feat(tools): opt-in format-on-write for edit_file/write_file

With ZERO_FORMAT_ON_WRITE=1, a successful edit/write runs the language's
community-standard formatter on the file (gofmt, rustfmt, ruff, prettier,
zig fmt, dart format, terraform fmt, shfmt, clang-format, ktlint,
swiftformat, stylua, gleam format — 27 extensions), so model output
always lands in project-canonical style and never fails a format check
it cannot see. Best-effort: missing binary, error, or 10s timeout leaves
the unformatted write standing. Off by default per house convention —
auto-reformatting changes bytes the model did not write.

Ordering is load-bearing: formatting runs BEFORE the FileTracker
re-baseline so the recorded content matches what the formatter left on
disk; baselining pre-format content would make the very next edit trip
the external-modification conflict guard (covered by test).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

.github/workflows/release-artifacts.yml

@@ -54,8 +54,10 @@ jobs:
       # is published under the pushed git tag. If they disagree, install.sh/install.ps1
       # and the npm postinstall all build a download URL that 404s. Fail fast so a
       # forgotten version bump can never publish mis-versioned, un-installable assets.
+      # Matches on the ref (not event_name) because release-please dispatches this
+      # workflow at the tag ref — its GITHUB_TOKEN-created tag cannot fire `push`.
       - name: Check tag matches package.json version
-        if: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
+        if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
         shell: bash
         run: |
           pkg_version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
@@ -78,13 +80,15 @@ jobs:
           path: dist/release/*
           if-no-files-found: error
 
-      # On a `v*` tag push, publish the packaged archive + .sha256 as GitHub Release
-      # assets so the documented `scripts/install.sh` / `install.ps1` path (which reads
-      # /releases/latest) works. Uses the preinstalled `gh` (no new action dependency);
-      # each matrix OS creates the release if absent (best-effort) then uploads its own
-      # assets with --clobber. NOTE: maintainers must push the tag — this never tags.
+      # On a `v*` tag ref (pushed manually, or dispatched at the tag by the
+      # release-please workflow), publish the packaged archive + .sha256 as GitHub
+      # Release assets so the documented `scripts/install.sh` / `install.ps1` path
+      # (which reads /releases/latest) works. Uses the preinstalled `gh` (no new
+      # action dependency); each matrix OS creates the release if absent
+      # (best-effort — release-please normally creates it first) then uploads its
+      # own assets with --clobber. Tags come from merging the release-please PR.
       - name: Publish to GitHub Release
-        if: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
+        if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
         shell: bash
         env:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
@@ -92,3 +96,89 @@ jobs:
           tag="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}"
           gh release create "$tag" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --title "$tag" --generate-notes 2>/dev/null || true
           gh release upload "$tag" dist/release/* --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --clobber
+
+  # Publishes the npm wrapper (@gitlawb/zero) once every platform's release
+  # assets are live — the package's postinstall downloads its binary from the
+  # GitHub Release, so publishing before the assets exist would ship a package
+  # that fails to install.
+  #
+  # Auth is npm OIDC trusted publishing: no NPM_TOKEN secret. The package's
+  # npmjs.com settings must list this repo + workflow file as a trusted
+  # publisher, and provenance is then generated automatically. Note npm only
+  # allows configuring a trusted publisher on an EXISTING package, so the very
+  # first @gitlawb/zero publish is a one-time manual `npm publish` bootstrap.
+  publish-npm:
+    name: Publish npm package
+    needs: package
+    if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    # Manual approval gate: this environment carries a required-reviewer rule
+    # (Settings -> Environments -> npm-publish), so the job pauses until a
+    # maintainer approves it in the Actions UI before anything reaches npm.
+    environment:
+      name: npm-publish
+      url: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@gitlawb/zero
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      id-token: write # OIDC token exchange for npm trusted publishing + provenance
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+
+      # No registry-url here on purpose: setup-node's registry-url writes an
+      # .npmrc line referencing $NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, and npm hard-fails on the
+      # unset env var. Trusted publishing needs no token at all.
+      - name: Setup Node
+        uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
+        with:
+          node-version: 24
+
+      # OIDC trusted publishing needs npm >= 11.5.1. Use the npm bundled with
+      # the pinned Node toolchain (Node 24 ships >= 11.5.1) rather than pulling
+      # npm@latest from the registry inside the publish path — an unpinned
+      # install there would be avoidable supply-chain exposure. Fail fast if a
+      # future runner/toolchain change ever regresses the bundled npm.
+      - name: Check npm supports trusted publishing
+        run: |
+          npm --version | node -e '
+            const version = require("fs").readFileSync(0, "utf8").trim();
+            const [major, minor, patch] = version.split(".").map(Number);
+            const ok =
+              major > 11 ||
+              (major === 11 && (minor > 5 || (minor === 5 && patch >= 1)));
+            if (!ok) {
+              console.error(
+                `::error::bundled npm ${version} is too old for OIDC trusted ` +
+                  `publishing (needs >= 11.5.1) — bump node-version in this job.`,
+              );
+              process.exit(1);
+            }
+            console.log(`npm ${version} supports trusted publishing.`);
+          '
+
+      # Probe the exact URLs postinstall will build (internal/release/release.go
+      # asset-name scheme) as an anonymous client. This also blocks publishing
+      # while the repo is still private — private release assets 404 without
+      # auth, exactly as they would for an installing user.
+      - name: Verify release assets are downloadable
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
+          base="https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/v${version}"
+          for asset in \
+            "zero-v${version}-linux-x64.tar.gz" \
+            "zero-v${version}-linux-arm64.tar.gz" \
+            "zero-v${version}-macos-x64.tar.gz" \
+            "zero-v${version}-macos-arm64.tar.gz" \
+            "zero-v${version}-windows-x64.zip"; do
+            for url in "${base}/${asset}" "${base}/${asset}.sha256"; do
+              if ! curl -fsSLI -o /dev/null "$url"; then
+                echo "::error::${url} is not publicly downloadable — npm postinstall would fail. Is the repo public and are all assets uploaded?" >&2
+                exit 1
+              fi
+            done
+          done
+          echo "all release assets for v${version} are publicly downloadable."
+
+      - name: Publish to npm
+        run: npm publish --access public

.github/workflows/release-please.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+name: Release Please
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - main
+
+permissions:
+  contents: write # push the release-PR branch, create the tag + GitHub Release
+  pull-requests: write # open/update the release PR
+  issues: write # create/apply release-tracking labels on the release PR
+  actions: write # dispatch release-artifacts.yml once a release is cut
+
+jobs:
+  release-please:
+    name: Release PR / tag
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Run release-please
+        id: release
+        uses: googleapis/release-please-action@a02a34c4d625f9be7cb89156071d8567266a2445 # v4.2.0
+
+      # Tags created with the default GITHUB_TOKEN never fire `on: push: tags`
+      # workflows (GitHub suppresses workflows triggered by workflow-created
+      # events), so release-artifacts.yml would not run for a release-please
+      # tag. workflow_dispatch invoked through the API is exempt from that
+      # suppression — dispatch the artifacts build at the new tag explicitly.
+      - name: Build and publish release artifacts
+        if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+        run: |
+          gh workflow run release-artifacts.yml \
+            --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
+            --ref "${{ steps.release.outputs.tag_name }}"

.github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml

@@ -4,12 +4,14 @@ on:
   pull_request:
     paths:
       - action.yml
+      - docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md
       - .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml
   push:
     branches:
       - main
     paths:
       - action.yml
+      - docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md
       - .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml
 
 jobs:
@@ -29,7 +31,8 @@ jobs:
           import sys, yaml
 
           with open("action.yml", "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-              doc = yaml.safe_load(handle)
+              action_raw = handle.read()
+          doc = yaml.safe_load(action_raw)
 
           assert isinstance(doc, dict), "action.yml must be a mapping"
           assert doc.get("name"), "action must declare a name"
@@ -65,6 +68,19 @@ jobs:
           assert "--skip-permissions-unsafe" not in serialized, \
               "action must never pass --skip-permissions-unsafe"
 
+          run_zero = next((step for step in steps if step.get("name") == "Run ZERO"), None)
+          assert run_zero is not None, "action.yml must contain a Run ZERO step"
+          run_zero_script = run_zero.get("run") or ""
+          assert 'export "${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV}=${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY}"' in run_zero_script, \
+              "Run ZERO must export the provider key for the current step"
+          assert "later steps inherit" not in action_raw.lower(), \
+              "provider keys must not be documented as inherited by later steps"
+          for line in run_zero_script.splitlines():
+              if "GITHUB_ENV" in line and (
+                  "ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY" in line or "ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV" in line
+              ):
+                  raise AssertionError("provider key must not be persisted to GITHUB_ENV")
+
           print(f"action.yml OK: {len(inputs)} inputs, {len(outputs)} outputs, {len(steps)} steps")
           PY
 

.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{".":"0.1.0"}

AGENTS.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Accepted file names, in priority order at each level:
 | `./ZERO.md` | Brand-specific alias. Same format, lower priority. |
 | `./.zero/AGENTS.md` | Project-local, hidden, gitignored. Personal notes that stay out of git. |
 
-Matching is **case-insensitive** on the basename, so `AGENTS.md`, `Agents.md`, and `agents.md` resolve to the same file on Windows and macOS. The git-tracked filename in this repo is `AGENTS.MD` (uppercase `MD`) — keep that on case-sensitive filesystems (Linux, the WSL filesystem, or a CI runner) to match what the loader looks for.
+Matching is **case-insensitive** on the basename, so `AGENTS.md`, `Agents.md`, and `agents.md` resolve to the same file on Windows and macOS. The git-tracked filename in this repo is `AGENTS.md` — keep that on case-sensitive filesystems (Linux, the WSL filesystem, or a CI runner) to match what the loader looks for.
 
 Both files use the same format. YAML frontmatter is optional; the markdown body is loaded as instructions for the agent. Zero reads the file once at session start, so changes take effect on the next `zero` launch — not mid-session.
 

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -6,6 +6,19 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
 aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
 tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
 
+## 0.1.0 (2026-07-02)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* publish zero to npm via release-please ([#367](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/367)) ([8eccc26](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8eccc2669887bc38d35bc16a315c888e4d9ec43a))
+* **tui:** FILES sidebar panel with click-to-select and file drill-in ([#365](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/365)) ([142c548](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/142c548c89a8652ce300e64ddf1228ee36df7606))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **auth:** propagate credentials to every provider-build surface and pin children to the live provider ([#366](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/366)) ([6e0a665](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6e0a665118fe0e09c4b07d482dd18f86045acd2b))
+
 ## [Unreleased]
 
 ### Added

Makefile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.MD says "Build with `make`" and "Run `make
+# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says "Build with `make`" and "Run `make
 # lint` before opening a PR" — these targets back those instructions.
 .DEFAULT_GOAL := build
 .PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint tidy clean help

README.md

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
   <a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
   <img alt="Go 1.25+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.25+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
   <img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
+  <br>
+  <strong>English</strong> | <a href="README_ZH.md">中文</a>
 </p>
 
 Zero is an AI coding agent for your local terminal. It can inspect a repository,
@@ -51,6 +53,31 @@ The npm package installs a small wrapper plus the matching Zero binary for your
 platform from GitHub Releases. It supports Linux, macOS, and Windows on x64 and
 arm64.
 
+### Bun
+
+Bun does not run dependency lifecycle scripts by default, so the `postinstall`
+that fetches the Zero binary is skipped and the first run fails with
+`No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`.
+
+The simplest fix is to trust the package after installing, which runs the
+blocked postinstall. This works for project and global installs:
+
+```bash
+# project install
+bun add @gitlawb/zero
+bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero
+
+# global install
+bun add -g @gitlawb/zero
+bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero
+```
+
+Alternatives: allow the postinstall up front by adding
+`"trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]` to your project's package.json
+before `bun add`, or run the installer manually
+(`node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs`) on Bun versions
+that do not have `bun pm trust`.
+
 ### Install scripts
 
