmp", DecisionReason: "write a temporary fixture",
}})
snapshot := state.snapshot()
if !reflect.DeepEqual(snapshot.Constraints, []string{"Please keep the change focused.", "Never commit generated reports."}) {
t.Fatalf("unexpected explicit constraints: %#v", snapshot.Constraints)
}
if len(snapshot.UnresolvedFailures) != 1 || snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Command != "go test ./internal/agent" || snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Summary != "Error: TestResumeRetainsState failed" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected failure evidence: %#v", snapshot.UnresolvedFailures)
}
if len(snapshot.Artifacts) != 1 || snapshot.Artifacts[0].Path != ".zero/artifacts/test-1.txt" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected artifact evidence: %#v", snapshot.Artifacts)
}
if len(snapshot.Approvals) != 1 || snapshot.Approvals[0].Decision != PermissionDecisionAllowForSession || snapshot.Approvals[0].Scope != "/tmp" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected approval evidence: %#v", snapshot.Approvals)
}
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "read-a", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: a.go is unavailable",
}})
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"b.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "read-b", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "package b",
}})
if failures := state.snapshot().UnresolvedFailures; len(failures) != 2 || failures[1].Summary != "Error: a.go is unavailable" {
t.Fatalf("success for a different target resolved the wrong failure: %#v", failures)
}
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: arguments, toolResult: ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "test-2", Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "ok",
}})
if failures := state.snapshot().UnresolvedFailures; len(failures) != 1 || failures[0].Summary != "Error: a.go is unavailable" {
t.Fatalf("successful retry did not resolve only its matching failure: %#v", failures)
}
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "read-a-2", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "package a",
}})
if failures := state.snapshot().UnresolvedFailures; len(failures) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("successful non-command retry did not resolve its matching failure: %#v", failures)
}
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "read-a-3", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: a.go failed again",
}})
snapshot = state.snapshot()
if len(snapshot.UnresolvedFailures) != 1 || snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Summary != "Error: a.go failed again" {
t.Fatalf("a failure recurring after success was hidden: %#v", snapshot.UnresolvedFailures)
}
for _, key := range snapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys {
if key == snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Key {
t.Fatalf("recurring failure retained a stale resolved key: %#v", snapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys)
}
}
}
func TestTaskStatePlanParityUsesLatestPlan(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"old","status":"completed"}]}`})
-404
View File
@@ -1,404 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestNonVisionImageNoticeQualifiesBudgetRecovery(t *testing.T) {
result := ToolResult{
Name: "mcp_screenshot",
Output: "One image exceeded this result's remaining image budget. Retrying with fewer images can recover this payload.",
Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: "image/png", Data: []byte("image")}},
}
notice, ok := toolResultImageMessage(result, Options{
SupportsVision: func(string) bool { return false },
})
if !ok || len(notice.Images) != 0 {
t.Fatal("non-vision delivery must produce a text-only notice")
}
if !strings.Contains(notice.Content, "Switch to a vision-capable model before retrying") ||
!strings.Contains(notice.Content, "budget") {
t.Fatalf("notice does not qualify budget recovery: %s", notice.Content)
}
}
// imageTool returns a tool result carrying an image, the way a screenshot tool
// should be able to.
type imageTool struct {
media string
data []byte
}
func (imageTool) Name() string { return "capture" }
func (imageTool) Description() string { return "Captures an image." }
func (imageTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{}}
}
func (imageTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (t imageTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: "Captured a screenshot.",
Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: t.media, Data: t.data}},
}
}
// A tool that produces an image must get that image in front of the model.
//
// It cannot ride the tool-result message: every provider drops images there.
// Anthropic maps a tool result to a tool_result block with string content,
// Gemini to a functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image parts to the user
// role explicitly. So the image has to arrive as a following user message,
// which is also the only shape that keeps one tool result per tool call.
func TestRunDeliversToolResultImagesToTheModel(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(imageTool{media: "image/png", data: []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake")})
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call_1", ToolName: "capture"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call_1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call_1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "I can see it."},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "screenshot please", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: 2,
Model: "gpt-4o",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
var carrier *zeroruntime.Message
for index := range result.Messages {
if len(result.Messages[index].Images) > 0 {
carrier = &result.Messages[index]
break
}
}
if carrier == nil {
t.Fatal("no message carried the tool's image; the model never saw it")
}
if carrier.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser {
t.Errorf("image rode a %q message; every provider only serializes images on the user role", carrier.Role)
}
if got := carrier.Images[0].MediaType; got != "image/png" {
t.Errorf("media type = %q, want image/png", got)
}
// The tool-result pairing must be untouched: one tool result per tool call.
toolResults := 0
var toolText string
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
toolResults++
toolText = message.Content
}
}
if toolText != "Captured a screenshot." {
t.Fatalf("tool text = %q, want preserved", toolText)
}
if toolResults != 1 {
t.Errorf("got %d tool-result messages for 1 tool call", toolResults)
}
}
// textTool is a second, image-free tool so a turn can carry two calls.
type textTool struct{}
func (textTool) Name() string { return "note" }
func (textTool) Description() string { return "Notes something." }
func (textTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{}}
}
func (textTool) Safety() tools.Safety { return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow} }
func (textTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "noted"}
}
// Tool results for one assistant turn must stay contiguous. The image messages
// are user-role, and a user message between two tool_results breaks strict
// provider replay: Anthropic coalesces consecutive user content into one block
// list and requires tool_result blocks first, so interleaving produces
// [tool_result, text, image, tool_result] and the request is rejected.
