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Author SHA1 Message Date
Vasanthdev2004 330b10fe8e docs(readme): clarify /loop runs a prompt or custom command, not built-ins 2026-07-06 08:59:06 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 ac25352e12 fix(tui): address /loop review round 2 — ticker re-arm, self-paced command, resume guard
- stopLoop re-arms the poll ticker after removing one loop, so stopping one of
  several no longer strands the rest with no tick scheduled (jatmn).
- a bare self-paced /command is rejected with a pointer to the interval form:
  self-paced drives a free-form goal via the playbook + LOOP: control line, which
  a custom command's expanded template never carries, so it would silently
  degrade to adaptive polling (jatmn).
- /resume only tears loops down on an actual session-id change; /resume latest or
  /resume <currentID> can resolve to the already-active session, whose loops are
  its own, not a "previous" session's (CodeRabbit).
- tests: skipped-behind-modal loop stays scheduled, footer carries the next-wake
  time, the confirmed /clear actually wipes the transcript, plus multi-loop stop
  keeping the ticker alive and self-paced-/command rejection.
2026-07-06 08:53:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 de7f0b6a5b fix(tui): finish /loop v1 — real self-paced completion, session scope, leave gate
Response to the review. The self-paced path was the real gap: it advertised
model-chosen completion but nothing ever wrote the done/next-wake fields, so it
was just adaptive polling dressed up. Replaced that with an actual control
channel — each self-paced iteration runs a short maintenance playbook and ends
its reply with a control line (LOOP: DONE / LOOP: CONTINUE [interval]) that
advanceLoop parses to stop the loop or pick the next wake. The two dead model
fields are gone; done and next-wake now come from the model's output.

Rest of the review:
- loops stop on a session switch (/new, /resume) instead of firing the previous
  conversation's prompt into the new one
- validateLoopTarget resolves custom /commands up front and rejects unknowns, so
  a mistyped `/loop 5m /nope` isn't scheduled and then re-sent as literal text
- a one-shot confirm gates /clear and /quit while loops are active
- age-based auto-expire (24h) next to the iteration cap
- the two CodeRabbit test nits (HasPrefix footer check, bare `/loop stop` on a
  single loop)

Hardening from a self-review pass over the above:
- normalize CRLF and allow a trailing note on the control line, so
  `LOOP: DONE — all clean` and \r\n replies still stop the loop
- disarm the leave-confirm before the queue/exit early returns, so an interposed
  prompt can't leave it falsely armed
- a loop no longer fires behind an open picker/modal; a run launched behind the
  /resume picker would otherwise complete into whatever session you switch to
2026-07-06 08:53:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 3eafaf584d fix(tui): stop looping on repeated failure + clear loop tag on cancel
Addresses CodeRabbit review on #502:
- advanceLoop now counts consecutive failed iterations (loopMaxFailures=3) and
  stops the loop, so a loop whose turns keep erroring no longer churns to the
  iteration cap (the doom guard only sees identical non-empty answers).
- cancelRun clears activeLoopID and re-arms the interrupted loop for its next
  cadence, so a cancelled iteration is not left running forever and the next
  unrelated turn is not misattributed as that loop's completion.
2026-07-06 08:53:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 9cfdb2fecf docs(readme): add /loop to the slash-command table 2026-07-06 08:53:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 4ffbf4e0fe test(tui): drive /loop end-to-end through Update (submit + stale tick) 2026-07-06 08:53:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 440d4df367 feat(tui): /loop self-paced adaptive cadence + footer summary + /clear note
Third slice of #501.

- Self-paced loops now use an adaptive cadence (2m early -> 30m heartbeat as
  iterations accrue), with the loopNextWake channel kept as an override for a
  future explicit model signal.
- Persistent footer segment "↻ N loops · next 3:05pm" while loops are active.
- /clear notes that loops keep running (it wipes the transcript, not the session)
  so a loop never silently fires into a cleared screen.
- Tests for adaptive cadence + footer summary.
2026-07-06 08:53:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 4bc9a97176 feat(tui): wire /loop into the turn lifecycle — dispatch, idle tick, continuation
Second slice of #501. Adds the controller and wires it in:

- /loop command registered (commands.go) and dispatched to handleLoopCommand.
- Loop state on the model (loops, activeLoopID, loopSeq/loopTicking poll guards,
  loopNextWake/loopDone self-pace channel).
- An idle poll tick (loopTickMsg, ~1s) fires the earliest due loop only when the
  session is idle — mirrors the launchQueuedMessageIfReady guard so loops and a
  user's queued prompt never collide; a self-perpetuating tea.Tick that stops when
  no loops remain.
- The agentResponseMsg completion seam advances a loop iteration (schedule next
  wake for fixed, model delay for self-paced) with doom-loop, iteration-cap, and
  done stop conditions, restarting the ticker if other loops remain.
- /loop list|stop|stop all, footer summary + list rendering, and a guard that only
  a prompt or custom /command may loop (not a built-in).

Controller tests cover start/advance/self-paced-delay/done/doom/cap/stop/busy.
2026-07-06 08:53:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 6d7d3946c8 feat(tui): /loop foundation — command parsing, loop state, safety bounds
First slice of the /loop feature (#501): the self-contained core with no TUI
wiring yet. parseLoopCommand handles the leading-interval, trailing-"every",
bare-self-paced, and list/stop forms; loopState models one session-scoped loop
with doom-loop + iteration-cap fields; interval/self-pace clamps and duration
formatting round it out, with unit tests. Because Zero drives loops off a Go
timer rather than a cron backend, arbitrary intervals (90s, 7m) are supported
with no whitelist limitation.
2026-07-06 08:52:13 +05:30
Gautam ManchandaniandGautam Manchandani d185f3ef0d Fix action summary for structured output (#485)
* Fix action summary for structured output

* Address action summary review comments

* Keep action summary extraction best effort

---------

Co-authored-by: Gautam Manchandani <[email protected]>
2026-07-06 08:52:43 +08:00
euxaristia 8c6c49ad52 chore: fix golangci-lint findings (dead code, ineffassign, staticcheck) (#527)
- Remove unused safeRequestedPrefix, safeShellCommandTokens
  (internal/agent/command_prefix.go), and truncateHeadTail
  (internal/tools/bash.go): each was a thin wrapper with no remaining
  callers.
- Drop an ineffectual assignment in stringListArgWebSearch: every
  return path after it already sets the named return explicitly.
- Simplify a negated-and condition in
  partition_cache_stable_test.go via De Morgan's law.
- Use strings.Contains instead of strings.Index(...) < 0 in
  edit_replacers.go.
- Fix error string style (ST1005): lowercase "unsafe redirect URL"
  and drop the trailing period from webFetchPublicOnlyHint.

Skipped the errcheck findings on this pass (unchecked defer
Close()/Write() errors): those are stylistic, not correctness bugs,
and this repo's CI only runs go vet, not golangci-lint.
2026-07-06 08:09:32 +08:00
Gautam ManchandaniandGautam Manchandani 809489a6e3 Batch session event persistence (#526)
Co-authored-by: Gautam Manchandani <[email protected]>
2026-07-06 08:08:58 +08:00
euxaristia 56147a708e ci: add golangci-lint as an advisory check (#528)
go vet, gofmt, govulncheck, and deadcode don't catch unused private
functions/assignments reachable within a package but never called, or
staticcheck-style correctness/readability issues. deadcode's whole-program
reachability analysis specifically missed several of these; golangci-lint's
truncateHeadTail nitpick on #476 assumed it would fail CI, but nothing in
this repo actually ran it.

Scoped to unused, ineffassign, and staticcheck rather than the full default
battery, and continue-on-error like deadcode, so this surfaces the existing
findings across the repo (being cleaned up incrementally per #527) without
blocking in-flight PRs on a big-bang adoption.
2026-07-06 08:07:29 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 81aad58d97 fix(tools): Block MSYS coreutils under Windows sandbox (#476)
* fix(tools): block MSYS coreutils under Windows sandbox

Git for Windows usr\bin coreutils (head, grep, cat, ...) are MSYS PE binaries that fail with ACCESS_DENIED and cygheap/signal-pipe errors when Zero runs them in the write-restricted Windows sandbox. Detect and block these commands before execution, surface MSYS runtime failures from stderr, steer agents toward native Zero tools or require_escalated, and exclude MSYS-prone names from known-safe command tails.

Refs #458

* fix(tools): anchor the last MSYS failure heuristic to MSYS markers

CodeRabbit review feedback: the win32-error-5 plus terminating check
had no MSYS-specific anchor, so unrelated access-denied failures could
be mislabeled as windows_msys_sandbox. Require an MSYS marker like the
neighboring checks do.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(tools): let escalation bypass the MSYS guard and make detection quote-aware

Addresses jatmn's review on PR #476:
- bash and exec_command called detectShellCommandIssue before resolving
  sandbox_permissions into a command engine, so a require_escalated retry of
  a blocked command was still hard-blocked by the same preflight check.
  Resolve the command engine first and only bypass the windows_msys_sandbox
  issue kind when that resolves to true unsandboxed execution; other issue
  kinds (real cmd.exe syntax problems) still block regardless of escalation.
- Unify all MSYS-prone command name checks (MsysProneCommandName, the
  preflight scan, and transitively command_prefix.go's known-safe guard)
  behind one windowsMsysProneNames set. This fixes expr (in the name set but
  missing from the old regex alternations, so never proactively flagged) and
  ls (hit the older windows_shell_syntax branch first, so it got different
  metadata than every other MSYS-prone name).
- Make the preflight scan quote-aware: split the command into cmd.exe-
  operator-separated segments respecting double-quote grouping, and only
  check the first word of each segment instead of scanning raw text anywhere.
  Fixes false positives on quoted text like commit messages or PR comment
  bodies that merely mention a coreutil name.

* test(tools): decouple MSYS-guard bypass tests from real command output

TestBashToolRequireEscalatedMsysGuard and
TestExecCommandRequireEscalatedBypassesMsysGuardAfterApproval asserted
shell_issue == "" to prove the require_escalated bypass worked. Once
bypassed, "cat somefile.txt" actually runs unsandboxed, and its real,
PATH-dependent output could trip the unrelated post-execution
detectShellOutputIssue heuristic, failing the assertion for reasons
unrelated to the preflight guard under test.

Assert on the exit_code "-1" sentinel (set only by shellIssueBlockResult)
instead, which directly reflects whether the preflight guard blocked the
command.

* fix(tools): anchor MSYS path detection to command position, fix prefix approval gap

Address jatmn's latest review on PR #476:

- shell_runtime.go: the explicit MSYS binary-path check (usr\bin\,
  mingw64\bin\, msys-2.0.dll, cygwin1.dll) ran against the raw command
  string, so a quoted mention (e.g. a commit message describing a
  usr\bin\head.exe failure) was still hard-blocked. It now runs against
  the first word of each operator-separated segment, same as the
  coreutil-name check. windowsCommandSegments also stopped treating ;
  as a command separator (cmd.exe does not split on ;, unlike bash) and
  now respects cmd.exe's ^ escape character, so escaped operators like
  echo ^| head are no longer misread as a real head invocation.

- command_prefix.go: proposedCommandPrefix could offer to approve a
  single segment (e.g. "ps aux" in "ps aux | head -5") without checking
  that every other segment was independently safe. Since approving a
  prefix escalates the whole command to bypass the sandbox, an
  MSYS-prone or otherwise unsafe segment could ride along uncovered.
  It now only proposes a segment as the prefix when every other
  segment in the command is known-safe on its own.

Added regression tests for quoted MSYS path mentions, caret-escaped
operators, semicolon text, and the prefix-approval gap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(tools): treat redirection as a command boundary, stop using command text as output evidence

Addresses jatmn's latest review on PR #476:
- firstCommandWord only split on whitespace, so cmd.exe redirection
  attached directly to a command name (head>out.txt, cat<in.txt,
  grep>matches.txt) was read as one word and never matched against the
  MSYS-prone name set. It now also stops at < and >.
- detectShellOutputIssue scanned command+output together, so a command
  whose own argument text merely quoted an MSYS failure string (e.g. a
  gh pr comment --body describing the bug) could be mislabeled after
  running even though the real stdout/stderr was unrelated. Removed the
  command parameter entirely from detectShellOutputIssue and both call
  sites (bash.go, exec_command.go), so the command line can never be
  used as post-execution evidence again.

* fix(tools): remove unused truncateHeadTail wrapper

CodeRabbit nitpick: truncateHeadTailWithTotal is called directly
everywhere, so this wrapper is dead code that trips golangci-lint's
unused check and fails CI.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-06 08:03:32 +08:00
Kevin Codex 95ccd5bc32 perf: universal tool-output ceiling with spill + async post-edit diagnostics (#518)
* feat(tools): universal token-based output ceiling with spill-to-disk

Cap every tool result at the registry boundary (16k estimated tokens,
ZERO_TOOL_OUTPUT_CEILING_TOKENS-tunable, 0 disables) unless the tool
manages its own deliberate budget. Head+tail truncation, full output
spilled to the existing redacted spill dir and re-readable via
grep/read_file, so nothing is lost — only deferred.

This closes the three unbounded paths a single call could flood the
context window through (and then re-bill every following turn):
- web_fetch: up to 256KiB default / 2MiB max of non-HTML body
- skill: full SKILL.md returned uncapped
- MCP-served tools: no budget at all

Self-budgeting tools opt out via an unexported marker interface (an MCP
server can never exempt itself): bash, exec_command (model-raisable),
read_file, read_minified_file, grep, glob, list_directory. Browser
snapshots deliberately stay under the net.

bash itself is tightened to match the unified token model: emit budget
96KiB -> 32KiB per stream (~24k -> ~8k tokens worst case per stream),
while capture retention stays at 96KiB head+tail so the new spill file
covers 6x more of the output than the transcript shows.

* perf(agent): collect post-edit LSP diagnostics off the tool-call path

Inline post-edit diagnostics blocked every edit_file/write_file result on
the language server: a >=300ms quiet-period debounce that reset on each
publish, seconds on the first edit per language, capped at 10s — the
largest recurring latency tax in an edit-heavy session.

Diagnostics are now collected in the background: a file is enqueued the
moment a mutating tool finishes, a single worker checks it while the rest
of the batch executes, and the loop drains completed results just before
building the NEXT provider request, appending errors as a user nudge.
The model always issues another request after an edit turn (to read its
tool results), so it still sees introduced errors at the same decision
point — no tool call ever stalls on the language server.

A file re-edited before its check runs is checked once in its final
state (the checker re-reads the file); re-edited after, it is re-queued
and the newer result wins. A drain that finds the worker still busy
gives up after 3s and delivers on a later turn — results stay accurate
because any further edit re-enqueues the file.

The tools-side inline mechanism (tools.RunOptions.Diagnostics) is kept
for direct API callers; the loop just no longer wires it.

* fix: address review — max-turns diagnostics drain, capture-gap marker, test hardening

- Drain background diagnostics before the max-turns final-answer request
  so an error introduced by the LAST turn's edit is reported in the
  summary instead of silently dropped (+ regression test).
- spillBashStreams marks the head/tail junction with a capture-gap
  marker when boundedBuffer dropped the middle of a stream, so a spilled
  log never reads as contiguous when it is not; junction position is
  asserted in the test.
- Tests override TMP/TEMP alongside TMPDIR (os.TempDir reads TMP/TEMP on
  Windows) via a shared setTestTempDir helper.
- TestBudgetBashCaptureReportsTrueTotal now asserts spill_path meta and
  spill file content; exemption-list test gains read_minified_file.

* fix(test): use a real workspace root in async diagnostics tests

filepath.IsAbs("/ws") is false on Windows (no drive letter), so the
collector test's workspace-absolute assertion failed on the windows
smoke job. Root the fake workspace at t.TempDir() — absolute on every
platform — and assert against it.

* fix: pattern-scrub spill files and gate finalization on pending diagnostics

Review follow-ups (Vasanthdev2004):

- Spill files now pass the pattern-based secret scanner (AWS keys,
  GitHub/Slack/OpenAI tokens, PEM blocks, JWTs) in addition to the
  configured-key scrub. A bash spill runs before formatBashOutput's
  scan, so without this a spilled file held in cleartext exactly the
  credentials the transcript redacts. Applied centrally in
  spillTruncatedOutput, covering bash, exec_command, and ceiling spills.

- Finalization diagnostics gate: a no-tool-call final answer now drains
  pending post-edit diagnostics with the full inline-era budget (10s,
  vs the 3s per-turn wait) before the run is accepted; introduced
  errors append the nudge and give the model one more turn instead of
  being silently dropped when no later turn exists. The max-turns
  summary path uses the same finalization budget. Free for runs that
  never edited — an idle collector returns immediately.
2026-07-05 23:50:31 +08:00
KRATOS 284a6c86cb Skills: deterministic invocation — /<skill-name>, searchable /skills picker, discovery-budget fix (#520)
* feat(skills): make skill invocation deterministic and discoverable

Skills were model-pulled only: the model had to notice a skill in a
640-byte system-prompt list (~6 skills visible; the rest collapsed into
'…and N more') and call the skill tool on its own. Users could not run a
skill at all — typing /<skill-name> reported 'unknown command'. The two
halves of the fix:

User invocation
- /<skill-name> [args] now runs an installed skill directly: resolved
  after builtins and user commands, the skill body is inlined as the
  prompt with the typed args appended, and submitted through the same
  launch path user commands use.
- /skills lists installed skills with their slash form, live from disk.
  Labels are honest: a skill shadowed by a builtin, alias, user command,
  or a case-colliding sibling is listed bare with a '(via skill tool)'
  note instead of advertising a dead /name.
- The slash palette suggests skills (labeled '(skill)') read through the
  same loader dispatch uses, so mid-session installs appear and shadowed
  or case-colliding names are never advertised.
- Skill and user-command invocations now apply the plain-prompt run-state
  guards: mid-run submissions queue the EXPANDED prompt (the queue flush
  submits literal text), compaction-in-flight warns, exiting drops.
- Skills resolve through a lazy plugin-aware loader (default dir merged
  with plugin skill roots — the same set the skill tool and the system
  prompt see), TTL-cached so palette keystrokes don't re-read SKILL.md
  bodies.

Model triggering
- Raise the skills-list budget 640 -> 4096 bytes: the list is the model's
  only discovery surface, and the old cap made skills past ~6 invisible —
  invocation reliability collapsed exactly for users invested in skills.
- Raise description truncation 100 -> 200 runes: the description carries
  the trigger conditions ('use when…'); cutting them is what stopped the
  model from firing the skill.
- Strengthen the instruction line: scan the list before acting, call the
  matching skill FIRST, don't substitute your own approach.

* feat(tui): /skills opens a searchable skill picker

Replace the static /skills card with the same picker UX /model uses:
type-to-filter (ranked search), arrow-key selection, Enter runs the
chosen skill immediately. Selection is by the skill's exact name, so
skills the slash path cannot reach — names shadowed by a builtin or
user command, or names that don't fit a slash token — are still
runnable from the picker, where the choice is unambiguous. The text
card remains only as the no-skills install hint, and the picker path
applies the same run-state guards as slash invocation.

* feat(tui): ask-first guard for bare skill invocations

A skill invoked with no request submits only its body — instructions
with no target ("review the PR" — which PR?) — and the model improvises
a target instead of asking, which is especially wrong in a fresh
session. Bare invocations (slash and picker) now append a conditional
note: if the instructions need a target or details not already clear
from the conversation, ask first; self-contained skills still just run.
Invocations that carry a request are unchanged.

* fix(tui): review follow-ups — restore typed invocation on compaction guard, cap merged suggestions

- The compaction-in-flight guard for skill/user-command invocations fired
  after the dispatch path had already cleared the composer, so the typed
  "/name args" was lost and had to be retyped; thread the raw invocation
  through and restore it into the composer (the plain-prompt guard keeps
  the composer intact by firing before the clear). The picker path has no
  typed form and restores nothing.
- Cap the merged autocomplete list at the shared bound: each source
  self-caps, but three sources could stack to ~3x the palette limit.
- Tighten the shadowed-skill palette test to assert on the advertised
  Name rather than the fallback Desc wording.

* chore: ignore zero-skills local build artifact

A locally built test binary under this name was accidentally committed
(and has been scrubbed from the branch history); ignore the name so it
cannot recur.
2026-07-05 21:14:53 +05:30
8f3b8f0d13 docs: document AGENTS.md/ZERO.md and plugin manifest format (#522)
* docs: document AGENTS.md/ZERO.md and plugin manifest format

Add an "Extending Zero" section to the README covering the
AGENTS.md/ZERO.md project-instructions lookup chain and the
plugin.json manifest fields, neither of which were previously
documented outside the source.

Closes #521

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>

* docs: fix plugin path scope and add per-user ZERO.md guidelines

- Correct project-scope plugin discovery to <cwd>/.zero/plugins, not
  the repo root.
- Clarify that user-scope plugin discovery always resolves under
  ~/.config regardless of OS, separate from config.UserConfigDir()
  (which is OS-aware and used for the per-user ZERO.md file).
- Document the per-user ZERO.md guidelines file added in #475.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 22:51:20 +08:00
PatrickNoFilter 0f69d995e9 fix: Termux/Android support — PRoot scroll, SIGSYS sandbox, build docs (#509)
* fix(tui): TracerPid PRoot detection, Ctrl+U/D direction, composer guard

- Replace Termux env var detection with isRunningUnderPRoot()
  via /proc/self/status TracerPid, cached with sync.OnceValue
- Mouse mode falls back to CellMotion (not AllMotion) under PRoot
  to fix broken touch scrolling
- Add Shift+Up/Shift+Down before plain KeyDown/KeyUp for transcript
  scroll with permission/askuser cursor + composer guard
- Add Ctrl+U (scroll up) and Ctrl+D (scroll down) with proper
  direction: Ctrl+U=move up, Ctrl+D=move down
- Add guards for active modals (wizard, picker, spec review, etc.)
  to avoid intercepting their Ctrl+U/D keybindings
- Tests: TestPermissionCursorCtrlU/D (direction regression),
  TestShiftUp/DownComposerGuard (composer guard)
- References issue #507

* fix(sandbox): avoid faccessat2 for Termux/Android portability

Replace exec.LookPath with lookupExecutable that uses os.Stat
instead of the faccessat2 syscall. The faccessat2 syscall (439)
is blocked by the Samsung seccomp filter on Android, causing
SIGSYS termination. os.Stat uses the newfstatat/statx syscalls
which are universally permitted.

This is part of broader Termux/Android support for Zero.

* docs(install): add Termux/Android build and configuration guide

Document how to build Zero for native Android/Termux: GOOS=android
to avoid the SIGSYS crash, proot bind-mount for DNS resolution,
PRoot scroll fix, and free-tier provider setup.

* fix(sandbox): skip empty PATH segments, use platform-aware executable check
2026-07-05 21:48:34 +08:00
Kevin Codex 87e7e69afd feat(openai): forward prompt_cache_key for server-side prefix cache routing (#515)
* feat(openai): forward prompt_cache_key for server-side prefix cache routing

Send the session ID as OpenAI's prompt_cache_key on every completion
request so consecutive turns route to a backend replica that already
holds the conversation prefix in its prompt cache, instead of re-billing
the full ~11k-token system+tools prefix each turn on OpenAI-compatible
endpoints (which get no cache_control breakpoints, unlike Anthropic).

Keyless requests serialize byte-identically to before, and
ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY=1 suppresses the field for strict
endpoints that reject unknown parameters. The Codex (Responses API)
flavor is deliberately untouched: the ChatGPT backend is a separate,
stricter surface.

* fix(openai): parse prompt-cache-key kill switch as a boolean flag

ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY=0 or =false previously disabled forwarding
because any non-empty value tripped the check. Parse it the same way
ZERO_FORMAT_ON_WRITE parses boolean flags, so explicitly-falsy values
are a no-op and only truthy values flip the toggle.
2026-07-05 21:41:03 +08:00
Vasanth T f4c998ac30 feat(agent): curb over-engineering the solution in the editing discipline (#517)
The editing discipline already caps the diff size and scope, but a small diff can
still over-build the solution — speculative abstraction, unrequested
configurability, handling for cases that cannot occur. Add a guardrail: solve the
problem as posed, nothing the user did not ask for; if a 200-line solution could
be 50, rewrite it.

Validated with a before/after eval on five over-engineering-prone tasks: 3/5
solutions came out simpler with the guardrail, none more complex, none broke
correctness (avg 9 vs 11 non-blank lines); the baseline gold-plated on two of them
(an unrequested cache-introspection attribute and header-merge config). No effect
on trivial tasks, where the baseline is already minimal.

Closes #516
2026-07-05 21:38:42 +08:00
Alaa Elsamouly 30bff28efc Fix/detailed view scroll select (#498)
* fix(tui): strip all ANSI escapes from copied transcript text

renderAssistantMarkdownText embeds bold markers for prose and ANSI color sequences from chroma for fenced code blocks. stripMarkdownRenderControls only stripped the bold markers, leaking ANSI codes into clipboard text. Switch to ansi.Strip() to remove all escape sequences.

* refactor(tui): extract rendering dispatch and add detailed bool to transcriptBodyItems

Extract rowRenderFn and transcriptRowDispatchFn types and refactor rendering methods into *Fn variants parameterized by the render function.

Add detailed bool parameter to transcriptBodyItems to prepare for the detailed transcript viewport. All callers pass false so there is no behavior change yet.

Extract transcriptRowBodyHeightCacheKeyOpts from transcriptRowBodyHeightCacheKey so the body cap can be configured per caller.

* feat(tui): scrollable detailed transcript viewport with sidebar suppression

Enable keyboard scrolling (PgUp/PgDown/Up/Down) in detailed transcript mode by routing through scrollChat instead of swallowing the keys.

Rewrite detailedTranscriptView to use the transcriptBodyItems pipeline so the body renders through the same viewport/scroll engine as the live view.

Implement detailedTranscriptFooter with copy-status and jump-to-bottom hint integration.

Suppress the sidebar in detailed mode so the full chat width is available for reading uncapped tool output.

* test(tui): detailed transcript scroll with PgUp/Down and Up/Down arrows

TestPgUpDownScrollsDetailedTranscript verifies that PgUp scrolls toward older content and PgDown returns to the bottom in detailed mode.

TestUpDownArrowsScrollDetailedTranscript verifies that arrow keys scroll one line at a time and bottom is clamped at offset 0.

* test(tui): ANSI strip verification for markdown rendering controls and selectable text

TestStripMarkdownRenderControlsStripsAllANSI verifies bold markers, color sequences, and combined sequences are stripped.

TestSelectedTranscriptTextStripsANSIFromHighlightedCode verifies that chroma-highlighted code blocks produce clean plain text in the selectable layer.

* fix for coderabit, and better fewer code.

* fix(tui): address PR review feedback dead code, hover clear, and
rebindable key label

* format

* addressing the review issue

1. the ctrl + b in detailed mode, added the guard to not be able to do
it in detailed mode so it affect its state in the normal mode.

2. added a test coverage for keyDown after `keDown then keyUp` so it
   covers that.

* fix(tui): close file drill-in when entering detailed transcript

toggleDetailedTranscript now calls exitFileView before returning, so an active file drill-in is automatically closed when the user enters detailed transcript mode.

* test(tui): verify file drill-in closes on detailed toggle

Adds TestDetailedTranscriptClosesFileView and TestDetailedTranscriptStaysClosedOnSecondToggle to guard against the file-view bypass bug.

* fix(tui): block composer hit-test while detailed transcript is active

composerMouseSelectionBlocked and mouseOverComposer now check m.transcriptDetailed so mouse clicks and wheel events in the composer area reach the transcript body instead of being silently consumed.

* test(tui): verify composer mouse is ignored in detailed mode

Adds TestComposerMouseSelectionBlockedInDetailedMode to guard against composer hit-test swallowing mouse events during detailed transcript viewing.
2026-07-05 19:36:17 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Sonnet 5 7b10aab74b feat(agent): inject per-user config.UserConfigDir()/zero/ZERO.md guidelines into system prompt (#475)
* Add-user-ZERO-guidelines-to-system-prompt

* fix(agent): resolve user ZERO.md under config.UserConfigDir()/zero

Review feedback: every other user-level config (config.json, commands,
specialists) lives under config.UserConfigDir()/zero, so the per-user
guidelines file now resolves there instead of ~/.zero. The basename match
is case-insensitive to mirror the project guideline loader.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* refactor(agent): extract shared guideline truncation and lookup helpers

CodeRabbit review feedback: the rune-safe truncation block and the
case-insensitive basename scan were duplicated across the project and
user guideline loaders. Extract truncateGuidelineContent and
findCaseInsensitiveFile and use them in both paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(agent): keep truncated guideline content within the byte limit

CodeRabbit review feedback: truncateGuidelineContent appended the
truncation marker after slicing to the limit, so the result could
exceed the requested budget by the marker length. Reserve space for
the marker before choosing the cut point.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(agent): fix small-limit truncation, precedence, and test isolation for user guidelines

Address remaining review feedback on PR #475:

- truncateGuidelineContent still exceeded the limit when limit was
  smaller than the truncation marker itself. Fall back to a hard,
  rune-safe cut with no marker in that case so the result never
  exceeds the caller's budget.
- Reorder buildSystemPrompt so user guidelines are injected before
  workspace/project guidelines, and add an explicit precedence note
  in the user guidelines section text, so a repo's AGENTS.md/ZERO.md
  is the later, more specific instruction and wins on conflict.
- Add a TestMain in the agent package that stubs userConfigDirForPrompt
  to an empty temp directory by default, so buildSystemPrompt(Options{})
  calls in unrelated tests don't pick up a contributor's real
  ~/.config/zero/ZERO.md.
- Document the per-user ZERO.md location and its precedence relative
  to project guidelines in AGENTS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 18:53:17 +08:00
Kevin Codex 3c81fea228 feat: agent quality, caching, retry, and tooling upgrades (#506)
* feat: agent quality, caching, retry, and tooling upgrades

Ten self-contained improvements to the core agent engine and tools:

- edit_file: fuzzy fallback matching (7-strategy cascade with uniqueness
  protection and a disproportion guard) when old_string does not match
  byte-for-byte; exact match remains the fast path
- edit_file/write_file: inline error-severity LSP diagnostics in tool
  output so the model sees a break it introduced in the same turn
- lsp: expand server registry from 4 to 28 languages; doctor grades only
  tier-1 servers and lists the long tail informationally
- agent: consecutive read-only tool calls execute concurrently (bounded
  at 8), consumed in original order, never spanning a mutating call
- anthropic: cache_control breakpoints on the last two conversation
  messages so the transcript prefix stays a prompt-cache hit
- providerio: retry schedule raised to 6 attempts with exponential
  2s-30s backoff when the server sends no Retry-After
- tools: truncated exec/bash output spills to a redacted temp file
  referenced in the truncation notice; bash output (previously
  unbounded) now shares exec_command's token budget
- web_fetch: dependency-free HTML-to-markdown conversion (format:
  auto|raw|markdown) and larger limits (256KiB default, 2MiB max, 30s)
- modelregistry: live models.dev overlay refreshes context limits and
  base pricing from a TTL-cached fetch; opt-in at the CLI entrypoint
- tools: opt-in format-on-write (ZERO_FORMAT_ON_WRITE=1) runs standard
  formatters across 27 extensions, ordered before the file-tracker
  re-baseline so conflict detection is preserved

* fix: address PR review feedback on fuzzy edits, diagnostics, spill

- edit_file: adapt the replacement to the fuzzy-resolved span — when the
  span is a uniformly deeper-indented copy of old_string (line-trimmed /
  indentation-flexible matches), the same indentation delta is applied to
  new_string, and a span ending in a bare CR keeps its CR so CRLF files
  never gain a mixed line ending; block-anchor matches with drifted
  interiors are deliberately left untouched
- diagnostics: render workspace-relative paths in inline post-edit
  diagnostics (base name outside the workspace) so absolute paths never
  leak the local username or directory layout into the model prompt or
  session transcript
- spill: harden the spill directory for shared temp dirs — per-uid name,
  reject symlinked or non-directory paths (MkdirAll follows symlinks),
  and on Unix require current-user ownership
- bash: the branch's output cap and truncation-flag threading are
  superseded by main's capture-time bounding (boundedBuffer +
  budgetBashCapture), which already sets Result.Truncated; this rebase
  adopts that design and keeps spill-to-disk on exec_command, where the
  full output is still buffered and a spill is genuinely complete

* fix: address review round 2 — permission-event race, fuzzy ambiguity, spill reachability

- agent: serialize OnPermission behind the same mutex as
  OnPermissionRequest in the parallel read batch. buildPermissionEvent
  fires for batched reads with a non-trivial sandbox decision (e.g. a
  grant-matched extra root), and front-end handlers append to shared
  session-recording state without their own locking — two batched reads
  emitting concurrently was a data race the pre-batch serial loop never
  allowed.
- edit_file: reject two or more DISTINCT candidate spans from one fuzzy
  strategy as ambiguous instead of silently editing the first. Duplicate
  blocks at different indentation each resolve to a unique literal, so
  the previous occurrence-uniqueness check passed and wrote the wrong
  span. A single candidate occurring at multiple positions still
  cascades to stricter strategies as before.
- tools: make spill files actually reachable by the recovery path the
  truncation notice advertises — resolveScopedReadPath now recognizes
  files inside the per-uid spill dir (containment verified after symlink
  resolution, so a planted link cannot smuggle an out-of-scope file
  through the gate); read_file/grep can follow the notice instead of
  re-running the command.

* fix: surface competing block-anchor spans; make write-barrier test observe cross-probe order

- edit_file: blockAnchorReplacer now returns every span clearing the
  similarity threshold (best first) instead of silently picking the
  single most-similar block. Hiding competitors from the cascade's
  distinct-candidate check could edit the wrong block when two blocks
  share anchors and both interiors are plausible; one clear winner still
  resolves, two plausible blocks now report ambiguity (covered by a
  two-block test that asserts the file is untouched).
- agent tests: the parallel write-barrier test now records both probes
  into one mutex-guarded shared log and asserts the cross-probe ordering
  it always claimed to (write starts after the first read batch ends;
  second read batch starts after the write ends). The previous version
  only compared indices within the read probe's own log, which a
  regression letting the write overlap a batch could still pass; the
  stray no-op mutex assignment is gone.
2026-07-05 17:25:26 +08:00
Ashwinhegde19andAshwin f6c060631e fix(openai): handle Ollama reasoning stream deltas (#486)
* fix(openai): handle reasoning alias in stream deltas

* test(cli): assert reasoning event order

---------

Co-authored-by: Ashwin <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 17:05:54 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 563a6dbe91 fix(sandbox): fix nested pipe creation under the Windows restricted token (#456)
* fix(sandbox): fix nested pipe creation under the Windows restricted token

Any subprocess spawned FROM WITHIN a process already running under Zero's
write-restricted token, that captures the child's output via a pipe, failed
with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED. Reproduces with `gh pr list` (gh shells out to git
and captures its output), with a bare Go program doing exec.Command(...).
Output(), and with cmd.exe's own FOR /F ('...') construct, which uses the
identical CreatePipe+CreateProcess pattern internally with no external tools
involved.

Root cause: a WRITE_RESTRICTED token requires a WRITE-type access check to
match BOTH the normal enabled-SID grant and a separate grant to one of the
token's restricted SIDs. CreateRestrictedToken does not modify the default
DACL it inherits from the base token, so a pipe created with a default
security descriptor (the common case; every language runtime's "spawn a
subprocess and capture output" primitive does this) only carries ACEs for
the base identity, none of which are in the restricted-SID list, so the
second check fails. This is the same failure family already documented for
Schannel/SEC_E_NO_CREDENTIALS, but broader in scope: it affects any pipe,
event, mutex, or other kernel object created with default security by a
process running under the token.

Fix: add the token's own logon SID (already unconditionally present in its
restricted-SID list) to the token's default DACL, so objects it creates
without an explicit security descriptor automatically satisfy the extra
check. This does not touch filesystem access: NTFS write-jailing is
enforced by the explicit ACL grants applied to workspace paths, created
WITH an explicit security descriptor, and the token's default DACL is only
consulted when none is supplied. Exposure is bounded to the same logon
session (only other processes running as the same signed-in user could, in
principle, open a NAMED object the sandboxed process creates with default
security; anonymous pipes have no name and are reachable only via an
inherited handle, so this is a no-op for the actual objects this fixes).

This is not specific to the unelevated tier added in #427 - the affected
token-construction code is shared by both the fully elevated and unelevated
restricted-token paths, so this predates that work.

Verified on Windows 11 (before/after, using an unfixed build for
comparison):
- Before: FOR /F fails with Win32 error 5 (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED), masked
  behind cmd.exe's generic "not recognized" message; `gh pr list` fails
  with "failed to run git: pipe: Access is denied."; a bare Go nested
  exec.Command(...).Output() fails with "pipe: Access is denied."
- After: all three succeed; `gh pr list` returns real PR data.
- Write-jail regression check: a write outside every granted root is still
  denied by the OS after the fix (unchanged from before).

New TestWindowsRestrictedTokenNestedPipeCapture (ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE=1)
pins the FOR /F case using only cmd.exe, no external dependency. go vet and
the full internal/sandbox suite are clean (excluding pre-existing failures
already present identically on unmodified main, unrelated to this change).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): fix dangling-buffer use-after-scope in default DACL merge

Addresses the blocker from review on this PR (Vasanthdev2004, gnanam1990,
coderabbitai): windowsTokenDefaultDacl returned a *windows.ACL that points
INTO the local buf byte slice backing TOKEN_DEFAULT_DACL - Windows embeds
the ACL data in the same allocation GetTokenInformation fills. The
function's own runtime.KeepAlive(buf) only covered buf up to that
function's own return; nothing kept it alive across the caller's later use.
In broadenWindowsRestrictedTokenDefaultDacl, the returned ACL pointer was
then dereferenced by native code in setEntriesInACL after intervening
allocations (the EXPLICIT_ACCESS literal, TrusteeValueFromSID) that are
GC-safepoint-eligible - a real use-after-free window in code that
constructs part of the sandbox's own restricted token, even though Go's
current non-moving GC meant it didn't manifest in testing.

windowsTokenDefaultDacl now returns the backing buffer alongside the ACL;
the caller holds runtime.KeepAlive(oldDaclBuf) until after
SetEntriesInAclW (the last point that dereferences it) returns.

Also from review: SetEntriesInAclW reports its Win32 error directly in the
return value, not via GetLastError, so setEntriesInACL now uses that
return value directly instead of the (potentially stale/unrelated) syscall
error. And narrowed the default-DACL grant from GENERIC_ALL to GENERIC_READ
| GENERIC_WRITE - the second WRITE_RESTRICTED access check only needs a
read/write match; GENERIC_ALL also implied DELETE/WRITE_DAC/WRITE_OWNER
that the pipe/event/mutex use case never needed.

Re-verified on Windows 11 with the fixed runner: nested pipe capture still
succeeds (pure Go exec.Command(...).Output(), and TestWindowsRestrictedTokenNestedPipeCapture
via go test itself), and the write-jail regression check (write denied
outside every granted root, allowed inside) is unchanged. Full
internal/sandbox suite green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 17:04:07 +08:00
Kunj SHAH 2312abe5dd feat: add zero changes push and pr subcommands, and extra repo-info metrics (#391)
* feat: add zero changes push and pr subcommands, and extra repo-info metrics

* fix: address review feedback on changes command and repoinfo

* style: format repoinfo.go with gofmt

* fix: address remaining review feedback — JSON tags, -- separator, PR validation, tests

* fix: address CodeRabbit + review feedback — default-branch guard, --yes flag, branch parsing, typed JSON, missing tests

- Add default-branch guard: Push rejects main/master unless --yes is passed
- Add --yes flag to changes push/pr to allow pushing to protected branches
- Fix BranchCount parsing: skip detached HEAD lines and strip worktree + prefix
- Replace ad-hoc map with typed struct for PR --json output
- Add push failure short-circuit test for pr workflow
- Add --dry-run rejection test for pr workflow
- Add CreatePR dir assertion in zerogit_test
- Add --yes validation test for commit
- Add RejectsDefaultBranch and AllowDefaultBranchWithYes tests

* test: add positive-path test for --yes flag in changes push

* fix: resolve remote HEAD dynamically instead of hardcoded main/master

* style: run gofmt on changed files

* retrigger CI

* fix: resolve syntax error in parseChangesArgs
2026-07-05 17:03:29 +08:00
Anandan afb5010a46 polish v2: smoothness & delight (#484)
* feat(tui): actionable hints on provider/model errors

Classify a failed turn's provider error into auth / rate-limit /
connectivity / model-not-found / context-overflow and render a one-line
next step below the red error row, instead of dumping an identical raw
blob for every failure mode.

The classifier lives in a new internal/errhint package so both the TUI
error row and the CLI exec path can share it (TUIHint references slash
commands, CLIHint references zero subcommands). Classification is a
conservative string heuristic keyed off providerio.ClassifiedError's
prefixes plus lower-level DNS/TLS/timeout/context-length signatures,
since the numeric HTTP status is gone by the time the error reaches a UI
surface.

* feat(tools): budget bash output with head+tail truncation

bash was the one tool that returned command output with no byte cap —
'cat large.log' or a verbose test run could dump megabytes into context
and force compaction, while every other read/search tool already applies
a budget.

Cap stdout and stderr at 96KB each, keeping the head and tail of an
oversized stream (build/test failures usually land at the tail) and
dropping the middle behind a marker that points at redirect-to-file +
read_file. Record raw_bytes/emitted_bytes/estimated_tokens/truncated in
Meta like the other tools. Sandbox-denial and shell-issue detection still
run on the full raw output before budgeting.

* fix(gemini): retry 401 with refreshed OAuth token

The Gemini provider used providerio.SendWithRetry (429/503/529 only),
so an expired OAuth token surfaced as a terminal 'API key not valid'
auth error while OpenAI and Anthropic silently recovered via
SendWithAuthRetry's force-refresh-and-replay on 401.

Plumb OAuthResolver through gemini.Options/Provider and the factory
(exactly as the other two providers already do) and switch the stream
send to SendWithAuthRetry. With a nil resolver (API-key users) behavior
is unchanged.

* fix(errhint): gate classification on provider-origin marker

Address CodeRabbit review on #1: agentResponseMsg.err can also carry
local failures (a tool's 'permission denied', a 'file does not exist',
a config error), and broad substrings would have attached a bogus
/provider or /model hint to those.

Classify now returns Unknown unless the message carries a provider marker
the provider layer always attaches (auth error: / rate limit error: /
provider error: / provider request error: / provider stream error:).
Local errors never draw a provider hint; provider errors sub-classify as
before. Added local-failure test cases proving they stay Unknown.

* feat(cli): actionable hint on text-mode exec provider errors

zero exec printed provider failures as a bare '[zero] <raw error>' with
no next step. Append a one-line hint (reusing the shared errhint
classifier) for recognized provider failures — 'run `zero auth`',
'run `zero doctor`', etc. The provider-origin gate means non-provider
codes (sandbox_error, mcp_error) and JSON/stream-json output are
untouched.

* fix(tools): set Result.Truncated for budgeted bash output

Address CodeRabbit review on #3: budgetBashOutput recorded truncation in
meta["truncated"] but never set the Result.Truncated struct field, so
consumers reading the struct (like glob/web_fetch/read_minified do) would
miss truncated bash results. Return the bool from budgetBashOutput and
set Result.Truncated on every return path.

* perf(tui): reuse one LSP manager across prompts

runAgentWithOptions built a fresh lsp.NewManager per run and shut it down
when the run returned, so gopls (and every other language server)
cold-started on the first edit of every turn — 200ms-2s of latency the
manager's own design (long-lived, reused servers) exists to avoid.

Build one manager per session in newModel (cheap: servers start lazily on
first Check) and reuse it across runs; the SelfCorrector still gets a
fresh checker wrapping the shared manager each run. Torn down with a
short deadline in quit(). Runs fall back to a per-run manager when the
session manager is absent (cwd unknown, or a directly-built test model).

* perf(tui): accumulate streamingText as []byte (O(1) append)

m.streamingText += msg.delta was O(len) per delta -> O(n²) across a long
generation (a 10k-token code gen allocates hundreds of MB of intermediate
strings and the UI gets progressively laggier). Accumulate into a []byte
with append (O(1) amortized) and read via streamingTextString().

A []byte rather than strings.Builder because the TUI model is copied by
value on every Update, which would trip strings.Builder's copy check;
[]byte is nil-safe and copies cleanly like the other slice fields.

* perf(tui): coalesce streamed text deltas to one frame

Every OnText delta was its own tea.Msg, so a fast provider (100+ tok/s)
drove 100+ full Update->View cycles per second, each re-parsing the
growing markdown — visible stutter over SSH and wasted CPU.

Batch agentTextMsg deltas at the runtime sink over a ~16ms frame and
forward them as a single message, decoupling render rate from token rate.
Any non-text message flushes pending text first so ordering with
tool-call / reasoning / row messages is preserved; the final
agentResponseMsg (a tea.Cmd return, not a sink message) is safe because
the model already drops deltas for an inactive runID.

* fix(agent): raise tool-failure stop threshold 4->6

guardrails.go halted a run after 4 consecutive same-error tool failures.
A corrective hint fires at 2, and a model iterating on a genuinely tricky
edit can legitimately fail a couple more times after the hint while
converging — stopping at 4 cut those runs short. Raise to 6; the streak
still resets the instant the tool succeeds or hits a different error, so
only true same-error loops are affected.

* fix(agent): more reconnect retries with jitter; narrow to transport errors

#19: bump maxStreamReconnects 2->4 and add up-to-50% jitter on the
exponential backoff (capped at 8s), so a multi-second network blip is
ridden out instead of killing the run on a 2s hiccup, and concurrent runs
(swarms, cron fleets) don't reconnect in lockstep.

#34: drop the '502'/'503' substring matches from shouldReconnect. 503
already exhausted providerio.SendWithRetry (retrying here is a redundant
double-retry) and 502 is non-idempotent by providerio's rule (the POST
may have been processed). Only genuine transport failures — where no
response was received — reconnect now.

* fix(agent): reduce stall retries 2->1 to bound stuck-session time

A no-output stream stall is detected only after the full stream idle
timeout (~5min) elapses, and each retry can idle again — so 2 retries
left an interactive session frozen for ~15min. Drop to 1 retry: keeps the
common single-hiccup recovery while bounding the worst case to ~2x the
idle timeout.

* fix(tui): serialize coalescer forwarding to preserve message order

Address CodeRabbit review on #7: flush() and the run-switch path drained
the text buffer under c.mu but called forward() after releasing it, so a
timer-fired text flush could race a concurrent non-text send() and land
after the tool-call/reasoning message it should precede.

Hold c.mu across drain AND forward (drainAndForwardLocked), so whoever
holds the lock delivers atomically and the other caller blocks until it
is done — text can never overtake a following non-text message. Added a
concurrency stress test (timer racing an inline send) that passes under
-race.

* feat(tui): accept /compact now

Bare /compact already triggers compaction, but /compact now — what users
reach for when the context gauge climbs — hit the usage-error branch.
Accept the 'now' keyword and advertise it in the command usage.

* feat(tui): add /retry, /edit, /copy, /export commands

/retry resends the last prompt; /edit recalls it into the composer to
tweak and resend — both read a new lastPrompt field captured verbatim
(pre-expansion) in launchPrompt. /copy puts the last answer on the
clipboard via the existing copy machinery; /export writes a plain
role-prefixed transcript to a file (timestamped default, or a given
path). Real gaps for SSH users with no mouse select.

* feat(tools): separator-insensitive tool_search matching

tool_search ranked deferred tools by exact substring, so a model that
typed 'webfetch' (dropping the underscore) matched nothing and looped.
Add a separator-squashing fallback ('web_fetch' -> 'webfetch') scored
below an exact substring match, so precise queries still rank first.

* feat(tools): signal ask_user dismissal distinctly from a blank field

Empty answers all rendered as '(no answer provided)', so the model
couldn't tell a wholesale dismissal (user closed the prompt without
answering anything) from one field left blank amid real answers — and
might invent a default. FormatAskUserAnswers now flags a full dismissal
up front as a skip and marks individual empties '(left blank)' vs
'(skipped)'.

* feat(tui): fuzzy ranking in model/session pickers

The pickers filtered by flat strings.Contains with no ranking, so
finding 'sonnet 4.5' among 50+ models meant an exact prefix or scrolling.
Rank matches (exact < prefix < contains < subsequence, reusing
fuzzySubsequenceGap) so the closest match lands on top, and 'snt45' now
matches 'Sonnet 4.5'. Groups stay contiguous — ordered by their best
match, never split — so the grouped model picker still renders one header
per provider. Covers both /model and /resume (shared commandPicker).

* perf(agent): cache per-tool schema render across turns

partitionTools re-ran the recursive schema->map conversion
(schemaToRuntimeMap) for every tool on every turn — redundant, since a
tool's advertised name/description/schema is stable for the run. Add a
per-run definition cache keyed by tool name (nil-safe; the plain
partitionTools entrypoint and tests pass nil for fresh renders).

The partitioning itself (visibility, deferral, ordering) still recomputes
every turn — it must, because a tool's deferred state can flip mid-run
(swarm tools un-defer once a swarm is active). Only the expensive schema
render is memoized. tool_search is excluded by its callers (dynamic
description) so it never poisons the cache.

* perf(agent): calibrate compaction estimate against real prompt tokens

The byte/4 heuristic (ApproxTextTokens) over-counts code-heavy content
~15-20%, so with triggerRatio=0.7 compaction fired at ~60% of true
capacity — premature summarizer calls that degrade quality. Each turn now
folds (rawEstimate, provider InputTokens) into an EMA calibration ratio,
clamped per-sample to a sane band; maybeCompact and the reactive path
scale their estimates by it. Turn 1 uses the raw estimate (no data yet);
later turns compact near real capacity.

* style: gofmt the new agent test files

The CI gofmt check flagged the #22/#25 test files (struct-field and
switch alignment). No behavior change.

* feat(agent): turn-based plan staleness reminder

The stale-plan nudge only fired after 10 tool calls since the last
update_plan, so a plan that drifts stale across many low-tool-call turns
(one call per turn) took many turns to catch — the 'plan set turn 1 stays
pending forever' case. Add a turn-count complement: after
stalePlanTurnThreshold (8) turns without an update AND with items still
pending, fire the same one-shot reminder. Gated on pending items so a
fully-completed plan is never nagged; the existing tool-call trigger is
unchanged. (The roadmap's fuzzy 'tool calls unrelated to plan items'
relevance match is deliberately omitted — too false-positive-prone.)