 Linux/macOS:
@@ -121,6 +148,13 @@ the key in the wizard:
 export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
 export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
 export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
+export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
+```
+
+To configure Meituan LongCat (LongCat-2.0) directly, run:
+
+```bash
+zero providers setup longcat --set-active
 ```
 
 For local models, run Ollama or LM Studio and then use `zero setup` or

README_ZH.md

@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+<p align="center">
+  <img src="docs/assets/zero-logo.png" alt="Zero" width="385">
+</p>
+
+<p align="center"><strong>一个独属于你的终端编码智能体。</strong></p>
+
+<p align="center">
+  <a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
+  <img alt="Go 1.25+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.25+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
+  <img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
+  <br>
+  <a href="README.md">English</a> | <strong>中文</strong>
+</p>
+
+Zero 是一个用于本地终端的 AI 编码智能体。它可以检查仓库、编辑文件、运行命令、使用浏览器/终端辅助工具，并在你选择模型和权限级别的同时保持持久的本地会话。
+
+```bash
+zero
+zero exec "修复 ./pkg 中失败的测试"
+zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
+```
+
+## 为什么选择 Zero
+
+- **使用你想要的模型。** 支持 OpenAI、Anthropic、Gemini、Groq、OpenRouter、DeepSeek、Mistral、xAI、Qwen、Kimi、GitHub Models、Ollama、LM Studio，或任何 OpenAI/Anthropic 兼容端点。
+- **保持控制权。** 文件写入、Shell 命令、网络访问和工作区外写入都经过 Zero 的权限和沙箱策略。
+- **在终端中工作。** TUI 具有模型/提供商选择器、图片输入、斜杠命令、实时计划/工具渲染、回滚滚动、主题以及恢复/分叉支持。
+- **无 TUI 也能工作。** `zero exec` 可脚本化，支持文本/JSON/stream-JSON I/O、隔离的工作树、规范优先运行，以及用于 CI 的有意义的退出码。
+- **保持上下文本地化。** 会话存储在磁盘上，可搜索、可恢复，且 Zero 不会作为遥测数据上传。
+- **可扩展。** 使用 MCP 服务器、技能、插件、钩子和来自同一 CLI 的专业子智能体。
+
+## 安装
+
+### npm
+
+```bash
+npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
+zero
+```
+
+npm 包安装一个小型包装器以及与你平台匹配的 Zero 二进制文件（从 GitHub Releases 获取）。支持 Linux、macOS 和 Windows 的 x64 和 arm64。
+
+### Bun
+
+Bun 默认不运行依赖的生命周期脚本，因此获取 Zero 二进制文件的 `postinstall` 会被跳过，首次运行会失败并显示 `No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`。
+
+最简单的解决方法是安装后信任该包，这会运行被阻止的 postinstall。项目安装和全局安装均适用：
+
+```bash
+# 项目安装
+bun add @gitlawb/zero
+bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero
+
+# 全局安装
+bun add -g @gitlawb/zero
+bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero
+```
+
+其他方式：在 `bun add` 之前将 `"trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]` 添加到项目的 package.json 以提前允许 postinstall；或在不支持 `bun pm trust` 的旧版 Bun 上手动运行安装程序（`node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs`）。
+
+### 安装脚本
+
+Linux/macOS：
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
+```
+
+Windows PowerShell：
+
+```powershell
+irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
+```
+
+### 从源码构建
+
+源码构建需要 Go 1.25+。
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
+cd zero
+go run ./cmd/zero
+```
+
+发布安装器和 npm 包需要已发布的 GitHub Release 资源。如果你在首次公开发布之前进行测试，请从源码构建：
+
+```bash
+go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
+```
+
+在 Linux 上，如果你需要原生沙箱，还需要构建沙箱辅助程序：
+
+```bash
+go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox
+go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp   # 可选的兼容性包装器
+```
+
+将 `zero` 和 `zero-linux-sandbox` 放在 `PATH` 上的同一目录中（`~/.local/bin` 是一个好的默认选择）。macOS 不需要额外的辅助二进制文件。Windows 源码构建可以使用主 `zero.exe` 作为沙箱辅助程序；发布包仍然附带独立的 Windows 辅助可执行文件。
+
+更多安装细节：[docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md)。
+
+## 首次运行
+
+启动 TUI：
+
+```bash
+zero
+```
+
+设置向导帮助你选择提供商和模型。你也可以从命令行配置提供商：
+
+```bash
+zero setup
+zero providers list
+zero models list
+zero doctor
+```
+
+对于 API 提供商，在设置之前设置匹配的环境变量或在向导中输入密钥：
+
+```bash
+export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
+export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
+export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
+export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
+```
+
+要直接配置美团 LongCat（LongCat-2.0），运行：
+
+```bash
+zero providers setup longcat --set-active
+```
+
+对于本地模型，运行 Ollama 或 LM Studio，然后使用 `zero setup` 或 `zero providers detect`。
+
+## 日常使用
+
+### 交互式 TUI
+
+```bash
+zero
+```
+
+常用控制：
+
+| 控制 | 操作 |
+|---|---|
+| `Enter` | 发送提示 |
+| `/` | 打开斜杠命令建议 |
+| `Shift+Tab` | 切换权限模式 |
+| `Ctrl+B` | 显示/隐藏侧边栏 |
+| `Ctrl+C` | 取消或退出 |
+
+常用斜杠命令：
+
+| 命令 | 用途 |
+|---|---|
+| `/model`、`/provider` | 切换活动模型/提供商 |
+| `/spec`、`/plan` | 在构建之前起草和审查计划 |
+| `/image` | 为视觉模型附加图片 |
+| `/resume`、`/rewind` | 继续或回滚本地会话 |
+| `/compact`、`/context` | 管理上下文使用 |
+| `/permissions`、`/tools` | 检查可用工具和策略 |
+| `/add-dir` | 为此会话授予额外的写入目录 |
+| `/theme`、`/doctor`、`/config` | 调整外观和检查设置 |
+
+### 无头 `exec` 模式
+
+```bash
+zero exec "解释 internal/agent/loop.go"
+zero exec --model claude-sonnet-4.5 "重构配置加载器"
+zero exec --use-spec "为 API 客户端添加速率限制"
+zero exec --worktree "在隔离的工作树中尝试迁移"
+zero exec --resume
+zero exec --fork <session-id> "尝试另一种方法"
+```
+
+编程使用：
+
+```bash
+zero exec --input-format stream-json --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
+```
+
+Stream-JSON 协议文档在 [docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)。
+
+## 安全模型
+
+Zero 旨在使副作用可见。
+
+- 工作区读取默认允许。
+- 文件写入限制在工作区内，除非你授予其他目录。
+- Shell 命令、网络访问、破坏性命令和提权操作需要权限授权。
+- `--add-dir <path>` 和 `/add-dir <path>` 授予额外的写入根目录，而不会给智能体整个文件系统。
+- 不安全/自主模式是显式选择加入。
+- 在 Zero 控制的界面上，密钥会从工具输出和日志中被脱敏。
+
+示例：
+
+```bash
+zero --add-dir ../docs-site
+zero exec --add-dir ../shared "更新两个仓库"
+```
+
+沙箱行为可以通过以下方式检查：
+
+```bash
+zero sandbox policy
+zero sandbox grants list
+```
+
+## Web 和本地控制
+
+Zero 包含本地文件/搜索/编辑/Shell 工具、用于公共 URL 的 `web_fetch`，以及用于额外工具的 MCP 支持。
+
+对于本地开发服务器，使用 Shell 命令（如通过 `exec_command` 的 `curl`），这样正常的沙箱和权限策略就会生效。长时间运行的命令保持附加到后台终端会话，可以从 TUI 中列出或停止。
+
+npm 包还包含本地浏览器/终端工具使用的浏览器和终端辅助包。源码构建可以在它们位于 `PATH` 上或在 Zero 的本地控制设置中配置时使用相同的辅助工具。
+
+## 常用命令
+
+```text
+zero                  交互式 TUI
+zero exec             一次性或脚本化智能体运行
+zero setup            首次运行提供商设置
+zero auth             支持提供商的 OAuth/登录辅助
+zero models           模型注册表和能力
+zero providers        提供商配置和检测
+zero doctor           设置、密钥和连接检查
+zero context          上下文预算报告
+zero repo-map         确定性仓库映射
+zero repo-info        本地仓库摘要
+zero search | find    搜索本地会话历史
+zero sessions         检查、恢复、分叉和回滚会话
+zero spec             管理规范模式草稿
+zero specialist       管理专业子智能体
+zero skills           管理 Markdown 指令技能
+zero plugins          管理插件
+zero hooks            管理生命周期钩子
+zero mcp              管理 MCP 服务器和工具
+zero serve --mcp      通过 MCP stdio 暴露 Zero 工具
+zero sandbox          检查沙箱策略和授权
+zero worktrees        准备隔离的 Git 工作树
+zero verify           检测和运行本地验证检查
+zero changes          检查和提交本地 Git 变更
+zero usage            Token 使用量和估算成本
+zero cron             定时智能体任务
+zero update           检查更新版本
+```
+
+## 外观和无障碍
+
+| 控制 | 效果 |
+|---|---|
+| `NO_COLOR=<任意值>` | 禁用颜色输出 |
+| `ZERO_THEME=<名称>` | 选择启动主题（`auto`、`dark`、`light`，或颜色主题如 `dracula`、`nord`、`gruvbox`、`tokyo-night`、`catppuccin`、`one-dark`、`solarized-dark`、`rose-pine`、`everforest`、`solarized-light`） |
+| `--theme <名称>` | 从 CLI 选择 TUI 主题（相同名称） |
+| `/theme` | 在 TUI 中打开主题选择器（实时预览；`/theme <名称>` 直接切换） |
+| `ZERO_NO_FADE=1` | 禁用流式淡入动画 |
+
+含义不仅仅依赖于颜色；差异、权限和状态也使用文本或标记符号。
+
+## 开发
+
+```bash
+go test ./...
+go run ./cmd/zero-release build
+go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
+go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench
+```
+
+交叉编译示例：
+
+```bash
+go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos linux --goarch amd64
+go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero.exe
+```
+
+## 文档
+
+- [安装](docs/INSTALL.md)
+- [更新流程](docs/UPDATE.md)
+- [Stream-JSON 协议](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)
+- [专家](docs/SPECIALISTS.md)
+- [GitHub Action](docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md)
+- [基准测试](docs/BENCHMARK.md)
+- [性能](docs/PERFORMANCE.md)
+- [智能体评估](docs/AGENT_EVALS.md)
+
+## 贡献
+
+欢迎贡献。阅读 [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md)，运行相关测试，然后提交一个聚焦的拉取请求。
+
+安全报告应遵循 [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)。
+
+## 许可证
+
+Zero 基于 [MIT 许可证](LICENSE) 发布。

action.yml

@@ -27,14 +27,14 @@ inputs:
   api-key:
     description: >-
       The provider API key. Pass it from a repository or organization secret;
-      it is exported into the step environment and never written to the log.
+      it is exported only for the ZERO step and never written to the log.
     required: false
     default: ""
   api-key-env:
     description: >-
       Name of the environment variable the chosen provider reads its key from
       (for example OPENAI_API_KEY or ANTHROPIC_API_KEY). When set together with
-      api-key, that variable is exported for the run. Leave the action
+      api-key, that variable is exported only for the ZERO step. Leave the action
       provider-agnostic by passing the env name your provider expects rather
       than hardcoding one here.
     required: false
@@ -192,10 +192,9 @@ runs:
             echo "::error::api-key-env must be a valid environment variable name." >&2
             exit 2
           fi
-          # Export in-process so the zero invocation in this same run block sees
-          # it, and append to GITHUB_ENV so any later steps inherit it too.
+          # Export in-process for this Run ZERO step so zero can read it; do
+          # not persist provider credentials to later job steps.
           export "${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV}=${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY}"
-          printf '%s=%s\n' "${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV}" "${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY}" >> "${GITHUB_ENV}"
         fi
         if [ -n "${ZERO_INPUT_PROVIDER}" ]; then
           export ZERO_PROVIDER="${ZERO_INPUT_PROVIDER}"

bin/zero.js

@@ -54,8 +54,28 @@ const nativePath = join(packageRoot, zeroBinaryName());
 const localControlHelpers = localControlHelperManifest(packageRoot);
 
 if (!existsSync(nativePath)) {
+  const postinstallScript = join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs');
+  const ranByBun = process.execPath.includes('bun') || !!process.versions?.bun;
   console.error(
-    '[zero] No native binary found next to the npm wrapper. Reinstall the zero package or run `go run ./cmd/zero-release build` from the repository.'
+    '[zero] No native binary found next to the npm wrapper.\n' +
+      'The platform binary is fetched at install time by a postinstall script,\n' +
+      'which did not run (or was skipped) for this install.\n' +
+      '\n' +
+      'Fix it now by running the installer manually:\n' +
+      `  node "${postinstallScript}"\n` +
+      '\n' +
+      (ranByBun
+        ? 'You installed with Bun, which does not run dependency lifecycle scripts\n' +
+          'by default. Trust the package to run the blocked postinstall:\n' +
+          '  bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero       (project install)\n' +
+          '  bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero    (global install)\n' +
+          'On Bun versions without `bun pm trust`, add\n' +
+          '  "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]\n' +
+          'to your project package.json and reinstall.\n' +
+          '\n'
+        : '') +
+      'If that fails, build from source: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero\n' +
+      '(go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.25+).',
   );
   process.exit(1);
 }

docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md

@@ -41,8 +41,9 @@ jobs:
 > provider-neutral: `api-key-env` is the environment variable name the chosen
 > provider reads its key from (for example `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `GEMINI_API_KEY`,
 > `OPENROUTER_API_KEY`), and `api-key` is the secret value. The action exports
-> that variable for the run and never prints it. If your repository already
-> commits a `.zero/config.json` with an active provider, you can omit `provider`.
+> that variable only for the ZERO step and never prints it. If your repository
+> already commits a `.zero/config.json` with an active provider, you can omit
+> `provider`.
 
 ## Inputs
 
@@ -51,8 +52,8 @@ jobs:
 | `prompt` | one of `prompt`/`prompt-file` | `""` | The instruction for ZERO to execute. |
 | `prompt-file` | one of `prompt`/`prompt-file` | `""` | Path (relative to `working-directory`) to a file whose contents are the prompt. |
 | `provider` | no | `""` | Provider id to activate (e.g. `openai`, `anthropic`, `gemini`, `ollama`, or any compatible endpoint). |
-| `api-key` | no | `""` | The provider API key. Pass from a secret; never logged. |
-| `api-key-env` | no | `""` | Env var name the provider reads its key from (e.g. `OPENAI_API_KEY`). Exported with `api-key`. |
+| `api-key` | no | `""` | The provider API key. Pass from a secret; exported only for the ZERO step and never logged. |
+| `api-key-env` | no | `""` | Env var name the provider reads its key from (e.g. `OPENAI_API_KEY`). Exported only for the ZERO step when used with `api-key`. |
 | `model` | no | `""` | Model id. Defaults to the resolved provider's default. |
 | `mode` | no | `""` | Run mode (`zero exec --mode`), e.g. `smart`, `deep`, `fast`. |
 | `auto` | no | `low` | Autonomy ceiling (`zero exec --auto`): `low`, `medium`, or `high`. Conservative by default. |
@@ -162,9 +163,10 @@ jobs:
 ## Security notes
 
 - **Secrets are passed as Action secrets and never logged.** The action exports
-  `api-key` (under `api-key-env`) and `slack-webhook-url` into the step
-  environment only. They are never echoed, and ZERO redacts secret-shaped
-  strings from its own output.
+  `api-key` (under `api-key-env`) only for the ZERO step. `slack-webhook-url`
+  is passed only to the Slack post step. They are never echoed or persisted to
+  later workflow steps, and ZERO redacts secret-shaped strings from its own
+  output.
 - **The sandbox is always active.** This action never passes
   `--skip-permissions-unsafe`, so writes stay inside the checked-out repository
   (plus any roots you grant with `add-dir`). Unsafe mode is never enabled

docs/INSTALL.md

@@ -24,6 +24,51 @@ Requirements:
 - Node.js 18+
 - network access to npm and GitHub Releases
 
+## Bun
+
+Bun is "default-secure" and does not run lifecycle scripts of installed
+dependencies (only the installing project's own scripts), so the `postinstall`
+that fetches the Zero binary is silently skipped. The first run then fails with
+`No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`.
+
+The simplest fix is to trust the package after installing, which runs the
+blocked postinstall. This works for project and global installs:
+
+```bash
+# project install
+bun add @gitlawb/zero
+bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero
+
+# global install
+bun add -g @gitlawb/zero
+bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero
+```
+
+`bun pm untrusted` (or `bun pm -g untrusted`) lists the blocked postinstalls if
+you want to inspect before trusting.
+
+Alternatively, allow the postinstall to run at install time by adding the
+package to your project's `trustedDependencies` before installing:
+
+```json
+{
+  "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]
+}
+```
+
+```bash
+bun add @gitlawb/zero
+```
+
+On Bun versions that do not have `bun pm trust`, run the installer manually
+after installing:
+
+```bash
+node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs
+```
+
+Reference: <https://bun.sh/docs/pm/lifecycle>
+
 ## Linux And macOS Script
 
 Install the latest release:

internal/agent/additional_permissions_validation_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
+)
+
+// A shell call that sets sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions but
+// omits (or malforms) additional_permissions can never succeed: the same
+// validation runs again at grant time regardless of the user's decision. It
+// must be rejected as a plain tool error BEFORE any permission prompt, not
+// surfaced as a confusing "approved but denied" prompt outcome.
+func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsMissingAdditionalPermissionsBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
+
+	promptCalls := 0
+	result, err := executeToolCall(
+		context.Background(),
+		registry,
+		ToolCall{
+			ID:        "c1",
+			Name:      "bash",
+			Arguments: `{"command":"echo hi","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions"}`,
+		},
+		PermissionModeAuto,
+		Options{
+			OnPermissionRequest: func(ctx context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
+				promptCalls++
+				return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionAllow}, nil
+			},
+		},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
+	}
+	if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %q, want error", result.Status)
+	}
+	if promptCalls != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want 0 (must reject before prompting)", promptCalls)
+	}
+}
+
+// The mismatched-flag case (additional_permissions present without the
+// sandbox_permissions flag) must be rejected the same way.
+func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsAdditionalPermissionsWithoutFlagBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
+
+	promptCalls := 0
+	result, err := executeToolCall(
+		context.Background(),
+		registry,
+		ToolCall{
+			ID:        "c1",
+			Name:      "bash",
+			Arguments: `{"command":"echo hi","additional_permissions":{"network":{"enabled":true}}}`,
+		},
+		PermissionModeAuto,
+		Options{
+			OnPermissionRequest: func(ctx context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
+				promptCalls++
+				return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionAllow}, nil
+			},
+		},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
+	}
+	if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %q, want error", result.Status)
+	}
+	if promptCalls != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want 0 (must reject before prompting)", promptCalls)
+	}
+}
+
+// The rejection message must show a concrete, correctly-shaped example: a
+// model that gets this wrong once (attaching sandbox_permissions out of habit
+// from an earlier call, without a valid payload) needs enough in the error to
+// self-correct on retry instead of repeating the identical mistake.
+func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
+
+	result, err := executeToolCall(
+		context.Background(),
+		registry,
+		ToolCall{
+			ID:        "c1",
+			Name:      "bash",
+			Arguments: `{"command":"ping example.com","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions"}`,
+		},
+		PermissionModeAuto,
+		Options{},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.Output, `{"network": {"enabled": true}}`) {
+		t.Fatalf("output = %q, want a concrete additional_permissions example", result.Output)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "omit sandbox_permissions") {
+		t.Fatalf("output = %q, want guidance that the flag can simply be omitted", result.Output)
+	}
+}
+
+// A well-formed additional_permissions payload must still reach the normal
+// permission prompt: this fix only rejects malformed payloads.
+func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
+
+	promptCalls := 0
+	_, err := executeToolCall(
+		context.Background(),
+		registry,
+		ToolCall{
+			ID:   "c1",
+			Name: "bash",
+			Arguments: `{"command":"echo hi","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions",` +
+				`"additional_permissions":{"network":{"enabled":true}}}`,
+		},
+		PermissionModeAuto,
+		Options{
+			OnPermissionRequest: func(ctx context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
+				promptCalls++
+				return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny}, nil
+			},
+		},
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
+	}
+	if promptCalls != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want exactly 1 for a valid elevation request", promptCalls)
+	}
+}

internal/agent/compaction.go

@@ -21,12 +21,17 @@ import (
 // the agent loop owns the provider wiring.
 
 // defaultCompactionPreserveLast is how many trailing messages are kept verbatim
-// when the caller does not specify a preserve count.
-const defaultCompactionPreserveLast = 8
+// when the caller does not specify a preserve count. Kept in sync with the replay
+// reconstruction default in internal/sessions/replay.go.
+const defaultCompactionPreserveLast = 6
 
 // compactionTriggerRatio is the fraction of the context window at which
-// proactive compaction kicks in (top of each turn).
-const compactionTriggerRatio = 0.8
+// proactive compaction kicks in (top of each turn). NOTE: this is speculative
+// tuning — validate against the per-turn latency/compaction metrics (roadmap 5.2)
+// before trusting it. Measured fixed overhead is ~7.4k tokens (not the ~16k the
+// roadmap assumed), so context fills slower; if data shows 0.7 triggers redundant
+// summarization, raise it back toward 0.8.
+const compactionTriggerRatio = 0.7
 
 // summaryLabel prefixes the injected summary so it is unmistakable in the
 // transcript (and so tests can assert on it).

internal/agent/file_diagnostics.go

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"os"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lsp"
+)
+
+// fileDiagnosticsTimeout bounds one inline post-edit diagnostics check so a
+// slow or wedged language server can never hang a tool call; on timeout the
+// edit simply reports without a diagnostics block.
+const fileDiagnosticsTimeout = 10 * time.Second
+
+// NewFileDiagnostics adapts an *lsp.Manager to the per-edit inline diagnostics
+// callback (tools.RunOptions.Diagnostics): it reads the just-written file,
+// checks it against the file's language server, and formats error-severity
+// diagnostics for the model. Warnings and hints are excluded — nagging about
+// style on every edit is noise, while a type error the edit just introduced is
+// exactly what the model should see before its next step. Returns nil when
+// manager is nil, disabling inline diagnostics entirely.
+func NewFileDiagnostics(manager *lsp.Manager) func(context.Context, string) string {
+	if manager == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return func(ctx context.Context, absPath string) string {
+		text, err := os.ReadFile(absPath)
+		if err != nil {
+			return ""
+		}
+		checkCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, fileDiagnosticsTimeout)
+		defer cancel()
+		diagnostics, err := manager.Check(checkCtx, absPath, string(text))
+		if err != nil {
+			return ""
+		}
+		errors := lsp.FilterBySeverity(diagnostics, lsp.SeverityError)
+		if len(errors) == 0 {
+			return ""
+		}
+		return lsp.FormatDiagnostics(absPath, errors)
+	}
+}

internal/agent/loop.go

@@ -475,11 +475,35 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 		// between tool_results breaks strict provider replay) — same after-batch
 		// rationale as turnRequestedModel above.
 		var changedFilesThisBatch []string
+		// Parallel read-ahead state: results for calls[precomputedStart:precomputedEnd]
+		// executed concurrently, consumed strictly in order below.
+		var precomputed []precomputedToolResult
+		precomputedStart, precomputedEnd := 0, 0
 		for index, call := range collected.ToolCalls {
+			// When this call starts a consecutive run of >= 2 auto-allowed read-only
+			// calls, execute the whole run concurrently now (see parallel_tools.go).
+			// The scan happens lazily at the run's first index — never ahead of a
+			// pending mutating call — so read-after-write ordering is preserved.
+			if index >= precomputedEnd {
+				runEnd := index
+				for runEnd < len(collected.ToolCalls) && parallelSafeToolCall(registry, collected.ToolCalls[runEnd], options) {
+					runEnd++
+				}
+				if runEnd-index >= 2 {
+					precomputed = executeParallelReadBatch(ctx, registry, collected.ToolCalls, index, runEnd, permissionMode, options)
+					precomputedStart, precomputedEnd = index, runEnd
+				}
+			}
 			if options.OnToolCall != nil {
 				options.OnToolCall(call)
 			}
-			toolResult, abortErr := executeToolCall(ctx, registry, call, permissionMode, options)
+			var toolResult ToolResult
+			var abortErr error
+			if index >= precomputedStart && index < precomputedEnd {
+				toolResult, abortErr = precomputed[index-precomputedStart].result, precomputed[index-precomputedStart].abortErr
+			} else {
+				toolResult, abortErr = executeToolCall(ctx, registry, call, permissionMode, options)
+			}
 			if options.OnToolResult != nil {
 				options.OnToolResult(toolResult)
 			}
@@ -816,6 +840,25 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 		}
 	}
 
+	// A shell command that sets sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions
+	// must carry a valid additional_permissions payload; inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile
+	// is the single source of truth for that shape, and buildPermissionEvent (below)
+	// calls it again to render the prompt's scope text. Check it here, before any
+	// permission prompt is shown: a malformed payload can never be satisfied no
+	// matter what the user decides, so surfacing it as a plain tool error (which the
+	// model can see and retry) is both clearer and avoids presenting a normal-looking
+	// prompt whose "allow" path is guaranteed to fail with a confusing denial.
+	if toolFound && isShellCommandTool(call.Name) {
+		if _, _, err := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, options.Cwd); err != nil {
+			return ToolResult{
+				ToolCallID: call.ID,
+				Name:       call.Name,
+				Status:     tools.StatusError,
+				Output:     "Error: " + err.Error(),
+			}, nil
+		}
+	}
+
 	// ask_user is intercepted in the loop (like permissions) so the question can
 	// be routed to an interactive front-end instead of blocking inside the tool.
 	// When no front-end is wired up it degrades to the tool's own graceful Run().
@@ -1032,6 +1075,8 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 		// Per-session file version tracker so write_file/edit_file refuse to clobber
 		// a file that changed on disk outside Zero since it was last read.
 		FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
+		// Inline post-edit diagnostics for mutating tools (nil = disabled).
+		Diagnostics: options.FileDiagnostics,
 		// Forward the run's operator tool filters so a filter-aware tool
 		// (tool_search) never discloses or loads an operator-hidden deferred tool.
 		EnabledTools:  options.EnabledTools,
@@ -2159,6 +2204,18 @@ func buildPermissionEvent(call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, p
 		}
 	}
 
+	// A command that explicitly requests additional sandbox permissions
+	// (sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions) is an ELEVATION the user
+	// must consent to, even when the base command's sandbox decision was Allow.
+	// shouldRequestPermission blocks on OnPermissionRequest for exactly this case,
+	// so the event MUST be a prompt — otherwise it carried Action=allow while the
+	// loop waited on a decision, and a UI that renders only prompts (the TUI)
+	// dropped it, deadlocking the run. Keep this consistent with
+	// shouldRequestPermission's own condition.
+	if action == PermissionActionAllow && !permissionGranted && shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) {
+		action = PermissionActionPrompt
+	}
+
 	if safety.Permission == tools.PermissionAllow && action == PermissionActionAllow && !grantMatched && block == nil {
 		return PermissionEvent{}, false
 	}
@@ -2310,7 +2367,12 @@ func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (s
 	}
 	raw, ok := args["additional_permissions"]
 	if !ok || raw == nil {
-		return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf("missing additional_permissions; provide at least one of network or file_system")
+		return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
+			"sandbox_permissions was set to %q but no additional_permissions object was provided. "+
+				`Include one, for example additional_permissions: {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
+				`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}. If this command does not need elevated permissions, `+
+				"omit sandbox_permissions entirely and retry",
+			tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
 	}
 	data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -2325,7 +2387,9 @@ func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (s
 		return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, err
 	}
 	if normalized.Empty() {
-		return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf("additional_permissions must include at least one requested permission in network or file_system")
+		return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
+			"additional_permissions must include at least one of network or file_system, for example " +
+				`{"network": {"enabled": true}} or {"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`)
 	}
 	grantProfile, err := sandbox.RequestPermissionGrantProfile(normalized)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -2458,76 +2522,97 @@ func partitionTools(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, opt
 
 	active := options.DeferThreshold > 0 && eligible >= options.DeferThreshold && loaderUsable
 
-	definitions := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0, len(visible))
-	exposedNames := make(map[string]bool, len(visible))
+	// INACTIVE: every visible tool eager (except tool_search), alpha-sorted. With no
+	// deferral there is no mid-session loading, so this is byte-stable across turns
+	// and byte-identical to the pre-deferral output.
+	if !active {
+		definitions := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0, len(visible))
+		for _, tool := range visible {
+			if tool.Name() == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
+				continue
+			}
+			definitions = append(definitions, runtimeToolDefinition(tool))
+		}
+		sort.Slice(definitions, func(left int, right int) bool {
+			return definitions[left].Name < definitions[right].Name
+		})
+		return definitions, ""
+	}
+
+	// ACTIVE: lay the tools array out so its cacheable prefix does NOT shift when a
+	// deferred tool loads mid-session. The tools block is part of the provider's
+	// cached prefix; if a load reorders it, the cache invalidates from that point
+	// through the system prompt and messages — on EVERY load. Previously the whole
+	// array was alpha-sorted each turn, so a newly loaded tool was INSERTED into the
+	// middle and shifted every later definition. Instead we build three append-only
+	// regions:
+	//   1. non-deferred tools, alpha-sorted — always present, identical every turn;
+	//   2. tool_search — always present, right after the stable block;
+	//   3. loaded deferred tools, alpha-sorted — APPENDED, so an unloaded->loaded
+	//      transition grows the tail instead of inserting into the eager block.
+	// (tool_search's discovery text still shrinks as tools load, so keeping it and
+	// the loaded tail AFTER the eager block preserves the eager tools' cache across a
+	// load; fully stabilizing the loader's own description is a scoped follow-up.)
+	eager := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0, len(visible))
+	loadedTail := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0)
 	var hiddenTools []tools.Tool
 	for _, tool := range visible {
 		name := tool.Name()
-		deferred := tools.IsDeferred(tool)
-
-		if !active {
-			// Inactive: byte-identical to legacy, but tool_search is never advertised.
-			if name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
-				continue
+		if name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
+			continue // added explicitly between the eager block and the loaded tail
+		}
+		if tools.IsDeferred(tool) {
+			if loaded[name] {
+				loadedTail = append(loadedTail, runtimeToolDefinition(tool))
+			} else {
+				hiddenTools = append(hiddenTools, tool)
 			}
-			definitions = append(definitions, zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
-				Name:        name,
-				Description: tool.Description(),
-				Parameters:  schemaToRuntimeMap(tool.Parameters()),
-			})
-			exposedNames[name] = true
 			continue
 		}
-
-		// Active path.
-		if deferred && !loaded[name] {
-			hiddenTools = append(hiddenTools, tool)
-			continue
-		}
-		definitions = append(definitions, zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
-			Name:        name,
-			Description: tool.Description(),
-			Parameters:  schemaToRuntimeMap(tool.Parameters()),
-		})
-		exposedNames[name] = true
+		eager = append(eager, runtimeToolDefinition(tool))
 	}
-
-	// On the ACTIVE path tool_search is guaranteed runnable (active implies
-	// loaderUsable), so it must ALWAYS be reachable — even when a non-empty
-	// EnabledTools allowlist omits it (the operator allowlisted the deferred
-	// tools, not the loader). Expose its full definition whenever it is not
-	// already in the exposed set. This never runs on the inactive path, so the
-	// byte-identical below-threshold output is preserved.
-	discovery := ""
-	if active && len(hiddenTools) > 0 {
-		discovery = tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(hiddenTools)
-	}
-	if active && !exposedNames[tools.ToolSearchToolName] {
-		description := loader.Description()
-		if discovery != "" {
-			description = discovery
-		}
-		definitions = append(definitions, zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
-			Name:        loader.Name(),
-			Description: description,
-			Parameters:  schemaToRuntimeMap(loader.Parameters()),
-		})
-	} else if active && discovery != "" {
-		for i := range definitions {
-			if definitions[i].Name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
-				definitions[i].Description = discovery
-				break
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	sort.Slice(definitions, func(left int, right int) bool {
-		return definitions[left].Name < definitions[right].Name
+	sort.Slice(eager, func(left int, right int) bool {
+		return eager[left].Name < eager[right].Name
+	})
+	sort.Slice(loadedTail, func(left int, right int) bool {
+		return loadedTail[left].Name < loadedTail[right].Name
 	})
 
+	discovery := ""
+	if len(hiddenTools) > 0 {
+		discovery = tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(hiddenTools)
+	}
+
+	// tool_search is guaranteed runnable on the active path, so it is ALWAYS exposed
+	// — even when a non-empty EnabledTools allowlist omits it (the operator
+	// allowlisted the deferred tools, not the loader). It sits right after the stable
+	// eager block and carries the discovery list for still-hidden tools.
+	description := loader.Description()
+	if discovery != "" {
+		description = discovery
+	}
+	definitions := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0, len(eager)+1+len(loadedTail))
+	definitions = append(definitions, eager...)
+	definitions = append(definitions, zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
+		Name:        loader.Name(),
+		Description: description,
+		Parameters:  schemaToRuntimeMap(loader.Parameters()),
+	})
+	definitions = append(definitions, loadedTail...)
+
 	return definitions, discovery
 }
 
+// runtimeToolDefinition renders a tool's advertised definition (name, description,
+// JSON-schema parameters) as sent to the provider.
+func runtimeToolDefinition(tool tools.Tool) zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
+	return zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
+		Name:        tool.Name(),
+		Description: tool.Description(),
+		Parameters:  schemaToRuntimeMap(tool.Parameters()),
+	}
+}
+
 func ToolVisible(tool tools.Tool, permissionMode PermissionMode, enabledTools []string, disabledTools []string) bool {
 	return ToolAllowedByFilters(tool.Name(), enabledTools, disabledTools) && ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode)
 }

internal/agent/loop_test.go

@@ -37,6 +37,35 @@ func (provider *mockProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zero
 	return ch, nil
 }
 
+type recordingWebSearchTool struct {
+	calls []map[string]any
+}
+
+func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Name() string        { return "web_search" }
+func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Description() string { return "test web search tool" }
+func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
+	return tools.Schema{
+		Type: "object",
+		Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{
+			"query": {Type: "string"},
+		},
+		Required:             []string{"query"},
+		AdditionalProperties: false,
+	}
+}
+func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{
+		SideEffect:      tools.SideEffectNetwork,
+		Permission:      tools.PermissionPrompt,
+		Reason:          "Sends model-provided search query text to the configured web search backend.",
+		AdvertiseInAuto: true,
+	}
+}
+func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
+	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "1. T — https://x.test"}
+}
+
 type sandboxDeniedRetryTool struct {
 	calls []map[string]any
 }
@@ -865,7 +894,7 @@ func TestRunRejectsLocalWebFetchBeforePermissionRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestRunAdvertisesAllowedWebSearchInAutoMode(t *testing.T) {
+func TestRunAdvertisesPromptedWebSearchInAutoMode(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Setenv("ZERO_WEBSEARCH_BASE_URL", "https://search.example/api")
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
 	for _, tool := range tools.CoreNetworkTools() {
@@ -896,6 +925,52 @@ func TestRunAdvertisesAllowedWebSearchInAutoMode(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestRunRequestsPermissionBeforeWebSearchExecution(t *testing.T) {
+	search := &recordingWebSearchTool{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(search)
+	provider := &mockProvider{
+		turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
+			{
+				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "web_search"},
+				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"query":"private workspace detail"}`},
+				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
+				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
+			},
+			{
+				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
+				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
+			},
+		},
+	}
+	var requests []PermissionRequest
+
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "search", provider, Options{
+		Registry:       registry,
+		PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
+		OnPermissionRequest: func(_ context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
+			requests = append(requests, request)
+			return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "network not approved"}, nil
+		},
+	})
+
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected final answer after denied tool call, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
+	}
+	if len(requests) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected one permission request, got %#v", requests)
+	}
+	if requests[0].ToolName != "web_search" || requests[0].Permission != string(tools.PermissionPrompt) || requests[0].SideEffect != string(tools.SideEffectNetwork) {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected permission request: %#v", requests[0])
+	}
+	if len(search.calls) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("web_search backend must not run when permission is denied, got calls %#v", search.calls)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestRunFiltersAdvertisedTools(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()

internal/agent/parallel_tools.go

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
+)
+
+// Parallel read-ahead for tool batches. When a turn requests several
+// independent lookups (read_file + grep + glob is the common shape), executing
+// them one after another serializes pure I/O waits. A consecutive run of
+// auto-allowed read-only calls is executed concurrently instead; results are
+// then consumed in the original call order, so guard counters, message
+// ordering, abort semantics, and the surface's call/result event pairing are
+// byte-identical to sequential execution. Runs never span a mutating call: a
+// read that follows a write must observe the write, so eligibility is decided
+// per consecutive run, not per batch.
+
+// maxParallelReadTools bounds concurrent read-only tool executions in a turn.
+const maxParallelReadTools = 8
+
+// precomputedToolResult is one parallel read-ahead execution, keyed back to
+// its batch index by the caller.
+type precomputedToolResult struct {
+	result   ToolResult
+	abortErr error
+}
+
+// parallelSafeToolCall reports whether call may run concurrently with its
+// neighbors: the tool must exist, be side-effect-free (SideEffectRead), and be
+// auto-allowed for these args, so no interactive prompt or workspace mutation
+// is on the hot path. Loop-intercepted tools (ask_user, request_permissions)
+// and tool_search (mutates the deferred-tool set) stay sequential.
+func parallelSafeToolCall(registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, options Options) bool {
+	switch call.Name {
+	case "ask_user", tools.RequestPermissionsToolName, tools.ToolSearchToolName:
+		return false
+	}
+	tool, found := registry.Get(call.Name)
+	if !found || tool.Safety().SideEffect != tools.SideEffectRead {
+		return false
+	}
+	args := map[string]any{}
+	if call.Arguments != "" {
+		if err := decodeToolArguments(call.Arguments, &args); err != nil {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return effectivePermission(tool, args) == tools.PermissionAllow
+}
+
+// executeParallelReadBatch runs calls[start:end] concurrently (bounded by
+// maxParallelReadTools) and returns results indexed relative to start. Any
+// permission prompt that still occurs (a sandbox preflight can demand one even
+// for an auto-allowed read) is serialized so an interactive front-end never
+// sees two prompts at once.
+func executeParallelReadBatch(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, calls []ToolCall, start, end int, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options) []precomputedToolResult {
+	batchOptions := options
+	if options.OnPermissionRequest != nil {
+		var promptMutex sync.Mutex
+		inner := options.OnPermissionRequest
+		batchOptions.OnPermissionRequest = func(ctx context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
+			promptMutex.Lock()
+			defer promptMutex.Unlock()
+			return inner(ctx, request)
+		}
+	}
+
+	results := make([]precomputedToolResult, end-start)
+	semaphore := make(chan struct{}, maxParallelReadTools)
+	var waitGroup sync.WaitGroup
+	for index := start; index < end; index++ {
+		waitGroup.Add(1)
+		go func(index int) {
+			defer waitGroup.Done()
+			semaphore <- struct{}{}
+			defer func() { <-semaphore }()
+			result, abortErr := executeToolCall(ctx, registry, calls[index], permissionMode, batchOptions)
+			results[index-start] = precomputedToolResult{result: result, abortErr: abortErr}
+		}(index)
+	}
+	waitGroup.Wait()
+	return results
+}

internal/agent/parallel_tools_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// probeTool records execution overlap and ordering so tests can assert what
+// actually ran concurrently.
+type probeTool struct {
+	name       string
+	sideEffect tools.SideEffect
+	delay      time.Duration
+
+	mu        sync.Mutex
+	active    int
+	maxActive int
+	log       []string
+}
+
+func (tool *probeTool) Name() string        { return tool.name }
+func (tool *probeTool) Description() string { return "test probe tool" }
+func (tool *probeTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
+	return tools.Schema{
+		Type:                 "object",
+		Properties:           map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"id": {Type: "string"}},
+		AdditionalProperties: false,
+	}
+}
+func (tool *probeTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tool.sideEffect, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "test"}
+}
+func (tool *probeTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	id, _ := args["id"].(string)
+	tool.mu.Lock()
+	tool.active++
+	if tool.active > tool.maxActive {
+		tool.maxActive = tool.active
+	}
+	tool.log = append(tool.log, "start:"+id)
+	tool.mu.Unlock()
+	time.Sleep(tool.delay)
+	tool.mu.Lock()
+	tool.active--
+	tool.log = append(tool.log, "end:"+id)
+	tool.mu.Unlock()
+	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "probe " + id}
+}
+
+func probeCallEvents(callID, toolName, id string) []zeroruntime.StreamEvent {
+	return []zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
+		{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: callID, ToolName: toolName},
+		{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: callID, ArgumentsFragment: fmt.Sprintf(`{"id":%q}`, id)},
+		{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: callID},
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParallelSafeToolCall(t *testing.T) {
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(&probeTool{name: "probe_read", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead})
+	registry.Register(&probeTool{name: "probe_write", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite})
+
+	call := func(name, args string) ToolCall { return ToolCall{ID: "c", Name: name, Arguments: args} }
+	if !parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("probe_read", `{"id":"a"}`), Options{}) {
+		t.Fatal("auto-allowed read tool must be parallel-safe")
+	}
+	if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("probe_write", `{"id":"a"}`), Options{}) {
+		t.Fatal("mutating tool must not be parallel-safe")
+	}
+	if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("unknown_tool", `{}`), Options{}) {
+		t.Fatal("unknown tool must not be parallel-safe")
+	}
+	if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("probe_read", `{"id":`), Options{}) {
+		t.Fatal("undecodable arguments must not be parallel-safe")
+	}
+	if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("ask_user", `{}`), Options{}) {
+		t.Fatal("loop-intercepted tools must stay sequential")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunExecutesConsecutiveReadsConcurrently(t *testing.T) {
+	probe := &probeTool{name: "probe_read", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, delay: 60 * time.Millisecond}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(probe)
+
+	turnOne := append(probeCallEvents("call-1", "probe_read", "a"), probeCallEvents("call-2", "probe_read", "b")...)
+	turnOne = append(turnOne, probeCallEvents("call-3", "probe_read", "c")...)
+	turnOne = append(turnOne, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone})
+	provider := &mockProvider{
+		turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
+			turnOne,
+			{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
+		},
+	}
+
+	var results []ToolResult
+	_, err := Run(context.Background(), "probe", provider, Options{
+		Registry:     registry,
+		OnToolResult: func(result ToolResult) { results = append(results, result) },
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if probe.maxActive < 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("consecutive read-only calls must overlap, max concurrency was %d", probe.maxActive)
+	}
+	// Results must still be recorded in original call order.
+	if len(results) != 3 || results[0].ToolCallID != "call-1" || results[1].ToolCallID != "call-2" || results[2].ToolCallID != "call-3" {
+		t.Fatalf("tool results out of order: %#v", results)
+	}
+	messages := provider.requests[1].Messages
+	var toolOrder []string
+	for _, message := range messages {
+		if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
+			toolOrder = append(toolOrder, message.ToolCallID)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(toolOrder) != 3 || toolOrder[0] != "call-1" || toolOrder[1] != "call-2" || toolOrder[2] != "call-3" {
+		t.Fatalf("recorded tool messages out of order: %v", toolOrder)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunParallelReadsNeverSpanMutatingCall(t *testing.T) {
+	read := &probeTool{name: "probe_read", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, delay: 30 * time.Millisecond}
+	write := &probeTool{name: "probe_write", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite}
+	// Shared log across both probes so relative ordering is observable.
+	write.mu = sync.Mutex{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(read)
+	registry.Register(write)
+
+	turnOne := append(probeCallEvents("call-1", "probe_read", "r1"), probeCallEvents("call-2", "probe_read", "r2")...)
+	turnOne = append(turnOne, probeCallEvents("call-3", "probe_write", "w")...)
+	turnOne = append(turnOne, probeCallEvents("call-4", "probe_read", "r3")...)
+	turnOne = append(turnOne, probeCallEvents("call-5", "probe_read", "r4")...)
+	turnOne = append(turnOne, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone})
+	provider := &mockProvider{
+		turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
+			turnOne,
+			{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
+		},
+	}
+
+	_, err := Run(context.Background(), "probe", provider, Options{Registry: registry})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// The write must start only after r1+r2 finished, and r3/r4 must start only
+	// after the write finished: batches never cross a mutating call.
+	index := func(log []string, entry string) int {
+		for i, e := range log {
+			if e == entry {
+				return i
+			}
+		}
+		return -1
+	}
+	readLog := func() []string { read.mu.Lock(); defer read.mu.Unlock(); return append([]string(nil), read.log...) }()
+	writeLog := func() []string { write.mu.Lock(); defer write.mu.Unlock(); return append([]string(nil), write.log...) }()
+	if index(writeLog, "start:w") == -1 {
+		t.Fatalf("write probe never ran: %v", writeLog)
+	}
+	for _, entry := range []string{"end:r1", "end:r2"} {
+		if index(readLog, entry) == -1 {
+			t.Fatalf("first read batch incomplete: %v", readLog)
+		}
+	}
+	// r3/r4 must appear strictly after r1/r2 in the read log (the write barrier
+	// between the two batches forces full separation).
+	firstBatchMaxEnd := max(index(readLog, "end:r1"), index(readLog, "end:r2"))
+	secondBatchMinStart := min(index(readLog, "start:r3"), index(readLog, "start:r4"))
+	if secondBatchMinStart < firstBatchMaxEnd {
+		t.Fatalf("second read batch started before first batch ended: %v", readLog)
+	}
+	if read.maxActive < 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("reads within a batch must overlap, max concurrency was %d", read.maxActive)
+	}
+}

internal/agent/partition_cache_stable_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
+)
+
+func TestPartitionToolsActiveAppendsLoadedToolAfterEagerBlock(t *testing.T) {
+	// Cache-stability property: loading a deferred tool must APPEND it after the
+	// always-eager tools, not sort it into the middle of them — otherwise the tool