//
// The first version of this feature appended each image immediately after its
// own tool result, which is exactly that shape. A single-tool-call test passed
// and said nothing about it.
func TestRunKeepsToolResultsContiguousWhenAToolReturnsAnImage(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(imageTool{media: "image/png", data: []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake")})
registry.Register(textTool{})
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "capture"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c2", ToolName: "note"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c2", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c2"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "two calls", provider, Options{Registry: registry, MaxTurns: 2, Model: "gpt-4o"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
// Two separate ifs rather than a switch: a tool-role message that also
// carried images would match only the first arm of a switch, so a regression
// that put the image back on the tool result would read as "no image at all"
// instead of naming what actually happened.
type toolResult struct {
index int
id string
}
var toolResults []toolResult
imageIndex := -1
for index, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
toolResults = append(toolResults, toolResult{index: index, id: message.ToolCallID})
}
if len(message.Images) > 0 {
if imageIndex >= 0 {
t.Fatalf("image delivered twice, at %d and %d; recorded %s", imageIndex, index, messageShape(result.Messages))
}
imageIndex = index
}
}
if imageIndex < 0 {
t.Fatalf("the image never reached the model; recorded %s", messageShape(result.Messages))
}
if len(toolResults) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("got %d tool-result messages for 2 tool calls; recorded %s", len(toolResults), messageShape(result.Messages))
}
if toolResults[0].id != "c1" || toolResults[1].id != "c2" {
t.Errorf("tool results answered %q then %q, want c1 then c2", toolResults[0].id, toolResults[1].id)
}
// The contract Anthropic enforces: every tool_result block has to come before
// any other block in the user message it lands in. Anything wedged between
// the two results breaks that, which is the 400 this PR exists to avoid.
if toolResults[1].index != toolResults[0].index+1 {
t.Errorf("tool results at %d and %d are not adjacent; %q message at %d splits them; recorded %s",
toolResults[0].index, toolResults[1].index, result.Messages[toolResults[0].index+1].Role,
toolResults[0].index+1, messageShape(result.Messages))
}
// Follows the last tool result, deliberately NOT pinned to exactly last+1.
// appendUserBlocks coalesces consecutive user-role content, so
// [tool_result, tool_result, text, image] still maps to tool_result blocks
// first and replays fine; pinning would redden that valid shape for nothing.
if imageIndex <= toolResults[1].index {
t.Errorf("image message at %d does not follow the last tool result at %d; recorded %s",
imageIndex, toolResults[1].index, messageShape(result.Messages))
}
}
// messageShape renders the conversation as a compact role list so a failure says
// what the ordering actually was instead of dumping whole messages.
func messageShape(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
parts := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
for index, message := range messages {
part := fmt.Sprintf("%d:%s", index, message.Role)
if message.ToolCallID != "" {
part += "(" + message.ToolCallID + ")"
}
if len(message.Images) > 0 {
part += "+image"
}
parts = append(parts, part)
}
return "[" + strings.Join(parts, " ") + "]"
}
func TestRunDropsToolResultImagesForANonVisionModel(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(imageTool{media: "image/png", data: []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake")})
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call_1", ToolName: "capture"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call_1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call_1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "ok"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "screenshot please", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: 2,
Model: "totally-made-up-model",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
var toolText string
var noticed bool
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
toolText = message.Content
}
if len(message.Images) > 0 {
t.Fatalf("non-vision model received image bytes on %q: %s", message.Role, messageShape(result.Messages))
}
if strings.Contains(message.Content, "does not support image input") {
noticed = true
}
}
if toolText != "Captured a screenshot." {
t.Fatalf("tool text = %q, want preserved on the non-vision path", toolText)
}
if !noticed {
t.Fatalf("non-vision model was not told the image was dropped; recorded %s", messageShape(result.Messages))
}
}
type switchAndCaptureTool struct {
targetModel string
}
func (switchAndCaptureTool) Name() string { return "switch_and_capture" }
func (switchAndCaptureTool) Description() string { return "Switches model and captures image" }
func (switchAndCaptureTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{}}
}
func (switchAndCaptureTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (t switchAndCaptureTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: "[image returned by tool]",
Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: "image/png", Data: []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake")}},
Meta: map[string]string{"escalate_to_model": t.targetModel},
}
}
func TestRunToolImagesRespectsModelSwitch(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("Non-vision to vision model escalation forwards images", func(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(switchAndCaptureTool{targetModel: "gpt-4o"})
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call_1", ToolName: "switch_and_capture"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call_1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call_1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "I see it on gpt-4o."},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
switched := false
switcher := func(_ context.Context, modelID string) (Provider, error) {
switched = true
return provider, nil
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "test", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: 2,
Model: "non-vision-initial",
ModelSwitcher: switcher,
SupportsVision: func(modelID string) bool {
return modelID == "gpt-4o"
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
if !switched {
t.Fatal("expected model switch to occur")
}
var carrier *zeroruntime.Message
for index := range result.Messages {
if len(result.Messages[index].Images) > 0 {
carrier = &result.Messages[index]
}
if strings.Contains(result.Messages[index].Content, "does not support image input") {
t.Fatalf("images were unexpectedly dropped after switch to vision model: %v", result.Messages[index])
}
}
if carrier == nil {
t.Fatal("expected image carrier message after escalation to vision model")
}
})
t.Run("Vision to non-vision model switch drops images with notice", func(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(switchAndCaptureTool{targetModel: "text-only-dest"})
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call_1", ToolName: "switch_and_capture"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call_1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call_1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "ok."},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
switcher := func(_ context.Context, modelID string) (Provider, error) {
return provider, nil
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "test", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: 2,
Model: "gpt-4o",
ModelSwitcher: switcher,
SupportsVision: func(modelID string) bool {
return modelID == "gpt-4o"
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
var noticed bool
var toolOutputSeen bool
for _, m := range result.Messages {
if len(m.Images) > 0 {
t.Fatalf("image delivered to non-vision destination model: %v", m)
}
if strings.Contains(m.Content, "does not support image input") {
noticed = true
}
if strings.Contains(m.Content, "[image returned by tool]") {
toolOutputSeen = true
}
}
if !noticed {
t.Fatal("expected drop notice when switching to non-vision model")
}
if !toolOutputSeen {
t.Fatal("expected tool output preserved in message history")
}
})
}
+9 -84
View File
@@ -26,15 +26,6 @@ const (
PermissionModeAsk PermissionMode = "ask"
PermissionModeUnsafe PermissionMode = "unsafe"
PermissionModeSpecDraft PermissionMode = "spec-draft"
// PermissionModePlan is an interactive, read-only planning mode. It applies
// to the CURRENT session (unlike spec-draft, which drafts in a separate
// session): the agent may inspect the workspace and shape the plan with
// update_plan/ask_user, but no mutating tool is advertised, so it cannot
// write files, run shell, or implement while planning. Entry points:
// the TUI's /plan on (exit with /plan off, which restores whatever mode
// was active before), `zero exec --plan`, and the ACP session mode
// selector ("plan").
