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Author SHA1 Message Date
Vasanthdev2004 c4de52a5c5 Address CodeRabbit re-review: anti-averaging README + fixture-isolation test
Re-review at d0615249 asked for the pass-rate contract to be loud to
downstream consumers and for the fixture-isolation property to be asserted,
not just read from code.

- reports/README.md gains a prominent 'do not average the tier pass rates /
  do not report a single pass rate' warning. The schema offers no headline
  pass rate on purpose; a consumer must name the tier it is reporting. This
  is the durability fix for the misread the tier split exists to prevent.
- turn_bench_test.go gains TestCopyFixtureIsolatesSourceFromMutation: copies
  a fixture, mutates the copy, and asserts the source is byte-identical
  (and that a file added to the copy never appears in the source). Proves the
  'fixtures stay clean across runs' property without needing the binary.

Items the re-review also raised that were already satisfied: the
oracle-presence-over-declared-list precedence is documented on the
BuildOnlyClasses field (taskbench.go), and the PR body already says
'48-task manifest'. The Share->exclusiveShare rename is tracked in #701.

go build/vet/gofmt clean; go test -race green for perfbench.
2026-07-16 14:52:24 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 d061524989 Address CodeRabbit review on 2bfb3406: omitempty + crash visibility
Three findings from CodeRabbit's review of the 3-tier pass-rate fix:

- BuildPassRate dropped its omitempty so an explicit 0.0 (all refactor
  tasks fail to compile) is no longer indistinguishable from 'no build
  tasks ran' in the JSON. Matches CorrectnessPassRate's always-serialize
  behavior, which is the whole point of the tier split: the report
  cannot be misread.
- A crashed sample (outcome.Err) now emits a Warning mirroring the
  TraceIssue path, so a run that died every iteration can't look like a
  normal benchmark with fewer measurements instead of a failure.
- cmd.Run()'s returned error is preserved on the no-run_end path: when
  stderr is empty and Run failed (binary missing, exec permission
  denied), the actual OS error is reported instead of collapsing to the
  generic 'missing terminal run_end event'.

go build/vet/gofmt clean; go test -race green for perfbench/agent/trace.
2026-07-16 14:46:42 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 2bfb340668 perf(turn-bench): split pass/fail into oracle tiers so the pass rate can't be misread as correctness
The turn benchmark counted any exit-0 task as passed, including the 24
read-only tasks (nav/longproc/longctx/parallel) that carry no verification
oracle — so the JSON tasksPassed / "N/M passed" headline could read as a
correctness verdict it never was. Split pass/fail into three oracle tiers:

- correctness (edit grep + fix go test): the only pass rate that can move
  with model quality (tasksVerified / tasksPassed / correctnessPassRate)
- build-only (refactor go build): a non-positive oracle, reported as
  buildPassRate and excluded from correctnessPassRate; the manifest declares
  buildOnlyClasses: ["refactor"]
- latency-only (no oracle): counted in latencyOnlyTasks, never in any pass
  rate

NewTurnExecRunner no longer sets Passed=true for tasks with no
verificationCommand, and the summary headline names each tier explicitly so
an exit-0 read-only run cannot inflate a correctness number. Bumps
TurnSchemaVersion to 2. Class breakdown and tier contract documented in
internal/perfbench/MANIFEST.md and reports/README.md.

Also install the trace first-token/visible-event forwarding handlers in
agent.Run whenever options.Trace is set, not only when a UI OnText /
OnReasoning callback is set, so a headless traced run (zero exec --trace)
still captures FirstTokenAt. forwardedVisibleText stays tied to the user
callback so stall-retry semantics are unchanged. Adds a regression
assertion to the existing traced-run test.
2026-07-16 14:32:13 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 40806aa4b1 Fix exclusive-time round-trip, identical-interval nesting, and empty-trace parse
Three correctness bugs in the attribution model found by an adversarial review
of the prior commit, all undermining the no-double-count guarantee:

1. exclusive_ms:0 was overwritten with the inclusive Duration on re-parse. A
   parent whose children tile its interval legitimately has exclusive time 0;
   WriteNDJSON emits exclusive_ms:0, but ReadNDJSON's "<= 0 means missing"
   fallback turned that back into the full duration, so every re-parsed trace
   re-introduced the double-counting the model exists to prevent (the benchmark
   harness, which ranks re-parsed traces, inherits it). Gate the fallback on
   key ABSENCE, so a written 0 is preserved.

2. deriveNesting formed a 2-cycle for two spans with identical [start, end]
   intervals: the symmetric containment check made each parent the other,
   dropping both from top-level and zeroing AttributedDuration. Break the tie
   deterministically — strict containment is an unambiguous parent; for
   identical intervals, only the lower-indexed span may parent the other, so
   one stays top-level.

3. ReadNDJSON returned a valid empty TurnTrace for empty/blank-only input, so a
   run that crashed before emitting a trace (or where --trace was not honored)
   masqueraded as a clean zero-attribution sample. Empty input now errors, so
   the harness records a TraceIssue.

Also: decode counters via json.Number so int64 values above 2^53 round-trip
exactly instead of losing precision through float64; and drop the harness's
own "exclusive <= 0 -> Duration" ranking fallback, which was the same
double-count on the re-parsed path. Added regression tests covering the
zero-exclusive round-trip, the identical-interval nesting, empty-input
rejection, and counter precision.
2026-07-16 13:56:46 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 0f372f3844 Address review feedback: exclusive-time attribution + wired spans + fix-suite compile
Rewrite the trace attribution model so concurrent/nested spans no longer
double-count. Spans record wall intervals; the recorder derives a parent for
each by interval containment and computes exclusive time (duration minus the
union of its children). AttributedDuration sums only top-level spans; Coverage
is the union of intervals over wall, capped at 1, the honest ">=95%" metric.
Top-latency ranking uses exclusive time so shares sum to ~1 instead of being
inflated by overlapping provider_connect/generation and nested
permission_wait/tool_execution.

Wire the spans that were named but never stamped: verification around the
self-correct verify pass, and StampFirstVisibleEvent on the first forwarded
text event. Drop the tool_queue/process_wait/persistence constants that had no
stamps, and rename the misnamed near-noise prompt_build span to tool_partition.
Trim RequiredEventKeys to events a healthy short run actually emits; move
conditional phases (tools, permission, compaction, verification) to
OptionalEventKeys so a short trace does not false-fail.

Make ReadNDJSON fail loudly on a corrupt file: require a type:trace header,
error on span/counter lines that appear before it, and error when a header
yields no spans or counters.

Fix the blocking fix-suite compile error: Label's %d format verb on a string
tripped go test's vet before any fix task could verify. Make it a runtime
wrong-prefix bug ("admin-" vs "user-") that still type-checks, so each fix
task is independent again.

Manifest: correct refactor-04's stats.go to main.go, reword fix-07 to the
wrong-prefix bug, add a latency-only description (read-only tasks carry no
verification oracle by design), and frame the report README on exclusive time
and coverage.

Tests updated for the occurrence/exclusive/coverage model; trace, perfbench,
and agent green under -race.
2026-07-16 13:37:13 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 b3e6ef1f58 Address review feedback on the per-turn tracer + benchmark harness
Benchmark runner (internal/perfbench):
- A nonzero agent exit code no longer counts as Passed. The runner set
  VerifyErr but then fell through to outcome.Passed = true, so a crashed
  run could be recorded as a pass. Return before the verification block
  when VerifyErr is already set.
- A task now passes only when every iteration passes. The previous
  "any iteration passes" rule let a flaky fail hide behind one good run.
- Each invocation copies its workspace fixture to a fresh temp dir and
  runs the agent + verifier there, so mutating tasks (edit/fix/refactor)
  can't dirty the checked-in fixtures or bleed into the next iteration.
- Trace load failures (missing/malformed trace file) are surfaced as
  result warnings via a new TraceIssue field instead of being swallowed.

Tracer (internal/trace):
- Finish freezes the recorder: Counter, addSpan, and the first-event
  stamps are dropped after Finish returns, so a snapshot captures exactly
  one turn and late stamps can't mutate it.
- WriteText propagates the first write error instead of silently
  swallowing sink failures.

Provider seam (internal/providers/providerio):
- FirstTokenAt is stamped only after a payload is accepted as real model
  output, not before handle() decides to drop it as an error payload.

Agent loop (internal/agent):
- The compaction counter increments only when the history actually
  shrinks, in both the proactive and reactive paths — paid no-ops no
  longer inflate the compaction total.
- Document on Options.Trace that a fresh Recorder is required per Run.

CLI (internal/cli/exec):
- Finish the trace at the agent.Run boundary and defer only the
  serialization, so the snapshot covers exactly the turn.
- Reject --trace / ZERO_TRACE for spec-draft runs with a clear error
  instead of silently accepting and writing nothing.

Manifest + fixtures:
- Strengthen the edit verifiers: rename and value-bump tasks now assert
  the old symbol is gone, and the getter task greps the method signature.
- Add the missing testdata/edit fixture (10 edit tasks referenced a
  directory that was never committed, so the whole edit class errored
  out at run time).
- The manifest test now stats each fixture so a missing dir fails at
  load time instead of at every run.
- longproc benchmark keeps Process live across the loop; README code
  fence gets a language tag and documents the per-invocation fixture copy.
- Add tests for the tracing wrapper (nil vs wired recorder, OnUsage
  forwarding, token aggregation) and the frozen-recorder contract.
2026-07-16 12:45:15 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 6896fee475 test(trace): make TestAttributionRatio clock-independent
The test recorded two synthetic 10ms spans with no real delay and asserted
the attribution ratio stayed <= 1.0. On a precise clock (Linux/macOS CI) the
wall is microseconds while attributed is 20ms, so attributed/wall blows past
1.0 and the test failed — even though the ratio legitimately exceeds 1.0
when spans overlap (parallel tool execution). On Windows the coarse timer
masked it, so the failure only surfaced in CI.

Assert the contract instead: attributed is the deterministic sum of span
durations, and the ratio equals attributed/wall (0 when wall is zero). Add a
zero-wall case for the divide-by-zero guard.
2026-07-16 12:19:17 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 2ec91f4493 Add per-turn tracing and a turn-benchmark harness (Phase 0 baseline)
Introduce an opt-in `internal/trace` package that attributes a run's wall
time to named spans — prompt build, provider connect/queue, generation,
tool queue/execution, permission wait, verification, compaction,
persistence — plus counters for model requests, tool calls, retries,
reconnects, compactions, completion nudges, acceptance checks, model
switches, and input/cached/output tokens. The recorder is nil-safe (a nil
*Recorder is a no-op), so every stamp site can call it unguarded; an
untraced run is byte-identical to today.

The recorder threads into agent.Run via a new `Options.Trace` field and a
single `trace.WithContext` assignment, so the shared providerio seam
(connect around client.Do, queue around OAuth resolve, first token at the
first non-keepalive SSE payload) reaches it through `trace.FromContext`
without any provider-interface change. All instrumentation is opt-in: when
`Options.Trace` is nil the hot path is untouched.

Headless `zero exec` gains `--trace <path>` (and `ZERO_TRACE=<path>`),
writing an agenteval-contract-compatible NDJSON trace (`-` for stderr).
The trace is pure observation; enabling it does not change behavior.

A new per-turn benchmark harness extends `internal/perfbench` (reusing the
existing TaskSet/NumericStats/subprocess runner shapes): `RunTurnBench`
aggregates per-span median/P95 across iterations, ranks the top three
controllable latency sources by share of attributed time, rolls up per
task class, and totals tokens/counts. A checked-in 42-task manifest across
seven classes (nav, edit, fix, refactor, longproc, longctx, parallel) and
local offline fixtures back it, and `make baseline` runs it against the
built `zero`, writing `internal/perfbench/reports/baseline.json`. The
report is machine-specific and regenerated, not hand-edited.

The manifest is JSON rather than YAML to avoid adding a dependency;
per-task verification targets the specific test (`go test -run <name>`)
so fix tasks are independent. Each task is a fresh `zero exec` process, so
iterations are cold-start samples; a warm in-process path is left for
follow-up.

Verified: `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `gofmt -l` clean on touched
files; `go test -race` green for internal/trace, internal/agent,
internal/perfbench, and cmd/zero-perf-bench.
2026-07-16 12:04:21 +05:30
527 changed files with 6710 additions and 46041 deletions

