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Author SHA1 Message Date
anandh8x 72440a85bf fix(tui): align active voice status with capture key 2026-08-26 16:25:15 +05:30
anandh8x ed38f57fab fix(tui): clarify voice capture controls 2026-08-26 15:38:35 +05:30
anandh8x 7e6f5e2a4a fix(tui): keep voice mode from swallowing spaces 2026-08-26 14:54:23 +05:30
PierrunoYTandClaude Opus 5 27b319ca88 test(execution): fail loudly when ps cannot answer instead of skipping (#961)
* test(execution): fail loudly when ps cannot answer instead of skipping

Every test in process_unix_test.go proves something about zombie detection, and
every one of those proofs is read out of ps. When ps could not answer, the
tests skipped — which is indistinguishable from success in CI output — and one
assertion passed vacuously for the same reason. A regression in ps parsing or
availability would have shown up as green.

requireProcessState probes BOTH ps pipelines against this test process, which
is by definition alive and not a zombie, so a working ps must report a live
state for it. When it cannot:

- Under CI (or ZERO_REQUIRE_PS=1) this is a hard failure. ps is present on every
  image used today, so its absence means the pipeline regressed and that has to
  surface immediately.
- Otherwise it stays a skip, so a contributor on an unsupported box is not
  blocked.

Both pipelines are probed because they are deliberately separate: the tests
assert what the production process-table parser concludes, so this file keeps
its own per-PID ps oracle rather than borrowing that parser to establish its own
preconditions. One regression must not be able to silence both sides at once.

Once the probe passes, failing to observe an EXPECTED state is a defect rather
than an environment problem, so the remaining escapes become failures:

- The zombie waits (awaitZombie) fail instead of skipping. The caller never
  waits on the child, so its zombie row persists until reaped — reaching the
  deadline means the child never exited or ps stopped answering, and the two
  are reported distinctly.
- A zombie group that is not signalable fails instead of skipping: a zombie
  still occupies the process table, so if kill(-pid, 0) fails the case under
  test is not present and the assertions after it would prove nothing.
- processSignalTarget returning anything but the individual PID fails instead
  of skipping: the child inherited this process's group, so its PGID is this
  process's PID and can never equal its own PID.

The vacuous assertion in TestTerminateProcessTreeStopsRunningGroup now requires
ok. That is sound rather than merely stricter: the test never waits on the
child, so the group's zombie row must still be present after termination, and
an unknown state means ps stopped answering rather than that the group is
clean.

Verified on Linux (WSL, go1.26.6) rather than by cross-compilation alone:

- all three tests pass unmodified
- with a stub ps that exits 1: CI unset skips with the reason named; CI=true
  fails, naming which pipeline could not answer
- the same broken-ps run against the ORIGINAL file produced two silent skips
  plus one unrelated failure after 12s, versus an immediate, explicit failure now

Windows is unaffected (the file is !windows); go vet passes for linux, darwin
and windows.

Fixes #863

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U389qmQUhoZB3YtXkFmiTq

* test(execution): treat an unsignalable zombie group as a kernel difference

The macOS Smoke job failed:

    the zombie group 5931 is not signalable (operation not permitted)

That was my error. I converted this skip along with the ps-availability ones,
but it never had anything to do with ps: whether kill(2) may signal a group
whose only member is a zombie is a KERNEL difference. Linux permits it, so
signalTargetRunning goes on to consult ps — the branch this test was written
for. Darwin returns EPERM, so signalTargetRunning short-circuits on the kill and
never reaches ps.

Rather than restore the blanket skip, the test now records which branch answers:

- Signal permitted: assert processGroupHasRunningMember directly, so a ps-side
  regression cannot hide behind the kill result. This is new coverage; the old
  test only checked signalTargetRunning, which conflates the two paths.
- Signal refused: log it and continue.

The outcome assertion — a zombie-only group must not count as running — now runs
on EVERY platform. Previously Darwin skipped before reaching it, so this is
strictly more coverage there, not less.

Any errno other than EPERM still fails: it means the group is not in the state
the test needs, and nothing after it would be meaningful.

TerminateProcessTree is asserted only where the signal is permitted, because
terminateTarget's own kill(2) would hit the same EPERM and return it as a
cleanup error. Worth a maintainer's eye: that may be a real gap in
TerminateProcessTree on such a platform — a zombie-only tree is already exited
and arguably should terminate cleanly rather than report failure, which is the
same spurious-cleanup-failure class #774 set out to remove. Confirming that
needs a Darwin host and is a production change, so it is flagged rather than
guessed at here.

Verified on Linux (WSL, go1.26.6): all three tests pass, including the new
direct ps assertion. The Darwin branch was exercised by forcing the EPERM path
on Linux — it logs both explanations and passes with the outcome assertion
still enforced. go vet passes for linux, darwin and windows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U389qmQUhoZB3YtXkFmiTq

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-26 13:22:43 +08:00
Anandan 1fde941803 perf: reduce startup and turn overhead (#932)
* perf(tui): disable duplicate composer cursor blink

* perf(tui): stop composer wakeups after idle

* refactor(tools): publish immutable registry snapshots

* perf(startup): defer optional tool discovery

* perf(provider): reuse compatible response sessions

* feat(provider): add native patch tool input

* fix(provider): recognize saved chat sessions

* perf(tui): render only on screen changes

* fix(runtime): address performance review findings

* fix(usage): expose cache efficiency details

* perf(agent): reduce redundant bounded-task turns

* fix: harden runtime review edge cases

* fix: address runtime review findings

* build: restore official Bubble Tea dependency

* fix(cli): redact MCP registration errors

* fix: harden turn session regressions

* fix: keep run tools and patch roots consistent

* fix: bind freeform patch writes to scoped roots

* test: keep patch fixtures out of worktree

* fix(tools): reject mixed-root freeform patches
2026-08-26 13:22:05 +08:00
KRATOS 7acac7acee fix(sandbox): refcount temporary roots so one holder's cleanup cannot revoke another's (#911)
* fix(sandbox): a temporary root is refcounted, so one holder's cleanup cannot revoke another's

Split out of #829 as an independent fix, per @Vasanthdev2004's review asking for
the self-contained pieces to arrive separately.

A temporary grant was add-then-remove with no notion of who still needed the
root. The second caller to ask for a root already present got a NO-OP undo, and
the first caller's cleanup then removed the root out from under it — so a live
grant lost its access while its holder still believed it had it.

Two read-only tools in the same parallel batch, both blocked on the same
directory, is exactly that shape, and read-only tools are precisely the ones the
batch runs concurrently.

tempReads/tempWrites now count live holders, and the root is only stripped when
the last one releases.

The release also performs both mutations under ONE hold of the lock. Dropping it
between them left a window where the root was still in readRoots but no longer in
tempReads: a concurrent AddTemporaryRead landing there reads it as a PERMANENT
root, hands its caller a no-op undo, and this call then strips the root — so that
caller believes it holds access it has already silently lost.

Independent of the remaining #829 work; builds and tests against current main on
its own.

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* fix(sandbox): a read covered by a TEMPORARY write root takes a reference too

Found by a self-review of this branch: the refcount closed the defect within
reads and within writes, but not across them.

AddTemporaryRead returned a no-op undo whenever writeRootCoversLocked said a
write root already covered the path, and the comment there claimed that cover was
permanent. It is not: writeRootCoversLocked scans extraRoots, and
AddTemporaryWrite appends TEMPORARY write roots into that same slice. So a read
covered by another holder's temporary write took no reference, and that holder's
cleanup silently revoked the reader's access — the very defect the refcount
exists to close, reached across the read/write boundary instead of within one
side of it.

Demonstrated before fixing, and the regression fails without it:

  ReadRoots before release = [ws, …/outer]
  ReadRoots after  release = [ws]
  the write holder's cleanup revoked a live read grant on …/outer/inner

The read now takes a reference on the covering temporary write root, and the
genuinely permanent case — the workspace root, or a session-scoped grant — still
returns a no-op undo.

The regression also asserts the other direction: once the reader releases too,
the root is gone, so the reference does not leak the grant past its last holder.

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* test(sandbox): make the concurrency test concurrent, and portable off macOS

Both raised by CodeRabbit. The third finding on this PR — a read covered by a
TEMPORARY write root taking no reference — was already fixed in 87a722cb with the
regression it asked for; this covers the two that were still live, and both are
cases of a test reporting more than it checked.

THE CONCURRENCY TEST WAS NOT CONCURRENT. The gate spun until hasReadRoot saw
somebody holding the root, which is satisfied by the FIRST holder, then opened
the release. The spin wins that race against goroutines still being scheduled:
instrumented over 200 runs, 194 peaked at a single simultaneous holder and not
one ever reached eight. A test named for concurrent holders was exercising one
holder at a time. Against a deliberately broken refcount, where the first release
strips the root, it passed 33 times in 40 — it was a flaky test that mostly
agreed with broken code. Counting all eight acquisitions makes the overlap real:
200 of 200 runs now peak at eight, and the same broken refcount is caught 40
times in 40. Holders signal the barrier on every path including failure, so a
holder that returns early fails the test rather than hanging it.

THE HELPER SKIPPED ON WINDOWS. scopeOutsideRoots reached for /Users/Shared and
fell back to /var/empty, neither of which exists there, so every test built on it
skipped and reported green having asserted nothing. It now uses the home
directory, which no platform lists as a default write root, matching what
scope_extra_read_test.go already does — and then PROVES the choice against
defaultTempWriteRoots rather than assuming it, so a future default root turns
these tests into an honest skip instead of a silent no-op.

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* fix(sandbox): a permanent grant outlives the temporary one, and an undo is per holder

Both P1s from @anandh8x, both reproduced before changing anything, and both are
the same mistake in different places: treating "something covers this path" as
though it answered "and will it still be there afterwards".

A PERMANENT GRANT WAS REVOKED BY A TEMPORARY HOLDER. extraRoots holds temporary
write roots alongside permanent ones, so Add asked only whether the path was
already covered. A session-scoped grant made while a temporary holder happened to
cover it recorded nothing at all, and disappeared the moment that holder
released. Outliving the request that prompted it is the entire difference between
Add and AddTemporaryWrite, and it was not happening. AddRead had it too,
including across the boundary: a permanent read covered only by a temporary WRITE
root died with that root.

Permanent coverage is now looked for first and across every root, so a temporary
cover cannot decide the answer when a permanent one is also present. The same
root held temporarily is promoted in place — its holders' releases become no-ops,
which is what permanence means here. A BROADER temporary root over a narrower
permanent grant cannot be fixed by promotion, so the narrower root is recorded in
its own right; that is the case he specifically called out, and it is the one a
promotion-only fix would have missed.

ONE HOLDER'S UNDO IS ONE HOLDER'S REFERENCE. The comment on releaseTemporaryRead
claimed each undo is called exactly once and that flooring the count at zero
covered the rest. Flooring stops the count going negative; it does nothing about
a holder's second call consuming a DIFFERENT holder's reference. With two
readers, calling the first's undo twice took the count 2 -> 1 -> 0 and removed a
root the second was still using — the exact revocation this refcount exists to
prevent, reached through a duplicate call rather than a sibling's cleanup, and a
deferred cleanup in a retry path is how a caller does that by accident. Every
undo handed out is now wrapped so it drops its own reference at most once, and
the comment says what is actually true.

Both mutation-checked: unwrapping the undo, and ignoring permanence in Add, each
fail the test that covers them. Race detector clean.

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* chore(sandbox): re-request an automated review of this head

No code change. CodeRabbit's verdict on this PR is pinned to ff85dbcc, a commit
that no longer exists on the branch, and a stale changes-requested keeps the PR
at mergeStateStatus=BLOCKED exactly as a human one would. It re-reviews on push
rather than on request, and repeated @coderabbitai triggers over five days
produced nothing, so this is the only lever available without maintainer rights.

The cost is that this dismisses @Vasanthdev2004's and @anandh8x's approvals of
4a7063aa. The tree they approved is byte-identical to this one.

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* test(sandbox): a fixture failure fails, a report cannot deadlock, and AddRead's
own branches are covered

All raised by CodeRabbit on the full review. Every one verified before changing
anything.

## The concurrent test could hang instead of failing

failures was buffered at one slot per holder, but each goroutine can report at
BOTH hasReadRoot checks — its own grant going missing while held, and again
after the release gate. Nothing drains the channel until after wg.Wait(), so the
ninth report blocks forever, wg.Done() is never reached and the wait hangs. The
test would deadlock in exactly the case it exists to catch: a refcount bug
severe enough to fail more than eight of eight holders. Buffered at 2*holders.

## A broken fixture reported itself as a pass

TestANarrowerRequestHoldsTheCoveringGrant called t.Skip when os.MkdirAll failed.
The directory is the fixture, not a precondition the environment may reasonably
withhold, and the sibling test above it already uses t.Fatal for the same call.

## Two tests assumed something they never checked

Both tests in scope_extra_read_test.go place their grant under $HOME precisely
because NewScope seeds /tmp and $TMPDIR as write roots — a grant that collapsed
into one of those would be writable for a reason unrelated to the property under
test. $HOME is normally clear of them, but a sandboxed or CI environment that
points HOME at a temp directory turns both tests into something that proves
nothing while still reporting PASS.

homeGrantOutsideTempRoots now builds the fixture for both and skips with the
reason when the assumption does not hold. Verified by running with HOME set to a
temp directory: both tests SKIP naming the covering root, where before they
passed. The path is resolved before comparing, because the temp roots are
resolved and /var is a symlink to /private/var on macOS.

## AddRead's branches were only covered from the write side

Two subtests added: a permanent read under a temporary WRITE root, and a narrow
permanent read under a BROAD temporary read root. Both mutation-checked by
removing the corresponding temporary-coverage guard in AddRead — each fails.

The first mutation I ran did not fail its test, and the finding looked wrong: the
pattern being edited occurs in Add, AddRead and AddTemporaryWrite alike, and a
first-match edit had changed Add. Re-run against the line inside AddRead, it
fails as claimed. Recorded because a mutation that misses its target is
indistinguishable from a test that holds.

## Also asserted: the refcount table is empty, not merely invisible

hasReadRoot answers what a caller can see. An entry left at zero in tempReads is
not visible that way and would still leak one map entry per acquire/release
cycle, so the contention test now checks the terminal state directly.

go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=5: clean.
Unrelated and pre-existing here: TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics
and TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

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* fix(sandbox): a reader outliving its writer keeps read authority, not write

Reported by @jatmn, and it is a privilege escalation rather than a lifetime bug.

AddTemporaryRead, given a path already covered by a temporary WRITE root, took a
reference on that write root and returned an undo that released it. The lifetime
was then correct — the reader no longer lost its access when the writer cleaned
up — but the capability was wrong. extraRoots feeds validate(), which authorises
WRITES, so once the write holder released first the path stayed in extraRoots for
as long as the read holder lived. A caller that asked only to READ could write
anywhere below the former write root after the write grant had ended.

His diagnosis names the root cause exactly: one write-capability reference was
doing two jobs, tracking a lifetime and standing in for a read-only dependent.

The lifetime is now kept as what the caller actually asked for — a temporary READ
root on its own path. AddTemporaryRead consults permanentWriteRootCoversLocked
rather than writeRootCoversLocked, so a merely temporary write cover no longer
short-circuits it into borrowing write authority.

Mutation-checked: restoring writeRootCoversLocked in that branch compiles and
fails the regression on three separate assertions — the reader keeps no read root
of its own, ReadRoots() loses the path, and the writer's cleanup revokes a live
read grant.

Two things a verification pass turned up that are worth recording:

The comment justifying this design said readRoots "feeds ReadRoots() and nothing
else". That was false — it also feeds ExtraReadRoots(). The security argument
survives, because neither confers write authority and validate() reads
workspaceRoot plus extraRoots, which this path never enters. But that sentence IS
the written justification for the whole choice, so it now lists both and says why
neither grants write.

The "the reader releases first" subtest passes on the unfixed tree: the
escalation needs the WRITER to go first. It is a real no-regression control for
the opposite ordering, not evidence the finding is closed, and it is renamed to
say so rather than padding the count.

Rebased onto ad34dc8d as requested. go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=5:
clean. Pre-existing here and on main, unrelated:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

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* fix(sandbox): a nested write holder keeps only the subtree it asked for

Reported by CodeRabbit, and it is the write-side twin of the read-side
escalation @jatmn found — I had disclosed it on this PR as still open, so this
closes it rather than deferring it again.

AddTemporaryWrite, given a path already covered by a broader TEMPORARY write
root, took a reference on that covering root. The lifetime was right and the
capability was wrong, exactly as on the read side: extraRoots is what validate()
authorises writes from, so keeping the covering root alive handed the nested
holder everything its neighbour had asked for.

Reproduced:

  both held           tempWrites={outer:2}                extraRoots=[... outer]
  after outer release tempWrites={outer:1}                extraRoots=[... outer]
  -> the inner-only holder can WRITE outer/sibling/not-mine.txt

A narrower request now records its own root. Each holder gets exactly the
authority it asked for and a lifetime of its own:

  both held           tempWrites={outer:1, inner:1}       extraRoots=[... outer inner]
  after outer release tempWrites={inner:1}                extraRoots=[... inner]
  -> sibling denied, inner retained

Only an EXACT match shares a refcount entry; a narrower one never does, which is
the distinction the escalation turned on. The nesting costs a redundant
extraRoots entry while both holders are live, which is not wrong — the broader
root already permits everything the narrower one does.

Three regressions: the escalation itself (broad holder releases first), the
opposite order as a control, and two holders of the same root sharing one entry.

Mutation: restoring the covering-root borrow compiles and fails the escalation
test on both the sibling and the covering root itself.

Honest note on a second mutation. Removing the permanent-cover early return
compiles and fails NOTHING. That is correct rather than a coverage gap: a
permanently covered request would then record its own temporary root, which is
redundant but harmless, since the permanent root outlives it and already permits
the writes. The early return is a cleanliness guard, not a correctness one, and
I would rather say so than write a test that pretends otherwise.

go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=5: clean. Pre-existing here and on main:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

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* test(sandbox): the outside-roots fixture fails loudly instead of skipping

Raised by CodeRabbit, and the helper had already written the argument against
itself: its own comment says "A skip is not a pass" while three of its four exits
were skips.

Every caller of scopeOutsideRoots asserts an AUTHORIZATION boundary — who may
write where, and whose release revokes it. A skipped fixture means that assertion
never ran and the build reported green anyway, which is precisely the failure the
helper was written to close. It closed it for one case (a home directory that
resolves nowhere on Windows) and left the others open.

Three exits become fatal:

  os.UserHomeDir failing        — resolves on every platform Zero supports
  os.MkdirTemp(home) failing    — a home that will not take a temp directory is a
                                  broken machine, not a limited one
  os.MkdirAll under base        — base was just created successfully, so a
                                  subdirectory failing under it is the same

If any fires, the right outcome is a red build somebody fixes, not silent
non-coverage of the sandbox's write rules.

ONE SKIP STAYS, and it is a different kind. When the grant path is already inside
a default write root, the fixture built correctly and the machine is fine — the
grant simply cannot demonstrate anything, because that path is writable before
any temporary grant exists. Running on would assert a permission that was never
in question. The comment now says which kind it is, so the distinction survives
the next reader.

Verified the fatal path fires: forcing the MkdirTemp error compiles and fails
TestANestedWriteHolderKeepsOnlyItsOwnSubtree at the fixture with the reason,
where it previously reported a pass.

go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=3: clean. Pre-existing here and on main:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

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* fix(sandbox): least authority for nested readers, and a hermetic grant fixture

@jatmn's three findings, taken as one pass over the grant construct rather than
as three local patches — his point that the same invariant kept not being
reapplied to the symmetric branch was fair, and this is the symmetric branch.

## The nested reader kept its neighbour's tree

AddTemporaryRead had exactly the shape AddTemporaryWrite was fixed for one
commit earlier: reader B asking for outer/inner took a reference on reader A's
covering root. Lifetime correct, capability wrong. readRoots feeds validateRead
and the native sandbox profile, so once A released, B could read outer/sibling.

Reproduced: tempReads={outer:2}; after A releases, the inner-only reader reads a
sibling it never asked for.

The rule is now the same on both sides: permanent coverage decides first, an
EXACT temporary root shares one refcount, and a narrower request records its own
root. Mutation: restoring the borrow fires both escalation assertions.

## Slice order no longer decides permanent coverage

permanentReadRootCoversLocked asks the whole question over both lists before any
insertion order can answer it, and AddRead now uses the same predicate instead of
its own scan, so the two cannot drift.

Honest note: with the borrow gone, this mutation is no longer catchable. Making
the scan return at the first covering entry compiles and fails nothing, because
AddTemporaryRead no longer borrows anything — it either no-ops or records its own
root, and neither escalates. The guard now prevents a redundant refcount entry
rather than an escalation. Verified by measurement, not assumed.

## A test that asserted the defect

TestANarrowerRequestHoldsTheCoveringGrant proved a lifetime property by
asserting the BROAD root was still present after the broad holder released —
which is the escalation written down as a requirement. It is replaced by tests
that assert lifetime and authority separately: the requested path stays readable,
the sibling and the covering root do not, plus the reverse release order,
exact-root sharing, and a permanent narrow root not borrowing a broad temporary
one.

## The obsolete predicate that broke CI

writeRootCoversLocked lost its last caller when the three coverage decisions
moved to permanentWriteRootCoversLocked and exact-root logic. make lint-static
reproduced the Windows `unused` failure locally. Removed rather than suppressed.
This is on me: I did not run lint-static before the previous push, which is a
required step, and CI caught what I should have.

## Fixtures out of the real home

scopeOutsideRoots and homeGrantOutsideTempRoots both built fixtures under
os.UserHomeDir(). Fixed at the cause jatmn identified rather than by relaxing the
setup checks: NewScope seeds the system temp directory as a permanent write root,
which is what made a t.TempDir() grant vacuous and sent the fixture to HOME in the
first place. Both helpers now build the Scope DIRECTLY — the pattern
scopeOutsideDefaults and temporaryWriteFixture already used — so no defaults are
seeded, t.TempDir() is outside by construction, and nothing touches HOME.

Each helper now asserts the NEGATIVE against its own scope before returning: the
target must be unwritable, and unreadable where relevant, before any grant
exists. That is stronger than the old check against defaultTempWriteRoots(),
which asked about a scope these tests no longer build.

Verified with HOME readable but not writable (caches redirected): the sandbox
suite passes. The one remaining failure there is
TestSeatbeltEnforcesExtraWriteRoots in seatbelt_integration_darwin_test.go, which
is NOT in this PR's diff — pre-existing, same shape, and worth its own issue
rather than riding along here.

gofmt, go vet, lint-static (0 issues), go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=5:
all clean. Pre-existing here and on main:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

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* refactor(sandbox): drop the child-grant accessors this PR does not consume

Reported by @jatmn.

ExtraRoots and ExtraReadRoots have no production caller anywhere in the tree —
only their own definitions and this PR's tests. They arrived with the initial
split because the extraction was made at the file level: the temporary-root
implementation came across while the CLI and runner wiring that consumes them
stayed behind in #829's child read-grant propagation area. That leaves unrelated
production surface in a branch scoped to refcounting.

Both accessors are removed, along with the getter-only propagation assertion that
existed to exercise them. The refcount regressions that used ExtraRoots only to
inspect beyond-workspace write state now use a test-only helper over Roots(),
because that inspection is a test concern rather than an API this branch needs.

Nothing about the refcount, permanence, least-authority, atomic-release or
hermetic-fixture work changes, and no child propagation is wired here — that
would widen the scope rather than fix the extraction boundary.

One comment needed correcting rather than deleting. The justification for keeping
a reader's lifetime as a READ root named the lists readRoots feeds, and that
sentence has now been wrong in both directions: an earlier draft said "ReadRoots
and nothing else" while ExtraReadRoots also read it, and the accessor it was
corrected to mention is the one being removed here. It now describes what ships
and says why the list has to stay exhaustive as accessors change.

Rebased onto 6fe0d1ed, 0 behind. lint-static: 0 issues.
go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=3: clean. Pre-existing here and on main:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.
2026-08-26 13:21:25 +08:00
KRATOS 1649008506 fix(tools): an edit keeps the reads it did not disturb (#908)
* fix(tools): an edit keeps the reads it did not disturb

Split out of #829 as an independent fix, per @Vasanthdev2004's review asking for
the small self-contained pieces to arrive separately.

A successful edit re-baselined the file through RecordHash, which drops EVERY
recorded read range. A file read in three pieces therefore lost all three to a
single two-line edit, and the next six edits into regions that had already been
read were refused as unseen — the model had to re-read what it had just read in
order to keep working.

RecordEdit replaces that on the edit path. Because the edit is ours, the changed
span is known exactly, so ranges the edit did not touch are carried across,
ranges after it are shifted by the line delta, and a range the edit spans is
split around it.

An EXTERNAL change still drops everything, deliberately: once a formatter has
rewritten the file we no longer know which line holds what was read, and the
conservative drop is the only honest answer there.

"Seen whole" is now decided in ONE place. SeenWhole derives the answer from the
ranges because the raw flag is only ever set by a single covering read, but
RecordEdit branched on the flag — so a file read whole in two chunks reported
seen-whole true, then false after one edit, putting back the write_file refusal
the derived answer exists to prevent.

countLines now reports the count a READER would give. strings.Split leaves an
empty final element for content ending in a newline, so it counted 4 lines for a
3-line file; since SeenWhole asks whether the ranges cover 1..total, that
inflated total made full coverage unreachable for a file just read in full.
Nearly every text file ends in a newline, so this was the common case.

Origin-Session: local-de382f | Claude Code | 9 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 92ae33c95cd1
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: ae653221fa15

* chore(tools): re-request an automated review of this head

No code change. CodeRabbit's verdict on this PR is pinned to 6f0cd6c4, a commit
that was force-pushed away five days ago, and a stale changes-requested keeps the
PR at mergeStateStatus=BLOCKED exactly as a human one would. It re-reviews on
push rather than on request, and repeated @coderabbitai triggers over five days
produced nothing, so this is the only lever available without maintainer rights.

The cost is that this dismisses @Vasanthdev2004's and @anandh8x's approvals of
0b6fcf54, which is an unhappy trade for an empty commit — the tree they approved
is byte-identical to this one.

Origin-Session: local-8cd239 | Claude Code | 6 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 149ab98453ad
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: ae653221fa15

* perf(tools): derive the changed-line span from bytes, not from per-line slices

Reported by @jatmn.

changedLineSpan split both file versions into []string, so it allocated one
string header per line for EACH version — work that scales with the size of the
file rather than the size of the edit. countLines then split a third time just to
take a length. All of it ran before RecordEdit had checked whether there was a
tracked observation to update at all.

He measured 32,036,640 bytes for two 2 MB versions of a million short lines, and
extrapolated roughly 1.6 GB of headers for a 100 MB file before counting the
content, the updated bytes and the hashes already live beside them.

The memory was not the sharp end. edit_file writes the updated bytes BEFORE
calling RecordEdit, so an out-of-memory kill lands after the user's file has
changed and before the tracker baseline catches up: the file and the record of it
disagree, and nothing says so. His instruction was to fix the allocation source
rather than add a size guard, and that a guard — if used at all — would have to
reject before os.WriteFile rather than during post-write re-baselining. Taken as
written: there is no new limit, and the same edits are accepted as before.

Two identical byte prefixes share every line that ends inside them, so counting
newlines in the common prefix counts the unchanged leading lines directly. Same
for the suffix, with one rule that the line-array version got for free: the line
a shared tail STARTS in is only shared when the tail begins on a line boundary in
both versions, or its opening bytes differ and it is a changed line that merely
ends the same way.

Measured on his own scenario, two 2 MB versions:

  changedLineSpan   32,036,640 bytes  ->  0 allocations
  countLines        per-line slice    ->  0 allocations

## The equivalence is tested, not asserted

A rewrite of a diff primitive is only safe if it is behaviour-preserving, so the
replaced implementation is kept in the test file as an oracle and both are asked
the same questions. That caught 206 mismatches in my first attempt at the byte
scan — empty versions, and trailing lines that are only partially shared. Neither
appears in the hand-written cases, and I would have shipped it.

Two regressions: the oracle comparison, and an absolute allocation ceiling rather
than a ratio, so a future rewrite that reintroduces per-line slices fails rather
than merely getting slower. Mutation: restoring strings.Split in either function
allocates 3.2 MB and 3.6 MB against a 4 KB bound.

splitLinesForTracking lost its last caller and is removed — the same obsolete-
helper lint failure that broke Windows CI on #911, caught here by running
make lint-static before pushing rather than after. 0 issues.

Rebased onto ad34dc8d, 0 behind. go test -race ./internal/tools/: clean.
Pre-existing here and on main: TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics
and TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 17 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: a599377c09e0
2026-08-26 13:20:48 +08:00
KRATOS 6fe0d1edcd fix(lockutil): use kernel-held advisory locks (#950)
* fix(lockutil): use kernel-held advisory locks

* fix(lockutil): harden cross-platform lock files

* test(lockutil): require one concurrent holder
2026-08-25 21:20:18 +08:00
e59bf78cab fix(sandbox): Make WSL backend tests deterministic. (#948)
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: cairn-code <[email protected]>
2026-08-25 21:19:31 +08:00
Kevin CodexandClaude Fable 5 6645f9744b perf(agent): cheap compaction — dedicated summarizer model, input cap… (#532)
* perf(agent): cheap compaction — dedicated summarizer model, input caps, free reactive prune, window re-derive

Compaction summarization was the single most expensive recurring event
in a long run: the full elided middle — verbatim tool bodies included —
went to the session's main model at full price (a ~100k-token call near
a 200k window, recursively multiplied on overflow).

Four changes, each independently safe:

- Dedicated summarizer model. Compaction summaries route to a cheap
  model resolved as ZERO_COMPACTION_MODEL > preferences.compactionModel
  > a curated default on official endpoints (Haiku 4.5 / Gemini
  Flash-Lite / gpt-4.1-mini; custom-endpoint catalogs are unknowable so
  they get none). Built lazily on the first paid compaction; ANY
  failure permanently falls back to the main provider for the run, so a
  misconfigured summarizer can never break compaction. "main" at any
  level forces the old behavior.

- Summarizer input caps. renderTranscript clamps tool-result bodies to
  2,000 chars and tool-call arguments to 500 (head+tail, rune-safe) —
  the summary needs what was done and decided, not raw payloads. Cuts
  summarizer input 5-10x on tool-heavy sessions.

- Free reactive prune. recover() now runs the same prune-first stage as
  the proactive path: a context-limit error is first answered by
  pruning stale tool bodies at zero cost, without consuming the
  one-shot reactive budget; the paid summarizer only runs when a later
  error finds nothing left to prune.

- Window re-derivation on model switch. Options.ContextWindowFor
  (wired to the model registry in exec and the TUI) lets the loop
  re-derive the compaction threshold after escalate_model, closing the
  documented KNOWN LIMITATION where a switch to a smaller-window model
  could overflow and a larger one over-compacted.

## Rebase notes (2026-08-25, onto 2749447c)

Rebased across 214 commits. main now summarizes through the context planner
(#879) and switches models via turn sessions, so the agent side was reworked
rather than merged textually:

- Summarizer selection lives on compactionState and is resolved lazily per
  main model through summarizeWithPlanner (planner + trace preserved); a
  failing dedicated summarizer is marked broken and the same slice is
  retried once on the main provider.
- Options.Summarizer now receives the main model in force:
  `func(ctx, mainModelID string) (Provider, error)`, and may return
  (nil, nil) when no dedicated model applies. After a successful
  escalate_model switch the loop calls compactor.switchModel, which
  re-derives the window and re-resolves the summarizer — a run that started
  on the cheap model and escalated regains cheap summaries (review P2).
- recover()'s free prune stage runs before the one-shot reactive guard
  (pruning is free and cannot loop) and mirrors maybeCompact's two prune
  passes; the free retry is taken only when the pruned history fits the
  window the provider enforces (with a 5% estimate margin), otherwise the
  same call falls through to the paid summarizer. Gating on the 70%
  proactive threshold would have sent histories in the 70-95% band to the
  summarizer unnecessarily (review P1 and the follow-up question).
- ContextWindowFor is wired through the turn-session switch path; the
  planner's window is updated alongside the compactor's.

Tests: the PR's suite is ported to the new seams, plus insufficient-prune
fall-through, free prune after the budget is spent, window-vs-threshold
gating, and summarizer re-resolution across a model switch.

* fix(agent): branch on a dedicated-summarizer flag instead of comparing providers

Review follow-ups for #532:

- summarizeProvider now reports whether the dedicated summarizer was
  selected and summarizeClosure branches on that flag; the previous
  `chosen == provider` compared Provider interface values, which panics
  when the dynamic type is not comparable. Regression test uses a provider
  with a slice field for both the summarizer and the main provider.
- CompactionModelID's curated-default test covers the official OpenAI
  profile alongside Anthropic and Google.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-25 21:18:04 +08:00
Kevin CodexandClaude Fable 5 2749447cdc fix(tools): make apply_patch tolerant and re-expose edit_file (#956)
* fix(tools): make apply_patch tolerant and re-expose edit_file

Head-to-head benchmarking against Grok Build on grok-4.6 (3 tasks × 3 runs)
showed Zero solving every task but spending 2.7× the tokens and 2.3× the
time on the multi-file feature task. Every one of the 20 apply_patch calls
in those runs failed, after which the model degraded to whole-file
write_file rewrites and read→write verification loops.

Root causes and fixes:

- The sandbox and the tool both rejected an absolute path that lies inside
  the workspace ("must stay inside the workspace"). Models routinely echo
  the absolute path read_file showed them. Absolute paths now flow through
  the normal workspace-scope validation (inside → allowed, outside → still
  denied); unified-diff headers are rewritten to a/ b/ relative form before
  git apply, and platform symlink prefixes (/var → /private/var) are
  normalised the same way the other file tools do.
- The structured parser demanded a byte-exact "*** Begin Patch" /
  "*** End Patch"; grok-4.6 writes "*** Begin Patch ***". Decorated marker
  spellings are accepted, and a unified range after "@@" ("-12,4 +12,6",
  optionally with a heading) no longer becomes a literal context search.
- Parse errors now carry a one-line format reminder so a failed call is
  recoverable in one retry instead of a format-guessing loop.
- edit_file (exact search/replace with uniqueness guard, CRLF and fuzzy
  fallbacks) is advertised to the model again alongside apply_patch, and
  the apply_patch description shows the structured format.
- Writers (edit_file, write_file, apply_patch) recorded a file's line total
  with lineCount, which is one higher than read_file's count for a file
  ending in a newline. RecordSeenRange resets every observation when the
  total changes, so a partial read_file after a successful edit silently
  discarded whole-file knowledge and the next edit was refused with
  "content that has not been read exactly in this session". All writers
  now record the same total read_file reports (trackedLineTotal).
- read_file's padded "  N | " line prefix was ~19% of every read (about
  1.5k tokens per 800-line file) and was re-sent on every later call. It is
  now the compact "N→" prefix models already know; nothing parsed the old
  form.
- The editing-discipline prompt steers: edit_file for a targeted change,
  apply_patch for multi-hunk/multi-file changes, write_file only for new
  files or full rewrites; a successful edit result is confirmation, so the
  file is not re-read to verify it.

Tests: regression tests for decorated markers, writer/reader line-total
agreement (edit → partial read → edit far away still succeeds), range hunk headers,
absolute in-workspace paths (structured + unified), outside-workspace
rejection, header-line-only relativisation, and tool visibility; the
prompt and tool-budget tests updated to the new contract.

Benchmark (grok-4.6, 3 tasks x 3 runs, harness in demo/bench-zero-vs-grok):
Zero 0.8.0 617 s / 1,527k tokens -> with this change 346 s / 493k tokens;
Grok Build 407 s / 713k. Every run of every configuration solved its task.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): keep CRLF line endings when relativizing patch headers

relativizeUnifiedPatchPaths split on a normalized "\n" and rejoined with
"\n", so any CRLF patch that needed a header rewrite lost its line endings
everywhere; git apply could then fail to match a CRLF file. Split on "\n"
only and carry each line's trailing "\r" through, including on rewritten
headers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(sandbox): share the structured-patch classifier with apply_patch

Review follow-ups for #956:

- The tool accepted decorated structured markers ("***Begin Patch") that
  the sandbox's applyPatchPaths did not recognise, so for that spelling the
  boundary scanned the patch as a unified diff, extracted no targets and
  validated nothing. The marker classifier now lives in the sandbox package
  (StructuredPatchMarker / IsStructuredPatch) and the tool delegates to it,
  so both sides accept exactly the same set; tests cover inside, traversal
  and outside targets for the no-space spelling at the boundary.
- Document the containment model at the apply site: structured patches are
  applied through an opened os.Root (descriptor-relative, no-follow);
  unified diffs keep the pre-existing git-apply pathname flow, which the
  absolute-path rewrite does not widen (they become the same root-relative
  form relative paths always used).
- OpenAI addendum: the one-file-per-call rule names read_file, edit_file and
  write_file explicitly and allows a single multi-file apply_patch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* test(sandbox): compare slash-normalised patch paths so the check passes on Windows

structuredPatchHeaderPaths normalises separators to "/", so the absolute
outside-workspace path in the boundary test must be compared in its slash
form; on Windows the backslash original never matched and the Smoke job
failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* test(sandbox): validate the parsed patch path at the scope boundary

For each accepted marker spelling, pass the exact path applyPatchRequestPaths
produced to scope.validate: an outside path must be denied and an inside
path accepted, so a separator-handling regression between the parser and the
scope cannot slip past the test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): apply unified diffs in-process through the workspace root

Review follow-up for #956. Unified diffs were validated by pathname and then
handed to git apply, which reopened the targets by name — a check-to-use
window a symlink swap could exploit — and the absolute-path rewrite added in
this PR normalised `diff --git` headers with strings.Fields, which splits a
git C-quoted path containing whitespace.

Both go away by not shelling out at all: parseUnifiedPatch translates a
unified diff into the same operations a structured patch produces, and both
formats are applied by applyPatchOperations through os.OpenRoot — every
stat, read, create and write is descriptor-relative and refuses to follow a
link out of the root. git is no longer required by apply_patch.

Unified-diff support: modifications, creations (--- /dev/null), deletions
(+++ /dev/null), multiple hunks per file, git "rename from/to" (a move,
hunks optional) and "copy from/to" (a new copy operation whose destination
inherits only the tracker credit the source had), "\ No newline at end of
file" on either side, a/ b/ prefixes, C-quoted paths, CRLF patches, and
git's diff/index/mode lines. Hunks are placed at their "@@ -a,b" range when
the expected lines match there and located by context otherwise (so a
stale range still applies and duplicate blocks are disambiguated by the
range). Binary patches are rejected.

Removed: the git apply flow, relativizeUnifiedPatchPaths,
recheckPatchWriteTargets, missingPatchTargets, completeCreatedPatchTargets
and recordCreatedPatchTargets. validatePatchPaths/changedFilesFromPatch stay
for mutation-target listing.

Tests: the existing unified-diff suite now runs through the in-process
applier unchanged; new coverage for quoted whitespace paths (inside applies,
outside is refused untouched), a workspace path swapped for a symlink that
escapes the root (both formats refused, outside file unmodified), create +
delete + no-newline markers, range hint vs context fallback, rename with a
hunk, and binary/empty rejection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): harden unified-diff parsing and cover the copy operation

Review follow-ups for #956 (in-process unified applier):

- A hunk that ends before its declared line counts is reported as
  malformed instead of silently absorbing the next file's ---/+++ header
  pair (which then failed later against the wrong file). Both shapes are
  caught: leftover counts at a header or at end of input, and a --- line
  directly followed by +++ inside a hunk. The element after a patch's final
  newline is no longer counted as an empty context line, so a truncated
  hunk cannot look complete.
- "\ No newline at end of file" may only follow a file's final hunk; a
  marker before another hunk is rejected rather than leaking into that
  hunk's result.
- Zero-context insertions (git diff -U0) are documented as
  position-trusting by design, matching git apply without fuzz; hunks with
  context are verified at the range before it is used.

Tests: copy from/to (source kept, destination created with the hunk
applied and tracked with the source's whole-file state; existing
destination refused untouched; copy onto itself refused), over-declared and
truncated hunk counts, and the no-newline marker before vs after the final
hunk.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): require an @@ line before treating ---/+++ inside a hunk as a file boundary

A removed "-- x" line directly followed by an added "++ y" line is valid
hunk content that also matches the ---/+++ header shape; the boundary check
now additionally requires the following line to be a hunk header, and a
regression test keeps such a pair intact. End-of-input strictness for a hunk
cut short is documented as deliberate: applying a truncated hunk would make
a partial change (removals without their replacements).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* refactor(tools): share one line-count implementation between reader and writer

sourceLineCount and trackedLineTotal computed the same count; keeping two
copies invites exactly the reader/writer drift this PR fixed. The reader now
delegates to trackedLineTotal, which carries the tracker contract.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): verify a unified deletion's expected content before removing the file

A unified diff's "+++ /dev/null" hunks state the content being removed, but
the in-process applier dropped them and deleted unconditionally, so a stale
deletion removed a file whose current content the patch never described.
Unified deletions now keep their hunks, require at least one, and run them
through the same verifier as updates: the hunks must match the current file
and leave nothing behind, otherwise the deletion is refused and the file is
untouched. A structured "*** Delete File" keeps its unconditional meaning.

Hardening from the same review: every non-create change re-reads its source
through the opened root immediately before commit and refuses to proceed if
the bytes differ from what was planned.

Tests: matching deletion, stale deletion (file byte-for-byte unchanged),
partial deletion, header-only deletion, multi-hunk deletion with one stale
hunk (nothing removed) and all-good hunks, structured delete unchanged, and
a source changed between planning and commit for update and delete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* test(tools): a move with a missing source is refused before publishing

The pre-commit recheck now refuses a move whose source vanished after
planning instead of publishing the destination and then failing; update the
test to the safer contract (error names the recheck, nothing is created).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): byte-exact unified deletions and git's header-only empty-file forms

Review follow-ups for #956:

- A unified deletion is verified byte for byte: the removed lines (with the
  removed side's "\ No newline at end of file" honoured) must equal the
  current file exactly, with only the file's own line-ending style
  normalised. None of the whitespace tolerance used to locate update hunks
  applies, and a whitespace-only remainder no longer passes; a deletion is
  not recoverable, so it fails closed.
- git describes an empty file's deletion or creation with header lines only
  ("diff --git", "deleted file mode"/"new file mode", "index") and no
  hunks. Both forms are recognised: the deletion is applied only when the
  current file is empty, the creation writes an empty file, and they compose
  with hunk-carrying files in the same patch.
- The pre-commit recheck test also covers the copy operation and asserts no
  destination is created on refusal.

Tests: whitespace/indentation/blank-line/space-only/missing-newline
mismatches all refused with the file unchanged, matching no-newline marker
and CRLF file accepted, header-only deletion of a non-empty file refused,
multi-file patch with header-only delete + create + a normal hunk.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* test(tools): remove the move source after planning via a deterministic hook

The refused-move test now creates source.txt, plans the move, and removes
the file through a test-only pre-commit hook (structuredPatchBeforeCommit)
so it exercises the post-planning disappearance path rather than a source
that was never there. Assertions unchanged: refused before publishing, no
destination created.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* test(tui): read_file fixtures use the compact N→ prefix

Three TUI fixtures still built fake read_file output in the legacy
"  N | text" shape; they pass either way but pinned an outdated contract.
They now mirror what appendReadFileRange emits, and the shape comment and
the expanded-card assertion are updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): name the committed files when a patch is partially applied

Review follow-up for #956. When a later change in a multi-file patch fails
(for example the pre-commit recheck refuses a file that changed after
planning), the error now lists exactly which files were already committed
and states that the rest are unchanged, instead of a generic "partially
applied" warning. The model can then re-read only what actually changed.

Test: a three-file structured patch whose second file is altered after
planning fails with "already committed: first.txt", first.txt holds the
patched content, and the other two files are untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-25 20:23:48 +08:00
github-actions[bot] ad34dc8d81 chore(main): release 0.8.0 (#896)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-22 00:08:57 +08:00
beardthelion 6edf9a8b78 fix(sandbox): normalize launcher names before the command-prefix denylist (#934)
* fix(sandbox): retire recorded approvals through a policy bump

Ahead of tightening which command prefixes may be approved, make the
upgrade path safe. A grant already on disk that the narrower rules
reject fails validation on read, and that path rejects the entire grants
file rather than the one entry. Every caller treats a read error as "no
grant" (engine.go LookupCommandPrefix, ApprovedCommandPrefixes, and the
Lookup in Evaluate), so one stale prefix would silently disable the
user's persisted deny grants too, with the error text never reaching
them.

Bump the approval policy version instead and let the store's existing
migration handle it: it backs the file up, keeps deny grants,
invalidates prior approvals, and reports the counts once through the
startup notice that both frontends already print. That is what the
mechanism was built for.

The v1-migration test pinned the policy version as a literal, so it now
derives the expected value from the constant and will not need editing
on the next bump.

* fix(sandbox): normalize launcher names before the command-prefix denylist

unsafeCommandPrefixLauncher matched the program name as written, so
python3.11, python2.7, python.exe, node.exe and git.exe all validated as
ordinary commands and could be persisted as command-prefix grants.
Lookup is a string-prefix match, so a single approval then auto-allowed
every later invocation: granting [python3.11 -c] covers
`python3.11 -c "import os; os.system(...)"` with no further prompt.

internal/agent's commandName already normalizes case and Windows
executable extensions for the allow side of the same decision; the deny
side did not, and the two disagreeing is the bug. Reduce the program to
the launcher it actually runs and match on that: executable extension,
Windows' trailing dots and spaces (python. starts python.exe), CPython
ABI flags, then a trailing version, testing the digit-stripped form as
well so python3.11 and python3 both arrive as python. A name is only
ever narrowed toward an existing entry, so the failure direction is an
extra permission prompt, never a silent grant. Digits without a
separator stay part of the name, which keeps base64, 7z and sha256sum
grantable.

Two Windows spellings cannot be resolved by name at all, so the shape is
refused alongside a path: 8.3 short names truncate the stem, which makes
POWERS~1.EXE unrecognizable, and python.exe::$DATA reaches the same
executable through its default stream. Normalizing the first token
before the banned-suggestion comparison keeps git.exe at parity with
git.

The list also gains launchers of the same class it already covers and
that normalization cannot reach: cmd, wsl, the remaining POSIX shells,
busybox, uv and uvx. Entries normalization now covers (/bin/bash,
/bin/zsh, powershell.exe, python3, pypy3) are gone; the first two were
already unreachable behind the path check above them.

Covers the persisted store, the session-scoped grants the agent takes
during a turn, the legacy-schema migration that prunes such a grant
per entry, and the Windows spellings hermetically.

* fix(sandbox): treat free-threaded CPython as a launcher too

The ABI flags came from the pre-3.13 set, so "python3.13t" and
"python3.13t.exe" normalized to themselves and stayed grantable as
command prefixes while the GIL build "python3.13" was refused. A
free-threaded interpreter runs arbitrary code just the same.

Add "t" to the flags trimmed under the existing digit guard, which is
what keeps ordinary names intact: "zstd" and "cat" have no digit beneath
the trimmed letters, so they keep their own names and stay grantable.

Reported by CodeRabbit on #934.