PermissionModePlan PermissionMode = "plan"
// PermissionModeMemberAuto is a headless mode for swarm/specialist MEMBERS: it
// advertises the in-workspace mutators a member needs to build (write/edit +
// shell) on top of the Auto set, while the sandbox engine still gates them at
@@ -77,19 +68,14 @@ type ToolResult struct {
Output string
// Truncated reports that the tool's model-visible output omitted content.
// The full result may be recoverable through Meta["spill_path"].
Truncated bool
Meta map[string]string
// Images the tool produced, delivered to the model as a following user
// message rather than on this result. See tools.Result.Images.
Images []zeroruntime.ImageBlock
Truncated bool
Meta map[string]string
Redacted bool
ChangedFiles []string
FileDiffs []tools.FileDiff
// ChangeSummaries are non-selectable generated-tree summaries emitted by
// command execution; callers must not schedule per-file work from them.
ChangeSummaries []execution.Change
Display tools.Display
Outcome tools.ToolOutcome
// DenialReason categorizes why a tool call was blocked (empty when it ran).
// It lets a surface distinguish the cause precisely instead of parsing Output.
DenialReason DenialCategory
@@ -110,24 +96,6 @@ type ToolResult struct {
RequestedModel string
}
// ModelOutput returns the bounded provider-facing result while preserving
// compatibility with synthetic and restored results created before outcomes
// were finalized.
func (result ToolResult) ModelOutput() string {
if result.Outcome.Finalized() {
return result.Outcome.ModelView
}
return result.Output
}
// HumanDisplay returns the presentation intended for interactive surfaces.
func (result ToolResult) HumanDisplay() tools.Display {
if result.Outcome.Finalized() {
return result.Outcome.HumanView
}
return result.Display
}
// DenialCategory classifies why a tool call was blocked before it executed.
type DenialCategory string
@@ -205,22 +173,6 @@ type PermissionRequest struct {
Grant *sandbox.Grant `json:"grant,omitempty"`
CommandPrefix []string `json:"commandPrefix,omitempty"`
AvailableDecisions []PermissionDecisionAction `json:"availableDecisions,omitempty"`
// PrefixApprovalEscalates reports that approving a command prefix will also
// run the command OUTSIDE the sandbox, not merely stop asking about it.
//
// It exists because that consequence was real but invisible. Approving a
// prefix rewrites the call to sandbox_permissions: require_escalated, which
// resolves to a nil engine and genuinely unsandboxed execution, and the
// engine's own escalation prompt is then satisfied by the approval just
// given for the sandboxed form. So the operator authorized one thing and got
// a wider one, having been shown only "allow command prefix for session".
//
// The escalation itself is deliberate and guarded: proposedCommandPrefix
// refuses to offer a prefix while any other segment of the command is not
// known-safe, precisely so an unreviewed segment cannot ride out of the
// sandbox on it. What was missing was telling the person deciding, so this
// surfaces it rather than removing it.
PrefixApprovalEscalates bool `json:"prefixApprovalEscalates,omitempty"`
}
type PermissionDecision struct {
@@ -326,12 +278,8 @@ type Options struct {
ProviderName string
Model string
ReasoningEffort string
ServiceTier string
Cwd string
SystemPrompt string
// TransientSystemPrompt adds trusted runtime guidance for this run only.
// Empty preserves the ordinary system prompt byte-for-byte.
TransientSystemPrompt string
// ResponseStyle is the operator-selected reply style from the TUI /style
// command (e.g. "concise", "explanatory", "review"). It is rendered into the
// system prompt as a short directive. Empty or "balanced" adds nothing — the
@@ -341,11 +289,6 @@ type Options struct {
// nil for text-only runs (the seeded message then carries no images, exactly
// as before).
Images []zeroruntime.ImageBlock
// SupportsVision, when set, reports whether the effective model accepts
// image input. Tool-produced images are dropped at the shared delivery
// boundary when this is false. nil uses the curated catalog plus the
// name heuristic via modelregistry.SupportsVision.
SupportsVision func(modelID string) bool
// ContextWindow is the model's maximum input token budget. When > 0 the agent
// loop compacts long conversations once the estimated size crosses a fraction
// of this window. 0 DISABLES compaction entirely (every existing caller/test
@@ -354,26 +297,10 @@ type Options struct {
// CompactionPreserveLast is how many trailing messages compaction keeps
// verbatim. <= 0 falls back to defaultCompactionPreserveLast.