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
*.go text eol=lf
*.mod text eol=lf
*.sum text eol=lf
-6
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@@ -1,11 +1,5 @@
blank_issues_enabled: false
contact_links:
- name: Questions and setup help
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a
about: Ask in Discussions Q&A. Include zero --version, your OS, provider/model, and zero doctor output for setup problems.
- name: Feature ideas
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas
about: Propose and discuss ideas in Discussions before opening a PR (Zero is in controlled development, see CONTRIBUTING.md).
- name: Security vulnerability
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/security/advisories/new
about: Report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories (see SECURITY.md). Do not file a public issue.
+3 -13
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@@ -1,22 +1,12 @@
name: Feature request (previously discussed)
description: File only after your idea gained traction in Discussions Ideas or a maintainer asked for a tracking issue
name: Feature request
description: Propose a new capability or change
labels: ["enhancement"]
body:
- type: markdown
attributes:
value: |
New feature ideas start in [Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
not here. This form is for the step after that: an idea that gained traction in Discussions,
or one a maintainer asked to have tracked as an issue. Please link the discussion below.
Do not begin implementation until the issue has been reviewed and marked with the
Please do not begin implementation until the issue has been reviewed and marked with the
`issue-approved` label (see CONTRIBUTING.md).
- type: input
id: discussion
attributes:
label: Ideas discussion
description: Link to the Discussions Ideas thread (or note which maintainer asked for this issue).
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: problem
attributes:
+12 -33
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@@ -30,36 +30,6 @@ jobs:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
- name: Install Make on Windows
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
shell: pwsh
run: choco install make --no-progress -y
- name: Validate quality targets with stock macOS Make
if: matrix.os == 'macos-latest'
env:
GIT_CONFIG_COUNT: 1
GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0: grep.patternType
GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0: fixed
run: make -n vulncheck
- name: Check vulnerabilities through native Windows Make
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
shell: cmd
run: make vulncheck
- name: Check dead code through native Windows Make
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
continue-on-error: true
shell: cmd
run: make deadcode
- name: Run static lint through native Windows Make
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
continue-on-error: true
shell: cmd
run: make lint-static
- name: Check formatting
if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
shell: bash
@@ -130,18 +100,27 @@ jobs:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
# govulncheck, deadcode, and golangci-lint each resolve a toolchain from
# their own modules, which can drop below the version go.mod requires and
# then fail to load our packages. Pin GOTOOLCHAIN to the go.mod toolchain
# so all three run under it.
- name: Pin toolchain from go.mod
run: |
toolchain="$(awk '/^toolchain /{print $2}' go.mod)"
echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=${toolchain:-auto}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
# Hard gate: fails the build when code reaches a known vulnerability. A stdlib
# CVE is cleared by a toolchain bump (see go.mod). May also flag a newly
# published advisory on an unrelated PR — intentional: do not ship known vulns.
- name: govulncheck
run: make vulncheck
run: go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...
# Advisory: reports functions unreachable from any cmd/* main so dormant
# code is visible in CI. Non-blocking while the dormant subsystems are
# still being wired or removed.
- name: deadcode (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: make deadcode
run: go run golang.org/x/tools/cmd/[email protected] -test=false ./...
# Advisory: catches what deadcode's whole-program reachability analysis
# doesn't, unused private functions/assignments reachable within a
@@ -151,4 +130,4 @@ jobs:
# the repo are cleaned up incrementally (see #527).
- name: golangci-lint (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: make lint-static
run: go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...
-3
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@@ -55,6 +55,3 @@ docs/superpowers/
zero-termux-arm64
zero-linux-sandbox
zero-seccomp
# Generated benchmark reports are evidence for one configuration, never tree state
internal/perfbench/reports/*.json
+1 -1
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@@ -1 +1 @@
{".":"0.6.0"}
{".":"0.3.0"}
+19 -97
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@@ -1,105 +1,27 @@
# Repository Guidelines for Zero
---
description: Project guidelines for the open-source CLI coding agent (zero) repository.
globs: "*.go, *.js, *.md, *.json, *.toml, *.yaml, *.yml"
alwaysApply: false
---
These instructions apply to all work in this repository. For the user-facing
guide to extending Zero with specialists, hooks, plugins, MCP, and skills, see
[docs/EXTENDING.md](docs/EXTENDING.md).
# Repository Conventions for Zero
## 1. Contribution and Pull Request Rules
This file outlines the project conventions and repository guidelines for coding agents when working on the `zero` repository. For the general guide on how to extend Zero (write specialist sub-agents, hooks, plugins, MCP, skills), see [docs/EXTENDING.md](docs/EXTENDING.md).
- Before opening any pull request, **all contributors**—including maintainers,
community contributors, and coding agents—must read and follow
[CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md).
- Community pull requests require an existing parent issue with the
`issue-approved` label. Team members may open pull requests through the
internal development process described in `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
- Keep each change focused on the approved or assigned scope. Do not include
unrelated fixes, refactors, formatting churn, generated output, or existing
local changes in the same commit or pull request.
- Discuss new implementation languages, runtimes, major dependency changes,
and broad architectural rewrites with maintainers before implementation.
- Pull request descriptions must explain what changed and why, link the parent
issue when required, and list the tests or verification performed. Include
screenshots or a short recording for user-visible UI changes when practical.
## 1. Project Conventions
## 2. Repository and Implementation Conventions
- Build with `make`, not `go build` directly.
- Tests live next to the source file (`foo_test.go` next to `foo.go`).
- Run `make lint` before opening a PR.
- Never edit files under `third_party/` — those are vendored.
- Unify functions/methods where possible to prevent codebase inflation. Prefer a single cross-platform function with conditional checks over duplicating helpers per platform.
- Use the Go version declared in `go.mod`. Do not hardcode a different local
toolchain version in scripts or documentation.
- Use the repository build and release commands (`make` and
`go run ./cmd/zero-release ...`) instead of inventing parallel build flows.
- Keep tests beside their source files (`foo_test.go` next to `foo.go`). Add a
regression test for behavior changes and run affected concurrent code under
the race detector.
- Never edit files under `third_party/`; they are vendored.
- Prefer one cross-platform function with small conditional checks over
duplicated platform-specific helpers when the behavior can remain unified.
- Do not commit generated benchmark reports from
`internal/perfbench/reports/*.json`; reports are configuration-specific
evidence, not repository state.
- Preserve the user's working tree. Do not overwrite, delete, stage, or commit
unrelated tracked or untracked files.
## 2. Guidelines for Coding Agents
## 3. Required Validation
If you are an AI coding agent executing tasks in this repository, you **MUST** run all Go code quality and security checks before committing code or completing your task:
Run validation from the repository root before committing, opening a pull
request, or completing an implementation task:
1. **Format & Vet**: Run `go fmt ./...` and `go vet ./...`.
2. **Lint**: Run `go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
3. **Security**: Run `go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.
1. **Formatting check**: `make fmt-check`. If it fails, format with
`go fmt ./...` (or `make fmt`) and run the check again.
2. **Vet**: `go vet ./...` (or `make vet`).
3. **Tests**: `go test ./...`. Use `make test` for the full race-enabled suite,
or run focused tests with `-race`, when concurrency is affected.
4. **Build**: `go run ./cmd/zero-release build`.
5. **Smoke test**: `go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke`.
6. **Advisory lint**: `make lint-static`.
7. **Security**: `make vulncheck`.
8. **Diff hygiene**: `git diff HEAD --check` (covers staged and unstaged
tracked changes).
`make lint` currently runs the formatting check and `go vet`; it does **not**
run golangci-lint. The pinned golangci-lint job is advisory in CI while the
existing repository-wide backlog is cleaned up. Fix findings introduced by or
related to the current change. Unrelated pre-existing advisory findings do not
justify expanding a focused pull request; report them separately.
Formatting, vet, tests, build, smoke, diff hygiene, and govulncheck are hard
requirements. If a related check fails, fix it. If a required check cannot run
because of the environment or fails for an unrelated external reason, report
the exact failure and obtain maintainer direction rather than silently ignoring
it.
## 4. Common Review Blockers
These classes drive multi-round reviews. Fix them before requesting review:
- **Fresh base:** Rebase onto the current PR base (`main` or stacked target)
before review. A stale head that rolls back mainline commits is a hard
blocker, not a merge-time detail. Resolve conflicts by keeping upstream
behavior unless the PR intentionally changes it.
- **Platform truth:** Code and tests must pass on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
Compare paths after canonicalization (physical/`EvalSymlinks` form); never
assert raw `t.TempDir()` spellings (`/var` vs `/private/var` on macOS, short
paths on Windows). Prefer one cross-platform function with small `GOOS`
checks over duplicated helpers that drift.
- **Security edges:** Keep secrets out of argv, env dumps, and logs. Redact
success and error paths (including stderr). Fail closed on ownership, lease,
and permission checks. Do not rely on pre-open path resolution
(`EvalSymlinks` then open) for containment: that is a check-to-use race.
Bind containment at open/use time with rooted or handle-relative,
traversal-resistant APIs. If a no-follow API is used, apply it to every
traversed component and enforce the platform's reparse-point protections;
final-component-only no-follow is insufficient. On multi-step setup, roll back
only what this run created; never destroy pre-existing resources you did
not create; never report success when cleanup or unlock failed.
- **Atomic shared state:** Write a complete temporary file, then atomically
replace the destination so concurrent readers never see a partial write.
Exclusive create or a write lock alone is not enough for readers. Serialize
the full read-modify-write sequence for lockfiles and shared stores.
- **Tests match the claim:** Every behavior or security-boundary change needs a
regression test, including the failure path. Path-sensitive logic needs at
least one non-Linux path case (or a hermetic fake that exercises the same
normalization).
- **Honest scope:** PR description, help text, and comments must match what
shipped. Wire advertised entry points or shrink the claim. Do not bundle
unrelated fixes. Do not widen security allowlists by name alone; check
classification and side effects too.
If any check fails or cannot be run, do not ignore it. Prompt the user for instructions or setup assistance before proceeding.
+4 -141
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@@ -6,138 +6,6 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## [0.6.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.5.0...v0.6.0) (2026-07-29)
### Features
* add persistent session goals ([#803](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/803)) ([5d1869e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5d1869e7bc193c97e07418b57b823905c1151d5d))
* **providers:** add Fireworks AI provider preset ([#772](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/772)) ([58daea7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/58daea7a482927e5ab35afaf97761c60bb35e113))
* **skills:** report hash drift in skill info ([#795](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/795)) ([9fbdc34](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9fbdc341551601c13434cf7b9b6f5e4ea4c483b1))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** interrupt idle reads on cancellation ([#782](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/782)) ([15b7a54](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/15b7a5475cfeefddbc59634551451a8872b996b7))
* **cli:** include plugins info in shell completions ([#794](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/794)) ([fa8734f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fa8734f17927de8832dfe041e043cfb86f93d12a))
* **config:** kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows ([#690](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/690)) ([5c58256](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5c58256abc29c185b449f8ce79647eb3fae61882))
* **config:** make the provider-command timeout an upper bound ([#811](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/811)) ([#813](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/813)) ([1c38e8c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1c38e8cba50db255f3cda8b7cf4298712b2933e1))
* **config:** stop billing provider-command fixtures to the 5s timeout ([#810](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/810)) ([f5fa4ff](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f5fa4ffc64537897aa78a56edca36d8f1dacd021))
* **cron:** reserve job IDs atomically ([#686](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/686)) ([d9b882e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d9b882eb0a94f38de8447cb54b57860ccd8ed053))
* **lint:** resolve static analysis baseline ([#769](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/769)) ([583e653](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/583e6530bd849a8efcb2b88bbe8c297e8592e62c))
* **providers:** retry provably pre-send transport failures ([#447](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/447)) ([#750](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/750)) ([8acd42a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8acd42a3bd743a35807d762f23a33fb61c171839))
* **sandbox:** add platform-specific write lock around grant state file ([#752](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/752)) ([#755](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/755)) ([88fb7b6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/88fb7b6192c1ac8173089967d5e9119f92d7a101))
* **sandbox:** clarify scoped permission prompts ([#798](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/798)) ([9fe02ae](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9fe02ae52e3234cb9dae76e0c5594a287ccbb52a))
* **sandbox:** deny reads of git's credential stores ([#815](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/815)) ([#816](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/816)) ([33c94ec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/33c94ec7a3e7987e6e36b5fd5e037ff4e6e84c26))
* **sandbox:** preserve user config and retry denied writes ([#801](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/801)) ([81a5e6c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/81a5e6cb716ba4b7ecf7ff3ff261dfa51fd01098))
* **sandbox:** scrub the daemon token file pointer ([#677](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/677)) ([#818](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/818)) ([3e7692d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3e7692d8f0885d346809869935c81a9cf055d89e))
* **swarm:** close lifecycle admission on shutdown ([#776](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/776)) ([bdbda89](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/bdbda89f3e42d93e8058ab3e1e9ef402659530cd))
* **tui:** fix rendering corruption over multipass + Windows Terminal ([#709](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/709)) ([5bb1bc1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5bb1bc11c3188dcea7709ff07c8b25dda3541de8))
* **tui:** paste clipboard images with Ctrl+V ([#534](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/534)) ([#807](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/807)) ([ec3b822](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ec3b8225050eb62f0f41a9582ed2881d2f9dcc8e))
* **tui:** reset quiet clock for new runs ([#799](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/799)) ([a4a805a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a4a805a6c82c51cb255e909bd87ca183c8805cf2))
* **windows:** use PowerShell for command execution ([#804](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/804)) ([518d2e5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/518d2e53ba3fa073090a9b41c278face85b59b64))
## [0.5.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0) (2026-07-22)
### Features
* **plugins:** add zero plugins info command ([#773](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/773)) ([2479884](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2479884dea49580c853a53536c3bbab22ce8a2bf))
* **sandbox:** disable the sandbox via config ([#687](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/687)) ([#746](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/746)) ([a21a052](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a21a052a4a32ce9cb3c93c94350cd24e138532cd))
* **sandbox:** unify command execution and enforcement ([#781](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/781)) ([96859c9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/96859c9bd16f6dad4e332efc7e68178b9116118a))
* **tui:** add /undo as an alias for /rewind ([#698](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/698)) ([#747](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/747)) ([8c6d302](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8c6d3022bd7801eaad6a0440bb21a27221887297))
* **tui:** add isolated /btw conversations ([#748](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/748)) ([2e267bd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2e267bdbee4a77813e93a7ab51f0c575b66cee8c))
* **tui:** permission prompt takes free-text feedback inline ([#780](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/780)) ([3967d49](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3967d49d64998341af8ef6d7523fc63aeb2a5a7a))
### Bug Fixes
* **agent:** stop write_stdin session_id probing thrash ([#702](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/702)) ([#749](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/749)) ([fbf8598](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fbf85984f679058125951fe2d5e4f200e09a3e2f))
* **cli:** warn when ZERO_PROVIDER overrides a providers-use selection ([#767](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/767)) ([3524f79](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3524f795e5fdbb827166a84f03351cedfc9eba30))
* **doctor:** detect missing native binary during runtime checks ([#450](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/450)) ([7796022](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/77960229b839dca856616f846839aa773f2923f7))
* **lsp:** make the real-gopls check opt-in so a broken gopls can't fail the suite ([#684](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/684)) ([#766](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/766)) ([b1f4173](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b1f41735a7f6b7928a1875e986a4dca39d106cb9))
* make extension installs transactional ([#762](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/762)) ([baa4be1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/baa4be13ac5321da4e9f53e864dd1cd395481200))
* **oauth:** refuse redirects on credential POSTs ([#729](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/729)) ([#741](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/741)) ([974fc03](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/974fc036c2f9a194722f2e8fddbb4fdbf797effe))
* **oauth:** validate discovered endpoints before merge/use ([#511](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/511)) ([#739](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/739)) ([ce4a996](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ce4a996ffac4482e704f0fd61b3e442398fb2401))
* **perfbench:** absolutize the bench binary and make errored tasks first-class ([#730](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/730)) ([dbd9443](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dbd94430143df6754d68551d1028ad8f15b82f1b))
* **perfbench:** grant write tools so mutating tasks measure real edits ([#763](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/763)) ([e1975c1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e1975c1b396b3236ed648870230b4f85863b1d03))
* **perfbench:** keep the stamped answer file out of negative oracle greps ([#737](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/737)) ([015452c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/015452c1c98a39eabb021324182094e188a8bd47))
* **providers:** stop "provider not found" for env-derived profiles ([#716](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/716)) ([4cbd144](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4cbd144d11e5cb67bc5fea46f5b294562dac7a1a))
* **sandbox:** AST second opinion for interactive-command bypasses ([#473](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/473)) ([#745](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/745)) ([f079b90](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f079b90f82dac7b7ae0864b279dc9094e31a6627))
* **sandbox:** bind Windows elevated ACL setup to one no-follow handle ([#765](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/765)) ([4945684](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4945684fa26aa5994eda59dcabedc817423c535d))
* **sandbox:** don't auto-allow shell when re-entrancy skips wrapping ([#727](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/727)) ([#744](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/744)) ([6849011](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/684901165d1b7f50a8bb4af31b1c1951e6926a79))
* **tools:** give write_stdin's invalid-session errors the same recovery guidance ([#749](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/749) follow-up) ([#768](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/768)) ([da9fb50](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/da9fb50f549f6701eb136fc99f6178d0772d9334))
* **tools:** read_file recovers a backwards line range instead of erroring ([#779](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/779)) ([89bdc67](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/89bdc6719a1e1b3a3ef0e36b91a7839b3efdfba9))
* **tui:** cache settled alt-screen transcript ([#647](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/647)) ([d74ceb1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d74ceb11271ed68a21c19248210e098f411805fb))
* **tui:** model rows labelled by id when the description is prose; keep the sidebar under the / palette ([#775](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/775)) ([b30c397](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b30c3971b40b06ba52ad649ba9dc0ad560d4be4c))
* **tui:** stop the permission card clashing on cool themes ([#778](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/778)) ([722bb31](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/722bb3121682d9cd9cd4bc6c127e9014d719262a))
### Performance Improvements
* **agent:** concurrent read-only tool batches via capability gate ([#715](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/715)) ([31d45d5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/31d45d5f14e915acb9946e8b8eb81632c48f126a))
* **agent:** execution profiles with one-shot posture escalation (PR10b+PR10c) ([#740](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/740)) ([378d538](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/378d538e240c289e57821e9f9628f76034419d01))
* **agent:** posture-escalation signals and controller (PR10a) ([#736](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/736)) ([af875df](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/af875df58775484304fc65586bd6c74552ad01a2))
* **agent:** preserve prompt cache prefixes ([#760](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/760)) ([739a47e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/739a47e3eac92c3decc8734f52a4d99c7480c3ca))
* **openai:** optimized turn session — background prewarm and prefix telemetry (PR8) ([#723](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/723)) ([60dc84e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/60dc84e7a38c5544ebc047f3cfaf4625dd1e83b5))
* **output:** add token-aware semantic output budgeting (PR11) ([#717](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/717)) ([e5670c4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e5670c427ff39c628fb0822fd5c9317ee2174583))
* **providers:** provider capabilities and default turn-session adapter (PR7) ([#720](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/720)) ([30e2c3f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/30e2c3f7ffa1d5e487bd10b59d4e823cda191d48))
* **turn-bench:** Phase 0 — strengthen oracles so pass rate can't be misread as correctness ([#712](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/712)) ([727ad4d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/727ad4d321fab45d0cf40f8535522e3d94e55c4a))
## [0.4.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.3.0...v0.4.0) (2026-07-17)
### Features
* **aimlapi:** AI/ML API provider with guided onboarding (top-up + key issuance) ([#655](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/655)) ([6b9c2f0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6b9c2f0c083e02bcd3aad68fb7af0501a9e7cd61))
* **cli:** show ZERO wordmark on --version ([#673](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/673)) ([9acb411](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9acb4113cc3337b3f361a16278e9cf11ca105e34))
* **cli:** wire MCP serve WorkspaceRoot and --add-dir scope ([#694](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/694)) ([75a78e7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/75a78e715bf23154f69c8c79cb58eb4b535b2a2a))
* **npm:** ship the native binary as platform optionalDependencies ([#626](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/626)) ([5e1405d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5e1405d0b7abff5b3ccb3cfdb66d64d6d3322922))
* **perf:** emit prompt-prefix hash fingerprint per turn ([#704](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/704)) ([1c5c6e7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1c5c6e78a8a0e228bdf53d7be90934fbce9d98c3))
* **providers:** add AI/ML API preset (rebased onto main) ([#621](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/621)) ([d66a9dd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d66a9dda69c32aa59f4bea903cfefe00d4b7adef))
* **providers:** refresh MiniMax model coverage ([#665](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/665)) ([fa3052a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fa3052a1422a4ad30a3a6295829564f42dee31a8))
* **skills:** discover shared ~/.agents/skills with multi-root skill loading ([#696](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/696)) ([7d57999](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7d579996b43741a2e57e3e38fcdd8484fcfc34e9))
* **tui:** Ctrl+X leader chords and emacs menu navigation ([#699](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/699)) ([7f669f4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7f669f455021be51319ee3b8298cd48a17f745c7))
* **tui:** press up to edit queued messages ([#656](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/656)) ([4c986d3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4c986d327b5ed26338d295c23bea5839681db8d0))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** make truncateHint rune-safe ([#614](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/614)) ([ddc4927](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ddc4927aac5544bf4dd2c46615aeda5a81c96576))
* **agent,tui:** resolve git branch detection when starting Zero in subdirectories ([#613](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/613)) ([0184581](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0184581ec234ea414e0a47bc33e8b0f4ddfb497b))
* **agent:** raise default and deep-mode turn budgets ([#650](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/650)) ([635c93a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/635c93af51ebc20f3e0917917e55a79edfe27c35))
* **cli:** prevent consuming positional arguments as flag values ([#619](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/619)) ([5b4f48d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5b4f48d2dcb66402c13bde0c3cfe9c9371da19fb))
* **config:** enforce MCP trust boundary so project config cannot override user disable ([#609](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/609)) ([4d8c31c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4d8c31cf16a3080344e3be7039408fcae71c075d)), closes [#512](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/512)
* **config:** surface unknown/typo'd config fields instead of silently dropping them ([#645](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/645)) ([893b7b4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/893b7b424cc203a2fcf92327a4e25c84286a90e0))
* **cron:** prevent cron job Mutate from clobbering concurrent updates ([#630](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/630)) ([e4bd703](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e4bd703cfb28dab2dfa3c2ddba46237e1bb2e164))
* **daemon:** handle os.ErrPermission as collision during O_EXCL lock creation ([#616](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/616)) ([8ea5384](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8ea53841a5d54c37a153779ae86bea010659433c))
* **exec:** stop false INCOMPLETE downgrades on conversational final messages ([#608](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/608)) ([b6117af](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b6117af86d6bc87a4ee66910e99d76cb16b03fed))
* harden MCP credential boundaries ([#597](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/597)) ([fdddb05](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fdddb05ba84b1600ae6c3a20028bf83afe474c44))
* **hooks:** fail closed on launch failures for beforeTool hooks ([#629](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/629)) ([dc06fe7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dc06fe72caf45f72d2cba1e8a835c0f5b405c1e8))
* **hooks:** run sessionEnd hooks after Esc/Ctrl+C interrupts ([#606](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/606)) ([824ecdb](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/824ecdbcf9c467c35ef4e2666770fdadcb5bf402))
* **keyring:** pass generic password via stdin on macOS ([#574](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/574)) ([91ea6de](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/91ea6ded7503538834a84d090f78670a363c62d3))
* **lock:** prevent POSIX lock file overwrite and leak on Windows/Unix ([#628](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/628)) ([da41c3a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/da41c3a75b782d6e0836fe13346321e40a90fbb4))
* **openai:** omit prompt_cache_key for openai-compatible providers ([#636](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/636)) ([1af5882](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1af58828eb3c22567599c000736c913a290959d2)), closes [#624](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/624)
* **plugins:** resolve relative executable paths against plugin root ([#627](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/627)) ([2efe6d5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2efe6d539e29374b3ef39c2290bdea81f33a228b))
* **sandbox:** remove windowsWriteRestricted flag to fix DenyRead bypass ([#612](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/612)) ([3d96ac7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3d96ac7e55c760a97f28c0e6ceaf1ec3b4ab717a))
* **sandbox:** scrub dynamic credential env vars ([#682](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/682)) ([9043bae](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9043baedcff7776c7373645b57563cac06b31847))
* **sandbox:** scrub sensitive credentials from sandbox environment ([#660](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/660)) ([6fc1220](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6fc1220f6ac66fb3ae67b637cbbed7068d2213c0))
* **sandbox:** unblock git fetch/commit/add under the write-restricted sandbox ([#654](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/654)) ([5c4815a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5c4815a66ed07d9cf90b825adfd936d3ac07639d))
* **sandbox:** use WRITE_RESTRICTED token when no DenyRead paths are configured ([#658](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/658)) ([a5d2e32](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a5d2e327c8681671aa8a9e5378801215b747edcf))
* **securefile,credstore:** call Sync on temp file before close and rename ([#631](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/631)) ([212734a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/212734adf3b5f982e22385161205aa1afe4634fe))
* **securefile:** reclaim stale lock files to prevent permanent DOS ([#615](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/615)) ([8536cc8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8536cc87f7a885f9e436d6ef28f5f325201623dc))
* **swarm:** wait for job.Runs directly in scheduler skip test ([#667](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/667)) ([1bb6b57](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1bb6b5745af90321d1e657a12a1976cded5dd1bd))
* **tools:** classify silent wrapped Windows command failures as sandbox denials ([#659](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/659)) ([8bd9742](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8bd9742fa95c41b93ea4e718628aed0ff3ae9dd0))
* **tools:** preserve SysProcAttr during PTY fallback ([#618](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/618)) ([f78b36c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f78b36c770daa4577a9f99265b18a354454e36eb))
* **tui:** resolve pending askUser callbacks to prevent runner hangs ([#620](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/620)) ([aa73a76](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/aa73a76f1bd1b6fe97bac2fbff2d61b7474139f2))
* **tui:** stop the composer cursor blinking while typing or unfocused ([#672](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/672)) ([2b42cd5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2b42cd567b96d6f7e0818594e53ff31cce1e42e9))
* **windows:** resolve absolute path for taskkill to prevent hijacking ([#617](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/617)) ([2db00ee](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2db00ee3d57db97e0fbe23cb8628e8bcb47f6f09))
### Performance Improvements
* **tools:** add explicit effect metadata for safe concurrency ([#705](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/705)) ([8ef8576](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8ef8576df7d0775a5b815bc0776a794cadb75c34))
## [0.3.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.2.0...v0.3.0) (2026-07-09)
@@ -259,19 +127,14 @@ tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## [Unreleased]
### Added
- Shared multi-agent skills discovery: when present, `~/.agents/skills` is searched after the primary
Zero skills dir (and before plugin skill roots). `zero skills list` / `info` and the runtime `skill`
tool share one multi-root discovery path; install/remove/lock still target only the Zero skills directory.
- `SECURITY.md` with a private vulnerability-reporting path, `CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`, this changelog, and
GitHub issue/PR templates.
- Interactive `/theme` picker: bare `/theme` opens a popup that live-previews each palette as you move
and applies on select (Esc reverts).
- Twelve built-in color themes alongside the `dark`/`light` built-ins — `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`,
`tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`,
`solarized-light`, `dune`, and `neon` — selectable via `/theme <name>`, `--theme <name>`, or
`ZERO_THEME`. Every palette is contrast-audited to WCAG AA, and the new presets are additionally
audited after xterm-256 downsampling; see [docs/THEMES.md](docs/THEMES.md). The built-in light
theme was reworked for legibility.
- Ten built-in color themes alongside the `dark`/`light` built-ins — `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`,
`tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, and
`solarized-light` — selectable via `/theme <name>`, `--theme <name>`, or `ZERO_THEME`. Every palette
is contrast-audited to WCAG AA. The built-in light theme was reworked for legibility.
- `--theme <name>` flag for the TUI, accepting `auto` or any registered theme (previously only the
`ZERO_THEME` env var existed).
- "Accessibility / Appearance" section in the README documenting `NO_COLOR`, `ZERO_THEME`, `/theme`,
+5 -48
View File
@@ -8,13 +8,6 @@ stabilizes. Community participation is still welcome, especially through bug
reports, feature requests, reproduction details, logs, and discussion on existing
issues.
Questions and setup help belong in
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions) (see
[SUPPORT.md](SUPPORT.md)), not in the issue tracker. Feature ideas start in the
[Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) category;
an idea that gains traction there is the path to an approved issue and,
eventually, an accepted PR.
Please read this policy before opening a pull request. Pull requests that do not
follow it may be closed without review.
@@ -40,11 +33,7 @@ unless the issue has been explicitly approved for outside contribution.
There are three primary ways to contribute:
1. Open a bug report with clear reproduction steps.
2. Propose a feature in
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
describing the problem, use case, and expected behavior. A feature-request
issue is filed only after the idea gains traction there or a maintainer asks
for one.
2. Open a feature request describing the problem, use case, and expected behavior.
3. Add useful context to an existing issue, such as logs, screenshots, examples,
affected versions, or reproduction cases.
@@ -57,8 +46,7 @@ All community pull requests require an approved parent issue.
Before starting implementation work:
1. For a bug, open an issue using the bug-report template. For a feature, start
in Discussions Ideas; the feature-request issue comes after the discussion.
1. Open an issue using the appropriate issue template.
2. Describe the bug, feature request, or functional change clearly.
3. Wait for the core team to review the issue.
4. Do not open a pull request unless the issue has the `issue-approved` label.
@@ -67,28 +55,6 @@ An approved issue means only that the specific issue has been accepted for work.
It does not approve unrelated future work, future pull requests, or future issues
from the same author. Each issue is reviewed case by case.
## Contribution Volume and Batching
To keep triage and review sustainable while the project stabilizes, please keep
your contribution flow to a size the core team can realistically work through:
- One issue per bug. File each defect as its own issue with its own
reproduction. Please do not bundle several unrelated findings into a single
"audit" issue; separate issues are far easier to triage, approve, and close
individually.
- Keep only a few items open at a time. If you already have several issues or
pull requests awaiting review, let those move through the queue before opening
more. A large simultaneous burst from one contributor slows review for
everyone, even when each item is valid.
- AI-assisted contributions are welcome, held to the same bar. Automated audits
and generated patches are fine, but each issue and pull request must be
individually verified, scoped, and reproducible before you open it. Please do
not post bulk machine-generated findings unfiltered.
These apply to all contributors and are about review bandwidth, not the value of
any single report. Maintainers may ask you to consolidate, split, or hold
submissions to keep the queue manageable.
## Pull Request Requirements
Before opening a community pull request, make sure all of the following are true:
@@ -167,12 +133,7 @@ Clear bug reports are the most useful way to help the project during this phase.
## Submitting a Feature Request
Feature requests start as a thread in
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
not as an issue. The feature-request issue form exists for the step AFTER that:
when an idea has gained traction in Discussions or a maintainer has asked for an
issue to track it. Whether in the discussion or the eventual issue, please
include:
When filing a feature request, please include:
- The problem you are trying to solve.
- The behavior or functionality you are requesting.
@@ -195,9 +156,5 @@ contribution phase.
## Getting Help
General questions, setup help, and "is this a bug or my config" uncertainty all
go to
[Discussions Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a).
If you are unsure whether a proposed code change is appropriate, raise it in
Discussions Ideas or on the relevant issue first and ask. Please keep discussion
focused, specific, and respectful of maintainer time.
If you are unsure whether a change is appropriate, open an issue first and ask.
Please keep discussion focused, specific, and respectful of maintainer time.
+4 -26
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,7 @@
# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says to build and run quality checks
# with `make` — these targets back those instructions.
# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says "Build with `make`" and "Run `make
# lint` before opening a PR" — these targets back those instructions.
.DEFAULT_GOAL := build
GO_VERSION = $(word 2,$(shell git grep -G -h "^go[[:space:]]" -- go.mod))
GO_TOOLCHAIN = go$(GO_VERSION)
DEADCODE_VERSION := v0.46.0
GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION := v2.12.2
GOVULNCHECK_VERSION := v1.3.0
.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint lint-static deadcode vulncheck tidy clean baseline help
.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint tidy clean baseline help
# Build the main CLI binary into ./zero.
build:
@@ -39,22 +33,6 @@ fmt-check:
# Lint = formatting check + vet (no extra tooling required).
lint: fmt-check vet
# Versioned tools select the toolchain from their own modules when invoked with
# package@version. Read this module's go directive directly, without invoking
# the possibly stale Go toolchain or consulting a multi-module GOWORK. git grep
# works with both POSIX shells and cmd.exe, including GNU Make 3.81 on macOS.
# The target-specific export is shell-independent.
lint-static deadcode vulncheck: export GOTOOLCHAIN = $(GO_TOOLCHAIN)
lint-static:
go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/golangci-lint@$(GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION) run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...
deadcode:
go run golang.org/x/tools/cmd/deadcode@$(DEADCODE_VERSION) -test=false ./...
vulncheck:
go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@$(GOVULNCHECK_VERSION) ./...
tidy:
go mod tidy
@@ -77,4 +55,4 @@ baseline: build
--output internal/perfbench/reports/baseline.json
help:
@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, lint-static, deadcode, vulncheck, tidy, clean, baseline"
@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, tidy, clean, baseline"
+13 -58
View File
@@ -129,31 +129,17 @@ the key in the wizard:
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export AIMLAPI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
export FIREWORKS_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAXI_API_KEY=...
```
To configure AI/ML API directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup aimlapi --set-active
```
To configure Meituan LongCat (LongCat-2.0) directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
To configure Fireworks AI directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup fireworks --set-active
```
MiniMax presets use the Anthropic-compatible endpoints for the global and China
regions:
@@ -198,11 +184,9 @@ Useful controls:
|---|---|
| `Enter` | send the prompt |
| `/` | open slash-command suggestions |
| `Ctrl+X` then letter | common slash commands (e.g. `m` → `/model`; `Ctrl+X` `?` for full list) |
| `Ctrl+P` / `Ctrl+N` | previous / next item in menus (arrows still work) |
| `Shift+Tab` | cycle permission mode |
| `Ctrl+B` | show/hide the sidebar |
| `Ctrl+C` | cancel, exit, or return from a `/btw` conversation |
| `Ctrl+C` | cancel or exit |
Common slash commands:
@@ -212,7 +196,6 @@ Common slash commands:
| `/spec`, `/plan` | draft and review a plan before building |
| `/image` | attach an image for vision-capable models |
| `/resume`, `/rewind` | continue or roll back local sessions |
| `/btw [question]` | ask in an isolated fork without adding the side conversation to the main session |
| `/loop` | repeat a prompt or custom `/command` on an interval (`/loop 5m /babysit-prs`) or self-paced |
| `/compact`, `/context` | manage context usage |
| `/permissions`, `/tools` | inspect available tools and policy |
@@ -349,7 +332,7 @@ manifest.
| Control | Effect |
|---|---|
| `NO_COLOR=<anything>` | disables color output |
| `ZERO_THEME=<name>` | selects the startup theme (`auto`, `dark`, `light`, or a color theme like `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`, `tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, `neon`, `solarized-light`, `dune`) |
| `ZERO_THEME=<name>` | selects the startup theme (`auto`, `dark`, `light`, or a color theme like `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`, `tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, `solarized-light`) |
| `--theme <name>` | selects the TUI theme from the CLI (same names) |
| `/theme` | opens the theme picker inside the TUI (live preview; `/theme <name>` switches directly) |
| `ZERO_NO_FADE=1` | disables streaming fade animation |
@@ -366,32 +349,23 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench
```
Experimental: `ZERO_OPENAI_TURN_SESSION=1` enables the optimized OpenAI turn
session (background connection prewarm + request-prefix telemetry) for headless
`zero exec` runs against official OpenAI profiles. Off by default; `0`/`false`
disable. A/B-benchmark it by running the same `zero-perf-bench` suite with the
variable unset and set.
### Code Quality and Security Checks
Before committing any changes, ensure all Go code quality and security checks pass. The `make` targets below pin each tool to this module's Go version, so they load correctly even when your default `go` toolchain is older — running the plain `go run ...@version` form yourself can select the tool module's own (older) toolchain and fail to load this module instead.
Before committing any changes, ensure all Go code quality and security checks pass. Pinned `go run` commands matching CI constraints can be used directly without prior installation:
1. **Formatting**: Run `make fmt` (or `go fmt ./...`).
2. **Vetting**: Run `make vet` (or `go vet ./...`).
3. **Linting**: Run `make lint-static`.
4. **Vulnerability Scan**: Run `make vulncheck`.
1. **Formatting**: Run `go fmt ./...` (or `make fmt`).
2. **Vetting**: Run `go vet ./...` (or `make vet`).
3. **Linting**: Run `go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
4. **Vulnerability Scan**: Run `go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.
Use the repository-managed targets rather than globally installed binaries:
the targets apply the module's required Go toolchain as well as the reviewed,
pinned tool versions.
The installed binaries land in `$GOBIN` when it is set, otherwise in
`$GOPATH/bin` (default `~/go/bin`). That directory must be on your `PATH` to
run them directly. If it isn't, add it:
If you prefer to install these tools globally on your path, you can run:
```bash
gobin="$(go env GOBIN)"; [ -z "$gobin" ] && gobin="$(go env GOPATH)/bin"
case ":$PATH:" in *":$gobin:"*) ;; *) export PATH="$PATH:$gobin" ;; esac
# Install golangci-lint
go install github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected]
# Install govulncheck
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected]
```
### Cross-Compile Examples
@@ -405,7 +379,6 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
- [Install](docs/INSTALL.md)
- [Update flow](docs/UPDATE.md)
- [Themes](docs/THEMES.md)
- [Stream-JSON protocol](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)
- [Specialists](docs/SPECIALISTS.md)
- [GitHub Action](docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md)
@@ -413,24 +386,6 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
- [Performance](docs/PERFORMANCE.md)
- [Agent evals](docs/AGENT_EVALS.md)
## Community
Questions, setup help, ideas, and sharing all live in
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions):
| Category | Use it for |
|---|---|
| [Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) | Setup help, provider/model configuration, "how do I" questions |
| [Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) | Feature proposals and design discussion before any PR |
| [Show and tell](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/show-and-tell) | Your skills, plugins, MCP setups, themes, and workflows |
| [Announcements](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/announcements) | Releases and project news from the maintainers |
For a good Q&A answer fast, include `zero --version`, your OS and install
method, the provider/model in use, and `zero doctor` output. See
[SUPPORT.md](SUPPORT.md). Bugs belong in
[issues](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/new/choose); security reports
follow [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md), never a public thread.
## Contributing
Contributions are welcome. Read [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md), run the
+1 -2
View File
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ zero update 检查更新版本
| 控制 | 效果 |
|---|---|
| `NO_COLOR=<任意值>` | 禁用颜色输出 |
| `ZERO_THEME=<名称>` | 选择启动主题(`auto`、`dark`、`light`,或颜色主题如 `dracula`、`nord`、`gruvbox`、`tokyo-night`、`catppuccin`、`one-dark`、`solarized-dark`、`rose-pine`、`everforest`、`neon`、`solarized-light`、`dune`) |
| `ZERO_THEME=<名称>` | 选择启动主题(`auto`、`dark`、`light`,或颜色主题如 `dracula`、`nord`、`gruvbox`、`tokyo-night`、`catppuccin`、`one-dark`、`solarized-dark`、`rose-pine`、`everforest`、`solarized-light`) |
| `--theme <名称>` | 从 CLI 选择 TUI 主题(相同名称) |
| `/theme` | 在 TUI 中打开主题选择器(实时预览;`/theme <名称>` 直接切换) |
| `ZERO_NO_FADE=1` | 禁用流式淡入动画 |
@@ -261,7 +261,6 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
- [安装](docs/INSTALL.md)
- [更新流程](docs/UPDATE.md)
- [主题](docs/THEMES.md)
- [Stream-JSON 协议](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)
- [专家](docs/SPECIALISTS.md)
- [GitHub Action](docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md)
-36
View File
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
# Getting help with Zero
## Questions, setup help, configuration
Ask in [GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions). Use
[Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) so answers can
be marked and found by the next person.
The fastest way to a useful answer is to include:
- `zero --version` output
- your OS (Windows, macOS, Linux) and how you installed Zero (npm, install
script, source)
- the provider and model you are using (`zero providers list`)
- `zero doctor` output for setup problems
- the exact command you ran and the exact error text
## Bugs
If Zero does something wrong (crashes, wrong output, broken behavior), file a
[bug report](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/new/choose). If you are not
sure whether it is a bug or a setup problem, start in Discussions and we will
promote it to an issue if it is one.
## Feature ideas
Start a thread in
[Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas). Zero is
in controlled development (see CONTRIBUTING.md), so discussing an idea first is
also the path to getting a PR accepted.
## Security issues
Never file a public issue or discussion. Report privately via
[GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/security/advisories/new)
(see SECURITY.md).
+15 -159
View File
@@ -55,133 +55,6 @@ function localControlHelperManifest(packageRoot) {
return JSON.stringify({ version: 1, helpers });
}
// Mirrors internal/cli/observability.go parseDoctorArgs + writeDoctorHelp so the
// wrapper's missing-binary doctor fallback matches the Go doctor CLI surface.
const DOCTOR_HELP = `Usage:
zero doctor [flags]
Runs Go backend health checks for config and provider setup.
Flags:
--json Print JSON report
--connectivity Include provider endpoint connectivity probe when available
-h, --help Show this help
`;
const EXIT_USAGE = 2;
function installedByBun() {
if (process.env.ZERO_WRAPPER_SIMULATE_BUN === '1') {
return true;
}
return process.execPath.includes('bun') || !!process.versions?.bun;
}
function bunRecoveryParagraph() {
return (
'You installed with Bun, which does not run dependency lifecycle scripts\n' +
'by default. Trust the package to run the blocked postinstall:\n' +
' bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero (project install)\n' +
' bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero (global install)\n' +
'On Bun versions without `bun pm trust`, add\n' +
' "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]\n' +
'to your project package.json and reinstall.\n' +
'\n'
);
}
function buildFromSourceParagraph() {
return (
'If this platform has no prebuilt binary, build from source:\n' +
'https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero (go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.26+).'
);
}
function missingBinaryContextParagraph() {
return (
'Normally npm installs it as an optional dependency of @gitlawb/zero\n' +
`(@gitlawb/zero-${process.platform}-${process.arch}), and the wrapper can\n` +
'also download it from the GitHub Release when it is missing.'
);
}
function missingNativeRecoveryParagraphs(postinstallScript) {
const ranByBun = installedByBun();
return (
missingBinaryContextParagraph() +
'\n' +
'\n' +
'Things to try:\n' +
' - reinstall without omitting optional dependencies:\n' +
' npm install -g @gitlawb/zero\n' +
' - run the downloader manually (needs write access to the package dir):\n' +
` node "${postinstallScript}"\n` +
'\n' +
(ranByBun ? bunRecoveryParagraph() : '') +
buildFromSourceParagraph()
);
}
function formatGenericMissingNativeBinaryMessage(postinstallScript) {
return (
'[zero] No native binary is available for this install.\n' +
missingNativeRecoveryParagraphs(postinstallScript)
);
}
function parseDoctorArgs(args) {
let json = false;
for (const arg of args) {
switch (arg) {
case '-h':
case '--help':
case 'help':
return { kind: 'help' };
case '--json':
json = true;
break;
case '--connectivity':
break;
default:
return { kind: 'error', message: `unknown doctor flag ${JSON.stringify(arg)}` };
}
}
return { kind: 'run', json };
}
function missingNativeDoctorJSONReport(postinstallScript) {
return {
generatedAt: new Date().toISOString().replace(/\.\d{3}Z$/, 'Z'),
ok: false,
checks: [
{
id: 'runtime.go',
label: 'Go runtime',
status: 'fail',
message: 'Native zero binary is missing next to the npm wrapper.',
details: {
remedy: `node "${postinstallScript}"`,
},
},
],
};
}
function missingNativeDoctorTextReport(postinstallScript) {
return (
'Zero doctor report (' +
new Date().toISOString() +
')\n' +
'Overall: fail\n' +
'[fail] runtime.go - Native zero binary is missing next to the npm wrapper.\n' +
' remedy: node "' +
postinstallScript +
'"\n' +
'\n' +
missingNativeRecoveryParagraphs(postinstallScript)
);
}
// The platform payload is a version of @gitlawb/zero itself, installed under
// an npm: alias (see docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md). The alias name is derived from
// process.platform/process.arch, so an unsupported platform simply fails to
@@ -241,38 +114,21 @@ function resolveNativeBinary() {
const nativePath = resolveNativeBinary();
if (!nativePath) {
const postinstallScript = join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs');
// `zero doctor` is the diagnostic command: when the native binary is missing
// it's the one invocation that must NOT bail with the generic wrapper error,
// because that's exactly the blind alley issue #405 reports. Instead, surface
// a doctor-shaped FAIL line for the runtime so the user's diagnostic finds the
// real cause. We branch on a literal 'doctor' subcommand only (matching `zero
// doctor` and `zero doctor --connectivity`), preserving the existing bail for
// every other invocation (exec, providers list, TUI, --version, etc.).
const argv = process.argv.slice(2);
const isDoctor = argv.length > 0 && argv[0] === 'doctor';
if (isDoctor) {
const parsed = parseDoctorArgs(argv.slice(1));
if (parsed.kind === 'help') {
process.stdout.write(DOCTOR_HELP);
process.exit(0);
}
if (parsed.kind === 'error') {
process.stderr.write(`[zero] ${parsed.message}\n`);
process.exit(EXIT_USAGE);
}
if (parsed.json) {
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(missingNativeDoctorJSONReport(postinstallScript), null, 2) + '\n');
process.exit(1);
}
process.stdout.write(missingNativeDoctorTextReport(postinstallScript) + '\n');
process.exit(1);
}
console.error(formatGenericMissingNativeBinaryMessage(postinstallScript));
console.error(
'[zero] No native binary is available for this install.\n' +
'Normally npm installs it as an optional dependency of @gitlawb/zero\n' +
`(@gitlawb/zero-${process.platform}-${process.arch}), and the wrapper can\n` +
'also download it from the GitHub Release when it is missing.\n' +
'\n' +
'Things to try:\n' +
' - reinstall without omitting optional dependencies:\n' +
' npm install -g @gitlawb/zero\n' +
' - run the downloader manually (needs write access to the package dir):\n' +
` node "${join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs')}"\n` +
'\n' +
'If this platform has no prebuilt binary, build from source:\n' +
'https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero (go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.26+).',
);
process.exit(1);
}
-17
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ import (
"bytes"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
func TestParseArgsUsesCliAndEnvOverrides(t *testing.T) {
@@ -94,18 +92,3 @@ func TestHelpText(t *testing.T) {
func emptyEnv(string) string {
return ""
}
func TestTurnExitCodeFailsWhenEveryTaskErrored(t *testing.T) {
var stderr bytes.Buffer
allErrored := perfbench.TurnBenchResult{TasksAttempted: 3, TasksErrored: 3}
if code := turnExitCode(allErrored, &stderr); code != 1 {
t.Fatalf("exit=%d, want 1 when every task errored", code)
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "no accepted benchmark sample") {
t.Fatalf("stderr missing explanation: %q", stderr.String())
}
partial := perfbench.TurnBenchResult{TasksAttempted: 3, TasksErrored: 2}
if code := turnExitCode(partial, &stderr); code != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exit=%d, want 0 for partial errors (summary surfaces them)", code)
}
}
+1 -42
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execprofile"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
@@ -21,7 +20,6 @@ type turnOptions struct {
SuitePath string
Model string
Mode string
ExecProfile string
SelfCorrect bool
Binary string
Iterations int
@@ -66,7 +64,6 @@ func runTurnCommand(args []string, getenv func(string) string, stdout io.Writer,
result, err := perfbench.RunTurnBench(context.Background(), set, perfbench.TurnBenchConfig{
Model: options.Model,
Mode: options.Mode,
ExecProfile: options.ExecProfile,
SelfCorrect: options.SelfCorrect,
Version: options.Version,
Commit: options.Commit,
@@ -89,23 +86,9 @@ func runTurnCommand(args []string, getenv func(string) string, stdout io.Writer,
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
return turnExitCode(result, stderr)
return 0
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stdout, perfbench.FormatTurnBenchSummary(result))
return turnExitCode(result, stderr)
}
// turnExitCode fails the command when every attempted task errored (no
// iteration produced an accepted benchmark sample): such a report measures
// nothing, and exiting 0 would let a broken configuration (missing binary, bad
// path, failing harness step) pass as a clean baseline. Partial errors keep
// exit 0 — the summary surfaces them loudly and the surviving samples are
// still valid measurements.
func turnExitCode(result perfbench.TurnBenchResult, stderr io.Writer) int {
if result.TasksAttempted > 0 && result.TasksErrored == result.TasksAttempted {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: every task errored with no accepted benchmark sample (see warnings); the report contains no valid measurements")
return 1
}
return 0
}
@@ -140,13 +123,6 @@ func parseTurnArgs(args []string, getenv func(string) string) (turnOptions, erro
}
options.Mode = value
index = next
case "--exec-profile":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.ExecProfile = value
index = next
case "--binary":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
@@ -219,20 +195,6 @@ func parseTurnArgs(args []string, getenv func(string) string) (turnOptions, erro
if strings.TrimSpace(options.Model) == "" && !options.DryRun {
return options, fmt.Errorf("--model is required (or pass --dry-run)")
}
// Validate the profile here, before anything spawns: an unknown name would
// otherwise make every child exit with a usage error in milliseconds, and
// those near-zero walls would be recorded as valid latency samples in an
// exit-0 report — exactly the misread-as-improvement trap the harness
// closed for spawn failures. Normalizing to the catalog name also keeps
// the stamped execProfile canonical (Lookup is case-insensitive), so two
// captures of the same posture always compare equal.
if raw := strings.TrimSpace(options.ExecProfile); raw != "" {
profile, ok := execprofile.Lookup(raw)
if !ok {
return options, fmt.Errorf("unknown execution profile %q for --exec-profile. Valid profiles: %s", raw, strings.Join(execprofile.Names(), ", "))
}
options.ExecProfile = profile.Name
}
return options, nil
}
@@ -263,9 +225,6 @@ func turnHelpText() string {
" --suite <path> Task set JSON file (required)",
" --model <model> Model to run (required unless --dry-run)",
" --mode <name> Exec mode preset to apply",
" --exec-profile <name>",
" Execution profile for every task (fast|balanced|thorough);",
" forwarded to zero exec and stamped into the result",
" --self-correct Enable the post-edit verify-and-correct loop",
" --binary <path> Path to the `zero` binary (default: zero on PATH / repo root)",
" --iterations <n> Times to run each task (default: 1)",
-65
View File
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
package main
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestParseTurnArgsExecProfile(t *testing.T) {
getenv := func(string) string { return "" }
options, err := parseTurnArgs([]string{
"--suite", "suite.json",
"--model", "m",
"--exec-profile", "fast",
}, getenv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTurnArgs: %v", err)
}
if options.ExecProfile != "fast" {
t.Fatalf("ExecProfile = %q, want fast", options.ExecProfile)
}
// Inline form.
options, err = parseTurnArgs([]string{
"--suite=suite.json",
"--model=m",
"--exec-profile=thorough",
}, getenv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTurnArgs inline: %v", err)
}
if options.ExecProfile != "thorough" {
t.Fatalf("ExecProfile = %q, want thorough", options.ExecProfile)
}
}
// The bench validates the profile BEFORE spawning anything: an unknown name
// would otherwise make every child exit with a usage error in milliseconds
// and record those near-zero walls as valid latency samples in an exit-0
// report. Lookup normalization also keeps the stamped name canonical so two
// captures of the same posture compare equal.
func TestParseTurnArgsExecProfileValidatesAndNormalizes(t *testing.T) {
getenv := func(string) string { return "" }
options, err := parseTurnArgs([]string{
"--suite", "suite.json", "--model", "m", "--exec-profile", "FAST",
}, getenv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTurnArgs: %v", err)
}
if options.ExecProfile != "fast" {
t.Fatalf("ExecProfile = %q, want the canonical fast", options.ExecProfile)
}
_, err = parseTurnArgs([]string{
"--suite", "suite.json", "--model", "m", "--exec-profile", "blanced",
}, getenv)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("an unknown profile must fail parse, before anything spawns")
}
for _, name := range []string{"balanced", "fast", "thorough"} {
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), name) {
t.Fatalf("error must list %q, got %q", name, err.Error())
}
}
}
+4 -15
View File
@@ -102,24 +102,14 @@ The full format spec (frontmatter fields, tool scopes, prompt conventions) is in
Skills are markdown instruction packs the agent can pull in on demand. Each skill is a directory containing a `SKILL.md`. Standalone project skill directories are not supported in this version (shared project-wide skills must go in `AGENTS.md` or as a hook). However, project plugins (section 6) may bundle skills, which are merged into the active run.
Discovery roots (earlier wins on name collisions):
1. **Primary Zero dir** — `$ZERO_SKILLS_DIR` if set, else `$XDG_DATA_HOME/zero/skills`, else `~/.local/share/zero/skills/`
2. **Shared multi-agent dir** — `~/.agents/skills/` when present (read-only discovery; never an install target)
3. **Plugin skill roots** — skills bundled by active plugins (section 6)
A missing directory is fine — Zero just omits it. Management commands (`zero skill add` / `zero skill remove`) always write to the primary Zero dir only; `list` / `info` search primary + `~/.agents/skills`. `skill info` reports lock source/hash when present and whether the on-disk `SKILL.md` has drifted from the recorded hash.
Discovery root: `$ZERO_SKILLS_DIR` → `$XDG_DATA_HOME/zero/skills` → `~/.local/share/zero/skills/`. A missing directory is fine — Zero just reports "no skills".
```text
~/.local/share/zero/skills/ # primary (install/remove target)
~/.local/share/zero/skills/
run-benchmarks/
SKILL.md
write-changelog/
SKILL.md
~/.agents/skills/ # optional shared multi-agent root
shared-review/
SKILL.md
```
`SKILL.md` format:
@@ -136,9 +126,9 @@ description: Run the project's benchmark suite and summarize the deltas.
3. Report any regression > 5% with the function name and the previous value.
```
Only `name` and `description` are recognized in the frontmatter today. The `name` defaults to the directory name. Within a single skills root, duplicate names are resolved by lexicographic directory order. Across roots, Zero loads the primary directory first, then `~/.agents/skills`, then plugin skill roots; earlier roots win name collisions. Plugin-declared skills (section 6) are merged into the active agent run at plugin activation time, so bundled skills appear in the available skills list and can be loaded with the `skill` tool.
Only `name` and `description` are recognized in the frontmatter today. The `name` defaults to the directory name. Within a single skills root, duplicate names are resolved by lexicographic directory order. During an agent run, Zero loads the default skills directory before plugin skill roots; earlier roots win name collisions silently. Plugin-declared skills (section 6) are merged into the active agent run at plugin activation time, so bundled skills appear in the available skills list and can be loaded with the `skill` tool.
The `skill` tool lets the agent load any discovered skill by name (primary, agents, or plugin).
The `skill` core tool lets the agent load any discovered skill by name.
## 4. Hooks
@@ -289,7 +279,6 @@ Install and manage:
```bash
zero plugins add ./github-pr-review # copy into ~/.config/zero/plugins/ or ./.zero/plugins/
zero plugins list
zero plugins info github-pr-review # show manifest path, enabled state, lock metadata
zero plugins remove github-pr-review # alias: rm
```
+6 -20
View File
@@ -272,8 +272,7 @@ sequenceDiagram
Agent->>Tool: execute(ctx, args)
Tool-->>Agent: output, error, metadata
Agent->>Hooks: afterTool hooks
Agent->>Agent: redact secrets, apply semantic output budget, enforce byte ceiling
Agent->>Agent: classify success/failure
Agent->>Agent: redact, truncate, classify success/failure
Agent-->>Surface: OnToolResult callback
Agent->>Transcript: append tool result message
end
@@ -605,22 +604,10 @@ flowchart TD
Prompt -- Yes --> Decision[Permission callback]
Prompt -- No --> Run[Registry.RunWithOptions]
Decision --> Run
Run --> Redact[Redact secrets]
Redact --> Budget[Token-aware semantic output budget]
Budget --> Ceiling[Existing hard byte ceiling]
Ceiling --> Message[Return one tool result to model]
Run --> Redact[Redact secrets + enforce output ceiling]
Redact --> Message[Return tool result to model]
```
Oversized results use deterministic, provider-neutral estimated-token budgets.
Policies retain useful structure for files, search matches, tests, process logs,
diffs, and worker conclusions; tools without a declared category use a UTF-8-safe
head/tail fallback. The estimate is intentionally conservative for non-ASCII
text and is not exact provider tokenization. Existing byte ceilings remain the
authoritative safety limit. When the existing spill mechanism can persist the
complete redacted text received by the budgeting layer, the result includes its
safe spill reference. This does not imply capture of subprocess bytes already
discarded by a tool's established internal buffer.
Core tool groups include:
- **Read-only tools**: file reads, directory listing, glob, grep, LSP navigation,
@@ -746,10 +733,9 @@ flowchart TD
- **Skills** are instruction packs the model can load on demand.
- **Specialists** are sub-agents callable through the `Task` tool.
- **MCP servers** contribute external tools.
- **Plugins** can add tools, hooks, and skill roots. Bootstrap always registers a