* feat(agent): preserve recent-edits summary across compaction

Compaction preserved the plan, loaded skills, tool schemas, and project
instructions, but not file edits — so after the editing turns were elided
the model knew it had changed a file only vaguely, and would re-read to
rediscover its own footprint. Extract write_file/edit_file targets from
the elided middle with a one-line note from each tool result, merge them
across repeated compactions (newer note per path wins), and carry them in
the preserved-state JSON (capped at 20 paths / 160 bytes per note).

* feat(tui): workspace-scoped /resume + fewer event reads

/resume listed sessions from every project globally, and read the full
event file for each of them to test for resumable content. Filter the
picker (and /resume latest) by the current workspace Cwd, checked BEFORE
the per-session read so a large global history no longer pays N full file
reads to build one workspace's list; also skip zero-event sessions via
metadata without any read. Sessions with no recorded Cwd (older runs) and
an unknown current workspace stay visible so nothing is hidden that can't
be confidently placed. Explicit /resume <id> still resolves any session.

* feat(tui): warn on model switch that drops staged images

Staged images were silently dropped at submit when the active model had
no vision support — the user only learned after sending. Chips already
render above the composer (renderAttachmentChips); add an immediate amber
warning line to the /model switch status (both same-provider and
cross-provider paths) when images are staged and the newly selected model
can't accept them, so the drop is surfaced at switch time.

* feat(tui): inline recovery affordance on setup errors

A first-run setup error rendered as a bare red 'error: <text>' with no
pointer to the fix. Append a faint, stage-tailored recovery line (edit
the endpoint/name/key above then Enter, or pick another model) that names
only keys the stage's footer confirms, so the guidance is always accurate.
Empty for stages whose footer already makes recovery obvious.

* fix: address CodeRabbit review (5 findings)

- loop.go: recompute the compaction calibration estimate at calibration
  time, not request-build time, so a reactive-compaction reissue that
  shrinks the request feeds the EMA the sample that actually completed.
- errhint: match bare HTTP status codes (401/403/429/529) only at digit
  boundaries, so an incidental number ('4290ms', 'id 14015') isn't
  mis-bucketed as auth/rate-limit.
- bash: drop the stray unmatched ']' in the output-truncation marker.
- tui /retry: apply the same exiting/compactInFlight guards commandPrompt
  has, so a retry can't race compactResultMsg's rewrite of session state.
- tui /export: write the transcript 0o600 (it may contain echoed
  secrets), not world/group-readable 0o644.

* test(tui): skip export file-mode assertion on Windows

os.WriteFile ignores Unix permission bits on Windows and Stat reports
0666, so the 0o600 assertion failed there. The production 0o600 is
honored on Linux/macOS (where it matters); guard the check with
runtime.GOOS so Windows smoke passes.

* fix(tui): align /resume latest filters + case-insensitive workspace match on Windows

Address CodeRabbit review on #21:
- latestResumableInWorkspace now applies the SAME filters as the picker
  (skip zero-event metadata and empty/failed runs), so /resume latest
  can't land on a session the picker intentionally hides.
- sessionMatchesWorkspace compares paths case-insensitively on Windows
  (its filesystem is), so the same workspace spelled with different casing
  no longer hides resumable sessions; other platforms stay case-sensitive.

* fix(tui): /retry resends the last prompt's image/PDF attachments

/retry relaunched only lastPrompt's text, but launchPrompt clears the
pending image/document queues once a turn is sent. A vision- or PDF-backed
prompt that failed would silently retry as text-only and answer a different
task. Snapshot the consumed attachments at launch and re-stage them on
/retry so launchPrompt rebuilds an identical request (document preamble,
images, and the submit-time vision re-check). startNewSession drops the
snapshot so a post-/new /retry cannot leak the previous session's
attachments. Also correct the OAuthResolver factory comment, which omitted
the Gemini provider it is now passed to.

* fix: address jatmn review (reconnect 5xx, /edit attachments, edit-cap, coalescer test)

- reconnect: exclude HTTP 5xx (500/502/503/504) before the transport
  substring match so "504 Gateway Timeout" no longer slips through on the
  generic "timeout" needle. A gateway timeout is non-idempotent — the
  completion POST may already have reached the model — so replaying the
  connect risked duplicate billable work. Reuses a digit-boundary status
  matcher exported from errhint (HasStatusCode). Test asserts 504/500 stay
  non-reconnectable.

- tui /edit: re-stage the remembered image/PDF snapshot alongside the
  recalled prompt text, mirroring the /retry fix — editing a vision- or
  document-backed prompt no longer silently resends a text-only version.

- compaction recent-edits: order edits by LAST edit, not first, and move a
  re-touched path to the newest position on merge, so the maxRecentEdits
  tail cap keeps the file the model most recently edited instead of dropping
  it. Adds mergeRecentEdits (edit-specific) and a capped-list regression.

- coalescer test: inject the frame timer via afterFunc so
  TestCoalescerBatchesDeltas proves buffering deterministically instead of
  racing the real 16ms wall-clock timer.

* fix(tools): bound bash output capture in memory, not just model-visible text

Previously stdout/stderr streamed into unbounded bytes.Buffers and were only
truncated to the 96 KiB budget AFTER the command finished, so a runaway command
(cat huge.log, yes) could grow Zero's memory until it stalled or OOMed before
budgetBashOutput ever ran. Replace the capture with boundedBuffer, an io.Writer
that keeps only the head+tail each stream will surface and discards the middle as
it arrives, while counting the true total for the truncation marker. Memory is now
bounded to ~head+2×tail per stream regardless of output size.

truncateHeadTail is refactored onto a total-aware core so the string path (and its
tests) are unchanged, and budgetBashCapture reports the true raw_bytes even though
only a bounded slice was held. Adds boundedBuffer/capture unit tests and an
end-to-end test that streams ~5× the budget and asserts bounded emission with an
accurate raw_bytes.
2026-07-05 13:15:14 +05:30
Vasanth T 30dd7c3112 fix(config): let a gateway ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL resolve as anthropic-compatible (#497)
Setting ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to a proxy/gateway failed setup with "anthropic
provider anthropic requires official baseURL https://api.anthropic.com".
OPENAI_BASE_URL already auto-promotes a non-official env URL to the
openai-compatible kind, but Anthropic had no equivalent, so the universal
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL proxy convention was rejected outright.

Mirror the OpenAI behaviour: a non-official ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL from the
environment promotes the profile to anthropic-compatible. This stays env-only
on purpose -- a custom baseURL in a project config.json is still rejected by
Resolve, so an untrusted project can't redirect a first-party key to another
host (TestResolveRejectsAnthropicOfficialProviderCustomBaseURL still passes).

Fixes #479
2026-07-05 11:39:22 +08:00
Gautam ManchandaniandGautam Manchandani e7d88b4b51 perf: cache TUI model registry (#496)
Co-authored-by: Gautam Manchandani <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 11:38:45 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Sonnet 5 177442cfe4 fix(specialist): cap max specialist nesting depth (#491)
* fix(specialist): cap max specialist nesting depth

A Task specialist can recursively spawn further specialists via --depth.
Without a ceiling, a runaway or malicious chain of Task calls can recurse
indefinitely, exhausting process and memory resources. Reject any run whose
depth exceeds a hard cap of 8.

Related to #470, not closing it: today's normal specialist/swarm path
cannot reach this recursively, since child sessions are launched with
--tag specialist and shouldRegisterExecSpecialistTools suppresses the Task
tool for that tag (see PR description for details). This is a
defense-in-depth guard, not a fix for an active exploit. Split out of #468
at reviewer request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(specialist): reject depth cap at the boundary, not past it

Addresses jatmn's review on PR #491:
- Executor.Run checked `CurrentDepth > maxSpecialistDepth`, but this call is
  what launches the child at CurrentDepth+1. A parent already AT the cap
  passed the check and started a child one level past it, only getting
  rejected on that child's own next call. Change to `>=` so the guard fires
  before the over-cap child is launched.
- Add TestRunRejectsDepthAtMax to cover the boundary explicitly.

* test(specialist): cover resume boundary in depth-cap guard

The pre-branch depth guard in Run sits before the fresh/resume split, but
the boundary test only exercised the fresh path, leaving a future refactor
free to move the guard without any test catching a resume regression.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 11:38:15 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 190241bd59 fix(tools): fix cmd.exe /S/C corrupting commands with embedded quotes (#465)
* fix(tools): fix cmd.exe /S/C corrupting commands with embedded quotes

Any shell command whose own text contains embedded double quotes -
python -c "print(15 / 3)", git commit -m "message", node -e "..." - was
silently corrupted on Windows before reaching the target program. Reported
live: a model ran python -c "print(15 / 3)" and got back a SyntaxError
showing the code Python received as literally "print(15, truncated right
before the /.

Root cause: bash.go passes the full command text as ONE argv element to
cmd.exe /d /s /c, and Go's os/exec escapes it correctly for a standard
CommandLineToArgvW-style parser (wrapping it in quotes, backslash-escaping
the embedded ones). But cmd.exe's own /C remainder parsing does not follow
those rules once /S is present: per its documented behavior, it strips the
FIRST and LAST literal quote character in the whole remainder - not a
matched pair - before handing the (now corrupted) text along to be
re-tokenized. The escaping was correct for one layer of parsing; the
command line actually goes through two.

Fix: on Windows, write commandText to a temp .cmd script file and point
/c at the file's path instead of the raw command text. This sidesteps
cmd.exe's /C-remainder heuristic entirely, since the remainder is then
just a plain path with no quotes to mis-strip. @echo off is prepended
since cmd.exe treats a /c target ending in .cmd as a batch file and
echoes each line it runs by default, which would otherwise pollute
captured stdout (caught by the existing bash tool test suite before this
commit, not left in).

buildBashCommand now returns a cleanup func (in addition to plan.Cleanup)
for the temp file. Both callers updated: bash.go's one-shot run defers it
immediately; exec_command.go's persistent session composes it with
startExecProcess's own cleanup and runs it after the session's process
actually exits, not before.

This fix lives upstream of the sandbox wrapping, in how the Name/Args spec
is constructed before either the direct or sandboxed code path consumes
it, so both benefit without separate sandbox-specific changes - cmd.exe's
own command-line parsing does not depend on what token launched it.

New TestBashToolPreservesEmbeddedQuotesOnWindows pins the exact failure
shape via a self-dispatch test helper (a quoted argument containing a
space and a slash, matching the original bug report's truncation point),
with no dependency on python being installed. Full internal/tools suite
green, excluding 3 failures pre-existing and identical on unmodified main
in my environment (unrelated path-assumption issues under a deeply nested
working directory).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(tools): pass the shell command line to cmd.exe raw instead of via a temp script

Review on the original fix found real problems with running commandText
from a temporary .cmd file: it silently changed cmd.exe command-line
syntax into batch-file syntax (for example, for %i loops need %%i only
inside an actual .bat/.cmd file), /s was still corrupting the script
path itself if it contained spaces, and the script leaked on sandbox
planning errors.

The actual root cause was narrower than the temp-file approach assumed.
cmd.exe's own /C remainder parsing is not CommandLineToArgvW-compatible:
it strips the first and last literal quote from the remainder whenever
it starts with a quote, without undoing backslash-escaping. Passing
commandText as a normal exec.Cmd argument makes Go wrap it in exactly
that shape (quoted because it has spaces, inner quotes escaped as \")
since it contains embedded quotes, which is what the stripping then
corrupts.

Fixes it at the source instead: commandText now reaches cmd.exe
completely unescaped (via SysProcAttr.CmdLine for the unwrapped path,
and the same treatment inside the sandboxed runner's own process
creation for the wrapped path), exactly as if it had been typed at an
interactive prompt. No outer quotes means the stripping heuristic never
triggers for a command like `python -c "print(15 / 3)"`, and a command
that legitimately starts with a quoted executable path is handled by
cmd.exe's own careful quote-preserving special case for that shape.
Also drops /s, which forced the more aggressive of cmd.exe's two
stripping behaviors. No temp file, so nothing to leak on error, and no
batch-file reinterpretation of the command text.

internal/sandbox/windows_runner.go now owns the shared shell-argv shape
(WindowsShellArgs/WindowsShellCommandLine) so internal/tools/bash.go
and the sandboxed runner's windowsCommandLine build the exact same raw
command line instead of duplicating the flag literals in two places.

* chore: retrigger CI

The Windows smoke job failed on TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges in internal/oauth (a lock-file access-denied flake), unrelated to this change. internal/tools and internal/sandbox, the packages this PR touches, both passed. Retriggering to confirm.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 11:36:00 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 ba6c026469 fix(tools): make grep and glob respect run cancellation (#464)
* fix(tools): make grep and glob respect run cancellation

grep and glob's Run/RunWithSandbox discarded their context parameter
entirely (bound to _) and ran a synchronous filepath.WalkDir with no way
to know it should stop. An unscoped search over a large tree - a broad
parent directory, not just the workspace, which the model can and does
reach for - could run long enough to be effectively unkillable: the TUI's
Ctrl+C/exit path calls the stored CancelFunc and immediately marks the run
"cancelled" in the UI, but the underlying walk kept running regardless,
because nothing in it ever checked ctx.Err(). Worse, the TUI's quit path
explicitly waits for the cancelled run's own response (to drain
flushRunIDs, so /rewind checkpoints stay consistent) before it will
actually exit - so with the walk unable to hear the cancellation, neither
a second Ctrl+C nor /exit could complete. The only way out was killing the
process.

Thread ctx through Run/RunWithSandbox into grepFiles/scanGlob and check
ctx.Err() at the top of each WalkDir callback, ahead of walkErr, so a
cancelled run aborts the walk on its very next entry instead of visiting
every remaining file. Checked the rest of the tools package for the same
_ context.Context pattern: list_directory (single-level os.ReadDir, no
walk), skill, ask_user, and update_plan don't touch the filesystem, so
grep and glob were the only two tools with this gap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(tools): thread cancellation through grep's match-collection phase

The walk-level fix in grepFiles stopped a cancelled search from visiting
new filesystem entries, but collectGrepMatches still read and
regex-scanned every file the walk had already found, so a search that
had discovered its full file list before cancellation kept running
regardless. Adds the same per-item ctx.Err() check to that phase, plus
a deterministic test that cancels after a fixed number of files instead
of relying on timing.

* test(tools): add mid-walk cancellation coverage and shared helper

Add deterministic mid-walk tests for grepFiles and scanGlob using countingCancelContext, and extract searchCancelledResult so grep/glob share the same cancellation Result mapping.

* style(tools): gofmt search_cancel.go (add missing trailing newline)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 11:35:01 +08:00
Pengkuh Dwi Septiandi daf65e0af9 feat: support shift enter for composer newlines (#462) 2026-07-05 11:34:18 +08:00
Anandan f401c66e81 polish: cut per-turn overhead, stabilize cache, add /new (#478)
* polish: cut per-turn overhead, stabilize cache, add /new

Context economy
- Compaction: preserveLast 8->6, triggerRatio 0.8->0.7 (both copies in sync).
- System prompt: kill the "ELABORATE summary" directive; scale summary to
  the work. Comment discipline moved into the core prompt for all model
  families (was Anthropic-only); Minimax/DeepSeek/Qwen/etc. now get it.
- Token-budget regression test ratchets the fixed per-turn overhead (base
  prompt + eager tool schemas) using the runtime's own estimator, so silent
  prompt/schema growth fails CI.

Response quality
- defaultResponseStyle balanced->concise. Reversible via /style.

Tool discovery
- <available_skills> block in the system prompt lists installed skills
  (name + one-line description) so the model loads the right one on the
  first call instead of guessing and reading the failure. Budget-capped at
  640 bytes with an "...and N more" fallback; renders nothing when no
  skills are installed (byte-identical to prior prompt).

Session lifecycle
- /new starts a fresh session in place; previous session stays on disk and
  is named in the confirmation for /resume. Guards against mid-run reset.
- /clear now notes that context persists and points to /new.

Performance & caching
- partitionTools no longer alpha-sorts the whole tools array every turn,
  which inserted a loaded deferred tool mid-array and shifted the cached
  prefix on every load. It now builds append-only regions
  [eager sorted] + [tool_search] + [loaded deferred sorted] so a
  mid-session load grows the tail instead of busting the eager prefix.
  Regression test asserts the eager block precedes any loaded tool.
- /context now shows cache hit rate (flags low rate over >5 turns as a
  possible unstable prefix) and rolling average turn latency with
  time-to-first-token. Both reset on /new.

Measured baselines (auto-mode, no workspace): base prompt 3162 tokens,
eager tool schemas 2433 across 12 tools. Budget ceilings set ~10% above.

Deliberately deferred (need a decision): inverted safety-policy rewrite
(sandbox doesn't catch ~half the B-tier rules), core-tool/web_fetch
deferral (activation-semantics blocker), aggressive prompt slim.

* fix(tui): clear staged attachments + queued message on /new

CodeRabbit: startNewSession reset conversation/usage/latency state but not
the staged input (pendingImages, pendingImageLabels, pendingDocuments,
queuedMessage), which is only consumed at prompt-submit. Without clearing it,
the fresh session's first prompt silently inherited the previous session's
images/documents/queued text. Test now stages all four and asserts they clear.
2026-07-04 20:56:52 +08:00
Pengkuh Dwi Septiandi 949ee43f71 fix: preserve conversation context in exec prompts (#460)
* fix: preserve conversation context in exec prompts

* fix: remove redundant

* test: cover exec prompt
2026-07-04 08:53:47 +08:00
Ashwinhegde19 2fcea71778 feat(tui): add search/filter to provider picker in setup wizard (#400)
* feat(tui): add search/filter to provider picker in setup wizard

Add a search input to the provider step of the setup wizard, matching
the existing model picker search UX. Typing filters the provider list
in real-time via case-insensitive substring matching on name, ID, and
aliases.

Fixes #392

* fix(tui): resolve provider index before clearing search on advance

Clearing providerSearch before using currentProvider() caused the wrong
provider to be selected — selectedProvider is an index into the filtered
slice, and clearing the search swaps to the full unfiltered list.

Also update placeholder to reflect that search matches ID and aliases.

* fix(tui): guard empty-filter Enter and add provider search tests

- Enter on an empty provider filter is now a no-op instead of advancing
  with the wrong provider (first full-list entry)
- Add table tests for filteredProviders/name/ID/alias matching
- Add tests for selectedProvider reset on edit, empty-match noop,
  Ctrl+U clear restores full list, and filtered advance selection

Addresses review feedback from @Vasanthdev2004 and @gnanam1990 on PR #400
2026-07-04 08:53:16 +08:00
PierrunoYTandVasanthdev2004 5f36349c18 feat(update): add zero upgrade command to apply self-updates (#461)
* feat(update): add zero upgrade command to apply self-updates

Extends the existing `zero update --check` (which only reported an
available release) with an actual install step:

- `zero update --apply` / `zero upgrade` download, sha256-verify, and
  install the latest release.
- npm installs delegate to `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`.
- Standalone installs download the release archive, verify its
  checksum, extract it (zip-slip guarded), and atomically replace the
  running binary plus any pre-existing optional sandbox helpers. On
  Windows, the running exe is renamed aside (NTFS allows this even
  while it's executing) since it can't be overwritten directly; the
  leftover ".old" file is cleaned up on a later invocation.

Closes #459.

* fix(update): correct macOS expectations in apply test

The optional-helper assertion in TestApplyStandaloneUpdateReplacesBinary
assumed every non-Windows platform has a linux-style "zero-seccomp"
helper to refresh, but applyStandaloneUpdate correctly ships no optional
helpers on macOS (matching scripts/postinstall.mjs). This made the test
fail on macOS CI. Only assert the helper refresh on linux/windows.

* fix(update): address CodeRabbit review findings on zero upgrade

- Reject --target when combined with --apply/upgrade: applying installs
  onto the current machine, so a mismatched --target could replace the
  running binary with an incompatible-arch build.
- Bound archive/checksum downloads with a dedicated timeout separate
  from the release-metadata check timeout, so a stalled connection
  can't hang zero upgrade forever.
- Surface a failed rollback in the Windows replaceBinary path instead
  of swallowing it, so a botched install is reported rather than
  silently leaving the binary missing.
- Run CleanupStaleBinary regardless of whether an update is available,
  so a leftover Windows ".old" file isn't stuck waiting for a future
  upgrade that may never come.
- Report optional sandbox-helper refresh failures as warnings on
  ApplyResult (surfaced in text and JSON output) instead of discarding
  them silently.

* fix(oauth): retry secret-lock on Windows delete-pending race to unblock CI

TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges was failing this PR's Windows
smoke job with "create token secret lock: ...Access is denied." — a
pre-existing flake in internal/oauth, not in the upgrade code. On Windows
a concurrent holder's os.Remove leaves the .lock in a delete-pending
state, so an O_EXCL create races it with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
(os.ErrPermission) rather than ErrExist; createSecretFile only treated
ErrExist as contention and hard-failed otherwise.

Treat os.ErrPermission as retryable too, mirroring acquireFileLock in
lock.go. This is the same root-cause fix as #445 (diagnosis by
@gnanam1990); folded in here to make this PR's CI green. Verified on
Windows: the concurrent-converge test passes 30/30.

---------

Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:52:07 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 e4f760ee8b fix(agent): reject a malformed additional_permissions payload before prompting (#453)
* fix(agent): reject a malformed additional_permissions payload before prompting

A shell tool call that sets sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions
but omits (or malforms) the additional_permissions payload was accepted into
the normal permission-prompt flow. buildPermissionEvent silently swallowed
the validation error while rendering the prompt's scope text, so the user
saw an ordinary-looking request, approved it, and only then hit a hard
denial from the same validation running again at grant time (loop.go's
grantInlineAdditionalPermissions), with the confusing message "failed to
grant session additional permissions: missing additional_permissions".

A malformed payload can never succeed regardless of the user's decision, so
run the same check (inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile, already the single
source of truth for this shape) up front, before any prompt, and return a
plain tool error the driving model can see and retry from. This also covers
the mismatched case (additional_permissions present without the flag).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(agent): make the additional_permissions rejection message actionable

The rejection added in the previous commit correctly stops a malformed
sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions call before any prompt,
but its message ("missing additional_permissions; provide at least one of
network or file_system") gave a model nothing concrete to correct itself
with. Observed in practice: a weaker tool-calling model (xai/grok-build-0.1)
kept re-attaching sandbox_permissions out of habit from an earlier, correct
gh/git call onto later commands that didn't need it (network was already
open via a session-scoped grant), hit this same rejection 4 times in a row
with no change in its retry, and gave up.

Both messages (missing payload, and empty-but-present payload) now include
a concrete, schema-accurate example - {"network": {"enabled": true}} or
{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}} - and the missing-payload message
adds the other half of the fix: if the command doesn't actually need
elevated permissions, omit sandbox_permissions entirely and retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:51:14 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 068c5ad3ad docs(install): recommend bun pm trust for Bun installs (#452)
The Bun instructions told global installers to run the postinstall script
manually against the global install path, because trustedDependencies only
works in a project package.json. Current Bun has a simpler sanctioned path
that works for both project and global installs: `bun pm trust
@gitlawb/zero` (with -g for globals) runs the blocked postinstall after the
fact. Verified on Bun 1.3.14 on Windows 11: `bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero`
fetched the binary and `zero --version` runs.

Lead with that in README.md, README_ZH.md, and docs/INSTALL.md, keep
trustedDependencies and the manual installer as alternatives for project
installs and older Bun versions, and teach the wrapper's missing-binary
message the same commands for the Bun case.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:45:49 +08:00
Gautam ManchandaniandGautam Manchandani 407a92739f fix(action): keep provider key scoped to zero step (#448)
Co-authored-by: Gautam Manchandani <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:41:38 +08:00
KRATOS d05e9148a7 fix(oauth): treat Windows ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED as lock contention in createSecretFile (#445)
createSecretFile's secret-lock loop only retried on os.ErrExist. On Windows a
concurrent holder's `defer os.Remove(lockPath)` leaves the lock file in a
"delete pending" state, so a racer's O_EXCL create returns ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
(os.ErrPermission) rather than ErrExist — which fell through to a hard
"create token secret lock: Access is denied" error instead of retrying. Mirrors
the identical handling already present in acquireFileLock (lock.go, from #261).

Fixes the flaky Windows-CI failure TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges
that was intermittently red-flagging every PR's Windows smoke job.

Verified on macOS: build/vet/gofmt clean, oauth package green, concurrent-
converge test passes under -race (5x). The Windows delete-pending path can't be
reproduced off Windows, so the definitive proof is the Windows CI on this PR.
2026-07-04 08:40:20 +08:00
Anandan 1d8638466c fix: allow non-TLS connections to private-network provider endpoints (#444)
* fix: allow non-TLS connections to private-network provider endpoints

The provider wizard and health probe rejected `http://` endpoints with a
non-loopback host, so users could not configure a local-network provider
like llama.cpp on another LAN machine (e.g. `http://192.168.1.100:8080/v1`).
Only loopback was relaxed.

Expand the "loopback-only" checks to also cover private-network addresses
(192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12) via `netip.Addr.IsPrivate()`:

- `providerhealth.endpointIsLoopback` → `endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate`
  (also returns true for private IP literals).
- `providerhealth.allowLoopback` → `allowLoopbackOrPrivate` — the flag
  now relaxes both loopback and private addresses in `validateEndpoint`
  and `safeDialContext`.
- `providerWizardIsLoopbackHost` in the TUI wizard now accepts private
  IPs, so `http://192.168.x.y` passes the endpoint URL validation.
- `providerProfileIsLocal` in headless setup recognizes private-network
  IPs as local (skip API key for keyless LAN providers).
- `baseURLIsLoopback` in app.go recognizes private-network IPs for
  credential-requirement logic.

Link-local (169.254.x.x), cloud metadata, and other special ranges
remain blocked. Redirects to any local/private address remain blocked
regardless of the flag (SSRF protection for 3xx targets is unchanged).

Fixes #431

* chore: fix gofmt indentation in connectivity client test
2026-07-04 08:35:14 +08:00
Anandan 305a62c954 fix(auth): route zero auth login chatgpt to the dedicated ChatGPT flow (#443)
* fix(auth): route `zero auth login chatgpt` to the dedicated ChatGPT flow

`zero auth login chatgpt` went through the generic OAuth manager loopback
path, which builds a random-port http://127.0.0.1:<port>/callback
redirect_uri with no extra authorize params. OpenAI's ChatGPT client
registration requires exactly http://localhost:1455/auth/callback plus the
id_token_add_organizations, codex_cli_simplified_flow, and originator
params, so the authorize endpoint rejected the request with an
"Authentication Error" before any browser interaction.

Route the chatgpt provider to the existing dedicated ChatGPT login
(provideroauth.ChatGPTLogin), which already binds the fixed port, uses the
localhost host, the /auth/callback path, and sends the required params.
`zero auth login chatgpt` now behaves identically to `zero auth chatgpt`.
--device is rejected with a clear message since ChatGPT has no device-code
path.

Fixes #430

* fix(auth): reject --scope on ChatGPT login instead of silently dropping it

`zero auth login chatgpt --scope <x>` reached the dedicated ChatGPT flow,
which ignores the generic manager's ExtraScopes — the scopes were silently
dropped while --device was explicitly rejected. Reject --scope up front
with a clear message, since the Codex client registration pins a fixed
scope set (incl. api.connectors.*) that custom scopes would risk dropping.

Addresses CodeRabbit review on #443.
2026-07-04 08:34:30 +08:00
Vasanth T 9134148f4d fix(tui): keep the profile name on /model switch so the stored key resolves (#441)
normalizeProfileForProvider rewrote profile.Name to the catalog provider.ID
whenever normalizeIdentity was true — which includes any first-party provider
whose saved baseURL matches the catalog default. The credential store is keyed
by profile.Name, and this rewrite runs before profileWithCredential, so the
stored-key lookup missed and the rebuilt provider went out with no key: a 401 on
every /model switch for a profile named differently from its catalog id (e.g.
"my-openai").

Only canonicalize an empty or generic placeholder name now; a real user-provided
name is preserved. CatalogID canonicalization is unchanged (it is not the store
key). Adds regression tests covering a custom-named first-party profile surviving
normalization and placeholder names still canonicalizing.

Fixes #440
2026-07-04 08:27:41 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 f653dcac36 fix(sandbox): gate /tmp test assertions on GOOS, not path existence (#426)
* fix(sandbox): gate /tmp test assertions on GOOS, not path existence

TestPermissionProfileFromPolicyIncludesDefaultTempWriteRoots and
TestNewScopeNormalizesAndValidatesExtraRoots guard their /tmp assertion with
pathExists("/tmp"), intending to skip it on Windows. But Go resolves the bare
path /tmp against the current drive on Windows, so on any host where C:\tmp
exists the guard passes while the product code (correctly, by design - see
defaultTempWriteRootCandidatesForGOOS) uses %TEMP%/%TMP% instead, and both
tests fail. Gate the assertion on runtime.GOOS != "windows" as well; POSIX
behavior is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* chore: retrigger CI

The Windows smoke job failed on TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges in internal/oauth, unrelated to this change. Retriggering to confirm it was a flake.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:26:22 +08:00
Eli Lap 071ea3a495 Make shortcuts reconfigurable via the config file. (#417)
* Make shortcuts reconfigurable via the config file.

* Use sidebarToggleAllowed. Fix fmt errors.

* Fix: combination matching superset.

* Remove non-default shortcut combination from the comment.
2026-07-04 08:25:33 +08:00
Kunj SHAH b0abde7d06 feat: add --auto flag for LLM-generated commit messages (#423)
* feat: add --auto flag to changes commit for LLM-generated commit messages

* fix: address CodeRabbit review suggestions on auto-commit message generation

* fix: resolve auto-commit message and flag validation tests

* fix: add 60s timeout for LLM call in --auto and surface --dry-run in help

Addresses gnanam1990 non-blocking feedback:
- Wrap provider call with context.WithTimeout (60s) to prevent hung provider
- Note --dry-run in --auto help text as preview escape hatch
2026-07-04 08:10:18 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 5658a36627 fix(tools): flag piped POSIX utilities before running on Windows (#412)
* fix(tools): flag piped POSIX utilities (head/tail/grep/...) before running on Windows

Zero always executes the bash tool through native cmd.exe on Windows
(shellExecutable() in bash.go), but the pre-flight Windows-syntax
detector only caught bash-style `cd /...` and bare `ls`. Anything
piped into head/tail/grep/wc/awk/sed/cut/xargs/tr — very common in
model-generated commands like `git log ... | head` — ran straight
through to cmd.exe, which has no such builtins, wasting a turn on a
guaranteed failure. Reported in the wild via `git log ... | head`
and a `git blame ... | grep` pipeline.

detectShellCommandIssue now also flags these before the command
runs, with the same "translate to cmd.exe / use Zero's native tools"
guidance already used for the cd/ls cases.

Note: the existing detectShellOutputIssue path (matching cmd.exe's
error text post-execution) only recognizes English strings and will
miss this on non-English Windows locales — the pre-flight check
above is locale-independent since it inspects the model-generated
command text rather than cmd.exe's translated error output.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(tools): require whitespace/end after POSIX utility name, not just \b

CodeRabbit review on PR #412: windowsPosixUtilityPattern used \b after
the utility alternation, but \b only requires a non-word character
next — so tail-log.sh, grep-cli, and sed.exe would all false-positive
(the hyphen/dot satisfies \b without being a real command boundary).
Match windowsLSCommandPattern's existing convention: require
whitespace or end-of-string after the utility name instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:09:22 +08:00
c60ad8729f fix(config): fall back to a usable saved provider instead of forcing full re-onboarding (#410)
When config.json has providers configured but none marked active
(e.g. a blank/stale activeProvider field, or a config with 2+
providers where none was ever selected), normalizeProviders threw
away the already-normalized provider list on ErrNoActiveProvider.
That meant the interactive TUI's existing "fall back to an
already-configured usable provider" logic (firstUsableProvider)
never got a chance to run for this case — the app instead wiped
resolved to a zero value and forced the user into a brand-new
onboarding wizard, even though a usable, already-saved provider
existed.

- normalizeProviders/Resolve now return the normalized providers
  list alongside ErrNoActiveProvider instead of discarding it.
- runInteractiveTUIWithSetup tries firstUsableProvider on that list
  before forcing setup; onboarding only runs when no configured
  provider is actually usable, matching the existing fallback
  already used for a different flavor of this problem
  (active-provider-present-but-no-credential).

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vasanth T <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:08:55 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 0562e3bef7 fix(tui): show an M suffix for million-scale token counts (#457)
humanCount (the status-line/sidebar token formatter) only ever produced a K
suffix, so a 1,000,000-token context window rendered as "1000K" instead of
"1M" - visible with any 1M-context model (e.g. xai/grok-build-0.1). Its
sibling formatContextWindow already switches to "M" above a million; extend
the same behavior to humanCount, generalized for arbitrary (non-round)
values rather than formatContextWindow's round-number-only heuristic, since
humanCount also renders live, arbitrary "used" token counts.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 22:50:44 +08:00
Anandan 9bd93c62f8 fix: add android platform support for Termux npm install (#455)
`npm install -g @gitlawb/zero` failed on Android/Termux with EBADPLATFORM
because `package.json` `os` array lacked `"android"`. Termux provides a
Linux userspace — the existing `linux-arm64` binary works natively.

- Add `"android"` to the `os` array in package.json.
- Map `android` platform to `linux` in postinstall.mjs resolvePlatform().

Fixes #449
2026-07-03 22:44:47 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 bdb1b0ecd1 fix(install): persist install dir to user PATH on Windows (#407)
* fix(install): persist install dir to user PATH on Windows

The PowerShell installer only printed a suggestion to add the
install directory to PATH but never actually did it, so `zero`
was unusable from a fresh terminal after install.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(install): don't abort install if PATH persistence fails

Address CodeRabbit review on PR #407:
- Wrap the [Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable call in try/catch
  so a PATH-persistence failure (e.g. restricted user profile) warns
  instead of aborting the whole install under $ErrorActionPreference
  = Stop.
- Factor the repeated PATH-contains check for user/session scopes
  into a Test-ZeroPathContainsDir helper.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 20:10:01 +08:00
Leonardo Faoro 4266baf222 fix(docs): rename AGENTS.MD > AGENTS.md (#438)
* fix(docs): rename AGENTS.MD > AGENTS.md

* fix(docs): fix references to AGENTS.MD > AGENTS.md
2026-07-03 19:40:50 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 8d0c5feccb fix(sandbox): self-heal a corrupt unelevated setup marker (#437)
A malformed/truncated windows-unelevated-setup.json returned a hard error
from loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker, bricking every unelevated command
until the file was hand-deleted, while the unknown-schema path already
reset to an empty marker. Treat corrupt JSON the same way: the marker only
memoizes idempotent ACL applies, so a reset can only cost redundant work,
never skip enforcement.

Addresses the review feedback from coderabbitai and @anandh8x on #427.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 19:34:56 +08:00
CengSinandzhangzetao b63fe696fd modify readme.md and add readme_zh.md (#436)
Co-authored-by: zhangzetao <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 17:16:41 +08:00
Baran3575andBaran3575 3fbbd28e4c fix(provider-wizard): allow multiple custom OpenAI-compatible providers (#403)
* fix(provider-wizard): allow multiple custom OpenAI-compatible providers

Generic/custom providers (custom-openai-compatible, custom-anthropic-compatible)
all share the same CatalogID. wizardProviderStoredKey matched by CatalogID,
which blocked creating more than one custom provider.

Fix: in advanceProviderWizard, skip the ManageKey diversion for custom
providers and route directly to the endpoint step instead. The user can
overwrite an existing instance by re-entering the same name, or create a
new one with a different name.

Named providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.) are unaffected — ManageKey is
still shown for them.

Fixes #375

* refactor(provider-wizard): deduplicate advance/discovery branch, add anthropic-compatible test

---------

Co-authored-by: Baran3575 <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 17:03:37 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 b9ddd6f421 feat(sandbox): unelevated Windows fallback tier instead of prompts-only degrade (#427)
Before the one-time elevated `zero sandbox setup` has run, Windows dropped
straight from the native sandbox to the in-process policy gate: commands ran
with no OS enforcement at all. But only the WFP network filters actually need
Administrator rights - the write-restricted token and the workspace ACL grants
(DACL edits on user-owned roots) work unelevated.

Add an `unelevated` enforcement tier between native and degraded: when the
elevated setup marker is missing and the profile restricts the filesystem, the
command still wraps through the command runner at a new `unelevated` sandbox
level. The runner applies the workspace ACL plan itself (recording applied
plans by hash in windows-unelevated-setup.json so repeat commands skip the
apply) and launches under the same write-restricted token, so the OS-level
write-jail holds. Network enforcement stays with the per-command approval gate
at this tier, and the downgrade reason says so; profiles that need the sandbox
only for network isolation keep the old degrade behavior, and `--sandbox
require` still errors with the setup hint.

Verified end to end on Windows 11 without elevation: a write inside the
workspace succeeds under the restricted token, a write outside every granted
root is denied by the OS (new ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE integration test, using
cmd.exe because managed PowerShell cannot initialize its crypto provider under
a write-restricted token on some hosts).

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 16:38:28 +08:00
Jochen aaad4d2712 feat(providers): split minimax zai into intl cn (#398)
* feat(providers): split minimax zai into intl cn

- Add minimaxi-cn (api.minimaxi.com) sharing model catalog with minimax
- Add zai-cn (open.bigmodel.cn) splitting zai from china to intl
- Decouple env vars: ZAI_API_KEY vs ZHIPU_API_KEY for zai/zai-cn,
  MINIMAX_API_KEY vs MINIMAXI_API_KEY for minimax/minimaxi-cn
- Map zai-cn and minimaxi-cn to models.dev providers "zai" and "minimax"
  so the model catalog hydrates for both endpoints

* chore(providers): address review feedback on intl/cn split

- Run gofmt on internal/providermodelcatalog/catalog.go (map-value
  alignment on the \"zai\" entry was off by one space, fails CI lint)
- Update stale comment in TestResolveAppliesZaiInternationalCatalogDefaults
  to say glm-4.5 default (live discovery upgrades to glm-5.2)
- Add missing ProviderKind, APIKeyEnv, and APIKey assertions to
  TestResolveAppliesZaiInternationalCatalogDefaults so it would catch
  a silent regression in ZAI_API_KEY routing
2026-07-03 16:33:11 +08:00
KRATOS b4275e3504 feat(providers): add Meituan LongCat catalog preset (#424)
Add LongCat-2.0 as a first-class OpenAI-compatible provider preset so it can be
selected by name in the setup wizard / `zero providers setup longcat` instead of
hand-entering a custom endpoint.

LongCat-2.0 is Meituan's open, OpenAI- and Anthropic-compatible model. This
wires the OpenAI-compatible transport:
  base URL: https://api.longcat.chat/openai  (Zero appends /chat/completions)
  model:    LongCat-2.0
  auth:     Bearer via LONGCAT_API_KEY

Purely additive — one descriptor plus its catalog/onboarding tests and a README
env-var line; no shared plumbing is touched, so existing providers are
unaffected. Placed with the other OpenAI-compatible third parties (after
moonshot), below the first-party providers.

Verified: go build / vet / test green (catalog + cli onboarding), gofmt clean,
and `zero providers catalog` lists the descriptor with the correct fields.
Endpoint is wired by-spec from LongCat's published docs; a live completion still
needs a real LONGCAT_API_KEY to confirm.
2026-07-03 12:44:11 +08:00
Alaa Elsamouly 5b2b4dea1a fix(tui): compose help overlay through the viewport overlay pipeline (#421)
* fix(tui): compose help overlay through the viewport overlay pipeline

exactly like how other popups works.

* fix for the CI/CD of formatting

* Added regression tests for the help overlay

* formatted code
2026-07-03 11:33:17 +08:00
Abdias J b5a78dca6f docs(install): document Bun install and improve missing-binary error (#418)
Bun does not run dependency lifecycle scripts by default, so the npm
wrapper's postinstall (which fetches the native Zero binary from GitHub
Releases) is silently skipped. The first run then fails with an
unhelpful "No native binary found" message that points at a source-only
build command, leaving Bun users stuck.

Add a Bun section to README.md and docs/INSTALL.md with the two working
install paths (run postinstall.mjs manually, or add the package to the
project's trustedDependencies). Rewrite the wrapper's missing-binary
error to give an actionable fix for everyone and a Bun-specific hint
when run under Bun, instead of only suggesting a source checkout.
2026-07-03 07:38:25 +08:00
KRATOS 952788f72d fix(tui): resolve every permission request so the agent can't deadlock (#397)
A goroutine dump of a run "stuck for 33 minutes" showed the agent parked
forever in executeToolCall -> requestPermission, blocked on the TUI's
decision channel. Root cause: a shell command whose sandbox decision was
Allow but which requested additional sandbox permissions
(sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions) made shouldRequestPermission
block on OnPermissionRequest, yet buildPermissionEvent stamped the event
Action=allow. The TUI's permissionRequestMsg handler only rendered/resolved
Action=prompt requests and silently dropped everything else — so the decide
callback was never called, the agent waited on a channel nothing would signal
(no ctx cancellation on the active run), and the UI showed "Working" with no
prompt and zero network activity. Intermittent and model-dependent: gpt-5.5's
folder-creation command set the additional-permissions flag, glm's did not,
which is exactly why one hung and the other ran clean.

Two-part fix:

- agent (buildPermissionEvent): an additional-permissions request is an
  ELEVATION the user must consent to, even over a sandbox Allow, so mark it
  Action=prompt (matching shouldRequestPermission's own condition). It now
  surfaces as a real prompt instead of a dropped auto-allow.

- tui (permissionRequestMsg handler): enforce the contract that a blocked
  agent ALWAYS gets a decision. A non-prompt action resolves immediately and
  FAILS CLOSED (deny; cancel stays cancel) so the UI can never silently grant
  an unsurfaced permission; a superseded-run (runID mismatch) resolves as
  cancel so its parked goroutine unblocks without depending on ctx-cancel
  ordering. Matches the ACP handler's always-resolve, fail-closed contract.

Red-green: reverting the tui branch reproduces the deadlock (decide never
called); reverting the agent override reproduces Action=allow. End-to-end
against a mock backend emitting the exact triggering tool call, the real TUI
now renders the permission prompt and the run completes on approval, where
before it parked forever.
2026-07-03 06:02:57 +08:00
Gautam ManchandaniandGautam Manchandani f915f70e5a fix(mcp): block cross-origin credential redirects (#396)
Co-authored-by: Gautam Manchandani <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 06:02:05 +08:00
Vasanth T cdf9d839ae fix(tui): title /model rows by model name, not the catalog description (#395)
The model picker rendered each row's title from the model's description via
modelPickerDisplayName, which returned the description whenever it was non-empty
and not a known-generic placeholder. Catalog/discovery descriptions come from
models.dev as full sentences (e.g. "DeepSeek chat model for instruction
following, coding, and analysis"), and several models share the same sentence —
so the picker showed sentence-long titles and rows that looked like exact
duplicates, with the real model id surviving only in the meta line.

Prefer the (prettified) model id as the row title; fall back to a non-generic
description only when there is no id to name the row. Distinct ids that share a
catalog description now render as distinct rows.
2026-07-02 23:29:12 +08:00
245 changed files with 19135 additions and 848 deletions