CompactionPreserveLast int
// Summarizer, when set, lazily builds the provider used for compaction
// summarization calls — typically a cheap/fast model, since summaries at
// main-model prices are the single most expensive recurring event in a
// long run. It receives the main model currently in force and may return
// (nil, nil) when no dedicated summarizer applies to it (the main model is
// already the cheap one). Built on the first paid compaction and again
// after a mid-run model switch. Any failure (build or call) falls back to
// the run's main provider until the next switch, so a misconfigured
// summarizer can never break compaction. nil keeps today's behavior.
Summarizer func(ctx context.Context, mainModelID string) (Provider, error)
// ContextWindowFor, when set, resolves a model ID to its context window so
// the compactor can re-derive its threshold after a mid-run model switch
// (escalate_model). Without it a switch keeps compacting against the
// original model's window — overflowing a smaller target or over-compacting
// a larger one. Return <= 0 when the model is unknown (window unchanged).
ContextWindowFor func(modelID string) int
Registry *tools.Registry
PermissionMode PermissionMode
Autonomy string
Sandbox *sandbox.Engine
Registry *tools.Registry
PermissionMode PermissionMode
Autonomy string
Sandbox *sandbox.Engine
// FileTracker records per-session file read/write versions so the write tools
// can detect a file changed on disk outside Zero since it was last read. nil
// disables the check. Created once per session and threaded into every tool run.
@@ -403,11 +330,9 @@ type Options struct {
// specialist child process emits while running. The toolCallID identifies
// which Task tool call the progress belongs to. nil is a no-op.
OnToolProgress func(toolCallID string, event streamjson.Event)
// OnContext, when set, is called for each main agent request with its
// per-category context budget, including a replacement request after
// compaction or a stall retry. Internal summarizer requests are excluded so
// surfaces keep showing the active conversation budget. Opt-in like the other
// callbacks; nil is a no-op.
// OnContext, when set, is called once per turn with the per-category context
// budget of the request about to be sent, so a surface (TUI/CLI) can show
// context utilization. Opt-in like the other callbacks; nil is a no-op.
OnContext func(ContextBreakdown)
// ModelSwitcher, when set, lets a tool escalate the run to a stronger model
// mid-run: the loop calls it with the requested model id and, on success,
+4
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ func ParseTraceEventKeys(stdout string) []string {
return keys
}
func TraceEventKeys(stdout string) []string {
return ParseTraceEventKeys(stdout)
}
func MissingTraceEvents(required []string, stdout string) []string {
seen := map[string]bool{}
for _, key := range ParseTraceEventKeys(stdout) {
+1 -32
View File
@@ -453,12 +453,7 @@ func (manager *Manager) normalizeLoadedTask(fileTaskID string, task Task) (Task,
}
outputFile, err := manager.outputFile(task.ID, task.OutputFile)
if err != nil {
var migrated bool
outputFile, migrated = manager.migrateLegacyOutputFile(task.ID, task.OutputFile)
if !migrated {
return Task{}, false, err
}
changed = true
return Task{}, false, err
}
if outputFile != task.OutputFile {
changed = true
@@ -567,32 +562,6 @@ func (manager *Manager) outputFile(taskID string, requested string) (string, err
return path, nil
}
// migrateLegacyOutputFile recovers task metadata written under a previous home
// or XDG data root. It accepts only the canonical per-task output
// name in the historic zero/background layout, and only when the corresponding
// regular file already exists inside the active manager root.
func (manager *Manager) migrateLegacyOutputFile(taskID string, requested string) (string, bool) {
requested = strings.TrimSpace(requested)
if !filepath.IsAbs(requested) {
return "", false
}
requested = filepath.Clean(requested)
expectedName := taskID + ".ndjson"
if filepath.Base(requested) != expectedName {
return "", false
}
legacyRoot := filepath.Dir(requested)
if filepath.Base(legacyRoot) != "background" || filepath.Base(filepath.Dir(legacyRoot)) != "zero" {
return "", false
}
canonical := filepath.Join(manager.rootDir, expectedName)
info, err := os.Lstat(canonical)
if err != nil || !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
return "", false
}
return canonical, true
}
func validTaskID(taskID string) bool {
return taskIDPattern.MatchString(strings.TrimSpace(taskID))
}
-83
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@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package background
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -192,88 +191,6 @@ func TestManagerSkipsInvalidPersistedMetadata(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestManagerMigratesLegacyOutputPathWhenCanonicalOutputExists(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
const taskID = "legacy_task"
canonicalOutput := filepath.Join(root, taskID+".ndjson")
if err := os.WriteFile(canonicalOutput, []byte("legacy output\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write canonical output: %v", err)
}
legacyOutput := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "background", taskID+".ndjson")
metadata, err := json.Marshal(Task{
ID: taskID,
Type: "specialist",
Status: StatusCompleted,
OutputFile: legacyOutput,
StartedAt: time.Date(2026, 8, 1, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal legacy metadata: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, taskID+".json"), append(metadata, '\n'), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write legacy metadata: %v", err)
}
manager, err := NewManager(root)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewManager returned error: %v", err)
}
task, ok := manager.Get(taskID)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("manager did not load migrated task")
}
if task.OutputFile != canonicalOutput {
t.Fatalf("migrated output file = %q, want %q", task.OutputFile, canonicalOutput)
}
if warnings := manager.LoadWarnings(); len(warnings) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("migration produced load warnings: %#v", warnings)
}
persisted, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, taskID+".json"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read migrated metadata: %v", err)
}
var saved Task
if err := json.Unmarshal(persisted, &saved); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode migrated metadata: %v", err)