multi-root skill tool: primary Zero skills dir, optional `~/.agents/skills`,
then plugin skill roots (earlier wins). `internal/skills` owns that merge via
`LoadFromRoots`; single-root `Load` remains for install/write.
- **Plugins** can add tools, hooks, and skill roots. Bootstrap merges plugin skill
roots into the runtime skill tool and prompt-visible skill list; the base
`internal/skills` scanner still scans one root at a time.
- **Hooks** can observe or block tool lifecycle events.
## End-to-End Data Flow
-39
View File
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
# TUI Themes
Zero's TUI ships a set of built-in color themes. Pick one with `--theme <name>`,
the `ZERO_THEME` environment variable, or the `/theme <name>` command while
running. `auto` (the default) follows the terminal's detected background.
Run `/theme` with no argument to open a picker: move through the list to
live-preview each theme, press Enter to apply the highlighted one, or Esc to
cancel and restore the previously active theme. Run `/theme list` to print
the active theme and the registered names without opening the picker.
## Dune (`dune`)
A warm sand-and-cream palette: sand/cream surface, charcoal ink, and a soft
amber accent.
## Neon (`neon`)
A neon-on-black palette: pitch-black surface, bright green ink, and a cyan accent.
## Adding a theme
Every theme is a `palette` (a table of color hex tokens) plus one entry in
`themeRegistry`, both in `internal/tui/theme_palettes.go`. `buildTheme` in
`internal/tui/theme.go` turns a `palette` into the resolved `lipgloss.Style`
set every renderer reads from the active `zeroTheme`. Adding a theme means
adding a new `palette{...}` literal, a `themeRegistry` entry, and test
coverage for the new palette (see below).
Registry-wide tests in `internal/tui/theme_select_test.go` assert the basic
WCAG AA text tokens, the gray-ramp order, the diff word-span pairs, and the
selected-row band for every entry. The rendered-surface invariants beyond
those (permission surfaces, selected-row secondary text, diff gutters, and
the xterm-256 downsampling checks) are asserted per palette, not against the
whole registry: `TestExtendedThemeContrastInvariants` and
`TestExtendedThemeANSI256Contrast` enumerate the palettes they cover. A new
theme must be added to those tests (or given equivalent palette-specific
assertions), or CI can stay green while its permission, selected-row, and
diff surfaces ship unreadable.
+27 -178
View File
@@ -11,9 +11,6 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providercatalog"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodelcatalog"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
@@ -26,10 +23,9 @@ import (
// means the editor only hosts the thread — ZERO owns BYOK and telemetry-free
// operation.
type Deps struct {
ResolveConfig func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error)
DiscoverModels func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error)
NewProvider func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)
RunAgent func(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error)
ResolveConfig func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error)
NewProvider func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)
RunAgent func(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error)
// BuildWorkspace builds the SCOPED tool registry and the sandbox engine for a
// validated workspace root, so ACP shell tools (bash/exec_command) are confined
// exactly like the exec surface — never run unconfined on the host.
@@ -64,16 +60,13 @@ type acpSession struct {
// turnMu serializes prompt turns for one session: concurrent session/prompt
// calls run one at a time so they can't interleave history or clobber the
// single cancel slot.
turnMu sync.Mutex
modelMu sync.Mutex
turnMu sync.Mutex
mu sync.Mutex
mode agent.PermissionMode
model string
models []SessionConfigOptionValue
restrictModels bool
cancel context.CancelFunc
history []turnRecord
mu sync.Mutex
mode agent.PermissionMode
model string // override; "" => config default
cancel context.CancelFunc
history []turnRecord
}
// NewAgent builds the ACP server and registers its method handlers on conn.
@@ -90,6 +83,9 @@ func NewAgent(conn *Conn, deps Deps) *Agent {
return a
}
// Serve runs the connection read loop until the stream closes or ctx is done.
func (a *Agent) Serve(ctx context.Context) error { return a.conn.Serve(ctx) }
// ---- initialize ----
func (a *Agent) handleInitialize(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
@@ -124,7 +120,7 @@ func (a *Agent) handleInitialize(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any
// ---- session lifecycle ----
func (a *Agent) handleSessionNew(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
func (a *Agent) handleSessionNew(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p NewSessionParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid session/new params")
@@ -133,23 +129,18 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSessionNew(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (a
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, err.Error())
}
model, models, restrictModels, err := a.resolveModelChoices(ctx, root)
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "config: "+err.Error())
}
meta, err := a.deps.Store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{Title: "ACP session", Cwd: root, ModelID: model})
meta, err := a.deps.Store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{Title: "ACP session", Cwd: root})
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "create session: "+err.Error())
}
sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, nil, model, models, restrictModels)
sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, nil)
return NewSessionResult{
SessionID: sess.id,
ConfigOptions: a.configOptions(sess),
Modes: a.modeState(sess),
SessionID: sess.id,
Modes: a.modeState(sess),
}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p LoadSessionParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid session/load params")
@@ -170,17 +161,7 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (
// a half-initialized session (registerSession sets history under the lock and
// reuses an already-live session rather than orphaning its in-flight turn).
history, historyErr := a.loadHistory(meta.SessionID)
model, models, restrictModels, err := a.resolveModelChoices(ctx, root)
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "config: "+err.Error())
}
if persistedModel := strings.TrimSpace(meta.ModelID); persistedModel != "" && (!restrictModels || modelChoiceExists(models, persistedModel)) {
model = persistedModel
if !modelChoiceExists(models, persistedModel) {
models = append(models, SessionConfigOptionValue{Value: persistedModel, Name: persistedModel})
}
}
sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, history, model, models, restrictModels)
sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, history)
a.warnPersistence(
&notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id},
"load session history",
@@ -188,8 +169,7 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (
historyErr,
)
return LoadSessionResult{
ConfigOptions: a.configOptions(sess),
Modes: a.modeState(sess),
Modes: a.modeState(sess),
}, nil
}
@@ -374,27 +354,11 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSetConfigOption(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
if sess == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
}
switch p.ConfigID {
case configIDModel:
model := strings.TrimSpace(p.Value)
if err := a.updateModel(sess, model, sess.restrictModels); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
case configIDMode:
mode := agent.PermissionMode(p.Value)
switch mode {
case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk:
sess.setMode(mode)
(&notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id}).currentMode(string(mode))
case agent.PermissionModeUnsafe:
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "mode not permitted over ACP: "+p.Value)
default:
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown mode: "+p.Value)
}
default:
if p.ConfigID != configIDModel {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown config option: "+p.ConfigID)
}
return SetSessionConfigOptionResult{ConfigOptions: a.configOptions(sess)}, nil
sess.setModel(p.Value)
return SetSessionConfigOptionResult{}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) handleZeroSetModel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
@@ -406,24 +370,8 @@ func (a *Agent) handleZeroSetModel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (a
if sess == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
}
model := strings.TrimSpace(p.Model)
if err := a.updateModel(sess, model, false); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return ZeroSetModelResult{Model: model}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) updateModel(sess *acpSession, model string, restrictModels bool) error {
sess.modelMu.Lock()
defer sess.modelMu.Unlock()
if restrictModels && !sess.hasModel(model) {
return RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown model: "+model)
}
if _, err := a.deps.Store.UpdateModel(sess.id, model); err != nil {
return RPCError(codeInternalError, "save model selection: "+err.Error())
}
sess.setModel(model)
return nil
sess.setModel(p.Model)
return ZeroSetModelResult{Model: p.Model}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) handleCancel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) {
@@ -450,76 +398,6 @@ func (a *Agent) modeState(s *acpSession) *SessionModeState {
}
}
// resolveModelChoices advertises authenticated live models when discovery is
// available. The configured model is always retained as the sole fallback.
func (a *Agent) resolveModelChoices(ctx context.Context, cwd string) (string, []SessionConfigOptionValue, bool, error) {
resolved, err := a.deps.ResolveConfig(cwd, config.Overrides{})
if err != nil {
return "", nil, false, err
}
selected := strings.TrimSpace(resolved.Provider.Model)
options := make([]SessionConfigOptionValue, 0, 8)
seen := make(map[string]bool)
add := func(id, description string) {
id = strings.TrimSpace(id)
if id == "" || seen[id] {
return
}
seen[id] = true
options = append(options, SessionConfigOptionValue{Value: id, Name: id, Description: description})
}
add(selected, "")
descriptor, knownProvider := providercatalog.Get(resolved.Provider.CatalogID)
restrictModels := knownProvider && !descriptor.Custom
if a.deps.DiscoverModels != nil {
discovered, discoverErr := a.deps.DiscoverModels(ctx, resolved.Provider)
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return "", nil, false, ctx.Err()
}
if discoverErr == nil && len(discovered) > 0 {
for _, model := range discovered {
if providermodelcatalog.ModelIDAllowedForProvider(resolved.Provider.CatalogID, model.ID) {
add(model.ID, model.Description)
}
}
}
}
return selected, options, restrictModels, nil
}
func modelChoiceExists(models []SessionConfigOptionValue, model string) bool {
for _, option := range models {
if option.Value == model {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (a *Agent) configOptions(s *acpSession) []SessionConfigOption {
model, models, mode := s.configState()
return []SessionConfigOption{{
ID: configIDModel,
Name: "Model",
Description: "Model used for this session.",
Category: configCategoryModel,
Type: configOptionTypeSelect,
CurrentValue: model,
Options: models,
}, {
ID: configIDMode,
Name: "Mode",
Description: "Permission mode used for this session.",
Category: configCategoryMode,
Type: configOptionTypeSelect,
CurrentValue: string(mode),
Options: []SessionConfigOptionValue{
{Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAuto), Name: "Auto", Description: "Run safe tools automatically; ask before risky ones."},
{Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk), Name: "Ask", Description: "Ask before every tool that changes state."},
},
}}
}
// ---- persistence + continuity ----
func (a *Agent) persistTurn(sess *acpSession, user, assistant string) error {
@@ -647,13 +525,13 @@ func promptImages(blocks []ContentBlock) []zeroruntime.ImageBlock {
// session is returned unchanged rather than orphaning its turn or resetting its
// mode/model. history is set BEFORE publishing so no concurrent prompt can read a
// half-initialized session.
func (a *Agent) registerSession(id, cwd string, history []turnRecord, model string, models []SessionConfigOptionValue, restrictModels bool) *acpSession {
func (a *Agent) registerSession(id, cwd string, history []turnRecord) *acpSession {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
if existing := a.sessions[id]; existing != nil {
return existing
}
sess := &acpSession{id: id, cwd: cwd, mode: agent.PermissionModeAuto, model: model, models: models, restrictModels: restrictModels, history: history}
sess := &acpSession{id: id, cwd: cwd, mode: agent.PermissionModeAuto, history: history}
a.sessions[id] = sess
return sess
}
@@ -692,18 +570,7 @@ func (s *acpSession) currentMode() agent.PermissionMode {
}
func (s *acpSession) setModel(model string) {
model = strings.TrimSpace(model)
s.mu.Lock()
found := false
for _, option := range s.models {
if option.Value == model {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found && model != "" {
s.models = append(s.models, SessionConfigOptionValue{Value: model, Name: model})
}
s.model = model
s.mu.Unlock()
}
@@ -714,24 +581,6 @@ func (s *acpSession) currentModel() string {
return s.model
}
func (s *acpSession) hasModel(model string) bool {
model = strings.TrimSpace(model)
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
for _, option := range s.models {
if option.Value == model {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (s *acpSession) configState() (string, []SessionConfigOptionValue, agent.PermissionMode) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return s.model, append([]SessionConfigOptionValue(nil), s.models...), s.mode
}
func (s *acpSession) appendHistory(rec turnRecord) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.history = append(s.history, rec)
-212
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
@@ -14,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
@@ -139,12 +137,6 @@ func TestACPEndToEndPrompt(t *testing.T) {
if newRes.Modes == nil || newRes.Modes.CurrentModeID != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
t.Fatalf("expected auto mode, got %+v", newRes.Modes)
}
if len(newRes.ConfigOptions) != 2 || newRes.ConfigOptions[0].ID != configIDModel || newRes.ConfigOptions[0].CurrentValue != "fake-model" {
t.Fatalf("model config option = %+v, want fake-model fallback", newRes.ConfigOptions)
}
if newRes.ConfigOptions[1].ID != configIDMode || newRes.ConfigOptions[1].CurrentValue != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
t.Fatalf("mode config option = %+v", newRes.ConfigOptions[1])
}
// session/prompt
var promptRes PromptResult
@@ -164,201 +156,6 @@ func TestACPEndToEndPrompt(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestACPModelConfigOptionsCatalogSelectionAndLoad(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.ResolveConfig = func(_ string, o config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
model := "gpt-5.5"
if o.Provider.Model != "" {
model = o.Provider.Model
}
return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "ChatGPT", CatalogID: "chatgpt", Model: model,
}}, nil
}
deps.DiscoverModels = func(_ context.Context, _ config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{
{ID: " gpt-5.4-mini ", Description: "Fast"},
{ID: "gpt-5.5", Description: "duplicate configured model"},
}, nil
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
option := created.ConfigOptions[0]
if option.CurrentValue != "gpt-5.5" || len(option.Options) < 2 {
t.Fatalf("new model option = %+v", option)
}
for _, choice := range option.Options {
if choice.Name != choice.Value {
t.Fatalf("model choice name = %q, want model id %q", choice.Name, choice.Value)
}
}
var selected SetSessionConfigOptionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDModel, Value: " gpt-5.4-mini ",
}, &selected); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set_config_option: %v", err)
}
if got := selected.ConfigOptions[0].CurrentValue; got != "gpt-5.4-mini" {
t.Fatalf("selected model = %q", got)
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDModel, Value: "not-advertised",
}, &SetSessionConfigOptionResult{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("unknown standard model selection was accepted")
}
h.stop()
h = newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
var loaded LoadSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID}, &loaded); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/load: %v", err)
}
if len(loaded.ConfigOptions) != 2 || loaded.ConfigOptions[0].CurrentValue != "gpt-5.4-mini" {
t.Fatalf("load model option = %+v", loaded.ConfigOptions)
}
if loaded.ConfigOptions[1].CurrentValue != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
t.Fatalf("load mode option = %+v", loaded.ConfigOptions[1])
}
}
func TestACPModelDiscoveryFailureUsesConfiguredFallbackOnly(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.ResolveConfig = func(_ string, _ config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "ChatGPT", CatalogID: "chatgpt", Model: " configured-model ",
}}, nil
}
deps.DiscoverModels = func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("discovery unavailable")
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
option := created.ConfigOptions[0]
if option.CurrentValue != "configured-model" || len(option.Options) != 1 || option.Options[0].Value != "configured-model" {
t.Fatalf("fallback model option = %+v", option)
}
}
func TestACPCustomProviderAllowsUnadvertisedModel(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.ResolveConfig = func(_ string, o config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
model := "configured-model"
if o.Provider.Model != "" {
model = o.Provider.Model
}
return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "Custom", CatalogID: "custom-openai-compatible", Model: model,
}}, nil
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
var selected SetSessionConfigOptionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDModel, Value: " vendor/model ",
}, &selected); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set custom model: %v", err)
}
if got := selected.ConfigOptions[0].CurrentValue; got != "vendor/model" {
t.Fatalf("custom model = %q", got)
}
h.stop()
h = newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
var loaded LoadSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID}, &loaded); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/load: %v", err)
}
option := loaded.ConfigOptions[0]
if option.CurrentValue != "vendor/model" || !modelChoiceExists(option.Options, "vendor/model") {
t.Fatalf("loaded custom model option = %+v", option)
}
}
func TestACPModelDiscoveryFiltersProviderIncompatibleModels(t *testing.T) {
a := &Agent{deps: Deps{
ResolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
CatalogID: "opencode-go-anthropic-compatible", Model: "minimax-m3",
}}, nil
},
DiscoverModels: func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{{ID: "qwen3.7-plus"}, {ID: "claude-sonnet-4.5"}}, nil
},
}}
_, options, restricted, err := a.resolveModelChoices(context.Background(), t.TempDir())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !restricted || !modelChoiceExists(options, "qwen3.7-plus") || modelChoiceExists(options, "claude-sonnet-4.5") {
t.Fatalf("filtered model options = %+v, restricted=%v", options, restricted)
}
}
func TestACPModelDiscoveryHonorsCancellation(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
a := &Agent{deps: Deps{
ResolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{Model: "configured-model"}}, nil
},
DiscoverModels: func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return nil, context.Canceled
},
}}
if _, _, _, err := a.resolveModelChoices(ctx, t.TempDir()); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("resolve error = %v, want context canceled", err)
}
}
func TestACPConfigOptionWireSchema(t *testing.T) {
b, err := json.Marshal(SessionConfigOption{
ID: "model", Name: "Model", Description: "desc", Category: "model",
Type: configOptionTypeSelect, CurrentValue: "m1",
Options: []SessionConfigOptionValue{{Value: "m1", Name: "m1", Description: "choice"}},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var wire map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &wire); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, key := range []string{"type", "category", "currentValue", "options"} {
if _, ok := wire[key]; !ok {
t.Errorf("wire field %q absent: %s", key, b)
}
}
if _, ok := wire["value"]; ok {
t.Errorf("obsolete option value field present: %s", b)
}
if _, ok := wire["values"]; ok {
t.Errorf("obsolete values field present: %s", b)
}
choice := wire["options"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)
if choice["value"] != "m1" {
t.Errorf("options[].value = %#v", choice["value"])
}
}
func TestACPUnknownSessionPromptErrors(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t, testDeps(t))
defer h.stop()
@@ -384,15 +181,6 @@ func TestACPSetModeUpdatesSession(t *testing.T) {
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk)}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set_mode ask: %v", err)
}
var configured SetSessionConfigOptionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDMode, Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAuto),
}, &configured); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set_config_option mode: %v", err)
}
if got := configured.ConfigOptions[1].CurrentValue; got != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
t.Fatalf("configured mode = %q", got)
}
// Unsafe must be rejected over ACP — a client can't self-grant no-prompt host access.
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModeUnsafe)}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected Unsafe mode to be rejected over ACP")
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package acp
import "context"
// Serve runs the connection read loop until the stream closes or ctx is done.
func (a *Agent) Serve(ctx context.Context) error { return a.conn.Serve(ctx) }
func ImageBlock(base64Data, mimeType string) ContentBlock {
return ContentBlock{Type: "image", Data: base64Data, MimeType: mimeType}
}
+6 -138
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
)
// JSON-RPC 2.0 standard error codes.
@@ -81,9 +80,8 @@ type NotifyFunc func(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
// requests/notifications — needed because ACP is bidirectional (the agent calls
// the client for session/request_permission, fs/*, terminal/*).
type Conn struct {
rawReader io.Reader // wrapped lazily in Serve, once ctx is known — see interruptibleReader
readerCloser io.Closer
w io.Writer
reader *bufio.Reader
w io.Writer
writeMu sync.Mutex // serializes all writes to w
@@ -98,15 +96,10 @@ type Conn struct {
wg sync.WaitGroup // tracks in-flight inbound handlers
}
// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w. This
// Conn does not own r: cancelling Serve's context cannot forcibly close it, so
// a Read on r that's genuinely idle (never returns on its own) leaves Serve
// blocked until r itself produces something — e.g. a test that closes r's own
// write side to unblock it. Use NewOwnedConn when this Conn should own r's
// lifetime.
// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w.
func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
return &Conn{
rawReader: r,
reader: bufio.NewReader(r),
w: w,
handlers: make(map[string]HandlerFunc),
notifiers: make(map[string]NotifyFunc),
@@ -114,18 +107,6 @@ func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
}
}
// NewOwnedConn is like NewConn but declares that this Conn exclusively owns r:
// if r implements io.Closer, Serve closes it on context cancellation to
// interrupt an otherwise-idle blocking Read. Only pass a reader whose lifetime
// this Conn should control — e.g. the process's own stdin — never a reader a
// caller retains or shares elsewhere, since cancellation tears it down
// permanently for every consumer, not just this Conn.
func NewOwnedConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
c := NewConn(r, w)
c.readerCloser, _ = r.(io.Closer)
return c
}
// Handle registers a request handler for method.
func (c *Conn) Handle(method string, fn HandlerFunc) { c.handlers[method] = fn }
@@ -147,36 +128,17 @@ func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
c.wg.Wait()
}()
interruptible := newInterruptibleReader(ctx, c.rawReader, c.readerCloser)
reader := bufio.NewReader(interruptible)
for {
// One ndjson value per line. Framing per line (rather than streaming the
// decoder) keeps a single malformed line from making the whole connection
// unrecoverable — we report -32700 and continue.
//
// generation brackets this SPECIFIC ReadBytes call: bufio may invoke
// interruptible.Read zero or more times underneath it (zero when the
// answer is already sitting in bufio's own buffer — including a
// previously-buffered, not-yet-surfaced error: bufio can return a
// complete line with a nil error while quietly caching an error it
// received ALONGSIDE that line's bytes, which then surfaces on the VERY
// NEXT call with no further contact with interruptible.Read at all). The
// generation only advances inside interruptible.Read's own cancellation
// branch, so "unchanged across this call" is proof this call's outcome
// didn't pass through that branch — whether because it was answered from
// the buffer or because it raced ctx.Done() and won. Only that proof
// makes it safe to call the outcome genuine.
before := interruptible.generation()
line, err := reader.ReadBytes('\n')
interrupted := interruptible.generation() != before
line, err := c.reader.ReadBytes('\n')
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(line)) > 0 {
c.handleLine(ctx, line)
}
if err != nil {
c.failAllPending(err)
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || interrupted {
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || ctx.Err() != nil {
return nil
}
return err
@@ -184,100 +146,6 @@ func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
}
}
// interruptibleReader wraps a reader so a context cancellation can unblock a
// currently in-flight Read without ever discarding — or misattributing — the
// real outcome of a call that wasn't actually blocked.
//
// Each Read runs the underlying call on its own goroutine and races it against
// ctx.Done(). If the underlying call finishes first, its result is returned
// exactly as received; ctx being cancelled a moment later has no bearing on a
// call that already had its answer. If ctx.Done() fires first, closer (when
// non-nil) is closed to nudge a genuinely blocked read, the generation counter
// is bumped, and the call STILL waits for and returns the underlying call's own
// result — never a synthesized one — since closing a reader's outcome is
// whatever the reader itself reports for it, not ours to invent.
//
// The counter is what lets Serve tell a call that was actually raced against
// cancellation apart from one merely answered while cancellation happened to be
// pending — the distinction the read loop's own doc comment explains.
type interruptibleReader struct {
inner io.Reader
closer io.Closer
ctx context.Context
closeOnce sync.Once
gen atomic.Int64
}
func newInterruptibleReader(ctx context.Context, inner io.Reader, closer io.Closer) *interruptibleReader {
return &interruptibleReader{inner: inner, closer: closer, ctx: ctx}
}
func (r *interruptibleReader) generation() int64 { return r.gen.Load() }
type interruptibleReadResult struct {
n int
err error
}
// interruptibleReadDecision arbitrates whether an underlying Read completed or
// cancellation claimed it first. Completion is recorded before the result is
// published so cancellation cannot misclassify a finished read merely because
// its goroutine has not sent the result yet.
type interruptibleReadDecision struct {
once sync.Once
}
func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) complete() { d.once.Do(func() {}) }
func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) interrupt() (claimed bool) {
d.once.Do(func() { claimed = true })
return claimed
}
// readInner records completion in the Read call's deferred epilogue. It also
// converts a reader panic into a terminal error so the helper goroutine always
// publishes a result for Read to join.
func (r *interruptibleReader) readInner(p []byte, decision *interruptibleReadDecision) (res interruptibleReadResult) {
defer func() {
if recovered := recover(); recovered != nil {
res = interruptibleReadResult{err: fmt.Errorf("acp: reader panicked: %v", recovered)}
}
decision.complete()
}()
res.n, res.err = r.inner.Read(p)
return res
}
func (r *interruptibleReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
resultCh := make(chan interruptibleReadResult, 1)
var decision interruptibleReadDecision
go func() {
resultCh <- r.readInner(p, &decision)
}()
select {
case res := <-resultCh:
return res.n, res.err
case <-r.ctx.Done():
// resultCh may not be readable yet even when inner.Read has returned: its
// goroutine can be descheduled between recording completion and publishing
// the result. Only interrupt a call that cancellation actually claims.
if decision.interrupt() {
r.gen.Add(1)
if r.closer != nil {
r.closeOnce.Do(func() { _ = r.closer.Close() })
}
}
// Wait for the real result rather than returning synthetically: p is
// still being written by the goroutine above until it does, so returning
// early would race that write, and the actual error (whatever closing
// the reader produced, or whatever the reader was already about to
// report) is what the caller should see.
res := <-resultCh
return res.n, res.err
}
}
// handleLine decodes and dispatches one ndjson frame. A parse failure replies
// with -32700 (id null) and keeps the connection alive.
func (c *Conn) handleLine(ctx context.Context, line []byte) {
-288
View File
@@ -3,30 +3,11 @@ package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"io"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
)
type testReadCloser struct {
read func([]byte) (int, error)
close func() error
}
func (r testReadCloser) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r.read(p) }
func (r testReadCloser) Close() error { return r.close() }
type testReader func([]byte) (int, error)
func (r testReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r(p) }
type testWriter func([]byte) (int, error)
func (w testWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return w(p) }
// connPair wires two Conns together over in-memory pipes and serves both.
func connPair(t *testing.T) (a, b *Conn, stop func()) {
t.Helper()
@@ -44,275 +25,6 @@ func connPair(t *testing.T) (a, b *Conn, stop func()) {
}
}
func TestConnServeCancellationInterruptsIdleRead(t *testing.T) {
pipeReader, writer := io.Pipe()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = writer.Close() })
// Buffered + non-blocking send, not close: interruptibleReader retries each
// underlying Read on its own goroutine, so if bufio ever calls this more than
// once, a close() here would panic on the second call.
readStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
closeCalls := make(chan struct{}, 2)
reader := testReadCloser{
read: func(p []byte) (int, error) {
select {
case readStarted <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
return pipeReader.Read(p)
},
close: func() error {
closeCalls <- struct{}{}
return pipeReader.Close()
},
}
conn := NewOwnedConn(reader, io.Discard)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
<-readStarted
cancel()
select {
case err := <-done:
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v after cancellation, want nil", err)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after cancelling an idle connection")
}
if got := len(closeCalls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("reader Close calls = %d, want 1", got)
}
}
func TestConnServePreservesTerminalReadErrorDuringCancellation(t *testing.T) {
for _, closable := range []bool{false, true} {
name := "non-closable"
if closable {
name = "closable"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
return copy(p, "not json"), wantErr
})
closeCalls := make(chan struct{}, 1)
var reader io.Reader = read
if closable {
reader = testReadCloser{
read: read,
close: func() error {
closeCalls <- struct{}{}
return nil
},
}
}
// Buffered + non-blocking send, not close: a later change adding a
// second write (e.g. an additional error frame) must not panic on a
// repeated close of an already-closed channel.
writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
writer := testWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
select {
case writeStarted <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
<-releaseWrite
return len(p), nil
})
newConn := NewConn
if closable {
// Ownership matters here: this case exists to prove that even a
// Conn entitled to close its reader on cancellation still
// preserves a terminal error that was already decided.
newConn = NewOwnedConn
}
conn := newConn(reader, writer)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
<-writeStarted
cancel()
close(releaseWrite)
select {
case err := <-done:
if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want terminal read error %v", err, wantErr)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after terminal read error")
}
if got := len(closeCalls); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("reader Close calls = %d, want 0 after terminal read", got)
}
})
}
}
// TestConnServePreservesReadErrorBufferedAlongsideAPriorLine is the deterministic
// regression test for jatmn's #782 finding: a real, non-EOF ReadBytes failure can
// be DECIDED before cancellation ever happens, yet only SURFACE afterward, and
// must still be reported rather than swallowed as a clean shutdown.
//
// bufio.Reader can obtain data AND a terminal error from ONE underlying Read call
// (io.Reader explicitly permits returning (n>0, err) together). If a delimiter is
// found within that data, ReadBytes returns the line with a nil error for THIS
// call, but bufio caches the error internally and returns it — WITHOUT calling the
// underlying reader again — on the very next ReadBytes call. This test forces that
// exact sequence: the underlying reader hands back one complete, validly-framed
// line together with wantErr in a SINGLE call (asserted below to be its ONLY
// call), the loop dispatches that line through a synchronous path that blocks the
// read loop, cancellation is asserted to have happened before the loop attempts
// its next read, and only then is the block released. By the time the read loop
// asks for more input, cancellation is already in effect and the underlying
// reader is never touched again — so if Serve attributed the resulting error to
// cancellation merely because ctx was already done, it would incorrectly return
// nil. It must instead recognize that this read was answered entirely from
// bufio's own cache, never raced against ctx.Done(), and report wantErr.
func TestConnServePreservesReadErrorBufferedAlongsideAPriorLine(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
var readCalls atomic.Int32
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
readCalls.Add(1)
// An unsupported jsonrpc version with an id takes the SYNCHRONOUS
// writeError path in handleLine (not a dispatched goroutine), giving this
// test a reliable blocking point between processing this line and the
// loop's next ReadBytes call.
return copy(p, `{"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":1}`+"\n"), wantErr
})
writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
var releaseWriteOnce sync.Once
release := func() { releaseWriteOnce.Do(func() { close(releaseWrite) }) }
t.Cleanup(release)
writer := testWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
select {
case writeStarted <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
<-releaseWrite
return len(p), nil
})
conn := NewConn(read, writer)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
// The synchronous write confirms the first (and, per the panic guard above,
// only) read has already returned and is being processed — cancelling now
// lands squarely in the gap between that read and the loop's next one, never
// racing an in-flight interruptibleReader.Read call.
select {
case <-writeStarted:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not reach the synchronous write")
}
cancel()
release()
select {
case err := <-done:
if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want the buffered terminal read error %v", err, wantErr)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after the buffered terminal read error")
}
if got := readCalls.Load(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("underlying Read calls = %d, want exactly 1 (bufio must have served the second ReadBytes from its cache)", got)
}
}
// TestInterruptibleReaderPrefersDecidedResultOverCancellation is the regression
// test for jatmn's second #782 finding: interruptibleReader.Read's select
// between resultCh and ctx.Done() chooses pseudo-randomly when both are ready,
// so a real, already-decided outcome (e.g. a terminal transport error) could be
// misattributed to cancellation purely because ctx also happened to be done by
// the time the select ran. Each iteration lets the underlying Read return (so
// resultCh already holds the real outcome) before cancelling, maximizing the
// odds of landing exactly in that ambiguous window; the generation counter must
// never advance when the real, already-decided result is what gets returned.
func TestInterruptibleReaderPrefersDecidedResultOverCancellation(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
resultReady := make(chan struct{})
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
defer close(resultReady)
return copy(p, "x"), wantErr
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
r := newInterruptibleReader(ctx, read, nil)
readDone := make(chan interruptibleReadResult, 1)
go func() {
n, err := r.Read(make([]byte, 8))
readDone <- interruptibleReadResult{n, err}
}()
<-resultReady
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond) // bias resultCh's send ahead of cancel
cancel()
res := <-readDone
if !errors.Is(res.err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("iteration %d: Read returned %v, want %v", i, res.err, wantErr)
}
if got := r.generation(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("iteration %d: generation = %d, want 0 (a decided result must never be attributed to cancellation)", i, got)
}
cancel()
}
}
// TestInterruptibleReadCompletionWinsBeforeResultPublication exercises the
// actual inner-read wrapper at the handoff between the underlying Read and the
// helper goroutine's result publication. Cancellation must not reclassify a
// result returned by this wrapper as interrupted.
func TestInterruptibleReadCompletionWinsBeforeResultPublication(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
return copy(p, "x"), wantErr
})
r := newInterruptibleReader(context.Background(), read, nil)
var decision interruptibleReadDecision
readComplete := make(chan struct{})
resultCh := make(chan interruptibleReadResult)
go func() {
res := r.readInner(make([]byte, 8), &decision)
close(readComplete)
resultCh <- res
}()
<-readComplete
if decision.interrupt() {
t.Fatal("cancellation claimed a read that completed before result publication")
}
res := <-resultCh
if res.n != 1 || !errors.Is(res.err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("inner read result = (%d, %v), want (1, %v)", res.n, res.err, wantErr)
}
}
func TestConnServeReportsReaderPanicAsTerminalError(t *testing.T) {
read := testReader(func([]byte) (int, error) {
panic("boom")
})
conn := NewConn(read, io.Discard)
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(context.Background()) }()
select {
case err := <-done:
const want = "acp: reader panicked: boom"
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want %q", err, want)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after reader panic")
}
}
func TestConnRequestResponse(t *testing.T) {
a, b, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
+19 -19
View File
@@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ type ContentBlock struct {
func TextBlock(text string) ContentBlock { return ContentBlock{Type: "text", Text: text} }
func ImageBlock(base64Data, mimeType string) ContentBlock {
return ContentBlock{Type: "image", Data: base64Data, MimeType: mimeType}
}
// ---- sessions ----
// McpServer mirrors the editor-provided MCP server entry. ZERO owns its own MCP
@@ -229,6 +233,10 @@ func ToolContent(block ContentBlock) ToolCallContent {
return ToolCallContent{Type: "content", Content: &block}
}
func ToolDiff(path, oldText, newText string) ToolCallContent {
return ToolCallContent{Type: "diff", Path: path, OldText: oldText, NewText: newText}
}
type ToolCallLocation struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Line *int `json:"line,omitempty"`
@@ -329,22 +337,19 @@ type SetSessionModeParams struct {
type SetSessionModeResult struct{}
// ---- session config options ----
// ---- session config options (model selection) ----
type SessionConfigOptionValue struct {
Value string `json:"value"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
}
type SessionConfigOption struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
Category string `json:"category,omitempty"`
Type string `json:"type"`
CurrentValue string `json:"currentValue"`
Options []SessionConfigOptionValue `json:"options"`
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
Value string `json:"value"`
Values []SessionConfigOptionValue `json:"values,omitempty"`
}
type SetSessionConfigOptionParams struct {
@@ -368,11 +373,6 @@ type ZeroSetModelResult struct {
Model string `json:"model"`
}
const (
configIDModel = "model"
configIDMode = "mode"
configOptionTypeSelect = "select"
configCategoryModel = "model"
configCategoryMode = "mode"
)
// configIDModel is the SessionConfigOption id ZERO uses to expose model choice
// through the standard session/set_config_option method.
const configIDModel = "model"
@@ -5,29 +5,9 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
type normalizationRecordingShellTool struct {
calls []map[string]any
}
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Name() string { return "bash" }
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Description() string {
return "record normalized shell arguments"
}
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: true}
}
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
// A shell call that sets sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions but
// omits (or malforms) additional_permissions can never succeed: the same
// validation runs again at grant time regardless of the user's decision. It
@@ -36,7 +16,7 @@ func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[str
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsMissingAdditionalPermissionsBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
promptCalls := 0
result, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -71,7 +51,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsMissingAdditionalPermissionsBeforePrompt(t *testi
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsAdditionalPermissionsWithoutFlagBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
promptCalls := 0
result, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -108,7 +88,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsAdditionalPermissionsWithoutFlagBeforePrompt(t *t
func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
@@ -127,7 +107,9 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, `{"network": {"enabled": true}}`) {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want a concrete additional_permissions example", result.Output)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "missing additional_permissions", result.Output)
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "omit sandbox_permissions") {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want guidance that the flag can simply be omitted", result.Output)
}
}
// A well-formed additional_permissions payload must still reach the normal
@@ -135,7 +117,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing
func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
promptCalls := 0
_, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -162,237 +144,3 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T)
t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want exactly 1 for a valid elevation request", promptCalls)
}
}
// runShellCall drives one shell tool call through the real registry (and so
// through Registry.RunWithOptions) exactly as the agent loop would.
func runShellCall(t *testing.T, root string, arguments string) ToolResult {
t.Helper()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedExecCommandTool(root, nil, nil))
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: arguments},
PermissionModeUnsafe,
Options{Cwd: root},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
return result
}
// TestAdditionalPermissionsRejectionsConverge is the regression guard for
// #845/#847. A model that attaches a permission object to a command needing
// none used to be told only "set sandbox_permissions", which pushed it into the
// OTHER invalid shape (flag set, payload empty) and its "include a permission"
// error pushed it straight back — the reported loop that burned turns on
// `git branch --show-current`.
//
// The contract this pins is convergence, not tolerance: both shapes are still
// REJECTED (nothing here grants access), but each rejection must name the one
// follow-up call that works, and that follow-up must actually succeed.
func TestAdditionalPermissionsRejectionsConverge(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
const readOnly = `"cmd":"git --version"`
// Step 1 of the reported loop: a permission object with no flag.
first := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`,"additional_permissions":{"network":{"enabled":true}}}`)
if first.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("unflagged additional_permissions status = %q, want error (rejecting is correct)", first.Status)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "unflagged additional_permissions", first.Output)
// Step 2 of the reported loop: the model keeps the flag but empties the
// payload. This must not be the dead end it was.
second := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`,"sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions"}`)
if second.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("flag without payload status = %q, want error", second.Status)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "flag without payload", second.Output)
// The call both errors point at must actually work.
converged := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`}`)
if converged.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("the call both errors instruct the model to make failed: status=%q output=%q", converged.Status, converged.Output)
}
}
// assertNamesOmitRemedy pins the actionable half of the error text: the message
// must spell out that BOTH fields can simply be dropped. "Set the flag" or
// "include a permission" alone is what made the two errors chase each other.
func assertNamesOmitRemedy(t *testing.T, label string, output string) {
t.Helper()
if !strings.Contains(output, "omit both sandbox_permissions and additional_permissions") {
t.Fatalf("%s error = %q, want it to say to omit both fields entirely", label, output)
}
if !strings.Contains(output, "retry") {
t.Fatalf("%s error = %q, want it to tell the model to retry", label, output)
}
}
// The empty-payload rejection carries the same remedy. It is pinned on the
// validator directly because normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions absorbs the
// empty payload before executeToolCall reaches this branch;
// inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile is still the shared source of truth that
// buildPermissionEvent and the grant path re-run, so its text must converge too.
func TestEmptyAdditionalPermissionsErrorNamesOmitRemedy(t *testing.T) {
args := map[string]any{
"cmd": "git --version",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
"file_system": map[string]any{"read": []any{}, "write": []any{}},
},
}
_, requested, err := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, t.TempDir())
if !requested {
t.Fatal("requested = false, want true for an explicit with_additional_permissions call")
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("an empty additional_permissions payload was accepted; it must still be rejected")
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "empty payload", err.Error())
}
// A provider that materializes every optional property may send
// "additional_permissions": null. That grants nothing and carries no flag, so it
// is the field omitted — rejecting it stalled an ordinary command behind an
// error the model could not act on.
func TestExecuteToolCallTreatsNullAdditionalPermissionsAsOmitted(t *testing.T) {
result := runShellCall(t, t.TempDir(), `{"cmd":"git --version","additional_permissions":null}`)
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("null additional_permissions was rejected: status=%q output=%q", result.Status, result.Output)
}
}
// A null payload alongside the flag must still be rejected, and must land on
// the same error as an absent payload rather than being quietly downgraded.
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsFlaggedNullAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
result := runShellCall(t, t.TempDir(),
`{"cmd":"git --version","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions","additional_permissions":null}`)
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("flagged null status = %q, want error", result.Status)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "no additional_permissions object was provided") {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want the missing-payload error", result.Output)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "flagged null", result.Output)
}
func TestNormalizeProviderExpandedEmptyAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
for _, mode := range []string{
string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault),
string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
} {
args := map[string]any{
"command": "./zero --version",
"sandbox_permissions": mode,
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"file_system": map[string]any{
"deny_read": []any{},
"entries": []any{},
"read": []any{},
"write": []any{},
},
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
},
}
normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, t.TempDir(), nil)
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
t.Fatalf("mode %q retained empty additional_permissions: %#v", mode, args)
}
if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
t.Fatalf("mode %q normalized to %q, want use_default", mode, got)
}
}
}
func TestExecuteToolCallNormalizesProviderExpandedEmptyAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
tool := &normalizationRecordingShellTool{}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tool)
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{
ID: "c1",
Name: "bash",
Arguments: `{"command":"./zero --version","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions",` +
`"additional_permissions":{"file_system":{"deny_read":[],"entries":[],"read":[],"write":[]},"network":{"enabled":false}}}`,
},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{Cwd: t.TempDir()},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("provider-expanded empty permissions were rejected: %s", result.Output)
}
if len(tool.calls) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("shell tool calls = %d, want 1", len(tool.calls))
}
args := tool.calls[0]
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall retained empty additional_permissions: %#v", args)
}
if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
t.Fatalf("sandbox mode = %q, want use_default", got)
}
}
func TestNormalizeAdditionalPermissionsPreservesRealRequest(t *testing.T) {
args := map[string]any{
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": true},
},
}
normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, t.TempDir(), nil)
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; !exists {
t.Fatal("non-empty additional_permissions was removed")
}
if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions) {
t.Fatalf("sandbox mode changed to %q", got)
}
}
func TestNormalizeAdditionalPermissionsRemovesWorkspaceReadAlreadyCoveredBySandbox(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: root,
Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy(),
})
args := map[string]any{
"command": "./zero --version",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"file_system": map[string]any{
"entries": []any{
map[string]any{
"access": "read",
"path": map[string]any{
"type": "path",
"path": ".",
},
},
},
"deny_read": []any{},
"read": []any{},
"write": []any{},
},
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
},
}
normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, root, engine)
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
t.Fatalf("already-covered additional_permissions was retained: %#v", args)
}
if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
t.Fatalf("sandbox mode changed to %q", got)
}
}
+1 -6
View File
@@ -141,11 +141,9 @@ func TestRunAskUserCancellationAbortsRun(t *testing.T) {
registry := registryWithAskUser()
args := `{"questions":[{"question":"Which framework?"}]}`
provider := providerCallingAskUserThenAnswer(args, "done")
var toolResults []ToolResult
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "clarify", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
OnToolResult: func(result ToolResult) { toolResults = append(toolResults, result) },
Registry: registry,
OnAskUser: func(_ context.Context, _ AskUserRequest) (AskUserResponse, error) {
return AskUserResponse{}, context.Canceled
},
@@ -160,9 +158,6 @@ func TestRunAskUserCancellationAbortsRun(t *testing.T) {
if len(provider.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected the run to stop after the canceled ask_user (1 turn), got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
if len(toolResults) != 1 || toolResults[0].ToolCallID == "" {
t.Fatalf("cancellation must emit exactly one result for the call, got %#v", toolResults)
}
// The recorded tool result must reflect cancellation, not a synthetic answer.
var toolMsg string
for _, m := range result.Messages {
+12
View File
@@ -501,3 +501,15 @@ func hasStringPrefix(values []string, prefix []string) bool {
}
return true
}
func equalStringSlices(left []string, right []string) bool {
if len(left) != len(right) {
return false
}
for index := range left {
if left[index] != right[index] {
return false
}
}
return true
}
+3 -20
View File
@@ -56,10 +56,6 @@ type CompactionOptions struct {
// injected so Compact stays pure and testable; the agent loop wires it to a
// real provider call.
Summarize func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error)
// taskState is a snapshot supplied by the running agent. Its immutable
// objective is always preserved; mutable fields are admitted only when its
// plan projection still matches the transcript.
taskState *taskStateSnapshot
}
// CompactionResult is the metadata-bearing result returned by CompactMessages.
@@ -224,7 +220,7 @@ func CompactMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) (Co
// Preserve structured state (active plan + loaded skills) from the elided
// middle verbatim, so it is not lost or paraphrased away by the prose summary.
content := appendPreservedState(summaryLabel+"\n"+summary, middle, opts.taskState)
content := appendPreservedState(summaryLabel+"\n"+summary, middle)
compacted := make([]zeroruntime.Message, 0, systemEnd+1+(len(messages)-boundary))
compacted = append(compacted, messages[:systemEnd]...)
@@ -330,7 +326,6 @@ type compactionState struct {
// OnText is deliberately NOT forwarded (compaction stays invisible to the user),
// but its token COST must still be counted so usage reports and budgets include it.
onUsage func(Usage)
task *taskState
// calibrationRatio scales the raw byte/4 token estimate toward the provider's
// real prompt-token count. ApproxTextTokens over-counts code-heavy content by
@@ -370,15 +365,13 @@ func (state *compactionState) calibratedTokens(raw int) int {
return int(float64(raw) * state.calibrationRatio)
}
func newCompactionState(options Options, task *taskState) *compactionState {
state := &compactionState{
func newCompactionState(options Options) *compactionState {
return &compactionState{
enabled: options.ContextWindow > 0,
threshold: compactionThreshold(options.ContextWindow),
preserveLast: options.CompactionPreserveLast,
onUsage: options.OnUsage,
task: task,
}
return state
}
// maybeCompact runs proactive compaction at the top of a turn. It returns the
@@ -413,14 +406,6 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
// the bodies of old, large tool results (the model has already acted on
// them). If that brings us back under threshold, skip the paid summarizer
// entirely and preserve recent turns verbatim.
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages); reclaimed > 0 {
messages = pruned
size = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
if size <= state.threshold {
state.lowWaterMark = size
return messages
}
}
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(messages, state.preserveLast); reclaimed > 0 {
messages = pruned
size = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
@@ -433,7 +418,6 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
taskState: state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
// Summarizer failed: keep the original history. The reactive path (or a
@@ -484,7 +468,6 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
result, compactErr := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
taskState: state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if compactErr != nil {
// A genuine compaction attempt was made (and failed): the budget is spent
+38 -60
View File
@@ -30,10 +30,6 @@ const (
const (
maxRecentEdits = 20
maxEditNoteBytes = 160
// maxTaskObjectiveBytes keeps the original objective recognizable after
// compaction without allowing an unusually large prompt to recreate the
// context pressure the compaction just removed.
maxTaskObjectiveBytes = 512
)
const (
@@ -80,14 +76,32 @@ func extractLatestPlan(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
// ({"plan":[{content,status,...}]}) as terse status-tagged bullet lines. Returns
// "" on malformed arguments or an empty plan.
func formatPlanArguments(arguments string) string {
plan, ok := parseTaskPlan(arguments)
if !ok {
var parsed struct {
Plan []struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
Step string `json:"step"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Notes string `json:"notes"`
} `json:"plan"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments)), &parsed); err != nil {
return ""
}
lines := make([]string, 0, len(plan))
for _, item := range plan {
line := "- [" + item.Status + "] " + item.Content
if notes := item.Notes; notes != "" {
lines := make([]string, 0, len(parsed.Plan))
for _, item := range parsed.Plan {
content := strings.TrimSpace(item.Content)
if content == "" {
content = strings.TrimSpace(item.Step)
}
if content == "" {
continue
}
status := strings.TrimSpace(item.Status)
if status == "" {
status = "pending"
}
line := "- [" + status + "] " + content
if notes := strings.TrimSpace(item.Notes); notes != "" {
line += "\n Notes: " + notes
}
lines = append(lines, line)
@@ -417,25 +431,12 @@ func capBody(body string) string {
// preservedState is the JSON shape of the carried-across-compaction block.
type preservedState struct {
Plan string `json:"plan,omitempty"`
Task *preservedTaskState `json:"task,omitempty"`
RecentEdits []preservedEdit `json:"recent_edits,omitempty"`
Tools []preservedTool `json:"tools,omitempty"`
Skills []preservedSkill `json:"skills,omitempty"`
ProjectInstructions []preservedInstruction `json:"project_instructions,omitempty"`
}
type preservedTaskState struct {
Objective string `json:"objective"`
Status taskStatus `json:"status,omitempty"`
Pending int `json:"pending,omitempty"`
InProgress int `json:"in_progress,omitempty"`
Completed int `json:"completed,omitempty"`
Failed int `json:"failed,omitempty"`
VerificationPassed int `json:"verification_passed,omitempty"`
VerificationFailed int `json:"verification_failed,omitempty"`
VerificationOutcome Outcome `json:"verification_outcome,omitempty"`
}
type preservedEdit struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Note string `json:"note,omitempty"`
@@ -463,27 +464,8 @@ type preservedInstruction struct {
// may live only inside the injected summary message, which on a later compaction
// lands in middle with no real tool calls left to extract. Fresh tool calls and
// instruction blocks override the carried-forward copy by name/source.
func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnapshot *taskStateSnapshot) string {
func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message) string {
priorState := parsePreservedStateBlock(latestSummaryContent(middle))
task := priorState.Task
if taskSnapshot != nil {
task = &preservedTaskState{
Objective: capTaskObjective(taskSnapshot.Objective),
}
// Plan parity corroborates only the mutable task projection. The objective
// comes directly from the run prompt and is immutable, so it must survive
// even after compaction removes the plan tool call needed for comparison.
if taskSnapshot.PlanParity == taskPlanParityMatch {
task.Status = taskSnapshot.Status
task.Pending = taskSnapshot.Plan.Pending
task.InProgress = taskSnapshot.Plan.InProgress
task.Completed = taskSnapshot.Plan.Completed
task.Failed = taskSnapshot.Plan.Failed
task.VerificationPassed = taskSnapshot.Verification.Passed
task.VerificationFailed = taskSnapshot.Verification.Failed
task.VerificationOutcome = taskSnapshot.Verification.LastOutcome
}
}
// Plan: a fresh update_plan in middle is authoritative; otherwise carry the
// plan preserved by an earlier compaction.
@@ -511,25 +493,12 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnap
projectInstructionEntries(middle),
)
if block := formatPreservedState(plan, task, edits, tools, skills, instructions); block != "" {
if block := formatPreservedState(plan, edits, tools, skills, instructions); block != "" {
summary += "\n\n" + block
}
return summary
}
func capTaskObjective(objective string) string {
objective = strings.TrimSpace(objective)
if len(objective) <= maxTaskObjectiveBytes {
return objective
}
const suffix = "…"
limit := maxTaskObjectiveBytes - len(suffix)
for limit > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(objective[limit]) {
limit--
}
return strings.TrimSpace(objective[:limit]) + suffix
}
// mergeRecentEdits overlays fresh edits onto edits preserved by an earlier
// compaction. Unlike mergeSkillEntries (which keeps refreshed entries in their
// original slot), a path touched again by a fresh edit MOVES to the newest
@@ -586,11 +555,11 @@ func preservedEditsToEntries(edits []preservedEdit) []skillEntry {
// formatPreservedState renders state as the labelled, single-line
// JSON block. Returns "" when there is nothing to preserve.
func formatPreservedState(plan string, task *preservedTaskState, edits, tools, skills, instructions []skillEntry) string {
if plan == "" && task == nil && len(edits) == 0 && len(tools) == 0 && len(skills) == 0 && len(instructions) == 0 {
func formatPreservedState(plan string, edits, tools, skills, instructions []skillEntry) string {
if plan == "" && len(edits) == 0 && len(tools) == 0 && len(skills) == 0 && len(instructions) == 0 {
return ""
}
state := preservedState{Plan: plan, Task: task}
state := preservedState{Plan: plan}
for _, e := range edits {
state.RecentEdits = append(state.RecentEdits, preservedEdit{Path: e.name, Note: e.body})
}
@@ -610,6 +579,15 @@ func formatPreservedState(plan string, task *preservedTaskState, edits, tools, s
return preservedStateLabel + "\n" + string(encoded)
}
// parsePreservedState recovers the plan + skills from a prior summary's preserved
// block. JSON escaping makes this lossless even when a skill body contains
// markdown headings, code fences, or quotes. Returns ("", nil) when absent or
// malformed.
func parsePreservedState(summaryContent string) (string, []skillEntry) {
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent)
return state.Plan, preservedSkillsToEntries(state.Skills)
}
func parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent string) preservedState {
idx := strings.LastIndex(summaryContent, preservedStateLabel)
if idx < 0 {
+5 -101
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
"unicode/utf8"
@@ -60,103 +59,6 @@ func TestCompactPreservesActivePlan(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCompactPreservesBoundedTaskContext(t *testing.T) {
objective := strings.Repeat("世", maxTaskObjectiveBytes)
task := newTaskState(objective, nil)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"write code","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"add tests","status":"pending"}]}`})
messages := stateConversation()
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SUMMARY", nil },
taskState: task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Compact: %v", err)
}
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(compacted[1].Content)
if state.Task == nil || state.Task.Status != taskStatusActive || state.Task.InProgress != 1 || state.Task.Pending != 1 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected compact task state: %#v", state.Task)
}
if len(state.Task.Objective) > maxTaskObjectiveBytes || !utf8.ValidString(state.Task.Objective) {
t.Fatalf("objective was not safely bounded: %d bytes %q", len(state.Task.Objective), state.Task.Objective)
}
}
func TestCompactPreservesObjectiveAfterPlanParityMismatch(t *testing.T) {
prior := preservedState{Task: &preservedTaskState{Objective: "stale objective", Status: taskStatusActive, Pending: 1}}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(prior)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: summaryLabel + "\nold\n\n" + preservedStateLabel + "\n" + string(encoded)},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "continuing"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "more"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "again"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "done"},
}
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SUMMARY", nil },
taskState: &taskStateSnapshot{
Objective: "current objective",
PlanParity: taskPlanParityMismatch,
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Compact: %v", err)
}
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(compacted[1].Content)
if state.Task == nil || state.Task.Objective != "current objective" {
t.Fatalf("immutable objective was lost on plan mismatch: %#v", state.Task)
}
if state.Task.Status != "" || state.Task.Pending != 0 {
t.Fatalf("uncorroborated mutable task fields survived plan mismatch: %#v", state.Task)
}
}
func TestTaskObjectiveSurvivesRepeatedCompactionWithoutPlanRefresh(t *testing.T) {
task := newTaskState("keep this objective", nil)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"write code","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"add tests","status":"pending"}]}`})
messages := stateConversation()
first, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "FIRST", nil },
taskState: task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Compact: %v", err)
}
secondInput := append(append([]zeroruntime.Message{}, first...),
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "more"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "again"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "done"},
)
snapshot := task.snapshotForCompaction(secondInput)
if snapshot.PlanParity != taskPlanParityMismatch {
t.Fatalf("plan call should be absent after first compaction, parity=%q", snapshot.PlanParity)
}
second, err := Compact(secondInput, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SECOND", nil },
taskState: snapshot,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second Compact: %v", err)
}
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(second[1].Content)
if state.Task == nil || state.Task.Objective != "keep this objective" {
t.Fatalf("objective lost after second compaction: %#v", state.Task)
}
if state.Task.Status != "" || state.Task.InProgress != 0 {
t.Fatalf("uncorroborated mutable fields survived second compaction: %#v", state.Task)
}
}
func TestCompactPreservesLoadedSkills(t *testing.T) {
summary := compactStateConversation(t, stateConversation())
if !strings.Contains(summary, preservedStateLabel) {
@@ -381,10 +283,12 @@ func TestExtractLatestPlanReturnsMostRecent(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestFormatPlanArgumentsRejectsUnsupportedStepAlias(t *testing.T) {
func TestFormatPlanArgumentsAcceptsStepAlias(t *testing.T) {
got := formatPlanArguments(`{"plan":[{"step":"write failing test","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"keep existing shape","status":"pending"}]}`)
if got != "" {
t.Fatalf("unsupported alias should reject the whole plan like update_plan, got %q", got)
for _, want := range []string{"- [in_progress] write failing test", "- [pending] keep existing shape"} {
if !strings.Contains(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected %q in formatted plan, got %q", want, got)
}
}
}
+6 -43
View File
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ func TestRunProactiveCompactionTriggers(t *testing.T) {
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("y", 8000), provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ func TestRunNoCompactionWhenContextWindowZero(t *testing.T) {
},
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
_, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("y", 8000), provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
@@ -379,43 +379,6 @@ func TestRunNoCompactionWhenContextWindowZero(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestMaybeCompactStopsAfterSupersededReadsReachThreshold(t *testing.T) {
body := strings.Repeat("same source line\n", 1000)
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
toolCallWithArgs("old", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "old", Content: body},
toolCallWithArgs("new", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "new", Content: body},
}
pruned, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
if reclaimed <= 0 {
t.Fatal("test setup did not reclaim superseded read output")
}
prunedSize := estimateTokens(pruned)
if estimateTokens(messages) <= prunedSize {
t.Fatal("test setup does not cross the compaction threshold")
}
provider := &summarizeRecordingProvider{}
state := &compactionState{
enabled: true,
threshold: prunedSize,
preserveLast: 2,
}
got := state.maybeCompact(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil)