* fix(sandbox): refuse the remaining spellings of listed launchers

Same defect as the free-threaded build, found by sweeping the families
already on the list for names it cannot reach:

- nodejs is node on Debian and Ubuntu, and was grantable.
- python3-dbg, python3.11-dbg and python3.13t-dbg are interpreters that
  run arbitrary code; so are bash-static, pwsh-preview and
  node-nightly. A closed set of build-channel suffixes now normalizes
  them. The set stays closed deliberately: a general "-word" strip would
  also swallow node-gyp, python3-config and ruby-lsp, which are ordinary
  tools a user should still be able to approve, and those are pinned as
  must-stay-grantable.
- pnpm, yarn and bunx run package scripts exactly as npm and npx do, and
  npm and npx are already refused.
- sudoedit escalates like sudo.

The launcher-wrapper family (winpty, chroot, unshare, nsenter, parallel,
script, unbuffer, taskset, flock) has the same inconsistency against the
env/nohup/timeout/setsid entries already on the list, and is left for a
separate decision rather than widened here.

* test(sandbox): cover the -debug and -beta launcher suffixes

Four of the six build-channel suffixes had regression cases; -debug and
-beta did not, so removing either from the set left every test green.
Both now fail RED when their entry is dropped.

Reported by CodeRabbit on #934.
2026-08-21 12:50:11 +08:00
Indra Gunawan 90dcfd127e fix(modelregistry): expose reasoning effort for DeepSeek V4 models (#931)
deepseek-v4-flash / deepseek-v4-pro expose thinking-mode effort control
through the OpenAI-compatible reasoning_effort parameter (low/high/max;
medium/xhigh map onto high). reasoningEffortsForModelName did not recognize
the deepseek family, so /effort only offered 'auto' for these models.

Advertise {low, high, max} so the /effort picker and Ctrl+T ring work, and
add fallback coverage for deepseek-v4-flash/pro/reasoner/chat.
2026-08-21 12:48:12 +08:00
Vasanth T 01c3498205 feat(update): recognise Homebrew installs and add mise, go install docs (#910)
* feat(update): recognise Homebrew installs and add mise, go install docs

* fix(update): match the keg shape, correct the docs, cover Apply and cross-target

* test(update): build the release fixture from the running platform

* fix(update): require a Homebrew receipt before refusing self-update

Review found the keg check was shape-only, and it was right: a directory
tree a user built themselves can have exactly a keg's shape. Classifying
one as Homebrew refuses a `zero upgrade` that would have worked
perfectly, on a machine Homebrew has never touched.

Two changes, cheap one first. The shape rule now requires the full
<prefix>/Cellar/<formula>/<version>/bin/<binary> depth rather than one
segment fewer, which already excludes the exact path the review raised.
Then, only for a path that still looks like a keg, one Stat for
INSTALL_RECEIPT.json — the file Homebrew writes into every keg and
nothing else does.

The receipt is what the old comment argued against, on the grounds that
it would put filesystem I/O on a path that runs at every version check.
That is no longer true of it: the Stat happens only after the shape test
has already matched, so an ordinary install still reaches no filesystem
here at all.

A directory named INSTALL_RECEIPT.json is not a receipt, which a bare
Stat would have accepted silently.

NOT taken: the same review asked for the Homebrew branch to be moved
ahead of the cross-target one in upgradeGuidance. That ordering is
deliberate and already pinned by
TestUpgradeGuidanceKeepsCrossTargetAnswerForHomebrew, whose comment
predicted exactly this reading — "it reads like an ordering bug until you
see which question is being answered". Homebrew is a property of the
binary on THIS machine; when the check was asked about a different
target the answer belongs to that other machine, and `brew upgrade zero`
would change this one instead. The reasoning is now recorded at the
branch as well as in the test, so the next reader finds it in both
places.

The install docs claimed detection was the Cellar path alone, which
undersold it, and stated the self-update rule absolutely in one paragraph
before excepting mise in the next. Both say the same thing now.

* test(update): give the Homebrew fixtures a receipt, and stop gating the receipt rule on the host

The previous commit made a receipt the thing that distinguishes a keg from any
directory sitting under a path containing "Cellar". Two fixtures still built a
keg without one, so detection correctly answered standalone and both failed:

  TestDetectInstallMethodRecognisesAHomebrewKeg  keg path: got "standalone", want "homebrew"
  TestApplyRefusesToUpdateAHomebrewKeg           refusal does not name the command that works:
                                                 download release archive: dial tcp: lookup example.test

The second is worth reading twice: with detection returning standalone, Apply
stopped refusing and went to the network, so the failure surfaced as a DNS error
rather than as a missing refusal. Both fixtures write a receipt now.

The reason this reached CI at all is the second half. Every test of the receipt
rule passed runtime.GOOS to isHomebrewPath, which already takes the target as a
parameter, so all of them skipped on Windows and the rule could only ever break
somewhere else. They pass an explicit target now and run everywhere. The two
that exercise DetectInstallMethod stay host-gated, because those are about the
wired entry point rather than the rule, but the rule underneath them is no
longer invisible here.

Verified the receipt path arithmetic on both non-Windows targets rather than
trusting the host-gated tests: isHomebrewPath is false before the receipt is
written and true after, with the receipt at the keg directory hasHomebrewReceipt
actually reads.
2026-08-21 12:33:21 +08:00
1ec7219aee feat: use Exa as default search provider (#926)
* feat: use Exa as default search provider

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a01522-a5f1-7139-8a55-5e417cba2751
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>

* fix(config): carry a legacy default's disable across the Exa migration

A user who ran `zero mcp disable firecrawl` chose not to open that outbound
connection. Renaming the built-in default to exa re-opened it under the new
name on upgrade, and because the replacement looked like an untouched default
the startup warning stayed quiet too.

Carry an explicit user-level disable of a retired default onto its successor,
but only when the user never declared the successor themselves — an explicit
exa entry wins either way. The carried-over disable is recorded as a user-level
decision, so the lower-trust project layer cannot lift it while
`zero mcp enable exa` still can.

Regression coverage: the legacy-disabled upgrade path, the explicit-exa
override, a configured-but-enabled legacy entry, the CLI re-enable, the
project-layer re-enable attempt, and the resulting startup behavior
(NormalizeConfig must not hand back an exa server to connect to).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(config): keep a retired default's transport for partial user entries

A user who added an API key to the firecrawl default wrote only the header —
the seeded default supplied the http type and URL. Once the default stops being
seeded that entry resolves with no type, url, or command, and NormalizeConfig
rejects it, taking down startup for every other server too rather than just
that one.

Record what Zero used to ship for a retired default and re-seed it under the
user's own fields. Only for an entry that named no transport of its own: an
entry with a self-hosted url or a stdio command is a complete definition the
user owns, and grafting the retired http default onto a command produces a
server that is rejected outright.

Regression coverage at both ResolveMCP and NormalizeConfig for the header-only
entry and its failure path, the self-hosted stdio entry that must be left
alone, and a disabled retired entry keeping a usable transport so a later
re-enable resolves.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-20 20:26:24 +08:00
Eli Lap 1a81292d3f Fix LM studio (local) model discovery. (#918)
* Fix LM studio (local) model discovery.

* fix(openai): handle typed-nil properties in normalizeToolParameters

The `properties == nil` interface comparison misses typed-nil
`map[string]any` values, which JSON-serialize as `null` instead of
`{}`. Strict OpenAI-compatible servers (LM Studio) reject the request.

Type-assert first, then compare the underlying map, so a typed-nil
properties field is rewritten to an empty object. Adds a regression
test that exercises the typed-nil path.

* test(openai): cover non-map properties in normalizeToolParameters

CodeRabbit follow-up on the typed-nil fix: lock in the behavior
when `properties` is a non-map value (e.g., empty slice) so the
type-assert branch normalizes it to an empty object on the wire.
2026-08-20 20:26:03 +08:00
Vasanth T a78c6c357e fix(acp): three defects a desktop ACP client hits (#915)
* fix(acp): four defects a desktop ACP client hits

Found by driving `zero acp` from ZeroApp and comparing both sides of the
wire. None of them fail loudly — they produce a blank transcript, a
silent denial, a spurious crash, or two buttons nobody can tell apart.

session/load restored the conversation into the agent's own memory and
sent nothing. The turns were read from the store and used to build every
later prompt, but not one notification went out, so a client that resumed
opened an empty transcript against a model that remembered everything.
Ask a follow-up and ZERO answers correctly, about a question no longer on
screen. It now replays the loaded turns as user/agent message chunks
before returning, so a client rendering on the reply already has them.
Whole messages rather than per-token deltas: this is a transcript, not a
stream.

A permission option we offered could not be accepted. The fallback list
for a request with no AvailableDecisions lived inside
buildPermissionOptions, while requestPermission validated the client's
answer against the raw field — so whenever ZERO did not enumerate, the
client was sent Allow and Reject and its reply was checked against an
empty slice. Every button it could possibly show failed closed to deny
with "permission option was not offered". The user clicked Allow and ZERO
recorded a denial, and nothing surfaced it, because a denial is a
legitimate answer. One resolver now feeds both, so they agree by
construction. The narrowing this validation exists for is unchanged: an
unoffered broader grant is still refused.

Cancelling a permission prompt came back as an internal error. Only
context.Canceled was recognised, so errPermissionApprovalCanceled fell
through to -32603 carrying the sentinel text, and clients render that as
a failed turn — declining a tool looked like ZERO falling over. For
apply_patch, dismissing the dialog is the only refusal a client is
offered. It maps to StopCancelled now. The sentinel is exported so the
surfaces can recognise it; a genuine failure is still an error.

request_permissions labelled two different decisions "Allow". The label
is the only thing an ACP client shows, and plain allow and strict-review
allow are offered together, so the panel had two identical buttons where
one silently enabled strict auto-review of what was granted. The
distinction cannot live in the option id, which is opaque to the client,
so it is in the name.

Eleven tests, each confirmed to fail without its fix.

* refactor(acp): drop the session/load replay, superseded by #914

gnanam's #914 lands the same fix and does more with it: the replayed
messages carry stable ids derived from the store's event ids, session/load
replays while session/resume deliberately does not, and both are
capability-gated. Keeping a second, weaker replay here would have meant a
conflict in handleSessionLoad and translate.go for no gain.

translate.go is back to its state on main. What remains are the three
defects #914 does not touch: the permission option that could not be
accepted, the cancel that arrived as an internal error, and the two
options labelled the same.

* fix(acp): validate a permission reply against the options that were sent

CodeRabbit caught a hole on the same seam this PR already fixes, in the
other direction.

buildPermissionOptions drops PermissionDecisionCancel, because ACP
expresses cancellation through the outcome rather than an option. But
ZERO enumerates cancel in AvailableDecisions for shell commands and
apply_patch — the two commonest prompts — so validating against the
decisions accepted {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"cancel"}: an
identifier no client was ever shown, aborting the whole turn.

Rather than reject cancel by name, decisionFromOutcome now takes the
[]PermissionOption that were actually sent, and requestPermission builds
that list once and uses it for both halves. "What we offered" and "what we
accept" become the same slice instead of two things kept in step, so
anything optionKindFor declines to render is excluded structurally — the
next such action is covered the day it is added.

The regression test is written over every option-less decision rather
than over cancel specifically, for the same reason. Cancelling through
the outcome still works, which is asserted separately: closing the
selected-id route must not close the real one.

Also adds the cancellation coverage CodeRabbit asked for on the two
sandbox-retry paths. Both wrap ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled and each is
reached by a different denial, and the ACP mapping in this PR depends on
them producing something recognisable. They also assert the escalated
retry does not run: a cancelled prompt that still ran it would run the
command the user had just declined.
2026-08-20 20:24:02 +08:00
euxaristiaandeuxaristia 8dd33ec39e docs(agents): Record four recurring review blockers (#899)
* docs(agents): Record four recurring review blockers

These classes come up across unrelated pull requests, are not caught by CI,
and nothing in AGENTS.md currently prevents them, so each is rediscovered by a
reviewer at the cost of a round trip.

Host tool version floors is the clearest case. Zero shells out to git and the
project declares no minimum version anywhere, so adding a modern flag raises
that floor silently and an older host fails with a usage error instead of a
clear message. Prove-the-test-fails addresses a recurring shape where the
problem is not a missing test but one that passes either way, because an
earlier guard rejects the input before the behavior under test runs. Hermetic
tests covers isolation helpers applied to some tests but not others reaching
the same storage. Platform error codes extends the existing platform-truth
rule, which covers path canonicalization but not errno and NTSTATUS values.

Advisory lint findings are deliberately not included: deadcode and lint-static
both run with continue-on-error in ci.yml, and section 3 already requires
fixing findings the change introduces.

Refs #898

* docs(agents): Tighten version-floor, isolation, and errno guidance

Three corrections from review, two of them to claims that were too strong.

Git version floors are per subcommand, not per flag. --end-of-options reached
the shared parser in 2.24 but git rev-parse only accepted it from 2.30, so
recording the flag's general debut would still let a caller ship something
that fails on 2.24 through 2.29.

The hermetic-tests bullet named config, cache, and state but gave a procedure
covering only config. It now covers each root, including %LocalAppData% for
the cache root, which os.UserCacheDir resolves without consulting XDG.

The errno bullet asserted ENOTDIR on Linux and Darwin. Only Linux was actually
measured; Darwin was assumed, in a bullet whose whole point is not to assume.
It now says the call may report either code and both should be accepted, which
is what the guidance was trying to teach.

Refs #898

* docs(agents): Clarify macOS and Windows roots for hermetic test isolation.

os.UserConfigDir and os.UserCacheDir derive from HOME on macOS and AppData/LocalAppData on Windows rather than reading XDG variables.

Refs #899

---------

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
2026-08-20 20:23:31 +08:00
Anandan d7ac85cbf9 Polish Zero's TUI and harden patch, model, and background workflows (#916)
* Checkpoint UI polish

* Fix structured apply patch handling

* Restore tool previews when resuming sessions

* Improve theme-aware code rendering

* Replace persistent sidebar with run details

* Remove inert transcript interactions

* Cover resumed edit previews

* Smooth active run status feedback

* Preserve semantic colors behind overlays

* Normalize ChatGPT model aliases

* Render staged image attachments in terminal

* Polish transcript and tool feedback

* Resolve rebased diff renderer conflict

* Address UI polish review findings

* Fix smoke test regressions

* Harden patch and transcript edge cases

* Bind structured patches to workspace root

* Use unique structured patch temp files

* Retry structured patch temp allocation

* Reuse rooted patch temp allocator

* Fix Windows CI process checks

* Fix structured patch safety boundaries

Preserve read-before-write credit only when the model already knew the full source, reject ambiguous hunk matches, and retain CRLF line endings. Add regression coverage for unsafe overwrites, positive tracking cases, duplicate matches, and Windows-style files.

* Resolve plan test seam after rebase

Drop the obsolete sticky-plan height helper while retaining the PR status test seams brought forward by the UI changes.

* Address final review correctness gaps

Bound narrow waiting labels, reject malformed plan records, preserve missing final newlines, reject out-of-order EOF hunks, clear stale tracking after failed rollback, and keep deferred tool loading aligned with model visibility.

* Harden patch transactions and review edges

Publish new patch targets without overwriting raced destinations, journal only completed mutations, and create replacement temps beside their targets. Reject pre-plan diagnostics, cover tool-search transcript suppression, and leave sufficient cleanup time in the Windows process fixture.

* Bind patch rollback to committed versions

Capture file identity and content before publication, quarantine rollback targets atomically, and refuse destructive undo when a path was replaced or modified in place. Add deterministic coverage for publication and rollback races.

* Align structured patch failure semantics

Use prevalidated sequential application with explicit partial-success errors instead of unsafe multi-file rollback. Retain atomic per-file publication, no-overwrite creates, unsupported-hardlink fallback, and conservative tracker invalidation.

* Preserve patch context bytes

Track source offsets for structured-patch context lines and reuse the exact matched source text during replacement. This keeps tolerant matching from changing indentation or mixed line endings outside the requested edit.
2026-08-19 22:18:47 +05:30
246 changed files with 16779 additions and 4036 deletions