}
if saved.OutputFile != canonicalOutput {
t.Fatalf("persisted output file = %q, want %q", saved.OutputFile, canonicalOutput)
}
}
func TestManagerRejectsUnrelatedAbsoluteOutputPathDuringMigration(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
const taskID = "legacy_task"
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, taskID+".ndjson"), []byte("output\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write canonical output: %v", err)
}
metadata, err := json.Marshal(Task{
ID: taskID,
Type: "specialist",
Status: StatusCompleted,
OutputFile: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), taskID+".ndjson"),
StartedAt: time.Date(2026, 8, 1, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal metadata: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, taskID+".json"), append(metadata, '\n'), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write metadata: %v", err)
}
manager, err := NewManager(root)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewManager returned error: %v", err)
}
if _, ok := manager.Get(taskID); ok {
t.Fatal("manager loaded task with an unrelated absolute output path")
}
if warnings := strings.Join(manager.LoadWarnings(), "\n"); !strings.Contains(warnings, "output file must be inside") {
t.Fatalf("load warnings = %q, want containment rejection", warnings)
}
}
func TestManagerMarksReloadedRunningTaskNonKillable(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
manager, err := NewManager(root)
-42
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,7 @@
package background
import (
"errors"
"os/exec"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
@@ -41,43 +39,3 @@ func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
func terminateProcess(pid int) error {
return execution.TerminateProcessTree(pid, terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval)
}
// terminateOwnedProcess terminates cmd's process group directly when its launch
// configuration proves it was made a group leader. This avoids fragile Getpgid
// rediscovery after an owned leader exits. Ordinary commands fall back to the
// safe PID/tree path rather than assuming their PID is also a process-group ID.
//
// The bool result is whether the leader had already exited before termination
// was attempted — the POSIX analogue of Windows GetExitCodeProcess returning a
// value other than STILL_ACTIVE. A waitable zombie is already-exited: Wait can
// collect it, but kill(0) still succeeds, and when ps is unavailable
// signalTargetRunning conservatively treats that as "still running".
// TerminateCommand uses the flag to discard the resulting spurious
// SIGKILL-timeout once the reap has independently succeeded. The flag is about
// the leader only; group/tree termination is still invoked so live descendants
// are signalled.
//
// The Setpgid && Pgid == 0 guard only recognizes ConfigureChildProcessGroup's
// own convention. A command made its own session leader via Setsid (as opposed
// to Setpgid) is also its own process-group leader in practice, but takes the
// slower rediscovery path here since Setsid isn't checked. Harmless today
// because TerminateCommand has exactly one caller in this codebase; worth
// covering explicitly if Setsid-configured commands start using this path too.
func terminateOwnedProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) (bool, error) {
alreadyExited := leaderWaitableExited(cmd.Process.Pid)
if cmd.SysProcAttr != nil && cmd.SysProcAttr.Setpgid && cmd.SysProcAttr.Pgid == 0 {
return alreadyExited, execution.TerminateProcessGroup(cmd.Process.Pid, terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval)
}
return alreadyExited, terminateProcess(cmd.Process.Pid)
}
// terminationTargetGoneAfterReap independently checks the exact signal target
// used for an owned command. In particular, reaping a zombie group leader does
// not make this return true while any descendant still occupies that group.
func terminationTargetGoneAfterReap(cmd *exec.Cmd) bool {
target := cmd.Process.Pid
if cmd.SysProcAttr != nil && cmd.SysProcAttr.Setpgid && cmd.SysProcAttr.Pgid == 0 {
target = -target
}
return errors.Is(syscall.Kill(target, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH)
}
+4 -179
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"bufio"
"errors"
"os/exec"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"strings"
"syscall"
@@ -148,12 +147,11 @@ func TestTerminateProcessKillsForkedChildren(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("terminateProcess: %v", err)
}
// The forked child must no longer be running. An orphaned zombie is already
// dead but may remain visible briefly until the platform's init reaps it.
// The forked child must be gone too (poll until reaped by init).
deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
// processStopped treats only ESRCH or an observed zombie state as stopped;
// other errors (for example EPERM) remain live and keep polling.
for !processStopped(childPID) {
// Only ESRCH proves the child is gone; any other error (e.g. EPERM) would
// wrongly pass the test, so treat it as still-present and keep polling.
for !errors.Is(syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH) {
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
_ = syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.SIGKILL)
t.Fatalf("forked child %d survived terminateProcess — group kill failed", childPID)
@@ -161,176 +159,3 @@ func TestTerminateProcessKillsForkedChildren(t *testing.T) {
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
}
}
func TestTerminateCommandStopsUnconfiguredCommand(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command("sleep", "30")
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
}
})
if err := TerminateCommand(cmd); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TerminateCommand: %v", err)
}
if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
t.Fatal("unconfigured command was not reaped")
}
}
func TestTerminateCommandKillsChildAfterLeaderExits(t *testing.T) {
grace, poll := terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval
terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval = 2*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond
t.Cleanup(func() { terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval = grace, poll })
// The leader exits immediately after launching the child. TerminateCommand
// must capture and signal the process group before Wait reaps the leader and
// makes its group identity unavailable.