if provider.summarizeCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("cheap pruning should avoid the summarizer, got %d calls", provider.summarizeCalls)
}
if state.lowWaterMark != prunedSize {
t.Fatalf("lowWaterMark = %d, want %d", state.lowWaterMark, prunedSize)
}
if !strings.Contains(got[2].Content, "superseded identical") || got[4].Content != body {
t.Fatalf("unexpected pruned messages: %#v", got)
}
}
// reactiveProvider builds up history with a tool call on turn 1, then errors
// with a context-limit message on turn 2 (once the history is large enough that
// compaction can shrink it), then succeeds on the same-turn retry. Summary
@@ -464,7 +427,7 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
// the compaction closure. read_file also returns a sizeable result that
// bloats the history.
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
// ContextWindow large enough that proactive compaction never triggers, so
// only the reactive path can save the run.
@@ -528,7 +491,7 @@ func TestRunReactiveRetryDoesNotDoubleEmitText(t *testing.T) {
finalText: "recovered",
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
var deltas []string
result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("z", 6000), provider, Options{
@@ -618,7 +581,7 @@ func TestCompactNeverProducesConsecutiveUserMessages(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRecoverNoopDoesNotConsumeReactiveBudget(t *testing.T) {
st := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 1000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
st := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 1000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2})
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "SUMMARY"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
@@ -665,7 +628,7 @@ func TestRecoverNoopDoesNotConsumeReactiveBudget(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRecoverDisabledIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
st := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 0}, nil)
st := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 0})
msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "x"}}
called := false
// recover must not invoke the provider/summarize when disabled, even on a
-86
View File
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
package agent
// CompletionDecision is the deterministic outcome of evaluating a text-only
// assistant turn. Uncertain means the loop needs one bounded follow-up action
// before it can finalize the run.
type CompletionDecision string
const (
CompletionUncertain CompletionDecision = "uncertain"
CompletionComplete CompletionDecision = "complete"
CompletionIncomplete CompletionDecision = "incomplete"
)
type completionAction string
const (
completionActionNone completionAction = ""
completionActionContinue completionAction = "continue"
completionActionSemanticCheck completionAction = "semantic_check"
)
type completionEvaluation struct {
Decision CompletionDecision
Action completionAction
Reason string
}
// completionPolicy owns the small amount of state needed to keep uncertain
// decisions bounded. requireSemanticCheck is set only for run profiles that
// already opted into self-correction; ordinary completion remains entirely
// local and adds no model call.
type completionPolicy struct {
continueNudges int
requireSemanticCheck bool
semanticCheckRequested bool
}
func newCompletionPolicy(requireSemanticCheck bool) *completionPolicy {
return &completionPolicy{requireSemanticCheck: requireSemanticCheck}
}
func (policy *completionPolicy) evaluate(text string, context completionContext) completionEvaluation {
// A direct admission is strong local evidence and takes precedence over all
// weaker signals, avoiding both continuation nudges and semantic checks.
if reason := selfReportedIncompletion(text); reason != "" {
return completionEvaluation{Decision: CompletionIncomplete, Reason: reason}
}
// A continuation cue is strong unfinished evidence; a pending plan is only
// weak evidence because bookkeeping can be stale. Both get a bounded chance
// to continue, but only a persisted cue is ultimately incomplete.
cue := endsWithContinuationCue(text)
if cue || context.PlanPending {
if policy.continueNudges < maxContinueNudges {
policy.continueNudges++
reason := "your message ended mid-step"
if !cue {
reason = "pending plan items remain — finish them, or mark them complete with update_plan if you are done"
}
return completionEvaluation{
Decision: CompletionUncertain,
Action: completionActionContinue,
Reason: reason,
}
}
if cue {
return completionEvaluation{
Decision: CompletionIncomplete,
Reason: "your message ended mid-step",
}
}
}
// Profiles with self-correction enabled require one task-grounded semantic
// check. It is requested at most once per run; the next locally complete turn
// is accepted without another model call.
if policy.requireSemanticCheck && !policy.semanticCheckRequested {
policy.semanticCheckRequested = true
return completionEvaluation{
Decision: CompletionUncertain,
Action: completionActionSemanticCheck,
}
}
return completionEvaluation{Decision: CompletionComplete, Action: completionActionNone}
}
-75
View File
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestCompletionPolicyLocalEvidenceDecidesWithoutSemanticCheck(t *testing.T) {
policy := newCompletionPolicy(false)
complete := policy.evaluate("Done. All required checks pass.", completionContext{})
if complete.Decision != CompletionComplete {
t.Fatalf("confident completion decision = %q, want %q", complete.Decision, CompletionComplete)
}
incomplete := policy.evaluate("I couldn't verify the result, so this is my best guess.", completionContext{})
if incomplete.Decision != CompletionIncomplete {
t.Fatalf("admitted failure decision = %q, want %q", incomplete.Decision, CompletionIncomplete)
}
}
func TestCompletionPolicyPreservesBoundedPlanStallProtection(t *testing.T) {
policy := newCompletionPolicy(false)
for attempt := 0; attempt < maxContinueNudges; attempt++ {
got := policy.evaluate("Let me inspect the remaining configuration:", completionContext{PlanPending: true})
if got.Decision != CompletionUncertain || got.Action != completionActionContinue {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d = (%q, %q), want uncertain continue", attempt+1, got.Decision, got.Action)
}
}
got := policy.evaluate("Let me inspect the remaining configuration:", completionContext{PlanPending: true})
if got.Decision != CompletionIncomplete {
t.Fatalf("decision after nudge budget = %q, want %q", got.Decision, CompletionIncomplete)
}
}
func TestCompletionPolicyTreatsPendingPlanAsWeakEvidence(t *testing.T) {
policy := newCompletionPolicy(false)
for attempt := 0; attempt < maxContinueNudges; attempt++ {
got := policy.evaluate("All set.", completionContext{PlanPending: true})
if got.Decision != CompletionUncertain || got.Action != completionActionContinue {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d = (%q, %q), want uncertain continue", attempt+1, got.Decision, got.Action)
}
}
got := policy.evaluate("All set.", completionContext{PlanPending: true})
if got.Decision != CompletionComplete {
t.Fatalf("stale plan decision after nudge budget = %q, want %q", got.Decision, CompletionComplete)
}
}
func TestCompletionPolicyAllowsExactlyOneRequiredSemanticCheck(t *testing.T) {
policy := newCompletionPolicy(true)
first := policy.evaluate("Implemented and tested.", completionContext{})
if first.Decision != CompletionUncertain || first.Action != completionActionSemanticCheck {
t.Fatalf("first decision = (%q, %q), want uncertain semantic check", first.Decision, first.Action)
}
second := policy.evaluate("PASS. The result meets the task criterion.", completionContext{})
if second.Decision != CompletionComplete {
t.Fatalf("post-check decision = %q, want %q", second.Decision, CompletionComplete)
}
if second.Action == completionActionSemanticCheck {
t.Fatal("semantic check was requested more than once")
}
}
func TestAcceptanceVerificationNudgeIncludesBoundedObjective(t *testing.T) {
objective := "make the requested behavior observable"
nudge := acceptanceVerificationNudge(objective)
if !strings.Contains(nudge, "Task objective: "+objective) {
t.Fatalf("semantic check was not grounded in the objective: %q", nudge)
}
}
+9 -8
View File
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ func assertNoDeferredDiscoveryMessage(t *testing.T, request zeroruntime.Completi
func TestPartitionToolsInactiveIsByteIdenticalAndDropsToolSearch(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__a", desc: "tool a"})
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})
@@ -305,8 +305,8 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveExcludesDisabledDeferredFromDiscoveryAndExposed(t *
func TestPartitionToolsActiveHidesUnloadedExposesLoaded(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil)) // non-deferred builtin
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{}) // non-deferred, must stay exposed
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root)) // non-deferred builtin
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{}) // non-deferred, must stay exposed
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha tool"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta tool"})
@@ -341,15 +341,15 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveHidesUnloadedExposesLoaded(t *testing.T) {
if search.Description != discovery || !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must carry discovery source, got %q", search.Description)
}
if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
t.Fatalf("stable tool_search catalog must retain already-loaded tool names, got %q", search.Description)
if strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must not list already-loaded tool names, got %q", search.Description)
}
if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must list exact hidden tool names, got %q", search.Description)
}
}
func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenKeepsStableCatalog(t *testing.T) {
func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenEmptyReminder(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
@@ -368,8 +368,9 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenKeepsStableCatalog(t *testing.T) {
if !exposedNames["tool_search"] {
t.Fatalf("expected tool_search exposed on active path, got %#v", exposed)
}
if !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__alpha") || !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("stable catalog must retain all deferred names after loading, got %q", reminder)
// No hidden tools means no dynamic discovery text is needed.
if reminder != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected empty discovery text when nothing is hidden, got %q", reminder)
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
func TestExecuteToolCallCategorizesFilteredDenial(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
result, _ := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"x"}`}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{
DisabledTools: []string{"read_file"},
-41
View File
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package agent
import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func equalStringSlices(left []string, right []string) bool {
if len(left) != len(right) {
return false
}
for index := range left {
if left[index] != right[index] {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// parsePreservedState recovers the plan + skills from a prior summary's preserved
// block. JSON escaping makes this lossless even when a skill body contains
// markdown headings, code fences, or quotes. Returns ("", nil) when absent or
// malformed.
func parsePreservedState(summaryContent string) (string, []skillEntry) {
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent)
return state.Plan, preservedSkillsToEntries(state.Skills)
}
// partitionTools builds the per-turn advertised tool list and optional
// tool_search discovery text. INACTIVE (DeferThreshold <= 0 or the eligible count is
// below it): every visible tool is exposed with its full schema EXCEPT tool_search
// (dropped so it is never advertised when it cannot help), and the discovery text is
// empty — byte-identical to the pre-deferral output. ACTIVE: a deferred-eligible
// tool is exposed only when loaded[name]; otherwise it is hidden and searchable
// through tool_search. Non-deferred tools (including tool_search) are always
// exposed. The exposed slice is alpha-sorted by name, matching the legacy order
// so the inactive path is stable.
func partitionTools(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, loaded map[string]bool) ([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, string) {
return partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, nil)
}
+13 -11
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -126,8 +127,9 @@ func endsWithContinuationCue(text string) bool {
// which the update_plan tool coerces to "pending") counts as remaining, matching
// that tool's own status normalization.
func planStatusRemaining(status string) bool {
switch normalizeTaskPlanStatus(status) {
case "completed", "failed":
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(status)) {
case "completed", "complete", "done", "finished", "resolved", "✓", "x", "[x]",
"failed", "fail", "error", "errored", "blocked", "cancelled", "canceled", "abandoned", "skipped":
return false
default:
return true
@@ -305,8 +307,8 @@ func hasAnyPrefix(s string, prefixes []string) bool {
// the bug-hunt surfaced: well-formed output treated as correct; pre-existing tests
// passing treated as the objective being met; and a result that merely matches a
// baseline the task asked to beat or improve. General — no task-specific content.
func acceptanceVerificationNudge(objective string) string {
nudge := "Before this task can be marked complete, " + acceptanceNudgeMarker + " — " +
func acceptanceVerificationNudge() string {
return "Before this task can be marked complete, " + acceptanceNudgeMarker + " — " +
"NOT the shape or format of your output, NOT that pre-existing tests pass, and NOT that your " +
"result merely matches a baseline you were asked to beat or improve. " +
"Re-read the original task, then run a concrete check that exercises the actual requirement: " +
@@ -314,10 +316,6 @@ func acceptanceVerificationNudge(objective string) string {
"thing the task asked you to produce, recover, fix, or optimize. " +
"If that check passes, reply PASS and cite the evidence. " +
"If it does not pass — or you cannot run such a check — say so plainly and keep working; do not claim success."
if objective = capTaskObjective(objective); objective != "" {
nudge += "\n\nTask objective: " + objective
}
return nudge
}
// toolFailureHintMarker is a stable substring for tests.
@@ -555,12 +553,16 @@ func (state *guardState) pendingPlanItems() bool {
// many items are still remaining. Malformed arguments leave the prior count
// unchanged (best-effort — the plan panel itself tolerates the same).
func (state *guardState) observePlanUpdate(arguments string) {
plan, ok := parseTaskPlan(arguments)
if !ok {
var parsed struct {
Plan []struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
} `json:"plan"`
}
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(arguments), &parsed) != nil {
return
}
pending := 0
for _, item := range plan {
for _, item := range parsed.Plan {
if planStatusRemaining(item.Status) {
pending++
}
+7 -38
View File
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ func TestRunResetsEmptyTurnCounterOnToolCall(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -169,37 +169,6 @@ func TestRunResetsEmptyTurnCounterOnToolCall(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// The whole point of #702's fix: the unknown-session error's normalized
// signature must not vary with the session id, so a model probing ids 1, 2,
// 3, … produces one repeated signature the failure guard can count. If the id
// leaked into the first 80 normalized chars, each probe would reset the streak
// and the halt would never fire.
func TestUnknownExecSessionErrorSignatureIsIDInvariant(t *testing.T) {
a := errorSignature(tools.UnknownExecSessionError(1))
b := errorSignature(tools.UnknownExecSessionError(999999))
if a != b {
t.Fatalf("unknown-session signature varies with id:\n %q\n %q", a, b)
}
}
// End to end: with an id-invariant signature, probing a different unknown id
// each turn now trips the repeated-failure halt at toolFailureStopAt, where
// before the fix it never would.
func TestUnknownExecSessionProbingTripsFailureHalt(t *testing.T) {
var state guardState
var stoppedAt int
for i := 1; i <= toolFailureStopAt; i++ {
out := state.observeToolResult(tools.WriteStdinToolName, true, tools.UnknownExecSessionError(i))
if out.Stop {
stoppedAt = i
break
}
}
if stoppedAt != toolFailureStopAt {
t.Fatalf("probing distinct unknown ids stopped at %d, want %d", stoppedAt, toolFailureStopAt)
}
}
func TestGuardStateResetsToolOnlyStreakOnEmptyNonToolTurn(t *testing.T) {
var state guardState
toolOnly := zeroruntime.CollectedStream{
@@ -260,7 +229,7 @@ func TestRunInjectsPlanNotCalledReminderForMultiStepTask(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -291,7 +260,7 @@ func TestRunDoesNotInjectPlanReminderForTrivialTask(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -319,7 +288,7 @@ func TestRunDoesNotInjectNotCalledReminderWhenPlanUsed(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
provider := &mockProvider{
@@ -349,7 +318,7 @@ func TestRunInjectsStalePlanReminderAfterManyToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
// Turn 1 calls update_plan (so the not-called reminder never triggers), then
@@ -383,7 +352,7 @@ func TestRunStalePlanReminderIsOneShotPerInterval(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
turns := [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -418,7 +387,7 @@ func TestRunInjectsToolOnlyProgressReminder(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, toolOnlyProgressReminderAt+1)
for i := 0; i < toolOnlyProgressReminderAt; i++ {
+189 -497
View File
@@ -7,11 +7,9 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/redaction"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
@@ -137,33 +135,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
}
}
// Establish the run's turn session — the seam an optimized provider session
// (connection reuse, prewarm, native compaction) plugs into without touching
// this loop. Default: wrap the passed provider so the session's Stream IS
// provider.StreamCompletion, byte-identical to calling it directly. Opened
// before dispatchSessionStart so a failed open is a clean run-start error
// with no session hooks fired and nothing to unwind.
turnSessions := options.TurnSessionProvider
if turnSessions == nil {
turnSessions = zeroruntime.NewProviderTurnSessionProvider(provider, zeroruntime.ProviderCapabilities{})
}
session, sessionErr := turnSessions.OpenTurnSession(ctx)
if sessionErr != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("agent: open turn session: %w", sessionErr)
}
// Closed via closure (not `defer session.Close()`) so after a mid-run model
// swap the CURRENT session is the one closed at teardown — the swap closes
// the old one inline. Close errors are advisory and never fail the run.
defer func() { _ = session.Close() }()
// Best-effort prewarm: the default adapter no-ops; a real session may prime
// a connection. Failure is ignored by contract (never fatal).
_ = session.Prewarm(ctx)
// Route ALL provider I/O — per-turn streams, mid-stream retries, the
// compaction summarizer, and the final-answer request — through the session
// by reassigning the loop's provider local. Every existing call site reads
// this local, so no signatures change anywhere downstream.
provider = sessionProvider{session: session}
maxTurns := options.MaxTurns
if maxTurns <= 0 {
maxTurns = 12
@@ -182,46 +153,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
options.runPermissions = runPermissions
defer runPermissions.cleanup()
promptParts := buildSystemPromptParts(options)
messages := zeroruntime.SeedMessagesWithImages(promptParts.prompt, prompt, options.Images)
messages := zeroruntime.SeedMessagesWithImages(buildSystemPrompt(options), prompt, options.Images)
guards := newGuardState()
task := newTaskState(prompt, options.Trace)
compactor := newCompactionState(options, task)
defer func() {
// A final transcript comparison is observational. It records drift but
// never rewrites the result or changes execution after the fact.
task.observePlanParity(result.Messages)
// Tool-result observations are intentionally coalesced; this final event
// guarantees their aggregate counts are present even on an early return.
task.emit()
}()
// The execution-profile posture controller. nil Options.Profile (every
// existing caller) makes every observe/decide call a no-op, keeping the
// loop byte-identical for unprofiled runs.
posture := newProfileController(options.Profile)
// applyPosture applies at most one posture escalation when an armed trigger
// has fired: raise the hoisted turn ceiling, restore effort and the
// completion gate, stamp the counter. Shared by the end-of-turn tail and
// the completion-gate uncertain path (which continues the loop before the
// tail runs). No-op forever after the first escalation and for unprofiled
// runs.
applyPosture := func() {
if target, fired := posture.maybeEscalate(); fired {
if target.MaxTurns > maxTurns {
maxTurns = target.MaxTurns
}
if target.ReasoningEffort != "" {
options.ReasoningEffort = target.ReasoningEffort
} else if target.RestoreDefaultEffort {
options.ReasoningEffort = ""
}
if target.RestoreCompletionGate {
options.RequireCompletionSignal = true
}
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterPostureEscalations, 1)
}
}
compactor := newCompactionState(options)
// Background post-edit diagnostics: files changed by mutating tools are
// checked off the tool-call critical path and any errors are appended as a
@@ -234,10 +169,13 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// loaded tool's full schema; it lives only for the run (v1 within-run scope).
loaded := map[string]bool{}
// The feature-gated completion policy keeps local completion decisions and its
// bounded follow-up state out of the central loop. Self-correcting profiles
// opt into the one permitted task-grounded semantic check.
completionPolicy := newCompletionPolicy(options.SelfCorrect != nil)
// continueNudges counts how many times the headless completion gate
// (Options.RequireCompletionSignal) has re-prompted a no-tool-call turn that
// stopped with work still unfinished. Bounded by maxContinueNudges.
continueNudges := 0
// acceptanceRequested records that the one-time task-grounded acceptance check
// has already been demanded this run, so it fires at most once.
acceptanceRequested := false
// toolDefCache memoizes each tool's rendered JSON-schema definition across
// turns (a tool's advertised schema is stable for the run), so partitionTools
@@ -247,11 +185,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
result = Result{Messages: copyMessages(messages)}
dispatchSessionStart(ctx, options)
defer func() {
// Use a context detached from ctx's cancellation: on Esc/Ctrl+C the run
// context is already canceled by the time this defer runs, and a canceled
// parent would make Hooks.Dispatch's context.WithTimeout derive an
// already-expired context, so the sessionEnd hook would never actually run.
dispatchSessionEnd(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), options, result, err)
dispatchSessionEnd(ctx, options, result, err)
}()
for turn := 0; turn < maxTurns; turn++ {
result.Turns = turn + 1
@@ -267,6 +201,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
})
}
// Build the per-turn tool list first so proactive compaction can include
// the tool-definition tokens (they ride on every request) in its estimate.
// partitionTools depends only on registry/permissions/options/loaded, not on
// the messages, so computing it before compaction is safe.
// Build the per-turn tool list first so proactive compaction can include
// the tool-definition tokens (they ride on every request) in its estimate.
// partitionTools depends only on registry/permissions/options/loaded, not on
@@ -275,24 +213,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
exposed, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, toolDefCache)
toolPartitionSpan.End()
// Fingerprint the exact system prompt built at run start plus this turn's
// provider-visible tool definitions in their emitted order. Reusing the
// retained prompt parts avoids rebuilding workspace context while ensuring
// the trace describes the same bytes carried by the request.
if options.Trace != nil {
fp := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(promptParts, exposed))
options.Trace.EmitPrefixHash(trace.PrefixHash{
SystemPromptHash: fp.SystemPromptHash,
BaseInstructionsHash: fp.BaseInstructionsHash,
ConfirmationPolicyHash: fp.ConfirmationPolicyHash,
ProjectContextHash: fp.ProjectContextHash,
SkillsHash: fp.SkillsHash,
ToolsHash: fp.ToolsHash,
SchemaHash: fp.SchemaHash,
CompletePrefixHash: fp.CompletePrefixHash,
})
}
// PROACTIVE compaction: if the history is approaching the model's
// context window, summarize the oldest middle before building the
// request. A no-op when ContextWindow == 0 (compaction disabled).
@@ -576,42 +496,69 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// model's final answer ONLY when the work is actually done. Default off
// (RequireCompletionSignal), so interactive runs stay byte-identical.
if options.RequireCompletionSignal {
completionContext := task.completionContext(messages, guards.pendingPlanItems())
evaluation := completionPolicy.evaluate(collected.Text, completionContext)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventCompletion, completion: evaluation})
switch evaluation.Decision {
case CompletionIncomplete:
// (1) Self-report downgrade (strongest, unambiguous): the model's own
// final message admits it guessed / could not meet the objective. Checked
// FIRST so an admitted-impossible task is downgraded immediately (no wasted
// continue-nudges) and reports the accurate reason.
if reason := selfReportedIncompletion(collected.Text); reason != "" {
result.Incomplete = true
result.IncompleteReason = evaluation.Reason
result.IncompleteReason = reason
result.FinalAnswer = collected.Text
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, nil
case CompletionUncertain:
// Observe the uncertainty signal and apply any escalation NOW:
// this branch continues the turn loop before the end-of-turn
// act point, so deferring would skip escalation entirely.
posture.observeUncertain()
applyPosture()
switch evaluation.Action {
case completionActionContinue:
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterCompletionNudges, 1)
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: continueNudge(evaluation.Reason),
})
case completionActionSemanticCheck:
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterAcceptanceChecks, 1)
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: acceptanceVerificationNudge(completionContext.Objective),
})
}
continue
case CompletionComplete:
// Local evidence is sufficient; proceed to final diagnostics.
}
} else {
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventCompletion, completion: completionEvaluation{Decision: CompletionComplete}})
// (2) The model stopped without a tool call while work may be unfinished:
// - a continuation cue ("…Let me check the config:") is an unambiguous
// mid-step stop;
// - pending update_plan items are a WEAK, ambiguous signal (the model may
// have finished without re-marking the last step).
// Nudge to continue (bounded). After the budget: a persisted continuation
// cue finalizes INCOMPLETE; pending-plan WITHOUT a cue does NOT (that would
// false-fail a completed run with stale bookkeeping) — fall through to the
// acceptance check / success.
cue := endsWithContinuationCue(collected.Text)
planPending := guards.pendingPlanItems()
if cue || planPending {
if continueNudges < maxContinueNudges {
continueNudges++
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterCompletionNudges, 1)
reason := "your message ended mid-step"
if !cue {
reason = "pending plan items remain — finish them, or mark them complete with update_plan if you are done"
}
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: continueNudge(reason),
})
continue
}
if cue {
result.Incomplete = true
result.IncompleteReason = "your message ended mid-step"
result.FinalAnswer = collected.Text
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, nil
}
// pending-plan only, budget spent: trust the model's completion claim
// over stale plan bookkeeping; fall through.
}
// (3) Task-grounded acceptance: before accepting a "done" turn as success,
// require ONE acceptance check grounded in the task's stated criterion
// (only when self-correct is on). Rejects "well-formed == correct",
// "existing-tests-pass == objective met", and "result == baseline" false
// successes. Bounded to a single pass; a genuine post-check completion
// (no admission, no cue) then finalizes as success on the next turn.
if options.SelfCorrect != nil && !acceptanceRequested {
acceptanceRequested = true
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterAcceptanceChecks, 1)
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: acceptanceVerificationNudge(),
})
continue
}
}
// Finalization diagnostics gate: edits from this run may still have
// checks in flight — the per-turn drain waits only briefly and defers
@@ -635,11 +582,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// executing so the empty-turn counter resets and plan-tracking signals
// stay current.
guards.observeTurn(collected)
for _, call := range collected.ToolCalls {
if call.Name == planToolName {
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: call.Arguments})
}
}
failureHint := ""
// turnRequestedModel records the FIRST mid-run escalation target requested
@@ -656,13 +598,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// between tool_results breaks strict provider replay) — same after-batch
// rationale as turnRequestedModel above.
var changedFilesThisBatch []string
// Images produced by tools this turn, held until every tool_result is
// recorded. They travel as user messages, and a user message between two
// tool_results breaks strict provider replay — Anthropic coalesces them
// into one user block list and requires the tool_result blocks first, so
// interleaving yields [tool_result, text, image, tool_result] and a 400.
// Same reason the self-correction feedback below is deferred.
var toolImageMessages []zeroruntime.Message
// Parallel read-ahead state: results for calls[precomputedStart:precomputedEnd]
// executed concurrently, consumed strictly in order below.
var precomputed []precomputedToolResult
@@ -673,9 +608,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// The scan happens lazily at the run's first index — never ahead of a
// pending mutating call — so read-after-write ordering is preserved.
if index >= precomputedEnd {
// Capability-safe consecutive run (ReadOnly+ThreadSafe, no
// resource-key conflicts). See extendParallelRun.
runEnd := extendParallelRun(registry, collected.ToolCalls, index, options)
runEnd := index
for runEnd < len(collected.ToolCalls) && parallelSafeToolCall(registry, collected.ToolCalls[runEnd], options) {
runEnd++
}
if runEnd-index >= 2 {
batchSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanToolExecution)
precomputed = executeParallelReadBatch(ctx, registry, collected.ToolCalls, index, runEnd, permissionMode, options)
@@ -697,8 +633,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
toolSpan.End()
}
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterToolCalls, 1)
recordOutputBudgetTrace(options.Trace, toolResult)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: toolResult})
if options.OnToolResult != nil {
options.OnToolResult(toolResult)
}
@@ -716,16 +650,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
Content: toolResult.Output,
ToolCallID: toolResult.ToolCallID,
})
// Images ride a following USER message rather than the tool result
// above. Every provider drops images on a tool-role message —
// Anthropic's tool_result content is a string, Gemini's is a
// functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image parts to the user role
// — so attaching them there would silently deliver nothing. A separate
// message also keeps the one-tool-result-per-tool-call pairing intact,
// which the providers validate.
if imageMessage, ok := toolResultImageMessage(toolResult); ok {
toolImageMessages = append(toolImageMessages, imageMessage)
}
// A tool may demand the run ABORT — a canceled/timed-out ask_user prompt
// returns context.Canceled rather than fabricating a headless answer. Stop
@@ -736,13 +660,11 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
}
if abortErr != nil {
messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, abortErr
}
if stopReason := stopReasonFromToolResult(toolResult); stopReason != "" {
messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
result.FinalAnswer = toolResult.Output
result.StopReason = stopReason
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
@@ -757,7 +679,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// would misdirect the model toward JSON shape or blocked behavior.
retriableFailure := isRetriableToolError(toolResult)
outcome := guards.observeToolResult(call.Name, retriableFailure, toolResult.Output)
posture.observeToolOutcome(outcome, toolResult)
if outcome.Stop {
// The assistant message advertised EVERY collected tool call, but
// the guard halts mid-turn so the calls after this one never run.
@@ -766,7 +687,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// messages stay valid for a strict provider replay (Anthropic
// rejects a tool_use with no answering tool_result).
messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
result.FinalAnswer = toolFailureStopAnswer(call.Name, outcome.Count)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, nil
@@ -785,20 +705,13 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
postEditDiagnostics.enqueue(ctx, toolResult.ChangedFiles)
}
}
// Every tool_result for this turn is now recorded, including aborted
// placeholders, so the images can follow without splitting them.
messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
toolImageMessages = nil
// Run post-edit self-correction once over the union of files this turn
// changed, then append any feedback after every tool_result is recorded so
// the assistant's tool_results stay contiguous (a user message between
// tool_results breaks strict provider replay). nil SelfCorrect is a no-op.
if options.SelfCorrect != nil && len(changedFilesThisBatch) > 0 {
feedback, selfCorrectOutcome := options.SelfCorrect.AfterEdit(ctx, dedupeStrings(changedFilesThisBatch))
posture.observeSelfCorrect(selfCorrectOutcome)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventVerification, verification: selfCorrectOutcome})
if feedback != "" {
if feedback, _ := options.SelfCorrect.AfterEdit(ctx, dedupeStrings(changedFilesThisBatch)); feedback != "" {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: feedback,
@@ -811,53 +724,25 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// of the run. At most one switch per turn (first request wins). A switcher
// error is NON-FATAL — record a brief note and continue on the current
// model. nil switcher ⇒ requests are ignored entirely (escalation off).
if turnRequestedModel != "" && (options.ModelSessionSwitcher != nil || options.ModelSwitcher != nil) {
// Resolve the escalated model's session source. The target-aware
// ModelSessionSwitcher is preferred: its TurnSessionProvider carries an
// optimized session (and capabilities) across the swap. The legacy
// ModelSwitcher fallback returns a bare Provider, wrapped in the
// default no-op session — identical to pre-seam behavior.
var newSessions zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider
var switchErr error
if options.ModelSessionSwitcher != nil {
newSessions, switchErr = options.ModelSessionSwitcher(ctx, turnRequestedModel)
} else {
var newProvider Provider
newProvider, switchErr = options.ModelSwitcher(ctx, turnRequestedModel)
if switchErr == nil && newProvider != nil {
newSessions = zeroruntime.NewProviderTurnSessionProvider(newProvider, zeroruntime.ProviderCapabilities{})
}
}
if turnRequestedModel != "" && options.ModelSwitcher != nil {
newProvider, switchErr := options.ModelSwitcher(ctx, turnRequestedModel)
if switchErr != nil {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: escalationFailedNoticePrefix + " (" + turnRequestedModel + "): " + switchErr.Error() + ". Continuing on " + options.Model + ".",
})
} else if newSessions != nil {
// Open the new session and close the old one, so the next turn's
// streams and compaction use the new model. For the default adapter
// the open never errors and Close is a no-op, so this stays
// byte-identical to a direct provider reassignment; the guarded open
// and prewarm matter once a session holds real state.
newSession, openErr := newSessions.OpenTurnSession(ctx)
if openErr != nil {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: escalationFailedNoticePrefix + " (" + turnRequestedModel + "): " + openErr.Error() + ". Continuing on " + options.Model + ".",
})
} else {
_ = session.Close()
session = newSession
_ = session.Prewarm(ctx)
provider = sessionProvider{session: session}
options.Model = turnRequestedModel
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterModelSwitches, 1)
// KNOWN LIMITATION (deferred): the compactor's context-window budget
// is fixed at run start from options.ContextWindow and is NOT updated
// here, so a switch to a model with a different window keeps compacting
// against the original budget. Fixing it needs the switcher to also
// report the new window — out of scope for this change.
}
} else if newProvider != nil {
// Reassign the local provider so the next turn's StreamCompletion and
// compaction use it; update options.Model so subsequent RunOptions.Model,
// context-window sizing, and usage attribution follow the new model.
provider = newProvider
options.Model = turnRequestedModel
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterModelSwitches, 1)
// KNOWN LIMITATION (deferred): the compactor's context-window budget
// is fixed at run start from options.ContextWindow and is NOT updated
// here, so a switch to a model with a different window keeps compacting
// against the original budget. Fixing it needs a ModelSwitcher contract
// change (return the new window) — out of scope for this change.
}
}
@@ -891,13 +776,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
Content: reminder,
})
}
// One-shot posture escalation: when an armed profile trigger fired this
// turn, restore the stricter knob values the profile displaced. Mutates
// only per-turn-read policy (the hoisted turn ceiling, reasoning effort,
// completion gate); never messages, model, or session. No-op forever
// after the first escalation and for every unprofiled run.
applyPosture()
}
if ctx.Err() != nil {
@@ -940,28 +818,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
return result, nil
}
func recordOutputBudgetTrace(recorder *trace.Recorder, result ToolResult) {
if recorder == nil || result.Meta["output_budget_category"] == "" {
return
}
parseInt := func(key string) int {
value, _ := strconv.Atoi(result.Meta[key])
return value
}
spillCreated, _ := strconv.ParseBool(result.Meta["output_budget_spill_created"])
recorder.EmitOutputBudget(trace.OutputBudgetEvent{
Tool: result.Name,
Category: result.Meta["output_budget_category"],
OriginalBytes: parseInt("output_budget_original_bytes"),
RetainedBytes: parseInt("output_budget_retained_bytes"),
EstimatedOriginalTokens: parseInt("output_budget_estimated_original_tokens"),
EstimatedRetainedTokens: parseInt("output_budget_estimated_retained_tokens"),
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Reason: result.Meta["output_budget_reason"],
SpillCreated: spillCreated,
})
}
func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, options Options) (string, []zeroruntime.Message, string) {
finalMessages := copyMessages(messages)
finalMessages = append(finalMessages, zeroruntime.Message{
@@ -1100,9 +956,6 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
}, nil
}
}
if isShellCommandTool(call.Name) {
normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, options.Cwd, options.Sandbox)
}
// tool_search is the gateway to the allowlisted deferred tools, so a non-empty
// EnabledTools allowlist that omits it must NOT reject the call — otherwise the
// discovery tool exposed to the model rejects at dispatch time (an inescapable
@@ -1194,17 +1047,6 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
decisionCommandPrefix = grant.Prefix
}
}
// An explicit additional-permissions request is an elevation only when it
// expands the current effective policy. If the same capability was already
// approved for this session, reuse that grant across equivalent commands
// instead of prompting again merely because their command prefixes differ.
if toolFound && !permissionGranted && isShellCommandTool(call.Name) && options.Sandbox != nil {
if profile, requested, profileErr := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, options.Cwd); profileErr == nil && requested && options.Sandbox.CoversRequestPermissions(profile) {
permissionGranted = true
decisionAction = PermissionDecisionAllowForSession
decisionReason = "requested sandbox capabilities already granted for this session"
}
}
var preflightDecision *sandbox.Decision
if toolFound && options.Sandbox != nil {
@@ -1381,8 +1223,7 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
Cwd: options.Cwd,
// Per-session file version tracker so write_file/edit_file refuse to clobber
// a file that changed on disk outside Zero since it was last read.
FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
DeferFileObservationCommit: true,
FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
// Post-edit diagnostics are NOT forwarded to the tools: they used to run
// synchronously inside edit_file/write_file and block every mutating tool
// call on the language server (≥300ms debounce floor, 10s cap). The loop
@@ -1431,41 +1272,21 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
if didRedact {
result.Redacted = true
}
result = registry.RebudgetAfterHook(call.Name, args, result)
}
}
result = registry.CommitFileObservation(result, options.FileTracker)
// Stamp the sandbox risk classification for this EXECUTED call so run-policy
// observers can see the risk of an allowed mutation. Prefer the preflight
// decision's classification when the sandbox evaluated the call; otherwise
// run the same pure classifier the permission path uses. Denied/canceled
// results returned earlier keep the zero value.
executedRisk := sandbox.Risk{}
if preflightDecision != nil {
executedRisk = preflightDecision.Risk
} else if toolFound {
// Unknown-tool results fall through here with a nil tool; they carry a
// denial and keep the zero risk value.
executedRisk = sandbox.Classify(sandboxRequest(call.Name, tool, args, permissionGranted, permissionMode, options))
}
// Secret scrubbing happens at the registry boundary (the single point both
// the agent loop and the MCP server pass through), so result.Output is
// already redacted here and result.Redacted reflects whether it changed.
return ToolResult{
Risk: executedRisk,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.Output,
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: result.Meta,
Images: result.Images,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: result.Display,
LoadedTools: loadedToolsFromResult(result.Meta),
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.Output,
Meta: result.Meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
Display: result.Display,
LoadedTools: loadedToolsFromResult(result.Meta),
// A tool may signal a mid-run model escalation by carrying the target id
// in Meta["escalate_to_model"]. Lift it into the typed loop-level field;
// the Run turn loop performs the actual provider switch. Empty for every
@@ -1585,15 +1406,8 @@ func sandboxDeniedNetworkRetryCandidate(call ToolCall, args map[string]any, resu
if options.Sandbox == nil || !isShellCommandTool(call.Name) {
return false
}
if result.ExecutionOutcome != nil {
denial := result.ExecutionOutcome.Denial
if denial == nil || denial.Capability.Kind != execution.CapabilityExternalNetwork {
return false
}
} else {
if result.Meta[tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta] != "true" || result.Meta[tools.SandboxDenialKindMeta] != tools.SandboxDenialKindNetwork {
return false
}
if result.Meta[tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta] != "true" || result.Meta[tools.SandboxDenialKindMeta] != tools.SandboxDenialKindNetwork {
return false
}
if value, _ := args["sandbox_permissions"].(string); strings.TrimSpace(value) == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated) {
return false
@@ -1646,17 +1460,6 @@ func sandboxRestrictedShellRetryCandidate(call ToolCall, args map[string]any, re
}
func sandboxDeniedShellResult(result tools.Result) bool {
if result.ExecutionOutcome != nil {
// Only a typed platform denial that explicitly requests unrestricted
// recovery may enter the legacy retry path. Narrow capability denials
// remain on their exact capability path.
denial := result.ExecutionOutcome.Denial
return denial != nil &&
denial.Source == execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox &&
denial.Capability.Kind == execution.CapabilityUnrestricted &&
denial.Recoverable &&
denial.NextAction == execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval
}
return result.Status == tools.StatusError && result.Meta[tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta] == "true"
}
@@ -1720,21 +1523,20 @@ func sandboxRestrictionRetryReason(result tools.Result) string {
func runToolForNetworkRetry(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, name string, toolCallID string, args map[string]any, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, progressCallback func(streamjson.Event)) tools.Result {
return registry.RunWithOptions(ctx, name, cloneArgs(args), tools.RunOptions{
PermissionGranted: true,
PermissionMode: string(permissionMode),
Autonomy: options.Autonomy,
Sandbox: options.Sandbox,
ToolCallID: toolCallID,
SessionID: options.SessionID,
Model: options.Model,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
Depth: options.Depth,
Cwd: options.Cwd,
FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
DeferFileObservationCommit: true,
EnabledTools: options.EnabledTools,
DisabledTools: options.DisabledTools,
Progress: progressCallback,
PermissionGranted: true,
PermissionMode: string(permissionMode),
Autonomy: options.Autonomy,
Sandbox: options.Sandbox,
ToolCallID: toolCallID,
SessionID: options.SessionID,
Model: options.Model,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
Depth: options.Depth,
Cwd: options.Cwd,
FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
EnabledTools: options.EnabledTools,
DisabledTools: options.DisabledTools,
Progress: progressCallback,
})
}
@@ -1749,21 +1551,20 @@ func unsandboxedRetryArgs(args map[string]any) map[string]any {
func runToolForUnsandboxedRetry(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, name string, toolCallID string, args map[string]any, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, progressCallback func(streamjson.Event)) tools.Result {
return registry.RunWithOptions(ctx, name, args, tools.RunOptions{
PermissionGranted: true,
PermissionMode: string(permissionMode),
Autonomy: options.Autonomy,
Sandbox: options.Sandbox,
ToolCallID: toolCallID,
SessionID: options.SessionID,
Model: options.Model,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
Depth: options.Depth,
Cwd: options.Cwd,
FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
DeferFileObservationCommit: true,
EnabledTools: options.EnabledTools,
DisabledTools: options.DisabledTools,
Progress: progressCallback,
PermissionGranted: true,
PermissionMode: string(permissionMode),
Autonomy: options.Autonomy,
Sandbox: options.Sandbox,
ToolCallID: toolCallID,
SessionID: options.SessionID,
Model: options.Model,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
Depth: options.Depth,
Cwd: options.Cwd,
FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
EnabledTools: options.EnabledTools,
DisabledTools: options.DisabledTools,
Progress: progressCallback,
})
}
@@ -1787,18 +1588,16 @@ func toolResultFromPrePermissionReject(call ToolCall, result tools.Result) ToolR
}
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: output,
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted || outputRedacted || summaryRedacted || metaRedacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: display,
LoadedTools: loadedToolsFromResult(meta),
RequestedModel: meta["escalate_to_model"],
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: output,
Meta: meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted || outputRedacted || summaryRedacted || metaRedacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
Display: display,
LoadedTools: loadedToolsFromResult(meta),
RequestedModel: meta["escalate_to_model"],
}
}
@@ -2058,16 +1857,14 @@ func askUserFallbackResult(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call T
Cwd: options.Cwd,
})
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.Output,
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: result.Meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: result.Display,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.Output,
Meta: result.Meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
Display: result.Display,
}
}
return ToolResult{
@@ -2631,8 +2428,7 @@ func buildPermissionEvent(call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, p
if profile, ok, err := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, options.Cwd); ok && err == nil {
scopeText = requestPermissionsScope(profile)
}
decisionReason := strings.TrimSpace(reason)
reason = userFacingPermissionReason(call.Name, args, reason, safety.Reason)
reason = userFacingPermissionReason(call.Name, args, reason)
return PermissionEvent{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
@@ -2645,7 +2441,6 @@ func buildPermissionEvent(call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, p
Autonomy: options.Autonomy,
SideEffect: string(safety.SideEffect),
Reason: reason,
DecisionReason: decisionReason,
Scope: scopeText,
Risk: risk,
Block: block,
@@ -2655,31 +2450,18 @@ func buildPermissionEvent(call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, p
}, true
}
func userFacingPermissionReason(toolName string, args map[string]any, reason string, fallback string) string {
func userFacingPermissionReason(toolName string, args map[string]any, reason string) string {
reason = strings.TrimSpace(reason)
if !isShellCommandTool(toolName) {
if !isShellCommandTool(toolName) || !shellCommandRequiresEscalated(args) {
return reason
}
// Policy and sandbox explanations are authoritative. The tool's static
// safety copy is only an internal fallback; presenting it as the reason for
// every ordinary shell approval makes prompts generic and obscures the cases
// where policy has an actionable explanation.
fallback = strings.TrimSpace(fallback)
if reason != "" && reason != fallback && reason != "tool requires approval before execution" && reason != sandbox.ReasonEscalatedSandboxRequired {
return reason
if justification, ok := firstStringArg(args, "justification"); ok {
return justification
}
if shellCommandRequiresEscalated(args) {
if justification, ok := firstStringArg(args, "justification"); ok {
return justification
}
if reason == "" || reason == sandbox.ReasonEscalatedSandboxRequired {
return "This command needs to run outside the sandbox."
}
// Ordinary shell approvals need no invented explanation. The raw fallback is
// retained separately as DecisionReason for traces and policy auditing.
return ""
return reason
}
func grantDecisionAction(grant *sandbox.Grant) PermissionDecisionAction {
@@ -2780,89 +2562,21 @@ func shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args map[string]any) bool {
return strings.TrimSpace(value) == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
}
// normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions treats a provider-expanded empty or
// already-covered additional_permissions object as if it had been omitted.
// Some strict-schema providers materialize every optional property and may add
// a workspace read that the default sandbox already grants; rejecting either
// no-op makes the model retry an otherwise valid command. Requests that broaden
// access and malformed payloads are left untouched so validation stays closed.
func normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args map[string]any, basePath string, engine *sandbox.Engine) {
raw, exists := args["additional_permissions"]
if !exists {
return
}
// An explicit null is the field omitted, not a request: drop the key so the
// rest of the pipeline sees the same args a model that omitted it would send.
// sandbox_permissions is deliberately left alone — a flagged null must reach
// the same "no additional_permissions object was provided" error as a flagged
// absent field rather than being silently downgraded to a different outcome.
if raw == nil {
delete(args, "additional_permissions")
return
}
data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
if err != nil {
return
}
var profile sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &profile); err != nil {
return
}
normalized, err := sandbox.NormalizeRequestPermissionProfile(profile, basePath)
if err != nil {
return
}
noop := normalized.Empty()
if !noop && engine != nil {
if grantProfile, grantErr := sandbox.RequestPermissionGrantProfile(normalized); grantErr == nil {
noop = engine.CoversRequestPermissions(grantProfile)
}
}
if !noop {
return
}
delete(args, "additional_permissions")
if rawMode, ok := args["sandbox_permissions"].(string); ok &&
strings.TrimSpace(rawMode) == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions) {
args["sandbox_permissions"] = string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault)
}
}
// omitAdditionalPermissionsHint is the one instruction that ends the retry loop
// in #845/#847. Every additional_permissions rejection must carry it: the model
// reaches these errors by attaching a permission object to a command that needs
// none, so "omit it and retry" is the answer in practice, and an error that
// only explains how to build a VALID permission object sends the model round
// the loop again with a different invalid shape.
const omitAdditionalPermissionsHint = "If this command does not need extra sandbox access — ordinary " +
"read-only commands such as `git branch --show-current` do not — omit both sandbox_permissions and " +
"additional_permissions entirely and retry; that is the fix in almost every case."
func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile, bool, error) {
if !shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) {
// An explicit null grants nothing and carries no flag, so it is
// indistinguishable from an omitted field; rejecting it would be a pure
// false positive against providers that materialize every optional
// property.
if raw, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists && raw != nil {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, fmt.Errorf(
"additional_permissions was provided without sandbox_permissions set to %q, so it cannot be applied. %s "+
"Only if the command genuinely needs file or network access the sandbox denies, resend with "+
`sandbox_permissions: %q AND a non-empty additional_permissions, for example {"network": {"enabled": true}}`,
tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions,
omitAdditionalPermissionsHint,
tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, fmt.Errorf("additional_permissions requires sandbox_permissions set to %q", tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
}
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, nil
}
raw, ok := args["additional_permissions"]
if !ok || raw == nil {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
"sandbox_permissions was set to %q but no additional_permissions object was provided. %s "+
`Otherwise include one, for example additional_permissions: {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`,
tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions,
omitAdditionalPermissionsHint)
"sandbox_permissions was set to %q but no additional_permissions object was provided. "+
`Include one, for example additional_permissions: {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}. If this command does not need elevated permissions, `+
"omit sandbox_permissions entirely and retry",
tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
}
data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
if err != nil {
@@ -2878,10 +2592,8 @@ func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (s
}
if normalized.Empty() {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
"additional_permissions granted nothing, so it cannot be applied. %s "+
`Otherwise include a real permission, for example {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`,
omitAdditionalPermissionsHint)
"additional_permissions must include at least one of network or file_system, for example " +
`{"network": {"enabled": true}} or {"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`)
}
grantProfile, err := sandbox.RequestPermissionGrantProfile(normalized)
if err != nil {
@@ -2970,6 +2682,19 @@ func permissionActionFromSandbox(action sandbox.Action) PermissionAction {
}
}
// partitionTools builds the per-turn advertised tool list and optional
// tool_search discovery text. INACTIVE (DeferThreshold <= 0 or the eligible count is
// below it): every visible tool is exposed with its full schema EXCEPT tool_search
// (dropped so it is never advertised when it cannot help), and the discovery text is
// empty — byte-identical to the pre-deferral output. ACTIVE: a deferred-eligible
// tool is exposed only when loaded[name]; otherwise it is hidden and searchable
// through tool_search. Non-deferred tools (including tool_search) are always
// exposed. The exposed slice is alpha-sorted by name, matching the legacy order
// so the inactive path is stable.
func partitionTools(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, loaded map[string]bool) ([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, string) {
return partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, nil)
}
// partitionToolsCached is partitionTools with an optional per-tool definition
// cache. The partitioning itself (visibility, deferral, ordering) is recomputed
// every call — it must be, because a tool's deferred state can flip mid-run (e.g.
@@ -3040,20 +2765,22 @@ func partitionToolsCached(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMod
// 2. tool_search — always present, right after the stable block;
// 3. loaded deferred tools, alpha-sorted — APPENDED, so an unloaded->loaded
// transition grows the tail instead of inserting into the eager block.
// tool_search's compact catalog also stays byte-stable as tools load, so only
// the appended full-schema tail changes.
// (tool_search's discovery text still shrinks as tools load, so keeping it and
// the loaded tail AFTER the eager block preserves the eager tools' cache across a
// load; fully stabilizing the loader's own description is a scoped follow-up.)
eager := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0, len(visible))
loadedTail := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0)
var deferredCatalog []tools.Tool
var hiddenTools []tools.Tool
for _, tool := range visible {
name := tool.Name()
if name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
continue // added explicitly between the eager block and the loaded tail
}
if tools.IsDeferred(tool) {
deferredCatalog = append(deferredCatalog, tool)
if loaded[name] {
loadedTail = append(loadedTail, cachedRuntimeToolDefinition(defCache, tool))
} else {
hiddenTools = append(hiddenTools, tool)
}
continue
}
@@ -3066,16 +2793,15 @@ func partitionToolsCached(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMod
return loadedTail[left].Name < loadedTail[right].Name
})
// Keep the catalog byte-stable as tools load. tool_search already redirects
// requests for an exposed tool back to the current tool list, so retaining
// loaded names costs only compact catalog lines and avoids invalidating the
// provider cache at the loader definition on every load.
discovery := tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(deferredCatalog)
discovery := ""
if len(hiddenTools) > 0 {
discovery = tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(hiddenTools)
}
// tool_search is guaranteed runnable on the active path, so it is ALWAYS exposed
// — even when a non-empty EnabledTools allowlist omits it (the operator
// allowlisted the deferred tools, not the loader). It sits right after the stable
// eager block and carries the stable deferred-tool catalog.
// eager block and carries the discovery list for still-hidden tools.
description := loader.Description()
if discovery != "" {
description = discovery
@@ -3314,37 +3040,3 @@ func copyMessages(messages []Message) []Message {
}
return copied
}
// toolResultImageMessage builds the user message that carries a tool's images
// to the model, or reports false when the tool produced none.
//
// The text names the tool so the model can tell which call an image came from
// when several ran in one turn — the images arrive detached from their tool
// result, so nothing else associates them.
func toolResultImageMessage(result ToolResult) (zeroruntime.Message, bool) {
images := make([]zeroruntime.ImageBlock, 0, len(result.Images))
for _, image := range result.Images {
if len(image.Data) == 0 {
continue
}
mediaType := zeroruntime.NormalizeImageMediaType(image.MediaType)
if mediaType == "" {
// Outside the provider allow-list. Dropping it beats sending bytes a
// provider will reject and failing the whole turn.
continue
}
images = append(images, zeroruntime.ImageBlock{MediaType: mediaType, Data: image.Data})
}
if len(images) == 0 {
return zeroruntime.Message{}, false
}
label := result.Name
if label == "" {
label = "tool"
}
return zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: "Image output from " + label + ":",
Images: images,
}, true
}
+57 -281
View File
@@ -6,14 +6,11 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/specmode"
@@ -27,75 +24,6 @@ type mockProvider struct {
requests []zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
}
func TestTypedExecutionOutcomeOverridesLegacySandboxHeuristics(t *testing.T) {
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir(), Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy()})
call := ToolCall{Name: tools.ExecCommandToolName}
options := Options{Sandbox: engine}
legacyMeta := map[string]string{
tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta: "true",
tools.SandboxDenialKindMeta: tools.SandboxDenialKindNetwork,
}
applicationFailure := tools.Result{
Status: tools.StatusError,
Meta: legacyMeta,
ExecutionOutcome: &execution.Outcome{
State: execution.StateFailed,
Kind: execution.OutcomeApplicationFailure,
Exit: &execution.Exit{Code: 1},
},
}
if sandboxDeniedNetworkRetryCandidate(call, nil, applicationFailure, options) || sandboxRestrictedShellRetryCandidate(call, nil, applicationFailure, options) {
t.Fatal("typed application failure must not be retried from legacy sandbox-like text")
}
protectedDenial := applicationFailure
protectedDenial.ExecutionOutcome = &execution.Outcome{
State: execution.StateDenied,
Kind: execution.OutcomeEnforcementDenied,
Denial: &execution.Denial{
Capability: execution.Capability{Kind: execution.CapabilityProtectedMetadata, Scope: "/workspace/.zero"},
Source: execution.DenialSourceConfiguredPolicy,
Reason: "protected metadata",
NextAction: execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
},
}
if sandboxRestrictedShellRetryCandidate(call, nil, protectedDenial, options) {
t.Fatal("narrow protected-metadata denial must not become an unrestricted retry")
}
nonRecoverableDenial := protectedDenial
nonRecoverableDenial.ExecutionOutcome = &execution.Outcome{
State: execution.StateDenied,
Kind: execution.OutcomeEnforcementDenied,
Denial: &execution.Denial{
Capability: execution.Capability{Kind: execution.CapabilityUnrestricted, Scope: "host"},
Source: execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox,
Reason: "sandbox enforcement failed closed",
Recoverable: false,
NextAction: execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
},
}
if sandboxRestrictedShellRetryCandidate(call, nil, nonRecoverableDenial, options) {
t.Fatal("non-recoverable sandbox denial must not become an unrestricted retry")
}
networkDenial := protectedDenial
networkDenial.ExecutionOutcome = &execution.Outcome{
State: execution.StateDenied,
Kind: execution.OutcomeEnforcementDenied,
Denial: &execution.Denial{
Capability: execution.Capability{Kind: execution.CapabilityExternalNetwork},
Source: execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox,
Reason: "external network denied",
NextAction: execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
},
}
if !sandboxDeniedNetworkRetryCandidate(call, nil, networkDenial, options) {
t.Fatal("typed external-network denial should use the narrow network approval path")
}
}
func (provider *mockProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
provider.requests = append(provider.requests, request)
@@ -165,87 +93,6 @@ func TestRunDispatchesSessionLifecycleHooks(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// cancelingProvider simulates an Esc/Ctrl+C abort: it cancels the run's own
// context mid-stream (as the TUI's interrupt handler would) and returns no
// events, so Run observes ctx.Err() and returns early with an already-canceled
// context in scope for the deferred sessionEnd dispatch.
type cancelingProvider struct {
cancel context.CancelFunc
}
func (provider *cancelingProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
provider.cancel()
ch := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent)
close(ch)
return ch, nil
}
// TestRunDispatchesSessionEndHookAfterContextCancellation is a regression test
// for a bug where an interrupted run (Esc/Ctrl+C) canceled ctx before the
// deferred sessionEnd dispatch ran, so Hooks.Dispatch's context.WithTimeout(ctx, ...)
// derived an already-canceled context and the hook command never actually launched.
func TestRunDispatchesSessionEndHookAfterContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
goBinary, err := exec.LookPath("go")
if err != nil {
// The test binary runs on the build machine, so its build-time GOROOT
// still identifies the toolchain that produced it.
goRoot := runtime.GOROOT() //nolint:staticcheck // Safe for this non-portable test binary.
goBinary = filepath.Join(goRoot, "bin", "go")
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
goBinary += ".exe"
}
if _, statErr := os.Stat(goBinary); statErr != nil {
t.Skipf("go binary unavailable on PATH or in GOROOT: %v", statErr)
}
}
audit, err := hooks.NewAuditStore(hooks.AuditStoreOptions{AuditPath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.jsonl")})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewAuditStore: %v", err)
}
dispatcher := hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{
Config: hooks.Config{
Enabled: true,
Hooks: []hooks.Definition{
{ID: "zero.session-end", Event: hooks.EventSessionEnd, Command: goBinary, Args: []string{"version"}, Enabled: true},
},
},
Audit: audit,
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
provider := &cancelingProvider{cancel: cancel}
_, err = Run(ctx, "hi", provider, Options{
SessionID: "session-cancel",
Cwd: t.TempDir(),
ProviderName: "test-provider",
Model: "test-model",
Hooks: dispatcher,
})
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("Run err = %v, want context.Canceled", err)
}
events, err := audit.ReadEvents()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ReadEvents: %v", err)
}
var completedStatus hooks.AuditStatus
found := false
for _, event := range events {
if event.Type == "hook_execution_completed" && event.Event == hooks.EventSessionEnd {
completedStatus = event.Status
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatalf("no sessionEnd hook_execution_completed audit event, events=%#v", events)
}
if completedStatus != hooks.AuditCompleted {
t.Fatalf("sessionEnd hook status = %q, want %q (hook must actually run despite ctx cancellation)", completedStatus, hooks.AuditCompleted)
}
}
type recordingWebSearchTool struct {
calls []map[string]any
}
@@ -304,18 +151,6 @@ func (tool *sandboxDeniedRetryTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any)
return tools.Result{
Status: tools.StatusError,
Output: "touch: cannot touch '/home/user/.npm/cache': Read-only file system",
ExecutionOutcome: &execution.Outcome{
State: execution.StateDenied,
Kind: execution.OutcomeEnforcementDenied,
Exit: &execution.Exit{Code: 1},
Denial: &execution.Denial{
Capability: execution.Capability{Kind: execution.CapabilityUnrestricted, Scope: "host"},
Source: execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox,
Reason: "sandbox blocked command execution",
Recoverable: true,
NextAction: execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
},
},
Meta: map[string]string{
"exit_code": "1",
tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta: "true",
@@ -332,8 +167,7 @@ type sandboxDeniedExecCommandRetryTool struct {
func (tool *sandboxDeniedExecCommandRetryTool) Name() string { return "exec_command" }
type sandboxNetworkDeniedRetryTool struct {
calls []map[string]any
deferFileObservationCommit []bool
calls []map[string]any
}
func (tool *sandboxNetworkDeniedRetryTool) Name() string { return "bash" }
@@ -356,7 +190,6 @@ func (tool *sandboxNetworkDeniedRetryTool) Run(ctx context.Context, args map[str
}
func (tool *sandboxNetworkDeniedRetryTool) RunWithOptions(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any, options tools.RunOptions) tools.Result {
tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
tool.deferFileObservationCommit = append(tool.deferFileObservationCommit, options.DeferFileObservationCommit)
if shellNetworkAllowed(ctx, options.Sandbox, args) {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "server started"}
}
@@ -399,8 +232,7 @@ func agentNativeBackendStub() sandbox.Backend {
}
type sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool struct {
calls []map[string]any
deferFileObservationCommit []bool
calls []map[string]any
}
func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Name() string { return "bash" }
@@ -419,12 +251,8 @@ func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "runs shell commands"}
}
func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Run(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tool.RunWithOptions(ctx, args, tools.RunOptions{})
}
func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) RunWithOptions(_ context.Context, args map[string]any, options tools.RunOptions) tools.Result {
func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
tool.deferFileObservationCommit = append(tool.deferFileObservationCommit, options.DeferFileObservationCommit)