+	// definitions (the provider's cacheable prefix) shift on every load. The old
+	// behaviour alpha-sorted the whole array, so "mcp__srv__alpha" jumped ahead of
+	// "read_file".
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root)) // non-deferred, "read_file"
+	registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})
+	registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
+	registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
+
+	exposed, _ := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{DeferThreshold: 2}, map[string]bool{"mcp__srv__alpha": true})
+
+	pos := func(name string) int {
+		for i := range exposed {
+			if exposed[i].Name == name {
+				return i
+			}
+		}
+		return -1
+	}
+	readPos, searchPos, alphaPos := pos("read_file"), pos("tool_search"), pos("mcp__srv__alpha")
+	if readPos < 0 || searchPos < 0 || alphaPos < 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected read_file, tool_search and loaded alpha all exposed, got %#v", exposed)
+	}
+	// The eager tools must precede the loaded deferred tool (appended, not inserted).
+	if !(readPos < alphaPos && searchPos < alphaPos) {
+		t.Fatalf("loaded deferred tool must be appended after the eager block; got read=%d search=%d alpha=%d", readPos, searchPos, alphaPos)
+	}
+	// beta was never loaded — it stays hidden.
+	if pos("mcp__srv__beta") != -1 {
+		t.Fatalf("unloaded deferred tool must stay hidden, got %#v", exposed)
+	}
+}

internal/agent/permission_additional_perms_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
+)
+
+// promptShellTool is a minimal shell-style tool whose Safety requires a prompt,
+// standing in for bash so buildPermissionEvent can be exercised directly.
+type promptShellTool struct{}
+
+func (promptShellTool) Name() string        { return "bash" }
+func (promptShellTool) Description() string { return "run a shell command" }
+func (promptShellTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
+	return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
+}
+func (promptShellTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "runs a shell command"}
+}
+func (promptShellTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
+}
+
+// A command whose sandbox decision is Allow but that explicitly requests
+// additional sandbox permissions is an ELEVATION: it must be surfaced as a
+// prompt, never Action=allow. Previously it carried allow while the loop still
+// blocked on OnPermissionRequest, and the TUI (which renders only prompts)
+// dropped it → the run deadlocked forever. This is the exact gpt-5.5
+// folder-creation shape captured in the reported hang.
+func TestBuildPermissionEventPromptsForAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
+	call := ToolCall{ID: "call_1", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
+	args := map[string]any{
+		"command":             "mkdir foo && cd foo && go mod init foo",
+		"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
+	}
+	// Base command allowed by the sandbox…
+	decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow}
+
+	event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("buildPermissionEvent returned ok=false; the elevation request must produce an event")
+	}
+	if event.Action != PermissionActionPrompt {
+		t.Fatalf("Action = %q, want prompt — an additional-permissions elevation must ask the user, not auto-allow", event.Action)
+	}
+	// Sanity: shouldRequestPermission agrees the loop blocks on this.
+	if !shouldRequestPermission(promptShellTool{}, args, false, decision) {
+		t.Fatal("shouldRequestPermission must be true for an additional-permissions request")
+	}
+}
+
+// Without the additional-permissions flag, a sandbox-allowed command is NOT a
+// prompt (shouldRequestPermission is false; it just runs) — the override must
+// not over-reach and prompt for ordinary allowed commands.
+func TestBuildPermissionEventKeepsAllowForOrdinaryAllowedCommand(t *testing.T) {
+	call := ToolCall{ID: "call_2", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
+	args := map[string]any{"command": "ls"}
+	decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow}
+
+	event, _ := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
+	if event.Action == PermissionActionPrompt {
+		t.Fatalf("Action = prompt for an ordinary allowed command; want allow (no spurious prompt)")
+	}
+	if shouldRequestPermission(promptShellTool{}, args, false, decision) {
+		t.Fatal("shouldRequestPermission must be false for an ordinary sandbox-allowed command")
+	}
+}

internal/agent/prompt_budget_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
+)
+
+// These ceilings are a deliberate ratchet on Zero's fixed per-turn overhead — the
+// system prompt and the eager tool schemas that ride on EVERY request. They are
+// set ~10% above the current measured cost, using ApproxTextTokens (the same
+// estimate the compaction loop and /context use, ~non-whitespace-bytes/4). A change
+// that pushes either past its ceiling must be justified (and the ceiling raised
+// deliberately) or trimmed — the per-turn floor should not creep up silently.
+//
+// Measured baselines (2026-07): base system prompt ~3160 tokens; the tools a normal
+// (auto permission-mode) interactive turn sends ~2430 tokens. The tool figure is
+// the auto-mode advertised set, not the full core registry — higher-risk tools that
+// only advertise in other modes are excluded, matching what a real turn actually
+// pays.
+const (
+	maxBaseSystemPromptTokens = 3500
+	maxEagerToolSchemaTokens  = 2700
+)
+
+func TestSystemPromptTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
+	// Minimal render: a model is set (so the session block renders) but no Cwd, so
+	// the workspace map, project guidelines, and repo map are excluded — this is the
+	// fixed base every session pays regardless of the workspace it runs in.
+	prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Model: "claude-opus-4-8"})
+	got := ApproxTextTokens(prompt)
+	t.Logf("base system prompt: %d tokens (%d bytes)", got, len(prompt))
+	if got > maxBaseSystemPromptTokens {
+		t.Fatalf("base system prompt is %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — trim it or raise the ceiling deliberately", got, maxBaseSystemPromptTokens)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEagerToolSchemaTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(t.TempDir(), nil) {
+		registry.Register(tool)
+	}
+	// Options{} keeps DeferThreshold at 0, so deferral is inactive and every core
+	// tool is exposed eagerly — exactly what a plugin-free session sends each turn.
+	exposed, _ := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{}, map[string]bool{})
+	got := estimateToolDefTokens(exposed)
+	t.Logf("eager core tool schemas: %d tokens across %d tools", got, len(exposed))
+	if got > maxEagerToolSchemaTokens {
+		t.Fatalf("eager tool schemas are %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — defer a tool or raise the ceiling deliberately", got, maxEagerToolSchemaTokens)
+	}
+}

internal/agent/skills_context_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestSkillsContextCapsLongList(t *testing.T) {
+	skills := make([]SkillInfo, 0, 40)
+	for i := 0; i < 40; i++ {
+		n := strconv.Itoa(i)
+		skills = append(skills, SkillInfo{Name: "skill-" + n, Description: "does something useful, number " + n})
+	}
+	got := skillsContext(Options{Skills: skills})
+	if len(got) > 1200 {
+		t.Fatalf("skills block should stay bounded, got %d bytes:\n%s", len(got), got)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(got, "more (call skill") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected an overflow summary line, got:\n%s", got)
+	}
+	// The first skill is always listed regardless of budget.
+	if !strings.Contains(got, "- skill-0:") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected the first skill to always be listed, got:\n%s", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSkillsContext(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := skillsContext(Options{}); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("no skills should yield an empty section, got %q", got)
+	}
+	got := skillsContext(Options{Skills: []SkillInfo{
+		{Name: "commit-writer", Description: "Write a conventional-commit message."},
+		{Name: "  ", Description: "nameless, should be skipped"},
+		{Name: "reviewer"},
+	}})
+	if !strings.Contains(got, "<available_skills>") || !strings.Contains(got, "</available_skills>") {
+		t.Fatalf("missing available_skills block: %q", got)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(got, "- commit-writer: Write a conventional-commit message.") {
+		t.Fatalf("missing commit-writer line: %q", got)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(got, "- reviewer\n") {
+		t.Fatalf("reviewer (no description) line missing: %q", got)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(got, "nameless") {
+		t.Fatalf("nameless entry should be skipped: %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSystemPromptIncludesSkillsOnlyWhenInstalled(t *testing.T) {
+	with := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Skills: []SkillInfo{
+		{Name: "commit-writer", Description: "Write a commit message."},
+	}})
+	if !strings.Contains(with, "<available_skills>") || !strings.Contains(with, "skill tool") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected available_skills guidance in system prompt: %q", with)
+	}
+	// Default (no skills) must reproduce the prior prompt: no skills block.
+	without := buildSystemPrompt(Options{})
+	if strings.Contains(without, "<available_skills>") {
+		t.Fatalf("available_skills block must not appear without skills")
+	}
+}

internal/agent/system_prompt.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"runtime"
+	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"unicode/utf8"
 
@@ -86,6 +87,9 @@ func buildSystemPrompt(options Options) string {
 	if delegation := specialistDelegationContext(options); delegation != "" {
 		sections = append(sections, delegation)
 	}
+	if skillsBlock := skillsContext(options); skillsBlock != "" {
+		sections = append(sections, skillsBlock)
+	}
 	if style := responseStyleContext(options); style != "" {
 		sections = append(sections, style)
 	}
@@ -164,6 +168,64 @@ func specialistDelegationContext(options Options) string {
 	return b.String()
 }
 
+// skillsContext lists the reusable skills the model can pull in on demand via the
+// skill tool, so it invokes the right one on the first try instead of guessing a
+// name, failing, and reading the error. It mirrors specialistDelegationContext:
+// names + one-line descriptions only (never skill bodies), and it renders nothing
+// when no skills are installed, so a skill-less run reproduces the previous prompt
+// byte-for-byte.
+// skillsContextListBudget bounds the bytes spent listing individual skills so a
+// workspace with dozens of them can't bloat every turn's prompt. Skills past the
+// budget are summarized as a count rather than dropped — the model can still load
+// any of them by name (an unknown name returns the full list from the skill tool).
+const skillsContextListBudget = 640
+
+func skillsContext(options Options) string {
+	if len(options.Skills) == 0 {
+		return ""
+	}
+	var b strings.Builder
+	b.WriteString("<available_skills>\n")
+	b.WriteString("Reusable, on-demand instruction sets you can load with the skill tool. When a request matches one, call skill with its exact name to pull in its guidance before acting — do not guess names or skip a relevant skill.\n")
+	listed, spent, omitted := 0, 0, 0
+	for _, info := range options.Skills {
+		name := strings.TrimSpace(info.Name)
+		if name == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		line := "- " + name
+		if desc := strings.TrimSpace(info.Description); desc != "" {
+			line += ": " + truncateForSkillLine(desc)
+		}
+		line += "\n"
+		// Always list at least one skill; past the budget, summarize the remainder
+		// as a count instead of silently dropping it.
+		if listed > 0 && spent+len(line) > skillsContextListBudget {
+			omitted++
+			continue
+		}
+		b.WriteString(line)
+		spent += len(line)
+		listed++
+	}
+	if omitted > 0 {
+		b.WriteString("- …and " + strconv.Itoa(omitted) + " more (call skill with a name; an unknown name lists them all)\n")
+	}
+	b.WriteString("</available_skills>")
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+// truncateForSkillLine keeps a skill's one-line description short so a single
+// verbose description can't dominate the skills-list budget.
+func truncateForSkillLine(desc string) string {
+	const maxDescRunes = 100
+	runes := []rune(desc)
+	if len(runes) <= maxDescRunes {
+		return desc
+	}
+	return strings.TrimSpace(string(runes[:maxDescRunes])) + "…"
+}
+
 func sessionRuntimeContext(options Options) string {
 	provider := strings.TrimSpace(options.ProviderName)
 	model := strings.TrimSpace(options.Model)
@@ -310,9 +372,9 @@ func projectGuidelineLabel(match, gitRoot string) string {
 
 // findProjectContextFile returns the first matching project guideline file
 // in dir. Lookup is case-insensitive on the basename and on the actual
-// filename returned, so a git-tracked file like AGENTS.MD (uppercase MD)
-// still resolves to its true filename on case-sensitive filesystems — the
-// returned path is what should appear in the project guidelines label.
+// filename returned, so a git-tracked file like AGENTS.md still resolves to
+// its true filename on case-sensitive filesystems — the returned path is what
+// should appear in the project guidelines label.
 // Returns "" when nothing matches.
 func findProjectContextFile(dir string) string {
 	for _, name := range projectContextFiles {

internal/agent/system_prompt.md

@@ -46,14 +46,10 @@ work.
    formatting-only edits unless the user asked for them.
 4. **Verify.** Verify after edits; see the testing gate below. This is
    mandatory.
-5. **Summarize.** For a substantial task, close with an ELABORATE, well-structured
-   summary — never a single throwaway line. Use short headings and bullets: a
-   one-line "what I built/changed"; **Where it lives** — the key files and how they
-   fit together; **How each requirement is met** — walk through each requirement
-   from the request and name the specifics that satisfy it; what validation ran and
-   what was NOT verified; and a brief "Next steps" or "Want me to…?" offer. Scale
-   the depth to the work — a big build earns several sections, a trivial fix earns
-   a line or two.
+5. **Summarize.** Close with a summary scaled to the work: a trivial fix earns one
+   line; a substantial change earns a few short bullets covering what changed, where
+   it lives, and what you did and did not verify. Lead with the outcome, and never
+   pad — do not restate the task or narrate steps the user already watched you take.
 
 ## Editing discipline
 
@@ -64,7 +60,9 @@ work.
 - Make one tool call per file. Do not batch multi-file writes into a single
   shell or script invocation.
 - For edits to existing files, prefer edit_file or apply_patch with minimal,
-  targeted diffs. Match the existing indentation, imports, and idioms.
+  targeted diffs. Match the existing indentation, imports, and idioms. Match the
+  file's comment density: do not add explanatory comments unless the user asks or
+  the code is already comment-dense.
 - Preserve behavior you were not asked to change. Do not delete or rewrite code
   you did not author unless the task requires it; if you must, say so.
 

internal/agent/system_prompt_models.go

@@ -6,11 +6,13 @@ import "strings"
 //
 // Different model families respond to different framing: the GPT family benefits
 // from an explicit markdown/output spec and a strong "prefer native tools" nudge;
-// Gemini benefits from explicit tool-preference and conciseness guidance; the
-// Claude family is already well-aligned with the core prompt and only needs a
-// light comment-discipline nudge. modelPromptAddendum returns the family-specific
-// block appended after the core prompt. Classification is by model id (the agent
-// only has the model string — no registry dependency).
+// Gemini benefits from explicit tool-preference and conciseness guidance. The
+// Claude family is already aligned with the core prompt and needs no addendum —
+// comment discipline is universal in the core prompt now, so every family gets it.
+// modelPromptAddendum returns the family-specific block appended after the core
+// prompt, or "" when the family is unknown or needs no specialization.
+// Classification is by model id (the agent only has the model string — no registry
+// dependency).
 
 const (
 	familyOpenAI    = "openai"
@@ -45,9 +47,10 @@ func modelPromptAddendum(model string) string {
 		return openAIPromptAddendum
 	case familyGemini:
 		return geminiPromptAddendum
-	case familyAnthropic:
-		return anthropicPromptAddendum
 	default:
+		// Anthropic (aligned with the core prompt) and unknown families get no
+		// family-specific block; comment discipline now lives in the core prompt
+		// for every model.
 		return ""
 	}
 }
@@ -70,8 +73,3 @@ const geminiPromptAddendum = `<model_guidance>
   in one short clause why it is needed.
 - Use update_plan for any multi-step task and keep it current.
 </model_guidance>`
-
-const anthropicPromptAddendum = `<model_guidance>
-- Do not add code comments unless the user asks or the surrounding code is
-  comment-dense; match the file's existing comment density.
-</model_guidance>`

internal/agent/system_prompt_models_test.go

@@ -29,9 +29,11 @@ func TestBuildSystemPromptAppendsModelAddendum(t *testing.T) {
 	if got := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Model: "gpt-5"}); !strings.Contains(got, openAIPromptAddendum) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected the OpenAI addendum in the gpt-5 prompt")
 	}
+	// Claude is aligned with the core prompt and gets no family addendum now that
+	// comment discipline is universal; it must not pick up another family's block.
 	claude := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Model: "claude-opus-4-6"})
-	if !strings.Contains(claude, anthropicPromptAddendum) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected the Anthropic addendum in the claude prompt")
+	if strings.Contains(claude, "<model_guidance>") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected no model_guidance block for Claude (aligned with core prompt)")
 	}
 	if strings.Contains(claude, openAIPromptAddendum) {
 		t.Fatalf("the claude prompt must not contain the OpenAI addendum")

internal/agent/system_prompt_test.go

@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ func TestCoreSystemPromptIncludesCodingQualityRules(t *testing.T) {
 		"avoid broad refactors",
 		"search the web before answering",
 		"do not recognize",
-		"how each requirement is met",
+		"scaled to the work",
+		"comment density",
 	} {
 		if !strings.Contains(prompt, want) {
 			t.Fatalf("expected core system prompt to include %q, got:\n%s", want, buildSystemPrompt(Options{}))
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@ func systemPromptTestBlock(t *testing.T, prompt, start, end string) string {
 }
 
 func TestBuildSystemPromptInjectsProjectGuidelinesCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
-	// Git tracks AGENTS.MD (uppercase MD) on a case-sensitive filesystem; the
+	// Git tracks AGENTS.md on a case-sensitive filesystem; the
 	// loader must still resolve it when the cwd lookup uses lowercase.
 	cwd := t.TempDir()
 	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(cwd, "AGENTS.MD"), []byte("Always run `make lint`."), 0o644); err != nil {

internal/agent/types.go

@@ -174,6 +174,16 @@ type SpecialistInfo struct {
 	WhenToUse string
 }
 
+// SkillInfo is a one-line summary of a reusable, on-demand skill (its name and
+// frontmatter description) surfaced to the system prompt so the model can invoke
+// the right skill with the skill tool on the first try instead of guessing a name
+// and reading the failure. Like SpecialistInfo it is plain data, so the agent
+// package needs no dependency on internal/skills.
+type SkillInfo struct {
+	Name        string
+	Description string
+}
+
 type Options struct {
 	MaxTurns int
 	// DeferThreshold activates deferred MCP-tool loading: when the number of
@@ -189,6 +199,12 @@ type Options struct {
 	// populated only where the Task tool is actually registered, so an empty slice
 	// (the default) reproduces the previous prompt byte-for-byte.
 	Specialists []SpecialistInfo
+	// Skills lists the reusable skills installed for this run (the default skills
+	// dir merged with any plugin skill roots). When non-empty the system prompt
+	// gains an <available_skills> block naming them so the model loads the right one
+	// via the skill tool on the first try. Empty (the default) reproduces the
+	// previous prompt byte-for-byte.
+	Skills []SkillInfo
 	// Specialist/sub-agent metadata is carried through exec now and consumed by
 	// the specialist runtime in later slices.
 	SessionID        string
@@ -269,6 +285,12 @@ type Options struct {
 	// ceiling and the autonomy gate. nil disables it entirely (the loop is
 	// byte-identical to before). One instance per run — it holds attempt state.
 	SelfCorrect *SelfCorrector
+	// FileDiagnostics, when set, is passed to mutating tools so edit_file /
+	// write_file append error-severity language diagnostics for the file they
+	// just wrote directly to their tool output — the model sees an error it
+	// introduced in the same turn instead of a later verification pass. Build
+	// one with NewFileDiagnostics. nil disables inline diagnostics.
+	FileDiagnostics func(ctx context.Context, absPath string) string
 
 	// RequireCompletionSignal gates run completion for HEADLESS exec. Without it,
 	// any assistant turn that produces text but no tool call is accepted as the

internal/cli/acp.go

@@ -43,8 +43,11 @@ func runACP(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int
 	conn := acp.NewConn(deps.stdin, stdout)
 	acp.NewAgent(conn, acp.Deps{
 		ResolveConfig: deps.resolveConfig,
-		NewProvider:   deps.newProvider,
-		RunAgent:      agent.Run,
+		// deps.newProvider is wrapped in fillAppDeps to apply the stored API key,
+		// so ACP is authenticated for apiKeyStored profiles like every other
+		// surface — no ACP-specific credential handling needed.
+		NewProvider: deps.newProvider,
+		RunAgent:    agent.Run,
 		// Build the SCOPED registry + sandbox engine per workspace, exactly like the
 		// exec surface, so ACP shell/file tools are confined — never run unconfined.
 		BuildWorkspace: func(workspaceRoot string, resolved config.ResolvedConfig) (*tools.Registry, *sandbox.Engine, error) {

internal/cli/app.go

@@ -19,9 +19,11 @@ import (
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/localcontrol"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/mcp"
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/observability"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/plugins"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providerhealth"
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/provideronboarding"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/redaction"
@@ -43,37 +45,44 @@ import (
 var version = "dev"
 
 type appDeps struct {
-	getwd                 func() (string, error)
-	stdin                 io.Reader
-	userConfigPath        func() (string, error)
-	resolveConfig         func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error)
-	resolveMCPConfig      func(workspaceRoot string) (config.MCPConfig, error)
-	newProvider           func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)
-	probeProviderHealth   func(context.Context, providerhealth.Options) providerhealth.Result
-	detectLocalRuntimes   func(context.Context, provideronboarding.LocalDetectOptions) []provideronboarding.DetectedLocalRuntime
-	newSessionStore       func() *sessions.Store
-	loadPlugins           func(plugins.LoadOptions) (plugins.LoadResult, error)
-	loadHooks             func(hooks.LoadOptions) (hooks.LoadResult, error)
-	skillsDir             func() string
-	pluginsDir            func() string
-	toolsDir              func() string
-	newMCPStore           func() (*mcp.PermissionStore, error)
-	newMCPTokenStore      func() (*mcp.TokenStore, error)
-	newSandboxStore       func() (*sandbox.GrantStore, error)
-	selectSandboxBackend  func(sandbox.BackendOptions) sandbox.Backend
-	runSandboxSetupHelper func(path string, args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) error
-	registerMCPTools      func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error)
-	prepareWorktree       func(context.Context, worktrees.Options) (worktrees.Result, error)
-	detectVerifyPlan      func(string) (verify.Plan, error)
-	runVerify             func(context.Context, verify.Plan, verify.RunOptions) verify.Report
-	runSelfVerify         func(context.Context, verify.Plan, selfverify.Options) selfverify.Report
-	runAgentEval          func(context.Context, agentEvalOptions) (agentEvalReport, error)
-	inspectChanges        func(context.Context, zerogit.InspectOptions) (zerogit.ChangeSummary, error)
-	commitChanges         func(context.Context, zerogit.CommitOptions) (zerogit.CommitResult, error)
-	runTUI                func(context.Context, tui.Options) int
-	runEditor             func(string) error
-	checkUpdate           func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.Result, error)
-	now                   func() time.Time
+	getwd            func() (string, error)
+	stdin            io.Reader
+	userConfigPath   func() (string, error)
+	resolveConfig    func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error)
+	resolveMCPConfig func(workspaceRoot string) (config.MCPConfig, error)
+	newProvider      func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)
+	// exportActiveProvider pins spawned children to the run's provider (production:
+	// config.SetActiveProviderEnv, set in defaultAppDeps — deliberately NOT filled
+	// by fillAppDeps, so tests never mutate the process environment unless they
+	// inject it). nil ⇒ no export.
+	exportActiveProvider   func(providerName string)
+	probeProviderHealth    func(context.Context, providerhealth.Options) providerhealth.Result
+	discoverProviderModels func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error)
+	detectLocalRuntimes    func(context.Context, provideronboarding.LocalDetectOptions) []provideronboarding.DetectedLocalRuntime
+	newSessionStore        func() *sessions.Store
+	loadPlugins            func(plugins.LoadOptions) (plugins.LoadResult, error)
+	loadHooks              func(hooks.LoadOptions) (hooks.LoadResult, error)
+	skillsDir              func() string
+	pluginsDir             func() string
+	toolsDir               func() string
+	newMCPStore            func() (*mcp.PermissionStore, error)
+	newMCPTokenStore       func() (*mcp.TokenStore, error)
+	newSandboxStore        func() (*sandbox.GrantStore, error)
+	selectSandboxBackend   func(sandbox.BackendOptions) sandbox.Backend
+	runSandboxSetupHelper  func(path string, args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) error
+	registerMCPTools       func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error)
+	prepareWorktree        func(context.Context, worktrees.Options) (worktrees.Result, error)
+	detectVerifyPlan       func(string) (verify.Plan, error)
+	runVerify              func(context.Context, verify.Plan, verify.RunOptions) verify.Report
+	runSelfVerify          func(context.Context, verify.Plan, selfverify.Options) selfverify.Report
+	runAgentEval           func(context.Context, agentEvalOptions) (agentEvalReport, error)
+	inspectChanges         func(context.Context, zerogit.InspectOptions) (zerogit.ChangeSummary, error)
+	commitChanges          func(context.Context, zerogit.CommitOptions) (zerogit.CommitResult, error)
+	runTUI                 func(context.Context, tui.Options) int
+	runEditor              func(string) error
+	checkUpdate            func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.Result, error)
+	applyUpdate            func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error)
+	now                    func() time.Time
 }
 
 type mcpToolRuntime interface {
@@ -99,9 +108,10 @@ func Run(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) int {
 
 func defaultAppDeps() appDeps {
 	return appDeps{
-		getwd:          os.Getwd,
-		stdin:          os.Stdin,
-		userConfigPath: config.DefaultUserConfigPath,
+		getwd:                os.Getwd,
+		stdin:                os.Stdin,
+		userConfigPath:       config.DefaultUserConfigPath,
+		exportActiveProvider: config.SetActiveProviderEnv,
 		resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
 			options, err := config.DefaultResolveOptions(workspaceRoot)
 			if err != nil {
@@ -118,13 +128,19 @@ func defaultAppDeps() appDeps {
 			return config.ResolveMCP(options)
 		},
 		newProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
+			// Resolve the OAuth login ONCE: the bearer resolver and the login key it
+			// bound must describe the same login (the key is passed on to the Codex
+			// account-header resolver so it never re-selects independently).
+			resolver, loginKey := oauthLoginForProfile(profile)
 			return providers.New(profile, providers.Options{
 				UserAgent:     userAgent(),
-				OAuthResolver: oauthResolverForProfile(profile),
+				OAuthResolver: resolver,
+				OAuthLoginKey: loginKey,
 			})
 		},
-		probeProviderHealth: providerhealth.Probe,
-		detectLocalRuntimes: provideronboarding.DetectLocalRuntimes,
+		probeProviderHealth:    providerhealth.Probe,
+		discoverProviderModels: defaultDiscoverProviderModels,
+		detectLocalRuntimes:    provideronboarding.DetectLocalRuntimes,
 		newSessionStore: func() *sessions.Store {
 			return sessions.NewStore(sessions.StoreOptions{})
 		},
@@ -166,6 +182,7 @@ func defaultAppDeps() appDeps {
 		runTUI:           tui.Run,
 		runEditor:        openEditor,
 		checkUpdate:      update.Check,
+		applyUpdate:      update.Apply,
 		now:              time.Now,
 	}
 }
@@ -213,6 +230,12 @@ func runWithDeps(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
 	defer observability.Recover(observability.DefaultCrashDir(), "cli", stderr, &exitCode)
 	deps = fillAppDeps(deps)
 
+	// CLI runs opt into the models.dev overlay (cached live context limits and
+	// pricing on top of the curated catalog). Explicitly enabled here — and only
+	// here — so library consumers and hermetic tests are never perturbed by a
+	// cache file on the machine. The refresh itself is fired in exec/TUI startup.
+	modelregistry.EnableModelsDevOverlay()
+
 	addDirs, args, err := splitLeadingAddDirFlags(args)
 	if err != nil {
 		return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), 1)
@@ -369,6 +392,8 @@ func runWithDeps(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
 		return runSandbox(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
 	case "update":
 		return runUpdate(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
+	case "upgrade":
+		return runUpgrade(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
 	case "worktrees", "worktree":
 		return runWorktrees(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
 	case "verify":
@@ -391,6 +416,14 @@ func runWithDeps(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
 		if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "unknown command %q\n", args[0]); err != nil {
 			return 1
 		}
+		// First-run users reach for `zero login`/`zero logout` (reported in the
+		// wild); point them at the real command instead of a bare usage pointer.
+		switch strings.ToLower(args[0]) {
+		case "login", "logout":
+			if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "did you mean %q?\n", "zero auth "+strings.ToLower(args[0])); err != nil {
+				return 1
+			}
+		}
 		if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "Run zero --help for usage."); err != nil {
 			return 1
 		}
@@ -421,6 +454,9 @@ func fillAppDeps(deps appDeps) appDeps {
 	if deps.probeProviderHealth == nil {
 		deps.probeProviderHealth = defaults.probeProviderHealth
 	}
+	if deps.discoverProviderModels == nil {
+		deps.discoverProviderModels = defaults.discoverProviderModels
+	}
 	if deps.detectLocalRuntimes == nil {
 		deps.detectLocalRuntimes = defaults.detectLocalRuntimes
 	}
@@ -490,9 +526,23 @@ func fillAppDeps(deps appDeps) appDeps {
 	if deps.checkUpdate == nil {
 		deps.checkUpdate = defaults.checkUpdate
 	}
+	if deps.applyUpdate == nil {
+		deps.applyUpdate = defaults.applyUpdate
+	}
 	if deps.now == nil {
 		deps.now = defaults.now
 	}
+	// Wrap newProvider ONCE, after all defaults are filled, so every surface that
+	// builds the runtime provider gets the credential-store key applied. The
+	// resolver is pure and leaves apiKeyStored profiles keyless; an unwrapped
+	// build sends unauthenticated requests. config.ApplyStoredAPIKey is a no-op
+	// when the key is already set or the profile isn't stored-key, so this is
+	// safe and idempotent for every profile kind and every injected newProvider.
+	baseNewProvider := deps.newProvider
+	userConfigPath := deps.userConfigPath
+	deps.newProvider = func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
+		return baseNewProvider(applyStoredProviderKeyAt(profile, userConfigPath))
+	}
 	return deps
 }
 
@@ -501,6 +551,11 @@ func runInteractiveTUI(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode agent.Perm
 }
 
 func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode agent.PermissionMode, addDirs []string, theme string, forceSetup bool) int {
+	// Refresh the models.dev pricing/limits cache in the background when stale;
+	// the overlay is read at registry construction from the cache file, so this
+	// benefits the next run and never blocks or fails this one.
+	go func() { _ = modelregistry.RefreshModelsDevCache(context.Background()) }()
+
 	workspaceRoot, err := deps.getwd()
 	if err != nil {
 		return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to resolve workspace: "+err.Error(), 1)
@@ -508,7 +563,32 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
 
 	resolved, err := deps.resolveConfig(workspaceRoot, config.Overrides{})
 	if err != nil {
-		return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), 1)
+		// A resolve failure the setup wizard can FIX is not fatal for the
+		// interactive TUI: drop into the wizard with an empty config so the user
+		// can onboard/repair, instead of exiting with an error they can only fix
+		// by hand-editing config.json. That covers a missing/unresolvable active
+		// provider and an active provider without a model (custom endpoints have
+		// no catalog default) — previously the second shape bricked bare `zero`
+		// and `zero setup`, the exact commands that could have fixed it. Any
+		// other error (malformed JSON, directory conflict, etc.) is still fatal,
+		// and headless commands (zero config / zero exec) still fail with the
+		// actionable message.
+		if !errors.Is(err, config.ErrNoActiveProvider) && !errors.Is(err, config.ErrProviderRequiresModel) {
+			return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), 1)
+		}
+		// ErrNoActiveProvider can mean "nothing configured yet" (needs onboarding)
+		// or "providers ARE configured, just none marked active" (e.g. config.json's
+		// activeProvider is blank/stale). In the second case resolved.Providers still
+		// carries the already-normalized list — prefer falling back to one of those
+		// over wiping everything and forcing the user to re-enter credentials they
+		// already saved.
+		if usable, ok := firstUsableProvider(resolved.Providers); errors.Is(err, config.ErrNoActiveProvider) && ok {
+			resolved.Provider = usable
+			resolved.ActiveProvider = usable.Name
+		} else {
+			resolved = config.ResolvedConfig{}
+			forceSetup = true
+		}
 	}
 	userConfigPath, err := deps.userConfigPath()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -690,9 +770,11 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
 			Hooks:          newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks),
 			DeferThreshold: resolved.Tools.DeferThreshold,
 			Specialists:    specialistRuntime.specialists,
+			Skills:         pluginActivation.skillInfos(deps.skillsDir()),
 		},
 		PermissionMode: permissionMode,
 		Notify:         resolved.Notify,
+		KeyBindings:    resolved.KeyBindings,
 		Setup: tui.SetupOptions{
 			Visible:    setupVisible,
 			Required:   needsSetup,
@@ -720,20 +802,50 @@ func tuiSandboxSetupCommand(backend sandbox.Backend, deps appDeps) func(context.
 	}
 }
 
+// buildProvider constructs the run's provider at STARTUP — it is called only from
+// the two launch paths (interactive TUI and headless exec), never from mid-run
+// rebuilds (escalation, wizard, ACP go through deps.newProvider directly).
 func buildProvider(resolved config.ResolvedConfig, deps appDeps) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
 	if !config.HasProviderProfile(resolved.Provider) {
 		return nil, nil
 	}
-	// Load the API key from the encrypted credential store when it isn't already
-	// resolved from inline config or an env var. This keeps the resolver pure (no
-	// I/O) and is a no-op for env/inline-key providers and when nothing is stored.
-	profile := resolved.Provider
-	if path, perr := deps.userConfigPath(); perr == nil {
+	// deps.newProvider is wrapped in fillAppDeps to apply the stored key, so this
+	// (and every other newProvider caller) needs no per-site key handling.
+	provider, err := deps.newProvider(resolved.Provider)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	// Pin spawned children (sub-agents / swarm members inherit the environment) to
+	// THIS run's provider from launch, not only after an in-session switch. Without
+	// the launch-time export a child re-resolves config.json at spawn time, so a
+	// provider switch persisted by ANOTHER zero process mid-session would silently
+	// move new children onto a different provider (and different credentials) than
+	// the parent is running. Runtime switches (/model, /provider, wizard,
+	// onboarding) re-export on commit, keeping the pin current. Injected via deps
+	// (nil in tests) because it mutates the process environment.
+	if deps.exportActiveProvider != nil {
+		deps.exportActiveProvider(resolved.Provider.Name)
+	}
+	return provider, nil
+}
+
+// applyStoredProviderKeyAt loads the API key from the encrypted credential store
+// when the resolver left it empty (the resolver is pure — no I/O — so an
+// apiKeyStored profile reaches this layer keyless). No-op for inline/env-key
+// providers and when nothing is stored. This is applied once, centrally, by the
+// deps.newProvider wrapper in fillAppDeps so EVERY surface that builds a runtime
+// provider (headless exec, the ACP builder, exec's mid-run escalation switcher,
+// and any future caller) is covered without a per-site invariant to forget.
+func applyStoredProviderKeyAt(profile config.ProviderProfile, userConfigPath func() (string, error)) config.ProviderProfile {
+	if userConfigPath == nil {
+		return profile
+	}
+	if path, perr := userConfigPath(); perr == nil {
 		if store, err := config.ProviderKeyStoreAt(filepath.Dir(path)); err == nil {
 			profile = config.ApplyStoredAPIKey(profile, store)
 		}
 	}
-	return deps.newProvider(profile)
+	return profile
 }
 
 func newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot string) *tools.Registry {
@@ -1078,7 +1190,8 @@ func profileHasCredential(profile config.ProviderProfile) bool {
 }
 
 // baseURLIsLoopback reports whether a provider base_url points at a loopback host
-// (a keyless local provider like Ollama/LM Studio), which needs no API key.
+// or a private-network host (192.168.x.y / 10.x.y.z / 172.16.x.y) — a local
+// provider like Ollama/LM Studio that needs no API key.
 func baseURLIsLoopback(baseURL string) bool {
 	u := strings.TrimSpace(baseURL)
 	if u == "" {
@@ -1093,7 +1206,7 @@ func baseURLIsLoopback(baseURL string) bool {
 		return true
 	}
 	if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); err == nil {
-		return addr.IsLoopback()
+		return addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate()
 	}
 	return false
 }

internal/cli/app_test.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
+	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -157,6 +158,141 @@ func TestRunNoArgsLaunchesSetupTUIWithNilProviderWhenNoProviderConfigured(t *tes
 	assertAgentOptions(t, launchedOptions, 12, agent.PermissionModeAsk)
 }
 
+func TestRunNoArgsEntersSetupWhenResolveReportsNoActiveProvider(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+	cwd := t.TempDir()
+	setCLIUserConfigRoot(t)
+	userConfigPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
+	var launchedOptions tui.Options
+	launched := false
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
+		getwd: func() (string, error) {
+			return cwd, nil
+		},
+		resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
+			return config.ResolvedConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: active provider %q not found", config.ErrNoActiveProvider, "ghost")
+		},
+		newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
+			t.Fatal("newProvider should not be called without a resolved provider")
+			return nil, nil
+		},
+		userConfigPath: func() (string, error) {
+			return userConfigPath, nil
+		},
+		registerMCPTools: func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
+			return noopMCPRuntime{}, nil
+		},
+		runTUI: func(ctx context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
+			launched = true
+			launchedOptions = options
+			return 0
+		},
+	})
+
+	if exitCode != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want 0 (setup TUI launched), stderr=%q", exitCode, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if !launched {
+		t.Fatal("TUI was not launched; expected fallback into setup instead of a fatal error")
+	}
+	if !launchedOptions.Setup.Visible || !launchedOptions.Setup.Required {
+		t.Fatalf("Setup = %#v, want visible required setup", launchedOptions.Setup)
+	}
+	if launchedOptions.Provider != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Provider = %#v, want nil for no-provider fallback", launchedOptions.Provider)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunNoArgsFallsBackToUsableProviderWhenNoneMarkedActive(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+	cwd := t.TempDir()
+	setCLIUserConfigRoot(t)
+	userConfigPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
+	var launchedOptions tui.Options
+	launched := false
+	var providerProfile config.ProviderProfile
+	fake := &cliFakeProvider{}
+
+	usable := config.ProviderProfile{
+		Name:         "work",
+		ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAI,
+		BaseURL:      config.OpenAIBaseURL,
+		APIKey:       "sk-test",
+		Model:        "gpt-test",
+	}
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
+		getwd: func() (string, error) {
+			return cwd, nil
+		},
+		resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
+			// config.json has providers configured but none marked active (e.g. a
+			// blank/stale activeProvider field) — Resolve returns the successfully
+			// normalized providers list alongside ErrNoActiveProvider.
+			return config.ResolvedConfig{Providers: []config.ProviderProfile{usable}},
+				fmt.Errorf("%w: active provider %q not found", config.ErrNoActiveProvider, "")
+		},
+		newProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
+			providerProfile = profile
+			return fake, nil
+		},
+		userConfigPath: func() (string, error) {
+			return userConfigPath, nil
+		},
+		registerMCPTools: func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
+			return noopMCPRuntime{}, nil
+		},
+		runTUI: func(ctx context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
+			launched = true
+			launchedOptions = options
+			return 0
+		},
+	})
+
+	if exitCode != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want 0, stderr=%q", exitCode, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if !launched {
+		t.Fatal("TUI was not launched")
+	}
+	if launchedOptions.Setup.Visible || launchedOptions.Setup.Required {
+		t.Fatalf("Setup = %#v, want no setup wizard — a usable saved provider exists", launchedOptions.Setup)
+	}
+	if providerProfile.Name != "work" {
+		t.Fatalf("provider used = %q, want fallback to the usable saved provider %q", providerProfile.Name, "work")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunNoArgsFailsWhenResolveErrorIsNotProviderRelated(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+	cwd := t.TempDir()
+	setCLIUserConfigRoot(t)
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
+		getwd: func() (string, error) {
+			return cwd, nil
+		},
+		resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
+			return config.ResolvedConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid config JSON")
+		},
+		runTUI: func(ctx context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
+			t.Fatal("TUI must not launch on a non-provider resolve error")
+			return 0
+		},
+	})
+
+	if exitCode == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("exit code = 0, want non-zero for fatal config error")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "invalid config JSON") {
+		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want the underlying config error", stderr.String())
+	}
+}
+
 func TestRunNoArgsLaunchesTUIWithMCPState(t *testing.T) {
 	var stdout bytes.Buffer
 	var stderr bytes.Buffer
@@ -1192,6 +1328,153 @@ func TestRunUpdateReportsUpToDate(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestRunUpdateApplyTextAndJSON(t *testing.T) {
+	applyResult := update.ApplyResult{
+		Result: update.Result{
+			CurrentVersion:  "dev",
+			LatestVersion:   "0.2.0",
+			UpdateAvailable: true,
+		},
+		Applied:       true,
+		InstallMethod: update.InstallMethodStandalone,
+		BinaryPath:    "/usr/local/bin/zero",
+		Message:       "updated to 0.2.0",
+	}
+	var gotOptions update.Options
+	deps := appDeps{
+		applyUpdate: func(_ context.Context, options update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error) {
+			gotOptions = options
+			return applyResult, nil
+		},
+		checkUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.Result, error) {
+			t.Fatal("checkUpdate should not run for --apply")
+			return update.Result{}, nil
+		},
+	}
+
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"update", "--apply"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
+	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "updated to 0.2.0") {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected apply text: %q", stdout.String())
+	}
+	if gotOptions.CurrentVersion != "dev" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected options passed to applyUpdate: %#v", gotOptions)
+	}
+
+	stdout.Reset()
+	stderr.Reset()
+	exitCode = runWithDeps([]string{"update", "--apply", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
+	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
+	}
+	var payload struct {
+		Applied       bool   `json:"applied"`
+		InstallMethod string `json:"installMethod"`
+		BinaryPath    string `json:"binaryPath"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("apply JSON did not decode: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
+	}
+	if !payload.Applied || payload.InstallMethod != string(update.InstallMethodStandalone) || payload.BinaryPath != applyResult.BinaryPath {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected apply JSON: %#v", payload)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunUpgradeDefaultsToApply(t *testing.T) {
+	var applyCalled bool
+	deps := appDeps{
+		applyUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error) {
+			applyCalled = true
+			return update.ApplyResult{Message: "already up to date"}, nil
+		},
+		checkUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.Result, error) {
+			t.Fatal("checkUpdate should not run for `zero upgrade`")
+			return update.Result{}, nil
+		},
+	}
+
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"upgrade"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
+	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if !applyCalled {
+		t.Fatal("expected `zero upgrade` to call applyUpdate")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunUpdateRejectsCheckAndApplyTogether(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"update", "--check", "--apply"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
+		checkUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.Result, error) {
+			t.Fatal("checkUpdate should not run")
+			return update.Result{}, nil
+		},
+		applyUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error) {
+			t.Fatal("applyUpdate should not run")
+			return update.ApplyResult{}, nil
+		},
+	})
+
+	if exitCode != exitUsage {
+		t.Fatalf("expected usage exit code, got %d", exitCode)
+	}
+	if got := stderr.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "only one of --check or --apply") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected --check/--apply usage error, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunUpdateRejectsTargetWithApply(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, args := range [][]string{
+		{"update", "--apply", "--target", "linux-arm64"},
+		{"upgrade", "--target", "linux-arm64"},
+	} {
+		t.Run(strings.Join(args, " "), func(t *testing.T) {
+			var stdout bytes.Buffer
+			var stderr bytes.Buffer
+
+			exitCode := runWithDeps(args, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
+				applyUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error) {
+					t.Fatal("applyUpdate should not run when --target is combined with --apply")
+					return update.ApplyResult{}, nil
+				},
+			})
+
+			if exitCode != exitUsage {
+				t.Fatalf("expected usage exit code, got %d", exitCode)
+			}
+			if got := stderr.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "--target cannot be combined with --apply") {
+				t.Fatalf("expected --target/--apply usage error, got %q", got)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunUpdateReportsApplyError(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"update", "--apply"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
+		applyUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error) {
+			return update.ApplyResult{}, errors.New("download failed")
+		},
+	})
+
+	if exitCode == exitSuccess {
+		t.Fatalf("expected non-success exit code, got %d", exitCode)
+	}
+	if got := stderr.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "download failed") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected apply error, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
 func assertHelpOutput(t *testing.T, args []string) {