No files matched your search

+14 -3
View File
@@ -100,9 +100,10 @@ jobs:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
# govulncheck and deadcode resolve a toolchain from their own modules, which
# can drop below the version go.mod requires and then fail to load our
# packages. Pin GOTOOLCHAIN to the go.mod toolchain so both run under it.
# govulncheck, deadcode, and golangci-lint each resolve a toolchain from
# their own modules, which can drop below the version go.mod requires and
# then fail to load our packages. Pin GOTOOLCHAIN to the go.mod toolchain
# so all three run under it.
- name: Pin toolchain from go.mod
run: |
toolchain="$(awk '/^toolchain /{print $2}' go.mod)"
@@ -120,3 +121,13 @@ jobs:
- name: deadcode (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: go run golang.org/x/tools/cmd/[email protected] -test=false ./...
# Advisory: catches what deadcode's whole-program reachability analysis
# doesn't, unused private functions/assignments reachable within a
# package but never actually called, plus staticcheck-style correctness
# and readability issues. Scoped to a few linters rather than the full
# default battery, and non-blocking, while the existing findings across
# the repo are cleaned up incrementally (see #527).
- name: golangci-lint (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...
+17 -1
View File
@@ -4,12 +4,14 @@ on:
pull_request:
paths:
- action.yml
- docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md
- .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml
push:
branches:
- main
paths:
- action.yml
- docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md
- .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml
jobs:
@@ -29,7 +31,8 @@ jobs:
import sys, yaml
with open("action.yml", "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
doc = yaml.safe_load(handle)
action_raw = handle.read()
doc = yaml.safe_load(action_raw)
assert isinstance(doc, dict), "action.yml must be a mapping"
assert doc.get("name"), "action must declare a name"
@@ -65,6 +68,19 @@ jobs:
assert "--skip-permissions-unsafe" not in serialized, \
"action must never pass --skip-permissions-unsafe"
run_zero = next((step for step in steps if step.get("name") == "Run ZERO"), None)
assert run_zero is not None, "action.yml must contain a Run ZERO step"
run_zero_script = run_zero.get("run") or ""
assert 'export "${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV}=${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY}"' in run_zero_script, \
"Run ZERO must export the provider key for the current step"
assert "later steps inherit" not in action_raw.lower(), \
"provider keys must not be documented as inherited by later steps"
for line in run_zero_script.splitlines():
if "GITHUB_ENV" in line and (
"ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY" in line or "ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV" in line
):
raise AssertionError("provider key must not be persisted to GITHUB_ENV")
print(f"action.yml OK: {len(inputs)} inputs, {len(outputs)} outputs, {len(steps)} steps")
PY
+5
View File
@@ -37,8 +37,13 @@ report.[0-9]_.[0-9]_.[0-9]_.[0-9]_.json
/zero
/zero.exe
/zero-skills
/snake-game.html
# Superpowers skill artifacts (brainstorm mockups, specs, plans) — local only
.superpowers/
docs/superpowers/
# Termux/Android build artifacts
zero-termux-arm64
zero-linux-sandbox
+8 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Accepted file names, in priority order at each level:
| `./ZERO.md` | Brand-specific alias. Same format, lower priority. |
| `./.zero/AGENTS.md` | Project-local, hidden, gitignored. Personal notes that stay out of git. |
Matching is **case-insensitive** on the basename, so `AGENTS.md`, `Agents.md`, and `agents.md` resolve to the same file on Windows and macOS. The git-tracked filename in this repo is `AGENTS.MD` (uppercase `MD`) — keep that on case-sensitive filesystems (Linux, the WSL filesystem, or a CI runner) to match what the loader looks for.
Matching is **case-insensitive** on the basename, so `AGENTS.md`, `Agents.md`, and `agents.md` resolve to the same file on Windows and macOS. The git-tracked filename in this repo is `AGENTS.md` — keep that on case-sensitive filesystems (Linux, the WSL filesystem, or a CI runner) to match what the loader looks for.
Both files use the same format. YAML frontmatter is optional; the markdown body is loaded as instructions for the agent. Zero reads the file once at session start, so changes take effect on the next `zero` launch — not mid-session.
@@ -47,6 +47,12 @@ Tips:
- In a monorepo, drop a narrower `AGENTS.md` in each sub-tree (e.g. `services/api/AGENTS.md`). Zero picks those up automatically when you launch from inside the sub-tree.
- A YAML frontmatter block (`---\n...\n---`) at the top is preserved verbatim in the injected prompt but is not parsed for `globs:` or `alwaysApply:` scoping today — keep the body self-contained.
### Personal guidelines, across every project
For preferences that follow *you*, not a specific repo (tone, tooling habits, workflow), drop a `ZERO.md` in your user config directory: `~/.config/zero/ZERO.md` on Linux/macOS, `%AppData%\Roaming\zero\ZERO.md` on Windows — the same directory as `config.json` and your personal specialists. Same format and 8 KiB cap as the project files above, and the same case-insensitive basename match.
This file is injected as its own `## User guidelines` section, before the project's `AGENTS.md`/`ZERO.md`, and is labeled as personal preference in the prompt: project guidelines are the later, more specific instruction and take precedence over it when the two conflict.
## 2. Custom specialists
Specialists are Zero's sub-agents. Three scopes, in priority order:
@@ -307,6 +313,7 @@ A team that wants every contributor's Zero to behave the same way commits:
Each contributor adds only:
- `~/.config/zero/config.json` — their personal API keys, theme, default mode.
- `~/.config/zero/ZERO.md` — personal preferences that follow them across every project (see section 1).
- `~/.local/share/zero/skills/` — personal skills they keep across projects.
That's it. Run `zero` from the repo root and the agent has the team's full instruction set, every contributor's personal setup, and nothing else.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.MD says "Build with `make`" and "Run `make
# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says "Build with `make`" and "Run `make
# lint` before opening a PR" — these targets back those instructions.
.DEFAULT_GOAL := build
.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint tidy clean help
+68
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.25+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.25+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<br>
<strong>English</strong> | <a href="README_ZH.md">中文</a>
</p>
Zero is an AI coding agent for your local terminal. It can inspect a repository,
@@ -51,6 +53,31 @@ The npm package installs a small wrapper plus the matching Zero binary for your
platform from GitHub Releases. It supports Linux, macOS, and Windows on x64 and
arm64.
### Bun
Bun does not run dependency lifecycle scripts by default, so the `postinstall`
that fetches the Zero binary is skipped and the first run fails with
`No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`.
The simplest fix is to trust the package after installing, which runs the
blocked postinstall. This works for project and global installs:
```bash
# project install
bun add @gitlawb/zero
bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero
# global install
bun add -g @gitlawb/zero
bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero
```
Alternatives: allow the postinstall up front by adding
`"trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]` to your project's package.json
before `bun add`, or run the installer manually
(`node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs`) on Bun versions
that do not have `bun pm trust`.
### Install scripts
Linux/macOS:
@@ -121,6 +148,13 @@ the key in the wizard:
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
```
To configure Meituan LongCat (LongCat-2.0) directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
For local models, run Ollama or LM Studio and then use `zero setup` or
@@ -152,6 +186,7 @@ Common slash commands:
| `/spec`, `/plan` | draft and review a plan before building |
| `/image` | attach an image for vision-capable models |
| `/resume`, `/rewind` | continue or roll back local sessions |
| `/loop` | repeat a prompt or custom `/command` on an interval (`/loop 5m /babysit-prs`) or self-paced |
| `/compact`, `/context` | manage context usage |
| `/permissions`, `/tools` | inspect available tools and policy |
| `/add-dir` | allow an extra write directory for this session |
@@ -249,6 +284,39 @@ zero cron scheduled agent jobs
zero update check for newer releases
```
## Extending Zero
### Project and personal instructions
Zero appends project-specific guidance to the system prompt from the first
`AGENTS.md`, `ZERO.md`, or `.zero/AGENTS.md` file found in each directory from
the git root down to your current working directory (checked in that order
per directory). Files are injected general-to-specific, capped at 8 KiB per
file and 32 KiB total.
A personal `ZERO.md` under `config.UserConfigDir()/zero/ZERO.md`
(`$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/zero/ZERO.md` or `~/.config/zero/ZERO.md` on Linux/macOS,
`%AppData%\Roaming\zero\ZERO.md` on Windows) applies across every workspace, ahead of any project guidelines.
### Plugins
Plugins are discovered from `~/.config/zero/plugins/<name>/plugin.json` (user
scope — `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME` or `~/.config` on every OS, independent of the
`config.UserConfigDir()` path used above) and `<cwd>/.zero/plugins/<name>/plugin.json`
(project scope — resolved from the current working directory, not the repo
root), and managed with `zero plugins`. A manifest can declare:
- `tools` — custom tools (`command`, `args`, `inputSchema`, and a
`permission` of `prompt` or `deny`; `allow` is honored only when manifest tool
auto-approval is enabled)
- `hooks` — commands run on `beforeTool`, `afterTool`, `sessionStart`, or
`sessionEnd`
- `prompts` and `skills` — additional prompt/skill files
MCP servers (`zero mcp`) and standalone markdown skills (`zero skills`) use
the same extension points and can also be wired up outside of a plugin
manifest.
## Appearance And Accessibility
| Control | Effect |
+297
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
<p align="center">
<img src="docs/assets/zero-logo.png" alt="Zero" width="385">
</p>
<p align="center"><strong>一个独属于你的终端编码智能体。</strong></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.25+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.25+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<br>
<a href="README.md">English</a> | <strong>中文</strong>
</p>
Zero 是一个用于本地终端的 AI 编码智能体。它可以检查仓库、编辑文件、运行命令、使用浏览器/终端辅助工具,并在你选择模型和权限级别的同时保持持久的本地会话。
```bash
zero
zero exec "修复 ./pkg 中失败的测试"
zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
## 为什么选择 Zero
- **使用你想要的模型。** 支持 OpenAI、Anthropic、Gemini、Groq、OpenRouter、DeepSeek、Mistral、xAI、Qwen、Kimi、GitHub Models、Ollama、LM Studio,或任何 OpenAI/Anthropic 兼容端点。
- **保持控制权。** 文件写入、Shell 命令、网络访问和工作区外写入都经过 Zero 的权限和沙箱策略。
- **在终端中工作。** TUI 具有模型/提供商选择器、图片输入、斜杠命令、实时计划/工具渲染、回滚滚动、主题以及恢复/分叉支持。
- **无 TUI 也能工作。** `zero exec` 可脚本化,支持文本/JSON/stream-JSON I/O、隔离的工作树、规范优先运行,以及用于 CI 的有意义的退出码。
- **保持上下文本地化。** 会话存储在磁盘上,可搜索、可恢复,且 Zero 不会作为遥测数据上传。
- **可扩展。** 使用 MCP 服务器、技能、插件、钩子和来自同一 CLI 的专业子智能体。
## 安装
### npm
```bash
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
zero
```
npm 包安装一个小型包装器以及与你平台匹配的 Zero 二进制文件(从 GitHub Releases 获取)。支持 Linux、macOS 和 Windows 的 x64 和 arm64。
### Bun
Bun 默认不运行依赖的生命周期脚本,因此获取 Zero 二进制文件的 `postinstall` 会被跳过,首次运行会失败并显示 `No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`。
最简单的解决方法是安装后信任该包,这会运行被阻止的 postinstall。项目安装和全局安装均适用:
```bash
# 项目安装
bun add @gitlawb/zero
bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero
# 全局安装
bun add -g @gitlawb/zero
bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero
```
其他方式:在 `bun add` 之前将 `"trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]` 添加到项目的 package.json 以提前允许 postinstall;或在不支持 `bun pm trust` 的旧版 Bun 上手动运行安装程序(`node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs`)。
### 安装脚本
Linux/macOS:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
Windows PowerShell:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
### 从源码构建
源码构建需要 Go 1.25+。
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
发布安装器和 npm 包需要已发布的 GitHub Release 资源。如果你在首次公开发布之前进行测试,请从源码构建:
```bash
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
在 Linux 上,如果你需要原生沙箱,还需要构建沙箱辅助程序:
```bash
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # 可选的兼容性包装器
```
将 `zero` 和 `zero-linux-sandbox` 放在 `PATH` 上的同一目录中(`~/.local/bin` 是一个好的默认选择)。macOS 不需要额外的辅助二进制文件。Windows 源码构建可以使用主 `zero.exe` 作为沙箱辅助程序;发布包仍然附带独立的 Windows 辅助可执行文件。
更多安装细节:[docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md)。
## 首次运行
启动 TUI:
```bash
zero
```
设置向导帮助你选择提供商和模型。你也可以从命令行配置提供商:
```bash
zero setup
zero providers list
zero models list
zero doctor
```
对于 API 提供商,在设置之前设置匹配的环境变量或在向导中输入密钥:
```bash
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
```
要直接配置美团 LongCat(LongCat-2.0),运行:
```bash
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
对于本地模型,运行 Ollama 或 LM Studio,然后使用 `zero setup` 或 `zero providers detect`。
## 日常使用
### 交互式 TUI
```bash
zero
```
常用控制:
| 控制 | 操作 |
|---|---|
| `Enter` | 发送提示 |
| `/` | 打开斜杠命令建议 |
| `Shift+Tab` | 切换权限模式 |
| `Ctrl+B` | 显示/隐藏侧边栏 |
| `Ctrl+C` | 取消或退出 |
常用斜杠命令:
| 命令 | 用途 |
|---|---|
| `/model`、`/provider` | 切换活动模型/提供商 |
| `/spec`、`/plan` | 在构建之前起草和审查计划 |
| `/image` | 为视觉模型附加图片 |
| `/resume`、`/rewind` | 继续或回滚本地会话 |
| `/compact`、`/context` | 管理上下文使用 |
| `/permissions`、`/tools` | 检查可用工具和策略 |
| `/add-dir` | 为此会话授予额外的写入目录 |
| `/theme`、`/doctor`、`/config` | 调整外观和检查设置 |
### 无头 `exec` 模式
```bash
zero exec "解释 internal/agent/loop.go"
zero exec --model claude-sonnet-4.5 "重构配置加载器"
zero exec --use-spec "为 API 客户端添加速率限制"
zero exec --worktree "在隔离的工作树中尝试迁移"
zero exec --resume
zero exec --fork <session-id> "尝试另一种方法"
```
编程使用:
```bash
zero exec --input-format stream-json --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
Stream-JSON 协议文档在 [docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)。
## 安全模型
Zero 旨在使副作用可见。
- 工作区读取默认允许。
- 文件写入限制在工作区内,除非你授予其他目录。
- Shell 命令、网络访问、破坏性命令和提权操作需要权限授权。
- `--add-dir <path>` 和 `/add-dir <path>` 授予额外的写入根目录,而不会给智能体整个文件系统。
- 不安全/自主模式是显式选择加入。
- 在 Zero 控制的界面上,密钥会从工具输出和日志中被脱敏。
示例:
```bash
zero --add-dir ../docs-site
zero exec --add-dir ../shared "更新两个仓库"
```
沙箱行为可以通过以下方式检查:
```bash
zero sandbox policy
zero sandbox grants list
```
## Web 和本地控制
Zero 包含本地文件/搜索/编辑/Shell 工具、用于公共 URL 的 `web_fetch`,以及用于额外工具的 MCP 支持。
对于本地开发服务器,使用 Shell 命令(如通过 `exec_command` 的 `curl`),这样正常的沙箱和权限策略就会生效。长时间运行的命令保持附加到后台终端会话,可以从 TUI 中列出或停止。
npm 包还包含本地浏览器/终端工具使用的浏览器和终端辅助包。源码构建可以在它们位于 `PATH` 上或在 Zero 的本地控制设置中配置时使用相同的辅助工具。
## 常用命令
```text
zero 交互式 TUI
zero exec 一次性或脚本化智能体运行
zero setup 首次运行提供商设置
zero auth 支持提供商的 OAuth/登录辅助
zero models 模型注册表和能力
zero providers 提供商配置和检测
zero doctor 设置、密钥和连接检查
zero context 上下文预算报告
zero repo-map 确定性仓库映射
zero repo-info 本地仓库摘要
zero search | find 搜索本地会话历史
zero sessions 检查、恢复、分叉和回滚会话
zero spec 管理规范模式草稿
zero specialist 管理专业子智能体
zero skills 管理 Markdown 指令技能
zero plugins 管理插件
zero hooks 管理生命周期钩子
zero mcp 管理 MCP 服务器和工具
zero serve --mcp 通过 MCP stdio 暴露 Zero 工具
zero sandbox 检查沙箱策略和授权
zero worktrees 准备隔离的 Git 工作树
zero verify 检测和运行本地验证检查
zero changes 检查和提交本地 Git 变更
zero usage Token 使用量和估算成本
zero cron 定时智能体任务
zero update 检查更新版本
```
## 外观和无障碍
| 控制 | 效果 |
|---|---|
| `NO_COLOR=<任意值>` | 禁用颜色输出 |
| `ZERO_THEME=<名称>` | 选择启动主题(`auto`、`dark`、`light`,或颜色主题如 `dracula`、`nord`、`gruvbox`、`tokyo-night`、`catppuccin`、`one-dark`、`solarized-dark`、`rose-pine`、`everforest`、`solarized-light`) |
| `--theme <名称>` | 从 CLI 选择 TUI 主题(相同名称) |
| `/theme` | 在 TUI 中打开主题选择器(实时预览;`/theme <名称>` 直接切换) |
| `ZERO_NO_FADE=1` | 禁用流式淡入动画 |
含义不仅仅依赖于颜色;差异、权限和状态也使用文本或标记符号。
## 开发
```bash
go test ./...
go run ./cmd/zero-release build
go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench
```
交叉编译示例:
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos linux --goarch amd64
go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero.exe
```
## 文档
- [安装](docs/INSTALL.md)
- [更新流程](docs/UPDATE.md)
- [Stream-JSON 协议](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)
- [专家](docs/SPECIALISTS.md)
- [GitHub Action](docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md)
- [基准测试](docs/BENCHMARK.md)
- [性能](docs/PERFORMANCE.md)
- [智能体评估](docs/AGENT_EVALS.md)
## 贡献
欢迎贡献。阅读 [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md),运行相关测试,然后提交一个聚焦的拉取请求。
安全报告应遵循 [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)。
## 许可证
Zero 基于 [MIT 许可证](LICENSE) 发布。
+8 -9
View File
@@ -27,14 +27,14 @@ inputs:
api-key:
description: >-
The provider API key. Pass it from a repository or organization secret;
it is exported into the step environment and never written to the log.
it is exported only for the ZERO step and never written to the log.
required: false
default: ""
api-key-env:
description: >-
Name of the environment variable the chosen provider reads its key from
(for example OPENAI_API_KEY or ANTHROPIC_API_KEY). When set together with
api-key, that variable is exported for the run. Leave the action
api-key, that variable is exported only for the ZERO step. Leave the action
provider-agnostic by passing the env name your provider expects rather
than hardcoding one here.
required: false
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ runs:
ZERO_INPUT_ADD_DIR: ${{ inputs.add-dir }}
ZERO_INPUT_WORKTREE: ${{ inputs.worktree }}
ZERO_INPUT_OUTPUT_FORMAT: ${{ inputs.output-format }}
ACTION_PATH: ${{ github.action_path }}
RUNNER_TEMP: ${{ runner.temp }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
@@ -192,10 +193,9 @@ runs:
echo "::error::api-key-env must be a valid environment variable name." >&2
exit 2
fi
# Export in-process so the zero invocation in this same run block sees
# it, and append to GITHUB_ENV so any later steps inherit it too.
# Export in-process for this Run ZERO step so zero can read it; do
# not persist provider credentials to later job steps.
export "${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV}=${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY}"
printf '%s=%s\n' "${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV}" "${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY}" >> "${GITHUB_ENV}"
fi
if [ -n "${ZERO_INPUT_PROVIDER}" ]; then
export ZERO_PROVIDER="${ZERO_INPUT_PROVIDER}"
@@ -248,10 +248,9 @@ runs:
echo "exit-code=${code}" >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
echo "output-file=${output_file}" >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
# Best-effort one-line summary: last non-empty line of the captured output.
summary="$(grep -v '^[[:space:]]*$' "${output_file}" | tail -n 1 || true)"
# Keep the summary single-line and bounded for the step output.
summary="$(printf '%s' "${summary}" | cut -c1-280)"
# Best-effort one-line summary. Structured output ends with lifecycle
# metadata, so parse final/error events instead of tailing stdout.
summary="$(node "${ACTION_PATH}/scripts/action-summary.mjs" "${ZERO_INPUT_OUTPUT_FORMAT}" "${output_file}" || true)"
{
echo "summary<<ZERO_EOF"
printf '%s\n' "${summary}"
+21 -1
View File
@@ -54,8 +54,28 @@ const nativePath = join(packageRoot, zeroBinaryName());
const localControlHelpers = localControlHelperManifest(packageRoot);
if (!existsSync(nativePath)) {
const postinstallScript = join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs');
const ranByBun = process.execPath.includes('bun') || !!process.versions?.bun;
console.error(
'[zero] No native binary found next to the npm wrapper. Reinstall the zero package or run `go run ./cmd/zero-release build` from the repository.'
'[zero] No native binary found next to the npm wrapper.\n' +
'The platform binary is fetched at install time by a postinstall script,\n' +
'which did not run (or was skipped) for this install.\n' +
'\n' +
'Fix it now by running the installer manually:\n' +
` node "${postinstallScript}"\n` +
'\n' +
(ranByBun
? 'You installed with Bun, which does not run dependency lifecycle scripts\n' +
'by default. Trust the package to run the blocked postinstall:\n' +
' bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero (project install)\n' +
' bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero (global install)\n' +
'On Bun versions without `bun pm trust`, add\n' +
' "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]\n' +
'to your project package.json and reinstall.\n' +
'\n'
: '') +
'If that fails, build from source: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero\n' +
'(go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.25+).',
);
process.exit(1);
}
+9 -7
View File
@@ -41,8 +41,9 @@ jobs:
> provider-neutral: `api-key-env` is the environment variable name the chosen
> provider reads its key from (for example `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `GEMINI_API_KEY`,
> `OPENROUTER_API_KEY`), and `api-key` is the secret value. The action exports
> that variable for the run and never prints it. If your repository already
> commits a `.zero/config.json` with an active provider, you can omit `provider`.
> that variable only for the ZERO step and never prints it. If your repository
> already commits a `.zero/config.json` with an active provider, you can omit
> `provider`.
## Inputs
@@ -51,8 +52,8 @@ jobs:
| `prompt` | one of `prompt`/`prompt-file` | `""` | The instruction for ZERO to execute. |
| `prompt-file` | one of `prompt`/`prompt-file` | `""` | Path (relative to `working-directory`) to a file whose contents are the prompt. |
| `provider` | no | `""` | Provider id to activate (e.g. `openai`, `anthropic`, `gemini`, `ollama`, or any compatible endpoint). |
| `api-key` | no | `""` | The provider API key. Pass from a secret; never logged. |
| `api-key-env` | no | `""` | Env var name the provider reads its key from (e.g. `OPENAI_API_KEY`). Exported with `api-key`. |
| `api-key` | no | `""` | The provider API key. Pass from a secret; exported only for the ZERO step and never logged. |
| `api-key-env` | no | `""` | Env var name the provider reads its key from (e.g. `OPENAI_API_KEY`). Exported only for the ZERO step when used with `api-key`. |
| `model` | no | `""` | Model id. Defaults to the resolved provider's default. |
| `mode` | no | `""` | Run mode (`zero exec --mode`), e.g. `smart`, `deep`, `fast`. |
| `auto` | no | `low` | Autonomy ceiling (`zero exec --auto`): `low`, `medium`, or `high`. Conservative by default. |
@@ -162,9 +163,10 @@ jobs:
## Security notes
- **Secrets are passed as Action secrets and never logged.** The action exports
`api-key` (under `api-key-env`) and `slack-webhook-url` into the step
environment only. They are never echoed, and ZERO redacts secret-shaped
strings from its own output.
`api-key` (under `api-key-env`) only for the ZERO step. `slack-webhook-url`
is passed only to the Slack post step. They are never echoed or persisted to
later workflow steps, and ZERO redacts secret-shaped strings from its own
output.
- **The sandbox is always active.** This action never passes
`--skip-permissions-unsafe`, so writes stay inside the checked-out repository
(plus any roots you grant with `add-dir`). Unsafe mode is never enabled
+100
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,51 @@ Requirements:
- Node.js 18+
- network access to npm and GitHub Releases
## Bun
Bun is "default-secure" and does not run lifecycle scripts of installed
dependencies (only the installing project's own scripts), so the `postinstall`
that fetches the Zero binary is silently skipped. The first run then fails with
`No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`.
The simplest fix is to trust the package after installing, which runs the
blocked postinstall. This works for project and global installs:
```bash
# project install
bun add @gitlawb/zero
bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero
# global install
bun add -g @gitlawb/zero
bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero
```
`bun pm untrusted` (or `bun pm -g untrusted`) lists the blocked postinstalls if
you want to inspect before trusting.
Alternatively, allow the postinstall to run at install time by adding the
package to your project's `trustedDependencies` before installing:
```json
{
"trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]
}
```
```bash
bun add @gitlawb/zero
```
On Bun versions that do not have `bun pm trust`, run the installer manually
after installing:
```bash
node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs
```
Reference: <https://bun.sh/docs/pm/lifecycle>
## Linux And macOS Script
Install the latest release:
@@ -128,6 +173,61 @@ Linux native sandboxing also requires Bubblewrap to be installed.
macOS uses the system sandbox and does not need an extra helper binary.
### Termux (Android)
Zero can run natively on Android via [Termux](https://termux.dev/). Build with
`GOOS=android` to avoid the `faccessat2` syscall that is blocked by Samsung's
seccomp filter on Android:
```bash
# Install Go in Termux
pkg install golang
# Build Zero for Android
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
cd zero
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=android GOARCH=arm64 go build -ldflags="-s -w" -o zero ./cmd/zero
# Move into PATH
mv zero ~/.local/bin/
```
> **Why `GOOS=android`?** Go 1.26+ detects `runtime.GOOS == "android"` and skips
> the `faccessat2` syscall inside `os/exec.findExecutable`, falling back to
> permission-bit checks. Without this flag, Android's seccomp sends SIGSYS and
> kills the process whenever Zero looks up a binary on `PATH` (git, sh, etc.).
**DNS.** Android does not expose `/etc/resolv.conf`. Go's pure-Go DNS resolver
needs one. Use `proot` to bind-mount Termux's resolver config:
```bash
pkg install proot
proot -b "$PREFIX/etc/resolv.conf:/etc/resolv.conf" zero
```
Create a wrapper at `~/.local/bin/zero` to avoid typing proot every time:
```bash
#!/data/data/com.termux/files/usr/bin/bash
exec proot -b "$PREFIX/etc/resolv.conf:/etc/resolv.conf" ~/.local/bin/zero.bin "$@"
```
**Scroll.** On native Termux (not under PRoot), mouse scrolling works out of the
box. The TUI uses Bubble Tea's `AllMotion` mouse mode by default. If you run Zero
inside PRoot (e.g. through proot-distro), the scroll fix activates `CellMotion`
to avoid PRoot's ptrace interference with the 1003 escape sequence.
**Providers.** Zero works with any OpenAI-compatible provider on Termux. For
example, to use OpenCode Zen's free tier:
```bash
zero providers add opencode \
--name opencode \
--model deepseek-v4-flash-free \
--base-url https://opencode.ai/zen/v1 \
--set-active
```
Windows source builds can use the main `zero.exe` as the command runner and setup
helper through Zero's built-in self-dispatch path. If you want a release-style
layout anyway, build the standalone helper executables next to `zero.exe`:
+5
View File
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ events when present.
```json
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "run_start", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "sessionId": "zero_20260603100000_abc123", "cwd": "/repo", "provider": "openai", "model": "gpt-4.1", "apiModel": "gpt-4.1" }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "reasoning", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "delta": "Thinking..." }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "text", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "delta": "..." }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "tool_call", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "id": "call_1", "name": "read_file", "args": { "path": "README.md" }, "sideEffect": "read" }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "permission_request", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "id": "call_2", "name": "write_file", "action": "prompt", "permission": "prompt", "permissionMode": "ask", "sideEffect": "write", "reason": "Creates or overwrites files." }
@@ -51,6 +52,10 @@ events when present.
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "run_end", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "status": "success", "exitCode": 0 }
```
`reasoning` events carry live model reasoning/status deltas for providers that
stream them separately from answer text. They are liveness/progress events only:
they are not folded into `text` or the final answer.
Permission events may include structured sandbox metadata:
```json
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// A shell call that sets sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions but
// omits (or malforms) additional_permissions can never succeed: the same
// validation runs again at grant time regardless of the user's decision. It
// must be rejected as a plain tool error BEFORE any permission prompt, not
// surfaced as a confusing "approved but denied" prompt outcome.
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsMissingAdditionalPermissionsBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
promptCalls := 0
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{
ID: "c1",
Name: "bash",
Arguments: `{"command":"echo hi","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions"}`,
},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{
OnPermissionRequest: func(ctx context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
promptCalls++
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionAllow}, nil
},
},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("status = %q, want error", result.Status)
}
if promptCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want 0 (must reject before prompting)", promptCalls)
}
}
// The mismatched-flag case (additional_permissions present without the
// sandbox_permissions flag) must be rejected the same way.
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsAdditionalPermissionsWithoutFlagBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
promptCalls := 0
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{
ID: "c1",
Name: "bash",
Arguments: `{"command":"echo hi","additional_permissions":{"network":{"enabled":true}}}`,
},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{
OnPermissionRequest: func(ctx context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
promptCalls++
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionAllow}, nil
},
},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("status = %q, want error", result.Status)
}
if promptCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want 0 (must reject before prompting)", promptCalls)
}
}
// The rejection message must show a concrete, correctly-shaped example: a
// model that gets this wrong once (attaching sandbox_permissions out of habit
// from an earlier call, without a valid payload) needs enough in the error to
// self-correct on retry instead of repeating the identical mistake.
func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{
ID: "c1",
Name: "bash",
Arguments: `{"command":"ping example.com","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions"}`,
},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, `{"network": {"enabled": true}}`) {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want a concrete additional_permissions example", result.Output)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "omit sandbox_permissions") {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want guidance that the flag can simply be omitted", result.Output)
}
}
// A well-formed additional_permissions payload must still reach the normal
// permission prompt: this fix only rejects malformed payloads.
func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
promptCalls := 0
_, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{
ID: "c1",
Name: "bash",
Arguments: `{"command":"echo hi","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions",` +
`"additional_permissions":{"network":{"enabled":true}}}`,
},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{
OnPermissionRequest: func(ctx context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
promptCalls++
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny}, nil
},
},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if promptCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want exactly 1 for a valid elevation request", promptCalls)
}
}
+185
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"path/filepath"
"sort"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// Post-edit LSP diagnostics used to run synchronously inside edit_file /
// write_file: every edit blocked its tool result on a fresh-publish wait with
// a quiet-period debounce (≥300ms floor that reset on each publish, 10s cap) —
// the largest recurring latency tax in an edit-heavy session. Collection is
// now asynchronous: a file is enqueued the moment a mutating tool finishes, a
// single worker checks it while the rest of the tool batch (and any
// self-correct verification) runs, and the loop drains completed results just
// before building the NEXT provider request, appending errors as a user-role
// nudge. The model always issues another request after an edit turn — it has
// to read its tool results — so it still sees introduced errors at the same
// decision point as before, without any tool call stalling on the language
// server.
//
// A file re-edited before its check runs is checked once in its final state
// (the checker re-reads the file); a file re-edited after its check completed
// is re-enqueued and the newer result wins. When the worker is still busy at
// drain time, the drain gives up after a short wait and the results are
// delivered on the following turn instead — they stay accurate because any
// further edit re-enqueues the file.
// asyncDiagnosticsDrainTimeout bounds how long a turn waits on the in-flight
// check before deferring delivery to the next turn. Most checks finish well
// under it (debounce floor + analysis); a cold language server on a large
// repo does not get to stall the loop the way the old inline 10s cap could.
// A var so tests can shorten the wait.
var asyncDiagnosticsDrainTimeout = 3 * time.Second
// asyncDiagnosticsFinalDrainTimeout is the wait used when the run is about to
// FINALIZE (natural completion or the max-turns summary): there is no later
// turn to defer to, so the gate waits out the old inline-era budget rather
// than silently dropping an error the last edit introduced. A var so tests
// can shorten the wait.
var asyncDiagnosticsFinalDrainTimeout = 10 * time.Second
// asyncDiagnosticsNudge prefixes the drained diagnostics blocks; phrased like
// the old inline block so the model reacts the same way.
const asyncDiagnosticsNudge = "Diagnostics after your recent edits (fix any errors you introduced):\n"
type asyncDiagnostics struct {
check func(context.Context, string) string
workspaceRoot string
mu sync.Mutex
queue []string
queued map[string]bool
results map[string]string
// working is non-nil while the worker goroutine runs and is closed when it
// exits, so drain can wait for quiescence without polling.
working chan struct{}
}
// newAsyncDiagnostics returns nil when check is nil, and every method on a nil
// receiver is a no-op — callers wire it unconditionally.
func newAsyncDiagnostics(check func(context.Context, string) string, workspaceRoot string) *asyncDiagnostics {
if check == nil {
return nil
}
return &asyncDiagnostics{
check: check,
workspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
queued: map[string]bool{},
results: map[string]string{},
}
}
// enqueue schedules changed files for a background check. Paths are
// workspace-relative from Result.ChangedFiles (absolute when under a granted
// extra write root), mirroring SelfCorrector's resolution.
func (diagnostics *asyncDiagnostics) enqueue(ctx context.Context, files []string) {
if diagnostics == nil || len(files) == 0 {
return
}
diagnostics.mu.Lock()
defer diagnostics.mu.Unlock()
for _, file := range files {
path := diagnostics.absPath(file)
if diagnostics.queued[path] {
continue
}
diagnostics.queued[path] = true
// A completed result for this file describes a pre-edit state now.
delete(diagnostics.results, path)
diagnostics.queue = append(diagnostics.queue, path)
}
if diagnostics.working == nil && len(diagnostics.queue) > 0 {
done := make(chan struct{})
diagnostics.working = done
go diagnostics.work(ctx, done)
}
}
func (diagnostics *asyncDiagnostics) work(ctx context.Context, done chan struct{}) {
defer close(done)
for {
diagnostics.mu.Lock()
if len(diagnostics.queue) == 0 || ctx.Err() != nil {
diagnostics.working = nil
diagnostics.mu.Unlock()
return
}
path := diagnostics.queue[0]
diagnostics.queue = diagnostics.queue[1:]
// Un-mark before checking so an edit that lands DURING the check
// re-enqueues the file and it is checked again in its final state.
delete(diagnostics.queued, path)
diagnostics.mu.Unlock()
block := diagnostics.check(ctx, path)
diagnostics.mu.Lock()
if block != "" {
diagnostics.results[path] = block
} else {
delete(diagnostics.results, path)
}
diagnostics.mu.Unlock()
}
}
// drain waits briefly for the worker to go quiet, then formats and consumes
// all completed error blocks as one nudge. Returns "" when there is nothing
// to report or the worker is still busy (results then surface next turn).
func (diagnostics *asyncDiagnostics) drain(ctx context.Context) string {
return diagnostics.drainWithin(ctx, asyncDiagnosticsDrainTimeout)
}
// drainFinal is drain with the finalization budget: called before the run's
// last model request, where an undelivered result would otherwise be lost.
func (diagnostics *asyncDiagnostics) drainFinal(ctx context.Context) string {
return diagnostics.drainWithin(ctx, asyncDiagnosticsFinalDrainTimeout)
}
func (diagnostics *asyncDiagnostics) drainWithin(ctx context.Context, timeout time.Duration) string {
if diagnostics == nil {
return ""
}
diagnostics.mu.Lock()
busy := diagnostics.working
diagnostics.mu.Unlock()
if busy != nil {
timer := time.NewTimer(timeout)
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case <-busy:
case <-timer.C:
return ""
case <-ctx.Done():
return ""
}
}
diagnostics.mu.Lock()
defer diagnostics.mu.Unlock()
if len(diagnostics.results) == 0 {
return ""
}
paths := make([]string, 0, len(diagnostics.results))
for path := range diagnostics.results {
paths = append(paths, path)
}
sort.Strings(paths)
blocks := make([]string, 0, len(paths))
for _, path := range paths {
blocks = append(blocks, diagnostics.results[path])
}
diagnostics.results = map[string]string{}
return asyncDiagnosticsNudge + strings.Join(blocks, "\n")
}
func (diagnostics *asyncDiagnostics) absPath(path string) string {
if filepath.IsAbs(path) {
return path
}
return filepath.Join(diagnostics.workspaceRoot, path)
}
+338
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestAsyncDiagnosticsNilCollectorNoOps(t *testing.T) {
var diagnostics *asyncDiagnostics
if diagnostics != newAsyncDiagnostics(nil, "/ws") {
t.Fatal("nil check must yield a nil collector")
}
diagnostics.enqueue(context.Background(), []string{"a.go"})
if nudge := diagnostics.drain(context.Background()); nudge != "" {
t.Fatalf("nil collector drain = %q, want empty", nudge)
}
}
func TestAsyncDiagnosticsCollectsAndDrainsOnce(t *testing.T) {
// A real absolute root: a literal "/ws" is not filepath.IsAbs on Windows
// (no drive letter), which is exactly what the assertions below check.
root := t.TempDir()
var mu sync.Mutex
var checked []string
check := func(_ context.Context, absPath string) string {
mu.Lock()
checked = append(checked, absPath)
mu.Unlock()
if filepath.Base(absPath) == "clean.go" {
return ""
}
return "ERR " + filepath.Base(absPath)
}
diagnostics := newAsyncDiagnostics(check, root)
diagnostics.enqueue(context.Background(), []string{"broken.go", "clean.go"})
nudge := diagnostics.drain(context.Background())
if !strings.HasPrefix(nudge, asyncDiagnosticsNudge) {
t.Fatalf("nudge missing prefix: %q", nudge)
}
if !strings.Contains(nudge, "ERR broken.go") || strings.Contains(nudge, "clean.go") {
t.Fatalf("nudge = %q, want broken.go errors only", nudge)
}
mu.Lock()
for _, path := range checked {
if !filepath.IsAbs(path) || !strings.HasPrefix(path, root+string(filepath.Separator)) {
t.Fatalf("check received %q, want path under workspace root %q", path, root)
}
}
mu.Unlock()
if second := diagnostics.drain(context.Background()); second != "" {
t.Fatalf("second drain = %q, want empty (results are consumed)", second)
}
}
// A check still running at drain time defers delivery to the next drain
// instead of blocking the turn.
func TestAsyncDiagnosticsSlowCheckDefersToNextDrain(t *testing.T) {
previous := asyncDiagnosticsDrainTimeout
asyncDiagnosticsDrainTimeout = 20 * time.Millisecond
defer func() { asyncDiagnosticsDrainTimeout = previous }()
release := make(chan struct{})
check := func(_ context.Context, absPath string) string {
<-release
return "ERR " + filepath.Base(absPath)
}
diagnostics := newAsyncDiagnostics(check, "/ws")
diagnostics.enqueue(context.Background(), []string{"slow.go"})
start := time.Now()
if nudge := diagnostics.drain(context.Background()); nudge != "" {
t.Fatalf("drain during in-flight check = %q, want empty", nudge)
}
if elapsed := time.Since(start); elapsed > time.Second {
t.Fatalf("drain blocked %v, want bounded by the (shortened) timeout", elapsed)
}
close(release)
deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
for {
if nudge := diagnostics.drain(context.Background()); nudge != "" {
if !strings.Contains(nudge, "ERR slow.go") {
t.Fatalf("deferred nudge = %q", nudge)
}
return
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatal("deferred diagnostics never delivered")
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
}
}
// Re-enqueueing a file after its check completed replaces the stale result.
func TestAsyncDiagnosticsReEditReplacesResult(t *testing.T) {
var mu sync.Mutex
response := "ERR old"
check := func(context.Context, string) string {
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
return response
}
diagnostics := newAsyncDiagnostics(check, "/ws")
diagnostics.enqueue(context.Background(), []string{"a.go"})
waitForIdle(t, diagnostics)
mu.Lock()
response = "ERR new"
mu.Unlock()
diagnostics.enqueue(context.Background(), []string{"a.go"})
nudge := diagnostics.drain(context.Background())
if !strings.Contains(nudge, "ERR new") || strings.Contains(nudge, "ERR old") {
t.Fatalf("nudge = %q, want only the re-check result", nudge)
}
}
func waitForIdle(t *testing.T, diagnostics *asyncDiagnostics) {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
for {
diagnostics.mu.Lock()
busy := diagnostics.working
diagnostics.mu.Unlock()
if busy == nil {
return
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatal("worker never went idle")
}
time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
}
}
// changedFilesTool is a fake mutating tool reporting a changed file without
// touching the filesystem.
type changedFilesTool struct{}
func (changedFilesTool) Name() string { return "fake_edit" }
func (changedFilesTool) Description() string { return "test mutating tool" }
func (changedFilesTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{}}
}
func (changedFilesTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "test"}
}
func (changedFilesTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "edited", ChangedFiles: []string{"main.go"}}
}
// End-to-end through Run: an edit turn does NOT carry diagnostics in the tool
// result (the old inline path), but the next request contains the background
// diagnostics nudge, before the model finalizes.
func TestRunDeliversAsyncDiagnosticsNudgeNextTurn(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(changedFilesTool{})
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "fake_edit"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
root := t.TempDir()
var checkedPath string
var mu sync.Mutex
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "fix main.go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
Cwd: root,
FileDiagnostics: func(_ context.Context, absPath string) string {
mu.Lock()
checkedPath = absPath
mu.Unlock()
return "main.go:1:1 error: boom"
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 provider turns, got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
// The tool result itself must NOT block on / embed diagnostics.
for _, message := range provider.requests[1].Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool && strings.Contains(message.Content, "boom") {
t.Fatalf("diagnostics leaked into the tool result: %q", message.Content)
}
}
// The nudge must be present in the second request as a user message.
found := false
for _, message := range provider.requests[1].Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.HasPrefix(message.Content, asyncDiagnosticsNudge) {
if !strings.Contains(message.Content, "boom") {
t.Fatalf("nudge missing diagnostics: %q", message.Content)
}
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatal("no async diagnostics nudge in the follow-up request")
}
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
if want := filepath.Join(root, "main.go"); checkedPath != want {
t.Fatalf("checked path = %q, want %q", checkedPath, want)
}
}
// When the run hits the maxTurns ceiling right after an edit turn, the
// final-answer request must still carry the diagnostics nudge — otherwise an
// error introduced by the last edit would go unreported in the summary.
func TestRunDrainsAsyncDiagnosticsBeforeMaxTurnsFinalAnswer(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(changedFilesTool{})
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "fake_edit"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "summary"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "fix main.go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
Cwd: t.TempDir(),
MaxTurns: 1,
FileDiagnostics: func(context.Context, string) string {
return "main.go:1:1 error: boom"
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "summary" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected the max-turns final-answer request, got %d requests", len(provider.requests))
}
found := false
for _, message := range provider.requests[1].Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.HasPrefix(message.Content, asyncDiagnosticsNudge) {
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatal("max-turns final-answer request missing the diagnostics nudge")
}
}
// When the model finalizes while a slow check is still in flight (the
// per-turn drain missed it), the finalization gate must wait it out and give
// the model one more turn with the nudge instead of dropping the errors.
func TestRunFinalizationGateDeliversLateDiagnostics(t *testing.T) {
previous := asyncDiagnosticsDrainTimeout
asyncDiagnosticsDrainTimeout = time.Millisecond
defer func() { asyncDiagnosticsDrainTimeout = previous }()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(changedFilesTool{})
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "fake_edit"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done after fix"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "fix main.go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
Cwd: t.TempDir(),
FileDiagnostics: func(context.Context, string) string {
// Slower than the (shortened) per-turn drain, well under the
// finalization budget.
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
return "main.go:1:1 error: boom"
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done after fix" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want the post-nudge answer", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected a third request carrying the late nudge, got %d requests", len(provider.requests))
}
found := false
for _, message := range provider.requests[2].Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.HasPrefix(message.Content, asyncDiagnosticsNudge) {
if !strings.Contains(message.Content, "boom") {
t.Fatalf("nudge missing diagnostics: %q", message.Content)
}
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatal("finalization gate did not deliver the late diagnostics nudge")
}
}
+33 -16
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package agent
import (
"fmt"
"runtime"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
@@ -27,10 +28,20 @@ func proposedCommandPrefix(toolName string, args map[string]any) []string {
}
return nil
}
for _, tokens := range segments {
if !knownSafeCommandSegment(tokens) && sandbox.ValidCommandPrefix(tokens) {
return append([]string(nil), tokens...)
// Only propose approving a prefix of one segment when every other segment
// in the command is independently known-safe. Once a prefix is approved,
// shellExecutionArgsForApproval escalates the whole command (every
// segment, not just the approved one) to bypass the sandbox, so offering a
// prefix that leaves an MSYS-prone (or otherwise unsafe) segment uncovered
// would let that segment run unsandboxed without ever being reviewed.
for index, tokens := range segments {
if knownSafeCommandSegment(tokens) {
continue
}
if !sandbox.ValidCommandPrefix(tokens) || !otherSegmentsKnownSafe(segments, index) {
return nil
}
return append([]string(nil), tokens...)
}
if len(segments) == 0 || !sandbox.ValidCommandPrefix(segments[0]) {
return nil
@@ -38,6 +49,20 @@ func proposedCommandPrefix(toolName string, args map[string]any) []string {
return append([]string(nil), segments[0]...)
}
// otherSegmentsKnownSafe reports whether every segment other than the one at
// skip is known-safe on its own.
func otherSegmentsKnownSafe(segments [][]string, skip int) bool {
for index, tokens := range segments {
if index == skip {
continue
}
if !knownSafeCommandSegment(tokens) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func matchCommandPrefix(toolName string, args map[string]any, options Options) (sandbox.CommandPrefixGrant, bool, bool) {
if !isShellCommandTool(toolName) || options.Sandbox == nil {
return sandbox.CommandPrefixGrant{}, false, false
@@ -168,10 +193,6 @@ func cleanPrefixRule(prefix []string) []string {
return cleaned
}
func safeRequestedPrefix(prefix []string, command []string) bool {
return safeRequestedPrefixForSegments(prefix, [][]string{command})
}
func safeRequestedPrefixForSegments(prefix []string, segments [][]string) bool {
if len(prefix) == 0 || !sandbox.ValidCommandPrefix(prefix) {
return false
@@ -196,14 +217,6 @@ func safeRequestedPrefixForSegments(prefix []string, segments [][]string) bool {
return matched
}
func safeShellCommandTokens(command string) ([]string, bool) {
segments, ok := safeShellCommandSegments(command)
if !ok || len(segments) != 1 {
return nil, false
}
return segments[0], true
}
func safeShellCommandSegments(command string) ([][]string, bool) {
command = strings.TrimSpace(command)
if command == "" {
@@ -275,7 +288,11 @@ func knownSafeCommandSegment(command []string) bool {
if len(command) == 0 {
return false
}
switch commandName(command[0]) {
name := commandName(command[0])
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" && tools.MsysProneCommandName(name) {
return false
}
switch name {
case "cat", "cd", "cut", "echo", "expr", "false", "grep", "head", "id",
"ls", "nl", "paste", "pwd", "rev", "seq", "stat", "tail", "tr",
"true", "uname", "uniq", "wc", "which", "whoami":
+50 -1
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
package agent
import (
"runtime"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
func TestProposedCommandPrefixUsesSafeSimpleCommands(t *testing.T) {
@@ -35,12 +37,37 @@ func TestProposedCommandPrefixHonorsValidatedRequestedPrefix(t *testing.T) {
func TestProposedCommandPrefixSupportsSegmentedCommands(t *testing.T) {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{"command": "ps aux | head -5"})
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
// head is MSYS-prone on Windows (#458), so proposedCommandPrefix must
// not offer "ps aux" as a reusable prefix here: approving it would
// escalate the whole command, including the uncovered head segment,
// to bypass the sandbox unreviewed. See
// TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsPrefixLeavingUnsafeTailUncovered for
// the platform-independent regression coverage of this behavior.
if got != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no prefix on Windows because head is MSYS-prone, got %#v", got)
}
return
}
want := []string{"ps", "aux"}
if !equalStringSlices(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("prefix = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
}
}
// TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsPrefixLeavingUnsafeTailUncovered guards
// against proposedCommandPrefix offering to approve one segment of a
// multi-segment command (e.g. "ps aux") while a different segment (e.g. "npm
// install") is not known-safe. shellExecutionArgsForApproval escalates the
// entire command once any prefix is approved, so an uncovered unsafe segment
// would bypass the sandbox unreviewed. Uses npm, which is never known-safe on
// any platform, so the assertion does not depend on runtime.GOOS.
func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsPrefixLeavingUnsafeTailUncovered(t *testing.T) {
if got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{"command": "ps aux && npm install"}); got != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no prefix because npm segment is not known-safe, got %#v", got)
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixHonorsRequestedPrefixAcrossSegments(t *testing.T) {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
"command": "git status --short && git status --branch",
@@ -120,13 +147,35 @@ func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsUnsafeLaunchers(t *testing.T) {
func TestMatchCommandPrefixCoversSegmentedCommandWithSafeTail(t *testing.T) {
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir()})
engine.GrantCommandPrefixForSession("bash", []string{"ps", "aux"})
// head is MSYS-prone on Windows (#458) and must not count as a known-safe tail.
command := "ps aux | head -5"
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
command = "ps aux | echo ok"
}
grant, ok, session := matchCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{"command": "ps aux | head -5"}, Options{Sandbox: engine})
grant, ok, session := matchCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{"command": command}, Options{Sandbox: engine})
if !ok || !session || !equalStringSlices(grant.Prefix, []string{"ps", "aux"}) {
t.Fatalf("match = %#v ok=%v session=%v, want session ps aux prefix", grant, ok, session)
}
}
func TestKnownSafeCommandSegmentRejectsMsysProneOnWindows(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS != "windows" {
t.Skip("windows-only known-safe MSYS guard")
}
for _, command := range [][]string{{"head", "-5"}, {"cat", "file.txt"}, {"grep", "pat"}} {
if knownSafeCommandSegment(command) {
t.Fatalf("expected %q to be unsafe on Windows, got known-safe", command)
}
}
if !knownSafeCommandSegment([]string{"echo", "ok"}) {
t.Fatal("expected echo to remain known-safe on Windows")
}
if !tools.MsysProneCommandName("head") {
t.Fatal("expected head to be MSYS-prone")
}
}
func TestMatchCommandPrefixRejectsUncoveredSegment(t *testing.T) {
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir()})
engine.GrantCommandPrefixForSession("bash", []string{"ps", "aux"})
+50 -8
View File
@@ -21,12 +21,17 @@ import (
// the agent loop owns the provider wiring.
// defaultCompactionPreserveLast is how many trailing messages are kept verbatim
// when the caller does not specify a preserve count.
const defaultCompactionPreserveLast = 8
// when the caller does not specify a preserve count. Kept in sync with the replay
// reconstruction default in internal/sessions/replay.go.
const defaultCompactionPreserveLast = 6
// compactionTriggerRatio is the fraction of the context window at which
// proactive compaction kicks in (top of each turn).
const compactionTriggerRatio = 0.8
// proactive compaction kicks in (top of each turn). NOTE: this is speculative
// tuning — validate against the per-turn latency/compaction metrics (roadmap 5.2)
// before trusting it. Measured fixed overhead is ~7.4k tokens (not the ~16k the
// roadmap assumed), so context fills slower; if data shows 0.7 triggers redundant
// summarization, raise it back toward 0.8.
const compactionTriggerRatio = 0.7
// summaryLabel prefixes the injected summary so it is unmistakable in the
// transcript (and so tests can assert on it).
@@ -320,6 +325,43 @@ type compactionState struct {
// OnText is deliberately NOT forwarded (compaction stays invisible to the user),
// but its token COST must still be counted so usage reports and budgets include it.
onUsage func(Usage)
// calibrationRatio scales the raw byte/4 token estimate toward the provider's
// real prompt-token count. ApproxTextTokens over-counts code-heavy content by
// ~15-20%, which would trip compaction early (at ~60% of true capacity). It
// starts at 1.0 and converges via an EMA as each turn reports actual usage, so
// later turns compact nearer to real capacity. Zero is treated as 1.0.
calibrationRatio float64
}
// calibrate folds one turn's (rawEstimate, actualPromptTokens) sample into the
// running calibration ratio. A single sample is clamped to a sane band so an
// outlier (a huge cache-read turn, a provider-overhead spike) can't skew the
// estimate enough to disable or thrash compaction.
func (state *compactionState) calibrate(rawEstimate int, actualPromptTokens int) {
if !state.enabled || rawEstimate <= 0 || actualPromptTokens <= 0 {
return
}
sample := float64(actualPromptTokens) / float64(rawEstimate)
if sample < 0.5 {
sample = 0.5
} else if sample > 2.0 {
sample = 2.0
}
if state.calibrationRatio <= 0 {
state.calibrationRatio = 1.0
}
const alpha = 0.3 // weight on the newest sample; smooths jitter across turns
state.calibrationRatio = state.calibrationRatio*(1-alpha) + sample*alpha
}
// calibratedTokens applies the learned ratio to a raw estimate. Before any sample
// arrives (ratio unset) it returns the raw estimate unchanged.
func (state *compactionState) calibratedTokens(raw int) int {
if state.calibrationRatio <= 0 {
return raw
}
return int(float64(raw) * state.calibrationRatio)
}
func newCompactionState(options Options) *compactionState {
@@ -348,7 +390,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
// the messages; both the threshold check and the shrink check below use the
// same term so they stay consistent.
toolTokens := estimateToolDefTokens(tools)
size := estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens
size := state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
if size <= state.threshold {
return messages
}
@@ -365,7 +407,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
// entirely and preserve recent turns verbatim.
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(messages, state.preserveLast); reclaimed > 0 {
messages = pruned
size = estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens
size = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
if size <= state.threshold {
state.lowWaterMark = size
return messages
@@ -381,7 +423,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
// later turn) can try again; we never drop messages on failure here.
return messages
}
newSize := estimateTokens(compacted) + toolTokens
newSize := state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(compacted) + toolTokens)
if newSize >= size {
// Compaction did not actually shrink anything (e.g. nothing to
// summarize). Leave the history untouched and don't churn next turn.
@@ -439,7 +481,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
// the SAME combined (messages + tool-defs) domain maybeCompact uses, so the
// proactive shrink-guard compares like with like.
state.reactiveAttempted = true
state.lowWaterMark = estimateTokens(result) + estimateToolDefTokens(tools)
state.lowWaterMark = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(result) + estimateToolDefTokens(tools))
return result, true, nil
}
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
package agent
import "testing"
func TestCalibrationConvergesTowardActual(t *testing.T) {
state := &compactionState{enabled: true}
// Before any sample, the estimate is unchanged.
if got := state.calibratedTokens(1000); got != 1000 {
t.Fatalf("uncalibrated tokens = %d, want 1000", got)
}
// The estimator over-counts: our raw estimate is 1000 but the provider reports
// 850 (a 0.85 ratio). Feeding that sample repeatedly should pull the ratio
// toward 0.85, so a 1000-token raw estimate calibrates downward.
for range 20 {
state.calibrate(1000, 850)
}
got := state.calibratedTokens(1000)
if got >= 1000 || got < 820 || got > 880 {
t.Fatalf("calibrated tokens = %d, want ~850 after convergence", got)
}
}
func TestCalibrateIgnoresDegenerateSamples(t *testing.T) {
state := &compactionState{enabled: true}
state.calibrate(0, 500) // zero estimate
state.calibrate(500, 0) // zero actual
if state.calibrationRatio != 0 {
t.Fatalf("degenerate samples must not move the ratio, got %v", state.calibrationRatio)
}
// Disabled state never calibrates.
disabled := &compactionState{enabled: false}
disabled.calibrate(1000, 850)
if disabled.calibrationRatio != 0 {
t.Fatalf("disabled compaction must not calibrate, got %v", disabled.calibrationRatio)
}
}
func TestCalibrateClampsOutliers(t *testing.T) {
state := &compactionState{enabled: true}
// A wild outlier (10x) is clamped to 2.0, so one bad sample can't blow up the
// ratio and disable compaction.
for range 50 {
state.calibrate(1000, 10000)
}
if state.calibrationRatio > 2.0 {
t.Fatalf("ratio should be clamped at 2.0, got %v", state.calibrationRatio)
}
}
+194 -4
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,16 @@ const (
toolNameUpdatePlan = "update_plan"
toolNameToolSearch = "tool_search"
toolNameSkill = "skill"
toolNameWriteFile = "write_file"
toolNameEditFile = "edit_file"
)
// maxRecentEdits caps how many edited files are carried across a compaction, and
// maxEditNoteBytes caps each edit's one-line note, so a long editing run can't
// bloat the preserved-state block.
const (
maxRecentEdits = 20
maxEditNoteBytes = 160
)
const (
@@ -100,12 +110,123 @@ func formatPlanArguments(arguments string) string {
}
// skillEntry is a named preserved body. It began as loaded-skill state and is
// reused for loaded tools and project instruction blocks.
// reused for loaded tools, project instruction blocks, and recent file edits.
type skillEntry struct {
name string
body string
}
// recentEdits returns the files mutated by write_file/edit_file calls in messages
// — latest note per path, in last-seen order — as skillEntry{name: path, body:
// note}. After compaction elides the editing turns, this tells the model WHAT it
// changed in each file (from the tool's result) so it need not re-read to
// rediscover its own footprint. Capped at maxRecentEdits paths.
//
// Ordering is by LAST edit, not first: re-editing a file moves it to the newest
// position so the tail cap below keeps the file the model most recently touched
// rather than an earlier, now-stale entry.
func recentEdits(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
pathByID := map[string]string{}
sequence := make([]string, 0)
for _, message := range messages {
for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
if call.Name != toolNameWriteFile && call.Name != toolNameEditFile {
continue
}
path := editPathFromArguments(call.Arguments)
if path == "" {
continue
}
if call.ID != "" {
pathByID[call.ID] = path
}
sequence = append(sequence, path)
}
}
order := lastSeenOrder(sequence)
if len(order) == 0 {
return nil
}
noteByPath := map[string]string{}
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || message.ToolCallID == "" {
continue
}
if path, ok := pathByID[message.ToolCallID]; ok {
noteByPath[path] = editNote(message.Content)
}
}
// Keep the most recent maxRecentEdits paths (the tail of last-seen order).
if len(order) > maxRecentEdits {
order = order[len(order)-maxRecentEdits:]
}
entries := make([]skillEntry, 0, len(order))
for _, path := range order {
entries = append(entries, skillEntry{name: path, body: noteByPath[path]})
}
return entries
}
// lastSeenOrder dedupes paths keeping each at its LAST occurrence, preserving
// chronological order otherwise. A re-edited path therefore lands at the newest
// position rather than staying pinned to where it first appeared.
func lastSeenOrder(paths []string) []string {
lastIdx := make(map[string]int, len(paths))
for i, p := range paths {
lastIdx[p] = i
}
order := make([]string, 0, len(lastIdx))
for i, p := range paths {
if lastIdx[p] == i {
order = append(order, p)
}
}
return order
}
// editPathFromArguments pulls the target file path from a write_file/edit_file
// call's JSON arguments (path/file/file_path/filename aliases). Returns "" on
// malformed arguments or no path.
func editPathFromArguments(arguments string) string {
var parsed struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
File string `json:"file"`
FilePath string `json:"file_path"`
Filename string `json:"filename"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments)), &parsed); err != nil {
return ""
}
for _, candidate := range []string{parsed.Path, parsed.File, parsed.FilePath, parsed.Filename} {
if s := strings.TrimSpace(candidate); s != "" {
return s
}
}
return ""
}
// editNote reduces an edit tool's result to a single short line (its first
// non-empty line, byte-capped on a rune boundary) for the preserved summary.
func editNote(content string) string {
for _, line := range strings.Split(content, "\n") {
s := strings.TrimSpace(line)
if s == "" {
continue
}
if len(s) > maxEditNoteBytes {
limit := maxEditNoteBytes
for limit > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(s[limit]) {
limit--
}
s = s[:limit] + "…"
}
return s
}
return ""
}
// loadedSkills returns the skills loaded via the skill tool in messages — the
// latest body per name, in first-seen order — matching each skill tool call to
// its tool result by id.
@@ -310,11 +431,17 @@ func capBody(body string) string {
// preservedState is the JSON shape of the carried-across-compaction block.
type preservedState struct {
Plan string `json:"plan,omitempty"`
RecentEdits []preservedEdit `json:"recent_edits,omitempty"`
Tools []preservedTool `json:"tools,omitempty"`
Skills []preservedSkill `json:"skills,omitempty"`
ProjectInstructions []preservedInstruction `json:"project_instructions,omitempty"`
}
type preservedEdit struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Note string `json:"note,omitempty"`
}
type preservedTool struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Body string `json:"body"`
@@ -347,6 +474,12 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message) string {
plan = priorState.Plan
}
// Recent edits: merge edits preserved earlier with fresh write_file/edit_file
// results in middle (newer note per path wins AND moves to the newest
// position), so the tail cap keeps the files the model most recently touched
// across repeated compactions rather than dropping a just-re-edited file.
edits := capRecentEdits(mergeRecentEdits(preservedEditsToEntries(priorState.RecentEdits), recentEdits(middle)))
// Tools: preserve deferred tool_search schemas from the transcript. Fresh
// loads override older carried copies by name.
tools := mergeSkillEntries(preservedToolsToEntries(priorState.Tools), loadedToolSchemas(middle))
@@ -360,19 +493,76 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message) string {
projectInstructionEntries(middle),
)
if block := formatPreservedState(plan, tools, skills, instructions); block != "" {
if block := formatPreservedState(plan, edits, tools, skills, instructions); block != "" {
summary += "\n\n" + block
}
return summary
}
// mergeRecentEdits overlays fresh edits onto edits preserved by an earlier
// compaction. Unlike mergeSkillEntries (which keeps refreshed entries in their
// original slot), a path touched again by a fresh edit MOVES to the newest
// position and takes the fresh note, so capRecentEdits — which keeps only the
// most-recent tail — never drops a file the model just re-edited. Paths present
// only in the older set keep their relative order, ahead of the fresh ones.
func mergeRecentEdits(older, newer []skillEntry) []skillEntry {
if len(newer) == 0 {
return older
}
freshBody := make(map[string]string, len(newer))
freshOrder := make([]string, 0, len(newer))
for _, e := range newer {
if _, ok := freshBody[e.name]; !ok {
freshOrder = append(freshOrder, e.name)
}
freshBody[e.name] = e.body
}
merged := make([]skillEntry, 0, len(older)+len(freshOrder))
// Older entries that were NOT re-edited keep their position, oldest first.
for _, e := range older {
if _, refreshed := freshBody[e.name]; refreshed {
continue // re-appended at its newest position below
}
merged = append(merged, e)
}
// Fresh edits follow, in last-seen order, each carrying the fresh note — so
// the most recently touched files sit at the tail the cap preserves.
for _, name := range freshOrder {
merged = append(merged, skillEntry{name: name, body: freshBody[name]})
}
return merged
}
// capRecentEdits bounds the preserved edit list to the most recent maxRecentEdits
// entries after a merge, so repeated compactions can't grow it without limit.
func capRecentEdits(entries []skillEntry) []skillEntry {
if len(entries) > maxRecentEdits {
return entries[len(entries)-maxRecentEdits:]
}
return entries
}
func preservedEditsToEntries(edits []preservedEdit) []skillEntry {
entries := make([]skillEntry, 0, len(edits))
for _, e := range edits {
if e.Path == "" {
continue
}
entries = append(entries, skillEntry{name: e.Path, body: e.Note})
}
return entries
}
// formatPreservedState renders state as the labelled, single-line
// JSON block. Returns "" when there is nothing to preserve.
func formatPreservedState(plan string, tools, skills, instructions []skillEntry) string {
if plan == "" && len(tools) == 0 && len(skills) == 0 && len(instructions) == 0 {
func formatPreservedState(plan string, edits, tools, skills, instructions []skillEntry) string {
if plan == "" && len(edits) == 0 && len(tools) == 0 && len(skills) == 0 && len(instructions) == 0 {
return ""
}
state := preservedState{Plan: plan}
for _, e := range edits {
state.RecentEdits = append(state.RecentEdits, preservedEdit{Path: e.name, Note: e.body})
}
for _, t := range tools {
state.Tools = append(state.Tools, preservedTool{Name: t.name, Body: t.body})
}
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
package agent
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// recentEdits extracts each mutated file's path and a one-line note from the
// matching tool result, latest note per path in last-seen order.
func TestRecentEditsExtractsPathsAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "e1", Name: "write_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/foo.go","content":"package foo"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e1", Content: "Wrote internal/foo.go (12 lines)"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "e2", Name: "edit_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/bar.go","old_string":"a","new_string":"b"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e2", Content: "Applied edit to internal/bar.go"},
}
edits := recentEdits(messages)
if len(edits) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 edited files, got %d: %#v", len(edits), edits)
}
if edits[0].name != "internal/foo.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[0].body, "12 lines") {
t.Fatalf("first edit = %#v, want foo.go with its note", edits[0])
}
if edits[1].name != "internal/bar.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[1].body, "Applied edit") {
t.Fatalf("second edit = %#v, want bar.go with its note", edits[1])
}
}
// After compaction elides the editing turns, the preserved-state block still
// names the edited files and what changed, so the model needn't re-read them.
func TestCompactionPreservesRecentEdits(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "add a flag"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "editing", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "e1", Name: "write_file", Arguments: `{"path":"cmd/main.go","content":"..."}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e1", Content: "Wrote cmd/main.go (adds --version flag)"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "done"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "continue"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "continuing"},
}
summary := compactStateConversation(t, messages)
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summary)
if len(state.RecentEdits) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 preserved edit, got %#v", state.RecentEdits)
}
if state.RecentEdits[0].Path != "cmd/main.go" || !strings.Contains(state.RecentEdits[0].Note, "--version") {
t.Fatalf("preserved edit = %#v, want cmd/main.go + its note", state.RecentEdits[0])
}
}
// A fresh edit note for a path overrides the one carried from an earlier
// compaction (newer wins) and moves the path to the newest position rather than
// duplicating it or leaving it pinned to its old slot.
func TestRecentEditsMergeNewerWins(t *testing.T) {
prior := preservedState{RecentEdits: []preservedEdit{{Path: "a.go", Note: "old note"}, {Path: "z.go", Note: "z"}}}
older := preservedEditsToEntries(prior.RecentEdits)
newer := []skillEntry{{name: "a.go", body: "new note"}, {name: "b.go", body: "added"}}
merged := mergeRecentEdits(older, newer)
// z.go (untouched) keeps its lead; a.go is re-edited so it takes the new note
// and moves behind z.go, ahead of the brand-new b.go: [z.go, a.go, b.go].
if len(merged) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected z.go + refreshed a.go + b.go, got %#v", merged)
}
if merged[0].name != "z.go" {
t.Fatalf("untouched z.go should stay first, got %#v", merged)
}
if merged[1].name != "a.go" || merged[1].body != "new note" {
t.Fatalf("re-edited a.go should move to the newest edits with the new note, got %#v", merged[1])
}
if merged[2].name != "b.go" {
t.Fatalf("brand-new b.go should be last, got %#v", merged[2])
}
}
// Regression: once more than maxRecentEdits distinct files are tracked, re-editing
// an early file must move it into the capped tail rather than leaving it to be
// dropped — otherwise the next compaction omits exactly the file the model most
// recently touched.
func TestRecentEditsCapKeepsReeditedFile(t *testing.T) {
// Earlier compaction preserved exactly maxRecentEdits files, f0 the oldest.
older := make([]skillEntry, 0, maxRecentEdits)
for i := 0; i < maxRecentEdits; i++ {
older = append(older, skillEntry{name: fmt.Sprintf("f%d.go", i), body: "old"})
}
// Fresh window re-edits the OLDEST file (f0) and adds a brand-new file, so the
// merged list exceeds the cap and something must be dropped.
newer := []skillEntry{{name: "f0.go", body: "re-edited"}, {name: "fresh.go", body: "new"}}
merged := capRecentEdits(mergeRecentEdits(older, newer))
if len(merged) != maxRecentEdits {
t.Fatalf("cap should keep %d entries, got %d", maxRecentEdits, len(merged))
}
var f0 *skillEntry
for i := range merged {
if merged[i].name == "f0.go" {
f0 = &merged[i]
}
if merged[i].name == "f1.go" {
t.Fatalf("f1.go (now the least-recently touched) should have been dropped, got %#v", merged)
}
}
if f0 == nil {
t.Fatalf("re-edited f0.go must survive the cap, got %#v", merged)
}
if f0.body != "re-edited" {
t.Fatalf("surviving f0.go should carry the fresh note, got %q", f0.body)
}
}
+62
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lsp"
)
// fileDiagnosticsTimeout bounds one inline post-edit diagnostics check so a
// slow or wedged language server can never hang a tool call; on timeout the
// edit simply reports without a diagnostics block.
const fileDiagnosticsTimeout = 10 * time.Second
// NewFileDiagnostics adapts an *lsp.Manager to the per-edit inline diagnostics
// callback (tools.RunOptions.Diagnostics): it reads the just-written file,
// checks it against the file's language server, and formats error-severity
// diagnostics for the model. Warnings and hints are excluded — nagging about
// style on every edit is noise, while a type error the edit just introduced is
// exactly what the model should see before its next step. Diagnostics are
// rendered with workspace-relative paths: the absolute path would put the
// local username/home directory into the model prompt and session transcript
// on every edit. Returns nil when manager is nil, disabling inline diagnostics
// entirely.
func NewFileDiagnostics(manager *lsp.Manager, workspaceRoot string) func(context.Context, string) string {
if manager == nil {
return nil
}
return func(ctx context.Context, absPath string) string {
text, err := os.ReadFile(absPath)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
checkCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, fileDiagnosticsTimeout)
defer cancel()
diagnostics, err := manager.Check(checkCtx, absPath, string(text))
if err != nil {
return ""
}
errors := lsp.FilterBySeverity(diagnostics, lsp.SeverityError)
if len(errors) == 0 {
return ""
}
return lsp.FormatDiagnostics(diagnosticsDisplayPath(workspaceRoot, absPath), errors)
}
}
// diagnosticsDisplayPath renders absPath relative to the workspace root for
// model-facing output, falling back to the file's base name when the path is
// outside the workspace (a bare name still identifies the file without
// exposing the directory layout).
func diagnosticsDisplayPath(workspaceRoot, absPath string) string {
if workspaceRoot != "" {
if rel, err := filepath.Rel(workspaceRoot, absPath); err == nil && !strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..") {
return rel
}
}
return filepath.Base(absPath)
}
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
package agent
import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
// Diagnostics are model-facing: absolute paths would leak the local username
// and directory layout into the prompt and session transcript on every edit.
func TestDiagnosticsDisplayPath(t *testing.T) {
root := filepath.Join("/Users", "someone", "project")
cases := []struct {
root, abs, want string
}{
{root, filepath.Join(root, "internal", "a.go"), filepath.Join("internal", "a.go")},
{root, filepath.Join("/etc", "other.go"), "other.go"}, // outside root -> base name only
{"", filepath.Join("/home", "user", "x.go"), "x.go"}, // no root -> base name only
}
for _, c := range cases {
if got := diagnosticsDisplayPath(c.root, c.abs); got != c.want {
t.Errorf("diagnosticsDisplayPath(%q, %q) = %q, want %q", c.root, c.abs, got, c.want)
}
}
}
+32 -9
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ const (
// calls have executed since the last update_plan call.
staleToolCallThreshold = 10
// stalePlanTurnThreshold injects the same one-shot reminder once this many
// turns have passed since the last update_plan while plan items are still
// pending — the turn-based complement to staleToolCallThreshold, catching a
// plan that drifts stale across many turns that each make few tool calls.
stalePlanTurnThreshold = 8
// toolOnlyProgressReminderAt injects a one-shot progress nudge after this
// many consecutive turns contain tool calls but no visible assistant text.
// It does not stop the run; it tells the model to synthesize what it already
@@ -43,8 +49,12 @@ const (
toolFailureHintAt = 2
// toolFailureStopAt halts the run after a tool fails this many times in a row
// with the same error, so NO model (weak or strong) burns turns looping on a
// bad call.
toolFailureStopAt = 4
// bad call. Set to 6 (not 4): a corrective hint fires at toolFailureHintAt (2),
// and a model iterating on a genuinely tricky edit can legitimately fail a few
// times after the hint while converging — stopping at 4 cut those runs short.
// The streak still resets the moment the tool succeeds or hits a different
// error, so this only affects true same-error loops.
toolFailureStopAt = 6
// maxContinueNudges bounds how many times the headless completion gate
// (Options.RequireCompletionSignal) re-prompts a model that stopped without a
@@ -354,8 +364,13 @@ type guardState struct {
emptyTurns int
totalToolCalls int
toolCallsSincePlanUpdate int
planEverCalled bool
notCalledReminderSent bool
// turnsSincePlanUpdate counts turns (not individual tool calls) since the last
// update_plan, so a plan that goes stale across many low-tool-call turns is
// still caught — the tool-call counter alone can take many turns to trip when
// the model makes only one call per turn.
turnsSincePlanUpdate int
planEverCalled bool
notCalledReminderSent bool
// staleReminderSent records whether the stale reminder has already fired for
// the current stale interval. It is cleared when a plan update opens a new
// interval, making the reminder one-shot per interval rather than per turn.
@@ -414,8 +429,9 @@ func (state *guardState) observeToolResult(name string, failed bool, output stri
func (state *guardState) observeTurn(collected zeroruntime.CollectedStream) (stop bool) {
hasToolCalls := len(collected.ToolCalls) > 0
hasVisibleText := strings.TrimSpace(collected.Text) != ""
hasReasoning := collected.HasReasoning || len(collected.ReasoningBlocks) > 0
if hasToolCalls || hasVisibleText {
if hasToolCalls || hasVisibleText || hasReasoning {
state.emptyTurns = 0
} else {
state.emptyTurns++
@@ -427,11 +443,16 @@ func (state *guardState) observeTurn(collected zeroruntime.CollectedStream) (sto
state.toolOnlyReminderSent = false
}
// One turn has passed; the plan-update below resets this to 0 when the model
// refreshes the plan this turn.
state.turnsSincePlanUpdate++
for _, call := range collected.ToolCalls {
state.totalToolCalls++
if call.Name == planToolName {
state.planEverCalled = true
state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate = 0
state.turnsSincePlanUpdate = 0
// A fresh plan update opens a new stale interval.
state.staleReminderSent = false
// Record how many items remain so the completion gate knows whether
@@ -485,10 +506,12 @@ func (state *guardState) progressReminder() string {
// number of turns completed so far).
func (state *guardState) planReminder(turn int) string {
// STALE reminder takes priority: a long run without a plan update is the
// stronger signal. One-shot per stale interval.
if state.planEverCalled &&
!state.staleReminderSent &&
state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate >= staleToolCallThreshold {
// stronger signal. Fires on either the tool-call streak OR a turn streak with
// pending items (so a plan drifting stale across many low-call turns is caught,
// while a fully-completed plan is left alone). One-shot per stale interval.
if state.planEverCalled && !state.staleReminderSent &&
(state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate >= staleToolCallThreshold ||
(state.turnsSincePlanUpdate >= stalePlanTurnThreshold && state.planItemsPending > 0)) {
state.staleReminderSent = true
return planStaleReminder(state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate)
}
+33
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,14 @@ func textTurn(content string) []zeroruntime.StreamEvent {
}
}
// reasoningTurn produces live reasoning without visible assistant text.
func reasoningTurn(content string) []zeroruntime.StreamEvent {
return []zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventReasoning, Content: content},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}
}
// toolTurn produces a turn that calls a named tool with the given args JSON.
func toolTurn(callID string, toolName string, args string) []zeroruntime.StreamEvent {
return []zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -101,6 +109,31 @@ func TestRunResetsEmptyTurnCounterOnVisibleOutput(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunResetsEmptyTurnCounterOnReasoning(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
reasoningTurn("thinking 1"),
reasoningTurn("thinking 2"),
reasoningTurn("thinking 3"),
textTurn("done"),
},
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
MaxTurns: 12,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("expected reasoning-only turns to keep the run live until final answer, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("expected 4 turns, got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
}
func TestRunResetsEmptyTurnCounterOnToolCall(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
+254 -67
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,12 @@ const maxTurnsFinalAnswerPrompt = "You have reached the tool-turn limit. Do not
// WITH NO OUTPUT yet is re-issued on a fresh connection before giving up. Only
// the no-output case is retried (a partial turn would duplicate), so this is a
// safe recovery for a stalled/dead pooled connection.
const maxStreamStallRetries = 2
//
// Set to 1 (not 2): each attempt can itself idle for the full stream timeout
// (~5min) before the stall is even detected, so 2 retries left an interactive
// session frozen for ~15min. One retry keeps the common single-hiccup recovery
// while bounding the worst case to ~2× the idle timeout.
const maxStreamStallRetries = 1
const (
toolResultMetaControl = "control"
@@ -132,6 +137,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
guards := newGuardState()
compactor := newCompactionState(options)
// Background post-edit diagnostics: files changed by mutating tools are
// checked off the tool-call critical path and any errors are appended as a
// nudge before the NEXT request (see async_diagnostics.go). nil when no
// FileDiagnostics callback is wired; every method no-ops on nil.
postEditDiagnostics := newAsyncDiagnostics(options.FileDiagnostics, options.Cwd)
// loaded tracks deferred-eligible tools the model has pulled via tool_search
// during THIS run. It is consulted by partitionTools each turn to expose a
// loaded tool's full schema; it lives only for the run (v1 within-run scope).
@@ -145,15 +156,31 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// has already been demanded this run, so it fires at most once.
acceptanceRequested := false
// toolDefCache memoizes each tool's rendered JSON-schema definition across
// turns (a tool's advertised schema is stable for the run), so partitionTools
// doesn't re-run the recursive schema→map conversion for every tool every turn.
toolDefCache := map[string]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{}
result := Result{Messages: copyMessages(messages)}
for turn := 0; turn < maxTurns; turn++ {
result.Turns = turn + 1
// Deliver background post-edit diagnostics from the previous turn's edits
// BEFORE compaction so the nudge is part of the request being budgeted.
// A brief wait at most (asyncDiagnosticsDrainTimeout); an unfinished check
// simply delivers on a later turn.
if nudge := postEditDiagnostics.drain(ctx); nudge != "" {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: nudge,
})
}
// Build the per-turn tool list first so proactive compaction can include
// the tool-definition tokens (they ride on every request) in its estimate.
// partitionTools depends only on registry/permissions/options/loaded, not on
// the messages, so computing it before compaction is safe.
exposed, _ := partitionTools(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded)
exposed, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, toolDefCache)
// PROACTIVE compaction: if the history is approaching the model's
// context window, summarize the oldest middle before building the
@@ -163,6 +190,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}
// Report the per-category context budget for this turn so a surface can
@@ -198,6 +226,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}
// Pre-content connect after a context-limit compaction: route through the
// reconnect helper so a transient upstream hiccup here doesn't fail the
@@ -258,6 +287,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}
retryStream, retryStreamErr := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, retryRequest, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
if retryStreamErr != nil {
@@ -316,6 +346,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}
retryStream, retryErr := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, retryRequest, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
if retryErr != nil {
@@ -340,6 +371,16 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
}
}
// Calibrate the compaction token estimator against the provider's real
// prompt-token count for the request we just sent, so later turns trigger
// compaction near true capacity instead of ~15% early on code-heavy history.
// Recompute the estimate HERE (not at request-build time): a reactive
// compaction may have replaced `messages` with a smaller set and re-sent, so
// this reflects the request that actually produced collected.Usage. The
// assistant reply is appended below, after this, so `messages` is still the
// sent request.
compactor.calibrate(estimateTokens(messages)+estimateToolDefTokens(exposed), collected.Usage.InputTokens)
// Carry the turn's terminal stop reason so a final answer cut off at the
// output token cap (or by a content filter) is reported as truncated. A
// tool-call turn normalizes to "" and clears any prior reason.
@@ -450,6 +491,19 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
continue
}
}
// Finalization diagnostics gate: edits from this run may still have
// checks in flight — the per-turn drain waits only briefly and defers
// to "a later turn", but a final answer means there is no later turn.
// Wait out the full inline-era budget once; an introduced error gives
// the model one more turn to see (and fix) it instead of being lost.
// Free for runs that never edited: an idle collector returns "".
if nudge := postEditDiagnostics.drainFinal(ctx); nudge != "" {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: nudge,
})
continue
}
result.FinalAnswer = collected.Text
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, nil
@@ -475,11 +529,35 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// between tool_results breaks strict provider replay) — same after-batch
// rationale as turnRequestedModel above.
var changedFilesThisBatch []string
// Parallel read-ahead state: results for calls[precomputedStart:precomputedEnd]
// executed concurrently, consumed strictly in order below.
var precomputed []precomputedToolResult
precomputedStart, precomputedEnd := 0, 0
for index, call := range collected.ToolCalls {
// When this call starts a consecutive run of >= 2 auto-allowed read-only
// calls, execute the whole run concurrently now (see parallel_tools.go).
// The scan happens lazily at the run's first index — never ahead of a
// pending mutating call — so read-after-write ordering is preserved.
if index >= precomputedEnd {
runEnd := index
for runEnd < len(collected.ToolCalls) && parallelSafeToolCall(registry, collected.ToolCalls[runEnd], options) {
runEnd++
}
if runEnd-index >= 2 {
precomputed = executeParallelReadBatch(ctx, registry, collected.ToolCalls, index, runEnd, permissionMode, options)
precomputedStart, precomputedEnd = index, runEnd
}
}
if options.OnToolCall != nil {
options.OnToolCall(call)
}
toolResult, abortErr := executeToolCall(ctx, registry, call, permissionMode, options)
var toolResult ToolResult
var abortErr error
if index >= precomputedStart && index < precomputedEnd {
toolResult, abortErr = precomputed[index-precomputedStart].result, precomputed[index-precomputedStart].abortErr
} else {
toolResult, abortErr = executeToolCall(ctx, registry, call, permissionMode, options)
}
if options.OnToolResult != nil {
options.OnToolResult(toolResult)
}
@@ -542,11 +620,14 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
failureHint = toolFailureHint(call.Name, toolSchemaJSON(registry, call.Name), toolResult.Output)
}
// Post-edit self-correction: collect the files this successful mutating
// tool changed; verification runs once over the union after the batch.
// A read-only tool (no ChangedFiles) never contributes.
if options.SelfCorrect != nil && toolResult.Status == tools.StatusOK && len(toolResult.ChangedFiles) > 0 {
// Collect the files this successful mutating tool changed. Self-correct
// verification runs once over the union after the batch; background
// diagnostics start NOW so the language server analyzes while the rest
// of the batch executes. A read-only tool (no ChangedFiles) never
// contributes.
if toolResult.Status == tools.StatusOK && len(toolResult.ChangedFiles) > 0 {
changedFilesThisBatch = append(changedFilesThisBatch, toolResult.ChangedFiles...)
postEditDiagnostics.enqueue(ctx, toolResult.ChangedFiles)
}
}
@@ -629,6 +710,17 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// mid-run, not a natural completion (a finished run returns via the no-tool-call
// success path before this). Under the headless completion gate that is INCOMPLETE,
// not success, so a run that loops to the turn limit isn't reported as done.
//
// The final-answer call is one more model request, so diagnostics from the
// LAST turn's edits get a drain too — with the finalization budget, since
// there is no later turn to defer to — otherwise an error introduced by
// the final edit would go unreported in the summary.
if nudge := postEditDiagnostics.drainFinal(ctx); nudge != "" {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: nudge,
})
}
if answer, finalMessages, finishReason := finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx, provider, messages, options); strings.TrimSpace(answer) != "" {
result.FinalAnswer = answer
result.FinishReason = finishReason
@@ -661,6 +753,7 @@ func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages [
stream, err := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(finalMessages),
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
if err != nil {
return "", messages, ""
@@ -816,6 +909,25 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
}
}
// A shell command that sets sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions
// must carry a valid additional_permissions payload; inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile
// is the single source of truth for that shape, and buildPermissionEvent (below)
// calls it again to render the prompt's scope text. Check it here, before any
// permission prompt is shown: a malformed payload can never be satisfied no
// matter what the user decides, so surfacing it as a plain tool error (which the
// model can see and retry) is both clearer and avoids presenting a normal-looking
// prompt whose "allow" path is guaranteed to fail with a confusing denial.
if toolFound && isShellCommandTool(call.Name) {
if _, _, err := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, options.Cwd); err != nil {
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: tools.StatusError,
Output: "Error: " + err.Error(),
}, nil
}
}
// ask_user is intercepted in the loop (like permissions) so the question can
// be routed to an interactive front-end instead of blocking inside the tool.
// When no front-end is wired up it degrades to the tool's own graceful Run().
@@ -1032,6 +1144,12 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
// Per-session file version tracker so write_file/edit_file refuse to clobber
// a file that changed on disk outside Zero since it was last read.
FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
// Post-edit diagnostics are NOT forwarded to the tools: they used to run
// synchronously inside edit_file/write_file and block every mutating tool
// call on the language server (≥300ms debounce floor, 10s cap). The loop
// now checks changed files in the background and nudges the model before
// its next request instead (see async_diagnostics.go). The tools' inline
// mechanism (tools.RunOptions.Diagnostics) stays for direct API callers.
// Forward the run's operator tool filters so a filter-aware tool
// (tool_search) never discloses or loads an operator-hidden deferred tool.
EnabledTools: options.EnabledTools,
@@ -2159,6 +2277,18 @@ func buildPermissionEvent(call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, p
}
}
// A command that explicitly requests additional sandbox permissions
// (sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions) is an ELEVATION the user
// must consent to, even when the base command's sandbox decision was Allow.
// shouldRequestPermission blocks on OnPermissionRequest for exactly this case,
// so the event MUST be a prompt — otherwise it carried Action=allow while the
// loop waited on a decision, and a UI that renders only prompts (the TUI)
// dropped it, deadlocking the run. Keep this consistent with
// shouldRequestPermission's own condition.
if action == PermissionActionAllow && !permissionGranted && shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) {
action = PermissionActionPrompt
}
if safety.Permission == tools.PermissionAllow && action == PermissionActionAllow && !grantMatched && block == nil {
return PermissionEvent{}, false
}
@@ -2310,7 +2440,12 @@ func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (s
}
raw, ok := args["additional_permissions"]
if !ok || raw == nil {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf("missing additional_permissions; provide at least one of network or file_system")
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
"sandbox_permissions was set to %q but no additional_permissions object was provided. "+
`Include one, for example additional_permissions: {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}. If this command does not need elevated permissions, `+
"omit sandbox_permissions entirely and retry",
tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
}
data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
if err != nil {
@@ -2325,7 +2460,9 @@ func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (s
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, err
}
if normalized.Empty() {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf("additional_permissions must include at least one requested permission in network or file_system")
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
"additional_permissions must include at least one of network or file_system, for example " +
`{"network": {"enabled": true}} or {"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`)
}
grantProfile, err := sandbox.RequestPermissionGrantProfile(normalized)
if err != nil {
@@ -2424,6 +2561,17 @@ func permissionActionFromSandbox(action sandbox.Action) PermissionAction {
// exposed. The exposed slice is alpha-sorted by name, matching the legacy order
// so the inactive path is stable.
func partitionTools(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, loaded map[string]bool) ([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, string) {
return partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, nil)
}
// partitionToolsCached is partitionTools with an optional per-tool definition
// cache. The partitioning itself (visibility, deferral, ordering) is recomputed
// every call — it must be, because a tool's deferred state can flip mid-run (e.g.
// swarm tools un-defer once a swarm is active). Only the expensive part —
// rendering each tool's JSON-schema parameters — is memoized by tool name, since a
// tool's advertised name/description/schema is stable for the run. defCache nil
// disables caching (used by tests and the plain partitionTools entrypoint).
func partitionToolsCached(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, loaded map[string]bool, defCache map[string]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) ([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, string) {
registeredTools := registry.All()
visible := make([]tools.Tool, 0, len(registeredTools))
@@ -2458,76 +2606,115 @@ func partitionTools(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, opt
active := options.DeferThreshold > 0 && eligible >= options.DeferThreshold && loaderUsable
definitions := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0, len(visible))
exposedNames := make(map[string]bool, len(visible))
// INACTIVE: every visible tool eager (except tool_search), alpha-sorted. With no
// deferral there is no mid-session loading, so this is byte-stable across turns
// and byte-identical to the pre-deferral output.
if !active {
definitions := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0, len(visible))
for _, tool := range visible {
if tool.Name() == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
continue
}
definitions = append(definitions, cachedRuntimeToolDefinition(defCache, tool))
}
sort.Slice(definitions, func(left int, right int) bool {
return definitions[left].Name < definitions[right].Name
})
return definitions, ""
}
// ACTIVE: lay the tools array out so its cacheable prefix does NOT shift when a
// deferred tool loads mid-session. The tools block is part of the provider's
// cached prefix; if a load reorders it, the cache invalidates from that point
// through the system prompt and messages — on EVERY load. Previously the whole
// array was alpha-sorted each turn, so a newly loaded tool was INSERTED into the
// middle and shifted every later definition. Instead we build three append-only
// regions:
// 1. non-deferred tools, alpha-sorted — always present, identical every turn;
// 2. tool_search — always present, right after the stable block;
// 3. loaded deferred tools, alpha-sorted — APPENDED, so an unloaded->loaded
// transition grows the tail instead of inserting into the eager block.
// (tool_search's discovery text still shrinks as tools load, so keeping it and
// the loaded tail AFTER the eager block preserves the eager tools' cache across a
// load; fully stabilizing the loader's own description is a scoped follow-up.)
eager := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0, len(visible))
loadedTail := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0)
var hiddenTools []tools.Tool
for _, tool := range visible {
name := tool.Name()
deferred := tools.IsDeferred(tool)
if !active {
// Inactive: byte-identical to legacy, but tool_search is never advertised.
if name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
continue
if name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
continue // added explicitly between the eager block and the loaded tail
}
if tools.IsDeferred(tool) {
if loaded[name] {
loadedTail = append(loadedTail, cachedRuntimeToolDefinition(defCache, tool))
} else {
hiddenTools = append(hiddenTools, tool)
}
definitions = append(definitions, zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
Name: name,
Description: tool.Description(),
Parameters: schemaToRuntimeMap(tool.Parameters()),
})
exposedNames[name] = true
continue
}
// Active path.
if deferred && !loaded[name] {
hiddenTools = append(hiddenTools, tool)
continue
}
definitions = append(definitions, zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
Name: name,
Description: tool.Description(),
Parameters: schemaToRuntimeMap(tool.Parameters()),
})
exposedNames[name] = true
eager = append(eager, cachedRuntimeToolDefinition(defCache, tool))
}
// On the ACTIVE path tool_search is guaranteed runnable (active implies
// loaderUsable), so it must ALWAYS be reachable — even when a non-empty
// EnabledTools allowlist omits it (the operator allowlisted the deferred
// tools, not the loader). Expose its full definition whenever it is not
// already in the exposed set. This never runs on the inactive path, so the
// byte-identical below-threshold output is preserved.
discovery := ""
if active && len(hiddenTools) > 0 {
discovery = tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(hiddenTools)
}
if active && !exposedNames[tools.ToolSearchToolName] {
description := loader.Description()
if discovery != "" {
description = discovery
}
definitions = append(definitions, zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
Name: loader.Name(),
Description: description,
Parameters: schemaToRuntimeMap(loader.Parameters()),
})
} else if active && discovery != "" {
for i := range definitions {
if definitions[i].Name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
definitions[i].Description = discovery
break
}
}
}
sort.Slice(definitions, func(left int, right int) bool {
return definitions[left].Name < definitions[right].Name
sort.Slice(eager, func(left int, right int) bool {
return eager[left].Name < eager[right].Name
})
sort.Slice(loadedTail, func(left int, right int) bool {
return loadedTail[left].Name < loadedTail[right].Name
})
discovery := ""
if len(hiddenTools) > 0 {
discovery = tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(hiddenTools)
}
// tool_search is guaranteed runnable on the active path, so it is ALWAYS exposed
// — even when a non-empty EnabledTools allowlist omits it (the operator
// allowlisted the deferred tools, not the loader). It sits right after the stable
// eager block and carries the discovery list for still-hidden tools.
description := loader.Description()
if discovery != "" {
description = discovery
}
definitions := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0, len(eager)+1+len(loadedTail))
definitions = append(definitions, eager...)
definitions = append(definitions, zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
Name: loader.Name(),
Description: description,
Parameters: schemaToRuntimeMap(loader.Parameters()),
})
definitions = append(definitions, loadedTail...)
return definitions, discovery
}
// cachedRuntimeToolDefinition returns the tool's rendered definition, reusing a
// cached render when defCache holds one for this tool name. A tool's advertised
// definition is stable across a run, so caching skips the recursive schema→map
// conversion (schemaToRuntimeMap) that would otherwise run for every tool on every
// turn. tool_search is excluded by its callers (its description is dynamic), so it
// never poisons the cache. A nil cache computes fresh.
func cachedRuntimeToolDefinition(defCache map[string]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, tool tools.Tool) zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
if defCache == nil {
return runtimeToolDefinition(tool)
}
if def, ok := defCache[tool.Name()]; ok {
return def
}
def := runtimeToolDefinition(tool)
defCache[tool.Name()] = def
return def
}
// runtimeToolDefinition renders a tool's advertised definition (name, description,
// JSON-schema parameters) as sent to the provider.
func runtimeToolDefinition(tool tools.Tool) zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
return zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
Name: tool.Name(),
Description: tool.Description(),
Parameters: schemaToRuntimeMap(tool.Parameters()),
}
}
func ToolVisible(tool tools.Tool, permissionMode PermissionMode, enabledTools []string, disabledTools []string) bool {
return ToolAllowedByFilters(tool.Name(), enabledTools, disabledTools) && ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode)
}
+11 -3
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
@@ -1945,6 +1946,11 @@ func TestRunCommandPrefixApprovalBypassesSandboxForMatchingShellCalls(t *testing
func TestRunCommandPrefixApprovalCoversSegmentedShellWithSafeTail(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
segmentedCommand := `ps aux | head -5`
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
// head is MSYS-prone on Windows (#458) and no longer counts as a known-safe tail.
segmentedCommand = `ps aux | echo ok`
}
retryTool := &sandboxDeniedRetryTool{}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(retryTool)
@@ -1958,7 +1964,7 @@ func TestRunCommandPrefixApprovalCoversSegmentedShellWithSafeTail(t *testing.T)
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-2", ToolName: "bash"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-2", ArgumentsFragment: `{"command":"ps aux | head -5"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-2", ArgumentsFragment: fmt.Sprintf(`{"command":%q}`, segmentedCommand)},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-2"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
@@ -2907,8 +2913,10 @@ func TestBuildSystemPromptInjectsHostShellContext(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected operating system in environment block, got %q", prompt)
}
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
if !strings.Contains(prompt, "Windows cmd.exe syntax") || !strings.Contains(prompt, "cwd argument") {
t.Fatalf("expected Windows cmd.exe shell guidance in prompt, got %q", prompt)
for _, want := range []string{"Windows cmd.exe syntax", "cwd argument", "MSYS binaries", "grep", "require_escalated"} {
if !strings.Contains(prompt, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected Windows shell guidance to mention %q, got %q", want, prompt)
}
}
} else if !strings.Contains(prompt, "/bin/sh syntax") {
t.Fatalf("expected POSIX shell guidance in prompt, got %q", prompt)
+97
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"sync"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// Parallel read-ahead for tool batches. When a turn requests several
// independent lookups (read_file + grep + glob is the common shape), executing
// them one after another serializes pure I/O waits. A consecutive run of
// auto-allowed read-only calls is executed concurrently instead; results are
// then consumed in the original call order, so guard counters, message
// ordering, abort semantics, and the surface's call/result event pairing are
// byte-identical to sequential execution. Runs never span a mutating call: a
// read that follows a write must observe the write, so eligibility is decided
// per consecutive run, not per batch.
// maxParallelReadTools bounds concurrent read-only tool executions in a turn.
const maxParallelReadTools = 8
// precomputedToolResult is one parallel read-ahead execution, keyed back to
// its batch index by the caller.
type precomputedToolResult struct {
result ToolResult
abortErr error
}
// parallelSafeToolCall reports whether call may run concurrently with its
// neighbors: the tool must exist, be side-effect-free (SideEffectRead), and be
// auto-allowed for these args, so no interactive prompt or workspace mutation
// is on the hot path. Loop-intercepted tools (ask_user, request_permissions)
// and tool_search (mutates the deferred-tool set) stay sequential.
func parallelSafeToolCall(registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, options Options) bool {
switch call.Name {
case "ask_user", tools.RequestPermissionsToolName, tools.ToolSearchToolName:
return false
}
tool, found := registry.Get(call.Name)
if !found || tool.Safety().SideEffect != tools.SideEffectRead {
return false
}
args := map[string]any{}
if call.Arguments != "" {
if err := decodeToolArguments(call.Arguments, &args); err != nil {
return false
}
}
return effectivePermission(tool, args) == tools.PermissionAllow
}
// executeParallelReadBatch runs calls[start:end] concurrently (bounded by
// maxParallelReadTools) and returns results indexed relative to start. All
// execution-side callbacks that can fire inside executeToolCall are serialized
// behind one mutex: a permission prompt (a sandbox preflight can demand one
// even for an auto-allowed read) must never appear twice at once on an
// interactive front-end, and OnPermission event handlers append to shared
// session-recording state without their own locking — two batched reads under
// a granted extra root would otherwise race (the pre-batch serial loop never
// had two callbacks in flight at once).
func executeParallelReadBatch(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, calls []ToolCall, start, end int, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options) []precomputedToolResult {
batchOptions := options
var callbackMutex sync.Mutex
if options.OnPermissionRequest != nil {
inner := options.OnPermissionRequest
batchOptions.OnPermissionRequest = func(ctx context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
callbackMutex.Lock()
defer callbackMutex.Unlock()
return inner(ctx, request)
}
}
if options.OnPermission != nil {
inner := options.OnPermission
batchOptions.OnPermission = func(event PermissionEvent) {
callbackMutex.Lock()
defer callbackMutex.Unlock()
inner(event)
}
}
results := make([]precomputedToolResult, end-start)
semaphore := make(chan struct{}, maxParallelReadTools)
var waitGroup sync.WaitGroup
for index := start; index < end; index++ {
waitGroup.Add(1)
go func(index int) {
defer waitGroup.Done()
semaphore <- struct{}{}
defer func() { <-semaphore }()
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(ctx, registry, calls[index], permissionMode, batchOptions)
results[index-start] = precomputedToolResult{result: result, abortErr: abortErr}
}(index)
}
waitGroup.Wait()
return results
}
+204
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// probeTool records execution overlap and ordering so tests can assert what
// actually ran concurrently.
type probeTool struct {
name string
sideEffect tools.SideEffect
delay time.Duration
// shared, when set, receives this probe's start/end entries too, so a test
// can observe ordering ACROSS probes (e.g. reads vs a write barrier).
shared *probeLog
mu sync.Mutex
active int
maxActive int
log []string
}
// probeLog is a mutex-guarded event log shared between probes.
type probeLog struct {
mu sync.Mutex
entries []string
}
func (log *probeLog) append(entry string) {
log.mu.Lock()
defer log.mu.Unlock()
log.entries = append(log.entries, entry)
}
func (log *probeLog) snapshot() []string {
log.mu.Lock()
defer log.mu.Unlock()
return append([]string(nil), log.entries...)
}
func (tool *probeTool) Name() string { return tool.name }
func (tool *probeTool) Description() string { return "test probe tool" }
func (tool *probeTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{
Type: "object",
Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"id": {Type: "string"}},
AdditionalProperties: false,
}
}
func (tool *probeTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tool.sideEffect, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "test"}
}
func (tool *probeTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
id, _ := args["id"].(string)
tool.mu.Lock()
tool.active++
if tool.active > tool.maxActive {
tool.maxActive = tool.active
}
tool.log = append(tool.log, "start:"+id)
tool.mu.Unlock()
if tool.shared != nil {
tool.shared.append("start:" + id)
}
time.Sleep(tool.delay)
if tool.shared != nil {
tool.shared.append("end:" + id)
}
tool.mu.Lock()
tool.active--
tool.log = append(tool.log, "end:"+id)
tool.mu.Unlock()
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "probe " + id}
}
func probeCallEvents(callID, toolName, id string) []zeroruntime.StreamEvent {
return []zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: callID, ToolName: toolName},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: callID, ArgumentsFragment: fmt.Sprintf(`{"id":%q}`, id)},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: callID},
}
}
func TestParallelSafeToolCall(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(&probeTool{name: "probe_read", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead})
registry.Register(&probeTool{name: "probe_write", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite})
call := func(name, args string) ToolCall { return ToolCall{ID: "c", Name: name, Arguments: args} }
if !parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("probe_read", `{"id":"a"}`), Options{}) {
t.Fatal("auto-allowed read tool must be parallel-safe")
}
if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("probe_write", `{"id":"a"}`), Options{}) {
t.Fatal("mutating tool must not be parallel-safe")
}
if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("unknown_tool", `{}`), Options{}) {
t.Fatal("unknown tool must not be parallel-safe")
}
if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("probe_read", `{"id":`), Options{}) {
t.Fatal("undecodable arguments must not be parallel-safe")
}
if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("ask_user", `{}`), Options{}) {
t.Fatal("loop-intercepted tools must stay sequential")
}
}
func TestRunExecutesConsecutiveReadsConcurrently(t *testing.T) {
probe := &probeTool{name: "probe_read", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, delay: 60 * time.Millisecond}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(probe)
turnOne := append(probeCallEvents("call-1", "probe_read", "a"), probeCallEvents("call-2", "probe_read", "b")...)
turnOne = append(turnOne, probeCallEvents("call-3", "probe_read", "c")...)
turnOne = append(turnOne, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone})
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
turnOne,
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
},
}
var results []ToolResult
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "probe", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
OnToolResult: func(result ToolResult) { results = append(results, result) },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if probe.maxActive < 2 {
t.Fatalf("consecutive read-only calls must overlap, max concurrency was %d", probe.maxActive)
}
// Results must still be recorded in original call order.
if len(results) != 3 || results[0].ToolCallID != "call-1" || results[1].ToolCallID != "call-2" || results[2].ToolCallID != "call-3" {
t.Fatalf("tool results out of order: %#v", results)
}