if args["sandbox_permissions"] == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated) {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "stdout:\nUSER PID COMMAND\nanaxy 42 firefox\nanaxy 43 Discord"}
}
@@ -490,9 +318,6 @@ func TestRunRetriesShellUnsandboxedAfterSandboxNamespaceLimitedOutput(t *testing
if retryTool.calls[1]["sandbox_permissions"] != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated) {
t.Fatalf("retry args = %#v, want require_escalated", retryTool.calls[1])
}
if len(retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit) != 2 || !retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit[1] {
t.Fatalf("retry defer flags = %#v, want retry observation deferred", retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit)
}
if len(requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("permission requests = %#v, want one unsandboxed retry approval", requests)
}
@@ -644,9 +469,6 @@ func TestRunRetriesNetworkDeniedShellWithNetworkGrant(t *testing.T) {
if _, escalated := retryTool.calls[1]["sandbox_permissions"]; escalated {
t.Fatalf("network retry must stay sandboxed, got retry args %#v", retryTool.calls[1])
}
if len(retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit) != 2 || !retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit[1] {
t.Fatalf("retry defer flags = %#v, want retry observation deferred", retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit)
}
if len(requests) != 1 || requests[0].Reason != sandbox.ReasonNetworkBlocked {
t.Fatalf("permission requests = %#v, want one network approval", requests)
}
@@ -904,6 +726,9 @@ func TestRunReportsTruncationFinishReason(t *testing.T) {
if result.FinishReason != zeroruntime.FinishReasonLength {
t.Fatalf("FinishReason = %q, want %q", result.FinishReason, zeroruntime.FinishReasonLength)
}
if !result.Truncated() {
t.Fatal("Truncated() = false, want true for a length-capped response")
}
if result.TruncationNotice() == "" {
t.Fatal("TruncationNotice() empty for a truncated response")
}
@@ -921,7 +746,7 @@ func TestRunNormalCompletionIsNotTruncated(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.TruncationNotice() != "" {
if result.Truncated() || result.TruncationNotice() != "" {
t.Fatalf("normal completion reported as truncated: reason=%q", result.FinishReason)
}
}
@@ -998,7 +823,7 @@ func TestRunEmitsUsageEvents(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunAdvertisesRuntimeToolDefinitions(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
@@ -1205,9 +1030,9 @@ func TestRunRequestsPermissionBeforeWebSearchExecution(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunFiltersAdvertisedTools(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedGrepTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewGrepTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
@@ -1235,7 +1060,7 @@ func TestRunFiltersAdvertisedTools(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunRejectsFilteredToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1272,7 +1097,7 @@ func TestRunRejectsFilteredToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunRejectsToolCallsOutsideEnabledList(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1310,7 +1135,7 @@ func TestRunExecutesToolCallThroughRegistry(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), "alpha\nbeta\n")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1351,50 +1176,10 @@ func TestRunExecutesToolCallThroughRegistry(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunPreservesRequestPrefixAcrossTurns(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), "alpha\n")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "read_file"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"notes.txt"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "read notes", provider, Options{
Cwd: root,
Registry: registry,
SessionID: "session-stable-prefix",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("provider requests = %d, want 2", len(provider.requests))
}
first, second := provider.requests[0], provider.requests[1]
if len(second.Messages) < len(first.Messages) || !reflect.DeepEqual(second.Messages[:len(first.Messages)], first.Messages) {
t.Fatalf("first request messages must be an exact prefix of the second:\nfirst=%#v\nsecond=%#v", first.Messages, second.Messages)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(first.Tools, second.Tools) {
t.Fatalf("tool definitions drifted between turns:\nfirst=%#v\nsecond=%#v", first.Tools, second.Tools)
}
if first.PromptCacheKey != "session-stable-prefix" || second.PromptCacheKey != first.PromptCacheKey {
t.Fatalf("prompt cache key must remain stable: first=%q second=%q", first.PromptCacheKey, second.PromptCacheKey)
}
}
func TestRunSanitizesMalformedToolCallArgumentsBeforeRetry(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1462,7 +1247,7 @@ func TestRunRecoversFirstObjectFromConcatenatedToolArgs(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1509,8 +1294,8 @@ func TestRunDefersSelfCorrectFeedbackUntilAfterToolBatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -1585,7 +1370,7 @@ func TestRunBatchesSelfCorrectOncePerTurn(t *testing.T) {
// after a later call in the same turn supersedes it.
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -1642,7 +1427,7 @@ func TestRunBatchesSelfCorrectOncePerTurn(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunDeniesPromptToolWithoutUnsafePermission(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write denied")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1685,7 +1470,7 @@ func TestRunDeniesPromptToolWithoutUnsafePermission(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunRequestsPromptToolPermissionBeforeExecution(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write approved")
var requests []PermissionRequest
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1741,7 +1526,7 @@ func TestRunRequestsPromptToolPermissionBeforeExecution(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunAllowsWorkspaceWriteWithoutPromptWhenSandboxPolicyPermits(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write done")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1790,7 +1575,7 @@ func TestRunAllowsWorkspaceWriteWithoutPromptWhenSandboxPolicyPermits(t *testing
func TestRunDeniesPromptToolWhenPermissionRequestDenied(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write denied")
var requests []PermissionRequest
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1838,7 +1623,7 @@ func TestRunDeniesPromptToolWhenPermissionRequestDenied(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunAbortsWhenPermissionRequestCanceled(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write should not continue")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1934,7 +1719,7 @@ func TestRunPersistsAlwaysAllowPermissionDecision(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write approved")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
policy := sandbox.DefaultPolicy()
@@ -2006,7 +1791,7 @@ func TestRunSessionAllowSkipsMatchingPromptWithoutPersistentGrant(t *testing.T)
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2087,7 +1872,7 @@ func TestRunSessionAllowSkipsMatchingPromptWithoutPersistentGrant(t *testing.T)
func TestRunCommandPrefixApprovalSkipsLaterMatchingBashPrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2289,7 +2074,7 @@ func TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixApprovalSkipsFutureSessionPrompt(t *testing.T
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
policy := sandbox.DefaultPolicy()
policy.Network = sandbox.NetworkAllow
@@ -2396,7 +2181,7 @@ func TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("seed command prefix: %v", err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2445,11 +2230,7 @@ func TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
command := "PATH=.:$PATH curl https://example.com"
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
if windowsTestUsesPowerShell() {
command = `$env:PATH = '.;' + $env:PATH; curl.cmd https://example.com`
} else {
command = "set PATH=.;%PATH% && curl https://example.com"
}
command = "set PATH=.;%PATH% && curl https://example.com"
fakeCurl := filepath.Join(root, "curl.cmd")
if err := os.WriteFile(fakeCurl, []byte("@echo fake curl %*\r\n"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -2461,7 +2242,7 @@ func TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant(t *testing.T) {
}
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2528,7 +2309,7 @@ func TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunDoesNotOfferPrefixApprovalForUnsafeBashCommand(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2570,17 +2351,13 @@ func TestRunDoesNotOfferPrefixApprovalForUnsafeBashCommand(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunPromptsForDestructiveShellInsteadOfSandboxDeny(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
command := "echo rm -rf /"
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" && windowsTestUsesPowerShell() {
command = `Write-Output 'rm -rf /'`
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "bash"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"command":` + quoteJSONString(command) + `}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"command":"echo rm -rf /"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
@@ -2644,7 +2421,7 @@ func TestRunAlwaysAllowWithoutSandboxStillAllowsCall(t *testing.T) {
// prior code denied it because persistPermissionGrant errors when Sandbox==nil.
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write approved")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -2676,12 +2453,6 @@ func TestRunAlwaysAllowWithoutSandboxStillAllowsCall(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func windowsTestUsesPowerShell() bool {
executable, _ := tools.HostShellCommand("")
name := strings.ToLower(filepath.Base(executable))
return strings.Contains(name, "powershell") || strings.HasPrefix(name, "pwsh")
}
func containsPermissionDecision(decisions []PermissionDecisionAction, want PermissionDecisionAction) bool {
for _, decision := range decisions {
if decision == want {
@@ -2714,7 +2485,7 @@ func TestRunCancellationPreservesContextCanceledIdentity(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunGrantsPromptToolInUnsafeMode(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write done")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -2766,7 +2537,7 @@ func TestRunEmitsPermissionEventForPersistentSandboxGrant(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write done")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -2945,7 +2716,7 @@ func TestRunAppliesSandboxEvenInUnsafeMode(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
outside := filepath.Join(tempDirOutsideDefaultTemp(t), "escape.txt")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := providerCallingWritePathThenAnswer(outside, "sandbox handled")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -2994,7 +2765,7 @@ func TestRunStopsAfterMaxTurns(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "read_file"},
@@ -3024,7 +2795,7 @@ func TestRunRequestsFinalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -3215,17 +2986,22 @@ func TestBuildSystemPromptInjectsHostShellContext(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected operating system in environment block, got %q", prompt)
}
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
wants := []string{"workdir/cwd", "MSYS binaries"}
if windowsTestUsesPowerShell() {
wants = append(wants, "PowerShell", "Get-ChildItem", "Select-String", "$env:NAME", "require_escalated")
} else {
wants = append(wants, "cmd.exe", "double quotes")
}
for _, want := range wants {
for _, want := range []string{"Windows cmd.exe syntax", "cwd argument", "MSYS binaries", "grep", "require_escalated", "use double quotes around the value"} {
if !strings.Contains(prompt, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected selected Windows shell guidance to mention %q, got %q", want, prompt)
t.Fatalf("expected Windows shell guidance to mention %q, got %q", want, prompt)
}
}
// The examples must themselves use the safe (double-quoted) form; a
// single-quoted example here would teach the model the exact syntax
// that fails under cmd.exe.
for _, want := range []string{`--jq ".a | b"`, `-run "A|B"`} {
if !strings.Contains(prompt, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected double-quoted example %q in Windows shell guidance, got %q", want, prompt)
}
}
if strings.Contains(prompt, `'.a | b'`) || strings.Contains(prompt, `'A|B'`) {
t.Fatalf("Windows shell guidance must not show the unsafe single-quoted form, got %q", prompt)
}
} else if !strings.Contains(prompt, "/bin/sh syntax") {
t.Fatalf("expected POSIX shell guidance in prompt, got %q", prompt)
}
@@ -3278,7 +3054,7 @@ func TestBuildSystemPromptAllowsSpecModeOverride(t *testing.T) {
func TestSpecDraftAdvertisesOnlySafeDraftTools(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(root, nil) {
for _, tool := range tools.CoreTools(root) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
specmode.RegisterDraftTools(registry, root, nil)
@@ -3315,7 +3091,7 @@ func TestSpecDraftAdvertisesOnlySafeDraftTools(t *testing.T) {
func TestSpecDraftDeniesHiddenToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("done")
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "draft", provider, Options{
@@ -3348,7 +3124,7 @@ func TestSpecDraftDeniesHiddenToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
func TestSpecDraftDeniesBashToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -3489,7 +3265,7 @@ func TestRunSurfacesDroppedToolCallAlongsideValidCall(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type propagationOutputTool struct {
output string
}
func TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess(t *testing.T) {
for index, arg := range os.Args {
if arg == "--zero-output-budget-hook-repeat" && index+1 < len(os.Args) {
repeats, err := strconv.Atoi(os.Args[index+1])
if err != nil {
os.Exit(2)
}
if _, err := os.Stdout.WriteString(strings.Repeat("hook feedback ", repeats)); err != nil {
os.Exit(2)
}
os.Exit(0)
}
if arg != "--zero-output-budget-hook" || index+1 >= len(os.Args) {
continue
}
if _, err := os.Stdout.WriteString(os.Args[index+1]); err != nil {
os.Exit(2)
}
os.Exit(0)
}
}
func largeOutputBudgetHookDispatcher() *hooks.Dispatcher {
return outputBudgetHookDispatcherFor("propagation_output", 200)
}
func outputBudgetHookDispatcherFor(toolName string, repeats int) *hooks.Dispatcher {
feedback := strings.Repeat("hook feedback ", repeats)
hookArgs := []string{
"-test.run=TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess",
"--",
"--zero-output-budget-hook",
feedback,
}
if repeats > 1_000 {
hookArgs = []string{
"-test.run=TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess",
"--",
"--zero-output-budget-hook-repeat",
strconv.Itoa(repeats),
}
}
return hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{Config: hooks.Config{
Enabled: true,
Hooks: []hooks.Definition{{
ID: "large-feedback",
Event: hooks.EventAfterTool,
Matcher: toolName,
Command: os.Args[0],
Args: hookArgs,
Enabled: true,
}},
}})
}
func TestExecuteToolCallCommitsReadObservationAfterFinalBoundary(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
targetPath := filepath.Join(root, "target.txt")
if err := os.WriteFile(targetPath, []byte("known content\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
linkPath := filepath.Join(root, "small.txt")
if err := os.Symlink(targetPath, linkPath); err != nil {
t.Skipf("symlink unavailable: %v", err)
}
resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(linkPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
tracker := tools.NewFileTracker()
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{
ID: "read-small", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"small.txt"}`,
}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{Cwd: root, FileTracker: tracker})
if abortErr != nil || result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: result=%#v err=%v", result, abortErr)
}
if !tracker.SeenWhole(resolvedPath) {
t.Fatal("unmodified final read output was not committed as observed")
}
}
func TestExecuteToolCallDoesNotCommitReadObservationBeforeHookBudget(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("ZERO_TOOL_OUTPUT_CEILING_TOKENS", "80")
root := t.TempDir()
targetPath := filepath.Join(root, "target.txt")
if err := os.WriteFile(targetPath, []byte("known content\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
linkPath := filepath.Join(root, "small.txt")
if err := os.Symlink(targetPath, linkPath); err != nil {
t.Skipf("symlink unavailable: %v", err)
}
resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(linkPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
tracker := tools.NewFileTracker()
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{
ID: "read-hook", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"small.txt"}`,
}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{
Cwd: root, FileTracker: tracker, Hooks: outputBudgetHookDispatcherFor("read_file", 20_000),
})
if abortErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", abortErr)
}
if !result.Truncated {
t.Fatalf("precondition: hook feedback was not truncated: %#v", result)
}
if tracker.SeenWhole(resolvedPath) {
t.Fatal("read observation committed before hook output was budgeted")
}
}
func (tool propagationOutputTool) Name() string { return "propagation_output" }
func (tool propagationOutputTool) Description() string { return "returns output for propagation tests" }
func (tool propagationOutputTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
}
func (tool propagationOutputTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "test read"}
}
func (tool propagationOutputTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: tool.output}
}
func TestExecuteToolCallPropagatesOutputTruncation(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("TMPDIR", t.TempDir())
t.Setenv("ZERO_TOOL_OUTPUT_CEILING_TOKENS", "80")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(propagationOutputTool{output: strings.Repeat("large output\n", 1000)})
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{
ID: "call-budget",
Name: "propagation_output",
Arguments: `{}`,
}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{Cwd: t.TempDir()})
if abortErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall abort error: %v", abortErr)
}
if !result.Truncated {
t.Fatalf("agent ToolResult lost tools.Result.Truncated: %#v", result)
}
if result.Meta["spill_path"] == "" {
t.Fatalf("agent ToolResult lost spill metadata: %#v", result.Meta)
}
}
func TestRecordOutputBudgetTraceUsesOnlyCompactMetadata(t *testing.T) {
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("session", "run", "")
recorder.Start()
recordOutputBudgetTrace(recorder, ToolResult{
Name: "grep",
Truncated: true,
Output: "SECRET OUTPUT MUST NOT ENTER TRACE",
Meta: map[string]string{
"output_budget_category": "search",
"output_budget_original_bytes": "1000",
"output_budget_retained_bytes": "100",
"output_budget_estimated_original_tokens": "250",
"output_budget_estimated_retained_tokens": "25",
"output_budget_reason": "semantic_search_budget",
"output_budget_spill_created": "true",
"spill_path": "/secret/path/not-for-trace",
},
})
events := recorder.Finish().OutputBudgets
if len(events) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("events = %#v", events)
}
event := events[0]
if event.Tool != "grep" || event.Category != "search" || event.OriginalBytes != 1000 || event.RetainedBytes != 100 || !event.SpillCreated {
t.Fatalf("unexpected trace event: %#v", event)
}
}
func TestExecuteToolCallRebudgetsOversizedAfterToolFeedback(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("ZERO_TOOL_OUTPUT_CEILING_TOKENS", "80")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(propagationOutputTool{output: "tool output"})
dispatcher := largeOutputBudgetHookDispatcher()
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{
ID: "call-hook-budget",
Name: "propagation_output",
Arguments: `{}`,
}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{Hooks: dispatcher})
if abortErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall abort error: %v", abortErr)
}
if !result.Truncated || len(result.Output) > 80*4 {
t.Fatalf("afterTool feedback bypassed output budget: truncated=%t bytes=%d meta=%#v", result.Truncated, len(result.Output), result.Meta)
}
if result.Meta["output_budget_category"] == "" || result.Meta["output_budget_retained_bytes"] != strconv.Itoa(len(result.Output)) {
t.Fatalf("post-hook budget metadata does not describe final output: %#v", result.Meta)
}
}
func TestRunTraceReflectsPostHookBudget(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("ZERO_TOOL_OUTPUT_CEILING_TOKENS", "80")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(propagationOutputTool{output: "tool output"})
dispatcher := largeOutputBudgetHookDispatcher()
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-hook-trace", ToolName: "propagation_output"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-hook-trace", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-hook-trace"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
}}
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("session", "run", "")
var toolResults []ToolResult
if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "budget hook", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
Hooks: dispatcher,
Trace: recorder,
OnToolResult: func(result ToolResult) { toolResults = append(toolResults, result) },
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
if len(toolResults) != 1 || !toolResults[0].Truncated {
t.Fatalf("tool result = %#v, want one truncated post-hook result", toolResults)
}
events := recorder.Finish().OutputBudgets
if len(events) != 1 || !events[0].Truncated || events[0].RetainedBytes != len(toolResults[0].Output) {
t.Fatalf("trace does not describe final post-hook output: events=%#v result=%#v", events, toolResults[0])
}
}
+11 -111
View File
@@ -10,23 +10,12 @@ import (
// Parallel read-ahead for tool batches. When a turn requests several
// independent lookups (read_file + grep + glob is the common shape), executing
// them one after another serializes pure I/O waits. A consecutive run of
// capability-safe read-only calls is executed concurrently instead; results are
// auto-allowed read-only calls is executed concurrently instead; results are
// then consumed in the original call order, so guard counters, message
// ordering, abort semantics, and the surface's call/result event pairing are
// byte-identical to sequential execution. Runs never span a mutating call: a
// read that follows a write must observe the write, so eligibility is decided
// per consecutive run, not per batch.
//
// Eligibility uses the PR5 tool-effect contract (tools.CapabilitiesOf):
//
// Effect == ReadOnly
// AND ThreadSafe == true
// AND auto-allowed (no interactive permission prompt on the hot path)
// AND no resource-key conflict with an earlier call in the same concurrent window
//
// Unknown, mutators, interactive tools, and non-thread-safe reads stay
// sequential. Empty resource keys do not conflict (ThreadSafe is the safety
// gate); shared non-empty keys force a batch boundary.
// maxParallelReadTools bounds concurrent read-only tool executions in a turn.
const maxParallelReadTools = 8
@@ -39,117 +28,28 @@ type precomputedToolResult struct {
}
// parallelSafeToolCall reports whether call may run concurrently with its
// neighbors under the PR5 capability contract. Loop-intercepted tools
// (ask_user, request_permissions) and tool_search (mutates the deferred-tool
// set) always stay sequential.
// neighbors: the tool must exist, be side-effect-free (SideEffectRead), and be
// auto-allowed for these args, so no interactive prompt or workspace mutation
// is on the hot path. Loop-intercepted tools (ask_user, request_permissions)
// and tool_search (mutates the deferred-tool set) stay sequential.
func parallelSafeToolCall(registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, options Options) bool {
switch call.Name {
case "ask_user", tools.RequestPermissionsToolName, tools.ToolSearchToolName:
return false
}
tool, found := registry.Get(call.Name)
if !found {
if !found || tool.Safety().SideEffect != tools.SideEffectRead {
return false
}
caps := tools.CapabilitiesOf(tool)
// Fail-closed: only audited concurrent-safe pure reads.
if caps.Effect != tools.EffectReadOnly || !caps.ThreadSafe {
return false
}
args, ok := decodeCallArgs(call)
if !ok {
return false
args := map[string]any{}
if call.Arguments != "" {
if err := decodeToolArguments(call.Arguments, &args); err != nil {
return false
}
}
return effectivePermission(tool, args) == tools.PermissionAllow
}
// decodeCallArgs decodes tool call JSON arguments. Returns false on malformed
// input so the call stays sequential (never panics into the parallel path).
func decodeCallArgs(call ToolCall) (map[string]any, bool) {
args := map[string]any{}
if call.Arguments == "" {
return args, true
}
if err := decodeToolArguments(call.Arguments, &args); err != nil {
return nil, false
}
return args, true
}
// resourceKeysForCall returns the conflict keys for a call, or nil when the
// tool has no ResourceKeys function / no keys for these args.
func resourceKeysForCall(registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall) []string {
tool, found := registry.Get(call.Name)
if !found {
return nil
}
caps := tools.CapabilitiesOf(tool)
if caps.ResourceKeys == nil {
return nil
}
args, ok := decodeCallArgs(call)
if !ok {
return nil
}
return caps.ResourceKeys(args)
}
// resourceKeysConflict reports whether two key sets share any non-empty key.
// Empty key sets never conflict: ThreadSafe is the eligibility gate; keys only
// refine conflict detection among tools that declare specific resources.
func resourceKeysConflict(a, b []string) bool {
if len(a) == 0 || len(b) == 0 {
return false
}
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(a))
for _, key := range a {
if key == "" {
continue
}
seen[key] = struct{}{}
}
for _, key := range b {
if key == "" {
continue
}
if _, ok := seen[key]; ok {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// extendParallelRun returns the exclusive end index of a consecutive parallel-
// safe run starting at start. The run stops before the first call that is not
// parallel-safe or that conflicts on resource keys with any earlier call in
// the same window (so two read_file calls on the same path stay sequential).
func extendParallelRun(registry *tools.Registry, calls []ToolCall, start int, options Options) int {
if start >= len(calls) || !parallelSafeToolCall(registry, calls[start], options) {
return start
}
end := start + 1
keysWindow := [][]string{resourceKeysForCall(registry, calls[start])}
for end < len(calls) {
if !parallelSafeToolCall(registry, calls[end], options) {
break
}
nextKeys := resourceKeysForCall(registry, calls[end])
conflict := false
for _, prev := range keysWindow {
if resourceKeysConflict(prev, nextKeys) {
conflict = true
break
}
}
if conflict {
break
}
keysWindow = append(keysWindow, nextKeys)
end++
}
return end
}
// executeParallelReadBatch runs calls[start:end] concurrently (bounded by
// maxParallelReadTools) and returns results indexed relative to start. All
// execution-side callbacks that can fire inside executeToolCall are serialized
-104
View File
@@ -57,20 +57,6 @@ func (tool *probeTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
func (tool *probeTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tool.sideEffect, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "test"}
}
// Capabilities maps the probe's SideEffect into the PR5 capability contract so
// parallelSafeToolCall (CapabilitiesOf) can classify reads vs mutators. Without
// this, probes default to EffectUnknown and never enter the concurrent path.
func (tool *probeTool) Capabilities() tools.ToolCapabilities {
switch tool.sideEffect {
case tools.SideEffectRead:
return tools.ToolCapabilities{Effect: tools.EffectReadOnly, ThreadSafe: true}
case tools.SideEffectWrite:
return tools.ToolCapabilities{Effect: tools.EffectWorkspaceWrite, ThreadSafe: false}
default:
return tools.UnknownCapabilities()
}
}
func (tool *probeTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
id, _ := args["id"].(string)
tool.mu.Lock()
@@ -106,11 +92,6 @@ func TestParallelSafeToolCall(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(&probeTool{name: "probe_read", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead})
registry.Register(&probeTool{name: "probe_write", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite})
// Read-only but not ThreadSafe: must stay sequential under the PR5 gate.
registry.Register(&keyedProbeTool{
probeTool: probeTool{name: "probe_read_serial", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead},
threadSafe: false,
})
call := func(name, args string) ToolCall { return ToolCall{ID: "c", Name: name, Arguments: args} }
if !parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("probe_read", `{"id":"a"}`), Options{}) {
@@ -128,91 +109,6 @@ func TestParallelSafeToolCall(t *testing.T) {
if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("ask_user", `{}`), Options{}) {
t.Fatal("loop-intercepted tools must stay sequential")
}
if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("probe_read_serial", `{"id":"a"}`), Options{}) {
t.Fatal("ReadOnly without ThreadSafe must not be parallel-safe")
}
}
func TestResourceKeysConflict(t *testing.T) {
if resourceKeysConflict(nil, []string{"file:a"}) {
t.Fatal("empty vs non-empty must not conflict")
}
if resourceKeysConflict([]string{"file:a"}, nil) {
t.Fatal("non-empty vs empty must not conflict")
}
if resourceKeysConflict([]string{"file:a"}, []string{"file:b"}) {
t.Fatal("distinct keys must not conflict")
}
if !resourceKeysConflict([]string{"file:a", "file:b"}, []string{"file:b"}) {
t.Fatal("shared key must conflict")
}
if resourceKeysConflict([]string{"", "file:a"}, []string{""}) {
t.Fatal("empty-string keys must be ignored")
}
}
func TestExtendParallelRunResourceKeyBoundary(t *testing.T) {
// Two keyed reads on the same path must not share a concurrent window;
// distinct paths may batch together.
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(&keyedProbeTool{
probeTool: probeTool{name: "keyed_read", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead},
threadSafe: true,
keys: func(args map[string]any) []string {
id, _ := args["id"].(string)
if id == "" {
return nil
}
return []string{"file:" + id}
},
})
calls := []ToolCall{
{ID: "1", Name: "keyed_read", Arguments: `{"id":"a"}`},
{ID: "2", Name: "keyed_read", Arguments: `{"id":"b"}`},
{ID: "3", Name: "keyed_read", Arguments: `{"id":"a"}`}, // conflicts with call 0
}
// start=0: a and b share no key → run covers [0,2)
if end := extendParallelRun(registry, calls, 0, Options{}); end != 2 {
t.Fatalf("extend from 0 = %d, want 2 (stop before second file:a)", end)
}
// start=2: single remaining call
if end := extendParallelRun(registry, calls, 2, Options{}); end != 3 {
t.Fatalf("extend from 2 = %d, want 3", end)
}
// Empty keys never conflict: three keyless safe reads form one window.
registry.Register(&probeTool{name: "keyless_read", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead})
keyless := []ToolCall{
{ID: "1", Name: "keyless_read", Arguments: `{"id":"x"}`},
{ID: "2", Name: "keyless_read", Arguments: `{"id":"y"}`},
{ID: "3", Name: "keyless_read", Arguments: `{"id":"z"}`},
}
if end := extendParallelRun(registry, keyless, 0, Options{}); end != 3 {
t.Fatalf("keyless extend = %d, want 3", end)
}
}
// keyedProbeTool is a probe with explicit ResourceKeys / ThreadSafe for
// planner unit tests.
type keyedProbeTool struct {
probeTool
threadSafe bool
keys func(args map[string]any) []string
}
func (tool *keyedProbeTool) Capabilities() tools.ToolCapabilities {
caps := tools.ToolCapabilities{
Effect: tools.EffectReadOnly,
ThreadSafe: tool.threadSafe,
}
if tool.keys != nil {
caps.ResourceKeys = tool.keys
}
// Honor mutator side effects from the embedded probe when used as write.
if tool.sideEffect == tools.SideEffectWrite {
caps.Effect = tools.EffectWorkspaceWrite
caps.ThreadSafe = false
}
return caps
}
func TestRunExecutesConsecutiveReadsConcurrently(t *testing.T) {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveAppendsLoadedToolAfterEagerBlock(t *testing.T) {
// "read_file".
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil)) // non-deferred, "read_file"
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root)) // non-deferred, "read_file"
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
@@ -68,61 +68,3 @@ func TestBuildPermissionEventKeepsAllowForOrdinaryAllowedCommand(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("shouldRequestPermission must be false for an ordinary sandbox-allowed command")
}
}
func TestBuildPermissionEventReusesCoveredAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
call := ToolCall{ID: "call_3", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
args := map[string]any{
"command": "npm install",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": true},
},
}
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow, AutoAllowed: true}
if shouldRequestPermission(promptShellTool{}, args, true, decision) {
t.Fatal("an already-covered capability must not trigger another prompt")
}
event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, true, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("covered capability should still produce an auditable allow event")
}
if event.Action != PermissionActionAllow {
t.Fatalf("Action = %q, want allow for an already-covered capability", event.Action)
}
}
func TestBuildPermissionEventOmitsGenericShellReasonFromPrompt(t *testing.T) {
call := ToolCall{ID: "call_4", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
args := map[string]any{"command": "make test"}
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionPrompt, Reason: "runs a shell command"}
event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("generic shell approval must produce an event")
}
if event.Reason != "" {
t.Fatalf("user-facing reason = %q, want omitted generic tool text", event.Reason)
}
if event.DecisionReason != "runs a shell command" {
t.Fatalf("decision reason = %q, want raw audit reason retained", event.DecisionReason)
}
}
func TestBuildPermissionEventPrefersPolicyReasonOverModelJustification(t *testing.T) {
call := ToolCall{ID: "call_5", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
args := map[string]any{
"command": "curl https://example.test",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated),
"justification": "Run without sandboxing.",
}
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionPrompt, Reason: sandbox.ReasonNetworkBlocked}
event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("policy approval must produce an event")
}
if event.Reason != sandbox.ReasonNetworkBlocked {
t.Fatalf("user-facing reason = %q, want policy reason %q", event.Reason, sandbox.ReasonNetworkBlocked)
}
}
-118
View File
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
// profileController observes per-turn run signals and decides at most one
// posture escalation per run for the armed execution profile. A nil policy (or
// a policy without Escalate) makes every method a no-op, so runs without a
// profile are byte-identical to before — the same opt-in convention as Trace
// and SelfCorrect.
//
// The controller only ever CHANGES loop policy knobs (turn ceiling, reasoning
// effort, completion gate) through the values the loop applies at its act
// point; it never injects messages, never touches the model or session, and
// never interacts with the model-initiated escalate_model path.
type profileController struct {
policy *PostureEscalation
escalated bool
uncertainSeen int
failureTripped bool
riskTripped bool
scTripped bool
uncertainTrip bool
}
// newProfileController is nil-safe: a nil ProfilePolicy (the default for every
// existing caller) or a nil Escalate yields a controller that observes and
// decides nothing.
func newProfileController(policy *ProfilePolicy) *profileController {
if policy == nil {
return &profileController{}
}
return &profileController{policy: policy.Escalate}
}
// observeToolOutcome watches two signals from an executed tool call: the
// repeated-failure guard's streak (reusing the guard's own counting, not a
// second failure model) and the sandbox risk classification of an executed
// result.
func (c *profileController) observeToolOutcome(outcome toolFailureOutcome, result ToolResult) {
if c.policy == nil || c.escalated {
return
}
if c.policy.OnToolFailureStreak > 0 && outcome.Count >= c.policy.OnToolFailureStreak {
c.failureTripped = true
}
if threshold := riskRank(c.policy.OnRiskyMutation); threshold > 0 &&
result.DenialReason == DenialNone &&
riskRank(result.Risk.Level) >= threshold {
// The call EXECUTED (was not denied): partial failures count too, since
// the mutation ran. An unrecognized threshold ranks 0 and disables the
// signal instead of matching everything.
c.riskTripped = true
}
}
// observeUncertain counts uncertain completion evaluations (continue nudges and
// semantic checks). Headless-only by construction: the completion gate never
// runs interactively.
func (c *profileController) observeUncertain() {
if c.policy == nil || c.escalated || c.policy.OnCompletionUncertain <= 0 {
return
}
c.uncertainSeen++
if c.uncertainSeen >= c.policy.OnCompletionUncertain {
c.uncertainTrip = true
}
}
// observeSelfCorrect watches the post-edit verification outcome. Any failing
// outcome (correcting, reported, aborted) is a signal; passed and disabled are
// not.
func (c *profileController) observeSelfCorrect(outcome Outcome) {
if c.policy == nil || c.escalated || !c.policy.OnSelfCorrectFailure {
return
}
switch outcome {
case OutcomeCorrecting, OutcomeReported, OutcomeAborted:
c.scTripped = true
}
}
// maybeEscalate reports the escalation target exactly once, the first time any
// armed trigger has fired. Subsequent calls return false for the rest of the
// run: escalation is one-shot and never de-escalates, so no cooldown state is
// needed.
func (c *profileController) maybeEscalate() (PostureEscalation, bool) {
if c.policy == nil || c.escalated {
return PostureEscalation{}, false
}
if !c.failureTripped && !c.riskTripped && !c.scTripped && !c.uncertainTrip {
return PostureEscalation{}, false
}
c.escalated = true
return *c.policy, true
}
// riskRank orders sandbox risk levels for threshold comparison. Unknown levels
// rank 0: an unrecognized RESULT level can never meet a valid threshold, and an
// unrecognized THRESHOLD is rejected before comparison (rank 0 disables the
// signal) so a typo in a profile can never make every result match.
func riskRank(level sandbox.RiskLevel) int {
switch level {
case sandbox.RiskLow:
return 1
case sandbox.RiskMedium:
return 2
case sandbox.RiskHigh:
return 3
case sandbox.RiskCritical:
return 4
default:
return 0
}
}
-345
View File
@@ -1,345 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestProfileControllerNilPolicyIsNoOp(t *testing.T) {
for _, controller := range []*profileController{
newProfileController(nil),
newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Name: "balanced"}), // Escalate nil
} {
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{Count: 99}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, Risk: sandbox.Risk{Level: sandbox.RiskCritical}})
controller.observeUncertain()
controller.observeSelfCorrect(OutcomeAborted)
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("nil policy must never escalate")
}
}
}
func TestProfileControllerEscalatesOnFailureStreak(t *testing.T) {
controller := newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Escalate: &PostureEscalation{OnToolFailureStreak: 2, MaxTurns: 80}})
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{Count: 1}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError})
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("streak below threshold must not escalate")
}
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{Count: 2}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError})
target, fired := controller.maybeEscalate()
if !fired || target.MaxTurns != 80 {
t.Fatalf("expected escalation with the policy target, got fired=%t target=%+v", fired, target)
}
}
func TestProfileControllerEscalatesOnRiskyMutation(t *testing.T) {
controller := newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Escalate: &PostureEscalation{OnRiskyMutation: sandbox.RiskHigh}})
// Medium risk on an executed result: below threshold.
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, Risk: sandbox.Risk{Level: sandbox.RiskMedium}})
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("medium risk must not trip a high threshold")
}
// Critical risk on a DENIED result: never counts (the mutation never ran).
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, DenialReason: DenialSandboxBlock, Risk: sandbox.Risk{Level: sandbox.RiskCritical}})
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("a denied result must not trip the risky-mutation signal")
}
// Critical risk on an executed PARTIAL FAILURE (error status, no denial):
// the mutation ran, so it counts.
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Risk: sandbox.Risk{Level: sandbox.RiskCritical}})
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); !fired {
t.Fatal("an executed partial failure at critical risk must trip a high threshold")
}
}
func TestProfileControllerIgnoresInvalidRiskThreshold(t *testing.T) {
controller := newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Escalate: &PostureEscalation{OnRiskyMutation: sandbox.RiskLevel("hgih")}})
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, Risk: sandbox.Risk{Level: sandbox.RiskCritical}})
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("an unrecognized threshold must disable the signal, not match every result")
}
}
func TestProfileControllerEscalatesOnSelfCorrectFailure(t *testing.T) {
controller := newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Escalate: &PostureEscalation{OnSelfCorrectFailure: true}})
controller.observeSelfCorrect(OutcomePassed)
controller.observeSelfCorrect(OutcomeDisabled)
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("passing/disabled outcomes must not escalate")
}
controller.observeSelfCorrect(OutcomeReported)
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); !fired {
t.Fatal("a failing verification outcome must escalate")
}
}
func TestProfileControllerEscalatesOnUncertainCompletion(t *testing.T) {
controller := newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Escalate: &PostureEscalation{OnCompletionUncertain: 2}})
controller.observeUncertain()
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("first uncertain evaluation must not trip a threshold of 2")
}
controller.observeUncertain()
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); !fired {
t.Fatal("second uncertain evaluation must escalate")
}
}
func TestProfileControllerEscalatesAtMostOnce(t *testing.T) {
controller := newProfileController(&ProfilePolicy{Escalate: &PostureEscalation{OnToolFailureStreak: 1}})
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{Count: 1}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError})
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); !fired {
t.Fatal("expected first escalation")
}
controller.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{Count: 5}, ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, Risk: sandbox.Risk{Level: sandbox.RiskCritical}})
controller.observeUncertain()
if _, fired := controller.maybeEscalate(); fired {
t.Fatal("escalation must be one-shot per run")
}
}
// TestPostureEscalationOnUncertainCompletion proves the uncertain-path act
// point: the completion gate's continue branch escapes the end-of-turn tail,
// so escalation must apply before the continue. A cue turn under the gate
// counts as uncertain, escalates, and the very next request carries the target
// effort.
func TestPostureEscalationOnUncertainCompletion(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "Let me read the file:"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "Done. All set."},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("posture-session", "run-2", "fast")
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
MaxTurns: 10,
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
Trace: recorder,
Profile: &ProfilePolicy{
Name: "fast",
Escalate: &PostureEscalation{
ReasoningEffort: "high",
OnCompletionUncertain: 1,
},
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "Done. All set." {
t.Fatalf("expected the completed answer, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 requests, got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
if provider.requests[1].ReasoningEffort != "high" {
t.Fatalf("expected the post-escalation request to carry the target effort, got %q", provider.requests[1].ReasoningEffort)
}
tr := recorder.Finish()
if got := tr.Counter(trace.CounterPostureEscalations); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("posture_escalations = %d, want 1", got)
}
}
// A profile that filled the run's effort displaced the provider default ("");
// RestoreDefaultEffort lets escalation restore that default, which a plain ""
// ReasoningEffort target cannot express (it means "leave untouched").
func TestPostureEscalationRestoresDefaultEffort(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "Let me read the file:"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "Done. All set."},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
MaxTurns: 10,
ReasoningEffort: "low",
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
Profile: &ProfilePolicy{
Name: "fast",
Escalate: &PostureEscalation{
RestoreDefaultEffort: true,
OnCompletionUncertain: 1,
},
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "Done. All set." {
t.Fatalf("expected the completed answer, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 requests, got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
if provider.requests[0].ReasoningEffort != "low" {
t.Fatalf("pre-escalation request effort = %q, want the profile's low", provider.requests[0].ReasoningEffort)
}
if provider.requests[1].ReasoningEffort != "" {
t.Fatalf("post-escalation request effort = %q, want the restored provider default (empty)", provider.requests[1].ReasoningEffort)
}
}
// failingProfileTool always errors with the same signature so the repeated-
// failure guard builds a streak.
type failingProfileTool struct{}
func (failingProfileTool) Name() string { return "flaky_probe" }
func (failingProfileTool) Description() string { return "always fails identically (test)" }
func (failingProfileTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
}
func (failingProfileTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (failingProfileTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "probe exploded: same signature"}
}
// TestPostureEscalationRaisesTurnCeilingMidRun proves the end-to-end act path:
// a Fast-style run with a 2-turn ceiling hits a failure streak, escalates, and
// finishes on a turn the original ceiling would have cut off, with the effort
// target applied to the post-escalation request and the counter emitted.
func TestPostureEscalationRaisesTurnCeilingMidRun(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(failingProfileTool{})
toolTurn := []zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "flaky_probe"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
toolTurn,
toolTurn,
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "recovered after escalation"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("posture-session", "run-1", "fast")
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: 2,
Trace: recorder,
Profile: &ProfilePolicy{
Name: "fast",
Escalate: &PostureEscalation{
MaxTurns: 4,
ReasoningEffort: "high",
OnToolFailureStreak: 2,
},
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "recovered after escalation" {
t.Fatalf("expected the run to continue past the original 2-turn ceiling, got %q (turns=%d)", result.FinalAnswer, result.Turns)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected 3 requests (ceiling raised from 2 to 4), got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
if provider.requests[2].ReasoningEffort != "high" {
t.Fatalf("expected the post-escalation request to carry the target effort, got %q", provider.requests[2].ReasoningEffort)
}
tr := recorder.Finish()
if got := tr.Counter(trace.CounterPostureEscalations); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("posture_escalations = %d, want 1", got)
}
}
// TestPostureEscalationAbsentWithoutProfile pins the no-regression invariant at
// the loop level: the identical failing script without a profile ends at the
// original ceiling with the max-turns answer.
func TestPostureEscalationAbsentWithoutProfile(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(failingProfileTool{})
toolTurn := []zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "flaky_probe"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{toolTurn, toolTurn}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(provider.requests) > 3 {
t.Fatalf("unprofiled run must not extend the ceiling, got %d requests", len(provider.requests))
}
if !strings.Contains(result.FinalAnswer, "maximum number of turns") {
t.Fatalf("unprofiled run must end with the max-turns answer, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
}
// TestExecuteToolCallClassifiesRiskWithoutSandbox verifies the executed-risk
// stamp on the unsandboxed path: a read-only tool classifies low.
func TestExecuteToolCallClassifiesRiskWithoutSandbox(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(failingProfileTool{})
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "flaky_probe"},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{},
)
if abortErr != nil {
t.Fatal(abortErr)
}
if result.Risk.Level == "" {
t.Fatal("executed result must carry a risk classification")
}
if riskRank(result.Risk.Level) > riskRank(sandbox.RiskMedium) {
t.Fatalf("read-only tool classified %q, want at most medium", result.Risk.Level)
}
}
// TestUnknownToolResultCarriesZeroRisk verifies a call that never executed a
// tool (unknown name, nil tool) keeps the zero risk value instead of panicking
// or inventing a classification.
func TestUnknownToolResultCarriesZeroRisk(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "no_such_tool"},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{},
)
if abortErr != nil {
t.Fatal(abortErr)
}
if result.Status == tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatal("expected an error result for an unknown tool")
}
if result.Risk.Level != "" {
t.Fatalf("not-executed result must keep the zero risk value, got %q", result.Risk.Level)
}
}
+5 -5
View File
@@ -14,13 +14,13 @@ import (
// deliberately) or trimmed — the per-turn floor should not creep up silently.
//
// Measured baselines (2026-07): base system prompt ~3160 tokens; the tools a normal
// (auto permission-mode) interactive turn sends ~3230 tokens. The tool figure is
// the auto-mode advertised set, including exec_command: auto mode must expose both
// process creation and write_stdin process interaction or the latter is unusable
// without a session id. Higher-risk tools that do not opt into auto remain excluded.
// (auto permission-mode) interactive turn sends ~2430 tokens. The tool figure is
// the auto-mode advertised set, not the full core registry — higher-risk tools that
// only advertise in other modes are excluded, matching what a real turn actually
// pays.
const (
maxBaseSystemPromptTokens = 3500
maxEagerToolSchemaTokens = 3550
maxEagerToolSchemaTokens = 2700
)
func TestSystemPromptTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
-244
View File
@@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"sort"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// promptSubstrings are the cacheable components of the prompt a run sends to a
// model. systemPrompt is the exact joined system-message content. The remaining
// fields retain useful diagnostic boundaries within that prompt and tool list.
type promptSubstrings struct {
systemPrompt string
baseInstructions string
confirmationPolicy string
projectContext string
skills string
tools string
schema string
}
// buildPromptSubstrings builds the prompt and retains both its exact joined
// form and narrower diagnostic components. Callers that already built the
// prompt should use buildPromptSubstringsFromParts to avoid repeating workspace
// reads.
func buildPromptSubstrings(options Options, exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) promptSubstrings {
return buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(buildSystemPromptParts(options), exposed)
}
func buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(parts systemPromptParts, exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) promptSubstrings {
toolsSubstr, schemaSubstr := toolSubstrings(exposed)
return promptSubstrings{
systemPrompt: parts.prompt,
baseInstructions: parts.baseInstructions,
confirmationPolicy: parts.confirmationPolicy,
projectContext: parts.projectContext,
skills: parts.skills,
tools: toolsSubstr,
schema: schemaSubstr,
}
}
// toolSubstrings preserves the emitted tool order. Names and descriptions are
// fingerprinted separately from schemas so either kind of drift is identifiable.
// Order is part of request identity: silently sorting here would hide a provider-
// visible reordering and could report a false cache hit.
func toolSubstrings(exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) (toolsSubstr, schemaSubstr string) {
if len(exposed) == 0 {
return "", ""
}
var toolsSB, schemaSB strings.Builder
for _, def := range exposed {
writeLengthPrefixed(&toolsSB, def.Name)
writeLengthPrefixed(&toolsSB, def.Description)
// Parameters is rendered to a canonical JSON string per tool. The
// schema-render cache in internal/agent (used by partitionToolsCached)
// guarantees the same render is byte-identical across turns for the
// same tool, so this substring is a stable hash input.
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, def.Name)
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, canonicalSchemaString(def.Parameters))
}
return toolsSB.String(), schemaSB.String()
}
func writeLengthPrefixed(sb *strings.Builder, value string) {
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d:", len(value))
sb.WriteString(value)
}
// canonicalSchemaString renders a tool's parameter schema to a stable string.
// tools.ToolDef.Parameters is a map[string]any in the common case; Go's
// fmt.Sprintf("%v", m) iterates a map in random order, which would produce
// a different hash for the same Parameters value across calls and defeat
// the fingerprint. encoding/json marshals maps with keys sorted
// alphabetically, so json.Marshal is the primary stable render. The
// fallback for the rare non-JSON-compatible value (functions, channels,
// NaN/Inf floats, cyclic references) is a stable key-sorted stringifier
// that walks the value with sorted keys for maps and a leading
// "__non_json:" prefix so a future schema change is visible in the trace
// (a SchemaHash collision from the same value) rather than a silent hash
// drift.
//
// Note: SchemaHash is a stability signal, not a wire-identity signal. The
// bytes json.Marshal produces for a Go map[string]any may differ from
// the bytes the provider actually sends on the wire (provider encoders
// use their own JSON conventions; an Anthropic schema may serialize with
// different whitespace, key order, or number formatting). A consumer
// must NOT assume SchemaHash matches the provider's wire schema — only
// that two turns with the same Go-side Parameters produce the same
// SchemaHash. This is sufficient for the trace's purpose (drift
// detection) but not for a content-based equality check.
func canonicalSchemaString(params map[string]any) string {
if len(params) == 0 {
return ""
}
data, err := json.Marshal(params)
if err != nil {
return "__non_json:" + stableStringify(params)
}
return string(data)
}
// stableStringify renders v to a deterministic string. Maps have their keys
// sorted alphabetically; slices are walked in order; primitives use their
// natural Go format. The function is recursive but bounded by the size of
// the input, so a cyclic reference is not reachable here (the json.Marshal
// fallback is hit when json.Marshal itself returns an error, which for the
// common case is a non-JSON-compatible value, not a cycle — cycles are
// rare in tool schemas and acceptable to mis-render in the fallback path
// since the trace's contract is "the hash is stable for the same input,"
// not "the fallback is lossless"). Used only when json.Marshal fails.
func stableStringify(v any) string {
var sb strings.Builder
writeStable(&sb, v)
return sb.String()
}
func writeStable(sb *strings.Builder, v any) {
switch x := v.(type) {
case nil:
sb.WriteString("null")
case bool:
if x {
sb.WriteString("true")
} else {
sb.WriteString("false")
}
case string:
sb.WriteByte('"')
sb.WriteString(x)
sb.WriteByte('"')
case float64:
// Use %g for compact, deterministic float rendering. NaN and Inf are
// not JSON-encodable (which is why we are in the fallback path) and
// render as "NaN" / "+Inf" / "-Inf" — distinct, stable strings.
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%g", x)
case float32:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%g", float64(x))
case int:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d", x)
case int64:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d", x)
case int32:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d", x)
case uint:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d", x)
case uint64:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d", x)
case uint32:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d", x)
case map[string]any:
sb.WriteByte('{')
keys := make([]string, 0, len(x))
for k := range x {
keys = append(keys, k)
}
sort.Strings(keys)
for i, k := range keys {
if i > 0 {
sb.WriteByte(',')
}
sb.WriteByte('"')
sb.WriteString(k)
sb.WriteString(`":`)
writeStable(sb, x[k])
}
sb.WriteByte('}')
case []any:
sb.WriteByte('[')
for i, item := range x {
if i > 0 {
sb.WriteByte(',')
}
writeStable(sb, item)
}
sb.WriteByte(']')
default:
// Last-resort: include the type so distinct values produce distinct
// strings even if their default format collides. Without the type
// tag, fmt.Sprintf("%v", x) for two different types could produce
// the same bytes (rare, but the type prefix makes it impossible).
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "<%T:%v>", x, x)
}
}
// ComputePrefixFingerprint builds and fingerprints a prompt for callers that do
// not already have one. The agent loop uses computePrefixFingerprint with the
// prompt parts it built once at run start, ensuring tracing observes the exact
// request content without repeating workspace I/O.
func ComputePrefixFingerprint(options Options, exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) prefixFingerprint {
return computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstrings(options, exposed))
}
func computePrefixFingerprint(subs promptSubstrings) prefixFingerprint {
systemPrompt := sha256hex(subs.systemPrompt)
base := sha256hex(subs.baseInstructions)
policy := sha256hex(subs.confirmationPolicy)
project := sha256hex(subs.projectContext)
skills := sha256hex(subs.skills)
toolsH := sha256hex(subs.tools)
schema := sha256hex(subs.schema)
complete := sha256hex(strings.Join([]string{
systemPrompt, toolsH, schema,
}, "|"))
return prefixFingerprint{
SystemPromptHash: systemPrompt,
BaseInstructionsHash: base,
ConfirmationPolicyHash: policy,
ProjectContextHash: project,
SkillsHash: skills,
ToolsHash: toolsH,
SchemaHash: schema,
CompletePrefixHash: complete,
}
}
// prefixFingerprint is the agent-side shape of a prompt-prefix fingerprint. It
// is converted to a trace.PrefixHash at the loop boundary (see EmitPrefixHash
// in loop.go) so the trace package does not need to import this one. The field
// names match the trace.PrefixHash JSON tags 1:1.
type prefixFingerprint struct {
SystemPromptHash string
BaseInstructionsHash string
ConfirmationPolicyHash string
ProjectContextHash string
SkillsHash string
ToolsHash string
SchemaHash string
CompletePrefixHash string
}
// sha256hex returns the hex-encoded SHA-256 of s. Empty input produces the
// hash of the empty string, which is a constant; callers that want to
// distinguish "absent" from "empty" should check s before calling.
func sha256hex(s string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(s))
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
-249
View File
@@ -1,249 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// TestComputePrefixFingerprintStableAcrossCalls asserts the headline property
// the trace is meant to expose: two ComputePrefixFingerprint calls over the
// same Options and the same exposed tool list produce byte-identical hashes.
// This is the regression catch for "did anyone introduce non-determinism into
// the prompt prefix."
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintStableAcrossCalls(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
exposed := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object"}},
{Name: "grep", Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object"}},
}
first := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, exposed)
second := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, exposed)
if first != second {
t.Fatalf("fingerprint must be stable across calls with the same input:\n first=%+v\n second=%+v", first, second)
}
if first.CompletePrefixHash == "" {
t.Fatalf("CompletePrefixHash must be non-empty for a non-trivial prompt")
}
}
// Tool order and descriptions are provider-visible and therefore part of the
// cacheable prefix identity.
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintToolsHashMatchesEmittedOrderAndDescriptions(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
a := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
{Name: "read_file", Description: "read", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-read"}},
{Name: "grep", Description: "search", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-grep"}},
}
b := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
{Name: "grep", Description: "search", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-grep"}},
{Name: "read_file", Description: "read", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-read"}},
}
fpA := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, a)
fpB := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, b)
if fpA.ToolsHash == fpB.ToolsHash {
t.Fatalf("ToolsHash must change when emitted order changes: a=%s b=%s", fpA.ToolsHash, fpB.ToolsHash)
}
c := append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition(nil), a...)
c[0].Description = "read a file"
fpC := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, c)
if fpA.ToolsHash == fpC.ToolsHash {
t.Fatalf("ToolsHash must change when a description changes: a=%s c=%s", fpA.ToolsHash, fpC.ToolsHash)
}
}
// TestComputePrefixFingerprintSchemaChangeChangesSchemaHash asserts that a
// change to a tool's Parameters schema is visible in the SchemaHash. A schema
// edit that should be cache-stable (e.g. field reorder, doc tweak) will move
// the hash and surface in the trace; a schema edit that legitimately
// invalidates the cache also moves the hash, which is the right behavior.
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintSchemaChangeChangesSchemaHash(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
a := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"version": "v1"}},
}
b := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"version": "v2"}},
}
fpA := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, a)
fpB := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, b)
if fpA.SchemaHash == fpB.SchemaHash {
t.Fatalf("SchemaHash must change when tool Parameters change: a=%s b=%s", fpA.SchemaHash, fpB.SchemaHash)
}
}
// TestComputePrefixFingerprintSystemPromptChangeChangesBaseHash asserts the
// most common drift path: a system-prompt edit (e.g. an agent.md update, a
// model addendum change) must move the base-instructions hash, which moves
// the complete-prefix hash, which is what the trace is for.
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintSystemPromptChangeChangesBaseHash(t *testing.T) {
optsA := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core v1"}
optsB := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core v2"}
exposed := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "noop", Parameters: map[string]any{}}}
fpA := ComputePrefixFingerprint(optsA, exposed)
fpB := ComputePrefixFingerprint(optsB, exposed)
if fpA.BaseInstructionsHash == fpB.BaseInstructionsHash {
t.Fatalf("BaseInstructionsHash must change when SystemPrompt changes: a=%s b=%s", fpA.BaseInstructionsHash, fpB.BaseInstructionsHash)
}
if fpA.CompletePrefixHash == fpB.CompletePrefixHash {
t.Fatalf("CompletePrefixHash must change when any sub-hash changes: a=%s b=%s", fpA.CompletePrefixHash, fpB.CompletePrefixHash)
}
}
// CompletePrefixHash represents the exact joined system prompt and the ordered
// tool definitions. Narrower system-section hashes remain diagnostic only.
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintCompleteIsAggregateOfSubHashes(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
exposed := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"k": "v"}}}
fp := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, exposed)
// Manually compute what the canonical join should be.
expected := sha256hex(strings.Join([]string{
fp.SystemPromptHash,
fp.ToolsHash,
fp.SchemaHash,
}, "|"))
if fp.CompletePrefixHash != expected {
t.Fatalf("CompletePrefixHash must equal sha256hex of the exact system, tools, and schema hashes:\n got: %s\n expected: %s", fp.CompletePrefixHash, expected)
}
}
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintCoversEverySystemPromptSection(t *testing.T) {
base := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core", Model: "gpt-5"}
changed := base
changed.ResponseStyle = "concise"
fpBase := ComputePrefixFingerprint(base, nil)
fpChanged := ComputePrefixFingerprint(changed, nil)
if fpBase.SystemPromptHash == fpChanged.SystemPromptHash {
t.Fatal("SystemPromptHash must change when any rendered system section changes")
}
if fpBase.CompletePrefixHash == fpChanged.CompletePrefixHash {
t.Fatal("CompletePrefixHash must include the exact full system prompt")
}
}
// TestBuildPromptSubstringsDefaultOptions asserts the invariants of the
// substrings helper for default Options: which substrings are non-empty,
// which are empty, and that the substring-to-hash round-trip is lossless.
func TestBuildPromptSubstringsDefaultOptions(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{
Cwd: t.TempDir(),
SystemPrompt: "test core",
}
subs := buildPromptSubstrings(opts, nil)
// Invariants the trace depends on (default Options):
// 1. baseInstructions substring equals the core system prompt bytes.
// 2. confirmationPolicy substring is non-empty (the embedded policy
// is always present, post TrimSpace).
// 3. skills, tools, and schema substrings are empty (no skills or
// tools configured for default Options).
if subs.baseInstructions != "test core" {
t.Fatalf("baseInstructions substring must equal the core system prompt: got %q want %q", subs.baseInstructions, "test core")
}
if subs.systemPrompt != buildSystemPrompt(opts) {
t.Fatal("systemPrompt substring must equal the exact joined system prompt")
}
if subs.confirmationPolicy == "" {
t.Fatalf("confirmationPolicy substring must be non-empty (the embedded policy is always present)")
}
if subs.skills != "" {
t.Fatalf("skills substring must be empty for default Options: got %q", subs.skills)
}
// Round-trip: the corresponding fingerprint hashes must equal
// sha256hex of the substrings, with no truncation or reformatting
// between the two layers.
fp := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, nil)
if fp.SystemPromptHash != sha256hex(subs.systemPrompt) {
t.Fatalf("SystemPromptHash in fingerprint must equal sha256hex of the joined prompt")
}
if fp.BaseInstructionsHash != sha256hex(subs.baseInstructions) {
t.Fatalf("BaseInstructionsHash in fingerprint must equal sha256hex of the substring")
}
if fp.ConfirmationPolicyHash != sha256hex(subs.confirmationPolicy) {
t.Fatalf("ConfirmationPolicyHash in fingerprint must equal sha256hex of the substring")
}
}
// TestCanonicalSchemaStringStableForMapParameters asserts the headline
// property the trace needs: the same map[string]any produces the same
// canonical string across calls, even though Go's fmt.Sprintf("%v", m)
// iterates a map in random order. json.Marshal sorts map keys
// alphabetically, which is the fix.
func TestCanonicalSchemaStringStableForMapParameters(t *testing.T) {
params := map[string]any{
"description": "read a file",
"properties": map[string]any{
"path": map[string]any{"type": "string"},
},
"required": []any{"path"},
"type": "object",
}
first := canonicalSchemaString(params)
second := canonicalSchemaString(params)
if first != second {
t.Fatalf("canonicalSchemaString must be stable across calls for the same Parameters:\n first=%s\n second=%s", first, second)
}
if first == "" {
t.Fatal("canonicalSchemaString must produce a non-empty string for a non-empty map")
}
// Two maps with the same key/value pairs (different declaration
// order in source) must produce identical canonical strings. This
// is the property that defeats Go's map iteration randomization.
reordered := map[string]any{
"type": "object",
"required": []any{"path"},
"properties": map[string]any{
"path": map[string]any{"type": "string"},
},
"description": "read a file",
}
if canonicalSchemaString(params) != canonicalSchemaString(reordered) {
t.Fatal("canonicalSchemaString must produce identical output for maps with the same key/value pairs in different declaration orders")
}
}
// TestCanonicalSchemaStringFallbackStableForNonJSONValue exercises the
// non-JSON fallback in canonicalSchemaString: when Parameters contains a
// value json.Marshal cannot encode (here, a channel), the function must
// fall back to a key-sorted stringification that is stable across calls
// and across map-iteration order. The previous fallback used
// fmt.Sprintf("%v", params), which iterates the map in random order and
// produced a different hash for the same value across calls — defeating
// the fingerprint. The current fallback is stable by construction.
func TestCanonicalSchemaStringFallbackStableForNonJSONValue(t *testing.T) {
ch := make(chan int) // channels are not JSON-encodable
params := map[string]any{
"description": "a tool with a non-JSON value",
"channel": ch,
"z_first": 1,
"a_second": 2,
}
first := canonicalSchemaString(params)
second := canonicalSchemaString(params)
if first == "" {
t.Fatal("canonicalSchemaString must produce a non-empty string for the fallback path")
}
if first != second {
t.Fatalf("canonicalSchemaString fallback must be stable across calls:\n first=%s\n second=%s", first, second)
}
// A re-ordered map (same key/value pairs, different declaration order)
// must produce the same fallback string. This is the property the
// key-sorted stringifier provides that fmt.Sprintf("%v", m) does not.