No files matched your search

+1 -1
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@@ -1 +1 @@
{".":"0.7.0"}
{".":"0.8.0"}
+39
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@@ -111,3 +111,42 @@ These classes drive multi-round reviews. Fix them before requesting review:
shipped. Wire advertised entry points or shrink the claim. Do not bundle
unrelated fixes. Do not widen security allowlists by name alone; check
classification and side effects too.
- **Host tool version floors:** Zero shells out to `git` and other host tools,
and the project does not declare a minimum version for any of them. A flag,
subcommand, or config key that is not long-established therefore raises that
floor silently, and the failure on an older host is an unhelpful usage error
rather than a clear message. Before adding one, check when it landed and say
so where a caller would look. Record the floor for the exact subcommand you
call, not for the flag in general: `--end-of-options` reached Git's shared
parser in 2.24, but `git rev-parse` only accepted it from 2.30, and
`git checkout` and `git reset` later still. Likewise `--show-current` is
`git branch` 2.22, and `branch.autoSetupMerge=inherit` is 2.35. Then either
keep a fallback for older versions or gate the call. A test that depends on a
newer feature must skip below its floor instead of failing, and say which
version it needs.
- **Prove the test fails without the change:** A regression test earns its
place only if it fails on the unfixed code, for the reason it claims. Run it
both ways and quote the failure in the PR. The recurring miss is not a
missing test but a test that never reaches the behavior it names, because an
earlier guard rejects the input first, so it passes with and without the fix.
When a test targets a specific layer, call that layer directly rather than
relying on a public entry point that may refuse earlier.
- **Hermetic tests:** Tests must not read or write the developer's real config,
cache, or state directories. Redirect every root the code under test
resolves, not just config. `os.UserConfigDir` and `os.UserCacheDir` read
`XDG_CONFIG_HOME` and `XDG_CACHE_HOME` only on Linux and the BSDs. On macOS
they derive from `HOME`, and on Windows from `%AppData%` and `%LocalAppData%`.
Setting the XDG variables alone still leaves a macOS run writing to the real
home, so set `HOME` as well, or take the directory as a parameter. Apply it to
every test that reaches the same storage, not only the one where it was first
needed; a test that passes on a clean machine and pollutes a real one is a
blocker.
- **Error codes vary by platform and by flag combination:** A check written
against the code one target returns can be silently inert on another while
still looking correct. `openat(O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW)` on a symlink may
report `ENOTDIR` or `ELOOP` depending on the platform, because the kernel can
reject the directory mismatch before it ever resolves the link; accept both
rather than assuming the one POSIX names. On Windows, `\\?\` and `\\.\`
prefixes are not UNC paths, and an `NtCreateFile` information class must match
the struct actually passed. Confirm the code each supported target returns
instead of reasoning from the man page.
+21
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@@ -6,6 +6,27 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## [0.8.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.7.0...v0.8.0) (2026-08-21)
### Features
* **security:** path-jail primitive, credential-store locking, worktree git hardening ([#891](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/891)) ([060d38c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/060d38ce716feb7c5b6657b082cd35cb8dda3d75))
* **update:** recognise Homebrew installs and add mise, go install docs ([#910](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/910)) ([01c3498](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/01c3498205e69d26e5f929225f9455b276444f39))
* use Exa as default search provider ([#926](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/926)) ([1ec7219](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1ec7219aee7b2840481ab0905f131644e27d2a4e))
* **zerogit:** auto-create a conventional branch before push/pr on default branch ([#671](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/671)) ([d065467](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d065467cd3ec3ed91c5dc60554c36fc4b4d6de4c))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** three defects a desktop ACP client hits ([#915](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/915)) ([a78c6c3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a78c6c357e1d21146d7cd2e8030a754e06f7f1f5))
* bump Go to 1.26.6 for stdlib vulnerability fixes ([#903](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/903)) ([dc15e82](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dc15e822987d8d7de467c62c375518f435b74d8c))
* **daemon:** clean up child after startup timeout ([#774](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/774)) ([9c29209](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9c292092a26c9092fd873d072b0af1b0d9d39ef0))
* **dictation:** redact API keys from streaming transcriber errors ([#852](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/852)) ([64a783b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/64a783b08caa2c7b21f188033b9ed84a14e00e84))
* **modelregistry:** expose reasoning effort for DeepSeek V4 models ([#931](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/931)) ([90dcfd1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/90dcfd127e8a6d9902ec9f4e72f6d03fef1a0fc6))
* **providers:** discover ChatGPT capabilities ([#890](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/890)) ([2d2450e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2d2450e9a744349f0d01b1d4e9ba29c24ba5650d))
* **sandbox:** normalize launcher names before the command-prefix denylist ([#934](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/934)) ([6edf9a8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6edf9a8b78dc030dc44598919db1c7fa9d4f809a))
## [0.7.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.6.0...v0.7.0) (2026-08-10)
+9 -5
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="Go 1.26.6+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.6+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
<br>
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | ie
### From source
Source builds require Go 1.26.5+.
Source builds require Go 1.26.6+.
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
@@ -371,9 +371,13 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench
Experimental: `ZERO_OPENAI_TURN_SESSION=1` enables the optimized OpenAI turn
session (background connection prewarm + request-prefix telemetry) for headless
`zero exec` runs against official OpenAI profiles. Off by default; `0`/`false`
disable. A/B-benchmark it by running the same `zero-perf-bench` suite with the
variable unset and set.
`zero exec` runs against official OpenAI profiles. Off by default; `0`, `false`,
or `off` disable it. A/B-benchmark it by running the same `zero-perf-bench` suite
with the variable unset and set.
Native ChatGPT Responses sessions are enabled by default. Set
`ZERO_CHATGPT_TURN_SESSION=0`, `false`, or `off` to restore stateless HTTP/SSE
transport.
### Code Quality and Security Checks
+2 -2
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="Go 1.26.6+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.6+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
<br>
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | ie
### 从源码构建
源码构建需要 Go 1.26.5+。
源码构建需要 Go 1.26.6+。
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
+1 -1
View File
@@ -33,4 +33,4 @@ Please include, where possible:
depend on a user explicitly disabling the sandbox (`--skip-permissions-unsafe`), are generally
out of scope — but please report anything you are unsure about.
- Zero sends no telemetry. Network calls go to the model/tool providers you configure (and, for
keyless web search, to the documented Firecrawl endpoint — see the README).
keyless web search, to Exa's hosted MCP endpoint at `https://mcp.exa.ai/mcp`).
+83 -8
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,30 @@
# Installing Zero
Zero is distributed as:
Pick whichever fits how you already install things. None of these is the
blessed one.
- an npm package, `@gitlawb/zero`
- release archives on GitHub Releases
- source builds with Go 1.26.5+
| Method | Command | Self-update |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Install script (Linux, macOS) | `curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh \| bash` | `zero upgrade` |
| Install script (Windows) | `irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 \| iex` | `zero upgrade` |
| npm | `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero` | `zero upgrade` (runs npm) |
| Release archive | download from [Releases](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/releases) | `zero upgrade` |
| mise | `mise use -g ubi:Gitlawb/zero` | `mise upgrade` |
| `go install` | `go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@latest` | rerun the command |
| Source | `go build -o zero ./cmd/zero` | rebuild |
The install scripts download a platform-specific release archive and require a
published GitHub Release for the requested version. The npm package is
self-contained: the platform binary installs from the npm registry.
`zero upgrade` follows whatever owns the binary, with one exception it cannot
detect. It delegates to npm for an npm install, refuses outright for a Homebrew
keg and names `brew upgrade zero`, and replaces the binary in place for
everything else — including a mise-managed one, which is the exception.
mise is the one case it cannot detect: a mise-managed binary is an ordinary
standalone install on disk, so `zero upgrade` will replace it and leave mise
describing a version that is no longer there. Use `mise upgrade` instead.
Release archives are the substrate for most of the above: the install scripts
and the npm fallback both download a platform archive from a published GitHub
Release and verify its checksum.
## npm
@@ -111,6 +127,45 @@ Defaults:
- Version: latest GitHub release
- Install path: `%LOCALAPPDATA%\zero\bin\zero.exe`
## mise
[mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/) installs Zero straight from the GitHub Release
archives through its `ubi` backend, so there is nothing extra to publish and no
registry in the middle:
```bash
mise use -g ubi:Gitlawb/zero
```
Pin a version the same way you would any other tool:
```bash
mise use -g ubi:Gitlawb/[email protected]
```
Updates come from `mise upgrade`. `zero upgrade` also works, because a
mise-managed binary is an ordinary standalone install, but then mise's records
describe a version that is no longer on disk. Prefer `mise upgrade`.
## go install
```bash
go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@latest
```
This builds from source, so it needs Go 1.26.6+ and it does not go through the
release archives. Two consequences worth knowing before you pick it:
- On Linux you also need the sandbox helper, which is a separate binary and is
not installed by this command. See
[Sandbox Helpers For Source Builds](#sandbox-helpers-for-source-builds).
Without it, native sandboxing is unavailable.
- `zero upgrade` treats the result as a standalone install and will replace the
binary with a release build rather than rebuilding from source. If you chose
`go install` deliberately, rerun it instead.
macOS and Windows need no extra helper.
## From Source
```bash
@@ -125,7 +180,7 @@ Build a local binary:
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
Source builds require Go 1.26.5+.
Source builds require Go 1.26.6+.
### Sandbox Helpers For Source Builds
@@ -242,3 +297,23 @@ zero upgrade
```
See the [update guide](UPDATE.md) for update modes, flags, and platform details.
`zero upgrade` behaves differently depending on how Zero was installed, because
overwriting a binary a package manager owns leaves that manager describing a
version that is no longer there:
- **npm**: runs `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest` for you.
- **Homebrew**: refuses, and tells you to run `brew upgrade zero`. Replacing the
keg binary directly would be reverted by the next `brew upgrade` or
`brew reinstall`.
- **everything else**: downloads the verified release archive and replaces the
binary in place.
Homebrew is detected by the binary living inside a Cellar keg that carries
Homebrew's own `INSTALL_RECEIPT.json`. The keg shape alone is not enough: a
directory tree you built yourself can have exactly that shape, and refusing to
update an install Homebrew never touched would be a real cost for a made-up
reason. The receipt is the thing only Homebrew writes.
An ordinary install under `/usr/local/bin` is left alone even on an Intel Mac
where that is also the Homebrew prefix.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ go 1.26.6
require (
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.9
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5
github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0
+2 -4
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1 h1:7r55WzBxpo/R3z98hGmY7KKPd3ET6vsf0Fb9sDHOV60=
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1/go.mod h1:GE6M31gaWZVXzGw73OeuTTgy4lX+OtkH0E5ymnNsHxo=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8 h1:SxTJMhCAI3lbPmy4SgX5LWZ24AdINr4I6UEqzZvYJuY=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8/go.mod h1:2SkdgoTXluXJHOUwAoRlRXF/28vklb1rFl6GcgV1/ss=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.9 h1:DpJCMWKgzQK8SJv4zbKKFHAI10ymWy/evClPFk0k0f8=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.9/go.mod h1:2SkdgoTXluXJHOUwAoRlRXF/28vklb1rFl6GcgV1/ss=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5 h1:kbNxgeeUOYv5J0YdpxFjfvf3dFvqH8Aci4zB6xqFtrY=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5/go.mod h1:9oqhxt4yxIMe6q5A4kHr44DremZk7J9UNh74GlWa5nc=
github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2 h1:F2VQgta7ecxGYO8k3ZZz3RS8fVIXVxONVUPlNERoyfY=
@@ -64,8 +64,6 @@ github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e h1:JVG44RsyaB9T2KIHavM
github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e/go.mod h1:RbqR21r5mrJuqunuUZ/Dhy/avygyECGrLceyNeo4LiM=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976 h1:X8Hz2ImujgbmetVuW+w2YkyZChE3cBpZi2P158rTG9M=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976/go.mod h1:vnf4pv9iKZXY58sQE1L86zmNWJ4159e1RkcWiLCkeEY=
golang.org/x/image v0.44.0 h1:+tDekMZED9+LrtB3G5xzRggpVh9CARjZqROla3R3R+I=
golang.org/x/image v0.44.0/go.mod h1:V8K3KE9KKKE+pLpQDOeN18w9oacNSvy1tDOirTu4xtY=
golang.org/x/image v0.45.0 h1:FMb1nTbH5H9vF55SriQHgFw5GnNL9Jg6L25BwXKzhB0=
golang.org/x/image v0.45.0/go.mod h1:n62x/7RqlwXDvGsSU4u6IUTUf6KghUZ9Bt7cG/T9Fx4=
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 h1:SZjpbeLmrCk4xhRSZFNZW5gFUeCeFgjekvI/+gfScek=
+16 -2
View File
@@ -296,6 +296,16 @@ func stopReasonFor(result agent.Result, err error) (string, error) {
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
return StopCancelled, nil
}
// A CLIENT THAT CANCELLED A PERMISSION PROMPT DID NOT FAIL. Only
// context.Canceled was matched here, so dismissing a permission dialog —
// a deliberate action, and for apply_patch the only refusal a client is
// offered — came back as JSON-RPC -32603 carrying the internal sentinel
// text. Editors and the desktop app both render that as a crashed turn,
// so declining a tool looked like ZERO falling over. It is a
// cancellation, and StopCancelled is what ACP has for saying so.
if errors.Is(err, agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
return StopCancelled, nil
}
return "", err
}
if result.FinishReason == "length" {
@@ -311,10 +321,14 @@ func stopReasonFor(result agent.Result, err error) (string, error) {
// session/request_permission request and maps the outcome back. Failure to reach
// the client fails closed to deny.
func (a *Agent) requestPermission(ctx context.Context, sessionID string, req agent.PermissionRequest) (agent.PermissionDecision, error) {
// Built ONCE and used for both halves. Sending one list and validating the
// reply against another is the defect this whole path had; see
// decisionFromOutcome.
options := buildPermissionOptions(req)
params := RequestPermissionParams{
SessionID: sessionID,
ToolCall: permissionToolCall(req),
Options: buildPermissionOptions(req),
Options: options,
}
var result RequestPermissionResult
if err := a.conn.Call(ctx, MethodSessionRequestPerm, params, &result); err != nil {
@@ -323,7 +337,7 @@ func (a *Agent) requestPermission(ctx context.Context, sessionID string, req age
}
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "permission request failed: " + err.Error()}, nil
}
return decisionFromOutcome(result.Outcome, req.AvailableDecisions), nil
return decisionFromOutcome(result.Outcome, options), nil
}
func (a *Agent) emitPlan(registry *tools.Registry, note *notifier) {
+217
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
package acp
// desktopinterop_test.go covers three defects found by driving the real `zero
// acp` binary from a desktop ACP client. Each is a case where ZERO and a
// conforming client disagreed about the wire, and none of them failed loudly —
// they produced a silent denial, a spurious crash, or two buttons the user
// could not tell apart.
//
// A fourth, session/load restoring history without replaying it, is fixed by
// #914 rather than here: that one also gives the replayed messages stable ids
// and keeps session/resume replay-free, which this did not.
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
)
// ---- an offered option is an acceptable answer ----
// The list the options were BUILT from and the list the answer was CHECKED
// against were different whenever ZERO did not enumerate: the client was sent
// Allow and Reject, and its reply was validated against an empty slice, so
// every button it could possibly show failed closed to deny. The user clicked
// Allow and ZERO recorded a denial, with nothing on screen to say so.
func TestAnOfferedOptionIsAccepted(t *testing.T) {
// No AvailableDecisions: the fallback path, which is every permission event
// that is not a prompt.
req := agent.PermissionRequest{ToolName: "bash"}
options := buildPermissionOptions(req)
if len(options) == 0 {
t.Fatal("no options were offered")
}
for _, option := range options {
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: option.OptionID},
buildPermissionOptions(req),
)
if string(decision.Action) != option.OptionID {
t.Fatalf("option %q was answered with %q (%s) — an offered option must be accepted",
option.OptionID, decision.Action, decision.Reason)
}
}
}
// The narrowing this validation exists for still holds: a client must not be
// able to return a broader grant than it was shown.
func TestAnOptionThatWasNotOfferedIsStillRefused(t *testing.T) {
req := agent.PermissionRequest{ToolName: "bash"}
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: string(agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow)},
buildPermissionOptions(req),
)
if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionDeny {
t.Fatalf("an unoffered broader grant was accepted as %q", decision.Action)
}
}
// The resolver is the single source of truth for both sides, which is what
// makes the two agree by construction rather than by being kept in step.
func TestOfferedDecisionsMatchWhatWasSent(t *testing.T) {
for _, req := range []agent.PermissionRequest{
{ToolName: "bash"},
{ToolName: "bash", AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}},
} {
offered := buildPermissionOptions(req)
for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(req) {
if !actionOffered(option.OptionID, offered) {
t.Fatalf("option %q was sent but is not in the offered set %v", option.OptionID, offered)
}
}
}
}
// ---- two options the user can tell apart ----
// request_permissions offers plain allow and strict-review allow together, and
// both were labelled "Allow". The label is the only thing an ACP client shows,
// so the panel presented two identical buttons where one silently enabled
// strict auto-review of what was granted.
func TestEveryOfferedOptionHasADistinctLabel(t *testing.T) {
req := agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: "request_permissions",
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
},
}
seen := map[string]string{}
for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(req) {
if previous, clash := seen[option.Name]; clash {
t.Fatalf("options %q and %q share the label %q — a user cannot tell them apart",
previous, option.OptionID, option.Name)
}
seen[option.Name] = option.OptionID
}
}
// The two remain distinct decisions: the label changed, the round trip did not.
func TestStrictAllowStillRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
req := agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: "request_permissions",
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict,
},
}
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: string(agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict)},
buildPermissionOptions(req),
)
if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict {
t.Fatalf("strict allow round-tripped as %q", decision.Action)
}
}
// ---- cancelling a permission is a cancellation, not a crash ----
// Only context.Canceled was recognised, so dismissing a permission dialog came
// back as JSON-RPC -32603 carrying the internal sentinel text. Clients render
// that as a failed turn, so declining a tool looked like ZERO falling over —
// and for apply_patch, dismissing is the ONLY refusal a client is offered.
func TestCancellingAPermissionEndsTheTurnAsCancelled(t *testing.T) {
canceled := fmt.Errorf("%w for apply_patch", agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled)
reason, err := stopReasonFor(agent.Result{}, canceled)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stopReasonFor returned an error for a cancellation: %v", err)
}
if reason != StopCancelled {
t.Fatalf("stop reason = %q, want %q", reason, StopCancelled)
}
}
// A genuine failure must still be an error. Mapping too much to cancelled would
// hide real faults behind a clean ending, which is the opposite mistake.
func TestARealFailureIsStillAnError(t *testing.T) {
failure := errors.New("provider exploded")
if _, err := stopReasonFor(agent.Result{}, failure); !errors.Is(err, failure) {
t.Fatalf("stopReasonFor(%v) = %v, want the failure preserved", failure, err)
}
}
// The sentinel is matched through errors.Is, so it survives the wrapping every
// return site applies — each one adds the tool name.
func TestPermissionCancellationSurvivesWrapping(t *testing.T) {
if !errors.Is(fmt.Errorf("%w for bash", agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled), agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
t.Fatal("a wrapped permission cancellation was not recognised")
}
if errors.Is(errors.New("something else"), agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
t.Fatal("an unrelated error was reported as a permission cancellation")
}
}
// A decision that never became an option cannot be selected.
//
// PermissionDecisionCancel is the case that exists today: optionKindFor drops
// it because ACP expresses cancellation through the outcome, yet ZERO
// enumerates it in AvailableDecisions for shell commands and apply_patch. While
// the reply was validated against the DECISIONS rather than the sent options, a
// client could return {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"cancel"} — an id it was
// never shown — and abort the whole turn.
//
// Written over every option-less decision rather than over "cancel", so a
// future action that optionKindFor declines to render is covered the day it is
// added rather than the day someone remembers this test.
func TestADecisionThatIsNotAnOptionCannotBeSelected(t *testing.T) {
for _, toolName := range []string{"bash", "apply_patch"} {
req := agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: toolName,
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
agent.PermissionDecisionCancel,
},
}
options := buildPermissionOptions(req)
for _, action := range req.AvailableDecisions {
if actionOffered(string(action), options) {
continue // it was sent; selecting it is legitimate
}
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: string(action)},
options,
)
if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionDeny {
t.Fatalf("%s: %q was never sent as an option but was accepted as %q",
toolName, action, decision.Action)
}
}
}
}
// Cancelling is still reachable — through the outcome, which is where ACP puts
// it. Closing the selected-id route must not close the real one.
func TestCancellingThroughTheOutcomeStillWorks(t *testing.T) {
options := buildPermissionOptions(agent.PermissionRequest{ToolName: "apply_patch"})
decision := decisionFromOutcome(RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeCancelled}, options)
if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionCancel {
t.Fatalf("outcome=cancelled gave %q, want cancel", decision.Action)
}
}
+57 -18
View File
@@ -15,14 +15,7 @@ import (
// PermissionOptions. Only the actions ZERO actually presented (AvailableDecisions)
// are surfaced; the optionId is the ZERO action string for a clean round-trip.
func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
actions := req.AvailableDecisions
if len(actions) == 0 {
// Sensible default if ZERO didn't enumerate: allow once / reject.
actions = []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}
}
actions := offeredDecisions(req)
options := make([]PermissionOption, 0, len(actions))
for _, action := range actions {
kind, name := optionKindFor(action, req.PrefixApprovalEscalates)
@@ -38,6 +31,32 @@ func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
return options
}
// offeredDecisions resolves what this request actually offers the client.
//
// ONE RESOLVER, USED BY BOTH SIDES, and that is the entire point of it existing.
// The fallback below used to live inside buildPermissionOptions while
// requestPermission validated the client's answer against the raw
// req.AvailableDecisions. When ZERO did not enumerate — which is every
// permission event that is not a prompt, and includes a shell call whose sandbox
// decision came back deny — the two disagreed completely: the client was sent
// "Allow" and "Reject", and validation was performed against an EMPTY list, so
// every option the client could possibly click failed closed to deny with
// "permission option was not offered".
//
// The user clicked Allow and ZERO recorded a denial. Nothing surfaced it,
// because a denial is a legitimate answer — the tool was simply refused and the
// turn carried on as though the user had rejected it.
func offeredDecisions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []agent.PermissionDecisionAction {
if len(req.AvailableDecisions) > 0 {
return req.AvailableDecisions
}
// Sensible default if ZERO didn't enumerate: allow once / reject.
return []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}
}
// optionKindFor maps a ZERO decision action to an ACP PermissionOptionKind and a
// human label. Returns an empty kind for actions that ACP expresses through the
// outcome rather than an option (cancel).
@@ -49,8 +68,16 @@ func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
// disclosure cannot be TUI-only.
func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, escalates bool) (kind, name string) {
switch action {
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllow, agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict:
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllow:
return PermAllowOnce, "Allow"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict:
// SPLIT FROM PLAIN ALLOW because the label is the only thing an ACP
// client shows. Both were labelled "Allow", and request_permissions
// offers them together — so the panel presented two identical buttons,
// and whichever the user picked looked the same while one of them
// silently turned on strict auto-review of what was granted. The option
// id carries no room for the distinction, so it has to be in the name.
return PermAllowOnce, "Allow with strict review"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession:
return PermAllowAlways, "Allow for this session"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix:
@@ -70,19 +97,31 @@ func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, escalates bool) (kind,
// decisionFromOutcome maps the client's permission outcome back to a ZERO
// decision. A cancelled outcome cancels the run; a selected option id is the ZERO
// action verbatim (validated against what was offered); anything unrecognized
// fails closed to deny.
func decisionFromOutcome(outcome RequestPermissionOutcome, offered []agent.PermissionDecisionAction) agent.PermissionDecision {
// action verbatim (validated against what was actually sent); anything
// unrecognized fails closed to deny.
//
// IT TAKES THE OPTIONS THAT WERE SENT, not the decisions the request offered,
// and the two are not the same list. Some actions never become options —
// PermissionDecisionCancel is dropped by optionKindFor because ACP expresses
// cancellation through the outcome instead — yet it IS enumerated in
// AvailableDecisions for shell commands and apply_patch, the two commonest
// prompts. Validating against the decisions therefore accepted
// {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"cancel"}: an identifier no client was ever
// shown, aborting the whole turn.
//
// Passing the sent options makes "what we offered" and "what we accept" the
// same slice rather than two things kept in step, so anything optionKindFor
// declines to render is excluded structurally instead of by name.
func decisionFromOutcome(outcome RequestPermissionOutcome, offered []PermissionOption) agent.PermissionDecision {
switch outcome.Outcome {
case OutcomeCancelled:
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionCancel, Reason: "client cancelled"}
case OutcomeSelected:
action := agent.PermissionDecisionAction(outcome.OptionID)
// Bind to what was actually offered for THIS call: a client must not be able
// to return a broader grant (always_allow / allow_for_session) that wasn't
// presented. Anything not offered fails closed to deny.
if actionOffered(action, offered) {
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: action}
if actionOffered(outcome.OptionID, offered) {
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionAction(outcome.OptionID)}
}
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "permission option was not offered"}
default:
@@ -90,9 +129,9 @@ func decisionFromOutcome(outcome RequestPermissionOutcome, offered []agent.Permi
}
}
func actionOffered(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, offered []agent.PermissionDecisionAction) bool {
for _, a := range offered {
if a == action {
func actionOffered(optionID string, offered []PermissionOption) bool {
for _, option := range offered {
if option.OptionID == optionID {
return true
}
}
+3 -2
View File
@@ -56,10 +56,11 @@ func TestACPPrefixOptionsStaySilentWithoutEscalation(t *testing.T) {
// what was offered, so decorating it would fail every prefix approval closed.
func TestACPDisclosureDoesNotDisturbTheOptionIDRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
request := escalationRequest(true)
for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(request) {
options := buildPermissionOptions(request)
for _, option := range options {
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: option.OptionID},
request.AvailableDecisions,
options,
)
if string(decision.Action) != option.OptionID {
t.Errorf("option id %q round-tripped to %q (%s)", option.OptionID, decision.Action, decision.Reason)
+8 -5
View File
@@ -39,11 +39,14 @@ func TestBuildPermissionOptionsDefault(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestDecisionFromOutcome(t *testing.T) {
offered := []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}
offered := buildPermissionOptions(agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: "bash",
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
},
})
if d := decisionFromOutcome(RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeCancelled}, offered); d.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionCancel {
t.Errorf("cancelled -> %q, want cancel", d.Action)
}
+37
View File
@@ -99,6 +99,43 @@ func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsUnsafeRequestedPrefix(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// The launcher denylist is only worth anything if it holds on the path a user
// actually sees. A model naming its own prefix_rule is that path: before
// launcher names were normalized, "python3.11" was offered as a one-token
// grant, and hasStringPrefix then matched every later python3.11 invocation.
func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsLauncherSpellingsInRequestedPrefix(t *testing.T) {
for _, testCase := range []struct {
command string
rule []any
}{
{"python3.11 script.py", []any{"python3.11"}},
{"python.exe script.py", []any{"python.exe"}},
{"node.exe app.js", []any{"node.exe"}},
{"cmd /c whoami", []any{"cmd"}},
{"busybox sh -c id", []any{"busybox"}},
{"uv run main.py", []any{"uv", "run"}},
{"python3.11 -c import_os", []any{"python3.11", "-c"}},
} {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
"command": testCase.command,
"prefix_rule": testCase.rule,
})
if got != nil {
t.Errorf("prefix_rule %v for %q was offered as %#v, want rejected", testCase.rule, testCase.command, got)
}
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixStillOffersOrdinaryCommands(t *testing.T) {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
"command": "cargo build --release",
"prefix_rule": []any{"cargo", "build"},
})
if len(got) != 2 || got[0] != "cargo" || got[1] != "build" {
t.Fatalf("ordinary prefix rule = %#v, want [cargo build]", got)
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsUnsafeShellForms(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{
"cat < in > out",
+178 -11
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strconv"
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
@@ -144,11 +146,17 @@ func estimateToolDefTokens(tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) int {
for _, tool := range tools {
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Name)
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Description)
total += ApproxTextTokens(string(tool.Type))
if len(tool.Parameters) > 0 {
if encoded, err := json.Marshal(tool.Parameters); err == nil {
total += ApproxTextTokens(string(encoded))
}
}
if tool.Format != nil {
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Format.Type)
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Format.Syntax)
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Format.Definition)
}
total += 4 // per-tool overhead
}
return total
@@ -390,6 +398,27 @@ type compactionState struct {
// starts at 1.0 and converges via an EMA as each turn reports actual usage, so
// later turns compact nearer to real capacity. Zero is treated as 1.0.
calibrationRatio float64
// summarizerFactory lazily builds the dedicated (cheap) summarizer provider
// (Options.Summarizer) for the current main model. summarizerProvider
// memoizes the built provider and summarizerResolved records that the
// factory ran (it may legitimately return no provider: the main model is
// already the cheap one). summarizerBroken is the sticky fallback: once a
// build or call fails, the run stays on the main provider until the next
// model switch — a misconfigured cheap model must never break (or
// repeatedly delay) compaction.
summarizerFactory func(ctx context.Context, mainModelID string) (Provider, error)
summarizerProvider Provider
summarizerResolved bool
summarizerBroken bool
// window is the context window the threshold was derived from. The
// reactive free-prune stage compares against it (the limit the provider
// enforces), not against the 70% proactive threshold — a pruned history
// between the two would still succeed on retry.
window int
// mainModel is the model the run currently streams on; the summarizer
// choice is made against it and remade after a mid-run switch.
mainModel string
}
// calibrate folds one turn's (rawEstimate, actualPromptTokens) sample into the
@@ -424,17 +453,88 @@ func (state *compactionState) calibratedTokens(raw int) int {
func newCompactionState(options Options, task *taskState) *compactionState {
state := &compactionState{
enabled: options.ContextWindow > 0,
threshold: compactionThreshold(options.ContextWindow),
preserveLast: options.CompactionPreserveLast,
onUsage: options.OnUsage,
task: task,
planner: newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{contextWindow: options.ContextWindow, serviceTier: options.ServiceTier}),
trace: options.Trace,
enabled: options.ContextWindow > 0,
threshold: compactionThreshold(options.ContextWindow),
window: options.ContextWindow,
mainModel: options.Model,
preserveLast: options.CompactionPreserveLast,
onUsage: options.OnUsage,
task: task,
planner: newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{contextWindow: options.ContextWindow, serviceTier: options.ServiceTier}),
trace: options.Trace,
summarizerFactory: options.Summarizer,
}
return state
}
// updateWindow re-derives the compaction threshold after a mid-run model
// switch. The low-water mark is reset: it was measured against the old
// threshold, and keeping it could suppress a compaction the smaller window
// now requires. <= 0 (unknown model) leaves everything unchanged.
func (state *compactionState) updateWindow(window int) {
if window <= 0 {
return
}
state.enabled = true
state.window = window
state.threshold = compactionThreshold(window)
state.lowWaterMark = 0
if state.planner != nil {
state.planner.config.contextWindow = window
}
}
// switchModel records a mid-run model switch: the window is re-derived
// (window <= 0 keeps the old one) and the summarizer choice is forgotten so
// the next compaction re-resolves it against the new main model. A run that
// started on the cheap model (no dedicated summarizer) and escalated to an
// expensive one therefore regains cheap summaries — the exact workflow a
// dedicated summarizer exists for.
func (state *compactionState) switchModel(modelID string, window int) {
state.mainModel = modelID
state.updateWindow(window)
state.summarizerProvider = nil
state.summarizerResolved = false
state.summarizerBroken = false
}
// summarizeProvider returns the provider summarization calls should use and
// whether it is the dedicated summarizer: that one when it applies to the
// current main model and is healthy, else the main provider. The factory runs
// at most once per main model; a build error marks the summarizer broken for
// that model. Callers branch on the boolean rather than comparing Provider
// values — interface comparison panics on a non-comparable dynamic type.
func (state *compactionState) summarizeProvider(ctx context.Context, main Provider) (Provider, bool) {
if state.summarizerFactory == nil || state.summarizerBroken {
return main, false
}
if !state.summarizerResolved {
state.summarizerResolved = true
built, err := state.summarizerFactory(ctx, state.mainModel)
if err != nil {
state.summarizerBroken = true
return main, false
}
state.summarizerProvider = built
}
if state.summarizerProvider == nil {
return main, false
}
return state.summarizerProvider, true
}
// fitsWindow reports whether a calibrated size is safely under the limit the
// provider enforces. The proactive threshold (70% of the window) is a trigger
// for the paid summarizer, not the hard limit; the reactive path compares
// against the window itself, with a small margin for estimate error, so a
// history pruned to, say, 85% of the window takes the free retry.
func (state *compactionState) fitsWindow(size int) bool {
if state.window <= 0 {
return size <= state.threshold
}
return size <= state.window-state.window/20
}
// maybeCompact runs proactive compaction at the top of a turn. It returns the
// (possibly compacted) message slice. It is a no-op when compaction is disabled,
// when the history is under threshold, or when the history has not grown past
@@ -528,10 +628,34 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
// context-limit error never triggers an unexpected summarization call.
return messages, false, nil
}
if state.reactiveAttempted {
if !isContextLimitError(errorMessage) {
return messages, false, nil
}
if !isContextLimitError(errorMessage) {
// CHEAP FIRST STAGE (mirrors maybeCompact): a context-limit failure can
// often be fixed for free by dropping superseded reads and pruning old
// tool-result bodies. It runs regardless of the one-shot reactive budget
// (it costs nothing and cannot loop: a second pass finds nothing left to
// prune). The free retry is taken only when the pruned history fits the
// window the provider enforces — otherwise a retry would fail the same
// way, so fall through to the paid summarizer in this same call.
toolTokens := estimateToolDefTokens(tools)
prunedAny := false
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages); reclaimed > 0 {
messages, prunedAny = pruned, true
}
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(messages, state.preserveLast); reclaimed > 0 {
messages, prunedAny = pruned, true
}
if prunedAny {
size := state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
if state.fitsWindow(size) {
state.lowWaterMark = size
return messages, true, nil
}
}
if state.reactiveAttempted {
return messages, false, nil
}
@@ -571,11 +695,21 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
// provider call. The summary stream intentionally does NOT forward OnText (so
// compaction stays invisible on the user-facing surface), but it DOES forward
// OnUsage so the summarizer's token cost is still counted by usage/budgeting.
// The call goes to the dedicated (cheap) summarizer when one applies; if that
// call fails the summarizer is marked broken for the current model and the
// same slice is retried once on the main provider, so the caller sees at most
// one (main-provider-quality) error.
func (state *compactionState) summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider) func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
if state.planner == nil {
state.planner = newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{})
}
return func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
chosen, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(ctx, provider)
summary, err := summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, chosen, toSummarize, state.onUsage, state.planner, state.trace)
if err == nil || !dedicated {
return summary, err
}
state.summarizerBroken = true
return summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, toSummarize, state.onUsage, state.planner, state.trace)
}
}
@@ -659,8 +793,41 @@ func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []ze
return summary, nil
}
// summaryToolResultClamp bounds each tool-result body in the summarizer input.
// Tool outputs dominate the elided middle's bulk (build logs, file reads,
// search results), yet the summary instructions only need their gist — the
// model that ACTED on the full output already turned it into decisions the
// surrounding messages record. 2,000 chars (~500 tokens) keeps the useful
// head+tail of a result while cutting the summarizer input by 5-10x on
// tool-heavy sessions; the summarizer's own cost is the price being cut.
const summaryToolResultClamp = 2000
// summaryToolArgsClamp bounds each tool-call argument blob in the transcript:
// a write_file call carries the whole file body in its arguments.
const summaryToolArgsClamp = 500
// clampForSummary head+tail-truncates text for the summarizer transcript,
// snapping to rune boundaries so the clamp never splits a UTF-8 sequence.
func clampForSummary(text string, max int) string {
if max <= 0 || len(text) <= max {
return text
}
head := max * 3 / 4
tail := max - head
for head > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(text[head]) {
head--
}
start := len(text) - tail
for start < len(text) && !utf8.RuneStart(text[start]) {
start++
}
return text[:head] + "\n…[" + strconv.Itoa(len(text)-head-(len(text)-start)) + " chars omitted for summarization]…\n" + text[start:]
}
// renderTranscript flattens messages into a plain-text transcript for the
// summarizer. Secret scrubbing already happened upstream at the tool boundary.
// Tool-result bodies and tool-call arguments are clamped (see the constants
// above): the summary needs what was done and decided, not the raw payloads.
func renderTranscript(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
lines := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
for _, message := range messages {
@@ -670,13 +837,13 @@ func renderTranscript(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
if len(message.ToolCalls) > 0 {
calls := make([]string, 0, len(message.ToolCalls))
for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
calls = append(calls, call.Name+"("+call.Arguments+")")
calls = append(calls, call.Name+"("+clampForSummary(call.Arguments, summaryToolArgsClamp)+")")
}
line += "\n[tool calls: " + strings.Join(calls, "; ") + "]"
}
lines = append(lines, line)
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool:
lines = append(lines, "tool result: "+message.Content)
lines = append(lines, "tool result: "+clampForSummary(message.Content, summaryToolResultClamp))
default:
lines = append(lines, string(message.Role)+": "+message.Content)
}
+469
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// compactableHistory returns a history whose middle is large enough to trip
// the proactive threshold for a 1000-token window.
func compactableHistory() []zeroruntime.Message {
return []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "sys"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: strings.Repeat("u", 4000)},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: strings.Repeat("a", 4000)},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "u2"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "a2"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "u3"},
}
}
// Summarization must run on the dedicated (cheap) summarizer when one is
// configured — the main provider sees no summarize traffic at all.
func TestMaybeCompactUsesDedicatedSummarizer(t *testing.T) {
cheap := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "CHEAP SUMMARY"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
main := &mockProvider{}
factoryCalls := 0
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Summarizer: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) {
factoryCalls++
return cheap, nil
},
}, nil)
compacted := state.maybeCompact(context.Background(), main, compactableHistory(), nil)
if len(cheap.requests) == 0 {
t.Fatal("dedicated summarizer never received the summarize call")
}
if len(main.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("main provider must see no summarize traffic, got %d requests", len(main.requests))
}
if factoryCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("summarizer factory calls = %d, want 1 (lazy, memoized)", factoryCalls)
}
if estimateTokens(compacted) >= estimateTokens(compactableHistory()) {
t.Fatal("compaction did not shrink the history")
}
found := false
for _, message := range compacted {
if strings.Contains(message.Content, "CHEAP SUMMARY") {
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatal("cheap summarizer's summary missing from the compacted history")
}
}
// A failing summarizer falls back to the main provider for the SAME slice and
// stays broken for the rest of the run — no repeated failed cheap calls.
func TestSummarizerFailureFallsBackToMainAndSticks(t *testing.T) {
broken := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: "boom: model not found"},
}}}
main := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "MAIN SUMMARY"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "MAIN SUMMARY 2"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
}}
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Summarizer: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) { return broken, nil },
}, nil)
summarize := state.summarizeClosure(context.Background(), main)
input := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "history"}}
summary, err := summarize(input)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("fallback must succeed via the main provider: %v", err)
}
if summary != "MAIN SUMMARY" {
t.Fatalf("summary = %q, want the main provider's", summary)
}
if len(broken.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("broken summarizer requests = %d, want exactly 1", len(broken.requests))
}
if !state.summarizerBroken {
t.Fatal("a failed summarizer must be marked broken for the run")
}
// Second summarization: straight to main, no cheap retry.
if _, err := summarize(input); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(broken.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("broken summarizer was retried (%d requests)", len(broken.requests))
}
if len(main.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("main provider requests = %d, want 2", len(main.requests))
}
}
// A factory that errors (misconfigured model) is equivalent to no summarizer:
// main provider used, factory not retried.
func TestSummarizerFactoryErrorFallsBack(t *testing.T) {
main := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "MAIN SUMMARY"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
factoryCalls := 0
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Summarizer: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) {
factoryCalls++
return nil, errors.New("unknown model")
},
}, nil)
summarize := state.summarizeClosure(context.Background(), main)
summary, err := summarize([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "history"}})
if err != nil || summary != "MAIN SUMMARY" {
t.Fatalf("summary = %q, err = %v; want main provider fallback", summary, err)
}
if factoryCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("factory calls = %d, want 1 (sticky failure)", factoryCalls)
}
if _, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); dedicated {
t.Fatal("after a factory failure the run must stay on the main provider")
}
if factoryCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("factory retried after failure (%d calls)", factoryCalls)
}
}
// Tool payloads are clamped in the summarizer transcript: results to
// summaryToolResultClamp, call arguments to summaryToolArgsClamp.
func TestRenderTranscriptClampsToolPayloads(t *testing.T) {
bigResult := strings.Repeat("r", 50_000)
bigArgs := strings.Repeat("w", 20_000)
transcript := renderTranscript([]zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "editing", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "c1", Name: "write_file", Arguments: bigArgs},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "c1", Content: bigResult},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "keep going"},
})
if len(transcript) > summaryToolResultClamp+summaryToolArgsClamp+1024 {
t.Fatalf("transcript is %d bytes; clamps did not apply", len(transcript))
}
if !strings.Contains(transcript, "chars omitted for summarization") {
t.Fatal("clamped transcript must carry the omission marker")
}
if !strings.Contains(transcript, "keep going") {
t.Fatal("non-tool content must survive unclamped")
}
// Head AND tail of the clamped payloads survive.
if !strings.HasPrefix(transcript[strings.Index(transcript, "tool result: ")+len("tool result: "):], "r") ||
!strings.Contains(transcript, "rrr\n\nuser: keep going") {
t.Fatalf("head/tail of the tool result lost:\n%s", transcript[:200])
}
}
// bigToolHistory returns a history with n large tool results (~40k estimated
// tokens each): the trailing protection window keeps the newest verbatim,
// the older ones are prunable.
func bigToolHistory(n int) []zeroruntime.Message {
bigBody := strings.Repeat("x", 160_000)
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "sys"}}
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
id := string(rune('a' + i))
messages = append(messages,
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: id, Name: "read_file", Arguments: "{\"path\":\"" + id + "\"}"}}},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: id, Content: bigBody},
)
}
return append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "go"})
}
func summaryProvider(text string) *mockProvider {
return &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: text}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: text}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
}}
}
// A context-limit error is first answered with the free prune stage; when the
// pruned history fits the window the retry is free (no summarizer call) and
// the one-shot reactive budget is untouched. The paid summarizer only runs
// when a later error finds nothing left to prune.
func TestRecoverPrunesBeforeSummarizing(t *testing.T) {
provider := summaryProvider("SUMMARY")
// The protected trailing tool output (~40k tokens) must fit the window.
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 200_000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
messages := bigToolHistory(5)
pruned, retried, err := state.recover(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried {
t.Fatal("prunable history that fits must produce a free retry")
}
if len(provider.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("free prune stage must not call the summarizer (%d requests)", len(provider.requests))
}
if state.reactiveAttempted {
t.Fatal("a free prune retry must not consume the reactive budget")
}
if estimateTokens(pruned) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
t.Fatal("prune did not shrink the history")
}
// Second context-limit error on the pruned history: nothing meaningfully
// prunable remains, so the paid summarizer fires and consumes the budget.
_, retried, err = state.recover(context.Background(), provider, pruned, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried {
t.Fatal("second recover must compact and retry")
}
if len(provider.requests) == 0 {
t.Fatal("second recover must reach the summarizer")
}
if !state.reactiveAttempted {
t.Fatal("a paid recover must consume the reactive budget")
}
}
// When pruning reclaims something but the pruned history still exceeds the
// window, recover falls through to the paid summarizer in the SAME call
// instead of spending a retry that would fail the same way.
func TestRecoverFallsThroughToSummarizerWhenPruneIsInsufficient(t *testing.T) {
provider := summaryProvider("SUMMARY")
// A 1,000-token window: even the protected trailing output overflows it.
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 1000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
messages := bigToolHistory(5)
compacted, retried, err := state.recover(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried {
t.Fatal("insufficient prune must still end in a retry via summarization")
}
if len(provider.requests) == 0 {
t.Fatal("insufficient prune must reach the summarizer in the same recover call")
}
if !state.reactiveAttempted {
t.Fatal("the paid summarizer consumes the reactive budget")
}
if estimateTokens(compacted) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
t.Fatal("recover did not shrink the history")
}
}
// The free prune stage is not gated behind the one-shot budget: after a paid
// reactive compaction, a later context-limit error still gets a free retry
// when pruning makes the history fit.
func TestRecoverFreePruneRunsAfterBudgetIsSpent(t *testing.T) {
provider := summaryProvider("SUMMARY")
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 200_000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
state.reactiveAttempted = true
messages := bigToolHistory(5)
pruned, retried, err := state.recover(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried || len(provider.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("free prune must retry without the summarizer even when the budget is spent (retried=%v, requests=%d)", retried, len(provider.requests))
}
if estimateTokens(pruned) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
t.Fatal("prune did not shrink the history")
}
// With nothing left to prune and the budget spent, the caller keeps its
// original error — recover neither loops nor summarizes.
_, retried, err = state.recover(context.Background(), provider, pruned, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil || retried || len(provider.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("spent budget must not summarize again (retried=%v, requests=%d, err=%v)", retried, len(provider.requests), err)
}
}
// The free-retry gate compares against the window the provider enforces, not
// the 70% proactive threshold: a history pruned to ~80% of the window still
// takes the free retry.
func TestRecoverFreeRetryGateUsesWindowNotThreshold(t *testing.T) {
provider := summaryProvider("SUMMARY")
messages := bigToolHistory(5)
pruned, _ := pruneStaleToolOutput(messages, 2)
prunedTokens := estimateTokens(pruned)
// Choose a window so the pruned size sits between 70% and 95% of it.
window := prunedTokens * 100 / 80
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: window, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
if prunedTokens <= state.threshold {
t.Fatalf("test setup: pruned size %d must exceed the proactive threshold %d", prunedTokens, state.threshold)
}
_, retried, err := state.recover(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried || len(provider.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("a history that fits the window must take the free retry (retried=%v, requests=%d)", retried, len(provider.requests))
}
}
// After a mid-run model switch the summarizer is re-resolved against the new
// main model: a run that started on the cheap model (no dedicated summarizer)
// and escalated gets a cheap summarizer, and a previously broken one is
// retried for the new model.
func TestSwitchModelReresolvesSummarizer(t *testing.T) {
cheap := summaryProvider("CHEAP SUMMARY")
main := summaryProvider("MAIN SUMMARY")
var factoryModels []string
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Model: "cheap-model",
Summarizer: func(_ context.Context, mainModelID string) (Provider, error) {
factoryModels = append(factoryModels, mainModelID)
if mainModelID == "cheap-model" {
return nil, nil // main already is the cheap model
}
return cheap, nil
},
}, nil)
if _, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); dedicated {
t.Fatal("on the cheap model the main provider must summarize")
}
if _, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); dedicated || len(factoryModels) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("factory must run once per main model, calls=%v", factoryModels)
}
state.switchModel("big-model", 400_000)
if state.threshold != compactionThreshold(400_000) || state.window != 400_000 {
t.Fatalf("switchModel must re-derive the window, got threshold=%d window=%d", state.threshold, state.window)
}
if got, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); !dedicated || got != Provider(cheap) {
t.Fatal("after escalating to an expensive model the dedicated cheap summarizer must be used")
}
if len(factoryModels) != 2 || factoryModels[1] != "big-model" {
t.Fatalf("factory must be re-invoked with the new main model, calls=%v", factoryModels)
}
// A broken summarizer is retried after the next switch.
state.summarizerBroken = true
if _, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); dedicated {
t.Fatal("a broken summarizer must fall back to main")
}
state.switchModel("other-model", 0)
if got, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); !dedicated || got != Provider(cheap) {
t.Fatal("a model switch must clear the broken flag and rebuild the summarizer")
}
}
func TestCompactionUpdateWindow(t *testing.T) {
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 100_000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
state.lowWaterMark = 50_000
before := state.threshold
state.updateWindow(0) // unknown model: unchanged
if state.threshold != before || state.lowWaterMark != 50_000 {
t.Fatal("updateWindow(0) must be a no-op")
}
state.updateWindow(10_000)
if state.threshold >= before {
t.Fatalf("threshold = %d, want re-derived below %d", state.threshold, before)
}
if state.lowWaterMark != 0 {
t.Fatal("low-water mark must reset on a window change")
}
if !state.enabled {
t.Fatal("a positive window must keep compaction enabled")
}
}
// End-to-end: after escalate_model switches providers, the loop re-derives the
// context window via ContextWindowFor, visible in the OnContext report.
func TestRunEscalationRederivesContextWindow(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(escalatingTool{target: "big-model"})
switched := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "escalate"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
var windows []int
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
ContextWindow: 100_000,
Model: "small-model",
ModelSwitcher: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) { return switched, nil },
ContextWindowFor: func(modelID string) int {
if modelID == "big-model" {
return 400_000
}
return 0
},
OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) { windows = append(windows, breakdown.ContextWindow) },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(windows) < 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected at least 2 OnContext reports, got %d", len(windows))