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "sleep 300 & echo $!; exit 0")
ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd)
stdout, err := cmd.StdoutPipe()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stdout pipe: %v", err)
}
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
}
line, err := bufio.NewReader(stdout).ReadString('\n')
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read forked child pid: %v", err)
}
childPID, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(line))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse forked child pid %q: %v", line, err)
}
if err := TerminateCommand(cmd); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TerminateCommand: %v", err)
}
deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
for !processStopped(childPID) {
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
_ = syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.SIGKILL)
t.Fatalf("forked child %d survived TerminateCommand", childPID)
}
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
}
}
func TestTerminateCommandZombieLeaderWithoutPS(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS != "linux" && runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
t.Skip("waitable-exited leader probe is implemented on linux and darwin")
}
grace, poll := terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval
terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval = 150*time.Millisecond, 10*time.Millisecond
t.Cleanup(func() { terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval = grace, poll })
// Issue #862: a zombie group leader with ps unresolvable used to burn both
// grace periods (kill(0) succeeds against a zombie) and return
// "did not exit after SIGKILL" even though cmd.Wait reaped exit status 0.
// The already-exited probe must answer without ps so TerminateCommand can
// discard that spurious timeout after a successful reap.
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "exit 0")
ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd)
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
}
pid := cmd.Process.Pid
t.Cleanup(func() {
if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
_ = cmd.Wait()
}
})
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for !leaderWaitableExited(pid) {
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatalf("leader %d did not become waitable-exited within 5s", pid)
}
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
}
t.Setenv("PATH", "")
if err := TerminateCommand(cmd); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TerminateCommand: %v, want nil (zombie leader with ps unavailable must not report SIGKILL timeout)", err)
}
if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
t.Fatal("zombie leader was not reaped")
}
}
func TestTerminateCommandPreservesGroupFailureWithExitedLeaderAndLiveChild(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS != "linux" && runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
t.Skip("waitable-exited leader probe is implemented on linux and darwin")
}
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "sleep 300 & echo $!; exit 0")
ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd)
stdout, err := cmd.StdoutPipe()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stdout pipe: %v", err)
}
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
}
line, err := bufio.NewReader(stdout).ReadString('\n')
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read forked child pid: %v", err)
}
childPID, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(line))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse forked child pid %q: %v", line, err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.SIGKILL)
if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
_ = cmd.Wait()
}
})
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for !leaderWaitableExited(cmd.Process.Pid) {
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatalf("leader %d did not become waitable-exited within 5s", cmd.Process.Pid)
}
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
}
treeErr := errors.New("process group could not be terminated")
originalTerminateOwnedProcess := terminateOwnedProcessForTest
terminateOwnedProcessForTest = func(got *exec.Cmd) (bool, error) {
if got != cmd {
t.Fatalf("terminate called with %p, want %p", got, cmd)
}
return true, treeErr
}
t.Cleanup(func() { terminateOwnedProcessForTest = originalTerminateOwnedProcess })
err = TerminateCommand(cmd)
if !errors.Is(err, treeErr) {
t.Fatalf("TerminateCommand error = %v, want live-group termination failure", err)
}
if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
t.Fatal("exited leader was not reaped")
}
if processStopped(childPID) {
t.Fatalf("child %d unexpectedly stopped; failure boundary needs a live group member", childPID)
}
}
func processStopped(pid int) bool {
if errors.Is(syscall.Kill(pid, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH) {
return true
}
state, err := exec.Command("ps", "-o", "stat=", "-p", strconv.Itoa(pid)).Output()
if err != nil {
return errors.Is(syscall.Kill(pid, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH)
}
return strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(string(state)), "Z")
}
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
//go:build darwin
package background
import "golang.org/x/sys/unix"
// szomb is sys/proc.h SZOMB: the process has exited and is waiting to be reaped.
const szomb int8 = 5
// leaderWaitableExited reports whether pid has already exited and is waiting
// to be reaped. This is the POSIX analogue of Windows GetExitCodeProcess
// returning a value other than STILL_ACTIVE: the leader is a zombie, waitable
// as exited, without collecting it. A true result does not mean the process
// group is empty — descendants may still be running.
//
// Darwin has no /proc and x/sys/unix does not wrap waitid here, so the probe
// is kern.proc.pid via sysctl. It does not use ps, which is the #862 failure
// mode when PATH cannot resolve ps.
func leaderWaitableExited(pid int) bool {
if pid <= 1 {
return false
}
kinfo, err := unix.SysctlKinfoProc("kern.proc.pid", pid)
if err != nil {
return false
}
return kinfo.Proc.P_stat == szomb
}
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux
package background
import (
"bytes"
"os"
"strconv"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// POSIX waitid si_code values for an already-exited child (bits/waitflags.h).
const (
cldExited int32 = 1
cldKilled int32 = 2
cldDumped int32 = 3
)
// leaderWaitableExited reports whether pid has already exited and is waiting
// to be reaped. This is the POSIX analogue of Windows GetExitCodeProcess
// returning a value other than STILL_ACTIVE: the leader is waitable as exited
// (typically a zombie) without collecting it. A true result does not mean the
// process group is empty — descendants may still be running.