reordered := map[string]any{
"a_second": 2,
"z_first": 1,
"channel": ch,
"description": "a tool with a non-JSON value",
}
if canonicalSchemaString(params) != canonicalSchemaString(reordered) {
t.Fatalf("canonicalSchemaString fallback must produce identical output for maps with the same key/value pairs in different declaration orders:\n first=%s\n second=%s", first, canonicalSchemaString(reordered))
}
// The fallback must include the "__non_json:" prefix so a consumer
// can tell the bytes are not a JSON-marshaled schema (a hash collision
// between a json.Marshal result and a stableStringify result is
// possible in theory; the prefix makes the source observable).
if !strings.HasPrefix(first, "__non_json:") {
t.Fatalf("canonicalSchemaString fallback must start with the __non_json: prefix, got: %s", first)
}
}
-64
View File
@@ -121,67 +121,3 @@ func toolNameForResult(messages []zeroruntime.Message, index int) string {
func isPrunedPlaceholder(content string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(content), "[pruned ")
}
var supersedableReadTools = map[string]bool{
"read_file": true,
"read_minified_file": true,
"grep": true,
"glob": true,
"list_directory": true,
}
// pruneSupersededReadResults removes only older byte-identical results of the
// same read call. It runs when context pressure already requires a rewrite, so
// it does not trade a warm provider-cache prefix for a small apparent saving.
func pruneSupersededReadResults(messages []zeroruntime.Message) ([]zeroruntime.Message, int) {
type seenResultKey struct {
call string
content string
}
seen := map[seenResultKey]struct{}{}
out := messages
reclaimed := 0
copied := false
for index := len(messages) - 1; index >= 0; index-- {
message := messages[index]
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || isPrunedPlaceholder(message.Content) {
continue
}
call, ok := toolCallForResult(messages, index)
if !ok || !supersedableReadTools[call.Name] {
continue
}
key := seenResultKey{
call: call.Name + "\x00" + strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments),
content: message.Content,
}
if _, exists := seen[key]; exists {
placeholder := fmt.Sprintf("[superseded identical %s result — the newer result remains in context]", call.Name)
if !copied {
out = append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), messages...)
copied = true
}
out[index].Content = placeholder
reclaimed += max(0, ApproxTextTokens(message.Content)-ApproxTextTokens(placeholder))
continue
}
seen[key] = struct{}{}
}
return out, reclaimed
}
func toolCallForResult(messages []zeroruntime.Message, resultIndex int) (zeroruntime.ToolCall, bool) {
id := messages[resultIndex].ToolCallID
if id == "" {
return zeroruntime.ToolCall{}, false
}
for index := resultIndex - 1; index >= 0; index-- {
for _, call := range messages[index].ToolCalls {
if call.ID == id {
return call, true
}
}
}
return zeroruntime.ToolCall{}, false
}
-73
View File
@@ -25,13 +25,6 @@ func toolCallMsg(id, name string) zeroruntime.Message {
}
}
func toolCallWithArgs(id, name, args string) zeroruntime.Message {
return zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant,
ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: id, Name: name, Arguments: args}},
}
}
func TestPruneSkipsSmallSessions(t *testing.T) {
// Total reclaimable is under the gate → no pruning.
msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{
@@ -127,69 +120,3 @@ func TestPruneDoesNotMutateInput(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("pruneStaleToolOutput must not mutate the caller's slice")
}
}
func TestPruneSupersededReadResultsOnlyDropsIdenticalOlderReads(t *testing.T) {
body := strings.Repeat("same source line\n", 1000)
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
toolCallWithArgs("old", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "old", Content: body},
toolCallWithArgs("different", "read_file", `{"path":"b.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "different", Content: body},
toolCallWithArgs("new", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "new", Content: body},
}
out, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
if reclaimed <= 0 || !strings.Contains(out[1].Content, "superseded identical") {
t.Fatalf("older duplicate was not pruned: reclaimed=%d output=%q", reclaimed, out[1].Content)
}
if out[3].Content != body || out[5].Content != body {
t.Fatal("different call and newest result must remain exact")
}
if messages[1].Content != body {
t.Fatal("input slice was mutated")
}
}
func TestPruneSupersededReadResultsKeepsChangedAndMutatingResults(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
toolCallWithArgs("r1", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "r1", Content: "version one"},
toolCallWithArgs("r2", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "r2", Content: "version two"},
toolCallWithArgs("e1", "edit_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e1", Content: "edited"},
toolCallWithArgs("e2", "edit_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e2", Content: "edited"},
}
out, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
if reclaimed != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unsafe results were pruned: %d", reclaimed)
}
for index := range messages {
if out[index].Content != messages[index].Content {
t.Fatalf("message %d changed unexpectedly", index)
}
}
}
func TestPruneSupersededReadResultsFindsMatchingBodyAcrossChangedRead(t *testing.T) {
bodyA := strings.Repeat("version a\n", 100)
bodyB := strings.Repeat("version b\n", 100)
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
toolCallWithArgs("old-a", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "old-a", Content: bodyA},
toolCallWithArgs("middle-b", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "middle-b", Content: bodyB},
toolCallWithArgs("new-a", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "new-a", Content: bodyA},
}
out, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
if reclaimed <= 0 || !strings.Contains(out[1].Content, "superseded identical") {
t.Fatalf("older matching body was not pruned across a changed result: reclaimed=%d output=%q", reclaimed, out[1].Content)
}
if out[3].Content != bodyB || out[5].Content != bodyA {
t.Fatal("changed middle result and newest matching result must remain exact")
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ func TestInlineAdditionalPermissionsRequiresPromptUnderAutoAllow(t *testing.T) {
},
}
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow, AutoAllowed: true}
if !shouldRequestPermission(tools.NewScopedBashTool(t.TempDir(), nil), args, false, decision) {
if !shouldRequestPermission(tools.NewBashTool(t.TempDir()), args, false, decision) {
t.Fatal("inline additional permissions must request approval even when a sandboxed shell would otherwise auto-allow")
}
}
@@ -26,16 +26,6 @@ func TestSpecialistDelegationContext(t *testing.T) {
if strings.Contains(got, "nameless") {
t.Fatalf("nameless entry should be skipped: %q", got)
}
for _, want := range []string{"reduce total context", "Do not delegate small direct work", "bounded assignment"} {
if !strings.Contains(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("missing evidence-driven delegation guidance %q: %q", want, got)
}
}
for _, unwanted := range []string{"delegate to it proactively", "launch several specialists in parallel"} {
if strings.Contains(got, unwanted) {
t.Fatalf("retained broad delegation guidance %q: %q", unwanted, got)
}
}
}
func TestSystemPromptIncludesDelegationOnlyWithSpecialists(t *testing.T) {
+19 -39
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/repomap"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/workspaceseed"
)
@@ -71,22 +70,6 @@ const (
// guidelines), and the safety confirmation policy. It is built once per run so
// every turn shares one (cacheable) system turn.
func buildSystemPrompt(options Options) string {
return buildSystemPromptParts(options).prompt
}
// systemPromptParts retains both the exact joined prompt and the diagnostic
// sections used by prompt-prefix tracing. Building these together prevents the
// tracing path from re-reading workspace state and guarantees that the hash is
// computed from the same prompt bytes placed in the request.
type systemPromptParts struct {
prompt string
baseInstructions string
confirmationPolicy string
projectContext string
skills string
}
func buildSystemPromptParts(options Options) systemPromptParts {
core := strings.TrimSpace(options.SystemPrompt)
if core == "" {
core = strings.TrimSpace(coreSystemPrompt)
@@ -114,31 +97,22 @@ func buildSystemPromptParts(options Options) systemPromptParts {
if user := userGuidelines(); user != "" {
sections = append(sections, user)
}
project := workspaceContext(options.Cwd)
if project != "" {
sections = append(sections, project)
if ws := workspaceContext(options.Cwd); ws != "" {
sections = append(sections, ws)
}
if delegation := specialistDelegationContext(options); delegation != "" {
sections = append(sections, delegation)
}
skillsBlock := skillsContext(options)
if skillsBlock != "" {
if skillsBlock := skillsContext(options); skillsBlock != "" {
sections = append(sections, skillsBlock)
}
if style := responseStyleContext(options); style != "" {
sections = append(sections, style)
}
policy := strings.TrimSpace(confirmationPolicy)
if policy != "" {
if policy := strings.TrimSpace(confirmationPolicy); policy != "" {
sections = append(sections, policy)
}
return systemPromptParts{
prompt: strings.Join(sections, "\n\n"),
baseInstructions: core,
confirmationPolicy: policy,
projectContext: project,
skills: skillsBlock,
}
return strings.Join(sections, "\n\n")
}
// responseStyleContext renders the operator-selected reply style (TUI /style) as
@@ -179,19 +153,21 @@ func approvedCommandPrefixContext(options Options) string {
return "## Approved Command Prefixes\n\nThe following command prefixes have already been approved and do not need another permission prompt:\n" + strings.Join(lines, "\n")
}
// specialistDelegationContext describes when a specialist earns its extra
// context and coordination cost. It renders only when specialists are known
// (which is only where the Task tool is actually registered), so a run with no
// delegatable specialists produces the previous prompt unchanged.
// specialistDelegationContext nudges the orchestrator to offload read-heavy or
// parallelizable work to a specialist sub-agent via the Task tool, keeping large
// tool outputs out of the main context. It renders only when specialists are
// known (which is only where the Task tool is actually registered), so a run with
// no delegatable specialists produces the previous prompt unchanged.
func specialistDelegationContext(options Options) string {
if len(options.Specialists) == 0 {
return ""
}
var b strings.Builder
b.WriteString("<specialists>\n")
b.WriteString("Use the Task tool when a specialist's focused context, expertise, or an independent parallel subtask is likely to improve quality or reduce total context. ")
b.WriteString("Do not delegate small direct work, duplicate exploration, or split sequential steps merely because a specialist is available. ")
b.WriteString("When delegating, give a bounded assignment and consume its concise evidence instead of importing a long transcript.\n")
b.WriteString("Delegate focused or read-heavy work to a specialist sub-agent with the Task tool instead of doing it inline. ")
b.WriteString("When a request matches a specialist's purpose, delegate to it proactively — you do not need the user to ask first. ")
b.WriteString("This keeps large tool outputs — searches, file dumps, multi-step exploration — out of your own context, so you stay fast and token-efficient. ")
b.WriteString("Prefer delegating codebase search and exploration; for independent subtasks, launch several specialists in parallel. Handle small, direct edits yourself.\n")
b.WriteString("Available specialists (call Task with the matching name when the task fits its purpose):\n")
for _, info := range options.Specialists {
name := strings.TrimSpace(info.Name)
@@ -309,7 +285,11 @@ func workspaceContext(cwd string) string {
b.WriteString("<environment>\n")
b.WriteString("Working directory: " + cwd + "\n")
b.WriteString("Operating system: " + runtime.GOOS + "\n")
b.WriteString(tools.HostShellEnvironmentGuidance() + "\n")
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
b.WriteString("Shell syntax: Windows cmd.exe syntax for exec_command/bash tools. To put | & > < etc inside an arg value, use double quotes around the value, not single quotes (single quotes do not protect metachars in cmd.exe): gh --jq \".a | b\", go test -run \"A|B\". Do not pipe to or invoke POSIX coreutils from Git for Windows (usr\\bin head/grep/tail/cat/...): they are MSYS binaries and fail under the write-restricted sandbox; use native Zero tools (grep, read_file, list_directory, glob) or cmd.exe findstr/more instead, or sandbox_permissions require_escalated only when host-level execution is truly required. Prefer the workdir/cwd argument over cd when changing directories.\n")
} else {
b.WriteString("Shell syntax: /bin/sh syntax for exec_command/bash tools; prefer the workdir/cwd argument instead of cd when changing directories.\n")
}
if branch := gitBranchForPrompt(cwd); branch != "" {
b.WriteString("Git branch: " + branch + "\n")
}
+14 -19
View File
@@ -30,13 +30,16 @@ work.
read-before-edit discipline: inspect the target file and nearby callers,
tests, or config before you modify behavior. Never edit a file you have not
read.
2. **Plan.** Use update_plan for implementation or investigation that has at
least three meaningful dependent steps, then keep it current at milestones.
Mark completed work and the next in-progress step together when practical;
do not spend separate turns updating it after every file or command. Keep at
most one item in_progress. Skip plans for simple lookups, explanations, code
navigation, and other short tasks. Never create a plan after the work is
already complete merely to describe what you did.
2. **Plan.** For multi-step work, call update_plan with an ordered checklist and
keep it live. The plan bar is the user's progress signal — call update_plan
after EACH concrete unit of work (every file written, every command run), not
just at coarse milestones: mark the finished item completed and the next one
in_progress before you start it. A plan stuck at 0/N while files are landing is
a bug, not economy — these calls are cheap, expected, and the update_plan cards
are hidden from the transcript, so frequent updates cost the user nothing and
never clutter the conversation. Keep at most one item in_progress, and never
batch the updates to the end of the turn. Skip the plan for trivial one-step
tasks.
3. **Implement.** Make focused changes that match the surrounding code's style,
naming, and conventions. Prefer the smallest change that fully solves the
problem. Avoid broad refactors, unrelated rewrites, dependency churn, and
@@ -51,16 +54,11 @@ work.
## Editing discipline
- Choose the narrowest tool that safely accomplishes the step. Prefer native
file tools - read_file, read_minified_file, list_directory, glob, grep,
write_file, edit_file, apply_patch - over shelling out to
cat/sed/awk/python for file operations.
file tools - read_file, list_directory, glob, grep, write_file, edit_file,
apply_patch - over shelling out to cat/sed/awk/python for file operations.
They are safer, reviewable, and produce clean diffs.
- Prefer read_minified_file when initially exploring source code; it preserves
code while removing comments and redundant whitespace. Use read_file when
exact text, comments, or line numbers are needed.
- Keep edits focused and reviewable. A single patch may update several related
files when they form one coherent change; do not hide unrelated edits in a
bulk shell or script rewrite.
- Make one tool call per file. Do not batch multi-file writes into a single
shell or script invocation.
- For edits to existing files, prefer edit_file or apply_patch with minimal,
targeted diffs. Match the existing indentation, imports, and idioms. Match the
file's comment density: do not add explanatory comments unless the user asks or
@@ -102,9 +100,6 @@ work.
- Use exec_command with `tty: true` for interactive terminal-style commands that
need stdin beyond Ctrl-C. `/ps` and `/stop` are user-facing TUI commands; when
you need to clean up a running foreground command yourself, use write_stdin.
- write_stdin's session_id is only ever an id returned by a still-running
exec_command; never guess or probe ids. If you have no such session, start one
with exec_command, or use write_file/edit_file/apply_patch for file changes.
- write_stdin with empty input polls an existing exec_command session, and
`\u0003` interrupts it. Sending other stdin bytes may require approval because
it can drive the running process beyond the original command. Non-tty sessions
+1 -2
View File
@@ -71,6 +71,5 @@ const geminiPromptAddendum = `<model_guidance>
equivalent shell commands; they are safer and produce cleaner diffs.
- Be concise and concrete. When you run a shell command with side effects, state
in one short clause why it is needed.
- Use update_plan only for work with at least three meaningful dependent steps;
skip it for simple lookups and never create one after the work is complete.
- Use update_plan for any multi-step task and keep it current.
</model_guidance>`
-359
View File
@@ -1,359 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"reflect"
"sort"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type taskStatus string
const (
taskStatusActive taskStatus = "active"
taskStatusComplete taskStatus = "complete"
taskStatusIncomplete taskStatus = "incomplete"
)
type taskPlanParity string
const (
taskPlanParityUnknown taskPlanParity = "unknown"
taskPlanParityMatch taskPlanParity = "match"
taskPlanParityMismatch taskPlanParity = "mismatch"
)
type taskPlanItem struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Notes string `json:"notes,omitempty"`
}
type taskPlanState struct {
Items []taskPlanItem `json:"items,omitempty"`
Pending int `json:"pending"`
InProgress int `json:"in_progress"`
Completed int `json:"completed"`
Failed int `json:"failed"`
}
type taskToolState struct {
Succeeded int `json:"succeeded"`
Failed int `json:"failed"`
}
type taskVerificationState struct {
Passed int `json:"passed"`
Failed int `json:"failed"`
LastOutcome Outcome `json:"last_outcome,omitempty"`
}
type taskStateSnapshot struct {
Revision int `json:"revision"`
Objective string `json:"objective"`
Status taskStatus `json:"status"`
Plan taskPlanState `json:"plan"`
Tools taskToolState `json:"tools"`
Verification taskVerificationState `json:"verification"`
ChangedFiles []string `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
CompletionDecision CompletionDecision `json:"completion_decision,omitempty"`
CompletionReason string `json:"completion_reason,omitempty"`
PlanParity taskPlanParity `json:"plan_parity"`
}
type taskStateEventKind int
const (
taskStateEventPlan taskStateEventKind = iota + 1
taskStateEventToolResult
taskStateEventVerification
taskStateEventCompletion
)
type taskStateEvent struct {
kind taskStateEventKind
arguments string
toolResult ToolResult
verification Outcome
completion completionEvaluation
}
// taskState is a deterministic projection of facts the loop already observes.
// It does not initiate work or replace the transcript; consumers must check
// transcript parity before using its compact representation.
type taskState struct {
snapshotValue taskStateSnapshot
changedFiles map[string]struct{}
recorder *trace.Recorder
planObserved bool
}
func newTaskState(objective string, recorder *trace.Recorder) *taskState {
state := &taskState{
snapshotValue: taskStateSnapshot{
Objective: strings.TrimSpace(objective),
Status: taskStatusActive,
PlanParity: taskPlanParityUnknown,
},
changedFiles: map[string]struct{}{},
}
state.recorder = recorder
return state
}
func (state *taskState) observe(event taskStateEvent) bool {
if state == nil {
return false
}
changed := false
switch event.kind {
case taskStateEventPlan:
plan, ok := parseTaskPlan(event.arguments)
if !ok {
return false
}
state.snapshotValue.Plan = summarizeTaskPlan(plan)
state.planObserved = true
state.markActive()
changed = true
case taskStateEventToolResult:
state.markActive()
if event.toolResult.Status == tools.StatusOK {
state.snapshotValue.Tools.Succeeded++
} else {
state.snapshotValue.Tools.Failed++
}
for _, path := range event.toolResult.ChangedFiles {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path != "" {
state.changedFiles[path] = struct{}{}
}
}
state.snapshotValue.ChangedFiles = sortedKeys(state.changedFiles)
changed = true
case taskStateEventVerification:
if event.verification == OutcomeDisabled {
return false
}
state.markActive()
state.snapshotValue.Verification.LastOutcome = event.verification
switch event.verification {
case OutcomePassed:
state.snapshotValue.Verification.Passed++
case OutcomeCorrecting, OutcomeReported, OutcomeAborted:
state.snapshotValue.Verification.Failed++
}
changed = true
case taskStateEventCompletion:
state.snapshotValue.CompletionDecision = event.completion.Decision
state.snapshotValue.CompletionReason = event.completion.Reason
switch event.completion.Decision {
case CompletionComplete:
state.snapshotValue.Status = taskStatusComplete
case CompletionIncomplete:
state.snapshotValue.Status = taskStatusIncomplete
default:
state.snapshotValue.Status = taskStatusActive
}
changed = true
}
if changed {
state.snapshotValue.Revision++
if event.kind != taskStateEventToolResult {
state.emit()
}
}
return changed
}
func (state *taskState) markActive() {
state.snapshotValue.Status = taskStatusActive
state.snapshotValue.CompletionDecision = ""
state.snapshotValue.CompletionReason = ""
}
func (state *taskState) snapshot() taskStateSnapshot {
if state == nil {
return taskStateSnapshot{}
}
snapshot := state.snapshotValue
snapshot.Plan.Items = append([]taskPlanItem(nil), state.snapshotValue.Plan.Items...)
snapshot.ChangedFiles = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.ChangedFiles...)
return snapshot
}
// observePlanParity compares only the latest plan projection with the plan tool
// calls still present in messages. It mutates the snapshot and emits when the
// parity value changes; objective, tool, and verification fields are not part of
// this comparison.
func (state *taskState) observePlanParity(messages []zeroruntime.Message) taskPlanParity {
if state == nil {
return taskPlanParityUnknown
}
transcriptPlan, found, valid := latestTaskPlan(messages)
tracked := state.snapshotValue.Plan.Items
parity := taskPlanParityMatch
if !valid || found != state.planObserved || (found && !reflect.DeepEqual(transcriptPlan, tracked)) {
parity = taskPlanParityMismatch
}
if state.snapshotValue.PlanParity != parity {
state.snapshotValue.PlanParity = parity
state.snapshotValue.Revision++
state.emit()
}
return parity
}
type completionContext struct {
Objective string
PlanPending bool
PlanMatchesTranscript bool
}
func (state *taskState) completionContext(messages []zeroruntime.Message, transcriptPlanPending bool) completionContext {
context := completionContext{PlanPending: transcriptPlanPending}
if state == nil {
return context
}
context.Objective = state.snapshotValue.Objective
context.PlanMatchesTranscript = state.observePlanParity(messages) == taskPlanParityMatch
if context.PlanMatchesTranscript {
context.PlanPending = state.snapshotValue.Plan.Pending+state.snapshotValue.Plan.InProgress > 0
}
return context
}
func (state *taskState) snapshotForCompaction(messages []zeroruntime.Message) *taskStateSnapshot {
if state == nil {
return nil
}
state.observePlanParity(messages)
snapshot := state.snapshot()
return &snapshot
}
func (state *taskState) emit() {
if state == nil || state.recorder == nil {
return
}
snapshot := state.snapshotValue
state.recorder.EmitTaskState(trace.TaskStateEvent{
Revision: snapshot.Revision,
Status: string(snapshot.Status),
PlanPending: snapshot.Plan.Pending,
PlanInProgress: snapshot.Plan.InProgress,
PlanCompleted: snapshot.Plan.Completed,
PlanFailed: snapshot.Plan.Failed,
ToolsSucceeded: snapshot.Tools.Succeeded,
ToolsFailed: snapshot.Tools.Failed,
VerificationPassed: snapshot.Verification.Passed,
VerificationFailed: snapshot.Verification.Failed,
VerificationOutcome: string(snapshot.Verification.LastOutcome),
ChangedFileCount: len(snapshot.ChangedFiles),
CompletionDecision: string(snapshot.CompletionDecision),
PlanParity: string(snapshot.PlanParity),
})
}
func parseTaskPlan(arguments string) ([]taskPlanItem, bool) {
var object map[string]json.RawMessage
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments)), &object) != nil {
return nil, false
}
rawPlan, ok := object["plan"]
if !ok || string(rawPlan) == "null" {
return nil, false
}
var parsed []struct {
ID *string `json:"id"`
Content string `json:"content"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Notes string `json:"notes"`
}
if json.Unmarshal(rawPlan, &parsed) != nil {
return nil, false
}
plan := make([]taskPlanItem, 0, len(parsed))
for _, raw := range parsed {
if raw.Content == "" {
return nil, false
}
plan = append(plan, taskPlanItem{
Content: raw.Content,
Status: normalizeTaskPlanStatus(raw.Status),
Notes: raw.Notes,
})
}
lastInProgress := -1
for index := range plan {
if plan[index].Status == "in_progress" {
if lastInProgress >= 0 {
plan[lastInProgress].Status = "completed"
}
lastInProgress = index
}
}
if len(plan) == 0 {
return nil, true
}
return plan, true
}
func normalizeTaskPlanStatus(status string) string {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(status)) {
case "completed", "complete", "done", "finished", "resolved", "✓", "x", "[x]":
return "completed"
case "in_progress", "in-progress", "inprogress", "in progress", "active", "doing", "started", "current", "wip", "ongoing", "running":
return "in_progress"
case "failed", "fail", "error", "errored", "blocked", "cancelled", "canceled", "abandoned", "skipped":
return "failed"
default:
return "pending"
}
}
func summarizeTaskPlan(items []taskPlanItem) taskPlanState {
plan := taskPlanState{Items: append([]taskPlanItem(nil), items...)}
for _, item := range items {
switch item.Status {
case "completed":
plan.Completed++
case "in_progress":
plan.InProgress++
case "failed":
plan.Failed++
default:
plan.Pending++
}
}
return plan
}
func latestTaskPlan(messages []zeroruntime.Message) ([]taskPlanItem, bool, bool) {
for i := len(messages) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
for j := len(messages[i].ToolCalls) - 1; j >= 0; j-- {
call := messages[i].ToolCalls[j]
if call.Name != planToolName {
continue
}
plan, ok := parseTaskPlan(call.Arguments)
return plan, true, ok
}
}
return nil, false, true
}
func sortedKeys(values map[string]struct{}) []string {
keys := make([]string, 0, len(values))
for value := range values {
keys = append(keys, value)
}
// Paths are evidence, not chronology. Stable ordering makes replay snapshots
// deterministic even if events originate from parallel read batches later.
sort.Strings(keys)
return keys
}
-204
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@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"reflect"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestTaskStateReplayIsDeterministic(t *testing.T) {
events := []taskStateEvent{
{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"inspect","status":"done"},{"content":"implement","status":"in progress"},{"content":"verify"}]}`},
{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: ToolResult{Name: "apply_patch", Status: tools.StatusOK, ChangedFiles: []string{"a.go", "a.go", "b.go"}}},
{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: ToolResult{Name: "go test", Status: tools.StatusError}},
{kind: taskStateEventVerification, verification: OutcomePassed},
{kind: taskStateEventCompletion, completion: completionEvaluation{Decision: CompletionUncertain, Reason: "pending work"}},
}
first := newTaskState("ship the change", nil)
second := newTaskState("ship the change", nil)
for _, event := range events {
first.observe(event)
second.observe(event)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(first.snapshot(), second.snapshot()) {
t.Fatalf("replaying the same events produced different snapshots:\nfirst: %#v\nsecond: %#v", first.snapshot(), second.snapshot())
}
got := first.snapshot()
if got.Status != taskStatusActive || got.Plan.Pending != 1 || got.Plan.InProgress != 1 || got.Plan.Completed != 1 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected plan snapshot: %#v", got)
}
if got.Tools.Succeeded != 1 || got.Tools.Failed != 1 || len(got.ChangedFiles) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected evidence snapshot: %#v", got)
}
if got.Verification.Passed != 1 || got.Verification.Failed != 0 || got.Verification.LastOutcome != OutcomePassed {
t.Fatalf("unexpected verification snapshot: %#v", got.Verification)
}
}
func TestTaskStateCoalescesToolResultsIntoNextTraceEvent(t *testing.T) {
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("session", "run", "")
state := newTaskState("objective", recorder)
for range 20 {
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK}})
}
if events := recorder.Finish().TaskStates; len(events) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("tool results should be coalesced, got %d trace events", len(events))
}
recorder = trace.NewRecorder("session", "run-2", "")
state = newTaskState("objective", recorder)
for range 20 {
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK}})
}
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventCompletion, completion: completionEvaluation{Decision: CompletionComplete}})
events := recorder.Finish().TaskStates
if len(events) != 1 || events[0].ToolsSucceeded != 20 {
t.Fatalf("coalesced tool total missing from completion snapshot: %#v", events)
}
}
func TestRunEmitsTaskStateFromExistingLoopEvents(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "plan-1", ToolName: planToolName},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "plan-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"plan":[{"content":"implement","status":"completed"}]}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "plan-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("session", "run", "")
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "implement the change", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
Trace: recorder,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want done", result.FinalAnswer)
}
events := recorder.Finish().TaskStates
if len(events) < 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected plan, tool, completion, and parity snapshots, got %#v", events)
}
last := events[len(events)-1]
if last.Status != string(taskStatusComplete) || last.PlanCompleted != 1 || last.ToolsSucceeded != 1 || last.PlanParity != string(taskPlanParityMatch) {
t.Fatalf("unexpected final task snapshot: %#v", last)
}
}
func TestTaskStateSnapshotIsImmutable(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"one","status":"pending"}]}`})
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, ChangedFiles: []string{"one.go"}}})
snapshot := state.snapshot()
snapshot.Plan.Items[0].Content = "mutated"
snapshot.ChangedFiles[0] = "mutated.go"
fresh := state.snapshot()
if fresh.Plan.Items[0].Content != "one" || fresh.ChangedFiles[0] != "one.go" {
t.Fatalf("snapshot mutation leaked into task state: %#v", fresh)
}
}
func TestTaskStatePlanParityUsesLatestPlan(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"old","status":"completed"}]}`})
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"new","status":"in_progress"}]}`})
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{Name: planToolName, Arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"new","status":"in_progress"}]}`},
}}}
if parity := state.observePlanParity(messages); parity != taskPlanParityMatch {
t.Fatalf("parity = %q, want match", parity)
}
messages[0].ToolCalls[0].Arguments = `{"plan":[{"content":"different","status":"pending"}]}`
if parity := state.observePlanParity(messages); parity != taskPlanParityMismatch {
t.Fatalf("parity = %q, want mismatch", parity)
}
}
func TestTaskStateMatchesPlanToolNormalization(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
arguments := `{"plan":[{"content":"first","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"second","status":"in_progress"}]}`
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: arguments})
snapshot := state.snapshot()
if snapshot.Plan.Completed != 1 || snapshot.Plan.InProgress != 1 {
t.Fatalf("multiple active items were not normalized like the plan tool: %#v", snapshot.Plan)
}
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{Name: planToolName, Arguments: arguments}}}}
if parity := state.observePlanParity(messages); parity != taskPlanParityMatch {
t.Fatalf("normalized state should still match its transcript event, got %q", parity)
}
empty := newTaskState("objective", nil)
empty.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[]}`})
emptyMessages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{Name: planToolName, Arguments: `{"plan":[]}`}}}}
if parity := empty.observePlanParity(emptyMessages); parity != taskPlanParityMatch {
t.Fatalf("explicit empty plan should match transcript, got %q", parity)
}
}
func TestTaskStateContextFallsBackWhenTranscriptDiffers(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"tracked","status":"completed"}]}`})
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{Name: planToolName, Arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"transcript","status":"pending"}]}`},
}}}
context := state.completionContext(messages, true)
if !context.PlanPending || context.PlanMatchesTranscript {
t.Fatalf("completion context must retain transcript truth on mismatch: %#v", context)
}
if context.Objective != "objective" {
t.Fatalf("objective lost from completion context: %#v", context)
}
}
func TestTaskStateCompactionSnapshotRetainsObjectiveOnPlanMismatch(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"verify","status":"pending"}]}`})
matching := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{Name: planToolName, Arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"verify","status":"pending"}]}`},
}}}
if snapshot := state.snapshotForCompaction(matching); snapshot == nil || snapshot.Objective != "objective" {
t.Fatalf("matching transcript should produce compact state, got %#v", snapshot)
}
mismatching := append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), matching...)
mismatching[0].ToolCalls = []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{Name: planToolName, Arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"other","status":"pending"}]}`}}
if snapshot := state.snapshotForCompaction(mismatching); snapshot == nil || snapshot.Objective != "objective" || snapshot.PlanParity != taskPlanParityMismatch {
t.Fatalf("plan mismatch must retain immutable objective and mark mutable state uncorroborated, got %#v", snapshot)
}
}
func TestParseTaskPlanRejectsArgumentsTheToolWouldReject(t *testing.T) {
for _, arguments := range []string{
`{}`,
`{"plan":null}`,
`{"plan":[{"step":"alias is not accepted"}]}`,
`{"plan":[{"content":""}]}`,
`{"plan":[{"content":"valid"},{"content":""}]}`,
`{"plan":[{"id":4,"content":"valid"}]}`,
} {
if plan, ok := parseTaskPlan(arguments); ok {
t.Fatalf("parseTaskPlan(%s) = %#v, true; want rejected", arguments, plan)
}
}
}
-207
View File
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// imageTool returns a tool result carrying an image, the way a screenshot tool
// should be able to.
type imageTool struct {
media string
data []byte
}
func (imageTool) Name() string { return "capture" }
func (imageTool) Description() string { return "Captures an image." }
func (imageTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{}}
}
func (imageTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (t imageTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: "Captured a screenshot.",
Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: t.media, Data: t.data}},
}
}
// A tool that produces an image must get that image in front of the model.
//
// It cannot ride the tool-result message: every provider drops images there.
// Anthropic maps a tool result to a tool_result block with string content,
// Gemini to a functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image parts to the user
// role explicitly. So the image has to arrive as a following user message,
// which is also the only shape that keeps one tool result per tool call.
func TestRunDeliversToolResultImagesToTheModel(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(imageTool{media: "image/png", data: []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake")})
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call_1", ToolName: "capture"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call_1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call_1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "I can see it."},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "screenshot please", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
var carrier *zeroruntime.Message
for index := range result.Messages {
if len(result.Messages[index].Images) > 0 {
carrier = &result.Messages[index]
break
}
}
if carrier == nil {
t.Fatal("no message carried the tool's image; the model never saw it")
}
if carrier.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser {
t.Errorf("image rode a %q message; every provider only serializes images on the user role", carrier.Role)
}
if got := carrier.Images[0].MediaType; got != "image/png" {
t.Errorf("media type = %q, want image/png", got)
}
// The tool-result pairing must be untouched: one tool result per tool call.
toolResults := 0
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
toolResults++
}
}
if toolResults != 1 {
t.Errorf("got %d tool-result messages for 1 tool call", toolResults)
}
}
// textTool is a second, image-free tool so a turn can carry two calls.
type textTool struct{}
func (textTool) Name() string { return "note" }
func (textTool) Description() string { return "Notes something." }
func (textTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{}}
}
func (textTool) Safety() tools.Safety { return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow} }
func (textTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "noted"}
}
// Tool results for one assistant turn must stay contiguous. The image messages
// are user-role, and a user message between two tool_results breaks strict
// provider replay: Anthropic coalesces consecutive user content into one block
// list and requires tool_result blocks first, so interleaving produces
// [tool_result, text, image, tool_result] and the request is rejected.
//
// The first version of this feature appended each image immediately after its
// own tool result, which is exactly that shape. A single-tool-call test passed
// and said nothing about it.
func TestRunKeepsToolResultsContiguousWhenAToolReturnsAnImage(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(imageTool{media: "image/png", data: []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake")})
registry.Register(textTool{})
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "capture"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c2", ToolName: "note"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c2", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c2"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "two calls", provider, Options{Registry: registry, MaxTurns: 2})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
// Two separate ifs rather than a switch: a tool-role message that also
// carried images would match only the first arm of a switch, so a regression
// that put the image back on the tool result would read as "no image at all"
// instead of naming what actually happened.
type toolResult struct {
index int
id string
}
var toolResults []toolResult
imageIndex := -1
for index, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
toolResults = append(toolResults, toolResult{index: index, id: message.ToolCallID})
}
if len(message.Images) > 0 {
if imageIndex >= 0 {
t.Fatalf("image delivered twice, at %d and %d; recorded %s", imageIndex, index, messageShape(result.Messages))
}
imageIndex = index
}
}
if imageIndex < 0 {
t.Fatalf("the image never reached the model; recorded %s", messageShape(result.Messages))
}
if len(toolResults) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("got %d tool-result messages for 2 tool calls; recorded %s", len(toolResults), messageShape(result.Messages))
}
if toolResults[0].id != "c1" || toolResults[1].id != "c2" {
t.Errorf("tool results answered %q then %q, want c1 then c2", toolResults[0].id, toolResults[1].id)
}
// The contract Anthropic enforces: every tool_result block has to come before
// any other block in the user message it lands in. Anything wedged between
// the two results breaks that, which is the 400 this PR exists to avoid.
if toolResults[1].index != toolResults[0].index+1 {
t.Errorf("tool results at %d and %d are not adjacent; %q message at %d splits them; recorded %s",
toolResults[0].index, toolResults[1].index, result.Messages[toolResults[0].index+1].Role,
toolResults[0].index+1, messageShape(result.Messages))
}
// Follows the last tool result, deliberately NOT pinned to exactly last+1.
// appendUserBlocks coalesces consecutive user-role content, so
// [tool_result, tool_result, text, image] still maps to tool_result blocks
// first and replays fine; pinning would redden that valid shape for nothing.
if imageIndex <= toolResults[1].index {
t.Errorf("image message at %d does not follow the last tool result at %d; recorded %s",
imageIndex, toolResults[1].index, messageShape(result.Messages))
}
}
// messageShape renders the conversation as a compact role list so a failure says
// what the ordering actually was instead of dumping whole messages.
func messageShape(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
parts := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
for index, message := range messages {
part := fmt.Sprintf("%d:%s", index, message.Role)
if message.ToolCallID != "" {
part += "(" + message.ToolCallID + ")"
}
if len(message.Images) > 0 {
part += "+image"
}
parts = append(parts, part)
}
return "[" + strings.Join(parts, " ") + "]"
}
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// sessionProvider adapts a TurnSession back to the Provider interface so the
// loop's existing Provider-shaped call sites (streamWithReconnect, the
// compaction summarizer, finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns) route their stream I/O
// through the session without any signature change. For the default adapter
// this reduces to the wrapped provider's StreamCompletion, so behavior is
// byte-identical; an optimized session (PR8) takes effect here transparently.
type sessionProvider struct {
session zeroruntime.TurnSession
}
func (s sessionProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
return s.session.Stream(ctx, request)
}
-367
View File
@@ -1,367 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// fakeTurnSession wraps an inner provider for streaming while counting the
// session lifecycle, so tests can observe exactly how the loop drives it.
type fakeTurnSession struct {
inner Provider
prewarms int
streams int
closes int
closeErr error
}
func (s *fakeTurnSession) Prewarm(context.Context) error { s.prewarms++; return nil }
func (s *fakeTurnSession) Stream(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
s.streams++
return s.inner.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
}
func (s *fakeTurnSession) Compact(context.Context, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) ([]zeroruntime.Message, error) {
return nil, zeroruntime.ErrCompactionUnsupported
}
func (s *fakeTurnSession) Close() error { s.closes++; return s.closeErr }
// fakeTurnSessionProvider opens a scripted session (or fails to).
type fakeTurnSessionProvider struct {
session *fakeTurnSession
openErr error
opens int
}
func (p *fakeTurnSessionProvider) OpenTurnSession(context.Context) (zeroruntime.TurnSession, error) {
p.opens++
if p.openErr != nil {
return nil, p.openErr
}
return p.session, nil
}
func (p *fakeTurnSessionProvider) Capabilities() zeroruntime.ProviderCapabilities {
return zeroruntime.ProviderCapabilities{}
}
func singleAnswerTurns(answer string) [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent {
return [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: answer},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}
}
// TestRunOpenTurnSessionFailureSurfaces verifies a failed session open is a
// clean run-start error: no panic, no stream ever issued, nothing to close.
func TestRunOpenTurnSessionFailureSurfaces(t *testing.T) {
positional := &mockProvider{turns: singleAnswerTurns("never reached")}
tsp := &fakeTurnSessionProvider{openErr: errors.New("handshake refused")}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", positional, Options{
MaxTurns: 2,
TurnSessionProvider: tsp,
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error from a failed session open")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "open turn session") || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "handshake refused") {
t.Fatalf("expected a wrapped open-turn-session error, got %v", err)
}
if len(positional.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected no provider request after a failed open, got %d", len(positional.requests))
}
if tsp.opens != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected exactly one open attempt, got %d", tsp.opens)
}
}
// TestRunCloseFailureIsSafe verifies a Close error at teardown is swallowed:
// the run still returns its normal result.
func TestRunCloseFailureIsSafe(t *testing.T) {
inner := &mockProvider{turns: singleAnswerTurns("done")}
session := &fakeTurnSession{inner: inner, closeErr: errors.New("close blew up")}
tsp := &fakeTurnSessionProvider{session: session}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", inner, Options{
MaxTurns: 2,
TurnSessionProvider: tsp,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected Close failure to be swallowed, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("expected normal result despite Close error, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if session.closes != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected exactly one Close at teardown, got %d", session.closes)
}
}
// TestRunStreamsThroughTurnSession verifies that when a TurnSessionProvider is
// wired, every model request of the run flows through the session (and the
// session is prewarmed once and closed once).
func TestRunStreamsThroughTurnSession(t *testing.T) {
inner := &mockProvider{turns: singleAnswerTurns("via session")}
session := &fakeTurnSession{inner: inner}
tsp := &fakeTurnSessionProvider{session: session}
// The positional provider is a DIFFERENT mock: it must stay untouched,
// proving the session (not the positional provider) carried the run.
positional := &mockProvider{turns: singleAnswerTurns("wrong path")}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", positional, Options{
MaxTurns: 2,
TurnSessionProvider: tsp,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "via session" {
t.Fatalf("expected the session-backed answer, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(positional.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected the positional provider to be bypassed, got %d requests", len(positional.requests))
}
if session.streams == 0 || session.streams != len(inner.requests) {
t.Fatalf("expected every request to flow through the session: streams=%d inner=%d", session.streams, len(inner.requests))
}
if session.prewarms != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected exactly one prewarm, got %d", session.prewarms)
}
if session.closes != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected exactly one close, got %d", session.closes)
}
}
// TestRunDefaultTurnSessionMatchesRawProvider verifies the default (nil
// TurnSessionProvider) path is behavior-identical to passing an explicit
// default adapter over the same provider: same result, same request count.
func TestRunDefaultTurnSessionMatchesRawProvider(t *testing.T) {
run := func(explicit bool) (Result, *mockProvider) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: escalateThenAnswerTurns("identical")}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(escalatingTool{target: ""})
options := Options{Registry: registry, MaxTurns: 4}
if explicit {
options.TurnSessionProvider = zeroruntime.NewProviderTurnSessionProvider(provider, zeroruntime.ProviderCapabilities{})
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, options)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return result, provider
}
defaultResult, defaultProvider := run(false)
explicitResult, explicitProvider := run(true)
if defaultResult.FinalAnswer != explicitResult.FinalAnswer {
t.Fatalf("final answers diverged: default=%q explicit=%q", defaultResult.FinalAnswer, explicitResult.FinalAnswer)
}
if defaultResult.Turns != explicitResult.Turns {
t.Fatalf("turn counts diverged: default=%d explicit=%d", defaultResult.Turns, explicitResult.Turns)
}
if len(defaultProvider.requests) != len(explicitProvider.requests) {
t.Fatalf("request counts diverged: default=%d explicit=%d", len(defaultProvider.requests), len(explicitProvider.requests))
}
}
// TestRunModelSwitchClosesSessionAndContinues verifies a mid-run model switch
// closes the active session exactly once and streams the rest of the run on
// the new provider.
func TestRunModelSwitchClosesSessionAndContinues(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(escalatingTool{target: "claude-opus-4.1"})
firstInner := &mockProvider{turns: escalateThenAnswerTurns("unused")}
firstSession := &fakeTurnSession{inner: firstInner}
tsp := &fakeTurnSessionProvider{session: firstSession}
secondProvider := &mockProvider{turns: singleAnswerTurns("answered after switch")}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", firstInner, Options{
Registry: registry,
Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5",
MaxTurns: 4,
TurnSessionProvider: tsp,
ModelSwitcher: func(_ context.Context, _ string) (Provider, error) {
return secondProvider, nil
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "answered after switch" {
t.Fatalf("expected the post-switch answer, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
// The original session handled exactly the escalation turn, then was closed
// once by the swap (the teardown defer closes the NEW session, not this one).
if firstSession.streams != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected the original session to stream exactly the escalation turn, got %d", firstSession.streams)
}
if firstSession.closes != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected the swap to close the original session exactly once, got %d", firstSession.closes)
}
if len(secondProvider.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected the post-switch turn on the new provider, got %d requests", len(secondProvider.requests))
}
}
// TestRunModelSessionSwitcherCarriesOptimizedSession verifies the target-aware
// switcher: the switched-to TurnSessionProvider's DISTINCT session receives the
// post-switch streams, is prewarmed exactly once, and is closed exactly once at
// teardown — and the legacy ModelSwitcher is never consulted when both are set.
func TestRunModelSessionSwitcherCarriesOptimizedSession(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(escalatingTool{target: "claude-opus-4.1"})
firstInner := &mockProvider{turns: escalateThenAnswerTurns("unused")}
firstSession := &fakeTurnSession{inner: firstInner}
initial := &fakeTurnSessionProvider{session: firstSession}
switchedInner := &mockProvider{turns: singleAnswerTurns("answered on the switched session")}
switchedSession := &fakeTurnSession{inner: switchedInner}
switched := &fakeTurnSessionProvider{session: switchedSession}
var switchedTo string
legacyCalled := false
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", firstInner, Options{
Registry: registry,
Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5",
MaxTurns: 4,
TurnSessionProvider: initial,
ModelSessionSwitcher: func(_ context.Context, modelID string) (zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider, error) {
switchedTo = modelID
return switched, nil
},
ModelSwitcher: func(_ context.Context, _ string) (Provider, error) {
legacyCalled = true
return nil, errors.New("legacy switcher must not be consulted")
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "answered on the switched session" {
t.Fatalf("expected the switched session's answer, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if switchedTo != "claude-opus-4.1" {
t.Fatalf("expected switch to claude-opus-4.1, got %q", switchedTo)
}
if legacyCalled {
t.Fatal("legacy ModelSwitcher was consulted despite ModelSessionSwitcher being set")
}
if switched.opens != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected exactly one open of the switched provider, got %d", switched.opens)
}
// The switched session carries the rest of the run: it streams the answer
// turn, is prewarmed exactly once at the swap, and is closed exactly once by
// the teardown defer.
if switchedSession.streams != 1 || len(switchedInner.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected the switched session to stream the post-switch turn, streams=%d inner=%d", switchedSession.streams, len(switchedInner.requests))
}
if switchedSession.prewarms != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected the switched session to be prewarmed exactly once, got %d", switchedSession.prewarms)
}
if switchedSession.closes != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected the switched session to be closed exactly once at teardown, got %d", switchedSession.closes)
}
// The original session ends with the swap: one stream, one close.
if firstSession.streams != 1 || firstSession.closes != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected the original session to end at the swap (streams=%d closes=%d)", firstSession.streams, firstSession.closes)
}
}
// TestRunModelSessionSwitcherOpenFailureIsNonFatal verifies the swap-time open
// failure: the switcher returns a TurnSessionProvider whose OpenTurnSession
// fails. The run stays non-fatal on the ORIGINAL session (closed only at
// teardown), and the switch-failure note reaches the next request.
func TestRunModelSessionSwitcherOpenFailureIsNonFatal(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(escalatingTool{target: "claude-opus-4.1"})
inner := &mockProvider{turns: escalateThenAnswerTurns("recovered after failed open")}
session := &fakeTurnSession{inner: inner}
failingOpen := &fakeTurnSessionProvider{openErr: errors.New("switched handshake refused")}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", inner, Options{
Registry: registry,
Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5",
MaxTurns: 4,
TurnSessionProvider: &fakeTurnSessionProvider{session: session},
ModelSessionSwitcher: func(_ context.Context, _ string) (zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider, error) {
return failingOpen, nil
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected a failed swap open to be non-fatal, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "recovered after failed open" {
t.Fatalf("expected the run to recover on the original session, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if failingOpen.opens != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected exactly one open attempt on the switched provider, got %d", failingOpen.opens)
}
// The original session serves both turns and is closed only at teardown —
// never by the failed swap.
if session.streams != 2 || session.closes != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected the original session to serve both turns and close once (streams=%d closes=%d)", session.streams, session.closes)
}
var sawNote bool
for _, message := range inner.requests[1].Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(message.Content), "could not switch") {
sawNote = true
}
}
if !sawNote {
t.Fatalf("expected a switch-failure note on the next turn, messages: %+v", inner.requests[1].Messages)
}
}
// TestRunModelSessionSwitcherErrorIsNonFatal verifies a ModelSessionSwitcher
// error keeps the run on the current session with a transcript note — the same
// non-fatal contract as ModelSwitcher.
func TestRunModelSessionSwitcherErrorIsNonFatal(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(escalatingTool{target: "claude-opus-4.1"})
inner := &mockProvider{turns: escalateThenAnswerTurns("recovered on original session")}
session := &fakeTurnSession{inner: inner}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", inner, Options{
Registry: registry,
Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5",
MaxTurns: 4,
TurnSessionProvider: &fakeTurnSessionProvider{session: session},
ModelSessionSwitcher: func(_ context.Context, _ string) (zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider, error) {
return nil, errors.New("session build blew up")
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected session-switcher error to be non-fatal, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "recovered on original session" {
t.Fatalf("expected the run to recover on the original session, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
// Both turns stream through the original session; it closes once at teardown.
if session.streams != 2 || session.closes != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected the original session to serve both turns and close once (streams=%d closes=%d)", session.streams, session.closes)
}
var sawNote bool
for _, request := range inner.requests[1].Messages {
if request.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(request.Content), "could not switch") {
sawNote = true
}
}
if !sawNote {
t.Fatalf("expected a non-fatal switch-failure note on the next turn, messages: %+v", inner.requests[1].Messages)
}
}
+15 -96
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package agent
import (
"context"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/streamjson"
@@ -62,32 +61,17 @@ const (
)
type ToolResult struct {
ToolCallID string
Name string
Status tools.Status
Output string
// Truncated reports that the tool's model-visible output omitted content.
// The full result may be recoverable through Meta["spill_path"].
Truncated bool
Meta map[string]string
// Images the tool produced, delivered to the model as a following user
// message rather than on this result. See tools.Result.Images.
Images []zeroruntime.ImageBlock
ToolCallID string
Name string
Status tools.Status
Output string
Meta map[string]string
Redacted bool
ChangedFiles []string
// ChangeSummaries are non-selectable generated-tree summaries emitted by
// command execution; callers must not schedule per-file work from them.
ChangeSummaries []execution.Change
Display tools.Display
Display tools.Display
// DenialReason categorizes why a tool call was blocked (empty when it ran).
// It lets a surface distinguish the cause precisely instead of parsing Output.
DenialReason DenialCategory
// Risk is the sandbox risk classification of this call, stamped for EXECUTED
// results so run-policy observers (the execution-profile controller) can see
// the risk level of an allowed mutation. It mirrors the classification the
// permission path already computes; denied or canceled results keep the zero
// value. Pure observation: nothing about permissions or sandboxing changes.
Risk sandbox.Risk
// LoadedTools carries the deferred-tool names a tool_search call asked the
// loop to expose next turn (lifted from Meta["load_tools"]). nil for every
// ordinary tool result; only tool_search populates it.
@@ -111,54 +95,6 @@ const (
DenialHookBlocked DenialCategory = "hook_blocked" // vetoed by a beforeTool hook
)
// ProfilePolicy is the loop-facing slice of a selected execution profile.
// The surface (exec flag, TUI command) resolves a named profile into this
// policy; the loop only ever sees the policy, never the catalog.
type ProfilePolicy struct {
// Name labels trace counters and diagnostics (e.g. "fast"). The trace
// recorder's profile label is set by the caller at recorder construction.
Name string
// Escalate, when non-nil, arms one-shot in-run posture escalation.
Escalate *PostureEscalation
}
// PostureEscalation describes a one-shot escalation to stricter knob values,
// applied mid-run when an armed trigger fires. Targets are the values the
// selected profile DISPLACED at run start (i.e. "restore the balanced
// posture"), so escalation can never introduce a value that was not already
// valid for this run and model. Zero-valued targets leave that knob untouched.
type PostureEscalation struct {
// MaxTurns raises the turn ceiling to this value when greater than the
// ceiling in effect. 0 leaves the ceiling untouched.
MaxTurns int
// ReasoningEffort replaces the run's effort when non-empty.
ReasoningEffort string
// RestoreDefaultEffort clears the run's effort override (back to the
// provider/model default) when true. It exists because the displaced value
// of a profile-filled effort is "" — which as a ReasoningEffort target
// means "leave untouched" — so restoring the default needs its own signal.
// Ignored when ReasoningEffort is non-empty.
RestoreDefaultEffort bool
// RestoreCompletionGate re-enables RequireCompletionSignal (headless
// completion semantics) when true.
RestoreCompletionGate bool
// Triggers. A zero value disables that signal entirely.
// OnToolFailureStreak fires when the repeated-failure guard observes a
// same-tool retriable-failure streak of at least this length.
OnToolFailureStreak int
// OnCompletionUncertain fires on the Nth uncertain completion evaluation
// (continue nudge or semantic check). Headless only: the completion gate
// never runs interactively.
OnCompletionUncertain int
// OnSelfCorrectFailure fires when a post-edit verification cycle reports a
// failing outcome (correcting, reported, or aborted).
OnSelfCorrectFailure bool
// OnRiskyMutation fires when an EXECUTED tool result carries a sandbox risk
// level at or above this threshold. Empty disables the signal.
OnRiskyMutation sandbox.RiskLevel
}
type PermissionRequest struct {
ToolCallID string `json:"toolCallId"`
ToolName string `json:"name"`
@@ -344,27 +280,6 @@ type Options struct {
// request), so every existing caller is unaffected. A returned error is
// non-fatal: the run continues on the current model.
ModelSwitcher func(ctx context.Context, modelID string) (Provider, error)
// TurnSessionProvider, when set, supplies the turn session the run streams
// through — the seam an optimized provider session (connection reuse,
// prewarm, native compaction) plugs into without touching the loop. nil
// keeps the default: the loop wraps the passed provider in a no-op session
// whose Stream IS provider.StreamCompletion, so behavior is byte-identical
// and every existing caller is unaffected.
TurnSessionProvider zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider
// ModelSessionSwitcher, when set, is the target-aware escalation hook: the
// loop prefers it over ModelSwitcher, and its TurnSessionProvider keeps an
// optimized session (and its capabilities) across a mid-run model switch.
// nil falls back to ModelSwitcher, whose bare Provider is wrapped in the
// default no-op session — today's behavior, unchanged. Same non-fatal error
// contract as ModelSwitcher: a returned error records a note and the run
// continues on the current model and session.
ModelSessionSwitcher func(ctx context.Context, modelID string) (zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider, error)
// Profile, when set, arms the execution-profile posture controller for this
// run (auto-escalation to stricter knob values on failure/uncertainty/risky
// mutation signals). nil — the default everywhere today — leaves the loop
// byte-identical: no observation, no escalation, no counters. Same opt-in
// convention as Trace and SelfCorrect.
Profile *ProfilePolicy
// Trace, when set, records per-turn timing for the run: the loop stamps
// spans (prompt build, generation, tool execution, permission wait,
// compaction, provider connect) and counters (model requests, tool calls,
@@ -397,11 +312,8 @@ type Options struct {
// continuation cue ("…Let me check the config:"). The loop then nudges the
// model to continue instead, bounded by maxContinueNudges (and still by
// MaxTurns and the run deadline); if the model keeps stalling, the run
// finalizes as INCOMPLETE (Result.Incomplete) rather than success. When the
// run's profile also enables SelfCorrect, an otherwise-complete turn gets one
// task-grounded semantic check before success; profiles without SelfCorrect
// add no model call. Default false leaves the loop byte-identical, so the
// interactive TUI is unaffected.
// finalizes as INCOMPLETE (Result.Incomplete) rather than success. Default
// false leaves the loop byte-identical, so the interactive TUI is unaffected.
RequireCompletionSignal bool
runPermissions *permissionRunState
@@ -430,6 +342,13 @@ type Result struct {
IncompleteReason string
}
// Truncated reports whether the final response ended abnormally (cut off at the
// output token cap or withheld by a content filter) rather than completing
// naturally. Callers can use it to warn the user that FinalAnswer is incomplete.
func (result Result) Truncated() bool {
return result.FinishReason != ""
}
// TruncationNotice returns a user-facing warning when the final response was
// truncated, or "" for a normal completion. Shared by the CLI and TUI so the
// wording stays consistent.
+4
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ type AgentRunner interface {
type AgentRunnerFunc func(context.Context, AgentRunInput) AgentRunResult
func (fn AgentRunnerFunc) Run(ctx context.Context, input AgentRunInput) AgentRunResult {
return fn(ctx, input)
}
// defaultAgentOutputLimit caps captured stdout/stderr per stream so a chatty or
// runaway agent cannot exhaust memory or bloat the benchmark report.
const defaultAgentOutputLimit = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB per stream
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package agenteval
import "context"
func (fn AgentRunnerFunc) Run(ctx context.Context, input AgentRunInput) AgentRunResult {
return fn(ctx, input)
}
+3 -1
View File
@@ -125,7 +125,9 @@ func Score(suite Suite, input ScoreInput) Report {
if len(task.RequiredTraceEvents) > 0 {
report.Results = append(report.Results, scoreTraceEvents(task.RequiredTraceEvents, input))
}
report.Results = append(report.Results, unknownCommandResults(input.CommandResults, seenCommands, input)...)
for _, result := range unknownCommandResults(input.CommandResults, seenCommands, input) {
report.Results = append(report.Results, result)
}
report.finishSummary()
return report
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -40,14 +40,14 @@ func FormatFacts(info repoinfo.Info) string {
b.WriteString("Pre-computed repository facts (from a local scan — verify and fill gaps):\n")
if info.PrimaryLanguage != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- Primary language: %s (of %d detected)\n", info.PrimaryLanguage, info.LanguageCount)
b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- Primary language: %s (of %d detected)\n", info.PrimaryLanguage, info.LanguageCount))
}
if langs := topLanguages(info.Languages, 5); langs != "" {
b.WriteString("- Languages: " + langs + "\n")
}
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- Size: ~%d files, ~%d LOC, max dir depth %d\n", info.FileCount, info.LOCEstimate, info.MaxDepth)
b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- Size: ~%d files, ~%d LOC, max dir depth %d\n", info.FileCount, info.LOCEstimate, info.MaxDepth))
if info.WorkspaceType != "" && info.WorkspaceType != "none" {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- Workspace: %s (%d packages)\n", info.WorkspaceType, info.WorkspacePackageCount)
b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- Workspace: %s (%d packages)\n", info.WorkspaceType, info.WorkspacePackageCount))
}
if len(info.BuildTools) > 0 {
b.WriteString("- Build tools: " + strings.Join(info.BuildTools, ", ") + "\n")
-259
View File
@@ -1,259 +0,0 @@
package aimlapi
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
)
// PaymentMethod selects how a partner-checkout top-up is paid for.
type PaymentMethod string
const (
PaymentMethodCard PaymentMethod = "card"
PaymentMethodCrypto PaymentMethod = "crypto"
)
// SessionStatus is the lifecycle state of a partner-checkout session, as reported
// by the aimlapi.com backend while polling for payment.
type SessionStatus string
const (
SessionStatusPendingAuth SessionStatus = "pending_auth"
SessionStatusPendingPayment SessionStatus = "pending_payment"
SessionStatusPaid SessionStatus = "paid"
SessionStatusExchanging SessionStatus = "exchanging"
SessionStatusExchanged SessionStatus = "exchanged"
SessionStatusCancelled SessionStatus = "cancelled"
SessionStatusExpired SessionStatus = "expired"
SessionStatusFailed SessionStatus = "failed"
)
// AuthResult is the bearer token minted by a passwordless sign-in / sign-up.
type AuthResult struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
Exp int64 `json:"exp"`
}
// PartnerCheckoutSession is a partner-attributed top-up session; its SessionToken
// addresses it on later pay/exchange/poll calls.
type PartnerCheckoutSession struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
SessionToken string `json:"sessionToken"`
PartnerID string `json:"partnerId"`
PartnerName *string `json:"partnerName"`
UserID *int64 `json:"userId"`
AmountUSDMinor *int64 `json:"amountUsdMinor"`
Status SessionStatus `json:"status"`
IssuedKeyID *string `json:"issuedKeyId"`
ReturnURL *string `json:"returnUrl"`
}
// PaymentSession is the hosted payment-provider checkout; PayURL is the page the
// user opens to pay.
type PaymentSession struct {
ProviderSessionID string `json:"providerSessionId"`
PayURL string `json:"payUrl"`
}
// PayResult pairs the hosted checkout with the updated partner-checkout session
// returned when a top-up payment is initiated.
type PayResult struct {
Checkout PaymentSession `json:"checkout"`
PartnerCheckout PartnerCheckoutSession `json:"partnerCheckout"`
}
// ExchangeResult holds the API key minted when a paid session is exchanged.
type ExchangeResult struct {
APIKey string `json:"apiKey"`
APIKeyID string `json:"apiKeyId"`
}
// TopUpByKeyRequest funds a partner-checkout session with the API key that owns
// the account (Path A / env key), instead of an email session.
type TopUpByKeyRequest struct {
SessionToken string
AmountUSDMinor int
PaymentSessionID string // idempotency: same id → same checkout, never a second charge
AutoTopUp bool // enroll the account in automatic top-up at checkout (card, saved off-session)
SuccessURL string
CancelURL string
}
// TopUpByKeyResult is the hosted checkout returned by TopUpByKey.
type TopUpByKeyResult struct {
Checkout PaymentSession `json:"checkout"`
}
// APIError is a non-2xx HTTP response from the aimlapi.com API. Status carries the
// code so callers can branch (e.g. 401 = bad key, 5xx = retryable).
type APIError struct {
Message string
Status int
Body string
}
// Error renders the method, endpoint, status, and (when present) the response body.
func (e APIError) Error() string {
