feat(providers): add zero providers models to discover a provider's models

`zero providers` had no way to list the models a provider actually serves, so a
custom OpenAI-/Anthropic-compatible endpoint (e.g. a self-hosted proxy serving a
dozen models) forced users to hand-write a config object per model. Live model
discovery already existed for the TUI picker but had no headless CLI surface.

Add `zero providers models [name] [--json]`: it probes the provider's live
model-listing endpoint (an OpenAI-compatible /v1/models or the Anthropic /models)
via providermodeldiscovery.Discover, using the profile's base URL and resolved
credential (inline -> stored -> env). This uses the raw discovery primitive with
no curated-catalog merge or coding-model filtering, so a custom provider's full
model list is returned. Configure the provider once, run `zero providers models`
to see what it serves, and use any id with `zero exec --model <id>` (Zero passes
unknown model ids through to the provider) -- no per-model config needed.

Wired through a new appDeps.discoverProviderModels hook (default:
providermodeldiscovery.Discover) so the command is unit-tested hermetically.

Fixes #381.

.github/workflows/release-artifacts.yml

@@ -112,12 +112,6 @@ jobs:
     needs: package
     if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    # Manual approval gate: this environment carries a required-reviewer rule
-    # (Settings -> Environments -> npm-publish), so the job pauses until a
-    # maintainer approves it in the Actions UI before anything reaches npm.
-    environment:
-      name: npm-publish
-      url: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@gitlawb/zero
     permissions:
       contents: read
       id-token: write # OIDC token exchange for npm trusted publishing + provenance

.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{".":"0.1.0"}
+{}

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -6,19 +6,6 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
 aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
 tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
 
-## 0.1.0 (2026-07-02)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* publish zero to npm via release-please ([#367](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/367)) ([8eccc26](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8eccc2669887bc38d35bc16a315c888e4d9ec43a))
-* **tui:** FILES sidebar panel with click-to-select and file drill-in ([#365](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/365)) ([142c548](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/142c548c89a8652ce300e64ddf1228ee36df7606))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **auth:** propagate credentials to every provider-build surface and pin children to the live provider ([#366](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/366)) ([6e0a665](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6e0a665118fe0e09c4b07d482dd18f86045acd2b))
-
 ## [Unreleased]
 
 ### Added

README.md

@@ -51,27 +51,6 @@ The npm package installs a small wrapper plus the matching Zero binary for your
 platform from GitHub Releases. It supports Linux, macOS, and Windows on x64 and
 arm64.
 
-### Bun
-
-Bun does not run dependency lifecycle scripts by default, so the `postinstall`
-that fetches the Zero binary is skipped and the first run fails with
-`No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`.
-
-Install with Bun, then fetch the binary in one of two ways:
-
-```bash
-# Option A: run the installer manually
-bun add @gitlawb/zero
-node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs
-
-# Option B: allow the postinstall to run on install
-# add to your package.json:  "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]
-bun add @gitlawb/zero
-```
-
-For global installs (`bun add -g @gitlawb/zero`), use Option A against the
-global install path, or prefer the install scripts below.
-
 ### Install scripts
 
 Linux/macOS:

bin/zero.js

@@ -54,26 +54,8 @@ const nativePath = join(packageRoot, zeroBinaryName());
 const localControlHelpers = localControlHelperManifest(packageRoot);
 
 if (!existsSync(nativePath)) {
-  const postinstallScript = join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs');
-  const ranByBun = process.execPath.includes('bun') || !!process.versions?.bun;
   console.error(
-    '[zero] No native binary found next to the npm wrapper.\n' +
-      'The platform binary is fetched at install time by a postinstall script,\n' +
-      'which did not run (or was skipped) for this install.\n' +
-      '\n' +
-      'Fix it now by running the installer manually:\n' +
-      `  node "${postinstallScript}"\n` +
-      '\n' +
-      (ranByBun
-        ? 'You installed with Bun, which does not run dependency lifecycle scripts\n' +
-          'by default. To let it run on future installs, add zero to your\n' +
-          'project\'s trustedDependencies:\n' +
-          '  "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]\n' +
-          'then reinstall.\n' +
-          '\n'
-        : '') +
-      'If that fails, build from source: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero\n' +
-      '(go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.25+).',
+    '[zero] No native binary found next to the npm wrapper. Reinstall the zero package or run `go run ./cmd/zero-release build` from the repository.'
   );
   process.exit(1);
 }

docs/INSTALL.md

@@ -24,38 +24,6 @@ Requirements:
 - Node.js 18+
 - network access to npm and GitHub Releases
 
-## Bun
-
-Bun is "default-secure" and does not run lifecycle scripts of installed
-dependencies (only the installing project's own scripts), so the `postinstall`
-that fetches the Zero binary is silently skipped. The first run then fails with
-`No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`.
-
-To install with Bun, either run the installer manually after installing:
-
-```bash
-bun add @gitlawb/zero
-node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs
-```
-
-Or allow the postinstall to run by adding the package to your project's
-`trustedDependencies` before installing:
-
-```json
-{
-  "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]
-}
-```
-
-```bash
-bun add @gitlawb/zero
-```
-
-For global installs (`bun add -g @gitlawb/zero`), run the installer manually
-against the global install path, or use the install scripts below.
-
-Reference: <https://bun.sh/docs/pm/lifecycle>
-
 ## Linux And macOS Script
 
 Install the latest release:

internal/agent/loop.go

@@ -2159,18 +2159,6 @@ func buildPermissionEvent(call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, p
 		}
 	}
 
-	// A command that explicitly requests additional sandbox permissions
-	// (sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions) is an ELEVATION the user
-	// must consent to, even when the base command's sandbox decision was Allow.
-	// shouldRequestPermission blocks on OnPermissionRequest for exactly this case,
-	// so the event MUST be a prompt — otherwise it carried Action=allow while the
-	// loop waited on a decision, and a UI that renders only prompts (the TUI)
-	// dropped it, deadlocking the run. Keep this consistent with
-	// shouldRequestPermission's own condition.
-	if action == PermissionActionAllow && !permissionGranted && shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) {
-		action = PermissionActionPrompt
-	}
-
 	if safety.Permission == tools.PermissionAllow && action == PermissionActionAllow && !grantMatched && block == nil {
 		return PermissionEvent{}, false
 	}

internal/agent/loop_test.go

@@ -37,35 +37,6 @@ func (provider *mockProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zero
 	return ch, nil
 }
 
-type recordingWebSearchTool struct {
-	calls []map[string]any
-}
-
-func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Name() string        { return "web_search" }
-func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Description() string { return "test web search tool" }
-func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
-	return tools.Schema{
-		Type: "object",
-		Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{
-			"query": {Type: "string"},
-		},
-		Required:             []string{"query"},
-		AdditionalProperties: false,
-	}
-}
-func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
-	return tools.Safety{
-		SideEffect:      tools.SideEffectNetwork,
-		Permission:      tools.PermissionPrompt,
-		Reason:          "Sends model-provided search query text to the configured web search backend.",
-		AdvertiseInAuto: true,
-	}
-}
-func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
-	tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
-	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "1. T — https://x.test"}
-}
-
 type sandboxDeniedRetryTool struct {
 	calls []map[string]any
 }
@@ -894,7 +865,7 @@ func TestRunRejectsLocalWebFetchBeforePermissionRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestRunAdvertisesPromptedWebSearchInAutoMode(t *testing.T) {
+func TestRunAdvertisesAllowedWebSearchInAutoMode(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Setenv("ZERO_WEBSEARCH_BASE_URL", "https://search.example/api")
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
 	for _, tool := range tools.CoreNetworkTools() {
@@ -925,52 +896,6 @@ func TestRunAdvertisesPromptedWebSearchInAutoMode(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestRunRequestsPermissionBeforeWebSearchExecution(t *testing.T) {
-	search := &recordingWebSearchTool{}
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(search)
-	provider := &mockProvider{
-		turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-			{
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "web_search"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"query":"private workspace detail"}`},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-			},
-			{
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-			},
-		},
-	}
-	var requests []PermissionRequest
-
-	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "search", provider, Options{
-		Registry:       registry,
-		PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
-		OnPermissionRequest: func(_ context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
-			requests = append(requests, request)
-			return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "network not approved"}, nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected final answer after denied tool call, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
-	}
-	if len(requests) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("expected one permission request, got %#v", requests)
-	}
-	if requests[0].ToolName != "web_search" || requests[0].Permission != string(tools.PermissionPrompt) || requests[0].SideEffect != string(tools.SideEffectNetwork) {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected permission request: %#v", requests[0])
-	}
-	if len(search.calls) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("web_search backend must not run when permission is denied, got calls %#v", search.calls)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunFiltersAdvertisedTools(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()

internal/agent/permission_additional_perms_test.go

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
-)
-
-// promptShellTool is a minimal shell-style tool whose Safety requires a prompt,
-// standing in for bash so buildPermissionEvent can be exercised directly.
-type promptShellTool struct{}
-
-func (promptShellTool) Name() string        { return "bash" }
-func (promptShellTool) Description() string { return "run a shell command" }
-func (promptShellTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
-	return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
-}
-func (promptShellTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
-	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "runs a shell command"}
-}
-func (promptShellTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
-	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
-}
-
-// A command whose sandbox decision is Allow but that explicitly requests
-// additional sandbox permissions is an ELEVATION: it must be surfaced as a
-// prompt, never Action=allow. Previously it carried allow while the loop still
-// blocked on OnPermissionRequest, and the TUI (which renders only prompts)
-// dropped it → the run deadlocked forever. This is the exact gpt-5.5
-// folder-creation shape captured in the reported hang.
-func TestBuildPermissionEventPromptsForAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
-	call := ToolCall{ID: "call_1", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
-	args := map[string]any{
-		"command":             "mkdir foo && cd foo && go mod init foo",
-		"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
-	}
-	// Base command allowed by the sandbox…
-	decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow}
-
-	event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("buildPermissionEvent returned ok=false; the elevation request must produce an event")
-	}
-	if event.Action != PermissionActionPrompt {
-		t.Fatalf("Action = %q, want prompt — an additional-permissions elevation must ask the user, not auto-allow", event.Action)
-	}
-	// Sanity: shouldRequestPermission agrees the loop blocks on this.
-	if !shouldRequestPermission(promptShellTool{}, args, false, decision) {
-		t.Fatal("shouldRequestPermission must be true for an additional-permissions request")
-	}
-}
-
-// Without the additional-permissions flag, a sandbox-allowed command is NOT a
-// prompt (shouldRequestPermission is false; it just runs) — the override must
-// not over-reach and prompt for ordinary allowed commands.
-func TestBuildPermissionEventKeepsAllowForOrdinaryAllowedCommand(t *testing.T) {
-	call := ToolCall{ID: "call_2", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
-	args := map[string]any{"command": "ls"}
-	decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow}
-
-	event, _ := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
-	if event.Action == PermissionActionPrompt {
-		t.Fatalf("Action = prompt for an ordinary allowed command; want allow (no spurious prompt)")
-	}
-	if shouldRequestPermission(promptShellTool{}, args, false, decision) {
-		t.Fatal("shouldRequestPermission must be false for an ordinary sandbox-allowed command")
-	}
-}