 	t.Helper()
 
@@ -1401,3 +1684,75 @@ func TestRunThemeFlagRejectsBadValue(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected a clear --theme error, got %q", stderr.String())
 	}
 }
+
+// A custom endpoint saved without a model previously bricked bare `zero` and
+// `zero setup` — the exact commands that could have fixed it (the resolve
+// error escaped before the wizard could open). The interactive TUI now treats
+// the requires-model failure as "needs onboarding", same as a missing active
+// provider. The error comes from a REAL Resolve over a real config file, so
+// this exercises the production sentinel wrapping, not a hand-built error.
+func TestRunNoArgsEntersSetupWhenActiveProviderMissesModel(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+	cwd := t.TempDir()
+	setCLIUserConfigRoot(t)
+	brokenConfig := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(brokenConfig, []byte(`{
+		"activeProvider": "gw",
+		"providers": [{"name": "gw", "provider_kind": "openai-compatible", "baseURL": "https://gw.example/v1", "apiKey": "sk-x"}]
+	}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	launched := false
+	var launchedOptions tui.Options
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
+		getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
+		resolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
+			return config.Resolve(config.ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: brokenConfig, Env: map[string]string{}})
+		},
+		newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
+			t.Fatal("newProvider must not be called without a resolved provider")
+			return nil, nil
+		},
+		userConfigPath: func() (string, error) { return filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json"), nil },
+		registerMCPTools: func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
+			return noopMCPRuntime{}, nil
+		},
+		runTUI: func(_ context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
+			launched = true
+			launchedOptions = options
+			return 0
+		},
+	})
+
+	if exitCode != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want 0 (setup TUI launched), stderr=%q", exitCode, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if !launched {
+		t.Fatal("TUI was not launched; a fixable requires-model config must fall into setup, not exit fatally")
+	}
+	if !launchedOptions.Setup.Visible || !launchedOptions.Setup.Required {
+		t.Fatalf("Setup = %#v, want visible required setup", launchedOptions.Setup)
+	}
+}
+
+// `zero login`/`zero logout` don't exist (it's `zero auth login`); first-run
+// users try them (reported in the wild), so the unknown-command error points at
+// the real command.
+func TestRunUnknownLoginSuggestsAuthLogin(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"login"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{})
+	if exitCode != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want 2 (unknown command)", exitCode)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), `"zero auth login"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want a zero auth login suggestion", stderr.String())
+	}
+	// An unrelated unknown command gets no misleading suggestion.
+	stderr.Reset()
+	runWithDeps([]string{"frobnicate"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{})
+	if strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "did you mean") {
+		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, unrelated commands must not get the auth hint", stderr.String())
+	}
+}

internal/cli/auth.go

@@ -301,12 +301,27 @@ func runAuthLogin(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDep
 	if len(parsed.positional) != 1 {
 		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "usage: zero auth login <provider> [--device] [--scope <scope>]")
 	}
+	provider := parsed.positional[0]
+	// ChatGPT (Codex) requires a fixed redirect_uri (http://localhost:1455/
+	// auth/callback) and mandatory authorize params (id_token_add_organizations,
+	// codex_cli_simplified_flow, originator) that the generic loopback flow
+	// cannot supply. Route it to the dedicated ChatGPT login so
+	// `zero auth login chatgpt` behaves identically to `zero auth chatgpt`.
+	if strings.EqualFold(provider, "chatgpt") {
+		if parsed.device {
+			return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "ChatGPT login does not support --device (it is loopback-only)")
+		}
+		if len(parsed.scopes) > 0 {
+			return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "ChatGPT login does not support --scope (the required scopes are fixed by the Codex client registration)")
+		}
+		return runAuthChatGPT(nil, stdout, stderr, deps)
+	}
 	manager, err := newAuthManager(deps, stdout)
 	if err != nil {
 		return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(err, redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
 	}
 	status, err := manager.Login(context.Background(), oauth.LoginOptions{
-		Provider:    parsed.positional[0],
+		Provider:    provider,
 		Device:      parsed.device,
 		ExtraScopes: parsed.scopes,
 	})
@@ -489,8 +504,9 @@ Commands:
 A provider is any OAuth 2.0 / OIDC server. "openrouter" ('zero auth openrouter')
 works out of the box. "xai" ('zero auth login xai') uses a built-in preset that is
 off by default — enable it with ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS=1, or set the
-ZERO_OAUTH_XAI_* vars yourself. Any preset field is overridable via the env vars
-below. For a custom provider named <name>, set:
+ZERO_OAUTH_XAI_* vars yourself. "chatgpt" ('zero auth login chatgpt' or
+'zero auth chatgpt') uses a fixed-port loopback flow against the Codex backend.
+Any preset field is overridable via the env vars below. For a custom provider named <name>, set:
   ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_CLIENT_ID       (required)
   ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_CLIENT_SECRET   (optional)
   ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_AUTHORIZE_URL   ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_TOKEN_URL

internal/cli/auth_propagation_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+package cli
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// seedStoredProviderKey writes key into a credential store rooted beside the
+// returned config path, and returns deps fields wired at that path — the same
+// layout applyStoredProviderKey resolves through in production.
+func seedStoredProviderKey(t *testing.T, providerName, key string) (userConfigPath string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_CRED_STORAGE", "encrypted-file") // never touch the real OS keychain in tests
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	store, err := config.ProviderKeyStoreAt(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ProviderKeyStoreAt: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := store.Set(providerName, key); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed stored key: %v", err)
+	}
+	return filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
+}
+
+// applyStoredProviderKeyAt must fill APIKey from the credential store for an
+// apiKeyStored profile — the single central helper the newProvider wrapper uses.
+func TestApplyStoredProviderKeyAtFillsFromCredstore(t *testing.T) {
+	configPath := seedStoredProviderKey(t, "echo", "sk-stored-test")
+	ucp := func() (string, error) { return configPath, nil }
+
+	stored := applyStoredProviderKeyAt(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "echo", APIKeyStored: true}, ucp)
+	if stored.APIKey != "sk-stored-test" {
+		t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want the stored key", stored.APIKey)
+	}
+
+	// A profile that did NOT opt into stored-key auth must be left unchanged —
+	// a stale store entry must not silently reactivate credentials.
+	plain := applyStoredProviderKeyAt(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "echo"}, ucp)
+	if plain.APIKey != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("non-stored profile APIKey = %q, want empty", plain.APIKey)
+	}
+}
+
+// fillAppDeps wraps newProvider so EVERY surface that builds a runtime provider
+// (buildProvider, the ACP builder — which is just deps.newProvider — and exec's
+// escalation switcher) gets the stored key applied. Passing the raw resolved
+// profile previously sent unauthenticated requests for apiKeyStored profiles,
+// the default onboarding outcome. Testing the wrap covers all those surfaces.
+func TestFillAppDepsWrapsNewProviderWithStoredKey(t *testing.T) {
+	configPath := seedStoredProviderKey(t, "echo", "sk-stored-wrap")
+
+	var captured config.ProviderProfile
+	deps := fillAppDeps(appDeps{
+		userConfigPath: func() (string, error) { return configPath, nil },
+		newProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
+			captured = profile
+			return nil, nil // only the captured profile matters here
+		},
+	})
+
+	if _, err := deps.newProvider(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "echo", APIKeyStored: true}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("wrapped newProvider: %v", err)
+	}
+	if captured.APIKey != "sk-stored-wrap" {
+		t.Fatalf("wrapped newProvider built with APIKey = %q, want the stored key (unauthenticated regression)", captured.APIKey)
+	}
+}
+
+// buildProvider (the TUI/exec STARTUP construction site) must export
+// ZERO_PROVIDER so children spawned at any point in the run are pinned to the
+// parent's provider from launch — not only after an in-session switch. Without
+// this, a provider switch persisted by another zero process mid-session moves
+// new children onto a different provider (and credentials) than the parent.
+func TestBuildProviderExportsActiveProviderEnv(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv(config.ActiveProviderEnv, "stale-from-elsewhere")
+	// The exporter is injected (defaultAppDeps wires config.SetActiveProviderEnv;
+	// fillAppDeps deliberately leaves it nil so ordinary tests never mutate the
+	// process env). Inject the real one here to assert the actual env effect.
+	deps := appDeps{
+		exportActiveProvider: config.SetActiveProviderEnv,
+		newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
+			return nil, nil
+		},
+	}
+
+	resolved := config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{Name: "pinned", ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindAnthropic, Model: "m"}}
+	if _, err := buildProvider(resolved, deps); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("buildProvider: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := os.Getenv(config.ActiveProviderEnv); got != "pinned" {
+		t.Fatalf("%s = %q after startup build, want %q (children would spawn on the stale provider)", config.ActiveProviderEnv, got, "pinned")
+	}
+
+	// A FAILED build must not move the pin: the process never committed to the
+	// new provider, so children must keep resolving whatever was in effect.
+	t.Setenv(config.ActiveProviderEnv, "still-current")
+	failing := appDeps{
+		exportActiveProvider: config.SetActiveProviderEnv,
+		newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
+			return nil, errors.New("boom")
+		},
+	}
+	if _, err := buildProvider(resolved, failing); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected build error")
+	}
+	if got := os.Getenv(config.ActiveProviderEnv); got != "still-current" {
+		t.Fatalf("%s = %q after failed build, want it untouched", config.ActiveProviderEnv, got)
+	}
+
+	// No provider profile at all → no provider, no pin change.
+	if _, err := buildProvider(config.ResolvedConfig{}, deps); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("buildProvider(empty): %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := os.Getenv(config.ActiveProviderEnv); got != "still-current" {
+		t.Fatalf("%s = %q after profile-less build, want it untouched", config.ActiveProviderEnv, got)
+	}
+}
+
+// A mid-run --allow-escalation model switch previously rebuilt the provider
+// from the PURE resolved profile (the stored key lives only in buildProvider's
+// local copy), so the escalated provider was keyless and the next completion
+// call 401'd mid-run. Every profile handed to newProvider on this path must
+// carry the stored key.
+func TestRunExecEscalationSwitchKeepsStoredKey(t *testing.T) {
+	dataHome := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("XDG_DATA_HOME", dataHome)
+	cwd := t.TempDir()
+
+	if _, ok := mustUpgradeTarget(t, "claude-haiku-4.5"); !ok {
+		t.Skip("registry has no upgrade target for claude-haiku-4.5")
+	}
+
+	configPath := seedStoredProviderKey(t, "echo", "sk-stored-escalation")
+
+	var builtProfiles []config.ProviderProfile
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{
+		"exec",
+		"--allow-escalation",
+		"--model", "claude-haiku-4.5",
+		"--init-session-id", "escalation_stored_key_run",
+		"escalate please",
+	}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
+		getwd:          func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
+		userConfigPath: func() (string, error) { return configPath, nil },
+		resolveConfig: func(_ string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
+			model := "claude-haiku-4.5"
+			if overrides.Provider.Model != "" {
+				model = overrides.Provider.Model
+			}
+			cfg := execResolvedConfig()
+			cfg.Provider.ProviderKind = config.ProviderKindAnthropic
+			cfg.Provider.Model = model
+			cfg.Provider.APIKeyStored = true // key lives ONLY in the credstore
+			cfg.MaxTurns = 3
+			return cfg, nil
+		},
+		newProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
+			builtProfiles = append(builtProfiles, profile)
+			return &usageEmittingEscalatingProvider{escalate: len(builtProfiles) == 1}, nil
+		},
+	})
+	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
+		t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want success; stderr=%s", exitCode, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if len(builtProfiles) < 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("want at least 2 provider builds (initial + escalated), got %d", len(builtProfiles))
+	}
+	for i, profile := range builtProfiles {
+		if profile.APIKey != "sk-stored-escalation" {
+			t.Fatalf("provider build %d APIKey = %q, want the stored key (escalated build went out keyless)", i, profile.APIKey)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/cli/auth_test.go

@@ -156,3 +156,44 @@ func TestRunAuthHelp(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+// TestRunAuthLoginChatGPTRoutesToDedicatedFlow verifies `zero auth login
+// chatgpt` reaches the dedicated ChatGPT login (fixed-port loopback + mandatory
+// authorize params), not the generic manager path. The generic login accepts
+// --device, so a ChatGPT-specific rejection proves the routing took effect.
+// See issue #430: the generic path built a random-port 127.0.0.1 redirect_uri
+// without the required extra params, so OpenAI's authorize endpoint rejected it.
+func TestRunAuthLoginChatGPTRoutesToDedicatedFlow(t *testing.T) {
+	withAuthStore(t)
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "login", "chatgpt", "--device"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code == exitSuccess {
+		t.Fatal("auth login chatgpt --device should be rejected (ChatGPT is loopback-only)")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "ChatGPT login does not support --device") {
+		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want the ChatGPT-specific --device rejection", stderr.String())
+	}
+	// Case-insensitive provider name should still route.
+	stdout.Reset()
+	stderr.Reset()
+	if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "login", "ChatGPT", "--device"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code == exitSuccess {
+		t.Fatal("auth login ChatGPT --device should be rejected")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "ChatGPT login does not support --device") {
+		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want the ChatGPT-specific rejection (case-insensitive)", stderr.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRunAuthLoginChatGPTRejectsScope mirrors the --device rejection: --scope
+// must not be silently dropped on the ChatGPT path. The Codex client
+// registration pins a fixed scope set (incl. api.connectors.*), so custom
+// scopes are rejected up front rather than plumbed through.
+func TestRunAuthLoginChatGPTRejectsScope(t *testing.T) {
+	withAuthStore(t)
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "login", "chatgpt", "--scope", "custom-scope"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code == exitSuccess {
+		t.Fatal("auth login chatgpt --scope should be rejected")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "ChatGPT login does not support --scope") {
+		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want the ChatGPT-specific --scope rejection", stderr.String())
+	}
+}

internal/cli/command_center.go

@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ func runProviders(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDep
 	if command == "detect" {
 		return runProvidersDetect(args, stdout, stderr, deps)
 	}
+	if command == "models" {
+		return runProvidersModels(args, stdout, stderr, deps)
+	}
 	if command != "list" && command != "current" && command != "catalog" {
 		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("unknown providers command %q", command))
 	}
@@ -465,9 +468,11 @@ func writeProvidersHelp(w io.Writer) error {
   zero providers use <name> [flags]
   zero providers setup <catalog-id> [flags]
   zero providers detect [flags]
+  zero providers models [name] [flags]
 
 Inspects resolved provider profiles and provider catalog descriptors without printing secrets.
 Detect probes for running local runtimes (Ollama, LM Studio) and prints adopt commands plus per-provider next steps.
+Models probes a provider's live model-listing endpoint (e.g. an OpenAI-compatible /v1/models) and lists the models it serves — including custom OpenAI-/Anthropic-compatible endpoints — so a self-hosted provider needs no per-model config.
 
 Flags:
       --json                    Print JSON summary

internal/cli/exec.go

@@ -135,6 +135,11 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 		return exitSuccess
 	}
 
+	// Refresh the models.dev pricing/limits cache in the background when stale;
+	// the overlay is read at registry construction from the cache file, so this
+	// benefits the next run and never blocks or fails this one.
+	go func() { _ = modelregistry.RefreshModelsDevCache(context.Background()) }()
+
 	// A mode seeds model/effort/max-turns/tool filters as a preset. Expand it up
 	// front — before tool-filter validation and the --list-tools branch — so a
 	// mode-injected tool filter is validated and reflected in --list-tools, and a
@@ -365,6 +370,9 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 	var modelSwitcher func(context.Context, string) (agent.Provider, error)
 	if options.allowEscalation {
 		modelSwitcher = func(_ context.Context, modelID string) (agent.Provider, error) {
+			// deps.newProvider is wrapped (fillAppDeps) to apply the stored key, so
+			// the escalated provider is authenticated even though resolved.Provider
+			// is the pure profile — no per-site key handling here.
 			switchedProfile := resolved.Provider
 			switchedProfile.Model = modelID
 			switchedProvider, err := deps.newProvider(switchedProfile)
@@ -496,15 +504,17 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 	// by default the corrector is nil, leaving the agent loop byte-identical. When
 	// on we verify with both the workspace test plan and LSP diagnostics over the
 	// changed files; the autonomy gate inside the corrector still decides whether
-	// failures auto-fix or just report. lspShutdown tears down any language-server
-	// sessions the LSP half spawned (no-op when self-correct is off).
-	selfCorrector, lspShutdown := newExecSelfCorrector(options.selfCorrect, workspaceRoot, options.autonomy)
+	// failures auto-fix or just report. fileDiagnostics (always on, lazy) gives
+	// edit_file/write_file inline error diagnostics for the file they just wrote.
+	// lspShutdown tears down any language-server sessions either half spawned.
+	selfCorrector, fileDiagnostics, lspShutdown := newExecSelfCorrector(options.selfCorrect, workspaceRoot, options.autonomy)
 	defer lspShutdown()
 	result, err := agent.Run(runCtx, agentPrompt, provider, agent.Options{
 		MaxTurns:         resolved.MaxTurns,
 		ContextWindow:    resolveAgentContextWindow(runCtx, modelRegistry, resolved.Provider),
 		DeferThreshold:   effectiveDeferThreshold,
 		Specialists:      specialistRuntime.specialistInfos(),
+		Skills:           pluginActivation.skillInfos(deps.skillsDir()),
 		SessionID:        preparedSession.Session.SessionID,
 		CallingSessionID: options.callingSessionID,
 		CallingToolUseID: options.callingToolUseID,
@@ -521,6 +531,7 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 		PermissionMode:   permissionMode,
 		Autonomy:         options.autonomy,
 		SelfCorrect:      selfCorrector,
+		FileDiagnostics:  fileDiagnostics,
 		// Headless exec: don't accept a no-tool-call turn as "done" while work
 		// clearly remains (pending plan items / a mid-step continuation cue) —
 		// nudge to continue, and finalize as INCOMPLETE rather than false success
@@ -696,23 +707,28 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 // unless a changed file's language actually has one installed on PATH. The
 // returned cleanup shuts that manager down (terminating any spawned server
 // sessions); it is a no-op when self-correct is off.
-func newExecSelfCorrector(enabled bool, workspaceRoot string, autonomy string) (*agent.SelfCorrector, func()) {
-	if !enabled {
-		return nil, func() {}
-	}
+func newExecSelfCorrector(enabled bool, workspaceRoot string, autonomy string) (*agent.SelfCorrector, func(context.Context, string) string, func()) {
+	// The manager is created regardless of --self-correct: it also backs the
+	// always-on inline post-edit diagnostics (agent.NewFileDiagnostics), and it
+	// stays lazy — no language server is spawned unless an edited file's
+	// language actually has one installed on PATH.
 	manager := lsp.NewManager(workspaceRoot)
+	cleanup := func() {
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+		defer cancel()
+		_ = manager.Shutdown(ctx)
+	}
+	fileDiagnostics := agent.NewFileDiagnostics(manager)
+	if !enabled {
+		return nil, fileDiagnostics, cleanup
+	}
 	corrector := agent.NewSelfCorrector(workspaceRoot, agent.NewLSPDiagnosticsChecker(manager), agent.NewProjectVerifier(workspaceRoot), agent.SelfCorrectConfig{
 		Enabled:      true,
 		IncludeTests: true,
 		IncludeLSP:   true,
 		Autonomy:     autonomy,
 	})
-	cleanup := func() {
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-		defer cancel()
-		_ = manager.Shutdown(ctx)
-	}
-	return corrector, cleanup
+	return corrector, fileDiagnostics, cleanup
 }
 
 func deferredEligibleCount(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode agent.PermissionMode, enabledTools []string, disabledTools []string) int {

internal/cli/oauth_credential_test.go

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ func TestProviderHasOAuthLogin(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestSetupRequiredRecognizesOAuthLogin(t *testing.T) {
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "tok.json")
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE", "file") // an inherited "keyring" would ignore the temp path and hit the OS keychain
 	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", path)
 	store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{FilePath: path})
 	if err != nil {
@@ -45,3 +46,88 @@ func TestSetupRequiredRecognizesOAuthLogin(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("a keyless provider with no OAuth login must require onboarding")
 	}
 }
+
+// A profile renamed away from its catalog ID must still get a runtime OAuth
+// resolver when the login is stored under the catalog name — and a CASE-VARIANT
+// profile name must not drop the catalog-ID candidate (the store is
+// case-sensitive; a case-insensitive dedupe would swallow it).
+func TestOAuthResolverForProfileFallsBackToCatalogID(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "tok.json")
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE", "file") // an inherited "keyring" would ignore the temp path and hit the OS keychain
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", path)
+	store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{FilePath: path})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt"), oauth.Token{AccessToken: "tok", ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour)}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed token: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// A renamed profile resolves the catalog-ID login, and the returned key MUST be
+	// that login's key — the same key the Codex account-header resolver reads from,
+	// so bearer and account can never come from different logins.
+	if resolver, key := oauthLoginForProfile(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "codex", CatalogID: "chatgpt"}); resolver == nil {
+		t.Fatal("renamed profile with a catalog-ID login must get a resolver (unauthenticated-children regression)")
+	} else if key != oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt") {
+		t.Fatalf("bound key = %q, want the chatgpt login key (bearer/account must share it)", key)
+	}
+	// Name differs from catalog ID only in CASE: the exact-case store key is
+	// "provider:chatgpt", so "chatgpt" must survive as a distinct candidate.
+	if resolver, key := oauthLoginForProfile(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "ChatGPT", CatalogID: "chatgpt"}); resolver == nil {
+		t.Fatal("case-variant profile name must still resolve the catalog-ID login (case-insensitive dedupe regression)")
+	} else if key != oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt") {
+		t.Fatalf("case-variant bound key = %q, want the chatgpt login key", key)
+	}
+	if resolver, _ := oauthLoginForProfile(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "chatgpt", CatalogID: "chatgpt"}); resolver == nil {
+		t.Fatal("catalog-named profile must get a resolver")
+	}
+	if resolver, key := oauthLoginForProfile(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "openai", CatalogID: "openai"}); resolver != nil || key != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("a profile with no stored login must get no resolver and an empty key, got key=%q", key)
+	}
+}
+
+// The catalog-ID fallback must NOT reach a sibling profile's OAuth login when
+// this profile has its own key — withBearer would erase the key and silently
+// bill the model call under the sibling's account (a real cross-profile
+// override the fallback introduced). A profile WITH its own resolved key gets no
+// resolver even when a catalog-shared login exists.
+func TestOAuthResolverForProfileDoesNotOverrideExplicitKey(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "tok.json")
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE", "file") // an inherited "keyring" would ignore the temp path and hit the OS keychain
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", path)
+	store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{FilePath: path})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
+	}
+	// A personal login stored under the catalog name.
+	if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("anthropic"), oauth.Token{AccessToken: "personal-tok", ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour)}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed token: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Work profile: same catalog, its OWN resolved API key, deliberately NOT the
+	// personal OAuth account. It must keep using its key (no resolver attached).
+	work := config.ProviderProfile{Name: "anthropic-work", CatalogID: "anthropic", APIKey: "sk-work-key"}
+	if resolver, key := oauthLoginForProfile(work); resolver != nil || key != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("a profile with its own API key must not get a catalog-shared OAuth resolver (cross-profile override), got key=%q", key)
+	}
+	// A raw auth-header credential must be protected the same way.
+	header := config.ProviderProfile{Name: "anthropic-hdr", CatalogID: "anthropic", AuthHeaderValue: "Bearer byo"}
+	if resolver, _ := oauthLoginForProfile(header); resolver != nil {
+		t.Fatal("a profile with its own auth header must not get a catalog-shared OAuth resolver")
+	}
+	// A same-NAME login must not override an explicit key either (the name
+	// candidate is gated on the profile being keyless, not just the catalog one).
+	if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("anthropic-work"), oauth.Token{AccessToken: "name-tok", ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour)}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed name token: %v", err)
+	}
+	if resolver, _ := oauthLoginForProfile(work); resolver != nil {
+		t.Fatal("a profile with its own API key must not get an OAuth resolver even from a same-name login")
+	}
+	// Sanity: a keyless sibling on the same catalog DOES resolve the shared login.
+	keyless := config.ProviderProfile{Name: "anthropic-oauth", CatalogID: "anthropic"}
+	if resolver, key := oauthLoginForProfile(keyless); resolver == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a keyless profile should still resolve the catalog-shared login")
+	} else if key != oauth.ProviderKey("anthropic") {
+		t.Fatalf("keyless sibling bound key = %q, want the catalog login key", key)
+	}
+}

internal/cli/oauth_provider.go

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"net/http"
-	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
@@ -12,33 +11,36 @@ import (
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers/providerio"
 )
 
-// providerOAuthName resolves the OAuth login name for a provider profile. It is
-// the name a user logs in under (`zero auth login <name>`) whose token then
-// authenticates this provider's model calls. For now it is the profile name;
-// the provider presets map well-known kinds (openai/anthropic) to canonical
-// names on top of this.
-func providerOAuthName(profile config.ProviderProfile) string {
-	return strings.TrimSpace(profile.Name)
-}
-
-// oauthResolverForProfile returns a TokenResolver that authenticates a provider's
-// model calls with the user's OAuth login, or nil when no login exists for this
-// provider. Returning nil for the no-login case keeps API-key users free of any
-// per-request store lookups: the resolver is only attached once a login is
-// present at construction time.
-func oauthResolverForProfile(profile config.ProviderProfile) providerio.TokenResolver {
-	name := providerOAuthName(profile)
-	if name == "" {
-		return nil
+// oauthLoginForProfile resolves the user's OAuth login for a provider ONCE and
+// returns both a TokenResolver that authenticates model calls with it and the
+// credential-store key it bound to. It returns (nil, "") when no login exists —
+// keeping API-key users free of any per-request store lookups, since the resolver
+// is only attached when a login is present at construction time.
+//
+// The returned key is the single source of truth for "which login is this
+// provider using": callers pass it to providers.Options.OAuthLoginKey so the
+// Codex chatgpt-account-id header reads its account from the exact login that
+// issued the bearer token, instead of doing a second, independent lookup that
+// could select a different login (a backend-rejected mismatch).
+//
+// Candidate login names (profile name, then a catalog-ID fallback, both gated on
+// the profile having no own configured credential) come from the shared
+// ProviderProfile.OAuthLoginCandidates so the runtime resolver, the Codex account
+// resolver, and the onboarding presence check never diverge.
+func oauthLoginForProfile(profile config.ProviderProfile) (providerio.TokenResolver, string) {
+	candidates := profile.OAuthLoginCandidates()
+	if len(candidates) == 0 {
+		return nil, ""
 	}
 	store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{})
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil
+		return nil, ""
 	}
-	key := oauth.ProviderKey(name)
-	if _, ok, loadErr := store.Load(key); loadErr != nil || !ok {
-		// No login (or an unreadable/invalid key) → API-key auth, no resolver.
-		return nil
+	_, key, ok := oauth.FirstStored(store, candidates)
+	if !ok {
+		// No login under any candidate (or unreadable/invalid keys) → API-key
+		// auth, no resolver.
+		return nil, ""
 	}
 	manager, err := oauth.NewManager(oauth.ManagerOptions{
 		Store:      store,
@@ -48,9 +50,9 @@ func oauthResolverForProfile(profile config.ProviderProfile) providerio.TokenRes
 		AllowPresets: true,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil
+		return nil, ""
 	}
-	return func(ctx context.Context, forceRefresh bool) (string, string, bool, error) {
+	resolver := func(ctx context.Context, forceRefresh bool) (string, string, bool, error) {
 		var token string
 		var rerr error
 		if forceRefresh {
@@ -67,4 +69,5 @@ func oauthResolverForProfile(profile config.ProviderProfile) providerio.TokenRes
 		}
 		return "Authorization", "Bearer " + token, true, nil
 	}
+	return resolver, key
 }

internal/cli/plugin_activate.go

@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ package cli
 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
+	"strings"
 
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/plugins"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
@@ -57,6 +59,27 @@ func activatePlugins(workspaceRoot string, registry *tools.Registry, deps appDep
 	return pluginActivation{hooks: result.Hooks, skillRoots: result.SkillRoots}
 }
 
+// skillInfos resolves the reusable skills the model can load via the skill tool —
+// the default skills dir merged with any plugin skill roots, the same set the
+// plugin-aware skill tool resolves against — as plain data for the agent's system
+// prompt. It returns nil when no skills are installed, so a skill-less run leaves
+// the prompt byte-identical.
+func (a pluginActivation) skillInfos(defaultDir string) []agent.SkillInfo {
+	merged, _ := plugins.MergedSkills(defaultDir, a.skillRoots)
+	if len(merged) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	infos := make([]agent.SkillInfo, 0, len(merged))
+	for _, skill := range merged {
+		name := strings.TrimSpace(skill.Name)
+		if name == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		infos = append(infos, agent.SkillInfo{Name: name, Description: strings.TrimSpace(skill.Description)})
+	}
+	return infos
+}
+
 // formatLoadDiagnostic renders a plugin load diagnostic into a single warning
 // line, prefixing the diagnostic kind and appending the most specific locator
 // available (manifest path, then plugin path, then plugin ID) so an operator can

internal/cli/provider_catalog_onboarding_test.go

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ func TestProviderCatalogRuntimeProvidersShowOnboardingSetupHints(t *testing.T) {
 	}{
 		{id: "openai", name: "OpenAI", transport: "openai", defaultModel: "gpt-4.1"},
 		{id: "groq", name: "Groq", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "llama-3.3-70b-versatile"},
+		{id: "longcat", name: "LongCat", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "LongCat-2.0"},
 		{id: "ollama-cloud", name: "Ollama Cloud", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "qwen3-coder:480b"},
 		{id: "ollama", name: "Ollama Local", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "llama3.1"},
 	}
@@ -46,6 +47,21 @@ func TestProviderCatalogRuntimeProvidersShowOnboardingSetupHints(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestProviderCatalogLongCatRequiresAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
+	output := runProviderCatalogOnboarding(t)
+	block := providerCatalogOnboardingBlock(t, output, "longcat")
+
+	for _, want := range []string{
+		"requiresAuth=true",
+		"authEnvVars=LONGCAT_API_KEY",
+		"setup: zero providers setup longcat --set-active",
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(block, want) {
+			t.Fatalf("expected LongCat catalog block to contain %q, got:\n%s", want, block)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func TestProviderCatalogOllamaCloudRequiresAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
 	output := runProviderCatalogOnboarding(t)
 	block := providerCatalogOnboardingBlock(t, output, "ollama-cloud")

internal/cli/provider_models.go

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+package cli
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
+)
+
+type providerModelsOptions struct {
+	name string
+	json bool
+}
+
+// runProvidersModels lists the models a saved provider actually serves by probing
+// its live model-discovery endpoint (e.g. an OpenAI-compatible `/v1/models`). It
+// works for custom OpenAI-/Anthropic-compatible providers too: discovery runs off
+// the profile's base URL + credentials, so a self-hosted endpoint serving a dozen
+// models no longer needs a config object per model — configure the provider once,
+// then run any listed model with `zero exec --model <id>` (Zero passes unknown
+// model ids through to the provider).
+func runProvidersModels(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
+	options, help, err := parseProviderModelsArgs(args)
+	if err != nil {
+		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
+	}
+	if help {
+		if err := writeProvidersHelp(stdout); err != nil {
+			return exitCrash
+		}
+		return exitSuccess
+	}
+
+	resolved, exitCode := resolveCommandCenterConfig(stderr, deps)
+	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
+		return exitCode
+	}
+	profile, err := selectProviderForCheck(resolved, options.name)
+	if err != nil {
+		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
+	}
+
+	ctx, stop := signalContext()
+	defer stop()
+	models, err := deps.discoverProviderModels(ctx, discoveryCredentialProfile(profile))
+	if err != nil {
+		return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitProvider)
+	}
+
+	if options.json {
+		items := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(models))
+		for _, model := range models {
+			entry := map[string]any{"id": model.ID}
+			if description := strings.TrimSpace(model.Description); description != "" {
+				entry["description"] = description
+			}
+			items = append(items, entry)
+		}
+		payload := map[string]any{
+			"provider": profile.Name,
+			"count":    len(items),
+			"models":   items,
+		}
+		if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, payload); err != nil {
+			return exitCrash
+		}
+		return exitSuccess
+	}
+
+	name := strings.TrimSpace(profile.Name)
+	if name == "" {
+		name = "provider"
+	}
+	if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Provider models (%s)\n", name); err != nil {
+		return exitCrash
+	}
+	for _, model := range models {
+		line := strings.TrimSpace(model.ID)
+		if description := strings.TrimSpace(model.Description); description != "" {
+			line += " — " + description
+		}
+		if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, line); err != nil {
+			return exitCrash
+		}
+	}
+	suffix := "s"
+	if len(models) == 1 {
+		suffix = ""
+	}
+	if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "%d model%s discovered\n", len(models), suffix); err != nil {
+		return exitCrash
+	}
+	if len(models) > 0 {
+		if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "next: zero exec %q --model %s\n", "hello", setupCommandArg(models[0].ID)); err != nil {
+			return exitCrash
+		}
+	}
+	return exitSuccess
+}
+
+// discoveryCredentialProfile resolves the profile's API key the same way the
+// runtime does — inline, then the stored credential, then the configured env var —
+// so a `providers models` probe authenticates exactly like a real request. Mirrors
+// discoveredModelContextWindow's credential resolution.
+func discoveryCredentialProfile(profile config.ProviderProfile) config.ProviderProfile {
+	authed := profile
+	if strings.TrimSpace(authed.APIKey) == "" {
+		if store, err := config.ProviderKeyStore(); err == nil {
+			authed = config.ApplyStoredAPIKey(authed, store)
+		}
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(authed.APIKey) == "" && strings.TrimSpace(authed.APIKeyEnv) != "" {
+		authed.APIKey = strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(authed.APIKeyEnv))
+	}
+	return authed
+}
+
+// defaultDiscoverProviderModels is the production discovery hook: a live probe of
+// the provider's model-listing endpoint with no curated-catalog merge or
+// coding-model filtering, so a custom provider's full model list is returned.
+func defaultDiscoverProviderModels(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
+	return providermodeldiscovery.Discover(ctx, profile, providermodeldiscovery.Options{})
+}
+
+func parseProviderModelsArgs(args []string) (providerModelsOptions, bool, error) {
+	options := providerModelsOptions{}
+	for index := 0; index < len(args); index++ {
+		arg := args[index]
+		switch {
+		case arg == "-h" || arg == "--help" || arg == "help":
+			return options, true, nil
+		case arg == "--json":
+			options.json = true
+		case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-"):
+			return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unknown flag %q", arg)}
+		default:
+			if options.name != "" {
+				return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unexpected argument %q", arg)}
+			}
+			options.name = arg
+		}
+	}
+	return options, false, nil
+}

internal/cli/provider_models_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+package cli
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
+)
+
+func TestRunProvidersModelsListsDiscoveredModels(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+	deps := commandCenterDeps(t)
+	var probed config.ProviderProfile
+	deps.discoverProviderModels = func(_ context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
+		probed = profile
+		return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{
+			{ID: "team/model-a", Description: "first"},
+			{ID: "team/model-b"},
+		}, nil
+	}
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "models"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
+
+	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
+		t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want %d: %s", exitCode, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
+	}
+	// No name given → the active provider is probed, with its resolved credential.
+	if probed.Name != "work" {
+		t.Fatalf("probed provider = %q, want active provider work", probed.Name)
+	}
+	out := stdout.String()
+	for _, want := range []string{"Provider models (work)", "team/model-a — first", "team/model-b", "2 models discovered", "--model team/model-a"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
+			t.Fatalf("output missing %q:\n%s", want, out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunProvidersModelsJSON(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+	deps := commandCenterDeps(t)
+	deps.discoverProviderModels = func(_ context.Context, _ config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
+		return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{{ID: "m1", Description: "d1"}, {ID: "m2"}}, nil
+	}
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "models", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
+
+	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
+		t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want %d: %s", exitCode, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
+	}
+	var payload struct {
+		Provider string `json:"provider"`
+		Count    int    `json:"count"`
+		Models   []struct {
+			ID          string `json:"id"`
+			Description string `json:"description"`
+		} `json:"models"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode json: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
+	}
+	if payload.Provider != "work" || payload.Count != 2 || len(payload.Models) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("payload = %#v", payload)
+	}
+	if payload.Models[0].ID != "m1" || payload.Models[0].Description != "d1" {
+		t.Fatalf("model[0] = %#v", payload.Models[0])
+	}
+	// A model with no description omits the field rather than emitting an empty string.
+	if payload.Models[1].ID != "m2" || payload.Models[1].Description != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("model[1] = %#v", payload.Models[1])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunProvidersModelsSelectsNamedProvider(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+	deps := commandCenterDeps(t)
+	custom := config.ProviderProfile{
+		Name:         "self-hosted",
+		ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAICompatible,
+		BaseURL:      "https://models.internal/v1",
+		APIKey:       "sk-internal",
+		Model:        "house-model",
+	}
+	deps.resolveConfig = func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
+		work := config.ProviderProfile{Name: "work", ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAI, BaseURL: config.OpenAIBaseURL, APIKey: "sk", Model: "gpt-4.1"}
+		return config.ResolvedConfig{ActiveProvider: "work", Provider: work, Providers: []config.ProviderProfile{work, custom}}, nil
+	}
+	var probed config.ProviderProfile
+	deps.discoverProviderModels = func(_ context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
+		probed = profile
+		return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{{ID: "house-model"}}, nil
+	}
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "models", "self-hosted"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
+
+	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
+		t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want %d: %s", exitCode, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if probed.Name != "self-hosted" || probed.BaseURL != "https://models.internal/v1" {
+		t.Fatalf("probed = %#v, want the named custom provider", probed)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunProvidersModelsUnknownProviderFails(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+	deps := commandCenterDeps(t)
+	called := false
+	deps.discoverProviderModels = func(_ context.Context, _ config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
+		called = true
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "models", "ghost"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
+
+	if exitCode == exitSuccess {
+		t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want non-zero for unknown provider", exitCode)
+	}
+	if called {
+		t.Fatal("discovery must not run for an unknown provider")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), `provider "ghost" not found`) {
+		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want provider-not-found", stderr.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunProvidersModelsSurfacesDiscoveryError(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+	deps := commandCenterDeps(t)
+	deps.discoverProviderModels = func(_ context.Context, _ config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
+		return nil, errors.New("models endpoint returned 404")
+	}
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "models"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
+
+	if exitCode != exitProvider {
+		t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want exitProvider %d", exitCode, exitProvider)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "models endpoint returned 404") {
+		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want the discovery error", stderr.String())
+	}
+}

internal/cli/provider_setup.go

@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ func validateProviderRuntimeReady(profile config.ProviderProfile) error {
 }
 
 func providerProfileHasCredential(profile config.ProviderProfile) bool {
-	return strings.TrimSpace(profile.APIKey) != "" || profile.APIKeyStored || strings.TrimSpace(profile.AuthHeaderValue) != ""
+	return profile.HasConfiguredCredential()
 }
 
 func providerKindForDescriptor(descriptor providercatalog.Descriptor) config.ProviderKind {

internal/cli/setup.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package cli
 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
+	"net"
 	"net/url"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
@@ -314,10 +315,14 @@ func setupRequired(resolved config.ResolvedConfig) bool {
 }
 
 // providerHasOAuthLogin reports whether a stored OAuth login exists for the
-// provider, keyed by its profile name or catalog id.
+// provider. It uses the same ProviderProfile.OAuthLoginCandidates the runtime
+// resolver does, so the "authenticated in the UI" gate and the "authenticated at
+// runtime" resolver can never diverge. This is only consulted for a profile with
+// no usable API-key credential (setupRequired returns early otherwise), where
+// the candidate set is permissive (profile name + catalog ID).
 func providerHasOAuthLogin(profile config.ProviderProfile, oauthLogins map[string]bool) bool {
-	for _, name := range []string{strings.TrimSpace(profile.Name), strings.TrimSpace(profile.CatalogID)} {
-		if name != "" && oauthLogins[name] {
+	for _, name := range profile.OAuthLoginCandidates() {
+		if oauthLogins[name] {
 			return true
 		}
 	}
@@ -449,6 +454,11 @@ func providerProfileIsLocal(profile config.ProviderProfile) bool {
 	case "localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1":
 		return true
 	}
+	// Also treat explicit private-network IPs (192.168.x.y, 10.x.y.z,
+	// 172.16-31.x.y) as local — the user is pointing at their own LAN box.
+	if ip := net.ParseIP(parsed.Hostname()); ip != nil && ip.IsPrivate() {
+		return true
+	}
 	return false
 }
 

internal/cli/specialist_test.go

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ import (
 	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
 )
 
 func TestRunSpecialistListShowAndPath(t *testing.T) {
@@ -326,7 +328,7 @@ func setSpecialistConfigRoot(t *testing.T) string {
 	default:
 		t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", root)
 	}
-	configRoot, err := os.UserConfigDir()
+	configRoot, err := config.UserConfigDir()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("UserConfigDir() error = %v", err)
 	}

internal/cli/update.go

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
 
 type updateOptions struct {
 	check      bool
+	apply      bool
 	json       bool
 	repository string
 	endpoint   string
@@ -20,6 +21,18 @@ type updateOptions struct {
 }
 
 func runUpdate(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
+	return runUpdateCommand(args, stdout, stderr, deps, false)
+}
+
+func runUpgrade(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