messages := provider.requests[1].Messages
var toolOrder []string
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
toolOrder = append(toolOrder, message.ToolCallID)
}
}
if len(toolOrder) != 3 || toolOrder[0] != "call-1" || toolOrder[1] != "call-2" || toolOrder[2] != "call-3" {
t.Fatalf("recorded tool messages out of order: %v", toolOrder)
}
}
func TestRunParallelReadsNeverSpanMutatingCall(t *testing.T) {
shared := &probeLog{}
read := &probeTool{name: "probe_read", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, delay: 30 * time.Millisecond, shared: shared}
write := &probeTool{name: "probe_write", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, shared: shared}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(read)
registry.Register(write)
turnOne := append(probeCallEvents("call-1", "probe_read", "r1"), probeCallEvents("call-2", "probe_read", "r2")...)
turnOne = append(turnOne, probeCallEvents("call-3", "probe_write", "w")...)
turnOne = append(turnOne, probeCallEvents("call-4", "probe_read", "r3")...)
turnOne = append(turnOne, probeCallEvents("call-5", "probe_read", "r4")...)
turnOne = append(turnOne, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone})
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
turnOne,
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
},
}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "probe", provider, Options{Registry: registry})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Cross-probe ordering on the SHARED log: the write must start only after
// both first-batch reads finished, and both second-batch reads must start
// only after the write finished — batches never cross a mutating call.
log := shared.snapshot()
index := func(entry string) int {
for i, e := range log {
if e == entry {
return i
}
}
t.Fatalf("entry %q missing from shared log: %v", entry, log)
return -1
}
writeStart, writeEnd := index("start:w"), index("end:w")
if firstBatchMaxEnd := max(index("end:r1"), index("end:r2")); writeStart < firstBatchMaxEnd {
t.Fatalf("write started before the first read batch finished: %v", log)
}
if secondBatchMinStart := min(index("start:r3"), index("start:r4")); secondBatchMinStart < writeEnd {
t.Fatalf("second read batch started before the write finished: %v", log)
}
if read.maxActive < 2 {
t.Fatalf("reads within a batch must overlap, max concurrency was %d", read.maxActive)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
package agent
import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
func TestPartitionToolsActiveAppendsLoadedToolAfterEagerBlock(t *testing.T) {
// Cache-stability property: loading a deferred tool must APPEND it after the
// always-eager tools, not sort it into the middle of them — otherwise the tool
// definitions (the provider's cacheable prefix) shift on every load. The old
// behaviour alpha-sorted the whole array, so "mcp__srv__alpha" jumped ahead of
// "read_file".
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root)) // non-deferred, "read_file"
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
exposed, _ := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{DeferThreshold: 2}, map[string]bool{"mcp__srv__alpha": true})
pos := func(name string) int {
for i := range exposed {
if exposed[i].Name == name {
return i
}
}
return -1
}
readPos, searchPos, alphaPos := pos("read_file"), pos("tool_search"), pos("mcp__srv__alpha")
if readPos < 0 || searchPos < 0 || alphaPos < 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected read_file, tool_search and loaded alpha all exposed, got %#v", exposed)
}
// The eager tools must precede the loaded deferred tool (appended, not inserted).
if readPos >= alphaPos || searchPos >= alphaPos {
t.Fatalf("loaded deferred tool must be appended after the eager block; got read=%d search=%d alpha=%d", readPos, searchPos, alphaPos)
}
// beta was never loaded — it stays hidden.
if pos("mcp__srv__beta") != -1 {
t.Fatalf("unloaded deferred tool must stay hidden, got %#v", exposed)
}
}
+63
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"reflect"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// countingSchemaTool records how many times its Parameters() schema is read, so a
// test can prove the definition cache avoids re-rendering across turns.
type countingSchemaTool struct {
name string
calls *int
}
func (t countingSchemaTool) Name() string { return t.name }
func (t countingSchemaTool) Description() string { return "counts schema reads" }
func (t countingSchemaTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
*t.calls++
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false, Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{
"x": {Type: "string"},
}}
}
func (t countingSchemaTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (t countingSchemaTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
// The cache renders a tool's schema once and reuses it across calls, and its
// output is identical to the uncached path.
func TestPartitionToolsCacheRendersOnceAndMatchesUncached(t *testing.T) {
calls := 0
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(countingSchemaTool{name: "alpha", calls: &calls})
registry.Register(countingSchemaTool{name: "beta", calls: &calls})
uncached, _ := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{}, map[string]bool{})
base := calls
cache := map[string]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{}
first, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{}, map[string]bool{}, cache)
rendersAfterFirst := calls - base
second, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{}, map[string]bool{}, cache)
rendersAfterSecond := calls - base
if rendersAfterFirst != 2 {
t.Fatalf("first cached call should render 2 tools once each, rendered %d times", rendersAfterFirst)
}
if rendersAfterSecond != 2 {
t.Fatalf("second cached call must reuse the cache (no new schema reads), total renders = %d", rendersAfterSecond)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(first, second) {
t.Fatal("cached calls must return identical definitions")
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(first, uncached) {
t.Fatal("cached output must match the uncached partitionTools output")
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// promptShellTool is a minimal shell-style tool whose Safety requires a prompt,
// standing in for bash so buildPermissionEvent can be exercised directly.
type promptShellTool struct{}
func (promptShellTool) Name() string { return "bash" }
func (promptShellTool) Description() string { return "run a shell command" }
func (promptShellTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
}
func (promptShellTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "runs a shell command"}
}
func (promptShellTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
// A command whose sandbox decision is Allow but that explicitly requests
// additional sandbox permissions is an ELEVATION: it must be surfaced as a
// prompt, never Action=allow. Previously it carried allow while the loop still
// blocked on OnPermissionRequest, and the TUI (which renders only prompts)
// dropped it → the run deadlocked forever. This is the exact gpt-5.5
// folder-creation shape captured in the reported hang.
func TestBuildPermissionEventPromptsForAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
call := ToolCall{ID: "call_1", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
args := map[string]any{
"command": "mkdir foo && cd foo && go mod init foo",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
}
// Base command allowed by the sandbox…
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow}
event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("buildPermissionEvent returned ok=false; the elevation request must produce an event")
}
if event.Action != PermissionActionPrompt {
t.Fatalf("Action = %q, want prompt — an additional-permissions elevation must ask the user, not auto-allow", event.Action)
}
// Sanity: shouldRequestPermission agrees the loop blocks on this.
if !shouldRequestPermission(promptShellTool{}, args, false, decision) {
t.Fatal("shouldRequestPermission must be true for an additional-permissions request")
}
}
// Without the additional-permissions flag, a sandbox-allowed command is NOT a
// prompt (shouldRequestPermission is false; it just runs) — the override must
// not over-reach and prompt for ordinary allowed commands.
func TestBuildPermissionEventKeepsAllowForOrdinaryAllowedCommand(t *testing.T) {
call := ToolCall{ID: "call_2", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
args := map[string]any{"command": "ls"}
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow}
event, _ := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
if event.Action == PermissionActionPrompt {
t.Fatalf("Action = prompt for an ordinary allowed command; want allow (no spurious prompt)")
}
if shouldRequestPermission(promptShellTool{}, args, false, decision) {
t.Fatal("shouldRequestPermission must be false for an ordinary sandbox-allowed command")
}
}
+64
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func planUpdateTurn(status string) zeroruntime.CollectedStream {
return zeroruntime.CollectedStream{ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{Name: "update_plan", Arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"step one","status":"` + status + `"}]}`},
}}
}
// Turn-based staleness: a plan that goes many turns without an update — while
// items are still pending — draws the stale reminder even though few tool calls
// have run (the tool-call streak alone would not have tripped).
func TestPlanReminderFiresOnTurnStaleness(t *testing.T) {
state := newGuardState()
state.observeTurn(planUpdateTurn("in_progress"))
// Text-only turns advance the turn counter without adding tool calls.
for range stalePlanTurnThreshold {
state.observeTurn(zeroruntime.CollectedStream{Text: "still working…"})
}
if state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate >= staleToolCallThreshold {
t.Fatalf("precondition: the tool-call trigger must not fire (%d calls)", state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate)
}
if got := state.planReminder(stalePlanTurnThreshold + 2); !strings.Contains(got, planStaleReminderMarker) {
t.Fatalf("expected a turn-based stale reminder, got %q", got)
}
}
// A fully-completed plan is NOT stale: no pending items means the turn-based
// trigger stays quiet even after many turns, so a finished plan isn't nagged.
func TestPlanReminderSkipsTurnStalenessWhenComplete(t *testing.T) {
state := newGuardState()
state.observeTurn(planUpdateTurn("completed"))
for range stalePlanTurnThreshold + 3 {
state.observeTurn(zeroruntime.CollectedStream{Text: "wrapping up…"})
}
if got := state.planReminder(stalePlanTurnThreshold + 5); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("a completed plan must not draw a stale reminder, got %q", got)
}
}
// A plan update resets the turn counter, so the stale reminder does not fire
// right after a fresh update.
func TestPlanUpdateResetsTurnStaleness(t *testing.T) {
state := newGuardState()
state.observeTurn(planUpdateTurn("in_progress"))
for range stalePlanTurnThreshold - 1 {
state.observeTurn(zeroruntime.CollectedStream{Text: "working…"})
}
// Refresh the plan — resets the turn streak.
state.observeTurn(planUpdateTurn("in_progress"))
if got := state.planReminder(stalePlanTurnThreshold + 1); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("a just-refreshed plan must not be stale, got %q", got)
}
}
+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
package agent
import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// These ceilings are a deliberate ratchet on Zero's fixed per-turn overhead — the
// system prompt and the eager tool schemas that ride on EVERY request. They are
// set ~10% above the current measured cost, using ApproxTextTokens (the same
// estimate the compaction loop and /context use, ~non-whitespace-bytes/4). A change
// that pushes either past its ceiling must be justified (and the ceiling raised
// deliberately) or trimmed — the per-turn floor should not creep up silently.
//
// Measured baselines (2026-07): base system prompt ~3160 tokens; the tools a normal
// (auto permission-mode) interactive turn sends ~2430 tokens. The tool figure is
// the auto-mode advertised set, not the full core registry — higher-risk tools that
// only advertise in other modes are excluded, matching what a real turn actually
// pays.
const (
maxBaseSystemPromptTokens = 3500
maxEagerToolSchemaTokens = 2700
)
func TestSystemPromptTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
// Minimal render: a model is set (so the session block renders) but no Cwd, so
// the workspace map, project guidelines, and repo map are excluded — this is the
// fixed base every session pays regardless of the workspace it runs in.
prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Model: "claude-opus-4-8"})
got := ApproxTextTokens(prompt)
t.Logf("base system prompt: %d tokens (%d bytes)", got, len(prompt))
if got > maxBaseSystemPromptTokens {
t.Fatalf("base system prompt is %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — trim it or raise the ceiling deliberately", got, maxBaseSystemPromptTokens)
}
}
func TestEagerToolSchemaTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(t.TempDir(), nil) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
// Options{} keeps DeferThreshold at 0, so deferral is inactive and every core
// tool is exposed eagerly — exactly what a plugin-free session sends each turn.
exposed, _ := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{}, map[string]bool{})
got := estimateToolDefTokens(exposed)
t.Logf("eager core tool schemas: %d tokens across %d tools", got, len(exposed))
if got > maxEagerToolSchemaTokens {
t.Fatalf("eager tool schemas are %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — defer a tool or raise the ceiling deliberately", got, maxEagerToolSchemaTokens)
}
}
+45 -5
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,11 @@ package agent
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"math/rand"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/errhint"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
@@ -17,10 +19,20 @@ import (
// times. We retry ONLY the connect (not a partially-consumed stream), so no
// already-forwarded OnText is ever duplicated.
const (
maxStreamReconnects = 2
streamReconnectBase = 500 * time.Millisecond
// maxStreamReconnects is how many times the connect is re-issued after a
// transient disconnect. 4 (not 2): with jittered exponential backoff this rides
// out a multi-second network blip (~0.5s + 1s + 2s + 4s worst case) instead of
// dying on a 2s hiccup and re-burning every token on a restart.
maxStreamReconnects = 4
// streamReconnectMax caps a single backoff so the tail attempts don't wait
// minutes on a long outage.
streamReconnectMax = 8 * time.Second
)
// streamReconnectBase is the first-retry delay (doubled each subsequent attempt).
// A var, not a const, so tests can shrink it to keep the exhaustion path fast.
var streamReconnectBase = 500 * time.Millisecond
// reconnectNotifier is called before each retry with the 1-based attempt number
// and the max, so the caller can surface a "Reconnecting N/max" notice. Nil is
// fine.
@@ -73,7 +85,7 @@ func streamWithReconnect(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, request zerorun
if notify != nil {
notify(attempt, maxStreamReconnects)
}
if waitErr := sleepWithContext(ctx, backoffFor(attempt)); waitErr != nil {
if waitErr := sleepWithContext(ctx, jitteredBackoff(attempt)); waitErr != nil {
return nil, err // ctx cancelled while waiting; surface the original error
}
stream, err = provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
@@ -96,6 +108,19 @@ func shouldReconnect(ctx context.Context, err error) bool {
if isContextLimitError(msg) || isImageRejectionError(err) {
return false
}
// HTTP 5xx statuses are non-reconnectable and must be excluded BEFORE the
// transport substring match below — otherwise "504 Gateway Timeout" would slip
// through on the generic "timeout" needle. 503 already exhausted
// providerio.SendWithRetry (retrying is a redundant double-retry); 500/502/504
// are non-idempotent by providerio's rule — the completion POST may already
// have reached the model before the upstream/gateway gave up, so replaying the
// connect risks duplicate billable work. Digit-boundary matched so an
// incidental "504" inside a latency/id number is not mistaken for a status.
if errhint.HasStatusCode(msg, "500", "502", "503", "504") {
return false
}
// Transport-level disconnects only. A genuine transport failure (EOF, reset,
// refused, timeout) means no response was received, which is safe to reconnect.
for _, needle := range []string{
"eof",
"connection reset",
@@ -106,8 +131,6 @@ func shouldReconnect(ctx context.Context, err error) bool {
"timed out",
"temporarily unavailable",
"i/o timeout",
"503",
"502",
"server closed",
"unexpected end",
} {
@@ -118,14 +141,31 @@ func shouldReconnect(ctx context.Context, err error) bool {
return false
}
// backoffFor is the deterministic exponential base delay for a 1-based attempt,
// capped at streamReconnectMax. Jitter is layered on separately (jitteredBackoff).
func backoffFor(attempt int) time.Duration {
d := streamReconnectBase
for i := 1; i < attempt; i++ {
if d >= streamReconnectMax {
return streamReconnectMax
}
d *= 2
}
if d > streamReconnectMax {
d = streamReconnectMax
}
return d
}
// jitteredBackoff adds up to 50% random jitter on top of backoffFor so concurrent
// runs (swarm members, a cron fleet) that all trip on the same outage don't
// reconnect in lockstep and hammer a recovering endpoint. Never shorter than the
// deterministic base, so backoff still grows attempt over attempt.
func jitteredBackoff(attempt int) time.Duration {
base := backoffFor(attempt)
return base + time.Duration(rand.Int63n(int64(base/2)+1))
}
func sleepWithContext(ctx context.Context, d time.Duration) error {
timer := time.NewTimer(d)
defer timer.Stop()
+30 -1
View File
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ func TestStreamWithReconnectRecoversFromTransientDisconnect(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestStreamWithReconnectGivesUpAfterMax(t *testing.T) {
// Shrink the backoff so exhausting all retries stays fast (real base would
// sleep ~7.5s across 4 attempts).
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = time.Millisecond
// Always fails with a disconnect error → exhausts retries and returns it.
p := &flakyProvider{failBefore: 99, failErr: errors.New("connection reset by peer")}
_, err := streamWithReconnect(context.Background(), p, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{}, nil)
@@ -87,7 +91,7 @@ func TestShouldReconnectClassification(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
disconnects := []string{
"unexpected EOF", "connection reset by peer", "broken pipe",
"i/o timeout", "503 Service Unavailable", "server closed the connection",
"i/o timeout", "server closed the connection", "connection refused",
}
for _, m := range disconnects {
if !shouldReconnect(ctx, errors.New(m)) {
@@ -97,6 +101,13 @@ func TestShouldReconnectClassification(t *testing.T) {
notDisconnects := []string{
"context length exceeded", "invalid api key", "model not found",
"400 bad request: unsupported parameter",
// HTTP 5xx statuses are handled by providerio.SendWithRetry (503) or are
// non-idempotent (500/502/504); the reconnect path must not double-retry
// them. "504 Gateway Timeout" must NOT slip through on the generic "timeout"
// transport signal — a gateway timeout is non-idempotent, since the upstream
// may have already processed the completion POST before giving up.
"503 Service Unavailable", "502 Bad Gateway",
"504 Gateway Timeout", "500 Internal Server Error",
}
for _, m := range notDisconnects {
if shouldReconnect(ctx, errors.New(m)) {
@@ -112,6 +123,24 @@ func TestBackoffGrows(t *testing.T) {
if backoffFor(2) != 2*streamReconnectBase {
t.Fatalf("attempt 2 backoff = %v, want %v", backoffFor(2), 2*streamReconnectBase)
}
// The exponential base is capped so late attempts don't wait minutes.
if got := backoffFor(20); got != streamReconnectMax {
t.Fatalf("attempt 20 backoff = %v, want cap %v", got, streamReconnectMax)
}
}
func TestJitteredBackoffStaysInBounds(t *testing.T) {
// Jitter never drops below the deterministic base and never exceeds base*1.5,
// so backoff still grows attempt over attempt while decorrelating retries.
for attempt := 1; attempt <= 5; attempt++ {
base := backoffFor(attempt)
for i := 0; i < 200; i++ {
got := jitteredBackoff(attempt)
if got < base || got > base+base/2 {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d jittered backoff %v out of [%v, %v]", attempt, got, base, base+base/2)
}
}
}
}
func TestReconnectNoticeRoutesThroughReasoning(t *testing.T) {
+88
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
package agent
import (
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestSkillsContextCapsLongList(t *testing.T) {
// 60 skills with realistic trigger-rich descriptions (~180 chars each, under
// the 200-rune truncation) total well past the 4096-byte list budget, so the
// overflow summary must kick in while the block stays bounded.
longDesc := strings.Repeat("use when the request touches deployments, release notes, or verification; ", 2) + "number "
skills := make([]SkillInfo, 0, 60)
for i := 0; i < 60; i++ {
n := strconv.Itoa(i)
skills = append(skills, SkillInfo{Name: "skill-" + n, Description: longDesc + n})
}
got := skillsContext(Options{Skills: skills})
if len(got) > skillsContextListBudget+1000 {
t.Fatalf("skills block should stay bounded near the %d-byte budget, got %d bytes:\n%s", skillsContextListBudget, len(got), got)
}
if !strings.Contains(got, "more (call skill") {
t.Fatalf("expected an overflow summary line, got:\n%s", got)
}
// The first skill is always listed regardless of budget.
if !strings.Contains(got, "- skill-0:") {
t.Fatalf("expected the first skill to always be listed, got:\n%s", got)
}
}
// A realistic mid-size skill set (20 skills, trigger-rich descriptions) must be
// listed in FULL — no overflow summary. This pins the fix for the old 640-byte
// budget, under which skills past ~#6 were invisible to the model and therefore
// never triggered.
func TestSkillsContextListsRealisticSetInFull(t *testing.T) {
desc := "Use when the user asks about deployments, release notes, or pre-merge verification runs."
skills := make([]SkillInfo, 0, 20)
for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
skills = append(skills, SkillInfo{Name: "skill-" + strconv.Itoa(i), Description: desc})
}
got := skillsContext(Options{Skills: skills})
if strings.Contains(got, "more (call skill") {
t.Fatalf("20 described skills must all be listed without overflow, got:\n%s", got)
}
for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
if !strings.Contains(got, "- skill-"+strconv.Itoa(i)+":") {
t.Fatalf("skill-%d missing from the list:\n%s", i, got)
}
}
}
func TestSkillsContext(t *testing.T) {
if got := skillsContext(Options{}); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("no skills should yield an empty section, got %q", got)
}
got := skillsContext(Options{Skills: []SkillInfo{
{Name: "commit-writer", Description: "Write a conventional-commit message."},
{Name: " ", Description: "nameless, should be skipped"},
{Name: "reviewer"},
}})
if !strings.Contains(got, "<available_skills>") || !strings.Contains(got, "</available_skills>") {
t.Fatalf("missing available_skills block: %q", got)
}
if !strings.Contains(got, "- commit-writer: Write a conventional-commit message.") {
t.Fatalf("missing commit-writer line: %q", got)
}
if !strings.Contains(got, "- reviewer\n") {
t.Fatalf("reviewer (no description) line missing: %q", got)
}
if strings.Contains(got, "nameless") {
t.Fatalf("nameless entry should be skipped: %q", got)
}
}
func TestSystemPromptIncludesSkillsOnlyWhenInstalled(t *testing.T) {
with := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Skills: []SkillInfo{
{Name: "commit-writer", Description: "Write a commit message."},
}})
if !strings.Contains(with, "<available_skills>") || !strings.Contains(with, "skill tool") {
t.Fatalf("expected available_skills guidance in system prompt: %q", with)
}
// Default (no skills) must reproduce the prior prompt: no skills block.
without := buildSystemPrompt(Options{})
if strings.Contains(without, "<available_skills>") {
t.Fatalf("available_skills block must not appear without skills")
}
}
+185 -23
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,11 @@ import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/repomap"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/workspaceseed"
)
@@ -37,6 +39,14 @@ const fallbackSystemPrompt = "You are Zero, a terminal coding agent. Help with t
// general-to-specific order.
var projectContextFiles = []string{"AGENTS.md", "ZERO.md", ".zero/AGENTS.md"}
// userContextFile is the per-user instruction file, resolved under
// config.UserConfigDir()/zero/ alongside the rest of Zero's per-user config
// (config.json, commands, specialists) so users can keep personal guidance out
// of individual repositories.
const userContextFile = "ZERO.md"
var userConfigDirForPrompt = config.UserConfigDir
// maxProjectContextBytes caps how much of a single project doc is injected so
// a large guidelines file can't blow the context budget.
const maxProjectContextBytes = 8 << 10 // 8 KiB per file
@@ -80,12 +90,22 @@ func buildSystemPrompt(options Options) string {
if seed := workspaceSeedContext(options.Cwd); seed != "" {
sections = append(sections, seed)
}
// User guidelines are injected before workspace/project guidelines so the
// project's AGENTS.md/ZERO.md is the later, more specific instruction
// block. See userGuidelines for the explicit precedence note carried in
// the section text itself.
if user := userGuidelines(); user != "" {
sections = append(sections, user)
}
if ws := workspaceContext(options.Cwd); ws != "" {
sections = append(sections, ws)
}
if delegation := specialistDelegationContext(options); delegation != "" {
sections = append(sections, delegation)
}
if skillsBlock := skillsContext(options); skillsBlock != "" {
sections = append(sections, skillsBlock)
}
if style := responseStyleContext(options); style != "" {
sections = append(sections, style)
}
@@ -164,6 +184,75 @@ func specialistDelegationContext(options Options) string {
return b.String()
}
// skillsContext lists the reusable skills the model can pull in on demand via the
// skill tool, so it invokes the right one on the first try instead of guessing a
// name, failing, and reading the error. It mirrors specialistDelegationContext:
// names + one-line descriptions only (never skill bodies), and it renders nothing
// when no skills are installed, so a skill-less run reproduces the previous prompt
// byte-for-byte.
// skillsContextListBudget bounds the bytes spent listing individual skills so a
// workspace with an extreme number of them can't bloat every turn's prompt.
// Skills past the budget are summarized as a count rather than dropped — the
// model can still load any of them by name (an unknown name returns the full
// list from the skill tool).
//
// The budget is deliberately generous — roughly 18 skills with maximally long
// (200-rune, ASCII) descriptions, or 40+ with typical terser ones; non-ASCII
// descriptions consume it faster since the budget counts bytes. This list is
// the model's ONLY discovery surface, so a skill squeezed out of it effectively
// never triggers. The previous 640-byte cap silently broke invocation for
// anyone with more than ~6 skills — the model cannot match a request against a
// skill it cannot see.
const skillsContextListBudget = 4096
func skillsContext(options Options) string {
if len(options.Skills) == 0 {
return ""
}
var b strings.Builder
b.WriteString("<available_skills>\n")
b.WriteString("Reusable, on-demand instruction sets you can load with the skill tool. Before acting on a request, scan this list; when the request matches a skill's name or description, call skill with its exact name FIRST and follow the loaded guidance — do not guess names, do not skip a matching skill, and do not substitute your own approach for its instructions.\n")
listed, spent, omitted := 0, 0, 0
for _, info := range options.Skills {
name := strings.TrimSpace(info.Name)
if name == "" {
continue
}
line := "- " + name
if desc := strings.TrimSpace(info.Description); desc != "" {
line += ": " + truncateForSkillLine(desc)
}
line += "\n"
// Always list at least one skill; past the budget, summarize the remainder
// as a count instead of silently dropping it.
if listed > 0 && spent+len(line) > skillsContextListBudget {
omitted++
continue
}
b.WriteString(line)
spent += len(line)
listed++
}
if omitted > 0 {
b.WriteString("- …and " + strconv.Itoa(omitted) + " more (call skill with a name; an unknown name lists them all)\n")
}
b.WriteString("</available_skills>")
return b.String()
}
// truncateForSkillLine keeps a skill's one-line description short so a single
// verbose description can't dominate the skills-list budget. The cap is roomy on
// purpose: the description carries the skill's trigger conditions ("use when…"),
// and truncating those is what stops the model from ever invoking the skill.
func truncateForSkillLine(desc string) string {
const maxDescRunes = 200
runes := []rune(desc)
if len(runes) <= maxDescRunes {
return desc
}
return strings.TrimSpace(string(runes[:maxDescRunes])) + "…"
}
func sessionRuntimeContext(options Options) string {
provider := strings.TrimSpace(options.ProviderName)
model := strings.TrimSpace(options.Model)
@@ -197,7 +286,7 @@ func workspaceContext(cwd string) string {
b.WriteString("Working directory: " + cwd + "\n")
b.WriteString("Operating system: " + runtime.GOOS + "\n")
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
b.WriteString("Shell syntax: Windows cmd.exe syntax for exec_command/bash tools; prefer the workdir/cwd argument instead of cd when changing directories.\n")
b.WriteString("Shell syntax: Windows cmd.exe syntax for exec_command/bash tools; prefer the workdir/cwd argument instead of cd when changing directories. Do not pipe to or invoke POSIX coreutils from Git for Windows (usr\\bin head/grep/tail/cat/...): they are MSYS binaries and fail under the write-restricted sandbox; use native Zero tools (grep, read_file, list_directory, glob) or cmd.exe findstr/more instead, or sandbox_permissions require_escalated only when host-level execution is truly required.\n")
} else {
b.WriteString("Shell syntax: /bin/sh syntax for exec_command/bash tools; prefer the workdir/cwd argument instead of cd when changing directories.\n")
}
@@ -250,13 +339,7 @@ func projectGuidelines(cwd, gitRoot string) string {
if remaining := maxProjectContextTotalBytes - totalUsed; remaining < limit {
limit = remaining
}
if len(content) > limit {
cut := limit
for cut > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(content[cut]) {
cut--
}
content = content[:cut] + "\n… (truncated)"
}
content = truncateGuidelineContent(content, limit)
label := projectGuidelineLabel(match, gitRoot)
b.WriteString("\n\n## Project guidelines (" + label + ")\n\n" + content)
totalUsed += len(content)
@@ -264,6 +347,92 @@ func projectGuidelines(cwd, gitRoot string) string {
return b.String()
}
// userGuidelines returns the per-user ZERO.md instructions block, if present.
// The file lives in config.UserConfigDir()/zero/ next to Zero's other
// per-user config; the basename match is case-insensitive so a file saved as
// zero.md still resolves on case-sensitive filesystems, mirroring the project
// guideline loader. The section carries an explicit precedence note because
// this is a global, personal preferences file: it is injected earlier in the
// prompt than the project's AGENTS.md/ZERO.md (see buildSystemPrompt), and
// the note keeps that precedence unambiguous even if a model weighs later
// context more heavily than section order alone implies.
func userGuidelines() string {
configDir, err := userConfigDirForPrompt()
if err != nil {
return ""
}
configDir = strings.TrimSpace(configDir)
if configDir == "" {
return ""
}
match := findCaseInsensitiveFile(filepath.Join(configDir, "zero"), userContextFile)
if match == "" {
return ""
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(match)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
content := strings.TrimSpace(string(data))
if content == "" {
return ""
}
content = truncateGuidelineContent(content, maxProjectContextBytes)
return "## User guidelines (" + filepath.Base(match) + ")\n\n" +
"These are the operator's personal preferences, not project policy. " +
"Where they conflict with a repository's project guidelines below (AGENTS.md/ZERO.md), the project guidelines take precedence.\n\n" +
content
}
// truncationMarker is appended to guideline content that was cut short.
const truncationMarker = "\n… (truncated)"
// truncateGuidelineContent caps content at limit bytes without splitting a
// UTF-8 rune, appending a truncation marker when anything was cut. Space for
// the marker is reserved before choosing the cut point. When limit is too
// small to fit the marker itself, the marker is dropped instead, so the
// returned string never exceeds limit for any non-negative limit.
func truncateGuidelineContent(content string, limit int) string {
if len(content) <= limit {
return content
}
if limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
cut := limit - len(truncationMarker)
if cut < 0 {
cut = 0
}
for cut > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(content[cut]) {
cut--
}
if truncated := content[:cut] + truncationMarker; len(truncated) <= limit {
return truncated
}
// limit is smaller than the marker itself: fall back to a hard,
// rune-safe cut at limit bytes with no marker rather than exceeding it.
end := limit
for end > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(content[end]) {
end--
}
return content[:end]
}
// findCaseInsensitiveFile returns the on-disk path of the regular file in dir
// whose name matches basename case-insensitively, or "" when absent.
func findCaseInsensitiveFile(dir, basename string) string {
entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
for _, e := range entries {
if !e.IsDir() && strings.EqualFold(e.Name(), basename) {
return filepath.Join(dir, e.Name())
}
}
return ""
}
// projectGuidelineDirs returns the directory chain from gitRoot to cwd
// (inclusive), in root-to-leaf order. If gitRoot is empty or unreachable
// from cwd, the chain collapses to [cwd].
@@ -310,29 +479,22 @@ func projectGuidelineLabel(match, gitRoot string) string {
// findProjectContextFile returns the first matching project guideline file
// in dir. Lookup is case-insensitive on the basename and on the actual
// filename returned, so a git-tracked file like AGENTS.MD (uppercase MD)
// still resolves to its true filename on case-sensitive filesystems — the
// returned path is what should appear in the project guidelines label.
// filename returned, so a git-tracked file like AGENTS.md still resolves to
// its true filename on case-sensitive filesystems — the returned path is what
// should appear in the project guidelines label.
// Returns "" when nothing matches.
func findProjectContextFile(dir string) string {
for _, name := range projectContextFiles {
baseLower := strings.ToLower(filepath.Base(name))
// Walk to the file's parent through dir with case-insensitive segment
// matching, then find a regular file with the same lowercased
// basename. This works on both case-sensitive and case-insensitive
// filesystems and always returns the on-disk filename.
// matching, then find a regular file with the same basename. This works
// on both case-sensitive and case-insensitive filesystems and always
// returns the on-disk filename.
parent, ok := resolveDirCaseInsensitive(filepath.Dir(filepath.Join(dir, name)), dir)
if !ok {
continue
}
entries, err := os.ReadDir(parent)
if err != nil {
continue
}
for _, e := range entries {
if !e.IsDir() && strings.ToLower(e.Name()) == baseLower {
return filepath.Join(parent, e.Name())
}
if match := findCaseInsensitiveFile(parent, filepath.Base(name)); match != "" {
return match
}
}
return ""
+11 -9
View File
@@ -46,14 +46,10 @@ work.
formatting-only edits unless the user asked for them.
4. **Verify.** Verify after edits; see the testing gate below. This is
mandatory.
5. **Summarize.** For a substantial task, close with an ELABORATE, well-structured
summary — never a single throwaway line. Use short headings and bullets: a
one-line "what I built/changed"; **Where it lives** — the key files and how they
fit together; **How each requirement is met** — walk through each requirement
from the request and name the specifics that satisfy it; what validation ran and
what was NOT verified; and a brief "Next steps" or "Want me to…?" offer. Scale
the depth to the work — a big build earns several sections, a trivial fix earns
a line or two.
5. **Summarize.** Close with a summary scaled to the work: a trivial fix earns one
line; a substantial change earns a few short bullets covering what changed, where
it lives, and what you did and did not verify. Lead with the outcome, and never
pad — do not restate the task or narrate steps the user already watched you take.
## Editing discipline
@@ -64,7 +60,13 @@ work.
- Make one tool call per file. Do not batch multi-file writes into a single
shell or script invocation.
- For edits to existing files, prefer edit_file or apply_patch with minimal,
targeted diffs. Match the existing indentation, imports, and idioms.
targeted diffs. Match the existing indentation, imports, and idioms. Match the
file's comment density: do not add explanatory comments unless the user asks or
the code is already comment-dense.
- Solve the problem as posed, not a more general version of it. Add no
speculative abstraction, configurability, or handling for cases that cannot
occur, and nothing the user did not ask for. A small diff can still be
over-built; if a 200-line solution could be 50, rewrite it.
- Preserve behavior you were not asked to change. Do not delete or rewrite code
you did not author unless the task requires it; if you must, say so.
+10 -12
View File
@@ -6,11 +6,13 @@ import "strings"
//
// Different model families respond to different framing: the GPT family benefits
// from an explicit markdown/output spec and a strong "prefer native tools" nudge;
// Gemini benefits from explicit tool-preference and conciseness guidance; the
// Claude family is already well-aligned with the core prompt and only needs a
// light comment-discipline nudge. modelPromptAddendum returns the family-specific
// block appended after the core prompt. Classification is by model id (the agent
// only has the model string — no registry dependency).
// Gemini benefits from explicit tool-preference and conciseness guidance. The
// Claude family is already aligned with the core prompt and needs no addendum —
// comment discipline is universal in the core prompt now, so every family gets it.
// modelPromptAddendum returns the family-specific block appended after the core
// prompt, or "" when the family is unknown or needs no specialization.
// Classification is by model id (the agent only has the model string — no registry
// dependency).
const (
familyOpenAI = "openai"
@@ -45,9 +47,10 @@ func modelPromptAddendum(model string) string {
return openAIPromptAddendum
case familyGemini:
return geminiPromptAddendum
case familyAnthropic:
return anthropicPromptAddendum
default:
// Anthropic (aligned with the core prompt) and unknown families get no
// family-specific block; comment discipline now lives in the core prompt
// for every model.
return ""
}
}
@@ -70,8 +73,3 @@ const geminiPromptAddendum = `<model_guidance>
in one short clause why it is needed.
- Use update_plan for any multi-step task and keep it current.
</model_guidance>`
const anthropicPromptAddendum = `<model_guidance>
- Do not add code comments unless the user asks or the surrounding code is
comment-dense; match the file's existing comment density.
</model_guidance>`
+4 -2
View File
@@ -29,9 +29,11 @@ func TestBuildSystemPromptAppendsModelAddendum(t *testing.T) {
if got := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Model: "gpt-5"}); !strings.Contains(got, openAIPromptAddendum) {
t.Fatalf("expected the OpenAI addendum in the gpt-5 prompt")
}
// Claude is aligned with the core prompt and gets no family addendum now that
// comment discipline is universal; it must not pick up another family's block.
claude := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Model: "claude-opus-4-6"})
if !strings.Contains(claude, anthropicPromptAddendum) {
t.Fatalf("expected the Anthropic addendum in the claude prompt")
if strings.Contains(claude, "<model_guidance>") {
t.Fatalf("expected no model_guidance block for Claude (aligned with core prompt)")
}
if strings.Contains(claude, openAIPromptAddendum) {
t.Fatalf("the claude prompt must not contain the OpenAI addendum")
+128 -2
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,25 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
// TestMain points userConfigDirForPrompt at an empty, package-wide temp
// directory for every test in this package. Without this, buildSystemPrompt
// falls back to the real config.UserConfigDir, so any developer with a
// personal ~/.config/zero/ZERO.md would get its content folded into
// otherwise-unrelated prompt assertions, making test runs non-deterministic
// across contributor machines. Tests that specifically exercise user
// guidelines stub userConfigDirForPrompt themselves via
// withSystemPromptTestUserConfigDir(Func) and restore this default on cleanup.
func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "zero-agent-tests-*")
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
userConfigDirForPrompt = func() (string, error) { return dir, nil }
code := m.Run()
os.RemoveAll(dir)
os.Exit(code)
}
func TestCoreSystemPromptIncludesCodingQualityRules(t *testing.T) {
prompt := strings.ToLower(buildSystemPrompt(Options{}))
@@ -23,7 +42,8 @@ func TestCoreSystemPromptIncludesCodingQualityRules(t *testing.T) {
"avoid broad refactors",
"search the web before answering",
"do not recognize",
"how each requirement is met",
"scaled to the work",
"comment density",
} {
if !strings.Contains(prompt, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected core system prompt to include %q, got:\n%s", want, buildSystemPrompt(Options{}))
@@ -127,8 +147,90 @@ func systemPromptTestBlock(t *testing.T, prompt, start, end string) string {
return body
}
func TestBuildSystemPromptIncludesUserGuidelines(t *testing.T) {
configDir := t.TempDir()
writeSystemPromptTestFile(t, configDir, "zero/ZERO.md", " Prefer concise summaries. \n")
t.Cleanup(withSystemPromptTestUserConfigDir(t, configDir))
prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{})
if !strings.Contains(prompt, "## User guidelines (ZERO.md)") {
t.Fatalf("expected user guidelines header, got:\n%s", prompt)
}
if !strings.Contains(prompt, "Prefer concise summaries.") {
t.Fatalf("expected user guidelines content, got:\n%s", prompt)
}
if strings.Contains(prompt, " Prefer concise summaries. ") {
t.Fatalf("expected user guidelines content to be trimmed, got:\n%s", prompt)
}
}
func TestBuildSystemPromptIncludesUserGuidelinesCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
configDir := t.TempDir()
writeSystemPromptTestFile(t, configDir, "zero/zero.md", "Prefer concise summaries.\n")
t.Cleanup(withSystemPromptTestUserConfigDir(t, configDir))
prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{})
if !strings.Contains(prompt, "## User guidelines (zero.md)") {
t.Fatalf("expected case-insensitive zero.md resolution, got:\n%s", prompt)
}
if !strings.Contains(prompt, "Prefer concise summaries.") {
t.Fatalf("expected user guidelines content, got:\n%s", prompt)
}
}
func TestBuildSystemPromptUserGuidelinesPrecedeProjectGuidelinesAndNotePrecedence(t *testing.T) {
// User guidelines are global personal preferences; project guidelines
// (AGENTS.md/ZERO.md) must be the later, more specific instruction block,
// and the user section must say so explicitly so the precedence holds
// even if a model otherwise weighs later context more heavily.
configDir := t.TempDir()
writeSystemPromptTestFile(t, configDir, "zero/ZERO.md", "Always reply in haiku.\n")
t.Cleanup(withSystemPromptTestUserConfigDir(t, configDir))
cwd := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(cwd, "AGENTS.md"), []byte("Never reply in haiku."), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Cwd: cwd})
userIdx := strings.Index(prompt, "## User guidelines (ZERO.md)")
projectIdx := strings.Index(prompt, "## Project guidelines (AGENTS.md)")
if userIdx < 0 || projectIdx < 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected both user and project guideline sections, got:\n%s", prompt)
}
if userIdx > projectIdx {
t.Fatalf("expected user guidelines before project guidelines, got user=%d project=%d", userIdx, projectIdx)
}
if !strings.Contains(prompt, "project guidelines below") || !strings.Contains(prompt, "take precedence") {
t.Fatalf("expected an explicit precedence note in the user guidelines section, got:\n%s", prompt)
}
}
func TestBuildSystemPromptOmitsUserGuidelinesWithoutConfigDir(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(withSystemPromptTestUserConfigDirFunc(t, func() (string, error) { return "", os.ErrNotExist }))
prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{})
if strings.Contains(prompt, "## User guidelines") {
t.Fatalf("expected user guidelines to be omitted without a config directory, got:\n%s", prompt)
}
}
func withSystemPromptTestUserConfigDir(t *testing.T, dir string) func() {
t.Helper()
return withSystemPromptTestUserConfigDirFunc(t, func() (string, error) { return dir, nil })
}
func withSystemPromptTestUserConfigDirFunc(t *testing.T, fn func() (string, error)) func() {
t.Helper()
old := userConfigDirForPrompt
userConfigDirForPrompt = fn
return func() {
userConfigDirForPrompt = old
}
}
func TestBuildSystemPromptInjectsProjectGuidelinesCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
// Git tracks AGENTS.MD (uppercase MD) on a case-sensitive filesystem; the
// Git tracks AGENTS.md on a case-sensitive filesystem; the
// loader must still resolve it when the cwd lookup uses lowercase.
cwd := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(cwd, "AGENTS.MD"), []byte("Always run `make lint`."), 0o644); err != nil {
@@ -256,6 +358,30 @@ func TestBuildSystemPromptProjectGuidelinesTruncatesAtTotalCap(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestTruncateGuidelineContentStaysWithinLimit(t *testing.T) {
limit := 64
content := strings.Repeat("x", limit+1)
got := truncateGuidelineContent(content, limit)
if len(got) > limit {
t.Fatalf("truncated result is %d bytes, want at most %d", len(got), limit)
}
if !strings.Contains(got, "truncated") {
t.Fatalf("expected truncation marker, got %q", got)
}
}
func TestTruncateGuidelineContentStaysWithinLimitForSmallBudgets(t *testing.T) {
// Limits at or below the truncation marker's own length can't fit the
// marker at all; the helper must still never exceed the requested limit.
content := strings.Repeat("x", 100)
for _, limit := range []int{0, 1, len(truncationMarker) - 1, len(truncationMarker), len(truncationMarker) + 1} {
got := truncateGuidelineContent(content, limit)
if len(got) > limit {
t.Fatalf("truncateGuidelineContent(_, %d) = %q (%d bytes), want at most %d bytes", limit, got, len(got), limit)
}
}
}
func TestProjectGuidelineDirsOrdersRootToLeaf(t *testing.T) {
root := filepath.Join("r")
leaf := filepath.Join(root, "a", "b")
+24
View File
@@ -174,6 +174,16 @@ type SpecialistInfo struct {
WhenToUse string
}
// SkillInfo is a one-line summary of a reusable, on-demand skill (its name and
// frontmatter description) surfaced to the system prompt so the model can invoke
// the right skill with the skill tool on the first try instead of guessing a name
// and reading the failure. Like SpecialistInfo it is plain data, so the agent
// package needs no dependency on internal/skills.
type SkillInfo struct {
Name string
Description string
}
type Options struct {
MaxTurns int
// DeferThreshold activates deferred MCP-tool loading: when the number of
@@ -189,6 +199,12 @@ type Options struct {
// populated only where the Task tool is actually registered, so an empty slice
// (the default) reproduces the previous prompt byte-for-byte.
Specialists []SpecialistInfo
// Skills lists the reusable skills installed for this run (the default skills
// dir merged with any plugin skill roots). When non-empty the system prompt
// gains an <available_skills> block naming them so the model loads the right one
// via the skill tool on the first try. Empty (the default) reproduces the
// previous prompt byte-for-byte.
Skills []SkillInfo
// Specialist/sub-agent metadata is carried through exec now and consumed by
// the specialist runtime in later slices.
SessionID string
@@ -269,6 +285,14 @@ type Options struct {
// ceiling and the autonomy gate. nil disables it entirely (the loop is
// byte-identical to before). One instance per run — it holds attempt state.
SelfCorrect *SelfCorrector
// FileDiagnostics, when set, checks files changed by mutating tools for
// error-severity language diagnostics IN THE BACKGROUND and appends any
// errors as a nudge before the model's next request — the model still sees
// an error it introduced at its next decision point, but no tool call ever
// blocks on the language server (the old inline path stalled every edit on
// a ≥300ms debounce, 10s cap). Build one with NewFileDiagnostics. nil
// disables post-edit diagnostics.
FileDiagnostics func(ctx context.Context, absPath string) string
// RequireCompletionSignal gates run completion for HEADLESS exec. Without it,
// any assistant turn that produces text but no tool call is accepted as the
+79 -4
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/localcontrol"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/mcp"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/observability"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/plugins"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providerhealth"
@@ -77,9 +79,12 @@ type appDeps struct {
runAgentEval func(context.Context, agentEvalOptions) (agentEvalReport, error)
inspectChanges func(context.Context, zerogit.InspectOptions) (zerogit.ChangeSummary, error)
commitChanges func(context.Context, zerogit.CommitOptions) (zerogit.CommitResult, error)
pushChanges func(context.Context, zerogit.PushOptions) (zerogit.PushResult, error)
createPR func(context.Context, zerogit.PROptions) (zerogit.PRResult, error)
runTUI func(context.Context, tui.Options) int
runEditor func(string) error
checkUpdate func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.Result, error)
applyUpdate func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error)
now func() time.Time
}
@@ -177,9 +182,12 @@ func defaultAppDeps() appDeps {
runAgentEval: defaultRunAgentEval,
inspectChanges: zerogit.Inspect,
commitChanges: zerogit.Commit,
pushChanges: zerogit.Push,
createPR: zerogit.CreatePR,
runTUI: tui.Run,
runEditor: openEditor,
checkUpdate: update.Check,
applyUpdate: update.Apply,
now: time.Now,
}
}
@@ -227,6 +235,12 @@ func runWithDeps(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
defer observability.Recover(observability.DefaultCrashDir(), "cli", stderr, &exitCode)
deps = fillAppDeps(deps)
// CLI runs opt into the models.dev overlay (cached live context limits and
// pricing on top of the curated catalog). Explicitly enabled here — and only
// here — so library consumers and hermetic tests are never perturbed by a
// cache file on the machine. The refresh itself is fired in exec/TUI startup.
modelregistry.EnableModelsDevOverlay()
addDirs, args, err := splitLeadingAddDirFlags(args)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), 1)
@@ -383,6 +397,8 @@ func runWithDeps(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
return runSandbox(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
case "update":
return runUpdate(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
case "upgrade":
return runUpgrade(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
case "worktrees", "worktree":
return runWorktrees(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
case "verify":
@@ -506,6 +522,12 @@ func fillAppDeps(deps appDeps) appDeps {
if deps.commitChanges == nil {
deps.commitChanges = defaults.commitChanges
}
if deps.pushChanges == nil {
deps.pushChanges = defaults.pushChanges
}
if deps.createPR == nil {
deps.createPR = defaults.createPR
}
if deps.runTUI == nil {
deps.runTUI = defaults.runTUI
}
@@ -515,6 +537,9 @@ func fillAppDeps(deps appDeps) appDeps {
if deps.checkUpdate == nil {
deps.checkUpdate = defaults.checkUpdate
}
if deps.applyUpdate == nil {
deps.applyUpdate = defaults.applyUpdate
}
if deps.now == nil {
deps.now = defaults.now
}
@@ -537,6 +562,11 @@ func runInteractiveTUI(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode agent.Perm
}
func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode agent.PermissionMode, addDirs []string, theme string, forceSetup bool) int {
// Refresh the models.dev pricing/limits cache in the background when stale;
// the overlay is read at registry construction from the cache file, so this
// benefits the next run and never blocks or fails this one.
go func() { _ = modelregistry.RefreshModelsDevCache(context.Background()) }()
workspaceRoot, err := deps.getwd()
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to resolve workspace: "+err.Error(), 1)
@@ -557,8 +587,19 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
if !errors.Is(err, config.ErrNoActiveProvider) && !errors.Is(err, config.ErrProviderRequiresModel) {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), 1)
}
resolved = config.ResolvedConfig{}
forceSetup = true
// ErrNoActiveProvider can mean "nothing configured yet" (needs onboarding)
// or "providers ARE configured, just none marked active" (e.g. config.json's
// activeProvider is blank/stale). In the second case resolved.Providers still
// carries the already-normalized list — prefer falling back to one of those
// over wiping everything and forcing the user to re-enter credentials they
// already saved.
if usable, ok := firstUsableProvider(resolved.Providers); errors.Is(err, config.ErrNoActiveProvider) && ok {
resolved.Provider = usable
resolved.ActiveProvider = usable.Name
} else {
resolved = config.ResolvedConfig{}
forceSetup = true
}
}
userConfigPath, err := deps.userConfigPath()
if err != nil {
@@ -740,9 +781,19 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
Hooks: newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks),
DeferThreshold: resolved.Tools.DeferThreshold,
Specialists: specialistRuntime.specialists,
Skills: pluginActivation.skillInfos(deps.skillsDir()),
},
// LoadSkills backs /skills and direct /<skill-name> invocation in the TUI.
// It resolves against the same merged set (default dir + plugin skill
// roots) as the skill tool and the system-prompt list, re-read per use so
// newly installed skills work without a restart.
LoadSkills: cachedSkillsLoader(func() []skills.Skill {
merged, _ := plugins.MergedSkillsLoaded(deps.skillsDir(), pluginActivation.skillRoots)
return merged
}),
PermissionMode: permissionMode,
Notify: resolved.Notify,
KeyBindings: resolved.KeyBindings,
Setup: tui.SetupOptions{
Visible: setupVisible,
Required: needsSetup,
@@ -1158,7 +1209,8 @@ func profileHasCredential(profile config.ProviderProfile) bool {
}
// baseURLIsLoopback reports whether a provider base_url points at a loopback host
// (a keyless local provider like Ollama/LM Studio), which needs no API key.
// or a private-network host (192.168.x.y / 10.x.y.z / 172.16.x.y) — a local
// provider like Ollama/LM Studio that needs no API key.
func baseURLIsLoopback(baseURL string) bool {
u := strings.TrimSpace(baseURL)
if u == "" {
@@ -1173,7 +1225,7 @@ func baseURLIsLoopback(baseURL string) bool {
return true
}
if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); err == nil {
return addr.IsLoopback()
return addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate()
}
return false
}
@@ -1234,3 +1286,26 @@ Flags:
`)
return err
}
// cachedSkillsLoader memoizes a skills loader for a short interval. The TUI
// calls the loader from autocomplete on every "/x" keystroke; without a cache
// each keystroke would re-read every SKILL.md body. Two seconds is fresh enough
// that a newly installed skill still shows up "immediately" while typing.
func cachedSkillsLoader(load func() []skills.Skill) func() []skills.Skill {
var (
mu sync.Mutex
at time.Time
cached []skills.Skill
)
const ttl = 2 * time.Second
return func() []skills.Skill {
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
if cached != nil && time.Since(at) < ttl {
return cached
}
cached = load()
at = time.Now()
return cached
}
}
+208
View File
@@ -205,6 +205,67 @@ func TestRunNoArgsEntersSetupWhenResolveReportsNoActiveProvider(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunNoArgsFallsBackToUsableProviderWhenNoneMarkedActive(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
cwd := t.TempDir()
setCLIUserConfigRoot(t)
userConfigPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
var launchedOptions tui.Options
launched := false
var providerProfile config.ProviderProfile
fake := &cliFakeProvider{}
usable := config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "work",
ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAI,
BaseURL: config.OpenAIBaseURL,
APIKey: "sk-test",
Model: "gpt-test",
}
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) {
return cwd, nil
},
resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
// config.json has providers configured but none marked active (e.g. a
// blank/stale activeProvider field) — Resolve returns the successfully
// normalized providers list alongside ErrNoActiveProvider.
return config.ResolvedConfig{Providers: []config.ProviderProfile{usable}},
fmt.Errorf("%w: active provider %q not found", config.ErrNoActiveProvider, "")
},
newProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
providerProfile = profile
return fake, nil
},
userConfigPath: func() (string, error) {
return userConfigPath, nil
},
registerMCPTools: func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
return noopMCPRuntime{}, nil
},
runTUI: func(ctx context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
launched = true
launchedOptions = options
return 0
},
})
if exitCode != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want 0, stderr=%q", exitCode, stderr.String())
}
if !launched {
t.Fatal("TUI was not launched")
}