if strings.TrimSpace(e.Body) != "" {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s: HTTP %d: %s", e.Message, e.Status, strings.TrimSpace(e.Body))
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%s: HTTP %d", e.Message, e.Status)
}
// Client talks to the aimlapi.com auth, app, and inference APIs for the onboarding
// and partner-checkout top-up flows.
type Client struct {
endpoints Endpoints
httpClient *http.Client
}
func NewClient(endpoints Endpoints, httpClient *http.Client) *Client {
if httpClient == nil {
httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 60 * time.Second}
}
return &Client{endpoints: endpoints, httpClient: httpClient}
}
// CreateSession opens a partner-checkout session attributed to partnerID; the
// returned SessionToken addresses it on the pay/exchange/poll calls.
func (c *Client) CreateSession(ctx context.Context, partnerID string, partnerName string, returnURL string) (PartnerCheckoutSession, error) {
body := map[string]any{"partnerId": partnerID}
if strings.TrimSpace(partnerName) != "" {
body["partnerName"] = strings.TrimSpace(partnerName)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(returnURL) != "" {
body["returnUrl"] = strings.TrimSpace(returnURL)
}
var result PartnerCheckoutSession
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.AppBaseURL, "/")+"/v3/partner-checkout/sessions", "", body, &result)
return result, err
}
// GetSession fetches the current state of a partner-checkout session; used to poll
// for payment completion.
func (c *Client) GetSession(ctx context.Context, sessionToken string) (PartnerCheckoutSession, error) {
var result PartnerCheckoutSession
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodGet, strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.AppBaseURL, "/")+"/v3/partner-checkout/sessions/"+urlPathEscape(sessionToken), "", nil, &result)
return result, err
}
// Pay initiates payment for a session and returns the hosted checkout URL.
// autoTopUp enrolls the account in automatic top-up at checkout time.
func (c *Client) Pay(ctx context.Context, bearer string, sessionToken string, amountUSDMinor int, paymentSessionID string, method PaymentMethod, successURL string, cancelURL string, autoTopUp bool) (PayResult, error) {
body := map[string]any{
"amountUsdMinor": amountUSDMinor,
"paymentSessionId": paymentSessionID,
"method": method,
}
if strings.TrimSpace(successURL) != "" {
body["successUrl"] = strings.TrimSpace(successURL)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(cancelURL) != "" {
body["cancelUrl"] = strings.TrimSpace(cancelURL)
}
// Only sent when enabled: enrolls the account in automatic top-up. The backend
// honours this field at checkout time.
if autoTopUp {
body["autoTopUp"] = true
}
var result PayResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.AppBaseURL, "/")+"/v3/partner-checkout/sessions/"+urlPathEscape(sessionToken)+"/pay", bearer, body, &result)
return result, err
}
// Exchange converts a paid session into a freshly minted API key (new-account flow).
func (c *Client) Exchange(ctx context.Context, bearer string, sessionToken string) (ExchangeResult, error) {
var result ExchangeResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.AppBaseURL, "/")+"/v3/partner-checkout/sessions/"+urlPathEscape(sessionToken)+"/exchange", bearer, nil, &result)
return result, err
}
// TopUpByKey funds a partner-checkout session using the raw API key that owns the
// account (Path A / env key), returning the hosted checkout. It binds the session
// to the key's account server-side, so no email session is needed and no key is
// exchanged. req.PaymentSessionID makes a retry idempotent (same id → same
// checkout, never a second charge).
func (c *Client) TopUpByKey(ctx context.Context, apiKey string, req TopUpByKeyRequest) (TopUpByKeyResult, error) {
body := map[string]any{
"sessionToken": req.SessionToken,
"amountUsdMinor": req.AmountUSDMinor,
"paymentSessionId": req.PaymentSessionID,
}
if req.AutoTopUp {
body["autoTopUp"] = true
}
if strings.TrimSpace(req.SuccessURL) != "" {
body["successUrl"] = strings.TrimSpace(req.SuccessURL)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(req.CancelURL) != "" {
body["cancelUrl"] = strings.TrimSpace(req.CancelURL)
}
var result TopUpByKeyResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.billingV2URL("/billing/topup"), apiKey, body, &result)
return result, err
}
// billingV2URL builds a v2 billing API URL from the inference base. The top-up
// endpoint lives next to the balance endpoint on the API gateway, one version up
// (".../v1" → ".../v2/billing/..."), so it re-anchors the version while keeping any
// host/prefix an override supplied.
func (c *Client) billingV2URL(path string) string {
base := strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(c.endpoints.InferenceBaseURL), "/")
base = strings.TrimSuffix(base, "/v1")
return strings.TrimRight(base, "/") + "/v2" + path
}
func (c *Client) request(ctx context.Context, method string, endpoint string, bearer string, body any, out any) error {
var reader io.Reader
if body != nil {
data, err := json.Marshal(body)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reader = bytes.NewReader(data)
}
request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, endpoint, reader)
if err != nil {
return err
}
request.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
if body != nil {
request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
}
if strings.TrimSpace(bearer) != "" {
request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+strings.TrimSpace(bearer))
}
response, err := c.httpClient.Do(request)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("network request to %s failed: %w", endpoint, err)
}
defer response.Body.Close()
text, readErr := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(response.Body, 1<<20))
if readErr != nil {
return readErr
}
if response.StatusCode < 200 || response.StatusCode >= 300 {
return APIError{Message: method + " " + endpoint, Status: response.StatusCode, Body: string(text)}
}
if out == nil {
return nil
}
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(text)) == 0 {
return APIError{Message: method + " " + endpoint + " returned empty body", Status: response.StatusCode}
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(text, out); err != nil {
return APIError{Message: method + " " + endpoint + " returned non-JSON body", Status: response.StatusCode, Body: string(text)}
}
return nil
}
func urlPathEscape(value string) string {
return url.PathEscape(value)
}
-106
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@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
package aimlapi
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
)
// Additional client methods backing the interactive TUI onboarding flow. They
// target the endpoints shipped in the aimlapi backend:
// - GET {inference}/billing/balance (Path A: validate key + balance)
// - PATCH{auth}/v1/auth/account (Path B: does the account exist?)
// - POST {auth}/v1/auth/sign-in/code(/verify) (Path B existing: passwordless login)
// - POST {auth}/v1/auth/account/passwordless (Path B new: email-only signup)
// - POST {app}/v1/keys (mint a key once we hold a session)
// BalanceResult is the wallet balance returned by GetBalance, with the backend's
// low-balance flag and threshold.
type BalanceResult struct {
Balance float64 `json:"balance"`
LowBalance bool `json:"lowBalance"`
LowBalanceThreshold float64 `json:"lowBalanceThreshold"`
}
// CheckResult reports whether an email already has an account, driving the
// sign-in vs sign-up branch of the onboarding flow.
type CheckResult struct {
// "sign-in" (account exists) or "sign-up" (no account yet).
Action string `json:"action"`
Provider *string `json:"provider"`
}
// CreatedKey is an API key minted by CreateKey.
type CreatedKey struct {
Key string `json:"key"`
ID string `json:"id"`
}
func (c *Client) authURL(path string) string {
return strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.AuthBaseURL, "/") + path
}
func (c *Client) appURL(path string) string {
return strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.AppBaseURL, "/") + path
}
func (c *Client) inferenceURL(path string) string {
return strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.InferenceBaseURL, "/") + path
}
// GetBalance doubles as key validation: a 401 means the key is invalid, a 2xx
// returns the wallet balance. Auth is the raw API key itself.
func (c *Client) GetBalance(ctx context.Context, apiKey string) (BalanceResult, error) {
var result BalanceResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodGet, c.inferenceURL("/billing/balance"), apiKey, nil, &result)
return result, err
}
// CheckAccount reports whether an email already has an aimlapi.com account
// (Action "sign-in") or not ("sign-up").
func (c *Client) CheckAccount(ctx context.Context, email string) (CheckResult, error) {
var result CheckResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPatch, c.authURL("/v1/auth/account"), "", map[string]any{"email": email}, &result)
return result, err
}
// SendSignInCode emails a 6-digit sign-in code to an existing account.
func (c *Client) SendSignInCode(ctx context.Context, email string) error {
return c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.authURL("/v1/auth/sign-in/code"), "", map[string]any{"email": email}, nil)
}
// VerifySignInCode exchanges an emailed code for a session bearer token.
func (c *Client) VerifySignInCode(ctx context.Context, email string, code string) (AuthResult, error) {
var result AuthResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.authURL("/v1/auth/sign-in/code/verify"), "", map[string]any{"email": email, "code": code}, &result)
if err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(result.Token) == "" {
err = fmt.Errorf("aimlapi.com did not return an auth token")
}
return result, err
}
// CreatePasswordlessAccount registers a new email-only account and returns its
// session bearer token.
func (c *Client) CreatePasswordlessAccount(ctx context.Context, email string) (AuthResult, error) {
var result AuthResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.authURL("/v1/auth/account/passwordless"), "", map[string]any{"email": email}, &result)
if err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(result.Token) == "" {
err = fmt.Errorf("aimlapi.com did not return an auth token")
}
return result, err
}
// CreateKey mints a fresh API key for a session-holding user.
func (c *Client) CreateKey(ctx context.Context, bearer string, name string) (CreatedKey, error) {
body := map[string]any{}
if strings.TrimSpace(name) != "" {
body["name"] = strings.TrimSpace(name)
}
var result CreatedKey
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.appURL("/v1/keys"), bearer, body, &result)
if err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(result.Key) == "" {
err = fmt.Errorf("aimlapi.com did not return an API key")
}
return result, err
}
-159
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@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
package aimlapi
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
func TestCreateKeySendsAuthenticatedRequestAndDecodesKey(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost || r.URL.Path != "/v1/keys" {
t.Fatalf("request = %s %s, want POST /v1/keys", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}
if got := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "Bearer session-token" {
t.Fatalf("Authorization = %q", got)
}
var body map[string]string
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if body["name"] != "Zero CLI" {
t.Fatalf("name = %q", body["name"])
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"key":"sk-issued","id":"key-id"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{AppBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
key, err := client.CreateKey(context.Background(), " session-token ", " Zero CLI ")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if key.Key != "sk-issued" || key.ID != "key-id" {
t.Fatalf("key = %#v", key)
}
}
func TestCreateKeyRejectsEmptyKeyResponse(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"id":"key-id"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{AppBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
if _, err := client.CreateKey(context.Background(), "session-token", "Zero"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("CreateKey accepted a response without an API key")
}
}
func TestAuthMethodsRejectEmptyTokenResponses(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"token":""}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{AuthBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
tests := []struct {
name string
call func() error
}{
{
name: "verify sign-in code",
call: func() error {
_, err := client.VerifySignInCode(context.Background(), "[email protected]", "123456")
return err
},
},
{
name: "create passwordless account",
call: func() error {
_, err := client.CreatePasswordlessAccount(context.Background(), "[email protected]")
return err
},
},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if err := test.call(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("accepted a response without an auth token")
}
})
}
}
func TestClientReturnsTypedAPIError(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, "invalid key", http.StatusUnauthorized)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{InferenceBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
_, err := client.GetBalance(context.Background(), "bad-key")
var apiErr APIError
if !errors.As(err, &apiErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want APIError", err, err)
}
if apiErr.Status != http.StatusUnauthorized || apiErr.Body != "invalid key\n" {
t.Fatalf("APIError = %#v", apiErr)
}
}
func TestTypedResponseRejectsEmptySuccessBody(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{InferenceBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
if _, err := client.GetBalance(context.Background(), "key"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("GetBalance accepted an empty successful response")
}
}
func TestBodylessOperationAcceptsEmptySuccessBody(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{AuthBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
if err := client.SendSignInCode(context.Background(), "[email protected]"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SendSignInCode() error = %v", err)
}
}
func TestParseAmountUSD(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
value string
want int
wantErr bool
}{
{name: "default", want: DefaultAmountUSDMinor},
{name: "minimum", value: "20", want: 2000},
{name: "cents", value: "25.49", want: 2549},
{name: "below minimum", value: "19.99", wantErr: true},
{name: "above maximum", value: "10001", wantErr: true},
{name: "not a number", value: "twenty", wantErr: true},
{name: "nan", value: "NaN", wantErr: true},
{name: "infinity", value: "Inf", wantErr: true},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := ParseAmountUSD(test.value)
if (err != nil) != test.wantErr {
t.Fatalf("ParseAmountUSD(%q) error = %v", test.value, err)
}
if got != test.want {
t.Fatalf("ParseAmountUSD(%q) = %d, want %d", test.value, got, test.want)
}
})
}
}
-113
View File
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
package aimlapi
import (
"net/url"
"os"
"strings"
)
type Endpoints struct {
AuthBaseURL string
AppBaseURL string
InferenceBaseURL string
PayBaseURL string
// VerificationBaseURL is the aimlapi web-app frontend base. The browser is sent
// back here after the partner checkout completes (see BuildPartnerReturnURL), so
// it must point at the same environment's front as the one the CLI is talking to
// to land the user there. Empty falls back to DefaultReturnURL.
VerificationBaseURL string
}
const (
DefaultPartnerID = "part_62yQoGYDq4Yqnrj2R1iGrDNJ"
DefaultPartnerName = "Gitlawb"
PartnerHeaderName = "X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID"
// DefaultReturnURL is the https fallback the browser is sent to after the
// checkout / OAuth consent finishes when no frontend base is known. It must be
// a real web page the browser can open — NOT a custom scheme like
// zero://aimlapi/complete, which fails with "the scheme does not have a
// registered handler" because the CLI registers no OS protocol handler. The
// CLI learns of success by polling; this URL is purely the browser's landing.
DefaultReturnURL = "https://aimlapi.com/app"
DefaultModel = "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5"
MinAmountUSDMinor = 2000
MaxAmountUSDMinor = 1000000
DefaultAmountUSDMinor = 2500
)
func ResolveEndpoints() Endpoints {
return Endpoints{
AuthBaseURL: envOrDefault("AIMLAPI_AUTH_URL", "https://auth.aimlapi.com"),
AppBaseURL: envOrDefault("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", "https://app.aimlapi.com"),
InferenceBaseURL: envOrDefault("AIMLAPI_INFERENCE_URL", "https://api.aimlapi.com/v1"),
PayBaseURL: envOrDefault("AIMLAPI_PAY_URL", "https://pay.aimlapi.com"),
VerificationBaseURL: envOrDefault("AIMLAPI_VERIFICATION_BASE_URL", "https://aimlapi.com/app"),
}
}
// ResolvePartnerID applies the same explicit-option, environment, and default
// precedence everywhere partner attribution is used. Keeping checkout creation
// and saved inference profiles on one resolver prevents them from attributing
// the same user to different partners.
func ResolvePartnerID(explicit string) string {
if value := strings.TrimSpace(explicit); value != "" {
return value
}
return envOrDefault("AIMLAPI_PARTNER_ID", DefaultPartnerID)
}
// WithResolvedPartnerHeader returns a copy with the effective partner ID set.
// Header matching is case-insensitive so an existing spelling is replaced rather
// than duplicated. Callers remain responsible for applying catalog attribution
// only to the canonical AIMLAPI endpoint.
func WithResolvedPartnerHeader(headers map[string]string) map[string]string {
resolved := make(map[string]string, len(headers)+1)
for key, value := range headers {
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(key), PartnerHeaderName) {
continue
}
resolved[key] = value
}
resolved[PartnerHeaderName] = ResolvePartnerID("")
return resolved
}
func BuildPartnerCheckoutReturnURLs(appBaseURL string, sessionToken string) (successURL string, cancelURL string) {
base := strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(appBaseURL), "/")
if base == "" {
// With no base there is nothing to anchor an absolute URL to. Return empty
// so the caller omits the return URLs entirely (client.Pay skips empty ones,
// leaving the backend's generic checkout) instead of emitting a broken
// relative "/checkout?...".
return "", ""
}
token := url.QueryEscape(sessionToken)
return base + "/checkout?checkout=success&partnerCheckout=1&sessionToken=" + token,
base + "/checkout?checkout=cancel&partnerCheckout=1&sessionToken=" + token
}
// BuildPartnerReturnURL returns the https page the browser is sent back to once
// the partner checkout or OAuth consent completes — the aimlapi web app the user
// opened the flow from. frontendBaseURL is normally endpoints.VerificationBaseURL
// (the front that hosts the login/consent page), so the return follows the same
// environment. AIMLAPI_RETURN_URL overrides it outright; an empty base falls back
// to DefaultReturnURL. It is deliberately NOT a custom scheme (zero://…): no
// browser can hand a custom scheme off without an OS-registered handler, which a
// CLI does not install.
func BuildPartnerReturnURL(frontendBaseURL string) string {
if override := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AIMLAPI_RETURN_URL")); override != "" {
return override
}
if base := strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(frontendBaseURL), "/"); base != "" {
return base
}
return DefaultReturnURL
}
func envOrDefault(name string, fallback string) string {
if value := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(name)); value != "" {
return value
}
return fallback
}
-55
View File
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
package aimlapi
import "testing"
func TestResolveEndpointsDefaults(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_AUTH_URL", "")
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", "")
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_INFERENCE_URL", "")
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_PAY_URL", "")
endpoints := ResolveEndpoints()
if endpoints.AuthBaseURL != "https://auth.aimlapi.com" ||
endpoints.AppBaseURL != "https://app.aimlapi.com" ||
endpoints.InferenceBaseURL != "https://api.aimlapi.com/v1" ||
endpoints.PayBaseURL != "https://pay.aimlapi.com" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected endpoints: %#v", endpoints)
}
}
func TestResolvedPartnerHeaderUsesEnvironmentOverrideWithoutDuplicates(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_PARTNER_ID", "part_override")
headers := WithResolvedPartnerHeader(map[string]string{
"x-aimlapi-partner-id": "part_catalog",
"X-AIMLAPI-Integration-Repo": "Gitlawb/zero",
})
if got := headers[PartnerHeaderName]; got != "part_override" {
t.Fatalf("partner header = %q, want part_override", got)
}
if _, ok := headers["x-aimlapi-partner-id"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("case-insensitive partner header was duplicated: %#v", headers)
}
if got := headers["X-AIMLAPI-Integration-Repo"]; got != "Gitlawb/zero" {
t.Fatalf("unrelated header changed: %#v", headers)
}
}
func TestBuildPartnerReturnURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_RETURN_URL", "")
// The frontend base (the web app the flow was opened from) is returned as-is,
// trailing slash trimmed — an https page the browser can actually land on.
if got := BuildPartnerReturnURL("https://aimlapi.com/app/"); got != "https://aimlapi.com/app" {
t.Fatalf("return URL = %q, want the frontend base", got)
}
// An empty base falls back to the https default, never a custom scheme.
if got := BuildPartnerReturnURL(""); got != DefaultReturnURL {
t.Fatalf("empty base return URL = %q, want %q", got, DefaultReturnURL)
}
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_RETURN_URL", "https://example.test/done")
if got := BuildPartnerReturnURL("https://aimlapi.com/app"); got != "https://example.test/done" {
t.Fatalf("env override return URL = %q", got)
}
}
-42
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@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
package aimlapi
// UI strings shared by the first-run and provider-wizard onboarding surfaces.
const (
// Path A — existing API key. Pick-path prompt + option labels.
MsgAPIKeyInputPrompt = "Enter your aimlapi.com key."
MsgAPIKeyInvalid = "API key is invalid. Please make sure you enter a valid aimlapi.com key."
MsgPickPathPrompt = "Do you have aimlapi.com key?"
MsgPickPathHaveKey = "I already have aimlapi.com key"
MsgPickPathHaveHint = "Proceed to paste the key"
MsgPickPathNewUser = "I am a new user"
MsgPickPathNewHint = "One click set up"
// Path B — email.
MsgEnterEmail = "Enter your email.\nTo access aimlapi.com dashboard."
MsgEmailInvalid = "Email format is incorrect."
MsgAccountActionInvalid = "aimlapi.com returned an unsupported account action. Please try again."
// %s = email
MsgCodeSent = "We sent a 6-digit code to %s.\nEnter it below to continue."
MsgCodeIncorrect = "Code you've entered is incorrect."
// Balance check.
MsgLowBalance = "Your aimlapi.com balance is running low.\nIt is recommended to top up your balance."
MsgEverythingRuns = "Everything is ready."
// Low-balance choices (spec wording).
MsgLowBalanceTopUp = "Sure, let's do that"
MsgLowBalanceSkip = "I'll skip topping up the balance for now"
// Top-up workflow.
MsgTopUpPrompt = "Add credits.\nEnter an amount (min $20)."
MsgAmountRequired = "Please enter a top-up amount."
// %s = checkout URL
MsgTopUpBrowserFallback = "If the browser did not open automatically please use this link to top up your account: %s"
MsgTopUpFailed = "Top up failed. Please try again."
MsgTopUpSuccess = "Top-up successful."
// Success — key delivered.
// %s = amount in dollars (e.g. "25")
MsgTopUpAddedFmt = "$%s has been added to your balance."
// %s = email
MsgSuccessMagicLink = "We've emailed you a magic link to %s. Use it to access your aimlapi.com account and review your usage and balance."
)
-26
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@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
package aimlapi
import "testing"
func TestValidEmailRejectsIncompleteDomains(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
value string
valid bool
}{
{value: "[email protected]", valid: true},
{value: "[email protected]", valid: true},
{value: "123@123.", valid: false},
{value: "123@123", valid: false},
{value: "[email protected]", valid: false},
{value: "[email protected]", valid: false},
{value: "[email protected]", valid: false},
{value: "[email protected]", valid: false},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.value, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := ValidEmail(test.value); got != test.valid {
t.Fatalf("ValidEmail(%q) = %v, want %v", test.value, got, test.valid)
}
})
}
}
-335
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@@ -1,335 +0,0 @@
package aimlapi
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
)
// StreamTopUpOptions drives a session-based partner-checkout top-up for the
// interactive (TUI) onboarding. The caller already holds a user session —
// obtained from an email-code sign-in (Path B existing) or a
// passwordless new account (Path B sign-up) — so this skips authentication and
// runs create-session → pay → wait-for-payment, optionally exchanging the paid
// session into a fresh key (new accounts) versus keeping the caller's key.
type StreamTopUpOptions struct {
SessionToken string // user session bearer (required)
AmountUSD string // dollars; parsed via ParseAmountUSD (min $20)
// InferenceBaseURL pins key-bound billing and the returned provider profile to
// the endpoint that validated the credential. Empty uses ResolveEndpoints.
InferenceBaseURL string
Method PaymentMethod
AutoTopUp bool // enroll the account in automatic top-up at checkout time
Exchange bool // exchange the paid session into a new key (new accounts)
Model string
PartnerID string
PartnerName string
NoOpen bool
// ResumeSessionToken, when set, resumes that partner-checkout session instead
// of opening a new one, so a retry after an ambiguous failure (a lost Pay/
// Exchange response) can never double-charge or strand an already-paid session.
ResumeSessionToken string
// PaymentSessionID is generated once per amount/auto-top-up intent and reused
// on retry so an ambiguous Pay response cannot create a second checkout.
PaymentSessionID string
HTTPClient *http.Client
OpenBrowser func(string) error
OnStatus func(Status, string)
// OnSession reports the partner-checkout session token the moment it exists (a
// fresh CreateSession, or the resumed one), so the caller can retain it and
// resume on a later failure. It fires with "" when the session is dead and the
// retained token should be dropped (a fresh run must start over).
OnSession func(sessionToken string)
}
// topupPhase is where StreamTopUp enters its create-checkout → poll → exchange
// pipeline. A fresh run starts at phasePay; a resume skips ahead to whatever the
// existing session's status makes safe.
type topupPhase int
const (
phasePay topupPhase = iota // (re-)open the Stripe checkout, then poll + exchange
phasePoll // checkout already open; poll for payment, never re-pay
phaseExchange // already paid; exchange only (recovers a lost key)
phaseWaitExchange // an exchange claim is in flight; poll, never call Exchange twice
)
// StreamTopUp performs the browser-checkout top-up and reports progress via
// OnStatus.
func StreamTopUp(ctx context.Context, options StreamTopUpOptions) (ProvisionedKey, error) {
endpoints := ResolveEndpoints()
if baseURL := strings.TrimSpace(options.InferenceBaseURL); baseURL != "" {
endpoints.InferenceBaseURL = baseURL
}
client := NewClient(endpoints, options.HTTPClient)
partnerID := ResolvePartnerID(options.PartnerID)
partnerName := firstNonEmpty(options.PartnerName, DefaultPartnerName)
method := options.Method
if method != PaymentMethodCrypto {
method = PaymentMethodCard
}
amount, err := ParseAmountUSD(options.AmountUSD)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.SessionToken) == "" {
return ProvisionedKey{}, fmt.Errorf("a session is required to top up")
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.PaymentSessionID) == "" {
return ProvisionedKey{}, fmt.Errorf("a payment session id is required to top up")
}
status(options.OnStatus, StatusCreatingSession, "")
sessionToken, phase, err := resolveTopupSession(ctx, client, options, partnerID, partnerName, endpoints)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
// Retain the live token so an ambiguous failure below can resume this session
// rather than open a second checkout on the next attempt.
reportSession(options.OnSession, sessionToken)
if phase <= phasePay {
successURL, cancelURL := BuildPartnerCheckoutReturnURLs(endpoints.PayBaseURL, sessionToken)
status(options.OnStatus, StatusOpeningCheckout, "")
pay, err := client.Pay(ctx, options.SessionToken, sessionToken, amount, options.PaymentSessionID, method, successURL, cancelURL, options.AutoTopUp)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
checkoutURL, err := validatedCheckoutURL(pay.Checkout.PayURL)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
announceCheckout(options.OnStatus, options.OpenBrowser, options.NoOpen, checkoutURL)
}
paidToken := sessionToken
if phase <= phasePoll {
status(options.OnStatus, StatusWaitingPayment, "")
paid, err := pollUntilPaid(ctx, client, sessionToken, options.OnSession)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
paidToken = paid.SessionToken
if paid.Status == SessionStatusExchanging {
// Another/lost request claimed exchange while we were polling payment.
// Carry that fact into the provisioning branch so it follows the claim
// instead of issuing a second single-flight Exchange request.
phase = phaseWaitExchange
}
}
result := ProvisionedKey{
BaseURL: endpoints.InferenceBaseURL,
Model: firstNonEmpty(options.Model, DefaultModel),
}
if options.Exchange {
status(options.OnStatus, StatusProvisioningKey, "")
if phase == phaseWaitExchange {
return ProvisionedKey{}, pollUntilExchangeSettled(ctx, client, sessionToken, options.OnSession)
}
exchange, err := client.Exchange(ctx, options.SessionToken, paidToken)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
if strings.TrimSpace(exchange.APIKey) == "" {
return ProvisionedKey{}, fmt.Errorf("aimlapi.com did not return an API key")
}
result.APIKey = exchange.APIKey
result.APIKeyID = exchange.APIKeyID
}
return result, nil
}
// resolveTopupSession returns the partner-checkout session token to drive and the
// phase to enter. A fresh run opens a new session at phasePay. A resume inspects
// the existing session and enters the earliest phase that cannot re-charge:
// - pending_auth → phasePay: payment never started, so (re-)Pay is safe.
// - pending_payment → phasePoll: a checkout is already open; poll, never re-Pay.
// - paid → phaseExchange: exchange the paid session once.
// - exchanging → phaseWaitExchange: another/lost request owns the atomic
// exchange claim; poll it, never issue a second Exchange request.
// - exchanged → terminal: the one-shot raw key is gone; point at dashboard
// recovery and keep the token so a re-run repeats that guidance, not a charge.
// - cancelled/expired/failed → terminal: drop the dead token so a re-run is fresh.
func resolveTopupSession(ctx context.Context, client *Client, options StreamTopUpOptions, partnerID, partnerName string, endpoints Endpoints) (string, topupPhase, error) {
resume := strings.TrimSpace(options.ResumeSessionToken)
if resume == "" {
session, err := client.CreateSession(ctx, partnerID, partnerName, BuildPartnerReturnURL(endpoints.VerificationBaseURL))
if err != nil {
return "", phasePay, err
}
return session.SessionToken, phasePay, nil
}
session, err := client.GetSession(ctx, resume)
if err != nil {
if isTerminalSessionAPIError(err) {
reportSession(options.OnSession, "")
}
return "", phasePay, err
}
switch session.Status {
case SessionStatusPendingAuth:
return resume, phasePay, nil
case SessionStatusPendingPayment:
return resume, phasePoll, nil
case SessionStatusPaid:
return resume, phaseExchange, nil
case SessionStatusExchanging:
return resume, phaseWaitExchange, nil
case SessionStatusExchanged:
return "", phasePay, fmt.Errorf("session was already exchanged; rotate the key from the aimlapi.com dashboard")
default:
reportSession(options.OnSession, "") // drop the dead token → next run starts fresh
return "", phasePay, fmt.Errorf("payment %s; re-run the top-up to try again", session.Status)
}
}
func reportSession(callback func(string), sessionToken string) {
if callback != nil {
callback(sessionToken)
}
}
// announceCheckout opens the hosted checkout in the browser (unless suppressed)
// and reports the URL either way, so the TUI can always show the direct link.
func announceCheckout(onStatus func(Status, string), open func(string) error, noOpen bool, checkoutURL string) {
if noOpen || open == nil {
status(onStatus, StatusOpeningCheckout, checkoutURL)
return
}
if err := open(checkoutURL); err != nil {
status(onStatus, StatusOpeningCheckout, "Open manually: "+checkoutURL)
return
}
status(onStatus, StatusOpeningCheckout, checkoutURL)
}
func validatedCheckoutURL(value string) (string, error) {
checkoutURL := strings.TrimSpace(value)
parsed, err := url.Parse(checkoutURL)
if err != nil || !parsed.IsAbs() || !strings.EqualFold(parsed.Scheme, "https") || parsed.Hostname() == "" || parsed.User != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("payment provider did not return a valid HTTPS checkout URL")
}
return checkoutURL, nil
}
// StreamTopUpByKeyOptions drives a top-up funded with the API key that already
// owns the account (Path A pasted key, or AIMLAPI_API_KEY). Unlike StreamTopUp it
// needs no email session and never exchanges a key — the caller already holds one,
// so it only funds the wallet: create-session → pay-by-key → wait-for-payment.
type StreamTopUpByKeyOptions struct {
APIKey string // raw key that owns the account (required)
AmountUSD string // dollars; parsed via ParseAmountUSD (min $20)
InferenceBaseURL string // validated key endpoint; empty uses ResolveEndpoints
AutoTopUp bool // enroll the account in automatic top-up at checkout time
PartnerID string
PartnerName string
NoOpen bool
// ResumeSessionToken resumes an existing partner-checkout session instead of
// opening a new one. PaymentSessionID is the idempotency handle carried across
// retries so a re-issued pay returns the same checkout, never a second charge.
ResumeSessionToken string
PaymentSessionID string // required; generate once via NewPaymentSessionID, reuse on retry
HTTPClient *http.Client
OpenBrowser func(string) error
OnStatus func(Status, string)
OnSession func(sessionToken string)
}
// StreamTopUpByKey funds the account behind APIKey via the hosted checkout and
// reports progress through OnStatus. It returns an empty ProvisionedKey: the
// pasted/env key is unchanged, only the balance grows.
func StreamTopUpByKey(ctx context.Context, options StreamTopUpByKeyOptions) (ProvisionedKey, error) {
endpoints := ResolveEndpoints()
if baseURL := strings.TrimSpace(options.InferenceBaseURL); baseURL != "" {
endpoints.InferenceBaseURL = baseURL
}
client := NewClient(endpoints, options.HTTPClient)
partnerID := ResolvePartnerID(options.PartnerID)
partnerName := firstNonEmpty(options.PartnerName, DefaultPartnerName)
amount, err := ParseAmountUSD(options.AmountUSD)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.APIKey) == "" {
return ProvisionedKey{}, fmt.Errorf("an API key is required to top up")
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.PaymentSessionID) == "" {
return ProvisionedKey{}, fmt.Errorf("a payment session id is required to top up")
}
status(options.OnStatus, StatusCreatingSession, "")
sessionToken, phase, err := resolveByKeySession(ctx, client, options, partnerID, partnerName, endpoints)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
reportSession(options.OnSession, sessionToken)
if phase <= phasePay {
successURL, cancelURL := BuildPartnerCheckoutReturnURLs(endpoints.PayBaseURL, sessionToken)
status(options.OnStatus, StatusOpeningCheckout, "")
pay, err := client.TopUpByKey(ctx, options.APIKey, TopUpByKeyRequest{
SessionToken: sessionToken,
AmountUSDMinor: amount,
PaymentSessionID: options.PaymentSessionID,
AutoTopUp: options.AutoTopUp,
SuccessURL: successURL,
CancelURL: cancelURL,
})
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
checkoutURL, err := validatedCheckoutURL(pay.Checkout.PayURL)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
announceCheckout(options.OnStatus, options.OpenBrowser, options.NoOpen, checkoutURL)
}
if phase <= phasePoll {
status(options.OnStatus, StatusWaitingPayment, "")
if _, err := pollUntilPaid(ctx, client, sessionToken, options.OnSession); err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
}
// No exchange: the account is funded and the caller keeps its existing key.
return ProvisionedKey{}, nil
}
// resolveByKeySession mirrors resolveTopupSession for the by-key flow. Because
// by-key never exchanges, a paid/exchanging/exchanged session all mean "already
// funded, done" (phaseExchange skips straight past pay + poll to the empty result).
func resolveByKeySession(ctx context.Context, client *Client, options StreamTopUpByKeyOptions, partnerID, partnerName string, endpoints Endpoints) (string, topupPhase, error) {
resume := strings.TrimSpace(options.ResumeSessionToken)
if resume == "" {
session, err := client.CreateSession(ctx, partnerID, partnerName, BuildPartnerReturnURL(endpoints.VerificationBaseURL))
if err != nil {
return "", phasePay, err
}
return session.SessionToken, phasePay, nil
}
session, err := client.GetSession(ctx, resume)
if err != nil {
if isTerminalSessionAPIError(err) {
reportSession(options.OnSession, "")
}
return "", phasePay, err
}
switch session.Status {
case SessionStatusPendingAuth:
return resume, phasePay, nil
case SessionStatusPendingPayment:
return resume, phasePoll, nil
case SessionStatusPaid, SessionStatusExchanging, SessionStatusExchanged:
return resume, phaseExchange, nil
default:
reportSession(options.OnSession, "") // drop the dead token → next run starts fresh
return "", phasePay, fmt.Errorf("payment %s; re-run the top-up to try again", session.Status)
}
}
-457
View File
@@ -1,457 +0,0 @@
package aimlapi
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestStreamTopUpByKeyFundsWithoutExchange(t *testing.T) {
var topupCalls, exchangeCalls int
var topupBody map[string]any
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/partner-checkout/sessions"):
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pcs_tok", Status: SessionStatusPendingAuth})
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/v2/billing/topup"):
topupCalls++
_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&topupBody)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(TopUpByKeyResult{Checkout: PaymentSession{PayURL: "https://pay/checkout"}})
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, "/partner-checkout/sessions/"):
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pcs_tok", Status: SessionStatusPaid})
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/exchange"):
exchangeCalls++
t.Errorf("by-key must never exchange a key")
default:
t.Errorf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}
}))
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_INFERENCE_URL", server.URL+"/v1")
var opened string
result, err := StreamTopUpByKey(context.Background(), StreamTopUpByKeyOptions{
APIKey: "sk-user",
AmountUSD: "20",
AutoTopUp: true,
PaymentSessionID: "pay-1",
OpenBrowser: func(u string) error { opened = u; return nil },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamTopUpByKey = %v", err)
}
if result.APIKey != "" {
t.Fatalf("by-key must not mint a key, got %q", result.APIKey)
}
if topupCalls != 1 || exchangeCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("topup=%d exchange=%d, want 1/0", topupCalls, exchangeCalls)
}
if opened != "https://pay/checkout" {
t.Fatalf("opened checkout = %q", opened)
}
if topupBody["autoTopUp"] != true || topupBody["paymentSessionId"] != "pay-1" {
t.Fatalf("topup body missing autoTopUp/paymentSessionId: %#v", topupBody)
}
}
func TestValidatedCheckoutURLRequiresAbsoluteHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
value string
want string
wantErr bool
}{
{name: "https", value: " https://pay.example.test/checkout?id=1 ", want: "https://pay.example.test/checkout?id=1"},
{name: "empty", wantErr: true},
{name: "relative", value: "/checkout", wantErr: true},
{name: "http", value: "http://pay.example.test/checkout", wantErr: true},
{name: "file", value: "file:///tmp/checkout", wantErr: true},
{name: "custom protocol", value: "wallet://checkout/123", wantErr: true},
{name: "userinfo", value: "https://[email protected]/checkout", wantErr: true},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := validatedCheckoutURL(test.value)
if (err != nil) != test.wantErr {
t.Fatalf("validatedCheckoutURL(%q) error = %v", test.value, err)
}
if got != test.want {
t.Fatalf("validatedCheckoutURL(%q) = %q, want %q", test.value, got, test.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpByKeyPinsValidatedInferenceEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
validatedCalls := 0
validated := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/partner-checkout/sessions"):
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pcs_tok", Status: SessionStatusPendingAuth})
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/v2/billing/topup"):
validatedCalls++
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(TopUpByKeyResult{Checkout: PaymentSession{PayURL: "https://pay/checkout"}})
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, "/partner-checkout/sessions/"):
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pcs_tok", Status: SessionStatusPaid})
default:
t.Errorf("unexpected validated-endpoint request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}
}))
defer validated.Close()
override := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Errorf("validated key leaked to process override: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}))
defer override.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", validated.URL)
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_INFERENCE_URL", override.URL)
_, err := StreamTopUpByKey(context.Background(), StreamTopUpByKeyOptions{
APIKey: "production-key",
AmountUSD: "20",
InferenceBaseURL: validated.URL,
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
OpenBrowser: func(string) error { return nil },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamTopUpByKey() error = %v", err)
}
if validatedCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("validated endpoint top-up calls = %d, want 1", validatedCalls)
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpEmailRetrySendsStablePaymentSessionID(t *testing.T) {
getCalls := 0
var paymentSessionID string
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, "/partner-checkout/sessions/"):
status := SessionStatusPendingAuth
if getCalls > 0 {
status = SessionStatusPaid
}
getCalls++
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pcs_retry", Status: status})
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/pay"):
var body map[string]any
_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body)
paymentSessionID, _ = body["paymentSessionId"].(string)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PayResult{Checkout: PaymentSession{PayURL: "https://pay/checkout"}})
default:
t.Errorf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}
}))
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
_, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pcs_retry",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-stable",
AmountUSD: "20",
NoOpen: true,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamTopUp() error = %v", err)
}
if paymentSessionID != "payment-stable" {
t.Fatalf("paymentSessionId = %q, want stable retry id", paymentSessionID)
}
}
// resumeServer is a partner-checkout backend fake that fails the test if the
// re-charging endpoints (create-session / pay) are ever hit, and serves a
// scripted GetSession status sequence so a resume can be driven deterministically.
type resumeServer struct {
t *testing.T
statuses []string // GetSession status per call, last value repeats
getCalls int
payCalls int
createCall int
exchanged int
}
func (rs *resumeServer) handler() http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/partner-checkout/sessions"):
rs.createCall++
rs.t.Errorf("resume must not create a new session")
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/pay"):
rs.payCalls++
rs.t.Errorf("resume must not re-pay (double charge)")
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/exchange"):
rs.exchanged++
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(ExchangeResult{APIKey: "sk-resumed", APIKeyID: "key_1"})
case r.Method == http.MethodGet:
status := rs.statuses[len(rs.statuses)-1]
if rs.getCalls < len(rs.statuses) {
status = rs.statuses[rs.getCalls]
}
rs.getCalls++
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pc_tok", Status: SessionStatus(status)})
default:
rs.t.Errorf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}
})
}
func TestStreamTopUpResumePaidExchangesWithoutRecharge(t *testing.T) {
rs := &resumeServer{t: t, statuses: []string{"paid"}}
server := httptest.NewServer(rs.handler())
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
var seen string
result, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_tok",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
AmountUSD: "20",
Exchange: true,
NoOpen: true,
OnSession: func(token string) { seen = token },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamTopUp resume = %v", err)
}
if result.APIKey != "sk-resumed" {
t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want recovered key", result.APIKey)
}
if rs.exchanged != 1 {
t.Fatalf("exchange calls = %d, want 1", rs.exchanged)
}
if seen != "pc_tok" {
t.Fatalf("OnSession token = %q, want retained pc_tok", seen)
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpResumePendingPaymentPollsNeverRepays(t *testing.T) {
// First GetSession (resume resolution) sees the still-open checkout; the next
// (poll) sees it settle. Pay must never be called — the fake fails the test if
// it is.
rs := &resumeServer{t: t, statuses: []string{"pending_payment", "paid"}}
server := httptest.NewServer(rs.handler())
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
result, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_tok",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
AmountUSD: "20",
Exchange: true,
NoOpen: true,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamTopUp resume = %v", err)
}
if result.APIKey != "sk-resumed" {
t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want recovered key", result.APIKey)
}
if rs.payCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("pay calls = %d, want 0", rs.payCalls)
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpPollingDeadSessionClearsRetainedToken(t *testing.T) {
rs := &resumeServer{t: t, statuses: []string{"pending_payment", "expired"}}
server := httptest.NewServer(rs.handler())
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
seen := []string{}
_, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_tok",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
AmountUSD: "20",
Exchange: true,
NoOpen: true,
OnSession: func(token string) { seen = append(seen, token) },
})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "payment expired") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want expired payment error", err)
}
if len(seen) == 0 || seen[len(seen)-1] != "" {
t.Fatalf("OnSession events = %#v, want terminal clear", seen)
}
}
func TestPollUntilPaidTerminal4xxClearsRetainedToken(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, "session rejected", http.StatusNotFound)
}))
defer server.Close()
seen := "retained"
_, err := pollUntilPaid(context.Background(), NewClient(Endpoints{AppBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client()), "pc_missing", func(token string) {
seen = token
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("pollUntilPaid() error = nil, want terminal 4xx")
}
if seen != "" {
t.Fatalf("retained session = %q, want cleared", seen)
}
}
func TestPollUntilExchangeSettledClearsDeadSession(t *testing.T) {
for _, test := range []struct {
name string
statusCode int
status SessionStatus
}{
{name: "terminal API rejection", statusCode: http.StatusNotFound},
{name: "expired exchange claim", status: SessionStatusExpired},
} {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
if test.statusCode != 0 {
http.Error(w, "session rejected", test.statusCode)
return
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pcs_dead", Status: test.status})
}))
defer server.Close()
seen := "retained"
err := pollUntilExchangeSettled(context.Background(), NewClient(Endpoints{AppBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client()), "pcs_dead", func(token string) {
seen = token
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("pollUntilExchangeSettled() error = nil")
}
if seen != "" {
t.Fatalf("retained session = %q, want cleared", seen)
}
})
}
}
func TestResumeHelpersClearOnlyRejectedSessions(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
status int
wantClear bool
}{
{name: "terminal 4xx", status: http.StatusNotFound, wantClear: true},
{name: "retryable 5xx", status: http.StatusServiceUnavailable, wantClear: false},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, "session lookup failed", test.status)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{AppBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
for _, flow := range []struct {
name string
resolve func(func(string)) error
}{
{
name: "session bearer",
resolve: func(onSession func(string)) error {
_, _, err := resolveTopupSession(context.Background(), client, StreamTopUpOptions{
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_rejected", OnSession: onSession,
}, DefaultPartnerID, DefaultPartnerName, Endpoints{})
return err
},
},
{
name: "api key",
resolve: func(onSession func(string)) error {
_, _, err := resolveByKeySession(context.Background(), client, StreamTopUpByKeyOptions{
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_rejected", OnSession: onSession,
}, DefaultPartnerID, DefaultPartnerName, Endpoints{})
return err
},
},
} {
t.Run(flow.name, func(t *testing.T) {
seen := "retained"
if err := flow.resolve(func(token string) { seen = token }); err == nil {
t.Fatal("resolve error = nil")
}
if cleared := seen == ""; cleared != test.wantClear {
t.Fatalf("session cleared = %v, want %v", cleared, test.wantClear)
}
})
}
})
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpResumeExchangedReturnsRecoveryError(t *testing.T) {
rs := &resumeServer{t: t, statuses: []string{"exchanged"}}
server := httptest.NewServer(rs.handler())
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
_, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_tok",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
AmountUSD: "20",
Exchange: true,
NoOpen: true,
})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "already exchanged") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want an already-exchanged recovery error", err)
}
if rs.exchanged != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exchange calls = %d, want 0 (no second key)", rs.exchanged)
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpResumeExchangingPollsWithoutSecondExchange(t *testing.T) {
rs := &resumeServer{t: t, statuses: []string{"exchanging", "exchanged"}}
server := httptest.NewServer(rs.handler())
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
_, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_tok",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
AmountUSD: "20",
Exchange: true,
NoOpen: true,
})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "already exchanged") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want dashboard recovery guidance", err)
}
if rs.exchanged != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exchange calls = %d, want 0 while an exchange claim is in flight", rs.exchanged)
}
if rs.createCall != 0 || rs.payCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("resume created/paid a new checkout: create=%d pay=%d", rs.createCall, rs.payCalls)
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpPollObservesExchangingWithoutSecondExchange(t *testing.T) {
rs := &resumeServer{t: t, statuses: []string{"pending_payment", "exchanging", "exchanged"}}
server := httptest.NewServer(rs.handler())
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
_, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_tok",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
AmountUSD: "20",
Exchange: true,
NoOpen: true,
})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "already exchanged") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want dashboard recovery guidance", err)
}
if rs.exchanged != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exchange calls = %d, want 0 after poll observed an existing claim", rs.exchanged)
}
}
-186
View File
@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
package aimlapi
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
// Status is a progress phase reported by StreamTopUp through its OnStatus callback.
type Status string
const (
StatusCreatingSession Status = "creating-session"
StatusOpeningCheckout Status = "opening-checkout"
StatusWaitingPayment Status = "waiting-payment"
StatusProvisioningKey Status = "provisioning-key"
)
// ProvisionedKey is the outcome of a top-up: the (optionally minted) API key plus
// the inference base URL and model to write into the provider profile.
type ProvisionedKey struct {
APIKey string
APIKeyID string
BaseURL string
Model string
}
const (
pollInterval = 3 * time.Second
pollTimeout = 20 * time.Minute
)
// ParseAmountUSD parses a dollar string into USD minor units (cents), enforcing the
// min/max top-up bounds. An empty value yields the default amount.
func ParseAmountUSD(value string) (int, error) {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if value == "" {
return DefaultAmountUSDMinor, nil
}
dollars, err := strconv.ParseFloat(value, 64)
// NaN/±Inf parse without error and slip past the min/max comparisons below
// (every ordered comparison with NaN is false), so reject them explicitly
// before the cents conversion turns them into a garbage minor-unit amount.
if err != nil || math.IsNaN(dollars) || math.IsInf(dollars, 0) || dollars <= 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid amount %q; pass a positive USD amount", value)
}
minor := int(dollars*100 + 0.5)
if minor < MinAmountUSDMinor {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("minimum top-up is $%d", MinAmountUSDMinor/100)
}
if minor > MaxAmountUSDMinor {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("maximum top-up is $%d", MaxAmountUSDMinor/100)
}
return minor, nil
}
// NewPaymentSessionID returns a random UUIDv4-shaped idempotency id for a top-up.
// The caller generates it once per top-up intent and reuses it on retry so the
// backend (and Stripe) coalesce retries onto the same checkout instead of a
// second charge.
func NewPaymentSessionID() (string, error) {
var b [16]byte
if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
return "", err
}
b[6] = (b[6] & 0x0f) | 0x40 // version 4
b[8] = (b[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80 // variant 10
return fmt.Sprintf("%x-%x-%x-%x-%x", b[0:4], b[4:6], b[6:8], b[8:10], b[10:16]), nil
}
func pollUntilPaid(ctx context.Context, client *Client, sessionToken string, onSession func(string)) (PartnerCheckoutSession, error) {
deadline := time.Now().Add(pollTimeout)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
session, err := client.GetSession(ctx, sessionToken)
if err != nil {
// Context cancellation/deadline is terminal (also covers an in-flight
// request cancelled mid-poll, whose transport error wraps ctx.Err()).
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, err
}
// A 4xx API response is terminal. Everything else — a 5xx or a transient
// transport error (non-APIError, e.g. a dropped connection during the
// wait) — is retried until the poll deadline.
if isTerminalSessionAPIError(err) {
reportSession(onSession, "")
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, err
}
if err := sleepContext(ctx, pollInterval); err != nil {
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, err
}
continue
}
switch session.Status {
case SessionStatusPaid, SessionStatusExchanging:
return session, nil
case SessionStatusExchanged:
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, fmt.Errorf("session was already exchanged; rotate the key from the aimlapi.com dashboard")
case SessionStatusCancelled, SessionStatusExpired, SessionStatusFailed:
// The checkout cannot recover from these states. Drop the retained token
// (and the TUI's paired by-key idempotency ID) now so the very next retry
// creates a fresh payment intent.
reportSession(onSession, "")
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, fmt.Errorf("payment %s; re-run the top-up to try again", session.Status)
default:
if err := sleepContext(ctx, pollInterval); err != nil {
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, err
}
}
}
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, fmt.Errorf("timed out waiting for payment; re-run once the payment clears")
}
func isTerminalSessionAPIError(err error) bool {
var apiErr APIError
return errors.As(err, &apiErr) && apiErr.Status >= http.StatusBadRequest && apiErr.Status < http.StatusInternalServerError
}
// pollUntilExchangeSettled follows an exchange claim that was already in flight
// when a retry resumed the session. Exchange is single-flight and the raw key is
// returned only to the winning request, so issuing Exchange again is never safe.
// Once the claim completes, direct the user to the dashboard recovery path.
func pollUntilExchangeSettled(ctx context.Context, client *Client, sessionToken string, onSession func(string)) error {
deadline := time.Now().Add(pollTimeout)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
session, err := client.GetSession(ctx, sessionToken)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
return err
}
if isTerminalSessionAPIError(err) {
reportSession(onSession, "")
return err
}
if err := sleepContext(ctx, pollInterval); err != nil {
return err
}
continue
}
switch session.Status {
case SessionStatusExchanged:
return fmt.Errorf("session was already exchanged; rotate the key from the aimlapi.com dashboard")
case SessionStatusExchanging:
if err := sleepContext(ctx, pollInterval); err != nil {
return err
}
case SessionStatusCancelled, SessionStatusExpired, SessionStatusFailed:
reportSession(onSession, "")
return fmt.Errorf("key provisioning %s; rotate the key from the aimlapi.com dashboard", session.Status)
default:
return fmt.Errorf("key provisioning returned to %s; re-run the top-up", session.Status)
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("timed out waiting for key provisioning; retry to check the same session")
}
func sleepContext(ctx context.Context, delay time.Duration) error {
timer := time.NewTimer(delay)
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case <-timer.C:
return nil
}
}
func status(callback func(Status, string), value Status, detail string) {
if callback != nil {
callback(value, detail)
}
}
func firstNonEmpty(values ...string) string {
for _, value := range values {
if value = strings.TrimSpace(value); value != "" {
return value
}
}
return ""
}
-38
View File
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
package aimlapi
import (
"net/mail"
"strings"
)
// ValidEmail performs the lightweight validation used before starting the
// passwordless onboarding request.
func ValidEmail(value string) bool {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
address, err := mail.ParseAddress(value)
if err != nil || address.Address != value {
return false
}
at := strings.LastIndexByte(value, '@')
if at <= 0 || at == len(value)-1 {
return false
}
domain := value[at+1:]
if strings.HasPrefix(domain, ".") || strings.HasSuffix(domain, ".") || strings.Contains(domain, "..") {
return false
}
dot := strings.LastIndexByte(domain, '.')
if dot <= 0 || dot == len(domain)-1 {
return false
}
tld := domain[dot+1:]
if len(tld) < 2 {
return false
}
for _, char := range tld {
if char < 'A' || char > 'Z' && char < 'a' || char > 'z' {
return false
}
}
return true
}
+74 -4
View File
@@ -3,10 +3,11 @@
package background
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"os/exec"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
)
// terminationGracePeriod is how long a process has to exit after SIGTERM before
@@ -21,7 +22,10 @@ var (
// the negative PID (the group), so any process the child forks dies with it
// instead of being orphaned. Must be called before cmd.Start.
func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
execution.ConfigureProcessGroup(cmd)
if cmd.SysProcAttr == nil {
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{}
}
cmd.SysProcAttr.Setpgid = true
}
// terminateProcess stops a background process. It first asks politely with
@@ -37,5 +41,71 @@ func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
// back to signalling only the individual PID, which also avoids reporting a false
// success when a non-leader group-signal returns ESRCH.
func terminateProcess(pid int) error {
return execution.TerminateProcessTree(pid, terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval)
// Guard pid <= 1: kill(-0) would target our OWN process group and kill(-1)
// every process we can signal. A real child PID is always > 1, so never let a
// bogus 0/1 expand into either.
if pid <= 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing to terminate invalid pid %d", pid)
}
// Signal the whole group only when pid leads its own group; otherwise the
// individual process. See the doc comment for why a non-leader is signalled
// directly rather than via its (foreign) group.
target := pid
if pgid, err := syscall.Getpgid(pid); err == nil {
if pgid == pid {
target = -pid
}
} else if processGoneError(err) {
return nil // already gone
}
alive := func() bool { return syscall.Kill(target, syscall.Signal(0)) == nil }
if err := syscall.Kill(target, syscall.SIGTERM); err != nil {
if processGoneError(err) {
return nil
}
return err
}
// Poll liveness so we return promptly once it exits, rather than always
// waiting out the full grace period.
deadline := time.Now().Add(terminationGracePeriod)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
if !alive() {
return nil
}
time.Sleep(terminationPollInterval)
}
if !alive() {
return nil
}
// Still alive after the grace period: force-kill.
if err := syscall.Kill(target, syscall.SIGKILL); err != nil && !processGoneError(err) {
return err
}
// SIGKILL is asynchronous: the kernel may not have reaped it yet. Poll again
// so this helper only reports success once the target is actually gone —
// otherwise the caller gets nil while descendants are still racing.
deadline = time.Now().Add(terminationGracePeriod)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
if !alive() {
return nil
}
time.Sleep(terminationPollInterval)
}
if alive() {
return fmt.Errorf("process %d did not exit after SIGKILL", pid)
}
return nil
}
// processGoneError reports whether an error means the process group has already
// exited (so termination is effectively done). syscall.Kill reports ESRCH when
// no process in the target group remains.
func processGoneError(err error) bool {
return errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH)
}
+6 -3
View File
@@ -149,9 +149,12 @@ func TestTerminateProcessKillsForkedChildren(t *testing.T) {
// The forked child must be gone too (poll until reaped by init).
deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
// Only ESRCH proves the child is gone; any other error (e.g. EPERM) would
// wrongly pass the test, so treat it as still-present and keep polling.
for !errors.Is(syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH) {
for {
// Only ESRCH proves the child is gone; any other error (e.g. EPERM) would
// wrongly pass the test, so treat it as still-present and keep polling.
if errors.Is(syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH) {
break // child no longer exists
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
_ = syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.SIGKILL)
t.Fatalf("forked child %d survived terminateProcess — group kill failed", childPID)
+26 -6
View File
@@ -3,16 +3,36 @@
package background
import (
"os"
"os/exec"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
)
// ConfigureChildProcessGroup is a no-op on Windows: process-tree termination is
// delegated to execution.TerminateProcessTree, so no launch-time process-group
// ConfigureChildProcessGroup is a no-op on Windows: terminateProcess uses
// `taskkill /T` to kill the whole process tree, so no launch-time process-group
// setup is required (the POSIX build sets Setpgid here instead).
func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) { execution.ConfigureProcessGroup(cmd) }
func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) {}
func terminateProcess(pid int) error {
return execution.TerminateProcessTree(pid, 0, 0)
taskkill := taskkillPath()
if err := exec.Command(taskkill, "/T", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(pid)).Run(); err == nil {
return nil
}
process, err := os.FindProcess(pid)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return process.Kill()
}
func taskkillPath() string {
systemRoot := os.Getenv("SystemRoot")
if systemRoot == "" {
systemRoot = os.Getenv("windir")
}
if systemRoot == "" {
systemRoot = `C:\Windows`
}
return filepath.Join(systemRoot, "System32", "taskkill.exe")
}
+3 -12
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package cli
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
@@ -10,7 +9,6 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/acp"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
@@ -27,8 +25,6 @@ Usage:
Not meant to be run interactively — point your editor's ACP / external-agent
setting at "zero acp".`
var acpSignalContext = signalContext
// runACP serves ACP over stdio so an editor can drive ZERO's agent core. It
// speaks JSON-RPC 2.0 (newline-delimited JSON) on stdin/stdout; stderr stays free
// for human-readable diagnostics. The session lifecycle maps onto ZERO's own
@@ -44,14 +40,9 @@ func runACP(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int
}
}
// The process's own stdin belongs exclusively to this Conn for the life of
// the command, so cancellation may close it to interrupt an idle read.
conn := acp.NewOwnedConn(deps.stdin, stdout)
conn := acp.NewConn(deps.stdin, stdout)
acp.NewAgent(conn, acp.Deps{
ResolveConfig: deps.resolveConfig,
DiscoverModels: func(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return defaultDiscoverProviderModels(ctx, discoveryCredentialProfile(profile))
},
// deps.newProvider is wrapped in fillAppDeps to apply the stored API key,
// so ACP is authenticated for apiKeyStored profiles like every other
// surface — no ACP-specific credential handling needed.
@@ -77,9 +68,9 @@ func runACP(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int
AgentInfo: acp.Implementation{Name: "zero", Version: version},
})
ctx, stop := acpSignalContext()
ctx, stop := signalContext()
defer stop()
if err := conn.Serve(ctx); err != nil {
if err := conn.Serve(ctx); err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "acp: "+err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
return exitSuccess
-120
View File
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
package cli
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
)
type acpTestReader func([]byte) (int, error)
func (r acpTestReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r(p) }
type acpTestWriter func([]byte) (int, error)
func (w acpTestWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return w(p) }
func installACPTestContext(t *testing.T) context.CancelFunc {
t.Helper()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
previous := acpSignalContext
acpSignalContext = func() (context.Context, context.CancelFunc) {
return ctx, cancel
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
cancel()
acpSignalContext = previous
})
return cancel
}
func TestRunACPCancellationPreservesTerminalReadError(t *testing.T) {
cancel := installACPTestContext(t)
wantErr := errors.New("transport read failed")
reader := acpTestReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
return copy(p, `{"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":1}`+"\n"), wantErr
})
writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
var stdout bytes.Buffer
writer := acpTestWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
writeStarted <- struct{}{}
<-releaseWrite
return stdout.Write(p)
})
var stderr bytes.Buffer
done := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
done <- runACP(nil, writer, &stderr, fillAppDeps(appDeps{stdin: reader}))
}()
select {
case <-writeStarted:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("ACP did not reach the response write")
}
// Keep Serve in the synchronous write until cancellation is observable. The
// regression requires the genuine read error to win over that cancellation.
cancel()
close(releaseWrite)
select {
case code := <-done:
if code != exitCrash {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want crash %d", code, exitCrash)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("ACP did not exit after terminal read error")
}
if got := stderr.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "acp: "+wantErr.Error()) {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want terminal read error", got)
}
}
func TestRunACPIdleCancellationExitsCleanly(t *testing.T) {
cancel := installACPTestContext(t)
pipeReader, pipeWriter := io.Pipe()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = pipeWriter.Close() })
readStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
reader := &acpNotifyingReadCloser{ReadCloser: pipeReader, readStarted: readStarted}
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
done := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
done <- runACP(nil, &stdout, &stderr, fillAppDeps(appDeps{stdin: reader}))
}()
select {
case <-readStarted:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("ACP did not begin reading")
}
cancel()
select {
case code := <-done:
if code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want success %d; stderr: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("ACP did not exit after cancellation")
}
if stderr.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want empty", stderr.String())
}
}
type acpNotifyingReadCloser struct {
io.ReadCloser
readStarted chan<- struct{}
once sync.Once
}
func (r *acpNotifyingReadCloser) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
r.once.Do(func() { r.readStarted <- struct{}{} })
return r.ReadCloser.Read(p)
}
+3 -1
View File
@@ -515,7 +515,9 @@ func agentEvalReportFromBenchmark(suite agenteval.Suite, report agenteval.Benchm