internal/cli/app.go

@@ -405,14 +405,6 @@ func runWithDeps(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
 		if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "unknown command %q\n", args[0]); err != nil {
 			return 1
 		}
-		// First-run users reach for `zero login`/`zero logout` (reported in the
-		// wild); point them at the real command instead of a bare usage pointer.
-		switch strings.ToLower(args[0]) {
-		case "login", "logout":
-			if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "did you mean %q?\n", "zero auth "+strings.ToLower(args[0])); err != nil {
-				return 1
-			}
-		}
 		if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "Run zero --help for usage."); err != nil {
 			return 1
 		}
@@ -544,21 +536,7 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
 
 	resolved, err := deps.resolveConfig(workspaceRoot, config.Overrides{})
 	if err != nil {
-		// A resolve failure the setup wizard can FIX is not fatal for the
-		// interactive TUI: drop into the wizard with an empty config so the user
-		// can onboard/repair, instead of exiting with an error they can only fix
-		// by hand-editing config.json. That covers a missing/unresolvable active
-		// provider and an active provider without a model (custom endpoints have
-		// no catalog default) — previously the second shape bricked bare `zero`
-		// and `zero setup`, the exact commands that could have fixed it. Any
-		// other error (malformed JSON, directory conflict, etc.) is still fatal,
-		// and headless commands (zero config / zero exec) still fail with the
-		// actionable message.
-		if !errors.Is(err, config.ErrNoActiveProvider) && !errors.Is(err, config.ErrProviderRequiresModel) {
-			return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), 1)
-		}
-		resolved = config.ResolvedConfig{}
-		forceSetup = true
+		return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), 1)
 	}
 	userConfigPath, err := deps.userConfigPath()
 	if err != nil {

internal/cli/app_test.go

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
-	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -158,80 +157,6 @@ func TestRunNoArgsLaunchesSetupTUIWithNilProviderWhenNoProviderConfigured(t *tes
 	assertAgentOptions(t, launchedOptions, 12, agent.PermissionModeAsk)
 }
 
-func TestRunNoArgsEntersSetupWhenResolveReportsNoActiveProvider(t *testing.T) {
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	cwd := t.TempDir()
-	setCLIUserConfigRoot(t)
-	userConfigPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
-	var launchedOptions tui.Options
-	launched := false
-
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) {
-			return cwd, nil
-		},
-		resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return config.ResolvedConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: active provider %q not found", config.ErrNoActiveProvider, "ghost")
-		},
-		newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
-			t.Fatal("newProvider should not be called without a resolved provider")
-			return nil, nil
-		},
-		userConfigPath: func() (string, error) {
-			return userConfigPath, nil
-		},
-		registerMCPTools: func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
-			return noopMCPRuntime{}, nil
-		},
-		runTUI: func(ctx context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
-			launched = true
-			launchedOptions = options
-			return 0
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want 0 (setup TUI launched), stderr=%q", exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if !launched {
-		t.Fatal("TUI was not launched; expected fallback into setup instead of a fatal error")
-	}
-	if !launchedOptions.Setup.Visible || !launchedOptions.Setup.Required {
-		t.Fatalf("Setup = %#v, want visible required setup", launchedOptions.Setup)
-	}
-	if launchedOptions.Provider != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Provider = %#v, want nil for no-provider fallback", launchedOptions.Provider)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunNoArgsFailsWhenResolveErrorIsNotProviderRelated(t *testing.T) {
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	cwd := t.TempDir()
-	setCLIUserConfigRoot(t)
-
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) {
-			return cwd, nil
-		},
-		resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return config.ResolvedConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid config JSON")
-		},
-		runTUI: func(ctx context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
-			t.Fatal("TUI must not launch on a non-provider resolve error")
-			return 0
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode == 0 {
-		t.Fatal("exit code = 0, want non-zero for fatal config error")
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "invalid config JSON") {
-		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want the underlying config error", stderr.String())
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunNoArgsLaunchesTUIWithMCPState(t *testing.T) {
 	var stdout bytes.Buffer
 	var stderr bytes.Buffer
@@ -1476,75 +1401,3 @@ func TestRunThemeFlagRejectsBadValue(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected a clear --theme error, got %q", stderr.String())
 	}
 }
-
-// A custom endpoint saved without a model previously bricked bare `zero` and
-// `zero setup` — the exact commands that could have fixed it (the resolve
-// error escaped before the wizard could open). The interactive TUI now treats
-// the requires-model failure as "needs onboarding", same as a missing active
-// provider. The error comes from a REAL Resolve over a real config file, so
-// this exercises the production sentinel wrapping, not a hand-built error.
-func TestRunNoArgsEntersSetupWhenActiveProviderMissesModel(t *testing.T) {
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	cwd := t.TempDir()
-	setCLIUserConfigRoot(t)
-	brokenConfig := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(brokenConfig, []byte(`{
-		"activeProvider": "gw",
-		"providers": [{"name": "gw", "provider_kind": "openai-compatible", "baseURL": "https://gw.example/v1", "apiKey": "sk-x"}]
-	}`), 0o600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	launched := false
-	var launchedOptions tui.Options
-
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
-		resolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return config.Resolve(config.ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: brokenConfig, Env: map[string]string{}})
-		},
-		newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
-			t.Fatal("newProvider must not be called without a resolved provider")
-			return nil, nil
-		},
-		userConfigPath: func() (string, error) { return filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json"), nil },
-		registerMCPTools: func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
-			return noopMCPRuntime{}, nil
-		},
-		runTUI: func(_ context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
-			launched = true
-			launchedOptions = options
-			return 0
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want 0 (setup TUI launched), stderr=%q", exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if !launched {
-		t.Fatal("TUI was not launched; a fixable requires-model config must fall into setup, not exit fatally")
-	}
-	if !launchedOptions.Setup.Visible || !launchedOptions.Setup.Required {
-		t.Fatalf("Setup = %#v, want visible required setup", launchedOptions.Setup)
-	}
-}
-
-// `zero login`/`zero logout` don't exist (it's `zero auth login`); first-run
-// users try them (reported in the wild), so the unknown-command error points at
-// the real command.
-func TestRunUnknownLoginSuggestsAuthLogin(t *testing.T) {
-	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"login"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{})
-	if exitCode != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want 2 (unknown command)", exitCode)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), `"zero auth login"`) {
-		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want a zero auth login suggestion", stderr.String())
-	}
-	// An unrelated unknown command gets no misleading suggestion.
-	stderr.Reset()
-	runWithDeps([]string{"frobnicate"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{})
-	if strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "did you mean") {
-		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, unrelated commands must not get the auth hint", stderr.String())
-	}
-}

internal/cli/observability.go

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
-	"runtime"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 
@@ -66,7 +65,7 @@ func runDoctor(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
 
 	report := doctor.Run(doctor.Options{
 		Now:            deps.now,
-		Runtime:        runtime.Version(),
+		Runtime:        "go",
 		UserConfig:     userConfig,
 		ProjectConfig:  projectConfig,
 		Provider:       provider,

internal/cli/specialist_test.go

@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
 )
 
 func TestRunSpecialistListShowAndPath(t *testing.T) {
@@ -328,7 +326,7 @@ func setSpecialistConfigRoot(t *testing.T) string {
 	default:
 		t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", root)
 	}
-	configRoot, err := config.UserConfigDir()
+	configRoot, err := os.UserConfigDir()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("UserConfigDir() error = %v", err)
 	}

internal/config/paths.go

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
-	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 )
 
@@ -34,32 +33,13 @@ func DefaultResolveOptions(workspaceRoot string) (ResolveOptions, error) {
 }
 
 func DefaultUserConfigPath() (string, error) {
-	userConfigDir, err := UserConfigDir()
+	userConfigDir, err := os.UserConfigDir()
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve user config directory: %w", err)
 	}
 	return filepath.Join(userConfigDir, "zero", "config.json"), nil
 }
 
-// UserConfigDir returns the base directory Zero stores per-user config under.
-// It mirrors os.UserConfigDir everywhere except macOS: there Go defaults to
-// ~/Library/Application Support, but Zero deliberately uses ~/.config (XDG-style,
-// matching Linux and Claude Code) so a single config path works cross-platform.
-// $XDG_CONFIG_HOME still wins on macOS when set.
-func UserConfigDir() (string, error) {
-	if runtime.GOOS == "darwin" {
-		if xdg := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME")); xdg != "" {
-			return xdg, nil
-		}
-		home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
-		if err != nil {
-			return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve home directory: %w", err)
-		}
-		return filepath.Join(home, ".config"), nil
-	}
-	return os.UserConfigDir()
-}
-
 func existingConfigFile(path string) (string, error) {
 	info, err := os.Stat(path)
 	if err != nil {

internal/config/paths_test.go

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ func setUserConfigRoot(t *testing.T) string {
 		t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", root)
 	}
 
-	configRoot, err := UserConfigDir()
+	configRoot, err := os.UserConfigDir()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("UserConfigDir() error = %v", err)
 	}
@@ -130,21 +130,3 @@ func mkdirAll(t *testing.T, path string) {
 		t.Fatalf("create directory %s: %v", path, err)
 	}
 }
-
-func TestDefaultUserConfigPathUsesXDGConfigOnMacOS(t *testing.T) {
-	if runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
-		t.Skip("macOS-specific config path behavior")
-	}
-	home := t.TempDir()
-	t.Setenv("HOME", home)
-	t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", "")
-
-	path, err := DefaultUserConfigPath()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("DefaultUserConfigPath() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	want := filepath.Join(home, ".config", "zero", "config.json")
-	if path != want {
-		t.Fatalf("DefaultUserConfigPath() = %q, want %q", path, want)
-	}
-}

internal/config/resolver.go

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package config
 
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/url"
 	"os"
@@ -15,31 +14,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
 )
 