//
// Detection does not use ps. waitid(WNOHANG|WNOWAIT) asks the kernel whether
// an exit status is already available. /proc/<pid>/stat state Z is the
// fallback when waitid cannot answer (for example if procfs is the only
// usable source). Either path is independent of PATH, which is the #862
// failure mode: empty PATH makes ps unresolvable and kill(0) still succeeds
// against a zombie.
func leaderWaitableExited(pid int) bool {
if pid <= 1 {
return false
}
if waitidAlreadyExited(pid) {
return true
}
return procIsZombie(pid)
}
func waitidAlreadyExited(pid int) bool {
var info unix.Siginfo
err := unix.Waitid(unix.P_PID, pid, &info, unix.WEXITED|unix.WNOHANG|unix.WNOWAIT, nil)
if err != nil {
return false
}
switch info.Code {
case cldExited, cldKilled, cldDumped:
return true
}
return false
}
func procIsZombie(pid int) bool {
data, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/" + strconv.Itoa(pid) + "/stat")
if err != nil {
return false
}
// /proc/<pid>/stat: pid (comm) state ... — comm may contain spaces or
// parentheses, so the state is the first field after the last ')'.
i := bytes.LastIndexByte(data, ')')
if i < 0 || i+1 >= len(data) {
return false
}
rest := bytes.TrimSpace(data[i+1:])
return len(rest) > 0 && rest[0] == 'Z'
}
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows && !linux && !darwin
package background
// leaderWaitableExited cannot positively identify a waitable-exited leader on
// this platform without ps. Returning false keeps TerminateCommand's existing
// conservative behaviour: a termination error is not discarded after reap.
func leaderWaitableExited(pid int) bool {
return false
}
-46
View File
@@ -3,21 +3,11 @@
package background
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// stillActiveExitCode is the documented GetExitCodeProcess value for a process
// that has not terminated. x/sys/windows does not expose Windows' STILL_ACTIVE
// constant.
const stillActiveExitCode uint32 = 259
var terminateProcessForTest = terminateProcess
// ConfigureChildProcessGroup is a no-op on Windows: process-tree termination is
// delegated to execution.TerminateProcessTree, so no launch-time process-group
// setup is required (the POSIX build sets Setpgid here instead).
@@ -26,39 +16,3 @@ func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) { execution.ConfigureProcessGroup
func terminateProcess(pid int) error {
return execution.TerminateProcessTree(pid, 0, 0)
}
// terminateOwnedProcess asks taskkill /T to terminate the tree rooted at cmd,
// with KillProcessTree's direct Process.Kill fallback if taskkill fails. taskkill
// can discover descendants only while the root PID still exists; unlike a POSIX
// process group, a Windows tree has no independently addressable identity after
// its root exits.
func terminateOwnedProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) (bool, error) {
var (
alreadyExited bool
terminateErr error
)
err := cmd.Process.WithHandle(func(handle uintptr) {
var exitCode uint32
if windows.GetExitCodeProcess(windows.Handle(handle), &exitCode) == nil {
alreadyExited = exitCode != stillActiveExitCode
}
// Keep the exact process identity pinned while the PID-based taskkill
// operation runs, preventing the PID from being recycled underneath it.
terminateErr = terminateProcessForTest(cmd.Process.Pid)
})
if err != nil {
// WithHandle refuses only a process that has already been waited or
// released, so it has finished. Say so in the form exec.Cmd understands:
// a Cancel error wrapping os.ErrProcessDone is "nothing to cancel", where
// the unexported "already released" error it would otherwise carry made
// Wait report a spurious cancel failure. A dead root has no tree left to
// find either way.
return true, fmt.Errorf("pin process %d for termination: %w: %w", cmd.Process.Pid, os.ErrProcessDone, err)
}
return alreadyExited, terminateErr
}
// Windows has no persistent process-group identity to query after a dead root
// is reaped. Preserve TerminateCommand's existing, documented dead-root
// behavior; the stronger independent target check is available on POSIX.
func terminationTargetGoneAfterReap(*exec.Cmd) bool { return true }
-106
View File
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package background
import (
"bufio"
"errors"
"os/exec"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestTerminateCommandReturnsTreeFailureAfterRootFallbackReaps(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command("powershell.exe", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", "Start-Sleep -Seconds 300")
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
}
treeErr := errors.New("taskkill /T failed")
originalTerminateProcess := terminateProcessForTest
terminateProcessForTest = func(pid int) error {
if err := cmd.Process.Kill(); err != nil {
return errors.Join(treeErr, err)
}
return treeErr
}
t.Cleanup(func() { terminateProcessForTest = originalTerminateProcess })
err := TerminateCommand(cmd)
if !errors.Is(err, treeErr) {
t.Fatalf("TerminateCommand error = %v, want tree failure", err)
}
if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
t.Fatal("root process was not reaped")
}
}
func TestTerminateCommandReapsExitedLeader(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command("cmd.exe", "/c", "exit", "0")
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
}
// Let the child exit without calling Wait so cleanup exercises the Windows
// taskkill/TerminateProcess race while it still owns the process handle.
time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
// jatmn's #774 finding: taskkill /T racing an already-exited PID (and the
// Process.Kill fallback) both fail here, but the reap below still succeeds —
// the process-handle exit-code check proves the leader was already gone, so
// TerminateCommand must not surface the expected kill-attempt error.
if err := TerminateCommand(cmd); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TerminateCommand: %v, want nil (leader was already gone and got reaped)", err)
}
if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
t.Fatal("exited process was not reaped")
}
}
func TestTerminateCommandDeadLeaderCannotIdentifyDescendantTree(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command("powershell.exe", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command",
`$p = Start-Process powershell.exe -ArgumentList '-NoProfile','-Command','Start-Sleep -Seconds 300' -PassThru; $p.Id`)
stdout, err := cmd.StdoutPipe()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stdout pipe: %v", err)
}
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
}
line, err := bufio.NewReader(stdout).ReadString('\n')
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read descendant pid: %v", err)
}
descendantPID, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(line))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse descendant pid %q: %v", line, err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = exec.Command("taskkill.exe", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(descendantPID)).Run()
})
// Wait until the leader is observably exited but deliberately leave it
// unreaped, matching the POSIX regression's ordering.