}
if windows[0] != 100_000 {
t.Fatalf("turn 1 window = %d, want the original 100000", windows[0])
}
if windows[len(windows)-1] != 400_000 {
t.Fatalf("post-escalation window = %d, want 400000", windows[len(windows)-1])
}
}
// nonComparableProvider has a slice field, so comparing two Provider interface
// values holding it would panic; the summarizer path must never compare them.
type nonComparableProvider struct {
inner *mockProvider
tags []string
}
func (p nonComparableProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
return p.inner.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
}
func TestSummarizeClosureNeverComparesProviderValues(t *testing.T) {
broken := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: "boom: model not found"},
}}}
main := nonComparableProvider{inner: summaryProvider("MAIN SUMMARY"), tags: []string{"x"}}
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Summarizer: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) { return nonComparableProvider{inner: broken}, nil },
}, nil)
summary, err := state.summarizeClosure(context.Background(), main)([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "history"}})
if err != nil || summary != "MAIN SUMMARY" {
t.Fatalf("fallback with non-comparable providers must not panic and must use main, got %q err=%v", summary, err)
}
// And with no dedicated summarizer at all the closure still works.
state = newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 1000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
if _, err := state.summarizeClosure(context.Background(), main)([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "history"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
+4 -1
View File
@@ -126,8 +126,11 @@ func capCompactionBrief(brief string) (string, bool) {
func compactionToolCallLine(call zeroruntime.ToolCall) string {
detail := ""
if call.Freeform && call.Name == "apply_patch" {
detail = strings.Join(patchPaths(call.Arguments), ", ")
}
var arguments map[string]any
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments)), &arguments) == nil {
if detail == "" && json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments)), &arguments) == nil {
for _, key := range []string{"file_path", "path", "url", "query", "pattern", "prompt", "description", "question"} {
if value, ok := arguments[key].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(value) != "" {
detail = value
+2 -1
View File
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ func TestProjectCompactionInputRetainsAskUserExchangeAndSemanticArguments(t *tes
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "ask", Content: "Which database should remain?: Postgres only; do not touch MySQL."},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "patch", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: `{"patch":"*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: internal/db.go\n*** End Patch"}`},
{ID: "raw-patch", Name: "apply_patch", Freeform: true, Arguments: "*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: internal/api.go\n*** Add File: internal/config.go\n*** End Patch\n"},
{ID: "fetch", Name: "web_fetch", Arguments: `{"url":"https://example.com/spec"}`},
{ID: "task", Name: "task", Arguments: `{"prompt":"Inspect the Windows implementation"}`},
}},
@@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ func TestProjectCompactionInputRetainsAskUserExchangeAndSemanticArguments(t *tes
}
content := projectCompactionInput(messages).messages[0].Content
for _, want := range []string{"Which database should remain?", "Postgres only; do not touch MySQL", "internal/db.go", "https://example.com/spec", "Inspect the Windows implementation"} {
for _, want := range []string{"Which database should remain?", "Postgres only; do not touch MySQL", "internal/db.go", "internal/api.go", "internal/config.go", "https://example.com/spec", "Inspect the Windows implementation"} {
if !strings.Contains(content, want) {
t.Fatalf("projection missing %q: %q", want, content)
}
+21
View File
@@ -275,6 +275,27 @@ func TestEstimateToolDefTokensCountsDefinitions(t *testing.T) {
if estimateToolDefTokens(one) <= 0 {
t.Fatal("a tool definition (name + description + schema) should estimate > 0 tokens")
}
typed := append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition(nil), one...)
typed[0].Type = zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFreeform
if estimateToolDefTokens(typed) <= estimateToolDefTokens(one) {
t.Fatal("a non-empty tool type must increase the estimated request cost")
}
for _, test := range []struct {
name string
format zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat
}{
{name: "type", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Type: "grammar"}},
{name: "syntax", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Syntax: "lark"}},
{name: "definition", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Definition: "start: WORD"}},
} {
t.Run("format "+test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
formatted := append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition(nil), one...)
formatted[0].Format = &test.format
if estimateToolDefTokens(formatted) <= estimateToolDefTokens(one) {
t.Fatalf("a non-empty format %s must increase the estimated request cost", test.name)
}
})
}
two := append(append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{}, one...), zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
Name: "write_file",
Description: "Write contents to a file in the workspace.",
+4
View File
@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ func copyToolDefinitions(toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) []zeroruntime.To
for index, definition := range toolDefs {
copied[index] = definition
copied[index].Parameters = copySchemaMap(definition.Parameters)
if definition.Format != nil {
format := *definition.Format
copied[index].Format = &format
}
}
return copied
}
+3
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ func TestContextPlannerPreservesProviderRequest(t *testing.T) {
}
toolDefs := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
Name: "read_file", Description: "Read a file",
Format: &zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Type: "grammar", Syntax: "lark", Definition: "start: PATH"},
Parameters: map[string]any{
"type": "object",
"required": []string{"path"},
@@ -53,10 +54,12 @@ func TestContextPlannerPreservesProviderRequest(t *testing.T) {
toolDefs[0].Parameters["required"].([]string)[0] = "other"
toolDefs[0].Parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)["path"].(map[string]any)["type"] = "integer"
toolDefs[0].Parameters["anyOf"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["type"] = "array"
toolDefs[0].Format.Definition = "changed"
if plan.Request.Messages[1].Content != "inspect this" || plan.Request.Messages[1].Images[0].Data[0] != 1 {
t.Fatalf("planned messages alias caller state: %#v", plan.Request.Messages[1])
}
if plan.Request.Tools[0].Name != "read_file" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Format == nil || plan.Request.Tools[0].Format.Definition != "start: PATH" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["required"].([]string)[0] != "path" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)["path"].(map[string]any)["type"] != "string" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["anyOf"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["type"] != "object" {
+378
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type customApplyPatchTool struct {
calls int
}
type fixedPathScope struct {
roots []string
}
func (scope fixedPathScope) Roots() []string {
return append([]string(nil), scope.roots...)
}
func newFixedPathScope(t *testing.T, roots ...string) fixedPathScope {
t.Helper()
resolved := make([]string, 0, len(roots))
for _, root := range roots {
absolute, err := filepath.Abs(root)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Abs(%q): %v", root, err)
}
if physical, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absolute); err == nil {
absolute = physical
}
resolved = append(resolved, absolute)
}
return fixedPathScope{roots: resolved}
}
func (*customApplyPatchTool) Name() string { return "apply_patch" }
func (*customApplyPatchTool) Description() string { return "custom JSON tool" }
func (*customApplyPatchTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"value": {Type: "string"}}}
}
func (*customApplyPatchTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead}
}
func (tool *customApplyPatchTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
tool.calls++
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchUsesExistingToolExecutionPath(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil))
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: hello.txt\n+hello\n*** End Patch\n"
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1",
Name: "apply_patch",
Arguments: patch,
Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: root, FileTracker: tools.NewFileTracker()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("freeform apply_patch status = %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
content, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, "hello.txt"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read patched file: %v", err)
}
if string(content) != "hello\n" {
t.Fatalf("patched content = %q, want hello newline", content)
}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchSupportsGrantedExtraRoot(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
extra := t.TempDir()
scope, err := sandbox.NewScope(root, []string{extra})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewScope: %v", err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, scope))
target := filepath.Join(extra, "hello.txt")
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: " + target + "\n+hello\n*** End Patch\n"
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: patch, Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: root, FileTracker: tools.NewFileTracker()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("freeform extra-root apply_patch status = %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
content, err := os.ReadFile(target)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read extra-root patched file: %v", err)
}
if string(content) != "hello\n" {
t.Fatalf("patched content = %q, want hello newline", content)
}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchRejectsMixedWorkspaceAndExtraRoots(t *testing.T) {
for _, extraHasMatchingPath := range []bool{false, true} {
name := "extra target missing"
if extraHasMatchingPath {
name = "extra target exists"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
workspace := t.TempDir()
extra := t.TempDir()
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(workspace, "src"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
workspaceTarget := filepath.Join(workspace, "src", "a.go")
if err := os.WriteFile(workspaceTarget, []byte("old\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
extraTarget := filepath.Join(extra, "src", "a.go")
if extraHasMatchingPath {
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(extraTarget), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(extraTarget, []byte("old\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
scope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspace, []string{extra})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(workspace, scope))
extraCreated := filepath.Join(extra, "b.go")
patch := strings.Join([]string{
"*** Begin Patch",
"*** Update File: src/a.go",
"@@",
"-old",
"+new",
"*** Add File: " + extraCreated,
"+extra",
"*** End Patch",
}, "\n")
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: patch, Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: workspace, FileTracker: tools.NewFileTracker()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError || !strings.Contains(result.Output, "mixes workspace-relative paths with an extra write root") {
t.Fatalf("mixed-root patch result = %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
if content, err := os.ReadFile(workspaceTarget); err != nil || string(content) != "old\n" {
t.Fatalf("workspace target changed: content=%q err=%v", content, err)
}
if extraHasMatchingPath {
if content, err := os.ReadFile(extraTarget); err != nil || string(content) != "old\n" {
t.Fatalf("extra-root target changed: content=%q err=%v", content, err)
}
}
if _, err := os.Stat(extraCreated); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("mixed-root patch created extra file: %v", err)
}
})
}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchAcceptsOneSemanticRoot(t *testing.T) {
for _, test := range []struct {
name string
useExtraRoot bool
}{
{name: "workspace"},
{name: "extra root", useExtraRoot: true},
} {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
workspace := t.TempDir()
extra := t.TempDir()
scope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspace, []string{extra})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
root := workspace
if test.useExtraRoot {
root = extra
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(root, "src"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
target := filepath.Join(root, "src", "a.go")
if err := os.WriteFile(target, []byte("old\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
updatePath := target
if !test.useExtraRoot {
updatePath = filepath.Join("src", "a.go")
}
created := filepath.Join(root, "b.go")
patch := strings.Join([]string{
"*** Begin Patch",
"*** Update File: " + updatePath,
"@@",
"-old",
"+new",
"*** Add File: " + created,
"+created",
"*** End Patch",
}, "\n")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(workspace, scope))
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: patch, Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: workspace, FileTracker: tools.NewFileTracker()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("single-root patch status = %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
if content, err := os.ReadFile(target); err != nil || string(content) != "new\n" {
t.Fatalf("updated content=%q err=%v", content, err)
}
if content, err := os.ReadFile(created); err != nil || string(content) != "created\n" {
t.Fatalf("created content=%q err=%v", content, err)
}
})
}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchRejectsAbsolutePathOutsideGrantedRoots(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
granted := t.TempDir()
outside := t.TempDir()
scope := newFixedPathScope(t, root, granted)
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, scope))
target := filepath.Join(outside, "blocked.txt")
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: " + target + "\n+blocked\n*** End Patch\n"
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: patch, Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: root})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("ungranted absolute patch status = %s, want error: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(target); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("ungranted absolute patch created target: %v", err)
}
}
func TestPreparedFreeformPatchRejectsIntermediateSymlinkSwap(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("creating directory symlinks requires privileges on Windows")
}
root := t.TempDir()
extra := t.TempDir()
outside := t.TempDir()
intermediate := filepath.Join(extra, "nested")
if err := os.Mkdir(intermediate, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Mkdir: %v", err)
}
scope := newFixedPathScope(t, root, extra)
tool := tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, scope)
target := filepath.Join(intermediate, "blocked.txt")
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: " + target + "\n+blocked\n*** End Patch\n"
args, err := tools.PrepareFreeformApplyPatchArguments(tool, patch)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("PrepareFreeformApplyPatchArguments: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Remove(intermediate); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Remove intermediate: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Symlink(outside, intermediate); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Symlink: %v", err)
}
result := tool.Run(context.Background(), args)
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("symlink-swapped patch status = %s, want error: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(outside, "blocked.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("symlink-swapped patch wrote outside root: %v", err)
}
}
func TestUnknownFreeformToolFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), tools.NewRegistry(), zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "unknown", Arguments: "raw", Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("unknown freeform status = %s, want error", result.Status)
}
}
func TestCustomApplyPatchCannotUseFreeformContract(t *testing.T) {
custom := &customApplyPatchTool{}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(custom)
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: "raw patch", Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError || !strings.Contains(result.Output, "Unsupported freeform tool call") {
t.Fatalf("custom freeform apply_patch result = %#v, want unsupported error", result)
}
if custom.calls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("custom apply_patch executed %d times", custom.calls)
}
}
func TestDeniedFreeformApplyPatchDoesNotWrite(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil))
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: denied.txt\n+must not exist\n*** End Patch\n"
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1",
Name: "apply_patch",
Arguments: patch,
Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeAsk, Options{
Cwd: root,
OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "test denial"}, nil
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("denied freeform status = %s, want error", result.Status)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "denied.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("denied freeform patch changed the workspace: %v", err)
}
}
func TestHistorySafeToolCallsPreservesRawFreeformArguments(t *testing.T) {
raw := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: internal/main.go\n@@\n-old\n+new\n*** End Patch\n"
safe := historySafeToolCalls([]ToolCall{{
ID: "call-1", ProviderCallID: "provider-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: raw, Freeform: true,
}})
if len(safe) != 1 || safe[0].Arguments != raw || safe[0].ProviderCallID != "provider-1" || !safe[0].Freeform {
t.Fatalf("freeform history changed raw call: %#v", safe)
}
}
func TestAbortedToolResultPreservesProviderCallID(t *testing.T) {
messages := appendAbortedToolResults(nil, []ToolCall{{
ID: "call-1", ProviderCallID: "provider-1", Name: "read_file",
}})
if len(messages) != 1 || messages[0].ToolCallID != "call-1" || messages[0].ToolCallProviderID != "provider-1" || !messages[0].IsError {
t.Fatalf("aborted tool result lost provider identity: %#v", messages)
}
}
+8 -9
View File
@@ -33,11 +33,11 @@ const (
// knows before spending more tool turns.
toolOnlyProgressReminderAt = 6
// planReminderTurn is the turn (1-based) by the end of which a multi-step
// task should have called update_plan; if it hasn't, a one-time reminder is
// injected. Set to 3 (not 2) so short, legitimate two-step tasks finish
// without a spurious planning nag.
planReminderTurn = 3
// planReminderTurn and planReminderToolThreshold keep bounded implementation
// work plan-free while still nudging a genuinely sustained run that has not
// established any structured progress. Both thresholds must be met.
planReminderTurn = 7
planReminderToolThreshold = 7
// planToolName is the planning tool the loop watches for by name.
planToolName = "update_plan"
@@ -591,13 +591,12 @@ func (state *guardState) planReminder(turn int) string {
return planStaleReminder(state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate)
}
// NOT-CALLED reminder: by the end of planReminderTurn the model should have
// called update_plan if it's doing a multi-step task (>=1 other tool call).
// One-shot for the whole run.
// NOT-CALLED reminder: once both the turn and tool-call thresholds are met,
// sustained work should have called update_plan. One-shot for the whole run.
if !state.notCalledReminderSent &&
!state.planEverCalled &&
turn >= planReminderTurn &&
state.totalToolCalls >= 1 {
state.totalToolCalls >= planReminderToolThreshold {
state.notCalledReminderSent = true
return planNotCalledReminder()
}
+43 -8
View File
@@ -257,19 +257,16 @@ func TestRunDoesNotCountDroppedToolCallTurnsAsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRunInjectsPlanNotCalledReminderForMultiStepTask(t *testing.T) {
const expectedThreshold = 7
if planReminderToolThreshold != expectedThreshold {
t.Fatalf("plan reminder tool threshold = %d, want %d", planReminderToolThreshold, expectedThreshold)
}
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
toolTurn("call-1", "read_file", `{"path":"notes.txt"}`), // turn 1: other tool call
toolTurn("call-2", "read_file", `{"path":"notes.txt"}`), // turn 2: still no update_plan
toolTurn("call-3", "read_file", `{"path":"notes.txt"}`), // turn 3: reminder fires here
textTurn("done"),
},
}
provider := &mockProvider{turns: append(repeatedReadTurns(expectedThreshold), textTurn("done"))}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
@@ -287,6 +284,44 @@ func TestRunInjectsPlanNotCalledReminderForMultiStepTask(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunDoesNotInjectPlanReminderForBoundedToolSequence(t *testing.T) {
const expectedThreshold = 7
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{turns: append(repeatedReadTurns(expectedThreshold-1), textTurn("done"))}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{Registry: registry, MaxTurns: 12})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if count := countUserMessagesContaining(result.Messages, planNotCalledReminderMarker); count != 0 {
t.Fatalf("bounded tool sequence must not draw a plan reminder, got %d", count)
}
}
func TestPlanReminderWaitsForTurnThresholdAfterEnoughToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
state := guardState{totalToolCalls: 7}
if got := state.planReminder(6); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("planReminder(6) = %q, want no reminder before turn threshold", got)
}
if state.notCalledReminderSent {
t.Fatal("early turn marked the not-called reminder as sent")
}
}
func repeatedReadTurns(count int) [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent {
turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, count)
for range count {
turns = append(turns, toolTurn("call", "read_file", `{"path":"notes.txt"}`))
}
return turns
}
func TestRunDoesNotInjectPlanReminderForTrivialTask(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
+75 -24
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,15 @@ const (
toolResultControlSpecReview = "spec_review_required"
)
var errPermissionApprovalCanceled = errors.New("permission approval cancelled")
// ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled ends a run because the caller cancelled a
// permission prompt, rather than because anything failed.
//
// EXPORTED FOR THE SURFACES. A cancel is a normal ending and each surface says
// so its own way — the TUI unwinds, and ACP has a "cancelled" stop reason for
// exactly this. While it was unexported ACP could not distinguish it from a
// fault and reported it as an internal error, so declining a tool looked like
// the agent crashing.
var ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled = errors.New("permission approval cancelled")
// isImageRejectionError reports whether err is a provider 400 that rejects
// image/multimodal content. This is checked BEFORE the compaction-retry path
@@ -133,6 +141,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
}
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterInputTokens, int64(usage.InputTokens))
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterCachedInputTokens, int64(usage.CachedInputTokens))
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterCacheWriteTokens, int64(usage.CacheWriteTokens))
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterOutputTokens, int64(usage.OutputTokens))
}
}
@@ -689,11 +698,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
turnRequestedModel = toolResult.RequestedModel
}
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
Content: toolResult.ModelOutput(),
ToolCallID: toolResult.ToolCallID,
IsError: toolResult.Status == tools.StatusError,
ChangedFiles: append([]string(nil), toolResult.ChangedFiles...),
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
Content: toolResult.ModelOutput(),
ToolCallID: toolResult.ToolCallID,
ToolCallProviderID: call.ProviderCallID,
IsError: toolResult.Status == tools.StatusError,
ChangedFiles: append([]string(nil), toolResult.ChangedFiles...),
})
// Images ride a following USER message rather than the tool result
// above. Every provider drops images on a tool-role message —
@@ -836,11 +846,21 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
options.ServiceTier = ""
planner.config.serviceTier = ""
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterModelSwitches, 1)
// KNOWN LIMITATION (deferred): the compactor's context-window budget
// is fixed at run start from options.ContextWindow and is NOT updated
// here, so a switch to a model with a different window keeps compacting
// against the original budget. Fixing it needs the switcher to also
// report the new window — out of scope for this change.
// Re-derive the context window for the new model so compaction and
// the OnContext budget report track the model actually in force —
// without this a switch to a smaller-window model can overflow the
// target, and a switch to a larger one over-compacts. An unknown
// model (<= 0) keeps the original window. The compactor also
// re-resolves its dedicated summarizer against the new model.
window := 0
if options.ContextWindowFor != nil {
window = options.ContextWindowFor(turnRequestedModel)
}
if window > 0 {
options.ContextWindow = window
planner.config.contextWindow = window
}
compactor.switchModel(turnRequestedModel, window)
}
}
}
@@ -1027,6 +1047,9 @@ func historySafeToolCalls(calls []ToolCall) []ToolCall {
safe := make([]ToolCall, len(calls))
for i, call := range calls {
safe[i] = call
if call.Freeform {
continue
}
args := strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments)
switch {
case args == "":
@@ -1110,8 +1133,28 @@ func decodeToolArguments(arguments string, v any) error {
}
func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options) (ToolResult, error) {
tool, toolFound := registry.Get(call.Name)
args := map[string]any{}
if call.Arguments != "" {
if call.Freeform {
if !toolFound || !tools.IsBuiltInApplyPatch(tool) {
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: tools.StatusError,
Output: "Error: Unsupported freeform tool call for " + call.Name + ".",
}, nil
}
prepared, err := tools.PrepareFreeformApplyPatchArguments(tool, call.Arguments)
if err != nil {
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: tools.StatusError,
Output: "Error: Invalid freeform apply_patch input: " + err.Error(),
}, nil
}
args = prepared
} else if call.Arguments != "" {
if err := decodeToolArguments(call.Arguments, &args); err != nil {
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
@@ -1139,7 +1182,6 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
DenialReason: DenialFiltered,
}, nil
}
tool, toolFound := registry.Get(call.Name)
if (permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft || permissionMode == PermissionModePlan) && toolFound && !ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode) {
modeName := string(permissionMode)
return ToolResult{
@@ -1364,7 +1406,7 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
}
case PermissionDecisionCancel:
emitCanceledPermission(options, call, requestEvent, decisionReason)
return canceledPermissionResult(call, decisionReason, requestEvent), fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", errPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
return canceledPermissionResult(call, decisionReason, requestEvent), fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
default:
emitDeniedPermission(options, call, requestEvent, decisionReason)
return deniedPermissionResult(call, decisionReason, requestEvent), nil
@@ -1548,7 +1590,7 @@ func maybeRetryUnsandboxedAfterSandboxRestriction(ctx context.Context, registry
case PermissionDecisionCancel:
emitCanceledPermission(options, call, requestEvent, reason)
canceled := canceledPermissionResult(call, reason, requestEvent)
return result, &canceled, true, decision.Action, reason, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", errPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
return result, &canceled, true, decision.Action, reason, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
default:
emitDeniedPermission(options, call, requestEvent, reason)
denied := deniedPermissionResult(call, reason, requestEvent)
@@ -1596,7 +1638,7 @@ func maybeRetryWithNetworkAfterSandboxDenial(ctx context.Context, registry *tool
case PermissionDecisionCancel:
emitCanceledPermission(options, call, requestEvent, reason)
canceled := canceledPermissionResult(call, reason, requestEvent)
return result, &canceled, true, decision.Action, reason, fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", errPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
return result, &canceled, true, decision.Action, reason, fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
default:
emitDeniedPermission(options, call, requestEvent, reason)
denied := deniedPermissionResult(call, reason, requestEvent)
@@ -3087,13 +3129,15 @@ func partitionToolsCached(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMod
// Deferral may activate only when tool_search is actually runnable; otherwise
// the loop would hide deferred tools behind a loader the dispatch gate rejects
// — an inescapable dead-end. "Runnable" mirrors executeToolCall's gate:
// registered, not in DisabledTools, and advertised in the current permission
// mode (e.g. not spec-draft, where tool_search is not advertised). The
// registered, model-visible, not in DisabledTools, and advertised in the
// current permission mode (e.g. not spec-draft, where tool_search is not
// advertised). The
// EnabledTools allowlist is intentionally NOT checked here — tool_search is
// exempt from the allowlist at dispatch, so an allowlist that omits it must
// not disable deferral.
loader, loaderFound := registry.Get(tools.ToolSearchToolName)
loaderUsable := loaderFound &&
tools.ModelVisible(loader) &&
!containsToolName(options.DisabledTools, tools.ToolSearchToolName) &&
ToolAdvertised(loader, permissionMode)
@@ -3200,15 +3244,21 @@ func cachedRuntimeToolDefinition(defCache map[string]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition,
// runtimeToolDefinition renders a tool's advertised definition (name, description,
// JSON-schema parameters) as sent to the provider.
func runtimeToolDefinition(tool tools.Tool) zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
return zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
definition := zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
Name: tool.Name(),
Description: tool.Description(),
Parameters: schemaToRuntimeMap(tool.Parameters()),
}
if tools.IsBuiltInApplyPatch(tool) {
definition.Type = zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFreeform
}
return definition
}
func ToolVisible(tool tools.Tool, permissionMode PermissionMode, enabledTools []string, disabledTools []string) bool {
return ToolAllowedByFilters(tool.Name(), enabledTools, disabledTools) && ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode)
return tools.ModelVisible(tool) &&
ToolAllowedByFilters(tool.Name(), enabledTools, disabledTools) &&
ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode)
}
func ToolAllowedByFilters(name string, enabledTools []string, disabledTools []string) bool {
@@ -3357,10 +3407,11 @@ func loadedToolsFromResult(meta map[string]string) []string {
func appendAbortedToolResults(messages []Message, remaining []ToolCall) []Message {
for _, call := range remaining {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
Content: abortedToolResultNotice,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
IsError: true,
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
Content: abortedToolResultNotice,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
ToolCallProviderID: call.ProviderCallID,
IsError: true,
})
}
return messages
+97 -2
View File
@@ -1853,7 +1853,7 @@ func TestRunAbortsWhenPermissionRequestCanceled(t *testing.T) {
},
})
if !errors.Is(err, errPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
if !errors.Is(err, ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
t.Fatalf("expected permission approval cancel error, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "" {
@@ -4096,7 +4096,7 @@ func TestRunDoesNotFlagCleanToolOutput(t *testing.T) {
// caller's callback AND stamps token counters, and the run completes.
func TestRunTracingWrapperStampsUsage(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventUsage, Usage: zeroruntime.Usage{InputTokens: 100, CachedInputTokens: 20, OutputTokens: 40}},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventUsage, Usage: zeroruntime.Usage{PromptTokens: 100, CachedInputTokens: 20, CacheWriteTokens: 10, CompletionTokens: 40}},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
@@ -4135,6 +4135,9 @@ func TestRunTracingWrapperStampsUsage(t *testing.T) {
if got := tr.Counter(trace.CounterCachedInputTokens); got != 20 {
t.Fatalf("cached input token counter = %d, want 20", got)
}
if got := tr.Counter(trace.CounterCacheWriteTokens); got != 10 {
t.Fatalf("cache-write token counter = %d, want 10", got)
}
if got := tr.Counter(trace.CounterOutputTokens); got != 40 {
t.Fatalf("output token counter = %d, want 40", got)
}
@@ -4340,3 +4343,95 @@ func TestPlanModeHonorsBeforeToolVeto(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected tool result to mention the beforeTool veto, got %q", combined)
}
}
// A cancelled permission on either sandbox-retry path must abort the run with a
// recognisable cancellation, and must not run the escalated retry.
//
// BOTH PATHS, because both wrap ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled and each is
// reached by a different kind of denial: one by an unrestricted platform denial
// asking for approval, the other by an external-network denial. Surfaces map
// this sentinel onto their own idea of a cancel — ACP returns stopReason
// "cancelled" for it — so a path that produced a bare error instead would show
// the user a crash where they had simply declined.
func TestCancellingASandboxRetryAbortsWithoutRetrying(t *testing.T) {
denial := func(capability execution.CapabilityKind, scope string) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{
Status: tools.StatusError,
ExecutionOutcome: &execution.Outcome{
State: execution.StateDenied,
Kind: execution.OutcomeEnforcementDenied,
Denial: &execution.Denial{
Capability: execution.Capability{Kind: capability, Scope: scope},
Source: execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox,
Reason: "denied by the sandbox",
Recoverable: true,
NextAction: execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
},
},
}
}
for _, testCase := range []struct {
name string
result tools.Result
run func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, ToolCall, tools.Tool, map[string]any, tools.Result, Options) error
}{
{
name: "unsandboxed retry",
result: denial(execution.CapabilityUnrestricted, "host"),
run: func(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, result tools.Result, options Options) error {
_, _, _, _, _, _, abortErr := maybeRetryUnsandboxedAfterSandboxRestriction(
ctx, registry, call, tool, args, result, PermissionModeAsk, options, nil)
return abortErr
},
},
{
name: "network retry",
result: denial(execution.CapabilityExternalNetwork, ""),
run: func(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, result tools.Result, options Options) error {
_, _, _, _, _, abortErr := maybeRetryWithNetworkAfterSandboxDenial(
ctx, registry, call, tool, args, result, PermissionModeAsk, options, nil)
return abortErr
},
},
} {
t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
retryTool := &sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool{}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(retryTool)
asked := 0
options := Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
Autonomy: "medium",
Sandbox: sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir(),
Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy(),
}),
OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
asked++
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionCancel, Reason: "client cancelled"}, nil
},
}
call := ToolCall{ID: "call-1", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{"command":"curl example.com"}`}
args := map[string]any{"command": "curl example.com"}
abortErr := testCase.run(context.Background(), registry, call, retryTool, args, testCase.result, options)
if asked != 1 {
t.Fatalf("permission was requested %d times, want exactly 1", asked)
}
if !errors.Is(abortErr, ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
t.Fatalf("abort error = %v, want it to match ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled", abortErr)
}
// The escalated retry is the thing the permission was gating. A
// cancelled prompt that still ran it would have run the command the
// user just declined.
if len(retryTool.calls) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("the escalated retry ran %d times after a cancel: %+v", len(retryTool.calls), retryTool.calls)
}
})
}
}
+13
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,19 @@ func (t countingSchemaTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Resul
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
func TestRuntimeToolDefinitionMarksOnlyBuiltInApplyPatchFreeform(t *testing.T) {
builtIn := runtimeToolDefinition(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
if builtIn.Type != zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFreeform {
t.Fatalf("built-in apply_patch type = %q, want freeform", builtIn.Type)
}
calls := 0
custom := runtimeToolDefinition(countingSchemaTool{name: "apply_patch", calls: &calls})
if custom.Type != "" {
t.Fatalf("custom apply_patch type = %q, want legacy function shape", custom.Type)
}
}
// The cache renders a tool's schema once and reuses it across calls, and its
// output is identical to the uncached path.
func TestPartitionToolsCacheRendersOnceAndMatchesUncached(t *testing.T) {
+18
View File
@@ -67,3 +67,21 @@ func TestEagerToolSchemaTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("eager tool schemas are %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — trim a schema, drop a core tool, or raise the ceiling deliberately (deferring will NOT help: this test disables deferral)", got, maxEagerToolSchemaTokens)
}
}
func TestAgentAdvertisesBothEditTools(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(t.TempDir(), nil) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
exposed, _ := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, map[string]bool{})
names := make(map[string]bool, len(exposed))
for _, definition := range exposed {
names[definition.Name] = true
}
if !names["apply_patch"] {
t.Fatal("agent must retain apply_patch for multi-hunk changes")
}
if !names["edit_file"] {
t.Fatal("agent must receive edit_file for targeted exact replacements")
}
}
+6
View File
@@ -58,12 +58,18 @@ func toolSubstrings(exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) (toolsSubstr, schemaSu
for _, def := range exposed {
writeLengthPrefixed(&toolsSB, def.Name)
writeLengthPrefixed(&toolsSB, def.Description)
writeLengthPrefixed(&toolsSB, string(def.Type))
// Parameters is rendered to a canonical JSON string per tool. The
// schema-render cache in internal/agent (used by partitionToolsCached)
// guarantees the same render is byte-identical across turns for the
// same tool, so this substring is a stable hash input.
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, def.Name)
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, canonicalSchemaString(def.Parameters))
if def.Format != nil {
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, def.Format.Type)
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, def.Format.Syntax)
writeLengthPrefixed(&schemaSB, def.Format.Definition)
}
}
return toolsSB.String(), schemaSB.String()
}
+32
View File
@@ -73,6 +73,38 @@ func TestComputePrefixFingerprintSchemaChangeChangesSchemaHash(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintIncludesToolTypeAndFormat(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
base := zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{Name: "apply_patch", Description: "Patch files"}
baseFingerprint := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{base})
typed := base
typed.Type = zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFreeform
if got := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{typed}); got.ToolsHash == baseFingerprint.ToolsHash {
t.Fatal("ToolsHash must change when tool Type changes")
}
formatCases := []struct {
name string
format zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat
}{
{name: "type", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Type: "grammar"}},
{name: "syntax", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Syntax: "lark"}},
{name: "definition", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Definition: "start: PATCH"}},
{name: "empty", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{}},
}
for _, test := range formatCases {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
withFormat := base
withFormat.Format = &test.format
got := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{withFormat})
if got.SchemaHash == baseFingerprint.SchemaHash {
t.Fatalf("SchemaHash must change for %s format input", test.name)
}
})
}
}
// TestComputePrefixFingerprintSystemPromptChangeChangesBaseHash asserts the
// most common drift path: a system-prompt edit (e.g. an agent.md update, a
// model addendum change) must move the base-instructions hash, which moves
+33 -24
View File
@@ -30,13 +30,10 @@ work.
read-before-edit discipline: inspect the target file and nearby callers,
tests, or config before you modify behavior. Never edit a file you have not
read.
2. **Plan.** Use update_plan for implementation or investigation that has at
least three meaningful dependent steps, then keep it current at milestones.
Mark completed work and the next in-progress step together when practical;
do not spend separate turns updating it after every file or command. Keep at
most one item in_progress. Skip plans for simple lookups, explanations, code
navigation, and other short tasks. Never create a plan after the work is
already complete merely to describe what you did.
2. **Plan.** Use update_plan for multi-component, sequencing-uncertain, or long
work. Skip it for bounded changes in one component. Update only when the
overall phase changes, keep at most one item in_progress, and never create a
plan after the work is complete.
3. **Implement.** Make focused changes that match the surrounding code's style,
naming, and conventions. Prefer the smallest change that fully solves the
problem. Avoid broad refactors, unrelated rewrites, dependency churn, and
@@ -52,37 +49,48 @@ work.
- Choose the narrowest tool that safely accomplishes the step. Prefer native
file tools - read_file, read_minified_file, list_directory, glob, grep,
write_file, edit_file, apply_patch - over shelling out to
edit_file, apply_patch, write_file - over shelling out to
cat/sed/awk/python for file operations.
They are safer, reviewable, and produce clean diffs.
- Prefer read_minified_file when initially exploring source code; it preserves
code while removing comments and redundant whitespace. Use read_file when
exact text, comments, or line numbers are needed.
- Use read_minified_file only to explore large or unfamiliar source. Use
read_file for small or likely edit targets and exact text, comments, or line
numbers. Do not read both unless a new need for exact content appears.
- Keep edits focused and reviewable. A single patch may update several related
files when they form one coherent change; do not hide unrelated edits in a
bulk shell or script rewrite.
- For edits to existing files, prefer edit_file or apply_patch with minimal,
targeted diffs. Match the existing indentation, imports, and idioms. Match the
file's comment density: do not add explanatory comments unless the user asks or
the code is already comment-dense.
- For edits to existing files, use edit_file for a targeted change (old_string
must match the file exactly and be unique, so include a few surrounding
lines) and apply_patch when one coherent change spans several hunks or
files. Use write_file only to create a file or when most of it changes; do
not rewrite a whole file to change a few lines. Match the existing
indentation, imports, and idioms. Match the file's comment density: do not
add explanatory comments unless the user asks or the code is already
comment-dense.
- A successful edit result already confirms the change; do not re-read a file
just to verify an edit that succeeded. If an edit fails, read the error, fix
the old_string or hunk, and retry the same tool rather than switching to a
full rewrite.
- Solve the problem as posed, not a more general version of it. Add no
speculative abstraction, configurability, or handling for cases that cannot
occur, and nothing the user did not ask for. A small diff can still be
over-built; if a 200-line solution could be 50, rewrite it.
over-built; if a 200-line solution could be 50, rewrite it. Once the required
behavior passes validation, stop instead of adding optional cleanup.
- Preserve behavior you were not asked to change. Do not delete or rewrite code
you did not author unless the task requires it; if you must, say so.
## Testing gate (mandatory)
- After any change to code, verify after edits by running the project's
validators before you summarize or commit: tests, type-checks, linters, and/or
the build, as appropriate. Scope them to the change while iterating; reserve
full-suite runs for milestones.
- If you are unsure which validators apply, search the repo (Makefile, package
manifests, CI config) to find them.
- After code changes, run the project's documented appropriate validators.
Scope iteration checks, combine compatible commands when diagnostics stay
useful, and run the final set once after the last edit. Rerun only after a
change or failure.
- If unsure which entry points apply, inspect the Makefile, manifests, or CI;
do not invent a parallel flow.
- Never claim a task is done, and never commit, while validators are failing. If
they fail, fix the cause and rerun; do not paper over it. If you could not run
a validator, say so explicitly rather than implying success.
- A successful native patch confirms the edit. Reread only when the next change
needs exact content or the result was ambiguous.
## Tool use
@@ -104,7 +112,7 @@ work.
you need to clean up a running foreground command yourself, use write_stdin.
- write_stdin's session_id is only ever an id returned by a still-running
exec_command; never guess or probe ids. If you have no such session, start one
with exec_command, or use write_file/edit_file/apply_patch for file changes.
with exec_command, or use edit_file/apply_patch/write_file for file changes.
- write_stdin with empty input polls an existing exec_command session, and
`\u0003` interrupts it. Sending other stdin bytes may require approval because
it can drive the running process beyond the original command. Non-tty sessions
@@ -140,6 +148,7 @@ work.
- Default to concise, skimmable output. Lead with the answer or the result.
- Use GitHub-flavored Markdown: headings to structure longer replies, fenced
code blocks for code, and `inline code` for file paths, commands, symbols, and
short snippets. Reference code as `file:line` so it is clickable.
short snippets. Reference code with file paths and include line numbers when
already known; do not look them up solely for the final summary.
- Report outcomes faithfully: if tests failed, show it; if a step was skipped,
say so; when something is done and verified, state it plainly without hedging.
+5 -2
View File
@@ -60,8 +60,11 @@ const openAIPromptAddendum = `<model_guidance>
longer answers, fenced code blocks for code, and ` + "`inline code`" + ` for paths,
commands, and symbols.
- Strongly prefer the native file tools (read_file, list_directory, grep, glob,
write_file, edit_file, apply_patch) over shelling out to cat/sed/awk/python for
file work. Make one tool call per file; do not batch file writes into a script.
edit_file, apply_patch, write_file) over shelling out to cat/sed/awk/python for
file work. Use them directly; never run apply_patch through exec_command.
read_file, edit_file and write_file take one file per call, while one coherent
apply_patch may span several files. Keep independent native calls in the same
turn, and do not batch file writes into a script.
- Persist until the task is fully handled this turn: gather context, implement,
run the validators, and report — do not stop at a partial result.
</model_guidance>`
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ func TestBuildSystemPromptAppendsModelAddendum(t *testing.T) {
if got := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Model: "gpt-5"}); !strings.Contains(got, openAIPromptAddendum) {
t.Fatalf("expected the OpenAI addendum in the gpt-5 prompt")
}
if got := strings.Join(strings.Fields(strings.ToLower(buildSystemPrompt(Options{Model: "gpt-5"}))), " "); !strings.Contains(got, "never run apply_patch through exec_command") {
t.Fatalf("OpenAI prompt must route edits through the native patch tool:\n%s", got)
}
// Claude is aligned with the core prompt and gets no family addendum now that
// comment discipline is universal; it must not pick up another family's block.
claude := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Model: "claude-opus-4-6"})
+12 -2
View File
@@ -29,14 +29,17 @@ func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
}
func TestCoreSystemPromptIncludesCodingQualityRules(t *testing.T) {
prompt := strings.ToLower(buildSystemPrompt(Options{}))
prompt := strings.Join(strings.Fields(strings.ToLower(buildSystemPrompt(Options{}))), " ")
if strings.Contains(prompt, "clickable file paths") {
t.Fatalf("system prompt must not claim inline-code file paths are clickable: %s", prompt)
}
for _, want := range []string{
"read-before-edit",
"inspect the target file",
"plan then act",
"choose the narrowest tool",
"prefer edit_file or apply_patch",
"for edits to existing files, use edit_file",
"verify after edits",
"honor the active permission mode",
"avoid broad refactors",
@@ -44,6 +47,13 @@ func TestCoreSystemPromptIncludesCodingQualityRules(t *testing.T) {
"do not recognize",
"scaled to the work",
"comment density",
"skip it for bounded changes in one component",
"do not read both unless a new need for exact content appears",
"combine compatible commands when diagnostics stay useful",
"do not invent a parallel flow",
"a successful native patch confirms the edit",
"once the required behavior passes validation, stop",
"do not look them up solely for the final summary",
} {
if !strings.Contains(prompt, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected core system prompt to include %q, got:\n%s", want, buildSystemPrompt(Options{}))
+20 -4
View File
@@ -348,10 +348,26 @@ type Options struct {
// CompactionPreserveLast is how many trailing messages compaction keeps
// verbatim. <= 0 falls back to defaultCompactionPreserveLast.
CompactionPreserveLast int
Registry *tools.Registry
PermissionMode PermissionMode
Autonomy string
Sandbox *sandbox.Engine
// Summarizer, when set, lazily builds the provider used for compaction
// summarization calls — typically a cheap/fast model, since summaries at
// main-model prices are the single most expensive recurring event in a
// long run. It receives the main model currently in force and may return
// (nil, nil) when no dedicated summarizer applies to it (the main model is
// already the cheap one). Built on the first paid compaction and again
// after a mid-run model switch. Any failure (build or call) falls back to
// the run's main provider until the next switch, so a misconfigured
// summarizer can never break compaction. nil keeps today's behavior.
Summarizer func(ctx context.Context, mainModelID string) (Provider, error)
// ContextWindowFor, when set, resolves a model ID to its context window so
// the compactor can re-derive its threshold after a mid-run model switch
// (escalate_model). Without it a switch keeps compacting against the
// original model's window — overflowing a smaller target or over-compacting
// a larger one. Return <= 0 when the model is unknown (window unchanged).
ContextWindowFor func(modelID string) int
Registry *tools.Registry
PermissionMode PermissionMode
Autonomy string
Sandbox *sandbox.Engine
// FileTracker records per-session file read/write versions so the write tools
// can detect a file changed on disk outside Zero since it was last read. nil
// disables the check. Created once per session and threaded into every tool run.
+32 -1
View File
@@ -453,7 +453,12 @@ func (manager *Manager) normalizeLoadedTask(fileTaskID string, task Task) (Task,
}
outputFile, err := manager.outputFile(task.ID, task.OutputFile)
if err != nil {
return Task{}, false, err
var migrated bool
outputFile, migrated = manager.migrateLegacyOutputFile(task.ID, task.OutputFile)
if !migrated {
return Task{}, false, err
}
changed = true
}
if outputFile != task.OutputFile {
changed = true
@@ -562,6 +567,32 @@ func (manager *Manager) outputFile(taskID string, requested string) (string, err
return path, nil
}
// migrateLegacyOutputFile recovers task metadata written under a previous home
// or XDG data root. It accepts only the canonical per-task output
// name in the historic zero/background layout, and only when the corresponding
// regular file already exists inside the active manager root.
func (manager *Manager) migrateLegacyOutputFile(taskID string, requested string) (string, bool) {
requested = strings.TrimSpace(requested)
if !filepath.IsAbs(requested) {
return "", false
}
requested = filepath.Clean(requested)
expectedName := taskID + ".ndjson"
if filepath.Base(requested) != expectedName {
return "", false
}
legacyRoot := filepath.Dir(requested)
if filepath.Base(legacyRoot) != "background" || filepath.Base(filepath.Dir(legacyRoot)) != "zero" {
return "", false
}
canonical := filepath.Join(manager.rootDir, expectedName)
info, err := os.Lstat(canonical)
if err != nil || !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
return "", false
}
return canonical, true
}
func validTaskID(taskID string) bool {
return taskIDPattern.MatchString(strings.TrimSpace(taskID))
}
+83
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package background
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -191,6 +192,88 @@ func TestManagerSkipsInvalidPersistedMetadata(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestManagerMigratesLegacyOutputPathWhenCanonicalOutputExists(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
const taskID = "legacy_task"
canonicalOutput := filepath.Join(root, taskID+".ndjson")
if err := os.WriteFile(canonicalOutput, []byte("legacy output\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write canonical output: %v", err)
}
legacyOutput := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "background", taskID+".ndjson")
metadata, err := json.Marshal(Task{
ID: taskID,
Type: "specialist",
Status: StatusCompleted,
OutputFile: legacyOutput,
StartedAt: time.Date(2026, 8, 1, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal legacy metadata: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, taskID+".json"), append(metadata, '\n'), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write legacy metadata: %v", err)
}
manager, err := NewManager(root)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewManager returned error: %v", err)
}
task, ok := manager.Get(taskID)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("manager did not load migrated task")
}
if task.OutputFile != canonicalOutput {
t.Fatalf("migrated output file = %q, want %q", task.OutputFile, canonicalOutput)
}
if warnings := manager.LoadWarnings(); len(warnings) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("migration produced load warnings: %#v", warnings)
}
persisted, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, taskID+".json"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read migrated metadata: %v", err)
}
var saved Task
if err := json.Unmarshal(persisted, &saved); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode migrated metadata: %v", err)
}
if saved.OutputFile != canonicalOutput {
t.Fatalf("persisted output file = %q, want %q", saved.OutputFile, canonicalOutput)
}
}
func TestManagerRejectsUnrelatedAbsoluteOutputPathDuringMigration(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
const taskID = "legacy_task"
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, taskID+".ndjson"), []byte("output\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write canonical output: %v", err)
}
metadata, err := json.Marshal(Task{
ID: taskID,
Type: "specialist",
Status: StatusCompleted,
OutputFile: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), taskID+".ndjson"),
StartedAt: time.Date(2026, 8, 1, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal metadata: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, taskID+".json"), append(metadata, '\n'), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write metadata: %v", err)
}
manager, err := NewManager(root)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewManager returned error: %v", err)
}
if _, ok := manager.Get(taskID); ok {
t.Fatal("manager loaded task with an unrelated absolute output path")
}
if warnings := strings.Join(manager.LoadWarnings(), "\n"); !strings.Contains(warnings, "output file must be inside") {
t.Fatalf("load warnings = %q, want containment rejection", warnings)
}
}
func TestManagerMarksReloadedRunningTaskNonKillable(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
manager, err := NewManager(root)
+50 -13
View File
@@ -839,24 +839,26 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
mcpTokenStore = nil
err = nil
}
criticalMCPConfig, optionalMCPConfig := splitMCPStartupConfig(mcpConfig)
mcpRuntime := mcpToolRuntime(noopMCPRuntime{})
if len(mcpConfig.Servers) > 0 {
mcpRuntime, err = deps.registerMCPTools(context.Background(), registry, mcpConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions{
if len(criticalMCPConfig.Servers) > 0 {
runtime, registerErr := deps.registerMCPTools(context.Background(), registry, criticalMCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions{
PermissionStore: mcpPermissionStore,
Autonomy: mcp.AutonomyLow,
Execution: executionRunner,
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
})
}
if err != nil {
closeMCPRuntime(stderr, mcpRuntime)
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), 1)
if registerErr != nil {
closeMCPRuntime(stderr, runtime)
return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(registerErr, redaction.Options{}), 1)
}
mcpRuntime = runtime
}
defer closeMCPRuntime(stderr, mcpRuntime)
// A server that could not be reached or validated is skipped, not fatal (one
// bad MCP server must not abort startup) — surface each so a missing tool set is
// explained rather than silently absent. A built-in default the user never
// configured (e.g. keyless Firecrawl with no credentials) is the exception: it
// configured (e.g. keyless Exa with no credentials) is the exception: it
// was never asked for, so its failure is not worth a startup warning — only
// servers the user actually configured warn on failure (issue #552).
for _, skipped := range mcpRuntime.Skipped() {
@@ -909,11 +911,35 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
}
// Activate deferred MCP-tool loading for the interactive run only when the
// VISIBLE deferred-eligible count meets the resolved threshold, matching exec.
// The registry is complete (core + specialist + MCP + plugins) here, so the
// count is accurate; below threshold this is a no-op and the surface is
// unchanged. The interactive surface applies no operator tool filters, so
// enabled/disabled are nil — matching the AgentOptions below.
// This first pass covers every prompt-critical tool. Optional built-in MCP
// defaults re-run the same gate after publishing their atomic batch, so a
// later catalog generation cannot miss its loader. The interactive surface
// applies no operator tool filters, so enabled/disabled are nil — matching the
// AgentOptions below.
registerToolSearchIfEligible(registry, resolved.Tools.DeferThreshold, permissionMode, nil, nil)
var optionalMCPRuntime *optionalMCPStartup
var awaitToolReadiness func(context.Context)
if len(optionalMCPConfig.Servers) > 0 {
optionalMCPRuntime = startOptionalMCP(
context.Background(),
registry,
optionalMCPConfig,
mcp.RegisterOptions{
PermissionStore: mcpPermissionStore,