+	return runUpdateCommand(args, stdout, stderr, deps, true)
+}
+
+// runUpdateCommand backs both `zero update` and `zero upgrade`. defaultApply
+// makes `--apply` the implicit behavior for `zero upgrade` when neither
+// `--check` nor `--apply` is passed explicitly; `zero update` keeps requiring
+// one of the two so existing scripts around `zero update --check` don't change.
+func runUpdateCommand(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, defaultApply bool) int {
 	options, help, err := parseUpdateArgs(args)
 	if err != nil {
 		return writeUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
@@ -30,10 +43,19 @@ func runUpdate(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
 		}
 		return exitSuccess
 	}
-	if !options.check {
-		return writeUsageError(stderr, "Only `zero update --check` is available right now.")
+	if options.check && options.apply {
+		return writeUsageError(stderr, "Pass only one of --check or --apply.")
 	}
-	checkOptions := update.Options{
+	if !options.check && !options.apply {
+		if !defaultApply {
+			return writeUsageError(stderr, "Pass --check to check for updates or --apply to install one (or use `zero upgrade`).")
+		}
+		options.apply = true
+	}
+	if options.apply && options.target != "" {
+		return writeUsageError(stderr, "--target cannot be combined with --apply; it only verifies release assets for --check.")
+	}
+	updateOptions := update.Options{
 		CurrentVersion: version,
 		Repository:     options.repository,
 		Endpoint:       options.endpoint,
@@ -44,10 +66,26 @@ func runUpdate(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
 		if err != nil {
 			return writeUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
 		}
-		checkOptions.GOOS = target.GOOS
-		checkOptions.GOARCH = target.GOARCH
+		updateOptions.GOOS = target.GOOS
+		updateOptions.GOARCH = target.GOARCH
 	}
-	result, err := deps.checkUpdate(context.Background(), checkOptions)
+	if options.apply {
+		result, err := deps.applyUpdate(context.Background(), updateOptions)
+		if err != nil {
+			return writeAppError(stderr, "Could not install update: "+err.Error(), exitCrash)
+		}
+		if options.json {
+			if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, result); err != nil {
+				return exitCrash
+			}
+			return exitSuccess
+		}
+		if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, update.FormatApply(result)); err != nil {
+			return exitCrash
+		}
+		return exitSuccess
+	}
+	result, err := deps.checkUpdate(context.Background(), updateOptions)
 	if err != nil {
 		return writeAppError(stderr, "Could not check for updates: "+err.Error(), exitCrash)
 	}
@@ -72,6 +110,8 @@ func parseUpdateArgs(args []string) (updateOptions, bool, error) {
 			return options, true, nil
 		case arg == "--check":
 			options.check = true
+		case arg == "--apply":
+			options.apply = true
 		case arg == "--json":
 			options.json = true
 		case arg == "--repo":
@@ -155,14 +195,17 @@ func parseUpdateTarget(value string) (string, error) {
 func writeUpdateHelp(w io.Writer) error {
 	_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
   zero update --check [flags]
+  zero update --apply [flags]
+  zero upgrade [flags]
 
 Flags:
       --check                 Check the latest GitHub release without installing
-      --json                  Print the update check result as JSON
+      --apply                 Download, verify, and install the latest release
+      --json                  Print the update result as JSON
       --repo <owner/repo>     Repository to check when no endpoint is provided
       --endpoint <url|repo>   Release API URL or owner/repo slug to check
       --timeout <duration>    Release check timeout (default 5s)
-      --target <platform>     Release target to verify (for example windows-x64)
+      --target <platform>     Release target to verify with --check (for example windows-x64); not valid with --apply
   -h, --help                  Show this help
 `)
 	return err

internal/cli/workflow_test.go

@@ -662,3 +662,144 @@ func TestRunExecRejectsWorktreeDirWithoutWorktree(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected empty stdout, got %q", stdout.String())
 	}
 }
+
+func TestParseChangesArgsAuto(t *testing.T) {
+	// 1. Correct parsing of auto
+	for _, args := range [][]string{
+		{"--auto"},
+		{"-a"},
+	} {
+		options, help, err := parseChangesArgs(args, "commit")
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("parseChangesArgs(%v) error: %v", args, err)
+		}
+		if help {
+			t.Fatalf("parseChangesArgs(%v) returned help", args)
+		}
+		if !options.auto {
+			t.Fatalf("auto = false, want true (args %v)", args)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// 2. Reject --auto on inspect
+	_, _, err := parseChangesArgs([]string{"--auto"}, "inspect")
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "--auto") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected --auto rejection on inspect, got %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// 3. Reject both --message and --auto on commit
+	_, _, err = parseChangesArgs([]string{"--message", "foo", "--auto"}, "commit")
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cannot specify both --message and --auto") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected --message and --auto conflict error, got %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// 4. Reject both empty message and --auto on commit
+	_, _, err = parseChangesArgs([]string{"--message=", "--auto"}, "commit")
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cannot specify both --message and --auto") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected empty --message and --auto conflict error, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+type mockCommitMsgProvider struct {
+	response string
+	req      zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
+}
+
+func (p *mockCommitMsgProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
+	p.req = request
+	events := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 2)
+	events <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: p.response}
+	events <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}
+	close(events)
+	return events, nil
+}
+
+func TestRunChangesCommitAuto(t *testing.T) {
+	cwd := t.TempDir()
+	summary := zerogit.ChangeSummary{
+		Root:   cwd,
+		Branch: "main",
+		Files:  []zerogit.FileChange{{Path: "README.md", Status: "modified"}},
+		Diff:   "some diff content with ghp_SECRETKEYHERE",
+	}
+
+	mockProv := &mockCommitMsgProvider{
+		response: "```\nfeat: auto commit message\n```",
+	}
+
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+	commitCalled := false
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"changes", "commit", "--auto"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
+		getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
+		inspectChanges: func(ctx context.Context, options zerogit.InspectOptions) (zerogit.ChangeSummary, error) {
+			return summary, nil
+		},
+		resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
+			cfg := execResolvedConfig()
+			cfg.Provider.Name = "openai"
+			cfg.Provider.Model = "gpt-4o"
+			return cfg, nil
+		},
+		newProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
+			return mockProv, nil
+		},
+		commitChanges: func(ctx context.Context, options zerogit.CommitOptions) (zerogit.CommitResult, error) {
+			commitCalled = true
+			if options.Message != "feat: auto commit message" {
+				t.Fatalf("expected commit message 'feat: auto commit message', got %q", options.Message)
+			}
+			return zerogit.CommitResult{
+				Root:       cwd,
+				Message:    options.Message,
+				Committed:  true,
+				CommitHash: "abc1234",
+				Before:     summary,
+			}, nil
+		},
+	})
+
+	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if !commitCalled {
+		t.Fatal("expected commitChanges to be called")
+	}
+	// Verify that secret in the diff was redacted
+	promptContent := mockProv.req.Messages[0].Content
+	if strings.Contains(promptContent, "ghp_SECRETKEYHERE") {
+		t.Fatal("expected secret in diff to be redacted, but it was found in the prompt")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(promptContent, "[REDACTED]") && !strings.Contains(promptContent, "REDACTED") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected redacted diff content in prompt, got: %q", promptContent)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "Generating commit message using LLM...") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected status message in stdout, got %q", stdout.String())
+	}
+
+	t.Run("EmptyLLMResponse", func(t *testing.T) {
+		mockProvEmpty := &mockCommitMsgProvider{
+			response: "   \n\n   ",
+		}
+		var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+		code := runWithDeps([]string{"changes", "commit", "--auto"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
+			getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
+			inspectChanges: func(ctx context.Context, options zerogit.InspectOptions) (zerogit.ChangeSummary, error) {
+				return summary, nil
+			},
+			resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
+				return execResolvedConfig(), nil
+			},
+			newProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
+				return mockProvEmpty, nil
+			},
+		})
+		if code == exitSuccess {
+			t.Fatal("expected command to fail when LLM returns empty response, got success")
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "empty commit message") {
+			t.Fatalf("expected empty commit message error in stderr, got %q", stderr.String())
+		}
+	})
+}

internal/cli/workflows.go

@@ -6,13 +6,16 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
+	"time"
 
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/redaction"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/selfverify"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/testrunner"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/verify"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/worktrees"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zerogit"
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
 )
 
 type worktreeCommandOptions struct {
@@ -35,8 +38,10 @@ type changesCommandOptions struct {
 	cwd          string
 	baseRef      string
 	message      string
+	hasMessage   bool
 	dryRun       bool
 	maxDiffBytes int
+	auto         bool
 }
 
 func runWorktrees(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
@@ -198,9 +203,52 @@ func runChanges(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
 		}
 		return exitSuccess
 	case "commit":
+		var message string
+		if options.auto {
+			summary, err := deps.inspectChanges(context.Background(), zerogit.InspectOptions{
+				Cwd:          workspaceRoot,
+				MaxDiffBytes: options.maxDiffBytes,
+			})
+			if err != nil {
+				return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("failed to inspect changes: %v", err))
+			}
+			if summary.Clean {
+				return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "no changes to commit")
+			}
+
+			resolved, err := deps.resolveConfig(workspaceRoot, config.Overrides{})
+			if err != nil {
+				return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("failed to resolve config: %v", err))
+			}
+			if !config.HasProviderProfile(resolved.Provider) {
+				return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "no provider configured for auto-commit message")
+			}
+			provider, err := deps.newProvider(resolved.Provider)
+			if err != nil {
+				return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("failed to create provider: %v", err))
+			}
+
+			if !options.json {
+				if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "Generating commit message using LLM..."); err != nil {
+					return exitCrash
+				}
+			}
+
+			safeSummary := redactChangeSummary(summary)
+			genCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 60*time.Second)
+			defer cancel()
+			msg, err := generateAutoCommitMessage(genCtx, provider, resolved.Provider.Model, safeSummary)
+			if err != nil {
+				return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("failed to generate commit message: %v", err))
+			}
+			message = msg
+		} else {
+			message = options.message
+		}
+
 		result, err := deps.commitChanges(context.Background(), zerogit.CommitOptions{
 			Cwd:          workspaceRoot,
-			Message:      options.message,
+			Message:      message,
 			DryRun:       options.dryRun,
 			MaxDiffBytes: options.maxDiffBytes,
 		})
@@ -395,9 +443,11 @@ func parseChangesArgs(args []string, command string) (changesCommandOptions, boo
 				return options, false, err
 			}
 			options.message = value
+			options.hasMessage = true
 			index = next
 		case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--message="):
 			options.message = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--message="))
+			options.hasMessage = true
 		case arg == "--diff-bytes":
 			value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
 			if err != nil {
@@ -415,14 +465,19 @@ func parseChangesArgs(args []string, command string) (changesCommandOptions, boo
 				return options, false, err
 			}
 			options.maxDiffBytes = maxDiffBytes
+		case arg == "-a" || arg == "--auto":
+			options.auto = true
 		case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-"):
 			return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unknown changes flag %q", arg)}
 		default:
 			return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unexpected changes argument %q", arg)}
 		}
 	}
-	if command != "commit" && (options.message != "" || options.dryRun) {
-		return options, false, execUsageError{"--message and --dry-run are only valid with `zero changes commit`"}
+	if command != "commit" && (options.hasMessage || options.dryRun || options.auto) {
+		return options, false, execUsageError{"--message, --dry-run, and --auto are only valid with `zero changes commit`"}
+	}
+	if command == "commit" && options.hasMessage && options.auto {
+		return options, false, execUsageError{"cannot specify both --message and --auto"}
 	}
 	if command == "commit" && options.baseRef != "" {
 		return options, false, execUsageError{"--base is only valid with `zero changes inspect`"}
@@ -712,9 +767,47 @@ Flags:
       --base <ref>        Diff against <ref>...HEAD instead of the working tree
       --diff-bytes <n>    Maximum diff bytes to include
   -m, --message <text>    Commit message for `+"`zero changes commit`"+`
+  -a, --auto              Auto-generate commit message using LLM (use --dry-run to preview)
       --dry-run           Preview commit metadata without mutating git state
       --json              Print JSON output
   -h, --help              Show this help
 `)
 	return err
 }
+
+func generateAutoCommitMessage(ctx context.Context, provider zeroruntime.Provider, model string, summary zerogit.ChangeSummary) (string, error) {
+	var promptBuilder strings.Builder
+	promptBuilder.WriteString("Analyze the following git diff and generate a concise, conventional commit message.\n")
+	promptBuilder.WriteString("The commit message subject line must be 72 characters or fewer, starting with a conventional commit type (e.g., feat, fix, docs, style, refactor, test, chore) followed by a colon and space, and a lowercase description.\n")
+	promptBuilder.WriteString("You may optionally include a blank line and a bulleted list of changes for the body if there are multiple files or complex changes.\n")
+	promptBuilder.WriteString("Output ONLY the raw commit message text. Do not wrap the message in markdown code block fence, do not include quotes or any introduction/explanation.\n\n")
+	promptBuilder.WriteString("Git Diff:\n")
+	promptBuilder.WriteString(summary.Diff)
+
+	request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+		Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{
+			{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: promptBuilder.String()},
+		},
+	}
+	stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	collected := zeroruntime.CollectStream(ctx, stream)
+	if collected.Error != "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("%s", collected.Error)
+	}
+
+	msg := strings.TrimSpace(collected.Text)
+	if strings.HasPrefix(msg, "```") {
+		if idx := strings.Index(msg, "\n"); idx != -1 {
+			msg = msg[idx+1:]
+		}
+	}
+	msg = strings.TrimSuffix(msg, "```")
+	msg = strings.TrimSpace(msg)
+	if msg == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("provider returned empty commit message")
+	}
+	return msg, nil
+}

internal/config/credentials.go

@@ -155,6 +155,63 @@ func MigratePlaintextProviderKeys(path string, store APIKeySetter) (int, error)
 	return migrated, nil
 }
 
+// HasConfiguredCredential reports whether the profile is set up to authenticate
+// with its own API key (inline, stored, or a raw auth header). It is the single
+// definition of "this profile is key-authed", shared by OAuthLoginCandidates and
+// the cli/tui setup surfaces so they never disagree about whether a profile is
+// keyed. APIKeyEnv is deliberately NOT included: an env var may be unset at
+// runtime while the profile actually relies on an OAuth login, so an
+// env-configured-but-empty profile must still be allowed to resolve a token.
+func (profile ProviderProfile) HasConfiguredCredential() bool {
+	return strings.TrimSpace(profile.APIKey) != "" ||
+		profile.APIKeyStored ||
+		strings.TrimSpace(profile.AuthHeaderValue) != ""
+}
+
+// OAuthLoginCandidates returns the login names to try, in order, when resolving
+// this profile's OAuth token — used by the runtime bearer resolver, the Codex
+// account-header resolver, and the onboarding presence check so all three agree.
+//
+// It returns NO candidates for a profile that carries its own configured
+// credential: attaching an OAuth resolver to such a profile makes withBearer
+// erase the key the instant a token resolves, silently routing/billing the call
+// through the OAuth account instead of the intended key (the cross-profile
+// override the review caught — and, via the profile name, a same-name login
+// overriding an explicit key). A stored-key profile that reaches this keyless
+// (e.g. a transiently unreadable keyring) is likewise treated as key-auth, so it
+// fails with a clear missing-credential error rather than silently borrowing an
+// unrelated OAuth login. APIKeyEnv is intentionally not part of that gate (an
+// env var may be unset while the profile relies on OAuth).
+//
+// For a keyless profile the profile name comes first (a login under your own
+// profile name is unambiguously yours), then the catalog ID as a FALLBACK (so a
+// profile renamed away from its catalog ID — e.g. {name:"codex",
+// catalogID:"chatgpt"} — still finds a `zero auth login chatgpt` token).
+// Candidates are trimmed, blank-skipped, and de-duplicated CASE-SENSITIVELY — the
+// OAuth token store is a case-sensitive map, so "ChatGPT" and "chatgpt" are
+// distinct keys and both must survive.
+func (profile ProviderProfile) OAuthLoginCandidates() []string {
+	if profile.HasConfiguredCredential() {
+		return nil
+	}
+	var names []string
+	add := func(s string) {
+		s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
+		if s == "" {
+			return
+		}
+		for _, existing := range names {
+			if existing == s { // case-sensitive: the store lookup is case-sensitive
+				return
+			}
+		}
+		names = append(names, s)
+	}
+	add(profile.Name)
+	add(profile.CatalogID)
+	return names
+}
+
 // ApplyStoredAPIKey fills profile.APIKey from the credential store when it is not
 // already resolved — an inline config key or a resolved APIKeyEnv always wins, so
 // this only supplies a key for providers whose secret lives in the store. A nil

internal/config/credentials_test.go

@@ -172,3 +172,69 @@ func TestProviderProfileAPIKeyStoredRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("no inline key expected, got %q", p.APIKey)
 	}
 }
+
+// OAuthLoginCandidates always offers the profile name, adds the catalog ID as a
+// fallback ONLY when the profile has no effective own credential, and dedupes
+// case-sensitively (the OAuth store is a case-sensitive map).
+func TestOAuthLoginCandidates(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		profile ProviderProfile
+		want    []string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:    "renamed keyless profile falls back to catalog id",
+			profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "codex", CatalogID: "chatgpt"},
+			want:    []string{"codex", "chatgpt"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "case-variant name keeps distinct catalog-id candidate",
+			profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "ChatGPT", CatalogID: "chatgpt"},
+			want:    []string{"ChatGPT", "chatgpt"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "exact-duplicate name and catalog id collapse",
+			profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "chatgpt", CatalogID: "chatgpt"},
+			want:    []string{"chatgpt"},
+		},
+		{
+			// A configured key must block ALL candidates (name included): a login
+			// under the profile's own name would otherwise erase the key too.
+			name:    "own inline key blocks every candidate",
+			profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "anthropic-work", CatalogID: "anthropic", APIKey: "sk-work"},
+			want:    nil,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "own auth header blocks every candidate",
+			profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "acme", CatalogID: "anthropic", AuthHeaderValue: "Bearer x"},
+			want:    nil,
+		},
+		{
+			// APIKeyStored means key-auth even if the key isn't loaded here (e.g. a
+			// transiently unreadable keyring): don't silently borrow an OAuth login.
+			name:    "stored-key profile blocks every candidate",
+			profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "openai-stored", CatalogID: "openai", APIKeyStored: true},
+			want:    nil,
+		},
+		{
+			// APIKeyEnv is NOT a configured credential for gating: the env var may be
+			// unset while the profile relies on an OAuth login, so candidates stand.
+			name:    "env-only profile still yields candidates",
+			profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "xai", CatalogID: "xai", APIKeyEnv: "XAI_API_KEY"},
+			want:    []string{"xai"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "empty profile yields no candidates",
+			profile: ProviderProfile{},
+			want:    nil,
+		},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := c.profile.OAuthLoginCandidates()
+			if strings.Join(got, ",") != strings.Join(c.want, ",") {
+				t.Fatalf("OAuthLoginCandidates() = %#v, want %#v", got, c.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/config/paths.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 )
 
@@ -33,13 +34,32 @@ func DefaultResolveOptions(workspaceRoot string) (ResolveOptions, error) {
 }
 
 func DefaultUserConfigPath() (string, error) {
-	userConfigDir, err := os.UserConfigDir()
+	userConfigDir, err := UserConfigDir()
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve user config directory: %w", err)
 	}
 	return filepath.Join(userConfigDir, "zero", "config.json"), nil
 }
 
+// UserConfigDir returns the base directory Zero stores per-user config under.
+// It mirrors os.UserConfigDir everywhere except macOS: there Go defaults to
+// ~/Library/Application Support, but Zero deliberately uses ~/.config (XDG-style,
+// matching Linux and Claude Code) so a single config path works cross-platform.
+// $XDG_CONFIG_HOME still wins on macOS when set.
+func UserConfigDir() (string, error) {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "darwin" {
+		if xdg := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME")); xdg != "" {
+			return xdg, nil
+		}
+		home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve home directory: %w", err)
+		}
+		return filepath.Join(home, ".config"), nil
+	}
+	return os.UserConfigDir()
+}
+
 func existingConfigFile(path string) (string, error) {
 	info, err := os.Stat(path)
 	if err != nil {

internal/config/paths_test.go

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ func setUserConfigRoot(t *testing.T) string {
 		t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", root)
 	}
 
-	configRoot, err := os.UserConfigDir()
+	configRoot, err := UserConfigDir()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("UserConfigDir() error = %v", err)
 	}
@@ -130,3 +130,21 @@ func mkdirAll(t *testing.T, path string) {
 		t.Fatalf("create directory %s: %v", path, err)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestDefaultUserConfigPathUsesXDGConfigOnMacOS(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
+		t.Skip("macOS-specific config path behavior")
+	}
+	home := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("HOME", home)
+	t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", "")
+
+	path, err := DefaultUserConfigPath()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("DefaultUserConfigPath() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	want := filepath.Join(home, ".config", "zero", "config.json")
+	if path != want {
+		t.Fatalf("DefaultUserConfigPath() = %q, want %q", path, want)
+	}
+}

internal/config/resolver.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package config
 
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/url"
 	"os"
@@ -14,6 +15,31 @@ import (
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
 )
 
+// ErrNoActiveProvider marks a resolve failure caused solely by a missing or
+// unresolvable active provider. The interactive TUI treats this as "needs
+// onboarding" (drop into the setup wizard) rather than a fatal config error.
+var ErrNoActiveProvider = errors.New("no active provider configured")
+
+// ErrProviderRequiresModel marks a resolve failure caused solely by the active
+// provider missing a model with no catalog default to fall back on (custom
+// openai-/anthropic-compatible endpoints — Zero cannot guess a gateway's model).
+// Like ErrNoActiveProvider, the interactive TUI treats it as "needs onboarding"
+// and drops into the setup wizard so the user can fix it; headless commands
+// (zero config, zero exec) still fail with the actionable message.
+var ErrProviderRequiresModel = errors.New("provider requires model")
+
+// setupFixableError tags an error with a sentinel for errors.Is WITHOUT
+// changing its message: the sentinel's own text must not prefix what the user
+// sees (the wrapped message is already complete and actionable).
+type setupFixableError struct {
+	err      error
+	sentinel error
+}
+
+func (e *setupFixableError) Error() string { return e.err.Error() }
+
+func (e *setupFixableError) Unwrap() []error { return []error{e.err, e.sentinel} }
+
 // defaultMaxTurns is the per-run tool-turn budget when none is configured. 30 was
 // too low for real multi-step agentic work (agents ran out mid-task before reaching
 // later steps); 50 matches the old "deep" preset. Raise per-session with /turns.
@@ -104,7 +130,11 @@ func Resolve(options ResolveOptions) (ResolvedConfig, error) {
 
 	providers, active, err := normalizeProviders(cfg.Providers, cfg.ActiveProvider, options.Env)
 	if err != nil {
-		return ResolvedConfig{}, err
+		// On ErrNoActiveProvider, providers may still hold the successfully
+		// normalized (but active-less) profile list — keep it so a caller can fall
+		// back to an already-configured usable provider instead of treating this
+		// like a config with nothing set up at all.
+		return ResolvedConfig{Providers: providers}, err
 	}
 
 	return ResolvedConfig{
@@ -118,6 +148,7 @@ func Resolve(options ResolveOptions) (ResolvedConfig, error) {
 		Tools:          cfg.Tools,
 		Swarm:          cfg.Swarm,
 		Preferences:    cfg.Preferences,
+		KeyBindings:    cfg.KeyBindings,
 		LocalControl:   cfg.LocalControl,
 	}, nil
 }
@@ -199,6 +230,7 @@ func mergeConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) {
 		dst.Preferences.Theme = strings.TrimSpace(src.Preferences.Theme)
 	}
 	mergeLocalControlConfig(&dst.LocalControl, src.LocalControl)
+	mergeKeyBindings(&dst.KeyBindings, src.KeyBindings)
 }
 
 func mergeProjectConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) error {
@@ -220,8 +252,17 @@ func mergeProjectConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) error {
 	// config: a cloned repo's .zero/config.json must not be able to grant
 	// itself write access outside the workspace. Global config and CLI flags
 	// are the only config sources for write roots.
+	//
+	// Sandbox.Network from project config may only TIGHTEN (→ "deny"), never
+	// WEAKEN (→ "allow"). A malicious repo must not be able to open network
+	// access for shell commands. Matches the AdditionalWriteRoots posture.
 	if network := strings.TrimSpace(src.Sandbox.Network); network != "" {
-		dst.Sandbox.Network = network
+		// Normalize: anything that isn't literally "allow" counts as deny.
+		if sandbox.NormalizeNetworkMode(sandbox.NetworkMode(network)) != sandbox.NetworkAllow {
+			dst.Sandbox.Network = network
+		}
+		// Silently ignore "allow" from project config — not an error, just
+		// a privilege the project scope does not have.
 	}
 	if src.Sandbox.BlockUnixSockets {
 		dst.Sandbox.BlockUnixSockets = true
@@ -242,6 +283,7 @@ func mergeProjectConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) error {
 	if src.Swarm.MaxTeamSize != 0 {
 		dst.Swarm.MaxTeamSize = src.Swarm.MaxTeamSize
 	}
+	mergeKeyBindings(&dst.KeyBindings, src.KeyBindings)
 	// Local control is intentionally user-config/override only. A cloned project
 	// must not be able to make browser, desktop, or terminal automation tools
 	// appear in the model's tool surface.
@@ -370,6 +412,18 @@ func effectiveProviderKind(profile ProviderProfile) ProviderKind {
 	return ""
 }
 
+// catalogDefaultModel returns the default model of a catalog provider ("" when
+// the id is unknown), used to fill a missing profile.Model for the official-API
+// kinds so a hand-written profile without a model resolves instead of bricking
+// every command that resolves config up front (zero config, bare zero setup).
+func catalogDefaultModel(catalogID string) string {
+	descriptor, ok := providercatalog.Get(catalogID)
+	if !ok {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return strings.TrimSpace(descriptor.DefaultModel)
+}
+
 func catalogDescriptorForProfile(profile ProviderProfile) (providercatalog.Descriptor, bool) {
 	catalogID := providercatalog.NormalizeID(profile.CatalogID)
 	if catalogID == "" {
@@ -536,9 +590,17 @@ func applyProviderEnv(cfg *FileConfig, providerKind ProviderKind, env envProfile
 	if profile.Name == "" {
 		profile.Name = string(providerKind)
 	}
+	// A non-official baseURL from the environment signals a proxy/gateway, so promote
+	// the first-party kind to its -compatible transport (which accepts a custom URL).
+	// Env-only by design: a custom baseURL in a project config.json is left as-is and
+	// rejected by Resolve, so an untrusted project can't redirect a first-party key to
+	// another host.
 	if providerKind == ProviderKindOpenAI && baseURL != "" && !isOfficialOpenAIBaseURL(baseURL) {
 		profile.ProviderKind = ProviderKindOpenAICompatible
 	}
+	if providerKind == ProviderKindAnthropic && baseURL != "" && !isOfficialAnthropicBaseURL(baseURL) {
+		profile.ProviderKind = ProviderKindAnthropicCompat
+	}
 	// When the env supplies only credentials (no baseURL) for a provider name that
 	// already exists, don't force the standard transport kind — a same-named
 	// openai-compatible/anthropic-compatible proxy or gateway must keep its kind.
@@ -618,6 +680,7 @@ func applyOverrides(cfg *FileConfig, overrides Overrides) {
 		cfg.Tools.deferThresholdSet = true
 	}
 	mergeLocalControlConfig(&cfg.LocalControl, overrides.LocalControl)
+	mergeKeyBindings(&cfg.KeyBindings, overrides.KeyBindings)
 	for _, provider := range overrides.Providers {
 		mergeProvider(cfg, provider)
 	}
@@ -653,6 +716,24 @@ func mergeLocalControlDriverConfig(dst *LocalControlDriverConfig, src LocalContr
 	}
 }
 
+func mergeKeyBindings(dst *KeyBindingsConfig, src KeyBindingsConfig) {
+	if src.ToggleDetailed != "" {
+		dst.ToggleDetailed = src.ToggleDetailed
+	}
+	if src.ToggleMouse != "" {
+		dst.ToggleMouse = src.ToggleMouse
+	}
+	if src.CycleReasoning != "" {
+		dst.CycleReasoning = src.CycleReasoning
+	}
+	if src.TogglePlan != "" {
+		dst.TogglePlan = src.TogglePlan
+	}
+	if src.ToggleSidebar != "" {
+		dst.ToggleSidebar = src.ToggleSidebar
+	}
+}
+
 func mergeMCPConfig(dst *MCPConfig, src MCPConfig) {
 	if len(src.Servers) == 0 {
 		return
@@ -731,11 +812,16 @@ func unionStrings(base []string, extra []string) []string {
 }
 
 type normalizeOptions struct {
-	defaultOpenAIModel bool
+	// defaultModels fills a missing profile.Model for the official-API provider
+	// kinds (openai from the model registry; anthropic/google from their catalog
+	// descriptors). Off for provider-command configs (command.go), which must
+	// surface exactly what the external command returned rather than inventing
+	// a model behind its back.
+	defaultModels bool
 }
 
 func normalizeProviders(providers []ProviderProfile, activeName string, envMaps ...map[string]string) ([]ProviderProfile, ProviderProfile, error) {
-	return normalizeProvidersWithOptions(providers, activeName, normalizeOptions{defaultOpenAIModel: true}, envMaps...)
+	return normalizeProvidersWithOptions(providers, activeName, normalizeOptions{defaultModels: true}, envMaps...)
 }
 
 func normalizeProvidersWithoutModelDefaults(providers []ProviderProfile, activeName string, envMaps ...map[string]string) ([]ProviderProfile, ProviderProfile, error) {
@@ -750,7 +836,7 @@ func normalizeProvidersWithOptions(providers []ProviderProfile, activeName strin
 	}
 	if len(providers) == 0 {
 		if activeName != "" {
-			return nil, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("active provider %q not found", activeName)
+			return nil, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: active provider %q not found", ErrNoActiveProvider, activeName)
 		}
 		return []ProviderProfile{}, ProviderProfile{}, nil
 	}
@@ -782,10 +868,17 @@ func normalizeProvidersWithOptions(providers []ProviderProfile, activeName strin
 	}
 
 	if !activeFound {
-		return nil, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("active provider %q not found", activeName)
+		// Return the successfully normalized list alongside the error (rather than
+		// nil) so a caller like the interactive TUI can still fall back to an
+		// already-configured, usable provider instead of forcing a full
+		// re-onboarding wizard just because none was marked active.
+		return normalized, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: active provider %q not found", ErrNoActiveProvider, activeName)
 	}
 	if active.Model == "" {
-		return nil, ProviderProfile{}, providerError(active, "provider %s requires model", active.Name)
+		return nil, ProviderProfile{}, &setupFixableError{
+			err:      providerError(active, "provider %s requires model — add \"model\" to its entry in config.json, or re-run: zero setup <catalog-id> --model <model>", active.Name),
+			sentinel: ErrProviderRequiresModel,
+		}
 	}
 
 	return normalized, active, nil
@@ -832,7 +925,7 @@ func normalizeProvider(profile ProviderProfile, env map[string]string, options n
 	case ProviderKindOpenAI:
 		if profile.BaseURL == "" || isOfficialOpenAIBaseURL(profile.BaseURL) {
 			profile.BaseURL = OpenAIBaseURL
-			if options.defaultOpenAIModel && profile.Model == "" {
+			if options.defaultModels && profile.Model == "" {
 				profile.Model = modelregistry.DefaultModelID
 			}
 			return profile, nil
@@ -849,6 +942,9 @@ func normalizeProvider(profile ProviderProfile, env map[string]string, options n
 	case ProviderKindAnthropic:
 		if profile.BaseURL == "" || isOfficialAnthropicBaseURL(profile.BaseURL) {
 			profile.BaseURL = AnthropicBaseURL
+			if options.defaultModels && profile.Model == "" {
+				profile.Model = catalogDefaultModel("anthropic")
+			}
 			return profile, nil
 		}
 		return ProviderProfile{}, providerError(profile, "anthropic provider %s requires official baseURL %s", profile.Name, AnthropicBaseURL)
@@ -863,6 +959,9 @@ func normalizeProvider(profile ProviderProfile, env map[string]string, options n
 	case ProviderKindGoogle:
 		if profile.BaseURL == "" || isOfficialGoogleBaseURL(profile.BaseURL) {
 			profile.BaseURL = GoogleBaseURL
+			if options.defaultModels && profile.Model == "" {
+				profile.Model = catalogDefaultModel("google")
+			}
 			return profile, nil
 		}
 		return ProviderProfile{}, providerError(profile, "google provider %s requires official baseURL %s", profile.Name, GoogleBaseURL)

internal/config/resolver_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package config
 
 import (
+	"errors"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"reflect"
@@ -616,6 +617,35 @@ func TestResolveUsesOpenAIEnvFallback(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestResolveUsesAnthropicEnvBaseURLAsCompatible(t *testing.T) {
+	// ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL pointing at a proxy/gateway must resolve to an
+	// anthropic-compatible provider (mirroring OPENAI_BASE_URL), not the "requires
+	// official baseURL" rejection — issue #479. The env is user-controlled, so a
+	// custom URL there is a deliberate gateway choice, unlike a project config.json.
+	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
+		Env: map[string]string{
+			"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY":  "sk-ant-env",
+			"ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL": "https://gateway.example/anthropic",
+			"ANTHROPIC_MODEL":    "claude-custom",
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if resolved.ActiveProvider != "anthropic" {
+		t.Fatalf("ActiveProvider = %q, want anthropic", resolved.ActiveProvider)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.ProviderKind != ProviderKindAnthropicCompat {
+		t.Fatalf("ProviderKind = %q, want anthropic-compatible", resolved.Provider.ProviderKind)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != "https://gateway.example/anthropic" {
+		t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want gateway URL", resolved.Provider.BaseURL)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.APIKey != "sk-ant-env" || resolved.Provider.Model != "claude-custom" {
+		t.Fatalf("Provider = %#v, want env credentials/model", resolved.Provider)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestResolveUsesOpenAIAPIKeyOnlyWithDefaultModel(t *testing.T) {
 	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
 		Env: map[string]string{
@@ -898,6 +928,9 @@ func TestResolveRejectsActiveProviderWithoutConfiguredProfiles(t *testing.T) {
 	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), `active provider "ghost" not found`) {
 		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want active provider missing message", err.Error())
 	}
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrNoActiveProvider) {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want errors.Is(err, ErrNoActiveProvider)", err)
+	}
 	if resolved.ActiveProvider != "" {
 		t.Fatalf("ActiveProvider = %q, want empty", resolved.ActiveProvider)
 	}
@@ -912,6 +945,25 @@ func TestResolveRejectsActiveProviderWithoutConfiguredProfiles(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestResolveKeepsNormalizedProvidersWhenNoneMarkedActive(t *testing.T) {
+	// Multiple providers configured (e.g. via `zero provider add`) but
+	// activeProvider is blank/stale — a caller like the interactive TUI still
+	// needs the normalized list to fall back to an already-usable provider
+	// instead of forcing a full re-onboarding wizard.
+	path := writeConfig(t, `{"providers":[
+		{"name":"work","provider_kind":"openai","apiKey":"sk-test","model":"gpt-test"},
+		{"name":"other","provider_kind":"openai","apiKey":"sk-other","model":"gpt-test"}
+	]}`)
+
+	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{ProjectConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrNoActiveProvider) {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want errors.Is(err, ErrNoActiveProvider)", err)
+	}
+	if len(resolved.Providers) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("Providers = %#v, want the 2 normalized profiles preserved despite the error", resolved.Providers)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestResolveTrimsProviderProfileAliasesBeforeFallback(t *testing.T) {
 	path := writeConfig(t, `{
 		"activeProvider": "custom",
@@ -1055,6 +1107,130 @@ func TestResolveAppliesProviderCatalogDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestResolveAppliesMiniMaxCNCatalogDefaults(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, `{
+		"activeProvider": "mini-cn",
+		"providers": [{
+			"name": "mini-cn",
+			"catalog_id": "minimaxi-cn"
+		}]
+	}`)
+
+	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
+		ProjectConfigPath: path,
+		Env: map[string]string{
+			"MINIMAXI_API_KEY": "sk-cn-mini",
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if resolved.Provider.CatalogID != "minimaxi-cn" {
+		t.Fatalf("CatalogID = %q, want minimaxi-cn", resolved.Provider.CatalogID)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.ProviderKind != ProviderKindAnthropicCompat {
+		t.Fatalf("ProviderKind = %q, want %q", resolved.Provider.ProviderKind, ProviderKindAnthropicCompat)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != "https://api.minimaxi.com/anthropic" {
+		t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want MiniMax CN default", resolved.Provider.BaseURL)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.Model != "MiniMax-M3" {
+		t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want MiniMax-M3", resolved.Provider.Model)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv != "MINIMAXI_API_KEY" {
+		t.Fatalf("APIKeyEnv = %q, want MINIMAXI_API_KEY", resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.APIKey != "sk-cn-mini" {
+		t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want env-resolved secret", resolved.Provider.APIKey)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveAppliesZaiCNCatalogDefaults(t *testing.T) {
+	// The "zai-cn" catalog entry preserves the legacy open.bigmodel.cn endpoint
+	// for users who still target the China hosting; "zai" itself now points at
+	// api.z.ai (international). The two env-vars are intentionally distinct
+	// (ZHIPU_API_KEY for China, ZAI_API_KEY for international) so an account on
+	// one side cannot be silently used against the other.
+	path := writeConfig(t, `{
+		"activeProvider": "zai-cn",
+		"providers": [{
+			"name": "zai-cn",
+			"catalog_id": "zai-cn"
+		}]
+	}`)
+
+	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
+		ProjectConfigPath: path,
+		Env: map[string]string{
+			"ZHIPU_API_KEY": "sk-zhipu-cn",
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if resolved.Provider.CatalogID != "zai-cn" {
+		t.Fatalf("CatalogID = %q, want zai-cn", resolved.Provider.CatalogID)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.ProviderKind != ProviderKindOpenAICompatible {
+		t.Fatalf("ProviderKind = %q, want %q", resolved.Provider.ProviderKind, ProviderKindOpenAICompatible)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != "https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4" {
+		t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want Z.ai China default", resolved.Provider.BaseURL)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.Model != "glm-4.5" {
+		t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want glm-4.5 (China default)", resolved.Provider.Model)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv != "ZHIPU_API_KEY" {
+		t.Fatalf("APIKeyEnv = %q, want ZHIPU_API_KEY", resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.APIKey != "sk-zhipu-cn" {
+		t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want env-resolved secret", resolved.Provider.APIKey)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveAppliesZaiInternationalCatalogDefaults(t *testing.T) {
+	// "zai" now resolves to the international endpoint; the catalog default
+	// model stays glm-4.5 (live discovery upgrades to glm-5.2 at runtime).
+	path := writeConfig(t, `{
+		"activeProvider": "zai-intl",
+		"providers": [{
+			"name": "zai-intl",
+			"catalog_id": "zai"
+		}]
+	}`)
+
+	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
+		ProjectConfigPath: path,
+		Env: map[string]string{
+			"ZAI_API_KEY": "sk-zai-intl",
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if resolved.Provider.CatalogID != "zai" {
+		t.Fatalf("CatalogID = %q, want zai", resolved.Provider.CatalogID)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.ProviderKind != ProviderKindOpenAICompatible {
+		t.Fatalf("ProviderKind = %q, want %q", resolved.Provider.ProviderKind, ProviderKindOpenAICompatible)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != "https://api.z.ai/api/paas/v4" {
+		t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want Z.ai international default", resolved.Provider.BaseURL)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.Model != "glm-4.5" {
+		t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want glm-4.5 (preserved default; live discovery upgrades to glm-5.2 at runtime)", resolved.Provider.Model)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv != "ZAI_API_KEY" {
+		t.Fatalf("APIKeyEnv = %q, want ZAI_API_KEY", resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.APIKey != "sk-zai-intl" {
+		t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want env-resolved secret", resolved.Provider.APIKey)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestResolveProviderCatalogAliasAndLocalNoAuth(t *testing.T) {
 	path := writeConfig(t, `{
 		"activeProvider": "local",
@@ -1269,6 +1445,45 @@ func TestResolveSandboxBlockUnixSocketsFromFile(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestResolveSandboxNetworkProjectConfigCannotWeaken(t *testing.T) {
+	// 1. Project config tries to set network to "allow" (should be ignored).
+	userPath := writeConfig(t, `{}`)
+	projectPath := writeConfig(t, `{
+		"sandbox": {"network": "allow"}
+	}`)
+
+	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
+		UserConfigPath:    userPath,
+		ProjectConfigPath: projectPath,
+		Env:               map[string]string{},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if resolved.Sandbox.Network == "allow" {
+		t.Fatal("resolved.Sandbox.Network = allow, want empty/deny to prevent project config from weakening sandbox")
+	}
+
+	// 2. User config sets network to "allow", project config sets it to "deny" (tightening is allowed).
+	userPath2 := writeConfig(t, `{
+		"sandbox": {"network": "allow"}
+	}`)
+	projectPath2 := writeConfig(t, `{
+		"sandbox": {"network": "deny"}
+	}`)
+	resolved2, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
+		UserConfigPath:    userPath2,
+		ProjectConfigPath: projectPath2,
+		Env:               map[string]string{},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if resolved2.Sandbox.Network != "deny" {
+		t.Fatalf("resolved.Sandbox.Network = %q, want deny (project config allowed to tighten)", resolved2.Sandbox.Network)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestResolveNotifyValid(t *testing.T) {
 	path := writeConfig(t, `{"notify":{"mode":"both","focusMode":"always"}}`)
 	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
@@ -1551,3 +1766,97 @@ func TestResolveMaxTurnsZeroFallsBackToDefault(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("MaxTurns = %d, want default %d", resolved.MaxTurns, defaultMaxTurns)
 	}
 }
+
+// The reported brick: a hand-written google profile with an apiKey but no
+// model made EVERY resolving command fail ("provider google requires model"),
+// including zero config and bare zero setup — the only commands that could
+// have fixed it. Official-API kinds now fall back to their catalog default
+// model, exactly like the openai kind always has.
+func TestResolveDefaultsGoogleModelFromCatalog(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, `{
+		"activeProvider": "google",
+		"providers": [{"name": "google", "provider_kind": "google", "apiKey": "AIza-x"}]
+	}`)
+	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v, want model defaulted from the google catalog", err)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.Model != "gemini-2.5-pro" {
+		t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want the google catalog default gemini-2.5-pro", resolved.Provider.Model)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != GoogleBaseURL {
+		t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want %q", resolved.Provider.BaseURL, GoogleBaseURL)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveDefaultsAnthropicModelFromCatalog(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, `{
+		"activeProvider": "anthropic",
+		"providers": [{"name": "anthropic", "provider_kind": "anthropic", "apiKey": "sk-ant-x"}]
+	}`)
+	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v, want model defaulted from the anthropic catalog", err)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.Model != "claude-sonnet-4.5" {
+		t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want the anthropic catalog default claude-sonnet-4.5", resolved.Provider.Model)
+	}
+}
+
+// An explicitly configured model must always win over the catalog default.
+func TestResolveKeepsExplicitGoogleModel(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, `{
+		"activeProvider": "google",
+		"providers": [{"name": "google", "provider_kind": "google", "apiKey": "AIza-x", "model": "gemini-2.5-flash"}]
+	}`)
+	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if resolved.Provider.Model != "gemini-2.5-flash" {
+		t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want the explicitly configured gemini-2.5-flash", resolved.Provider.Model)
+	}
+}
+
+// Provider-command configs must NOT get invented models: the without-defaults
+// path surfaces exactly what the external command returned.
+func TestNormalizeWithoutModelDefaultsStillRequiresGoogleModel(t *testing.T) {
+	_, _, err := normalizeProvidersWithoutModelDefaults(
+		[]ProviderProfile{{Name: "google", ProviderKind: ProviderKindGoogle, APIKey: "AIza-x"}},
+		"google", map[string]string{})
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("provider-command path must still require an explicit model")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "requires model") {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want requires-model", err.Error())
+	}
+	// The residual error must tell the user how to fix it.
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "config.json") {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want an actionable config.json hint", err.Error())
+	}
+}
+