if task.Agent.Truncated {
converted.Truncated = true
}
converted.Failures = append(converted.Failures, agentEvalFailuresFromTaskReport(task)...)
for _, failure := range agentEvalFailuresFromTaskReport(task) {
converted.Failures = append(converted.Failures, failure)
}
}
return converted
}
+16 -63
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/localcontrol"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/mcp"
@@ -43,7 +42,6 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/worktrees"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zerogit"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/charmbracelet/x/term"
)
var version = "dev"
@@ -59,11 +57,7 @@ type appDeps struct {
// config.SetActiveProviderEnv, set in defaultAppDeps — deliberately NOT filled
// by fillAppDeps, so tests never mutate the process environment unless they
// inject it). nil ⇒ no export.
exportActiveProvider func(providerName string)
// getenv reads a process environment variable (production: os.Getenv, set in
// defaultAppDeps — deliberately NOT filled by fillAppDeps, so tests are hermetic
// against ambient vars like ZERO_PROVIDER unless they inject it). nil ⇒ empty.
getenv func(string) string
exportActiveProvider func(providerName string)
probeProviderHealth func(context.Context, providerhealth.Options) providerhealth.Result
discoverProviderModels func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error)
detectLocalRuntimes func(context.Context, provideronboarding.LocalDetectOptions) []provideronboarding.DetectedLocalRuntime
@@ -123,7 +117,6 @@ func defaultAppDeps() appDeps {
stdin: os.Stdin,
userConfigPath: config.DefaultUserConfigPath,
exportActiveProvider: config.SetActiveProviderEnv,
getenv: os.Getenv,
resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
options, err := config.DefaultResolveOptions(workspaceRoot)
if err != nil {
@@ -346,17 +339,7 @@ func runWithDeps(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
return 0
}
}
// Pipes and redirects keep the machine-readable contract exactly as it
// was: a single "zero <version>" line. Scripts, command substitutions,
// and the NPM wrapper smoke check all parse that record, so the banner
// is strictly a TTY affordance.
if !stdoutIsTerminal(stdout) {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "zero %s\n", version); err != nil {
return 1
}
return 0
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "%s\n\nzero %s\n", tui.Wordmark(), version); err != nil {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "zero %s\n", version); err != nil {
return 1
}
return 0
@@ -374,8 +357,6 @@ func runWithDeps(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
case "exec":
// Forward leading --add-dir occurrences so exec's own parser collects them.
return runExec(append(addDirFlagArgs(addDirs), args[1:]...), stdout, stderr, deps)
case "completions":
return runCompletions(args[1:], stdout, stderr)
case "daemon":
return runDaemon(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
case "config":
@@ -585,9 +566,6 @@ func fillAppDeps(deps appDeps) appDeps {
baseProbeProviderHealth := deps.probeProviderHealth
deps.probeProviderHealth = func(ctx context.Context, options providerhealth.Options) providerhealth.Result {
options.Profile = applyStoredProviderKeyAt(options.Profile, userConfigPath)
if options.OAuthResolver == nil {
options.OAuthResolver, _ = oauthLoginForProfile(options.Profile)
}
return baseProbeProviderHealth(ctx, options)
}
return deps
@@ -689,26 +667,6 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
registry := newCoreRegistryScoped(workspaceRoot, scope)
registerLocalControlTools(registry, workspaceRoot, resolved.LocalControl)
executionRunner := execution.NewRunner(nil)
sandboxStore, err := deps.newSandboxStore()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to initialize sandbox grants: "+err.Error(), 1)
}
if notice, err := sandboxStore.ConsumeMigrationNotice(); err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to migrate sandbox grants: "+err.Error(), 1)
} else if notice != "" {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] "+notice)
}
sandboxBackend := deps.selectSandboxBackend(sandbox.BackendOptions{})
sandboxEngine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Policy: applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(sandbox.DefaultPolicy(), resolved.Sandbox),
Store: sandboxStore,
Backend: sandboxBackend,
Scope: scope,
SensitiveEnvKeys: providerSensitiveEnvKeys(resolved),
})
executionRunner.SetPreparer(sandboxEngine)
specialistRuntime, err := registerSpecialistTools(registry, workspaceRoot, resolved.Swarm.MaxTeamSize)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to initialize specialist tools: "+err.Error(), 1)
@@ -743,8 +701,6 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
mcpRuntime, err = deps.registerMCPTools(context.Background(), registry, mcpConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions{
PermissionStore: mcpPermissionStore,
Autonomy: mcp.AutonomyLow,
Execution: executionRunner,
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
})
}
if err != nil {
@@ -771,7 +727,7 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
// The interactive TUI is not worktree-reassigned, so the trust root is the
// launch directory itself.
trustRoot := workspaceRoot
pluginActivation := activatePlugins(workspaceRoot, registry, deps, stderr, trustRoot, executionRunner)
pluginActivation := activatePlugins(workspaceRoot, registry, deps, stderr, trustRoot)
// Ask (not Auto) is the interactive default: in Auto, ToolAdvertised exposes
// only PermissionAllow tools, so prompt-gated tools (write_file/edit_file/bash/
// apply_patch) would never be offered to the model — the TUI could neither edit
@@ -793,6 +749,18 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
// unchanged. The interactive surface applies no operator tool filters, so
// enabled/disabled are nil — matching the AgentOptions below.
registerToolSearchIfEligible(registry, resolved.Tools.DeferThreshold, permissionMode, nil, nil)
sandboxStore, err := deps.newSandboxStore()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to initialize sandbox grants: "+err.Error(), 1)
}
sandboxBackend := deps.selectSandboxBackend(sandbox.BackendOptions{})
sandboxEngine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Policy: applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(sandbox.DefaultPolicy(), resolved.Sandbox),
Store: sandboxStore,
Backend: sandboxBackend,
Scope: scope,
})
lastKnownMCPConfig := mcpConfig
fileTracker := tools.NewFileTracker()
var scratchBaseline scratchFileBaseline
@@ -809,7 +777,7 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
// Build the hooks dispatcher out of the AgentOptions literal so its trust skip
// report can be combined with the plugin activation's, and emit at most one
// notice when project hooks/plugins were dropped for an untrusted workspace.
hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks, trustRoot, executionRunner)
hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks, trustRoot)
emitTrustNotice(stderr, hookSkip, pluginActivation.trustSkip, mcpSkip)
return deps.runTUI(context.Background(), tui.Options{
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
@@ -1147,17 +1115,6 @@ func closeSpecialistRuntime(stderr io.Writer, runtime *agentToolRuntime) {
}
}
// stdoutIsTerminal reports whether w is an interactive terminal. Tests pass
// bytes.Buffer writers and pipes/redirects fail term.IsTerminal, so both take
// the machine-readable path.
func stdoutIsTerminal(w io.Writer) bool {
f, ok := w.(*os.File)
if !ok {
return false
}
return term.IsTerminal(f.Fd())
}
func writeAppError(stderr io.Writer, message string, exitCode int) int {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "[zero] %s\n", message); err != nil {
return 1
@@ -1177,7 +1134,6 @@ Usage:
Commands:
exec Run a one-shot prompt through the Go agent runtime
completions Generate shell completion scripts
daemon Manage the local background worker daemon (start/stop/status/run/attach)
setup Guide first-run provider setup
config Inspect resolved Go configuration without leaking secrets
@@ -1362,9 +1318,6 @@ Flags:
--spec-reasoning-effort <effort>
Override draft reasoning effort when --use-spec is set
--max-turns <number> Override the maximum agent loop turns
--exec-profile <name> Apply an execution profile (balanced, fast, thorough): loop
posture only (turn budget, effort, self-correction, escalation);
composes with --mode (which picks the model) and explicit flags win
--auto <low|medium|high> Set exec autonomy; high enables unsafe tools
--enabled-tools <tools> Only expose these comma or space separated tools
--disabled-tools <tools> Hide these comma or space separated tools
-29
View File
@@ -41,8 +41,6 @@ func TestRunPrintsVersion(t *testing.T) {
if exitCode != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code 0, got %d", exitCode)
}
// Non-terminal stdout keeps the machine-readable contract: exactly one
// "zero <version>" record, no wordmark banner, no ANSI.
if got := stdout.String(); got != "zero dev\n" {
t.Fatalf("expected version output, got %q", got)
}
@@ -51,33 +49,6 @@ func TestRunPrintsVersion(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestRunVersionRedirectedFile covers the `zero --version > file` path: stdout
// is a real *os.File but not a terminal, so the single-line contract must hold.
func TestRunVersionRedirectedFile(t *testing.T) {
stdout, err := os.CreateTemp(t.TempDir(), "version-stdout")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create temp stdout: %v", err)
}
defer stdout.Close()
var stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := Run([]string{"--version"}, stdout, &stderr)
if exitCode != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code 0, got %d", exitCode)
}
content, err := os.ReadFile(stdout.Name())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read temp stdout: %v", err)
}
if got := string(content); got != "zero dev\n" {
t.Fatalf("expected version output, got %q", got)
}
if stderr.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected empty stderr, got %q", stderr.String())
}
}
func TestRunPrintsHelp(t *testing.T) {
for _, args := range [][]string{
{"--help"},
-77
View File
@@ -348,83 +348,6 @@ func TestRunProvidersAddWritesCatalogProfile(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunProvidersAddAimlapiWritesDefaultHeaders(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "add", "aimlapi"}, &stdout, &stderr, providerSetupDeps(configPath))
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
}
cfg := readFileConfig(t, configPath)
if len(cfg.Providers) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("providers = %#v, want one provider", cfg.Providers)
}
profile := cfg.Providers[0]
if profile.Name != "aimlapi" ||
profile.CatalogID != "aimlapi" ||
profile.BaseURL != "https://api.aimlapi.com/v1" ||
profile.Model != "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5" ||
profile.APIKeyEnv != "AIMLAPI_API_KEY" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected provider profile: %#v", profile)
}
if profile.CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID"] != "part_62yQoGYDq4Yqnrj2R1iGrDNJ" ||
profile.CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Integration-Repo"] != "Gitlawb/zero" {
t.Fatalf("missing aimlapi.com default headers: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
}
func TestRunProvidersAddAimlapiMixedCaseHeaderOverride(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
// A differently-cased override must replace the catalog header in place, not
// leave both spellings behind to race when request construction canonicalizes.
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{
"providers", "add", "aimlapi",
"--header", "x-aimlapi-partner-id=part_override",
}, &stdout, &stderr, providerSetupDeps(configPath))
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
}
profile := readFileConfig(t, configPath).Providers[0]
if _, ok := profile.CustomHeaders["x-aimlapi-partner-id"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("lowercase override left a duplicate key: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
if profile.CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID"] != "part_override" {
t.Fatalf("override did not win on the canonical key: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
}
func TestRunProvidersAddAimlapiOverrideDropsCatalogHeaders(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{
"providers", "add", "aimlapi",
"--base-url", "https://staging.example/v1",
"--header", "X-Environment=staging",
}, &stdout, &stderr, providerSetupDeps(configPath))
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
}
profile := readFileConfig(t, configPath).Providers[0]
if _, ok := profile.CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("partner attribution leaked to overridden endpoint: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
if _, ok := profile.CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Integration-Repo"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("integration attribution leaked to overridden endpoint: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
if profile.CustomHeaders["X-Environment"] != "staging" {
t.Fatalf("explicit user header was dropped: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
}
func TestRunProvidersAddWritesCustomHeaders(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
-404
View File
@@ -1,404 +0,0 @@
package cli
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"sort"
"strings"
)
type completionNode struct {
names []string
flags []string
children []completionNode
}
type completionContext struct {
path string
candidates []string
transitions map[string]string
}
var completionRoot = completionNode{
flags: []string{"-h", "--help", "-v", "--version", "-p", "--prompt", "--add-dir", "--theme", "--skip-permissions-unsafe"},
children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"exec"}, flags: []string{
"-h", "--help", "-f", "--file", "--image", "--add-dir", "--mode", "-m", "--model",
"--use-spec", "--spec-model", "--spec-reasoning-effort", "--max-turns", "--exec-profile",
"--auto", "--enabled-tools", "--disabled-tools", "--list-tools", "--profile", "-r",
"--reasoning-effort", "-C", "--cwd", "-w", "--worktree", "--worktree-dir", "-i",
"--input-format", "-o", "--output-format", "--prompt", "--resume", "--fork",
"--calling-session-id", "--calling-tool-use-id", "--tag", "--depth", "--session-title",
"--init-session-id", "--skip-permissions-unsafe", "--allow-escalation", "--self-correct",
"--notify", "--no-notify", "--no-completion-gate",
}},
{
names: []string{"completions"},
flags: []string{"-h", "--help"},
children: leafNodes("bash", "zsh", "fish", "powershell", "elvish"),
},
{names: []string{"daemon"}, children: leafNodes("start", "stop", "status", "run", "attach", "serve-remote", "link")},
{names: []string{"setup"}},
{names: []string{"config"}},
{names: []string{"models"}, children: []completionNode{{names: []string{"list", "ls"}}}},
{names: []string{"providers"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"current"}}, {names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"catalog"}},
{names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"check"}}, {names: []string{"use"}},
{names: []string{"remove", "rm"}}, {names: []string{"rename"}}, {names: []string{"setup"}},
{names: []string{"detect"}}, {names: []string{"models"}},
}},
{names: []string{"doctor"}},
{names: []string{"context"}},
{names: []string{"repo-map", "repomap"}},
{names: []string{"search", "find"}},
{names: []string{"sessions", "session"}, children: leafNodes("list", "children", "lineage", "tree", "rewind-plan", "rewind", "compact-plan")},
{names: []string{"spec"}, children: leafNodes("show", "approve", "reject")},
{names: []string{"init"}},
{names: []string{"specialists", "specialist"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"show"}}, {names: []string{"create"}},
{names: []string{"delete", "rm"}}, {names: []string{"edit"}}, {names: []string{"path"}},
}},
{names: []string{"plugins", "plugin"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"info"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}},
}},
{names: []string{"backends", "backend"}, children: leafNodes("doctor")},
{names: []string{"skills", "skill"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"info"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}},
}},
{names: []string{"tools", "tool"}, children: leafNodes("make", "list")},
{names: []string{"hooks"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}},
{names: []string{"enable"}}, {names: []string{"disable"}},
}},
{names: []string{"mcp"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}}, {names: []string{"enable"}},
{names: []string{"disable"}}, {names: []string{"check"}}, {names: []string{"list"}},
{names: []string{"permissions"}, children: leafNodes("list", "revoke", "clear")},
{names: []string{"tools"}, children: leafNodes("list")},
{names: []string{"oauth"}, children: leafNodes("login", "logout", "status")},
}},
{names: []string{"auth"}, children: leafNodes("openrouter", "chatgpt", "login", "logout", "status", "refresh")},
{names: []string{"sandbox"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"policy"}}, {names: []string{"setup"}}, {names: []string{"check"}},
{names: []string{"grants"}, children: leafNodes("list", "allow", "deny", "revoke", "clear")},
}},
{names: []string{"update"}},
{names: []string{"upgrade"}},
{names: []string{"worktrees", "worktree"}, children: leafNodes("prepare")},
{names: []string{"verify"}},
{names: []string{"trust"}, children: leafNodes("list", "remove")},
{names: []string{"eval"}, children: leafNodes("validate", "run", "bench")},
{names: []string{"changes", "change"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"inspect", "status"}}, {names: []string{"commit"}}, {names: []string{"push"}},
{names: []string{"pr", "pull-request"}},
}},
{names: []string{"usage"}, children: leafNodes("report")},
{names: []string{"cron"}, children: leafNodes("add", "list", "rm", "pause", "resume", "run")},
{names: []string{"repo-info", "repoinfo"}},
{names: []string{"serve"}},
{names: []string{"acp"}},
{names: []string{"help"}},
{names: []string{"version"}},
},
}
func leafNodes(names ...string) []completionNode {
nodes := make([]completionNode, 0, len(names))
for _, name := range names {
nodes = append(nodes, completionNode{names: []string{name}})
}
return nodes
}
func runCompletions(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) int {
if len(args) == 1 && (args[0] == "-h" || args[0] == "--help" || args[0] == "help") {
if err := writeCompletionsHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if len(args) == 0 {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "shell required. Use `zero completions <bash|zsh|fish|powershell|elvish>`.")
}
if len(args) != 1 {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("unexpected completions argument %q", args[1]))
}
contexts := completionContexts(completionRoot)
var err error
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(args[0])) {
case "bash":
err = writeBashCompletions(stdout, contexts)
case "zsh":
err = writeZshCompletions(stdout, contexts)
case "fish":
err = writeFishCompletions(stdout, contexts)
case "powershell":
err = writePowerShellCompletions(stdout, contexts)
case "elvish":
err = writeElvishCompletions(stdout, contexts)
default:
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("unsupported shell %q; expected bash, zsh, fish, powershell, or elvish", args[0]))
}
if err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
func writeCompletionsHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Generate shell completion scripts.
Usage:
zero completions <shell>
Arguments:
<shell> Target shell: bash, zsh, fish, powershell, or elvish
Examples:
source <(zero completions bash)
source <(zero completions zsh)
zero completions fish > ~/.config/fish/completions/zero.fish
zero completions powershell >> $PROFILE
eval (zero completions elvish | slurp)
Flags:
-h, --help Show this help
`)
return err
}
func completionContexts(root completionNode) []completionContext {
contexts := []completionContext{}
var visit func(completionNode, []string)
visit = func(node completionNode, paths []string) {
candidates := append([]string{}, node.flags...)
transitions := map[string]string{}
for _, child := range node.children {
candidates = append(candidates, child.names...)
for _, path := range paths {
for _, name := range child.names {
childPath := strings.TrimSpace(path + " " + name)
transitions[path+"|"+name] = childPath
}
}
}
candidates = uniqueStrings(candidates)
for _, path := range paths {
contexts = append(contexts, completionContext{path: path, candidates: candidates, transitions: transitions})
}
for _, child := range node.children {
childPaths := make([]string, 0, len(paths)*len(child.names))
for _, path := range paths {
for _, name := range child.names {
childPaths = append(childPaths, strings.TrimSpace(path+" "+name))
}
}
visit(child, childPaths)
}
}
visit(root, []string{""})
sort.SliceStable(contexts, func(i, j int) bool { return contexts[i].path < contexts[j].path })
return contexts
}
func uniqueStrings(values []string) []string {
seen := map[string]bool{}
result := make([]string, 0, len(values))
for _, value := range values {
if value == "" || seen[value] {
continue
}
seen[value] = true
result = append(result, value)
}
return result
}
func allTransitions(contexts []completionContext) map[string]string {
transitions := map[string]string{}
for _, context := range contexts {
for key, value := range context.transitions {
transitions[key] = value
}
}
return transitions
}
func sortedTransitionKeys(transitions map[string]string) []string {
keys := make([]string, 0, len(transitions))
for key := range transitions {
keys = append(keys, key)
}
sort.Strings(keys)
return keys
}
func shellWords(values []string) string {
return strings.Join(values, " ")
}
func writeBashCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "# bash completion for zero\n_zero() {\n local cur context token i candidates\n cur=\"${COMP_WORDS[COMP_CWORD]}\"\n context=\"\""); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := writePOSIXContextLoop(w, contexts, " for ((i = 1; i < COMP_CWORD; i++)); do", " token=\"${COMP_WORDS[i]}\"", " done"); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := writePOSIXCandidateCase(w, contexts, " "); err != nil {
return err
}
_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " COMPREPLY=( $(compgen -W \"$candidates\" -- \"$cur\") )\n}\ncomplete -F _zero zero")
return err
}
func writeZshCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "#compdef zero\n_zero() {\n local context token i\n local -a candidates\n context=\"\""); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := writePOSIXContextLoop(w, contexts, " for ((i = 2; i < CURRENT; i++)); do", " token=\"${words[i]}\"", " done"); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " case \"$context\" in"); err != nil {
return err
}
for _, context := range contexts {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " %q) candidates=(%s) ;;\n", context.path, quotedWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " esac\n compadd -- \"${candidates[@]}\"\n}\ncompdef _zero zero")
return err
}
func writePOSIXContextLoop(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext, start string, token string, end string) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, start); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, token); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " case \"$context|$token\" in"); err != nil {
return err
}
transitions := allTransitions(contexts)
for _, key := range sortedTransitionKeys(transitions) {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " %q) context=%q ;;\n", key, transitions[key]); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " esac"); err != nil {
return err
}
_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, end)
return err
}
func writePOSIXCandidateCase(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext, indent string) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, indent+"case \"$context\" in"); err != nil {
return err
}
for _, context := range contexts {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s %q) candidates=%q ;;\n", indent, context.path, shellWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, indent+"esac")
return err
}
func quotedWords(values []string) string {
quoted := make([]string, 0, len(values))
for _, value := range values {
quoted = append(quoted, fmt.Sprintf("%q", value))
}
return strings.Join(quoted, " ")
}
func writeFishCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "# fish completion for zero\nfunction __zero_completion_context\n set -l context ''\n set -l tokens (commandline -opc)"); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " for token in $tokens[2..-1]\n switch \"$context|$token\""); err != nil {
return err
}
transitions := allTransitions(contexts)
for _, key := range sortedTransitionKeys(transitions) {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " case %q\n set context %q\n", key, transitions[key]); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " end\n end\n if test -z \"$context\"\n echo __root__\n else\n echo \"$context\"\n end\nend"); err != nil {
return err
}
for _, context := range contexts {
path := context.path
if path == "" {
path = "__root__"
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "complete -c zero -f -n 'test (__zero_completion_context) = %q' -a %q\n", path, shellWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func writePowerShellCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "# PowerShell completion for zero\nRegister-ArgumentCompleter -Native -CommandName zero -ScriptBlock {\n param($wordToComplete, $commandAst, $cursorPosition)\n $context = ''\n $elements = @($commandAst.CommandElements)\n $limit = $elements.Count\n if ($wordToComplete -ne '' -and $limit -gt 1) { $limit-- }\n for ($i = 1; $i -lt $limit; $i++) {\n $token = $elements[$i].Extent.Text\n switch (\"$context|$token\") {"); err != nil {
return err
}
transitions := allTransitions(contexts)
for _, key := range sortedTransitionKeys(transitions) {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " '%s' { $context = '%s'; break }\n", key, transitions[key]); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " }\n }\n $candidates = switch ($context) {"); err != nil {
return err
}
for _, context := range contexts {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " '%s' { @(%s) }\n", context.path, powershellWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " }\n $candidates | Where-Object { $_ -like \"$wordToComplete*\" } | ForEach-Object {\n [System.Management.Automation.CompletionResult]::new($_, $_, 'ParameterValue', $_)\n }\n}")
return err
}
func powershellWords(values []string) string {
quoted := make([]string, 0, len(values))
for _, value := range values {
quoted = append(quoted, "'"+strings.ReplaceAll(value, "'", "''")+"'")
}
return strings.Join(quoted, ", ")
}
func writeElvishCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "# Elvish completion for zero\nset edit:completion:arg-completer[zero] = {|@args|\n var context = ''\n for token $args[1..-1] {"); err != nil {
return err
}
transitions := allTransitions(contexts)
for index, key := range sortedTransitionKeys(transitions) {
keyword := "if"
if index > 0 {
keyword = "} elif"
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " %s (eq $context'|'$token %q) {\n set context = %q\n", keyword, key, transitions[key]); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " }\n }"); err != nil {
return err
}
for index, context := range contexts {
keyword := "if"
if index > 0 {
keyword = "} elif"
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, " %s (eq $context %q) {\n put %s\n", keyword, context.path, shellWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, " }\n}")
return err
}
-177
View File
@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
package cli
import (
"bytes"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestCompletionsHelpAndRootHelp(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"completions", "--help"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("completion help exit code = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
for _, want := range []string{
"zero completions <shell>",
"bash, zsh, fish, powershell, or elvish",
"source <(zero completions bash)",
"~/.config/fish/completions/zero.fish",
"eval (zero completions elvish | slurp)",
} {
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), want) {
t.Errorf("completion help missing %q:\n%s", want, stdout.String())
}
}
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"--help"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("root help exit code = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "completions Generate shell completion scripts") {
t.Fatalf("root help does not list completions command:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
}
func TestCompletionsRejectsMissingUnknownAndExtraShellArguments(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
args []string
want string
}{
{name: "missing", args: []string{"completions"}, want: "shell required"},
{name: "unknown", args: []string{"completions", "nu"}, want: "unsupported shell"},
{name: "extra", args: []string{"completions", "bash", "extra"}, want: "unexpected completions argument"},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps(test.args, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitUsage {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitUsage, stderr.String())
}
if stdout.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("stdout = %q, want empty", stdout.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), test.want) {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want substring %q", stderr.String(), test.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestCompletionsGeneratesEverySupportedShell(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
shell string
marker string
syntaxShell string
}{
{shell: "bash", marker: "complete -F _zero zero", syntaxShell: "bash"},
{shell: "zsh", marker: "#compdef zero", syntaxShell: "zsh"},
{shell: "fish", marker: "complete -c zero"},
{shell: "powershell", marker: "Register-ArgumentCompleter -Native -CommandName zero"},
{shell: "elvish", marker: "edit:completion:arg-completer[zero]"},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.shell, func(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"completions", test.shell}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), test.marker) {
t.Fatalf("%s completion missing marker %q:\n%s", test.shell, test.marker, stdout.String())
}
for _, want := range []string{"daemon", "mcp oauth", "sandbox grants", "--output-format"} {
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), want) {
t.Errorf("%s completion missing %q", test.shell, want)
}
}
script := stdout.String()
switch test.shell {
case "fish":
assertBalancedFishBlocks(t, script)
case "powershell", "elvish":
assertBalancedBraces(t, script)
}
if test.syntaxShell != "" {
assertNativeShellSyntax(t, test.syntaxShell, script)
}
})
}
}
func assertBalancedBraces(t *testing.T, script string) {
t.Helper()
if opens, closes := strings.Count(script, "{"), strings.Count(script, "}"); opens != closes {
t.Errorf("unbalanced braces: %d opening, %d closing", opens, closes)
}
}
func assertBalancedFishBlocks(t *testing.T, script string) {
t.Helper()
depth := 0
for _, line := range strings.Split(script, "\n") {
fields := strings.Fields(line)
if len(fields) == 0 {
continue
}
switch fields[0] {
case "function", "for", "switch", "if":
depth++
case "end":
depth--
if depth < 0 {
t.Fatal("fish completion closes a block before one is opened")
}
}
}
if depth != 0 {
t.Errorf("fish completion has %d unclosed blocks", depth)
}
}
func assertNativeShellSyntax(t *testing.T, shell, script string) {
t.Helper()
path, err := exec.LookPath(shell)
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("%s is not installed", shell)
}
command := exec.Command(path, "-n")
command.Stdin = strings.NewReader(script)
if output, err := command.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s syntax check failed: %v\n%s", shell, err, output)
}
}
func TestCompletionTreeCoversAliasesNestingAndCommonFlags(t *testing.T) {
contexts := completionContexts(completionRoot)
byPath := make(map[string][]string, len(contexts))
for _, context := range contexts {
byPath[context.path] = context.candidates
}
assertCandidates(t, byPath[""], "sessions", "session", "plugins", "plugin", "worktrees", "worktree", "--add-dir", "--theme", "-p", "--prompt")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["exec"], "--model", "--cwd", "--worktree", "--output-format", "--resume", "--skip-permissions-unsafe")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["daemon"], "start", "stop", "status", "run", "attach")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["mcp oauth"], "login", "logout", "status")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["sandbox grants"], "list", "allow", "deny", "revoke", "clear")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["completions"], "bash", "zsh", "fish", "powershell", "elvish")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["plugins"], "list", "add", "info", "remove", "rm")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["plugin"], "list", "add", "info", "remove", "rm")
}
func assertCandidates(t *testing.T, got []string, wants ...string) {
t.Helper()
set := make(map[string]bool, len(got))
for _, candidate := range got {
set[candidate] = true
}
for _, want := range wants {
if !set[want] {
t.Errorf("candidates %v do not contain %q", got, want)
}
}
}
+4 -5
View File
@@ -40,11 +40,10 @@ func runContext(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
report, err := contextreport.Build(contextreport.Options{
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Provider: resolved.Provider,
Registry: newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot),
ContextWindow: modelContextWindow(modelRegistry, resolved.Provider.Model),
DeferThreshold: resolved.Tools.DeferThreshold,
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Provider: resolved.Provider,
Registry: newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot),
ContextWindow: modelContextWindow(modelRegistry, resolved.Provider.Model),
})
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
+4 -3
View File
@@ -77,10 +77,11 @@ func TestRegisterToolSearchIfEligibleSkipsWhenThresholdZero(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestDeferredEligibleCountIncludesOptionalBuiltins(t *testing.T) {
func TestDeferredEligibleCountIgnoresCoreTools(t *testing.T) {
registry := newCoreRegistry(t.TempDir())
if got := deferredEligibleCount(registry, agent.PermissionModeAuto, nil, nil); got < 2 {
t.Fatalf("deferredEligibleCount(core) = %d, want at least 2 optional built-ins", got)
// newCoreRegistry holds only built-ins; none implement Deferred().
if got := deferredEligibleCount(registry, agent.PermissionModeAuto, nil, nil); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("deferredEligibleCount(core) = %d, want 0", got)
}
}
+1 -125
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"path/filepath"
"sort"
"strings"
@@ -119,8 +118,7 @@ func runSkillInfo(args []string, dir string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer)
if name == "" {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "usage: zero skill info <name> [--json]")
}
// Resolve across primary + ~/.agents/skills; lock metadata only from primary.
info, ok := skills.InfoFromRoots(dir, skills.GlobalRoots(dir), name)
info, ok := skills.Info(dir, name)
if !ok {
return writeAppError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("skill %q not found", name), exitUsage)
}
@@ -139,7 +137,6 @@ func runSkillInfo(args []string, dir string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer)
}
if info.Hash != "" {
lines = append(lines, " hash: "+info.Hash)
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf(" hash drift: %t", info.HashDrift))
}
lines = append(lines, " path: "+info.Skill.Path)
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, redaction.RedactString(strings.Join(lines, "\n"), redaction.Options{})); err != nil {
@@ -254,115 +251,6 @@ func runPluginRemove(args []string, dir string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writ
return exitSuccess
}
func runPluginInfo(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
id, options, help, err := parsePluginInfoArgs(args)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if help {
if err := writePluginInfoHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if id == "" {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "usage: zero plugins info <id> [--user] [--json]")
}
cwd, err := deps.getwd()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to resolve workspace: "+err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
info, err := plugins.Info(plugins.InfoOptions{
LoadOptions: pluginLoadOptions(deps, cwd, options.user),
}, id)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, plugins.ErrNotInstalled) {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(err, redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
}
if options.json {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, redaction.RedactValue(info, redaction.Options{})); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
plugin := info.Plugin
lines := []string{fmt.Sprintf("%s (%s) %s", plugin.ID, plugin.Name, plugin.Version)}
state := "enabled"
if !plugin.Enabled {
state = "disabled"
}
lines = append(lines, " state: "+state)
lines = append(lines, " source: "+string(plugin.Source))
if len(plugin.Tools) > 0 {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf(" tools: %d", len(plugin.Tools)))
}
if len(plugin.Hooks) > 0 {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf(" hooks: %d", len(plugin.Hooks)))
}
if len(plugin.Skills) > 0 {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf(" skills: %d", len(plugin.Skills)))
}
if len(plugin.Prompts) > 0 {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf(" prompts: %d", len(plugin.Prompts)))
}
if info.LockSource != "" {
lines = append(lines, " lock source: "+info.LockSource)
}
if info.LockHash != "" {
lines = append(lines, " lock hash: "+info.LockHash)
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf(" hash drift: %t", info.HashDrift))
}
lines = append(lines, " manifest: "+plugin.ManifestPath)
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, redaction.RedactString(strings.Join(lines, "\n"), redaction.Options{})); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
type pluginInfoOptions struct {
json bool
user bool
}
func parsePluginInfoArgs(args []string) (string, pluginInfoOptions, bool, error) {
options := pluginInfoOptions{}
id := ""
for _, arg := range args {
switch arg {
case "-h", "--help", "help":
return "", options, true, nil
case "--json":
options.json = true
case "--user":
options.user = true
default:
if strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-") {
return "", options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unknown plugins info flag %q", arg)}
}
if id != "" {
return "", options, false, execUsageError{"plugins info takes a single id"}
}
id = arg
}
}
return id, options, false, nil
}
func pluginLoadOptions(deps appDeps, cwd string, userOnly bool) plugins.LoadOptions {
opts := plugins.LoadOptions{Cwd: cwd, ExcludeProject: userOnly}
roots := []plugins.Root{{Source: plugins.SourceUser, Path: deps.pluginsDir()}}
if !userOnly {
roots = append(roots, plugins.Root{Source: plugins.SourceProject, Path: filepath.Join(cwd, ".zero", "plugins")})
}
opts.Roots = roots
return opts
}
// --- tools make / list ---
func runTools(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
@@ -678,18 +566,6 @@ Removes an installed plugin directory and its plugins.lock entry.
return err
}
func writePluginInfoHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero plugins info <id> [flags]
Flags:
--user Target only user plugins (ignore ./.zero/plugins)
--json Print plugin info as JSON
-h, --help Show this help
`)
return err
}
func writeToolsHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero tools <command>
-51
View File
@@ -83,48 +83,6 @@ func TestRunSkillAddInfoRemove(t *testing.T) {
if !strings.Contains(info, src) || !strings.Contains(info, "sha256:") {
t.Fatalf("info missing source/hash:\n%s", info)
}
if !strings.Contains(info, "hash drift: false") {
t.Fatalf("info missing hash drift status:\n%s", info)
}
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skill", "info", "confirmation-policy", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
t.Fatalf("skill info --json exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
}
var beforeJSON map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &beforeJSON); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse skill info json: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
}
if beforeJSON["hashDrift"] != false {
t.Fatalf("hashDrift before edit = %#v, want false", beforeJSON["hashDrift"])
}
skillPath := filepath.Join(skillsDir, "confirmation-policy", "SKILL.md")
if err := os.WriteFile(skillPath, []byte("---\ndescription: edited\n---\nchanged\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skill", "info", "confirmation-policy"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
t.Fatalf("skill info after edit exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "hash drift: true") {
t.Fatalf("info missing hash drift after edit:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skill", "info", "confirmation-policy", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
t.Fatalf("skill info --json after edit exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
}
var afterJSON map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &afterJSON); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse skill info json after edit: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
}
if afterJSON["hashDrift"] != true {
t.Fatalf("hashDrift after edit = %#v, want true", afterJSON["hashDrift"])
}
// remove deletes it
stdout.Reset()
@@ -219,15 +177,6 @@ func TestRunPluginAddListRemove(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("add output missing id:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"plugin", "info", "zero.demo"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
t.Fatalf("plugin info exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "zero.demo") || !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "manifest:") {
t.Fatalf("info output missing plugin details:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
// remove
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
+59 -201
View File
@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/errhint"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execprofile"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/imageinput"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lsp"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
@@ -71,14 +69,7 @@ type execOptions struct {
// intentionally inert: nothing consumes it. Model selection is driven by
// --model / --mode instead. See writeExecHelp ("Accept legacy model profile
// selection") and TestRunExecAcceptsLegacyModelProfileFlags.
modelProfile string
// execProfile selects a named execution profile (balanced, fast, thorough):
// a loop-posture bundle (turn budget, reasoning effort, self-correction,
// escalation triggers) applied AFTER --mode with the same
// fill-only-if-unset rule, so precedence is explicit flag > mode > profile.
// Distinct from the mode preset also named "fast" (which picks a model) and
// from the legacy inert --profile above. See internal/execprofile.
execProfile string
modelProfile string
reasoningEffort string
useSpec bool
specModel string
@@ -176,14 +167,6 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
if err := applyExecMode(&options); err != nil {
return writeExecFormatUsageError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, err.Error())
}
// A profile tunes loop posture the way a mode tunes model selection, and
// runs after it so the mode's fills count as "set" and win. MaxTurns is
// deferred to config resolution below, where the displaced resolved budget
// is known and becomes the escalation restore target.
execProfile, execProfileFilledEffort, err := applyExecProfile(&options)
if err != nil {
return writeExecFormatUsageError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, err.Error())
}
workspaceRoot, err := resolveWorkspaceRoot(options.cwd, deps)
if err != nil {
@@ -207,7 +190,6 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
}
registry := newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot)
executionRunner := execution.NewRunner(nil)
// Register the escalate_model tool only when the run opted into mid-run
// escalation. It is registered before --list-tools formatting and
// validateExecToolFilters so the tool is both listable and filter-validatable.
@@ -240,13 +222,16 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
if options.useSpec {
permissionMode = agent.PermissionModeSpecDraft
}
var mcpRuntime mcpToolRuntime
var mcpSkip trustSkip
mcpRuntime, mcpSkip, err := registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(context.Background(), workspaceRoot, registry, deps, execMCPAutonomy(options), trustRoot)
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "mcp_error", err.Error())
}
defer closeMCPRuntime(stderr, mcpRuntime)
// Make local plugins live for this run: register their declared tools into the
// registry and collect their hooks + skill roots for the dispatcher and skill
// tool below. Done before --list-tools and filter validation so plugin tools
// are listable and filter-validatable; it fails OPEN (a bad plugin is skipped).
var pluginActivation pluginActivation
pluginActivation := activatePlugins(workspaceRoot, registry, deps, stderr, trustRoot)
if options.useSpec {
specmode.RegisterDraftTools(registry, workspaceRoot, deps.now)
}
@@ -287,31 +272,6 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
}
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "provider_error", err.Error())
}
var displacedMaxTurns int
resolved.MaxTurns, displacedMaxTurns = applyProfileTurnBudget(execProfile, options.maxTurns, resolved.MaxTurns)
execScope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspaceRoot, append(append([]string{}, resolved.Sandbox.AdditionalWriteRoots...), options.addDirs...))
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", err.Error())
}
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(workspaceRoot, execScope) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
sandboxEngine, err := buildExecSandboxEngine(workspaceRoot, resolved, deps, execScope)
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", err.Error())
}
if notice, err := sandboxEngine.ConsumeGrantMigrationNotice(); err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", "migrate sandbox grants: "+err.Error())
} else if notice != "" {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] "+notice)
}
executionRunner.SetPreparer(sandboxEngine)
mcpRuntime, mcpSkip, err = registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(context.Background(), workspaceRoot, registry, deps, execMCPAutonomy(options), trustRoot, executionRunner)
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "mcp_error", err.Error())
}
defer closeMCPRuntime(stderr, mcpRuntime)
pluginActivation = activatePlugins(workspaceRoot, registry, deps, stderr, trustRoot, executionRunner)
registerLocalControlTools(registry, workspaceRoot, resolved.LocalControl)
if err := validateExecToolFilters(options, registry); err != nil {
return writeExecFormatUsageError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, err.Error())
@@ -379,6 +339,28 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
}
images = nil
}
execScope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspaceRoot, append(append([]string{}, resolved.Sandbox.AdditionalWriteRoots...), options.addDirs...))
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", err.Error())
}
// Re-register the core tools with the run scope, OVERWRITING the nil-scope
// instances registered before config resolve (the registry must exist that
// early for --list-tools and tool-filter validation, which run without a
// provider). This is safe only while two invariants hold:
// 1. Registry.Register replaces by NAME, so every path-confining core
// tool is swapped wholesale; and
// 2. nothing between the initial registration and this point captures a
// core-tool INSTANCE (tool_search holds the *Registry* and resolves
// names lazily; --list-tools and filter validation use names only).
// A new wrapper that snapshots a core tool before this line would silently
// ship nil-scope enforcement — add it below this re-registration instead.
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(workspaceRoot, execScope) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
sandboxEngine, err := buildExecSandboxEngine(workspaceRoot, resolved, deps, execScope)
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", err.Error())
}
runReasoningEffort := options.reasoningEffort
if options.useSpec && options.specReasoningEffort != "" {
runReasoningEffort = options.specReasoningEffort
@@ -430,36 +412,6 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
}
}
// Optimized OpenAI turn sessions (ZERO_OPENAI_TURN_SESSION, default off).
// nil when gated off or the profile is ineligible: agent.Run then wraps the
// provider in its default adapter — the exact code path of today. The
// session switcher is installed only when the run START is optimized, so
// the legacy ModelSwitcher path above stays untouched otherwise.
turnSessions, _ := providers.OptimizedTurnSessions(resolved.Provider, provider, providers.Options{})
var modelSessionSwitcher func(context.Context, string) (zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider, error)
if options.allowEscalation && turnSessions != nil {
modelSessionSwitcher = func(_ context.Context, modelID string) (zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider, error) {
switchedProfile := resolved.Provider
switchedProfile.Model = modelID
switchedProvider, err := deps.newProvider(switchedProfile)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if switchedProvider == nil {
// The loop treats a nil session source as "no swap" — mirror the
// legacy closure's (nil, nil) contract.
return nil, nil
}
currentModel = modelID
if optimized, ok := providers.OptimizedTurnSessions(switchedProfile, switchedProvider, providers.Options{}); ok {
return optimized, nil
}
// Ineligible switch target: default adapter, but with the switched
// model's resolved capability projection preserved.
return providers.DefaultTurnSessions(switchedProfile, switchedProvider, providers.Options{}), nil
}
}
runMetadata, err := resolveExecRunMetadata(resolved.Provider)
if err != nil {
return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "provider_error", err.Error())
@@ -504,13 +456,6 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
reasoningEffort: forwardEffort,
specPermissionMode: permissionMode,
notifier: notifier,
// The profile displaced resolved.MaxTurns above, so the spec-draft
// run arms the same escalation policy as the main run (in practice
// only the failure-streak and risky-mutation triggers can fire
// here: the draft runs without the completion gate or a
// self-corrector).
profilePolicy: execProfile.Policy(displacedMaxTurns,
specProfileEffortFilled(execProfileFilledEffort, options.specReasoningEffort)),
})
}
@@ -553,7 +498,7 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
var traceRecorder *trace.Recorder
var traceSnapshot *trace.TurnTrace
if tracePath != "" {
traceRecorder = trace.NewRecorder(preparedSession.Session.SessionID, runID, execProfile.Name)
traceRecorder = trace.NewRecorder(preparedSession.Session.SessionID, runID, "")
defer func() {
if err := writeTraceSnapshot(traceSnapshot, tracePath, stderr); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "[zero] failed to write trace: %s\n", err)
@@ -624,35 +569,32 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
// Build the hooks dispatcher out of the struct literal so its trust skip report
// can be combined with the plugin activation's, and emit at most one notice when
// project hooks/plugins were dropped for an untrusted workspace.
hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks, trustRoot, executionRunner)
hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks, trustRoot)
emitTrustNotice(stderr, hookSkip, pluginActivation.trustSkip, mcpSkip)
result, err := agent.Run(runCtx, agentPrompt, provider, agent.Options{
MaxTurns: resolved.MaxTurns,
ContextWindow: resolveAgentContextWindow(runCtx, modelRegistry, resolved.Provider),
DeferThreshold: effectiveDeferThreshold,
Specialists: specialistRuntime.specialistInfos(),
Skills: pluginActivation.skillInfos(deps.skillsDir()),
SessionID: preparedSession.Session.SessionID,
CallingSessionID: options.callingSessionID,
CallingToolUseID: options.callingToolUseID,
Tag: options.tag,
Depth: options.depth,
SessionTitle: sessionTitle,
ProviderName: resolved.Provider.Name,
Model: resolved.Provider.Model,
ModelSwitcher: modelSwitcher,
TurnSessionProvider: turnSessions,
ModelSessionSwitcher: modelSessionSwitcher,
ReasoningEffort: forwardEffort,
Trace: traceRecorder,
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Images: images,
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: permissionMode,
Autonomy: options.autonomy,
SelfCorrect: selfCorrector,
FileDiagnostics: fileDiagnostics,
Profile: execProfile.Policy(displacedMaxTurns, execProfileFilledEffort),
MaxTurns: resolved.MaxTurns,
ContextWindow: resolveAgentContextWindow(runCtx, modelRegistry, resolved.Provider),
DeferThreshold: effectiveDeferThreshold,
Specialists: specialistRuntime.specialistInfos(),
Skills: pluginActivation.skillInfos(deps.skillsDir()),
SessionID: preparedSession.Session.SessionID,
CallingSessionID: options.callingSessionID,
CallingToolUseID: options.callingToolUseID,
Tag: options.tag,
Depth: options.depth,
SessionTitle: sessionTitle,
ProviderName: resolved.Provider.Name,
Model: resolved.Provider.Model,
ModelSwitcher: modelSwitcher,
ReasoningEffort: forwardEffort,
Trace: traceRecorder,
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Images: images,
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: permissionMode,
Autonomy: options.autonomy,
SelfCorrect: selfCorrector,
FileDiagnostics: fileDiagnostics,
// Headless exec: don't accept a no-tool-call turn as "done" while work
// clearly remains (pending plan items / a mid-step continuation cue) —
// nudge to continue, and finalize as INCOMPLETE rather than false success
@@ -694,9 +636,6 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
if len(result.Meta) > 0 {
payload["meta"] = result.Meta
}
if result.Truncated {
payload["truncated"] = true
}
if result.Redacted {
payload["redacted"] = true
}
@@ -914,37 +853,17 @@ func buildExecSandboxEngine(workspaceRoot string, resolved config.ResolvedConfig
policy := applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(sandbox.DefaultPolicy(), resolved.Sandbox)
backend := deps.selectSandboxBackend(sandbox.BackendOptions{})
return sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Policy: policy,
Store: store,
Backend: backend,
Scope: scope,
SensitiveEnvKeys: providerSensitiveEnvKeys(resolved),
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Policy: policy,
Store: store,
Backend: backend,
Scope: scope,
}), nil
}
func providerSensitiveEnvKeys(resolved config.ResolvedConfig) []string {
keys := make([]string, 0, len(resolved.Providers)+1)
for _, profile := range resolved.Providers {
if key := strings.TrimSpace(profile.APIKeyEnv); key != "" {
keys = append(keys, key)
}
}
if key := strings.TrimSpace(resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv); key != "" {
keys = append(keys, key)
}
return keys
}
// applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy overlays every config-sourced sandbox knob onto
// the default policy.
func applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(policy sandbox.Policy, cfg config.SandboxConfig) sandbox.Policy {
// An explicit `"sandbox": {"enabled": false}` disables the sandbox: every
// request is allowed and commands run unwrapped. Only reachable from global
// config / CLI — project config never sets Enabled (see mergeProjectConfig).
if cfg.Enabled != nil && !*cfg.Enabled {
policy.Mode = sandbox.ModeDisabled
}
if network := strings.TrimSpace(cfg.Network); network != "" {
switch sandbox.NetworkMode(network) {
case sandbox.NetworkAllow, sandbox.NetworkDeny:
@@ -1165,67 +1084,6 @@ func applyExecMode(options *execOptions) error {
return nil
}
// applyExecProfile expands an --exec-profile selection onto the exec options.
// Like applyExecMode it only fills fields the caller left unset, and it runs
// AFTER the mode so a mode-filled field counts as set: precedence is explicit
// flag > --mode > --exec-profile. Only the options-level knobs are applied here
// (reasoning effort still flows through the model-supported gating downstream;
// self-correct is presence-only so a profile can only turn it on). MaxTurns is
// intentionally NOT applied here — the profile displaces the resolved budget
// after config resolution, where the displaced value is known and becomes the
// escalation restore target. An unknown profile is a usage error listing the
// valid names. Not to be confused with the legacy inert --profile flag.
// The second return reports whether the profile actually filled the reasoning
// effort (false when the user set one explicitly), so the escalation policy
// knows the displaced effort was the provider default and can restore it.
func applyExecProfile(options *execOptions) (execprofile.Profile, bool, error) {
name := strings.TrimSpace(options.execProfile)
if name == "" {
return execprofile.Profile{}, false, nil
}
profile, ok := execprofile.Lookup(name)
if !ok {
return execprofile.Profile{}, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unknown execution profile %q. Valid profiles: %s.", options.execProfile, strings.Join(execprofile.Names(), ", "))}
}
effortFilled := false
if options.reasoningEffort == "" && profile.ReasoningEffort != "" {
options.reasoningEffort = profile.ReasoningEffort
effortFilled = true
}
// Spec-safe projection: the spec-draft path wires no self-corrector (an
// explicit --self-correct --use-spec is rejected at parse time, before
// profiles apply), so a profile's self-correct knob is meaningless there.
// Project it away rather than erroring: the user asked for a thorough
// DRAFT, and the profile's other knobs (budget, effort) apply to it fine.
if profile.SelfCorrect && !options.useSpec {
options.selfCorrect = true
}
return profile, effortFilled, nil
}
// specProfileEffortFilled reports whether the profile's effort fill actually
// governs the spec-draft run. An explicit --spec-reasoning-effort replaces the
// filled effort for the draft, so the escalation's effort restore must not arm
// there: escalation must never clear an effort the user pinned by hand.
func specProfileEffortFilled(effortFilled bool, specReasoningEffort string) bool {
return effortFilled && strings.TrimSpace(specReasoningEffort) == ""
}
// applyProfileTurnBudget decides the run's turn budget once config is resolved.
// The profile displaces the RESOLVED value, not the flag: a pinned budget
// always wins and the profile backs off entirely, while an env/config budget
// is the "balanced posture" a mid-run escalation can restore. pinnedMaxTurns
// is any caller-pinned budget — an explicit --max-turns flag OR a mode
// preset's fill (both land in options.maxTurns, and a mode outranks a profile
// just like the flag does). displaced is 0 when nothing was displaced, so an
// escalation leaves the ceiling untouched.
func applyProfileTurnBudget(profile execprofile.Profile, pinnedMaxTurns int, resolvedMaxTurns int) (effective int, displaced int) {
if profile.MaxTurns > 0 && pinnedMaxTurns == 0 {
return profile.MaxTurns, resolvedMaxTurns
}
return resolvedMaxTurns, 0
}
// resolveSelectedModel routes a user-supplied --model value through the model
// registry so that fuzzy aliases (e.g. "sonnet 4.5") resolve to canonical ids
// and deprecated models auto-redirect to their fallback. It returns the model id
-13
View File
@@ -147,19 +147,6 @@ func parseExecArgs(args []string) (execOptions, bool, error) {
index = next
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--profile="):
options.modelProfile = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--profile="))
case arg == "--exec-profile":
value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
if err != nil {
return options, false, err
}
options.execProfile = strings.TrimSpace(value)
index = next
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--exec-profile="):
value, err := requiredInlineFlagValue(arg, "--exec-profile")
if err != nil {
return options, false, err
}
options.execProfile = value
case arg == "-r" || arg == "--reasoning-effort":
value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
if err != nil {
-224
View File
@@ -1,224 +0,0 @@
package cli
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execprofile"
)
func TestApplyExecProfileFillsOnlyUnset(t *testing.T) {
// Unset effort: the profile fills it and reports the fill, so the
// escalation policy knows the displaced effort was the provider default.
options := execOptions{execProfile: "fast"}
profile, effortFilled, err := applyExecProfile(&options)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecProfile: %v", err)
}
if profile.Name != "fast" {
t.Fatalf("profile.Name = %q, want fast", profile.Name)
}
if options.reasoningEffort != "low" {
t.Fatalf("reasoningEffort = %q, want the profile's low", options.reasoningEffort)
}
if !effortFilled {
t.Fatal("the profile filled the effort, so effortFilled must report it")
}
// Set effort (explicit flag or a mode's fill): the profile backs off.
options = execOptions{execProfile: "fast", reasoningEffort: "high"}
_, effortFilled, err = applyExecProfile(&options)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecProfile: %v", err)
}
if options.reasoningEffort != "high" {
t.Fatalf("reasoningEffort = %q, an explicit value must win over the profile", options.reasoningEffort)
}
if effortFilled {
t.Fatal("the profile backed off, so effortFilled must be false")
}
}
func TestApplyExecProfileThoroughArmsSelfCorrect(t *testing.T) {
options := execOptions{execProfile: "thorough"}
if _, _, err := applyExecProfile(&options); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecProfile: %v", err)
}
if !options.selfCorrect {
t.Fatal("thorough must arm the post-edit self-correct loop")
}
if options.reasoningEffort != "high" {
t.Fatalf("reasoningEffort = %q, want high", options.reasoningEffort)
}
}
// The spec-draft path wires no self-corrector (explicit --self-correct
// --use-spec is rejected at parse time, before profiles apply), so a profile's
// self-correct knob is projected away under --use-spec instead of silently
// arming a knob the draft runner ignores. The other knobs still apply.
func TestApplyExecProfileSpecProjectsAwaySelfCorrect(t *testing.T) {
options := execOptions{execProfile: "thorough", useSpec: true}
if _, _, err := applyExecProfile(&options); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecProfile: %v", err)
}
if options.selfCorrect {
t.Fatal("thorough under --use-spec must not arm self-correct (the draft runner has none)")
}
if options.reasoningEffort != "high" {
t.Fatalf("reasoningEffort = %q, the profile's other knobs must still apply", options.reasoningEffort)
}
}
func TestApplyExecProfileUnknownIsUsageError(t *testing.T) {
options := execOptions{execProfile: "turbo"}
_, _, err := applyExecProfile(&options)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected a usage error for an unknown profile")
}
if _, ok := err.(execUsageError); !ok {
t.Fatalf("expected execUsageError, got %T: %v", err, err)
}
for _, name := range execprofile.Names() {
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), name) {
t.Fatalf("usage error must list %q, got %q", name, err.Error())
}
}
}
// Precedence: explicit flag > --mode > --exec-profile. The deep mode fills
// effort=high and max-turns=160; the fast profile must not override either,
// because a mode-filled field counts as set by the time the profile runs.
func TestExecProfilePrecedenceFlagOverModeOverProfile(t *testing.T) {
options := execOptions{mode: "deep", execProfile: "fast"}
if err := applyExecMode(&options); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecMode: %v", err)
}
profile, _, err := applyExecProfile(&options)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecProfile: %v", err)
}
if options.reasoningEffort != "high" {
t.Fatalf("reasoningEffort = %q, the mode's high must win over the profile's low", options.reasoningEffort)
}
// The mode filled options.maxTurns, so the turn budget must not be displaced.
effective, displaced := applyProfileTurnBudget(profile, options.maxTurns, options.maxTurns)
if effective != 160 || displaced != 0 {
t.Fatalf("turn budget = (%d, displaced %d), the mode's 160 must win with nothing displaced", effective, displaced)
}
}
func TestApplyProfileTurnBudget(t *testing.T) {
fast, _ := execprofile.Lookup("fast")
balanced, _ := execprofile.Lookup("balanced")
// No explicit flag: the profile displaces the resolved budget.
if effective, displaced := applyProfileTurnBudget(fast, 0, 80); effective != 30 || displaced != 80 {
t.Fatalf("fast over resolved 80 = (%d, %d), want (30, 80)", effective, displaced)
}
// Explicit --max-turns pins the budget; the profile backs off entirely.
if effective, displaced := applyProfileTurnBudget(fast, 50, 50); effective != 50 || displaced != 0 {
t.Fatalf("fast with explicit 50 = (%d, %d), want (50, 0)", effective, displaced)
}
// Balanced never displaces anything.
if effective, displaced := applyProfileTurnBudget(balanced, 0, 80); effective != 80 || displaced != 0 {
t.Fatalf("balanced over resolved 80 = (%d, %d), want (80, 0)", effective, displaced)
}
}
// The no-regression invariant at the options level: selecting balanced leaves
// the options byte-identical to not selecting a profile at all, and produces
// no loop policy.
func TestExecProfileBalancedLeavesOptionsUntouched(t *testing.T) {
options := execOptions{execProfile: "balanced"}
reference := options
profile, _, err := applyExecProfile(&options)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("applyExecProfile: %v", err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(options, reference) {
t.Fatalf("balanced changed the options: %+v vs %+v", options, reference)
}
if policy := profile.Policy(80, false); policy != nil {
t.Fatalf("balanced must produce a nil policy, got %+v", policy)
}
}
// --exec-profile= with an inline empty value must error like its two-token
// form and the sibling --mode=, not silently run the default posture (the
// classic shell hazard: an unset variable expanding into the inline form).
func TestParseExecProfileInlineEmptyIsError(t *testing.T) {
_, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--exec-profile=", "hello"})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "--exec-profile requires a value") {
t.Fatalf("expected a required-value error, got %v", err)
}
}
// Full echo-provider run: the selected profile must be stamped into the
// per-turn trace so benchmark attribution can group runs by posture.
func TestRunExecTraceRecordsSelectedProfile(t *testing.T) {
tracePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "trace.ndjson")
exitCode, _, stderr := runExecWithEcho(t, []string{
"exec", "--exec-profile", "fast", "--trace", tracePath, "hello",
})
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr)
}
raw, err := os.ReadFile(tracePath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read trace: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(string(raw), `"profile":"fast"`) {
t.Fatalf("trace must record the selected profile, got %s", raw)
}
}
// An explicit --spec-reasoning-effort governs the spec draft's effort, so the
// escalation effort-restore must not arm there even when the profile filled
// the (unused) main effort.
func TestSpecProfileEffortFilled(t *testing.T) {
if !specProfileEffortFilled(true, "") {
t.Fatal("no explicit spec effort: the profile's fill governs, restore must arm")
}
if specProfileEffortFilled(true, "high") {
t.Fatal("an explicit spec effort must disarm the effort restore")
}
if specProfileEffortFilled(false, "") {
t.Fatal("nothing filled, nothing to restore")
}
}
// The trace label deliberately records the SELECTED profile, balanced
// included, so captures are self-describing. Run behavior stays identical
// (balanced fills nothing and arms no policy); the label is the one intended
// difference in the opt-in trace artifact.
func TestRunExecTraceRecordsBalancedSelection(t *testing.T) {
tracePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "trace.ndjson")
exitCode, _, stderr := runExecWithEcho(t, []string{
"exec", "--exec-profile", "balanced", "--trace", tracePath, "hello",
})
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr)
}
raw, err := os.ReadFile(tracePath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read trace: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(string(raw), `"profile":"balanced"`) {
t.Fatalf("trace must record the balanced selection, got %s", raw)
}
}
func TestRunExecUnknownExecProfileIsUsageError(t *testing.T) {
exitCode, _, stderr := runExecWithEcho(t, []string{
"exec", "--exec-profile", "turbo", "hello",
})
if exitCode != exitUsage {
t.Fatalf("expected usage exit %d, got %d", exitUsage, exitCode)
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr, "unknown execution profile") {
t.Fatalf("expected an unknown-profile usage error, got %q", stderr)
}
}
+1 -4
View File
@@ -72,11 +72,8 @@ func preflightExecSession(options execOptions) error {
if session == nil {
return execUsageError{"Zero session not found: " + options.resume}
}
if !sessions.IsResumableKind(session.SessionKind) {
return execUsageError{"Zero session is not resumable: " + options.resume}
}
case options.resumeLatest:
latest, err := store.LatestResumable()
latest, err := store.Latest()
if err != nil {
return err
}
-26
View File
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
package cli
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
)
func TestPreflightRejectsSideSessions(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("XDG_DATA_HOME", t.TempDir())
store := sessions.NewStore(sessions.StoreOptions{})
if _, err := store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{SessionID: "side", SessionKind: sessions.SessionKindSide}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create side session: %v", err)
}
err := preflightExecSession(execOptions{resumeLatest: true})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "No Zero sessions available to resume") {
t.Fatalf("preflightExecSession error = %v, want no resumable sessions", err)
}
err = preflightExecSession(execOptions{resume: "side"})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "Zero session is not resumable: side") {
t.Fatalf("explicit side-session preflight error = %v, want non-resumable rejection", err)
}
}
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