Autonomy: mcp.AutonomyLow,
Execution: executionRunner,
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
},
deps.registerMCPTools,
func() {
registerToolSearchIfEligible(registry, resolved.Tools.DeferThreshold, permissionMode, nil, nil)
},
)
defer closeMCPRuntime(stderr, optionalMCPRuntime)
awaitToolReadiness = func(ctx context.Context) {
optionalMCPRuntime.Await(ctx, optionalMCPPromptGrace)
}
}
lastKnownMCPConfig := mcpConfig
fileTracker := tools.NewFileTracker()
var scratchBaseline scratchFileBaseline
@@ -948,10 +974,20 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
FavoriteModels: resolved.Preferences.FavoriteModels,
RecentModels: resolved.Preferences.RecentModels,
RecapsEnabled: resolved.Preferences.RecapsEnabled(),
CompactionModel: resolved.Preferences.CompactionModel,
Provider: provider,
NewProvider: deps.newProvider,
ProbeProviderHealth: deps.probeProviderHealth,
UserAgent: userAgent(),
NewTurnSessionProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile, provider zeroruntime.Provider) zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider {
if provider == nil {
return nil
}
if optimized, ok := providers.OptimizedTurnSessions(profile, provider, providers.Options{}); ok {
return optimized
}
return providers.DefaultTurnSessions(profile, provider, providers.Options{})
},
ProbeProviderHealth: deps.probeProviderHealth,
UserAgent: userAgent(),
PrepareRunCompletionWarning: func() {
scratchBaseline = scratchFileSnapshot(workspaceRoot)
},
@@ -959,6 +995,7 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
return scratchFileWarning(workspaceRoot, scratchBaseline)
},
Registry: registry,
AwaitToolReadiness: awaitToolReadiness,
SessionStore: sessionStore,
PeerService: peerService,
SandboxStore: sandboxStore,
+80 -4
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/mcp"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/redaction"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tui"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/update"
@@ -211,12 +212,12 @@ func TestTUIStartupSuppressesWarningForUnconfiguredDefaultServer(t *testing.T) {
},
resolveMCPConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, excludeProject bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
return config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
"firecrawl": config.DefaultMCPServers()["firecrawl"],
"exa": config.DefaultMCPServers()["exa"],
}}, nil
},
registerMCPTools: func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
return fakeMCPRuntimeWithSkips{skipped: []mcp.SkippedServer{
{Name: "firecrawl", Err: errors.New("returned HTTP 401"), UnconfiguredDefault: true},
{Name: "exa", Err: errors.New("returned HTTP 401"), UnconfiguredDefault: true},
}}, nil
},
runTUI: func(ctx context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
@@ -227,7 +228,7 @@ func TestTUIStartupSuppressesWarningForUnconfiguredDefaultServer(t *testing.T) {
if exitCode != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exitCode = %d stderr=%s", exitCode, stderr.String())
}
if strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "firecrawl") {
if strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "exa") {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want no warning for an unconfigured default server", stderr.String())
}
}
@@ -486,6 +487,74 @@ func TestRunNoArgsLaunchesTUIWithMCPState(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunNoArgsPaintsBeforeOptionalDefaultMCPIsReady(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
cwd := t.TempDir()
userConfigPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
permissionStore, err := mcp.NewPermissionStore(mcp.StoreOptions{FilePath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "mcp-permissions.json")})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewPermissionStore() error = %v", err)
}
tokenStore, err := mcp.NewTokenStore(mcp.TokenStoreOptions{FilePath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "mcp-oauth.json")})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewTokenStore() error = %v", err)
}
started := make(chan struct{})
release := make(chan struct{})
configResult := make(chan error, 1)
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
userConfigPath: func() (string, error) { return userConfigPath, nil },
resolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return config.ResolvedConfig{MaxTurns: 8}, nil
},
resolveMCPConfig: func(string, bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
return config.MCPConfig{Servers: config.DefaultMCPServers()}, nil
},
newMCPStore: func() (*mcp.PermissionStore, error) { return permissionStore, nil },
newMCPTokenStore: func() (*mcp.TokenStore, error) { return tokenStore, nil },
registerMCPTools: func(_ context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, cfg config.MCPConfig, _ mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
var configErr error
if _, ok := cfg.Servers["exa"]; !ok || len(cfg.Servers) != 1 {
configErr = fmt.Errorf("optional MCP config = %#v, want only exa", cfg.Servers)
}
configResult <- configErr
close(started)
<-release
registry.Register(cliFakeMCPRegistryTool{})
return noopMCPRuntime{}, nil
},
runTUI: func(ctx context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
select {
case <-started:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("optional MCP initialization did not start")
}
if options.AwaitToolReadiness == nil {
t.Fatal("TUI did not receive optional tool readiness barrier")
}
if _, ok := options.Registry.Get("mcp_docs_lookup"); ok {
t.Fatal("optional MCP tool was published before registration completed")
}
close(release)
options.AwaitToolReadiness(ctx)
if _, ok := options.Registry.Get("mcp_docs_lookup"); !ok {
t.Fatal("optional MCP tool was not visible after readiness completed")
}
return 0
},
})
if exitCode != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exitCode = %d stderr=%s", exitCode, stderr.String())
}
if configErr := <-configResult; configErr != nil {
t.Fatal(configErr)
}
}
func TestTUIMCPCommandUsesLastGoodConfigOnRefreshError(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
@@ -565,6 +634,7 @@ func TestRunNoArgsClosesPartialMCPRuntimeWhenRegistrationFails(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("NewTokenStore() error = %v", err)
}
runtimeClosed := false
secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("a", 23) + "0"
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) {
@@ -591,7 +661,7 @@ func TestRunNoArgsClosesPartialMCPRuntimeWhenRegistrationFails(t *testing.T) {
return closeFunc(func() error {
runtimeClosed = true
return nil
}), errors.New("register mcp tools failed")
}), fmt.Errorf("register mcp tools failed: %s", secret)
},
runTUI: func(ctx context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
t.Fatal("TUI should not launch after MCP registration fails")
@@ -605,6 +675,12 @@ func TestRunNoArgsClosesPartialMCPRuntimeWhenRegistrationFails(t *testing.T) {
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "register mcp tools failed") {
t.Fatalf("stderr missing registration error: %s", stderr.String())
}
if strings.Contains(stderr.String(), secret) {
t.Fatalf("stderr leaked MCP registration secret: %s", stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), redaction.RedactedSecret) {
t.Fatalf("stderr missing redaction marker: %s", stderr.String())
}
if !runtimeClosed {
t.Fatal("partial MCP runtime was not closed after registration error")
}
+17 -10
View File
@@ -682,16 +682,20 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
ModelSwitcher: modelSwitcher,
TurnSessionProvider: turnSessions,
ModelSessionSwitcher: modelSessionSwitcher,
ReasoningEffort: forwardEffort,
Trace: traceRecorder,
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Images: images,
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: permissionMode,
Autonomy: options.autonomy,
SelfCorrect: selfCorrector,
FileDiagnostics: fileDiagnostics,
Profile: execProfile.Policy(displacedMaxTurns, execProfileFilledEffort),
Summarizer: summarizerFactory(resolved, deps.newProvider),
ContextWindowFor: func(modelID string) int {
return modelregistry.AgentContextWindow(modelContextWindow(modelRegistry, modelID))
},
ReasoningEffort: forwardEffort,
Trace: traceRecorder,
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Images: images,
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: permissionMode,
Autonomy: options.autonomy,
SelfCorrect: selfCorrector,
FileDiagnostics: fileDiagnostics,
Profile: execProfile.Policy(displacedMaxTurns, execProfileFilledEffort),
// Headless exec: don't accept a no-tool-call turn as "done" while work
// clearly remains (pending plan items / a mid-step continuation cue) —
// nudge to continue, and finalize as INCOMPLETE rather than false success
@@ -939,6 +943,9 @@ func registerToolSearchIfEligible(registry *tools.Registry, deferThreshold int,
if deferThreshold <= 0 {
return
}
if _, registered := registry.Get(tools.ToolSearchToolName); registered {
return
}
if deferredEligibleCount(registry, permissionMode, enabledTools, disabledTools) < deferThreshold {
return
}
+15 -9
View File
@@ -267,23 +267,29 @@ func streamJSONPermissionEventType(event agent.PermissionEvent) streamjson.Event
func (writer *execEventWriter) usage(usage agent.Usage) {
if writer.format == execOutputJSON {
writer.writeJSON(map[string]any{
"type": "usage",
"prompt_tokens": usage.PromptTokens,
"completion_tokens": usage.CompletionTokens,
"total_tokens": usage.TotalTokens(),
"type": "usage",
"prompt_tokens": usage.PromptTokens,
"completion_tokens": usage.CompletionTokens,
"cached_input_tokens": usage.CachedInputTokens,
"cache_write_tokens": usage.CacheWriteTokens,
"total_tokens": usage.TotalTokens(),
})
return
}
if writer.format == execOutputStreamJSON {
promptTokens := usage.EffectiveInputTokens()
completionTokens := usage.EffectiveOutputTokens()
cachedInputTokens := usage.CachedInputTokens
cacheWriteTokens := usage.CacheWriteTokens
totalTokens := usage.TotalTokens()
writer.writeStreamJSON(streamjson.Event{
Type: streamjson.EventUsage,
RunID: writer.runID,
PromptTokens: &promptTokens,
CompletionTokens: &completionTokens,
TotalTokens: &totalTokens,
Type: streamjson.EventUsage,
RunID: writer.runID,
PromptTokens: &promptTokens,
CompletionTokens: &completionTokens,
CachedInputTokens: &cachedInputTokens,
CacheWriteTokens: &cacheWriteTokens,
TotalTokens: &totalTokens,
})
}
}
+36
View File
@@ -52,3 +52,39 @@ func TestExecWriterPropagatesToolResultTruncation(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
func TestExecWriterPropagatesCacheUsage(t *testing.T) {
for _, format := range []execOutputFormat{execOutputJSON, execOutputStreamJSON} {
t.Run(string(format), func(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
writer := execEventWriter{
stdout: &stdout,
format: format,
runID: "run_usage",
streamedText: &strings.Builder{},
}
writer.usage(agent.Usage{
InputTokens: 100,
OutputTokens: 20,
PromptTokens: 100,
CompletionTokens: 20,
CachedInputTokens: 60,
CacheWriteTokens: 10,
})
if writer.err != nil {
t.Fatalf("usage: %v", writer.err)
}
var payload map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(bytes.TrimSpace(stdout.Bytes()), &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode output %q: %v", stdout.String(), err)
}
cachedKey, writeKey := "cached_input_tokens", "cache_write_tokens"
if format == execOutputStreamJSON {
cachedKey, writeKey = "cachedInputTokens", "cacheWriteTokens"
}
if payload[cachedKey] != float64(60) || payload[writeKey] != float64(10) {
t.Fatalf("cache usage missing from payload: %#v", payload)
}
})
}
}
+8 -8
View File
@@ -9,15 +9,15 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
)
// `zero mcp disable firecrawl` must work even though firecrawl is a built-in
// `zero mcp disable exa` must work even though exa is a built-in
// default that is not written to the user's config file until overridden.
func TestRunMCPDisableSeededFirecrawlDefault(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunMCPDisableSeededExaDefault(t *testing.T) {
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
// A config with no firecrawl entry — the default lives in code, not the file.
// A config with no Exa entry — the default lives in code, not the file.
writeMCPCommandRawConfig(t, configPath, `{"activeProvider":"fast"}`)
var out, errBuf bytes.Buffer
code := runWithDeps([]string{"mcp", "disable", "firecrawl", "--json"}, &out, &errBuf, appDeps{
code := runWithDeps([]string{"mcp", "disable", "exa", "--json"}, &out, &errBuf, appDeps{
userConfigPath: func() (string, error) { return configPath, nil },
})
if code != exitSuccess {
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ func TestRunMCPDisableSeededFirecrawlDefault(t *testing.T) {
if err := json.Unmarshal(out.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode disable JSON: %v\n%s", err, out.String())
}
if payload.ServerName != "firecrawl" || !payload.Disabled || !payload.Changed {
t.Fatalf("disable payload = %#v, want firecrawl disabled+changed", payload)
if payload.ServerName != "exa" || !payload.Disabled || !payload.Changed {
t.Fatalf("disable payload = %#v, want exa disabled+changed", payload)
}
// End-to-end: resolving that config now turns the default off.
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func TestRunMCPDisableSeededFirecrawlDefault(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
if !cfg.Servers["firecrawl"].Disabled {
t.Fatal("expected `mcp disable firecrawl` to turn the seeded default off in the resolved config")
if !cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
t.Fatal("expected `mcp disable exa` to turn the seeded default off in the resolved config")
}
}
+147
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
package cli
import (
"context"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/mcp"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
const (
optionalMCPPromptGrace = time.Second
optionalMCPCloseGrace = 250 * time.Millisecond
)
// splitMCPStartupConfig keeps explicitly configured servers on the
// prompt-critical path. Only unchanged built-in defaults may initialize after
// first paint; their failure was already intentionally silent.
func splitMCPStartupConfig(cfg config.MCPConfig) (critical config.MCPConfig, optional config.MCPConfig) {
critical.Servers = map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{}
optional.Servers = map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{}
for name, server := range cfg.Servers {
if server.Disabled {
continue
}
if config.IsUnconfiguredDefault(name, server) {
optional.Servers[name] = server
continue
}
critical.Servers[name] = server
}
return critical, optional
}
type optionalMCPStartup struct {
cancel context.CancelFunc
done chan struct{}
mu sync.Mutex
runtime mcpToolRuntime
closeOnce sync.Once
runtimeCloseOnce sync.Once
closeErr error
}
func startOptionalMCP(
parent context.Context,
registry *tools.Registry,
cfg config.MCPConfig,
options mcp.RegisterOptions,
register func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error),
onReady func(),
) *optionalMCPStartup {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(parent)
startup := &optionalMCPStartup{cancel: cancel, done: make(chan struct{})}
go func() {
runtime, err := register(ctx, registry, cfg, options)
if err == nil && onReady != nil {
onReady()
}
startup.mu.Lock()
startup.runtime = runtime
startup.mu.Unlock()
close(startup.done)
}()
return startup
}
// Await gives optional tools one bounded opportunity to join the next turn's
// immutable registry snapshot. A timeout leaves this turn on the existing core
// tool set; a later turn observes the completed generation.
func (startup *optionalMCPStartup) Await(ctx context.Context, timeout time.Duration) bool {
if startup == nil {
return true
}
select {
case <-startup.done:
return true
default:
}
if timeout <= 0 {
select {
case <-startup.done:
return true
case <-ctx.Done():
return false
}
}
timer := time.NewTimer(timeout)
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case <-startup.done:
return true
case <-timer.C:
return false
case <-ctx.Done():
return false
}
}
func (startup *optionalMCPStartup) Close() error {
if startup == nil {
return nil
}
startup.closeOnce.Do(func() {
startup.cancel()
reaped := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(reaped)
<-startup.done
startup.closeRuntime()
}()
timer := time.NewTimer(optionalMCPCloseGrace)
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case <-reaped:
case <-timer.C:
}
})
startup.mu.Lock()
defer startup.mu.Unlock()
return startup.closeErr
}
func (startup *optionalMCPStartup) closeRuntime() {
startup.runtimeCloseOnce.Do(func() {
startup.mu.Lock()
runtime := startup.runtime
startup.mu.Unlock()
if runtime == nil {
return
}
err := runtime.Close()
startup.mu.Lock()
if err != nil && startup.closeErr == nil {
startup.closeErr = err
}
startup.mu.Unlock()
})
}
func (startup *optionalMCPStartup) Skipped() []mcp.SkippedServer {
return nil
}
+187
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
package cli
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/mcp"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
type closeTrackingMCPRuntime struct {
closed chan struct{}
err error
}
func (runtime *closeTrackingMCPRuntime) Close() error {
close(runtime.closed)
return runtime.err
}
func (*closeTrackingMCPRuntime) Skipped() []mcp.SkippedServer { return nil }
func TestSplitMCPStartupConfigDefersOnlyUnconfiguredDefaults(t *testing.T) {
defaults := config.DefaultMCPServers()
cfg := config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
"exa": defaults["exa"],
"docs": {Type: "http", URL: "https://docs.example.test/mcp"},
"disabled": {Type: "http", URL: "https://disabled.example.test/mcp", Disabled: true},
}}
critical, optional := splitMCPStartupConfig(cfg)
if _, ok := critical.Servers["docs"]; !ok || len(critical.Servers) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("critical servers = %#v, want only docs", critical.Servers)
}
if _, ok := optional.Servers["exa"]; !ok || len(optional.Servers) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("optional servers = %#v, want only exa", optional.Servers)
}
}
func TestOptionalMCPAwaitTimesOutThenObservesPublishedTools(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
release := make(chan struct{})
started := make(chan struct{})
startup := startOptionalMCP(
context.Background(),
registry,
config.MCPConfig{Servers: config.DefaultMCPServers()},
mcp.RegisterOptions{},
func(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, _ config.MCPConfig, _ mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
close(started)
select {
case <-release:
registry.RegisterBatch([]tools.Tool{tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil)})
return noopMCPRuntime{}, nil
case <-ctx.Done():
return noopMCPRuntime{}, ctx.Err()
}
},
nil,
)
defer func() { _ = startup.Close() }()
<-started
if startup.Await(t.Context(), time.Millisecond) {
t.Fatal("optional startup unexpectedly completed before release")
}
if got := len(registry.All()); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("registry published tools before readiness: %d", got)
}
close(release)
if !startup.Await(t.Context(), time.Second) {
t.Fatal("optional startup did not complete after release")
}
if _, ok := registry.Get("read_file"); !ok {
t.Fatal("completed optional startup did not publish its tool batch")
}
}
func TestOptionalMCPFailedRegistrationSkipsReadinessCallback(t *testing.T) {
readyCalls := 0
startup := startOptionalMCP(
context.Background(),
tools.NewRegistry(),
config.MCPConfig{Servers: config.DefaultMCPServers()},
mcp.RegisterOptions{},
func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
return noopMCPRuntime{}, errors.New("connect failed")
},
func() { readyCalls++ },
)
defer func() { _ = startup.Close() }()
if !startup.Await(t.Context(), time.Second) {
t.Fatal("failed optional startup did not settle")
}
if readyCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("readiness callback ran after failed registration: %d", readyCalls)
}
}
func TestOptionalMCPCloseCancelsBlockedStartup(t *testing.T) {
started := make(chan struct{})
startup := startOptionalMCP(
context.Background(),
tools.NewRegistry(),
config.MCPConfig{Servers: config.DefaultMCPServers()},
mcp.RegisterOptions{},
func(ctx context.Context, _ *tools.Registry, _ config.MCPConfig, _ mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
close(started)
<-ctx.Done()
return noopMCPRuntime{}, nil
},
nil,
)
<-started
if err := startup.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Close() error = %v", err)
}
}
func TestOptionalMCPCloseReturnsRuntimeErrorWithinGrace(t *testing.T) {
closeErr := errors.New("close failed")
runtime := &closeTrackingMCPRuntime{closed: make(chan struct{}), err: closeErr}
startup := startOptionalMCP(
context.Background(),
tools.NewRegistry(),
config.MCPConfig{Servers: config.DefaultMCPServers()},
mcp.RegisterOptions{},
func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
return runtime, nil
},
nil,
)
if !startup.Await(t.Context(), time.Second) {
t.Fatal("optional startup did not settle")
}
if err := startup.Close(); !errors.Is(err, closeErr) {
t.Fatalf("Close() error = %v, want %v", err, closeErr)
}
}
func TestOptionalMCPCloseBoundsRegistrationThatIgnoresCancellation(t *testing.T) {
started := make(chan struct{})
release := make(chan struct{})
released := false
defer func() {
if !released {
close(release)
}
}()
runtime := &closeTrackingMCPRuntime{closed: make(chan struct{})}
startup := startOptionalMCP(
context.Background(),
tools.NewRegistry(),
config.MCPConfig{Servers: config.DefaultMCPServers()},
mcp.RegisterOptions{},
func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
close(started)
<-release
return runtime, nil
},
nil,
)
<-started
closeResult := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { closeResult <- startup.Close() }()
select {
case err := <-closeResult:
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Close() error = %v", err)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Close blocked on registration after cancellation")
}
close(release)
released = true
select {
case <-runtime.closed:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("late optional MCP runtime was not closed")
}
}
+17
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
package cli
import (
"context"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// summarizerFactory adapts the resolved profile and the authenticated provider
// builder into agent.Options.Summarizer; the selection rules live in
// providers.CompactionSummarizerFactory, shared with the TUI.
func summarizerFactory(resolved config.ResolvedConfig, newProvider func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)) func(context.Context, string) (agent.Provider, error) {
return providers.CompactionSummarizerFactory(resolved.Provider, resolved.Preferences.CompactionModel, newProvider)
}
+15 -5
View File
@@ -105,7 +105,17 @@ func TestLoadProviderCommandTimeout(t *testing.T) {
//
// This is a hang-breaker, not a tuned margin. Nothing in a healthy run waits on
// it, since both tests return about one WaitDelay after the fixture exits.
const providerCommandTestBudget = 60 * time.Second
const (
providerCommandTestBudget = 90 * time.Second
providerCommandReadyWaitAttempts = 45
)
func TestProviderCommandBudgetLeavesCleanupMargin(t *testing.T) {
readyWaitCeiling := time.Duration(providerCommandReadyWaitAttempts) * time.Second
if providerCommandTestBudget < 2*readyWaitCeiling {
t.Fatalf("provider command test budget %s leaves less than one readiness window for cleanup after %s", providerCommandTestBudget, readyWaitCeiling)
}
}
// backgroundChildLifetime must exceed providerCommandTestBudget so that a child
// dying of old age is unobservable: any run where runProviderCommand has not
@@ -341,15 +351,15 @@ func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
// assertion fail is far more diagnosable than blocking until the
// timeout fires and reporting an unrelated error. Each iteration is
// about a second, since `ping -n 2` sleeps between its two echoes,
// so the ceiling is roughly 15s: far longer than any cold PowerShell
// start seen on a runner, and far shorter than
// providerCommandTestBudget, so giving up surfaces a legible
// so the ceiling is roughly 45s: enough for a heavily loaded Windows
// runner while leaving the other half of providerCommandTestBudget for
// process exit, PID-file verification, and cleanup. Giving up surfaces a legible
// PID-file failure rather than a timeout that hides the real cause.
lines = append(lines,
":zeroWaitReady",
"if exist \""+readyFile+"\" goto zeroReady",
"set /a ZERO_READY_TRIES+=1",
"if %ZERO_READY_TRIES% GEQ 15 goto zeroReady",
"if %ZERO_READY_TRIES% GEQ "+itoa(providerCommandReadyWaitAttempts)+" goto zeroReady",
"ping -n 2 127.0.0.1 >nul",
"goto zeroWaitReady",
":zeroReady",
+98 -13
View File
@@ -5,22 +5,20 @@ import (
"strings"
)
// DefaultMCPServers returns the MCP servers Zero ships ENABLED by default so web
// search and scraping work out of the box with no setup and no API key. They are
// seeded before user/project config is merged (see ResolveMCP), so a user can
// override any field — for example point firecrawl at a self-hosted instance, or
// add an API-key header to lift the free-tier limit — or disable it entirely with
// DefaultMCPServers returns the MCP servers Zero ships ENABLED by default so
// web search and page fetching work out of the box with no setup and no API
// key. They are seeded before user/project config is merged (see ResolveMCP),
// so a user can override any field — for example add an API-key header to lift
// Exa's anonymous rate limit — or disable it entirely with
// `zero mcp disable <name>` (which writes `"disabled": true`).
//
// Keyless Firecrawl routes requests through firecrawl.dev (1,000 free credits per
// month, no account). Self-host Firecrawl (AGPL-3.0) for unlimited and private
// use. Zero only calls it over the network, so Firecrawl's license never reaches
// into Zero's own code.
// Exa's hosted MCP server works anonymously with rate limits. Users can add an
// Exa API key for higher limits.
func DefaultMCPServers() map[string]MCPServerConfig {
return map[string]MCPServerConfig{
"firecrawl": {
"exa": {
Type: "http",
URL: "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp",
URL: "https://mcp.exa.ai/mcp",
},
}
}
@@ -35,13 +33,13 @@ func IsDefaultMCPServer(name string) bool {
// IsUnconfiguredDefault reports whether server is one of Zero's built-in
// defaults that the user never wrote an entry for in their config — i.e. it is
// running with whatever Zero ships (e.g. keyless Firecrawl, no credentials).
// running with whatever Zero ships (e.g. keyless Exa, no credentials).
//
// Both conditions below must hold:
// - !server.configured: the user's JSON never declared an object for this
// server key at all (set by MCPServerConfig.UnmarshalJSON only when it
// actually ran for this key). Any explicit action — including a
// disable/enable toggle like `zero mcp enable firecrawl` that leaves the
// disable/enable toggle like `zero mcp enable exa` that leaves the
// resolved value unchanged — sets configured, so it always counts as
// user-configured, even though the value comparison below could not tell
// the difference on its own.
@@ -58,3 +56,90 @@ func IsUnconfiguredDefault(name string, server MCPServerConfig) bool {
def, ok := DefaultMCPServers()[strings.TrimSpace(name)]
return ok && !server.configured && reflect.DeepEqual(def, server)
}
// retiredDefaultMCPServer describes a built-in default Zero no longer ships.
type retiredDefaultMCPServer struct {
// successor is the default that replaced it.
successor string
// shipped is the value Zero used to seed for this name. A user entry
// written while the default was still shipped may name only an override
// (a header, say) and rely on these fields for the rest, so they have to
// outlive the default itself.
shipped MCPServerConfig
}
// retiredDefaultMCPServers maps a retired built-in default to what replaced it
// and to the value Zero used to ship for it.
var retiredDefaultMCPServers = map[string]retiredDefaultMCPServer{
"firecrawl": {
successor: "exa",
shipped: MCPServerConfig{
Type: "http",
URL: "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp",
},
},
}
// migrateRetiredDefaultMCPServers keeps an upgrade across a default-provider
// swap from changing what the user's config means. It handles the two ways a
// rename can break a config written against the old default:
//
// - A user who ran `zero mcp disable <old default>` made an explicit choice
// not to open that outbound connection. Without carrying that decision to
// the successor, the upgrade re-opens it under the new name — and because
// the replacement looks like an untouched default, even the startup
// warning stays quiet (see IsUnconfiguredDefault and issue #552).
// - A user who customized the old default could name only the field they
// were changing, because the seeded default supplied the transport. Once
// the default stops being seeded that entry resolves to a server with no
// type, url, or command, which fails NormalizeConfig and takes the whole
// startup down rather than just that one server.
//
// It runs immediately after the user layer merges (see ResolveMCP), which
// scopes it to user-level decisions — the only scope whose disable is sticky.
// The carried-over disable applies only when the user never declared the
// successor themselves: an explicit `exa` entry wins whether it enables or
// disables. Because the disable is recorded as a user-level decision, the
// lower-trust project layer cannot lift it, while `zero mcp enable exa` still
// can (the CLI override scope merges with canReenable=true).
func migrateRetiredDefaultMCPServers(cfg *MCPConfig) {
for name, retired := range retiredDefaultMCPServers {
entry, ok := cfg.Servers[name]
if !ok {
continue
}
if inheritsRetiredTransport(entry) {
// Re-seed what Zero used to ship underneath the user's fields, so a
// partial entry still resolves to the complete server it named when
// it was written. Their own values still win — this only fills the
// gap the retired default used to cover.
entry = mergeMCPServer(retired.shipped, entry, true)
cfg.Servers[name] = entry
}
if !entry.disabledSet || !entry.Disabled {
continue
}
replacement, ok := cfg.Servers[retired.successor]
if !ok || replacement.configured {
continue
}
replacement.Disabled = true
replacement.disabledSet = true
cfg.Servers[retired.successor] = replacement
}
}
// inheritsRetiredTransport reports whether entry named no transport of its own
// — no type, url, command, or args — and so relied entirely on the retired
// default to supply one.
//
// Anything else is a complete definition the user owns (a self-hosted url, a
// stdio command) and must be left alone: grafting the retired default's http
// type onto an entry that names a command produces a server that is rejected
// outright, turning a working config into a startup failure.
func inheritsRetiredTransport(entry MCPServerConfig) bool {
return strings.TrimSpace(entry.Type) == "" &&
strings.TrimSpace(entry.URL) == "" &&
strings.TrimSpace(entry.Command) == "" &&
len(entry.Args) == 0
}
+197 -36
View File
@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ import (
)
func TestIsDefaultMCPServer(t *testing.T) {
if !IsDefaultMCPServer("firecrawl") {
t.Fatal("firecrawl should be a built-in default")
if !IsDefaultMCPServer("exa") {
t.Fatal("exa should be a built-in default")
}
if IsDefaultMCPServer(" firecrawl ") == false {
if IsDefaultMCPServer(" exa ") == false {
t.Fatal("IsDefaultMCPServer should trim whitespace")
}
if IsDefaultMCPServer("not-a-default") {
@@ -18,45 +18,45 @@ func TestIsDefaultMCPServer(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestResolveMCPSeedsEnabledFirecrawlDefault(t *testing.T) {
func TestResolveMCPSeedsEnabledExaDefault(t *testing.T) {
cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
firecrawl, ok := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]
exa, ok := cfg.Servers["exa"]
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected the firecrawl default to be seeded with no user config")
t.Fatal("expected the exa default to be seeded with no user config")
}
if firecrawl.Type != "http" || firecrawl.URL != "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected firecrawl default: %#v", firecrawl)
if exa.Type != "http" || exa.URL != "https://mcp.exa.ai/mcp" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected exa default: %#v", exa)
}
if firecrawl.Disabled {
t.Fatal("the firecrawl default must be enabled out of the box")
if exa.Disabled {
t.Fatal("the exa default must be enabled out of the box")
}
}
func TestResolveMCPUserCanDisableDefault(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"exa":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
if !cfg.Servers["firecrawl"].Disabled {
if !cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
t.Fatal("a user must be able to disable the default by writing over it")
}
}
func TestIsUnconfiguredDefault(t *testing.T) {
if !IsUnconfiguredDefault("firecrawl", DefaultMCPServers()["firecrawl"]) {
t.Fatal("an untouched firecrawl default should be reported as unconfigured")
if !IsUnconfiguredDefault("exa", DefaultMCPServers()["exa"]) {
t.Fatal("an untouched exa default should be reported as unconfigured")
}
if IsUnconfiguredDefault("firecrawl", MCPServerConfig{Type: "http", URL: "http://localhost:3002/mcp"}) {
if IsUnconfiguredDefault("exa", MCPServerConfig{Type: "http", URL: "https://example.com/mcp"}) {
t.Fatal("a server overriding the default URL is no longer unconfigured")
}
if IsUnconfiguredDefault("firecrawl", MCPServerConfig{Type: "http", URL: "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp", Auth: "bearer"}) {
if IsUnconfiguredDefault("exa", MCPServerConfig{Type: "http", URL: "https://mcp.exa.ai/mcp", Auth: "bearer"}) {
t.Fatal("a server with credentials added is no longer unconfigured")
}
if IsUnconfiguredDefault("not-a-default", MCPServerConfig{}) {
@@ -65,57 +65,173 @@ func TestIsUnconfiguredDefault(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestResolveMCPExplicitReenableIsNotUnconfiguredDefault(t *testing.T) {
// `zero mcp enable firecrawl` after a prior disable writes {"disabled":false}
// `zero mcp enable exa` after a prior disable writes {"disabled":false}
// explicitly. The resolved value is identical to the untouched default (both
// enabled, no credentials), but the user DID take an explicit action here, so
// IsUnconfiguredDefault must not treat it as untouched (issue #563 review).
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":false}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"exa":{"disabled":false}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
firecrawl := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]
if firecrawl.Disabled {
t.Fatalf("explicit re-enable should leave the server enabled: %#v", firecrawl)
exa := cfg.Servers["exa"]
if exa.Disabled {
t.Fatalf("explicit re-enable should leave the server enabled: %#v", exa)
}
if IsUnconfiguredDefault("firecrawl", firecrawl) {
if IsUnconfiguredDefault("exa", exa) {
t.Fatal("an explicit enable/disable toggle must count as user-configured, even though the resolved value matches the default")
}
}
func TestResolveMCPExplicitRedeclareOfDefaultValuesIsNotUnconfiguredDefault(t *testing.T) {
// A user who copies firecrawl's exact default type/url into their config
// A user who copies Exa's exact default type/url into their config
// (e.g. from an example file, planning to add credentials later) produces a
// resolved value byte-identical to DefaultMCPServers()["firecrawl"] — the
// resolved value byte-identical to DefaultMCPServers()["exa"] — the
// same trap TestResolveMCPExplicitReenableIsNotUnconfiguredDefault covers for
// the disabled toggle. IsUnconfiguredDefault must still treat this as
// user-configured because the user's JSON declared an entry for it, even
// though a plain resolved-value comparison could not tell the difference.
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"type":"http","url":"https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp"}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"exa":{"type":"http","url":"https://mcp.exa.ai/mcp"}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
firecrawl := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]
want := DefaultMCPServers()["firecrawl"]
if firecrawl.Type != want.Type || firecrawl.URL != want.URL || firecrawl.Disabled != want.Disabled {
t.Fatalf("expected the resolved value to match the default's fields exactly: %#v", firecrawl)
exa := cfg.Servers["exa"]
want := DefaultMCPServers()["exa"]
if exa.Type != want.Type || exa.URL != want.URL || exa.Disabled != want.Disabled {
t.Fatalf("expected the resolved value to match the default's fields exactly: %#v", exa)
}
if IsUnconfiguredDefault("firecrawl", firecrawl) {
if IsUnconfiguredDefault("exa", exa) {
t.Fatal("redeclaring the default's exact values is still an explicit user configuration, not an untouched default")
}
}
func TestResolveMCPUserCanOverrideDefaultURLKeepingOtherFields(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
// Point firecrawl at a self-hosted instance; the default's Type must survive.
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"url":"http://localhost:3002/mcp"}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
// Point Exa at a proxy; the default's Type must survive.
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"exa":{"url":"https://example.com/mcp"}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
exa := cfg.Servers["exa"]
if exa.URL != "https://example.com/mcp" {
t.Fatalf("user override of the default URL did not apply: %#v", exa)
}
if exa.Type != "http" {
t.Fatalf("override should keep the default's other fields (type), got %#v", exa)
}
}
func TestResolveMCPCarriesLegacyDefaultDisableToSuccessor(t *testing.T) {
// Upgrade path: the user disabled the firecrawl default Zero used to ship.
// Swapping the default to exa must not re-open an outbound connection they
// explicitly switched off.
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
if !cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
t.Fatalf("a prior disable of the retired default must carry to its replacement: %#v", cfg.Servers["exa"])
}
}
func TestResolveMCPExplicitSuccessorBeatsLegacyDefaultDisable(t *testing.T) {
// The user disabled the old default but has since explicitly configured exa.
// Their newer, explicit choice wins — the migration must not override it.
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true},"exa":{"disabled":false}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
exa := cfg.Servers["exa"]
if exa.Disabled {
t.Fatalf("an explicit exa entry must survive the legacy-disable migration: %#v", exa)
}
if IsUnconfiguredDefault("exa", exa) {
t.Fatal("an explicitly configured exa is not an untouched default")
}
}
func TestResolveMCPLegacyDefaultLeftEnabledDoesNotDisableSuccessor(t *testing.T) {
// A user who configured firecrawl without disabling it (e.g. added a header)
// never opted out of the default search server, so exa stays enabled.
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer k"}}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
if cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
t.Fatal("only an explicit disable of the retired default should carry over")
}
}
func TestResolveMCPLegacyDefaultDisableIsLiftableByOverride(t *testing.T) {
// The carried-over disable is a user-level decision, not a permanent one:
// `zero mcp enable exa` merges through the CLI override scope, which is the
// one layer allowed to re-enable.
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
enabled := MCPServerConfig{Disabled: false, disabledSet: true}
cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{
UserConfigPath: path,
Overrides: Overrides{MCP: MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]MCPServerConfig{"exa": enabled}}},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
if cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
t.Fatalf("an explicit enable must lift the carried-over disable: %#v", cfg.Servers["exa"])
}
}
func TestResolveMCPLegacyDisableSurvivesProjectReenable(t *testing.T) {
// The project layer is lower-trust and must not lift the carried-over
// user-level disable — the same guard a direct `zero mcp disable exa` gets.
dir := t.TempDir()
userPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(userPath, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
projectPath := filepath.Join(dir, "project.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(projectPath, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"exa":{"disabled":false}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: userPath, ProjectConfigPath: projectPath})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
if !cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
t.Fatal("project config must not re-enable a server the user disabled")
}
}
func TestResolveMCPKeepsRetiredDefaultTransportForPartialEntry(t *testing.T) {
// A user who added an API key to the firecrawl default wrote only the header
// — the seeded default supplied the http type and URL. Retiring the default
// must not strip those out from under them and leave an unusable server.
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer k"}}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
@@ -123,10 +239,55 @@ func TestResolveMCPUserCanOverrideDefaultURLKeepingOtherFields(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
firecrawl := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]
if firecrawl.URL != "http://localhost:3002/mcp" {
t.Fatalf("user override of the default URL did not apply: %#v", firecrawl)
if firecrawl.Type != "http" || firecrawl.URL != "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp" {
t.Fatalf("a partial entry must keep the retired default's transport: %#v", firecrawl)
}
if firecrawl.Type != "http" {
t.Fatalf("override should keep the default's other fields (type), got %#v", firecrawl)
if firecrawl.Headers["Authorization"] != "Bearer k" {
t.Fatalf("the user's own field must still win: %#v", firecrawl)
}
}
func TestResolveMCPDoesNotGraftRetiredDefaultOntoOwnTransport(t *testing.T) {
// A self-hosted firecrawl over stdio is a complete definition the user owns.
// Re-seeding the retired http default under it would produce an http server
// carrying a command, which NormalizeConfig rejects outright.
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"command":"firecrawl-mcp"}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
firecrawl := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]
if firecrawl.Type != "" || firecrawl.URL != "" {
t.Fatalf("an entry naming its own transport must be left alone: %#v", firecrawl)
}
if firecrawl.Command != "firecrawl-mcp" {
t.Fatalf("the user's command must survive: %#v", firecrawl)
}
}
func TestResolveMCPDisabledRetiredEntryStaysReEnableable(t *testing.T) {
// The disable carries to exa, and the retired entry itself keeps a usable
// transport so a later `zero mcp enable firecrawl` does not resolve to a
// server with no type, url, or command.
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
firecrawl := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]
if !firecrawl.Disabled {
t.Fatalf("the retired entry must stay disabled: %#v", firecrawl)
}
if firecrawl.Type != "http" || firecrawl.URL != "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp" {
t.Fatalf("a disabled retired entry should still carry a usable transport: %#v", firecrawl)
}
if !cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
t.Fatal("the disable must still carry to the successor")
}
}
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ func TestResolveMCPExcludeProjectDropsProjectServers(t *testing.T) {
if _, ok := cfg.Servers["user-srv"]; !ok {
t.Fatal("the user server must always be present")
}
if _, ok := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]; !ok {
if _, ok := cfg.Servers["exa"]; !ok {
t.Fatal("the built-in default must always be present")
}
})
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func TestResolveMCPExcludeProjectDropsProjectServers(t *testing.T) {
if _, ok := cfg.Servers["user-srv"]; !ok {
t.Fatal("the user server must survive when the project layer is dropped")
}
if _, ok := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]; !ok {
if _, ok := cfg.Servers["exa"]; !ok {
t.Fatal("the built-in default must survive when the project layer is dropped")
}
})
+5 -1
View File
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ func Resolve(options ResolveOptions) (ResolvedConfig, error) {
}
func ResolveMCP(options ResolveOptions) (MCPConfig, error) {
// Seed Zero's built-in default MCP servers (e.g. keyless Firecrawl for free,
// Seed Zero's built-in default MCP servers (e.g. keyless Exa for free,
// no-setup web search/scrape) BEFORE merging user/project config, so the user
// can override any field or disable a default by writing over it.
cfg := FileConfig{MCP: MCPConfig{Servers: DefaultMCPServers()}}
@@ -194,6 +194,10 @@ func ResolveMCP(options ResolveOptions) (MCPConfig, error) {
// server the user disabled (a user-level disable is sticky, but the user
// scope itself may lift it).
mergeMCPConfig(&cfg.MCP, fileConfig.MCP, true)
// Reconcile config written against a default Zero has since retired,
// here while the user layer is the only one merged — so a carried-over
// disable counts as a user-level decision the project layer cannot lift.
migrateRetiredDefaultMCPServers(&cfg.MCP)
}
// Drop the project layer when the workspace is untrusted, so a cloned repo's
// ./.zero/config.json cannot register (and spawn) MCP servers. Fail-closed:
+9 -2
View File
@@ -119,6 +119,12 @@ type PreferencesConfig struct {
// the user turned idle recaps off. A *bool is its own tri-state, so no
// custom unmarshal is needed (unlike ToolsConfig.DeferThreshold's int).
Recaps *bool `json:"recaps,omitempty"`
// CompactionModel routes compaction summarization calls to this model
// instead of the session's main model (summaries at main-model prices are
// the most expensive recurring event in long runs). Empty = automatic: a
// curated cheap model on official endpoints, the main model elsewhere.
// "main" forces the main model. ZERO_COMPACTION_MODEL overrides.
CompactionModel string `json:"compactionModel,omitempty"`
}
// RecentModelEntry is one provider-qualified model selection recorded in
@@ -151,7 +157,8 @@ type KeyBindingsConfig struct {
ToggleMouse KeyBindingDef `json:"toggleMouse,omitempty"`
// CycleReasoning cycles through reasoning effort levels (default: ctrl+t).
CycleReasoning KeyBindingDef `json:"cycleReasoning,omitempty"`
// TogglePlan toggles the plan panel expansion (default: ctrl+p).
// TogglePlan is retained for configuration compatibility. Plan updates render
// in the transcript and no longer have a persistent panel to toggle.
TogglePlan KeyBindingDef `json:"togglePlan,omitempty"`
// ToggleSidebar toggles the right context sidebar (default: ctrl+b).
ToggleSidebar KeyBindingDef `json:"toggleSidebar,omitempty"`
@@ -464,7 +471,7 @@ type MCPServerConfig struct {
// fields it set or what values they hold. A built-in default seeded by
// DefaultMCPServers() is never unmarshaled from JSON, so it starts false;
// any explicit entry in the user/project file — even one that happens to
// repeat a default's exact field values (e.g. re-declaring firecrawl's
// repeat a default's exact field values (e.g. re-declaring Exa's
// default URL) — sets it true. IsUnconfiguredDefault checks this alongside
// a resolved-value comparison, so redeclaring default values verbatim still
// counts as user-configured.
+9 -66
View File
@@ -5,31 +5,23 @@ import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lockutil"
)
// Cross-process lock tuning. The lock is held only for a single metadata
// read-modify-write (milliseconds), never across a job's exec, so the timeout is
// generous and the stale threshold sits far above any real hold.
// read-modify-write (milliseconds), never across a job's exec, so the timeout
// is generous relative to any real hold.
const (
cronLockTimeout = 10 * time.Second
cronLockStaleAfter = 60 * time.Second
cronLockRetryDelay = 20 * time.Millisecond
)
var cronLockSeq atomic.Uint64
// lockJob takes a cross-process exclusive lock for one job by O_EXCL-creating a
// sibling "<id>.lock" file next to the job directory (so Remove's RemoveAll of
// the job dir never deletes a live lock). It serializes the read-modify-write of
// a job's metadata across concurrent schedulers and commands. The lock file is
// removed on release; a stale lock from a crashed holder (older than
// cronLockStaleAfter) is reclaimed. Wall-clock time.Now is used deliberately
// (not the injectable Store.now) so lock timing never depends on a frozen test
// clock and the stale check compares against real file mtimes.
// lockJob takes a cross-process advisory lock for one job on a stable sibling
// "<id>.lock" file next to the job directory. It serializes the read-modify-write
// of a job's metadata across concurrent schedulers and commands. The kernel
// releases the lock when a holder exits; the file is never renamed or removed.
func (s *Store) lockJob(id string) (func(), error) {
if !validID(id) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid cron job id %q", id)
@@ -38,64 +30,15 @@ func (s *Store) lockJob(id string) (func(), error) {
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(lockPath), 0o700); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
token := fmt.Sprintf("%d-%d-%d", os.Getpid(), time.Now().UnixNano(), cronLockSeq.Add(1))
deadline := time.Now().Add(cronLockTimeout)
for {
f, err := os.OpenFile(lockPath, os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
lock, err := lockutil.TryAcquireFileLock(lockPath)
if err == nil {
// A partial write would leave a lock file without our token, so the
// releaser could never delete it — stranding the lock. Fail closed.
if _, werr := f.WriteString(token); werr != nil {
_ = f.Close()
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cron: write job lock: %w", werr)
}
if cerr := f.Close(); cerr != nil {
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cron: close job lock: %w", cerr)
}
var released bool
return func() {
if released {
return
}
released = true
if data, rerr := os.ReadFile(lockPath); rerr == nil && string(data) == token {
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
}
}, nil
return func() { _ = lock.Release() }, nil
}
// On Windows a concurrent holder's os.Remove leaves the lock file in a
// "delete pending" state, so an O_EXCL create races it with
// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (os.ErrPermission) rather than ErrExist. Treat that
// as contention and retry, exactly like ErrExist — otherwise the lock
// spuriously fails under concurrency on Windows.
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrPermission) {
if !errors.Is(err, lockutil.ErrLockHeld) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cron: acquire job lock: %w", err)
}
// Reclaim a stale lock left by a crashed holder — atomically (H3). A blind
// Remove lets two racers both "reclaim" and recreate, so both hold the lock;
// reclaimStaleLock renames the file aside (only one rename of a given file
// wins) and restores it if it turns out fresh, so a live lock is never deleted
// out from under its holder.
if info, statErr := os.Stat(lockPath); statErr == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) > cronLockStaleAfter {
cleared, rerr := lockutil.ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, token, func(reclaimedPath string) bool {
info, err := os.Stat(reclaimedPath)
return err == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) <= cronLockStaleAfter
})
if rerr != nil {
// Reclaim hit a hard failure: the rename aside failed outright, or a
// live holder's lock could not be put back (the lock path may be
// missing, so re-acquiring would break mutual exclusion). Fail closed
// instead of spinning to the deadline.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cron: reclaim stale job lock: %w", rerr)
}
if cleared {
continue // cleared a genuinely stale lock; retry the O_EXCL create now
}
// Lost the reclaim race (or it was actually fresh) — fall through to the
// bounded wait instead of hot-spinning on a reclaim that never wins (L13).
}
if !time.Now().Before(deadline) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cron: timed out acquiring job lock for %q", id)
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ func TestMutateRemovedJobReturnsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
if !errors.Is(err, ErrJobNotFound) {
t.Fatalf("Mutate on removed job = %v, want ErrJobNotFound", err)
}
// And the lock file left no litter / did not resurrect the job dir.
// The stable advisory-lock file does not resurrect the removed job dir.
if _, gerr := store.Get(job.ID); !errors.Is(gerr, ErrJobNotFound) {
t.Fatalf("job should remain removed, Get = %v", gerr)
}
+35 -67
View File
@@ -3,107 +3,60 @@ package daemon
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lockutil"
)
// Single-instance lock. Mirrors reference-daemon-code-agent-js/supervisor.js's
// lock file: a PID file created with O_EXCL. A second start fails; a STALE lock
// left by a dead daemon (the recorded PID is no longer alive) is reclaimed so the
// daemon recovers from an unclean shutdown without manual cleanup.
// Single-instance lock. The stable PID file carries a kernel advisory lock for
// the daemon's full lifetime. Process exit releases the lock automatically, so
// stale metadata needs no rename/remove recovery protocol.
// ErrAlreadyRunning is returned when a live daemon already holds the lock.
var ErrAlreadyRunning = errors.New("daemon: another instance is already running")
// fileLock is an acquired single-instance lock.
type fileLock struct {
path string
lock *lockutil.FileLock
}
// processAlive reports whether pid is a live process. Implemented per-platform
// (lock_posix.go / lock_windows.go). It is a package var so tests can stub it.
var processAlive = osProcessAlive
// acquireLock takes the single-instance lock at path, reclaiming a stale lock
// whose recorded PID is dead. isAlive overrides the liveness check (tests pass a
// stub); nil uses the real processAlive.
// acquireLock takes the single-instance advisory lock at path. isAlive is used
// only to enrich a contention error with the current holder's PID; the kernel
// lock, not PID metadata, is authoritative.
func acquireLock(path string, isAlive func(pid int) bool) (*fileLock, error) {
if isAlive == nil {
isAlive = processAlive
}
// At most two passes: create, or detect-stale-then-retry once.
for attempt := 0; attempt < 2; attempt++ {
f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
if err == nil {
// A failed PID write would leave a malformed lock file that another
// process reads as stale (unparsable PID) and wrongly reclaims, breaking
// the single-instance guarantee — so on write failure, remove it and fail.
if _, werr := fmt.Fprintf(f, "%d\n", os.Getpid()); werr != nil {
_ = f.Close()
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(path)
return nil, werr
}
if cerr := f.Close(); cerr != nil {
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(path)
return nil, cerr
}
return &fileLock{path: path}, nil
}
if !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrExist) && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrPermission) {
lock, err := lockutil.TryAcquireFileLock(path)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, lockutil.ErrLockHeld) {
return nil, err
}
pid, perr := readPidFile(path)
if perr == nil && pid > 0 && isAlive(pid) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w (pid %d)", ErrAlreadyRunning, pid)
}
// Stale lock (dead PID or unreadable) — reclaim it atomically, then retry the
// O_EXCL create. A blind Remove here races: two daemons starting at once could
// both read the stale PID, both Remove, and then one Removes the OTHER's
// freshly-created lock — leaving both "holding" the single-instance lock.
// reclaimStaleLock renames the file aside so only one racer wins the rename,
// and restores it if a live holder reacquired in the gap (D6).
if _, rerr := reclaimStaleLock(path, isAlive); rerr != nil {
// Reclaim hit a hard failure: the rename aside failed outright, or a
// live holder's lock could not be put back (the lock path may be
// missing, so re-acquiring would break the single-instance guarantee).
// Fail closed instead of spinning to the deadline.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("daemon: reclaim stale lock: %w", rerr)
}
return nil, ErrAlreadyRunning
}
return nil, ErrAlreadyRunning
if err := lock.WriteMetadata([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("%d\n", os.Getpid()))); err != nil {
return nil, errors.Join(err, lock.Release())
}
return &fileLock{lock: lock}, nil
}
// daemonLockSeq makes each reclaim attempt's sidelined filename unique per process.
var daemonLockSeq atomic.Uint64
// reclaimStaleLock atomically reclaims a single-instance lock whose recorded
// PID is dead, via lockutil.ReclaimStaleLock: the lock file is renamed aside
// (only one racer can win the rename) and stolen only if the moved file's PID
// is still dead; a holder that reacquired the lock in the gap between the
// stale check and the rename carries a LIVE pid and is restored rather than
// stolen. Returns true only when a genuinely stale lock was removed. A
// non-nil error means the caller must fail closed instead of re-acquiring
// (see lockutil.ReclaimStaleLock).
func reclaimStaleLock(path string, isAlive func(pid int) bool) (bool, error) {
suffix := fmt.Sprintf("%d-%d", os.Getpid(), daemonLockSeq.Add(1))
return lockutil.ReclaimStaleLock(path, suffix, func(reclaimedPath string) bool {
pid, err := readPidFile(reclaimedPath)
return err == nil && pid > 0 && isAlive(pid)
})
}
// release removes the lock file. Safe to call once. An already-missing lock
// file is not an error (lockutil.RemoveLockFile swallows it on every platform).
// release drops the kernel lock and closes its handle. The stable PID file is
// deliberately retained so contenders always address the same inode.
func (l *fileLock) release() error {
if l == nil || l.path == "" {
if l == nil || l.lock == nil {
return nil
}
return lockutil.RemoveLockFile(l.path)
return l.lock.Release()
}
// readPidFile reads and parses the PID recorded in a lock file.
@@ -112,5 +65,20 @@ func readPidFile(path string) (int, error) {
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(data)))
metadata := strings.TrimSpace(string(data))
if pid, err := strconv.Atoi(metadata); err == nil {
return pid, nil
}
pidText, sequenceText, ok := strings.Cut(metadata, "-")
if !ok || pidText == "" || sequenceText == "" || strings.Contains(sequenceText, "-") {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("daemon: parse lock PID metadata %q", metadata)
}
if _, err := strconv.ParseUint(sequenceText, 10, 64); err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("daemon: parse lock holder sequence: %w", err)
}
pid, err := strconv.Atoi(pidText)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("daemon: parse lock PID: %w", err)
}
return pid, nil
}
+54 -42
View File
@@ -32,27 +32,48 @@ func TestLockSingleInstance(t *testing.T) {
_ = l2.release()
}
func TestLockStaleRecovery(t *testing.T) {
// A PID liveness probe is diagnostic only. Even if it reports the recorded PID
// dead, a contended kernel lock proves that the holder is active and must win.
// The old rename-aside protocol trusted this stale observation and admitted a
// second daemon while the first one was still inside its critical section.
func TestLockDoesNotOverrideKernelHolderWithStalePIDProbe(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "daemon.lock")
// Simulate a stale lock from a crashed daemon: a PID file whose process is
// dead.
first, err := acquireLock(path, func(int) bool { return true })
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first acquireLock: %v", err)
}
defer first.release()
second, err := acquireLock(path, func(int) bool { return false })
if second != nil {
_ = second.release()
}
if !errors.Is(err, ErrAlreadyRunning) {
t.Fatalf("contended acquire with stale PID probe = %v, want ErrAlreadyRunning", err)
}
}
func TestLockIgnoresStaleMetadataWhenKernelLockIsFree(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "daemon.lock")
// A crashed daemon may leave PID metadata behind, but its kernel lock is
// released automatically, so the next daemon can acquire without moving it.
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("4242\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write stale lock: %v", err)
}
dead := func(int) bool { return false }
l, err := acquireLock(path, dead)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stale-lock recovery failed: %v", err)
t.Fatalf("acquire over stale metadata: %v", err)
}
// The lock now records OUR pid, not the stale one.
data, _ := os.ReadFile(path)
if strings.TrimSpace(string(data)) != strconv.Itoa(os.Getpid()) {
t.Fatalf("reclaimed lock pid = %q, want %d", strings.TrimSpace(string(data)), os.Getpid())
t.Fatalf("lock pid = %q, want %d", strings.TrimSpace(string(data)), os.Getpid())
}
_ = l.release()
}
func TestLockReleaseRemovesFile(t *testing.T) {
func TestLockReleaseKeepsStableFile(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "daemon.lock")
l, err := acquireLock(path, func(int) bool { return true })
if err != nil {
@@ -61,46 +82,37 @@ func TestLockReleaseRemovesFile(t *testing.T) {