-// ErrNoActiveProvider marks a resolve failure caused solely by a missing or
-// unresolvable active provider. The interactive TUI treats this as "needs
-// onboarding" (drop into the setup wizard) rather than a fatal config error.
-var ErrNoActiveProvider = errors.New("no active provider configured")
-
-// ErrProviderRequiresModel marks a resolve failure caused solely by the active
-// provider missing a model with no catalog default to fall back on (custom
-// openai-/anthropic-compatible endpoints — Zero cannot guess a gateway's model).
-// Like ErrNoActiveProvider, the interactive TUI treats it as "needs onboarding"
-// and drops into the setup wizard so the user can fix it; headless commands
-// (zero config, zero exec) still fail with the actionable message.
-var ErrProviderRequiresModel = errors.New("provider requires model")
-
-// setupFixableError tags an error with a sentinel for errors.Is WITHOUT
-// changing its message: the sentinel's own text must not prefix what the user
-// sees (the wrapped message is already complete and actionable).
-type setupFixableError struct {
-	err      error
-	sentinel error
-}
-
-func (e *setupFixableError) Error() string { return e.err.Error() }
-
-func (e *setupFixableError) Unwrap() []error { return []error{e.err, e.sentinel} }
-
 // defaultMaxTurns is the per-run tool-turn budget when none is configured. 30 was
 // too low for real multi-step agentic work (agents ran out mid-task before reaching
 // later steps); 50 matches the old "deep" preset. Raise per-session with /turns.
@@ -246,17 +220,8 @@ func mergeProjectConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) error {
 	// config: a cloned repo's .zero/config.json must not be able to grant
 	// itself write access outside the workspace. Global config and CLI flags
 	// are the only config sources for write roots.
-	//
-	// Sandbox.Network from project config may only TIGHTEN (→ "deny"), never
-	// WEAKEN (→ "allow"). A malicious repo must not be able to open network
-	// access for shell commands. Matches the AdditionalWriteRoots posture.
 	if network := strings.TrimSpace(src.Sandbox.Network); network != "" {
-		// Normalize: anything that isn't literally "allow" counts as deny.
-		if sandbox.NormalizeNetworkMode(sandbox.NetworkMode(network)) != sandbox.NetworkAllow {
-			dst.Sandbox.Network = network
-		}
-		// Silently ignore "allow" from project config — not an error, just
-		// a privilege the project scope does not have.
+		dst.Sandbox.Network = network
 	}
 	if src.Sandbox.BlockUnixSockets {
 		dst.Sandbox.BlockUnixSockets = true
@@ -405,18 +370,6 @@ func effectiveProviderKind(profile ProviderProfile) ProviderKind {
 	return ""
 }
 
-// catalogDefaultModel returns the default model of a catalog provider ("" when
-// the id is unknown), used to fill a missing profile.Model for the official-API
-// kinds so a hand-written profile without a model resolves instead of bricking
-// every command that resolves config up front (zero config, bare zero setup).
-func catalogDefaultModel(catalogID string) string {
-	descriptor, ok := providercatalog.Get(catalogID)
-	if !ok {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return strings.TrimSpace(descriptor.DefaultModel)
-}
-
 func catalogDescriptorForProfile(profile ProviderProfile) (providercatalog.Descriptor, bool) {
 	catalogID := providercatalog.NormalizeID(profile.CatalogID)
 	if catalogID == "" {
@@ -778,16 +731,11 @@ func unionStrings(base []string, extra []string) []string {
 }
 
 type normalizeOptions struct {
-	// defaultModels fills a missing profile.Model for the official-API provider
-	// kinds (openai from the model registry; anthropic/google from their catalog
-	// descriptors). Off for provider-command configs (command.go), which must
-	// surface exactly what the external command returned rather than inventing
-	// a model behind its back.
-	defaultModels bool
+	defaultOpenAIModel bool
 }
 
 func normalizeProviders(providers []ProviderProfile, activeName string, envMaps ...map[string]string) ([]ProviderProfile, ProviderProfile, error) {
-	return normalizeProvidersWithOptions(providers, activeName, normalizeOptions{defaultModels: true}, envMaps...)
+	return normalizeProvidersWithOptions(providers, activeName, normalizeOptions{defaultOpenAIModel: true}, envMaps...)
 }
 
 func normalizeProvidersWithoutModelDefaults(providers []ProviderProfile, activeName string, envMaps ...map[string]string) ([]ProviderProfile, ProviderProfile, error) {
@@ -802,7 +750,7 @@ func normalizeProvidersWithOptions(providers []ProviderProfile, activeName strin
 	}
 	if len(providers) == 0 {
 		if activeName != "" {
-			return nil, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: active provider %q not found", ErrNoActiveProvider, activeName)
+			return nil, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("active provider %q not found", activeName)
 		}
 		return []ProviderProfile{}, ProviderProfile{}, nil
 	}
@@ -834,13 +782,10 @@ func normalizeProvidersWithOptions(providers []ProviderProfile, activeName strin
 	}
 
 	if !activeFound {
-		return nil, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: active provider %q not found", ErrNoActiveProvider, activeName)
+		return nil, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("active provider %q not found", activeName)
 	}
 	if active.Model == "" {
-		return nil, ProviderProfile{}, &setupFixableError{
-			err:      providerError(active, "provider %s requires model — add \"model\" to its entry in config.json, or re-run: zero setup <catalog-id> --model <model>", active.Name),
-			sentinel: ErrProviderRequiresModel,
-		}
+		return nil, ProviderProfile{}, providerError(active, "provider %s requires model", active.Name)
 	}
 
 	return normalized, active, nil
@@ -887,7 +832,7 @@ func normalizeProvider(profile ProviderProfile, env map[string]string, options n
 	case ProviderKindOpenAI:
 		if profile.BaseURL == "" || isOfficialOpenAIBaseURL(profile.BaseURL) {
 			profile.BaseURL = OpenAIBaseURL
-			if options.defaultModels && profile.Model == "" {
+			if options.defaultOpenAIModel && profile.Model == "" {
 				profile.Model = modelregistry.DefaultModelID
 			}
 			return profile, nil
@@ -904,9 +849,6 @@ func normalizeProvider(profile ProviderProfile, env map[string]string, options n
 	case ProviderKindAnthropic:
 		if profile.BaseURL == "" || isOfficialAnthropicBaseURL(profile.BaseURL) {
 			profile.BaseURL = AnthropicBaseURL
-			if options.defaultModels && profile.Model == "" {
-				profile.Model = catalogDefaultModel("anthropic")
-			}
 			return profile, nil
 		}
 		return ProviderProfile{}, providerError(profile, "anthropic provider %s requires official baseURL %s", profile.Name, AnthropicBaseURL)
@@ -921,9 +863,6 @@ func normalizeProvider(profile ProviderProfile, env map[string]string, options n
 	case ProviderKindGoogle:
 		if profile.BaseURL == "" || isOfficialGoogleBaseURL(profile.BaseURL) {
 			profile.BaseURL = GoogleBaseURL
-			if options.defaultModels && profile.Model == "" {
-				profile.Model = catalogDefaultModel("google")
-			}
 			return profile, nil
 		}
 		return ProviderProfile{}, providerError(profile, "google provider %s requires official baseURL %s", profile.Name, GoogleBaseURL)

internal/config/resolver_test.go

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 package config
 
 import (
-	"errors"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"reflect"
@@ -899,9 +898,6 @@ func TestResolveRejectsActiveProviderWithoutConfiguredProfiles(t *testing.T) {
 	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), `active provider "ghost" not found`) {
 		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want active provider missing message", err.Error())
 	}
-	if !errors.Is(err, ErrNoActiveProvider) {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want errors.Is(err, ErrNoActiveProvider)", err)
-	}
 	if resolved.ActiveProvider != "" {
 		t.Fatalf("ActiveProvider = %q, want empty", resolved.ActiveProvider)
 	}
@@ -1273,45 +1269,6 @@ func TestResolveSandboxBlockUnixSocketsFromFile(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestResolveSandboxNetworkProjectConfigCannotWeaken(t *testing.T) {
-	// 1. Project config tries to set network to "allow" (should be ignored).
-	userPath := writeConfig(t, `{}`)
-	projectPath := writeConfig(t, `{
-		"sandbox": {"network": "allow"}
-	}`)
-
-	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
-		UserConfigPath:    userPath,
-		ProjectConfigPath: projectPath,
-		Env:               map[string]string{},
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	if resolved.Sandbox.Network == "allow" {
-		t.Fatal("resolved.Sandbox.Network = allow, want empty/deny to prevent project config from weakening sandbox")
-	}
-
-	// 2. User config sets network to "allow", project config sets it to "deny" (tightening is allowed).
-	userPath2 := writeConfig(t, `{
-		"sandbox": {"network": "allow"}
-	}`)
-	projectPath2 := writeConfig(t, `{
-		"sandbox": {"network": "deny"}
-	}`)
-	resolved2, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
-		UserConfigPath:    userPath2,
-		ProjectConfigPath: projectPath2,
-		Env:               map[string]string{},
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	if resolved2.Sandbox.Network != "deny" {
-		t.Fatalf("resolved.Sandbox.Network = %q, want deny (project config allowed to tighten)", resolved2.Sandbox.Network)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestResolveNotifyValid(t *testing.T) {
 	path := writeConfig(t, `{"notify":{"mode":"both","focusMode":"always"}}`)
 	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
@@ -1594,97 +1551,3 @@ func TestResolveMaxTurnsZeroFallsBackToDefault(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("MaxTurns = %d, want default %d", resolved.MaxTurns, defaultMaxTurns)
 	}
 }
-
-// The reported brick: a hand-written google profile with an apiKey but no
-// model made EVERY resolving command fail ("provider google requires model"),
-// including zero config and bare zero setup — the only commands that could
-// have fixed it. Official-API kinds now fall back to their catalog default
-// model, exactly like the openai kind always has.
-func TestResolveDefaultsGoogleModelFromCatalog(t *testing.T) {
-	path := writeConfig(t, `{
-		"activeProvider": "google",
-		"providers": [{"name": "google", "provider_kind": "google", "apiKey": "AIza-x"}]
-	}`)
-	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v, want model defaulted from the google catalog", err)
-	}
-	if resolved.Provider.Model != "gemini-2.5-pro" {
-		t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want the google catalog default gemini-2.5-pro", resolved.Provider.Model)
-	}
-	if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != GoogleBaseURL {
-		t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want %q", resolved.Provider.BaseURL, GoogleBaseURL)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolveDefaultsAnthropicModelFromCatalog(t *testing.T) {
-	path := writeConfig(t, `{
-		"activeProvider": "anthropic",
-		"providers": [{"name": "anthropic", "provider_kind": "anthropic", "apiKey": "sk-ant-x"}]
-	}`)
-	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v, want model defaulted from the anthropic catalog", err)
-	}
-	if resolved.Provider.Model != "claude-sonnet-4.5" {
-		t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want the anthropic catalog default claude-sonnet-4.5", resolved.Provider.Model)
-	}
-}
-
-// An explicitly configured model must always win over the catalog default.
-func TestResolveKeepsExplicitGoogleModel(t *testing.T) {
-	path := writeConfig(t, `{
-		"activeProvider": "google",
-		"providers": [{"name": "google", "provider_kind": "google", "apiKey": "AIza-x", "model": "gemini-2.5-flash"}]
-	}`)
-	resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	if resolved.Provider.Model != "gemini-2.5-flash" {
-		t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want the explicitly configured gemini-2.5-flash", resolved.Provider.Model)
-	}
-}
-
-// Provider-command configs must NOT get invented models: the without-defaults
-// path surfaces exactly what the external command returned.
-func TestNormalizeWithoutModelDefaultsStillRequiresGoogleModel(t *testing.T) {
-	_, _, err := normalizeProvidersWithoutModelDefaults(
-		[]ProviderProfile{{Name: "google", ProviderKind: ProviderKindGoogle, APIKey: "AIza-x"}},
-		"google", map[string]string{})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("provider-command path must still require an explicit model")
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "requires model") {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want requires-model", err.Error())
-	}
-	// The residual error must tell the user how to fix it.
-	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "config.json") {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want an actionable config.json hint", err.Error())
-	}
-}
-
-// The residual requires-model failure (custom endpoint, no catalog default)
-// must be tagged setup-fixable WITHOUT changing its message: the interactive
-// TUI matches the sentinel to drop into the wizard, while headless commands
-// print the exact actionable text.
-func TestResolveRequiresModelErrorIsSetupFixable(t *testing.T) {
-	path := writeConfig(t, `{
-		"activeProvider": "gw",
-		"providers": [{"name": "gw", "provider_kind": "openai-compatible", "baseURL": "https://gw.example/v1", "apiKey": "sk-x"}]
-	}`)
-	_, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected requires-model error for a custom endpoint without model")
-	}
-	if !errors.Is(err, ErrProviderRequiresModel) {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want errors.Is(err, ErrProviderRequiresModel)", err)
-	}
-	// The sentinel must NOT prefix the user-facing message.
-	if !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), "provider gw requires model") {
-		t.Fatalf("message = %q, want it to start with the provider error, not the sentinel text", err.Error())
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "sk-x") {
-		t.Fatalf("error leaked API key: %q", err.Error())
-	}
-}