+// The residual requires-model failure (custom endpoint, no catalog default)
+// must be tagged setup-fixable WITHOUT changing its message: the interactive
+// TUI matches the sentinel to drop into the wizard, while headless commands
+// print the exact actionable text.
+func TestResolveRequiresModelErrorIsSetupFixable(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, `{
+		"activeProvider": "gw",
+		"providers": [{"name": "gw", "provider_kind": "openai-compatible", "baseURL": "https://gw.example/v1", "apiKey": "sk-x"}]
+	}`)
+	_, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected requires-model error for a custom endpoint without model")
+	}
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrProviderRequiresModel) {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want errors.Is(err, ErrProviderRequiresModel)", err)
+	}
+	// The sentinel must NOT prefix the user-facing message.
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), "provider gw requires model") {
+		t.Fatalf("message = %q, want it to start with the provider error, not the sentinel text", err.Error())
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "sk-x") {
+		t.Fatalf("error leaked API key: %q", err.Error())
+	}
+}

internal/config/types.go

@@ -112,6 +112,25 @@ func (p PreferencesConfig) RecapsEnabled() bool {
 	return p.Recaps == nil || *p.Recaps
 }
 
+// KeyBindingDef defines one key binding string (e.g. "ctrl+o") that the TUI
+// can remap. An empty string means "use the built-in default" for that action.
+type KeyBindingDef string
+
+// KeyBindingsConfig holds the subset of TUI keybindings that users may remap
+// via config.json. Each field defaults to a sensible built-in when empty.
+type KeyBindingsConfig struct {
+	// ToggleDetailed toggles the detailed transcript view (default: ctrl+o).
+	ToggleDetailed KeyBindingDef `json:"toggleDetailed,omitempty"`
+	// ToggleMouse toggles mouse capture release (default: ctrl+e).
+	ToggleMouse KeyBindingDef `json:"toggleMouse,omitempty"`
+	// CycleReasoning cycles through reasoning effort levels (default: ctrl+t).
+	CycleReasoning KeyBindingDef `json:"cycleReasoning,omitempty"`
+	// TogglePlan toggles the plan panel expansion (default: ctrl+p).
+	TogglePlan KeyBindingDef `json:"togglePlan,omitempty"`
+	// ToggleSidebar toggles the right context sidebar (default: ctrl+b).
+	ToggleSidebar KeyBindingDef `json:"toggleSidebar,omitempty"`
+}
+
 // LocalControlConfig controls local browser/desktop/terminal automation helpers.
 // Helpers are discovered lazily by the tool that needs them; no setup command or
 // background probe is required during startup.
@@ -206,6 +225,7 @@ type FileConfig struct {
 	Tools          ToolsConfig        `json:"tools,omitempty"`
 	Swarm          SwarmConfig        `json:"swarm,omitempty"`
 	Preferences    PreferencesConfig  `json:"preferences,omitempty"`
+	KeyBindings    KeyBindingsConfig  `json:"keybindings,omitempty"`
 	LocalControl   LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl,omitempty"`
 }
 
@@ -220,6 +240,7 @@ func (cfg FileConfig) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
 		Tools          ToolsConfig         `json:"tools,omitempty"`
 		Swarm          SwarmConfig         `json:"swarm,omitempty"`
 		Preferences    PreferencesConfig   `json:"preferences,omitempty"`
+		KeyBindings    KeyBindingsConfig   `json:"keybindings,omitempty"`
 		LocalControl   *LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl,omitempty"`
 	}
 	raw := rawConfig{
@@ -232,6 +253,7 @@ func (cfg FileConfig) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
 		Tools:          cfg.Tools,
 		Swarm:          cfg.Swarm,
 		Preferences:    cfg.Preferences,
+		KeyBindings:    cfg.KeyBindings,
 	}
 	if !cfg.LocalControl.Empty() {
 		raw.LocalControl = &cfg.LocalControl
@@ -256,6 +278,7 @@ type Overrides struct {
 	Sandbox        SandboxConfig
 	Notify         NotifyConfig
 	Tools          ToolsConfig
+	KeyBindings    KeyBindingsConfig
 	LocalControl   LocalControlConfig
 }
 
@@ -270,6 +293,7 @@ type ResolvedConfig struct {
 	Tools          ToolsConfig
 	Swarm          SwarmConfig
 	Preferences    PreferencesConfig
+	KeyBindings    KeyBindingsConfig
 	LocalControl   LocalControlConfig
 }
 
@@ -316,6 +340,7 @@ func (cfg *FileConfig) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
 		Tools           ToolsConfig                `json:"tools"`
 		Swarm           SwarmConfig                `json:"swarm"`
 		Preferences     PreferencesConfig          `json:"preferences"`
+		KeyBindings     KeyBindingsConfig          `json:"keybindings"`
 		LocalControl    LocalControlConfig         `json:"localControl"`
 		MCPServers      map[string]MCPServerConfig `json:"mcpServers"`
 		MCPServersSnake map[string]MCPServerConfig `json:"mcp_servers"`
@@ -342,6 +367,7 @@ func (cfg *FileConfig) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
 	cfg.Tools = raw.Tools
 	cfg.Swarm = raw.Swarm
 	cfg.Preferences = raw.Preferences
+	cfg.KeyBindings = raw.KeyBindings
 	cfg.LocalControl = raw.LocalControl
 	if cfg.MCP.Servers == nil && (len(raw.MCPServers) > 0 || len(raw.MCPServersSnake) > 0) {
 		cfg.MCP.Servers = map[string]MCPServerConfig{}

internal/config/validate_test.go

@@ -66,10 +66,13 @@ func TestValidateFileRedactsSecretInIssue(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestValidateFileMissingModelWarns(t *testing.T) {
+	// An openai-compatible CUSTOM endpoint has no catalog default to fall back
+	// on, so a missing model is still a real issue — and the message must tell
+	// the user how to fix it.
 	path := writeValidateFixture(t, `{
 		"activeProvider": "main",
 		"providers": [
-			{"name": "main", "provider_kind": "anthropic"}
+			{"name": "main", "provider_kind": "openai-compatible", "baseURL": "https://gateway.example/v1"}
 		]
 	}`)
 
@@ -80,6 +83,30 @@ func TestValidateFileMissingModelWarns(t *testing.T) {
 	if !strings.Contains(issues[0].Message, "requires model") {
 		t.Fatalf("expected requires-model issue, got %#v", issues)
 	}
+	if !strings.Contains(issues[0].Message, "config.json") {
+		t.Fatalf("requires-model issue should carry an actionable hint, got %#v", issues)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestValidateFileDefaultsOfficialKindModels(t *testing.T) {
+	// Official-API kinds (anthropic/google) fall back to their catalog default
+	// model, so a hand-written model-less profile validates clean instead of
+	// bricking zero config / bare zero setup — the only commands that could
+	// have fixed it (the reported google case).
+	path := writeValidateFixture(t, `{
+		"activeProvider": "google",
+		"providers": [
+			{"name": "google", "provider_kind": "google", "apiKey": "AIza-x"},
+			{"name": "anthropic", "provider_kind": "anthropic", "apiKey": "sk-ant-x"}
+		]
+	}`)
+
+	_, issues := ValidateFile(path)
+	for _, issue := range issues {
+		if strings.Contains(issue.Message, "requires model") {
+			t.Fatalf("official-kind profiles must default their model, got issue %#v", issue)
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 func TestValidateFileValidConfigHasNoIssues(t *testing.T) {

internal/doctor/hardening.go

@@ -131,29 +131,45 @@ func doctorSandboxPolicy(cfg config.SandboxConfig) sandbox.Policy {
 // lspServersCheck reports which language servers ZERO would use are present on
 // PATH. Missing servers are not a failure — ZERO degrades to text-only edits for
 // those languages — so the worst status is WARN, and each missing server gets an
-// actionable install command keyed by its binary name.
+// actionable install command keyed by its binary name. Only the tier-1 servers
+// (lsp.CoreServerBinaries) drive the status: the long-tail servers configured
+// for breadth are listed informationally under missingOptional, because warning
+// about a missing zls on a machine with no Zig code would be permanent noise.
 func lspServersCheck(lookup func(string) (string, error)) Check {
 	if lookup == nil {
 		lookup = exec.LookPath
 	}
+	core := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, binary := range lsp.CoreServerBinaries() {
+		core[binary] = true
+	}
 	present := map[string]any{}
 	missing := map[string]any{}
+	missingOptional := map[string]any{}
 	for _, binary := range lsp.ServerBinaries() {
 		if _, err := lookup(binary); err == nil {
 			present[binary] = "on PATH"
 			continue
 		}
-		missing[binary] = lspRemedy(binary)
+		if core[binary] {
+			missing[binary] = lspRemedy(binary)
+		} else {
+			missingOptional[binary] = lspRemedy(binary)
+		}
+	}
+	details := map[string]any{"present": present}
+	if len(missingOptional) > 0 {
+		details["missingOptional"] = missingOptional
 	}
 	if len(missing) == 0 {
-		return check("lsp.servers", "LSP servers", StatusPass, "All known language servers are available on PATH.", map[string]any{
-			"present": present,
-		})
+		message := "All core language servers are available on PATH."
+		if len(missingOptional) > 0 {
+			message = fmt.Sprintf("All core language servers are available on PATH (%d optional server(s) not installed).", len(missingOptional))
+		}
+		return check("lsp.servers", "LSP servers", StatusPass, message, details)
 	}
-	return check("lsp.servers", "LSP servers", StatusWarn, fmt.Sprintf("%d language server(s) missing from PATH; affected files degrade to text-only edits.", len(missing)), map[string]any{
-		"present": present,
-		"missing": missing,
-	})
+	details["missing"] = missing
+	return check("lsp.servers", "LSP servers", StatusWarn, fmt.Sprintf("%d language server(s) missing from PATH; affected files degrade to text-only edits.", len(missing)), details)
 }
 
 // lspRemedy returns an actionable install command for a missing language-server

internal/lsp/registry.go

@@ -9,26 +9,134 @@ import (
 
 // serverCommands maps a file extension to the language-server command (argv) ZERO
 // will spawn. The first element is the binary looked up on PATH; missing binaries
-// are not an error, the agent just degrades to text-only for that file.
+// are not an error, the agent just degrades to text-only for that file. Every
+// command is the language's community-standard server invoked in stdio mode, so
+// a wrong guess can never spawn something surprising — only fail the PATH check.
 var serverCommands = map[string][]string{
-	".go":  {"gopls", "serve"},
-	".ts":  {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
-	".tsx": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
-	".js":  {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
-	".jsx": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
-	".py":  {"pyright-langserver", "--stdio"},
-	".rs":  {"rust-analyzer"},
+	".go":     {"gopls", "serve"},
+	".ts":     {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".tsx":    {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".mts":    {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".cts":    {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".js":     {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".jsx":    {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".mjs":    {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".cjs":    {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".py":     {"pyright-langserver", "--stdio"},
+	".pyi":    {"pyright-langserver", "--stdio"},
+	".rs":     {"rust-analyzer"},
+	".c":      {"clangd"},
+	".h":      {"clangd"},
+	".cpp":    {"clangd"},
+	".cc":     {"clangd"},
+	".cxx":    {"clangd"},
+	".hpp":    {"clangd"},
+	".java":   {"jdtls"},
+	".kt":     {"kotlin-language-server"},
+	".kts":    {"kotlin-language-server"},
+	".rb":     {"ruby-lsp"},
+	".php":    {"intelephense", "--stdio"},
+	".zig":    {"zls"},
+	".lua":    {"lua-language-server"},
+	".ex":     {"elixir-ls"},
+	".exs":    {"elixir-ls"},
+	".hs":     {"haskell-language-server-wrapper", "--lsp"},
+	".swift":  {"sourcekit-lsp"},
+	".ml":     {"ocamllsp"},
+	".mli":    {"ocamllsp"},
+	".scala":  {"metals"},
+	".clj":    {"clojure-lsp"},
+	".cljs":   {"clojure-lsp"},
+	".cljc":   {"clojure-lsp"},
+	".dart":   {"dart", "language-server"},
+	".gleam":  {"gleam", "lsp"},
+	".nix":    {"nixd"},
+	".tf":     {"terraform-ls", "serve"},
+	".sh":     {"bash-language-server", "start"},
+	".bash":   {"bash-language-server", "start"},
+	".yaml":   {"yaml-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".yml":    {"yaml-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".json":   {"vscode-json-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".css":    {"vscode-css-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".scss":   {"vscode-css-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".less":   {"vscode-css-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".html":   {"vscode-html-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".svelte": {"svelteserver", "--stdio"},
+	".vue":    {"vue-language-server", "--stdio"},
+	".astro":  {"astro-ls", "--stdio"},
 }
 
 // languageIDs maps a file extension to the LSP languageId used in didOpen.
 var languageIDs = map[string]string{
-	".go":  "go",
-	".ts":  "typescript",
-	".tsx": "typescriptreact",
-	".js":  "javascript",
-	".jsx": "javascriptreact",
-	".py":  "python",
-	".rs":  "rust",
+	".go":     "go",
+	".ts":     "typescript",
+	".tsx":    "typescriptreact",
+	".mts":    "typescript",
+	".cts":    "typescript",
+	".js":     "javascript",
+	".jsx":    "javascriptreact",
+	".mjs":    "javascript",
+	".cjs":    "javascript",
+	".py":     "python",
+	".pyi":    "python",
+	".rs":     "rust",
+	".c":      "c",
+	".h":      "c",
+	".cpp":    "cpp",
+	".cc":     "cpp",
+	".cxx":    "cpp",
+	".hpp":    "cpp",
+	".java":   "java",
+	".kt":     "kotlin",
+	".kts":    "kotlin",
+	".rb":     "ruby",
+	".php":    "php",
+	".zig":    "zig",
+	".lua":    "lua",
+	".ex":     "elixir",
+	".exs":    "elixir",
+	".hs":     "haskell",
+	".swift":  "swift",
+	".ml":     "ocaml",
+	".mli":    "ocaml",
+	".scala":  "scala",
+	".clj":    "clojure",
+	".cljs":   "clojure",
+	".cljc":   "clojure",
+	".dart":   "dart",
+	".gleam":  "gleam",
+	".nix":    "nix",
+	".tf":     "terraform",
+	".sh":     "shellscript",
+	".bash":   "shellscript",
+	".yaml":   "yaml",
+	".yml":    "yaml",
+	".json":   "json",
+	".css":    "css",
+	".scss":   "scss",
+	".less":   "less",
+	".html":   "html",
+	".svelte": "svelte",
+	".vue":    "vue",
+	".astro":  "astro",
+}
+
+// coreServerBinaries are the tier-1 servers for the languages agents hit most;
+// `zero doctor` treats their absence as warn-worthy. The long tail of servers
+// configured above for breadth is reported informationally only — warning about
+// a missing zls on a machine with no Zig code would be permanent noise.
+var coreServerBinaries = []string{
+	"gopls",
+	"typescript-language-server",
+	"pyright-langserver",
+	"rust-analyzer",
+}
+
+// CoreServerBinaries returns the tier-1 server binaries (sorted copy).
+func CoreServerBinaries() []string {
+	binaries := append([]string(nil), coreServerBinaries...)
+	sort.Strings(binaries)
+	return binaries
 }
 
 // ServerBinaries returns the unique set of language-server binaries ZERO may

internal/mcp/client_test.go

@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
 package mcp
 
 import (
-	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"os"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
@@ -211,6 +212,85 @@ func TestHTTPClientListsAndCallsTools(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestHTTPClientFollowsSameOriginRedirect(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	testServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
+		if request.URL.Path == "/mcp" {
+			http.Redirect(response, request, "/redirected", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
+			return
+		}
+		if request.Method != http.MethodPost || request.URL.Path != "/redirected" {
+			t.Errorf("request = %s %s, want POST /redirected", request.Method, request.URL.Path)
+			http.Error(response, "bad request", http.StatusNotFound)
+			return
+		}
+		if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "secret" {
+			t.Errorf("X-Api-Key = %q, want secret", got)
+			http.Error(response, "missing auth", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+			return
+		}
+
+		message := readHTTPRPCMessage(t, request)
+		switch message.Method {
+		case "initialize":
+			writeHTTPRPCResponse(t, response, message.ID, map[string]any{"protocolVersion": "2024-11-05"})
+		case "notifications/initialized":
+			response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
+		default:
+			writeHTTPRPCResponse(t, response, message.ID, map[string]any{})
+		}
+	}))
+	defer testServer.Close()
+
+	client, err := Connect(ctx, Server{
+		Name:    "docs",
+		Type:    ServerTypeHTTP,
+		URL:     testServer.URL + "/mcp",
+		Headers: map[string]string{"X-Api-Key": "secret"},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Connect() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := client.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Close() error = %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHTTPClientRejectsCrossOriginRedirectBeforeSendingHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	var targetHits int32
+	target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
+		atomic.AddInt32(&targetHits, 1)
+		if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "" {
+			t.Errorf("redirect target received X-Api-Key = %q", got)
+		}
+		response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}))
+	defer target.Close()
+
+	redirector := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
+		http.Redirect(response, request, target.URL+"/mcp", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
+	}))
+	defer redirector.Close()
+
+	_, err := Connect(ctx, Server{
+		Name:    "docs",
+		Type:    ServerTypeHTTP,
+		URL:     redirector.URL + "/mcp",
+		Headers: map[string]string{"X-Api-Key": "secret"},
+	})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-origin redirect") {
+		t.Fatalf("Connect() error = %v, want cross-origin redirect error", err)
+	}
+	if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&targetHits); got != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("redirect target hits = %d, want 0", got)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestSSEClientListsAndCallsToolsFromRemoteStream(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
 	defer cancel()
@@ -340,6 +420,53 @@ func TestSSEClientListsAndCallsToolsFromRemoteStream(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestSSEClientRejectsCrossOriginEndpointBeforeSendingHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	var targetHits int32
+	target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
+		atomic.AddInt32(&targetHits, 1)
+		if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "" {
+			t.Errorf("SSE endpoint target received X-Api-Key = %q", got)
+		}
+		response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
+	}))
+	defer target.Close()
+
+	stream := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
+		if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "secret" {
+			t.Errorf("X-Api-Key = %q, want secret on configured SSE server", got)
+			http.Error(response, "missing auth", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+			return
+		}
+		if request.Method != http.MethodGet || request.URL.Path != "/sse" {
+			t.Errorf("request = %s %s, want GET /sse", request.Method, request.URL.Path)
+			http.Error(response, "bad request", http.StatusNotFound)
+			return
+		}
+		response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
+		_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(response, "event: endpoint\ndata: %s/messages\n\n", target.URL)
+		if flusher, ok := response.(http.Flusher); ok {
+			flusher.Flush()
+		}
+	}))
+	defer stream.Close()
+
+	_, err := Connect(ctx, Server{
+		Name:    "docs",
+		Type:    ServerTypeSSE,
+		URL:     stream.URL + "/sse",
+		Headers: map[string]string{"X-Api-Key": "secret"},
+	})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "endpoint origin") {
+		t.Fatalf("Connect() error = %v, want cross-origin endpoint error", err)
+	}
+	if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&targetHits); got != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("SSE endpoint target hits = %d, want 0", got)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestHTTPClientReportsNonOKStatus(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
 	defer cancel()
@@ -393,28 +520,43 @@ func TestConnectRejectsUnsupportedTransport(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestClientRequestWaitsForMatchingResponseID(t *testing.T) {
-	var incoming bytes.Buffer
-	incomingWriter := newMessageWriter(&incoming)
-	if err := incomingWriter.write(rpcMessage{Method: "notifications/progress"}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := incomingWriter.write(rpcMessage{
-		ID:    99,
-		Error: &rpcError{Code: -32000, Message: "wrong response"},
-	}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := incomingWriter.write(rpcMessage{
-		ID:     1,
-		Result: mustRaw(map[string]any{"value": "matched"}),
-	}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
+	// Pipes, not a pre-filled bytes.Buffer: the fake server responds only AFTER
+	// reading the outgoing request, matching production ordering. With responses
+	// pre-loaded, the client's reader goroutine could consume the matching
+	// response — and hit EOF — before request() registered its pending id,
+	// flaking as "request() error = EOF" on fast runners.
+	serverReader, clientWriter := io.Pipe() // client → server
+	clientReader, serverWriter := io.Pipe() // server → client
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		_ = clientWriter.Close()
+		_ = serverWriter.Close()
+	})
+
+	serverErr := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		requests := newMessageReader(serverReader)
+		request, err := requests.read()
+		if err != nil {
+			serverErr <- err
+			return
+		}
+		responses := newMessageWriter(serverWriter)
+		for _, message := range []rpcMessage{
+			{Method: "notifications/progress"},
+			{ID: 99, Error: &rpcError{Code: -32000, Message: "wrong response"}},
+			{ID: request.ID, Result: mustRaw(map[string]any{"value": "matched"})},
+		} {
+			if err := responses.write(message); err != nil {
+				serverErr <- err
+				return
+			}
+		}
+		serverErr <- nil
+	}()
 
-	var outgoing bytes.Buffer
 	client := &Client{
-		reader: newMessageReader(&incoming),
-		writer: newMessageWriter(&outgoing),
+		reader: newMessageReader(clientReader),
+		writer: newMessageWriter(clientWriter),
 		nextID: 1,
 	}
 	var result struct {
@@ -426,6 +568,9 @@ func TestClientRequestWaitsForMatchingResponseID(t *testing.T) {
 	if result.Value != "matched" {
 		t.Fatalf("result.Value = %q, want matched response", result.Value)
 	}
+	if err := <-serverErr; err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("fake server error: %v", err)
+	}
 }
 
 type errorCloser struct {

internal/mcp/network_client.go

@@ -733,7 +733,11 @@ func resolveSSEEndpointURL(baseValue string, endpointValue string) (string, erro
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("parse MCP SSE endpoint URL: %w", err)
 	}
-	return baseURL.ResolveReference(endpointURL).String(), nil
+	resolvedURL := baseURL.ResolveReference(endpointURL)
+	if !sameMCPOrigin(baseURL, resolvedURL) {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("MCP SSE endpoint origin %s differs from configured server origin %s", mcpOrigin(resolvedURL), mcpOrigin(baseURL))
+	}
+	return resolvedURL.String(), nil
 }
 
 func rpcResponseKey(id any) string {
@@ -873,10 +877,10 @@ func (source *storeTokenSource) Refresh(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
 
 // oauthHTTPClient returns an HTTP client whose transport attaches OAuth bearer
 // tokens and refreshes them on 401 for OAuth-configured servers. Servers that do
-// not declare OAuth get the default client unchanged.
+// not declare OAuth use the default transport with the same MCP redirect guard.
 func oauthHTTPClient(server Server) (*http.Client, error) {
 	if !strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(server.Auth), ServerAuthOAuth) {
-		return http.DefaultClient, nil
+		return mcpHTTPClient(server, nil), nil
 	}
 	store, err := NewTokenStore(TokenStoreOptions{})
 	if err != nil {
@@ -888,5 +892,5 @@ func oauthHTTPClient(server Server) (*http.Client, error) {
 		httpClient: http.DefaultClient,
 		now:        time.Now,
 	}
-	return &http.Client{Transport: newOAuthRoundTripper(http.DefaultTransport, source, server.Name)}, nil
+	return mcpHTTPClient(server, newOAuthRoundTripper(http.DefaultTransport, source, server.Name)), nil
 }

internal/mcp/network_client_test.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
@@ -149,6 +150,141 @@ func TestOAuthRoundTripperDoesNotRetryAfterSuccessfulNon401(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestOAuthRoundTripperRejectsCrossOriginRedirectBeforeBearerLeak(t *testing.T) {
+	source := &fakeTokenSource{}
+	source.access.Store("access-secret")
+	source.refreshFunc = func() (string, error) { return "access-fresh", nil }
+
+	var targetHits int32
+	target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		atomic.AddInt32(&targetHits, 1)
+		if got := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "" {
+			t.Errorf("redirect target received Authorization = %q", got)
+		}
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}))
+	defer target.Close()
+
+	redirector := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		http.Redirect(w, r, target.URL+"/mcp", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
+	}))
+	defer redirector.Close()
+
+	client := mcpHTTPClient(
+		Server{Name: "oauth-docs", Type: ServerTypeHTTP},
+		newOAuthRoundTripper(http.DefaultTransport, source, "oauth-docs"),
+	)
+	resp, err := client.Get(redirector.URL + "/mcp")
+	if resp != nil {
+		_ = resp.Body.Close()
+	}
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-origin redirect") {
+		t.Fatalf("Get() error = %v, want cross-origin redirect error", err)
+	}
+	if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&targetHits); got != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("redirect target hits = %d, want 0", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSameMCPOriginNormalizesDefaultPorts(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name  string
+		left  string
+		right string
+		want  bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:  "https default port",
+			left:  "https://example.test/mcp",
+			right: "https://EXAMPLE.test:443/other",
+			want:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "http default port",
+			left:  "http://example.test/mcp",
+			right: "http://example.test:80/other",
+			want:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "different scheme",
+			left:  "https://example.test/mcp",
+			right: "http://example.test:443/other",
+			want:  false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "different port",
+			left:  "https://example.test/mcp",
+			right: "https://example.test:8443/other",
+			want:  false,
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			left, err := url.Parse(tc.left)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			right, err := url.Parse(tc.right)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if got := sameMCPOrigin(left, right); got != tc.want {
+				t.Fatalf("sameMCPOrigin(%q, %q) = %v, want %v", tc.left, tc.right, got, tc.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveSSEEndpointURLRestrictsOrigin(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name     string
+		base     string
+		endpoint string
+		want     string
+		wantErr  string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     "relative endpoint",
+			base:     "https://example.test/sse",
+			endpoint: "/messages",
+			want:     "https://example.test/messages",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "absolute same origin",
+			base:     "https://example.test/sse",
+			endpoint: "https://example.test/messages",
+			want:     "https://example.test/messages",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "default port equivalent",
+			base:     "https://example.test/sse",
+			endpoint: "https://example.test:443/messages",
+			want:     "https://example.test:443/messages",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "cross origin",
+			base:     "https://example.test/sse",
+			endpoint: "https://evil.test/messages",
+			wantErr:  "differs from configured server origin",
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got, err := resolveSSEEndpointURL(tc.base, tc.endpoint)
+			if tc.wantErr != "" {
+				if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.wantErr) {
+					t.Fatalf("resolveSSEEndpointURL() error = %v, want %q", err, tc.wantErr)
+				}
+				return
+			}
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("resolveSSEEndpointURL() error = %v", err)
+			}
+			if got != tc.want {
+				t.Fatalf("resolveSSEEndpointURL() = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestNonOAuthServerIsUnaffected(t *testing.T) {
 	// Regression: a server without auth must not get a bearer header or any
 	// OAuth round tripper, and must connect normally.

internal/mcp/network_redirect.go

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+package mcp
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+const maxMCPRedirects = 10
+
+func mcpHTTPClient(server Server, transport http.RoundTripper) *http.Client {
+	return &http.Client{
+		Transport:     transport,
+		CheckRedirect: checkMCPRedirect(server),
+	}
+}
+
+func checkMCPRedirect(server Server) func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
+	return func(request *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
+		if len(via) >= maxMCPRedirects {
+			return fmt.Errorf("MCP %s server %s stopped after %d redirects", server.Type, server.Name, maxMCPRedirects)
+		}
+		if len(via) == 0 {
+			return nil
+		}
+		if !sameMCPOrigin(via[0].URL, request.URL) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("MCP %s server %s refused cross-origin redirect to %s", server.Type, server.Name, mcpOrigin(request.URL))
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+func sameMCPOrigin(left *url.URL, right *url.URL) bool {
+	if left == nil || right == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return strings.EqualFold(left.Scheme, right.Scheme) &&
+		strings.EqualFold(left.Hostname(), right.Hostname()) &&
+		effectiveMCPPort(left) == effectiveMCPPort(right)
+}
+
+func effectiveMCPPort(value *url.URL) string {
+	if value == nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	if port := value.Port(); port != "" {
+		return port
+	}
+	switch strings.ToLower(value.Scheme) {
+	case "http":
+		return "80"
+	case "https":
+		return "443"
+	default:
+		return ""
+	}
+}
+
+func mcpOrigin(value *url.URL) string {
+	if value == nil {
+		return "<nil>"
+	}
+	host := value.Hostname()
+	port := effectiveMCPPort(value)
+	if port != "" {
+		host = net.JoinHostPort(host, port)
+	}
+	if value.Scheme == "" {
+		return host
+	}
+	return strings.ToLower(value.Scheme) + "://" + host
+}

internal/mcp/oauth_test.go

@@ -370,7 +370,14 @@ func TestFullFlowStoresTokens(t *testing.T) {
 		redirect := parsed.Query().Get("redirect_uri")
 		go func() {
 			cbURL := redirect + "?code=auth-code&state=" + url.QueryEscape(state)
-			_, _ = http.Get(cbURL)
+			for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
+				resp, err := http.Get(cbURL)
+				if err == nil {
+					resp.Body.Close()
+					return
+				}
+				time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
+			}
 		}()
 		return nil
 	}

internal/modelregistry/catalog.go

@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ func DefaultModelEntries() []ModelEntry {
 		googleModel("gemini-2.5-flash-lite", "Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite", "gemini-2.5-flash-lite", ModelStatusActive, []string{"google:gemini-2.5-flash-lite", "gemini-flash-lite"}, ContextLimits{ContextWindow: 1_048_576, MaxOutputTokens: 65_536}, ModelCost{InputPerMillion: 0.1, CachedInputPerMillion: 0.01, OutputPerMillion: 0.4}, []ModelCapability{ModelCapabilityVision, ModelCapabilityJSONMode, ModelCapabilityReasoning, ModelCapabilityLongContext}, standardReasoningEfforts(), "Google low-cost Flash model for background routing and summaries."),
 	}
 	decorateModelDepth(entries)
+	// Overlay volatile facts (context limits, base pricing) from a cached
+	// models.dev snapshot when one is present and fresh — see modelsdev.go.
+	// Identity fields (ids, aliases, patterns, deprecations) stay curated.
+	entries = applyModelsDevOverrides(entries, cachedModelsDevProviders())
 	return cloneModelEntries(entries)
 }
 

internal/modelregistry/modelsdev.go

@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+package modelregistry
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Live models.dev overlay for the curated catalog. The hand-maintained
+// DefaultModelEntries list is the source of truth for identity — ids, aliases,
+// match patterns, deprecations, escalation targets — but its VOLATILE facts
+// (context window, max output tokens, per-million pricing) go stale between
+// releases. When a cached snapshot of https://models.dev/api.json is present,
+// those fields are refreshed from it at registry construction; everything else
+// stays curated. The overlay never adds models (an auto-added entry would lack
+// aliases, match patterns, and provider wiring) and never touches the network
+// on the registry hot path — fetching happens only in the explicit background
+// refresh, cached to disk with a TTL.
+
+const (
+	modelsDevDefaultURL = "https://models.dev/api.json"
+	// modelsDevRefreshAfter is how old the cache may get before a background
+	// refresh re-fetches it.
+	modelsDevRefreshAfter = 24 * time.Hour
+	// modelsDevMaxAge is the oldest cache still applied as an overlay. Beyond
+	// this the curated catalog (updated with the binary) is likely fresher than
+	// the snapshot, so a stale file is ignored rather than trusted.
+	modelsDevMaxAge      = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
+	modelsDevFetchLimit  = 32 << 20 // 32MiB guard on the response body
+	modelsDevFetchWindow = 15 * time.Second
+)
+
+// modelsDevModel is the subset of a models.dev model record the overlay uses.
+type modelsDevModel struct {
+	Limit struct {
+		Context int `json:"context"`
+		Output  int `json:"output"`
+	} `json:"limit"`
+	Cost struct {
+		Input      float64 `json:"input"`
+		Output     float64 `json:"output"`
+		CacheRead  float64 `json:"cache_read"`
+		CacheWrite float64 `json:"cache_write"`
+	} `json:"cost"`
+}
+
+// modelsDevProvider matches one provider object in api.json.
+type modelsDevProvider struct {
+	Models map[string]modelsDevModel `json:"models"`
+}
+
+// parseModelsDev decodes an api.json document into provider-slug -> api-model
+// -> record. api.json is a top-level object keyed by provider id.
+func parseModelsDev(data []byte) (map[string]map[string]modelsDevModel, error) {
+	var doc map[string]modelsDevProvider
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &doc); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("modelregistry: parse models.dev: %w", err)
+	}
+	providers := make(map[string]map[string]modelsDevModel, len(doc))
+	for slug, provider := range doc {
+		if len(provider.Models) == 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		providers[slug] = provider.Models
+	}
+	if len(providers) == 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("modelregistry: models.dev document has no providers")
+	}
+	return providers, nil
+}
+
+// modelsDevSlugs maps an entry's provider kind to the models.dev provider ids
+// worth checking. Only first-party slugs are used: router entries on models.dev
+// carry generic or stale numbers.
+func modelsDevSlugs(kind ProviderKind) []string {
+	switch kind {
+	case ProviderAnthropic:
+		return []string{"anthropic"}
+	case ProviderOpenAI:
+		return []string{"openai"}
+	case ProviderGoogle:
+		return []string{"google", "google-vertex"}
+	default:
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+// applyModelsDevOverrides refreshes each curated entry's context limits and
+// base pricing from the snapshot, when the snapshot knows the model. Tiered
+// pricing is never touched: models.dev has no tier data, and mixing a live
+// base rate with curated tiers would misprice the tier boundaries.
+func applyModelsDevOverrides(entries []ModelEntry, providers map[string]map[string]modelsDevModel) []ModelEntry {
+	if len(providers) == 0 {
+		return entries
+	}
+	for i := range entries {
+		entry := &entries[i]
+		var record modelsDevModel
+		found := false
+		for _, slug := range modelsDevSlugs(entry.Provider) {
+			if models, ok := providers[slug]; ok {
+				if candidate, ok := models[strings.TrimSpace(entry.APIModel)]; ok {
+					record = candidate
+					found = true
+					break
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if !found {
+			continue
+		}
+		if record.Limit.Context > 0 {
+			entry.ContextLimits.ContextWindow = record.Limit.Context
+		}
+		if record.Limit.Output > 0 {
+			entry.ContextLimits.MaxOutputTokens = record.Limit.Output
+		}
+		if len(entry.Cost.Tiers) == 0 && record.Cost.Input > 0 && record.Cost.Output > 0 {
+			entry.Cost.InputPerMillion = record.Cost.Input
+			entry.Cost.OutputPerMillion = record.Cost.Output
+			if record.Cost.CacheRead > 0 {
+				entry.Cost.CachedInputPerMillion = record.Cost.CacheRead
+			}
+			if record.Cost.CacheWrite > 0 {
+				entry.Cost.CacheWritePerMillion = record.Cost.CacheWrite
+			}
+			entry.Cost.Source = "models.dev/api.json (cached)"
+		}
+	}
+	return entries
+}
+
+// modelsDevCachePath returns the on-disk cache location. ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH
+// overrides it (used by tests and unusual setups).
+func modelsDevCachePath() (string, error) {
+	if override := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH")); override != "" {
+		return override, nil
+	}
+	base, err := os.UserCacheDir()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return filepath.Join(base, "zero", "modelsdev.json"), nil
+}
+
+var (
+	modelsDevOnce    sync.Once
+	modelsDevCached  map[string]map[string]modelsDevModel
+	modelsDevEnabled atomic.Bool
+)
+
+// EnableModelsDevOverlay opts the process into applying the cached models.dev
+// snapshot on top of the curated catalog. The CLI entrypoint calls it; library
+// consumers and tests that never do get the curated catalog byte-identical to
+// before, so hermetic tests can't be perturbed by a cache file on the machine.
+// ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH disables both the overlay and the fetch.
+func EnableModelsDevOverlay() {
+	modelsDevEnabled.Store(true)
+}
+
+// cachedModelsDevProviders loads the cached snapshot once per process. Not
+// enabled, missing, stale (> modelsDevMaxAge), or malformed all yield nil and
+// the curated catalog is used untouched. Read once deliberately:
+// DefaultRegistry is called on hot paths (pickers, cost views) and must not
+// re-stat the file every time; a background refresh benefits the NEXT process.
+func cachedModelsDevProviders() map[string]map[string]modelsDevModel {
+	if !modelsDevEnabled.Load() || strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH")) != "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	modelsDevOnce.Do(func() {
+		path, err := modelsDevCachePath()
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		info, err := os.Stat(path)
+		if err != nil || time.Since(info.ModTime()) > modelsDevMaxAge {
+			return
+		}
+		data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		providers, err := parseModelsDev(data)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		modelsDevCached = providers
+	})
+	return modelsDevCached
+}
+
+// resetModelsDevCacheForTest clears the process-level cache memoization and
+// disables the overlay.
+func resetModelsDevCacheForTest() {
+	modelsDevOnce = sync.Once{}
+	modelsDevCached = nil
+	modelsDevEnabled.Store(false)
+}
+
+// RefreshModelsDevCache fetches models.dev/api.json into the on-disk cache
+// when the cache is missing or older than modelsDevRefreshAfter. It is safe to
+// call fire-and-forget from startup (use a goroutine); it never affects the
+// current process's registry (see cachedModelsDevProviders). Disabled entirely
+// by ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH. The URL can be overridden with ZERO_MODELS_URL.
+func RefreshModelsDevCache(ctx context.Context) error {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH")) != "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	path, err := modelsDevCachePath()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if info, err := os.Stat(path); err == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) < modelsDevRefreshAfter {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	url := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ZERO_MODELS_URL"))
+	if url == "" {
+		url = modelsDevDefaultURL
+	}
+	fetchCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, modelsDevFetchWindow)
+	defer cancel()
+	request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(fetchCtx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	request.Header.Set("User-Agent", "zero-models-refresh/0.1")
+	response, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(request)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer response.Body.Close()
+	if response.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		return fmt.Errorf("modelregistry: models.dev fetch: HTTP %d", response.StatusCode)
+	}
+	data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(response.Body, modelsDevFetchLimit))
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	// Validate before persisting: a bad body must never clobber a good cache.
+	if _, err := parseModelsDev(data); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o755); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	temp, err := os.CreateTemp(filepath.Dir(path), "modelsdev-*.json")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if _, err := temp.Write(data); err != nil {
+		_ = temp.Close()
+		_ = os.Remove(temp.Name())
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := temp.Close(); err != nil {
+		_ = os.Remove(temp.Name())
+		return err
+	}
+	return os.Rename(temp.Name(), path)
+}

internal/modelregistry/modelsdev_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+package modelregistry
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const sampleModelsDev = `{
+  "anthropic": {
+    "id": "anthropic",
+    "models": {
+      "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929": {
+        "limit": {"context": 1000000, "output": 64000},
+        "cost": {"input": 3.5, "output": 17.5, "cache_read": 0.35, "cache_write": 4.4}
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "google": {
+    "id": "google",
+    "models": {
+      "gemini-2.5-pro": {
+        "limit": {"context": 2097152, "output": 65536},
+        "cost": {"input": 9.99, "output": 9.99}
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}`
+
+func TestParseModelsDev(t *testing.T) {
+	providers, err := parseModelsDev([]byte(sampleModelsDev))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	record, ok := providers["anthropic"]["claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929"]
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected anthropic sonnet record")
+	}
+	if record.Limit.Context != 1_000_000 || record.Cost.Input != 3.5 {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected record: %+v", record)
+	}
+	if _, err := parseModelsDev([]byte(`{}`)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("empty document must be rejected")
+	}
+	if _, err := parseModelsDev([]byte(`not json`)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("malformed document must be rejected")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestApplyModelsDevOverrides(t *testing.T) {
+	// Point the cache at a non-existent file so DefaultModelEntries returns the
+	// pure curated catalog, then apply the sample snapshot explicitly.
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent.json"))
+	resetModelsDevCacheForTest()
+	t.Cleanup(resetModelsDevCacheForTest)
+
+	providers, err := parseModelsDev([]byte(sampleModelsDev))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	entries := applyModelsDevOverrides(DefaultModelEntries(), providers)
+
+	var sonnet, geminiPro, opus ModelEntry
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		switch entry.ID {
+		case "claude-sonnet-4.5":
+			sonnet = entry
+		case "gemini-2.5-pro":
+			geminiPro = entry
+		case "claude-opus-4.1":
+			opus = entry
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Known model: limits and base pricing refreshed from the snapshot.
+	if sonnet.ContextLimits.ContextWindow != 1_000_000 || sonnet.ContextLimits.MaxOutputTokens != 64_000 {
+		t.Fatalf("sonnet limits not overridden: %+v", sonnet.ContextLimits)
+	}
+	if sonnet.Cost.InputPerMillion != 3.5 || sonnet.Cost.OutputPerMillion != 17.5 || sonnet.Cost.CacheWritePerMillion != 4.4 {
+		t.Fatalf("sonnet cost not overridden: %+v", sonnet.Cost)
+	}
+	if sonnet.Cost.Source != "models.dev/api.json (cached)" {
+		t.Fatalf("sonnet cost source not marked: %q", sonnet.Cost.Source)
+	}
+
+	// Tiered pricing is curated: limits refresh, cost must NOT (gemini-2.5-pro
+	// has curated tiers and the snapshot's flat 9.99 would misprice them).
+	if geminiPro.ContextLimits.ContextWindow != 2_097_152 {
+		t.Fatalf("gemini limits not overridden: %+v", geminiPro.ContextLimits)
+	}
+	if geminiPro.Cost.InputPerMillion == 9.99 || len(geminiPro.Cost.Tiers) == 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("tiered cost must stay curated: %+v", geminiPro.Cost)
+	}
+
+	// Model absent from the snapshot: untouched.
+	if opus.ContextLimits.ContextWindow != 200_000 || opus.Cost.InputPerMillion != 15 {
+		t.Fatalf("opus must be untouched: %+v %+v", opus.ContextLimits, opus.Cost)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRefreshModelsDevCacheFetchesAndCaches(t *testing.T) {
+	hits := 0
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		hits++
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(sampleModelsDev))
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	cachePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "modelsdev.json")
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", cachePath)
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_URL", server.URL)
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH", "")
+
+	if err := RefreshModelsDevCache(t.Context()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if hits != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 1 fetch, got %d", hits)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(cachePath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("cache file missing: %v", err)
+	}
+	// Fresh cache: second call must not re-fetch.
+	if err := RefreshModelsDevCache(t.Context()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if hits != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("fresh cache must skip the fetch, got %d hits", hits)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRefreshModelsDevCacheRejectsBadBodyWithoutClobbering(t *testing.T) {
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte("not json"))
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	cachePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "modelsdev.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(cachePath, []byte(sampleModelsDev), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	stale := time.Now().Add(-48 * time.Hour)
+	if err := os.Chtimes(cachePath, stale, stale); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", cachePath)
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_URL", server.URL)
+
+	if err := RefreshModelsDevCache(t.Context()); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("bad body must return an error")
+	}
+	content, err := os.ReadFile(cachePath)
+	if err != nil || string(content) != sampleModelsDev {
+		t.Fatal("bad fetch must not clobber the existing cache")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRefreshModelsDevCacheDisabledByEnv(t *testing.T) {
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		t.Fatal("fetch must not happen when disabled")
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "modelsdev.json"))
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_URL", server.URL)
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH", "1")
+	if err := RefreshModelsDevCache(t.Context()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCachedModelsDevProvidersIgnoresStaleCache(t *testing.T) {
+	cachePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "modelsdev.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(cachePath, []byte(sampleModelsDev), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	stale := time.Now().Add(-modelsDevMaxAge - time.Hour)
+	if err := os.Chtimes(cachePath, stale, stale); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", cachePath)
+	resetModelsDevCacheForTest()
+	t.Cleanup(resetModelsDevCacheForTest)
+	EnableModelsDevOverlay()
+
+	if providers := cachedModelsDevProviders(); providers != nil {
+		t.Fatal("stale cache must be ignored")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCachedModelsDevProvidersRequiresOptIn(t *testing.T) {
+	cachePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "modelsdev.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(cachePath, []byte(sampleModelsDev), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", cachePath)
+	resetModelsDevCacheForTest()
+	t.Cleanup(resetModelsDevCacheForTest)
+
+	// Without EnableModelsDevOverlay a fresh, valid cache must still be ignored:
+	// library consumers and hermetic tests get the pure curated catalog.
+	if providers := cachedModelsDevProviders(); providers != nil {
+		t.Fatal("overlay must be opt-in")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDefaultModelEntriesAppliesFreshCache(t *testing.T) {
+	cachePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "modelsdev.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(cachePath, []byte(sampleModelsDev), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", cachePath)
+	resetModelsDevCacheForTest()
+	t.Cleanup(resetModelsDevCacheForTest)
+	EnableModelsDevOverlay()
+
+	for _, entry := range DefaultModelEntries() {
+		if entry.ID == "claude-sonnet-4.5" {
+			if entry.ContextLimits.ContextWindow != 1_000_000 {
+				t.Fatalf("fresh cache must overlay the registry: %+v", entry.ContextLimits)
+			}
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	t.Fatal("claude-sonnet-4.5 not found")
+}

internal/oauth/encrypt.go

@@ -114,7 +114,12 @@ func createSecretFile(path string) ([]byte, error) {