if err := l.release(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("release: %v", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(path); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("lock file still present after release: %v", err)
if _, err := os.Stat(path); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("release removed stable lock file: %v", err)
}
}
func TestReclaimStaleLockRemovesDeadHolder(t *testing.T) {
func TestReadPidFileMetadataFormats(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "daemon.lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("4242\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write stale lock: %v", err)
}
if ok, err := reclaimStaleLock(path, func(int) bool { return false }); err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("reclaimStaleLock must report a genuinely stale (dead-PID) lock reclaimed (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(path); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("a reclaimed stale lock must be removed, stat = %v", err)
}
}
func TestReclaimStaleLockRestoresLiveHolder(t *testing.T) {
// If a holder reacquires the lock in the gap between the stale check and the
// rename, the moved file carries a LIVE pid; reclaim must restore it untouched
// rather than steal it — otherwise two daemons both "hold" the lock (D6).
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "daemon.lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("4242\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write lock: %v", err)
}
if ok, err := reclaimStaleLock(path, func(int) bool { return true }); err != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("reclaimStaleLock must NOT report a live-PID lock reclaimed (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("live lock must be restored in place, read = %v", err)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(string(data)) != "4242" {
t.Fatalf("restored lock content = %q, want %q (unchanged)", strings.TrimSpace(string(data)), "4242")
}
// No sidelined ".stale" leftovers.
matches, _ := filepath.Glob(path + ".stale.*")
if len(matches) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("reclaim left sidelined files: %v", matches)
for _, test := range []struct {
name string
metadata string
wantPID int
wantErr bool
}{
{name: "legacy PID", metadata: "4242\n", wantPID: 4242},
{name: "PID and holder sequence", metadata: "4242-7\n", wantPID: 4242},
{name: "missing sequence", metadata: "4242-", wantErr: true},
{name: "non-numeric sequence", metadata: "4242-next", wantErr: true},
{name: "extra component", metadata: "4242-7-8", wantErr: true},
} {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(test.metadata), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got, err := readPidFile(path)
if (err != nil) != test.wantErr {
t.Fatalf("readPidFile() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, test.wantErr)
}
if !test.wantErr && got != test.wantPID {
t.Fatalf("readPidFile() = %d, want %d", got, test.wantPID)
}
})
}
}
+6 -2
View File
@@ -124,12 +124,16 @@ func TestServerEndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after shutdown")
}
// Socket, status, and lock files are removed on exit.
for _, p := range []string{paths.Socket, paths.Status, paths.Lock} {
// Runtime endpoints are removed on exit. The advisory lock file remains as
// a stable inode, but the kernel lock on it has been released.
for _, p := range []string{paths.Socket, paths.Status} {
if _, err := os.Stat(p); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("file %s not cleaned up after shutdown: %v", p, err)
}
}
if _, err := os.Stat(paths.Lock); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stable lock file missing after shutdown: %v", err)
}
}
func TestServerSecondInstanceFails(t *testing.T) {
+10 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,16 @@ import (
"strings"
)
const PolicyVersion = 1
// PolicyVersion is the version of the approval policy that recorded grants were
// evaluated under. Bump it whenever a change narrows what may be approved: the
// grant store then backs the file up, keeps deny grants, invalidates prior
// approvals, and tells the user once, instead of silently honoring approvals
// that the current rules would have refused.
//
// v2 tightened command-prefix validation so a launcher spelled with a version
// or an executable extension ("python3.11", "python.exe") can no longer be
// approved as an ordinary command.
const PolicyVersion = 2
type Origin string
+157 -29
View File
@@ -3,13 +3,93 @@
package execution
import (
"errors"
"os"
"os/exec"
"strconv"
"strings"
"syscall"
"testing"
"time"
)
// requireProcessState refuses to let a broken ps pipeline masquerade as passing
// coverage. Every test in this file proves something about zombie detection,
// and every one of those proofs is read out of ps — so if ps cannot report
// state, the tests verify nothing whatever they do next.
//
// The old code answered that with t.Skip, which is indistinguishable from
// success in CI output. This probes BOTH ps pipelines against this test
// process, which is by definition alive and not a zombie, so a working ps must
// report a live state for it. Failing that:
//
// - In CI (or with ZERO_REQUIRE_PS=1) it is a hard failure. ps is present on
// every image used today, so its absence means the pipeline regressed and
// that has to surface immediately rather than as skipped-green.
// - Elsewhere it stays a skip, so a contributor on an exotic box is not
// blocked by an environment the project does not claim to support.
//
// This only covers "ps cannot report state at all". Once it passes, a later
// failure to observe an EXPECTED state is a real defect, and the tests below
// treat it as one.
func requireProcessState(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
self := os.Getpid()
var reasons []string
// The production path: ps -A -o pid=,pgid=,stat=, parsed by
// processTableStateMatches. This is what signalTargetRunning consults.
if running, ok := processIsRunning(self); !ok || !running {
reasons = append(reasons, "the process table read used by signalTargetRunning reported no live state for this test process")
}
// This file's independent oracle: ps -o stat= -p <pid>. It is deliberately
// NOT the production parser, so a regression in that parser cannot hide by
// breaking the test's own precondition check in the same way.
if zombie, ok := processIsZombie(self); !ok || zombie {
reasons = append(reasons, "the per-PID state read used by this test file reported no live state for this test process")
}
if len(reasons) == 0 {
return
}
reason := "cannot read process state, so ps-based zombie detection is unverifiable here: " + strings.Join(reasons, "; ")
if requireWorkingPS() {
t.Fatal(reason + " — failing rather than skipping because CI (or ZERO_REQUIRE_PS) is set, where ps is expected to work")
}
t.Skip(reason)
}
// requireWorkingPS reports whether an unusable ps must fail the run instead of
// skipping it. ZERO_REQUIRE_PS lets a developer opt into the strict behavior
// locally to reproduce what CI does.
func requireWorkingPS() bool {
if strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ZERO_REQUIRE_PS")) != "" {
return true
}
return strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("CI")) != ""
}
// awaitZombie blocks until pid is an unreaped zombie. The caller must not have
// waited on the child, so the zombie is a stable state rather than a race: it
// persists until something reaps it. Failing to reach it therefore means the
// child never exited or ps stopped reporting its state, and both are defects
// rather than reasons to skip.
func awaitZombie(t *testing.T, pid int) {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for {
zombie, ok := processIsZombie(pid)
if ok && zombie {
return
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("pid %d left the process table without being reaped; this test never waited on it, so its zombie row must persist", pid)
}
t.Fatalf("pid %d did not reach the zombie state within 5s", pid)
}
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
}
}
// TestTerminateProcessTreeTreatsZombieGroupAsExited is the regression test for
// counting unreaped processes as alive: kill(2) with signal 0 succeeds for a
// zombie, so a group whose only remaining member is waiting to be reaped used to
@@ -17,6 +97,8 @@ import (
// as "did not exit after SIGKILL" — a spurious cleanup failure whose timing
// depended on when the reaper ran.
func TestTerminateProcessTreeTreatsZombieGroupAsExited(t *testing.T) {
requireProcessState(t)
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "exit 0")
ConfigureProcessGroup(cmd)
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
@@ -27,23 +109,59 @@ func TestTerminateProcessTreeTreatsZombieGroupAsExited(t *testing.T) {
// is exactly the state a terminated tree passes through.
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cmd.Wait() })
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for {
if zombie, ok := processIsZombie(pid); ok && zombie {
break
awaitZombie(t, pid)
// Whether a zombie-only group can be signalled is a KERNEL difference, not a
// ps one. On Linux the zombie still occupies the process table and
// kill(-pid, 0) succeeds, so signalTargetRunning goes on to consult ps —
// which is the branch this test was written for. Darwin returns EPERM for
// the same call, so signalTargetRunning short-circuits on the kill and never
// reaches the ps check.
//
// The OUTCOME is identical and is asserted on every platform below. Only the
// branch that produces it differs, so record that instead of skipping the
// whole test (which would drop Darwin's coverage of the outcome) or failing
// it (which would report a supported platform as broken). Any errno other
// than EPERM means the group is not in the state this test needs.
psPathReachable := true
if err := syscall.Kill(-pid, syscall.Signal(0)); err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, syscall.EPERM) {
t.Fatalf("zombie group %d is unsignalable with an unexpected error (%v); the zombie case is not present, so nothing below would be meaningful", pid, err)
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Skip("child did not reach the zombie state; ps output is unavailable in this environment")
}
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
}
if syscall.Kill(-pid, syscall.Signal(0)) != nil {
t.Skip("the zombie group is no longer signalable; cannot exercise the case")
psPathReachable = false
t.Logf("kernel refuses to signal zombie-only group %d (EPERM); signalTargetRunning answers from kill(2) rather than ps here, so the ps-based zombie check is asserted directly on platforms that allow the signal", pid)
}
// Where the signal IS permitted, pin the ps-based check itself. This is the
// regression #774 was about, and asserting only signalTargetRunning would
// let a ps-side regression hide behind the kill result.
if psPathReachable {
running, ok := processGroupHasRunningMember(pid)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("process group %d has no rows while its zombie is unreaped; ps stopped reporting the group rather than the group being gone", pid)
}
if running {
t.Fatal("the ps-based group check must not report a zombie-only group as running")
}
}
// Valid on every platform: whichever branch answers, a zombie-only group is
// not running. On a kernel that refuses the signal this is the whole of the
// coverage, and it is more than the previous skip provided.
if signalTargetRunning(-pid) {
t.Fatal("a group holding only a zombie must not count as running")
}
if !psPathReachable {
// terminateTarget's own kill(2) would hit the same EPERM and be returned
// as a cleanup error, so this assertion cannot be made where the kernel
// refuses the signal. That may be a real gap in TerminateProcessTree on
// such a platform rather than a test limitation — a zombie-only tree is
// already exited and should terminate cleanly — but confirming and
// changing that is a production fix, not this test's business.
t.Log("skipping the TerminateProcessTree assertion: its kill(2) would hit the same EPERM as the probe above")
return
}
if err := TerminateProcessTree(pid, 50*time.Millisecond, 10*time.Millisecond); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TerminateProcessTree on an already-exited tree: %v", err)
}
@@ -53,6 +171,8 @@ func TestTerminateProcessTreeTreatsZombieGroupAsExited(t *testing.T) {
// a live member must still be seen as running and then actually stopped, so the
// zombie tolerance above cannot degrade into ignoring real processes.
func TestTerminateProcessTreeStopsRunningGroup(t *testing.T) {
requireProcessState(t)
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "sleep 30")
ConfigureProcessGroup(cmd)
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
@@ -67,7 +187,15 @@ func TestTerminateProcessTreeStopsRunningGroup(t *testing.T) {
if err := TerminateProcessTree(pid, time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TerminateProcessTree: %v", err)
}
if running, ok := processGroupHasRunningMember(pid); ok && running {
// ok reports whether ANY row for this group was found. This test never waits
// on the child, so its zombie row must still be there — an unknown state
// means ps stopped answering, not that the group is gone. Treating that as a
// pass is what let this assertion succeed without checking anything.
running, ok := processGroupHasRunningMember(pid)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("process group %d has no rows after termination; the unreaped child's zombie row must persist, so the group's state is undeterminable rather than clean", pid)
}
if running {
t.Fatal("the group still has a running member after termination")
}
}
@@ -82,6 +210,8 @@ func TestTerminateProcessTreeStopsRunningGroup(t *testing.T) {
// "unknown" resulted every time, and signalTargetRunning conservatively (and
// incorrectly) treated a zombie individual-PID target as still running.
func TestSignalTargetRunningTreatsZombieIndividualPIDAsExited(t *testing.T) {
requireProcessState(t)
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "exit 0")
// Deliberately do NOT call ConfigureProcessGroup: the child inherits this
// test process's group, so it is not its own leader and processSignalTarget
@@ -92,40 +222,38 @@ func TestSignalTargetRunningTreatsZombieIndividualPIDAsExited(t *testing.T) {
pid := cmd.Process.Pid
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cmd.Wait() })
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for {
if zombie, ok := processIsZombie(pid); ok && zombie {
break
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Skip("child did not reach the zombie state; ps output is unavailable in this environment")
}
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
}
awaitZombie(t, pid)
target, err := processSignalTarget(pid)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("processSignalTarget: %v", err)
}
// The child inherited this process's group, so its PGID is this process's
// PID and can never equal its own PID. A negative target here would mean
// processSignalTarget misread the group, which is the very thing the
// individual-PID fallback exists to handle.
if target != pid {
t.Skip("child unexpectedly became its own group leader; cannot exercise the individual-PID fallback")
t.Fatalf("processSignalTarget(%d) = %d, want the individual PID: the child inherited this process's group, so it is not its own leader", pid, target)
}
if signalTargetRunning(target) {
t.Fatal("a zombie individual-PID target must not count as running")
}
}
// processIsZombie reports a process's zombie state via ps. ok is false when the
// state could not be read.
// processIsZombie reports a process's zombie state via ps. It is deliberately a
// separate, per-PID ps invocation rather than a reuse of the production
// process-table parser: these tests assert what that parser concludes, so
// borrowing it to establish their own preconditions would let one regression
// silence both sides at once.
//
// ok is false when no state could be read, which after requireProcessState has
// passed means the process left the table rather than that ps is broken.
func processIsZombie(pid int) (zombie bool, ok bool) {
output, err := exec.Command("ps", "-o", "stat=", "-p", strconv.Itoa(pid)).Output()
if err != nil {
return false, false
}
state := string(output)
for len(state) > 0 && (state[0] == ' ' || state[0] == '\n' || state[0] == '\t') {
state = state[1:]
}
state := strings.TrimLeft(string(output), " \n\t")
if state == "" {
return false, false
}
+9 -63
View File
@@ -5,93 +5,39 @@ import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lockutil"
)
// Cross-process lock tuning for the audit log. The lock is held only across a
// single read-then-append (milliseconds), so the timeout is generous and the
// stale threshold sits far above any real hold.
// single read-then-append (milliseconds), so the timeout is generous relative
// to any real hold.
const (
auditLockTimeout = 10 * time.Second
auditLockStaleAfter = 60 * time.Second
auditLockRetryDelay = 20 * time.Millisecond
)
var auditLockSeq atomic.Uint64
// lockAudit takes a cross-process exclusive lock on the audit log by
// O_EXCL-creating a sibling "<auditPath>.lock" file (removed on release). It makes
// lockAudit takes a cross-process advisory lock on the audit log through a
// stable sibling "<auditPath>.lock" file. It makes
// the lastSequence()+append in append() atomic across processes; the audit log is
// a shared global file, so without it two processes can read the same last
// sequence and write duplicate numbers. A stale lock from a crashed holder (older
// than auditLockStaleAfter) is reclaimed. Wall-clock time is used deliberately so
// lock timing never depends on the store's injectable clock and the stale check
// compares against real file mtimes. This mirrors internal/cron/lock.go and
// internal/oauth/lock.go. Uses internal/lockutil for lock restore and reclaim.
// sequence and write duplicate numbers. Kernel lock lifetime provides crash
// recovery without moving or deleting the lock path.
func (store *AuditStore) lockAudit() (func(), error) {
lockPath := store.auditPath + ".lock"
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(lockPath), 0o700); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
token := fmt.Sprintf("%d-%d-%d", os.Getpid(), time.Now().UnixNano(), auditLockSeq.Add(1))
deadline := time.Now().Add(auditLockTimeout)
for {
f, err := os.OpenFile(lockPath, os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
lock, err := lockutil.TryAcquireFileLock(lockPath)
if err == nil {
// A partial write would leave a lock file without our token, so the
// releaser could never delete it — stranding the lock. Fail closed.
if _, werr := f.WriteString(token); werr != nil {
_ = f.Close()
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("hooks: write audit lock: %w", werr)
}
if cerr := f.Close(); cerr != nil {
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("hooks: close audit lock: %w", cerr)
}
var released bool
return func() {
if released {
return
}
released = true
if data, rerr := os.ReadFile(lockPath); rerr == nil && string(data) == token {
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
}
}, nil
return func() { _ = lock.Release() }, nil
}
// On Windows a concurrent holder's os.Remove leaves the lock file in a
// "delete pending" state, so an O_EXCL create races it with
// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (os.ErrPermission) rather than ErrExist. Treat both
// as contention and retry.
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrPermission) {
if !errors.Is(err, lockutil.ErrLockHeld) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("hooks: acquire audit lock: %w", err)
}
// Reclaim a stale lock left by a crashed holder — atomically (H3). A blind
// Remove lets two racers both reclaim + recreate and so both hold the lock;
// reclaimStaleLock renames the file aside (only one rename wins) and restores
// it if it turns out fresh, so a live lock is never deleted out from under it.
if info, statErr := os.Stat(lockPath); statErr == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) > auditLockStaleAfter {
cleared, rerr := lockutil.ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, token, func(reclaimedPath string) bool {
info, err := os.Stat(reclaimedPath)
return err == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) <= auditLockStaleAfter
})
if rerr != nil {
// Reclaim hit a hard failure: the rename aside failed outright, or a
// live holder's lock could not be put back (the lock path may be
// missing, so re-acquiring would break mutual exclusion). Fail closed
// instead of spinning to the deadline.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("hooks: reclaim stale audit lock: %w", rerr)
}
if cleared {
continue
}
// Lost the reclaim race (or it was actually fresh) — fall through to the
// bounded wait rather than hot-spinning on a reclaim that never wins.
}
if !time.Now().Before(deadline) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("hooks: timed out acquiring audit lock")
}
+111 -48
View File
@@ -1,64 +1,127 @@
// Package lockutil provides the platform-specific file primitives behind the
// O_EXCL lock files in cron, daemon, hooks, oauth, and swarm: a no-overwrite
// restore for locks that were sidelined during a stale-reclaim attempt, and a
// lock file remover with one cross-platform contract (missing files are a
// no-op; Windows retries transient sharing violations).
// Package lockutil provides cross-process advisory file locks used by cron,
// daemon, hooks, oauth, and swarm. Locks are held by the kernel for the lifetime
// of an open file handle, so process exit releases them without a stale-file
// reclaim protocol. The lock file itself is stable: holders never rename or
// remove it while another process may still have its inode locked.
package lockutil
import (
"io"
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
)
// restoreByCopy restores reclaimed to path without overwriting an existing
// path, as a fallback for when the platform's primary no-replace primitive
// (hard link on POSIX, MoveFileEx on Windows) fails for a reason other than
// the destination existing. It stages a full copy under a private name next
// to reclaimed and publishes it to path with publish (the same no-replace
// primitive the caller's platform uses for the primary restore), so path
// never appears in a partially-copied state: a crash between staging and
// publish leaves path exactly as it was (missing or, if a competing holder
// created it, untouched), never a truncated file that a PID/content-based
// liveness check could mistake for dead. Leaving path missing here would let
// the next O_EXCL create succeed while the sidelined holder is still live,
// breaking mutual exclusion. publish keeps the no-overwrite guarantee: a new
// holder that appeared in the meantime wins and this returns os.ErrExist. The
// copy resets the lock's mtime to now, which only makes the restored lock
// look fresher; that is safe, since it is being handed back to a live holder.
func restoreByCopy(reclaimed, path string, publish func(from, to string) error) error {
staged := reclaimed + ".copy"
src, err := os.Open(reclaimed)
var (
// ErrLockHeld reports that another process or goroutine currently holds the
// advisory lock. Callers may wait and retry until their own deadline.
ErrLockHeld = errors.New("lockutil: lock is held")
// ErrLockReleased reports an attempt to update metadata after Release.
ErrLockReleased = errors.New("lockutil: lock is released")
)
var holderSequence atomic.Uint64
// FileLock is an exclusive advisory lock held through an open file handle.
// Release is idempotent. The lock path remains on disk after release; deleting
// or replacing it would let different processes lock different inodes.
type FileLock struct {
mu sync.Mutex
file *os.File
state platformLockState
released bool
releaseErr error
}
// TryAcquireFileLock attempts to take an exclusive advisory lock without
// waiting. A contended lock returns ErrLockHeld. The kernel releases a lock if
// its process exits, so an old unlocked file never needs stale reclamation.
func TryAcquireFileLock(path string) (*FileLock, error) {
return TryAcquireFileLockAt(filepath.Dir(path), path)
}
// TryAcquireFileLockAt attempts to lock path while confining every component
// below root to a handle-relative traversal. root is the caller's trusted
// boundary and may itself be reached through a legitimate link; links and
// reparse points below it are rejected before metadata can be written.
func TryAcquireFileLockAt(root, path string) (*FileLock, error) {
if root == "" {
return nil, errors.New("lockutil: lock root is empty")
}
relative, err := filepath.Rel(root, path)
if err != nil {
return err
return nil, fmt.Errorf("lockutil: resolve lock path relative to root: %w", err)
}
dst, err := os.OpenFile(staged, os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
relative = filepath.Clean(relative)
if relative == "." || relative == ".." || filepath.IsAbs(relative) || strings.HasPrefix(relative, ".."+string(filepath.Separator)) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("lockutil: lock path %q escapes root %q", path, root)
}
file, err := openLockFileAt(root, relative, path)
if err != nil {
_ = src.Close()
return err
return nil, fmt.Errorf("lockutil: open lock file: %w", err)
}
_, err = io.Copy(dst, src)
// Close the source before removing anything below: Go opens files without
// FILE_SHARE_DELETE on Windows, so deleting reclaimed or staged while src
// is open would fail with a sharing violation.
_ = src.Close()
state, contended, err := tryLockFile(file)
if err != nil {
_ = dst.Close()
_ = os.Remove(staged)
return err
_ = file.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("lockutil: acquire advisory lock: %w", err)
}
if err := dst.Close(); err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(staged)
return err
if contended {
_ = file.Close()
return nil, ErrLockHeld
}
if err := publish(staged, path); err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(staged)
return err
lock := &FileLock{file: file, state: state}
metadata := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%d-%d\n", os.Getpid(), holderSequence.Add(1)))
if err := lock.WriteMetadata(metadata); err != nil {
return nil, errors.Join(err, lock.Release())
}
return lock, nil
}
// WriteMetadata replaces the diagnostic contents of the lock file while the
// caller holds it. Metadata does not establish ownership; the kernel lock does.
func (lock *FileLock) WriteMetadata(data []byte) error {
if lock == nil {
return ErrLockReleased
}
lock.mu.Lock()
defer lock.mu.Unlock()
if lock.released || lock.file == nil {
return ErrLockReleased
}
if err := lock.file.Truncate(0); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("lockutil: truncate lock metadata: %w", err)
}
if _, err := lock.file.Seek(0, 0); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("lockutil: seek lock metadata: %w", err)
}
if _, err := lock.file.Write(data); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("lockutil: write lock metadata: %w", err)
}
// publish may leave staged behind (a hard-link publish keeps both names),
// so remove it explicitly; a move-based publish already made this a no-op.
_ = os.Remove(staged)
// The lock is back at path, so the restore has succeeded; failing to clean
// up the sidelined name must not be reported as a failed restore.
_ = RemoveLockFile(reclaimed)
return nil
}
// Release unlocks and closes the held file handle. It deliberately leaves the
// stable lock file in place. Repeated calls return the first release result.
func (lock *FileLock) Release() error {
if lock == nil {
return nil
}
lock.mu.Lock()
defer lock.mu.Unlock()
if lock.released {
return lock.releaseErr
}
lock.released = true
unlockErr := unlockFile(lock.file, &lock.state)
closeErr := lock.file.Close()
lock.file = nil
if err := errors.Join(unlockErr, closeErr); err != nil {
lock.releaseErr = fmt.Errorf("lockutil: release advisory lock: %w", err)
}
return lock.releaseErr
}
+82 -33
View File
@@ -4,43 +4,92 @@ package lockutil
import (
"errors"
"io/fs"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// RestoreLockFile restores a sidelined lock file on non-Windows platforms. It
// uses os.Link so a competing lock created at path in the meantime wins: the
// link fails with os.ErrExist instead of overwriting it. If the link fails for
// any other reason (hardlink-incapable filesystems such as FAT or some
// FUSE/network mounts, ENOSPC, EPERM), it falls back to an O_EXCL copy rather
// than leaving path missing and the live holder's lock stranded in reclaimed.
// Once the lock is back at path the restore has succeeded, so a failed cleanup
// of the sidelined name is not reported as an error; the leftover file is
// invisible to the lock protocol.
func RestoreLockFile(reclaimed, path string) error {
err := os.Link(reclaimed, path)
type platformLockState struct{}
func openLockFileAt(root, relative, displayPath string) (_ *os.File, resultErr error) {
parentFD, err := unix.Open(root, unix.O_RDONLY|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open lock root: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if parentFD >= 0 {
resultErr = errors.Join(resultErr, unix.Close(parentFD))
}
}()
components := strings.Split(filepath.Clean(relative), string(filepath.Separator))
for _, component := range components[:len(components)-1] {
nextFD, openErr := unix.Openat(parentFD, component, unix.O_RDONLY|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC|unix.O_NOFOLLOW, 0)
if openErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open lock path component %q: %w", component, openErr)
}
if closeErr := unix.Close(parentFD); closeErr != nil {
_ = unix.Close(nextFD)
parentFD = -1
return nil, fmt.Errorf("close lock path component: %w", closeErr)
}
parentFD = nextFD
}
name := components[len(components)-1]
fd := -1
// Darwin can transiently return ENOENT when many callers race to create the
// same O_NOFOLLOW entry. The bound parent handle cannot be redirected, so a
// bounded retry preserves first-use contention without weakening no-follow.
for attempt := 0; attempt < 10; attempt++ {
fd, err = unix.Openat(parentFD, name, unix.O_CREAT|unix.O_RDWR|unix.O_CLOEXEC|unix.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)
if !errors.Is(err, unix.ENOENT) {
break
}
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
file := os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), displayPath)
if file == nil {
_ = unix.Close(fd)
return nil, errors.New("convert lock handle to file")
}
var stat unix.Stat_t
if err := unix.Fstat(fd, &stat); err != nil {
return nil, errors.Join(fmt.Errorf("inspect lock file: %w", err), file.Close())
}
if stat.Mode&unix.S_IFMT != unix.S_IFREG {
return nil, errors.Join(errors.New("refusing non-regular lock file"), file.Close())
}
if stat.Nlink != 1 {
return nil, errors.Join(errors.New("refusing multiply-linked lock file"), file.Close())
}
if err := unix.Close(parentFD); err != nil {
parentFD = -1
return nil, errors.Join(fmt.Errorf("close lock parent: %w", err), file.Close())
}
parentFD = -1
return file, nil
}
func tryLockFile(file *os.File) (platformLockState, bool, error) {
err := unix.Flock(int(file.Fd()), unix.LOCK_EX|unix.LOCK_NB)
if err == nil {
_ = RemoveLockFile(reclaimed)
return platformLockState{}, false, nil
}
if errors.Is(err, unix.EWOULDBLOCK) || errors.Is(err, unix.EAGAIN) {
return platformLockState{}, true, nil
}
return platformLockState{}, false, err
}
func unlockFile(file *os.File, _ *platformLockState) error {
if file == nil {
return nil
}
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
return err
}
return restoreByCopy(reclaimed, path, os.Link)
}
// isReclaimContended reports whether a failed rename-aside of a suspected
// stale lock means it was lost to a racer rather than a hard failure. POSIX
// rename has no contention errno (a lost race surfaces only as ENOENT, which
// ReclaimStaleLock already treats as benign), so nothing extra is benign here.
func isReclaimContended(error) bool { return false }
// RemoveLockFile removes a lock file on non-Windows platforms. Removing an
// already-missing file reports nil, matching the Windows implementation, so
// callers see one cross-platform contract.
func RemoveLockFile(path string) error {
if err := os.Remove(path); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
return err
}
return nil
return unix.Flock(int(file.Fd()), unix.LOCK_UN)
}
+205 -101
View File
@@ -1,116 +1,220 @@
package lockutil
import (
"bufio"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
)
func TestRestoreLockFile(t *testing.T) {
tempDir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(tempDir, "lock")
reclaimed := filepath.Join(tempDir, "lock.stale.token")
// 1. Successful restore when target does not exist
if err := os.WriteFile(reclaimed, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := RestoreLockFile(reclaimed, path); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RestoreLockFile failed: %v", err)
}
if data, err := os.ReadFile(path); err != nil || string(data) != "token" {
t.Fatalf("restored lock content = %q, err %v; want %q intact", data, err, "token")
}
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("expected sidelined lock to be cleaned up/removed: %v", err)
}
// 2. Fail when target already exists (prevent overwrite)
if err := os.WriteFile(reclaimed, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("competing"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err := RestoreLockFile(reclaimed, path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected RestoreLockFile to fail when target exists")
}
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected os.ErrExist, got: %v", err)
}
// The sidelined lock must still exist on failure, and the competing lock
// must be untouched.
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected sidelined lock to still exist: %v", err)
}
if data, _ := os.ReadFile(path); string(data) != "competing" {
t.Fatalf("competing lock was clobbered: %q", data)
}
}
func TestRestoreByCopy(t *testing.T) {
tempDir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(tempDir, "lock")
reclaimed := filepath.Join(tempDir, "lock.stale.token")
// 1. Restores content and cleans up the sidelined file when the target is
// free (the fallback taken when the platform's no-replace primitive fails
// for a reason other than the destination existing).
if err := os.WriteFile(reclaimed, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := restoreByCopy(reclaimed, path, os.Link); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("restoreByCopy failed: %v", err)
}
if data, err := os.ReadFile(path); err != nil || string(data) != "token" {
t.Fatalf("restored lock content = %q, err %v; want %q intact", data, err, "token")
}
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected sidelined lock to be cleaned up after copy: %v", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed + ".copy"); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected staged copy to be cleaned up: %v", err)
}
// 2. Keeps the no-overwrite guarantee: a competing lock at the target wins
// and the sidelined lock survives for the caller's ErrExist cleanup.
if err := os.WriteFile(reclaimed, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("competing"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := restoreByCopy(reclaimed, path, os.Link); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected os.ErrExist when target exists, got: %v", err)
}
if data, _ := os.ReadFile(path); string(data) != "competing" {
t.Fatalf("competing lock was clobbered: %q", data)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected sidelined lock to still exist: %v", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed + ".copy"); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected staged copy to be cleaned up after a failed publish: %v", err)
}
}
func TestRemoveLockFile(t *testing.T) {
func TestFileLockSerializesAndKeepsStablePath(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
first, err := TryAcquireFileLock(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first acquire: %v", err)
}
if err := RemoveLockFile(path); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RemoveLockFile failed: %v", err)
firstInfo, err := os.Stat(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stat first lock path: %v", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(path); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected lock file to be removed: %v", err)
if _, err := TryAcquireFileLock(path); !errors.Is(err, ErrLockHeld) {
t.Fatalf("contended acquire = %v, want ErrLockHeld", err)
}
// Removing an already-missing lock file is a no-op on every platform.
if err := RemoveLockFile(path); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RemoveLockFile on a missing file = %v, want nil", err)
if err := first.Release(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("release first: %v", err)
}
releasedInfo, err := os.Stat(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("release removed stable lock path: %v", err)
}
if !os.SameFile(firstInfo, releasedInfo) {
t.Fatal("release replaced the stable lock file")
}
second, err := TryAcquireFileLock(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("acquire after release: %v", err)
}
secondInfo, err := os.Stat(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stat second lock path: %v", err)
}
if !os.SameFile(firstInfo, secondInfo) {
t.Fatal("reacquire used a different lock file")
}
if err := second.Release(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("release second: %v", err)
}
if err := second.Release(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("idempotent release: %v", err)
}
}
func TestFileLockMetadata(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
lock, err := TryAcquireFileLock(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := lock.WriteMetadata([]byte("holder\n")); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write metadata: %v", err)
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil || string(data) != "holder\n" {
t.Fatalf("metadata = %q, err %v", data, err)
}
if err := lock.Release(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := lock.WriteMetadata(nil); !errors.Is(err, ErrLockReleased) {
t.Fatalf("write after release = %v, want ErrLockReleased", err)
}
}
func TestFileLockConcurrentFirstAcquisition(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
const contenders = 200
start := make(chan struct{})
results := make(chan error, contenders)
locks := make(chan *FileLock, contenders)
var ready sync.WaitGroup
ready.Add(contenders)
for range contenders {
go func() {
ready.Done()
<-start
lock, err := TryAcquireFileLock(path)
if lock != nil {
locks <- lock
}
results <- err
}()
}
ready.Wait()
close(start)
acquired := 0
for range contenders {
err := <-results
switch {
case err == nil:
acquired++
case !errors.Is(err, ErrLockHeld):
t.Errorf("concurrent first acquire: %v", err)
}
}
close(locks)
for lock := range locks {
if err := lock.Release(); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
}
if acquired != 1 {
t.Fatalf("concurrent first acquire: got %d holders, want 1", acquired)
}
}
func TestFileLockRefusesMultiplyLinkedEntry(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
target := filepath.Join(dir, "target")
lockPath := filepath.Join(dir, "lock")
const sentinel = "do not overwrite"
if err := os.WriteFile(target, []byte(sentinel), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.Link(target, lockPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create redirected hard link: %v", err)
}
if lock, err := TryAcquireFileLock(lockPath); err == nil {
_ = lock.Release()
t.Fatal("TryAcquireFileLock accepted a multiply-linked entry")
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(target)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if string(data) != sentinel {
t.Fatalf("redirected target was modified: %q", data)
}
}
func TestFileLockAtRejectsEscapingPath(t *testing.T) {
base := t.TempDir()
outside := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(base), "outside.lock")
if lock, err := TryAcquireFileLockAt(base, outside); err == nil {
_ = lock.Release()
t.Fatal("TryAcquireFileLockAt accepted a path outside its root")
}
if _, err := os.Stat(outside); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("escaping path was created: %v", err)
}
}
// TestFileLockReleasedByProcessExit proves crash recovery is provided by the
// kernel lock lifetime. The child exits without calling Release; the next
// process can then lock the same persistent file without moving or deleting it.
func TestFileLockReleasedByProcessExit(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
cmd := exec.Command(os.Args[0], "-test.run=^TestFileLockHelperProcess$")
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "ZERO_LOCKUTIL_HELPER=1", "ZERO_LOCKUTIL_PATH="+path)
stdout, err := cmd.StdoutPipe()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stdin, err := cmd.StdinPipe()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cmd.Stderr = os.Stderr
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ready, err := bufio.NewReader(stdout).ReadString('\n')
if err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(ready) != "ready" {
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
_ = cmd.Wait()
t.Fatalf("helper readiness = %q, err %v", ready, err)
}
if _, err := TryAcquireFileLock(path); !errors.Is(err, ErrLockHeld) {
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
_ = cmd.Wait()
t.Fatalf("acquire while helper holds lock = %v, want ErrLockHeld", err)
}
if err := stdin.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := cmd.Wait(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("helper exit: %v", err)
}
lock, err := TryAcquireFileLock(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("acquire after helper exit: %v", err)
}
if err := lock.Release(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestFileLockHelperProcess(t *testing.T) {
if os.Getenv("ZERO_LOCKUTIL_HELPER") != "1" {
return
}
lock, err := TryAcquireFileLock(os.Getenv("ZERO_LOCKUTIL_PATH"))
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
os.Exit(2)
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(os.Stdout, "ready"); err != nil {
os.Exit(3)
}
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, os.Stdin)
runtime.KeepAlive(lock) // deliberately exit without Release
}
+183 -58
View File
@@ -4,77 +4,202 @@ package lockutil
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"syscall"
"time"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"unsafe"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// RestoreLockFile restores a sidelined lock file on Windows. It moves the file
// with a no-replace MoveFileEx so a competing lock created at path in the
// meantime wins: the move fails with os.ErrExist instead of overwriting it. If
// the move fails for any other reason (ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION or
// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED under concurrent access to the file), it falls back to
// an O_EXCL copy rather than leaving path missing and the live holder's lock
// stranded in reclaimed.
func RestoreLockFile(reclaimed, path string) error {
err := moveFileNoReplace(reclaimed, path)
if err == nil || errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
return err
}
return restoreByCopy(reclaimed, path, moveFileNoReplace)
type platformLockState struct {
overlapped windows.Overlapped
}
// moveFileNoReplace renames from to to, failing if to already exists. It calls
// MoveFileExW directly via golang.org/x/sys/windows (the standard library's
// syscall package does not export MoveFileEx on this platform) with no flags,
// so an existing destination fails with ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS, which satisfies
// errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) (pinned by
// TestMoveFileNoReplaceMapsAlreadyExistsToErrExist), instead of overwriting it
// the way os.Rename does on Windows (it passes MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING to
// match POSIX rename semantics cross-platform).
func moveFileNoReplace(from, to string) error {
fromPtr, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(from)
const lockByteOffsetHigh = 1
func openLockFileAt(root, relative, displayPath string) (_ *os.File, resultErr error) {
rootPtr, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(root)
if err != nil {
return err
return nil, err
}
toPtr, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(to)
parent, err := windows.CreateFile(
rootPtr,
windows.FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES|windows.FILE_TRAVERSE|windows.SYNCHRONIZE,
windows.FILE_SHARE_READ|windows.FILE_SHARE_WRITE|windows.FILE_SHARE_DELETE,
nil,
windows.OPEN_EXISTING,
windows.FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS,
0,
)
if err != nil {
return err
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open lock root: %w", err)
}
return windows.MoveFileEx(fromPtr, toPtr, 0)
}
// isReclaimContended reports whether a failed rename-aside of a suspected
// stale lock means the file was concurrently open or pending deletion (which
// surfaces as ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION or ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED on Windows)
// rather than a hard failure, so ReclaimStaleLock reports a lost race instead
// of an error. Neither errno satisfies errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist), and
// ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION does not satisfy errors.Is(err, os.ErrPermission)
// either, so the classification compares raw errnos like RemoveLockFile below.
func isReclaimContended(err error) bool {
var errno syscall.Errno
return errors.As(err, &errno) && (errno == windows.ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION || errno == windows.ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)
}
// RemoveLockFile removes a lock file on Windows, retrying on the sharing
// violation or access denied errors that are common under heavy concurrent
// contention. Removing an already-missing file reports nil, matching the
// non-Windows implementation, so callers see one cross-platform contract.
func RemoveLockFile(path string) error {
var err error
for i := 0; i < 15; i++ {
err = os.Remove(path)
if err == nil || os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil
defer func() {
if parent != 0 {
resultErr = errors.Join(resultErr, windows.CloseHandle(parent))
}
var errno syscall.Errno
if errors.As(err, &errno) && (errno == windows.ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION || errno == windows.ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) {
time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
}()
components := strings.Split(filepath.Clean(relative), string(filepath.Separator))
for _, component := range components[:len(components)-1] {
next, openErr := openLockDirectoryAt(parent, component)
if openErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open lock path component %q: %w", component, openErr)
}
if closeErr := windows.CloseHandle(parent); closeErr != nil {
_ = windows.CloseHandle(next)
parent = 0
return nil, fmt.Errorf("close lock path component: %w", closeErr)
}
parent = next
}
handle, err := openLockFileHandleAt(parent, components[len(components)-1])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
file := os.NewFile(uintptr(handle), displayPath)
if file == nil {
_ = windows.CloseHandle(handle)
return nil, errors.New("convert lock handle to file")
}
if err := windows.CloseHandle(parent); err != nil {
parent = 0
return nil, errors.Join(fmt.Errorf("close lock parent: %w", err), file.Close())
}
parent = 0
return file, nil
}
func openLockDirectoryAt(parent windows.Handle, name string) (windows.Handle, error) {
handle, err := openLockPathAt(
parent,
name,
windows.FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES|windows.FILE_TRAVERSE|windows.SYNCHRONIZE,
windows.FILE_OPEN,
windows.FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY,
windows.FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE|windows.FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT|windows.FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT,
)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if err := validateWindowsLockHandle(handle, true); err != nil {
return 0, errors.Join(err, windows.CloseHandle(handle))
}
return handle, nil
}
func openLockFileHandleAt(parent windows.Handle, name string) (windows.Handle, error) {
for attempt := 0; attempt < 10; attempt++ {
handle, err := openLockPathAt(
parent,
name,
windows.GENERIC_READ|windows.GENERIC_WRITE|windows.SYNCHRONIZE,
windows.FILE_OPEN,
windows.FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
windows.FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE|windows.FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT|windows.FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT,
)
if err == nil {
if err := validateWindowsLockHandle(handle, false); err != nil {
return 0, errors.Join(err, windows.CloseHandle(handle))
}
return handle, nil
}
if !windowsLockPathMissing(err) {
return 0, err
}
handle, err = openLockPathAt(
parent,
name,
windows.GENERIC_READ|windows.GENERIC_WRITE|windows.SYNCHRONIZE,
windows.FILE_CREATE,
windows.FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
windows.FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE|windows.FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT|windows.FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT,
)
if err == windows.STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION || errors.Is(err, windows.ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
continue
}
return err
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if err := validateWindowsLockHandle(handle, false); err != nil {
return 0, errors.Join(err, windows.CloseHandle(handle))
}
return handle, nil
}
return err
return 0, errors.New("lock file creation did not stabilize")
}
func windowsLockPathMissing(err error) bool {
return err == windows.STATUS_NO_SUCH_FILE ||
err == windows.STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND ||
err == windows.STATUS_OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND ||
errors.Is(err, windows.ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND) ||
errors.Is(err, windows.ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND)
}
func openLockPathAt(parent windows.Handle, name string, access, disposition, attributes, options uint32) (windows.Handle, error) {
objectName, err := windows.NewNTUnicodeString(name)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
objectAttributes := &windows.OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES{
Length: uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(windows.OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES{})),
RootDirectory: parent,
ObjectName: objectName,
Attributes: windows.OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | windows.OBJ_DONT_REPARSE,
}
var handle windows.Handle
err = windows.NtCreateFile(
&handle,
access,
objectAttributes,
&windows.IO_STATUS_BLOCK{},
nil,
attributes,
windows.FILE_SHARE_READ|windows.FILE_SHARE_WRITE|windows.FILE_SHARE_DELETE,
disposition,
options,
0,
0,
)
return handle, err
}
func validateWindowsLockHandle(handle windows.Handle, wantDirectory bool) error {
var info windows.ByHandleFileInformation
if err := windows.GetFileInformationByHandle(handle, &info); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("inspect lock path handle: %w", err)
}
isDirectory := info.FileAttributes&windows.FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY != 0
if info.FileAttributes&windows.FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT != 0 || isDirectory != wantDirectory {
return errors.New("refusing non-file or reparse-point lock path")
}
if !wantDirectory && info.NumberOfLinks != 1 {
return errors.New("refusing multiply-linked lock file")
}
return nil
}
func tryLockFile(file *os.File) (platformLockState, bool, error) {
state := platformLockState{overlapped: windows.Overlapped{OffsetHigh: lockByteOffsetHigh}}
flags := uint32(windows.LOCKFILE_EXCLUSIVE_LOCK | windows.LOCKFILE_FAIL_IMMEDIATELY)
err := windows.LockFileEx(windows.Handle(file.Fd()), flags, 0, 1, 0, &state.overlapped)
if err == nil {
return state, false, nil
}
if errors.Is(err, windows.ERROR_LOCK_VIOLATION) || errors.Is(err, windows.ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION) {
return platformLockState{}, true, nil
}
return platformLockState{}, false, err
}
func unlockFile(file *os.File, state *platformLockState) error {
if file == nil {
return nil
}
return windows.UnlockFileEx(windows.Handle(file.Fd()), 0, 1, 0, &state.overlapped)
}
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package lockutil
import (
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// TestMoveFileNoReplaceMapsAlreadyExistsToErrExist pins the errno coupling
// every caller keys its cleanup on: with no flags, MoveFileEx fails with
// ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS when the destination exists, and that errno must
// satisfy errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist).
func TestMoveFileNoReplaceMapsAlreadyExistsToErrExist(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
from := filepath.Join(dir, "from")
to := filepath.Join(dir, "to")
if err := os.WriteFile(from, []byte("sidelined"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(to, []byte("competing"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err := moveFileNoReplace(from, to)
if !errors.Is(err, windows.ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
t.Fatalf("MoveFileEx with an existing destination = %v, want ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS", err)
}
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
t.Fatalf("ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS must satisfy errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist), got: %v", err)
}
if data, _ := os.ReadFile(to); string(data) != "competing" {
t.Fatalf("destination was overwritten: %q", data)
}
}
// TestRemoveLockFileRetriesSharingViolation holds the file open briefly (Go
// opens files without FILE_SHARE_DELETE on Windows, so a concurrent DeleteFile
// fails with ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION while the handle is open); RemoveLockFile
// must ride its retry loop (15 x 5ms) past the window and succeed once the
// handle closes.
func TestRemoveLockFileRetriesSharingViolation(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
go func() {
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
_ = f.Close()
}()
if err := RemoveLockFile(path); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RemoveLockFile should succeed once the contending handle closes: %v", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(path); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected lock file to be removed: %v", err)
}
}
// TestRemoveLockFileSharingViolationExhausts verifies the retry loop is
// bounded: with the contending handle held for the whole call, RemoveLockFile
// surfaces the sharing violation instead of retrying forever.
func TestRemoveLockFileSharingViolationExhausts(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer f.Close()
if err := RemoveLockFile(path); !errors.Is(err, windows.ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION) {
t.Fatalf("RemoveLockFile with a held handle = %v, want ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION", err)
}
}
-82
View File
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
package lockutil
import (
"errors"
"os"
)
// restoreLockFile is swappable so tests can force the fail-closed path of
// ReclaimStaleLock, which requires both the fast restore and its no-replace
// fallback (with its own copy fallback) to fail; that cannot be provoked
// portably on a healthy filesystem.
var restoreLockFile = restoreLiveLock
// restoreLiveLock puts a lock that turned out to be live back at path after
// ReclaimStaleLock moved it aside to inspect it. It first tries a fast,
// replacing rename straight from reclaimed to path: a single syscall, which
// keeps the window during which path does not exist (and so is open to a
// fourth process's unrelated O_EXCL create landing on it) as short as
// possible. RestoreLockFile's no-replace restore (with its slower copy
// fallback on some failures) is a correctness-preserving fallback for when
// the fast path itself fails (e.g. a cross-device sidelined name): it is a
// much longer version of the identical race, but still detects rather than
// silently clobbers a competing lock, which the fast path's replacing rename
// cannot do. Neither path makes the race impossible, only unlikely; see
// ReclaimStaleLock's doc comment.
func restoreLiveLock(reclaimed, path string) error {
if err := os.Rename(reclaimed, path); err == nil {
return nil
}
return RestoreLockFile(reclaimed, path)
}
// ReclaimStaleLock atomically reclaims a suspected-stale lock file. It renames
// lockPath aside to "<lockPath>.stale.<suffix>" (only one racer can win the
// rename of a given file, so two racers can never both reclaim the same lock),
// then consults isLive on the moved file; if the lock turns out to be live (a
// holder reacquired it in the gap between the caller's stale check and the
// rename) it is restored rather than stolen. The suffix must be unique per
// acquirer attempt. Returns true only when a genuinely stale lock was removed,
// so the caller knows it is safe to retry its exclusive create immediately; on
// a lost race it returns false. A non-nil error means either the rename aside
// failed for a reason that is not contention (so retrying cannot help and the
// caller should fail fast instead of spinning to its deadline), or a live
// holder's lock could not be restored (both restoreLiveLock's fast path and
// its no-replace fallback failed), so lockPath may be missing; callers must
// fail closed instead of re-acquiring. The sidelined file is removed on every
// restore failure: once the restore has failed it has no protocol function
// (release only consults the lock path), so keeping it would only leak files.
//
// The live-restore path has an inherent, unclosed race: between the rename
// aside above and restoreLiveLock putting the lock back, lockPath does not
// exist, so an unrelated caller's O_EXCL create can legitimately succeed
// there. restoreLiveLock's fast path then silently overwrites that new
// claimant's lock file, which does not corrupt release (it is
// ownership-aware, so the new claimant's later release safely no-ops against
// content it no longer owns) but does mean the new claimant can still run
// its critical section concurrently with the original live holder. Making
// this race actually impossible would need an OS-level advisory lock (flock
// / LockFileEx) held for a holder's whole critical section, checked
// non-destructively instead of by moving the file; restoreLiveLock only
// shrinks the window to roughly one syscall, it does not close it.
func ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, suffix string, isLive func(reclaimedPath string) bool) (bool, error) {
reclaimed := lockPath + ".stale." + suffix
if err := os.Rename(lockPath, reclaimed); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) || isReclaimContended(err) {
return false, nil // another racer already moved/removed it, or it vanished
}
return false, err
}
if isLive(reclaimed) {
// Put the live lock back instead of stealing it, and let the caller wait.
if rerr := restoreLockFile(reclaimed, lockPath); rerr != nil {
_ = RemoveLockFile(reclaimed)
if !errors.Is(rerr, os.ErrExist) {
return false, rerr
}
}
return false, nil
}
_ = RemoveLockFile(reclaimed)
return true, nil
}
-31
View File
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows
package lockutil
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
// TestReclaimStaleLockPropagatesRenameFailure pins the fail-fast contract of
// the rename aside: a failure that is not a lost race must reach the caller.
// Mapping it to the benign lost-race result would leave acquirers spinning
// until their deadline and reporting a timeout instead of the real cause. A
// directory squatting on the sidelined name makes os.Rename fail with EISDIR,
// which matches neither os.ErrNotExist nor a contention errno.
func TestReclaimStaleLockPropagatesRenameFailure(t *testing.T) {
lockPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("stale-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.Mkdir(lockPath+".stale.tok", 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok", func(string) bool { return false }); err == nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("a hard rename failure must surface an error (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(lockPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the lock file must be left in place on a failed rename: %v", err)
}
}
-112
View File
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
package lockutil
import (
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
func TestReclaimStaleLock(t *testing.T) {
lockPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
dead := func(string) bool { return false }
live := func(string) bool { return true }
// A lock the predicate reports dead is reclaimed and removed.