internal/config/validate_test.go

@@ -66,13 +66,10 @@ func TestValidateFileRedactsSecretInIssue(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestValidateFileMissingModelWarns(t *testing.T) {
-	// An openai-compatible CUSTOM endpoint has no catalog default to fall back
-	// on, so a missing model is still a real issue — and the message must tell
-	// the user how to fix it.
 	path := writeValidateFixture(t, `{
 		"activeProvider": "main",
 		"providers": [
-			{"name": "main", "provider_kind": "openai-compatible", "baseURL": "https://gateway.example/v1"}
+			{"name": "main", "provider_kind": "anthropic"}
 		]
 	}`)
 
@@ -83,30 +80,6 @@ func TestValidateFileMissingModelWarns(t *testing.T) {
 	if !strings.Contains(issues[0].Message, "requires model") {
 		t.Fatalf("expected requires-model issue, got %#v", issues)
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(issues[0].Message, "config.json") {
-		t.Fatalf("requires-model issue should carry an actionable hint, got %#v", issues)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestValidateFileDefaultsOfficialKindModels(t *testing.T) {
-	// Official-API kinds (anthropic/google) fall back to their catalog default
-	// model, so a hand-written model-less profile validates clean instead of
-	// bricking zero config / bare zero setup — the only commands that could
-	// have fixed it (the reported google case).
-	path := writeValidateFixture(t, `{
-		"activeProvider": "google",
-		"providers": [
-			{"name": "google", "provider_kind": "google", "apiKey": "AIza-x"},
-			{"name": "anthropic", "provider_kind": "anthropic", "apiKey": "sk-ant-x"}
-		]
-	}`)
-
-	_, issues := ValidateFile(path)
-	for _, issue := range issues {
-		if strings.Contains(issue.Message, "requires model") {
-			t.Fatalf("official-kind profiles must default their model, got issue %#v", issue)
-		}
-	}
 }
 
 func TestValidateFileValidConfigHasNoIssues(t *testing.T) {

internal/doctor/doctor.go

@@ -57,11 +57,6 @@ type Options struct {
 	// LSP-server checks. Nil means exec.LookPath; tests inject a stub so the
 	// checks are deterministic regardless of the host's installed tooling.
 	LookupExecutable func(string) (string, error)
-	// Executable resolves the running Zero binary's path (nil => os.Executable)
-	// and StatExecutable stats it (nil => os.Stat). Injected so the native-binary
-	// runtime check is testable without depending on a real on-disk layout.
-	Executable     func() (string, error)
-	StatExecutable func(string) (os.FileInfo, error)
 }
 
 func Run(options Options) Report {
@@ -70,7 +65,7 @@ func Run(options Options) Report {
 		now = time.Now
 	}
 	checks := []Check{
-		runtimeCheck(options),
+		runtimeCheck(options.Runtime),
 		configFilesCheck(options.UserConfig, options.ProjectConfig),
 		configValidationCheck(options.UserConfig, options.ProjectConfig),
 	}
@@ -119,48 +114,12 @@ func Format(report Report) string {
 	return strings.Join(lines, "\n")
 }
 
-// runtimeCheck verifies the running Zero native binary is actually present and
-// runnable, and reports its resolved path — instead of the former hardcoded
-// always-pass, which claimed "Go runtime is available" while checking nothing
-// (#405). doctor executes INSIDE the native binary, so this only fails if
-// os.Executable can't resolve or the running file has vanished; the missing-
-// binary-at-install case is caught earlier by the npm wrapper, which refuses to
-// launch without the platform binary. Surfacing the binary PATH is the useful
-// part: it lets a user see which binary answered (e.g. an npm-installed one vs a
-// stale/shadowing copy on PATH) rather than a meaningless green.
-func runtimeCheck(options Options) Check {
-	runtimeVersion := strings.TrimSpace(options.Runtime)
-	if runtimeVersion == "" {
-		runtimeVersion = "go"
+func runtimeCheck(runtime string) Check {
+	runtime = strings.TrimSpace(runtime)
+	if runtime == "" {
+		runtime = "go"
 	}
-	details := map[string]any{"runtime": runtimeVersion}
-
-	executable := options.Executable
-	if executable == nil {
-		executable = os.Executable
-	}
-	path, err := executable()
-	if err != nil {
-		return check("runtime.go", "Zero native binary", StatusFail,
-			"Could not resolve the running Zero binary: "+err.Error(), details)
-	}
-	details["binaryPath"] = path
-
-	stat := options.StatExecutable
-	if stat == nil {
-		stat = os.Stat
-	}
-	info, err := stat(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return check("runtime.go", "Zero native binary", StatusFail,
-			fmt.Sprintf("The running Zero binary is not accessible at %s: %s. Reinstall the zero package, or build from source: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero", path, err.Error()), details)
-	}
-	if info.IsDir() {
-		return check("runtime.go", "Zero native binary", StatusFail,
-			fmt.Sprintf("The resolved Zero binary path %s is a directory, not an executable.", path), details)
-	}
-	return check("runtime.go", "Zero native binary", StatusPass,
-		fmt.Sprintf("Zero native binary is present and runnable at %s (%s).", path, runtimeVersion), details)
+	return check("runtime.go", "Go runtime", StatusPass, fmt.Sprintf("Zero Go runtime is available (%s).", runtime), map[string]any{"runtime": runtime})
 }
 
 func configFilesCheck(userPath string, projectPath string) Check {

internal/doctor/runtime_check_test.go

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-package doctor
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"io/fs"
-	"os"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// fakeFileInfo is a minimal os.FileInfo for the runtime-check stat injection.
-type fakeFileInfo struct{ dir bool }
-
-func (f fakeFileInfo) Name() string       { return "zero" }
-func (f fakeFileInfo) Size() int64        { return 1 }
-func (f fakeFileInfo) Mode() fs.FileMode  { return 0o755 }
-func (f fakeFileInfo) ModTime() time.Time { return time.Unix(0, 0) }
-func (f fakeFileInfo) IsDir() bool        { return f.dir }
-func (f fakeFileInfo) Sys() any           { return nil }
-
-func runtimeCheckFor(t *testing.T, exe func() (string, error), stat func(string) (os.FileInfo, error)) Check {
-	t.Helper()
-	return runtimeCheck(Options{Runtime: "go1.26", Executable: exe, StatExecutable: stat})
-}
-
-// A present, runnable binary passes AND reports its resolved path — the check is
-// no longer a hardcoded green; it names which binary answered.
-func TestRuntimeCheckPassesAndReportsBinaryPath(t *testing.T) {
-	c := runtimeCheckFor(t,
-		func() (string, error) { return "/opt/homebrew/lib/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/zero", nil },
-		func(string) (os.FileInfo, error) { return fakeFileInfo{}, nil })
-	if c.Status != StatusPass {
-		t.Fatalf("status = %s, want pass", c.Status)
-	}
-	if c.Details["binaryPath"] != "/opt/homebrew/lib/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/zero" {
-		t.Fatalf("binaryPath = %v, want the resolved path in details", c.Details["binaryPath"])
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(c.Message, "/opt/homebrew/lib/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/zero") {
-		t.Fatalf("message should surface the binary path, got %q", c.Message)
-	}
-}
-
-// The vanished-binary case FAILS loudly instead of the old unconditional pass —
-// this is the #405 regression: a broken runtime no longer gets a green check.
-func TestRuntimeCheckFailsWhenBinaryMissing(t *testing.T) {
-	c := runtimeCheckFor(t,
-		func() (string, error) { return "/path/to/zero", nil },
-		func(string) (os.FileInfo, error) { return nil, os.ErrNotExist })
-	if c.Status != StatusFail {
-		t.Fatalf("#405: a missing/inaccessible binary must FAIL, got %s (%q)", c.Status, c.Message)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(c.Message, "/path/to/zero") {
-		t.Fatalf("failure message should name the path, got %q", c.Message)
-	}
-}
-
-// os.Executable resolution failure fails loudly too.
-func TestRuntimeCheckFailsWhenExecutableUnresolvable(t *testing.T) {
-	c := runtimeCheckFor(t,
-		func() (string, error) { return "", errors.New("no executable path") },
-		func(string) (os.FileInfo, error) { return fakeFileInfo{}, nil })
-	if c.Status != StatusFail {
-		t.Fatalf("unresolvable executable must FAIL, got %s", c.Status)
-	}
-}
-
-// A path that resolves to a directory is not a runnable binary → FAIL.
-func TestRuntimeCheckFailsWhenPathIsDirectory(t *testing.T) {
-	c := runtimeCheckFor(t,
-		func() (string, error) { return "/some/dir", nil },
-		func(string) (os.FileInfo, error) { return fakeFileInfo{dir: true}, nil })
-	if c.Status != StatusFail {
-		t.Fatalf("a directory path must FAIL, got %s", c.Status)
-	}
-}
-
-// Default injection (nil Executable/StatExecutable) resolves the real running
-// test binary — proving the production default path works and passes.
-func TestRuntimeCheckDefaultsToRealBinary(t *testing.T) {
-	c := runtimeCheck(Options{})
-	if c.Status != StatusPass {
-		t.Fatalf("default runtime check should pass for the running test binary, got %s (%q)", c.Status, c.Message)
-	}
-	if strings.TrimSpace(c.Details["binaryPath"].(string)) == "" {
-		t.Fatal("default runtime check should report the running binary path")
-	}
-}