 			}
 			return writeNewSecretFile(path)
 		}
-		if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
+		// On Windows a concurrent holder's os.Remove leaves the lock file in a
+		// "delete pending" state, so an O_EXCL create races it with
+		// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (os.ErrPermission) rather than ErrExist. Treat that
+		// as contention and retry too — mirroring acquireFileLock in lock.go —
+		// otherwise concurrent secret creation spuriously fails on Windows.
+		if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrPermission) {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: create token secret lock: %w", err)
 		}
 		if data, rerr := readSecretFileRetry(path); rerr == nil {

internal/oauth/store.go

@@ -41,6 +41,26 @@ func ValidateKey(key string) error {
 // ProviderKey builds the store key for a provider login.
 func ProviderKey(name string) string { return KeyPrefixProvider + name }
 
+// FirstStored returns the token and its ProviderKey for the FIRST candidate name
+// that has a token in the store, with ok=false when none do. Callers pass
+// ProviderProfile.OAuthLoginCandidates() so that everything derived from a login
+// — the bearer token AND any header claim like chatgpt-account-id — comes from
+// the SAME login; selecting independently per consumer could otherwise pair a
+// bearer from one login with an account header from another. A load error on a
+// candidate is treated as a miss (skip to the next), never a hard failure.
+func FirstStored(store *Store, candidates []string) (Token, string, bool) {
+	if store == nil {
+		return Token{}, "", false
+	}
+	for _, name := range candidates {
+		key := ProviderKey(name)
+		if token, ok, err := store.Load(key); err == nil && ok {
+			return token, key, true
+		}
+	}
+	return Token{}, "", false
+}
+
 // Status is a redaction-safe summary of a stored token (no secret material).
 type Status struct {
 	Key             string    `json:"key"`

internal/providercatalog/catalog.go

@@ -123,8 +123,10 @@ var descriptors = []Descriptor{
 	openAICompat("together", "Together AI", "https://api.together.xyz/v1", "meta-llama/Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct-Turbo", []string{"TOGETHER_API_KEY"}),
 	openAICompat("dashscope", "DashScope", "https://dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com/compatible-mode/v1", "qwen-plus", []string{"DASHSCOPE_API_KEY", "QWEN_API_KEY"}, "qwen"),
 	openAICompat("moonshot", "Moonshot AI", "https://api.moonshot.ai/v1", "kimi-k2-0905-preview", []string{"MOONSHOT_API_KEY"}, "kimi"),
+	openAICompat("longcat", "LongCat", "https://api.longcat.chat/openai", "LongCat-2.0", []string{"LONGCAT_API_KEY"}, "meituan longcat", "meituan", "longcat-2.0"),
 	openAICompat("nvidia-nim", "NVIDIA NIM", "https://integrate.api.nvidia.com/v1", "nvidia/llama-3.1-nemotron-70b-instruct", []string{"NVIDIA_API_KEY"}, "nvidia nim"),
 	anthropicCompat("minimax", "MiniMax", "https://api.minimax.io/anthropic", "MiniMax-M3", []string{"MINIMAX_API_KEY"}, "mini-max", "mini_max"),
+	anthropicCompat("minimaxi-cn", "MiniMax CN", "https://api.minimaxi.com/anthropic", "MiniMax-M3", []string{"MINIMAXI_API_KEY"}, "minimax cn", "minimax-cn"),
 	openAICompat("mistral", "Mistral", "https://api.mistral.ai/v1", "mistral-large-latest", []string{"MISTRAL_API_KEY"}),
 	openAICompat("github", "GitHub Models", "https://models.inference.ai.azure.com", "openai/gpt-4.1", []string{"GITHUB_TOKEN"}, "github-models"),
 	transportDescriptor("bedrock", "Amazon Bedrock", TransportBedrock, "https://bedrock-runtime.${AWS_REGION}.amazonaws.com", "anthropic.claude-3-5-sonnet-20241022-v2:0", []string{"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "AWS_PROFILE"}, []APIFormat{APIFormatBedrockConverse}, true),
@@ -133,7 +135,11 @@ var descriptors = []Descriptor{
 	openAICompat("venice", "Venice AI", "https://api.venice.ai/api/v1", "qwen-2.5-qwq-32b", []string{"VENICE_API_KEY"}),
 	openAICompat("xiaomi-mimo", "Xiaomi MiMo", "https://api.mimo.xiaomi.com/openai/v1", "mimo-vl", []string{"MIMO_API_KEY", "XIAOMI_API_KEY"}, "xiaomi mimo"),
 	openAICompat("bankr", "Bankr", "https://api.bankr.bot/v1", "bankr-large", []string{"BANKR_API_KEY"}),
-	openAICompat("zai", "Z.ai", "https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4", "glm-4.5", []string{"ZAI_API_KEY", "ZHIPU_API_KEY"}),
+	openAICompat("zai", "Z.ai", "https://api.z.ai/api/paas/v4", "glm-4.5", []string{"ZAI_API_KEY"}, "z.ai"),
+	openAICompat("zai-cn", "Z.ai CN", "https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4", "glm-4.5", []string{"ZHIPU_API_KEY"}, "z.ai cn"),
+	openAICompat("kilocode", "KiloCode", "https://api.kilo.ai/api/gateway", "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.6", []string{"KILO_API_KEY"}, "kilo", "kilo gateway"),
+	openAICompat("opencode", "OpenCode Zen", "https://opencode.ai/zen/v1", "deepseek-v4-flash", []string{"OPENCODE_API_KEY"}, "opencode zen"),
+	openAICompat("opencode-go", "OpenCode Go", "https://opencode.ai/zen/go/v1", "deepseek-v4-pro", []string{"OPENCODE_API_KEY"}, "opencode go"),
 	openAICompat("atomic-chat", "Atomic Chat", "https://api.atomic.chat/v1", "gpt-4.1", []string{"ATOMIC_CHAT_API_KEY"}),
 	// ChatGPT subscription via a local OAuth proxy. A ChatGPT (Plus/Pro) OAuth
 	// token only works against ChatGPT's own backend (which is Cloudflare-gated to

internal/providercatalog/catalog_test.go

@@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ var expectedCatalogIDs = []string{
 	"together",
 	"dashscope",
 	"moonshot",
+	"longcat",
 	"nvidia-nim",
 	"minimax",
+	"minimaxi-cn",
 	"mistral",
 	"github",
 	"bedrock",
@@ -34,6 +36,10 @@ var expectedCatalogIDs = []string{
 	"xiaomi-mimo",
 	"bankr",
 	"zai",
+	"zai-cn",
+	"kilocode",
+	"opencode",
+	"opencode-go",
 	"atomic-chat",
 	"chatgpt-proxy",
 	"custom-openai-compatible",
@@ -96,6 +102,28 @@ func TestRecommendedProviderEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestLongCatDescriptor(t *testing.T) {
+	descriptor, err := Require("longcat")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Require(longcat) error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if descriptor.Name != "LongCat" {
+		t.Fatalf("Name = %q, want LongCat", descriptor.Name)
+	}
+	if descriptor.DefaultBaseURL != "https://api.longcat.chat/openai" {
+		t.Fatalf("DefaultBaseURL = %q, want LongCat OpenAI-compatible endpoint", descriptor.DefaultBaseURL)
+	}
+	if descriptor.DefaultModel != "LongCat-2.0" {
+		t.Fatalf("DefaultModel = %q, want LongCat-2.0", descriptor.DefaultModel)
+	}
+	if descriptor.Transport != TransportOpenAICompatible {
+		t.Fatalf("Transport = %q, want %q", descriptor.Transport, TransportOpenAICompatible)
+	}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(descriptor.AuthEnvVars, []string{"LONGCAT_API_KEY"}) {
+		t.Fatalf("AuthEnvVars = %#v, want LONGCAT_API_KEY", descriptor.AuthEnvVars)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestCatalogDescriptorsExposeRequiredDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, descriptor := range All() {
 		if descriptor.ID == "" {
@@ -263,8 +291,8 @@ func TestListByTransportPreservesCatalogOrder(t *testing.T) {
 		TransportGoogle:          {"google"},
 		TransportBedrock:         {"bedrock"},
 		TransportVertex:          {"vertex"},
-		TransportAnthropicCompat: {"minimax", "custom-anthropic-compatible"},
-		TransportOpenAICompat:    {"gitlawb-opengateway", "ollama-cloud", "ollama", "lmstudio", "openrouter", "huggingface", "chatgpt", "groq", "deepseek", "together", "dashscope", "moonshot", "nvidia-nim", "mistral", "github", "xai", "venice", "xiaomi-mimo", "bankr", "zai", "atomic-chat", "chatgpt-proxy", "custom-openai-compatible"},
+		TransportAnthropicCompat: {"minimax", "minimaxi-cn", "custom-anthropic-compatible"},
+		TransportOpenAICompat:    {"gitlawb-opengateway", "ollama-cloud", "ollama", "lmstudio", "openrouter", "huggingface", "chatgpt", "groq", "deepseek", "together", "dashscope", "moonshot", "longcat", "nvidia-nim", "mistral", "github", "xai", "venice", "xiaomi-mimo", "bankr", "zai", "zai-cn", "kilocode", "opencode", "opencode-go", "atomic-chat", "chatgpt-proxy", "custom-openai-compatible"},
 	}
 
 	for transport, wantIDs := range cases {

internal/providerhealth/connectivity_client_test.go

@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ func TestValidateEndpointAllowsLoopbackOnlyForLocalProvider(t *testing.T) {
 		if err := validateEndpoint(ctx, ep, r, true); err != nil {
 			t.Errorf("local provider endpoint %q should be allowed with allowLoopback=true, got %v", ep, err)
 		}
-		if !endpointIsLoopback(ep) {
-			t.Errorf("endpointIsLoopback(%q) = false, want true", ep)
+		if !endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(ep) {
+			t.Errorf("endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(%q) = false, want true", ep)
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -179,14 +179,27 @@ func TestValidateEndpointAllowsLoopbackOnlyForLocalProvider(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Error("loopback must remain blocked when allowLoopback=false (redirects / non-local)")
 	}
 
-	// allowLoopback relaxes loopback ONLY — other special ranges (cloud metadata,
-	// link-local, private) stay blocked even for a local provider config.
-	for _, ep := range []string{"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data", "http://10.0.0.5:8080/v1"} {
+	// allowLoopbackOrPrivate relaxes loopback AND private-network ranges — but
+	// link-local and other special ranges (cloud metadata, documentation) stay
+	// blocked even for a local provider config.
+	for _, ep := range []string{"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data", "http://192.0.2.1:8080/v1"} {
 		if err := validateEndpoint(ctx, ep, staticResolver{addr: netip.MustParseAddr("169.254.169.254")}, true); err == nil {
-			t.Errorf("non-loopback special address %q must stay blocked even with allowLoopback=true", ep)
+			t.Errorf("special-use address %q must stay blocked even with flag=true", ep)
 		}
-		if endpointIsLoopback(ep) {
-			t.Errorf("endpointIsLoopback(%q) = true, want false", ep)
+		if endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(ep) {
+			t.Errorf("endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(%q) = true, want false", ep)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Private-network addresses (192.168.x.y / 10.x.y.z / 172.16.x.y) are
+	// now allowed when the flag is true — the user is pointing at their own
+	// LAN box (e.g. llama.cpp on another local machine).
+	for _, ep := range []string{"http://192.168.1.100:8080/v1", "http://10.0.0.5:8080/v1", "http://172.16.0.10:8080/v1"} {
+		if err := validateEndpoint(ctx, ep, staticResolver{addr: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.100")}, true); err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("private-network address %q should be allowed with flag=true, got %v", ep, err)
+		}
+		if !endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(ep) {
+			t.Errorf("endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(%q) = false, want true", ep)
 		}
 	}
 }

internal/providerhealth/providerhealth.go

@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ func connectivityCheck(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile, kind
 	requestCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
 	defer cancel()
 
-	request, allowLoopback, err := healthRequest(requestCtx, profile, kind, options)
+	request, allowLoopbackOrPrivate, err := healthRequest(requestCtx, profile, kind, options)
 	if err != nil {
 		category := CategoryConfig
 		var safety endpointSafetyError
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ func connectivityCheck(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile, kind
 	}
 	client := options.HTTPClient
 	if client == nil {
-		client = newConnectivityClient(timeout, options.Resolver, sensitiveAuthHeaderNames(profile, kind), allowLoopback)
+		client = newConnectivityClient(timeout, options.Resolver, sensitiveAuthHeaderNames(profile, kind), allowLoopbackOrPrivate)
 	}
 	response, err := client.Do(request)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -332,8 +332,8 @@ func healthRequest(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile, kind con
 	// Loopback is permitted only when the user's OWN configured base_url is loopback
 	// (a local provider like Ollama/LM Studio) — never for a redirect target. This is
 	// the flag returned to the caller so the dial path applies the same policy. (AUDIT-H1)
-	allowLoopback := endpointIsLoopback(endpoint)
-	if err := validateEndpoint(ctx, endpoint, options.Resolver, allowLoopback); err != nil {
+	allowLoopbackOrPrivate := endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(endpoint)
+	if err := validateEndpoint(ctx, endpoint, options.Resolver, allowLoopbackOrPrivate); err != nil {
 		return nil, false, err
 	}
 	request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, endpoint, nil)
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ func healthRequest(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile, kind con
 		request.Header.Set("User-Agent", options.UserAgent)
 	}
 	applyAuth(request, profile, kind)
-	return request, allowLoopback, nil
+	return request, allowLoopbackOrPrivate, nil
 }
 
 func resolvedBaseURL(profile config.ProviderProfile, kind config.ProviderKind) (string, error) {
@@ -367,11 +367,11 @@ func resolvedBaseURL(profile config.ProviderProfile, kind config.ProviderKind) (
 }
 
 // validateEndpoint enforces the SSRF policy for the provider connectivity probe.
-// allowLoopback permits loopback hosts (localhost / 127.0.0.0/8 / ::1) ONLY — it is
-// set true exclusively for the user's own explicitly-configured local provider
-// base_url (e.g. Ollama/LM Studio), never for redirect targets, and it relaxes
-// loopback alone (other private/special ranges, incl. cloud metadata, stay blocked).
-func validateEndpoint(ctx context.Context, endpoint string, resolver Resolver, allowLoopback bool) error {
+// allowLoopbackOrPrivate permits loopback hosts (localhost / 127.0.0.0/8 / ::1)
+// and private-network hosts (192.168.0.0/16 / 10.0.0.0/8 / 172.16.0.0/12) — it
+// is set true exclusively for the user's own explicitly-configured base_url
+// (e.g. Ollama/LM Studio on the LAN), never for redirect targets.
+func validateEndpoint(ctx context.Context, endpoint string, resolver Resolver, allowLoopbackOrPrivate bool) error {
 	parsed, err := url.Parse(endpoint)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -385,13 +385,13 @@ func validateEndpoint(ctx context.Context, endpoint string, resolver Resolver, a
 	}
 	normalized := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.ToLower(host), ".")
 	if normalized == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(normalized, ".localhost") {
-		if allowLoopback {
+		if allowLoopbackOrPrivate {
 			return nil // user-configured local provider; loopback is intentional
 		}
 		return endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity URL is unsafe: localhost hosts are blocked"}
 	}
 	if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(normalized); err == nil {
-		if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopback && addr.IsLoopback()) {
+		if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopbackOrPrivate && (addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate())) {
 			return endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity URL is unsafe: " + reason}
 		}
 		return nil
@@ -407,17 +407,19 @@ func validateEndpoint(ctx context.Context, endpoint string, resolver Resolver, a
 		return endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity host resolved to no addresses"}
 	}
 	for _, addr := range addrs {
-		if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopback && addr.IsLoopback()) {
+		if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopbackOrPrivate && (addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate())) {
 			return endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity URL is unsafe: " + reason}
 		}
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 
-// endpointIsLoopback reports whether the configured endpoint's host is a loopback
-// host the user typed themselves (localhost or a 127.0.0.0/8 / ::1 literal). Used to
-// decide whether the connectivity probe may reach the user's own local provider.
-func endpointIsLoopback(endpoint string) bool {
+// endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate reports whether the configured endpoint's host is a loopback
+// or private-network host the user typed themselves — a local provider on the LAN
+// (e.g. 192.168.x.y / 10.x.y.z) or localhost. Used to decide whether the
+// connectivity probe may relax address-blocking and reach the user's own
+// explicitly-configured provider.
+func endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(endpoint string) bool {
 	parsed, err := url.Parse(endpoint)
 	if err != nil {
 		return false
@@ -427,7 +429,7 @@ func endpointIsLoopback(endpoint string) bool {
 		return true
 	}
 	if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); err == nil {
-		return addr.IsLoopback()
+		return addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate()
 	}
 	return false
 }
@@ -446,7 +448,7 @@ const maxConnectivityRedirects = 5
 //     time and then dials the validated IP literal, closing the TOCTOU window
 //     between the pre-flight validateEndpoint check and the actual connection
 //     (DNS rebinding).
-func newConnectivityClient(timeout time.Duration, resolver Resolver, sensitiveHeaders []string, allowLoopback bool) *http.Client {
+func newConnectivityClient(timeout time.Duration, resolver Resolver, sensitiveHeaders []string, allowLoopbackOrPrivate bool) *http.Client {
 	if resolver == nil {
 		resolver = defaultResolver{}
 	}
@@ -456,7 +458,7 @@ func newConnectivityClient(timeout time.Duration, resolver Resolver, sensitiveHe
 	} else {
 		transport = &http.Transport{}
 	}
-	transport.DialContext = safeDialContext(resolver, allowLoopback)
+	transport.DialContext = safeDialContext(resolver, allowLoopbackOrPrivate)
 	return &http.Client{
 		Timeout:   timeout,
 		Transport: transport,
@@ -476,8 +478,8 @@ func newConnectivityClient(timeout time.Duration, resolver Resolver, sensitiveHe
 				}
 			}
 			// Redirects are NEVER allowed to reach loopback, even for a local provider:
-			// allowLoopback covers only the user's own configured base_url, not a 3xx
-			// target (which could be attacker-controlled SSRF). (AUDIT-H1)
+			// allowLoopbackOrPrivate covers only the user's own configured base_url,
+			// not a 3xx target (which could be attacker-controlled SSRF). (AUDIT-H1)
 			return validateEndpoint(req.Context(), req.URL.String(), resolver, false)
 		},
 	}
@@ -519,7 +521,7 @@ func sensitiveAuthHeaderNames(profile config.ProviderProfile, kind config.Provid
 // safeDialContext returns a dial function that resolves the target host, refuses
 // the connection if any resolved address is blocked, then dials the validated IP
 // literal so the kernel cannot re-resolve to a different address after the check.
-func safeDialContext(resolver Resolver, allowLoopback bool) func(context.Context, string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
+func safeDialContext(resolver Resolver, allowLoopbackOrPrivate bool) func(context.Context, string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
 	dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 10 * time.Second, KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second}
 	return func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error) {
 		host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(address)
@@ -527,7 +529,7 @@ func safeDialContext(resolver Resolver, allowLoopback bool) func(context.Context
 			return nil, err
 		}
 		if addr, parseErr := netip.ParseAddr(host); parseErr == nil {
-			if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopback && addr.IsLoopback()) {
+			if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopbackOrPrivate && (addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate())) {
 				return nil, endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity URL is unsafe: " + reason}
 			}
 			return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, address)
@@ -540,7 +542,7 @@ func safeDialContext(resolver Resolver, allowLoopback bool) func(context.Context
 			return nil, endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity host resolved to no addresses"}
 		}
 		for _, addr := range addrs {
-			if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopback && addr.IsLoopback()) {
+			if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopbackOrPrivate && (addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate())) {
 				return nil, endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity URL is unsafe: " + reason}
 			}
 		}

internal/providermodelcatalog/catalog.go

@@ -21,6 +21,22 @@ type Model struct {
 	Source           string
 }
 
+// Shared by both "minimax" and "minimaxi-cn"; Models() rebuilds a fresh slice
+// per call, so the shared backing slice cannot be mutated by callers.
+var minimaxCuratedModels = []Model{
+	{ID: "MiniMax-M3", Description: "catalog default"},
+	{ID: "MiniMax-M2.1", Description: "agentic coding model"},
+}
+
+// Shared by both "zai" (international, api.z.ai) and "zai-cn" (China,
+// open.bigmodel.cn); same model lineup on both endpoints.
+var zaiCuratedModels = []Model{
+	{ID: "glm-4.5", Description: "catalog default"},
+	{ID: "glm-4.5-air", Description: "fast model"},
+	{ID: "glm-4.6", Description: "latest general model"},
+	{ID: "glm-z1-air", Description: "reasoning model"},
+}
+
 var curatedModels = map[string][]Model{
 	"ollama-cloud": {
 		{ID: "qwen3-coder:480b", Description: "catalog default"},
@@ -88,10 +104,8 @@ var curatedModels = map[string][]Model{
 		{ID: "meta/llama-3.1-70b-instruct", Description: "general model"},
 		{ID: "mistralai/mixtral-8x7b-instruct-v0.1", Description: "mixture model"},
 	},
-	"minimax": {
-		{ID: "MiniMax-M3", Description: "catalog default"},
-		{ID: "MiniMax-M2.1", Description: "agentic coding model"},
-	},
+	"minimax":     minimaxCuratedModels,
+	"minimaxi-cn": minimaxCuratedModels,
 	"mistral": {
 		{ID: "mistral-large-latest", Description: "catalog default"},
 		{ID: "codestral-latest", Description: "coding model"},
@@ -123,12 +137,8 @@ var curatedModels = map[string][]Model{
 	"bankr": {
 		{ID: "bankr-large", Description: "catalog default"},
 	},
-	"zai": {
-		{ID: "glm-4.5", Description: "catalog default"},
-		{ID: "glm-4.5-air", Description: "fast model"},
-		{ID: "glm-4.6", Description: "latest general model"},
-		{ID: "glm-z1-air", Description: "reasoning model"},
-	},
+	"zai":    zaiCuratedModels,
+	"zai-cn": zaiCuratedModels,
 	// OpenGateway smart-routes by model id across its upstream providers
 	// (see /health: xiaomi-mimo, minimax, qwen, google, nvidia, z-ai). These are
 	// the curated coding defaults; the gateway accepts any model its upstreams

internal/providermodelcatalog/catalog_test.go

@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@ func TestModelsAreProviderScoped(t *testing.T) {
 			want:     []string{"mistral-large-latest", "codestral-latest"},
 			notWant:  []string{"gpt-4.1", "claude-sonnet-4.5"},
 		},
+		{
+			provider: "minimaxi-cn",
+			want:     []string{"MiniMax-M3", "MiniMax-M2.1"},
+			notWant:  []string{"gpt-4.1", "claude-sonnet-4.5"},
+		},
+		{
+			provider: "zai-cn",
+			want:     []string{"glm-4.5", "glm-4.6", "glm-4.5-air", "glm-z1-air"},
+			notWant:  []string{"gpt-4.1", "claude-sonnet-4.5"},
+		},
 	}
 
 	for _, tt := range tests {
@@ -88,3 +98,66 @@ func modelIDs(models []Model) []string {
 	}
 	return ids
 }
+
+// Pins the contract that MiniMax CN exposes exactly the same model IDs as the
+// international provider; a divergence here is almost always a mistake.
+func TestMiniMaxCNModelsMirrorInternational(t *testing.T) {
+	intl, ok := providercatalog.Get("minimax")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("provider minimax missing from catalog")
+	}
+	cn, ok := providercatalog.Get("minimaxi-cn")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("provider minimaxi-cn missing from catalog")
+	}
+	intlModels := Models(intl)
+	cnModels := Models(cn)
+	if len(intlModels) != len(cnModels) {
+		t.Fatalf("model count mismatch: international=%d china=%d", len(intlModels), len(cnModels))
+	}
+	intlIDs := map[string]string{}
+	for _, m := range intlModels {
+		intlIDs[m.ID] = m.Description
+	}
+	for _, m := range cnModels {
+		wantDesc, ok := intlIDs[m.ID]
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("china provider exposes %q which is not in the international catalog", m.ID)
+		}
+		if m.Description != wantDesc {
+			t.Fatalf("model %q description diverged: international=%q china=%q", m.ID, wantDesc, m.Description)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Same contract as TestMiniMaxCNModelsMirrorInternational, for Z.ai: the
+// international (api.z.ai) and China (open.bigmodel.cn) endpoints expose the
+// same model lineup.
+func TestZaiCNModelsMirrorInternational(t *testing.T) {
+	intl, ok := providercatalog.Get("zai")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("provider zai missing from catalog")
+	}
+	cn, ok := providercatalog.Get("zai-cn")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("provider zai-cn missing from catalog")
+	}
+	intlModels := Models(intl)
+	cnModels := Models(cn)
+	if len(intlModels) != len(cnModels) {
+		t.Fatalf("model count mismatch: international=%d china=%d", len(intlModels), len(cnModels))
+	}
+	intlIDs := map[string]string{}
+	for _, m := range intlModels {
+		intlIDs[m.ID] = m.Description
+	}
+	for _, m := range cnModels {
+		wantDesc, ok := intlIDs[m.ID]
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("china provider exposes %q which is not in the international catalog", m.ID)
+		}
+		if m.Description != wantDesc {
+			t.Fatalf("model %q description diverged: international=%q china=%q", m.ID, wantDesc, m.Description)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/providermodelcatalog/remote.go

@@ -128,6 +128,10 @@ func ModelsDevProviderID(provider providercatalog.Descriptor) string {
 		return "nvidia"
 	case "xiaomi-mimo":
 		return "xiaomi"
+	case "zai-cn":
+		return "zai"
+	case "minimaxi-cn":
+		return "minimax"
 	default:
 		return strings.TrimSpace(provider.ID)
 	}

internal/providermodelcatalog/remote_test.go

@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ func TestModelsDevProviderIDMapsZeroAliases(t *testing.T) {
 		"xiaomi-mimo":  "xiaomi",
 		"dashscope":    "alibaba",
 		"ollama-cloud": "ollama-cloud",
+		"zai-cn":       "zai",
+		"minimaxi-cn":  "minimax",
 	}
 	for zeroID, want := range tests {
 		provider, ok := providercatalog.Get(zeroID)

internal/providers/anthropic/cache_breakpoints_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+package anthropic
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// The final two messages must carry a cache_control breakpoint on their last
+// cacheable block so the conversation transcript — not just system prompt and
+// tools — is a prompt-cache hit on the next turn. Earlier messages must stay
+// unmarked (Anthropic caps breakpoints at 4 per request: system, tools, and
+// these two).
+func TestAnthropicRequestMarksLastTwoMessagesForCaching(t *testing.T) {
+	var gotBody map[string]any
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&gotBody); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("decode request body: %v", err)
+		}
+		writeSSEEvent(w, "message_stop", `{"type":"message_stop"}`)
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	provider, err := New(Options{BaseURL: server.URL + "/", Model: "claude-test"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("New returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+	stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(context.Background(), zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+		Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{
+			{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "first"},
+			{
+				Role:      zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant,
+				Content:   "calling a tool",
+				ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "toolu_1", Name: "grep", Arguments: `{}`}},
+			},
+			{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, Content: "result", ToolCallID: "toolu_1"},
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("StreamCompletion returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+	drain(stream)
+
+	messages := gotBody["messages"].([]any)
+	if len(messages) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 3 wire messages, got %d: %#v", len(messages), messages)
+	}
+	lastBlockHasCache := func(message any) bool {
+		blocks, ok := message.(map[string]any)["content"].([]any)
+		if !ok || len(blocks) == 0 {
+			return false
+		}
+		last := blocks[len(blocks)-1].(map[string]any)
+		control, ok := last["cache_control"].(map[string]any)
+		return ok && control["type"] == "ephemeral"
+	}
+	if lastBlockHasCache(messages[0]) {
+		t.Fatalf("first message must not carry a breakpoint: %#v", messages[0])
+	}
+	if !lastBlockHasCache(messages[1]) {
+		t.Fatalf("second-to-last message must carry a breakpoint: %#v", messages[1])
+	}
+	if !lastBlockHasCache(messages[2]) {
+		t.Fatalf("last message must carry a breakpoint: %#v", messages[2])
+	}
+}
+
+// A string-content message must be converted to a block array so it can carry
+// the breakpoint, and thinking blocks must never carry cache_control (the API
+// rejects them) — the marker goes on the last cacheable block instead.
+func TestApplyMessageCacheBreakpointsSkipsThinkingBlocks(t *testing.T) {
+	messages := []anthropicMessage{
+		{Role: "user", Content: "plain string"},
+		{Role: "assistant", Content: []map[string]any{
+			{"type": "text", "text": "answer"},
+			{"type": "thinking", "thinking": "hmm", "signature": "sig"},
+		}},
+	}
+	applyMessageCacheBreakpoints(messages)
+
+	userBlocks := contentBlocks(messages[0].Content)
+	if len(userBlocks) != 1 || userBlocks[0]["cache_control"] == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("string content must become a marked block: %#v", messages[0].Content)
+	}
+	assistantBlocks := contentBlocks(messages[1].Content)
+	if assistantBlocks[1]["cache_control"] != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("thinking block must not be marked: %#v", assistantBlocks[1])
+	}
+	if assistantBlocks[0]["cache_control"] == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("text block must carry the breakpoint instead: %#v", assistantBlocks[0])
+	}
+}

internal/providers/anthropic/provider.go

@@ -405,9 +405,35 @@ func (provider *Provider) anthropicRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
 		}
 		mapped.Tools[len(mapped.Tools)-1].CacheControl = &cacheControl{Type: cacheEphemeral}
 	}
+	applyMessageCacheBreakpoints(mapped.Messages)
 	return mapped, nil
 }
 
+// applyMessageCacheBreakpoints marks the last content block of the final two
+// messages with cache_control so the conversation transcript is cached
+// turn-over-turn, not just the system prompt and tool definitions. Two message
+// breakpoints (not one) keep the previous turn's prefix a cache hit while the
+// newest suffix is being written. Anthropic allows at most 4 breakpoints per
+// request: system + tools use two above, these use the remaining two. Thinking
+// blocks cannot carry cache_control, so the marker goes on the last block that
+// can.
+func applyMessageCacheBreakpoints(messages []anthropicMessage) {
+	marked := 0
+	for i := len(messages) - 1; i >= 0 && marked < 2; i-- {
+		blocks := contentBlocks(messages[i].Content)
+		for j := len(blocks) - 1; j >= 0; j-- {
+			blockType, _ := blocks[j]["type"].(string)
+			if blockType == "thinking" || blockType == "redacted_thinking" {
+				continue
+			}
+			blocks[j]["cache_control"] = map[string]any{"type": cacheEphemeral}
+			messages[i].Content = blocks
+			marked++
+			break
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func mapMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message) (string, []anthropicMessage, error) {
 	systemParts := []string{}
 	mapped := []anthropicMessage{}

internal/providers/factory.go

@@ -26,6 +26,13 @@ type Options struct {
 	// OAuth bearer token (preferred over the API key). nil => API-key auth only.
 	// Applied to the OpenAI and Anthropic providers.
 	OAuthResolver providerio.TokenResolver
+	// OAuthLoginKey is the credential-store key OAuthResolver bound to (empty when
+	// there is no OAuth login). It is the SAME selection the bearer resolver made,
+	// resolved ONCE by the caller so the Codex chatgpt-account-id header reads its
+	// account from the exact login that issued the bearer token — never a second,
+	// independent lookup that could pick a different login (a backend-rejected
+	// mismatch).
+	OAuthLoginKey string
 }
 
 // New creates a runtime provider for a resolved provider profile.
@@ -251,14 +258,22 @@ func isCodexCatalog(profile config.ProviderProfile, _ resolvedProfile) bool {
 
 // newCodexProvider builds a Codex-flavored openai provider for the chatgpt
 // catalog. The Codex headers (`originator`, `chatgpt-account-id`) are
-// injected by the CodexProvider wrapper. The `chatgpt-account-id` is
-// resolved dynamically from the stored OAuth token's Account field on
-// every request so a refresh that rotates the token (and its account
-// claim) takes effect immediately — a static AccountID captured at
-// construction would go stale on the first refresh.
+// injected by the CodexProvider wrapper. The `chatgpt-account-id` is read from
+// the stored OAuth token's Account field on every request so a refresh that
+// rotates the token (and its account claim) takes effect immediately — a static
+// AccountID captured at construction would go stale on the first refresh.
+//
+// The *login* the header reads from is options.OAuthLoginKey — the SAME key the
+// bearer resolver bound, resolved ONCE by the caller. The bearer resolver
+// refreshes the token in place under that key; reading the account from the same
+// key keeps header and token on one login for the provider's life. Resolving the
+// key independently here (a second oauth.FirstStored) could, after a transient
+// per-candidate load error or a mid-session `zero auth login`, pick a different
+// login than the bearer — a mismatch the backend rejects.
 func newCodexProvider(profile config.ProviderProfile, resolved resolvedProfile, options Options) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
+	accountKey := options.OAuthLoginKey
 	resolver := openai.CodexAccountResolver(func(ctx context.Context) (string, bool, error) {
-		account := codexAccountFromStore(profile.Name)
+		account := codexAccountForKey(accountKey)
 		if account == "" {
 			return "", false, nil
 		}
@@ -288,17 +303,20 @@ func newCodexProvider(profile config.ProviderProfile, resolved resolvedProfile,
 	})
 }
 
-// codexAccountFromStore reads the chatgpt_account_id from the stored OAuth
-// token for the given provider name. It is called per-request (via the
-// resolver) so a refresh that rotates the token takes effect immediately
-// without restarting the agent. Returns "" when no token is stored (the
-// Codex provider then omits the header and the user sees a clear 401).
-func codexAccountFromStore(providerName string) string {
+// codexAccountForKey reads the chatgpt_account_id from the token currently
+// stored under key. Called per-request (via the resolver) so a refresh that
+// rotates the token — saved back in place under the same key — takes effect
+// immediately without restarting the agent. Returns "" when key is empty (no
+// OAuth login), or the token is absent or carries no account claim.
+func codexAccountForKey(key string) string {
+	if key == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
 	store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{})
 	if err != nil {
 		return ""
 	}
-	token, ok, err := store.Load(oauth.ProviderKey(providerName))
+	token, ok, err := store.Load(key)
 	if err != nil || !ok {
 		return ""
 	}

internal/providers/factory_test.go

@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ func TestNewRoutesChatGPTCatalogToCodexProvider(t *testing.T) {
 	// OAuth token and the "want empty chatgpt-account-id" assertion fails locally
 	// (it still passes in CI, where no login is stored). Mirrors the isolation in
 	// TestNewRoutesChatGPTCatalogWithStoredAccountID.
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE", "file")
 	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", t.TempDir()+"/tokens.json")
 
 	transport := &captureTransport{
@@ -322,11 +323,10 @@ func TestNewRoutesChatGPTCatalogToCodexProvider(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestNewRoutesChatGPTCatalogWithStoredAccountID(t *testing.T) {
 	// The factory reads the stored OAuth token's Account field for the
-	// chatgpt-account-id header. Seed a token in a temp store and point
-	// ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH at it so the factory picks it up.
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", dir+"/tokens.json")
-	store, err := newOAuthStoreForTest()
+	// chatgpt-account-id header, from the login key the CALLER supplies in
+	// Options.OAuthLoginKey (the same key the bearer resolver bound). Seed a
+	// token in an isolated temp store, then pass that key.
+	store, err := newOAuthStoreForTest(t)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -344,8 +344,9 @@ func TestNewRoutesChatGPTCatalogWithStoredAccountID(t *testing.T) {
 		CatalogID: "chatgpt",
 		Model:     "gpt-5",
 	}, Options{
-		HTTPClient: &http.Client{Transport: transport},
-		UserAgent:  "zero-factory-test",
+		HTTPClient:    &http.Client{Transport: transport},
+		UserAgent:     "zero-factory-test",
+		OAuthLoginKey: oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt"),
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("New() error = %v", err)
@@ -407,10 +408,61 @@ func (transport *captureTransport) body() io.Reader {
 	return strings.NewReader(transport.requestBody)
 }
 
-// newOAuthStoreForTest builds a Store pointed at the current
-// ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH (set by the caller). It exists so the chatgpt
-// factory tests can seed a token without copying the path-handling dance
-// from internal/cli.
-func newOAuthStoreForTest() (*oauth.Store, error) {
+// newOAuthStoreForTest pins the OAuth token store to a plain temp FILE and
+// returns a Store on it. Pinning ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE matters as much as the
+// path: an inherited "keyring" value would send NewStore to the OS keychain
+// and ignore ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH entirely, making the test read/write the
+// developer's real logins. Exists so the chatgpt factory tests can seed a
+// token without copying the path-handling dance from internal/cli.
+func newOAuthStoreForTest(t *testing.T) (*oauth.Store, error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE", "file")
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", t.TempDir()+"/tokens.json")
 	return oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{})
 }
+
+// codexAccountForKey reads the chatgpt-account-id from the token stored under a
+// FIXED key — the key the caller (cli.oauthLoginForProfile) already bound for the
+// bearer token, passed through providers.Options.OAuthLoginKey. The account is
+// therefore always read from the same login that issued the bearer (no second,
+// independent selection). It re-reads per call, so an in-place token refresh (new
+// account claim under the SAME key) is picked up; an empty key (no OAuth login)
+// or a missing/account-less token yields "".
+func TestCodexAccountForKey(t *testing.T) {
+	store, err := newOAuthStoreForTest(t)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt"), oauth.Token{AccessToken: "tok-1", Account: "acc-catalog-7"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Save chatgpt: %v", err)
+	}
+	// A different login WITHOUT an account claim, to prove the read stays on the
+	// requested key and never crosses to another login's account.
+	if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("codex"), oauth.Token{AccessToken: "tok-codex"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Save codex: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if got := codexAccountForKey(oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt")); got != "acc-catalog-7" {
+		t.Fatalf("account = %q, want acc-catalog-7", got)
+	}
+	// The bound key's token has no account → "", NOT the other login's account.
+	if got := codexAccountForKey(oauth.ProviderKey("codex")); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("account = %q, want empty (must not cross to another login's account)", got)
+	}
+	// Empty key (no OAuth login) → header omitted.
+	if got := codexAccountForKey(""); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("account for empty key = %q, want empty", got)
+	}
+	// Unknown key → "".
+	if got := codexAccountForKey(oauth.ProviderKey("nope")); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("account for unknown key = %q, want empty", got)
+	}
+
+	// An in-place refresh under the bound key IS reflected per request.
+	if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt"), oauth.Token{AccessToken: "tok-refreshed", Account: "acc-rotated"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh chatgpt: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := codexAccountForKey(oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt")); got != "acc-rotated" {
+		t.Fatalf("account = %q, want acc-rotated (in-place refresh must be picked up)", got)
+	}
+}

internal/providers/gemini/provider.go

@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ func (provider *Provider) geminiRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (
 			declarations = append(declarations, geminiFunctionDeclaration{
 				Name:        tool.Name,
 				Description: tool.Description,
-				Parameters:  tool.Parameters,
+				Parameters:  sanitizeGeminiSchema(tool.Parameters),
 			})
 		}
 		mapped.Tools = []geminiToolGroup{{FunctionDeclarations: declarations}}
@@ -350,6 +350,71 @@ func (provider *Provider) geminiRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (
 	return mapped, nil
 }
 
+// geminiSchemaFields is the subset of JSON Schema keywords Google's
+// functionDeclarations[].parameters accepts (the Generative AI Schema type).
+// Anything outside it — most notably OpenAI's `additionalProperties`, which Zero
+// emits on every tool's parameters and which Gemini 400s on ("Unknown name
+// \"additionalProperties\" … Cannot find field") — must be dropped before the
+// request goes out. Kept as an allowlist rather than a denylist so a schema
+// keyword Zero (or an MCP server) adds later can't silently leak an unsupported
+// field into the Gemini payload.
+var geminiSchemaFields = map[string]bool{
+	"type": true, "format": true, "title": true, "description": true,
+	"nullable": true, "enum": true, "items": true, "properties": true,
+	"required": true, "anyOf": true, "propertyOrdering": true, "default": true,
+	"minimum": true, "maximum": true, "minItems": true, "maxItems": true,
+	"minLength": true, "maxLength": true, "minProperties": true,
+	"maxProperties": true, "pattern": true, "example": true,
+}
+
+// sanitizeGeminiSchema returns a copy of a JSON-Schema map keeping only the
+// keywords Gemini supports (geminiSchemaFields), recursing through the nested
+// schemas under `properties`, `items`, and `anyOf`. Returns nil for a nil input
+// so a parameterless tool stays parameterless.
+func sanitizeGeminiSchema(schema map[string]any) map[string]any {
+	if schema == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	out := make(map[string]any, len(schema))
+	for key, value := range schema {
+		if !geminiSchemaFields[key] {
+			continue
+		}
+		switch key {
+		case "properties":
+			if props, ok := value.(map[string]any); ok {
+				cleaned := make(map[string]any, len(props))
+				for name, sub := range props {
+					if subMap, ok := sub.(map[string]any); ok {
+						cleaned[name] = sanitizeGeminiSchema(subMap)
+					} else {
+						cleaned[name] = sub
+					}
+				}
+				value = cleaned
+			}
+		case "items":
+			if subMap, ok := value.(map[string]any); ok {
+				value = sanitizeGeminiSchema(subMap)
+			}
+		case "anyOf":
+			if variants, ok := value.([]any); ok {
+				cleaned := make([]any, len(variants))
+				for i, variant := range variants {
+					if subMap, ok := variant.(map[string]any); ok {
+						cleaned[i] = sanitizeGeminiSchema(subMap)
+					} else {
+						cleaned[i] = variant
+					}
+				}
+				value = cleaned
+			}
+		}
+		out[key] = value
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
 func mapMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message) (*geminiContent, []geminiContent, error) {
 	systemParts := []geminiPart{}
 	contents := []geminiContent{}

internal/providers/gemini/provider_test.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package gemini
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"reflect"
@@ -504,3 +505,129 @@ func eventsOfType(events []zeroruntime.StreamEvent, eventType zeroruntime.Stream
 	}
 	return matching
 }
+
+// TestSanitizeGeminiSchemaStripsUnsupportedFields: the sanitizer keeps only
+// Gemini-supported keywords and recurses into properties/items/anyOf, so no
+// OpenAI-ism (additionalProperties, $schema, patternProperties) survives at any
+// depth while legitimate fields (type/description/enum/required/default) stay.
+func TestSanitizeGeminiSchemaStripsUnsupportedFields(t *testing.T) {
+	in := map[string]any{
+		"type":                 "object",
+		"additionalProperties": false,
+		"$schema":              "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+		"required":             []string{"path"},
+		"properties": map[string]any{
+			"path": map[string]any{
+				"type":        "string",
+				"description": "a path",
+				"default":     ".",
+			},
+			"nested": map[string]any{
+				"type":                 "object",
+				"additionalProperties": false, // must be stripped at depth too
+				"properties": map[string]any{
+					"tags": map[string]any{
+						"type":  "array",
+						"items": map[string]any{"type": "string", "additionalProperties": true},
+					},
+				},
+			},
+		},
+	}
+	out := sanitizeGeminiSchema(in)
+
+	assertNoAdditionalProps(t, out, "root")
+	if out["additionalProperties"] != nil {
+		t.Fatal("top-level additionalProperties must be stripped")
+	}
+	if out["$schema"] != nil {
+		t.Fatal("$schema must be stripped")
+	}
+	// Legitimate fields survive.
+	if out["type"] != "object" {
+		t.Fatalf("type should survive, got %v", out["type"])
+	}
+	props := out["properties"].(map[string]any)
+	pathProp := props["path"].(map[string]any)
+	if pathProp["description"] != "a path" || pathProp["default"] != "." {
+		t.Fatalf("legitimate property fields must survive: %#v", pathProp)
+	}
+	// nil input stays nil (parameterless tool).
+	if sanitizeGeminiSchema(nil) != nil {
+		t.Fatal("nil schema should map to nil")
+	}
+}
+
+// assertNoAdditionalProps fails if additionalProperties appears anywhere in the
+// (recursively walked) schema.
+func assertNoAdditionalProps(t *testing.T, node any, path string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	switch v := node.(type) {
+	case map[string]any:
+		if _, ok := v["additionalProperties"]; ok {
+			t.Fatalf("additionalProperties leaked at %s", path)
+		}
+		for k, sub := range v {
+			assertNoAdditionalProps(t, sub, path+"."+k)
+		}
+	case []any:
+		for i, sub := range v {
+			assertNoAdditionalProps(t, sub, fmt.Sprintf("%s[%d]", path, i))
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGeminiRequestOmitsAdditionalPropertiesInToolSchema: end-to-end, the tool
+// parameters Zero emits (schemaToRuntimeMap always writes additionalProperties)
+// must not reach Gemini — otherwise every functionDeclaration is 400-rejected
+// ("Unknown name additionalProperties"), which broke all tool-using exec calls
+// against Google (issue #373).
+func TestGeminiRequestOmitsAdditionalPropertiesInToolSchema(t *testing.T) {
+	var gotBody map[string]any
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&gotBody); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("decode request body: %v", err)
+		}
+		writeSSE(w, `{"usageMetadata":{"promptTokenCount":1}}`)
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	provider, err := New(Options{APIKey: "k", BaseURL: server.URL + "/", Model: "models/gemini-2.5-flash"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("New returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+	stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(context.Background(), zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+		Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "hi"}},
+		Tools: []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
+			Name:        "grep",
+			Description: "search",
+			Parameters: map[string]any{ // exactly what schemaToRuntimeMap produces
+				"type":                 "object",
+				"additionalProperties": false,
+				"required":             []string{"pattern"},
+				"properties": map[string]any{
+					"pattern": map[string]any{"type": "string", "description": "regex"},
+				},
+			},
+		}},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("StreamCompletion returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+	drain(stream)
+
+	tools := gotBody["tools"].([]any)
+	decls := tools[0].(map[string]any)["functionDeclarations"].([]any)
+	params := decls[0].(map[string]any)["parameters"].(map[string]any)
+	if _, ok := params["additionalProperties"]; ok {
+		t.Fatalf("additionalProperties must not be sent to Gemini: %#v", params)
+	}
+	// The tool is still usable: its real schema survived.
+	if params["type"] != "object" {
+		t.Fatalf("tool parameters type should survive, got %v", params["type"])
+	}
+	props := params["properties"].(map[string]any)
+	if _, ok := props["pattern"]; !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("tool property must survive sanitization: %#v", props)
+	}
+}

internal/providers/providerio/retry.go

@@ -23,12 +23,18 @@ import (
 // (billable) work. Only the INITIAL request is ever in scope; once the response
 // body starts streaming it is never re-issued.
 
-const defaultMaxRetryAttempts = 3
+const defaultMaxRetryAttempts = 6
 
 // maxBackoff caps a single backoff wait so a hostile or buggy Retry-After can't
 // stall the agent for minutes.
 const maxBackoff = 30 * time.Second
 
+// retryBackoffBase is the first wait when the server supplied no Retry-After.