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("crashed-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok-a", dead); err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("a dead lock should be reclaimed (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(lockPath); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("reclaimed dead lock should be gone, stat err=%v", err)
}
// A LIVE lock (a holder reacquired in the gap) must be RESTORED intact.
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("live-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok-b", live); err != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("a live lock must not be reclaimed (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if data, err := os.ReadFile(lockPath); err != nil || string(data) != "live-holder" {
t.Fatalf("live lock must be left intact, got %q err %v", data, err)
}
// A missing lock reports no reclaim (nothing to steal).
_ = os.Remove(lockPath)
if ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok-c", live); err != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("a missing lock should not report a reclaim (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
}
// restoreLiveLock's fast path is a single replacing rename, chosen to
// minimize (not eliminate) the window during which lockPath is absent and
// open to an unrelated O_EXCL create; see ReclaimStaleLock's doc comment for
// why that residual race exists. This test pins the resulting behavior: the
// fast path overwrites a competing file at path rather than detecting it,
// unlike RestoreLockFile's own no-replace contract.
func TestRestoreLiveLockFastPathOverwritesCompetingFile(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
reclaimed := filepath.Join(dir, "lock.stale.tok")
path := filepath.Join(dir, "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(reclaimed, []byte("original-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("new-claimant"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := restoreLiveLock(reclaimed, path); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("restoreLiveLock failed: %v", err)
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil || string(data) != "original-holder" {
t.Fatalf("path = %q, err %v; want the original holder's content restored", data, err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected reclaimed to be consumed by the rename: %v", err)
}
}
func TestReclaimStaleLockFailsClosedOnRestoreError(t *testing.T) {
// When both the no-replace restore and its copy fallback fail (only
// provokable via the seam; a healthy filesystem cannot produce it), the
// caller must receive an error so it fails closed instead of re-acquiring a
// missing lock path, and the sidelined file must not leak.
restoreLockFile = func(reclaimed, path string) error { return errors.New("restore failed") }
defer func() { restoreLockFile = restoreLiveLock }()
lockPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("live-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok", func(string) bool { return true })
if err == nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("a failed restore must surface an error (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if matches, _ := filepath.Glob(lockPath + ".stale.*"); len(matches) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("a failed restore must not leak sidelined files: %v", matches)
}
}
func TestReclaimStaleLockDropsSidelinedWhenNewHolderWins(t *testing.T) {
// An os.ErrExist restore failure means a new holder recreated the lock
// path; that is not an error for the caller, and the sidelined file is
// dropped rather than leaked.
restoreLockFile = func(reclaimed, path string) error { return os.ErrExist }
defer func() { restoreLockFile = restoreLiveLock }()
lockPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("live-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok", func(string) bool { return true })
if err != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("losing to a new holder is not an error (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if matches, _ := filepath.Glob(lockPath + ".stale.*"); len(matches) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("the sidelined file must be dropped when a new holder wins: %v", matches)
}
}
-50
View File
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package lockutil
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
// TestReclaimStaleLockTreatsSharingViolationAsLostRace pins the errno
// classification the Windows acquire loops depend on: a rename aside that
// fails because the lock file is concurrently open (Go opens files without
// FILE_SHARE_DELETE, so the rename fails with ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION or
// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) is contention, not a hard failure, and must report a
// benign lost race so the caller keeps waiting.
func TestReclaimStaleLockTreatsSharingViolationAsLostRace(t *testing.T) {
lockPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("held"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f, err := os.Open(lockPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer f.Close()
if ok, rerr := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok", func(string) bool { return true }); rerr != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("a sharing-violation rename must report a benign lost race (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, rerr)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(lockPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the lock file must be left in place: %v", err)
}
}
// TestReclaimStaleLockPropagatesRenameFailure pins the fail-fast contract of
// the rename aside on Windows: a failure that is not contention must reach
// the caller instead of masquerading as a lost race. A quote is an invalid
// filename character, so the sidelined name fails with ERROR_INVALID_NAME.
func TestReclaimStaleLockPropagatesRenameFailure(t *testing.T) {
lockPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("stale-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, `bad"name`, func(string) bool { return false }); err == nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("a hard rename failure must surface an error (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(lockPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the lock file must be left in place on a failed rename: %v", err)
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ type Server struct {
// credential lookup uses it to avoid reusing legacy user tokens by name.
ProjectConfigured bool
// UnconfiguredDefault is true when this server is one of Zero's built-in
// defaults (e.g. keyless Firecrawl) that the user never touched in their
// defaults (e.g. keyless Exa) that the user never touched in their
// config — no credentials, no overrides. Callers use it to avoid warning
// loudly when a server nobody configured fails to connect.
UnconfiguredDefault bool
+118 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
package mcp
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -90,7 +92,7 @@ func TestNormalizeConfigValidatesTransportBoundaries(t *testing.T) {
func TestNormalizeConfigFlagsUnconfiguredDefault(t *testing.T) {
cfg := config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
"firecrawl": config.DefaultMCPServers()["firecrawl"],
"exa": config.DefaultMCPServers()["exa"],
"web": {
Type: "http",
URL: "https://example.com/mcp",
@@ -107,8 +109,8 @@ func TestNormalizeConfigFlagsUnconfiguredDefault(t *testing.T) {
byName[server.Name] = server
}
if !byName["firecrawl"].UnconfiguredDefault {
t.Fatal("an untouched firecrawl default should be flagged UnconfiguredDefault")
if !byName["exa"].UnconfiguredDefault {
t.Fatal("an untouched exa default should be flagged UnconfiguredDefault")
}
if byName["web"].UnconfiguredDefault {
t.Fatal("a server the user configured must not be flagged UnconfiguredDefault")
@@ -240,3 +242,116 @@ func TestCopyStringMapTrimsKeysAndPreservesValues(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("copied[TOKEN] = %q, want value preserved verbatim", copied["TOKEN"])
}
}
// Startup behavior for the firecrawl -> exa default migration: a user who
// disabled the retired default must end up with no Exa server to connect to,
// not merely a disabled entry in the resolved config.
func TestNormalizeConfigSkipsExaAfterLegacyFirecrawlDisable(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := config.ResolveMCP(config.ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
servers, err := NormalizeConfig(cfg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NormalizeConfig: %v", err)
}
for _, server := range servers {
if server.Name == "exa" {
t.Fatalf("exa must not be started after the user disabled the default it replaced: %#v", server)
}
}
}
// The same path with no legacy disable still starts Exa, so the migration
// cannot quietly switch off the default for everyone else.
func TestNormalizeConfigStartsExaWithoutLegacyDisable(t *testing.T) {
cfg, err := config.ResolveMCP(config.ResolveOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
servers, err := NormalizeConfig(cfg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NormalizeConfig: %v", err)
}
for _, server := range servers {
if server.Name == "exa" {
if !server.UnconfiguredDefault {
t.Fatalf("an untouched exa default should be flagged unconfigured: %#v", server)
}
return
}
}
t.Fatal("expected the exa default to be started out of the box")
}
// The failure path CodeRabbit flagged: a firecrawl entry that named only a
// header relied on the retired default for its transport. Resolving it must
// still produce a complete server — an incomplete one fails NormalizeConfig,
// which takes down every other server's startup with it, not just this one.
func TestNormalizeConfigResolvesPartialRetiredDefaultEntry(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer k"}}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := config.ResolveMCP(config.ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
servers, err := NormalizeConfig(cfg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a header-only legacy entry must not break startup: %v", err)
}
var firecrawl *Server
var sawExa bool
for i := range servers {
switch servers[i].Name {
case "firecrawl":
firecrawl = &servers[i]
case "exa":
sawExa = true
}
}
if firecrawl == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected the customized firecrawl server to survive: %#v", servers)
}
if firecrawl.Type != ServerTypeHTTP || firecrawl.URL != "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp" {
t.Fatalf("firecrawl lost the transport its entry relied on: %#v", *firecrawl)
}
if firecrawl.Headers["Authorization"] != "Bearer k" {
t.Fatalf("firecrawl lost the user's header: %#v", *firecrawl)
}
if !sawExa {
t.Fatal("the new exa default should still start alongside it")
}
}
// The mirror case: an entry that names its own stdio transport must not have
// the retired http default grafted onto it, which would be rejected outright.
func TestNormalizeConfigLeavesRetiredEntryWithOwnTransportAlone(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"command":"firecrawl-mcp"}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cfg, err := config.ResolveMCP(config.ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
}
servers, err := NormalizeConfig(cfg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a self-hosted stdio entry must keep working: %v", err)
}
for _, server := range servers {
if server.Name != "firecrawl" {
continue
}
if server.Type != ServerTypeStdio || server.Command != "firecrawl-mcp" {
t.Fatalf("the user's own stdio transport was corrupted: %#v", server)
}
return
}
t.Fatalf("expected the self-hosted firecrawl server to survive: %#v", servers)
}
+4 -2
View File
@@ -176,9 +176,11 @@ func RegisterTools(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, cfg config.MCP
staged = append(staged, tool)
}
}
for _, tool := range staged {
registry.Register(tool)
registered := make([]tools.Tool, 0, len(staged))
for index := range staged {
registered = append(registered, staged[index])
}
registry.RegisterBatch(registered)
return runtime, nil
}
+65 -9
View File
@@ -70,6 +70,62 @@ func TestRegisterToolsAddsPromptGatedMCPTools(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRegisterToolsPublishesServerToolsInOneGeneration(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
before := registry.Snapshot().Generation
client := &fakeToolClient{listed: []RemoteTool{
{Name: "lookup", Description: "Lookup documentation"},
{Name: "search", Description: "Search documentation"},
}}
runtime, err := RegisterTools(context.Background(), registry, config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
"docs": {Type: "stdio", Command: "docs-mcp"},
}}, RegisterOptions{ClientFactory: func(context.Context, Server) (ToolClient, error) {
return client, nil
}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RegisterTools() error = %v", err)
}
defer runtime.Close()
after := registry.Snapshot()
if after.Generation != before+1 {
t.Fatalf("registry generation = %d, want %d", after.Generation, before+1)
}
for _, name := range []string{"mcp_docs_lookup", "mcp_docs_search"} {
if _, ok := registry.Get(name); !ok {
t.Fatalf("expected %s to be published in the batch", name)
}
}
}
func TestRegisterToolsPublishesNoneWhenServerToolValidationFails(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
before := registry.Snapshot().Generation
client := &fakeToolClient{listed: []RemoteTool{
{Name: "lookup", Description: "Lookup documentation"},
{Name: "", Description: "Invalid nameless tool"},
}}
runtime, err := RegisterTools(context.Background(), registry, config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
"docs": {Type: "stdio", Command: "docs-mcp"},
}}, RegisterOptions{ClientFactory: func(context.Context, Server) (ToolClient, error) {
return client, nil
}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RegisterTools() error = %v", err)
}
defer runtime.Close()
if got := registry.Snapshot().Generation; got != before {
t.Fatalf("registry generation = %d, want unchanged %d", got, before)
}
if _, ok := registry.Get("mcp_docs_lookup"); ok {
t.Fatal("valid prefix of rejected server batch was published")
}
if skipped := runtime.Skipped(); len(skipped) != 1 || skipped[0].Name != "docs" || skipped[0].Err == nil {
t.Fatalf("Skipped() = %#v, want one validation failure for docs", skipped)
}
}
func TestRegisterToolsMarksPersistentlyApprovedToolsAllow(t *testing.T) {
store, err := NewPermissionStore(StoreOptions{
FilePath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "permissions.json"),
@@ -153,16 +209,16 @@ func TestRegisterToolsSkipsUnreachableServerAndKeepsOthers(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRegisterToolsFlagsUnconfiguredDefaultOnSkip(t *testing.T) {
// firecrawl is seeded by config.DefaultMCPServers with no credentials; when a
// user never configures it, a connect failure (e.g. the real HTTP 401 from
// issue #552) must be recorded as UnconfiguredDefault so callers can avoid
// Exa is seeded by config.DefaultMCPServers with no credentials; when a
// user never configures it, a connect failure must be recorded as
// UnconfiguredDefault so callers can avoid
// warning about a server the user never asked for. "custom" is configured by
// the user and must NOT be flagged even though it also fails to connect.
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
runtime, err := RegisterTools(context.Background(), registry, config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
"firecrawl": config.DefaultMCPServers()["firecrawl"],
"custom": {Type: "stdio", Command: "custom-mcp"},
"exa": config.DefaultMCPServers()["exa"],
"custom": {Type: "stdio", Command: "custom-mcp"},
}}, RegisterOptions{
ClientFactory: func(_ context.Context, server Server) (ToolClient, error) {
return nil, errors.New(server.Name + " connect failed")
@@ -177,12 +233,12 @@ func TestRegisterToolsFlagsUnconfiguredDefaultOnSkip(t *testing.T) {
for _, skipped := range runtime.Skipped() {
byName[skipped.Name] = skipped
}
firecrawl, ok := byName["firecrawl"]
exa, ok := byName["exa"]
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("Skipped() = %#v, want an entry for firecrawl", runtime.Skipped())
t.Fatalf("Skipped() = %#v, want an entry for exa", runtime.Skipped())
}
if !firecrawl.UnconfiguredDefault {
t.Fatalf("Skipped()[firecrawl] = %#v, want UnconfiguredDefault", firecrawl)
if !exa.UnconfiguredDefault {
t.Fatalf("Skipped()[exa] = %#v, want UnconfiguredDefault", exa)
}
custom, ok := byName["custom"]
if !ok {
+6
View File
@@ -231,6 +231,12 @@ func reasoningEffortsForModelName(name string) []ReasoningEffort {
// the gateway's translation concern — unknown fields are ignored, so the
// worst case is a silent no-op rather than a 400.
return []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortMedium, ReasoningEffortHigh}
case strings.Contains(n, "deepseek"):
// DeepSeek V4 (deepseek-v4-flash / deepseek-v4-pro) exposes thinking-mode
// effort control through the OpenAI-compatible reasoning_effort parameter.
// The API accepts low/high/max and maps medium/xhigh onto high, so only
// the three distinct tiers are advertised.
return []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortHigh, ReasoningEffortMax}
default:
return nil
}
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ func TestReasoningEffortsFallbackForGPT5AndOSeries(t *testing.T) {
{"hy3", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortMedium, ReasoningEffortHigh}},
{"hunyuan-t1", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortMedium, ReasoningEffortHigh}},
{"openai/o3-mini", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortMedium, ReasoningEffortHigh}}, // github-style vendor/ id
{"deepseek-v4-flash", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortHigh, ReasoningEffortMax}},
{"deepseek-v4-pro", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortHigh, ReasoningEffortMax}},
{"deepseek-reasoner", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortHigh, ReasoningEffortMax}},
{"deepseek-chat", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortHigh, ReasoningEffortMax}},
{"gpt-4.1", nil}, // non-reasoning, registered: stays empty
{"gpt-4o-mini", nil},
{"ollama/llama3.1", nil},
+7 -64
View File
@@ -5,24 +5,16 @@ import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lockutil"
)
const (
fileLockTimeout = 5 * time.Second
fileLockStaleAfter = 30 * time.Second
)
const fileLockTimeout = 5 * time.Second
var lockSeq atomic.Uint64
// acquireFileLock takes a cross-process exclusive lock by creating lockPath with
// O_EXCL. It retries with a short backoff until a timeout, breaking a lock whose
// file is older than fileLockStaleAfter (so a crashed holder cannot deadlock the
// store). Release is ownership-aware: it removes the lock only if it still holds
// our token, so a stale-broken holder cannot delete a newer holder's lock.
// acquireFileLock takes a cross-process advisory lock through a stable lock
// file. It retries with a short backoff until a timeout. Kernel lock lifetime
// provides crash recovery, so the path is never renamed or removed.
func acquireFileLock(lockPath string, now func() time.Time) (func(), error) {
if now == nil {
now = time.Now
@@ -30,64 +22,15 @@ func acquireFileLock(lockPath string, now func() time.Time) (func(), error) {
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(lockPath), 0o700); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
token := fmt.Sprintf("%d-%d-%d", os.Getpid(), now().UnixNano(), lockSeq.Add(1))
deadline := now().Add(fileLockTimeout)
for {
f, err := os.OpenFile(lockPath, os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
lock, err := lockutil.TryAcquireFileLock(lockPath)
if err == nil {
// A partial/failed write would leave a lock file without our token, so
// the releaser below could never delete it — stranding the lock for
// other processes. Fail closed: remove the file and surface the error.
if _, werr := f.WriteString(token); werr != nil {
_ = f.Close()
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: write token lock: %w", werr)
}
if cerr := f.Close(); cerr != nil {
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: close token lock: %w", cerr)
}
var released bool
return func() {
if released {
return
}
released = true
if data, rerr := os.ReadFile(lockPath); rerr == nil && string(data) == token {
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
}
}, nil
return func() { _ = lock.Release() }, nil
}
// On Windows a concurrent holder's os.Remove leaves the lock file in a
// "delete pending" state, so an O_EXCL create races it with
// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (os.ErrPermission) rather than ErrExist. Treat that
// as contention and retry, exactly like ErrExist — otherwise the lock
// spuriously fails under concurrency on Windows.
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrPermission) {
if !errors.Is(err, lockutil.ErrLockHeld) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: acquire token lock: %w", err)
}
// Reclaim a stale lock left by a crashed holder — atomically (H3). A blind
// Remove lets two racers both reclaim + recreate and so both hold the lock;
// reclaimStaleLock renames the file aside (only one rename wins) and restores
// it if it turns out fresh, so a live lock is never deleted out from under it.
if info, statErr := os.Stat(lockPath); statErr == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) > fileLockStaleAfter {
cleared, rerr := lockutil.ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, token, func(reclaimedPath string) bool {
info, err := os.Stat(reclaimedPath)
return err == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) <= fileLockStaleAfter
})
if rerr != nil {
// Reclaim hit a hard failure: the rename aside failed outright, or a
// live holder's lock could not be put back (the lock path may be
// missing, so re-acquiring would break mutual exclusion). Fail closed
// instead of spinning to the deadline.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: reclaim stale token lock: %w", rerr)
}
if cleared {
continue
}
// Lost the reclaim race (or it was actually fresh) — fall through to the
// bounded wait rather than hot-spinning on a reclaim that never wins.
}
if now().After(deadline) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: timed out acquiring token lock %s", filepath.Base(lockPath))
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ func windowsTokenOwner(token windows.Token) (*windows.SID, error) {
}
owner := (*windowsTokenOwnerInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(&buffer[0])).owner
if owner == nil {
return nil, errors.New("Windows access token has no default owner")
return nil, errors.New("windows access token has no default owner")
}
return owner.Copy()
}
+22 -2
View File
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ type TurnBenchResult struct {
type TurnBenchTotals struct {
InputTokens int64 `json:"inputTokens"`
CachedInputTokens int64 `json:"cachedInputTokens"`
CacheWriteTokens int64 `json:"cacheWriteTokens"`
OutputTokens int64 `json:"outputTokens"`
ModelRequests int64 `json:"modelRequests"`
ToolCalls int64 `json:"toolCalls"`
@@ -479,6 +480,7 @@ func topLatencySources(perSpan map[string]SpanStats, top int) []LatencySource {
func aggregateTotals(totals *TurnBenchTotals, tr *trace.TurnTrace) {
totals.InputTokens += tr.Counter(trace.CounterInputTokens)
totals.CachedInputTokens += tr.Counter(trace.CounterCachedInputTokens)
totals.CacheWriteTokens += tr.Counter(trace.CounterCacheWriteTokens)
totals.OutputTokens += tr.Counter(trace.CounterOutputTokens)
totals.ModelRequests += tr.Counter(trace.CounterModelRequests)
totals.ToolCalls += tr.Counter(trace.CounterToolCalls)
@@ -531,8 +533,9 @@ func FormatTurnBenchSummary(result TurnBenchResult) string {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf(" %-18s %10s %5.1f%%", src.Span, FormatMetric(src.TotalMs, "ms"), src.Share*100))
}
}
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("totals: in=%d (cached %d) out=%d | requests=%d tools=%d retries=%d reconnects=%d compactions=%d",
result.Totals.InputTokens, result.Totals.CachedInputTokens, result.Totals.OutputTokens,
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("totals: in=%d (cache-read %d, cache-write %d, uncached %d) out=%d | requests=%d tools=%d retries=%d reconnects=%d compactions=%d",
result.Totals.InputTokens, result.Totals.CachedInputTokens, result.Totals.CacheWriteTokens,
uncachedInputTokens(result.Totals), result.Totals.OutputTokens,
result.Totals.ModelRequests, result.Totals.ToolCalls, result.Totals.Retries,
result.Totals.Reconnects, result.Totals.Compactions))
for _, class := range sortedClasses(result.PerClass) {
@@ -545,6 +548,23 @@ func FormatTurnBenchSummary(result TurnBenchResult) string {
return strings.Join(lines, "\n")
}
func uncachedInputTokens(totals TurnBenchTotals) int64 {
remaining := totals.InputTokens
if remaining <= 0 {
return 0
}
for _, cached := range []int64{totals.CachedInputTokens, totals.CacheWriteTokens} {
if cached <= 0 {
continue
}
if cached >= remaining {
return 0
}
remaining -= cached
}
return remaining
}
// classTier returns the oracle tier label a class was classified into, so the
// per-class roll-up states explicitly which oracle (if any) its "passed" count
// is measured against.
+33
View File
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ func TestRunTurnBenchAggregation(t *testing.T) {
"t3": cannedTrace(150, 20, 1500),
"t4": cannedTrace(300, 10, 1000),
}
canned["t1"].Counters = append(canned["t1"].Counters, trace.Counter{Name: trace.CounterCacheWriteTokens, Value: 125})
cfg := TurnBenchConfig{
Model: "fake-model",
Iterations: 1,
@@ -155,6 +156,9 @@ func TestRunTurnBenchAggregation(t *testing.T) {
if result.Totals.InputTokens != 5500 {
t.Fatalf("inputTokens = %d, want 5500", result.Totals.InputTokens)
}
if result.Totals.CacheWriteTokens != 125 {
t.Fatalf("cacheWriteTokens = %d, want 125", result.Totals.CacheWriteTokens)
}
if result.Totals.OutputTokens != 2750 {
t.Fatalf("outputTokens = %d, want 2750", result.Totals.OutputTokens)
}
@@ -334,6 +338,35 @@ func TestFormatTurnBenchSummaryNamesTopSources(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestUncachedInputTokensClampsInconsistentTotals(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
totals TurnBenchTotals
want int64
}{
{name: "normal", totals: TurnBenchTotals{InputTokens: 100, CachedInputTokens: 30, CacheWriteTokens: 20}, want: 50},
{name: "cached exceeds input", totals: TurnBenchTotals{InputTokens: 100, CachedInputTokens: 120}, want: 0},
{name: "write exceeds remainder", totals: TurnBenchTotals{InputTokens: 100, CachedInputTokens: 20, CacheWriteTokens: 90}, want: 0},
{name: "overflowing inconsistent counters", totals: TurnBenchTotals{CachedInputTokens: 1<<63 - 1, CacheWriteTokens: 1<<63 - 1}, want: 0},
{name: "overflowing counters with input", totals: TurnBenchTotals{InputTokens: 100, CachedInputTokens: 1<<63 - 1, CacheWriteTokens: 1<<63 - 1}, want: 0},
{name: "negative cache counters ignored", totals: TurnBenchTotals{InputTokens: 100, CachedInputTokens: -20, CacheWriteTokens: -10}, want: 100},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := uncachedInputTokens(test.totals); got != test.want {
t.Fatalf("uncachedInputTokens(%+v) = %d, want %d", test.totals, got, test.want)
}
})
}
summary := FormatTurnBenchSummary(TurnBenchResult{Totals: TurnBenchTotals{
CachedInputTokens: 1<<63 - 1,
CacheWriteTokens: 1<<63 - 1,
}})
if !strings.Contains(summary, "uncached 0") {
t.Fatalf("summary did not clamp inconsistent cache totals:\n%s", summary)
}
}
func TestLoadBaselineManifest(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join("manifests", "baseline.json")
set, err := LoadTaskSet(path)
+4
View File
@@ -184,6 +184,10 @@ func parseOpenAIStyleModelList(body []byte) ([]remoteModel, error) {
func ModelsDevProviderID(provider providercatalog.Descriptor) string {
switch strings.TrimSpace(provider.ID) {
case "chatgpt":
// ChatGPT authenticates against the Codex backend, while its public
// model metadata is published under the OpenAI provider on models.dev.
return "openai"
case "dashscope":
return "alibaba"
case "github":
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ func TestPublicLiveCatalog(t *testing.T) {
func TestModelsDevProviderIDMapsZeroAliases(t *testing.T) {
tests := map[string]string{
"chatgpt": "openai",
"github": "github-models",
"moonshot": "moonshotai",
"nvidia-nim": "nvidia",
+2 -1
View File
@@ -539,7 +539,8 @@ func mergeLiveModels(provider providercatalog.Descriptor, liveModels []Model, ca
hasCatalog := len(byID) > 0
// Aggregators publish the live list as the source of truth. Keep live-only
// ids even when a remote catalog also loaded, instead of intersecting.
preferLive := providermodelcatalog.PublicLiveCatalog(provider.ID) ||
preferLive := provider.Local ||
providermodelcatalog.PublicLiveCatalog(provider.ID) ||
providercatalog.NormalizeID(provider.ID) == "chatgpt"
result := make([]Model, 0, len(liveModels))
for _, live := range liveModels {
@@ -139,6 +139,68 @@ func TestMergeChatGPTModelsKeepsLiveOnlyEntries(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestDiscoverCatalogChatGPTMergesOpenAIModelsDevMetadata(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/api.json":
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{
"openai": {"models": {
"gpt-5.6-sol": {
"id": "gpt-5.6-sol",
"name": "GPT-5.6 Sol",
"description": "Frontier coding model",
"tool_call": true,
"reasoning": true,
"reasoning_efforts": ["low", "high", "max"],
"limit": {"context": 1050000},
"modalities": {"input": ["text", "image", "pdf"], "output": ["text"]}
}
}}
}`))
case "/backend-api/codex/models":
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"id":"gpt-5.6-sol"}]}`))
default:
t.Errorf("unexpected request path %q", r.URL.Path)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
}))
defer server.Close()
provider, ok := providercatalog.Get("chatgpt")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("ChatGPT provider missing from catalog")
}
models, err := DiscoverCatalog(context.Background(), provider, config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "chatgpt",
CatalogID: "chatgpt",
ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAICompatible,
BaseURL: server.URL + "/backend-api/codex",
}, Options{
HTTPClient: server.Client(),
ModelsDevURL: server.URL + "/api.json",
OAuthResolver: func(context.Context, bool) (string, string, bool, error) {
return "Authorization", "Bearer test", true, nil
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DiscoverCatalog returned error: %v", err)
}
if len(models) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("models = %#v, want one ChatGPT live model", models)
}
model := models[0]
if model.ID != "gpt-5.6-sol" || model.ContextWindow != 1050000 || !model.ToolCall || !model.Reasoning {
t.Fatalf("merged ChatGPT model = %#v, want models.dev metadata", model)
}
if got := strings.Join(model.InputModalities, ","); got != "text,image,pdf" {
t.Fatalf("input modalities = %q, want text,image,pdf", got)
}
if got := strings.Join(model.ReasoningEfforts, ","); got != "low,high,max" {
t.Fatalf("reasoning efforts = %q, want low,high,max", got)
}
}
func TestMergeLiveModelsUsesLiveDefaultsAndReasoningCapability(t *testing.T) {
models := mergeLiveModels(
providercatalog.Descriptor{ID: "chatgpt"},
@@ -164,6 +226,29 @@ func TestMergeLiveModelsUsesLiveDefaultsAndReasoningCapability(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestMergeLocalModelsKeepsLiveOnlyEntries(t *testing.T) {
models := mergeLiveModels(
providercatalog.Descriptor{ID: "lmstudio", Local: true},
[]Model{
{ID: "qwen3-coder-30b", ContextWindow: 32768},
{ID: "text-embedding-local"},
{ID: "qwen2.5-coder-32b-instruct", Description: "live description"},
},
[]Model{{ID: "qwen2.5-coder-32b-instruct", Description: "catalog description", ToolCall: true}},
)
if got, want := strings.Join(modelIDs(models), ","), "qwen3-coder-30b,qwen2.5-coder-32b-instruct"; got != want {
t.Fatalf("models = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
for _, model := range models {
if model.ID == "qwen2.5-coder-32b-instruct" {
if model.Description != "catalog description" || !model.ToolCall {
t.Fatalf("merged catalog metadata = %#v", model)
}
}
}
}
func TestDiscoverCatalogOpenGatewayUsesLiveListWithoutKey(t *testing.T) {
// Catalog and live endpoints return distinct payloads so the merge must keep
// live-only ids that are absent from the remote catalog response.
+108
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
package providers
import (
"context"
"os"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Compaction summarization model selection.
//
// Compaction summaries used to run on the session's main model — near a 200k
// window one summarization is a ~100k-token input call at full price, the
// single most expensive recurring event in a long run. A cheap model handles
// the "dense factual summary" task fine, so summarization is routed to one
// whenever the target is knowable.
//
// Resolution order: ZERO_COMPACTION_MODEL env > preferences.compactionModel
// config > a curated per-kind default (OFFICIAL endpoints only) > "" (use the
// main model). The literal value "main" at any level forces the main model.
// A wrong choice is never fatal: the agent falls back to the main provider on
// the first summarizer failure for the rest of the run.
// CompactionModelEnv overrides the compaction summarization model.
const CompactionModelEnv = "ZERO_COMPACTION_MODEL"
// compactionMainSentinel disables the dedicated summarizer explicitly.
const compactionMainSentinel = "main"
// Curated cheap summarizer defaults, applied only for provider kinds whose
// model catalog is guaranteed (official endpoints). Custom / *-compatible
// endpoints get NO default — their catalogs are unknowable, and a guaranteed
// failed call per run is worse than main-model prices.
const (
defaultAnthropicCompactionModel = "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001"
defaultGoogleCompactionModel = "gemini-2.5-flash-lite"
defaultOpenAICompactionModel = "gpt-4.1-mini"
)
// CompactionModelID returns the model that compaction summarization calls
// should use for the given profile, or "" to use the session's main model.
// preference is the resolved config value (preferences.compactionModel).
func CompactionModelID(profile config.ProviderProfile, preference string) string {
value := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(CompactionModelEnv))
if value == "" {
value = strings.TrimSpace(preference)
}
if value != "" {
if strings.EqualFold(value, compactionMainSentinel) {
return ""
}
return value
}
return defaultCompactionModel(profile)
}
func defaultCompactionModel(profile config.ProviderProfile) string {
metadata, err := ResolveRuntimeMetadata(profile, Options{})
if err != nil {
return ""
}
var candidate string
switch metadata.ProviderKind {
case config.ProviderKindAnthropic:
candidate = defaultAnthropicCompactionModel
case config.ProviderKindGoogle:
candidate = defaultGoogleCompactionModel
case config.ProviderKindOpenAI:
candidate = defaultOpenAICompactionModel
default:
return ""
}
// Session already runs on the cheap model: a dedicated summarizer buys
// nothing and would only add a second provider instance.
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(metadata.APIModel), candidate) {
return ""
}
return candidate
}
// CompactionSummarizerFactory returns the lazy constructor the agent loop
// calls for its dedicated compaction summarizer (agent.Options.Summarizer).
// The compactor passes the main model in force at that moment — on the first
// paid compaction and again after a mid-run model switch — so the choice
// tracks escalations: a run that starts on the cheap model gets no dedicated
// summarizer, and gains one once it escalates to a pricier main model.
// Returning (nil, nil) means "summarize on the main provider". The factory
// itself is nil only when no provider builder exists. Shared by the exec and
// TUI front ends so the selection rules cannot drift between them.
func CompactionSummarizerFactory(base config.ProviderProfile, preference string, newProvider func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)) func(context.Context, string) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
if newProvider == nil {
return nil
}
return func(_ context.Context, mainModelID string) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
profile := base
if strings.TrimSpace(mainModelID) != "" {
profile.Model = mainModelID
}
modelID := CompactionModelID(profile, preference)
if modelID == "" {
return nil, nil
}
profile.Model = modelID
return newProvider(profile)
}
}
+113
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
package providers
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestCompactionModelIDResolutionOrder(t *testing.T) {
anthropic := config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "anthropic",
ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindAnthropic,
Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5",
}
t.Setenv(CompactionModelEnv, "my-env-model")
if got := CompactionModelID(anthropic, "my-config-model"); got != "my-env-model" {
t.Fatalf("env must win, got %q", got)
}
t.Setenv(CompactionModelEnv, "main")
if got := CompactionModelID(anthropic, "my-config-model"); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("env 'main' must force the main model, got %q", got)
}
t.Setenv(CompactionModelEnv, "")
if got := CompactionModelID(anthropic, "my-config-model"); got != "my-config-model" {
t.Fatalf("config preference must apply when env unset, got %q", got)
}
if got := CompactionModelID(anthropic, "main"); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("config 'main' must force the main model, got %q", got)
}
}
func TestCompactionModelIDCuratedDefaults(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(CompactionModelEnv, "")
anthropic := config.ProviderProfile{Name: "anthropic", ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindAnthropic, Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5"}
if got := CompactionModelID(anthropic, ""); got != defaultAnthropicCompactionModel {
t.Fatalf("anthropic default = %q, want %q", got, defaultAnthropicCompactionModel)
}
google := config.ProviderProfile{Name: "google", ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindGoogle, Model: "gemini-2.5-pro"}
if got := CompactionModelID(google, ""); got != defaultGoogleCompactionModel {
t.Fatalf("google default = %q, want %q", got, defaultGoogleCompactionModel)
}
openai := config.ProviderProfile{Name: "openai", ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAI, Model: "gpt-4.1"}
if got := CompactionModelID(openai, ""); got != defaultOpenAICompactionModel {
t.Fatalf("openai default = %q, want %q", got, defaultOpenAICompactionModel)
}
// Custom/compatible endpoints: catalog unknowable, no default.
compatible := config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "opengateway",
ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAICompatible,
BaseURL: "https://opengateway.gitlawb.com/v1",
Model: "some-model",
}
if got := CompactionModelID(compatible, ""); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("openai-compatible must have no default, got %q", got)
}
}
func TestCompactionModelIDSkipsWhenMainIsAlreadyCheap(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(CompactionModelEnv, "")
haiku := config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "anthropic",
ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindAnthropic,
Model: defaultAnthropicCompactionModel,
}
if got := CompactionModelID(haiku, ""); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("already-cheap session must not get a dedicated summarizer, got %q", got)
}
}
func TestCompactionSummarizerFactoryTracksMainModel(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(CompactionModelEnv, "")
base := config.ProviderProfile{Name: "anthropic", ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindAnthropic, Model: defaultAnthropicCompactionModel}
var built []string
newProvider := func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
built = append(built, profile.Model)
return nil, errors.New("not needed")
}
factory := CompactionSummarizerFactory(base, "", newProvider)
if factory == nil {
t.Fatal("factory must exist when a provider builder exists")
}
// Main model is the cheap default: no dedicated summarizer, nothing built.
if provider, err := factory(context.Background(), defaultAnthropicCompactionModel); provider != nil || err != nil || len(built) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("cheap main model must yield (nil, nil) without building, got %v %v built=%v", provider, err, built)
}
// After escalating to an expensive model the cheap default is built.
if _, err := factory(context.Background(), "claude-sonnet-4-5"); err == nil || len(built) != 1 || built[0] != defaultAnthropicCompactionModel {
t.Fatalf("escalated main model must build the cheap summarizer, built=%v err=%v", built, err)
}
// An empty main model falls back to the base profile's model — the cheap
// default here, so again nothing is built.
built = nil
if provider, err := factory(context.Background(), ""); provider != nil || err != nil || len(built) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("empty main model must use the base profile, got %v %v built=%v", provider, err, built)
}
// The explicit "main" preference disables the dedicated summarizer.
if provider, err := CompactionSummarizerFactory(base, "main", newProvider)(context.Background(), "claude-sonnet-4-5"); provider != nil || err != nil {
t.Fatalf("preference main must disable the summarizer, got %v %v", provider, err)
}
if CompactionSummarizerFactory(base, "", nil) != nil {
t.Fatal("no provider builder means no factory")
}
}
+238 -60
View File
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ const (
responsesEventReasoningDelta = "response.reasoning_summary_text.delta"
responsesEventOutputTextDone = "response.output_text.done"
responsesEventFunctionArgsDelta = "response.function_call_arguments.delta"
responsesEventCustomInputDelta = "response.custom_tool_call_input.delta"
responsesEventContentPartDone = "response.content_part.done"
responsesEventOutputItemDone = "response.output_item.done"
responsesEventCompleted = "response.completed"
@@ -70,17 +71,37 @@ const (
responsesEventIncomplete = "response.incomplete"
)
const applyPatchLarkGrammar = `start: begin_patch hunk+ end_patch
begin_patch: "*** Begin Patch" LF
end_patch: "*** End Patch" LF?
hunk: add_hunk | delete_hunk | update_hunk
add_hunk: "*** Add File: " filename LF add_line+
delete_hunk: "*** Delete File: " filename LF
update_hunk: "*** Update File: " filename LF change_move? change?
filename: /(.+)/
add_line: "+" /(.*)/ LF -> line
change_move: "*** Move to: " filename LF
change: (change_context | change_line)+ eof_line?
change_context: ("@@" | "@@ " /(.+)/) LF
change_line: ("+" | "-" | " ") /(.*)/ LF
eof_line: "*** End of File" LF
%import common.LF`
// responsesRequest is the wire shape POSTed to {baseURL}/responses.
type responsesRequest struct {
Model string `json:"model"`
Instructions string `json:"instructions"`
Input []inputItem `json:"input"`
Stream bool `json:"stream"`
Store bool `json:"store"`
MaxOutputTokens int `json:"max_output_tokens,omitempty"`
Tools []responsesTool `json:"tools,omitempty"`
Reasoning *responsesReasoning `json:"reasoning,omitempty"`
ServiceTier string `json:"service_tier,omitempty"`
Type string `json:"type,omitempty"`
Model string `json:"model"`
Instructions string `json:"instructions"`
PreviousResponseID string `json:"previous_response_id,omitempty"`
Input []inputItem `json:"input"`
Stream bool `json:"stream"`
Store bool `json:"store"`
ParallelToolCalls bool `json:"parallel_tool_calls"`
MaxOutputTokens int `json:"max_output_tokens,omitempty"`
Tools []responsesTool `json:"tools,omitempty"`
Reasoning *responsesReasoning `json:"reasoning,omitempty"`
ServiceTier string `json:"service_tier,omitempty"`
PromptCacheKey string `json:"prompt_cache_key,omitempty"`
}
// responsesReasoning carries the reasoning controls for the Responses API. The
@@ -105,6 +126,7 @@ type inputItem struct {
CallID string `json:"call_id,omitempty"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty"`
Arguments string `json:"arguments,omitempty"`
Input string `json:"input,omitempty"`
// function_call_output fields
Output any `json:"output,omitempty"`
}
@@ -118,10 +140,11 @@ type contentItem struct {
}
type responsesTool struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
Parameters map[string]any `json:"parameters,omitempty"`
Type string `json:"type"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
Parameters map[string]any `json:"parameters,omitempty"`
Format *zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat `json:"format,omitempty"`
}
// responsesEvent is the decoded form of one Responses SSE data payload.
@@ -132,6 +155,7 @@ type responsesEvent struct {
Delta string `json:"delta,omitempty"`
// item payloads (response.output_item.added / done)
ItemID string `json:"item_id,omitempty"`
CallID string `json:"call_id,omitempty"`
// OutputIndex is a *int so a real 0 (the first output) is distinguishable from
// "absent" — a plain int defaulting to 0 dropped a no-item_id call's args (M1).
OutputIndex *int `json:"output_index,omitempty"`
@@ -150,6 +174,7 @@ type itemPayload struct {
CallID string `json:"call_id,omitempty"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty"`
Arguments string `json:"arguments,omitempty"`
Input string `json:"input,omitempty"`
Status string `json:"status,omitempty"`
}
@@ -173,7 +198,8 @@ type outputDetails struct {
}
type inputDetails struct {
CachedTokens int `json:"cached_tokens"`
CachedTokens int `json:"cached_tokens"`
CacheWriteTokens int `json:"cache_write_tokens"`
}
type errorPayload struct {
@@ -187,8 +213,10 @@ type errorPayload struct {
// response.output_item.done.
type toolCallBuilder struct {
ID string
CallID string
Name string
Arguments strings.Builder
Freeform bool
started bool
ended bool
}
@@ -197,15 +225,57 @@ type toolCallBuilder struct {
// event has been emitted. It is the Responses-API equivalent of the
// chat-completions toolState in provider.go.
type responsesState struct {
toolCalls map[string]*toolCallBuilder
usage *usagePayload
done bool
toolCalls map[string]*toolCallBuilder
toolOrder []string
text strings.Builder
responseID string
usage *usagePayload
emitted bool
done bool
}
func newResponsesState() *responsesState {
return &responsesState{toolCalls: map[string]*toolCallBuilder{}}
}
func (state *responsesState) outputInputItems() []inputItem {
items := make([]inputItem, 0, len(state.toolOrder)+1)
if state.text.Len() > 0 {
items = append(items, inputItem{
Type: "message",
Role: "assistant",
Content: []contentItem{{Type: "output_text", Text: state.text.String()}},
})
}
for _, key := range state.toolOrder {
builder := state.toolCalls[key]
if builder == nil || builder.ID == "" || builder.Name == "" {
continue
}
callID := builder.CallID
if callID == "" {
callID = builder.ID
}
itemType := "function_call"
if builder.Freeform {
itemType = "custom_tool_call"
}
item := inputItem{
Type: itemType,
ID: builder.ID,
CallID: callID,
Name: builder.Name,
}
if builder.Freeform {
item.Input = builder.Arguments.String()
} else {
item.Arguments = builder.Arguments.String()
}
items = append(items, item)
}
return items
}
// buildResponsesRequest converts a runtime CompletionRequest into the
// Responses API wire format. System messages fold into a top-level
// `instructions` field; everything else (user/assistant turns, tool
@@ -215,11 +285,14 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) buildResponsesRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequ
return nil, errors.New("codex provider: model is required")
}
req := &responsesRequest{
Model: p.inner.model,
Stream: true,
MaxOutputTokens: p.inner.maxTokens,
Model: p.inner.model,
Stream: true,
ParallelToolCalls: true,
MaxOutputTokens: p.inner.maxTokens,
PromptCacheKey: request.PromptCacheKey,
}
instructions := []string{}
customCallIDs := map[string]string{}
for _, msg := range request.Messages {
switch msg.Role {
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem:
@@ -234,13 +307,31 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) buildResponsesRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequ
return nil, err
}
req.Input = append(req.Input, items...)
for _, call := range msg.ToolCalls {
if call.Freeform && call.ID != "" {
callID := call.ProviderCallID
if callID == "" {
callID = call.ID
}
customCallIDs[call.ID] = callID
}
}
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool:
if msg.ToolCallID == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("codex provider: tool message missing tool call id")
}
outputType := "function_call_output"
callID := msg.ToolCallProviderID
if callID == "" {
callID = msg.ToolCallID
}
if customID, custom := customCallIDs[msg.ToolCallID]; custom {
outputType = "custom_tool_call_output"
callID = customID
}
req.Input = append(req.Input, inputItem{
Type: "function_call_output",
CallID: msg.ToolCallID,
Type: outputType,
CallID: callID,
Output: msg.Content,
})
default:
@@ -249,12 +340,25 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) buildResponsesRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequ
}
req.Instructions = strings.Join(instructions, "\n\n")
for _, tool := range request.Tools {
req.Tools = append(req.Tools, responsesTool{
Type: "function",
Name: tool.Name,
Description: tool.Description,
Parameters: tool.Parameters,
})
definition := tool
if definition.Name == "apply_patch" && definition.Type == zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFreeform {
definition.Description = "The apply_patch tool edits files from a raw structured patch. Use absolute file paths in patch headers to target a granted extra write root. Do not wrap the patch in JSON."
definition.Format = &zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Type: "grammar", Syntax: "lark", Definition: applyPatchLarkGrammar}
}
wireTool := responsesTool{
Type: string(definition.Type),
Name: definition.Name,
Description: definition.Description,
Parameters: definition.Parameters,
Format: definition.Format,
}
if wireTool.Type == "" {
wireTool.Type = string(zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFunction)
}
if wireTool.Type == string(zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFreeform) {
wireTool.Parameters = nil
}
req.Tools = append(req.Tools, wireTool)
}
// Codex / o-series reasoning models take the effort tier nested under
// `reasoning` on the Responses API (the chat-completions `reasoning_effort`
@@ -312,13 +416,26 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) assistantInputItems(msg zeroruntime.Message) ([]inputIte
if tc.Name == "" {
return nil, errors.New("codex provider: assistant tool call missing name")
}
items = append(items, inputItem{
Type: "function_call",
ID: tc.ID,
CallID: tc.ID,
Name: tc.Name,
Arguments: tc.Arguments,
})
callID := tc.ProviderCallID
if callID == "" {
callID = tc.ID
}
itemType := "function_call"
if tc.Freeform {
itemType = "custom_tool_call"
}
item := inputItem{
Type: itemType,
ID: tc.ID,
CallID: callID,
Name: tc.Name,
}
if tc.Freeform {
item.Input = tc.Arguments
} else {
item.Arguments = tc.Arguments
}
items = append(items, item)
}
return items, nil
}
@@ -479,6 +596,18 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) emitResponsesEvent(
state.done = true
return false
}
return p.emitParsedResponsesEvent(ctx, &event, state, events)
}
// emitParsedResponsesEvent converts one already-decoded Responses event into
// zero or more runtime events. WebSocket sessions use this path to avoid
// decoding each frame twice; the SSE path retains emitResponsesEvent above.
func (p *CodexProvider) emitParsedResponsesEvent(
ctx context.Context,
event *responsesEvent,
state *responsesState,
events chan<- zeroruntime.StreamEvent,
) bool {
if event.Type == "" {
// A payload that parses as JSON but carries no `type` field is a
// malformed Responses event — the type is the discriminator that
@@ -500,12 +629,17 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) emitResponsesEvent(
// the runtime. response.incomplete is folded into a length finish at
// scan-end (state.done stays false so the wrapper emits the
// StreamEventDone with FinishReasonLength).
if event.Response != nil && event.Response.ID != "" {
state.responseID = event.Response.ID
}
return true
case responsesEventOutputItemAdded:
p.handleOutputItemAdded(ctx, &event, state, events)
p.handleOutputItemAdded(ctx, event, state, events)
return true
case responsesEventOutputTextDelta:
if event.Delta != "" {
state.emitted = true
state.text.WriteString(event.Delta)
providerio.SendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText,
Content: event.Delta,
@@ -517,6 +651,7 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) emitResponsesEvent(
// phase shows progress (and keeps the activity clock fresh) instead of
// looking like a hang. Requested via reasoning.summary="auto".
if event.Delta != "" {
state.emitted = true
providerio.SendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventReasoning,
Content: event.Delta,
@@ -524,13 +659,16 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) emitResponsesEvent(
}
return true
case responsesEventFunctionArgsDelta:
p.handleFunctionArgsDelta(ctx, &event, state, events)
p.handleToolInputDelta(ctx, event, state, events, false)
return true
case responsesEventCustomInputDelta:
p.handleToolInputDelta(ctx, event, state, events, true)
return true
case responsesEventOutputItemDone:
p.handleOutputItemDone(ctx, &event, state, events)
p.handleOutputItemDone(ctx, event, state, events)
return true
case responsesEventCompleted, responsesEventFailed:
return p.handleTerminalResponse(ctx, &event, state, events)
return p.handleTerminalResponse(ctx, event, state, events)
case responsesEventError:
message := event.Message
if event.Code != "" {
@@ -570,22 +708,38 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) handleOutputItemAdded(
return
}
switch event.Item.Type {
case "function_call":
case "function_call", "custom_tool_call":
key := p.toolCallKey(event)
if key == "" {
return
}
builder := &toolCallBuilder{
ID: key,
Name: event.Item.Name,
builder, exists := state.toolCalls[key]
if !exists {
builder = &toolCallBuilder{ID: key, Freeform: event.Item.Type == "custom_tool_call"}
state.toolCalls[key] = builder
state.toolOrder = append(state.toolOrder, key)
}
if event.Item.CallID != "" {
builder.CallID = event.Item.CallID
}
if event.Item.Name != "" {
builder.Name = event.Item.Name
}
builder.Freeform = builder.Freeform || event.Item.Type == "custom_tool_call"
if builder.Freeform && event.Item.Input != "" && builder.Arguments.Len() == 0 {
builder.Arguments.WriteString(event.Item.Input)
}
state.emitted = true
if !builder.started {
providerio.SendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart,
ToolCallID: key,
ToolCallProviderID: builder.CallID,
ToolName: builder.Name,
ToolCallFreeform: builder.Freeform,
})
builder.started = true
}
state.toolCalls[key] = builder
providerio.SendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart,
ToolCallID: key,
ToolName: event.Item.Name,
})
builder.started = true
}
}
@@ -593,11 +747,12 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) handleOutputItemAdded(
// to the in-flight builder and emits StreamEventToolCallDelta. The
// Codex backend uses either `item_id` or `output_index` to attribute
// the delta; we honor both.
func (p *CodexProvider) handleFunctionArgsDelta(
func (p *CodexProvider) handleToolInputDelta(
ctx context.Context,
event *responsesEvent,
state *responsesState,
events chan<- zeroruntime.StreamEvent,
freeform bool,
) {
key := p.toolCallKey(event)
if key == "" {
@@ -610,10 +765,16 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) handleFunctionArgsDelta(
// an intermediate proxy). Treat the delta as the start of a new
// tool call with no known name yet — the eventual
// response.output_item.done carries the final name.
builder = &toolCallBuilder{ID: key}
builder = &toolCallBuilder{ID: key, Freeform: freeform}
state.toolCalls[key] = builder
state.toolOrder = append(state.toolOrder, key)
}
builder.Freeform = builder.Freeform || freeform
if event.CallID != "" && builder.CallID == "" {
builder.CallID = event.CallID
}
builder.Arguments.WriteString(event.Delta)
state.emitted = true
providerio.SendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta,
ToolCallID: key,
@@ -632,7 +793,7 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) handleOutputItemDone(
state *responsesState,
events chan<- zeroruntime.StreamEvent,
) {
if event.Item == nil || event.Item.Type != "function_call" {
if event.Item == nil || (event.Item.Type != "function_call" && event.Item.Type != "custom_tool_call") {
return
}
key := p.toolCallKey(event)
@@ -641,20 +802,31 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) handleOutputItemDone(
}
builder, ok := state.toolCalls[key]
if !ok {
builder = &toolCallBuilder{ID: key}
builder = &toolCallBuilder{ID: key, Freeform: event.Item.Type == "custom_tool_call"}
state.toolCalls[key] = builder
state.toolOrder = append(state.toolOrder, key)
}
if event.Item.Name != "" {
builder.Name = event.Item.Name
}
if event.Item.Arguments != "" && builder.Arguments.Len() == 0 {
builder.Arguments.WriteString(event.Item.Arguments)
if event.Item.CallID != "" {
builder.CallID = event.Item.CallID
}
builder.Freeform = builder.Freeform || event.Item.Type == "custom_tool_call"
finalInput := event.Item.Arguments
if builder.Freeform {
finalInput = event.Item.Input
}
if finalInput != "" && builder.Arguments.Len() == 0 {
builder.Arguments.WriteString(finalInput)
}
if !builder.started {
providerio.SendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart,
ToolCallID: key,
ToolName: builder.Name,
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart,
ToolCallID: key,
ToolCallProviderID: builder.CallID,
ToolName: builder.Name,
ToolCallFreeform: builder.Freeform,
})
builder.started = true
}
@@ -664,6 +836,7 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) handleOutputItemDone(
ToolName: builder.Name,
})
builder.ended = true
state.emitted = true
}
// handleTerminalResponse emits the final usage + done event for a
@@ -693,6 +866,7 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) handleTerminalResponse(
return false
}
state.usage = event.Response.Usage
state.responseID = event.Response.ID
if event.Response.Usage != nil {
usage := zeroruntime.Usage{
InputTokens: event.Response.Usage.InputTokens,
@@ -700,6 +874,7 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) handleTerminalResponse(
}
if event.Response.Usage.InputTokensDetails != nil {
usage.CachedInputTokens = event.Response.Usage.InputTokensDetails.CachedTokens
usage.CacheWriteTokens = event.Response.Usage.InputTokensDetails.CacheWriteTokens
}
if event.Response.Usage.OutputTokensDetails != nil {
usage.ReasoningTokens = event.Response.Usage.OutputTokensDetails.ReasoningTokens
@@ -735,7 +910,7 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) handleTerminalResponse(
state.done = true
return false
}
providerio.SendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone})
providerio.SendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone, ResponseID: event.Response.ID})
state.done = true
return false
}
@@ -754,6 +929,9 @@ func (p *CodexProvider) toolCallKey(event *responsesEvent) string {
if event.Item != nil && event.Item.CallID != "" {
return event.Item.CallID
}
if event.CallID != "" {
return event.CallID
}
if event.OutputIndex != nil {
// output_index is present (a *int distinguishes a real 0 — the first output
// in the response — from "absent"), so key on it even when 0 instead of
+421
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
package openai
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"reflect"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/coder/websocket"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers/providerio"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
const (
responsesWebSocketBetaHeader = "OpenAI-Beta"
responsesWebSocketBetaValue = "responses_websockets=2026-02-06"
responsesWebSocketRequest = "response.create"
previousResponseNotFoundCode = "previous_response_not_found"
webSocketConnectionLimitCode = "websocket_connection_limit_reached"
responsesWebSocketReadLimit = 16 << 20
)
var errCodexTurnSessionBusy = errors.New("codex turn session already has an active stream")
// NewCodexTurnSessionProvider enables one Responses WebSocket connection for
// each agent run. The session falls back to the existing HTTP/SSE provider when
// the endpoint cannot upgrade or loses its response chain.
func NewCodexTurnSessionProvider(provider *CodexProvider, caps zeroruntime.ProviderCapabilities) zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider {
return &codexTurnSessionProvider{provider: provider, caps: caps}
}
type codexTurnSessionProvider struct {
provider *CodexProvider
caps zeroruntime.ProviderCapabilities
}
func (provider *codexTurnSessionProvider) OpenTurnSession(ctx context.Context) (zeroruntime.TurnSession, error) {
if provider == nil || provider.provider == nil || provider.provider.inner == nil {
return nil, errors.New("codex turn session requires a provider")
}
sessionCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
return &codexTurnSession{
ctx: sessionCtx,
cancel: cancel,
provider: provider.provider,
prewarmDone: make(chan struct{}),
}, nil
}
func (provider *codexTurnSessionProvider) Capabilities() zeroruntime.ProviderCapabilities {
return provider.caps
}
type codexTurnSession struct {
ctx context.Context
cancel context.CancelFunc
provider *CodexProvider