if launchedOptions.Setup.Visible || launchedOptions.Setup.Required {
t.Fatalf("Setup = %#v, want no setup wizard — a usable saved provider exists", launchedOptions.Setup)
}
if providerProfile.Name != "work" {
t.Fatalf("provider used = %q, want fallback to the usable saved provider %q", providerProfile.Name, "work")
}
}
func TestRunNoArgsFailsWhenResolveErrorIsNotProviderRelated(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
@@ -1267,6 +1328,153 @@ func TestRunUpdateReportsUpToDate(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunUpdateApplyTextAndJSON(t *testing.T) {
applyResult := update.ApplyResult{
Result: update.Result{
CurrentVersion: "dev",
LatestVersion: "0.2.0",
UpdateAvailable: true,
},
Applied: true,
InstallMethod: update.InstallMethodStandalone,
BinaryPath: "/usr/local/bin/zero",
Message: "updated to 0.2.0",
}
var gotOptions update.Options
deps := appDeps{
applyUpdate: func(_ context.Context, options update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error) {
gotOptions = options
return applyResult, nil
},
checkUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.Result, error) {
t.Fatal("checkUpdate should not run for --apply")
return update.Result{}, nil
},
}
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"update", "--apply"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "updated to 0.2.0") {
t.Fatalf("unexpected apply text: %q", stdout.String())
}
if gotOptions.CurrentVersion != "dev" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected options passed to applyUpdate: %#v", gotOptions)
}
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
exitCode = runWithDeps([]string{"update", "--apply", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
}
var payload struct {
Applied bool `json:"applied"`
InstallMethod string `json:"installMethod"`
BinaryPath string `json:"binaryPath"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("apply JSON did not decode: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
}
if !payload.Applied || payload.InstallMethod != string(update.InstallMethodStandalone) || payload.BinaryPath != applyResult.BinaryPath {
t.Fatalf("unexpected apply JSON: %#v", payload)
}
}
func TestRunUpgradeDefaultsToApply(t *testing.T) {
var applyCalled bool
deps := appDeps{
applyUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error) {
applyCalled = true
return update.ApplyResult{Message: "already up to date"}, nil
},
checkUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.Result, error) {
t.Fatal("checkUpdate should not run for `zero upgrade`")
return update.Result{}, nil
},
}
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"upgrade"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
}
if !applyCalled {
t.Fatal("expected `zero upgrade` to call applyUpdate")
}
}
func TestRunUpdateRejectsCheckAndApplyTogether(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"update", "--check", "--apply"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
checkUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.Result, error) {
t.Fatal("checkUpdate should not run")
return update.Result{}, nil
},
applyUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error) {
t.Fatal("applyUpdate should not run")
return update.ApplyResult{}, nil
},
})
if exitCode != exitUsage {
t.Fatalf("expected usage exit code, got %d", exitCode)
}
if got := stderr.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "only one of --check or --apply") {
t.Fatalf("expected --check/--apply usage error, got %q", got)
}
}
func TestRunUpdateRejectsTargetWithApply(t *testing.T) {
for _, args := range [][]string{
{"update", "--apply", "--target", "linux-arm64"},
{"upgrade", "--target", "linux-arm64"},
} {
t.Run(strings.Join(args, " "), func(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := runWithDeps(args, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
applyUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error) {
t.Fatal("applyUpdate should not run when --target is combined with --apply")
return update.ApplyResult{}, nil
},
})
if exitCode != exitUsage {
t.Fatalf("expected usage exit code, got %d", exitCode)
}
if got := stderr.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "--target cannot be combined with --apply") {
t.Fatalf("expected --target/--apply usage error, got %q", got)
}
})
}
}
func TestRunUpdateReportsApplyError(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"update", "--apply"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
applyUpdate: func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error) {
return update.ApplyResult{}, errors.New("download failed")
},
})
if exitCode == exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected non-success exit code, got %d", exitCode)
}
if got := stderr.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "download failed") {
t.Fatalf("expected apply error, got %q", got)
}
}
func assertHelpOutput(t *testing.T, args []string) {
t.Helper()
+19 -3
View File
@@ -301,12 +301,27 @@ func runAuthLogin(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDep
if len(parsed.positional) != 1 {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "usage: zero auth login <provider> [--device] [--scope <scope>]")
}
provider := parsed.positional[0]
// ChatGPT (Codex) requires a fixed redirect_uri (http://localhost:1455/
// auth/callback) and mandatory authorize params (id_token_add_organizations,
// codex_cli_simplified_flow, originator) that the generic loopback flow
// cannot supply. Route it to the dedicated ChatGPT login so
// `zero auth login chatgpt` behaves identically to `zero auth chatgpt`.
if strings.EqualFold(provider, "chatgpt") {
if parsed.device {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "ChatGPT login does not support --device (it is loopback-only)")
}
if len(parsed.scopes) > 0 {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "ChatGPT login does not support --scope (the required scopes are fixed by the Codex client registration)")
}
return runAuthChatGPT(nil, stdout, stderr, deps)
}
manager, err := newAuthManager(deps, stdout)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(err, redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
}
status, err := manager.Login(context.Background(), oauth.LoginOptions{
Provider: parsed.positional[0],
Provider: provider,
Device: parsed.device,
ExtraScopes: parsed.scopes,
})
@@ -489,8 +504,9 @@ Commands:
A provider is any OAuth 2.0 / OIDC server. "openrouter" ('zero auth openrouter')
works out of the box. "xai" ('zero auth login xai') uses a built-in preset that is
off by default — enable it with ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS=1, or set the
ZERO_OAUTH_XAI_* vars yourself. Any preset field is overridable via the env vars
below. For a custom provider named <name>, set:
ZERO_OAUTH_XAI_* vars yourself. "chatgpt" ('zero auth login chatgpt' or
'zero auth chatgpt') uses a fixed-port loopback flow against the Codex backend.
Any preset field is overridable via the env vars below. For a custom provider named <name>, set:
ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_CLIENT_ID (required)
ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_CLIENT_SECRET (optional)
ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_AUTHORIZE_URL ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_TOKEN_URL
+41
View File
@@ -156,3 +156,44 @@ func TestRunAuthHelp(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
// TestRunAuthLoginChatGPTRoutesToDedicatedFlow verifies `zero auth login
// chatgpt` reaches the dedicated ChatGPT login (fixed-port loopback + mandatory
// authorize params), not the generic manager path. The generic login accepts
// --device, so a ChatGPT-specific rejection proves the routing took effect.
// See issue #430: the generic path built a random-port 127.0.0.1 redirect_uri
// without the required extra params, so OpenAI's authorize endpoint rejected it.
func TestRunAuthLoginChatGPTRoutesToDedicatedFlow(t *testing.T) {
withAuthStore(t)
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "login", "chatgpt", "--device"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code == exitSuccess {
t.Fatal("auth login chatgpt --device should be rejected (ChatGPT is loopback-only)")
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "ChatGPT login does not support --device") {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want the ChatGPT-specific --device rejection", stderr.String())
}
// Case-insensitive provider name should still route.
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "login", "ChatGPT", "--device"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code == exitSuccess {
t.Fatal("auth login ChatGPT --device should be rejected")
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "ChatGPT login does not support --device") {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want the ChatGPT-specific rejection (case-insensitive)", stderr.String())
}
}
// TestRunAuthLoginChatGPTRejectsScope mirrors the --device rejection: --scope
// must not be silently dropped on the ChatGPT path. The Codex client
// registration pins a fixed scope set (incl. api.connectors.*), so custom
// scopes are rejected up front rather than plumbed through.
func TestRunAuthLoginChatGPTRejectsScope(t *testing.T) {
withAuthStore(t)
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"auth", "login", "chatgpt", "--scope", "custom-scope"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code == exitSuccess {
t.Fatal("auth login chatgpt --scope should be rejected")
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "ChatGPT login does not support --scope") {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want the ChatGPT-specific --scope rejection", stderr.String())
}
}
+37 -13
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/errhint"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/imageinput"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lsp"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
@@ -135,6 +136,11 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
return exitSuccess
}
// Refresh the models.dev pricing/limits cache in the background when stale;
// the overlay is read at registry construction from the cache file, so this
// benefits the next run and never blocks or fails this one.
go func() { _ = modelregistry.RefreshModelsDevCache(context.Background()) }()
// A mode seeds model/effort/max-turns/tool filters as a preset. Expand it up
// front — before tool-filter validation and the --list-tools branch — so a
// mode-injected tool filter is validated and reflected in --list-tools, and a
@@ -499,15 +505,17 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
// by default the corrector is nil, leaving the agent loop byte-identical. When
// on we verify with both the workspace test plan and LSP diagnostics over the
// changed files; the autonomy gate inside the corrector still decides whether
// failures auto-fix or just report. lspShutdown tears down any language-server
// sessions the LSP half spawned (no-op when self-correct is off).
selfCorrector, lspShutdown := newExecSelfCorrector(options.selfCorrect, workspaceRoot, options.autonomy)
// failures auto-fix or just report. fileDiagnostics (always on, lazy) gives
// edit_file/write_file inline error diagnostics for the file they just wrote.
// lspShutdown tears down any language-server sessions either half spawned.
selfCorrector, fileDiagnostics, lspShutdown := newExecSelfCorrector(options.selfCorrect, workspaceRoot, options.autonomy)
defer lspShutdown()
result, err := agent.Run(runCtx, agentPrompt, provider, agent.Options{
MaxTurns: resolved.MaxTurns,
ContextWindow: resolveAgentContextWindow(runCtx, modelRegistry, resolved.Provider),
DeferThreshold: effectiveDeferThreshold,
Specialists: specialistRuntime.specialistInfos(),
Skills: pluginActivation.skillInfos(deps.skillsDir()),
SessionID: preparedSession.Session.SessionID,
CallingSessionID: options.callingSessionID,
CallingToolUseID: options.callingToolUseID,
@@ -524,6 +532,7 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
PermissionMode: permissionMode,
Autonomy: options.autonomy,
SelfCorrect: selfCorrector,
FileDiagnostics: fileDiagnostics,
// Headless exec: don't accept a no-tool-call turn as "done" while work
// clearly remains (pending plan items / a mid-step continuation cue) —
// nudge to continue, and finalize as INCOMPLETE rather than false success
@@ -535,6 +544,7 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
EnabledTools: options.enabledTools,
DisabledTools: options.disabledTools,
OnText: writer.text,
OnReasoning: writer.reasoning,
OnToolCall: func(call agent.ToolCall) {
writer.toolCall(call, registry)
sessionRecorder.append(sessions.EventToolCall, map[string]any{
@@ -699,23 +709,29 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
// unless a changed file's language actually has one installed on PATH. The
// returned cleanup shuts that manager down (terminating any spawned server
// sessions); it is a no-op when self-correct is off.
func newExecSelfCorrector(enabled bool, workspaceRoot string, autonomy string) (*agent.SelfCorrector, func()) {
if !enabled {
return nil, func() {}
}
func newExecSelfCorrector(enabled bool, workspaceRoot string, autonomy string) (*agent.SelfCorrector, func(context.Context, string) string, func()) {
// The manager is created regardless of --self-correct: it also backs the
// always-on background post-edit diagnostics (agent.NewFileDiagnostics,
// collected off the tool-call path by the loop), and it stays lazy — no
// language server is spawned unless an edited file's language actually has
// one installed on PATH.
manager := lsp.NewManager(workspaceRoot)
cleanup := func() {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_ = manager.Shutdown(ctx)
}
fileDiagnostics := agent.NewFileDiagnostics(manager, workspaceRoot)
if !enabled {
return nil, fileDiagnostics, cleanup
}
corrector := agent.NewSelfCorrector(workspaceRoot, agent.NewLSPDiagnosticsChecker(manager), agent.NewProjectVerifier(workspaceRoot), agent.SelfCorrectConfig{
Enabled: true,
IncludeTests: true,
IncludeLSP: true,
Autonomy: autonomy,
})
cleanup := func() {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_ = manager.Shutdown(ctx)
}
return corrector, cleanup
return corrector, fileDiagnostics, cleanup
}
func deferredEligibleCount(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode agent.PermissionMode, enabledTools []string, disabledTools []string) int {
@@ -948,6 +964,14 @@ func writeExecProviderError(stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, format execOutpu
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "[zero] %s\n", message); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
// Append a one-line next step for recognized provider failures (auth /
// rate-limit / connectivity / …). The classifier gates on a provider-origin
// marker, so non-provider codes (sandbox_error, mcp_error) never draw a hint.
if hint := errhint.CLIHint(errors.New(message)); hint != "" {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "[zero] %s\n", hint); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
}
return exitProvider
}
+59 -3
View File
@@ -529,6 +529,45 @@ func TestRunExecStreamJSONRunStartUsesResolvedAPIModel(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunExecStreamJSONEmitsReasoningEvents(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("XDG_DATA_HOME", t.TempDir())
cwd := t.TempDir()
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"exec", "--output-format", "stream-json", "think then answer"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) {
return cwd, nil
},
resolveConfig: func(_ string, _ config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return execResolvedConfig(), nil
},
newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
return reasoningExecProvider{}, nil
},
})
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
}
events := decodeJSONLines(t, stdout.String())
reasoningIdx, reasoning := findJSONEventIndex(t, events, "reasoning")
if reasoning["delta"] != "Thinking. " {
t.Fatalf("unexpected reasoning event: %#v", reasoning)
}
textIdx, text := findJSONEventIndex(t, events, "text")
if text["delta"] != "done" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected text event: %#v", text)
}
if reasoningIdx >= textIdx {
t.Fatalf("expected reasoning event before text event, got indices %d and %d", reasoningIdx, textIdx)
}
final := findJSONEvent(t, events, "final")
if final["text"] != "done" {
t.Fatalf("reasoning must not be folded into final answer: %#v", final)
}
}
func TestExecEventWriterTruncatesStreamJSONToolResults(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
writer := execEventWriter{
@@ -751,6 +790,17 @@ type toolCallingExecProvider struct {
answer string
}
type reasoningExecProvider struct{}
func (reasoningExecProvider) StreamCompletion(context.Context, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
ch := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 3)
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventReasoning, Content: "Thinking. "}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}
close(ch)
return ch, nil
}
func (provider toolCallingExecProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
for _, message := range request.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
@@ -777,13 +827,19 @@ func (provider toolCallingExecProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, re
func findJSONEvent(t *testing.T, events []map[string]any, eventType string) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
for _, event := range events {
_, event := findJSONEventIndex(t, events, eventType)
return event
}
func findJSONEventIndex(t *testing.T, events []map[string]any, eventType string) (int, map[string]any) {
t.Helper()
for idx, event := range events {
if event["type"] == eventType {
return event
return idx, event
}
}
t.Fatalf("event %q not found in %#v", eventType, events)
return nil
return -1, nil
}
func findSessionEvent(t *testing.T, events []sessions.Event, eventType sessions.EventType) sessions.Event {
+50
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
package cli
import (
"bytes"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// A recognized provider error in text mode prints the raw message plus a one-line
// actionable hint; a non-provider error (or JSON mode) prints no hint.
func TestWriteExecProviderErrorAppendsHint(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("provider auth error gets a hint", func(t *testing.T) {
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := writeExecProviderError(&stdout, &stderr, execOutputText, "provider_error",
"auth error: your API key is missing or invalid")
if code != exitProvider {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want exitProvider", code)
}
out := stderr.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "auth error:") {
t.Fatalf("expected raw message, got %q", out)
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "zero auth") {
t.Fatalf("expected an actionable hint referencing `zero auth`, got %q", out)
}
})
t.Run("non-provider error gets no hint", func(t *testing.T) {
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
writeExecProviderError(&stdout, &stderr, execOutputText, "sandbox_error",
"sandbox setup failed: permission denied")
out := stderr.String()
// Exactly one "[zero]" line — no spurious hint attached to a local error.
if n := strings.Count(out, "[zero]"); n != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected exactly one [zero] line for a non-provider error, got %d:\n%s", n, out)
}
})
t.Run("json mode never appends a hint line", func(t *testing.T) {
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
writeExecProviderError(&stdout, &stderr, execOutputJSON, "provider_error",
"auth error: bad key")
if stderr.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("json mode must not write to stderr, got %q", stderr.String())
}
if strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "zero auth") {
t.Fatalf("json mode must not inject a hint into the structured payload, got %q", stdout.String())
}
})
}
+10
View File
@@ -80,6 +80,16 @@ func (writer *execEventWriter) text(delta string) {
writer.writeStdout(delta)
}
func (writer *execEventWriter) reasoning(delta string) {
if writer.format == execOutputJSON {
writer.writeJSON(map[string]any{"type": "reasoning", "delta": delta})
return
}
if writer.format == execOutputStreamJSON {
writer.writeStreamJSON(streamjson.Event{Type: streamjson.EventReasoning, RunID: writer.runID, Delta: delta})
}
}
func (writer *execEventWriter) toolCall(call agent.ToolCall, registry *tools.Registry) {
if writer.format == execOutputJSON {
writer.writeJSON(map[string]any{
+23
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ package cli
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/plugins"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
@@ -57,6 +59,27 @@ func activatePlugins(workspaceRoot string, registry *tools.Registry, deps appDep
return pluginActivation{hooks: result.Hooks, skillRoots: result.SkillRoots}
}
// skillInfos resolves the reusable skills the model can load via the skill tool —
// the default skills dir merged with any plugin skill roots, the same set the
// plugin-aware skill tool resolves against — as plain data for the agent's system
// prompt. It returns nil when no skills are installed, so a skill-less run leaves
// the prompt byte-identical.
func (a pluginActivation) skillInfos(defaultDir string) []agent.SkillInfo {
merged, _ := plugins.MergedSkills(defaultDir, a.skillRoots)
if len(merged) == 0 {
return nil
}
infos := make([]agent.SkillInfo, 0, len(merged))
for _, skill := range merged {
name := strings.TrimSpace(skill.Name)
if name == "" {
continue
}
infos = append(infos, agent.SkillInfo{Name: name, Description: strings.TrimSpace(skill.Description)})
}
return infos
}
// formatLoadDiagnostic renders a plugin load diagnostic into a single warning
// line, prefixing the diagnostic kind and appending the most specific locator
// available (manifest path, then plugin path, then plugin ID) so an operator can
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ func TestProviderCatalogRuntimeProvidersShowOnboardingSetupHints(t *testing.T) {
}{
{id: "openai", name: "OpenAI", transport: "openai", defaultModel: "gpt-4.1"},
{id: "groq", name: "Groq", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "llama-3.3-70b-versatile"},
{id: "longcat", name: "LongCat", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "LongCat-2.0"},
{id: "ollama-cloud", name: "Ollama Cloud", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "qwen3-coder:480b"},
{id: "ollama", name: "Ollama Local", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "llama3.1"},
}
@@ -46,6 +47,21 @@ func TestProviderCatalogRuntimeProvidersShowOnboardingSetupHints(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestProviderCatalogLongCatRequiresAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
output := runProviderCatalogOnboarding(t)
block := providerCatalogOnboardingBlock(t, output, "longcat")
for _, want := range []string{
"requiresAuth=true",
"authEnvVars=LONGCAT_API_KEY",
"setup: zero providers setup longcat --set-active",
} {
if !strings.Contains(block, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected LongCat catalog block to contain %q, got:\n%s", want, block)
}
}
}
func TestProviderCatalogOllamaCloudRequiresAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
output := runProviderCatalogOnboarding(t)
block := providerCatalogOnboardingBlock(t, output, "ollama-cloud")
+9
View File
@@ -88,6 +88,15 @@ func formatRepoInfo(info repoinfo.Info) string {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Files: %d\n", info.FileCount)
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Directories: %d (max depth %d)\n", info.DirectoryCount, info.MaxDepth)
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Est. LOC: %d\n", info.LOCEstimate)
if info.CommitCount != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Commits: %d\n", *info.CommitCount)
}
if info.BranchCount != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Branches: %d\n", *info.BranchCount)
}
if info.TagCount != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Tags: %d\n", *info.TagCount)
}
if info.PrimaryLanguage != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Primary lang: %s\n", info.PrimaryLanguage)
}
+5 -1
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ func TestFormatRepoInfoText(t *testing.T) {
contrib := 3
info := repoInfoTestData(age, contrib)
out := formatRepoInfo(info)
for _, want := range []string{"Files", "TypeScript", "main", "GitHub Actions", "42", "3"} {
for _, want := range []string{"Files", "TypeScript", "main", "GitHub Actions", "42", "3", "Commits: 100", "Branches: 5", "Tags: 10"} {
if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
t.Fatalf("text output missing %q:\n%s", want, out)
}
@@ -113,12 +113,16 @@ func initTempGitRepo(t *testing.T) string {
}
func repoInfoTestData(age, contrib int) repoinfo.Info {
commits := 100
branches := 5
tags := 10
return repoinfo.Info{
FileCount: 10, DirectoryCount: 3, MaxDepth: 2, LOCEstimate: 500,
Languages: []repoinfo.LangStat{{Name: "TypeScript", LOCEstimate: 400, FileCount: 4}},
PrimaryLanguage: "TypeScript", LanguageCount: 1,
WorkspaceType: "none", CICD: []string{"GitHub Actions"},
HasGit: true, Branch: "main", AgeDays: &age, Contributors90d: &contrib,
CommitCount: &commits, BranchCount: &branches, TagCount: &tags,
}
}
+6
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package cli
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -453,6 +454,11 @@ func providerProfileIsLocal(profile config.ProviderProfile) bool {
case "localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1":
return true
}
// Also treat explicit private-network IPs (192.168.x.y, 10.x.y.z,
// 172.16-31.x.y) as local — the user is pointing at their own LAN box.
if ip := net.ParseIP(parsed.Hostname()); ip != nil && ip.IsPrivate() {
return true
}
return false
}
+51 -8
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
type updateOptions struct {
check bool
apply bool
json bool
repository string
endpoint string
@@ -20,6 +21,18 @@ type updateOptions struct {
}
func runUpdate(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
return runUpdateCommand(args, stdout, stderr, deps, false)
}
func runUpgrade(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
return runUpdateCommand(args, stdout, stderr, deps, true)
}
// runUpdateCommand backs both `zero update` and `zero upgrade`. defaultApply
// makes `--apply` the implicit behavior for `zero upgrade` when neither
// `--check` nor `--apply` is passed explicitly; `zero update` keeps requiring
// one of the two so existing scripts around `zero update --check` don't change.
func runUpdateCommand(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, defaultApply bool) int {
options, help, err := parseUpdateArgs(args)
if err != nil {
return writeUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
@@ -30,10 +43,19 @@ func runUpdate(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
}
return exitSuccess
}
if !options.check {
return writeUsageError(stderr, "Only `zero update --check` is available right now.")
if options.check && options.apply {
return writeUsageError(stderr, "Pass only one of --check or --apply.")
}
checkOptions := update.Options{
if !options.check && !options.apply {
if !defaultApply {
return writeUsageError(stderr, "Pass --check to check for updates or --apply to install one (or use `zero upgrade`).")
}
options.apply = true
}
if options.apply && options.target != "" {
return writeUsageError(stderr, "--target cannot be combined with --apply; it only verifies release assets for --check.")
}
updateOptions := update.Options{
CurrentVersion: version,
Repository: options.repository,
Endpoint: options.endpoint,
@@ -44,10 +66,26 @@ func runUpdate(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
if err != nil {
return writeUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
checkOptions.GOOS = target.GOOS
checkOptions.GOARCH = target.GOARCH
updateOptions.GOOS = target.GOOS
updateOptions.GOARCH = target.GOARCH
}
result, err := deps.checkUpdate(context.Background(), checkOptions)
if options.apply {
result, err := deps.applyUpdate(context.Background(), updateOptions)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "Could not install update: "+err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
if options.json {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, result); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, update.FormatApply(result)); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
result, err := deps.checkUpdate(context.Background(), updateOptions)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "Could not check for updates: "+err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
@@ -72,6 +110,8 @@ func parseUpdateArgs(args []string) (updateOptions, bool, error) {
return options, true, nil
case arg == "--check":
options.check = true
case arg == "--apply":
options.apply = true
case arg == "--json":
options.json = true
case arg == "--repo":
@@ -155,14 +195,17 @@ func parseUpdateTarget(value string) (string, error) {
func writeUpdateHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero update --check [flags]
zero update --apply [flags]
zero upgrade [flags]
Flags:
--check Check the latest GitHub release without installing
--json Print the update check result as JSON
--apply Download, verify, and install the latest release
--json Print the update result as JSON
--repo <owner/repo> Repository to check when no endpoint is provided
--endpoint <url|repo> Release API URL or owner/repo slug to check
--timeout <duration> Release check timeout (default 5s)
--target <platform> Release target to verify (for example windows-x64)
--target <platform> Release target to verify with --check (for example windows-x64); not valid with --apply
-h, --help Show this help
`)
return err
+141
View File
@@ -662,3 +662,144 @@ func TestRunExecRejectsWorktreeDirWithoutWorktree(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected empty stdout, got %q", stdout.String())
}
}
func TestParseChangesArgsAuto(t *testing.T) {
// 1. Correct parsing of auto
for _, args := range [][]string{
{"--auto"},
{"-a"},
} {
options, help, err := parseChangesArgs(args, "commit")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseChangesArgs(%v) error: %v", args, err)
}
if help {
t.Fatalf("parseChangesArgs(%v) returned help", args)
}
if !options.auto {
t.Fatalf("auto = false, want true (args %v)", args)
}
}
// 2. Reject --auto on inspect
_, _, err := parseChangesArgs([]string{"--auto"}, "inspect")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "--auto") {
t.Fatalf("expected --auto rejection on inspect, got %v", err)
}
// 3. Reject both --message and --auto on commit
_, _, err = parseChangesArgs([]string{"--message", "foo", "--auto"}, "commit")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cannot specify both --message and --auto") {
t.Fatalf("expected --message and --auto conflict error, got %v", err)
}
// 4. Reject both empty message and --auto on commit
_, _, err = parseChangesArgs([]string{"--message=", "--auto"}, "commit")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cannot specify both --message and --auto") {
t.Fatalf("expected empty --message and --auto conflict error, got %v", err)
}
}
type mockCommitMsgProvider struct {
response string
req zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
}
func (p *mockCommitMsgProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
p.req = request
events := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 2)
events <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: p.response}
events <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}
close(events)
return events, nil
}
func TestRunChangesCommitAuto(t *testing.T) {
cwd := t.TempDir()
summary := zerogit.ChangeSummary{
Root: cwd,
Branch: "main",
Files: []zerogit.FileChange{{Path: "README.md", Status: "modified"}},
Diff: "some diff content with ghp_SECRETKEYHERE",
}
mockProv := &mockCommitMsgProvider{
response: "```\nfeat: auto commit message\n```",
}
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
commitCalled := false
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"changes", "commit", "--auto"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
inspectChanges: func(ctx context.Context, options zerogit.InspectOptions) (zerogit.ChangeSummary, error) {
return summary, nil
},
resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
cfg := execResolvedConfig()
cfg.Provider.Name = "openai"
cfg.Provider.Model = "gpt-4o"
return cfg, nil
},
newProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
return mockProv, nil
},
commitChanges: func(ctx context.Context, options zerogit.CommitOptions) (zerogit.CommitResult, error) {
commitCalled = true
if options.Message != "feat: auto commit message" {
t.Fatalf("expected commit message 'feat: auto commit message', got %q", options.Message)
}
return zerogit.CommitResult{
Root: cwd,
Message: options.Message,
Committed: true,
CommitHash: "abc1234",
Before: summary,
}, nil
},
})
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
}
if !commitCalled {
t.Fatal("expected commitChanges to be called")
}
// Verify that secret in the diff was redacted
promptContent := mockProv.req.Messages[0].Content
if strings.Contains(promptContent, "ghp_SECRETKEYHERE") {
t.Fatal("expected secret in diff to be redacted, but it was found in the prompt")
}
if !strings.Contains(promptContent, "[REDACTED]") && !strings.Contains(promptContent, "REDACTED") {
t.Fatalf("expected redacted diff content in prompt, got: %q", promptContent)
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "Generating commit message using LLM...") {
t.Fatalf("expected status message in stdout, got %q", stdout.String())
}
t.Run("EmptyLLMResponse", func(t *testing.T) {
mockProvEmpty := &mockCommitMsgProvider{
response: " \n\n ",
}
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := runWithDeps([]string{"changes", "commit", "--auto"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
inspectChanges: func(ctx context.Context, options zerogit.InspectOptions) (zerogit.ChangeSummary, error) {
return summary, nil
},
resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return execResolvedConfig(), nil
},
newProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
return mockProvEmpty, nil
},
})
if code == exitSuccess {
t.Fatal("expected command to fail when LLM returns empty response, got success")
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "empty commit message") {
t.Fatalf("expected empty commit message error in stderr, got %q", stderr.String())
}
})
}
+291 -5
View File
@@ -6,13 +6,16 @@ import (
"io"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/redaction"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/selfverify"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/testrunner"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/verify"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/worktrees"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zerogit"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type worktreeCommandOptions struct {
@@ -35,8 +38,17 @@ type changesCommandOptions struct {
cwd string
baseRef string
message string
hasMessage bool
dryRun bool
maxDiffBytes int
remote string
force bool
title string
body string
fill bool
draft bool
yes bool
auto bool
}
func runWorktrees(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
@@ -198,9 +210,52 @@ func runChanges(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
}
return exitSuccess
case "commit":
var message string
if options.auto {
summary, err := deps.inspectChanges(context.Background(), zerogit.InspectOptions{
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
MaxDiffBytes: options.maxDiffBytes,
})
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("failed to inspect changes: %v", err))
}
if summary.Clean {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "no changes to commit")
}
resolved, err := deps.resolveConfig(workspaceRoot, config.Overrides{})
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("failed to resolve config: %v", err))
}
if !config.HasProviderProfile(resolved.Provider) {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "no provider configured for auto-commit message")
}
provider, err := deps.newProvider(resolved.Provider)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("failed to create provider: %v", err))
}
if !options.json {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "Generating commit message using LLM..."); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
}
safeSummary := redactChangeSummary(summary)
genCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 60*time.Second)
defer cancel()
msg, err := generateAutoCommitMessage(genCtx, provider, resolved.Provider.Model, safeSummary)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("failed to generate commit message: %v", err))
}
message = msg
} else {
message = options.message
}
result, err := deps.commitChanges(context.Background(), zerogit.CommitOptions{
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Message: options.message,
Message: message,
DryRun: options.dryRun,
MaxDiffBytes: options.maxDiffBytes,
})
@@ -218,6 +273,10 @@ func runChanges(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
case "push":
return runChangesPush(args, stdout, stderr, deps)
case "pr", "pull-request":
return runChangesPR(args, stdout, stderr, deps)
default:
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("unknown changes command %q", command))
}
@@ -395,9 +454,11 @@ func parseChangesArgs(args []string, command string) (changesCommandOptions, boo
return options, false, err
}
options.message = value
options.hasMessage = true
index = next
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--message="):
options.message = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--message="))
options.hasMessage = true
case arg == "--diff-bytes":
value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
if err != nil {
@@ -415,18 +476,73 @@ func parseChangesArgs(args []string, command string) (changesCommandOptions, boo
return options, false, err
}
options.maxDiffBytes = maxDiffBytes
case arg == "--remote":
value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
if err != nil {
return options, false, err
}
options.remote = strings.TrimSpace(value)
index = next
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--remote="):
options.remote = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--remote="))
case arg == "--force":
options.force = true
case arg == "--title":
value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
if err != nil {
return options, false, err
}
options.title = value
index = next
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--title="):
options.title = strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--title=")
case arg == "--body":
value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
if err != nil {
return options, false, err
}
options.body = value
index = next
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--body="):
options.body = strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--body=")
case arg == "--fill":
options.fill = true
case arg == "--draft":
options.draft = true
case arg == "--yes":
options.yes = true
case arg == "-a" || arg == "--auto":
options.auto = true
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-"):
return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unknown changes flag %q", arg)}
default:
return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unexpected changes argument %q", arg)}
}
}
if command != "commit" && (options.message != "" || options.dryRun) {
return options, false, execUsageError{"--message and --dry-run are only valid with `zero changes commit`"}
if command != "commit" && options.message != "" {
return options, false, execUsageError{"--message is only valid with `zero changes commit`"}
}
if command == "commit" && options.baseRef != "" {
if command != "commit" && (options.hasMessage || options.dryRun || options.auto) {
return options, false, execUsageError{"--message, --dry-run, and --auto are only valid with `zero changes commit`"}
}
if command == "commit" && options.hasMessage && options.auto {
return options, false, execUsageError{"cannot specify both --message and --auto"}
}
if command != "commit" && command != "push" && options.dryRun {
return options, false, execUsageError{"--dry-run is only valid with commit or push"}
}
if command != "inspect" && options.baseRef != "" {
return options, false, execUsageError{"--base is only valid with `zero changes inspect`"}
}
if command != "push" && command != "pr" && (options.remote != "" || options.force) {
return options, false, execUsageError{"--remote and --force are only valid with push or pr"}
}
if command != "pr" && (options.title != "" || options.body != "" || options.fill || options.draft) {
return options, false, execUsageError{"--title, --body, --fill, and --draft are only valid with `zero changes pr`"}
}
if command != "push" && command != "pr" && options.yes {
return options, false, execUsageError{"--yes is only valid with push or pr"}
}
return options, false, nil
}
@@ -704,17 +820,187 @@ func writeChangesHelp(w io.Writer) error {
_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
zero changes inspect [flags]
zero changes commit [flags]
zero changes push [flags]
zero changes pr [flags]
Inspects local git changes and optionally creates a commit.
Inspects, commits, pushes, and creates pull requests for local git changes.
Flags:
-C, --cwd <path> Workspace directory
--base <ref> Diff against <ref>...HEAD instead of the working tree
--diff-bytes <n> Maximum diff bytes to include
-m, --message <text> Commit message for `+"`zero changes commit`"+`
--dry-run Preview commit metadata / push without mutating git state
--remote <name> Remote to push to (defaults to upstream tracked branch or origin)
--force Use force-with-lease when pushing
--title <text> PR title
--body <text> PR body
--fill Automatically populate PR title and body from commits
--draft Create PR as a draft
--yes Confirm pushing to a default/protected branch
-a, --auto Auto-generate commit message using LLM (use --dry-run to preview)
--dry-run Preview commit metadata without mutating git state
--json Print JSON output
-h, --help Show this help
`)
return err
}
func runChangesPush(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
options, help, err := parseChangesArgs(args, "push")
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if help {
if err := writeChangesHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
workspaceRoot, err := resolveWorkspaceRoot(options.cwd, deps)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
result, err := deps.pushChanges(context.Background(), zerogit.PushOptions{
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Remote: options.remote,
Force: options.force,
DryRun: options.dryRun,
AllowPushDefaultBranch: options.yes,
})
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if options.json {
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, result); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
dryRunStr := ""
if options.dryRun {
dryRunStr = " (dry run)"
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Pushed branch %s to remote %s%s\n", result.Branch, result.Remote, dryRunStr); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
if result.Output != "" {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, result.Output); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
}
return exitSuccess
}
func runChangesPR(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
options, help, err := parseChangesArgs(args, "pr")
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if help {
if err := writeChangesHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if !options.fill && options.title == "" {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "must provide either --fill or --title to run non-interactively")
}
workspaceRoot, err := resolveWorkspaceRoot(options.cwd, deps)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if !options.json {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "Pushing current branch to set upstream..."); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
}
pushResult, err := deps.pushChanges(context.Background(), zerogit.PushOptions{
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Remote: options.remote,
Force: options.force,
AllowPushDefaultBranch: options.yes,
})
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("auto-push failed: %v", err))
}
if !options.json {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Pushed branch %s to remote %s\n", pushResult.Branch, pushResult.Remote); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
}
prResult, err := deps.createPR(context.Background(), zerogit.PROptions{
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Fill: options.fill,
Draft: options.draft,
Title: options.title,
Body: options.body,
})
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if options.json {
type prJSONResult struct {
Branch string `json:"branch"`
Remote string `json:"remote"`
Output string `json:"output"`
}
res := prJSONResult{
Branch: pushResult.Branch,
Remote: pushResult.Remote,
Output: strings.TrimSpace(prResult.Output),
}
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, res); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, strings.TrimSpace(prResult.Output)); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
func generateAutoCommitMessage(ctx context.Context, provider zeroruntime.Provider, model string, summary zerogit.ChangeSummary) (string, error) {
var promptBuilder strings.Builder
promptBuilder.WriteString("Analyze the following git diff and generate a concise, conventional commit message.\n")
promptBuilder.WriteString("The commit message subject line must be 72 characters or fewer, starting with a conventional commit type (e.g., feat, fix, docs, style, refactor, test, chore) followed by a colon and space, and a lowercase description.\n")
promptBuilder.WriteString("You may optionally include a blank line and a bulleted list of changes for the body if there are multiple files or complex changes.\n")
promptBuilder.WriteString("Output ONLY the raw commit message text. Do not wrap the message in markdown code block fence, do not include quotes or any introduction/explanation.\n\n")
promptBuilder.WriteString("Git Diff:\n")
promptBuilder.WriteString(summary.Diff)
request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: promptBuilder.String()},
},
}
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
collected := zeroruntime.CollectStream(ctx, stream)
if collected.Error != "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%s", collected.Error)
}
msg := strings.TrimSpace(collected.Text)
if strings.HasPrefix(msg, "```") {
if idx := strings.Index(msg, "\n"); idx != -1 {
msg = msg[idx+1:]
}
}
msg = strings.TrimSuffix(msg, "```")
msg = strings.TrimSpace(msg)
if msg == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("provider returned empty commit message")
}
return msg, nil
}
+40 -2
View File
@@ -130,7 +130,11 @@ func Resolve(options ResolveOptions) (ResolvedConfig, error) {
providers, active, err := normalizeProviders(cfg.Providers, cfg.ActiveProvider, options.Env)
if err != nil {
return ResolvedConfig{}, err
// On ErrNoActiveProvider, providers may still hold the successfully
// normalized (but active-less) profile list — keep it so a caller can fall
// back to an already-configured usable provider instead of treating this
// like a config with nothing set up at all.
return ResolvedConfig{Providers: providers}, err
}
return ResolvedConfig{
@@ -144,6 +148,7 @@ func Resolve(options ResolveOptions) (ResolvedConfig, error) {
Tools: cfg.Tools,
Swarm: cfg.Swarm,
Preferences: cfg.Preferences,
KeyBindings: cfg.KeyBindings,
LocalControl: cfg.LocalControl,
}, nil
}
@@ -225,6 +230,7 @@ func mergeConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) {
dst.Preferences.Theme = strings.TrimSpace(src.Preferences.Theme)
}
mergeLocalControlConfig(&dst.LocalControl, src.LocalControl)
mergeKeyBindings(&dst.KeyBindings, src.KeyBindings)
}
func mergeProjectConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) error {
@@ -277,6 +283,7 @@ func mergeProjectConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) error {
if src.Swarm.MaxTeamSize != 0 {
dst.Swarm.MaxTeamSize = src.Swarm.MaxTeamSize
}
mergeKeyBindings(&dst.KeyBindings, src.KeyBindings)
// Local control is intentionally user-config/override only. A cloned project
// must not be able to make browser, desktop, or terminal automation tools
// appear in the model's tool surface.
@@ -583,9 +590,17 @@ func applyProviderEnv(cfg *FileConfig, providerKind ProviderKind, env envProfile
if profile.Name == "" {
profile.Name = string(providerKind)
}
// A non-official baseURL from the environment signals a proxy/gateway, so promote
// the first-party kind to its -compatible transport (which accepts a custom URL).
// Env-only by design: a custom baseURL in a project config.json is left as-is and
// rejected by Resolve, so an untrusted project can't redirect a first-party key to
// another host.
if providerKind == ProviderKindOpenAI && baseURL != "" && !isOfficialOpenAIBaseURL(baseURL) {
profile.ProviderKind = ProviderKindOpenAICompatible
}
if providerKind == ProviderKindAnthropic && baseURL != "" && !isOfficialAnthropicBaseURL(baseURL) {
profile.ProviderKind = ProviderKindAnthropicCompat
}
// When the env supplies only credentials (no baseURL) for a provider name that
// already exists, don't force the standard transport kind — a same-named
// openai-compatible/anthropic-compatible proxy or gateway must keep its kind.
@@ -665,6 +680,7 @@ func applyOverrides(cfg *FileConfig, overrides Overrides) {
cfg.Tools.deferThresholdSet = true
}
mergeLocalControlConfig(&cfg.LocalControl, overrides.LocalControl)
mergeKeyBindings(&cfg.KeyBindings, overrides.KeyBindings)
for _, provider := range overrides.Providers {
mergeProvider(cfg, provider)
}
@@ -700,6 +716,24 @@ func mergeLocalControlDriverConfig(dst *LocalControlDriverConfig, src LocalContr
}
}
func mergeKeyBindings(dst *KeyBindingsConfig, src KeyBindingsConfig) {
if src.ToggleDetailed != "" {
dst.ToggleDetailed = src.ToggleDetailed
}
if src.ToggleMouse != "" {
dst.ToggleMouse = src.ToggleMouse
}
if src.CycleReasoning != "" {
dst.CycleReasoning = src.CycleReasoning
}
if src.TogglePlan != "" {
dst.TogglePlan = src.TogglePlan
}
if src.ToggleSidebar != "" {
dst.ToggleSidebar = src.ToggleSidebar
}
}
func mergeMCPConfig(dst *MCPConfig, src MCPConfig) {
if len(src.Servers) == 0 {
return
@@ -834,7 +868,11 @@ func normalizeProvidersWithOptions(providers []ProviderProfile, activeName strin
}
if !activeFound {
return nil, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: active provider %q not found", ErrNoActiveProvider, activeName)
// Return the successfully normalized list alongside the error (rather than
// nil) so a caller like the interactive TUI can still fall back to an
// already-configured, usable provider instead of forcing a full
// re-onboarding wizard just because none was marked active.
return normalized, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: active provider %q not found", ErrNoActiveProvider, activeName)
}
if active.Model == "" {
return nil, ProviderProfile{}, &setupFixableError{
+172
View File
@@ -617,6 +617,35 @@ func TestResolveUsesOpenAIEnvFallback(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestResolveUsesAnthropicEnvBaseURLAsCompatible(t *testing.T) {
// ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL pointing at a proxy/gateway must resolve to an
// anthropic-compatible provider (mirroring OPENAI_BASE_URL), not the "requires
// official baseURL" rejection — issue #479. The env is user-controlled, so a
// custom URL there is a deliberate gateway choice, unlike a project config.json.
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
Env: map[string]string{
"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY": "sk-ant-env",
"ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL": "https://gateway.example/anthropic",
"ANTHROPIC_MODEL": "claude-custom",
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
}
if resolved.ActiveProvider != "anthropic" {
t.Fatalf("ActiveProvider = %q, want anthropic", resolved.ActiveProvider)
}
if resolved.Provider.ProviderKind != ProviderKindAnthropicCompat {
t.Fatalf("ProviderKind = %q, want anthropic-compatible", resolved.Provider.ProviderKind)
}
if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != "https://gateway.example/anthropic" {
t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want gateway URL", resolved.Provider.BaseURL)
}
if resolved.Provider.APIKey != "sk-ant-env" || resolved.Provider.Model != "claude-custom" {
t.Fatalf("Provider = %#v, want env credentials/model", resolved.Provider)
}
}
func TestResolveUsesOpenAIAPIKeyOnlyWithDefaultModel(t *testing.T) {
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
Env: map[string]string{
@@ -916,6 +945,25 @@ func TestResolveRejectsActiveProviderWithoutConfiguredProfiles(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestResolveKeepsNormalizedProvidersWhenNoneMarkedActive(t *testing.T) {
// Multiple providers configured (e.g. via `zero provider add`) but
// activeProvider is blank/stale — a caller like the interactive TUI still
// needs the normalized list to fall back to an already-usable provider
// instead of forcing a full re-onboarding wizard.
path := writeConfig(t, `{"providers":[
{"name":"work","provider_kind":"openai","apiKey":"sk-test","model":"gpt-test"},
{"name":"other","provider_kind":"openai","apiKey":"sk-other","model":"gpt-test"}
]}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{ProjectConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
if !errors.Is(err, ErrNoActiveProvider) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want errors.Is(err, ErrNoActiveProvider)", err)
}
if len(resolved.Providers) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("Providers = %#v, want the 2 normalized profiles preserved despite the error", resolved.Providers)
}
}
func TestResolveTrimsProviderProfileAliasesBeforeFallback(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "custom",
@@ -1059,6 +1107,130 @@ func TestResolveAppliesProviderCatalogDefaults(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestResolveAppliesMiniMaxCNCatalogDefaults(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "mini-cn",
"providers": [{
"name": "mini-cn",
"catalog_id": "minimaxi-cn"
}]
}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
ProjectConfigPath: path,
Env: map[string]string{
"MINIMAXI_API_KEY": "sk-cn-mini",
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
}
if resolved.Provider.CatalogID != "minimaxi-cn" {
t.Fatalf("CatalogID = %q, want minimaxi-cn", resolved.Provider.CatalogID)
}
if resolved.Provider.ProviderKind != ProviderKindAnthropicCompat {
t.Fatalf("ProviderKind = %q, want %q", resolved.Provider.ProviderKind, ProviderKindAnthropicCompat)
}
if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != "https://api.minimaxi.com/anthropic" {
t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want MiniMax CN default", resolved.Provider.BaseURL)
}
if resolved.Provider.Model != "MiniMax-M3" {
t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want MiniMax-M3", resolved.Provider.Model)
}
if resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv != "MINIMAXI_API_KEY" {
t.Fatalf("APIKeyEnv = %q, want MINIMAXI_API_KEY", resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv)
}
if resolved.Provider.APIKey != "sk-cn-mini" {
t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want env-resolved secret", resolved.Provider.APIKey)
}
}
func TestResolveAppliesZaiCNCatalogDefaults(t *testing.T) {
// The "zai-cn" catalog entry preserves the legacy open.bigmodel.cn endpoint
// for users who still target the China hosting; "zai" itself now points at
// api.z.ai (international). The two env-vars are intentionally distinct
// (ZHIPU_API_KEY for China, ZAI_API_KEY for international) so an account on
// one side cannot be silently used against the other.
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "zai-cn",
"providers": [{
"name": "zai-cn",
"catalog_id": "zai-cn"
}]
}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
ProjectConfigPath: path,
Env: map[string]string{
"ZHIPU_API_KEY": "sk-zhipu-cn",
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
}
if resolved.Provider.CatalogID != "zai-cn" {
t.Fatalf("CatalogID = %q, want zai-cn", resolved.Provider.CatalogID)
}
if resolved.Provider.ProviderKind != ProviderKindOpenAICompatible {
t.Fatalf("ProviderKind = %q, want %q", resolved.Provider.ProviderKind, ProviderKindOpenAICompatible)
}
if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != "https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4" {
t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want Z.ai China default", resolved.Provider.BaseURL)
}
if resolved.Provider.Model != "glm-4.5" {
t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want glm-4.5 (China default)", resolved.Provider.Model)
}
if resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv != "ZHIPU_API_KEY" {
t.Fatalf("APIKeyEnv = %q, want ZHIPU_API_KEY", resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv)
}
if resolved.Provider.APIKey != "sk-zhipu-cn" {
t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want env-resolved secret", resolved.Provider.APIKey)
}
}
func TestResolveAppliesZaiInternationalCatalogDefaults(t *testing.T) {
// "zai" now resolves to the international endpoint; the catalog default
// model stays glm-4.5 (live discovery upgrades to glm-5.2 at runtime).
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "zai-intl",
"providers": [{
"name": "zai-intl",
"catalog_id": "zai"
}]
}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
ProjectConfigPath: path,
Env: map[string]string{
"ZAI_API_KEY": "sk-zai-intl",
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
}
if resolved.Provider.CatalogID != "zai" {
t.Fatalf("CatalogID = %q, want zai", resolved.Provider.CatalogID)
}
if resolved.Provider.ProviderKind != ProviderKindOpenAICompatible {
t.Fatalf("ProviderKind = %q, want %q", resolved.Provider.ProviderKind, ProviderKindOpenAICompatible)
}
if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != "https://api.z.ai/api/paas/v4" {
t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want Z.ai international default", resolved.Provider.BaseURL)
}
if resolved.Provider.Model != "glm-4.5" {