internal/mcp/client_test.go

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
 	"os"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
@@ -212,85 +211,6 @@ func TestHTTPClientListsAndCallsTools(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestHTTPClientFollowsSameOriginRedirect(t *testing.T) {
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	testServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
-		if request.URL.Path == "/mcp" {
-			http.Redirect(response, request, "/redirected", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
-			return
-		}
-		if request.Method != http.MethodPost || request.URL.Path != "/redirected" {
-			t.Errorf("request = %s %s, want POST /redirected", request.Method, request.URL.Path)
-			http.Error(response, "bad request", http.StatusNotFound)
-			return
-		}
-		if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "secret" {
-			t.Errorf("X-Api-Key = %q, want secret", got)
-			http.Error(response, "missing auth", http.StatusUnauthorized)
-			return
-		}
-
-		message := readHTTPRPCMessage(t, request)
-		switch message.Method {
-		case "initialize":
-			writeHTTPRPCResponse(t, response, message.ID, map[string]any{"protocolVersion": "2024-11-05"})
-		case "notifications/initialized":
-			response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
-		default:
-			writeHTTPRPCResponse(t, response, message.ID, map[string]any{})
-		}
-	}))
-	defer testServer.Close()
-
-	client, err := Connect(ctx, Server{
-		Name:    "docs",
-		Type:    ServerTypeHTTP,
-		URL:     testServer.URL + "/mcp",
-		Headers: map[string]string{"X-Api-Key": "secret"},
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Connect() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := client.Close(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Close() error = %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestHTTPClientRejectsCrossOriginRedirectBeforeSendingHeaders(t *testing.T) {
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	var targetHits int32
-	target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
-		atomic.AddInt32(&targetHits, 1)
-		if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "" {
-			t.Errorf("redirect target received X-Api-Key = %q", got)
-		}
-		response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-	}))
-	defer target.Close()
-
-	redirector := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
-		http.Redirect(response, request, target.URL+"/mcp", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
-	}))
-	defer redirector.Close()
-
-	_, err := Connect(ctx, Server{
-		Name:    "docs",
-		Type:    ServerTypeHTTP,
-		URL:     redirector.URL + "/mcp",
-		Headers: map[string]string{"X-Api-Key": "secret"},
-	})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-origin redirect") {
-		t.Fatalf("Connect() error = %v, want cross-origin redirect error", err)
-	}
-	if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&targetHits); got != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("redirect target hits = %d, want 0", got)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestSSEClientListsAndCallsToolsFromRemoteStream(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
 	defer cancel()
@@ -420,53 +340,6 @@ func TestSSEClientListsAndCallsToolsFromRemoteStream(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestSSEClientRejectsCrossOriginEndpointBeforeSendingHeaders(t *testing.T) {
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	var targetHits int32
-	target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
-		atomic.AddInt32(&targetHits, 1)
-		if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "" {
-			t.Errorf("SSE endpoint target received X-Api-Key = %q", got)
-		}
-		response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
-	}))
-	defer target.Close()
-
-	stream := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
-		if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "secret" {
-			t.Errorf("X-Api-Key = %q, want secret on configured SSE server", got)
-			http.Error(response, "missing auth", http.StatusUnauthorized)
-			return
-		}
-		if request.Method != http.MethodGet || request.URL.Path != "/sse" {
-			t.Errorf("request = %s %s, want GET /sse", request.Method, request.URL.Path)
-			http.Error(response, "bad request", http.StatusNotFound)
-			return
-		}
-		response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
-		_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(response, "event: endpoint\ndata: %s/messages\n\n", target.URL)
-		if flusher, ok := response.(http.Flusher); ok {
-			flusher.Flush()
-		}
-	}))
-	defer stream.Close()
-
-	_, err := Connect(ctx, Server{
-		Name:    "docs",
-		Type:    ServerTypeSSE,
-		URL:     stream.URL + "/sse",
-		Headers: map[string]string{"X-Api-Key": "secret"},
-	})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "endpoint origin") {
-		t.Fatalf("Connect() error = %v, want cross-origin endpoint error", err)
-	}
-	if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&targetHits); got != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("SSE endpoint target hits = %d, want 0", got)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestHTTPClientReportsNonOKStatus(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
 	defer cancel()

internal/mcp/network_client.go

@@ -733,11 +733,7 @@ func resolveSSEEndpointURL(baseValue string, endpointValue string) (string, erro
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("parse MCP SSE endpoint URL: %w", err)
 	}
-	resolvedURL := baseURL.ResolveReference(endpointURL)
-	if !sameMCPOrigin(baseURL, resolvedURL) {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("MCP SSE endpoint origin %s differs from configured server origin %s", mcpOrigin(resolvedURL), mcpOrigin(baseURL))
-	}
-	return resolvedURL.String(), nil
+	return baseURL.ResolveReference(endpointURL).String(), nil
 }
 
 func rpcResponseKey(id any) string {
@@ -877,10 +873,10 @@ func (source *storeTokenSource) Refresh(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
 
 // oauthHTTPClient returns an HTTP client whose transport attaches OAuth bearer
 // tokens and refreshes them on 401 for OAuth-configured servers. Servers that do
-// not declare OAuth use the default transport with the same MCP redirect guard.
+// not declare OAuth get the default client unchanged.
 func oauthHTTPClient(server Server) (*http.Client, error) {
 	if !strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(server.Auth), ServerAuthOAuth) {
-		return mcpHTTPClient(server, nil), nil
+		return http.DefaultClient, nil
 	}
 	store, err := NewTokenStore(TokenStoreOptions{})
 	if err != nil {
@@ -892,5 +888,5 @@ func oauthHTTPClient(server Server) (*http.Client, error) {
 		httpClient: http.DefaultClient,
 		now:        time.Now,
 	}
-	return mcpHTTPClient(server, newOAuthRoundTripper(http.DefaultTransport, source, server.Name)), nil
+	return &http.Client{Transport: newOAuthRoundTripper(http.DefaultTransport, source, server.Name)}, nil
 }

internal/mcp/network_client_test.go

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
-	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
@@ -150,141 +149,6 @@ func TestOAuthRoundTripperDoesNotRetryAfterSuccessfulNon401(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestOAuthRoundTripperRejectsCrossOriginRedirectBeforeBearerLeak(t *testing.T) {
-	source := &fakeTokenSource{}
-	source.access.Store("access-secret")
-	source.refreshFunc = func() (string, error) { return "access-fresh", nil }
-
-	var targetHits int32
-	target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		atomic.AddInt32(&targetHits, 1)
-		if got := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "" {
-			t.Errorf("redirect target received Authorization = %q", got)
-		}
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-	}))
-	defer target.Close()
-
-	redirector := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		http.Redirect(w, r, target.URL+"/mcp", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
-	}))
-	defer redirector.Close()
-
-	client := mcpHTTPClient(
-		Server{Name: "oauth-docs", Type: ServerTypeHTTP},
-		newOAuthRoundTripper(http.DefaultTransport, source, "oauth-docs"),
-	)
-	resp, err := client.Get(redirector.URL + "/mcp")
-	if resp != nil {
-		_ = resp.Body.Close()
-	}
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-origin redirect") {
-		t.Fatalf("Get() error = %v, want cross-origin redirect error", err)
-	}
-	if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&targetHits); got != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("redirect target hits = %d, want 0", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestSameMCPOriginNormalizesDefaultPorts(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		name  string
-		left  string
-		right string
-		want  bool
-	}{
-		{
-			name:  "https default port",
-			left:  "https://example.test/mcp",
-			right: "https://EXAMPLE.test:443/other",
-			want:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:  "http default port",
-			left:  "http://example.test/mcp",
-			right: "http://example.test:80/other",
-			want:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:  "different scheme",
-			left:  "https://example.test/mcp",
-			right: "http://example.test:443/other",
-			want:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:  "different port",
-			left:  "https://example.test/mcp",
-			right: "https://example.test:8443/other",
-			want:  false,
-		},
-	} {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			left, err := url.Parse(tc.left)
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			right, err := url.Parse(tc.right)
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			if got := sameMCPOrigin(left, right); got != tc.want {
-				t.Fatalf("sameMCPOrigin(%q, %q) = %v, want %v", tc.left, tc.right, got, tc.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolveSSEEndpointURLRestrictsOrigin(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		name     string
-		base     string
-		endpoint string
-		want     string
-		wantErr  string
-	}{
-		{
-			name:     "relative endpoint",
-			base:     "https://example.test/sse",
-			endpoint: "/messages",
-			want:     "https://example.test/messages",
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "absolute same origin",
-			base:     "https://example.test/sse",
-			endpoint: "https://example.test/messages",
-			want:     "https://example.test/messages",
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "default port equivalent",
-			base:     "https://example.test/sse",
-			endpoint: "https://example.test:443/messages",
-			want:     "https://example.test:443/messages",
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "cross origin",
-			base:     "https://example.test/sse",
-			endpoint: "https://evil.test/messages",
-			wantErr:  "differs from configured server origin",
-		},
-	} {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			got, err := resolveSSEEndpointURL(tc.base, tc.endpoint)
-			if tc.wantErr != "" {
-				if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.wantErr) {
-					t.Fatalf("resolveSSEEndpointURL() error = %v, want %q", err, tc.wantErr)
-				}
-				return
-			}
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("resolveSSEEndpointURL() error = %v", err)
-			}
-			if got != tc.want {
-				t.Fatalf("resolveSSEEndpointURL() = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
 func TestNonOAuthServerIsUnaffected(t *testing.T) {
 	// Regression: a server without auth must not get a bearer header or any
 	// OAuth round tripper, and must connect normally.

internal/mcp/network_redirect.go

@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-package mcp
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-const maxMCPRedirects = 10
-
-func mcpHTTPClient(server Server, transport http.RoundTripper) *http.Client {
-	return &http.Client{
-		Transport:     transport,
-		CheckRedirect: checkMCPRedirect(server),
-	}
-}
-
-func checkMCPRedirect(server Server) func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
-	return func(request *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
-		if len(via) >= maxMCPRedirects {
-			return fmt.Errorf("MCP %s server %s stopped after %d redirects", server.Type, server.Name, maxMCPRedirects)
-		}
-		if len(via) == 0 {
-			return nil
-		}
-		if !sameMCPOrigin(via[0].URL, request.URL) {
-			return fmt.Errorf("MCP %s server %s refused cross-origin redirect to %s", server.Type, server.Name, mcpOrigin(request.URL))
-		}
-		return nil
-	}
-}
-
-func sameMCPOrigin(left *url.URL, right *url.URL) bool {
-	if left == nil || right == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	return strings.EqualFold(left.Scheme, right.Scheme) &&
-		strings.EqualFold(left.Hostname(), right.Hostname()) &&
-		effectiveMCPPort(left) == effectiveMCPPort(right)
-}
-
-func effectiveMCPPort(value *url.URL) string {
-	if value == nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-	if port := value.Port(); port != "" {
-		return port
-	}
-	switch strings.ToLower(value.Scheme) {
-	case "http":
-		return "80"
-	case "https":
-		return "443"
-	default:
-		return ""
-	}
-}
-
-func mcpOrigin(value *url.URL) string {
-	if value == nil {
-		return "<nil>"
-	}
-	host := value.Hostname()
-	port := effectiveMCPPort(value)
-	if port != "" {
-		host = net.JoinHostPort(host, port)
-	}
-	if value.Scheme == "" {
-		return host
-	}
-	return strings.ToLower(value.Scheme) + "://" + host
-}