mu sync.Mutex
connection *websocket.Conn
webSocketOff bool
lastRequest *responsesRequest
lastResponseID string
lastOutput []inputItem
streamActive bool
prewarmOnce sync.Once
prewarmDone chan struct{}
closeOnce sync.Once
}
// Prewarm starts the WebSocket handshake without blocking prompt assembly. The
// first Stream waits for this bounded attempt; failure simply selects HTTP/SSE.
func (session *codexTurnSession) Prewarm(ctx context.Context) error {
session.prewarmOnce.Do(func() {
go func() {
defer close(session.prewarmDone)
prewarmCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(session.ctx, prewarmTimeout)
defer cancel()
recorder := trace.FromContext(ctx)
span := recorder.Span(trace.SpanProviderPrewarm)
defer span.End()
recorder.Counter(trace.CounterPrewarmAttempts, 1)
connection, err := session.provider.dialResponsesWebSocket(prewarmCtx)
session.mu.Lock()
defer session.mu.Unlock()
if err != nil {
session.webSocketOff = true
return
}
session.connection = connection
}()
})
return nil
}
func (session *codexTurnSession) Stream(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
_ = session.Prewarm(ctx)
select {
case <-session.prewarmDone:
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
fullRequest, err := session.provider.buildResponsesRequest(request)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
session.mu.Lock()
if session.streamActive {
session.mu.Unlock()
return nil, errCodexTurnSessionBusy
}
if session.webSocketOff || session.connection == nil {
session.mu.Unlock()
trace.FromContext(ctx).Counter(trace.CounterResponsesHTTPFallback, 1)
return session.provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
}
session.streamActive = true
connection := session.connection
wireRequest := *fullRequest
wireRequest.Type = responsesWebSocketRequest
if delta, ok := responseInputDelta(session.lastRequest, session.lastOutput, fullRequest); ok && session.lastResponseID != "" {
wireRequest.PreviousResponseID = session.lastResponseID
wireRequest.Input = delta
trace.FromContext(ctx).Counter(trace.CounterResponseChainReused, 1)
} else if session.lastRequest != nil {
trace.FromContext(ctx).Counter(trace.CounterResponseChainReset, 1)
session.lastRequest = nil
session.lastResponseID = ""
session.lastOutput = nil
}
session.mu.Unlock()
body, err := json.Marshal(wireRequest)
if err != nil {
session.releaseStream()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encode codex websocket request: %w", err)
}
events := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 16)
go func() {
defer close(events)
defer session.releaseStream()
session.streamWebSocket(ctx, connection, body, fullRequest, request, events)
}()
return events, nil
}
func (session *codexTurnSession) releaseStream() {
session.mu.Lock()
session.streamActive = false
session.mu.Unlock()
}
func (session *codexTurnSession) Compact(context.Context, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) ([]zeroruntime.Message, error) {
return nil, zeroruntime.ErrCompactionUnsupported
}
func (session *codexTurnSession) Close() error {
session.closeOnce.Do(func() {
session.cancel()
session.prewarmOnce.Do(func() { close(session.prewarmDone) })
select {
case <-session.prewarmDone:
case <-time.After(prewarmTimeout):
}
session.mu.Lock()
connection := session.connection
session.connection = nil
session.webSocketOff = true
session.mu.Unlock()
if connection != nil {
_ = connection.CloseNow()
}
})
return nil
}
func responseInputDelta(previous *responsesRequest, output []inputItem, current *responsesRequest) ([]inputItem, bool) {
if previous == nil || current == nil || !responsesRequestPropertiesEqual(previous, current) {
return nil, false
}
prefix := make([]inputItem, 0, len(previous.Input)+len(output))
prefix = append(prefix, previous.Input...)
prefix = append(prefix, output...)
if len(current.Input) <= len(prefix) || !reflect.DeepEqual(current.Input[:len(prefix)], prefix) {
return nil, false
}
return append([]inputItem(nil), current.Input[len(prefix):]...), true
}
func responsesRequestPropertiesEqual(left, right *responsesRequest) bool {
return left.Model == right.Model &&
left.Instructions == right.Instructions &&
left.Stream == right.Stream &&
left.Store == right.Store &&
left.ParallelToolCalls == right.ParallelToolCalls &&
left.MaxOutputTokens == right.MaxOutputTokens &&
reflect.DeepEqual(left.Tools, right.Tools) &&
reflect.DeepEqual(left.Reasoning, right.Reasoning) &&
left.ServiceTier == right.ServiceTier &&
left.PromptCacheKey == right.PromptCacheKey
}
func (session *codexTurnSession) streamWebSocket(
ctx context.Context,
connection *websocket.Conn,
body []byte,
fullRequest *responsesRequest,
runtimeRequest zeroruntime.CompletionRequest,
events chan<- zeroruntime.StreamEvent,
) {
if err := connection.Write(ctx, websocket.MessageText, body); err != nil {
session.disableWebSocket(connection)
session.forwardHTTP(ctx, runtimeRequest, events)
return
}
state := newResponsesState()
for {
readCtx := ctx
cancel := func() {}
idleTimeout := session.provider.inner.streamIdleTimeout
if idleTimeout > 0 {
readCtx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, idleTimeout)
}
messageType, data, err := connection.Read(readCtx)
readTimedOut := errors.Is(readCtx.Err(), context.DeadlineExceeded) && ctx.Err() == nil
cancel()
if err != nil {
session.disableWebSocket(connection)
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return
}
if !state.emitted {
session.forwardHTTP(ctx, runtimeRequest, events)
return
}
errorMessage := err.Error()
if readTimedOut {
errorMessage = providerio.StreamTimeoutMessage(providerio.ErrStreamIdle, idleTimeout)
}
providerio.SendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
Error: session.provider.redact("provider stream error: " + errorMessage),
})
return
}
if messageType != websocket.MessageText {
continue
}
var responseEvent responsesEvent
decodeErr := json.Unmarshal(data, &responseEvent)
if decodeErr == nil {
if (responseEvent.Code == previousResponseNotFoundCode || responseEvent.Code == webSocketConnectionLimitCode) &&
!state.emitted {
session.disableWebSocket(connection)
session.forwardHTTP(ctx, runtimeRequest, events)
return
}
if responseEvent.Type == responsesEventIncomplete {
session.resetResponseChain(connection)
providerio.SendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone,
FinishReason: zeroruntime.FinishReasonLength,
})
return
}
}
keepReading := false
if decodeErr == nil {
keepReading = session.provider.emitParsedResponsesEvent(ctx, &responseEvent, state, events)
} else {
keepReading = session.provider.emitResponsesEvent(ctx, string(data), state, events)
}
if keepReading {
continue
}
if responseEvent.Type == responsesEventCompleted && responseEvent.Response != nil &&
responseEvent.Response.Error == nil && responseEvent.Response.Status != "failed" && state.responseID != "" {
session.mu.Lock()
if session.connection == connection && !session.webSocketOff {
requestCopy := *fullRequest
requestCopy.Input = append([]inputItem(nil), fullRequest.Input...)
session.lastRequest = &requestCopy
session.lastResponseID = state.responseID
session.lastOutput = state.outputInputItems()
}
session.mu.Unlock()
}
return
}
}
func (session *codexTurnSession) resetResponseChain(connection *websocket.Conn) {
session.mu.Lock()
defer session.mu.Unlock()
if session.connection != connection {
return
}
session.lastRequest = nil
session.lastResponseID = ""
session.lastOutput = nil
}
func (session *codexTurnSession) forwardHTTP(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest, events chan<- zeroruntime.StreamEvent) {
trace.FromContext(ctx).Counter(trace.CounterResponsesHTTPFallback, 1)
stream, err := session.provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
if err != nil {
providerio.SendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
Error: session.provider.redact(err.Error()),
})
return
}
for event := range stream {
providerio.SendEvent(ctx, events, event)
}
}
func (session *codexTurnSession) disableWebSocket(connection *websocket.Conn) {
session.mu.Lock()
if session.connection == connection {
session.connection = nil
session.webSocketOff = true
session.lastRequest = nil
session.lastResponseID = ""
session.lastOutput = nil
}
session.mu.Unlock()
_ = connection.CloseNow()
}
func (provider *CodexProvider) dialResponsesWebSocket(ctx context.Context) (*websocket.Conn, error) {
endpoint, err := responsesWebSocketURL(provider.inner.endpoint)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for authTry := 0; authTry < 2; authTry++ {
headers, err := provider.responsesWebSocketHeaders(ctx, authTry == 1)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
connection, response, err := websocket.Dial(ctx, endpoint, &websocket.DialOptions{
HTTPClient: provider.inner.httpClient,
HTTPHeader: headers,
CompressionMode: websocket.CompressionNoContextTakeover,
})
if err == nil {
connection.SetReadLimit(responsesWebSocketReadLimit)
return connection, nil
}
if response == nil || response.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized || provider.inner.oauthResolver == nil || authTry == 1 {
return nil, err
}
}
return nil, errors.New("codex websocket authentication failed")
}
func (provider *CodexProvider) responsesWebSocketHeaders(ctx context.Context, forceRefresh bool) (http.Header, error) {
request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, provider.inner.endpoint, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
base := providerio.AuthHeaders{
APIKey: provider.inner.apiKey,
DefaultAuthHeader: "Authorization",
DefaultAuthScheme: "Bearer",
AuthHeader: provider.inner.authHeader,
AuthScheme: provider.inner.authScheme,
AuthHeaderValue: provider.inner.authHeaderValue,
CustomHeaders: provider.inner.customHeaders,
}
if resolver := provider.inner.oauthResolver; resolver != nil {
header, value, ok, err := resolver(ctx, forceRefresh)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if ok {
providerio.ApplyAuthHeaders(request, providerio.AuthHeaders{CustomHeaders: provider.inner.customHeaders})
if strings.TrimSpace(header) == "" {
header = "Authorization"
}
request.Header.Set(header, value)
} else {
providerio.ApplyAuthHeaders(request, base)
}
} else {
providerio.ApplyAuthHeaders(request, base)
}
provider.injectCodexHeaders(request)
request.Header.Set(responsesWebSocketBetaHeader, responsesWebSocketBetaValue)
return request.Header.Clone(), nil
}
func responsesWebSocketURL(endpoint string) (string, error) {
parsed, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(endpoint))
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
switch parsed.Scheme {
case "http":
parsed.Scheme = "ws"
case "https":
parsed.Scheme = "wss"
default:
return "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported Responses websocket URL scheme %q", parsed.Scheme)
}
return parsed.String(), nil
}
@@ -0,0 +1,590 @@
package openai
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/coder/websocket"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestCodexTurnSessionChainsOnlyAppendOnlyRequests(t *testing.T) {
var mu sync.Mutex
requests := []map[string]any{}
betaHeader := ""
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
if !strings.EqualFold(request.Header.Get("Upgrade"), "websocket") {
http.Error(writer, "websocket required", http.StatusUpgradeRequired)
return
}
mu.Lock()
betaHeader = request.Header.Get(responsesWebSocketBetaHeader)
mu.Unlock()
connection, err := websocket.Accept(writer, request, nil)
if err != nil {
return
}
defer connection.CloseNow()
for index := 0; index < 3; index++ {
_, body, err := connection.Read(request.Context())
if err != nil {
return
}
var payload map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &payload); err != nil {
return
}
mu.Lock()
requests = append(requests, payload)
mu.Unlock()
switch index {
case 0:
writeWebSocketEvents(request.Context(), connection,
`{"type":"response.created","response":{"id":"resp-1","status":"in_progress"}}`,
`{"type":"response.output_item.added","item_id":"call-1","item":{"type":"function_call","id":"call-1","call_id":"call-1","name":"read_file"}}`,
`{"type":"response.function_call_arguments.delta","item_id":"call-1","delta":"{}"}`,
`{"type":"response.output_item.done","item_id":"call-1","item":{"type":"function_call","id":"call-1","call_id":"call-1","name":"read_file","arguments":"{}"}}`,
`{"type":"response.completed","response":{"id":"resp-1","status":"completed"}}`,
)
case 1:
writeWebSocketEvents(request.Context(), connection,
`{"type":"response.output_text.delta","delta":"done"}`,
`{"type":"response.completed","response":{"id":"resp-2","status":"completed"}}`,
)
case 2:
writeWebSocketEvents(request.Context(), connection,
`{"type":"response.completed","response":{"id":"resp-3","status":"completed"}}`,
)
}
}
}))
defer server.Close()
provider := newCodexSessionTestProvider(t, server)
// A disabled stream watchdog must use the parent context rather than creating
// an immediately-expired read deadline.
provider.inner.streamIdleTimeout = 0
session := openCodexSession(t, provider)
defer session.Close()
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("session-1", "run-1", "test")
recorder.Start()
streamContext := trace.WithContext(t.Context(), recorder)
base := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "Use tools carefully."},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Read the file."},
},
Tools: []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object"}}},
PromptCacheKey: "session-1",
}
first := collectCodexSessionEvents(t, session, base)
if !hasToolCallEnd(first, "call-1") {
t.Fatalf("first stream did not produce the tool call: %#v", first)
}
second := base
second.Messages = append(append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), base.Messages...),
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "call-1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: "{}"}}},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "call-1", Content: "contents"},
)
secondEvents := collectCodexSessionEventsContext(t, streamContext, session, second)
if got := joinedText(secondEvents); got != "done" {
t.Fatalf("second stream text = %q, want done", got)
}
third := second
third.ReasoningEffort = "high"
third.Messages = append(append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), second.Messages...),
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "done"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Continue."},
)
collectCodexSessionEventsContext(t, streamContext, session, third)
finishedTrace := recorder.Finish()
if got := finishedTrace.Counter(trace.CounterResponseChainReused); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("response-chain reuse count = %d, want 1", got)
}
if got := finishedTrace.Counter(trace.CounterResponseChainReset); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("response-chain reset count = %d, want 1", got)
}
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
if len(requests) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("websocket requests = %d, want 3", len(requests))
}
if betaHeader != responsesWebSocketBetaValue {
t.Fatalf("OpenAI-Beta = %q, want %q", betaHeader, responsesWebSocketBetaValue)
}
if requests[0]["type"] != responsesWebSocketRequest || requests[0]["previous_response_id"] != nil {
t.Fatalf("first request chaining fields = %#v", requests[0])
}
if requests[0]["parallel_tool_calls"] != true || requests[0]["prompt_cache_key"] != "session-1" {
t.Fatalf("first request stable fields = %#v", requests[0])
}
if requests[1]["previous_response_id"] != "resp-1" {
t.Fatalf("second previous_response_id = %#v", requests[1]["previous_response_id"])
}
secondInput, _ := requests[1]["input"].([]any)
if len(secondInput) != 1 || secondInput[0].(map[string]any)["type"] != "function_call_output" {
t.Fatalf("second incremental input = %#v", requests[1]["input"])
}
if requests[2]["previous_response_id"] != nil {
t.Fatalf("incompatible request reused response chain: %#v", requests[2])
}
thirdInput, _ := requests[2]["input"].([]any)
if len(thirdInput) <= 1 {
t.Fatalf("incompatible request did not send full input: %#v", thirdInput)
}
}
func TestCodexTurnSessionFallsBackWhenPreviousResponseIsMissing(t *testing.T) {
var mu sync.Mutex
webSocketRequests := 0
httpRequests := 0
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
if strings.EqualFold(request.Header.Get("Upgrade"), "websocket") {
connection, err := websocket.Accept(writer, request, nil)
if err != nil {
return
}
defer connection.CloseNow()
for index := 0; index < 2; index++ {
if _, _, err := connection.Read(request.Context()); err != nil {
return
}
mu.Lock()
webSocketRequests++
mu.Unlock()
if index == 0 {
writeWebSocketEvents(request.Context(), connection,
`{"type":"response.output_item.added","item_id":"call-1","item":{"type":"function_call","id":"call-1","call_id":"call-1","name":"read_file"}}`,
`{"type":"response.output_item.done","item_id":"call-1","item":{"type":"function_call","id":"call-1","call_id":"call-1","name":"read_file","arguments":"{}"}}`,
`{"type":"response.completed","response":{"id":"resp-1","status":"completed"}}`,
)
continue
}
writeWebSocketEvents(request.Context(), connection,
`{"type":"response.error","code":"previous_response_not_found","message":"missing"}`,
)
}
return
}
mu.Lock()
httpRequests++
mu.Unlock()
writer.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(writer, "data: {\"type\":\"response.output_text.delta\",\"delta\":\"fallback\"}\n\n")
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(writer, "data: {\"type\":\"response.completed\",\"response\":{\"id\":\"resp-http\",\"status\":\"completed\"}}\n\n")
}))
defer server.Close()
provider := newCodexSessionTestProvider(t, server)
session := openCodexSession(t, provider)
defer session.Close()
base := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Read it."}},
Tools: []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object"}}},
}
collectCodexSessionEvents(t, session, base)
second := base
second.Messages = append(append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), base.Messages...),
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "call-1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: "{}"}}},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "call-1", Content: "contents"},
)
events := collectCodexSessionEvents(t, session, second)
if got := joinedText(events); got != "fallback" {
t.Fatalf("fallback stream text = %q, want fallback; events=%#v", got, events)
}
for _, event := range events {
if event.Type == zeroruntime.StreamEventError {
t.Fatalf("response-chain recovery leaked an error: %#v", event)
}
}
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
if webSocketRequests != 2 || httpRequests != 1 {
t.Fatalf("requests = websocket:%d http:%d, want 2/1", webSocketRequests, httpRequests)
}
}
func TestCodexTurnSessionFallsBackWhenSocketClosesBeforeOutput(t *testing.T) {
var mu sync.Mutex
httpRequests := 0
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
if strings.EqualFold(request.Header.Get("Upgrade"), "websocket") {
connection, err := websocket.Accept(writer, request, nil)
if err != nil {
return
}
if _, _, err := connection.Read(request.Context()); err == nil {
_ = connection.CloseNow()
}
return
}
mu.Lock()
httpRequests++
mu.Unlock()
writer.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(writer, "data: {\"type\":\"response.output_text.delta\",\"delta\":\"recovered\"}\n\n")
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(writer, "data: {\"type\":\"response.completed\",\"response\":{\"id\":\"resp-http\",\"status\":\"completed\"}}\n\n")
}))
defer server.Close()
provider := newCodexSessionTestProvider(t, server)
session := openCodexSession(t, provider)
defer session.Close()
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("session-fallback", "run-fallback", "test")
recorder.Start()
events := collectCodexSessionEventsContext(t, trace.WithContext(t.Context(), recorder), session, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Hello"}},
})
if got := joinedText(events); got != "recovered" {
t.Fatalf("fallback text = %q, want recovered", got)
}
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
if httpRequests != 1 {
t.Fatalf("HTTP fallback requests = %d, want 1", httpRequests)
}
if got := recorder.Finish().Counter(trace.CounterResponsesHTTPFallback); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("responses HTTP fallback counter = %d, want 1", got)
}
}
func TestCodexTurnSessionKeepsWebSocketAfterIncompleteResponse(t *testing.T) {
var mu sync.Mutex
webSocketRequests := 0
httpRequests := 0
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
if strings.EqualFold(request.Header.Get("Upgrade"), "websocket") {
connection, err := websocket.Accept(writer, request, nil)
if err != nil {
return
}
defer connection.CloseNow()
for index := 0; index < 2; index++ {
if _, _, err := connection.Read(request.Context()); err != nil {
return
}
mu.Lock()
webSocketRequests++
mu.Unlock()
if index == 0 {
writeWebSocketEvents(request.Context(), connection,
`{"type":"response.incomplete","response":{"id":"resp-1","status":"incomplete"}}`,
)
continue
}
writeWebSocketEvents(request.Context(), connection,
`{"type":"response.output_text.delta","delta":"websocket"}`,
`{"type":"response.completed","response":{"id":"resp-2","status":"completed"}}`,
)
}
return
}
mu.Lock()
httpRequests++
mu.Unlock()
writer.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(writer, "data: {\"type\":\"response.output_text.delta\",\"delta\":\"fallback\"}\n\n")
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(writer, "data: {\"type\":\"response.completed\",\"response\":{\"id\":\"resp-http\",\"status\":\"completed\"}}\n\n")
}))
defer server.Close()
provider := newCodexSessionTestProvider(t, server)
session := openCodexSession(t, provider)
defer session.Close()
request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Continue."}},
}
first := collectCodexSessionEvents(t, session, request)
if len(first) != 1 || first[0].Type != zeroruntime.StreamEventDone || first[0].FinishReason != zeroruntime.FinishReasonLength {
t.Fatalf("incomplete response events = %#v, want length completion", first)
}
second := collectCodexSessionEvents(t, session, request)
if got := joinedText(second); got != "websocket" {
t.Fatalf("second turn text = %q, want websocket; events=%#v", got, second)
}
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
if webSocketRequests != 2 || httpRequests != 0 {
t.Fatalf("requests = websocket:%d http:%d, want 2/0", webSocketRequests, httpRequests)
}
}
func TestCodexTurnSessionDoesNotReplayAfterVisibleOutput(t *testing.T) {
var mu sync.Mutex
httpRequests := 0
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
if strings.EqualFold(request.Header.Get("Upgrade"), "websocket") {
connection, err := websocket.Accept(writer, request, nil)
if err != nil {
return
}
if _, _, err := connection.Read(request.Context()); err == nil {
writeWebSocketEvents(request.Context(), connection,
`{"type":"response.output_text.delta","delta":"visible"}`,
)
}
_ = connection.Close(websocket.StatusInternalError, "interrupted")
return
}
mu.Lock()
httpRequests++
mu.Unlock()
}))
defer server.Close()
provider := newCodexSessionTestProvider(t, server)
session := openCodexSession(t, provider)
defer session.Close()
stream, err := session.Stream(t.Context(), zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Hello"}},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Stream: %v", err)
}
sawText, sawError := false, false
for event := range stream {
sawText = sawText || event.Type == zeroruntime.StreamEventText
sawError = sawError || event.Type == zeroruntime.StreamEventError
}
if !sawText || !sawError {
t.Fatalf("visible interrupted stream = text:%v error:%v", sawText, sawError)
}
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
if httpRequests != 0 {
t.Fatalf("visible interrupted stream was replayed over HTTP %d time(s)", httpRequests)
}
}
func TestCodexTurnSessionReportsWebSocketIdleTimeout(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
connection, err := websocket.Accept(writer, request, nil)
if err != nil {
return
}
defer connection.CloseNow()
if _, _, err := connection.Read(request.Context()); err != nil {
return
}
writeWebSocketEvents(request.Context(), connection,
`{"type":"response.output_text.delta","delta":"visible"}`,
)
<-request.Context().Done()
}))
defer server.Close()
provider := newCodexSessionTestProvider(t, server)
provider.inner.streamIdleTimeout = 200 * time.Millisecond
session := openCodexSession(t, provider)
defer session.Close()
stream, err := session.Stream(t.Context(), zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Hello"}},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Stream: %v", err)
}
var streamError string
for event := range stream {
if event.Type == zeroruntime.StreamEventError {
streamError = event.Error
break
}
}
if !strings.Contains(streamError, "idle timeout after 200ms") {
t.Fatalf("stream error = %q, want idle-timeout detail", streamError)
}
}
func TestCodexTurnSessionRejectsOverlappingStreams(t *testing.T) {
started := make(chan struct{})
release := make(chan struct{})
var releaseOnce sync.Once
releaseStream := func() { releaseOnce.Do(func() { close(release) }) }
t.Cleanup(releaseStream)
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
connection, err := websocket.Accept(writer, request, nil)
if err != nil {
return
}
defer connection.CloseNow()
if _, _, err := connection.Read(request.Context()); err != nil {
return
}
close(started)
<-release
writeWebSocketEvents(request.Context(), connection,
`{"type":"response.completed","response":{"id":"resp-1","status":"completed"}}`,
)
}))
defer server.Close()
provider := newCodexSessionTestProvider(t, server)
session := openCodexSession(t, provider)
defer session.Close()
request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Hello"}},
}
first, err := session.Stream(t.Context(), request)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Stream: %v", err)
}
select {
case <-started:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("first WebSocket stream did not start")
}
if _, err := session.Stream(t.Context(), request); !errors.Is(err, errCodexTurnSessionBusy) {
t.Fatalf("overlapping Stream error = %v, want %v", err, errCodexTurnSessionBusy)
}
releaseStream()
for range first {
}
}
func TestCodexTurnSessionHTTPFallbackRedactsSetupError(t *testing.T) {
const secret = "sk-secret-fallback"
provider, err := NewCodexProvider(CodexOptions{Options: Options{
APIKey: secret,
BaseURL: "https://chatgpt.example/backend-api/codex",
Model: "gpt-test",
}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewCodexProvider: %v", err)
}
session := &codexTurnSession{provider: provider}
events := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 1)
session.forwardHTTP(t.Context(), zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRole(secret), Content: "invalid"}},
}, events)
select {
case event := <-events:
if event.Type != zeroruntime.StreamEventError {
t.Fatalf("fallback event type = %s, want error", event.Type)
}
if strings.Contains(event.Error, secret) {
t.Fatalf("fallback error leaked credential: %q", event.Error)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("fallback did not emit setup error")
}
}
func TestCodexTurnSessionCloseDoesNotStartPrewarm(t *testing.T) {
provider, err := NewCodexProvider(CodexOptions{Options: Options{
APIKey: "test-token",
BaseURL: "https://chatgpt.example/backend-api/codex",
Model: "gpt-test",
}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewCodexProvider: %v", err)
}
session, err := NewCodexTurnSessionProvider(provider, zeroruntime.ProviderCapabilities{}).OpenTurnSession(t.Context())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("OpenTurnSession: %v", err)
}
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- session.Close() }()
select {
case err := <-done:
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Close() error = %v", err)
}
case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
t.Fatal("Close blocked without a prewarm attempt")
}
}
func newCodexSessionTestProvider(t *testing.T, server *httptest.Server) *CodexProvider {
t.Helper()
provider, err := NewCodexProvider(CodexOptions{
Options: Options{
APIKey: "test-token",
BaseURL: server.URL,
Model: "gpt-test",
HTTPClient: server.Client(),
},
AccountID: "account-test",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewCodexProvider: %v", err)
}
return provider
}
func openCodexSession(t *testing.T, provider *CodexProvider) zeroruntime.TurnSession {
t.Helper()
session, err := NewCodexTurnSessionProvider(provider, zeroruntime.ProviderCapabilities{}).OpenTurnSession(t.Context())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("OpenTurnSession: %v", err)
}
if err := session.Prewarm(t.Context()); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Prewarm: %v", err)
}
return session
}
func collectCodexSessionEvents(t *testing.T, session zeroruntime.TurnSession, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) []zeroruntime.StreamEvent {
t.Helper()
return collectCodexSessionEventsContext(t, t.Context(), session, request)
}
func collectCodexSessionEventsContext(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, session zeroruntime.TurnSession, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) []zeroruntime.StreamEvent {
t.Helper()
stream, err := session.Stream(ctx, request)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Stream: %v", err)
}
events := []zeroruntime.StreamEvent{}
for event := range stream {
events = append(events, event)
if event.Type == zeroruntime.StreamEventError {
t.Fatalf("stream error: %s", event.Error)
}
}
return events
}
func writeWebSocketEvents(ctx context.Context, connection *websocket.Conn, events ...string) {
for _, event := range events {
if err := connection.Write(ctx, websocket.MessageText, []byte(event)); err != nil {
return
}
}
}
func hasToolCallEnd(events []zeroruntime.StreamEvent, id string) bool {
for _, event := range events {
if event.Type == zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd && event.ToolCallID == id {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func joinedText(events []zeroruntime.StreamEvent) string {
var builder strings.Builder
for _, event := range events {
if event.Type == zeroruntime.StreamEventText {
builder.WriteString(event.Content)
}
}
return builder.String()
}
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package openai
import (
"context"
"reflect"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
@@ -25,6 +27,126 @@ func TestToolCallKeyOutputIndexZero(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestResponsesStatePreservesDistinctCallID(t *testing.T) {
provider := &CodexProvider{}
state := newResponsesState()
events := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 4)
provider.handleOutputItemAdded(context.Background(), &responsesEvent{
ItemID: "item-1",
Item: &itemPayload{
Type: "function_call",
ID: "item-1",
CallID: "call-1",
Name: "read_file",
},
}, state, events)
items := state.outputInputItems()
if len(items) != 1 || items[0].ID != "item-1" || items[0].CallID != "call-1" {
t.Fatalf("captured function call = %#v, want item id item-1 and call id call-1", items)
}
}
func TestCodexCustomApplyPatchStreamProducesFreeformCall(t *testing.T) {
provider := &CodexProvider{}
state := newResponsesState()
events := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 16)
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: hello.txt\n+hello\n*** End Patch\n"
for _, payload := range []string{
`{"type":"response.output_item.added","item_id":"item-1","item":{"type":"custom_tool_call","call_id":"call-1","name":"apply_patch"}}`,
`{"type":"response.custom_tool_call_input.delta","item_id":"item-1","call_id":"call-1","delta":"*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: hello.txt\n"}`,
`{"type":"response.custom_tool_call_input.delta","item_id":"item-1","call_id":"call-1","delta":"+hello\n*** End Patch\n"}`,
`{"type":"response.output_item.done","item_id":"item-1","item":{"type":"custom_tool_call","call_id":"call-1","name":"apply_patch","input":"*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: hello.txt\n+hello\n*** End Patch\n"}}`,
`{"type":"response.completed","response":{"id":"resp-1","status":"completed"}}`,
} {
if keepReading := provider.emitResponsesEvent(context.Background(), payload, state, events); !keepReading && !state.done {
t.Fatalf("stream stopped before terminal event for %s", payload)
}
}
close(events)
collected := zeroruntime.CollectStream(context.Background(), events)
if len(collected.ToolCalls) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("tool calls = %#v, want one", collected.ToolCalls)
}
call := collected.ToolCalls[0]
if call.ID != "item-1" || call.ProviderCallID != "call-1" || call.Name != "apply_patch" || !call.Freeform || call.Arguments != patch {
t.Fatalf("custom apply_patch call = %#v", call)
}
}
func TestCodexApplyPatchUsesFreeformWireContract(t *testing.T) {
provider, err := NewCodexProvider(CodexOptions{Options: Options{
APIKey: "test-token",
BaseURL: "https://chatgpt.example/backend-api/codex",
Model: "gpt-test",
}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewCodexProvider: %v", err)
}
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: hello.txt\n+hello\n*** End Patch\n"
request, err := provider.buildResponsesRequest(zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Add the file."},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{
ID: "item-1", ProviderCallID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: patch, Freeform: true,
}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "item-1", ToolCallProviderID: "call-1", Content: "Done!"},
},
Tools: []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
Name: "apply_patch", Description: "Apply a patch.", Type: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFreeform,
}},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("buildResponsesRequest: %v", err)
}
if len(request.Tools) != 1 || request.Tools[0].Type != string(zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFreeform) ||
request.Tools[0].Format == nil || request.Tools[0].Format.Syntax != "lark" || request.Tools[0].Parameters != nil {
t.Fatalf("apply_patch tool wire shape = %#v", request.Tools)
}
if !strings.Contains(request.Tools[0].Format.Definition, "*** Begin Patch") {
t.Fatalf("apply_patch grammar = %q", request.Tools[0].Format.Definition)
}
if !strings.Contains(request.Tools[0].Description, "absolute file paths") || !strings.Contains(request.Tools[0].Description, "granted extra write root") {
t.Fatalf("apply_patch description does not explain extra-root paths: %q", request.Tools[0].Description)
}
if len(request.Input) != 3 || request.Input[1].Type != "custom_tool_call" || request.Input[1].ID != "item-1" ||
request.Input[1].CallID != "call-1" || request.Input[1].Input != patch ||
request.Input[2].Type != "custom_tool_call_output" || request.Input[2].CallID != "call-1" {
t.Fatalf("custom apply_patch replay input = %#v", request.Input)
}
}
func TestCodexPreservesCustomApplyPatchFunction(t *testing.T) {
provider, err := NewCodexProvider(CodexOptions{Options: Options{
APIKey: "test-token",
BaseURL: "https://chatgpt.example/backend-api/codex",
Model: "gpt-test",
}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewCodexProvider: %v", err)
}
parameters := map[string]any{
"type": "object",
"properties": map[string]any{"value": map[string]any{"type": "string"}},
}
request, err := provider.buildResponsesRequest(zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Call the custom tool."}},
Tools: []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
Name: "apply_patch", Description: "Custom integration tool.", Parameters: parameters,
}},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("buildResponsesRequest: %v", err)
}
if len(request.Tools) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("tools = %#v, want one", request.Tools)
}
tool := request.Tools[0]
if tool.Type != string(zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFunction) || tool.Format != nil ||
tool.Description != "Custom integration tool." || !reflect.DeepEqual(tool.Parameters, parameters) {
t.Fatalf("custom apply_patch function was rewritten: %#v", tool)
}
}
func TestHandleTerminalResponseNilPayload(t *testing.T) {
p := &CodexProvider{}
@@ -90,11 +212,14 @@ func TestHandleTerminalResponseFailedPayloadWithoutError(t *testing.T) {
// A response.completed with a payload and no error remains a clean done.
ok := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 8)
p.handleTerminalResponse(context.Background(),
&responsesEvent{Type: responsesEventCompleted, Response: &responsePayload{Status: "completed"}}, &responsesState{}, ok)
&responsesEvent{Type: responsesEventCompleted, Response: &responsePayload{ID: "resp-1", Status: "completed"}}, &responsesState{}, ok)
close(ok)
for ev := range ok {
if ev.Type == zeroruntime.StreamEventError {
t.Error("response.completed with a non-error payload must NOT emit an error")
}
if ev.Type == zeroruntime.StreamEventDone && ev.ResponseID != "resp-1" {
t.Errorf("done response id = %q, want resp-1", ev.ResponseID)
}
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ func TestCodexProviderParsesResponsesTextDeltas(t *testing.T) {
`{"type":"response.output_text.delta","delta":"hello "}`,
`{"type":"response.output_text.delta","delta":"world"}`,
`{"type":"response.output_text.delta","delta":"!"}`,
`{"type":"response.completed","response":{"id":"resp-1","status":"completed","usage":{"input_tokens":7,"output_tokens":3,"output_tokens_details":{"reasoning_tokens":1},"input_tokens_details":{"cached_tokens":2}}}}`,
`{"type":"response.completed","response":{"id":"resp-1","status":"completed","usage":{"input_tokens":7,"output_tokens":3,"output_tokens_details":{"reasoning_tokens":1},"input_tokens_details":{"cached_tokens":2,"cache_write_tokens":1}}}}`,
)
defer srv.Close()
@@ -809,8 +809,8 @@ func TestCodexProviderParsesResponsesTextDeltas(t *testing.T) {
if usage == nil {
t.Fatal("expected a usage event, got none")
}
if usage.InputTokens != 7 || usage.OutputTokens != 3 || usage.CachedInputTokens != 2 || usage.ReasoningTokens != 1 {
t.Fatalf("usage = %+v, want input=7 output=3 cached=2 reasoning=1", *usage)
if usage.InputTokens != 7 || usage.OutputTokens != 3 || usage.CachedInputTokens != 2 || usage.CacheWriteTokens != 1 || usage.ReasoningTokens != 1 {
t.Fatalf("usage = %+v, want input=7 output=3 cached=2 cache-write=1 reasoning=1", *usage)
}
if !gotDone {
t.Fatal("expected a done event, got none")
+17 -1
View File
@@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ func (provider *Provider) emitChunk(
PromptTokens: chunk.Usage.PromptTokens,
CompletionTokens: chunk.Usage.CompletionTokens,
CachedInputTokens: chunk.Usage.PromptTokensDetails.CachedTokens,
CacheWriteTokens: chunk.Usage.PromptTokensDetails.CacheWriteTokens,
ReasoningTokens: chunk.Usage.CompletionTokensDetails.ReasoningTokens,
},
})
@@ -486,7 +487,7 @@ func (provider *Provider) openAIRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) c
Function: toolFunction{
Name: tool.Name,
Description: tool.Description,
Parameters: tool.Parameters,
Parameters: normalizeToolParameters(tool.Parameters),
},
})
}
@@ -494,6 +495,21 @@ func (provider *Provider) openAIRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) c
return mapped
}
// normalizeToolParameters keeps schemas accepted by strict OpenAI-compatible
// servers such as LM Studio. No-argument tools still need an object-valued
// parameters.properties field instead of an omitted field.
func normalizeToolParameters(parameters map[string]any) map[string]any {
normalized := make(map[string]any, len(parameters)+1)
for key, value := range parameters {
normalized[key] = value
}
properties, ok := normalized["properties"].(map[string]any)
if !ok || properties == nil {
normalized["properties"] = map[string]any{}
}
return normalized
}
// promptCacheKeyDisabled reports whether the ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY
// kill switch is set to a truthy value. "0" and "false" (any case) are
// no-ops, matching how ZERO_FORMAT_ON_WRITE parses boolean flags, so an
+132 -2
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package openai
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"reflect"
@@ -105,6 +106,72 @@ func TestStreamCompletionPostsChatCompletionRequest(t *testing.T) {
if tool["type"] != "function" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected tool wrapper: %#v", tool)
}
functionDefinition := tool["function"].(map[string]any)
parameters := functionDefinition["parameters"].(map[string]any)
properties, ok := parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)
if !ok || len(properties) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("parameters.properties = %#v, want empty object", parameters["properties"])
}
}
// TestStreamCompletionSerializesTypedNilPropertiesAsEmptyObject locks in the
// normalizeToolParameters fix: a tool whose parameters carry a typed-nil
// properties map must serialize "properties":{} on the wire, never
// "properties":null, because strict OpenAI-compatible servers (LM Studio)
// reject the null form.
func TestStreamCompletionSerializesTypedNilPropertiesAsEmptyObject(t *testing.T) {
var gotBody map[string]any
var gotRaw []byte
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
raw, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read request body: %v", err)
}
gotRaw = raw
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &gotBody); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode request body: %v", err)
}
writeSSE(w, `{"choices":[]}`)
writeSSE(w, `[DONE]`)
}))
defer server.Close()
provider, err := New(Options{
APIKey: "sk-secret",
BaseURL: server.URL + "/",
Model: "gpt-test",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("New returned error: %v", err)
}
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(context.Background(), zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "hi"}},
Tools: []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
Name: "no_args",
Description: "Takes no arguments",
Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object", "properties": map[string]any(nil)},
}},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamCompletion returned error: %v", err)
}
drain(stream)
if !strings.Contains(string(gotRaw), `"properties":{}`) {
t.Fatalf("request body must serialize properties as an empty object, got: %s", gotRaw)
}
if strings.Contains(string(gotRaw), `"properties":null`) {
t.Fatalf("request body must not serialize properties as null, got: %s", gotRaw)
}
tools := gotBody["tools"].([]any)
tool := tools[0].(map[string]any)
functionDefinition := tool["function"].(map[string]any)
parameters := functionDefinition["parameters"].(map[string]any)
properties, ok := parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)
if !ok || len(properties) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("parameters.properties = %#v, want empty object", parameters["properties"])
}
}
func TestNewRequiresModelButNotAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
@@ -193,14 +260,14 @@ func TestStreamCompletionAppliesCustomAuthAndHeaders(t *testing.T) {
func TestStreamCompletionEmitsTextUsageAndDone(t *testing.T) {
provider := newTestProvider(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
writeSSE(w, `{"choices":[{"delta":{"content":"hello "}}]}`)
writeSSE(w, `{"choices":[{"delta":{"content":"zero"}}],"usage":{"prompt_tokens":12,"completion_tokens":5,"prompt_tokens_details":{"cached_tokens":3}}}`)
writeSSE(w, `{"choices":[{"delta":{"content":"zero"}}],"usage":{"prompt_tokens":12,"completion_tokens":5,"prompt_tokens_details":{"cached_tokens":3,"cache_write_tokens":2}}}`)
writeSSE(w, `[DONE]`)
})
events := collectProviderEvents(t, provider)
assertEvent(t, events[0], zeroruntime.StreamEventText, "hello ")
assertEvent(t, events[1], zeroruntime.StreamEventText, "zero")
if events[2].Type != zeroruntime.StreamEventUsage || events[2].Usage.PromptTokens != 12 || events[2].Usage.CompletionTokens != 5 || events[2].Usage.CachedInputTokens != 3 {
if events[2].Type != zeroruntime.StreamEventUsage || events[2].Usage.PromptTokens != 12 || events[2].Usage.CompletionTokens != 5 || events[2].Usage.CachedInputTokens != 3 || events[2].Usage.CacheWriteTokens != 2 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected usage event: %#v", events[2])
}
if events[3].Type != zeroruntime.StreamEventDone {
@@ -1479,3 +1546,66 @@ func TestOpenAIRequestPreservesCacheablePrefixAcrossTurns(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("wire prompt cache key must remain stable: first=%#v second=%#v", first["prompt_cache_key"], second["prompt_cache_key"])
}
}
// TestStreamCompletionSerializesNonMapPropertiesAsEmptyObject locks in the
// normalizeToolParameters type-assert branch: when a tool's parameters carry a
// `properties` field whose value is a non-map (e.g., an empty slice), it must
// be normalized to "properties":{} on the wire, never "properties":[] or
// "properties":null.
func TestStreamCompletionSerializesNonMapPropertiesAsEmptyObject(t *testing.T) {
var gotBody map[string]any
var gotRaw []byte
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
raw, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read request body: %v", err)
}
gotRaw = raw
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &gotBody); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode request body: %v", err)
}
writeSSE(w, `{"choices":[]}`)
writeSSE(w, `[DONE]`)
}))
defer server.Close()
provider, err := New(Options{
APIKey: "sk-secret",
BaseURL: server.URL + "/",
Model: "gpt-test",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("New returned error: %v", err)
}
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(context.Background(), zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "hi"}},
Tools: []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
Name: "no_args",
Description: "Takes no arguments",
Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object", "properties": []any{}},
}},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamCompletion returned error: %v", err)
}
drain(stream)
if !strings.Contains(string(gotRaw), `"properties":{}`) {
t.Fatalf("request body must serialize properties as an empty object, got: %s", gotRaw)
}
if strings.Contains(string(gotRaw), `"properties":null`) {
t.Fatalf("request body must not serialize properties as null, got: %s", gotRaw)
}
if strings.Contains(string(gotRaw), `"properties":[]`) {
t.Fatalf("request body must not serialize properties as an empty array, got: %s", gotRaw)
}
tools := gotBody["tools"].([]any)
tool := tools[0].(map[string]any)
functionDefinition := tool["function"].(map[string]any)
parameters := functionDefinition["parameters"].(map[string]any)
properties, ok := parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)
if !ok || len(properties) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("parameters.properties = %#v, want empty object", parameters["properties"])
}
}
+6 -1
View File
@@ -195,7 +195,12 @@ func (s *turnSession) computeFingerprint(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest)
func wireToolsDigest(tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) string {
rendered := make([]string, 0, len(tools))
for _, tool := range tools {
schema, err := json.Marshal(tool.Parameters)
wireShape := struct {
Type zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionType `json:"type,omitempty"`
Parameters map[string]any `json:"parameters,omitempty"`
Format *zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat `json:"format,omitempty"`
}{Type: tool.Type, Parameters: tool.Parameters, Format: tool.Format}
schema, err := json.Marshal(wireShape)
if err != nil {
rendered = append(rendered, tool.Name+"\n"+tool.Description+"\n__non_json:"+tool.Name)
continue
+2 -1
View File
@@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ type usage struct {
}
type promptTokenDetails struct {
CachedTokens int `json:"cached_tokens"`
CachedTokens int `json:"cached_tokens"`
CacheWriteTokens int `json:"cache_write_tokens"`
}
type completionTokenDetails struct {
+43 -12
View File
@@ -15,9 +15,27 @@ import (
// value (e.g. "1") to enable — the same boolean idiom as ZERO_FORMAT_ON_WRITE.
const openaiTurnSessionEnv = "ZERO_OPENAI_TURN_SESSION"
// ChatGPT Responses sessions are enabled by default for their native provider.
// Setting this to 0/false/off restores the stateless HTTP/SSE transport.
const chatGPTTurnSessionEnv = "ZERO_CHATGPT_TURN_SESSION"
func openaiTurnSessionEnabled() bool {
value := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(openaiTurnSessionEnv))
return value != "" && value != "0" && !strings.EqualFold(value, "false")
return value != "" && !explicitEnvFalse(value)
}
func chatGPTTurnSessionEnabled() bool {
value := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(chatGPTTurnSessionEnv))
return value == "" || !explicitEnvFalse(value)
}
func explicitEnvFalse(value string) bool {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(value)) {
case "0", "false", "off":
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// OptimizedTurnSessions returns the gated optimized TurnSessionProvider for an
@@ -25,20 +43,33 @@ func openaiTurnSessionEnabled() bool {
// is ineligible. Callers leave agent Options.TurnSessionProvider nil on false,
// so the loop's default wrap keeps today's behavior byte-identical.
//
// Eligibility is deliberately narrow: the resolved provider kind must be
// official OpenAI (NOT openai-compatible gateways — the constructor merges the
// two, so this branches on the resolved kind explicitly), not the ChatGPT
// Codex catalog, and the provider value must be the concrete *openai.Provider
// (a fake, a Codex provider, or nil falls back to the default path safely).
// No base-URL check on top of the kind: prewarm and fingerprint telemetry are
// harmless against any host, and kind==openai mirrors the existing
// official-OpenAI precedent used for prompt_cache_key.
// Eligibility is deliberately narrow: native ChatGPT Responses uses its
// concrete Codex provider and defaults on with a kill switch; official OpenAI
// chat-completions keeps its existing opt-in prewarm session. Compatible
// gateways and foreign provider values always retain the default adapter.
func OptimizedTurnSessions(profile config.ProviderProfile, provider zeroruntime.Provider, options Options) (zeroruntime.TurnSessionProvider, bool) {
if !openaiTurnSessionEnabled() {
resolved, err := resolveProfile(profile, options)
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
resolved, err := resolveProfile(profile, options)
if err != nil || resolved.providerKind != config.ProviderKindOpenAI || isCodexCatalog(profile, resolved) {
if isCodexCatalog(profile, resolved) {
if !chatGPTTurnSessionEnabled() {
return nil, false
}
concrete, ok := provider.(*openai.CodexProvider)
if !ok {
return nil, false
}
caps, err := resolveCapabilities(profile, options)
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
return openai.NewCodexTurnSessionProvider(concrete, caps), true
}
if resolved.providerKind != config.ProviderKindOpenAI {
return nil, false
}
if !openaiTurnSessionEnabled() {
return nil, false
}
concrete, ok := provider.(*openai.Provider)
+72 -5
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers/openai"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ func TestOptimizedTurnSessionsDefaultOff(t *testing.T) {
func TestOptimizedTurnSessionsFalseyValues(t *testing.T) {
profile := openaiEligibleProfile()
provider := buildGateProvider(t, profile)
for _, value := range []string{"0", "false", "FALSE", "False", " ", ""} {
for _, value := range []string{"0", "false", "FALSE", "False", "off", "OFF", " ", ""} {
t.Setenv(openaiTurnSessionEnv, value)
if _, ok := OptimizedTurnSessions(profile, provider, Options{}); ok {
t.Fatalf("gate enabled for falsey value %q", value)
@@ -59,6 +60,21 @@ func TestOptimizedTurnSessionsFalseyValues(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestChatGPTTurnSessionGateValues(t *testing.T) {
for _, value := range []string{"0", "false", "FALSE", "off", "OFF"} {
t.Setenv(chatGPTTurnSessionEnv, value)
if chatGPTTurnSessionEnabled() {
t.Fatalf("ChatGPT gate enabled for falsey value %q", value)
}
}
for _, value := range []string{"", " ", "1", "true", "on"} {
t.Setenv(chatGPTTurnSessionEnv, value)
if !chatGPTTurnSessionEnabled() {
t.Fatalf("ChatGPT gate disabled for default/truthy value %q", value)
}
}
}
func TestOptimizedTurnSessionsOpenAIEligible(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(openaiTurnSessionEnv, "1")
profile := openaiEligibleProfile()
@@ -88,13 +104,64 @@ func TestOptimizedTurnSessionsRejectsCompatible(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestOptimizedTurnSessionsRejectsCodexCatalog(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(openaiTurnSessionEnv, "1")
t.Setenv(chatGPTTurnSessionEnv, "0")
profile := openaiEligibleProfile()
profile.Name = "chatgpt"
profile.CatalogID = "chatgpt"
if _, ok := OptimizedTurnSessions(profile, buildChatGPTGateProvider(t, profile), Options{}); ok {
t.Fatal("the ChatGPT Codex catalog must honor the turn-session kill switch")
}
}
func TestOptimizedTurnSessionsEnablesChatGPTResponsesByDefault(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(chatGPTTurnSessionEnv, "")
profile := openaiEligibleProfile()
profile.Name = "chatgpt"
profile.CatalogID = "chatgpt"
provider := buildChatGPTGateProvider(t, profile)
turnSessions, ok := OptimizedTurnSessions(profile, provider, Options{})
if !ok || turnSessions == nil {
t.Fatal("ChatGPT Responses provider did not receive its default turn session")
}
if got := turnSessions.Capabilities().Model; got != profile.Model {
t.Fatalf("Capabilities().Model = %q, want %q", got, profile.Model)
}
}
func TestOptimizedTurnSessionsRecognizesCompatibleLabeledChatGPTProfile(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(chatGPTTurnSessionEnv, "")
profile := openaiEligibleProfile()
profile.Name = "chatgpt"
profile.CatalogID = "chatgpt"
profile.ProviderKind = config.ProviderKindOpenAICompatible
if turnSessions, ok := OptimizedTurnSessions(profile, buildChatGPTGateProvider(t, profile), Options{}); !ok || turnSessions == nil {
t.Fatal("ChatGPT catalog profile must use its native session regardless of the stored compatibility label")
}
}
func buildChatGPTGateProvider(t *testing.T, profile config.ProviderProfile) *openai.CodexProvider {
t.Helper()
provider, err := openai.NewCodexProvider(openai.CodexOptions{
Options: openai.Options{
APIKey: "test-token",
BaseURL: "https://chatgpt.example/backend-api/codex",
Model: profile.Model,
},
AccountID: "account-test",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewCodexProvider: %v", err)
}
return provider
}
func TestOptimizedTurnSessionsRejectsNonCodexProviderForChatGPT(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(chatGPTTurnSessionEnv, "1")
profile := openaiEligibleProfile()
profile.CatalogID = "chatgpt"
// Build the provider from the base profile: the point under test is the
// catalog check, not Codex construction (which needs OAuth wiring).
if _, ok := OptimizedTurnSessions(profile, buildGateProvider(t, openaiEligibleProfile()), Options{}); ok {
t.Fatal("the ChatGPT Codex catalog must not get the optimized session")
t.Fatal("a ChatGPT catalog profile with a non-Codex provider must use the default session")
}
}
+2
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
type BackendOptions struct {
GOOS string
LookupExecutable func(string) (string, error)
DetectWSL func() WSLInfo
}
type Backend struct {
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ func SelectBackend(options BackendOptions) Backend {
return NewSandboxManager(SandboxManagerOptions{
GOOS: options.GOOS,
LookupExecutable: options.LookupExecutable,
DetectWSL: options.DetectWSL,
}).Backend()
}
+15
View File
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ func TestSelectBackendChoosesPlatformAdapterWithFallback(t *testing.T) {
}
return "", errors.New("missing")
},
DetectWSL: func() WSLInfo { return WSLInfo{} },
})
if backend.Name != BackendUnavailable || backend.Available {
t.Fatalf("linux backend = %#v, want native sandbox unavailable without Linux helper", backend)
@@ -54,6 +55,20 @@ func TestSelectBackendChoosesPlatformAdapterWithFallback(t *testing.T) {
}
})
t.Run("linux helper missing under WSL reports WSL fallback", func(t *testing.T) {
backend := SelectBackend(BackendOptions{
GOOS: "linux",
LookupExecutable: func(string) (string, error) { return "", errors.New("missing") },
DetectWSL: func() WSLInfo { return WSLInfo{IsWSL: true, IsWSL2: true} },
})
if backend.Name != BackendWSL || backend.Available || !backend.Fallback {
t.Fatalf("linux backend = %#v, want explicit WSL fallback", backend)
}
if !strings.Contains(backend.Message, "WSL2") {
t.Fatalf("linux fallback message = %q, want WSL2 diagnostic", backend.Message)
}
})
t.Run("darwin sandbox exec available", func(t *testing.T) {
backend := SelectBackend(BackendOptions{
GOOS: "darwin",
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
package sandbox
import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestApplyPatchPathBlockOnlyRejectsRelativeTraversal(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
inside := filepath.Join(root, "main.js")
structured := func(path string) string {
return strings.Join([]string{"*** Begin Patch", "*** Update File: " + path, "@@", "-a", "+b", "*** End Patch"}, "\n")
}
for name, patch := range map[string]string{
"absolute inside workspace": structured(inside),
"relative": structured("main.js"),
"decorated markers": "*** Begin Patch ***\n*** Update File: main.js\n@@\n-a\n+b\n*** End Patch ***",
"no-space marker": "***Begin Patch\n*** Update File: main.js\n@@\n-a\n+b\n***End Patch",
} {
request := Request{ToolName: "apply_patch", WorkspaceRoot: root, SideEffect: SideEffectWrite, Args: map[string]any{"patch": patch}}
if block := applyPatchPathBlock(request); block != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: unexpected block %+v", name, block)
}
}
for _, path := range []string{"../escape.js", ".."} {
for name, patch := range map[string]string{"canonical": structured(path), "no-space": "***Begin Patch\n*** Update File: " + path + "\n@@\n-a\n+b\n***End Patch"} {
request := Request{ToolName: "apply_patch", WorkspaceRoot: root, SideEffect: SideEffectWrite, Args: map[string]any{"patch": patch}}
block := applyPatchPathBlock(request)
if block == nil || block.Code != BlockOutsideWorkspace {
t.Fatalf("%s %q must be blocked as traversal, got %+v", name, path, block)
}
}
}
}
// Every marker spelling the tool applies must be classified as structured at
// the sandbox boundary too; otherwise the boundary scans the patch as a unified
// diff, extracts no targets, and validates nothing (fail-open).
func TestStructuredPatchClassifierMatchesToolSpellings(t *testing.T) {
for _, header := range []string{"*** Begin Patch", "*** Begin Patch ***", "***Begin Patch", " *** Begin Patch ", "\ufeff*** Begin Patch"} {
patch := header + "\n*** Update File: main.js\n@@\n-a\n+b\n*** End Patch"
if !IsStructuredPatch(patch) {
t.Fatalf("%q must classify as a structured patch", header)
}
if paths := applyPatchPaths(patch); len(paths) != 1 || paths[0] != "main.js" {
t.Fatalf("%q: sandbox must extract the structured target, got %v", header, paths)
}
}
for _, header := range []string{"--- a/x", "Begin Patch", "*** Begin Patchwork", "*** Update File: x"} {
if IsStructuredPatch(header + "\n-a\n+b") {
t.Fatalf("%q must not classify as a structured patch", header)
}
}
if StructuredPatchMarker("*** End Patch ***") != "end" || StructuredPatchMarker("***End Patch") != "end" {
t.Fatal("decorated end markers must classify as end")
}
}
func TestApplyPatchRequestPathsCarryAbsolutePathsToScopeValidation(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
// NewScope also grants the system temp dir, so a sibling t.TempDir() is
// legitimately in scope; pick a path under the filesystem root instead.
outside, err := filepath.Abs(filepath.Join(string(filepath.Separator), "zero-outside-workspace-test", "escape.js"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
scope, err := NewScope(root, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
inside := filepath.Join(root, "main.js")
structured := func(header, footer, path string) string {
return strings.Join([]string{header, "*** Update File: " + path, "@@", "-a", "+b", footer}, "\n")
}
for name, spelling := range map[string][2]string{"canonical": {"*** Begin Patch", "*** End Patch"}, "no-space": {"***Begin Patch", "***End Patch"}} {
// Failure path: the exact path the boundary parsed must be denied by the
// scope. structuredPatchHeaderPaths normalises separators to "/", so the
// parsed form is compared in slash form and then validated as-is.
paths := applyPatchRequestPaths(map[string]any{"patch": structured(spelling[0], spelling[1], outside)})
if len(paths) != 1 || paths[0] != filepath.ToSlash(outside) {
t.Fatalf("%s: absolute patch path must reach scope validation unchanged, got %v", name, paths)
}
if block := scope.validate(paths[0]); block == nil || block.Code != BlockOutsideWorkspace {
t.Fatalf("%s: scope must deny the parsed outside path %q, got %+v", name, paths[0], block)
}
// Success path: the parsed inside path must be accepted by the scope.
paths = applyPatchRequestPaths(map[string]any{"patch": structured(spelling[0], spelling[1], inside)})
if len(paths) != 1 || paths[0] != filepath.ToSlash(inside) {
t.Fatalf("%s: inside patch path must reach scope validation unchanged, got %v", name, paths)
}
if block := scope.validate(paths[0]); block != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: scope must accept the parsed inside path %q, got %+v", name, paths[0], block)
}
}
}
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