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for processExistsOnWindows(cmd.Process.Pid) {
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatal("leader did not exit")
}
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
}
if err := TerminateCommand(cmd); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TerminateCommand: %v", err)
}
// Windows has no persistent group ID analogous to POSIX: once the leader is
// gone, taskkill /T cannot rediscover this descendant. Assert that platform
// distinction rather than claiming TerminateCommand can provide it here.
if !processExistsOnWindows(descendantPID) {
t.Fatal("descendant unexpectedly stopped after its root exited")
}
}
func processExistsOnWindows(pid int) bool {
return exec.Command("powershell.exe", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command",
"Get-Process -Id "+strconv.Itoa(pid)+" -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null").Run() == nil
}
-110
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,5 @@
package background
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"os/exec"
"time"
)
const commandReapTimeout = 3 * time.Second
// terminateOwnedProcessForTest is a seam for the failure-boundary tests. Tests
// replace it only while no other test in this package is running in parallel.
var terminateOwnedProcessForTest = terminateOwnedProcess
// TerminateProcess stops a background process by PID — on Windows its process
// tree; on POSIX its whole process group when the PID leads its own group (the
// invariant ConfigureChildProcessGroup establishes for processes started through
@@ -25,100 +12,3 @@ var terminateOwnedProcessForTest = terminateOwnedProcess
func TerminateProcess(pid int) error {
return terminateProcess(pid)
}
// TerminateCommand stops a started command and reaps its leader. The caller must
// have exclusive ownership of cmd: it must not have previously called Wait or
// Process.Release, and no goroutine may call either concurrently. On POSIX it
// stops the whole group when the command was configured as its leader; ordinary
// commands safely fall back to PID/tree discovery. When POSIX observes a
// waitable-zombie leader before signalling, a termination error is discarded
// after reap only if the launch-time signal target is independently gone; the
// leader observation alone says nothing about descendants. Windows retains its
// existing behavior of ignoring the expected kill-attempt error when
// GetExitCodeProcess shows that the root was already dead. Windows cannot
// rediscover a tree from a dead root, so descendants may survive there. `zero
// daemon start` needs this operation when readiness times out: it launched the
// child, so it must both stop the tree and collect the leader.
//
// The order matters: the tree is signalled first, because Wait releases the
// leader's PID and a later group lookup could then resolve to nothing (or, worse,
// to a recycled PID). Termination stays in the shared execution lifecycle
// primitives rather than introducing a second platform-specific killer.
//
// If the bounded reap times out, the Wait call already started by this function
// continues in its goroutine. From that point onward the caller must not access
// cmd at all, including ProcessState, because that would race with Wait.
func TerminateCommand(cmd *exec.Cmd) error {
if cmd == nil || cmd.Process == nil {
return errors.New("terminate command: process was never started")
}
leaderAlreadyExited, terminateErr := terminateOwnedProcessForTest(cmd)
reapErr := waitForTerminatedCommandWithin(cmd, commandReapTimeout)
if reapErr != nil {
if terminateErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%v (reap failed: %w)", terminateErr, reapErr)
}
return reapErr
}
if terminateErr != nil {
if !leaderAlreadyExited || !terminationTargetGoneAfterReap(cmd) {
return terminateErr
}
}
// On POSIX, discard a termination error only when the leader was already
// exited and the launch-time signal target is independently gone after reap.
// A successful leader reap alone says nothing about live descendants.
// Windows retains its existing dead-root semantics because it has no
// persistent group identity to query after the root exits.
return nil
}
// TerminateCommandGroup stops a started command's process group on POSIX, or its
// process tree on Windows, WITHOUT reaping it.
//
// It is TerminateCommand without the Wait, for a caller whose Wait already runs
// somewhere else: a worker pool waiting on the command in its own goroutine, or
// the command's own Cancel hook, which exec.Cmd invokes while its Wait is in
// progress. TerminateCommand would be a second Wait there. Both used to pass
// cmd.Process.Pid to TerminateProcess, which rediscovers the group at signal time
// with Getpgid, and once the leader has exited that lookup fails, so only the dead
// leader was signalled and its descendants kept running. When cmd was configured
// by ConfigureChildProcessGroup the group now comes from that launch-time
// configuration instead. On Windows it is the tree kill TerminateProcess performs,
// with the process handle pinned while it runs so the PID cannot be recycled
// underneath it; once the command has been waited that pin fails with an error
// wrapping os.ErrProcessDone.
func TerminateCommandGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) error {
if cmd == nil || cmd.Process == nil {
return nil
}
_, err := terminateOwnedProcess(cmd)
return err
}
// classifyWaitError treats a non-zero exit status as success: a process being
// terminated is expected to report one (or a signal), so the only interesting
// failure is Wait itself not working.
func classifyWaitError(waitErr error) error {
var exitErr *exec.ExitError
if waitErr != nil && !errors.As(waitErr, &exitErr) {
return fmt.Errorf("reap process: %w", waitErr)
}
return nil
}
// waitForTerminatedCommandWithin bounds the reap so a child that somehow survives
// termination cannot hang the caller — the daemon-start cleanup path runs while a
// user waits at the CLI. On timeout its Wait goroutine is intentionally left to
// finish: exec.Cmd permits only one Wait call, and abandoning it without a reaper
// would leak the child once it eventually exits.
func waitForTerminatedCommandWithin(cmd *exec.Cmd, timeout time.Duration) error {
waitDone := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { waitDone <- cmd.Wait() }()
select {
case waitErr := <-waitDone:
return classifyWaitError(waitErr)
case <-time.After(timeout):
return fmt.Errorf("process %d did not reap after termination", cmd.Process.Pid)
}
}
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