internal/mcp/oauth_test.go

@@ -370,14 +370,7 @@ func TestFullFlowStoresTokens(t *testing.T) {
 		redirect := parsed.Query().Get("redirect_uri")
 		go func() {
 			cbURL := redirect + "?code=auth-code&state=" + url.QueryEscape(state)
-			for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
-				resp, err := http.Get(cbURL)
-				if err == nil {
-					resp.Body.Close()
-					return
-				}
-				time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
-			}
+			_, _ = http.Get(cbURL)
 		}()
 		return nil
 	}

internal/providercatalog/catalog.go

@@ -134,9 +134,6 @@ var descriptors = []Descriptor{
 	openAICompat("xiaomi-mimo", "Xiaomi MiMo", "https://api.mimo.xiaomi.com/openai/v1", "mimo-vl", []string{"MIMO_API_KEY", "XIAOMI_API_KEY"}, "xiaomi mimo"),
 	openAICompat("bankr", "Bankr", "https://api.bankr.bot/v1", "bankr-large", []string{"BANKR_API_KEY"}),
 	openAICompat("zai", "Z.ai", "https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4", "glm-4.5", []string{"ZAI_API_KEY", "ZHIPU_API_KEY"}),
-	openAICompat("kilocode", "KiloCode", "https://api.kilo.ai/api/gateway", "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.6", []string{"KILO_API_KEY"}, "kilo", "kilo gateway"),
-	openAICompat("opencode", "OpenCode Zen", "https://opencode.ai/zen/v1", "deepseek-v4-flash", []string{"OPENCODE_API_KEY"}, "opencode zen"),
-	openAICompat("opencode-go", "OpenCode Go", "https://opencode.ai/zen/go/v1", "deepseek-v4-pro", []string{"OPENCODE_API_KEY"}, "opencode go"),
 	openAICompat("atomic-chat", "Atomic Chat", "https://api.atomic.chat/v1", "gpt-4.1", []string{"ATOMIC_CHAT_API_KEY"}),
 	// ChatGPT subscription via a local OAuth proxy. A ChatGPT (Plus/Pro) OAuth
 	// token only works against ChatGPT's own backend (which is Cloudflare-gated to

internal/providercatalog/catalog_test.go

@@ -34,9 +34,6 @@ var expectedCatalogIDs = []string{
 	"xiaomi-mimo",
 	"bankr",
 	"zai",
-	"kilocode",
-	"opencode",
-	"opencode-go",
 	"atomic-chat",
 	"chatgpt-proxy",
 	"custom-openai-compatible",
@@ -267,7 +264,7 @@ func TestListByTransportPreservesCatalogOrder(t *testing.T) {
 		TransportBedrock:         {"bedrock"},
 		TransportVertex:          {"vertex"},
 		TransportAnthropicCompat: {"minimax", "custom-anthropic-compatible"},
-		TransportOpenAICompat:    {"gitlawb-opengateway", "ollama-cloud", "ollama", "lmstudio", "openrouter", "huggingface", "chatgpt", "groq", "deepseek", "together", "dashscope", "moonshot", "nvidia-nim", "mistral", "github", "xai", "venice", "xiaomi-mimo", "bankr", "zai", "kilocode", "opencode", "opencode-go", "atomic-chat", "chatgpt-proxy", "custom-openai-compatible"},
+		TransportOpenAICompat:    {"gitlawb-opengateway", "ollama-cloud", "ollama", "lmstudio", "openrouter", "huggingface", "chatgpt", "groq", "deepseek", "together", "dashscope", "moonshot", "nvidia-nim", "mistral", "github", "xai", "venice", "xiaomi-mimo", "bankr", "zai", "atomic-chat", "chatgpt-proxy", "custom-openai-compatible"},
 	}
 
 	for transport, wantIDs := range cases {

internal/providers/gemini/provider.go

@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ func (provider *Provider) geminiRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (
 			declarations = append(declarations, geminiFunctionDeclaration{
 				Name:        tool.Name,
 				Description: tool.Description,
-				Parameters:  sanitizeGeminiSchema(tool.Parameters),
+				Parameters:  tool.Parameters,
 			})
 		}
 		mapped.Tools = []geminiToolGroup{{FunctionDeclarations: declarations}}
@@ -350,71 +350,6 @@ func (provider *Provider) geminiRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (
 	return mapped, nil
 }
 
-// geminiSchemaFields is the subset of JSON Schema keywords Google's
-// functionDeclarations[].parameters accepts (the Generative AI Schema type).
-// Anything outside it — most notably OpenAI's `additionalProperties`, which Zero
-// emits on every tool's parameters and which Gemini 400s on ("Unknown name
-// \"additionalProperties\" … Cannot find field") — must be dropped before the
-// request goes out. Kept as an allowlist rather than a denylist so a schema
-// keyword Zero (or an MCP server) adds later can't silently leak an unsupported
-// field into the Gemini payload.
-var geminiSchemaFields = map[string]bool{
-	"type": true, "format": true, "title": true, "description": true,
-	"nullable": true, "enum": true, "items": true, "properties": true,
-	"required": true, "anyOf": true, "propertyOrdering": true, "default": true,
-	"minimum": true, "maximum": true, "minItems": true, "maxItems": true,
-	"minLength": true, "maxLength": true, "minProperties": true,
-	"maxProperties": true, "pattern": true, "example": true,
-}
-
-// sanitizeGeminiSchema returns a copy of a JSON-Schema map keeping only the
-// keywords Gemini supports (geminiSchemaFields), recursing through the nested
-// schemas under `properties`, `items`, and `anyOf`. Returns nil for a nil input
-// so a parameterless tool stays parameterless.
-func sanitizeGeminiSchema(schema map[string]any) map[string]any {
-	if schema == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	out := make(map[string]any, len(schema))
-	for key, value := range schema {
-		if !geminiSchemaFields[key] {
-			continue
-		}
-		switch key {
-		case "properties":
-			if props, ok := value.(map[string]any); ok {
-				cleaned := make(map[string]any, len(props))
-				for name, sub := range props {
-					if subMap, ok := sub.(map[string]any); ok {
-						cleaned[name] = sanitizeGeminiSchema(subMap)
-					} else {
-						cleaned[name] = sub
-					}
-				}
-				value = cleaned
-			}
-		case "items":
-			if subMap, ok := value.(map[string]any); ok {
-				value = sanitizeGeminiSchema(subMap)
-			}
-		case "anyOf":
-			if variants, ok := value.([]any); ok {
-				cleaned := make([]any, len(variants))
-				for i, variant := range variants {
-					if subMap, ok := variant.(map[string]any); ok {
-						cleaned[i] = sanitizeGeminiSchema(subMap)
-					} else {
-						cleaned[i] = variant
-					}
-				}
-				value = cleaned
-			}
-		}
-		out[key] = value
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
 func mapMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message) (*geminiContent, []geminiContent, error) {
 	systemParts := []geminiPart{}
 	contents := []geminiContent{}

internal/providers/gemini/provider_test.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package gemini
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"reflect"
@@ -505,129 +504,3 @@ func eventsOfType(events []zeroruntime.StreamEvent, eventType zeroruntime.Stream
 	}
 	return matching
 }
-
-// TestSanitizeGeminiSchemaStripsUnsupportedFields: the sanitizer keeps only
-// Gemini-supported keywords and recurses into properties/items/anyOf, so no
-// OpenAI-ism (additionalProperties, $schema, patternProperties) survives at any
-// depth while legitimate fields (type/description/enum/required/default) stay.
-func TestSanitizeGeminiSchemaStripsUnsupportedFields(t *testing.T) {
-	in := map[string]any{
-		"type":                 "object",
-		"additionalProperties": false,
-		"$schema":              "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
-		"required":             []string{"path"},
-		"properties": map[string]any{
-			"path": map[string]any{
-				"type":        "string",
-				"description": "a path",
-				"default":     ".",
-			},
-			"nested": map[string]any{
-				"type":                 "object",
-				"additionalProperties": false, // must be stripped at depth too
-				"properties": map[string]any{
-					"tags": map[string]any{
-						"type":  "array",
-						"items": map[string]any{"type": "string", "additionalProperties": true},
-					},
-				},
-			},
-		},
-	}
-	out := sanitizeGeminiSchema(in)
-
-	assertNoAdditionalProps(t, out, "root")
-	if out["additionalProperties"] != nil {
-		t.Fatal("top-level additionalProperties must be stripped")
-	}
-	if out["$schema"] != nil {
-		t.Fatal("$schema must be stripped")
-	}
-	// Legitimate fields survive.
-	if out["type"] != "object" {
-		t.Fatalf("type should survive, got %v", out["type"])
-	}
-	props := out["properties"].(map[string]any)
-	pathProp := props["path"].(map[string]any)
-	if pathProp["description"] != "a path" || pathProp["default"] != "." {
-		t.Fatalf("legitimate property fields must survive: %#v", pathProp)
-	}
-	// nil input stays nil (parameterless tool).
-	if sanitizeGeminiSchema(nil) != nil {
-		t.Fatal("nil schema should map to nil")
-	}
-}
-
-// assertNoAdditionalProps fails if additionalProperties appears anywhere in the
-// (recursively walked) schema.
-func assertNoAdditionalProps(t *testing.T, node any, path string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	switch v := node.(type) {
-	case map[string]any:
-		if _, ok := v["additionalProperties"]; ok {
-			t.Fatalf("additionalProperties leaked at %s", path)
-		}
-		for k, sub := range v {
-			assertNoAdditionalProps(t, sub, path+"."+k)
-		}
-	case []any:
-		for i, sub := range v {
-			assertNoAdditionalProps(t, sub, fmt.Sprintf("%s[%d]", path, i))
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestGeminiRequestOmitsAdditionalPropertiesInToolSchema: end-to-end, the tool
-// parameters Zero emits (schemaToRuntimeMap always writes additionalProperties)
-// must not reach Gemini — otherwise every functionDeclaration is 400-rejected
-// ("Unknown name additionalProperties"), which broke all tool-using exec calls
-// against Google (issue #373).
-func TestGeminiRequestOmitsAdditionalPropertiesInToolSchema(t *testing.T) {
-	var gotBody map[string]any
-	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&gotBody); err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("decode request body: %v", err)
-		}
-		writeSSE(w, `{"usageMetadata":{"promptTokenCount":1}}`)
-	}))
-	defer server.Close()
-
-	provider, err := New(Options{APIKey: "k", BaseURL: server.URL + "/", Model: "models/gemini-2.5-flash"})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("New returned error: %v", err)
-	}
-	stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(context.Background(), zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
-		Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "hi"}},
-		Tools: []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
-			Name:        "grep",
-			Description: "search",
-			Parameters: map[string]any{ // exactly what schemaToRuntimeMap produces
-				"type":                 "object",
-				"additionalProperties": false,
-				"required":             []string{"pattern"},
-				"properties": map[string]any{
-					"pattern": map[string]any{"type": "string", "description": "regex"},
-				},
-			},
-		}},
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("StreamCompletion returned error: %v", err)
-	}
-	drain(stream)
-
-	tools := gotBody["tools"].([]any)
-	decls := tools[0].(map[string]any)["functionDeclarations"].([]any)
-	params := decls[0].(map[string]any)["parameters"].(map[string]any)
-	if _, ok := params["additionalProperties"]; ok {
-		t.Fatalf("additionalProperties must not be sent to Gemini: %#v", params)
-	}
-	// The tool is still usable: its real schema survived.
-	if params["type"] != "object" {
-		t.Fatalf("tool parameters type should survive, got %v", params["type"])
-	}
-	props := params["properties"].(map[string]any)
-	if _, ok := props["pattern"]; !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("tool property must survive sanitization: %#v", props)
-	}
-}

internal/sandbox/engine_test.go

@@ -9,25 +9,22 @@ import (
 	"time"
 )
 