+// Rate-limit windows are measured in seconds, not milliseconds: retrying a 429
+// after 400ms almost always burns the attempt while still limited, so the
+// schedule is 2s, 4s, 8s, 16s, then maxBackoff. A var so tests can shrink it.
+var retryBackoffBase = 2 * time.Second
+
 // SendWithRetry issues an HTTP request, retrying ONLY the safe-to-replay server
 // responses (429 and 503, see ShouldRetryStatus) up to maxAttempts — backing off
 // between tries and honoring a server Retry-After header and context
@@ -110,17 +116,11 @@ func ShouldRetryStatus(code int) bool {
 }
 
 // Backoff waits before retry attempt N (1-based), returning false if the context
-// is cancelled during the wait. The wait is attempt*400ms unless the server
-// supplied a (positive) Retry-After, and is capped at maxBackoff.
+// is cancelled during the wait. A server-supplied (positive) Retry-After wins;
+// otherwise the wait doubles from retryBackoffBase per attempt. Either way the
+// wait is capped at maxBackoff.
 func Backoff(ctx context.Context, attempt int, retryAfter time.Duration) bool {
-	wait := time.Duration(attempt) * 400 * time.Millisecond
-	if retryAfter > 0 {
-		wait = retryAfter
-	}
-	if wait > maxBackoff {
-		wait = maxBackoff
-	}
-	timer := time.NewTimer(wait)
+	timer := time.NewTimer(backoffWait(attempt, retryAfter))
 	defer timer.Stop()
 	select {
 	case <-ctx.Done():
@@ -130,6 +130,27 @@ func Backoff(ctx context.Context, attempt int, retryAfter time.Duration) bool {
 	}
 }
 
+// backoffWait computes the wait before retry attempt N (1-based): Retry-After
+// when supplied, else exponential from retryBackoffBase, both capped at
+// maxBackoff. The exponent is clamped so a large attempt count cannot overflow.
+func backoffWait(attempt int, retryAfter time.Duration) time.Duration {
+	wait := retryAfter
+	if wait <= 0 {
+		exponent := attempt - 1
+		if exponent > 5 {
+			exponent = 5
+		}
+		if exponent < 0 {
+			exponent = 0
+		}
+		wait = retryBackoffBase * time.Duration(1<<exponent)
+	}
+	if wait > maxBackoff {
+		wait = maxBackoff
+	}
+	return wait
+}
+
 // RetryAfter parses a response's Retry-After header (delay-seconds or an HTTP
 // date) into a positive duration, or 0 when absent/unparseable. The result is
 // capped at maxBackoff by Backoff.

internal/providers/providerio/retry_test.go

@@ -94,7 +94,40 @@ func TestBackoffWaitsThenReturnsTrue(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// shrinkBackoff makes retry waits negligible for the duration of a test.
+func shrinkBackoff(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+	saved := retryBackoffBase
+	retryBackoffBase = time.Millisecond
+	t.Cleanup(func() { retryBackoffBase = saved })
+}
+
+func TestBackoffWaitSchedule(t *testing.T) {
+	// Without Retry-After the wait doubles per attempt from 2s and caps at 30s;
+	// a supplied Retry-After wins but is capped too.
+	cases := []struct {
+		attempt    int
+		retryAfter time.Duration
+		want       time.Duration
+	}{
+		{1, 0, 2 * time.Second},
+		{2, 0, 4 * time.Second},
+		{3, 0, 8 * time.Second},
+		{4, 0, 16 * time.Second},
+		{5, 0, 30 * time.Second},  // 32s capped
+		{50, 0, 30 * time.Second}, // clamped exponent, no overflow
+		{1, 7 * time.Second, 7 * time.Second},
+		{1, 5 * time.Minute, 30 * time.Second}, // hostile Retry-After capped
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		if got := backoffWait(c.attempt, c.retryAfter); got != c.want {
+			t.Errorf("backoffWait(%d, %v) = %v, want %v", c.attempt, c.retryAfter, got, c.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func TestSendWithRetryRetriesThenSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
+	shrinkBackoff(t)
 	var hits int32
 	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		if atomic.AddInt32(&hits, 1) == 1 {
@@ -140,6 +173,7 @@ func TestSendWithRetryReturnsNonRetryableImmediately(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestSendWithRetryReturnsLastResponseAfterMaxAttempts(t *testing.T) {
+	shrinkBackoff(t)
 	var hits int32
 	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		atomic.AddInt32(&hits, 1)

internal/sandbox/engine_test.go

@@ -9,22 +9,25 @@ import (
 	"time"
 )
 
-// TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromShellNetworkPolicy verifies that the
-// sandbox network policy gates sandboxed shell egress, not first-party
-// in-process web tools.
-func TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromShellNetworkPolicy(t *testing.T) {
+// TestEvaluatePromptsForNetworkToolsButExemptsThemFromShellNetworkPolicy verifies
+// that first-party in-process network tools are governed by their permission
+// metadata, not by the sandboxed shell egress policy.
+func TestEvaluatePromptsForNetworkToolsButExemptsThemFromShellNetworkPolicy(t *testing.T) {
 	base := Policy{Mode: ModeEnforce, Network: NetworkDeny}
 
 	engine := NewEngine(EngineOptions{Policy: base})
 	d := engine.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{
-		ToolName: "web_search", SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork, Permission: PermissionAllow,
+		ToolName: "web_search", SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork, Permission: PermissionPrompt,
 	})
-	if d.Action != ActionAllow || d.Block != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("web_search must be allowed by the sandbox gate, got %#v", d)
+	if d.Action != ActionPrompt || d.Block != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("web_search must prompt before permission is granted, got %#v", d)
+	}
+	if d.Reason == ReasonNetworkBlocked {
+		t.Fatalf("web_search prompt should come from tool permission, not shell network policy: %#v", d)
 	}
 
 	allowed := engine.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{
-		ToolName: "web_search", SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork, Permission: PermissionAllow, PermissionGranted: true,
+		ToolName: "web_search", SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork, Permission: PermissionPrompt, PermissionGranted: true,
 	})
 	if allowed.Action != ActionAllow || allowed.Block != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("granted web_search must be allowed under deny, got %#v", allowed)

internal/sandbox/manager.go

@@ -19,6 +19,13 @@ var errWindowsSandboxNotInitialized = errors.New(
 const windowsSetupDowngradeReason = "Windows OS sandbox inactive — commands run with workspace path-confinement and " +
 	"per-command approval only. Run `zero sandbox setup` from an elevated (Administrator) terminal for full filesystem and network isolation."
 
+// windowsUnelevatedDowngradeReason is surfaced when Windows runs the sandbox in
+// the unelevated tier: the restricted-token write-jail is enforced (the command
+// runner applies the workspace ACLs itself, which needs no Administrator
+// rights), but the WFP network filters are Administrator-only and absent.
+const windowsUnelevatedDowngradeReason = "Windows sandbox running unelevated — the filesystem write-jail is enforced, but network " +
+	"isolation still relies on per-command approval. Run `zero sandbox setup` from an elevated (Administrator) terminal for OS-level network enforcement."
+
 // windowsSandboxInitialized reports whether the per-host Windows sandbox setup
 // marker exists. A missing marker is the common fresh-install state, so the
 // caller degrades rather than bricking the command. Indirected through a var so
@@ -174,19 +181,28 @@ func (manager SandboxManager) BuildExecutionRequest(request SandboxManagerReques
 	if request.ValidateExecution && preference == SandboxPreferenceRequire && backend.SupportLevel() != BackendSupportNative {
 		return SandboxExecutionRequest{}, nativeSandboxUnavailableError(backend)
 	}
-	// Windows: the OS sandbox needs a one-time elevated `zero sandbox setup` (it
-	// applies WFP network filters + workspace ACLs and writes a marker). Without
-	// it the command runner hard-fails — so on the default preference, DEGRADE to
-	// the in-process policy gate + per-command approval (matching Linux/macOS when
-	// their sandbox is unavailable) instead of bricking every command. A strict
-	// caller (--sandbox require) still gets a clear error pointing at setup.
+	// Windows: the FULL OS sandbox needs a one-time elevated `zero sandbox setup`
+	// (it applies WFP network filters + workspace ACLs and writes a marker).
+	// Without it, a restricted-filesystem profile can still run in the UNELEVATED
+	// tier: the command runner applies the workspace ACL plan itself (DACL edits
+	// on user-owned roots need no Administrator rights) and wraps the command in
+	// the write-restricted token, so the filesystem write-jail holds. Only the
+	// WFP network filters are Administrator-only, so network stays with the
+	// in-process approval gate at that tier. A profile that needs the sandbox
+	// solely for network isolation gains nothing from the unelevated tier and
+	// DEGRADES to the policy gate as before. A strict caller (--sandbox require)
+	// still gets a clear error pointing at setup.
 	windowsNeedsSetup := false
 	if manager.goos == "windows" && requiresPlatformSandbox && enforcementLevel == EnforcementNative && !windowsSandboxInitialized() {
 		if preference == SandboxPreferenceRequire {
 			return SandboxExecutionRequest{}, errWindowsSandboxNotInitialized
 		}
-		enforcementLevel = EnforcementDegraded
 		windowsNeedsSetup = true
+		if profile.FileSystem.Kind == FileSystemRestricted {
+			enforcementLevel = EnforcementUnelevated
+		} else {
+			enforcementLevel = EnforcementDegraded
+		}
 	}
 	targetBackend := manager.targetBackend(preference, policy, requiresPlatformSandbox)
 	downgradeReason := ""
@@ -196,7 +212,11 @@ func (manager SandboxManager) BuildExecutionRequest(request SandboxManagerReques
 			downgradeReason = windowsSetupDowngradeReason
 		}
 	}
-	wrapped := backend.CommandWrapping && backend.Available && enforcementLevel == EnforcementNative
+	if enforcementLevel == EnforcementUnelevated {
+		downgradeReason = windowsUnelevatedDowngradeReason
+	}
+	wrapped := backend.CommandWrapping && backend.Available &&
+		(enforcementLevel == EnforcementNative || enforcementLevel == EnforcementUnelevated)
 	markers := backend.SandboxEnvMarkers(policy)
 	if !wrapped && backend.Name != BackendWSL {
 		markers = nil

internal/sandbox/manager_test.go

@@ -72,7 +72,10 @@ func TestPermissionProfileFromPolicyIncludesDefaultTempWriteRoots(t *testing.T)
 	if !writeRootsContain(profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, tmpdir) {
 		t.Fatalf("write roots = %#v, want temp root %q", profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, tmpdir)
 	}
-	if pathExists("/tmp") && !writeRootsContain(profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, "/tmp") {
+	// /tmp is a default temp write root on POSIX only (see
+	// defaultTempWriteRootCandidatesForGOOS); on Windows the bare path resolves
+	// against the current drive, so a stray C:\tmp must not turn this on.
+	if runtime.GOOS != "windows" && pathExists("/tmp") && !writeRootsContain(profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, "/tmp") {
 		t.Fatalf("write roots = %#v, want /tmp", profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots)
 	}
 }

internal/sandbox/runner_windows_integration_test.go

@@ -132,6 +132,64 @@ exit 0
 	}
 }
 
+// TestWindowsUnelevatedRealSandboxSmoke exercises the unelevated tier end to
+// end WITHOUT running the elevated setup helper: the command runner applies
+// the workspace ACLs itself, a write inside the workspace succeeds under the
+// restricted token, and a write outside every granted root is denied. Unlike
+// the elevated smoke above it needs no Administrator terminal.
+func TestWindowsUnelevatedRealSandboxSmoke(t *testing.T) {
+	if os.Getenv("ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE") != "1" {
+		t.Skip("set ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE=1 to run real Windows sandbox smoke tests")
+	}
+	runnerExe := realSmokeExecutable(t, "ZERO_WINDOWS_COMMAND_RUNNER_EXE", WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName)
+
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	outside := t.TempDir()
+	sandboxHome := filepath.Join(root, ".zero-sandbox")
+	profile := PermissionProfile{
+		FileSystem: FileSystemPolicy{
+			Kind:                 FileSystemRestricted,
+			ReadRoots:            []string{root},
+			WriteRoots:           []WritableRoot{{Root: root, ProtectedMetadataNames: []string{".git", ".zero", ".agents"}}},
+			IncludePlatformRoots: true,
+			AllowTemp:            true,
+		},
+		Network: NetworkPolicy{Mode: NetworkDeny},
+	}
+	config := WindowsSandboxCommandArgsOptions{
+		SandboxHome:       sandboxHome,
+		CommandCWD:        root,
+		WorkspaceRoots:    []string{root},
+		PermissionProfile: profile,
+		SandboxLevel:      WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated,
+	}
+
+	// cmd.exe rather than powershell.exe: managed PowerShell cannot initialize
+	// its crypto provider under a write-restricted token on some hosts
+	// (0x8009001d, the same restricted-token limitation the runner documents for
+	// Schannel), and the write-jail assertion only needs a native shell.
+	insideMarker := filepath.Join(root, "unelevated-write-ok.txt")
+	runWindowsRealSmokeCommand(t, runnerExe, config, []string{
+		"cmd.exe", "/d", "/s", "/c", "echo ok>" + insideMarker,
+	}, 0)
+	if bytes, err := os.ReadFile(insideMarker); err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(string(bytes)) != "ok" {
+		t.Fatalf("unelevated sandboxed write marker = %q, %v; want ok", bytes, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerPath(sandboxHome)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expected the unelevated setup marker to be recorded: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	outsideMarker := filepath.Join(outside, "unelevated-write-denied.txt")
+	runWindowsRealSmokeCommand(t, runnerExe, config, []string{
+		"cmd.exe", "/d", "/s", "/c", "echo leaked>" + outsideMarker,
+	}, 1)
+	if _, err := os.Stat(outsideMarker); err == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unelevated sandbox allowed a write outside every granted root")
+	} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("stat outside marker: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
 func realSmokeExecutable(t *testing.T, envKey string, fallbackName string) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	if path := os.Getenv(envKey); path != "" {

internal/sandbox/scope_test.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package sandbox
 import (
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 )
@@ -128,7 +129,10 @@ func TestNewScopeNormalizesAndValidatesExtraRoots(t *testing.T) {
 	if !stringSliceContains(roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort(extra)) {
 		t.Fatalf("Roots()=%v want extra root %q", roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort(extra))
 	}
-	if pathExists("/tmp") && !stringSliceContains(roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort("/tmp")) {
+	// /tmp is a default temp write root on POSIX only (see
+	// defaultTempWriteRootCandidatesForGOOS); on Windows the bare path resolves
+	// against the current drive, so a stray C:\tmp must not turn this on.
+	if runtime.GOOS != "windows" && pathExists("/tmp") && !stringSliceContains(roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort("/tmp")) {
 		t.Fatalf("Roots()=%v want default /tmp write root", roots)
 	}
 }

internal/sandbox/types.go

@@ -143,9 +143,16 @@ const (
 )
 
 const (
-	EnforcementNative   EnforcementLevel = "native"
-	EnforcementDegraded EnforcementLevel = "degraded"
-	EnforcementDisabled EnforcementLevel = "disabled"
+	EnforcementNative EnforcementLevel = "native"
+	// EnforcementUnelevated is the Windows-only middle tier used when the
+	// elevated `zero sandbox setup` has not run: commands still wrap through the
+	// command runner with a write-restricted token and workspace ACLs (which the
+	// runner can apply without Administrator rights), but the WFP network
+	// filters are absent, so network isolation stays with the in-process
+	// approval gate.
+	EnforcementUnelevated EnforcementLevel = "unelevated"
+	EnforcementDegraded   EnforcementLevel = "degraded"
+	EnforcementDisabled   EnforcementLevel = "disabled"
 )
 
 type Policy struct {

internal/sandbox/windows_command_runner_windows.go

@@ -8,14 +8,21 @@ import (
 )
 
 func runWindowsSandboxCommand(config WindowsSandboxCommandConfig, stderr io.Writer) int {
-	if config.SandboxLevel != WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken {
+	switch config.SandboxLevel {
+	case WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken:
+		if err := ValidateWindowsSandboxSetupMarker(WindowsSandboxSetupConfigFromCommand(config)); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(stderr, WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName+": "+err.Error())
+			return 1
+		}
+	case WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated:
+		if err := ensureWindowsUnelevatedSetup(config); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(stderr, WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName+": "+err.Error())
+			return 1
+		}
+	default:
 		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "%s: unsupported Windows sandbox level %q\n", WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName, config.SandboxLevel)
 		return 1
 	}
-	if err := ValidateWindowsSandboxSetupMarker(WindowsSandboxSetupConfigFromCommand(config)); err != nil {
-		fmt.Fprintln(stderr, WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName+": "+err.Error())
-		return 1
-	}
 	if err := ValidateWindowsNetworkPolicy(config.PermissionProfile.Network); err != nil {
 		fmt.Fprintln(stderr, WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName+": "+err.Error())
 		return 1
@@ -57,3 +64,32 @@ func runWindowsSandboxCommand(config WindowsSandboxCommandConfig, stderr io.Writ
 	}
 	return exitCode
 }
+
+// ensureWindowsUnelevatedSetup applies the workspace ACL plan from the current
+// (non-elevated) process so the write-restricted token has somewhere its
+// capability SIDs are granted. DACL edits on user-owned workspace and temp
+// roots need no Administrator rights; the WFP network filters DO, so this tier
+// provisions no network enforcement — the offline-marker SID composed into the
+// token stays inert until an elevated `zero sandbox setup` installs the block
+// filters. Applied plans are recorded by hash so repeat commands skip the
+// re-apply; like the elevated setup, grants are left in place (the rollback is
+// deliberately discarded) because they only name synthetic capability SIDs
+// that no other token carries.
+func ensureWindowsUnelevatedSetup(config WindowsSandboxCommandConfig) error {
+	applied, plan, err := buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	marker, err := loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(config.SandboxHome)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if marker.contains(applied) {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if _, err := applyWindowsACLPlan(plan); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("apply unelevated workspace ACLs: %w — the workspace may be on a filesystem the current user does not own; "+
+			"run `zero sandbox setup` from an elevated (Administrator) terminal, or re-run with `--sandbox forbid` to skip OS sandboxing", err)
+	}
+	return recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config.SandboxHome, applied)
+}

internal/sandbox/windows_degrade_test.go

@@ -2,14 +2,16 @@ package sandbox
 
 import (
 	"errors"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 )
 
-// On Windows, a not-yet-set-up sandbox must DEGRADE (run unwrapped with a
-// downgrade reason) on the default preference — never brick the command — while
-// a strict --sandbox require still errors with a setup hint. Once the marker
-// exists, enforcement is native and the command wraps.
-func TestWindowsDegradesWhenSandboxNotInitialized(t *testing.T) {
+// On Windows, a not-yet-set-up sandbox must fall back to the UNELEVATED tier
+// (wrapped through the runner with the write-restricted token, network left to
+// the approval gate) on the default preference — never brick the command —
+// while a strict --sandbox require still errors with a setup hint. Once the
+// marker exists, enforcement is native and the command wraps.
+func TestWindowsFallsBackUnelevatedWhenSandboxNotInitialized(t *testing.T) {
 	restore := windowsSandboxInitialized
 	t.Cleanup(func() { windowsSandboxInitialized = restore })
 
@@ -24,13 +26,70 @@ func TestWindowsDegradesWhenSandboxNotInitialized(t *testing.T) {
 		ValidateExecution: true,
 	}
 
-	// Marker missing + auto -> degrade (unwrapped, with a reason), no error.
+	// Marker missing + auto -> unelevated tier: still wrapped, with a reason
+	// documenting the missing network enforcement, no error.
 	windowsSandboxInitialized = func() bool { return false }
 	auto := base
 	auto.Preference = SandboxPreferenceAuto
 	req, err := mgr.BuildExecutionRequest(auto)
 	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("auto must degrade, not error: %v", err)
+		t.Fatalf("auto must fall back, not error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if req.EnforcementLevel != EnforcementUnelevated {
+		t.Fatalf("enforcement = %v, want unelevated", req.EnforcementLevel)
+	}
+	if !req.CommandWrapped {
+		t.Fatal("unelevated command must still be wrapped through the sandbox runner")
+	}
+	if req.DowngradeReason == "" || !strings.Contains(req.DowngradeReason, "network") {
+		t.Fatalf("downgrade reason = %q, want an explanation of the missing network enforcement", req.DowngradeReason)
+	}
+
+	// Marker missing + require -> hard error pointing at setup.
+	require := base
+	require.Preference = SandboxPreferenceRequire
+	if _, err := mgr.BuildExecutionRequest(require); !errors.Is(err, errWindowsSandboxNotInitialized) {
+		t.Fatalf("require must error with the setup hint, got %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Marker present -> native, wrapped, no downgrade reason.
+	windowsSandboxInitialized = func() bool { return true }
+	req, err = mgr.BuildExecutionRequest(auto)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("initialized auto: %v", err)
+	}
+	if req.EnforcementLevel != EnforcementNative || !req.CommandWrapped {
+		t.Fatalf("initialized -> native wrapped, got enforcement=%v wrapped=%v", req.EnforcementLevel, req.CommandWrapped)
+	}
+	if req.DowngradeReason != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("native downgrade reason = %q, want empty", req.DowngradeReason)
+	}
+}
+
+// A profile that needs the platform sandbox ONLY for network isolation gains
+// nothing from the unelevated tier (which cannot enforce network), so it must
+// keep the old degrade-to-policy-gate behavior.
+func TestWindowsNetworkOnlyProfileStillDegradesWhenNotInitialized(t *testing.T) {
+	restore := windowsSandboxInitialized
+	t.Cleanup(func() { windowsSandboxInitialized = restore })
+	windowsSandboxInitialized = func() bool { return false }
+
+	mgr := NewSandboxManager(SandboxManagerOptions{
+		GOOS:    "windows",
+		Backend: Backend{Name: BackendWindowsRestrictedToken, Available: true, Executable: "zero.exe", Platform: "windows"},
+	})
+	req, err := mgr.BuildExecutionRequest(SandboxManagerRequest{
+		WorkspaceRoot: `C:\ws`,
+		Command:       CommandSpec{Name: "bash", Args: []string{"-c", "echo hi"}},
+		Policy:        DefaultPolicy(),
+		Profile: PermissionProfile{
+			FileSystem: FileSystemPolicy{Kind: FileSystemUnrestricted, IncludePlatformRoots: true, AllowTemp: true},
+			Network:    NetworkPolicy{Mode: NetworkDeny},
+		},
+		Preference: SandboxPreferenceAuto,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("network-only profile must degrade, not error: %v", err)
 	}
 	if req.EnforcementLevel != EnforcementDegraded {
 		t.Fatalf("enforcement = %v, want degraded", req.EnforcementLevel)
@@ -41,21 +100,4 @@ func TestWindowsDegradesWhenSandboxNotInitialized(t *testing.T) {
 	if req.DowngradeReason == "" {
 		t.Fatal("expected a downgrade reason explaining the missing setup")
 	}
-
-	// Marker missing + require -> hard error pointing at setup.
-	require := base
-	require.Preference = SandboxPreferenceRequire
-	if _, err := mgr.BuildExecutionRequest(require); !errors.Is(err, errWindowsSandboxNotInitialized) {
-		t.Fatalf("require must error with the setup hint, got %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Marker present -> native, wrapped.
-	windowsSandboxInitialized = func() bool { return true }
-	req, err = mgr.BuildExecutionRequest(auto)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("initialized auto: %v", err)
-	}
-	if req.EnforcementLevel != EnforcementNative || !req.CommandWrapped {
-		t.Fatalf("initialized -> native wrapped, got enforcement=%v wrapped=%v", req.EnforcementLevel, req.CommandWrapped)
-	}
 }

internal/sandbox/windows_process_windows.go

@@ -87,11 +87,20 @@ func windowsCommandLine(args []string) (string, error) {
 	if len(args) == 0 {
 		return "", errorsNewWindowsProcess("missing command")
 	}
-	out := make([]string, 0, len(args))
 	for _, arg := range args {
 		if strings.ContainsRune(arg, 0) {
 			return "", errorsNewWindowsProcess("command argument contains NUL")
 		}
+	}
+	// Zero's cmd.exe shell invocation needs its final element (the shell
+	// command text) reaching cmd.exe raw, not escaped like a normal argv
+	// element: see WindowsShellCommandLine for why. Every other command this
+	// runner might launch is escaped normally below.
+	if commandLine, ok := windowsShellCommandLineFromArgs(args); ok {
+		return commandLine, nil
+	}
+	out := make([]string, 0, len(args))
+	for _, arg := range args {
 		out = append(out, syscall.EscapeArg(arg))
 	}
 	return strings.Join(out, " "), nil

internal/sandbox/windows_runner.go

@@ -95,10 +95,66 @@ type WindowsSandboxLevel string
 
 const (
 	WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken WindowsSandboxLevel = "restricted-token"
-	WindowsSandboxLevelElevated        WindowsSandboxLevel = "elevated"
-	WindowsSandboxLevelDisabled        WindowsSandboxLevel = "disabled"
+	// WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated is the restricted-token tier without the
+	// elevated setup: the runner applies the workspace ACL plan itself before
+	// launching (no Administrator rights needed) and skips the elevated setup
+	// marker check. Network is NOT enforced at this level — the WFP filters need
+	// the elevated setup — so callers must keep network behind the approval gate.
+	WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated WindowsSandboxLevel = "unelevated"
+	WindowsSandboxLevelElevated   WindowsSandboxLevel = "elevated"
+	WindowsSandboxLevelDisabled   WindowsSandboxLevel = "disabled"
 )
 
+// WindowsShellArgs returns cmd.exe's argv (after the executable name) for
+// running commandText as a shell command on Windows: no wrapping quotes and
+// no /S, so commandText reaches cmd.exe's own /C remainder parsing exactly as
+// written. See WindowsShellCommandLine for why that matters. Used both as
+// CommandSpec.Args for the plain (unwrapped) path and, via
+// windowsShellCommandLineFromArgs, to recognize this same shape once it has
+// round-tripped through the sandboxed runner's CLI argv.
+func WindowsShellArgs(commandText string) []string {
+	return []string{"/d", "/c", commandText}
+}
+
+// WindowsShellCommandLine builds the raw command line a Windows CreateProcess
+// call should receive to run commandText as a shell command: "cmd.exe /d /c "
+// followed by commandText completely unescaped.
+//
+// cmd.exe's own /C remainder parsing is not CommandLineToArgvW-compatible: it
+// applies its own quote-stripping heuristic (documented in `cmd /?`) whenever
+// the remainder starts with a literal quote, and that heuristic does not
+// understand backslash-escaped inner quotes the way a normal argv consumer
+// would. A command like `python -c "print(15 / 3)"` passed through the
+// standard exec.Cmd Args mechanism gets wrapped in an outer pair of quotes
+// (because it contains spaces) with its own quotes escaped as \" — exactly
+// the shape that heuristic corrupts, stripping the outer quotes but leaving
+// the literal backslashes behind. Passing commandText through raw, exactly as
+// the model wrote it, means cmd.exe parses it the same way it would if typed
+// directly at an interactive prompt: a leading quoted executable path like
+// `"C:\Program Files\foo.exe" arg` is preserved correctly by cmd.exe's own
+// quote-preserving special case, and a command with no leading quote at all,
+// like the python example above, is never touched by the stripping heuristic
+// in the first place.
+func WindowsShellCommandLine(commandText string) string {
+	return "cmd.exe /d /c " + commandText
+}
+
+// windowsShellCommandLineFromArgs reports whether args is exactly
+// ["cmd.exe"]+WindowsShellArgs(text) for some text and, if so, returns
+// WindowsShellCommandLine's result for that text. The sandboxed runner path
+// only has the deserialized argv (WindowsSandboxCommandConfig.Command) to
+// work from, not the original commandText, so it recovers the raw command
+// line by recognizing the shape instead.
+func windowsShellCommandLineFromArgs(args []string) (string, bool) {
+	if len(args) != 4 {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	if !strings.EqualFold(args[0], "cmd.exe") || args[1] != "/d" || args[2] != "/c" {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	return WindowsShellCommandLine(args[3]), true
+}
+
 type WindowsSandboxCommandArgsOptions struct {
 	SandboxHome       string
 	CommandCWD        string
@@ -271,13 +327,20 @@ func windowsRestrictedTokenCommandPlan(execRequest SandboxExecutionRequest, poli
 		return CommandPlan{}, err
 	}
 	childEnv := windowsSandboxChildEnv(spec.Env, policy, execRequest.WorkspaceRoot)
+	// The unelevated enforcement tier maps to the runner's unelevated level: same
+	// restricted token, but the runner applies the workspace ACLs itself instead
+	// of requiring the elevated setup marker.
+	level := WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken
+	if execRequest.EnforcementLevel == EnforcementUnelevated {
+		level = WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated
+	}
 	args, err := BuildWindowsSandboxCommandArgs(WindowsSandboxCommandArgsOptions{
 		SandboxHome:       sandboxHome,
 		CommandCWD:        spec.Dir,
 		WorkspaceRoots:    []string{execRequest.WorkspaceRoot},
 		PermissionProfile: execRequest.PermissionProfile,
 		Env:               childEnv,
-		SandboxLevel:      WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken,
+		SandboxLevel:      level,
 		Command:           append([]string{spec.Name}, spec.Args...),
 	})
 	if err != nil {
@@ -381,7 +444,7 @@ func nextWindowsSandboxFlagValue(args []string, index int) (string, int, error)
 
 func validWindowsSandboxLevel(level WindowsSandboxLevel) bool {
 	switch level {
-	case WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken, WindowsSandboxLevelElevated, WindowsSandboxLevelDisabled:
+	case WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken, WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated, WindowsSandboxLevelElevated, WindowsSandboxLevelDisabled:
 		return true
 	default:
 		return false

internal/sandbox/windows_runner_test.go

@@ -147,3 +147,56 @@ func TestRunWindowsSandboxCommandRunnerRejectsInvalidArgs(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want runner name", stderr.String())
 	}
 }
+
+func TestWindowsShellArgsHasNoSAndKeepsCommandTextWhole(t *testing.T) {
+	args := WindowsShellArgs(`python -c "print(15 / 3)"`)
+	want := []string{"/d", "/c", `python -c "print(15 / 3)"`}
+	if len(args) != len(want) {
+		t.Fatalf("args = %#v, want %#v", args, want)
+	}
+	for index := range want {
+		if args[index] != want[index] {
+			t.Fatalf("args = %#v, want %#v", args, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWindowsShellCommandLineLeavesCommandTextUnescaped(t *testing.T) {
+	// The whole point of this function: commandText's own quotes must reach
+	// cmd.exe exactly as written, not re-quoted or backslash-escaped the way
+	// a normal argv-escaping function (like syscall.EscapeArg) would treat an
+	// argument containing spaces and embedded quotes.
+	commandText := `python -c "print(15 / 3)"`
+	got := WindowsShellCommandLine(commandText)
+	want := `cmd.exe /d /c python -c "print(15 / 3)"`
+	if got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("WindowsShellCommandLine = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWindowsShellCommandLineFromArgsRecognizesTheShellShape(t *testing.T) {
+	commandLine, ok := windowsShellCommandLineFromArgs([]string{"cmd.exe", "/d", "/c", `echo "hi"`})
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("windowsShellCommandLineFromArgs did not recognize the shell shape")
+	}
+	if want := `cmd.exe /d /c echo "hi"`; commandLine != want {
+		t.Fatalf("commandLine = %q, want %q", commandLine, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWindowsShellCommandLineFromArgsRejectsOtherShapes(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := [][]string{
+		nil,
+		{"cmd.exe"},
+		{"cmd.exe", "/d", "/c"},
+		{"cmd.exe", "/d", "/c", "echo hi", "extra"},
+		{"git.exe", "/d", "/c", "echo hi"},
+		{"cmd.exe", "/s", "/c", "echo hi"},
+		{"cmd.exe", "/d", "/k", "echo hi"},
+	}
+	for _, args := range cases {
+		if _, ok := windowsShellCommandLineFromArgs(args); ok {
+			t.Fatalf("windowsShellCommandLineFromArgs(%#v) matched, want no match", args)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/sandbox/windows_unelevated.go

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+package sandbox
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+const windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion = 1
+
+// windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerMaxPlans bounds the applied-plan history so the
+// marker cannot grow without limit when a user hops between many workspaces.
+// Oldest entries are dropped first; re-applying an already-granted plan is
+// harmless, so eviction only costs a redundant ACL apply.
+const windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerMaxPlans = 64
+
+// WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan fingerprints one workspace ACL plan the
+// unelevated tier has applied. Unlike the elevated setup marker it carries no
+// network infrastructure hash: the unelevated tier never provisions WFP
+// filters, so there is nothing network-side to fingerprint.
+type WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan struct {
+	ACLPlanHash    string `json:"aclPlanHash"`
+	ACLPlanEntries int    `json:"aclPlanEntries"`
+}
+
+// WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker records which workspace ACL plans the command
+// runner has applied without elevation, keyed by plan hash, so repeat commands
+// in a known workspace skip the re-apply. One file serves every workspace under
+// a sandbox home (the elevated marker is instead a single-plan snapshot,
+// because its WFP half genuinely is machine-global).
+type WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker struct {
+	SchemaVersion int                            `json:"schemaVersion"`
+	AppliedPlans  []WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan `json:"appliedPlans,omitempty"`
+}
+
+func WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerPath(sandboxHome string) string {
+	return filepath.Join(filepath.Clean(sandboxHome), "windows-unelevated-setup.json")
+}
+
+// buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan derives the ACL plan for the command's
+// permission profile plus its marker fingerprint. The same BuildWindowsACLPlan
+// output later feeds the apply step, so the fingerprint and the applied grants
+// can never drift apart.
+func buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config WindowsSandboxCommandConfig) (WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan, WindowsACLPlan, error) {
+	plan, err := BuildWindowsACLPlan(config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan{}, WindowsACLPlan{}, err
+	}
+	hash, err := WindowsACLPlanHash(plan)
+	if err != nil {
+		return WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan{}, WindowsACLPlan{}, err
+	}
+	return WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan{
+		ACLPlanHash:    hash,
+		ACLPlanEntries: len(plan.Entries),
+	}, plan, nil
+}
+
+// loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker reads the marker; a missing file is the
+// common first-run state and returns an empty marker, not an error. A marker
+// with an unexpected schema version or a corrupt/truncated body is likewise
+// treated as empty so the runner re-applies (and rewrites) rather than failing:
+// the marker only memoizes idempotent ACL applies, so resetting it can only
+// cost redundant work, never skip enforcement.
+func loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(sandboxHome string) (WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker, error) {
+	sandboxHome = strings.TrimSpace(sandboxHome)
+	if sandboxHome == "" {
+		return WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker{}, errors.New("windows sandbox home is required")
+	}
+	path := WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerPath(sandboxHome)
+	bytes, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
+			return WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker{SchemaVersion: windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion}, nil
+		}
+		return WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker{}, fmt.Errorf("read windows unelevated setup marker: %w", err)
+	}
+	var marker WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(bytes, &marker); err != nil {
+		return WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker{SchemaVersion: windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion}, nil
+	}
+	if marker.SchemaVersion != windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion {
+		return WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker{SchemaVersion: windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion}, nil
+	}
+	return marker, nil
+}
+
+func (marker WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker) contains(applied WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan) bool {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(applied.ACLPlanHash) == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, plan := range marker.AppliedPlans {
+		if plan.ACLPlanHash == applied.ACLPlanHash && plan.ACLPlanEntries == applied.ACLPlanEntries {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan appends the plan to the marker (dropping
+// the oldest entries past the cap) and writes it atomically, following the
+// temp-file-then-rename pattern of the sibling marker writers.
+func recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(sandboxHome string, applied WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan) error {
+	marker, err := loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(sandboxHome)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if marker.contains(applied) {
+		return nil
+	}
+	marker.SchemaVersion = windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion
+	marker.AppliedPlans = append(marker.AppliedPlans, applied)
+	if overflow := len(marker.AppliedPlans) - windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerMaxPlans; overflow > 0 {
+		marker.AppliedPlans = append([]WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(nil), marker.AppliedPlans[overflow:]...)
+	}
+	path := WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerPath(sandboxHome)
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("create windows unelevated setup marker dir: %w", err)
+	}
+	bytes, err := json.MarshalIndent(marker, "", "  ")
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("marshal windows unelevated setup marker: %w", err)
+	}
+	tmp, err := os.CreateTemp(filepath.Dir(path), ".windows-unelevated-setup-*.tmp")
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("create windows unelevated setup marker temp file: %w", err)
+	}
+	tmpPath := tmp.Name()
+	if _, err := tmp.Write(bytes); err != nil {
+		_ = tmp.Close()
+		_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
+		return fmt.Errorf("write windows unelevated setup marker temp file: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := tmp.Close(); err != nil {
+		_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
+		return fmt.Errorf("close windows unelevated setup marker temp file: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := os.Rename(tmpPath, path); err != nil {
+		_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
+		return fmt.Errorf("replace windows unelevated setup marker: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}

internal/sandbox/windows_unelevated_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+package sandbox
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func testWindowsUnelevatedCommandConfig(t *testing.T) WindowsSandboxCommandConfig {
+	t.Helper()
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	return WindowsSandboxCommandConfig{
+		SandboxHome:    filepath.Join(root, ".zero-sandbox"),
+		CommandCWD:     root,
+		WorkspaceRoots: []string{root},
+		PermissionProfile: PermissionProfile{
+			FileSystem: FileSystemPolicy{
+				Kind:       FileSystemRestricted,
+				ReadRoots:  []string{root},
+				WriteRoots: []WritableRoot{{Root: root, ProtectedMetadataNames: []string{".git", ".zero", ".agents"}}},
+				AllowTemp:  true,
+			},
+			Network: NetworkPolicy{Mode: NetworkDeny},
+		},
+		SandboxLevel: WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated,
+		Command:      []string{"cmd.exe", "/c", "echo hi"},
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWindowsSandboxCommandArgsRoundTripUnelevatedLevel(t *testing.T) {
+	config := testWindowsUnelevatedCommandConfig(t)
+	args, err := BuildWindowsSandboxCommandArgs(WindowsSandboxCommandArgsOptions{
+		SandboxHome:       config.SandboxHome,
+		CommandCWD:        config.CommandCWD,
+		WorkspaceRoots:    config.WorkspaceRoots,
+		PermissionProfile: config.PermissionProfile,
+		SandboxLevel:      WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated,
+		Command:           config.Command,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("BuildWindowsSandboxCommandArgs: %v", err)
+	}
+	parsed, err := ParseWindowsSandboxCommandArgs(args)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ParseWindowsSandboxCommandArgs: %v", err)
+	}
+	if parsed.SandboxLevel != WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated {
+		t.Fatalf("round-tripped sandbox level = %q, want %q", parsed.SandboxLevel, WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlanFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
+	config := testWindowsUnelevatedCommandConfig(t)
+	applied, plan, err := buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan: %v", err)
+	}
+	if applied.ACLPlanHash == "" || applied.ACLPlanEntries == 0 || applied.ACLPlanEntries != len(plan.Entries) {
+		t.Fatalf("applied plan = %+v with %d plan entries, want a non-empty consistent fingerprint", applied, len(plan.Entries))
+	}
+	// Same config -> same fingerprint (the marker's dedupe key).
+	again, _, err := buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("rebuild: %v", err)
+	}
+	if again != applied {
+		t.Fatalf("fingerprint not stable: %+v then %+v", applied, again)
+	}
+	// An unrestricted profile has no ACL plan to apply and must error.
+	config.PermissionProfile.FileSystem.Kind = FileSystemUnrestricted
+	if _, _, err := buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected an error for an unrestricted filesystem profile")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerRecordAndLoad(t *testing.T) {
+	config := testWindowsUnelevatedCommandConfig(t)
+	applied, _, err := buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Missing marker file is the fresh-install state: empty, no error, no match.
+	marker, err := loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(config.SandboxHome)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load missing marker: %v", err)
+	}
+	if marker.contains(applied) {
+		t.Fatal("empty marker must not contain the plan")
+	}
+
+	if err := recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config.SandboxHome, applied); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("record: %v", err)
+	}
+	marker, err = loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(config.SandboxHome)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load recorded marker: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !marker.contains(applied) || len(marker.AppliedPlans) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("marker = %+v, want exactly the recorded plan", marker)
+	}
+
+	// Recording the same plan again must not duplicate it.
+	if err := recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config.SandboxHome, applied); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("re-record: %v", err)
+	}
+	marker, err = loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(config.SandboxHome)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reload marker: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(marker.AppliedPlans) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("marker has %d plans after duplicate record, want 1", len(marker.AppliedPlans))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerEvictsOldestPastCap(t *testing.T) {
+	home := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ".zero-sandbox")
+	first := WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan{ACLPlanHash: "hash-0", ACLPlanEntries: 1}
+	if err := recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(home, first); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("record first: %v", err)
+	}
+	for index := 1; index <= windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerMaxPlans; index++ {
+		plan := WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan{ACLPlanHash: fmt.Sprintf("hash-%d", index), ACLPlanEntries: index}
+		if err := recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(home, plan); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("record %d: %v", index, err)
+		}
+	}
+	marker, err := loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(home)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(marker.AppliedPlans) != windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerMaxPlans {
+		t.Fatalf("marker has %d plans, want the cap of %d", len(marker.AppliedPlans), windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerMaxPlans)
+	}
+	if marker.contains(first) {
+		t.Fatal("oldest plan should have been evicted past the cap")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSelfHealsCorruptFile(t *testing.T) {
+	home := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ".zero-sandbox")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(home, 0o700); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mkdir sandbox home: %v", err)
+	}
+	path := WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerPath(home)
+	// A truncated body must reset like an unknown schema, not brick every
+	// unelevated command until the file is hand-deleted.
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"schemaVersion":1,"appliedPlans":[{"aclPlanHash":"h`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write corrupt marker: %v", err)
+	}
+	marker, err := loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(home)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("corrupt marker must self-heal, got error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(marker.AppliedPlans) != 0 || marker.SchemaVersion != windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion {
+		t.Fatalf("corrupt marker must reset to empty current-schema marker, got %+v", marker)
+	}
+	// The healed marker must accept new recordings over the corrupt file.
+	applied := WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan{ACLPlanHash: "hash-heal", ACLPlanEntries: 2}
+	if err := recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(home, applied); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("record over corrupt marker: %v", err)
+	}
+	marker, err = loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(home)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reload healed marker: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !marker.contains(applied) {
+		t.Fatalf("healed marker = %+v, want the recorded plan", marker)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerResetsUnknownSchema(t *testing.T) {
+	home := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ".zero-sandbox")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(home, 0o700); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mkdir sandbox home: %v", err)
+	}
+	path := WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerPath(home)
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"schemaVersion":99,"appliedPlans":[{"aclPlanHash":"h","aclPlanEntries":1}]}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write marker: %v", err)
+	}
+	marker, err := loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(home)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(marker.AppliedPlans) != 0 || marker.SchemaVersion != windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion {
+		t.Fatalf("unknown schema must reset to empty current-schema marker, got %+v", marker)
+	}
+}

internal/sessions/exec_session.go

@@ -160,10 +160,7 @@ func FormatExecPrompt(prompt string, prepared PreparedExec) string {
 	if prepared.Mode == ModeNew || len(prepared.ContextEvents) == 0 {
 		return prompt
 	}
-	events := prepared.ContextEvents
-	if len(events) > 20 {
-		events = events[len(events)-20:]
-	}
+	events := promptContextEvents(prepared.ContextEvents)
 
 	lines := []string{}
 	for _, event := range events {
@@ -187,6 +184,25 @@ func FormatExecPrompt(prompt string, prepared PreparedExec) string {
 	}, "\n")
 }
 
+func promptContextEvents(events []Event) []Event {
+	const maxPromptContextEvents = 80
+
+	filtered := make([]Event, 0, len(events))
+	for _, event := range events {
+		switch event.Type {
+		case EventMessage, EventCompaction, EventSessionFork, EventSessionChild, EventSpecialistStart, EventSpecialistStop, EventError:
+			filtered = append(filtered, event)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(filtered) == 0 {
+		filtered = append(filtered, events...)
+	}
+	if len(filtered) > maxPromptContextEvents {
+		filtered = filtered[len(filtered)-maxPromptContextEvents:]
+	}
+	return filtered
+}
+
 func forkTitle(title string) string {
 	if title == "" {
 		return ""