t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want glm-4.5 (preserved default; live discovery upgrades to glm-5.2 at runtime)", resolved.Provider.Model)
}
if resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv != "ZAI_API_KEY" {
t.Fatalf("APIKeyEnv = %q, want ZAI_API_KEY", resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv)
}
if resolved.Provider.APIKey != "sk-zai-intl" {
t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want env-resolved secret", resolved.Provider.APIKey)
}
}
func TestResolveProviderCatalogAliasAndLocalNoAuth(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "local",
+26
View File
@@ -112,6 +112,25 @@ func (p PreferencesConfig) RecapsEnabled() bool {
return p.Recaps == nil || *p.Recaps
}
// KeyBindingDef defines one key binding string (e.g. "ctrl+o") that the TUI
// can remap. An empty string means "use the built-in default" for that action.
type KeyBindingDef string
// KeyBindingsConfig holds the subset of TUI keybindings that users may remap
// via config.json. Each field defaults to a sensible built-in when empty.
type KeyBindingsConfig struct {
// ToggleDetailed toggles the detailed transcript view (default: ctrl+o).
ToggleDetailed KeyBindingDef `json:"toggleDetailed,omitempty"`
// ToggleMouse toggles mouse capture release (default: ctrl+e).
ToggleMouse KeyBindingDef `json:"toggleMouse,omitempty"`
// CycleReasoning cycles through reasoning effort levels (default: ctrl+t).
CycleReasoning KeyBindingDef `json:"cycleReasoning,omitempty"`
// TogglePlan toggles the plan panel expansion (default: ctrl+p).
TogglePlan KeyBindingDef `json:"togglePlan,omitempty"`
// ToggleSidebar toggles the right context sidebar (default: ctrl+b).
ToggleSidebar KeyBindingDef `json:"toggleSidebar,omitempty"`
}
// LocalControlConfig controls local browser/desktop/terminal automation helpers.
// Helpers are discovered lazily by the tool that needs them; no setup command or
// background probe is required during startup.
@@ -206,6 +225,7 @@ type FileConfig struct {
Tools ToolsConfig `json:"tools,omitempty"`
Swarm SwarmConfig `json:"swarm,omitempty"`
Preferences PreferencesConfig `json:"preferences,omitempty"`
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig `json:"keybindings,omitempty"`
LocalControl LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl,omitempty"`
}
@@ -220,6 +240,7 @@ func (cfg FileConfig) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
Tools ToolsConfig `json:"tools,omitempty"`
Swarm SwarmConfig `json:"swarm,omitempty"`
Preferences PreferencesConfig `json:"preferences,omitempty"`
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig `json:"keybindings,omitempty"`
LocalControl *LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl,omitempty"`
}
raw := rawConfig{
@@ -232,6 +253,7 @@ func (cfg FileConfig) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
Tools: cfg.Tools,
Swarm: cfg.Swarm,
Preferences: cfg.Preferences,
KeyBindings: cfg.KeyBindings,
}
if !cfg.LocalControl.Empty() {
raw.LocalControl = &cfg.LocalControl
@@ -256,6 +278,7 @@ type Overrides struct {
Sandbox SandboxConfig
Notify NotifyConfig
Tools ToolsConfig
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig
LocalControl LocalControlConfig
}
@@ -270,6 +293,7 @@ type ResolvedConfig struct {
Tools ToolsConfig
Swarm SwarmConfig
Preferences PreferencesConfig
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig
LocalControl LocalControlConfig
}
@@ -316,6 +340,7 @@ func (cfg *FileConfig) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
Tools ToolsConfig `json:"tools"`
Swarm SwarmConfig `json:"swarm"`
Preferences PreferencesConfig `json:"preferences"`
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig `json:"keybindings"`
LocalControl LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl"`
MCPServers map[string]MCPServerConfig `json:"mcpServers"`
MCPServersSnake map[string]MCPServerConfig `json:"mcp_servers"`
@@ -342,6 +367,7 @@ func (cfg *FileConfig) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
cfg.Tools = raw.Tools
cfg.Swarm = raw.Swarm
cfg.Preferences = raw.Preferences
cfg.KeyBindings = raw.KeyBindings
cfg.LocalControl = raw.LocalControl
if cfg.MCP.Servers == nil && (len(raw.MCPServers) > 0 || len(raw.MCPServersSnake) > 0) {
cfg.MCP.Servers = map[string]MCPServerConfig{}
+25 -9
View File
@@ -131,29 +131,45 @@ func doctorSandboxPolicy(cfg config.SandboxConfig) sandbox.Policy {
// lspServersCheck reports which language servers ZERO would use are present on
// PATH. Missing servers are not a failure — ZERO degrades to text-only edits for
// those languages — so the worst status is WARN, and each missing server gets an
// actionable install command keyed by its binary name.
// actionable install command keyed by its binary name. Only the tier-1 servers
// (lsp.CoreServerBinaries) drive the status: the long-tail servers configured
// for breadth are listed informationally under missingOptional, because warning
// about a missing zls on a machine with no Zig code would be permanent noise.
func lspServersCheck(lookup func(string) (string, error)) Check {
if lookup == nil {
lookup = exec.LookPath
}
core := map[string]bool{}
for _, binary := range lsp.CoreServerBinaries() {
core[binary] = true
}
present := map[string]any{}
missing := map[string]any{}
missingOptional := map[string]any{}
for _, binary := range lsp.ServerBinaries() {
if _, err := lookup(binary); err == nil {
present[binary] = "on PATH"
continue
}
missing[binary] = lspRemedy(binary)
if core[binary] {
missing[binary] = lspRemedy(binary)
} else {
missingOptional[binary] = lspRemedy(binary)
}
}
details := map[string]any{"present": present}
if len(missingOptional) > 0 {
details["missingOptional"] = missingOptional
}
if len(missing) == 0 {
return check("lsp.servers", "LSP servers", StatusPass, "All known language servers are available on PATH.", map[string]any{
"present": present,
})
message := "All core language servers are available on PATH."
if len(missingOptional) > 0 {
message = fmt.Sprintf("All core language servers are available on PATH (%d optional server(s) not installed).", len(missingOptional))
}
return check("lsp.servers", "LSP servers", StatusPass, message, details)
}
return check("lsp.servers", "LSP servers", StatusWarn, fmt.Sprintf("%d language server(s) missing from PATH; affected files degrade to text-only edits.", len(missing)), map[string]any{
"present": present,
"missing": missing,
})
details["missing"] = missing
return check("lsp.servers", "LSP servers", StatusWarn, fmt.Sprintf("%d language server(s) missing from PATH; affected files degrade to text-only edits.", len(missing)), details)
}
// lspRemedy returns an actionable install command for a missing language-server
+167
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
// Package errhint classifies provider/model failures into a few user-actionable
// categories and turns them into a one-line "next step" hint.
//
// Provider errors already arrive with a classified string prefix from
// providerio.ClassifiedError ("auth error:", "rate limit error:", …); lower-level
// failures (DNS, TLS, timeouts, context-length) arrive as raw driver or library
// messages. Classify matches both so the interactive error row (TUI) and the
// `zero exec` provider-error path (CLI) can append one concrete next step instead
// of dumping an identical red blob for every failure mode.
package errhint
import "strings"
// Category buckets a provider/model failure into a small set of classes that each
// map to a distinct recovery action.
type Category int
const (
// Unknown means the error didn't match any known signature; callers should
// emit no hint rather than guess.
Unknown Category = iota
Auth
RateLimit
Connectivity
ModelNotFound
ContextOverflow
)
// providerMarkers are the prefixes the provider layer attaches to every
// provider-originated failure: providerio.ClassifiedError emits "auth error:",
// "rate limit error:", "provider error:", and "provider request error:", and the
// streaming paths wrap transport/decoding failures as "provider stream error:".
// A UI surface's error can also be a *local* failure (a tool's "permission
// denied", a "file does not exist", a config error), so Classify only proceeds
// past this gate for messages that are recognizably from the provider — otherwise
// a broad substring like "does not exist" would attach a bogus /model hint to an
// unrelated local error.
var providerMarkers = []string{
"auth error:",
"rate limit error:",
"provider error:",
"provider request error:",
"provider stream error:",
}
// Classify buckets err by scanning its message for known signatures. It is a
// deliberately conservative string heuristic — the provider layer has already
// discarded the numeric HTTP status by the time the error reaches a UI surface,
// so the message is all we have. It first gates on a provider-origin marker (see
// providerMarkers) so local failures never draw a provider hint, then sub-classifies.
// Order matters: more specific signatures are tested before broader ones (e.g.
// "context length" as overflow before the generic "timeout" as connectivity).
func Classify(err error) Category {
if err == nil {
return Unknown
}
m := strings.ToLower(err.Error())
if !containsAny(m, providerMarkers...) {
return Unknown
}
switch {
case containsAny(m, "auth error:", "unauthorized", "api key", "api_key", "invalid_api_key",
"authentication", "permission denied", "forbidden") || containsStatusCode(m, "401", "403"):
return Auth
case containsAny(m, "rate limit", "rate_limit", "too many requests", "quota",
"resource_exhausted", "overloaded") || containsStatusCode(m, "429", "529"):
return RateLimit
case containsAny(m, "context length", "context window", "maximum context", "context_length_exceeded",
"too many tokens", "prompt is too long", "reduce the length", "maximum context length"):
return ContextOverflow
case containsAny(m, "model not found", "model_not_found", "does not exist", "unknown model",
"no such model", "unsupported model", "invalid model", "model is not"):
return ModelNotFound
case containsAny(m, "dial tcp", "no such host", "connection refused", "network is unreachable",
"i/o timeout", "context deadline exceeded", "tls handshake", "connection reset",
"unexpected eof", "lookup ", "timeout"):
return Connectivity
default:
return Unknown
}
}
// TUIHint returns a one-line hint referencing interactive slash commands, or ""
// when the category is Unknown. Meant to sit under the raw error in the live
// error row.
func TUIHint(err error) string {
switch Classify(err) {
case Auth:
return "API key rejected — run /provider to re-check your credentials"
case RateLimit:
return "Rate limited — wait a moment, or switch model with /model"
case Connectivity:
return "Can't reach the provider — run /doctor --connectivity"
case ModelNotFound:
return "Model unavailable — pick another with /model"
case ContextOverflow:
return "Context window full — run /compact to free space"
default:
return ""
}
}
// CLIHint returns a one-line hint referencing `zero …` subcommands, or "" when the
// category is Unknown. Meant for the non-interactive `zero exec` error path, where
// slash commands don't apply.
func CLIHint(err error) string {
switch Classify(err) {
case Auth:
return "API key rejected — run `zero auth` or set the provider's API key, then retry"
case RateLimit:
return "Rate limited — wait a moment, or switch model with --model"
case Connectivity:
return "Can't reach the provider — run `zero doctor`"
case ModelNotFound:
return "Model unavailable — run `zero doctor` or pick another with --model"
case ContextOverflow:
return "Context window full — shorten the prompt or start a fresh session"
default:
return ""
}
}
func containsAny(haystack string, needles ...string) bool {
for _, n := range needles {
if strings.Contains(haystack, n) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// containsStatusCode reports whether haystack contains any of the given HTTP
// status codes as a standalone number — not embedded in a longer digit run like
// "completed in 4290ms" or "request id 14015" — so an incidental number can't be
// mis-bucketed as an auth/rate-limit failure.
func containsStatusCode(haystack string, codes ...string) bool {
return HasStatusCode(haystack, codes...)
}
// HasStatusCode reports whether haystack contains any of the given HTTP status
// codes as a standalone number — not embedded in a longer digit run like
// "completed in 4290ms" or "request id 14015". Exported so other packages (e.g.
// the reconnect classifier) can gate on a status code without re-implementing
// the digit-boundary check.
func HasStatusCode(haystack string, codes ...string) bool {
for _, code := range codes {
for from := 0; ; {
rel := strings.Index(haystack[from:], code)
if rel < 0 {
break
}
pos := from + rel
beforeOK := pos == 0 || !isASCIIDigit(haystack[pos-1])
end := pos + len(code)
afterOK := end >= len(haystack) || !isASCIIDigit(haystack[end])
if beforeOK && afterOK {
return true
}
from = pos + 1
}
}
return false
}
func isASCIIDigit(b byte) bool {
return b >= '0' && b <= '9'
}
+94
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
package errhint
import (
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestClassify(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
msg string
want Category
}{
{"nil-ish empty", "", Unknown},
{"providerio auth prefix", "auth error: your API key is missing or invalid — run `zero auth`", Auth},
{"raw 401", "provider request error: 401 Unauthorized", Auth},
{"invalid api key", "provider request error: invalid_api_key: incorrect key provided", Auth},
{"rate limit prefix", "rate limit error: 429 too many requests", RateLimit},
{"overloaded", "provider error: model is overloaded, please retry", RateLimit},
{"resource exhausted gemini", "provider stream error: rpc error: code = ResourceExhausted desc = quota exceeded", RateLimit},
{"context length openai", "provider request error: this model's maximum context length is 128000 tokens", ContextOverflow},
{"context_length_exceeded", "provider request error: context_length_exceeded", ContextOverflow},
{"model not found", "provider request error: 404 the model `gpt-9` does not exist", ModelNotFound},
{"unknown model", "provider request error: unknown model: sonnet-99", ModelNotFound},
{"dns failure", "provider stream error: Post \"https://api...\": dial tcp: lookup api.foo.com: no such host", Connectivity},
{"connection refused", "provider stream error: dial tcp 127.0.0.1:443: connection refused", Connectivity},
{"deadline", "provider stream error: context deadline exceeded (Client.Timeout exceeded)", Connectivity},
{"provider-marked but no sub-signature", "provider error: something totally unexpected happened", Unknown},
// An incidental number that merely contains a status-code digit run must NOT
// be mis-bucketed (digit-boundary check), even behind a provider marker.
{"incidental latency number", "provider error: request completed in 4290ms then failed", Unknown},
{"incidental request id", "provider error: request id 14015 failed unexpectedly", Unknown},
{"standalone 401 still auth", "provider request error: got 401 from upstream", Auth},
{"standalone 429 still rate limit", "provider error: 429 returned", RateLimit},
// Local (non-provider) failures must NOT be classified — no provider marker,
// so no bogus recovery hint attaches to them.
{"local fs permission denied", "open /etc/shadow: permission denied", Unknown},
{"local file missing", "stat foo.go: no such file or directory", Unknown},
{"local model config typo", "unknown model: sonnet-99", Unknown},
{"tool timeout local", "tool bash timed out after 600s", Unknown},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := Classify(errors.New(tc.msg)); got != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("Classify(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.msg, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestClassifyNil(t *testing.T) {
if got := Classify(nil); got != Unknown {
t.Fatalf("Classify(nil) = %v, want Unknown", got)
}
}
// Context-overflow must win over the connectivity "timeout" catch-all: a message
// mentioning both "context length" and a timeout is an overflow, not a network
// problem.
func TestContextOverflowBeatsConnectivity(t *testing.T) {
err := errors.New("provider request error: maximum context length exceeded; request timeout")
if got := Classify(err); got != ContextOverflow {
t.Fatalf("Classify = %v, want ContextOverflow", got)
}
}
func TestHintsPresentForKnownCategories(t *testing.T) {
known := []error{
errors.New("auth error: bad key"),
errors.New("rate limit error: 429"),
errors.New("provider stream error: dial tcp: no such host"),
errors.New("provider request error: model does not exist"),
errors.New("provider request error: maximum context length is 128000 tokens"),
}
for _, err := range known {
if h := TUIHint(err); strings.TrimSpace(h) == "" {
t.Fatalf("TUIHint(%q) empty, want a hint", err)
}
if h := CLIHint(err); strings.TrimSpace(h) == "" {
t.Fatalf("CLIHint(%q) empty, want a hint", err)
}
}
// Unknown yields no hint on either surface.
unknown := errors.New("provider error: mystery")
if h := TUIHint(unknown); h != "" {
t.Fatalf("TUIHint(unknown) = %q, want empty", h)
}
if h := CLIHint(unknown); h != "" {
t.Fatalf("CLIHint(unknown) = %q, want empty", h)
}
}
+123 -15
View File
@@ -9,26 +9,134 @@ import (
// serverCommands maps a file extension to the language-server command (argv) ZERO
// will spawn. The first element is the binary looked up on PATH; missing binaries
// are not an error, the agent just degrades to text-only for that file.
// are not an error, the agent just degrades to text-only for that file. Every
// command is the language's community-standard server invoked in stdio mode, so
// a wrong guess can never spawn something surprising — only fail the PATH check.
var serverCommands = map[string][]string{
".go": {"gopls", "serve"},
".ts": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
".tsx": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
".js": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
".jsx": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
".py": {"pyright-langserver", "--stdio"},
".rs": {"rust-analyzer"},
".go": {"gopls", "serve"},
".ts": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
".tsx": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
".mts": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
".cts": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
".js": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
".jsx": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
".mjs": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
".cjs": {"typescript-language-server", "--stdio"},
".py": {"pyright-langserver", "--stdio"},
".pyi": {"pyright-langserver", "--stdio"},
".rs": {"rust-analyzer"},
".c": {"clangd"},
".h": {"clangd"},
".cpp": {"clangd"},
".cc": {"clangd"},
".cxx": {"clangd"},
".hpp": {"clangd"},
".java": {"jdtls"},
".kt": {"kotlin-language-server"},
".kts": {"kotlin-language-server"},
".rb": {"ruby-lsp"},
".php": {"intelephense", "--stdio"},
".zig": {"zls"},
".lua": {"lua-language-server"},
".ex": {"elixir-ls"},
".exs": {"elixir-ls"},
".hs": {"haskell-language-server-wrapper", "--lsp"},
".swift": {"sourcekit-lsp"},
".ml": {"ocamllsp"},
".mli": {"ocamllsp"},
".scala": {"metals"},
".clj": {"clojure-lsp"},
".cljs": {"clojure-lsp"},
".cljc": {"clojure-lsp"},
".dart": {"dart", "language-server"},
".gleam": {"gleam", "lsp"},
".nix": {"nixd"},
".tf": {"terraform-ls", "serve"},
".sh": {"bash-language-server", "start"},
".bash": {"bash-language-server", "start"},
".yaml": {"yaml-language-server", "--stdio"},
".yml": {"yaml-language-server", "--stdio"},
".json": {"vscode-json-language-server", "--stdio"},
".css": {"vscode-css-language-server", "--stdio"},
".scss": {"vscode-css-language-server", "--stdio"},
".less": {"vscode-css-language-server", "--stdio"},
".html": {"vscode-html-language-server", "--stdio"},
".svelte": {"svelteserver", "--stdio"},
".vue": {"vue-language-server", "--stdio"},
".astro": {"astro-ls", "--stdio"},
}
// languageIDs maps a file extension to the LSP languageId used in didOpen.
var languageIDs = map[string]string{
".go": "go",
".ts": "typescript",
".tsx": "typescriptreact",
".js": "javascript",
".jsx": "javascriptreact",
".py": "python",
".rs": "rust",
".go": "go",
".ts": "typescript",
".tsx": "typescriptreact",
".mts": "typescript",
".cts": "typescript",
".js": "javascript",
".jsx": "javascriptreact",
".mjs": "javascript",
".cjs": "javascript",
".py": "python",
".pyi": "python",
".rs": "rust",
".c": "c",
".h": "c",
".cpp": "cpp",
".cc": "cpp",
".cxx": "cpp",
".hpp": "cpp",
".java": "java",
".kt": "kotlin",
".kts": "kotlin",
".rb": "ruby",
".php": "php",
".zig": "zig",
".lua": "lua",
".ex": "elixir",
".exs": "elixir",
".hs": "haskell",
".swift": "swift",
".ml": "ocaml",
".mli": "ocaml",
".scala": "scala",
".clj": "clojure",
".cljs": "clojure",
".cljc": "clojure",
".dart": "dart",
".gleam": "gleam",
".nix": "nix",
".tf": "terraform",
".sh": "shellscript",
".bash": "shellscript",
".yaml": "yaml",
".yml": "yaml",
".json": "json",
".css": "css",
".scss": "scss",
".less": "less",
".html": "html",
".svelte": "svelte",
".vue": "vue",
".astro": "astro",
}
// coreServerBinaries are the tier-1 servers for the languages agents hit most;
// `zero doctor` treats their absence as warn-worthy. The long tail of servers
// configured above for breadth is reported informationally only — warning about
// a missing zls on a machine with no Zig code would be permanent noise.
var coreServerBinaries = []string{
"gopls",
"typescript-language-server",
"pyright-langserver",
"rust-analyzer",
}
// CoreServerBinaries returns the tier-1 server binaries (sorted copy).
func CoreServerBinaries() []string {
binaries := append([]string(nil), coreServerBinaries...)
sort.Strings(binaries)
return binaries
}
// ServerBinaries returns the unique set of language-server binaries ZERO may
+127
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"os"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -211,6 +212,85 @@ func TestHTTPClientListsAndCallsTools(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestHTTPClientFollowsSameOriginRedirect(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
testServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
if request.URL.Path == "/mcp" {
http.Redirect(response, request, "/redirected", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
return
}
if request.Method != http.MethodPost || request.URL.Path != "/redirected" {
t.Errorf("request = %s %s, want POST /redirected", request.Method, request.URL.Path)
http.Error(response, "bad request", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "secret" {
t.Errorf("X-Api-Key = %q, want secret", got)
http.Error(response, "missing auth", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
message := readHTTPRPCMessage(t, request)
switch message.Method {
case "initialize":
writeHTTPRPCResponse(t, response, message.ID, map[string]any{"protocolVersion": "2024-11-05"})
case "notifications/initialized":
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
default:
writeHTTPRPCResponse(t, response, message.ID, map[string]any{})
}
}))
defer testServer.Close()
client, err := Connect(ctx, Server{
Name: "docs",
Type: ServerTypeHTTP,
URL: testServer.URL + "/mcp",
Headers: map[string]string{"X-Api-Key": "secret"},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Connect() error = %v", err)
}
if err := client.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Close() error = %v", err)
}
}
func TestHTTPClientRejectsCrossOriginRedirectBeforeSendingHeaders(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var targetHits int32
target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
atomic.AddInt32(&targetHits, 1)
if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "" {
t.Errorf("redirect target received X-Api-Key = %q", got)
}
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer target.Close()
redirector := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(response, request, target.URL+"/mcp", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
}))
defer redirector.Close()
_, err := Connect(ctx, Server{
Name: "docs",
Type: ServerTypeHTTP,
URL: redirector.URL + "/mcp",
Headers: map[string]string{"X-Api-Key": "secret"},
})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-origin redirect") {
t.Fatalf("Connect() error = %v, want cross-origin redirect error", err)
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&targetHits); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("redirect target hits = %d, want 0", got)
}
}
func TestSSEClientListsAndCallsToolsFromRemoteStream(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
@@ -340,6 +420,53 @@ func TestSSEClientListsAndCallsToolsFromRemoteStream(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestSSEClientRejectsCrossOriginEndpointBeforeSendingHeaders(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var targetHits int32
target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
atomic.AddInt32(&targetHits, 1)
if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "" {
t.Errorf("SSE endpoint target received X-Api-Key = %q", got)
}
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
}))
defer target.Close()
stream := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "secret" {
t.Errorf("X-Api-Key = %q, want secret on configured SSE server", got)
http.Error(response, "missing auth", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
if request.Method != http.MethodGet || request.URL.Path != "/sse" {
t.Errorf("request = %s %s, want GET /sse", request.Method, request.URL.Path)
http.Error(response, "bad request", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(response, "event: endpoint\ndata: %s/messages\n\n", target.URL)
if flusher, ok := response.(http.Flusher); ok {
flusher.Flush()
}
}))
defer stream.Close()
_, err := Connect(ctx, Server{
Name: "docs",
Type: ServerTypeSSE,
URL: stream.URL + "/sse",
Headers: map[string]string{"X-Api-Key": "secret"},
})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "endpoint origin") {
t.Fatalf("Connect() error = %v, want cross-origin endpoint error", err)
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&targetHits); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("SSE endpoint target hits = %d, want 0", got)
}
}
func TestHTTPClientReportsNonOKStatus(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
+8 -4
View File
@@ -733,7 +733,11 @@ func resolveSSEEndpointURL(baseValue string, endpointValue string) (string, erro
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("parse MCP SSE endpoint URL: %w", err)
}
return baseURL.ResolveReference(endpointURL).String(), nil
resolvedURL := baseURL.ResolveReference(endpointURL)
if !sameMCPOrigin(baseURL, resolvedURL) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("MCP SSE endpoint origin %s differs from configured server origin %s", mcpOrigin(resolvedURL), mcpOrigin(baseURL))
}
return resolvedURL.String(), nil
}
func rpcResponseKey(id any) string {
@@ -873,10 +877,10 @@ func (source *storeTokenSource) Refresh(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
// oauthHTTPClient returns an HTTP client whose transport attaches OAuth bearer
// tokens and refreshes them on 401 for OAuth-configured servers. Servers that do
// not declare OAuth get the default client unchanged.
// not declare OAuth use the default transport with the same MCP redirect guard.
func oauthHTTPClient(server Server) (*http.Client, error) {
if !strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(server.Auth), ServerAuthOAuth) {
return http.DefaultClient, nil
return mcpHTTPClient(server, nil), nil
}
store, err := NewTokenStore(TokenStoreOptions{})
if err != nil {
@@ -888,5 +892,5 @@ func oauthHTTPClient(server Server) (*http.Client, error) {
httpClient: http.DefaultClient,
now: time.Now,
}
return &http.Client{Transport: newOAuthRoundTripper(http.DefaultTransport, source, server.Name)}, nil
return mcpHTTPClient(server, newOAuthRoundTripper(http.DefaultTransport, source, server.Name)), nil
}
+136
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
@@ -149,6 +150,141 @@ func TestOAuthRoundTripperDoesNotRetryAfterSuccessfulNon401(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestOAuthRoundTripperRejectsCrossOriginRedirectBeforeBearerLeak(t *testing.T) {
source := &fakeTokenSource{}
source.access.Store("access-secret")
source.refreshFunc = func() (string, error) { return "access-fresh", nil }
var targetHits int32
target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
atomic.AddInt32(&targetHits, 1)
if got := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "" {
t.Errorf("redirect target received Authorization = %q", got)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer target.Close()
redirector := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, target.URL+"/mcp", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
}))
defer redirector.Close()
client := mcpHTTPClient(
Server{Name: "oauth-docs", Type: ServerTypeHTTP},
newOAuthRoundTripper(http.DefaultTransport, source, "oauth-docs"),
)
resp, err := client.Get(redirector.URL + "/mcp")
if resp != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-origin redirect") {
t.Fatalf("Get() error = %v, want cross-origin redirect error", err)
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&targetHits); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("redirect target hits = %d, want 0", got)
}
}
func TestSameMCPOriginNormalizesDefaultPorts(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
left string
right string
want bool
}{
{
name: "https default port",
left: "https://example.test/mcp",
right: "https://EXAMPLE.test:443/other",
want: true,
},
{
name: "http default port",
left: "http://example.test/mcp",
right: "http://example.test:80/other",
want: true,
},
{
name: "different scheme",
left: "https://example.test/mcp",
right: "http://example.test:443/other",
want: false,
},
{
name: "different port",
left: "https://example.test/mcp",
right: "https://example.test:8443/other",
want: false,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
left, err := url.Parse(tc.left)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
right, err := url.Parse(tc.right)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got := sameMCPOrigin(left, right); got != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("sameMCPOrigin(%q, %q) = %v, want %v", tc.left, tc.right, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestResolveSSEEndpointURLRestrictsOrigin(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
base string
endpoint string
want string
wantErr string
}{
{
name: "relative endpoint",
base: "https://example.test/sse",
endpoint: "/messages",
want: "https://example.test/messages",
},
{
name: "absolute same origin",
base: "https://example.test/sse",
endpoint: "https://example.test/messages",
want: "https://example.test/messages",
},
{
name: "default port equivalent",
base: "https://example.test/sse",
endpoint: "https://example.test:443/messages",
want: "https://example.test:443/messages",
},
{
name: "cross origin",
base: "https://example.test/sse",
endpoint: "https://evil.test/messages",
wantErr: "differs from configured server origin",
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := resolveSSEEndpointURL(tc.base, tc.endpoint)
if tc.wantErr != "" {
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("resolveSSEEndpointURL() error = %v, want %q", err, tc.wantErr)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("resolveSSEEndpointURL() error = %v", err)
}
if got != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("resolveSSEEndpointURL() = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestNonOAuthServerIsUnaffected(t *testing.T) {
// Regression: a server without auth must not get a bearer header or any
// OAuth round tripper, and must connect normally.
+74
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
package mcp
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
)
const maxMCPRedirects = 10
func mcpHTTPClient(server Server, transport http.RoundTripper) *http.Client {
return &http.Client{
Transport: transport,
CheckRedirect: checkMCPRedirect(server),
}
}
func checkMCPRedirect(server Server) func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
return func(request *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= maxMCPRedirects {
return fmt.Errorf("MCP %s server %s stopped after %d redirects", server.Type, server.Name, maxMCPRedirects)
}
if len(via) == 0 {
return nil
}
if !sameMCPOrigin(via[0].URL, request.URL) {
return fmt.Errorf("MCP %s server %s refused cross-origin redirect to %s", server.Type, server.Name, mcpOrigin(request.URL))
}
return nil
}
}
func sameMCPOrigin(left *url.URL, right *url.URL) bool {
if left == nil || right == nil {
return false
}
return strings.EqualFold(left.Scheme, right.Scheme) &&
strings.EqualFold(left.Hostname(), right.Hostname()) &&
effectiveMCPPort(left) == effectiveMCPPort(right)
}
func effectiveMCPPort(value *url.URL) string {
if value == nil {
return ""
}
if port := value.Port(); port != "" {
return port
}
switch strings.ToLower(value.Scheme) {
case "http":
return "80"
case "https":
return "443"
default:
return ""
}
}
func mcpOrigin(value *url.URL) string {
if value == nil {
return "<nil>"
}
host := value.Hostname()
port := effectiveMCPPort(value)
if port != "" {
host = net.JoinHostPort(host, port)
}
if value.Scheme == "" {
return host
}
return strings.ToLower(value.Scheme) + "://" + host
}
+4
View File
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ func DefaultModelEntries() []ModelEntry {
googleModel("gemini-2.5-flash-lite", "Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite", "gemini-2.5-flash-lite", ModelStatusActive, []string{"google:gemini-2.5-flash-lite", "gemini-flash-lite"}, ContextLimits{ContextWindow: 1_048_576, MaxOutputTokens: 65_536}, ModelCost{InputPerMillion: 0.1, CachedInputPerMillion: 0.01, OutputPerMillion: 0.4}, []ModelCapability{ModelCapabilityVision, ModelCapabilityJSONMode, ModelCapabilityReasoning, ModelCapabilityLongContext}, standardReasoningEfforts(), "Google low-cost Flash model for background routing and summaries."),
}
decorateModelDepth(entries)
// Overlay volatile facts (context limits, base pricing) from a cached
// models.dev snapshot when one is present and fresh — see modelsdev.go.
// Identity fields (ids, aliases, patterns, deprecations) stay curated.
entries = applyModelsDevOverrides(entries, cachedModelsDevProviders())
return cloneModelEntries(entries)
}
+269
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
package modelregistry
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
)
// Live models.dev overlay for the curated catalog. The hand-maintained
// DefaultModelEntries list is the source of truth for identity — ids, aliases,
// match patterns, deprecations, escalation targets — but its VOLATILE facts
// (context window, max output tokens, per-million pricing) go stale between
// releases. When a cached snapshot of https://models.dev/api.json is present,
// those fields are refreshed from it at registry construction; everything else
// stays curated. The overlay never adds models (an auto-added entry would lack
// aliases, match patterns, and provider wiring) and never touches the network
// on the registry hot path — fetching happens only in the explicit background
// refresh, cached to disk with a TTL.
const (
modelsDevDefaultURL = "https://models.dev/api.json"
// modelsDevRefreshAfter is how old the cache may get before a background
// refresh re-fetches it.
modelsDevRefreshAfter = 24 * time.Hour
// modelsDevMaxAge is the oldest cache still applied as an overlay. Beyond
// this the curated catalog (updated with the binary) is likely fresher than
// the snapshot, so a stale file is ignored rather than trusted.
modelsDevMaxAge = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
modelsDevFetchLimit = 32 << 20 // 32MiB guard on the response body
modelsDevFetchWindow = 15 * time.Second
)
// modelsDevModel is the subset of a models.dev model record the overlay uses.
type modelsDevModel struct {
Limit struct {
Context int `json:"context"`
Output int `json:"output"`
} `json:"limit"`
Cost struct {
Input float64 `json:"input"`
Output float64 `json:"output"`
CacheRead float64 `json:"cache_read"`
CacheWrite float64 `json:"cache_write"`
} `json:"cost"`
}
// modelsDevProvider matches one provider object in api.json.
type modelsDevProvider struct {
Models map[string]modelsDevModel `json:"models"`
}
// parseModelsDev decodes an api.json document into provider-slug -> api-model
// -> record. api.json is a top-level object keyed by provider id.
func parseModelsDev(data []byte) (map[string]map[string]modelsDevModel, error) {
var doc map[string]modelsDevProvider
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &doc); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("modelregistry: parse models.dev: %w", err)
}
providers := make(map[string]map[string]modelsDevModel, len(doc))
for slug, provider := range doc {
if len(provider.Models) == 0 {
continue
}
providers[slug] = provider.Models
}
if len(providers) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("modelregistry: models.dev document has no providers")
}
return providers, nil
}
// modelsDevSlugs maps an entry's provider kind to the models.dev provider ids
// worth checking. Only first-party slugs are used: router entries on models.dev
// carry generic or stale numbers.
func modelsDevSlugs(kind ProviderKind) []string {
switch kind {
case ProviderAnthropic:
return []string{"anthropic"}
case ProviderOpenAI:
return []string{"openai"}
case ProviderGoogle:
return []string{"google", "google-vertex"}
default:
return nil
}
}
// applyModelsDevOverrides refreshes each curated entry's context limits and
// base pricing from the snapshot, when the snapshot knows the model. Tiered
// pricing is never touched: models.dev has no tier data, and mixing a live
// base rate with curated tiers would misprice the tier boundaries.
func applyModelsDevOverrides(entries []ModelEntry, providers map[string]map[string]modelsDevModel) []ModelEntry {
if len(providers) == 0 {
return entries
}
for i := range entries {
entry := &entries[i]
var record modelsDevModel
found := false
for _, slug := range modelsDevSlugs(entry.Provider) {
if models, ok := providers[slug]; ok {
if candidate, ok := models[strings.TrimSpace(entry.APIModel)]; ok {
record = candidate
found = true
break
}
}
}
if !found {
continue
}
if record.Limit.Context > 0 {
entry.ContextLimits.ContextWindow = record.Limit.Context
}
if record.Limit.Output > 0 {
entry.ContextLimits.MaxOutputTokens = record.Limit.Output
}
if len(entry.Cost.Tiers) == 0 && record.Cost.Input > 0 && record.Cost.Output > 0 {
entry.Cost.InputPerMillion = record.Cost.Input
entry.Cost.OutputPerMillion = record.Cost.Output
if record.Cost.CacheRead > 0 {
entry.Cost.CachedInputPerMillion = record.Cost.CacheRead
}
if record.Cost.CacheWrite > 0 {
entry.Cost.CacheWritePerMillion = record.Cost.CacheWrite
}
entry.Cost.Source = "models.dev/api.json (cached)"
}
}
return entries
}
// modelsDevCachePath returns the on-disk cache location. ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH
// overrides it (used by tests and unusual setups).
func modelsDevCachePath() (string, error) {
if override := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH")); override != "" {
return override, nil
}
base, err := os.UserCacheDir()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return filepath.Join(base, "zero", "modelsdev.json"), nil
}
var (
modelsDevOnce sync.Once
modelsDevCached map[string]map[string]modelsDevModel
modelsDevEnabled atomic.Bool
)
// EnableModelsDevOverlay opts the process into applying the cached models.dev
// snapshot on top of the curated catalog. The CLI entrypoint calls it; library
// consumers and tests that never do get the curated catalog byte-identical to
// before, so hermetic tests can't be perturbed by a cache file on the machine.
// ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH disables both the overlay and the fetch.
func EnableModelsDevOverlay() {
modelsDevEnabled.Store(true)
}
// cachedModelsDevProviders loads the cached snapshot once per process. Not
// enabled, missing, stale (> modelsDevMaxAge), or malformed all yield nil and
// the curated catalog is used untouched. Read once deliberately:
// DefaultRegistry is called on hot paths (pickers, cost views) and must not
// re-stat the file every time; a background refresh benefits the NEXT process.
func cachedModelsDevProviders() map[string]map[string]modelsDevModel {
if !modelsDevEnabled.Load() || strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH")) != "" {
return nil
}
modelsDevOnce.Do(func() {
path, err := modelsDevCachePath()
if err != nil {
return
}
info, err := os.Stat(path)
if err != nil || time.Since(info.ModTime()) > modelsDevMaxAge {
return
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return
}
providers, err := parseModelsDev(data)
if err != nil {
return
}
modelsDevCached = providers
})
return modelsDevCached
}
// resetModelsDevCacheForTest clears the process-level cache memoization and
// disables the overlay.
func resetModelsDevCacheForTest() {
modelsDevOnce = sync.Once{}
modelsDevCached = nil
modelsDevEnabled.Store(false)
}
// RefreshModelsDevCache fetches models.dev/api.json into the on-disk cache
// when the cache is missing or older than modelsDevRefreshAfter. It is safe to
// call fire-and-forget from startup (use a goroutine); it never affects the
// current process's registry (see cachedModelsDevProviders). Disabled entirely
// by ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH. The URL can be overridden with ZERO_MODELS_URL.
func RefreshModelsDevCache(ctx context.Context) error {
if strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH")) != "" {
return nil
}
path, err := modelsDevCachePath()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if info, err := os.Stat(path); err == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) < modelsDevRefreshAfter {
return nil
}
url := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ZERO_MODELS_URL"))
if url == "" {
url = modelsDevDefaultURL
}
fetchCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, modelsDevFetchWindow)
defer cancel()
request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(fetchCtx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
request.Header.Set("User-Agent", "zero-models-refresh/0.1")
response, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(request)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer response.Body.Close()
if response.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return fmt.Errorf("modelregistry: models.dev fetch: HTTP %d", response.StatusCode)
}
data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(response.Body, modelsDevFetchLimit))
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Validate before persisting: a bad body must never clobber a good cache.
if _, err := parseModelsDev(data); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o755); err != nil {
return err
}
temp, err := os.CreateTemp(filepath.Dir(path), "modelsdev-*.json")
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := temp.Write(data); err != nil {
_ = temp.Close()
_ = os.Remove(temp.Name())
return err
}
if err := temp.Close(); err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(temp.Name())
return err
}
return os.Rename(temp.Name(), path)
}
+228
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
package modelregistry
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
)
const sampleModelsDev = `{
"anthropic": {
"id": "anthropic",
"models": {
"claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929": {
"limit": {"context": 1000000, "output": 64000},
"cost": {"input": 3.5, "output": 17.5, "cache_read": 0.35, "cache_write": 4.4}
}
}
},
"google": {
"id": "google",
"models": {
"gemini-2.5-pro": {
"limit": {"context": 2097152, "output": 65536},
"cost": {"input": 9.99, "output": 9.99}
}
}
}
}`
func TestParseModelsDev(t *testing.T) {
providers, err := parseModelsDev([]byte(sampleModelsDev))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
record, ok := providers["anthropic"]["claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929"]
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected anthropic sonnet record")
}
if record.Limit.Context != 1_000_000 || record.Cost.Input != 3.5 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected record: %+v", record)
}
if _, err := parseModelsDev([]byte(`{}`)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("empty document must be rejected")
}
if _, err := parseModelsDev([]byte(`not json`)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("malformed document must be rejected")
}
}
func TestApplyModelsDevOverrides(t *testing.T) {
// Point the cache at a non-existent file so DefaultModelEntries returns the
// pure curated catalog, then apply the sample snapshot explicitly.
t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent.json"))
resetModelsDevCacheForTest()
t.Cleanup(resetModelsDevCacheForTest)
providers, err := parseModelsDev([]byte(sampleModelsDev))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
entries := applyModelsDevOverrides(DefaultModelEntries(), providers)
var sonnet, geminiPro, opus ModelEntry
for _, entry := range entries {
switch entry.ID {
case "claude-sonnet-4.5":
sonnet = entry
case "gemini-2.5-pro":
geminiPro = entry
case "claude-opus-4.1":
opus = entry
}
}
// Known model: limits and base pricing refreshed from the snapshot.
if sonnet.ContextLimits.ContextWindow != 1_000_000 || sonnet.ContextLimits.MaxOutputTokens != 64_000 {
t.Fatalf("sonnet limits not overridden: %+v", sonnet.ContextLimits)
}
if sonnet.Cost.InputPerMillion != 3.5 || sonnet.Cost.OutputPerMillion != 17.5 || sonnet.Cost.CacheWritePerMillion != 4.4 {
t.Fatalf("sonnet cost not overridden: %+v", sonnet.Cost)
}
if sonnet.Cost.Source != "models.dev/api.json (cached)" {
t.Fatalf("sonnet cost source not marked: %q", sonnet.Cost.Source)
}
// Tiered pricing is curated: limits refresh, cost must NOT (gemini-2.5-pro
// has curated tiers and the snapshot's flat 9.99 would misprice them).
if geminiPro.ContextLimits.ContextWindow != 2_097_152 {
t.Fatalf("gemini limits not overridden: %+v", geminiPro.ContextLimits)
}
if geminiPro.Cost.InputPerMillion == 9.99 || len(geminiPro.Cost.Tiers) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("tiered cost must stay curated: %+v", geminiPro.Cost)
}
// Model absent from the snapshot: untouched.
if opus.ContextLimits.ContextWindow != 200_000 || opus.Cost.InputPerMillion != 15 {
t.Fatalf("opus must be untouched: %+v %+v", opus.ContextLimits, opus.Cost)
}
}
func TestRefreshModelsDevCacheFetchesAndCaches(t *testing.T) {
hits := 0
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
hits++
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(sampleModelsDev))
}))
defer server.Close()
cachePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "modelsdev.json")
t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", cachePath)
t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_URL", server.URL)
t.Setenv("ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH", "")
if err := RefreshModelsDevCache(t.Context()); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if hits != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 fetch, got %d", hits)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(cachePath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cache file missing: %v", err)
}
// Fresh cache: second call must not re-fetch.
if err := RefreshModelsDevCache(t.Context()); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if hits != 1 {
t.Fatalf("fresh cache must skip the fetch, got %d hits", hits)
}
}
func TestRefreshModelsDevCacheRejectsBadBodyWithoutClobbering(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("not json"))
}))
defer server.Close()
cachePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "modelsdev.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(cachePath, []byte(sampleModelsDev), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stale := time.Now().Add(-48 * time.Hour)
if err := os.Chtimes(cachePath, stale, stale); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", cachePath)
t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_URL", server.URL)
if err := RefreshModelsDevCache(t.Context()); err == nil {
t.Fatal("bad body must return an error")
}
content, err := os.ReadFile(cachePath)
if err != nil || string(content) != sampleModelsDev {
t.Fatal("bad fetch must not clobber the existing cache")
}
}
func TestRefreshModelsDevCacheDisabledByEnv(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Fatal("fetch must not happen when disabled")
}))
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "modelsdev.json"))
t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_URL", server.URL)
t.Setenv("ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH", "1")
if err := RefreshModelsDevCache(t.Context()); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestCachedModelsDevProvidersIgnoresStaleCache(t *testing.T) {
cachePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "modelsdev.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(cachePath, []byte(sampleModelsDev), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stale := time.Now().Add(-modelsDevMaxAge - time.Hour)
if err := os.Chtimes(cachePath, stale, stale); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", cachePath)
resetModelsDevCacheForTest()
t.Cleanup(resetModelsDevCacheForTest)
EnableModelsDevOverlay()
if providers := cachedModelsDevProviders(); providers != nil {
t.Fatal("stale cache must be ignored")
}
}
func TestCachedModelsDevProvidersRequiresOptIn(t *testing.T) {
cachePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "modelsdev.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(cachePath, []byte(sampleModelsDev), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", cachePath)
resetModelsDevCacheForTest()
t.Cleanup(resetModelsDevCacheForTest)
// Without EnableModelsDevOverlay a fresh, valid cache must still be ignored:
// library consumers and hermetic tests get the pure curated catalog.
if providers := cachedModelsDevProviders(); providers != nil {
t.Fatal("overlay must be opt-in")
}
}
func TestDefaultModelEntriesAppliesFreshCache(t *testing.T) {
cachePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "modelsdev.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(cachePath, []byte(sampleModelsDev), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("ZERO_MODELS_CACHE_PATH", cachePath)
resetModelsDevCacheForTest()
t.Cleanup(resetModelsDevCacheForTest)
EnableModelsDevOverlay()
for _, entry := range DefaultModelEntries() {
if entry.ID == "claude-sonnet-4.5" {
if entry.ContextLimits.ContextWindow != 1_000_000 {
t.Fatalf("fresh cache must overlay the registry: %+v", entry.ContextLimits)
}
return
}
}
t.Fatal("claude-sonnet-4.5 not found")
}
+6 -1
View File
@@ -114,7 +114,12 @@ func createSecretFile(path string) ([]byte, error) {
}
return writeNewSecretFile(path)
}
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
// On Windows a concurrent holder's os.Remove leaves the lock file in a
// "delete pending" state, so an O_EXCL create races it with
// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (os.ErrPermission) rather than ErrExist. Treat that
// as contention and retry too — mirroring acquireFileLock in lock.go —
// otherwise concurrent secret creation spuriously fails on Windows.
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrPermission) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: create token secret lock: %w", err)
}
if data, rerr := readSecretFileRetry(path); rerr == nil {
+4 -1
View File
@@ -123,8 +123,10 @@ var descriptors = []Descriptor{
openAICompat("together", "Together AI", "https://api.together.xyz/v1", "meta-llama/Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct-Turbo", []string{"TOGETHER_API_KEY"}),
openAICompat("dashscope", "DashScope", "https://dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com/compatible-mode/v1", "qwen-plus", []string{"DASHSCOPE_API_KEY", "QWEN_API_KEY"}, "qwen"),
openAICompat("moonshot", "Moonshot AI", "https://api.moonshot.ai/v1", "kimi-k2-0905-preview", []string{"MOONSHOT_API_KEY"}, "kimi"),
openAICompat("longcat", "LongCat", "https://api.longcat.chat/openai", "LongCat-2.0", []string{"LONGCAT_API_KEY"}, "meituan longcat", "meituan", "longcat-2.0"),
openAICompat("nvidia-nim", "NVIDIA NIM", "https://integrate.api.nvidia.com/v1", "nvidia/llama-3.1-nemotron-70b-instruct", []string{"NVIDIA_API_KEY"}, "nvidia nim"),
anthropicCompat("minimax", "MiniMax", "https://api.minimax.io/anthropic", "MiniMax-M3", []string{"MINIMAX_API_KEY"}, "mini-max", "mini_max"),
anthropicCompat("minimaxi-cn", "MiniMax CN", "https://api.minimaxi.com/anthropic", "MiniMax-M3", []string{"MINIMAXI_API_KEY"}, "minimax cn", "minimax-cn"),
openAICompat("mistral", "Mistral", "https://api.mistral.ai/v1", "mistral-large-latest", []string{"MISTRAL_API_KEY"}),
openAICompat("github", "GitHub Models", "https://models.inference.ai.azure.com", "openai/gpt-4.1", []string{"GITHUB_TOKEN"}, "github-models"),
transportDescriptor("bedrock", "Amazon Bedrock", TransportBedrock, "https://bedrock-runtime.${AWS_REGION}.amazonaws.com", "anthropic.claude-3-5-sonnet-20241022-v2:0", []string{"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "AWS_PROFILE"}, []APIFormat{APIFormatBedrockConverse}, true),
@@ -133,7 +135,8 @@ var descriptors = []Descriptor{
openAICompat("venice", "Venice AI", "https://api.venice.ai/api/v1", "qwen-2.5-qwq-32b", []string{"VENICE_API_KEY"}),
openAICompat("xiaomi-mimo", "Xiaomi MiMo", "https://api.mimo.xiaomi.com/openai/v1", "mimo-vl", []string{"MIMO_API_KEY", "XIAOMI_API_KEY"}, "xiaomi mimo"),
openAICompat("bankr", "Bankr", "https://api.bankr.bot/v1", "bankr-large", []string{"BANKR_API_KEY"}),
openAICompat("zai", "Z.ai", "https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4", "glm-4.5", []string{"ZAI_API_KEY", "ZHIPU_API_KEY"}),
openAICompat("zai", "Z.ai", "https://api.z.ai/api/paas/v4", "glm-4.5", []string{"ZAI_API_KEY"}, "z.ai"),
openAICompat("zai-cn", "Z.ai CN", "https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4", "glm-4.5", []string{"ZHIPU_API_KEY"}, "z.ai cn"),
openAICompat("kilocode", "KiloCode", "https://api.kilo.ai/api/gateway", "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.6", []string{"KILO_API_KEY"}, "kilo", "kilo gateway"),
openAICompat("opencode", "OpenCode Zen", "https://opencode.ai/zen/v1", "deepseek-v4-flash", []string{"OPENCODE_API_KEY"}, "opencode zen"),
openAICompat("opencode-go", "OpenCode Go", "https://opencode.ai/zen/go/v1", "deepseek-v4-pro", []string{"OPENCODE_API_KEY"}, "opencode go"),
+27 -2
View File
@@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ var expectedCatalogIDs = []string{
"together",
"dashscope",
"moonshot",
"longcat",
"nvidia-nim",
"minimax",
"minimaxi-cn",
"mistral",
"github",
"bedrock",
@@ -34,6 +36,7 @@ var expectedCatalogIDs = []string{
"xiaomi-mimo",
"bankr",
"zai",
"zai-cn",
"kilocode",
"opencode",
"opencode-go",
@@ -99,6 +102,28 @@ func TestRecommendedProviderEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestLongCatDescriptor(t *testing.T) {
descriptor, err := Require("longcat")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Require(longcat) error = %v", err)
}
if descriptor.Name != "LongCat" {
t.Fatalf("Name = %q, want LongCat", descriptor.Name)
}
if descriptor.DefaultBaseURL != "https://api.longcat.chat/openai" {
t.Fatalf("DefaultBaseURL = %q, want LongCat OpenAI-compatible endpoint", descriptor.DefaultBaseURL)
}
if descriptor.DefaultModel != "LongCat-2.0" {
t.Fatalf("DefaultModel = %q, want LongCat-2.0", descriptor.DefaultModel)
}
if descriptor.Transport != TransportOpenAICompatible {
t.Fatalf("Transport = %q, want %q", descriptor.Transport, TransportOpenAICompatible)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(descriptor.AuthEnvVars, []string{"LONGCAT_API_KEY"}) {
t.Fatalf("AuthEnvVars = %#v, want LONGCAT_API_KEY", descriptor.AuthEnvVars)
}
}
func TestCatalogDescriptorsExposeRequiredDefaults(t *testing.T) {
for _, descriptor := range All() {
if descriptor.ID == "" {
@@ -266,8 +291,8 @@ func TestListByTransportPreservesCatalogOrder(t *testing.T) {
TransportGoogle: {"google"},
TransportBedrock: {"bedrock"},
TransportVertex: {"vertex"},
TransportAnthropicCompat: {"minimax", "custom-anthropic-compatible"},
TransportOpenAICompat: {"gitlawb-opengateway", "ollama-cloud", "ollama", "lmstudio", "openrouter", "huggingface", "chatgpt", "groq", "deepseek", "together", "dashscope", "moonshot", "nvidia-nim", "mistral", "github", "xai", "venice", "xiaomi-mimo", "bankr", "zai", "kilocode", "opencode", "opencode-go", "atomic-chat", "chatgpt-proxy", "custom-openai-compatible"},
TransportAnthropicCompat: {"minimax", "minimaxi-cn", "custom-anthropic-compatible"},
TransportOpenAICompat: {"gitlawb-opengateway", "ollama-cloud", "ollama", "lmstudio", "openrouter", "huggingface", "chatgpt", "groq", "deepseek", "together", "dashscope", "moonshot", "longcat", "nvidia-nim", "mistral", "github", "xai", "venice", "xiaomi-mimo", "bankr", "zai", "zai-cn", "kilocode", "opencode", "opencode-go", "atomic-chat", "chatgpt-proxy", "custom-openai-compatible"},
}
for transport, wantIDs := range cases {
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ func TestValidateEndpointAllowsLoopbackOnlyForLocalProvider(t *testing.T) {
if err := validateEndpoint(ctx, ep, r, true); err != nil {
t.Errorf("local provider endpoint %q should be allowed with allowLoopback=true, got %v", ep, err)
}
if !endpointIsLoopback(ep) {
t.Errorf("endpointIsLoopback(%q) = false, want true", ep)
if !endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(ep) {
t.Errorf("endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(%q) = false, want true", ep)
}
}
@@ -179,14 +179,27 @@ func TestValidateEndpointAllowsLoopbackOnlyForLocalProvider(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("loopback must remain blocked when allowLoopback=false (redirects / non-local)")
}
// allowLoopback relaxes loopback ONLY — other special ranges (cloud metadata,
// link-local, private) stay blocked even for a local provider config.
for _, ep := range []string{"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data", "http://10.0.0.5:8080/v1"} {
// allowLoopbackOrPrivate relaxes loopback AND private-network ranges — but
// link-local and other special ranges (cloud metadata, documentation) stay
// blocked even for a local provider config.
for _, ep := range []string{"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data", "http://192.0.2.1:8080/v1"} {
if err := validateEndpoint(ctx, ep, staticResolver{addr: netip.MustParseAddr("169.254.169.254")}, true); err == nil {