-// TestEvaluatePromptsForNetworkToolsButExemptsThemFromShellNetworkPolicy verifies
-// that first-party in-process network tools are governed by their permission
-// metadata, not by the sandboxed shell egress policy.
-func TestEvaluatePromptsForNetworkToolsButExemptsThemFromShellNetworkPolicy(t *testing.T) {
+// TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromShellNetworkPolicy verifies that the
+// sandbox network policy gates sandboxed shell egress, not first-party
+// in-process web tools.
+func TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromShellNetworkPolicy(t *testing.T) {
 	base := Policy{Mode: ModeEnforce, Network: NetworkDeny}
 
 	engine := NewEngine(EngineOptions{Policy: base})
 	d := engine.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{
-		ToolName: "web_search", SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork, Permission: PermissionPrompt,
+		ToolName: "web_search", SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork, Permission: PermissionAllow,
 	})
-	if d.Action != ActionPrompt || d.Block != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("web_search must prompt before permission is granted, got %#v", d)
-	}
-	if d.Reason == ReasonNetworkBlocked {
-		t.Fatalf("web_search prompt should come from tool permission, not shell network policy: %#v", d)
+	if d.Action != ActionAllow || d.Block != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("web_search must be allowed by the sandbox gate, got %#v", d)
 	}
 
 	allowed := engine.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{
-		ToolName: "web_search", SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork, Permission: PermissionPrompt, PermissionGranted: true,
+		ToolName: "web_search", SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork, Permission: PermissionAllow, PermissionGranted: true,
 	})
 	if allowed.Action != ActionAllow || allowed.Block != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("granted web_search must be allowed under deny, got %#v", allowed)

internal/sandbox/manager_test.go

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func TestPermissionProfileFromPolicyIncludesDefaultTempWriteRoots(t *testing.T)
 	if !writeRootsContain(profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, tmpdir) {
 		t.Fatalf("write roots = %#v, want temp root %q", profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, tmpdir)
 	}
-	if runtime.GOOS != "windows" && pathExists("/tmp") && !writeRootsContain(profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, "/tmp") {
+	if pathExists("/tmp") && !writeRootsContain(profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, "/tmp") {
 		t.Fatalf("write roots = %#v, want /tmp", profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots)
 	}
 }

internal/sandbox/scope_test.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package sandbox
 import (
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
-	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 )
@@ -129,7 +128,7 @@ func TestNewScopeNormalizesAndValidatesExtraRoots(t *testing.T) {
 	if !stringSliceContains(roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort(extra)) {
 		t.Fatalf("Roots()=%v want extra root %q", roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort(extra))
 	}
-	if runtime.GOOS != "windows" && pathExists("/tmp") && !stringSliceContains(roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort("/tmp")) {
+	if pathExists("/tmp") && !stringSliceContains(roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort("/tmp")) {
 		t.Fatalf("Roots()=%v want default /tmp write root", roots)
 	}
 }

internal/specialist/manifest.go

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
 )
 
@@ -121,7 +120,7 @@ var knownToolNames = map[string]bool{
 }
 
 func DefaultPaths(workspaceRoot string) (Paths, error) {
-	userConfigDir, err := config.UserConfigDir()
+	userConfigDir, err := os.UserConfigDir()
 	if err != nil {
 		return Paths{}, fmt.Errorf("resolve user config directory: %w", err)
 	}

internal/tools/edit_file.go

@@ -79,25 +79,6 @@ func (tool editFileTool) RunWithOptions(_ context.Context, args map[string]any,
 	content := string(contentBytes)
 	occurrences := strings.Count(content, oldString)
 
-	// CRLF fallback: read_file normalizes \r\n → \n before presenting content to
-	// the model, so the model's old_string will use \n line endings. When the raw
-	// file uses \r\n (common on Windows), the \n-based old_string won't match.
-	// Detect this and transparently normalize: if the direct match fails, translate
-	// old_string's line endings to \r\n and search again. If found, use the CRLF-translated
-	// old_string and new_string for the replacement to preserve the file's existing EOL style
-	// without rewriting EOLs in unrelated parts of the file.
-	if occurrences == 0 && strings.Contains(content, "\r\n") && !strings.Contains(oldString, "\r\n") {
-		crlfOldString := strings.ReplaceAll(oldString, "\n", "\r\n")
-		normalizedOccurrences := strings.Count(content, crlfOldString)
-		if normalizedOccurrences > 0 {
-			occurrences = normalizedOccurrences
-			oldString = crlfOldString
-			if !strings.Contains(newString, "\r\n") {
-				newString = strings.ReplaceAll(newString, "\n", "\r\n")
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
 	if occurrences == 0 {
 		return errorResult("Error: Could not find the exact string to replace in " + relativePath + ". The old_string must match the file byte-for-byte.")
 	}

internal/tools/registry_test.go

@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ func TestCoreNetworkToolsExposeSafetyMetadata(t *testing.T) {
 	if property, ok := search.Parameters().Properties["query"]; !ok || property.Type != "string" {
 		t.Fatalf("web_search must expose a string query property, got %#v", search.Parameters().Properties["query"])
 	}
-	if safety := search.Safety(); safety.Permission != PermissionPrompt || !safety.AdvertiseInAuto {
-		t.Fatalf("web_search safety = %#v, want prompt and advertised in auto", safety)
+	if safety := search.Safety(); safety.Permission != PermissionAllow || safety.AdvertiseInAuto {
+		t.Fatalf("web_search safety = %#v, want allow without prompt-advertise override", safety)
 	}
 }
 

internal/tools/web_search.go

@@ -81,14 +81,13 @@ func newWebSearchToolWithBackend(backend searchBackend) Tool {
 				Required:             []string{"query"},
 				AdditionalProperties: false,
 			},
-			// Hosted search sends model-provided query text to a configured network
-			// backend. Keep it visible in auto mode, but guard execution through the
-			// normal permission flow like web_fetch.
+			// Hosted search is a read-only discovery action. It remains marked as
+			// network for metadata, but sandbox network policy is the shell egress
+			// boundary; web_search keeps its own result-domain filtering safeguards.
 			safety: Safety{
-				SideEffect:      SideEffectNetwork,
-				Permission:      PermissionPrompt,
-				Reason:          "Sends model-provided search query text to the configured web search backend.",
-				AdvertiseInAuto: true,
+				SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork,
+				Permission: PermissionAllow,
+				Reason:     "Performs a web search over the network.",
 			},
 		},
 		backend: backend,
@@ -96,8 +95,7 @@ func newWebSearchToolWithBackend(backend searchBackend) Tool {
 }
 
 // RunWithSandbox follows the normal web_search path. The sandbox network policy
-// gates sandboxed shell egress; this in-process hosted search tool is guarded by
-// the permission flow plus backend and result-domain safeguards.
+// gates sandboxed shell egress, not this in-process hosted search tool.
 func (tool webSearchTool) RunWithSandbox(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any, engine *zeroSandbox.Engine) Result {
 	return tool.Run(ctx, args)
 }

internal/tools/web_search_test.go

@@ -116,52 +116,17 @@ func TestWebSearchRegisteredInCoreNetworkTools(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestWebSearchSafetyPromptsForHostedSearchButAdvertisesInAuto(t *testing.T) {
+func TestWebSearchSafetyAllowsHostedSearchWithoutPrompt(t *testing.T) {
 	tool := newWebSearchToolWithBackend(&fakeSearchBackend{})
 	safety := tool.Safety()
 	if safety.SideEffect != SideEffectNetwork {
 		t.Fatalf("side effect = %s, want network", safety.SideEffect)
 	}
-	if safety.Permission != PermissionPrompt {
-		t.Fatalf("permission = %s, want prompt", safety.Permission)
+	if safety.Permission != PermissionAllow {
+		t.Fatalf("permission = %s, want allow", safety.Permission)
 	}
-	if !safety.AdvertiseInAuto {
-		t.Fatal("web_search should be advertised in auto mode while still requiring permission")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestWebSearchRegistryRequiresPermissionBeforeBackendCall(t *testing.T) {
-	backend := &fakeSearchBackend{results: []searchResult{{Title: "T", URL: "https://x.test"}}}
-	registry := NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(newWebSearchToolWithBackend(backend))
-
-	res := registry.Run(context.Background(), "web_search", map[string]any{"query": "private workspace detail"})
-
-	if res.Status != StatusError {
-		t.Fatalf("expected permission error, got %s: %s", res.Status, res.Output)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(res.Output, "Permission required for web_search") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected permission-required output, got %q", res.Output)
-	}
-	if backend.gotQuery != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("backend must not be called before permission, got query %q", backend.gotQuery)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestWebSearchRegistryRunsAfterPermissionGranted(t *testing.T) {
-	backend := &fakeSearchBackend{results: []searchResult{{Title: "T", URL: "https://x.test"}}}
-	registry := NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(newWebSearchToolWithBackend(backend))
-
-	res := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "web_search", map[string]any{"query": "go errors"}, RunOptions{
-		PermissionGranted: true,
-	})
-
-	if res.Status != StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("expected ok, got %s: %s", res.Status, res.Output)
-	}
-	if backend.gotQuery != "go errors" {
-		t.Fatalf("backend query = %q, want %q", backend.gotQuery, "go errors")
+	if safety.AdvertiseInAuto {
+		t.Fatal("web_search should not need the prompt-tool auto advertisement override")
 	}
 }
 

internal/tools/write_tools_test.go

@@ -250,29 +250,6 @@ func TestEditFileToolReplacesExactStrings(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestEditFileToolReplacesCRLF(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	path := filepath.Join(root, "code.go")
-	writeTestFile(t, path, "const a = 1\r\nconst b = 2\r\n")
-
-	result := NewEditFileTool(root).Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{
-		"path":       "code.go",
-		"old_string": "const a = 1\nconst b = 2",
-		"new_string": "const a = 42\nconst b = 24",
-	})
-
-	if result.Status != StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("expected edit ok, got %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
-	}
-	content, err := os.ReadFile(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if string(content) != "const a = 42\r\nconst b = 24\r\n" {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected edited content: %q", string(content))
-	}
-}
-
 func TestEditFileToolEmitsUnifiedDiff(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	writeTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "code.go"), "const a = 1\nconst b = 2\n")

internal/tui/model.go

@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ func newModel(ctx context.Context, options Options) model {
 		}
 	}
 