t.Errorf("non-loopback special address %q must stay blocked even with allowLoopback=true", ep)
t.Errorf("special-use address %q must stay blocked even with flag=true", ep)
}
if endpointIsLoopback(ep) {
t.Errorf("endpointIsLoopback(%q) = true, want false", ep)
if endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(ep) {
t.Errorf("endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(%q) = true, want false", ep)
}
}
// Private-network addresses (192.168.x.y / 10.x.y.z / 172.16.x.y) are
// now allowed when the flag is true — the user is pointing at their own
// LAN box (e.g. llama.cpp on another local machine).
for _, ep := range []string{"http://192.168.1.100:8080/v1", "http://10.0.0.5:8080/v1", "http://172.16.0.10:8080/v1"} {
if err := validateEndpoint(ctx, ep, staticResolver{addr: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.100")}, true); err != nil {
t.Errorf("private-network address %q should be allowed with flag=true, got %v", ep, err)
}
if !endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(ep) {
t.Errorf("endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(%q) = false, want true", ep)
}
}
}
+27 -25
View File
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ func connectivityCheck(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile, kind
requestCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
defer cancel()
request, allowLoopback, err := healthRequest(requestCtx, profile, kind, options)
request, allowLoopbackOrPrivate, err := healthRequest(requestCtx, profile, kind, options)
if err != nil {
category := CategoryConfig
var safety endpointSafetyError
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ func connectivityCheck(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile, kind
}
client := options.HTTPClient
if client == nil {
client = newConnectivityClient(timeout, options.Resolver, sensitiveAuthHeaderNames(profile, kind), allowLoopback)
client = newConnectivityClient(timeout, options.Resolver, sensitiveAuthHeaderNames(profile, kind), allowLoopbackOrPrivate)
}
response, err := client.Do(request)
if err != nil {
@@ -332,8 +332,8 @@ func healthRequest(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile, kind con
// Loopback is permitted only when the user's OWN configured base_url is loopback
// (a local provider like Ollama/LM Studio) — never for a redirect target. This is
// the flag returned to the caller so the dial path applies the same policy. (AUDIT-H1)
allowLoopback := endpointIsLoopback(endpoint)
if err := validateEndpoint(ctx, endpoint, options.Resolver, allowLoopback); err != nil {
allowLoopbackOrPrivate := endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(endpoint)
if err := validateEndpoint(ctx, endpoint, options.Resolver, allowLoopbackOrPrivate); err != nil {
return nil, false, err
}
request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, endpoint, nil)
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ func healthRequest(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile, kind con
request.Header.Set("User-Agent", options.UserAgent)
}
applyAuth(request, profile, kind)
return request, allowLoopback, nil
return request, allowLoopbackOrPrivate, nil
}
func resolvedBaseURL(profile config.ProviderProfile, kind config.ProviderKind) (string, error) {
@@ -367,11 +367,11 @@ func resolvedBaseURL(profile config.ProviderProfile, kind config.ProviderKind) (
}
// validateEndpoint enforces the SSRF policy for the provider connectivity probe.
// allowLoopback permits loopback hosts (localhost / 127.0.0.0/8 / ::1) ONLY — it is
// set true exclusively for the user's own explicitly-configured local provider
// base_url (e.g. Ollama/LM Studio), never for redirect targets, and it relaxes
// loopback alone (other private/special ranges, incl. cloud metadata, stay blocked).
func validateEndpoint(ctx context.Context, endpoint string, resolver Resolver, allowLoopback bool) error {
// allowLoopbackOrPrivate permits loopback hosts (localhost / 127.0.0.0/8 / ::1)
// and private-network hosts (192.168.0.0/16 / 10.0.0.0/8 / 172.16.0.0/12) — it
// is set true exclusively for the user's own explicitly-configured base_url
// (e.g. Ollama/LM Studio on the LAN), never for redirect targets.
func validateEndpoint(ctx context.Context, endpoint string, resolver Resolver, allowLoopbackOrPrivate bool) error {
parsed, err := url.Parse(endpoint)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -385,13 +385,13 @@ func validateEndpoint(ctx context.Context, endpoint string, resolver Resolver, a
}
normalized := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.ToLower(host), ".")
if normalized == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(normalized, ".localhost") {
if allowLoopback {
if allowLoopbackOrPrivate {
return nil // user-configured local provider; loopback is intentional
}
return endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity URL is unsafe: localhost hosts are blocked"}
}
if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(normalized); err == nil {
if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopback && addr.IsLoopback()) {
if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopbackOrPrivate && (addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate())) {
return endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity URL is unsafe: " + reason}
}
return nil
@@ -407,17 +407,19 @@ func validateEndpoint(ctx context.Context, endpoint string, resolver Resolver, a
return endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity host resolved to no addresses"}
}
for _, addr := range addrs {
if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopback && addr.IsLoopback()) {
if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopbackOrPrivate && (addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate())) {
return endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity URL is unsafe: " + reason}
}
}
return nil
}
// endpointIsLoopback reports whether the configured endpoint's host is a loopback
// host the user typed themselves (localhost or a 127.0.0.0/8 / ::1 literal). Used to
// decide whether the connectivity probe may reach the user's own local provider.
func endpointIsLoopback(endpoint string) bool {
// endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate reports whether the configured endpoint's host is a loopback
// or private-network host the user typed themselves — a local provider on the LAN
// (e.g. 192.168.x.y / 10.x.y.z) or localhost. Used to decide whether the
// connectivity probe may relax address-blocking and reach the user's own
// explicitly-configured provider.
func endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate(endpoint string) bool {
parsed, err := url.Parse(endpoint)
if err != nil {
return false
@@ -427,7 +429,7 @@ func endpointIsLoopback(endpoint string) bool {
return true
}
if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); err == nil {
return addr.IsLoopback()
return addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate()
}
return false
}
@@ -446,7 +448,7 @@ const maxConnectivityRedirects = 5
// time and then dials the validated IP literal, closing the TOCTOU window
// between the pre-flight validateEndpoint check and the actual connection
// (DNS rebinding).
func newConnectivityClient(timeout time.Duration, resolver Resolver, sensitiveHeaders []string, allowLoopback bool) *http.Client {
func newConnectivityClient(timeout time.Duration, resolver Resolver, sensitiveHeaders []string, allowLoopbackOrPrivate bool) *http.Client {
if resolver == nil {
resolver = defaultResolver{}
}
@@ -456,7 +458,7 @@ func newConnectivityClient(timeout time.Duration, resolver Resolver, sensitiveHe
} else {
transport = &http.Transport{}
}
transport.DialContext = safeDialContext(resolver, allowLoopback)
transport.DialContext = safeDialContext(resolver, allowLoopbackOrPrivate)
return &http.Client{
Timeout: timeout,
Transport: transport,
@@ -476,8 +478,8 @@ func newConnectivityClient(timeout time.Duration, resolver Resolver, sensitiveHe
}
}
// Redirects are NEVER allowed to reach loopback, even for a local provider:
// allowLoopback covers only the user's own configured base_url, not a 3xx
// target (which could be attacker-controlled SSRF). (AUDIT-H1)
// allowLoopbackOrPrivate covers only the user's own configured base_url,
// not a 3xx target (which could be attacker-controlled SSRF). (AUDIT-H1)
return validateEndpoint(req.Context(), req.URL.String(), resolver, false)
},
}
@@ -519,7 +521,7 @@ func sensitiveAuthHeaderNames(profile config.ProviderProfile, kind config.Provid
// safeDialContext returns a dial function that resolves the target host, refuses
// the connection if any resolved address is blocked, then dials the validated IP
// literal so the kernel cannot re-resolve to a different address after the check.
func safeDialContext(resolver Resolver, allowLoopback bool) func(context.Context, string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
func safeDialContext(resolver Resolver, allowLoopbackOrPrivate bool) func(context.Context, string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 10 * time.Second, KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second}
return func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error) {
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(address)
@@ -527,7 +529,7 @@ func safeDialContext(resolver Resolver, allowLoopback bool) func(context.Context
return nil, err
}
if addr, parseErr := netip.ParseAddr(host); parseErr == nil {
if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopback && addr.IsLoopback()) {
if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopbackOrPrivate && (addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate())) {
return nil, endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity URL is unsafe: " + reason}
}
return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, address)
@@ -540,7 +542,7 @@ func safeDialContext(resolver Resolver, allowLoopback bool) func(context.Context
return nil, endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity host resolved to no addresses"}
}
for _, addr := range addrs {
if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopback && addr.IsLoopback()) {
if reason := blockedAddrReason(addr); reason != "" && !(allowLoopbackOrPrivate && (addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate())) {
return nil, endpointSafetyError{message: "provider connectivity URL is unsafe: " + reason}
}
}
+20 -10
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,22 @@ type Model struct {
Source string
}
// Shared by both "minimax" and "minimaxi-cn"; Models() rebuilds a fresh slice
// per call, so the shared backing slice cannot be mutated by callers.
var minimaxCuratedModels = []Model{
{ID: "MiniMax-M3", Description: "catalog default"},
{ID: "MiniMax-M2.1", Description: "agentic coding model"},
}
// Shared by both "zai" (international, api.z.ai) and "zai-cn" (China,
// open.bigmodel.cn); same model lineup on both endpoints.
var zaiCuratedModels = []Model{
{ID: "glm-4.5", Description: "catalog default"},
{ID: "glm-4.5-air", Description: "fast model"},
{ID: "glm-4.6", Description: "latest general model"},
{ID: "glm-z1-air", Description: "reasoning model"},
}
var curatedModels = map[string][]Model{
"ollama-cloud": {
{ID: "qwen3-coder:480b", Description: "catalog default"},
@@ -88,10 +104,8 @@ var curatedModels = map[string][]Model{
{ID: "meta/llama-3.1-70b-instruct", Description: "general model"},
{ID: "mistralai/mixtral-8x7b-instruct-v0.1", Description: "mixture model"},
},
"minimax": {
{ID: "MiniMax-M3", Description: "catalog default"},
{ID: "MiniMax-M2.1", Description: "agentic coding model"},
},
"minimax": minimaxCuratedModels,
"minimaxi-cn": minimaxCuratedModels,
"mistral": {
{ID: "mistral-large-latest", Description: "catalog default"},
{ID: "codestral-latest", Description: "coding model"},
@@ -123,12 +137,8 @@ var curatedModels = map[string][]Model{
"bankr": {
{ID: "bankr-large", Description: "catalog default"},
},
"zai": {
{ID: "glm-4.5", Description: "catalog default"},
{ID: "glm-4.5-air", Description: "fast model"},
{ID: "glm-4.6", Description: "latest general model"},
{ID: "glm-z1-air", Description: "reasoning model"},
},
"zai": zaiCuratedModels,
"zai-cn": zaiCuratedModels,
// OpenGateway smart-routes by model id across its upstream providers
// (see /health: xiaomi-mimo, minimax, qwen, google, nvidia, z-ai). These are
// the curated coding defaults; the gateway accepts any model its upstreams
@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@ func TestModelsAreProviderScoped(t *testing.T) {
want: []string{"mistral-large-latest", "codestral-latest"},
notWant: []string{"gpt-4.1", "claude-sonnet-4.5"},
},
{
provider: "minimaxi-cn",
want: []string{"MiniMax-M3", "MiniMax-M2.1"},
notWant: []string{"gpt-4.1", "claude-sonnet-4.5"},
},
{
provider: "zai-cn",
want: []string{"glm-4.5", "glm-4.6", "glm-4.5-air", "glm-z1-air"},
notWant: []string{"gpt-4.1", "claude-sonnet-4.5"},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
@@ -88,3 +98,66 @@ func modelIDs(models []Model) []string {
}
return ids
}
// Pins the contract that MiniMax CN exposes exactly the same model IDs as the
// international provider; a divergence here is almost always a mistake.
func TestMiniMaxCNModelsMirrorInternational(t *testing.T) {
intl, ok := providercatalog.Get("minimax")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("provider minimax missing from catalog")
}
cn, ok := providercatalog.Get("minimaxi-cn")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("provider minimaxi-cn missing from catalog")
}
intlModels := Models(intl)
cnModels := Models(cn)
if len(intlModels) != len(cnModels) {
t.Fatalf("model count mismatch: international=%d china=%d", len(intlModels), len(cnModels))
}
intlIDs := map[string]string{}
for _, m := range intlModels {
intlIDs[m.ID] = m.Description
}
for _, m := range cnModels {
wantDesc, ok := intlIDs[m.ID]
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("china provider exposes %q which is not in the international catalog", m.ID)
}
if m.Description != wantDesc {
t.Fatalf("model %q description diverged: international=%q china=%q", m.ID, wantDesc, m.Description)
}
}
}
// Same contract as TestMiniMaxCNModelsMirrorInternational, for Z.ai: the
// international (api.z.ai) and China (open.bigmodel.cn) endpoints expose the
// same model lineup.
func TestZaiCNModelsMirrorInternational(t *testing.T) {
intl, ok := providercatalog.Get("zai")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("provider zai missing from catalog")
}
cn, ok := providercatalog.Get("zai-cn")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("provider zai-cn missing from catalog")
}
intlModels := Models(intl)
cnModels := Models(cn)
if len(intlModels) != len(cnModels) {
t.Fatalf("model count mismatch: international=%d china=%d", len(intlModels), len(cnModels))
}
intlIDs := map[string]string{}
for _, m := range intlModels {
intlIDs[m.ID] = m.Description
}
for _, m := range cnModels {
wantDesc, ok := intlIDs[m.ID]
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("china provider exposes %q which is not in the international catalog", m.ID)
}
if m.Description != wantDesc {
t.Fatalf("model %q description diverged: international=%q china=%q", m.ID, wantDesc, m.Description)
}
}
}
+4
View File
@@ -128,6 +128,10 @@ func ModelsDevProviderID(provider providercatalog.Descriptor) string {
return "nvidia"
case "xiaomi-mimo":
return "xiaomi"
case "zai-cn":
return "zai"
case "minimaxi-cn":
return "minimax"
default:
return strings.TrimSpace(provider.ID)
}
@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ func TestModelsDevProviderIDMapsZeroAliases(t *testing.T) {
"xiaomi-mimo": "xiaomi",
"dashscope": "alibaba",
"ollama-cloud": "ollama-cloud",
"zai-cn": "zai",
"minimaxi-cn": "minimax",
}
for zeroID, want := range tests {
provider, ok := providercatalog.Get(zeroID)
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
package anthropic
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// The final two messages must carry a cache_control breakpoint on their last
// cacheable block so the conversation transcript — not just system prompt and
// tools — is a prompt-cache hit on the next turn. Earlier messages must stay
// unmarked (Anthropic caps breakpoints at 4 per request: system, tools, and
// these two).
func TestAnthropicRequestMarksLastTwoMessagesForCaching(t *testing.T) {
var gotBody map[string]any
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&gotBody); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode request body: %v", err)
}
writeSSEEvent(w, "message_stop", `{"type":"message_stop"}`)
}))
defer server.Close()
provider, err := New(Options{BaseURL: server.URL + "/", Model: "claude-test"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("New returned error: %v", err)
}
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(context.Background(), zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "first"},
{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant,
Content: "calling a tool",
ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "toolu_1", Name: "grep", Arguments: `{}`}},
},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, Content: "result", ToolCallID: "toolu_1"},
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamCompletion returned error: %v", err)
}
drain(stream)
messages := gotBody["messages"].([]any)
if len(messages) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected 3 wire messages, got %d: %#v", len(messages), messages)
}
lastBlockHasCache := func(message any) bool {
blocks, ok := message.(map[string]any)["content"].([]any)
if !ok || len(blocks) == 0 {
return false
}
last := blocks[len(blocks)-1].(map[string]any)
control, ok := last["cache_control"].(map[string]any)
return ok && control["type"] == "ephemeral"
}
if lastBlockHasCache(messages[0]) {
t.Fatalf("first message must not carry a breakpoint: %#v", messages[0])
}
if !lastBlockHasCache(messages[1]) {
t.Fatalf("second-to-last message must carry a breakpoint: %#v", messages[1])
}
if !lastBlockHasCache(messages[2]) {
t.Fatalf("last message must carry a breakpoint: %#v", messages[2])
}
}
// A string-content message must be converted to a block array so it can carry
// the breakpoint, and thinking blocks must never carry cache_control (the API
// rejects them) — the marker goes on the last cacheable block instead.
func TestApplyMessageCacheBreakpointsSkipsThinkingBlocks(t *testing.T) {
messages := []anthropicMessage{
{Role: "user", Content: "plain string"},
{Role: "assistant", Content: []map[string]any{
{"type": "text", "text": "answer"},
{"type": "thinking", "thinking": "hmm", "signature": "sig"},
}},
}
applyMessageCacheBreakpoints(messages)
userBlocks := contentBlocks(messages[0].Content)
if len(userBlocks) != 1 || userBlocks[0]["cache_control"] == nil {
t.Fatalf("string content must become a marked block: %#v", messages[0].Content)
}
assistantBlocks := contentBlocks(messages[1].Content)
if assistantBlocks[1]["cache_control"] != nil {
t.Fatalf("thinking block must not be marked: %#v", assistantBlocks[1])
}
if assistantBlocks[0]["cache_control"] == nil {
t.Fatalf("text block must carry the breakpoint instead: %#v", assistantBlocks[0])
}
}
+26
View File
@@ -405,9 +405,35 @@ func (provider *Provider) anthropicRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
}
mapped.Tools[len(mapped.Tools)-1].CacheControl = &cacheControl{Type: cacheEphemeral}
}
applyMessageCacheBreakpoints(mapped.Messages)
return mapped, nil
}
// applyMessageCacheBreakpoints marks the last content block of the final two
// messages with cache_control so the conversation transcript is cached
// turn-over-turn, not just the system prompt and tool definitions. Two message
// breakpoints (not one) keep the previous turn's prefix a cache hit while the
// newest suffix is being written. Anthropic allows at most 4 breakpoints per
// request: system + tools use two above, these use the remaining two. Thinking
// blocks cannot carry cache_control, so the marker goes on the last block that
// can.
func applyMessageCacheBreakpoints(messages []anthropicMessage) {
marked := 0
for i := len(messages) - 1; i >= 0 && marked < 2; i-- {
blocks := contentBlocks(messages[i].Content)
for j := len(blocks) - 1; j >= 0; j-- {
blockType, _ := blocks[j]["type"].(string)
if blockType == "thinking" || blockType == "redacted_thinking" {
continue
}
blocks[j]["cache_control"] = map[string]any{"type": cacheEphemeral}
messages[i].Content = blocks
marked++
break
}
}
}
func mapMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message) (string, []anthropicMessage, error) {
systemParts := []string{}
mapped := []anthropicMessage{}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ type Options struct {
ModelRegistry *modelregistry.Registry
// OAuthResolver, when set, lets the provider authenticate model calls with an
// OAuth bearer token (preferred over the API key). nil => API-key auth only.
// Applied to the OpenAI and Anthropic providers.
// Applied to the OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google (Gemini) providers.
OAuthResolver providerio.TokenResolver
// OAuthLoginKey is the credential-store key OAuthResolver bound to (empty when
// there is no OAuth login). It is the SAME selection the bearer resolver made,
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ func New(profile config.ProviderProfile, options Options) (zeroruntime.Provider,
AuthScheme: profile.AuthScheme,
AuthHeaderValue: profile.AuthHeaderValue,
CustomHeaders: profile.CustomHeaders,
OAuthResolver: options.OAuthResolver,
MaxTokens: resolved.maxOutputTokens,
HTTPClient: options.HTTPClient,
UserAgent: options.UserAgent,
+16 -8
View File
@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ type Options struct {
CustomHeaders map[string]string
HTTPClient *http.Client
UserAgent string
// OAuthResolver, when set, supplies an OAuth bearer credential per request and
// is retried once with a forced token refresh after an upstream 401 (matching
// the OpenAI and Anthropic providers). Nil falls back to plain API-key auth.
OAuthResolver providerio.TokenResolver
// StreamIdleTimeout aborts the stream if no data arrives for this long.
// When unset, Zero uses providerio.ResolveStreamIdleTimeout — the
// ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT override or providerio.DefaultStreamIdleTimeout.
@@ -67,6 +71,7 @@ type Provider struct {
customHeaders map[string]string
httpClient *http.Client
userAgent string
oauthResolver providerio.TokenResolver
streamIdleTimeout time.Duration
}
@@ -95,6 +100,7 @@ func New(options Options) (*Provider, error) {
customHeaders: providerio.CopyHeaders(options.CustomHeaders),
httpClient: providerio.HTTPClient(options.HTTPClient),
userAgent: options.UserAgent,
oauthResolver: options.OAuthResolver,
streamIdleTimeout: providerio.ResolveStreamIdleTimeout(options.StreamIdleTimeout),
}, nil
}
@@ -127,20 +133,22 @@ func (provider *Provider) stream(ctx context.Context, body []byte, events chan<-
streamCtx, cancelStream := context.WithCancel(ctx)
defer cancelStream()
response, err := providerio.SendWithRetry(streamCtx, provider.httpClient, http.MethodPost, provider.streamURL(), body, func(request *http.Request) {
request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
if provider.userAgent != "" {
request.Header.Set("User-Agent", provider.userAgent)
}
providerio.ApplyAuthHeaders(request, providerio.AuthHeaders{
response, err := providerio.SendWithAuthRetry(streamCtx, provider.httpClient, http.MethodPost, provider.streamURL(), body,
providerio.AuthHeaders{
APIKey: provider.apiKey,
DefaultAuthHeader: "x-goog-api-key",
AuthHeader: provider.authHeader,
AuthScheme: provider.authScheme,
AuthHeaderValue: provider.authHeaderValue,
CustomHeaders: provider.customHeaders,
})
}, 0)
},
provider.oauthResolver,
func(request *http.Request) {
request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
if provider.userAgent != "" {
request.Header.Set("User-Agent", provider.userAgent)
}
}, 0)
if err != nil {
providerio.SendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: provider.redact("provider stream error: " + err.Error())})
return
@@ -370,6 +370,57 @@ func TestStreamCompletionClassifiesHTTPAndPromptBlockErrors(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// A 401 with an OAuth resolver is retried once with a force-refreshed token; the
// replayed request carries the refreshed bearer and succeeds.
func TestStreamCompletionRetries401WithRefreshedToken(t *testing.T) {
var attempts int
var secondAuth string
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
http.Error(w, `{"error":{"message":"token expired"}}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
secondAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
writeSSE(w, `{}`)
}))
defer server.Close()
var forceRefreshOnRetry bool
resolver := func(ctx context.Context, forceRefresh bool) (string, string, bool, error) {
if forceRefresh {
forceRefreshOnRetry = true
return "Authorization", "Bearer refreshed", true, nil
}
return "Authorization", "Bearer stale", true, nil
}
provider, err := New(Options{
APIKey: "sk-google",
BaseURL: server.URL,
Model: "gemini-test",
OAuthResolver: resolver,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("New returned error: %v", err)
}
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(context.Background(), validRequest())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamCompletion returned error: %v", err)
}
drain(stream)
if attempts != 2 {
t.Fatalf("attempts = %d, want 2 (initial 401 + one refreshed retry)", attempts)
}
if !forceRefreshOnRetry {
t.Fatalf("resolver was not called with forceRefresh on the retry")
}
if secondAuth != "Bearer refreshed" {
t.Fatalf("retry Authorization = %q, want refreshed bearer", secondAuth)
}
}
func TestStreamCompletionEmitsStreamErrorObject(t *testing.T) {
provider := newTestProviderWithKey(t, "sk-google", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
writeSSE(w, `{"error":{"code":429,"message":"stream failed sk-google","status":"RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED"}}`)
+25 -2
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -283,10 +284,10 @@ func (provider *Provider) emitChunk(
events chan<- zeroruntime.StreamEvent,
) {
for _, choice := range chunk.Choices {
if choice.Delta.ReasoningContent != "" {
if reasoning := choice.Delta.reasoningText(); reasoning != "" {
sendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventReasoning,
Content: choice.Delta.ReasoningContent,
Content: reasoning,
})
}
if choice.Delta.Content != "" {
@@ -317,6 +318,13 @@ func (provider *Provider) emitChunk(
}
}
func (delta streamDelta) reasoningText() string {
if delta.ReasoningContent != "" {
return delta.ReasoningContent
}
return delta.Reasoning
}
// mapFinishReason maps OpenAI's finish_reason onto the runtime's normalized
// terminal reasons. A normal finish ("stop"/"tool_calls"/"") returns "".
func mapFinishReason(reason string) string {
@@ -414,6 +422,12 @@ func (provider *Provider) openAIRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) c
if effort := openAIReasoningEffort(request.ReasoningEffort); effort != "" {
mapped.ReasoningEffort = effort
}
// prompt_cache_key is a documented OpenAI parameter; compatible servers
// ignore unknown fields, but a strict endpoint that rejects it can be
// accommodated with ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY=1.
if key := strings.TrimSpace(request.PromptCacheKey); key != "" && !promptCacheKeyDisabled() {
mapped.PromptCacheKey = key
}
if len(request.Tools) > 0 {
mapped.Tools = make([]toolDefinition, 0, len(request.Tools))
for _, tool := range request.Tools {
@@ -430,6 +444,15 @@ func (provider *Provider) openAIRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) c
return mapped
}
// promptCacheKeyDisabled reports whether the ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY
// kill switch is set to a truthy value. "0" and "false" (any case) are
// no-ops, matching how ZERO_FORMAT_ON_WRITE parses boolean flags, so an
// explicitly-disabled toggle never flips the behavior it names.
func promptCacheKeyDisabled() bool {
value := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY"))
return value != "" && value != "0" && !strings.EqualFold(value, "false")
}
// openAIReasoningEffort normalizes a requested effort to a value the OpenAI chat
// completions API accepts, or "" to omit the field. "none" (and anything else)
// is dropped rather than risking a 400 on an unrecognized enum.
@@ -227,6 +227,39 @@ func TestStreamCompletionEmitsReasoningContentDeltas(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestStreamCompletionEmitsReasoningAliasDeltas(t *testing.T) {
provider := newTestProvider(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
writeSSE(w, `{"choices":[{"delta":{"reasoning":"Thinking. "}}]}`)
writeSSE(w, `{"choices":[{"delta":{"reasoning":"Answering now."}}]}`)
writeSSE(w, `[DONE]`)
})
events := collectProviderEvents(t, provider)
reasoning := eventsOfType(events, zeroruntime.StreamEventReasoning)
if len(reasoning) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("reasoning events = %#v, want two reasoning deltas", reasoning)
}
if reasoning[0].Content != "Thinking. " || reasoning[1].Content != "Answering now." {
t.Fatalf("unexpected reasoning events: %#v", reasoning)
}
if text := eventsOfType(events, zeroruntime.StreamEventText); len(text) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("reasoning must not emit text events, got %#v", text)
}
}
func TestStreamCompletionPrefersReasoningContentOverAlias(t *testing.T) {
provider := newTestProvider(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
writeSSE(w, `{"choices":[{"delta":{"reasoning_content":"standard","reasoning":"alias"}}]}`)
writeSSE(w, `[DONE]`)
})
events := collectProviderEvents(t, provider)
reasoning := eventsOfType(events, zeroruntime.StreamEventReasoning)
if len(reasoning) != 1 || reasoning[0].Content != "standard" {
t.Fatalf("reasoning events = %#v, want standard reasoning_content", reasoning)
}
}
func TestStreamCompletionEmitsReasoningBeforeRegularContent(t *testing.T) {
provider := newTestProvider(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
writeSSE(w, `{"choices":[{"delta":{"reasoning_content":"Thinking. ","content":"Answer."}}]}`)
@@ -1226,3 +1259,61 @@ func TestOpenAIRequestEmptyContentHandling(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("assistant tool calls dropped: %#v", req.Messages[1])
}
}
// TestOpenAIRequestPromptCacheKey locks in prompt_cache_key forwarding: a
// session-carrying request serializes the key so the backend can route to a
// replica holding the cached prefix, a keyless request omits the field
// entirely (strict servers see byte-identical requests to before), and
// ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY suppresses it for endpoints that reject it.
func TestOpenAIRequestPromptCacheKey(t *testing.T) {
provider, err := New(Options{Model: "gpt-test"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("New returned error: %v", err)
}
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "hi"}}
req := provider.openAIRequest(zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: messages,
PromptCacheKey: "sess_123",
})
if req.PromptCacheKey != "sess_123" {
t.Fatalf("PromptCacheKey = %q, want sess_123", req.PromptCacheKey)
}
data, err := json.Marshal(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(string(data), `"prompt_cache_key":"sess_123"`) {
t.Fatalf("prompt_cache_key not serialized: %s", data)
}
req = provider.openAIRequest(zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{Messages: messages})
if data, err = json.Marshal(req); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal: %v", err)
}
if strings.Contains(string(data), "prompt_cache_key") {
t.Fatalf("keyless request must omit prompt_cache_key: %s", data)
}
t.Setenv("ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY", "1")
req = provider.openAIRequest(zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: messages,
PromptCacheKey: "sess_123",
})
if req.PromptCacheKey != "" {
t.Fatalf("kill switch ignored; PromptCacheKey = %q", req.PromptCacheKey)
}
// Explicitly-falsy kill switch values must NOT disable forwarding — only
// truthy values flip the toggle (same parsing as ZERO_FORMAT_ON_WRITE).
for _, value := range []string{"0", "false", "FALSE"} {
t.Setenv("ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY", value)
req = provider.openAIRequest(zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: messages,
PromptCacheKey: "sess_123",
})
if req.PromptCacheKey != "sess_123" {
t.Fatalf("ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY=%q must be a no-op; PromptCacheKey = %q", value, req.PromptCacheKey)
}
}
}
+6
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@ type chatCompletionRequest struct {
ReasoningEffort string `json:"reasoning_effort,omitempty"`
Stream bool `json:"stream"`
StreamOptions *streamOptions `json:"stream_options,omitempty"`
// PromptCacheKey asks the backend to route the request to a replica that
// already holds this conversation's prefix in its prompt cache (the OpenAI
// `prompt_cache_key` parameter). Omitted when the caller carries no session
// identity or when ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY is set.
PromptCacheKey string `json:"prompt_cache_key,omitempty"`
}
// streamOptions requests the final usage chunk on a streaming response. Without
@@ -78,6 +83,7 @@ type streamChoice struct {
type streamDelta struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
ReasoningContent string `json:"reasoning_content"`
Reasoning string `json:"reasoning"`
ToolCalls []streamToolCallDelta `json:"tool_calls"`
}
+32 -11
View File
@@ -23,12 +23,18 @@ import (
// (billable) work. Only the INITIAL request is ever in scope; once the response
// body starts streaming it is never re-issued.
const defaultMaxRetryAttempts = 3
const defaultMaxRetryAttempts = 6
// maxBackoff caps a single backoff wait so a hostile or buggy Retry-After can't
// stall the agent for minutes.
const maxBackoff = 30 * time.Second
// retryBackoffBase is the first wait when the server supplied no Retry-After.
// Rate-limit windows are measured in seconds, not milliseconds: retrying a 429
// after 400ms almost always burns the attempt while still limited, so the
// schedule is 2s, 4s, 8s, 16s, then maxBackoff. A var so tests can shrink it.
var retryBackoffBase = 2 * time.Second
// SendWithRetry issues an HTTP request, retrying ONLY the safe-to-replay server
// responses (429 and 503, see ShouldRetryStatus) up to maxAttempts — backing off
// between tries and honoring a server Retry-After header and context
@@ -110,17 +116,11 @@ func ShouldRetryStatus(code int) bool {
}
// Backoff waits before retry attempt N (1-based), returning false if the context
// is cancelled during the wait. The wait is attempt*400ms unless the server
// supplied a (positive) Retry-After, and is capped at maxBackoff.
// is cancelled during the wait. A server-supplied (positive) Retry-After wins;
// otherwise the wait doubles from retryBackoffBase per attempt. Either way the
// wait is capped at maxBackoff.
func Backoff(ctx context.Context, attempt int, retryAfter time.Duration) bool {
wait := time.Duration(attempt) * 400 * time.Millisecond
if retryAfter > 0 {
wait = retryAfter
}
if wait > maxBackoff {
wait = maxBackoff
}
timer := time.NewTimer(wait)
timer := time.NewTimer(backoffWait(attempt, retryAfter))
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
@@ -130,6 +130,27 @@ func Backoff(ctx context.Context, attempt int, retryAfter time.Duration) bool {
}
}
// backoffWait computes the wait before retry attempt N (1-based): Retry-After
// when supplied, else exponential from retryBackoffBase, both capped at
// maxBackoff. The exponent is clamped so a large attempt count cannot overflow.
func backoffWait(attempt int, retryAfter time.Duration) time.Duration {
wait := retryAfter
if wait <= 0 {
exponent := attempt - 1
if exponent > 5 {
exponent = 5
}
if exponent < 0 {
exponent = 0
}
wait = retryBackoffBase * time.Duration(1<<exponent)
}
if wait > maxBackoff {
wait = maxBackoff
}
return wait
}
// RetryAfter parses a response's Retry-After header (delay-seconds or an HTTP
// date) into a positive duration, or 0 when absent/unparseable. The result is
// capped at maxBackoff by Backoff.
@@ -94,7 +94,40 @@ func TestBackoffWaitsThenReturnsTrue(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// shrinkBackoff makes retry waits negligible for the duration of a test.
func shrinkBackoff(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
saved := retryBackoffBase
retryBackoffBase = time.Millisecond
t.Cleanup(func() { retryBackoffBase = saved })
}
func TestBackoffWaitSchedule(t *testing.T) {
// Without Retry-After the wait doubles per attempt from 2s and caps at 30s;
// a supplied Retry-After wins but is capped too.
cases := []struct {
attempt int
retryAfter time.Duration
want time.Duration
}{
{1, 0, 2 * time.Second},
{2, 0, 4 * time.Second},
{3, 0, 8 * time.Second},
{4, 0, 16 * time.Second},
{5, 0, 30 * time.Second}, // 32s capped
{50, 0, 30 * time.Second}, // clamped exponent, no overflow
{1, 7 * time.Second, 7 * time.Second},
{1, 5 * time.Minute, 30 * time.Second}, // hostile Retry-After capped
}
for _, c := range cases {
if got := backoffWait(c.attempt, c.retryAfter); got != c.want {
t.Errorf("backoffWait(%d, %v) = %v, want %v", c.attempt, c.retryAfter, got, c.want)
}
}
}
func TestSendWithRetryRetriesThenSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
shrinkBackoff(t)
var hits int32
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if atomic.AddInt32(&hits, 1) == 1 {
@@ -140,6 +173,7 @@ func TestSendWithRetryReturnsNonRetryableImmediately(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestSendWithRetryReturnsLastResponseAfterMaxAttempts(t *testing.T) {
shrinkBackoff(t)
var hits int32
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
atomic.AddInt32(&hits, 1)
+50
View File
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ type Info struct {
AgeDays *int `json:"ageDays,omitempty"`
Contributors90d *int `json:"contributors90d,omitempty"`
CommitVelocity30d *int `json:"commitVelocity30d,omitempty"`
BranchCount *int `json:"branchCount,omitempty"`
CommitCount *int `json:"commitCount,omitempty"`
TagCount *int `json:"tagCount,omitempty"`
}
// RunGit runs a git subcommand in dir and returns raw stdout. A non-zero exit
@@ -229,6 +232,43 @@ func Collect(ctx context.Context, opts Options) (Info, error) {
info.CommitVelocity30d = &n
}
}
if count, err := run(ctx, dir, "rev-list", "--count", "HEAD"); err == nil {
if n, perr := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(count)); perr == nil {
info.CommitCount = &n
}
}
if branches, err := run(ctx, dir, "branch", "-a"); err == nil {
set := map[string]bool{}
for _, line := range strings.Split(branches, "\n") {
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if line == "" || strings.Contains(line, "->") {
continue
}
// Strip leading '* ' (current branch) or '+ ' (checked out in another worktree).
line = strings.TrimPrefix(line, "* ")
line = strings.TrimPrefix(line, "+ ")
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "(") {
continue
}
// If it's a remote branch, extract the branch name.
// E.g., remotes/origin/main -> main
// E.g., remotes/origin/feature/xyz -> feature/xyz
if strings.HasPrefix(line, "remotes/") {
line = strings.TrimPrefix(line, "remotes/")
if slashIdx := strings.Index(line, "/"); slashIdx != -1 {
line = line[slashIdx+1:]
}
}
set[line] = true
}
n := len(set)
info.BranchCount = &n
}
if tags, err := run(ctx, dir, "tag"); err == nil {
n := countNonEmptyLines(tags)
info.TagCount = &n
}
return info, nil
}
@@ -328,3 +368,13 @@ func defaultRunGit(ctx context.Context, dir string, args ...string) (string, err
}
return stdout.String(), nil
}
func countNonEmptyLines(s string) int {
count := 0
for _, line := range strings.Split(s, "\n") {
if strings.TrimSpace(line) != "" {
count++
}
}
return count
}
+13 -1
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ func TestCollectCoreMetrics(t *testing.T) {
"remote": "https://github.com/x/y.git\n",
"log": "0\n",
"rev-list": "12\n",
"branch": " main\n remotes/origin/HEAD -> origin/main\n remotes/origin/main\n remotes/origin/feature\n",
"tag": "v0.1.0\nv0.2.0\n",
}, nil),
})
if err != nil {
@@ -85,6 +87,15 @@ func TestCollectCoreMetrics(t *testing.T) {
if info.CommitVelocity30d == nil || *info.CommitVelocity30d != 12 {
t.Fatalf("CommitVelocity30d=%v want 12", info.CommitVelocity30d)
}
if info.CommitCount == nil || *info.CommitCount != 12 {
t.Fatalf("CommitCount=%v want 12", info.CommitCount)
}
if info.BranchCount == nil || *info.BranchCount != 2 {
t.Fatalf("BranchCount=%v want 2", info.BranchCount)
}
if info.TagCount == nil || *info.TagCount != 2 {
t.Fatalf("TagCount=%v want 2", info.TagCount)
}
}
func TestCollectContributorsUnique(t *testing.T) {
@@ -252,12 +263,13 @@ func TestCollectNotGitRepo(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCollectOnlyReadOnlyLocalSubcommands(t *testing.T) {
allowed := map[string]bool{"ls-tree": true, "rev-parse": true, "remote": true, "log": true, "rev-list": true}
allowed := map[string]bool{"ls-tree": true, "rev-parse": true, "remote": true, "log": true, "rev-list": true, "branch": true, "tag": true}
var used []string
_, err := Collect(context.Background(), Options{
Now: time.Unix(0, 0),
RunGit: fakeGit(t, map[string]string{
"ls-tree": lsTree, "rev-parse": "main\n", "remote": "u\n", "log": "0\n", "rev-list": "1\n",
"branch": "main\n", "tag": "v0.1.0\n",
}, &used),
})
if err != nil {
+77 -10
View File
@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@ package sandbox
import (
"errors"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
)
// errWindowsSandboxNotInitialized is returned only to a caller that explicitly
@@ -19,6 +20,13 @@ var errWindowsSandboxNotInitialized = errors.New(
const windowsSetupDowngradeReason = "Windows OS sandbox inactive — commands run with workspace path-confinement and " +
"per-command approval only. Run `zero sandbox setup` from an elevated (Administrator) terminal for full filesystem and network isolation."
// windowsUnelevatedDowngradeReason is surfaced when Windows runs the sandbox in
// the unelevated tier: the restricted-token write-jail is enforced (the command
// runner applies the workspace ACLs itself, which needs no Administrator
// rights), but the WFP network filters are Administrator-only and absent.
const windowsUnelevatedDowngradeReason = "Windows sandbox running unelevated — the filesystem write-jail is enforced, but network " +
"isolation still relies on per-command approval. Run `zero sandbox setup` from an elevated (Administrator) terminal for OS-level network enforcement."
// windowsSandboxInitialized reports whether the per-host Windows sandbox setup
// marker exists. A missing marker is the common fresh-install state, so the
// caller degrades rather than bricking the command. Indirected through a var so
@@ -114,9 +122,55 @@ func (manager SandboxManager) Backend() Backend {
return manager.backend
}
// isExecutable checks whether a file is executable. On Unix, this checks the
// execute permission bits. On Windows, Go's os.FileMode does not set execute
// bits, so we check for common executable extensions instead.
func isExecutable(fi os.FileInfo) bool {
if !fi.Mode().IsRegular() {
return false
}
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
name := strings.ToLower(fi.Name())
return strings.HasSuffix(name, ".exe") ||
strings.HasSuffix(name, ".com") ||
strings.HasSuffix(name, ".bat") ||
strings.HasSuffix(name, ".cmd")
}
return fi.Mode()&0o111 != 0
}
// lookupExecutable checks whether a named binary exists and is executable,
// using os.Stat instead of exec.LookPath. exec.LookPath internally uses the
// faccessat2 syscall, which is blocked by Android's seccomp filter (SIGSYS).
func lookupExecutable(name string) (string, error) {
if !strings.Contains(name, string(os.PathSeparator)) {
path := os.Getenv("PATH")
for _, dir := range strings.Split(path, string(os.PathListSeparator)) {
if dir == "" {
continue // skip empty entries (e.g. trailing colon)
}
candidate := filepath.Join(dir, name)
if fi, err := os.Stat(candidate); err == nil {
if isExecutable(fi) {
return candidate, nil
}
}
}
return "", errors.New("executable file not found in $PATH")
}
fi, err := os.Stat(name)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if isExecutable(fi) {
return name, nil
}
return "", errors.New("executable file not found")
}
func selectPlatformBackend(goos string, lookup func(string) (string, error)) Backend {
if lookup == nil {
lookup = exec.LookPath
lookup = lookupExecutable
}
switch goos {
case "linux":
@@ -174,19 +228,28 @@ func (manager SandboxManager) BuildExecutionRequest(request SandboxManagerReques
if request.ValidateExecution && preference == SandboxPreferenceRequire && backend.SupportLevel() != BackendSupportNative {
return SandboxExecutionRequest{}, nativeSandboxUnavailableError(backend)
}
// Windows: the OS sandbox needs a one-time elevated `zero sandbox setup` (it
// applies WFP network filters + workspace ACLs and writes a marker). Without
// it the command runner hard-fails — so on the default preference, DEGRADE to
// the in-process policy gate + per-command approval (matching Linux/macOS when
// their sandbox is unavailable) instead of bricking every command. A strict
// caller (--sandbox require) still gets a clear error pointing at setup.
// Windows: the FULL OS sandbox needs a one-time elevated `zero sandbox setup`
// (it applies WFP network filters + workspace ACLs and writes a marker).
// Without it, a restricted-filesystem profile can still run in the UNELEVATED
// tier: the command runner applies the workspace ACL plan itself (DACL edits
// on user-owned roots need no Administrator rights) and wraps the command in
// the write-restricted token, so the filesystem write-jail holds. Only the
// WFP network filters are Administrator-only, so network stays with the
// in-process approval gate at that tier. A profile that needs the sandbox
// solely for network isolation gains nothing from the unelevated tier and
// DEGRADES to the policy gate as before. A strict caller (--sandbox require)
// still gets a clear error pointing at setup.
windowsNeedsSetup := false
if manager.goos == "windows" && requiresPlatformSandbox && enforcementLevel == EnforcementNative && !windowsSandboxInitialized() {
if preference == SandboxPreferenceRequire {
return SandboxExecutionRequest{}, errWindowsSandboxNotInitialized
}
enforcementLevel = EnforcementDegraded
windowsNeedsSetup = true
if profile.FileSystem.Kind == FileSystemRestricted {
enforcementLevel = EnforcementUnelevated
} else {
enforcementLevel = EnforcementDegraded
}
}
targetBackend := manager.targetBackend(preference, policy, requiresPlatformSandbox)
downgradeReason := ""
@@ -196,7 +259,11 @@ func (manager SandboxManager) BuildExecutionRequest(request SandboxManagerReques
downgradeReason = windowsSetupDowngradeReason
}
}
wrapped := backend.CommandWrapping && backend.Available && enforcementLevel == EnforcementNative
if enforcementLevel == EnforcementUnelevated {
downgradeReason = windowsUnelevatedDowngradeReason
}
wrapped := backend.CommandWrapping && backend.Available &&
(enforcementLevel == EnforcementNative || enforcementLevel == EnforcementUnelevated)
markers := backend.SandboxEnvMarkers(policy)
if !wrapped && backend.Name != BackendWSL {
markers = nil
+3
View File
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ func TestPermissionProfileFromPolicyIncludesDefaultTempWriteRoots(t *testing.T)
if !writeRootsContain(profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, tmpdir) {
t.Fatalf("write roots = %#v, want temp root %q", profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, tmpdir)
}
// /tmp is a default temp write root on POSIX only (see
// defaultTempWriteRootCandidatesForGOOS); on Windows the bare path resolves
// against the current drive, so a stray C:\tmp must not turn this on.
if runtime.GOOS != "windows" && pathExists("/tmp") && !writeRootsContain(profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, "/tmp") {
t.Fatalf("write roots = %#v, want /tmp", profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots)
}
@@ -132,6 +132,125 @@ exit 0
}
}
// TestWindowsUnelevatedRealSandboxSmoke exercises the unelevated tier end to
// end WITHOUT running the elevated setup helper: the command runner applies
// the workspace ACLs itself, a write inside the workspace succeeds under the
// restricted token, and a write outside every granted root is denied. Unlike
// the elevated smoke above it needs no Administrator terminal.
func TestWindowsUnelevatedRealSandboxSmoke(t *testing.T) {
if os.Getenv("ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE") != "1" {
t.Skip("set ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE=1 to run real Windows sandbox smoke tests")
}
runnerExe := realSmokeExecutable(t, "ZERO_WINDOWS_COMMAND_RUNNER_EXE", WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName)
root := t.TempDir()
outside := t.TempDir()
sandboxHome := filepath.Join(root, ".zero-sandbox")
profile := PermissionProfile{
FileSystem: FileSystemPolicy{
Kind: FileSystemRestricted,
ReadRoots: []string{root},
WriteRoots: []WritableRoot{{Root: root, ProtectedMetadataNames: []string{".git", ".zero", ".agents"}}},
IncludePlatformRoots: true,
AllowTemp: true,
},
Network: NetworkPolicy{Mode: NetworkDeny},
}
config := WindowsSandboxCommandArgsOptions{
SandboxHome: sandboxHome,
CommandCWD: root,
WorkspaceRoots: []string{root},
PermissionProfile: profile,
SandboxLevel: WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated,
}
// cmd.exe rather than powershell.exe: managed PowerShell cannot initialize
// its crypto provider under a write-restricted token on some hosts
// (0x8009001d, the same restricted-token limitation the runner documents for
// Schannel), and the write-jail assertion only needs a native shell.
insideMarker := filepath.Join(root, "unelevated-write-ok.txt")
runWindowsRealSmokeCommand(t, runnerExe, config, []string{
"cmd.exe", "/d", "/s", "/c", "echo ok>" + insideMarker,
}, 0)
if bytes, err := os.ReadFile(insideMarker); err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(string(bytes)) != "ok" {
t.Fatalf("unelevated sandboxed write marker = %q, %v; want ok", bytes, err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerPath(sandboxHome)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected the unelevated setup marker to be recorded: %v", err)
}
outsideMarker := filepath.Join(outside, "unelevated-write-denied.txt")
runWindowsRealSmokeCommand(t, runnerExe, config, []string{
"cmd.exe", "/d", "/s", "/c", "echo leaked>" + outsideMarker,
}, 1)
if _, err := os.Stat(outsideMarker); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("unelevated sandbox allowed a write outside every granted root")
} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("stat outside marker: %v", err)
}
}
// TestWindowsRestrictedTokenNestedPipeCapture pins the fix in
// broadenWindowsRestrictedTokenDefaultDacl (windows_token_windows.go): a
// nested subprocess spawned FROM WITHIN the sandboxed process, with its
// output captured via a pipe, must succeed. Before the fix, the sandboxed
// process's own attempt to create a pipe for such a subprocess failed with
// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (Win32 error 5) — the WRITE_RESTRICTED token's extra
// access check has no restricted-SID match against a freshly created pipe's
// default security descriptor. This is exactly the pattern any tool that
// shells out internally and captures output hits (`gh` invoking `git`, for
// one; cmd.exe's own FOR /F does the identical CreatePipe+CreateProcess
// dance internally, so it reproduces the bug with no external dependency
// beyond cmd.exe itself).
func TestWindowsRestrictedTokenNestedPipeCapture(t *testing.T) {
if os.Getenv("ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE") != "1" {
t.Skip("set ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE=1 to run real Windows sandbox smoke tests")
}
runnerExe := realSmokeExecutable(t, "ZERO_WINDOWS_COMMAND_RUNNER_EXE", WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName)
root := t.TempDir()
sandboxHome := filepath.Join(root, ".zero-sandbox")
profile := PermissionProfile{
FileSystem: FileSystemPolicy{
Kind: FileSystemRestricted,
ReadRoots: []string{root},
WriteRoots: []WritableRoot{{Root: root, ProtectedMetadataNames: []string{".git", ".zero", ".agents"}}},
IncludePlatformRoots: true,
AllowTemp: true,
},
Network: NetworkPolicy{Mode: NetworkDeny},
}
config := WindowsSandboxCommandArgsOptions{
SandboxHome: sandboxHome,
CommandCWD: root,
WorkspaceRoots: []string{root},
PermissionProfile: profile,
SandboxLevel: WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated,
}
marker := filepath.Join(root, "nested-pipe-marker.txt")
script := filepath.Join(root, "nested-pipe.cmd")
// FOR /F drives cmd.exe's own internal CreatePipe+CreateProcess capture
// of the quoted command's output — the exact mechanism this fix targets.
// The full path to whoami.exe sidesteps PATH resolution inside the
// sandboxed process's minimal environment.
scriptBody := "for /F %%i in ('C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe') do echo %%i> " + marker + "\r\n"
if err := os.WriteFile(script, []byte(scriptBody), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write nested-pipe script: %v", err)
}
runWindowsRealSmokeCommand(t, runnerExe, config, []string{
"cmd.exe", "/d", "/s", "/c", script,
}, 0)
captured, err := os.ReadFile(marker)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read nested-pipe marker: %v", err)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(string(captured)) == "" {
t.Fatalf("nested-pipe marker is empty; FOR /F failed to capture the subprocess's output")
}
}
func realSmokeExecutable(t *testing.T, envKey string, fallbackName string) string {
t.Helper()
if path := os.Getenv(envKey); path != "" {
+3
View File
@@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ func TestNewScopeNormalizesAndValidatesExtraRoots(t *testing.T) {
if !stringSliceContains(roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort(extra)) {
t.Fatalf("Roots()=%v want extra root %q", roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort(extra))
}
// /tmp is a default temp write root on POSIX only (see
// defaultTempWriteRootCandidatesForGOOS); on Windows the bare path resolves
// against the current drive, so a stray C:\tmp must not turn this on.
if runtime.GOOS != "windows" && pathExists("/tmp") && !stringSliceContains(roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort("/tmp")) {
t.Fatalf("Roots()=%v want default /tmp write root", roots)
}
+10 -3
View File
@@ -143,9 +143,16 @@ const (
)
const (
EnforcementNative EnforcementLevel = "native"
EnforcementDegraded EnforcementLevel = "degraded"
EnforcementDisabled EnforcementLevel = "disabled"
EnforcementNative EnforcementLevel = "native"
// EnforcementUnelevated is the Windows-only middle tier used when the
// elevated `zero sandbox setup` has not run: commands still wrap through the
// command runner with a write-restricted token and workspace ACLs (which the
// runner can apply without Administrator rights), but the WFP network
// filters are absent, so network isolation stays with the in-process
// approval gate.
EnforcementUnelevated EnforcementLevel = "unelevated"
EnforcementDegraded EnforcementLevel = "degraded"
EnforcementDisabled EnforcementLevel = "disabled"
)
type Policy struct {
@@ -8,14 +8,21 @@ import (
)
func runWindowsSandboxCommand(config WindowsSandboxCommandConfig, stderr io.Writer) int {
if config.SandboxLevel != WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken {
switch config.SandboxLevel {
case WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken:
if err := ValidateWindowsSandboxSetupMarker(WindowsSandboxSetupConfigFromCommand(config)); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(stderr, WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName+": "+err.Error())
return 1
}
case WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated:
if err := ensureWindowsUnelevatedSetup(config); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(stderr, WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName+": "+err.Error())
return 1
}
default:
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "%s: unsupported Windows sandbox level %q\n", WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName, config.SandboxLevel)
return 1
}
if err := ValidateWindowsSandboxSetupMarker(WindowsSandboxSetupConfigFromCommand(config)); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(stderr, WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName+": "+err.Error())
return 1
}
if err := ValidateWindowsNetworkPolicy(config.PermissionProfile.Network); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(stderr, WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName+": "+err.Error())
return 1
@@ -57,3 +64,32 @@ func runWindowsSandboxCommand(config WindowsSandboxCommandConfig, stderr io.Writ
}
return exitCode
}
// ensureWindowsUnelevatedSetup applies the workspace ACL plan from the current
// (non-elevated) process so the write-restricted token has somewhere its
// capability SIDs are granted. DACL edits on user-owned workspace and temp
// roots need no Administrator rights; the WFP network filters DO, so this tier
// provisions no network enforcement — the offline-marker SID composed into the
// token stays inert until an elevated `zero sandbox setup` installs the block
// filters. Applied plans are recorded by hash so repeat commands skip the
// re-apply; like the elevated setup, grants are left in place (the rollback is
// deliberately discarded) because they only name synthetic capability SIDs
// that no other token carries.
func ensureWindowsUnelevatedSetup(config WindowsSandboxCommandConfig) error {
applied, plan, err := buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config)
if err != nil {
return err
}
marker, err := loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(config.SandboxHome)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if marker.contains(applied) {
return nil
}
if _, err := applyWindowsACLPlan(plan); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("apply unelevated workspace ACLs: %w — the workspace may be on a filesystem the current user does not own; "+
"run `zero sandbox setup` from an elevated (Administrator) terminal, or re-run with `--sandbox forbid` to skip OS sandboxing", err)
}
return recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config.SandboxHome, applied)
}
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