-	userConfigDir, _ := config.UserConfigDir()
+	userConfigDir, _ := os.UserConfigDir()
 	loadedUserCommands := usercommands.Load(usercommands.DefaultPaths(cwd, userConfigDir))
 
 	registry := options.Registry
@@ -1669,38 +1669,17 @@ func (m model) updateModel(msg tea.Msg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 		// when the loop is already running or there is nothing to animate.
 		return m, m.ensureSpinnerTick()
 	case permissionRequestMsg:
-		// The agent goroutine that raised this request is BLOCKED waiting on the
-		// decision callback, so every branch below must resolve it exactly once —
-		// or store it in pendingPermission, which resolves it on the user's reply.
-		// Dropping a request without resolving parks the run forever (the reported
-		// "stuck for 33 minutes" deadlock): the agent waits on a decision channel
-		// nothing will ever signal, with no visible prompt and no network activity.
 		if msg.runID != m.activeRunID {
-			// A superseded/stale run: unblock its parked goroutine now rather than
-			// relying on that run's context cancel to fire first.
-			if msg.decide != nil {
-				msg.decide(agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionCancel, Reason: "run superseded"})
-			}
-			return m, nil
-		}
-		if msg.request.Action != agent.PermissionActionPrompt {
-			// Not a user-facing prompt (e.g. a sandbox-allowed command that still
-			// blocked because it requested additional permissions). The UI has
-			// nothing to ask, so resolve immediately and FAIL CLOSED — never
-			// silently grant access that was never surfaced to the user. (The agent
-			// now marks such elevation requests as prompts, so in practice this is a
-			// defensive backstop; matches the ACP handler's fail-closed contract.)
-			if msg.decide != nil {
-				msg.decide(autoResolvedPermissionDecision(msg.request.Action))
-			}
 			return m, nil
 		}
 		promptRow := permissionTranscriptRow(permissionEventFromRequest(msg.request))
 		promptRow.runID = msg.runID
 		m.transcript = appendTranscriptRow(m.transcript, promptRow)
-		m.pendingPermission = &pendingPermissionPrompt{
-			request: msg.request,
-			decide:  msg.decide,
+		if msg.request.Action == agent.PermissionActionPrompt {
+			m.pendingPermission = &pendingPermissionPrompt{
+				request: msg.request,
+				decide:  msg.decide,
+			}
 		}
 		return m, nil
 	case askUserRequestMsg:
@@ -4546,21 +4525,6 @@ func (m model) sendPermissionRequest(runID int, request agent.PermissionRequest,
 	m.runtimeMessageSink(permissionRequestMsg{runID: runID, request: request, decide: decide})
 }
 
-// autoResolvedPermissionDecision resolves a permission request the TUI cannot
-// turn into a user prompt (Action != prompt). The agent is blocked awaiting a
-// decision, so one must ALWAYS be produced. Only an explicit Cancel is honored
-// as such; every other non-prompt action — including allow — is DENIED, so the
-// UI never silently grants access it did not surface for approval.
-func autoResolvedPermissionDecision(action agent.PermissionAction) agent.PermissionDecision {
-	if action == agent.PermissionActionCancel {
-		return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionCancel, Reason: "run cancelled"}
-	}
-	return agent.PermissionDecision{
-		Action: agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
-		Reason: "permission request could not be surfaced for approval",
-	}
-}
-
 func (m model) sendAskUserRequest(runID int, request agent.AskUserRequest, answer func([]string)) {
 	if m.runtimeMessageSink == nil {
 		return

internal/tui/model_picker_display_test.go

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-package tui
-
-import "testing"
-
-// The model picker must title each row with the model NAME, not the models.dev
-// marketing description. Regression: Ollama Cloud models resolved full-sentence
-// descriptions from the remote catalog, so rows showed sentences and several
-// models sharing one description looked like exact duplicates (issue: /model
-// list rendered descriptions as titles).
-func TestModelPickerDisplayNamePrefersModelName(t *testing.T) {
-	sentence := "DeepSeek chat model for instruction following, coding, and analysis"
-	cases := []struct {
-		id          string
-		description string
-		want        string
-	}{
-		{"deepseek-v3.2", sentence, "Deepseek V3.2"},
-		{"deepseek-v3.2-thinking", sentence, "Deepseek V3.2 Thinking"},
-		{"glm-5.2", "GLM flagship model", "GLM 5.2"},
-		{"qwen3-coder:480b", "Qwen coding agent model for repository tasks", "Qwen3 Coder 480b"},
-		{"anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.6", "some blurb", "Claude Sonnet 4.6"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		if got := modelPickerDisplayName(tc.id, tc.description); got != tc.want {
-			t.Errorf("modelPickerDisplayName(%q, %q) = %q, want %q", tc.id, tc.description, got, tc.want)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// Two distinct model ids that share the same catalog description must render as
-// distinct rows (the "duplicate-looking rows" symptom), never as the shared
-// sentence.
-func TestModelPickerDisplayNameDistinctForSharedDescription(t *testing.T) {
-	shared := "Mistral coding agent model for repository tasks and software engineering"
-	a := modelPickerDisplayName("codestral-2", shared)
-	b := modelPickerDisplayName("devstral-2", shared)
-	if a == b {
-		t.Fatalf("shared description collapsed rows to the same title: %q", a)
-	}
-	if a == shared || b == shared {
-		t.Fatalf("row title used the description sentence: a=%q b=%q", a, b)
-	}
-}
-
-// With no id to name the row, a non-generic description is still an acceptable
-// fallback; a generic placeholder (or nothing) falls back to "model".
-func TestModelPickerDisplayNameFallsBackToDescriptionOnlyWithoutID(t *testing.T) {
-	if got := modelPickerDisplayName("", "Friendly Name"); got != "Friendly Name" {
-		t.Fatalf("empty id should fall back to the description, got %q", got)
-	}
-	if got := modelPickerDisplayName("", "catalog default"); got != "model" {
-		t.Fatalf("generic description with no id should yield %q, got %q", "model", got)
-	}
-	if got := modelPickerDisplayName("", ""); got != "model" {
-		t.Fatalf("empty id and description should yield %q, got %q", "model", got)
-	}
-}

internal/tui/permission_deadlock_test.go

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-package tui
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
-)
-
-func permissionModel(t *testing.T) model {
-	t.Helper()
-	m := newModel(context.Background(), Options{})
-	m.pending = true
-	m.activeRunID = 7
-	m.width = 96
-	return m
-}
-
-// The deadlock: a permission request whose Action is NOT prompt (e.g. a
-// sandbox-allowed command that still blocked to request additional permissions)
-// must be resolved immediately — the agent goroutine is parked awaiting a
-// decision. Before the fix the handler dropped it, and the run hung forever
-// (the reported "stuck for 33 minutes"). Fail closed: a non-prompt allow denies.
-func TestPermissionRequestNonPromptResolvesFailClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	m := permissionModel(t)
-	var got *agent.PermissionDecision
-	decide := func(d agent.PermissionDecision) { got = &d }
-
-	updated, _ := m.Update(permissionRequestMsg{
-		runID:   7,
-		request: agent.PermissionRequest{ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "bash", Action: agent.PermissionActionAllow},
-		decide:  decide,
-	})
-	next := updated.(model)
-
-	if got == nil {
-		t.Fatal("DEADLOCK: decide was never called for a non-prompt request — the agent goroutine would park forever")
-	}
-	if got.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionDeny {
-		t.Fatalf("decision = %q, want deny (fail closed — never silently grant an unsurfaced permission)", got.Action)
-	}
-	if next.pendingPermission != nil {
-		t.Fatal("a non-prompt request must not open a pending prompt")
-	}
-}
-
-// A superseded/stale run's request (runID mismatch) must also be resolved
-// (cancelled) so its parked goroutine unblocks instead of depending on
-// context-cancel ordering.
-func TestPermissionRequestStaleRunResolvesCancel(t *testing.T) {
-	m := permissionModel(t) // activeRunID = 7
-	var got *agent.PermissionDecision
-	decide := func(d agent.PermissionDecision) { got = &d }
-
-	m.Update(permissionRequestMsg{
-		runID:   3, // != activeRunID
-		request: agent.PermissionRequest{ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "bash", Action: agent.PermissionActionPrompt},
-		decide:  decide,
-	})
-
-	if got == nil {
-		t.Fatal("stale-run request was dropped without resolving — its agent goroutine would park")
-	}
-	if got.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionCancel {
-		t.Fatalf("decision = %q, want cancel for a superseded run", got.Action)
-	}
-}
-
-// An explicit-cancel action is honored as a cancel (not denied).
-func TestPermissionRequestCancelActionResolvesCancel(t *testing.T) {
-	m := permissionModel(t)
-	var got *agent.PermissionDecision
-	decide := func(d agent.PermissionDecision) { got = &d }
-
-	m.Update(permissionRequestMsg{
-		runID:   7,
-		request: agent.PermissionRequest{ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "bash", Action: agent.PermissionActionCancel},
-		decide:  decide,
-	})
-	if got == nil || got.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionCancel {
-		t.Fatalf("cancel action must resolve as cancel, got %#v", got)
-	}
-}
-
-// A genuine prompt request stores the pending prompt and does NOT resolve yet —
-// the decision comes from the user's reply. (Regression guard: the fix must not
-// accidentally auto-resolve real prompts.)
-func TestPermissionRequestPromptDefersToUser(t *testing.T) {
-	m := permissionModel(t)
-	resolved := false
-	decide := func(agent.PermissionDecision) { resolved = true }
-
-	updated, _ := m.Update(permissionRequestMsg{
-		runID: 7,
-		request: agent.PermissionRequest{
-			ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "bash", Action: agent.PermissionActionPrompt,
-			Reason: "runs a shell command", AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{agent.PermissionDecisionAllow},
-		},
-		decide: decide,
-	})
-	next := updated.(model)
-
-	if resolved {
-		t.Fatal("a real prompt must not be auto-resolved; it awaits the user")
-	}
-	if next.pendingPermission == nil {
-		t.Fatal("a prompt request must open a pending permission prompt")
-	}
-}

internal/tui/picker.go

@@ -452,17 +452,11 @@ func registryModelPickerMeta(entry modelregistry.ModelEntry) string {
 }
 
 func modelPickerDisplayName(id string, description string) string {
-	// The row title is the model NAME, not its marketing blurb. Catalog/discovery
-	// descriptions (from models.dev) are full sentences, and several models share
-	// the same one — using them as titles showed sentence-long rows that looked like
-	// exact duplicates and hid the actual id (which only survived in the meta line).
-	// Prefer the (prettified) id; fall back to a non-generic description only when
-	// there is no id to name the row.
+	if description = strings.TrimSpace(description); description != "" && !providerWizardGenericModelDescription(description) {
+		return description
+	}
 	id = strings.TrimSpace(id)
 	if id == "" {
-		if description = strings.TrimSpace(description); description != "" && !providerWizardGenericModelDescription(description) {
-			return description
-		}
 		return "model"
 	}
 	name := id

release-please-config.json

@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@
   "bootstrap-sha": "02f0c0929bec65f5fc41bdcab3eb518d2b0b329a",
   "packages": {
     ".": {
-      "package-name": "@gitlawb/zero"
+      "package-name": "@gitlawb/zero",
+      "release-as": "0.1.0"
     }
   }
 }